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CRITICISM OF JERUSALEM'S BEING MADE ISRAEL'S CAPITAL

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 14 Aug 80 p 4

[Article by M. L. Snoussi]

[Text] The Israeli Knesset's passage, Wednesday, 30 July, of the "constitutional law" to make Jerusalem "the eternal and indivisible capital of the Zionist State" is not only a challenge and an act of defiance launched at the Arabs and Moslems throughout the world, but also a breach of international law and an attack on the morale of the United Nations.

Jerusalem has always been the Holy City for all monotheistic religions. It also belongs to all believers, debarring none. It is for this reason that it was considered an international city by both the SDN [League of Nations] during the inter-war years and afterwards by the UNO [United Nations Organization].

If the Moslems and particularly the Arabs have always claimed the right to manage it, it is because for 15 centuries, by their tolerance and their respect for Judaism and Christianity, they have rightly been the sole guarantees of its protection from barbarism. In fact, throughout the 12th Century, during which the crusades laid the city waste, the latter, under Moslem control, continued to enjoy religious peace. No religious monument was destroyed or even defaced.

However, will this be so with such fanatics as Begin, the deputy Guela Cohen, the extreme right Hatehia Movement (revived), the Rabin Kahan gangs, the members of the Ghoush Emounim, and even Labor Party members, who have voted for this law? Didn't the above, despite UN resolutions, back in 1967 initiate a Jerusalem disfiguration action by so-called archeological excavations and the destruction of numerous districts, in order to wipe out forever this city's religious and historical character? Didn't they also support the attempt made in August 1967 to burn down the most prestigious Mosque: Al Aqsa?

Once again this just goes to prove that Zionism is an ideology, one and indivisible, with the same objective, namely, to establish an empire whose

capital, for the time being, would be Jerusalem and finally, Rome. The only difference between the Likoud and the Labor Party members, regardless of any other trend of opinion, is in fact merely a subtle nuance in tactics.

A strange statement of fact: Didn't the advocate of Zionism quite simply say "The day we take over Jerusalem...I would like to destroy everything that is not sacred to the Jews and I would burn down every historical monument." However, only one single voice in Israel saw in this vote a meaningless policy with very serious consequences. In fact, only the Avneri delegate, from the Shelli left, had the courage, during the discussion of this law, to state that "This is a declaration of war against the Moslem world."

Indeed, the Arabs and Moslems will lose no time in firing back a stinging reply to this new challenge, nor, this time, recoil before any obstacles or hesitate to use every means possible, for, as President Bourguiba never ceased to repeat, should the Zionists get to the top, that their overbearing pride and their stubbornness will lead to nothing save their own undoing, since the Arabs have both men and time at their disposal. And if Sadat is willing to take one slap in the face after the other from Begin, this will not be the case for all the Arabs.

On the other hand, this vote is not only a declaration of war on the Moslems, but also on the Christians. And now is the time to resort to their influence with the Pope and with Europe in this matter, for Christian monuments are also in danger.

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RETALIATION AGAINST CAMP DAVID THREATENED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 21 Jun 80 p 13

[Interview with Majid Abu Sharar, Member of Central Committee of Fatah, by Kamil Fa'ur, in Beirut; date not given]

> [Text] Majid Abu Sharar Tells AL-WATAN, "We Will Break Legs of Those Who Lean Towards Camp David; 10 Bitter Palestinian Days Revitalized Fatah; al-Shak'ah and Khalaf Are Two Symbols of the Struggle of Our People in the Country; the Soviet Union Is Our Ally and the United States Is Our Nation's Arch Enemy; Supreme Coordination Committee Between the Palestinian Revolution and Iran."

Brother Majid Abu Sharar, former secretary of the Revolutionary Council of the Fatah Movement and present member of Fatah's Central Committee thinks that the fourth conference, which was recently held by Fatah, was a significant turning point. The principal thing [in that conference] is the fact that Fatah affirmed its political program which declares that a democratic Palestinian state in Palestine is the ultimate goal, and that a national authority is an interim goal. Until these goals are achieved, the Palestinian rifle must continue to be on the ready. Camp David means the betrayal of the Palestinian question. Going on record with that position was not enough for Fatah; it decided to confront those who have been thinking about veering towards Camp David. "We will break their legs!" This is what Abu Sharar said. Accordingly, we must open the Arab fronts towards Palestine. First of all, the Jordanian front must be restored in accordance with the resolutions Fatah adopted in its conference.

Abu Sharar added, "The United States and Europe are thinking of oil first. Fatah has the match that could set off a total explosion of U.S. interests in the area." The interview that Abu Sharar had with AL-WATAN follows:

Right and Left

[Question] Can you tell us how the makeup of the new Central Committee is viewed in Fatah, and if there is any truth to accounts that there is a Right, a Left and a Center in that committee?

[Answer] The fourth general conference of the movement took place after an absence of about 9 years. During this period three general conferences were to have been convened. Hence comes the special significance of this conference. It constitutes a courageous step on the road of developing the movement and, consequently, developing the Palestinian revolution and its capabilities.

To face in 10 days what has been accumulating over a period of 9 years is difficult and complex, but it is possible. This is just what happened in our conference. We discovered the moment we convened the conference that we had a mountain of problems.

We were being called upon to deal with these problems and not to ignore, not even for one instant, an important and a major fact. That fact is that we have withstood all the conspiracies which had sought to bring an end to the revolution during the past few years. We are still carrying the gun; we are still fighting; we are still realizing for the people and for the Palestinian Revolution a new political gain or a new diplomatic gain every day. Our gains have been equal to or slightly greater than our losses. Based on the principle that the revolution is still alive, is still capable of surviving and is still capable of living and developing, we faced this mountain of our problems. The leadership of the movement faced a sweeping flood of critical remarks. People were questioned rigorously, but responsibly. The senior staff and the junior staff in the conferences proved that cruel criticism was not motivated by a desire to hurt others as much as by a desire to bring about development.

Ten Bitter Days

These were 10 long days; they were bitter and cruel, but they were truly Palestinian. It was the Palestinian will, the will of the fighter, the will of the peasant who is clinging to his land in his homeland, Palestine, the will of the farmer in the ravaged plantations of Ghaza, the will to live in Bassam al-Shak'ah, in Karim Khalaf, the will of Kamal 'Adwan and Kamal Nasir--it was this will that prevailed throughout the 10 Palestinian days which we experienced during the Fatah Conference. We interwove our pain and our suffering with our ambitions, and we came out with bylaws that are based on respect for democratic life within the movement, on centralized democracy and on setting up the organization as the backbone for domestic life. We also established our political program which rejected the [principle of] settlement because the Fatah Palestinian will at the conference considered a settlement at this stage to be in line with the Camp David course all the way. We also defined our strategic goal, and we did not run away from writing down our interim goal--I mean the interim programs of the PLO which do not conflict with our strategic alliance with the Soviet Union. We confirmed the fact that the United States is the country that heads the list of enemies of our nation and our people. We confirmed the nature of the relationship with the masses, and

we considered it to be the foundation. [We established] that relationships with regimes must serve relationships with the masses and not vice versa. We confirmed our view towards Jordan which must be restored as the most important political, military and media base for the Palestinian Revolution.

This is what was achieved in our conference. At the end of the conference a new central committee was elected, and it was charged with putting the bylaws into practice, protecting the course and unity of the movement and translating the political program into obvious and distinct political practice. The Central Committee is an expression of the will of Fatah's infrastructure, which is basically a national liberation movement. All ideas in that movement coexist on a common ground of commitment to principles, goals, methods and the political program. From now on this will be the standard. It is on this basis that people will be called to account and evaluations made. But as far as talking about a Right and a Left in the movement, these are ambiguous expressions that have various political implications. It is true that within any national liberation movement there is a trend that is always striving for the development of the liberation movement and for pushing it towards democratic life and towards progress on the road to victory; [and it is also true] that there is always a trend that fears democracy and fears pushing the movement towards progress. But in the end we find that the logic of life and the product of daily victories do push a movement forward, and this is exactly what happened in our recent conference. It is a fundamental [requirement] that we be patriotic and democratic, and that we consider our national question to be a fundamental question and that we consider democratic life to be [the ingredient] which protects the revolution and the continuation of the struggle that is continuously pushing the revolution into positions that are more progressive and leading to achieving the goals of the revolution.

The Mandatory Powers of the Revolutionary Council

[Question] In your capacity as a former member of Fatah's Revolutionary Council and as secretary of that council, will you define for us that council's mandatory powers?

[Answer] We now have a revolutionary council that is fundamentally different from the former council. The representative power of the new council is greater than that of the previous council. The number of members in the new council rose to about 75, whereas in the past there were about 43 members. Among the members of the new council are 40 members who are elected by secret ballot from the general assembly; 15 members, who are members of the Central Committee; and 20 members who are elected members of the Revolutionary Council. Our bylaws stipulated that in the absence of the general assembly, the Revolutionary Council was to be considered the highest authority to monitor, to audit, to make decisions and to form monitoring and follow-up committees. This means that we now have a higher authority that can reckon with the daily leadership, that is, the Central Committee, on a permanent basis. This is a significant achievement that we were able to realize in our fourth conference.

[Question] How is the decision made to convene the Revolutionary Council?

[Answer] There is a special internal rule that determines the council's meetings and the method of conducting business in the council. This is an internal, secret rule.

The Barrel of Oil and the Match

[Question] Some Zionist officials are attributing the upheaval in occupied Arab territory to three factors: first, the presence of the PLO in Lebanon; second, the new European position on the Palestinian question; and third, the U.S. position of having a partial understanding of this question. My question is this: how do you evaluate the European and American positions in their current and probable forms?

[Answer] The principal reason for the uprising in our occupied homeland is the presence of the occupation. Wherever there is occupation, there is must be resistance. This is what is happening concerning our Palestinian people who are well-versed in struggle and who have a long history of fighting British colonialism and the Zionist colonialism that ensued. Our people will continue to struggle until we ralize the creation of our Palestinian, democratic state. Our Palestinian, democratic state will not only bring to an end the problem of Palestinian banishment and homelessness, it will also end the pain of the Jew who is torn between his loyalty to the land of his birth where he had lived and his loyalty to the Zionist movement which treats him as though he were a commodity to be used for establishing a base on Palestinian territory to protect the interests of imperialism. Regarding how we evaluate the Arab posture vis-a-vis Europe and the United States, [let me say this]: the United States and Europe look upon the Middle East area through their own interests in the area, and especially their oil interests. The view which the United States and Europe have of Israel is governed by the fact that the Zionist entity constitutes an advanced base for the protection of imperialist interests in the area. As long as these interests are secure and safe and as long as the Zionist entity is capable of protecting these interests, we must not wait, not for one instant, for any change in U.S. and European policy vis-a-vis the Palestinian question and the problem of the Middle East. Those who believe otherwise are the servants and the clients of imperialism. Accordingly, we can also understand the reason for this unending attack on the Palestinian Revolution ever since its birth. The revolution is fighting over an ocean of oil which is being plundered by imperialism with the direct protection of Israel. In the final analysis, the Palestinian Revolution will either be slaughtered and defeated at the gates of the oil wells or it will create the circumstances that will enable the Arab nation to liberate its oil, defeat imperialism and do away with the justification for the survival and the existence of Israel as a guardian of imperialist interests in the area.

This explains why we are always being subjected to unlimited pressures from Arab reactionaries who give us crumbs with one hand and hold a gun to

our hearts with the other hand. It is Arab reactionaries who have been bent on taming the revolution and turning it from a power that threatens imperialism and its interests into a tame revolution that constitutes no threat to imperialism and its interests. This is the essence of the struggle in the area where reactionaries followed by imperialism and by Israel have failed. They will also fail in the future [in their efforts] to tame the revolution and to bridle the capabilities of its surge to the farthest limits.

U.S. policy and European policy then are interested in the barrel of oil and the match. As long as the barrel of oil is flowing peacefully to the United States and to Europe, this nation will remain deprived of its will; its resources will be plundered; and it will remain shackled in backwardness, oppression and ignorance. Accordingly, Israel will remain strong and contentious. However, whenever the match is brought close to the opening of the oil barrel, the matter will certainly be different. This is a question that may not be discussed in detail.

Those who are counting on the development of U.S. and European policy in the context of current circumstances are simply steering themselves towards Camp David with either good or bad intentions. We will not [join Camp David]! The political program of the Fatah Movement demands that we break the legs of those who steer themselves towards Camp David. [This is our right] just as it is our right to breathe. The political program of the Fatah Movement has established models for proper and clear solutions for confronting all the treachery that is contained in the policy of the United States and Europe. The only thing we have to do is turn these models into practical plans to protect our revolution and guarantee its survival.

Defiance and Resistance

[Question] Has the time come for the Defiance, Resistance and Opposition Front to assume an official Arab critical posture on Camp David? How do you view this problem and are there alternatives which you are pointing out?

[Answer] The Defiance and Resistance Front still constitutes the better framework, but not the ideal one for confronting Camp David. This is because it is still a weak and a tenuous framework. We, the Palestinians, must strive before others to develop this framework so we can propose alternative plans to Camp David on a foundation of inevitable change in the Arab political map. Without this political change, which we should not discuss now in detail, we will remain prisoners of our impotence to confront the Camp David process. We must finally get out of the cycle of reaction and enter into that of taking action. I believe that our fourth conference has taken us out of the cycle of reaction and into that of taking action.

Al-Shak'ah Is a Symbol of Struggle

[Question] The official media in Jordan provided impressive coverage to Brother Bassam al-Shak'ah. What does this mean to you from your perspective

on the uprising inside the country and on the political consequences in general of that uprising?

[Answer] It is natural for the Jordanian official media to provide strong coverage to Bassam al-Shak'ah who today represents one of the most prominent symbols of struggle, not only in the struggle of our Palestinian People, but also in the struggle of nations in the world that aspire to independence and liberation. Didn't Bassam al-Shak'ah say, "When they blew up my legs, they wanted to keep me away from the land, but I suddenly became closer to the land without my legs?" Why did they [try to] blow up Bassam al-Shak'ah? They [tried to] blow up Bassam al-Shak'ah because he is a Palestinian Arab who has been struggling daily against the occupation and under the slogan that the PLO is the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. They [tried to] blow up Bassam al-Shak'ah and Karim Khalaf because they are two Palestinian symbols fighting for national Palestinian independence against Zionist occupation, the Arab mandate and all attempts to obliterate the Palestinian national personality. Bassam al-Shak'ah has struggled for over 20 years just as every Palestinian fighter who lived in the West Bank has. When the Zionist occupation came, he continued to resist for 13 years so as to achieve Palestinian national independence. I understand, just as Bassam al-Shak'ah, Karim Khalaf and every Palestinian fighter and warrior do, the meaning of resisting occupation and the meaning of Palestinian national independence.

Lebanese National Conciliation

[Question] We would like to shift to the Lebanese scene. There is now the question of the resignation of the government of Dr Salim al-Huss and the formation of a new government. Do you think it is necessary to form a national coalition government that would incorporate the basic political influential factors on the Lebanese scene?

[Answer] It is known that we are pursuing a clear policy vis-a-vis the Lebanese scene. This policy is based on the foundation of a tireless and a sincere effort to create conditions that would bring about the security, the unity, the safety and the Arab character of Lebanon. We are [also] reserving our right to take action on the Lebanese scene in accordance with the agreements that we have with the Lebanese government. We also affirm the fact that we refuse to give up any one of those rights or to accept settlement not only in Lebanon, but also anywhere else outside Palestine. The problem of forming a government is purely a Lebanese matter wherein we are governed by the view of our strategic ally in Lebanon. I am referring to the Lebanese National, Progressive and Pan-Arab Movement which has already presented its view of national conciliation. We had supported this view at the time. President Sarkis had also presented his view of the conciliation, and we had supported it then. Any loyal, patriotic Palestinian will have to promote this conciliation so that Lebanon can regain its vigor and its health.

In the Same Foxhole

[Question] The second matter that is being raised quite passionately now on the scene is that of the future of relations between the PLO and the Lebanese National Movement in its new structure. Another problem is that of the future of relations with the Amal Organization. How do you view all this?

[Answer] We consider the opinion expressed by the National Movement in any form it sees fit to organize its matters and its affairs inside the Lebanese arena to be a matter that we support, encourage and try to make successful. We are in the same foxhole with the National Movement, and we will continue to be. With regard to the future of relations with the Amal Movement, [it is our opinion] that Amal has no alternative but to become an inseparable part of the National Movement. It would accordingly be represented in the Central Political Council of the National and Progressive Movement. We will try to achieve this goal because the fact that Amal is still outside this framework is creating problems that we do not need. Our national arena must definitely not be subjected to disorder or to weakness; we must rather always strive to strengthen and fortify it.

With Syria With No Reservations

[Question] Is It true that the Syrian authorities have arrested Palestinians who are accused of assisting the Moslem Brotherhood? By the way, what is your position with regard to the activities of the Moslem Brotherhood in Syria?

[Answer] I do not know of any Palestinians who were arrested for helping the Moslem Brothers in Syria. This is a question that should basically be addressed to our brothers in Syria. But regarding my position on the activities of the Moslem Brotherhood in Syria, [let me say that] on the basis of the fact that what is happening in Syria is an internal matter that interests our brothers in Syria only, we consider any action taken against Syria at this time when Syria is opposing Camp David and proclaiming a clear position rejecting Camp David and any other settlement based on the Camp David Accords [to be objectionable], whether it be taken by the Moslem Brothers or by others. The purpose of this position is to weaken the Syrian national position and to push Syria in the direction of submitting to the conditions of Camp David. We support without reservations a Syria which is opposed to Camp David. We support without reservations a Syria which is opposed to the United States and to the conspiracies of reactionaries. Our stance stems from a Palestinian, fighting, nationalist position. We must work to develop this Syrian position and to push Syria towards taking positions that are more serious and more stern against Camp David, against the United States and against reactionaries. Syria's defiance of Camp David has had positive effects on the Palestinian scene and is hardening the Palestinian national position. The fact that Syria is subject to extortion by the United Staes and by Israel does also leave negative ideas on the Palestinian

scene. Hence we are advocating the development of cooperation and coordination between the Syrians, the Palestinians and the Lebanese National and Progressive Movement so that a strong front can be created to defy Camp David and the United States.

A coordination Committee with Iran

[Question] The question that remains to be asked is whether or not you have noticed any coolness in Palestinian-Iranian relations. How strong are these relations and what is their future?

[Answer] Palestinian-Iranian relations are controlled by absolute hostility to U.S. imperialism and to Zionism. We were in agreement with the Iranian Revolution before its success over the slogan of hostility to imperialism and over the slogan of liberating Palestine. Accordingly, Palestinian-Iranian relations are strategic relations which neither party can renounce or escape. Iranians are committed to their hostility to imperialism and to liberating Palestine; and the Palestinians are committed to their hostility to imperialism and to liberating Palestine. Interventions have taken place here and there and especially in the gulf to undermine this relationship or to portray it as a cool relationship. Let me affirm here that we did discuss this point at great length in our fourth conference, and we did establish that the Iranian Revolution was a strategic ally of the Palestinian Revolution and the Palestinian people.

We cannot get the better of any tactical alliance here and there. This alliance is rather a strategic one. The future of Palestinian-Iranian relations is one that must experience more cooperation and coordination in the context of practical steps. In our conference we advocated that these steps be taken and confirmed. Tjere can be no doubt that the nature of the struggle in the area and the nature of the dangers that are facing force expedition in taking such steps. Among these steps is the establishment of a supreme coordination committee between the Palestinian Revolution and the Iranian Revolution.

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TUNISIAN-SAUDI ARABIAN CULTURAL COOPERATION

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 8 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Yesterday afternoon, Mr Fouad Mebazaa, minister of information and cultural affairs, welcomed Dr Amri Ibn Bakir, rector of the Faculty of Economy and Administration at the King "Abdelaziz" University in Jeddah. The conversation dealt with the means to be brought into play in order to strengthen the cooperation between the two countries in matters of culture and information as also in the assistance which Saudi Arabia can lend to Tunisia in its effort to recover its visible Islamic traces.

On this occasion, Mr Ibn Bakir gave the minister a general idea of the book which he is writing and which has some bearing on President Habib Bourguiba's politics.

Present at this interview were Messrs Robeh Dkhill, the minister's principal private secretary, and Kacem Bousnina, Tunisian Ambassador at Jeddah.

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BRIEFS

ARAB-ISLAMIC MEETING--Habib Chatty, secretary general of the Islamic Congress Organization, and the Islamic delegations accompanying him will be involved in intensive activity and important meetings beginning next week in Tunis. We note in particular the talks that will take place between the Islamic Congress Organization and the League of Arab States beginning this Tuesday, 19 August, for the purpose of establishing concerted cooperation based on clear principles making it possible to give both organizations new stimulus and to stand up effectively against every kind of challenge. We recall that during a recent visit to Tunisia, the secretary general of the Islamic Congress Organization was received by President Bourguiba and the prime minister, both of whom expressed satisfaction at this action aimed at strengthening Arab-Islamic solidarity. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Aug 80 p 1] 11798

CSO: 4400

ISLAMIC WORLD LEAGUE CONTRIBUTES FUNDS FOR WEST BANK MOSQUES

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 14 Jul 80 p 3

[Article: "Arrangements Discussed for Holding Third Conference of Ministers of Religious Trusts in Amman; Half Million Riyals From Islamic World League To Support West Bank Mosques"]

[Text] Amman--Mr Kamal al-Sharif, minister of religious affairs and holy places, who is a member of the constituent assembly of the Islamic World League, discussed preparations for the third conference of religious trusts and Islamic affairs ministers in his meeting with Muhammad Safwat al-Saqqa Amini, assistant secretary general of the Islamic World League. The conference is to be held in Amman early next year.

Mr al-Sharif reveiwed preparations made by the ministry of religious trusts for this conference, as Jordan will be the host nation for this conference.

He also presented some suggestions pertaining to coordination between his ministry and the office of the secretary general of the conference of religious trusts ministers. There was agreement in viewpoints on the basic problems discussed. Those who attended the meeting agreed upon the necessity of making arrangements to convene the followup committee (created by the conference) in Mecca during the coming pilgrimage season.

Those who attended the meeting listened with interest to the detailed statement delivered by Prof Hassan Fatin Tahbub about current conditions in occupied Palestine, especially Jerusalem, and the encroachment upon Islamic holy places by the brutal Zionist enemy. The statement dealt with the prevailing situation among Muslim citizens, who are being subjected to various types of injustice, intimidation and pressure designed to drive them out and weaken them, in preparation for making the entire territory Jewish. It also reviewed repair and support requirements for the mosques and Islamic institutions on the West Bank, and the region's need for missionaries and spiritual advisers to stimulate and spread the call to Islam.

The Islamic World League delegation was favorably disposed toward fulfillment of these requirements, and requested a detailed report concerning these needs. Consequently it will be possible to study them and make effective

decisions about them in accordance with the League's capabilities. Muhammad Safwat al-Saqqa Amini presented a check for a half million Saudi riyals to Kamal al-Sharif as an initial installment to benefit the mosques on the West Bank. Later on, the ministry is to provide the office of the league's secretary general with reports on this sum, and a list of the mosques which have benefitted from this donation.

At the end of the session those who attended the meeting agreed on the necessity of continued coordination. They also agreed to meet whenever necessary.

9605
CSO: 4802

SEVERAL PORTFOLIOS BROUGHT UNDER KARMAL'S DIRECT CONTROL

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 22 Jul 80 pp 3, 6

[Article: "Russians Decide to Help Babrak Karmal, Khalq; Several Ministries Brought Under Karmal's Control; Rivals in Cabinet Lose Power"]

[Text] Kabul, 21 July--In order to strengthen Babrak Karmal's position, the administrative structure is being overhauled. Radio Kabul announced establishment of a presidential department to oversee all ministries. The office of the prime minister and some important departments in the ministry of the interior come under this new department. This means that Karmal's position has been made very strong. Strangely enough, only a short time ago there were rumors of his illness and even death.

The BBC reports from Delhi that the government has decreased the authority of Mohammad Gulabzoi, minister of the interior and chief rival of Karmal. In addition to this, a special department is being set up to coordinate all Islamic affairs. This step is meant to give a pro-Islamic facade to the government. All this indicates that the Soviets have decided to support Babrak Karmal and the Khalq party. The government is also helping people going on pilgrimage to Mecca. The deputy prime minister, Asadullah Sarwari, left to visit Moscow last month. According to some Western reporters, Karmal had insisted on Sarwari's leaving the country. It should be remembered that Sarwari was regarded as one of Karmal's rivals.

7997
CSO: 4203

MUJAHIDIN KILL MINISTER OF EDUCATION, TWO DEPUTY MINISTERS

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 24 Jul 80 pp 1, 6

[Article: "Mujahidin Shoot Three Ministers of Karmal Government; Several Ministers Disappear Mysteriously; Turmoil in the Capital; Twelve People Sentenced, Two to Death, for Demonstrating Against Russians"]

[Text] Tehran, 23 July--The Mujahidin killed Dr Anahita Ratebzad, the minister of education; Wali Safeer, deputy minister of education; and the deputy minister of the interior; in Kabul.

According to AFP, an Indian technical adviser arriving in Delhi said that the deputy minister of the interior was shot as he was sitting in his car in a business district. A passing taxi showered bullets on the car of the deputy minister whose name is not known. Another tourist arriving in Delhi from Kabul said that the minister of education, Anahita Ratebzad, was also killed. This source did not reveal the conditions under which this lady minister met her death.

Quoting Radio Kabul, the BBC reports that the deputy minister of education, Mohammed Wali Safeer, has been buried. The radio did not reveal the details of the deputy minister's death. However, according to other sources, he was killed by the Mujahidin near Kabul. Government sources in Kabul did not verify these reports.

According to other reports, several ministers in Karmal's cabinet have disappeared mysteriously.

The ASSOCIATED PRESS says that according to reliable sources, a so-called revolutionary court in Kabul has sentenced 12 people for violent demonstrations against the Russian soldiers. Two of these were sentenced to death.

Military sources in the U.S. say that most of the weapons in the hands of the Mujahidin were provided by deserters from Karmal's army. These bring weapons and ammunition with them. In addition, the Mujahidin get weapons in their surprise attacks on the government army.

7997
CSO: 4203

MANY KILLED IN CLASHES BETWEEN KHALQ AND PARCHAM FACTIONS

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 26 Jul 80 pp 1, 6

[Article: "23 Soldiers Killed in Bloody Clash Between Khalq and Parcham Factions in Afghan Army; Khalq Soldiers Refuse to Recognize Parcham Commander in Ghazni; Both Factions Fighting Hard in Kabul; Many Government Officials and Senior Officers Arrested or Killed"]

[Text] Kabul, 25 July (APP/PPI)--Khalq and Parcham factions in the Afghan army have started to clash with each other. A few days ago, 23 soldiers were killed in two skirmishes. Many more soldiers were seriously wounded. In Ghazni, Khalq soldiers in the government army refused to recognize a commander belonging to the Parcham faction. Many government officials and senior officers around the country have been arrested. It is reported that many of these have been killed, and that tension in Kabul is coming to a head. Armed men are stationed all over the city.

In Lowgar Province, a large number of Afghan Mujahidin have been fighting the Russians and the Afghan army. In the meantime, the rift between the ruling party's Khalq and Parcham factions has spread to the army resulting in big clashes among Afghan soldiers. Twenty three Afghan soldiers have been killed in these clashes. Russian MIG jets and helicopters are flying over Lowgar Province and Ghazni in addition to Kabul. News about fierce battles between the Mujahidin and the government forces at (Kanjak), 40 miles from Kabul has been received. It is rumored in Kabul that many government officials have been killed. Members of the Khalq and Parcham faction are attacking each other at night. A traveler arriving in New Delhi from Kabul reports that many high ranking officers and officials have been arrested there, while other Afghan officers have been either killed or wounded by the Mujahidin in many clashes.

According to a report, Kabul radio announced the names of persons sentenced to death. All of these are senior officers connected with the Khalq faction. They are being kept in Pul Charkhi jail. Mohammed Katawazi, minister of information in the cabinet of deposed president Hafizullah Amin, is among those arrested. Kabul radio also announced that President Babrak Karmal will review the sentences passed on these people. According to

reports from Kabul, the purpose of this radio announcement was to further disrupt the Khalq faction.

Among important changes made by the government was the appointment of a Parcham commander in place of a Khalq commander of an army garrison in Ghazni. The officers of this garrison refused to cooperate with the new commander, since they are members of the Khalq faction. The new commander had to be recalled. According to other information from Kabul, Russian soldiers have been stationed outside the garrison to thwart attempts by Afghan soldiers to join the Mujahidin. Also, students who had staged a boycott, but returned for examinations held from 15 to 19 July, have been arrested. Information has also been received about (cancellation?) of the scholarships of 42 female students.

Tourists arriving from Kabul say that due to the heavy military traffic in Kabul, civilians have a hard time going out. One tourist reports Babrak Karmal's first public appearance in a long time.

According to the Voice of America, the number of soldiers guarding important buildings in Kabul has been doubled.

Last week, there was a marked increase in the number of helicopters and fighter planes circling over Kabul. The puppet government headed by Karmal was worried about the Mujahidin staging an attack on Kabul to coincide with the opening ceremonies of the Olympics [in Moscow].

It is reported that the Russians are using a new kind of armored vehicle in Afghanistan. These vehicles are like tanks up front, while the rear part is used for transporting soldiers.

AFP reports that according to Delhi sources, the Mujahidin have asked Afghan businessmen to close their shops on 27 and 28 July in protest against the Russian occupation. The news agency says that according to some tourists, the situation in Kabul is very serious now.

The Associated Press reports that the Parcham and Khalq factions of the ruling party are drifting apart. Their rift has had its impact on Afghan soldiers. Twenty three Afghan soldiers have been killed in two clashes resulting from this rift. One of these clashes took place in Kabul's Karga military depot. This clash resulted in the death of 13 soldiers. Another 25 soldiers were wounded. The second clash took place on 24 July at the Pul Charakhi military camp. Eight soldiers belonging to the Parcham faction [and two to Khalq] were killed and many more were wounded. The Russian army had to interfere to stop these clashes. In order to do that, two Russian tanks and armored vehicles were stationed at the site of the clashes.

According to the latest news, Afghanistan's deputy minister of education, Mohammed Yusuf, who was killed by the Mujahidin on 21 July, was buried in

the government cemetary in Kabul. According to some diplomatic sources in Delhi, a large number of doctors, lawyers, and teachers have left Afghanistan along with their families. According to this source, these people are paying a steep price for their passports. They are leaving Afghanistan for fear of strict measures by the government against them, because they have not whole-heartedly supported the Karmal government.

7997
CSO: 4203

FORMER AFGHAN KING URGES DIPLOMACY TO SOLVE AFGHAN CRISIS

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 2 Aug 80 pp 1, 6

[Article: "Many Tribes Have Written to Me; Soviets Requested Me to Take Over After Being Disappointed With Hafizullah Amin; Diplomacy, Not War, Needed to Solve Afghan Crisis; Interview With the Former Afghan King"]

[Text] London, 1 August--The former ruler of Afghanistan, Shah Zahir Shah, would consider returning to his lost throne, but is not ready to take any action against Russia. He hopes that the Western powers will force the Russians out of Afghanistan. Then, by "universal demand," he would be invited to retake the throne of Afghanistan.

According to the French news agency GAMMA, the deposed ruler is still following his old practice of keeping both Russia and America happy. He says he was asked by the Soviets to take over Afghanistan in September 1979, when the Soviets were disillusioned with Hafizullah Amin. The former king refused on the grounds that he would be treated in the same way as Noor Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin.

Shah Zahir Shah, who is living in Rome, said in an interview with the French reporter Olivier Farran that a large number of Afghan people want him to return to power and that he has received many requests saying: "Those of us who are fighting for freedom believe that you are the only leader who can unite the Afghan nation under the one flag of Islam. Therefore, please rise and help us fight the anti-Islamic forces." According to Zahir Shah, these petitions are being sent by the chiefs of different tribes.

Zahir Shah said that he believes that the problem of Afghanistan cannot be solved by war; it needs diplomatic effort. He disclosed that China had promised to provide arms to the Mujahidin, but did not fulfill its promise. He wants the Western powers to force Russia out of Afghanistan. Answering a question about the reinstatement of monarchy in Afghanistan, he said that the situation has changed so much. Unarmed Afgan youths are fighting Russian tanks and dying bravely. The deposed ruler said that he did not want to discuss his return or becoming a king again, since it

might cause more bloodshed, and he did not want the brave youth of Afghanistan to shed even one additional drop of blood.

Zahir Shah became king of Afghanistan on 18 April 1933 when his father, Gen Nadir Khan, was murdered. He was only 19 years old then, and for the next 20 years he followed the policy of not accepting any help from outside, to avoid his country becoming an arena for international conflict. However, when he appointed his brother-in-law Mohammad Daud Khan as prime minister in 1953, this policy was changed. Daud Khan was also minister of defense and internal affairs. Thus, all power was transferred to him, and he asked both Russia and America for financial and military help. The U.S. refused to give military aid, and this paved the way for the Russian intrusion into Afghanistan in 1955.

This started the flow of Russian military, technical, and financial aid. At this point, the U.S. also offered help, and, since then, Afghanistan became divided into two spheres of influence. Russian aid dominated the northern part, and the southern part was under the influence of the U.S. When the Afghan people objected to all of this, Zahir Shah fired Daud Shah as prime minister. Zahir Shah continued improving relations with the U.S., and, to pacify the people, took some steps to establish a democratic system. One [concession] was that no person related to the royal family could become a minister. However, all these steps could not satisfy the popular demands. Daud Khan took advantage of the resulting period of uncertainty, and, while Zahir Shah was in Italy, took control of Afghanistan on 17 July 1973. Zahir Shah has been living as an exile in Italy since then.

7997
CSO: 4203

HIZB-E ISLAMI REPORTS HEAVY CASUALTIES ON RUSSIANS, KABUL GOVERNMENT

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 Sep 80 p 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Aug. 31: The Mujahideen of Hizbe Islami attacked Jalalabad Air Base recently and shot down three helicopters, destroyed five tanks and killed 85 Russian soldiers says a Press release of Hizbe Islami, Afghanistan.

Heavy fighting was also reported between the Muslim fighters and invading Russian forces in Pusaraka area in Jalalabad. In this fighting, several Afghan tanks were reported to have been destroyed and 60 Russians were killed. Report from Laghman province says that Mujahideen also attacked a garrison in that area and after a few hours of heavy fighting, seven tanks were destroyed and three Russian soldiers were killed. Three Russian trucks, full of weapons and ammunition were also seized by Mujahideen while three other trucks were destroyed. A Russian convoy was also attacked by Mujahideen in Surkhakan area.

Reports from Kunnar province say that Mujahideen attacked Russian forces in Sratak area of Asmar district, about 30 km to the east of Chagha Sarai, centre of Kunnar. In this clash, which lasted for three days, 35-Afghan soldiers were killed. Sizeable weapons and ammunition was also captured by Mujahideen. The road between Chahga Sarai and Bacikoot was blocked by the Mujahideen. As the Russian forces tried to pass the blocked road, they were attacked violently by the faithful Mujahideen as a result, some Russians were killed.

According to the Press release, fighting is continuing in the suburbs of Kabul. Recently Shah Rahman, a government spy alongwith two other Parchamis was killed by the Mujahideen in Bagrami district, 20 km to the east of Kabul.

On Aug. 21, the house of Gen. Mohammad Hussain, the father of Babrak Karmel, was burnt by brave Mujahideen in Shiwaki district and at the same time, the Shiwak High School for Girls which was the centre of Communists was also destroyed. On Aug. 22, Ghulam Hazrat son of Sikander, the Deputy Minister of Public Affairs, was attacked and wounded seriously.

The Russian tanks and armoured cars attacked the Mujahideen killing the field Commander of Mujahideen. His body was taken away by Mujahideen. Seven children and women were killed while five other were wounded seriously during the raid.

JAIL ATTACKED: Meanwhile, Islamic Alliance for Liberation of Afghanistan has issued the following Press release. According to a report from Kunduz, Mujahideen attacked on Kunduz Central Jail and released a number of prisoners including Mujahideen in this attack, the third on the same jail. One tank was destroyed. In Kunduz City, Mujahideen killed 12 Parchamis and captured some weapons and destroyed one armoured vehicle. The office is located near Spoen Zar Hotel, which is the headquarters of Parchamis in Kunduz. This section of the city is virtually in the hands of Mujahideen who can walk with their weapons freely even during the day time.

KABUL CLAIM: Afghanistan Government radio on Saturday said 500 insurgents were killed and 200 captured in battles with armed forces in the remote north-western province of Faryab.

"Our people have achieved success against counter-revolutionaries", claimed a broadcast monitored in India.

The broadcast quoted the official Bakhtar News Agency as saying that 500 guerillas were "destroyed" in Maymana, Faryab's main city 470 kilometres north-west of Kabul. About 500 rifles were seized from the guerillas, it said.—PPI/APA

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

'FRONTIER GANDHI' SUPPORTS AGGRESSION--Islamabad, 22 July--Justifying the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who is known as "Frontier Ghandi," said that had the Russians been 3 days late in their action, America, with the cooperation of Pakistan, would have taken over Afghanistan. Addressing newsmen in Poona, "Frontier Gandhi," who is known for his opposition to the establishment of Pakistan, said that he agrees with the position India has taken regarding the Afghanistan issue. He said that he views this situation the same way Indira Gandhi does. The Russian invasion, according to him, came because America and Pakistan were going to attack Afghanistan within 3 days. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 23 Jul 80 p 1]

ANTI-KARMAL ATHLETES EXECUTED--Moscow, 1 August (APP, UPI)--500 Afghan residents are being tortured in Russian jails. These Afghans had requested immigration to Western countries. Meanwhile, four of the athletes who had refused to return to Afghanistan from Moscow, and had asked Western countries for political asylum have been sent to Kabul and executed. One source said that many Afghans are in Russian jails where the KGB is torturing them. This source said that a spokesman of the Afghan Olympic team confirmed that many members of the team wanted to emigrate to Western countries. The spokesman further said that the whole Afghan team is kept under guard round the clock, and its members are not allowed to contact anyone. This source also reported that many Afghan citizens who were in Moscow before the Russian aggression are being arrested to avoid their fleeing to America and other countries. This source also admitted that he tried to get a visa for himself to emigrate to Germany or the U.S., but failed in his attempt, and was later questioned by the KGB twice. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 2 Aug 80 pp 1, 6] 7997

CSO: 4203

QASHQA'I TRIBESMEN SET FOR REVOLT

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 19 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] A senior revolutionary guardsman has warned of an impending tribal revolt in the south of Iran along the Persian Gulf.

Dr. Mashallah Aein, head of the Revolutionary Guardsmen at Firuzabad, the center of the Qashqaie tribe stronghold in Fars province, said yesterday that the former minister of defense and governor-general of the oil rich province of Khuzestan, Ahmad Madani was busy mobilizing the southern tribes with the help of the U.S.

"These tribes have been receiving heavy armaments through the southern ports along the Persian Gulf for quite a long time," he said.

A Majlis deputy warned last week that the U.S. was sending large amounts of arms and ammunition to the tribesmen in the south of Iran.

Madani, has been called on to appear before an Armed Forces Revolutionary Court next week. He quit his seat in the Majlis two weeks ago on the pretext that the Majlis was not representative of the people.

According to the senior Revolutionary Guardsman, Madani was said to be playing an important role in the conspiracy.

Asked what was being done to foil the conspiracy, the Guardsman said: "We have drawn up certain plans which I cannot reveal at present. But no matter what we do, we would definitely mobilize the local tribesmen."

He said there was a war of nerves going on in the area and tribal leaders were creating an atmosphere of repression in order to frighten the local inhabitants.

The senior tribesman further backed up his warning by referring to the early seasonal migration of Qashqaie tribesmen saying large amounts of arms and ammunition were being moved to the mountainous areas in Fars province.

He said local tribal chieftains had already lodged themselves around the mountainous areas near Basij, west of firuzabad, and some 180 of their guards has secured vital routes in the area preventing all movement.

CSO: 4920

TEACHERS MUST HAVE 'RIGHT' POLITICAL VIEWS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 21 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] TEHRAN – Probing of one's beliefs is not becoming of a revolutionary society and is utterly inconsistent with freedom of thought as lived and expressed in Islam, a law graduate seeking admission as teacher has said in a letter to presidential adviser Mousavi Garmaroudi.

A copy of the letter sent to the Persian daily 'Enqelab-e Eslami' and published yesterday claimed that a questionnaire which the law graduate applicant for the teaching post was called upon to answer by the Ministry of Education, made it obligatory on him to reveal his personal private political convictions.

It alleged that the procedure was unfair and pointed to partiality and prejudice in the selection of teachers. It is very clear that the selections were being made not on the merits of the applicants qualifications to be a teacher but on the basis of his political beliefs.

The student revealed in the letter that among the questions were those such as : "what are your views on Dr. Beheshti?" And again : "Name a few of Iran's political parties, and what are your views on them?"

Many of the questions had no relevance to the fitness of applicants for the teaching post. All that is required in an application of this nature were the qualifications and bio-data of the student, his previous records and fitness to be a teacher, the letter said.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

NEW MILITARY UNIFORMS, RANKS--Color of the military personnel's uniforms is to be changed into dark green and their ensigns into numbers according to their ranks, it was announced yesterday. Military personnel have already received questionnaires on their preferences. Apart from the new color and ensigns, Army personnel's uniforms will feature two swords and a flower on one of their colors while the number of signifying their ranks will be carried on the other color. A general will wear the number 22, while a seargent will wear a number one. [as published] [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 24 Aug 80 p 1]

CSO: 4920

KURDISH REFUGEES RECOUNT PERSIAN ATROCITIES

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 3 Jun 80 p 8

[Article: "The Appeal to the Conscience of Mankind From the Iranian Kurdish Villages Is so Loud as To Deafen the Ears"]

> [Text] "Key to Paradise" is one of Khomeyni's religious rulings which justifies killing any opponent of his regime, especially the Kurds.
>
> A family mourns four of its children and flees with three others out of fear.
>
> A total of 1,571 Kurdish Iranian families have sought asylum in Iraq.

Do not kill, Allah orders us, save rightfully. This is what the true religion of Islam says. Its opinion is as clear as the light of day. There is no double-talk in its words. Its rules are definite. Where do the new Iranian leaders stand with regard to the opinions and precepts of Islam? They declared to the world at large that they adhere to the precepts of Islam and act according to the Sharia and the Koran!! But take a look at these international news agency reports published in more than one Arab or foreign newspaper:

--So-called revolutionary guards enter a Kurdish village, kill the men and loot the homes.

--The Kurds accuse Khomeyni and his government of using American-made Phantom planes to drop napalm bombs on peaceful villages. More than 80 youths are executed in one Kurdish village.

--Photographs of world news agencies show scenes of execution of a number of Kurds tied to the windows of their homes, in the presence of their mothers, fathers, wives and children. Other pictures show Kurdish children being wrapped in shrouds after they were killed by the bullets and bombs of Iran's Persian leaders.

And so on! One can read and see many more news and pictures which cry out to save humanity in Iran from the claws of those who claim to be Moslems! Since when did religion justify killing an innocent child? Since when did it justify dropping bombs (American-made of the type used against the Vietnamese people) on peaceful villages? We do not know of a religion which allows the dragging of men out of their homes and executing them in front of their families without a trial or even an accusation. Can such actions be called human? Where is the reaction of mankind to which God sent Islam to save it from the acts of evildoers.

The Flight of Kurdish Iranian Families to Iraq

About 1,571 Kurdish Iranian families, most of them women and children, took refuge in revolutionary Iraq where peace and security reign. This is the Iraq of the Ba'thist revolution, the revolution of 17 July! These families fled from the bombs and bullets of Khomeyni's guards who entered the villages in military cars, and left them in ruins. The bodies of the victims were left on the streets and the houses were looted. The women who hid and were not hurt lament the fate of the villages. An investigative reporter of AL-JUMHURIYAH met with members of these stricken families. Explaining the reasons for his seeking refuge in Iraq, one of them, Mr Rahim said: "We left Iran without any of our belongings. We fled the neo-Nazis who attempt to destroy every non-Persian individual."

Kicked and Beaten To Death While Holding the Koran

"What are the methods adopted by the neo-Nazis," we asked Mr Rahim? He answered: "I will mention this incident. It is an example of scores of incidents that take place inside the area where Arabs and Kurds live in Iran. It may wake up those whom Khomeyni and his gang fooled with sweet talk. They pretend to be Islamic, but Islam is innocent of their deeds. A few days ago, Persian elements of Khomeyni's came to our homes carrying American made weapons. They rounded up 86 men of the village and executed them. Before they executed the men, the mayor of the village came out carrying the Koran in his hands and appealed to Khomeyni's agents. He explained to them that the men were innocent Moslems, and that Islam forbids slaying them. The mayor was kicked and beaten to death." We asked: "Is your stay in Iraq a temporary one"? He answered: "Yes, we are part of the Iranian land which we left. We shall return after we achieve victory over the irresponsible gang which pretends to be religious."

AL-JUMHURIYAH met with another Iranian Kurdish refugee who talked about one of the principles of Khomeyni's group. He said: "Khomeyni's group uses what is called 'Key to Paradise' to justify their inhumane actions." We asked: "What is the Key to Paradise"? He answered: "It is a principle which says that slaying any opponent of the regime is justified, and that the killer will go to heaven. It is a new religious ruling of the new shah with a turban. Islam will haunt him till doomsday. Islam has many humane

and democratic aspects. How can such a ruling which justifies murder be ascribed to Islam? Thus, you see the bodies of innocent Kurds lying in the streets--not only Kurds but also Arabs living in Iran, and every Iranian who opposes the regime of the new Shah.

"Everybody recognized the game played by Khomeyni when he pretended his hostility to America and the Zionist entity [Israel]. How can he justify his cooperation with America's agents? The hostage game became boring and lost its attraction to those who were fooled at the beginning. This became clear after the declaration of the Iranian regime's representative at the United Nations. He said: 'We have benefited from the hostages for propaganda purposes. They are of no use now. We will set them free as soon as possible.'"

Finally, AL-JUMHURIYAH met with a family which left Iran. After the family rested for a short period from fatigue and hunger, the wife was in tears lamenting her four children killed by blind Persian hatred. The father said: "I came here with my family to save those who survived the bullets of the Persian regime. The Iraqi revolutionary government granted a monthly allowance and living needs to every family which took refuge in Iraq. The good heart of the Iraqi revolution has room for all oppressed members of the true [Islamic] religion. It is a heart full of love and kindness to all men of goodwill."

9607
CSO: 4802

IRANIAN DEPORTEES FROM IRAQ SEEK JOBS IN ARAB WORLD

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 16 May 80 p 11

[Article: "Iranians Driven Out of Iraq Look for Jobs in Other Arab Countries"]

[Text] Tehran--Iranians expelled by Iraq following the strained relations between the two countries continue to ask Arab diplomats to find them jobs in other Arab states. These deportees, estimated at 35,000, including businessmen, teachers, engineers and physicians, face many problems in Iran due to unemployment in the country and their inability to speak Persian. They speak Arabic.

A group of the deportees gathered in front of the Tunisian Embassy to appeal to Mr Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the Arab League, to seriously study their situation and urge the Iraqi Government to return them to Iraq or make a just settlement for the properties they could not take out of Iraq. The Arab diplomats have refused to comment on the possible steps which the Arab governments may take regarding resettlement of these deportees.

The IRAQI NEWS AGENCY in Baghdad reports that an arrested member of the banned al-Da'wah [Islamic vocation] Party disclosed on 15 May criminal plans of the party for the assassination of top officials in Iraq.

The agency described Hamid 'Aziz, the arrested member, as an agent of Iran. The agency quotes him as saying that leaders of al-Da'wah "charged him with preparing a map of government departments and agencies in preparation for assassinating officials and blowing up buildings according to instructions of the Persian regime."

The Iraqi authorities had arrested many members of al-Da'wah, which it regards as an agent of Iran, and decided to inflict capital punishment on anyone proved to be a member of this party.

The agency quoted 'Aziz as saying that he distributed weapons which were smuggled from Iran to cells of the party in Iraq. The weapons included handguns with silencers and grenades.

9607
CSO: 4802

IRAQI-IRANIAN DISPUTE, PLO INTEREST IN MEDIATION REVIEWED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 30 May 80 pp 29-30

[Article by Huda al-Husayni: "Between Iraq and Iran, Battles Are Permissible but War Is Forbidden"]

[Text] As observers expected, the sharp tension along the Iraqi-Iranian border did not lead to a military confrontation between the two nations.

It is known that the dispute reached its peak during the middle of last month, when the Iraqi Navy increased its patrols in the Gulf in response to Tehran's decision to put its armed forces on alert. The world was concerned about the security situation between the two countries only because of its concern about the oil in the region. This was so much so that some Western voices started to offer advice. When Sadegh Qutbzadeh, Iran's foreign minister threatened to close the straits of Hormuz, the SUNDAY TIMES advised the United States to block the straits before Iran did. The SUNDAY TIMES suggested that the Sixth Fleet in the Indian Ocean should undertake the blockade operation. The FINANCIAL TIMES advised that France and Italy expedite the delivery of military ships ordered by Iraq so that Baghdad also may be in a position to block the flow of oil in the Gulf.

The present quiet on the Iraqi-Iranian borders does not eliminate fears or preclude the possibility of renewed flare-ups between the two countries.

A few years back, when the situation deteriorated between Iraq and Iran and reached the brink of a bloody war between the two countries, it was the result of Iranian pressure on Iraq to give a part of Shatt al-'Arab to Iran. The pressure was applied through Iranian support for an Iraqi Kurdish separatist movement. The Algiers agreement of 1975 halted the possibility of a flare-up throughout the Gulf area. But the situation in 1975 differs from the one in 1980, because Iran under the Islamic Revolution is different from Iran under the shah with regard to the Palestinian question. Iran under the shah sided with Israel, while Iran under Khomeyni is for the Palestinians.

We know that the strategy of the Palestinian Liberation movement is based on agreement of the Arab and Islamic world on the Palestinian question and on disagreement within the western world with regard to this question, so as to be able to exploit this disagreement in European, American and international circles.

As the Palestinian movement pays the price for every dispute among any two or more Arab or Islamic nations, it is in the interest of the Palestinians now to restore harmony between the nations of the area which support the Palestinian cause. Yasir 'Arafat cannot divorce himself from the Iranian revolution on which he bet and won. Indeed he made Khomeyni commit himself and Iran to the Palestinian cause. In fact, Khomeyni called for the liberation of Jerusalem even before Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] told him: "You have an even greater responsibility to liberate Jerusalem than myself." In spite of the internal and external difficulties facing the Iranian revolution, its leaders have not lost their concern for the Palestinian cause. Every statement made by them mentions the liberation of Jerusalem. The Iranian revolution did not hesitate to send Iranian officials to southern Lebanon. Converting the Israeli Embassy in Tehran into a PLO office was done with fanfare, particularly in view of the extent of the shah regime's association with Israel. The Iranian revolution did not stop providing the Palestinian movement with military and financial support in spite of the serious economic problems facing it. The strongest connection between the Iranian revolution and the Palestinian resistance became obvious when the Iranian leaders expressed their willingness to offer the Greater Tumb, the Smaller Tumb and the Abu Musa islands to the Palestinians if they asked for them.

This is the reason for the repeated efforts of Abu 'Ammar to mediate between Iraq and Iran to pacify the situation. The Palestinian mediation has not been a direct one between the two countries. It started out as a Palestinian move among the Arab countries and ended up as a move by the Arab countries, especially as the damage to the Palestinian question from the conflict between Iraq and Iran would not be any less than the damage this conflict would inflict on the two countries and the Gulf area as a whole.

Attention focused on Iraq. Some nations issued statements while others sent delegates to discuss the situation. The Gulf states put aside their fear of the Iraqi regime and stood with Iraq, especially when Iran threatened to export the revolution to the states of the area. Press headlines in the Gulf states stressed the bonds between the Gulf states in these terms: "If the pillars of Baghdad fall, so will the edifice of the Gulf fall apart," and "If the storm hits Iraq, violence will plague the entire Gulf area." Thus, the risk of damage to the Palestinian cause was equated with risks of damage to the Arab nations and Iran as well.

Arab mediation started when King Husayn of Jordan stated that all Arab countries should stand with Iraq and wished that the Islamic revolution in Iran would support the causes of the Arab nations. A Saudi official arrived in

Iraq. Shaykh Sa'd al-Abdullah al-Sabah, the Kuwaiti crown prince, travelled to Iraq, Jordan and Syria. And an Iraqi-Kuwaiti communique affirmed that the security of the Gulf was not the responsibility of one single nation but the responsibility of all [Gulf] nations, free of any foreign intervention of any kind. The communique also emphasized the support of the two nations for the Palestinian resistance movement.

The Arab and Islamic peoples were torn up psychologically when the dispute between Iraq and Iran surfaced. The Arab peoples support the Iranian revolution and its success, but they do not forget that they are Arabs before anything else, and they cannot give up their Arab nationalism. On the other hand, the Arab peoples feel that Khomeyni took revenge for them when he defied the United States and continued to do so irrespective of the consequences in terms of damage to the economy of his country and its future. The Arab citizen cannot ignore the stands of Khomeyni which few Arab leaders dared to take.

Contacts between the Arab countries, between the Palestinians and Iran, and between the Palestinians and Arab countries continued. This was followed by a statement by Iranian President Bani-Sadr to a Gulf newspaper, in which he said: "Iraq is a sister country. We respect Iraq. The Gulf area is an Islamic front. Iran does not covet any territories, especially not Arab territories." Bani-Sadr said, "Iran which is ready to fight Israel alongside the Arabs will not disagree with the Arabs on territories." It was the first time that the Iranian leader did not attack Arab nationalism. He said, "We are not against Arab nationalism which undoubtedly stands by Islam."

On the other hand, Iraq showed its good intentions toward Iran when Tariq 'Aziz, the deputy prime minister and member of the Iraqi Revolution Council wrote an editorial in the Iraqi newspaper AL-BA'TH, in which he said: "What political or economic gain would Iraq achieve from hurting Iran? Iraq will not get involved in conflict unless it is forced to defend its nationalism and identity." He added: "When Islamic people emphasize their Islamic identity they get closer to the Arab nation."

This is how the idea of a five-nation summit including Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the PLO developed.

It is certain that Iraq and Iran can or would inevitably agree on a least common denominator, namely their support for the Palestinian cause. But the questionis: "How far can Iran and Iraq agree on leadership of the area or on a unified policy? Iraq hopes to play the role of leader in the area, while Iran considers that it has the right to play that role.

It was noted that the conflicts between Iran and Iraq worried the Soviet Union, since it is a conflict between two neighboring countries that are rich in oil. And it is known that Iraq concluded an agreement of cooperation with Moscow in 1972 (which led to the Soviet Union supplying Iraq with arms) but relations between the two countries have been strained since 1978.

Although the Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Mohammed Baqry, informed the Soviet officials that his country wishes Moscow to stop supplying Iraq with arms, Iran as a state has not as yet really sought the assistance of Moscow. Nevertheless, the situation could draw the two countries closer together. Another issue between Iraq and Iran is Iraq's declared determination to recover the three Arab islands, while Iran has vowed to maintain their Persian identity.

Iraq claims that Iran is trying to create terror in Iraq and Iran accuses Iraq of becoming the main shelter of the Iranian opposition. Iran claims that there are 500 Iranian officers and soldiers in Iraq preparing for "the battle of Arabistan and Kurdistan."

The most difficult issue is what Iraq asks from Iran with regard to granting autonomy to the minorities in Iran, including the Arabs of Arabistan. What is serious about this concept, in the view of the Iranian leaders, is that the request means fragmenting the Persian State. Khomeyni will not accept granting autonomy to the minorities at any cost. We all remember the last statement of the ousted shah that Iran stood [the risk] in the future to become divided into small parts according to their nationalities and that these would reunite under the red flag. It is impossible for Khomeyni to accept the fulfillment of the shah's prophecies as long as he is alive.

On the other hand, we know that Iran's present economy entirely depends upon the oil revenues from the Arabistan (Khuzistan) region. Any revolution for the autonomy of this region would constitute a real economic danger to the success of the Iranian revolution as a whole, more soo than any armed revolution in Kurdistan, Baluchistan, Azerbaijan or Turkistan.

Finally, Iraq and Iran refuse to go to war and the whole area rejects the idea of a war between them as well. Will they meet to find a solution through the five-nation summit or will they settle for the existing situation of a continuous war of attrition similar to that of the Lebanese crisis in which the fires are checked so as not to spread to the neighboring countries.

A foreign commentator wrote that an Iraqi-Iranian war would be most dangerous if it should erupt, because it would inflame nationalist, religious, ethnic and regional feelings. Its fires would not be confined to the surface but would penetrate the ground to where the lakes of the "black blood" of the industrial world are situated. It is this which makes such a war impossible!

9607
CSO: 4802

FACTORS OF SUCCESS, DIFFICULTY IN PLANNED DEVELOPMENT ANALYZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 6 Jul 80 p 35

[Article: "Rapid Industrialization Combined With Political Equilibrium"]

[Text] A feeling of satisfaction is now prevalent in Jordanian ministerial circles. This is due to the expected realization of the objectives of the 1975-80 five-year development plan to attain an annual 12 percent increase in national income, and to double this income.

At the moment, all efforts are concentrated on preparing the next five-year development plan. The departments concerned are now totally engaged in studying what has been accomplished and determining the reasons for the problems which should be rectified in the upcoming development plan. However, this apparent optimism leaves the solution of some failures in the program of economic development contingent upon the success of the forthcoming plan in the sectors of phosphate, potassium and fertilizers. It is from these that the Jordanian Government has derived its present satisfaction with regard to what has already been accomplished.

The most important, of these failures is the fact that the trade balance deficit has doubled from $505 million in 1975 to $1,200 million in 1978. It is expected that this deficit will reach $2 billion at the end of 1980. Naturally, Jordan complains of high energy prices, as well as the lack of response from the Arab countries to Jordan's problems. In fact, the volume of oil imports has reached half of Jordan's exports. Thus, while oil prices have been rising, oil imports have also been rising, because the development plan, which seeks the achievement of high rates of growth, has increased the demand for oil.

The realization of the ambitious development plan has increased the volume of industrial imports whose prices have increased worldwide. Consequently, this has contributed an additional factor to the weakening of Jordan's financial resources. This, in turn, leads Jordan to borrow money. From a practical point of view, the trade deficit does not have a negative effect, except in those cases where efforts are not made to raise industrial and

agricultural production. In the case of Jordan, official statistics indicate a 14 percent annual rate of growth in the industrial sector throughout the years of the plan, especially in the phosphate sector.

Industrialization Progresses, but Agriculture Suffers

According to reliable sources, one of the basic goals of the plan, which aims at changing the Jordanian basic economic structure, is cpmcemtration on industrialization. For example, the share of industrialization in the development program was more than 40 percent, and is expected to rise to 50 percent. The results give rise to some optimism that industry could absorb most of Jordan's borrowing through increased production. Thus, phosphate production has risen from 1.035 million tons in 1975 to 2.320 million tons in 1978. It is expected that this figure will reach 5 million tons by the end of 1980. It is expected that phosphates, potassium and fertilizer production in Aqaba will provide Jordan with $660 million [annually] by the beginning of the next development plan.

Therefore, the basic goal of intensive industrialization in these sectors is to achieve a larger measure of independence from outside aid. Nevertheless, the political goal is not absent, either. For example, these sectors put up $3.3 billion for investments, which is equivalent to twice the amount of Arab aid to Jordan.

Agriculture was the biggest victim of the course taken by Jordanian political and economic policy. Agricultural production declined [sic] by 10 percent and did not increase by more than 5 percent annually. In theory, this rate of growth exceeds the demographic rate of growth by 3.2 percent. In other words, Jordan is still better off than the majority of developing countries. However, in practice, such a rate of growth is not enough to meet Jordan's domestic demand, because 60 percent of all Jordanians will be living in cities. In the meantime, available land is limited. Consequently, any increase in production requires introducing intensive mechanization. This, in turn, would lead to higher costs and higher prices. The increase in the volume of imports and the vertical stimulation of the economy led to the increase in the rate of inflation. Actually, the annual budget deficit in itself has been sufficient to maintain inflationary pressures. Thus, the annual increase in the rate of inflation did not drop below 15 percent. Jordan hopes to be able to contain this rate of increase within the limits of 12 percent a year in the upcoming 5-year development plan. The question is: Will Jordan be able to do so?

Finance and a Balanced Policy

The rise in income of the Jordanian citizen, and the government's insistence on extending the broad outline of the current plan into the next 5-year plan, takes away from the departments concerned any possible means of fighting inflation. The money flowing in from Jordanian workers in the Gulf nations (who saved the equivalent of $500 million a year for Jordan, or an amount

equal to the revenues from phosphates, potassium and the Jordan Valley combined) will continue to play its [major] role in financing the next development plan. However, this keeps away from Jordan the most important and specialized workforce the country possesses.

Recent Iraqi-Jordanian cooperation will play a very important role in the upcoming 5-year plan. In this respect, political harmony between the two countries does seem to be satisfactory. Thus, if Jordan manages to maintain its economic relations with Syria, it will have realized its dream of "political balance as a basis for the success of the Jordanian economy."

9528
CSO: 4802

FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOCUSES ON INCREASING AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 20 Jun 80 p 15

[Text] Dr Jawad al-'Anani, minister of supplies, said that the construction of an automatic bakery in the al-Karak governorate has been approved. He added that this project is part of the five-year plan and that operational procedures and necessary studies will take place during the current year. He pointed out that the budget for the five-year plan is estimated at around 2 billion dinars and that the annual project expenditures are approximately 500 million dinars.

Dr al-'Anani also confirmed, in a meeting held at the cneter for vocational syndicates in al-Karak, that the main solution to supply problems is represented by increased production, and he emphasized the necessity of cooperation between the citizens and the state to achieve this goal. He said that agricultural production is considered one of the largest income-producing sectors, and that we must give more attention to agriculture and farming. He called for increased production of poultry and vegetables to cover the deficit in some other crops. He also said that Jordan has the most favorable climate for the poultry industry and that it must be taken advantage of in order to increase production and exports. Dr al'Anani emphasized the importance of food production, as it is a fundamental operation for agricultural development in Jordan.

Dr al'Anani pointed out that a complete feed plant will be constructed in al-Juwaydah region, including a mill and silos for grain. This plant will provide the necessary poultry feed.

During the meeting, there was an open discussion of the action sheets presented by the organization that supervises the syndicate center's branch, the al-Karak chamber of commerce and the cooperative committee for egg production and distribution. The supervising organization's action sheet included several topics related to poultry production and marketing, the consumers' market, the parallel market and food production.

Other participants in the discussions were National Advisory Council memebers, the assistant governor of al-Karak, the mayor, department managers and some residents of the governorate.

9455
CSO: 4802

DATA ON GROWTH OF PHOSPHATE EXPORTS GIVEN

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 5 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Taysir al-Majali: "Four Million Tons of Phosphate Exported During the Current Year"]

[Text] Phosphate is among our most important exports, which form one of the economic pillars in our country. Our phosphate exports are increasing year after year due to increased local production.

As export of this product takes place via the port of the phosphate company in al-'Aqabah, AL-DUSTUR had the chance to meet with Mr 'Adil al-Shara', the port's branch manager of the company. He said that the phosphate port is one of the most modern ports in the world with regard to its storage capacity.

The port has 6 large warehouses that can accommodate 410,000 tons. The port is also equipped with the most modern equipment to automatically transfer phosphate from these warehouses.

The port of al-'Aqaba daily receives 12,000 to 13,000 tons and transfers 1/3 of this amount by truck and another 1/3 by railroad. Railroads transport around 4,000 tons per day. This amount will increase next year to 6,000 tons, as the railroad will acquire more cars, although the railroad can only transport the phosphate from its mines to the al-Hasa area.

In discussing the phosphate exports in general, Mr al-Shara' said that our exports in 1979 were 2,700,000 tons, transported by 243 ships; i.e., at an average of 1 ship per day. It was exported to a number of Asian and European countries, including India, Turkey, Romania, Japan, China, Pakistan and Yugoslavia.

He added that exports are anticipated to reach 4 million tons during this year, due to increased phosphate production.

As for phosphate exports during the coming years, he said that the company expects to export 6 million tons during 1982, as the al-Shidyah mines, which are considered the richest Jordanian locations in phosphate, will be directly utilized during the coming years.

As for the characteristics of Jordanian phosphate, he said that this phosphate is considered among the best kinds in the world. The Jordanian phosphate company currently produces 3 kinds of phosphate: The first quality which contains 66 to 68 percent of triphosphate calcium; the second quality which contains 70 to 72 percent and the third and best quality which contains 73 to 75 percent.

Mr al-Shara' added that Jordanian phosphate has another characteristic, which is that it has a very low percentage of chlorine, which helps in further improving its quality in the future. He also said that the port has a technical laboratory to test phosphate samples before exporting them which also helps improve these qualities.

9455
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

LOAN FOR COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK--The National Planning Council signed an agreement between Jordan and Japan yesterday, in relation to the Japanese loan which the government of Japan has decided to extend to Jordan. The loan amounts to 8,693 million Japanese yen, and will be used to finance expansion of the communications network and telephone services in Jordan. The agreeemnt was signed by the president of the National Planning Council, Dr Hanna 'Awdah, on behalf of the Jordanian Government, and by the Japanese Ambassador in Amman, Mr Homia Okada, on behalf of the Japanese Government. This took place in the presence of the general manager of the telephone and telegraph communications organization and the secretary general of the National Planning Council. The Japanese Government had previously extended two loans to Jordan totalling 10,500 million Japanese yen for the expansion of local telephone services and the Wadi al'Arab dam and irrigation projects. It has also participated in the establishment of electronic training and service centers for the Royal Science Society and in the study of a complete regional development project for northern Jordan (the Irbid region). [Text] [Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 29 Jun 80 p 8] 9455

INVESTMENT ENCOURAGEMENT PROGRAM--In a meeting held yesterday under the chairmanship of deputy minister Mr Muhammad Salih, the investment promotions committee of the ministry of trade and industry approved the classification of 9 industrial and tourism projects as economic projects. They will receive an exemption of 1,650,000 dinars in custom duties on their machinery and equipment. These projects employ 550 workers. The committee also approved the exemption from all custom duties of machinery and equipment for 13 ongoing industrial and hotel projects. The value of this machinery and equipment is 840,000 dinars. [Text] [Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 29 Jun 80 p 3] 9455

ALIA MAKES PURCHASES--The ALIA Foundation and a group of local financial institutions signed an agreement to issue ALIA promissory notes for 10 million Jordanian dinars to be used to cover part of the cost of the new airplanes it recently agreed to purchase. These will be delivered within the next 3 years. The notes will be issued in two installments of 5 million dinars each; the first to be issued on 6 August and the second at the beginning of May 1981. The government insured the capital and interests of these notes and exempted them from income tax. These notes

earn an annual interest of 8 5/8 percent, paid in two equal installments. The agreement was signed by ALIA's general manager, Mr 'Ali Ghandur; Dr Khalil al-Salim of the Arab/Jordan Financial Institution; Mr Zuhayr Khuri of the Commercial Paper [Financing] Company; and Mr Jawad Hadid of the Jordanian Arab Investment Bank. [Text] [Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 3] 9455

PALESTINIAN AIRLINES RECOMMENDED--The 20th emergency session of the Civil Aviation Council of the Arab Nations, which began on 29 June, was concluded yesterday. The council approved civil aviation strategy and considered it the basis for joint civil aviation activity of the member nations. The council confirmed Palestine's right to form its own civil aviation organization in any Arab country, based on approval of this Palestinian organization by the host country. This organization will have the same privileges as other air transport organizations. It will also carry out all its obligations, in addition to running regular flights. The council decided to move the organization's regional headquarters from Cairo to Khartoum. It also reaffirmed the Jerusalem resolution taken at the 18th emergency session in 1979, related to the boycott of the Egyptians in various civil aviation and air transportation fields in the event there was evidence that the Egyptian aviation organizations were dealing with the Zionists. The council approved its 5-year plan for 1980-1985, and priorities and air fares defined in the report of the council's permanent committee. The council decided to freeze air transport fares among Arab nations until the beginning of next year. It also confirmed its previous decision to nominate Iraq, Lebanon and Algeria for positions in the international civil aviation council, and to try to deprive Egypt of its membership and replace it with an Arab country. The council praised Jordan's withdrawal of its nomination [at the forthcoming] session [of the international council] to serve Arab interests. Delegations representing 15 Arab nations and representatives of the Arab League participated in this session. [Text] [Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 3 Jul 80 p 3] 9455

CSO: 4802

SUBVERSIVE INCIDENTS MAY SIGNAL GULF TREND

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 16 Aug 80 pp 7-9

[Excerpts] More than a year ago, US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke of the "crescent of crisis" that would spread over regions of the Middle East. He foretold of tragedies and internal disorders that would erupt across the Middle East and into the Gulf area.

Today, the first signs of the perils to come have apparently been registered in Kuwait where a series of bombing and fire incidents, of arrests and reshuffles have prompted observers to wonder whether it will not be long before we witness the "Lebanonization" of Kuwait first, then the rest of the Gulf. Kuwait would be in their opinion the first target of the same gusty winds that blew over Lebanon.

The problems which Kuwait has been facing for most of the past year came out in the open recently when Interior Minister Sheikh Nawwaf Ahmed Al Sabah decided, last month, to speed up the retirement of 36 high-ranking officers of the Kuwaiti internal security forces. He said the purpose behind the move was to reorganize the security apparatus and pointed out that the main problem lay in the poor services rendered in the last few months by the country's intelligence service. He did not elaborate more but he was understood to be accusing the 36 officers of neglect and his list of grievances was long.

At the time, informed sources in Beirut told THE ARAB WORLD that the move was tantamount to a purge moitvated by Kuwaiti official fears that members of the security forces belonged to a number of parties and organizations--Baathist, NSSP, Communist, Palestinian--and could take part in an anti-regime move. They added that the Kuwaiti officials were screening the files of all officers carefully.

The reason for the Kuwaiti concern is many-fold. In the past few months, the authorities have come across publications calling for rebellion against the existing rule. In the meantime, reports said, investigations have also revealed that the pamphlets distributed by the gunmen who occupied the

Mecca Grand Mosque in Saudi Arabia were printed by activists operating in Kuwait.

Reports in the Arab press this week focused on the problem and said that, although the situation in Kuwait may resemble the situation that prevailed in Lebanon on the eve of the 1975 war, the Kuwaiti society does not have historical precedents, social problems and past divisions capable of generating more divisions inside the country. Their belief is that, with the help of neighbouring countries Kuwait can control the spread of corrosion.

Other observers, however contend that what is taking place in Kuwait points out to a foreign-inspired plan whose far-reaching purpose is to have an armed force deploy in the Gulf to protect the oil-fields and ensure safe transport of oil to the industrialized world in order to ward off the dangers of plans which allegedly call for either the destruction of the oil wells or the closing of the Hormuz Straits (which would paralyze 62 per cent of oil exports), or still the alleged Soviet "dream" of getting access to a warm seaport and, as US Defense Minister Harold Brown said it last week, "the Soviet objective is to be in control of Europe's vital sources."

CSO: 4820

RESTORATION OF PARLIAMENTARY LIFE PLANNED, DESPITE SECURITY PROBLEMS

Beirut AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 1 Sep 80 pp 6-7

[Text] In spite of the current sense of insecurity created by, among other things, a wave of terrorist bombings, the Emir of Kuwait has decided to proceed with plans to restore the elected parliament which was dissolved five years ago. No date has yet been set for a general election, but it is expected that one will be held in January; the Emir, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabah, last week issued a decree stating that a new, 50-member National Assembly would convene before the end of February 1981.

The Minister of State for Legal Affairs, Sheikh Salman al-Duaij al-Sabah, meanwhile said that discussions were still being held on whether or not to allow women to vote for the first time.

Sheikh Salman said that the new assembly would have the same powers as the one dissolved by the late Emir in August 1976; this, he added, meant that no law could be passed without the assembly's approval. "It won't be the government deciding alone, it will be the government and the assembly," he said in an interview with REUTERS; he added: "the final word really is with the National Assembly."

As this newsletter reported in its August 18 issue, fears had been expressed that the authorities would use the recent acts of sabotage and violence as a pretext to postpone indefinitely the elections which the late Emir specified should be held within four years. That deadline expired last week, and Sheikh Salman said that it would take at least two months to organise an election.

But, while the authorities have decided to go ahead with the restoration of the assembly, Prime Minister Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah al-Abah warned in an interview published last week that the body must avoid "the bickering and cheap deals which affected the course of our parliamentary life" until August 1976. The late Emir's decree ending 15 years of parliamentary participation in Kuwaiti politics, accused the assembly of that time of "exploiting democracy for private gain."

Interviewed by the newspaper AL-WATAN, the Prime Minister added: We must close the doors and windows against those elements whose only desire is to divide the country and upset security and stability." Earlier, the government had accused foreign powers and a local "fifth column" of perpetrating the bomb attacks and of distributing anti-government propaganda, but it gave no details.

It is in this light that the Interior Minister, Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah, announced last week that Kuwait is to propose a comprehensive plan for cooperation between Arab states on internal security, at a forthcoming meeting of Arab interior ministers in Saudi Arabia. Sheikh Nawaf told a local newspaper that the plan emphasises the non-interference of Arab states in each other's affairs, a clear indication of the Kuwaiti government's concern over the recent wave of terrorism and bomb attacks in the country. As this newsletter reported in its August 18 issue, the main target for suspicion is Kuwait's sizeable Iranian community, many of whom support Ayatollah Khomeini and his call for the overthrow of the regimes in other Gulf states.

Other Gulf governments have also recently expressed concern at increasing social tension and criminal activity, which are usually blamed on the huge influx of foreigners into their countries. Most Gulf economies are dangerously reliant on foreign workers, who in some states, such as the UAE, constitute the majority of the population.

Echoing this growing awareness of the fragility of the Gulf's social fabric, the Bahraini newspaper AKHBAR AL-KHALEEJ welcomed Kuwait's democratic stirrings last week, proclaiming that "true democracy is the shield which protects the nation both from internal and external dangers." Even though its own parliament was also dissolved in 1975, Bahrain is the only other Arab Gulf state with a tradition of parliamentary rule.

CSO: 4820

FAILURE OF AMAL, AL-MURABITUN, SOCIALIST ALLIANCE ANALYZED

Kuwait AL-HADAF in Arabic 19 Jun 80 p 15

[Article: "New Bloodbaths at Doors; Higher Political Sources Tell AL-HADAF Details of Recent Developments in Lebanese National Movement; Islamic Alliance's Mediation Foiled at Last Moment; Will Armed Conflict Between Communists and Amal Flare Anew?"]

[Text] Beirut--AL-QUDS PRESS--Some well-informed press sources in Beirut say that the next few months in Lebanon will be tantamount to a series of sudden and surprising events. If the resignation of the Lebanese prime minister and of his government and the possibilities involved in the formation of a new government constitute the number one event, then the second event in this regard is the installation of Walid Junblatt, the son of the late Lebanese leader Kamal Junblatt and the chairman of the Socialist Progressive Party (with the majority of its base formed of Druzes), as chairman of the Lebanese National Movement, i.e. chairman of the Central Political Council of the parties joined under the name of the National Movement. The most prominent of these parties are the Socialist Progressive Party itself, the Lebanese Communist Party, led by George Hawi; the Communist Action Organization, led by Muhsin Ibrahim; the Independent Nasirists (al-Murabitun) Movement, led by Ibrahim Qulaylat and the Syrian Social National Party led by 'Abdallah Sa'adah.

In addition to giving Walid Junblatt the position of chairman of the Central Political Council--a position which became vacant with the death of Walid Junblatt's father 3 years ago--the said council has also adopted a new resolution providing for the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party Organization (pro-Damascus) to join the council parties and naming 'Asim Qansu, the organization chairman, a member of the Executive Committee of the National Movement parties and a deputy chairman of the Central Political Council. This is in addition to accepting the Socialist Arab Union and its leader 'Abd-al-Rahim Murad in the Central Political Council and the election of Murad to the Executive Committee.

Step Backward

These resolutions have certainly bolstered the position of the Communist Party and of the Communist Action Organization, especially in Beirut, by

way of the important political cover provided by Damacus through the Ba'th Party Organization and the cover provided by the Druze sect through the Socialist Progressive Party which is almost considered the sect's indisputable party. To understand all this, it is necessary for us to backtrack a little to the two months preceding the adoption of these resolutions to understand the direction that the events were threatening to take and to learn the reasons that caused the changes in the expectations that had actually been imminent. In this regard, higher partisan and political sources in Beirut have given AL-HADAF the following account of the story of the developments:

These sources say that it had been expected, even definite and certain, that announcement would be made of the formation of a political front comprised of the Socialist Progressive Party, al-Murabitun and Amal and that this front would become the sole spokesman and political and military representative of the Muslim sects in Lebanon. Just for the sake of information, al-Murabitun is a political and military organization with broad and evident influence in Western Beirut, especially where the traditional Islamic leaderships [fa'aliyat] are centered, while Amal is a political and military organization with a very broad influence among the Shi'ite Muslims. With the unification of these three organizations, unity, cohesion and solidarity would have been established among the three Muslim sects in Lebanon, namely: The Sunna, the Shi'ites and the Druzes.

Such a probability which had been certain and definite to materialize would have been capable of creating fundamental changes in the Lebanese relations and balances. Unification of the three Muslim sects under the leadership of three strong and effective parties with a generally good reputation among the Muslim masses would have meant forcing the other local and external political sides to reassess their concept of who is the true representative of the Muslims in Lebanon and would have brought into focus the following ever-present argument cited by Pierre al-Jumayyil, the leader of the isolationist rightist Phalanges Party which has strong relations with the Zionist entity at present: We don't know with whom to conduct the dialogue. Pierre al-Jumayyil meant this, of course, to be a reference to the disunity and multiplicity of the Muslim political axes and leaderships and to underline the impossibility of saying that there is a sufficiently strong and influential Muslim leadership with which to hold the dialogue and to contest, both with weapons and with words.

Position of Communists

This is a first consequence that could have resulted immediately [from the unification]. A second consequence which would have actually resulted from the first one would have put the communists--(both the party and the organization) in particular and, consequently, the leftist forces following a Marxist conviction and course--in a very tight corner and could have even made it possible to disregard them completely and deny them any weight in

the actual calculation of the local forces. The truth is, say these sources, that the communists move and work in the Islamic street alone. In addition to being a [member of the] National Movement, the Central Political Council, the regional political councils and a military faction operating in the Islamic areas and in the south and in addition to having good relations with the Palestinian resistance leadership, the communists project themselves as the real representatives of the Lebanese people generally. But under the state of sectarian division, they believe firmly that they are the true representatives of the Muslims and of the Shi'ite Muslim man-in-the-street at least. Therefore, they view the other Muslim political forces operating in this street with suspicion and doubt and describe them as being sectarian, conventional, reactionary and so forth.

Strong Allies

The three aforementioned parties--al-Murabitun, the Socialist Progressive and Amal--could have actually produced a final solution to this problem, i.e. they could have brought to the Islamic street [sic] a harmony, unity and cohesion which it actually lacks. This being the case, the Palestinian resistance would, naturally, reassess its local alliances because, as we have already said, these three parties exercise evident control over the Islamic street. As for the communist parties and organization, they rely mainly on strong allies who have good relations with the Palestinian resistance primarily and then with Syria generally, with Iraq, the Soviet Union and Libya. All of these are influential, capable and strong forces. But with the emergence of a new, strong and effective alliance consisting of the Socialist Progressive Party, al-Murabitun and Amal, these strong and capable forces would be compelled to reexamine quickly their relations with the local forces, meaning that they would have to weave strong and clear relations of alliance with the leaders of this new alliance in the Islamic street.

Resistance and Unity

To make matters clear, these sources add, we must say that the Palestinian resistance wants, seeks and would be a thousand times more interested if the Islamic Street were more united and harmonious and if the divisions and axes present in it did not exist altogether. The resistance is paying in part the price of this disunity and division. While having good relations with the communists, the resistance also has good and firm relations with the Socialist Progressive Party, al-Murabitun and Amal. The resistance exerted efforts in 1976 to unite all these forces in a broad front. Then the broad national front slogan was projected in 1977 and 1978, but to no avail. The broad national front including, or supposed to include, all the effective political forces in the Islamic street has continued to be one degree or another a concern and, at the same time, a hope--a concern felt by the people in charge of this Islamic street and a hope that occurs to the minds of the ordinary people who pay an extremely exorbitant and indescribable price every day as a result of the multiplicity, division and conflicts

existing in this street. Consequently, the resistance would not have been harmed by the rise of a new and strong alliance consisting of the three aforementioned parties, which have their credibility in the Islamic street, even though such an alliance would turn over--and it was hoped that this would be done quietly--the page of the communists in the street and would turn the Central Political Council into a link with no actual importance. This is what had been expected with certainty, the sources say. All this had been clear to the minds of those concerned, both at home and abroad.

In the face of all this, active efforts were exerted, as made evident recently by the dimensions of the surprise, to contain this probability and to prevent it from materializing. Naturally, what was required of the Central Political Council and of the communists was the following: First, seek to gain favors from Damacus by giving the Ba'th Party Organization a leadership position, perhaps the actual leadership position if necessary, in the Central Political Council. Second, give the Socialist Progressive Party chairman the position of chairman of the Central Political Council to prevent his rapprochement with Amal and al-Murabitun. This is what has actually happened after secret mediations, meetings and discussions that have led to the resolutions that we noted at the beginning of these words.

Frustration and Miscarriage

These resolutions have foiled finally, it seems, the creation of a tripartite alliance in the Islamic street comprised of the aforementioned forces. These resolutions have also thwarted finally the National Pan-Arab Front [al-jabhah al-qawmiyah al-wataniyah] which was led by the Socialist Ba'th Party Organization with the Union of the Working People's Forces (led by Kamal Shatila), thus abandoning yesterday's allies to fend for themselves. These resolutions have also put al-Murabitun, a party which is still participating in the National Movement but with many reservations, before two possibilities: Either bolster its presence and role in the Central Political Council or choose the path of a final breakaway. The resolutions have also caused Amal to be relatively exposed because it cannot claim that it has with Damascus and the PLO better relations than the Central Political Council parties have with Damacus and the PLO. Naturally, such difference in the level of the relations of alliance has a significant return insofar as the calculations pertaining to the past and the future are concerned. The first reaction to these resolutions that have paralyzed the efforts for an alliance between the Socialist Progressive Party, al-Murabitun and Amal has come from al-Murabitun which has issued a detailed political statement underlining its reservations toward the National Movement and the Central Political Council and pointing out that "our organization has expressed its reservation and continues to express its reservation on any internal organizational step taken by the National Movement on bases other than those demanded by al-Murabitun for years, but not taken into consideration." Thus, al-Murabitun Organization has stayed in the Central Political Council outwardly but is out of it practically. The resolutions [of Central Political Council] were issued on 11 December 1979. Yet, by 13 June 1980 no

noteworthy reactions appeared. What draws attention is that silence has been the most prominent reaction to the resolutions, especially by Amal, the Syrian Social National Party and the Union of the People's Working Forces. In any case, these resolutions have cuaght by surprise all those who had been observing and who had expected other developments to which we referred at the outset of this article. The resolutions have also brought up anew the issue of the armed conflict that erupted recently between the communists and Amal in Beirut's southern suburb. After all that has happened, the question now is: Will the armed conflict erupt anew between these sides and how will Amal respond to these resolutions?

Finally, the scurce [sic] says: Expect interesting and sudden developments at a later time.

We say: God spare the Lebanese more bloodbaths and save all from this tribulation.

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AMAL LEADER DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH NATIONAL MOVEMENT, PALESTINIANS

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 20 Jun 80 p 11

[Interview With Nabih Barri, Chairman of Amal Movement Command Council, by Kazim 'Uwayd; Nabih Barri to AL-WATAN: "Amal and Palestinian Resistance in One Trench; Settlement Tune Is Factor for Unity and not Division; We Support Army's Entry into South to Bring Haddad's Mini-State to End; Damascus Agreement Is New Book That Protects Relations on National Arena; No Cooperation With Sectarian Entities or With Enemy Supporters; Iranian Leadership Doesn't Want Any Disagreement to Occur Between Us and Palestinian Resistance"]

[Text] Amal Movement, in the person of its founder Imam Musa al-Sadr, the chairman of the Supreme Islamic Shi'ite Council, participated with the Lebanese National Movement in formulating the political reform program. Amal was also a fundamental partner in founding the National Front. But it then disagreed with the National Movement when the latter came up with the civil administration plan at the time the Arab Deterrence Force entered Lebanon in 1976 because Amal viewed this plan as a partition threat.

Even though the civil administration page was turned over long ago, the disagreement between Amal Movement and the National Movement has grown and has been nurtured by numerous other factors. It recently developed into bloody clashes between Amal Movement members and elements of some parties of the National Movement in al-Nabatiyah, southern Lebanon, and then in the southern suburb of Beirut, the capital. Those clashes posed the threat of serious ramifications but the Syrian and Palestinian leaderships hastened to deal with the situation and to get the two sides together in Damascus where a statement was issued defining the means to contain the fires of the sedition and to deal with the development of the situation.

No Cooperation With Enemy

Lawyer Nabih Barri, chairman of the Fatah Movement Command Council, has dealt with the disagreement issue and has given an assessment of the outcome of the Damascus talks in an interview with AL-WATAN, saying: There has been no disagreement over the principles in which Amal Movement believes. Rather,

the disagreement has centered on the faulty approach followed to deal with every situation in which differences, even if they are childish, erupt.

Regarding the agreement resulting from the quadrilateral meeting in Damascus, Barri has said: It is tantamount to a new book that protects the relations on the national arena and that contributes to a large degree toward realizing the Lebanese national detente and the Lebanese-Palestinian understanding which, we hope, will constitute a good access to moving the stubborn Lebanese crisis and saving the country from the talons of the plotters and of the Zionist enemy.

Lawyer Nabih Barri has refused to respond to the accusations leveled against Amal and has described them as fabrications, saying: "There is absolutely no cooperation with the advocates of sectarian entities and there is absolutely no cooperation with the Zionist enemy or his supporters. Cooperation with the Zionist enemy is proscribed, as Imam al-Sadr has taught us."

Following is the text of AL-WATAN's interview with Nabih Barri:

Army Between Two Roles

[Question] You demand the army's entry into the south and you call for its deployment in the other areas when the need arises whereas the National Movement objects to the army's present structure and does not feel reassured by its command. How do you comment on this issue?

[Answer] Our position toward this issue consists of two parts: The first concerns the army's deployment in southern Lebanon and the second concerns its deployment in the capital and its suburbs. Concerning the first part, we support the Lebanese army's entry into the entire south, beginning with the border strip, in order to put an end to Sa'd Haddad's mini-state and to all the direct and indirect extensions of the Zionist enemy and to rescue the southern inhabitants from the atrocities inflicted upon them every day, and even every hour. When the homeland's borders are exposed to aggression, when parts of its territories are faced with the threat of occupation while other parts are actually occupied and when the inhabitants of the south are divided into displaced and tormented, then there is no place for a discussion on the sex of the angels. Protecting the homeland, whose gate is the south, deserves greater attention than the sect of this or that officer and whether this position should belong to that officer and that position to this officer. Getting rid of Sa'd Haddad's mini-states and of the woes it brings the south and the southerners, such as the murder and kidnapping of innocent people, threatening the homeland's entity and the protection money that Haddad levies on the citizens, is a lot more important than the existing objections to the manner in which the army is structured. We have informed the resistance movement leadership frankly of this position and we have declared it openly. While aspiring for the Lebanese army to be a national and pan-Arab [qawmi] army capable of defending the homeland and of undertaking the requirements of the Arab causes, we still support the army's

entry into the south even though it doesn't fully meet the qualities that we have mentioned. In the face of the greater danger the ambiguities over which there are objections take second place. I want to stress here that I have not heard from the resistance and the National Movement arguments that refute this argument.

As for the second part, i.e. the deployment of the army in the capital and its suburbs, we have another and opposite position for several considerations:

First, the army's real place is the country's borders and across the enemy. It is not its mission to perform the duty of traffic police in the capital and its suburbs. Second, if the need arises for the army to perform its duty in the city, then the army should be non-sectarian, balanced and acceptable to all. As long as the army is not balanced and is not acceptable to all, its entry into the capital will act as an explosion factor and not as a factor facilitating the Lebanese national detente for which the issue of deploying the army in the capital and the suburbs is brought up. Therefore, Amal Movement has supported the army's entry into the south and has not supported its deployment in the capital and its suburbs out of its national visualization of the issues and not for the considerations rumored, very regrettably, by many.

Abu-'Ammar Agrees

[Question] While adopting this position, have you taken into consideration the resistance fears that the army's entry into the south will not be in its interest and that the army command may have objectives other than those which you seek?

[Answer] I will answer this question with another question: Is it in the interest of the Palestinian resistance that Haddad's mini-state continue to exist? The answer: Of course not.

Another question: Is it in the interest of the Palestinian resistance that other parts of the Arab homeland, especially southern Lebanon, be occupied? The answer: No.

A third question: Is it in the interest of the Palestinian resistance that the Zionist enemy find a pretext through which to realize its expansionist goals, namely control of the water sources and termination points--especially since the enemy's ambitions in Lebanon in this regard are well known and certain? The answer is also no.

Moreover, is it in the interest of the resistance that the inhabitants of the south be displaced by Sa'd Haddad, and the Zionist enemy behind him, under the pretext of the uncontrollable situation there and the weakness of the U.N. Forces? The answer is no and no again.

On the contrary, Amal Movement views the stay of the southerner on his land, putting an end to Sa'd Haddad's mini-state, implementation of U.N. Security Council resolution No 425 and return of the evicted southerners to the border strip as a great service to the Palestinian cause itself. Moreover, safeguarding the south against occupation is no longer just a Lebanese demand but an Arab and a Palestinian demand. The southerner has shouldered the burden of the Palestinian cause since 1948 and has endured all its tragedies and pains and dreamt of its dreams throughout this period to the point where the words of Mr al-Bu'ayjan, the ambassador of Kuwait, that "the southerner is almost the sole Arab in this Arab nation" apply truly to this southerner. Therefore, there is no conflict between the Palestinian resistance's goals, which are the liberation of the land and of the people, and Amal Movement's goals which are liberation of the south from the yoke of the torture under which it writhes every day. I will be divulging no secret when I say that I discussed this issue with brother Abu-'Ammar during the recent Damacus meeting and that he agreed with our visualization.

New National Book

[Question] On the mention of the Damascus meeting, what is your assessment of the outcome of the meeting and how do you view your future relations with the resistance and the Lebanese national forces?

[Answer] As you know, the Damascus meeting took place as a result of a fraternal initiative and a national mediation on the part of the fraternal Syria in the wake of the violent battles that erupted in southern Lebanon and in the southern suburb of Beirut and which almost erupted among the brothers in Burj al-Barajinah and al-Burj Camp. The talks were complex and difficult and consumed 30 hours out of the total of 48 hours that the Amal delegation spent in Damascus. There was no disagreement over the principles in which Amal Movement believes or those on whose premise the Palestinian resistance movement acts. The disagreement centered over the faulty approach followed to deal with every case in which a difference, even a childish difference, erupts. As a result of bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral meetings, a plenary meeting was held under the chairmanship of Syrian Foreign Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam and was attended by nearly all the resistance factions and the National Movement, in addition to Amal Movement. The meeting ended with an agreement to form a quadrilateral (Amal, the resistance, the National Movement and the National Front) coordination committee to deal with any problem that may crop up, to exert efforts to confine and contain it within its basic dimensions and to prevent its spilling over or causing a comprehensive explosion. This came in the wake of an agreement on principles that were declared in a statement calling for safeguarding the resistance right and the Palestinian right, preserving Lebanon's sovereignty and independence and rejecting resettlement. In the wake of the conclusion of this agreement which was signed by all parties concerned, we have actually felt that it was tantamount to a

new book that protects the relations on the national arena and contributes to a large degree toward realizing the Lebanese national detente and the Lebanese-Palestinian understanding which, we hope, will constitute a good access for moving the crisis and saving the country from the talons of the plotters and of the Zionist enemy. We also hope that this agreement will prevent the eruption of any harmful explosion, especially since we in Amal Movement are fully eager for tranquility so that we may have the opportunity to direct our total attention to the south that is threatened by the common enemy. The weapons are not for Beirut's alleys and suburbs and only those lacking thought resort to them. We are people with a creed and we try with amicable means. We only draw our weapons to defend our principles and ourselves.

Israel Is Absolute Evil

[Question] It is said that elements of the Liberal Party and others from the Duxieme Bureau took part in the southern suburb clashes on the side of Amal. What do you say to these accusations?

[Asnwer] There is no time to pause before these fabrications and trivialities. We need testimony of partiotism from nobody. The history of Amal Movement puts us in the ranks of those who give testimony of patriotism to others. There is absolutely no cooperation with the advocates of the sectarian entities and there is absolutely no cooperation with the enemy. Cooperation with the Zionist enemy is proscribed, as Imam al-Sadr has taught us. He who is underprivileged on his land should support him who is deprived of his land, as Imam Musa al-Sadr has taught us. Moreover, Israel is an absolute evil and whoever stands against it becomes in our view, in one way or another, an absolute good. The greatness of Amal Movement lies in the fact that it is not spared the allegations of the tendentious.

We Are Against Sectarianism

[Question] Each of the National Movement, the Palestinian resistance movement and Amal Movement has good relations with the Islamic revolution in Iran. Isn't this fact fit as an inlet to a national understanding?

[Answer] It is well-known that the Iranian revolution gives all its momentum and support to Palestine and the Palestinian revolutionaries. It also views southern Lebanon with concern and is eager for Lebanon's sovereignty and independence. It thus follows the same line on which Amal Movement had been built before the Islamic revolution triumphed. This intellectual agreement, in addition to the spiritual agreement, have made us view the Iranian revolution with pride and honor. But this position of ours is not based on the narrow sectarian aspect, as some people try to depict it. Amal Movement is against the sectarian aspect, as some people try to depict it. Amal Movement is against the sectarian entitles and against sectarian politics. It fights a despotic ruler even if he is a Shi'ite Muslim, as

Imam al-Sadr has taught us. It is against a sectarian state, even if such a state were a Shi'ite Muslim state. We are Muslim Arabs who view our Arab-Islamic heritage as a path, a pioneer and an ethic. However, we reject the sectarian projections. There is an enormous and vast difference between piety and sectarianism. The first is ours, God willing. As for the second, we reject and renounce it for ourselves and for others.

[Question] Did Iran mediate during the recent clashes?

[Answer] We know that the Iranian leadership does not want any disagreement to erupt between us and the Palestinian resistance. We know from our brothers in Iran, who notified us during Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh's visit to Lebanon, that they are eager for our principles to meet with the Palestinian revolution's principles because they emanate from the same source. Therefore, there was no Iranian leadership, contrary to what some people try to disseminate. The mediation was the result of conviction in Amal and in its cadres and principles, in addition to the good offices exerted by the Syrian leadership, without forgetting the Iranian direction in the first place.

We Don't Seek Explosion

[Question] What are the roots of the disagreement with the communists that made them take part in the clashes against you?

[Answer] The truth is that we have been surprised in the latest conflagration by the Lebanese Communist Party's involvement in the clashes in al-Nabatiyah area, particularly in Zifta, and then in the southern suburb, keeping in mind that the harbingers of this position were present in the speech that George Hawi, the Lebanese Communist Party secretary general, made at the Arab University of Beirut almost a month ago. We imagined at the time that what was said in the speech was something transient, especially after Hawi visited me and after we discussed this issue. There was no disagreement over what was discussed. However, the [communist party's] field position reaffirmed what had been said in the speech and what Hawi had denied during the visit. In the plenary meeting in Syria, there was a frank reproof and we discussed the situation in detail. George Hawi asserted anew that the communist party has no intention to confront Amal Movement or to take a hostile position toward it. He has signed the joint communique issued by the Damascus quadrilateral meeting. We hope that this position is final because, as I have already pointed out, we are not advocates of intensification and we do not want to be preoccupied with sidebattles that are of no benefit whatsoever to the fundamental national issue.

Amal and Resistance in Same Trench

[Question] How do you evaluate the relationship of Amal Movement with the Palestinian resistance in light of the recent developments?

[Answer] The relationship of Amal Movement with the Palestinian resistance dates back to the time when the Movement emerged. As for our relationship with the Palestinian people, it dates back to 17 years before the rise of the resistance movement itself. If others have shouldered the burden of the Palestinian cause since 1967 or 1975, we southerners have shouldered it since 1948, as I have already said. As for Amal as a movement, it was created on the basis of a charter drawn up by Imam Musa al-Sadr stating frankly the duty of a member of Amal Movement to protect and defend the Palestinian resistance and to believe in the Palestinian right. The charter also states that the liberation of Jerusalem is a duty that this member shoulders before anything else. This has been embodied in our defense of the resistance in al-Shiyah, al-Nab'ah, Tall al-Za'tar, Burj Hammud and in every other area where clashes have taken place on the Lebanese arena since the outbreak of the 1975 war and until this day. What is amazing is that the bomb that the enemy hurls on the south hits both the Palestinian and the southerner simultaneously and yet you find those who come and tell you: Amal wants to liquidate or confront the Palestinian resistance! The relations remained strong and firm until the tune of resettlement [of the Palestinians in the south] began to be heard recently and began to play havoc with the souls. This made it seem as if Amal's interest is in conflict with the Palestinian resistance's interest in southern Lebanon. Because the southerner is enduring what he is enduring for the Palestinian cause, it has become the duty of the Palestinian to reaffirm daily his concern for southern Lebanon and his strong eagerness that is not superceded by any consideration to cooperate with Amal in particular so that no opportunity may be given to the plot to infiltrate and to sow sedition among those who are in the same trench. If resettlement is accepted by the Palestinian, then this resettlement is a plot against him before it is against others. A Palestinian who accepts, God forbid, land other than his own land is one who has abandoned his land and his cause at the same time.

As long as the Palestinians refuse to be resettled in Lebanon or anywhere else and as long as the southerners do the same, then the right thing is for this refusal to unite rather than divide them. This is what Amal Movement seeks and aspires for. The plotters are actually trying to sow sedition between Amal Movement and the Palestinian resistance so that both sides may be exhausted because only then will the plotters realize their goals without any resistance.

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BANKING ACTIVITY FOR 1979 REVIEWED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 29 Jun 80 p 6

[Article: "Beirut Chamber (of Commerce and Industry) Report on Banking Activity in 1979; Increase of 32.6 Percent in Resources and 38.7 Percent in Compensations; Bank of Lebanon Measures Reduce Rise in Supply of Money in Circulation"]

[Text] The Studies Center of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry has prepared a report on the 1979 banking activity, pointing out that the unified budget of the banks has recorded an increase of 31 percent over 1979, that the increase rate in the resources has amounted to 32.6 percent and that there has been a noticeable increase of 38.7 percent in investments.

The banking investments [in 1979] amounted to 23.473 billion Lebanese pounds, of which 40 percent was used in foreign investments. The commercial sector got 51.7 percent of the investments, the agricultural sector 2.2 percent and industry 17 percent.

The report points out that loans to the industrial sector were short- and medium-range loans used to finance foreign transactions. It asserts that this expansion in investments has led to a drop in liquidity, thus affecting the interest rate prices paid for the Lebanese pound.

The report also points out that the currency volume increased by 26.7 percent in 1979 and the currency in circulation increased by only 6.6 percent whereas this increase amounted to 20.4 percent in 1978. The report attributes the drop to the measures taken by the Bank of Lebanon.

Following are the most important contents of the report:

The banking statistics available from the unified budget of the banks show that this budget recorded an increase of 31 percent in 1979 over 1978 despite the slow improvement in the other economic sectors. (Chart No 1)

Chart No 1. Development of Unified Situation of Commercial Banks (In millions of Lebanese pounds)

Year	Value	Development	
		In Figures	In Percentage
End of 1974	11,411	--	--
End of 1975	12,755	+ 1,344	+ 11.78
End of 1976	12,843	+ 88	+ 0.69
End of 1977	16,174	+ 3,331	+ 25.94
End of 1978	18,987	+ 2,803	+ 17.3
End of 1979	24,876	+ 5,889	+ 31.0

In 1977, the increase in resources (43 percent) exceeded the increase in investments (21.2 percent) and the 2 were parallel in 1978. This led to an enormous liquidity in the banks. But the revival of the economic activity in 1979 led to a noticeable increase of 38.7 percent in the investments compared to an increase of 32.6 percent in the resources.

Banking Resources

The relative improvement in the security situation in 1979 led to an increase in the foreign transfers as compared to 1978. The banking resources amounted to 18.334 billion Lebanese pounds in 1979, i.e. with an increase of 4.508 billion Lebanese pounds, compared to an increase of 2.207 billion Lebanese pounds in 1978. (Chart No 2)

Chart No 2. Banking Resources (In millions of Lebanese pounds)

	On-Demand Deposits		Set-Term Deposits		Foreign Currency Deposits		Total	
	Value	Percent	Value	Percent	Value	Percent	Value	Percent
End of 1977	2,300	20	6,716	58	2,595	22.3	11,609	100
End of 1978	2,822	20.4	8,385	60	2,696	19.5	13,826	100
End of 1979	3,152	17	9,576	52	5,606	30.5	18,334	100
End of 1978 compared to End of 1977	+ 522	+22.6	+1,669	+24.8	+ 101	+3.8	+2,207	+19.0
End of 1979 compared to End of 1978	+ 330	11.6	+1,191	14.0	+2,910	108.0	+4,508	32.6

We notice the following trends in the distribution of resources:

A decline in the on-demand deposits in comparison to the total deposits from 20.4 percent in 1978 to 17 percent in 1979.

A decline in the set-term deposits from 60 percent in 1978 to 52 percent in 1979.

A large increase in the rate of deposits in foreign currencies from 19.5 percent in 1978 to 30.5 percent in 1979.

Contrary to 1978 when the foreign currency deposits amounted to only 3.8 percent, the increase rate in this case amounted to 108 percent in 1979.

This is due to the drop in the interest rate price paid for the Lebanese pound on the one hand and to the unprecedented enormous rise in the interest rate price paid for the dollar and the pound sterling.

Interest rate among the banks rose from 1 percent to 11 percent in the first quarter of 1980.

As a result, the Central Bank has adopted measures to curtail the transfer of Lebanese currency into foreign currencies.

Banking investments

The banking investments amounted to 23.473 billion Lebanese pounds in 1979, with an increase of 6.553 billion Lebanese pounds compared to an increase of 2.644 billion Lebanese pounds in 1978. (Chart No 3)

Chart No 3. Development of Banking Investments (In million Lebanese pounds)

	End of 1977	End of 1978	End of 1979	End of 1978 Compared to End of 1977		End of 1979 Compared to End of 1978	
				Value	Percent	Value	Percent
Foreign Investments	5,770	6,052	9,379	+ 282	+ 4.8	+3,327	+55
Loans to Private Sector	7,919	9,792	12,894	+1,873	+23.6	+3,102	+31.6
Loans to Public Sector	475	949	1,066	+ 474	+99.7	+ 117	+12.3
Stocks	112	127	134	+ 15	+13.3	+ 7	+ 5.5
Total	14,276	16,920	23,473	+2,644	+18.5	+6,553	+38.7

A total of 40 percent of the capital was used in foreign investments compared to 35.7 percent in 1978, keeping in mind that most of the deposits come from residents.

The commercial sector--imports, exports and domestic trade--got a share of 51.7 percent whereas agriculture got only a 2.2 percent share and industry a 17 percent share, keeping in mind that most of the loans advanced to the industrial sector are short- and medium-range loans used to finance foreign transactions. Added to this is the fact that these capitals [loans] may have been used for nonindustrial purposes, such as construction.

This requires that more accurate banking statistics be made available on the utilization of loans in the industrial and agricultural sectors.

Loans to Private Sector

Loans to the private sector increased by 31.2 million Lebanese pounds in 1979, i.e. by 31.6 percent. It is to be noted that 63 percent of the loans were advanced in the first half of the year, rising by 9 percent in the first quarter of the year and by 10 percent in the second quarter, whereas the rate increase amounted to only 4 percent in the third quarter and to 5 percent in the fourth quarter.

The reason for the decline in loan-increase rate as of the beginning of the second half of 1979 is due to the measures taken by the Bank of Lebanon to freeze real estate speculation and to safeguard the soundness of the national currency.

Circulars [issued by Central Bank of Lebanon] restricting loans to private sector to Lebanese pounds:

Circular No 236, dated 8 June 1979.
Circular No 243, dated 27 July 1979.

Circulars on depositing compulsory reserves in Bank of Lebanon:

Circular No 220, dated 24 February 1979.
Circular No 225, dated 3 April 1979.
Circular No 228, dated 12 April 1979.
Circular No 243, dated 26 May 1979.
Circular No 240, dated 25 June 1979.

Foreign Investments

Foreign investments rose in 1979 by 3.327 billion Lebanese pounds or by 55 percent whereas this increase amounted to only 4.8 percent in 1978.

The fundamental reason for this increase in foreign investments is the enormous increase in the interest rate paid for the dollar and the pound sterling.

Thus, contrary to the 2 preceding years when the increase in resources exceeded the increase in investments in 1977 and when the 2 were equal in 1978, the increase in investments was bigger in 1979 than the increase in resources.

This expansion in investments led to a drop in liquidity and this drop brought about the developments concerning the interest rate paid for the Lebanese pound.

These developments show that the Lebanese banking system is no longer suffering from the enormous liquidity which characterized it in previous years.

Currency Volume

The total currency volume rose by 26.7 percent in 1979 compared to 19.8 percent in 1978 (chart No 4). This increase is reflected in a definite manner in the elements forming the currency situation, namely:

1. Currency Liquidity: The 8.7 percent growth in the currency volume in 1979 is a small growth when compared to the growth of 21.4 percent in 1978.

The currency in circulation in 1979 rose by 6.6 percent whereas this increase amounted to 20.4 percent in 1978.

The same applies to credit currency [al-naqd al-rasidi] which rose by 22.6 percent in 1978 and by no more than 11 percent in 1979.

Despite this, the elements forming the currency situation have not changed: The currency in circulation represents 52 percent whereas the on-demand deposits put in banks represent only 47.1 percent.

This phenomenon is in contrast to the transaction means used in the advanced countries which attach greater significance to bank accounts than to currency circulation.

2. Semi-Currency

The semi-currency [shibh al-naqd] volume grew by 37 percent in 1979 compared to 19 percent in 1978. This percentage is high when compared with the growth of the currency liquidity (8.7 percent).

The set-term deposits increased by 14 percent, compared to 25 percent in 1978. These deposits form 63 percent of the total semi-currency whereas they represented 75.7 percent in 1978.

Chart No 4. Comparative Increase in Currency Volume
(Changes in Liquidity)

	End of 1978		End of 1979	
	Value	Percentage	Value	Percentage
Currency liquidity increase	1,086	21.4	536	8.7
Money in circulation	557	20.4	220	6.6
Money assets	529	22.6	316	11.0
Increase in semi-money	1,770	19.0	4,101	37.0
Set-term deposits	1,669	25.0	1,191	14.0
Foreign currency deposits	101	4.0	2,910	108.0
Increase in currency volume	2,856	19.8	4,601	26.7

Deposits in foreign currency recorded an enormous increase amounting to 108 percent whereas this increase amounted to only 4 percent in 1978. The total value of these deposits in the semi-currency rose from 24.3 percent in 1978 to 37 percent in 1979.

This phenomenon is due to two reasons:

First, the decline in private investment and its refrainment from embarking on the construction of new projects because of the high costs and the turbulent security.

Second, the rise in the interest rates paid for foreign currency.

This large increase in the foreign assets has led to curtailing the increase in the currency liquidity which has come to represent only 30.6 percent of the currency volume whereas it represented 35.7 percent of this volume in 1978.

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CSO: 4802

FOREIGN TRADE ACTIVITY FOR 1979 REVIEWED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 30 Jun 80 p 7

[Article: "Beirut Chamber (of Commerce and Industry) Report on Foreign Trade in 1979; Exports Total 2.698 Billion Lebanese Pounds, Reexports 940 Million and Imports 7.8 Billion; Lebanese Economy Missed Opportunity Worth Billions of Pounds Because of Security Crises"]

[Text] The Economic Studies and Documentation Center of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry has issued a report on the 1979 foreign trade--a practice which the center established last year. It is learned from this report that the value of the 1979 Lebanese exports amounted to 2.698 billion Lebanese pounds and the value of reexported goods amounted to 940.4 million Lebanese pounds compared to imports amounting in value to 7.8 billion Lebanese pounds.

The report relies in its estimates on the fact that the goods exported in accordance with a certificate of origin issued by the Beirut Chamber of Commerce represent 65 percent of the value of the Lebanese exports and that the customs fees collected for imported goods range from 8 to 10 percent.

With the improved security conditions at the outset of 1977, the Lebanese exports experienced continuous monthly increases. The monthly export rate for the second half of 1977 amounted to 240 million Lebanese pounds. It had been expected that these exports would rise to much higher rates in 1978 as a result of the capital spending aimed at rebuilding the 25 percent of the production capacity destroyed during the 2-year war and at setting up new projects.

But the period of security did not last and the frequent, intensifying and longer security setbacks in 1978 had a direct negative impact on the export volume and on the immunity of the production structures. The average export rate in the second half of 1978 dropped to the level at which it had started at the beginning of 1977. It seems as if the Lebanese economy has become the captive of the initial maelstrom and that whenever it looks as if this economy is about to awaken, something develops to obstruct its march.

1/2 [sic], Drop in Industry To Rebuild Production:

It is evident from the monthly development of the 1979 Lebanese exports that these exports were not able to make up for the losses incurred as a result of the destruction of the installations in 1978 and of the bitter security gulps with which the economic activity is still choking. The highest monthly export rate in 1979 amounted to 221 million pounds, at the 1977 prices, whereas the comparative rate in 1977 amounted to 277 million Lebanese pounds. This shows that the immunity of the production structures dropped to levels below those of 1977 and this poses a threat to the future of production in Lebanon. It may be beneficial to estimate the volume of the direct export losses in 1978 and 1979 if the security situation had not deteriorated after 1977.

1/3, Estimate of Direct Losses in Export Volume as Result of Security Setbacks:

It is evident from the available figures that the Lebanese exports passed through four phases in the past 3 years:

First phase: January-July 1977 or the phase of a breather in the first 3 months and then of a rapid and solid upsurge at a rate of 210 million pounds monthly.

Second phase: July 1977-June 1978 phase which was characterized by stability when the exports remained unchanged despite some security setbacks, beginning with February 1978. The average monthly value of the exports in this phase amounted to 225 million pounds.

Third phase: The August 1978-October 1978 phase in which the average monthly exports dropped to 10 million pounds. This phase was characterized by a rapid drop in the value of the exports as a result of the total and partial destruction caused to the production installations and to stoppage of work in the Beirut Port which is the most important fundamental facility to the Lebanese economy because it constitutes a gate for the importation of the raw materials and equipment necessary to continue the production process. This situation led to a drop in the exports from 225 million pounds [monthly] in the preceding phase to 10 million pounds in this phase.

Fourth phase: November 1978-December 1979 or the new preparatory phase in which the exports rose constantly but at small rates and without reaching the 1977 levels.

The lesson we can conclude is that if the Lebanese economy had not been dealt constant blows as a result of the security setbacks, beginning with al-Fayyadiyah incident in February 1978, it would have been possible for the Lebanese producers to embark on capital spending in a period of

stability and this would have realized a vast step in making up for the loss incurred by the economy as a result of the 2-year events. It is possible to make a report on the export profits lost in 1978 and 1979.

The average monthly value of the exports amounted to 161 million pounds in 1978 and 225 million pounds in 1979 whereas it could have risen to 237 million pounds at least--an average which the exports achieved in the last quarter of 1977 and the first quarter of 1978. Thus, it is possible that the 1978 and 1979 exports could have amounted to 5.7 billion pounds instead of 3.713 billion pounds.

The direct loss in exports thus amounts to 5.700-3.713 = 1.987 billion Lebanese pounds at the 1977 prices or 2.514 billion Lebanese pounds at the current prices. Considering that the volume of industrial exports represents 60 percent of the production volume (after the events), then the profit missed is 4.19 billion Lebanese pounds.

2. Most Important Types of Exports

2/1 Importance of Industrial Exports: Despite the enormous losses and damage incurred by the industrial installations and equipment. Lebanon is still distinguished from other developing countries by the diversity of its exports on the one hand and by the importance of its industrial exports in comparison to its total exports on the other hand.

Due to the lack of data on industrial production, it is beneficial to make these observations:

Domination of the four conventional sectors by nearly 70 percent, meaning the following by these sectors:

1. The food industries
2. The textile industry
3. Furniture and wood products
4. Construction materials.

The progress realized by the industry through the introduction of some nonconventional industries, such as chemical industries, aluminum and plastic products and transportation equipment, indicates a decline in the domination of the conventional industries.

A rise in the ratio of exports to production from 25 percent before the events to nearly 45 percent at present. (Exports of manufactured Lebanese goods were estimated at 45 percent in 1974 and at 60 [sic] percent after the events as a result of the competition from smuggled goods and the drop in production. This casts doubts on the percentages presented by the report.)

2/2 Types of Exported Goods:

It is evident from an analysis of the chamber statistics concerning Beirut and Mount Lebanon that the most important exports are:

Manufactured goods used in construction: 610 million Lebanese pounds representing 34.8 percent of the total exports with certificates of origin approved by the Chamber of Commerce, compared to 445 million Lebanese pounds in 1978.

Ordinary metals and their products: 267.8 million Lebanese pounds.

Stone, ceramic and glass products: 172.6 pounds.

Mineral products (cement) [sic]: 170.4 million pounds.

Chemical industry products: 287.5 million pounds, compared to 191 million pounds in 1978.

Textiles: 194 million pounds, compared to 152 million pounds in the preceding year.

Paper and paper products: 113 million pounds, compared to 110 million in 1978.

Alcohol and food industry products: 123 million pounds, compared to 74 million in 1978.

3. Markets of Lebanese Exports:

The tightness of the local market and the strong foreign competition against the Lebanese products have urged the Lebanese industries to turn toward exportation, especially to the Arab markets.

Despite the fierce competition facing the Lebanese products, these products still enjoy the ability to reach their traditional Arab markets, especially the markets of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq and the Gulf countries.

3/1 Exports by Beirut and Mount Lebanon:

The following chart concerning the exports with certificate of origin approved by the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry and representing nearly 65 percent of the total Lebanese exports shows that 91.4 percent of total exports flow to the Arab markets whereas this percentage was around 54 percent in 1974.

Through a comparison with similar exports in 1978, we notice the following:

A. Decline of 5.1 percent in the exports to Jordan, of 2.9 percent in the exports to Kuwait, 1.9 percent in the exports to the Gulf and a decline of 1 percent in the exports to Saudi Arabia.

A rise of 7.4 percent in the exports to Iraq and of 2.7 percent in the exports to Syria.

B. Re-exportation of Goods of Foreign Origin Approved by the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry

The reexportation figures with which this report deals are confined to Beirut and Mount Lebanon because the origin of their reexports is approved by the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

1. Development of Exports of Foreign Origin:

Despite the 1978 events and their impact, the exportation of goods of foreign origin continued to rise in the past 3 years, increasing by 33 percent in 1978 and by 42 percent in 1979 and amounting in value to 940 million Lebanese pounds or the equivalent of 54 percent of the exports of Lebanese origin.

2. Most Important Reexported Commodities:

The most important reexported commodities are:

Animal kingdom products: 20 percent
Electrical machinery, equipment and appliances: 12 percent
Lumber: 11 percent
Ordinary metals: 9 percent
Textiles: 9 percent
Transportation equipment: 9 percent.

Geographical Distribution of Source and Destination of Exports of Foreign Origin:

The source of most of the reexported goods is the industrial countries:

The EEC: 41 percent
The Comecon [the Socialist Common Market]: 25 percent
The United States 17 percent.

The destination of 93 percent of the reexported goods is the Arab countries.

Second: Commodity Imports

In view of the delay in issuing foreign trade statistics based on customs data and in view of the increased smuggling in 1979, we have relied on various sources in assessing the Lebanese imports:

A. The foreign trade statistics of the most important countries exporting to Lebanon (such as France, United States, England, FRG and Japan).

A total of 45 to 55 percent of Lebanon's imports in past years relied on the markets of these countries. These imports rose in 1979 to 3.833 billion Lebanese pounds, compared to 2.344 billion pounds and 2.13 billion pounds in 1978 and 1977 respectively, i.e. with an increase of 63 percent over 1978.

B. Customs imports: The customs imports rose in 1979 to 682 million pounds, compared to 541 million pounds and 481 million pounds in 1978 and 1977 respectively, i.e. with an increase of 26 percent and 42 percent over the preceding 2 years.

The customs imports in preceding years represented 10 to 11 percent of the total goods imported. But increased importation through illegal ports is likely to reduce this percentage to 8-9 percent.

On the basis of the aforementioned, Lebanon's commodity imports in 1979 range from 7.3 billion pounds to 7.8 billion pounds, compared to 5.2 billion in 1978 and 4.5 billion in 1977.

Third: 1980 Expectations

A. At Level of Imports: Increased national production and rapid growth in this production are tied to a large degree to the volume of imports. Lebanon used to import 50 percent more than its production to meet its consumption, production and exportation needs.

The imports are distributed as follows:

Nearly 35 percent in intermediate goods (raw materials and semiprocessed goods).

Nearly 40 percent for consumption (goods ready for immediate consumption).

Nearly 12 percent for investment (capital goods).

Nearly 13 percent for reexportation.

In view of Lebanon's rising needs after the war, whether for consumption or investment, it is most likely that imports will rise in both quality and quantity:

1. Insofar as the first category imports (raw materials and semiprocessed goods) are concerned, the Lebanese industry used to rely on these imports by nearly 60 percent. It is most likely that this percentage will rise in the coming years to 70-75 percent as a result of the destruction of some of the local industries producing semiprocessed goods and of the stoppage of others.

2. Insofar as the second category of imports (consumer goods) are concerned, 60 percent of the local market's needs of consumer goods were secured through local production and 40 percent through imports. It is expected that the demand for foodstuffs and consumer goods generally will increase in future years.

3. Insofar as the third category (investment) is concerned, the Lebanese economy's needs for capital goods, whether for the purpose of setting up new plants or for modernizing existing installations, are large. Therefore, it is most likely that there will be a big increase in the importation of equipment, electrical machinery and means of transportation.

It is worth noting that machinery and equipment valued at 419 million Lebanese pounds was imported in 1979 and this shows that there is a broad opportunity for investment in the production sectors when the right atmosphere prevails. After implementation of the decree on the 400 million dollar loan, most of which is set aside for the industrial establishments, it is expected that the investment activity will forge ahead with greater momentum, especially if national detente is established.

All these indications show that the year 1980 is likely to witness an enormous rise in the volume of investments--a volume that may exceed 2.5 billion pounds--because there are repressed capabilities that are waiting for the right time to march forth.

Thus, the faster the Lebanese economic growth, the greater the imports will be.

B. At Level of Exports

As for exports, their volume is tied to increased imports and foreign markets on the one hand and to the dynamic character of the exporters on the other. It is evident that Lebanon's traditional markets in the Arab world are still open for Lebanon's exports in view of the rising needs of these markets.

C. At Level of Balance of Trade

In view of the aforementioned, the deficit in the balance of trade will increase in future years. This deserves a comment.

The surplus services constituted in the past nearly one-quarter of the national income. As a result of the events and of the successive security setbacks, the rate of the economic activity with foreign sources in the national economy's structure has risen to 45 percent. This means that a little less than one-half the income distributed and consumed in Lebanon is the outcome of production activities outside the borders

Added to this are the expenditures by foreigners, the transit activity and the remittances by expatriate Lebanese, all of which generate an increased consumer demand in the local market.

In view of the fact that the production of goods paralleling these incomes has been carried out abroad, these goods have to be imported to establish a balance. Therefore, the deficit in the Lebanese balance of trade does not constitute an unhealthy situation, contrary to what is rumored. The attempt to reduce this deficit is legitimate but the possibility of eliminating the deficit altogether is a pure illusion. As long as it is possible to remit these incomes to Lebanon--and these remittances constitute a fundamental element in Lebanon's economic prosperity--it is necessary to import a volume of goods equal to these incomes. In contrast, when these incomes drop, the deficit in the balance of payments will drop automatically.

It is worth noting here that the drop in the tourist and transit movement as a result of the Lebanese tragedy is largely made up for through the remittances from the Lebanese working in the Arab countries whose numbers, incomes and remittances to their families living in Lebanon--this country which currently has one-third its workforce outside the borders--have doubled during the events.

Lebanese Exports (In million Lebanese pounds)

	1977	1978	1979
At current prices	2,365	1,930	2,698
At 1977 prices	2,365	1,755	2,133
Estimate of price indicator at time of exportation	100	110	126.5

Monthly Development of Exports of Foreign Origin [Reexports] (Beirut and Mount Lebanon--In million Lebanese pounds)

Month	1977	1978	1979
January	15.5	65.8	49.2
February	16.1	63.2	46.7
March	20.0	67.5	81.4
April	23.5	61.2	73.6
May	30.0	75.7	72.7
June	27.7	79.7	88.8
July	36.7	37.7	90.4
August	49.9	52.5	111.2
September	52.0	50.8	69.8
October	109.0	39.2	82.8
November	17.7	40.5	89.9
December	46.3	27.9	74.9
Totals	498.4	662.3	940.4

Comparison Between Exports of Lebanese and Foreign Origin in 1977, 1978 and 1979 (Beirut and Mount Lebanon--In million Lebanese pounds)

Year	Lebanese Origin (1)	Foreign Origin (2)	Percentage 2/1
1977	1,537	498	33
1978	1,252	662	53
1979	1,754	940	54

Reexports and Exports with Certificate of Origin Approved by Beirut Chamber of Commerce According to Sections of Customs List (In thousand Lebanese pounds)

Section		Reexports	Exports
1.	Livestock and animal kingdom products	61,638	7,876
2.	Plant kingdom products	184,984	107,984
3.	Animal and vegetable fats, oils and animal waste	1,502	9,780
4.	Food industry products, alcohols	26,007	123,175
5.	Metal products	11,026	170,473
6.	Products of chemical and related industries	88,712	287,500
7.	Synthetic (ratinjat) and plastics, rubber	15,071	52,247
8.	Leathers, fur leathers and their products, travel requirements	3,141	15,939
9.	Lumber, charcoal, wood products	99,400	16,504
10.	Paper and paper products	21,011	113,284
11.	Textiles and their products	88,417	194,336
12.	Shoes, headgear, umbrellas and products made of human hair	2,703	22,919
13.	Stone, gypsum, cement and asbestos products, ceramic products, glass and glass products	26,565	172,016
14.	Pearls, precious and semiprecious stones, precious metals and fake jewelry	7,029	40,402
15.	Ordinary metals and their products	95,383	267,869
16.	Machinery and equipment, electrical equipment	109,074	105,290
17.	Transportation equipment	81,139	25,111

[continued]

18. Visual equipment and apparatuses	10,088	2,731
19. Weapons and ammunition	54	8
20. Miscellaneous industrial products not included under any other section	7,384	18,089
21. Art pieces, collector articles and historical pieces	66	238
Totals	940,400	1,753,560

Estimate of Geographic Distribution of Lebanon's Total Exports in 1977, 1978 and 1979 (In million Lebanese pounds)

	1977		1978		1979	
Country	Value	Percent	Value	Percent	Value	Percent
Saudi Arabia	943	40	701	36	998	37
Kuwait	124	5	96	5	108	3.5
Iraq	118	5	170	9	405	15.0
Syria	259	11	174	9	350	13.0
Jordan	212	9	217	11	188	7.0
Gulf	118	5	72	4	117	4.5
Other Arab countries	236	10	154	8	212	8.0
Foreign countries	355	15	347	18	320	12.0

Value of Reexports with Certificate of Origin Approved by Beirut Chamber of Commerce According to Country of Origin and Destination (In thousand Lebanese pounds)

	Country of Origin		Country of Destination	
Countries	Value	Percent	Value	Percent
Asia	111,591	2	18,634	2
Africa	8,764	-	12,930	1
America	153,247	17	629	-
Australia	24,458	3	--	-
Europe	386,092	41	29,107	3
Western European Market	283,612	30	9,540	1
Free Trade Zone	46,943	5	14,795	2
Comecon	181,959	35	1,342	-
Arab Countries	74,293	9	877,758	93
Totals [all figures as published]	940,400	100	940,400	100

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CSO: 4802

LIBYA ANTICIPATES EGYPTIAN ATTACK PLANNED BY U.S.

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 30 Jun 80 pp 1, 14

[Interview with Muhammad Mahmud Hijazi, Secretary of the Libyan General People's Committee for Information, by Ahmad Isfahani, in Damascus; date not given]

[Text] Libyan information officer tells AL-SAFIR:

"We expect an Egyptian military attack within a month.

"We will face Sadat with a united front until we bring him down.

"Al-Assad assures us that national boundaries will cease to exist if we are attacked."

The secretary of the Libyan General People's Committee for Information, Muhammad Mahmud Hijazi, denied that Libya has built any barriers, walls, or fortified military lines on its borders with Egypt. He invited observers and journalists to go to the border area to see the situation for themselves.

Hijazi said in an interview with AL-SAFIR in Damascus, during his participation in the emergency conference of Arab cultural ministers, that current Egyptian moves on the Egyptian-Libyan border represent the second phase of the Camp David agreements. A confrontation between the Libyan and Egyptian armies is a matter to be reckoned with, perhaps soon.

Hijazi pointed out that Libya will not start an attack against Egypt, because the Libyan people are committed to Arab unity. However, Libya will repel any act of aggression against its people in self-defense. He said that the issue is not at present purely Libyan, but rather a pan-Arab one, and that President Hafiz al-Assad has assured him that the entire Arab nation will come to Libya's aid if the latter is attacked.

The following is the text of the interview:

[Question] The Egyptian media continues to issue threats to Libya, and there has been an escalation in this media campaign. What is the nature of the current situation on the Egyptian-Libyan border in the light of these threats?

[Answer] Of course, you know well the nature of this issue and of the Egyptian build-up on the border with Libya. Going back to 1977, we find that, before Sadat's shameful visit and surrender to Israel, he waged a lightning war against Libya. Before this, there was a concentrated Egyptian media campaign alleging that Egyptians working in Libya were harassed and badly treated, and demanding that they be protected. At that time, Sadat was trying to find any excuse for a war with Libya. This was part of a plan concocted by American imperialism and world Zionism, and Sadat was the tool for its implementation.

The same programmed events of 1977, which were followed by Sadat's visit to the Zionist entity and his signing of the Camp David agreements, have started all over again. Not long ago, the Egyptian regime announced a one year state of emergency on the Egyptian-Libyan border. The purpose of this announcement was to mass the Egyptian armies, including the second army, on the border. The announcement was accompanied by an escalation in the statements of Egyptian authorities, from Sadat on down to the vice-president, the minister of defense, and senior commanders of the army. An Egyptian media campaign alleged that Col Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi said in his speech of 11 June 1980 that the Libyan army would henceforth point all its weapons toward Egypt and its army. The truth is that this was never said by Qadhdhafi in his speech. On the contrary, the Libyan position on this issue remains the same as in 1977, when we announced that the Egyptians on our border were our brothers and we would never fight them. We said that we were willing to provide them with provisions and food, and we actually did so at that time.

It is clear from Commander Qadhdhafi's speech of 11 June and a recent announcement of the Libyan foreign affairs office, that Libya has declared that Egyptian soldiers on our border are our kin, brothers, and relatives. Libya would not aim weapons against them, unless they commence fighting, in which case it would be a matter of self-defense. We will not fight Egypt, and we have total confidence that the Egyptian army is not completely an agent of Sadat and Zionism.

There are undoubtedly many Arab nationalists in the ranks of the Egyptian army, and they are working against Sadat within Egypt.

American Maneuvers

Our present belief is that the United States has prepared a program for an attack on Libya at this time. We expect direct military confrontation with Egypt, particularly next month when joint maneuvers of the American Air Force and Egyptian military forces take place. America has mobilized extensive resources for these maneuvers, in addition to the weapons which

have started pouring into Egypt via an airlift recently established by the U.S.

These maneuvers at this particular time, particularly following the massing of Egyptian forces against Libya, are very meaningful as far as we are concerned. For this reason, our first action was to issue a statement to public opinion, in which we emphasized that we were not prepared to fight our brothers. However, Sadat's action in proclaiming a state of emergency is a unilateral declaration of war. Egyptian preparations are under way in this direction.

The political committee of the pan-Arab front for steadfastness and resistance met and took several positive decisions in keeping with the resolution of the front's recent summit conference that an attack on any country of the front would constitute an attack on all member countries. World public opinion was on Libya's side in the face of the Egyptian threats, as were our Arab brethern in Syria, Democratic Yemen, and Saudi Arabia. These countries showed their solidarity with the Libyan people and issued official communiques condemning the Egyptian threats against Libya.

Confrontation Probable

[Question] This being so, do you expect the next stage to result in an Egyptian-Libyan military clash similar to what happened in 1977?

[Answer] Experience assures us of that, particularly the 1977 experience, when Libyans awoke one morning to find that Egyptian forces had crossed the border, were waging a lightning war, and were attacking the Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir Air Base at Tobruq with military aircraft.

[Question] What preparations is Libya making against this expected Egyptian attack?

[Answer] I pointed to the political side of these in my thorough answer to the first question. In this regard, we are trying to explain to public opinion the nature of the wild Egyptian press campaign, and the meaning of the threats made by the Egyptian authorities. We have also clarified our position of not starting a war except in self-defense. As to the military side of these preparations, I can assure you that we possess sufficient resources to repel any military attack from any direction.

[Question] Do you think that this Egyptian position is the start of a new phase of the plan to implement the Camp David conspiracy?

[Answer] This is true. The Egyptian mobilization against Libya falls within the plans laid at Camp David, and violent Egyptian attacks on Libya represent the second phase of this conspiracy. The fact is that various other phases of this conspiracy may in the future affect member countries of the steadfastness front.

Oil

[Question] Do you think there are reasons which drive Egypt against Libya other than the Camp David conspiracy against steadfastness front countries? Perhaps an Egyptian desire to take over oil wells in border areas?

[Answer] Of course there is an Egyptian movement in this direction. This is also part of the Camp David program. Sadat and officials of his regime claim that Libyan petroleum exceeds the needs of the Libyan people, and that it is not right that the "small" Libyan population should enjoy such great wealth; instead, this wealth should go to the "large" Egyptian population. Indeed, some Egyptian officials claim that Libyan petroleum should go to the "superior people." They mean by this the Egyptian people.

[Question] To what extent did the decisions of the emergency conference of foreign ministers of the steadfastness front represent an appropriate answer to the threats to Libya?

[Answer] These decisions show that Libya is not alone. They also show that confrontation with the Egyptian regime is not solely a Libyan concern, but a comprehensive pan-Arab confrontation concerning the entire Arab nation.

[Question] That is political, but what about steps on the military front?

Al-Assad's Assurances

[Answer] Of course, steps have been taken by the political committee of the steadfastness front in the military field. Yesterday, during our meeting with Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad, the president assured us that national geographic boundaries would cease to exist in the event of an Egyptian attack on Libya, and that all Arabs would join the Libyans in battle with all their strength. Other steadfastness front countries have assured us of the same thing.

Everyone knows that Libya has friends and brothers all over the world. The Libyan people are naturally committted to Arab unity and have no intention of attacking Egypt. It is Sadat who has decided to fight us, and it is he who has decided to declare war. If Sadat actually ignites a war, he will face a united Arab front under which the Libyan and Egyptian peoples will unite to bring him down. We do not think our brothers and friends will fail us in this battle.

Detailed military plans regarding the Sadat regime and its threats against Libya await future developments.

[Question] Do you think that this new phase of Egyptian threats is part of the role assigned by American imperialism to the Egyptian regime in the African continent?

[Answer] The truth is that American and world Zionism have laid a new plan to control the wealth of this area and destroy all national forces and liberation movements in it. The Egyptian regime has been given the role of a policeman in Africa. Indeed, Sadat has done all he was asked to do, for he fought in Zaire and Chad in the name of, and as a representative of, imperialism. He has always said that "Egypt has a responsibility in Africa to protect the interests of imperialism, multinational corporations, and world monopolies."

Sadat asked the African countries to resume relations with the Zionists, after they severed them following the October 1973 war. However, the African nations refused. Sadat is playing a dangerous and destructive role in the Arab world; on the border with Libya; in the conspiracy against Lebanon and against the Iranian revolution, since American planes took off from Egyptian bases to attack Iran; and finally, in the conspiracy against third world nations, African countries, and the cause of freedom everywhere.

The "Libyan Wall"

[Question] The Egyptian media dwells on what it calls a "defensive line" or "big wall" which Libya is said to be building on the border with Egypt. What is the truth about this?

[Answer] This is totally untrue. The Libyan people are committed to Arab unity and would never agree to such artificial borders. During the previous Libyan regime, someone in the army named Abu Wishah wanted to build a big wall between Libya from Egypt. Our position at the time was to totally reject that project. We said that we were committed to Arab unity and could not build any "wall" or "defensive line" to separate Arab nations. Everything that the Egyptian media says about a "big wall" or "new Barlev line" in Libya is lies.

We invite all journalists seeking the truth to visit Libya and inspect border posts, so as to see that these claims are lies. A group of BBC newsmen recently visited the border area and saw for themselves that there is no wall there. The BBC group was accompanied by Abdallah al-Maqri, director for foreign information. They went as close as 15 kilometers from the Egyptian positions, and briefly crossed the international border to observe Egyptian military movements.

Finally, I wish to emphasize that Libyan forces have no aggressive intentions, and that Libya has not sent any additional forces to the border lately. Any journalist can check this fact with his own eyes. We will not attack Egyptian forces, but we will fiercely defend ourselves if attacked.

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CSO: 4802

'LIBERATION' SUMS UP ASSEMBLY SESSION RESULTS

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 18 Jul 80 pp 2-3

[Article: "Parliament Reckoning: A Blocking 'Majority'"]

[Text] Following the closure of the April 1980 session of the House of Representatives, the deputies representing the Ittihadia opposition issued a communique (for the full text see EL MOUHARRIR No 1,922 of 17 July 1980), a summary of which follows:

The Ittihadia opposition reminds, first of all, of the content of its letter addressed to the president of the parliament on the eve of the opening of the spring session, which denounced the inability, carelessness and paralysis afflicting this representative institution of the nation in the face of the real problems experienced by the deprived masses, in general, and the vital questions such as the integration of the Saharian provinces, in particular.

The proceedings of the April session confirmed the fears of the opposition, namely that the "majority" has proven its total ignorance of the deep aspirations and real needs of the people's masses and of the most important national problems, supporting through its presence the policy of the exploiting class which has imposed an official democratic system represented by the existence of a parliament elected under conditions of the known desires of the people and which would like to perpetuate forever this vanished House.

The Ittihadia opposition then analyzes the results of the proceedings of the April session drawing the following conclusions:

1. The parliament totally failed to address itself to the crucial problems of the greatest interest in the struggle waged by the Moroccan nation against the enemies of territorial integrity and the future of the Moroccan people in the political, economic, social and culture domains. The solution of said problems would allow the country to come out of the crisis and lead to a true mobilization of all the vital forces of the nation in the face of the hegemonistic aspirations of Morocco's enemies.

2. The "majority" systematically opposed all draft bills, particularly those of a social nature which could somewhat alleviate the misery of the popular masses. Thus for example the opposition submitted a bill on rentals, hoping to reduce real estate speculation and provide tenants with some guarantees. The motion was fiercely opposed by the majority, which ended by imposing a text based on the principle of the freedom of contract. This means the legalizing of speculation and the continuous rise of rentals.

3. In order to fill the vacuum, three different draft bills were submitted to parliament:

A. Several draft laws favoring individuals or funded agencies without the prior resolution of the control problem. This proves the inability of the rulers to assume full and total responsibility. Let us cite within this framework texts governing the manufacturing, delivery and sales of pharmaceuticals by veterinarians, the creation of the Casablanca airport office, and the justice auxiliary corps.

B. "Theoretical" draft laws based on the fact that the government failed to consider both financial and material conditions for the necessary manpower for the implementation of such legislation. This is also the case of laws regarding the protection of historical monuments, works of art or the audit office.

C. The entirely formal amendments made to previous laws, not worth mentioning here.

Let us recall along this line, since it is a question of draft laws, the draft law on the organization of the referendum. In the course of the debates on the matter, the opposition deputies expressed most specific reservations as to stipulations which could facilitate fraud and falsification of the will of the people. The results of the 30 May 1980 referendum justified this fear. Nevertheless, while noting with satisfaction the participation in the referendum of the troops of the Royal Armed Forces, the members of the auxiliary forces, and police immigrant elements, the opposition demanded that this right be extended to legislative and local consultations; it also proposed that the voting age be lowered to 18.

4. Verbal interpolations, allowing the deputies to start a real dialog with the executive, based on control over governmental activities. The fact alone that the delay of answers, sometimes in excess of two years, and the required procedure which eliminates any debate, have resulted in the fact that the Thursday sessions are of no interest whatever. This resulted in motions submitted by the deputies. However, the growing number of such motions has made it impossible for parliament to debate them, whereas over the last two weeks of the session some resolutions were put on the agenda. This violated the stipulations of the rules of order, or else led to the pure and simple creation, even if considered in their broadest possible context, of new procedures having nothing in common with said rules.

5. Report on the consideration by the House of some draft bills passed by specialized committees. Let us cite the case of the draft bill on the exclusive economic zone: The government postponed sine die the study of the draft which was part of the agenda without citing any valid reason. Furthermore, we know that the government's plan replaced the opposition's motion which had remained blocked for two years! This system has been used in other situations, such as, for example, the draft bills on eminent domain expropriations or the real estate investments code.

6. The action of the opposition deputies, even though it is within the limits of its constitutional rights, seems considerably to bother the officials in charge, who, at the last session, resumed their policy of repression, threats and vague promises, instead of answering questions. That is what happened in the course of the debates on the development of the 30 May 1980 referendum, which was boycotted by the people's masses. The embarrassment of the "majority" leadership was exposed also through the repeated violations of the stipulations of the parliamentary rules, for the implementation of said stipulations would have proved the total failure of the government's antipeople's policy.

7. On the basis of the items on the agenda, in the course of the debate on oral questions and motions, the Ittihadia opposition was able to prove the antipeople's nature of the government's policy in the economic, social and cultural areas, a policy of dependence which led to the aggravation of the recession. Thus the deputies of the USFP [Socialist Union of People's Forces] opposed raising the prices of petroleum products. This indicates the absence of an overall strategy in the energy sector, particularly in the case of a nonpetroleum producing country, and the nature of the structures of revenues and taxes in the budget. This governmental decision equally ignored the nefarious consequences which could follow on the economic and social levels, particularly since Morocco is currently facing quite unfavorable circumstances. The opposition deputies took this opportunity to ask for a raise in salaries, since the purchasing power of the working class was affected by the government's decision.

Furthermore, the Ittihadia opposition denounced the government's policy toward Moroccan workers abroad who are exploited by both capitalist companies and the Moroccan administrative machinery.

In the course of the debates on relations between Morocco and the European Economic Community, the USFP deputies analyzed the real nature of trade between our country and the EEC members and all resulting difficulties, thus proving the dependence of the Moroccan economy. They called for a new strategy which would free the country economically.

Finally, in the final session, the USFP deputies submitted oral and written questions to the ministers, published in EL MOHARRIR, in the defense of the interests of the nation, in general, and of the working class, in particular, in all areas and, above all, in the areas of housing, agriculture and education.

8. Let us note a number of very important motions which were not entered in the agenda of the plenary sessions by the House of Representatives bureau or debates on which were avoided by the government:

A. A motion submitted by the Ittihadia opposition on the situation in our recovered provinces and on the policy of the government in the diplomatic, military and information areas. The opposition used several opportunities to recall the existence of said motion and demand a debate on the question so that parliament could play its natural role of supervising governmental policy in this area.

B. An opposition motion demanding of the government the implementation of the decision of the International Labor Office on the reintegration of education and health employees. On this matter, while noting that the government and "its majority" have systematically refused to assume their responsibilities and have avoided discussing the problem, the opposition noted the decision of His Majesty the King to compensate for the wrongs inflicted on trade union members for launching a legitimate strike, thus meeting the wishes of the democratic forces both inside and outside Morocco.

C. An opposition motion on a review of the practices used by the Moroccan Radio and Television in broadcasting parliamentary debates. However, the "majority" refused to grant priority to this motion, despite its importance.

D. A motion on the poor results of the first session of the baccalaureate examinations, a motion which was "buried," for its debate would have led to the formulation of a new education policy. However, this did not prevent the opposition from letting its viewpoint on this subject be publicly known through the AL MOUHARRIR daily.

E. A letter addressed by the Ittihadia opposition to the president of the House of Representatives, requesting him to set up an investigation commission to study the discrepancy between the official results of the 30 May 1980 referendum and the factual participation of the voters, both at home and abroad. The opposition based this request on the precedent of the formation of an investigation commission in 1979 following the scandal of baccalaureate "leaks." However, the negative answer of the president of the parliament prevented the latter to assume its expected role in a matter of such great vitality and interest affecting Moroccan democracy.

9. Despite the imposed political restrictions and the fact that parliament failed to discuss a single draft bill submitted by the Ittihadia opposition (rentals, lowering of the voting age to 18, public freedoms, civilian and military pensions, labor accidents and the exclusive zone) the USFP deputies insisted on submitting several bills including the following:

A. A draft bill amending the law on referendums, calling for the lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18. The "majority" voted against the motion.

B. A draft bill on the Moroccan Radio and Television status, thus preventing it from being monopolized by the executive power and putting it under democratic and national management.

C. A draft bill to nationalize cereal imports, thus enabling the National Cereals Office to play its full role and put an end to the harmful activities of some speculating middlemen.

D. A draft bill to nationalize steel and iron imports, which would enable the National Iron and Steel Company to assume its responsibilities and thus put an end to the monopoly exercised in this area by several foreign enterprises, partially, "Moroccanized."

10. The Ittihadia opposition continued its efforts of the last session to defend the rights and gains of political prisoners and allow the mixed commission in charge of their problems to assume its responsibilities with a view to demanding of the officials a revision of detention conditions in their material, medical, cultural and psychological aspects. However, the opposition remains convinced that the main objective is the release of all political detainees and the return of exiles to the home country.

In conclusion, the results of the last session--particularly on the qualitative level--were laughable. They were due to two factors:

1. The "sterility" and inability of the "majority" to be able to fully play its role within parliament. This is explained by the fact that the hetergeneous "majority" achieved in the familiar conditions of falsifying the people's will and electoral fraud, has a very weak structure.

2. The lack of control over the executive branch by the House of Representatives. In effect, the government is avoiding all discussions and does not take very seriously the work of parliament (several ministers were absent during the debates, including the prime minister, who failed to attend a single meeting of the last session, lack of initiative on the part of officials, and their inability to confront the problems facing the nation).

It is undeniable that the boycott (supported by the USFP) by the popular masses of the 30 May 1980 referendum may be explained by the steady failure of parliamentary work. Therefore, the Moroccan people have condemned the falsification of its will and the "false" official democracy, and are opposing all policy of impoverishment and governmental irresponsibility.

The opposition pledges to continue the struggle on the side of the popular forces and in favor of the working class in order to abolish exploitation and enable the people to intensify their struggle for the defense of Moroccan territorial integrity.

The inadequacies of the representative institution not withstanding, the USFP deputies pledge to denounce the domination of the exploiting class and to use the parliament as one of the fronts of the struggle in the political, economic and cultural areas for the triumph of the liberation, democracy and socialism.

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CSO: 4400

QADHDHAFI-ITES HAVE EVEN CONTRADICTED KORAN

Rabat L'OPINION in French 20 Jul 80 p 1

[Article by Abou Bakr Ali Kadiri: "Rescuing Islam from the Threat of the 'Qadhafi-ites'"]

[Text] No month can pass without hearing the echo of yet another vagary perpetrated against the Libyan Moslem people by the sinister hero of the incredible "Qadhdhafi-ites." When Colonel Qadhafi launched his socialist revolution against the fighting Senussi, he said that it was drawing its essence from the precepts of Islam and that it would work with a view to promoting an authentic Islamic resurrection. Years have passed since then proving to us the monstrous reality of this "innovator" who, to begin with, irresponsibly opposed the "Sunna," thus fulfilling the famous prophecy of Sidna Mohammed (May he be saved!), who said: "The day will come when someone will appear who will contest everything coming from the Prophet under the pretext of obeying the Holy Script."

His second coup was his flagrant intrusion into religious precepts by modifying the calling of the 'Al Asr" [evening] prayer.

Thirdly, and most seriously, it was his abolition of the Koranic expression "Say" which the colonel ? Imam consider an anachronism, since the "speaker" (the Prophet Mohammed) is no longer alive.

In a word, today we read in the 24 March 1980 issue of the newspaper GREEN ASSAULT, published by the Libyan "Revolutionary Committees," an article which is a masterpiece of atheism and a challenge to the entire Islamic nation. The title of the article makes its content absurdly clear: "God Alone Is the Enemy of Socialism." I shall skip the horrible and perfidious expressions with which the article abounds.

Thus, this challenge has reached its peak, and Qadhdhafi socialist revolution exposes its destructive reality which threatens the faith of the Islamic Libyan people.

There is no longer even a shadow of a doubt that this "revolution" is a state of war declared on Islam. Its targets have never stopped being the hegemonism, expansionism and destruction of the Islamic entity. It is high time for Islamic governments and peoples to rise against this plot and take the necessary measures to safeguard Islam in this fraternal country.

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MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON SOCIALIST PARTIES' CONFERENCE

Rabat L'OPINION in French 21 Jul 80 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Abdelhaq Tazi, member of the Executive Committee of the Istiklal Party and secretary of state for cadre training, conducted by Ahmed el-Fadili: "Political Pluralism and Democracy"]

[Text] Back from Tunis, where he was a member of the delegation of the Istiklal Party, headed by Mrs M'Hamed Boucetta, secretary general, and which included Hassan El Halcui, member of the Executive Committee, Abderrazak Afilal, secretary general of the UGTM [General Union of Moroccan Workers], and Mohamed Louafa, secretary general of the Istiklal Youth, who attended the constituent assembly of the Socialist Inter-African, Abdelhaq Tazi, member of the Executive Committee, was willing to grant us the following interview:

Question: Mr Minister, could you draw up a balance of the Tunis meeting?

Answer: The Tunis meeting, the fifth of its kind, since in 1975 the idea was born of setting up a body which would rally all socialist oriented parties and, above all, parties which believe in democracy and democratic socialism. Therefore, the idea was born in Tunis in the course of the 1975 meeting of African socialist parties. Since then other meetings have been held, either in the Tunisian capital or in Dakar to implement it.

In September 1978, in Dakar, we were on the point of announcing the establishment of the Socialist Inter-African, when certain events occurred, in particular the Jerusalem trip, which resulted in the fact that Egypt, which was one of the main partners in the creation of such an organization, defaulted.

Subsequently, we recently met to consider the conditions for the establishment of this Socialist Inter-African. Therefore, in addition to Tunisia, the meeting was attended by Senegal, Sudan, Mauritius and Morocco, which was represented by two parties, the Istiklal Party, naturally, included.

We decided to go forth this time and to establish contacts with some African countries which share our call, to invite them to participate in the constituent congress, either as full members, or as observers, in order to maintain contacts and see to it that our organization does not become a closed one but be open to any subsequent applicant.

Therefore, there is the will to succeed, which is a very positive element. The best proof is that we have decided on the date of the constituent congress, which will take place in Tunis, on 26, 27 and 28 February 1981, Tunisia having offered to host the congress.

In order to complete the preparations, on 3 and 4 December next we shall meet in Dakar to sum up the contacts with the other parties and draft the details of the Tunis congress.

Question: In addition to the parties which attended the Tunis meeting, which organizations could eventually join the Socialist Inter-African?

Answer: First, all the parties represented in Dakar in September 1978, which include, in addition to those I have already mentioned, the two Voltan organizations, since Upper Volta is currently a country with a pluralist system, and that the two main parties of that country have expressed the desire to join our organization and, therefore, will be automatically invited; this also includes the Mauritian Socialist Party, which has always attended our meetings, but was unable attend the one in Tunis, but will be present the next time.

Furthermore, we have considered 14 other organizations which will be approached by the Destourien Socialist Party (Tunisia), the Senegalese Socialist Party and Istiklal Party.

We shall be contacting Nigeria, which no longer has a military, but a civilian regime practicing party pluralism; we shall also see which of the Nigerian parties have a democratic and socialist orientation and could, therefore, join our organization. We shall equally contact Guinea, under President Sekou Toure, Somalia, and, finally, Kenya.

Question: Mr Tazi, what was the contribution of the Istiklal Party to the Tunis meeting?

Answer: As usual, and ever since the idea was formulated, the Istiklal Party has assiduously followed the preparatory meetings of the Socialist Inter-African. Thus we took active part in drafting the charter and the internal rules. We shall participate equally as in the past through the contacts which we intend to make with the fraternal parties in an effort to create this organization of democratic and socialist parties which believe in freedom and human rights and make it an organization which will serve the development of the African peoples and freedom.

Question: Could it be said, Mr Tazi, that the Socialist Inter-African will be used to counterbalance what has been accepted to describe as the bloc of "progressive" countries, for we note that all the parties which participated in the preparatory meetings, or which have been asked to join this organization afterwards, come from countries reputed to be "moderate"?

Answer: No, for from the very start we have insisted on eliminating any controversy and to stipulate that the Socialist Inter-African is not constituted by any specific group or aimed against any other party. At most, it is a family sharing a certain ethic and a certain view on life and, particularly, which supports the principles of freedom for all citizens (freedom of speech, freedom of opinion, freedom of affiliation, etc), and the defense of basic human rights, for we consider the defense and development of these rights of extreme importance.

We support human rights, political pluralism, freedom and democracy. These are the values and beliefs which unite us and which we would like to promote. However, we are not making an alliance against anyone. On the contrary, we leave the door open to anyone who shares such convictions and believes in these values and would wish to join us.

Question: In Tunis, Morocco was represented by two organizations: the Istiklal Party and the USFP [Socialist Union of People's Forces]; is there collaboration between these two organizations?

Answer: We have always attended jointly the preparatory meetings and, therefore, we have worked together and held discussions in the best possible atmosphere and, therefore, have worked for the same cause.

Question: The question faces, above all, the foreign observer who might be inclined to make the following remark: How is it that what unites the Istiklal Party and the USFP in meetings such as Tunis does not unite them on the domestic or national levels?

Answer: This situation may be traced by purely circumstantial reasons. We must not forget that we were united until the 1977 elections and it was at that point that we separately analyzed the situation and, consequently, selected our way with full awareness.

As far as we are concerned, we have decided to join the democratic process and to try to promote the democratic institutions. Conversely, our comrades have taken the opposite way. Naturally, they were free to choose the way they considered desirable.

Question: On the fringe of the Tunis meeting, the Istiklal delegation had contacts and talks with the leaders of the PSD [Destourien Socialist Party] . . . .

Answer: Yes, one may call such contacts almost traditional and natural, for very profound ties exist between the Destourien Socialist Party and the

Istiklal Party, developed in the course of the struggle against foreign occupation and, furthermore, the ties which linked President Habib Bourguiba and deceased Allal el-Fassi are known. They struggle together and together created the Arab Maghreb Bureau in Cairo. They followed a virtually identical strategy in the struggle against the occupation power and the Moroccan victories were Tunisian victories, and vice versa.

Let us not forget that the assassination of Farhat Hachad, on 5 December 1952, had deep repercussions among the Moroccan people. The Tunisians will never forg. this.

Naturally, the French were expecting that the revolution would break out in Tunis. Instead, it took place in Casablanca and, therefore, it was Moroccan martyrs who were the first to fall after the death Farhat Hachad. Hence the very close links which linked us through the past and which continue to link us. These are indissoluble links which make the Istiklal Party in Morocco and the PSD in Tunisia branches of the same tree known as North African nationalism.

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'L'OPINION' CONDEMNS 'STALINIST' CRITICISM OF SOCIALIST CONFERENCE

Rabat L'OPINION in French 23 Jul 80 pp 1, 3

[Article: "Socialist Inter-African: Rejection of Satellite Behavior and Emulation"]

[Text] A dogmatic Marxist voice has risen from the deep caverns of Stalinism, blaming some African parties for uniting in their goals and the method they have chosen with a view to insuring the development and establishing social equality in their countries, rallying within a continental organization able to concretize the true aspirations of the African peoples, and providing the proper mechanism for exchanging experience and utilizing their knowledge.

On the other hand, this system offers the African peoples a better framework for solidarity on the international scene, buffeted by currents which divide our societies, try to impose upon us models foreign to our realities and aspire to the solution of problems different from ours.

Such is the target which for the past several years has marked the patient progress of the African parties, all of which unanimously support the ideas of the rejection of the capitalist way and communist dogmatism, and are animated by the will to find, fully independently, African solutions to African problems.

It is with this desire and within such a frame of mind that the socialist-leaning African parties regrouped and undertook the creation of a continental organization.

For months contacts and studies have been underway with a view to intensifying and clarifying such concepts.

It is thus that the Socialist Inter-African is on the verge of being born as the result of the Tunis meeting of six parties which unanimously approved the constituent charter and bylaws of the organization.

We knew from the start that the Marxist charlatans were to oppose the idea, for they consider themselves the sole holders of socialism and as entrusted to monopolize it as though it were shares on the stock market.

Had this been done by a Muscovite clique, their attitude would have been quite different. For these "people" consider themselves the cousins of the parrot Kerekou, the bloodthirsty Mengistu Haile-Mariam, or Samora Machel, the tamer.

Had they been involved, the attitude of such "people" would be one of applause and blessings in accordance with their "scientific" and "objective" method, and also in accordance with their false logic according to which socialism is limited to learning how to recite from memory the milk output of each Soviet cow, transcribe PRAVDA in their bulletins, and open their umbrellas in Casablanca when it rains in Leningrad.

The forces opposing the Socialist Inter-African and all those who follow them have no concern other than to oppose those who are making their way toward independence and authenticity, and who throw their arms, however, in the face of the Socialist International, which rallies Simon Peres and his comrades, whose only concern is that of exercising their paternalism over the peoples of the third world.

No, gentlemen! Defending socialism and laying its foundations does not mean tailism or circulating in the various "internationals" headed by the European socialist parties, both of the East and the West.

Actually, it is a question of a struggle consistent with the specific objective conditions of each society with a view to following a specific way leading to development and the promotion of social justice.

This is the purpose for the rallying of a group of African parties who have no complex whatever toward those who claim to the keepers of socialism.

The latter have accounts to pay which we should publicize in order to put them in their true place and stand up, whenever necessary, against their dictatorial trends and distorted and falsified ideological affiliation.

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STUDENTS UNION ISSUES PROTEST

Rabat L'OPINION in French 19 Jul 80 p 1

[UGEM [General Union of Moroccan Students] communique on students expelled from the ENS [Advanced Teacher-Training Schools]]

[Text] A general meeting of students expelled from the ENS took place at the seat of the UGEM in Rabat in the presence of the vice president of this student union and the members of the executive committee.

Having recalled the steady militant attitude of the UGEM, the vice president listed the problems afflicting higher training from the fact, he stated, of the predominance of a partisan spirit among some professors, the "Ifran doctors" in particular, who show their apprehension concerning the growing student generation.

In conclusion, the vice president informed those present of the date (25 July 1980) agreed upon with those in charge of the higher schools.

Following is the communique which was made public at the conclusion of this meeting:

Considering the deplorable situation under which ENS students live in Rabat, Casablanca and Fes as a result of the expulsion of over 200 students, the UGEM met with a view to studying the situation. Following a thorough overall discussion, it was decided that the present communique be issued, addressed to those in charge, which includes the following demands of this assembly:

Noncompetitivie admission of such students to first-year CPR [College Education], with monthly salaries;

Allowing them to practice as apprentice teachers and to take their graduation competitive examination over a three-year period;

Allowing expelled students and students who are nonrepeaters to repeat or be enrolled in the CPR with no restrictions;

Putting an end to the activities of some officials;

Need to open boarding houses which could house all the students of the corresponding establishment;

Need to take into consideration the choice of the student as to the pursuit of his studies in the area consistent with his scientific level;

Allowing the students access to their examination grades;

Need to allow the students to elect their representatives and the power to attend discussions in accordance with the current statute of such establishments.

The assembly notes the lack of equipment (laboratories, classrooms, libraries, etc . . .), the regular absenteeism of some professors and the incompetence of some professors, foreign professors in particular. Furthermore, the assistants demand that inspectors be appointed to watch over the normal work of such establishments.

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SUPPORT FOR AFGHANISTAN IS ISLAMIC DUTY

Rabat L'OPINION in French 28 Jul 80 pp 1-2

[Article by Abou Bakr Al Kadiri: "Ramadan Topics: Solidarity With Fighting Afghan People Is Islamic Duty"]

[Text] The Casablanca daily newspaper, AL-BAYANE, considered as inopportune, subversive and pro-imperialist the formulation by certain states of a request envisaging the examination of the intensive attacks perpetrated against the Afghan people, with a view to the recording of this point on the agenda of the ordinary meeting of the UN General Assembly which will meet next September.

Also by subscribing to this request Morocco has placed itself, without a tradeoff, in that category of states practicing the imperialist me-tooism and has committed a great mistake which is added to its previous errors and this for having elected to defend causes which run counter to liberation and progress in the world.

At the very outset, I should like to reaffirm that I harbor no political animosity for any of the states, including the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the position of support for the Palestinian revolution on the part of the Soviet Union has my entire consideration.

However--and there is the rub--such a position could not in any way eclipse in my eyes other realities which have occurred here and there in the world in which the Soviet Union distinguishes itself by its flagrant contradiction of its pretensions vis-a-vis support of oppressed peoples and the defense of their freedom and self-determination.

Its positions concerning both the invasion of Czechoslovakia--a socialist state--years ago and the events in Somalia and Eritrea and most recently its monstrous military occupation of Afghanistan, all that arouses me and every person jealous of the principles of protest and indignation.

The massacre of tens of thousands of Afghan Moslems, whether on the holy field of battle or in concentration camps, the destruction and the incendiary razing of Afghan villages, the extermination of about 100,000 Afghan

families, all that impels us to say that in our opinion it could not be a question of imposing theories, systems and regimes by force of iron and fire.

The daily newspaper, AL-BAYANE, unfortunately maintained that the intervention of these troops of death was the result of a request by the government of Afghanistan. AL-BAYANE knows perfectly well that the current president of the Afghan government could not have come to power without the force of the Soviet army's arsenal. It also is aware of the fate reserved for his predecessors, the last of whom was President Amin who, in spite of his fervent communism, did not venture to avail himself of foreign armies.

The fact of installing one of the agents of such a power in authority does not in any way invest him with legitimacy.

The "comrades" of AL-BAYANE, or some of them, at least experienced the decisive stage in the history of the national struggle when French colonialism perpetrated its hideous plot against the Moroccan throne and its august titulary, the late Mohammed V. At the time, all the Moroccan people were unanimously in favor of repudiating the figurehead presented by colonialism to replace the deported activist monarch.

Therefore, the question is not of small or large states which have made a request to examine the events in Afghanistan but quite simply it is a matter of a people whose dignity has been violated and whose territory has been occupied by a foreign army. This people has resisted as best it could with available resources and has been unable to obtain other than negligible aid from brother Moslem peoples and from those who claim to be in favor of peace.

The Afghan combatants who are fighting against the invader are not in any way unconditional supporters or agents of American imperialism. Formerly they had fought for the victory of the Palestinian revolution as well as for other liberation causes and this in addition to their attachment for an exemplary adherence to Islamic doctrine. And it is this potential of faith which unleashes in their soul the desire to combat any foreign invasion, whatever its doctrine and its political concepts, as was illustrated historically during their struggles against the British and czarist Russia and as is now illustrated in the face of the Soviet invader.

The Moroccan position of support for the Afghan struggle, if only by reasonable words, is a position which is completely in conformity with the concept of Islamic solidarity.

Therefore, we are surprised by the articles published by the newspaper AL-BAYANE which really amaze and astonish us. Besides, since when have we taken as our internal or external national positions criteria which are based upon what others say and do?

Of course, certain states concerned over the above-mentioned request concerning the Afghan affair do not effectively inspire respect for their positions. It is useless to cite them since the "comrades" know perfectly well what our

positions are toward them and our stubborn struggles against their aggression plans; however, was this sufficient reason for our foregoing our solidarity with the cause of the Moslem people who have taken up arms to defend their territory and their doctrine? It is enough to say that if the "comrades" were to avail themselves of this logic they would often wind up finding themselves against their own country, since they are just as aware as all of us are that some pawns which are said to exist among the African states were only hostile to our national cause because they claim to be in the progressive camp, for example, the position of Mugabe (Mozambique) [as published] in Freetown. Therefore, it is important to know that the cause of liberation of peoples and solidarity with them in no way takes as criteria either the number of supporters in such and such bloc or the international weight or notability of states. This is so true that it is these very states which are responsible for the conflagration in various parts of the world.

We do not agree with the "comrades" who feel that the objective of the armed intervention of foreign armies consists in consolidating a progressive regime, knowing, do we not, that the choice and consolidation of regimes are the business of the people concerned. The regime we should support and cooperate with is the regime which the Afghan people would have chosen were it not for the foreign military invasion.

We not only refuse to accept the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan but also refuse to accept the honeyed words which American imperialism is pouring out for that region. We appeal to the Islamic peoples and governments and to the nonalined states as well as to every state which wants peace and justice to do their duty with respect to the combatant Afghan people's cause, and we also demand the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghan territory with an eye toward free self-determination of the Afghan people.

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ALGERIA, LIBYA STRIVE TO 'DESTABILIZE' MAGHREB

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 1 Aug 8. pp 1, 3

[Article by Dr Ramzi]

[Text] Rabat (MAP)--President Qadhdhafi, in a statement over French television, claimed that Libya had played no part in the Gafsa events and that he had not been informed of these events until after their announcement by the Tunisian government.

With regard to that affair, Moroccan authorized sources are surprised by the tone of this statement and are wondering whether Qadhdhafi was fully aware of the fact that he was addressing French public opinion or thought he was in Libya, talking to a group of muzzled citizens. Qadhdhafi's mistake they say is in thinking that European public opinion accepts his insane acts at their face value and remain silent in the fashion of Libyan citizens who are terrorized and oppressed. No one, moreover, can believe in the sincerity of Qadhdhafi's statement. In fact, the same sources recall, all the plotters against Tunisia have admitted that they were trained, equipped and financed by Libya whose military training camps were their point of departure. The whole world no longer doubts the subversive role played by Qadhdhafi through the assembling of mercenaries, outlaws in bases of subversion in Libya training them to stir up troubles in close and not-so-close neighboring countries for the purpose of realizing his leadership fantasies. The same sources emphasize that the fact Libyan public funds are being squandered to pay the mercenaries is no longer a secret to anyone and that the assassination of Libyan citizens inside the country and abroad, whose sold wrongdoing is their loyalty to their country and their rejection of Qadhdhafi's nonsense, has become a characteristic sign of the regime installed in Libya.

These same quarters say that Qadhdhafi is naive if he thinks that world public opinion believes him innocent of the Gafsa events and the arming of mercenaries to stir up troubles in the Arab Maghreb and in Africa, Tunisia, Morocco, Chad, Uganda and Senegal.

Moroccan sources also feel that if we accept Qadhdhafi's ravings on the subject of the Gafsa events, we might also accept the allegations of Algerian leaders who claim they are not involved in the arming, supplying and training

of the mercenaries who are attacking the provinces of Moroccan Sahara. The Algerian government is in fact up to its ears in the plots hatched against the territorial integrity of Morocco and in the arming of mercenaries who are attacking Moroccan provinces from bases in Tindouf. This does not permit Algeria to deny its responsibility in the plot, a responsibility which is in defiance of international law and customs. It is the Algerian people who are paying the price of this plot through the squandering of their resources which have been made available to all the mercenaries, enemies of the unity of Arab Maghreb, the same sources add. Algeria will pay very dearly in the future for the tragedy which its government is in the process of writing, they emphasize.

What we have here is the same bell tolling in Algeria and Libya: the wish of these two countries to destabilize the Arab Maghreb and by this means to satisfy their instincts for domination and expansionism and to attain other objectives on the continent of Africa is obvious, the same sources conclude.

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NIGERIA'S ROLE, POLICY IN AFRICA DISCUSSED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 28 Jul 80 pp 1-2

[Article by Mohamed Tamri: "Fluctuations Marked By Conjecture"]

[Text] The current diplomatic offensive was foreseeable, therefore, necessary since Moroccan experiences at the last OAU summit demonstrated the existence of a broad African front opposed to certain deviations of the Organization of African Unity.

Therefore, it is now not only a question of thanking all those who forthrightly supported the just Moroccan position but also and above all of drawing advantage from the hesitations and the profound distrust formulated by other delegations vis-a-vis Libyan maneuvers, an attitude which led them to confine themselves to an uncomfortable neutrality and at times to formulate a point of view which, without being favorable to the Moroccan position, put the OAU on guard against the schisms which are threatening its unity.

The Nigerian attitude in this regard is significant and merits thought: not only did the motion introduced by Lagos succeed in giving the OAU a new stay of execution but also the position occupied by Nigeria on the continental level results in all of its position-taking having considerable impact, which often changes the attitude of many other African states. Also, Moroccan diplomacy is induced to concern itself particularly with that country which draws from its economic weight the authority which distinguishes its diplomatic voice.

At this level in foreign policy, Nigeria is influenced by two concerns: the playing of an important role in the OAU in keeping with its size and succeeding in assuring a zone of economic expansion for itself, in which it can sell its industrial surpluses, by causing the countries of Black Africa to become aware that they are the center of gravity of the continent and organizing them to make them capable of resisting outside influences coming in particular from certain countries in Northern Africa and South Africa.

The two premises of this policy are complementary: Lagos intends to play a determinant role in the OAU to stop regroupings based on particularities and

to be in a position to encourage only viable groups, those determined by geography. Obviously these groups would have the advantage of placing under Nigeria's authority countries whose association is considered a threat by Lagos.

A third characteristic of Nigerian foreign policy is designed to obtain investments from a Western world called upon for its survival to develop the Third World; and Lagos--to distinguish itself from the former French colonies which in general adopt Euro-African positions--wishes to become a world power, a position which countries such as Japan, Canada and the United States appreciate, and with reason.

Also, is Nigeria considered by African public opinion to be an instrument of American policy. In reality, the Nigerian attitude corresponds to the country, which was established to spread the power of British companies over part of the African continent. United States' interest in Nigeria is due in particular to the very special ties which affinities of mind have succeeded in establishing. It remains nonetheless true that the long-range objectives of Nigerian diplomacy correspond to American aims: to restructure Black Africa to give it a preeminent role in the OAU. To do this, to favor the emergence of Lagos and to induce it to exercise its growing influence on its neighbors.

This plan has seen the start of implementation since the accession of a civilian government whose behavior confirms this desire to assemble the countries of the Nigerian geographic area and to reach a settlement of African disputes by taking initiatives, a desire which materialized during the last OAU summit through the introduction of the motion on the tension in northwest Africa. This same desire, moreover, was confirmed well before this summit, when there was a question of a decolonization problem, that of Zimbabwe and the pressures exerted on Great Britain and when a strictly political problem illustrated by the Chad affair resulted in several efforts at solution sponsored by Nigeria.

In the Sahara affair, the last OAU summit showed that Nigeria has reached the point of a certain degree of neutrality, in any event the point of more discretion than during the Monrovia summit. "The passing of the country from a military regime to a civilian government obviously illustrates a desire to confine itself to a strict neutrality dictated by Nigeria's membership on the Council of the Wise Men." This notwithstanding the fact remains that certain positions taken by Nigerian officials have been the subject of disconcerting comments by the mass media and still seem to be the subject of "fluctuations marked by the events and situation of the moment, with, however, a perceptible attenuation of the virulence against our country."

That unquestionably is the result of the efforts exerted by our diplomacy to make Nigeria sensitive to the fairness of the Moroccan cause. And this is only the beginning, for the Nigerian position is being called upon to further develop in favor of Morocco: President Sehu Shagari accepted in principle an invitation to travel to Rabat; during the last OAU summit, he avoided taking part in the strongest debates. And it was not until the end of the summit that he spoke to provide a solution a la Nigerian, "one of the most moderate adopted on the question by an African organization, seeing that its goal was to place in suspense the request for admission by the shadowy [Saharan Arab Democratic Republic] and to reactivate the mission of the Committee of Wise Men."

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FRANCE ADOPTS MEASURES TO BLOCK MOROCCAN STUDENTS

Casablanca AL-BAYANE in French 8 Aug 80 pp 1, 3

[Article by R.C.]

[Excerpts] The crisis situation being experienced by higher education in our country is impelling a great number of our students to seek enrollment, which they have been unable to obtain in the Moroccan university, in foreign colleges and institutions. France has always had a massive influx of our young people into its universities; and, up to the time of the economic crisis which that country is experiencing, it did not call upon its officials to considerably limit the admission of foreigners to their colleges. It is within this framework that the latest decisions, laws and decrees were adopted in France. Thus, the French government decided to establish a national commission with responsibility for the selection of foreign students, verification of their knowledge of the French language, their enrollment and orientation. The measure, better known as the "Imbert Decree," named after the man who wrote the decision and president of this commission, has the basic purpose of closing the doors of French universities to students from developing countries and in particular from African countries, for whom the securing of an enrollment in Paris or Dijon is like running a combat obstacle course.

Thus, a recent Moroccan student who has passed the "baccalaureat" and who wishes to continue his studies in France first must file a pre-enrollment request with the French diplomatic authorities in Morocco. It is pointless to say that, in view of the reduced number of spaces granted Morocco, very few of our fellow countrymen from the popular social strata will have the opportunity of obtaining an enrollment approval. After this initial and delicate step, the candidate must take an examination to verify his knowledge of the French language. The French university authorities themselves admit that this involves "a third level dictation" (that is, the 4th year of secondary school). Therefore, it would seem that for Mr Imbert our "bacheliers" have barely attained the level of French of the 4th year of secondary school. When we know that Morocco was a French protectorate for 44 years and that our education is still bilingual, we are induced to ask questions about the propriety of such a measure. It is a fact that Mr Imbert has exempted secondary school graduates holding a French diploma from this examination. This

is a new way of perpetuating and developing French cultural domination in our country. "The spread" of Victor Hugo's language depends upon this, it seems.

Having completed this second step, the candidate is confronted by a multitude of administrative harassments when he has to "regularize his situation" vis-a-vis the French prefectural authorities. Thus, in order to obtain a residence permit, he will have to present his enrollment certification, his scholarship certificate or a bank statement showing a balance of 8,000 French francs, nothing more than that! Once this obstacle is overcome--and very rare are those who overcome it--new problems present themselves, which are just as difficult to resolve as those already cited.

It is unacceptable that racist acts against our nationals are perpetuated without the Moroccan authorities reacting.

The satisfaction of the material and moral demands of Moroccan students in France, which have been expressed on many occasions by their union, the UNEM [National Union of Moroccan Students], is an urgent measure to be adopted. Just as it is an urgent matter that all decisions harmful to the development of Morocco and restrictive measures be annulled in favor of a new university policy in the service of the people for a Moroccanized, scientific, democratic and Arabized education system.

The Morocco of tomorrow is being built today.

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MINISTER REBUFFS 'LE MONDE' ARTICLE ON ECONOMY

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 21 Jul 80 pp 1-2

[Rebutal of LE MONDE article]

[Text] In an article carried by LE MONDE, in its 8 July issue, the Rabat correspondent of this Parisian daily paints a very dark picture of the Moroccan economic situation, specifically in the area of foreign balances.

Questioned on this subject by the economics department of MAP [Maghreb-Arab Press Agency], circles close to the Ministry of Finance consider that "it is understandable for the author to formulate pessimistic views. This is his right." However, for such views to be based on false information is not acceptable when it is a question of a newspaper whose main slogan is that of providing objective information.

Furthermore, at some points, the author of the article simply makes claims without bothering to cite even the least bit of simple proof.

Roland Delcour, the author of the article, it is further said, brings forth three elements in support of his judgment. First, the current 1980 foreign deficit of payments could reach, if not surpass, last year's figure.

This claim is exactly the opposite of reality.

Actually, at present it is virtually certain, taking into consideration the excellent situation of the export sectors, a fact mentioned by the author of the article himself, that the current foreign deficit will be substantially reduced in 1980. The predictable figure for this year would be only slightly over 5 billion dirhams, or a 20 percent drop compared with the previous year. This is the best result achieved in this area over the past 5 years.

Secondly, the same source added, the author of the article claims that servicing the Moroccan foreign debt will total this year 5 billion dirhams. Roland Delcour could have been considered more seriously by providing the source of this figure, which exceeds by 30 percent the factual figure, which totals no more than 3.7 billion dirhams.

Thirdly, the article claims that the Moroccan finance minister went to Washington at the beginning of June to borrow $250 million and found it hard to obtain it. Such an allegation contradicts the various official communiques and statements which were issued on the occasion of this trip whose purpose was to learn from the American Administration the methods used for levying taxes and in the struggle against fiscal fraud in the United States.

Actually, let us point out to Mr Delcour, for his information, that no single big international bank has its headquarters in Washington. The loan mentioned by the article is currently being floated on the international financial market at the stage of syndication. It was subscribed in full in the course of a few weeks by toplevel Arab, American, French, British and German banks. The signing of the contract on this loan will take place in the next few weeks, the same sources specified.

Was it necessary to falsify facts and figures for the sole purpose of substantiating the idea according to which Moroccan indebtedness has allegedly reached the bearable limit, those same circles ask themselves?

Something even more serious, the author of the article has not even bothered to tell us what were, in his view, the criteria traditionally used in determining the indebtedness of a country, such as the amount of indebtedness and the indebtedness rates. Curiously enough, no indication has been provided as to such data. Does the author fear that any reference to objective data would be unable to justify his prejudices?--conclude the same circles.

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FISCAL REFORM PROPOSALS REVIEWED

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 1 Aug 80 pp 1, 4

[Article by Jean Celeste, Accounting Specialist]

[Text] Recently Jean Celeste, an accounting expert, made an analysis for the CFCIM [French Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Morocco] bulletin of what may be the next fiscal reform, which was approved by the council of ministers and will be submitted to parliament with the outlines of a bill.

The principle which inspired the draft reform is equality vis-a-vis the tax laws: equal taxes for equal income and social justice.

The basic characteristic of the reform is the abolition of the present income tax schedule (IBP [tax on professional income], PTS [deduction from allowances and wages], TU ["single tax"], and an agricultural tax) and of the supplementary tax now in force and the institution of a general tax on income based on the size of the taxable income of an individual.

The term "person" means "natural person" as well as "artificial person."

That said, the reform is broken down into three segments:

1. The establishment of the general tax on income.

2. The development of tax schedules reflecting methods of assessment and the determination of taxable income.

3. Institution of the TVA [value-added tax].

I. The general tax on income

This involves putting an end to the multiple disparities existing in the following specific tax procedures: regressiveness of certain split [fractionnes] incomes, tax tables, exemption threshholds, deductions for family dependants, etc.

The unification of the tax table will affect both taxpayers who have only one source of income and those who have multiple incomes.

For this second category of taxpayers, the same tax table is applied but in accordance with different application procedures.

The draft reform provides that the present tax rate will be maintained up to the 70,000-dirham level. Above that amount, the rate of increase will be 2.24 percent up to 120,000 dirhams and 1.21 percent for an annual income of 240,000 dirhams.

As for recipients of income applicable to different tax schedules (rental incomes, agricultural income, wage earners, etc.) the various incomes will be taxed separately, except for the correction of the regressiveness due to splitting. The incomes will then be regrouped to determine the amount of the tax payable which will be subject to collection after deduction of original costs [cotes], with the proviso that a merchant who experienced a loss in his professional activities determined in accordance with the real profits schedule will be able to charge this loss against total income.

II. Changes in tax schedules

For the purposes of this general tax on income (IGR) allowances are made at each level of the schedule.

A). Urban tax and usage [edilite] tax

1). Urban tax:

a). Taxes on rental incomes of natural persons

The general tax schedule will be applied.

However, it is proposed to give gross incomes a standard allowance to cover the costs of maintenance, repairs, janitorial service, etc.

b). Usage tax applicable to urban real property

When buildings are occupied by their owners, it is proposed that the present schedule of the urban tax be applied.

On the other hand, when it is a matter of income-producing buildings, these will be subjected to the same percentage of annual rental income (13.5 percent).

2). Usage tax

This will become a land tax and the determination of the taxable base will be a function of the rental income of buildings as determined for the calculation of the urban tax.

B). Tax on professional income (IBP)

Provision is made for dividing the IBP into two schedules:

--on the one hand, a tax on the income of natural persons

--on the other hand, a tax on companies.

This distinction will permit application of the general tax on income to the income of natural persons.

1). Tax on the income of natural persons

Four tax categories are proposed:

1. Net real tax. Mandatory for transit agents [transitaires], insurance offices, accounting offices and those liable for taxes whose turnover reaches a certain threshhold.

2. Simplified accounting. This category will be for merchants of taxed products (sugar, cement, tea), professional persons, etc.

3. Turnover and minimum income. In this category, which is now in force moreover, the taxable income is determined by application of a set coefficient for each branch of activity or profession, after updating of the present rates; however, the tax determined in this manner is not collected by the tax administration unless it is higher than the minimum income as defined by the regulation.

4. Conventional flat rate. The flat rate for the taxpayer is established in the event of an agreement between the administration and the taxpayer, for a period of 2 years.

2). Tax on companies (IS).

This tax will be applied at a proportional rate to the income of all companies no matter what their organization and their purpose, including agricultural companies and real estate companies, excluding de facto companies and civil, closely-held real estate companies assimilable to groups of owners.

3). Tax on dividends and tax credit

In view of the fact that the profits upon which dividends are determined on behalf of the stockholder have already been subjected to the tax on companies, it is proposed to institute a tax credit at the level of the IGR. (General income tax)

4). Loss carryover

Within the framework of the reform, it is proposed to limit the length of the loss carryover period to 3 years instead of the 5 years now in force. What is more, companies with losses must pay a minimum tax in the third year of the deficit. This minimum will be increased every year until the company reports a profit.

5). Reevaluation of financial statements

The reform provides for the reevaluation of financial statements. The following solutions are proposed in this connection:

--Either authorize unrestricted reevaluation with a reduced assessment at the rate of the company tax (IS) on the reevaluation reserve which thus becomes an ordinary available reserve;

--Or improve the present reevaluation rates (coefficient 1 for 1958) and thus maintain the system in force, with one more accentuated restriction, however, with respect to tax-liable [passible] incorporation of the reserve with capital, an operation for which the 3-year grace period will be extended to 5 years (Article 18 of the organic dahir on the IBP).

C). Deduction from salaries and wages (PTS)

It is proposed to apply a 17.5 percent "deduction" to gross income determined with account taken of the two present allowances: professional expenses (10 percent), a decrease in the taxable base at the level of the 25 percent supplementary tax. For high-income taxpayers, this allowance will be limited. Finally, the deduction at the source of this tax may be retained.

D). Supplementary tax (CC)

In the proposed fiscal reform, this tax will be eliminated and replaced by the general tax on the income of natural persons.

E). The agricultural tax

The proposed measures are as follows:

--to subject legally constituted agricultural companies to the company tax;

--to optionally permit farmers who wish to be taxed on their net real income (3-year option);

--to reevaluate estimated income;

--to subject estimated income to the unified tax schedule of the general tax on incomes;

--to extend the deductions for dependents to farm income as well as the exemptions for other income;

--to institute a land tax payable by the owner which will be a function of the rental value of agricultural properties by the hectare.

F). Tax on income from stock dividends (TPA)

You know that present regulations call for a 25 percent withholding tax at the source, creditable to the CC (Expansion unknown) assessment payable by natural persons.

This withholding tax will be maintained with one difference: anonymous holders of stock portfolios may have a deduction applied to them at the maximum tax rate of the general tax on income.

G). Tax on real estate profits (TPI)

The regulations now in force would be maintained (1978 Tax Law and 1980 changes).

H). Tax on urban lands

The draft tax reform gives no information on this subject.

III. The value-added tax (TVA)

Finally, the third segment of the tax reform provides for the institution of the TVA. This tax would be substituted for taxes on turnover (TCA). However, this measure would be applied in stages.

Jean Celeste

Accounting Expert

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EXPORT, IMPORT FIGURES FOR 1979 REVIEWED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 5 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] The bimonthly report of the BMCE [Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank] published an article in its last issue (56) on the subject of Moroccan trade with the other continents in 1979.

Here is a brief summary of that trade:

In 1979, Moroccan imports totaled 14,327,700 M DH [million dirhams] compared to 12.361 M DH in 1978, an increase of 15.9 percent, while Moroccan exports totaled 7,622,400 M DH compared to 6.261 M DH a year earlier, an increase of 21.7 percent.

Therefore, our trade balance had a deficit of 6,705,300 M DH in 1979 compared to 6.1 M DH in 1978, a coverage rate of 53.2 percent compared to 50.6 percent in 1978.

Moroccan purchases on the EEC totaled 6.942 M DH (compared to 6.072 M DH in 1978) while Moroccan sales to Europe in 1979 were 4.447 M DH (compared to 3,565,100 M DH in 1978). The relatively greater increase in exports resulted in an improvement in the rate of coverage which was 64.1 percent compared to 58.7 percent the previous year.

Countries of the EEC supplied 48.5 percent of our total imports and absorbed 58.3 percent of our total sales. Within this group of countries, France continues to be our principal trade partner and by itself provides 27.4 percent of our purchases and absorbs 28 percent of our sales abroad.

Our trade with countries of the EFTA [European Free-Trade Association] represented 4.5 percent of our purchases abroad and 3.9 percent of our total sales, with 652 M DH on the import side and 295.4 M DH on the export side.

Eastern Europe grouped within the CAEM [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] supplied 5.1 percent of our total imports (compared to 6 percent in 1978) and absorbed 10.8 percent of our total exports (compared to 11.4 percent in 1978).

Our trade with these countries resulted in an excess of 91.8 M DH compared to a deficit of 37 M DH in 1978.

For the rest of Europe, our imports continued to remain at the same level (1.463 M DH compared to 1.440 in 1978) constituting 10.2 percent of our total imports. As for our sales to this group of countries, these totaled 708 M DH, an increase of 28.8 percent compared to 1978, representing 9.3 percent of our total exports.

Our trade with Africa continued to be characterized by a certain amount of balance since the rate of coverage improved again, increasing from 93.7 percent in 1978 to 95.7 percent in 1979. Our purchases from African countries represented 2 percent of our total imports, and our sales to them totaled 3.9 percent of our overall exports.

The American continent supplied 9.8 percent of our foreign purchases and absorbed 6.3 percent of our total sales. The weakness at the export level (478 M DH) compared to that of imports (1.403 M DH) was reflected in the rate of coverage which did not exceed 34.1 percent compared, however, to only 25.7 percent in 1978.

The United States, Canada and Brazil continue to be our principal partners on that continent.

With the Asian continent, our sales, despite an increase of 33.5 percent, remained at a low level (587 M DH) compared to imports which increased again by 77.4 percent, going from 1.591 M DH to 2.823 M DH. Because of this, the coverage rate decreased to 20.8 percent compared to 27.6 percent one year earlier.

The increase in the oil bill in large part explains this situation.

Our trade with Oceania continued to be characterized by weakness: 19.6 M DH on the import side; i.e., 0.1 percent of our total imports, and 1.8 M DH on the export side, less than 0.1 percent of our total sales.

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BRIEFS

HASSAN MEETING WITH OFFICERS--Casablanca, 21 July (MAP). His Majesty Hassan II presided over two work sessions at the Casablanca Royal Palace. The first session was attended by M'Hamed Boucetta, minister of state in charge of foreign affairs and cooperation, Dr Azeddine Lakraki, minister of national education and cadre training, and Abdelwahid Belekziz, minister of information. The work session chaired by His Majesty the King was attended by Gen Moulay Hafid Alaoui, minister of the Royal Household, protocol and chancery, Gen Ahmed Dlimi, director of the ADC's of His Majesty the King, Col Mohamed Kabbaj, Col Mohamed Achahbar, Col Mohamed Bernichi, Col Mohamed Ziati, Col Aharrouch Ben Ali, and Lt Col Lahcen Ohirra. [Text] [Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 21 Jul 80 p 1] 5157

CSO: 4400

CANDIDATES FOR MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 10 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] During the official ceremonies organized yesterday in the Sidi El Bechir (Tunis), Jebel Jeloud and Hamman-Lif delegations, the party candidates for municipal by-elections in the Sidi El Bechir, Ez-Zahra municipal districts and the Ben Arous 2d and 3d districts announced their candidacy for these elections to the regions' local authorities in the presence of Mr Abdel-krim Azaiez, secretary general of the Tunis-Sud Party's coordinating committee and of other officers of the party and administration.

On Sunday, 17 August, the electors from these municipal districts will again elect the municipal councils in conformity with the grievance committee's decision to render void the results of the municipal elections held last 25 May in these districts because of irregularities in conducting them. In fact, many citizens have challenged last 25 May election results and called them into question for the following reasons:

Some citizens who were not of legal age took part in the last 25 May elections. Pressure was resorted to in conducting the elections at some balloting polls. There were some irregularities in calculating the votes.

Let us point out that immediately after the decision to render void the 25 May election results, the Tunis ruling party initiated the examination of the register of voters to make sure that all the citizens inscribed in it had fulfilled all the required conditions.

Here, on the other hand, is the number of registered voters, their distribution, the number of advisers and the persons at the voting polls for each one of the municipal districts in question:

1) The Sidi El Bechir district:
Number of men registered: 27,825
Number of women registered: 250,051
Number of advisers: 14
Number of voting polls: 187

2) Ez-Zahra district
Number registered (men and women): 7,000
Number of advisers: 16
Number of voting polls: 29

3) Ben Arous Municipality: 2d district (Ibn Sina)
Number of registered (men): 1,891
Number of registered (women): 1,726
Total number of registered voters: 3,617
Number of advisers: 7
Number of voting polls: 16

4) Ben Arous municipality: 3d district (Mohamed Ali):
Number of registered (men): 1,158
Number of registered (women): 1,099
Total number of registered voters: 2,251
Number of advisers: 6
Number of voting polls: 16

Sidi El Bechir municipal district:

The following, from another source, is the register of Party candidates to these elections for the districts in question:

1) Mahmoud Cadhi
2) Brahim Arian
3) Mohamed Hedi Barbar
4) Mohamed Ghadhbane
5) Bechir ben Ammar
6) Chedlia Oalmami
7) Mohamed Moncef Almoadhen
8) Nasr Oandil
9) Mansour Mani
10) Mongi Zaghlam
11) Mohamed Hedi Hamoudiya
12) Hamida bon Tarbout
13) Falma Ben Bechir
14) Chedlia Aziai
15) Mohamed Naceur Hached
16) Cherif Kaak
17) Med B. Slimane B. Vahia
18) Bechir Alfaqih
19) Aicha Farhat
20) Abdessalem Achour
21) Rachid ben Abdallah
22) Mohamed Moncef Dakhiaoul
23) Abdelwahab Jmel
24) Lahkdar Zarqane
25) Hamda Langliz
26) Charifa Bejaoui
27) Mahmoud Chaabane
28) Abdelmajid El Msallati

Second Ben Arous district:
1) Assaida Brahim
2) Hamda Lourimi
3) Mongi Barouni
4) Mostafa Belhaj Youssef
5) Bechir Jnane
6) Fathi Attouzi
7) Mohsen Alfanni
8) Mohamed Mida
9) Tahar Chaibi
10) Habib Dmassi
11) Mahmoud El Akermi
12) Hedi El Mhadhebi
13) Tahar Haddad
14) Ahmed Al Hamdouni

Third Ben Arous district:
1) Abdeljbbar Alghodhiban
2) Fatma Miled
3) Abdessolam Ben Dialat
4) Beigacem Majri

5) Naceur Msakri
6) Mohson Osim
7) Mohamen Al Affas
8) Makhtar Al Quitouri
9) Belhassen Ben Hassine
10) Lamine Cherif
11) Bechir Al Ajmi
12) Tahar Naimi

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COMMITTEE TO IMPLEMENT ORDER ABOLISHING ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 10 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Yesterday the Ministry of Justice released the following statement: In pursuance of the president of the republic's order on 8 August 1980 related to the abolishing of the attorney general of the republic's office, the minister of justice this morning appointed an ad hoc committee to adopt urgent measures and establish the necessary procedures for the immediate execution of the presidential order.

The committee is composed of the following magistrates:

Messr: Hedi Said, attorney general, director of judicial affairs;
Bechir Zahra, inspector general to the Ministry of Justice;
Mohamed Salah Ayari, first chairman of the Tunis Court of Appeals;
Abdesselam Mahjoub, chairman of the realty tribunal.

During its morning session, the committee arrived at a series of decisions likely to make it possible for the attorney general to pursue his duty in a normal and satisfactory manner.

The Ministry of Justice has instructed the committee to study the readjustments necessary to be introduced into the legal texts in court in order that they be in accordance with the presidential order relative to the suppression of the attorney general of the republic's office.

On the other hand, the minister of justice has instructed the district attorney of judicial affairs to see to the transfer of powers.

Moreover, a meeting has been scheduled for Thursday, 14 August, at 1100 at the Ministry of Justice headquarters at which will be present the assistant public prosecutors and the district attorneys from the various courts of justice.

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COMMUNISTS REACT FAVORABLY TO 'OPEN DOOR' POLICY

Paris LE MONDE in French 28 Aug 80 p 7

[Article by Michel Deure]

[Text] In a communique circulated on Monday, 25 August, Tunisian Communists assert that they "deeply believe in the likelihood of a democratic phase as a possible step in the direction of socio-economic changes." Thus they appear to be reacting favorably, initially, to the "open door" policy the government has been implementing since the start of summer.

"At present," they state, "Communists are convinced of the possibility of reaching a national compromise on crucial issues calling for immediate solutions, provided meaningful political changes are made and workers' and young people's interests and demands are respected, the plurality of prevailing political forces is taken into account, and all public freedoms are guaranteed."

French Language Weekly Is Suspended

If the latest action by the authorities to ease the tense political climate "is to become irreversible," the Communists are of the opinion that it will be necessary to solve "on a sound democratic basis" the problems of trade union and student representation, to declare a general amnesty, and to guarantee all political forces the right to express and organize themselves. Their chief demands are removal of the 18-year old ban on their party, and the right to publish their own newspapers.

LA PHARE, a French language weekly, was suspended for three months on 23 August for "publishing false news." It was accused last week of reporting an appeal to Bourguiba by the secretary general of the African Trade Unity Organization. Such an appeal apparently was not made. The issue of the weekly that was to blame was nevertheless put on the market as usual. LE PHASE had been coming out since 6 January. It presented itself as a newspaper that was free of any political connection. But for some time it had been devoting more and more space to the labor union crisis and it did not conceal its partiality towards the former leadership of the UGTT (Tunisian General Federation of Labor). A month ago it ran into trouble when the printshop which was affiliated with the labor union refused to continue running it off. Since that time it was forced to cut back on the number of pages and curtail its press run which, according to the editors, was up to 5000 copies.

CSO: 4400

HABIB CHATTY COMMENTS ON JERUSALEM AS ISRAELI CAPITAL

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] Habib Chatty, secretary general of the Islamic Conference, left Tunis yesterday at noon for Rabat, where he will head up the Islamic Conference's delegation at the Jerusalem Committee's meeting, which will be held on the 16th and 17th of this month.

Habib Chatty said in a statement that during its session in Rabat, the Jerusalem Committee will consider the practical steps to be taken to meet the Israeli challenge to the Arabs and Palestine--a challenge that has just been renewed through Israel's decision to transfer its capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Chatty observed in this connection that the Islamic Conference was the first organization to launch an appeal for practical measures in behalf of the Palestinian people, among them political pressure on Israel and intensified resistance within the occupied territories.

Habib Chatty also said that by establishing settlement centers, Israel aims to create a de facto situation and is making every effort to subject the West Bank to the same fate as the Arab lands it has annexed. Chatty added that because of this, the duty of the Arabs commands that they stand in the way of Israel's schemes and use every means at their disposal to prevent the accomplishment of Zionist aims.

Questioned as to the chances of the resolution submitted to the Security Council by the Islamic Conference, Habib Chatty explained that the resolution will be debated by all the members of the Security Council in various ways. Most of the countries support the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent state, whereas all the European countries are hesitating because, while they actually support the rights of the Palestinian people, they are bound to the United States, which is preparing for a presidential election and cannot, in such circumstances, escape Zionist influence.

Habib Chatty concluded by emphasizing that the decision by the Security Council will depend on the position adopted by the United States and the Western camp. He noted that if the United States abstains, the resolution will pass, but if the United States uses its veto power, the Security Council will make no decision.

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PROBLEMS PERTAINING TO EMIGRANT WORKERS DISCUSSED

Return of Workers a Priority

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Aug 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] Mr Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and secretary general of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party], will preside at the 14th congress of Tunisian workers abroad, to be held today at the El Omrane Lycee. As they do each year, the representatives of our emigrant workers will discuss a number of problems pertaining to their living and working conditions abroad, their social and economic concerns and the prospects available to them if they return definitively to the country with representatives of the various ministries, national organizations and enterprises.

As of 31 December 1978, the Tunisian community living abroad included 356,387 citizens distributed as follows: 202,931 in France, 19,180 in Germany, 13,500 in Belgium, 1,304 in Holland, 2,200 in Switzerland, 81,067 in Libya, 25,406 in Algeria, 1,564 in Morocco, and 9,235 in other countries.

This figure, representing almost a third of the active Tunisian population, represents a very substantial productive and social mass the gradual re-integration of which in the national job system has become increasingly necessary because of the protectionist measures adopted by many of the host countries due to the effects of rather acute economic crises.

However as the capacity of the domestic job market to absorb them is not under current conditions such as to allow all Tunisian workers abroad to return to the country and immediately obtain jobs here, solutions must be found so that the interests of all parties (host country, country of origin and workers) can be safeguarded.

If it is true that a good number of the countries using foreign manpower are currently faced with recession problems forcing them to give priority in their concern to their own citizens, it is equally true that in periods of economic prosperity, these same foreign workers they would like to get

rid of now have played a very active role in the rapid advance of the economies of these countries, and it would therefore be unjust to make them alone suffer the consequences of a crisis for which they are not responsible.

When one benefits from cheap manpower, for the training of which one has spent nothing, and enjoys this advantage for long years, it is no longer acceptable to "wash one's hands"as soon as one no longer needs them. This is why it is the duty of the host countries to take the interests of their foreign workers into account, to grant them the rights to which they have become entitled after long years of labor, and to allow them to benefit from all social advantages (decent housing, adequate education for their children, the right to sociocultural differences, etc) until such time as their return to their countries of origin becomes possible and can be effected honorably and with dignity.

Among the major points which will be discussed during the 14th congress of Tunisian workers abroad, the means of dealing with the current situation in the host countries and the urgent solutions required to safeguard the interests of our workers abroad will thus be given priority.

Prime Minister Speaks

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Aug 80 pp 1, 4-5

[Text] Tunisian workers abroad meeting in Tunis for their 14th national seminar yesterday made overwhelmingly clear their confidence in and support of the government working under the leadership of President Bourguiba and the direction of Mr Mohamed Mzali to carry out a policy of renewal in all sectors of national life.

It was in an atmosphere of warm support and enthusiasm recalling the great days of the struggle that the opening session of the seminar developed, with Mr Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and secretary general of the party, presiding, and a number of government and Political Bureau officials participating.

Mr Mzali's entry into the assembly hall at the El Omrane Lycee won him a prolonged ovation. Those present stood to sing the revolutionary anthem and to chant the name of the chief of state at length.

An immediate rapport was established between the prime minister and his audience. Our foreign workers, educated in the school of endurance and courage, reacted to Mr Mohamed Mzali throughout his speech, which they interrupted on a number of occasions to applaud and cheer. In particular, they appreciated the profound sincerity evident in the words of the prime minister and the patriotic and moral motivations underlying his thought. Brilliantly adapting the magic of words to daily problems and happily

marrying lyricism and objectivity, Mr Mohamed Mzali spoke to the Tunisian workers abroad in direct and open language which went straight to their hearts. He praised their love of their native country and reasserted the desire of the Bourguiba regime to pursue a policy such that Tunisians abroad, wherever they may be, will benefit from secure conditions of life and work.

The following is the text of the address delivered by Mr Mzali.

"Dear Brothers:

I am happy to inaugurate this 14th national seminar of our workers abroad, with a large number of my colleagues in the government and Political Bureau, our ambassadors and consuls and numerous officials in charge of affairs involving you abroad attending.

This seminar, which is a happy tradition we are determined to continue, is in fact one link in a chain of meetings and direct talks among officials in all sectors.

I would like first of all, while bidding you welcome, to inform you of the great concern the supreme combatant, President Habib Bourguiba, has for you. He has instructed me to convey to you his greetings and to tell you once again of the affection he has for you and his determination to continue his actions to maintain the links which bind you to Tunisia and which are a part of the organic bonds between you and the nation to which you belong. This attachment must remain powerful and encourage the efforts which will allow you to continue to play a positive role in the national development and to contribute to the gradual achievement of prosperity in our country.

This substantial contingent of emigrant compatriots, totaling 350,000 workers, students and businessmen--nearly 210,000 in France, i.e. more than half, and about 80,000 in Libya--while the whole population of certain independent countries does not exceed or even reach this figure--must be regarded as an integral part of our Tunisian nation, and we must regard the emigration of this part of our sons as a basically temporary situation.

I must in truth stress that our compatriots living abroad have at all times expressed their devotion to their country and given evidence of a patriotic spirit. I myself had the experience of this truth when, more than 30 years ago, I pursued my higher studies in France. This was in the era of the struggle for national liberation and we students were in constant contact with the Tunisian workers who had emigrated to France. They, serving as secret soldiers, provided a mailing drop for the Destourian cells and militants. Still today, the overwhelming majority of the Tunisian workers abroad are playing, as in the past, an important role in the defense of the interests of their country, safeguarding its outstanding image.

However, in recent years we have seen a new phenomenon which did not exist at the time of the national struggle. It has to do with the conduct of certain organizations and certain regimes which, profiting from the difficulties encountered by some of our compatriots abroad, difficulties most often due to irregular situations, are subjecting them to vile slander and turning them little by little against their country.

Maneuvers Victimizing These Workers

The maneuvers are sometimes underhanded, but they may also be flagrant and scandalous as was the case in the Gafsa affair. Other minds with evil intent have recourse to more "subtle" methods taking the form of indoctrination or brainwashing, methods designed to make the foreign worker, whether he be Tunisian, Arab or African--for this does not involve Tunisians alone--that the policy being pursued by his country is not a good one and that the choices made are not satisfactory.

This undertaking derives from an overall strategy designed to weaken the stability of the existing regimes. The worker begins to feel defensive, and with a great flood of ideological argument and depending on the case, he becomes a revolutionary, a leftist, a rightist extremist or joins organizations whose names or labels are not unknown to you.

Distributed in autonomous cells with no more than five or six members and with no communication between them, their heads are stuffed with slogans, a dab of progressivism here, a bit of socialism there, like a dish one seasons with various ingredients, so that the worker, who has left his homeland to earn a living and come to the aid of his family, becomes a subversive element, ready to overturn the regime in his country.

The authors of these maneuvers--and their writings provide proof of this--are seeking to sow confusion among the workers in order to turn them against their country. Tunisia is not the sole target for such undertakings: all African nations have suffered from it. But this has not succeeded and will not succeed with Tunisia for a number of reasons. Our Bourguiba regime is in fact one with a popular essence, and it is Bourguiba himself who has educated his people and forged the nation.

All Tunisians, whether they work in their country or in foreign lands, know perfectly well what Tunisia was like before independence, what it has become and what it is called upon to be thanks to the Bourguiba policies. They know that this regime is basically founded upon the people and that there is no hiatus between the masses and the officials for the simple reason that the latter, beginning with President Bourguiba himself, come from the people and are fervently dedicated to serving them. Whereas some of those who try to poison minds themselves belong to the bourgeoisie. How can such people, who have always lived in the greatest of comfort, dare claim to know the people? Is it the right of the sons of the well-to-do to give us lessons in progressivism and socialism? Wouldn't they have been better off

to examine their own situation first? It is true that the camel does not see his own hump! We have known these people since we attended the Sadiki College. Although they belong to families of rich landowners, they have such overweening arrogance as to take pride in progressivism and to assume for themselves labels which hardly fit. We whose parents lived in the most total deprivation, we who had no weapon with which to face life except determination and faith in the future, are today accused by these pseudo-progressives of serving the bourgeoisie! A strange inversion of roles! The Tunisian workers, who are familiar with all of this, do not lend their ears to this song which does not ring true to reality. Some of them who, for one reason or another, have been led into error, have as soon as they realized the truth rejoined the ranks of the majority and made common cause with the people. This is what we have been able to note in recent times. The reason for it is that the Bourguiba regime is a regime with a popular essence and, as such, it is safe from intrigues--whatever their source--designed to deceive the workers and make them believe that the regime does not care at all about their situation. The other explanation for the devotion of the emigrant Tunisian workers to their country lies in the particular concern the Bourguiba regime has devoted to them. In this connection, the organization we have established is perfect.

Ambassadors, consuls, social attachés, mutual interest associations, Destourian cells--all are pursuing consistent action to the benefit of our compatriots abroad. Without citing figures with which most of you are entirely familiar, I would remind you of the outstanding activities such as the establishment of sports and cultural associations, the organization of seminars and discussions similar to this one.

Breaking the Vicious Circles

If problems exist, we must examine them and provide them with the proper solutions without further delay. It is important to break out of the vicious circle. The workers should no longer be content to submit their complaints or the competent authorities to make a note of them, while awaiting a better tomorrow.

The time has come to put a stop to this situation. Let us try to examine the pending problems together and focus our efforts on finding together the solutions required. We have nothing to hide and nothing can embarrass us. If certain measures prove outdated, it will perhaps be possible to revoke or amend them.

If there have been errors, it is important to correct them. Nothing forces us to be slaves to routine or to confine ourselves to futile discussion.

We have addressed ourselves to the task. Day and night, we are pursuing the study of our problems. For example only yesterday our ambassador, Mr Hedi Mabrouk, told me that plans call for the establishment of an advance

unit at each consulate, a cell which will have the task of facilitating, for each Tunisian worker desiring to establish a business, the completion of the necessary formalities before he returns to Tunisia, so that he will not be required, once he is back in the country, to go from one office to another indefinitely. Some officials, it must be admitted, not all, happily, but a minority, sit back at ease in their armchairs and are content to ask you to present this or that document or to put you off indefinitely. This is the damnable routine from which I do not want you to suffer. Routine takes root in people's minds. We must amend this state of affairs so that the administration will perfectly and speedily carry out its duty to the citizens. I myself have seen some problems in this connection. In a village in the Sahel, a citizen told me a very discouraging tale. For more than a year his machinery has been halted while he has been sent from one office to another. He had purchased premises from his own funds, but his business did not succeed. He had lost all taste for eating and drinking and spent most of his time going from one department to another while the municipal or administrative official seemed not to care, at peace with himself. This red tape must be banished from our thinking by an effort of conscious will. Our difficulties come 70 to 80 percent from this situation. It must be noted that our budget, our policy and our plans have been clearly established. Thus red tape must be held responsible. This term, which is not to be found in the Arab language, should be incorporated within it, like many foreign words which were welcomed by our scholars at the time of the upsurge of Arab civilization or in the modern era, such as philosophic terms, those pertaining to sophism, recycling, etc.

If it is possible to help the worker complete the necessary formalities by cooperating with the country to which he has chosen to emigrate it will be possible for him to return to his native land and establish himself there without further procedures. Mr Mongl Kooli, director of the party, has told me that he established the Economic and Social Department of the party, entrusted to Comrade Noureddine Hached, and representing a department designed to spare Tunisians working abroad the inconvenience of interminable administrative procedures. Specialized agents are assigned to help and advise the emigrant worker. This helps to explain why our workers are devoted to our regime, which is concerned about their interests and makes an effort every year to resolve certain of their problems. A third reason for their devotion to the regime is what we might call genuine patriotism.

Each Tunisian a Patriot

Each Tunisian in fact, whether he is a worker, farmer, businessman, industrialist or government employee, is a patriot, loves his country, and by the grace of God, understands perfectly that the foreigner who comes to stuff his head intends nothing else but to make him a slave of a foreign country by enrolling him in opposition movements. One must understand the ins and outs of the matter. If this gentleman encourages you to weaken

your country and to sow disorder, it is to bring it to its knees before what the regime preached by the opposition represents. I do not wish to mention any particular country. These people want to weaken us and to sow intrigue among us to favor our absorption by their countries in the name of this or that progressive, rightist, unionist or other doctrine. In the name of friendship and brotherhood they embrace you in order to smother you and weaken your country, so that Tunisia will no longer be anything but a market and will lose its independence. This is the real truth. Tunisians understand only too well what this or that party represents. Do not force me to dot the i's. Slogans should not deceive us. Some countries--God forgive or damn them--would like to plunge us into anarchy and establish their parties in Tunisia, so that we would lose our independence and become dependent on them. Whatever their opinions may be, Tunisian workers would prefer famine, even if they were incapable of feeding their children, rather than agree to be the slaves of a foreign country and to sell out their own.

It is for these reasons that some foreign leaders err where we are concerned. In their view the fact that Tunisians, when they meet, whether it be in a cafe or the premises of a Destourian cell or in some other place, undertake to criticize this or that action by the administration and urge the improvement of certain things, leads them to believe with disconcerting naivete that Tunisians are ready to sell out their country. No, gentlemen, you are in serious error! You should know that when a Tunisian criticizes this or that aspect of national life, he is acting like a son who expresses his discontent with regard to some action by his parents. Between criticism and betrayal, however, the distance is enormous. Tunisians, whatever complaints they may have about the actions of the government or the administration, are not prepared to betray and will never betray their country. For the fact of owing allegiance to a foreign party or power represents, whatever the excuse or pretext, betrayal. And there can be no cooperation between Tunisia and a country of the East or the West if the cooperation relations are not based on mutual respect for independence and non-intervention in the domestic affairs of each state. No cooperation, unity or privileged bilateral relations can be tolerated if they derive from the will of the stronger or if they tend to impose de facto hegemony. The modern concept of international relations excludes the concept of the weak and the strong. Each state, whatever its size, must legitimately safeguard its independence, on which no compromise is justified. It is acceptable that a powerful nation may unite with one less strong than it is, but on condition that the former nurture no intent at all to crush the other and then assimilate it. Unity through violence and force is something universally rejected. Our happiness, our dignity, are not for sale, and we will never be willing to see them besmirched in any way whatsoever. To live modestly but in respect and with our honor intact, never stooping to beg from anyone--this is the motto of all Tunisians, wherever they may be. It happens that some of our fellow-citizens express their discontent from time to time about this or that administrative action, but those who --and here I am speaking to foreigners--believe that they can attack

Tunisia, lead Tunisians into error, corrupt them or win them over for their designs are seriously mistaken. This country was not born yesterday. It is the fatherland of a people who have recovered their identity and their dignity, who have been struggling for nearly half a century and who have won their independence at the cost of thousands of martyrs. Today, all Tunisians are working tirelessly in order to bequeath to their children and the children of their children a free, sovereign and respected Tunisia. Thus those who believe that they can plunder this country or trifle with its independence should not waste their effort. This we state forcefully and proclaim to heaven and earth.

I have made a point of paying homage to the healthy patriotic spirit which you have evidenced or are evidencing and your courageous attitude in the defense of the territorial integrity of your country and in safeguarding the prestige of Tunisia. When you state your nationality, there is no reason to blush or to bow to anyone. Our honor is intact and our situation is enviable. Thanks to Bourguiba and the party of Bourguiba, the Tunisian star glitters in the firmament. This is what I had to say to you at the beginning of this address.

Now I would like to discuss with you what has come to be called the problem of return. But before doing that, I would like to remind you that emigration itself has historic causes. Our country inherited an unenviable situation from the colonial era. The present regime, the men who are in power today, had nothing to do with it, quite the contrary. Our ancestors offered our country to the colonials as a preserve. A protectorate was imposed on us. To regain our sovereignty, we had to fight for more than 20 years.

Full Flowering for Each Tunisian

Today, 24 years after winning independence, we have not for all that ceased to wage the battle. But what progress we have made since then! This is the statement of a reality which, you will doubtless agree, is not motivated by any propaganda purpose. We do not however claim to have achieved our goal. Some of our achievements have in fact been the cause of new difficulties. For example, the popularization of education--which in the past was almost nonexistent, because our grandfathers did not even conceive of this possibility, and also because the colonial authorities did not find it in their interests--has not failed to give rise to new problems of which we are fully aware. It is a question of guaranteeing jobs for the graduates, providing work for those who do not graduate, and beyond these questions, waging a battle against a certain attitude of mind, once very widespread, involving fatalism and submission to fate. President Bourguiba has transformed this way of thinking. A well-known verse in the Koran says that God does not change the situation of the people until they have changed what lies in themselves. Remember that Tunisians were resigned to colonialism.

After innumerable visits to the cities and the countryside, President Bourguiba succeeded in drastically altering this mode of thinking. Since then, Tunisians have been ready to sacrifice for their fatherland.

Once independence was won and education widespread, a healthy ambition developed in the people. This eminently positive ambition, which we would like to see shared by all, did not fail to give rise to new needs and to arouse new aspirations.

Today, it is our concern to find a solution to all these problems, for it is our ardent desire that no Tunisian be trapped in routine, and that the love of life be the main stimulus. We nurture the desire to see every Tunisian achieve his full flowering, both for him and for his children. But this requires the development of wealth, of jobs and an increase in the income of the country so that each Tunisian can achieve his aspirations. This is our constant concern. Tunisians, generally speaking, and the workers in particular, should not be unaware of all we have done toward this end, of the path it remains for us to cover and of the contribution they must make to the success of this advance.

The present plan is coming to an end. The sixth plan is being drafted. It is an ambitious plan. Its choices, its goals and the means it will mobilize will be specified in the months to come. I will content myself with outlining some of its characteristics. We will work tirelessly to provide every condition for its success. We are determined first of all to reabsorb the unemployed, which will require the creation of 600,000 new jobs in the next 5 or 6 years. This is not an easy task, particularly since we are firmly determined to create profitable jobs in the full sense of the word.

The problem of unemployment exists in Tunisia. I say this and confirm it although some are reluctant to speak of it. What harm is there in speaking of it? It is an obvious fact and it is the reason that numerous Tunisians have had to emigrate. The Tunisians who have recently returned to the country encounter difficulties on the level of finding jobs in general or, more particularly, work which meets their requirements. Problems exist on this level and require suitable solutions. One of the great choices made in this connection is the launching of major projects in inland Tunisia, which has not benefited from the same rate of growth as the coastal regions. There is an imbalance of an historical nature to be corrected here. Major projects are under study or in the process of implementation. It is not a question of creating work sites or establishing small enterprises of minor dimensions to be surrounded by a great publicity effort. It is a question on the contrary of establishing major farm or industrial projects capable of absorbing unemployment in the regions located between Jendouba and Medenine.

The problem of unemployment, it must be remembered, is not specific to Tunisia. The countries in which you work suffer from the same evil. Thus to admit the existence of unemployment in our country in no way diminishes us. Unemployment is a fate shared by all. In France, in the FRG, in the United States, there are millions unemployed. And if you are encountering difficulties, it is because the French, the Germans or the Belgians have not found job opportunities. In other words the problem of unemployment is a general one, the list of reasons for which would be tedious.

In addition, it is a question of promoting the agricultural sector. In this connection I would like to draw your attention to the priority importance of agriculture.

Far from coming down to mere plowing, agriculture today is an industry which creates jobs and covers activities as diverse as livestock breeding, fishing, early fruits and vegetables, greenhouse crops and industries such as canning and processing. This is our goal. Already we have begun to try to educate the banks to this end. Measures have already been announced. Others will be announced soon, in the month of November, as soon as they have been perfected. These measures are designed to settle Tunisians on their land so that they can develop it and derive from it the means of assuring a decent and worthy life.

Eliminating Backward Thinking

The success of such an undertaking also presumes a reduction in administrative formalities. This is one of the reasons we have been led to contemplate administrative decentralization. It involves bringing the administration closer to the citizen. It is abnormal for a resident of Medenine or Kasserine to be forced to make a trip to the capital in order to obtain an administrative document. It is necessary for the administration to be decentralized and to have autonomous branch units on the regional level. It is also important to limit the number of documents required in order to obtain an authorization. Why, for example, must 10 or 12 documents be presented to obtain a passport? Shouldn't a national identity card suffice to obtain this document from the capital of the governorate? I might inform you in passing that this is now an accomplished fact. The minister of interior has already made a decision in this regard. The same is the case with authorizations and permits of all sorts. A petitioner, if no response is obtained within a period of 15 days, is entitled to presume that he has been given a green light to undertake the action for which he solicited authorization from the government authorities. It is intolerable for citizens to have to waste their time in trips back and forth as tedious as they are unnecessary. It is through measures of this sort that we will put an end to backward ways of thinking and will succeed in bringing the administration closer to the citizen. We propose to undertake this task without delay and the coming months will show you that we are determined to effect an administrative reform consistent with the desires of the citizens. In this way we will put an end

to the reasons for emigration. For we believe that Tunisia is capable of feeding its sons, just as we believe that it has and always will have need of all its sons.

There is another question I would like to bring up and which has to do with your contribution to the development of the country. This seminar gives me an opportunity to pay ringing homage to the active role you have paid in the past 4 or 5 years in the national development effort. During this period, nearly 750 projects have been developed by Tunisians returning to their native land after having worked abroad. I hope that this major effort will continue and will be expanded. The government and the party have taken every step to encourage and support this effort. Measures will be adopted to facilitate the formalities required and to encourage this goodwill.

Developing Socio-Political Activities

With modest capital and subsidies allocated by the funds already established, it is possible to establish small enterprises, if only of the family type. The worker returning to his country need not necessarily build a great factory. A small shop adjacent to his home can enable him to pursue his activity with the help of his family. Such enterprises exist in Italy and Switzerland, for example, and provide a living for a certain number of citizens.

Moreover, it would be desirable to develop socio-political activities for the benefit of workers continuing to live abroad, by creating Destourian cells and organizing conferences, in particular for those living in France and especially those living in Paris. The number of these workers as well as the funds available allow undertakings in this direction. In this connection, it is my pleasure to inform you of a decision Mr Hedi Mabrouk, our ambassador in Paris, and I have just made. With regard to the level of maturity achieved by our workers abroad, and in order to allow their mutual interest associations to achieve wider influence and to carry out their activities under better conditions, we have decided to make available to them the premises situated on Fortuny Street, which are at present vacant. These premises, owned by the Tunisian government, will in the future be yours. They will serve to house your activities and can be administered by a committee including, in addition to the Tunisian consul, members of the mutual interest association and the Destourian cell.

If we have been able to make these premises available, it is because we have been able, since 1 July of this year, to effect savings equivalent to a third of the budget allocated to our embassy in France. The personnel assigned to the offices in Fortuny Street have been transferred to the consulate and the embassy. Thus we have sought to reduce administrative costs and allocate the funds saved to projects benefiting the workers. As to the premises now available, they will as I have said be made available to you. In my capacity as secretary general of the PSD and in the presence

of the director of the party, I would like to inform you that we are prepared to help you carry out whatever you deem it possible to do to strengthen the activity and the influence of the party and to allow ou thus to develop the awareness of certain of our young workers. This action should, naturally, be carried out within the framework of respect for the laws in effect in the host country. As President Bourguiba stressed in the message he delivered to us last 1 June, the Tunisian worker and all Tunisians in general, whether they be workers, students or businessmen, should adhere to exemplary conduct. In the course of my talks with the French, German and other ministers, I have learned of the feelings the host countries have concerning us. They believe that Tunisians are industrious and competent. Minister of Social Affairs Mohamed Ennaceur has confirmed to me that more than half of the Tunisian workers are skilled workers. This is an unusual fact and is worth noting. Tunisians thus enjoy an excellent fund of esteem and consideration. It is a question of consolidating it and avoiding anything which could strike a blow at the reputation of our country. If some young people--very few, indeed--engage in reprehensible actions, it is for the mutual aid association, the Destourian cell or the sports association to call them to account. To my knowledge, there are some 80 sports associations for our workers abroad, including 49 in France, as well as numerous dramatic groups. Our workers also have libraries.

Safeguarding the Workers' Interests

We are prepared to increase this social and cultural activity, in cooperation with the departments involved, in order to provide our workers, in particular the young ones, with an alternative to bars and other places of ill repute and to involve them in educational and leisure activities within the framework of the mutual interest associations and Destourian cells. This can only contribute to Tunisia's prestige.

A last point: Some of you want to know whether you are protected by the Tunisian state or not. It should not be necessary to assure you that you are, and that this is one of our major concerns. But as I have just stressed, your host countries have since 1974-75 been adopting measures designed to limit foreign contingents.

We are working, discreetly but effectively, whether it be with the French authorities or those of other countries, to safeguard the interests of Tunisian workers, to ensure that they will benefit from certain favorable measures and to avoid their abusive or arbitrary expulsion.

It is our desire that the return of our workers should be organized in a rational and carefully-thought-out manner. Our position in this regard is clear. We say to the friendly and neighboring countries that the state of our relations with them reflects the treatment they give our nationals. We tell them quite frankly that the level of our cooperation with them and the degree of our friendship remain a function of their behavior toward

our workers. Today or tomorrow, our position remains the same. This is a constant in our policy, whether it is a question of organizing the sojourn of our workers abroad or their return to Tunisia.

In conclusion, I would like you to bear witness with me to the atmosphere of optimism and fraternity prevailing in Tunisia today. In the course of your stay, be it 1 month or 15 days, you have certainly seen that Tunisia is a land of dialog. But as I stressed in my speech in Mahdia, dialog does not mean laxity or carelessness. Dialog obeys the laws, within the context of rights and duties.

Tunisia, as President Bourguiba said on 3 August, is perhaps the only country in the Third World in which the chief of state can solemnly assert that there are no more political prisoners in his country.

The most curious thing, and this is a mere remark, is that some parties and circles are trying to make contact with you. Wouldn't it have been better for them to sweep their own doorsteps first? Whether they come from the West or the East, by what right do they assume the right to teach us lessons in progressiveness? It would be interesting to know how many political prisoners are rotting in their prisons, how many have been shot and how many are being persecuted!

The Tunisia of Bourguiba is determined to persevere in the path of dialog and an open approach to all Tunisians.

Tunisia is not the monopoly of any individual or category to the exclusion of all the others. It belongs to all Tunisians, from whatever region they may come, and we are not afraid of stating, whatever opinions they endorse. We do not fear plurality of views. On the contrary, we believe that this provides enrichment. Is there not a diversity of opinions, tastes and inclinations within any given family?

Tunisians constitute a single family and each of them has the right to express his opinions freely within the framework of the law, respect for others and harmony.

I believe that there is no hindrance to this. But if a Tunisian wants to dominate or head a gang to attempt intimidating maneuvers, that cannot be. Just yesterday Bourguiba recalled that he had sacrificed his youth and will continue to devote all his energies to ensure that all Tunisians are equal before the law.

In the presence of Mr Mongi Kooli and other colleagues, I told the president in Monastir the other day that I wanted to effect a housecleaning, beginning at the top, for we should set the example. I would not want, when I am addressing citizens from a rostrum, to be forced to speak about someone and to denounce his actions while he is sitting beside me.

Tunisia belongs to honest, upright Tunisians who are working in the service of God and the fatherland.

It is not a question of the party who talks the loudest and pounds on the table having the last word. Dialog must develop in respect for the basic rules of courtesy. The supreme combatant told me that his entire battle has been designed to raise Tunisia to this level. I told him that he can count on its sons.

I am here with you sharing the same love of the fatherland and of Bourguiba. What we ask of you is to help us to serve our country with self-sacrifice and devotion.

Organized Repatriation

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] Minister of Social Affairs Mohamed Ennaceur delivered the concluding address last evening at the 14th seminar of Tunisian workers abroad.

In his address, Mr Mohamed Ennaceur said that this seminar, unlike the preceding ones, brought to the fore the concern of Tunisian workers abroad about their definitive return to their country. "It is natural and legitimate for each Tunisian worker abroad," he said, "to be concerned about his definitive return to the country. This is also a major concern of the government. However, this return, as was the case with emigration, must be organized and prepared for within the framework of a tripartite arrangement involving the host country, Tunisia and the emigrant himself."

And Mr Ennaceur added:

"In our view, return to the country means above all reintegration in the domestic socioeconomic circuit and not a return to unemployment.

"As a result, it is important for the emigrant workers to derive profit from their stay abroad by perfecting themselves on the professional level and obtaining continuing training, setting to work in such a way as to create the conditions for a decent life in their country. For the Tunisian worker abroad must constantly keep in mind that he only chose emigration in order to improve his standard of living.

"Therefore, the return he must deliberately choose, like his choice to emigrate, should assure him of a better future."

Further on the subject of reintegration in active national life, Mr Mohamed Ennaceur suggested the establishment of a national savings-employment fund.

Its purpose would be to encourage the Tunisian worker to prepare for his definitive return to his country.

Mr Ennaceur made it clear that the host countries which employ young emigrants whose training costs their country of origin dear should play a positive role in organizing their return, in particular by providing these workers with proper training and capital sufficient to prevent their unemployment.

Mr Ennaceur announced moreover that during the course of the next plan, Tunisia plans to halt emigration and will work to create jobs for the emigrant workers who have chosen to return for good. In order for this to be achieved, he said, Tunisian workers abroad must help us in preparing statistics pertaining to this return, by contacting the bodies in charge of emigration and informing them about their definitive return and their specialties.

Where jobs are concerned, the minister of social affairs noted that the government is making a vast effort with a view to creating jobs, while encouraging private persons to undertake industrial projects. However, he said, the state and industry cannot alone meet all of the demand for jobs, and this is why it is imperative for other sectors (agriculture, crafts) to participate in this effort by launching small projects capable of ensuring a number of citizens of a decent income.

Earlier, the general conference motion was read. In it the participants reiterated their unalterable devotion to the supreme combatant and to national unity.

They noted with satisfaction the social achievements benefiting them and recommended the strengthening of the administrative structures and the party in the host countries.

They also recommended additional aid for the children and families of Tunisians working abroad.

From the political point of view, they urged the strengthening of party action in the host countries, to provide, among other things, better coordination of the efforts undertaken by the party structures.

On the social level, they recommended the drafting of social security agreements between Tunisia and the host countries, and the strengthening of education in the Arab language.

From the economic viewpoint, they recommended the simplification of administrative procedures and pointed to the needed to help emigrant workers to launch productive enterprises by supplying them with the necessary information for this purpose. Finally, the participants addressed two telegrams of support to President Bourguiba and Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali.

5157
CSO: 4400

FARMERS GAMBLE ON OLIVES, PISTACHIOS, ALMONDS

Lusaka SUNDAY TIMES OF ZAMBIA in English 24 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by John Madeley]

[Text] THE United Nations World Food Programme has persuaded more than 80,000 small farmers in Tunisia to abandon wheat and maize production and plant their land with olive trees.

For up to 20 years — until the olives bear fruit — the farmers will be totally dependent on WFP food aid, from outside sources over which they have no control.

The Tunisian project is part of a WFP plan to "modernise" agriculture in arid and semi-arid regions.

A similar scheme has just begun in Syria. Such projects raise serious questions about the direction of Third World agricultural development.

The Tunisian project was launched some 10 years ago to improve the income and standard of living of small farmers in the north of the country.

Plot

The farmers, each working about two hectares of land, grew wheat and maize, both for their own use and to sell locally.

Yearly earnings from a two hectare plot were only about K500, and some of the farmers were giving up their land and drifting to the towns.

The WFP reckons that growing olive, almond and pistachio trees instead of wheat and maize will eventually enable a farmer to treble his income. The snag is that olives do not bear fruit until 15 to 20 years after planting, pistachios until 11 years and almonds until 10.

During that time, the WFP has promised to supply food to farmers who make the change-over. Farmers and their families receive a weekly package of semolina, oil, beans, milk powder, cheese and sugar, giving each person the equivalent of 1,600 calories a day.

A farmer who planted olive trees in 1978 must expect to receive such aid until at least 1993.

Farmers were tempted to join the scheme by the offer of free food and the promise of higher incomes later on.

They qualified only if they joined a farmer "grouping". There are now 733 of these groupings, and the land converted covers an area of over 200,00 hectares.

A farmer who joins a grouping reaps his last harvest of grain, digs up his field and receives a loan to plant trees, mainly olives. The loan will be paid off eventually from the proceeds of the fruit.

But the trees need maintenance if they are to yield fruit, so the farmer is obliged to stay on the land and look after them.

As the maintenance of the trees only occupies a few hours a week, some farmers also work as hired labour for larger landowners.

So the smallholder, who once grew his own wheat and maize and was able to control his own livelihood, however modest, is now dependent on a weekly food package and will be so for up to 20 years. He is in debt for his trees and has perhaps become a hired hand for a larger landowner.

The rewards, the farmer is assured, will come later. But how certain is this, either for the farmer or for the country as a whole?

Tunisia's current five year plan aims at self-sufficiency in food. But that goal is still a long way off. This year, Tunisia will produce about

600,000 tons of grain and import a million tons. The WFP olive project is steadily reducing the amount of land under grain, and means a lower overall food output for Tunisia for the next 15 to 20 years.

At the same time, the switch to cash crops — some of which will be exported — means increasing dependence on the vagaries of world market forces.

At present, there is a surplus of olives in Europe and the Middle East and this may well continue for the next decade.

The WFP projects represents the longest-ever period for which Third World farmers have been expected to depend on food donations.

The Tunisian farmers will in effect be dependent on foreign governments, and subject to any shifts of aid policy in donor countries.

Exciting policies on food aid may, in fact, be drastically revised in the next few years. There are signs that a "food aid rethink", spearheaded by the field staff of development agencies, is now spreading to donor governments.

It is beginning to be acknowledged that while food aid is valuable in emergencies, it is not a good tool for development.

It creates a dependence on outside sources which can undermine the process of development.

The WFP project in Tunisia represents a major gamble.

If it pays off, it will mean higher incomes and a better standard of living for the small farmers. If it does not, it means that Tunisia's food production capacity drops, and 80,000 families lose their livelihood. — **EARTHSCAN.**

CSO: 4420

FEDERAL COUNCIL APPROVES MILITARY SERVICE BILL

Council Debates Bill

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 28 May 80 pp 1, 3

[Article by Sadiq 'Aziz and Muhammad 'Amir: "National Military Service Bill Approved; Disbursement of Salaries to Drafted Civil Servants To Continue Throughout the Period of Their Service"]

[Text] At the meeting it held yesterday, attended by His Excellency Muhammad ibn Rashid, the minister of defense, the Federal National Council [FNC] approved the National Military Service Bill in the light of amendments that were introduced into it by the council's Committee on Domestic Affairs and Defense. The bill was turned over to the Council of Ministers for approval; it is then to be turned over to the Supreme Council so that it would be put into effect as soon as it is endorsed.

The council had amended Article 17 of the bill as follows: "The civilian position of an enlisted man and all the salaries and promotions that derive therefrom are to be held for him while he is performing his national military service. Government agencies and public organizations are to continue disbursing the salaries of enlisted men they employ. But those who work in private sector companies or agencies, receive their salaries from the Ministry of Defense. The length of their military service is to be calculated in their civilian service and treated as double emergency service when compensations or pensions are computed." The committee had introduced several amendments to the bill, and these were approved by the council. These amendments are:

Article 2 made military service mandatory for all male citizens between the ages of 16 and 35. It was the opinion of the committee that the age of 16 was not quite suitable. This is because a young man at this early age is not capable of joining the army corps. Such a step would require bearing arms and pursuing an arduous military life. Therefore, the article was amended to make it apply to those between the ages of 18 and 35.

Article 6 gave peremptory exemption from service to all the sons of officers or enlisted men who lost their lives in the service or who were 60 percent or more disabled during military operations. It was the opinion of the committee that only the two oldest sons were to be exempted from military service so that the rest of the sons would still have the honor of performing their national duty.

Article 7 gave a temporary exemption from service to a man who was supporting his brother if that brother was disabled because of a physical impairment or disease. It also gave a temporary exemption to students and to people who were undergoing a course of therapy. An addition was made granting a temporary exemption to men supporting a brother or brothers who were not 18 years old.

The council's discussions and the amended text of the law are on page 3.

It was evident when the Federal National Council [FNC] began its session yesterday that there were few members [present]. Had only two or three [more] members not come, the session would not have been held, and the meeting would have been postponed for lack of a quorom. But God protected the council, [and the meeting did take place]. It was also evident from the outset that the discussion would be calm, regardless of how long the session would last, because of the small number of members.

What is important is that at 10 o'clock Hilal Lawtah chaired the session because His Excellency Tarim 'Umran Tarim had expressed his regrets and His Excellency Hamad Bu Shihab was absent because he was heading a delegation of the council that was visiting Taiwan. The meeting was attended by His Excellency Muhammad ibn Rashid, the minister of defense; His Excellency Sa'id al-Ghayth, the minister of state for the affairs of the Council of Ministers; and the chairman of the Civil Service Council. The meeting was also attended by 'Abd-al-Majid al-Sayyid, adviser to His Highness al-Shaykh Maktum ibn Rashid; by the adviser on civil service affairs; and by Staff Maj 'Abdallah Muhammad al-Mazahimi, the director of operations and training in the Ministry of Defense. They all attended the meeting since it had been determined that the council would discuss, besides the Military Service Bill, the policy of the government in the area of civil service as well as evident signs of the increasing cost of living and other "new business."

The Council's Letters

In less than 5 minutes, statements of regret were read; the council approved the minutes of its meeting on 22 April; and two letters from his excellency the minister of state for the affairs of the Council of Ministers were read.

The first letter pertained to a Council of Ministers' resolution on foreign corporations and domestic spending. The text of that letter follows:

"Please be advised that the Council of Ministers decided when it met on 31/3/1980 to charge the Ministry of Finance with settling the bids for projects and provisions on national companies and ascertaining that no sp spurious companies are participating [in those endeavors]. The Ministry of Finance is to lay down rules and regulations [for these matters] and it is to take the steps that are necessary to implement this decision."

The second letter pertained to the recommendation that was made by the National Council regarding the matter of federal projects and popular housing. The text of that letter follows:

"Please be advised that the council reviewed the recommendation when it met on 5/5/1980 and expressed its interest in the matter. It has charged the Ministry of Public Works and Housing with presenting a study of the new designs to the Council of Ministers so that a suitable design for a popular home may be selected."

At the same time the council turned over to the Legislative Committee a federal bill that would amend some provisions of Law No 1 for 1972 regarding the mandatory powers of the ministries and the jurisdictions of the ministers.

The Military Service Law

The discussion of the National Military Service Bill in the light of amendments that were introduced by the Committee on Domestic Affairs and Defense began immediately. Salih al-Shal, the secretary to the committee stood up and read the articles of the law and the amendments that were introduced by the committee. It became evident that although the law had 35 articles, the committee had introduced only four amendments to it.

The first article that was amended was Article 2 which had stipulated conscription for males between the ages of 16 and 35. The committee amended that to males between the ages of 18 and 35.

The discussion began with Muhammad ibn Badawah who asked if the law applied to the armed forces only or also to the police force. He also asked if it applied to males only or also to females.

Muhammad ibn Rashid: "It applies to males only; we did not think of females."

Faraj ibn Hammudah: "The government's bill set the age at 16. Our young men at this age are intellectually mature and are ready to assume responsibility. Why was the age changed from 16 to 18?"

'Abdallah Amin: "I think the article should stay as it was without amendment so that when the student leaves school at this age, he is [in a sense] adopted by the Ministry of Defense. In fact, I suggest that we reduce this age to 14 if possible."

Khalifah Muhammad: "Young men should not be eligible [for military service] before they are 18. If a student fails in school, he may volunteer in the armed forces whose institutions are open to everyone. Compulsory conscription, however, is a responsibility."

Khalifah Hamid: "The question now is this: why was the age changed from 16 to 18?"

Muhammad ibn Rashid: "Frankly, the age of 18, on the one hand, is the age that is used in most of our neighboring countries. On the other hand, our armed forces are now equipped with the most modern scientific weapons which must be understood through learning, awareness and knowledge."

There were discussions in which Salih al-Shal, 'Ali al-Marzuq, Ahmad al-Mazru'i and 'Abdallah Rashid participated. The majority almost came to an agreement that the age of 18 was a more suitable age, but an explosive question was suddenly placed on the floor.

Muhammad al-'Amiri: "It is my opinion that this law will open the door to students to leave school and join the armed forces. There are many places in government which need qualified citizens. What will these places do if we took our young people into the military and the other stages of education remain vacant?"

We Want an Army of Educated Men

Muhammad ibn Rashid: "Military service is a national and a pan-Arab duty. We prepared this bill after looking into all the laws and after considering our efforts and our own circumstances in the Emirates. This law does not mean that every individual will be compelled to join the military corps or that students will be encouraged to leave their studies. On the contrary, all the gulf countries are now turning to this law since it is unavoidable. It will benefit our citizens by giving them a strong incentive and a strong motive in civilian life. Military training gives young people the self-confidence that is necessary for them to become involved in the aspects of practical life. This law then is almost a voluntary law. We have taken all the circumstances into consideration. Young people will not continue to defend [their country] unless they desire to do so."

His excellency the minister of defense added, "There is in fact some danger that a student who gets used to military discipline and likes it will remain in the military. But he is in fact free to continue or discontinue his service after he completes it. As far as educated people are concerned--those who have reached the highest rung on the educational ladder--we do in fact need them because we want 'a strong, educated army in this country.'"

There was another round of discussion about whether the age [of eligibility] should be 16 or 18. Then the matter was put to a vote by a showing of hands and the article was kept as amended by the committee so that the age of conscription is from 18 to 35. This was approved by the majority.

The Sons of a Man Killed in Action

Articles 3, 4 and 5 were passed quickly. When it came to Article 6, Faraj Hammudah asked, "Why did the committee change the exemption for 'the sons of an officer or an enlisted man who was killed in action or who was more than 60 percent disabled during military operations' to the oldest two of the officer's or enlisted man's sons who are eligible for the draft, etc. to the end of that section?"

Salih al-Shal: "What was intended is that if a man who was killed in action or was disabled had 10 male children, would they all be exempted from the draft? It was the opinion of the committee that only the oldest two be exempted."

Faraj ibn Hammudah: "Why the oldest two? Maybe they are basically not suitable for supporting the family of the [officer] who was killed in action. Who would support the family if the rest were drafted?"

Al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-Jabbar: "The law as amended is fair. It stipulated that anyone who is supporting a family is to be exempted."

Muhammad al-'Amiri: "It is honorable to die in action. To honor the man who died in action it is enough to exempt two of the sons from the draft, even though they will be deprived of the honor of losing their lives in action."

The members approved the article as it was amended by the committee.

In discussing Article 7 the members asked that the term "the one and only son" be changed to that of "the only son" because the term, "one and only" was pretentious.

The council then moved to the following articles which were approved without discussion until they came to Article 17. It stipulated that "The civilian position of an enlisted man and all the salaries and promotions that derive therefrom are to be held for him while he is performing his national military service. This period is to be calculated with the period of his civilian service, and it is to be treated as double emergency duty when compensation or pension is computed."

The Law Almost Fell Apart

This article came close to being passed by a significant margin had it not been for al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-Jabbar Bashir who made a point about a flaw in the article. "The article held the enlisted man's position, but it did not

hold his salary for him." He asked, "What will become of a family whose breadwinner is drafted and his salary drops to that of a soldier? Does the law assume that all those who are drafted will be students who do not have jobs or families?"

Muhammad ibn Rashid: "A person who is in the reserves receives his salary, but an enlisted man receives a soldier's salary from the army. Military service is everyone's duty, and everyone must perform this duty. All countries pay enlisted men nominal amounts of money. Sometimes it is two dinars or two and a half dinars. How can we come out with something different? If an enlisted man is working some place for a salary that is greater than that of a soldier, and if he were to join the military service at his same salary, what would be the position of the soldier who is training with him and is affiliated with the armed forces service?"

Jabr Sayf agreed with the minister's statements, and Faraj Hammudah asked if the committee had studied and investigated this subject. Salih al-Shal replied and conceded that the committee was negligent in investigating this point.

Muhammad al-'Amiri asked that the bill be returned to the committee for reconsideration.

Faraj ibn Hammudah proposed that the enlisted man's employer pay 30 or 50 percent of the salary of the enlisted worker.

Sultan Khalifah: "No company will pay the salary of a worker who has enlisted. Furthermore, it may not even appoint him in the first place so it would not pay him a salary when he enlists."

Nasir Lawtah denounced the material negotiations that preceded military service as a tax that was required of every citizen in this homeland.

Al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-Jabbar proposed that [the Ministry of] Social Affairs pay the salary difference to the family of the enlisted man. Then, as usual, he became involved in a heated discussion with Counselor Dr Sayyid Ibrahim.

The minister almost settled the matter when he declared, "Those who are employed may be affected by the draft. But I personally cannot approve now. The council is to amend this article and to send the amended text to the Council of Ministers where it would be discussed in a broader fashion. It is known that at the outset the law will actually be applied to some of the workers who have not yet reached 35 years of age. Afterwards, in the future no citizen will work anywhere until he performs his military duty."

Two proposals remained: that the state pay the difference in salary or that the article remain as it is and the period of service be considered a citizen's duty and the sacrifice he makes. There were discussions that went on for more than 2 hours; they ended with [an agreement] to amend the article so that "the government agency or the public organization where the enlisted man was employed was to continue paying his salary, and the Ministry of Defense would pay the salaries of those employed in the private sector." This [amendment] was made in accordance with a suggestion made by Counselor Dr Sayyid Ibrahim.

The remaining articles of the law (18 articles) were passed in less than 10 minutes, and the meeting was adjourned for half an hour.

When the meeting was reconvened, a large number of the members had left and the rest did not constitute a quorum. After a discussion that lasted 10 minutes, it was decided that the meeting be postponed till 10 June.

Text of Amended Bill

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 28 May 80 pp 3-4

[Article: "Text of the National Military Service Bill as Amended by the Federal National Council"]

[Text] The text of the federal bill which pertains to national military service as it was approved by the Federal National Council [FNC] yesterday follows. This is the text of the bill as amended by the Committee on Domestic Affairs and Defense and by the council.

Section One: Definitions

Article 1: In enforcing the provisions of this law the following words and expressions are to be construed in accordance with the definitions provided for each one unless the text indicates otherwise.

A. National military service is the mandatory period spent by those who are subject to this law in the armed forces either in active duty or in reserve service.

B. Active military duty is the period during which a citizen is drafted and his status changed from civilian to military. This period includes a military training period and the actual practice of military life in the units of the armed forces in accordance with that citizen's military specialization.

C. Reserve military service is the period during which an enlisted man would have left the armed forces after having fulfilled his active military duty when he would be ready to meet the request of the armed forces and join the army either for training or mobilization.

D. An enlisted man is a young man who enlists for national military service and works in the armed forces for the duration of the period determined by law.

E. The volunteer is the young man who volunteers for service in the armed forces and who chooses military life as his way of life, whether he is an officer or a solider.

F. Military schools are educational units affiliated with the armed forces where military studies are undertaken in accordance with "the general training policy. Graduates obtain military titles at those schools."

Section Two: General [Conditions]

Article 2: National military service is mandatory for all male citizens of the United Arab Emirates and for all males who acquire citizenship and who are between the ages of 18 and 35 and are suitable for military service.

Article 3: The duration of national military service for all enlisted men is to be 9 years of good service, not including periods of absence, absences without leave or prison sentences. This period begins on the date the enlisted man enlists in military service, and it includes two basic terms:

A. A term for active military service; this is to be determined as follows and in accordance with the individual's educational level.

1. For those who do not have educational qualifications, 18 months.

2. For those who have intermediate qualifications, 12 months.

3. For those who have higher scientific degrees, 9 months.

B. A term for reserve military service is to be determined as follows:

1. For those who do not have educational qualifications, 7.5 years.

2. For those who have intermediate educational qualifications, 8 years.

3. For those who have higher educational qualifications, 8 years and 3 months.

Article 4: The minister of defense is to issue organizational instructions that determine the method and the duration of military training, the system of calling up the reserves and the method of their distribution to the various branches of the armed forces in accordance with the needs of those branches.

Article 5: The following groups [of people] are to be exempted from mandatory national military service:

A. Those who are employed as state guards for the chairman and the members of the Supreme Council of the Federation. They are also to be exempted by government decree.

B. Those who volunteer to work as military men--officers or other ranks--in the armed forces or in the police, provided that they volunteer for not less than 3 years.

C. Students at military colleges, institutes and academies. In case for any reason they do not continue their course of study until they graduate, the period of time they spent in these colleges is to be counted in their term for national military service, provided that such a period is not less

than 6 continuous months with no [interruptions] for sick leave or imprisonment. The remainder of the period is to be considered reserve military service in case the 9 years determined in Article 3 were not completed.

Article 6: The following groups [of people] are to be exempted peremptorily from national military service.

A. Anyone who does not meet the medical suitability requirements for military service as determined by resolution of the minister of defense made in accordance with the recommendation of the Department of Medical Services.

B. The oldest two eligible for the draft who are sons of an officer or an enlisted man who was killed in action or who has more than a 60 percent disability acquired during war operations.

C. The oldest brother or the one following him of an officer or an enlisted man who was killed in action or who has a 60 percent disability acquired in the course of military operations.

D. The eldest eligible for the draft among the sons of an officer or an enlisted man who died or was discharged from military service because of an illness, an injury or an infirmity acquired during or because of service.

E. Paragraphs B, C and D are to be applied to everyone concerning whom a federal law has been issued requiring that he be treated as a citizen who had lost his life in action.

Article 7: The following groups [of people] are to be exempted temporarily from national military service.

A. A father's or a mother's only son as long as he remains an only son.

B. The son who is the only provided for his father provided that the father is unable to earn a living because of a disability or an illness or because he is 60 years old.

C. The son who is the only provider for his mother provided that the mother is a widow or irrevocably divorced or that her husband is unable to earn a living because of a disability or a sickness or because he is 60 years of age.

D. The man who is the only provider for his brother, provided that the brother be unable to earn a living because of a disability or a disease or because he is not yet 18 years old or his draft had been deferred because he was studying or undergoing therapy.

E. The man who is the only provider for his sister provided that the sister is a widow, or irrevocably divorced or had never been married in the first place.

F. Those who have been sentenced to lengthy incarcerations and those who are detained pending investigation [are temporarily exempted from military service] for the duration of the term of their punishment.

G. Anyone who reaches the age of 35 during the period of a temporary exemption is peremptorily exempted.

H. An exemption is revoked when the reasons for it are no longer extant. Anyone who has no more reasons for exemption is to notify the branches of the Civilian Military Service Administration by registered letter within 60 days. He is [also] to present himself to the authorized agencies.

Article 8: National military service is to be deferred for the following groups:

A. School students until the age of 24.

B. Students in colleges, institutes of higher learning or similar [establishments] until the age of 31.

C. People who are studying in the country or abroad to obtain higher academic degrees--a masters degree or a doctorate--until the age of 34.

D. A brother who follows the one who enlisted or was drafted until [the term of] his enlistment or his draft is completed.

E. Those who were commissioned by one of the ministries because there was an urgent need for them at their places of work, provided that this be done by decree from the Council of Ministers and until the age of 34 in times of peace.

The draft may be deferred for other groups not mentioned in the previous articles by decree of the minister of defense. The maximum age stated in paragraphs A, B and C may be overlooked by no more than 2 years in the case of illness during the various stages of education, provided that this be documented by a certificate endorsed by the Ministry of Health. Those whose draft had been deferred are to present themselves voluntarily to a branch of the National Military Service Administration when the reasons for the deferment are no longer extant. They are to present themselves at the times determined by the Ministry of Defense or by the General Command of the Armed Forces so that their names can be registered or they can be drafted.

Article 9: Every young man who is subject to the provisions of this law is to present himself to the concerned agencies determined [by this law] within 60 days of reaching the legal age for the draft.

All authorized state agencies that are related to the subject of the draft are to notify the National Military Service Administration in the Ministry of Defense of those who reach the draft age every year.

Article 10: The minister of defense, in accordance with the state's public interest as far as the armed forces are concerned, is to declare the number of individuals who are required for the draft every year. He is to declare the number of those whose [military service] is to be deferred and those who will be exempted from the draft.

Article 11: The duration of active military service may be prolonged upon the recommendation of the minister of defense and the endorsement of the Council of Ministers because of war, mobilization or emergencies.

Section Three: Rights and Duties

Article 12: An enlisted man is to be granted the salary of a soldier as of the day he presents himself to the draft offices of the Ministry of Defense. This is in accordance with the financial regulations that are in effect in the armed forces. An enlisted man is eligible for the promotions and the periodic pay increases that derive therefrom.

Article 13: An enlisted man is entitled to all the rights granted to the members of the armed forces with regard to therapy and social service. He and the members of his family who are supported by him are to receive therapy paid for by the armed forces in military hospitals for the duration of his active military service and when he is on call during his military service in the reserves.

Article 14: A man who is called from the reserves [to active duty] is to be granted a salary at a rank that follows the rank he had reached when he left active duty, provided that that maximum salary be that of a sergeant. In addition, [he is to receive] an allowance in accordance with what is determined by the Council of Ministers on the basis of a recommendation from the minister of defense.

Article 15: A person who is called from the reserves is to continue receiving his salary from the governmental agency where he was employed if he was employed in one of the ministries, governmental organizations or agencies or public corporations. He is to receive the difference in salary and the reserve allowance from the armed forces.

Article 16: An enlisted man is to be granted 3,000 dirhams as a bonus when his term of active military service is completed, provided that his conduct [during the period of service] was not less than good.

Article 17: The civilian position of an enlisted man and all the salaries and promotions that derive therefrom are to be held for him while he is performing his national military service. Government agencies and public corporations are to continue disbursing the salaries of enlisted men they employ. Those who are employed in the private sector are to receive their salaries from the Ministry of Defense.

This period is to be considered part of an enlisted man's civilian service, and it is to be treated as double emergency duty when a bonus or a pension is being computed.

Article 18: In case an enlisted man is partially or totally disabled or loses his life during the period of his enlistment or when he is called up from the reserves, he becomes eligible for the Pensions and Retirement Compensation Law for Military Men No 8 for 1976 A.D., which is in effect in the armed forces. The 2 percent salary deduction is not to be made throughout this period.

Article 19: If circumstances permit, an enlisted man is entitled to all the vacations stipulated in the armed forces except the vacation for pilgrimage during his period of active military service. In case he cannot take annual leave because of work conditions, he is to receive a monetary allowance in accordance with instructions and orders regulating disbursement of such an allowance, which are in effect in the armed forces.

Article 20: An enlisted man is entitled to a 15 days vacation to mark the end of his national military service before he is placed in the reserves.

Article 21: An enlisted man is entitled to being promoted to the rank of an enlisted sergeant during his period of service in the armed forces. He is to be granted all the privileges of the new titles provided that the period between a promotion from one rank to another be not less than 6 months.

Article 22: An enlisted man may volunteer in the armed forces during or after his active military service.

Article 23: The minister of defense is to issue instructions, orders and rules regulating the process and the conditions of promotions; the authorities [who grant] promotions and also the method of changing [the classification] of an enlisted man to that of a volunteer.

Article 24: An enlisted man may enroll in evening schools to learn if the circumstances of military service permit and provided that this be done with the approval of his commander.

Section Four: Controls

Article 25: Every citizen who is 18 years old and not more than 35 years old and who meets the conditions for national military service but has not performed this service may not be appointed in any government agency unless he has special permission from the Ministry of Defense.

Article 26: Every citizen for whom national military service is mandatory is subject to military orders as of the date that citizen was to have joined the armed forces. He is to conform to the Law of Military Regulations.

Article 27: Anyone who fails to present himself to the armed forces 3 months from the date he was to have joined the armed forces is to be drafted for 6 additional months after serving his term of active national military service.

The penalty is to be reduced by half if the citizen joins the armed forces voluntarily within 6 months of the date of his failure to present himself. This term [of punishment] may be revoked if the citizen renders good service and if his commander so recommends.

Article 28: Anyone who fails to present himself to the armed forces 6 months after the date he was supposed to have joined the armed forces is to be drafted for one additional year. The penalty is to be reduced by half if the person voluntarily joins the armed forces within 1 year of his failure to do so [originally]. This period may be revoked if that citizen renders good service and if his commander so recommends.

Article 29: Anyone who fails to render national military service and passes the age of 35 is to be punished by imprisonment for no more than 2 years, and he is to pay a monetary fine of 10,000 dirhams.

The prison penalty may be revoked and the financial penalty may be doubled by the minister of defense if there is justification for doing so.

Article 30: Every person for whom national military service is mandatory who evades that service or tries to evade it by cheating or by hurting himself; and also every person who helps or tries to help another avoid military service or unrightly defer it; or anyone who turns another person against performing his national military service is to be punished by imprisonment for a term that is no more than 3 years, or he is to pay a monetary fine of 15,000 dirhams, or both.

Article 31: Anyone who commits the crimes mentioned in the previous article in a state of war is to be punished by imprisonment for no less than 10 years and no more than 15 years.

Section Five: General Provisions

Article 32: No one who is required to sign up for national military service may leave the country before performing this service, except in the following cases and with the endorsement of the Ministry of Defense or whomever the ministry empowers:

A. Those who have temporary exemptions as mentioned in Section Two, Article 7, provided that the permission to leave is issued annually and that it be tied to an administrative certificate from the authorized agencies that the reason for the temporary exemption continues to exist.

B. Those whose draft has been deferred as was mentioned in Section Two, Article 8 and until the age determined for that deferment, provided that the reason for travel is the pursuit of learning.

C. For therapeutic reasons provided that the decision to travel be made by a medical committee from the Ministry of Health and endorsed by a military medical committee.

Article 33: The minister of defense is to issue regulatory instructions to regulate the method according to which he will issue those permits mentioned in Article 32 and to regulate the agents that will issue these permits and endorse them.

Article 34: An administration is to be established in the Ministry of Defense to regulate and execute this law. It is to be called the National Military Service Administration. The minister of defense is to issue regulatory instructions and orders for this administration.

Article 35: The ministers, each within his jurisdiction, are to execute this law. This law is to be published in the Official Gazette; it goes into effect upon publication.

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EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE FOOD SECURITY DETAILED

Abu Dhabi AL-WAHDAH in Arabic 27 May 80 p 5

[Article: "Efforts Towards Achievement of Food Security"]

[Text] The importance of food as a strategic weapon is increasing day by day, and food is becoming a weapon whose strategic importance is no less than that of any other weapon used in its areas of utilization. This importance stems from the growing demand for food and the increase in the world's population. Because of this growing importance of food, the state has spared no efforts in achieving food security for the citizen. This is because the state believes that food security for the citizen is of no less importance than his security and stability in any other location. Where do we stand [on this matter], now that we have all heard of operations threatening the use of food as a weapon whose danger would be no less than that of any other weapon?

This danger will increase in the future. We have all begun to hear about the threats the United States is making against other countries that do not go along with it [in helping it] achieve its colonialist goals.

To free ourselves from these threats which we are hearing now and which will inevitably be used against us one day either by the United States or by another country, state officials have been concerned with this matter in a manner that seeks the establishment of more cultivated areas and, accordingly, the production of more of our food needs. Besides, locally produced goods acquire a special significance since people are beginning to have bitter feelings when they see that everything they eat and use is imported. Interest in agriculture, therefore, would bring a person closer to the national soil and would increase his interest and his love for that land. A statement made by one of the citizens when he saw the farms of al-'Awhah which had been planted with wheat is sufficient [to illustrate this feeling]. The citizen said at the time, "This green is enough for us at this stage. In the future we must cultivate more of this land for the purpose of production."

Data and Statistics

In order to formulate a true picture of this interest in agriculture, we must make a quick review of the statistical data that were issued by the Department of Agriculture and Animal Production in al-'Ayn. These data show the magnitude of the expansion in agricultural land.

In the area of preparing and leveling farms, the number of farms that were established until 1979 exceeded 98; their area amounted to 23,089 donums. In 1970, 290 farms had been prepared, and their area was 11,299 donums. These farms are distributed among al-Qattarah, Seyh ibn 'Ammar, al-'Ayn, al-Wajan, Madisis, the afforestation division, al-'Awhah and others. It is worth noting here that 44 of these farms, whose area amounts to 1,419 donums, utilize a sprinkler irrigation method which is considered to be one of the most modern and the least costly methods of irrigation. It is [also] the least wasteful of water. In addition, returns yielded by the plants [as a result] of this method [are good].

Services for Farmers

The department offers farmers its numerous services. In the area of leveling, plowing and fertilizing the soil, the department's services have covered 50,000 donums. In addition, the department furnished seeds, fertilizers and seedlings in large quantities. The quantities of seeds that were distributed free of charge to farmers in 1979 amounted to 160,068 kilograms. In the area of preventive services and services for fighting plant diseases, the [total] area which received protective services from the department amounted to 14,764 donums; the [total] areas that were sprayed amounted to 118,805 donums; and the quantities of insecticides, pesticides and other materials used in 1979 amounted to approximately 38,394 kilograms.

Machine Maintenance

The department carried out all maintenance operations on drilling machines, digging machines and plowing and harvesting equipment. The department utilizes 289 agricultural machines [that represent] various kinds of agricultural machinery.

In the area of material aid whose objective is to encourage farmers to work on these farms, the department offered loans in 1979 that totaled 2,483,113 dirhams. [A total of] 1,344 farmers benefited from these loans. These funds were used to purchase agricultural machines and plows and to lay down irrigation systems.

The Green Cover

In the area of afforestation, horticulture and the cultivation of vegetables and fruits, the department furnished large numbers of these seedlings and plants in addition to seedlings of all kinds of vegetables in the area of

al-'Ayn. The department cultivated 1,979 donums with different kinds of vegetables and fruits for testing purposes so that their cultivation can be expanded and distributed among the farms of al-Qattarah, Suwayhan and the rest of the farms.

Vegetable production was abundant and met a good percentage of local market consumption. Locally produced vegetables were distinguished from imported vegetables by a large difference in price and also by quality. In 1979 the total tomato crop exceeded 3,540,842 kilograms, and the cucumber crop amounted to 791,596 kilograms.

The department's activities were not confined to vegetables only; the department was clearly interested in fruit trees. Farms in al-'Ayn are now producing good quantities of lemons, dates and guavas.

The department has also been interested for a number of years in raising bees. There are now more than 250 beehives in al-'Ayn; last year they yielded 258,025 dirhams [in revenues].

Wheat is foremost among the plants receiving attention with regard to expanding its cultivation and production. This expansion began several years ago; and it was in al-'Awhah that this expansion began. The results that were achieved by the department showed that it was possible to obtain a good return of wheat per donum, compared with the returns in other places famous for the cultivation of wheat. During the 1979-1980 season the department began cultivating 3,760 donums; it is expected that wheat production from this land will be 800 tons.

This area, which is cultivated with wheat, [is located] in al-'Awhah region. The department will grow wheat in Umm Ghafah after soil test results have shown that growing wheat there was possible because the necessary materials for cultivating wheat were found in the soil in good quantities.

The department's activities are not confined to land and agriculture. The department does give much attention to animals and to the development of animal resources. There is a veterinary hospital in al-'Ayn whose services last year were delivered to 4,884 camels; 1,281 cows; and 30,261 sheep. In addition, it offered poultry services as well as other services.

Veterinary professionals treated 54,107 cases in al-'Ayn free of charge. There are six outpatient clinics affiliated with the department. These are scattered among Madisis, al-Khaznah and other locations. Besides treatment, the department offers financial assistance to the owners of these animals. The total aid that was offered by the department to the owners of these animals exceeded 11 million dirhams; these were distributed among 2,902 cattle owners.

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STEADY, SLOW DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL COMMUNITY EXPECTED

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 26 May 80 p 3

[Article by Fu'ad Ayyub: "Gallantry of Bedouins in al-Taybah Valley: 10 Young Men From Village Support Their Families Along with Their Fathers To Provide Good Life for Family Members; Khamis Shares His Modest Salary With His Father To Help Him Raise His Six Brothers; Village Mosque Built by Citizen Living in Qatar and Furnished by Village Residents"]

[Text] There are many negative factors in the lives of Bedouins who have been living for many years in the village of al-Taybah inside al-Fahid Mountain. There are also many positive factors, which are primarily humanitarian, in that life. The Bedouins of al-Taybah--that village which is located on both sides of al-Taybah Valley with half of its 45 houses to the east and the other half to the west--are still dreaming about having electricity. They see the power lines that are stretched across the roads in the valley every day. They also have their own water problems: some days they have water; other days they don't. In addition, their palm trees are diseased and the (al-hambu) and (bean) crops are weak. In addition to these negative factors, there are the positive factors which are exclusive to the Bedouins. These are positive factors that were established by the nature of life in mountainous regions where cooperation and mutual responsibility are requirements dictated by the circumstances of that life. In that region people live as one family all of whose members love and care for each other. It is within this family that notions of manhood, gallantry, sacrifice and redemption flourish. It is in al-Taybah that we find a son who had denied himself the mere thought of marriage so he can stand by his father, his mother and his brothers and sisters to relieve them of some of the suffering that is caused by the inability of their material resources to meet their needs and realize their wishes. We also find a gallant man who saw people traveling scores of miles to perform the duty of group prayer, so he volunteered to build a mosque for them.

Before we begin with the negative factors that are considered the common denominator in most of the areas of the eastern region where there are concentrations of Bedouins, we [would like] to present an honorable picture of the positive factors [of Bedouin life]. This picture is exemplified in one

of the young village residents whose relationship with his original community was not severed despite the fact that he had joined an urban society and obtained a reasonable position. This young man is Khamis Ahmad Muhammad Khamis. He is about 20 years old, and he is a civil servant in Dubai with the armed forces. Circumstances had helped him to enroll in the primary school in Masafi when he was a boy, but only 5 years later these circumstances had declined, and he was unable to complete his education. He took advantage of the first opportunity he had, and he joined the army.

Regarding his reason for joining the army and leaving school Khamis says, I had no choice in doing this. The stages of education are lengthy, and my father is becoming an old man. The orchard he has does not provide him with an income to speak of, but he has the responsibility of supporting me and supporting my three brothers and three sisters."

Between the Pipe Smoker and Local Tobacco

While Khamis was talking to me very calmly, his father, Ahmad Khamis was preoccupied with smoking his modest pipe and watching us intently. His looks were significant: he would sometimes look at his son, and other times his eyes would shine with pride and affection for him or for his present position. His son had become a government civil servant, and he was receiving a salary from the government that made him not need a government pension. I sensed that he wanted to join in the conversation and to say something. But before I listened to him, I asked him about the pipe he was smoking; it was a contraption that looked very much like a pipe. To describe it more accurately, it was a miniature pipe. I found out from him that that pipe was the pipe most Bedouins use because it was very economical and its tobacco was cultivated locally, in most cases between the trunks of the palm trees in some of the mountainous regions. One mann [two pounds] of this tobacco sold for 200 dirhams, and sometimes [one could buy it for as little as] 50 dirhams. One gram of this tobacco lasted for a long time, 15 or 20 [hours of smoking]."

After putting his pipe aside beside him Ahmad Khamis said, "Life was difficult: the palm trees that we cultivate became diseased, and the (al-hambu) and (al-lumi) trees no longer gave us the good fruits that we used to harvest in days gone by. Therefore, my son's position was important for him and for us too."

I Am Not a Hero

Let me go back to Khamis, the young son, to ask him, "What did you give your father and your family after you went to work?"

He says, "I have stood by their side ever since I took that job. At the beginning when my salary was small, I gave my father 200 dirhams every month. Then the sum increased to 500 dirhams. But now that I have a big pension of approximately 2,600 riyals, I give my father 1,000 dirhams a month. Along with his monthly pension, this sum meets his needs and the needs of my brothers and sisters for a month. I am therefore, quite satisfied. Every week I come here with my modest car to visit them and spend the weekend with them."

I told him, "Have you saved any money for marriage?" He replied, "This is a real problem, but I do not feel it, nor am I concerned with it now. Naturally, I did not save anything. I am only interested now in providing happiness to my brothers and my sisters and also to my mother who has had a hard time bringing us up and looking after our comfort."

When I shook Khamis' hand and expressed my admiration for what he was doing for his father, his mother and his brothers and sisters, he said, "Don't think of me as a hero who is making sacrifices for his family. I am not the only one who is doing this. There are 10 other young men in al-Taybah village who are working in the government and helping their families. Some of them live where they work and come to al-Rub' like me every week. Others live [illegible], and still others are married and are living in the modest dwellings of their parents, which you see here, so they can provide a comfortable life for their fathers and their mothers and toil for them."

Will There Be Electricity Before Ramadan?

I found another positive model in the village; its features were outlined carefully by the chief of al-Taybah region, the chief of al-'Abadlah, Muhammad 'Ali ibn Dawud al-'Abduli. It was that of a man who was not in the village. His name is Khamis ibn Ahmad al-'Abduli, and he is presently residing in the fraternal state of Qatar. The village, which has 45 homes and about 250 persons, did not have a mosque where people could pray; no one had been able to build that mosque. While he was on a visit to the valley, the man found out about this and offered to build the mosque that is here now, where people assemble to pray at all times. Chief Muhammad 'Ali says, "When the mosque became a reality in front of all of us, we collected contributions among ourselves, and we furnished it. We also purchased a microphone so that the muezzin [the man who calls the faithful to prayer] could be heard in every house in the area. We purchased the microphone after his highness the ruler of al-Fujayrah sent us a generator to light the mosque."

I found myself moved to inquire, "Is there electricity in the village, then?" And here the chief replied, "No. There is electricity in the mosque, but [the generator] cannot supply any other place with electricity. However, we hope to have electricity in our homes soon. The ministry has installed the cables and the poles along the hills of the valley and has told us that we will have electricity soon. We are asking the Ministry of Electricity and Water to provide us with electricity to light our homes before the month of Ramadan."

Among the negative factors [in the village] was the fact that water, which comes to the village by truck, does not come regularly. This truck has been transporting water non-stop for 6 years. Now, however, it does get idle: it works one day and is idle for days. What can people do when they do not get water?

'Ali ibn 'Abdallah ibn Husayn says, "The ministry denies that there is discomfort as a result of the fact that water is delivered one day and not the other. When the tanker that carries the water is idle, we are forced to take water from the wells that irrigate the plants and the palm trees. This naturally causes a problem, since we deprive the palm trees of the water when we take it from the well [for our own use]. This hurts the palm trees; but what are we to do?

Death Is Inescapable if a Car Is Not Found

There is another negative factor that pertains to medical treatment. There is not a single medical facility in the entire area. According to the Bedouins, it is easy to send children to school if there is no school in the valley because there are special cars that come to take them to school. But what would be the situation in case there are cases of emergency illnesses at night?

This matter is explained at length by the chief of al-'Abadlah. He says, "It very often happens that a woman would get sick, and especially with one of those emergency diseases. The illness [usually] gets worse at night when everything is dark and the valley is still. If the husband has a car, there is no problem, but if he doesn't, there is a major problem. It is known that most of us do not have cars. In this case the worried husband would run around the valley, knocking on the homes of the Bedouins who own cars and asking them for help. There have been many cases when a man was not able to save his wife because there was no car, and his wife [later] died in his arms. This is a real problem that we have always been facing. We had been hoping that the state would build a medical facility in our area."

'Abdallah Muhammad Sa'id adds, "We lack a medical facility and wells to irrigate our orchards. The old wells have dried up and are in need of repair. None of us can repair them, and we are still waiting for electricity. Most of the houses, as you can see, are built of palm leaves and (al-shinku). Very few of them have been built with brick. Don't think that [those who built their homes with brick] are wealthy; quite the contrary, all the people borrowed from the bank to improve their standard of living."

Despite all the problems that I heard about and despite the barren life which the Bedouins are living in al-Taybah, the village is one of the rare villages in the state where natural wells abound and where palm trees, mango trees, lemon trees and other vegetables are flourishing. If the ministries that deliver services were to focus their attention on this area to provide the Bedouins with everything they need, and if the Ministry of Agriculture and Fish Resources were to give this area its attention, al-Taybah Valley will become a source of benefits for its people. By nature the area is one of the most beautiful areas of the country. In fact, it would be a first class tourist area if it were utilized in the best fashion. But the Bedouins are not looking now for tourism, because their first hope, whose realization they are still awaiting, is the arrival of electricity. [They are also hoping] that the obvious lack of services they have been receiving will be amply met in all the principal cities of the state.

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VILLAGES IN NORTHERN EMIRATES TO RECEIVE ELECTRICITY

Abu Dhabi AL-WAHDAH in Arabic 27 May 80 p 1

[Article: "All Villages in Northern Emirates To Receive Electricity"]

[Text] At the meeting which was chaired yesterday by His Highness al-Shaykh Rashid ibn Sa'id al-Maktum, the vice president and prime minister, the Council of Ministers approved a short-term plan for the Ministry of Electricity and Water. This plan is to be implemented in the next 2 years, 1981-1982, and its costs amount to 200 million dirhams.

The plan includes providing electricity to all the villages in the northern emirates and hooking up electricity and water services to all the remote areas in the country.

The plan also includes tying the power stations of Umm al-Qayawayn and Falaj al-Ma'la with an overhead line to strengthen the electricity of Falaj al-Ma'la and to supply neighboring areas with power services.

According to recommendations from High Highness al-Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan, the president of the emirates, the council approved the sum of 5 million dirhams for the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to shore up women's handicrafts in the country.

Two million dirhams of this sum were earmarked for strengthening the centers for environmental industries and handicrafts, and 1.5 million dirhams were earmarked for strengthening women's associations. This sum represents an increase that amounts to 70 percent of current financial allocations for strengthening women's associations. The sum of 1.5 million dirhams has also been earmarked for bonuses [to be granted] to female workers in the field of environmental and popular industries who took part in the Handicrafts Fair that was recently wound up by his highness, the president.

The Council of Ministers reviewed a report from His Excellency Sa'id Ghubash, minister of planning. The report included the implementation of the projects of the 1979 Investment Program as well as the status of spending and implementation for first quarter projects in the 1980 Investment Program.

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BRIEFS

LARGEST POWER PLANT CONTEMPLATED--It is estimated that the huge power plant, whose construction has been decided on for the area of Zabarah, 30 kilometers from Umm al-Nar Island in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, will cost more than 25 billion dirhams or more than 7 billion dollars. The power plant is still an idea, but it will be implemented now that the Department of Electricity in Abu Dhabi has completed preparations for a comprehensive study of the future electricity and water needs of the country. The study was given to a number of international consulting firms who will look into the economic and technical aspects of the project which the state wants to complete before the end of 1990. The preliminary study of the project that has been made considers the establishment of a power generating plant and a water desalinization plant so that the country's needs of water and electricity may be provided; so that the northern emirates may be provided with the electricity they need; and the emirates who are members of the federation are hooked up to a standard electricity system. The date for beginning implementation of the project has not yet been determined, but the study that has been made bears in mind that construction and the operation of the first unit, which will operate at a capacity of 130 megawatts, is to occur in 1985 and that construction of all the other units is to be completed gradually before 1990. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 7 Jun 80 p 45] 8592

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PALESTINIANS BEGIN BIG PUBLICITY CAMPAIGN IN EUROPE

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 24 Jun 80 p 18

/Article by 'Adnan Nasrawin: "Abu 'Ammar Has Started To Invade Europe from the South and Will Soon Reach the North"/

/Text/ AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM met with the Palestine Liberation Organization's representative in Brussels and the European Council, Mr Na'im al-Farra, during his recent visit to Paris.

Mr al-Farra said that the organization's Brussels office enjoys a quasi-diplomatic status, working as an embassador, although Belgium has not yet officially recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as a sole representative of the Palestinian people.

To his statement he added that the Belgian position is characterized by positive and negative aspects at the same time. He said that Abu al-Lutf's recent talks in Brussels showed progress in the Belgian and European position regarding the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The director of the organization's office in Belgium pointed out that Abu 'Ammar's visit to Brussels has become a possibility for the near future. Herewith follows the text of the discussion:

/Question/ What is the status of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Brussels?

/Answer/ The Liberation Organization office in Brussels enjoys a quasi-diplomatic status. The Belgain government does not consider that it is diplomatic in nature because it has not yet recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as a sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The Belgian foreign minister's excuse for this is that when the Palestine Liberation Organization gives itself a legal framework then Brussels will recognize the organization, which means that Belgium is now asking us for the establishment of a Palestinian state in exile before officially recognizing the organization. In spite of all this, we have constant contacts with the Belgian Foreign Ministry on all official levels

and deal with the Belgian Foreign Ministry like any Arab ambassador to Brussels. Relations between us and officials in the Foreign Ministry are positive, although we do not agree with them on all points related to the Palestinian cause and the developments of events in the Middle East region. Belgian diplomacy supports the Camp David agreements as a positive first step toward peace and we reject that totally.

However, from another standpoint, the positive points in the Belgian government's position are that it demands that Israel withdraw from all Arab territories occupied since 1967, including the Arab city of Jerusalem, and it recognizes the right of the Palestinian people to determine their destiny in total freedom. It states that the Palestinian people have the right to choose their representatives as they wish, but they implicitly recognize, and this was frankly stated during our brother Faruq al-Qaddumi's visit to Brussels recently, that the Palestine Liberation Organization currently is the channel through which the Palestinian people express their will to establish their independent state.

In another area, Belgium, and Europe as a whole, although condemning Israeli policy, in particular the policy of establishing settlements in occupied Arab territories, have not yet adopted practical measures to put pressure on Israel to desist from establishing new settlements or eliminate the old ones existing on occupied Arab territories.

The Belgian Foreign Minister and His Talks with Abu al-Lutf

/Question/ What is the effect of the visit Mr al-Qaddumi made recently to Brussels on Palestinian-Belgian relations?

/Answer/ Abu al-Lutf's visit in itself was very important, since it was the first official visit to be made by the chief of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization to Brussels, by invitation of the Belgian Foreign Ministry, with the agreement of the Belgian government and under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The presence of Abu al-Lutf on this type of official visit to Brussels means a great deal. The Belgian foreign minister, commenting on this visit, said "I do not talk with or officially invite people I do not recognize." Therefore al-Qaddumi's presence in Brussels means Belgium's implicit recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The importance of this visit by Abu al-Lutf also lies in the high-level official meetings which he held with senior Belgian officials. He met officially with the foreign minister and met the minister of foreign trade and the minister of cooperation for economic development. He met each one of them in his ministry, in his official office, and in addition the foreign minister of Belgium held a luncheon in his honor at the headquarters of the ministry itself to which he invited the Arab ambassadors and a large number of Belgian official personalities. Abu al-Lutf also met with a number of parliamentarians and a number of Belgian political personalities from various political party tendencies in the Belgian parliament building. Each of these

contacts is important in itself because it establishes the legitimacy of the representation of the Palestine Liberation Organization in an official form of the Palestinian people, and Belgium's official recognition of that. The Belgian press devoted major importance to Abu al-Lutf's visit, dedicating extensive spaces to it in its papers in a positive manner affecting Belgian public opinion and giving the proper picture of the Palestinian official who is talking from a position of responsibility and concern for the interests of the Palestinian people.

/Question/ How did Belgian official circles receive the recent statements by the French president on the principles of settlement in the Middle East?

/Answer/ These statements by President D'Estaing met with strong support in Belgian circles, although these circles received the French President's declaration with a kind of astonishment; Belgian officials did not understand why this kind of commotion was stirred up over President D'Estaing's statements and positions, which were not new as the foreign minister of Belgium had previously embraced them intensely and stated them, both in the context of the United Nations and in Belgium, even during the meetings of the nine European countries belonging to the European Common Market. However, in light of the sensitive position France occupies in European milieux, and also because the French president spoke for the first time during his visit to Jordan about the need for the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in any discussions on the Middle East, they took these statements into consideration. Belgian officials told me that they were happy with D'Estaing's statements because they considered that the major European countries had started to proceed along the positive political path which the smaller European countries like Belgium and Ireland had been traveling on months before that. I can now say that European efforts are being made to conduct an important European diplomatic initiative whose features will become prominent after 26 May, the date of the conclusion of what are called the autonomy talks, which the European countries expect to fail in achieving the national aspirations of the Palestinian people. This European initiative will take place in order to avoid the political vacuum which will occur when it is apparent to everyone that the peace efforts the United States of America is making now in the Middle East fail, especially since America is now absorbed in the presidential election campaign and other crises which concern it more than the Middle East, especially the Iranian crisis. Therein lies the role of the European countries and the importance of their initiative. We hope that this European initiative will truly be positive and that it will not be in the Camp David framework or in the framework of American policy, which has proved that it is hostile to the rights of the Palestinian people and Arab issues in general.

Means of Contacting World Public Opinion

/Question/ How do you perform your task as a Palestine Liberation Organization official in contact with European organizations and bodies in Strasbourg?

/Answer/ Our opinion in the Palestine Liberation Organization is that European parliamentary bodies are ignorant of the details of the Palestinian cause and are ignorant of the true official Palestinian position for numerous reasons. In spite of all that, these circles, whether they are the Parliamentary Society in the European council or the European parliament, take decisions on the Middle East which ignore or are unmindful, in whole or in part, of Palestinian rights and Arab issues. Therefore, we have considered it necessary to work within these parliamentary circles because the resolutions adopted in these circles are relied on in the national parliaments of each European country as a prelude to get these national parliaments to adopt hostile positions on the Palestinian people. Therefore, the decision in the Liberation Organization was that we should concentrate intensively on the European Parliament and the Council of Europe and try to make their members understand the reality of the justice of our Palestinian cause and Arab causes. I can state now, through my contacts with European parliamentarians, that they have come to understand the truth of the Palestinian cause and parliamentary bodies have started progressing toward a demand for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories and recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people and the Liberation Organization, especially in circles of the European Parliamentary Society, which recently heard the point of view of the Syrian foreign minister and the foreign minister of Jordan. In addition, the society's political committee met with representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization, questioned them directly and allowed them to speak plainly to the European committee on the Palestinian situation. This all had an effect on the European position in general and the adoption of more positive, progressive positions regarding the rights of the Palestinian people than the previous positions, which were adopted out of ignorance or fanaticism on behalf of Israel.

The Importance of the European-Palestinian Parliamentary Meeting

/Question/ What is the importance of the European-Palestinian parliamentary meeting held lately in Strasbourg?

/Answer/ In Europe, there is something called the European Parliamentary Society for Cooperation with the Arab World, which in reality has no relationship to the European Parliament as a European parliament but rather consists of parliamentarians from the national parliaments of the European countries which meet in the society. This society began more than 6 years ago, when at the beginning it had five members; now their numbers exceed 350 from the various European countries. One of this society's activities has been to meet with a delegation from the Palestine National Congress, which it considers the Palestinian parliament, to talk with it about the issues which have been set forth and to attain understanding from it on the real positions of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian people. We held two meetings over 2 full days and they were dominated by serious discussion on these issues. We managed to answer many

questions which are being presented to European parliamentarians in their countries on the Palestinian cause and its facts which in the past they were incapable of answering.

The importance of the issue is that the meetings were held in the headquarters of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, and this means a sort of Palestinian raid on the headquarters of the European Parliament. On this occasion the European Parliament also played a role and we seized the occasion to meet with some political groups in the European Parliament. The Palestinian delegation met officially with the socialist group of the European Parliament which represents the nine member countries of the European Economic Community in the European Parliament headquarters. We also met with the Communist group of the European Parliament and asked the Christian and liberal group, who declined to meet officially though we met with them in an unofficial manner in the headquarters of the European Parliament, conveying to them the Palestine Liberation Organization position while they presented us with their groups' positions. Following the session of the European Parliament, there is the session of the European Council, and I will be staying in Strasbourg to talk with the council's meetings on the Middle East issue and Europe's position on it.

/Question/ Do you believe that Mr Yasir 'Arafit will make an official visit to Belgium soon?

/Answer/ The fact is that our brother Abu 'Ammar has started the invasion of Europe, starting from the south. The countries proposed for the visit are France and Italy. It is probable that the atmosphere of elections in France will delay our brother Abu 'Ammar's visit to Paris but, as far as the other small European countries go, there is no doubt that they will wait; they do not want to be the first and do not want to be the last to invite Abu'Ammar, but I do not see anything, in the medium term at least, to prevent an official invitation being sent to our brother Abu 'Ammar to visit Belgium officially. I can state bluntly that we have not yet studied this matter seriously, in view of the Belgian situation, /but will/ when the political circumstances are ready inside Belgium. Unfortunately this country has been going through political crises for a number of months. Currently the government has resigned and we do not know if another new government will be formed soon or if Belgium will be compelled to have new elections.

11887
CSO: 4802

KUWAITI PAPER COMMENTS ON SYRIAN-LIBYAN MERGER

LD111136 Kuwait KUNA in English 1006 GMT 11 Sep 80

[From the press review; quotation marks as received]

[Text] Kuwait, 11 Sep (KUNA)--AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM on Arab Unity

"The Arab citizen fully realizes that the horrible suppression to which he has been subjected stems from the absence of unity. Those who have planned to spread their hegemony over the Arab nation decided first to apply the policy of divide and rule. The imperialist knives began to tear the Arab body to pieces to ensure full control over its dignity and wealth. Then came the decision to create Israel in Palestine.

The most disastrous result was the creation of artificial entities in the Arab world which in the long run have turned into distant, repulsive and belligerent states.

For these reasons attempts at Arab unity were defeated repeatedly to the extent that this nation began to doubt its capabilities.

"Amidst this state of disappointment, it was obvious that salvation could only come through unity because this is the only thing we lack.

"Following yesterday's merger between Syria and Libya we became hopeful that the Arabs have at last found the curative medicine for the deadly illness.

This merger is a good omen for a bright future. The significance of this unity could be realised from the pronounced feeling of danger that has seeped through Israel and the Camp David parties. This feeling affirms that those enemies plan to keep the Arab nation torn apart so this (?nation) continues to be weak and defeated forever.

Unity is the only hope which makes the liberation of Arab lands possible. It is also the only means for the realization of national aims."

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

IRAQI, JORDANIAN AVIATION MEETING--Baghdad, 3 Sep (INA)--Sa'dun Ghaydan, member of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council and minister of transport and communications, met here today with Ghazi Rakan, director general of the Jordanian Civil Aviation Department, and members of his delegation. The two sides reviewed various aspects of transport and communications cooperation between the two countries and the adequate means to strengthen this cooperation in implementation of the bilateral decision to consider air and land transport between the two countries as domestic transport. Husayn Hayawi Khammash, president of the Iraqi Civil Aviation Organization, met with his Jordanian counterpart Ghazi Rakan. Their discussion dealt with the possibility of increasing airflights between the two countries, inaugurating a direct air route from the port of Aqaba in Jordan to Baghdad and Basra in Iraq and coordinating the exchange of expertise between the civil aviation departments in the two countries. [Text] [JN031520 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1425 GMT 3 Sep 80]

IRAQI PARTY CRITICIZES SYRIA--Baghdad, 5 Sep (INA)--Michel 'Aflaq, secretary general of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, has said that struggler Salah al-Din al-Bitar's martyrdom marks the beginning of a new stage in history for the Syrian people's struggle and for the stand taken by the international and Arab public on the Syrian issue and the Syrian people's ordeal. In a speech delivered here last night during the commemorative ceremony marking the 40th day after the death of martyr al-Bitar, Michel 'Aflaq said: Al-Bitar's martyrdom raises the issue of Syria's ordeal and the Syrian people's tragedy. It demonstrates that the Syrian regime is prepared to resort to anything to preserve its seats of power and to safeguard its plunder. The Ba'th Party secretary general added: We will not leave the proud Syrian people to stand alone in confronting this rancorous anit-Arab regime. We pledge to the Syrian people that we will make Syria's liberation the beginning of an escalating struggle of the masses that rectifies the state of affairs in the Arab countries, crushes al-Sadat's treason and returns Egypt to the arena of the pan-Arab struggle. [Excerpts] [JN050853 Baghdad INA in Arabic 0735 GMT 5 Sep 80]

EGYPTIANS DIE IN IRAQ--Cairo, 6 Sep (MENA)--The Egyptian authorities at Cairo International Airport have managed to unveil an ugly tragedy whose victims were 137 Egyptian peasants and workers who were working in Iraq. AKHBAR AL-YAWM reports today that the Egyptian authorities unveiled this tragedy when they were surprised one day by the arrival of 15 coffins containing the bodies of 15 Egyptians from Iraq. The paper says that the Egyptian authorities were suspicious of the cause of death of these peasants and workers because the death certificates sent with the coffins say that they died of an epidemic disease when there is no epidemic disease--cholera, for example--in Iraq. Although the Iraqi authorities claimed that the bodies were embalmed, a stench which emanated from the coffins was an indication that this was not true. The paper says that there must be a grave secret behind this ugly tragedy or that our sons in Iraq are being subjected to an ugly massacre, as can be conjectured from statements by some Egyptians who have returned from Iraq. AKHBAR AL-YAWM demands a quick investigation of the secrets associated with these bodies, which are arriving from Iraq inside coffins sealed with red wax, together with the death certificates which conceal the real cause of death. [Text] [NC060957 Cairo MENA in Arabic 0745 GMT 6 Sep 80]

UAE, PDRY FINANCIAL AGREEMENT--Abu Dhabi, 11 Sep (QNA)--It was stated here that the UAE and PDRY have signed an agreement on financing the Aden electricity plant and (Nashtun) fishing port projects. The agreement stipulates that the UAE contribute $30 million to finance the Aden electricity plant project while Algeria will finance the rest of the project. The Abu Dhabi fund for Arab economic development will contribute 60 million dirhams, estimated at $16 million, to the project, the total cost of which amounts to 112 million dirhams. The paper AL-KHALIJ published today says that Shaykh Surur Ibn Muhammad, head of the UAE president's office, signed the agreement for the UAE yesterday while PDRY installations minister Abu Bakr Haydar al-'Attas signed it for the PDRY. Shaykh Surur Ibn Muhammad met with the PDRY minister yesterday but nothing was announced on the discussion held during the meeting. [Text] [JN111156 Doha QNA in Arabic 1050 GMT 11 Sep 80]

CSO: 4802

AFGHANISTAN INVASION A SIGN OF SOVIET WEAKNESS NOT STRENGTH

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONALE in French Summer 80 pp 113-114, 118-119, 121-122

/Article by Emmanuel Todd: "The USSR in Afghanistan: The Final Collapse?". The author is a Ph. D. in history from Cambridge University. His other works include "La Chute Finale, Essai sur la decomposition de la sphere sovietique" /The Final Collapse: Essay on the Disintegration of the Soviet Sphere/, Robert Laffont, 1976, and "Le fou et le proletaire" /The Madman and the Proletarian/, Robert Laffont, 1979/

/Excerpt/ Since the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan early in January 1980, the West again believes in the possibility of a worldwide triumph of communism in its Russian and Soviet version. More and more imposing is the image of an immensely powerful USSR, ruthlessly aggressive, and ready to strike, invade, and control the world around it at the least sign of weakness or irresolution by the "imperialist camp." Through Cuban intermediaries, the Soviet Union seems determined to invest Africa, and through the intervention of the Vietnamese to master southeast Asia. Its fleets of warships, prodigiously developed since 1970, henceforth cruise in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean, asserting the presence--in those historically sensitive zones and traditional sites of great power confrontation--of a system which still aspires, as it has since 1917, to world domination. Concurrently with that "conventional" military and political expansion, the USSR between 1970 and 1980 has caught up with the United States in the domain of strategic--that is, nuclear--arms.

It is in this context of growing power that the Soviet Union, strong in its 22 million square km and 260 million people, is intervening in Afghanistan, thereby adding 20 million people and 650,000 square km to its empire, which already included 110 million east Europeans and Mongols spread over 2.5 million square km. How can we fail to interpret the invasion of that country, which has been neutral since the 1907 agreement between Russia and England, as an upsetting of the world power balance and a stage in the Red Army's march to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean? A glance at the globe clearly reveals the central position of Afghanistan at the junction of the Soviet, Moslem, Chinese, and Indian worlds. Specialists in geopolitics at once recognize in this vast stretch of desert and mountains an essential and alarming center of future expansion.

There is certainly some truth in that interpretation of Soviet expansionism. Here I wish simply to show that it can be countered by another equally credible but completely opposite interpretation, which sees in the operation against Afghanistan the effect of a generalized crisis--economic, demographic, and ideological--in the Soviet system. From this viewpoint, the entry of the Red Army into Kabul would not be an expression of strength, but a symptom of impotence.

Islam as a Demographic System

It is only from within the Soviet sphere that the population growth of the USSR's Moslem republics appears strange; on the global scale it is strikingly commonplace. Everywhere, from Morocco to Pakistan, Islam is remarkable for the extreme rapidity of its demographic expansion, even for the Third World. The growth rate for Uzbekistan approaches those for Algeria or Syria, and is especially close to that for Afghanistan. Much is said today about the cultural affinity between the peoples of Soviet central Asia and those of Afghanistan (approximately 15 percent of which is composed of Uzbeks, Turkmen, and Kirghiz, with a majority of Pushtuns). It is most often emphasized that the Russian revolution brought about a cultural divergence between the two zones, the Moslems of Soviet Asia discovering the delights of progress, and those of Afghanistan stagnating in backwardness.

The former are said today to be 100 percent literate, the latter 80 percent illiterate. An unlikely argument: the coincidence of demographic behavior on both sides of the Soviet border underscores the superficial nature of that so-called divergence. An examination of the respective growth of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, for example, is rather revealing in this regard. Uzbekistan: 8 million inhabitants in 1959, 15 million in 1979; Afghanistan: 9 million in 1956; 19 million in 1976.

The American statistical annual [Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1978, p 902], in its demographic projections, predicted 36 million Afghans by 2000. An almost empty territory and a diplomatic fiction in 1907, Afghanistan will soon compare in size with such European nations as Spain or Poland. The Soviets' panic is understandable in light of the fact that this new nation has several counterparts within the territory of the USSR.

These demographic and national phenomena primarily concern the USSR, but they are in fact of more general import. It is difficult not to link the present Islamic effervescence to a phenomenon of massive augmentation and densification in a civilization hitherto very thinly spread: in 1940 the Arab world numbered 82 million people; in 1976, it had 192 million--an increase of 134 percent in 35 years.

The French are in a particularly good position to understand the demographic problem faced by the Soviet leaders. They had in Algeria an altogether similar experience.

When the troops of Charles X occupied Algiers on the eve of the revolution of 1830 north Africa, in terms of contemporary European norms, was barely populated. It comprised a few ports, which were pirates' nests, and a few nomadic or semi-nomadic groups inland. In 1876 Algeria still had but 1.3 million people. In 1956, at the start of the war for independence, it already had 11 million. In 1978 it reached 18 million. A nation was literally born under French occupation, just as one or more Moslem nations are being born in central Asia under Russian occupation.

The invasion of Afghanistan can thus be considered as the last episode of European colonialism: incapable of facing up to the Moslem problem within its borders, the USSR has chosen adventure. It has yielded to a sensation of giddiness. It had to settle the problem of the cultural irreductibility of 40 million Moslems. By its invasion of Afghanistan, the Red Army has just raised that total to 60 million, of whom 20 million are in a state of insurrection.

The global nature of the Moslem problem is perfectly perceived by the Afghan resisters. In the words of one of their commanders in the field, "To reach Kabul is not too hard; the whole country is with us. But next, we will take Samarkand and Bukhara, where our Moslem brothers are. Then, we will go as far as Tashkent, and some day we will reach Moscow." This desire to dismember the USSR recurs as a leitmotiv in the testimony of journalists on the scene. But though aware of the general character of the Moslem question, this resister nevertheless reverses certain aspects of the problem: it is hardly likely that the Afghans can, with their forces alone, thrust the Russians out of Kabul. The Soviet regime cannot consent to a withdrawal, which would be humiliating and apt to arouse by repercussion the latent nationalism of Moslems in the USSR. The Afghans' only chance, faced as they are with an invader seemingly resolved to wage savage warfare, in fact lies in a crisis which would shake the republics of Soviet central Asia, in the taking of action by the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Turkmen of the Soviet Union. Thus there is in the present situation an immediate phenomenon of progression towards extremes, for neither of the two adversaries can accept anything but the total destruction of the other. One can well see in this context the absolutely ridiculous nature of European proposals for neutralization of Afghanistan. The implementation of such a project would in fact constitute a direct intervention by the West in Soviet internal affairs.

A Deadlock War

After several months of operations in Afghanistan the results obtained by the Red Army in the field are slight: control of the capital and a few bases and lines of communication. From the start, losses were heavy: 500 to 600 killed in a month and a half of combat, according to American estimates. This figure, if it remained constant, would correspond to between 4,000 and 4,800 killed yearly, representing a level of engagement equivalent to that of the Americans in Vietnam in 1966 [Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1978, p 380]. Ideological control of Afghanistan by the

Russians is rapidly declining to nonexistence; disintegration of the Afghan regular army is proceeding at a quickened pace.

Whatever their determination and brutality, the 115,000 men committed by the USSR (85,000 in Afghanistan proper and 30,000 stationed on the Soviet side of the border, but who go back and forth and serve as logistical support) will not go much farther toward control of the country. To win this war, even temporarily, the Soviets indeed would have at least to triple their forces in the field, that is, raise them to 300,000 men.

Because Afghanistan belongs to the Islamic community, the Soviet Union cannot apply to it the strategy of genocide pursued by the Vietnamese in Cambodia. It cannot physically eliminate the totality of the Afghan population, a procedure whose effect would be deplorable not only in the free Moslem world, but also in Soviet central Asia. Since Cambodia is more isolated culturally, the Vietnamese can permit themselves a final solution of the guerilla (already begun by the Khmer Rouge regime) by the organization and maintenance of a famine resulting in liquidation of the Khmer nation. In central Asia, on the other hand, the mathematics of demography suggest a constantly worsening situation for the Russians, with the Afghan population growing each year by a half million, and that of the Moslem world within the Soviet borders by 1.2 million.

Thus we are not witnessing the next stage in the progression of world communism, but rather the initial colonial difficulties of Russia. There is little likelihood that the conquest of Afghanistan will eventuate in a new advance toward the Persian Gulf. Supposing that the Soviet Union proves able to break Afghan resistance with 300,000 men--a very optimistic assumption--it would logically need 500,000 to master Iran and 1.5 million to control Pakistan.

Such a mobilization by the Soviet Union is inconceivable in view of its economic situation. In March 1980, Western intelligence services received reports indicating that food requisitions made necessary by the holding of the Olympics were starving large areas of Russia near Moscow! The Soviet Union is certainly capable of razing, by thermonuclear means, all the nations of the Western and Moslem world. It is perhaps capable of winning a quick conventional war in Europe. But it is very probably incapable of taking another step toward its conquest of the Islamic world. Occupation and guerilla war have their cost; the USSR, which has reached the limit of its economic strength, cannot pay it.

Westerners, as usual, are enormously overestimating the Soviet potential. They do not want to see that the USSR has less and less control, economically and culturally, over the popular democracies, where divers experiments are underway which are totally opposed to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism: political liberalism with a totalitarian facade in Poland, economic liberalism with a Marxist facade in Hungary. In Cuba, rapid disintegration of the economy and political regime will soon compel direct management by the Kremlin, already begun by the presence of a Soviet army brigade, no doubt charged with cowing the local population.

The West is no longer confronted by the monolithic bloc of the 50's, which then reached from Berlin to Peking. It henceforth confronts an exhausted Russia which is further exhausting itself to keep its place in the world, and especially in its empire, an ever more heterogeneous and gelatinous mass in which every human group--Polish, Hungarian, German, Uzbek, Turkoman--is in process of renationalization.

Russia, the universal hope of mankind from 1917 to 1960, is on the way to becoming an object of hate for all the world's peoples. Henceforth arrayed against it is not only the Western camp, but also China and, potentially, the whole Moslem world. This objective alliance is almost too vast. In consequence, is it indeed reasonable to imagine that Russia, a nation of 196 million souls, is about to take control of a planet numbering 4 billion of them?

6145
CSO: 4900

ANTHONY HYMAN REPORTS LACK OF UNITY AMONG OPPOSITION

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 1 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] The Russians are the only strong force in Afghan politics. We should learn from them at least the principle of unity," comments an embittered exile in Peshawar, the Pakistani town which provides a base for many of the Afghan opposition parties. Certainly, although the Government of Babrak Karmal looks dilapidated, and is unable to prevent members of the Afghan Communist Party's two factions--Khalq and Parcham--from gunning one another down in Kabul, the Opposition has not seemed able to do any better. In the past month private warfare between five opposition parties has resulted in 12 dead and 30 wounded in one province alone, Ningrahar, where guerrillas have struggled for more than a year to gain control of the provincial capital, Jalabad Afghan nationalists unattached to the main opposition parties have come to believe that the leaders are less concerned with beating the Russians than with ensuring their own future as politicians-in-exile.

The fortunes of the resistance groups could revive if large arms deliveries, believed to have been made recently from Egypt and friendly Muslim countries in the Gulf, are properly distributed around the rival parties and are also, for the first time, given to poorly-armed regional and tribal groupings. The arms consignments apparently include many anti-tank guns, which are urgently needed to lessen the immense disparity in military equipment between guerrilas and Soviet troops.

About a million refugees are now encamped just inside Pakistan and Iran and, in spite of international assistance, their presence is a great strain to the host countries. Equally serious, but more neglected, is the recent growth in the number of internal refugees. Hundreds of thousands of uprooted villagers have found shelter in the towns, which are relative havens of security from bombing raids and from hunger. This development is particularly evident in Kabul--the only large city in the country--where the population has risen from 700,000 in 1979 to an estimated one and a half million now. The Hazara parts of Kabul are bursting at the seams with refugees from Hazarat villages to the west of the city, while repeated bombings

of dissident regions such as Logar and Wardak have produced a stream of Pukhtoon tribesmen fleeing their ruined villages.

Influx

Although the authorities in Kabul are trying to stop this influx--they have hastily erected roadblocks around the capital--the city still grows bigger by the day, as if by relentless force of nature. Only traditional Afghan customs of family hospitality keep many of the internal refugees with food and a roof over their heads. The refugees have no hope of employment in the city.

The scale of this migration had led to a collapse of the rural economy. Villagers and herdsmen have ceased to produce food not only for themselves but also for Kabul, where there are now only irregular arrivals of lories carrying vegetables or fruits, which sell out immediately The mass salughter of cattle in the Northern provinces has caused a desperate shortage of milk and meat.

The shortfall in grain production, like last year's will have to be made up largely by the Soviet Union. Wheat is the national staple food, and in the towns supplies have been maintained and prices have been held to 3 Afghanis (about 2p) for each standard flat loaf of bread (nan). No Afghan administration would dare risk bread riots in the capital, but only Kabul and the towns, where the Soviet-backed administration has effective control, can expect imports of wheat or other essential foodstuffs. Food shortages, and near-famine in poverty-stricken Jazarajat, are of great value to heel rural communities which are supporting the resistance.

Because of this policy of starving them out and because of general shortages caused by muddled land reforms, the coming winter will be a hard one for the guerilla groups high in the mountains. But the resistance can take some heart from the decline in the morale of the Afghan Army and Air Force. Afghan pilots have been withdrawn from bombing raids, and eighty pilots were sent to the Soviet Union in June on an oddly-timed "three year training scheme", after their loyalty had become suspect. The love for the Russians felt by the dwindling Afghan Army must also be in serious doubt after reports that an armoured division defected en mass in the crucial southern zone near Ghazni.

Soviet troops in Kabul are exhibiting a slight decline in military discipline, natural enough in the superficially rich atmosphere of Kabul. Exotic imported articles are stacked high in the city's shop windows and, lacking cash with which to buy them, many Soviet soldiers are engaging in barter. The going rate for one packet of American or English cigarettes in Kabul is two bullets (which is less than half the price in the provinces). Not only bullets but also items of uniform, wrenches, screwdrivers and tools of all kinds from Soviet vehicles, together with petrol from armoured cars, are finding their way into the Kabul bazaars. Soviet

soldiers are interested in jeans, cigarettes and other Western imports as well as in one of Afghanistan's own products--drugs, Hashish and opium are freely available (as always) in Kabul, and trade is brisk.

Pilfering

The city's grocery business is less successful, as many food shops are suffering from pilfering during the curfew hours after 11 p. m. Although they are, in theory, protected from burglary by the presence of Soviet and Afghan patrols through the city, grocery stores are suffering the attentions of Soviet soldiers with a voracious sweet tooth: how else can one explain the fact that packets of biscuits and chocolate are continually removed while money lying in the shops is left untouched? At check-points and roadblocks across the northern trunk road which eventually joins the Soviet border across the Oxus, similar acts of sweet tooth robbery frequently occur. Trucks laden with luscious raisins and other Afghan fruits are stopped for inspection by Soviet soldiers, who take a crateful for their own consumption before allowing the lorries to continue their journey.

CSO: 4920

FRENCH AUTHOR REASSESSES STATUS OF ALGERIA

Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Aug 80 pp 1, 4

[Article by Andre Mandouze, professor at the University of Paris IV - Sorbonne: "Between Past and Present -- The Algerian Challenge"]

[Text] Professor at the University of Paris IV - Sorbonne and author of "The Algerian Revolution," Andre Mandouze presents his account of Algeria today, following a 3 week visit.

It would be foolish for anyone to try to characterize in a simplistic way this Algeria which on 15 July, on the evening of the first day of Ramadan, was informed of the list of 26 ministers and 6 secretaries of state decided upon by President Chadli Bendjedid.* Indeed, anyone who would note its hopes and its disappointment without any qualifications would prove by this very act that, substituting the sharpness of theories for the ambiguity of reality, he is giving in to the demons of a type of analysis which is more formal than Cartesian.

In any case, 3 weeks in the beginning of the summer of 1980, which I spent meeting a large number of political personalities and senior civil servants as well as old friends and Algerians of all kinds, have -- on the occasion of this reunion -- safeguarded me against such hasty conclusions which, in spite of being outrageously favorable, are ultimately more prejudicial to the object of sympathy than criticisms dictated by friendship.

For example, to obscure the seriousness of the problem of a galloping birth-rate which exists in this country would prove that one has not even deigned to risk setting foot in the streets of the big cities or that one has not paid the slightest attention to the average age of the people one has met during random walks. But it would also be a sign that one does not credit the political officials with the intelligence and courage necessary to try to bring this phenomenon under control as soon as possible. Likewise, to stress only the all too evident lazyness or corruption of certain bureaucrats

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* See the article by Daniel Junqua in the 17 July issue of LE MONDE.

or of certain racketeers would be to forget the example provided by or the part played in these fraudulent operations by the western counterparts of these domestic saboteurs of the Algerian revolution.

My first piece of luck was to be in Algeria during a kind of interlude, at the conclusion of the activities of the new central committee of the FLN, the reduction of the number of the members of the political committee having preceded that of the number of commission presidents,* but not yet allowing for a clear picture of the scope or the limits of the real political changes.

Therefore, speculation was widespread with each individual hoping that the new government team would respond to its wishes.

The skilful balance which resulted -- with few spectacular changes, but corrections of details which are open to varied interpretations -- now prolongs this situation, which was characteristic of the period from the end of June to the middle of July. Thus, if the country came out of the test of the long wait which preceded Ramadan, it continues nonetheless -- during this exceptional time of the Moslem year which ends it -- to calculate the chances of the hopes which were glimpsed and the promises which were made. However, one fact is certain, recognized by all, and not only by the opponents of the previous regime: the Boumedienne era has come to an end.

Does this, for all that, mean that the abolition of the revolutionary council signifies a repudiation of that era? Not at all. But a man is dead and life must go on. An episode is finished and it is assumed that the next one will inevitably be different.

An initiative, taken in March and recorded in the JOURNAL OFFICIEL of the Republic of Algeria, is characteristic in this respect: an allocation has been provided which will be paid to those -- Ferhat Abbas and Benyoussef Benkhedda -- who succeeded each other at the head of the GPRA [Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic] during another period of the revolution: the period which, during the last years of the war, preceded the independence of our country. There is no doubt that, even if the problem is more delicate, the history of modern Algeria will ultimately find its full continuity in the reinstatement, within the overall process of liberation, of the "Ben Bella years": all things considered, is this not the only way for the current president -- who took the initiative of the relative expansion measures which occurred in the spring of 1979 -- to prevent the development of that which, in politics, contains the most formidable force there is: a myth?

In any case, tongues were loosened and the Algerian temperament is back to its former self: concerned with a responsibility and an effectiveness which moderate its naturally rebellious instinct, it is eminently taken with a sense of freedom which causes it to be expansive. Henceforth, there

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* See the article by Daniel Junqua in the 18 July issue of LE MONDE.

are no longer subjects which are taboo. Thus, far from avoiding the subject of the Berber problem, the top senior officials make it their duty to learn a lesson from the serious events which took place last spring in the Kabylie and elsewhere. An example of this is the formula which I heard from one of the top people in the state and which was repeated practically in the same terminology in statements which he made, no longer in private, but before a very large audience: "If we want to avoid the dangers of Berber factionalism, it will be absolutely necessary for all the people and the nation to accept this overall Berberism."*

Does this mean that everyone agrees, without batting an eyelid, with this way -- though strictly true to history -- of stating that Algeria began to exist prior to being either Arab or Moslem? Certainly not, and it was not one of the least surprising facts for someone like me, who has known the country for 35 years, to discover the existence -- as recent as it is undeniable -- of the FM, that is to say the Moslem Brotherhood. But there again, an observer would be mistaken in departing from the steady calmness which the authorities have shown toward a phenomenon which -- even though it is undoubtedly more worrying than a simple product imported from the Middle East -- is nevertheless blatantly inconsistent with the Algerian temperament. Furthermore, under whatever sky and in whatever denominational context it may have appeared, fundamentalism has always been a kind of childhood disease of religious feeling: born of ignorance, these evil spells collapse as soon as politicians worthy of that name manage to prevent them from usurping their sphere of activity.

On the other hand, an attitude of symmetrical circumspection, no more no less, was aroused within the government formation by this "socialist vanguard" (PAGS [Socialist Vanguard Party]) which avoids not only for technical reasons calling itself "communist": as a matter of fact, as far as it can be guessed at through meticulous actions, its specific line seems less overloaded with Marxism than its terminology does.

Indeed, political Algeria remains an extremely subtle universe: Against a background in which the army, omnipresent, is far from monolithic, the FLN is trying to recapture, in a management context, the unquestionably revolutionary spirit which inspired its creation at the beginning of the war.

Realism and Courage

At this moment, when nothing yet has been either compromised or resolved, the most definite guarantee for the future of Algeria is undoubtedly the

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* The son of Sheik Ibrahimi, Dr Ahmed Taleb, minister counselor to the president, had formerly written in the same vein: "When one says that Algeria consists of Arabs and Berbers, this is false. Algerians are more or less arabized Berbers. Algerian blood is Arab-Berber, with the dominant characteristic being Berber within an Arab culture." (Quoted on p 79, in a footnote, in "La republique algerienne democratique et populaire," by B. Cubertafond.)

realism with which its citizens, and not only the ruling politicians, turn toward this very future while keeping in mind the lessons of the past.

They are not among those who believe themselves to be infallible, and they have the courage to make assessments. True, they are mostly counting on the 5 year plan and expect that its implementation will re-establish a healthy balance between industry and agriculture. But, in order to achieve this and in spite of conflicts between a voluntary socialism and an influential bourgeoisie, they know henceforth that nothing is possible as long as the disparities between city and country, and between the public sector and the national companies continue to worsen and as long as, specifically, the prospect of the profits offered by the latter deprives the country of the "developers" it needs in all areas and which the university, in spite of everything, desperately tries to provide it with.

In this respect, the debate between teachers and students, which the very dynamic minister of higher education established in the beginning of July, was very symptomatic. Within the atmosphere of freedom which I mentioned earlier, it was inevitable that some of the more senior people found it difficult to accept being challenged while some of the younger ones felt that the size of their intervention was too small. Nevertheless, it is a fact that, for those who are in the profession and who know the methods of Mrs Saunier-Seite in France, the experiment which is thus being tried specifically on the crucial subject of the "formation," seems not only comforting in its very principle (unthinkable on the side of the Rue Dutot), but promising in terms of developments which, when used, could be decisive.

A trip to the South finally made me realize that the desire to move mountains clearly goes beyond the neighboring horizons of the Chrea or the Djurdjura and could reach as far as the Hoggar. Ever since the Trans-Sahara highway reached Tamanrasset, not only the city itself, but the whole region has become an enormous building site sprinkled with cranes and crisscrossed by trucks and machinery. If, in spite of the lack of water, which remains the major handicap and will necessitate extremely costly works, things have been envisaged on a very large scale, this was due to the fact that a very sure instinct has pushed today's Algerians to respond to the African vocation of this crossroads once glimpsed by Father de Foucauld. Already, next to roads, the advent of the telephone and of telecommunications by satellite has disrupted the conditions of life here. What will tomorrow be like when, thanks to the great effort made by the youth of the national service, the branch lines of the Trans-Sahara highway will have enabled the completion of a handy link between Southern Algeria and both Niger and Mali?

This was a very audacious economic wager if one remembers the investments required by the hydraulic problems. But it was, undoubtedly even more so, a human wager, if not an ethnological one, of an intense interest because of its formidable complexity: as a matter of fact, it really requires a belief in man and in his powers of adaptation to be able to contemplate the integration of the world of the Tuaregs in one of the most modern of projects.

It is not an a priori certainty that the price to be paid for rescuing this nomad universe from poverty will not be an urbanization only moderately concerned with safeguarding the real values of a very ancient way of life. What is certain, on the other hand, is that the time seems long past when the far South was synonymous with punishment or curse: today, it is probably those men who are most determined to succeed and who are most capable of understanding (because nothing durable could be achieved without the support of the peoples), who are involved in this formidable challenge to the weight of the centuries.

Gigantic Educational Effort

I hope I will be forgiven, being an academic and an intellectual specifically expert on the ancient history of the Maghreb, for concluding this quick survey of today's Algeria -- which is seemingly completely turned toward a future the risks of which it is trying to measure while knowing that this is the price of progress and that progress depends specifically, but not exclusively, on technology -- with a double step back into the past.

First of all, a figure struck me: today, there are 10 times more Algerian students than there were in 1963, when I was entrusted with the administration of higher education in Algiers. Now, this concerns all forms of intellectual life and, even though this is obviously a result of demographic growth, it remains true that this stage would not have been reached if it had not been for the gigantic effort made earlier to educate a country to which colonization had refused culture, except for rare exceptions (in 1946, there was one student of Algerian origin at the University of Algiers for each nine European students, whereas the population as a whole consisted roughly of nine "Moslems" for every European!). And for anyone who might be tempted to suggest maliciously that maybe diplomas come cheaply over there, I would like to note that, for the last session of university entrance qualifications, only 30 percent passed, a proportion which is substantially lower than for our corresponding BEPC [Elementary School Diploma].

Finally, I am left with an image. Not first of all -- may my Algerian colleagues forgive me -- that of very specialized seminars where I naturally found them to be listeners knowledgeable about the history and prosopography of (North) Africa from the fourth to the sixth century. What overwhelmed me much more was the mixed and, overall, very young audience which, completely filling the cavea of the Roman amphitheater in Tipassa (the ancient city dear to Camus), came, at nightfall, to listen to a speech about their ancestor -- Saint Augustin.

In response to a request from the minister of culture and conferring with the highest authorities in the country, I had, during a period of 3 weeks, been a witness to this will of Algeria to take on all of its history through all the languages spoken, all the civilizations experienced, all the religions practiced by the long line of men who, throughout the centuries, made this Algeria very specifically what it has become. That evening, through the mouth of a little boy whom I was asking questions about what he had understood of my words, I became convinced that the Algeria of tomorrow would no longer allow the confiscation of its share, specifically thanks to the prestigious Bishop of Hippo, in a civilization, said to be Western, which would not be what it is without the Maghreb.

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APPOINMENTS, TRANSFERS, PROMOTIONS OF GOVERNORS, DISTRIC HEADS

Changes Reported

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 8-9 Aug 80 pp 1,3

[Article: "In the Wake of the Extraordinary Congress of the FLN: Numerous Changes in Governors' and District Heads' Assignments"]

[Text] The country is experiencing an intense activity in most fields, especially since the extraordinary congress of the party, the major objective being to fulfill the aspirations and hopes expressed by citizens and party members on numerous occasions, especially during the congress and during central committee meetings.

Now that the political bureau, the central committee of the party and the new government have been formed, numerous changes in governors' and district head's assignments have been announced yesterday, Friday. Thus, 5 governors have seen their appointments terminated, 5 others have been transferred, and 5 new governors have been appointed, a communique from the Presidency of the Republic announced; it also stated that 17 district heads had seen their appointments terminated, that 38 were transferred and that 22 applicants had been promoted district heads.

In addition, one district head and four governorate general secretaries have been promoted to governor posts.

The Presidency of the Republic has published the following communique to this effect:

President Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic, general secretary of the FLN party, has decreed the following appointments:

Mr Khatib Djelloul, member of the central committee, is appointed governor of Oran where he shall replace Mr Boumahdi Benyoucef who has been appointed governor of Batna to replace Mr Noureddine Sahraoui, himself appointed governor of M'Sila where he shall replace Mr Chabane Ait Abderrahim who has been appointed governor of Constantine.

Mr Mostefa Maghraoui is appointed governor of El-Asnam where he shall replace Mr Mohamed Lamine Guerieb who has been appointed governor of Setif to replace Mr Abdelwahab Guedmani, himself appointed governor of Laghouat.

Mr Abdeslam Benslimane is appointed governor of Skikda where he shall replace Mr Fachid Aktouf who has been appointed governor of Tiaret.

Also, the following appointments have been made: Mr Mostefa Hidouci is appointed governor of Biskra; Mr Abdelghani Zouani, governor of Djelfa; Mr Chaffai Benremouga, governor of Mostaganem; and Mr Mokhtar Hanni, governor of Jijel.

In addition, 38 district heads have been transferred, 7 of whom to the central administration, viz. Messrs Akbi Mohamed, Tounsi Hacene, Bouzaher Mohamed Douadi, Lalmi Othmane, Terki Zaghloul, Hamadi Ahmed, Abda Mohamed Larbi, the other 31 being transferred to other districts. These are: Messrs. Cherifi Mohamed, Akhamoukh Bey, Quiddir Khelifa, Boutriha M'hamed, Abada Abderrachid, Chorfi Mahieddine, Fares Salah, Mechentel Salah, Makhloufi Abdelhamid, Bendris Mohamed, Boutemadja Mohamed, Hamaiti Mohamed, Bessaih Abdelatif, Kettaf El Habib (also called Omar), Khorsi Tahar, Boubzid Hamlat, Benouareth Abdelaziz, Legrioui Bachir, Kadri Ahmed, Merad Mostefa, Mouheb Mohamed-Ouali, Boutarfi Ahmed, Brahimi Mohamed Ould Tahar, Boualem Zeggai, Ait Ahmed Ouali, Bahloul Belkacem, Benlallam Seghir, Benarab Rachid, Idir Ismail, Benaissa Maamar and Benali Bouziane.

Also, 22 new district heads have been appointed. These are: Messrs: Bouguerra Hamoudi, Marouf Abdelkader, Louber Adberrahmane, Khemane Miloud, Lemhel Brahim, Hamed Abdelouahab Mustapha, Sekrane Tahar, Guemari Saddek, Laloui Abdellah, Brahimi Mohamed Ould Abdesselam, Tifoura Smail, Dahlouk Ali, Badrissi Ahmed, Drici Mohamed, Choul Mostefa, Redouane Hocine, Yacef Sid Ahmed, Benouddane Hocine, Ghimouz Messaoud, Guellai Djenidi, Nedjadi Aissa and Badaoui Djelloul.

Mr Mostefa Hidouci, former head of the Mostaganem district, has been promoted governor of Biskra.

The table below refers to the appointments and transfers of governors.

Full Name	Former Post	New Post
Governors Transferred from One Governorate to Another		
Boumahdi Benyoucef	Oran	Batna
Ait Abderrahim Mostefa	M'sila	Constantine
Meghraoui Mostefa	Mostaganem	El-Asnam
Guedmani Abdelwahab	Setif	Laghouat
Gherieb Mohamed Lamine	El-Asnam	Setif
Sahraoui Noureddine	Batna	M'sila
Khatib Djelloul	Constantine	Oran
Aktouf Rachid	Skikda	Tiaret
New Governors		
Hidoussi Mostefa	head of Mostaganem district	gov. of Biskra
Wouani Abdelghani	gen. sec. of Setif governorate	gov. of Djelfa
Benremouga Chaffai	gen. sec. of Tiaret governorate	gov. of Mostaganem
Henni Mokhtar	gen. sec. of Blida governorate	gov. of Jijel
Benslimane Abdeslam	gen. sec. of Oran governorate	gov. of Skikda
Heads of Districts Transferred		
Cherifi Mohamed	Hussein-Dey (Algiers)	Mostaganem (Most.)
Akhamoukh Bey	Bechar (Bechar)	Laghouat (Ouargla)
Ouiddir Khelifa	Amizour (Bejaia)	Kais (Batna)
Boutriha M'Hamed	Bouira (Bouira)	Sidi M'Hamed (Algiers)
Abada Abderachid	Ouled Djellal (Biskra)	Bouira (Bouira)
Chorfi Mahieddine	El Meghaier (Biskra)	Amizour (Bejaia)
Fares Salah	Mila (Constantine)	El Meghaier (Biskra)
Mechentel Salah	Boukadir (El Asnam)	Bordj Menaiel (Tizi-Ouzou)
Makhloufi Abdelhamid	Bouchegouf (Guelma)	Ouled Djellal (Biskra)
Bendris Mohamed	El Milia (Jijel)	Tissemsilt (Tiaret)
Boutemadja Mohamed	Ferdjioua (Jijel)	Hussein-Dey (Algiers)
Hamaiti Mohamed	Jijel (Jijel)	Ain M'Lila (O.E.B.)
Bessaih Abdelatif	Ghardaia (Laghouat)	Bechar (Bechar)
Kettaf El Habib (Oma)	Laghouat (Laghouat)	Teniet el Had (Tiaret)
Khorsi Tahar	Tighennif (Mascara)	Boukadir (El Asnam)
Bouzbid Hamlat	Touggourt (Ouargla)	Jijel (Jijel)
Benouareht Abdelaziz	Oum El-Bouaghi (O.E.B.)	El Milia (Jijel)
Ligrioui Bachir	Ain M'Lila (O.E.B.)	Cheria (Tebessa)
Kadri Ahmed	Oran (Oran)	Sidi Bel-Abbes (Sidi Bel-Abbes)
Merad Mostefa	Setif (Setif)	Mila (Constantine

Full Name	Former Post	New Post
Mouheb Mohamed Ouali	Ain Oulmene (Setif)	Ferdjioua (Jijel)
Boutarfi Ahmed	Azzaba (Skikda)	Ain El-Hammam (Tizi-Ouzou)
Brahim Mohamed Ould Tahar	Al-Aouinet (Tebessa)	Ras El Oued (Setif)
Boualem Zeggai	Tissemsilt (Tiaret)	Miliana (El-Asnam)
Ait Ahmed Ouali	Azzazga (Tizi-Ouzou)	Remchi (Tlemcen)
Bahloul Belkacem	Ain El-Hammam (Tizi-Ouzou)	Oued Zenati (Guelma)
Benlallam Seghir	Larba Nath Iraten (Tizi-Ouzou)	Cherchell (Blida)
Benarab Rachid	Tizi-Ouzou (Tizi-Ouzou)	Sidi Ali (Mostaganem)
Idir Ismail	Tigzirt (Tizi-Ouzou)	Souk Ahras (Guelma)
Benaissa Maamar	Ghazaouet (Tlemcen)	Mazouna (Mostganem)
Benali Bouziane	Remchi (Tlemcen)	Oran (Oran)

Applicants Promoted District Heads

Full Name	Post
Bouguerra Hamoudi	Barika (Batna)
Marouf Abdelkader	El-Oued (Biskra)
Louber Abderrahmane	Biskra (Biskra)
Khemane Miloud	Bouhadjar (Guelma)
Lemel Brahim	Bouchegouf (Guelma)
Ahmed Abdelouahab Mustapha	Ghardaia (Laghouat)
Sekrane Tahar	Tighennif (Mascara)
Guemari Saddek	Touggourt (Ouargla)
Laloui Abdellah	Djanet (Ouargla)
Brahimi Mohamed (Oueld Abdessalam)	El Hassasna (Saida)
Tifoura Smail	Saida (Saida)
Hlouk Ali	Ain Oulmane (Setif)
Badrissi Ahmed	Azzaba (Skikda)
Drici Mohamed	Bir El Ater (Tebessa)
Choul Mostefa	El Aouinet (Tebessa)
Redouane Hocine	Ksar Chellala (Tiaret)
Yacef Sid Ahmed	Azazga (Tizi-Ouzou)
Benouaadane Hocine	Draa El-Mizan (Tizi-Ouzou)
Ghimouz Messaoud	Larbaa Nath Iraten (Tizi-Ouzou)
Guellai Djenidi	Tigzirt (Tizi-Ouzou)
Nadjadi Aissa	Ghazaouet (Tlemcen)
Badaoui Djelloul	El Attaf (El-Asnam)

District Heads Appointed to Other Posts

Full Name	Former Post
Akbi Mohamed	Sidi M'hamed (Algiers)
Tounsi Hacene	Kais (Batna)
Bouzaher Mohamed Dhouadi	Cherchell (Blida)
Lalmi Othmane	El Attaf (El-Asnam)
Terki Zeghoul	Miliana (El-Asnam)
Hamadi Ahmed	Saida (Saida)
Abda Mohamed Larbi	Bir El Ater (Tebessa)

Biographical Data

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 10 Aug 80 p 3

[Article: "The New Governors and District Heads"]

[Text] Here are the resumes of the new governors appointed Friday by Mr Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic, general secretary of the FLN party.

Benremouga Chaffai, born 25 October 1937; married, six children; secondary education; diploma from public administration schools.

Present rank: chief inspector, Postal, Telephone and Telegraph Service. Past political record: ALN member, 1956-1962. Previous functions: chief inspector, Postal, Telephone and Telegraph Service from 1962 to 1966; district head from 1966 to 1978; governorate general secretary from 1978 to date.

Assignment: governor of Mostaganem.

Henni Mokhtar, born 8 February 1937; married, three children; graduate of National School of Administration.

Present rank: administrator.

Past political record: member of ALN.

Previous functions: district head from 1964 to 1972, then governorate general secretary from 1972 to date.

Assignment: governor of Jijel.

Benslimane Abdeslam, born 29 November 1943; married, one child; graduate of National School of Administration.

Present rank: administrator.

Previous functions: administrator at the Ministry of Internal Affairs starting in 1968, then governorate general secretary from 1976 to date.

Assignment: governor of Skikda.

Hidouci Mostefa, born 11 March 1935; married, three children; bachelor's degree.

Present rank: administrator.

Past political record: ALN member, 1955-1962.

Previous functions: district head from 1962 to date.

Assignment: governor of Biskra.

Zouani Abdelghani, born 7 February 1935; married, three children; bachelor's degree.

Present rank: administrator.

Past political record: ALN member.

Previous functions: district head from 1964 to 1976; governorate general secretary from 1967 to 1980.

Assignment: governor of Djelfa.

Mr Louber Abderrahmane was born 23 March 1939; a member of the National Liberation Army, 1957-1962, he obtained two certificates towards a bachelor's degree in arts before being appointed Biskra (Biskra) district head. Mr Louber Abderrahmane has filled an executive position at the People's Credit Bank of Algeria in Oran, prior to being appointed delegate to the governor. He is married.

Mr Hamed Abdelwahab Mustapha, who has been appointed head of the Ghardaia (Laghouat) district, was born 5 March 1934; a member of the ALN from 1955 to 1962, he took up responsibilities within the party from 1962 to 1965, before becoming controller at the Ministry of Trade, then department head at SNNGA [National Construction Materials Company]. He is married and the father of five children.

Mr Khemane Miloud, born 2 March 1941, was a member of the ALN during the liberation war prior to studying at the university where he obtained a bachelor's degree in economics. Since 1971, he has filled several executive positions (ONACO [Algerian National Marketing Office], ECOTEC [National Office for Economic and Technical Studies], SONELEC [Algerian National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Electronic Equipment], COOPEMAD [expansion unknown]) before being appointed head of the Bouhadjar (Guelma) district. He is married and the father of two children.

Mr Laloui Abdellah, born 17 October 1934, has been appointed head of the Djanet (Ouargla) district; a former member of the ALN (1957-1962), he then obtained a bachelor's degree in law and was appointed administrator. He is married and the father of six children.

Mr Badoui Djelloul, the new head of the El-Attaf (El-Asnam) district, was born 20 March 1941; a former member of the ALN (1958-1962), he has been administrator at the Ministry of Internal Affairs. He is married and the father of six children.

Mr Dahlouk Ali, born 3 January 1942, has been a member of the ALN (1957-1962) prior to filling several positions. He has been successively police inspector (1962-1964), delegate to the Ministry of Veterans' Affairs (1964-1971), then executive at the Ministry of Light Industry (since 1972) prior to being delegated to SONATITE [National Telecommunications Infrastructure Construction Company]. He has earned two certificates toward a bachelor's degree in law. He has been appointed head of the Ain-Oulmene (Setif) district.

The new head of the Ghazaouet (Tlemcen) district, Mr Nedjadi Aissa, born 20 September 1944, has been a member of OCFLN [expansion unknown] prior to obtaining a bachelor's degree in law. After completing his studies, he was appointed technical advisor to the governor in 1976. He is married and the father of six children.

Born 27 July 1937, the new head of the Larba N. Iraten (Tizi-Ouzou) district, Mr Chimouz Messaoud, has been a member of the OCFLN from 1955 to 1967, and of the ALN from 1957 to 1962, prior to earning a bachelor's degree in law. He has also been administrator at the Constantine University. He is married and the father of five children.

Mr Benouaadane Hocine, the new head of the Draa El Mizan (Tizi-Ouzou) district, was born 19 January 1940; a member of the OCFLN, he earned a bachelor's degree in history and geography before becoming secondary school teacher (1964 to date). He is married and the father of seven children.

Mr Redouane Hocine, the new head of the Ksar Chellala (Tiaret) district, was born 22 June 1939; a member of the OCFLN from 1967 to 1961, and of the ALN in 1961-1962, he holds a bachelor's degree in history and geography and has earned a doctorate (DEA [expansion unknown]) in economic geography. He has also studied law.

Mr Marouf Abdelkader, born 28 November 1940, the new head of the El Oued (Biskra) district, is a graduate of the National School of Administration. He has been successively administrator, then delegate to the governor from 1972 to date. He is married and the father of five children.

Mr Bouguerra Hamoudi, born in 1948, the new head of the Barika (Batna) district, is a graduate of the National School of Administration. He has held positions as administrator of the Ouargla governorate, then director of local administration and regulations from 1977 to date. He is married and has no children.

Mr Tifoura Smail, head of the Saida (Saida) district, was born 28 July 1945. As an administrator, he has been technical advisor to the governor since 1979. He is married and the father of two children.

The new head of the Bouchegouf (Guelma) district, Mr Lemhel Brahim, was born 10 February 1946. A graduate of the National School of Administration, he has been administrator since 1965, and director of local administration and regulations since 1977. He is married and the father of four children.

Mr. Guellai Djenidi, the new head of the Tighzirt (Tizi-Ouzou) district, was born 6 August 1942; he studied law before becoming an officer of the El-Watani police force, then company manager in 1969, and general manager of SOTRAW [expansion unknown] from 1978 to date. He is married and the father of five children.

Mr Yacef Sid-Ahmed, born 23 July 1945, who has been appointed head of the Azazga (Tizi-Ouzou) district, earned a bachelor's degree in economics before being appointed general manager of governorate enterprise, department head at SONATITE, then engineer at INPED [National Productivity and Industrial Development Institute]. He is married.

Mr Ghoul Mostefa, the new head of the El-Aouinet (Tebessa) district, was born 7 January 1945; he is a graduate of the National School of Administration. He has successively filled the positions of administrator, then manager of the research department at the CFA [expansion unknown], then delegate to the governor. He is married and the father of two children.

Mr Drici Mohamed, born 18 May 1946, the new head of the Bir El-Ter (Tebessa) district, holds bachelor's degrees in arts and in law. He has been successively a teacher (1965 to 1976), assistant at the Annaba FAC [expansion unknown] (1977 to 1978), principal of a CEM [College of Intermediate Studies] since 1978. He is married and the father of two children.

Mr Sekrane Tahar, the new head of the Tighenif (Mascara) district, was born 25 February 1946; he is a graduate of the ENA [National School of Agriculture]. He has been administrator, then director of local administration and regulations from 1976 to date. He is married and the father of three children.

Mr Guemmari Saddek, the new head of the Touggourt (Ouargla) district, was born 14 February 1943. He earned a bachelor's degree in economics and a diploma of higher studies in economics. He has been an executive at the DNC[expansion unknown]-ANP[People's National Army] since 1971. He is married and the father of two children.

Mr Badrissi Ahmed, the new head of the Azzaba (Skikda) district, was born 13 August 1942. After earning a bachelor's degree and a diploma of higher studies in political science, he has held several executive positions with the People's Credit Bank of Algeria.

Mr Brahimi Mohamed, the new head of the El-Assasna (Saida) district, was born in 1941. President of the APC until december 1971, he then became director of local administration and regulations. He holds a bachelor's degree and has the rank of administrator. He is married.

Rigorous Selection

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 8-9 Aug 80 p 1

[Article by Hamid Aberkane: "Necessary Rigor in the Selection of Men"]

[Text] Numerous changes in the assignment of governors and district heads have just been announced officially, only a few weeks after the new government has been formed following a series of events which have recently shaped to a considerable degree the country's political activity, and the most important of which has probably been the extraordinary congress of the FLN which took place in June. This operation was expected; therefore, it does not stand apart from the direction taken by the country's leadership. It is, of course, the necessary continuation of a rather large movement which had already touched all positions of responsibility in the nation. After the fourth congress of the FLN, a comprehensive process of completion of the central structures of the state and of the institutions had been undertaken. This process has now been carried further, by means of changes in decentralized structures and institutions, involving new appointments, promotions and transfers. These structures must become more dynamic, they must become able to take proper care of the interests of the citizens and the state, the highest interest of Algeria, and to prove themselves in carrying out the urgent tasks which have been assigned to them. Then, they must renew themselves, they must not hesitate to call on new men and, above all, to select them among those who satisfy the criteria defined in the National Charter.

The decision of our country's leadership is based primarily on the desire to decentralize as much as possible the means and the decision-making process, to render them effective on a regional scale, and to enable institutions and men to play their part in full. President Chadli has stressed this particular point in several official speeches and statements.

Is it necessary to recall, however, that decision-making is a difficult task which requires a deep sense of responsibility and great scruples in those who assume it?

Therefore, the choices made by the political leadership could not be devoid of rigor because they are the result of a prerequisite of the extraordinary congress of the FLN and are inspired by the unanimous will or our people to give a meaning to the principles "the right man in the right place." In selecting these men, the political leadership has taken at least three criteria into consideration, some of which had been neglected at times: the militancy record of the new officials, i.e. whether they took part in the national liberation war, as members either of the ALN or of the FLN.

The newly appointed men have also been selected for their intellectual qualities. They are either university graduates, or competent cadres. Finally, they also have some practical experience in exercising the responsibilities which they now must fulfill creditably.

We should also consider that shuffling men at all levels of responsibility had become an indispensable operation resulting from the desire to avoid sclerosis, routine, "local" consecration of an individual, or the political careerism of an authority. No appointment can deviate from what we must call "the highest interest of the nation." National or local responsibility must exist solely--exclusively--in the service of the state and of the citizens, never--as has already happened--to satisfy personal interest and open the road to patronage. All the credibility of our decentralized institutions now depends on the high level of conscientiousness of these cadres, and on the selection made by the political leadership, who have the full confidence of our people.

Methods, Men

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 10 Aug 80 p 1

[Article signed K.B.: "After the Changes Among Governors and District Heads: Methods and Men"]

[Text] The communique from the Presidency of the Republic concerning the changes which have been made among governors and district heads shows that the series of measures announced by the country's leaders at the extraordinary congress of the FLN is progressing both in depth and in scope.

Everything indicates that the leadership is determined to restore order in the state apparatus which had become heavy with bureaucratic sluggishness and which, because of its size and complexity, required an overall in-depth examination, as well as a revision of its methods, to enable it to take over--centrally as well as in decentralized structures--responsibility for the problems related to development and to the fulfillment of the people's needs.

The extraordinary congress of the party has closed once for all the question of the men entrusted with a state mission. It was high time to end a certain form of patronage which had arisen among our structures and developed at the lowest level like a gangrene, creating situations of wilful immobilism, regionalism and nepotism which, if they did not serve the masses, inculcated into them mentalities which have nothing to do with state and community interest.

The question of elected or state-appointed cadres has now become crucial; experience has shown that the results obtained on location will depend on how these men are selected. "It is through them that the masses judge the political and moral health of the revolutionary movement," and, above all, the democratic institutions with which the country has endowed itself.

The changes announced among governors and district heads, coming after the government reshuffle, have definitely found an echo in the public who can see that new men are appearing, which gives its true meaning to the concept of relief through experienced, politically trustworthy and more dynamic elements.

The appointment, in the government and in governorates, of officials who have already proved themselves in lower positions is a way of giving encouragement and recognition to the more deserving; it marks a break with methods which might promote routine and careerism.

Since the fourth congress of the FLN, and especially since the commitments made by the president of the republic at the last extraordinary congress, the guideline has shown that the political leadership has, until now, proven equal to its responsibilities and that it is determined to continue to make sure that each institution plays the part which it has been assigned, the more so as the requirements of the five-year plan and the necessity to satisfy social needs require an actual mobilization of the structures and of the men who operate them from the base to the top.

We must recognize that public opinion has not remained indifferent to all the measures taken by the country's leadership, which it feels are of prime importance. In these measures, it finds concrete answers to its desire for a better life and a responsible and efficient functioning of the institutions, the purpose of which is to serve the masses.

It goes without saying that these measures clearly indicate that the country's leadership has taken full advantage of the Ramadan period. For Algeria cannot afford the luxury of a two months' idle period as was the custom during previous years (Ramadan and holiday periods).

Now is the time to work, and to work only!

This is the slogan which all citizens and officials must now bear in mind.

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LIFE BEGINS IN RAMADAN THE 10TH CITY

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 22 Jun 80 p 6

[Article by Muhammad al-Hawari: "Two Thousand Families Move Into Ramadan the 10th City This Week"]

[Text] This week life actually begins in Ramadan the 10th City. The water supply and utilities are in operation and 2,000 families will move into the city.

On 21 June, Engineer Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, the minister of reconstruction, housing and land reclamation, and Engineer Mahir Abazah, the minister of electricity, inaugurated the first power plant in Ramadan the 10th City. The power plant's capacity will reach 66,000 kilowatts, which is enough to provide electricity for all of the city's residences and the industrial area.

The inauguration was attended by the Romanian minister of trade and the governor of the province of al-Sharqiyah. Engineer 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sayyad, the head of the Commission for Electrification of the Rural Areas, announced that the new power plant cost 4 million pounds, and that its capacity during the first phase will be 25,000 kilowatts. The power plant will be linked to the central electricity network, by means of aboveground cables, and will provide electricity for all of the city's utilities as well as for its residential units and industrial area. It has been decided to immediately begin the installation of electric meters in the homes.

Engineer 'Imad Ibrahim, head of the Development Agency for Ramadan the 10th City, announced that the city would begin its life this week with the handing over of 2,000 residential units to the citizens who will be living in them. They will be provided with all electric and water supply services plus four shopping centers. Occupants of these residential units will be the people working in the city's plants, which have already begun functioning. There are 10 of these plants, and 4 more are presently under construction.

Ibrahim added: "We are finishing the construction of 2,000 more units which will be handed over to their new occupants during the next 3 months. We are also presently giving 2,000 plots of land to other citizens so that they can begin building on them."

He also said: "This year's plan includes beginning the construction of 2,000 new units, to be added to the 4,000 units previously built. Utility services will be extended to 24 districts in Ramadan the 10th City, which will absorb 150,000 inhabitants during the next 2 years."

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COMPLAINTS AGAINST NEW IMPORT SYSTEM

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 23 Jun 80 pp 18-22

[Article by Hasan 'Amir: "An Opening for Monopolies in the New Import System"]

[Excerpts] "Listen to us. Publish our point of view. It could be that we are wrong. We hope that we are wrong, and that the Ministry of Economy and Foreign Trade is right. But it is our right to try to find people who will listen to us and engage in discussion with us. The newspapers have published in detail what was said by the ministry concerning Decision No 15 which reorganizes the import system without currency conversion, but the newspapers have ignored the [views of] thousands of individuals, companies and agencies who are importers!"

These feelings have been expressed many times, in different words and in various versions. They have been expressed quietly or excitedly. Logically speaking, there is nothing wrong in listening to the point of view of those who are in the importing sector. This is particularly true since the volume of allegations made against the decision, regarding the form in which it was issued and the way it is being interpreted, is growing daily. The following is alleged concerning the decision: It permits the growth of monopolies. It deprives Egypt of available credit facilitations. It curtails the freedom of the banks. It imposes the power of banks over the market. It impairs liquidity. It paralyzes commercial agencies. It raises import costs. It places new financial burdens on the shoulders of the consumers.

Instant Conflusion!

The wording and interpretation of the decision have brought confusion into the market on several levels. It has caused emotional confusion! In the words of Mr Azman, member of the board of directors of the Cairo Chamber of Commerce: "None of the merchants believed that [Minister of Finance and Economy] Dr 'Abd al-Raziq 'Abd al-Majid, who had revoked the most ridiculous decision ever made in Egypt (the decision to pay customs fees in free currency), would sign a decision which has such comprehensive side effects."

There has also been legal confusion. This is because the decision was issued in a very vague and obscure form, and has required daily clarification on the part of government officials. As our sources say, it is not reasonable to expect the market to keep adjusting itself to the flow of clarifications, interpretations and modifications being made. Vagueness and obscurity of decisions are more dangerous for the market than are clear decisions, whatever their dimensions and effects might be.

Added to this is the confusion which has occurred in bank transactions, customs transactions and elsewhere.

In spite of the fact that 17 days have passed since the decision was issued, this confusion still exists. In addition, there is a chain of apprehensions and allegations which alternately surface in the commercial market and are emphasized in every discussion.

Veiled Monopoly!

"Certainly the decision will lead to the formation of monopolies." These words were said by Fathi Shahdi Ibrahim, head of the lumber merchants' division in the Chamber of Commerce.

He elaborates as follows: "The decision obligates an importer to pay 25 percent when opening credit to import foodstuffs, 40 percent when importing intermediate goods and 100 percent when importing luxury goods. This advance payment for opening credit is capital which is frozen for a period which ranges from 1 month to up to 6 months.

"It is conceivable that a small importer could open credit once or twice a year. The medium-size importer could open credit 3 or 4 times a year. But the large importer is the only one in a position to open a succession of lines of credit. His financial liquidity provides him with liquidity in commodities. Consequently, he is able to fix prices, drive small or medium-size importers out of the market, and, finally, monopolize the market."

In the opinion of Ahmad Na'im Ahmad, an importer and head of the perfume dealers' division [of the Chamber of Commerce], the decision eliminates competition. "Competition exists in the market only when there is a large number of importers," he says.

Special Terms

According to Mr Azman, the decision is in the interest of foreign suppliers because it eliminates the special terms which a large number of Egyptian merchants had obtained from foreign suppliers. He says: "These special terms gave the merchants from 90 days up to a whole year to pay. In most cases there were no interest charges. Depending on the type of goods, credit could in most cases be opened without any advance payment. These special terms will be lost, because the importer will be obligated

to make advance payments of 25, 40 or 100 percent. As we understood from the Customs Bureau, 100 percent payments have to be made for about 95 percent of imported goods."

Privileges of Agencies

Mr Azman adds: "The special terms in question include privileges obtained by commercial agents. Most suppliers send goods to Egyptian commercial agents without letters of credit. They provide the goods to the agents on terms which sometimes do not call for interest charges.

"Also, this decision nearly deprives us of our special relations with foreign banks and joint banks. Bank regulations permit opening credit by means of an advance payment of 10 percent. And once there is trust and a close relationship between the importer and the bank, the opening of credit takes place without any advance payment!"

In the words of Fu'ad Hammudah, member of the Assocation of Egyptian Businessmen: "These special relations are not established with individuals only, but rather have a collective aspect. For example, there are a number of easy terms which foreign countries offer the private sector. Examples of them are the loans made by the American International Development Agency and the easy terms provided by the British Export Development Corporation, the French organization (Kufas), German organizations and others. How are we now supposed to deal with these organizations? We still do not know the answer, in spite of all of the clarifications which have been made so far."

There Will Be Losses

Mr Ahmad Na'im Ahmad brings up a new point: "The decision exposes importers of goods of a special type--such as foodstuffs, cement, glass, medical supplies and others--to the danger of tremendous unforeseen losses. Before these goods can be cleared by customs, they have to pass agricultural, industrial, health and other inspections.

"Theoretically, these goods can be either rejected or accepted. Before Decision No 15, losses due to rejection of shipments of goods were taken into account in advance. Under the previous system, the only expenses incurred were bank and inspection fees. If the goods were not accepted, I either reexported them or returned them to the supplier, and there were no problems.

"Under the new system, I have to make an advance credit payment and deposit 50 percent of the customs fees. These amounts of cash remain frozen and, commercially speaking, are wasted. In case the shipment of goods is not accepted, the loss becomes a triple one of expenses incurred for shipping, unloading and reshipping of goods, while my capital is frozen until I resell the goods."

Prices Will Likely Go Up

According to Mustafa Muhammad 'Ali, a member of the paper products division [of the Chamber of Commerce], there is no doubt that the decision will affect prices negatively, not positively. He says: "Prices will likely go up. It is true that expenses involved in buying dollars from the black market have decreased, but the freezing of a portion of one's capital in the form of an advance payment for opening credit is a process which is costly from the commercial point of view. It is also costly to borrow from banks to make such advance payments. In both cases, these expenses are passed on to the final consumers in the form of higher sales prices.

"Prices will likely go up for another reason. Most goods which arrive in Egypt are fully paid for. This is in contrast to the previous system which permitted imports under a system of credit, and at a lower rate of interest. This has been the case with goods coming from Britain. The British Export Corporation granted terms of 120 days at a 7.5 percent rate of interest. This rate of interest is quite a bit lower than the prevailing rate of interest in Britain which goes as high as 20 percent. The difference in the two rates of interest means that the price of goods was effectively lower under the old system."

Mr Fathi Shahdi feels that prices will likely go up also as a result of monopolization and elimination of competition.

Commercial Financing

Other sources in the Chamber of Commerce say: "The old import system allowed importers to distribute their shipments of goods to small and medium-size merchants on credit, because the importers themselves originally received easy credit terms from the foreign suppliers.

"Losing the easy terms extended by foreign suppliers will weigh heavily on small and medium-size merchants. The situation may even develop to the point where groups of merchants will either have to cease doing business and close their shops, or pay the importers in advance for their orders. The large-scale importers will be transformed into banks which receive advance payments for orders of goods. I am afraid that once this system is in full swing, swindlers will look for opportunities to run away with the merchants' money."

Shrinkage in the Supply of Goods

Pessimism has pervaded the commercial market after the decision was issued. Most merchants expect that the supply of goods will shrink, fortuitously or by design. The monopolies which are expected to emerge will see in the short supply of goods an opportunity to optimize profits. The smaller supply of goods will certainly affect production and cause an increase in wasted resources.

It is almost certain that the new system will lead to a decrease in the dollar's rate of exchange. But will this lead to an increase in the value of the Egyptian pound on the world market? This question is being asked by merchants and importers, and there is still no answer to it.

The Merchants' Demands

What do the merchants want?

1. 'Abdallah Mustafa Ibrahim, head of the [Chamber of Commerce's] division of automobile spare parts merchants says: "We want a period of grace during which we can clear up old transactions." He adds: "I am in favor of the decision. And I am in favor of setting import guidelines, but with reservations."

2. Merchants feel that decisions taken concerning the commercial market should be discussed with those who have an interest in the market, so that all may have a chance to adjust their activities in accordance with the new regulations.

3. Some merchants have more radical opinions. They demand that Decision No 15 be reexamined and that other methods be found to achieve the desired aims. They say: "If the aim is to have import transactions done by Egyptian banks instead of foreign banks, we welcome this. It is possible to achieve this by means of a political decision or directive."

Some importers say that a large number of import transactions are in fact now being carried out by Egyptian banks. This occurred after importers found that the rates of interest charged by Egyptian banks are lower. But this switching over to Egyptian banks has not been total, because the manner in which business is done in Egyptian banks caused delays, for many days, when one tries to open credit there. This is due to reasons beyond the control of the Egyptian banks, which are burdened with requests by the public sector to open credit.

Nevertheless, shifting transactions to Egyptian banks is something which can be achieved through appropriate coordination.

4. Merchants feel that if the aim is to protect local industries, what is needed is protective tariffs and predetermined market shares, instead of a newfangled experiment called "bank protection!"

[The following is inset as part of this article]

It Is Forbidden for Foreign Suppliers To Play Games With Egyptian Agents

The Association of Egyptian Businessmen sent a memorandum to the various levels of government economic agencies. The memorandum discusses the negative aspects of the law concerning the appointment of commercial agents, and suggests a series of guidelines for correcting the course of this experiment.

The memorandum says: "Actual application of the law reveals that a large number of committees [which decide on bids of merchants to be appointed as agents] do not adhere to the law. There is a flaw in the process of issuing temporary permits which allows foreign suppliers to play games with Egyptian agents who have paid earnest money. Also, foreign suppliers designate more than one merchant as agent, even for the same product."

The association suggests that the government economic agencies concerned should issue a decision which will obligate all committees in charge of bids to adhere to the law. The association also suggests that the issuing of temporary permits be done in a serious and exact manner, and that agencies issuing a permit should make sure that a dealership authorized by a foreign firm has not already been given to some other merchant.

The association demands shortening the period of final review for authorization of an agent to a maximum of 30 days. It also demands consolidation of the apparatus which reviews the authorization of agents, to put a stop to the phenomenon of more than one Egyptian merchant being an agent for the same foreign goods. The association demands that lists of agents be continually reviewed to make sure that only one agent is authorized to deal with a particular item from one supplier.

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COMMENTARY ON CONTROL OF FOREIGN BANKS IN EGYPT

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 23 Jun 80 pp 6-7

[Article by 'Isam Rif'at: "Our Companion on the Road We Are Taking, and Misconceptions About Foreign Banks"]

[Text] A few days ago, Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq 'Abd al-Majid, deputy prime minister, announced that all foreign banks in Egypt--53 in all--are now under the control of the Central Bank of Egypt. It is necessary to make some comments concerning this action.

1. The Central Bank's control over all branches of foreign banks should be complete.

It is not enough to say that agreement has been reached with 53 branches of foreign banks to have them deposit 15 percent of the value of their free currency deposits in the Central Bank so that the financing of commodity import operations may not create congestion. There is still a long way to go, and the gap is still very wide between "reality" and total control by the Central Bank over foreign banks in Egypt.

2. For this reason, even though we acknowledge that this step is considered to be a turning point in the course of the Egyptian economy, we maintain that a great deal remains to be done.

It is not necessary to plunge into the world of statistics to show that the collective financial position of banks which benefited from the provisions of the investment law from 31 December 1975 until 1978 reveals an extremely important economic fact which needs to be addressed.

This fact is the withdrawal of some of our deposits for investment abroad.

What I mean is this: Foreign currency deposits are finding their way into international financial centers outside Egypt, and some of them are being used for short-term operations instead of being used to finance investments of a productive type.

Perhaps the explanation for this situation is the purely economic one which says that it is a matter of high interest rates abroad.

But this explanation is not acceptable when we consider the purpose behind setting up foreign banks in Egypt and the importance of their role in "priming the pump" of local investments.

Perhaps the government has finally done something about this by means of its decision concerning the 15 percent reserves. However, we have many reservations concerning this matter, since there is no actual control over these banks. This makes the issue of the "size of the reserves" nebulous, and leads us to the third point.

3. The third point concerns the role played by the "Central Bank" in Egypt in theory and in practice, especially under the economic open-door policy.

We know that the Central Bank is the bank of the government in the sense that it is the bank which acts as the government's "accountant" and keeps its books. Also, by virtue of its numerous functions which are recognized in all textbooks throughout the country, it stands above all banks--national or foreign. It is the "bank of banks" in the sense that it is responsible for guiding and controlling other banks. It is responsible for monitoring their abidance by all financial policies and guidelines it lays down for them.

As far as the Egyptian banking system is concerned, the Central Bank is God's representative on earth.

How do we now stand with regard to all of this?

Here is what Dr Hamid al-Sayih, the former minister of economy, told the press:

"Government economic authorities have complete control over all operations of 'Egyptian' banks, and the Central Bank has complete control over the process of setting interest rates for 'local currency,' be it in Egyptian or foreign banks."

This means simply that control over interest on "foreign currency" has been relinquished, and that the Central Bank does not have complete control over the transactions of "foreign" banks in Egypt. Consequently, the formulation and implementation of banking policy is a matter which requires clear definitions of the roles played by the various arms of the banking system, be they the Central Bank, our national banks, or the foreign banks.

In the final analysis, we do feel that the deputy prime minister's decision to have 15 percent of the foreign banks' deposits placed in the Central Bank is a step toward rectifying the situation. At the same time, we emphasize that this does not constitute a retreat from the open-door policy.

On the contrary, it is a rectification and a means of guiding our "companion" along the "road" of the economic open-door policy, so that this policy may achieve its aims of real growth of our national economy.

Finally, the term "companion" does not designate just the foreign banks. It also designates the companies operating on the basis of the open-door policy. But this is a subject which merits a separate article.

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DETAILED ACCOUNT OF EGYPTIAN NUCLEAR SCIENTISTS IN ALL NATIONS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Jun 80 p 3

[Article by Wajdi Riyad: "Total of 227 Egyptian Scientists Are Participating in Nuclear Research in a Number of the World's Major Cities"]

> [Text] The [Egyptian] Atomic Energy Agency prepared this year 250 research studies which have been published in specialized international journals.
>
> The Egyptian scientist, Dr Yahya al-Mashad, was the only one who assembled the entire technology of the atomic bomb.
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> The assassination in Paris of Dr al-Mashad, the professor of atomic reactor engineering, perhaps reveals the prominent role played by Egyptian scientists in the field of atomic research throughout the world.
>
> It is not surprising that we have a large number of Egyptian scientists in all fields of atomic research. They left Egypt to conduct and lead scientific research projects in Arab countries, Europe and America. There they set up schools of science to which they are attached, just as their names are attached to these schools. Their knowledge and genius have spread all over the Arab world, and they administer atomic research laboratories in many Arab countries.

Dr Yahya al-Mashad was one of those scientists who did outstanding work in the field of nuclear reactors. He was the only Egyptian scientist who was interested in putting together all information concerning the design and technology of the atomic bomb. Perhaps this explains the secret of the research which the criminals were searching for in his private room. This must be the case, since during the course of his entire academic life in Egypt, Dr al-Mashad never engaged in any political activity. He possessed outstanding scientific capabilities. At the same time he was a man of outstanding morals. Operating as a skilled scientist, he created a school of science which dealt with nuclear reactors.

Five years ago, in the first conference on nuclear science and its application, he alone presented 14 scientific papers concerning nuclear reactors. He did all of this in only one conference! In the words of Dr Ibrahim Hammudah, chairman of the board of directors of the Atomic Energy Agency: "We lost Dr al-Mashad at the second conference on nuclear science and its application in 1978, because at that time he was going to Baghdad."

Dr Fawzi Hamad, professor of nuclear metals at the Atomic Energy Agency, says that the Atomic Energy Agency has great appreciation for his efforts indeed. He used to administer the nuclear reactor research laboratory of the Atomic Energy Agency. Then he went to Alexandria where he joined the faculty of the School of Engineering at the University of Alexandria. However, he kept in close touch with the Atomic Energy Agency and remained involved in its projects. He was chosen member of the executive committee of the second nuclear power station to be constructed in the Sidi Karir district of Alexandria.

As we know, Dr al-Mashad was supervising the construction of nuclear power reactors in Baghdad. The late Egyptian scientist raised the research reactor's capacity from 2 to 10 megawatts, that is, he increased its capacity by 5 times. At the same time, the Atomic Energy Agency in Baghdad was building an atomic power reactor. Dr al-Mashad was in charge of everything concerning this new reactor. He conducted all aspects of the scientific negotiations between the French Atomic Energy Agency and the Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency. He was empowered by the Iraqi Government to negotiate in its behalf. The reason for this was that negotiations centered entirely on supplying Iraq with 90 percent fuel and plutonium. This is a percentage which has been of some concern to the International Atomic Energy Agency headquartered in Vienna. This agency usually supervises and monitors all agreements of this kind, because of its concern that such research could be utilized to design atomic bombs.

It is said that France had decided to back down on supplying Iraq with 90 percent nuclear fuel. The task of Dr al-Mashad, who was 48 years old, was to bring these talks to a successful conclusion, and come up with an agreement which would satisfy the Atomic Energy Agency.

The Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency had been the target of an incident which was tantamount to a warning. This was when some groups of extremists blew up parts for a power reactor before they could be shipped out of France.

In the words of Dr Fawzi Hamad, who was a colleague of the martyred scientist: "His scientific school is now full of young scientists. It includes Drs Yusri Abu Shadi, Yusri Jawhar, 'Atiyyah, Dimitri, Abu Mandur and many others. Al-Mashad was cooperative, sincere and humble. He had all the qualities of a scientist."

Our Scientists Abroad

According to the latest statistics put out this week by the Atomic Energy Agency in Egypt, about 227 Egyptian scientists went on official leave of absence to work in other Arab countries in 1979. Of these, 147 have had their leave of absence extended, 50 have had it renewed, and 30 are slated to return to Egypt.

Among the scientists of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Agency, 300 are Egyptian scientists who specialize in 13 different fields of nuclear science. Their fields include nuclear reactors, nuclear physics, nuclear chemistry, nuclear metals, nuclear fuel, radioactive isotopes, scientific nuclear instruments, nuclear laboratories, reactor physics, plasma, nuclear accelerators, protection from atomic radiation, nuclear biology and nuclear environment.

In addition to the scientists of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Agency, there are the scientists of the Institute of Nuclear Radiation Research. It is estimated that there are 100 such scientists. This would mean that Egypt now has 400 nuclear scientists.

Dr Muhammad Rabi' Ahmad 'Ali, an instructor in the nuclear reactor department of the Atomic Energy Agency, who has just returned from the United States, says that in America alone there are about 50 Egyptian scientists who are working in the field of atomic research and in all specialized fields of nuclear energy. In the National (Argon) Laboratory alone, there are more than 15 Egyptian scientists conducting nuclear research.

As far as the Arab world is concerned, there are Egyptian experts in almost every Arab country. There, they administer nuclear research laboratories or atomic energy agencies. They are qualified to do this, because of the expertise which they possess in the field of atomic research--expertise which is attested to by all of international conferences. The following is a list of some of the outstanding names among the Egyptian scientific experts who engage in the field of atomic research: Dr Jamal Za'luk, who works in the administration of lighting and power projects in North Carolina; Dr Husayn Yahya Fu'ad, one of the most prominent scientists in the French atomic energy company (Fram) and a specialist in design; Dr Hasan 'Abd al-Halim, an administrator in the field of designing nuclear reactors in the American firm (Nabcox Wilkes); Dr Salah Badir, who works in North Carolina and is an engineer who designs fuel cells; Dr Fathi 'Arif Darwish, a professor of nuclear metals in Brazil; and Dr Muhammad 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abduh, one of the directors in the nuclear fusion programs in the National (Argon) Laboratory in the United States.

In the Arab World

The map of the Arab world is studded with Egyptian scientists who work in numerous fields, the most prominent being the field of nuclear research.

In Algeria Dr 'Abd al-Fattah Mujahid, professor of radio-biology, Engineer Fahmi Hajjaj and Dr Ibrahim Muhammad Jum'ah teach nuclear science subjects in Algeria's universities. The following Egyptian scientists are in Libya: Dr 'Isam 'Abd al-Ghafur, whose field is nuclear chemistry and desalinization; Dr Jalal Abu al-'Aynayn, whose field is nuclear reactor engineering, and Dr Sa'd Fadil, whose field is nuclear reactor engineering. All of them have obtained a doctor's degree in nuclear reactor engineering and nuclear chemistry, and they all teach in Libyan universities. In addition to these people, there is Dr 'Izzat 'Abd al-'Aziz, who is the technical consultant of the Atomic Energy Agency for which the Libyan Government has allocated 1 billion pounds to build a reactor with a capacity of 300 megawatts. The reactor is being planned and built by the Soviet Union. Other Egyptian scientists in Libya are Dr Muhammad Mas'ud, who teaches plasma physics; Dr 'Isam 'Isa, who is in the field of nuclear physics, and Dr Muhammad Ahmad al-Jarihi.

In Iraq the following Egyptian scientists engage in teaching and in working in the Iraqi Atomic Energy Agency: Dr Ahmad Abu al-'Ala; Dr Ahmad al-Qassas, head of the department of nuclear reactor physics; and Dr Hasanayn Jabir, professor of nuclear metals. Work there was administered by the late martyr, Dr Yahya al-Mashad. Iraq had gone to great lengths to get Dr al-Mashad to work there, especially since Iraq was pursuing an ambitious national atomic energy program. Other Egyptian scientists in Iraq are: Dr Mursi al-Sayyid Mursi, and Dr Mujdi al-Din 'Ali Ra'iyyih.

A Laboratory Which Produces Scientists

Mrs Zayn Shah 'Abd al-Fattah has compiled some statistics concerning Egyptian scientists who have been sent abroad or who have gone abroad on official leave of absence this year. It turns out that 444 of them are on official leave of absence abroad. This includes instructors, assistant instructors, teaching assistants, professors and assistant professors. All of these people are from the Atomic Energy Agency. And the total number of employees, technicians, and scientists who work at the Atomic Energy Agency is 2,580.

Dr Ibrahim Hammudah, chairman of the board of directors of the Atomic Energy Agency, says: "The Atomic Energy Agency is a laboratory which produces scientists who serve Egypt and all of the Arab countries. Egypt is the country which produced the first school of nuclear science in the Arab world, and was one of the first countries to do this in the Third World."

Dr Hammudah adds: "Egypt has a basic group of experts of its own who are able to absorb the complicated technology involved in nuclear power programs. This extensive group of scientists and qualified personnel has grown during the course of the last 25 years and has acquired an international reputation and prominent status which Egypt is proud of. With their expertise, these Egyptian scientists, through organizations

of international experts, have contributed a lot to the Arab countries. All of them have ended up working in the largest atomic energy laboratories in universities and in large industrial nations. Most of them are working in the United States. At the present time, 141 Egyptian scientists are working in Saudi Arabia; 28 are working in Iraq; 3 scientists are in Yemen; 11 scientists are in Qatar; 13 are in Kuwait; 4 are in Jordan; 6 are in Libya; 2 are in Algeria, and 1 scientist each are in Syria and Zambia."

Dr Hammudah says in conclusion: "Our scientists and experts have taken on the great task of confronting future difficulties when nuclear power is introduced as a means of producing electricity. This is because nuclear power is considered to be the only alternative currently available to deal with future energy needs--in view of the shortage of petroleum resources and the continual rise in the prices of oil. The government's national plan for developing sources of electricity calls for setting up a number of nuclear power stations, the capacity of each of which will be 6,000 megawatts. This is to be done by the year 2000. The program as a whole aims at raising Egypt's power capacity from its present level of 4,000 megawatts to a level of 17,000 megawatts by the year 2000."

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NEW GRADUATES FINDING JOBS OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT MANPOWER SYSTEM

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 26 Jun 80 p 3

[Article by Latifah 'Abd al-Raziq: "A Total of 30,000 Graduates Did Not Seek Employment Through the Government Manpower System"]

[Text] The process of placing graduates this year has revealed an important phenomenon. It turns out that there is a shortage of 30,000 graduates in various fields of specialization. This is because recent graduates did not seek employment through the government manpower system. Instead, they got jobs elsewhere. Government agencies still have vacancies, especially in positions for engineers, general agriculturalists and lawyers.

A total of 89,000 college graduates, classes of 1977 and January 1978, and secondary vocational and trade school graduates, class of 1976, have been placed in the provinces in which they said they wanted to work.

AL-AKHBAR met with Sa'd Fanjari, the director of the graduates placement office, and asked him about the reason for the aforesaid phenomenon. He said: "These graduates [who did not seek employment through the government manpower system] were absorbed by the market right after they graduated. This shows up very clearly in some fields of specialization. For example, with regard to law school graduates, we have a shortage of 2,037, since 1,736 graduates applied for jobs, when we needed 3,773. There is a shortage of 380 new architects, as 407 applied for jobs, but the need was for 787. There is a shortage of 1,587 new civil engineers, as 160 civil engineering graduates applied for jobs, but 1,747 were needed. As for accounting graduates, we have a shortage of 37, since 4,753 applied for jobs, but the need was for 4,790. In the field of business administration, there is a shortage of 1,171 graduates, as 525 business administration graduates applied for jobs, but the need was for 1,696."

The director of the graduates placement office went on to say: "In addition to this, we are still suffering from a shortage of people who specialize in languages, especially Arabic, English and French. There is a shortage of about 9,000 new graduates in this field. For this reason, the Ministry of Manpower was forced to employ 1976 graduates [sic] to fill the need for graduates specializing in Arabic and foreign languages."

Making Up for the Shortage in Specialists

Sa'd Fanjari added: "In spite of the fact that there is a shortage of specialists in some fields, there is a surplus of specialists in others. This is true, for example, with regard to general agriculture graduates [sic. First paragraph above refers to a shortage of these]. There is a surplus of 130 such graduates, as 2,351 applied for jobs, but the need was for only 2,221. There was a surplus of 130 graduates with bachelor of science degrees who studied geology, as 191 applied for jobs, but the actual need was for only 61."

"For this reason, in order to make up for the shortage of specialists in certain fields, the ministry has decided to suggest retraining programs. This would be done by specialized agencies. A complete training plan would be set up for all [interested] new graduates, to be implemented in cooperation with the agencies concerned."

Women Are Given Priority

Sa'd Fanjari went on: "The Ministry of Manpower and Training has seen to it that the new graduates are located geographically in accordance with their place of residence. The ministry has also seen to it that women have equal opportunity with male graduates. Women received priority in terms of getting jobs in accordance with their place of residence, or where they, in their applications, said that they wanted to work."

Sa'd Fanjari also said: "On 12 September 1979, the ministerial committee for services issued recommendations to give administrative agencies in the government freedom to fill positions by means of competitive testing. But it has been noticed that this principle has not been adhered to. For this reason, we wish to reaffirm this principle in the interest of equal opportunity for new graduates."

Opinions of the Graduates

Hashim 'Uthman 'Awad, a graduate in agriculture, class of 1978, says that he wants to work in the Ministry of Supply, because this is the only ministry that he can work in, since his field is microbiology. He stresses the fact that it is important that he be placed in Cairo, because that is where his family is.

Hasan Shahatah Muhammad, a 1977 graduate of the Cooperative Institute, says that he will go along with the graduate placement office's placing him in the appropriate ministry, provided it is in Cairo.

'Abd al-Ra'uf Ahmad 'Abd al-Ra'uf, a graduate of the accounting department of the school of commerce, says that it is very important for him

to be able to work in the province of al-Jizah. But he says that this does not mean that he would not accept a job in the Ministry of Supply or in the local government.

Samiyah 'Abd al-'Aziz Ahmad, a graduate of the class of 1977 who has specialized in physiology, says that she wants to work in the National Research Center, because that is where she has applied to do her master's thesis. She says that although she lives in Heliopolis, she is prepared to make a sacrifice for the sake of her master's thesis.

Su'ad Tawfiq 'Ali, a graduate of the class of 1978 who has specialized in mathematics, says that she wants to work in the Ministry of Education, because one can more quickly land a job there. She also says that she wants to be placed in a job in the province of Alexandria, because she is married, lives there, and wants to stay with her husband so that then can remain together as a family.

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COMBATTING WASTE IN UTILIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 23 Jun 80 pp 14-17

[Article by Jamal Zayidah: "The Future War Against Wasted Productive Resources"]

[Text] In 1978, 302 million Egyptian pounds were lost as a result of wasted productive capacity in the public sector. It is expected that this figure will increase for the year 1979, although the statistics for 1979 have not yet been finalized. Wasted productive capacity represents a loss not only of national income, but also of individual income. On the average, each individual in Egypt lost about 7.5 pounds of income. Also, wasted capacity means a loss of wages and adds [sic] to the rate of inflation.

This loss is compounded when you take into consideration the circulation of capital. The revenue lost as a result of the lack of circulation of 304 million pounds [the value of wasted resources] is very large. If this amount were merely invested in the form of a bank deposit, at an interest rate of 15 percent, it would yield 45 million pounds.

"Wasted Resources," was the subject of a symposium organized by the Research Center for Technological Planning and Development at the University of Cairo. Those participating in the discussion were Engineer Taha Zaki, minister of industry, 35 heads of industrial companies and a number of professors from the university. The symposium lasted 8 hours, during which the following topics were taken up: the reasons for the increase in the phenomenon of wasted resources, its effects on the national economy, and ways of utilizing this wasted capacity and incorporating it in the process of national production.

Inquiries and Ideas

At the beginning of the discussion, Dr 'Ali al-Silmi, director of the Research Center, introduced a series of inquiries and ideas, such as: Has agreement been reached concerning a comprehensive and exact definition of what constitutes idle and wasted productive capacity? Have all of the reason for, and causative factors of wasted capacity been defined within a formal framework to enable us to sort out the

interaction of the causative factors of wasted resources in such a manner as to prevent an overlapping of indicators and concepts? What method could be used to compile statistical data concerning wasted capacity? What is the optimum speed for compiling data to enable us to eliminate the effect of the time-lag factor on the effectiveness of efforts to deal with the problems of wasted capacity? And how can we measure productivity and evaluate different methods of monitoring and comparison?

Within Our Control and Beyond Our Control

There are many reasons for the phenomenon of wasted capacity. They can be willful or fortuitous. They can be caused by the workers or the administrators. And they can be due to investment or financing factors.

Minister Zaki dwelt on fortuitous factors which contribute to the phenomenon of wasted capacity. He said: "There are factors which are beyond the control of the companies. The most important of them is power failures. It is estimated that, in 1978, losses of industrial companies in the public sector resulting from power failures amounted to 57 million pounds."

Minister Zaki referred to foreign competition as another factor. On this matter he said that allowing imports without currency conversion and permitting unequal competition by foreign goods has led to a stagnation of Egyptian production. The value of the resultant loss of domestic production in 1978 was estimated at 62 million pounds, that is, 21 percent of total wasted resources.

In recent years, companies have also been suffering from a lack of liquidity and lack of capability to finance their needs in terms of production requirements. The negative effects of this factor have been compounded due to the rise in world prices for services and spare parts, and this has affected costs and volume of production. Resultant wasted capacity has been estimated at about 86 million pounds, or about 28 percent of the value of total wasted resources in the industrial sector.

Wasted Time

Dr Yahya Qabil, the head of Cairo's city planning division, dealt with the effect of the waste of production time on the phenomenon of wasted resources. He said: "In many cases, wasting time has turned into a tradition and a right which the workers have acquired. Examples of this are coming to work late, leaving work early, taking time off during work to eat and have something to drink. The workers often do this as a group--reading newspapers while on the job, taking time off to pay respects to the family of a deceased person, and taking time off to go meet or see off important visitors." Studies made concerning losses resulting from time wasted on the job show that between 20 and 40 percent of the time on the job is wasted. This percentage differs from one production unit to another.

The Problem Is An Administrative One!

In the opinion of Raja' al-Hadi, first undersecretary of the Ministry of Industry, the problem of wasted capacity is an administrative one. He believes that as long as the administrative methods used in the public sector do not change, the phenomenon of wasted capacity is likely to continue and to increase. He said that the heads of public sector companies are hampered by bureaucracy and obsolete regulations which restrict action and the taking of sound decisions.

In his analysis of bureaucracy and obsolete regulations, he went on to say: "The problem is that regulations are not stable. They keep on changing from time to time. Sometimes companies receive instructions to accept a labor force which their production units do not need. At other times they receive directives to the effect that they are not allowed to expand their labor force."

He added: "The regulations which restrict the higher management definitely lead to wasted capacity. The heads of companies are sometimes not able to take quick decisions when there is a problem between workers or between one company and another. In such cases, bureaucracy makes it necessary to initiate investigations which waste the time of administrative personnel. An example of this is the fact that the records of certain companies have been kept in the offices of district attorneys for the last 20 years, because investigations have not been completed. How is it possible for these companies to function when their records are not in the administrative offices of the companies?"

In conclusion, he said that wasted resources is not only a matter of machines burned off, but also a matter of unproductive labor.

The Regulations, Again!

Engineer Fu'ad Abu Zaghlah, president of the Iron and Steel Co, dealt with the problem of laws and regulations. He said: "One worker in the company damaged a roller which cost 8,000 pounds. This is sabotage of the company's resources. I wanted to suspend this worker from his job for a period of 3 months. This required a meeting of the company's board of directors, because the president of the company does not have the authority to suspend a worker from his job for more than 3 days."

The Ph.D's Are Prepared!

Dr Yahya Qabil brought up an important question, which was: How can a substitute be found for the expertise of higher administrative personnel who leave their jobs in public sector companies and go to work either for companies operating under the open-door policy or in foreign countries? The drain in administrative expertise contributes to aggravation of the problem of wasted resources. He added that to make up for this, it is necessary to reexamine the conditions under which such administrative personnel work. He felt that it is necessary to seek

help from university researchers to overcome technical and other obstacles. He said: "University professors are prepared to be of service to the production sector, but companies continue to ignore the fact that the universities and research centers have tremendous expertise which could help them. In the more advanced countries, 70 percent of the work done by university professors basically goes into serving the sectors of production. Only 30 percent of their efforts is in the direction of study and research at their universities. For this reason, we should start having agreements, concerning the exchange of knowledge, between centers of production and academic institutions."

Actual Cases

A number of presidents of companies gave presentations concerning the problems of wasted resources in their companies. Engineer Amin Rif'at, president of the Edwina Canned Foods Co, said that unutilized resources in his company, in the year 1979, added up to a value of 675,000 pounds. He said that there are many reasons for this, including a shortage of produce. For example, there is a 52-percent shortage in tomatoes, a 60-percent shortage in mangoes and a 66-percent shortage in okra. The reason for this is that the company is unable to obtain sufficient amounts of these items from the market, either because production is down, or because prices are too high. In addition to this, there is the factor that production of these items is seasonal. Also, there is a time lag between the availability of vegetables and fruits.

Obsolescence of Production Lines

Another reason for wasted resources is the fact that the useful life of some of production lines is over. For example, the production line for canning fish has been in use for more than 20 years, and production line for canning oranges has been in use for 15 years. The problem is not only one of obsolete production lines. There is also the fact that spare parts are not available when needed.

The same problem exists in the National Textile Co, according to Engineer Hasanayn al-Hisafi, the general manager of the company's plants. The company has more than 900 mechanical looms, but most of them were assembled in 1937. Their productive efficiency has gone down to 40 percent of what it used to be.

Training the Labor Force

Engineer Husayn Bayyumi, head of the Nasr Steam Boiler Manufacturing Co, said: "Our company's problem in the realm of wasted resources consists of the fact that the present labor force does not have the necessary level of skill for the production of steam boilers and pressure containers. This results in inferior products, a slow pace, and the need to repeat some operations." He pointed out that some of the trained labor force has gone to work in other Arab countries or in investment companies, because the wages there are higher. He also mentioned that training

programs are inadequate and unable to raise the level of skill of the labor force. Mr Bayyumi also talked about the inadequate level of engineers and supervisors, especially the fact that most of them have just recently graduated from school. Likewise, he referred to the problem of the lack of adequate data, which makes it difficult to solve problems and make decisions.

The National Textile Co also suffers from this problem of a lack of a trained labor force. This shortage of workers is not only due to emigration. Mr Al-Hisafi pointed to the existence of another problem in the fact that 400 workers have retired to take advantage of the early pension law.

Finding Their Own Solutions

Some companies have confronted the problem of wasted capacity and have found their own solutions. For example, the Edwina Co started manufacturing its parts locally.

The company set up central workshops equipped to produce spare parts. It also concluded contracts with other local workshops for the production of some spare parts. The Edwina Co has striven to revamp its production lines by using automated systems in order to decrease the need for labor. In addition to this, the company has set up programs to train new workers to perform technical jobs and has improved wages by means of a system of incentive payments.

The Nasr Steam Boiler Manufacturing Co confronted the labor shortage problem by hiring and training auxilliary workers to replace workers taking leave without pay or resigning so as to work in other enterprises.

Some companies have begun to supply their plants with diesel generators to be used in case of power failures. But these generators can only be used for a limited number of hours.

But what has the Ministry of Industry done to deal with this problem which plagues 116 industrial companies?

The Agreement With (Unido)

Engineer Ibrahim Sharkas, vice president of the Public Industrialization Agency said: "The agency has reached an agreement with (Unido) on a project to deal with wasted resources. The project is called "Optimum utilization of available industrial resources." The (Unido) Organization has allotted 1.3 million pounds for this purpose. The aim of the project is to find ways which will insure the full utilization of available productive resources in some industrial companies. This will be achieved by bringing in specialized experts as consultants, and by providing the necessary equipment and know-how for developing and raising the level of production."

In 1978 the governments of Egypt and the United States signed an agreement concerning a loan of $46.5 million and a grant of $38.5 million to finance projects designed to replace old machinery, renovate and develop production in existing plants, and make studies of the benefits to be achieved by these projects.

In 1979 the Public Industrialization Agency and the (Unido) Organization signed an agreement for aid to a project for the full utilization of available productive resources at three companies. These are: the Dyestuffs and Chemicals Co in Kafr al-Zayyat, the Nasr Co for Manufacturing Steam Boilers and Pressure Containers in Cairo and the Edwina Canned Foods Co in al-Ra's al-Sawda' in Alexandria.

The symposium ended with agreement concerning a series of guidelines, by means of which it would be possible to deal with and control the phenomenon of waste resources. They include:

1. Provide the necessary funds for preventive and continual maintenance to keep buildings and equipment in sound condition.

2. Give priority in investment policy to vertical expansion so as to fully utilize existing resources.

3. Provide training programs to meet needs for skilled and semi-skilled workers as well as administrative cadres.

4. Concentrate on productive efficiency and vocational training. This is particularly necessary, because industry became interested in productive efficiency in the fifties, but then interest waned. Productive efficiency should be entrusted to responsible officials in the company.

5. Reexamine the laws governing industrial companies to give their administrations the opportunity to act and account for their accomplishments at the end of the year.

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BRIEFS

TWO EGYPTIAN-ROMANIAN PLANTS--On 21 June Egypt and Romania signed a protocol for cooperation on the construction of two plants for making cement and iron for reinforced concrete in Sadat City. It will cost $200 million to construct them. The agreement was signed in Ramadan the 10th City by the Romanian minister of trade (Alexander Milka), and Engineer Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, the minister of reconstruction, housing and land reclamation. Al-Kafrawi announced that the agreement includes the construction of a cement plant, with an annual production capacity of 1 million tons, and a plant for making iron for reinforced concrete, with an annual production capacity of 400,000 tons. Construction of the two plants will begin immediately. Al-Kafrawi said: "Import restrictions will be eased to facilitate the importation of supplies for the construction of the two plants, and this will strengthen the ties of friendship between Egypt and Romania." On behalf of the Egyptian Government, al-Kafrawi thanked Nicolae Ceausescu, the Romanian president, and said: "The two plants will be a symbol of Egyptian-Romanian cooperation." [Text] [Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 22 Jun 80 p 6] 9468

NEW POWER PLANTS--It has been decided to speed up the installation of additional electric power plants in "May 15 City," near Halwan, in order to accommodate 50,000 persons this year. This was announced by Mr Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, the minister of reconstruction, housing and land reclamation. He said: "A total of 10,000 residential units in 'May 15 City' will be handed over to workers of the plants of Halwan in order to solve the housing problem in this important region." The minister also said: "During the next 2 weeks a gas-powered electric power plant will be inaugurated in Sadat City and will begin operating for the industrial area of the city. This is in addition to a number of other gas-powered power plants, with an output of 5 megawatts, which will be imported early next year. This is made possible by a loan of 10 million Swiss francs from the Swiss Government. It has also been decided to speed up completion of the power plant in the new city of al-'Amiriyah so that normal life may begin there." The minister added: "Electricity is considered to be the basis for any normal type of life in the new cities, because it is involved in the operation of all other utilities." [Text] [Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 23 Jun 80 p 6] 9468

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RETURN OF OLD ASSEMBLY PROPOSED, RATHER THAN NEW ELECTIONS

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 27 Aug 80 p 1

[Editorial by Ahmad al-Jarallah: "What if the Old National Assembly Returned, with Conditions?"]

[Text] There is no doubt that the period of time set for the reconvening of the National Assembly is insufficient for the necessary concepts to be publicized and firmly implanted. One of the fundamental issues set forth now is the reapportionment of electoral districts, which is unconstitutional without the consent of the National Assembly. This means that the government by itself does not have the constitutional authority to reapportion.

Therefore, reconvening the former Assembly might be practical, provided that the government actively works towards what it has committed itself to and that it takes action that it believes is in keeping with the notion of the common good. By this I mean its duty to endeavor to obtain the consent of the Assembly--the old one now, the new one, once the electoral districts are redrawn--on the condition that it submits matters for public debate.

I believe that public opinion is mature, capable of crystallizing what it understands to be its interests and desires, which may have general, as well as limited and particular significance. In any case, it [reconvening the old Assembly] would provide an opportunity to weigh alternatives and to find out what is actually wanted.

Reconvening the former Assembly, in itself, would save time, provided that the government plays an active role in it.

Naturally, there would be no harm done if the government had to dissolve the Assembly again, if it failed to find a suitable formula for cooperation between the two. For the dissolving of representative assemblies is a common thing in all advanced countries. Indeed, it is part of the democracy game, although we would not press this here, because that sort of thing may cause confusion in a state which is still in the process of development.

We toss out this idea to save time and to get away from discussion of ideas over which debate may drag on and on, to the point that the government could find that the time announced this week for reconvening the Assembly has run out.

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ARMY REVOLT CONNECTED WITH LIBYAN OPPOSITION

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 27 Aug 80 pp 4-5

[Article by Muhammad Majdi Qanadil: "A Look at the Situation in Libya--the Secrets Behind the Libyan Army Revolt in Tobruk"]

[Text] What happened in Tobruk was neither completely surprising nor startling!

What happened in the Ninth Libyan Brigade was nothing strange, and can be said to have been expected!

The revolts and attempted coups against the regime of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi which might occur later will be a natural, consequential, logical result of the policies of the absolute dictatorship which is stifling the Libyan people, governing their fate, threatening their freedom, and squandering their money.

Therefore, observers and political analysis are almost unanimous that something will happen in Libya, and that a ruler like Colonel al-Qadhdhafi cannot go on being a center for terrorism and the export of unrest to the rest of the region. A regime like the ruling regime in Tripoli cannot continue the political chaos represented by the "revolutionary committees," which have been transformed into anarchic groups and gangs so as to impose terror, snatch money and demoralize the people.

Colonel al-Qadhdhafi and his aides try to find an explanation for the armed revolt which occurred in the Ninth Brigade in Tobruk, commanded by Maj Idris al-Shuhaybi. Maj 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, the number two man in the Libyan regime, tries to cover up the suppressed complaints in the Libyan army and to blame foreign parties such as Egypt for the "attempted insurrection" in order to decieve people and evade reality. However, no matter what it does, the ruling regime in Libya will be unable to suppress the mounting popular uprising against it, or to falsify the facts of the terrorism, oppression and corruption which rules Libya.

The available facts about Maj Idria al-Shuhaybi indicate that he was the director of Libyan intelligence in Tobruk, and was responsible for contacting the tribes in the Cyrenaica and desert regions adjacent to the Egyptian

borders. After some time, there were some disagreements between al-Qadhdhafi and al-Shuhaybi about money matters and the millions of dinars allocated for payment to al-Qadhdhafi's bedouin agents and for enlisting tribal mercenaries.

Al-Qadhdhafi transferred al-Shuhaybi from Tobruk, and he disappeared from the intelligence agency for a long time, until his name reappeared recently in connection with the Ninth Brigade incidents.

It is certain that a state of emergency was declared in the eastern region--Tobruk and Benghazi--to counter the insurrection and to pursue and arrest the participating officers and soldiers.

It is also certain that there were many victims of the bloody clash, amounting to 400 persons.

I will not go into the details of the attempt which took place in the Ninth Brigade stationed in Tobruk, and I will not go into Maj Idris al-Shuhaybi's motives which led to an armed clash between the rebel forces and al-Qadhdhafi's forces, commanded by East German officers.

An Eyewitness to al-Qadhdhafi's Thinking

But I will linger over an important observation made by an Arab politician who met recently with Colonel al-Qadhdhafi in Tripoli, and who returned to say that he was astounded and amazed at al-Qadhdhafi's thinking, for he is living in a dream.

He--that is, the colonel--believes that his thoughts will solve all the country's problems, and that his theories will sooner or later be applied to the whole world. Thus he is prepared to do anything to carry out what is in his head--in Libya, at least, so it can be a model. He believes that his "Green Book" is better than anything humanity has published or known so far. In order to apply it, he has allocated a huge budget in petrodollars, and does not hesitate to use any means of removing any obstacle in his path.

The visiting Arab political eyewitness went on to al-Qadhdhafi's thinking and the behavior which results from his visionary dreams, saying, "Therefore, the colonel lives in isolation, attacking in particular the politicians and intellectuals who do not accept his way of thinking. Therefore, he orders the murder and liquidation of political opponents, or those he considers to be opponents, among the refugees abroad, and launches concentrated operations to arrest lawyers, journalists and writers who have not stomached the theories of the Green Book.

"For example, 28 intellectuals accused of forming illegal organizations were brought before the Tripoli Criminal Court at al-Qadhdhafi's command. They have been detained without an investigation since mid-April, and no verdict has yet been issued in their case.

"More seriously, the new law on parties and members of political movements which al-Qadhdhafi is preparing calls for the punishment of death for this charge"!

Government by the Green Book and the Revolutionary Committees

This testimony by the Arab visitor gives a sample of the ruling way of thinking in Libya, and gives a true indication of what is going on in the colonel's head. It is also obvious that no one has the right to dispute al-Qadhdhafi's thoughts and theories without facing imprisonment, death, or banishment outside Libya.

There is no place for educated thinking or enlightened opinions in the colonel's vicinity, for he considers this to be opposition, which he must silence, make a crime and charge with treason!

There are some definite facts discovered by Amnesty International about the repressive methods governing Libya, which indicate the arrest of hundreds of Libyans--civilians and military personnel--since February, simultaneous with wholesale overseas assassination operations against al-Qadhdhafi's opponents.

Thus Lawyer Amin Dayfin died in prison under obscure circumstances after 3 days of torture, and masses of Libyans attended his funeral procession. Al-Qadhdhafi's reaction was to arrest two more prominent lawyers, Muhammad Sajir and Muhammad Banuna, who in turn met their end at the hands of the popular security committees.

It is significant that the colonel ignores the law in confronting judicial reservations about his thinking. Justice has become totally based on the principles and teachings of the Green Book. When he arrested hundreds of businessmen and army officers, they were tried before a "people's court" composed of "revolutionary committee" members who had no connection with the judicial system. Because those officers were charged with corruption, they were not permitted to appoint lawyers to defend them. The purpose was to get rid of patriotic elements in the Libyan Army!

There is another resistance to Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's theories, as eyewitnesses coming from Libya report and that is the religious men's opposition to his thoughts, which are antithetical to Islam and which distort the Koran. The colonel imagines it to be his duty to "renew" the religion through his own interpretation of God's book and through his Green Book.

As the ultimate in foolishness and perilousness, al-Qadhdhafi has eliminated the presence of muftis and religious men and has prohibited their speaking on the radio or in the press, to such an extent that Shaykh 'Azawi, the mufti of Libya, is now prohibited from appearing on television. The colonel has replaced him with speeches inspired by the Green Book.

The Al-Maryam Tribal Incident in Tobruk

This challenge to the law, defacement of religion and destruction of freedom, has consequently led to the accumulation of feelings of anger and suppressed rebellion, whether among the people or in the army. What happened in the Ninth Brigade had its beginnings in Tobruk itself 5 months ago, when the angry public demonstrated spontaneously, protesting the conduct of the popular committees. The demonstration turned into a bloody battle with the security forces, which fired on it, and ended with 37 dead and wounded demonstrators. Two days later, two corpses of popular committee members were found in the harbor at the port of Tobruk.

The reason was that the popular committee had summoned a shaykh of the Al-Maryam tribe to its headquarters in the city. The man refused to make a statement to these young mercenaries because of his status in his tribe. In the evening, four committee members broke into his home and struck and insulted him. The result was an outburst of anger; the next day hundreds of Al-Maryam tribe members beseiged the committee's offices and the clash took place.

Such incidents have been repeated many times in other parts of Libya as a result of the excesses of the popular committee members. In most cases, al-Qadhdhafi has been forced to dismiss and change them, to quiet public opinion and to stop the committees from going to extremes in dominating the people and exploiting their influence.

There is other testiomony to the resistance which has begun to break out. Huge masses shouting in unison "God is Great" participated in the funeral procession of a well-known Libyan who died under torture in Tripoli Prison, and this participation was tantamount to a cry of opposition and protest against the al-Qadhdhafi regime. But everyone is afraid of the tyranny of the revolutionary committees, which the colonel has unleashed to eliminate his opponents and confiscate their money and property. One eyewitness who visited Tripoli recently says that the Libyans have to remain silent because they fear imprisonment or assassination, but they are biding their time, and sometimes one of them finds the courage to say, "Perhaps someday someone will rid us of al-Qadhdhafi."

The colonel is aware of all these dangers surrounding him, especially since the recent assassination attempt in which he was shot in the arm. He lives in isolation behind the "iron curtain" which he has built bit by bit around Libya, and no one can find out where he is.

Suppressed Ferment in the Libyan Army

Therefore, al-Qadhdhafi is always uneasy about the army, and his doubts about the Libyan officers opposed to him are increasing, especially in Cyrenaica. Recent commotions have occurred in the Libyan army prior to the revolt of the Ninth Brigade in Tobruk, and leaflets speaking out against the

al-Qadhdhafi regime were distributed in units stationed in Benghazi and Sabha (the southern capital). There are two basic influencing factors in the army's complaint:

1. The resounding disgrace of al-Qadhdhafi's intervention in Uganda to help Idi Amin, now his arch-enemy, and the breaking-up and dispersal of his forces in the jungles of Uganda, a disgusting defeat which resulted in the death of 400 Libyan officers and soldiers and the caputre of another 200. This led to heightened complaining and opposition among the officers against the dangerous direction being taken by al-Qadhdhafi's foreign policy.

There was strong opposition to the mass conscription of Libyan youths, at the colonel's order, and their transport to the Egyptian borders to be stations along the "Chibouk" line under the command of Cuban and East German officers.

2. The Soviet experts' increasing domination of the Libyan armed forces, especially the airplanes, rockets and tanks, and the stripping of authority from Libyan officers leadings the units. These experts number more than 1,000 technicians and officers. Planes take off only at their command, and ammunition is issued only with their approval. This is besides the influx of mercenary pilots from communist countries and the East German experts' domination of security agencies and intelligence.

Those Wounded in the Uganda Operation Are With the Resistance

Popular committee members who support al-Qadhdhafi try to justify the assassination of opponents of the Libyan regime in European capitals and in Libya itself by claiming that al-Qadhdhafi decided to assassinate his opposition in Europe because he learned that a number of Libyans were getting overseas training under American CIA supervision, and because he wanted to forestall the development of a link between those overseas Libyans and the current of domestic opposition.

But it is certain that this link has actually existed since early this year.

Some Libyan officers and soldiers who were wounded in Uganda last year went to London for treatment, very bitter and indignant about al-Qadhdhafi's policy which got them into the Uganda imbroglio. They seized the opportunity to refuse to return to Libya, and got together in the British capital to organize a resistance to bring down the colonel's regime. They contacted the al-Qadhdhafi opponents who were living there and in Rome, Geneva, and Rabat. The scope of the Libyan "National Democratic Movement" expanded when a number of intellectuals, students and businessmen joined it, and its activity increased during the last few months, as a counter-reaction to the start of the assassination and physical liquidation attempts directed at those opposition figures spread throughout the capitals of Europe.

The movement felt that it was facing a direct threat from al-Qadhdhafi's agents and the Libyan assassination teams distributed overseas. The executive bureau of the movement met last April and decided to answer

al-Qadhdhafi with the same violence. After that, the movement's leaders met in late May in an Arab capital and decided to move quickly to confront the danger facing them, and the attempts to wipe them out one by one.

Afterwards, they went to another Arab capital via Rome to organize the assistance against the Libyan regime and to reply to al-Qadhdhafi from within Libya itself. The Ninth Brigade movement came about as a confirmation of the outbreak of suppressed complaining and anger.

But Colonel al-Qadhdhafi huddles in his isolation and does not want to recognize the existance of an opposition. He deludes himself in his interviews with foreign journalists, saying that there is no political problem in Libya!

But the state of domestic collapse is strangling the colonel, and his doubts about everyone around him are increasing. Therefore, last year he formed a special team to protect him, made up of members of his own al-Qadhdhafah tribe from the Sirt region, and armed it with the most modern Soviet equipment. Constant purging of the Libyan army, through imprisonment and execution, has helped him carry out his plans, but for how long? That remains to be seen!

8559
CSO: 4802

EUROPEAN MIDEAST INITIATIVE IS EXPECTED FOR DECEMBER

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 3 Sep 80 p 5

[Commentary by Moncef Ben Amor: "Saving Face"]

[Text] While in Tunisia for the meeting of the French-Tunisian mixed commission, Quai d'Orsay's chief, Francois Poncet, will meet with the secretary general of the all-Arab organization, Chedli Klibi, for a full review of the situation in the Middle East and of the prospects for getting the European-Arab dialogue going again. Messrs Klibi and Poncet will also, at that time, reconsider the outlines of a possible European initiative expected, in principle, this coming December.

Since the one side is staying out of the limelight, and the other side is weary or cautious while awaiting the outcome of the presidential elections this November, Europe is the only one, actually, that is in a position, if it wants, and if the others permit, to play a part in moving the stalled negotiations moving.

Still, it is extremely difficult to delineate the contours of the initiative. Two factors account for this. First, the enormous differences of opinion on the nature and even the notion of peace between Israel and the Arab countries. Second, Europe's hitherto diffident activity in that region of the world and its inability, on paper at least, to "impose" a peace solution on the two superpowers and on the protagonists themselves. It is this that renders any European initiative for the Middle East difficult, not to say impossible.

The "deterioration" of the situation, following Israel's and Egypt's signing of a peace treaty and the two superpowers' unprecedented military, economic, and political involvement, one on the side of Tel Aviv, the other on the side of Damascus, lead to the belief, nonetheless, that Washington and Moscow could perhaps seriously get things moving again, and still save face, by endorsing a possible future European initiative.

CSO: 4400

KEY GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS IN BUREAUCRATIC REFORM MEASURES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Aug 80 p 6

[Report on government proposals for administrative reform by Siah B. Larbi: "Administrative Reform Project -- The Key Proposals"]

[Text] Responsibilities: to devolve and decentralize.
Authority: to turn the center into a body for conception and supervision.
Citizens: to facilitate procedures to be followed by citizens: for example, building permits.
Civil servants: to improve salaries through a precise and well defined legal statute.
Retirement: maximum retirement benefit: 90 percent for 35 years of service.

Administrative reform. A fashionable term lately. A topical subject for debate. This testifies to the acuteness of the concerns raised by the administration in terms of its performance and its relations with the citizens. An administration which is highly hierarchical and heavy in terms of its mechanics. As an example: according to government statistics, the required waiting period to obtain a building permit for a villa averages 60 days. "I cannot imagine a waiting period of more than 10 days," one official tols us. For a building permit for an apartment building, the average waiting period is 80 days. Not to mention official documents -- very common and touching all citizens -- which also require waiting periods of variable duration and sometimes are a nuisance for the citizen. The reason for this is the maze of departments through which an administrative document must go, even an elementary one, with each department jealously safeguarding its prerogatives.

The diagnosis established by the administration's reform project is the following:
- An administration characterized by a multiplicity of grades and aspirations to go up in the hierarchy and of decisions of all sorts;
- An infinite multiplicity of structures with imprecise responsibilities;
- Cumbersome and formal procedures;
- A regional administration lacking any significant authority.

The remedies:
- To entrust the small structures with those matters they are better able to handle than the others;
- To regionalize the administration without "creating a self-defined regional authority";
- To facilitate procedures;
- To redefine the civil service statute in order to improve the salaries.

The administrative reform project is organized along three main lines, veritable pillars of the Tunisian administration: the structures, the network and procedures, and the status of the civil servant which is the determining element for the success of an administrative reform.

The administrative structures comprise the central bodies as well as their internal departments, the municipalities, the councils of the governorates, the field offices, etcetera... Their vitalization implies the granting to each structure of what it alone can accomplish in order to rationalize the management of the life of the cities and villages and to facilitate the procedures to be followed by the citizen.

The achievement of these objectives implies a transfer by the central authorities to the regional departments and local communities of actions and services with the following characteristics:
- secondary importance,
- current matters,
- regional or local impact.

The legal means for such a transfer are: devolution and decentralization.

"Devolution means to entrust responsibilities and decision making powers of the central administration to officials appointed by the central authorities." For example, the governor.

"Decentralization is the process by which the state, a legal person, delegates part of its prerogatives to another legal person." The typical structure for this kind of action is of course the municipality.

Devolution of course empowers the territorial administrations to exercise their authority, without necessarily implying a loss of control by the center. Decentralization does not lead to the creation of "a self-defined regional authority, but to administrative, economic and social powers fitting into a national institutional system which determines responsibilities, sets down rules, oversees their implementation and provides arbitration."

In order for the governorate to have means at its disposal to impart a regional character to the development programs, it will have to be equipped with instruments such as research departments, "think tanks"...

The departments involved in the planning of the human and material environment to prepare it for development, referred to in the administrative

reform project as "development training services" are affected by the /devolution/ [in italics] project:
- land agencies,
- training centers,
- reclamation bodies,
- regional development bodies.

As well as the support sections, which "support the actual implementation of development," banks, foreign trade, etcetera...

In order for the devolution project to succeed, "a putting in order will be necessary." Of what?

Of the relationships between the governor and the "department heads" of the regional departments of the central administration, a putting in order which is based on a specific definition of their respective authority. The law of 1975 concerning the governors is clear: "the governor has authority over the personnel of the state departments operating in his governorate." According to the very terminology of the project, the field offices of the civil administration of the state are "characterized by heterogeneity" at various levels, including the delegation of authority to the field office. It suggests two ways for "putting in order."

First, a division into regions of devolution, each of which would group together two or three governorates, one of which would be selected as devolution capital, where field office heads would be given the delegations of authority provided for the whole devolution region. The merit of this formula is that it relieves congestion in the capital by subdividing the large regional units.

The inconveniences: it postpones the implementation of devolution while waiting for the selection of the regional capitals, and runs the risk of demobilizing [as printed] the governorates which were not selected as regional capitals.

The second formula maintains the current division (19 governorates, 136 field office centers and 1221 sectors).

Advantages: by grafting regional directorates, which would represent the ministries and be provided with wide powers, the central administration would be free of day to day management matters and solutions to citizen's problems would be provided "with desired swiftness."

The means provided by the project to achieve devolution are the currently available funds of the central administration, and it suggests incentives for officials going to work in the interior regions:
- a housing allowance, the amount of which could vary in relation to the geographic location of the governorates relative to the capital:
- a seniority bonus, which would make it possible for officials working in the interior of the Republic to be promoted more rapidly than their counterparts working in Tunis;

- access to those ranks at which appointment is discretionary (director in chief, director general).

As for decentralization, its ideal framework is definitely the municipality.

To optimize its action, one has to "go through successive adaptations to find the model most likely to organize the whole of the city (...) while avoiding centrifugal tendencies which break down tribal order..."

For the administrative reform project, the restructuring of the municipalities involves:
- the extension of the territorial limits of the municipality to that of the field office area in order to "progressively erase the distinction between the urbanized municipal areas and the rural areas";
- taking charge of training facilities: land development, refuse removal, various networks, centers for the promotion of administration, culture and sports; and related facilities: shopping centers, parking lots, green areas, etcetera...

As far as the governorate councils are concerned -- local communities, which manage the interests of unincorporated areas -- the project proposes a widening of their authority in order to:
- be acquainted with the data relating to the governorates,
- issue proposals,
- participate in the elaboration of rural development programs.

In short, to become "the privileged authority of the area in matters of economic, social and cultural development."

Those who would be represented in it are: representatives, municipalities, cells, national organizations and economic bodies, "without falling into sterile debates to find out whether the members of the council should be appointed or elected."

Means:
- the recycling of personnel assigned to the local communities, which are thus decentralized,
- the transfer of credits from the state budget.

New resources would be released thanks to taxes, assessments and revenues.

The territorial division of "economic regions" should lead to homogeneous regions "within which the deviations from the mean would be as small as possible." One should avoid a division based on complementarity (East-West, for example), which would "lead to a covering up of the differences, and probably to their intensification."

They will be provided with regional councils "with exclusively economic powers."

Their responsibilities would be:
- the conception of the economic and social issues concerning the region,
- following up on the implementation of the national plans,
- coordination among governorate councils.

Two requirements have to be reconciled: no excess of numbers and a balanced representation of the various governorates.

The presidency could go to each governor in turn and the meeting place would be the seat of the governorate whose governor is presiding over the regional council.

The second large section of the administrative reform project concerns procedures, which, in the view of the citizens, is the basis of the humanization of the administration. The citizens who, it must be admitted, are hampered in their daily business by the sluggishness of the bureaucracy and are caught in a veritable Kafkaesque system.

The procedures, which the project suggests should be made more flexible, are at several levels.

Economic Level

Procedures concerning the following matters:
- building permits,
- the creation of enterprises,
- industrial credit guarantees,
- the importation of raw materials,
- the importation of agricultural products,
- technological transfers,
- statistical registration of new enterprises,
- FOPRODI [expansion unknown] projects,
- customs procedures,
- agricultural credit,
- transportation permits,
- technical inspection center for vehicles.

Civil Level

Procedures relating to civil documents may well constitute the major share of administrative actions and put the citizen in daily contact with the administration.

All citizens are involved and have to take all kinds of actions to be in order in their civil life. Actions which involve getting birth certificates, number 3 certificates or even burial permits.

It has already become easier to get a number 3 certificate and other actions will follow, such as, for example, with regard to car registration books.

Numerous ministerial departments have published citizen guides.

Inter-administrative Level

This level concerns the internal procedures of the administration. For example, the project suggests that the prime minister raise the ceilings which limit the respective powers of the various trade committees. It also suggests that the elimination of preliminary validation, the orders for advancement in rank and the orders relating to the granting of compensations as provided in the regulations currently in use.

The status of the civil servant, mainspring of the administration and promoter of all administrative reforms, is the third target of the reform project.

Two ideas: the fruits of reflection by the High Civil Service Council.

- Improve the provisions of the general statute by facilitating mobility between administrations, by improving conditions for internal promotion, by adapting the statute to certain realities (half-time work, special leave for training and reorientation, for mothers, for those active in sports and an extension of the duration of availability...)

- Lighten certain procedures at the level of evaluation and of the disciplinary system...

Government workers will see a recasting of their statute, which will take into account newly developed qualifications, an updating of job descriptions and an improvement of fringe benefits, etcetera...

Corollary of the definition of a precise legal statute: the improvement of remunerations.

The project recognizes the existence of "some injustices and some imbalances" in a remuneration system involving 150,000 civil servants, divided into 60 separate bodies and more than 200 grades, which correspond to very different qualifications.

It suggests that the remuneration system should take into account the quality of the civil servant, the job being held and the manner in which the official performs his job.

Principles for improvement:
- maintenance of the principle of equality at the level of grade related remunerations,
- extension of certain specific bonuses to those officials who respond to the criteria of their granting, but who have been previously excluded,
- creation of new special allowances and possible revaluation of those which exist in function of service, specific qualifications, needs of the country in a given special field, etcetera,

- extension of additional allowances -- which are in no way related to the job specifications -- to all the categories of civil servants and government workers,
- indexing of the base remuneration to changes in the cost of living, according to a still to be determined formula.

Finally, the reform project tackles the guarantees of post retirement life.

With regard to the recommendations concerning the system of retirement benefits, the current pension level -- with its maximum of 80 percent -- could be raised to a level which would come close to the remuneration while employed: 90 percent.

At the present time, the requirement to receive the maximum of 80 percent, is 40 years of service.

To improve the determination of retirement benefits, two solutions are presented:
- a regressive plan where the highest benefits would be found at the beginning of a career (as for CAVIS [expansion unknown]),
- a progressive plan: the highest benefits would be found at the end of a career.

The project proposes that the maximum could be reached after 35 years of service, whatever annuity plan is adopted.

The retirement benefits problem opens onto the problem of setting age limits.

Three levels of age limits could be provided:
- first level: 65 years of age for the upper cadres whose access to civil service jobs comes at the approximate age of 30. At the age of 65, the duration of service (35 years) would lead to retirement benefits at the maximum rate of 90 percent;
- second level: 60 years of age for the medium cadres;
- third level: 55 years of age for the lower level officials.

At the age of 55, they will have accomplished 35 years of service because the average age of access to a civil service job is at the approximate age of 20.

8463
CSO: 4400

BILLION DINARS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF QUALITY OF LIFE IN SLUMS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 10 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by B. L. Slah]

[Text] The main objective of the rehabilitation project for Jebel-Lahmar, Saida Manoubia and Mellassine is to get rid of the shacks.

An unhealthy, squalid belt, these zones promote the rapid multiplication of unauthorized and dangerous structures where homes are crowded together in promiscuously cramped quarters and suffer from the lack of sanitary equipment: sewerage systems, drinking water, electricity, etc.

What is the origin of this unplanned housing phenomenon?

What are the distinctive features of the present situation and the objectives which the rehabilitation projects envision?

We are offering an answer to all these questions below.

The deterioration of the urban fabric is unquestionably the outcome consequent upon migratory movements of people fleeing the countrysides for the great centers of population where they are attracted by urban "conveniences." For these movements, which indicate a certain lack of security prevalent in various regions, towns and countrysides, the center of attraction is the capital.

After 1956, the capital was invaded by a vast influx of migrants who came directly from the countryside or the inland towns.

The most underdeveloped social strata intensified the movement which increased the density of urban space "used" by the inhabitants. This densifying movement particularly affected such districts as Mellassine, Saida Manoubia, Jebel-Lahmar, Sidi-Fathallah, etc., which town planners called "shacktowns" because of the precariousness and insalubrity of their structures.

On the other hand, the migrants, on arriving in the capital, found in these districts neglected and therefore disposable plots of land for their building projects. Some examples: In the "Ennour" district in "Kebaria" some "houses" were built overnight!

In Ariana, in a district humorously called "Neguez" city, migrants and some families dig the foundations at night, build and cover the shacks over with sheets of zinc. In the morning, the families move in!

In a town-planning study which the Ministry of National Economy made in 1972, it is evident that the "predominance of the nation's private sector gives rise to distortions unfavorable to the consistent development of the local network by encouraging the wide scattering of developments and the consequent waste of space.

Speculation also contributes to marginalizing property-wise (if we may use this term) the underprivileged and to driving them into primitive structures in a framework devoid of foundations.

The following table gives a detailed outline of the present situation as well as the social plan for the provision of housing.

Elements	Jebel Lahmar	Saida Manoubia	Mellassine (1st section)
Total area	102 ha	105	57
Number of inhabitants	45,000	37,000	23,500
Number of households	8,180	6,500	3,415
Number of lodgings	4,800	3,800	1,864
Average household monthly income	71 DT	72 DT	49 DT
Portion of income going to lodging	19 %	17 %	18 %
Average number of people per room	5	5	4
Substructure Percentages			
Lots connected to water system	53	30	41
Lots connected to electricity system	67	78	95
Lots connected to sewerage system	41	24	60

The rehabilitation projects for these three districts, which aim at merging these areas with the Tunis urban network, revolves around three axes: equipment in substructure and joint foundations, the improvement of housing conditions and the betterment of the inhabitants socioeconomic situation.

The on-site substructures include automobile and pedestrian road systems, drinkable water, electricity etc, as well as public equipment.

In regard to housing, the three conditions calling for improvement are:
--the reorganization of the land and legal situation of the real estate to allow the occupants access to the property;
--the construction of temporary housing for rehousing with a view to dismantling the shacks and thinning out the existing housing;
--the granting of credits for housing improvement.

The pillars of the socioeconomic promotion project are:

--the creation of new jobs by setting up small industries, the sale of lots for business enterprises, the granting of credits for the circulation of capital, technical assistance and the improvement of existing small workshops;
--the establishment of social services, prenatal and maternity care centers and professional training centers.

The services planned are as follows:

Projects	Jebel Lahmar	Saida Manoubia	Mellassine
New housing	1,000	838	3,000
Schools	1	5	1
Kindergartens	--	--	1
Dispensaries	1	1	1
Markets	1	1	1
Household refuse removal station	--	--	--
Tar-surfaced roads	30,000 m	20,000 m	27,000 m
Drainage	18,700 m	19,000 m	7,000 m
Drinking-water mains	16,400 m	16,000 m	10,000 m
Electricity (cableline)	17,000 m	14,000 m	6,000 m
Public lighting	713 homes	415	150
Improvement of socioeconomic conditions [in Tunisian dinars]	188,000 DT	112,000 DT	354,000 DT

The overall cost of the Jebel Lahmar operation is estimated at 4.738 million DT. For Saida Manoubia and Mellassine (first section) the costs are rising respectively, to 4,562 million and 2.332 million DT.

8370
CSO: 4400

AGRICULTURAL SITUATION REPORT 1979-1980

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 11-12 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] A series of working sessions were held this week with the regional commissioners of agricultural development to study the outcome of the 1979-1980 agricultural campaign, within the framework of the operation undertaken, to determine both its characteristic effects and its weak points, and to prepare for the next campaign. These meetings, which the Ministry of Agriculture cooperating deputy, Mr Moncef Moatamri, chaired, took place at Bizerte for the northwest districts, at Nabeul for the Northeast, at Kaironan for the central districts and at Sfax for the South.

From these meetings it emerged that during the 79-80 campaign almost 110,000 hundredweight of selected seed had been sown, which was an increase of almost 20 percent as compared with the previous campaign. As for the extent of the areas sown, on the other hand, there is a decrease, particularly in the Central district and in the South where the areas sown have gone from 1.776 million hectares (78-79) to 1.59 million hectares, or a 23 percent decrease. Weather conditions were mainly responsible for this decrease. On the other hand, the various campaigns went off quite well. The agents were pleased to note that there was no report of any lack of fertilizer or seed supply and that the farmers are becoming more responsive to the use of selected seed of which the tonnage used has shown an actual increase. With regard to field cleaning, achievements in this area have far exceeded expectations as 186,000 hectares have been cleaned as against 106,000 hectares for the past year.

Regarding the mechanization problem, Mr Moatamri has informed the regional commissioners of the recent decisions which the Ministry of Agriculture has made to promote the use of agricultural machinery. These decisions essentially relate to the decentralization of the SONAM [National Society of Mechanical Farming] operation. As a first step, four of this society's agencies (Jendauba, Za-Zaghouan, Beja and Siliana) will be granted their independent management.

With regard to farm credits, the commissions explained the problems which the farmers met in obtaining these credits. On this occasion, Mr Moatamri

told the commissioners about the minister of agriculture's decisions to encourage small and average farmers in particular and to have them agree to the credits which constitute the most important factor for achieving food self-sufficiency.

Therefore, in the first phase, he has decided to establish mutual farm security companies at the delegation level. These companies will make access to farm credits easy for the farmers. In the final phase, they will generalize the establishment of these companies.

Considering the encouraging results recorded during the 79-80 agricultural campaign regarding the development of screened farming and the part which this operation can play in improving production and in job creation, in accordance with the prime minister's instructions, it was decided to change the initially planned 180-hectare area of screened farmland to 250 hectares.

Also, within the framework of opening up agricultural training centers to farmers in their respective regions, beginning with the next campaign, students will have continual contact with the farmers. They will work right on these producers' lands and will meet these latter in their centers where the teachers will hold briefing and practical work sessions with them. This procedure, which is conducive to making the agricultural training centers truly influential centers in their regions, corroborates the success of this 7- and 8-year experiment.

On the administrative level, the next campaign will indicate the starting point of the radical reform which the Ministry of Agriculture has undertaken, namely, the extension of local government. Beginning next January, the regional commissioner will have the power which will allow him to administer budget items I and II. FOSDA [Special Agricultural Credit Fund] credit has already been entirely decentralized. The various departments will necessarily send accounts to the CKMA [CRMA] Regional Agricultural Mutual Fund] in order to entrust them with certain prerogatives rightfully theirs. The ministry staff will thus be able to visit the country's heartland more frequently.

8870
CSO: 4400

PETROLEUM SITUATION REPORT 1979-1980

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 14 Aug 80 p 6

[Text] Tunisia, a moderate producer with 5.4 million tons in 1979 and an expectation of 6 million in 1980, covers its petroleum invoice for the most part thanks to exports.

As our crude oil contains very little sulphur, its quality is excellent. Moreover, we export the bulk of our products (around 95 percent) at the price of $30 to $35 a barrel (early in 1980) and we are now importing for our own consumption. The petroleum returns in 1979 went up to 250 million dinars and should reach 325 million in 1980.

Domestic consumption (2.5 million tons in 1979) shows a yearly 12 percent increase; development needs explain this very high rate. Now, the production output of the two main deposits has reached its ceiling with 2.8 million tons per year for El-Borma and 2.3 million tons for Achtart, not to mention that beginning in 1985 oil drilling is to drop and reserves depleted in the 1990s. This is putting things at their worst. However, some 30 international companies are conducting research. They have planned to invest 42 million dinars in it in 1980 as against 38 million in 1978.

Up to now, they have discovered only six small deposits (with an average of 200,000 tons each year): three in the South (in Medenine and Kasserine) and three offshore near Hammamet, Sousse and Sfax. But in the opinion of a representative of a foreign company established in Tunisia, that goes to prove that "the Tunisian mining area has not yet said its last word." On the other hand, a court settlement with Libya on the boundary of the continental shelf in the Gulf of Gabes (now before The Hague International Court of Justice) may grant Tunisia full right to explore the Isis deposits (1 million tons a year).

Another significant point in petroleum policy: the expansion of the Bizerte refinery, the only one we have in Tunisia. ABandoned time and again, the project, whose works could get underway around the end of 1980, is to have a yearly refining capacity of 1.5 to 4 million tons.

8870
CSO: 4400

ENGINEERS DEVELOPING SOLAR ENERGY TECHNOLOGY WITHIN COUNTRY

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 15 Aug 80 p 12

[Article by Hassen Chaari]

[Text] With regard to Tunisia, the solar energy supplied us is considerable, varying from 6,057 calories per cm^2 to 19,870, according to the month and the area.

Tunisia's climatic conditions are favorable for the exploitation of this energy resource. In fact, we enjoy sunshine for almost 3,000 hours a year, between 147 and 377 hours a month according to the month and the area, or still an average of between 5 and 12 hours a day.

The inexhaustible energy source is supplied to us regularly and especially generously. All we need would be to have a collecting surface area large enough to have the appropriate watts for heating the sanitary water, the housing and the air conditioning.

Solar energy can significantly help improve the quality of life for millions of Tunisians living in rural villages. The use of this energy is indispensable in Tunisia for two main reasons:

1. Our country must face the expenses involved in the rapid rise in the price of oil used to produce energy in urban areas.

2. Because of the lack of energy, forests have been decimated to get wood to burn. This results in erosion and at times in the abandonment of the land.

The Tunis National School of Engineers (ENIT) has been trying for some years now to adjust Tunisian solar cells to higher efficiency by directly changing solar energy into electricity and by means of parabolic pick-ups to obtain higher temperature by thermal route. On its part, STEC [expansion unknown] has only recently been marketing small solar stations for the production of hot sanitary water. Moreover, some private organizations have been established to manufacture 100 percent Tunisian pick-ups with an integration quota of a large amount of local materials.

In the agricultural area, they have initiated the establishment of solar pumps powered by solar cells in the Tunisian south. These pumps are used to drain the water necessary for consumption and irrigation.

Tomorrow's energy--solar rays--is now ready for use. On several levels, its techniques are perfect. If the costs are still high in Tunisia, it is because the succession of steps has not yet been reached.

There are 3 million solar water heaters in Japan, 400,000 in Israel and 50,000 in France....

This energy--a new frontier which has no enemies--kindles hopes and enthusiasm. It can be a momentous joint adventure for Tunisia, for other developing countries and even for the Western peoples.

8870
CSO: 4400

COLONEL HABIB AMMAR INSTALLED AS NEW COMMANDER OF SAHARA BRIGADE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 6 Aug 80 p 4

[Unsigned article: "Border Troops Symbolize Militancy and Vigilance"]

[Text] The Sahara Brigade, which stands at the desert's edge as a bastion of Bourguiba's doctrines and which guards the integrity of the national territory, experienced its hour of militancy and vigilance yesterday during the visit to Remada of Mr Slaheddine Baly, Minister of National Defense, who came to install the new brigade commander. After a three-hour flight by military helicopter, he arrived in Remada with General Abdelhamid Ech-Chikh, Army Chief of Staff, and a number of senior officers. He was greeted by local cadres led by Mr Salah Bhouri, governor of Medenine, and Mr Hedi Cherab, secretary general of the Coordinating Committee.

Mr Baly first went to the Monument of the Martyrs where he placed a floral wreath and said the Fatiha in memory of the heroes felled on the battle-field during the battles of Remada. Then the minister went to brigade headquarters where he proceeded to install Col Ammar in his new functions as brigade commander replacing Col Abou Bakr Ben Kraiem who has been called to other duties.

In his closing address to officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, Mr Baly emphasized the privileged character of the mission which befalls border posts.

He declared that "at each visit to this militant region whose sons, at the time of liberation struggles, wove solid bonds of affection with the Supreme Commander, we experience admiration and gratitude for border troops conscientiously and devotedly guarding the integrity of the nation."

He added:

"Led by valorous officers trained in Tunisian and foreign military schools, the border zones form the shield of the state and the guardians of the people. All those who reside there, be they military or civilian, must be imbued with the principles of the Bourguiba doctrine, and must harbor patriotic and civic sentiments. In these regions, vigilance is essential, and it must be constant, able to detect and destroy any domestic or foreign attempt to tamper with the nation's gains. Since particularly strategic regions are involved, the importance of the soldiers' mission is thereby increased."

The minister further stated that in addition to its defense and protection role, the army must perform a task at another level. It must contribute to the development of these distant and arid zones in order to establish nuclei of civilization and to settle populations. The symbol of the state's sovereignty resides in that tenacity which mankind possesses in creating resources where nature's harshness and climate make sedentary settlement difficult.

In this connection Mr Baly praised the results obtained in Borj El Khadhra and Borj Bourguiba where urban, economic, and cultural development is beginning to gain a foothold.

He emphasized that "the presence of the army and citizenry in the most remote areas of the republic is testimony to our determination to defend and maintain the integrity of every parcel of our national territory."

He continued, saying that "these are certainly disadvantaged areas where life is particularly difficult, but is not the guiding spirit of the Bourguiba doctrine, to have always been able to derive the most from the least, and to have expanded potential and created wealth thanks to effort and gray matter?"

The minister of defense also paid tribute to the brigade and thanked Col Ben Krajem and his collaborators for the quality of their achievement. He pointed out the dynamism and earnestness of Col Ammar, the brigade's new commander, and stated his conviction that the new commander, like his predecessor, will succeed in working harmoniously with regional authorities toward developing and protecting the Sahara.

Mr Baly and the senior officers accompanying him then went by helicopter to Hosr Ghilane and to Garaat Boutnija, 200 km from Gabes, where the minister inspected the projects of the National Service which is carrying out a program of 50 dwellings, a mosque, a market, a dispensary, and a primary school. The local population, struggling with exemplary courage to improve the resources of a palm plantation recently established under the rural development program and which provides these people's subsistence, greeted Mr Baly warmly and gave him a message of support for

President Bourguiba. On his part, the minister transmitted the greetings of the Chief of State:

"The Supreme Commander asked me to tell you that he thinks of you and truly appreciates the value of the mission you are performing, you who are mourabitines bravely struggling against nature's harshness to create progress. We know your life is hard and that you lack means. The army is there to assist and aid you, as its means allow, to improve your existence. The essential thing is your conviction that the Bourguiba regime is determined to make it possible for every Tunisian everywhere to enjoy decent living conditions. What the state expects from you is your vigilance, as well as your alertness to the least bit of information likely to strengthen the security of the Tunisian people, and to aid the army in performing its role efficiently and seriously."

Mr Baly returned to the capital at the end of the afternoon after a marathon trip of more than 10 hours in the Tunisian south.

11,023
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

EXCLUDED FROM DESTOURIAN PARTY -- The Executive Committee of the Destourian Socialist Party [PSD] has issued the following announcement: "The Supreme Fighter, President Habib Bourguiba, president of the PSD, has decided to exclude Ameur Ben Aicha from the party because he exploited his position within the party to interfere in judicial matters. Signed: Mongi Kooli, director of the PSD." [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 9 Aug 80 p 1] 8463

PSD POLITICAL COMMITTEE ACTIONS -- The Political Committee of the PSD met Thursday at 2100 hours, under the chairmanship of Mr Mohamed Mzali, secretary general of the party and prime minister. During this meeting, the Political Committee ratified the list of candidates for the partial municipal elections, to be held on 17 August 1980 in the districts of Ez-Zahra, Bou Arkoub and Sidi El Bechir, as well as in the second and third municipal districts of Ben Arous. In addition, the Political Committee decided to suspend Hamadi Mustapha Toumi, president of the Destourian cell of Utique Nouvelle, from all activities within the party and to bring him before the Disciplinary Committee of the PSD, for having embezzled public funds. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 9 Aug 80 p 1] 8463

NATIONAL DEFENSE MINISTRY COMMUNIQUE -- The Ministry of National Defense notifies the young conscripts who were recently mobilized and who are serving in the 2nd regiment at Beja and posted to the 13th motorized infantry battalion at Ain Draham, that regular vaccinations will take place on Saturday, 9 and Sunday, 10 August. Consequently, parents are requested not to visit them during these 2 days. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 9 Aug 80 p 5] 8463

CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

NATIONAL GASOLINE COMPANY--The UAE is to set up a national company to sell petrol in the Emirates. At present sales are controlled by three foreign firms. The cabinet took the decision in principle yesterday and asked the Oil Ministry to make final studies on establishing the company. Earlier this year the government had to step in with massive subsidies for petrol prices. The three foreign firms, Shell, Caltex and British Petroleum, had raised them by 30 percent, sparking street protests. The UAE has to import most of its petrol because of a lack of refineries. [Text] [GF021235 Manama GULF DAILY NEWS in English 2 Sep 80 p 5]

CSO: 4820

END

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23 September 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2186

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23 September 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2186

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DEPORTED WEST BANK MAYORS INTERVIEWED ON U.S., EUROPEAN TOUR

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 2 Jul 80 p 19

[Interview with Fahd al-Qawasimah, Hebron Mayor, and Muhammad Mulhim, Halhul Mayor, by 'Adnan Nasrawin; "Fahd al-Qawasimah to AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM: Our Mission In Paris Has Been Very Successful; 40,000 Palestinians Have Entered Jail Since 1967"]

[Text] Paris--Fahd al-Qawasimah, the mayor of Habron, and Muhammad Mulhim, the mayor of Halhul, who were deported from the occupied West Bank last week have visited Paris within a tour they are making in the European countries and the United States.

AL-RA'Y AL-AMM has had this interview with al-Qawasimah and Mulhim during their stay in Paris:

[Question] What is the purpose of your tour in the international capitals?

[Answer] Al-Qawasimah: We have visited so far the United States, Britain, the Netherlands and Switzerland and we will continue our tour to Vienna to meet with Austrian Chancellor Kreisky. The aim of our tour is to ask the officials of these countries to exert pressure on the Israeli government to repatriate us and also to familiarize the world public opinion with the actual conditions of oppression to which the Arab citizens in the occupied terrorists are subjected by the Israeli military rule authorities.

I must point out here that our visit to Paris has been very successful, that we have met with the head of the Middle East Bureau in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and have assured him that all the citizens in the occupied Arab territories stress the need for France's recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the need for France to play an effective role in realizing just and comprehensive peace for the area. We have also impressed upon the French official the need for France to perform its role with the Israeli government to repatriate us.

We have met during our visit to Paris with Francois (Mitterrand), the chairman of the French Socialist Party; Georges (Marchais), the chairman of the French Communist Party; and (Couv de Mourphille), a Gaullist leader and the chairman of the French Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. They have all expressed their full sympathy for the cause of the Palestinian people who are demanding the restoration of their legitimate rights to their homeland.

Muhammad Mulhim: We have come to Paris, as my colleague Fahd al-Qawasimah has said, to meet with the French officials. But at the same time, we have come to address the French public opinion through its press. The fact is that the French public opinion has begun to respond to the Palestinian right. We are prepared to come back at any time our French friends invite us so as to tell and reveal to them the enormity of the conditions in which the Palestinian people live under the Zionist occupation.

[Question] What is the position of the mayors of the Bank and of the Strip toward the PLO?

[Answer] Al-Qawasimah: It must be noted first that the number of mayors in the occupied West Bank is 24 mayors and that there are four municipalities in the Gaza Strip. I say with utter strength and firmness that all the Palestinian people under occupation support the PLO which we consider our sole legitimate representative. We have proven this more than once when we had official documents signed by all the official establishments, associations, unions, chambers of commerce and other organizations functioning officially in the occupied territories and then had the documents transmitted to the United Nations. We also conveyed the documents to the consuls present in Jerusalem, including the French consul who, I believe, was a sincere human being who did actually transmit the documents to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. You will find that these documents are signed by me, by my colleague Muhammad Mulhim and by all the mayors in the Bank and the Strip.

[Question] What is the status and what are the activities of the Palestinian National Front in the occupied Arab territories?

[Answer] Muhammad Mulhim: When al-Sadat launched his evil initiative by visiting Israel--an initiative which later led to the Camp David negotiations and the proposed self-rule--the official organizations and national personalities in the occupied Arab territories rallied to call for holding national conferences. One of those conferences was the Jerusalem conference which declared openly its rejection of Camp David and of self-rule and its adherence to the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and to setting up their independent Palestinian state. In all honesty, all the municipal and village councils, unions, chambers of commerce and religious establishments were represented in this conference from which emanated the

National Guidance Committee to follow up the conference resolution on mobilizing the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories in order to attain their national goals. This committee has considered itself an arm of the PLO and not an alternative to it, as is evident in all of the committee's actions up to this moment. I and Al-Qawasimah have been members of this committee. All the committee's actions and resolutions have been public and have been heard in all the world, thus leaving no place for doubt as to the aspiration of our people in the occupied territories to realize their goals.

[Question] Why were you deported from the occupied territories to Lebanon?

[Answer] Muhammad Mulhim: We were not consulted on the matter. Had we been consulted, we would have chosen to stay in our homeland. Moreover, if all the Palestinians in Lebanon were consulted, they would choose to return to their homeland, even if given Lebanon, Syria and the entire Arab homeland. There is nothing sweeter to their hearts than the day of their repatriation. We will acknowledge with gratitude and forever the good deed of all the Arab brothers who have received us and supported us in our tragedy outside the homeland.

[Question] Can you tell us about the arrest and intimidation campaigns to which the Arab citizens in the occupied Arab territories are subjected? And what is the purpose of your deportation?

[Answer] Al-Qawasimah: The number of detainees incarcerated in Israeli prisons at present is more than 5,000 Palestinians and Arabs because there are prisoners from Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and other countries--prisoners who have fought alongside the Palestinian people and have been arrested.

As for the number of people who have entered the Israeli prison since 1967, this number exceeds 40,000 Palestinians--i.e. more than 10 percent of the forces qualified [sic] to enter prison. The rest are on their way.

As for the purpose behind our deportation, it means deportation or intimidation of all the national elements. However, I want to stress that even if only a single Palestinian remains in the occupied Arab territories he will continue to struggle until he achieves his rights to self-determination and to setting up a Palestinian state. They are wrong if they think that they will devoid the land of its national elements by deporting two mayors. We learn patriotism from our children and I will tell you this story which confirms what I am saying: In one of the demonstrations staged in Hebron, the picture of my 15-year old daughter was taken while she was hurling stones at the occupation troops. The picture was taken by the Israeli intelligence. The military ruler confronted me a few days later with the picture and I told him: This is all our people, not only my daughter,

stoning the occupation soldiers. When I returned home, I asked my daughter about the picture, just to make sure: Is it true that you hurled stones at the soldiers? I did not want to punish her. However, she did not give me a decisive answer and then she went to her mother and told her verbatim: If my father fears for his position as the mayor, then I don't want him to come to bail me when I get jailed. Believe me that I went to apoligize to my daughter when my wife told me of this because it is not what I had meant. This is the reality of our Palestinian people with all their factions in the occupied Arab territories.

8494
CSO: 4802

DETAILS OF LATEST PALESTINIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS BARED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 18 Jun 80 p 10

/Article: "AL-WATAN Exclusively Publishes Verbatim Text of the Palestinian National Congress Meeting"/

/Text/ AL-WATAN has obtained the verbatim text of the Palestinian National Congress meeting held in Damascus on the evening of 7 June 1980 from high level Palestinian leadership sources. AL-WATAN is anxious to avoid mentioning some of the special secret resolutions bearing on military aspects, lest the revolution's adversaries and enemies benefit from them. Here is the text:

At the beginning of the session, agreement was given to the following agenda:

The activity of the Executive Committee, which will be broken down into:

A. The visit to India. B. The Tripoli meeting of the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front. C. The meeting of the Islamic state foreign ministers in Islamabad. D. The visit to Amman. E. The National Congress delegation visit to Europe.

The situation in the occupied territories.

The situation in Lebanon.

The 15th session of the National Congress.

Analysis and general discussion of political conditions in the region and the world.

Miscellaneous

1. Popular organizations in the Libyan jamahiriyah.

2. The detentions in Jordan.

'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu Mayzar spoke, stating: "India's visit to the organization delegation came after Indian recognition of us, and the visit concerned various levels--the minister of foreign affairs, the prime minister, and other officials. One can summarize the Indian position on international and Arab issues as follows:

"India's position as regards Afghanistan is concentrated on concern for relations with the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, and they said 'We cannot participate in the American game, since the issue must be dealt with by another method, a sound friendly method.' As far as the Palestine cause goes, India's position fully supported the national rights of the Palestinian people and agreed on the formation of a committee of cooperation in more than one cultural and non-cultural field."

He went on, "The committee held its first meeting directly after the visit. Representing the organization was Dr Sidqi al-Dajani, and the visit really was distinguished from the ordinary by two issues concerning India, which affect the Indian position on the subject:

"1. Yasir 'Arafat eliminated a great obstacle in Indira Gandhi's way when he managed to convince a prominent Islamic leader in India to desist from his enmity toward Indira and stop making attacks against her and defaming her.

"2. The economic situation. Regarding this point, 'Arafat got in touch with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf and guaranteed India's oil requirements at reasonable prices; in exchange for this, there is this positive Indian position regarding the Liberation Organization."

Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani then spoke about the visit to India, stating "We discussed the situation in Lebanon and Afghanistan, the Islamic conference, nonalignment, the occupied territories, economic cooperation between India and the Arabs and the third world, and cultural cooperation. The most important thing achieved in India was the oil question, as our brother Abu Hayzar said."

Muhsin Abu Mayzar: Let us now move on to the second point, which is the Steadfastness and Perseverance Front.

Abu 'Ammar: At the front meeting, al-Qadhdhafi stated that he had no relationship with the revolutionary committees and that he would hold anyone bearing responsibility for this activity to account. However, we were again surprised when al-Qadhdhafi asked 200 teachers to give their agreement to the political committees or be banished.

The FATH Conference

Abu 'Ammar: The fact that the conference had not been held for 9 years was due to the difficult circumstances of the revolution, which you well

know, and the diminution of the conference, since there are about 200 staff members who were prevented from attending because of circumstances outside our will. In brief, the atmosphere was democratic, issues were presented unhesitantly, from Abu al-Sa'id's activities to the military activities, and I recognize that there was supposed to have been guided democracy and not negligent democracy. The resolutions and the political program were issued, and what was authorized was the text issued in FALASTIN AL-THAWRAH. What was issued in the newspaper AL-LIWA' was not carefully edited. The resolutions of the National Congress complemented FATH's premises and did not conflict with what was issued up to the third congress.

He said, "The bylaws have been modified on behalf of the powers of the Revolutionary Council, oversight, periodic meetings and so forth. Agreement has been reached on the attendance of six observers from popular organizations to attend congress meetings. I have been appointed a general commander of the congress and for the first time 76 countries attended our conference and we stressed that our national unity is our national demand."

Muhsin Abu Mayzar made a statement of appreciation for FATH and the resolutions issued by it in the name of the Central Congress.

Abu Salih: Abu 'Ammar was the one who did the most to make conference succeed and honor various opinions, which is a characteristic for which he has always been noted.

On the Islamic Conference

Muhsin: The conference went beyond the cause, and everything going on in the area. We have made efforts to rectify the situation as far as our cause goes and we achieved some success, especially on Jerusalem, the occupied territories and the refusal to turn the organization of the Islamic Conference into a pulpit for the United States of America. Through our participation in the committees, we had influence on a large number of conference members, since everything was mobilized against Afghanistan on America's behalf.

We had reservations on the drafts of some resolutions, and Abu 'Ammar's visit to India had a negative effect on Zia-ol-Haqq, which was reflected in the conference.

Concerning the delegation of the Palestinian National Council to Europe (Khalid al-Hasan was absent from the session), discussion of this subject was postponed.

Emphasis was placed on not talking about political matters, and non-political ones, outside the Palestine National Congress resolutions.

2. Agreement was reached to hand the subject of the European delegation and the statements issued on that over to the Executive Committee.

3. While it was necessary to refer to this in the Central Council statement, the statement issued did not refer to the issue in any clause or word.

The Situation in the Occupied Territories

Abu 'Ammar: We talk a great deal and we do little as regards the occupied territories. We have received $76 million and have not been able to send that to our people. There are Arab countries which have not yet sent their commitments. As far as the situation in Lebanon goes, that is costing us a lot, especially the military aspect.

Bahjat Abu Gharibah (Abu Sami): There is a liquidation coming, not a settlement. The enemy is working with great speed to empty the occupied territories of Arab people. As far as what is being said about international support and international resolutions, they have a positive character but there is no road but the military solution. The Liberation Organization must be convinced, first, and the Arab countries second, of this matter.

Abu Riyad: There is a conspiracy,not a settlement. The attempts underway either by Europe or some Arab countries (which he named) do not go beyond the status of an operation to save Camp David. There is much evidence and also some people are acting as if the Palestine cause was a commodity they could deal in. Examples of that are what an Arab official stated, and his declaration "I can line up the Palestinians." Therefore one must stress and emphasize that no one whoever except the Liberation Organization may talk for the Palestinian people.

Regarding the situation in the Kingdom of Jordan, the stage is serious and the coming period will be the occasion for the crystallization of a plan which will constitute the common denominator for a Jordanian-Palestinian formula.

The secretary general of the Jordanian Communist Party, Fa'iq Warrad: I support the viewpoint of Bahjat Abu Gharibah; we cannot achieve any progress worth mentioning without confrontation.

Abu Hatim talked about the Aid Agency and said, "I recommend that the Arab countries and the Liberation Organization make the agency's payments, to eliminate this agency's dominance over the Palestinian people.

Abu 'Ammar: I object, because that means abandonment by other countries, especially the foreign ones, of support and aid for the cause.

Farhan Abu al-Hayja: We always make disorganized reactions which fall short of what is desired. We receive aid from Arab countries but we must not forget the masses. We have relied on the Arab People's Conference, though realizing that Arab action should be developed. Our activity must not be restricted to the official aspect--rather, our presence must be consecrated on the popular level.

Taysir Qab'ah: We must break out of the circle of illusions. We must be clear. It is necessary to stress national unity first and effective dynamic action secondly.

Abu Salih: We have an inflation in support from the world public opinion and a deficit in the Arab context. France's position, for example, is ahead of that of an Arab country concerned (he named it), and al-Sadat has wasted all the resources of the Arab nation, but al-Sadat is not alone. There are America's other Arabs. We have been flexible to the point where flexibility has become a burden on us, including the outbreak of disputes among us; we have been described as capitulationists, and the goal was to transfer the struggle within us. We are on the side of the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front and it is on our side, by virtue of interests, and we must cooperate in accordance with these interests in favor of the Arab situation. What is going on in Lebanon is an Arab act. There is the likelihood that "Begin" will resort to a military decision and the occupation of southern Lebanon if he comes to a dilemma. We must call a spade a spade and start with ourselves first. As far as the National Congress goes, we must be oriented toward a national unity in front form and if this occurs, the Palestinians will be able to provide half their budget domestically. We must produce political clarity. No one will respect us if we do not threaten America's interests in the region, since in either case the plot and the attack rising against us are continuing. That is, in spite of flexibility, why don't we use force, on grounds that force is the way toward a just peace, not diplomacy? There is no peace and the settlement which is being proposed is a clear process of capitulation.

Abu Salih continued: Attaining a Palestinian state, even on a square inch of land, will require force and many long years of struggle.

Ahmad Sidqi al-Dajani talked about the future format for Arab action, the international situation, and the Zionist entity. He said, "The Palestinian leadership is considered by the international picture to be the most mature leadership and we have been told more than once on more than one occasion, 'You are the stronger for your maturity.'

"I am in favor of what our brothers said with precision on the need to draw up boundaries for our policies, but we must preserve this course, I mean political activity during the past years, and not content ourselves with slogans which are 30 years old. We are not proceeding toward the mirage of 'settlement'--examples of that are why is there a dispute between the United States and Europeans, why is there a dispute between China and the Soviet Union? There is the Arab card, the security of Europe is linked to the security of the area, and there are the Soviets and nonalignment. Europe is influenced by India's position. Since 1974 we have been in the international context, and diplomatic relations influence and are reflected on us positively. For 5 years the European position has been evolving and has come around to support the rights of the Palestinian

people, and America is boycotting the European countries. There is a danger in this role and we must repel it, on grounds that America has monopolized dealings with the situation in the region since 1977 and wants to continue doing so."

At the end of the meeting, agreement was reached on:

Holding the National Congress in the early part of the middle of next month.

Meeting the secretary generals (Saturday 14 June in the capital of Syria).

Preparatory meetings to guarantee the success of the session of the Palestine National Congress, especially as regards the issue of national unity.

11887
CSO: 4802

AL-FAHUM DISCUSSES PALESTINIAN MEETINGS, EUROPEAN INITIATIVE

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 29 Jun 80 p 17

[Interview with Khalid al-Fahum, Chairman of Palestinian National Council, by Khalil al-Taqi: "Council's Forthcoming Session Will be Palestinian National Unity Session; Greater Powers for PLO Council and Unionist Measures for Resistance Factions"]

[Text] Damascus--In the wake of its latest meeting in Damascus, the Palestinian Central Council--which includes the Palestinian resistance movement leaders--decided that the 15th session of the Palestinian National Council will be held in Damascus on the 31st of next August. Political observers consider this session one of the most important sessions in view of the serious issues that it will discuss on the one hand and of the serious phase through which the Palestinian issue and the Arab nation are passing on the other hand.

It has become certain that a mini-committee representing the top-level Palestinian leaderships will meet at the beginning of the coming month of July to discuss the new developments concerning the Palestinian issue and to draw up a draft political statement to be presented to the next session of the National Council as a fundamental working paper for discussing and tackling the current issues, the new developments and the firm and principled positions of the PLO.

In an interview with AL-QABAS, Khalid al-Fahum, the Palestinian National Council chairman, has said that the forthcoming 15th session of the council will be one of the most important meetings and "I believe optimistically that it will be the session of Palestinian national unification because I hope that it will implement the organizational program approved by the 14th session and providing for the formation of a new executive committee in which all the resistance movement factions are represented. I also hope that the National Council will approve a proposal to strengthen the PLO Central Council and to give it more powers to enable it to perform its full role as a responsible leadership body in the organization."

Al-Fahum has also expressed the hope that the National Council will realize in its 15th session "the establishment of more Palestinian unionist organizations, especially in the military field, in addition to the organizations already set up in accordance with the resolutions and recommendations of the Palestinian National Council's 14th session which was held in Damascus at the beginning of 1979." Al-Fahum has added that he hopes that the Executive Committee which will be elected by the National Council will be able to exercise its work as a collective leadership capable of shouldering the responsibilities of action at all the levels of struggle.

Al-Fahum has also reviewed the most important issues which will be discussed by the 15th session of the Palestinian National Council and has said that they are embodied in:

A. The unified Palestinian position vis-a-vis the European movement or any international movement that may produce a new cover for the camp's [Camp David] agreements.

B. Strengthening and bolstering the relationship of fateful struggle with the pan-Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front on the basis of bolstering and developing its agencies and its methods of work.

C. Relations with the Arab countries according to their positions vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue and toward the international movements concerning the issue.

D. The explosive situation inside the occupied homeland.

E. The conditions prevalent on the Lebanese arena.

Al-Fahun has also said that he believes that the council will emerge with a unified Palestinian position on all these issues.

Meetings of Palestinian Leaderships

The Palestinian National Council chairman has also discussed the outcome of the meetings held by the Palestinian leaderships in the past few weeks, saying: "These leaderships have held recently a number of meetings, the most important being the meeting held by the Central Council in Damascus at the beginning of this month. This meeting discussed a number of new developments concerning the Palestinian issue inside the occupied homeland and on both the Arab and international arenas. The meeting also discussed the convocation of the 15th session of the Palestinian National Council to achieve national unity and the importance of realizing unionist steps among the resistance movement factions in the military, financial and political spheres."

In this respect, the Central Council has decided to form a mini-committee including the chairman of the National Council and of the Executive Committee, the general secretaries of all the resistance movement factions and four members of the Central Council to be entrusted with making serious preparations for convocation of the 15th session of the Palestinian National Council. This committee did actually meet in the middle of June and it discussed all the political developments pertaining to the Palestinian issue, especially in the military and financial spheres, and decided on two important things:

1. Set the date for convocation of the 15th session of the Palestinian National Council as the first of next August in Damascus.

2. Form a mini-committee comprised of the chairman of the Executive Committee and of two committee members, the National Council chairman and the general secretaries of the resistance movement factions to discuss the new developments pertaining to the Palestinian issue according to the following bases:

A. Putting stress on ratification of the political and organizational programs approved by the 14th session of the Palestinian National Council.

B. Drawing up the fundamental broad lines of the political statement which will be presented to the next session of the Palestinian National Council and will deal with all the current issues.

C. Formulating practical visualizations for real unionist steps in all the spheres--steps liable to be developed to the maximum.

D. Formulating steps for military unity among the resistance movement factions and for controlling the violations so as to confront the danger present on the Lebanese arena.

E. Re-forming the Executive Committee in a manner that enables it to shoulder the responsibilities and to make the independent Palestinian decision through rallying the active organizations and forces behind it.

F. Studying development and expansion of the PLO Central Council.

Relations With Syria

Discussing the Syrian-Palestinian relations, al-Fahum has said:

The Syrian and Palestinian views are in agreement on the need to reassess fundamentally the strategy of the Arab action to confront the Zionist-U.S. plot that is aimed against the Arab nation and its central issue, namely the Palestinian issue. Through an evaluation of the situation with the

brothers in the Syrian leadership, there has been full agreement that the movements taking place for the realization of a political settlement in the area under the canopy of the imbalance between the Arabs on one hand and Zionism and imperialism on the other will lead to further concessions in favor of the enemy. Therefore, the need arises to reassess all the policies for confronting this situation in a manner that will guarantee creation of all the conditions that lead to enabling the Arab nation to regain its rights and defend its entity.

European Position

Al-Fahun added:

Within the framework of the study conducted with the officials in the Arab Syria on the situation in the area, the communique issued by the European summit was studied and analyzed in detail. As a result, the Palestinian and Syrian leaderships have become aware of the negative aspects of this communique. Ultimately, the communique has come as an attempt to beautify the Camp David accords and to lure some Arab countries. The communique also constitutes an outflanking of the Arab position in order to facilitate the success of the Egyptian-Israeli-U.S. negotiations. Consequently, the sum total of the principles and ideas contained in the communique--especially its reliance on resolution 242 which is rejected by the Arab nation that does not consider this resolution fit for the establishment of a just, lasting and comprehensive peace--has brought nothing new to the contents of the two Camp David accords, especially in regard to the firm national rights of the Arab Palestinian people and particularly their right to repatriation and to building their independent state of their liberated national soil. These rights have been recognized by the international community as firm and inalienable rights that can be subject to no prior condition. Moreover, the European communique has not recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Arab Palestinian people. While acknowledging Israel's right to security and survival, the communique has given the Palestinian people conflicting and ambiguous words, using the Camp David language, especially in the phrases concerning the right to self-determination. The statement links the self-determination to appropriate measures within the framework of a comprehensive settlement and this is something that devoids it of its meaning and gives Israel the right to accept or reject whatever pertains to this right of slef-determination. Moreover, the European summit communique has excluded Jerusalem from the framework of the occupied Arab territories and has considered it a separate and negotiable issue and this arouses suspicions over the position of the European group countries toward the Arabism of Jerusalem. Moreover, the European communique has linked withdrawal and its concept to the instrument, method and course imposed by the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, and this is something that the Arab nation rejects. Thus, the European communique has come in evident response to the U.S. pressures and in line with the U.S. Middle East strategy.

Egyptian-U.S. Coordination

In his discussion of the European position, al-Fahum added:

The issue of the European movement has preoccupied the minds of many Arab officials but the Venice communique has been disappointing. The Palestinian officials have expressed our position toward this initiative.

We believe, and our brothers and friends share our opinion, that no European, African, Asian or international movement can be accepted unless it is based clearly and frankly on two fundamental points: First, recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of our people and recognition of the firm national rights of the Palestinian people, namely their right to repatriation, to self-determination and to establishing their national state over the liberated Palestinian soil. Second, rejection and frustration of the Camp David policy because it doesn't represent the right path toward just, comprehensive and real peace.

Al-Fahun also said: It has now become indubitably clear and evident that the military coordination between the United States and al-Sadat's regime against the aspirations and hopes of the Arab Egyptian people and of their national forces is coupled with another and more evident kind of coordination because the United States and Israel to impose the U.S. imperialist domination over the Middle East area and to control our national resources now that the energy crisis has intensified and become a matter of live or death for the west. This coordination between the United States, al-Sadat and Israel is also aimed at containing the area and at putting an end to the Arab liberation movement so that they may control the entire Arab homeland.

Conditions of Occupied Territories

Speaking about the conditions in the occupied homeland, al-Fahun said:

Our people in the occupied homeland are the ones who have foiled the self-rule plot. They have foiled it despite the enticement and intimidation campaigns to which they have been subjected by the racist Zionist occupation authorities, by al-Sadat's intelligence agencies and by the U.S. Central Intelligence. Not a single Palestinian has agreed to take part in the self-rule plot. Therefore, I am not exaggerating when I say that the steadfastness of our kinsmen in the occupied territories and the fully evident coordination and cooperation between the Arab Syria and the PLO have helped our kinsmen in the occupied territories to bolster their steadfast position, to carry on with their confrontation to continue to endure and to inflict defeat on all the forces of evil and aggression.

The stance of the Arab countries rejecting the policy of capitulation which the Camp David parties are trying to impose--this stance has had a clear impact on bolstering the steadfastness of our kinsmen in the occupied homeland and on raising their morale. However, the positions of these Arab countries should be developed. I hope that the Arab reactions to what our people are being subjected to will be of a more practical nature than the words of sympathy that we hear now, especially since foiling the self-rule plot is an indivisible part of the pan-Arab struggle because liquidation of the Palestinian cause means Zionist control of the Arab nation's destinies.

Concluding the interview, al-Fahun said;

The steadfastness of our people in the occupied homeland and supporting the PLO are tantamount to defending the Arab struggle generally. This is why we find that the racist Zionist enemy has intensified his ferocity and violence with the aim of imposing its control on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and why this enemy has resorted to the maximum degrees of organized terror through the deportation and assassination of the Palestinian national leaderships with the aim of devoiding the Palestinian land of its Arab inhabitants so that he may annex and incorporate it and may leap from it to size the neighboring Arab terrorists.

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LATEST CRIMES, SCANDALS IN ISRAEL DESCRIBED

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 23 Jun 80 p 18

/Article: Letter from Amman: AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM talks with Abu Jihad: We Will Compel Israel To Stay in a State of Permanent Alert"/

/Text/ At midnight, AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM recorded an important, intense conversation with one of the most conspicuous leaders of the Palestinian revolution, our brother Khalil al-Waz'r, Abu Jihad, member of the Central Committee of the FATH movement.

By virtue of the responsible position the well known fighting commander Abu Jihad occupies, the discussion concentrated on Palestinian military activity within the occupied territories.

In his talk, the Palestian official also dealt with an analysis and evaluation of the exploding situation in the occupied territories, and the relationship between the Palestinian revolution and liberation movements, especially in the military field. In brief, I can state that his serious, responsible talk makes the reader feel that he is making our nation face its responsibilities of providing the equipment and wherewithal to support the Palestinian fighting man and give free rein to the Arab fighting man, so that they may together create the badge of triumph, in a manner totally harmonious with the eternal slogan "ask for death and it will give you life!"

Herewith follows the text of AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM's conversation with the leader Abu Jihad:

/Question/ What is your evaluation of the situation in the occupied territories and analysis of the phenomenon of the resignation of the mayors and members of the municipal councils, or the withdrawl of the councils there, its connection and effect on the situation domestically, and Israeli reactions?

The leader Abu Jihad replied, "Regarding the subject of the resignations, we must pay heed to the fact that that is always linked with the nature of

the events facing our people in the occupied territories; the method the Israeli enemy uses to confront our people is making the incidents there grow in number in accordance with the nature of the circumstances and the nature of the Israeli enemy's style. For a while, circumstances demanded, in the condition of the struggle of our brother Bassam al-Shak'ah, his arrest and the decision to banish him, that the mayors and members of the municipal councils declare a united stand alongside our brother al-Shak'ah. This stand has had its effect in having the enemy back down. Then the circumstances and events followed one another, and through these events the role the mayors play in the struggle to confront the occupation and to express national positions regarding every event our people experienced in the occupied territories became strengthened. This role has terrified our Zionist enemy, and he showed his vengeance and resentment at this role when theenemy leaders repeatedly declared their opposition to the mayors' domestic method vis-a-vis the definition of their positions and the positions declared on their part on national issues. Therefore the enemy has always called on the mayors and drawn their attention, through its declarations and press statements, repeatedly prevented the mayor of this town or that from meeting newsmen and prevented them on many occasions to have any meetings of a group of mayors, in addition to many measures the enemy adopts which we have learned about through the various press agencies and information media.

"The enemy," commander Abu Jihad went on, "has realized that the mayors' positions constitute one of the citadels of the struggle in confronting his tyranny, in confronting the occupation and his terror, in revealing and exposing the enemy's terrorist methods against our people, the grievances he is committing against them, and the arbitrary measures he is perpetrating to influence the moral spirit of our people, practicing more pressures to force our people to abandon their land and emigrate from their homeland so that he will be able to carry out his schemes and measures.

National Symbols

"When the campaign of national confrontation with the occupation intensified, we saw our enemy losing his judgment.

"Here he is, not knowing how to act, and we find him repressing a number of mayors and expelling some of them, as heppened with our fighting brother Fahd al-Qawasimah, the mayor of Hebron, Muhammad Hasan Milhim, mayor of Halhul, and His Eminence Shaykh Rajab al-Tamimi, the Islamic judge of Hebron. The enemy uprooted them from the territory of the homeland and threw them far away, over the borders, to Lebanon, imagining that throwing these fighting men out of their homeland would douse the flame of revolution in the occupied territories. However, in spite of his terrorist methods and curfew system, the attacks by 'Gush Emonim' bands on the town of Hebron and its sections, their aggressions against property, cars, and inhabitants, and in spite of the methods of brutal terror which have also taken place in confronting the upheaval of our people in the occupied

territory--in spite of all that, the flame of revolution has not been extinguished, in fact, to the contrary, it has become more and explosive and inflammatory. As information has been constantly reaching us, the enemy leaders have discussed and studied in the Foreign and Security Affairs Committee and in their cabinet means whereby they can confront this decisive uprising, and they adopted the decision to use a more brutal method, which is that of individual liquidation. There then occurred the episodes of the aggressions against our two fighting brothers Bassam al-Shak'ah and Karim Khalaf, alongside the attempt also to commit aggression against our brother Ibrahim al-Tawil, the mayor of al-Birah. Through these operations, the enemy tried to liquidate the national symbols within and snuff out the burning firebrands of the struggle. However, their fortunes were dashed and their dreams were not realized. The fighting spirit exploded in a more extensive fashion within the ranks of our masses and this popular rallying about these fighting men made the enemy miss what he wanted. Our people's rallying around the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Palestinian revolution within the occupied territories has increased."

The Mistake of Resignation

The fighting commander Abu Jihad elaborated, stating: "In this atmosphere prominent voices said 'one must make a stand in which the mayors declare their resignations.' There was an initiative on the part of some and we ourselves said directly that this measure is a mistake. First, there must be a single national position on the part of all our brother mayors and municipal and village councils domestically, a united position is necessary, and then it is necessary to study the adversary's goals. In this struggle, he has tried to liquidate some mayors, and, if others resign, that will mean that we are falling into the adversary's net. Therefore it has been necessary that our brothers who declared this initiative directly must draw back and stand alongside their brothers. Otherwise we will be giving our enemy an opportunity then to form military committees which will take charge of commanding these municipalities, and therefore his schemes will be realized."

A Different Struggle

Our brother the commander Abu Jihad said, "This struggle is different from the previous one. The goals of this struggle are specific and its dimensions are clear. Therefore, we must act in our steps from this premise, and therefore the opinion has been that it is necessary not to resign and that those who offered their resignations should withdraw them. These brothers responded and the position within the occupied territories now has become clear. It is also a united position against the processes of resignation and a national position which perceives the goals of the adversary and understands what our Zionist enemy wants from these operations."

Military Operations

There is no doubt that the leader Abu Jihad is the best person to whom to direct a question in evaluating the index of guerrilla military operations against the Zionist enemy within, comparing them with past years, then evaluating their nature, qualitatively and quantitatively, and the reactions and comments by the enemy leadership on them.

Abu Jihad replies: "Naturally the platform of FATH and the Palestinian revolution has been and remains one of escalating revolutionary combat activity within our occupied territories; in fact, this activity has increased and escalated, and has not decreased. It is increasing every year over the preceding one, because our platform is to increase operations against the Zionist enemy in spite of increased Israeli measures and precautions and in spite of the almost permanent state of alert in every town, colonial outpost and settlement in the occupied territories. The life our enemy is living of near-alert, mobilization of civil guard and police, army, informers and the like, of which we may find a picture in their declaration that they have used 110,000 local guard members as well as army, police and general security forces and have used methods of enticement to follow up on military operations when they announce that prizes of 1,000 Israeli pounds are being offered to anyone finding anything suspicious, that anyone finding bombs will get 2,000 to 3,000 or 5,000 pounds, and that anyone seizing the person who set out the bomb will get 20,000 to 30,000 pounds, making the main concern of tens, indeed hundreds, of thousands of unemployed persons to act as informants roaming the streets of Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, Haifa and other colonial settlements in search of suspicious objects--and we hear Israeli police reports stating that thousands of reports reach them every day concerning every town or settlement--this life of a nearly permanent alert and constant vigilance the Zionist is witnessing constitutes a problem in military activity, but, in spite of all these circumstances, the schedule and list of military operations is increasing qualitatively and quantitatively."

Statement of Operations and the Enemy's Admissions

The commander Abu Jihad says, "Let us talk in the language of figures, according to the admissions of the Israeli enemy himself." Abu Jihad left the place, hastening to an adjacent room in order to bring a military file containing facts, statistics and figures on military operations within the occupied territories, then started to flip the pages of the file, stating, "According to admissions by the Israeli enemy--operations in 1977, for example; I do not want to talk about before that--the number of operations he acknowledged within the occupied territories in 1977 were 163. In 1978 they rose to 185 and increased to 329 in 1979. What has been broadcast about the number of military operations since the beginning of this year, up to the end of April, were 77 operations, by the enemy's admissions."

Increasing Operations

The commander Abu Jihad says, "These figures, according to Zionist admissions (which try to belittle the importance and number of the operations) give a clear picture of the increasing number of operations from the quantitative standpoint. From the standpoint of quality, and from the standpoint of performance level, the nature of operations, the style of organization and implementation, and the provision of security, let us listen to what our enemy says in this sphere.

Israeli Testimony

"The military correspondent of the Zionist newspaper YEDIOT AHARONOT talked about the status of the resistance and its development during the recent period, saying, 'The guerrillas have learned lessons from their past experiences. From the standpoint of organization their cells were many in number, but now, with the organization of their new cells, they pose abundant problems for Israeli intelligence. In recent time the personal level of the guerrillas has risen markedly and Israeli intelligence personnel say that they have discovered that the secret cells and the guerrilla groups they have discovered recently include the greatest number of college and university graduates who receive special instruction in which they learn ways of persevering in the face of Israeli intelligence interrogation if they fall into Israeli hands. The people trained in this field are guerrillas who have experienced detention in the occupied territories and have completed periods of imprisonment. Their weapons inside the occupied territories have developed greatly. Just 1 year ago 75 percent of the explosives were manufactured locally, in primitive form, but this year 80 percent of the explosives discovered or seized have been of excellent types, such as Cytex or R DeLuxe, whose killing power is much greater than any other explosive. This is one of the latent reasons for the fact that a very large number of people have been killed or wounded in the guerrilla operations which have been carried out in the recent period.'

Who Is Yusuf Nidam?

"The military editor of the Zionist newspaper YEDIOT AHARONOT went on to say, 'The guerrillas have never owned such a tremendous amount of explosives and war materiel as they do today. All evidence shows that this materiel is being transported somehow, but not via the bridges, through Lebanon or by the port of Haifa. Their greatest success occurred when they seized some explosives upon arresting Yusuf Juju Nidam and his group.'"

Another Item of Testimony

The Palestinian leader Abu Jihad went on to state, "Israeli military reports, which are confirmed by the military correspondent of the Zionist newspaper HAARETZ, stated 'Establishment of guerrilla cells has assumed a new form, and the number of people per cell has become very limited and

small. There are cells made up of one person or two only, while in the past cells consisted of six to nine persons. The type of guerrilla personnel also differs. Most guerrillas who have been arrested have enjoyed a broad cultural, educational and training level."

New Leaders in the Strip

Abu Jihad went on to say, "Military activity has developed not just on the bank but also in the Gaza area, which was dominated by a period of paralysis. 'She'ef Ze'evi' has mentioned that FATH exerted special efforts for months to expand its organizational and operational groundwork in the Gaza Strip. FATH particularly has operated there during the recent period to introduce commanders of a good level to develop the organization of secret cells and operation cells as well as developing the introduction of arms."

Developing Operations--and Increasing Their Rate

Commander Abu Jihad continued his statement, presenting his analysis and evaluation of guerrilla military operations and stating "These operations have developed and their areas have extended to encompass all areas of the occupied homeland, both the areas occupied in 1948, which the enemy has acknowledged have increased qualitatively and quantitatively, and the areas in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip." Even Col 'Yossi Wartmund,' head of the section of explosives experts in the Zionist police, has said, 'We cannot win this war; guerrilla bombs and explosives have become more developed and advanced than in the past. The arms stores and depots of the Israeli forces recently have become a big source of supply of explosives and weapons for those they call terrorists, and Palestinian organizations have succeeded in obtaining weapons in addition to army sources through marine shipments along the Mediterranean coast or by numerous packages by various ways and means, coming in by land, sea or air.'"

Military Activity--a Revolutionary Wing

On relations between political and military struggles within the revolutionary context, commander Abu Jihad says, "What I would like to state and stress here is that these military operations are constant and successive; they are increasing in quantity and developing in quality. These operations constitute one of the wings of revolutionary struggle; alongside this revolutionary struggle there is also another wing, the political struggle. Our people inside the occupied territories are performing this role inside, through the development and escalation we see in their political struggle, in confronting the challenge with strikes, protests and sit-ins, and in confronting terrorist methods with the national stands declared by our people, through their various institutions and leaders inside the occupied territories. This combative activity inside is not far removed, either, from what it represents in terms of a combative harvest in the form of a background for the Liberation Organization and Palestinian revolution's political struggle in various Palestinian spheres, among the ranks of our

people in all the areas where they are gathered and oriented, since the people's rallying about the Palestine Liberation Organization within these national forces inside the ranks of our people is being deepened and their national unity is also being deepened, in addition to our people's struggle inside our occupied territories or the Arab scene, when these triumphs of our people inside constitute a background and an incentive for the masses of our Arab nation in the Arab area, or for Arab regimes as well, and in the international area for all those with live consciences in this world who have supported our people's struggle or are standing alongside this struggle by various means--or even those who have not supported our rights but before whom these struggles constitute factors which challenge reality. It has become clear that these people are determined to gain their legitimate rights for their homeland, self-determination, and establishment of an independent state, and therefore our political movement is a combative movement complementing our revolutionary struggle and the military struggle and the political struggle are two wings of our people's revolutionary struggle."

Revolutionaries of the World in Palestinian Camps

/Question/ But what are the areas of cooperation between the Palestinian revolution and the revolutions in the world, especially in the context of military action? What is the philosophy of the Palestinian revolution defining the contexts and the policy of this cooperation?

Commander Abu Jihad says, "We, as a Palestinian revolution, have suffered a great deal from bitterness and torture. We as a Palestinian people who have borne many pains and hardships along the combative road are facing clear truth, which is that it is our duty to reduce the distance of torture and the road of pain for everyone battling for his rights. This is a conviction which has been born through our struggles and we have therefore announced our positions through every means in the Liberation Organization and the FATH movement. It has also been included in our political program, which was issued by the fourth conference of the Palestine National Liberation Movement (FATH), and it has also been included in numerous statements by the Palestine Liberation Organization and its national congresses, stressing the fact that the Palestinian organization and revolution stand alongside everyone who fights against occupation, alongside everyone who struggles for his rights, and alongside everyone who is oppressed, downtrodden or tortured. This position is a position in principle on the part of the Palestinian revolution, which stands in support of all fighting men. This has not been a slogan which is voiced--it is a fact embodied in our stand alongside all the combative and revolutionary movements in Asia and Africa." The commander Abu Jihad added, "If you come to our camps you will find revolutionaries there from all parts of the world; brother combatants are being trained in our camps and follow up on their combative missions after that."

The FATH Conference and the Main Issue

/Question/ What, however, is the effect of the resolutions of the recent Fourth FATH Conference in escalating military and fighting activity in the occupied territories?

The commander Abu Jihad replies, "The issue of escalating the Palestinian armed struggle and political struggle against our enemy was FATH's slogan at the fourth conference, and the main issue on which the Fourth FATH Conference laid emphasis, which was the summary of the resolutions, was to give priority to this issue and the escalation of the armed struggle within the occupied territories, escalating our struggle for the sake of attaining more victories. This was one of the basic points of emphasis and prominent landmarks at the meeting of the Fourth FATH Conference."

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EASING OF U.S.-IRAN CRISIS HINTED

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 4 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] In spite of the continuing publication of various anti-American announcements, and anti-Iranian ones in the United States, it appears that the crisis between the Iranian and U.S. governments is lessening to an extent. From one direction U.S. officials, concerning the property looted by members of the Pahlavi family, have once again announced, but this time more precisely, that complaints can be brought to U.S. courts for the restitution of this property. Of course if a complaint were brought, the first action according to U.S. laws would be to freeze the property until the court's opinion was announced. From another direction, in the case of the Iranian demonstrators who were arrested in Washington, it was decided to remove them from the police prison and place them in the authority of immigration officials. Furthermore, any one of them having permission to reside in the U.S. were to be released immediately. Only those not having residence permits would be tried on that charge and not on the (first) charge of disturbing the peace and fighting with the police. Meanwhile, as a result of objections of Iranian students residing in the U.S. concerning police brutality against those arrested, it was decided to begin investigations in this connection.

At the same time during the past two weeks, a number of Iranians have received travel visas to the United States "for humanitarian reasons," the first time since the students' occupation of the former U.S. embassy in Tehran and the hostage-taking of its personnel. A number of others have been promised that their visa request will be examined in a favorable light. Lastly, it was said in the United States after the deposed Shah's death that his family will not be able to reside in the United States with the easiness of the past.

Certainly this is slight evidence for claiming that the Iran-U.S. crisis is about to end. However, if we add to it the recent letter of U.S. senators to the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the sale of $150 million of spare parts from western petroleum organizations, among them American, to Iran by way of England, and note besides that the tone of recent anti-

American declarations and statements by Iranian officials and the numerous centers of power in that country has become milder, then we can say that basic efforts are probably underway behind the scenes to resolve the crisis between the two countries. It certainly appears that this time the channels of communication have completely altered. Basically, the Americans who had until now based their hopes for creating better relations with Iran on secular leaders, have this time established some religious leaders as their direct correspondents.

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BEHESHTI SEEN AS IRAN'S FUTURE LEADER

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 27, 16-22 Aug 80

[Article by Wafiq Ramadan: "Beheshti: 'Khomeyni's Alternate'"]

[Text] Next to Imam Khomeyni, everything in Iran revolves about Ayatollah Beheshti who, until a few months ago, was relatively unknown. Now, however, as the political picture in Iran is becoming clearer, Beheshti's name is heard everywhere. Political life from Qum to Tehran appears to revolve about him.

The political picture that is emerging after many months of confusion is as Beheshti has planned. He has managed to divide the country into two factions: the weak and the powerful. The powerless group--which was not so only a few months ago--has been reduced to its present impotent position as a result of Beheshti's shrewd and exceptionally brilliant political maneuvering and intellectual skill. Simultaneously, Beheshti's superior organizational ability has made the powerful group even stronger. The political battlefield is now wide open before this group and it is expected to tighten its grip on the country's political reins.

The weak faction consists mainly of those who had returned from exile to join the Islamic revolution. Imbued with liberal ideas, and laboring under the notion that loyalty to the revolution and Imam al-Khomeyni was all that was needed to insure the success of their cause, this group has been woefully disappointed. Heading the list of this faction are the President, Dr Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, followed by the minister of foreign affairs, Mr Sadegh Qutbzadeh, his predecessor Dr Ibrahim Yazdi and others. The powerful group, on the other hand, is made up largely of the clergy, a group that will settle for nothing less than total control.

In today's Iran, Beheshti has become the only standard by which the political strength of all political figures is measured. His total control of everything in Iran is exercised principally through the various offices and positions he holds:

--He is the first secretary of the Revolutionary Council, which, until the new Majlis (parliament) was convened a few weeks ago, exercised both legislative and executive power.

--He is the head of the Islamic Republican Party, the party of the clergy, which boasts millions of members, and which controls parliament, a body more than 70 percent of whose members are party adherents. (Because parliamentary elections in certain parts of Iran have not been completed, parliament has only 236 members out of a total of 270. Of the 236 members, 120 are party members and 40 others are sympathetic supporters.)

--He heads the revolutionary (governmental) committees, which have replaced the police and the army, and which exericse de facto control throughout the country.

--He heads the Council of Experts, which supervises all legislation, and which was responsible for drafting Iran's new constitution.

Ayatollah Beheshti, 51 years old, is a tall man. His black religious garb tends to make him appear even taller. Unlike other clergymen, he is extremely careful about his appearance. His crisply pressed garb is tailored of the best material. His appearance is impressive, and his deep resonant voice is heard immediately the moment he alights from his dark green automobile among a group of heavily armed guards.

During Imam Khomeyni's last months of exile in Paris in the fall of 1978, his voice was heard through Beheshti, who acted as his coordinator, interpreter, chief organizer and executive. Beheshti's name was linked with a number of events associated with the fall of the shah's regime and the success of the Islamic revolution. His gradual rise in Iran's religious and political circles caused even the United States to take note of his power as evidenced by the indirect contacts made with him regarding the American hostages. Such contacts were initially made with President Bani-Sadr. These contacts, however, will be to no avail, particularly in view of Beheshti's more extreme position on the hostage issue as well as on relations with the United States in general. Beheshti's power has in fact grown in proportion to the decline in Bani-Sadr's influence and to his multiplying internal political difficulties. The Iranian President's immature, even childish, actions to regain Imam Khomeyni's support are a measure of his desparation to gain the upper hand in the struggle against Beheshti and to halt his rise to power.

From the moment he was elected president, Bani-Sadr has failed to assess properly Beheshti's religious and political clout. This lack of vision led him to declare prematurely upon his election that the Islamic Republican Party was finished and that, at any rate, it represented no more than 4 percent of Iran's electorate.

Bani-Sadr's declaration was the signal that the conflict between Beheshti and his supporters on the one hand, and Bani-Sadr and the handful of his friends who have returned with him from exile on the other has come into the open. The disparity in the relative strength of the opposing parties soon became evident. For while the Islamic Republican Party's newspaper,

THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC, began to accuse Bani-Sadr and his friends openly of deviation from the Islamic course, Bani-Sadr's paper, THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, failed to respond adequately or to go on the offensive. The journalistic battle continued in this fashion until Bani-Sadr, possessed by an illusion that he has "cornered" Beheshti, launched a campaign in which his party's paper accused Dr Hasan Ayat, head of Beheshti's Political Bureau, of plotting to overthrow Bani-Sadr. The campaign failed dismally. For, after all, what is the value of a tape recording in which Hasan Ayat's voice is heard inciting against Bani-Sadr in a political arena already reverberating with the din of clashing political armor in the best Iranian style? Bani-Sadr's unsuccessful campaign, however, provided Beheshti with an opportunity to call a press conference and to enhance his image further before foreign journalists.

Bani-Sadr's mortal error, the error that eroded his prestige and is bound to cost him his office in the near future, is that he failed to find a way to come to an understanding with Beheshti rather than confront him. For how could Beheshti and other clerics remain silent in the face of Bani-Sadr's last January's post-election announcement in which he vowed to impose restrictions on the political power of certain religious figures? Beheshti, of course, was the intended target of that announcement; nevertheless many members of the clergy found the announcement unacceptable. Had Bani-Sadr read the [new] constitution carefully, he would have realized that limiting the power of the clergy was impossible. On the contrary, they had the power to limit his own. They had in fact demonstrated that power earlier against nonreligious figures like Bani-Sadr and ultimately succeeded in removing them from positions of authority altogether.

Beheshti's wiliness and shrewd maneuvering trapped Bani-Sadr in the snare he was preparing for Beheshti. When the early results of the parliamentary elections began to show that Beheshti's party was winning, Bani-Sadr still harbored hopes of gaining the upper hand by appointing one of his supporters to the prime minister's office, one who would help him in confronting the predominantly Beheshti-controlled parliament. As Bani-Sadr sent name after name to parliament for approval to the prime minister's office, Beheshti's taunting response came back in the form of an insistence that not only the prime ministry, but the important ministries as well as the presidency of parliament must go to his majority party. The danger of becoming a puppet in Beheshti's hands, a fear that had constantly haunted Bani-Sadr, suddenly became real. He began to see the presidency of Iran as a decorative office, one whose responsibilities would be limited to presiding over the opening of flower shows. This spectre drove Bani-Sadr to despair. In a last-ditch--and, of course, hypocritical--effort to save the situation, he proposed to Imam Khomeyni to appoint his son, Hojjat Oleslam Ahmad Khomeyni, to the prime minister's office. Not only did Khomeyni reject the suggestion publicly, but he ruled out any of his relatives for public office. Following this development, Bani-Sadr announced that Mustafa Mir Salim would be the future prime minister. But this candidate was also turned down by the Beheshti-controlled religious

majority in parliament. This is the situation today, but there will be no progress until Bani-Sadr nominates to the office a candidate acceptable to Beheshti.

Beheshti, however, is not easy to satisfy. He will settle for nothing less than the total islamization of all facets of life in Iran. His obsession with this objective is behind the recent dismissal of leftist university professors and students. Beheshti's "purification" campaign extends to anyone not totally committed to comprehensive islamization. The possibility that a few innocent people may fall victims will not deter Beheshti. Not only does he wield the reins of political authority through his majority in parliament and his control of the Revolutionary Council and the Republican Islamic Party, he has strong relations with Khomeyni as well. Furthermore, he exercises immense military power through the Revolutionary Committees and the Revolutionary Guard and enjoys the absolute support of the clergy in Qum and Tehran. His weekly press conference has made him a star of the international press. The Iranian newspapers quote his remarks and publish his pictures daily. His knowledge of both English and German enhance his image in the foreign press, which he knows how to handle. (He learned German while heading the Islamic Center in Hamburg from 1962-68.)

It is evident that nothing in Iran can stop Beheshti. When Imam Khomeyni dies, Beheshti will inherit the mantle of the "Supreme Religious Leader" (the de facto head of government of the Islamic Republic of Iran). Beheshti satisfies all the constitutional criteria to lead the nation and to insure that all governmental agencies and institutions will remain true to their Islamic responsibilities.

Beheshti exploits every political development, external or internal, to further weaken the secular [nonreligious] faction. The most dramatic example of this is his success in directing the anger of the Iranian populace against any leader advocating a moderate position in regard to the hostage question. Included in this list are Bani-Sadr and Qutbzadeh, and, before them, Mahdi Bazarghan and Ibrahim Yazdi. Beheshti has succeeded brilliantly in keeping the hostage issue "hot," one not admitting of easy solutions and not without conditions.

Even as Beheshti scrambles to wrest all political power in Iran, he continues to enjoy the complete confidence of Imam Khomeyni. He is the imam's special adviser and spends many hours with him every day. No one else enjoys this privilege. At the same time, Beheshti is said to have given Imam Khomeyni a few anxious days. It is believed that the heart ailment which afflicted Khomeyni a few months ago, and from which he recovered totally, was triggered by a letter from Hojjat Oleslam 'Ali Tahrani, a confidante of Khomeyni, accusing Beheshti of being behind the attempt to assassinate General Vally-Ollah Qarani and Hojjat Oleslam Mohammad Mofti. The letter is said to have absolved Forqan [an extremist group] of the assassination attempts as previously announced.

Beheshti is the kind of person who does not bend easily. His persistence was demonstrated in a pre-presidential election meeting with al-Khomeyni in which he spent 6 hours trying to convince the imam to support the candidacy of Jalaleddin Farsi. The attempt was to no avail. Farsi later withdrew from the race when it was revealed that he was partly Afghan and not 100 percent of Iranian stock as the constitution stipulates.

Beheshti is back again pushing Farsi for the office of prime minister. Bani-Sadr is opposed to this candidate precisely because of Beheshti's support for him. The confrontation between these two thus continues, and more fireworks are in the offing.

Beheshti is not a latter-day supporter of the Islamic revolution. He played a crucial role during the 12 months preceding the fall of the shah and the subsequent creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran. His efforts on behalf of the revolution have raised his political stock immensely and made him a powerful force to be reckoned with in Iran's political game.

Beheshti's maneuvers against the Bakhtiar government on the eve of the shah's fall are responsible for its fragmentation and for demoralizing Bakhtiar himself. Beheshti is said to have sent Bakhtiar a letter containing two items: the text of Bakhtiar's own resignation, and an announcement that he [Bakhtiar] would be leaving for Paris, to see the Imam al-Khomeyni at his residence in Neauphile-le-Château. (The letter was carried by Amir 'Abbas Intizam, then a spokesman for the government, and later imprisoned upon the discovery of documents in the U.S. Embassy linking him with some of its employees.) Beheshti's letter struck Bakhtiar like a thunderbolt. He announced his readiness to go see al-Khomeyni but declined to resign beforehand. Beheshti rejected Bakhtiar's offer and so did al-Khomeyni at Beheshti's urging. When Bakhtiar announced that he was ready to meet with al-Khomeyni, the latter announced that he would not see him. Bakhtiar's government soon collapsed without Bakhtiar's resignation or a meeting with Khomeyni.

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SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ISSUES DISCUSSED BY BEHESHTI

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 7 Aug 80 p 18

[Text] Ayatollah Dr Beheshti, Chief Justice of the National Supreme Court, spoke at a press conference yesterday morning, answering the questions of local and foreign reporters. He disclosed a planned propaganda plot and said cncerning this matter:

The problem is that according to information I have received, Imperialism and world Zionism have been putting all their energy during the past year and a half into destroying the clergy's image, especially those persons who have a firm and proper standing among the people, and they have tried to dissolve the trusting relationship between the people and the clergy. The revolution's detractors abroad also benefit from the cooperation and agreement of groups and individuals within the country, and moreover they are not without the cooperation of some counterrevolutionaries who live abroad. It is thus clear that this plan is for all the confederates and sworn supporters of the former regime both within and outside the country, to help them carry out this plot. Since this group will resort to any method or lie to further its aims, when it senses that the solidarity between the people and committed and responsible clerics is stronger and more deeply rooted than with the perpetrators of these plots, it immediately seeks to launch a propaganda campaign against them.

On the basis of information I have received recently, they are preparing a propaganda campaign both domestically and abroad, using altered tapes and retouched photographs. Therefore, people who feel that they will be taken out of the picture because of these persistent activities will also participate in the plot.

I have a number of their names, which I will not disclose now pending positive verification, but if these people want to waste our dear country's precious time and energy on these troublemakers and this psychological and propaganda warfare, I will expose all of them by announcing their names and characteristics. Doctor Beheshti then added:

I am warning them at this press conference to desist from their plotting, for the smoke of the fires they are fanning will end up in their own eyes.

Our nation will not leave them at peace, for some of them are people who have come to Iran after the revolution who lived abroad comfortably throughout those years. I say to them that our people have sufficient data at hand to identify them thoroughly, and if any new information concerning these plots becomes available we will turn it over to the people.

Reason for Releasing the Students

A reporter noted that American immigration authorities had announced the release of the students because they had given their names to that administration, and asked him if he thought this was the real reason for their release.

Actually, activities like this pose two dangers for America. One is that there will be a reflexive continuation of these heroic confrontations in American society, especially American Moslem society, which cannot benefit America. We can say that this episode was an epic song these young people sang in their relationship with Islam.

The second is that they wanted to end the disturbance as quickly as possible.

Helping Lebanese Shi'ites

Another reporter asked:

Now that the well being of the Lebanese Shi'ites is being threatened by the Iraqi Government, what sort of help can the Iranian Government offer at this stage of its development?

It is natural that they should receive political, social, and material assistance, for this is an Islamic duty. Any number of difficulties of various kinds will develop for us unless we give them substantial aid.

The Fate of the Pilgrimage

A question was asked as to whether Saddam Hossein's talks with the King of Saudi Arabia would adversely affect the Iranian pilgrimage to Mecca.

Beheshti answered:

I do not forsee such a thing happening.

The Madani Question

Another reporter asked:

What do you see concerning the fate of the case of Mr Madani, after the rejection of his credentials and the documents that have come to hand concerning him?

Beheshti answered:

This matter would be more under the jurisdiction of the Revolutionary Court, and Mr Qoddusi would be better able to express an opinion.

Differing Criteria

The question was asked: You have talked about differing criteria in your own speeches and you have mentioned that the Islamic Republican Party's criteria for choosing a prime minister differ from those of the President of the Republic. Could you possibly explain these differences?

Beheshti said: On the contrary, I stressed in that speech that after long discussions we came to the conclusion that we have no differences of criteria, and moreover these criteria were also written into the agreement of unity that was concluded between us and signed by those present. It is possible, however, that differences arose in recognizing these criteria, for example, concerning the person we have in mind, that Mr Bani Sadr might not consider him to be in accordance with these criteria, and/or vice versa.

It was said: Could you say that these standards are what you have stressed?

Beheshti answered:

These standards are the same ones that have appeared in party statements, as well as in the newspaper JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, and our standards are the same ones the Imam has stressed.

Spy Trials

The question was asked: The Supreme Judicial Council will have responsibility for trying the American spies. Will the behavior of the American police towards our students have any effect on their trial?

Beheshti answered: You know that this issue cannot be allowed to influence the domain of justice. It is in a realm outside the issue of justice. In the realm of justice we cannot punish someone for another more serious crime.

The Jerusalem Question

The question was asked: Do you, as a policy making individual, have a plan for recovering Jerusalem?

Beheshti answered: This is an objective towards which we will have to struggle for a long time. In my view, one of the things we can do to realize this objective is to spread the Islamic Revolution throughout the Islamic world. At the same time, close cooperation between Iran and the Palestinian fighters can also be considered a very effective way to attain this goal.

Personal Conflicts

A reporter asked: Mr Bani Sadr said last week that personal conflicts are hurting the Islamic Republic. What did he mean by this?

Doctor Beheshti answered:

I did not ask him about this particular remark, but he was asked about all the issues he discussed and they told him that his view was pessimistic and reminded him that this kind of talk will create an atmosphere of ambiguity and misgiving among the people.

His answer to our friends was: I was not referring to you, because we are friends, and if we have differences we can resolve them through discussion.

The question was asked: Is the matter of the disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr still being pursued or not?

Doctor Beheshti said: There is no doubt that the issue of Imam Musa Sadr is important to us, whether from the standpoint of religion, politics, or emotion. This matter will remain alive and important for us, and we will seriously pursue the possibilities of the issues.

How much information have you obtained in connection with this?

We have not obtained any information that could be called significant.

Another reporter asked:

What new steps have been taken by the Supreme Judiciary Council?

The answer was given: We have had no new basic tasks. The tasks are outlined in previous statements.

Foreign Reporters

Foreign reporters also took part in this press conference. The answers to their questions appear below.

One foreign reporter asked about the clergy's relationship to the exercise of power within the country.

A: The relationship between the country's system and the clergy is shown in the relationship between Islam and the government.

Iran is an Islamic country. A clergyman's role in the system to a certain extent resembles the role of an ideologue (theorizer) in an ideological system. I don't think this is anything like an ecclesiastical system.

Q: Don't several of the people in the Majles patronize your party?

A: The number of party members in the Majles is around 70. Those who think along party lines, however, number perhaps 130. Therefore there is harmony between the party and the Majles.

Concerning the President of the Republic

Q: What do you think of the President of the Republic?

A: Our belief is that the President of the Republic must be strengthened to enable him to carry out his responsibilities.

Sometimes, however, this matter depends on following a line of harmony and like thinking, so that points of view in the country's administration can be perceived. Through this kind of mutual understanding we can create conditions that will be very useful for cooperation. We have tried and made efforts to create these conditions, and we have succeeded to a certain extent, but not entirely.

Q: Do you have a consensus of opinion on the prime minister?

A: Yes, we have exchanged views at our weekly meeting, and we hope to make an announcement concerning the prime minister within two days.

Anti-American Feelings

Another reporter asked:

Anti-American feelings in Iran are now pervasive and intense. Do you think these feelings will continue a long time?

A: As long as the American Government does not change its position, these feelings will continue a long time.

Q: Apparently the Americans want to meet some of the Iranian demands, such as releasing impounded funds, in order to free the hostages. Will this be useful?

A: We must see what the Majles will say about this. At the moment the Majles is involved with more important matters, such as choosing a prime minister and a cabinet. After that, it is possible that the Majles will take steps to discuss this matter.

Another reporter, concerning the same matter, importunately asked:

You have a lot of influence. In your view, if the American Government wants to meet some of the Iranian demands, will this result in the release of the hostages?

A: This matter depends on the decision of the Majles. All the issues will be discussed and deliberated in the Majles. It is not for us to say it will go this way or that way. The Majles representatives will study every aspect of ways to solve this problem.

Another foreign reporter asked about differences of opinion with Mr Bani Sadr, and Mr Beheshti answered:

The differences between myself and Mr Bani Sadr should not be regarded as differences between two individuals, but as differences between the thinking of the Islamic Republican Party and the thinking of the President of the Republic and a great many others in society. It is natural that all people in society think a certain way. They do not think alike.

One foreign reporter asked about Iran's economic difficulties. In answering, Dr Beheshti said:

We must study the Iranian economy as much as possible, for we do not want to follow the former economic path. We must lay down new plans based on new premises, and this is not easy. No matter how difficult it may be, however, there is nothing to prevent us from starting.

Throughout the past year we have sought to identify areas of difficulty in the economy, and we now have a better understanding of these problems. I hope we will solve the problems in the near future.

Some of the foreign reporters again asked about the prime minister and the cabinet ministers. Dr Beheshti answered: We have issued a statement, and I have said several times in interviews and speeches that the party has no difficulty in this matter. The most important point is that the prime minister and the ministers must be selected on the basis of Islamic criteria, they must be believing Moslems, revolutionary, active and decisive. They must be able to work as a group and get along with other members of the cabinet.

Q: Do you have anyone in particular in mind?

A: The Islamic Party has mentioned several people. I have nothing new to say. We do not mean, however, that the prime minister will definitely be one of these people. Anyone who has sound Islamic standards is acceptable for us. We only require that values and standards be upheld. Determining this is the responsibility of the Majles, not the party and not the President of the Republic.

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CSO: 4906

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS DISCUSSED BY DR BEHESHTI

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 14 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] Ayatollah Dr Beheshti, Chief Justice of the National Supreme Court, answered various questions yesterday from foreign and local reporters at a television and radio press conference.

In answer to a question regarding the existence of a plot, he said: We have received sufficient information concerning this plot. Those who should follow up on this information are doing so, in order to develop very clear conclusions. I am not at liberty to give any more details.

Priority Tasks

Concerning priority tasks in the Majles, Ayatollah Beheshti said: The basic task consists of extensive and effective efforts to increase the spiritual and moral content of the revolution, not merely with talk and writing, but through the use of practical and constructive methods. The second thing is to establish legal and social security. It is natural that the greater part of this responsibility is ours, and we are making efforts, but the military and law enforcement agencies, the radio and television media and other organs also have an effective role to play in this area. Thirdly, we are trying to get the economy on its feet and make it active, especially in the area of production and just distribution of wealth and necessities of life within the Islamic Republic of Iran, and to develop a decisive foreign policy, as well as to rapidly and decisively pursue a cultural revolution.

Establishing an Atmosphere of Mutual Understanding

A reporter asked him, what was discussed when you were with the Imam yesterday? He said: The Imam recommended that efforts be made by all officials in the country to create an atmosphere of peace and mutual understanding, stressing that the future government of Mr Raja'i should be established with the help of God on the basis of genuine Islamic standards and principles.

The Imam stressed: Every official in the country must try to bring about a greater atmosphere of mutual understanding and cooperation than we have had

until now, and to stop every process that damages mutual understanding and cooperation between officials. He stressed that the officials themselves must be very careful in their interviews, and avoid saying things that could be misused by groups and elements with bad intentions. They must be cautious with their words and deeds. He also ordered that the newspapers must always write to encourage the people, not with false hopes, but with hopes that are real. They must report the positive accomplishments and activities of the revolution, the Majles of the President of the Republic, the government, and the different units, to the people. If they find some small discrepancy and exaggerate it, naturally the people will become anxious. He stressed that they must eliminate this distrubing atmosphere that creates needless apprehension.

The question was asked: It appears that Mr Bani Sadr does not have confidence in the activities of Mr Raja'i. What is your view?

I know Mr Raja'i to be a brother with faith, who is hard working, with outstanding moral principles and an outstanding revolutionary background. I think such a prime minister, more than anyone else, is capable of attracting genuine revolutionary forces and that he and the revolutionary forces will be highly efficient together. I pray that God will grant them success. Although Mr Raja'i is not a member of the Islamic Republican Party, he is one of our long time companions, coworkers and peers. I have known him for 17 years. Generally I see that there are two schools of thought concerning his recent service in the field of education and training. Some speak very highly of his work, and there are also those who criticize him. The truth is, I have not yet had an opportunity to collect the facts and evaluate this carefully to see which of these views is correct. Are his critics correct, his supporters, or actually both of them? In some respects his work was very good, and at times it was also open to criticism. In any case, the evaluation should be reopened. I can say that I am very optimistic about the future of this dear brother's work. God willing, the government chosen by the Majles will be a pious people's government, with faith in the character of the people, especially since he has stressed that his ministers will be chosen from groups crystallized by the Islamic revolution. I hope to see shining and successful programs and achievements during the period of his prime ministership.

Meetings of Saddam and Zia'olhaqq

Concerning Saddam Hossein and Zia'olhaqq's meetings with the King of Saudi Arabia, Doctor Beheshti said: The triumphant Islamic revolution of the Iranian nation has agitated and disturbed officials and temporal rulers who do not govern their people on the basis of Islam. Furthermore, the world devouring aggressor America is left with nothing to do in the area.

Enjoining Good and Prohibiting Evil

A reporter asked: Are there organizations in existence to carry out the (Koranic) injunction to enjoin what is good and prohibit waht is evil? The Chief Justice of the National Supreme Court said:

The matter of enjoining good and prohibiting evil has different aspects. One side of it pertains to the common people, another aspect of it concerns radio, television, and the press, another aspect of it concerns education, training, and higher education. Another dimension of it concerns national guidance, culture, and art, and an important part of that is the responsibility of the clergy, which is working freely in this area, and part of it is also the responsibility of the judicial branch. In having these two separate branches it was foreseen that each of these two powers would be responsible for one part of the task of enjoining good and prohibiting evil. One is monitoring the entire country, and one is the court of justice, and actually these two branches are each responsible for a part of enjoining the good and prohibiting evil.

Concerning the consolidation of the courts, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court said:

Even now the revolutionary courts are under the jurisdiction of the judicial branch, and they work under the supervision of the Supreme Judicial Council. Furthermore, for that matter the constitution has now been put into effect. As soon as the Supreme Judicial Council was formed the constitution was put into effect.

These days there is not a single court outside the control of the Supreme Judiciary Council. Every decision is subject to confirmation, rejection, and explanation, and the Supreme Judicial Council, which is responsible for Judiciary matters, carried out these things.

Student Demonstrations

Concerning demonstrations by Iranian students abroad, he said: On the basis of the absence of capitulation everywhere in the world, the courts there cannot do anything. This is a responsibility of our Foreign Ministry, which must be the protector of the rights of our citizens outside the country. If the courts are unable to do anything, it will act on its responsibility.

It is the job of the courts to give the necessary explanations to the Foreign Ministry.

Buying Wheat

In the matter of buying wheat, Doctor Beheshti said: According to the agreements we have made, we will not refuse this wheat, because we cannot be sure of our grain supplies during the next year.

Securing Employment

Concerning the issue of securing employment for young people who are unemployed or retired as a result of purges, Doctor Beheshti said:

There is no disputing the fact that work in harmony with the revolution must be created for those who are unemployed because of purges. The process of creating employment, however, will not be confined to forced labor camps. Fortunately, we live in a time when solutions are more numerous. Initially we must try to guide them towards suitable work by making use of their personal initiative. Naturally, if these methods are not effective or cannot be used, we must not rule out the possibility of setting up forced labor camps.

The Minister of Justice

Concerning the nomination of someone as minister of justice, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court said:

According to the constitution, this matter is in the hands of the Supreme Judicial Council, and the Supreme Judicial Council can even nominate two or three people. Then Mr Raja'i can select one of them as minister of justice in his cabinet. We will do this at the first session of the Supreme Judicial Council. We have some people in mind, but we have not as yet made a definite decision, because we wanted to see what the makeup of the Prime Minister's cabinet would be in order to be able to account for the necessary compatibilities.

Agitation and Chanting

A reporter asked about the agitation and chanting that had taken place at some talks. Doctor Beheshti said: There is no doubt that all responsible brothers must strive to prevent these abuses. This is not difficult to do, and they must not even be given an opening. We will succeed, just as I myself have always employed this method in all my speeches. Fortunately, I see that though the speech may be attended by a large crowd, there have been no such abuses, neither during the talk, not so far as I have heard, afterwards. I recommend this method that I have been able to employ to all brothers.

Confiscation of Land

Concerning the confiscation of land, he said:

Two tasks must be carried out simultaneously and in a parallel direction, in order to be truly effective. One is to write a law for implementing article 46 of the constitution. This article states: Persons who acquire wealth by selling dead lands, substandard constructions, by charging interest, by making profits on public property and other such methods must have this wealth confiscated by legal means.

We must act quickly to implement this article. Of course the major part of this task is the responsibility of the executive offices of the judicial branch, and we are also trying to empower the judicial branch to pursue this matter, to prepare the necessary laws, and submit them for legislative approval.

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DR SHAKERI PROPOSES DEMOCRATIC FRONT

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 9 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Dr Shakeri, a distinguished member of the National Democratic Front and a major opponent of the Shah's regime, during a press interview in London called for the union of all moderate and leftist democrats in Iran in order to overthrow the fanatic, pitiless religious regime of Ayatollah Khomeyni and to establish a democratic, multi-party republic.

Radio BBC said in this connection that it is totally clear that efforts are underway to revive the policy of the era of Dr Mosaddeq, meaning a government largely composed of secular persons and having a social-democratic policy. Dr Shakeri belongs to a front that has been founded recently. This front is hopeful that it can find supporters among the ranks of the National Front, the Mojahedin-e Khalq and Feda'i-ye Khalq guerilla organizations and other minorities.

What is noteworthy is that Dr Shakeri is utterly opposed to military intervention in Iran from abroad, and says that such an action would have grave consequences for Iran since such interference would doubtless lead to a civil war. Within the framework of this belief Dr Shakeri harshly criticized Shapur Bakhtiar, and said that Bakhtiar is in contact with Zionist supporters and General Oveysi. In the BBC's view, considering all the disputes between the groups opposed to the Islamic Republic, whether in Iran or abroad, there is small probability that a moderate, secular and democratic regime will replace the Islamic Republic in the near future. However, if it is said that the Islamic Republican control is lying in wait to exert influence throughout the country and alienate all other political groups from itself, it must also be said that at present it appears that the formation of a union of moderates and leftists could possibly attract the attention and support of the people.

In the past several weeks contacts have been made for a union of all moderate and progressive forces. Meetings in this connection were held outside Iran. These groups which were strongly opposed to the dictatorial Pahlavi regime and which played an extremely important role in its overthrow now desire the creation of a democratic regime in Iran without having opponents connected with the former regime, whether Oveysi's, Bakhtiar's or Nahavandi's, play any role in it.

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CSO: 4906

RAJA'I'S CANDIDACY APPROVED AS PREMIER BY PARLIAMENT

Statements Made by New Premier

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 12 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i, the new prime minister, told reporters last night: Since friends wish to know me better, I will introduce myself in three sentences: I am a follower of the Imam, a son of the Majles, and a brother of the President of the Republic.

I am a follower of the Imam, and this is one of the pure qualities of the members of our cabinet, and we hope that these pure qualities will be able to establish a flow between the people, the executive organizations, and the revolutionary structures.

I am a son of the Majles for the Imam, because I never made any attempt to become prime minister, so that the Majles presented me as prime minister because of its encounters with me and its previous acquaintance with me. In this respect I regard myself as a son of the Majles, meaning I am actually a son of the people, because the Majles, in its most secluded lawmaking sessions, benefits from the decisive counsel of the people. In the kindness that my colleagues have shown in the course of all this I have benefited from very decisive counsel.

I am a brother of the President of the Republic inasmuch as we both have responsibilities and we hope to be the elected representatives of the people in the service of the people, and we hope our brotherhood will become closer every day. We will expend all our efforts in the service of the people and in alleviating their difficulties.

Concerning the government's program, Raja'i said: We have no specific program now whose aspects can be presented, except the belief of the people of Iran who made a revolution, shed blood, and delivered the nation and this country from the clutches of this regime. I hope to submit this nation, with its wealth, to the revolutionary people who shed blood at the crossroads of origin in Tehran and various other places. We believe they are the most worthy persons to administer the nation. We will prepare a program and submit it to the respected representatives of the Majles.

Concerning future ministers, the Prime Minister said: We will make use of all revolutionary structures, both their own people and their knowledge, and God willing we will introduce a cabinet that follows the line of the people and is with the people themselves.

Speech of Palestine Envoy at Parliament

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian Aug 12 80 pp 2-3

[Text] Yesterday the Islamic Consultative Assembly, having been introduced to the Prime Minister by the President of the Republic, gave him a vote of confidence. At this session, which convened at 11:30 presided over by Hojjatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, a vote of confidence was given to 'Ali Raja'i as Prime Minister, who had been introduced in a letter from the President of the Republic, in a secret balloting. With all 196 ballots counted there were 153 votes for, 24 votes against, and 19 absentions.

Participants in the Jerusalem Liberation Congress visited the open session. After their arrival Hojjatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani said during an address: On behalf of all the representatives of the Consultative Assembly, we extend a welcome to the brothers and sisters of the freedom movement of the Islamic sector to the presence of the Imam and especially to the Majles. On behalf of our brothers we announce that this Majles, which is the protector of the Moslem people of Iran, having taken the name Islamic Council, counts you foreign brothers and sisters among its own people.

He added: When the Imam proclaims one of the days of the blessed month of Ramazan "Jerusalem Day," this is the best indication of the protection by the people of Iran for the freedom movements of the Islamic sectors of the world.

Then a representative of free Eritrea, on behalf of participants in the Jerusalem Conference said during his talk and after praising the Imam of the nation, the oppressed people of the world, and representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly: The participating representative groups, in honor of the second anniversary of world Jerusalem day, observed the near readiness of the Iranian Moslem nation concerning Palestinian liberation and the participation of all sides in observing friday as Jerusalem day. This confirms for us that even our enemy's prime minister in occupied Palestine, who called the Iranian moslem nation an earthquake, is correct. The liberation of Jerusalem in the beginning of a day of transforming this earthquake to a volcanic eruption in the face of Zionism.

After that Hojjatoleslam Montazeri delivered a report to the Majles on the activities of the Jerusalem Liberation Congress and said: According to the order of Imam Khomeyni, who has declared world Jerusalem Day a day when the oppressed will stand up to the oppressors, we call this an honorable day.

Then Hani al-Hassan, representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization, during a speech, said that the Islamic Republic's recent announcement about freeing Jerusalem and occupied Palestine was cheering news for all Moslems of the world, especially Palestinian Moslems. The Palestinians were the happiest people, for we know that in the end it is the Islamic nation that must free Palestine.

In another part of his speech he said: The Palestinian people are a believing people, for a people who exist in the Masjedolaqsa (a mosque in Jerusalem) and in the Christian churches cannot fail to be a believing people. We are expecting you to come and participate with us in the liberation of Palestine, and when you participate directly in the war with the enemy, you will be able to implant your Islamic ideas there.

In conclusion he said: In the name of all the oppressed people of the world we wish you a happy Jerusalem Day, and in the name of the Moslem nation of Palestine we thank the Iranian people and Imam Khomeyni on the occasion of the declaration of Jerusalem Day and the extensive cooperation on this day.

At this session the committee to study the qualifications of the prime minister presented its report to the Majles. Initially Hojjatoleslam Yazdi reported the study committee's candidates for the prime ministership and the committee's consultation with the President, and he said this committee finally agreed on Mr Raja'i.

Hojjatoleslam Yazdi added: At the end we came to the conclusion that we should hold a meeting with Mr Bani Sadr and Mr Raja'i and investigate the matter thoroughly.

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COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES BRING SECURITY MEASURES

Army on Guard Against Coups

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Jul 80 p 12

[Excerpt] Gen Zahirnezhad, commander of the ground forces and supervisor of the National General Gendarmerie, described his views on other matters related to the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran in an exclusive interview with KEYHAN's political correspondent, while describing the army's countermeasures against attacks by the hireling army of Iraq on our country's border towns.

In response to a question on why the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran was not responding to these attacks, in view of the increase in Iraqi army attacks on our country's border towns, he said, "In this regard first I must inform my beloved compatriots that the Iraqi army has not yet carried out an attack which could constitute a military aggression inside the borders of our country. The Iraqi army attacks have so far taken the form of fire attacks which have been made by airplane and artillery, and thus the response to these attacks has also been given to Iraqi army installations and bases. In an attack some days ago, Iraq was drawn into fire in a counterattack on Iraq's border post. As has been announced numerous times, the Islamic revolution of Iran does not aim at territorial expansion, since, if it did, the revolution would lose its value. Secondly, we are at the present time occupied with the tyrannical imperialist countries of the world, and the people of Iran have driven them out and will drive them out with their will and their bare hands, by resorting to appeals to the creator alone. People who make attacks on this revolution in the form of powers outside other borders are without doubt or hesitation servants of these demonic international imperialist forces. These governments do not have a base among Islamic peoples, in particular the Islamic people of Iraq. We cannot fire on the homes and lives of a number of Moslem brothers in Iraq because of an attack by Saddam Husayn and some of his mercenaries against our country. We are trying to subject that place to attack

by fire where the Moslem people of Iraq are not present. The order has been given that henceforth we are to respond to any Iraqi fire against our installations, though perhaps at much greater volume. It is clear that the goal of the army of Iraq in these attacks is nothing but to help its masters to dominate the lives, property and honor of a Moslem people and continue the dishonorable life of Saddam Husayn and the hireling regime of the Ba'th of Iraq, since it is not possible for a nation to establish tyranny of repression in one part of its border while a group of Moslem people are without knowledge, under the domination of satans, in another group.

"The Islamic revolution, if, God willing, it is realized in Iran, as it will be, will assuredly leave no room for Saddam Husayns."

The commander of the ground forces then referred to the conditions and role of leadership in the triumph of the revolution and to the conspiracy of the counterrevolution, especially American imperialism, to crush our Islamic revolution, and said, "In my opinion, the leader must possess three basic attributes in addition to the other attributes of leadership. First, the leader himself must present himself to the people as a model of opposition to the ruling apparatus, and the people must believe that this is a model of an element which is less frequently found in those opposed to him--otherwise, how could Bakhtiar and the likes of him, who have bowed down before this regime and sworn loyalty to it hundreds of time, not have become the leaders of the people, or those people who beat their breasts with the stone of the former constitution? The second condition is that the leader be the object of trust. The people must make the leader the object of their trust from the time they start to follow him, and this person must be the object of the people's support. If 36 million people do not have trust, they will not give up 70,000 victims. Who now can claim that he is the object of the people's trust to the degree Emam Khomeyni is? The third part of the condition of leadership is possession of material resources. Through a simple review of the history of the world's revolutions, you can see that every revolution which has taken place has been produced from some large financial source. Of course, many countries have held coups d'etat and have called them revolutions, but the material resources of the Iranian revolution were provided by the funds of the pure emams. Of course, this is my opinion, and perhaps many people will not be pleased by it, but the people of Iran, in accordance with their religious beliefs, under the supervision of Emam Khomeyni, spent their charitable alms on religious affairs; they put these funds to use eliminating the material needs of the revolution, and this is the only determining aspect of the Iranian revolution which distinguishes it from the other revolutions of the world--98 percent of which received material support from others." At that point, Gen Zahirnezhad referred to counterrevolution's role and the conspiracy of the superpowers, in cooperation with their domestic personnel, to weaken the revolution, and said, "In order to attain a new government, we have passed through some stages in which all the people were joined and coordinated on behalf of the goals of the revolution.

However, in the meantime, a number of people followed in the path of the revolution until the revolution triumphed, and then, following the course of completion of the revolution, disappeared for various reasons. In other words, they had no part of the revolution. From the ideological standpoint this did not create a problem for the revolution, but a group disappeared from the course of the revolution and stood against this revolution, and we can give them no name except counterrevolution. For example, people who stand against elections on election day and set fire to ballot boxes or disturb them, or try through armed uprisings to cause the Islamic revolution to deteriorate--who now will remove these people from the course of the revolution? Britain or America? No, the force of the revolution must remove them, the force of which the army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the gendarmerie and the other legal armed forces are a part as well. When such a situation arises, all revolutionary forces and the army are obliged to remove the stone from the path of the people's revolutionary movement and, if they do not do so, they in fact will have betrayed the revolution and wasted the blood of 70,000 Iranian martyrs. Therefore the person who tells the army to go to the border must realize that the borders are here--the borders between the counterrevolutionary and the revolutionary. For this reason, we consider any obstacle before the movement of the revolution to be a counterrevolutionary obstacle, in accordance with the law, and we consider that striking down its agent, in this period particularly, is one of the lawful duties of all revolutionary forces." He then continued:" The counterrevolutionary movement by domestic enemies emerges in its hireling form at a time when the enemy's foreign forces are also protecting them. You can see the protection of the enemy's foreign forces in the faces of each individual opponent of the revolution. Ask them where these counterrevolutionary forces have obtained all these weapons, arms whose sale and purchase are entirely in the control of governments and whose trade is not permitted. Who is it who has been able in a short time to import 50,000 Kalashnikov automatic weapons into Iran? What superpower is it which has given these weapons to the counterrevolution, has provided its wages and has even defined its objective, whose goal is me and you? The Kurdish, Turkoman, Baluch or Turkish brother who has been deceived and once he gets his hands on a trigger and shoots off 30 rounds with a Kalashnikov, see where he gets his money from. The shell which is bought and sold in Kordestan for 20 tomans each, or the announcements which are published at least three or four times a week throughout the country in colored offset print--who provides these enormous expenses? Is it not truethat these weapons and materials are placed at the disposal of the counterrevolution by America, Israel or the other superpowers?"

Arms Smuggling

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Jul 80 p 3

In our continuing discussions with people's representatives regarding recurring problems in their electoral precincts and the provision of appropriate solutions to alleviate the problems, we sat down for a conversation

this time with Seyyed Mohammad Kazem Danesh, representative of Shush and Andimeshk. In part of his statement, describing the problems of the area, he said that counterrevolutionary agents are bringing equipment and arms into Iran from Iraq via the border at Shush.

At the start of his statements, Danesh said "Regarding problems in the electoral precincts, I consider it better to describe each one separately. It seems that all of Iran has been destroyed through the blessings of the phoney Pahlavi 'great civilization,' but around Shush, which is one of my electoral areas, some of which is also considered a border area, the problems are many times greater than in the town of Shush. There there are tribes and rural inhabitants who have a special affection for and interest in the emam and the problems which I am raising are the problems of this group of tribes. Their biggest need is potable water, which they lack. There the situation is such that women are sometimes forced to walk more than half a kilometer to fetch water. Of course since last year we have been sending that group a water tank truck so that it can provide some of its daily drinking water but this problem has not been wholly eliminated. In some areas deep wells have also been drilled, the drilling of some wells is also continuing, and, God willing, we hope that we will be able to exploit them as soon as possible. Other problems are the lack of highways, electricity, schools and so forth. As regards the schools, I must state that there is perhaps one school for 30 or 40 villages and again in some areas they even lack a teacher. The town of Shush itself is also faced with many problems and inadequacies, among the most important of which is the lack of a modern adequate communications system. In this town the Department of Communications just consists of two broken down rooms and a branch of communications lines, and this branch of lines is the only means of telephone communication with Andimeshk. Again, in some areas it is cut off. This problem must be eliminated as soon as possible by official parties and through the cooperation of the people, who certainly will cooperate. Of course, on account of the vastness of the area from the standpoint of agriculture and religious pilgrimages, and the fact that it is on the border, this problem possesses great importance. In addition, there are counterrevolutionary persons there and links between those persons and Iraq, and they import weapons and equipment into this town through various means and explosions have also taken place recently. The importance of this matter from the standpoint of communications equipment, especially communications, is apparent. For about 6 years the people of Shush have been trying to have a municipal and inter-city communications system established in this town but so far, since I have been here, no results have been yet realized through these efforts. Of course promises were made in the early part of the revolution and steps were also taken but unfortunately they have not been followed up on. In the Andimeshk area, which is another electoral district of ours, there are also problems in the same general area, some of which are connected to departments and are connected with the question of the purge in the Andimeshk railway. Recently a committee came in for the purge and unfortunately, instead of liquidating unfit elements, we witnessed the liquidation of good, fit people, which in

itself caused problems and discontentment. In another area, the situation in the municipality is not an object of the people's contentment. Likewise the condition of the streets--in particular the fact that the town of Andimeshk has been broken up into two segments by railway tracks and these two segments are linked by a street which passes over the railway tracks. Severe accidents have always occurred and are occurring at that point. Another of the most important problems of the people of Andimeshk is the cultural problem, since the people of this town at the present time are deprived of the presence of an informed, committed, literate clerical figure and have not had a Friday emam for some time. It is necessary that the academic community or the teachers' society send a committed cleric and manager to this area both to perform the Friday prayer and engage in the religious affairs of the people, and also to be able to create a religious and cultural base, since little atheistic and receptive groups are now active there. Of course good committed young Moslem people are also there, and they must be nurtured."

Arms Cache for Coup

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Jul 80 p 3

Large amounts of arms and materiel which were to have been used in a coup d'etat conspiracy, along with proclamations by the persons plotting the coup, were discovered in the basement of the home of a retired police colonel by the guards of the regional committee in part of Shemran.

This person, named Col Amir Hushang Nur, is currently in hiding. This person's son was arrested by the guards of Region One Committee and is being questioned.

In his speech which took place after the disclosure of the unsuccessful coup d'etat attempt, Emam Khomeyni referred to the large volumes of arms and equipment discovered and seized in a Shemran home by guards.

As the nation's emam described it in his statement, this event occurred when the guards of the Region One Committee of Shemran became suspicious that this house was a place of gambling, and went there to close the place of gambling down. Inside the courtyard of the house, a dog rushed at one of the guards, and that guard went into the basement of the house and in order to save himself from the danger of the dog and came up against large amounts of arms, materiel, other military equipment, and large amounts of announcements which had been signed by the Military Council of the Iranian Nation in the basement.

The text of the declarations obtained in the basement of that house is as follows:

"Beloved compatriots: the promised hour has come; the patriotic army of Iran has uprooted the filthy government of prelates and all the units of

the army, the gendarmerie and the police have declared their solidarity. Any resistance will be severely crushed. Be prepared to receive orders.

"Military Council of the Iranian Nation."

Way in Which the House Was Discovered

In a conversation with KEYHAN's correspondent in Shemran, the guards of the Committee of Region One of Shemran described the way in which the site in which the arms were concealed with the abovementioned declarations was discovered as follows:

Some time before, the guards of the Committee of Shemran Region One became suspicious of the comings and goings of a group in the Za'faranieh area and then received information that some military uniforms had been taken into a house situated in Za'faranieh. In another area, questionable comings and goings at this house made the guards think that the visitors were not just going to the place to gamble. Finally they entered the house to investigate. At the beginning the son of the owner of the place opened the door and when the guards said they intended to investigate he guided them through the basement to the top floor of the building. During this period, as the guards were engaged in investigating the house, a dog suddenly attacked the guards and one of the guards withdrew to the basement window so that his clothes would not get in contact with the dog, intending through this act to investigate the inside of the basement from outside. He noticed weapons in the basement and informed the other guards of the occurrence after investigating the ground. The people present in the house were immediately arrested and help was requested from the other units of the committee. After the basement was broken into, a large number of items, hand grenades, military uniforms, three-colored flags and a large amount of declarations were discovered. All the materiel and arms discovered were handed over to the competent officials after an inventory of the session.

The figures on the weapons and objects discovered in this storage areas are as follows:

Eighty-one different items of weaponry, 18 hand grenades, 216 Uzi cartridge clips, 8,000 rounds, 500 military uniforms, 2,000 three-colored flags, 10,000 copies of a declaration, five large wire and cable cutting shears, 53 small flashlights, one infrared light, eight bullhorns and a package of dynamite.

Special Anti-coup Staff

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 13 Jul 80 p 2

Hojjatoleslam Fazlollah Mahallati, Emam Khomeyni's representative in the army of guards, participated today in an exclusive interview with PARS NEWS

AGENCY's correspondent and described the manner in which the latest plot was carried out and the status of the army of guards. He pointed out that the army of guards is the army of the Islamic revolution and that all Islamic rules must rule the army. Anyone who devictes from these Islamic rules will be expelled from the army.

Hojjatoleslam Mahallati said, "Following the assignment from the emam, we got in touch with various officials and members of the army and through the investigation I carried out in the course of a week I conveyed the inadequacies to the emam."

Reverring to the point that there are many chaste, self-sacrificing, devoted people in the army and that if they did not exist our revolution would not have borne fruit, Hojjatoleslam Mahallati added, "There is some lack of discipline in the army, and that is an important problem. Sometimes people are arrested without permission from the public prosecutor or official persons, sometimes some people in the army spend money or perform acts which are outside the limits of their duties, and this activity will be strictly combatted."

Referring to the point that the army sometimes acts alone and does not make use of the other armed forces, which sometimes results in the death of guards themselves, he added, "One thing I did in the west of the country was that we in the Province Insurance Council undertook to have no organ or body of the armed forces act alone. They would prepare their plan in advance and would break responsibilities down among themselves, and no one would depart from his duty. They also put this program into operation in the Central Security Council, in the attendance of the president; every act and struggle which occurs is to take place with the cooperation of the armed forces, and it was through this coordination that we were able to neutralize this dangerous plot, with God's will and the aid of our upright brothers in the air force and army, central council and Islamic council brothers. Therefore, this is our plan, that the army should cooperate with everyone and not depart from the limits of its duties and that no armed force should take any kind of selfish attitude. If a person or group carries out a program alone it will immediately be subject to prosecution and punishment."

In response to the question "It has been said that some members of the staff took part in the arrest of Mr Baqeri--what is your view on this matter?" Hojjatoleslam Mahallati said "I have not yet investigated this matter but, as they have informed me, the army did not arrest him; some members of the Islamic Society of the air force carried out this program."

Hojjatoleslam Mahallati added, "By orders of the president, a staff has been formed for this subject from all the security organs, one of which is the army of guards, the committee, the air force, and the others, and all information must be given to this staff. Any organ it is given to must give the information to the staff. It is the staff which will take

a decision concerning the arrest of an individual. Regarding his arrest and that of Sadiqi, so far as I have heard, and I have got in touch with the staff, the staff had no information. Since this activity took place without the knowledge of the staff, they gave the order that they should not oppose them and if there is positive evidence regarding any person there will not be the slightest doubt regarding him. Therefore, in matters of this sort which arise, no guard, whether he is from the army, from the committee or from the Islamic societies, will have the right to arrest anyone unless an order is issued by that staff itself. If they do this, and even if they are right, they themselves will be arrested on grounds of committing a violation."

Governors' Powers Increased

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 5 Jul 80 p 14

The bill on the law on the powers of the governors general of the country was ratified by the Revolutionary Council on 19 June.

In accordance with this law, the governors general will be presented to the Council of State by the minister of the interior and, following appointment to the area of jurisdiction of their assignment, will be considered the highest representative of the state in their area of jurisdiction and will be responsible for carrying out the general policy of the government there. The text of the bill on the law on the powers of the governors general is as follows:

Article 1. As of the date of the ratification of this law, the governors general will be presented by the minister of the interior to the council of State and, following the approval of their appointment, a writ of governor generalcy will be issued by the cabinet, signed by the president, prime minister and minister of the interior.

Article 2. The governors general will be considered the highest representative of the state in the area of jurisdiction of their assignment, will be responsible for implementation of the general policy of the state in the area of their assignment, and will have full, supreme oversight over all the executive matters of the province.

Note 1. The governors general can engage in the investigation of government organizations and departments and, if they have opinions regarding the affairs of these units, may render judgment with the cooperation of the director of chief of the unit involved.

In the event the issue is not resolved in the capital of the province, the governors general may conduct discussions with the minister to whom the unit is subordinate and resolve the issue. The minister in charge will, after the necessary investigations into the governor general's report, implement the requisite measures.

Note 2. In the event the case is not resolved in the above manner, the governors general will submit the issue to the minister of the interior, the minister of the interior will raise the issue in cabinet, and the cabinet's decision will be conveyed to the governors general for implementation.

Article 3. In order to supervise and oversee radio and television programs in full, the governors general may appoint a representative to the radio and television organization of the province. This representative will be considered the representative of the government.

Article 4. In order to coordinate the measures of government departments and organizations, and the revolutionary and social bodies in each province, with the general policy of the state, and in order to strengthen these bodies, the governors general may, at any time they consider it necessary, form joint sessions composed of the relevant managers, chiefs and persons in charge and other persons they deem necessary. In case of need they will place the necessary information at the disposal of the people.

Article 5. Preserving the order, security and welfare of the people and general calm in every province through the Insurance Council will be the duty of the governor general. In addition to this, providing supplies, general provisions and careful surveillance over the implementation of construction, renovation and improvement programs in the towns, villages and so forth, through the councils of competent agencies, will be among the duties of the governors general.

Note. The governors general must encourage people and organizations to establish companies and engage in public works and similar matters.

Note 2. The purge of departments, organizations and companies belonging to the government will be carried out in accordance with the laws, through consultation with and surveillance by the governors general.

Article 6. The government departments and representatives sent out by the ministries and other government and national organs concerning issues which bear on general policy or have importance in terms of local policy must perform their duties with the knowledge and guidance of the governor general.

/Signed/ Seyyed Abol Hasan Bani Sadr, president and chairman of the Islamic Revolutionary Council of Iran.

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BAHRAIN LIBERATION FRONT MEMBER DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH IRAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 19 Jul 80 p 4

/Article: "The Islamic Revolution Is Being Exported: Acquaintance with the Islamic Revolution in Bahrain"/

/Text/ The triumph of the Islamic revolution of Iran has had a great, profound influence on all the downtrodden peoples of the world, in particular the Moslem peoples of the region. Proceeding from Africa and Asia to Latin America, and from the Far East to the Near East and Middle East, from Afghanistan and Iraq to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, everyone considers that this revolution is the vanguard of his victory and considers that its great leader and commander is his sole commander. Among them, a nation such as Bahrain, which has a very profound historic and cultural link with Iran, and until a few years ago was considered a member of Iran's body, enjoys a very large degree of acceptance and influence from our revolution. In this connection, in order to bring the voice of these deprived, tyrannized people to the ears of our Iranian brothers and sisters, we arranged an interview with two brother representatives of the Islamic Liberation Front of Bahrain, which you may read as follows:

/Question/ All in all, how do you view the current conditions in Bahrain and the conditions of the Islamic revolution of the people of Bahrain?

/Answer/ The conditions of Bahrain have not yet changed in any way, are just like the conditions of 200 years ago, since at that time, when it was under British colonialism, and later when it became independent so to speak, the same Pharaohs have always governed in Bahrain in the form of al-Khalifah and the family of al-Khalifah, but just in different forms. Fire and iron, killing and torture, and mass arrests have always been imposed on the deprived, tyrannized people of Bahrain. The only thing which has changed is that methods have changed and have become more advanced with the progress of time! The government of al-Khalifah, with the cooperation of America, the British, the bloody regime in Iraq and Pakistani, Jordanian

and Saudi mercenaries, in addition to fugitive Savak members from the regime of the deposed Shah, are crushing every kind of liberation movement in the most severe way.

The slightest demonstrations meet with mass killing and arrests. Even a number of religious young people who are working in a benevolent fund by the name of the al-Husayn Social Fund are being kept in the worst conditions in prisons. However, in spite of all that, there is an intense revolutionary state among the people of the downtrodden nation of Bahrain. Demonstrations are constantly being held for any excuse. The demonstrations which were held on the occasion of the martyrdom of Ayatollah Sadr were very significant. Of course, a very large number were arrested, and one of the best active, religious young men of Bahrain was martyred. The people made an attack, removed the body of this martyr and took it to the mosque. The following day a splendid funeral was held for him.

/Question/ What is your opinion about the parties and societies which are active in Bahrain against the government?

/Answer/ Previously, about 15 years ago, there were some left-wing parties active on the scene in Bahrain, such as the Bahraini National Liberation Front, which was Russian, and the "People's Front," which was Maoist, because there was no Islamic thinking. However, they in no had a popular base, but, because of the political climate then, because of the presence of British colonialism, anti-popular activities, and the extreme poverty, suppression and pressure the people endured, attention was given to these two parties in very small measure. To some extent they managed to attract people's thoughts. However, after the people learned the nature of these parties, they turned back toward the true Islam. They became aware that it is only Islam which can achieve their proper demands at any time and in any place.

About 12 years ago an Islamic front was formed and began activity in a broad context. However, until the triumph of the Islamic revolution of Iran, this front's activity was hidden and the Islamic front for the liberation of Bahrain declared the existence openly immediately following the triumph in Iran.

/Question/ Bahrain openly declared its existence /sic/--who are the leaders of this front and how do they think, from the ideological standpoint?

/Answer/ The leaders of this front are Islamic and Shiite and the domin ant idea is the unificationist idea of Islam. Of course four committed Moslem revolutionary clerics are also in leadership positions in this front.

The ideological thinking of the people of Bahrain is totally Islamic, and leftist ideas and leftist parties have been entirely eliminated. About 95 percent of the people of Bahrain are Moslem, twelve Shiites, and a much more important fact is that the people possess a very high political

development and religious differences are in no way at issue at the present time. Recently a society and movement by name of "The Islamic Society Movement," who are among Sunnite brethren, declared their existence and the aim of this society is also just to fight against the dictatorial regime of Bahrain under the flag of Islam. They also call for unity between Shiites and Sunnites, but the regime is trying to sow disputes between these two groups.

/Question/ What is the nature of cooperation between the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and other parties, inside or outside your country?

/Answer/ We are ready to cooperate with all Islamic parties and groups which have deep-rooted faith in the path of genuine Islam, are fighting against satanic regimes and against oppression and tyranny, and are on neither an eastern nor a western path, and we are in cooperation with some parties. We wholly believe that all the downtrodden people of the world must believe in the leadership of Emam Khomeyni and accept this leadership in heart and soul. The Moslem people of Bahrain are among them, and this is wholly clear from the demonstrations and slogans they make. Therefore we cooperate with all peoples who are on this path and this belief.

/Question/ What is your opinion about Mr Qotbzadeh and the status of the Iranian embassy in Bahrain?

/Answer/ The visit by Qotbzadeh, as the foreign minister and representative of a revolutionary Moslem country, to the reactionary colonial country of Bahrain has had a very negative effect on the people of Bahrain.

Qotbzadeh made a visit to this country at a time when American airplanes were taking off from it to make a military attack on Iran and Israeli aircraft had also taken over all Bahrain's airports. Qotbzadeh, going by h's own statement, was bringing a message from the emam to the caliph of Bahrain, but in my opinion this subject is completely lacking in truth; the emam does not do such things. The news that reached us was that Mr Qotbzadeh's visit was cancelled after it had been ratified by the Revolutionary Council but he made the visit anyway.

The status of the Iranian embassy in Bahrain is still satanic. Agents of Savak and the Shah's regime are still busy there. Of course I am saying that Qotbzadeh's visit was cancelled, since we talked with Mr Ahmad Khomeyni and he promised that this visit had been cancelled. The Moslem people of Bahrain put glorious demonstrations in movement during those days to protest America's military attack on Iran.

/Question/ What do you say about the effect the Iranian revolution has left in Bahrain?

/Answer/ As I explained before, the Moslem people of Bahrain accept only the leadership of the emam. In our demonstrations, we gave the slogan "Khomeyni, go forward, go forward, for today is the day of the people." Any house you go to people have certainly put up the emam's picture. The prime minister of Bahrain, in a conversation with a British magazine, stated "The most important column protecting us has fallen;" he was extremely uncomfortable. Similarly, the prime minister of Bahrain has openly asked aid from Iraq, so that if the state of revolution in Bahrain progresses Iraq will immediately intervene.

/Question/ At present, what countries are helping the government of Bahrain crush the people?

/Answer/ The Ba'th regime of Iraq is cooperating intensely, to the point where Iraqi intelligence is free to do anything it wishes in Bahrain. Security officials of Bahrain and policemen are mostly Iraqi, Saudi Arabian, Jordanian, Pakistani and Israeli. Out of Bahrain's population of 500,000, we have 200,000 foreigners! Most of them are in the police, army and security agencies. The commander of the naval bases is an American.

After Iraq, the first country which fell under the influence of the Islamic revolution of Iran was Bahrain. Immediately on hearing the news of the triumph of the Iranian revolution, all the people poured into the streets and held demonstrations, parties and joyous celebrations. The state of absorption in news of Iran among the people of Bahrain is amazing. All homes listen to Radio Iran and Iranian television. Now all the demands of the people of Bahrain are Iranian demands. On Jerusalem Day many glorious demonstrations were held in Bahrain, unparalleled in any Arab or Islamic country. It is in these conditions that an American official said that Bahrain is in a complicated and overall fearful situation. For the same reason the emam's representative in Bahrain was arrested and then banished. Putting up pictures of the emam and listening to Radio Iran have been declared completely illegal. Anyone acting in violation is immediately arrested and tortured.

/Question/ Could you give a description about the economic conditions of the people of Bahrain?

/Answer/ Bahrain, because of its important geographical position and its strategic position, has considerable importance for America and Europe from the economic and political standpoint. In Bahrain, especially after the war in Lebanon, we have about 42 foreign and international banks. The regime is a capitalist regime in every sense. The Emir of Bahrain, members of his family (the ruling family), the ministers and a few limited individuals enjoy extremely great wealth, but the majority of the people of Bahrain live in poverty and squalor. There is downtroddenness in Bahrain in the true meaning of the word. Inflation is oppressive, unemployment has reached its peak, and the cutoff of electricity and water goes on for hours. Of

course these things just concern the deprived people of the nation. Except for them, inflation has no meaning to people and cutoffs of water and electricity and similar matters do not in any way involve their families. Oil is plentiful in Bahrain and if the oil money were to be allocated it would be a thousand times greater than the needs of the people. Of course, it is all in the hands of the foreign companies. Pearls and coral used to be produced in large quantities and were a great resource themselves, but their production has been declared forbidden and they are gradually burying their marine sources.

From the standpoint of agriculture, Bahrain was famous as the land of life, but now all of our goods are imported. Bahrain is full of foreign goods, especially as regards cloth and clothes, which are exported to Iran in large quantities. However, the government recently prohibited Iranian launches from approaching Bahrain. This was out of fear of the entry of the Islamic revolution into Bahrain.

/Question/ What evaluation do you have on the triumph of the revolution of Bahrain and the overthrow of its regime?

/Answer/ Its regime is very flimsy. To the contrary, the will and desire of the nation is powerful and strong. The regime, which views the regime of the Shah as its guardian and lord and master, is a corrupt regime and, God willing, will soon fall.

/Question/ What is the number of prisoners in Bahrain?

/Answer/ The number of prisoners is greater than 1,200. Among them are religious scholars, 10 women, and the rest mostly committed, enthusiastic young Moslems who are subjected to the worst torture. Let me mention that imprisoning women in Bahrain, according to the customs they have, is a very serious, intolerable act for the Moslem people of Bahrain, though recently they have been putting women and girls in prison, including one committed, religious sister who is also a powerful speaker and has had an effective role in guiding girls, name of Sister Sadiqah al-Musawi.

/Question/ Could you describe military matters in Bahrain and the volume of American interference in these issues?

/Answer/ The Bahrain military bases, one in al-Muharraq (air and ground) and one in al-Junayr (naval), are both entirely American and all the personnel in them are American. There are about 15,000 military personnel in Bahrain, from soldiers to military advisors, and America made abundant use of the Bahrain bases in its latest attack on Iran. Four days before the military intervention, the prime minister held meeting and conversation with the commander of the naval forces, who is America, and also held talks with the commander of the vessels present in the Persian Gulf.

/Question/ In conclusion, what is your message to the Iranian people, as the representative of a fraternal people?

/Answer/ Our message to the Iranian people would be to consider that this nation has entered a great Islamic revolution and is considered a big brother which has acquired a very good experience for us. Our message is on the basis of the federation of nations. Our only message to the Iranian nation is to open its arms to the deprived, downtrodden peoples of the world, become acquainted with their conditions, conduct investigations into the oppressions they endure and show a decisive reaction. Our message to the beloved people of Iran is to build a bridge between Iran and the peoples who are rising up. Another message from us is that we request them always to commit themselves to the emam's leadership and never forget their emam, their leader, and their valuable revolution, not just through slogans but through deeds, so that they will be performing their mission. Another important issue which I would like to state to the Iranian people, as a request and message, is that they never weaken the officials. If they make mistakes, they should mention it, correct their views, insist to the officials and also try, themselves, to export the Islamic Iranian revolution, since it does not belong to them themselves, so that the hopes of downtrodden people may be realized through the leadership of Emam Khomeyni. Another matter which I want to mention to the Iranian brothers, is that the mass media not state the news of the revolution of Bahrain and other revolutions and if they do convey news or convey mistakes or deficient news, we hope that all the Moslems of the world will be united and victorious in attaining a single worldwide Islamic government.

11887
CSO: 4906

BALUCHI RELIGIOUS LEADER ASKS TEHRAN RECOGNITION OF SUNNI LAWS

LD091025 Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 Sep 80 p 15

[Interview with Mowlavi Mosleheddin Salehi, Imam Jomeh of Sarbaz, Iranshahr by KEYHAN "Political Correspondent": "The Baluchis Will Defend The Islamic Republic to the Last Drop of Blood"; date and place not specified]

[Excerpt] "A number of evil-doers and bandits whose interests were threatened after the Islamic Revolution and who are in contact with agents of the former regime and foreigners on the border between Iran and Pakistan are creating unrest and disturbance and terrifying the people." "The people of Baluchestan want the military forces, including the gendarmerie and the guards corps, to go into action as soon as possible and extirpate these corrupt elements."

The above remarks were made by a theologian from Baluchestan, Imam Jomeh of a Sarbaz, Iranshahr, during an exclusive interview with the KEYHAN political correspondent. He continued:

"The people of Baluchestan have a particular affection for the Imam and the Islamic Revolution and they wish to apply the Imam's concept of equal rights for Sunnis and Shi'ites to the whole of Iran, particularly Baluchestan. Remember that Baluchestan has a special geographical situation. Imperialism is trying to inflict damage on the Islamic Republic by penetrating this sensitive area.

"In addition, since the Sunnis are in the majority in Baluchistan, foreigners wish to set the region ablaze by creating a climate of division, war and fighting between Shi'a and Sunni. For this reason, both the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Islamic Republic Government must translate the Imam's concept of the constitution into action, and give consideration to supplementary provisions to Article 12 of the constitution, and submit this to public referendum.

"In accordance with a decree by the Imam, Dr Yazdi traveled to this area about a year ago to investigate conditions in Sistan and Baluchestan, and following his inspection of the region he submitted a report to the Imam, which both the Imam and the Revolutionary Council approved. The demand of

the people, as reflected in the report, was that the laws of the Sunni religion be officially recognized by the courts, and that action should follow on that basis. As I said, most Baluchis are Sunnis and they wish to enjoy equal rights with their Shi'ite brethren. In order to implement this, our first request is that the Sunni religion be recognized as official by the constitution, and then for our religious laws to apply."

On the subject of the influence of foreigners in Baluchestan, Mowlavi Salehi said: "There is no doubt that certain persons are at work keeping Baluchestan in a state of unrest. These elements keep coming and going between Pakistan and Iranian Baluchestan, but rest assured that they will never achieve their shameful ends, since the Baluchis, men and women, young and old, will resist in defending the Islamic Republic of Iran to the last drop of their blood; and, anyway, we are Muslims and prepared to die as martyrs in the defense of Islam and the homeland. The Muslim people of Baluchestan are now on full alert to forestall any sort of adventurism on the part of counterrevolutionaries in the province."

As to how security might be established in the region, he said: "In order to bring about stability and security in the region, above all else, the forces of the gendarmerie and the guards corps should be reinforced in the border zone, so that they can stop the penetration of the area by elements supporting foreign powers. Everyone should know that most of the unrest is the work of evil-doers who come and go freely between Pakistan and Iranian Baluchestan. Therefore, if they are stopped, I can promise a 100-percent return of security in Baluchestan. Meanwhile, if good and experienced individuals are employed in the gendarmerie and the guards corps, they will be able to control the border zone by prudent and correct methods and to stop the insecurity which sometimes affects this area."

CSO: 4906

BANI-SADR'S OFFICE INFORMS PUBLIC ON OPPOSITION GROUPS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 2 Sep 80 p 15

[Text] Tehran, PARS News Agency--The following statement was released by President-People Liaison Office last night:

"In the Name of God,

"Dear Muslim Brothers and Sisters,

"As you are aware, this is not the first time that when our nation is poised for making historic decisions under most sensitive circumstances, certain groups, factions and currents have attempted, by means of systematic, multi-faceted and far-reaching attacks and by salvos of aspersions and invectives, to drag us into disputes and counterattacks, but each time we have refrained from reacting to such set-up episodes.

Our silence, however, is not one of acquiescence and appeasement. When the enemy tries to cause you to cry, silence is the most effective weapon for combating that kind of enemy. It is the method with the Shi'ites emulating Ali [i.e. the first Imam of the Shi'ites and the son-in-law of Prophet Mohammad] have learned from him.

Lately, while the people, the Majles and the popularly elected president are entangled in efforts to select the cabinet ministers, a new uproar has flared up against us in the wake of the previous attacks and aspersions. As an example, we can cite the statement by the Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Enqelab-e Eslami [The Islamic Revolutionary Militants Organization] about the cabinet. It would be appropriate here to remind that the said statement was broadcast on several occasions by the Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran in tandem with a matching commentary written by the commentators of the "Knowing Time." Now it is open to question what was the underlying motives of the writers of the statement in repeating the themes which have already been harped frequently. It is our belief that they try to engage the people in such a way that the society will tend to neglect the right which is about to be usurped from it. The fact of the matter is that the nation

has elected the president so that he may select the prime minister and the cabinet ministers in accordance with the express letter of the constitution. Of course, the constitution stipulates at the same time that these officials shall have to be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly so that the government is empowered to make provisions for the enforcement of the constitution by way of ensuring the required coordination among the various mechanisms. This is the fact that militates against their collective interests at any rate. The posing of any problem designed to draw a herring across the eyes of the public to detract them from watchful supervision over the implementation of the constitution would be considered by us to be the machination of the "malicious savants" or that of the ignorant stooges of the enemy. We assure you that we will preserve our aplomb and silence in this situation no matter how wildly they revile us.

In conclusion we remind that under the present circumstance and in such an atmosphere it is only natural for us to analyze their efforts, motives, schemes and actions. [According to the Koran] Blessed are those devouts who tread the straight path without haughtiness and those who merely utter greetings (Salaam) when accosted by the ignorant. Those who evince fortitude and perseverance shall be rewarded with a lofty position where they shall be hailed with greetings and well-wishing.

9695
CSO: 4906

BAKHTIAR, GEN OVEYSI MEET NEAR VERSAILLES

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 25 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] The SUNDAY TIMES newspaper reported on its front page yesterday that confidential talks took place in the vicinity of Versailles between former Iranian Army Commander Field Marshall Oveysi and the Prime Minister of the ousted shah, Shapur Bakhtiar. The newspaper added that the basic subject of the talks was military strategy for overthrowing Ayatollah Khomeyni, forming a post-Khomeyni government, and returning monarchical power to Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, the oldest child of the ousted shah.

After the defeat of the recent military coup d'etat plot, it was said that Shapur Bakhtiar aligned himself with General Oveysi's supporters, and his recent meetings with Oveysi are seen by observers as an indication of his total unity with Oveysi's group.

9310
CSO: 4906

INTELLIGENCE SERVICE NETWORK 'REVEALED'

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 25 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Radio Tehran announced that the Islamic Revolutionary Guards of Esfahan have uncovered a spy network in this city following comprehensive research and extensive activities. Documents and evidence have come to hand from this spy network, known as the Osqofi ring and having personnel in the cities of Yazd, Kerman, Shiraz and Tehran, which included Iranian military secrets and apparatus that denote the Osqofi spy ring.

In connection with the recent sinister coup d'etat, evidence has also come to hand that documents the transfer of 500 million American dollars to the Osqofi ring of Esfahan and 300 tons of TNT explosives for distribution among a number of Army personnel, the Bahai group and the counterrevolutionary groups. At the present time a number of members of this group who are foreign nationals, along with their Iranian colleagues in this network, have been arrested.

Radio Iran said it is necessary to remember that the Osqofi ring of Iran in Esfahan, under the command of Osqof Hassan Dehqani Farari, who is also in command of Osqofi of Jerusalem and the Middle East, has benefitted from the services of such veteran and long-time spies as Father Iraj Mottahedeh Yahudi, who came from the Anglican priesthood, and who is in detention now.

The aforesaid individual, after spending periods of time in Israel and England, spent 35 years in the service of the Osqofi ring, working in the cities of Tehran, Esfahan and Shiraz.

This center is regarded as one of the most important spy bases attached to the Intelligence Service, so that according to evidence that has come to hand, when the Islamic Revolution of Iran was victorious, the CIA spy organization extended an offer to help to the spies of the Osqofi ring in a letter, and it will be remembered that the CIA and the Intelligence Service are long-time allies.

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CSO: 4906

RAFSANJANI: WE WILL HELP ERITREA LIBERATION ORGANIZATION

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 25 Aug 80 p 7

[Text] The representative of the Eritrea Liberation Organization met and talked yesterday with Hojjatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani. After referring to Hojjatoleslam Rafsanjani's election and wishing him well as Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and after reporting on the situation in Eritrea, he said:

After the triumph of the Islamic Revolution of Iran, which is really considered a victory for the people of Eritrea, the people of Eritrea have the same feeling about the Islamic Revolution of Iran that the people of Iran have about their revolution, especially since the ousted shah had very close relations with the Ethiopian regime and the people of Eritrea suffered because of this. Even Iranian aircraft bombarded Eritrea during the time of the ousted shah. Our revolutionaries, after the occupation of the spy nest by the Moslem Students Following the Line of the Imam, upon the severing of Iranian-American relations by the Islamic Revolution of Iran, announced their readiness and were prepared to fight alongside their brothers in Iran against America.

Iran's victory over its problems and difficulties is a victory for us and our people. The people of Eritrea expect the revolution of Iran to defend and back their revolt and to stand beside the revolutionaries of Eritrea in order to liberate the land under Ethiopian occupation.

He said the Eritrea Liberation Organization is the only legal representative of the people of Eritrea, and the people are interested in it and back it. The people of Eritrea are not ready to submit to the domination or power of any ruler.

Then Hojjatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani, while thanking the representative of the Eritrea Liberation Organization for his good wishes, said: We are concerned about the people of Eritrea. We consider America, Russia and Ethiopia culpable and condemned, and despite great distance and separation, we are ready to help.

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CSO: 4906

BBC CITED ON QOTBZADEH'S FUTURE

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 9 Aug 80 p 9

[Text] Last night BBC said that while the Islamic Republican Party continues to strengthen and consolidate its domination and political influence in Iran, one of the targets of their recent attacks, Sadeq Qotbzadeh, Iranian foreign minister, has again stated that he has no intention whatsoever to hold a position in the future Iranian government.

Sadeq Qotbzadeh, who has in recent weeks been attacked by the Islamic Republican Party for Iran's foreign policy and a lack of revolutionary zeal and excitement, yesterday strongly defended himself in front of the Majles. He said that in accordance with expectations, Iran's foreign policy during his tutelage was unwaveringly in Ayatollah Khomeyni's line and had tendencies neither in an eastern nor western direction. However, he added, unfortunately Iran, 13 months after the revolution, has still not chosen a clear and precise foreign policy.

Qotbzadeh then defended the statement which he made in Paris immediately after on the attempt on the life of Shapur Bakhtiar, former prime minister. In this statement he had said that the Iranian government neither had any information about the course of this assassination nor approved of it.

Qotbzadeh then came under harsh criticism from the Islamic Republican Party extremists for making this statement. He said yesterday in this regard that a law could be passed in the Majles which would give Iran the right to attack anyone in any corner of the world; however, if such a law were approved, foreign countries would then have to decide whether or not to continue relations with Iran.

The last declarations of Qotbzadeh and the Islamic Republican Party's implicit criticism of them, and Qotbzadeh's decision not to perform a role in Iran's new government and thus the Islamic Republican government, make it clear that he will not attain another position.

Qotbzadeh is not alone in this respect. One month ago Admiral Madani accused the Islamic Republican Party of planning to form a one-party country in Iran. At the beginning of the present week the Majles with a very noteworthy majority decided to reject Admiral Madani's credentials as a Majles member and now demands his arrest and trial. In reality Madani had decided to refrain from participation in the Majles. He had previously entirely rejected the procedure by which the credentials of Majles deputies who were freely elected by the people were subjected to investigation.

Admiral Madani resembles many politicians who in the first stage supported the Iranian revolution but who have gradually become discouraged by the direction that the revolution is taking.

9597
CSO: 4906

RUMORS ON PLAN AND BUDGET ORGANIZATION DISSOLUTION DENOUNCED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Aug 80 p 3

[Article: "Plan and Budget Organization Deputy: Rumors on Plan and Budget Organization Dissolution Are for Destroying the Basis of Order and Equilibrium"]

> [Text] The Deputy of the Plan and Budget Organization, following some rumors concerning the dissolution of this organization, answered these rumors and some questions during an interview, and clarified the views of the above organization concerning the country's economic problems.

Deputy al-Sabahi, concerning the country's distressed economic condition, while alluding to our one-commodity economy, the lack of sufficient production, lack of capital investment, stagnation, unemployment and rapid inflation, and on top of everything, unjust income distribution, took up its most important feature, saying: A problem related to all these distress factors is the lack of unified management in the economic organization of our society. This stems from the multiplicity of power centers and special day-to-day problems, which leads us to the conclusion that our country's economic crisis cannot find economic solutions under current conditions before political solutions are applied.

Concerning 18 months of government revenues, he added that our country's revenues for 18 months have been based mostly on consumption and dependence. Due to decreased production and capital investment and greater stagnation, we satisfied all our needs with oil revenues. Even all our creative, ideological and religious movements began with a reliance on petroleum income. For example, the waging of the holy struggle began in practice with a reliance on oil wells, while to our minds a holy war is a religious and spiritual movement.

Continuing his remarks, while explaining the planning process and its importance for economic stability and health, he expressed regret that most ideas, suggestions and planning proposals have not been usable until now as expected and as necessity requires because of contradiction, conflict and fragmentation between executive powers. He added: Concerning the lack of planning

discipline and putting a stop to it in the noble nation of Iran, we are reminded and we proclaim that "there is no way to move away from backwardness and dependence without comprehensive planning."

In one part of his speech he said: The act of weakening the Plan and Budget Organization through continuous strikes and attacks, and rumors of this organization's dissolution, are circulating for the purpose of sidetracking the last stronghold of order and equilibrium. He then referred to the role of the organization, saying:

The Plan and Budget Organization is a coordinator of proposals, plans, policies and methods. In short, it balances society's acceptable expectations and arranges for society's acceptance. Without this effort the load of problems will vastly increase beyond what it is now. The continuation of this crisis will put every plan in jeopardy.

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CSO: 4900

STUDENTS EXPELLED FROM UK GREETED AT TEHRAN AIRPORT

LD120408 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0114 GMT 12 Sep 80

[Unattributed Commentary]

[Text] The reason for the closure of the British Embassy in Tehran has been made public. Following the Iranian authorities' warnings to the British Government and after the expulsion of the first batch of Muslim students, the British Foreign Office recalled to London its charge d'affaires and all other diplomats in Tehran, except one. Now the British Embassy in Tehran is closed. The British authorities said: We have deemed it essential to recall our diplomats from Tehran because of the present difficult and unpredictable phase in our relations with Iran.

On the other hand, the Pars News Agency reported that the two Muslim Iranian students, accompanied by the 3-year-old child and British wife of one of the brothers, who had left Britain, arrived in Tehran at 0230. Thousands of Muslim sisters and brothers from Tehran, who had been given only a few hours notice of the arrival of these crusaders, assembled at Mehrabad Airport and chanted slogans in an extremely orderly manner, paying tribute to the students defending the Islamic Revolution who had been expelled from Britain.

The Islamic nation's auspicious rally, while sending greetings to Imam Khomeyni and backing the struggles of the Muslim Iranian students, identified the British police as the stooges of U.S. imperialism and world zionism. The British wife of one of the expelled brothers, who was carrying in her arms her 3-year-old child, told the Pars News Agency correspondent: The British police behaved inhumanly against us when we were demonstrating quite peacefully against the United States; and we reject any charges of assaulting the British police or of obstruction. This British Muslim, whose expulsion order had been signed by the British home secretary for the crime of defending the Islamic Revolution and backing Imam Khomeyni, then continued: At a time when several British policemen are caught committing the crime of burglarizing a department store one could draw one's conclusion about the truth of the depositions made by such safeguarders of law and order. She termed ludicrous the Western puppet press accusations that the students had received money from Iran in order to stage demonstrations.

In another part of this interview an expelled Muslim brother said: We will continue our struggle until our other Muslim sisters and brothers are released from the prison of the British fascist police. He continued: The British police are definitely unsuccessful and we will give a full report to the Imam of the Islamic nation and to our martyr-nurturing nation.

As to the British police's behavior toward the jailed students, the same expelled brother said: Their behavior was utterly brutal; we spent over 30 days in tiny cells in conditions of the utmost squalor and indignity.

The British wife of the same Muslim crusader then said that the British police had behaved in an utterly inhuman manner to her husband, that the demonstrators had never assaulted the police and that the charge of assaulting the police was nothing but a tissue of lies without foundation.

Another of our brothers, whose deportation order had been issued by the British puppet courts for the crime of taking photographs, said: In a cell where a number of us were detained we did not have enough room even to sit down and they kept pumping extremely foul and polluted air into our cells. So in order to make the surrounding air breathable we kept wetting our shirts in the toilet and wiping our faces with them. As to the accusation that we received money from the Iranian Government in order to stage demonstrations, the same brother said: What else could they say--thieving police, a number of whom, according to the guardian, were arrested a week ago for the crime of burglarizing--could they possibly say anything else to please their master, the United States? How else could they prove to the United States that they are good servants?

A Muslim brother who said that he had studied technology in Britain for 5 years added: In accordance with my Islamic convictions I deem defending the Islamic Revolution and its achievements one of my main duties. Referring to the fact that British fascist police and jailers had been instructed by the British home office to subject us to psychological torture, he added: We, the 57 student members of the Islamic association who are condemned to expulsion, contrary to the empty claim of the British authorities in no way had the right to defend ourselves in court. But we never gave the British the satisfaction of appealing against our sentences. We thereby condemned and rejected the competence and the predetermined verdicts of the made-to-order British courts.

This sister and these brothers, while chanting Khomeyni, om Imam and being showered with flowers as a gesture of welcome by the brother guards, left the airport in the midst of a vast crowd and joined the ranks of another assembly of brothers and sisters who had waited for hours outside the airport in an orderly manner. The crowd was composed of young and old, men and women, clergymen and students and others. The vast crowd of welcomers, chanting such slogans as the Muslim students are the manifestation of our faith; Khomeyni, Khomeyni, is our speaking Koran! And death to the British fascist police!, left the airport at 0330.

We would like to remind you that last month the British fascist police arrested 72 of our Muslim brother and sister members of the Islamic Association of Students, after orderly demonstrations in protest against U.S. imperialism opposite the U.S. embassy in London. These brothers and sisters, who were charged merely with defending the Islamic Revolution and Imam Khomeyni and professing hostility to the United States, were finally condemned by the made-to-order British courts and expelled.

CSO: 4906

NEW LAR DAM AGREEMENT CRITICIZED

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 11 Aug 80 p 12

[Text] Iran has agreed to pay a $500 million price increase to a group of Italian, German, Japanese and English companies for the completion of the Lar Dam project. In the view of economic experts this decision is a sign of renewal of developmental activities in Iran through foreign companies.

The new contract was signed in Tehran with a company affiliated with the Fiat corporation. Work on the Lar dam has remained almost at a standstill since the revolution's victory. Last spring foreign companies threatened that in the case of a failure to reach an agreement with the Iranian government they would drop the projects. This project, which began in 1974, will end in another two years. It is one of the limited number of projects in which members of the Pahlavi family did not receive a commission from foreign contractors for hits completion.

Simultaneously with the signing of this contract it was announced in Tehran that the Iranian government is prepared to enter into discussions with the main offices of those German companies whose branches were nationalized in Iran, regarding their future management. These two decisions are transformations in the economic policy of Iranian revolutionary authorities who in the past were opposed to any form of cooperation with western companies. The new dam is supposed to supply additional drinking water for thirsty Tehran, districts of which were without water for hours this summer. The Iranian Plan and Budget Organization undertook responsibility for the success of the recent negotiations. Officials of this organization expressed hope that other foreign companies whose cooperation would be useful to the Iranian economy and which had not cooperated with corrupt agents of the Pahlavis in the past would be able to continue their activities in Iran.

9597
CSO: 4906

ISLAM HELD UNCOMPROMISING AGAINST FOREIGN 'INHIBITIONS'

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 26 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Kalim Siddiqui: "A New Phase in Islamic History"]

[Text]

The world pretends that the dynamism of the Islamic movement has taken it by surprise. The first reaction of the detractors of Islam, even before they try to understand us, is to give Islam a bad name. Hence, the string of emotional adjectives - resurgent, emergent, militant designed to evoke fear. Islam, as Muslims know, is none of these things. Islam is always the same - the truth as ordained by Allah *subhanahu wa ta'la*. Islam is not a movement by the choice of the Muslims. Islam came as a movement and has always been a movement. It is incontrovertibly linked with man's movement and progress. For centuries this movement was propelled by a succession of prophets in many parts of the world. As many as 124,000 prophets bore the message. The message, its *method* and its model were completed by the last of all prophets - Muhammad, upon whom be peace. Since Muhammad, the Islamic movement has always struggled to emulate him and his message in order to achieve the same result - the establishment of the Islamic State and the Islamic civilization. Only recently have some in the Islamic movement deviated from the direct and unambiguous message and the *method* of Islam. The result has been a 'subservient Islam', welcome and acceptable to our detractors. The link between the message, its *method* and the result has been dramatically re-established by the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

Islamic Iran has given a new edge to the Islamic movement, but no more. Iran has given us nothing new. If the leadership in Iran is transparently selfless,

self-effacing and totally uncompromising it is only because that is the Sunnah of the Prophet; if the Islamic movement in Iran has a worldview free from secular inhibitions, it is only because that is the Sunnah of the Prophet; if Iran is determined to uproot all influences of alien values and culture, it is only because the Qur'an insists on it; if Iran is determined to eliminate capitalism and all traces of exploitation of the weak, it is only because Allah demands it; if Iran defies 'power' many times its nominal size, it is only because Allah is an active participant in the Islamic movement and He is the only superpower, or any power, recognised by the Islamic movement ..... In a sense, there is nothing new.

But in a very real sense there is much that we must take stock of. Perhaps the most important of all lessons we have to learn is that a geographical national identity is the very antithesis of Islam. All forms of nationalism must be eliminated from the Muslim consciousness at all levels. It is nonsense to suggest, as many 'independence' movements have done, that nationalism is essential for Statism. Islam itself is a sufficient identity and has its own view of State. The secular State has no place in Islam and Muslims do not need it. It follows, therefore, that all the post-colonial States and their regimes and political systems have little more than a transient legitimacy. The Islamic movement itself is a seamless garment without the familiar majority/minority distinctions. Muslims living in Canada and the United States, Europe and other areas are as much parts of the *Ummah* as those living in the heartland of Islam. The US and European wings of the movement in Iran have clearly demonstrated the role and power of the small 'expatriat' cells of the movement. Each local Islamic movement is part of a global Islamic movement. All parts of the Islamic movement must mobilise their resources and commit them to the defence of the leading exposed edge, at present in Iran. As and when similar stage is reached in other areas, the Islamic movement must concentrate its resources there.

In the case of Iran, unfortunately, even the voice of the Islamic movement was not heard clearly enough. While Muslims everywhere felt a close identity with the Revolution, their feelings found little open expression. Those who felt their interests threatened managed to manipulate the media. They were, as always, helped by the western media in distorting the image of the Revolution. They are still trying to contain the Revolution in Iran by having it branded as 'Shi'a' and by searching for 'conditions peculiar to Iran'. But the Islamic movement has absorbed the Revolution at all levels. The Muslim masses now know the essential conditions for an Islamic movement and State. They will not be deceived

again by such palliatives as 'Islamic democracy,' 'Islamic socialism' and 'Islamic nationalism.' They will demand and they will get movements that break free of these inhibitions and legacies of the colonial era.

Muslim history has now entered a new phase. The seemingly relentless speed of our decline has been arrested, if not as yet reversed. The post-colonial nightmare is coming to an end. There is a new sense of destiny, direction and purpose. But the processes of recovery are going to be as painful as the processes of decline and defeat have been. There are no easy options. History extracts its pound of flesh in flesh and blood. While our recovery need not be at the cost of any other people, evidence suggests that we will not be allowed a smooth run. The experience of Iran since the Revolution is a case in point. Many among us will play the game of the external powers. Many of the post-colonial regimes will oppose the Islamic movement at every step. Many will put restrictions on even such small efforts as this journal.

In this situation we must keep a cool head. The tempers within the House of Islam must be kept within the bounds of Islam. The Prophet (upon whom be peace) never lost temper against his opponents. He was kind even to his enemies. In recent years many 'Islamic' journals and journalists have become intemperate in their language and presentation. This appear to have been influenced by the style of the 'fringe group' politics in western democracies. We in the Islamic movement must be very clear about who's who and what is what. We must state our views in plain and simple language But we must never become abusive towards anyone - be it the Saudi regime or the White House or others with whom we shall have more than one occasion to differ. But we must consistently, relentlessly and fearlessly expose the contradictions and hypocrisies of the modern civilisation and all its conceptual, philosophical and structural supports.

In the last two years Imam Khomeini's speeches have sketched out a new worldview for the Muslims and the Islamic movement. His style may appear to be old but his message has originality and freshness long missing from the Muslim political arena. He has decisively closed the era of apologetics, and yet his modesty at the hour of supreme achievement is a lesson in personal behaviour which few in all history can equal. The relevance of the Imam's message is the greatest to those of us who have acquired western education and absorbed western lifestyles and even culture and outlook. One basic characteristic of western education is that it makes the individual arrogant and egocentric. Witness the fresh graduate at the convocation. He walks on a cushion of intellectual air.

(To be continued)

CSO: 4920

UAE CLAIMS OWNERSHIP OF THREE GULF ISLANDS

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 25 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] Correspondents have reported that the United Arab Emirates Foreign Minister has protested Iran's continued "occupation" of three islands in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary General of the United Nations. It must be remembered that these three islands, known as Abu Musa and the greater and lesser Tombs, are located near the Straits of Hormoz and were taken over by Iranian forces in 1971 after British forces departed from the Persian Gulf.

Rashid 'Abdollah, in answer to a letter sent this past May or June to the Secretary General by Qotbzadeh, Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, said that the UAE hopes that the problem of these three islands can be solved and settled through normal channels and that provocative acts can be avoided.

He called on the new government of Iran to solve the problems arising from the expansionist policies of the former shah's regime and to return these three islands to the UAE.

In conclusion, with repeated emphasis on the UAE's attachment to these three islands, Iran was called upon to take part in serious bilateral talks in order to demonstrate its sincerity in desiring good relations with its neighbors, and in order, through this process, by transferring the islands to their original owners, to put an end to this problem.

9310
CSO: 4906

BRIEFS

FIRST SAHARAN AMBASSADOR--The first ambassador of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic has been appointed to the Islamic Republic of Iran. [GF101930 Tehran Domestic Television Service in Persian [no date or time given]

KHUZESTAN DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS--The Khuzestan Department of Mines and Industry has reported the approval of the following projects for the period 23 August-5 September 1980: A unit producing cement blocks with a capacity of 216,000 blocks per annum; a cardboard box factory with a capacity of 450 tons per annum; a mosaic tile factory with a capacity of 200,000 sq meters per year. The projects will cost 336,440,000 rials and employ 82 persons. [GF101930 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1230 GMT 10 Sep 80]

CSO: 4906

CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSE BUDGET CUTS OUTLINED BY AIR FORCE CHIEF

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Jul 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by the military editor of HA'ARETZ: "Air Force Chief Protests: Israeli Pilots Are Flying Fewer Hours than in the Arab Forces"; "Jordan a Serious Threat; Iraq Has Placed MIG-23's on its Border with Jordan; Problems in Tel-Milhata"]

[Text] In the wake of reductions in the defense budget, severe reductions have taken place in the Air Force, including flight hours for the fighting force. At present, Israeli Air Force pilots fly fewer hours than American pilots or pilots of many European air forces. For the first time, a number of Arab pilots are flying their fighter planes more than our pilots. The commander of the Air Force, Major General David Ivri, discussed this in a meeting with military correspondents in connection with Air Force Day.

With respect to Arab air forces, he said that Jordan has become a more serious threat because of new arms it has acquired which are aimed at vital targets in Israel. He revealed that the Iraqis have placed MIG 23's in the middle of their border with Jordan as well as a new control system in this area.

Major-General Ivri said that if it turns out that this affects the fitness of our pilots or the security of the Air Force, it will be necessary to give back flight hours to some of the pilots. This will, however, be at the expense of other areas. The budget cuts will also affect purchase plans. It is already clear that in the future, we will buy fewer F-18's than we had originally thought.

Problems in Tel-Milhata

A large sum was cut, he said, from the portion of the 1980 budget designated for the building of the third airport in the Negev at Tel-Milhata. At the moment, construction on site has not yet begun because of legal problems with the Bedouins. If the delay is a long one, the airport will not be ready by 1983. "It is a mistake to think that the cut in this

area is economical. It is a budgetary savings but a waste from another point of view because the equipment will be stored outside and is likely to be damaged. The cost in the end will be greater."

In his opinion, a difficult phase can be expected when the Sinai air fields are evacuated. The new fields which are being built by the Americans are smaller, and, therefore, the third field at Tel-Milhata will be needed. There will be thousands of tons of equipment, and there is not enough storage space for all of it. It will cost a great deal to build new warehouses.

In answer to a question about accidents in the Air Force, he confirmed that this year, there was an increase in the number of training accidents as compared to last year which was the best in 16 years. What characterizes this year's accidents is that many of them are related to weather rather than to technical problems. The Air Force has established a special team to study this problem and new courses are being offered.

U.S.-Egypt Cooperation

With regard to changes in the Arab air forces, he said that we ought to look carefully at the strategic cooperation between the United States and Egypt. "I say this from a positive point of view as well. For example, there could be a possibility for Israel to join in this arrangement such as offering maintenance service to Egypt's air force."

Concerning the Jordanian Air Force, he said that it is becoming a serious threat because of their recent acquisition of 14 batteries of improved Hawk missiles the majority of which have already been made operational, and because of their acquisition of French Mirage F-1's. France plans to arm them with the most advanced "Magique" air missiles, and, in addition, will supply the Jordanians with [? word unknown] bombs and trajectory exploding bombs.

The Jordanians are setting up three new air fields, two of which are almost completed. One of them, Jaffar, is across from the Plains in the Negev. The second, Azrak, is across from the Dead Sea. They have also established a control system developed in America and a radar checking system which counts units from everywhere.

The Jordanian Air Force is at an advanced level, and its planes are 3-7 minutes flight from vital strategic targets in Israel. The strength of Jordan's air defense capability eliminates the argument of their non-participation in a war with Israel. "These developments necessitate that the Israeli Air Force be capable of a swift response against Jordan."

MIG-23 on the Jordanian Border

He said that the Iraqis are developing an air field base near the border with Jordan. A control and command system has been established there and

brand new MIG-23's set up. The Iraqis are also about to receive the Mirage F-1 from the French, and a new and powerful MIG-24 helicopter from the Russians.

The Syrians made great strides by getting MIG-25 planes last year which are already in place in the field. They have also acquired a very large quantity of N.M. missiles, three times as many as they had in the Yom Kippur War.

9348
CSO: 4805

FUEL SITUATION REVIEWED BY ENERGY MINISTER

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 15 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by DAVAR editor in the Knesset: "Modai: Israel is Being Strict about Stockpiling Fuel"]

[Text] The Minister of Energy and Infrastructure announced yesterday in the Knesset that in the area of liquid fuel, Israel will be strict about guarding the strategic supplies which exist within Israel's borders. The supplies are at a level such that a government resolution is required so that we do not allow the level to be lower than that which existed many years ago.

In an investigation of the activities of his department, the minister said that the planning and policy sections have completed their plans regarding what Israel would do if, for political, economic or other reasons, it were not to receive its full supply of fuel from outside of Israel. One of the means would involve activating the emergency law, similar to the emergency security law. The minister said that this subject would be raised and confirmed during this session.

Minister Modai said that as early as 1978, Israel reduced its dependency on Iranian oil by diversifying its sources and thus assured itself of alternate markets when the Iranian revolution took place. At present, Israel gets about 50 percent of its imported fuel from "spot" markets, but, in addition, has been able to attain acceptable purchase levels. The minister revealed that in the previous fiscal year, Israel's average purchase price did not exceed 24 dollars per barrel, and most of the deals were successful.

"In 1979, expenditures for fuel amounted to 1.5 billion dollars. This year, they approached 2.5 billion dollars. We have reached the point of spending 8.5 percent of our GNP on fuel, and this is an international record. This year we are likely to exceed the 10 percent mark," the minister said.

Modai reviewed Israeli accomplishments in the realm of utilization of solar energy and the setting up of solar pools for producing electricity, an approach which has gained economic respectability in the world. Plans have been started to produce electricity by means of a solar pool that would produce about 5 megawatts of electricity if its technical/economic advantages can be proved. He also noted that more than 400,000 solar hot water heaters have been installed in Israel for heating water and pools, and that in the next 2 years that number will be doubled.

Harish: Soviet Military Trouble

MK Michael Harish (Alignment) said during a debate about the Energy Department that the USSR is changing from being an exporter to an importer of oil. Due to the restrictions on foreign currency, the fuel shortage is likely to bring about political processes or even military intervention by the USSR in the Gulf states and in Iran.

MK Harish says that he is doubtful about the stability of the fuel supply from Egypt and Mexico. In his opinion, this is likely to become no less serious a problem, in the long run, than the economic problem.

MK Avtavi (NRP) said that we must continue to set up reservoirs in case of emergency. At one time, the United States promised to establish a fuel reservoir, but this promise has not yet been carried out. He advised not to raise fuel prices every month or two but, rather, three times a year. It is necessary that we conserve energy by greater use of solar hot water heaters. We need to make sure that the electric company is performing efficiently in order to reduce their expenses. We cannot afford to arrive at a situation where some of the population has to spend 20 percent of its income on electricity.

9348
CSO: 4805

EXPORTS INCREASE IN FIRST HALF OF YEAR

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 16 Jul 80 p 8

[Article: "Exports Increase by 30 Percent During January to June"]

[Text] Net exports of goods, calculated in current prices in dollars, amounted to 438 million dollars in June of this year. Of that, 413 million dollars consisted of industrial exports and 25 million in agricultural exports. In comparison with June of last year, in which exports totaled 338 million dollars, there was an increase in June of this year of 30 percent. The net value of exports, excluding diamonds, ships and planes, seasonally adjusted, rose in June by 23 percent in contrast to May of this year. This data was presented by the Central Bureau of Statistics and by the Department of Industry, Commerce and Tourism.

During the first half of the year, net exports of goods totaled 2.65 billion dollars as compared to 2.09 billion dollars in the same period last year, an increase of 27 percent. Industrial exports, excluding diamonds, rose by 33 percent, diamond exports by 22 percent and agricultural exports by 15 percent.

Seasonally adjusted data show that the average monthly value of the net exports, apart from diamonds, ships and planes, was 315 million dollars during the second quarter of the year; this was a 3 percent increase over the monthly level in the last quarter and a 9 percent increase over last year's final quarter.

Retreat in the Second Quarter

Industrial exports (excluding diamonds) in the first half of the year totaled 1.48 billion dollars as compared to 1.11 billion dollars in the same period last year, an increase of 33 percent. This increase reflects growth in all the major industrial sectors: chemicals, rubber and plastic, and mining of nonmetallic minerals, 55 percent; textiles, clothing and leather, 46 percent; wood, paper, printing and the like, 20 percent; metal, machines and electronics, 20 percent; food, beverages and tobacco, 17 percent.

Seasonally adjusted data point out that in the second quarter of this year, industrial exports, excluding diamonds, amounted to a monthly average of 264 million dollars, a level which is slightly lower than in the previous quarter, but 12 percent higher compared to the monthly average for the last quarter of last year.

Export of polished diamonds (net) in the first half of the year totaled 723 million dollars compared to 593 million dollars during the same period last year, an increase of 22 percent. Seasonally adjusted data show that in the first half of the year, the monthly average of exports of diamonds (in dollars) rose by 9 percent as compared to the second half of 1979.

Agricultural exports (including citrus fruits) in the first half of the year totaled 528 million dollars, as compared to 373 million dollars in the same period last year--an increase of 15 percent. Exports of citrus fruits totaled 213 million dollars from January to June of this year as compared to 196 million dollars in the corresponding period last year--an increase of 9 percent. The rest of the agricultural exports totaled 215 million dollars in the first half of the year as compared to 177 million dollars in the same period last year--a rise of 21 percent.

9348
CSO: 4805

REAL DROP OF 20 PERCENT IN 1979 INVESTMENTS REPORTED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 21 Jul 80 p 8

[Article by the Economics editor of DAVAR: "Real Drop of 20 Percent in 1979 Investments"]

[Text] The number of investments approved in 1979 by the Center for Investments dropped more than 20 percent in real terms. Investments totaled 27.2 billion Israeli pounds as compared to 16.8 billion pounds in 1978 and 9.4 billion in 1977. According to the report from the Center for Investments, 1,531 permits were issued in 1979 as compared to 1,270 in 1978. Overall investment in Israeli currency last year amounted to 25 billion pounds as compared to 15.1 billion in 1978. Investment in foreign currency in 1979 was 111.1 million dollars as compared to 96.5 million dollars in 1978.

There was an increase in the number of permits for investment in industrial enterprises. The majority of these were permits to expand facilities. In the past year, 1,173 permits were issued by the Center for Investments for industrial enterprises as compared to 885 in 1978. In 1979, investments in industry were approved for the sum of 21.4 billion pounds in 1978. Out of that, investments in foreign currency amounted to 32.1 million dollars as compared to 14.7 million dollars in 1978.

A Drop of 50 Percent in the Hotel Industry

There was a drop of more than 50 percent in investments in the hotel industry last year. Twenty-nine permits were issued for a total of 847 million pounds. Out of that, there were 7.66 millions in dollars. This is in contrast to 60 permits for a total of 1.44 billion pounds in 1978 with 9.4 million dollars of that in foreign currency.

In property last year, 148 investments were approved for a total of 2.46 billion pounds, including 16.8 million dollars in foreign currency. This is in comparison with 138 investment plans for a total of 1.16 billion dollars approved in 1978. In the preceding year, investment in foreign currency in property was about 22.2 million dollars.

In agriculture, 16 investment plans totaling 87 million dollars were approved in 1979 as compared to 9 plans totaling 34.2 million dollars in 1978.

In other areas, the Center for Investments approved 160 plans totaling 2.4 billion pounds. The foreign currency component totaled 66.5 million dollars. In 1978, 173 plans were approved totaling 2.6 billion pounds. In that year, the foreign currency component amounted to 48.6 million dollars.

145 New Businesses

A look at the breakdown of permits in the area of industry shows that in 1979, permits were issued for the establishment of 145 new businesses for a total of 1.5 billion pounds, as compared to 124 new businesses for a total of 1.3 billion pounds in 1978. In addition, 272 permits were issued last year for the expansion of businesses at a sum of 8.69 billion pounds as compared to 221 permits for hotels at an investment of 892 million pounds [as published] in 1978.

As for hotels, last year permits were issued to build only 5 new hotels at an investment of 128.9 million pounds as compared to 18 permits for hotels at an investment of 892 million pounds in 1978.

Americans and Canadians in the Lead

In looking at the breakdown of permits for the establishment of new enterprises in which foreign money is involved, it is clear that the Americans and Canadians are in first place. Permits were issued for 52 investment plans for their participation, with the overall investment at 2.3 billion pounds. Britain and South Africa come next. Investors in those countries were issued 67 permits for a total investment of 555.6 million pounds.

Twenty investment programs involving investors from Switzerland, Lichtenstein and Luxembourg were approved last year for an overall investment of 235.5 million pounds. German investors were involved in 9 investment programs totaling 163.4 million pounds. French investors were involved in 5 programs amounting to 38.3 million pounds. Investors from Italy were involved in 5 programs totaling 3.9 million pounds.

9348
CSO: 4805

SYRIAN COMMUNIST PARTY DISSIDENTS ATTACK PARTY CONGRESS

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 27 Jun 80 p 11

[Article: "Syrian Communist Party Wing Led by Yusuf and Qaysiyah Considers the Party Congress To Be Phony and Schismatic"]

[Text] The wing of the Syrian Communist Party led by Mr Murad Yusuf and Mr Nayif Qaysiyah has responded to the recent congress held by the party. In a statement distributed in Beirut and signed by "representatives of the organizations of the Syrian Communist Party," this wing of the party described the 5th congress as "a dangerous schismatic action undertaken by the opportunist right-wing leadership of the party." The congress is regarded as "phony, schismatic and not representative of the party," and its decisions are described as "not binding on Syrian communists."

It should be mentioned that Yusuf and Qaysiyah are two members of the Syrian Communist Party's Politburo who were responsible party officials in two important regions. The 5th congress announced that they had been expelled.

The statement issued by the "representatives of the party organizations" supported "the positions adopted by the eight comrades, members of the Central Committee, who had addressed a letter to the Politburo, dated 26 November 1979. The letter contained basic and practical suggestions to restore party unity and hold the 5th congress on the basis of dogmatic principles. These party comrades had been entrusted with the responsibility of conducting the party's work at the present stage and with taking the necessary steps to achieve this in the best possible manner, in cooperation with the regional committees and party cadres."

The statement extolled "the importance of the existing relationships of cooperation between our country and the countries of the socialist bloc, led by our loyal friend and faithful ally, the Soviet Union." The statement also praised "the work being done to consolidate, develop, and expand these relations in all political, economic and military domains."

In another statement addressed to all members of the Communist Party, the "representatives of the organizations of the Syrian Communist Party" accused the leadership of the party, headed by Mr Khalid Bakdash, of "violating basic documents of the party, including the important party document which was unanimously approved by the Central Committee in January 1978."

9468
CSO: 4802

COMMUNIST PARTY SUPPORTS REGIME AGAINST MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 21 Jun 80 p 9

[Article: "Support for the 'National Identity' of the Regime, in Spite of 'Negative Economic Phenomena'"]

[Text] Mr Danyal Ni'mah, member of the Politburo of the Syrian Communist Party, held a press conference at Hotel Beau Rivage yesterday. He talked about the agenda of the party's 5th congress, which was "unanimously ratified," and expressed "complete support" for President Hafiz al-Assad against "the Moslem Brotherhood and the imperialist-Zionist onslaught." He also alluded to "the dangerous negative economic phenomena" in Syria.

He said that the communists, when they are given weapons, are prepared to defend Syria's independence. He accused Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq of supporting the Moslem Brotherhood.

The report which Ni'mah read said that "Syria is playing an increasingly important role in the battle against imperialism, the Camp David scheme, and Sadat's treachery."

The report considered it "necessary to strengthen the permanent relations of friendship with the Soviet Union, because it is our firm, loyal, true friend."

Confusion

The report distinguished between "the national identity of the regime, which has become clear to a great extent, and its domestic, internal identity, which is still confused. The confusion is attributable to negative developments in the social and economic situation, especially the dreadfully widespread and deep-rooted growth and development of the parasitic bourgeois phenomenon. This is the thing which constitutes the principal source of rampant corruption and bribery. The reason is that the strongest of these parasitic bourgeois groups, the bourgeois merchants, have direct ties with imperialist, capitalist monopolies and are striving to bind the entire economy of the country to the interests of these monopolies."

The report goes on to say: "The activities of the parasitic bourgeoisie, which cooperates and engages in conspiracies with bureaucratic bourgeoisie, have led to the appearance of a large number of millionaires." The report refers to "the growth of capitalist exploitation in agriculture and its effects on the peasant laboring class."

The report then notes that Syria's economic and social policy has "led to dangerous negative phenomena which have had a cruel impact on the standard of living of the masses as well as on the country's political mood and general situation. These negative effects have been exploited by bands of people who engage in conspiracies, sabotage and killing, and who are supported from abroad. It is only natural that the party's position has been, and remains, that of combatting these negative phenomena."

The Key Issue

The report then says that "the key issue is the fact that national and class conflicts are flaring up more and more in Syria." The report stresses "the importance of democracy, its orientation regarding the classes, and the importance of expanding and intensifying the role of the Progressive National Front, especially with regard to the workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals."

The report points out that "the policy of the Syrian Communist Party is strongly committed to these social and economic issues. It does not hesitate to support the position taken against the bands of conspirators, and to support the general policies expressed by President Hafiz al-Assad in his latest speech."

The report then emphasized the following points:

1. Affirmation of the soundness of the party's past policy, wisdom and farsightedness, and affirmation of the fact that the masses have come to understand this policy.

2. Affirmation of Syria's hostile role against imperialism in the area; the importance of the role which has been played, and will continue to be played, by the Syrian Communist Party; and the necessity to strengthen cooperation between it and the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party within the framework of the Progressive National Front.

3. Affirmation of the international orientation of the party and its deep-rooted friendship with the glorious party of Lenin, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

4. Criticism of shortcomings in work done by the party, including the performance of leadership councils and Central Committee bureaus; and the need for appropriate self-criticism of shortcomings on the part of this or that party official and this or that council.

5. Unanimous condemnation of Murad Yusuf and his party behavior, and unanimous agreement concerning decisions made by the Central Committee, especially those concerning Murad Yusuf and his supporters.

6. Demonstration of resolute determination to put an end to circumstances which have existed as a result of crises in the party, gradually closing party ranks, and rallying closer around the party leadership, the Central Committee, the Politburo and the party's secretary general, Comrade Khalid Bakdash.

The discussion period brought up the question of cooperation on various levels between the Communist Party and the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party, and the necessity to improve such cooperation.

It should be mentioned that Mr Murad Yusuf recently split off from the party, and that his supporters are Mr Nayif Qaysiyah and some members of the Central Committee.

The Lebanese Communist Party

After Ni'mah finished reading the report, he answered questions by reporters, and received help in this regard from Mr Nabih Rushaydat and Mr Ya'qub Karu, who are among the leaders of the party. He was asked why there were no representatives from the Lebanese progressive parties and the Lebanese Communist Party at the press conference. He was also asked whether or not these parties had been invited to the press conference, and whether or not there were differences with them. He answered: "Everybody was invited. Actually, I believe that this question should be directed to the Lebanese Communist Party." Ni'mah continued: "A representative has been sent to the press conference from the newspaper AL-NIDA' (the organ of the Lebanese Communist Party). Is he not here? Yes, he is here."

[Question] It has been noticed that, among the greetings received by your congress, there was no greeting sent by the Lebanese Communist Party. Why is this?

[Answer] The fact that the Lebanese Communist Party did not send a greeting to our congress is something which concerns only the Lebanese Communist Party. We strive to have good relations with all of the parties.

[Question] Do you have any differences with the Lebanese Communist Party?

[Answer] The purpose of this press conference is to present the results of the work done by the 5th congress [of the Syrian Communist Party]. However, with regard to this question of yours, it could be that there are such differences, but we usually bring them up at meetings usually held by the Arab communist parties.

[Question] Will there be a meeting of the Arab communist parties?

[Answer] I do not know.

[Question] What is your response to the Moslem Brotherhood's attack on your party?

[Answer] We call for action on a broader mobilization of national forces to confront the Moslem Brotherhood. We are demonstrating complete support for the resolute position against the Moslem Brotherhood. We call for more democracy and for taking economic and social measures which are more progressive. We are trying to clarify objectives. It is a national and class struggle, and it is being pictured as a sectarian struggle. The first action of the members of the Moslem Brotherhood was to burn down consumer establishments.

[Question] In your opinion, what is the difference between the Iraqi regime and the Syrian regime?

[Answer] The difference is in their attitude toward imperialism. In Syria, there is ever-increasing hostility toward imperialism and colonialism, whereas in Iraq we see that the opposite is true.

[Question] Who is giving aid to the Moslem Brotherhood organization?

[Answer] Sabotage activity is not conducted by the Moslem Brotherhood alone. This organization is only the shock troops which we see on the surface. There is confirmed information that members of the Moslem Brotherhood are being trained in Jordan and that they receive aid from Saudi Arabia and Iraq.

[Question] What is your position with regard to other leftist political forces in Syria?

[Answer] We consider that the principal and basic enemy is the black forces of reaction. As for other leftist forces, such as those of Jamal al-Atasi and the League of Communist Action, we feel that their work and orientation, in the final analysis, are grain for the mills of the forces of reaction. In fact, we have said this in our dialogues with them. Many times we have demanded that they ease their campaign of violence against us, and direct it against the forces of reaction. But we consider that their work and orientation are, if not collusive, then certainly shortsighted.

[Question] What is your position with regard to their joining the "National Front" in Syria?

[Answer] Our position will be determined on the basis of what position they take with regard to the front.

[Question] What is your position with regard to the regime in Lebanon?

[Answer] I believe that we have stated our support of the need to reach a national accord in Lebanon, and to affirm Lebanon's sovereignty and the fact that Lebanon is an Arab nation.

[Question] How do you feel about the people's militias in Syria?

[Answer] Distribution of weapons has started in some areas. When we are given weapons, we will use them to defend Syria's independence against the onslaught of the Zionist imperialists.

9468
CSO: 4802

PLANNING MINISTER INTERVIEWED IN ATHENS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 20 Jun 80 p 19

[Interview with Dr Salim Yasin, Syrian minister of planning by Muhammad Mustafa Mahmud, in Athens; date not given]

[Text] The Syrian minister of planning, Dr Salim Yasin, tells AL-QABAS: "Economic cooperation between the Arabs and Europe is based on an inadequate concept of our potential." Dr Salim Yasin defines the premises of the forthcoming 1981-1986 5-year plan in light of previous experience and within a framework of long-range development guidelines affecting the remainder of the 20th century.

In Minister Yasin's interview with AL-QABAS in Athens, where he led the Syrian delegation to meetings of the joint Greek-Syrian Committee for Economic Cooperation, he clarified the goals of current economic activity in Syria in all fields.

He said that right now, the Fifth Five-Year Plan is being prepared, since four 5-year plans have already been implemented. Each one of these 5-year plans had its own particular goals, strategy, regulations and procedures.

He added that work on the Fifth Five-Year Plan began with an analysis of Syria's economic development from the year 1961 until today. Particular emphasis in this analysis was on a thorough study of the current economic situation, that is, of the Fourth Five-Year Plan which comes to an end at the end of 1980. Ideas began to jell for the next 5-year plan in light of this analysis and study of the current situation. This was done within the framework of outlines for long-range development for the nineties, all the way up to the year 2000.

It could be said that there are a number of premises for the Fifth Five-Year Plan which have been defined on the collective level and on the individual level. There are also other premises which right now are in the process of being defined. These premises include:

1. Stressing increase in production through increasing productivity by making optimum use of the projects, installations and other facilities which are currently being utilized. This also applies to projects which have been started and not yet completed. They too should be put into operation.

2. Stressing the growth of agriculture and development of the rural areas.

3. Stressing the development of services in order to meet the needs of growing economic activity, on the one hand, and the needs of Syria's citizens, on the other.

4. Stressing broader application of the concept of comprehensive planning. This is planning which includes economic feasibility studies for all projects, and studies of their direct and indirect effects not only on the sectors of the projects themselves, but also on other sectors of the national economy. This also includes defining the requirements of each project in terms of human, material and other resources, and securing them at the right time and at the appropriate place. This is something which could overcome economic bottlenecks and avert anticipated difficulties in the implementation and operation of such projects.

Minister Yasin went on to say that this, of course, requires the utilization of modern planning methods which began to be used in the Fourth Five-Year Plan. Likewise, it requires the existence of integral partial plans which must be interlocked with the general overall plan. These include, for example, the labor force plan, foreign trade plan, money transfer plan, etc. Right now these plans are being prepared along with the 5-year plan.

The Status of Cooperation Between Syria and Greece

[Question] What is the status of cooperation between Syria and Greece?

[Answer] There is economic and technical cooperation between Syria and Greece. This cooperation takes place within the framework of a number of agreements, some of which have been signed and ratified. Others are still in the planning stage.

There is a joint Greek-Syrian Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation which meets periodically. Its next meeting is expected to take place in Damascus in the third quarter of this year. It will be chaired by the Greek minister of coordination and the Syrian minister of planning.

The agenda for this committee's forthcoming meeting will include a draft agreement concerning maritime transport, a juridical draft agreement, a draft agreement regulating maritime labor, and other such draft agreements between the two countries

Assessment of Arab-European Cooperation

[Question] How do you assess economic cooperation between the Arabs and the Europeans?

[Answer] In my opinion, the principal benefit from [contacts with Europe] is that we become familiar with the point of view of Europe's intellectuals with regard to problems which concern the Arabs, and the causes of these problems. We also hope to learn what methods they feel can be clearly defined and utilized to deal with these problems in the framework of Arab-European cooperation. There is no doubt that a great many benefits could be derived from Arab-European cooperation, if it were based on principles of mutual interest and benefit for both parties.

There was cooperation in the past, during numerous periods of time, but it was on conflicting bases. The appropriate thing is that such cooperation be based on realistic premises and an objective knowledgeable perception of the reality of the issues which confront each of the two regions. A healthy diagnosis should be made of the causes of problems and how to deal with them.

For example, one of the opinions which has surfaced is that the Arab world faces a problem of food supply. Europe is able to satisfy the needs of the Arab world in this regard. This view is based on computing current increasing demand and current supply, and projecting these calculations into the future.

My belief is that an opinion such as this is based on inadequate computation. Computing both current and future supply of foodstuffs in the Arab world should take place not only on the basis of the current situation and its projection into the future. On the contrary, one should compute these things on the basis of calculating the Arab world's agricultural potential, especially the potential which so far has not been utilized. One should also compute how to make optimum use of modern technology in agriculture in the Arab world. The costs of doing this should be estimated and compared with the actual costs of importing foodstuffs from the European countries. In light of all this, and in the framework of the theory of relative costs in foreign trade, a report should be rendered about whether or not it is beneficial to continue to import foodstuffs from Europe or whether it would be better to develop, modernize, and utilize the Arab world's own agricultural capabilities. [end of answer]

Doctor Yasin concluded the interview by saying that there is another opinion which has surfaced concerning the export of technology to the Arab world, and which technology would be beneficial for it. This is in addition to importing machines and equipment, learning how to operate and maintain them, etc. This opinion favors effort to create advanced industry based on the Arab world's own technological capability. The reason is that this approach would mean designing and developing machines and equipment which would be better adapted to the economic and social realities of the Arab world. Consequently, they would be more productive.

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OIL MINISTER DISCUSSES SYRIAN ENERGY RESOURCES

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 6 Jul 80 p 34

[Interview with 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Dahhak, the Syrian minister of oil and natural resources, by Randah Taqiy al-Din; date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] What is the situation in Syria today with regard to energy resources?

[Answer] Syria is still a young country as far as the field of energy resources is concerned. Our energy production is limited, and does not exceed 10 million tons [of oil] per year. However, we have had our own particular experience which differs from that of the other Arab countries. This is because in Syria the exploitation of oil takes place on the basis of geological survey operations and refining undertaken by Syrian experts using Arab labor.

We refine part of our oil in Syria, because our oil is of the heavy type. It is necessary for us to blend it with light-weight oil in the two refineries at Homs and Baniyas. Also, we have agreements for importing gasoline and mazut.

[Question] Where do you buy your light crude oil from, and in what quantities do you buy it?

[Answer] We sometimes buy light crude oil for our blending processes. For example, the production capacity of the refinery at Homs is 5.2 million tons a year. The oil it refines is 50 percent Syrian and 50 percent Iraqi. This means that we buy about 2.75 million tons of Iraqi oil per year. As for the refinery at Baniyas, it is still in the experimental stage, and its maximum production capacity is 6 million tons per year. The oil it refines is 20 percent Syrian, and 80 percent Iraqi and sometimes Saudi oil. This refinery sometimes refines oil for some European plants.

[Question] Do the OAPEC countries lower their oil prices for you?

[Answer] We buy their oil at official OAPEC prices.

Gas Projects

[Question] It is said that Syria has asked (?Abikurb), a French firm, to help in the extraction of gas in Syria. What are your expectations in this regard?

[Answer] As far as the production of gas is concerned, we are still in the initial stages. We have an estimated 11 billion cubic meters of gas associated with oil. And we have reached an agreement with the French firm (?Antribu) to build a plant in the city of al-Hasakah, in northern Syria, to liquefy this gas. This project will be completed 2 years from now. We also have natural gas, and it comes in two types. There is the gas in the gas caps of the oil wells. We want to keep it there to maintain the pressure level necessary for the extraction of oil. As long as we utilize these oil wells, we do not want to extract this gas. We have also discovered some wells which contain only natural gas. This is the gas which we were thinking of extracting in cooperation with the World Bank, which was going to finance the initial stages of this project, including making an estimate of the gas reserves and a study of its economic potential. In initial studies, experts have concluded that there are about 50 billion cubic meters of gas. We are making every effort to study and assess these reserves in preparation for processing and utilizing the gas in the production of electricity and in other fields.

[Question] What do you anticipate in the way of reserves?

[Answer] There are 90 billion cubic meters. It is believed that 50 billion cubic meters are pure gas, about 30 billion cubic meters are in gas caps, and about 10 or 11 billion cubic meters of gas [associated with oil]. Of course, there are not big quantities. But in view of the importance of all sources of energy, we are devoting a great deal of attention to this subject.

Limited Aid

[Question] Is the financial aid which Syria received for oil and gas exploration from the OAPEC countries and the World Bank sufficient?

[Answer] Up till now the amount of aid received has been limited. At the present time, we are relying on concluding contracts with foreign companies to prospect for oil in Syrian territory, on condition that the Syrian Government will not suffer any financial losses if these companies do not find oil. If they do find oil, they can recover the costs by selling 40 percent of the oil which is discovered, at world market prices. But the rest of the oil, that is, 60 percent of it, goes to Syria.

As far as OAPEC is concerned, it has a Petroleum Services Co. with headquarters in Libya, which does drilling for oil. But we have our own geophysical expertise in this field. Even foreign companies that do oil

exploration in Syria draw on this local expertise. For this reason we have so far not asked for any services from Arab countries, bearing in mind that the Petroleum Services Co is able to offer its services throughout the Arab world.

[Question] Are there any joint projects with Arab countries in OAPEC in the field of oil exploration in Syria?

[Answer] We are working together with them in the field of searching for alternative sources of energy. There are national energy committees which are interested in questions of solar energy, wind power, water power and the generation of electricity to conserve energy resources. Initial studies have also been made concerning the setting up of a petrochemical industries complex in Syria. However, a final decision has not yet been made about this. But talks are going on with investment companies in the Arab countries concerning the building of industries in the Arab countries. We could benefit from them in the field of fertilizer production. Relevant negotiations are going on right now, and we hope that they will result in a formula by means of which we could make use of the potential of the Arab countries.

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END

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POSSIBLE OPEC MOVES TO COUNTER OIL GLUT DISCUSSED

Destabilizing Effects of Stockpiles

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 19 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Algiers (APS)--We have been informed by a reliable source that some member countries of the OPEC are concerned over the situation on the world oil market and are considering a special meeting of the petroleum ministers of the member countries of this organization to examine the oil supply situation prevailing in the consumer countries.

We know that the industrial countries since the beginning of this year have accumulated stockpiles of oil previously unattained.

The record stockpiles thus established are a means of destabilizing the oil market which the decisions made at the Algiers conference last June were to have stabilized by the adoption of a reference price of US$32 per barrel and a ceiling differential of US$5.

We do not understand the levels of production of some member countries of the OPEC which are continuing to pour oil into the world market at a rate not justified either by their customary and reported level of production or by their financial needs and even less by the normal supplying of the world market.

And we wonder about the objectives pursued by these countries which are maintaining excess production which can be harmful only to the other members of the OPEC.

In this regard, we know that the great majority of the latter lowered the level of their exports last year and during 1980 to regain the conditions of a normalized market. That is the situation with Kuwait, Venezuela, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, the Arab Emirates and Qatar. All of these countries together represent two-thirds of OPEC exports and are the majority of the exporting countries.

We fear that the situation which now prevails on the oil market may be the apple of discord at the meeting which has been scheduled in Vienna on 15-16 September and which is to examine the questions to be submitted to the second OPEC summit set for the beginning of November in Baghdad and may run counter to the efforts exerted to develop a strategy of dialog with the industrial countries.

Regularization of Oil Market

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 21 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Algiers (APS)--In this summer season, the world oil market is experiencing an excess of supply over demand, in spite of the energy crisis which has recently prevailed. This paradoxical situation, apart from certain local considerations, is explained by the stockpiling policy being pursued to the extreme by the Western countries during the past few years.

This policy of establishing so-called security stockpiles is really a kind of blackmail in the hands of the Western countries against the OPEC countries which already is beginning to weigh heavily upon the oil market. If in the past the capitalist games, although still in force, consisted in relying fully upon inflation and the devaluation of the dollar to erode oil revenues and weaken the purchasing power of a barrel of oil while at the same time attempting to freeze the price of the latter, today, on the other hand, these games increasingly consist in ensuring surplus production serving to swell the so-called security stockpiles and thus to inundate the market to create confusion over the prices of a barrel of oil.

We observe that in addition to the methods used regularly to keep oil prices at the lowest levels other methods adapted to the present situation have been added to better exploit oil without concern over its conservation.

With regard to the so-called security stockpiles, the Western countries have in mind not just transfers of the equivalent of reserves of certain large deposits but transfers of the equivalent of the entire reserve of a medium-size producing country.

At present, about 2 million barrels of crude oil coming in particular from certain large producers of the OPEC which have not yet decided to reduce their production are being used to feed these stockpiles daily.

To permit the oil price-setting mechanism to fully play its role in the safeguarding of the purchasing power of a barrel of oil and the protection of oil revenues from capitalist inflation, the producing countries must give serious consideration to the question of the energy balance and the

reduction of their production to a level compatible with their development needs and to a level which eliminates all waste and constraint which could backfire against them.

The price-setting mechanism as proposed by the OPEC strategy committee; i.e., a mechanism which takes into account inflation in countries of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and the evolution of their GNP, a mechanism whose content can in the meantime be improved, could have its effects nullified if the energy balance between supply and demand is distorted by a frantic exhausting of the reserves and an oversupplying of the market.

The question of reduced production which was lightly touched upon at the Algiers meeting will, in this regard, be of greater concern to the producing countries and will give them another opportunity to tighten the bonds existing between them to establish a balanced relationship with the consuming countries.

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SAUDI CAMPAIGN FOR ARAB SOLIDARITY, COORDINATION SEEN

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 1 Aug 80 pp 20-21

[Article: "Amir Fahd Takes On a Task Which Has So Far Been Impossible to Handle"]

[Text] Late in June, Amir Fahd spelled out Saudi Arabia's position regarding the Middle East and the Palestinian problem. His statement emphasized 6 points:

1) The need for Arab solidarity;

2) The Palestinian problem is the central issue of the Middle East conflict;

3) The only solution is contingent upon Israeli withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied in 1967;

4) East Jerusalem must be returned to Arab control;

5) Peace in the region may be achieved only if the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including the right to return to their homeland and to establish their own state, are recognized; and

6) Saudi Arabia rejects any negotiated settlement or initiative independent of the Arab nation's will.

It is evident from this statement that the first and last points, i.e., Arab solidarity and the insistence on a solution acceptable to the Arab people, form the foundation of Saudi Arabia's approach to the Middle East problem. The other 4 points follow immediately as inescapable consequences of these two major points.

The truth is that Saudi Arabia's position sums up the convictions of all Arabs. For, if anything, the summit conferences of the past 2 years, not to mention prior ones, have convinced the Arabs that what these conferences needed most was unanimity. And unanimity means solidarity and unified action regardless of the differences in the structure of Arab governments and irrespective of regional, party, and even doctrinal disputes. To

begin with, these disputes are essentially insignificant. They are no more than minor differences in approach and aspirations and squabbles over national interests. But, with respect to the Palestine problem, there are no differences. All Arab countries are in agreement with the Saudi position. The achievement of peace, in their view, is contingent upon the fulfillment of the same conditions laid down by Saudi Arabia. The problem lies not in differences over the goal, but on a plan of action for achieving that goal. The unfortunate aspect of this problem is that the rift over a plan of action is intensifying gradually, and this despite all protestations of solidarity and mobilization for facing the Zionist enemy.

The 1978 Baghdad summit conference raised hopes that the Arab states had finally agreed on a sound course of action. While it is true that they did ostracize Egypt as a renegade and seemed resigned to its loss, it is equally true that they did agree on a unified position. Unfortunately, that agreement was not translated into concrete action. The conference was referred to as the "rejection" summit, or the summit of the states opposed to the Camp David accords. In retrospect, however, rejection alone was apparently not enough. The rejection summit ultimately spawned the "steadfast front." The list of adjectives did not stop there, but in all cases the designations referred to those countries that were opposed to the Camp David accords and determined to remain steadfast in their opposition to Israel. Any Arab state outside the rejectionist front was seen as a renegade and not representative of the Arab will. The consensus among the rejectionists was that opposition to the Camp David accords inevitably implied continued confrontation of the Zionist enemy, who, in the rejectionist view, appeared undeterred in defying the Arab will, in ignoring the rights of the Palestinian people, and in his determination to annex occupied Palestinian and Arab territory.

It was further recognized that the actions of the Zionist enemy were backed by a military apparatus that was sustained by and had the absolute support of the United States. On the other hand, the rejectionist front was also aware of a developing support for the Palestinian and Arab cause among certain East and West European nations. That support, however, it was felt, had not yet been expressed openly.

It was evident, furthermore, that despite the Zionist enemy's complete economic and military dependence on the United States, he persisted not only in rejecting a military alliance with that country but in refusing to knuckle down to any demand conflicting with [Israel's] interest. On the contrary, the Zionist enemy's obstinancy went as far as compelling the United States to support, or at best to refrain from criticizing, Israeli policies that under other circumstances would be unacceptable to that country.

This was the background that would serve as the springboard of the rejectionist challenge. But what form was the challenge to take? Who would take the first step? Should a single Arab country, a group of Arab countries, or all Arab countries together take the first step? It is

at precisely this moment that the principle of Arab solidarity was born at the Baghdad summit. The principle, however, is not new. It had been echoed at a number of summit conferences since 1948. It would be put to the test once more. But how? Many questions were raised. Precisely what did Arab solidarity mean? Was it to be limited to a kind of boycott of Israel, or would it encompass other measures in which all Arab countries involved would participate? What were the ways for resisting the Zionist enemy? Would the resistance be passive as has been the case for the past 30 years, or would it be active as it should be? How would the means of this resistance be provided?

In answering these questions, some said the Palestinian revolution should serve as the starting point of this resistance. But it must be remembered that the Palestinian revolution is divided into two fronts: one operating within Palestine and the second outside it. The former is faced with a relentless and bloody enemy, a terrorist enemy devoid of respect for moral and human values. The latter is operating under restrained conditions; its path is strewn with obstacles, even explosives. For a while the entire burden of the Palestinian revolution was borne by tiny Lebanon, whose military might cannot stand up to a single division of the Israeli army. Lebanon, as was inevitable, finally exploded, and that explosion generated a new problem for the Arabs, one no less ominous than the Palestine problem.

Some advocated a united stand against the Camp David agreement in an effort to scuttle it. Some wondered whether that strategy was sufficient. "Even if we succeed in scuttling the Camp David accords," they asked, "what then?" Do we continue to wait and seek ways to confront Israel and its supporters, or do we take immediate action? If we opt for immediate action, what action do we take? Who will set the broad outlines for such an action? Who will set the details? Will the burden be placed on the confrontation states, or will it be shared by all members of the solidarity pact?

Another question: What will be the common ground which could provide the launching point for a positive resistance, a resistance with well-defined goals and established priorities? To put the question another way, let us first consider the following. Israel plans for every one of its actions. Its plans are usually very long-range, for generations to come. Furthermore, Israel's plans encounter no opposition or protests. Any opposition, external or internal, is most frequently perfunctory; often it is a part of the plan. With this in mind, what are the means for countering Israel's plans? Do we simply react, or should our opposition be based upon our own independent planning, planning that is consistent with the Arab will and guided by Arab goals? Should we opt for war as a last resort, are we willing to make the necessary preparations. Furthermore, will our preparations be sound?

I once discussed this very point with an Arab leader. Here is what he said: We Arabs are accustomed to viewing things simplictically, to underestimate things and to overestimate our ability to get things done. We even make it sound easy to die. Others do not see death in such a

non-chalant manner. Unfortunately, some of our informational media are responsible for this. They drown our people in a make-believe world. They pay little heed to the effects this has on people who ultimately wake up to reality. When people sober up to face reality, at best they become frustrated and bitter; at worst they turn to revolution.

He added: "Let me review candidly some aspects of our situation. Until the recent past, our disputes were kept secret. We managed to solve our problems quietly. Today, at the first sign of a difference, we rush to our guns. Often, our disputes are over trivia. I have attended most of the conferences and meetings held since the 1978 Baghdad Summit conference. What have we accomplished so far? Let me give you an example. At the Baghdad summit it was resolved to set aside $9.00 billion to assist the confrontation states, those that would form the spearhead in any confrontation with Israel. Five billion dollars were to go to Egypt in the event it repudiated the Camp David accords. Egypt showed no such inclination. But instead of giving the Egyptian share to the remaining confrontation states, that provision of the resolution was withdrawn. Even worse, some of the states that had promised to cover the other $4.00 billion have not yet paid their shares. Why? Because certain regional developments were not to their liking. Now, as we approach the 11th summit conference to be held in Amman next November--Amman has asked for a postponement of the conference till after the American presidential elections to give the Arabs a better view of the American position--our situation has not changed very much. A quick glance at the map of the Arab world will show that in some instances our position has deteriorated. In North Africa, for example, Mauritania is occupied with its own affairs, oblivious to all else. It is a country engulfed in crises. Morocco is in a state of undeclared war with Algeria over the Polisarios. Libya backs Algeria with the support of the 'Steadfast Front.' The problem, in my opinion, is not difficult to resolve, provided good will prevails. Ever since the Qafasah episode, Tunisia's relations with Libya have been smoldering, ready to explode. Libya is massing troops on the Egyptian border. It has created a defense line similar to the old China wall. Egypt responds by massing troops on its side of the border. Egypt, the most populous and powerful country in the Arab world is completely isolated from that world. Will this isolation resolve our dispute over the Camp David accords? I will not even attempt to answer this question for I cannot correct what time has wrought. Relations between Syria and Iraq, and even between Syria and Jordan are not exactly consistent with the principles of Arab solidarity. The smoldering situation in Lebanon bodes ill for the entire Arab world. The Gulf states are at a loss on how to counter the threats surrounding them. Neither the Soviet Union nor the United States have their best interest at heart. This is even true of the European countries, especially Great Britain. The Gulf states rightfully reject any interference in their internal and defense affairs, but what will happen should the situation explode? Not even the wisest Arab diplomat can answer this question. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), accepted by the Arabs as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, is having a rough time reconciling the contradictory Arab policies and providing a suitable environment for

launching its revolution properly. What has become of Iraq's national declaration that all inter-Arab disputes must be resolved peacefully? When we renounce the use of force and resort to dialogue, sincere dialogue free of exaggeration, we will be able to resolve our internecine economic and political disputes. But we have not so far accepted negotiations as a replacement for ths use of force. We are still prone to violence. The Iraqi national declaration also called upon the Arabs to mobilize and use all their resources in confronting the Zionist enemy. We have been tentalized by this dream since the early 50s, more specifically since the July, 1952 Egyptian revolution. But the 28-year old revolution has been oscillating from one extreme to the other, and this lack of stability that has been at the base of its retreats and defeats. Neither Egypt could rely on the Arabs and their resources, nor they on her. Egypt was always a controversial topic among Arab leaders, who neither assessed her position correctly nor defined clearly their position with respect to her. This brings us to the Camp David accords, which, according to Egyptian officials, were entered into not enthusiastically but with the sad realization that the Arabs could never agree. Egypt's 'weakened faith' in the Arabs was thus a factor in her decision to enter into the Camp David accords."

Having finished his quick review of our situation, the Arab leader went on: "We must wake up one day--we haven't yet--to the reality of our situation. If you ask me about a solution, I have no answers. The only thing I can say is what everyone else is saying: We must unite; we must set aside our disputes and concentrate on the struggle with Israel and its supporters. This, in my view, is where we have failed all along."

Has Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia decided to take up this challenge? It seems that his planned tour of the Arab world is calculated to resolve disputes and unite the ranks of the Arab nations to give the forthcoming Amman summit a chance of success. Press reports from Riyad indicate that Saudi officials during the past 2 months have become certain of 2 crucial trends: 1) Because of internal developments or in response to changes in relations with the non-Arab world, inter-Arab disputes will be on the increase; 2) Israel will exploit the Arab fueding to create a series of new realities, ranging from driving the largest possible number of Arabs from Palestine through pressure and terroristic measures as a preliminary to declaring occupied Arab territory, including East Jerusalem, an indivisible part of the Zionist entity, to the implementation of a plan to occupy southern Lebanon. The latter measure might encompass a series of lightening raids on some of the neighboring Arab states.

Based on this information, Saudi Arabia is convinced that Arab solidarity may soon undergo its most critical test. The Saudis further believe that these impending developments may be behind the weakening of European support for the Arab cause and the Palestinian problem, as well as for turning the attention of the United States exclusively to Israel. Like any other nation, the danger of rift and possibly armed conflict within the Arab world is likely to propel the United States to seek a stable

ally in the region to help safeguard its interests. The manifest unity of the Zionist enemy, unlike our so-called solidarity is bound to speed this switch in U.S. policy.

In a recent talk, Prince Fahd questioned the intentions of the major powers regarding the Arab region and appeared skeptical about their announced declarations to defend the area, its oil and shipping lanes. He expressed apprehension about conditions in the Gulf region, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the [apparent] weakness of Europe in the face of Russia's might. But his greatest fear was over the disarray in Arab ranks. He described the lack of Arab unity as posing a greater danger than that posed by the major powers, and appealed for unity and an effective Arab voice in world affairs. Prompted by these apprehensions, Prince Fahd had decided to visit the trouble spots in an attempt to bring about negotiated settlements of Arab disputes. The Prince's example had immediate effects. Following the visit of Dr Rif'at al-As'ad, commander of Syria's defense forces and a leader of the Ba'ath party, to Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Government announced that it would no longer require Arab nationals to procure visas before entering Syria. Visas, according to the announcement, could be obtained from offices on the Syrian border. The abolished requirement had been interpreted as a sign of poor relations between Syria and her Arab neighbors, whom the Syrian Government had accused of helping members of the "Moslem Brotherhood" enter Syria. The imposition of the visa requirement had earlier resulted in turning thousands of Arab visitors from the Syrian border. Syria's abandonment of the visa requirement was a signal that the country would no longer adhere to a policy of reciprocal treatment with other Arab governments, who continued to adhere to the prior-to-entry visa requirement. Syria's example is but a simple example of the initiatives that could be undertaken to advance Arab solidarity.

The question, of course, is whether Prince Fahd will succeed in his undertaking. Will he be able to break the self-imposed bonds which shackle the Arabs and restrict their freedom of action, the bonds that have led to their splintering and immobilized their case?

There is reason for hope. Things have so deteriorated that we have only two options: success or further immobilization of every Arab case. In any event, success is contingent on agreement by all parties and on determination to achieve it.

Success is also contingent on actions, not on words. Excess words is not what is needed. What we need is action. A negligent smoker who causes a fire with his cigarette butt does not mean to start a fire. On the contrary, a worker who plants dynamite in a stone quarry knows what he is doing and produces a calculated result. We believe that Prince Fhad is trying to get the Arabs to be more like the dynamite planter, to deliberately undermine their disputes and to achieve a goal that has eluded them much too long.

9063
CSO: 4802

FATAH LEADER WARNS OF DIFFICULT TIMES, EXPRESSES MILITANCE

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 3 Jul 80 p 3

/Article: Khalid al-Hasan at a Press Conference: The Arabs Are Venturing on Crucial Times Which Might Scorch More Than One Country in the Area"/

/Text/ Mr Khalid al-Hasan, member of the Central Committee of the FATH movement, declared the Palestinians' rejection of any monopolization of the region by any major power in the world. He said that the Middle East issue must be solved with the participation of all major powers in the world, including the European countries. He described the European initiative as having been "drawn up" in an obscure manner, out of diffidence. He expressed his hope that Europe would have the courage to establish a clear friendship with the Arabs, as it previously had the courage to fight them and be hostile to them.

At a press conference he held yesterday at the headquarters of the FATH office in Kuwait, Khalid al-Hasan called upon the Arab countries to draw up their policy in accordance with the requirements of their national and domestic interests. He said that the Arabs were venturing on difficult and crucial times and that more than one Arab country could be badly burned if it was not in solidarity with the Arabs in their policy and their struggle.

Khalid al-Hasan declared that a delegation from the European Common Market countries would make a tour of the Middle East in which contacts would occur with all parties, including the Palestine Liberation Organization.

He said that the Palestinian resistance's information indicated that King Husayn was still adhering to the resolutions of the Baghdad and Tunis summits and that Carter had not been able to push him into joining the "Camp David" axis.

The Palestinian Delegation's Tour

At the start of his press conference, the member of the Central Committee of the FATH movement talked about the Palestinian delegation's tour of

Europe, which took 45 days, and stated that this tour took place in order to carry out two separate missions, first to participate in the meetings of the International Parliamentary Federation in Oslo, second to attend the Strasbourg Conference of the Society of European Parliamentarians.

Concerning the former meeting, Mr al-Hasan said that that was held to prepare for the basic general conference meeting which would be held in Berlin next September. At this meeting, the issues and drafts of resolutions were spelled out which would be presented to the general conference.

He stated that the task of the Palestinian delegation to this meeting, which comprised parliamentary delegates from 85 countries, was to add the issue of the Palestinian cause to the conference's agenda. He stressed that the delegation succeeded in this task without difficulty, since all parliamentary delegates except the representative of the Zionist enemy agreed to that.

Mr Khalid al-Hasan mentioned that another matter connected to the Palestinian cause was discussed at this meeting--the draft of a resolution to deal with the problems of refugees in the world in general.

An Israeli Draft!

He said that Israel presented a draft on this subject in the context of giving refugees passports from countries to which they had taken refuge and giving them some social and political facilities so that they would be able to express their cultural and political goals. Mr al-Hasan declared that this Israeli position arose from Israel's opposition to the return of the Palestinians to their homeland and their homes.

He mentioned that the draft of a contradictory resolution was presented to the conference with explanatory memoranda critical of the draft Israeli resolution. The opposing resolution stressed that solution of the refugee problem would occur when they returned to their homelands. The result was that the draft of the resolution opposed to the Israeli one won.

He added that after the conclusion of the meeting of the International Parliamentary Federation in Oslo the Palestinian delegation moved on to attend the Strasbourg conference. That was originally founded by the European Parliamentary Society and contained five parliamentarians representing France, Britain, The Netherlands and Germany. This society just includes the members of parliament of the nine European Common Market countries in its membership. It now consists of 350 parliamentary members. It has relations with the Arab Parliamentary Federation. Since Arab fragmentation has afflicted the Arab Parliamentary Federation with paralysis, and since the Palestinian cause is the vital one on the international stage, there are relations between the Organization of European Parliamentarians and the Palestine National Congress.

Mr al-Hasan said that in the light of these circumstances, the European organization recommended that a meeting be held between it and representatives of the Palestine National Congress, and the date was set last April. The agenda of this meeting contained a number of major issues, including a description of the reality and manner of operation of the Palestine National Congress.

A Welcome for the European Initiative

As regards the European initiative, he said that the Palestinian resistance would welcome this initiative, if it set forth from a principle of sincerity and seriousness. He pointed out that this principle must proceed from the usurped rights of the Palestinian people. He added that Europe, which had a prominent part in planning the establishment of Israel, must know full well what the Palestinian people want.

The member of the Central Committee of the FATH movement stressed the Palestinians' rejection of monopolization of the region by any major power in the world. He said that the Middle East issue must be resolved with the participation of all the major powers in the world, including the European countries, which have common interests and a political geography linking them with the Middle East.

He then focused on the demands which would enable the Palestinian people to look upon the European initiative with confidence. He said that the European position is not clearly hostile to the Arabs but is not a friendly position either and has not reached the desired level; rather, it has been drawn up in an obscure manner, with obvious diffidence. He expressed his hope that Europe would have the courage to establish true friendship with the Arabs, as it had the courage to fight them and be hostile to them.

He stressed that the first basic steps to guarantee that a sound atmosphere was provided for Arab European friendship would be recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a sole ligitimate representative of the Palestinian people, then the establishment of cultural and educational relations and the provision of aid to the palestinian people and their revolution inside and outside the occupied territories. He pointed to a deficit in the budget of the Refugee Aid Agency (UNRRA): if this deficit, which came to more than $18 million, continued, that would lead to depriving many Palestinian people of an education.

Mr al-Hasan declared that the Palestine resistance has a number of observations on the European initiative--first that it must be clear and not entail interpretations and explanations, and that it must contain a practical content for implementation, including economic punishments for Israel.

Mr Khalid al-Hasan added that after the conference ended the Palestinian delegation split up into three delegations visiting parliaments of European countries; their meetings were at the level of parliament members and

and foreign affairs committees, and there were meetings at the foreign ministry level.

Mr al-Hasan characterized Palestinian-Jordanian relations as being governed by the results of the Baghdad and Tunis summits. He said that the Palestinian positions change in accordance with change in the Jordanian positions.

He then said that the Palestine National Congress at its next meeting would stress the political program approved at the former meeting and that a new executive committee would be elected which would contain two representatives from each detachment of the Palestinian resistance. A working program for the next stage would be set out in the light of the political and organizational program approved by the former congress.

Flames Will Scorch More Than One Arab Country

Concerning conditions in Lebanon, he said that talk has proliferated in Washington about information indicating that Israel would soon launch a war against Lebanon and Syria this summer.

He expressed his belief that this war would be aimed at creating a new situation which would change the political course in the region.

He warned the Arabs of this dangerous situation, and said that they would be venturing on very difficult days if they did not return to a true combative solidarity accompanied by material action within a clear plan of action. He called on the Arabs not to content themselves with the resolutions they have become accustomed to issuing or else flames would scorch more than one Arab country.

The Resistance and Lebanon

On the subject of partition in Lebanon, he said that that was an Israeli goal and point of departure and that the resistance was on the side of the unity of Lebanon, land and people.

He mentioned that the resistance's new measures had not just been in Lebanon, but that it had started to intensify the struggle in the occupied territories, then worked to eliminate the armed phenomena and aggressions and conduct which do not become revolutionary morality and the customs and traditions of the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples. He said that these aggressions had reached the point where they were stirring up the Lebanese popular base against the resistance and that that was to be considered one of the most serious things the revolution faced especially if it continued.

Mr al-Hasan expressed his regret over the clashes which occurred with the Amal organization. He stated decisively that Iran had no relationship to these problems.

He said that the Palestinian leaders had done everything in their power to eliminate the causes of these disputes.

Mr al-Hasan concluded his press conference by saying "Any Arab political link with the events going on in America or Europe should be considered ignorance of the laws of political action, the conduct of anyone practicing them is subordinate, not independent, and the Arabs must come to understand the need to set out their policies in accordance with the requirements of their national and domestic interests, foremost among them the Palestinian cause, and deal with others from the premise of this policy."

11887
CSO: 4802

PARLIAMENT, SUPREME COURT PROPOSED TO UNITE ARAB NATION

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 2 Jul 80 pp 1, 6

/Article by Ibrahim Abu Nab: "The New National Charter"/

/Excerpt] When the Conference of Arab Foreign and Economic Ministers meets in Amman to prepare for the 11th Arab summit conference, which will be held in the Jordanian capital next November, it would be best if the ministers of defense also join the foreign and economic ministers, because the military danger of Israel has not lessened--rather, it has multiplied many times over and has been increased by other military dangers in the Gulf region. It would be best if all these were joined by the ministers of the interior in the Arab countries, and the ministers of education, the media, economy, culture and all the other types of ministers, if there still exist people like unity ministers in some Arab countries! It has been said that there are ministries in some Arab countries which do not exist in others, such as the Ministry of Cultural Legacy and the Ministry of Refugee Affairs; it would not be bad if these attended also.

Were it not for the fear that this talk of ours would be taken more in a spirit of jest than in a spirit of seriousness, we would recommend that an Arab parliamentary conference be held in conjunction with the Ministers' conference, in spite of the fact that Arab parliaments in the true meaning of the word do not exist and are closer to municipality councils, district councils, gathering places for old sheiks or royal seals!

Fortunately, or by the mockery of fate, I do not know which, a meeting of the sort which I am talking about actually took place in the Jordanian capital in April 1979 and lasted 4 days, from the 11th to the 15th of that month. However, it was not under the supervision of the Arab League or at its initiative, but was at the initiative and under the supervision of the international research institute of New York City. For this symposium, the institute assembled Arab and foreign experts, from all Arab countries and some foreign ones--specialists in all affairs, regardless of their position of responsibility. They met to discuss the state of this "Arab world in the transition stage." As for "transition" from what to what, I do not know, but what is proved is that this world is heading toward a

state which is different from that it is in now. How I would have liked it if our ministers who are to meet, then our kings and presidents afterward, were to be guided by the conclusions of this symposium and did not abandon them to the benefit of the Aspen Institute alone, which is the name of the international research institute in New York City!

In our opinion, the Arab countries which are meeting must set forth a general, comprehensive plan for Arab development, because balanced, integrated Arab development is a basic, necessary thing for true regional development and is also very essential for preserving the natural development of every country and keeping Arab disputes, which in reality reflect economic disputes, from flaring up.

Speed of development must be in harmony with human absorptive power in economic, material, and social terms. What has happened in Iran offers an economic explanation of revolution besides the other political and religious justifications. The Shah wanted to achieve more than was possible in all fields at exceptional speed and he thus gave room for social and economic "takeoff" and the development of obscenely rich classes, wretchedly poor classes and classes of parasites and middlemen. "The lack of balance between major industrial development, the construction of towns and military development, on the one hand, and rural agricultural development on the other, was to some extent responsible for the economic problems and popular unrest in Iran. Achievements in specific sectors of Iranian society created deficiencies and grumbling in other ones."

However, foreigners consider, as we ourselves do, that the need to deal with the Arab nation as a single economic and social unit is still urgent. If this is not happening now through Arab unity, let it happen through real integration, so that every king or president will remain in his seat, provided that he paves the way for the growth of intrinsic Arab power. It is this integration which will give every Arab country the power of the entire Arab group. It is this which will prevent any of them from being weak and falling apart because of its particular conditions.

Perhaps the national charter which President Saddam Husayn recommended will be somewhat of an attempt in this direction, as an alternative to the National Action Charter which existed between Syria and Iraq. Let us recognize that the National Action Charter between Syria and Iraq had the aroma of an axis which could have turned the Ba'th, after it was united, into a major revolutionary force exerring pressure. However, the national charter now seems closer to reality and more likely to get all regimes respond to it, in view of the guarantees it offers them. The greatest of these guarantees is the fact that no country will attempt to resolve its problems with another country by force. Internal Arab struggles, as we have stated above, use up three quarters of Arab strength. Every Arab country, including Iraq, Syria and the Sultanate of Oman, for example, needed the power of the entire Arab group in order to stand up to various pressures.

Perhaps Iraq felt the need for stronger guarantees in the national charter than a mere meeting of kings and presidents and agreement on that. It called for a popular conference in Baghdad in which many Arab political organizations and personalities took part. It is noteworthy that among the things this conference called for was the issuance of a charter on Arab human rights.

The Correct Start

Perhaps this will be the correct start. A charter for the rights of Arab man: his human, social, political and economic rights. Arab man everywhere, so that the rights and privileges of Arab man will be no greater in any country than they are in any other country. To embody this in practice, the Arab League should be transformed from a league of states to a league of states and peoples, through the creation of a united Arab parliament in which the representation of peoples will be achieved through free election by numbers and in which representation of governments will be achieved through equal numbers.

We have in mind, for example, two national assemblies (one for Arab representatives elected by free direct election under the supervision of the Arab League and the second for senators to which every country will appoint three or four representatives). The assembly of senators will have the right to abrogate any decree taken by the assembly of representatives which might diminish the sovereignty of any state. Thus balance between the desires and interests of peoples and the wishes and interests of regimes will be achieved.

A supreme Arab court of justice within the context of the league is essential. This court, which has been one of the league's dreams, has not yet been realized. The supreme court of justice would be composed of a number of senior Arab judges representing all Arab member countries, on the stipulation that they be appointed by election through judiciary committees in every country as a guarantee of the independence and impartiality of the judges. The decrees of this court will be decisive in basic disputes arising over the interpretation of the "national charter," since this charter will be tantamount to a federal constitution of the Arab nation.

As for the kings and presidents of the Arab states, or the Arab summit, they will be the collective leadership of the nation and the supreme political authority which will adopt its decisions by majority; these decisions will only be valid following agreement by the assemblies of representatives and senators. It will be possible for the summit to elect every year for a period of 1 year a president who will have the honor of representing the whole nation in international gatherings and of speaking in its name concerning all matters which arise.

To this end, I said at the beginning of the article that it would be best when the Arab foreign and economics ministers meet next July in Amman if

the ministers of defense and education and the ministers of labor, information, culture, interior and all ministers also attended, because, if the national charter is to be a real national charter, political and economic affairs cannot be conducted apart from defense, security, education, finance and all other matters. If Arab man attains his rights in the national charter, Arab wealth will be a common national resource whose affairs will be managed by a central Arab monetary bank, the Arab Monetary Fund--which, by the way, the Aspen symposium considered a pressing need which one could not ignore.

Therefore, until this kind of charter which we are talking about is realized, a country like Libya which proceeds to build a reinforced concrete wall 300 kilometers long at a cost of $3 billion will not have been the first Arab country to do so. The walls which exist between these countries are stronger than reinforced concrete and are making Arab disputes bear fruit.

11887
CSO: 4802

PRIME MINISTER EXAMINES INDUSTRIAL EXPANSION PROBLEMS

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 1-2 Aug 80 pp 1,3

[Excerpt] As part of a program of visits of inspection and working sessions, Prime Minister Ben Ahmed Abdelghani and Minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform Salim Saadi went to the wilayas of Annaba and Guelma the day before yesterday, Thursday. The prime minister was also accompanied in his visit by Mr Benblidia, from the Ministry of Planning, and by Khalfa Mameri, director of studies in the Prime Minister's Office.

After being greeted by Bouhedja Said, national party commissioner for Annaba, and by Abdelaziz Madoui, wali of Annaba, the prime minister went directly to the Les Salines area to look at the pumping wells and installations built to alleviate the problem of water supply for the town of Annaba and for the steel industrial complex of El-Hadjar. Immediately after this, the prime minister went to the port of Annaba to see the progress made in the construction of the mineral port and, in more general terms, to assess the conditions under which the port is being used and managed.

Next, the prime minister and accompanying delegation went to visit the El-Hadjar steel industrial complex where after being greeted by Ait Hocine, director general of the SNS [National Steel Company], by the director of the plant and by the chairman of the Plant Workers' Assembly, Abdelghani expressed interest in the various problems connected with the expansion of the industrial complex and with the social situation of the workers, problems which were explained to him by the ATU [Plant Workers' Assembly] chairman.

In the industrial district of Annaba, the prime minister stopped to visit a cooperative where they process the sugar beet crop from the area of Bou-Namoussa. During his visit to the wilaya of Guelma, the prime minister went to the SOGEDIA [Food Industries Management and Development Company] plant which processes the sugar beet crops grown in the two wilayas visited as well as imported brown sugar. The tour of the plant was followed by a working session during which the wali and the plant officials had a chance to explain the operational problems of the plant.

Expansion Problems in the Industrial Zone of Annaba

On Thursday, Abdelghani, member of the Central Committee and prime minister, went to Annaba and Guelma where he spent the day making tours of inspection and holding working sessions. He was accompanied by Salim Saadi, member of the Central Committee and minister of agriculture and agrarian reform, by the secretary general of the Ministry of Planning and Land Development and by the director of studies in the Prime Minister's Office.

After being met at Les Salines Airport by civilian and military authorities form the wilaya of Annaba, Abdelghani and Salim Saadi went to the pumping station located near the airport where local officials gave them detailed explanations concerning the project to develop water resources in Annaba and its region. The project consists of two dams, the dam on the Chiffia with a reservoir of 95 million cubic meters and the dam on the Mexena with a reservoir of 150 million cubic meters, both of which will supply water for agricultural, industrial and domestic use. The project also includes nine pumping wells. The Annaba-Les Salines pumping station, almost completed and already pumping 1,200 liters per second, is 3 years behind schedule. The dam on the Chiffia already holds a volume of 34 million cubic meters of water which can be used.

It has been estimated that the town of Annaba requires 1,742 liters of water per second. Right now the town is only getting 1,490 liters per second but if all goes well, the town will receive 1,970 liters per second by April 1981 and 2,260 liters per second by 1982.

Therefore the problem of the town's water supply will be solved for several years to come although in the long run it is absolutely essential to build the dam on the Mexena, the wali said.

It must also be pointed out that a substantial portion of the water now available--some mention the figure of 50 percent--gets lost in the distribution network which is very old. From what the prime minister was told, it seems that the SNS [National Steel Company] requirements are being satisfied but nothing has changed as regards the volume of water allocated to agriculture and the population continues to suffer from water shortages. This is why people are impatiently waiting for the reservoir volume of the Chiffia dam to increase from 34 million to 95 million cubic meters, for the pumping wells to be fully operational and, above all, for the construction of the Mexena dam (150 million cubic meters).

After this, the ministerial delegation went to the port of Annaba to inspect the extension work being done on the southern pier of the mineral port where 83 percent of the construction work has been completed. They have already built 174 meters of the 322-meter long pier. When the project, where work has been going on for 4 years, is completed, the port will accommodate ships of between 50 and 70,000 tons. In its present state, the mineral port receives 10,000 tons of coal a day and has storage yards holding 90,000 tons. After explaining to the prime minister how work is progressing and the goals

of this phase of expansion, the local authorities mentioned long-term expansion plans without which some of the port traffic will have to be diverted to other ports.

Shortly after this, the prime minister and his party went to El-Hadjar where they visited the facilities of its large steel industrial complex.

Before touring, among others, the coking-plant, the blast-furnace number 2 and the 225-cubic meter silo which collapsed last May pulling down two conveyors, an extractor, a weighing machine and a coal hopper sprout, (...) Abdelghani listened to reports presented by the director of the complex and the ATU chairman on the situation in the complex and did so in the presence of the SNS director general.

The El-Hadjar industrial complex, Boudraa said in substance, employs 17,000 (seventeen thousand) workers in its own facilities and 15,000 (fifteen thousand) more in its by-products plants.

The prime minister asked the director of the industrial complex to tell him about the incident which took place last June, about environmental problems and about general problems in the industrial complex.

The Belgian construction firm, Casse Sambre, is fully responsible for the incident in early June, Boudraa replied.

Abdelghani wondered about the silence which had surrounded the incident in contrast with the outcry that such a negligence would have provoked if Algerian cadres had been the ones responsible for it.

He also reiterated the need to trust Algerian cadres as the president of the republic and secretary general of the FLN has advised time and time again.

To launch its second phase, Boudraa went on to say, the industrial complex requires 200 liters of water per second above its current water allocation (of 350 liters per second). In the final phase, the centers' requirements of water for industrial use will jump by 50 liters per second until they reach a total volume of 800 liters per second. But what is badly needed is drinking water. The industrial complex gets less than half of the drinking water it needs and the workers are forced to drink water which is not potable.

Going down the list of problems in the plant, Boudraa mentioned the problem of bringing products and raw materials to the complex and the problem of carrying the finished product to the consumers. In this matter he said, we are concerned thinking of what will happen in the next 4 years.

Finally, he emphasized the need to increase the number of ways of access to the complex by rail, especially the need to build a double track for the Ramdane Djamel-Constantine railroad line now under construction and the need to redevelop the coupler circuits of the Annaba region.

"As regards accommodation, Boudraa said, we need 9,000 apartments. Of course, we could build them outselves as agreed with the Ministry of Housing and with the wilaya but our engineering company requires financial aid to become adapted to housing construction." (...) Speaking about the problem of transportation for his personnel, the director of the complex reported on the efforts deployed in that sphere. We have, he said, 60 buses traveling 14,000 kilometers a day on 28 routes. Given their high rate of use, the condition of the roads and the lack of spare parts, the average life of a bus is less than one year. The SNTF [National Railroad Transportation Company] is not an alternative solution. This company tends to give priority to the transportation of freight and is not convenient for the workers who must walk several kilometers from their homes to the station and from the station to the complex. Nonetheless, 1,900 workers commute to work by train every day.

The director went on to talk about administrative problems mentioning, among others, the large amount of paperwork, the lack of spare parts, the rejection of aid contracts because they are too costly, for reasons of renewal or licenses (...) saying that all these difficulties are a heavy burden on the day-by-day running of the complex. For instance, the work of the shop which repairs and manufactures spare parts and units and which was created to cut down on imports, is being jeopardized by the cuts in technical assistance and by the rejection of contracts with the result that the number of assistants in that shop has dropped from 30 to 15.

When the prime minister asked about relations between management and the ATU, the director of the complex said that relations are generally good and are marked by a frank dialog, by an effective cooperation in the implementation of a number of tasks which are important for the complex (...). However, some differences of opinion exist as regards the main working methods, social matters and so on. ATU chairman Dehmi said at this point that, indeed, they still have differences of opinion on the issues of working methods and working conditions in the complex.

"We insist and, in fact, will not compromise on the subject of democratization in the activities of the industrial complex. We believe that the workers have something to say regarding all the problems of the complex regardless of their nature. (...) They are asked to produce and have done so with courage and dedication. In exchange, we are asking that they be heard on matters of work organization, management, working conditions and others, since these questions affect the stability of the work force, the tempo and rate of production and the health of the plant's workers. (...)"

The ATU chairman gave a list of the major points of friction (health and safety, transportation, social medicine, housing, restoration and democratization of activities in the plant) between the workers' representatives and management. Stressing the question of working conditions, the ATU chairman mentioned fatal accidents--4 in 1978, 8 in 1979 and 3 during the first 6 months of 1980--, inadequate infrastructure, shortcomings in the amount and quality of restoration work, water shortage, lack of means of transportation

and so on. Then, the director of the complex spoke about the working areas where they have had a higher number of accidents and said "that apart from those resulting in fatal casualties, accidents in the complex are less frequent and less serious than in the rest of the SNS plants or in steel plants in foreign countries. He then explained the measures taken to reduce the number of accidents particularly in some sectors (working areas with the highest accident rates, automotive traffic inside the plant).

Finally, the mentioned the difficulties created mostly by the Ministry of Planning when they try to implement social programs (nursery schools, holidays and resting centers, medical and social centers, sports grounds and so on), programs prepared in collaboration with the workers' representatives...

During the discussion and throughout his visit to the installations, the prime minister showed that he was very interested in the problems of the industrial complex asking questions on the use of the equipment, on production methods, on working conditions and on the technical supervisory staff. He congratulated the plant workers (management, ATU, cadres and groups) for the progress which they have made in all spheres and assured them that the government is aware of the difficulties which they are still facing.

After visiting the El-Hadjar industrial complex, the prime minister and his party went to the sugar beet cooperative grouping some 40 agricultural exploitations and covering a total area of 1,300 hectares. Sugar beet farming--which is not encouraged and requires a large labor force apparently not available in the Annaba region--seems to be having problems. Producers only do this type of farming when they are compelled or forced and even then it is done marginally over very small areas. The yield per hectare is also very low. The yield for the 1973-74 season was 12 tons per hectare; on the following season it was 8 tons per hectare; in 1975-76, it was 10 tons; in 1177-78, 12 tons; in 1978-79, 6 tons and in 1979-80, 8.568 tons.

The farmers' reluctance is obvious if one compares the area actually planted in a case in which the target was to plant 2,025 hectares. Only 1,798 hectares were planted during the 1977-78 season and on the following year they planted 131 hectares less. In this same example, the yield was 19,660 tons for the first season mentioned and 13,954 tons for the following year.

After touring the cooperative installations, the prime minister asked about the reasons why the farmers refuse to grow sugar beet, what causes the low yields, and what would be the consequences of reconverting the cooperative and of abandoning such risky farming. In their answers, local officials were unanimously in favor of reconversion.

8796
CSO: 4400

PRIME MINISTER REVIEWS PROBLEMS IN CONTEXT OF 5-YEAR PLAN

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 8-9 Aug 80 pp 1, 3

[APS article: "To Strike a Balance Between the Targets and the Ability to Meet Them"]

[Text] The Prime Minister Visits Oran and Mostaganem

Prime Minister Abdelghani was in Oran on Thursday on a visit of inspection and work. He was accompanied by Minister of Housing Ahmed Ghazali and Minister of Education and Scientific Research Abdelhak Bererhi, both members of the Central Committee, by senior officials working on the plan and by the ministers' close assistants.

Abdelghani and the ministerial delegation accompanying him arrived in the western capital in the morning and were greeted by local authorities, notably by the wali of Oran, the deputy CNP [National Party Commissioner], a representative of the ANP [People's National Army] and the directors of the wilaya's external departments.

Abdelghani chaired a working session, held at the wilaya headquarters, to discuss matters of housing and education--particularly university education--and problems related to supplies. This preliminary conversation enabled the participants to take stock of the situation, assess the needs and review the difficulties. Abdelghani presented these questions mostly in the context of the various development plans and more particularly of the 5-year plan. In this respect, said the prime minister during the discussion, our efforts must be directed towards striking a balance between our means and the list of development projects which can be carried out in each wilaya. The prime minister underscored the fact that officials must be careful in the selection and management of the tasks which they want to undertake so as to be able to carry out the projects needed to make their regions prosperous. This is particularly important, he said, in view of the fact that two-thirds of the 5-year plan consist of activities intended to complete many projects and tasks started under previous plans.

This is why he asked officials to show precision and a correct sense of evaluation when they work out their programs. "One should not present proposals which, from an economic viewpoint, are not directly based on the realities of the region and which cannot be carried out. What should be done is to take into account the human factor, the material elements likely to turn these proposals into a reality within the required time span to avoid falling behind schedule time and time again, to avoid having to reassess costs and unnecessarily wasting energy and resources..."

A New Town Will Be Built in Bethioua

After outlining the spirit and substance of the national development effort, the prime minister opened the dialog between the local authorities and the ministries involved, in this case, the Ministries of Housing and Higher Education. In this framework, the wali of Oran reviewed the housing situation in his wilaya where there had been a very rapid economic and social development, and accelerated population growth with the resulting migration. The large industrial plants built in Arzew and Oran have created huge housing requirements. Consequently, the housing deficit, which in 1977 was estimated to amount to 89,700 dwellings, will start at more than 56,000 dwellings by 1984. More than 27,000 housing units were built under programs included in previous plans or under private initiative and the theoretical deficit projected for 1984 has been cut down to 29,000 units. The 12,000 housing units scheduled to be built under the 5-year plan will eventually be substracted from that figure. In terms of land, 1,000 additional hectares of developed land will be required. With this in mind, the wilaya of Oran has established the following targets: to grant permission for the urban development required to meet the citizens' applications; to build integrated housing; to protect agricultural land with high yields and to cut down on the commuting time between the place of work and home. To achieve this goal , there have been studies dealing with regional development, with projects of general urban development for the areas of Oran, Arzew and Oued-Tlelat. They have also conducted detailed studies on the ZHUN [expansion unknown], on communal lands, on the renovation of older districts and of industrial districts. A renovation of the housing stock is also underway.

A new town, Araba, will be built near Bethioua to alleviate the housing shortage mostly in the industrial area of Arzew. It will add 10,000 units to the region's rural housing. But construction work in the wilaya is affected by the lack of resources, of adequate studies and of certain materials. Based on these facts, Minister of Housing Ahmed Ali Gazhali spoke about the need to restructure the construction companies on a local and national level to achieve better results. The minister also noted that studies must be carefully drawn up and must offer every guarantee of being practicable. Therefore, a better balance must be achieved between resources and targets in the sphere of housing.

In the wilaya of Oran, the minister would like, among other things, to see the ZHUN becoming a reality, to have more building lots and to renovate the older districts.

As a first measure to solve the problem of the lack of auxiliary industries in the housing sector, the prime minister announced that 1,000 carpentry shops and 1,000 flooring plants will be created all over the country to supply the housing industry. Abdelghani also stressed the need to finish building the University of Science and Technology in Oran where work seems to be way behind scheduled since it did not start seriously until April 1980. The discussion of problems related to education were to continue mainly between the minister of higher education and scientific research and local representatives.

The subject of the new university city, which has been closed since they had an accidental fire there, was also discussed. Unfortunately, its facilities cannot be reopened for safety reasons. That university city will remain closed until an alternative solution is found. Several proposals have been put forward by the local authorities. On this point, the prime minister called for this problem to be resolved since the beginning of the new academic year is approaching. He also hoped that the wilaya will be allocated a quota of accommodations in the University of Oran. The infrastructure for higher education is developing from year to year in the region but remains insufficient in the spheres of student accommodation and teachers. Solutions were put forward to solve these problems.

The working session went on to discuss the problems of supplies which are not too serious in the wilaya of Oran.

Towards the end of the meeting, marked by a frank and constructive dialog, the prime minister urged the local authorities to do their best to ensure a harmonious development in their wilaya.

Next, the ministerial delegation headed by Abdelghani visited the working site of the USTO [Oran University of Science and Technology] and then went to Mostaganem where it arrived in the afternoon and proceeded to visit the SONIC [National Cellulose Industries Company] paper plant, the SOGEDIA [Food Industries Management and Development Company] plant, the harbor, the wilaya construction company and the university city. During these visits, the prime minister and ministers accompanying him discussed the problems which the wilaya authorities are facing.

Mostaganem: Problems of the SONIC Paper Plant

Immediately after being greeted by the wilaya authorities, the ministerial delegation went to the SONIC paper plant. The prime minister was told about operating conditions in the plant and particularly about water supply problems and electricity outages which cause costly disruptions in production. A 3-hour cut in their water supply results in a 24-hour stop of production. If the water cuts last 24 hours, production stops for 3 days to which must be added a great deal of work to get the machinery back into working order.

The SONIC plant requires 2,200 cubic meters of water per hour. In most instances, the water cuts are due to the low-water season of the Cheliff and to the conservation requirements applying to the ground water reservoir which feeds the plant. But sometimes the water cuts are the result of electricity

outages which prevent the SONADE [National Company for the Distribution of Drinking Water and Water for Industrial Use] facilities from operating. Production, which at the moment stands below the plant's capabilities, can only be increased if the difficult problem of water supply is solved.

During the year of 1979, water cuts resulted in 3,519 hours of production stoppages. Also, these difficult conditions of operation in the plant have affected the stability of the qualified personnel. Out of 104 trained staff members, 42 have left.

Profitable Investments

As regards marketing, it must be pointed out that the price which the producer gets for 1 kilo of paper, which is 4.50 dinars, has not changed since 1975, while the consumer has to pay as much as 11.50 dinars today. Large profits are made by the retailers. Also, there have been considerable increases in the prices of all the raw materials and products used to make the paper.

As for the harmful effects on the environment, the plant officials have given reassurances that as soon as production goes back to normal, pollution will fall down to tolerable levels. Right now, the evacuation of residual waters into the sea and the smoke coming out of the plant chimneys are harmful. Very heavy investments were necessary to build the plant and it must show a profit all the more so since the project is part of the policy of increasing the value of the country's raw material to make a product as important as paper.

In the SOGEDIA sugar refinery, which the prime minister visited next, the situation is slightly better as regards production. However, the results achieved so far must be consolidated and developed. This plant transforms imported brown sugar into lumps and sugarloaves of white crystallized sugar.

Most of the specialized staff working at the SOGEDIA refinery was trained on the job which is why the ATU chairman told the prime minister about their need for training programs. The removal of the output is also a problem and affects workers' productivity. The ONACO [Algerian National Marketing Office] faces problems of transportation and cannot ensure the regular evacuation of the finished product.

Port: a Dredger Out of Operation for 3 Months

Next, the prime minister paid a visit to the port of Mostaganem where traffic has increased considerably in recent years. In addition to the ships calling there regularly, the port also accommodates ships initially going to the ports of Oran and Algiers. Dredging operations are needed in the port and although work started it was not completed because the dredger broke down several months ago. The port of Mostaganem is not congested thanks to the hard work of the port employees. Of all the Algerian ports, Mostaganem seems to be the one with the highest productivity.

At Mostagenem university campus--which was built by SOTRAMO [Mostagenem Construction Company] in the amazing short time of 15 months--the prime minister visited various buildings and was told about current and future projects of extension. The same company is now building a 500-bed residential university city.

The SOTRAMO offices and yards were the last stop in the minister's tour. SOTRAMO makes an important contribution to the development of the wilaya and since it was created, it has done over 170 millions worth of business. Its main field of activities is found in the sphere of the agrarian reform. Being well organized, the SOTRAMO finances its own machinery which maintains its value. In addition to doing projects, the company produces construction materials and supplies goods used in construction work. The company owns a tile factory, a briquette manufacturing plant and a carpentry shop.

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COUNTRY'S AGRICULTURAL SITUATION ANALYZED

Meeting of Wilaya Coordinators

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] Algiers (APS)--A meeting of wilaya coordinators of the National Union of Algerian Peasants (UNPA) was held yesterday morning at Party headquarters (Place des Martyrs), in the presence of Mohamed Djeghaba, Ahmed Sebaa and Aissa Nadjem, members of the Central Committee and respectively president of the Party's general organization commission, department mass organizations official and UNPA secretary general.

During this meeting, the participants presented their thoughts on three important problems in the agricultural sector. The topics included the organizational situation at the level of the various wilayas, the results of the harvesting-threshing season and the problem of commercialization after the recent measures taken by the ministry of agriculture and the agrarian revolution.

The last-named topic aroused great interest on the part of participants. In fact, the delegates of the Algerian peasants were slightly in agreement with the ministerial decision to liberalize the market, while at the same time expressing a great number of reservations.

The coordinators were especially apprehensive about the seizure and control of the market by the president [mandataire]. They wanted to know most particularly whether the latter will not take the opportunity offered to him to create situations of shortages and thereby even speculate on prices.

The meeting continued throughout the afternoon.

Signs of Change in Agricultural Sector

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Said Mouas]

[Text] Oran--Agriculture is to the Ain-Temouchent region what the sea is to the fisherman. The region draws its wealth from agriculture just as the

fisherman draws his from the sea. The land makes demands; and it is here that the fellah, as everywhere else, is faced by problems which are as difficult as they are varied.

In this vast daira, one of the country's largest, agricultural activity has experienced many disruptions which have led officials at certain times to rethink their actions. It was precisely for this purpose that a meeting was held recently in the daira offices which assembled all the authorities involved in agricultural questions.

A report summarizing the principal aspects of the situation was presented on that occasion.

With a view to better defining the situation and examining the problems down to their smallest details, the debate at the meeting covered all aspects inherent in the agricultural sector: social and organizational techniques. Before taking up the problem in-depth, it seems useful to provide some specifics about the structural and ambient framework of the region.

In this region, there are 64 self-managed entities, 2 CAPAM (Moudjahidine Production Cooperative) and 149 CAPRA (Agricultural Production Cooperative of the Agrarian Revolution) sharing about 114,927 hectares with 3,404 small fellahs.

Naturally, the self-managed sector has the lion's share. With a total land area of 77,365 hectares, it employs 7,367 laborers, including 1,902 seasonal workers. However, its output is far below the expected yield. This year's production was described as low in this section despite the fact that resources seemed relatively sufficient. Thus the average yield per crop was as follows: 6 quintals of grain per hectare, 3 quintals-hectare of dried legumes, 20 quintals-hectare of wine grapes and 25 quintals-hectare of aboriculture.

The agrarian revolution sector covers an area of 25,928 hectares and has 149 CAPRA. Most of the CAPRA are concentrated around El-Amria (Hassi, 58; El Ghella, 28, Ain-Temouchent, 15; and Ain Tolba, 6). Some 1,321 assignees of the agrarian revolution are attached to these structures.

Improper Production Techniques

As for the private sector, it is now handling 10,366 hectares. The profitability of this sector is slightly higher than that of the other sectors (8 quintals-hectare of grains; 40 quintals-hectare of wine grapes and 35 quintals-hectare of aboriculture). These results reveal at least one thing: the agrarian revolution and self-managed sectors are basically able to greatly exceed their present productions. Problems of all kinds can be

cited which are keeping the socialist sector from reaching production levels worthy of its possibilities but how these problems are to be resolved continues to be a question of the commitment and the awareness of their responsibilities on the part of the workers.

This indoctrination effort is the responsibility of the Party and the mass organizations. Of course, this point alone should not be used as a pretext for the kinds of dismissals being manifested.

There are three kinds of objective restraints:

--In the first place, techniques! The financing of some projects requires sizable credits which the production units do not always obtain. As we know, the BNA [National Bank of Algeria] makes loans on the basis of the situation of these units. By facilitating the procedure for the granting of loans to interested parties as much as possible, the Bank would in part resolve their problems.

A second point relating to the expansion of water resources construction work would permit recovery of large expanses of land. Of a total of 270 watering sites noted throughout the daira, only 107 are equipped for the irrigation of 1,135 hectares. In the communes of Hassi, El Ghella and El-Amria, land development work has been delayed for lack of credits. There are also soil protection and restoration activities through reforestation and the installation of traversable roads [banquettes] through fertile lands and at higher elevations in Ain Tolba and Aghlal, in particular, and repair of local roads whose poor condition is the cause of many breakdowns of agricultural equipment, etc.

Uncultivated lands cover an area of 16,974 hectares. The size of this area, principally at the level of the production units, permits intensification of sheepraising, up to 3,000 head. For the moment, livestock production falls within the jurisdiction of the self-managed sector with a total of 5,215 head (4,318 sheep and 897 cattle). Also, supplies of fodder (4,055 quintals the past season) are large enough to permit the installation of sheep and cattle fattening areas.

The opening of poultry centers, "chickens for meat and egg production" would respond to a necessity: the need to check the price rises affecting the sale of these products which have become the preferred target of all kinds of speculators who abound in the urban centers and who have succeeded in setting up veritable full-blown poultry "industries" on their own property or elsewhere. Judicious control of this parallel private poultry market and an increase in the number of production centers in the state sector would have the immediate result of isolating the phony poultry raisers who are getting rich at a breathtaking rate following the sharp rise in the price of meat.

Among the reasons for low yields, it is worth noting the insufficiency of high-powered tractors, climatic hazards and improper production techniques.

15 Socialist Agricultural Villages Scheduled

Added to all these technical problems there is a no less important factor affecting the workers' standard of living. The housing program in the self-managed and agrarian revolution sectors, once completed, will very appreciably change the social environment of those who work the land. Fifteen socialist agricultural villages will be built in the next decade, including three in Aghlal, two in El-Amria, two in Temouchent and two in Terga. These four localities, therefore, share a total of 10 projects. This grandiose program will complement the one now being carried out in Aghlal, Ain-Tolba, Terga and El-Malah, where about 100 housing units per agricultural village are scheduled. Let us state parenthetically that the construction through self-financing of the socialist village of Messada Ben-Badis (El-Malah commune) which was started about 5 years ago is still having problems.

For its part, the self-managed sector has 626 housing units of which 19 are in the completion stage in Chaabat El-Leham. The needs of this sector have also increased.

Along with housing, education presents another problem which is facing students who are having difficulty getting to their respective schools on a daily basis.

An increase in old-age pensions and standardization of family allowances vis-a-vis other sectors are also the aspirations of the fellah group in the daira.

Production and productivity cannot be disassociated from these problems. Moreover, there is one problem, which because of its implications, impacts upon production. In this instance, the problem is one of the technical environment; i.e., the entire chain of structures which support the farmers and condition the attainment of their objectives. We will mention three of these structures:

--the ONAMA [National Agricultural Equipment Office]: this office is not entirely fulfilling its responsibilities vis-a-vis production centers which are poorly supplied with spare parts and which are complaining of not being assisted technically in matters of mechanical breakdowns and the drilling of wells.

--the CAPCS [Communal Multi-Service Agriculture Cooperative]: this office is marking time at present, particularly as regards anything having to do with supplies and commercialization. The problem of transportation and packaging continues to have an impact on the producer-consumer cycle.

--the COFEL [Fruit and Vegetable Cooperative]: the Temouchent branch supplies that of Sisi-Bel-Abbes in the amount of 50 percent, in conformance with a not-too-rigid circular, which does not in any way take into consideration the needs of the daira itself. We wonder why the COFEL of the wilaya administrative seat would not do the same thing.

The wilaya director of the organization in question apparently made commitments to equip the Temouchent COFEL with trucks and packaging equipment. Not only was nothing done but what is more the packaging equipment sent to Sidi-Bel-Abbes was not returned. In any event, the COFEL is not doing its job of regulator; and the difficulties observed in the flow of products derive in large measure from these contradictions.

Agricultural development in the Ain-Temouchent daira has never experienced a more favorable situation. The decisions made in this regard by the second meeting of the Central Committee, the many ministerial debates which are taking place in this period and above all the installation of communal delegations of the agrarian revolution are as many encouraging signs and the precursors of change. It is time for agriculture to recover the position which belongs to it in the national economic configuration.

Improvement in Skikda

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 22-23 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by Rachid Souilah]

[Text] In the Skikda wilaya, the harvesting-threshing season is progressing satisfactorily, with account taken of the efforts made by the wilays services and the directorate of agriculture, on the one hand, and the material resources utilized, on the other hand.

The season is scheduled to end on 25 August, while last year it ended on 15 September. This appreciable saving of time is due to the preparation in the materials sector which took place in an organized manner and which thus was able to respond favorably to the needs of agricultural exploitation for equipment; e.g., harvester-threshers and baggers. In fact, with the purchase this year of 20 harvester-threshers, the wilaya of Skikda found itself equipped with 128 pieces of agricultural machinery. This permitted an enormous speedup in harvesting operations. What is more, the timesaving is already permitting the start of work on the preparation of the soil for the next plowing-sowing season.

As for production, it is estimated that there is an appreciable production increase which ranges from 5 and 10 percent, depending upon the crop, compared to the last season. Thus the overall forecasts for harvests are on the order of 355,000 quintals compared to the 320,000 quintals obtained in 1979; i.e., an increase of 35,000 quintals.

We should point out that this improvement in production is not only due to the quality of the work done, particularly in the weeding operations, but also to the good distribution of rains which were favorable this year to grain crops.

Moreover, the objectives of the 1980 season which set their sights on a total surface of 41,834 hectares permitted the recording of per crop production which breaks down as follows:

--Hard wheat: 31,000 hectares, soft wheat: 7,400 hectares; barley: 1,500 hectares; oats: 1,394 hectares.

As can be noted, hard wheat represented 70 percent of production, followed by barley, 22 percent, oats, 7.5 percent, and finally, soft wheat, 0.5 percent [as published].

Availability of Spare Parts

In the equipment sector, it is worth noting the improvements registered both in the inventory of machinery area, which was bolstered by 26 harvester-threshers, and in the breakdown area that improved considerably compared to last year which had a 30 percent breakdown rate for the entire season.

This year the rate of breakdowns did not exceed 15 percent. This improvement was possible thanks to the much improved availability of spare parts at the ONAMA level, which is providing regular supplies. The situation is the same as regards bagging machinery, fuel and lubricants which covered all the wilaya's needs during the season.

In the technical sector, the directorate of agriculture installed a technical team which was responsible for monitoring the harvesting-threshing operations and the ONAMA sent two teams of breakdown mechanics equipped with vehicles containing the tools needed for the on-site repair of machinery.

These teams did a fine job, and their efforts produced the excellent results which we cited earlier. Nevertheless, it continues to be desirable for these teams to be beefed up by the ONAMA in the future; this would make it possible to give coverage to all the communes of the wilaya.

As regards the collection of grain production, this is handled by the CERECOOP [? Grain Cooperative] which is exerting great efforts, particularly through the establishment of a motor park for trucks which are dispatched to meet the demand of the producers. Because of this arrangement, the collecting of the harvests is accomplished regularly to the great satisfaction of the fellahs.

Finally, the problems encountered are to be found principally in the sector of inadequate storage facilities. In fact, it is estimated that for lack of warehouses in sufficient number unwarehoused grain will total 20,000 quintals this year.

However, the CERECOOP, alerted by the directorate of agriculture, apparently has already taken steps to handle this situation by building suitable storage sites, according to the conclusion reached by officials responsible for the management of agriculture, the agrarian revolution and the forests.

As can be readily observed, thanks to the concerted efforts of all parties (local authorities, offices, cooperatives, farmers), the harvesting-threshing season has been crowned by excellent results in the Skikda wilaya. It is to be hoped that the satisfactory results obtained will be multiplied in the coming years, and this in response to national needs in the grain sector.

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HARVEST PROGRESS, PROBLEMS REPORTED

80 Percent of Crops Harvested

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 5 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] The harvesting and threshing campaign, which started on 15 August, is in progress all over the country. These activities should be completed by 15 August. Eighty percent of the crops have been harvested by now. Many farmers would like to finish the harvest before the Aid festivities. But to do so they must work even harder to overcome obstacles of a material and human nature. In addition to the insufficiencies arising in the sphere of transportation of the grain, which at times force the farmers to stop their harvesting and threshing activities to take care of that transportation, the harvest has raised the problem of a shortage of manpower.

As the labor force gets older, there is no younger generation to take over. Temporary solutions have been tried out to meet this shortage but they are only stopgap solutions. Pensioners and seasonal young workers have been recruited to bring in the grain harvest for daily wages of 35 Algerian dinars.

Also, when the harvest is finished, the land is not allowed to lie fallow. With the practice of transhumance, the fields are subjected to overgrazing which has very bad consequences.

However, it is acknowledged that while adequate, the 1980 harvest is not an exceptionally good one. Self sufficiency in grain production is still a goal to be achieved and Algeria continues to import large quantities of grain. To be selfsufficient, serious problems must be overcome.

Harvest Progress in Mascara Wilaya

Algiers LA NATION in French 6 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] Mascara (APS)--Harvesting and threshing activities, going on at a brisk pace in the wilaya of Mascara, are coming to an end since 80 percent of the crops have been harvested. So far, 859 quintals of grain have been harvested, of which 445,000 quintals came from the socialist sector, 95,100 quintals from

the agrarian reform sector and 319,500 quintals from the private sector. These figures represent crops harvested in an area of 78,495 hectares out of the total area of 95,444 hectares planted throughout the wilaya. The harvest is expected to be over by the middle of August.

The DARAW [expansion unknown] officials reckon that by the end of the season the wilaya will have produced over 1 million quintals of grain. If this figure is reached, it will set a record in production since last year's yield was 582,692 quintals and the previous year's production was in the order of 342,103 quintals. The current harvest is taking place under very satisfactory conditions thanks to the mechanized equipment which includes 236 combine-harvesters.

The difficulties arising at the beginning of the harvesting season, which were due to the shortage of manpower, since the workers were busy with other crops such as potatoes and onions, were solved in good time by recruiting seasonal workers from neighboring regions.

It must also be pointed out that the hay harvest ended a short while ago in the wilaya. This harvest involved 24,831 hectares of fields where 495,000 quintals of hay were harvested: 223,000 quintals from lands belonging to the selfmanagement sector, 51,000 quintals from lands belonging to the agrarian reform sector and 221,000 quintals from privately owned lands. This volume of production will be enough to meet the wilaya's requirements of livestock fodder. This crop registered a significant increase being 174,614 quintals in excess of last year's crop which amounted to 320,386 quintals.

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INADEQUATE STORAGE FACILITIES REPORTED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 1-2 Aug 80 p 2

[Report: "Constantine: Inadequate Storage Facilities; Two SNNGA [National Construction Materials Company] for a Population of 500,000"]

[Text] Constantine (APS). Wednesday, at 1030 hours, inside the Galeries Algeriennes (formerly Magasin du Globe), everyone was in his assigned position, waiting with apprehension for the store to open. Since the beginning of Ramadhan this has been, for the employees of the unit, the beginning of their daily Calvary.

The employee in charge of raising the store curtain was cautious, for a huge and impatient crowd had been waiting for over one hour in front of each of the three doors.

Even before the curtain was completely raised the first customers had already rushed inside. Released, the human flood poured into the hall. In less than one minute the food products area became packed. Hundreds of people were crowded in a hall for a capacity one-twentieth of their number.

As of that point no one could move freely. Gripped in the cog, the consumer could only follow the movements of the human tide.

Access to the exhibited goods becomes a challenge and the consumer could spend a great deal blocked in front of the shelf with spices whereas he would have liked to buy some cheese. Then, after having surmounted thousands of difficulties, should he succeed in making his purchases, he is faced with the most difficult trial of going through the cash register. One could wait for hours on end in line. It is there that a high percentage of clients give up, unable physically to withstand the ultimate trial.

The six cashiers of the "general foods" area were literally besieged and crowded from all sides. Si Ahmed, the most courteous of the cashiers, the one who answers with a smile to the bad mood of the customers, is totally confused. Yet, the situation is simple: He could do his job

properly only if the customers line up. This would speed up things and everyone would be served. Si Ahmed leaves his booth and tries to make order. After repeated requests for civil behavior, discipline, and reason he gives up. . . .

Anyway, this would be impossible, for even if the most disciplined among the customers would like to line up "decently," they would be unable to do so because of lack of space.

Every day is the same, one clerk in the unit points out. "In a normal period we just about managed. Now, in the midst of the Ramadhan season, the people have to come here. There is no other food outlet. Two SNNGA units cannot serve half a million people," another clerk added.

Some 100 meters away the same situation prevails in the second unit (the old Monoprix) of the SNNGA. Furthermore, let us point out the small size of the two stores which could barely accomodate the population of a big district.

Being the only ones, the two SNNGA units are subjected to strong pressure throughout the year.

The Need for a Souk El-Fellah

The same type of crowding in purchasing fruits and vegetables takes place in the enclosed market, the market on Boudjeriou Boulevard, or the "Souk El-Fellah." Here again the citizen is still harassed.

Possibilities in the area of the marketing and distribution of food remain rather slim. In a period in which big marketing areas are increasing in number throughout the country, the idea of a peasant market in Constantine has not even been considered. The city is, therefore, awaiting the implementation of a plan for small SNNGA units to be opened in the outlying districts in order to reduce the concentration in the center of the city.

Yet, even though a dozen or even more such units would be needed, the plan calls for no more than four, only one of which is under construction. It will be completed by the end of the year. Implementation of the four units planned should be seriously undertaken.

Considering the difficulties which companies and agencies directly involved in the implementation of the imports program in this first half of Ramadhan have encountered, several actions should be implemented before the market could be controlled and prices stabilized.

Thus, if substantial amounts of goods are allocated to Constantine, shipping them from the ports of Skikda and Annaba would be a major hindrance.

Most of the national companies have no transportation facilities and the wilaya has not as yet set up its own enterprise. Furthermore, the SNTR [National Road Transportation Company], the main transport organization, has only one agency in Constantine. Therefore, use has been made of private transports. This is not an advantageous solution, for the cost of such transportation is very high. Private transportation is insufficient and cannot be efficiently used.

Other problems include the lack of storage capacities. Currently there is a shortage of refrigerated areas and systems.

The volume and pace of arrivals do not always correspond to the desires of the importers. One could easily imagine, therefore, the mess which could possibly result by such insufficiencies.

Once again this year, despite the abundance of products and goods, the condition of the Constantine consumer remains quite unsatisfactory. Massive imports can resolve only part of the problem. Therefore, imports alone are insufficient.

Since the goods are available, their purchase by the citizens should be made easier. This is the first requirement if the imports program is to succeed. To achieve this, this aspect of the problem should be considered on the local level with the proper amount of interest and permanent concern should be displayed to satisfy the interests of the citizen.

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FREEDOM, PROGRESS UNDER ISLAM DISCUSSED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 8-9 Aug 80 p 1

[Article by K. B.: "Islam, Liberation and Progress"]

[Text] All young Algerians who draw moral comfort and motivations from contemporary Islamic society would find this a proper turnaround. Despite the regained freedom, following one-and-a-half centuries of oppression, and the return of the land and social justice to their legitimate beneficiaries, one age-old dimension which has molded the historical character of the Algerian people was lacking: Islam, which was one of the most powerful barriers to attempted depersonalization carried out through foreign invasions, colonialism, and feudal collaborators.

Today, Algeria with its National Charter, is clearly aware of its affiliation with the Islamic world. The only issue facing this world is "to go beyond reformism and take the way of the social revolution." Unquestionably, socialism is well within the historical perspectives of Islam.

The Algerian people follow a militant Islam, moved by a sense of justice, equality, and exposure to the benefits of knowledge and the sciences. We have nothing in common with the foggy messages of some fishermen in muddy waters who abuse the faith of the Algerians leading them into an aberrant moralism, a withdrawal within themselves, and a conditioning which has never been consistent with the ideas of the Revelations of the Holy Book, starting with that famous night of Leilat el Kadr which was celebrated Thursday by the entire Algerian people.

Islam has never been a party of clandestinity. The fact that it triumphed and won the peoples over was certainly not due to chauvinistic concepts which today quite poorly conceal the intentions of their authors, to restore anachronism in a world which escapes them and, for the sake of purification and moral virtues, rally within the same ranks the last vestiges of our traditional feudal lords and big merchants who hate socialism and progress.

The type of Islam supporting a socialist revolution is credible because it has impartially analyzed the historical reasons for the decadence of the Islamic world, because it has no sectarian visions of Islamic thinking, and because of its lofty concept of human dignity.

Islam, which will brilliantly shine on our society, will be the creation of our children, the heirs of revolutionaries who are pursuing a project far greater than assimilation through "the goat and the djellaba:" the total resme!ting of the society through decisive changes which will put a definitive end to obscurantism, despotism, and feudalism. To be a worker for the agrarian revolution, a promoter of social management, a student, or a researcher in an Algerian university does not mean any reduction of the faith in Islam.

This would be a modern, just, and nondemagogical way of serving it. It basically opposes the divine powers which some militant faithful and other conquerors and lords ruling at the expense of their peoples have attributed to themselves.

The Algerian people have neither complexes nor lessons to receive, particularly in terms of its Arab nature and faith in Islam: All the attributes of our religion have been actively restored with the regaining of independence.

The broadening of knowledge, thanks to schools and universities, was paralleled by an increased deepening of Islamic faith in a path of progress and justice. This faith, anchored for centuries in the heart of every Algerian man and woman, must be protected from factionalist and fraudulent elements who are trying to undermine the joint efforts of the revolution and Islam in Algeria by exploiting insufficiencies and some contradictions which have appeared within the society.

The spiritual nature of despair had some validity under colonialism. Today the Algerian is a free person. He is the master of his own fate. He does not need in the least the help of his opponents of yesterday or for the methods of those addicted to the past, applied on shores less forebearing than ours.

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CSO: 4400

IMAMS URGED TO FOCUS ON ROLE AS EDUCATORS

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 25 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by Cherif Haddad]

[Text] Abderrahmane Chibane, member of the Central Committee and minister of religious affairs, who took a work trip to Constantine on Saturday, accompanied Mohamed Benahmed Abdelghani, member of the Central Committee and prime minister, on a visit which the prime minister made to the work sites of the Islamic University and the Emir Addelkader Mosque.

In the afternoon, the minister of religious affairs, with Ahmed Hamani, president of the Islamic Superior Council and his close colleagues at his side, chaired a work meeting which included the imams from the wilaya of Constantine.

Opening the meeting, the wilaya director of religious affairs welcomed the minister and the delegation accompanying him and took this opportunity to assure him of his full cooperation in the accomplishment of his mission.

In turn, Ahmed Hamani stressed the purpose and meaning of the Imam's mission as the propagator of the Islamic religion. The president of the Islamic Superior Council described the social-cultural training which should be given to every imam so that he will be able to master all the Koranic laws and in turn be able to engage in Islamic instruction in a social spirit, in accordance with the recommendations of the hadith.

The minister of religious affairs presented the broad lines of force which in the future will govern the working relations between his ministerial department and all the other ministries, based on the spirit of understanding and the complementariness in the action of building the country in conformity with the recommendations of the FLN Party's extraordinary congress and the last meeting of the Central Committee.

As he brought out the prestigious past of the capital of the East, its cultural and religious influence throughout the territory, the minister emphasized the importance of the homage which he was rendering to the venerated Sheikh Abdelhamid Ibn Badis by making his first visit outside Algiers to the city of Constantine.

Examining the history of the mosque's participation in the fight for national liberation, the minister of religious affairs called upon the imams to have a better understanding of their role as educators of Islam and asked them to draw as near as possible to the citizen wherever he may be.

Recalling the rights and duties of the imam, Abderrahamne Chibane described "religion as the cement of peoples" and called upon the imams to leave their mosques and to draw nearer to all the authorities (Party, APC, Administration).

"An imam should preach by example in the accomplishment of his mission as an Islamic educator," he concluded.

Profitable debates were then begun on several topics concerning social problems and the training of imams. Clarifications were presented for the imams by high officials of the ministry of religious affairs, and a plan of action was drawn up to breathe new life into the imam's mission throughout the country.

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CSO: 4400

NEW ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY OPENS IN OCTOBER

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24 Aug 80 pp 1, 3

[Article by Cherif Haddad]

[Text] Yesterday Mohamed Benahmed Abdelghani, member of the Central Committee and prime minister, made an inspection and working visit to the eastern part of the country, accompanied by Abderrahmane Chibane, member of the Central Committee and minister of religious affairs.

The first stop of this tour was made at the Islamic University and the Emire Abdelkader Mosque, which is under construction.

Received at the Ain El-Bey airport by civilian and military authorities of the wilaya, the ministerial delegation, after several minutes of relaxation in the airport's lounges, traveled to the construction sites of the Islamic University and the Emir Abdelkader Mosque.

The prime minister chaired a limited work meeting on the site of the Emir Abdelkader Mosque. During this meeting, two topics were discussed: the state of advancement of construction work and the housing construction situation in the wilaya.

After having listened attentively to the reports given by the regional delegate of the DNC [?National Directorate for Construction], the organization responsible for the construction of the Islamic University-Emire Abdelkaer Mosque complex and by the wilaya director for housing and urbanism, the prime minister placed particular emphasis on the awareness which should motivate every leader, wherever located, to leave the beaten paths and redouble his efforts to hasten the building of the country.

Fully acknowledging the problems being encountered by those engaged in building the Emir Abdelkader Mosque and the Islamic University, the prime minister assured them of his active support in the completion of the

ambitious project in the shortest time possible and called upon them to make better use of the potentialities existing in the country and to assure closer cooperation among all parties responsible for execution of the project.

The idea of building a grand mosque in Constantine originated in 1968. Faced by the magnitude of the project, Abdelghani, who commanded the Fifth Military Region at that time, was personally interested in this work of art. Excited by this project, the late President Houari Boumediene took it to his heart; and it was under his aegis that the mosque project was broadened to include an Islamic university.

The bureau of technical studies of the SONATRACH was then made responsible for the [feasibility] studies, while the execution of the project was placed in the hands of the DNC.

Made up of an immense prayer hall with its annexes and the Islamic University, the complex whose construction work was started in 1972 is far behind schedule because of a shortfall in financing. Added to this is the specificity of the products needed for its completion, which must harmonize with its architectural configuration.

At present, the credits needed for reactivation of the work sites are on the order of 13,961,250 dinars.

This situation, after having being brought to the attention of the prime minister, was the subject of a work meeting including the minister of religious affairs, the president of the Islamic Superior Council, representatives of the minister and the operators (DNC and SONATRACH).

At an early stage, solutions were offered in the financial sector. For his part, Abderrahmane Chibane, minister of religious affairs, assured the builders of his personal support, to speed up construction work on this imposing project.

Taking into account all of the measures approved during the work meeting, the DNC regional delegate assured the minister of religious affairs of the mobilization of all DNC personnel to deliver the Islamic University to the students next October.

Before traveling to Skikda, the prime minister familiarized himself with the status of housing construction in the Constantine wilaya. The DHUC [expansion unknown] report indicates that the wilaya which on 31 December 1979 had a financial package for the construction of 25,731 urban housing units programmed during the two Plans had taken delivery of only 6,050 housing units as of 31 December 1979 and 739 units during the first 6 months of 1980.

Accounts payable incurred during the first 6 months of 1980 totaled 131 million dinars.

The housing program of the educational sector is suffering from a cost overrun, and 792 housing units remain unfinished to this day. Rural housing and the self-managed sector have registered an appreciable rate of advancement.

In a related connection, construction of the socialist villages continues to be uncertain. The village originally planned at Djebel Ouahch, consisting of 100 housing units, could not be built, since the locality involved did not have allottees [attributaries]; and a request for the relocation of the village was addressed to the minister of planning.

This first stage of the prime minister's trip in the eastern part of the country was highlighted by a status report on construction in the housing sector across the wilaya and reactivation of the construction sites for the Emir Abdelkader Mosque-Islamic University complex.

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CSO: 4400

NEW PARTY CELLS SET UP IN TLEMCEN ENTERPRISES

Algeria EL MOUDJAHID in French 14 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] The process of setting up of FLN Party cells in enterprises and economic and administrative entities which was started a few months ago is continuing. The development of an organizational action plan was the subject of a meeting held by the first three enterprise cells established in the Tlemcen SONELEC [Algerian National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Electronic Equipment] and in the APC Hospital Center.

The workers' principal concerns with respect to the cell's operation were compiled by bureau members of the three enterprise cells.

The participation of FLN cells in the management of enterprises will permit the harmonizing and coordinating of actions designed to strengthen this important state sector on the one hand and the making of decisions on the other hand aimed at invigorating work in all its aspects, as set forth in the statutes.

The other enterprise cells which will be installed in the enterprises and economic and administrative entities of the Tlemcen wilaya will in turn extend this important operation implemented by the FLN Party to all the communes.

The installation of these cells the principle of which was established by the Fourth Party Congress falls within the framework of application of the decision made by the Central Committee to set up enterprise cells.

As a new structure, the Party cell has the role of broadening the Party's field of action and thus permitting it to better exercise its responsibilities in the sectors of planning and control of the country's general policy. The installation of these cells also translates the Party's desire to organize all sectors of national life and to be present in industrial entities, in agricultural exploitations and in socioeducative, cultural, administrative

and service institutions. As stated by Articles 7 and 8 covering the organization and operation of this structure: "The enterprise cell takes care of the ideological and political training of workers and farmers in the work sites."

Its role is also "to orient the enterprise's policy within the framework of application of the National Constitution and the execution of every development plan, to evaluate and control the management organizations of the enterprise, as well as the schedule of activities within the framework of the development plan..."

Depending upon the size and importance of the enterprise, one or several cells can be set up, whose membership will range from 10-50 activists. Let us remember that several Party cells have already been installed in the production entities of various sectors.

8143
CSO: 4400

COORDINATING COUNCIL STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNES

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 13 Aug 80 p 1

[Article by Rachid Souilah]

[Text] Continuing the cycle of meetings with elected officials of the rank and file organizations, members of the Skikda CNP [National Party Commission] council traveled to Tamalous and Collo recently where they held work meetings with the executive councils of the kasmas and APCs of the communes of Tamalous, Ain-Kechra, Oum-Toub, Collo, Ouled Attia and Zitouna.

During the meetings-debates, organizational, socioeconomic and cultural problems were examined at length and concrete solutions were advanced to make up for the inadequacies existing here and there, whether in the sectors of education, housing, transportation or water resources, agriculture, fishing or trade.

A region which is basically committed to agriculture, with a modest fishing activity, the Collo daira is facing problems of enclavement which places a rein on its economic and social development. The problems, therefore, are sizable when one knows that this cradle of the armed revolution suffered a great deal from colonization which caused serious damage and when one measures the size of its population, the largest in the wilaya.

This daira is the subject of very particular attention on the part of the local authorities, notably through implementation of its special development program and its various plans for modernization. The execution of the ambitious projects which were granted to it will most certainly permit the daira to make up the cumulative shortfalls in all sectors and in the near future to experience a considerable economic upsurge. Of course, constraints of a material and human kind (particularly technical cadres) are present, and officials at all levels are aware of them.

Moreover, it is in this sense that the speech by Lakhdar Ouazzani, Party national commissioner [CNP], was oriented. He asked the officials elected

by the rank and file to unify their actions and to work without letup within the framework of the mission which was entrusted to them by the people for the economic and social promotion of the region.

After having reassured them with respect to the continuing help which will be given them by the political and administrative organizations of the wilaya, the CNP did not fail to call their attention to the application by deeds of the recommendations of the Party's extraordinary congress and of the directives of the political directorate. What is more, he also recalled the objectives of the Third Development Plan and the results expected in the next 5 years.

In Tamalous, the CNP also spoke about the importance of such meetings. After having called the attention of the elected officials to the need for a proper analysis and understanding of the major lines and objectives envisaged by the Plan to assure its application and success in all sectors (education, housing, water resources, fishing, health, etc.), the Party's national commissioner recalled that political independence has need of economic independence and that it was necessary to work for the liberation of the country from foreign dependence. To successfully attain harmonious, national economic balance, to assure restoration of national revenue, therefore, the standard of living the awareness and mobilization of all the living forces of the nation are necessary, as they also permit the thwarting and eliminating of all the dangers which are threatening our political and economic independence.

The CNP stressed the dangers created by internal and external reaction and its activities which are inimical to the revolution and its achievements, and also called for the strengthening of the FLN Party's ranks and vigilance.

Ouazzani emphasized the explanation and understanding of the recommendations and resolutions of the Party's extraordinary congress. He also defined the mission of the new communal council for coordination and cited the responsibilities which envisage the economic and social development of the commune. Finally, he invited the officials to rise above local problems and to concentrate all their efforts on tasks of national development.

During the debate which ensued, officials of the executive councils of the six communes described with great frankness and clarity the problems they are encountering in the sector of implementation as well as the shortfalls experienced in various sectors which are the cause of the development delays in their respective localities. These shortfalls particularly involve education, health, water resources...

Finally, Said Hamrouche, deputy CNP, provided guidelines to be followed to overcome and resolve the problems encountered. In this regard, he invited the elected officials to be aware of national realities to objectively

analyze the total package of problems and to find suitable solutions for them. "For the responsibility falls principally upon elected officials who must keep ahead of problems and avoid confining themselves to a position of wait-and-see or fleeing from their responsibilities." He also called upon the elected officials to be responsive to the aspirations of the people for the satisfaction of their needs. Finally, he cited the role of the elected assemblies in the materializing of the objectives of the National Development Plan.

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CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

FLN POLITBURO AGENDA--Algiers (APS)--The Politburo met yesterday in the office of the presidency under the chairmanship of President Chadli Bendjedid, secretary general of the FLN Party, in the presence of the prime minister and the head of the permanent secretariat of the Central Committee. The Politburo studied the preparations for the elections of the Mouhafadhat Bureaus. The party's secretary general stressed the need for taking the measures needed to guarantee the success of these elections, in accordance with the party's charter and the Central Committee's recommendations. The Politburo also heard a report presented by the minister of foreign affairs on the country's foreign policy. The minister of energy and petrochemical industries gave a report on energy policy. [Text] [Algiers AL MOUDJAHID in French 21 Aug 80 p 1] 8143

WILAYA COUNCIL WORKING METHODS--Algiers (APS)--A coordination meeting was held yesterday afternoon in the Zirout Youcef Palace in the presence of Boualem Benhamouda, member of the Politburo, and minister of interior; and Mohamed Cherif Messaadia, member of the Central Committee and head of the FLN permanent secretariat of the Central Committee. This meeting was devoted to a report on a bill establishing the working methods of coordinating councils at the wilaya level, in accordance with guidelines provided by the president of the republic and the party's secretary general and in application of the party's basic charter and internal regulations, particularly the articles dealing with the prerogatives and attributions of the coordination councils. During this meeting, it was decided to set up a working group on which all the concerned organizations will be represented and which will work under the aegis of the general organization commission to examine and improve the draft legislation under consideration which will be submitted for approval to the Central Committee at its next meeting. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 12 Aug 80 p 1] 8143

CSO: 4400

PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY DISCUSSES GOVERNMENT, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT LAW

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 7 Jul 80 p 5

[Article: "Law No 83 Before the People's Assembly"]

[Text] In a few hours, the most famous Egyptian bill affecting the working class will be submitted to the People's Assembly--the final bill to eliminate all the effects of Law No 83 of 1973.

A report on the law has been prepared by the Manpower Committee of People's Assembly, which is chaired by Husayn Washahi. Continual meetings inside and outside the committee had been held with People's Assembly President Dr Sufi Abu-Talib and with Deputy Prime Minister Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din.

There had been discussion among the representatives of the people and officials of the finance ministry about some of the abolished provisions to be covered by the new law, which led to the law's not being included in the budget discussion. However, a number of People's Assembly representatives and government officials have agreed to consider the workers' and employees' demands for total equality, especially since President al-Sadat, when he decreed the payment of allowances equal to 6 months' wages on the occasion of the workers' celebrations of May Day, did not discriminate between state and public sector employees.

A meeting was held last week, attended by Deputy Prime Minister Dr Fu'ad Muhyi-al-Din, Committee Chairman Husayn Washahi, Vice President of the Labor Federation Mukhtar 'Abd-al-Hamid, People's Assembly Members Rajab al-Sa'di and Ahmad Idris, President of the Central Agency for Organization and Administration Dr Hasan Tawfiq, and First Deputy Finance Minister Muhammad 'Abduh.

During the meeting, agreement was reached on a number of principles and bases which were subsequently approved by the committee, which began preparing its comprehensive report on the law. Agreement was reached on the following points.

1. The law includes all professionals in the government and public sector, unskilled clerical personnel, and those employed in auxiliary services,

who have previously-issued certificates of acceptance and degrees received at the end of a 5-year study period.

2. The law must benefit experienced workers, for whom a special bill will be prepared, which the government will submit for debate along with Law No. 83.

3. As for pension-holders, it has been decided that those retired as of 1 July 1980 will benefit from Law No 83, in light of the privileges the law grants the workers. As for those who retired prior to 1 July 1980, the government has decided to submit a bill increasing their pensions by 5 percent, the minimum being one pound and the maximum 3 pounds. However, the Manpower Committee has reservations about this law, and feels that for the sake of fairness the minimum should be increased to 3 pounds.

4. It was agreed that the government would immediately submit a bill increasing the minimum for state and public sector workers, so that all the workers in service will benefit by about 3 pounds. This will be achieved by granting them a so-called gradual allowance.

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CSO: 4802

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER JUSTIFIES HOLDING COMPANY CONCEPT

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 14 Jul 80 p 5

[Article by 'Atif Husayn: "The Public Sector Won't Be Eliminated"]

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid has announced that it is a crime to say that President Anwar al-Sadat's government will eliminate the public sector, for the government has allocated one-quarter of the national income to strengthen it. President al-Sadat's government has not fired anyone and will not fire anyone, and the workers' rights are maintained everywhere. This remark was made at the conference of the General Union of Commerce Workers, which was attended by Deputy Economy Minister Ahmad 'Abd-al-'Aziz, all the presidents of foreign trade companies, and a large number of their board members, not to mention the leaders of the commerce union and the union committees of foreign trade companies.

Dr 'Abe-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid explained, "There is no trend towards eliminating the public sector; the trend is to support it. The public sector is a major socialist gain, and we cannot do without the gains which the public sector has won for Egypt and the Egyptian people. It is a safeguard for all of us, and we must support it."

The deputy prime minister went on to say that the industrial public sector companies have not modernized their equipment for a very long time, and that the government of President al-Sadat has allocated 3.2 billion Egyptian pounds to the public sector for investments. He explained that he came to the General Union of Commerce Workers to congratulate the workers of the foreign trade companies on the improvement of their material conditions since the application of financial laws similar to those of the investment authority, which will double salaries, as a decisive result of the establishment of the national export-import bank. He also explained that he had not expected that he would be accused of wanting to eliminate the public sector.

Replacement and Renovation in the Public Sector

The deputy prime minister announced that the only guarantee that the public sector will remain is to spend every millieme allocated to support the

public sector on replacement and renovation of this sector's plants, not on expansion into other new installations. It is essential that public sector investments be spent on what they are allocated for.

Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid explained, "When we established the National Investment Bank, some people believed that it would eliminate the Planning Ministry. But it has actually strengthened the Planning Ministry, because it gave it follow-up powers.

"The battle for prosperity and development needs a strong apparatus, and the Planning Ministry is not enough. The establishment of the National Investment Bank was unavoidable, in order to strengthen planning in Egypt."

Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid reviewed the history of the public sector over the past 5 years, saying, "After the abolition of state organizations in 1976, the ministries began oppressing the public sector companies. It became clear to us that the state organizations had been better, because the abolition of state organizations had been aimed at liberating labor but labor was not liberated. The public sector companies came to be at the mercy of the ministries."

The Idea of Holding Companies Did Not Come Out of Nowhere

He explained that today's thinking is heading in the direction of combining a number of companies under the banner of holding companies, which no one, no matter how strong, could dissolve in the future. This idea of holding companies did not come out of nowhere. For example, some of the workers in industrial zones or complexes, such as Shubra al-Khaymah and Hulwan, would be treated fairly, while others would be wronged, when the profits were paid out. Profits basically depend on the prices of the goods which these companies sell, and in the case of some basic commodities the state steps in to lower their prices to bring them within the reach of the struggling classes of the people. Natuaraly, the companies which produce these goods will have limited profits, as opposed to the companies which do not produce these profits and which are therefore free to set their prices. Consequently, their profits are much more than the others. Therefore, we find a great disparity in profit distribution among the workers located in a single industrial zone, for in some companies the workers' profits amount to 15 days' salary, and in others 2 months' salary. The question which pops up is: What is the crime of the workers in the companies producing basic goods subject to state intervention in price-fixing?

He went on to say, "Establishing a holding company bringing together the Hulwan companies would enable the elimination of this phenomenon. If we assume for the sake of argument the establishment of a holding company called the Hulwan Development Company, to which all the Hulwan companies would be subject, then surely the holding company will make an effort to reconcile

the gains and losses, and will distribute profits equally to every worker in the entire Hulwan zone."

The deputy prime minister confirmed that the present system governing the public sector companies will ultimately lead to the collapse of the public sector, for it will be unable to stand up to the private sector. He explained, "When we say 'holding company,' there are many forms of holding companies. There can be holding companies comprising one kind of company; for example, there can be a holding for all the fertilizer companies nationwide. There can be a holding company for a group of companies working in a group of integrated industries, such as the oil and soap companies and the like. There can be holding companies representing entire industrial zones like Hulwan and Shubra al-Khaymah. In short, our thinking must not be rigid, for every sector has its peculiarities, and there is some kind of holding company that will be good for it."

Foreign Trade and Finance

Then Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid spoke of the foreign trade companies, saying, "Some people are saying that each sector of these companies will have its own holding companies, but the question is: How can all the foreign trade companies be grouped under one holding company? The foremost problem of the foreign trade companies is their indebtedness. The foreign trade operation is primarily a financing operation. Without this, it cannot carry out its work. Getting loans from banks is nothing but trouble, and perpetuating this situation will lead to the public sector's collapse in the foreign trade sector. Commerce cannot proceed without funds, and the private sector is strong in this respect. There must be a strong public sector to stand up to it. If we do not have the financial strength to import basic commodities, we will not be able to function in the foreign trade field."

He explained, "The idea of establishing the national export-import bank was an alternative to establishing a holding company, because holding companies are no good for importing and exporting. What is good for this is a bank. During the coming phase, we need nothing more than intellectual openness, not petrification. We cannot watch the public sector collapse before our very eyes while we stand by with a petrified mentality until it actually does. The idea of such a bank has been carried out in socialist states like Romania, Czechoslovakia and others, as well as in western states. Therefore, the idea of establishing this bank has no ideological connotations."

At the end of his speech, Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid expressed his hope that the picture had been made completely clear. He explained that Egypt, in the coming stage, would need all its combined expertise. It would need experience in all fields in order to comprehend the method of managing holding companies, and these holding companies would need expertize to manage the people's capital.

The National Press and the Elimination of Trade Companies

President of the General Union of Commerce Workers 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Sharbini delivered a speech at the beginning of the meeting in which he voiced the welcome of the commerce workers, represented by their general union and union committees, for Deputy Prime Minister Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid. He explained that the presence of the deputy prime minsiter at the union headquarters was a good initiative and a commendable procedure, definitely proving the sound democracy which President al-Sadat has anchored.

The union chief reviewed the reason for this meeting with the deputy prime minister--the apprehension among worker and leadership circles within the domestic trade companies that the government was intending to eliminate the public sector, and the foreign trade companies in particular. This apprehension stemmed from national press coverage of the establishment of the national export-import bank as part of the decision to try to wipe out the financial debt of those companies operating in the foreign trade sphere. This press coverage made it seem that these companies would lose their identity through their absorption into the bank, and aroused a certain amount of mental anxiety among workers and company presidents alike.

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CSO: 4802

PROFITS TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO INDUSTRIAL WORKERS 'NEXT WEEK'

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 7 Jul 80 p 1

[Article: "Profits to be Distributed Next Week; 600,000 Workers in Industrial Companies To Receive Profits; Industry Minister Requests Preparation of Lists for Paying Profits to the Workers"]

[Text] Industry Minister Engr Taha Zaki has decreed the preparation of lists for disbursing profits to factory workers, so that disbursement can begin next week.

The minister's instructions require the profits to be figured according to a minimum not less than the amount paid out last year. The amount would be higher according to how far each company fulfilled its goals.

An AL-'UMMAL correspondent has learned that the minister's instructions provide for granting profits to the workers at those companies which realized a profit.

It has been decided that this year about 600,000 workers at 116 industrial companies will benefit from the profits.

The profits, up to a maximum of 75 Egyptian pounds, will be paid to workers at some companies, including the Kima Fertilizer Company, the Egyptian National Chemicals and Plastics Company, the Sugar Company, and the al-Mahallah Textile Plant.

Workers in Non-Industrial Sectors

Furthermore, steps are now being taken to disburse profits to workers in non-industrial companies, now that these companies budgets have clearly shown that they realized a profit and exceeded their goals as set in the plan.

Flour Mill Workers

It was decided to pay periodic raises and realized profits to the 28,520 workers at flour mill companies. This decision was made after it became

clear that these companies had realized an estimated surplus of 3.83 million pounds, with total production amounting to 157,510,119 pounds.

Al-Ma'murah Workers

It was also decided to pay a bonus equivalent to 5 months' wages to the workers at the al-Ma'murah Company, and a maximum profit share, as well as a periodic raise of 100 percent.

Foodstuff Workers

It was also decided to pay all the profits to all the workers at the 11 foodstuff companies, as well as periodic raises to all of them. Some 23,997 men and women workers will benefit from this decision.

Warehouse and Shipping Agency Workers

Minister of Transport, Communication and Maritime Transport Engr Sulayman Mitwalli has decided to pay a bonus equivalent to 2 months' wages to the workers at the Egyptian Warehouses Company and the Alexandria Shipping Company, in addition to a periodic raise of 100 percent. The warehouse company's net profit was 10 million pounds, 47 percent over the goal. It was also decided to pay profits equivalent to 45 days' wages to the workers.

As for the Alexandria Shipping Company, its profits amounted to 19 million pounds, 10 million pounds over the target. It has been decided to pay the maximum profit share of 75 pounds to the workers there.

8559
CSO: 4802

URBAN LABOR FORCE INCREASING, CONSTRUCTION WORKER WAGES RISING

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 14 Jul 80 p 5

[Article by Rif'at Khalid: "Fewer Investments in the Countryside Is Cause of Concentration of Labor in the Cities and Migration; Lack of a Clear Training Policy Is Behind the Rise in Construction Workers' Wages"]

[Text] A report by the Manpower Branch of the Specialized National Councils has shown that emigration overseas has increased in recent years, and that the lack of a clear policy for training and meeting occupational shortages has led to an increase in construction workers' wages. Also, the decline in investments directed towards the countryside has led to a concentration of workers in the cities. Furthermore, there is the natural decline in certain workers and continued vocational training under the old method. But what do the officials say?

Head of the Specialized National Council's Manpower Branch 'Abd-al-Latif Baltiyah says that one factor influencing the labor force and especially the construction sector is the phenomenon of migrating overseas to work, which has increased in recent years, and which the Planning Ministry estimates at about 1.5 million workers or 3.7 percent of the total population. This has led to a great shortage in the skilled artisan and professional labor force and to instability in the construction industry because of its sensitivity to economic fluctuations.

Training Without Policy

There is also another important point--the lack of a firm training policy, in addition to the existing training centers; shortcomings from the standpoint of quantity, quality, and modern scientific advancement.

The Professional Labor Force Is Declining.

Dr Muhammad 'Abd-al-Qadir Hatim, general supervisor for the Specialized National Councils, says that a problem exists in the natural decline in the professional labor force because of old age, disability and death, as well as the fact that the professions are no longer handed down as they once were.

Accumulation of Workers In the Cities

Since the facts indicate a serious situation with respect to the accumulation of workers in the cities, what is responsible for this?

Dr Hatim adds that the decline in investments directed towards the countryside is responsible for this, along with the settling of industries and services in the urban areas, which helps perpetuate the accumulation of workers in the cities as a result of the continual internal migration and the accompanying shortage of skills in the countryside and the increased flow of non-skilled workers to the cities. It is worth mentioning that the urban population amounts to about 44 percent of the total population.

What the Figures Say

We looked at the statistics prepared by the Manpower Branch of the Specialized National Councils dealing with the labor force employed in economic activities and in the service and production sectors. Workers employed in the economic activities of service sectors make up about 40 percent of the total labor force, while their wages amount to about 57.6 percent of the total wages. As for the production sectors, they make up about 60 percent of the total labor force, with their wages constituting about 42.4 percent of the total. Wages have increased in recent years, and in a fantastic way for construction workers in particular. This is a serious indication, and there must be some kind of intervention to stop this increase occuring at the expense of the citizens.

Figures show that during the 10 years from 1960 to 1970, construction workers' wages rose between 15 to 50 percent. Since 1970 up to today, these wages have risen between 200 and 600 percent. This increase includes auxiliary professions as well. The construction worker who was paid 80 piasters a day in 1962 gets 3 Egyptian pounds a day now. The reinforcing carpenter has gone from 60 piasters to 3.5 pounds; the smelter from 70 piasters to 5 pounds; the whitewasher from 60 piasters to 3 pounds; the painter from 70 piasters to 3 pounds; and the electrician from 30 piasters to 3 pounds 20 piasters.

Analysis of the Graduate Labor Force

Analyzing the labor force made up of graduates of universities, industrial schools and professional institutes and their contribution to the Egyptian labor force, the Manpower Branch report shows that university graduates make up about 6 percent of the labor force, graduates of industrial schools about 8 percent, and professionals who graduated from training schools about 6 percent of the labor force. The uneducated and untrained, most of whom are refugees from the countryside, make up about 8 percent of the labor force.

11.9 Million Employed Persons in 1982

The statistical report on the labor force indicates that the labor force is now estimated at 9.72 million workers, and is expected to rise to about 11.9 million workers in 1982, at an average yearly rate of increase of about 4 percent. This rate is expected to increase in following years because of a number of factors, the most important being the increase in the working-age population and an increase in women's contribution to economic activity. There is another important point made by the report relating to the number of people past the productive age. The overall percentage of persons not of productive age, i.e. younger than 12 years and older than 65 years, is expected to drop from 33.6 percent in 1976 to 31.9 percent of the total population in 1987, because of an anticipated drop in the birth rate and a change in the customs of the populace.

The report boils down to the need to support technical education in various fields, to prepare the labor force and the working and technical cadres needed to serve production and development, and to expand the training institutes which will prepare a constant, experienced technical labor force according to the most modern scientific methods and advanced technology, in the context of international cooperation.

8559
CSO: 4802

NEW LAW REGULATES EMPLOYMENT OF EGYPTIAN SEAMEN

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 7 Jul 80 pp 1, 4

[Article: "New Statute to Regulate Employment of 30,000 Egyptian Seamen on Arab and Foreign Vessels; Job Opportunities To Be Made Available Without Intercession; Insurance Coverage To Be Extended to Them"]

[Text] The Manpower and Vocational Training Ministry has decided to draw up a new statute to regulate the employment of 30,000 Egyptian seamen working on Arab and foreign vessels, to provide them job opportunities without intercession, to eliminate their problems, and to extend insurance coverage to them.

It has been decided that those seamen whose names are registered on the membership rolls of the union committees at Egyptian ports will be subject to the new law, as well as those working on Arab and foreign ships of whatever type.

Minister Said Muhammad Ahmad held a meeting last week which was attended by representatives of the Maritime Transport Ministry, the Social Insurance Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and the General Federation of Labor Unions, at which the new statute and its implementation was discussed.

The new law includes a number of clauses, one of which provides that every worker or seaman requesting work should submit his request to the employment bureau, accompanied by his personal or family identification card, a certificate of good behavior from the manpower bureau, his maritime passport, and a license to work for foreigners permitted to reside in Egypt. The bureau will nominate the seamen according to whoever comes first in the listing for each profession. In case the captain rejects the nominee for substantial reasons, the employment bureau will nominate the man next on the list. Renomination more than three times is not allowed.

The seamen who are accepted for work on the ship must obtain a statement of approval of his appointment from the director of the employment bureau, to be presented to the port passport department. In no case can any seamen

who does not have a statement of approval from the employment bureau be permitted to work on a ship.

The shipping agency commissioner will draw up a work contract for the seaman accepted by the ship's captain, in one original and five copies for the captain, the seaman, the shipping agency, the maritime inspection office, and the employment bureau, in the format agreed to by the General Union for Maritime Transport.

The law requires each appointed maritime worker to pay the sum of 6 Egyptian pounds as an employment fee, to which will be added the sum of 3 pounds 600 milliemes as union membership fees.

The minister explained that according to this statute, membership will be limited to seamen. Domestic elements will be sifted out, so as to limit it to seamen who are actually practicing the profession, and to remove fictitious names from the membership rolls.

Joint work contracts will also be concluded with shipowners and their agents in the ports, and bases for regulating the employment of seamen and protecting their rights will be drawn up. Professional training centers for seamen will be established to increase their technical skill and educational level.

Muhammad Ahmad added that the law includes the formulation of an insurance law for Egyptian seamen, to protect them from the dangers of old age, disability and death. An insurance card will be handed out to unemployed workers.

In another context, it has been decided to make the employment bureaus for Egyptian maritime workers working on foreign ships in Alexandria, Port Sa'id and Suez Governorates subject to the supervision of the General Union for Maritime Transport, and the union president will draw up its current administrative system.

Also, a permanent committee will be formed to supervise the activities of the bureaus, to be formed of representatives from the manpower directorate, the General Union for Maritime Transport, and the shipping agencies.

8559
CSO: 4802

OFFICIALS DESCRIBE LITERACY PROGRAM FOR WORKERS

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 14 Jul 80 p 2

[Article: "Class Study Hours Must Be Reconciled With Working Hours"]

[Text] Nine years after the workers' literacy programs were assigned to the Workers' Cultural Organization, many people are asking whether the organization has succeeded in carrying out the experiment. What are the difficulties? What is happening now? This investigation into the organization is an attempt to answer these questions.

Director of the Workers' Cultural Organization's Literacy Department Muhammad al-Mahdawi says, "There are more than 6 million workers suffering from the problem of illiteracy, which represents a national issue which we all must combat.

"The idea of assigning the task of combatting workers' illiteracy to the organization originated in 1971. The idea boils down to an attempt to graduate literacy teachers from among the workers themselves, on the basis of nominations by the union organization, whereby the candidate would study the basics and methods of instructing adult workers for several months at the organization's Worker Education Institute. This experiment has been successful, and more than 2,000 worker-teachers have been graduated. The experiment has shown that the literacy classes by institute graduates have been 95 percent successful, whereas the literacy classes run by Education Ministry teachers have been only 65 percent successful. In spite of this, the experiment was suspended until 1977, at which time the Workers' Cultural Organization reached an agreement with the Arab Labor Organization to offer literacy classes to 10,000 workers over a period of 2 years.

"After this agreement was signed, Minister of Manpower and Head of the General Federation of Labor Unions Sa'd Muhammad Ahmad, in his capacity as head of the organization, issued a decree forming a supreme committee for workers' literacy, chaired by the federation's vice president."

Vice President of the General Federation of Labor Unions and Head of the Supreme Literacy Committee Mukhtar 'Abd-al-Hamid says, "The committee has

prepared a workers' strategy to confront the problem of illiteracy among the workers, aimed at liberating the Egyptian worker from both his functional and cultural illiteracy at once.

"This strategy has been divided into a number of stages for reaching the goal, as follows:

1. Preparation--this stage begins after data is collected and the illiterate workers are classified. The General Federation of Egyptian Labor Unions will draw up a method of clarifying the basic socio-economic features of a worker society, and will get the teachers ready.

2. Implementation--this stage will last 5 years starting in 1978, and efforts will be made to combat illiteracy among workers of all sectors.

3. Mopping-up--this stage will last 2 years, in order to eliminate any pockets of illiteracy left over from the implementation stage. The sources of illiteracy will be terminated by making elementary education compulsive and universal, and by achieving integration between school and non-school education."

The head of the committee adds that implementation of this strategy, whereby 150 classes would be opened in 1977 in the various governorates and another 200 classes in 1978, has actually started. Implementation exceeded the plan by 15 percent in 1977, since 168 classes were opened that year. The organization will open more than 400 classes this year.

One of the obstacles facing the experiment, says the head of the literacy committee, is the obvious phenomenon of worker absenteeism due to the work system at various installations, especially since the experiment follows the shift system. Therefore, there must be some reconciliation between work hours and class study hours. Also, the worker wants to utilize the time he spends studying in other matters which he may feel are more serious than education.

Finally, says the head of the Supreme Literacy Committee, in order for the experiment to continue to be successful, the following recommendations made by the committee ought to be adopted.

1. The technical and cultural cooperation agreement with the Arab Labor Organization should be renewed for 2 more years, the number of participating workers should be increased to 25,000 workers, and the appropriations made by the organization should be increased to 150,000 Egyptian pounds.

2. Some of the money from fines which is in the Manpower Ministry's fine fund should be allocated for disbursement to the organization's anti-illiteracy plan.

3. Some of the Education Ministry's funds for opening public and national sector literacy classes should be transferred to the organization, to enable it to open literacy classes for private sector workers.

8559
CSO: 4802

SEWER WORKERS' JOB CONDITIONS DEPLORED

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 14 Jul 80 pp 3,5

[Article by Nadiyah Sultan: "12,000 Workers Living Amid the Dangers of Disease and Death!"]

[Text] Some 12,000 workers are living amid dangers and diseases which threaten their lives, their future, and the future of their families. These workers are the sewer workers. A distressing anomaly is that they lose their health while preserving the health of the people. Although everyone knows that 90 percent of them are striken with life-endangering diseases, no one thinks of alleviating the troubles of that hard-working group. Al-'Ummal met with a group of sewer workers inside their places of work.

Muhammad Ahmad Sayyid, a diver who has worked with the authority for 10 years, says that sewer workers of various professions are exposed to many dangers and diseases which threaten their lives and their future. The worker is exposed to the sun's heat in summer and the freezing winter cold, in addition to having to breathe polluted air and immerse himself in water and filth. All of this subjects him to disease, especially chest diseases, which are considered the most dangerous type.

Nevertheless, we find that the authority and the state in general has been remiss in its duty towards this group, which represents the cornerstone of the cleanliness of the state as a whole. It does not provide protective clothing or food rations, except a half-kilo of cheese a month.

Worker Muhammad Ahmad Sayyid continued, "When we look at sewer workers, we find that about 90 percent of them suffer from diseases, and the methods of treatment are totally insufficient. The authority gives us a mere 7.5 percent nature-of-work allowance, and an infection allowance of 75 piasters a month. Naturally, this is not at all commensurate with the difficult nature of our work. We are exposed to danger, and we demand that the state show special concern for the sewer workers, so as to give them their full rights and an incentive not to leave this profession, which is both dangerous and difficult at the same time."

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Sami' Mabruk, who works as a diver for the State Sanitation Authority, says, "The nature of our work is extremely difficult, and causes us many diseases. It makes no sense for us to be treated the same as those who work in offices. Sufficient proof of this is to say that whenever any person smells a horrible smell from anywhere, he immediately hurries to leave that place because of the repulsive smell. What about the workers whose profession is diving in sewers, with their smell and the diseases they cause? Isn't this enough reason to grant the sewer worker a nature-of-work allowance totally different from that given other groups which sit behind desks?"

He went on to say, "Granting sewer workers nature-of-work allowances in keeping with their jobs is no heresy. We are working at a profession which is considered one of the most difficult, dangerous professions."

One Pound for the Worker and Five for the Engineer

Chief of Workers Affairs for the Cairo Sanitation Authority Masylihi Badir supports these views, and says, "Working in the sewers exposes the workers to many occupational and chest diseases, which leads them to flee the job. We also find that the workers gets only one Egyptian pound as an infection allowance, or 75 piasters after deductions. Meanwhile, the engineer supvising the network gets 5 pounds, without being exposed to infection at all.

"We find that the sewer worker works 8 hours a day, and is not given protective clothing or equipment. Also, he gets no meals except a half kilo of cheese per month. Furthermore, the sewer workers work on the shift system while everyone else is sleeping and relaxing at home. We find that the sewer worker works day and night without anyone seeing him."

Five Piasters Per Dive

Musaylihi Badir adds, "There are divers, who immerse themselves in the polluted water and the terrible smell. We find them being treated like an ordinary worker in all respects. When they dive, they get only an additional 5 piasters for each dive, which might last for hours while they clear the sewer. The supervisor punishes the worker who refuses to immerse himself, and the incentives, i.e. about one-quarter of his salary, are deducted."

Worker Faruq Musaylihi 'Awad-allah, who is a carpenter for the sanitation authority, builds supports for the sewers, which exposes him to many dangers. Nevertheless, the authority gives him a 7.5 percent nature-of-work allowance, some incentives, and the sum of only one pound as an infection allowance, from which about 25 percent is deducted for the war effort. Even though Law No. 47 of 1978 provides for the granting of increased allowances and bonuses, the authority even now has not given us the increased allowances, and is still paying us according to the old system."

Mustafa Lutfi, a general supervisor for the sanitation garage, brings up another problem. The authority hires divers at 20 pounds a month, without giving them any other bonuses such as their colleagues driving for other authorities get. This leads to a great shortage of drivers, which results in an interruption of work.

Sewer Workers and Perfume Workers

AL-'UMMAL net with 'Abd-al-Fattah Badr, secretary of the general federation and president of the union committee for sanitation workers, who spoke of the union committee's efforts to solve these problems. He said that about 6 months ago the committee requested the head of the sanitation authority, the officials of the People's Assembly, the cabinet, and the Housing Minister in particular, inasmuch as the authority is subject to this ministry, to raise the nature-of-work allowance to 40 percent, on the basis of the articles of Law No. 47 of 1978 pertaining to state employees. It is illogical and unacceptable for sewer workers to be on an equal footing with the perfume company workers as far as allowances go, and for workers at these latter companies to be paid a 40 percent nature-of-work allowance.

'Abd-al-Fattah Badr went on to say that this topic is now being studied by the Central Agency for Organization and Administration, in order to raise the nature-of-work allowance for sanitation workers. Also, the People's Assembly Housing Committee, chaired by Engr Muhibb Istino, has prepared a bill for a special statute for sewer workers' wages. A committee in which the union committee is represented has been formed at the authority to work on this wage bill.

A Strange Anomaly

As for the infection allowance, he says, "It makes no sense to perpetuate the strange anomaly whereby the sewer workers who go down into polluted water get 75 piasters, while we find that the engineer who sits in his office and does not undergo the workers' problems gets 5 pounds a month." 'Abd-al-Fattah Badr has demanded that this group be protected from all the dangers surrounding them, that the sewer workers have a special wage law, and that they not be exposed to any more dangers than mine and quarry workers face.

Athsma and Pheumatism

Speaking of the health dangers to which sewer workers are exposed, Dr Sami Rashid Tadrus, a doctor at the Cairo Sanitation Authority, says that the most dangerous disease from which more than 90 percent of the authority's workers suffer is bronchial asthma, which results from the workers' descending into polluted water and breathing harmful odors. Usually, this disease first appears as a bronchial cold which then develops into bronchial athsma. It will rapidly develop into something more serious if the workers continue doing the same job. There is another disease, rheumatism

of the joints, which is the second most widespread disease among the authority's workers.

Dr Sami points out that there is more than one way to make sure that those workers who spend their lives serving the citizens are protected. First of all, protective clothing must be handed out, including gas masks, which will reduce the workers' exposure to disease. Then there must be a regular medical check-up for the workers at least once a year, if not every 6 months. This would greatly benefit the workers, especially in discovering disease in its early stages and preventing its subsequent complication.

He adds that one of the most important ways of reducing the disease rate among workers is to transfer any worker who has been found to be afflicted with disease to some other job within the authority suitable to his health condition. Otherwise, he will be left a victim of disease, to such a degree as to possibly cause his death.

A Shameful Thing

Engr 'Abd-al-Mun'im al-'Ashmawi, board chairman of the State Sanitation Authority, has responded to the serious questions which the workers have raised. saying that the sewer workers are exposed to many occupational hazards and diseases as a result of their exposure to filth and environmental pollution, Even though the authority provides protective clothing for the divers, the workers refuse to use it, on the pretext that it hampers their movement. Also, the authority provides food for the workers, in addition to free medical treatment, and also pays incentives and allowances which can add up to 60 percent of the wages. As for the infection allowance, the authority pays 75 piasters a month to each worker, which is unfortunately a disgrace.

A Special Package for the Workers

Engr al-'Ashmawi adds that the authority has prepared a special package for sewer workers, including insurance and retirement, similar to the law for workers in dangerous and difficult jobs. The bill has been submitted to the National Democratic Party, and will be discussed by the People's Assembly during its current session.

The authority's chairman of the board is presenting a number of proposals for ways of getting the workers to remain in this profession.

1. There should be a special package for sewer workers so as to achieve some conformity between work and wages.

2. The pension statute for sewer and sanitation workers should be amended to take into account the number of years of actual service, figured by year and half-year, when calculating the pension, in view of the dangers to which they are exposed. This should be similar to pensions for mine workers.

3. Production incentives for the workers should be set at 100 percent of the average salary and wage.

4. The infection and nature-of-work allowances for sewer and sanitation workers should be re-examined and figured in brackets according to the nature and danger of the job.

5. A training center subordinate to the authority should be established to train the workers so as to increase their efficiency, inasmuch as the modern machines and equipment being used to clean out the sewers require a great deal of skill.

Will these proposals be implemented? Will the state respond to the urgent demands of this group, which has suffered for so long and is still suffering?

8559
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STATISTICS ON JOB ACCIDENTS, LOST TIME RELEASED

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 7 Jul 80 p 5

[Article: "The State Loses 21 Million Pounds a Year Through Work Accidents and Absenteeism"]

[Text] A report by the manpower and vocational training ministry confirms that the state is losing more than 21 million Egyptian pounds a year because of workers' accidents and unexcused absenteeism.

The report says that in recent years there has been a continual increase in work accidents, which amounted to 135,000 cases last year, after having been 98,000 cases 10 years ago.

The report mentions that work accidents in four textile companies amounted to 2,235 cases, while there are 17,400 workers at these companies. There were 40,782 days of absence because of these accidents, in addition to the estimated 19,000 pounds paid in wages for injured workers. Lost time cost 9,658 pounds during the period from January to December 1979.

As for the engineering and electrical industries sector, the report indicates that there were 779 accidents in three companies employing 3,861 workers, and lost time cost 3,495 pounds.

The report mentions that during 1979, there were 1,376,000 days lost at all the 162,645 installations throughout the republic, because of non-occupational illness, accidents, and job accidents, which increased the losses suffered by production.

The report also explains that this phenomenon is due to many causes, including the worker himself, the lack of industrial safety equipment and potentials, and the proliferation of agencies supervising industrial safety.

8559
CSO: 4802

WORKING WIVES SEE COST OF LIVING ALLOWANCE AS INADEQUATE

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 7 Jul 80 p 5

[Article" "The Working Woman Says That the 3-pound Allowance is Not Enough!"]

[Text] The married working woman still has a problem with the cost-of-living allowance. Even if it is decided to treat her the same as a bachelor, whereby she would obtain 3 pounds as an inflation allowance, she nevertheless says that this is not enough, that her rights are still being trampled on, and that this allowance is just barely enough to buy a kilogram of meat.

Dr Lu'lu' Ya'qub, a doctor at the al-Manshiyah al-Kubra General Hospital, says that government wages are very low. Assuming that the cost-of-living allowance was the same for the working wife as for the husband, these 3 pounds make absolutely no sense.

'A'idah Jirjis, an employee, asks, "What shall I do with this tiny sum? How can the unmarried working woman be equal to the married working woman?"

Zaynab Muhammad Rajab, an employee at the Agricultural Credit Bank; 'Afifah Sami, an employee and mother of one son and one daughter; and Qut al-Qalub Muhammad, an employee and a mother, are all demanding an increase in the inflation allowance for women with children. They all emphasize that they would prefer price reductions to getting this allowance.

Dalal Hasan al-'Awda, an employee, widow, and the mother of a son and a daughter, asks why a decree has not yet been issued pertaining to widows. She is demanding an allowance just like that a husband gets, since her circumstances are the same as his, for she is supporting a family and must get a cost-of-living allowance figured on the same bases as a male, married worker's allowance is.

8559
CSO: 4802

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL DENOUNCES HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Appeal to Prime Minister

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Amnesty International, the humanitarian organization, on Friday, 29 August, published an appeal addressed to Iranian Prime Minister Mohamed Ali Rajai, asking him to put an end "to the executions and arrests which persons are victims of only because of their origin or their convictions."

In the letter addressed to Mr Rajai on 19 August, Amnesty International "expresses its profound concern over the repeated violations of human rights committed since the revolution and particularly over the large number of executions which have taken place. The right to a fair and equitable trial has constantly been denied the persons who were hauled before the Islamic Revolutionary tribunals."

Attached to the letter from Amnesty International was a voluminous report on the problems of legislation and the rights of man in Iran. This report, based on the findings of a mission which went to Iran in 1979 and on the study of hundreds of trials, concludes that numerous persons were executed without having the right to a fair and equitable trial. The report had prior to publication been addressed to the Iranian authorities last January but the organization has so far not received any response to the various questions raised.

The letter addressed to the prime minister also expresses Amnesty International's worry "about the growing number of arrests of persons considered to be opponents by the Iranian authorities, including even members of parliament. In many cases, the persons arrested had been active opponents of the regime of the shah and some had even been imprisoned by virtue of their political views.

"The arrests of members of the Bahai, Jewish and more recently Christian communities seem to cast doubt upon the spirit of religious tolerance which was believed to prevail after the revolution and which was reflected

in the new Iranian Constitution. Certain members of those communities had to undergo lengthy detention without any charges or trials and others were sentenced to death," Amnesty International notes furthermore before indicating that "it would with satisfaction receive any opportunity of discussing its preoccupations with the Iranian prime minister or with diplomatic representatives of his country."

LE MONDE Editorial

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Aug 80 p 5

[Editorial: "The Iranian Republic Menace"]

[Text] In measured but firm terms, Amnesty International, the humanitarian organization, has just denounced the violations of human rights in Iran: arbitrary arrests, hasty trials, and summary executions "of which persons are victims by virtue of their origin or their views." These accusations are shocking, coming from a perfectly independent institution which by the way has never stopped defending those whom the shah was persecuting. It suffices to recall that, among the numerous prisoners "adopted" by Amnesty, under the imperial regime, was the Ayatollah Montazeri, who today has become the spirtual heir of Imam Khomeyni.

Although the leaders in Tehran as a matter of principle, disdain any humanitarian protestations coming from the "Western oppressors," they should at least be concerned with the political consequences of a repression which continues to upset or exasperate a growing number of their fellow citizens who are neither "pro-Western" nor "counterrevolutionary." The Iranians did not oust the imperial regime so that one could execute, without any form of trial, officers who have been retired for one or two decades, homosexuals, adulterous women, drug traffickers, Jews or Bahais, nor to have songs or films considered "lascivious" by one or the other mullah banned. There is no doubt that such actions are not to be found among most of the Iranians who practice a kind of militant Islam which by the way played a certain revolutionary role.

Nations have short memories. The Iranian leaders should not count on the eternal appreciation of men and women who, 18 months after the establishment of the republic, do not feel that they are governed, who have not yet been told about any project designed to resolve the serious economic and social problems from which they suffer. The country has between 2 and 4 million unemployed. Almost all of the nationalized industries are running in the red, just like the government itself which cannot balance its budget in spite of petroleum revenues. Imported products are becoming increasingly rare. The rate of inflation has reached and exceeded 50 percent. Under these conditions, can one imagine the reaction of the "disinherited" to the endless meetings held by premier-designate Rajai who, he says, is trying to form a "100-percent Islamic government?"

The incoherence of the behavior of the leaders, partly due to their inexperience, is spreading to the political arena. While the integrity of national territory is seriously threatened, both by the harrassing actions of the Iraqi armed forces and by potential American military intervention, everything goes on as if certain officials were trying to surround the Islamic Republic in a kind of splendid isolation," by simultaneously taking on Europe, the USSR, almost all of the Muslim countries which are charged with being "reactionary" or "anti-Islamic." Domestically, these same officials strike out against the right and the left, against the royalists and the communists, against progressive and extreme left-wing Marxist Muslims, against national or religious minorities.

Although divided, the royalist opposition has considerable resources and powerful support abroad: the United States, Egypt, Iraq, just to mention a few of them, are supplying arms, training camps, and radios. The Iraqi army and government are full of people who want the old regime back. The Iranian nation is disappointed and tired. To put an end to arbitrary procedure, insecurity, and privations, one cannot rule out that it might resign itself to a restoration, disguised or open.

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CSO:4900

CHIEF PROSECUTOR WARNS POLITICAL GROUPS ON ACTIVITIES

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Aug 80 p 3

> [Text] If a problem ever once exceeds the limits of the law we will act on the provisions we have in these matters. These provisions are very clear and must be decisively enforced.
>
> Not only are these people doing things not in accordance with the constitution, but some of them claim to have grievances themselves.
>
> According to the constitution, all the country's courts must be administered by the Supreme Judicial Council.

Ayatollah Musavi Ardabili, Chief Prosecutor, in an exclusive interview yesterday with KEYHAN, gave his views concerning the convening of the judges' seminar, the district courts, the revolutionary courts, and the visible and non visible activities of some political groups.

Concerning the aim of the judge's seminar, Ayatollah Musavi Ardabili said: The reason for forming this seminar is that it is felt that the courts and the revolutionary courts ought to remain in place due to exigencies in our society, just as His Holiness the Imam has ordered, and society itself and the people also want this. Meaning that in any area where there are no revolutionary courts, we are pressured by the inhabitants of that area, who ask us to form revolutionary courts day and night. It is a reality that the courts and the revolutionary courts must be functioning now because of the needs and desires of the people. Therefore furnishings must be found for them and whatever deficiencies and difficulties they have must be put aside now. Since all the country's courts of justice must be administered by the Supreme Judicial Council according to the Imam's orders and according to the constitution, the Supreme Judicial Council has called upon all judges and revolutionary trial courts to rally around this point, to talk on the same series of issues, to follow the same methods and points of view, and to come to unanimous agreement concerning the issues that are to arise in order that they may be of one kind throughout the country.

The Chief Prosecutor then stressed that this seminar will only undertake to study issues pertaining to the courts and the revolutionary courts.

Ayatollah Ardabili said: The call for unity is not a new issue. This is a central issue for the Imam and the nation, but unfortunately some publications and some persons have not adopted a correct attitude towards this order of the Imam and the desire of the people. Naturally the Imam has decided to confront this critical issue.

Ayatollah Musavi Ardabili then said concerning the activities of some political groups: If a problem ever once exceeds the limits of the law we will act on the provisions we have in these matters. These provisions are very clear and must be decisively enforced.

The Chief Prosecutor added: We have reminded these groups many times and we have asked them to bring their activities in line with the constitution. Insofar as they do not do this we will be obliged to put the legal provisions pertaining to them into effect. Not only are these people doing things not in accordance with the constitution, but some of them claim to have grievances themselves. Again we call on these people to desist from activities that can only be called counterrevolutionary at this stage of the revolution. If they wish to engage in sound political activities, there is no need for plotting and instigation. For example, an organization came to me and complained as an organization. I told them we didn't know anything about their organization. We knew nothing of their central group, their general body or their institution, and we had no information about them. How could we investigate the problems of an organization of which we were totally ignorant? I told them, if you want us to officially acknowledge your complaints and charges, we must know about you. They said we cannot give you any of this information because of security considerations, and we want you to acknowledge us just as you know us. Where in this world is such a practice customary?

The Chief Prosecutor then stressed: The people will give these groups a period of respite, and if they do not come around we will take legal action.

He added: Of course, since we don't want to create a new problem in the country, we are therefore now confronting the issues as we think it proper, and if these problems cannot be resolved in other ways, naturally we must decisively bring forward legal methods.

Musavi Ardabili then said concerning the election of the prime minister: Mr Raja'i, in our view and from the standpoint of religion, is extremely reliable, and we know him to be a true Moslem and a person who has struggled for many years. We hope, God willing and with the cooperation of the Majles, the President of the Republic, and other revolutionary organizations, that everyone will unitedly carry the revolution forward at this sensitive stage.

9310
CSO: 4906

ARTICLE DEPLORES GRADUAL DISINTEGRATION OF ARMED FORCES

Tehran RANJBAR in Persian 21 Jul 80 p 7

[Article: "The Army Is the Backbone of National Defense"]

[Text] Do not sacrifice the Islamic Republic institutions to factional rivalries.

Any purge of the army should make for its strengthening.

All deviant views on the army have a common denominator: the gradual or expeditious liquidation of the army.

The recent counterrevolutionary conspiracy, because it was conceived within the army, made the role of the army and the attitude toward this revolutionary institution an issue of the day again.

The current debates about the army these days all have sharply divergent directions. On the one hand, a group of people have questioned the merits of the entire army simply because there is a handful of counterrevolutionary elements in the Army. On the other hand, a large number of forces and the mass of the people have showered the army with praise and increased deference because of the existence of zealous soldiers and noncommissioned, as well as commissioned officers in the army and because the devout personnel of the army itself was the principal factor in uncovering and foiling the recent plot.

The approach to be adopted vis-a-vis the army has been an undecipherable enigma since the very inception of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Under the previous regime, the army was, on the one hand, an instrument for repressing the people by the Shah while, there have been many democratic traditions in the history of the same army, on the other, which, given the structure of the army which comprises mostly soldiers, non-commissioned as well as commissioned officers, seem only natural and justifiable.

On the eve of the revolution, Imam Khomeyni took note of the ambivalence inherent in the army, namely (a) the dominance of a handful of pro-imperialist and royalist officers over the army; and, (b) the existence of populist

personnel who comprised the near-total majority of the components of this political institution. The Imam rightly adopted a dual policy toward the Army and wisely appealed to the patriotism of the majority of the officers and to the revolutionary spirit of the soldiers and non-commissioned personnel who had all risen from the toiling classes of the society. This explains why the army of the reactionaries which was poised as the principal column for crushing the Revolution, was paralyzed and came apart at the seams. The validity of this dual policy of the Imam's toward the army was borne out in practice by the fact that the huge numbers from the army personnel joined the revolution.

Such a clear-sighted and practice-tested policy should have remained as the basic policy toward the army after the Revolution. Basically, insistence on such a policy compelled a mere handful of the traitors and those with outside links to flee or to be beaten down or outcast while this purge and the reorganization of the Army under the principal mottos of the Revolution, namely the application of Islamic Republican principles, non-reliance on the East or the West, independence, freedom, and social justice put the army fully in the service of the people and in the cause of Iran's independence and territorial integrity.

However, after the revolution, the enemies of the Islamic Republic played on the feelings seething among the people and spread slogans in favor of the disbandment of the army. Broached at the level of the society, by such notorious groups as the leaders of the guerrilla organization and by Kianuri's gang, the slogans impressed some of the forces within the ranks of the revolution, too, but it was foiled by the alertness of the leadership of the revolution and by the responsible authorities of the government both of which enjoyed the informed support of the mass of the people. It was soon clear that by hiding behind the mask of seemingly revolutionary slogans, the Soviet-and American-backed counterrevolutionaries intended to deprive the Islamic Republic of Iran of the institutions that defended Iran's independence and territorial integrity and to pave the way for realizing their ulterior motives.

The bloody clashes that started in all corners of the country after the revolution, and then the instantaneous events involving Iraq and Afghanistan, lucidly showed the motives of the conspirators for disarming the Islamic Republic of Iran via the disbandment of the Army. These events laid bare the ugly purposes of these people hidden behind their demagogic slogans.

It was for this very reason that the "Dismantle the Army" slogan was rightly written off as one subservient to Imperialism and Social-Imperialism and counterrevolution, while the enemy had not yet discarded his heinous plan. When the agents of the Eastern and Western superpowers realized that the people were aware of the conspiracy for the dissolution of the Army and of the fact that the Islamic Republic would not fall for this conspiracy, they hatched yet another plot which called for the gradual dissolution of the Army instead of its rapid disbandment. But how? The enemies of the Islamic Republic, throughout this period, tried the following tricks:

1. To foist off the army as anti-people for its role in the Kordestan events, and ....;

2. To discredit the army in the eyes of the people;

3. To disrupt the army's internal communications and terms of reference, and to infest its structure with internal chaos;

4. To demoralize the army's personnel;

5. To disseminate rumors about its commanders;

6. To show the army pitted against other military institutions, viz. the Revolutionary Guards Corps that had sprung from the Revolution;

7. To fuel the competition among various military institutions; and,

8. ... [sic]

By resorting to these schemes, the enemies of the regime attempted to weaken the army and to propel it toward disbandment and to attain their goals.

Also, by capitalizing on the rampant chaos, the agents of Russia and America tried hard to infiltrate into this institution and to pressurize it from within and without, so that this institution might not get organized, nor find discipline, nor get established on a "neither Western, nor Eastern" footing, nor get disposed to serving the revolution.

Despite all these schemes, and for the fact of the existence of thousands of devout, pious and brave revolutionary soldiers and of the patriotism of the near-total majority of the commissioned and noncommissioned officers, the army did not yield under these pressures and played a positive role in the past 18 months by giving hundreds of martyrs in safeguarding the revolution and the territorial integrity of Iran and in following the leadership of the Revolution.

In such a backdrop, the issue of the army has once again become the topic of the day for political factions. It is unfortunate that some political forces have pitched into action to undermine the army and are waging extensive propaganda campaigns against it without thinking about the ramifications of the policy they have adopted.

Although the persuasions of these groups differ from those of the enemies of the revolution and the former have adopted this tack within the context of factional competitions for the grab of political power, yet the weakening of the army and pushing it to the verge of disbandment serve no purpose other than that of the superpowers and of their agents such as the Kianuri gang in the Tudeh Party who have been pursuing such a policy for months.

From the very beginning, our party denounced the "Dissolve the Army" slogan and put forth a logical and revolutionary approach to the problem of the army. In a formulated document which it presented to the preliminary seminar of the National Defense University in the month of Farvardin of the current year [March-April 1980], our party dealt with the various problems relating to national defense, including the tracing of the roots of the existing diversionary views on the army, which views it analyzed and criticized. Inserted in Issues Nos 46 through 48 of RANJBAR newspaper, the document says, inter alia: "There is the view that we should not create a strong army but have a different force such as the Revolutionary Guards Corps instead. This view does not put much faith in the army and tends to create a separate military force which it can trust. But this view primarily aims at cinching power within the system with the help of a definite force. It does not so much heed the safeguarding of the nation's independence and its unmistakable needs and the impact of these. Secondly it reduces the role of the army in the nation's defence to zero. ....'

The view that says the command sysetm of the army should be replaced by a council-ruled system governing the army by initiating the decision-making process at the lower echelons in fact creates a built-in susceptibility to infiltration and makes for debilitating the army. This view aims at no less than factionalizing the army because the army they have in mind will soon be converted to a heterogenous amalgam of disparate factions unable, even at its best, to make decisions and to carry out orders because each council would be deciding for itself." Excerpt from RANJBAR, No 48.

The document submitted by our party to the preliminary seminar of the National Defense University also analyzed and derived conclusions from other diversionary views that "the nation needs no army because it is capable of defending the independence of the country", that "the Army needs no heavy hardware...", or that "the Army should not have a defensive but an offensive nature", [sic] or that "Heavy armaments bring dependence while we do not need them anyway."

The various diversionary views about the Army have more or less one thing in common: the elimination or gradual or rapid dissolution of the Army.

The verity of the analyses of the army by our party has been proven in practice and continues to be valid.

Those who today, for any reason, discredit the army, demoralize its personnel, jumble its internal hierarchy, fan the fire of rivalry among the armed forces of the Islamic Republic are not pursuing anything within the framework of their activities by the disintegration of the army.

We believe that these diversionary tendencies harm the revolution irreversibly. Had the holders of such views been moved by the best interests of the revolution or were they bound by the guidelines of the Imam, they would behave differently. Has the Imam not lauded the army many times and denounced the efforts for weakening it? Has the Imam not called fo the "Army of Islam"? How can they justify the act of weakening the Army and put it down as a revolutionary act in line with the Imam's policy?

We are in circumstances in which the Soviet armed forces scheme against Iran's territorial integrity from the north and the east as the American navy threatens Iran from the south and while we are embroiled in chashes with Iraq on our Western borders. In other words, we face aggression on all four sides while armed counter revolution is still active inside the country. All in all, there are a thousand dangers to our revolution. Is the weakening of the army in these circumstance anything but putting wind in the sails of the enemy?

The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran is extant and should be strengthened and solidified. Even the purge of the hostile elements from inside the Army should make for its strengthening. To make the institutions of the Islamic Republic victims of factional rivalries is not permissible. These rivalries and policies gnaw away like moth at the bastion of the revolution from within and wreak on us without hands what the enemies did not manage to do with a thousand pilots.

Defense and national security in the sensitive situation of the world, the region and Iran, constitute a radical problem whose solution calls for the unity of all independence-seeking forces.

Our basic mottos in this matter, as indicated in the said document, are as follows:

1. Creation of a national and popular army as the mainstay of our national defense and as one which is immune from any monopolism;

2. Promotion and expansion of informed orderliness in the army on the basis of democratic decentralization;

3. Promotion and expansion of the spirit of combat and military education within the army in the service of the nation's independence, freedom and social justice;

4. Creation of command and operation unity between the Army and the Revolutionary Corps and attempting to create a 20-million strong army; and,

5. Purging the army and the other branches of the armed forces with a yardstick which would weed out the agents of the two superpowers and the corrupt and incorrigible elements linked to the previous regime and would prevent these from infiltrating.

Only by banking on the foregoing mottos and on the unity of all the forces seeking independence, Islam, nationalism and socialism will we succeed in safegaurding the revolution from the many dangers facing it in the field of national defense and security. Only that way can we continue our march forward.

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CSO: 4906

REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS TO GET AIRBORNE TRAINING

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 13 Aug 80 p 13

[Article: "Revolutionary Guard Commander of Fars: Revolutionary Guardsmen Are Receiving Flight and Airborne Training"]

> [Text] The Revolutionary Guard is not affiliated with any party or group. It is an independent organization.
>
> A number of the instigators of the outbreak in Firuzabad have been arrested but no court has convened as yet to investigate them.

Shiraz - KEYHAN correspondent - Dr Mas'ud Khatemi, Commander of the Fars Revolutionary Guards, in an exclusive interview with KEYHAN, enumerated the Guard's programs for promoting organizational order, and strengthening the ideological and military dimension. Referring to the Guard's relationship with the religious law magistrate, he declared: The Revolutionary Guard is not affiliated wih any party or group. It is an independent organization.

The Revolutionary Guard Commander, in response to a question about what differences exist between the Revolutionary Guards and the Shiraz Religious Magistrate, said:

In the Islamic Revolutionary Courts of Shiraz there is an atmosphere we do not expect to see in a revolutionary court. It passes judgement arbitrarily and operates on the basis of influence rather than merit. The Religious Magistrate needs people who are the equivalent of gendarmes, in order to summon anyone on any pretext. They even arrest people without authorization from the Revolutionary Court. Revolutionary Guardsmen will not acquiesce to such activities.

Concerning the non-affiliation of the Revolutionary Guards of Shiraz with any particular party or group, which was the subject of another of the KEYHAN correspondent's questions, Dr Khatemi said:

Contrary to enemy rumours, the Guard is in no way affiliated with any party or groups. It is itself an independent organization. Concerning programs that are being prepared and carried out by the Revolutionary Guards, he said:

The Guard is equipped by headquarters. We also have programs in Fars for establishing organizational order in the various units, and for developing our ideology and putting it into writing as much as possible. Other Guard plans include strengthening the Guard's military capability by forming advanced military training programs such as airborne training, flight training, and training in heavy and extra heavy weapons.

Concerning identification of the instigators of outbreaks in Firuzabad, which led to the deaths of five guardsmen, Dr Khatemi said:

It is clear that a tribal chief himself and some of his close companions were the instigators of these outbreaks. Of course a number of lesser, unwittingly loyal tribes became involved in the evil plots of chiefs, but fortunately the zealous tribes, due to their religious beliefs and their Islamic qualities, are not ready to confront the Islamic Republic. As of now a number of instigators of the outbreak have been arrested, but no court has been convened to investigate them.

Dr Khatemi was asked: Now that you do not have a good relationship with the Shiraz Religious Magistrate, to what authority do you defer on questions of religious law?

He answered: We act upon the religious and theological judgements of Ayatollah Seyyed Abdolhosseyn Dastgheyb, Emam Jom'eh of Shiraz, and/or we cooperate with Mr Mir Gharfari of the Revolutionary Court.

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CSO: 4906

GOVERNMENT TAKES OVER BIG TRANSPORT COMPANIES

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 13 Aug 80 p 13

[Text] The assets of eight big transport companies with four thousand trucks have been taken over by the government. The debt of these eight companies to banks and the Ministry of Commerce was around 11 billion 280 million rials. Some of these companies had borrowed 2600 times the amount of their own assets.

In announcing this news today, Mehdi Aminzadeh, of the Board of Directors of the Department for Expanding Commercial Services, said: There were about eight transport companies in Iran consolidated under the name of one parent company called "Baranbar", with assets of 100 million rials. The subsidiaries of this company were: Gostaresh-e Khadamat-e Bazargani, controller of 40 percent of the stock, Hamlonaql, and Sarbanha, Iran Tanker, the Tehran-Khorramshahr express of Iran, Iran Sor'at, Transcontinental, the Hamlonaql-e Pars Container Company, and Iran-Europe Carrier, which held the remainder of the stock.

Aminzadeh said: In 1352 [21 Mar 73-20 Mar 74] and 1353 [21 Mar 74-20 Mar 75] due to increased oil production and a flood of imports, the despised Pahlavi regime was faced with a shortage of transport facilities. Consequently it called upon its supporters, loaned them money from the treasury, and established these companies. He added: These eight companies have about four thousand trucks, two thousand of which are roadworthy. These eight companies were indebted to government banks and the Ministry of Commerce by about 11 billion 280 million rials, and some of them, such as the Tehran-Khorramshahr express, had borrowed 2600 times the value of their own assets. Aminzadeh said: Calculating these amounts, every truck should be worth 2 million rials, but now these trucks are not worth half that amount. Aminzadeh then undertook to explain this company, saying: After the revolution the Sarbanha Company, which was related to Qasem-e Sarbanha, took over the directorship of the foundation and some other shareholders. This company, with its initial capital of 50 million rials, owed around 700 million rials to the Ministry of Commerce and 2.6 billion rials to the banks.

The Iran Tanker Company, which was also related to the Sarbanha family, with its initial capital of 139 million rials was in debt about 100 million rials to the banks. The Hamlonaql-e Bozorg-e Iran Company was related to the Sudavar family, which now has government managers, and with assets equal to 500 million

rials it owed about one billion 410 million rials to the government. Iran Sor'at, which was related to the Ruholamin va Gerami family, now has a government board of directors. This company, with assets of 20 million rials, had borrowed one billion 757 million rials from the government. Pars Container, which was related to the Paksima family, is now in the administrative hands of the worker's council. This company, with assets of 10 million rials, owed the government 1.4 billion rials. Transcontinental, which was related to the Mohammadian family, with assets of 500 million rials, only owed 1.2 billion rials to the Ministry of Commerce. This company is now under the supervision of government directors.

The Khorramshahr Express, which was affiliated with Mr Azari, with one million rials starting capital, had borrowed 320 million rials from the banks and the Ministry of Commerce. Finally, Iran Europe Carrier, which was affiliated with Kazemi, with 200 million rials assets, only owed 800 million rials to the Ministry of Commerce.

On the other hand, according to a note of confirmation, the directors of these companies will be from the Ministry of Commerce, but their employees will not be government employees and they will not be subject to government regulation. Aminzadeh said: Five companies, Iran Sor'at, Pars Container, Sarbanha, Iran Tanker, and the Tehran-Khorramshahr Express will be supervised by the Department for Expanding Commercial Services. Two companies, Hamlonaql-e Bozorg-e Iran and Transcontinental will come under the mantle of the Grain Administration, and the last company has also been placed under the control of the Wheat and Sugar Administration.

Aminzadeh said: At a meeting attended by Mr Bani-Sadr, President of the Republic, it was arranged that unemployed drivers would be referred to the transport companies to return to work after filling out questionaires.

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CSO: 4906

MINISTER OUTLINES FUTURE OF NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Aug 80 p 9

[Article: "Minister of Industries and Mines: Nationalized Industries Will Not Be Returned to Their Previous Owners"]

> [Text] None of the major industries which have been nationalized will be returned to their previous owners. And the Ministry of Industries and Mines will use all in its power to carry out those regulations which have been passed. These statements were made by Ahmadzadeh, the minister of Industries and Mines, in a press conference at which the vice ministers were also present.

Concerning industrial production levels of the past year, the minister of Industries and Mines said: After the revolution, both accurate and inaccurate figures were given to the people in a haphazard manner. But today, we have at our disposal relatively accurate figures for the year 1979-80 [1358] which contrast with those of '77-'78 and '78-'79 ['56 and '57]. Of course, these figures only include the major production areas and show that our industrial production in '79-'80 ['58] has in certain instances been less and in certain instances more than in '77-'78 ['56].

The figures show that in the areas in which we have been more dependent on raw and semi-finished materials, production has decreased.

Ahmadzadeh added: In any case, we can claim that we have been successful in '79-'80 and in spite of all the difficulties, production has been good. We hope to have increased production of high quality in '80-'81 ['59].

He added: At the end of last year, 70 percent of the investment in industries came from the government.

He added: Last year, we had many disagreements with the owners of nationalized industries, who tried to prove in various ways that the government is unable to manage the nationalized industries. But I declare before all that these individuals should not think that they will be successful. The Ministry of Industries and Mines will use all in its power to enforce the law and will not allow those industries which have financially fed upon this ministry during the past year, the ministry having assumed their management, to be returned to their previous owners.

Concerning workers' councils of the production units, the minister of Industries and Mines said: We have often used the members of Islamic councils of the factories as members of the board of directors of the factories. For example, there are members of Islamic councils on the board of directors of 80 percent of the textile units. In the food industry, this figure is about 50 percent. But the reason for the closing of the nationwide Union of Islamic Revolutionary Councils is as follows: This Union contained individuals from leftist groups who actively disrupted production within the industrial units of the Organization of Expansion and Renovation of Iranian Industries. At the same time, in accordance with the law, the formation of Islamic councils in large industrial units must take place only with the approval of the government.

In conclusion, Ahmadzadeh added: After the revolution, 95 percent of the production units were closed. We began almost from zero and now, after one year, the situation is almost reversed; that is, at the present time, 95 percent of the production units are operating. Of the 400 production units under the supervision of the Ministry of Industries and Mines, there is disruption in fewer than 5 percent of the units. The others are working well. At present, Iran National puts 250 automobiles on the market daily and it has enough raw materials to last six months.

In this meeting, Dr Sadr, the executive vice chairman of the Organization of Expansion and the Organization of National Industries, also spoke about the reasons for dissolving the factory councils. In Tabriz, councils within the nationwide Union of Islamic Revolutionary Councils were dissolved by Ayatollah Musavi. Later, a number of workers came to us and requested the dissolution of the aforementioned union. He also said: Islamic councils approved by the Islamic govern-

ment are also approved of by the Organization of Expansion and Renovation of Industries.

He added: Investment in the Organization of Expansion and Renovation of Iranian Industries is all governmental and belongs to the people. What we want is to establish law and order in the workplace, because last year disorder caused a deficit of 2 billion rials.

In the continuation of this press conference, Engineer Saberi, the industrial vice minister of Industries and Mines, said concerning the nationalized industries: After the nationalization of industries, about 1,000 directors were selected by the Ministry of Industries and Mines. This may be the largest number appointed. The selected directors were first faced with actual problems such as strikes, disruptions, counter-revolutionaries, etc. Basically, dependent capitalism tried to prove that the government is not able to manage the nationalized industries.

In this meeting, Engineer Mohammad 'Ali Zaker, the secretary of the Organization for the Coordination of the Development and Independence of Iranian Industries, explained the goals of this organization. He said: The Organization began operation with insignificant means from last June-July [TIr]. First, it took steps to organize an exhibition of spare parts imported from abroad. The goal of this exhibition was to have Iranian craftsmen make these parts. But there were several major problems including the fact that most of those who were able to make the parts did not have the necessary means. And another problem was that the cost was high, several times the price of foreign-made parts. In addition, lack of cooperation on the part of factories with craftsmen caused problems.

He added: We have divided industries into 18 guild councils. The primary duty of these councils is to help establish an industrial information bank.

Following this session, Engineer Rahjú, vice minister of mines of the Ministry of Industries and Mines, spoke about the excavation of mines: Different organizations will participate in the excavation of mines and we are trying to centralize all excavation activities in one place, in an independent organization called "The Unit for the Exploration of Mines."

He added: Following the ratification of the Constitution, we drew up the Law of Mines in consultation with various spiritual leaders including Mr Golzadeh-Ghafurí and we sent it to the Revolutionary Council. In accordance with this law,

since the mines belong to the people, no excavation permit will be issued to individuals. However, exploration will remain open to the private sector. That is, the private sector will be contracted to do excavation for the government.

At the end of the meeting, Engineer Hejazi, vice minister for finance and administration of the Ministry of Industries and Mines, said: The Ministry's personnel has been reduced by 25 percent and from an organizational perspective, it has decreased by 50 percent [as published].

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CSO: 4906

HALF OF FOREIGN TRADE NATIONALIZED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 19 Aug 80 p 12

[Article: "Minister of Commerce Announces at a Press Conference: Fifty Percent of Foreign Commerce Has Been Nationalized"]

[Text] At a press conference the Minister of Commerce discussed issues in the areas of foreign trade, centers of production and distribution of goods, setting up an institute for commercial studies, helping the private sector, price control, and the employment of specialists.

This conference, held in the offices of the Ministry of Commerce, was attended by the managing directors of the three centers, Production and Distribution, Metals, Paper and Wood, and Textiles and Fibres. Reza Sadr, Minister of Commerce, began by talking about foreign trade: At the end of Ordibehesht [mid April] we were able to secure the Revolutionary Council's approval of Article 44 of the Constitution, which divides the economic system of the Islamic Republic of Iran into government, cooperative, and private sectors with a systematic and eminently sound plan. He added: After the text of the law nationalizing foreign trade is written and approved by the Council of Ministers at the end of Tir [mid June], no one will be able to import iron directly. As of now around 50 percent of foerign commerce has been nationalized, of which around 30 percent of the country's imports will be secured by three centers. Twenty percent of that is related to the Center of Metals, and the other 10 percent will be handled by the centers of paper, wood, textiles, and fibre importing. Taking another group of imports into consideration, such as wheat, rice, meat, sugar cubes, sugar, and vegetable oil, which have been handled by the government up until now, this makes more than 50 percent.

Reza Sadr said: Another foundation has been set up for commercial studies which has prepared itself to gather statistics.

We know that we have been getting the worst of it in trade until now, for we have paid high prices for goods because we have not had good information in the international market. Since our trade has been traditional in nature, our information has been very slight. He said: We hope to make progress in our commercial and industrial sectors in order to be able to reduce prices and inflation.

Then Shoja'eidin Fathi, an assistant in the Ministry of Commerce, talked about changes in the country's economic situation: It is our intention, by not continuing in a state of dependence, to turn our talents to production within the country. Therefore, the first effect of nationalization is to return production to within the country. If not, we will not achieve self sufficiency through talk and discussion. Therefore, the choice of methods should be such that people will move in the direction of production. Therefore, this profiteering must be stopped.

In conclusion, he called for communications to study and analyze the effects of nationalization in order for it to be clear whether in the long run nationalization of foreign trade would lead to self sufficiency or not.

Reza Sadr added: After commerce was nationalized and more than 80 percent of industry was nationalized, a law was approved by the Revolutionary Council which appointed 22 members of the 45-person Executive Committee of the Chamber of Commerce from the Ministries of Commerce, Industries, and Mines, two people from the mines sector, 10 people from the industries sector, and 10 people from commerce. Of this number, six members of this same chamber and these same centers will be chosen, and also 23 other people will be chosen from the private sector for the purpose of helping the growth of foreign trade.

He said: I hope, with the awareness that we will give the people, and with attention to article 44, the upholders of which law will be in the Chamber of Commerce, and with attention to people in charge, God willing we will succeed in implementing this article according to the wishes of its affirmers in the Assembly of Experts and the nation.

Mohammad Suri, an assistant in the Ministry of Commerce, said concerning the establishment of a trade center: We have decided to convert the 32 story building called the Mepehr Building, formerly belonging to Hazhbar Yazdaui, to a trade center, in order to centralize all centers in that place. In this way we will transform our business from a bazaar of little shops and offices to a presentable condition that is competitive with the large countries of the world. To this end, we are asking the owner of this building, meaning the Export Bank, to complete it and turn over all the necessary facilities and international business information to the government.

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CSO: 4906

MINISTRY OF LABOR SETS 44-HOUR WORK WEEK

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 18 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Tehran--Working hours for all government employees as well as workers in the private sector has been fixed at 44 hours per week, it was announced by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Reza Nematzadeh yesterday.

Nematzadeh speaking to the Pars News Agency said that the law will be strictly enforced as from August 23, 1980.

Under laws operating earlier working hours for executives and officials was only 35 hours per week and since the beginning of the revolution there was no consistency in the number of working hours, as a result of the lengthy periods for which offices and commercial houses came to be voluntarily closed in support of revolutionary calls.

Later, with industrial closures, worker and manager disputes, calls for pay rises and other attendant disruptions of work no regular working hours could be properly determined.

It was suggested, said the labor minister, that working hours for the lower rings in the work force should be reduced to bring it in line with working hours to those in the official and executive grades. But this has been rejected, he said, as the revolutionary tasks ahead deem more working hours necessary rather than fewer hours before.

Since early in 1980 there have been attempts at every level to have industries back on their feet and normalizing of work in all government departments, so the longer working hours were a matter of the highest priority now, the labor minister said.

Asked if it was fair that working hours for officials and executives should be equalized in view of the heavy work capacities that those in this category were called upon to bear, Nematzadeh disagreed saying that labor laws throughout the world did not discriminate this way. Besides, he said, it was anticipated that most government departments would be

faced with a problem of overstaffing shortly. He added that this was because there were plans mooted for streamlining work in all these departments.

The solution, he said, would be to divert as many officials as possible into the provinces and rural sectors. This is in keeping with government's policies of decentralization of society stressing development in the provinces and rural sectors.

CSO: 4920

RAILROAD IMPROVEMENT PROGRAM LAUNCHED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Aug 80 p 3

[Article: "By the General Director of Railroads: The Program for the Expansion, Replacement, and Repair of Railways Announced"]

[Text] Seyyed Mohammad 'Alizadeh, director general of Iranian government railroads, related the present situation of the railroads and their problems in a press conference.

Before the interview, the problems of the railroads were pointed out with slides and explanations. It was explained that within only the last week, seven bombs were discovered and neutralized in the Iranian railroads. There are also many telephone calls which threaten to stop the trains. In this connection, a number of people have been arrested and handed over to the proper authorities.

Then, Engineer Alizadeh, concerning the general policies of the railroads after the revolution, said:

We began basic repairs of the railroads four months ago; however, the budget for railroads in '80-'81 ['59] is insufficient. Had we had the funds, we would have been able to employ 100,000 people.

For instance, between Tehran and Garmsar there has been no reconstruction. Along this route, which is 114 km, so far only 100 km of railroad has been replaced.

The Revolutionary Council has put 600 million rials at our disposal in connection with the budget shortage, the plan for self-sufficiency, and rapid action plans.

He also added: About one-half million tons of rails designated for the stretch between the ports of Emam Khomeyni and Ma'shur (formerly Mahshahr), which is about 2,809 km, have been abandoned. These rails were purchased four to seven years ago and have been left out in the rain.

Concerning the engine power of the trains, Alizadeh said:

Presently, we have 414 diesels, one-fourth of which are used for freight and passengers. The rest, because of the lack of spare parts, labor problems, salary shortages, etc., are inoperational.

At the present time, we have 48,000 employees of the railroads who do not hold high school diplomas or are illiterate, with the exception of 4-5,000. They are, in fact, among the most disadvantaged employees of the railroads.

The reason is that the railroad was the only institution which was not in the service of the tyrannical power. Of course, it transported military personnel, but on the whole, it has been an institution used for transporting freight and passengers. The situation is presently the same. The exploitive policies of governments which controlled locomotives and rails were to profit from keeping the railroad system a consuming institution. They did not worry about making the railroads self-sufficient; they only thought of trying to sell as much as possible.

For example, when they brought us turbotrains, they did so only for their profit of $800 million.

The director general of railroads then added:

On the whole, the present situation of the railroads from the standpoint of passengers, roads, spare parts, etc. can be divided into three segments. The technical segment includes the situation with the rails, engine power, and employees and related problems. As far as the situation with the rails is concerned, there are 4,600 km of main lines and 200 km of secondary lines. These lines have not had essential, basic repairs since they were built by the British, French, and Russians.

All the lines need to be replaced, and most disasters are caused for this reason.

The ballast and ties have been damaged by snow, flood, and rain and grass has grown between the ties.

He added that although we have had 2-2 1/2 times fewer engines in operation than in previous years, this year more freight has been transported than before.

The director general of the Iranian government railroads also said: The people should realize themselves that they should travel less in order to cut back on railroad usage.

Concerning spare parts and necessary equipment, he said that the United States is not providing us with this equipment but intends to sell it to us through third parties at twice or three times the actual price. We, of course, will not accept this. In any case, the rebuilding of the lines will take 7-8 years.

He added: The safety factor of our railroads is very low and the possibility of train derailments does exist. The reason is that for many years attention has not been paid to them. Only in the last 6 or 7 months has there been any movement concerning the railroads. We need 18 million rials per km to rebuild the lines. Next year, we will rebuild between 500 and 700 km of railroad. In the north and in the south together, 1500 km of railroad needs to be rebuilt.

Concerning the making of parts, locomotive equipment, and rails in Iran, he said: About 18 or 19 years ago, a locomotive was built in Iran, all of whose parts we could build ourselves. After the coup d'état of 1953 [28 Mordad], 254 Santa Fe steam engines were put into service between 1953 and 1955 [1332-1334], which were supposed to last for 40 years. After the coup d'état, the changing of railroad directors, and the signing of contracts with the United States, the steam engines were taken out of operation and buried, even those which had no mileage on them. But at the present time, our job is to replace parts. For instance, last year we replaced 1400 cylinder heads which were corroded.

Because 5 months ago supplies had reached zero, we repaired and used the old train parts which had formerly been disposed of. For comparison, last year in Pakistan, only one cylinder head was replaced while at the same time in Iran 1400 cylinder heads were replaced. Between 2 1/2 and 6 months ago, that is, until early June [mid Khordad], we had only 78 heavy diesel

engines left out of 122. That is, every week, one engine went out of order. Since 2 1/2 months ago, through the efforts and attention of employees, the number has become fixed. We have succeeded in keeping the figure at about 62 diesel engines.

Of course, recently because of the increased number of passengers, we have added seven or eight engines.

He added: By using old parts, we have been able to make repairs in 70 cases, of which only 2 have gone out of order.

9593
CSO: 4906

PARTY ORGAN HAILS TIES WITH INDIA

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 18 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] The morning daily Jomhouri-e Eslami in a front page article yesterday commented on the relations between Iran and India and said that the Islamic Revolution of Iran has created joy among the Moslems of India. Realistically, the Iranian Revolution could further strengthen the friendship between the two countries for it has dealt the severest blow ever to United States imperialism and British colonialism in the region. There is need to say that the nation of India too has suffered from British and American colonialism and the U.S. through its plots has created schism among Hindu and Moslem population of India with the objective of preventing them from fighting against the dominant world blasphemy.

At present these populations are suffering from these plots and therefore they should all become aware of these instigations and put an end to them.

The fact is that the Hindus and Moslems could live together in peace and unitedly fight against imperialism and in this connection the Islamic Revolution of Iran could assist them and could take steps to strengthen friendly relations between these populations. Besides, Iran and India could expand their relations in the sphere of industry and economics. Such cooperation which would not appease the enemies of the two countries could be beneficial for both of them. Iran could meet part of the economic demands of India and India in return, could through its cooperation with Iran open a strong economic front against imperialism, added the newspaper.

In the opinion of Jomhouri-e Eslami so far the efforts made to create peaceful coexistence between Hindus and Moslems have not been sufficient enough, for both population to be able to develop their culture in a fee atmosphere. To this end holding Islamic seminars and conferences would prove to be useful, stressed the article.

The article concluded by saying that if the statesmen of the two countries realize the importance of expansion of the relations between Iran and India there would be a promising future for both nations culturally, economically and politically.

This is because stability and peace in the Indian Sub-Continent is a vital importance for the Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Iranian Revolution could not remain indifferent towards the foolish plots of U.S. imperialism.

CSO: 4920

COUNTRY SEEN READY FOR PREEMPTIVE WAR

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 27 Jun 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Nash'at al-Taghlubi: "Israel Plans for Preemptive War If Palestinians Go on With Escalation of Their Operations; European Initiative Does not Support Anybody Against Anybody; Zionist Call for 'Unity of World Jewry and Israel'; Return to Zero Point in Egyptian-Israeli Negotiations"]

[Text] Before King Husayn's visit to Washington, Jordan was the focus of attention. After the conclusion of the king's talks with U.S. President Carter, Jordan has continued to be the focus of attention. However, the following questions are raised: What comes after President Carter's determination to carry on with the two Camp David accords to the end and after the Jordanian monarch's refusal to join these two accords which, according to the monarch, have not made a single step forward on the path of solving the Palestinian problem? What does Jordan intend to do now regarding the Palestinian resolution to escalate the military operations in the occupied territories and the subsequent use of the Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese territories and Israeli reactions to such escalation?

Before King Husayn's trip to Washington, it was noticed that Yasir 'Arafat visited Jordan and held a long meeting with the king. After 'Arafat, the Jordanian capital was visited by a Palestinian delegation headed by Abu Jihad, the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee then met and a delegation representing the Palestinian National Council followed.

It is true that these movements were for the purpose of getting reassured about the health of Bassam al-Shak'ah, the mayor of Nabulus whose legs had been amputated. But what is also true is that Israel has not been unaware of what is happening on the Palestinian-Jordanian arena. Israel has wasted no time and has resorted immediately to talking about "a Palestinian base being set up in the Jordanian territories to escalate the military operations in the West Bank," warning the neighboring Arab countries of "the consequences of any attacks constituting a threat to Israel's security."

At the same time, the Israeli papers have devoted extensive space to attacking the resolution issued by Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Movement, calling for

"the full liberation of Palestine and the economic, political, military, cultural and intellectual liquidation of the Zionist entity." It has been noticed that the papers have seized upon this paragraph and have disregarded the second paragraph of the resolution calling for "the establishment of a democratic Palestinian state on the entire Palestinian soil," i.e. a common state in which the Arabs and the Jews coexist. These papers have intentionally stressed that the Palestinians cannot carry out the operations to which they have referred unless the neighboring Arab countries (Jordan, Syria and Lebanon) agree to let the Palestinians launch their operations from their territories and unless the other Arab countries supply them with the money necessary for the "war escalation." This is why the Israelis have made their threats against several Arab countries, considering the contacts that have taken place in Jordan on the one hand and the rapprochement between Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq on the other hand, as well as the Jordanian, Saudi and Iraqi armament, and even the Egyptian armament, a direct threat to Israel's security. This is also why the Israelis have said that "the Arab countries must shoulder their responsibilities for whatever may result from this."

Under Israeli pressure, the United States has been compelled to dip its bucket in the issue and Muskie, the U.S. Secretary of State, has addressed a direct warning to the Egyptians, Israelis and Palestinians and an indirect warning to all the Arabs against "obstructing the negotiations over the two Camp David accords." Muskie has further warned of a "whirlwind of destruction that will cover the Near East area" and will threaten "to extend to the other parts of the world" if the two accords do not reach their goal.

The U.S. Department of State has also considered the resolution of "Fatah, the party with influence in the PLO," to escalate the military action against Israel at the expense of the diplomatic efforts a very serious matter by virtue of the fact that "it doesn't offer any help to the peace efforts."

As for the U.S. press, it has attributed to the U.S. officials the reports that they expect numerous explosions in a vast area extending from the Near East to southwest Asia. This press has said that "the PLO is awaiting the outcome of the two meetings of the European countries in Venice to determine in the light of their outcome implementation of the program of scheduled operations." This press has also said that "Israel is getting ready and is blaming ahl the Arab countries, especially the neighboring Arab countries."

Meanwhile, Washington has been exerting big efforts for resumption of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. This effort has been proceeding in two parallel lines: First, obstruct a European initiative conflicting with the two Camp David accords. Second, compel the Arab countries, especially Jordan, "not to facilitate the Palestinian task of escalating the operations in the occupied territories."

Egypt and Israel have agreed to direct preparatory contacts in Washington to know "the nature of the grounds on which the negotiations can be resumed."

But neither Cairo nor Tel Aviv are convinced of the possibility of realizing any success in this regard. The Begin government has considered the U.S. invitation "a temporary superficial success" for Carter, enabling him to keep the crisis at a distance for some time and to devote his efforts to his election campaign. The Cairo government finds nothing from Israel to encourage resumption of the negotiations, especially since Begin--who had repeatedly stressed his refusal of any "conditional" negotiations--has been the first to hasten to set "prior conditions" when he declared that Israel alone decides the necessities of its security in the occupied territories and that the government cannot ask the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) to withdraw the bill for establishing the city of Jerusalem as the finally united capital of Israel. Cairo has said that this declaration is a direct reference to the two points that had led to suspending the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations last month. Cairo has added that the statement in which Begin has stressed his determination to build 10 more settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is enough to blow up everything because it means a return to the Zero point.

As for the European initiative, the U.S. movement to contain this initiative has been described as "consisting of a series of warnings." President Carter has warned his European allies, stressing that he is "firmly and strongly in control of the delicate matters, despite his preoccupation with the elections!" Carter's secretary of state has also declared frankly that the United States will not allow its control of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations to be lost and that it will not allow any measure at present leading to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

This U.S. position has, naturally, influenced the resolutions of the EEC countries participating in the Venice meeting. These resolutions have had the quality of a "political declaration" rather than the quality of "positive action," even though some Palestinian circles have considered the resolutions a step forward. Though the European capitals have implied that their initiative will assume bigger dimensions later on, the European political observers do not find it likely that any significant development will occur, first, because Washington wants nothing to annoy it from now till the end of the presidential elections and, second, because the European countries are eager to avoid a confrontation with the United States at present, as evident in the statement made by Jean Francois-Poncet, the French minister of foreign affairs, to the U.S. NEWSWEEK. Perhaps this statement explains to a large degree the nature of the Elycee Palace (the French presidency) thinking under the present circumstances. Despite the enthusiasm of French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing for a European initiative leading to the recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and to recognition of the Palestine people's right to self-determination and to the establishment of their state, he has been initially persuaded that the European initiative must pass through phases: The first is the phase of "filling the vacuum during the period in which the U.S. administration is paralyzed because of the elections." The second is the phase of deciding on positive action through amendment of Security Council resolution 242 or through any other formula agreed upon, such as the formula proposed by U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim calling for the holding of an international conference

to deal with the Palestinian issue and to decide on the solution it requires in freedom from the Geneva conference formula whereby the conference was chaired alternately by the United States and the Soviet Union.

On the basis of this reality, the French press has described the European initiative as being "in support of nobody and against nobody."

The question raised now is: Will Fatah, and consequently the PLO, carry out the threat to escalate the military operations in the occupied territories? Will the Arab countries help them to do so? What will the position of Israel, and also that of the United States, be in such a case?

Those who observe the course of developments in the Middle East area sum up the features of these developments as follows:

First, the recent developments, both at the international diplomatic level and in the occupied territories, confirm that the position of the Palestinians, and of Yasir 'Arafat in particular, has improved and strengthened. It is indubitable that Israel has become isolated internationally and that it can find no supporter other than the United States. On the other hand, despite all the Israeli pressures, the Palestinians in the occupied homeland continue to acknowledge no party other than the PLO as their representative.

Second, while the regime in Israel suffers from internal degeneration and faces the danger of escalated violence, it is noticed that all the Arab countries, especially the Gulf countries, will find themselves compelled to go to the most radical extremes if the efforts exerted at present fail to reach a comprehensive settlement for the Palestinian issue.

Third, the United States, despite its shaky international reputation as the result of its inability to persuade Israel to abide by the provisions of the Camp David accords, still insists on monopolizing the diplomatic action in the Middle East without displaying any readiness for any alternative to these two accords, keeping in mind that the United States knows that there has to be advance preparation for any conference held to solve any problem, meaning that there has to be preparatory negotiations that lay down the fundamental lines which guarantee the success of such a conference.

Fourth, President al-Sadat has not at all changed his opinion that the solution to the Palestinian problem and peace in the Middle East pass through neither Moscow, Paris or any other capital but through Washington alone. The reason for his insistence on his opinion is that he is wagering on the fall of Begin's government and the coming of another more moderate government!

Fifth, continuation of the present situation in the area encourages the inclination toward violence. When violence and counter-violence begin, the vicious circle starts and nobody knows when or where this circle will end.

Sixth, as a result of the internal U.S. conditions, Menachem Begin has become more inflexible and no longer agrees to anything conflicting with the rejected conditions which he has laid down as a basis for the Israeli solution to the self-rule issue. Begin has even denounced the U.S. abstention from voting on the resolution issued by the Security Council denouncing the attacks on the mayors of Nabulus and Ramallah. Because of this abstention, Begin has criticized the Washington administration sharply, as if he wants it to support the terror perpetrated by radical Israeli organizations--and all signs indicate that these organizations receive support from Begin's government itself.

But why has the U.S. secretary of state voiced his warning in which he expects "a destructive whirlwind extending from the Middle East to the other parts of the world" at a time when the U.S. officials whisper that "the Arab countries will not dare to open their borders to the PLO" and when they cite as an example the statement made by 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf, the Jordanian prime minister, in which he has talked of "supporting our brothers in the occupied territories" without making any reference to supporting the Palestinian action outside the occupied territories, being content with calling on the Arab countries to engage in serious action to confront the Israeli occupation and asserting that "Jordan will be in the vanguard of the deep Arab confrontation?"

The Americans answer that the international equation has compelled them to make radical statements.

On this particular point, the U.S. press and the European press are in agreement that the PLO is capable of moving despite the reservations of some Arab countries on this movement and that the Soviet Union is now interested in pushing the Middle East conditions toward further tension.

As for Begin's government which has been spreading threats that "it will not soften by one iota insofar as its security is concerned," it is no less worried than Washington itself. Its concern emanates primarily from the tension which has not been confined to the occupied territories alone but which has spread among Palestinians carrying Israeli identity cards [Israeli Palestinians] in the other areas. Begin has found himself compelled to warn these Palestinians against their solidarity with the West Bank Palestinians and the Israeli opposition has also found itself compelled to support Begin on this issue in the wake of the [press] conference held by Tawfiq Ziyad, the Knesset member and representative of the communist party (Rakah) in the Knesset, who criticized the Israeli government's position vis-a-vis the attack on the mayors of Nabulus and Ramallah and vis-a-vis the attack on Hebron.

On the other hand, the French LE FIGARO has published a statement by Shimon Peres, the opposition (Labor Party) leader, expressing tacit support for the position of Begin's government. Peres has expressed the belief that Israel is smaller than to have an agricultural society and an industrial society and has said that the Israeli Palestinians must contribute to industrializing the country as they contributed in the past to developing agriculture and "they benefited a lot from this." Even though Peres considers the settlements

built by his government a "de facto that allows their legitimacy" whereas the present government "is building settlements outside the framework of any legitimacy," he has urged Europe not to "obstruct the course of the peace in which it had not participated before and not to make Arab oil the sole expression of its foreign policy and of a society that has not yet succeeded in establishing the political Europe!" Peres has also said: "For the Camp David accords to overcome their present crisis, the government must change its policy on settlement in the occupied territories, the self-rule must be first applied in Gaza which will become the 'Hong Kong' of the Mediterranean and elections must be held in Judea and Samaria in coordination with Jordan because the Judea and Samaria--West Bank--Palestinians have not given up their Jordanian passports. Their choice will not be between us and Jordan but between Jordan and the PLO. This is more an issue of interest than one of conviction."

This statement has assured the French press of the presence of a common denominator between Begin's government and any other government that will replace it insofar as the Palestinian issue is concerned. The statement has also asserted that if Begin tries to explode the situation, even if he does so according to the saying "upon my head and the head of my enemies," the explosion will guarantee him a better position, regardless of the circumstances and the results, because the explosion will guarantee, first, the containment of the "hesitant" European initiative and, second, embarking on the negotiations from an angle different from the angle on which Egypt still insists. What Begin fears worst at present is what has been said by some Labor Party leaders about the presence of the danger of the eruption of a civil war in Israel if it is decided to evacuate the settlements. This is why is has encouraged the terrorist operations aimed at devoiding the West Bank of the main Palestinian leaderships and even of the population, if necessary, "because of the difficulty of controlling more than one million Palestinians in the occupied territories. He has even included in his calculations the possibility of launching a preemptive war if Jordan weakens and permits the PLO to act from its territories."

This possibility has appeared in the appeal addressed by (Leon Dolzen), the chairman of the International Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency, to the Israelis to stop their internal quarrels and to exercise self-restraint and full solidarity. Dolzen has said: The internal quarrels cast shadows on the national cohesion over which the government and the opposition do not disagree. The most important foundations of this cohesion are opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state, opposition to negotiations with the PLO and opposition to the partition of Jerusalem and a return to the 1967 borders. Dolzen has also stressed the importance of Jewish unity between Israel and the world Jewry to confront whatever threatens the Israeli entity.

Thus, Israel has not been making offhanded threats against the Arab countries and has not adopted its inflexible positions out of the desire to foil the Camp David accord concerning the Palestinian self-rule. Israel has done this, in the view of the Israeli observers themselves, in an attempt to create a

new reality which it doesn't want changed if President Carter is re-elected and finds himself free of the Zionist votes, considering that his new term will be the last term permitted by the constitution.

Those who believe in this view add that what encourages Israel most to carry out this plan is its feeling that it is capable of launching a preemptive war against one or two Arab countries without facing reactions from the other Arab countries as a result of the conflicts still present among these countries. Even if there are reactions, they will come late.

On the basis of this situation, successive Israeli statements containing indirect threats against the Arabs have been made. However, these statements constitute, in the opinion of the observers, indicators that must not be disregarded or neglected. General Etan, the Israeli chief of staff, has pointed out in a statement to YEDI'OT AHARONOT that the eastern front (the front with Jordan and Syria) is being bolstered "in an unimaginable way." Etan has also said: An enormous military base is also being built in Tabuk, Saudi Arabia. This Saudi base is adjacent to the Port of Eilat on the Bulf of 'Aqaba. As for Jordan, it possesses Chieftain tanks which are the best kind of tanks. Jordan will also receive weapons from the Soviet Union and the Jordanian army is developing rapidly and now owns antiaircraft batteries. As for Syria, it has replaced its old tanks with Soviet T-62 and T-72 tanks and has acquired Mig-23 and Mig-25 aircraft. As for Iraq, it has doubled its army in the past 4 years. General Etan has added: All this means that what is happening on the eastern front is very serious. Therefore, there is no place at present for economizing in the Ministry of Defense budget. Israel has the ability to confront this front if Israel's army remains the stronger and the better.

On the other hand, General (Sagi), the chief of the Israeli intelligence, has said in another statement: Israel does not expect a war because instability in the Arab area generally spares it such a war. However, it must be said that "any change or any revolution that may occur in the area will act as two factors leading to war."

Naturally, Sagi has not defined the form of the change or of the revolution which, or one of which, Israel can use a pretext for war. Israel considers the evaluation of such a matter a private concern and an internal affair! This exactly is what calls for extreme caution because the experiences through which the Arab countries, especially the frontline states, have gone from 1949 until the present confirm that the issue of "security" is to the Israelis, with their various governments, the clothes hanger on which they hang the justifications for all their wars, which they call preemptive wars!

8494
CSO: 4802

LIKUD, ALINEMENT CLASH IN HISTADRUT

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Yehudit Winkler: "Struggle Between the Likud and the Alinement in the Packaging of Ideology"]

[Text] The tension which marked the preparations for the opening of the second session of the Histadrut convention dissipated yesterday, just before the beginning of the deliberations. It became evident that the Likud does not intend at this stage to carry out the threat to turn to the courts, in order to protect its status in the Histadrut institutions. "We are too late," explained MK Me'ir Cohen, one of the heads of the Likud in the Histadrut Council, the appeal to the courts will indeed take place.

The morning session of the Histadrut convention in the Hall of Culture in Tel Aviv was more than a little reminiscent of the meetings of the central committee of the Labor Party. In the first rows of the center of the hall stood the hierarchy of the Alinement; Shimon Peres, Chaim Bar-Lev, Yitzhaq Rabin, Secretary of the MAPAM Victor Shem-Tov, Gad Ya'aqovi, Yosef Takoa, and the former secretaries-general of the Histadrut Yitzhaq Ben-Aharon and Aharon Baqar. Missing from the ranks of the Likud were the members of the Knesset, including those who spent the first part of their political careers in the Histadrut, and others who sought to convince the public before the entrance of the Likud into the Histadrut that they were members of the Histadrut--that their right to vote and to be elected is anchored in this membership.

Next Year's Elections

The second session of the Histadrut convention was convened, first and foremost, for the purpose of paving the way for the holding of the elections to the Histadrut next year, and not in 1982 as the Histadrut Council had decided in the past. The change of the decision requires the approval of the convention.

Attached to this formal decision (taken during the initial states of clarification in the hierarchy of the Alinement in the Histadrut) was

another decision which authorizes the Histadrut Council to hold discussions--in order to define and to specify the rights and obligations of the factions in the Histadrut. Anyone familiar with what is happening in the Histadrut calls this decision another attempt of the Alinement to cope with the repeated efforts of the Likud in the Histadrut institutions to move the struggle outside of its confines in the courts and in the Knesset--where it is a respectable minority, albeit a minority nonetheless--to the executive committee of the Histadrut, where the Alinement enjoys a substantial majority which enables it to conduct the routine activities in the Histadrut in accordance with its viewpoint and policy.

Ideological Packaging

These practical aspects were enclosed yesterday at the convention in ideological packaging--the head of the Alinement referred to the convention as an "ideological convention" even though throughout yesterday there were only a few ideological comments. The dispute between the Alinement and the Likud has been conducted along the policy line of the present government and the policy of the former Alinement governments. The controversy which continued throughout the day was far from being one involving thinkers who represented opposing political and economic world outlooks.

The secretary general of the Histadrut MK Yeruham Meshel stated in his opening address: "It is necessary to appeal to the government, and in my opinion, the government itself should have had the sense to put its political, economic, and social policy to the public test."

Before this, Meshel greeted the Chairman of the Labor Party, MK Shimon Peres, who was present in the hall, however, he ignored the presence of MK Yitzhaq Rabin. The Likud representative Ya'aqov Shamat "stole the show" when he reminded everyone that former prime minister Yitzhaq Rabin was present in the hall. His words were greeted with the thunderous applause of those in the hall, virtually without party distinction.

MK Meshel reiterated the necessity to hold elections as soon as possible, and subsequently stated that the Histadrut must also hold a social ideological discussion and sharpen the debate, in order to accelerate the process of meeting with the public. This will enable the latter to judge the path it will choose for the conduct of the affairs of state. "The crisis is not only conjectural, it has become structural" were the words of the Histadrut secretary general. Meshel repeated the opposition of the Alinement to the compulsory arbitration law, demanded the imposition of a tax on capital gains, and for an entire hour repeated his often-expressed criticism of the economic and social policy of the present government.

Meshel Opposed To Removal of Likud

The Histadrut secretary general announced that he was opposed to the removal of the Likud from the Histadrut. However, he also stated that "we dare not have a situation in which a recognized faction seeks (outside of Histadrut) a way to overcome decisions which a democratic majority took in the Histadrut." In response to the demand of the Likud that the Workers Cooperative Association grant a cost-of-living increase of 100 percent instead of 80 percent as was specified in the wage agreement, MK Meshel said: "...this is hypocrisy not truth."

The chairman of the Likud faction, Daniel Nahmani, followed in the footsteps of the Histadrut secretary general and expanded the political dispute which could have developed on any other political rostrum, "I appeal from this rostrum to the members of the Knesset and to the head of the opposition to be faithful to the State of Israel...you are doing everything possible to bring down the government..."

In referring to the attempts to prevent the Likud from moving its struggles in the Histadrut outside its confines, he stated: "...it is our right and our obligation as an opposition, without damaging the State and the Histadrut, to struggle against everything which we see as contrary to the truth, justice, and conscience." The chairman of the Likud delegation also had an explanation as to why the hierarchy of the Histadrut was seeking to advance the elections: "The moment the Alinement believes that there are prospects for it to increase its strength in the Histadrut, it wants to bring on elections so that the Alinement will have the power to weaken the workers community. This was the situation before the Likud government. This is the situation which the Alinement wants, and I do not understand how you do not comprehend the matter...."

No Roll-Call Votes

At the beginning of the session, the majority of the convention approved the proposal of the chairman of the preparatory committee, Aharon Harel, to change the rules of the convention so that the votes would be conventional--not roll-call ones as the Likud had demanded. Also rejected was the Likud demand to include on the agenda a motion to discuss the implementation of a 100 percent cost of living increase, and the updating of the points of credit and allowances for children.

The various speakers for the Likud repeated their criticism of the heads of the Histadrut for not including an update of the points of credit and allowances in the framework agreement with the representatives of the civil service. They sought to prove by this that the upper echelon of the Histadrut is primarily concerned about the established groups in the population, on the account of those with little means and large families. Against this background, a dispute erupted on more than one occasion as to who is a more faithful representative of the workers, during which the claim was hard numerous times from the ranks of the Likud that

the convention delegates of the Alinement do not represent the workers. From the benches of the Alinement came the repeated criticism of the Likud that its primary concern has been oriented towards government.

Concerns Prove To Be Unfounded

The concerns of Aharon Harel over the distortion of the deliberation and intentional disturbances on the part of the Likud proved to be unfounded. There was one instance, which occurred slightly after noon, when the representative of the Likud, Shmuel Robert ascended the rostrum and remarked: "...everyone here speaks in the name of the worker. Who here is a worker? Whom amongst you have been workers all their lives or for many years? You have never worked in your lives. This amounts to a collection of communal workers. This is what you are.... The Likud made a serious error when it did not begin to move you, so that you would not have anything to eat.... You do not know any other language, only force.... You have created an economy of hidden unemployment in this nation, a nation of insurance agents and bookkeepers...."

The special session of the Histadrut convention yesterday was far from being an ideological convention. At best, it served as a forum for a repetitive and concentrated dispute between the Likud and the Alinement, in the well-known style of the executive committee. There was no confrontation between world outlooks.

The one-day session of the convention was primarily another political instrument in the struggle between the two large parties, on the level of trade union activists.

5830
CSO: 4805

POLL ASSESSES STRENGTH OF POLITICAL PERSONALITIES

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Jul 80 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Independent List Headed By Hurvitz Would Win Only Two Seats"]

[Text] If the Finance Minister Yigael Hurvitz would run together with MK Zalman Shoval at the head of an independent list in the Knesset elections, this list would not win more than two seats during the first half of July; in contrast with the three seats of the RAFI faction of the Likud in the present Knesset. This is apparent from the monthly public opinion poll conducted for the MONAITIN Monthly by Dr Mina Tzemah.

In light of the information that Hurvitz and Shoval are considering the possibility of establishing an independent list outside of the Likud structure, 1,219 interviewees were asked for whom they would vote "if Minister Yigael Hurvitz would leave the Likud and, together with MK Shoval, set up an independent list." It is evident from the responses that the electoral potential of such a list does not exceed 1.5 percent of the electorate, and this amounts to 2 seats: one at the expense of the Likud and one at the expense of the Alinement.

A MONAITIN poll in July tested the electoral potential of an independent list headed by Ezer Weizman. It is evident from the findings that if such a list were established, it would receive 12 seats during this month--8 of them at the expense of the Alinement and 3 at the expense of the Likud (in contrast with 16 seats in the June poll and 10 in the May poll).

The poll also examined the current potential of an additional option which has begun to be discussed in certain political circles--a partnership between Ezer Weizman and Moshe Dayan at the head of a new list. The responses of the interviewees indicate that if such a list were established it would receive (in July) 16 seats in the Knesset, 10 of them at the expense of the Alinement and 5 at the expense of the Likud.

The current election forecast for the first half of July, in comparison with the second third of June, reveals a rather stable picture. If the various lists were to run within their current structures and leadership

there would be only slight changes in their strength: the Alinement-61 seats (63 in June); the Likud-24 (25); NRP-11 (10); Agudat Yisrael-Po'alei Agudat Yisrael-6 (6); Hatehiya-3 (2); Shai-1 (1); and the other lists -14 seats.

Slight Changes

Only slight changes--all in the sample-error range--were recorded in the July poll of MONAITIN also, in the degree of popularity of the four leading candidates for prime minister. In response to the question as to which of the four--Yitzhaq Rabin, Menahem Begin, Shimon Peres, and Ezer Weizman--is most suitable for prime minister, Rabin received 35 percent of the votes (37.9 in June), Begin-22.5 percent (20.2), Peres-19.7 percent (21.1), Weizman-12.8 percent (12.3) with 10 percent abstaining (8.5). In comparison with the June poll, Weizman maintained his strength whereas Menahem Begin (who was hospitalized during the period of the poll) recovered more than half of the 3.7 percent which he lost between May and June and again passed Shimon Peres.

The general picture, however, remained unchanged: Yitzhaq Rabin continues to lead by a significant percentage, more than 55 percent ahead of the person in second place; Begin and Peres are close to one another in the popularity race, whereas Ezer Weizman continues to be last in the list without significant changes in his strength.

The stability in the relative degree of support for Rabin and Peres is reflected in the poll in an additional question. In response to the question as to which of the two is more fit to be prime minister, Rabin received 57.3 percent of the votes against 29.6 percent for Peres (in June 57.6 against 30.2). As was the case in the previous polls, Rabin continues to lead Peres in all groups--age, education, countries of origin, and voters in the various lists, including the Alinement.

The July poll, however, included for the first time a new group--the group of members of the Alinement parties, that is to say members of the Labor Party and the MAPAM. It appears that among this group, Rabin received 53.1 percent against 41.3 percent for Peres.

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LIBERAL PARTY RIGHT GAINS INFLUENCE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 Jul 80 p 9

[Article by Amnon Barzilai: "Strengthening of the Liberal Right"]

[Text] When Prime Minister Menahem Begin returned home after an extended stay in the hospital, he gave his assistants an urgent request. Begin requested immediate contact with the offices of the Tel Aviv municipality, specifically with Deputy Mayor David Shifman. In the telephone conversation, Begin congratulated Shifman on his election as the chairman of the central committee of the Liberal Party. Begin also apologized for his delay in sending his greeting because of his illness; he said that he was determined that when he returned home his first act would be to telephone him and congratulate him. Shifman, a public relations expert, told Begin that on the previous Sabbath in the synagogue, he made a MESHEBARAKH [the traditional prayer for the sick, the opening words of which are MESHEBARAKH, "He who blessed..."] for the health of the prime minister, and the entire congregation responded, "Amen."

The short conversation was conducted within the framework of the customary courtesies. However, its political significance--like Shifman's victory over Minister Gideon Patt in the contest for the chairman of the party central committee--goes well beyond the normal democratic process. Step by step, the people of the chairman of the party leadership, Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i, are capturing the dominant positions in the party. About 10 days ago, it was Shifman. This week, the candidate for victory is minister Moshe Nissim (a member of the coalition in the party headed by Moda'i) who will compete against MK Avraham Sharir for the chairmanship of the party leadership.

"The Quiet Revolution"

At the conclusion of the dramatic vote in the central committee of the party which convened in the American Zionist House and after a tense wait for the results of the vote, Gideon Patt said to the members of the central committee that he regards Shifman's victory in the vote as a great and personal achievement for he himself, in that the vote proved that

that half of the party backs him (backs Patt). The claim was designed to salvage the honor of Patt, whose personal status was always stronger than Shifman's. However, he was unable to erase "the quiet revolution" which took place among the Liberals. The Patt-Shifman struggle was indeed a personal one, however, the incisive fact is that Shifman--a hawk by the Liberal criteria--has views identical to those which represent Moda'i just as Patt is close in his positions to Simha Ehrlich. If Moshe Nissim defeats Avraham Sharir on Thursday in the central committee, Nissim will complete the hawkish triumvirate which will lead the party.

The change in the face of the Liberal Party--if Moda'i-Shifman-Nissim stand at its head (Ehrlich stands above them and has reconciled himself to the reality)--is not limited to a shift to the extreme on the political defense level only. The second development is shocking and more difficult to digest. At the head of the Liberal Party will be a religious and observant trio. Moda'i and Shifman--not to mention Nissim (the son of the former Sephardic chief rabbi)--are religious, observant, careful about eating only kosher food, do not travel on the Sabbath, and spend their Sabbaths and holidays in the synagogue. The strengthening of such a trio at the head of the Liberal Party (in contrast with the previous trio: Rimalt, Ehrlich, and Dolzin) will bring satisfaction to Begin. The quick telephone call to Shifman was an expression of Begin's political ability. The prime minister has perhaps disappointed his supporters in his abilities to govern, however, he has no peer in understanding internal politics and the analysis of party procedures. These internal developments foil a plan which has not yet died: to help the Liberals for the purpose of establishing a party of the center.

During the last year there was an increasing clamor in the Herut Movement for the dissolution of the Likud. This tendency is fed from several developments:

*The prevailing trend in public opinion polls which project a Likud defeat and its return to the opposition.

*The expected movement towards the extreme in the political-security positions of the Likud in the opposition.

*The voices of Yigael Hurvitz and Zalman Shoval in the RAFI calling for separation.

*The low regard for the leadership of the Liberal Party and its ability "to attract" votes.

*Confidence in the Herut Movement--that as an independent party it could win 15-20 seats in the Knesset.

In the Herut Movement the electoral potential of the RAFI is more highly regarded than the strength of the Liberals. Owing to Hurvitz's hawkish positions, the minister of finance is considered to be an ally of Herut. However, if he establishes an independent party--the Herut people

believe--Hurvitz will not siphon off voters from the Herut Movement or the Likud but rather from the Labor Party, especially from the old settlement. Together with Moshe Dayan who, under the Likud administration, achieved public rehabilitation (and the possibility is not ruled out that Dayan will agree to join a political movement which will bear the RAFI name), the force which will sweep away such a list (established by [text missing] rostrum), will not be insignificant.

Without Hurvitz who, together with Zalman Shoval, represents in Likud the wealthy property owners class, it will be easy for people such as David Levi to appeal to the voters and present them with a visiting card of a party which professes to help the poor and the underprivileged. The Liberals are in the category of "a bone in the throat." They are not helping David Levi improve the populist image of the Herut. Moreover, since according to the understanding in his movement, the Liberals carry no weight among the public, their representatives in the Knesset will occupy real and safe places of the Herut people. However, for those who want a dissolution of the GAHAL partnership (the Likud was established on the basis of the agreement between Herut and the Liberals), there will be a problem with "the master of the house." As long as Begin is chairman of the movement, he will not permit the partnership between himself and the Liberals headed by Simha Ehrlich to be damaged. After Ehrlich finds that he cannot attack the new coalition in his party and joins it, Begin will not permit the Liberals to be hurt in the slightest.

Bone in the Throat

The Likud has once again fallen into a trapped position. The Herut does not want to absorb the Liberals, however, it is also unable to eject them. Although Herut does not need the Liberals in order to win over those who vote for it, the severing of the bonds which tie the Liberals to Herut will move them to the center of the political map. A unique opportunity will then be created: the Liberals would, in this event, fall lie ripe fruit into the hands of Ezer Weizman, who is waiting to see the developments toward the elections to the Knesset.

Begin would not permit his major rival for the leadership of the Likud, a golden opporunity to establish a large centrist party at his expense. Those in the Herut movement who oppose the dissolution of the Likud will ultimately gain supremacy because their argument appears to be more logical. It is perhaps better to lose several seats for the good of the Liberals who will remain with them (in one pot), rather than to destroy the Liberal Party and push it to the center so that it would be a lever for the establishment of a centrist party--such a development would push the Herut back to the middle of the fifties. The changes in the leadership of the Liberals mean turning over control by democratic means to the hawks. However, this is a process which has not been completed, and even the hawks are not eager to flaunt it. In the meeting of the central committee which elected Shifman, the faction of Gideon Patt

decided "to run" Avraham Sharir for chairman of the party leadership. This position which was held by Ehrlich until the party convention was deprived of its powers with the revival of the institution of the party chairmanship, which was given to Ehrlich, and the establishment of the leadership institution--now headed by Moda'i with the election of Shifman as the chairman of the central committee.

However, in order to salvage their honor, Patt and Sharir were prepared to be satisfied with a position in the top leadership. In the deliberation which they held during the course of the meeting of the central committee, after it became known that Patt had been defeated, they decided to work for a vote of the party leadership that very day. Their consideration was tactical. Many of the coalition people had already gone home after Shifman's victory became known. Sharir had nothing to lose, and actually his prospects for defeating Nissim were rather good.

Simha Ehrlich foiled the Patt-Sharir action. He requested permission to speak, ascended the rostrum, and moved that the members of the central committee adjourn ("because of the heat and fatigue"). He suggested that the contest be held on another occasion. By a majority vote, and after the protests of the Patt and Sharir people, the members of the central committee went home. The election of Shifman was the first test of the party coalition headed by Moda'i. If Nissim is elected, it will be additional evidence of Moda'i's growing hold on the party.

The heads of the coalition now have a new trick up their sleeve. In collaboration with Simha Ehrlich and the chairman of the Liberal Workers Association Tzvi Renner, they are working on a plan to establish a nominating committee which will select the Liberal candidates for the Knesset will be selected not by secret ballots in the central committee but rather in accordance with the new relationships of the forces which are strengthening the hawkish tendencies and tightening the bond between Herut and the Liberals.

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SHELI SEEN LOSING GROUND

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 17 Jul 80 p 1

[Article by A. Kinerti: "Danger of Disintegration in SHELI"]

[Text] The crisis in SHELI worsened with the "desertion" of MK Sa'adya Marciano from the movement; following his announcement that he would not vacate his seat in the Knesset in accordance with the rotation agreement, and the negotiations which he is conducting with MK Mordekhai Algrebli on the establishment of a joint faction in the Knesset and a list for the coming elections--together with the Oded group and the Ha'ohalim movement in Jerusalem.

The SHELI institutions will apparently convene in the near future, in light of the danger of disintegration which threatens the movement. For the last two days discussions of this matter have been conducted with the participation of Me'ir Pa'il, Uri Avneri, and others; it is expected that there will be an official reaction by the institutions of SHELI to the Marciano affair. It is known that SHELI activists have been perturbed by the style of the debate between Marciano and Me'ir Pa'il, and because of the personal insults which they have exchanged.

Additional Departures Expected

SHELI is expecting the additional departures of Amnon Zikhroni, a Ha'olam Haze man and a friend of MK Avneri, who will likely joint the Labor Party and of Lova Eliav with whom Labor Party and MAPAM people have been conducting negotiations. Eliav is about to return to Israel from his sabbatical in the United States.

Also expected is the departure of a group of former MAQI members who became disenchanted with SHELI after joining it for organizational reasons--representation in the institutions, etc--and because of the position of its leaders on political issues, including relations with the PLO and contacts with PLO representatives abroad. A "pioneer" of this group who left was Yair Tzeven, who switched to MAPAM a month ago. It is known that there have been contacts by several former MAQI members with the Labor Party and MAPAM.

Marciano Wants Biton

MK Algrebli and MK Marciano are conducting intensive activity for the establishment of a joint movement which will include the Oded Movement, the Panthers from the neighborhoods and the Ha'ohalim people. Marciano wants to add his friend MK Charley Biton, a member of the HADASH [acronym for the Leftist Democratic Front] (RAKAH in the Knesset), to the Knesset faction and the proposed list. Biton's friends have said to him: "Leave RAKAH and Afghanistan and come to us."

Algrebli Wants Yitzhaqi

Yesterday, a RAKAH personality told DAVAR reporter that it can not be assumed that Biton will leave HADASH in order to join Algrebli and Marciano. In HADASH he has a free hand in an issue close to his heart, the social problems and the indigent neighborhoods. It is not impossible that Biton will appear in the HADASH list in the elections to the Tenth Knesset, this personality stated.

Algrebli is known to be working for the addition of MK Yitzhaq Yitzhaqi from the Likud to the proposed joint faction and for establishing a list to the Knesset with a "social-neighborhood platform," however, Yitzhaqi is still standing by his decision to run for the Knesset on the "One Israel" list headed by him.

Ha'ohalim Will Not Join

A DAVAR reporter on welfare matters adds:

"The Ha'ohalim Movement will not join the party established by MK's Algrebli and Marciano, however it is likely that it will collaborate with it."

A Ha'ohalim spokesman, D. Benvenisti, said yesterday that his movement welcomes the establishment of the political force which will be a preferable alternative to the parties active in Israel, however the Ha'ohalim will remain a social movement independent of any party.

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POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL CHANGE IN NATION ASSESSED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 3 Jul 80 p 13

/Article by Muhammad Ma'tuq: "Will Normal Political Life Return to Jordan? The 'Opposition' Is Not Opposing and the Government Is Closeting Itself in Ignorance"/

/Text/ It is no longer farfetched in Amman that normal political life might return, after having been repressed after the unsuccessful coup attempt 27 years ago. There are people who believe that the matter is imminent and that it might not take more than a few months.

Although no positive sign on the imminence of this possibility has yet been given by the authorities, preparations are being made by bodies and political parties to respond to a request which is expected to be made of them to play a role they have been deprived of for a long time.

Informed sources have told AL-SAFIR that there are two contradictory trends inside the Jordanian regime, one was expressed by the prime minister himself and the other embraced by some ministers, among them ones who share his desire that the "bitter party experience" not be repeated, but who do support a move toward a new experiment which will skirt the dangers of the past and respond to the need for "normal" political life in Jordan.

It is related that one of these ministers would prefer to establish a system of two parties or two political blocks in Jordan, provided that one of them constitute the ruling system and the other represent the opposition. However, this minister, who does not seem to be speaking for himself alone, stresses the need that the opposition and the loyal party alike be under the banner of the regime.

Signals about these contradictions or disputes within the regime must have reached the political parties functioning secretly under various rubrics. The course of the dispute going on within the governnent must also have inspired optimism among these parties, and they therefore determined 2 years ago to form what they called "the popular forces in Jordan," electing a secretariat general for themselves which issues statements on political developments in the Arab region.

This political grouping, which contains most of the national and progressive political parties operating in Jordan, alongside personalities well known for their nationalist positions, was formed in April 1978. One party personality in Amman insists that the notion of the grouping arose after the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in March of that year.

Representatives of the political parties held their charter meeting at that time in the headquarters of the grouping of vocational unions of Jordan, in the elegant al-Shumaysani shop, and announced a charter bearing on the grouping which did not contradict official declared positions in its general policy sections. They then demanded that the authorities permit them to function, but the latter refrained and still do not recognize the secretariat general, in spite of the intense activity it was performing.

A Media Obfuscation

Through its dominance of all the media, the government has managed to ignore the secretariat general on purpose. The statements issued in the secretariat's name have sometimes been published, but under the name of "the Committee to Save Jerusalem," which also participates in the secretariat and enjoys official recognition by the government. The secretariat tried to win some recognition by deliberately issuing statements on positions which represent support for the viewpoint of the authorities (the declared one, at least). However, the statements did not reach public opinion, other than through the parties and bodies participating in this political grouping.

Some bodies participating in the abovementioned secretariat general describe this style of the authorities as proof of the insincerity of their general policy positions. If they really rejected Camp David, as they announced in a government statement, why didn't they allow the secretariat general to publish a statement supporting their position on Camp David and bearing verbal testimony to it?

Aspiration to Power

However, to some others who participate in the secretariat general, the picture does not seem so black. These people still point out how King Husayn himself attended the declaration of the birth of the national grouping following the June 1967 defeat, in order to absorb the popular resentment which had arisen from the defeat and Israel's occupation of the West Bank. These people do not rule out recognition of the secretariat general, corresponding to a recognition of the grouping, rest in peace, which was buried in September 1970, shen specific conditions arise.

Because this possibility is not farfetched, the secretariat general is fully prepared for it, and secretariat sources expect that the king will come to it at any moment or invite it and ask it to form the new government. And so on.

Although the notion seems strange now, preparation for this desired moment is going on at full speed. The most prominent features of the preparation are two: one is emphasis on the unity of the destiny of the two peoples, the Jordanians and Palestinians, and the second is care not to have Palestinian organizations represented in the secretariat general.

Most political and party personalities which a person examining the horizons of political activity in Jordan might run into see no harm in participating in power in the context of the present regime of King Husayn, although not all have neglected to compare the political positions they declare with those of the authorities.

In any event, most of these personalities do not consider the grouping of popular forces to be an opposition movement or an opposition grouping: "There is nothing for us to oppose." This is because the situation of Jordan possesses a rare characteristic, that of a front line state surrounded by two radical regimes, in Damascus and Baghdad, whose position on peace with Israel is absolutely negative and blunt, though the Jordanian regime has been able, for a while at least, to satisfy these two regimes to a given degree without letting America or Israel think that it has burned the bridges to the field of direct negotiations.

Therefore, the regime's announced political positions do not stir up protest among national parties, although most of the time they stop at the border of words.

Relations with the Regime

In another area, most of the independent political personalities which participate in the secretariat general of the popular forces in Jordan are establishing firm ties and bonds with the regime. Some observers in Jordan wonder how there can be an "opposition" when most of the people in it are millionaires and include people who have grown rich from grants and concessions the regime itself has given them.

These observers cite examples. There is one person who owns a pier in al-'Aqabah, second, one who owns a plant with a private monopoly, then a third, fourth and fifth who own millions and have been graced with permits from the regime itself.

These observers wonder how this opposition, on which the regime is raining bounties, can be. Can it not be gleaned from this that it is an opposition tailormade to the regime's measurements?

The fact is that no one in Amman with whom AL-SAFIR met, who is considered a leader of his party, which functions in secret, enthusiastically embraced the notion that the regime will change. Some of them ignore or avoid the issue entirely. Others reply by saying that there is no alternative to this regime. There are people who say that they do not see an alternative

even within the royal family, and go on to say that everything propagated in the past about the existence of disputes, struggles and contradictory tendencies within the ruling family is only a rumor. The king is the whole authority and the others, starting with the crown prince and ending with government official, are officials without assignments, except for one, namely 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf.

'Abd-al-Hamid Shaaf himself was an opponent in the past, and was sentenced in Jordan when he assumed the position of editor in chief of the magazine AL-HURRIYAH, spokesman for the Arab Nationalists' Movement before it was liquidated. Now, however, he is the prime minister and the second person in power, entrusted with all secrets.

However, 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf is no longer the Arab nationalist militant he was by nature. He repudiated this characterization before making a reconciliation with the regime, as one of the conditions of this reconciliation.

'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf is not the only nationalist party man it was possible to assimilate into power; in fact almost more than half of every cabinet formed since 1957 has consisted of former Arab nationalists and Ba'thists. It is related that one non-government Jordanian personality once passed through Damascus in a previous era and was detained by intelligence for questioning. During the interrogation the man did not deny his strong relationship with the Jordanian regime--in fact replied by stating "Why aren't you in agreement with our Ba'thist regime in Amman?" This was because most of the members of the Jordanian cabinet at that time were former Ba'thists.

However, cooperating with opposition personalities is one thing and cooperating with opposition parties is something else. In Jordan's political history, very few cases have been recorded--and those were particular in nature--when party members of parties with a national progressive context reached the parliament and the cabinet. The first time was in the days of al-Nablusi's cabinet, where a working member of the Communist Party was elected to parliament and a working member of the Ba'th Party was included in the cabinet. The second time involved the social nationalists who were linked to King Husayn by special relations which were ruined by the party's position on the Jordan massacres of September 1970. Before that, the party managed to get two members into parliament, Ra'uf Abu Jabir and 'Abd-al-Halim al-Nimr; the second later became minister but by that time had finally left the party.

In spite of the distinctive relationship linking the Jordanian regime to them, the Moslem Brothers have remained a peripheral power in Jordan and were only once permitted to send a deputy to parliament. That was in the 1967 elections, before the Israeli occupation of the bank. At that time Yusuf al-'Azm ran successfully from Ma'an.

On the subject of the brothers, there are people who say they have eluded the grasp of the Jordanian regime and that practices they are pursuing which stir the wrath of Damascus are happening against the will of the regime. However, the phenomenon so far remains the same--that is, the brothers enjoy the greatest degree of political freedom in Amman.

The regime--and its intelligence, as has been related--know that the brothers pursue political activity and are not reducing it but are propagating their stands in mosques and institutes. Similarly, the regime knows about the activity of all political parties operating secretly in Jordan. However, according to one source in the grouping of popular forces, it is anxious to maintain a brilliant image abroad, thus only resorts to repression when it sees that a danger is being realized. This danger occurs whenever any operating party reaches a good organizational level and constitutes a force which must be constantly watched. At that point the regime acts and strikes to stifle it.

A Tendency To Crystallize

Is it now possible to expect the return of political life to Jordan in reality? It is difficult to predict the answer, although a basic condition is necessary for this, and that is that independent personalities cast a broad shadow over any grouping of popular forces so that the distinguishing features of every grouping will be obliterated and all national parties will attach themselves to them. Thus the grouping will turn into an opposition party standing on the other side of client forces, which may perhaps make up a party in the near future, as long as this remains the greatest degree of tolerance the regime can provide, and the nationalist parties can only accept or decline.

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CONFLICTING FORCES CRITICIZED FOR DISRUPTING NATION

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Jun 80 pp 1, 17

/Article by Dr George Farshakh: "In a Stormy Conversation with AL-QABAS in Paris, Raymond Iddih Draws the Map of the Partition of Lebanon!"/

/Text/ I brought a map of Lebanon along, went to Dean Raymond Iddih, spread it out in front of him and said, "Dean, the talk about Lebanon these days deals only with partition. Is partition realistic, and how?" The dean started to draw the partition map as people had presented it to him. However, he soon paused and said with obvious irritability, "No, no, I can't. It's not permissible." The pen was moving over the map, like a knife cutting into the body of a living man--not to say the body of the dean. He threw the pen down, rolled up the map and said, "Let's just talk."

The dean had prepared us a copy of a statement by "al-Jumayyil's son," as he calls him, in which al-Jumayyil the younger (Bashir) said that if the Moslems did not agree to a format then it would be better for "al-Jumayyil's son" to reach agreement with Abu 'Ammar over the partition of Lebanon. The dean said, "This is basically their scheme." During the conversation, the dean received a phone call and we heard him discussing the subject of the formation of the cabinet, then telling the person who addressed him "a cabinet of activities, indeed a cabinet of children--since Ezer Weitzmann has resigned from Begin's cabinet, why don't they ask him to form the children's cabinet in Lebanon?"

These days, it is difficult to talk with the dean. True, he is a democrat, as he says, but he cannot bear criticism of his opinions. When he gets vexed, he says, "Are you here to ask questions or to get the answers you want?" If you insist on arguing, he will threaten to increase the volume of his attack on President Hafiz al-Asad and Syria, on grounds that you will be scared.

You come out of a discussion with Dean Iddih in despair. Not even the road to partition is blocked, but has become open. The dean recognizes

that he has failed to thwart the schemes, and that they are all dwarves in Lebanon.

I ask him if he would agree to return to a partitioned Lebanon and he says "I am fighting partition, and cannot imagine that Lebanon will be partitioned."

The conversation took place in the dean's apartment in the Hotel Prince de Galles, as follows:

AL-QABAS: Where is Lebanon going?

The dean: So far, toward collapse. In Lebanon there is no state except in name, and the territory of Lebanon is occupied by Syria, Israel and the Phalange Party. Communism [he means "legitimacy"] exists in less than one quarter of a percent (o.25 percent) of the area.

AL-QABAS: And the Palestinians?

The dean: Syria and the Palestinians are the same body.

AL-QABAS: But dean, there are 20 Palestinian organizations.

The dean: I mean the Palestine Liberation Army. When the Syrian forces withdrew from some centers and barriers, to whom did they hand these positions over? To the liberation army.

AL-QABAS: How is the "occupation" broken down, in your opinion?

The dean: Eighty-five percent of the territory of Lebanon is under Syrian-Palestinian occupation, 10 percent is under the dominance of the Israeli army, that is, from the al-Litani River to the borders with Israel, and 4.75 percent is under the dictatorship of the Phalange (that is, the al-Ashrafiyah area of Beirut, half of al-Matn, Kasrawan and Jubayl). Legitimacy exists on less than one quarter of 1 percent (0.25 percent), that is, in Ba'abda Palace, the gardens around it, the al-Fayadiyah Barracks, part of al-Hadth, 'Ayn al-Rummanah and Furn al-Shabbak.

AL-QABAS: But the Syrian forces now have a legitimate presence. They are a factor in the Lebanese situation, and for us to keep repeating that they are occupation forces or legitimate forces does not add or detract anything, especially from here, from Paris.

The dean: That is your opinion. I, however, say that the Lebanese authorities are harrassed and that if you conduct a referendum among all Lebanese circles you will find that the overwhelming majority want the withdrawal of the Syrian forces. However, some Lebanese who are Christians are clinging to the Syrian army.

AL-QABAS: Let me go back to my first question: where is Lebanon going?

The dean: I said, toward collapse. I now add, I do not know. Maybe it will be partitioned, in implementation of the plan drawn up by the former American Secretary Henry Kissinger, which aims at settling 500,000 Palestinians in Lebanon.

The Partition of Lebanon Will Afflict the Arabs with a Contagious Disease

AL-QABAS: 400,000 or 500,000? There is a big difference

The dean: Who knows? Who can give you precise figures? Kissinger's plan calls for the settlement of Palestinians in the section which might then become Moslem Lebanon. Israel will take the portion lying south of the al-Litani River, once the majority of the Shiites migrate north of the al-Litani. As for Syria, the al-Biqa', 'Akkar and the town of Tripoli will be severed to compensate it for the Golan and for the fatigue it has endured in order to stop the fighting--which is still continuing--if it does not insist on putting its hands on the port of Beirut, at which point Hafiz al-Asad will become the Napoleon of the region because he will gather the transit movement to the whole Arab region in his hands.

AL-QABAS: That talk isn't serious, dean. Napoleon, enduring fatigues, transit movement--there is a big political game in the region. Will Iraq agree? Will Egypt be quiet? And so on.

The dean: That talk isn't serious? We Lebanese will never change. That is how they always answered me. What has the result been? Lebanon now is actually partitioned. Since 1974, I have been saying that there was a Kissinger plan to "Cypriotize" Lebanon and "Balkanize" the area. I tried to repel this plan by diplomatic means. So far, I have not been successful in my mission. Therefore I am directing an appeal and a warning to the Arab countries, I am telling the Arabs: come let us convince America that the interests of the region require that Lebanon survive, because, if Lebanon disappears or is partitioned, the contagious disease of partition will move to other Arab countries. The Arabs all must stand up to this plan and act to thwart this conspiracy.

There Are Partition Maps

AL-QABAS: Has anyone discussed partition with you?

The dean: I have always been in favor of a united Lebanon and against partition. Those who have held discussions with me, and stated that peaceful coexistence between Moslems and Christians could come about only through partition, have received nothing from me, and I have never agreed to their plans.

AL-QABAS: Who has held discussions with you?

The dean: There is no need to mention names. The people who have partition plans are well known.

AL-QABAS: Is there a partition map?

The dean: There are partition maps.

AL-QABAS: Could you draw them for us specifically on this map?

The dean: Of course it is possible.--After the dean started to draw the map, he threw the pen away and stated, with obvious irritability: No, I cannot continue. It's not possible. I am in a serious situation.

AL-QABAS: Where does the real danger to Lebanon come from?

The dean: From Israel. Israel wants to expand up to the al-Litani River. Were it not for the expansionist Zionist scheme, we would now be living in peace. Of course a responsibility lies on the Lebanese rulers who thought lightly of the Israeli danger, and whose rule was based on indifference to this danger; the result was that Lebanon lost its unity and its sovereignty. The Arab countries, and Syria in particular, bear great responsibility for what we have ended up with. As for the Palestinians, they came as refugees, then bore arms after the collapse of the Arab armies in 1967. They are now using the diplomatic field to acquire a country. The Palestinian people have a right to a country. This country can only be in Palestine.

AL-QABAS: Regarding what has happened in Lebanon?

The dean: I am not trying to exonerate the Palestinians for what has happened in Lebanon. However, I do hold the Lebanese authorities who signed the Cairo Agreement with them responsible for what has happened, permitting them to roam around outside the camps with arms and asking them to take charge themselves of protecting their camps, when Abu 'Ammar came and asked the Lebanese authorities to protect the Palestinian camps after the assassination of the three leaders Kamal Nasir, Kamal 'Adwan and Abu Yusuf. No Arab country has allowed the Palestinians to use its territory the way they have been permitted to use Lebanon.

The Cause of Lebanon No Longer Concerns Anyone

AL-QABAS: Do you believe that the cause of Lebanon still concerns the world?

The dean: Most sadly, I can say no. The Israeli issue is the one which concerns the world in the first place, followed by the Palestinian issue. The importance of the Palestinian issue arises from the fact that it is linked to the general situation in the oil region, which is extremely

delicate, and the fact that it offers confidence for the destiny of the Zionist state. As for Lebanon, no one is any longer concerned about it. Its rulers must travel abroad and plead the Lebanese case in Europe, America and the United Nations.

AL-QABAS: What is your personal contribution to the process of searching for a solution?

The dean: I, as a deputy, am studying what would be the optimum solution on Lebanon's behalf. I believe that the optimum solution would be to establish a nation for the Palestinians in Palestine, at which point Lebanon would relax, because, even if some of the Palestinians remained on its territory, they would have the same rights and duties that apply to every foreigner.

The Reconciliation Plan--Hypocrisy!

AL-QABAS: Have they taken your opinion on reconciliation?

The dean: No, no one has consulted with me. The reconciliation plan, as it has been set forth now, is a hypocrisy and a diversion.

AL-QABAS: Do you believe that Lebanon still enjoys its independence? What is your opinion about putting it under United Nations trusteeship? Couldn't that be the start of a solution?

The dean: First of all, what is your notion of the word "independence?" If the word independence means a state which is independent of another state by law, Lebanon is a country which is independent of Syria, Israel and the other countries in the area. If the word independence means a sovereign state, Lebanon today is an independent state but does not enjoy full sovereignty.

As regards the United Nations trusteeship, a state which is put under trusteeship is a "deficient" state, and there is no doubt that if we take the opinions of some Lebanese today who want to live in dignity and security, and who want to rid themselves of exploitation by parties, we will find that these people want to be put under a United Nations trusteeship, in spite of the fact that Article 78 of the United Nations Organization Charter states that the system of trusteeship does not apply to countries which have joined as members in the organization. I will remind you that I many times asked that foreign or mixed foreign-Arab international forces be sent to take the place of the Syrian army, provided they were under the command of the secretary general of the United Nations, and that their task be that of a force supporting the Lebanese army, so that it could collect the heavy arms in the possession of the Palestinian resistance and the militia, and protect the Palestinian camps from Israeli and other aggressions--naturally while keeping the international forces in the south to expel the Israeli army in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426.

The Maronites against the Lebanese Front

AL-QABAS: You are a Maronite leader, and you are opposed to the Lebanese Front, which claims to represent the Maronites. Does it really represent them?

The dean: The Maronites of Lebanon are spread about over all the areas of Lebanon. What is left of what is called the Lebanese Front, walled up in al-Ashrafiyah, half of al-Matn, Kasrawan and Jubayl does not represent all the Maronites at all--it does not even represent the Maronites residing in the areas which the front dominates, or, more precisely, which the fascist Nazi Phalange Party dominates. The Maronite majority turned against the Chamounite and Phalange parties because of the militia's behavior and vicissitudes in political alliances. Today they agree to the Cairo Agreement and tomorrow they will turn against it. Today they are on the side of the Palestinians and the noble guerrilla and tomorrow they will be against him. Today they resort to having the Syrian army come and tomorrow they will fight against it. Today they ally themselves with Israel and receive arms from it to protect the Christians and tomorrow they will state and declare that Israel wants to exploit the Christians and use them for its own interests. The Maronite people have become convinced that that this leadership has failed, but they cannot rid themselves of it because of the Phalangist dictatorship, because it is the only military authority present in the region. The majority of the Maronites do not want partition; they want Lebanon to regain its independence and sovereignty.

AL-QABAS: When will you return to Lebanon?

We Are All Dwarves

The dean: When it becomes in the power of the Lebanese authorities to replace the Syrian army group which is present in the Ministry of Information a few meters away from my house with a Lebanese army group. I have personally conveyed this request to the prime minister, Salim al-Huss, who said that it was an easy request. However, a week later he contacted me from Beirut through a major official in the office of the premier to inform me that he was unable to carry out this modest demand. I am not asking that to create a paralysis but for reasons related to my dignity as a Lebanese deputy and because I have been exposed to two assassination attempts within sight of this group and it did not try to intervene--perhaps because it knew about the attempts.

AL-QABAS: Are there heroes in Lebanon?

The dean: The events have proved that we are all dwarves.

AL-QABAS: But you and--

The dean: All of us in Lebanon are dwarves.

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CSO: 4802

INVOLVEMENT IN WEST AFRICAN DISPUTES REVIEWED

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 21-27 Jul 80 pp 13-14

[Article by al-Salami al-Husni: "What Happened Between the Republic of the Poet and the Jamahiriyah of the Colonel?"]

[Text] The outbreak of the dispute between Libya and Senegal, which led to the severance of relations between the two countries, is another indication of the tense situation in the area of the Arab Maghrib and the area of the Southern Sahara in Africa. Were we to accept the reasons given by the two sides for the eruption of this dispute, we would come up with nothing more than mere disagreements between two regimes which have conflicting interests. However, there is more to the matter than this, because the factors and motivations that brought the breach between Tripoli and Dakar cover a whole region, and include issues of balance of power and international conflicts.

Officially, Senegal accuses the Jamahiriyah of acting as a host for the Islamic-oriented Senegalese opposition, which is trying to overthrow the Senghor regime by armed force, and of enabling this opposition to get arms, materiel and training in Mali and northern Senegal, where the Muslim Senegalese tribes live. Libya charges Senegal with representing French interests in Africa and with implementing Paris' policy, which is delineated at the Franco-African summit every year. Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, therefore, broke relations with Dakar, and called upon France to represent Senegal in the Jamahiriyah, in line with his earlier announcement that the Jamahiriyah would sever relations with African countries maintaining close relations with France. This means that the crisis between Senegal and the Jamahiriyah falls within the context of the French-Libyan struggle in Africa.

However, when this crisis erupted, Libyan-French contacts were under way to normalize relations between the two countries, and arrange for the return of the French ambassador to Tripoli and the recognition by the French Foreign Ministry of the Libyan People's Bureau in Paris as a form of diplomatic mission. Although these contacts have had no major results,

the two sides hope to come up with permanent solutions on the political issues outstanding between the two countries, because economic relations have continued even though French-Libyan political relations had gone downhill.

French circles say that the remaining obstacle between the two countries is the situation in Chad, as they are still giving indirect support to Husayn Habre whom Libya regards, with justice, as a rebel against the legitimate authority as represented by Goukouni. The French believe that the break in Libyan-Senegalese relations was understood in Paris to be an attempt to put pressure on France to withdraw from Chad for good, and to abandon its African policy. The Libyan-Senegalese, however, also has a connection with another problem, which is still, in one way or another, helping to stir up disagreements among the countries of the Arab Maghrib. This is the Western Sahara issue, the debates on which, at the OAU [Organization of African Unity] summit in Freetown, coincided with the break in Libyan-Senegalese relations as a result of the hardline position taken by Dakar on backing Morocco. Tripoli viewed this as siding with the Moroccan plan to resolve the Western Sahara issue. In fact, the Libyan-Senegalese disputes do not arise only from the reasons we have already mentioned. These are merely factors which expedited the emergence and escalation of these disputes to the point of breaking off relations.

The essence of the dispute goes back to the Libyan thrusts toward the area of West Africa, particularly Mauritania, Mali and the Western Sahara, which, Senegalese sources allege, are primarily military thrusts. Official Senegalese circles have leaked a report to French papers that Libya has built a secret military airbase north of Mali that could be used by Senegalese teams in lightning strikes against government institutions in Senegal. Also, the deteriorating French-Mauritanian relations on the one hand, and the emergence of the Libyan presence in Noakchott, particularly economically, have made Dakar perceive a direct threat to what it calls its vital surroundings north of the Senegal River. Since the coup against Ould Dada in 1978, Senghor has threatened several times to annex this area, if the new Mauritanian authorities launched a campaign to Arabize the country.

Since the Military Committee for National Salvation in Mauritanian assumed power, the issue of the northern Senegal River has become a candidate for turning into an international issue, similar to the Western Sahara issue, particularly after Senghor's government hosted a group of opponents to the government of Ould Haidalla in Nouakchott. Dakar intends to push this group to announce a government in exile on the pattern of the Saharan government of the Polisario Front.

To the Jamahiriyah, which is now taking a greater interest in the issues of the Arab Maghrib since the breakup of the Confederation of Arab Republics and the switch of al-Sadat's Egypt toward Washington, this means that its policy in the area is now threatened, particularly since some have

begun to talk about the possibility of Algerian flexibility in dealing with the Western Sahara issue. Consequently, the Jamahiriyah would find itself facing a whole set of unpropitious conditions and climates in the area of the Arab Magrib and south of the Sahara. Therefore, Senegal appeared to be a weak link in the interface of these conditions that could be curbed and threatened with collapse by blocking it from engaging in any activity outside its borders.

Coming Developments

It does not appear that the crisis between the Jamahiriyah and Senegal will end with the severance of diplomatic relations, not only as a result of the probable start in Moroccan-Algerian negotiations about the Western Sahara or, at least, Algerian caution toward Polisario activity, but as a result of reports about Libyan help in forming a federation between Western Sahara and Mauritania, extending to northern Senegal and possibly including some parts of Mali. Completion of this project, which now constitutes the subject of discussions by political circles in Paris, depends not only on the willingness of the parties concerned, that is, Nouakchott and the Polisario Front, but on the blessing of other quarters concerned, such as Algeria and Morocco, and on the extent to which there is annexation of districts in both Senegal and Mali (Dagana and Matam in Senegal and [Khasaw?] in Mali), areas which include tribes similar to, if not related to the tribes of Western Sahara and Mauritania and the Tauregs of southern Algeria.

One thing conducive to completion of this plan is the fact that the tribes concerned do not recognize established borders, since they are nomadic tribes that wander across the desert, preserving their own tribal organization. This would make it easy to include them by mere agreement of their shaykhs under the banner of Islam.

The obstacles to this plan are many; most importantly the fact that some of the tribes still swear loyalty to the monarchy in Morocco and others live most of the time on Algerian soil, while the tribes of northern Senegal have begun to turn to agrarian sedentary life. Have governments, including Algeria, adopted such an Islamic Sahara Federation project? That is the question.

In any case, the crisis which began between the republic of the poet, Senghor, and the Jamahiriyah of Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, is not one of limited dimensions. Rather, it covers the whole area of West Africa. Therefore, its consequences will begin to emerge in the near future: either a Western negotiated solution will be accomplished for the Western Sahara issue, or there will be involvement in preparing the plan for an Islamic Sahara Federation. Between this possibility and that one, the quarrels will continue with accompanying benefits for the big powers, particularly France, which still feels that its African interests are not seriously threatened.

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CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

NEW BOOK ON JAMAHIRIYA--Moscow, 15 Ramadan-27 July (JAMAHIRIYA NEWS AGENCY). A new work has just been published in the Soviet Union by the House of Science. It concerns the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, under the title "Libya On The Path Of Independence, Of Social Progress," and was written by the Soviet writer Sorine Tomassian. The author treats, in the first part, there are 11 parts, the (Djihad) combat of the Libyan Arab people against Italian colonialism and the period of so-called independence at the time of the restored monarchy. Then the author analyzes the circumstances of the great revolution of the fateh and describes the situation at the time when Libya was under the yoke of the American and British colonial bases and of the multinationals, which pillaged the petroleum resources of the country. The writer devotes several parts of his book to the power of the people in the Jamahiriya, of which he speaks knowledgeably since he served as ambassador to Libya. The writer analyzes the gigantic achievements of the grand revolution of 1 September over the past decade. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRIYA-PRESSE in French 27 Jul 80] 8956

IRANIAN NEWSPAPER COMMENTS ON JAMAHIRIYA--Tripoli 8 Ramadan-20 July (JAMAHIRIYA NEWS AGENCY). In the series of articles that it is publishing on the Jamahiriya, the Iranian newspaper AZKIKAN praised the experiments of the Jamahiriya in the creation of people's markets in all the regions of the Jamahiriya, which are considered to be the best way to fight the high cost of living and the monopolies and to put an end to the society of exploitation and domination. The newspaper also recalled that the Libyans had suffered very much from the monopolies and dealers who dominated the markets where they sold merchandise at excessive prices for quick profits. In its report, the newspaper has in addition drawn up a comparison between the prices in the people's markets and those which existed in the public markets. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRIYA-PRESSE in French 21 Jul 80] 8956

SUPPORT FOR JAMAHIRIYA--Beirut, 12 Ramadan-24 July (JAMAHIRIYA NEWS AGENCY). The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has affirmed its support of an aggression on the part of the Egyptian president against the Arab people of Libya. The Front has also expressed the esteem in which it holds the grand revolution of 1 September, its courageous positions and its accomplishments in favor of the liberation of Palestine and of the occupied Arab

territories. That is the essence of a communique released yesterday in Beirut, following the visit of a delegation of the Front to the Jamahiriya between 14 and 17 July. According to this communique, the delegation of the Front has had a number of meetings with the brothers in the Jamihiriya. Following these meetings, which took place between the General Union of Students of the Jamahiriya and the Student Bureau of the Front, the two parties affirmed their strong desire to pursue cooperation in the student domain. They agreed to coordinate and exchange their points of view on the problem of student employment in the Arab fatherland, or elsewhere, and to work in common toward that goal. The communique affirmed that the Palestinian armed revolution is pursuing its efforts to liberate the land of Palestine, in order to contribute to the rising up of the masses in the occupied territory, to concretize the solidarity of the Palestinian revolution with the national movement in southern Lebanon and to halt the projects for settlement which aim only at stifling the revolution and at destroying the national identity of the Palestinian people. [Text] [Paris BULLETIN QUOTIDIEN DE L'AGENCE JAMAHIRIYA-PRESSE in French 24 Jul 80] 8956

CSO: 4800

MINISTER NOTES GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS TO ALLEVIATE FOOD SHORTAGE

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 18 Jul 80 p 3

[Interview with Mohamed Ould Amar, minister of rural development--date and place not given]

> [Text] In an interview that he granted the AMP [Malagasy Press Agency], Mr Mohamed Ould Amar, minister of rural development, talked about all aspects of the country's policy in the rural sector.
>
> This policy, the minister said, makes our country's food self sufficiency a fundamental concern.
>
> The land problem and the return of our people to their homelands were touched on by the minister who pointed out that the goal of our country's agricultural policy is to make it possible for our people to lead a decent and harmonious life.

[Question] Mr Minister, since the advent of the movement of 10 July, the priority in the rural sector has gradually been becoming a reality. Among the goals to be achieved in this plan, food self sufficiency occupies a high place. Can we find out the results obtained in this area?

[Answer] Our country's food self sufficiency is indeed one of the government's basic concerns. Our dependency on imports and donations of food products, especially grain, has become, owing to the persistence of the drought, very disturbing: our national production still scarcely covers 20 percent of our needs.

Steps have of course been taken to ensure the country's food security in time of climatic-agricultural distress, with among other things, the establishment of the food assistance commissariat; but the basic problem remains: i.e., the development of our productive capacity.

Hence we have firmly oriented our policy in this direction and the achievements have followed: a campaign to promote and expand market-garden crops and projects inaugurated and guided, particularly in arid areas like Lejoua in Inchiri or N'Beika in Tagant; dams have been repaired or built, for example, in the severely tested region of Tamchekett; the agricultural services have embarked on basis programs in favor of dry crops, which still represent a primary part of our production, in spite of the unpredictable and freakish nature of our climate. Moreover it is in order to shake off this climatic insecurity that we are devoting all our efforts to acquiring the management of water and developing the irrigated areas that are vital to our food self sufficiency. This is a struggle that promises to be long and difficult but whose implementation will be undertaken during the next plan. Let's mention only black Gorgol and Aftout-Es-Sahel, the financing for which is in progress, to justify a measure of confidence in the future.

[Question] With the appearance of the drought phenomenon and to a certain extent with the modernization of farming, the land problem poses itself again with acuteness. Solving it, on the one hand, will facilitate achieving food self sufficiency and, on the other hand, will condition the success of the rural development strategy in our country.

Mr Minister, what are you contemplating to solve this ticklish problem?

[Answer] It is true that the land issue has become acute and everyone must realize the difficulties that we are encountering in this ticklish area.

The pilot "ease" of Gorgol is still suffering from the insolvency of our modern legislation in the land area and from its insuitability for allowing the settlement of issues that arise during the development of lands and of their improvement. This example shows how urgent it is that the state undertake a decisive investigation of this question to attain development's real socio-economic objectives.

While waiting for such legislation, we have studied solutions among which, we are sure, the landowners, the non-owner farmers, and the government will find the one that will restore vitality to this "ease" of Gorgol, which has proved itself worthy by its exceptional productive capacity. This first Mauritanian installation in the area of managing water should become the jewel of our irrigated farming.

[Question] Question on the management of water and the protection of the environment: These are two closely linked problems and they constitute two important parts in conjunction with the accomplishment of food self sufficiency. Can you tell us, Mr Minister, your specific achievements in these areas?

[Answer] As you say, these issues of the management of water and protection of the environment are closely linked, and each of them is an element in our policy to return the inhabitants to the land with a view to agricultural production.

The vicious circle formed by desert encroachment, the decrease in production, and the rural exodus has established itself and we have to break it in several places.

This is the reason that we recently sponsored a seminar on desert encroachment in which numerous countries that are friendly to us and several international or regional organizations participated. Our battle plan against this scourge was defined at this time and we are determined to carry it out with international cooperation but above all with the help of the inhabitants concerned who have become cruelly aware of the threat that weighs on them. Direct action has been carried out to enlarge the network of fire screens, to set up reforesting nurseries; increased surveillance of forests and the merciless suppression of improper or illegal cuts are on the agenda.

A national tree day will be celebrated in August that will symbolize our collective desire to recover the land abandoned to the desert.

As a result of this policy, rural inhabitants will have less precarious living conditions and a more favorable environment for traditional life and work at their disposal.

This is where water comes in, a vital factor and one that we not only need to find more of but we need to manage parsimoniously since it is as precious and as expensive as it is.

We have undertaken numerous activities as a prelude to the implementation of a bold water policy: the planning of the use of water is under study, the hydrometerological system is being expanded, the research of methods to use solar and eolian energy has gotten off to a start.

Finally the mobilization of water resources and the management of water constitute the primary goals of the hydraulic and rural engineering departments and SONADER [National Rural Development Company]. The achievements are far from being insignificant. The getting under way of 26 drillings, the construction and the repairing of 139 wells, the installation of two solar pumps, the laying of more than 40 kms of pipe to carry water from our capital overburdened by the influx of rural populations, the construction of four dams that will make it possible to farm more than 400 hectares of grain crops at N'Beika, the 10 irrigated hectares of Lejoua that I have already mentioned, and this list is far from being exhaustive.

All these projects are encouraging but still greatly inadequate. Development activities should be integrated and should be concerned with all the socio-economic aspects of the problem posed; its cost is therefore still very high.

This is being tested in all the areas of the rural sector, whether it is a question of farming, hydraulics, or animal husbandry; this is the reason that indepth studies are being undertaken on this sector and its potentialities

that will make it possible to better plan our rural development and integrate as much as possible the social, ecological, and economic factors, the links among which we have raised. Thus it is an important step towards the working out of solutions to our problems and towards food self sufficiency in particular.

[Question] Mr Minister, what results have been obtained in the campaign launched a year ago to protect the livestock?

[Answer] It is important first of all to review in a few words the extremely difficult conditions that presided over this protection campaign, the results of which you are asking me about now.

In order to do this, let's go back in time a little. The year 1979 was characterized by a sizable rainfall shortage. This did not fail to occasion a very large shortage in grazing land in the whole animal husbandry area of our country. This fact resulted, at the livestock level and particularly with regard to cattle, in undernourishment and a resurfacing of the contagious and food-deficiency diseases, which as early as the month of April began carrying off animals.

Faced with this situation that grew worse day by day, my department launched the program you are alluding to and the goal of which was:

--to distribute free cattle feed to animals in the disaster-struck areas.

--supply water to the areas that had grazing land that was not being used because of the lack of water.

--to strengthen the sanitary condition of the livestock by deparasiting and, if necessary, vaccinating.

Concerning the results themselves of the campaign, it is important that you realize that:

--2,300 tons of cattle feed were distributed free.

--some 200 to 300,000 head of livestock in the area of Kaedi-Maghama alone benefited from a regular procurement of water. At this level the results were highly positive, sizable quantities of milk at low deposits in May were collected daily by the cattle raisers.

On the sanitation level, close to 100,000 animals were affected by deparasiting and vaccination programs. These programs proved to be very highly effective because no outbreaks of the disease appeared during the whole period of the campaign.

A sharp fall in conjunction with this would certainly lead to fresh outbreaks of certain diseases well known to our cattle raisers. To summarize, I'd say that the principal outcome of this campaign has been the strong reduction in the number of fatalities noted in all animal husbandry areas of our country.

[Question] Where are we, Mr Minister, in the implementation of the policy that seeks to encourage investments in agro-pastoral enterprises?

[Answer] As you know, new investment laws have been promoted [sic], with the intent to promoting, in particular, investments in agro-pastoral enterprises. They have considerable importance and we are studying several projects on tomatoes. However these laws are very recent and their practical application in the rural sector involves only a few files submitted to the investment committee in the area of chicken raising for example.

However we intend to widely promote the private sector with a view to developing our agro-industry and to give the most attention to these new laws so that our farming and animal husbandry benefit as much as possible for the sake of the whole country. Private capital is indeed vital to our rural development and everything must be done to encourage investments in the rural sector. The needs certainly are considerable, taking into account the costs of development, factories, equipment, and the weakness of our present infrastructure; it is inconceivable that the government can assume the necessary program on public funds and it is therefore crucial to attract Mauritanian and foreign capital.

Our whole policy, you have seen, seeks to make it possible for the nation and its citizens to live decently and in harmony with the habits, the environment that are the foundation of our traditional culture. Hence it is a question of the fact that our people reoccupy the land that they abandoned, pushed by the need to find the food and work that the drought had deprived them of.

So it is obvious that our campaign against desert encroachment and for the management of water is, in itself, one of the most important sections in the struggle against the rural exodus; it alone makes it possible to restore a tool for production and a receptive land to the inhabitants, and it is the condition even for agricultural production and the settlement of the people.

All this is accompanied by parallel steps within the scope of a development policy rethought in light of the drought's catastrophic effects felt by the whole community.

As a result, the notion of projects has changed, as well as their method of utilization and people are applying themselves to integrating all the aspects of social day-to-day living, whether it be education, health, or communications. The 36 drillings are an example: people provided for, in addition to draining equipment, drinking-troughs for the livestock, the need to water

gardens, and boundary cisterns for communities. Black Gorgol will be another place where a complete socio-cultural infrastructure to meet the needs of a village community will be provided for. The administrative plan, drawn up for Tagant, is another one where all the constraints that are a burden on a harmonious regional development have been taken into account.

I feel that in this way, we are on the right path and that the trend will soon be reversed, as a result of the return of our farmers to their better protected lands and of our cattle raisers to better developed and more dependable community pastures. This is our aspiration.

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CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

HEAVY LOSSES OF CATTLE--Nouakchott, 9 Sep (AFP)--More than 70 percent of the cattle in eastern and central Mauritania have died because the rains were late and sparse this year, Rural Development Minister Mohamed Ould Amar said in a newspaper interview published here. Mr Ould Amar told the DAILY CHAAB that the government had begun buying up cattle from the hardest-hit regions in a bid to preserve the herds. He said that precipitation was only 40 percent of normal in certain agricultural regions during July, and he added that a short rainy season will be disastrous for cattle because their forage will not have finished its growth cycle before the hot season begin in October. In 1979, Mauritania was one of the countries worst affected by drought in the Subsaharan Sahel belt. The country's grain deficit was 75,000 tons, most of which was made up by other countries and international organizations. [Text] [AB091630 Paris AFP in English 1547 GMT 9 Sep 80]

CSO: 4420

PRESIDENT INTERVIEWED ON DOMESTIC, REGIONAL ISSUES

Algiers EL-DJEICH in French Jul 80 pp 29-32

[Interview with President Ali Nasser Mohammed, in Aden, by Hacene Baadji; translated from the Arabic by H. Timsiline--date not given]

[Text] In the context of his reporting on the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen [PDRY], our reporter Hacene Baadji took advantage of his presence in Aden to interview President Ali Nasser Mohamed, secretary of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party [YSP], president of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Council, and prime minister of the PDRY.

The interview ranged over several questions of great interest relative to Yemen, the Arab world, and the rest of the world.

And here is the translation in full.

[Question] The Yemeni Socialist Party has set several goals to attain, among which is elevation of the economic-social level of the Yemeni people as a whole. How far has this come, so far? And how much emphasis is placed in the second Five-Year Plan on utilization of local resources? Finally, what part will foreign technical assistance play in the execution of this plan.

[Answer] The YSP, as the program of the democratic national revolution, decreed by the first party congress, stipulates, envisions the development of the various sectors of the national economy and the improvement of the material and spiritual conditions of existence of the laboring masses. Also, during recent years, and after the regaining of independence, we have centered out efforts and our potential, as well as the militancy of the masses, on the basic goal of liquidating the after-affects of economic and social underdevelopment we inherited from British colonialism.... This has led to some revolutionary transformations in this area.

We can say in particular that implementation of agrarian reform, nationalization of capitalist companies and institutions run by foreigners and the local comprador bourgeois as well, the creation of a state sector, a cooperative sector, and a mixed sector, have allowed us to mobilize our resources and use them for this economic development.

If it be true that Democratic Yemen does not abound in natural wealth, and that it has recourse to foreign assistance, it is no less true that the remarkable projects that have been achieved command respect.

Beyond this it is necessary to say that despite the plots and maneuvers of all kinds, and also the economic blockade, as well as direct and veiled pressure, we have been able to carry out plans for construction of dozens of factories, roads, complete agricultural projects and build hundreds of schools, hospitals, and health units.

All this is testimony to the path [we have] followed toward improving the living conditions of the citizens. The YSP has succeeded in orienting the people toward achieving the two economic development plans. In the same way as it continues to work toward realization of the second Five-Year Plan.

We can say that the investments in the second plan will make possible the bringing about of the best conditions for guaranteeing national economic advancement and the improvement of the social conditions of the people.... To bring such delicate missions to a successful end, our vanguard party, the enlightened guide of the people, is based on rigorously scientific planning. Just as it calls for the best possible utilization of local resources and also foreign assistance, which we consider an important factor in the execution of programs of economic development.

[Question] Forces hostile to the Yemeni revolution are presently inspiring a tendentious campaign in the press whose goal is to discredit and cast suspicion on the treaty of friendship and cooperation between Democratic Yemen and the Soviet Union.

These press campaigns have even gone so far as to claim that in Yemen there exist serious divergences of opinion between the party and the state. What do you say to this?

[Answer] Imperialist-reactionary forces will never cease mounting such campaigns of denigration and lying insinuations against the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the Yemeni and Soviet peoples, which was signed last October.

Just as these forces will never stop mounting similar campaigns against any country maintaining friendly and cooperative relations with the Soviet Union.

What is the true nature of these forces which are deeply hostile to moral principles and values, such as friendship, peace, and social progress, and which try by all [possible] means to prevent such relations from being established? World imperialism is trying, through tendentious and criminal scheming against the USSR and [against our] friendship with its people, to keep young nations, the newly independent countries, within the orbit of its strategy, in order to use them in the ferocious struggle it is waging against international socialism. Naturally we, in Democratic Yemen, are proud of the friendship which binds us to the Soviet people, for it rests on principles and a basis of equality, mutual respect, and non-exploitation. Just a it contributes to the establishment of peace in the world and aims for the well-being of our two peoples.

Yemeni-Soviet friendship is not a new thing. It is the continuation of the relations of friendship and cooperation already enshrined in the treaty signed between our two peoples in 1928. Isn't this a proof that our friendship has withstood the test of time with flying colors? Once again I would like to say that our friendship with the Soviet people cannot be shaken by slanderous campaigns nourished by imperialism. It is also a friendship which responds to the logic of the revolutionary age which is converging toward socialism, peace, and understanding between peoples. This same logic will eradicate the vestiges of phenomena we see every day: wars, colonialism, aggression, and exploitation. All these phenomena are faces of world imperialism, which never extends friendship except at the price of the subjection of the people.

The allegations from these forces as to divergencies between the state and the party need no response for the simple reason that in Democratic Yemen the party and the state cannot be in contradiction; rather, they are two inseparable aspects of the revolutionary work. It was in this spirit that the treaty of friendship and cooperation between Yemen and the Soviet Union was concluded, at the directive of our party and at the insistence of the president of the People's Superior Council."

[Question] The Socialist Party of Democratic Yemen reaffirms that the achievement of a united Yemen is one of the greatest and noblest objectives, intimately bound up with the interests and evolution of the Yemeni people. How is the work of the mixed commissions coming, and just how optimistic are you as to the future of unification? Also, are there obstacles which could retard the advent of the merger between Aden and San'a' into a united Yemeni state?

[Answer] Achievement of the democratic unification of Yemen remains the fundamental task, and one of the noblest for which our Yemeni socialist party and all Yemeni patriots work. For the prolongation of the state of division, and the dispersion of the capacities and potentialities of Yemen only delay the process of development of the Yemeni revolution.

Besides, the achievement of unity will provide our country with human and material possibilities of considerable size, permitting it to go forward on the road of social progress. However, the imperialist and

reactionary forces take a dim view of the unity of our peoples. Also, they are fomenting all kinds of plots to thwart such a design and maintain instability.

Nevertheless, despite the plots and scheming the two parts of Yemen are firmly determined to reach this unity. Their optimism about its future is great, for it answers to the logic of history and to the will of our Yemeni people. And despite the obstacles our enemies prepare and the plots they weave, they cannot indefinitely delay the advent of unity.

In this sense, the world of the unity commissions is going ahead and is well on the road to achieving their goals and overcoming the problems with which they are confronted.

This is being done in continual coordination with brother Col Ali Abdellah Salah, president of the Yemen Arab Republic.

The next visit that we will undertake to San'a', historic capital of the Yemeni people, will be the occasion for working out together the modalities of further coordination between the leadership of the two parties. Just as it will provide an opportunity to review the results of the work of the unity commissions as well as to pursue and complete pending work.

[Question] Imperialist-reactionary conspiracies are being hatched against the Arab nation both in the Arab East and the Maghreb. They are materialized in particular by the defeatist and capitulationist position of the Cairo regime in the Middle East and that of the puppet monarchist regime of the Naghreb. What do you think are the most effective methods for isolating and encircling these two regimes, especially in light of the growing strength of the firmness front and the positive results recorded at the Fifth Conference, especially with its recognition for the first time of the POLISARIO Front as the unique legitimate representative of the Saharan people?

[Answer] Never since the onset of the Arab nation's struggle for liberation has it encountered a situation as dangerous as the one through which it is passing today.... In reality, both in the Arab East and in the Maghreb, world imperialism, and more especially U.S. imperialism, is conspiring overtly against the Arab peoples and attacking their dignity.... Plundering her wealth, the income form which it invests to the benefit of the Zionist enemy. This same money is used to break the Arab liberation movements. What could be more shameful and more grievous for the Arabs than that imperialism should receive the support, the blessings, and the encouragement of reactionary Arab powers such as the regimes in place in Cairo and Oman?

Some of these reactionary forces in collusion with the American imperialist policy are maintaining a total silence about its hostile policy toward our Arab nation.

These puppet governments refrain from denoucning all these plots being concocted, but rather loudly proclaim the friendship which ties them to the imperialist forces, even though U.S. imperialism be Israel's unconditional ally.

In our opinion, too, there is no other way to bring down the Camp David accords than to strengthen inter-Arab, anti-imperialist, and anti-reactionary solidarity.

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of opposition to the Camp David plan we see the urgent need to undertake practical steps translating words, decisions, resolutions [into action] in such a way as to put an end to the cherished designs of the Camp David accords.

[Question] If the member countries of the Steadfastness and Resistance Front have thrown all their forces into the evolutionary battle, energetically fighting the illicit Camp David accords and the Zionist enemy, the remaining Arab countries, by contrast, continue to adopted an overly moderate position. What role do you think these countries should play, and more precisely those that have a political and economic weapon such as oil?

[Answer] The parties present at the Camp David summit are carrying out their plan. And it is our duty, in the framework of Arab solidarity and the Steadfastness and Resistance Front, to answer these attacks forcefully. To do that we must make use of all our weapons, which are numerous and decisive, and in the first place the oil weapon and Arab assets in the imperialist banks. Beyond that we must use our relations with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries as a strategic weapon.

[Question] On the pretext of watching out for peace and stability in the region, the American fleet is cruising off the Arab Gulf and in the Indian Ocean. This constitutes a threat to the Yemeni revolution, especially in light of Oman's agreement to provide the United States full military presence in the region? Also, what is the capability of the Yemeni people's defense in the event of a foreign attack against our country?

[Answer] Their allegations are well-known and unfounded. The presence of the American fleet in the Arab Gulf and the Indian Ocean threatens the security, stability, and sovereignty of the peoples of all the region. So of course it directly threatens the Yemeni revolution. Also, one should say that those who are already placing bets on the future development of Democratic Yemen and are prediciting less of a future for it, or who are still placing their hopes on the American military presence, are only ensnaring themselves in illusion. For Democratic Yemen has the capacity to defend itself and has the means necessary to protect the inviolability of its borders and to safeguard its sovereignty, as also it will not be alone should it be exposed to eventual foreign aggression.

All supporters of justice, peace, and sovereignty will rise up with it. It is also of interest to all the countries bordering on the [Gulf and the Indian] ocean that peace and stability should prevail in this region, and that there should be a stop to the establishment of military bases and the provision of military facilities as the regime in power in Oman is doing. This is the kind of thing that further complicates things and could plunge the region into the orbit of conflicts, crises, and tensions that threaten world peace. Besides, American imperialism is saying for all who are willing to listen that the Soviet Union is trying to bring the region into its sphere of influence and that it has designs on its oil. These are nothing but chimeras and false charges, a record that has been played over a thousand times.

Nevertheless, the peoples of the region are aware that the USSR is the richest nation in the world in terms of oil resources, and because of this fact it has no pretensions of this kind.

From another angle, the U.S.A., which consumes enormous quantities of this resource obtained from our region, is working to maintain its military presence, thus threatening the national independence of the peoples of the region.

[Question] Yemen is committee to certain principles such as supporting national liberation movements. In connection with this, what aid do you give to Arab liberation movements, on the one hand, and to other liberation movements around the world, on the other?

[Answer] This is a position of principle which characterizes our revolution. We are in favor of the legitimate struggle of peoples who are aspiring toward their national independence. As you know, our people lived through the horrors of colonization and the plundering of our liberty. When they committed themselves to the path of struggle for recovery of their independence, they enjoyed the sympathy of revolutionary forces around the world, as well as their support. Thus it is natural that our people, who have acquired their liberty, stand today shoulder to shoulder with the national liberation movements which are struggling to free their peoples from the colonial yoke and imperialist domination. Thus, we stood resolutely at the side of the Vietnamese people attacked by American imperialism. Just as we supported the peoples of Southeast Asia, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, Zimbabwe, Nicaragua, and Iran....

We will continue to give our support to the Saharan people under the direction of the POLISARIO Front and to the people of OMAN under the leadership of the popular front (PFLO). We are also giving all possible aid to the struggle of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO. Naturally our aid to national liberation movements is in proportion to our means, for we are a small country with modest resources."

[Question] Based on the party organizational experience of Democratic Yemen, what is the place of the party and its role in the economic,

social, and political life of the country? And how solid are the relations linking the Yemeni Socialist Party to the FLN Party in Algeria? Also what arethe prospects for improvement and strengthening of these relations?

[Answer] We have had a very rich and continuous experience. It was begun at the time when we undertook the organization of the people's vanguard forces to enter the struggle against the occupying power.

After independence and more precisely after 22 June, 1969, we worked to improve our partisan movement. Organization on a production sector basis replaced organization on a geographic basis. And we created the college of scientific socialism in order to be able to recycle and educate militants in accordance with the ideas and the principles of the theory of scientific socialism. At the same time, the various branches of the national movement launched the debate on singleness of political organization. This enterprise was crowned with success at the Unification Congress of October 1975. This was a step forward toward the establishment of a vanguard party. In October 1978, the first party congress went into session, declaring the birth of the YSP. We can say that the YSP truly constitutes a fighting vanguard actualizing the people's struggle for social progress.

The YSP's role is becoming larger and larger, in its leadership functions, in the ranks of the workers and of the laboring masses. It defines the directions and the axes of economic and social development. In the light of the latter, the YSP guides the people toward the concretization of its policy to promote better life, both materially and spiritually.

Our party is working to consolidate its ties with revolutionary parties, both in the Arab and outside world. In this connection, relations between YSP (Yemen) [and] FLN (Algeria) have been made even closer, through the exchange of delegations. Which led to the acquisition of experience for both sides concerning the organization of the party in the two fraternal countries. There are far-reaching prospects for these ties, and we are convinced that we are going forward in this direction, for our two parties are the bearers of revolutionary and progressive values, and are shoulder to shoulder in the anti-imperialist and anti-reactionary struggle, and they are militating for social progress and socialism.

[Question] Mister President, you recently paid visits to several fraternal and friendly countries. What have you learned and what positive results have you brought back from your trip? What are the benefits for the two parties of these respective visits?

[Answer] I recently visited Syria and the Soviet Union. In Syria we had fruitful discussions with our brother President Hafiz al-Assad. They resulted in further deepening the friendly and fraternal relations between the Syrian and Yemeni peoples and made possible the delineation of a plan for common action within the Firmness Front so as to increase the effectiveness of the front and to strengthen Arab solidarity in

opposition to the Camp David plan and the conspiracies hatched by American imperialism and in the confrontation with the Zionist occupying power.

In the Soviet Union the discussions we had with Comrade Brezhnev and all the Soviet leaders took place in an atmosphere of sincere friendship.

They covered all the questions of common and general interest. These discussions were crowned with immense success. We can say, further, that this visit enabled friendly Soviet-Arab relations to become even closer. Just as it enlarged the field of cooperation between the Yemeni and Soviet peoples.

The aid which the latter will bring to our country, in accordance with the new agreements, and which will permit the Yemeni economy to make a fresh start on new basis, is testimony to the friendship which exists between our two peoples and two countries.

[Question] Certain newspapers in Beirut and the Gulf have spread the news that certain changes are imminent in the leadership of the party and the government. How much credence can one give these stories? If it is true, how do you explain these changes?

[Answer] In truth this is nothing but deceitful information exuded by sources known for their hostility to the Yemeni revolution. They are without foundation. What has been written on the subject of the supposed intention of the party to effect certain changes in the leadership posts is absolutely false. Moreover, there would be no justification for such a move. At any rate we understand the motives of this publicity hostile to our country. Their designs are clear...to deceive public opinion, both in the Arab world and internationally, by making them believe that instability reigns in our country.

Let me tell you that the news published by this insinuating press does not interest us anymore. For we are sure we are on the right road, and the confidence our people place in us is enough. All attempts at political sabotage and all the hostility of this press only reinforces our conviction and our vigilance.

[Question] What are the implications of the visit that President Chadli Bendjedid recently made to the PDRY on the fraternal relations existing between the two countries? Also, are you yourself contemplating a visit to Algeria soon?

[Question] President Chadli Bendjedid's visit is a revealing sign of the improvement of Yemeni-Algerian bilateral relations. Just as it was an opportunity for our two governments to study a certain number of questions of common interest. We came to an understanding on several important points such as strengthening the effectiveness of the Steadfastness and Resistance Front and the reconsolidation of the unity of progressive Arab regimes, in order that they can play a more preponderant role in support of Arab liberation movements and most especially the

Palestinian revolution, in order to permit the national liberation movements and the progressive Arab forces better to meet the imperialist-Zionist and reactionary conspiracies. We also reached agreement on the question of development and extension of the field of cooperation bilaterally between Yemen and Algeria.

The fruitful results of the visit of our brother President Chadli Bendjedid underline the importance of exchanges of visits and meetings between our two political leaderships. For, in face of the constant scheming of reactionary forces, it is imperative to strengthen the unity of national and progressive Arab forces. I must express here my relief and my serinite [translation unknown] at the positive results which marked the visit of our brother President Chadli Bendjedid. Here in Democratic Yemen we consider Algeria as the dearest and surest friend. As we stand fast in the consolidation of our relations with the fraternal Algerian people. Because of this it is with great joy that I will pay a visit to Algeria.

[Question] Mr President, what message do you send to the Algerian people by means of our publication?

[Answer] I am pleased to transmit by means of your publication my highest militant salutations to the fraternal Algerian people and to the National Liberation Front Party of Algeria, on behalf of our people and of the Yemeni Socialist Party. Similarly, we express to them our deep confidence in the strengthening of the ties of shared militantism between the two progressive revolutions concretized by the two revolutions [sic]. These ties will also be strengthened by virtue of our joint fighting solidarity in the path of militantism to promote liberation and social progress, by our firmness in opposition to the conspiracies and schemes of imperialist and reactionary forces.

The history of relations between our two revolutions clearly testifies to positions of support and joint solidarity with respect to questions of revolutionary progress in our two fraternal countries in particular, and with respect to all questions of national independence, social progress, and peace in the world, in general.

In light of this history, the process of martial relations between democratic Yemen and the Algerian Democratic Peoples Republic will move forward and affect every domain of cooperation and exchange of experiences. Toward more radiant horizons and still greater prospects. We respect Algeria greatly for the grandiose sacrifices its people paid to obtain its national independence. We also believe that the people who sacrificed more than a million chouhada [translation unknown] for their national independence can become masters of their own destiny and realize their national progressive aspirations.

9516
CSO: 4800

RECONCILIATION EFFORTS AMONG PERSIAN GULF NATIONS REVIEWED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 13 Jul 80 pp 17-18

[Article by Kuwait correspondent: "Aden Seeks To Settle its Differences"]

[Text] There have been a lot of mediation attempts to reconcile Aden with its neighbors. Kuwait has taken action. Saudi Arabia has given it its blessing. And the trip of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani [Chairman of the PDRY council of ministers], may crown these initiatives with success. But there remains the problem between Aden and Baghdad. The process of bringing about a settlement of the differences between the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and the Sultanate of Oman has already begun. It was Kuwait which took the initiative to bring about a reconciliation between the two Yemens. Kuwait then focused its mediation efforts on Aden and Muscat, in an attempt to bring about stability in the southern part of the Arabian Peninsula.

When 'Ali Nasir Muhammad took over as prime minister in Aden, the very first initiative actually came from Aden, when it sent Mr Mahmud Najashi, the PDRY minister of culture, to Kuwait on a mission which was said to be related to cultural affairs. In fact, the mission was of a political nature, even though the media said nothing about its being policical.

In addition to his 3 days of meetings with the Kuwaiti undersecretary of information, Mr Sa'dun al-Jasim, Mr Najashi met with the ruler of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah; the crown prince and prime minister, Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah; and the deputy prime minister and minister of information, Shaykh Jabir al-'Ali al-Salim al-Sabah. During these meetings he made preparations for the visit of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad to Kuwait.

Nasir Muhammad took action concerning the Gulf area when he paid his first visit to Saudi Arabia last Saturday. This was a visit which had been previously set, but had been postponed because of Mr Muhammad's sudden trip to Moscow. He made this trip to reassure the Soviets that

the changes which had resulted in the resignation of the previous prime minister, Mr 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, would not affect relations between Southern Yemen and the Soviet Union. After Mr Muhammad visited Saudi Arabia, he visited Kuwait.

Dialog on Two Fronts

The PDRY minister of culture did not release any comments to the press during his visit in Kuwait. But during his private talks, he hinted that the PDRY government was prepared to reopen a dialog on two fronts--with Iraq and with Oman. Regarding relations with Iraq, he said that it would be possible to normalize them through talks between the officials of the two countries. He said that there would have to be an end to the difficulties which were caused by the circumstances of the assassination [of an Iraqi lecturer at Aden University in 1979], and the subsequent arrest of Yemeni Ba'thist elements in Aden and of PDRY citizens in Iraq.

Concerning the Sultanate of Oman, Najashi said that democratic Yemen would welcome a resumption of "fraternal" relations between the two countries. But he said that this would have to be on condition that each of the two countries should not interfere in the affairs of the other, and that the sultanate should not be bound by any treaty or defense agreement with the United States. Asked about the facilities which the PDRY regime was granting to the Soviet fleet, he denied that this was being done, saying that the only thing which bound Aden to Moscow was a treaty of friendship. He refused to admit that any bases or military facilities had been granted to the Soviets in connection with this treaty.

The Sultanate Is neither Fish nor Fowl

Oman, for its part, still has not revealed the true nature of the security agreement which it has concluded with Washington. Qays al-Zawawi, the minister of state for foreign affairs, keeps talking in his statements about coordinating the sultanate's foreign policy with the policy which is followed by the other Gulf countries.

According to information relayed by diplomats from Muscat, the sultanate insists on having consultations with the other Gulf countries before making any decisions concerning matters which affect issues of security and defense. This is because the sultanate feels that the countries of the area are a unit, and that whatever affects one of the countries of the area will affect all of the area's other countries.

But diplomats are met with silence when they ask about the nature of the defense agreement [with the United States], and the extent to which it is consistent with the general policy of the Gulf countries which rejects foreign tropps and rejects the policy of alliances. These

diplomats are told that the agreement is merely an "aid agreement," which is more economic and financial than it is political or military.

Authoritative sources in the Gulf states expect that it is Saudi Arabia itself which will give the green light to pursue success of the mediation efforts. If Saudi Arabia reaches even a minimum of mutual understanding with 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, this will signal the start of Kuwaiti mediation, which was temporarily at a standstill, but consequently took on new dimensions when it was expanded to include relations between Southern Yemen and Iraq. The fact is that Saudi Arabian and Southern Yemeni officials are setting conditions and counter-conditions for the achievement of a "minimum" of mutual understanding. The Southern Yemenis are concerned that there should be no interference in their internal affairs or politics, and they want to be free to choose the type of regime they want. At the same time, they would pledge to try not to export their "ideas or revolutionary ideology" to places outside their borders, on condition that no one should provoke them or "conspire" against them.

Another of their demands is that they should share in the oil wealth. They want to do this by means of implementing development projects and building schools and hospitals. They do not want aid to them to be in the form of goods, that is, "cash." Furthermore, they say that they are able to coexist with any type of regime next door to them, on condition that this regime would not provoke them. They, in turn, would not provoke that regime.

Neutralization, Not Threats

This is all that the Saudis are asking for. They also have certain reservations. One of these reservations is the fact that Aden signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Moscow, and subsequently signed a similar treaty with the Marxist regime in Ethiopia.

Informed sources in the Gulf area say that Saudi Arabia perhaps felt that these two treaties were concluded in a state of emergency which would pass. But they say that Saudi Arabia's reservations are based on its fear that the treaty with Msocow will be used to give the Soviets--some reports say that the Soviets have already been given--naval and air bases in Socotra, Maksar and other places. It may be that Saudi Arabia is not too concerned about such a military presence when it is far away, but Saudi Arabia cannot afford to feel this way when the military presence is right on its borders, threatens its security and, consequently, threatens its oil resources.

For this reason, Saudi Arabia makes the condition that any foreign military presence in the area be eliminated, be it a Soviet or American military presence. Saudi Arabia consequently desires to have the area neutralized, and this includes both Southern Yemen and the Sultanate of Oman. Saudi Arabia wants the former to undo its bonds with the Soviet Union, and wants the latter to do the same with the United States.

Saudi Arabia also has reservations about the considerable presence of Soviet, East German and Cuban military advisers in Southern Yemen, who consequently pose a constant threat from Aden to the Sultanate of Oman.

In the opinion of Saudi Arabia, if it is necessary to have the sultanate return to the ranks of the Arabs and have it commit itself to the decisions made by the Arab summit conference, it is also necessary to stop threatening the sultanate. This is because threats will only drive it farther away and will impel it to search for means of providing itself with security, even if it has to cooperate with the United States.

Diplomatic sources in the Arabian Gulf area are of the opinion that 'Ali Nasir Muhammad will not be inflexible in his talks with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. They feel this way, particularly because he is known for his flexibility. In addition, he believes in an open-minded policy and a policy of coexistence, at the same time adhering to principles which he considers to concern himself and the Yemeni people.

These sources also say that the new regime in Aden does not want a protracted discussion of its ideological convictions. Rather, it is prepared to search for a way to work together with its "fellow-Arabs" in the Arabian Gulf and Red Sea areas.

Iraq Has no Objections

If a solution can be found for the problem between Aden and Riyadh, and for the problem between Aden and Muscat, there still remains the problem between Aden and Baghdad.

According to information from responsible sources in the Gulf area, Aden and Baghdad are not in a hurry to solve this problem and settle the issues which mainly developed during the days when 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il was prime minister.

Saudi Arabia does not want to have anything to do with the problem between Southern Yemen and Iraq, and neither does Kuwait. Informed sources in Kuwait consider that this problem may be solved by a Yemeni initiative, which they think has already been started by the prime minister of Northern Yemen, 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. They especially feel this way, because relations are very close between San'a' and Baghdad, and because relations between San'a' and Aden were strengthened after 'Ali Nasir Muhammad became prime minister.

San'a' receives a great deal of financial aid from Baghdad, and Baghdad is implementing a number of development projects for San'a'. For this reason, San'a did not want to approach Aden, because this would cause Iraq to ask a lot of questions. This is why San'a', after the change in regime in Aden, has sent a number of envoys to Baghdad and to the capital cities of the other countries of the Arabian Gulf area. Informed sources in Kuwait say that Northern Yemeni mediation between Aden and Baghdad is already proceeding along a sure path, but they say that the fruits of this mediation will not be seen before Aden reaches final reconcilation with Riyadh and Muscat.

9468
CSO: 4802

RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH GREAT BRITAIN EXAMINED

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 29 Jul 80 p 2

[Editorial: "The Resumption of Saudi-British Relations]

[Text] The resumption of normal relations between the kingdom and Great Britain confirms the desire of both parties to stay on the path of cooperation in support of efforts being exerted at present to bring about peace in the Arab region and to find a just solution to the Palestinian problem. The crisis which occurred in Saudi-British relations convinces all of us that the best way to maintain friendly relations is to steer them away from anything which offends the national values, ideals and feelings of the two nations, and, in particular, to eliminate once and for all the sources of tension in these relations, so that they do not recur in the future.

In its relations and dealings with all nations of the world, the kingdom always seeks mutual respect and avoidance of everything which offends the customs, values and ideals of these nations. It thus expects similar treatment from other nations.

We have been candid in expressing our feelings about the affronts made to our Islamic religion and to the values and ideals of our country, thereby causing a deterioration in diplomatic relations between our two countries.

We certainly appreciate the British government's recent positions regarding the Arab-Zionist struggle. They are positions which Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington have expressed on more than one occasion, confirming support of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination, and condemning the expansionist and terrorist acts being carried out by the Zionist authorities in the occupied Arab territories, including the establishment of new settlements and the policies of Judaization. They are positions which have subjected Lord Carrington to a stream of cheap attacks launched against him by Menachim Begin, the enemy's prime minister.

However, this does not mean that Great Britain as a great power has fulfilled its duty with respect to solving the Palestinian problem. We believe that words of condemnation and sharp criticism are not what is required. "Political history"is full of these statements. What is important is their translation into the realm of practical application. Great Britain is the one most responsible for the creation of the Palestinian problem. Consequently, it bears great responsibility to search for and participate effectively in finding a just solution for it, just as it succeeded in finding a solution for the Rhodesian problem, through the skill of Lord Carrington and his unprecedented efforts in this domain.

There are many opportunities for British participation in a solution. The most prominent of these include withdrawing British support for the Camp David agreements condemned by the Arab nations, contributing toward a push for a real European initiative for peace in the region, exerting effective pressure on the Zionist entity, and recognizing both the PLO and the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent state on their national land.

If the British government has made progress on this road, we hope it will continue to do so, for this serves its interests, above all, as well as peace and stability in the region.

7811
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DANES WIN DESIGN CONTRACT FOR CIVIL DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 10 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by Martin Hartung: "Danish Design for Large Arabian Building Complex"]

[Text] A large building complex is to be built in Riyadh, capital of Saudi Arabia, as designed by Danish architects. The complex is to house the headquaters of the country's civil defense.

The size of the project is apparent from the fact that the floor area of the complex will amount to 57,000 square meters, which for comparison is over 60 percent larger than the foreign ministry's new office blocks at Asiatisk Plads near Knippelsbro in Copenhagen.

This was a very demanding and complicated design task, all the more so because the structure is to house, in addition to a command center and offices, a housing wing for the personnel and a school for recruits, an indoor swimming pool, and a mosque. The design was prepared by a group of technicians consisting of Condane (the engineering firms of B. Hojlund Rasmussen, N. H. Harms, and Geotechnical Institute), as well as the engineering firm of Crone & Kock and the architectural firm of Holm & Grut.

The group was assigned the task in competition with half a dozen large firms of various Western countries.

The Arabs preferred the Danish design because, among other things, it was worked out in consultation with the Danish civil defense administration and thereby provided a better solution than the Arabs had in fact asked for.

About 60 technicians of the involved engineering and architectural firms were employed in the design work, which according to the contract was to be done within a time limit and at a firm price.

The design has just been delivered to and approved by the Arab authorities, and it is now to be submitted for enterprise bids. The bid material submitted by the Danish group consists of about 900 drawings and about 3000 pages of specifications and material amounts, figures that give an impression of the size of the project.

In shaping the project's forms and materials, designs and installations the Danes made efforts to reduce the demand for maintenance to the extent possible. For example, facades are to be in cast concrete of a smooth, sand-colored surface.

In the design the Danes strived to produce a building complex which to the smallest detail will conform to the Arabian way of life. They did, however, refrain from any attempt to create Islamic architecture. It will be a simple and robust and to some degree also a monumental structure.



Perspective drawing of the design for the headquarters of Saudi Arabia's civil defense, prepared by a group of Danish engineers and architects. The structure is to be built on a concrete deck at the first floor level above the terrain. On the deck there will be, among other things a well shaped courtyard in front of the office wing (in the middle of the complex.) Below the deck there will be a parking garage. On the deck there will be gardens and a helicopter landing pad. Below the deck there will be a bomb-proof command center and bomb shelters.

11,256
CSO: 3106

SAUDI ANTICRIME WORKING PAPER SUBMITTED TO ARAB CONFERENCE

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 30 Jul 80 p 1

[Article by Tal'at Waqa: "Kingdom Submits Working Paper to Conference of Arab Interior Ministers"]

[Text] His Royal Highness Prince Nayif ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, minister of interior, has told AL-RIYAD that the kingdom has submitted a working paper to the conference of Arab interior ministers scheduled to be held in Ta'if on 15 Shawwal [27 August]. AL-RIYAD has learned that the most important feature of the Saudi working paper is a field study of security problems in Arab countries.

The interior minister said that the kingdom, in its capacity as host nation, has joined the Social Defense Organization in writing the agenda for the conference. He added that consulations are under way with Arab interior ministers to learn their opinions about the proposals which have been submitted. Many answers have been received approving the agenda.

AL-RIYAD has learned, moreover, that the agenda of the conference consists of several points, including security problems in Arab countries and their present challenges, the drafting of a preventive security plan and the development of the conference of Arab interior ministers into a permanent ministerial conference. The agenda of the conference also includes choosing the place and time of the fourth meeting, in addition to appointing the secretary general of the Arab Social Defense Organization.

Dr Faruq Murad, director of the Anti-Crime Center of the interior ministry, told AL-RIYAD that the most important feature of the Saudi working paper at the conference is a field study of security problems in Arab countries. The study was undertaken by the Anti-Crime Center of the interior ministry. It sent investigators to all Arab countries with a questionnaire prepared in advance.

Through the use of qualified investigators and on the basis of information produced through the study, this working paper set forth the first preventive security plan. It is hoped that joint Arab cooperation in security matters will crystallize around the plan over the next 3 years, which is the period of the plan.

7811
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

WATER PROJECTS--The Water and Sewage Authority of the Eastern Province has recently undertaken the drilling of eight artesian wells and has built the necessary reservoirs and pumps in both al-Dammam and al-Khabar. 'Abdullah Muhammad al-Babatayn, deputy director of the authority, has said that five artesian wells have also been dug in various districts in al-Dammam and al-Khabar, plus three wells in al-'Aqrabiyah and al-Thiqbah. Reservoirs with a capacity of 40 cubic meters have been built for them. He also said that a study has been completed for a project to drill seven artesian wells, with their reservoirs and pumps, in populated areas. The study includes an extension project in al-Dammam and al-Khabar and a well project. The authority is also trying to distribute water in tank trucks to those who are not served by the public water system. [Text] [Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 6 Aug 80 p 3] 7811

HEALTH PROGRAM--The Minister of Health, Dr Husayn al-Jaza'iri, is scheduled in the near future to establish the work program of clinics and hospitals in the western region during this year's pilgrimage season, according to Dr 'Abd al-'Aziz Abbar, assistant director general of Health Affairs in the western region. He added that Health Affairs in the region has set up this program which includes the preparation of hospitals in general and those in the area of the shrines of the pilgrimage ceremonies, in particular, plus the preparation of clinics on the al-Madinah road, in order to get ready to receive pilgrims. The minister of health is scheduled to decide on this program very soon. The program also includes the numbers and names of workers during the season. It is worth pointing out that some of the staff of the King 'Abdul 'Aziz University Hospital in Jiddah is expected to participate side by side with Health Affairs in its work during the pilgrimage season, in accordance with the agreement concluded between the two parties. Dr Abbar hoped that the program would ultimately succeed in achieving the goal sought by the ministry and desired by Health Minister Dr Husayn al-Jaza'iri. He confirmed that the program will be set up by the minsiter before the end of the current month of Ramadhan. [Text] [Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 29 Jul 80 p 3] 7811

AIRPORT NETWORK--A number of airports have either been opened or will be opened in Saudi Arabia during the latter part of this year. The new

Ha'il airport was recently opened at a cost of 169 million riyals. It includes a main building covering 2,270 square meters, a VIP lounge furnished with a private wing for royalty, an arrival lounge accommodating 600 passengers per hour and a departure lounge accommodating 240 passengers per hour. Thus the arrival lounge is capable of receiving 5 Boeing-727's per hour, and the departure lounge can send off 2 of the same type of aircraft per hour. The runway is 3,200 meters long and 45 meters wide. There is an access 22 meters wide parallel to the runway. The space for aircraft parking is 25 meters by 225 meters and accommodates 4 Boeing-727's at one time. Saudi Arabian Airlines recently began the first trial flight to Muhasin airport in al-Ihsa' on Miskar-28 aircraft which hold 65 passengers. Then the new airport was opened with regular official flights averaging three flights daily and serving the route of al-Hufuf--al-Riyadh--Dhahran--Jiddan--al-Riyadh--Dhahran--Jiddah and vice-versa. Limited tests of aircraft will begin this month at King 'Abd 'Aziz International Airport in Jiddah in preparation for its official opening at the end of this year. The Budnah airport recently opened, and following this month of Ramadhan, the airports of Najran, Jayzan, Bishih and al-Wujih will open officially. These airports have been furnished with modern and advanced equipment in the fields of aviation, control and international air safety. In its budget for this year, the Civil Aviation board authorized the selection of a site for construction of a civilian airport in al-Hufuf in the central district. A team of engineers and experts has been commissioned to select the site of the new airport. It is worth pointing out that the estimated cost of the new airport is more than 250 million riyals. Saudi Civil Aviation president Shaykh Nasir al-'Asaf says that a network of modern and advanced airports will be built in the kingdom by the end of the current plan. [Text] [Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 30 Jul 80 p 8] 7811

FERTILIZER PLANT--A new fertilizer plant will be built in Jubayl District in Saudi Arabia. Work on its facilities is expected to begin in early November, and production will begin by the end of 1982. The Royal Commission of the Jubayl and Yanba' project has recently signed an agreement to rent land for the plant which will produce urea fertilizer. Annual production capacity will be 500,000 tons for both local consumption and export abroad. The plant will be built on a plot of 487,200 square meters. It may be pointed out here that the Royal Commission made preliminary preparations of the land designated for the plant, and the Jubayl Fertilizer Company completed the gound surveys. The site will be supplied with electricity, water, a sewage system and communications, in addition to the sea water necessary for cooling. [Text] [Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 30 Jul 80 p 8] 7811

WATER PIPELINE--Saudi Arabia has allocated $910 million for a huge project which aims at supplying Riyadh with water by laying a pipeline between the Gulf coast and the Saudi capital. Several German, Dutch, French and American companies will execute this contract. It is the final stage of the tremendous project to assure the water requirements

of Riyadh during the 1980's. The contract was awarded through the Saudi government Salt Water Conversion Organization. Last year it awarded a contract to built 10 desalinization units at the port of Jubayl. Japanese and Italian companies are currently supplying the pipes. The project consists of 2 pipelines, each 1.5 meters in diameter and 466 kilometers long, in order to supply 830,000 cubic meters of water, in addition to 6 pumping stations aloug the pipelines. [Text] [Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 30 Jul 80 p 8] 7811

CSO: 4802

AL-SADIQ AL-MAHDI DISCUSSES NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, RELATIONS WITH EGYPT

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 9 Jul 80 pp 15, 12

[Interview with Sudanese opposition leader al-Sadiq al-Mahdi by Babakr Hasan Makki in Khartoum; date not given]

[Text] Al-Mahdi tells AL-SIYASAH:

"We Want Alternative That Avoids Pre-May and Post-May Mistakes.

"Elements Inside Regime Worked to Foil National Reconciliation.

"Al-Sharif al-Hindi Asked Sudanese Ambassador in Tripoli to Negotiate With Him But Khartoum Refused.

"Biggest Accomplishment of Palestinian Revolution Is That It Transferred Battle to West Bank and Gaza Strip.

"Arabs Must Put United States Before One of Two Options: Relationship With Arabs or With Israel."

Before my interview with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, the popular Khartoum was talking about a diplomatic flap that almost erupted between Sudan and Nigeria when Nigeria gave al-Mahdi an official reception even though he has no official status other than being a former Sudanese prime minister, chairman of the banned National [al-ummah] Party, former chairman of the opposition National Front, former member of the Socialist Union's Political Bureau, the grandson of Muhammad Ahmad al-Mahdi, the leader of the biggest revolution in the Arab area, and, finally, the quiet opposition man who uses Khartoum as the base of his opposition. The popular Khartoum said that the Nigerian president had received al-Mahdi only hours before convocation of the African economic summit conference and that this motivated Muhammad Mirghani, the minister of state for foreign affairs, to criticize this act on the part of the Nigerian government. Even though al-Sadiq al-Mahdi denied that the issue was so clamorous when I asked him about it and was content to say only that he had met with the Nigerian president without any official reception--despite

this, this issue was one of many which had aroused my interest in interviewing al-Sadiq. The external opposition considers the man a participant in the regime whereas the official Khartoum considers him an opponent.

Al-Sadiq still lives in Halah, Aba Island, where his house abounds with members of al-Ansar, some lying on the green grass, some eating the hot 'asidah [paste made of flour and butter] for breakfast and some coming from the west for greetings and "congratulation." Amidst all this, al-Sadiq secluded himself in his office which overflows with volumes and books, with a picture of William (Deng), al-Mahdi's late friend, placed in the middle.

[Question] The public street is wondering about your real position toward the regime. Some say that you have joined the regime whereas others say that you have broken your agreement with Numayri?

[Answer] Our position toward the present regime in Sudan, says al-Sadiq, is based on the fact that we were in conflict and dispute and that then came a stage during which the regime offered the national reconciliation. As a front comprised of the various parties and leaderships, our opinion was to respond to the reconciliation on the grounds that it would establish a system of concord in Sudan through understanding between the regime and its opponents. The bases--seven altogether--for this system of concord were laid down and the most important was the principle that the current political system--the Sudanese Socialist Union--has failed to be a democratic system in the country. Therefore, al-Mahdi adds, this issue had to be rexamined, not for the sake of a return to the system of parties but for the sake of setting up a comprehensive political system in Sudan. This was the basis of the expected reform in the Sudanese political system. Nine points were defined for this political reform and were made public. There was the issue of the constitution because we held the belief that there was a need for reforms in a democratic and Islamic direction insofar as the country's constitution is concerned. The provisions required to be amended in this regard were laid out in detail. In any case, our demands dealt with fundamental changes in the political establishments and actions. Since then--the beginning of the reconciliation--we have been discussing the details of these matters. The starting point of these discussions has been the importance of normalizing the relations between yesterday's opponents so that a freer atmosphere of discussion may be created. This normalization did certainly require definite measures--such as putting a stop to the arrests and to the opening of jails, abolishing or freezing the state security law and the return of those present in camps abroad and providing them stability in modern cooperative associations. Generally, the normalization required the creation of an atmosphere in which the state of bitterness and conflict existing earlier would be eliminated. We believe that it has been possible in past periods to realize all the aspects of normalization and to bring back all the brothers who were in exile abroad and establish them in various projects. However, implementation of the fundamental changes required has not been realized for reasons. These reasons are connected with the presence in the regime of elements that have done all they can to resist the required changes in order to preserve their positions and out of fear of the democratic changes that may occur. As leaderships that have responded to the reconciliation, we find that as

long as there is in our country the freedom that enables us to say what is right and what is wrong and to call for correcting the wrong--and there is now greater freedom in our country than in many of the Arab and African countries--then this is enough to make us interested in the issue of reconciliation and in continuing the efforts to realize the remaining goals. I believe that under the free atmosphere currently present in Sudan, we have been able to talk objectively about the shortcomings and faults of the regime and to also talk maturely about the mistakes of the pre-May regime and to say how we want a situation that will not take the country back to the era preceding the 25th of May (1969). We have also been able to say that we do not want continuation of the current practices in the country but want to find an alternative that avoids the pre-May and post-May mistakes. We believe that this line is the best line for the interest of the country. This is why we are happy that it has been possible, through the path of reconciliation, to relatively exclude the foreign factors, elements and forces from interfering and playing a role in the Sudanese politics. This has been one of the accomplishments which has made it possible to turn the disagreement over the remaining issues into a purely Sudanese disagreement. This transformation protects the Sudanese political body from the incoming influences that could intensify if we return to the state of confrontation. Therefore, the state of confrontation is rejected, and so is surrender to the status quo and to the system in its present form because such surrender means continuation of the present mistakes and impotent policies and practices. Such continuation is against the country's interest. If it is against Sudan's interest to return to the policy of confrontation and if it is against Sudan's interest to capitulate to the conditions as they are at present, then it is logically in Sudan's interest to take advantage of the conditions of relative freedom to work with political means in order to realize the goals which, we believe, will lead to changes when achieved. As long as we can fault any of the regime's actions with freedom, then there is no justification for us or for others to work from abroad. The moderate opposition leader adds: In summary, we can describe our position as that of a group that has responded to the reconciliation on certain conditions. Some of the circumstances preparing the way and some of the accesses leading to these (conditions) have been realized but not all of the desired goals have been realized. I declared and explained in a press conference in July 1978 that all the things that will reunite the will of the Sudanese will be the fruit of the national reconciliation process.

Optimism

[Question] (Here I interrupted al-Mahdi to ask:) Does this mean that you are optimistic that all your goals will be realized someday?

[Answer] I am neither optimistic nor pessimistic. As long as the counter opinion has freedom and as long as the policy of violence and oppression is stopped, it is my opinion that it is the duty of the Sudanese citizen to work within this framework to realize the goals which he views as the outlet for his country. It is my opinion that there is no justification for the policy of confrontation except when freedom is undermined and confiscated and when a policy of violence and oppression is established. It is also my

opinion that as a part of the third world, our country does not have the opportunity and it is not right for it to adopt the policies and constitutional systems followed, for example, in West or East Europe. It must also not be said, for example, that we want a liberal democracy. It is also my opinion that any attempt to copy these policies exactly will have harmful consequences because even the systems followed in Europe have come as the result of certain political and social development that accompanied the conditions through which Europe has passed. Therefore, we are, as I have already said, in need of detente and of finding an equation with two sides: One side for unifying the administration and building the country and the other side for the freedom that provides the opportunity for participation, for bringing into account, for questioning and for correcting the mistakes. The challenge facing us is the challenge of enabling our political system to establish this equation for this generation satisfactorily. This is the lesson that we can derive from Islam because Islam has no single system of government. There isn't a certain system of government called Islam. Islam contains general principles--consultation, justice and so forth--and has the Shari'a. If we examine the Shari'a itself, we find that it contains provisions and these provisions were turned into laws by the jurisprudents--Abu Hanifah, Malik, al-Shafi'i and ibn Hanbal. Those jurisprudents benefited from the intellectual and social background under which they lived to turn the provisions found in the book [Koran] and in the Sunna into laws by which the people abide. As long as we want to apply the Islamic Shari'a, we are required to know the provisions of the book and the Sunna and to understand them in the light of the intellectual and social life we are living today. The strongest point of Islam, says the son of al-Siddiq al-Mahdi, is that it has not committed mankind to a certain system of government but has left general principles. It is our duty to apply these principles at all times and everywhere through the channels and means befitting the conditions under which we live in the light of these facts. The present regime came up with interpretations, including the Socialist Union which it has adopted from Egypt, and established the present constitution. When we view this experiment from within, we find that it must be corrected in the light of the action and of the experience. When we view it from outside, we find that it must be corrected within the framework of the concepts within which the reform is sought. We have called for correction of the experiment. It is my belief that as long as we are working in an atmosphere of freedom, we cannot be annoyed. The problem arises when the government says: I follow one system of government and you are either with me or against me. This does not apply to the present policy, as I have already said, because there is a degree of tolerance and freedom which, to my belief, doesn't exist in many Arab and Islamic countries.

I Resigned From Political Bureau for These Reasons

[Question] After your return to Sudan, you entered the Socialist Union and took the oath as a member of the Political Bureau but gave up this position soon afterwards, either by resigning or by being relieved. How do you explain all this?

[Answer] When I entered the Socialist Union, I did so as the result of four points which were announced in the press conference to which I have already referred, namely:

1. Correcting, reorganizing and restructuring the Socialist Union.

2. Revising the provisions of the constitution to make it more democratic and more Islamic.

3. Resettling the groups of al-Ansar that were abroad.

4. Reviewing the entire current performance to bolster the positive and to drop the negative. Even though I had agreed on these points with President Numayri, there are elements in the Socialist Union who resisted this inclination strongly when they became aware of it. The question became more complex with the rise of the question: Where does Sudan stand vis-a-vis Camp David? We had thought that this position would be discussed in the Political Bureau which is the top political authority. But when I found that the decision concerning Sudan's policy toward Camp David had been adopted without a meeting of the Political Bureau, this provided the proof that this bureau does not perform the role it should perform in determining this country's policies. Therefore, my resignation was due to the fact that the measures that were expected to be taken regarding the four points had met resistance which led to freezing them. This matter was subject to give and take. But then came the straw that broke the camel's back in the form of the adoption of a decision on a serious matter without the participation of the authority concerned, namely the Political Bureau. Had the four points been realized and had the Political Bureau continued to exercise its jurisdiction as the highest political agency, I would not have had to resign.

This is al-Sharif al-Hindi

[Question] (I then asked al-Sadiq the question raised by the Sudanese man-in-the-street, saying:) You and al-Sharif al-Hindi were the two faces of the opposition coin. You have returned and al-Sharif has continued his opposition from abroad, accusing you of abandoning the struggle as a result of the temptation of some positions. What is your position toward al-Sharif al-Hindi and toward the accusation he has made against you?

[Answer] The truth is that brother Husayn al-Hindi was a member with us in the National Front. When the front adopted the reconciliation decision, it did so with a unanimous vote. He personally was present when the decision was taken. After I met with brother Numayri in July 1977, the front met on 14 July 1977 at the Brown Hotel in London. Al-Hindi was present at this meeting and (agreed) to all the results of this meeting. Afterwards, brother Husayn al-Hindi declared from London Rabio [BBC] and from Tripoli Radio on 24 July 1977 his support for all that I had said. It was then decided that I would come to Sudan with all the front leaders to continue discussing the provisions contained in the reconciliation policy. Al-Hindi was supposed to return with us but he excused himself for health reasons. However, he did

see us off at the airport on 29 September 1977 and we agreed that he would stay abroad until I returned to him or wrote him on the outcome of what happens at home. We were then to assess the developments and he, because he had stayed behind, was to write President Numayri to inform him of my delegation to conduct the negotiations at home. He was also to observe silence and not to make any comments until the two of us met. In fact, he did write a letter to President Numayri which was published by DAR AL-AYYAM on 29 September 1977 in which he says that he supports the reconciliation policy and delegates me to conduct the negotiations. He observed silence for about a month and then began to express his opposition to the discussions without knowing what had taken place.

Partisan Jealousy

(In talking about al-Sharif al-Hindi, al-Mahdi adds:) It is my opinion that he started the opposition not because he is opposed to the reconciliation policy but because he feels that the popular reception that I was given upon my return to Sudan brought me, in his opinion, a political gain and because the Arab and world information media showed interest in the reconciliation as a matter between me and President Numayri, thus dropping [reference to] all other parties. These things aroused al-Hindi's partisan jealousy and this is why he did not fulfill what he had promised and why he started his well-known opposition. The proof of this is that when some men in the regime learned that I insisted on certain measures for change and reform they thought of maneuvering within the partisan disagreement existing between me and brother Husayn al-Hindi and thus contacted him and concluded with him the 1978 London agreement. In that agreement, al-Hindi agreed to the constitution as it is and agreed to the Socialist Union as it is. All he demanded was the more careful application of the constitution and the re-formation of the Socialist Union. This agreement was broadcast and announced in London and signed by brother Husayn al-Hindi. This means that when he entered the reconciliation, he agreed to issues that I would not have accepted because they are not within the framework of the front's policy. However, when the brothers in the regime concentrated on the issue of "partisan jealousy," they found from him response to things that I was rejecting and thus showed that his aim was not rejection of the reconciliation. It later became evident that the London agreement itself was not for the purpose of reconciliation but for the purpose of threatening us. Since then, brother Husayn al-Hindi has moved to establish alliances with several partisan organizations in the Arab countries. However, he has not kept his promises to these parties--promises that he would stage revolutions in Sudan.

Al-Hindi Asked Sudanese Ambassador in Tripoli to Mediate for Reconciling Him With Regime

(Al-Sadiq adds:) I later learned that during his presence in Libya, brother Husayn al-Hindi contacted the Sudanese ambassador in Tripoli--after contacting Dr al-Turayki--and asked to negotiate with the ambassador. However, the Sudanese ambassador asked Khartoum for the permission to do so but Khartoum refused to open negotiations with al-Hindi because it doesn't trust what he says and so the ambassador refused to meet with him. It is my opinion that

the policy which al-Hindi is following and which relies on getting aid from foreign countries that are usually hostile to Sudan, on his acting from abroad and on his sending weapons into the country is a completely wrong policy because it is an adventurous policy and because it has hurt his party's followers whereas he is safe abroad. He sends things that cause his followers at home to perpetrate security crimes and this has exposed all his party's cells to the Sudanese security agencies. Now most of his men are involved in security problems because of his adventurous policy. Another of the faults of al-Hindi's policy is that even if we assume that this policy succeeds, at best, in polarizing a certain country hostile to Sudan to support him, this success would give Sudan the justification to polarize another country. If this policy succeeds, it will, under the best assumption, turn Sudan into an arena of conflict among non-Sudanese forces operating in Sudan. What value does all this have when the Sudanese has the opportunity to say this is wrong and this is right? Sudan is currently alive with a free student movement. If you visit the universities, you will notice this. There is also a free labor movement, in the sense that labor elections took place this time without any arrests being made against any side, unlike in the past. It is true that there was intervention but no arrests were made among the rival leaderships. This policy, and within this degree of this freedom, is the policy in which I believe. I reject and condemn any policy that resorts to violence or to foreign aid as long as there is an opportunity for dialogue, difference and tolerance in Sudan for the realization of the popular demands. It is my belief that this adventurous policy [of al-Hindi's] will result in harm for all sides, regardless of whether it succeeds or fails. This is why it is a faulty and rejected policy. (Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi adds:) This is why I have told and advised and continue to tell and advise brother al-Hindi--through my meetings with people who are connected with al-Hindi--that the mistake does not lie in whether we cooperate or we don't cooperate but in this adventurous course. It is my conviction that if al-Hindi abandons this course, there will be opportunity for national action in Sudan, and even for rejecting the reconciliation. Not all those who support me support the reconciliation. Many of them oppose it and believe that it is a faulty policy but only because they are confident that the reconcoliation's goals will be realized. I have no objection to realizing the reconciliation's goals and I have no objection to whoever says that it is our duty to abandon the reconciliation policy.

I Have Not Collected Single Mil From My Position in Sudanese Socialist Union

The former chairman of the National Front and the former prime minister of Sudan then proceeds to deal with the accusations made against him by al-Sharif al-Hindi, saying: These accusations are short-lived. For example, there is the accusation that I have been lured with positions. Until this day, I have refused to have the discussions deal with any position and have insisted that they deal with the regime and with the required changes. I have said that there is no use in changing persons and that what is needed is a change in the actions and the establishments. If my goal was to accept a position, this would have happened long ago. But so far, I have no official status whatsoever. As far as rights are concerned, I have eagerly sought since returning to Sudan the rights of those who had been punished

economically. I can say that through the reconciliation, the rights of many people have been restored and many others have been rehabilitated. But until this day, nothing has been returned to me or to my family and if anything is returned in the future, I will be the last to get it. What this means is that if we had embarked on the reconciliation for personal gain, something would have definitely happened in this long period. Had I asked for anything, there would have been a response. At present, I am an ordinary citizen only and I am committed not to transfer the domestic battle or differences outside Sudan but to work for containing them in the country and to try to convince the regime of any policy in which I believe through amicable means of communication. I will tell you that I did not collect a single mil as a monthly salary for the period I spent as a member of the Political Bureau in which I served for 5 months after taking the oath, keeping in mind that a Political Bureau member has privileges that exceed those of a minister.

Why Should I Reconsider If Offered Position of Prime Minister?

[Question] I took this opportunity to ask al-Sadiq: Will you reconsider if you are offered the position of prime minister?

[Answer] (He replied with surprise:) Why should I reconsider?

[Question] I hastened to say: But you have pointed out that not all your conditions for national reconciliation have been realized.

[Answer] This is true. But, as I have told you, I do not want to talk about any positions unless the reforms which I believe to be necessary for reforming people take place. It is out of the question for me to assume any position or responsibility if these reforms are not made.

Egyptian Leaders Assume Sudan's Subservience to Them

[Question] I asked al-Sadiq al-Mahdi about the truth of the Sudanese-Egyptian relations in light of Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat's attack on Sudanese President Ja'far Numayri in the 15 May speech.

[Answer] There are between Sudan and Egypt historical bonds that exist at present and that will exist in the future. The faults of the Egyptian policy is that many of Egypt's leaders and of its ruling class assume that these bonds commit Sudan to follow Egypt. This is a basic mistake. Sudan has a political movement that is more mature than the political movement in Egypt and Sudan's people are aware of their dignity and their entity. We are Egypt's neighbors but nobody will be wrong if he says that there is a clear-cut Sudanese personality. For example, our Arabic dialect is different from the Egyptian Arab dialect. The official sect in Sudan and Egypt is inherited from the Ottomans, namely the Hanafi sect, whereas the popular sect in Sudan is the Maliki sect and the popular one in Egypt is the Shafi'i sect.

Sidqi Pasha Dreamt of Putting Sudan in His Pocket

(Al-Sadiq adds:) When Sidqi Pasha, for example, returned from his negotiations with Bevin in 1946, he told his people: "I have brought you Sudan in my pocket." When Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, the chairman of the banned al-Ummah [Presumably meaning al-Wafd] Party, wanted to criticize the Egyptian revolution because this revolution was serious in giving Sudan the right to self-determination under the influence of Maj Gen Muhammad Najib who knew the Sudanese well--when Siraj-al-Din wanted to criticize this revolution, he said that it lost Sudan, as if Sudan, says al-Sadiq, is a part of his estate. At present, President al-Sadat assumes that Sudan should support his policies as a matter of course without his having to discuss any of his policies with it. Al-Sadat surprised President Numayri with his Camp David policy. Numayri had his circumstances which compelled him to proceed slowly in taking a clear and definite position against the policies of al-Sadat who did not consult Numayri even though he had consulted a number of other Arab leaders. When al-Sadat was in the United States, Numayri arrived there before the former's departure but al-Sadat did not even wish to wait to meet with Numayri and to try to convince him of anything because he assumed, as a result of this attitude of superiority, that Sudan would naturally support any decision he takes. As a result of this attitude, he counted Sudan with the supporters of the [Washington] accord. Even when Numayri made his Arab solidarity tour, he found understanding from all the countries, including the rejectionist countries, but total disregard from Cairo which doesn't want him to think for himself. In my opinion, the major problem lies in how to implant in the mentality of the Egyptian ruling class the idea that this class cannot realize the common interests of the two peoples except respecting and appreciating the Sudanese will and through abandoning the concept of committing Sudan to be subservient to Egypt. It is my view that any Sudanese, whoever he may be, acknowledges and fully believes in the ties that bind the two fraternal people. But ultimately, all the Sudanese will stand in the face of any Egyptian leadership that wants to transform these interests into subservience. I believe, says al-Sadiq, that the present leadership in Egypt is like the leadership which existed in the days of King Faruq--a leadership that has been and continues to be very ill with this disease. The Egyptian studies materials that assure him that Sudan was part of Egypt until the conquest [sic] and that one of the demands of the Egyptian national movement is "evacuation" and "Sudan." These concepts must be eliminated from the Egyptian national education and from the Egyptian culture. The Egyptian must view Sudan as a people with their entity, their pride and their dignity. Through such approach, the highest degrees of cooperation, integration and unity can be achieved. Otherwise, there will be estrangement, conflict and alienation. (Continuing his assessment of the Egyptian policy, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi adds:) There is a very serious aspect in al-Sadat policy embodied in the fact that when al-Sadat came to Khartoum to take part in the session of the Joint Egyptian-Sudanese People's Assembly, he said that he is Sudan's protector, thus imposing custodianship on our country and ignoring the fact that he was addressing a people with their priorities in life and with their concepts and values. He who sells the trust of his country cannot find a way with which to impose "custodianship" on Sudan. The mainstays of the Arab Egypt and of the Islamic Egypt have been lost with al-Sadat's policy. With

his current policy, the Egyptian president has shattered any possibility of cooperation between Egypt and Sudan because he has turned Egypt into an inlet for relationship with Israel and this relationship is rejected at the Arab, Islamic and national levels.

To put it briefly, the success of any relationship between Egypt and Sudan depends on the disappearance of two things:

First, disappearance of the domineering Egyptian khedivite mentality that assumes Sudan's subservience to Egypt.

Second, disappearance of the current Egyptian policy which is non-Arab, non-Islamic and unnational.

Biggest Accomplishment of Palestinian Revolution Is Its Transfer of Battle to West Bank and Gaza

[Question] I then moved on with al-Sadiq al-Mahdi to talk about the Palestinian resistance. I said: Are you with the policy of the Palestinian diplomacy or with the policy of the rifle only?

[Answer] (Here, the leader of al-Ansar says:) First, this sharp division between the rifle and diplomacy does not exist at all. It is my opinion that the Palestinian resistance performed an honorable act when it transferred the battle to the occupied territories. The battle is still heated and the West Bank and Gaza people are still fighting bravely. This in itself is one of the biggest accomplishments of the Palestinian revolution and is something that sends the greatest joy in the heart amidst this darkness which has been created by al-Sadat policy. All that we hope for now is that the Arab and Islamic countries play a role in heating up the battle. Israel must be made to feel that this situation in the West Bank and the Strip is unbearable insofar as it is concerned. As for the issue of diplomacy, it is necessary and it has major priority, especially since it has become evident that it is possible to influence the U.S. public opinion, especially the black sector which has displayed great readiness to understand the Arab cause. It is our duty to address this public opinion. We should also not forget that there is evident conflict between the United States and its allies and here arises the need to address these allies.

I tell you, says al-Sadiq, that the Arabs must put the United State before two options: Either the relationship with the Arabs or the relationship with Israel. I believe that if we put the United States before these two options, it will certainly opt for the places where it has its interests, namely the relationship with the Arabs, because Washington is fully aware that Israel is saddling it with extremely exorbitant costs. Israel is an industrial entity created by the U.S. intelligence and the U.S. weapons. I know many Americans, such as Fulbright, George Ball and James (Aiken), the former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, who have shown a clear understanding of the Arab cause and have demanded reassessment of the U.S. relations with Israel from the angle of restoring the legitimate Arab rights.

The U.S. mentality, adds al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, still believes that the United States can be the main support for Israel while being at the same time the main beneficiary of the Arab interests. An end must be put to this "vanity" through the alert movement of the Islamic and Arab nation.

Iranian Revolution's Experience

[Question] Just before leaving the office of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi in his house, I remembered the Iranian revolution and the messages that al-Mahdi has carried from President Numayri to Khomeyni and the Iranian leaders and so I asked him about his assessment of the Iranian revolution.

[Answer] (Al-Sadiq said:) I believe that the Iranian revolution had clear and definite goals, foremost being the goal of purging Iran of the regime of the shah who wanted to change Iran's skin and to impose western interests on it. The Iranian revolution is the biggest proof of the capabilities of Islam to mobilize the masses' will for liberation. It is also an affirmation that the interests of the Muslims do not lie in subservience to the east or the west and that these interests are based on the faith, creed, ideals and entity of the Muslims. But as we know, adds al-Sadiq, every revolution has to encounter some troubles because the previous security and administration system falls to pieces and this leads to an eruption of the previously repressed problems. It is my belief that the current problems of the Iranian revolution arise from the absence of alternative programs to those of the toppled regime. They also emanate from the lack of harmony between the revolutionary cadre of politicians and the clergymen. This has provided the opportunity for the rise of some centers of power that want to leave their own impression. The Iranian revolution is now facing a major challenge embodied in drawing up alternative revolutionary programs and developing the revolutionary cadre capable of leadership.

8494
CSO: 4802

BOURGUIBA SIGNS DECREE-LAWS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Aug 80 p 4

[Report: "The Independence of the Judiciary Must Be Safeguarded"]

[Text] Yesterday morning President Habib Bourguiba conferred at Carthage Palace with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali.

Mohamed Mzali, minister of justice, and Slaheddine Baly, minister of national defense, later joined the conversation.

Following the audience, Mohamed Mzali made the following statement: "The talk with the chief of state dealt with some problems related to the functioning of the administration and the judiciary.

The Supreme Fighter reemphasized the need for an independent judiciary. He equally recalled that he had sacrificed his youth for the independence of the country and for the prevalence of justice among the citizens, and that he will always watch, with God's help, over the honesty of this state and the strengthening of the foundations of its domestic and foreign influence.

Furthermore, the President of the Republic was kind enough to sign in the course of the audience the following decree-laws:

- Decree-law on the creation of a school of medicine in Monastir;

- Decree-law on the organization of pharmaceutical studies in Tunisia;

- Decree-law on the organization of the teaching of dentistry;

- Decree-law amending Law No 76-64 of 12 July 1976 on the organization of medical careers;

- Decree-law amending Law No 77-19 of 23 March 1977 on the system of studies in medical schools;

- Decree-law on the ratification of the loan agreement concluded in Washington on 22 May 1980 between the government of the Republic of Tunisia and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development pertaining to the fourth highways project;

- Decree-law ratifying the agreement between the government of the Republic of Tunisia and the Association for Voluntary Sterilization.

The President of the Republic also signed two decrees, the first appointing M'hamed Ali Souissi director general of projects of the Ministry of the Plan and Finances, and appointing Ridha Zbiri director general of taxes of the same department.

5157
CSO: 4400

PRIME MINISTER ADDRESSES GROUP CHARGED WITH FORGING NEW STUDENT UNION

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 6 Aug 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] "We want an organization or several organizations elected freely and by democratic means which would really represent the students, take part in the organization of university life and, why not, be really concerned with the political, economic, social, and obviously, the cultural life of the country."

These were the words of the prime minister and Party secretary general, Mr Mohamed Mzali on Monday evening at the Dar Maghrebia in Carthage, when he inaugurated the work of the study commission assigned to the examination of the question of student representation.

In his recent declarations, Mr Mohamed Mzali had already promised that the government would do whatever was in its power this summer in order that at the beginning of the academic year, the students could form such an organization. To understand the problem and to place the Monday evening meeting in its true context, the prime minister gave an analysis which recalled the various techniques applied, but unsuccessfully, to solve the crisis affecting the UGET [General Tunisian Student Union] since the Korba Congress and which has finally caused a paralysis in this organization.

"The university crisis," said the prime minister, "and the periodical disturbances it has been experiencing, derive from many objective and subjective reasons of which one, which is by no means the least, is that hateful "division into small groups," caused itself essentially by the ideological quarrels which have for several years been sapping the student milieus. The situation was, so to say, blocked, and this block was the result of almost rigidly frozen stands and of the previously adopted principles. In particular, two previous stands, which were expressed by two slogans: "Free our imprisoned comrades" and "Do away with supervision." Today there is no longer any political prisoner in Tunisia, and an interministerial council has just decided that the former university supervisors will be, in a matter of speaking, recycled, converted and transferred to other administrative cadres. As regards the statement that the students are unable to practice democracy in a supposedly non-democratic country, I would answer: we ourselves believe that Tunisia is evolving unceasingly towards increasing

democracy, that democracy is acquired, built up and earned, and finally, that the initiatives taken just recently by President Bourguiba should encourage the spectators and skeptics among the students to speak on democracy. As for me, I sincerely believe that it will be possible for us to obtain, by the beginning of the academic year, a strategy tending to permit the students to take part in the university life and more generally, in the political life of the country by means of an organization which would be their own, as was the case in the past, and more particularly during the national struggle."

Students Must Assume Their Responsibilities

"But the government can only take part in the solution of the problem of the UGET. It cannot be held solely responsible for it. For there are also the university authorities whose duty is to guarantee the process of free elections and by so doing, remove the students' doubts. But indeed neither the government nor the university authorities could do anything if the persons directly concerned, i.e., the students do not assume their own responsibilities, seriously, loyally and especially courageously. That is why I wish to make an appeal to the students to get rid of the doubts they have entertained in the past, so that they could speak of a democratic solution, and be wary of those behavior patterns and stands which have delayed the cause of the students, wasted their energies, and been detrimental to their interests."

Elections at the Start of the Academic Year

"I am also asking the members of this commission to start immediately a search for procedures which would solve the problem democratically and not to become lost in analyses and conjectures.

Ever since Korba, over many years and in many newspaper columns, the phenomenon has been analyzed to such a degree that it has almost been killed, and with it, the university life."

The prime minister then suggested that at the beginning of the academic year, the students should proceed to elect delegates which would be representing them with the committee which will be appointed to prepare the congress of organization. These elections must be free, and their organization might be entrusted to the Deans who are elected and by lecturers accepted voluntarily by the students.

"What I promise," Mr Mohamed Mzali also said, "is that the organization to which this congress gives birth, according to this formula or any other formula accepted by the students, will be recognized by the government as a valid partner and as a legitimate and legal representative of the students." "Where will this step lead us?" was the prime minister's next question, before declaring: either to the success of the operation, a situation which would compel us to practice the game of democracy and negotiation leading either

to agreement or disagreement. In case of the latter, the dialog would have to continue, and public opinion would be called on as witness. If this attempt were to fail, unfortunately, the government would be released from its responsibility, because it would have exhausted all its possible procedures.

Be that as it may, the only way open to us in Tunisia is to become accustomed to living with a diversity of opinions which may well be supplementary as long as they are based on patriotism, national unity, the unswerving attachment to the development model freely chosen by us.

That is why the very essence of "bourguibism" is to open our minds to ideas and trends, however different they may be, and to work towards establishing by their means a platform for national struggle."

Bourguibism, Symbol of Democracy

Indeed, bourguibism has its roots in the people, and that is why it is democratic, and that is why it is so devoted to openness, to the debating of ideas, by means of dialog and far removed from sterile violence. On the other hand, ideological depth represents the surest path to increasing democracy."

This meeting was attended by Messrs Mongi Kooli, Party Leader and ministerial delegate of the prime minister, Abdelaziz Ben Dhia, minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, Fouad Mebazaa, minister of Information and Cultural Affairs, Mansour Moalia, minister of Planning and Finances, Sadok Ben Jemaa, minister of Transportation and Communications and Mezri Chekir, head of the prime minister's Cabinet.

9018
CSO: 4400

PRIME MINISTER PRESIDES OVER MEETING ON RELIGIOUS QUESTIONS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 5 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] Mr Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and Party secretary general, presided at noon yesterday, over a work session whose purpose was to study religious questions. This meeting was attended in particular by Messrs Fouad Mebazaa, minister of Information and Cultural Affairs, Mohamed Frej Chedli, minister of National Education, Mezri Chekir, head of the prime minister's Cabinet, Sheikh Mohamed Habib Belkhoja, Mufti of the Republic, Mr M'hadheb Roujssi, governor and president of the Tunis District, Zakaria Ben Mustapha, mayor of the capital and Kamel Tarzi, Cult director.

On this occasion, the prime minister announced that he would be honoring on Wednesday 6 August, corresponding to 25 Ramadan, at the time of breaking the fast (Iftar), the imams who preached in the District of Tunis.

He recommended moreover that care be taken of the mosques, both with regard to the furniture and the external appearance which should be worthy of the spiritual worth of these buildings and in accordance with the directives of the Supreme Warrior who has always shown his solicitude for religious matters and is anxious to safeguard the mosques and promote the Islamic religion.

During this session, it was decided to hold a meeting, to be chaired by the prime minister, of the commission appointed a few months ago for the purpose of reforming the syllabus and the methods of teaching of the Kairouan Theology School.

Finally, the prime minister gave instructions to ban publicity regarding alcoholic beverages and tobacco, to preserve the physical and moral health of the Tunisian youth.

9018
CSO: 4400

MOKADDEM COMMENTS ON NEW DYNAMISM IN NATIONAL ASSEMBLY

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 21 Jul 80 pp 30-32

[Interview with President of the National Assembly Sadok Mokkadem by Raja el-Almi]

> [Text] On the eve of the celebration, this coming 25 July, of the 23rd anniversary of the republic, a "balance sheet" interview with the president of the national assembly--a fundamental institution of the democratic and republican system which this year has, moreover, begun its fifth session--was a "must." This was all the more true in that the method employed in the election of the nation's representatives (through the introduction of the system of expanded lists), and the agenda for the immediate future, both invite reflection. We have therefore deemed it useful to put some important questions to Dr Sadok Mokaddem.

[Question] Mr President, for the first time since independence the deputies of the National Assembly have been elected on the basis of a system prescribed by the Electoral Code: the system of expanded lists. These elections gave the citizens the opportunity to freely choose their representatives.

Has this new electoral formula resulted in the appearance--during the session now drawing to a close--of a new dynamism in the National Assembly, particularly at the level of the debates and the parliamentary committees?

[Answer] It is appropriate to note first of all that the procedure of the expanded lists has resulted in a major turnover in the membership of the National Assembly. Virtually two-thirds of the Assembly is composed of new deputies who are sitting in that body for the first time. Another important fact is the decrease in the average age of the deputies, for you cannot fail to have noted that this Assembly is much younger than the preceding one. Lastly, the deputies have in fact been eager to participate to a greater extent, both on the committees and in the plenary assemblies. It can accordingly be said that this new procedure (although we

are too close to the situation to judge, and despite some negative aspects that have been noted) has certain interesting positive aspects and provides food for thought and study. There is no doubt that the voters, and public opinion, have greeted the new system with considerable interest. The voter has felt himself more involved, for the new system enables him to feel that he is participating to a greater extent in public affairs. This heightened interest on the part of the voters is, moreover, an additional incentive for the deputies to express themselves more vigorously and influence the debates. As you say, a new dynamism is beginning to manifest itself, to take shape. I believe this is a good thing. I like to say--and to reiterate--that although we have been living under a representative system we have yet to create our traditions, our customs.... That takes a long time, and a quarter of a century--in the lifetime of a nation--isn't very long... especially when the turnover in the Assembly has been on a massive scale.

[Question] It is admissible, in a democracy, for an elected representative to have complete freedom of expression--and make his point of view prevail--in Parliament. There are limits, however. Could you tell us what they are?

[Answer] Democratic dialog has its rules. The essential thing is, above all else, tolerance toward opposing views, toward others. I believe this to be the fundamental rule of all democratic activity. The exercise of the right of self-expression therefore presupposes one's agreement that others shall also enjoy the same right to express themselves with the same freedom and under the same conditions. The second rule is to hold fast to certain norms--certain rules of the game--to which one should adhere, in that they derive from one's awareness of the responsibility one assumes when participating in public affairs, in the democratic system and in democratic dialog as an elected representative of the nation or even as an ordinary citizen. One should, moreover, feel duty bound to place this dialog on a certain level by acting in such a way that it will be oriented toward the search for truth and the public interest rather than toward disruption, personal attacks and so forth. These are the only limitations, and they are, moreover, not imposed but freely accepted.

In our case--in our Assembly--we obviously adhere to an agenda. One cannot bring up every aspect of every subject. That is the only limitation. I believe, moreover, that the deputies are beginning to use this right of expression with considerable skill and conscientiousness. The merit of our system is precisely the fact that it enables all the deputies--who are a representative sample of society as a whole--to express their own views together with those currents and trends of opinion that gave birth to their respective candidacies or that relate to their respective constituencies and backgrounds...which do not necessarily correspond to the point of view of their opponents in the debate....

[Question] It's the right to be different that makes the National Assembly so valuable....

[Answer] Yes, and these differences do not prejudice the quality of the dialogue. I believe this is the most important fact. It is an example of one of the bases of the Bourguiba philosophy, which is founded on dialog and compromise--an example taken from the parliamentary milieu.

[Question] In his keynote address to the National Assembly the prime minister placed emphasis on the clarity that should prevail in the relations among the different branches of government. In particular, he declared that the exercise of power should rule out secrecy.

In what measure does this intent serve to consolidate the relations of trust that exist between the legislative branch and the executive branch?

[Answer] I believe that in order to be fair and to be faithful to historical truth, it must be said that clarity has always existed in the relations between the government and the National Assembly. There has never been any secrecy, or secret agreements, or secret clauses, of any kind; there has been, in fact, a resolute manifestation of the truth. There have been two or three debates which have dealt with basic questions. I may mention the debate on the proposed union with Libya in 1974.... There has also been a complete openness both on the part of the Assembly and on the part of the government, and the respective responsibilities have been accepted with the greatest decisiveness. The same thing was true this year following the attack on Gafsa. The government did not conceal any of the data in its possession that were useful in an evaluation of the situation, and the deputies did not fail to state their views, ask questions and attempt to cast greater light on the events. The same was also true in 1978, when the agitation that occurred in January and the subsequent attempts to incite uprisings in our country also gave rise to a very intense and profound debate concerning the matter. This is to say that on the part of Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali what has happened is neither an innovation nor a new element in the evaluation of the relations between the government and the Assembly but rather the affirmation of a situation that has always prevailed in the relations between the two branches and that constitutes the very foundation, and the guaranty, of the efficient operation of our political system--a situation which I always define as good harmony, and good coordination, among the individual cogs in the machinery of our republican system.

[Question] Mr President, the 1979-1980 parliamentary session is coming to a close. Is it possible to identify for us its strong points?

[Answer] First of all, you know that as with all the assemblies in the world the important--the essential--action of an assembly is the budget. Why is this so? Because the budget lays bare all the problems that affect the life of the nation and offers a complete panorama of those problems. The analysis of the budget requires virtually 3 months of committee meetings and plenary assemblies. And also because the budget is the basic instrument which authorizes the government to employ the means necessary to carry out its policy, particularly when it is linked to the policy of

development. Through the instrumentality of the budget the complete framework of the state's activities is delineated by the joint effort of the Assembly and the government. The study of the budget is therefore the most difficult--and the most important--aspect of the session and the one that requires the greatest attention and care on the part of the deputies. A second aspect to be considered is the fact that through the medium of the cooperation agreements and international accords the whole of our foreign policy is evoked and gives rise--in the National Assembly--to debates with the government that are most valuable and most interesting. Problems also arise that relate to security, public order and the law. Substantial changes have been made in certain codes, as occurred this year in the case of the Civil and Commercial Code of Procedures, the penal code, and everything that relates to social security. These are very important problems to which the Assembly has accorded a great deal of attention.

[Question] The Gafsa incident demonstrated that national unity has been strengthened. What do you think can be done to consolidate this unity further?

[Answer] You know, it is my belief that the consolidation of national unity is a continuing task--a constant effort that should basically take into account not only the evolution of the mentality of our citizens but also the profound changes our society is undergoing as a result of its development. These changes are the consequences of development--consequences that are known and predictable but that are inevitable. They involve the generalization of education, the elevation of our standard of living, the number of dwellings that have been constructed, the social guarantees that have been granted--all of which serves to create among the citizens, in a general way, a somewhat different and changing vision the importance of which must be grasped precisely, in order that their decisions may be adapted to the maintenance of national unity. It is therefore not a matter of something sacrosanct before which one bows down or venerates because it is something sacred, something mysterious. It is instead a constant effort, a daily effort. I would almost say it is a state of mind, a mentality, that should prevail--especially among officials, at whatever level of responsibility they function. It is a continuing quest, an effort that is constantly renewed--a kind of dynamism for every moment. What you have here is the process of developing political awareness, the political maturation, the ferment, that is taking place in our society--for our society is indeed in the process of maturing. It is the gestation of a new social and economic order--gestation which is, very fortunately, taking place under good conditions despite some minor disturbances. It is a process of gestation that is nonetheless taking place: our society is giving birth to something new. This is the gamble that President Bourguiba has taken, that the party has taken. In one of his speeches the president said that after the attainment of independence in some countries the status quo had been preserved, with no effort being made to democratize education, to facilitate access by all social classes to education, to instruction, to responsibilities--primarily for the sake of having peace. It is a vision, however, that did prevail in certain countries for a time but ended in an explosion. Here in Tunisia the president and the party took a gamble,

with all the risks it entailed, and they did so consciously. We are witnessing a profound transformation in our society--a transformation that was anticipated and that will give birth to a new society, which Medi Nouira has called the "Middle Society." I believe we shall achieve a social system that will satisfy the aspirations of the young people who raise their eyes toward the heavens, toward the future: who scrutinize the future to see what will become of them, how their destiny will evolve, with all the attendant social and economic implications and also all the constraints--the constraints of employment, the constraints of investment, and so on--which are often very severe. All of this, however, is the risk that democracy and development entail.

[Question] The country is about to begin preparation of the Sixth Plan for economic and social development. How does the National Assembly propose to participate effectively in this preparation?

[Answer] Participation in the preparation of the Sixth Plan is taking place on several levels. There are the preliminary phases, which are now in the process of implementation and in which the deputies are participating in different individual capacities, either through their national organizations or through their sectorial committees. Their participation is therefore a fact. The Assembly is already present in the person of these elements, who are participating as individuals or as representatives of their respective organizations. Once the bill has taken shape there will be committees on which deputies will also serve. It is when the draft of the bill is completed that the Assembly will take formal charge of it, for in the final analysis the draft plan will become a law--an executory law--which will to some extent follow the same process as all laws.

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BRIEFS

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ACTIVITIES--The National Assembly reports the following: "The expanded commissions of the National Assembly, including all deputies, shall meet on Tuesday 19 August 1980 at 0900 for a general foreign policy debate with the minister of foreign affairs. In the course of their joint meeting, to be held on Thursday 21 August 1980, at 0900 hours, the finance and plan commissions and the agriculture, industry, and trade commissions shall hear the minister of the national economy on a draft project authorizing the state to subscribe to the capitalization of the Wholesale Markets Company of Tunis. The National Assembly shall meet next Thursday at 1100 hours to examine the motion to deprive Hassen Kacem of his paarliamentary immunity." [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Aug 80 p 5] 5157

RETIREMENT FUND FOR PROFESSIONALS--Yesterday morning Mohamed Ennaceur, minister of social affairs, received in his office a delegation representing the boards of directors of the councils of the Order of Physicians, Pharmacists, and Architects, and of the National Union of General Insurance Agents. The discussions dealt with extending the retirement system to members of the liberal professions. Mohamed Ennaceur informed the delegation members that the retirement plan is currently under study by the ministry and that an expert of the International Labor Office (ILO) is examining the question. The beneficiaries of this system will choose the formula best adapted to their situation. Furthermore, the delegation informed the minister of a plan for the establishment of a national liberal professions union. A provisional community has been set up to this effect. Its mission will be to facilitate coordination with the Ministry of Social Affairs with a view to extending the old age, disability, and survivor benefits to the liberal professions. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Aug 80 p 1] 5157

CANDIDATES FOR EZ-ZAHRA ELECTIONS--Following is the list of the candidates for the partial municipal elections of Ez-Zahra: Fatma Larbi Boussoffara; Youssef Meganem; Abdeljelil Boudraa; Tahar Bouchlaka; Habib Ghedamsi; Habib Kherigi; Abdelhakim Chtili; Mohamed Sahil; Slaheddine Belhaouane; Mohamed Ben Ali; Makhtar Ben F'Tima; Amal M'zah; Ahmed Mansour Ben Jomaa; Rafika Marrakchi; Hassiba Chediy; Abdelaziz Toull; Abdelhamid Ammari; Rachid Ben Hassine; Khemales Lajmi; Mohamed Limam; Belhassen M'rad; Mohamed Mokhtar Labidi; Moncef Frini; Mohamed Solah Ayari; Mohamed Ben Maamer; Mohamed Ezzi; Nabil Gafsi; Farouk Ben M'rad; Ali Chebil; Rabeh Kannou; Hechmi Ben Romdhane; Hassen Bellil. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Aug 80 p 4] 5157

BOU ARKOUB MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS--The Bou Arkoub partial municipal elections campaign opened last Thursday. At an electoral meeting organized on this occasion the secretary general of the Nabeul Coordination Committee recalled that the creation of the Bou Arkoub municipality was consistent with the wish expressed by the local citizens. He discussed the mission of the municipality as a cell for action and promotion and as a course in the learning and exercise of democracy. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Aug 80 p 4] 5157

CSO: 4400

AOSARIO OPEN LETTER TO AFRICAN HEADS OF STATE

Rabat L'OPINION in French 6 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] The Movement of the Natives of Saguiet Al Hamra and of Rio de Oro (AOSARIO) sent an open letter to all the African heads of state in the framework of the next meeting of the Committee of the Wise Men, which will meet shortly in Africa. Here is the complete text of that letter:

Open letter to
Their Excellencies the African Heads of State
with a copy for information to their ministers of
Foreign Affairs,

Excellencies,

At a time when all eyes are turned toward the occurrence of the future meeting of the Committee of the Wise Men, which will have to debate the so-called "Sahara formerly under Spanish domination" problem, the AOSARIO appeals to the sense of responsibility and to the conscience of the African leaders, asking them to situate the debate in its proper context, even to consider it--which is actually the case--under the conflictual angle which sees opposed our mother country, Morocco, and the Algerian Republic, which by its intentions and its tendencies toward expansionism and hegemonism has deliberately sacrificed the life, the destiny and the future of our people now held captive on Algerian soil.

Permit us to recall briefly to all the African leaders that historic moment when the creation of the "Polisario" was decided upon in 1974 in Algiers under the most artificial conditions.

It was indeed after the first movement of liberation born in the Sahara against the occupant--a movement whose offices were located in Algeria until the end of 1974--had refused to play the role of a puppet in the service of Algiers, that the leaders in power in the country had recourse to that dilatory maneuver. A maneuver which was to permit them to carry out their pact

with the Francoist authorities on political and economic concessions, which were themselves based on the respective interests of the two heads of state.

It was in accordance with this secret pact made known after the death of Franco, that the Algerian leaders tried from the month of June 1975 to place their troops in strategic positions located in the Sahara, particularly Amgala, Mahbes, Guelta Zemmour, as well as in several forts along the lines which link these bridgeheads; in addition the confrontation at the places cited between Algerian troops and Royal Army Forces had revealed this maneuver on which Algiers was counting to quietly replace the colonial forces in place.

The Overwhelming Evidence

In order to avoid hasty and unfounded positions and for the purpose of allowing international and African opinion to be informed in particular, the AOSARIO has drawn up a paper which will be placed in the hands of Amnesty International, the Committee of the Wise Men and all the appropriate international authorities. This paper is supported by the testimony of dozens of our brothers who have fled the camps set up in the great Algerian south, telling of the conditions of imprisonment of our people, the barbarous and inhumane treatment inflicted daily upon them, the physical liquidations, the collective and systematic massacres of which all who refused to play the Algerian game and submit were victims.

Active Solidarity with Morocco

Other peoples have also witnessed deportations and the taking as hostages of hundreds of members of our tribes by the Algerian army at the time it fell back from positions it was occupying on our soil before the arrival of troops of the Royal Armed Forces.

In the face of these serious events witnessed by the African northwest, in the face of that truth travestied by the Algerian-Libyan coalition, which cares only about its own hegemonic interests, African leaders have an obligation to use every effort to safeguard the principles of African solidarity and fraternity. A solidarity and fraternity which must be based unconditionally on ideological or clan contingencies. On that point we can affirm--without fear of contradiction--that if the African peoples are divided into states and nations, it is nevertheless true that they remain one and the same family, a family which, despite great ethnic and cultural diversity, forms a single mosaic in which each individual must find his own place.

We ourselves are persuaded that the African leaders will examine our case, a living Calvary for our brothers and sisters on Algerian soil, with great lucidity and with that great wisdom which is known to be theirs. We do not doubt, moreover, that the interests of our mother country, Morocco, will be protected against all partiality and injustice.

A retrospective of the last 3 decades of history can only lead the African leaders to realize that it is precisely the courageous attitude of our people and that of their sovereign, their authentically militant solidarity adopted with respect to the Algerian people struggling for their independence, which has caused the process of decolonialization undertaken by Spain in accordance with our country's wishes in these regions of the south to stop mid-way and this was done in a unilateral and arbitrary way by that same Spain which had just returned to Morocco Tarfaya and its region, which was followed by the return of Ifni.

A Single Family

These historical facts, as well as those concerning a legal precedent, explain why the principle of the inviolability of the colonial frontiers according to the OAU cannot be applied specifically to the case of Morocco in the matter of the process of decolonialization involving the regions of the south. One cannot refer to historical references without being obliged to recall, moreover, that all the peoples of the Sahara who were formerly under Spanish domination are from a generological and ethnological point of view only parts of mother tribes, established since time immemorial within the mother country, Morocco. The profound reasons which have provoked that hostility on the part of Spain are due to the pressure from the former colonial powers and are aimed directly at Morocco and its people, who have never faltered in their unconditional support of the Algerian FLN.

It must be noted that if the Moroccan people and their sovereign had agreed to accept the colonial arguments by refusing, because of them, to grant refuge bases to the Algerian fighters, there can be no doubt that no pressure would have been exerted on Spain. Pressure advising it at the time to halt a process of decolonialization, which would have inevitably led several years ago to giving back the Sahara to the mother country, Morocco.

Scorn for International Conventions

Must it be recalled that it is thanks to the political, diplomatic and military support of Morocco that the colonial maneuver of France, which attempted to create an independent state in the Algerian Sahara, was thwarted. Thanks also to the solidarity of the African countries certain "rump" states, which were to be created on purpose, never came into existence (Biafra, Katanga, Cabinda...) and thus was avoided the Balcanization of Africa. And we, authentic native peoples of the Sahara formerly under Spanish domination, are being tortured in camps by the Algerian leaders, in scorn of international law and African fraternity. Torture, massacres and deportation of our families are utilized for hegemonic purposes by that country. We deplore strongly the scorning on the part of Algerian leaders of international conventions, these leaders who have until now refused to take a census, as required by the Geneva Convention, of our brothers held on their soil, just as they have refused to receive any international commission whose role would be to authenticate the native peoples of the Sahara formerly under Spanish domination.

We also deplore the fact that tens of thousands of Malians, of Chadians, of Nigerians, of Mauritanians and of Algerian Sahraouis are shown in Tindouf in showcase camps as being native peoples of our region and constituting a storehouse of subversion for the countries of that region.

The AOSARIO movement which brings together MOREHOB, the first liberation movement born in the Sahara, the PUNS [Sahraoui National Union Party], the FLU [Front for Liberation and Unity] and the Jemaa, all of whom are petitioning the United Nations, express the hope of seeing the African heads of state discriminate between lies and truth in the face of a coalition of Algerian-Libyan interests, of which all africa is fully aware.

5 August 1980
for the AOSARIO
The Secretary Genera;
signed: Ahmed Rachid

8956
CSO: 4400

AOSARIO SECRETARY GENERAL DISCUSSES ORGANIZATION'S ROLE

Rabat L'OPINION in French 31 Jul 80 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Mr Ahmed Rachid, secretary of AOSARIO by M. T.--date and place unknown]

> [Text] The secretary general of the AOSARIO, Ahmed Ould Rachid, declares in an exclusive interview with L'OPINION: It is necessary to combat and eliminate the harmful activities of the enemy's fifth column.
>
> Toward the intensification of AOSARIO military action.
>
> The time having come, the historic movements--that is the MOREHOB [expansion unknown], the PUNS [Sahraoui National Union Party], the FLU [Front for Liberation and Unity], and the Jemaa and the AOSARIO--will testify before African and international authorities.
>
> More than 7,000 regular Mauritanian troops assigned by the Nouakchott regime to the ranks of the mercenaries in service of Algerian hegemonism.
>
> In a declaration published exclusively in L'OPINION, the secretary general of the AOSARIO explains his organization, its structure and its program for the immediate future.

In answer to the request to define the AOSARIO, Mr Ahmed Rachid emphasizes the fact that his movement has its legitimacy in the necessity to demystify and counteract the allegations of the Algerian mercenaries and to prove, in particular, that our Sahraoui brothers are being held captive in Tindouf.

The moment having come, adds the secretary general of the AOSARIO, the historic movements having struggled against Spanish colonialism and having defended the territorial integrity of the mother country, Morocco, that is, the MOREHOB, the Sahraoi National Union Party (PUNS), the Front for Liberation and Unity (FLU) and the Jemaa will testify before African and international authorities, just as they had already done in 1975 and 1976 before the United Nations.

Mr Ahmed Rachid points our further that it is up to our government, and to it alone, to draw the conclusions which are imposed by past events and those to come.

A Single Struggle

Concerning the role that the AOSARIO ought to fill, he pointed out that it was part of the great struggle led by the Moroccan people in support of their sovereign. "Because, if the uniforms are different, it is nevertheless true that the end result is the same, that is, the struggle against the enemies of our integrity and of our national unity."

"For us," adds Mr Ahmed Rachid, "our country and our people must remain vigilant, more than ever, in order to--not only--oppose the foreign enemy, but also to combat and thwart the harmful activities of that fifth column which is acting openly and is benefiting from a certain immunity which permits it to operate in relative peace."

"I cite, for example," adds the secretary general of the AOSARIO, certain Mauritanians whom we meet, as we travel around to Dakar and other places, and who, strangely, denigrate our accomplishments, while they benefit from considerable advantages right here in Morocco."

To the question of the AOSARIO'S views and future actions, Mr Ahmed Rachid reminds us that the AOSARIO is being used to complete the implantation of the organizational infrastructure in Europe as well as in Africa, and has laid the groundwork for more active cooperation with the international movements and organizations which share its convictions.

Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism

"It was for that purpose," Mr Ahmed Rachid adds, "that the AOSARIO met in Paris with Mr al-Bitar, the former Syrian prime minister and co-founder of the Baas Party, 1 week before his assasination by the henchmen of Hafed Al Assad and his brother. Mr al-Bitar was chairing a delegation which, along with other African and European leaders and officials, participated in drawing up a charter intended to promote Pan-Islamism, Pan-Africanism and Pan-Arabism.

"All these organizations," adds Mr Rachid, "have assured the AOSARIO of their full support and have, together, rendered a vibrant homage to the actions of the late king, Mohammed V and to his worthy successor, Hassan II, and that was done for the good of all our peoples who are affected by those actions. These organizations have, in addition, assured our movement of their active and militant support."

Intensified Action

"Our action," the secretary general of the AOSARIO added, "followed by great attention on the part of African leaders, will be intensified and extended to the whole of the continent."

Recalling what President Senghor revealed recently concerning the racist aspect of the Algerian mercenaries, Mr Ahmed Rachid points out that "the president of Senegal has laid bare the nature of a policy that the Algerians modeled after those of Hitler."

Algiers Accused

"Taking into consideration our contacts with "Amnesty International" and certain humanitarian organizations, under the United Nations," adds the secretary general of the AOSARIO, "the massacres ordered by Algiers of Black Mauritanians and Senegalese, as well as hundreds of our brothers and sisters held prisoner on Algerian soil, taking into consideration these contacts we can state that international opinion has decided to judge severely the genocide that Algiers is guilty of. It is in that context that the AOSARIO is preparing a legal dossier which will confound the criminals and show the facts of the genocide based on irrefutable testimony."

On the military level, Mr Ahmed Rachid claims that "it is not impossible, it is even probable that the AOSARIO will intensify and extend its military action to regions where our brothers and sisters are held prisoner." "The action itself," points our Mr Ahmed Rachid, "might possibly take the form of reprisals against all those who would dare interfere in our domestic affairs and especially against those who might try to use our destiny for hegemonic ends."

"I point out," says the secretary general of the AOSARIO, "that the indigenous peoples of the Sahara will never exchange their Moroccan heritage for Algerian welfare."

Mauritanian Provocations

In conclusion, Mr Ahmed Rachid denounces the provocative role played by certain Mauritanian officials, of which the latest provocation against our country was the placing at the disposition of the mercenaries in the pay of the Algerian government of 7,000 troops of the regular Mauritanian army.

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END

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26 September 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2188

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26 September 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2188

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ARAB LEAGUE UN ENVOY ON JERUSALEM, U.S. RELATIONS

LD080855 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 29 Aug 80 pp 22-23

[Interview of Arab League UN Ambassador Dr Clovis Maqsud by 'Muhammad 'Abd al-Mawla in Washington--date not given]

[Excerpt] Some 4 weeks ago the UN General Assembly held a special session to discuss the Palestinian issue and adopted basic resolutions in favor of the Palestinian people and the PLO. Two weeks ago, the UN Security Council held an emergency session to discuss Israeli Decision to annex Arab Jerusalem to Israel.

Irrespective of the results of the Security Council debate, Arab diplomatic efforts will not stop, as Arab League UN Ambassador Dr Clovis Maqsud has told AL-HAWADITH. The Arabs will use all ways and means provided by the international organization to achieve their aims, be they diplomatic, economic or military.

I asked Ambassador Maqsud in his Washington office: But who is to implement these sanctions or military measures?

He replied: The Arabs, of course. The United Nations approves of punishing Israel.

I said: The American representatives at the General Assembly said that the Arabs will not secure the votes of two-thirds of the General Assembly matters if they seek to freeze Israel's membership.

He answered: We guarantee two-thirds of the votes, because the majority of world states are with the Arabs.

I said: Do you believe that the Jerusalem problem will restore Egypt to the Arab camp? Could it be a reason for Egypt to abandon Camp David?

He said: Basically, Israel regarded Camp David as an authorization to continue with its obstinate policy. Since Camp David Israel has intensified

the construction of settlements and expanded the existing ones, annexed Jerusalem and persisted in its barbaric attacks on south Lebanon. This means that Camp David is more an American achievement than a Middle Eastern one. Regarding the second part of the question, a change will occur in Egypt and Egypt will resume its natural Arab role.

When we moved on to discuss the American election, I asked Dr Maqsud: In your opinion, who is better for Arab causes: Carter or Reagan?

He answered: Both of them are bad. If the Arabs wish to overthrow one of the candidates, they have only to say that they support him.

Dr Maqsud then spoke about Israel's disregard of all international laws. He said: Israel is a state which has never had a sense of responsibility for its actions. This is a very odd situation.

I said: What about the Arabs' respect for America's interests and America's disrespect of Arab interests?

Dr Maqsud replied: There is an extensive Arab awareness that it is no longer permissible to meet America's demands unless America meets Arab demands. If America has interests, so do the Arabs. The last meeting between King Khalid and President Saddam Husayn on Jerusalem emphasized the aforementioned fact not only with regard to America but also with regard to world states. The decision to take a unified stand against every state that recognizes Jerusalem as Israel's capital is an indication that the Arabs have begun to couple words with deeds. The fact is that the equation between America's insistence on fulfilling its economic requirements and its disregard of crucial Arab interests cannot go on. This equation must be balanced through more dialog, mutual understanding and frankness, without convulsions and by further study of all the legitimate Arab demands. That we should fulfill their demands while they deny ours is also an abnormal situation.

[Question] Is this a genuine posture or just mere words?

[Answer] Arab convictions have begun to crystallize in the behavior of the Arab governments. This was apparent recently when the IMF attempts to reject PLO's admission as an observer and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE responded by suspending their contributions. We are now open to dialog, but not a one-way dialog.

[Question] Is this a warning that the Arab League is addressing to the world?

[Answer] Developments demand that the Arabs adopt serious stands. We do not warn; we draw attention. True, we have problems and we talk, but the people have begun to think and talk. Sometimes in the past, we used to think of a subject but not announce it. Sometimes we announce a stand but do not act on it. The process of coupling words with deeds has now begun.

[Question] Why did the Arabs react to the European initiative the way they did?

[Answer] The European proposals are a positive step but not precise. If it represents a final European stand, then it is unacceptable. But if it constitutes a step and a beginning, then we approve of it. The European representative now visiting the area will submit his report. This means that the Europeans will be reconsidering their stance. Therefore, we cannot say that the Europeans' Venice proposals were final.

[Question] Let us suppose that the Europeans' Venice stance is the first step: should not the Arabs encourage them in this direction in order to strengthen their position vis-a-vis the United States?

[Answer] As far as Europe is concerned, the basic factor is recognition of the PLO. Have the Europeans come up with an equation stipulating that the PLO must participate in the peace discussions? The European position is ambiguous. Israel's record proves that it always interprets ambiguities in a manner that serves its occupation and expansion. The European initiative is a fine gesture, but the way it was produced is bad. We hope it will be reporduced in a better manner. We are neither negative nor positive; our position depends on the results.

[Question] Should not the Europeans recognize the PLO as a result of the Common Market's recent mission?

[Answer] If they fail to do so, the Europeans must be wasting a historic opportunity, because they will not have carried out their convictions.

CSO: 4802

FRENCH COMMENTATOR SEES EC QUIET DIPLOMACY AS MIDEAST PEACE KEY

LD150921 Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 9 Sep 80 p 18

[Interview given to AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM by Philippe (Rondeau), director of the Middle East Section of the French Center for International Political Studies and Research, in Paris--date not given]

[Excerpt] [Question] What is your assessment of the current situation in the Middle East?

[Answer] It must be said that the peace process in the Middle East has now reached an impasse, especially in relation to the Egyptian-Israeli autonomy talks. It is internationally recognized that these talks have failed. The recent Israeli measure annexing the city of Jerusalem demonstrates clearly and definitely the extent of Israel's obstinacy and defiance of all international principles and laws, which make illegal Israel's measures to Judaize and annex Jerusalem its military occupation of the holy city in 1967.

Meanwhile, I am certain that President al-Sadat is aware of the failure of the Egyptian-Israeli talks. Al-Sadat, however, continues to pin hopes on the peace process which he has initiated with Israel, because he does not wish to admit the erroneousness of this process which started with the Camp David agreements and the separate Egyptian-Israeli peace accord. Peace in the Middle East can be achieved only by Arab consensus, because the Palestinian issue concerns all the Arab states.

It is also clear that the situation in the Middle East has reached an impasse because the United States, which can exert pressure on Israel, is now preoccupied with the Presidential election and is therefore giving secondary attention to the Middle East. Also, the focus of international attention, especially in the United States, the country which is primarily concerned with the peace process in the area, has shifted to the Iranian-American diplomatic crisis. By its present policy, Israel is trying to complicate matters and increase tension in the area while it continues to defy the international will, deny the Palestinian people's rights which have been recognized by the international community, and disregard the principles of human rights.

[Question] In your capacity as a politician who has been following the developments in the Middle East, what in your opinion is the way out of the impasse which the Middle East peace process has reached?

[Answer] I believe that the Middle East crisis must be resolved through comprehensive international participation in the peace efforts by putting the Middle East issue before an international conference in which the United States, the Soviet Union, Europe and all the parties concerned with the Arab-Israeli conflict will participate under UN supervision. We are now living in an age of international solidarity and no one state, however strong and mighty, has the right to monopolize the responsibility of mediating to resolve such a complex issue as the Middle East: This issue concerns the entire international community, in view of the fact that the whole world's future depends on the fate of the Middle East area, with its political and economic importance to the world. It is true that the United States is the only country which can exert direct pressure on Israel to follow the road to peace. Therefore, Washington must pressure the Tel Aviv government and participate with the international community in the international diplomatic efforts to ensure stability and security in the Middle East and throughout the world. Everybody is aware that, if the Soviet Union remains outside the peace efforts in the Middle East, it has the means to frustrate any settlement achieved in the area without its participation, because Soviet influence exists in the area whether Washington likes it or not.

[Question] What role can Europe play in the MIddle East peace efforts?

[Answer] If we review the history of events in the Middle East from 1947 through French President Giscard d'Estaing's visit to the Arab area last March, we will find out that Europe used to be content to comment and express views on the settlement plans put forward by the United States for a peaceful settlement in the area. I believe, however, that the statements President Giscard made during his Arab tour are regarded as a historic turning point in the European Middle East role, especially because all the European Common Market member states supported the settlement principles voiced by the French president: the need for Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, for the Palestinian people to have the right to determine their own fate, and for PLO participation in the diplomatic efforts in the area. The European community has agreed to contribute to the achievement of these principles. This is a very positive situation, because some of the European states which adopted these principles previously opposed PLO participation in the international efforts. This European change constitutes support for the Arab cause in international diplomatic circles. European envoy Thorn's tour of the Arab capitals will add strength to this European stance. The day must come for the European community to take an effective diplomatic initiative to contribute to the establishment of a comprehensive, just peace. The European stand must have an impact on Europe's ally, the United States, which must eventually adopt the same

attitude as Europe to the principles of a peaceful, just settlement in the Middle East. What I wish to say is that Europe, in its moves regarding the Middle East, is pursuing quiet diplomacy which requires intensive contacts with the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict before defining the basis of the European initiative, which I believe will one day emerge strong and clear and bring the Middle East crisis back to an international conference to establish the necessary international guarantees for peace between the Arabs and Israel.

CSO: 4802

EMIGRATION OF ARAB FINANCIERS FOLLOWS THAT OF ARAB CAPITAL

'AL HAWADITH' Detects New Phenomenon

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 18 Jul 80 p 65

[Text] Because Arab oil is considered by those who have it and by the world to be a universal commodity, it is natural that oil funds, or more accurately, surplus oil funds should become global funds roaming the capital markets abroad in search of security, profit or trade. Arab banks would not have been able to accommodate this sudden activity had not Beirut been an advanced center for banking, technical services and business before the oil surge. Beirut had thus acquired a world-wide reputation which it did not lose despite the destructive war. Other European and Arab capitals were not able to take Beirut's place.

Recently, more specifically since the war in Lebanon began, a new phenomenon has emerged: banks and bankers are now moving to the international centers of capital, whereas in the past only capital moved. Some people are saying that this phenomenon is damaging, because it is stripping the Arab world of necessary expertise, and tempting those who have capital to move away from their homelands, thereby depriving these homelands of investment and development opportunities. But other people are saying that this prevents foreigners from carrying out the plunder and the exploitation they used to carry out.

Now that this phenomenon has been established and has become an existing fact, AL-HAWADITH thought it would be appropriate to shed some light on this phenomenon, regardless of its pros and cons and regardless of who its heroes are and what people think of them. This will be the beginning of a journalistic assignment that will in the future assume the character of a meticulous scientific inquiry. AL-HAWADITH met with Dr Bashir al-Zuhayri, Sabih Shukri, 'Ali al-Jammal and 'Abd-al-Karim al-Mudarris. This special supplement is [the result of these interviews]; it is the first in a series of its kind.

Views of Bashir al-Zuhayri

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[Text] Financial experts estimate that at the end of 1979 oil exporting countries had 200 billion dollars in assets outside the Arab world. They are

saying that the conditions which were created by the revolution in Iran--conditions which shrivelled the volume of development projects in these countries--will increase those assets another 100 billion dollars. Those people add, "About 70 percent of these assets which are considered surplus oil money belongs to the countries of the gulf and especially Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The amount of these assets which are owned by individuals does not exceed 15 percent, but it does constitute huge accumulations of capital, especially if the population is compared to the amount of these assets."

This situation raises an inevitable question: Where do the Arabs invest their money, and what sectors do they prefer in investment operations? Dr Bashir al-Zuhayri, director of the Arab-European Bank Group in London, says:

"There are Arab investments owned by governments and placed by funds created by these governments; and there are private Arab investments. We must in fact distinguish between these two kinds of investments. Investments that assume a governmental character and constitute a monetary surplus revert to the oil producing countries. Since 1979 statistics have not yet been issued, 1978 statistics did shed some light on the distribution of these investments.

"There are, first, capital investments in international markets, that is, the funds that are in circulation in the capital market--Euromarket. It is estimated that these funds are around 60 billion dollars.

"Second, there are direct investments in the United States, that is, the investments that are made in securities, in investment certificates and in treasury notes. These are usually issued by major banks and purchased by Arab countries that have a surplus when these countries invest part of their capital in U.S. markets. Third, there are direct investments in the industrial countries, that is, a number of Arab countries that have surplus funds are investing part of their capital in shares in major industrial corporations or in joint industrial organizations. For example, shares in the Mercedes Corporation were purchased, and recently Libya purchased shares in the Fiat Automobile Company. Other investments are also made in various sectors. It has been estimated that these investments amount to about 35 billion dollars.

"Fourth, there are loans and aid to developing countries: about 20 billion dollars have already been offered. There are also capital contributions for developing the international development organizations such as the international food funds or the organizations that are affiliated with IBRD. These contributions are estimated at about 12 billion dollars. This sum constitutes the trends that Arab government investments abroad [seem to be taking].

"In return for the joy which the western world feels for its success in luring Arab oil funds to Europe, much criticism is being leveled against these methods of investment. Among such critical remarks, for example, [are the following]: Why are the Arabs investing their capital in dollars when the dollar is in such decline in money markets world-wide? Why don't the Arabs

resort to the "currency basket" method? Why don't the Arabs invest in the Arab countries? Dr al-Zuhayri says, "Arab countries sell their oil for dollars; oil contracts are concluded in dollars. When the proceeds of these contracts are collected, these proceeds are in dollars and not in another currency. To protect themselves from currency fluctuations, the Arab countries resorted to--and the world market is still experiencing such fluctuations--diversifying their foreign currency reserves and investments. They began to convert the dollar to other currencies like the pound sterling and the Deutschmark. Thus they gradually formed a kind of currency basket. There is another example: A loan was agreed upon between Saudi Arabia and West Germany. This kind of investment indicates that Arab investments are being diversified.

"Contrary to what is being rumored, I do not believe that pressures are being made on the Arab countries to deposit their funds in specific countries; rather, the funds go where the depositor's interests lie and especially where there are obvious changes in interest rates. If we were to take the last two months as an example, we would see that the interest rates in dollars had risen to 16 percent, and an inclination to invest in dollars emerged. This is because the interest rate is rewarding and beneficial. But to counter this investment in dollars were the dangers that arose as a result of the fluctuations in the other foreign currencies which did not raise interest rates. Deposits were then made wherever payment contracts were to be found, that is, when the Arab countries had obligations to pay for industrial equipment, for basic foods or for any purchases. If these contracts were made in dollars, funds for making those payments had to be deposited in dollars. In this case, the depositor would not assume responsibility for fluctuations in the exchange rates for that currency. It is for this reason that I do not believe there are political pressures, but there are agreements and mutual interests between the Arab countries and the advanced industrial countries.

"There are, of course, conflicting opinions in the hallways of capitalists' chambers around the future of Arab investments and especially Arab deposits. Questions are being raised earnestly about the future of deposits, especially after President Carter froze Iranian funds. It is being said that political intervention in this area has weakened the depositor's confidence in those banks that complied with the measure. Afterwards there was a movement to expand Arab banks so as to create the proper technology that would oversee the growing Arab deposits. The danger to Arab deposits emerged not too long ago when a movement appeared in the meetings of presidents of western banks to draw up a special policy for lending money to developing countries, and the Arab countries are, of course, among them. What does this mean? If this policy is drawn up, it will ultimately mean that it will affect development projects in the Arab world.

"If these countries were to declare, for example, that the loans they will make will be a certain percentage of the capital or of the deposits available in banks, this would mean that the ability to lend money would be determined by this policy, and the countries that will be affected by this policy are the countries that borrow money. These countries need the loans to complete

existing projects they have; they need the loans for development operations; for settling a temporary deficit in the balance of payments, or for guaranteeing that basic materials are imported.

"In western countries all this leads to an increase in the quantity of currency that remains uninvested. When this quantity of currency grows, interest rates can be manipulated. When interest rates fall, Arab deposits will be substantially affected. It is this situation that proposes anew the need to create an Arab money market and the need to create Arab financial institutions that specialize in lending operations and in utilizing this interest to benefit Arab interests on the one hand and the interests of Arab investors, on the other."

Views of Sabih Shukri

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[Text] It is difficult to keep track of the figures as they move on the telex or on the teleprinter. It is even difficult to explain the reasons why these figures change. During the past 15 months billions of dollars have been transferred from the gulf and from Saudi Arabia to Europe. Although it is difficult to determine the amount of these funds, one of the directors of foreign banks in London's financial district, the City, says, "During the first few months of 1979 billions of dollars were taken out of the Middle East and sent to Europe to settle in European banks. After the shock of 1974 [officials in] European banks are no longer astonished when billions of dollars are suddenly moved. That was the time when the cry that was heard in financial and political circles was this: 'What will the Arabs do with their surplus funds' as a result of the fact that oil prices had been doubled?"

If it is difficult to tabulate the real sums of money that are leaving their Arab homeland permanently or temporarily, it is also difficult to pinpoint the single basic reason [for this phenomenon]. Is it the revolution of Iran? Is it the threatened stability in the area and the subsequent intervention of the Soviets in Afghanistan? Or is it the inability of Arab and even international banks in that area to accommodate this surplus? Are these funds being sent to Europe for investment purposes in the form of world-wide loans or what? Before all this [happened], what role did Arab banks play to attract this surplus? The flow of Arab funds to the magic safes in Europe has not stopped. The overflow of funds was sent to the United States and then eastward to South Korea, to Japan and sometimes to Hong Kong. The world is now experiencing the phenomenon of Arab funds without regional or international identities leaving their homeland. This immigrant who needs no passport, no entrance visa and no multi-colored luggage has caused a strange madness in Europe that is still in its initial stages. According to one of the financial experts, the catastrophe has been delayed and no one knows whom it will hit. Will it hit Europe which is receiving the immigrant with an ardent embrace, or will it hit the immigrant's country? What is important is the fact that there are many questions that need answers. We had the following interview with Sabih Shukri, the leading figure in Arab banks in London (as the financial city calls him) and the executive director of the Allied Arab Bank.

[Question] You had advised the late 'Abd-al-Hamid Shuman, the founder of the Arab Bank to open a branch of the Arab Bank in London. You gave him this advice before the June war. He followed your advice, and you did [in fact] open a branch in London in 1972. What is the reason that made you predict that Arab surplus funds will be unexpectedly large after the Ramadan [October] war in 1973 so as to make Arab banks in particular seek those funds in Europe itself?

[Answer] The story began when I was director of al-Rafidin Bank in London. I returned to Jordan late in 1965 as director of the same bank in Amman, and I was in Jordan during the 1967 war. After a careful reading of all the circumstances surrounding the area, and especially the oil crisis and the fear and anxiety that developed therefrom in the world's banking and financial circles as a result of the interruption of oil resources and the closing of the Suez Canal, it became evident to me that oil resources will become the principal question for the world with regard to the Middle East region. Therefore, I thought that all Arab financial institutions should prepare themselves to establish their special presence in world markets so that they would be ready to accommodate the surplus Arab funds in the future. It is coincidental in this regard that I was able to establish the foundations of the bank in 1972 so it would ready for operations early in 1973.

[Question] A few years later you took another step that was more courageous and more comprehensive. You established an independent bank in London in particular. This was not a branch as had been customary. Why did you take this step?

[Answer] It was the same logic that required that this step be made. At that time I thought that instead of having branches of banking institutions outside the Arab countries, there should be Arab banking establishments whose main office and centers were outside the Arab world. These banks could serve as a bridge to connect Arab markets to the present market in London on the basis of the fact that London was their universal center. Currency conversion and investment decisions would thus be more flexible and subject to more liberal conditions with universal guarantees. Such decisions would not be restricted by the political and economic restraints in the Arab countries, and such establishments would be more beneficial than others for Arab financial investments.

[Question] Arab banks then began to be established quickly, and they began to grow quickly. What were the early days of these banks like, or if you will, the branches of these banks?

[Answer] As far as I know the first Arab bank was established in England in 1954. This was a branch of al-Rafidin Bank, which is the bank of the Iraqi government. Afterwards, Arab banks began to establish branches in Britain first and then in the rest of Europe. I do not remember that a bank began operating in Europe before that date.

[Question] Why weren't Arab banks established in Europe before that date?

[Answer] The reason, I think, is that Arab banks in the Arab countries themselves were not major establishments with technical capabilities that would enable them to establish branches in Europe. Al-Rafidin Bank was an exception. Then the Arab Bank was established after it. Al-Rafidin Bank established a branch in London only. I believe that the Arab Bank established a branch in Switzerland and then one in Germany early in the sixties.

[Question] Banks proliferated afterwards. Can it be said that the Ramadan [October] war and the sudden fortunes that were produced by oil were the reason for the proliferation of Arab banks?

[Answer] Yes, after the Ramadan war Arab banks that were governmental and national began to grow in Europe. Arab banks also began to participate in European and world banks such as the UBAF Bank, the Arab Bank and the Allied Arab Bank which was established on a British foundation with Arab funds and Arab management. Attempts were then made in the United States to establish Arab banks there. Zionist resistance, however, was so strong that these attempts were thwarted. It was around this time that the International Saudi Arabian Bank was established in 1974-1975.

[Question] Was the establishment of these banks the result of the development of banking business in the Arab world or was it the result of the increased activity of Arab investments in particular?

[Answer] Of course it was the result of the increased investment activity of Arab funds and not the result of the development of the banking business. There is no doubt that Arab banking activity has undergone unexpected growth and prosperity. The evidence for this is the emergence of joint Arab banking institutions.

[Question] Have these banks been able to accommodate Arab investments and surplus Arab funds?

[Answer] No, not even a small portion of those funds. This is because Arab investments are still going to foreign banks for many reasons, perhaps the most important of them is the fact that Arabs do not have absolute confidence in Arab establishments, that is, relative to their confidence in foreign banking establishments.

[Question] Some people are saying that the flow of Arab funds into foreign banks is part of a plan that is almost a conspiracy against those funds. Iran has learned a lesson from depositing its funds in foreign banks.

[Answer] I have no knowledge of a conspiracy of this kind; but wherever there is money, and especially Arab money in this amount, there would be rumors. It is natural, however, for Arab organizations to deal with Arab investors with [a measure of] sincerity that is consistent with public interests.

[Question] The existence of Arab banks abroad makes them subject to the laws and regulations of the host countries. A law was issued in Britain last year that determined license grades for foreign banks. Parliament gave the Bank of England the authority to implement this law with regard to issuing bank licenses and monitoring [bank activities]. What objective does the legislator have for enacting such a law?

[Answer] I believe that the British legislator intended [to achieve] many goals. Among those goals is that of ascertaining that these banks which are doing business in England are sound and solid regardless of their nationality and the extent of their ability to do business in a proper manner that is consistent with the British economy, with the money market in London and with London's position in the world. The British legislator also sought to limit the proliferation of banks in Britain and to select the best banks by means of these restraints. It is for this reason that the law established three license grades. The first grade is determined by granting the bank a full mandate and full recognition; that bank is called a recognized bank. The second grade means granting the bank a specific license to accept deposits. On this basis such a bank has to refer to the Bank of England when it makes foreign exchange transactions and when it participates in international loans. Banks that are fully recognized do not require such a measure. Third grade banks include financial institutions that have no right to call themselves banks; instead, they are called financial corporations or financial institutions.

This makes it evident that the legislator, which is the Bank of England, had intended for the first grade banks, which are fully recognized banks, to be under the direct observation of the Bank of England.

This is because the Bank of England considers itself accountable to depositors and creditors. It has a financial responsibility to depositors and creditors that goes beyond the moral responsibility to them. Experience has proven, for example, that when a licensed bank has financial difficulties, the Bank of England subsidizes it and offers it financial support. It is for this reason that depositors or creditors have never lost their funds as a result of such a situation.

Views of 'Ali al-Jammal

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[Text] When Mr 'Ali al-Jammal opened a branch of al-Jammal Bank in London early in December 1978, AL-HAWADITH asked him whether what he had done was the result of the deteriorating security condition in Lebanon, and whether or not by opening a branch bank in London he was relying on the universal rule which proclaims that money is a coward and grows only in peaceful and secure conditions. The reply he made almost a year ago was that Lebanon will continue to be the center of banking in the Arab world even under current emergency conditions.

"But the civil war in Lebanon has not come to an end, and there are no early signs of the stability that is necessary for capital to come out of its hiding, regain its vitality and activity and acquire a reasonable measure of courage." To this statement al-Jammal replied, "Events in Lebanon have never at all led to any decline in banking activities. On the contrary banking business flourished in a manner that exceeded all the cautious expectations and especially those that were made by foreigners. Let me repeat now what I said a year ago: there is no substitute for Lebanon in the area."

It was 'Ali al-Jammal who established al-Jammal Bank in 1971--the bank that is named after him--with a group of expatriates after that group had purchased all the stock of the bank and raised its capital from 3 million pounds to 10 million pounds. Before that the bank had been called the Financial Investment Bank, and it had 3 million pounds in capital. Then the bank expanded in firm and planned stages to North Africa and Europe. 'Ali al-Jammal affirmed that "the reason for the prosperity of banking activity in Lebanon was due to a special quality in the Lebanese character. It is this quality that made Lebanon capable of adjusting and adapting. The services that have been offered and perfected for which Lebanon has gained fame include banking activities. Perhaps this is because of the same reason that I mentioned, which is this special characteristic that made these banking services unique in the world."

'Ali al-Jammal paused suddenly as though the concerns of Lebanon had somehow found their way to his soul and to his mind. Then he added, "We are always after the Lebanese financier wherever we can find him. That is why we came to Europe and to London, in particular. We establish ties between the African continent, where the Lebanese [investor] is active, and Europe which is also tied to Africa and to Lebanese investments. It is rare for any Lebanese investor to abandon his investments in Lebanon. Quite the contrary the Lebanese investor is always seeking to open new markets and to increase these markets."

This insistence on the part of 'Ali al-Jammal makes him appear to be coming from Europe and not from ravaged Lebanon. But he adds with satisfaction on the basis of the principle that something may be harmful in one way but beneficial in another: "Before the events we confined our activities to Lebanon, but after what happened, we created new markets in Europe and we went as far as China. This is the secret of the Lebanese personality: reaching unexpected places and achieving successes that observers doubted were available. I personally increased bank activities in Lebanon threefold. In 1975 the bank had four branches. Now the bank has 10 branches in Lebanon, and 2 branches are being established. We have plans to establish a network of branches so [our bank] would cover all the regions of Lebanon."

From this premise and from the logic of tireless action [which characterizes] the Lebanese personality, according to 'Ali al-Jammal, Mr al-Jammal returned a week ago from a private business trip to Cairo where preparations were underway to open a new branch of the bank in Alexandria after the success of the Cairo branch which was established in 1979. Inspite of the conditions of war and inspite of the logical reservations which characterized the banking

activities of the bank, the bank did succeed in realizing accomplishments that many people did not expect. By the end of 1978--except for accounts outside the budget--bank assets had amounted to 184 million pounds compared with 127 million pounds at the end of the previous year. This is approximately a 45 percent increase.

'Ali al-Jammal considers foreign banks and their condition in Lebanon and says, "These banks have limited activities in Lebanon, compared with Lebanese banking activity which proved its trustworthiness in times of crises. Although a large number of banks stopped making payments during the crisis, Lebanese banks met their obligations and did not stop making their payments at all. Many people believe that there is a special secret behind the fact that banking activity in Lebanon is flourishing, but the secret lies in the efforts of the Lebanese people themselves. However, what is important is this prosperous reality which we are seeing now. Many people spoke about the post-war German miracle and the ability of the German people to recreate German industry so as to make it the first industry in Europe. It was the German personality that was the secret behind this. I wish I knew what the Lebanese miracle will be when the Lebanese war comes to an end. I personally want to anticipate events and to re-affirm to you that there is no substitute [for Lebanon] in the area."

Many people believe that 'Ali al-Jammal's trip from Africa to Lebanon--this trip which took al-Jammal Bank from a 3 million dollar bank to a 303 million dollar bank by the end of 1979--bears witness to the secret of his financial personality.

Views of Muhammad Abu Shadi

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[Text] On the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the Union of Arab and French Banks, which is known as UBAF, Dr Muhammad Mahmud Abu Shadi chairman of the board of directors and general manager of UBAF made a detailed statement from which we excerpt the following:

"When my colleagues, the members of the board of directors honored me by electing me chairman during the first meeting of the UBAF board of directors which was held on 26 February 1970 I made some opening remarks in which I touched upon the broad lines upon which our unique organization was established with regard to its makeup and its objectives. I made special mention of the hopes that have been placed on this organization in the Arab countries, in France and in the money markets of Europe, and [I also spoke about] the objectives of such Arab-French cooperation on the international banking scene.

"Now that 10 full years have gone by it behooves us to pause and to consider what our hopes were and what we achieved of those hopes. Although our goals were ambitious ones, those that were actually realized could never have occurred to anyone. Here is our organization 10 years after being in business:

it did not confine its activities to developing economic and human relations between the Arab world and France; instead, it carried this message to international financial centers so that in 10 years it has acquired 10 banking units that are doing business in Europe, in the Arabian Gulf, East Asia and in the United States of America.

"Whether we look only at this bank in France or at the banking group that it formed, both have become prominent among the banks of the world because of their business activities. This is because the total budget of the bank by the end of 1979 amounted to 16.2 billion francs--that is, over 4 billion dollars. The total budgets of the banks of the group on the same date amounted to 7.5 billion dollars.

"This increase in the total budget of the bank was accompanied by an increase in its permanent funds which include capital, reserves and stock. By the end of January 1980 these amounted to 1,205 million francs. This sum which is equal to 299 million dollars, may be broken down as follows:

Proper funds	343 million francs
Bonds that may be converted into shares	200 million francs
Notes and certificates of deposit for 165 million dollars that are equal to	663 million francs
	1,206 million francs

"It is estimated that the total permanent funds in the banks of the UBAF Group are about 185 million dollars (746 million francs).

"In 1978 our bank in Paris, UBAF France, was in 15th position among French banks with regard to its total budget. It was 11th in credit financing for medium term purchases.

"The bank still has a prominent position among joint Arab banks. Its budget alone represents over 65 percent of the total budgets of joint Arab banks in France.

"UBAF now has a prominent position in the field of organizing and managing loans in the international market whether these loans are for Arab or non-Arab borrowers. UBAF is now leading banking groups that have made arrangements for a number of huge loans in the Euro-dollar market.

"In recent years the name, UBAF, has always been one of the prominent names in this area. It also established the notion of the UBAF Group as a participant in the leadership groups in several major loans.

"Ever since the bank was established in Paris it has participated in 338 loan operations for intermediate and long term [projects], totaling 30 billion dollars. The bank was a prime mover or a participant with the management or co-management group in 132 operations whose total [worth] amounted to 13 billion dollars. It took part in managing 55 operations to issue shares whose

total came to 2 billion dollars. It also contributed to promotions and purchase operations in 683 other operations to issue shares whose total amounted to 38 billion dollars. This, of course, was in addition to what the banks of the other groups did, and especially those in London, Hong Kong and New York.

"Now that our organization is 10 years old as I mentioned early in this statement, it behooves me to refer to many of the benefits that were realized as a result of the establishment of this organization. You may find these benefits to be deeper and more effective than a mere comparison of figures.

"Perhaps the most distinguished achievement has been the fact that Arab bankers have affirmed that they are worthy of the respect of international banking circles and that the excellent position which Arab banking has assumed in recent years in money markets is due to the scientific efficiency and the practical experience [of Arab bankers] and not to the financial resources that have come to the Arabs from oil.

"The primary objective of establishing UBAF and other similar joint banks in Paris was to strengthen economic, commercial and financial ties between France and the Arab countries. This was reinforced by factors that placed France in the forefront among nations in its dealings with Arab countries. This is evident in the foreign trade figures between France and the Arab countries. Foreign trade between France and the Arab countries has remained almost stable, in the vicinity of 2.5 billion dollars per year during the sixties. In 1973 that figure jumped to more than double (5.7 billion dollars); and in 1978 it tripled to 17.4 billion dollars.

The following data reflect that fact by means of comparing the volume of Arab trade with France with the volume of Arab trade with other industrial countries in 1978:

The Country	The Volume of Trade in Billion Dollars
The United States of America	25.1
Japan	25.1
France	17.4
Italy	15.6
Germany	14.4
The United Kingdom	11.2

"UBAF and the other Franco-Arab banks can therefore be proud of the operations they carried out in the past few years and of the atmosphere of friendship and understanding they established with all officials in the Arab countries and also with the French financial, monetary and banking authorities. They are also to be proud of the relations that grew out of this friendly atmosphere between Arab and French businessmen which undoubtedly had some effect on the fact that the volume of trade did reach this level.

"Among the other important effects of the establishment of UBAF is the fact that it provided the opportunity for strengthening direct relations between Arab bankers and their colleagues in Europe, Asia and America.

"In fact, one of the most important achievements of UBAF ever since its establishment is the fact that it brought together around one table French banks, other banks in other countries and Arab bankers and financiers who are citizens of countries whose political and ideological methods and whose economic systems differ [from those of France]. UBAF thereby provided the opportunity for the creation of bilateral or multi-party business ties between them; this is besides the personal relations. In some cases this resulted in the parties cooperating to establish independent financial institutions and to conclude joint funding deals that served the interests of their organizations and those of the Arab economy.

"As I look at the strides we have made 10 years after the creation of this organization and the continued support that this organization has received from its shareholders and its friends in the Arab world and outside the Arab world, I can only express my confidence in the future of our group and in the major role it can play in strengthening economic and financial relations between the Arab world and the other countries.

"I cannot fail to mention also the sincere and tireless efforts that are being made by the French and Arab workers on all levels, nor can I fail to express to them my utmost appreciation and admiration."

Views of 'Abd al-Karim al-Mudarris

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[Text] When 'Abd al-Karim al-Mudarris speaks about the creation of Anglo-Arab chambers of commerce and when he speaks about the Arab-British Chamber of Commerce in particular as a model for these chambers, he does not speak as the secretary general and the executive officer of the London chamber only. He rather speaks [with the voice] of the positions he had held before coming to London to manage the office of the Arab League there. He had worked 25 years in the General Secretariat of the Arab League in Cairo; he had been adviser to the legal department of the league and the officer in charge of the league's Organization of Management Sciences. This was in addition to the diplomatic post he had had as minister plenipotentiary, commissioned by the Iraqi government.

He responded to our question about how Arab-foreign chambers of commerce came into being. This is what he said:

[Answer] The idea of joint chambers of commerce is a new idea that found its place and its home in the Arab League which adopted it. The idea had come originally from the Federation of Chambers of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry in the Arab World. It was based on the fact that these organizations can be strong factors in strenthening relations between the Arab countries and the industrially advanced countries and especially the countries of western Europe.

The Arab League had entrusted the General Federation of Arab Chambers of Commerce with the task of overseeing and monitoring the affairs of the chambers. This federation played a prominent role and, undoubtedly, made a noticeable effort in putting down controls and appropriate guidelines that seek the pan-Arab interests of the Arab side as well as the interests that the Arab and foreign sides have in common.

[Question] Have joint chambers been established now in all the countries of western Europe?

[Answer] There are chambers in existence now in the most important capitals of Europe. Some of them have been created recently, and some of them are engaged in effective activity. This is, of course, within the framework of the capabilities that are available.

[Question] Some of these chambers, however, are being criticized quite frequently. It is being said, for example, that they have not even achieved the minimum goals for which they were established, the most important of which is that there be additional communications channels to further understanding between nations and to develop equal relations.

[Answer] I don't think I can make an evaluation of these chambers because each chamber has its own circumstances.

[Question] It seems that the Anglo-Arab Chamber of Commerce has been unique among all the chambers due to the numerous confrontations it has had. Even when it was created in 1975 some agencies tried to impede its creation.

[Answer] The fact that it faced numerous obstacles was expected, and I do not wish to comment on it. It was the political dimension of the chamber, according to what these agencies believed, that made those agencies in question resist the creation of an Arab-British chamber of commerce under conditions when the Arabs began to exercise the influence that a group of countries had never before exercised. This was because of the fortunes and the oil they have and also, of course, because of the tremendous markets. In spite of all this there was a number of British [subjects] who worked tirelessly for the establishment of the chamber. I can say that the conditions under which the Arab-British Chamber of Commerce was established were difficult. No other chamber had faced them, but we, of course, were able to overcome these difficulties.

[Question] Then you were faced afterwards with the Zionist campaign in the British parliament when the pro-Zionist Lord Byers proposed a foreign boycott bill for the purpose of achieving Israel's goal of closing the boycott circle after it had succeeded in the United States.

[Answer] There is no doubt that the notion of proposing a foreign boycott law was the first feasible test of the chamber's ability to take action against a law which would have had tremendous results on Anglo-Arab relations had parliament passed it. It was natural that opposition to this bill be one

of the chamber's principal functions on the basis of the fact that it was the only Arab organization that was on the front line in the struggle, if one can use that expression. The bill did in fact stipulate intervention in the freedom of British corporations and organizations in selecting whomever they wished to deal with. There was no doubt that Zionism, tempted by its successes in the United States and in other countries, decided to try its luck in Britain on the basis of the fact that the Zionist lobby was quite strong. This is a fact that everyone knows. The chamber participated in the general debates in the House of Lords, and its secretary testified about the effect that the law may have on Anglo-Arab relations. It seems that some people understood that Britain would be the first one to get hurt by this bill. This is what British experts themselves acknowledge.

[Question] What is curious is that Zionism succeeded in France even though there is no Zionist lobby in [the French] parliament!

[Answer] A similar bill was in fact proposed to the French parliament in the context of the Israeli plan to do away with the Arab boycott as it is known. Although French parliament approved it, the French government had reservations about it because this bill included the Arab boycott of Israel. Attempts were made in the Netherlands, but the Netherlands is known for its support for Israel to the point that that support has become part of its political traditions.

[Question] You testified in the House of Lords to scuttle this bill. Were you personally or was the chamber subjected to campaigns from the Zionists?

[Answer] It is true that I testified in front of a select committee. I was invited by that committee, and the invitation was extended in accordance with a resolution adopted by the Council of Arab Ambassadors. It was this council that had appealed to the chamber to oppose this bill. As far as the story about pressures is concerned, I prefer not to talk about them at the present time.

[Question] There are campaigns in the media directed towards building a distorted image of the Arabs and to creating a frame of mind that is against them. These campaigns have been so vicious that some Arab observers believe that the organized media has succeeded in creating a measure of hatred and malice [for the Arabs]. Are you in a position that would enable you to oppose such campaigns effectively and positively?

[Answer] If you mean our position on the publicity campaign that was carried out by the London branch of one of the French automobile companies which created an uproar in Arab circles, this is true. The fact of the matter is that this company suddenly began an advertising campaign for the purpose of marketing its cars in Britain. On the 13th and 17th of June last year it printed an advertisement on a full page of a number of British newspapers that was entitled, "How To Make a Sheikh Shake!"

The company claimed in its advertisement that the Arab countries were delighted with the increased consumption of fuel in western countries because this justified the action they took to increase oil prices and amass huge fortunes. This company's car was so economical in fuel consumption, it would make the oil sheikhs tremble. [The company also claimed] that the reason for high gasoline [prices] in Britain was the result of increasing oil prices. It was inevitable of course that we take a position on these advertisements that were derogatory of the Arabs. So we told company officials that whoever wanted to deal with the Arabs had to respect them and that it was absolutely impossible for any commodity to enter Arab markets if the manufacturers of that commodity insulted and slandered the Arabs. We have always rejected in all our activities this way of dealing with the Arabs, that is, [we expect] that the Arabs be treated with respect. We also reflect this inclination in the printed material we publish and in the round table discussions we hold. We have a magazine that publishes special issues regularly about each Arab country.

[Question] And now what will become of the two projects you had announced recently and turned over directly to the Arab world?

[Answer] The fact is that the two projects are in the final stages. The first project which we announced a few weeks ago is for training the technical cadres in the Arab countries. For the second project the chamber has allocated a portion of its income to be spent on gifted, needy Arabs. We hope that through this fund we will have established a new dimension to our activities. Unlike what the Yugoslav proverb says, we do not stand outside the city walls to publicize our activities.

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CSO: 4802

FATAH LEADER KHALID AL-HASAN INTERVIEWED

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 14 Jul 80 p 12

[Report on interview with Fatah leader Khalid al-Hasan by Fathi Sharif; date and place not given]

[Text] The decision made by the Arab ministers of foreign affairs to reject UN Resolution 242, which was passed in 1967 to establish a solution to the Middle East crisis, has provoked far-ranging international reactions. Political observers have provided various interpretations of this action, some describing the rejection as an Arab appeal to wage war. Others, [however], interpreted it as a kind of tactical intransigence by a number of Arab countries. Still others explained it in terms of Arab pressure on the United States and Europe to achieve a new formula for a peaceful settlement that would call for the return of the Palestinian people [to their homeland] and their pursuit of their destiny on their soil.

In view of this conflicting analysis on the part of many political observers, AL-SIYASAH conducted an interview with Mr Khalid al-Hasan, one of the Palestinian leaders and member of the Central Committee. It presented to him the sum total of ideas and reactions over the Arab consensus to reject Resolution 242.

Khalid al-Hasan said, "Yes, this rejection cannot mean anything else but war. Otherwise, we would be tricking ourselves. I hope that the rejection of the resolution will be the definitive expression of the Arab position that favors the full liberation of all Arab territory that has been occupied since 1947 and not only the territory which has been occupied since 1967, even if circumstances required that the struggle be scheduled so that territory occupied in 1967 be liberated during a first stage. This would be the decisive stage that would determine the stages that would follow."

Responding to a question about whether or not the Arabs were now prepared to undertake a deterrent military action against the Israeli enemy, al-Hasan said, "Naturally, I cannot say this because the resolutions are based on regaining a military strategic balance with the Zionist enemy and on tying the economic position to the political position and tying all this to the

position of the media and to the international diplomatic movement. This means drawing up a strategy to prepare for a military confrontation or at least to reach a level of strength and earnestness if a plan were drawn up and implemented so that the international society would force the Zionist enemy to withdraw unconditionally to the 1967 truce lines."

Regarding the nature of the next Arab step that will be made after the resolution was rejected, the member of the Central Committee of the Fatah Organization said, "The most prominent of these steps are [as follows]: first, a joint military command is to be formed; it is to include basically Syria, Iraq, Jordan and the PLO. This command should have room for Arab forces and Arab volunteers who wish to join and to build a military force that would be capable of taking action in the context of an integrated, comprehensive military plan.

"Second, an Arab economic central command is to be formed. It is to tie Arab economic activity to the pan-Arab economic goals that emanate centrally from the question of Palestine.

"Third, there is to be a central political leadership to coordinate Arab diplomatic and media activity.

"Fourth, no Arab party is to undertake any political, media or economic action that is in conflict with, contradicts or assumes a neutral posture on all this."

Khalid al-Hasan continued his conversation with AL-SIYASAH on the nature of the next Arab step and said, "Whether the Arabs decide on a partial war or on an all-out war or whether they decide to restore the strategic balance to strengthen [their] negotiating position or [to prepare for] a military confrontation, what is important is that they adhere to that decision. The first step to adhering to a decision involves not monopolizing the responsibility and acknowledging the existing fact that there are four forces that must be fused, united or consolidated into one force that is generally coordinated by a joint command for implementing any Arab strategy that may be approved.

"These four forces are Syria, Iraq, Jordan and the PLO."

Al-Hasan added, "Any Arab army that prepares for the battle without having in its midst or with it a quarter of a million Palestinian fighters cannot be taken seriously. Likewise, any one of these powers that excludes itself from unified action to restore strategic balance cannot be taken seriously in its consent to the Arab resolution. This is regardless of those powers' internal problems or the disputes they have among themselves."

Concerning the seriousness of implementing Arab resolutions on the basis of previous experiences, the member of the Central Committee of the Fatah Organization said, "Any reading of the hundreds of resolutions that have been adopted by the Arab countries in Arab League meetings, in summit meetings or

in foreign alliances since 1948 would find them to be good resolutions. But I do not know if it would be possible to adopt new resolutions in that context. Let us take, for example, the resolutions of the last three summit conferences in Rabat, Baghdad and Tunisia. These were in fact good resolutions whether or not they are described as representing the minimal [demands]. The recommendations of the Amman Conference asked that the next summit support these resolutions. In my judgment, however, the important point lies in the implementation tool and in the mechanics of action to establish central military, economic and media commands that would undertake the task of drawing up a plan and carrying out the collective resolutions that were adopted so that they would be taken seriously by the world and thereby force the international community to respect Arab will and Arab action and to take our positions seriously at least once in contemporary history. Many, many things would then change on the scene of the Arab struggle."

Khalid al-Hasan went on to say, "The Baghdad Resolutions are over 2 years old, and the Tunisia Resolutions are almost 1 year old. Has any resolution on a confrontation with the enemy or with the United States of America been implemented?

"I believe that the principal reason for the Arab inability to carry out such resolutions is due to a provincial mentality and to a provincial style that find themselves incapable of carrying out pan-Arab resolutions [because of a lack of] self-confidence and because of mutual fear."

Khalid al-Hasan also said, "The rejection of Resolution 242 is not new for the question of Palestine; it is rather a continuation of the past. It is known that Resolution 242 is concerned with removing the effects of the 1967 aggression. When the United States tried to make Resolution 242 the basis for solving the question of Palestine, the liberation organization and all the Arab countries without exception turned this down.

"The Arab countries that had approved Resolution 242 had done so so as to have the effects of the 1967 aggression removed. The Arab countries that had approved the resolution had done so through their approval of Resolution 338, and they had expressed reservations that explained their approval.

"But as far as all factions of the PLO are concerned, the organization rejected 242 ever since it was issued whether the resolution applied to the Arab position or to the Palestinian position. When the United States proposed recognizing the organization in 1977 in return for the organization recognizing Resolution 242, the PLO rejected this openly and clearly."

Khalid al-Hasan expressed his belief that the decision to reject Resolution 242 required that basic amendments be made to the resolutions of the Baghdad and Tunisia summits which were described as minimal resolutions. These amendments would bring the resolutions up to the level of rejecting Resolution 242 which has no relationships [whatsoever] to the Palestinian question.

Likewise, the only meaning of the collective Arab position to reject Resolution 242 is that of rejecting Resolution 338 also, provided that this rejection not become a media position or a temporary position. Approval or

rejection of such positions must be made in the context of an integrated Arab strategic position."

Khalid al-Hasan was asked about the degree of Palestinian military preparedness if talk of war and liberation were to be imposed on the Arab position at this stage.

He said, "To the Palestinian people, going back to the method of liberating Palestine by force is the tune they wake up to in the morning and go to sleep by at night. If we were to say that any nation can mobilize 10 percent of its citizens in a real war, the Palestinian nation can easily mobilize and arm a quarter of a million men and women. This army will be at the vanguard of any joint military action undertaken under a unified Arab command."

Al-Hasan was asked about the future of any joint Arab military action if the four powers were to continue their disputes around the method and the strategy of the next stage.

He said, "We are asking these four Arab powers to rise above their disputes and to settle them for the Palestinian question. We are asking them to realize that the liberation of Palestine is the greatest economic development project in the Arab world because it would do away with all the economic drain that is the result of building the Arab armed forces for defense [purposes]. There is also a pan-Arab significance to the liberation of Palestine: it would promote the practical application of pan-Arab goals much more quickly than any political observer could have imagined."

Regarding the repercussions he expected would befall the U.S. position after the collective Arab rejection of Resolution 242 and the prevalence of the hardline approach in the Arab positions, Khalid al-Hasan said, "If the hardline or semi-hardline Arab position were clear and serious in stating what it wanted, and if it were taking action through a central command in the context of a plan whose implementation was characterized by earnestness and practicality, the positions of our friends will become much better. The positions of our enemies will also be improved, and our enemies will reconsider those positions." Al-Hasan was asked if Israel could undertake any pre-emptive military action at this stage to strike any kind of gathering or to try to break up the Arab hardline formula.

The member of the Central Committee of the Fatah Organization said that that was very possible. "It is not unlikely for Israel to carry out a military operation as an adventure. This is part of its strategy. We must know, however, that the strategic reserve of the Israeli and the U.S. policy is based on Arab fragmentation. Accordingly, the earnestness and the unity of will of the Arab position in the struggle will resolve all these questions even if Israel were to carry out any unanticipated adventure. This is because reducing oil production by half or stopping production [altogether] will become a justifiable and a legitimate action and it would impose hostile positions on the Israeli enemy."

Regarding the European position and the possibilities for change that may take place following the rejection of Resolution 242, which Europe had declared would be the foundation for the basic ideas behind any initiative it undertakes, Khalid al-Hasan said, "If the goal of the Amman recommendations which will be submitted to the Arab Summit Conference will be to reach a step-by-step political settlement from a position of strength, then cooperation with Europe for a future initiative becomes desirable. But if the objective of these resolutions is ultimately to get out of the settlement process and to move into a prologue to a military confrontation, then the need for any European or non-European initiative will become unjustified."

"I believe that the nature of the Arab position at the next meeting of the UN General Assembly [that will be held] this July 22 to discuss the Palestinian question will explain the ultimate dimensions of the Amman resolutions and the directions that the resolutions of the next summit meeting will take. What about the Palestinian position itself?"

Al-Hasan said, "When it meets next September 4 the National Council will be called upon to draw up a new strategy for Palestinian action in the light of what happened in Amman and what will happen at the UN meeting."

I told Khalid al-Hasan, "During a tour you made recently in a number of western European countries you proposed a five-point action program that would form the basis for any new European initiative. Some leaders of Palestinian organizations criticized this proposal and objected to it. What is your evaluation of the reactions that happened on the Palestinian and European scenes?"

He said, "I did not propose five points; I proposed a large number of points. The most prominent of them was recognition of the PLO and Europe dealing with the liberation organization and with the Palestinian people. I also proposed another number of points that were derived from the resolutions of the Palestinian National Council. Some organizations had some objections but these objections were abstract and were made without any objective discussion."

He said, "The method which some news agencies used to convey their understanding of the ideas which they announced was flawed. This method must be reviewed carefully. A person can only suffer over the words that some fellow secretary generals used in making their remarks. I cannot use those words in any counter-criticism. Ultimately the masses of the Palestinian people will pass judgment: they will be judge and arbiter.

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KUWAITI DAILY INTERVIEWS PFLP OFFICIAL ON ROMANIA VISIT, INITIATIVE

GF021850 Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AAM in Arabic 1 Sep 80 p 18

[Interview given by Taysir Qubba'ah, PFLP Political Bureau member and official in charge of foreign relations, to AL-RAY'Y AL-'AAM correspondent Salih Qallab in Beirut--date not given]

[Text] [Question] A number of questions have arisen regarding your recent talks in Bucharest in view of the fact that the Romanian side announced a Middle East initiative during your stay there, and also because you were the most recent Palestinian delegation to visit Romania on a specific political mission.

[Answer] First of all, I should make it clear that our visit to Romania was not linked to a specific event. The PFLP had received an invitation from the Romanian Communist Party a long time ago. The invitation was within the framework of strengthening relations between the two sides. The circumstances of our struggle prevented us from responding to this invitation in the past.

The PFLP command decided recently to send a delegation to strengthen relations between the Palestinian and Romanian peoples and to inform the Romanian leadership of the conditions of the Palestinian people, especially in the occupied territories.

During this visit we held several meetings with Romanian Communist Party Politburo members. We also met with Romanian Foreign Minister Stefan Andrei. Our last meeting was with President Ceausescu. We explained to him the Palestinian and Arab struggle in the present stage--a struggle characterized by opposition to the Camp David conspiracy both within and outside the occupied territories.

During these meetings we explained that the Camp David conspiracy is aimed at Syria and the Lebanese national movement as well as the Palestinian resistance so that the Arab nation would accept the Camp David plan now that Egypt has done so.

We stressed to the Romanian officials, led by Ceausescu, that the present task of the Palestinian revolution and the Arab progressive forces is to thwart the Camp David plot and the conspiracies against the Palestinian revolution, the steadfastness front and the forces of the Arab liberation movement.

[Question] It has been noted, however, that Romania declared its stand during your stay in Bucharest. Indeed, AGERPRES deliberately reported that the announcement of the Romanian initiative was made during the presence of a PFLP delegation in Bucharest.

[Answer] Romania's announcement of its initiative may have taken place during our stay in Bucharest, but Romanian officials expressed their point of view in this regard a long time ago. They discussed their view with other Palestinian leaders who visited Bucharest recently.

President Ceausescu proposed an international conference to resolve to so-called Middle East question. Our view was completely at variance with his, not only as regards the convening of such a conference but also as regards the understanding of Camp David and the nature of the conflict in the Middle East as a whole.

[Question] If such a conference is convened under an auspices and with the Soviet Union's guarantees, will you oppose it?

[Answer] We in the PFLP oppose any conference under the umbrella of the Camp David policy. We have taken a clear stand on the European initiative and regard it as complementary to the Camp David accords. Once again I stress that our task and the task of our allies in the present stage is to negate the Camp David policy and its results and to look for a new initiative that makes it more acceptable or develops it.

[Question] Even if the conference is based on the [October 1977] U.S.-Soviet statement, would you still be opposed to it?

[Answer] We have a very clear view: We believe that any conference held under the Camp David umbrella is complementary to the Camp David policy.

[Question] It is said that, in addition to proposing an international conference, Ceausescu also proposed to you the United Arab Kingdom plan with Jordan.

[Answer] President Ceausescu did not propose this matter in a clear manner. However, we explained to him the reasons for our rejection of the United Arab Kingdom plan. We warned him of Jordan's role, especially after the next Israeli elections. We explained that if the Israeli Labor Party should win the elections it is likely that it would offer Jordan parts of the West Bank and Gaza within the framework of a solution at the expense of the Pelestinian people and within the framework of the United Arab Kingdom plan.

[Question] Nevertheless, while you are expressing these apprehensions, the PLO's relations with Jordan are becoming firmer and more solid.

[Answer] We do not agree to the present formula [of relations] between the PLO and the Jordanian regime. So that these relations can have a basis, we demand freedom for the Palestinian resistance's presence along the Palestinian borders on the Jordan River. We demand freedom for the Palestinian resistance to work among its masses in Jordan. We also demand an end to the persecution and harassment of nationalist elements in Jordan and noninterference in the Palestinian people's affairs in the occupied territories.

In any case, let us not be idealistic and stray too far in our dreams. The structure of the Jordanian regime does not allow for coexistence with the Palestinian resistance.

[Question] Jordan, however, has declared and continues to declare its rejection of Camp David.

[Answer] I believe that there are two reasons for the Jordanian regime's rejection of Camp David: First, in its past stage there was nothing in the Camp David policy that tempted Jordan to join it. Second, in return for formal rejection of Camp David the Jordanian regime obtained from the Baghdad summit conference $1.25 billion by which it strengthened itself in preparation for its coming role.

[Question] In light of the foregoing, it may occur to some that postponement of the Palestinine National Council is related to these matters.

[Answer] We in the PFLP call for convening the Palestine National Council at the scheduled time. We are continuing our fight to convene the council as soon as possible. There are many developments in the area that require study and the determination of a revolutionary stand toward them. Moreover, the tasks of the present stage require the election of a new Palestinian leadership that is capable of implementing Palestinian decisions and continuing the efforts to achieve national unity.

We should not remain idle in the face of the intensification of plots against the Palestinian revolution, within the occupied territories, in Lebanon or on the international level. Hostile forces in Lebanon are continuing to prepare themselves at a fast rate to assault the Palestinian resistance. Moreover, the Palestine National Council is responsible for defining a clear stand that is compatible with our people's aspirations on all the initiatives that are being proposed, be they the European initiative or the international conference.

Regrettably, some Palestinian forces are still stalling on the issue of convening the Palestine National Council at the scheduled date. We in the PFLP see no justification for such stalling, whether on the pretext of awaiting the result of the U.S. Presidential elections or on any other pretext.

[Question] With regard to the forthcoming Arab summit conference in Amman, do you believe that its resolutions will complement those of the Baghdad and Tunis summits?

[Answer] We do not pin great hopes on Arab summit conferences. Many summit conferences have been held only to yield weak resolutions that could not be implemented. The reason is that the balance of power in such summits has always been in favor of reactionary forces allied to imperialism.

The Baghdad summit conference resolved to boycott completely the Egyptian regime. Despite this, as you know we are daily witnessing blatant violation of this resolution politically and economically. We also assert that he who wants to fight Israel cannot be a friend of the United States because the United States and Israel are two sides of the same coin. Therefore, what is required is, at least, to reduce the supply of oil to the United States and other capitalist countries so that they can feel the danger to their interests in our region.

CSO: 4802

BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION ON NEW PLA COMMANDER

Damascus SAWT FALASTIN in Arabic Jul 80 p 3

[Article: "Brig Gen Muhammad Tariq al-Khadra' Is Appointed Commander-In-Chief and Chief Of Staff of the Palestine Liberation Army"]

[Text] Brig Gen Muhammad Tariq al-Khadra' was appointed chief of staff of the Palestine Liberation Army [PLA], and was given the powers of commander-in-chief, after being promoted to the rank of brigadier general. The appointment became effective on 10 June 1980.

Upon assuming his new responsibilities, Brig Gen al-Khadra' made a comprehensive patriotic and hortatory speech to the members of the PLA in which he called for increased self-sacrifice, attention to military duties, and greater combat readiness. He gave an explanation of sound standards of self-sacrifice. He emphasized that "we are an indivisible part of proud Arab Syria, and we should seek guidance from the beacon of steadfastness--revolutionary Syria--and from the leadership of the militant president, Hafiz al-Asad."

A Resume Of His Military Career

1. Given name and surname: Muhammad Tariq 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Khadra'.

2. Place and date of birth: Safad, occupied Palestine, 1941.

3. Education: Diploma in general secondary school studies (science), the Hashemite Jawdah Secondary School, 1960; (B.A.?) in history, University of Damascus, 1973; he is fluent in English.

4. He enlisted in the Syrian Arab Army on 28 September 1960 when he enrolled in the War College of the United Arab Republic. He then left and was admitted to the Syrian war college in 1961. He graduated in 1962.

5. Military Tours of Duty:

a. Infantry platoon commander (the War College in Cairo--Homs, 28 September 1960 to 1 August 1962).

b. Infantry company commander in Cairo, 25 December 1966 to 20 May 1967.

c. Infantry battalion commander in the Syrian Arab Republic [SAR], 25 August 1969 to 25 January 1970.

d. Brigade commander in the Soviet Union, 1972.

e. General staff course at the Higher Military Academy in the SAR, 1979 to 1980.

6. He participated in the October War of Liberation and the war of attrition, and gained (recognition of excellence).

He took part in the battle against the Zionist enemy during the aggression of June 1967, when he was a battalion commander among the troops of 'Ayn Jalut, in the Gaza Strip, and at the Suez Canal.

He commanded the (M.D.) company at al-'Urqub in southern Lebanon in 1970.

7. He was appointed commander of the Hittin forces in 1971.

8. He was promoted to brig gen on 10 June 1980, and assumed the duties of chief of staff and commander-in-chief of the PLA.

9. Decorations he has received:

Syrian Arab Army Day Medal, 1962;

Eighth of March Medal, 1963;

Military Duty Medal, first class, 1974;

Medal for Bravery, first class, 1974, by order of the SAR army and armed forces commander-in-chief;

Training Medal, first class, 1974;

Sixth of October Medal, 1974;

Jordanian Military Medal of Honor, second class, 1976;

Military Sacrifice Medal, second class, 1977;

Military Duty Medal, first class, 1977.

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CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

GUIDANCE COMMITTEE PRESS CONFERENCE--Engineer Ibrahim Daqqaq, a leader of the national guidance committee in the territories, said that the Palestinians recognize Israel's right to exist, and they are willing to negotiate with it. But they demand a state for themselves. Ibrahim Daqqaq spoke at a press conference in Jerusalem to protest the confinement order that was issued against him. Also appearing with him were the three editors of East Jerusalem newspaper that were confined to their residences. They claim this was done out of political vindictiveness, because of their opposition to the Camp David agreements. [Text] [TA171323 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 17 Sep 80]

BETHELEHEM AID FROM JORDAN--Bethlehem Mayor Ilyas Frayj issued a statement that the Bethlehem Municipality is suffering an acute financial crisis. According to Frayj, its deficit amounts to over 1 million Israeli pounds monthly, and the mayor expressed the concern that soon the municipality would no longer be able to extend services to its residents. In the meantime, Frayj asked the military government for permission to go to Jordan to present the crisis to the Jordanian authorities and seek a solution to the problem. [Text] [TA142108 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 2000 GMT 14 Sep 80]

SYRIAN GROUP RECEIVES JORDANIAN FUNDS--Damascus, 17 Sep (SANA)--Amin al-Asfar, official in charge of military training in the Muslim brotherhood organization gang, said he had received 500,000 Syrian pounds in installments via Jordan to finance sabotage operations in the Syrian Arab Republic. In an interview with Syrian Arab television last night, the gang member said he has used the money to buy different kinds of arms and ammunition, to be used by the gang in its criminal operations. He affirmed that the brotherhood gang forges passports and is associated with hostile foreign quarters. At the end of his statement, he admonished Muslim brotherhood gang members and the public in general to avoid sedition, as it serves the interest of imperialism and Zionism. [Excerpts] [JN170954 Damascus SANA in Arabic 0835 GMT 17 Sep 80]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

TEACHERS CALLED INTO ARMY--According to reports from Afghanistan, the Karmal administration has called teachers for military service to strengthen the army. Kabul Radio has been repeatedly making announcements calling upon teachers to join the army for military service as part of their sacred duty. It may be noted that due to the rise in unemployment during the last five years, qualified young men were hired by the education department on the condition that, if necessary, they would serve in the army. However, according to recent reports, a large number of teachers quit their jobs for fear of being enlisted in the army. This has been confirmed by a correspondent of the BBC who also reports that a large number of Afghan soldiers have either deserted or joined the ranks of the Mujahidin, thus forcing the Soviet soldiers to carry out even very ordinary chores. Mark Tally, the BBC correspondent in New Delhi, confirmed the reported assassination of a Soviet Brigadier by unidentified persons outside his residence in Kabul last week. It is also reported that the revolt of the 14th Afghan Battalion, though under control, has cut the number of its men to half their previous total. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 5 Aug 80 p 3] 9484

CSO: 4203

MUBARAK ON TALKS WITH FRENCH PRESIDENT

LD111535 Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 9 Sep 80 pp 1, 15

[Report by Muhammad 'Abd al-Mun'im: "Mubarak Discusses Middle East With d'Estaing; Vice President says: Agreement on Jerusalem Necessary for Tripartite Summit"]

[Excerpts] Paris, 8 Sep--Vice President Husni Mubarak said following his 90-minute meeting with President Giscard d'Estaing today that a certain amount of consensus on the Jerusalem issue is necessary before a tripartite summit can be organized among Egypt, Israel and the United States or the Palestinian autonomy negotiations resumed.

The vice president also emphasized the importance of the role Europe can play in the Middle East crisis. He said that Europe can play a major role and expressed the belief that the resolutions issued following the EEC summit in June in Venice constitute a strong support for the peace process.

Mubarak said that the "climate of trust" between Israel and Egypt must be restored before contacts between the two parties and the United States are resumed to prepare for a tripartite summit or the resumption of negotiations on autonomy for the Palestinians. The restoration of the climate of trust between the two countries is up to Israel, he added, and said: As soon as this is achieved meetings can be held in the United States to prepare for the tripartite summit.

Mubarak explained that President al-Sadat believes that it is necessary to hold a meeting of the three countries at summit level in order to seek a way out of the present impasse since the United States is a full partner in the negotiations. He also said that President al-Sadat believes that Europe has an important role which it can play in solving the Middle East crisis.

Observers described the meeting between Mubarak and the French president as extraordinary and as indicating both the importance of the subjects discussed as well as the rapprochement between the Egyptian and French stands.

Speaking once again about the Jerusalem question in response to questions by journalists on the subject, Mabarak said that Jerusalem is a sensitive issue and one of the major issues in the autonomy talks. Therefore it is natural that it should be the basic and major problem from which any talks should start.

Husni Mubarak said that "Jerusalem is part of the West Bank whether we like it or not" and that the talks should deal with it whether we accept or not. "We regard Jerusalem as an extremely sensitive issue because it concerns 800 million Muslims in the world and, as a holy city, it concerns more than 1 billion Christians. It does not concern the Jews alone."

Husni Mubarak said that talks with President Giscard d'Estaing dealt with bilateral relations, the Middle East problem, the entire Arab situation and world events affecting the area. The Egyptian vice president praised the relations between Egypt and France, saying that they go back many years. He said that President al-Sadat and the Egyptian people will never forget the aid that France gave to Egypt even before the October war.

Husni Mubarak said that he discussed the question of Jerusalem with Pope John Paul when he met with him last week. He said that the pope views the problem from a religious standpoint while Israel looks at it from a political standpoint.

CSO: 4802

MUBARAK: JERUSALEM NO 'INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE' TO MIDEAST PEACE

LD101205 Paris LE MONDE in French 10 Sep 80 p 6

[Interview with Egyptian Vice President Husni Mubarak by Jacques Amalric in Paris: "Israel Must Restore an Atmosphere of Confidence Particularly With Regard to Jerusalem"--date not specified]

[Text] [Question] Why has President al-Sadat gone back on his decision to suspend negotiations on Palestinian autonomy sine die? Have you received assurances on more flexibility in the Israeli positions?

[Answer] We have not changed our position. Our objective is still the same but we must adapt to the situation. We are in fact facing a new situation.

This new situation has been created by President Carter and Mr Begin's agreeing to another tripartite summit. It is the prospect of this new summit which enables us to resume negotiations--whose failure could be disastrous--on Palestinian autonomy. In any case, this resumption cannot take place before 15 October and, if the summit is to take place, Israel must take the necessary steps to restore the atmosphere of confidence which no longer exists, particularly as regards Jerusalem. A summit requires very serious preparations.

[Question] What do you think has destroyed that atmosphere of confidence?

[Answer] Negotiations reached deadlock for three reasons: The Knesset's adoption of the fundamental law on Jerusalem, the rumors from Israel on a bill providing for the annexation of the Golan Heights and Israel's military attacks on Lebanon, not to mention the Israeli policy of setting up new colonies.

[Question] Can the Jerusalem affair be settled?

[Answer] I do not believe that it is an insurmountable obstacle; Jerusalem concerns 800 million Muslims and 1.2 billion Christians. Do not forget that Sinai was annexed and that during the negotiations on withdrawal the Israelis tried for a long time to keep some colonies in that territory.

Finally, they gave up and the problem was settled. As regards the law adopted by the Knesset, do not forget that a law passed in 1957 provided for the annexation of Sinai.

Nonetheless, it was on Jerusalem that President al-Sadat was forced to send an initial letter to Mr Begin. However, in his reply Mr Begin avoided all the questions. The president then sent Mr Begin a second letter proposing a new tripartite summit with the U.S. President. That idea was accepted by Mr Carter and then by Mr Begin. That is the new situation which has been created.

[Question] By asking Mr Carter to organize a new summit, has President al-Sadat not above all given the democratic candidate for the White House an election gift?

[Answer] We may be prepared to help our friends, but only to a certain extent. Therefore, when Mr Carter's Middle East adviser Linowitz wanted to come to Cairo in August to make us resume negotiations on Palestinian autonomy, we refused. However, you must understand that for us the Camp David agreements constitute a pivot--the only pivot: it is the only document which contains Israeli promises.

"Arab Countries Incapable of Putting Forward a Coherent Plan"

[Question] Are you not afraid that the possible election of Mr Reagan could call into question the entire U.S. Middle East policy?

[Answer] We do not deal with individuals but with states whose leaders must take account of their public opinion. President Carter has often said that he cannot thwart his public opinion. The same applies to the European leaders. However, it is true that Mr Carter is deeply involved in the Camp David process. Mr Reagan will probably need time to understand it, but U.S. public opinion will still be there.

[Question] Do you note a change in the stances adopted by Riyadh and Amman toward negotiations on Palestinian autonomy?

[Answer] What, in your opinion, is the real influence of Jordan or any other Arab country? What proposals can they make to promote a solution? You see, we were expecting those taking part in the November 1978 Baghdad summit to make specific proposals. We saw nothing emerge. They could do no more than insult Egypt and offer us $9 billion to break off negotiations and prepare for a new war. Even if that financial offer had been credible, Egypt will never sell its national independence even for more billions than that. The same happened at the Tunis summit: they stepped up the war of the airwaves and took ineffectual sanctions against us.

For 30 years the Arab countries have been incapable of putting forward a specific plan. Conventional solutions, whether war or UN resolutions, have achieved nothing. That is why we are prepared to accept any alternative solution.

[Question] Do you still think, to cite President al-Sadat, that the United States holds 99 percent of the diplomatic cards in the Middle East?

[Answer] Yes, even the European countries admit that. All the European leaders told me that during my tour.

[Question] Including Mr Giscard d'Estaing?

[Answer] We did not discuss that specific point. But, tell me, what can the Europeans really do?

[Question] Is Cairo still as skeptical about the Europeans' intention to launch a diplomatic initiative in the Middle East?

[Answer] We are not in the least skeptical: Such an initiative exerts pressure on the United States, and that prompts Washington to exert pressure on Israel in turn.

[Question] And yet are you aware that most European leaders no longer believe in the Camp David process?

[Answer] If that is the case, what alternative solution is there? Once again, this is the only document which contains Israeli promises on the Palestinian problem.

[Question] Do you think that Mr Begin's departure could make the negotiations easier?

[Answer] I do not want to dwell on that question, so that Israel cannot say that I am trying to divide public opinion from my government. Mr Begin is the government leader; he carries the responsibility. Nonetheless, I am sure that Israeli public opinion favors peace.

[Question] What is the state of Egyptian-Libyan relations, and what do you think of the plan to unite Syria and Libya?

[Answer] Al-Qadhdhafi is an unstable, unpredictable, arrogant man. You never know what he will do next. He is a leader without a people and he claims that Egypt is a country without a leader. However, with 42 million inhabitants we are able to find a leader without help from al-Qadhdhafi.

As regards the plan for union with Syria, the matter is simple: al-Asad hopes to receive money from Libya, and al-Qadhdhafi will give him nothing.

CSO: 4800

MUBARAK TELLS ISRAELI PAPER JERUSALEM LAW NOT INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE

TA101144 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Sep 80 p 1

[Report by Tamar Golan: "The Existence of the Jerusalem Law Is not an Obstacle Which Cannot Be Overcome"--Paris, no date]

[Text] The problem of Jerusalem will be the main issue in the next contacts between Israel and Egypt and certainly also at the tripartite summit and, despite its being most complicated, it is not insoluble.

This view was expressed by Egyptian Vice President Gen Husni Mubarak in a talk with us here on the eve of his departure from Paris to Vienna and Bucharest.

The Egyptian position as presented by General Mubarak and Dr Usamah al-Baz is that a distinction should be drawn between agreement on the city's final status, which will be discussed at a later stage--and apparently also by the highest echelons--and those aspects linked with the Jerusalem issue in the framework of the Camp David agreements, which involve autonomy. In Egypt's view, the arrangements for self-rule--security, local elections and education--also apply to the inhabitants of East Jerusalem.

In a talk with us, as in the series of interviews with the French communications media, the Egyptian vice president stressed that even if his country sharply condemns the Jerusalem law, the very fact of this law's existence does not appear to him to be an obstacle that cannot be overcome. The Egyptians are not making the resumption of the autonomy talks dependent on agreement on the Jerusalem issue, but are now claiming that this will be a main issue in everything involving their future contacts with Israel.

It appears that, because of the intensive diplomatic contacts conducted recently between Washington, Cairo and Jerusalem, there has been a "flexibility" in the Egyptian position. The use of the term "preparatory talks for the summit" is intended to replace talk of a "resumption of the autonomy talks" and this will be a sort of honorable way out for Egypt, which unilaterally stopped the talks.

In his talks with French leaders and in all his public appearances here, General Mubarak often spoke about the need for goodwill and an atmosphere of trust, especially on the issue of Jerusalem.

Vice President Mubarak is leaving Paris with the feeling that there has been an easing in the relations between Egypt and France and that President Giscard d'Estaing has returned to his previous stand, of friendship to Egypt and recognition of the fact that it is the main power in the Middle East and the Arab world.

Although some of the Egyptian vice president's advisers are not so optimistic about the talks held here, there is no doubt that the Egyptians think the ice has been broken, and there will again be close contacts in the future between President Valery Giscard d'Estaing and his friend Anwar al-Sadat. On the practical level it appears that Egypt would prefer economic and, primarily, military cooperation with France to cooperation with Britain.

CSO: 4802

ANIS MANSUR ON AL-SADAT-BEGIN MESSAGES

LD050957 Cairo OCTOBER in Arabic 31 Aug 80 pp 8-11

[Article by Anis Mansur: "Al-Sadat's Reply in 300 Words; So That We Will Not Look Back and Say: Were All These Complications Necessary?"]

[Excerpts] At the very beginning of the meeting between President al-Sadat and Israeli Ambassador Dr Ben-Elissar the ambassador said: Mr President, I have nothing to complain about this time.

The ambassador was referring to what he had always complained about--that he is being isolated, that the steps to normalize relations are slow and that so far he has been unable to find an apartment to live in.

So the ambassador no longer has anything to complain about either because the reasons for complaint have ceased to exist, or because the ambassador has gotten accustomed to this atmosphere, which has therefore become something ordinary, or because the discussions between Egypt and Israel have reached such a high level as to lessen the significance of any other discussions or complaints of any sort.

But it was President al-Sadat who had more than one complaint. The talk with President al-Sadat lasted 90 minutes. After the talks the Israeli ambassador said that President al-Sadat is optimistic and that he believes that there must be a solution.

President al-Sadat discussed every viewpoint and expressed astonishment at the misconception of much of what is being said. He expressed the view that the Israeli Government is extremely nervous.

As the negotiations stopped it was natural that the exchange of messages between President al-Sadat and Mr Begin should stop too and for the same reason. The negotiations became pedantic, revolving around themselves, and not moving onto new ground. They are twitching but not moving. And if there is any movement at all it is from Alexandria to al-Jizah or to Herzeliyya. But nothing new is being said and there is no hope either.

This is one of the difficult situations that Israel has created; there has been intransigence, time-wasting and attempts to make the world believe that Israel is being serious about reaching or attaining something.

Violent decisions and provocative challenges to Egypt and the whole world followed. The negotiations stopped but were not discontinued.

Then came the turn to negotiate on paper, that is the exchange of messages between President al-Sadat and Mr Begin. However long these negotiations went on they were bound to stop because Israel created situations under which it was difficult to exchange messages, since otherwise such exchanges would mean accepting these situations. In the messages, just as in the negotiations, there were pedantic discussions on the part of Israel as well as oratory addressed to the Jewish peoples everywhere. There was also touchiness and great misunderstanding.

For example, when President al-Sadat said that the Jewish history begins here, that is in Egypt, and that it appears to be Egypt's destiny to end this history here too, Mr Begin's reply was: No, this is not true. The history of the Jews begins in the city of Ur in Iraq when Abrahma left for the land of Canaan and stopped at Elon Moreh.

This is a historical fact known by any junior student of the history of ancient civilizations, or the great migrations in history, or comparative religions. But what President al-Sadat meant, but did not wish to mention because of his awareness that such a reference would hurt and pain the Jews, was the suffering of the Jews in Egypt, their bondage, and their exodus behind Moses and the beginning of the exodus from Egypt and from all the other countries as well as the beginning of the diaspora and wandering in Sinai and in the world. What President al-Sadat meant to say was that with peace the historical suffering can end and that it is Egypt's destiny once again to end Israel's historical diaspora and fear.

Among other things, President al-Sadat said to the Israeli ambassador: What has Israel gained now? It has gained the enmity of hundreds of millions of Muslims and one billion Christians. It has not satisfied 14 million American and European Jews and has lost Europe's traditional friendship. The Israeli prime minister could have done without all this.

The aggression against Lebanon then followed and Israel went on building settlements. All this and the statements in Mr Begin's messages created difficult conditions and unbearable pressures on the Egyptian negotiator. We therefore decided on a pause for reflection.

But we must ask: Why all this? Does Mr Begin want to bring pressure to bear on Egypt, or embarrass it, or drive it to break the negotiations as if we had never agreed on dialog, without which there would have been no peace agreement?

Will this Israeli hardline attitude lead to the weakening of Egypt? What benefit would Israel gain if this happens? If some of the extremists imagine that it is possible to isolate Muslim and Arab Egypt with its ancient history from the rest of the Arab and Islamic world and separate it from roots that are 60 centuries old, is this not indulging in belief in myths?

There are other questions that are difficult to answer in the short time it takes to write these lines but it is an established fact that Israel now stands alone against the whole world. It believes that it alone is right and the rest of humanity is wrong.

If this is not sheer madness then it is megalomania.

It is unfair to say that what the Israeli Government has done expresses the aspirations and dreams of the people or the Jewish peoples everywhere. Rather, it is only a handful of hardliners who believe in this.

But we must not forget that the most important thing that President al-Sadat's initiative has achieved is that it has proved that there is no other means than dialog. We have put aside arms as well as mistrust, fear, enmity, and blind rejection. This tremendous gain, which the generations after us will inherit, must not be wasted.

Therefore, the exchange of messages between the Egyptian and Israeli leaderships was a continuation of the dialog but in a different manner.

The suspension of these messages was but a kind of search for a different approach. Will the dialog to follow be between Egypt and Israel with a dialog between Israel and the United States followed by a dialog between the three parties?

The subject of the dialog will be very simple: the decision to annex Arab Jerusalem to Israel--an annexation which Israel believes to be legitimate and which we believe to be a violation of the Security Council Resolution, the Camp David agreement and international law.

We will not discuss now the draft law which [Knesset member] Guela Cohen will submit for the annexation of the Golan in October nor will we discuss the project to dig a 61-mile long canal between the Mediterranean and the Dead Sea through occupied Arab territories because this would be premature.

CSO: 4802

EGYPTIAN OIL MINISTER ANNOUNCES NEW OIL STRIKES

NC041912 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1542 GMT 4 Sep 80

[Text] Ra's Gharib, 4 Sep (MENA)--Eng Ahmad 'Izz al-Din Hilal, deputy prime minister and oil minister, has announced that new oil discoveries have been made. He added that detailed statements will be made when the new wells begin to produce oil in commercial quantities.

Hilal affirmed that Egypt has entered the phase of serious oil services, because Egypt is now drilling its own wells. In the past, foreign companies alone made such drillings. He said that Egypt wants to fulfill its objective of producing 1 million barrels of oil daily.

Hilal was speaking at a ceremony marking the beginning of the operation of the huge oil rig (Senefro), which is the property of the Egyptian drilling company. The rig is a whole city floating on the high seas; it is capable of working in 225-foot deep water.

The ceremony was held in the Ra's Gharib area in the Gulf of Suez. It was attended by the members of the ministerial production committee, the chairmen of the People's Assembly industrial committee and the National Democratic Party committee, and executive and workers leaders in the oil sector. The ceremony was also attended by the Japanese ambassador in Cairo, who represented his country. It is worth noting that Japan built the rig at a cost of $30 million, drawn from the Japanese loan to Egypt.

Engineer Hilal noted that the new rig saves Egypt $26,000 daily, which was paid to foreign companies in the past in the form ofoil quantities. Furthermore, he stated, the rig provides workers with technical training opportunities, because all those working on the rig are Egyptians.

He said that another huge rig will arrive in Egypt next April. It is now being built in Japan at a cost of $40 million.

The minister pointed out that these rigs will not operate in the Gulf of Suez only. They will also operate in the Mediterranean Sea for the purpose of promoting oil development and exploration processes.

Engineer Hilal had begun his speech by conveying President al-Sadat's greetings to the oil sector workers and his congratulations on their diligent work. Engineer Hilal noted that new and joint Egyptian and foreign companies will be established to work in the oil industry. He said that this signifies that the economic open door policy is not just one for importing consumer commodities, but--and in reality--it is primarily a production open door policy.

CSO: 4802

AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI SEES DIFFERENCES WITH BANI-SADR AS HEALTHY SIGN

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 21 Aug 80 pp 1, 7

[Interview with Ayatollah Beheshti, Chairman of the Iranian Supreme Council; "Beheshti to AL-SAFIR: Our Differences With Bani-Sadr Are Healthy Phenomenon; Lebanese and Palestinians Must Unite Their Capabilities"]

[Text] Tehran--Ayatollah Beheshti is one of the main names on the Iranian political arena at present. He holds the official position of chairman of the Supreme Council, which is the highest judiciary position under the new regime. But his "actual" and more important position is that of being "the number one man" in the Islamic Republican Party and the main rival of Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, the president of the republic.

Ayatollah Beheshti is a respected personality even though there is a lot of talk regarding his popularity, considering that President Bani-Sadr's circles focus on the weakness of this popularity. However, this doesn't seem to change things much so far. Beheshti's position in the existing main balances is an influential position, whether in the circle of Imam Khomeyni or in the important political circles of present-day Iran, be they the circles of the Consultative Council (of which he is not a member), the circles of the Council of Ulema [al-hawzah al-'ilmiyah] in Qom or other centers.

In the past, Ayatollah Beheshti was far from the lights. But in recent weeks, he has begun to appear in the media, both in the streets where posters supporting him have begun to show on Tehran's walls or in the press, the radio and the television. But so far, he rarely speaks to the non-Iranian media.

AL-SAFIR has conducted this interview with him at his office in the Supreme Court (Diwan 'Ami).

In this interview, Beheshti has discussed the disagreement between the Republican Party and Bani-Sadr, Mohammad Ali Rajai whom the party has imposed on the president of the republic by virtue of its majority in the Consultative Council, Iran's Arab relations, the Iranian position toward the Soviet Union and its position toward southern Lebanon.

[Question] It is the opinion of many that Rajai's government will not last long because of its being "a de facto" government imposed on the president of the republic by the majority in the Consultative Council. Do you think so?

[Answer] It is difficult to talk affirmatively about something that hasn't happened yet. But hope for the success of brother Rajai's government is very strong.

[Question] President Bani-Sadr is raising the banner of the "tolerant Islam" and of defending the liberties in his disagreement with the Islamic Republican Party. This slogan contains an explicit accusation that you represent the radical religious current confronting the private and public liberties.

[Answer] It is the opinion of the Islamic Republican Party that observation of the liberties permitted by the constitution is the duty of everybody, be he President Bani-Sadr or anybody else. Therefore, the disagreement cannot be over this point. The disagreement is over preserving the pure Islamic system versus the tolerance that opens a door or a mini-door for the influence of the non-Islamic systems in the Islamic republic. The party and the majority underline their rejection of this and stress the need to preserve the pure Islamic system. All intellectual and practical movement and all the dynamism must be within the framework of the pure Islam. Dynamism is something that we welcome whereas opening the door to the thinking alien to Islam is something that we prohibit and fight.

[Question] You have talked about the "un-Islamic systems" that you reject. What do you mean?

[Answer] Yes, there is a mixture of Islam and capitalism, a mixture of Islam and socialism or a mixture of Islam and secularism and there are factions inclined toward each of these mixtures, thinking that it is Islam. It must be stressed that government employees, teachers and similar people who have an impact on determining the content and form of the modern Islamic social system must have a purely Islamic thinking and must abide practically by the tasks of the Muslim. However, the others should be given an opportunity to express their opinions in the intellectual meetings and symposiums on the various issues. Every man will thus have the freedom to express and defend his opinion and to hear the various other opinions. This constitutes a free election [intikhab] of every opinion on the one hand and a preservation of the Islamic identity of the revolution and of the regime on the other hand [sic.]

Disagreement With Bani-Sadr

[Question] There is an opinion that says that the disagreement between the party and President Bani-Sadr is more than a difference of views on the system of Islamic rule and that it is a struggle in whose light the nature of the political authority of the future Iran will be determined.

[Answer] In any case, we believe that the broad religious and political bloc which is making great strikes and playing an important role inside and outside the Consultative Council must be represented in a position of power. Any reaction on the part of this bloc is for the sake of God, may He be praised, and for the sake of avoiding war to get political power. However, this bloc will continue its struggle to achieve the pure and advanced Islamic system. The efforts exerted should not be considered a loss. "Man is a loser, except for him who has believed and has done good deeds and has advocated what is right and preached patience." [Loose translation of Koran phrase]

[Question] The revolution's triumph is not 2 years old yet. However, many heads have fallen in the political struggles that have erupted since the overthrow of the shah. Are these disagreements, including the current disagreement between you and President Bani-Sadr, a healthy phenomenon in the course of the Iranian revolution?

[Answer] In fact, if the reason behind this disagreement was personal, then the disagreement would not be a healthy phenomenon but rather a sickness suffered by the revolution and its makers. But if the cause of the disagreement is the wish to underline preservation of the pure Islamic entity of the revolution, then such disagreement is healthy and it strengthens the revolution and makes it sounder and more active. Every revolution that has lost part of its original intellectual identity and that has allowed foreign intellectual identities to oppose its rule has exposed itself to elimination from within and from outside. God forbid that this should happen to our Islamic revolution.

Four Priorities

[Question] What are the priorities of the program on whose basis the forthcoming government will rule and how do you view the matter in your capacity as leader of the majority in the Consultative Council?

[Answer] First, I do not consider myself leader of the majority in the Islamic Consultative Council because thinking and action in our bloc are collective and not individualistic and because the leadership is collective and not individualistic. Second, the priorities of our program are:

A. Use of the revolutionary youth who have pure faith in Islam and who are trained in a revolutionary manner to run the government.

B. Stress on the cultural revolution in its comprehensive sense.

C. Stress on mature and successful economic planning in agriculture, industry and trade according to the modern method whose principles we have outlined in the constitution.

D. Establish a strong cultural, political, economic and ethical Islamic movement that will have an impact on preserving the moral and social personality in a manner compatible with Islam so that our youth may become a

progressive revolutionary Muslim generation that loves the jihad [holy struggle], that fears no danger and that desires no entertainment that hinders man from proceeding toward God, may He be praised, and from struggling for His sake.

[Question] Do you think that the current phase in Iran is the phase of laying down the foundations of the state or the phase of the priority of spreading the call for revolution in the Islamic world?

[Answer] I personally find no conflict between these two tasks.

Relations With Soviets

[Question] It is said that nearly 3,000 Soviet experts are working in Iran. It is well-known that there is an economic cooperation agreement concluded between the two countries. On the other hand, there is a deep disagreement between Iran and the Soviet Union over many issues, foremost of which is the issue of Afghanistan. What is the truth of the relations between the two countries and how do you view the future of these relations?

[Answer] We prefer to have constructive relations between us and the various peoples. However, we stress preservation of the Islamic values and ideology, not only in writing but also in deeds and in reality. As long as the economic and political relations are subject to the clear Islamic positions, they will last. As soon as such relations require us to concede our concern for these [Islamic] values, we will preserve the values, even if at the expense of abandoning the relations.

Southern Lebanon

[Question] You are aware of the situation in southern Lebanon. How do you view the matter and do you have a special position insofar as the relations between the Shi'ites and the Palestinians in that area are concerned?

[Answer] The truth is that the responsibility of defending southern Lebanon is the responsibility of every Muslim. We wish the circumstances allowed us to do more toward this responsibility than we are doing at present. I ask the Lebanese brothers in Jabal 'Amil and the Palestinian brothers to unite their capabilities against the Zionist enemy. I also ask them not to disappoint their brothers in the struggle against the infidel enemy.

[Question] It is well-known that Iran enjoys positive relations with some Arab countries. Does the improvement of these relations have, in your view, special significance to Iran or is Iran interested only in concentrating its positive ties with Syria, Libya, Algeria and the PLO alone?

[Answer] We stress on positive relations between us and the Muslim peoples. But a few regimes dominating these peoples have stood as a stumbling block between the revolutionary Iranian Muslim people and the fraternal Muslim peoples that are being persecuted by the tyrannical rule of their governments.

All these peoples must rise against the tyrannical rule dominating them, against world imperialism and against Zionism that is allied with this imperialism.

I have a word to address to all the Muslim youth in Lebanon: Rise with God's will, clear your conscience, prepare all your capabilities and unite your ranks against your enemy and God's enemy. Know that God will give you victory and do not fear the enormous military and economic capabilities that your enemy possesses. The experience of modern history is enough to confirm the belief that a revolutionary and faithful people can trample and overcome such capabilities. God is worthier of your fear if you are believers.

[Question] We read in the Iranian publications certain criticism of the Palestinian policy. Some of this criticism censures the Palestinian revolution for something which may consider unrealistic, namely the failure of this revolution to adopt the Islamic ideology. We noticed a few days ago that Jalal-al-Din al-Farisi, your colleague in the Republican Party, answered this criticism, urging the Iranians to appreciate the special circumstances of the Palestinians and not to embarrass them with the slogan of "neither eastern nor western." Do the statements of al-Farisi, who is closely connected with you, reflect your view and how do you evaluate the Iranian-Palestinian relations under the present circumstance?

[Answer] Beheshti declined to answer this question

8494
CSO: 4902

UNEMPLOYMENT, ECONOMIC ISSUES DISCUSSED BY BANI-SADR

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 22 Aug 80 pp 5, 6

[Text] President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr, accompanied by a number of Majles representatives, left Tehran for an inspection tour of Kerman. Accompanying him are representatives from Kerman, Birjand, Gonbad, Tabas, Ferdows and Torbat-e Jam. Also accompanying the President are his cultural and legal advisors.

The aircraft, carrying the President and his party, landed at Kerman airport at 11:30 am. Welcoming the President at the airport were the governor general of the Kerman Province, and high civilian and military officials. Immediately after his arrival, Bani Sadr left for Takhti stadium in the city.

The President was greeted at the stadium by the Imam's representative in Kerman, Hojjatoleslam Ja'fari, who praised Bani Sadr for the appointment of Raja'i as the head of the government, calling him fit for the job. He also added that the Moslem people of Kerman expected the President to take proper action regarding security in the city. He then called for unity and cooperation in the Islamic community and called for eradication of unemployment in the country. This was followed by the shouts of "Bani Sadr, Bani Sadr, we support you," which filled the stadium, after which people chanted "Bani Sadr, Bani Sadr, God be with you."

In his speech at the stadium, Bani Sadr said he hoped that people in Kerman would strive to advance and rebuild, saying that the nation faced similar problems everywhere.

Bani Sadr pointed out that during his visit to Khorramabad he had received 990 letters from people 65 percent of which concerned economic problems. Security, he said, was the second important problem which, he said, must be solved by legal means instead of by force. He said that resorting to force could make the revolution meet the fate of other revolutions. He said he believed there was another method for taking care of the security problem, that of going everywhere, meeting people, exchanging views in free debates and creating a sort of Islamic order by an informed public

and establishing a spirit of brotherhood everywhere. Thus, an informed public and society would abandon the use of force and destructive methods. If we succeed by adopting this approach, our Islamic revolution will be the first in the history to have achieved its ultimate.

Referring to economic problems, Bani Sadr talked about the reopening of various plants in the country, saying that if the government was expected to do all that over the country how could it be expected to tackle other more serious and basic problems. He said that every individual in the country must do his part.

Our success in Iran today depends on being able to inform the public of all that is happening in the country, the President said. He declared that as far as he was concerned, he was prepared to do his job in rebuilding the country through basic and fundamental changes which, he believed, was not possible without advanced planning.

The President concluded by emphasizing the importance of spirituality, saying that resolving the many problems the country was faced with and setting up an Islamic government were quite impossible without planning. He noted that spirituality was one of the most fundamental conditions for the implementation of comprehensive planning.

The President then talked about the setting up of the Organization for Scientific and Industrial Development. He said that talented individuals with creative minds will be asked to join the organization to help build an independent and prosperous Iran, self-sufficient and free from foreign domination.

9561
CSO: 4906

DISSENSION FORESEEN WITHIN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 22 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] According to reports from Tehran, criticism from within the Islamic Republic Party of Mohammad Ali Raja'i, the Party's candidate for Prime Minister, who was nominated despite Bani Sadr's disapproval, have already begun. His most important critic has been Jalaleddin Farsi, the party's theoretician.

Farsi has declared that preference of Mohammad Ali Raja'i over the Islamic ideals is contrary to the country's political and economic necessities. He has declared that "a true Moslem is one who is able to create a balance between Islam and education."

Such criticism had so far been reserved for the moderates. Bani Sadr had expressed his lack of enthusiasm for the selection of Raja'i but agreed to his appointment because the Islamic Republic Party held a majority in the Majles.

Foreign Minister Sadeq Qotbzadeh has indicated he will not join the government formed by Raja'i, and, despite the fact that Jalaleddin Farsi had said he was not seeking any position in the new government, his name is being mentioned as the possible new foreign minister.

Farsi had been the first choice of the Islamic Republic Party for the premiership but had been rejected by Bani Sadr. Farsi, who had served with the Palestinians, and was a popular candidate for President, withdrew his candidacy at the last moment due to his Afghan origin.

Raja'i, who was supposed to introduce his cabinet yesterday, has said his ministers will be committed to Islam one hundred percent.

Referring to repeated statements by Raja'i in the past that he will be following the line of the Imam, Farsi has said that this alone was not sufficient for one to become prime minister. "Many claim to be followers of the Imam's line and, therefore, should qualify to become prime minister."

On Wednesday, Bani Sadr issued a decree appointing Raja'i as the new head of the government. He was told that his first task was to establish unity in the country. Raja'i was scheduled to present his government to the Majles Thursday, yesterday. The delay in doing so is said to have been the result of differences between him and some members of the Islamic Republic Party. Party members had wanted that all, or at least the majority of the new cabinet members, be chosen from among the party members.

9561
CSO: 4906

HOSTAGE ISSUE, SHAH'S DEATH DISCUSSED BY MAJLES DEPUTY

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 21 Aug 80 pp 2, 3, 4

[Text] Majid Ansari, Consultative Assembly representative, said during an interview: The shah's death is something which has now come to pass. However, there is another issue more important than the shah's death which is occurring in the United States today. In connection with the issue you raised, the shah's death was something foreseen from the very first day. We were sure that the United States would not deliver the shah. The reason for this was that the shah's delivery would have meant delivering documents and crimes of the United States itself, and would have meant disgracing all the presidents who had supported the shah. We knew from the first day that the United States would play around so that perhaps the hostages would be freed; if they were not freed, they would at last kill the shah. I personally consider it very unlikely that the shah's death was a natural one, particularly when we see that the United States waits until the Majles is convened, and when it is on the verge of deciding, the United States does this so that perhaps the Majles will reduce their demands.

Furthermore, the shah's death is nothing to us, it is an ordinary matter. The important issue is that we will show no deviation whatsoever in relation to the hostages, although the shah is now dead. Very well, the shah's wealth exists, these associates of the shah, close associates of the shah who are plotting against the revolution today, exist. Again, for the sake of the Islamic spirit and the imam's commands, we will make this concession, i.e. that they return the close associates of the shah who are busy plotting, and similarly all the nation's wealth that he stole and placed in foreign banks.

We will free the hostages with a degree of reduction in our demands. Otherwise, the Islamic Consultative Assembly will even make a firm stand, and God willing, the hostage issue and their trial will be raised, and the Majles will take the appropriate decision.

In any case the issue is that the Iranian nation must prepare itself to struggle with the United States. The nation will not be expecting us to return the hostages and let the United States come and kiss the nation's face and make up, this is impossible. If we retreat, the United States will advance. God willing, our struggle with the United States will continue until the world is free from the domination of the U.S. government and every other superpower.

Today the United States strives to display the hostage issue as a fundamental issue, while this is not so. The hostage issue is a minor problem and our position in relation to it is explicit. If we give them the hostages the background of this issue will be destroyed.

If they act as they have promised, we will give them the hostages, and in this way we are victorious and have not been defeated. If the United States surrenders to our words, we have advanced a step, and we will attack again.

Today the United States has the Palestinians and Jerusalem hostage. It has the Middle East hostage. It exploits all the Islamic nations of the world and because we are Moslems we must struggle for their deliverance.

When we struggle for Palestinian freedom, it means we are struggling against the United States. When we aid the Philippine and Eritrean Moslem fronts and other liberation movements, we are battling with the United States. It is not only an issue of hostage-taking.

Ansari added: The United States with its imperialistic essence is always plotting, and until the time that the imam's line and the revolution's line have been drawn to compromise, it will go on plotting. Our war with the United States is perpetual. Our revolution in its foundation and essence is in opposition to U.S. imperialism and all world imperialism. One problem is U.S. stupidity, stupidity meaning that they want to lay plans here based on their own materialistic standards. They do not know and ignore the fact that essentially it is spirituality which carries our revolution forward. In their fantasies they think that if they make a coup d'etat and kill four persons, the people will be frightened and stay quiet, just like the fantasies which caused the Rey Cinema and the Kerman mosque and...to be set on fire, and 17 Shahrivar [8 September 78] was brought about. Imagining that the nation will be frightened. But they cannot comprehend the spirituality ruling our revolution nor the blessing of martyrdom which is the wish of all of us.

But that which is real and which makes the United States hopeful of carrying out a coup d'etat is the existence of counterrevolutionaries in Iran. These elements are in the army. Elements associated with the former regime are plentiful in the army, and the army must be completely purged. Although we approve the army as a whole, and it must be approved, there are Savakists in it who unfortunately were not crushed after the revolution and who were strengthened by some officials. There are persons

who have been harmed by this revolution and whose interests are endangered in some way, and who furthermore cannot be in those slimy materialistic programs.

There are leftist groups who in the imam's words are U.S. leftists, those tied to the east and west. There are holders of deviationist leftist thoughts, and even leftists pretending to be Moslems who have formed a coalition to act with them and have adopted a hypocritical attitude.

They are all elements who have made efforts to weaken the leadership and the Islamic republic domestically, and have prepared an area of hope for the United States. The path to collision with them is definite. We must decisively confront the plotters.

The true school of Islam believes in free discussion one hundred percent, and respects this kind of thing. However, discriminations must be made. It is not possible to hold free talks and discussions with everyone. Boundaries must be determined. There is the obscene Feda'i-ye Khalq group which has directly declared war against the Islamic Republic of Iran and whose weapons the entire disturbance in Kordestan revolves. What talks can we hold with them, and upon what issue can we come to an agreement with them? With someone for whom the issue is truly not clear and who has an opinion, fine, we will sit down and talk. But whenever we feel that they are plotting in the wings of this discussion, and that they account free discussion as a rostrum for their propagandizing, we must prevent this. People are important, and people must not listen to these rumors and provocations.

The people vigilantly neutralize the efforts that U.S. agents make inside the country, such as creating shortages and producing a lack of security and creating an unfavorable atmosphere on the basis of rumors. I am certain, God willing, that with the spirit governing the revolution, as the imam says, the United States cannot do a darn thing, even though it lays plans for a hundred coup d'etats. As the imam says, an airplane which takes off is compelled to land, and it is this nation which will stand up against that airplane with its fists.

If they had wanted to be able to do something with a coup d'etat force, they would have had to do it with the army that they held, the Savakists they had, and with Mohammad Reza. They were not able to then, and now it is definite, unless, God forbid, differences develop among the people, and officials, instead of thinking about the struggle with imperialism and about the revolution, fall into a power struggle.

These matters cannot be a suitable field for a U.S. plot. An individual whom we say is in the U.S. line does not necessarily have U.S. identification papers. We have no more than two lines: Islam and non-Islam. Whatever is not in an Islamic direction is non-Islamic, and today whatever is to the advantage of the United States, whether or not it supports the Soviet Union or China or whomever, is non-Islamic.

9597
CSO: 4906

GENERAL PALIZBAN'S COUP OPERATION DESCRIBED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 Sep 80 p 13

[Text] Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt Supplied Financial Aid to the Shah's Affiliates and Mercenaries.

Palizban, Bakhtiar and Ashraf Gave Speeches for the Mercenaries at Iraq's Military Camps.

Kermanshah--KEYHAN reporter: In the course of the operations of the recent abortive coup in Iran, some 20,000 mercenaries in the West of the country were scheduled to move on Qasr-e Shirin, Eslamabad and Kermanshah on Palizban's order.

KEYHAN's reporter despatched to Eslamabad from Kermanshah has been talking to a group of the deceived members of the Qolkhani tribe. This tribe has recently returned to Iran from Iraq at the behest of the Devouts of the Imam. So far some 2,500 members of this tribe have arrived in Iran and given up their arms.

Haji Tahmasebi, in charge of the Headquarters of the Devouts of the Imam, spoke to KEYHAN about the manner of organizing of the headquarters on the border strip. After the counterrevolution used the Qolkhani tribe and had the members of this tribe hired by Palizban and Oveysi for sabotage work inside Iran, an organized group of the Qolkhani tribesmen who had preserved their solidarity with the Islamic Republic were called on to close ranks with a number of non-natives and with the Revolutionary Guards Corps to form the Organization of the Devouts of the Imam. After the formation of this organization, some 50 members of the "committed" people of the region banded together within this organization and tried to disrupt the air of suspicion among the Qolkhani tribes people toward the Islamic Republic of Iran and toward the purging of the areas in the grip of the counterrevolutionaries. They succeeded in this disruption.

In his interview with KEYHAN's special correspondent, Haji Tahmasebi added that long before the coup d'etat "we found out that persons like Palizban, Oveysi and Bakhtiar intended to use the tribes of this region. We,

therefore, diverted all our energies and efforts to this region." Haji Tahmasebi added, "We gave frequent speeches in the region and gave the people political awareness." The Qolkhani peasants were told "Be alert! They want to use you for the criminal United States and its stooges Saddam Hussein and the like of Palizban and Oveysi." This was the way "we countered the coup," he said. The supervisor of the Devouts of the Imam added, "Also by re-organizing the Devouts of the Imam and by strengthening their organization we managed to attract into our fold group after group of those people who had been deceived; those who aimed their weapons at us until yesterday have now joined us. Our force has thus burgeoned to 1,300 strong."

It was thus that the conspiracy was foiled at the scheduled time, Tahmasebi said. "At present, group after group of the deceived Qolkhani tribesmen join us and our organization expands extensively. By setting up cooperative societies and enlisting the support of the Reconstruction Campaign Organization, we have made efforts to obviate the problems of the region. Our force has restored tranquility in the region since four months ago. We have covered under our security umbrella a vast area extending from Salas Babajani to Qasr-e Shirin."

In conclusion Tahmasebi said, "We gave the counterrevolutionaries five days to surrender their arms. Failing to do so, they will be in for the most severe punishment and we shall confront them in the harshest manner."

Seyyed Nasreddin Heydari, the leader of the Society of the Patrons of Righteousness (Jame'e Ahl-e Haqq) who carried a letter announcing the allegiance of a group of Qolkhani folks, numbering around 2,500, talked to KEYHAN's despatched reporter. He said, "The shah's regime sent a number of the Qolkhani tribesmen to Sar-e Pol-e Zahab town during the revolution as club-wielders by offering them money and by threatening and intimidating them. In the ensuing clashes there a number of people were killed and wounded. This angered the people against the Qolkhani tribe and they blocked their supply and transit route. The puppet government of Iraq availed of the opportunity and befriended a large number of the tribesmen by supplying them with provisions and weapons."

Regarding the place of training of the deceived and counterrevolutionary groups he said, "The counterrevolutionaries are receiving military training in various camps from fugitive officers (of the previous Iranian regime) and from the agents of the Iraqi Ba'thists." But he pointed out that their most important training camp was located at Charkolav. The families of the trainees, he said, were kept in a separate area as hostages until such a time when their husbands and relatives carried out their missions and returned to their camps.

The religious leader of the Society of the Patrons of Righteousness also spoke about funds funneled to "these mercenaries" and said that the monies were primarily supplied by the affiliates of the shah. But, he added, it had recently been arranged for them to receive financial assistance from Arab reactionary countries such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Jordan via Iraq.

Concerning the strengthening of the Ba'thist Iraqi armed forces with support from Arab armies, Seyyed Nasreddin Heydari said, "The groups returning to Iran say that a force put together by Jordan, Kuwait and Egypt has entered Iraq and been deployed on the borders, although these countries are opposed to Oraq on certain scores."

In conclusion he pointed out that Iraq had heavily counted on Qolkhani tribe--comprising of some 20,000 households. However, the tribesmen did not deign to become mercenaries. Many of them, he added, had written letters and expressed willingness to declare allegiance to the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Nosoor Khosravi, one of the tribesmen who has joined the rank of the Devouts of the Imam together with 50 members of his clan said, "The Iraqi Ba'thist agents deceived us. They promised us money and weapons." Every day, he added, a counterrevolutionary lectured to the tribespeople. "One day it was Palizban, another day it was Bakhtiar and later it would be Ashraf." However, he added, when a group of the Devouts of the Imam visited their villages they realized that all the propaganda of the counterrevolutionaries had been false. "That was how," he said, "we embraced the Islamic Republic of Iran which we shall support to the last drop of our blood."

Hatam Arzhang, another member of the Qolkhani tribe who had been contacted by the counterrevolutionaries, said that one day they went to him and told him, "Bring one hundred men and receive a monthly salary of nine thousand tumans from us." But, he said, he did not accept the money and instead volunteered to join the Devouts of the Imam at its headquarters in Kermanshah.

Hamid Nameh'i, a vigilante in the region, too, said, "I ask the brothers who have been taken in not to be deceived by Imperialism. The monies that are supplied to you is the blood money of all the martyrs of the cause of freedom."

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CSO: 4906

HEAD OF CENTRAL BANK DISCUSSES MAJOR ECONOMIC ISSUES

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 20 Aug 80 pp 8, 9 10

[Text] In a press, radio and TV interview, the head of the Central Bank of Iran, Ali Reza Nowbari, discussed issues such as retirement and forced retirement plan for employees of banks, foreign exchange reserve, effect of the reduced oil export, unemployment and the return to Iran of the former shah's wealth.

With reference to the order issued by Imam Khomeyni to the effect that Iranian workers in the Persian Gulf area were religiously duty-bound to sell their foreign exchange earnings to the Central Bank, Nowbari said:

"Workers in the Persian Gulf area should not bring Iranian currency with them to Iran because their money will be confiscated at the airports and at the border and, according to regulations, it will not be returned to them. This had created a lot of headache for both the bank and our Iranian brother workers."

On the retirement plan and the forced retirement of bank employees, the head of the Central Bank said: "The plan is designed to determine the fate of those employees whose services are no longer needed by their respective organizations. Under the new plan, employees with 15 years of service could be made to retire by another 10 years to their service."

He said that under the new plan retirement of those with 25 years of service is mandatory. He also said that payment of 2,000,000 rials had been considered to employees who will be forced to retire.

Concerning foreign exchange reserve and the effect of the reduced oil export, the head of the Central Bank said: "Oil export during the month of Tir [22 June-22 July] had reached 570,000 barrels a day, which is a very small figure in view of the country's economic needs and budgetary calculations for the fiscal year 1359 [21 March 80-20 March 81]."

He said that under these conditions the nation's budgetary deficit will be three to four times higher than was expected, which is a serious threat to the nation's economy and will put the country in a financial squeeze. But he added that the issue was not an economic problem but a political one requiring political solution.

Regarding unemployment, he said that some 700,000 young labor force had entered the market this year without any plans for their absorption.

On returning the wealth of the deposed shah to Iran, the head of the Central Bank said that legal measures had been taken for the return to Iran of 32 billion tumans the deposed shah had stolen from the nation's treasury. He added that the pursuing of the matter required favorable political atmosphere.

Speaking about Iranian workers in the Persian Gulf area who are paid in foreign exchange, the head of the Central Bank said that these workers had preferred to exchange their earnings through private exchange dealers at a higher rate, higher than that of the Central Bank.

This made it possible for the foreign exchanges earned by Iranian workers to be smuggled to America, Europe and elsewhere. In its place, Iranian currency was being brought back to the country by the same workers which, in turn, created two basic problems.

One was that it helped supporters of the old regime with foreign exchange and the money left the country. Another problem concerned workers themselves. As we know, regulations do not permit anyone to bring into the country foreign exchange in excess of equivalent of 2,000 tumans. Many workers bring much more which very often is confiscated at the airports, putting great pressure on them.

Imam Khomeyni has granted permission to purchase foreign exchange from these workers at a lower rate provided they sell their exchanges through official Iranian bank branches of the Central Bank only.

Nowbari further added that by this method Iran will be able to earn between 200 to 300 million tumans additional income every year. But he said that the additional income was not the main thing. The important issue, he said, was the creation of a second source of foreign exchange reserve.

He noted that the goal was the adoption of a method to earn up to one billion tumans a year in foreign exchange in order to set up a second source of reserve, second to that of oil.

He announced that all Iranian bank branches in the Persian Gulf area had been mobilized to handle the purchasing foreign exchange from Iranian workers and transferring a substantial amount of the purchased exchange to their families in Iran. This will be done, he said, with the help of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Regarding the forced retirement plan of the bank employees, he said that it had been approved by the banks' General Assembly which is composed of 6 cabinet ministers, and was something similar to that of the government

with the exception that the plan for the banks had its own peculiar problems because a number of banks had been part of the private sector and had then been nationalized by the government.

Therefore, he said, there were differences in pay and benefits between state banks and the previously private ones, and the main problem now was to merge them [into a single system].

He said that the new plan allows bank managers to retire those employees who feel they could engage in productive activities by paying them for their years of services in their respective banks.

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ARMY INVESTIGATION PUT ON FIRMER FOOTING

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] The Seminar on Studying and Selecting a New Investigation System for Military Agencies was held at the Inspection Office of the Ministry of Defense. Attended by the representatives of the three branches of the armed forces and the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff, the Seminar is now underway.

The manner of the dismantling of the inspection system of the army which is considered to be a legacy of the previous oppressive regime of Iran is on the seminar's agenda. The obsolete system made only for misappropriation of the taxpayer's money and for burgeoning the bureaucratic machinery and for specious show-off. The system is not compatible with the humane and Islamic spirit of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. It, therefore, has to be superseded by a new system which meets the need of the Islamic Revolution.

Secondly, the new system, which is yet to be put together, should be armed with a revolutionary, Islamic and humane spirit. In order to be thus armed, the system in question should be primarily equipped with a spirit of piety and expertise. These two qualities are mutually inclusive. The army should train such inspectors who besides being expert are endowed with the spirit of piety, sincerity and purity.

Third on the agenda is the manner in which these inspections are carried out and an atmosphere of harmony is created in the relationships between the various units of the army, on the one hand, and between the army and revolutionary institutions such as the Revolutionary Guard Corps, on the other. Inspection was a managerial tool, the seminar was told. If there were healthy and bona fide inspections, then productivity and efficiency would rise commensurately. Therefore, to ensure that the army inspection interfaced with revolutionary, Islamic and humane criteria, and in order to ensure that the army met the Islamic revolutionary requirements, radical changes would have to be introduced in the army inspection system.

The representatives of the tripartite forces and of the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff spoke about the problems and the inadequacies beleaguering their respective units. Enumerating the problems they also put forth solutions for making up the deficiencies.

The seminar is scheduled to make the outcome of its deliberations known to the Iranian public through a resolution on 8 Shahrivar [30 August].

At the closing of yesterday's session of the seminar, Col Aziz Dizaji, Chief of the Inspection Department of the Ministry of Defense and Secretary of the Islamic Association of the Military Personnel talked to KEYHAN's reporter. He said, "Our Islamic revolution has grown several months old but it is most regrettable that the laws governing the army do not yet fit the spirit of the Islamic Revolution." For instance, he said, in the unit that he served, the thinking, approach and tastes applied to the matter of inspection were not Islamic at all. "We, therefore, thought," he said, "a seminar should be organized to assess and assign an Islamic inspectorate system in the army to ensure that the inspection system of the army has an Islamic and human character." The seminar, he said, was underway and "we are confident that it will bear positive and desirable fruit."

Referring to the characteristics of an Islamic inspection he said, "Previously, under the oppressive regime, inspection was a convenient and hypocritical means at the disposal of the chiefs of the army so that they would be entitled to receiving considerable rewards by scoring the 100 mark." With such externalism, they tried to sweep under the carpet the harsh realities and the deprivation rampant in the army, he said. They indeed made quite a job of it. We had a straw army and an impious one at that, he added. Now that the revolution has succeeded, we should pay more attention to the "contents" rather than the "container"; we should build an ideologically oriented army.

To achieve this, in Col Dizaji's view, first of all we should identify the faults. He added, if we try to remove the wrongdoer without understanding the wrong, that wrong will stay with us forever. Inspection should, therefore, make for guidance and supervision. In other words we should seek out the faults, understand them, analyze them and, in order to arrive at fundamental constructiveness, we should put forth corrective solutions.

Asked if he cooperated with the Ideology Section of the army, the Inspectorate Chief of the Defence Ministry said that each section of the army worked independently. Undoubtedly, he said, there should be a measure of cooperation and coordination among various sections. He said that what his unit did was to establish order and discipline among the various productive units of the army. The operations of various units, he explained, are kept under observation and control. In order to prevent the various inspection functional areas from clashing or overlapping and in order to have inspection duties well covered, he said, we should establish coordination among the inspection sections of various governmental and even non-governmental organizations.

Citing a case of cooperation between the inspection section of the army and the revolutionary institutions, Col Dizaji said, some time ago one of the committees informed us that some people were trying to transport the army's electronic equipment abroad. We went into action immediately and saw that they wanted to take the army's electronic equipment out of the country. We prevented that and put the thieves under arrest. Col Dizaji expressed hope that the system that would be announced after the conclusion of this seminar would put an end to the many problems now besieging the armed units.

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SHAH'S LAST CHIEF OF STAFF DEFENDS ACTIONS

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 19 Aug 80 pp 13, 14

[Text] Several contradictory reports have so far been published regarding the role played by General 'Abbass Qarebaghi during the last days of the former regime and the early days of the new one. Up to now, the last chief of staff of the army of the deposed shah had not himself commented about the reports.

The army officer who, according to the opponent of the regime, was responsible for preventing the continuous bloodshed and the total disintegration of the armed forces, but, according to the supporters of the old regime, surrendered the army to revolutionaries, has sent us a statement which we are hereby publishing in its entirety. Should we receive additional information on the subject from our readers we will, no doubt, publish them as well.

"I am an Iranian. This is my motto. I am proud of my patriotism. My dear compatriots. My suffering buddies and you, the personnel of the armed forces who, under the rule and domination of the mullahs have been dishonored and humiliated. I am talking to you after 16 months in hiding and forced silence. I take my soldierly honor as my witness to talk to you, as always, truthfully. I have no doubt that history will be the judge and the truth will become known. I have written all the facts about the recent events in full detail which, after choosing a foreign country for my residence, will divulge the facts in a press interview first, and will then publish my notes so that the noble people of Iran could pass its judgement. These documents will provide logical and documented answers for the ill-informed but patriotic groups who, unlike today, were all out supporters of cooperation between the army and the people throughout the various stages of the revolution. After discovering the real nature of the revolution and the true identity of its leaders they were disheartened and now try to justify their cooperation and their sense of guilt by bringing false accusations against me. In my writings, I also answer those who know the secrets of the revolution and are aware of the behind the scene facts. This group is ill-intentioned and, for personal and private reasons, would like to smear my integrity and my

soldierly honor by taking advantage of the situation and prevent me in my struggle aimed at ridding my dear country from the yoke and domination of the dark rule of the mullahs.

"My survival, which has been variously interpreted, by the grace of the Almighty, has been the result of an accident and devotion and sacrifices by honorable individuals whose identities should not be divulged at the moment for the sake of their security and protection.

Army Communique

"The Iranian army is responsible for the defense of the nation's independence and its territorial integrity. It has, so far, remained aloof in the internal turmoils and, by supporting the country's legal governments, has performed its duties in the best possible way. In view of the recent events in the country, the High Council of the army convened at 10:30 on 23 Bahman 1357 [11 Feb 79], and in order to prevent further chaos and bloodshed, it unanimously agreed to announce its neutrality in the present political disputes and ordered all army units to return back to their respective bases. The Iranian army has and always will support the will of the noble and patriotic people of the country.

(signed) Gen Qarebaghi, Gen Shafeqat, Gen Fardust, Lt Gen Hatem, Lt Gen Moqadam, Lt Gen Najmi Na'ini, Lt Gen Mohaqeqi, Lt Gen Badre'i, Lt Gen Rabi'i, Admiral Habibollahi, Lt Gen Ma'sumi Na'ini, Lt Gen Sane'i, Admiral Asadollah Mohsenzadeh, Lt Gen Hosseyn Jahanbani, Lt Gen Mohammad Kazemi, Maj Gen Kabir, Lt Gen Bakhshi-Azar, Lt Gen Khajeh-Nuri, Maj Gen Parviz Amin-Afshar, Lt Gen Amir Farhang Khal'atbari, Maj Gen Fandam, Lt Gen Jalal Pezhman, Maj Gen Manuchehr Khosrowdad, Lt Gen Firuzmand, Lt Gen Rahimi-Larijani, Lt Gen Rahimi, Gen Reza Tabataba'i.

The above communique was, no doubt, a logical response by the armed forces to the wishes of the nation on that date. If the nation had not been able to foresee what treatment they were going to receive from the leaders of the revolution after coming to power in the name of the Islamic Republic, this held also true for the army commanders who, while giving in to the wishes of the people, were not able to predict how they would be treated by those who had revolted in the name of God and, at the same time, pretended brotherhood with the armed forces personnel. This concerns all segments of the Iranian society. Furthermore, nowhere in the communique was there a mention of the surrendering of the army garrisons. While giving general instructions regarding protection of the army garrisons at the end of the meeting, I personally ordered that the headquarters of the General Staff be defended by all forces after it had come under attack. I refer to the statements by Lt Gen Firuzmand made at the so-called Islamic Revolutionary Court which was printed in edition 69 of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC newspaper on page 2 of Wednesday, 31 Mordad 1358 [19 Aug 79]. Relying on my 40 years of devoted services as a soldier I declare that at no time that I have been hiding I cooperated with any

organization, council, political or clerical official. I disclaim all rumors and during the time I was in hiding in Iran I was never under the protection of officials of the present regime, political or religious.

In conclusion, I beg the noble people of Iran that until all the facts are known and are presented for public judgement refrain from having any doubt about my integrity. Greetings to the souls of the true martyrs of Iran. Long live the armed forces."

General 'Abbas Qarebaghi.

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CSO: 4906

GENDARMERIE PERSONNEL ASKED FOR SELF-SACRIFICE

LD121048 Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 0930 GMT 12 Sep 80

[Text] The commander of the gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic of Iran issued the following statement today, addressed to all regions, regiments, posts, bases, training centers and other organizations of the gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In his exalted name. My brothers: Today, our Islamic Revolution, our Islamic Republican country and our heroic nation need for self-sacrifice. Today, no element can keep us from carrying out our mission. Today--in front of the great leader of our Islamic Revolution and the Muslim nation of Iran--nothing but self-sacrifice could make us proud. Today, it is our blood that could be the guarantor of the stability of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of the exercise of its sovereignty. Today is the day of hopelessness for the enemies of the Islamic Revolution of Iran. Today is the day for the oppressed to overcome the world oppressors. Today is the day for striving, self-sacrifice and martyrdom. Therefore, considering the sensitivity of this period, as the commander of the gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic of Iran, I declare to all the gendarmerie personnel, including officers, NCOs, gendarmes, (?javanmard) and clerks that no one--under any pretext--may leave his position vis-a-vis the enemy, or surrender his weapon to the enemy, or commit any form of negligence or go-slow in the performance of his assigned duties.

Everybody should resist in face of any foreign aggressor, or any internal counterrevolutionary, until the last man and the last breath, and rub the snouts of every enemy and traitor.

My brothers, only one thing can save our honor and integrity: self-sacrifice. Naturally, he who shows courage, zeal and [words indistinct], deserves all kinds of encouragement and honor. But, he who adopts cowardice, fear and lack of zeal, deserves all forms of reprimand and the worst punishment.

This is my ultimatum to all you dear brothers, peace.

The commander of the gendarmerie of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Colonel Foruzan
CSO: 4906

BRIEFS

RIYADH BANKING CONFERENCE--'Ali Reza Nowbari, governor of the Central Bank of Iran, returned to Tehran last night after heading the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the recent Riyadh conference of governors of central banks of Islamic countries. Nowbari told PARS the conference's objective was to seek appropriate means for economic, financial and banking coordination among Islamic countries. Nowbari added that we achieved comprehensive success at the conference in condemning the United States for having frozen Iranian assets deposited in U.S. banks. The governors of central banks of Islamic countries stated that this U.S. measure is a form of robbery disruptive of the international banking and monetary system. This is a great victory for us. Nowbari added that another result of the conference was the adoption of a policy that will enable Palestine to participate as an observer in the RMF meetings to be held in a month. He added that there are big and weighty opportunities for establishing an Islamic countries' common market similar to the EEC. [Text] [JN070742 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0600 GMT 7 Sep 80]

FRG CAMPAIGN AGAINST MUSLIMS--The Bonn Government seems to be apprehensive these days over the increasing number of Muslims in the FRG. Most of these Muslims are immigrants, as the Germans who converted to Islam do not exceed 1,200. The FRG Government has no precise statistics available on the number of Muslims among immigrants to the FRG, most of these Muslims coming to the FRG to work. However, estimates which appear to be close to the truth indicate that the number of Muslims exceeds 1.5 million. Turks make up the greater number of these Muslims, coming to 1.3 million. The Yugoslavs, who are far behind, number 100,000 and are followed by Iranians, Arabs and Pakistanis. The FRG Government is apprehensive over such a spread of Islam since it fears that this would lead to the incitement of political disturbances. Indeed, the FRG press has lately launched a racist campaign against Islam under the justification that the rate of crime has increased in the areas where Muslims reside. [Text] [JN120846 Tehran International Service in Arabic 0445 GMT 12 Sep 80]

PERSIAN GULF NAVAL EXERCISES--The 5-day exercises by the navy of the Islamic Republic of Iran which began in the warm waters of the Persian Gulf ended with complete success Wednesday. In the exercises the valiant soldiers of Islam demonstrated their heroic readiness to confront the aggression of the arch-Satan, the bloodsucking United States, and its allies in the area. They also demonstrated their readiness to defend Islam and Iran. [Text] [GF131555 Tehran International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 13 Sep 80]

NEW HOSPITAL IN SHIRAZ--The Shiraz international hotel has been closed and will be turned into a 250-bed hospital. It has been handed over to the PARS Health Department. Shiraz revolution guards reported that following several warnings to the abovementioned hotel, which has not been respecting Islamic principles and teachings, the hotel was closed. Taking into consideration the shortage of hospitals in Shiraz, the health department asked to use the hotel building as a hospital for the treatment of [words indistinct]. [Text] [GF151622 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 15 Sep 80]

FARS COORDINATION ANNOUNCEMENT--The governor general and the head of operation coordination of Fars announces the following: The operation cocordination branches in the cities of Fasa, Firuzabad, Lar, Kazerun and Shiraz will continue to work. In the event of any problem, the branches should inform the operational coordination headquarters at the Fars governorate general. [Text] [GF131625 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 13 Sep 80]

KHUZESTAN CANCELS AGRICULTURE EQUIPMENT--From now on sales of agricultural equipment will be through Islamic societies with the approval of reconstruction crusade or land redistribution committees. The public relations office of Khuzestan Department of Agriculture, releasing this news, said: Due to the shortage of agricultural equipment, orders for delivery previously approved are cancelled and no new requests will be accepted as of today. [Text] [GF131856 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1230 GMT 13 Sep 80]

FARS DEVELOPMENT STATISTICS--The development and production headquarters of Fars has announced that since the establishment of the organization 37 out of 40 approved agricultural projects have been completed. Some 200 million rials in loans have been given to 607 persons for these projects. Twenty-eight out of 33 approved industrial projects have been completed and 165 million rials in loans have been paid to 407 individuals involved in these projects. Thirty-three million rials have been lent to 225 individuals for development projects and 1.5 million given to 46 persons for service projects. [GF141730 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1400 GMT 14 Sep 80]

CSO: 4906

MINISTER DISCUSSES OIL PRICING, PRODUCTION, TIES WITH FRANCE

LD021525 London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 25-31 Aug 80 pp 18-19

[Report on interview with Oil Minister Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim in Baghdad by 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Qaysi--date not given]

[Text] Baghdad--As this is the most important question being asked by all the people of the world, Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim was asked if there is a world energy crisis. He replied: First of all, I can say that there is no real energy crisis because what we are producing at present is more than the world oil market demands. It is over 50 percent more than what we were producing 2 years ago when a surplus of more than 3 million barrels was available daily in the market. The disappearance of this surplus is due to the strategic stockpiling being carried out by the major companies or the major consumer industrial states. The real shortage has not yet occurred but it is expected to occur in light of the increasing consumption of this strategic material.

By the end of this century the world will face a real shortage and crisis in the world oil market. It will also face a great imbalance between supply and demand because it will be difficult to meet the world's real consumption of this commodity in the next few years.

Asked about higher oil prices and the effect this has on the developing countries, 'Abd-al-Karim said: With regard to reconciling the sharp increase in prices, the problems of the developing states and world economic problems, any sharp increase and jump in oil prices will harm the economies of the developing states in particular. It will also cause confusion in the economies of the world states in general.

Iraq's policy, however, lies in effecting a gradual price increase which takes into consideration the rates of inflation and the rate of decline of the dollar on the basis of which our oil revenues are calculated. In other words, Iraq's price policy is against an upswing and a sharp increase in oil prices. Meanwhile, we are against freezing prices as long as rates of inflation continue to spiral because this inflation is exported to us in the form of commodities and technology.

'Abd al-Karim continued by talking about the aid Iraq is giving to the developing countries to cope with the increase in oil prices. He said: Iraq has given and continues to give long-term loans at token rates of interest or without interest to our friends and brothers in the Third World. Moreover, President Saddam Husayn has proposed the establishment of a world fund to help protect developing countries and the Third World states against oil price increases.

The proposal stipulates that the industrial states undertake to compensate the developing countries for every hike in oil prices and that all the funds that result from increases in the rate of inflation be distributed among the developing countries in the form of interest-free long term loans to enable them to meet their needs and protect their economies against inflation.

Asked about Iraq's oil deposits, 'Abd al-Karim said: Iraq is one of the states that has large deposits. I cannot give you a specific figure for this but we are making extraordinary efforts and intensive plans to conduct a geological and seismic survey of Iraq in order to determine the real size of deposits. This point was neglected in the past by the oil monopolies and before Iraqi oil was nationalized. I am receiving new figures about the size of deposits every day. I can say that Iraq is one of the states which has enormous deposits. In this respect I would like to cite President Saddam Husayn who said: One of the last two oil barrels produced in the world will be Iraqi.

'Abd al-Karim then emphasized the following fact: I would like to say that Iraq does not rely completely on oil, which is an exhaustible commodity. Iraq is a first class agricultural country. It has adopted the slogan: "Agriculture is perpetual oil." Iraq is now experiencing a major agricultural and industrial revolution.

I would also like to point out that during the Abbaside era Iraq's population numbered 30 million people who lived by agriculture despite the fact that their methods were primitive. If Iraq utilizes most of its land, the yield of wheat and barley will suffice the Arab homeland.

Iraq is earnestly trying to achieve this and it is working according to a large-scale plan in this respect. Iraq is an agricultural and industrial country.

AL-DUSTUR asked 'Abd al-Karim if Iraq is prepared to increase its oil production and if there is a specific plan in this direction. He said: Certainly. Iraq has programs to increase oil production. These plans are no longer connected with or subject to the world market demand. Our plan to increase our production capacity is subject to national criteria based on the revenues needed for our development plans, on our pan-Arab and international commitments toward our friends and brothers in the Arab homeland and on the situation in the world oil market. In our production policy we coordinate with the OPEC countries

in order to create a state of balance between supply and demand and to avoid increases that would encourage to consumers [as printed] or an oil surplus that would upset prices. We are trying to establish an actual and practical balance between supply and demand.

[Question] However, we see clear differences in the prices charged by the OPEC countries? What is your position on this?

[Answer] Iraq does not approve of the policy of having different oil prices in OPEC; Iraq hopes that OPEC will achieve a standard price policy during its next meeting.

'Abd al-Karim went on to explain: Iraq does not see any need for exorbitant oil prices which are only exploited by the industrial states in order to export inflation.

[Question] The world has fears about the possibility of there being a great oil shortage. How do you view this?

[Answer] Within the next 2 years the world market will experience an oil shortage compared to demand. This will be due to diminishing deposits in the producing countries. By the end of the 1980's the shortage of oil supplies in the world market is expected to be from 6 to 10 million barrels daily--that is if the problem is not tackled seriously.

The industrial states must understand that the remedy rests in their hands. The remedy is to quickly find alternative resources to oil like coal and atomic and solar energy. Should the world experience such an oil shortage it would face real danger.

The talk then turned to France and the nature of economic and political relations between Iraq and France--relations which have provoked the interests of the world information media for a long time, especially after the two countries signed an oil agreement followed by an agreement on cooperation in the field of nuclear energy.

'Abd al-Karim said: My meeting with President Giscard d'Estaing and Prime Minister Raymond Barre was a pointer to the development of these relations. I sensed a true desire for more comprehensive cooperation between the two countries in their mutual interests. We aim to expand the horizons of cooperation so as to set an example to the industrial states and the developing states of the world and to strengthen the possibility of reaching greater understanding in the dialogue which we are trying to achieve between the north and the south--between the industrial world and the developing world--in order to establish a new economic system that is more just and equitable in the relations among the peoples of these states.

Asked what new agreements have been reached between the two countries, 'Abd al-Karim said: We have established the foundations of cooperation and have discussed the obstacles. What we have achieved is regarded as a step forward in the direction of deepening and expanding economic cooperation between the two countries. We have given France a privileged status since the nationalization of Iraqi oil in view of France's attitude toward Iraq and the Arabs.

As for giving preference to French commodities, this is subject to considerations and criteria which we adopt in the implementation of our projects or regarding the volume of the trade exchange--criteria based on competition, the quality of the commodity, advanced technology and the conditions for implementing the contract on schedule.

'Abd al-Karim went on to explain: The developed relations between the two countries are due to France's understanding of the Arab-Zionist conflict in the area and France's sympathy with the Arab fateful issues as well as its attitude, which is different from that of the rest of the European countries and the industrial world, toward our pan-Arab issues and the question of development in Iraq, and France's readiness to provide us with technology and to have its companies participate in the implementation of development projects in Iraq.

He concluded by saying: We are prepared to establish relations with the various states of the world irrespective of their political systems, in the light of the principle of respect for sovereignty, on the basis of equal relations and noninterference in internal affairs and in the light of the principles and aims in which we believe and use as a guide in our relations with all the states of the world to achieve our national interest and the sublime interests of our nation.

CSO: 4802

CP STATEMENT ON INTERNAL SITUATION CITED

LD150941 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 27 Aug 80 p 6

[Report: "Iraq-Repression at Home and Alinement With Arab Reaction"]

[Text] In a recent statement made by its Central Committee, the Iraqi Communist Party [ICP] expresses the view that "an internal struggle among the Iraqi Ba'th regime leadership is, in fact, taking place." The main result of an alleged coup against President Saddam Husayn last summer has been the execution of 31 current Ba'th Party leaders and the imprisonment of scores of military and civilian cadres and hundreds of activists, the ICP recalls, emphasizing that a "power crisis" is rampant in Baghdad.

At the same time, opposition is growing in Kordezstan, where most of the Iraqi army is mobilized making the entire region look like an occupied country.

In the south, the Saddam Husayn government is mainly opposed by Shi'ite Muslims, who represent some 60 percent of Iraq's total population.

Democrats--especially communists, Kurds and Shi'ites--are being put down by force. "Hundreds of death sentences are being imposed without trial. In addition, there have been deaths under torture, secret assassinations and large-scale liquidations which have even affected the army," the ICP states, disclosing that hundreds of opposition members were arrested in July 1980. Some of them have died under torture.

This is what happened to Jabbar Hadi, an ICP regional committee member for the Central Euphrates region; Ismail Khalil, a communist official whose body was returned to his family with bullet holes in his head; and Hani Wahhab, a communist worker who was run over by a "security" vehicle.

The list of names of imprisoned democrats about whom there has been no news for several weeks is long. Some of them have been arrested with their wives and young children.

Repression at home, rapprochement with the most reactionary Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, and increasing economic integration in the capitalist system--these are in short the main aspects of Baghdad's policy. "Some fabulous contracts with big multinational companies are being signed to the detriment of both the Iraqi people's real interests and a genuine development of the country's economy" (these contracts provide for supplies of arms, manufactured products and so forth), the ICP states.

In the oil sphere, Iraq has also made up its mind on whose side it stands. Apart from Saudi Arabia, it is the only country which has advocated within OPEC a crude oil price freeze and an increase in production merely to please big oil companies affected by Iran's and its own cutbacks "black gold" production. "In 1979, as a result of the sale of Iraqi crude at a price lower than that charged by other OPEC members except the Saudis, Iraq lost $8 billion," the ICP states. As for the big companies, they gained a similar amount!

Saddam Husayn's recent visit to Saudi Arabia sanctioned the Baghdad Ba'th regime's rapprochement with the Wahhabite monarchy and, consequently, "indirectly with the United States." "To make it possible to challenge Syria and other steadfastness front countries opposed to the Camp David accords (Algeria, Libya, Democratic Yemen and the PLO) within the Arab world, the Baghdad-Riyadh axis is to be extended and pass through Amman."

During the Baghdad Arab Peoples Conference (in March 1980), the ICP statement emphasizes, various attempts were made to spread discord not only within the "steadfastness front" but even within the Palestinian movement.

Furthermore, the statement concludes, "the Venice summit European initiative aimed at saving the essence of the Camp David accords' content and [word indistinct] Jordan and a few Palestinians in some dubious settlement has been encouraged and supported by the Iraqi Government."

CSO: 4800

BRIEFS

AGREEMENT WITH YUGOSLAVIA--Baghdad, 9 Sep (INA)--Iraq and Yugoslavia today signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation. The agreement was signed for Iraq by Hasan 'Ali, revolution command council member and trade minister; for Yugoslavia, by Zvone Dragan, vice president of the Federal Executive Council. In a speech following the signing of the agreement, Hasan 'Ali praised the developed relations of cooperation and friendship between the two friendly countries and their leading role in the nonalined movement. In reply, Dragan praised Iraq's free and independent policy and its aid to Yugoslavia in various fields. [Text] [JN091256 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1240 GMT 9 Sep 80]

OILFIELD BOMBINGS--Beirut, 13 Sep (AFP)--Two oilfield installations in northeast Iraq's Kirkuk Province were bombed on Wednesday, the Lebanese newspaper AL-SAFIR reported today. Quoting sources in Baghdad, the newspaper said that one of the blasts took place at a crude oil distributing center with a capacity of more than one-half million barrels daily. The other explosion was at a natural gas pumping station. The news sources attributed the blasts to the Islamic Al-Da'wah Party, which sympathizes with the Iranian revolution. The newspaper gave no details on the amount of damage. [Text] [NC130905 Paris AFP in English 0847 GMT 13 Sep 80]

CSO: 4820

NATION'S RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES ANALYZED

TA051254 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 5 Sep 80 p 6

[Commentary by Hirsh Goodman: "Facing Facts"]

[Text] Premier Menahem Begin was apparently very upset when one of his interviewers on television's Moqed on Wednesday night implied that U.S.-Israel relations were at an all-time low. The prime minister was quite correct to cite both 1948 and 1956 as examples of lower ebbs; but what he forgot to mention was that never before were we so dependent on the United States on the one hand, and so isolated on the other.

He also failed to recognize that the "special relationship" that has been axiomatic in describing bilateral relations between Israel and the United States over the past 15 years, is being dissipated. And not necessarily because of the policies of the Begin government, but because of changing strategic realities that have led American policymakers to greener pastures.

While it is true that President Jimmy Carter, presidential aspirant Ronald Reagon and all manner of American officials continually rededicate America to upholding Israel's well-being and safeguarding its security, the reality unfolding behind the rhetoric gives cause for concern.

To be sure, the Begin government has made it easier for those in the White House, the Pentagon, the State Department and Congress to rationalize the gradual movement away from the special relationship.

The real reasons for the withdrawal, however, are far more complicated than a settlement here, the passage of a Jerusalem law there. And, with all due respect to the prime minister, who cited oil and petrodollars as the prime causes, they are not exclusively to blame for the state of affairs either. Constant reference to these is an over-simplification that only serves to divert attention from the actual challenges we face.

The reasons for the U.S. shift are manifold. Prime among them is the realization that the fulcrum of conflict in the Middle East has moved dramatically from the Mediterranean basin to the Persian Gulf. This has necessitated a search by the Americans for stable allies in the Gulf region, with Israel reduced to secondary importance in the strategic equation.

The Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, coming within the same period as the rise of Khomeyniism in Iran, could not have been more propitious for the United States. Egypt was the strategic planner's dream, for conditions in the country, coupled with its geographical location, provided the precise constellation for the establishment of a U.S. bridgehead in the Gulf area.

Whether we like it or not, or whether or not we or the Americans are prepared to admit it, this new special relationship between Egypt and the United States must come at the expense of the old Israeli-U.S. model, especially as the three parties concerned are in the middle of a delicate negotiating process. The Egyptians suddenly find themselves holding a card they previously did not possess, while Israel's hand is clearly second best.

Furthermore, the Arab attitude to the Camp David Accords, and Egypt's almost total isolation in the Arab world, have provided both parties with the excuses they have been looking for to justify the relationship. When Israeli officials express concern over the flow of sophisticated weaponry to Egypt while the peace treaty is still in the embryonic stage and the possibility of war still exists, the U.S. answer is quick and logical.

Al-Sadat has to be protected, from both internal and external threat. The army has to be placated, and the upper echelons of the Egyptian bureaucracy have to be satisfied that the price Egypt is paying for the peace treaty is worthwhile. If the United States were to refuse elementary aid requests to an Egypt rejected by the Arab world, Al-Sadat would not last long. Needless to say, add the Americans, nor would the peace treaty.

This was recognized by 'Ezer Weizman, who as defense minister, also realized that it would be wise for Israel to become an active partner in the U.S. effort rather than be excluded. But he also realized that simultaneously, Israel had to stress its own strategic importance to the Americans, and work towards an Egyptian-Israeli axis.

It was in this context that he offered the Americans the use of Israeli bases countless times, almost to the point of national embarrassment, only to be refused. Israel, it seems, is simply not necessary at this juncture, and certainly not within the global consideration of the men sitting in America's strategic think-tanks.

The implications should have been clear to Israel when the Americans consistently refused to take Weizman up on his offer. Instead, they established bases in Egypt, Kenya and Somalia, where their establishment would not have the embarrassing political repercussions that building a base in Haifa or Ashdod would have had. That would not only have caused a further rift with Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, but would have virtually precluded any U. . overture to Iraq.

The latter's importance has increased both because it is sitting on the second-largest known reservoir of oil, and because it lies at the heart of the region and has common borders with Iran, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

In the light of these facts Israel has met growing difficulties in arguing the thesis that it is of vital strategic importance to the United States. This was demonstrated clearly in April, when Israel was totally excluded from the plan to rescue the U.S. hostages in Iran.

Despite the fact that Israel possessed perhaps the best intelligence on Iran, no request was made for it. And its proven expertise in missions of this kind was likewise ignored. Communications assistance was not sought. Israel was not even asked to prepare hospital beds in case of an emergency.

So completely was this country left out of the picture that the first the general staff heard about a rescue operation was the news of its failure that came over the wire services. Egypt, on the other hand, played a key role in the whole operation, both during its preparation and when it was put into action.

The growing exclusion of Israel, other than as a preferred customer for sophisticated weapons, coupled with the deepening U.S.-Egyptian military bond, as demonstrated by the joint air maneuvers and the building of U.S. installations in Egypt cannot be ignored. Nor can the increasing U.S. criticism of Israeli actions in the Lebanon and the suspension of the Israeli-U.S. strategic dialogue, as admitted by Premier Begin on Wednesday night.

The signs of erosion are clear. What is less clear is why Begin is trying to paper them over, rather than admitting the widening chasm.

The new realities call for a basic strategic reassessment in Israel itself, and a clarification of where this country fits in the new equation. That clarification is possible, but only if the trends are recognized and isolated. And if Premier Begin can switch off the rhetoric and take a close look at events in his capacity as defense minister--a job to which, he claims, he devotes "day and night."

Despite the premier's efforts, one has the distinct impression that our strategic thinking has stagnated; that we are always on the defensive, running after events as they overtake us: that we are totally consumed with the here and now, instead of projecting into the future; and that we rely too heavily on cosmetics or righteous indignation (depending on whom one is speaking to or about) when dealing with chancing alliances in the Middle East.

There is no question that Israel constitutes an important and integral strategic asset to the United States. Now all we have to do is find out why and explain it.

CSO: 4820

DAYAN ASSESSES ISRAELI-U.S.-EGYPTIAN-PALESTINIAN RELATIONS

[Editorial Report] Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew at 0705 GMT on 13 September carries a recorded interview with former foreign minister MK Moshe Dayan by political correspondent Shim'on Schiffer broadcast within the framework of the yearly newsreel. MK Moshe Dayan says that "there is an ebb in our relations with the United States; there are differences of opinion" with the impact expected to be felt in both economic and military aid "if things continue to develop along these lines, namely that they think our policy contradicts theirs. A first sign of this was their refusal to veto the UN Security Council resolution." However, in order to reach an understanding with the United States, Israel should, nevertheless, "not give up major and principal things," even if we have to pay an economic price for it. These principal things are, for instance, "the settlements in the territories," which Dayan favors "even if the United States says it is an obstacle to peace or illegal as per the Geneva convention," or "Jerusalem as the capital of Israel--and I am talking about the western part of the city." On the other hand, "the transfer of the prime minister's office...to east Jerusalem, this is not essential." Dayan maintains, however, that "the root of the difference of opinion is the Palestinian issue." Dayan says that the history of the differences of opinion on the Palestinian issue--between the Rogers plan and our plan "not to return to the former borders" as was the view of "all the governments since 1967"--goes bach many years.

Even though Dayan refuses to assess Carter's personality in terms of his being a friend or a foe of Israel, he says "I would like to say this to his credit and in praise of him: that he did more than any other president for peace between us and Egypt as well as for progress in peace with the Palestinians." However, he adds that "he may have done so for U.S. interests or Egyptian interests."

Regarding the European front, Dayan says that "we do not have to make life easy for ourselves and say that it is oil and that the moment Europe has enough oil from the northern region this problem will be solved." Still, he says, "I do not think that Europe is, as far as we are concerned, lost." The key is for Europe to know that "we are insisting" on our positions: "We will not give up on our basic issues, say Israel's security." Europe should not talk to us like "those who sit with us and tell us what to do."

Regarding his assessment of the future of the autonomy talks and their chances of success, Dayan says: "I indulge in no hopes about these negotiations for two reasons which are the two sides of one coin: the first reason is that neither the Palestinians nor Jordan...will join the Camp David accords or the negotiations based on them. He says that the alignment's Jordanian option is "the West Bank" and so is the Palestinian issue. They are both the same. Therefore, an agreement with the Egyptians will be no more than an agreement with the Egyptians, but "we need an agreement with the Palestinians, not with the Egyptians." The Israeli Government, Dayan says, is not prepared to "abolish the military government without negotiations." But on the other hand, he says negotiations with Egypt, "even if they resume, will not solve the problem." The first question that should be presented to the West Bank mayors is: "Can you or can you not, do you or do you not want to maintain security and prevent terror acts in your towns? In that case, we will withdraw. If not, we will not leave because we are not prepared to commit suicide." Yet, we should not only "take their word" for it, but we should also tell them: "If we withdraw and you introduce the PLO, we will be back in 15 minutes. The Palestinians have no tanks or aircraft or army. They can stage demonstrations." If one party does not honor an agreement--and that applies to Egypt as well--Dayan says that "the agreement is not binding on the other party and that party should take the steps it sees fit." Dayan adds: "First of all, I do not think an agreement with the Palestinians is possible. Not one of them will sign or come or sit" with us. He does, however, think that "they will first consult with the PLO" in which case one of the following two alternatives is possible: "One, that the PLO will try to torpedo" the agreement for various reasons, including Soviet influence, or that it will regard this as a first step toward a Palestinian state and independence by "first of all seeing the Israelis out." At the same time, Dayan asserts that he does not believe a Palestinian state will be established. "If we do not permit it, it will not come about, and I think we will not permit it."

"I am not disappointed with what I had expected this peace to achieve," Dayan says. The most important thing Dayan had anticipated as an outcome of peace was for Egypt "to be removed from the circle of war against Israel," which "is unrelated to normalization" but is connected with "Egypt's interest in improving its economy" by having no more wars and is also related to "the U.S. involvement." Any war Egypt might want to indulge in in the future will have to be carried out with U.S. arms and aid and will also entail "violating an agreement Carter signed," and "overcoming those U.S. forces that will be found in the buffer zone instead of the UN forces." Dayan believes Egypt will not do so, "not even under another leader."

CSO: 4805

CHIEF OF STAFF COMMENTS ON WAR THREATS, MUSLIM NUCLEAR OPTION

TA100814 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0405 GMT 10 Sep 80

[Interview with Chief of Staff Lt Gen Refa'el Eytan by military correspondent Shmu'el Tal; date not given--recorded]

[Excerpt] [Question] We have recently witnessed a massive reinforcement of the Syrian army, an increase in Jordan's air power and changes in the Saudi Arabian army. How much of a threat is posed to Israel by all this, and how is the IDF preparing to meet the threat from the East?

[Answer] Today the eastern front is the threatening factor, or one that may threaten the security of the State of Israel, in comparison with the southern front, or that in the south, where the peace agreement with Egypt was signed and the IDF is deployed differently. The eastern front is being reinforced, and not just in Syria recently; Syria is being equipped and is absorbing the most modern types of weapons and equipment in a permanent process. The same applies to Iraq and Saudi Arabia and Jordan, although this is being done in Jordan rather more slowly, because Jordan depends on Western weapons whose supply is more controlled than that of eastern weapons supplied by the Eastern Bloc. However, Jordan may now be turning to the Soviet Union for equipment and this would burst all the dams curbing Jordan when it was being supplied from elsewhere. The eastern front will be a danger to the State of Israel if it materializes, if the coalition in the East is integrated into a single force, or if it coordinates action within itself. Single countries, separate within the eastern front, are not a danger. That does not mean that integration jeopardizes the very fact of our existence, because our reaction and our countermoves toward the eastern front will be the determining factor if there is any danger, or if this danger becomes greater or smaller.

[Question] In view of the massive hyperactivity on the Golan Heights at the moment, are we in any immediate danger from Syria?

[Answer] This activity is not unusual in Syria. It is carried out every year in this or other frameworks. The very fact of this activity is not a danger. We are following these things alertly and, if necessary, we take the appropriate steps.

[Question] The chief of the intelligence branch said at the end of last week that Iraq and the Muslim countries are realizing the nuclear option now. What steps does this development require the IDF to take?

[Answer] We have had to follow, to know exactly what was being done there in Iraq. The possession of nuclear weapons in the Middle East by one of the Arab countries is a threat both to Israel and to the world, since it is impossible to know exactly where they will be aimed if they have nuclear weapons. They may threaten neighboring countries, they may threaten us, they may threaten anyone who has interests contradicting theirs. In my opinion, this is an international problem of prime importance: how and with what measures the world will prevent such extremist countries from possessing such weapons.

[Question] In your opinion, as a result of this development in the nuclear issue, will the superpowers' involvement in the area increase?

[Answer] This may occur, but we must remember that the West is dependent on Arab oil and its activity is dictated by this dependence on oil and the Arab countries--Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Gulf principalities--may decide to use pressure, to use the oil weapon so that the West should not intervene in the nuclear issue. This is what must be decided: whether the West prefers to leave nuclear weapons in the Arabs' possession or to suffer from an economic crisis. I very much fear that the West is split on this issue and will not be able to reach an understanding and unanimity.

[Question] A precise examination of the political-military circumstances: Does it lead you to a forecast of a war between Israel and its neighbors, or some of its neighbors in the coming year?

[Answer] I do not want to speak about time, but as long as the Palestinians want to destroy the State of Israel and Syria makes the same statements and Iraq, certainly, and Jordan do not want to make peace, and Saudi Arabia is spurring them all on to a holy war and Libya is ready to enter any such conflict [last word in English], in this form or another, as long as this is the situation, there is a danger of war.

[Question] Can we expect war in the foreseeable period?

[Answer] Maybe yes, maybe no. It depends on us to a great extent: how strong we appear from the outside, how united, and how much we insist on our rights.

[Question] Chief of state, can we expect a change in Jordan's approach to the terrorists in view of the relations now being strengthened between King Husayn and Yasir 'Arafat? Can we expect a resumption of terrorist activity from Jordanian territory?

[Answer] Recently there have been several attempts to infiltrate from Jordanian territory. I presume that this was without the knowledge of the authorities, but it is reasonable to assume that if other sectors are sealed off to them, they will try to come from the border of Jordan, which is a long one, and from their viewpoint, a breachable one. Husayn may be forced to accept dictates and act in contradiction of his tradition to date, that of preventing terrorist activity from Jordanian territory. This may certainly occur.

[Question] Does our dependence on the United States as our primary supplier of weapons, perhaps our only one, other than local industry, harm our freedom of action?

[Answer] In my opinion, no. It is true that we receive a great number of weapons from the United States, but we can supply our own needs to a certain limit, which is a high one, for almost all the items needed to run an army. There are many items we produce ourselves which cannot be purchased anywhere else in the world because they either are not suitable or they are not good or they are not sold for political reasons and we rely upon ourselves. Here the problem is much more internal: the degree to which the security, the military industry is recognized as an economic and security factor by the nation, in my opinion, can contribute greatly to our security industry working at full impetus and speed to supply us with items that are unique to the IDF. It will supply jobs for many thousands of people and will permit long-term development, for many more years.

CSO: 4805

ABSENCE OF FULL-TIME DEFENSE MINISTER DISCUSSED

TA051010 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 Sep 80 p 13

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "Discordant Notes From the Qirya"]

[Excerpts] Prior to the Begin-Arens meeting [when MK Moshe Arens rejected Begin's proposal that he become defense minister] I heard an assessment in the defense establishment that Begin would continue in his post as defense minister and would not transfer this important portfolio to Arens. This was not because of the problems that Ari'el Sharon and Mordekhay Tzipori would have created inside and outside the party, each in his own separate and inimitable way. Nor was it because of the threat from Weizman's direction that he would vote against an Arens appointment because of the latter's stand against the Camp David accords. The appraisal was that Begin would retain this portfolio because he feels wonderful holding it. In any event, it was said, it would be a major surprise if he were to let it go.

This is the first time since he became prime minister that Begin is truly ruling and governing. True, this has come to pass in one sphere only, but that sphere is an extensive and important one. And what is no less important: he is being accorded full honors, as is the custom in a military hierarchy. His contact with those in uniform, the personnel of a Jewish army, captivates him to the point of hypnosis. It is thus that his national activity as prime minister--which he so greatly esteems--is given expression. In his position as defense minister, Begin sums things up, and issues orders and directives. Nor are these orders that are translated into talk only, but ones that are translated into deeds, military operations, sorties of aircraft and naval vessels that penetrate enemy territory, security contacts abroad, arms sales, development of arms systems projects and the promotion of senior officers. None of this is to be compared with the bitterness Begin has experienced more than once in the prime minister's office. In short, Began has been rejuvenated in his position of defense minister. This is perhaps the best medicine against a feeling of depression--so why should he forego it?

The pressing problem lies in another direction. Begin does not have enough time to devote to the Defense Ministry. He is filling that post as a part-time job only. One day a week. On that day things go as they

should. I do not come to judge his decisions as defense minister, but on that day meeting follows meeting. Minister's staff meeting, operational discussions, meetings in various forums on urgent and current matters, personal sessions with senior officers. If Begin could devote the whole week and all his time to defense issues, he would certainly not prove any less of a defense minister than Levi Eshkol.

When Tzipori and the chief of staff were asked whether this is not detrimental to the administration of the defense establishment, they replied, evasively, that it is always possible to get in touch with the defense minister. And what else could they say? Substantively, the method of running the IDF and the defense establishment by remote control, via the telephone or a walkie-talkie, is unacceptable. This is the largest and most sensitive system in the country, and its administration cannot be based on the giving of approvals from afar. What is worrying is not necessarily the possibility that operations will be carried out without the approval or knowledge of the political echelon. The defense establishment requires a leader, someone to run and direct it, someone who will follow things first-hand and will push people to implementation and to thought. And on this matter there are already indications of various delays which are liable to grow into genuine problems in the future.

As for the phone connection, it must be borne in mind that the tendency is not to bother the prime minister needlessly. Everyone remembers that he has just recuperated from an illness, and will think three and four times about whether to disturb him during his rest and sleep hours. So far there have been no hitches, but in the reality around us unexpected situations must also be taken into account, such as occurred when a Libyan passenger plane burst into Israeli airspace and a fateful decision had to be taken within a minute. It is quite probable that a situation will arise in which the chief of staff will make a fateful decision on his own, within a minute. And in the state of affairs that exists today in the defense establishment hierarchy, it cannot be said that, in Begin's absence, the deputy minister-chief of staff team can be relied upon--and that is another problem.

Weizman succeeded in directing the complex of relations among the deputy minister, the chief of staff and the Defense Ministry's director general, each was in his place, and despite the occasional differences of opinion the three were properly coordinated. Ever since Begin assumed the defense portfolio, deep differences of outlook have emerged between Deputy Minister Tzipori and the chief of staff. The impression is that these two are operating on two nearly separate and at times conflicting courses in the defense establishment. Sometimes one of them acts and the other brakes him. There is a view in the Defense Ministry that the chief of staff acts without taking into consideration the civilian aspect. The claim is that often the army does not report things to the Defense Ministry in time. And since Begin's support and his inclination go to the chief of staff, the deputy minister is no longer a full-fledged deputy. The differences of opinion and the conflicts between the deputy minister and the chief of staff prevail on virtually every serious subject.

But it is Raful [the chief of staff's nickname] who sets the tone. This applies also to a central and vital subject such as the defense budget. This was usually the main instrument of the director general for controlling the system. However, in the debate over the defense budget it was not the deputy minister or the chief of staff who represented the defense establishment, but Lieutenant General Eytan. It was he who set the tone for the debate. The defense minister himself refrained almost entirely from intervening and was, in his second post as prime minister, a kind of referee. The result was that Raful pulled the defense budget reins in his direction. It is possible that Begin found this move amenable, but it is more likely the result of the fact that there is no full-time defense minister.

If Begin were holding a different second ministerial portfolio and not that of prime minister, one could legitimately argue that he should forego the other portfolio and concentrate on defense affairs, since what is involved is the position of prime minister and defense minister, it is clear that as long as this situation continues--with Begin a part-time defense minister--new problems will crop up in the defense establishment and solutions will be put off.

The infirm relations at the top will only worsen. And what is more serious: we are liable to face unexpected and dangerous situations. Raful is more and more playing the crucial part of chief of staff and a kind of deputy to Begin, and is influencing the civilian side of the defense establishment also. In this situation the ministerial defense committee is charged with a more important role than ever with respect to the civilian supervision of the IDF and of its military and operational plans.

CSO: 4805

POLL INDICATES MAJORITY AGAINST CONCESSIONS IN JERUSALEM

TA110932 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Sep 80 p 3

[Hanokh Smith Public Opinion Poll: "Ninety-One Percent Are Opposed to Concessions in Jerusalem"]

[Text] The Jewish residents of the State of Israel are strongly united behind the government's opposition to territorial concessions in East Jerusalem. This emerges from the results of the public opinion poll conducted by the Smith Institute among a representative sample of over 1,200 Israeli Jews who were interviewed between 20 August and 4 September.

A decisive majority of 91 percent were not prepared for any territorial compromise in East Jerusalem in return for peace with Jordan; 5 percent were prepared to return only part of the old city; and only 2 percent were prepared to return the entire eastern part of the city.

A large majority--85 percent--also expressed opposition to territorial concessions in the Golan Heights as a gesture to Syria.

The views on the issue of Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip were much more divided. On the question of the West Bank the views were divided almost equally: 50 percent opposed any territorial concessions in return for peace with Jordan while 47 percent were prepared for concessions, although most of them supported partial compromise only.

On the matter of the Gaza Strip the Israeli public was much more forthcoming: 58 percent supported a return of part of the Gaza Strip in return for peace, and surprisingly enough, 37 percent were ready to return the entire strip.

"In return for peace with King Husayn of Jordan just as with Al-Sadat of Egypt, would you be prepared to return territories and which?"

	No	Only part	All	No opinion
East Jerusalem	91	5	2	2
Judaea and Samaria	50	37	10	3
Gaza	38	21	37	4
The Golan Heights (a concession to Syria)	85	10	2	3

This question has not been recently posed in the Hanokh-Smith Institute's public opinion polls, but when a similar question was presented in April 1977, months before Al-Sadat's initiative, the Israeli public revealed greater flexibility. Those polled then were asked a general question: Which territories are you prepared to give back in return for peace with the Arabs? In that poll 81 percent said they opposed any territorial compromise in Jerusalem; 63 percent opposed returning territories in the Golan Heights; and only 44 percent opposed territorial compromise in the Gaza Strip. In addition, 39 percent were opposed to returning territories in the West Bank and 24 percent to returning territories in the Sinai.

In comparison with the situation on the eve of the 1977 Knesset election, today, after most of the Sinai has been returned to Egypt for peace, there is a general toughening among the public on the question of additional territorial concessions in return for peace, this time with Jordan. The only exception is in the Gaza Strip where the approach has become more flexible.

The assumption that the Israeli public has grown tougher on the question of territorial compromise in East Jerusalem and some of the occupied territories can be inferred from the swings in public opinion on the settlement policy in the territories. In March 1980 a poll was conducted among a representative sample of the Jewish residents of the country. In that interview those polled were asked to choose among five possible settlement policies. An identical question was posed to the participants in the present poll.

"On the Judaea and Samaria settlements, which of the following positions is closest to yours?"

	March 1980	August-September 1980
The Sharon or Gush Emunim position--wide settlement in Judaea and Samaria	14	22
The 'Ezer Weizman position--controlled settlement in well-defined blocs.	20	19
The position of part of the opposition--settlement only in strategic areas that are not populated with Arabs such as the Jordan Valley	21	20
Against new settlements now but for strengthening existing settlements in the territories	9	11
Against settlements in Judaea and Samaria in these days of peace negotiations	21	14
Other, write it down	4	1
No answer, do not know.	11	12

The results indicate two important trends in the Israeli public's views. First, there is no national concensus on settlement policy. None of the possibilities presented to the public gained a clear preference. Second, the extreme positions, Sharon-Gush Emunim on the one hand and halting settlements during the peace negotiations on the other, both gain considerable support.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Israel's recent defeats in the international arena and the criticism leveled at Israel on the Jerusalem and settlements issues by its friends have caused a defensive reaction among the Israeli public reflected in a toughening of public opinion.

This has also curbed the decline in Prime Minister Begin's personal popularity but did not curb the deterioration of his government's popularity. It may have even increased their deterioration. This issue will be discussed in following reports.

CSO: 4805

'DAVAR' EDITOR DISCUSSES AUTONOMY STRATEGY

TA051155 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5 Sep 80 p 11

[Commentary by Hana Zemer: "Autonomy: Play the Game"]

[Text] "Begin wants, he wants very much indeed, to reach agreement on autonomy before the end of the government's term in office"--this was said to me, to my surprise, by an Egyptian source who would be described by commentators as a well informed source. Not that he knows the Israeli prime minister's inner soul, but he knows the Egyptian evaluations very well indeed. One could say he is one of the people who formulate them.

I asked him why, in his opinion, Begin is so interested in an autonomy agreement. Is it in order to show the voters an achievement on the eve of the polls?

"It goes deeper than that," the Egyptian source explained, "it is even more ideological than electoral: As we see it, Begin fears that the alignment will come to power and make a territorial compromise." (I asked him, in an aside, whether he thought that a territorial compromise was a realistic political possibility. His reply was in the positive, but only in the framework of an interim agreement.) "In any event, Begin must take such a possibility into account. And he wants to block it as long as he can. Signing an autonomy agreement would indeed be a block to territorial compromise."

Interesting, I said, and logical, too. But if this is your evaluation, why are you pessimistic about the chance of an autonomy agreement, to the point of severing the talks?

"Because he wants but is incapable," my interlocutor replied. "That is, Begin wants to conclude the autonomy talks on his own conditions. He is incapable, by the very fact of his view, of agreeing to our minimal logical conditions. From the substantive aspect, in our estimation, Begin has exhausted all he is capable of giving and we have nothing to expect from continuing negotiations with him."

So what is your conclusion, I wanted to know.

"My conclusion is not so important since the president decides," he said. "I can only analyze, just as you can analyze and the Americans, the Europeans and the Arabs can analyze. If we were to follow the pure logic embedded in the talks themselves, there would be no point in continuing the talk."

Why?

"Because we have been going around dizzily for 14 months and we have not reached anything. Because we have agreed to everything that could be agreed and we have solved all the problems that did not exist. But we have not made an iota of progress on any important, disputed question. And because Begin's objective, in contrast to the aim of the Camp David agreements, is not to leave any option open for any other permanent arrangement than Israeli rule over the West Bank. And as long as he conducts the negotiations, that is how it will be in the future, too. Except that the sole logic for an agreement is not the only logic playing here."

What else is playing, in your opinion?

"The game of politics, and especially strategy," my Egyptian interlocutor said. "Politics--that is clear: Out of the three leaders who signed what they signed at Camp David, Carter appears to be the most pressed at the moment because his election is so close. In fact, he is less pressed, since he has done nothing that contradicted traditional U.S. policy or that committed him to concessions. Begin did do this and Al-Sadat even more so. For those two to come and admit that they made a mistake, that they got onto the wrong road, that they made sacrifices that did not justify themselves, that is not simple." That is politics.

"But there is something more important than this, certainly from Egypt's viewpoint: President Al-Sadat's strategy was the global shift, severance from the Soviets and building the infrastructure for regional defense linked to the United States and relying on Egypt, North Africa, Saudi Arabia (Iran has been eliminated). Peace with Israel fitted in with this view, as you know."

"For Egypt to get back Sinai is a great thing per se," my interlocutor continued. "I think that even the historian will judge President Al-Sadat as having been right in all the policy that led to this. But the best card is the strategic one. The concept is linked with the United States, with any president in office there, and it is this that dictates the moves, even if the logic of the talks requires that they be stopped, politics (as mentioned) and strategy (as mentioned) require that we continue with them or find an alternative to them and play this until the approaching moment of ability that will permit more than a game."

This conversation, held a week ago, makes it possible to evaluate the significance of the announcement about the resumption of the talks and the somehow contradictory interpretations given in the various capitals.

There is no new breakthrough here, there is no return here to the tracks of before the talks were stopped. There is a "game to be played" for the reasons mentioned above, and even this is for the best, or, to be more precise, it is not for the worst.

CSO: 4805

MAPAM'S SHEM-TOV READY FOR PEACE TALKS EVEN WITH PLO

AU061755 Vienna ARBEITER-ZEITUNG in German 4 Sep 80 p 5

[AZ report on exclusive interview with Victor Shem-tov, secretary general of MAPAM, the Leftist-Socialist United Labour Party of Israel, in Vienna on 3 September 1980]

[Text] Vienna--"We are of the opinion that Israel should negotiate on a peace treaty with Jordan and with any Palestinian 'factor' that is recognizing Israel, that is ready to sign a peace treaty with Israel, and that rejects terrorism as a weapon for solving conflicts. This also applies to the PLO, if it accepts these conditions." This was stated by Victor Shem-tov, secretary general of the Leftist-Socialist United Workers Marty of Israel (MAPAM) in an ARBEITER-ZEITUNG interview on Wednesday.

This position has been named "Shem-tov-Yarif formula" after Shem-tov, who in the Golda Meir and Rabin cabinets was minister of health, and after former information minister Yarif.

Shem-tov, who on Tuesday had a 1 and 1/2 hour talk with Chancellor Kreisky, chairman of the Austrian Socialist Party [SPOE] added that "we will immediately recognize the Palestinians as a nation and their right to self-determination in the framework of a comprehensive Middle East peace, as soon as we are sitting at a table with such Palestinian representatives and are negotiating a peace treaty."

Unfortunately, he said, the PLO has so far not found this road and does not recognize the State of Israel, but on the contrary has again decided that the destruction of that "Zionist structure" is its main goal. Hence the door is also closed for contacts.

The MAPAM secretary general also believes that the Palestinian problem is the focal point and the hard core of the conflict. "Within the framework of a comprehensive settlement, and in order to solve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects, Israel must be ready to return the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, after new borders have been established in negotiations which give Israel the necessary security. We are not interested in annexing the West Bank."

What MAPAM would like best would be a federation between Jordan and the Palestinians because the Palestinians are living on both sides of the Jordan River and the Palestinian nation therefore should establish one single state. A prerequisite for that would be, however, that the West Bank would be demilitarized and would absorb all refugees and exiles, he said.

As far as Jerusalem is concerned, Shem-tov declared that in the Knesset MAPAM voted against Begin's Jerusalem bill because MAPAM regards it as superfluous, unnecessary and harmful. Jerusalem is united and will remain united as Israel's capital, but the question of Jerusalem is also open for negotiations in peace talks.

In MAPAM's opinion a modus vivendi for Christian and Muhammedan Arabs should be found. The city should get a status similar to that of the Vatican State, with extraterritorial rights for the holy shrines, with flags and symbolic militay units for Muslims, Christians and Jews. There would also be a possibility for East Jerusalem to become the capital of the Jordanian-Palestinian federation. However, the Jerusalem question should only be dealt with at the very end.

The reason for the trip of Shem-tov and of Dov Zakin, MAPAM secretary for international relations, which took the two of them first to Bonn to Socialist International (SI) chairman Willy Brandt, then to London, and now to Vienna to see SI Vice Chairman Kreisky, was to promote MAPAM's admission to the SI as a full-fledged member. MAPAM would like to acquire SI membership--at the side of the Socialist Democratic Israeli Labour Party (MAPAI) which already is an SI member--under an arrangement similar to that applying to Italy and Japan, both of which are represented by two socialist parties in the SI. (Both MAPAM and MAPAI belong to the labour bloc in Israel.)

There are good chances of MAPAM to become a full-fledged SI member as early as at the next SI congress in Madrid in November. Shem-tov, who stressed the long-standing friendly relations with the SPOE and with Chancellor Kreisky, discussed with the SPOE chairman and government chief not only MAPAM's application for SI membership but also the Middle East and the world situation.

CSO: 4403

RAMALLAH DEPUTY MAYOR CALLS ON NATION TO NEGOTIATE WITH PLO

TA181129 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 18 Sep 80 p 2

[Report by Gavri'el Stern: "West Bank Personality Calls on His 'Jewish Brothers' To Negotiate With the PLO"]

[Text] Deputy mayor of Ramallah, the Anglican priest ('Uda Rantisi)--currently replacing Karim Khalaf who is undergoing medical treatment in the United States following the terrorist assassination attempt against him and Nabulus mayor Bassam Ash-Shak'ah--this week issued an emotional call on his "Jewish brothers" to put themselves in the place of the Palestinians.

(Rantisi) added: "We do not believe in a state of war and hatred and the more we sit together and attempt to reconcile our troubles the better. The Israelis should put it out of their minds that we, Palestinians, want to kill or expel them. On the contrary, we want them to go on striving for the sake of peace and to realize that we are a nation that has the same right to exist as they do."

(Rantisi) has served in his post for 4 years on behalf of the nationalistic bloc. [sentence as published] (Rantisi) emphasized that the PLO is the only legal representative of the Arab Palestinian people and that if Israel really wants peace then it should negotiate with it. As a Christian Palestinian and devout religious man dedicated to the issue of human rights, (Rantisi) claimed he advocates peace founded on justice and mutual trust and not on the expropriation of land, imprisonment and oppression.

(Rantisi) was interviewed by Elyas (Zananiri), an editor of the English-language AL-FAJR, which is aimed at the Israeli public and also publishes articles written by Israeli journalists. (Rantisi) revealed that he has received anonymous telephone threats that he is "the next in line" after the [Ramallah and Nabulus] mayors. (Rantisi) stressed the opposition of the Palestinian leadership to the autonomy. He also rejected the claim that the settlements in the West Bank would bring about peaceful coexistence because they were being established on expropriated land. If they really want peace, the Israelis should return the houses they confiscated from us. (Rantisi) added that, at least, goodwill gestures should be made in order to reduce the gap dividing the two peoples.

CSO: 4805

GUSH EMUNIM PLANS CONTINUED SETTLEMENT ACTIVITY IN WEST BANK

TA160730 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 16 Sep 80

[Text] Gush Emunim claims that according to promises it was given by senior government personnel, the intention is to continue with the settlement project even after the establishment of the 10 settlements that are supposed to complete the settlement program for Judaea and Samaria. Amana [truth], the Gush Emunim settlement body, is now preparing for a large, encompassing settlement project. Among other things, it intends to prepare Shave Shomron B, Teqo'a B and the territory seized between Jerusalem and Ma'ale Ha'edumim. Our correspondent on settlement affairs, Avraham Ben-Melekh, says that at this stage Gush Emunim does not intend to settle without government approval.

[Ben Melekh] The government does not intend to stop settlement in Judaea and Samaria. This is the impression the Gush Emunim settlement personnel gained from their talks with government people. Hanan Porat said it was explained to him and his colleagues that the publicity about Israel's intention to stop settlement as soon as the 10 settlements remaining to complete the government's settlement program are established is incorrect.

[Begin Porat recording] It was explained to us that this publicity is unfounded. What we were told indicates that this is unfounded and settlement will continue. [end recording]

[Ben-Melekh] Amana, which is the Gush Emunim settlement movement, according to evidence provided by Amana coordinator Uri Ari'el, is now preparing some nucleii to move into the land.

[Begin Ari'el recording] We are going to set up several more nucleii in the very near future. We are now dealing with them. The short-term program is to civilianize and establish the places decided upon by the government and, beyond this, additional places that appear in the settlement program, which has certainly not been concluded: among other things, Shave Shomron B, Teqo'a B and Mikhmash. Later, we will certainly be discussing a continuation of the settlement impetus in both urban centers and such rural settlements as (Matot) to close the area from Neve Ya'aqov to the urban quarter of Ma'ale Ha'edumin. [end recording]

[Ben-Melekh] Gush Emunim also intends to settle in Qarne Shomron D and Mizpe Govrin and is now locating other places. A construction impetus, Hanan Porat added, is also affecting the existing settlements now.

[Begin Porat recording] In most of our settlements that have, at least superficially, been given a temporary character, there are the beginnings of consolidation in the great majority of them, including breaking ground and also houses that are being constructed. The foundations for the permanent buildings are already being laid. [end recording]

[Ben-Melekh] However, in spite of all this, Gush Emunim is concerned and Uri Elitzur said: This government is speaking in two voices.

[Begin Elitzur recording] On the one hand, the Israeli and international press is writing as though there was a promise that after four more settlements, no more settlements will be established in Judaea and Samaria; on the other, the government says [words indistinct] and it is completely clear to us that we do not have to believe the communications media. We are concluding one settlement program with those four settlements and after that we will begin with a stage-two settlement program. [end recording]

[Ben-Melekh] The people from Amana say that they are prepared for the possibility that the government will indeed freeze settlement, and they are also prepared for the possibility that it will continue with it.

CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS SLIGHT RISE FOR LIKUD IN AUGUST

TA051052 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5 Sep 80 p 1

[Dr Mina Tzemah Public Opinion Poll: "A Slight Rise for the Likud--at the Alignment's Expense"]

[Text] If the Knesset elections had been held in the second half of August, the Likud list would have gained four more seats in comparison with the first half of July, while the alignment and NRP would have lost two seats each. This emerges from the monthly public opinion poll conducted for the MONITIN monthly by Dr Mina Tzemah, the director of the Dahaf Company's research institute.

The elections forecast, conducted on the basis of replies by 1,232 interviewees, gives the alignment 59 seats (61 in July), the Likud 28 seats (24 in July) and the NRP 9 seats (11 in July). However, if the alignmen list was headed by MK Yitzhaq Rabin, it would have won 64 seats (65 in July), the Likud would have won 25 seats (21 in July) and the NRP 8 (11 [in July]).

The forecast also shows that the electoral potential of a list headed by 'Ezer Weizman has not altered between the two polls: in August, as in July, this potential totals 12 seats.

Together with the variations in the relative strength of the lists, the August MONITIN poll also shows variations in the relative popularity in public opinion of the four people who lead in the race for the premiership. While MK Rabin has, in fact, kept his strength and status at the head of the quartet, and enjoys the support of 34.7 [percent] of the people who were interviewed (35 percent in July), there has been a slight rise in Begin's popularity, from 22.5 percent to 25 percent, and a rise in 'Ezer Weizman's popularity, from 12.8 percent to 14.3 percent. On the other hand, there has been a drop in the popularity of MK Peres, from 19.7 percent in July to 15.8 percent in August.

As is done by several polls, the August poll again also examined the position of the four people from the aspect of their credibility among the public. The following scale was shown by the replies: Rabin: 34.8 percent; Begin: 27.9 percent; Weizman, Peres: 10.5 percent, while

Rabin and Begin enjoyed a rise in their credibility in the public view, Weizman and Peres suffered a drop in this credibility.

The relative stability of Rabin's public status in comparison with the drop in that of Peres is reflected on the poll on another question. Replying to the question: Which of the two would be more suitable for the post of prime minister, the gap between those who prefer Rabin and those who prefer Peres was widened. While the July poll gave this gap a total of 27.7 percent (57.8 percent against 29.6 percent) in August it reached 36.3 percent (61.1 percent as against 24.8 percent).

CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS DECLINE FOR LIKUD; RISE FOR ALIGNMENT

TA151520 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 15 Sep 80 p 2

[Hanokh Smith Center Poll conducted between 20 August and 4 September: "The Likud Went Down to 18 Percent; the Alignment Rose to 40 Percent"]

[Text] Despite the inflexibility shown by the Jewish voters in regard to a territorial compromise in return for peace and in regard to the settlements in the occupied territories and in spite of the fact that Menahem Begin's personal popularity has not gone down since the public opinion poll of March 1980, the public support for the Likud has continued to decline. In a poll conducted by the Smith Research Institute between 20 August and 4 September among a scientifically selected cross section of 1,200 Israeli Jews, only 18 percent of the Jewish voters said that had the elections been held now they would have voted for the Likud whereas the rate of those who said they would have voted for the alignment went up to 40 percent.

(Figures in Percentages)

Date	Likud	Alignment	Religious parties	Others	Undecided
May 1979	26	33	13	8	20
Sep 1979	23	36	11	6	24
Feb-Mar 1980	20	37	11	6	26
Aug-Sep 1980	18	40	12	7	23

Compared with the poll conducted 6 months ago, the Likud lost 2 percent while the alignment won 3 percent. Compared to May 1979 the Likud went down by 8 percent and the alignment went up by 7 percent. There were negligible shifts among the other partisan groups. The striking phenomenon in these polls was the constantly steady, large number of voters who were undecided, totalling--on the average--one of every four voters.

It should be pointed out that these polls represent only Jewish voters. If these are added to the minority votes and compared to the last election, a clearer picture emerges as follows:

(Figures in Percentages)

Date	Likud	Alignment	Religious parties	Other Jewish parties	Arab parties	Undecided
Aug-Sep 1979	16	37	12	7	6	22
1977 Knesset elections	35	25	14	20	6	--
1973 Knesset elections	30	40	12	12	6	--

Whereas in comparison with the 1977 Knesset election the alignment gained remarkably, it still needs some of the undecided voters' ballots to reach the overall rate of 1973.

Both the Likud and other Jewish parties suffered heavy losses of voters, caused almost exclusively by the total disappearance of Yiga'el Yadin's DMC, which received 11.6 percent of all the votes in 1977, whereas in the last poll it got less than 1 percent. Since there are grounds to assume that most of the alignment's share in the DMC's votes of 1977 returned to their original party, one can rather assuredly surmise that the lion's share of the undecided voters were made up of former Likud voters who could not find an alternative party to support and from the DMC voters who do not regard the alignment as a satisfactory alternative. The small remainder from this group (of undecided voters) includes several religious voters who were undecided or voted for small parties as well as some former voters for the alignment who are undecided. It will not be easy for the alignment to gather many votes from these hesitant voters.

As far as the small parties are concerned it seems that, at this stage, they only attract a few voters. Between the March and the August-September polls, "Hatehiya" received only modest gains. The Shay movement, Sheli and Shulamit Aloni are probably guaranteed a margin above the 1 percent, but none of them received over 2 percent of all the voters in any of these polls. The status of Flatto-Sharon's list is unclear and Yiga'el Yadin's DMC, to repeat, has hardly any support at all.

However, all these results should be regarded with caution. One should note that in the periods between elections, most of the polls basically reflect the public's reaction to the ruling government and thus serve a good cause. Yet, when the election itself gets nearer, the opposition parties have to attract voters to maintain their supporters' camp. Thus the rivalries among the cabinet ministries directly affect the popularity of their party in the public's eyes because the results of those arguments directly affect the public. On the one hand, squabbles within the opposition do not have such a grave impact on support for the opposition

because they do not have an immediate outcome but, at the same time, these quarrels may have greater weight with the voter as the election date gets closer in the course of 1981 and the voter has to cast only one ballot.

In accordance with the assumption that until the election campaign itself opens attention should focus on the performance of the people in power, let us examine the fluctuations in public opinion about the cabinet's functioning and the functioning of those personalities who led it in the course of the four polls.

Since the 1973 Knesset election, the Smith Research Center polls have presented a standard set of questions on the citizens' evaluation of the government's success. The percentage of those who believe that the cabinet either succeeded or largely succeeded in the various fields of activity were summed up in all of the four polls.

"In your opinion, has the cabinet succeeded in the following areas or has it not?" (the percentage includes those who maintain that it did succeed as well as those who believe that it has largely succeeded)

	Current poll Aug/Sep 1980	Poll of Feb/Mar 1980	Poll of Sep 1979	Poll of May 1979
Handling the economic sphere	14	18	11	11
Handling the social sphere	18	15	18	18
Handing security affairs	56	61	69	72
Handling foreign affairs	20	31	44	58
Your overall opinion of the cabinet	17	20	25	--

On the whole, these figures indicate that a small number of Israeli voters believes the cabinet is either successful or largely successful in the economic and social spheres. The fluctuations in the figures regarding the economic sphere are worthy of special attention. When the first two polls were conducted, Simha Ehrlich was finance minister; while the February-March poll was held a few months after Yiga'el Hurvitz was appointed finance minister and reflects increased faith in him as a result of his activities. Similarly, the decline in the latest poll reflects a certain degree of lack of faith with regard to the cabinet's economic performance. The public's immediate reaction to Hurvitz and his policy will be examined at a later stage. The crux of the matter is that only a small percentage of the public believes that the cabinet is successful in the vital domestic areas of its social and economic policies. This lack of confidence may be costly in the 1981 election, just as it was in 1977, when similar polls conducted by the Smith Center

predicted that only 15 percent of the voters thought the outgoing government was successful in the economic sphere and 24 percent held that view regarding the social sphere. Thus, the failure of the internal policy contributed a lot to the fall of the alignment government.

The most dramatic change in the assessment of the government's performance can be seen in the area of foreign relations. Since May 1979 there has been a steep decline in the percentage of the public who believes that the cabinet is successful in that respect: from 50 percent to 20 percent. The fall from one poll to the next was most dramatic and there has been a further 11-percent decline since the poll of 6 months ago.

As for defense, the decline probably reflects more the general feeling of lack of faith in the government's operation than a real lack of confidence in the way security is maintained in the country. 'Ezer Weizman's resignation from the Defense Ministry also may have somewhat contributed to the decline. One should add that on the eve of the 1977 election the percentage of those who believed that the cabinet was successful or largely successful in the field of defense and foreign affairs was 57 percent.

The question about the overall opinion about the cabinet was first introduced in the September 1979 poll. It, too, points to a steady fall in the number of those who think the cabinet succeeds or largely succeeds in general. In a poll that has only now been completed, only one of the six Israelis thought that the current government as a whole either succeeds or generally succeeds. In view of these results, it is not at all surprising that the percentage of those who would be prepared to vote for the Likud if the elections were held today has gone down and that the DMC has lost public support. What continues to amaze us is the constant support for the religious parties. They are especially lucky in that they have an almost regular support backbone. Also, they face their challenges well.

CSO: 4805

NABULUS MAYOR COMMENTS ON MEASURES AGAINST MUNICIPAL COUNCILS

LD090935 London ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 6 Sep 80 p 1

[ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Bureau Report: "Israel Escalates Its Arbitrary Measures and Plans To Bring Down Municipal Councils"]

[Text] London--Bassam al-Shak'ah, mayor of Nabulus in occupied Palestine, has issued a statement in London, in the name of the municipal councils in the occupied territories, in which he appeals to world opinion to take note of the arbitrary and repressive measures which the Israeli occupation authorities have been taking particularly in recent times.

In his statement Al-Shak'ah, who is now receiving treatment in London for the serious wounds he suffered as a result of an Israeli terrorist bomb exploding in his car in Nabulus and causing the loss of both his legs, said: "The Israeli military occupation authorities are taking a series of measures to subjugate or bring about the downfall of municipal councils in the occupied towns."

Reviewing the Israeli measures, Al-Shak'ah said that after dismissing the municipal councils of Bayt Jala and Qabatiyah the Israeli authorities divested Janin Municipal Council of its administrative powers, thus impeding construction work and public services.

Al-Shak'ah said: "The expulsion by the Israeli authorities of the mayors of Hebron and Halhul and their attempt to assassinate the mayors of Ramallah, al-Birah and Nabulus was aimed at implementing a plan to paralyze and render ineffective all the municipal councils. But the Israeli measures have now reached a new and escalating stage aimed at imposing the so-called autonomous rule or administrative rule, so as to enable Israel to achieve its ambitions in the occupied Arab territories according to its racist and aggressive plans."

Continuing, Al-Shak'ah said: The recent Israeli measures were as follows:

"Banning the Palestinian-Jordanian committee in 'Amman from sending money to the municipal and village authorities, so that the occupation authorities can prevent the councils from carrying out their plans;

"Freezing the municipal council budgets and giving the occupation authorities control of the councils' assets in banks;

"Refusal of the Israeli authorities to pay their financial obligations drawn from fuel tax and property tax, which the Israeli military authorities collect on behalf of the municipalities in return for a 10-percent collection fee--something which has made many municipalities unable to pay their employees wages;

"The imposition on all West Bank mayors of forced residence in their towns and of a ban on their contacting public opinion, through either the media or the press."

Al-Shak'ah said that the municipal councils in the West Bank are now considering the idea of suing the military occupation authorities in the appropriate courts, in order to end such measures. The municipal councils are strongly protesting against the military governor's actions, and the citizens are expressing their discontent with the measures taken by the military administration authorities.

Concluding his statement on behalf of the municipal councils in the occupied territories, Al-Shak'ah said that the recent Israeli arbitrary measures would further impede the achievement of peace and increase the risk of war and bloodshed in the area.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

FATAH MEMBER GUILTY--Yesterday a Lod Military Court found (Zuhayr Awad Siyuri), aged 28, an inhabitant of (Ras al-'Amud) in Jerusalem and a member of the Fatah organization, guilty of membership of an enemy organization. The charge sheet prepared by military prosecutor Capt Moshe Shefi said the accused had joined the Fatah organization in February 1979 in Amman, from where he was transferred to the organization's training camp in Damascus; there he learned to assemble and defuse explosive charges. The heads of the Fatah organization used the accused to carry messages to organization members in Jerusalem and he carried out all the duties he was given. In May 1980 the accused tried to recruit four Arabs who were working with him in the Nof Hall, Jerusalem, into the organization, telling them that he has been given military training in the ranks of the organization and was going to receive weapons from the Fatah. The presiding judge, reserves Maj Gen Aharon (Elpern), decided to convict the accused and postpone giving the sentence until the end of the month. [Yitzhaq Danon] [Text] [TA091413 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Sep 80 p 3]

ARAB WORKERS--At the end of August there were 44,256 workers from the territories employed in Israel, in comparison with 44,504 at the end of July. These statistics have been supplied by the Department for Statistical Information of the Employment Service, which notes that unemployment in Israel has not affected the figures for workers from the territories. [TA142110 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1730 GMT 14 Sep 80]

AUGUST UNEMPLOYMENT--Some 35,000 Israelis were looking for work in August, and about 20,000 of them did not find suitable employment. More than 8,000 of all those who were looking for work that month joined the ranks of the unemployed for the first time. From the data of the employment service it emerges that two-thirds of those looking for work are nonprofessional workers, and most of these are young people under 24. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 14 Sep 80 TA]

VETERINARIANS TO EGYPT--An official delegation from the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture left today on a 5-day visit to Egypt. It is composed of senior veterinary experts and has been invited by the Egyptian veterinary services to discuss cooperation in such fields as ways to combat cattle disease. [Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1745 GMT 14 Sep 80 TA]

JULY IMPORTS DOWN--The downward trend in imports, which began less than a year ago, continued in July as well. This emerges from statistical data provided by the port authority published on the Jewish New Year. In July, imports arriving in Israel's three ports amounted to 492,000 tons, constituting a 7-percent decrease compared to July of last year. Exports, however, continue to rise in comparison with 1979. In July 493,000 tons of goods were exported through the three ports. This marks a 17-percent rise compared to July of last year. Since April 1980, 1.6 million tons of goods have arrived through the ports. This is a 21-percent decline compared to last year. In exports, however, there was a 6-percent rise compared to the parallel period last year and exports reached 1.9 million tons. The Ashdod port had the greatest traffic of all three ports. [TA152047 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Sep 80 p 5 TA]

AUGUST INDEX RISE--The consumer's price index rose by 8.2 percent in August, the spokesman of the Central Bureau of Statistics reported. The price hikes were felt in all articles, but were particularly noticeable in articles related to apartment maintenance, furniture, transport, mail services and food. The index rose chiefly reflects price hikes initiated by the government and price increases before the high holidays. Since the beginning of the year the index rose by 69 percent, which, when computed annually will mean a price increase of 122 percent. [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 15 Sep 80 TA]

ARAB COLLEGE REJECTION--The High Education Council notified Nazareth mayor Tawfiq Zayadah that the resolution of the Nazareth Municipal Council to set up an Arab university in the city is illegal. The High Education Council demands that the Nazareth Municipality discontinue any activity that may lead to the establishment of an Arab university in the city. [TA171130 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 17 Sep 80]

MAPAM DEMANDS CHANGES--MAPAM has demanded that the Labor Party introduce substantial changes in the political portion of the alignment's platform. The MAPAM negotiating team, headed by secretary general Victor Shem-tov, has demanded that Labor Party representatives, led by MK Shim'on Peres, state in the joint platform that the alignment demands border alteration "for security reasons only." MAPAM also demanded that the Labor Party state in the platform that "settlements beyond the green line will not constitute an impediment to peace." No distinction is made in this clause between settlements established by Gush Emunim and settlements erected by the alignment government. MAPAM further urges the recognition of self-determination for the Palestinians. All the demands for changes in the political section are included in the decisions of the MAPAM convention. Although they were submitted as demands to the Labor Party, they do not constitute an ultimatum or a condition for MAPAM's continuing partnership with the Labor Party. The MAPAM team conducting the talks includes the three secretaries of the party--Messrs Victor Shem-tov, El'Azar Granot and Eli'Ezer Yafe--MK Me'ir Talmi, Ya'aqov Hazan, MK Haya Grossman and Naftali Ben-Moshe. It has been learned that the

team members have been voicing their bitterness over the fact that the Labor Party has been incapable of starting a dialogue with MAPAM because of internal struggles and their reluctance to make a decision before the party's convention in December. [Amnon Barzilay] [Excerpt] [TA171330 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Sep 80 p 2]

EAST JERUSALEM DEVELOPMENT--Some 670 million Israeli pounds will be invested in developing East Jerusalem this year. This was decided yesterday by the Ministerial Directors General Committee for Jerusalem Affairs headed by the director general of the Interior Ministry, Dr Hayim Kubersky. This sum is 250 million pounds larger than the sum allocated last year. These funds will be used for sewage works within the [old city] walls, the preparation of a new drainage system, the paving of roads, the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the Damascus gate and the completion of the road leading to the Mount of Olives. [Barukh Me'iri] [Excerpt] [TA171326 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 17 Sep 80 p 7]

WEIZMAN ON JERUSALEM LAW--"The Jerusalem law is superfluous and, furthermore, I think Ge'ula Kohen coerced us all," former defense minister MK 'Ezer Weizman has said. Weizman, who did not participate in the Knesset vote on the law, added: "What was bad before that? Who nagged before that? Are we heroes? You should know that a live hero is always better than a dead one." The local paper HADSHOT HADERA carries an interview with Mr Weizman in the edition published today. When asked about his political activity, Weizman replied that it was "simmering" and he does not intend to occupy himself with politics unless he could return to activity involving action. As for the government, he said that "it is a fact that this government is continuing to live without me...God help it." With regard to the peace agreement with Egypt, Weizman said that this was such a strong move and so basic that there could be no retreat from it. [Ashser Kizhner] [Text] [TA051304 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 Sep 80 p 2]

YAMIT SETTLERS FIGHT EVACUATION--The Yamit Strip settlers' Etzel and Ma'oz organizations have decided, in coordination with Tehiya movement, to fight against the world Zionist organization settlement department's intention to dismantle the Yamit Strip settlements in the spring. On Sunday the Tehiya movement's executive will meet in the Yamit Strip. At that time the organizations intend to plan ways to fight what they call the evacuation sentence and to stop all moves to withdraw from Sinai. During the Succot holiday the inhabitants of Yamit town will be celebrating the fifth anniversary of the town's inauguration and those opposed to this evacuation intend to use that day for their activities. [Text] [TA150831 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 15 Sep 80]

POPULATION DATA--Israel's population increased by 82,000 people in 1979-1980 [Jewish year 5739] and reached 3,885,000. This number includes over 3,250,000 Jews. This data was published today by the Central Bureau of Statistics. Israel's Jewish population increased by 91,000 people. The natural growth is estimated at 45,000 and the number of immigrants is estimated at 28,000 persons. The number of people emigrating from Israel has been estimated at 12,000. The growth of the Jewish population has declined and reached 1.9 percent compared to 2.3 percent last year mainly due to the decrease in the number of immigrants. Israel's non-Jewish population has increased by 21,000 people. The natural growth of this sector has also declined and reached 3.4 percent compared to 3.6 percent last year. The increase of the non-Jewish population is wholly attributed to natural reproduction. [Text] [TA100419 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 9 Sep 80]

WEST BANK, PFLP AT ODDS--A grave breach has developed between the communists and the members of the Popular Front in Judaea and Samaria, the two main components of the National Guidance Committee, for the first time since the 6-Day War. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Irbari reports that since the row in the labor camp in Nazareth where Palestinian flags were flown, the Popular Front members have not stopped attacking the communists. [Text] [TA080545 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 8 Sep 80]

RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS MINISTER APPOINTED--Gedalya Schreiber, who has until now served as the chairman of the Jerusalem Religious Council, will assume the post of director general of the Religious Affairs Ministry on 8 September. He has thus responded to Minister Aharon Abu-Hatzera's offer to replace ousted Yisra'el Lippel, who was dismissed about 1 month ago. [TA040642 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Sep 80 p 1]

VISA VALIDITY LIMITED--The foreign and interior ministries have decided to limit the validity of passports issued to Israel's abroad to 1 year only. This is in the framework of the policy of combatting emigration. Those Israelis who wish to renew their passports will have to report to the local Israeli consulate every 3 months and pay the fee for the extension. [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Sep 80 p 2 TA]

STATE DEBTS--Israel's debts in foreign currency denominations totaled $16.15 billion at the end of April 1980. The state's debts increased by 15 percent reaching more than $2 billion in the course of last year. The loans to be repaid during the coming year amount to some 20 percent of the total payments to be made. Some 85 percent of the government's debt is in U.S. dollars. Our correspondent notes that Israel owes about one-third of its debts to the U.S. Government, which is Israel's largest creditor. [Text] [TA231033 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 22 Aug 80]

RISE IN UNEMPLOYMENT--There was an increase of about 10 percent in the number of unemployed people in August. The number of people unemployed for 6 days and above reached 14,150 compared with 13,000 in July. This data was supplied by the employment office. [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Sep 80 p 2 TA]

MAJORITY FAVORS EARLY ELECTIONS--Tel Aviv--A majority of the public favours the immediate dispersal of the Knesset and the calling of early elections, according to the Rosh Hashana Eve JERUSALEM POST poll. To the question, "do you favour the immediate dispersal of the Knesset and early elections?" 59.6 percent of those interviewed responded positively, with 35.3 percent opposed. Only 5.1 percent were undecided. The poll was conducted by the Modi'in Ezrahi Applied Research Centre among a representative sample of 1,289 adults. [Text] [TA100931 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 10 Sep 80 p 2]

OIL FROM NORWAY--Israel can buy oil from Norway, said the country's Energy Ministry. All that needs to be done is to draw up an agreement between Israeli and Norwegian oil companies. The Norwegian oil minister said in a meeting in Oslo with the chairman of the Knesset committee on economics, Gad Ya'aqobi, that an agreement can be reached. Norway had said that it did not have any extra oil to sell to Israel. [Text] [TA180718 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 18 Sep 80]

FUNDS FOR ARAB VILLAGES--Nazareth--The Interior Ministry has allocated IS2 million for the preparation this year of outline plans for Arab villages in the triangle (eastern Sharon). The ministry's town planners expect the population of the villages to double over the next 20 years since the birth rate in the villages is over 3 percent a year. Thus, the size of present construction and development zones is expected to be doubled or even trebled in the plans. The Interior Ministry has already approved such plans for 20 Arab villages, and an additional 35 are under study. [Excerpt] [TA151029 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 15 Sep 80 p 3]

JUNE-AUGUST EXPORTS--Israel's commodity exports in January-August amounted to $3,414 million, 26 percent more, in current prices, than in the same period last year, when they totalled $2,709 million. But during June-August exports have declined, dropping sharply in August, so that the increase over last year is the result of higher exports in January-May, according to data released on Monday by the Central Bureau of Statistics. In August, net exports of goods were $288 million, sharply down from July, when exports were $408 million, and even more so from June, when they stood at $433 million. So far, August's exports

were the lowest of any month in the preceding 12 months, and below the monthly average of 1979 and 1978, which was $357 million and $308 million, respectively. [TA101100 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 10 Sep 80 p 3]

RISE IN EXPORTS--Exports were higher in August, but the rate of increase tapered off somewhat, according to Industry, Trade and Tourist Ministry figures. The total for the month was $291.1 million, up 14.3 percent from a year earlier. Industry, Trade and Tourism Minister Gid'on Pat yesterday disclosed that exports for the first 8 months of 1980 were up by $725 million or 26.7 percent over the corresponding period last year, reaching a total of $3,432 million. Agricultural products accounted for $443 million of the amount, a 10-percent rise over 1979, and industrial goods $2.98 billion, a 29.5-percent increase. [TA041008 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 4 Sep 80 p 3]

CSO: 4820

CREATION OF MINISTRY FOR OCCUPIED TERRITORIES EXPLAINED

LD150817 Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 9 Sep 80 pp 1, 15

[Special dispatch: "Official Jordanian Sources: Creation of 'Ministry of Occupied Territories' Does not Mean Encroachment on PLO Rights"]

[Text] Amman--Official Jordanian sources said yesterday that the creation of a "Ministry of Occupied Territories" in the new cabinet headed by Mudar Badran in no way means "encroachment" on PLO rights in the occupied territories.

A senior Palestinian official said recently in Damascus that the PLO is upset about the creation of this ministry.

The Jordanian sources said that the affairs of Palestinian camps and refugees were previously administered by the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development which, because of its secondary importance, always came under a minister holding another portfolio. Also, the executive office for the occupied territories, the body that provides aid to citizens of the West Bank and the Gaza sector in collaboration with the PLO, had wide powers vested in it by the Ministry of Reconstruction and Development. This office was administered by a minister holding yet another portfolio and was attached at one time to the Ministry of Information and Culture and at another time to the Ministry of State.

The Jordanian sources added: In view of this situation, officials decided to merge the powers of reconstruction and development and the executive office in one ministry, the Ministry of Occupied Territories, under Hasan Ibrahim. The Ministry of Occupied Territories will also be the Jordanian side of the Jordanian-Palestinian joint committee set up in accordance with the Baghdad summit resolution to support steadfastness among the inhabitants of occupied territories.

Therefor, the creation of a ministry for the occupied territories cannot be construed as an encroachment on PLO rights in there territories. Also, it was not called the Ministry of the Occupied Homeland, as in the case of the PLO department under this name which is headed by executive committee member Jami' Abu Sittah.

Moreover, King Husayn's letter designating the present cabinet calls for efforts to help the Palestinian demand for the achievement of Palestinian rights and cooperation with the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

This was explained to the inhabitants of Palestinian camps and Palestinian personalities in Jordan by Prime Minister Mudar Badran and Minister of Occupied Territories Hasan Ibrahim when the question was raised.

CSO: 4802

INFORMATION MINISTER REVIEWS RELATIONS WITH U.S., ARAB NATIONS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 17 Jun 80 p 10

[Interview with Sa'id al-Tal, Jordanian minister of information, by Muhammad Ma'tuq, in Amman; date not given]

[Text] The repeated postponement of King Husayn's visit to Washington does not mean that there are any conflicts between the two interested parties, Jordanian minister of information, Sa'id al Tal, said. This visit comes within the framework of the "dialogues, exchanges of views and direct contacts with the rulers of the world," he added. America, he said, is "party" to the Middle East problem, regardless of the difference of opinions concerning the extent of the involvement.

During his interview with AL-SAFIR, the Jordanian minister spoke about Jordanian relations with Syria, Iraq and the Palestine resistance. His country, he said, is against alignments and its relations with the three parties in question are good.

[Question] What is the meaning of King Husayn's acceptance of the invitation to visit the United States at this time?

[Answer] You know that this invitation was made a long time ago, and this has already been postponed several times for normal reasons. In other words, this postponement has nothing to do with any difference of opinions between the two interested parties. The king's visit--as well as his previous visits--comes within the framework of the Jordanian philosophy which advocates personal contacts, exchanges of views and dialogues with the rulers of the world and people who are concerned about our affairs or interested therein. Generally speaking, we have a positive way of handling things. However, our positive attitude is dominated by our belief that any settlement must be achieved within the framework of Arab efforts and joint efforts. It is also dominated by our observance of two basic principles, on which all Arabs agree, i.e., the general and complete evacuation of all occupied Arab territories--starting with Jerusalem--and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including its right to establish its own state on the soil of its mother country, Palestine.

Passivity has emptied the field, apart from the enemy. As far as we are concerned, we believe that it is necessary to fight the enemy wherever it is, without abandoning national and patriotic goals or forfeiting our principles.

King Husayn has both an official and a popular influence, and he will convey the Arab point of view to the press, the authorities and the public opinion in the United States. That will have a definite influence.

[Question] Has King Husayn defined his position, which he will convey to Washington, in conjunction with the other Arab rulers?

[Answer] The Arab picture of the situation was defined by the resolutions of both the Baghdad and Tunis conferences, in which Jordan participated, and it is known to everybody. However, it should be stressed that Jordan does not have to be given the green light by any one.

[Question] King Husayn had previously mentioned that the United States will no longer play any influential part in the Middle East. Is this still the position of Jordan?

[Answer] The king may have said that within the context of some general idea, and that consequently cannot be understood as a permanent and general rule. I personally would say that America is a major power in the world, with interests in this area and connections with both Israel and the Arab states. This is what makes it an interested party, and this fact is acknowledged by everybody, whatever the extent of such an involvement may be according to the different point of view of this or that authority. It is necessary to have a dialogue with America and clarify its views. This does not at all mean that we do not disagree with America about many points. We agree with America on certain questions, while we disagree about other things.

It still is necessary to contact America to exercise pressure on it and make it adopt more equitable and balanced positions in this area.

European Move

[Question] What is your position with reference to the so-called "European move" regarding the solution of the Middle East crisis?

[Answer] Both in Jordan and in the Arab world at large, we expected that there might be a European move aiming at remedying the present situation and unlocking the dead end which is has reached. The Arabs, including us, had been very optimistic about such an initiative, particularly since Europe. owing to its relations with the area, is more aware and more realistic with reference to the consideration of the problem and its ramifications.

However, this initiative did not come out in the manner which we had wished. The gist of the remarks made at the conference about the Middle East

question did not reflect any real initiative, but merely remained within the limits of ordinary resolutions.

Before the European move, what I look for is the determination of an Arab strategy, i.e. the bases of an Arab move implying a joint effort and full awareness of all the data and circumstances, and such a move should transcend reactions, exaggerations and susceptibilities. It is such a move which will play a part in the realization of Arab hopes, since other initiatives will not be free from the influences of other world powers. For example, the European move will not be free from the influence of the American policy and, accordingly, from the well-known Zionist influence of the American policy itself.

I finally stress that the Arab strategy, when it is determined, must define every action or activity pertaining to the Palestinian question at the military, political and other levels.

Lebanese Crisis

[Question] What do you think of the Lebanese crisis and ways to solve it?

[Answer] Owing to the special relationship existing between Lebanon and Jordan, what happens in Lebanon is both painful and saddening to us, and it makes our hearts bleed. I do not say this to be nice. The bloodshed in Lebanon is not detrimental only to the latter but also to all the Arabs, and particularly to their cause, the cause of Palestine.

Owing to our own situation, we can only say and hope that all the forces interested in the Lebanese crisis should as soon as possible achieve the harmony which will bring tranquility and safety back to Lebanon, so that it may play the essential part which used to characterize it in the international field.

We hope that all will overlook secondary and superficial differences, and even personal interest, in the interest of Lebanon and the Arab nation itself.

Bloodshed in Lebanon is bleeding the Arab nation, and this must be stopped as promptly as possible. The crisis in Lebanon has gone beyond the limits of its national interest and the cause of Palestine.

Relations with Opposition

[Question] What is your evaluation of the Jordanian-Palestinian relations?

[Answer] Jordan, based on its essential principles and its convictions, believes in maintaining balanced and mutually constructive Arab relations with all Arabs. The special relationship existing between the Jordanian and the Palestinian peoples--between Jordan and Palestine--must improve in order to serve the supreme Arab interest.

Since the decision of the Rabat summit conference, Jordan has taken upon itself to deal with the PLO as being the sole and rightful representative of the Palestinian people.

There is coordination between both parties, through committees, and transactions are conducted through the joint committee.

[Question] The matter of an alternate homeland in Jordan was suggested in the past, and they now suggest a settlement in Lebanon. What do you think of these outrageous suggestions?

[Answer] The Israeli enemy is trying its best to liquidate the Palestinian question once and for all. Among the various methods which it has used in the past, and which it tries to use again and again, the enemy currently talks about having an alternate homeland for the Palestinians in Jordan, trying to justify its claim on the basis of inaccurate statistics, according to which the majority of the population in Jordan consists of Palestinians. Merely for the record, the Palestinians residing on the East bank represent only about one-third of the local population. Also for the record, the majority of the Palestinian people still live on Palestinian land, where the highest Palestinian concentration is found.

Based on the same logic, the enemy tries to find a homeland for the Palestinians in southern Lebanon for the same purpose and same goals, i.e. to liquidate the Palestinian question once and for all, and occupy Palestine entirely.

As far as we are concerned, in Jordan, the Palestinian question has nothing to do with finding any homeland or refuge for the Palestinians, since the whole Arab land is the homeland of all Arabs. The problem has nothing to do with the presence of Palestinians in Jordan or elsewhere. As far as we are concerned, the question of Palestine is the question of an Arab land which has been occupied by force and must be taken back, whatever may be the sacrifices and time which that may require. It is the question of an Arab people, which was driven away from the land of its fathers and ancestors, and which must return to it.

Relations with Syria

[Question] The news recently mentioned something about a lapse in the relations existing between Jordan and Syria owing to the military given by 'Amman, according to the news, to the Muslim Brotherhood people accused of conducting sabotage operations in various parts of Syria.

[Answer] Relations with Syria are perfectly good. In addition to maintaining special and strong personal relations, Jordan and Syria together represent the Arab front standing before the enemy. We must accordingly deepen and strengthen these relations, and we must coordinate our moves in every field.

I have recently visited Syria, and my visit was successful. During my visit, I have pointed out to the Damascus authorities--although they already knew it--the importance and the necessity of deepening and strengthening the relations existing between the two countries. Their response has been excellent, and their feelings and aspirations do not differ from our own. Many forces are trying to arouse mutual suspicion and differences of opinions among the Arabs. It is regrettable that, owing to lack of awareness, campaigns aimed at arousing doubts have managed to find listening ears, but we can assure you that our relations with Damascus are indeed excellent.

Of course, imaginary differences may arise at times, and this is normal. However, such imaginary differences are soon dissipated through dialogue, discussion and exchange of views and information. Our relations currently are better than ever, and they will get better and better in the future. There is nothing likely to change this.

Some authorities have thought that Jordan maintained relations with certain agencies which undertake certain operations in Syria. We have explained that Jordan has not involved itself in the least, in any way and under any condition, both at the national and patriotic level, in any operation undertaken by any group whatsoever in order to create any conflict in Syria.

Any superficial incompatibility arising in any Arab country or between Arab countries is an insignificant and secondary matter, which should be settled wisely, intelligently and rationally.

Relations with Iraq

[Question] What about relations with Iraq?

[Answer] For Syria and for us, Iraq represents a strategic depth before the Zionist aggression, and it is accordingly an essential part of the confrontation with the enemy.

With reference to the improvement of our relations with Syria, we do not merely think of trying to have a dialogue with the latter. The same thing applies to our relations with Iraq. While we try to develop sound and strong relations with both Syria and Iraq, we hope that sound and strong relations will also develop between Syria and Iraq.

From a patriotic point of view, and at this particular stage, we personally do not believe that mere attempts to have a dialogue may benefit the Arabs, and we do not believe that any conflict between Arab countries is in the interest of the Arabs.

It is necessary to make a difference between mere attempts to have a dialogue and personal relations.

From a purely personal point of view, I believe that there is no reason for us to disagree. If any things conducive to disagreement were to arise, I believe--based on patriotic, national and moral principles--that we must solve such a disagreement as promptly as possible and disregard it in order to build the autonomous Arab power.

Finally, we wish to point out that Iraq has assisted and still assists Jordan, and supports the development projects undertaken in Jordan, just as it has helped and still helps Syria, and supports the development projects there.

2693
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

PRIME MINISTER'S MID-EAST STATEMENT--Kuwait, 9 Sep (MENA)--Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali has emphasized that Egypt will not initiate a dialog with the Arabs because the Arab states were the ones who severed the relations with Egypt, not the other way round. In an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-QABAS published today, Kamal Hasan 'Ali expresses his belief that a comprehensive and just settlement of the Middle East Problem will not take longer than 3 years. He also voices the opinion that the U.S. Administration will not adopt any definite decisions before the U.S. elections in November. Campaign outbiddings, he maintains, certainly do not express the views of the U.S. Administration. Referring to the situation on the Egyptian-Libyan borders, 'Ali stresses that Egypt will not be the one to start any military action. It is up to Libya, he says. On the Lebanese crisis, he says he believes that it will not be resolved before a Middle East settlement is achieved. [Excerpts] [NC091546 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1433 GMT 9 Sep 80]

CSO: 4802

PLO APPLICATION FOR DEFENSE COUNCIL MEETING 'FUTILE'

NC061519 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1130 GMT 6 Sep 80

[The 6 September "clarification" by Lebanese foreign ministry official source on PLO's application to convene Arab joint defense council--announcer-read]

[Text] The PLO has applied for the convening of the Arab Defense Council, concurrently with the Arab League ordinary session, to consider the issue of the south and the dangers to which it is being subjected. The government, acting through the Foreign Ministry, has notified the Arab League secretary general that the Lebanese Government is the only quarter competent to raise such an issue because it enjoys sovereignty over its territory and over the residents on it. Furthermore, the government is responsible for this territory.

The Foreign Ministry has also noted that it raised all aspects of the issue of the south and the dangers to which it is being exposed at the 1979 Arab summit conference in Tunis. The conference did not respond to Lebanon's demands, nor did it give the subject the importance that it deserves, despite the grave dangers this issue holds for the Lebanese national interests and the Palestinian cause.

In conclusion, the ministry believes that a defense council session would be futile unless it was prepared for in such a way that would insure an ample discussion of the issue of the south and the adoption of an Arab stance based on pooling all potentials in the various domains within the context of a unified Arab strategy that would be aimed at confronting the dangers to which the south and its Lebanese and Palestinian residents are being subjected. If these things are done, then every Arab state--within the limits of its capabilities--will share the burden that Lebanon is shouldering alone, and Lebanon will be able to recover full authority over its territory.

CSO: 4802

NLP OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON NLP-PHALANGIST RELATIONS

NC101845 Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 8 Sep 80 pp 16-25

[Interview with Dory Sham'un, Lebanese National Liberal Party secretary general, by MONDAY MORNING correspondent Lydia Georgi--place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] The Lebanese Army has taken over several NLP [National Liberal Party] centers at the request of NLP President Camille Sham'un, who has at the same time declared that the NLP is essentially a political party. In practical terms, does this mean that the NLP militia will be dissolved? And should that happen, wouldn't the areas which are now under Lebanese front control come under the total control of the Phalangist militia?

[Answer] What [former] President Sham'un said concerning the political role of the NLP is simply this: that the NLP is a political party and that the military role was imposed on us by what we considered to be attacks against the population and integrity of Lebanon. We were obliged to take up arms and fight the aggressors.

Now, this [statement by President Sham'un) does not mean, as President Sham'un also pointed out, that we are going to throw away these arms, stop training or completely dissolve our military effort, if you can call it that. We will not do so as long as we estimate that there are still people aggressing against the soil and independence of Lebanon.

But where we feel that the Lebanese Army has control of the situation, we do not see any reason to keep our boys awake all night to see that no one comes into the various quarters that they have been defending up till now. And this happens to be the case in al-Hadath, Kfarshima and a number of other places. As long as there is no outbreak of fighting in these places, we feel that our military role is not really needed.

This is the exact situation, and it is our sincerest wish to see the Lebanese Army fully in control of the situation all over the place. As soon as that happens, we will immediately forget about anything called "military role."

[Question] If you have no intention of dissolving your militia, why are you more or less surrendering your control in certain areas?

[Answer] Because we have found that in certain areas...there is no fighting against the Palestinians in, say, Juniyah. The militias that used to be in Juniyah were there because they were needed to support or relieve fighters in other areas. But since the fighting has stopped for the time being--and we hope it will remain this way--we see no reason why we should leave these arms in the hands of the boys, especially in view of the risk of someone coming along at any time and, for the slightest thing which has nothing to do with politics or defending the territory, start a private discussion which will finally turn into some kind of bloodshed and draw one party against the other.

To eliminate this possibility, we have decided to put everything aside.

[Question] Which NLP centers, exactly, has the Lebanese Army taken over now?

[Answer] They have not really taken over the NLP centers. They have taken over what we used to have as military outposts. We said to them, "As long as you are there, we do not need these things." If they are needed later, that is a different story, but for the time being, nothing is needed, so why should we keep our boys under arms? As long as the army is ready to do it, we are ready. We are ready to hand them many other places, but we want the army to be in a position to take them over. Over there, they seemed willing to do so, so we said, "Okay, take them." If they are willing to do so in other places, we're ready to hand over other military outposts.

[Question] Are you ready to hand over all your military outposts to the army?

[Answer] We are ready to hand over all our military outposts to the legal authority if this legal authority is ready to take over and maintain law and order where our militias are doing so.

[Question] This is a new position. You have been saying so far that you won't accept the Lebanese Army unless it is deployed in all Lebanese areas.

[Answer] We have never said this.

[Question] I believe you have.

[Answer] No, we have never said this. We have always said that we would like to see the Lebanese Army deployed all over the place. That is our sincerest wish, and I think they should do it. They should not be satisfied to be in 'Ayn al-Rummanah to the exclusion of Shiyah, for example, or al-Ghubayri, or around the airport--and I'm talking about effective presence in their little barracks. This is something we sincerely hope they

will do, and we have been encouraging them to do it. In handing over our control to them in certain places, we hope to encourage them and perhaps set a good example for the others--on this side and on the other side.

[Question] Although both President Sham'un and yourself have been playing down the NLP-Phalangist conflict, it has become obvious that the relationship between the two parties is under severe strain. Do you think it can be returned to normal?

[Answer] We've always declared that no matter what happens between the al-Khata'ib (Phalangists) and ourselves, our reaction will always be positive.

Admittedly, when you feel that you have been working positively and see a negative reaction on the part of the al-Khata'ib or someone in the al-Khata'ib, it is difficult to remain positive, forget what has been done to you and turn over another new leaf. This is something we have succeeded in doing many a time, and we hope to be able to continue doing it, because we estimate that politically we carry the burden of responsibility. However heavy the burden may become, we're not going to just throw it off our shoulders. This is a role that we have decided to assume and we will continue to assume it as long as there is any possibility of doing so.

We estimate that the external dangers are still there, and they're much too great to allow us to create more internal divisions. Our attitude toward them will be the same as our attitude toward the al-Khata'ib.

[Question] Do you share the view of those who say that the Phalangist Party is trying to extend its unilateral authority over the eastern areas?

[Answer] It is the aim of any political party to have as much control of any situation as possible--be it in parliament, in social activities, or whatever. This is very true of the al-Khata'ib. The al-Khata'ib found themselves having a certain structure with a certain capacity behind it, and they're trying to grab as much as they possibly can.

[Question] At your expense?

[Answer] Maybe at our expense, maybe also at the expense of the rest of the population, but that is what they're doing. Now, I don't approve of the methods. I would probably try to do the same thing if I could, but I would use different methods. I don't exactly approve of the methods of the al-Khata'ib, and have always said so. They will end up paying the price if they continue this way.

The Lebanese population has never admitted the control of any one party; they don't even admit the control of the government, and this is why many governments have not succeeded. The Lebanese population is not going to accept the control of any single party. As the Arabic saying goes, anything

in excess is a shortcoming. When you overdo certain things, you get negative reactions, and I think there are already negative reactions to what the al-Khata'ib are doing.

[Question] Dany Sham'un has said that certain NLP members have been intimidated into joining the Lebanese forces. Do you see this as part of an attempt to control all the eastern areas?

[Answer] Maybe. It could well be interpreted as part of that attempt, but I don't see it succeeding in the absence of a party decision to join the Lebanese forces. As long as there is no party decision that all NLP militiamen should enter the Lebanese forces, anybody entering the Lebanese forces will be doing so on his own responsibility. We're not going to stop them. If they want to do it, let them do it, but they will not be doing it on party orders and they'll be responsible to the party for whatever action they take on that side.

We have said it very plainly: those who want to leave the party and join something else are very free to do so.

[Question] Has anybody left since then?

[Answer] Very few. Very, very few.

[Question] How many?

[Answer] In the region of al-Hadath, Kfarshima and all the rest, they don't amount to 5 percent. We are glad that those who left did so, and if there are others who want to leave, we will be even gladder. Because these are people who don't believe in the party and don't want to obey orders, and this is exactly the kind of people that we don't want. They would render us a great service by leaving.

[Question] We have always understood that the Lebanese forces is the umbrella military organization for all rightist political parties. Now we're hearing about the Lebanese forces versus the NLP militias. What does "Lebanese forces" mean today? Could you explain the exact status of these forces?

[Answer] I wish I knew myself. I think this is a question you should put to Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil (commander of the Lebanese forces) himself. I personally haven't found the right answer yet.

[Question] What has happened to the formulas that are supposed to be under consideration for the regulation of NLP-Phalangist relations? There was talk about either creating a "National Council for the Lebanese Resistance" or establishinga "Federal" relationship between the two parties.

[Answer] I don't like to talk about predetermined forms of councils or federations or whatever. There is something called the Lebanese front. It was created way back and was an umbrella organization that was supposed to group all the forces within the liberated regions at the time. That was back in 1977, when this organization that covered all the liberated areas from Zharta to al-Hadath or Karfshima.

Of course, the incidents of Ihdin Ehden (1978) chopped off a big part of that area, diminishing it by about one third. Since then, the Lebanese front has grouped mainly the al-Khata'ib and the al-Ahrar (NLP), plus a few other small organizations.

Even then, the idea was to turn this structure into what I might call a "shadow government," because in the absence of a real government, unfortunately, one had to try and solve one's problems. We decided--or at least some of us did--that it would perhaps be a good thing to have an unofficial local government that would see what the area needed and try to obtain what was needed from the official government. This would have allowed us not only to have the political parties working together as a team, but also to invite many people from the various life forces in the area to join in and help within this organizational framework. It would have been a very democratic way of trying to solve the problems of the area, trying to develop the area into an example for other areas to follow. Because I go by the principle that if you want people to do what you are advising them to do, you have to show them what you yourself have done.

We would have liked to turn this area into a model which everybody else would want to copy. I think Lebanon needed an area which could rebuild itself and serve as a model for the rest of the country to copy, so that we could get out of the archaic governmental system which we knew to be inefficient in many ways before the war, so that we could build something more modern on more scientific bases.

This failed, and all I can say is that we were not responsible for its failure.

[Question] So if I understand you correctly, no new formula for NLP-Phalangist cooperation is now being studied....

[Answer] There are many propositions being studied today for the restructuring of the Lebanese front, to make a sort of administrative council for the area composed of the various members of the Lebanese front and their allies in the area. This would at least allow us to see how things are going and avoid conflicting responsibilities. Certain people would have certain roles: people in charge of information, others of educational problems, others of social problems, etc. It would be like a shadow government.

[Question] In your recent press conference, you announced that you were in the process of undertaking a major overhaul of the NLP. Could you elaborate on that?

[Answer] I don't think it will interest anybody. It's all an inside cuisine. The main objectives are, of course, to develop as much as possible the cultural and educational policy of the party and try to have within the student and teaching bodies as many people as possible who understand what we believe to be the right kind of education for Lebanon's future generations and implement it.

[Question] How many armed elements do you have now?

[Answer] You can't say "armed elements." We have about 5,000 fully trained, and about half of them have had battle experience for all it's worth.

[Question] Since the July 7 incidents, your brother Dany has launched several verbal attacks against Bashir al-Jumayyil, but President Sham'un and yourself have toned down your comments on Mr al-Jumayyil's responsibility for these and later incidents. Could you explain the discrepancy?

[Answer] It is not a discrepancy. Dany's reaction was a very normal human reaction. My father's reaction and mine were more of a political reaction.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because we're doing politics.

[Question] But you share your brother's feelings?

[Answer] We're doing politics, and when you're doing politics, many things come into consideration, and many times--too many times, unfortunately--you have to forget about your own personal feelings and go by slightly different logic.

[Question] To sum up the question of NLP-Phalangist relations, how would you evaluate those relations now?

[Answer] I would describe them as not what they should be, unfortunately. Inadequate, insufficient and inappropriate.

[Question] Is the NLP ready to enter into a dialog with the national movement, and on what conditions?

[Answer] On one condition only: their sincere vow to work or fight, or whatever it takes, for a free and fully independent Lebanon.

[Question] Here, we come to the problem of conceptions. They have their conception of a "free and fully independent" Lebanon, and you have yours, and we've being going around in circles....

[Answer] There aren't many conceptions where this sort of thing is concerned. When I say "a fully independent Lebanon," I mean a Lebanon where there is only one authority--the Lebanese authority--and nothing else. Everybody who is on the territory has to abide by this authority. That is the meaning of full independence.

If they have other conceptions of what full independence means, that's a different story, but this is my understanding of independence and I think it's a universal understanding. I haven't invented anything new. If they want to invent something new, I'm sorry, but I like to abide by the dictionary.

[Question] Do you think it is conceivable that new alliances will emerge in Lebanon--like an alliance between your party, former President Sulayman Franjiyah and eventually the national movement?

[Answer] Our party has no problems with Sulayam Franjiyah, and we hope there will be none.

[Question] But do you see this relationship evolving into an alliance?

[Answer] When it comes to Lebanon and Lebanese interests, we are allied. Not everybody in an alliance has to see things in exactly the same way, but I believe Sulayman Franjiyah thinks the same way we do when it comes to the interpretation of the independence of Lebanon. On this we are allies. Get me more people who think that Lebanon should be independent, and they will automatically be our allies. We may differ on how things should be done internally, but before we start working on internal problems, let us solve our problems with the exterior first. Let's become independent, so that everyone who has something to say will be able to say it in a free and independent Lebanon in which the only authority is the Lebanese authority. Then we can talk about how we're going to teach people and make social laws or whatever. First give Lebanon back to the Lebanese. Once the Lebanese have it all in hand, they can decide freely what to do with it. But until then, let's not bark up the wrong tree.

[Question] Are you ready to enter into a dialog with the leaders of the Palestinian resistance with a view to regulating your relations pending the solution of the Palestinian problem?

[Answer] We have done it so many times, and to no avail. We're ready to do it again. But it is difficult to arrive at any solution or understanding with someone who happens to be in your country and does not respect your ideas about your own country.

If they accept in advance our ideas about our country--in other words, if they would like to stay in Lebanon within Lebanese laws and regulations, respecting Lebanese authority and not creating an authority of their own, as we have always said--then ahlan wa sahlan [welcome] to the discussion

table. They have always been welcome in Lebanon on those conditions. If they accept them, we are ready, and I think everyone in Lebanon would be ready, to sit down with them and say, "You're welcome here. You can stay until the Palestinian problem is solved." We have never said the contrary.

[Question] The problem is that you always say, "If they're ready to do this or that, we will talk." Why not talk to arrive at this or that?

[Answer] Because we've done it so many times before, and nothing has happened.

Haven't we gone through this experience before, saying exactly what you're saying--"All right, let's sit down and talk and see how we can solve these problems"? We've done it. We've talked, and I think they fully understand what we mean. There is no reason why they should come to the table again pretending that they don't know what we want. They know exactly what we want, and if they want to come to the table, it means that they already accept what we want.

[Question] Have there been any meetings between the NLP and the Palestinians after the one that your brother Dany held with Yasir 'Arafat a few weeks ago?

[Answer] I don't know about Dany's meeting with Yasir 'Arafat. I never even bothered to ask him about it. That's one.

Secondly, there have been no other meetings.

Thirdly, I wish there would be meetings--but meetings, as I said, to solve the problem and not make it more difficult. Solving the problem means: Palestinians in Lebanon, ahlan wa sahlan, on one condition--Palestinians under Lebanese rule, not above it.

[Question] In your press conference, you expressed the belief that Lebanon should be liberated from foreigners, including the Syrians. Are you ready to discuss this with the Syrians?

[Answer] Was I given the chance to discuss it with the Syrians when they first come in? The Syrians came in because the Americans told us very, very plainly that if we wanted the fighting to stop in Lebanon, we must accept what they called the "Syrian initiative."

This is what high-level officials told me at the State Department in 1976, and this is why we accepted the Syrians or did not make too much of a fuss. We were convinced that the Syrians had different ideas in mind. It was the condition to put an end to the war, and we accepted it because after 40,000-50,000 people had died, we thought we must put an end to the fighting at any price. This was the basic consideration. We accepted the presence of the Syrians because it was imposed on us.

Why did the Americans do this? I think it is very plain to everybody today. They wanted to put a clamp on all sides and create a situation of status quo which would keep the Palestinians in Lebanon whether they or the Lebanese like it or not. Keeping the Palestinians in Lebanon is one way of solving one of the problems facing the American peace plan for this area. In other words, the Americans know that the Israelis would not accept any attempt to impose the return of the Palestinians to Palestine or to Israel, and that this would make the peace talks impossible.

If the Palestinians haven't seen this yet, they should see it, and if the rest of the Lebanese population hasn't realized it, they should realize it.

I think it's about time we ask the Syrians to please leave Lebanon--not because we want to throw the Palestinians out done their job. [as received] They have stopped the fighting, and I don't think there will be any more fighting. I don't think the Palestinians will fight the same kind of war that they tried in 1975, and I think it's about time that the Lebanese were given the opportunity to say what they want to say and do what they want to do in their own country.

If we all decide that we want independence, I think the time is ripe to tell the Syrians, "thank you very much. As Lebanese, we all thank you for what you have done, and the time has come for us to become good neighbors again. Please go back to Syria and let's become good neighbors again."

The Syrian forces are here today as nothing but occupation forces, and I also regard the Palestinians as occupying forces, but where the Palestinians are concerned, they can stay in Lebanon if they wish, but only if they abide by Lebanese rules.

So to the Syrians we say, "Gentlemen, thank you very much for what you've done, but your presence is becoming too heavy a burden, and for the sake of future relations between the two countries, please go back to Syria and see what's happening over there."

[Question] Who would you say was behind the abortive attempt on Ambassador's Dean's life last week?

[Answer] Your guess is as good as mine.

[Question] What about the reports in the leftist press that Phalagists were involved?

[Answer] I think that's a bit far-fetched. If the Phalagists wanted to do something like this, I think they're organized enough to be able to do it in an area where someone else would automatically be blamed for it. I think the perpetrators did it in this area precisely so someone can blame the Phalagists. That is my opinion. I don't think it's the Phalagists. Now, I could be completely mistaken, because, as I said, you guess is as good as mine.

[Question] How would you evaluate American policy toward the Lebanese front today?

[Answer] American policy is simply American policy--done by America for America, and not for Lebanon. If it happens that the interests of the Lebanese front or any other Lebanese faction coincide with American policy, so be it, but it would be a great mistake to think that American policy on Lebanon is made for Lebanon's sake. Like all big countries, America's policy is defined by its own interests.

[Question] Do those interests coincide with yours right now?

[Answer] Frankly, I don't see how. Because I think that those who allowed the Syrians in could take them out if they wanted to.

[Question] In the light of the recent talks between President Sham'un and Soviet Ambassador Alekandr Soldatov, can we say that there is a rapprochement between your party and the Soviet Union?

[Answer] Rapprochement between our party and the Soviet Union? I think it would be too pretentious for us to talk of a rapprochement between us and the Soviet Union.

I think it was simply to clarify certain ideas which the Soviet ambassador here may have had about our party or about certain declarations made by our party. It was simply to normalize a relationship between a political party and a foreign representation in the country.

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TOURIST AFFAIRS REVIEWED BY MINISTER OF TOURISM

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 7

[Interivew with Minister of Tourism 'Ali al-Khalil by Lur Ma'luf in Beirut; date not given.]

> [Text] The minister of tourism, Mr 'Ali al-Khalil, expressed optimism about the future of tourism in Lebanon. He said that preparations will begin next fall for the 1981 Ba'labakk summer festivals. Al-Khalil mentioned that the ministry of tourism's organization is considered unproductive under the current circumstances but it is working as much as possible toward [the promotion of] future tourism.

Minister al-Khalil opened the interview with the following statement:

"The tourism policy, like other administrative policies, is operating in two ways: The first method of operation is based on carrying out responsibilities assigned to the ministry of tourism and tourist organizations. This is achieved through conducting limited tourist activities whenever possible under the existing circumstances. We, of course, believe that these activities will not only help tourism, but will also participate in supporting Lebanese withstanding conflict and in bringing the situation back to normal.

"On the other hand, we are continually trying to strengthen tourist facilities so that Lebanon will be prepared for its tourist seasons in the coming years, which we hope will be quiet, stable and secure years.

In the politics of tourism, we are not only interested in carrying out our usual activities for the current year. We also have to plan for the future. For example, let us look at tourism during the summer season; we are planning for its success in the summer of 1980 but are also interested in achieving an overall plan for the years 1981, 1982 and 1983. Activities take place on two parallel courses: We, at the ministry of tourism, have activities to be carried out by the secretariat general

and the National Council [for tourism]. Naturally, the National Council takes care of tourist activities abroad and tourism advertisements via announcements and publications which are aimed at attracting tourists. These publications are distributed to organizations, businessmen and other economically-influential people. This year we limited advertisement abroad to these publications to prove to businessmen that the situation in Lebanon is improving. Through these publications, we shed some light on the Lebanese situation.

"A tourist is not just the person who comes solely for recreational purposes; businessmen, bankers and employees of organizations passing through the Middle East are also effectively tourists. Tourist offices provide publications that give these tourists information about the country.

"The department of tourism takes care of regional tourist facilities and festivals, building beaches and hotels, and supervising tourist and travel agencies. The ministry of tourism manages tourist resthouses, in cooperation with the ministry of national education and fine arts.

"There is also a third [tourist] organization, represented by the secretariat general. Its main responsibility is to look for archeological sites. It is involved in excavations, acquisition of areas, searching for antiquities, maintenance of the museum and the bringing out of historic and archeological features. There are tourist places like the Ja'ita Cave, Bayt al-Din Palace, Ba'labakk, Tyre, Jubayl and others that are managed by this organization.

"This is the structure of the ministry of tourism. I cannot say this structure is productive under the present conditions; however, it maintains the status quo and strengthens the bases for future tourist activities."

[Question] Tourist festivals, such as the Ba'labakk festivals, are used to attract a large number of tourists. What, in your opinion, is the best way to attract tourists? Or do you think the current situation does not permit improvement?]

[Answer] The situation is not tense, and there is a chance to revive these festivals. The Ba'labakk festivals will be resumed in the near future, as preparations for these festivals will begin in the fall. That is, in the fall of 1980, we will start preparing for the summer of 1981.

Preparation for festivals requires travel abroad to contract with international professional groups and prepare the advertisement necessary to promote the festival. This means that we cannot prepare for a summer festival in the spring, especially for one at the level of those held in Ba'labakk.

[Question] How do you evaluate the tourist situation before and after the events?

[Answer] There is no doubt that tourism was experiencing growth in Lebanon in 1974. I had assumed the responsibilities of the ministry of tourism in 1973, for a short period of time. I recall that tourism was at its peak. During that time, the administration was as stable as possible. The continuous construction of hotels and the carrying out of tourist activities, particularly the Balabakk festivals, were proof that summer resorts and hotels were flourishing.

Tourism is naturally affected by the security situation, as the Lebanese economy is based on services. There is no other country in the world with such characteristics. The tourist comes to Lebanon to relax; he will not come if it is unsafe. Thus, this sector was affected by the situation that existed throughout the country.

However, we hope that the situation will improve in 1980 and the coming years. I repeat that security is the most important factor allowing tourism to continue its growth under our sponsorship.

[Question] What about the hotels that were destroyed during the war? How can the government help them? Can the central bank give them loans to continue their tourist activities?

[Answer] First, there are some hotel establishments that have outstanding bank loans, but this subject will be treated (like others) through parliamentary decisions. A parliamentary session was held to study this matter and the matter of loan installments. Many organizations, including hotels, who had bank loans stopped their operations during the year. Of course, they were unable to pay off their outstanding loans. Since there are conditions to be met for loan disbursement, banks could refuse giving new loans until they have received their outstanding loan payments. I do not know to what extent we can establish a reasonable balance between promoting consumers benefits, and giving the banks a chance to survive.

[Question] What tourist projects are currently being carried out?

[Answer] There is the resthouse project, such as the Sidon and 'Anjar resthouses, the Ja'ita Cave improvement project, and other tourist projects under study for implementation, among which is the Dayr al-Qamar project which will be put into effect soon.

[Question] Do you encourage the construction of new [private] beaches or does the government lean toward encouraging free [public beaches]?

[Answer] The syndicate of beach owners in Lebanon, in cooperation with the ministry of tourism, is participating in building these [free] beaches. These, of course, require the attention of concerned municipalities as well as the ministry of public works and transport in relation to the coasts. At the same time, they need financial support. Swimming should not be costly on a coast like that of Lebanon. There are currently 2 public beaches under study in the Tabarja and al-Manarah areas.

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COOPERATIVE CENTER APPROVED BY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 3 Jul 80 p 6

[Statute of Cooperative Center As Approved By Council of Ministers]

[Text] During its session yesterday, the council of ministers approved the basic statute governing the "cooperative center" which will be in charge of imports, purchases, contracts, and wholesale and retail operations related to food products, as well as the most significant consumer goods and animal and agricultural products and byproducts.

The center is authorized to establish public markets in various areas, and deal with them directly without the use of middlemen. This project was embodied in one of the major resolutions of the conference of the General Labor Federation. The following is the basic statute governing the center:

Article 1: Definitions:

Terms that appear in the statute have the following meanings:

Law - the establishing the cooperative center.

Minister - the minister of housing and cooperatives.

Board - the board of directors of the cooperative center.

Chairman - the chairman of the board.

Section 1 - The Administration of the Center

Chapter 1: Board of Directors

Article 2: The board of directors consists of a chairman and 8 members appointed in accordance with the bylaws of Article 3. Under the same decree, 2 of these members will be named vice chairmen, one for purhcasing and import affairs, the other for packing and sales affairs.

Article 3: The board will serve for a period of 5 years from the date of issuance of the appointment decree. If the service period expires and is not renewed, or a new board is not appointed, the same board will retain its duties and appropriate authorities until a decree for renewal or appointment is issued.

Article 4: The following titles should not be held by the same person: chairman and vice chairman, or minister and member of parliament or any other position in the government or in public organizations or independent agencies.

Article 5: The chairman will conduct board meetings at least once a week.

The government representative may call the board for an emergency session at any time.

The board may invite to its meetings, and for consulting purposes, any specialists they choose, provided these specialists do not participate in voting.

Article 6: The board meeting is presided over by the chairman who also leads the discussions. In his absence, the older of the 2 vice chairmen acts on his behalf.

Members must personally attend the meetings; they cannot delegate anyone to represent them.

Article 7: Minutes will be recorded during each meeting and will be given to the trustee minister within no more than 1 week after [the meeting].

Decisions are considered effective if the trustee minister does not uphold the government commissioner's veto of these decisions within one week from the date of the veto.

Article 8: The board manages the center's functions, ensures its progress and protects its interests. It has, for these purposes, comprehensive authorities in accordance with regulations in force and this statute. It has, but is not limited to the following functions:

1 - It outlines the center's general policy.

2 - It approves the center's budget and sees that it is properly executed.

3 - It approves all deals, contracts and agreements that are in excess of 100,000 Lebanese pounds.

4 - It accepts donations and grants from any source.

5 - It opens bank accounts following approval by the trustee minister.

6 - It delegates necessary authority to its chairman or one of his vice chairmen.

Chapter 2 - Administration of the Center

Article 9: The chairman is the (alternative) chairman of all [functions] at the center and has the following functions in particular:

1 - He represents the center before the state and court and other bodies and carries out all the work and proceedings required by this representation.

2 - He signs all deals, contracts and agreements and approves expenses that do not exceed 100,000 Lebanese pounds.

3 - He signs checks, vouchers, notes and bank accounts with one of his vice chairmen as co-signer, in accordance with their jurisdictions.

4 - He prepares a proposed budget and presents it to the board for approval. It does not become effective until the trustee minister has approved it.

5 - He prepares a semi-annual report on the activities of the center and presents it to the trustee minister after the board approves it.

6 - He sees that the center's work is properly carried out and takes the necessary measures to ensure that.

Article 10: The vice chairman of purchasing and imports is responsible for handling all related duties.

Article 11: The vice chairman of packing and sales is responsible for handling all related duties and the settlement of all transactions pertaining to these activities.

Article 12: The minister can issue a decision appointing an assistant chairman or assistant vice chairman.

Section 2 - Trusteeship Powers

Chapter 1 - Powers of the "Trustee" Minister

Article 13: In addition to the decisions which, under the laws and regulations, are subject to the approval of the trusteeship authority, the following decisions of the board are subject to the minister's approval:

1 - The establishment of branches, public markets and distribution centers.

2 - The general annual budget.

3 - The opening of bank accounts.

4 - The definition of the center's ownership and the workers' and employees' conditions of employment and compensation.

5 - The hiring and dismissal of permanent employees and workers.

Chapter 2 - The Government Commissioner

Article 14: The government commissioner enjoys the authority given to him in accordance with the laws and regulations in force, particularly the following:

1 - He attends the council's sessions and enjoys the right of discussion without voting.

2 - He calls emergency sessions for the council.

3 - He has the right to veto all board decisions, provided the trustee approves this opposition within 1 week.

Section 3 - The Center's Controllership Authority

Chapter 1 - The Financial Controller

Article 15: The financial controller exercises the following authorities:

- He oversees implementation of the center's budget, manages and controls its finances.

- He checks the accuracy of the center's special and regular accounts, loans, debts and their validity.

Article 15: The financial controller prepares an annual report on the center's business and activities from a financial standpoint, and gives copies to the minister of finance, the trustee minister, the council and the government commissioner.

Article 17: The financial controller may not receive any salary or compensation from the center.

Chapter 2 - The Audit Commissioner

Article 18: An audit commissioner is appointed under contract signed by the minister of housing and cooperatives. He reviews all the records, reports, documents, financial statements, inventory lists, the general budget and other center-related accounts.

Article 19: The audit commissioner prepares a report on all inadequacies or violations he notices in the center's activities. This report is

immediately handed to the chairman, with copies to the trustee minister and the government commissioner.

Article 20: In addition to his general annual report, the audit commissioner prepares a detailed monthly report about the center's financial situation, its business and his audit results, and gives it to the trustee minister, with copies to the council and the government commissioner.

Chapter 3 - The General Administrative Supervisor

Article 21: The general administrative supervisor must have at least 10 years of administrative experience in addition to a college degree. He is appointed by a decree issued by the minister of housing and cooperatives. He oversees the progress of work at the center, and examines and exercises supervision over the following:

1 - The carrying out of duties and responsibilities by employees.

2 - Employee behavior, particularly in relation to their being on time.

3 - Employees' abidance by laws and regulations in performing their jobs.

4 - Investigation of petitions and complaints and their related results.

Article 22: Supervision is conducted periodically and on the basis of special assignments by the minister, or the chairman or one of the vice chairmen of the board of directors.

- Every six months, the general administrative supervisor prepares a report to the minister on his work, his inspection tours and the results of his inspection reports.

Section 4 - The Center's Financial Affairs

Article 23: The center's financial resources consist of the following:

1 - Commissions which the centers adds to the price of goods in accordance with Article 1 of the law.

2 - Donations and grants.

3 - Special allotments in the general budget.

4 - Interest earned on money deposited in banks.

Article 24: The chairman prepares the proposed annual budget and presents it to the board of directors before the end of September each year.

The board must, before the end of October, approve and present the budget to the minister.

Article 25: The chairman specifies a cut-off date for the financial year, provided it is no later than the last day of March of each year.

The board approves the cut-off date and gives a copy of the approval to the minister before the end of April.

Article 26: Loans and treasury advances are to be spent for the purposes they are allotted for. Special funds necessary to pay off outstanding loans are accounted for annually in the center's budget.

Section 5 - Conditions of Employment, Salaries and Compensation

Article 27: The conditions of employment, salaries and compensation are to be defined in accordance with the attached schedule [AL-SAFIR does not carry the schedule in question].

Article 28: The center's staff will be determined by its needs, by decisions issued by the board. These decisions are not effective until the trustee minister approves them.

Article 29: The hiring and dismissal of employees and workers is implemented by a decision of the board of directors upon the chairman's recommendation. This procedure becomes effective only after the trustee minister approves it.

As for temporary workers who are used for emergency and temporary work, they are hired when there is a need for them. Their salaries and compensation are decided by the chairman.

Article 30: This statute takes effect upon its promulgation by decree.

9455
CSO: 4802

FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH MAURITANIA, ARAB WORLD

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 11-17 Aug 80 p 22

[Interview with Moroccan Foreign Minister M'hamed Boucetta, Conducted by Rashid Khashanah, in Tunis; date not given]

[Text] The Western Sahara conflict has undergone some developments recently, following the extraordinary conference of the Algerian Liberation Front and the OAU's Freetown summit, not to mention military developments in the territory of the conflict itself. Morocco's Foreign Minister M'hamed Boucetta reviews his government's position regarding these developments, evaluates relations between the Arab Maghrib countries, and explains his stand on the question of alliances within the Arab world, in an interview with AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI during his recent visit to Tunisia.

[Question] Ever since the last conference of the Algerian Liberation Front, there have been hints that the tension between Algeria and Morocco will be eliminated. Do you believe that there has actually been any development in attitudes which would permit rapprochement between the two sides?

[Answer] Current issues in Algeria are primarily and above all domestic issues concerning the Algerian regime and the adjustments which Algerian officials feel are necessary. As for relations with Morocco and the regional tension, we feel that a clearer understanding of the situation has begun to emerge, no doubt, because the matter primarily pertains to the attacks from the Algerian borders of which we in Morocco have been the victims. In this respect, there has been no change in our viewpoint; in fact, as Moroccans we must take every step to defend our country. In fact, we wish an end could be put to this tension, because it is not in the interest of either the Algerian or Moroccan people or the region as a whole.

There is talk in the air indicating the possibility of creating a climate for this mutual understanding. In any case, Morocco will not hesitate to do everything in its power to prevent this tension and to make the dialog more open, so as to create ways of regional economic development and fruitful cooperation. But we have not yet observed anything definitely new.

[Question] Moroccan-Mauritanian relations have gone through many twistings and turnings, and sometimes real shocks, especially after the Algiers agreement between the Polisario and Mauritania. How do you evaluate present Moroccan-Mauritanian relations?

[Answer] As you know, Mauritania took it on itself to adopt a so-called "neutral" stand on this issue. We don't want to impose any stand on Mauritania, just as we would not allow one to be imposed on us, because this issue primarily and above all pertains to sovereignty. What we will remark on about our Mauritanian brothers is that there were agreements between us, in the fields of regional security and defense of Mauritania's safety, the region's safety and our own safety. There were also agreements for joint economic activity and rapprochement in many fields, in some of which slackness was observed after the Algiers agreement. But nevertheless we tried and we are always trying to make Moroccan-Mauritanian relations friendly and cooperative in all spheres, because in any case we share a common destiny with Mauritania. We hope that Mauritanian officials understand that their relations with their neighbors, especially Morocco, do not concern Mauritania alone but the entire region. We will strive to make these relations cooperative ones.

We Did Not Reject Mediation

[Question] Recently, attempts to mediate between Algeria and Morocco have intensified, and there has been talk of Saudi mediation and then Tunisian mediation, because of Prince Fahd's visit to Rabat and then Mohamed Mzali's recent visit. Why has Morocco rejected this mediation? What are the conditions and guarantees under which Morocco would agree to mediation to solve the conflict?

[Answer] There have in fact been a number of attempts by fraternal and friendly countries, who want to put an end to the tension existing in the region and between Morocco and Algeria; this is a fact we cannot deny. As for the statement that Morocco has rejected mediation, this is untrue, because Morocco has always wanted to end the existing tension. The first attempt was by President Bourguiba, and after that came attempts by Saudi Arabia to create an atmosphere of rapprochement. Then there was Mr Mzali's visit, during which we acquainted him with the true situation. I don't think that there has been any mediation in the true sense, but just a search for ways to open the dialog. I can affirm that Morocco has not rejected and will not reject this, because we are prepared to do everything which might bring about rapprochement.

[Question] There has been much talk about Polisario's moving its military operations to southern Morocco. Some people have even said that the Boucraa mines, for example, have been or will be closed. Do you believe that transferring the battle to southern Morocco would postpone the hour of solution by causing economic harm to southern Morocco?

[Answer] This has many interpretations, and much has been said about it. There is actually a mercenary gang attacking Morocco--no one can deny this. As for economic activities, whether pertaining to the Boucraa mines or to other existing activities in the region, they are following their natural course. In fact, there are some very important harbor, housing, factory and road projects which are currently proceeding as usual. Morocco had to look at this issue from the point of view of the aggressor. It has actually taken this viewpoint, and has adopted the appropriate measures, whether pertaining to the military sphere, i.e. security measures so as to concentrate its forces, or to the necessary equipment and the mobilization of the people to resist these attacks. Economic projects are proceeding as usual.

[Question] What is Morocco's attitude toward the OAU and the Steadfastness Front countries, after the stands which both groups adopted vis-a-vis the struggle in the Western Sahara?

[Answer] Our attitude towards the OAU is clear. We feel that this issue is one of Moroccan territorial integrity. Some states feel that colonialism has not been eliminated in this region. Therefore, we did not accept the Monrovia recommendations, because they were not serious and did not respect the organization's laws, and we had obvious reservations about them at the time. Now, a number of African states have begun to comprehend the real situation, and there is no better proof of this than the stands which were decisively adopted at the last conference at Freetown.

[Question] But there was a split at the last conference.

[Answer] It almost occurred. Half the organization's members adopted a clear stand, and this is what I was referring to when I said that some African states had comprehended the real situation. I know that accepting a group like this one, government or state, into the organization would give this organization little hope of remaining. There were some decisive stands taken by some of the organization's states.

No Essential Difference

[Question] In the context of differing Arab reactions to the policy of the Egyptian regime, the viewpoints and policies of Arab governments towards the current phase have varied. Therefore, we have observed that after the formation of the Steadfastness Front there has been a kind of rapprochement or alliance among a number of Arab states which refused to join that front, especially Riyadh, Rabat, Tunis, and other countries. Even the Tunisian prime minister, while visiting Morocco, spoke of "a chain stretching from Rabat to Riyadh." Do you think it likely that this trend, which is relatively isolated in its way of looking at the circumstances, will crystallize and change into a front or alliance?

[Answer] This question contains several questions. I don't want to talk about the stands adopted by the Steadfastness Front states, for this concerns those states which have joined it. What concerns us, as Morocco first of all,

is that our stand on the Arab cause and the Palestinian cause is one to which we have clearly adhered, first at the 1974 Rabat summit, the basic factors of which were carried over to the Baghdad summit, and then at Tunis. We explained that these agreements which were signed would not solve the problem, because they did not deal with the essential issue, the Palestinian cause and the establishment of the Palestinian state. Naturally, there are individual relations among some Arab states, which are perhaps firmer between one party and another than those existing among the Arab community. But Morocco's position will always remain well within Arab solidarity. We have firm relations with Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq, for example.

[Question] In spite of the diversity of regimes?

[Answer] There is no difference with respect to the essential issue. There are also bilateral relations with Kuwait, the UAE, and other states. It is incorrect, in my opinion, to speak of an axis. There are doubtless firm relations, but as for the creation of an axis to counter a second line in the Arab community, this is not so with respect to Morocco. We want to unify our lines in the Arab national interest. We don't want to drive a wedge in the heart of the Arab nation, or to create an axis to counter a second axis. This is not in the interest of the Arab nation, its people, or its basic cause.

8559
CSO: 4402

GERMANY OFFERS COUNTRY TECHNICAL, SCIENTIFIC TRAINING

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 15 Jun 80 p 14

/Article: "Saudi-German Cooperation in Development, Science and Technology"/

/Text/ Saudi-German cooperation in the cultural fields is concentrated on the vocational training process and technical instruction, in order to benefit from lengthy German expertise in this field. Therefore, at the beginning of the sixties, as it was on its long road toward development, industrialization, and the development of its basic economic facilities, the kingdom oriented itself toward a Western European country which was known for its scientific and technical progress, the Federal Republic of Germany, so that we could build bridges of cooperation and participation with Germany in an important field, that of development policy and scien tific and technical cooperation.

In the early part of the sixties, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia decided to spread vocational and technical training throughout various parts of the country. After long study and investigation with organizations belonging to the United Nations and some industrially developed countries, the Saudi government, in 1964, adopted an important decision, stipulating that the vocational training system applied in West Germany would be applied, and it embarked on negotiations bearing on this subject with the federal government in Bonn. The first Saudi-German technical and vocational training agreement was signed in 1966, stipulating that German advice and expertise and German professors, trainers and experts would be provided for the Kingdom of Suadi Arabia and that it would contribute to supplying Saudi technical and qualifying institutes, schools and centers with machinery, equipment and supplies for education, training, studies and books, at the expense of the Saudi government itself. The first group of German experts, professors and trainers arrived in the kingdom toward the end of 1966, consisting of five professors to engage in work in the industrial vocational school in the town of al-Hufuf, as well as a German expert for the Saudi Ministry of Education who would coordinate activity between the German and Saudi parties and would set out a practical applied study on the possibility of establishing a group of new training centers in various parts

of the kingdom and establishing the necessary contacts with agencies responsible for this matter in Germany, the kingdom and the organizations belonging to the United Nations and the international development programs.

This agreement witnessed a number of modifications which were introduced before it was decided to conclude a new technical cooperation agreement between Bonn and Riyadh in 1975 whose costs were estimated at about 1 billion Saudi riyals. The latter is considered to be the first agreement of its kind which the Federal Republic of Germany has reached with a country of the third world founded on bases related to the policy of developmental cooperation in exchange for the payment of expenses. This is a policy bearing on rich developing countries, in particular the oil producing countries, which the federal government adopted in early 1974 following the explosion of the crisis in oil and raw materials in the world, and it is aimed at offering developmental assistance to rich developing countries which are headed along the road to development and industrialization, in exchange for payment of the costs of these expenses, and cooperation with them in various developmental fields which they select for themselves for their own interests.

Supervising the implementation of this new developmental policy, which many industrial countries in the world have adopted, is the federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation in Bonn, while the German Technical Cooperation Organization assumes charge of the executive aspect of this policy, which is to provide technical development aid. This German organization is a quasi official one which makes contracts with economic, industrial and technical organizations and German and foreign experts, professors and trainers to carry out specific programs in the context of technological development, as well as providing technical equipment and training and teaching aids and erecting educational, applied and model buildings, schools, facilities and centers. This organization, which is known by the name GTZ, has been able in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to take part in constructing institutes, schools, and training and vocational shops in Riyadh, Jiddah, al-Hufuf, al-Ta'if, 'Unayzah, Buraydah and al-Dammam in the framework of propagating vocational training in various areas of the kingdom. The number of experts with this organization who are working in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia today exceeds 75 and it is expected that this will increase to no less than 150 by 1985.

At the beginning of this year, 1980, the duration of this technical cooperation agreement was extended during a visit to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia by the federal minister of economic cooperation, Dr Otto Graf Lambsdorff, with the objective of strengthening economic relations and offering more technical and technological aid to the kingdom in the scope of the 1980-1985 5-year development plan.

Dr Hartmut Neuel, director general of the German Technical Cooperation Organization, says:

"German-Saudi cooperation in the technological and vocational field goes back to the sixties, when the first agreement was signed between the two countries in the field of vocational training and technical education. It clearly shows the extent of the possibility of succeeding in transferring technology from industrial countries to third world countries taking urgent steps in the industrialization and development field, and the extent of the success of German-Saudi cooperation in implementation of development and improvement projects in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and this has led to the extension of the validity of this agreement for another 5 years, when these projects will be handed over to earnest Saudi personnel."

11887
CSO: 4802

STATUS OF NATION'S POWER GENERATING CAPACITY REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 19 Jun 80 p 5

/Article by Sa'ud al-Salih al-Musaybih: "The State of Electricity This Summer"/

/Text/ No two persons will disagree over the importance electricity has attained and the degree to which it is essential for every house and to which it must continue and not be cut off. The capital, Riyadh, has always suffered from repeated cutoffs of electricity every summer season; when summer approaches the citizen prepares himself to receive it and nostalgia has accustomed him, forcing your brother not to forsake the equipment of the past. The "feather duster" becomes the air conditioner and the "waterskin" and the "pot" become equipment one cannot do without at all in cooling water; the "burlap bag," by spraying it with water and putting vegetables and watermelon in it, becomes an irreplaceable refrigerator. Let us not forget, either, a return to the preservation of meat by the old method. In general, all these things have been returning to the inhabitants of the town of Riyadh when the summer season approaches.

The citizens have become accustomed to this, although what we observe is that the cutoffs have started to decrease, if not actually cease, thanks to the efforts which the management of the Electric Company of Riyadh and Outskirts has made and is making because of the great interest on the part of people directly responsible for the matter of Riyadh's electricity. We are not stating this out of hypocrisy or propaganda on behalf of the company; rather, it is a fact, and the citizen felt and is feeling this change, both last year and this year. We can stress this through the superb achievement which has taken place for the first time during the examination period, which passed safely without any cutoffs. This phenomenon might give us hope that the company will be prepared and able strongly to persevere this summer through sound planning and early preparation. Dear reader, it pleases us, during this report, to meet with Eng 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Wahid, manager of the Electric Company of Riyadh and Outskirts, who has described for the citizen everything concerning the company's preparations for the summer in addition to many important things which concern the citizen. This discussion took place and we hope it will take

care of everything which is of concern and interest to the citizen concerning electricity and the electric company, since it discusses the preparations the Riyadh Electric Company has made and is making to eliminate the problem of the cutoff of electricity, provisionally this summer and definitively in coming years.

Most of the cutoffs arise from the load on branch distribution stations and main supply cables or the old overhead network which operates at a level of 4,160 volts.

For 3 years the company has embraced a radical solution to deal with this problem in particular and to improve the conditions of the electric service the Riyadh Electric Company provides in general.

It has striven to redesign and replan its main systems and main supply cables, providing suitable voltage for transmission and distribution lines and stations to guarantee that current will be transmitted and bear demand, and then to get rid of the old overhead system which is no longer considered at all suitable for the conditions of electricity demand in the city of Riyadh.

With thanks to God, it has succeeded in carrying out the major portion of this task, so far completing the construction of a circular line around the city of Riyadh to transmit current at a level of 132,000 volts. In the past 2 years, 310 kilometers of ground and overhead cable have been put into operation, functioning at this voltage, and 17 main transfer stations working at this voltage also have been put into operation.

In addition, 330,000 volt and 13,800 volt lines have been consolidated, and the total put into operation at both of these two voltages came to 612 kilometers in 1979. In the first half of this year, alone, 370 kilometers were laid and put in operation.

The distribution stations operating at 33,000 volts rose in number from 17 at the end of 1977 to 62 at present, that is, an increase of 264 percent; what was installed in 1979 exceeds what had been installed and put in operation since the company was established. The total number of stations operating as of the start of 1979 came to 1,243 while those installed in 1979 alone came to 1,780. The total number of stations in service now comes to 3,975.

As regards the overhead system operating at 4,160 volts, it has been possible with God's help to get rid of 95 percent of that and replace it with a 13,800-volt network. This was achieved in record time of less than 2 years. These achievements were accompanied by the development of major and periodic maintenance services on the lines and distribution stations.

This has all been reflected in the improvement of the conditions of the systems, which has led to the elimination of part of the major technical

explanations for the cutoffs the city of Riyadh was complaining about.

As regards the cutoffs to come, they result either from the lines being struck by contractors at excavations for other utilities or what lie within the normal limit of breakdowns in any network system in any country.

The Seventh Station Will Be Adequate for Riyadh's Consumption

Regarding the Riyadh Electric Company's projects to cover all areas and new sections with electricity, Eng 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-'Abd-al-Wahid said, "The company is trying, indeed is committed to not deviating from its new policy of finishing the extensions to every area before the design and planning of its main system, thus guaranteeing that the maximum will be provided for in the development of the region. This is all so that we may avoid recurrent problems from 'weak systems.' However, this has not prevented and will not prevent the sound, secure linkup of electricity to all sections of the city of Riyadh--in fact, the element of speed has commicted us to a policy of bidding out these areas as independent projects to contractors besides our ordinary ones.

"In the past 2 years, we have sought to complete the bookup of electricity to the sections of al-Nasim, al-Rabwah, Baghlaf, the King Faysal model section, Shubra, al-Rahmaniyah, north al-'Ulya, al-Suwaydi, al-Fawwaz, al-Rawdah 1, al-Rawda 2, al-Dar al-Bayda', the district of north Station Four, north al-Sulaymaniyah, and al-Dar'iyah al-Jadidah."

On what has been done as far as the great station on the al-Kharj Road, on which work is now underway, when it will be completed, and probable part it will play, the director general of the Riyadh Electric Company said,

"This station is called the company's installed generating plant in fact is almost the biggest gas turbine station burning raw fuel in the world. It consists of 16 gas turbine units with a capacity of 50,000 kilowatts each, or a total capacity of 800,000 kilowatts.

"The contract was signed for that on 5 July 1979 with the American General Electric Company and work on this project is continuing urgently. The first unit will be ready for operation in mid-July 1980, and this will be followed by the other units at a rate of one per month.

"This station will back up the generation requirements of the city and outskirts of Riyadh."

255 Meter Change Requests per Month

On the process of changing and replacing meters, and the fact that that requires much time, especially when we realize that the area is inside the city and that the electricity is under high voltage, and what the reason for that is, he said, "The process of changing or replacing meters occurs

spontaneously as a result of the breakdown of the meter or the fact that it is burned, or as a result of a request from the customer as a result of increased load on the meter.

"With respect to the first case, the replacement process does not take any time worth mentioning.

"With respect to the second case, it is necessary to restudy the situation so that supply will occur in a sound manner which will suffice to meet requirements and the customer will not commit the same error again.

"Following the improvement in the conditions of the systems, we have started to implement about 255 requests a month, while we receive about 330.

"In our opinion, the rates are drawing close together, to the point where the time will soon come where replacement or added loads will occur as soon as the request is received."

A Complete Training Policy

On the role the company is playing to prepare young Saudis qualified for future technical activities in the company, Eng 'Abd-al-Wahid said,

"The company is devoting special attention to this aspect, but there was no training program some time ago except for those contained in import contracts with the manufacturing firms.

"Recently a training policy has been carried out which is concentrated on three aspects:

"1. Raising the competence of Saudi employees by sending them on educational and training missions abroad (the United States, Britain, Ireland, Japan), reaching periods of 4 years in some cases, after which the trainee graduates as an engineer or a managerial person. The number of people sent on missions, receiving training and studies in various fields of electrical engineering, business administration and language courses, reached 57. A comprehensive evaluation of all Saudi employees in the company is now taking place to determine the missions which should be sent this year.

"2. Establishing a training and teaching center which will take charge of developing the employees' capabilities through training courses as they perform their jobs. The number of these courses in 1979 came to 150, and 1,300 employees benefited from them.

"This year 59 courses were held and 38 employees benefited from them.

"These courses include operation of modern machinery and equipment to connect and weld cables, lay underground and overhead lines, maintenance activities, transformer installation, safety and English language programs.

"3. The company has also proceeded to enroll a number of students with intermediate and primary educations in the teaching and training center, exposing them to intensified training and teaching for a period of 18 months, after which they are qualified to work in systems activities.

"The first group, consisting of 48 pupils, joined this course starting 1 January 1980.

"The second group will join on 22 August 1980."

22 Invoice Collection Centers

On the reasons for the small number of company collection centers, whether there would be a solution to this problem in the future, whether there was a solution to the problem that readers come to houses in the morning when the owners are not present, and the development plans the company would carry out in order to develop distribution so that that would be consonant with the development steps the company was witnessing, he said:

"The situation might be correct as far as previous years go; up to late 1979 we had just 12 collection centers whereas there are now 22 collection centers working in the morning and afternoon periods. That is an adequate number at present.

"As regards solutions, we have studied the customer's response to this method and his readiness to accept it.

"As to the fact that readers visit and arrive at houses in the morning, the company has recently adopted a system of installing meters outside homes and has proceeded to implement this system in the new sections. As for the old sections, the company will bring the meters outside the homes soon, God willing, as in the new sections. In any case the meter readers have clear plain instructions to return to read the meters whose owners do not want to be visited in the morning; they will return in the afternoons."

Regarding the benefits the company offers its workers, and whether it intends to give them other benefits:

"The company is very anxious to provide good psychological climate for its employees and is exerting efforts to prepare the employee and provide him with good circumstances which will make him able to produce, create and innovate in an exceptional manner, and carry out his work with full enthusiasm so his production will be more abundant, his thinking clearer and his fitness better. Thus numerous excellent opportunities have been furnished for education, domestically and abroad; he and his family are provided with free health care and in addition housing has been built for technicians at the company stations and there is a transportation allowance. In addition, attention is given to cultural and recreational aspects. A large library has been built which contains many religious and literary

books, sources, textbooks and technical books. The effort has been made to create soccer, ping-pong and volleyball courts and we are studying the possibility of adding other benefits which are in harmony with the development of the workforce in the kingdom."

Regarding the situation he hopes to see the company enjoy in the future, Eng 'Abd-al-'Aziz al 'Abd-al-Wahid said,

"The subject of contentment is always a relative one. In my opinion no one is wholly satisfied with the job whose responsibilities he pursues and whose concerns he exercises, especially if this job is directly and firmly connected to the public and he has a strong bond with their interests and comfort. Therefore, to speak the truth, I do not believe that I will ever reach the point of satisfaction with everything there is; I wish for development in our service."

On the role which is expected of the citizen toward the company, so that the company may provide the best services, he said, "Giving proper information at times of requests, in terms of the location and the equipment to be installed, the appliances to be used with electricity, and so forth, and guiding consumption, I mean, using electricity when we need it and when we are at home, since there is no use in leaving air conditioners on while the whole family is outside the house, and providing adequate houses in the plans for new sections."

On the role the company has played and is playing to insure the principle of safety for citizens, Eng 'Abd-al Wahid said,

"The company has printed a brochure which is being distributed among all customers containing information bearing on ways of coping with accidents arising from electric current and means to avoid their occurrence at the outset. If its contents are observed, that will be adequate."

11887
CSO: 4802

SOVIETS SAID PREPARING FOR AL-ASAD'S DEMISE

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 16 Jul 80 p 1

[Article: "Moscow Preparing for Coup Against al-Asad; 4,000 Soviet Troops Arrive in Syria"]

[Text] London--Thousands of pieces of Soviet equipment and weapons are flowing into Damascus. Four thousand Soviet advisers and experts have arrived in Syria and this figure will be doubled shortly in the wake of a secret treaty already concluded between the Soviet Union and Syria.

Western intelligence sources have reported that General (Shevloc), the deputy chairman of the Soviet army's Political Department, was seen in Damascus recently.

These sources link Shevloc's visit with the visit by his chief, General (Yebitchiev), to Kabul last fall. The sources have also said that the Soviets do not send their prominent generals to any area unless they are on the threshold of an enormous change in their policy and they are about to adopt a serious decision concerning involvement of the Soviet combat troops.

Yebitchiev's arrival in Afghanistan was in preparation for the Soviet invasion of Kabul. It is not unlikely that Shevloc's visit is in preparation for the inflow of Soviet forces to Damascus to support al-Asad and to prepare for staging a deep coup.

It is said in the western intelligence sources that Russia is searching for another Babrak Karmal in Syria to stage a coup against al-Asad like the one staged in Kabul. [sic]

To realize this, the Soviets are currently cooperating with the Syrian intelligence and they have sent units of commando forces known by the name of the (Spisnaz) to take part with the Syrian army in wiping out the rebels in northern Syria who reject the local government system.

Families of the Soviet advisers have been withdrawn from northern Syria after repeated attacks against them.

8494
CSO: 4802

RIF'AT AL-ASAD'S VISIT TO RIYADH, RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES ANALYZED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 25 Jul 80 pp 20-21

[Article by Sulayman al-Farzali: "In Wake of Rif'at al-Asad's Visit to Riyadh: Furious Race in Area Between Relaxation and Explotion; Damascus Apprehensive of Political Dimensions of U.S. Congressional Resolution to Stop Aid to Syria"]

[Text] The surprise visit recently paid by Rif'at al-Asad, the brother of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, to Saudi Arabia has been the main subject discussed by the press and diplomatic circles in the major capitals, especially since the visit has come in the wake of noticeable frigidity in the relations between Damascus and Riyadh--a frigidity that has been secret to nobody. The importance and delicate nature of the mission have been indicated by the fact that the Syrian President has chosen his brother and not anybody else for this mission. The importance of political missions is usually measured by the importance of the persons chosen for them.

Therefore, the importance of the visit is not the subject of discussion. What has drawn the observers' attention is its timing. It is from this timing that they have made their conclusions regarding the issues discussed, especially since only implicit information has been leaked besides the joint communique which, in turn, indicates the importance of the new Syrian-Saudi meeting under the special domestic circumstances of Syria, the general political and international circumstances through which the Middle East crisis is passing and under the circumstances of the current Arab relations--relations that have weakened in comparison to what they were between the Baghdad and Tunis summits.

Rif'at al-Asad's visit to Riyadh has coincided with the second military coup staged by the Lebanese Phalanges in the eastern area and with Iraq's celebration of the July revolution anniversary. The visit has also come in the wake of Damascus' decision that visas must be acquired before entry into Syria--a decision which forced nearly 50,000 Saudi summer vacationers who had been on their way to Bludan and Latakia to return home--and in the wake of the U.S. Congress' resolution to abolish the U.S. aid for Syria.

Some [observers] say that the Syrian President has sent his brother to Riyadh to tell the Saudis that the president's serious step in the direction of the Soviet Union is no "joke" this time, unless Syria's conditions and interests are taken into consideration by the others. These observers add that the Syrian President has thus thrown the ball in their [the Saudis'] court, absolving himself of the choice. Others say that Syria has not been in need of the Amman conference to show that it has been under a state of "Arab siege" which has contributed to complicating its internal situation and weakening its position toward the Camp David accords, that it has been forced to break this siege either in the Saudi direction or the Iraqi direction and that it has chosen the former direction for numerous considerations, especially since all the previous coordination attempts made between Baghdad and Damascus since 1970--the latest being the agreement whose page was turned over almost a year ago--have failed. The Iraqis have their view on why the Syrian regime has knocked at the Saudi door and not their door this time. They point out that the Syrian regime had always come to them to overcome an international dilemma or a critical domestic dilemma and that they have always opened the door for this regime and turned a new page with it only to find that the relations would deteriorate anew and that this deterioration would be followed by vituperations and attacks. According to the Iraqis, this has futilely repeated for three times and they are not ready for a fourth experiment. The Iraqis, according to what they say, are not hostile to the Syrian regime, in the sense that they fulfill their commitments toward this regime on time and that they do not offer its domestic opponents any aid, regardless of their opinions of this regime's policy and positions. But at the same time, they do not want to give this regime the opportunity to use them to strengthen itself against its enemies at home and against the other Arab axes. Insofar as Damascus is concerned, the Iraqi game has ended within the same framework in which it had been projected previously, namely the unionist framework, and this game is still possible within a general Arab framework to which Baghdad is not the inlet. The Iraqi-Syrian relations are normal but are not likely to become better or worse in the short run. This is why the Syrian complaint is focused on Jordan these days. The Syrians accuse the Jordanians openly of supplying the Muslim Brotherhood with aid and of providing it with the opportunities of training and of transporting weapons [into Syria]. Even though the Syrians do not make a similar complaint against Iraq and even though the lukewarm relations between Baghdad and Damascus have not reached the point of open hostility which had prevailed 2 years ago, the Syrians hint at the presence of a Jordanian-Iraqi alliance which is tacitly approved by Saudi Arabia. This, according to the observers, has its causes and will have its consequences when the outcome of Rif'at al-Asad's visit to Riyadh appears.

It may be true that President al-Asad has chosen his brother for the Saudi mission because of the personal friendship that ties this brother with Prince 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the second deputy prime minister and the national guard commander, and because of 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam's preoccupation with the Amman conference. However, it is also true that despite the cool relations between Damascus and Riyadh recently, the Syrian President has not dropped Saudi Arabia from his main calculations regarding the Arab balances since his visit to Riyadh and his agreement with the late King Faysal ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz

to coordinate the roles in the Ramadan war. In explaining this, it is said that al-Asad noticed during the 1967 war that a main reason of the defeat in that war was the absence of coordination between the frontline states and the second line, or supporting, states--meaning the oil states. So, al-Asad made his visit to Riyadh to bring the weight of the second line states into the international balance.

The Saudi-Syrian relations remained somewhat good from 1973 until they turned cool 2 years ago. In this regard, the Saudis have their logic and their reasons, even though they agree with Syria on opposing the Camp David accords and even though they consider Syria the first defense line of the Arab nation, as stated in the recent joint communique with Rif'at al-Asad. The Saudis say in reply to Damascus' claims that they don't know if there is an alliance in the true sense of the word between Amman and Baghdad. But in case such an alliance exists, they understand its motives in view of the emergence of the signs of a Syrian-Iranian alliance since the time Khomeyni attained power in Tehran. The Saudis say that this [alliance] has caused the outbreak of incidents in some Arab areas that have threatened to foil the balances existing in the area. This consideration is foremost among the causes of the cool relations between Damascus and Riyadh. Added to this, in the Saudi view, is the Syrian position toward the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, considering that Damascus boycotted the Islamabad conference.

Then comes the endless Lebanese series. In this regard, the Saudis censure Damascus strongly because it has considered them a mere financial partner whose task is to finance the Deterrence Forces even though they, the Saudis say, are the ones who saved the relations between Syria and the Palestinian resistance in the Riyadh conference and saved the Syrian-Lebanese relations in Bayat-al-Din conference. This is why the Saudis find no reason or justification for their intentional exclusion from the Lebanese arena, whether in terms of advice or in terms of control. They cite as evidence of this exclusion the foiling of the Quadrilateral Committee and other similar efforts. Saudi Arabia believes that it has a fundamental role in Lebanon by virtue of its being the only Arab country that is open to all the forces and trusted by all the parties. Saudi Arabia also believes that one of the reasons for what has happened in Lebanon is [Syria s] monopolistic formulation of a policy that doesn't take into consideration the advice of all the forces that are interested in restoring health to the State of Lebanon.

The international and Arab analyses of the recent Syrian opening up to Saudi Arabia are various and diverse but they agree on one point, namely the involved situation in Syria as a result of the security conditions emanating from the activity of the Muslim Brotherhood. It has been noticed recently that the Syrian situation has monopolized a large part of the efforts of the western information media, even though the western media had been silent for a long time on this situation.

The U.S. papers in particular have certain criteria for making conclusions regarding the reasons for the Syrian situation that has led to opening up to Saudi Arabia. These papers point out the failure of the three cards that

Syria has tried to use recently, namely: The Iranian card, the Lebanese card and the Soviet card. The continuous turbulence in Iran has given Iraq an opportunity to take a winning position toward Iran at both the Arab and international levels, especially in connection with the issue of Bahrain and the issue of the Arab Gulf islands occupied by the Iranian forces. Added to this is the position of offense that Iraqi President Saddam Husayn has personally taken against Khomeyni and Khomeynism--a position that has made a prominent NEW YORK TIMES commentator say that Saddan Husayn has won the war against Khomeyni.

It is natural that the Syrians would understand the effect of this position on them. They were not able to cause a decisive turn in the situation or to deal with it by withdrawing from their relationship with Iran. So, they advised the Iranians to improve their relations with the neighboring Arab countries so as to brighten their Arab image. As a result, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs, toured Syria, Kuwait and the UAE in an attempt to reassure the Gulf countries and eliminate their fears of Iran and, consequently, to neutralize them and prevent them from strengthening their alliance with Baghdad, especially since Kuwait has taken a position of open support for Iraq. However, Ghotbzadeh's tour turned into an ill-fated tour in the wake of his rash declaration in Damascus about "Saddam Husayn's death and his going to hell." It became evident shortly afterwards that the news was imaginary. Moreover, Ghotbzadeh himself was subjected to a real assassination attempt in Kuwait.

As for Lebanon, the Lebanese conflicts which used to be a winning card in the hand of the Syrians in the past, have now turned into a burden for the Syrians and the winds of these conflicts have begun to blow into Syria itself. It is said that large quantities of the weapons seized by the Syrian security forces during the recent combing operations in the northern Syrian cities had found their way into Syria from Lebanon. This is why it has been noticed recently that the Syrian position toward the conditions in Lebanon has been based on the principle of "block the door through which the wind blows and have peace." Even the Phalangist coup against the National Liberals has not been, in the view of the Syrians, something special that requires intervention.

Even though the Syrian relations with the Phalanges have been tense in the past 2 years, the Syrians have acted since the beginning of their intervention in Lebanon on the basis that the Phalanges are the main force on the Lebanese arena. Moreover, the Syrians have not cut off the thread of dialogue with the Phalanges. Therefore, the forces disturbed by the Phalangist coup against the Liberals, including former President Sulayman Franjiyah, do not conceal their censure to their Syrian allies in this regard.

However, the Soviet card continues to be the most dangerous card in view of its impact on the international situation. The Syrians are better aware of this fact than others and this is why they have used this card skilfully to freeze any Arab or international movement against them. The anti-Soviet Arab and international forces are also aware of the danger of this card and know

that any firm Syrian decision in this direccion means war. But [the outcome of] war is not guaranteed for the Syrians and war is not desired by the Soviets themselves. Rif'at al-Asad's visit to Saudi Arabia has raised a question that has been pending since the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations started to falter in recent months, namely the question of whether the situation in the Arab world, especially on the Syrian-Lebanese-Israeli borders, has reached the point of explosion. The U.N. observers are very afraid of the period extending from August to November 1980--the period in which there is real vacuum insofar as decision making in the White House is concerned--because the Israeli government, led by Menachem Begin, may exploit the failure of the negotiations with Egypt to deal a blow to the Syrian front.

All this, those who are well-informed say, was put on the negotiations table for a quick stock taking in the two-hour session of frank discussions between Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the crown prince and the first deputy prime minister, and Rif'at al-Asad. As a result, the final communique has been clear and strong in underlining the Arab position against Camp David and in stressing the Saudi support for Syria. Al-Asad reviewed to Prince Fahd all the pressures shouldered by Syria and familiarized him with the picture of the internal situation and with the consequences that may emanate from continuation of the support given to the Muslim Brotherhood by some neighboring Arab countries--support that may impose on the Syrian regime options that it does not want but into which it may be forced if the Saudis and the other neutral Arabs do not intervene to stop this involvement in Syria's internal affairs, that is if there is a serious effort to confront Camp David and considering that this confrontation is a collective Arab duty. Rif'at al-Asad has said that foiling the Camp David plot and defeating all its parties is a collective Arab responsibility and that Syria is determined to achieve strategic balance with the Zionist enemy, benefiting from the aid of all the brothers in the Arab homeland and of the friends outside the Arab homeland "because in this course alone lies the force capable of destroying the Camp David plot."

Those close to the Syrian regime are satisfied with the outcome of Rif'at al-Asad's visit and say that his use of the phrase "all the brothers in the Arab homeland" indicates a real desire for Arab reconciliation. As for the opponents of the Syrian regime, they do not conceal their displeasure at the visit. These opponents have tempered down their wager on the foreign forces in their battle against the regime. They say that these forces do not want to weaken the regime to the point of toppling it and, at the same time, they do not want to strengthen it to the degree where it will take independent positions. The opponents conclude from this that the foreign forces use them and that they reap no benefit from these forces. This is why it is said that some Syrian opposition forces are now seeking reconciliation with the Syrian regime by asserting their breakaway from the Muslim Brotherhood so that the forthcoming Arab reconciliation may not catch them unawares and so that they may not emerge empty handed from here and there. Neutral observers say that this reconciliation has become probable and imminent in view of the fact that in return for the Saudi mediation, Syria has given varying assurances concerning its Iranian, Lebanese and Soviet policies--assurances whereby the Syrian regime has preserved its line of retreat in case the said mediation falters.

This explains the second phrase in Rif'at al-Asad's statement which adds "the friends outside this homeland" to the phrase "all the brothers in the Arab homeland."

Information received from Riyadh in the wake of Rif'at al-Asad's visit says that Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz will carry the Arab concerns that have gathered before him, including the recent frank discussions with his Syrian guest, and tour a number of Arab capitals in an endeavor to block the gap and to unite the Arab ranks in a phase considered to be the most important and serious phase. This information estimates that Fahd's Arab tour for this purpose will take place after the month of Ramadan.

There are two things currently in the scales and it is most likely that their features will become clear after the forthcoming National Congress of the ruling paper in Damascus: The Saudi mediation on the one hand and the Syrian-Soviet summit on the other. The Syrian sources have leaked reports in Beirut to the effect that President Hafiz al-Asad may visit Moscow shortly or that a summit may be held between al-Asad and Brezhnev in Damascus if the Soviet leader's health permits. These sources have described this possibility as a "qualitative step" in the Syrian-Soviet relations.

Even though the Arab sources say that this leakage is intended for putting the expected Saudi mediation in a race with time, they agree with the Syrian sources which say that the message which Rif'at al-Asad has carried to Riyadh has been to the effect that "he who has forewarned is absolved" in case the Saudi mediation fails. Such failure will make it look as if the Soviet options have been imposed on Syria whereas Syria doesn't want to really take them.

Few people know what Saudi Arabia has promised Rif'at al-Asad. The few include Yasir 'Arafat, the PLO Executive Committee chairman, who has been familiarized with both the Saudi and Soviet sides of the situation. The Palestinian resistance sources say that during his visit to Moscow, 'Arafat coordinated his position with the Syrian position and carried with him a complete file of the situation in the area, including the weapon demands. It is said that the new arms deal for Syria and the resistance may not come from Moscow this time but through one of the eastern bloc countries. It is considered very likely that last week's visit to Poland by Gen Mustafa Talas, the Syrian minister of defense, was within this sphere.

As for the Americans, they insist on insinuating that the Syrian movement in this or that direction is a movement for blackmail and that the Congressional resolution abolishing the U.S. aid program for Syria is meant to make sure of this matter [sic]. Syria started receiving this aid, amounting to 90 million dollars annually, in 1974. This sum was suspended in 1979 and abolished finally in the middle of the current month of June, as the U.S. ambassador has been notified.

Even though this U.S. aid is insignificant and even though Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, the UAE or any [sic] other Arab state can make up for it, its political indications are what is important. The U.S. Embassy in Damascus has pointed out that the resolution was taken for several reasons connected with Syria's position on the Lebanese arena, its relations with the Soviet Union and finally, and this is the most important, with its hostile position toward the Camp David accords.

Those who know how the U.S. system operates affirm that this resolution is meant to explore the Syrian intentions because the Congress' approval of the resolution doesn't mean that it has become politically binding to the decision maker at the White House who has not severed his relations with Damascus and who described President al-Asad when the two met in Geneva 3 years ago as "the great president of Syria. As for the Syrians, they say that the congressional resolution is part of the political, economic and security pressures intended to harass the Syrian regime and to force it to succumb.

However, it is indubitable that the real picture of the Syrian situation within the framework of the intricate Arab and international relations and as conveyed to the Saudis by Rif'at al-Asad during his recent visit puts the area in a furious race between relaxation and explosion. For whichever wins, the Lebanese arena will be the gate.

8494
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD--This morning, security forces raided a Muslim brotherhood den in the Bab al-Nasr area of Aleppo. The security forces exchanged fire with the members of the gang inside the den. They succeeded in storming the den and in killing its occupants, amounting to nine persons, including two women. They confiscated documents and identity cards that were ready for distribution. They also seized a large quantity of various weapons, one photocopying machine, one duplicating machine, one camera and one monitoring device, as well as other telecommunications instruments. The security forces also raided another den belonging to the criminal gang in the (Aqyul) quarter of Aleppo, where they seized 12 rifles, 7 pistols and 15 bombs. In addition, the security forces raided a third den in the Karm al-Tahhan quarter of Aleppo, where they seized 8 rifles, 2 machineguns of U.S. make, 5 pistols, 15 bombs and a large quantity of ammunition, explosives, important documents and forged identity cards. [Text] [JN112041 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1915 GMT 11 Sep 80]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

OIL FIELDS DEVELOPMENT--An agreement was signed recently to develop 3 oil fields in Abu Dhabi and to build collection and export complexes and installations on Dalma Island. The company which contracted for the project will begin construction very soon, so that economic benefit can be obtained from the project by 1984. The project will cost about $700 million, covering the construction of important petroleum complexes on Dalma Island, including a port for exporting crude oil, a petroleum collection center, excavations for and construction of platforms, and extending pipelines between the stations and the oil fields and between the stations and the island. Gas separation stations, petroleum storage tanks, electric power plants and residential complexes will also be built on the island. ADNOC will have a 60 percent share in the fields, and JUDCO will have 40 percent. Meanwhile, UDCO will develop the Satah, Jarnin and Dalma fields. In another petroleum context, during May 45,750,376 barrels were produced by active Abu Dhabi fields, of which ADCO produced 24,772,266 barrels, ADMA 15,435,005 barrels, Total-Abu-Bakush 4,220,166 barrels, the Japan Company 653,256 barrels, and Amiradahish 651,683 barrels. During the same period 42,110,473 barrels of crude oil were exported, 24,716,775 barrels by ADCO, 15,371,502 barrels by ADMA, 1,551,705 barrels by Abu al-Bakush, 3,650,622 barrels by the Japan Company, and 819,869 barrels by Amiradahish. The daily export rate was 1,390,660 barrels. [Text] [Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 30 Jul 80 p 8] 8559

OIL INSTALLATION SECURITY MEASURES--The newspaper AL-KHALIJ, published in Sharjah, has reported that the Gulf oil states have intensified their measures for guarding oil installations in their territories. The newspaper said that these measures include the production fields, refineries, pipelines between production fields and export ports, and storage tanks. Citing Gulf diplomatic sources, it added that these measures are being taken as a necessary step in the wake of sabotage operations witnessed by some states in the area. In this context, these sources indicated that several European organizations are offering various proposals to some Gulf states, through their embassies in European capitals, for providing the petroleum states with advanced electronic warning devices to protect their oil installations. The newspaper indicated that the Gulf oil states are now consulting among themselves about adopting similar precautionary measures and using a standard warning system. [Text] [Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 30 Jul 80 p 8] 8559

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HABIB CHATTY ON STRATEGY FOR ISLAMIC COUNTRIES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 22 Aug 80 p 5

[Article: "Mr Chatty at the Meeting of Moslem Thinkers: Perfecting a Strategy to Enable the Islamic Countries to Accept Challenges"]

> [Text] The committee of Moslem thinkers in charge of preparing the draft proclamation of the Third Islamic Summit, which will be held in Mecca at the beginning of the new century of the Hegira, began its work yesterday morning at the Hilton Hotel in Tunis, under the chairmanship of Mr Habib Chatty, secretary general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.
>
> Taking part in this meeting, which will last for three days, will be ulemas from the different Arab countries, such as Dr Habib Belkhoja, mufti of the Tunisian Republic, Dr Hassan Tourabi, Sudanese minister of justice, Dr Abdallah Nacif, rector of "King Abdelaziz" University at Jedda, Dr Ezzeddine Brahim, cultural counselor for Emir Zayed Ibn Soltone Nahiyane, chief of state of the United Arab Emirates.

In a short speech made on that occasion, Mr Habib Chatty pointed out that the coming of the new century of the Hegira constituted a favorable occasion for the issuance of a proclamation which would light the way for the Islamic nation, stressing the need to perfect a strategy enabling the Islamic countries to accept the challenges thrust upon them by certain hegemonic currents.

After analyzing the political and economic factors having brought about the situation which prevails in the Moslem world at present, Mr Habib Chatty pointed out that the great powers, which are currently the masters of the world and which, moreover, are living through a crisis in moral and religious values, are trying by all possible means to sap the efforts of the Islamic community to erect a society steadfastly attached to its independence and to its own values.

Mr Chatty affirmed that the Islamic nation owes it to itself, on the eve of the coming of the new century of the Hegira, to carry on a dual struggle in order to triumph over underdevelopment and to cope with maneuvers aimed at strengthening the Zionist entity, usurping the richness of the Islamic nation and accentuating its political, economic and cultural dependence.

"That is the reason why," he noted, "it is important for the Moslems to define a strategy which would enable the Islamic world to occupy the place it merits in the concert of nations, to exploit for its benefit its richness and to improve the level of living of the individual, which, it has found, should constitute the foremost objective of all developmental action."

In this context, Mr Habib Chatty indicated that in order to reach this goal, it is imperative for the Islamic community, in the present state of affairs, to give further proof of solidarity and to direct its efforts, all its efforts, towards future generations, by inculcating them with an education whose foundations lie in Islamic values and by facilitating their access to the exact sciences, which constitute the most effective weapon against the various Zionist maneuvers." [as published]

At the end of Mr Habib Chatty's speech, the participants turned their attention to the working document prepared by the secretariat of the Organization of the Islamic Conference.

9434
CSO: 4400

PLO OFFICIAL SUGGESTS OVERSEAS INFORMATION STRATEGY

Jiddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 30 Jul 80 p 3

[Interview with Director of the PLO's Paris Office Ibrahim al-Sus, by 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Mit'al; date and place not given]

[Text] There is no doubt that overseas Arab information about pivotal issues constitutes a cornerstone in any strategy intended to support Arab stands in various political, military and economic fields.

Therefore, this issue is receiving special attention from Arab information officials, out of their awareness of the importance of the written word and the role which information media have come to play in influencing various sectors of public opinion.

Modern development, along with the complexity of international circumstances and the growing role of public opinion in influencing the official decision-making process, has necessitated a unified Arab information strategy based on a common conception of the dimensions and goals of Arab overseas information.

A unified Arab will is the only way to gain the world's respect for us and to determine the destiny of our fateful issues. Such a unified will in the information field will not be achieved except through a unified strategy which knows how to speak to modern society in the language it understands, in order to erase the mistaken picture which has become firmly planted in the minds of some people because of hostile colonialist and Zionist propaganda.

In view of the nature of the current stage and its issues, at the head of which is the Middle East issue, the rights of the Palestinian people, and Zionist propaganda's successful deception operations in some Western European and American societies, Arab overseas information has a big job ahead of it consistent with the nature of the stage.

We held this interview about Arab overseas information and its challenges with Director of the PLO Paris Office Ibrahim al-Suss, who is now the

candidate for the post of Arab League information advisor and the post of information director for the league's General Secretariat.

Speaking of ways to develop Arab overseas information, Ibrahim al-Sus started out by stressing that there has veen an improvement in world public opinion about major Arab causes, especially the Palestinian cause. This was not the result of direct propaganda, but was caused by practical political and economic circumstances which demonstrated just how much the West urgently needed the Arab economy and Arab markets in general, in addition to the significant influence of the Palestinian revolution and its direct and indirect information.

He said, "What is required of Arab information in the West in this stage is not propaganda aimed at changing international public opinion or giving a practical picture of Arab life, but propaganda aimed at changing that conception which makes our land nothing but an oil well and a center for international competition and, at the same time, a force afraid of its own financial and economic influence."

Presenting a True Picture of the Arab World

Speaking of changing this unrealistic picture of the Arab world in the West's eyes, he went on to say, "Changing this picture primarily means bringing out the real aspects of our Arab world as it is, i.e. accentuating the real problems afflicting it as an integrated society enjoying economic, political and cultural resources, hopes, aspirations and a future--i.e., to be precise, accentuating the fundamental social aspects which the propaganda agencies, concentrating only on petroleum so as to develop hostility towards the Arabs or else reducing Arab problems to a single political problem to be seen only in the context of the struggle between the two world camps, refuse to see."

In his talk, Ibrahim al-Suss stressed the necessity for Arab propaganda to make an effort to present a true, comprehensive picture of the Arab world which would allow the West to understand our problems as they really are, and which would provide the opportunity for a dialog based on sound, fruitful bases.

Distinct Arab Messages to the World

He said, "Arab information has not yet been able to achieve very many positive results in the West, not because of technical reasons, but mainly because of substantive reasons pertaining to content." He stressed the Arab world's need for special, distinct messages propagandizing for it, whether in the political, economic or cultural spheres. He added, "If any society does not have a distinct message to present to the world, all its propaganda becomes nothing more than a demand that the world support this or that cause without being convinced of the justness of these causes."

Our Heritage and Western Lessons

In explaining the Arab information problem, he said, "If we may exclude the Palestinian issue, the Arabs have not gotten, on the economic world, what they are demanding from the West, while the West is accusing the Arabs of having huge capital throughout the world and vast resources. The world is demanding help from the Arabs at a time when the Arab economy is suffering from major problems affecting all the economies of the developing countries.

On the cultural level, we are not offering any new experience in cultural development which would take into account our Arab heritage and culture and our future aspirations." Ibrahim al-Sus expressed his conviction that "we have not yet succeeded in reconciling this heritage with our present cultural needs."

Since the question about ways of developing Arab information still remained, the director of the PLO Paris office went on to say, "We feel that the development of Arab information in the West must be based on presenting a new experience and the real problems of our development, so that other states and other cultures might find in this experience some of the solutions to modern problems they are looking for.

"Then there can be a dialog and an exchange of opinion, and not merely informational propaganda or propagandistic information."

As a practical step along this road, he proposed the establishment of an Arab studies center in Paris which would recruit Arab researchists in the West to serve Arab goals. At the same time, it would be a research center and a cultural center presenting a picture of Arab cultural development and offering study grants for Arabs to take certain studies. Also, researchists from various countries would give classes in Arab and Islamic culture and civilization and also modern Arab society. The PLO office in France and UNESCO have both expressed their willingness to help make the preparations for carrying out such a proposal if the Arab League approves it.

The Role of the Zionist Lobby

Speaking of the role of Arab information in the United States as compared to Zionist information , Ibrahim al-Suss said, "They cannot be compared, since for 30 years the Zionist information media have found fertile territory on the American scene. They have been able to do whatever they want because of the special relations existing between the United States and Israel, and because of the Zionist lobby and its influence on the decisions of Congress and the successive American administrations."

He added, "Arab, and especially Palestinian, information is still making progress, because of the great efforts being made by the PLO and the Arab

information elite on the American scene, and especially what the Arab League offices in New York are doing.

"There is no doubt that Arab information could enter upon a path which started out hard and difficult years ago, by concentrating information efforts on certain groups in American society, such as the blacks for example. Here I would like to refer to the results achieved by the PLO's United Nation representative with the former American UN Permanent Delegate Andrew Young."

Ibrahim al-Sus explained that the PLO's information operates on the basis of winning over larger sectors of public opinion to side of the cause. He stressed that as the Arab information message has become more unified on the American scene, its influence on American public opinion has increased.

The Arab League and the Palestinian Cause

In response to a question about coordination between the PLO's work and the activity of the Arab League, he siad, "There is no doubt that the Arab League, ever since Shadhili al-Qalibi became its president, had been making tireless efforts, on the political and cultural levels, to expound the Palestinian cause in the West and to refute the Camp David agreements." He expressed his extreme optimism that all the Arab League's steps will enable the consolidation of a dynamic Arab information line based on the presentation of Arab causes on the same level as contemporary causes.

He added, "We feel that the league will succeed in this task, the proof being that the information seminars being held under its auspices have taken it upon themselves to discuss all the problems facing Arab overseas information in detail."

At the end of his talk, Ibrahim al-Sus stressed that there is cooperation between the PLO offices and the Arab League offices. But he expressed the hope that the league's general secretariat will be able to issue directions to its offices so that the league's support for the PLO offices can be more effective, especially with respect to overseas information projects being undertaken by the PLO.

8559
CSO: 4802

ARAB ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Aug 80 p 1

[Article: "Several Arab Ministers of Economy and Finance Received at the Casbah: Mr Mzali Calls for the Setting Up of an Arab Plan for Economic Development"]

[Text] Mr Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister, yesterday afternoon received at the Government Palace in the Casbah several Arab ministers of the economy and of finance currently staying in Tunis to take part in the work of the Arab Economic Committee.

Present at the interview were Messrs Mansour Moalla, minister of planning and finance, Mezri Chekir, director of the prime minister's cabinet, Kacem Bousnina, the Tunisian ambassador to Jeddah, and Abdelhassan Zelzela, deputy secretary general of the League of Arab States in charge of economic affairs.

On that occasion, Mr Mohamed Mzali recalled the considerable potentialities and the economic weight of the Arab world, which the Arab countries could take advantage of among themselves to institute a fruitful cooperation based on a community of interests.

The prime minister urged his guests to coordinate their efforts to promote the economy of the Arab countries and to reduce the acuteness of their dependence on the industrialized countries. He urged them, moreover, to continue the political struggle to achieve the unity of the Arab world.

The prime minister called for the completion of a long-term action strategy and for the setting up of an economic development plan for the Arab world, stressing the need for the Arab countries to intensify their cooperation in the industrialization of agriculture so as to insure the achievement of self-sufficiency in food.

Mr Mohamed Mzali expressed the hope of seeing the work of the Arab Economic Committee lead to proposals which could be submitted to the next Arab economic summit.

9434
CSO: 4400

KLIBI, CHATTI COMMENT ON NETHERLANDS WITHDRAWAL FROM JERUSALEM

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 28 Aug 80 pp 1, 5

[Article: "Tunis: An Act of Great Political Wisdom"]

[Text] When asked about the decision of the government of the Netherlands to transfer its embassy from El-Qods [Jerusalem] to Tel Aviv, the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:

"It is an act of great political wisdom and a significant contribution to the cause of justice and peace."

It is recalled that the ambassador of the Netherlands in Tunis was invited last Saturday, the 23rd, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where he had a talk on this question with those in charge at the department.

Mr Klibi: A Wise Decision

"The decision of the Dutch government to transfer the location of the Dutch embassy from El-Qods to Tel Aviv is a wise decision, in conformance with Right and Justice, and preserving the friendship between the Arab world and the Netherlands," Mr Klibi, secretary-general of the League of Arab States, said yesterday.

Mr Klibi sent a telegram to Mr Christoph Van Der Klaauw, the Dutch foreign affairs minister, in which he congratulated the Dutch government's decision.

Mr Chatti: A Triumph For Right

The transfer of the embassies of the Netherlands and six other Latin American countries, following the Security Council's resolution condemning the Israeli decision to annex El-Qods, is a triumph of right over aggression, a victory of the international order for peace over an expansionism which generates instability and wars.

It is the first time that a decision of the Security Council, condemning Israel for its repeated attacks on the fundamental rights of the Palestinian people, has been acted upon.

For the first time in the annals of the United Nations, countries have said no to the arrogance of the Zionists, thereby witnessing that they are faithful to the principles which they have promised to respect by their adherence to the UN charter.

However, this is only one crack in Israel's colonizing and oppressive structure.

It denotes, in spite of everything, a serious realization on the part of the international community of the dangers which Israel's intolerable acts of defiance present to peace.

While congratulating the initiative of the states that have acted on the Security Council's decision on El-Qods, the Islamic states are no less strongly determined to work in whatever way possible for the respect and application of the other resolutions of the United Nations and the Security Council on the Holy Land, the occupied Arab and Palestinian lands, and the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.

9475
CSO: 4400

KHOMEYNI'S BRAND OF ISLAM CRITICIZED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 11 Aug 80 p 25

[Article by Raja El-Almi]

[Text] Amazement. Consternation. "No prophet, including Mohamed himself, has completely succeeded in his mission of bringing justice to men. The only messenger who will succeed in establishing justice throughout the world will be the Imam Mahdi who is to come (al Mountadhar)," Khomeyni has said. This is by no means the allegation of a man who is demented, but rather it is a statement which has not yet been denied, made by the Iranian ayatollah during the holy month of Ramadan to the Moslem world. Even beyond its obvious sacrilegious and blasphemous nature, this statement by the man who represents the highest spiritual and temporal power in a nation of Islam, because of its excessive nature, does arouse a certain number of questions, and causes both faith and ordinary common sense to revolt.

It may perhaps be useful to comment here that the Iranian ayatollah and his mullahs have unfortunately done much--in fact they couldn't have done more--by their behavior and their words to implant the idea in the world of an Islam that is synonymous with intolerance and prohibitions, even outright obstructionism, of an Islam dominated by a hierarchy--a hierarchy, it is true, belonging to Shi'ism. In addition to the harm caused to Islam outside, there is also the damage which is now being done to all Moslems, who are being injured in the very depths of their faith and their convictions. This explains the number of protests that have been heard everywhere, criticizing the behavior, which is to say the least, unacceptable and inconceivable, of a man who is making use of

his position and his temporal power acquired after the Iranian revolution to reshape Islam to meet his desires. In so doing, he is acting falsely against the very essence of Islam and against its most fundamental precepts. In so doing, he is responsible for a sin even more serious than murder itself in Islam, Al Fitna. For we can only interpret his words in a way that we do not even like to formulate: that Khomeyni would recognize this Mahdi who is to come...that he has seen him already somewhere.

No. Islam, even Shi'ite Islam, is something other than this excessive affirmation of self as the representative of the only truth. Islam, the Islam of all Moslems, is a faith of vision and not of blindness. Islam also means the fundamental prohibition against disturbing the faith of the Moslem people. Islam is a religion that does not favor additions. It could not be more clear. This Islam is written in the Koran. And the reign of justice in the world has a time which the Koran contains and stipulates. In another way.

Citing the verses of the Koran, Dr Habib Belkhoja, mufti of the republic, pointed out during his speech on the occasion of the Night of Destiny, that Khomeyni's statements are doing a disservice to Islam and that "one who ignores the Sunna and contradicts the Koran can not claim to belong to Islam, and still less can he pretend to be its standard-bearer."

This is especially true as Islam is a unifying religion whose fundamental vocation is to group together, to unite, and not to divide. The Moslem must align his behavior according to this principle. And this is even more essential for the man of religion, who should set an example of the best and not the worst, and who should encourage believers to faith and not to heresy. This explains why the Islamic world has unanimously termed Khomeyni's words and his attitude shocking, for they clash with all of the Islamic world at the very time when this world is aspiring to recover the place it deserves, when the nations forming this Islamic world are changing, and when the Moslem people have the greatest need of solidarity, understanding, justice, dialogue, and cooperation. In this climate which calls for peace and fraternity, in this holy period of feasts and prayers, Khomeyni's statements are more than a discordant note; they are an unacceptable blasphemy, and like all blasphemies, can only be greeted by indignation against the lack of responsibility of their author. As proof, in Tunisia consider the reactions of the man in the street,

as soon as an ayatollah, overstepping the limits of his authority, dares to attack the very essence of Islam.

But in fact, those who have likened him to a Monsignor Lefebvre--with temporal power and with power over life and death added--were not mistaken.

7679
CSO: 4400

SAUDI FINANCE MINISTER'S VISIT TO TUNIS REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 23 Aug 80 p 5

[Article: "Saudi Arabia Called Upon To Show the Greatest Concern for the Total Development of the Arab World"]

[Text] Sheikh Mohamed Abalkheil, Saudi finance and economic minister, left Tunis yesterday, where he had taken part in the work of the Arab Economic Ministerial Committee, which had stemmed from the meeting of Arab foreign affairs and economy ministers last July in Amman.

In a statement to the press, Mr Abalkheil indicated that the Committee meeting was preparing what would be taken up by the Arab Economic Council in Tunis next 8 September, as well as the Arab summit meeting to be held in Amman in November 1980. That summit will examine, in particular, the economic relations among the Arab nations as well as with non-Arab countries.

He noted that the Arab summit meeting will have great importance because, first of all, it will study the means of providing a new impetus to the development of the least endowed Arab countries and of supporting the steps those countries are taking to achieve economic prosperity.

Saudi Arabia, Mr Abalkheil pointed out, has been called upon from now to show the greatest concern for the total development and the increase of living standards in the Arab world. This objective requires the utilization of all the available economic resources in the Arab countries, he emphasized.

The Ministerial Committee meeting in Tunis also insisted on the need to strengthen the Arab Economic Development Fund and the Arab Monetary Fund by increasing the resources entrusted to it and by simplifying the conditions for giving credit, he added.

Mr Abalkheil was met at "Tunis-Carthage" by Messrs Hassan Belkhoja, foreign affairs minister; Mansour Moalla, minister of planning and finance; Kacem Bousnina, Tunisian ambassador in Jeddah; as well as by the Saudi embassy's charge in Tunis.

9475
CSO: 4400

ARAB INFORMATION COMMISSION STUDIES MEANS OF COUNTERING ISRAELI PROPAGANDA

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 23 Aug 80 p 6

[Article: "Toward a Believable and Objective Arab News Media"]

[Text] The Permanent Commission on Information in the Arab World continued its work yesterday at the headquarters of the League of Arab States, under the presidency of Mr Abdallah Hourami, director general of the Information Department of the PLO, and in the presence of Messrs Assaad El Assaad, adjunct secretary general of the league, and Khaled Al Baabaa, information director.

The meeting's agenda included, in particular, the examination of a certain number of work documents presented by the participating delegations, relative to getting the Arab news media to neutralize Israel's attempts to distort the Arab entity politically, socially and culturally. The participants insisted upon the need to give a dimension of "civilization" to Arab news, thus guaranteeing its credibility and objectivity.

The work of the Permanent Commission on Information in the Arab World will continue in Tunis until 24 August.

9475
CSO: 4400

ARAB MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE FINISHES ITS WORK

Tunis LE TEMPS in French 22 Aug 80 p 4

[Article: "Examination of the Possibilities of a Common Arab Economic Strategy: Conclusion of the Work of the Arab Ministerial Committee"]

[Text] The Arab ministerial committee responsible for examining the possibilities of a common Arab economic strategy began its work Wednesday evening in Tunis, under the chairmanship of the Jordanian minister of industry and trade, Mr Ali Youssef El-Sennour.

This committee was set up by the conference of Arab ministers of foreign affairs and of the economy which was held last July in Amman. It includes the ministers of the economy or of finance of Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Syria and the two Yemens.

The committee is to study different proposals concerning coordination and cooperation among the Arab countries in the economic field. It should prepare, to that end, a working document which it will submit to the next meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Arab League at the time of the Council's ordinary session held on 8 September next in Tunis. Once adopted by the Arab League Council, the document will be submitted to the Arab states' economic summit, whose meeting is expected to take place next November in Amman.

During the opening meeting, the Arab economic committee elected its chairman in the person of the Jordanian minister of industry and trade.

Before holding their meeting, the committee members were received by the Tunisian prime minister, Mr Mohamed Mzali, who urged them to combine their efforts for the finalization of a plan for the economic development of the Arab world.

The committee concluded its work under the chairmanship of Mr Ali Al Sennour [as published], in the presence of Dr Abdelhassan Zelzala, deputy secretary general of the Arab League in charge of economic relations.

The committee adopted, on that occasion, a series of recommendations.

9434
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

INFORMATION COMMISSION ARAB STATES'--The League of Arab States' Standing Commission on Information will hold its 26th session from 21 to 24 August 1980. The agenda includes the examination of several items, in particular: The implementation of the decisions of the Council of Arab Ministers of Information; the draft budget of the fund for Arab propaganda; the recommendations of the Conference of European and American Experts on Information, a conference held in Tunis in February 1980; the recommendations of the Conference of Heads of Overseas Offices of the League of Arab States, held last July at the League of Arab States headquarters; the opening of new League offices in Vienna, Athens, Amsterdam, Mexico and Venezuela. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18-19 Aug 80 p 4] 9434

CSO: 4400

GOVERNMENT PURGE ENCOUNTERS COMPLICATIONS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Jul 80 p 3

/Article: "Petition from Purge Committees of 29 Government Departments to the Emam: Some Officials Are Putting up Obstacles to Purges in Departments"/

/Text/ A declaration has been published, as follows, by the committees to purge and reform departments in connection with the latest message by Emam Khomeyni:

In the name of God almighty:

If our government continues as it has and retains the condition and appearance it has had, we must hold a wake for this resurgence. We must now announce to the consultative council the fact that an absolute 100 percent religious Islamic government must not accept a minister if he is like some of the ministers who are present now.

/Addressed/ Emam Khomeyni.

This message is also in connection with the Emam's message of 27 June on the creation of satan and the revolutionary liquidation of the pollution of reasonous, mercenary elements connected with imperialism.

The purge committees have traveled this long road on which they had also taken steps as far as possible and as quickly as possible. Now more than 150 Purge committees have been created in a coordinated manner in various departments in the country and many projects in the field of implementing reforms have also been presented. However, unfortunately, some people in charge of matters have not only never taken part in this movement--they have also always thrown up obstacles in the way. Emam, realize that the National Employment and Administrative Affairs Organization has presented projects to the Revolutionary Council which are "demeaning to the guardians and beloved of the enemies." The committees present a bill to this organization which is beneficial to the satanic, to Savak members and to thieves and highwaymen, and sets a pension of up to 5,000 tomans for them. Is this

the meaning of a revolutionary government? Up to 5,000 tomans' retirement for persons who sucked the blood of the nation up to yesterday and today are engaged in conspiring as well and laughing at the revolution? Five thousand tomans for the corrupt on the excuse that they have many dependents, but no thought is given to the condition of the downtrodden, who also have many dependents and are many times more deserving--is this the meaning of Islamic justice which these non-revolutionary gentlemen understand?

/Signed/ The purge committees of the Ministry of Power and the Water Organization, Regional Electricity, the Ministry of Agriculture, Rural Cooperation, the Directorate of Forests, industries, the Purge Committee of the Organization to Expand Iranian Industries, tobacco, General Motors, the Ministry of Roads, the railway, meteorology, National Airlines, Expansion of Iranian Roads, Ports and Shipping, the Ministry of Finance, Central Insurance, Iranian National Iarlines, the Atomic Energy Organization, the Ministry of Labor, the dissolved houses of parliament, the Voice and Face of the Islamic Republic of Iran, religious endowments, the Red Crescent, PARS NEWS AGENCY, Planning Promulgator of the Naval Forces, Ministry of Housing and Town Construction, and the Ministry of Post and Telegraph.

11887
CSO: 4906

MAJLES TO GET ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM PLAN

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Jul 80 p 3

/Article: "Administrative Plan Will Be Presented to Parliament by the Islamic Society Federation in the Departments"/

/Text/ The Islamic societies met in the Interior Ministry auditorium yesterday afternoon in the presence of representatives of all the societies of government departments, Eng Mir Salim, the undersecretary and chief supervisor of the General National Police, and some representatives of the Islamic Consultative Council.

These groups began by reading some verses from the glorious Koran. Then the latest message by the nation's emam was broadcast and, following Emam Khomeyni's message, one member of the Islamic Council of the Ministry of the Interior, enumerating the services of the Ministry of Interior's Islamic Society during the period after it started its activity, said, "After the constant opposition and obstinate million-man demonstrations by the tormented, suffering people of Iran and the solidarity and coordination of all groups and classes in the face of the tyranny of the degenerate imperial regime, the rotten vermin, and the likes of Azhari and the non-Bakhtiar, a number of employees of the Ministry of the Interior, like the other people locked up in the great prison of Iran, destitute from 'life' like 'death' and 'survival' like 'oblivion,' attended the raging sea of demonstrations and with their constant strikes and work slowdowns stood in the face of the pressure and threats of corrupt people like the Qarabaghis. However, they did not let up; they set forth and obstinately followed the leadership of the emam in their small and insignificant homes and societies." Then another of the brothers of the Islamic Society raised the plan in conjunction with the administrative system; part of that is as follows: 1. Personnel problems. 2. Organizational and structural problems. 3. The chaos in the laws and stipulations of the regulations. 4. Problems of administration. A discussion took place in detail regarding each part of this plan.

After that, Hojjatoleslam Muhammad Mojtahed Shabastari, Tehran representative to the Islamic Consultative Council, inaugurating this convocation,

said, "Changing the administrative system will be one of the jobs of the Islamic Consultative Council, and we accept the plans which are being presented." In another area he said, "It is a source of great good fortune that our nation has succeeded in feeling problems and it is you, departmental societies, who have seen the problems in the departments and have felt them; again, it is you who must try to eliminate the problems, and the legislative power is waiting to eliminate the problems and difficulties in its path by means of all the classes of the nation. If the legislative power is not together with you it will not have the power to solve all problems. Rather, it needs the cooperation of all classes and all thinking."

The next speaker was Zavare'i, undersecretary of interior. Regarding the codification of the administrative system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, he said, "On the one hand it is a source of sorrow that today, after 17 months, we have begun thinking about an administrative revolution. The administrative system we possess was set out by black satanic planners, and what has not been carried out in these 17 months is change, and a great part of this change is in the administrative system: unfortunately during these 17 months satan's system was retained." In conclusion, Mr Mir Salim, undersecretary of the interior and chief supervisor of the General National Police, stated, in the course of a speech, "What is at our disposal today is of value to the satan. There were three sections which were considered important to the previous regime; one was education, by means of which they wanted to eliminate the thinking of our generation, second were the media, especially the radio and television, in which not everyone could be employed, and the third were the general departments of the society." In conclusion he told the people attending this convocation, "Your responsibility is great, but greater responsibility lies on the Islamic Consultative Council, and it was on this subject that the emam issued instructions which must certainly be carried out." This convocation will also continue tomorrow to the Ministry of the Interior.

11887
CSO: 4906

PLANS FOR ISLAMIC FRONT STUDIED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Jul 80 p 3

/Article: "By Invitation of the Dawn of Hope Islamic Society: Method of Forming Islamic Front Subjected to Discussion"/

/Text/ In the course of a meeting at the invitation of the Dawn of Hope Islamic Society, the method of forming an Islamic front was discussed in the presence of Dr Abol Hasan Bani Sadr, Dr Yadollah Sahabi, Ayatollah Musavi Ardabili, Dr Hasan Habibi, Dr Kazem Sami and Dr Mohammad Moballeghi-Eslami.

At the start of the session, the representative of the Dawn of Hope Islamic Society addressed the goal of this session as one of cooperating and sometimes reaching agreement regarding general issues on the formation of an Islamic front. In expressing disappointment regarding the failure of individuals who could not participate to participate in the session, he stressed the attendance of all the Islamic groups and the presentation of their views. In supporting the formation of this session with every group that was available, Dr Bani Sadr also said "Formation of the Islamic front is part of our charter in the Revolutionary Council." He added "We need a strong front which will be able to aid us in problems."

Dr Yadollah Sahabi then considered discussion of such issues to be essential and referred to the dangerous situation arising from differences and dissension and the need to have basic unity within society. Dr Sahabi also considered the discussions which took place in the parliment regarding nationality and nationalism to be an example of nationalism and the trae of the nationalists' evil.

Continuing the session, Dr Kazem Sami considered the need for a specific, clear definition of Islam for the formation of an advanced Islamic front and said, "If there is no clear, specific definition of Islam, how for example will you solve the problem of reception?"

On this subject, Dr Bani Sadr then stated "The basis of establishing a philosophy is also a kind of reception, as the philosophy of Plato is the

basis of establishment." He added, "Marxism is a continuation of the path of Plato, and one of the founders of Marxism is Plato. Aristotle is also the founder of a kind of religion."

Dr Bani Sadr considered this path of Aristotle's to be the cause of instability in decisions and daily changes in opinions and considered that one reason for the failure of Islamic movements was instability in decision-making.

Ayatollah Musavi Ardabili mentioned that suffering from dissension and fragmentation was one of the reasons for this gathering and added, "Our ultimate demand is unity." In another part of his statement, he pointed out "The issues which are the subject of dispute are those of nationhood and nationalism, prelatism, and the subject of reception. In my view the possibility of attaining conciliation on many matters is present, since we do not have disputes on all matters."

After a period of conversation and discussion by the participants, Dr Moballeghi-Eslami requested that the policy and issues which must constitute the subject of discussion in the sessions be determined. He recommended the slogan "independence and freedom of the Islamic republic" as an issue to subject to discussion and in another part of his statements requested that several people be appointed to discuss and exchange views in the context of criteria and rules in subsequent sessions and then set them down and present them for review by public opinion.

In conclusion, Dr Bani Sadr recommended that one or two discussion meetings be held weekly in the home of Ayatollah Musavi Ardabili, gathering together a number a number of people with opinions of different tendencies, presenting the conclusions which are identified to others and then declaring them.

This recommendation was agreed to by the participants.

The Dawn of Hope Islamic Society also invited the public and people with opinions to send their opinions to the address at Post Box 3068, Tehran.

11887
CSO: 4905

FOREIGN STUDENTS' LEADER: AFGHAN INVASION WORRIES NATION

Oslo KLASSEKAMPEN in Norwegian 25 Jul 80 p 7

[Article by Geir Imset]

[Text] The news picture from Iran is spotty. There are constant reports of executions. What is the situation in Iran now? Where does Khomeyni stand? Are there contradictions within the Iranian Government? What is the Soviet Union doing in Iran?

KLASSEKAMPEN directed these question to Ghassem Momeni, international secretary of the Confederation of Iranian Students--CIS. CIS is an international organization of Iranian students in foreign countries. Under the shah's regime, CIS was an important oppositional force abroad. Ghassem is studying at the university in Lund, Sweden but he has regular contact with his homeland.

"Anarchy in Iran has increased dangerously. Before, there were battles between the government and various leftist groups and democratic groups. Now the situation is such that groups in the government plan coups against each other," Momeni says.

Sabotage From The Soviet Union

"What is the reason for this development?"

"I want to emphasize two points. First of all, sabotage from the Soviet Union, but also from the United States and its cohorts. Both sides are trying to undermine stability."

"Secondly, there is the idea of a monopoly--the regimentation of the Muslim priests. Everything must be Islamic. They do not respect the people's democratic rights. Other views are not tolerated. For this reason, disputes arise constantly."

"Is this true of the entire Islamic priesthood?"

"No. There are several factions. There are rightist fanatics who are bitter anticommunists and against the Islam that is struggling for independence and social progress, of which I am speaking. They have a majority in the government."

"They also have 43 percent of the seats in parliament. They say that they carried out the revolution for Islam, not so that the people could be fed. For them the economy means nothing."

"On the other side is president Bani Sadr and his supporters. He is attempting to create stability in Iran. He is for cooperation with the third world and Europe."

Khomeyni Regrets Chaos

"Where does Khomeyni himself stand in the picture?"

"Khomeyni spoke to the people recently. He said of the situation in Iran that this is not what he wanted. He asked the people for forgiveness for the chaotic conditions. He admits that he has lost control. I do not believe there are any great differences between Khomeyni and Bani Sadr but in certain questions the fanatics can probably pressure him."

"There are two Islamic groups within the government--one group that has the power and one that wants it. But despite their differences these groups manage to unite against the president and his supporters."

Worker Burned Self

"What sort of support does the government have among the Iranian people now?"

"It is on the decline. In the referendum on the Islamic republic 21.5 million of 22 million eligible voters voted yes. A year later there were elections for the Islamic parliament. In the first election only 12 million voted. This means that 9 million stayed at home. For the reelection it was 8 million."

"Dissatisfaction among the workers is extremely widespread. The government does not listen to their demands. An important source of protest is the notorious law 33. It was also attacked under the shah but is still in effect. Armed with it, employers can fire workers just like that. An Iranian worker burned himself in protest against that law and against repression on the job."

"The chaos. Does it apply to the economy, too?"

"Yes, very much so. In Iran there are shortages of almost all goods. Previously Iran was dependent on the United States. It is impossible

for Iran to become economically self-supporting all at once. Iran must cooperate with other countries. We in the CIS believe Iran must broaden cooperation with the third world. With regard to technology, it is also necessary to cooperate with Europe. On the other hand, we condemn agreements with the United States and the Soviet Union. This is also Bani Sadr's line. Both the right-wing fanatics and the pro-Soviet groups attack him for that. They attack Europe for being lackeys of United States imperialism. When Bani Sadr wishes to cooperate with Europe they call him a "CIA agent." The pro-Soviet groups are trying to isolate Iran from all other countries. In this way they want to force Iran into the hands of the Soviet Union. Hostage actions suit them to a T."

"You spoke of sabotage?"

"This is occurring in both agriculture and industry. Crops are set on fire. According to Iran's Radio the so-called Fadai groups are behind it. These are the pro-Soviet groups that are working together with the Moscow oriented Tudeh Party."

"There is much sabotage in the oil industry, too. Under the shah Iran produced 5.5 million barrels of oil per year. After the revolution the authorities planned to reduce this to 4 million barrels. In practice, production has not risen above 1 million barrels. There are shortages of technicians and replacement parts. The situation is serious because oil is Iran's only export article of significance. Now there is little left over for exporting."

"As you portray it, it seems as though the right-wing fanatics and the supporters of Moscow are moving in the same direction. Is this true?"

"My impression is that the Soviet Union is supporting the Islamic fanatics. It does not matter to them what kind of laws Iran gets as long as the Soviet Union gains power and influence. There is also evidence that the pro-Soviet groups and the right-wing fanatics are trying to form a common front. At one time the Fadai groups called for armed struggle against the government. They branded it "United States dependent" and "reactionary." Then, after one week, according to the Fadai groups, the government suddenly became "revolutionary." At the same time, the Fadai groups wrote in their newspaper that 'the Soviet Union is Iran's brother country,' and that they 'support Iran's government because of the 'socialist block.'"

"The leaders of the Fadai groups have also had meetings with the leaders of the Islamic republic--the right-wing fanatics. Khomeyni, for his part, has expressed that there is a plot behind the change in policy of the Fadai groups."

Revolutionary Council Member Behind Coup

"There was an attempted coup in Iran last week, was there not?"

"A coup was planned against Bani Sadr. The fanatics see Bani Sadr as their greatest enemy. The leader of the coup is Hassan Ajat. He is a member of the Revolutionary Council and a representative in the Islamic parliament. The coup attempt was discovered. Everyone knows Afat was behind it but, since he is a representative of the Islamic republic, no one will say anything. If he had not been such a representative he would have been executed on the spot."

"Is there any proof that the Soviet Union had a hand in this?"

"We have no evidence that the fanatics are working directly for the Soviet Union. But their policies are playing Iran into the hands of the Kremlin."

Fanatics Sent Soldiers

"What does the CIS think of the Kurd question in Iran?"

"Because of the regimentation of the right-wing fanatics it has been easy for the Soviet Union to play on the oppressed Kurdish people. The Kurds are Sunites (a movement within Islam), while the dominant priests are Shiites. These movements are not given equal status. We believe the only solution is to respect the rights of the Kurds. Among other things we believe they have a right to their own parliament. We are against all forms of violence toward the Kurds. President Bani Sadr is for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question. It is the right-wing fanatics who have sent military forces against them."

Invasion Awoke Iran

"Are the people of Iran following the invasion of Afghanistan?"

"The Soviet invasion has awakened the Iranian people. It has helped them understand the true nature of the Soviet Union. The Tudeh Party and the Fadai groups are attempting to portray the Soviet Union as Iran's friend. But the people no longer believe it. Iran and Afghanistan have a long history that unites us. The people in Iran have sympathy for Afghanistan and support the struggle for liberation. I can mention an example. Every Friday there are public prayers in Iran. After the invasion many people asked why the priests did not speak of Afghanistan. Then the priest in Tehran answered that even though the priests did not speak of Afghanistan every day this does not mean we do not support its people. The whole world, including Brezhnev, shall know that in all international forums we support the freedom fighters and not Karmal's lackey regime," Momeni says.

"The invasion of Afghanistan awakened the Iranian people," Ghassem Momeni says.

9336
CSO: 3108

CLERICAL, SECULAR FACTIONS SQUARE OFF

Brussels SPECIAL in French 18 Aug 80 pp 15-16

[Text] The naming of Mr Mohammed Radjai, alined with the ayatollahs, as prime minister, seems to deepen the divorce which exists, henceforth, between the two blocs in the governmental team. And this could have enormous fall-out effects in the medium term.

In the presidential elections, the Shi'ite clergy mobilized their support massively for Mr Bani-Sadr. Once elected head of state, he has ceaselessly battled the encroachments of this same clergy, which reproaches him with not showing himself sufficiently and exclusively Muslim, and with wanting to keep democratic structures in Iran (even if they are only a facade). For the very idea of a democratic system, with parties, a parliament, responsibilities, and popular representativity is, for the Ayatollah Khomeyni and his followers, a heresy: for Shi'ite fanatics, rigorous and traditional application of the Koran is everything, and everything else is pointless.

Get Around the President by the Prime Minister

Three weeks ago, after interminable negotiations, President Bani-Sadr called on a zealous partisan of the ayatollahs, Mr Moahmmed Ali Radjai, to serve as prime minister. He also gave him the responsibility of forming a ministerial team, which is supposed to bring some order into the institutional chaos the country is experiencing. It would be necessary, for example, to have a responsible and balanced minister of justice, rather than [just] the Ayatollah Khomeyni, "itinerant judge," who leaves heaps of corpses in his wake... One week ago, the new prime minister gave to the president the list of ministers he planned for his governmental cabinet. And the president wasted no time rejecting this list. This refusal by the chief of state publicly exposed, both the disagreement (if not hostility) which exists between the two men, and the gap which has widened between the two main blocs which survived the coming to power of the Iranian revolution. The group with power behind it, that of the clergy, is on no account ready to ease off, whereas the other, that of the partisans of a "para-democratic" type regime, is tired of the disorder and

capriciousness which reigns in the country. In this regard, the interview just given by the minister for foreign affairs, Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, to the American weekly TIME is revealing. In this interview, the man responsible--officially--for Iranian diplomacy (?) states quite clearly that he would consider it inadmissible to stage a trial of the American hostages held in Iran. This is the same Mr Ghotbzadeh, moreover, who had to argue fiercely with the "Islamic students" who also wanted to hold the members of the UN commission hostage, the very commission created to deal with the fate of the hostages. And he was clearly throwing rocks right into the garden of the ayatollahs when he declared: "It is not by shouting down with the United States or down with the USSR that we will stir up revolutions in the world."

Prepare for the Future

The health of the Ayatollah Khomeyni (the Imam) is precarious. And if he were to disappear, no other religious leader has the stature needed to replace him. Then the question of authority would be posed: an authority to which both the clergy and the figures elected by the people, such as President Bani-Sadr, would accord allegiance. In the near future, it seems obvious that only a governmental team with men like Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh would have sufficient cohesion to resist the post-Khomeyni maelstrom. Able to surround itself with "Islamic hostages" such as Prime Minister Radjai. But on condition that these "hostages" cannot manipulate the real levers of command. And one comes back to the dispute which presently pits the president and the prime minister against each other. For the chief of state is primarily opposed to the nomination for the ministry of the interior. A minister who, if he was of the "clerical clan," would sow disorder, repression, and violence in short order, not to speak of the fate eventually awaiting the American hostages. Now the "secular clan" realizes perfectly well that a trial of the hostages, with its possible consequences, would permanently alienate the few friends Iran has kept abroad and to which it above all remains attached. The difference in concept is perfectly exemplified by what is happening in Iran at the present moment. On the one hand, in the name of the Islamic revolution, President Bani-Sadr is trying to establish a democratic regime, in opposition to the old regime, and in the name of this same revolution Khomeyni refuses to give up his supervision of operations, since as Imam he is invested by God with the mission of watching over the destiny of Iran. A country which, almost certainly, is headed toward a civil war as soon as Khomeyni has left the scene. And the factions are numerous: the clergy, the educated technocrats of the revolution such as Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh, the monarchists (especially within the army) and the adovcates of a Western-style democracy who will be united behind the emissaries of ex-prime minister Shahpur Bakhtiar. And all this is not even to take into account the separatist movements... The Iran of tomorrow may well collapse like a house of cards. It remains to be seen who will pocket the trumps.

9516
CSO: 4900

ALL INTERNATIONAL SCHOOLS ABOLISHED

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 23 Jul 80 p 16

/Article: "All International Schools throughout the Country are Dissolved"/

/Text/ All international schools throughout the country have been declared dissolved. From now on, there will be no schools administered by non-Iranians. Hoseyn Khoshnevisan, director general of education of Tehran, declared this subject at a press conference.

Khoshnevisan, who was speaking following the conclusion of the session which made the decision on this type of school (which had been convened in the presence of some education officials), added "In this manner, the dissolution of international schools in hereby declared and this conference itself proclaims the dissolution. If no circular letter is issued let no one imagine that international schools still exist." He then said,

"At this decision-making session, commissions have taken the necessary decisions to eliminate the problems which exist for the students in schools of this type. Commission members consist of competent persons who naturally are the guardians of their original students.

"At the present time, the guardians of students who have the necessary education to benefit from and apply their studies to ordinary schools are being advised to register their children at the school nearest their home. Students who do not have adequate education in terms of Persian literature should register in the same schools, in accordance with a program which has been set out; at the conclusion of a specific 'time' which will be necessary to prepare the student and apply the Persian language program, their study program will continue as in the past, in accordance with the basic changes which are being made by an appointed group." Khoshnevisan then said,

"From the financial standpoint, that group of curricula which correspond to the Ministry of Education cirriculum will be at our expense and the costs for that portion of studies which needs time for application (for example, physics or chemistry in French or German) will be at the expense

of the guardians themselves. Of course it is necessary to mention that the 'time' determined for application of the curricula for the elementary stage will not be more than 1 year; that is, in the academic year 1981-82 Education will have no responsibilities toward that type of student."

Minority Schools

The director general of Tehran education then referred to the schools of religious minorities and said,

"Regarding schools for Jews, Christians and Zorastrians, every right which an Iranian requires from the educational standpoint will be made available with respect to them, and the subject of Article 15 of the constitution, that is, instruction in ethnic languages, will be observed in every sense. There is no problem regarding religious observances which concern the level of the school; nonetheless, one must note that the school and church must be separate, although both are places of education."

He added, "In the coming school year we will have no school by the name of a majority or minority school, and all schools will be uniform."

11887
CSO: 4906

KING CLOSES EDUCATION CONFERENCE

Final Speeches

Rabat L'OPINION in French 1 Sep 80 pp 1, 3

[Text] Ifr-ne--From our Special Correspondent Mohamed Tamri. The work on the national education conference was ended yesterday with a speech given by His Majesty King Hassan II pronounced just before noon before all the participants meeting in the capital of Ifrane province, in the presence of SAR [expansion unknown] the Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed, members of the government led by Me Maati Bouabid, prime minister and minister of justice, Mr Dey Ould Sidi Baba, president of the chamber of representatives, and several other personalities.

In his speech, H.M. King Hassan II decided to create a national commission which will work at his side and will be responsible for arriving at conclusions that will be submitted to Parliament in the April session. His Majesty the King said that this commission will be composed of heads of political parties participating in these meetings, presidents of commissions, political personalities inadequately represented in the chamber of representatives, the minister of finance and the planning authority.

If need be the commission will be able to call on the help of Moroccan or foreign experts.

His Majesty Hassan II said that the work of all the commissions unfolded in a climate marked by a certain awareness and that the participants understood the nature, the importance, and the scope of the problem.

"We have decided," the sovereign added, "that the elite should meet to examine the questions related to education and look at the ideas in order to come to a national solution."

The sovereign emphasized also that he preferred to opt for the path of dialog in order to come to a unification of the ranks in face of the crucial problems.

His Majesty Hassan II, finally, thanked the participants for their contribution to the success of these sessions.

Dr Azzedine Laraki made a statement which aroused great satisfaction and reaffirmed optimism as to the flexibility that faculty enrollments have shown. Dr Laraki was to say that 5,808 places are still available on the faculties of letters, law, and the sciences. This will allow the enrollment of more candidates for the baccalaureate.

To this end, the minister has decided to proceed with a third period of enrollment starting 15 September. Dr Laraki was also to say that he has assumed his political responsibility in the government as to the implementation of guidelines for the university re-opening and that he had taken, in coordination with the deans, all the technical measures to organize it in the way in which it has unfolded.

For his part Mr Abderrazak Afilal on behalf of the UGTM [General Union of Moroccan Workers] gave a speech in which he underlined that it is necessary to adopt an overall solution for the problems in education. It was observed that in general problems do not excite great interest except when one is confronted with an immediate crisis, such as university re-opening, as is the case this year.

To establish a systematic education policy, brother Afilal made an appeal for guidelines to be established, starting at the end of primary education, that are centered on vocational training capable of providing the mid-level cadres, as well as [centered] on general and technical education adequate for training the upper cadres of which the country has need.

Mr Abderrazak Afilal was also to emphasize that UGTM has elaborated a radical plan for structural reform in education which will be submitted to the various committees of the colloquium.

Mr Afilal was also to say:

"I have the honor to speak to this colloquium on behalf of the UGTM, and first of all I must express our sincere thanks to H.M. the King who has given us this opportunity to express our concerns on educational questions.

"In our view, the crisis in education is structural. The causes of this crisis lie in the fact that we are falling into generalities without broaching the very foundation of the educational problem. This is what happened in the colloquium of 1964, and in similar meetings. I certainly hope we will avoid this practice in this colloquium."

We have met at a time when we are faced with the problem of university re-opening, or what has been called in other terms university orientation. For our part we consider that any orientation which is only beginning at this phase can only perpetuate a serious mistake which has characterized education for years.

The orientation, in our opinion, should begin at the end of primary school, by creating a common base, of a duration of two years, which at the end of two years leads to two main branches: that of ordinary education which leads to the second secondary cycle, and that of vocational training which leads to the formation of mid-level cadres destined to satisfy the needs of our economic development. It must be emphasized that finishing studies in this branch will allow the better elements to go on to technical education which begins at the level of the second cycle, which in turn leads to higher technical education--the school of engineering, for example.

I return to the question of the common base, to re-emphasize that all those who follow it will end up either with the acquisition of a trade which will be useful to them and by consequence answer societal needs, or they will go on to normal schooling with its cycle of 3 years and which ends up in two branches:

One branch which we can call functional education, which trains teachers and certain cadres of the private and public sector. The second branch leads to university education, which trains the upper cadres and furnishes the raw material for scientific research. I would like to present here the opinion of UGTM as to the question of teacher training. In fact the training should have for its ultimate foundation mastery of the teaching profession. This cannot be acquired except through a sufficient period of training, and cannot be less than 3 years.

We are proposing this, that the choice of students to be trained as teachers be made among the students of the sixth secondary year, which is obviously a temporary solution while waiting for the implementation of functional education.

The problem of education which distinguishes this period is in the first place that of university re-opening. It is evident that our position is to give all bachelors the opportunity to enroll in the institution of their choice. We can overcome the problem created this year, that is certain. But what would our position be during the coming years when the number of bachelors increases.

This situation requires us to find definitive solutions and to come to agreement on the fundamental choices. The problems we are confronting, moreover, are only the result of the improvised policies adopted by the various ministries of education in previous years. I believe it is time to find a basic and all-encompassing solution to the problem."

In other developments, brother Mohamed Louafa, secretary general of Istiqlalian Youth, gave a speech in which he said in the first place that the discussion on educational questions was undertaken without any objective discussion of the economic and social crisis, of which the education crisis is only a reflection.

In other developments, brother Mohamed Louafa, secretary general of Istiqlalian Youth, gave a speech in which he said in the first place that the discussion on educational questions was undertaken without any objective discussion of the economic and social crisis, of which the education crisis is only a reflection.

Mr Louafa also pointed out that every time educational questions are discussed, resolutions and motions are adopted. These latter, unfortunately, remain dead letters. Moreover, this very fact is constantly aggravating problems and creating an atmosphere of distrust between citizens and officials. And Mr Louafa stressed that the prescriptions suggested on behalf of the Istiqlalian Party by combatant Hachmi Filali are after all those of the Istiqlalian Youth which for its part stresses that the cause of the problem lies in the insufficiency of university places. This situation is due to the waste, with regard to construction and equipment, in certain institutions, whereas we could have built a sufficient number of university institutions with adequate equipment for the same cost.

With regard to orientation, it must be recognized that it is a mistake to initiate it at the university level. Therefore, we must consider it at the beginning of secondary school and in such a way that this orientation can answer to the economic needs of the country, without, notwithstanding, failing to take into account the capacities and the preferences of the student.

Brother Louafa was also to emphasize that the interest of this colloquium should be centered on the university re-opening, but without ignoring student choice.

Mr Louafa then launched into the problem of scholarships, and recalled the unshakeable principle of Istiqlalian Youth as to generalization of scholarships. This without, nevertheless, putting on an equal footing the provided-for student and the poor student who is obliged--through his scholarship--to support his family.

'AL-BAYANE' Comment

Casablanca AL-BAYANE in French 2 Sep 80 p 1

[Editorial--passages between slantlines originally published in capitals]

[Text] Ifrane is over...But, paradoxically, everything is only beginning!

As we noted in our previous editorial--and before the end of the colloquium--it could be considered that in itself this assembling of "all the concerned parties" to the education crisis marked a new stage in the process of the democratization of public life:

Today, on examining the actions and recommendations made by the "conference on national education," one truly finds that this stage has brought the results one could legitimately hope for.

And this is where the value of democratic concertation is manifested: it allows the submission of proposals and ideas which would ordinarily be swept aside by technocracy and partisan spirit; it gives the representatives of the popular interests and their "spokesmen" the opportunity to expose their urgent demands and to defend their rights. And in fact what happened at Ifrane was good.

Without any pretension it can be stated that the representatives of progressive forces, including the PPS [Party of Progress and Socialism], marked the work of the colloquium and its recommendations by their presence and their ideas.

They advanced proposals and reiterated principles which were /adopted unanimously by the participants/--which in turn is a reflection of national unanimity--and which advanced the broad lines of an emergency rescue plan, especially in the higher [education].

In testimony whereof, all the Malthusian and arbitrary measures which barred access to the universities were swept away.

In other developments, many concrete suggestions were made which eloquently prove that no problem is insoluble if one agrees to resolve it on the basis of just solutions founded on the people's concerns and not on bureaucratic views cut off from the masses.

And therefore one is able to think that the 1980-1981 university re-opening will be able to unfold under much better circumstances than what otherwise could have been: No bachelor will be refused, there will be no preliminary selection, injustice or arbitrary action.

These measures are from Ifrane, but--as we keep saying--let it not be forgotten that they come directly from the views and positions of the leftist forces--the PPS, USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces], UNEM [National Union of Moroccan Students], etc.

Now everything is beginning:

After having obtained the approval of all parties present to their proposals, the forces of progress owe it to themselves to watch over their implementation and execution.

It is a new democratic battle which is under way, one which requires translating the Ifrane resolutions into reality and into facts.

No doubt, in the enterprise ahead, we will have the full support of the people and the masses!

9516
CSO: 4400

BUREAUCRATIC REFORM MEASURES REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18-19 Aug 80 p 4

[Article: "Administrative Reform: Mr Belhaj Amor Presides Over a Working Session"]

[Text] Mr Moncef Belhaj Amor, ministerial delegate to the prime minister, in charge of the public service and of administrative reform, chaired a working session on Saturday, at the prime minister's office, which brought together a number of high officials responsible for the follow-up of the administrative reform project.

This working session was devoted to the finalization of the first stages passed through by the different administrative services in the implementation of the decisions and recommendations arising out of the joint government/ Political Committee meeting which was held on 25 July 1980. These decisions and recommendations calling for the implementation, at an early date, of administrative reform, in accordance with the citizens' wishes for expansion of decentralization and simplification of administrative procedures, so that the administration would really be at the service of the citizens. [as published]

In this context, a survey was made of the state of progress of the work of the administrative services toward publication by each ministry of a citizen's guide so as to clarify all procedures to be followed and to avoid any slowness due to ignorance of procedures.

Also decided on during the meeting were practical measures to facilitate the setting up of administrative support services in the different governorates so as to accelerate the establishment or strengthening in the regions of structures under the various ministries' jurisdiction. It was decided to grant these structures all the powers and prerogatives required to endow them with the power of decision and the capacity for resolving citizens' problems on the spot, without having recourse to the capital.

With regard to the question of improving the administrative management system, the participants agreed that this improvement would be achieved through the introduction of data processing.

In order to encourage state employees to work in the interior of the country, consideration was given during the meeting to a draft laying down the privileges and inducements to be granted them for that purpose.

9434
CSO: 4400

SIXTH PLAN TO ENCOMPASS ALL CURRENTS, TENDENCIES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18-19 Aug 80 p 4

[Article: "Mr Mezri Chekir in Monastir: The Committees Responsible for Preparing the Sixth Plan Will Bring Together All Currents"]

[Text] Three Tunisian banks for foreign cooperation will be set up.

The development of the tourist sector was the object of an open discussion organized by the Regional Hotel and Tourism Federation of the Monastir governorate under the chairmanship of Mr Mezri Chekir, director of the prime minister's cabinet, in the presence of Mr Mansour Skhiri, governor of the region, and of a good number of hotel-keepers and officials of financial institutions.

Replying to the participants, Mr Mezri Chekir pointed out that the expansion of the tourist sector, which provides some 100,000 jobs, does not depend only on the quality of the services, but also on the socio-political stability of the country, a stability which, he said, encourages investments in Tunisia by holders of capital, such as Middle East businessmen, who are already beginning to finance the carrying out of some projects in our country.

And Mr Mezri Chekir added:

"The secret of the success of Tunisian policy and the credit enjoyed by Tunisia in the concert of nations lie in President Bourguiba's prestige and in the country's political stability."

The director of the prime minister's cabinet then brought out the need for safeguarding the nation's assets, in particular, by the preservation of the healthy socio-political climate which prevails in the country. "That is,"

he stated, "a responsibility that falls not only on the government and the party, but also on the whole national community, which should give proof of straightforwardness, of discipline and of solidarity....[as published]

Dealing with the need to protect the environment against pollution, Mr Mezri Chekir stressed the efforts made by the government in this direction, indicating that the establishment of an ecological structure was under study.

Mr Mezri Chekir brought out, moreover, the prime minister's concern for developing among all citizens a spirit of cooperation and cohesion, this in accordance with the directives of the Supreme Combatant. "This option," he noted, "tends to strengthen the invulnerability of the state, whose action is governed by Bourguibian principles, with the result that the party remains open to all and justice remains independent."

In this context, the director of the prime minister's cabinet announced that the committees responsible for preparing the Sixth Plan will bring together all currents and all tendencies so that the whole of the national community will take part in strengthening the foundations of full-scale development.

He stressed, moreover, that the measures taken with a view to setting up three Tunisian banks for cooperation with other countries would solve all the financing and loan-granting problems and would not fail to reassure businessmen wishing to start tourist projects.

Mr Mezri Chekir, in conclusion, brought out the Supreme Combatant's interest in development projects and his concern for associating all levels of staff in their implementation.

He transmitted to the participants the prime minister's greetings and the attention given by him to the tourist sector because of the essential role which the latter plays in the strengthening of the national economy. He expressed the prime minister's determination to take measures of a nature to promote this sector, while at the same time preserving the country's moral, social and spiritual values.

9434
CSO: 4400

PREPARATIONS FOR RETURN OF TUNISIANS WORKING OUT OF COUNTRY

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18-19 Aug 80 p 4

[Article: "Seminar on Tunisian Workers Abroad: For a Gradual and Organized Return"]

[Text] As foreseen, the principal theme of the 14th congress on Tunisian workers abroad, which took place on 16 August at the El Omrane Lycee, was the eventual return to the country of our expatriate workers. All those attending the congress were indeed unanimous in recognizing that this return, in view of present circumstances in the host countries, has become a very serious possibility.

What were the principal conclusions of the congress on this subject?

First, it is the worker and the worker alone who has the right to decide the time of his return. As pointed out by the minister of social affairs at the end of the work of the congress, it was the worker who decided to leave for abroad, and the government helped him do this. His return should be made in the same fashion. It is thus the responsibility of our expatriates not to yield to the pressures which some authorities are beginning to exert on them to induce them to return in a precipitous manner, just as it is their responsibility not to succumb to the offers which are painted in glowing colors so that they will leave their place of work. Yes to a return, but no to a forced return should be a motto of our workers.

Second: In agreeing to emigrate, every worker had as his goal the improvement of his financial and social situation. It would therefore be absurd to require him to return to the country empty-handed in order to occupy the same position that impelled him to leave. Yes to a return, but no to just any return is another motto for our expatriates who would wish to return home surrounded by all the guarantees of success, whether through adequate training, enabling them to occupy a post useful to the country and likely to guarantee them a decent wage, or through a minimum amount of capital which they could lay to advantage in the country. It is therefore the duty of the host countries to provide our workers with the vocational training to which they have a right. It is, on the other hand, our workers' responsibility to try

to improve themselves vocationally as well as intellectually, especially since their presence in countries allowing, by several means available, (evening courses, etc.) [as published] such an improvement could only encourage them to do so. It is, lastly, their responsibility to prepare suitably for their return by keeping themselves reguarly informed about employment or investment possibilities which occur in the country and not to wait for their return before deciding on their later activities.

Third: The task which falls on the Tunisian authorities in preparing for the return of these expatriates is no less important. It consists first of all in protecting their interests during their stay abroad, with all that this requires in the way of cooperation agreements, direct and regular contacts to protect their rights and their authenticity. It consists further in providing them with the place they are entitled to in Tunisian society, in guaranteeing them maximum employment, decent housing and investment incentives.

Our expatriate workers constitute a very important productive work force which unfavorable circumstances have obliged us to give up for the benefit of foreign countries. These countries at present consider that they no longer need them. So much the better for us, even with the little time they leave for us to reintegrate them adequately.

9434
CSO: 4400

SUGAR PRODUCTION TOO LOW FOR DOMESTIC NEEDS

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 11 Aug 80 p 56

[Article by A.M.]

[Text] The national sugar beet production is still very low; to meet its needs, Tunisia must look abroad. The Bou Salem sugar mill is needed; it is designed to expand production and to slow down the rural exodus.

As part of the preparatory work being done for the sixth economic and social development plan, DIALOGUE, in its economic reportage, is considering some problems of vital interest to Tunisian society.

All the actions taken are designed to bring about an economic recovery, to ensure self-sufficiency in food production, to guarantee job security, and to reduce regional and sectorial imbalance.

The projects being carried out are quite numerous and varied. In the industrial sector there are: ICM [Maghreb Chemical Industries] 1 and ICM 2; the STIR [Tunisian-Italian Refining Company]; SOFOMECA [expansion unknown]; Goulette 1 and Goulette 2; the Sousse power plant. In the transportation sector there are: the CTN [expansion unknown], SNT [National Transportation Company], SRT, STM [expansions unknown], and Tunis-Air. In agriculture: dams, offices, complexes, greenhouse cultivation, the STIL [expansion unknown], and animal husbandry projects.

In sugar, in terms of meeting household needs and the demand of some industries (confectionery, soft drinks), the national production is still low, and Tunisia must resort to imports.

The sugar beet harvest, the basic raw material used at the Beja sugar mill, varies between 118,000 tons--a record in 1977, and 60,000 tons, the quantity produced in 1979. So the production varies by 100 percent. The decline in the last few years is attributed to the limited capacity of the enterprise, the rather low rainfall, the reduction of cultivated lands, and the decline of the rate of return. There is also the tendency of farmers in the region to grow vegetable crops which are considered more profitable than sugar beets. All these factors added together have had quite a negative impact on sugar beet cultivation and thus on sugar production.

That is why Tunisia is turning abroad to buy raw sugar in a solid state, which is then refined at the Beja sugar mill. In the past 5 years, the average imports of sugar, coming primarily from Cuba, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium, have been 50,000 tons, for a price of 5 million dinars. This amounts to a price of 100 millimes per kilo.

The production of the sugar company (from sugar beets and from the refining of imported sugar) does not manage to cover local consumption. The demand for granulated or powdered sugar came to 111,000 tons on the average, during the period considered. This cost 140 million dinars, or 140 millimes per kilo.

We note the diverging trend between the amounts imported, which are increasing slightly, and the corresponding costs, which are declining; that is due to the decline in the world sugar price.

We should comment, though, that Tunisia does export refined sugar in the form of sugar cubes, primarily to Algeria; in 1979, Tunisia exported 32,600 tons for 5.4 million dinars.

The government is naturally aware of the inadequacy of our sugar production. A joint cabinet committee has studied this problem, and the decision to establish a second sugar mill at Bou Salem is a good one.

The development of this industry proves the interest of the state in the western regions; it will help, insofar as possible,

to limit the rural exodus toward urban areas, to reduce the number of the unemployed, and to keep in the area the labor needed for the enterprise to operate satisfactorily.

Overall Data on Sugar (in thousands of tons)

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Production of:					
sugar from beets(1)	6.3	7.9	9.5	7.4	6.1
refined sugar (2)	51.4	45.2	29.8	47.5	51.0
Total (STS)	57.7	53.1	39.3	54.9	57.1
Lump or cube sugar (3)	34.2	44.4	38.5	51.5	52.0
Imports of:					
raw sugar in solid state	54.5	54.8	34.7	51.6	47.0
granulated sugar	64.9	122.6	124.9	119.6	126.5
other sugars		5.8		1.1	0.9
Total	119.4	183.2	159.6	172.3	174.4
Exports of:					
refined sugar in cubes	22.1	36.0	31.7	28.2	32.6

(1) Local production
(2) Based on imported raw sugar
(3) Based on imported granulated sugar.

Source: INS [National Statistics Institute] documents.

The economic policy followed by the government is designed to develop our human resources, to promote the good of society, and the good of the citizen.

7679
CSO: 4400

FORMER COORDINATION COMMITTEE HEAD, MOHAMED TROUDI ARRESTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 22 Aug 80 p 4

[Article: "Former Secretary General of Bizerte Coordination Committee Arrested"]

[Text] As a result of the decision taken by the Political Committee to disband four coordination committees including the one in Bizerte, the former secretary general of the Bizerte Coordination Committee, Mohamed Troudi, undertook, through an agent he himself recruited, the destruction of official documents belonging to the Coordination Committee, a matter of surprise to the authorities, all the more since the destruction of these documents took place immediately after Mohamed Troudi had been informed of the disbanding of the committee of which he was secretary general.

During the interrogation, the agent implicated stated that the documents destroyed and burned represented minutes of congresses of cells, documents related to the work of social solidarity, and the stubs of books of vouchers for donations intended for the construction of a mosque.

Considering the gravity of the act, which constitutes an infraction of the law, in view of the deliberate intention of its instigator and the admissions of the agent, who stated, following the discovery of the operation, that he had acted on the direct order of Mohamed Troudi and not on his own initiative, an arrest order was issued against the former secretary general of the Coordination Committee. He was handed over to the public prosecutor's department, where the investigation is continuing. This infraction was not the only one committed by Troudi. Indeed, some of his previous schemes confirm his tendency to use his responsibilities with the party for purely personal aims and interests.

Mention can be made, in this connection, of Troudi's acquisition of a property (Henchir) at Utique, known under the name of "Ouakef Sidi El Arbi," for the benefit of his relatives. Using his status as party official, he forced the owners of this property to give it up to him at the derisory price of 27,000 dinars, whereas the real value of this property, which covers 120 hectares, is 70,000 dinars, if not more, according to an agricultural expert's estimate, especially since a part of the property is irrigated in view of its location in the Medjerda valley.

Troudi, by fraudulent maneuvers, since he had not succeeded at first in convincing the liquidator in charge of the property--let us recall that an inheritance was involved--was going to claim to the heirs that he had an authorization from the government to buy the said property at a price markedly lower than the one he was offering them. The latter agreed, unwillingly, to conclude the transaction, which obliged the regional authorities to intervene recently to put an end to these schemings and extortions by restoring the property to its legitimate owners.

Another affair proves Troudi's utilization of his responsibilities for personal ends, sowing, by these acts, dissension and discord.

In fact, a citizen recently made a complaint to the Justice Department in which he affirmed having been the object of a planned attack by some ex-convicts, who are the hired men of certain parties and work on the order of the Coordination Committee's ex-secretary general. One of them recanted for fear of returning once again to prison, according to his own admission during the preliminary investigation.

In the framework of these schemings, let us again mention a no less serious act. Troudi even used the Coordination Committee's assets in accordance with his wishes. About a year ago, he gave a car belonging to the committee to someone in his entourage in charge of an agricultural cooperative against a bad check without, for all that, demanding the amount until the examining judge found the check and ordered the restitution of the Coordination Committee car. Such are the acts, among others not yet disclosed, which show that the ex-secretary general of the Bizerte Coordination Committee is primarily concerned with satisfying his personal interests, interests which are entirely in contradiction with the general interest, using his official status.

9434
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CHANGES--Yesterday morning, during a plenary session presided over by Mr Sadak Mokaddem, the National Assembly adopted a draft report submitted by the committee on parliamentary immunity stripping Deputy Hassen Kacem of his parliamentary immunity. Before closing the meeting, Mr Sadak Mokaddem announced that Ameur Ben Aicha had lost his status as deputy to the National Assembly as the result of his exclusion from the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] and in application of the provisions of article 109 of the electoral code. The president of the National Assembly stated that the necessary measures were taken to provide in due time for this recess. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 22 Aug 80 p 1] 9434

FOREIGN POLICY DEBATES--The National Assembly's expanded committees yesterday morning held a meeting which they devoted to the discussion of the country's foreign policy. Mr Hassan Belkhoja, minister of foreign affairs, was to give, on that occasion a talk on the different activities of Tunisian diplomacy, bringing out in particular the importance that it gives to cooperative and neighborly relations. The minister also brought up some questions regarding Tunisia's relations with neighboring countries, the Arab world, the Islamic community and Africa. He then gave details of the positions taken by Tunisia with regard to the Palestinian cause and to El Qods, which Israel had decided to annex and to consider as its eternal capital, thus trampling on international resolutions and scorning the Islamic community's feelings. The minister also surveyed Tunisia's relations with Western Europe, the North-South dialog and international economic problems. During the debate, the deputies raised questions regarding Tunisia's relations with its sister countries. The deputies also discussed Tunisia's relations with the European Community and particularly the future of this cooperation after the anticipated expansion of the EEC. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 20 Aug 80 p 5] 9434

THERMAL POWER PLANT--An order for electro-mechanical equipment will be submitted for the first phase of construction of a thermal power station at Rades, near Tunis (300 MW net unit power), two identical power sections of between 140 and 160 MW each, on firm order. Two supplemental sections of equal power will be sought on option, bringing the station's total power to 600 MW at the conclusion of the second phase. Total cost envisioned for completion of the first phase: 80-85 million dinars. [Excerpts] [Paris L'USINE NOUVELLE in French 4 Sep 80 p 35]

END

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30 September 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2190

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30 September 1980

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No. 2190

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LEADER OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE DESCRIBES ORGANIZATION'S ROLE

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 18 Jun 80 p 9

/Article by 'Uthman 'Abduh Hashim: "Secretary General of Organization of Islamic Conference Talks to AL-RIYAD: There Have Been No Contacts with Moscow in the Political Sense"/

/Text/ The permanent tripartite commission on the issue of Afghanistan, which was formed at the latest conference of foreign ministers of the Islamic states in Islamabad, is still continuing its consultations and contacts preparatory to conducting direct contacts with the parties to the issue, especially the Soviet Union and the ruling regime in Afghanistan. The situation could result in the holding of a conference which would assemble these parties at a European capital. As these contacts are going on, the Palestine Liberation Organization has requested the holding of an emergency meeting of foreign ministers of Islamic states to discuss the aggressions the Zionist enemy is carrying out against the Palestinian people on the occupied territories, the latest of which was the attempt to assassinate the three mayors. It is in this atmosphere that the importance of this talk with Mr Habib el-Chatti, secretary general of the organization of the Islamic Conference, arises.

This conversation occurred following his visit to Syria, Jordan, Tehran and France.

We began the conversation with the results which were achieved following his recent visit to Syria, Jordan, Tehran and France, the accomplishments the Organization of the Islamic Conference made during these successive meetings, and the goals these visits were aimed at. He replied:

"There is no doubt that these visits are aimed at various goals. My visit to Tehran concerned the meeting of the tripartite ministerial committee dealing with Afghanistan; this committee held its first meeting in Tehran. We discussed the issue of Afghanistan from all aspects and decided to make contacts with all parties to the Afghanistan problem."

/Question/ What results have you obtained from these contracts?

/Answer/ In fact, our objective, as I have said, was to get in touch with the parties concerned with the issue, which are:

The Islamic resistance;

The current regime in Kabul;

The Soviet Union.

We have agreed to meet with these three parties to discuss solving the issue of Afghanistan with them and have agreed that this should take place at a meeting to be held half a month after the first meeting, that is, on 22 July, in a European capital. In the first stage we sent invitations to the two Afghan parties. I met with the Mojahedin in Tehran and they emphasized that they would send a united delegation to meet with the commission.

/Question/ What about the current regime in Kabul?

/Answer/ I have sent an invitation to the current regime in Kabul, on grounds that it is a political movement representing a separate political opinion. We have not yet received any answer from them; perhaps the difficulty of communications and contacts is obstructing our contacts there.

As regards the Soviet Union, I am assigned to carry out what is called a feeler only, and the contacts do not have the political significance of dealing deeply with the essence of the issue. Therefore there is no truth to the news which is stated or issued from Moscow by parties claiming to be diplomatic to the effect that the Soviet Union has refused to receive us. This is not at issue and there is no truth to this news item, because I have not asked that of them, since we have not yet gotten to the stage where we will get in touch with the Soviet Union. I do not know how there could be a rejection as long as there has not been a request. That is strange.

/Question/ You have met with His Highness Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, the foreign minister; what are the issues which were discussed?

/Answer/ We discussed all issues concerning relations between the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the kingdom, foremost among them the Palestine cause and the request the Palestine Liberation Organization made for the convening of an urgent conference of Arab foreign ministers as soon as possible.

We also discussed the Afghanistan issue and the efforts we have exerted to solve this problem.

We also discussed the position of the European countries and the decisions these countries will take in Venice.

We discussed the issue of the Islamic summit conference which will be held in the kingdom in January.

Recently a discussion took place on the exceptional coming session of the United Nations General Assembly which will be devoted to Palestine and will be held starting next 22 July.

/Question/ Do you believe that there will be rapid solution to the Afghanistan issue and to ridding its Moslem pelple of the viper of Russian intervention?

/Answer/ I would like to say that it is natural that my answers should be clear and frank. Therefore I do not believe that it will be solved easily, because an issue of this type is not simple or easy to solve. This is a major country which has intervened militarily in the affairs of a small country, and when it ventured on this act it had objectives and aspirations it wanted to achieve.

As far as we are concerned, as Islamic countries, we cannot be content with the fact that Soviet forces remain in Afghanistan. We must act to withdraw them from that Moslem country. All I ask is that God give us success in this.

/Question/ Is there a period of time in which you believe it can be guaranteed that this process is carried out?

/Answer/ There is no doubt that we will earnestly strive to realize Afghanistan's freedom from this foreign intervention, but the process will not be easy. In fact, we will find many obstacles and various difficulties on our way. However, these obstacles and difficulties will not divert us from our course. We are determined to continue moving toward the attainment of our goals, which are aimed at having Afghanistan go back to being what it was, an independent nonaligned Moslem country.

We hope that this action of ours will not take long, but we will carry it out, whatever the difficulties are, and will continue the action whatever period this action might require.

/Question/ To what extent do you consider there is a congruence of views between the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Arab League?

/Answer/ I do not believe that there is any dispute between the organization and the Arab League, for a basic reason, which is that all countries belonging to the Arab League are at the same time members of the Islamic Organization. Therefore, when these members attend the Islamic Conference, they come to it with a certain kind of agreement and harmony among

themselves, because, if there is any dispute, this dispute will always remain outside, and what we always strive for is harmony on major worldwide issues. Our basic cause is Jerusalem, and when I say Jerusalem I say Palestine, because almighty glorious God said "The holy mosque whose surroundings we have blessed," and its surroundings are Palestine. As far as we are concerned, the term Jerusalem refers to the land which God has blessed, and that is Arab Moslem Palestine. On this point, there cannot be a dispute between the organization and the Arab League, since as I have said our goal is the same.

There is also another goal which is not less important than the preceding one, and that is to strengthen Islamic solidarity. When we say strengthening Islamic solidarity, we must turn toward all fields of life, politics, economics, society, culture and so forth. When we act with Islamic solidarity, our act concerns the Arab nation, which has half the members in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. Therefore our action in behalf of our seminal issues responds to the cooperation the Arabs aspire to in economic, social and cultural spheres, and various spheres. On this occasion, I personally believe that Arab nationalism and Islamic nationalism are integral and that there is nothing which will have the effect of putting them in opposition over anything. The Arab nation is part of the Islamic nation. If the Arab nation is in harmony and is united over goals, that will be tantamount to a beginning of construction for the sake of harmony and solidarity with the Islamic world.

Put more clearly, every step which Arab nationalism takes realizes the numerous interests of Moslems in general and makes it easy for us to build the edifice of Islamic solidarity. This causes me to be optimistic regarding the need for cooperation between the organization and the Arab League. On this occasion, we must realize that the organization is studying all Islamic issues, including Arab issues. Naturally we do not study particular issues between Arab states, but we do study issues common to the Arab nation.

/Question/ Does the Organization of the Islamic Conference have a role in bringing Arab viewpoints closer together with respect to existing disputes?

/Answer/ There is no doubt that the Islamic Organization is able to play an important role in this sphere, because it deals with all problems and tries to boil them down in another framework which will unify people's statements, and action as well, in order to cope with our crucial issues.

The Palestine cause, for example. I do not believe that Arabs differ over the Palestine cause. When they come to the Islamic Organization, they come to it with a single spirit and strong fixed determination. Therefore personal disputes must not influence our goals--rather, we must leave them to the side and think about a future which will serve the Arab and Islamic nations together. There is one thing which must be taken for granted and that is that our major enemy is Israel and the sole danger threatening us

is Israel. The rapid action which we must take is to stand up to Israel, in the sense that secondary disputes must not stand in the way of what we aspire to to attain our unity and freedom together.

/Question/ What has been done regarding the recent aggressions the Zionist enemy has committed to liquidate major Palestinians?

/Answer/ What the Islamic Organization has done regarding these aggressions is:

First, we have sought to have a Security Council meeting held and have been concerned to have the council issue a resolution condemning Israel.

Second, we have sent a request to the International Red Cross to conduct an investigation into what is going on in the West Bank.

Third, we have sent a similar request to the International Human Rights Commission to do the same.

Fourth, we have sent special letters to all members of Islamic states to adopt a position toward this and have explained to them the gravity of the situation which the recent aggressions in occupied Palestine have created, believing that the aggressions which occurred lately were not a sudden event or events directed exclusively at the persons against whom the aggressions were committed. I believe that it is part of a big scheme which will continue and will be aimed at creating a climate of terror among Arabs in order to throw them out and force them to emigrate.

That is, we have explained what Israel is aiming at to our brothers in the Islamic countries and we must resist this without enabling it to influence us and frighten us into abandoning territory to it. Thus we feel the need for rapid action. We will not let Israel get what it is aspiring to, as it did in the days of the British mandate when it succeeded in creating a climate of terror. We can mention what happened in Dayr Yasin as an example, and not just this alone.

/Question/ What has happened regarding the Palestine Liberation Organization's request to hold an urgent conference?

/Answer/ The Liberation Organization has requested the holding of an urgent conference. This might occur in early July and will be devoted to reviewing this issue. The Moslem foreign ministers will study a response to these aggressions.

I would like to stress that people can be liberated only by powerful struggle. By the nature of the case, people struggling for their freedom without a doubt need aid from their brothers, but they must be strengthened by them first. I sent an appeal to the Palestinians on the occupied territories when I visited our brother Bassam Shak'ah in the hospital in Amman.

I sent an appeal for them to continue their struggle and turn these aggressions into a greater resolution to continue their struggle until the enemy feels that no aggression it commits will deflect us from our determination.

/Question/ What about the United Nations resolutions--do you believe that they will serve our cause or that they are just transitory ones which are often repeated?

/Answer/ Naturally these resolutions do not solve the problem but they do serve our causes, and I say that they serve our causes from the standpoint of Arab pressure on Israel and the United States of America, which supports it. The stronger this pressure is, the more we will bring about a reduction of the United States of America's contributions to Israel or even the withdrawal of American support for Israel.

/Question/ Finally, what is required of you as a political organization?

/Answer/ We, as a political organization, are required to perform this political action in order to reach our goals, which are:

First, to put pressure on America (political pressure abroad).

Second, to confront Israel (revolution within).

While this action of ours is political, accompanied by the decisive revolution which we are witnessing in the occupied territories by our Palestinian brothers, which we are all hailing, we must continue and stress our continuing struggle to obtain our usurped rights.

Therefore, when these two actions are combined, it will be possible to reach our goals.

/Question/ What about war?

/Answer/ That is the one thing which is left. That decision is not one of the jobs of the organization. It is what countries decide when they have access to the resources to make that job succeed. However, as long as we have not decided on war, it is necessary for us to continue the two abovementioned actions, which are revolution within, firstly, and political pressure outside.

Through these two acts we will achieve many goals which will guarantee that we will reach our desired goals.

11887
CSO: 4802

DEVELOPMENT OF AIR DEFENSE FORCES DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 7, 11

[Interview With Maj Gen Sayyid Hamdi, Commander of Air Defense Forces, by Faruq al-Shadhili, in Cairo; date not given]

[Text] Maj Gen Sayyid Hamdi, the commander of the air defense forces, has spoken to AL-AKHBAR about steps to develop the air defense forces and supply them with the latest equipment. The equipment, including missiles, will cover all parts of Egypt. He has also said that studies on the results of the October war are currently underway in order to prepare the plan for developing the air defense. The development plan includes the eastern weapons used by the air defense forces. The following is the text of the interview with the commander of the air defense forces:

[Question] The entire world has attested to the accomplishments of the Egyptian air defense forces in the October 1973 war--accomplishments that are well-known to all. Can your excellency tell us the accomplishments that the Egyptian air defense has realized since the October war?

Benefiting From Results of October War

[Answer] A profound study has been made of the results and lessons of the glorious October war. These lessons have been put to use in preparing the plans to develop the air defense forces, to develop the military doctrine and to develop the military means and tactics of the air defense forces and, subsequently, to develop the available eastern equipment and to introduce engineering and technical modifications on this equipment to improve its performance in the face of the most modern aircraft. All this has been done with the efforts of the combatant in the Egyptian air defense forces and on the basis of the combat experience gained in the October 1973 war.

Development of Eastern Weapons

The development and modernization have not been confined to what I have just mentioned. There is another sphere of major importance, namely developing and prolonging the life of the eastern weapons and equipment

that we have. There is no doubt that these weapons constitute a national wealth and a trust in our hands. We have been able to overcome all the difficulties, thanks to our experts and our military plants and the help of some European companies specialized in this field. We have acquired some complementary equipment that has added a lot to the eastern weapons. Our plants have also been able to produce critical spareparts for the eastern weapons with the assistance of some western companies. It can be consequently said that we have succeeded in solving these problems.

Diversifying Sources of Weapon

As a result of the historic decision of President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, the leader in war and in peace, to diversify the sources of weapons, contracts have been concluded with European countries and with the United States for various types of air defense weapons and equipment. These weapons and equipment are manufactured in accordance with the latest accomplishments of the 20th century technology and in accordance with the specifications set by the Egyptian air defense on the basis of the combat experience gained from the October 1973 war.

The delivery of these weapons and equipment and their preparation for combat is considered a major accomplishment that moves the air defense forces to the age of the modern western technology. Some of these weapons have actually begun to enter the service in the air defense forces, thus crowning the previous efforts to prepare and get ready for absorbing them.

Most Modern Firing Range

Moreover, the latest and biggest firing range for air defense missiles in the Middle East will be opened in the next few weeks, God willing. All the equipment for this range has been received and the final touches are being applied to its construction. This range uses radio-guided drones similar in their capabilities to the most modern jet fighters. This range can serve all the Arab and friendly countries, not just Egypt. The completion of this range attests to the superior ability of the air defense forces to absorb and use advanced technology. It will also contribute a lot to the practical training of the air defense weapons and to raising their efficiency and their combat readiness.

U.S. Weapon Deals

[Question] What has been the share of the Egyptian air defense of the U.S. weapon deals, when are these weapons expected to arrive in Egypt and what is their impact on the Egyptian air defense?

[Answer] I have pointed out that contracts have been concluded with the United States for some air defense equipment. It is no secret that the sophisticated Hawk surface-to-air missiles are a part of these contracts. It is not necessary for me to divulge the size of the weapons for which

contracts have been concluded with the United States or the dates of their delivery. However, I assert that these weapons and equipment will be on the Egyptian soil as soon as the training of the Egyptian technical cadres necessary to operate them--cadres that are being trained in both Egypt and the United States--is completed.

Moreover, the volume of these weapons is considered appropriate and compatible with the needs of the air defense forces for the already mentioned development plans. Moreover, the Egyptian air defense has asked for the introduction of some modifications on these weapons and equipment to make them compatible with the requirements of tactical use by the Egyptian air defense forces on the basis of the combat experience of the October 1973 war, the U.S. side has agreed to the modifications and they are being made.

Future of Air Defense

[Question] We know that the air defense constantly uses the latest accomplishments of science and technology. Does this have anything to do with what has been announced about requiring the Air Defense College graduates to get a B.S. in electronic engineering in addition to the B.S. in military sciences and what is the effect of this development on the future of air defense?

[Answer] Dealing with air defense equipment requires the officers to attain a high level of command of many of the engineering sciences. Radar, which is the backbone of air defense, is considered fundamentally the science of electronics. The missiles that cruise at many times the speed of sound require full knowledge of the sciences of air dynamics and of rocket propellers and whatever scientific theories are connected with them.

Moreover, missile and fighter plane guidance systems use electronic computers extensively and depend on automatic-control theories. Moreover, some of these systems use infra-red rays or lazer beams.

Detecting and shooting down aircraft through the use of radar follows mathematical laws that are within the sphere of the theory of probabilities.

All these are examples of some of the engineering sciences needed by the air defense officers.

8494
CSO: 4802

LAWS ISSUED ON ESTABLISHMENT OF ARMED FORCES MEDICAL ACADEMY

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic 26 Jun 80 pp 944-45

[Law No 118 of 1980]

[Text] Law No 118 of 1980 Amending Some Provisions of Law No 57 of 1979 on Establishment of Military Medical Academy in Armed Forces:

In the name of the people,

The president of the republic announces:

The People's Assembly has ratified the following law and we have promulgated it:

Article One

The phrase "chairmen of the medical services of the air, naval and air defense forces" shall be replaced by the phrase of "the directors of the institutes under the control of the academy" mentioned in the formation of the Higher Council of the Military Medical Academy stipulated in article 5 of law No 57 of 1979 on the creation of the armed forces Military Medical Academy.

Article Two

The text of the first paragraph of article 9 of the aforementioned law No 57 of 1979 shall be replaced by the following text:

Article 9. The Academy Council shall be formed in the following manner:

The head of the Military Medical Academy as chairman.

The deputy chairman of the training staff as member. The chief of staff of the Medical Services Administration as member. The directors of the institutes under the academy's control as members. The armed forces chief surgeon as member. The chief internal medicine specialist in the armed forces as

member. The most senior heads of the special sections according to their academic [al-'ilmiyah] seniority as members. Five professors of the Egyptian universities with qualifications and experience in the goals for which the academy is established and appointed as members on a decision by the minister of defense on the nomination of the academy's Higher Council after consultation with the Higher Council of the Universities and with the authorities concerned. Their appointment shall be for a term of 2 renewable years.

The deputy chairman of the Academy of Higher Clinical Studies as secretary.

Article Three

This law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall go into effect on the day following its publication.

This law shall be stamped with the seal of the state and shall be implemented as one of the state laws.

Issued at the Presidential Office on 17 June 1980.

[Signed] Anwar al-Sadat

8494
CSO: 4802

DECREE SETS UP LOWER STATE SECURITY COURTS

Cairo AL-WAQA'I' AL-MISRIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] daily Supplement of the Official Gazette in Arabic No 145, 22 Jul 80 p 3

[Decrees by Ministry of Justice]

[Text] Minister of Justice Decree No 1994 of 1980 on Establishment of Lower [juz'iyah] State Security Courts in Cairo, Alexandria and al-Jizah:

The minister of justice,

After perusing the judiciary authority law No 46 issued in 1972 and the approval of the general assemblies of the courts of first instance of southern Cairo, Alexandria and al-Jizah,

Has decided:

Article 1. A lower court shall be set up in Cairo Governorate to try lower state security cases. Its jurisdiction shall cover the area of jurisdiction of the two courts of first instance in southern and northern Cairo. Its offices shall be located in the Courts Complex on al-Jala' Street.

Article 2. A lower court shall be set up in Alexandria Governorate and shall try lower state security cases. Its jurisdiction shall cover the area of jurisdiction of the Alexandria court of first instance, except for Marsa Matruh District. Its offices shall be located at the Court of First Instance--'Arabi Complex.

Article 3. A lower court shall be set up in al-Jizah Governorate and shall try lower state security cases. Its jurisdiction shall cover the area of jurisdiction of al-Jizah Court of First Instance, except for the provincial centers of al-Saff, al-'Ayyat and al-Badrashin. Its offices shall be located in the premises of al-Duqqi Lower Court.

Article 4. This decree shall be published in AL-WAQA'I' AL-MISRIYAH and shall go into effect on 1 June 1980.

Issued on 25 May 1980.

[Signed by] Minister of Justice
Counselor Anwar 'Abd-al-Fattah Abu-Sahli

8494
CSO: 4802

MINISTER OF INTERIOR UNDERLINES DEVELOPMENT OF POLICE FORCES

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 27 June 80 p 4

[Article: "Nabawi Isma'il Announces at Graduation Ceremony of Two Groups at Commanders Institute: New Powers for Security Directors and Strengthening of Police in Governorates; Strict Control of Prices and Fight Against Deviation"]

[Text] Nabawi Isma'il, the deputy prime minister and the minister of interior, has announced giving new powers to the security directors to enable them to face their responsibilities and to bolster the police agency in all the governorates with the means of transportation and with modern scientific means.

Isma'il Nabawi asked the policemen to exercise strict control over prices and to fight any deviation. He has said that the most important police responsibilities are to confront the attempts of the hostile foreign forces to undermine the peace march.

At a ceremony to graduate two batches from the Commanding Police Officers Institute, Nabawi said: The most important responsibilities of the police forces in bolstering the peace march include creating an atmosphere of security and reassurance and confronting any attempt seeking to undermine the atmosphere of stability and security prevailing on our domestic front and to damage the atmosphere of freedom and democracy which President al-Sadat is eager to provide to our homeland.

Nabawi Isma'il has also said: We believe in working according to a system free of complexes and fear and in keeping clear off the conventional methods so as to raise the level of our performance to the dimensions of the problems, accumulations and challenges facing us. Isma'il has also stressed the need to exert efforts to put an end to centralism in decision making, to bolster the local authorities, to release their capabilities and to provide them with all the means of success.

Isma'il added: The ministry's plan in this phase is based on strengthening the police agency in all the governorates with the means of transportation and with the modern scientific means, on developing all the laws and regulations and on giving the security directors powers and jurisdiction to enable them to face their responsibilities.

Nabawi Isma'il has also stressed the need to exercise stricter control over prices and to mobilize all the capabilities of the security agency to secure the people's food and to fight any deviation.

Maj Gen 'Abd-al-'Azim Lashin, the Commanders Institute director, had earlier delivered an address in which he explained the institute's work plan which has led to doubling the number of graduating officers.

At the end of the ceremony, Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il distributed the diplomas and the awards to the top graduates.

8494
CSO: 4802

NETWORK OF RADIO STATIONS TO SERVE PROVINCES

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 19 Jul 80 p 6

[Article by Mustafa al-Damrani: "Broadcasting System To Cover Every Spot on the Map of Egypt"]

[Text] For the first time in Egypt, 16 regional radio stations will be constructed to cover all governorates of the republic [see map on following page]. The construction of 10 stations will start by the end of this year, and will take 5 years to complete. This will strengthen the role played by these stations in furthering comprehensive development in the regions, in keeping with the total independence which President al-Sadat has given to the various provinces.

What is the full story of these stations and the methods of financing them? What are the construction priorities, and will each governorate have a regional station, or will there be a regional station for more than one governorate?

Also, what is the connection between these stations and the mother station in Cairo? And what programs will these stations carry compared with the programs presented by the Cairo station?

Safwat al-Sharif, chairman of the board of directors of the Radio and Television System, says that "in light of the directives of President al-Sadat on strengthening broadcasting so that the voice of Egypt will reach the most remote village and hamlet, we decided to plan that our regional radio stations should have two objectives. First, they would be relay stations to help strengthen transmission, so that the mother station could reach far places of the countryside. At the same time, they would be regional stations reflecting the activities of the region, promoting its daily life and helping to achieve its progress. We will, thereby, have saved time by accomplishing two objectives simultaneously."

Safwat al-Sharif goes on to say: "The new plan of action which is now under way involves the construction of 16 regional stations, 10 of which will be built over the next 5 years."

[Map of Planned Network of Regional Radio Stations]



Key:

1. Al-Sallum
2. Matruh
3. Al-Bahriyah Oasis
4. Al-Minya
5. Asyut
6. Sawhaj
7. Al-Kharijah Oases
8. Al-Dakhilah Oases
9. Red Sea
10. Al-Ghardaqah
11. Qina
12. Al-Qusayr
13. Luxor
14. Idfu
15. Aswan
16. Abu Sunbul

With regard to the sites of these stations, the plan includes both Upper and Lower Egypt. Opportunity in Upper Egypt with regard to the construction of these stations is great, because work is now under way on strengthening the stations which transmit the General Program, the Koran and the People Program. This provides an opportunity to utilize [unused resources] after the strengthening operation is completed in the construction of the regional stations in Upper Egypt."

The chairman of the board has sent urgent letters to all governors in the republic on taking the initiative in serving the national and regional objective of constructing regional stations by setting aside the necessary land for these stations. The letter contains their construction, stating that the land should not be more than 5 km from the center of the provincial city, and should be a good site which would facilitate hooking up public utilities.

The system will send teams of radio engineering experts to the governorates which hasten to respond to the chairman of the board and which want a regional station in their province. The team will inspect the site, judge its suitability and draft the designs for the new station. It will then submit its report to the chairman of the board of directors on the suitability of the site, so that a start can be made in arrangements for implementation. A timetable will be laid down for installation of the antennas for these stations.

The system will install the equipment required for construction of the station after approving the decision of the team on the suitability of the site for construction of a regional station in the governorate. Priority will be given to the governorate which is most responsive to the chairman of the board of directors.

Increasing the Independence of Local Government

Safwat al-Sharif says: "Establishment of these stations will serve a specific philosophy ultimately aimed at accomplishing the hopes of the president about the independent character of local government and the achievement of comprehensive regional development. This philosophy has now become clear in the reorganization of the state, since the president has given the governors all necessary powers and resources of the governorates, so as to marshal all their capabilities toward reconstruction and prosperity in the climate of democracy presently enjoyed by the country."

With regard to the nature of these stations, Safwat al-Sharif says: "They will not be central stations in the usual sense of the term, but will be a product of the environment, addressing themselves to local society and the various segments of the populace in a manner adapted to their culture, customs, traditions and the nature of local work. These stations will differ from one governorate to another, from an agricultural governorate to an industrial governorate, from a governorate with a high educational

level to one where there is a great deal of illiteracy, from a society where women use makeup to one where they are still veiled, and from a society with a high artistic level to one which has an illustrious historic cultural background.

These stations will be characterized by their ability to adapt themselves to the society of the region--stations of a new type which do not carry a one-sided media message, but are able to communicate with the man in the street in the region and motivate him to take part in the decision making process.

These stations will combine mass and individual communication. The citizen will hear himself on them, since they will ultimately express his problems, his hopes and his pains, and propel him toward a better future. They will provide an opportunity to play up the talent available in the rural areas in various spheres of life. The talents can glitter on the regional stations and even surpass those of the main station in Cairo in the areas of ideas, literature, art, economy, law, agriculture, industry, etc. In fact, there will be competition between these stations and the mother station in discovering new talents and in the various aspects of the arts which they will present to the masses.

Studies prepared in this regard suggest the construction of a major regional station to be called "Central Delta Regional Station." Its range would cover the governorates of al-Gharbiyah, al-Minufiyah, Kafr al-Shaykh, al-Buhayrah, al-Daqahliqh and Damietta. It would carry 18 hours of programs daily. These would be distributed equally among the 6 governorates, so that each governorate would have 3 hours of programs dedicated to it. These special programs would be channeled through the Central Radio Coordination Office whose experts would set the proper timing of each governorate's programs.

Studies and reports also suggest the possibility of combining two governorates for coverage by 1 station. The two governorates would join hands in drawing up a joint plan for programs beamed to them. This idea would apply to adjacent states. Each station would still have 3 hours of special programs dedicated to it.

The plan also contemplates construction of a major regional radio station in Lower Egypt which would serve the 5 governorates of al-Jizah, al-Sharqiyah, al-Qalyubiyah, Bani Suwayf, and al-Fayyum [al-Jizah, Bani Suwayf and al-Fayyum are in Upper Egypt]. It would carry 15 hours of programs which would be distributed so that each governorate would have its share of 3 hours of special programs.

The plan leaves it up to the governors to decide that each governorate should have its own station, if they do not favor the idea of a major station. The chairman of the board of directors says: "In this regard,

the Radio and Television System does not at all object to the idea of establishing a station in each governorate, if the governor provides all necessary facilities to do so to the system. This is especially so, since our objective is that each governorate should have a station, if possible."

The plan seeks to establish seven regional stations in Upper Egypt in al-Minya, Asyut, Sawhaj, Qina, Naja' Hammadi, and Aswan and New Valley. The latter will serve al-Khariyah, al-Dakhihah and al-Bahriyah regions and Baris. There will also be two major stations, the first in the Red Sea governorate, serving the areas of al-Ghardaqah, al-Qusayr and Ra's Gharib, and the second in al-'Arish, serving the Sinai areas.

The Link With the Mother Station

With regard to the link between the regional stations and the mother station in Cairo, Safwat al-Sharif says: The plan is for a link between these stations and Cairo, so that there will be no isolation after construction of these stations. In fact, the plan calls for a sort of tie-in through allocation by the mother station of certain programs for broadcasting by the regional stations. By the same token, some regional programs will be carried by Cairo. In fact, all these stations can join the wavelength of the mother station in Cairo on national occasions or for important events. Moreover, the regional stations will have to avail themselves of the expertise of the mother station with regard to policies, planning, operations, and the social news portion of news programs.

The power of the central station in Cairo will be increased on all wavelengths so as to reach the various regions, so that their people can learn the ideas of Cairo, and so that regional station workers may be able to adapt ideas they like into their own broadcasts. The station of the people will be the central station with regard to the regional stations, because its programs address themselves to all segments of society in the various provinces of Egypt.

8389
CSO: 4802

CAIRO AIRPORT PLAGUED BY CASES OF FALSE TRAVEL DOCUMENTS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 19 Jul 80 p 6

[Article: "Decisive Steps at the Airport To Cope with Wave of Forged Travel Documents Totaling 200 Cases a Month"]

[Text] Strict measures have been taken at Cairo International Airport to cope with a serious wave of forgery of travel documents that has appeared recently. Maj Gen 'Isam al-Ramali, director general of travel documents and migration, and Maj Gen Muhammad al-Manshawi, director of the Port Police Department, have issued instructions to passport officers not to complete action on any passport, unless its holder himself is in front of them when action on the passport is completed. Passport officers are also instructed not to complete action on passports if any airport worker, who has a permit to enter the customs area, tries to assist any traveler in his passport arrangements. This came about after Brig Gen 'Abd al-Ra'uf Hasan, director of passports at the airport, discovered a number of attempts to travel on forged passports with the help of some persons who hold permits to enter the airport and work there.

Airport passport authorities have discovered about 200 cases of forgery in a single month, mostly by persons from rural areas of Egypt traveling abroad, who fell victim to gangs of confidence men. Each victim paid 600 pounds to one of these gangs to obtain a forged certificate of [fulfillment] of military service, or a forged passport, or a personal or family identity card falsifying his age so as to be able to travel abroad.

The new type of passport is expected to put a stop to passport forgery operations.

8389
CSO: 4802

WORK OF NUCLEAR MEDICINE CENTER EXAMINED

Cairo AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 2 Jul 80 p 6

[Article by Suhayr 'Abd-al-Sattar: "First Nuclear Medicine Center; Diagnosing Cancer, Heart Diseases and Heart Attacks With Atom; Treatment Is Free and at Economic Prices for Able"]

[Text] An Egyptian patient can now have his heart or his kidneys treated and have his ailment diagnosed very accurately.

He can also have any tumors that he may develop, even if they are malignant, diagnosed very accurately. There is no reason for concern. Early discovery, specialized physicians and the right treatment will wipe out the disease.

At a distance of a few steps and in the new building behind the Meridian--the building of the National Nuclear Medicine Center, the patient can, free of charge, reassure himself about his health, can have any disease discovered early and can have the treatment method and procedure determined.

AL-JUMHURIYAH has interviewed the center family on the nature of the center, its work, the meaning of nuclear medicine, how Egypt has entered this sphere and the possibilities of the success of our scientists in this precise branch of medicine.

The interview began with Dr Malmud Mahfuz, the international radiology expert, a former minister of health and the present center chairman.

Dr Mahmud Mahfuz has said: I will not be far from the truth if I say that the National Nuclear Medicine Center is the first of its kind in the Middle East. But how have we brought it up to this degree of capability?

Dr Mahfuz has said that Egypt entered the age of nuclear medicine years ago, but very slowly and more carefully. We had one floor in Qasr al-'Ayni Hospital and had equipment with very limited capabilities. Why?

The center chairman answers: Because the use of the atom in treatment requires highly specialized studies and extremely precise apparatuses that need a building with special specifications. You will find my words to be true when you study the building and its equipment and the system of operation inside it. You will then realize how extremely precise is the equipment and the system of operation inside the building.

Curative Diagnosis

Dr Shawqi al-Haddad, the center deputy chairman who holds the highest degrees of specialization in nuclear treatment and curative diagnosis, takes part in the interview. We can now, says Dr al-Haddad, use the atom successfully in curative diagnosis. We can diagnose with the atom any irregularity in the body's functions. We can, for example, diagnose heart attacks in their early stages. Naturally, any successful treatment depends fundamentally on the successful diagnosis of a disease in its early stages.

Moreover, says the center's deputy chairman, we can use the atom in evaluating the performance of the kidneys or any irregularity in the functions of the heart. We can also measure the glandular hormones, such as those of the thyroid glands or the endocrine glands. We can also discover any abnormal cells in the liver and can determine the right cure immediately in order to protect this regulator of the body's vital functions.

Blockage of Lung Capillaries

As for patients with chest diseases, the blockage of any lung capillaries or the presence of lung pus--which constitute extreme danger to a cancer patient--can also be discovered. An early discovery of such pus through use of the atom helps greatly to follow the right method of treatment.

We then move to the second part of nuclear medicine, namely treatment by radiation. This means the use of the atom for treatment. Dr Shawqi al-Haddad says: We have succeeded in treating a number of diseases by the use of the atom. These were hopeless cases are now improving or on their way to improving, especially cancer patients.

Free Treatment

Dr Shawqi adds that treatment is free daily in the morning only. There is also the system of economic treatment at moderate fees from 1500 to 1700 [daily]. Even though the center is new, nearly 3,000 patients, of whom 1,300 are cancer patients, frequent this center.

The presence of the center makes it unnecessary for a patient to go abroad [for treatment] and saves a lot of foreign currencies that be channelled toward the purchase of more sophisticated equipment to be used in the center. What is important, says Dr Shawqi al-Haddad, is that the equipment that the center has makes it unnecessary for a patient to go abroad for treatment.

[We have] nuclear scanners that determine very accurately the location of tumors in the body and that give the physician an accurate reading of the size of these tumors and, consequently, help him determine the method of treatment at the right time and in the right way.

We also have the (Gamma Camera) apparatus which is the latest apparatus existing in similar European centers. This apparatus is linked to a computer and through it, we can examine any part of the body. The physician can determine the type of disease on a television screen during the examination. He can also notice any irregularity and record it on the computer and can then refer to the data whenever he needs. As for treatment by radiation, Dr al-Haddad says that the radiation laboratory room has actually been set up and equipped with a capacity of 20 million volts of cobalt and that it is the latest in the sphere of tumor treatment. This room will go into operation shortly. These pieces of equipment and others are valued at 3 million pounds. They require constant maintenance and periodic checking because they are extremely sensitive.

Dr Jabir Ziyad, the young Egyptian researcher, then picks up the conversation to say: These apparatuses give the physician a very accurate picture and do not expose the patient to any side effects--such as in the case of some heart diseases for which it is difficult to make an (astra).

Equipment Maintenance

The first problem or issue brought up by the center's physicians and technicians is the issue of maintenance.

Dr Jabir Ziyadah and Engineer 'Abd-al-Halim Ibrahim say that any irregularity in any apparatus requires a specialist that we have to summon from abroad. The same applies to spareparts. The center is exerting efforts at present to provide a team of engineers specialized in maintenance, to train the center physicians on maintenance of the equipment and to encourage innovators to design spareparts for this equipment.

Dr Shawqi al-Haddad, the center's deputy chairman, says that the center makes it conditional when concluding contracts to purchase any apparatus that the company winning the contract have a maintenance center in Egypt.

Dr Hasanah Mustafa says: Nuclear medicine is a new sphere for research and discovery. Therefore, only a truly enthusiastic physician enters this sphere. The team operating the apparatuses is comprised of 3 professors, an assistant professor, 8 instructors, 4 assistant instructors and 36 technicians. This team needs to keep up with the scientific developments constantly. This is available to us because there are agreements with similar centers in the FRG, France, the United States and England. But what surprises Dr Hasanah is that the regulations applying to the workers of the Nuclear Energy Authority do not apply to the workers of this center and that these workers have no material priviliges other than an allowance of 3 pounds [monthly].

Material Temptations

The material [money] problem becomes clearer when presented by Dr Jabir Ziyadah, the instructor at the center:

Regrettably, the lack of any material priviliges stands as a stumbling block in the face of creating a second line or training second and third line cadres to take charge of the center after us. Moreover, we are not allowed to open [private] clinics because nuclear substances can be imported for scientific centers only. Besides, the cost of nuclear equipment is very high.

Medicine Is Sacred Profession

Despite of the center workers' awareness of the material problem, enthusiasm for work in this sphere urges young physicians to join the center. Dr Mamduh Hajjaj, who works in the center, says: I have graduated with an evaluation of "very good" and with a mention in the honor list. I have chosen the field of nuclear medicine because it is new. I know that nuclear medicine is no means for profit [enrichment] but I am satisfied and happy with science.

Cancer Can Be Treated

Dr Muna Najjar, the newest physician in the center, says: My grandfather and grandmother died of cancer. This is why I have the desire to research and to learn about this disease and why I have chosen to work in this field. I have found out that this disease is not a ghoul, as commonly believed. It is a disease like any other and can be treated if the patient sees the specialist at the right time. But unfortunately, some patients are scared by the mere mention of the name of this disease and others go to unspecialized physicians and so lose their chance.

8494
CSO: 4802

ANALYSIS OF IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 23 Aug 80 pp 8, 9

[Text] In its analysis of relations between Islamic nations, newspaper LIBERATION writes:

The Iraqis feel that the time for the implementation of "the great plan," which Baghdad had always been thinking of, has finally arrived, this, despite the fact that contemporary history has turned Iraq into an "eternally isolated state." To make its dream come true, Iraq is holding three winning cards. Relying on its huge oil revenue, Iraq had been able to build a strong economy. Enriched uranium, received from France, has turned Iraq into a potential nuclear power. And, finally, the Iraqi army is undoubtedly the best organized army in the Arab world.

These three factors have helped bring Iraq and Saudi Arabia closer to each other on an equal basis. It may not be an exaggeration to claim that they are talking about the existence of a Baghdad-Riad axis which will also include Jordan. This is, in fact, the first step toward a new coalition designed to fight "contagious" Iranian revolution, influenced by the Soviets.

The adoption by Saudi Arabia of a more hostile position against Israel, particularly with regard to the question of the Holy City, it has made it possible for the alliance to remain safe from being accused of being a toy of the United States. At the same time, all indications point to the fact that the Fatah organization, the most important wing of the PLO, which no longer has cordial relations with Damascus, is in favor of the alliance especially now that their forces are locked in Lebanon in fighting with the Shi'ite Moslems of the "Amal" organization who support Iran.

In the long run, Pakistan and Turkey could join the axis, for they pursue the same goal for shrewd reasons. Considering the present deadlock in the Camp David agreements, Egypt could be accepted in the alliance at the price of breaking relations with Israel, which could be justified because of the policy Begin is pursuing at the present time.

Is this a foretelling? Recent turmoil in Libya is, no doubt, related with this change of direction, and recent religious clashes in Syria, where Moslem Brotherhood receive its arms from Saudi Arabia and undergo military training in Jordan, are all connected with this axis.

In this connection, advantage is taken of religion and a Sunni front is created to face the Shi'ite revolution. The Syrian 'Alawites (Hafiz al-Assad is one of them) are some kind of Shi'ites. Israel could disrupt all these arrangements by continuously keeping the tension high at its borders until it reaches the no return point and another war is erupted giving the Soviet Union the chance to return to the area with strength.

These developments will give the two most vulnerable states, meaning Syria and Libya, a good chance for survival. Will Israel go to the aid of the Soviets and its biggest enemies? The time has not yet arrived but politics has strange faces sometimes.

Relations between Syria and Iraq was not good. It is worse now. With the expelling of Syrian diplomats from Baghdad last week on charges of spying, their differences have broken open now.

Damascus expresses regret for the "petty dispute" at a time when "solidarity and common action by Arab states against plots and aggression is vital."

Iraq can say the same thing with the difference that by "plot" and "aggression," Syria means "American imperialism" and "Zionism" but for Iraq it means Iran and the Soviet Union.

In these two cases everything separates Syria and Iraq from one another. Syria is the Soviet ally in the Arab world and has not condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while Iraq has done so in a strong term.

From the very beginning, Syria supported the Iranian revolution. Iraq took the opposite direction and publicly condemned it. Not a single day passes without border clashes between the two countries and Iraqi leaders have publicly given aid to anti-Khomeyni elements in exile especially to the shah's chief of staff General Oveysi and to former Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar.

9561
CSO: 4906

DEPUTY SPEAKER DISCUSSES ESFAHAN ARCHBISHOP, CIA CONNECTION

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 2 Sep 80 p 15

[Article: "The Office of Bishop of Esfahan Received $500 Million From the CIA for Distribution Among Counterrevolutionaries"]

[Text] During an interview with a reporter of the PARS NEWS AGENCY, 'Ali Akbar Parvaresh, deputy for Esfahan and deputy speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, has placed at his disposal a document concerning the bishopric of Esfahan. In the course of this interview, Parvaresh has stated that religious missionaries were introduced into Iran on England's initiative: they are under joint protection of England and the United States and they place at the disposal of these two countries the results of their spying. He added that documents were disclosed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Command in Esfahan that clearly connect this institution with the United States, England and the regime that grabbed Jerusalem. As an example of these documents may serve a letter dated 30 December 1960 sent by the British Embassy to the Bishopric of Esfahan, which mentions Queen Elizabeth as the mother of the Episcopal Churches and recommends emphatically that prayers be said for the President of the United States after church services. In another document connected with the unsuccessful coup d'etat plot in Iran it is said that 500 million American dollars were sent by the CIA to the bishopric to be distributed among counterrevolutionaries.

As regards "bishop Hasan Dehqani," 'Ali Akbar Parvaresh said that he was the priest of the "Luke's" Church, who took advantage of religious feelings of the youth for adverse propaganda and deception of the young people. Since this matter aroused suspicion, the activities of the bishopric were put under surveillance and it became apparent that religious propaganda was only deception and that behind it suspicious political activities were being carried out. Parvaresh showed to the reporter another document connected with espionage involvement of the bishopric and said: Many documents have come to hand concerning basic salaries and allowances that the American Embassy was sending to the missionaries working at the bishopric of Esfahan. There are also documents that relate to the military secrets of Iran such as air bases and

naval stations, names of the air force personnel, and technical plans of the Esfahan refinery and the air base of Manjil, obtained by the bishopric and sent to the CIA agents.

Parvaresh added that a document was also obtained that clearly shows a direct connection of the bishopric with the radio and television networks of the United States and England, which actually are broadcasting imperialist and Zionist propaganda. This matter awaits analysis of documents discovered by the Revolutionary Guards Command of Esfahan and if something more will come to light then naturally the government and Majles will have to make firm decisions in the matter.

1015
CSO: 4906

REAGAN LABELED 'SYMBOL OF FASCISM' BY BANI SADR

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 16 Aug 80 p 20

/Article: "Bani Sadr: The Candidate for the American Presidency Is a Manifestation of Fascism"/

/Text/ Dr Abol Hasan Bani Sadr, the president, set out for Hamadan at 1000 hours Thursday morning to investigate the problems and issues of the Province of Hamadan.

On his trip to Hamadan, after visiting the Nozzeh Air Base at 1400 hours in the afternoon, our country's president left the site by car.

According to the same report, Dr Bani Sadr subjected this province's problems and issues to discussion in the course of separate sessions with clerics and persons in charge of revolutionary organizations and government departments on Thursday afternoon.

Dr Abol Hasan Bani Sadr then participated in a splendid meeting of the various classes of the people of Hamadan which had been organized at Azadi Stadium in that town.

In this talk, which lasted more than an hour and a half, the president discussed the people's readiness to confront conspirators, order and discipline, respect for the law, the need to establish morale in the country and other matters.

Aggressors Will Have No Refuge But the Grave

In his statements, referring to the remarks by one of the candidates to the American presidency and emphasizing the point that no aggressor will find any place of refuge in our country but the grave, Dr Bani Sadr said, "Usually, in various countries, including our own, armed forces are drawn up in order that there be confidence about domestic security in the face of foreign attacks, but it has very rarely been seen that a people is totally prepared to defend the existence of the country and the government

which has come into being through a revolution in order to put up a resistance in the face of the piracies of foreign enemies and their domestic accomplices."

The president added, "Iran today is witnessing the creation of a nation which is prepared to stand in the face of conspiracy and resist with all its being and the participation of each of its individual members."

The president added, "According to the reports we have received and the relatively strong, clear information we have attained, this historic nation's enemies have finally determined to bring us to our knees through conspiracy and agitation. Forces have been readied outside our borders to be used to invade our country."

The Manifestation of Fascism in the Present Era

He went on, "The candidate for the American presidency, a person who perhaps could be said to be a manifestation of fascism in the present era, states in every speech that as soon as he is elected president he will conquer Iran."

The president stressed, "I, as the president of Iran, tell him: If you become the president of America and come to conquer our country, you will acquire in this land a series of graves which have been prepared for the aggressors you send to this land. You don't know anything about the state of Iran; you don't know what hard times this land has gone through and what savage invaders have been brought to their knees in the face of the will and the culture of resistance of this great nation and have been laid to rest in this land's soil. You do not know, and you do not recognize the spirit of these young people."

We Are Decisively Confronting the Conspirators

Referring to his relief that through the will of God and the aid of our people no conspiracy would reach a conclusion, the president said, "I am resolved to confront this conspiracy and I am sure that this resolute spirit exists among all our people. To all those who imagine that they can bring this nation to its knees through conspiracy and agitation and consider themselves the enemy of Iran, and have rushed into the embrace of Iran's enemies, I give notice and warning that these conspiracies will get nowhere. Iran, through the will of God, will remain alive and on its feet and will accept no regime except the regime of the Islamic republic. Iran has been born again through the Islamic republic. Iran, through the Islamic republic, has attained its independence."

In inviting the conspirators to the warm embrace of the nation, the president said, "If they do not respond to this invitation and pursue the conspiracies, they must realize that we have decided to desiccate the roots of every kind of conspiracy and conspirator in this country. We have put

tremors and doubts behind us and have become resolved to confront the conspirators once and for all and categorically desiccate them for good as corrupt materials, and our armed forces are prepared today more than in any other period to defend the independence and existence of the republic in the face of every kind of conspiracy."

The Need To Respect the Constitution

At this point the president emphasized, "It is not only necessary for everyone to respect the constitution and carry it out, indeed it is necessary that the various officials of the country and the people who speak to the people observe truth in speech and especially not quote more or less than the statements of anyone who has important responsibilities in the republic. If they want to quote something from a statement by the president, let them quote his subject matter without adding or detracting."

In continuing his statement, emphasizing the maintenance and preservation of Islamic morality, the president declared, "So far, by virtue of the duty I have in accordance with the law and Islamic morality, which must be the guardian of the unity of the people, I have been silent on quotations from my statements which people have made with additions and subtractions, but from now on I will reject this approach because if a subject is quoted from the president's statements and that subject is not correct, the people will fall into error and this error could later cause a loss of confidence among the people. Loss of confidence in these historic, determining moments is not something which I as president can fail to note."

The president added, "Public opinion, the will of the people, and the fact that they must know the whole truth and not half the truth, which is the biggest of lies, prevent the people's confidence on those who have governmental and non-governmental responsibilities in the three powers, the executive, legislative and judiciary, from growing weak, failing which our republic will lose the basic ingredient of survival and victory which is you the people, and your attention and your protection. Therefore I hope that this issue will be regarded as a serious warning by everyone and from now on no subject will arise where I should be compelled to correct a statement, not to mention deny it. I must state that several of these subjects have arisen during these past few days and I am not talking at present but I hope that those who have stated half my words or have stated them inaccurately and want to attain their own ends will hear this statement and realize that to the point where I can state my words to the people I will do so and will not remain heedless regarding these acts."

Stressing the importance of breaking dead ends and advancing the Islamic republic and referring to the problems of the town of Hamadan, Dr Bani Sadr then said, "The problem of your town is the problem of all the towns of Iran and the reasons for them have also become determined and clear. There are forces, and there are forces relying on these groups, and if we want to break the barriers and dead ends we must turn these forces, which

now have inhibited the road to progress and movement for the forces of progress and construction through destructive activities."

Security and the Economy Are Our Basic Problem

Referring to the point that, according to a poll which had been taken, the two basic problems of security and economics are among our basic problems and the people must constantly seek from officials the reason why problems and difficulties have not been solved, the president said, "We cannot keep these two problems ambiguous and not state why these two problems have not yet been solved. If the problem of security is not solved, there are assuredly reasons for it. If matters which must be carried out in the context of the economy if Iran is to obtain its economic independence are not resolved, that certainly has a reason and cause--why aren't these reasons and causes being subjected to serious discussion before the people?

"These whys must exist in the minds of all the people and the officials must be asked to come and give answers to these whys. One must ask what forces, whether intrinsic or foreign, are inhibiting the stability of this republic. If these issues are not explained, you the people will become a nation engaged in peripheral, false issues to make you forget your basic problems so that you will not be aware of the basic problems of your country. Therefore, if you have problems and issues from the security and economic standpoint in your own town, you must raise them so that they will be subjected to appraisal in your own presence, so that you yourselves will know why our country is not traveling on the road toward construction in the manner it ought to be and why defense security is not being established."

Referring to the point that one of the most important ingredients of security is that the ruling forces not overstep the limits of the law, the president said "The condition for the establishment of security is that the republican forces be bound to the law and not speak, not wish and not accept what is above or in excess of the law."

The Conditions for Creating Security and Solving the Problem of the Economy

The president added, "If the people's attention is not drawn and attracted toward morale, people's hearts are not united, the social groundwork for discrimination and inequality is not eliminated, and many other ifs, the economy will not get moving nor will real security come into existence."

Referring to the point that a good government is the government which begins first with itself, the president then said "We cannot state that because we need the institutions which existed before and after the revolution we must close our eyes to their errors. The importance of security has constantly been exhibited by the people in the course of 18 months. There is no criterion in which the first subject which is the object of the people's attention is not security and the economy, otherwise what is necessary to establish the republican regime firmly and what the people

want cannot be carried out, and, if we want to get the economy moving, security is necessary and the security that that requires should not be combined with tyranny. It should not be the security of the previous regime--rather, it should be security combined with freedom, so that the morale of our people, religion and morality in society will become clearer to our people every day and will govern their acts more strongly."

In another portion of his speech, the president said "Why are you, who are so concerned about purging a given organization of one or several satanic employees, careless about purging your own social environment? Why don't you purge this environment of rancors, contradictions and hypocrisies? Why do you allow small groups which want to to weaken our republic by weighting down the atmosphere with contradiction and enmity? Why do we not purge our social environment? Why don't you promote the culture of unification in your own society? Therefore if you really want to conduct a purge you must keep the social environment of your won life clean most of all. You should abandon all harsh conduct, all vindictive conduct and all hypocritical actions and strive to create a sound social environment which will be able to bear the burden of the weightier duties of the age."

Continuing his statement, referring to administrative problems and issues and the people's complaints against agencies, the president said, "The people in charge of the administrative agencies say 'They don't let us work' and when I ask who and why they don't, they say 'when we want to work and solve a problem those secret hands come of the sleeve and hit us so hard they paralyze us.' One of our most significant dead ends is that devout, enthusiastic, sincere responsible people come and engage in work but cannot give in to all the expectations of groups and individuals in order to work. Essentially there is a contradiction between working well for everyone and working badly for individuals and groups. When an official wants to work for all the people of a town it is possible that a clash might arise with such individuals and groups."

Parliamentary Representatives Do Not Have the Right To Interfere in Executive Matters

The president then referred to the point that "I said in parliament and say here also that representatives in parliament do not have the right to interfere in executive matters."

He added, "Nobody must act as a representative for departments under the title of your representative, just as the executive agencies do not have the right to interfere in the activities of the legislative power. If there is interference in duties, as the emam's message stated and as historical experience has also proved, the administrative and executive agency will be paralyzed and then the people's affairs will remain suspended."

In responding to the people's slogans of "reveal, reveal," referring to the importance of the role of truthful revelation based on fact, the

president stated, "Whenever I consider it appropriate, as you have seen in the past, I will come and tell you everything. It is clear that in the face of all the domestic and foreign forces which are against us, our only strength, beyond the grace of God, as a manifestation of the grace of God, is the force of you the people; your force is in your unity, your unity is in your awareness, and your awareness is in the revelations of actual fact. Revelation is different from labelling, insulting and agitating."

Throughout the president's speech, the people, stating "God is great, long live Bani Sadr, Bani Sadr, Bani Sadr, we will protect you, Bani Sadr, reveal and we will protect you," in reaffirming the president's speech, expressed feelings regarding him.

Likewise, at a meeting in the presence of Dr Abol Hasan Bani Sadr, the president, with the participation of the officials of Bu Ali Sina University of Hamadan, the problems and issues of this university were subjected to investigation and exchanges of views Thursday evening.

11887
CSO: 4906

REPORTER ANALYZES IRANIAN SITUATION

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 17 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by M. N. Raptis]

[Text] The greatest danger for the besieged Iranian Revolution continues to come from the preparations and plans of the Western countries and the conservative Arab regimes in the explosive area of the Persian Gulf. When we talk about the Westerners, we should distinguish between North Americans on the one hand and Europeans on the other.

Both the former and the latter now desire and are preparing for the quick end of Khomeini in Iran and of the Islamic Revolution. But they differ in the means for achieving this goal.

On the one hand, immediately after their presidential elections, and assuming the burning question of their hostages will not have been solved at least by then, the North Americans are figuring on going over once again to purely military operations against Iran.

And this will be done not only from their bases in the Indian Ocean and their fleet at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, but also in combined operations with certain Arab countries, beginning with Egypt, of course. But recently the new Iraq-Saudi Arabia axis has intervened in these plans--an alignment which is being promoted especially by the Europeans, including France and Germany. The Europeans would prefer the fall of Khomeini to be the result of action by the Arabs, behind which the members of the Atlantic Alliance could hide. Whereas the Americans are trying to have the Arabs be more or less their rear-guard, so that the fall of Khomeini can be seen as tantamount to the dominance of American leadership in the sector of petroleum once again.

On the other hand the Frenchmen and the Germans, who are now seeking as well a political and even military "united Europe," would prefer to give prominence to the conservative Arabs--especially the Iranian and Saudi ones--within the framework of their new international strategy.

This strategy aims at a priveleged association between a "united Europe" and the Arab and African countries, thus thrusting aside to some extent America's influence over these countries.

The weaknesses of the Islamic Revolution in Iran are being exploited to the utmost now by the Westerners in order to conceal and justify their aggressive plans and their feverish preparations for their conclusive attack against the Khomeini regime.

But this person is still counting on the inexhaustible revolutionary potential of Iran, which--assuming a finally open military intervention--will surely manifest itself in the form of a general armed uprising against the invaders. Reliable observers maintain that the Westerners and the conservative Arab regimes are grievously mistaken if they now believe that "chaos" prevails in Iran and that the regime is collapsing. "Chaos" does exist, but it is a matter of the special unavoidable chaos of every great revolution in the phase of its continuing tempestuous development.

Despite its "Islamic" excesses, which deprive it of valuable allies, the Khomeini regime continues to be able to mobilize millions of the masses against imperialism whenever it chooses. The plebian masses of the country, poor people of the cities and countryside, as well as a very significant portion of the women and youth, do not view these Islamic excesses through the spectacles of the Westerners, but rather as a return to the springs of their particular national culture, as a very valuable revelation and gaining of their specific national and cultural individuality.

The Western nations should understand that our world continues to be very profoundly heterogenous in terms of its values, its ideals, and its ways of thinking, which is the result of a one-sided competitive development over the centuries.

Very profound and dangerous misunderstandings, and even veritable mutual unintelligibility between the different cultures, emerge from this situation.

The chief characteristic of the present phase of the Iranian Revolution is not the dominance of Islamism in the form represented by the Islamic Republic Party of Ayatollah Beheshti, which in any case is a weak dominance, but rather its strongly anti-imperialistic dimension, which is supported by the overwhelming majority of the plebian masses.

Perhaps only the Soviets understand this reality. And perhaps for this reason they will win ultimately the fight for Iran--a battle of worldwide strategic significance.

The Soviets are waiting, untroubled and almost with certitude, for their chance in Iran. Within the country their party, the Tudeh, calmly continues to give 100-percent support to the regime of Khomeini, despite the

constant attacks and persecutions which it suffers. Abroad, Moscow is following a more complex policy. On the one hand, it is strengthening its military positions in Afghanistan, which it is definitely not going to abandon, as well as along the border with Iran, so as to be fully prepared at any moment to deal with the consequences which would result, for example, from an invasion of this country by the Western nations. But at the same time it is continuing to strengthen Iraq with arms, which is the chief enemy of the Khomeini regime in the Arab and Moslem sphere. Thus it is maintaining a constant, ingeniously applied pressure on this regime, which is now inclined to intensify its anti-Soviet campaign within the framework of its more general anti-Imperialist fight.

A struggle by Khomeini on three fronts, against the Westerners, the conservative Arabs, and the Soviets, seems hopeless and pointless. But no great revolution "thinks logically," having above all confidence in its own powers and in the influence which it can exert on the relevant international sector.

Khomeini, who continues to be the true Bonaparte of the centralist Jacobin policy of authority in the country, as the super-arbitrator between its various socio-political movements, is counting on the uprising of the Moslem plebian and anti-imperialist masses in countries such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt in case of foreign military intervention in Iran. Perhaps here he is laboring under a slight delusion, even though the armed uprising of the Iranian masses against any invasion or internal reactionary coup must be considered to be more or less certain and inevitable. Because aside from the enormous authority which Khomeini himself retains at all times, one should also consider the following factor which has been systematically ignored by the Westerners: In the state of affairs as it now exists in Iran, there is not yet a unique centralized State authority. There continues to exist an immense network of "committees" in the factories, in the neighborhoods, and in the villages, which is largely autonomous and able to mobilize millions of armed individuals at a moment's notice. This is the chief strength of the revolution.

It is against this that the future coup leaders or foreign invaders, or the two in conjunction, will have to fight. In a few months at most, the curtain will rise on a new bloody episide of the Iranian Revolution. The polymorphous foreign and domestic counter-revolution will inevitably and fatally venture to bring Iran back under the control of the West. With them, "peaceful coexistence" is ruled out. It is then also that the hour will chime for new developments in Soviet policy. In Iran, the fate not only of Khomeini's style of "Islamic Revolution," but also more generally of "peace" or war in our world, is being gambled. But perhaps also the fate of the revolution itself, which at some moment will need to cast off its personal, transitional garment of Islamic cassocks and black chadors.

12114

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FREEDOM MOVEMENT TO BE REVIVED BY FORMER PREMIER

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 20 Aug 80 p 7

[Text] In an interview, former prime minister and present Majles representative, Mehdi Bazargan, talking about Nazih, said: "I should talk about three Nazihs, the present-day Nazih, Nazih as managing-director of the NIOC and the Nazih of prerevolution era. All his friends in the Freedom Movement, members of the provisional government and myself condemn the present-day Nazih, believing that his activities are contrary to the Islamic principles and humanity and defies simple logic."

During the period he served as managing-director of the NIOC, Nazih was able, despite all the odds and problems that existed at that time, to get the work done and run his organization, even though he was not free from criticism, some of which I did bring to his attention.

In prerevolution era, Nazih had cooperated with Dr Mosaddeq and was the architect of the open letter by the Freedom Movement to the shah, the very same letter that many people would not have even dared to read at that time. He also had cooperated in the year preceding the revolution and after the revolution had become victorious.

Regarding Admiral Madani and Ayat, Bazargan said: "Madani did not appear before the Majles and I believe that was his greatest mistake. He should have appeared before the Majles and defended himself, like three other representatives. Had he appeared before the Investigating Committee, like the other three, who defended themselves and their credentials were approved, it is possible that his credential would have been approved too.

"About Mr Ayat, I must say that I did not know him and my knowledge about him came from what I had read about him in newspapers and from the report prepared by the Investigating Committee. Later on I abstained from voting when his case was put to vote."

In conclusion, the former prime minister said that Freedom Movement will be revived with a much better organization than before.

On cooperation with the leftist groups, Bazargan said: "Already there is a friendly and close cooperation. Their cooperation with us depends on how much time they are going to have. There are no sound bases for that." He added that there will be a newspaper, directly or indirectly. [sic] He said that most of the Freedom Movement members had held positions in the provisional government and had pledged themselves to the imam not to take part in any party activities.

9561
CSO: 4906

'TOUGH MEASURES' AGAINST ISRAEL DEMANDED BY IRAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 Aug 80 p 10

[Text] The Foreign Ministry announced in a notice that the severance of relations with Israel's friends is not sufficient. In this notice the Foreign Ministry announced its positions vis-a-vis countries friendly to Israel in connection with the declaration of Jerusalem as Israel's capital. The text of the notice is as follows:

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. As the Zionists' greedy desires soar to the so-called legalization of their aggressions in Jerusalem and the declaration of Jerusalem as Israel's capital, the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has taken initiative in the international arena and has repeatedly announced its positions based on the complete rejection of this aggression. In particular it has announced its positions in sessions of the Conference of Islamic States and the United Nations which were convened in order to examine this problem and the national rights of the Palestinian nation. Unfortunately some Islamic countries have tried and are trying, vis-a-vis this plot, to threaten those persons supporting Israel's decision solely with the severance of diplomatic relations.

At the head of this plot is the fascist government of Iraq, which in words has always raised an uproar and displayed itself as revolutionary, and in actions has cooperated with and helped reactionaries and U.S. imperialism. The experience of recent years has shown that Iraq, in spite of not having visible diplomatic relations with the United States, has spared no effort in cooperation with the reactionaries and accomplices of the United States, and has always plotted against and continues to plot against those who are battling the United States. Examples of this are the murders of Palestinian leaders by its agents in recent years; the hostility it has displayed to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the anticolonialist Arab nations; the great effort it made to support the deposed shah's rule during its fall; the bringing of Farah Pahlavi's puppet show to Iraq; and the restrictions it brought about on Iran's revolutionary leader, leading eventually to his expulsion from Iraq. It even brought pressure of Kuwait's government to not accept

him. However, God willing, an enemy can become a source of good. "They deceive, and deceive God, and God will give the deceivers their bounty" [Koranic verse]; the revolution was victorious.

The Foreign Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Iran has shown its positions in confrontation with this plot. It reminds you that the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel's friends is not sufficient. The economic channels to those who aid Israel must also be closed. Therefore the Islamic Republic of Iran calls for the revision of trade with Israel's friends, halting the export of strategic goods such as petroleum, and the removal of financial investments from countries friendly to Israel, the United States foremost among them. The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that this parasitical growth can be destroyed only by cutting the lines of nourishment. Therefore, it once again warns the Islamic community that severance of diplomatic relations with those governments which recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is necessary, but not sufficient, and that if this action is enough for them, it is nothing other than a cover-up of their cooperation with Israel's friends.

9597
CSO: 4906

BEHESHTI'S COMMENTS ON NEW CABINET, MESSAGE TO IRELAND

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 Aug 80 p 10

[Text] According to a report from a PARS NEWS AGENCY reporter, Dr Beheshti, in reply to a question about activities of opposition groups and espionage organizations against the Islamic Republic of Iran, said: You observe that I have received no special report about details of this sort of activity, either outside or inside Iren. But as you know, great opposition exists to our Islamic revolution in Iran... These activities are only a part of our enemies' plots, particularly those of the United States, some European countries and eastern and western countries, against the victorious Iranian revolution. But our extraordinary good fortune is that our people are sufficiently aware of the plots of these enemies. I hope that the enemies of the Iranian Islamic revolution will realize that they have no chance whatsoever for acceptance in the Iranian nation.

Ayatollah Beheshti, in reply to a question about his message to the people of Ireland, a people who attach great importance to their religion, and who are in a good position for actions against the superpowers which have put them under pressure for some time, said: All people do not necessarily have to follow one special path. Fundamentally we believe that people must move in the right path. However, as long as faith in religion can place vital instruction of a special order based on faith in God in the hands of people, people may follow that path.

I do not know if the Christians of Ireland can display such an order and system or not. My message to the Irish people was that they intensify their efforts in the struggle against imperialism and for the purpose of preserving their land and people. I hope that the Irish people will be victorious in the near future.

The president of the Supreme Court, in reply to a question about whether Iran will establish normal relations with countries which halt support for imperialists and their decisions, said: In order to acquaint them with the Islamic revolution it is possible that even offices in these countries will be inaugurated.

Dr Beheshti, while pointing to the probable composition of the future cabinet, said: Usually the prime minister must freely select all the ministers, and afterwards the president officially confirms the ministers one by one. For this task they (the prime minister and the president) will have a sort of agreement in this area.

It was asked whether or not Majles representatives can become ministers at the present time.

Ayatollah Beheshti replied: They cannot be representatives and ministers at the same time. But they can leave their Majles seat to take a ministerial post, and afterwards, if they do not wish to continue their work as ministers, they can return to the Majles. However, this matter requires a new law. Ayatollah Beheshti, in reply to the question as to whether or not Raja'i, the prime minister, will consult with the Islamic Republican Party in the selection of his cabinet's ministers, said: We will ask all Islamic revolutionary groups, including the Islamic Republican Party, to give their recommendations in this area.

9597
CSO: 4906

ETHNIC PARTIES GIVEN LITTLE CHANCE IN ELECTIONS

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 17 Jul 80 p 4

[Article by Avi Bettelheim: "Under Existing Electoral Methods There Is Little Chance for Ethnic Lists"]

[Text] Eliahu Elyashar, chairman of the Sephardic List (which won four seats in the first Knesset and two in the second) and for many years the president of the Sephardic Committee in Jerusalem, is the father of the ethnic party in Israel, and one of its success stories, until now, in the attempt of ethnic parties to gain seats in the Knesset.

Most of the attempts have failed. From the third Knesset until today, no ethnic party has succeeded in winning a seat in the Israeli legislative body.

The Sephardic List and the Yemenite Union have not succeeded in making the cutoff point in Knesset elections (the Yemenites had one seat in the first two Knessets).

In elections for the fourth Knesset, the "North African Likud," the "Sephardic National Party," the "National Sephardic Union," and the "Yemenite Faction" all failed.

"The Religious Sephardic Party" failed in elections for the fifth Knesset; "Young Israel, Sepharadim and Oriental Communities" failed in their attempt to get into the sixth Knesset, and in the race for the seventh Knesset no ethnic party won a seat.

Four ethnic parties failed in their attempt to get into the eighth Knesset: the "Yemenite List in Israel," "the Blue and White Panthers," "the Black Panthers," and the "Democratic Israelis." Failing in their bid for the ninth Knesset were "Bay Yisrael--the League of Yemenites"; "the Zionist Panthers"; and "Khofesh" headed by Shalom Kohen.

Eliahu Elyashar, who is 81 years old, says that under the present electoral method, there is no hope for the ethnic party, principally because of the

absence of personal contact between the voter and the one elected. "As early as 1935, I demanded the introduction in Israel of a regional, personal, majority electoral method. I claimed then, as I do now, that such a method will lead to national unity. The one elected will have to pay attention to his region, and to be concerned with his voters. If this method were to be introduced, I would not care if all 120 Knesset members were ashkenazim, because this method would force them to work. If they did not work, they would not be re-elected."

Yehuda Toledano, chairman of the "oded" movement, does not see any prospect for the ethnic party "because the public which has to vote for them does not want to cut off its national membership. At the moment of casting his vote, the voter from a poor neighborhood prefers Israel, and only after his neighborhood. This is the reason that "Oded" has not raised the ethnic banner." Toledano also fears that as a result of the social deterioration in Israel, the ethnic party may find itself drawn into a violent and dangerous struggle. Following the failure of several ethnic parties in elections for the eighth Knesset, their chiefs adopted a new tactic: integration within existing parties, and conducting a socio-ethnic struggle from within. Charlie Biton entered Rakah as a representative of the panthers; Sa'adia Merciano joined the Sheli camp; Mordekhai Algarbeli and Viktor Tayar joined Dash.

Yet even this attempt did not prove itself. Beyond internal disputes, crises, and splintering, the representatives of the ethnic movements did not succeed in changing things. The extent of their success in solving social problems by means of legislation was very limited.

"All of those activists who represented the ethnic parties, at the moment that they entered the Knesset were swallowed up by the larger parties, and they became more Catholic than the Catholics themselves," says Eliahu Elyashar with some bitterness.

Mordekhai Ben-Porat was a past Knesset member on behalf of the Alinement and Rafi, and was among the leaders of the Iraqi Immigrants Union who ran in the last Knesset elections on the "Ze" list--the Movement for Social-Zionist Renaissance" (which did not make the cutoff point). Mordekhai Ben-Porat adds: "The integration of activists of the ethnic movement in existing parties is not effective. The Knesset operates on the basis of pressure groups. Justice and values do not walk on two feet, but rather according to the number of raised hands."

Ben-Porat's solution: "Some serious people in the country must rise to organize a movement on the basis of meeting face to face social and economic problems. I am sure that such a body could attract a lot of votes. All of the neighborhood people who in 1977 were sure that Begin and Likud would save them would now vote for such a body, on the condition that it be a serious body. The ethnic parties which have appeared so far in Israel--with the exception of Eliahu Elyashar's movement--have not been serious."

"I am a citizen of the country. I am an Israeli, and I am not ashamed of the fact that I am Morrocan," says MK Algarbeli ("Oded"). "The state of Israel has given the orientals the right to vote, but it still does not understand that the oriental communities have their own Berl Katznelson." The heads of this new social-political movement hasten to add that they speak of a Zionist party open to every man of conscience. "It is not an ethnic party," emphasize Algarbeli, Merciano, and Savisa, who two days ago convened their people at...Lichtenstein House.

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CSO: 4805

GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO FURTHER CAUSE IN U.S.

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 14 Jul 80 p 5

[Article by Yuval Elitsur: "Elections in America and Promises in Israel"]

[Text] After last week's cabinet session, a short communique was issued which aroused particular interest among foreign correspondents: it was reported that the cabinet had conducted a short discussion regarding the exploitation of elections in the U.S. to advance Israel's interests, and it was decided to hand over the subject to one of the committees.

The idea that the electoral wars in the U.S. present an opportunity which appears only once in four years to gain for Israel explicit promises from candidates for the American presidency, on issues which are essential to Israel, is not a new idea. The new twist is that this time the Israeli government is doing less and talking more.

It may be assumed that when the electoral season and the conventions of the two large parties in the U.S. draw nigh, the Israeli foreign minister--perhaps with the advice of the prime minister--would issue instructions to the Israeli embassy in Washington regarding the most important objectives for Israel to accomplish in the following months. Embassy workers would establish direct contacts with members of Congress, or by means of Jewish leaders, so as to clarify what was "pressing" Israel, and what Israel expected of its friends in both political parties. These would be sophisticated contacts, in which the two sides would understand one another, without declarations, and sometimes without even direct contact between them.

We do not know if ever in the past the Israeli cabinet explicitly discussed this issue, for the ministers would be alert to the danger that the Israeli government would be accused of intervention in the U.S. elections, and so these things were not publicized. What is certain is that in the past, the issue occupied formulators of Israeli policy to a greater extent than today when they are preoccupied with other problems. The very fact that Minister of Religion, Aharon Abu-Khatsira, saw fit to raise the issue at a cabinet session raises the suspicion that there was an oversight of this issue, which in the past would have been obvious.

The four day visit of John Anderson, one of the three candidates, last week in Israel proves that more than ever, the American candidates are sensitive to Israel's desires and to the positions of its friends in the U.S. Anderson's visit constitutes a precedent: never before has such a visit been made by a candidate, such a short time before election day. The success of the visit, which might also bring to us the Republican candidate, Ronald Reagen, could mark the beginning of a tradition.

Every expert on electoral affairs in the U.S. knows that a candidate has never won the presidency without victory in the two key states of California and New York. President Carter lost both states in the democratic primaries. The victor in both was his opponent, Senator Edward Kennedy. If the president loses both of these states in the general elections, his prospect of re-election is very slim. Similarly, the prospects of Ronald Reagen will be reduced if most of the voters in California and New York vote for John Anderson or for Jimmy Carter.

This is the importance of the "Jewish vote" in the elections this year. Nationally, the Jewish vote constitutes no more than 4 or 5 percent of the total voting public, but in New York their weight approaches 20 percent of the total, a not insignificant amount in that key state.

In contrast to what is believed in Israel, the candidates in the U.S. do not like to spread around promises, especially if they believe that they will win and will have to deliver on the promises. They are forced into making declarations, so as not to trail their opponents. This year there is a feeling that in spite of the importance of the Jewish vote, the candidates will be more restrained than ever in making promises for Israel. The fact that the U.S. did not exercise its veto in the UN Security Council vote on Jerusalem, without provoking the outrage of the Republican or independent candidate, and the fact that the two other candidates did not jump on President Carter when it became known that he intended to authorize (after the election) the sale of sophisticated equipment for F-15 planes in Saudi Arabia, should have lit a warning light for us.

Even John Anderson, whose promises require less, has been careful in his expressions, even while he was in Jerusalem. The transfer of the American embassy to Jerusalem? Yes, but only after the vision of the end of days is realized, and the peace process in the Middle East comes to full fruition. The area in which the friends of Israel can change this disturbing trend of restraint in expression, and open a competition which calls for candidates' promises, is particularly in the area of aid and economic cooperation. In these areas, the candidates are less exposed to criticism for spreading "irresponsible" promises in terms of U.S. interest in the Middle East, and they also risk less opposition pressure from oil companies and business men. In Israeli terms, promises in this area could be of more practical significance than theoretical declarations on political issues which can have varying interpretations immediately after the candidate assumes the office of president.

The "obligations" with respect to Israel, the economic issues where the declarations of the candidates can be of great importance, and where the prospects of implementation are much greater, must include: a plan for "erasing debts"; the possibility of a transfer of technology, especially in the defense industry; American government aid in the development (jointly) of an airplane, and of other weapons systems; and American government support for research in the area of energy and the establishment of nuclear power stations in Israel. Likewise, Israel must exploit this non-recurring opportunity to salvage its oil agreement with the U.S. and to extract from each of the candidates a clear declaration that if Israel will have to pay a particularly high price for its oil, this will be equivalent to oil being unavailable, and the U.S. will have to supply oil to Israel.

During the Nixon period, Israel obtained from the presidential candidate a promise of long term economic aid. This turned out to be an empty promise; Congress had to authorize every dollar of aid. It is much easier to operate in the area of reducing the burden of loan repayment, which will leave in Israeli hands much greater sums for the development of its economy. It is not seemly for Israel to raise such a suggestion, but it would be different if such a proposal were to come from one of the presidential candidates.

Similarly, every one of the ideas proposed here have enormous importance for Israel and significant prospects of being realized, if included in the platform of one or the other of the candidates, or what is even more desirable--if included in the platforms of all of the candidates.

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CSO: 4805

HARD-LINE POLICY SEEN ENCOURAGING EXTREMISM

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Jul 80 p 11

[Article by Yehuda Litani: "Operation: 'The Fate of Eretz Yisra'el'"]

[Text] To the observer of events in the Territories it seems as of late, that most of the processes which took place in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip during the 3 years of the Likud government administration, are about to intensify and become sharper in the final year of this session of the government. Both sides (Jews and Arabs) sense that the period up to the coming elections of the Knesset is an exceedingly important period--almost fateful.

This sense is particularly acute on the part of the head of the government, Menahem Begin, and his following in the government and in the Likud. As far as they are concerned, the period from now to the elections is a period of struggle over the "fate of Eretz Yisra'el."

New Settlements

Regarding the chairman of the ministerial committee for settlement affairs Ariel Sharon, the "struggle for Eretz Yisra'el," focuses on the establishment of more and more settlements for the purpose of whose construction more and more land must be expropriated. Despite reductions in the budgets of the government ministries, Ariel Sharon is planning to establish many settlements this coming year. This month alone, the bulldozers are scheduled to begin work in preparation of the land for 2 new settlements in the Katif Block in the Gaza Strip. In the near future, setting up construction of a third settlement in this block will begin, likewise, the establishment of a regional center for the Katif Block, which is situated mainly on government lands and these are not in abundance in the Gaza Strip. The residents of the Gaza Strip, headed by Mayor Rashad al-Shawa argue that the reserve of government lands should be utilized for the needs of the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and particularly for the rehabilitation of refugees, whereas the government of Israel is taking this minuscule reserve for its own purposes.

Ariel Sharon's plan includes establishment of a block of settlements (in addition to the 3 that are to be established in the upcoming weeks, the Minister of Agriculture wishes to set up at least another 3-4 settlements in this block--all this in addition to the 3 settlements which presently exist in this block) in the form of an "L" in the south of the Gaza Strip. The block will be joined to Israel by a system of north-south roads. The plan to expand this block is intended mainly to create a buffer zone between Egypt and the Gaza Strip which will return--in accordance with the agreement with Israel--in approximately another 2 years to the international boundary. Similarly, Ariel Sharon is planning to establish at least another 2 Israeli settlements in the north of the Gaza Strip, adjacent to its border with Israel.

Additional settlements (totalling 6) will be established in accordance with the plan of the chief of the settlement department in the Jewish Agency, Matityahu Drobles, in the Jericho Corridor, with the aim of sealing the corridor against the possibility of its transfer to Jordan which was intended to create a physical connection between Jordan and East Jerusalem. The first settlement in this corridor is now in the final stages of work, and it will shortly be transferred to the settlers. Similarly, new settlements are planned during the coming year in the south of Mount Hebron, on both sides of the Green Line, in the northwest of the West Bank, in the heart of Samaria and in the Ufra area northeast of Ramallah (where during the coming weeks 2 new settlements are to be established).

As usual, the question remains if indeed all of the plans are to be carried out, since they are presently on paper only. However, even if only half of the planned settlements are established, this will be an important achievement for the government--in its own eyes, of course. The goal for the coming year is to firmly establish more settlements. As a result, less attention will be given to planning and to the actual prospects for the duration of settlement over the long range. Ariel Sharon--as well as Menahem Begin and his cohorts--believes that every additional settlement is an additional barrier to the partition of the country.

Likewise on the matter of the transfer of the prime minister's office to East Jerusalem. Although the U.S. ambassador in Israel, Samuel Lewis, threatened during a dialogue with the prime minister that both he and his colleagues from Britain and Germany will be unable to meet with the prime minister of Israel in his office in East Jerusalem, preparations for the transfer have not been halted (perhaps because Mr Begin knows that in the end the ambassadors of the West will be forced to go there if they wish to speak with him). The prime minister reacted sharply to the "advice" of the British foreign minister, Lord Carrington not to transfer his office to East Jerusalem. When King David transferred his capital from Hebron to Jerusalem--said Mr Begin--the civilized world had not yet heard of a city named London. This sharp retort of the prime minister, while he was still in the hospital, is evidence of the intractability of the decision to transfer his office to East Jerusalem into the building whose construction was recently completed.

In the Supreme Court the petition of the East Jerusalem (Jordanian) Electric Company against the government of Israel, to prevent the government of Israel's domination of the company, is being considered. The petitioners allege that Israel wishes to take control of the company in order to control the sources of energy of the prospective autonomous region. In their view, this is another symbol which the current government wishes to break down. The company represented a specific independence to the Arab inhabitants of the city. This is the sole venture in Jerusalem managed and operated by Arabs, and now--they allege--Israel has taken it too.

The Solution: A Flogging Stick

In addition to all this Israel has, in recent months, been taking a hard line with the Territories. Three personages from the Mount Hebron area have been deported. The military government prevents political meetings among the mayors and members of the Committee for National Direction, and prevents meetings among persons in the Gaza Strip and on the West Bank. Houses are being blown up. It appears that even this process will continue and will intensify since the present government has no positive solution--to resolve the matter of autonomy--on the issue of inhabitants of the Territories, and nothing is easier than utilization of the flogging stick.

The mayor of Nablus, Bassam Shak'a, said on Saturday--in remarks he made to the members of the professional societies of his city--that the Israeli authorities are at a loss. His perception is that the attacks upon himself and Karim Khalaf (both of whom accuse the government of Israel with responsibility for the attacks upon them) demonstrated this loss. It appears as if every hard line policy and every attack on him only serves to increase Bassam Shak'a's self-confidence, and the tone of his proclamations become sharper from one time to the next. Bassam Shak'a is now top leader in the occupied Territories--not only since his maiming--particularly because of the Shak'a incident: the decision of the Israeli authorities to deport him and the nullification of that decision. In Bassam Shak'a's opinion, his deportation was prevented because of the "proud stance" of the West Bank's inhabitants. Due to the strong arm policy adopted by the military government, the extremists (of the ilk of Shak'a and Khalaf) are becoming even more extreme, and the moderates (of the ilk of Elias Frij) must "straighten up" in accordance with the new line and take a more extreme line.

Since the success of the petitioners from the village of Rujayb to evacuate the settlers of Elon Moreh from their lands, hundreds of petitions have been submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly from rural areas of Judea and Samaria. It appears now as if the number of petitions from inhabitants of the villages to the Supreme Court will increase--from both Ariel Sharon's plans to establish new settlements as well as from the conclusions of the committee under his leadership, which investigated the situations of the lands in 8 settlements, and decided to expand them.

Against the foreign television cameras and the searching eyes from the Western countries (and particularly the U.S., Britain and France) the struggle in the Territories will continue between the establishers of the settlements on the one hand, and the owners of the lands on the other. Despite the strong arm policy and the flogging stick, agitation is increasing in the Territories. The severe outcome of all this is the serious crumbling within the camp of the moderates in the Territories.

It is difficult to believe that an accretion of settlements, transfer of government agencies to East Jerusalem and failure of the autonomy talks will prevent the partition of the land of Israel in the long run. It is clear that (because of those) during the coming year, the already tense atmosphere between the Jews and the Arabs in the land of Israel will be fouled.

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SINAI GIVEAWAY AND SETTLEMENT POLICY DEPLORED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 24 Jul 80 p 7

[Article by Ehud Ben-Ezer: "Two Time Bombs--West Bank and Gaza"]

[Text] The Likud administration is leaving behind it two time bombs on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. The one, which practically is unrelated to the administration, but which the administration has done a great deal to strengthen, and the second--almost entirely within the purview of the administration, and also because of which all of us shall suffer.

The first time bomb is the Arabs of the Territories. At present something is beginning to become increasingly clear, which was suspected by the pessimists (even though they are "doves") from the very start: that the entire matter of peace was perhaps nothing more than a glittering Egyptian exercise in misrepresentation (and perhaps an American one as well), in order to leave us without most of the relatively uninhabited areas (Sinai) and with all of the Arabs under our control (the West Bank and the Gaza Strip). Furthermore, leaving on the assumption that the Palestinian question not only would not calm down after return of the Sinai--but instead would become explosive. The result would present us with an awesome dilemma: to remain with those territories and, at the same time fearing that a Cyprus Syndrome would take place making life unbearable, putting an end to tourism and to the remnants of immigration, and increase emigration (of Jews, of course, not of Arabs), vis-a-vis the alternative--to rid ourselves of the Territories as early as possible, to withdraw from most of the areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This would be prompted by an obvious fear that in so doing, we shall bring about a Lebanon Syndrome in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, by the absence therein of a central administration relying upon a single military, such as the situation is today.

The dizzy dream of Begin is to "outwit" the Egyptians by demonstrating generosity bordering on frivolity in the Sinai, in the forlorn hope that he will succeed, in effect, in annexing the West Bank and the Gaza Strip while ignoring their demographic status. This dream is going up in the smoke of the shootings and the bombings which are increasing day by day,

and are causing people who previously would never have considered emigrating from our land, and who carried the burden of building and wars--to begin to ask themselves and their families if, in fact, this is the Israel in which they wish to spend their lives

If these perceptions were caused solely by the intensity of the Arab opposition to our existence, they would not be a factor in the undermining of the national consensus. The history of Jewish settlement in this land indicates that Arab opposition in almost all instances brought about a strengthening of the national consensus. The problem is, that in a significant portion of the public which is considered stable (and bearing the burden), there is the sense that the extremism in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is additionally and mainly a direct outcome of Jewish acts of extremism; that the entire settlement movement is a chimera and an act of political lunacy.

Thus, Sadat is leaving us the Palestinian time bomb in the occupied Territories, while the Likud is leaving us, after its upset in the coming elections, a second time bomb hazardous and totally of "domestic" manufacture--the private army of the Gush Emunim in the Occupied Territories. Anyone observing the many Yeshiva [Talmudical Academy] youths circulating in our streets, particularly in Jerusalem, outfitted with skullcaps and bearing automatic rifles (most of whom, one senses, have never even served in the military but rather acquired the arms directly from the regional defense unit in the occupied Territories), cannot help feeling apprehensive about the future. For as long as the Likud Administration is allegedly governing and yet, is being led around by the nose by these somnabulists (who are polarizing us vis-a-vis the entire world), there is but one consolation--their weapons have not yet been directed toward Jews. What will happen when an alignment government takes over? In addition to the dismantling of the Palestinian time bomb in the Territories, it will also have to dismantle this Jewish time bomb. In other words, to remove most of the settlements in the heart of the West Bank, which were established during the period of the Likud administration, and to return at least the framework of the Allon Plan. The latter remains to this day, the security minimum or optimum that Israel may indulge itself; if it does not wish to expand or to contract to the point of self-destruction from one direction or the other.

Can an alignment government dismantle these settlements and their semi-private army? And what will the NRP instigate? What will the extremists of the Likud be shouting as they sit in the opposition? And who among the personages of the alignment will be able to head up a government which will be required to make decisions as difficult as these, so that to avoid a civil war the State will be brought to the brink of a civil war? Even Ben Gurion would find it difficult to survive this, however, he certainly would not have permitted an internal situation over which we do have control, to reach such a point.

Our land is becoming an untenable place for the human base that is most important to its existence--it is most stable from the age subsequent to service in the military and during the two or three decades of life following, prior to old age. This is not a country whose Arab citizens are fleeing from it. This is not a country whose elderly are abandoning it, nor whose rabbis and yeshiva students, nor even its disturbed and lunatic Jews who apparently are the only ones being ingathered most recently from several points on the globe--this is a country whose capable men are despairing of it. For they are the ones who are paying the price of the wars and current security situation, the swollen bureaucracy, and the deteriorating economy--from which the new finance minister does not prevent several political leeches from sucking munificent budgets for the purposes of somnabulistic settlement, for support of the needs of religious institutions, and questionable economic adventures for the favorites of the ruling party.

The aforementioned people in the country are bound, with torn hearts, to 'vote with their feet'. Or, they will one day arrive at the awesome conclusion that against the caprices of the Gush Emunim and the Rabbi Kehane people--who circulate armed with legal weapons in the occupied territories--it will be necessary (it has already been necessary) to use force. Otherwise, the state will fall victim to the hands of an extremist minority which is a cruel caricature of the Zionist idea, and to a subversion of the remnant of the national consensus.

Anyone not wishing the destruction of this state, anyone wishing that there be a shred of hope for a continuation of the peace process (extremely fragile, as well as hazardous), must stand up and shout from every possible platform--that the present administration can be changed, before the situation in Israel and in the Territories degenerates to a citizens' war not only between us and the Arabs, but also between Jews.

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ANALYST REJECTS PERES' JORDANIAN OPTION

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Jul 80 p 9

[Article by Yorem Aridor: "The Deception and the Interceptor"]

[Excerpt] The leader of the opposition MK [Member of Knesset] Shimon Peres is going all out to publicize the Jordanian option as the magic solution in his hand to achieve peace with Hussein. Within the framework of his option he agrees to transfer to Hussein, on condition of demilitarization, sections of the Land of Israel--in Judea, Samaria and Gaza but not Jerusalem. Peres even proposes, if it will not be possible to sign a peace treaty, to arrive at an interim agreement on the basis of transferring areas in the land of Israel to Hussein. He even made known that he has a basis for assuming that King Hussein will be prepared for talks stemming from these proposals.

The importance of the issue and the personality of the proposer require a detailed analysis of the proposal, particularly from the standpoint on which MK Peres bases his position: the pragmatic test. From this standpoint, it should be mentioned that MK Peres still opposes establishment of a Palestinian state west of Jordan, and finds no contradiction between his support of the Jordanian option and his opposition to the formation of a Palestinian state. However, this contradiction, as will be demonstrated, still exists. If MK Peres is able to realize the Jordanian option, its implementation, haphazardly, will bring about the formation of a Palestinian state and the demilitarization will be of no value. This allegation is amenable to clarification and to demonstration, on the basis of MK Peres' own arguments and reasons which have been publicly advanced by him. For this purpose it is necessary to return to another proposal by MK Peres, which is also related to the Jordanian option. In an essay which MK Peres publicized in YEDI'OT AHARONOT (6 Apr) he supported, under certain conditions, "self-determination" for the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza. In this essay, Peres expressed support for the solution of the Palestinian problem by Jordan "including also the majority of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza." Peres even expressed a hope that the Jordanian Palestinian state would convert to a democracy and added: "I hope that the Arab democracy will afford them self-determination."

A Question of Time

There are proposals which exist in the realm between MAPAM and SHELI--since the Labor Party has yet to adopt for itself the concept of self-determination which is identified by its characteristic and result as establishment of a Palestinian state. In reference to this proposal there can and should be a few questions propounded: Why particularly in Jordan will the first Arab democracy arise? Secondly, how will MK Peres be able to oppose the preparation of a plebiscite among the inhabitants of Judea, Samaria and Gaza--with the argument that a plebiscite is opposed to democracy? Third, how will MK Peres be able to oppose their proclaiming of a separate Palestinian state--with the argument that they are permitted to determine themselves only in accordance with what he, MK Peres, desires? Fourth, how will MK Peres be able to oppose the setting of Arafat at their head--with the argument that in the name of democracy they may reject Hussein but they may not choose anyone else whom they desire to replace him?

These questions suffice to demonstrate that between the granting of "self-determination" and between the formation of the Palestinian State there is nothing but a question of time. Indeed, Mr Peres in proposing the Jordanian option understands that when that is implemented he will not be able to evade "self-determination" which is why he proposed it as well, but that it would already be a Palestinian State.

In order to demonstrate the qualitative connection between the Jordanian option and the "self-determination," that is, the Palestinian State, it is not necessary to rely solely on MK Peres. Even King Hussein says that specifically, and leaves no room for deception or doubt on this issue. He said this at the conference of Arab foreign ministers in Amman on 5 July 80 when he proclaimed that the PLO terrorist organization is "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians" and that there will be self-determination on the Palestinian land, including Jerusalem, after the withdrawal of Israel. He said that also on 11 July 80, at the above mentioned conference, when he called for establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in Gaza. Hussein even rejected (on 2 March 80 in an announcement on the French station Europe 1, and on 30 May 80 in the newspaper AL-MAJALLA which appears in London) any idea that sovereignty over the "Conquered Territories" would be transferred to Jordan. That is to say: there is no discussion here of temporary and coincidental tactics, but of a consistent line, repeated and recurring proclamations of Hussein that the option called "Jordanian" does not exist. The outcome of the effectuation of this option is a Palestinian state--in 2 stages: Stage A--Peres transfers to Hussein. State B--Hussein transfers to Arafat.

By supporting the Palestinian option, King Hussein has entirely negated the compromise territorial proposals of the Alignment. We know What Hussein said about the Allon Plan: Decidedly unacceptable. The ideas of MK Peres regarding territorial compromise in the land of Israel as basis for a peace treaty were defined by Hussein as "naive." This definition was given by

him immediately after a visit of Peres to Washington and his meeting with President Carter. The consistency of this approach of Hussein is also shown by the experience of 10 years from 1967 to 1977, when the alignment was in power and advocated territorial compromise in the land of Israel without the formation of a Palestinian state, as the basis for a peace treaty. It is a fact that there was no peace agreement achieved with Jordan, and the compromise did not materialize.

Peace did not come although the Alignment wished it--because there never was, nor is there now, a line in Judea and Samaria along which it is possible to agree on a territorial compromise, not with Hussein nor with Sadat as well (which is why there is no such line even in the peace treaty with Egypt). I would make another citation: "I find it very difficult to see a line on the West Bank that will satisfy the Arabs and the Jews at the same time. Whoever proposes a line--is proposing a new conflict." These are the words of MK Peres himself (AS HAMISHMAR, 25 Feb 75).

Since then a great deal has changed for Peres. He will hardly recognize himself. What in the past has been a "line for a new conflict," has been converted suddenly to a line for peace. But the line itself is hidden from view. Where will this secret line be? Even according to Peres' plan this line will not pass within Jerusalem. Will Hussein agree to this? It will include under our jurisdiction the Etzion block. Will Hussein agree to this? It will leave us with the Jordan Valley. Does Hussein agree to that? It's a line with a very strange characteristic--it doesn't exist. If so, therefore, where is the "Jordanian Option?"

The Disappearing Line

Mr. Galili, the expert in phrasing, who bridges actual gaps with bridges of paper, will be able to reveal mutual phrases to MK Peres and MK Sarid, to MK Peres and MK Talmi, and perhaps even to MK Peres and MK Rabin; even he will be unable to uncover the territorial compromise line mutual to MK Peres and King Hussein.

Mr Peres is certainly not naive, and is alert to these difficulties. He is thus prepared, in the absence of a practical possibility to achieve peace with Hussein on the basis of a territorial compromise, to reach an interim agreement with him based upon withdrawal even without peace. Thus Mr Peres also notified DIE WELT. There was a precedent for this in the Sinai, and there, too, the interim agreements did not bring peace. A return to the former policy of the Alignment will not change the outcome of the policy: there will be no peace, but one important difference exists in all of this. When areas in the Sinai were transferred, without peace, it was not possible to wave the Palestinian Flag there. If areas in the land of Israel are transferred to Hussein, that flag will immediately fly there. The Palestinian state in that area will certainly receive immediate recognition from many governments, the foremost of them being the Soviet Union. What will MK Peres do in such an eventuality? Will he ask the IDF to march into an area under foreign sovereignty?

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PLO EVADES WEST BANK RESTRAINTS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 25 Jul 80 p 14

[Article by Jehuda Litani: "A Committee in a Pressure Suit"]

[Text] Is the Committee for National Direction, the top body of PLO sympathizers in the Territories, continuing to function despite many restrictions placed in recent months on its activity, after the deportation of 2 mayors and severe wounding of 2 other mayors, all of them important and active figures in the committee? Sources close to the committee members state that despite many restrictions which the military authority has most recently placed upon its activity, it continues to function, mainly in secret and with a great deal of care.

Contrary to these, others on the West Bank are of the opinion that the restrictions which were placed, deportation of the mayors, and the wounding of Shak'a and Khalaf were a severe blow to its activity which has been frozen. One of the members of the committee, with whom I spoke this week, admitted that the activity has been much reduced, however, according to him, it has not been totally frozen.

General Recruitment

In a special review on the 3 deportees from Mount Hebron which a spokesman of the IDF made public at the beginning of the month (where it was said--"A special review which bares the true face of the three deportees"--as though until then they showed a smiling and pleasant face and now the IDF has come and torn this mask off of their faces), the stages preceding the organization of the committee are elaborated upon: ...in effect the PLO acquired a progressively stronger hold among the political public in the Territories through a long process in recent years, and particularly since 1976. However, the critical acceleration came particularly after the signing of the Camp David agreements. In the wake of the agreements, there crystallized in the Territories "an opposition front" and a local "rejection" parallel to the Pan-Arab one which came into being following the Sadat initiative.

This local "opposition-rejectionist" front was formed by the leaders of the public in the area of Judea and Samaria by means of a noteworthy flair for manipulating the public. To this front was recruited the politically conscious public (principally urban) with all its components (PLO supporters, Jordan supporters, communists, and religious circles) excluding some isolated mavericks. The attempt to recruit the village population as well (70 percent of the inhabitants of the Judea and Samaria region)--did not succeed for the most part, yet this did not bring about a reduction in the effectiveness of the overall success.

With respect to the actual establishment of the committee, the spokesman for the IDF writes in the review: "Crystallization of this local opposition front was brought about by a series of several central political gatherings (in Jerusalem and in the Universities of Bethlehem, Birzayt, and Al Najah in Nablus and in Hebron), as well as by a larger number of smaller political meetings on the premises of societies, associations etc., in the large as well as the small cities. In all of the gatherings (the central and the small), manifestos and proclamations were composed and publicly signed. These were later disseminated (publicly as well) by the various groups."

"Also established were 'follow up' committees whose function it was to continue this activity. At the head of this array, a group of mayors and leaders of public groups who are recognized radicals and militants took position. These individuals established the Committee for National Direction and included in the expanded forum some 22 persons, in order to lend a representative and legitimate character to it, both among their people, as well as among the Israeli, and foreign public opinion. As for themselves, they took a position of leadership as an "executive committee" of 6 people (Shak'a, Khalaf, al-Qawasimah, Ibrahim Dakak, 'Adil 'Anam, Giris al-Khouri)..."

In recent months, the movement of the mayors and other persons in the Territories has been limited. All the mayors on the West Bank, almost without exception, have been confined to their cities and every departure requires approval of the military government. Movement restrictions have also been imposed on the Gaza Strip: the mayor of Gaza, Rashad al-Shawa, is required to report his movements to the authorities, and the chief of the the pro-PLO movement in the Gaza Strip, Dr. Khaydar 'Abd al-Shafi, has been forbidden to travel to the West Bank without approval of the authorities. Mayors and other people, particularly members of the Committee for National Direction are inhibited from carrying on telephone conversations.

According to many of them, the military authorities eavesdrop on all telephone conversations. One of the members of the committee showed me a crack in the entrance door to his home which, according to him, was broken during an attempt by the security people to break in to his house, in order to install a listening device. Mayors and members of the Direction Committee say that they find alternatives: when they wish to transmit an

announcement from one mayor to another, or from a member of the committee to his deputy, it is done by way of special messengers, or orally--generally not by written documents.

The most important personage in the committee continues to be Bassam Shak'a despite his severe wounding. Everyone read about what was termed the "Shak'a Affair"--his arrest, threat of deportation and the blocking of the deportation. Now, following his wounding, his popularity has skyrocketed. Shak'a now is not only the Mayor of Nablus but a symbol, as well, of the struggle of the Palestinian nation. Bassam Shak'a was, in effect, the organizer of the Committee for National Direction: that was a few months after the Camp David agreements. Personages from all parts of the West Bank, and especially mayors, gathered at Shak'a's initiative in the village of Anvata, in order to protest the expropriation of lands in the area. Afterwards, all of the participants came out to Nablus and there, in effect, the foundation was laid for the establishment of the committee.

Another member of the committee is the mayor of the municipality of al-Bira, Sulayman Tawil, who was miraculously spared injury (and who did not bother to pay a hospital visit to Border Guard Sulayman Hirbawi who was seriously wounded while attempting to dismantle the charge that was intended for Tawil). Tawil is not considered to be of superior ability among members of the committee, although until recently, he had been looked upon as the right-hand man of Karim Khalaf, Mayor of Ramallah.

Other mayors who are members of the committee are the mayor of the municipality of Tulkarm, Hilmi Hanun (the veteran mayor on the West Bank--since 1967 known to be a PLO supporter), the mayor of Jericho, Abdul Aziz Suwayty and the mayor of Anvata, Wahid Hamdallah. Bassara Daud, who previously had been mayor of the municipality of Bayt-Jala, (and was removed from his office following conviction on a charge of beating police officers) represents the 3 "Bayts" in the committee (Bayt Lahm, Bayt Jala and Bayt Sahur). To this very day, the members of the committee are as important as the person who was appointed by the military authority to the position of the municipality of Bayt Jala, Farah al-'Arraj (who had also been the mayor prior to Bassara Daud), and continue to relate to Bassara Daud as the mayor for all matters. Until their deportation from the area, the mayors of Hebron and Halhul Fahd al-Quwasimah and Muhammad Milham were also members of the committee.

The living spirit in the committee is Ibrahim Dakak who serves as a kind of secretary or coordinator of the committee. Dakak, owner of an engineering firm in East Jerusalem, secretary of the Society of Engineers on the West Bank, is a very shy man who prefers not to be exposed, but behind the scenes he manifests considerable activism. Jordan sympathizers in East Jerusalem and on the West Bank like to label Dakak "communist." Ibrahim Dakak is not a card carrier of the party, however, he is apparently close in his views to the Left.

Other members of the committee: East Jerusalem attorney Jiris Khouri, chairman of the Professionals' Societies on the West Bank, 'Adil 'Anam, Sayyid Alladdin (former minister in the Jordan Government), East Jerusalem resident director of the Chamber of Commerce Shaykh Ali Tazziz, chairman of the United Fund on the West Bank, Amin al-Hatif, the head sermonizer in the Al Aksa mosque, Akhramah Davri, the head of the Gaza Strip Red Crescent, Dr. Haydar al-Shaf and the head of the Medical Society in Gaza, Sayyid Bakhar.

Newspapermen are represented by the editor of AL-FADJAR, Ma'mun al-Sayyid; Akram Haniya, assistant editor of the daily AL-SHA'AB, and editor of the Communist weekly AL-TALIYA, Bassir Barguty (considered to be one of the most important and influential members of the committee.) Samihah Halil represents the women on the West Bank--she is head of the Committee for Prisoner Aid. She is better known by her nickname Um Halil, and has been glorified by all particularly because of her ceaseless energy and efforts on behalf of the prisoners.

A senior officer recently stated that the military authorities prevented a meeting of the committee (which had been scheduled for East Jerusalem on the 14th of this month), and that in the future, it will vigorously prevent all its activity. Some have interpreted this as imposing house arrest on all members of the committee; if they attempt to violate the edict of the government and continue their activism. One member of the committee told me this week that restrictions of the authorities have actually succeeded in blocking the public activity of the committee--meetings and announcements ments--yet, the foundation remains and it is now perfectly clear that the committee is healthy. In fact, members of the committee or others who think similarly to them, are placed at many key points in the Territories. It is now difficult for others, even if they wished to do so, to conduct a line opposing that of the PLO.

In the review of the IDF spokesman on the matter of the deportees from Hebron it is stated, that an extremism has developed among the radical sources, and that "the extremism will likely continue, with the active agitation of the Committee for National Direction, which leads the public, and particularly the youth in this direction." Despite restriction of the military authorities (says a person close to the committee), the public in the Territories knows how to react to events affecting it, by demonstrations or other means, such as for example, the reaction this week to the death of a prisoner in the Nafi'a Prison. The committee represents a militant and radical line, and, in general, the Rejection Front. On occasion its members have had confrontations and differences of opinion with the official stand of the PLO as expressed by its strongest branch, Al-Fatah. The best known confrontation was on the issue of resignation of the mayors, after the deportation decision of Shak'a. Members of the Direction Committee took an open position against the stand of Al-Fatah and of Jordan, which had advocated a collective resignation.

One Way Out--Terror

It would appear that in the near future the military authorities will make the restrictions even more binding. Therefore, there is a prospect that the most recent loopholes by members of the committee to continue their activism will be blocked. If so, the question is--what will be left for inhabitants of the Territories after this route of activism is denied them? If not political gatherings, strikes and demonstrations there is but one way left, the way which has already increased recently (its peak was the murderous act at the Hadassah building in Hebron). The Israeli authority in the Territories has been deluding itself in recent years that it is possible, in one way or another, to encourage moderate elements against the rising tide of nationalism, on occasion disruptive nationalism.

During this period, the more moderate elements (the intent being directed against the pro-Jordanians) do not dare to raise their heads. It is difficult for them, especially against the suppression by the members of the Committee for Direction and others. If they are now permitted to operate freely, they will be considered traitors and will bring public wrath upon themselves.

The reality in the Territories, and particularly in the West Bank in the summer of 1980, is that members of the committee represent more than any other factor in the eyes of many inhabitants the Palestinian issue. Imposition of restrictions to the point of silencing the committee will not create a vacuum in the leadership of the West Bank. In recent years, the leadership in the Territories is becoming progressively extremist. It is possible that in 1981, we shall find members of the Committee for National Direction replaced by a much more extremist leadership operating covertly, and calling on the public to resort to terrorism in the streets of the Territories. Perhaps then we shall remember, and yearn for the days when the Territories were led by people such as Fahd al-Qawasimah, Muhammad Milham and Karim Khalaf.

8090
CSO: 4805

THOUSANDS LEAVE NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT TOWNS

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 17 Jul 80 p 9

[Article: "14,000 Left Northern Development Towns in 1978-1979"]

[Text] More than 14,000 people have left northern development towns in 1978 and 1979, according to data provided by the Central Bureau for Statistics to the mayors of northern development towns.

The mayors of these towns estimate that the number of "dropouts" is even larger, since their experience indicates that some of the "dropouts" prefer to be registered as residents of development towns in order to continue to enjoy the benefits of development town residents. According to their estimates, the number of those leaving who did not bother to change their address is 14,000, so that the number of "dropouts" for those years is in fact 28,000.

These figures were the center of discussion at a meeting yesterday of mayors of northern development towns held at Safad. At the meeting it was reported that the number of residents of the center of the country who request to move to development towns in the north is declining at an alarming rate. This is primarily due to employment difficulties in the northern towns, and the inflation of housing costs there.

More than 90 requests from families and single persons, requesting to join Kibbutz Misgav Am, have been received by the Center for Development Town placement.

The director of the Center, Zohar Gindal, reported yesterday at Safad that 8 families and 8 single persons have begun the process of practical absorption in the kibbutz on the Lebanese border. Twenty other families have organized themselves in an urban commune which will come to the kibbutz in another 10 months, after finishing the construction of housing at the kibbutz.

Mr Gindal also reported that following the success of the "Build Your Home" campaign in Upper Nazereth, where 114 families occupied 94 lots within the framework of this campaign, a similar campaign will be started in the near

future in Tiberias. The goal is to provice 113 lots to those interested in building their homes in Tiberias.

Currently, the Center is working on another campaign: "To Go Up to Ma'alot, Stage 2." This stage will be conducted under the motto: "In Ma'alot there is work, there is housing, there is quality of life." Within the framework of this campaign, 130 new apartments and villas will be made available to interested parties. The price for a 3 room apartment will be 1.5 million pounds, with a 55,000 pound downpayment.

7075
CSO: 4805

RISE IN NUMBER OF SERVICE WORKERS REPORTED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 21 Jul 80 p 10

[Article: "Workers Leave Industry and Construction, Go to Services"]

[Text] In the first months of 1980, the number of public service workers grew by 8000 employees, while 14,000 workers left industry and 7000 left construction. All of this ran contrary to the policy of the Finance Ministry of reducing the number of public service workers.

These data were included in a report prepared by economists by the Bank of Israel on economic developments in recent months. From the report it is learned that financial services also absorbed 6000 new workers. In all, the number of those employed in the business sector declined by 18,000 workers. Due to the expansion of the public services, employment was reduced only slightly.

The flight of workers from the business sector, and especially from industry and construction, was the principal factor in the growth of unemployment. In the first quarter of 1980, the number of unemployed rose to 62,000, which is an unemployment rate of 4.7 percent, as compared to unemployed of 36,000 (2.8 percent) at the end of 1979.

The growth of unemployment was only one of the characteristics of recession which hit the economy at the beginning of the year. In addition to the unemployment, there was also a decline in personal consumption and in real wages, a decline in the activity of the business sector, a reduction in imports, and a growth in exports.

Industrial production declined by 10 percent in the first quarter. Housing construction in the private sector contracted, and the number of housing starts declined. The reduction of imports was especially prominent in the imports of raw materials for production, and the expansion of exports stemmed from a decline in local demand, which caused the shift of production from the local market to abroad.

At the beginning of the year there was a slowdown in the rate of inflation, and it stood at a monthly average of 5.8 percent. However, in the second

quarter the inflation rate accelerated and rose to 8 percent per month. In the opinion of the Bank of Israel economists, this acceleration of inflation stemmed from the increase in price of oil, the increase in the money supply, the cost of living supplement payments, and the weakening of expectations regarding the stemming of inflation.

The increase in money supply stemmed to a substantial degree from the marked acceleration of collection of indirect taxes, a phenomenon explained by the contraction of private consumption.

In the last three months, the recession at least temporarily eased in activity and spending (according to partial information). Economic activity, and figures on employment services indicate that there has been no expansion in the scope of unemployment.

7075
CSO: 4805

INCREASE IN EXPORT REVENUES REPORTED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 21 Jul 80 p 11

[Article: "Export Profits Increase By 2 Percent This Year"]

[Text] In the first half of 1980, export profits rose by 2 percent, in addition to support by means of credit.

The deputy commissioner of the Bank of Israel, Dr Eliezer Shafar, transmitted to MA'ARIV the summary of an audit in this matter. In the first half of 1980 the consumer price index rose by 49.4 percent, while the lira was devaluated in relation to the currency basket by 43.7 percent. Prices abroad rose in the same period, according to data of the International Currency Fund, by 6 percent. The general result was a rise in export profits by 2 percent in the first half of this year.

In addition, there was increased aid for exports by means of credit.

On the issue of proposals for insuring a rate of exports, Dr Shafar avoided responding because of the lack of a clear program. It is not yet clear if the intention is to insure by means of a premium by insurance companies, or if what is being considered is insurance by means of the budget.

He did not reject a rate insurance by means of premiums, but insurance by means of the budget requires, according to him, basic clarification.

An internal staff within the Ministry of Industry is currently studying various alternatives for preserving export profits by means of a system which will assure a realistic exchange for the exporter.

There is being studied, among other things, a plan for insuring the rate, whose purpose will be to assure coordination of changes in the currency rate to changes in the local costs in production.

A committee headed by Yoram Blizovski, the deputy director of finance within the ministry, will present proposals for establishing means of assuring profits in exports. The committee did not limit itself to changes in exchange rates.

For some time, the Ministry of Industry has supported the possibility of encouraging export by means of rate insurance. The ministry views this measure as complementary to credit extended to the exporter, and not as a device to replace credit.

7075
CSO: 4805

INADEQUATE PROTECTION OF NEWSPAPER OFFICE CHARGED

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 13 Jul 80 p 1

[Editorial: "The Word, and the Explosives"]

[Excerpts] Very well. You have blown up our office. But we will continue; we will not stop. AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM will remain a shining beacon of free speech, both in our beloved country and throughout the greater nation. We knew that in this evil time for the Arab world we would pay a tax on what we say. We knew that the bats of the night would be proficient in placing explosives to destroy AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, or firing pistols with silencers to murder its director. In other words, we were aware of the prostitution of this Arab period and the extent of the rift which has divided the Arab spirit. Out of this rift have emerged those who are working to silence its free minds and break the pens which have been dedicated to freedom and the cause.

While we extend our thanks to the state officials for their great concern after the incident, we must ask ourselves this question: Some 4 months ago, the Foreign Ministry notified the Interior Ministry that a certain group was threatening to blow up the office of AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM and murder its chief, but no one took the initiative to institute any protective measure. Meanwhile, dozens of security personnel could be seen in their vehicles guarding the American Embassy and other places. In this critical Arab phase, when the Arab press has become the vanguard in the fight against the plans for control and occupation and the elimination of the Arab cause and the Arab being, the Arab press should have received the same attention as the embassy of the great lords in Washington.

We say this not because we have lost what we built up over 20 years. For we have set upon this task, and we are certain that we will continue to bear the word as a weapon in the jungle. We are also certain, and determined as well, that we will remain content to bear this weapon against those who carry bombs and pistols. In other words, we believe that the protection of the cultural heritage of this nation, and the defense of its aspirations toward freedom, liberation and sovereignty over the land, is worthy of sacrifice and confrontation with the weapon of culture, which will certainly and ultimately be victorious.

8591
CSO: 4802

IMPROVEMENT OF SECURITY FORCES URGED

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 15 Jul 80 p 1

[Editorial by Ahmad al-Jarallah: "Every Citizen Is a Guardsman"]

[Text] I believe that for a country such as Kuwait, which enjoys large revenues and extensive financial activity, security is a vital matter. We do not want to say here that security is inadequate or that members of the security forces are preoccupied with private affairs. All of this has been said many times. However, we would like to make one important observation. Switzerland is a country of wealth and affluence, and it is assured of extremely thorough security, although it is a country which makes use of foreign nationals. If the government of Kuwait were to utilize the security system applied in Switzerland, it would need nothing more than a knowledge of what is required to protect the country and a small amount of spending in the appropriate place. Funds allocated to the security forces would not be spent improperly and would not go to employees and domestics of some [officers] who are only interested in saving their own money.

The security system in Kuwait needs someone to man its forces with Kuwaiti citizens, just as the Swiss Security system is manned with Swiss citizens for the protection of their country's security. The citizen in Switzerland is in effect a citizen guardsman, because the Swiss have turned the security system into a cultural authority rather than a domineering, blustering agency. The Swiss security organization stands for culture and protection of the nation and the citizen; it does not stand for intimidation of the people and the stifling of the spirit of cooperation between the people and the security forces.

Additional spending with integrity and in the proper place will ensure this country's growth and development and make it a land for hard workers, not troublemakers, killers and saboteurs.

8591
CSO: 4802

KUWAITI COMPANY CO-MANAGES DOLLAR LOAN

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 11 Jul 80 p 15

[Article: "Kuwait and Mideast States Participate in International Issue Valued in Dollars"]

[Text] Financial market circles in London reported yesterday that a major British real estate company intends to seek one third of a new loan valued at $30 million. This is the first international dollar-valued issue of its kind by a British company [involving funds] from a Mideast state--in this case, Kuwait--in 6 years.

The funds for the company Metropolitan and Property International, a subsidiary of the parent company, will be assembled through convertible Eurodollar bonds paying 8.25 percent interest.

The operation will be managed by two groups: Morgan Grenfell and Company and the Kuwaiti International Investment Company.

Also participating in the management of the loan will be the Industrial Bank of Kuwait; Morgan Stanley International; (Brussels Lambert) Bank; Pearson; (Heldring) and Pearson; S.G. Warburg; and (Odli) Limited.

A spokesman for the British company informed the Kuwaiti News Agency that at least 30 percent of the $30-million issue will be subscribed to in the Middle East area.

The spokesman added that the remaining portion will be subscribed to in Great Britain, Europe and the Far East.

The bonds will mature in 15.5 years and can be converted into shares of the Metropolitan and Property Company beginning in 1981.

The company is the second largest on the British stock exchange and possesses assets worth 643 million pounds sterling ($1.5 billion).

The company intends to use the loan to expand its interests in the United States, where it has a subsidiary called M.A.P.C. American Properties Bank.

The American subsidiary possesses holdings worth a little over $100 million. Its investment properties include offices in Houston, Las Vegas and Minneapolis.

The spokesman said: "We believe that this is a good time to expand the company's interests in the United States with the aim of relying on the success of its investments and in order to take advantage of new opportunities which will probably appear in the near future."

8591
CSO: 4802

PHALANGE PARTY LEADER JUMAYYIL INTERVIEWED

Milan IL BORGHESE in Italian 10 Aug 80 pp 920-922

[Report on interview with Bashir Jumayyil by Duccio Di Michele: "Toward a Christian National State in Lebanon: Romulus and Remus in Beirut"]

[Text] Beirut--"There had to be bloodshed, unfortunately and alas! We had no alternative. Those other Christians had let themselves drift into the languors of Capua, and tolerated the bordello that has reigned [over the country] since the end of the civil war, leaving Lebanon not only at the mercy of the Syrians and Palestinians but also of the dope traffickers and smugglers. It was a terrible, heart-rending thing, Christians against Christians--absurd, incredible, suicidal. But Dany just let things putrefy, concerned only with [his] millions. His own father, Camille Shamun, suffered for it, but the spirit of the 'clan,' the family, was too strong. That's why we launched Operation Trojan Horse, and within a few minutes the Tigers no longer existed."

This is how the Phalangists explain the night of the "heavy hand" that overwhelmed the garrison of the "Liberals."

Was this tragic exploit really necessary or urgent? To Bashir Jumayyil, the new strong man of the Lebanese Maronites, it recalled the episode of Romulus and Remus.

All civil wars characteristically degenerate into clan warfare within factions, and Lebanon was no exception. It took 200 dead for Romulus to win the upper hand by force over Remus. Two hundred dead and 600 wounded in a nation of 3 million that lost 50,000 in the civil war would not have been a huge figure if the Phalangists' victory had not precipitated fundamental consequences for the future of Lebanon and the Near East. With the assistance of two collaborators, IL BORGHESE "shot a film" of that "night of the long knives."

'The Trojan Horse'

7 July--In his office, furnished in presidential style, Bashir Jumayyil, commander of the Kataeb, Christian Phalangists, conferred for the last time

with his General Staff, garbed in the green uniform of the commandos--all young wolves with emaciated faces. There was Munzer, the Phalange Party's lawyer and spokesman. There was Pussy, commando chief who, in 1978, blew up the Palestinians' munitions factory at Tell Al-Zaatar in Beirut, making it with a handful of volunteers through the city sewers. There was Jo who, at 27, commanded the entire Christian quarter of Ashrafieh. There was Kamal, 28, and others. All of them repeatedly assured Shaykh Bashir, "We're ready!"

Dark and thickset, Bashir, 33, glances through the big window at the Bay of Beirut, spread out before his eyes, with ships lying gutted in the port and the sea-front boulevard lined with buildings reduced to rubble or pocked with shell-holes. Within a few hours he will rule over this city, once a tourist paradise, the joie de vivre of the Lebanese people, today a victim in the grip of chaos, racketeering, drugs and contraband, moral and national fragmentation--indeed, a whorehouse. Within a few hours he will see to it that the law and order of the Phalange Party dominates.

Noon. One after the other, the "operational chiefs" go out through the armored door on the way to their respective posts. Alone, Bashir prays, staring long at the single photo on his desk, a portrait of his only daughter, Maya, killed on 23 February at the age of 20 months when they blew up her father's car. He, the target, was not in the car at that moment. Whose target? The Shamunites', of course. This he firmly believes, although there is nothing to prove it. Between Lebanon's two [principal] Christian parties a long series of vendettas had piled up a number of corpses over the years. Officially they met, clapped each other on the shoulder, signed agreements and swore eternal friendship, but mortal rivalry seethed below the surface.

Since the assassination of Maya, Bashir has not been the same man I met in July 1978 (cf. IL BORGHESE, No 32/33 of that year: "Rome Dies in Beirut"). He wanted to end it all with the "Tigers." Thus, he summoned Camille Shamun, former president of Lebanon and several times prime minister, who called in the American Marines during the insurrection of 1958, and [subsequently] organized his own Christian militia: Numur, the "Tigers."

At 82, Shamun, with his elegant figure and wavy white hair, is still a leader of parts in Lebanon. Some of his powers he delegated to his 50-year-old son Dany. United in the common struggle against the Palestinians and the so-called "progressives," Tigers and Phalangists concluded a "political" truce and set up a united military front. But when the Palestinians were subdued and militarily driven well back and with the Syrians so beleaguered that they couldn't hang on much longer in Lebanon, the two [leading] Christian clans fell to fighting each other for supremacy.

The Phalangists were worried. The zones occupied by the Tigers left much to be desired, and many Tigers metamorphosed into wolves, avid for lucre and the indolent life. Too much contraband money floated around among them, and too much corruption was tainting Shamun's supermillionaire tribe. The

superficial observer did not see that while the Phalangists lived in austere poverty, the Tigers were rolling in money, that where the former constituted a sort of petite bourgeoisie or Christian proletariat, the latter resurrected, symbolically at least, the old Lebanon of gambling casinos, dance halls in the mountains, and millions [of dollars] stashed away in Paris and Rio de Janeiro.

Jumayyil repeatedly brought these facts to the Shamunites' attention, but rien a faire. Bashir, therefore, decided to take action in the deepest secrecy. On the night of 7 July, 500 of his best Kataeb, all in mufti and unarmed, issued forth from the Phalangist garrison, gathered together at point X, and boarded supply trucks that served the Christian zone. In the cabins, the drivers likewise wore mufti. Behind them, 30 well-armed men per truck huddled among a few sacks of flour. This was Operation Trojan Horse, devised to "avoid bloodshed and a frontal clash with their Shamunite brethren."

The trucks headed for the Shamunites' main fortification at Saffrah, north of Juniyah. All unsuspecting, the sentries opened the gates to the garrison. Inside, the trucks disgorged a floodtide of Phalangists, who opened fire and demanded surrender. Knowing down to the smallest detail the most favorable positions to overrun, the Phalangists enjoyed the advantage of their surprise tactics. Still, slaughter was inevitable, and about 200 men died. A massacre? Perhaps. But the 3,000 prisoners taken indicated that the number of victims would have been higher had there been a frontal clash.

One by one all the Tigers' bastions fell after Jumayyil, who extended his offensive throughout the Christian-controlled area, spread the word that the Shamunites had surrendered. Suddenly the elderly Camille Shamun was left stripped of his arms and his legions, while Jumayyil was urging all militiamen to join the Phalangists.

But why all this, asked the defeated. "Why must we create a new State, a new, single Lebanese national army?" Because we want no more clans, the Phalangists replied.

At 5 that afternoon, Shamun surrendered officially to Jumayyil at the Monastery of St Antonio.

The Tragedy Behind the Scenes

An extraordinary meeting took place in the presence of Pierre Jumayyil, 75, founder of the Phalange Party. With his hair cropped in the style of the 1930's, with his raucous voice and pugilist face (he closely resembles the great boxer Georges Carpentier), Jumayyil Sr offered Shamun the honorary presidency of the united Christians, at the same time urging him to banish his son Dany from political life. (Although Dany obviously lacked his father's political acumen and the military expertise of his rival Bashir,

Shamun had appointed him military commander of the Tigers.) Shamun accepted Jumayyil's suggestion but could not speak for his son, who had vanished from the scene.

Pierre Jumayyil gave the order not to "touch the Shamun family" and freed those (Shamunite) prisoners who swore they would take up arms again only as Phalangists.

Captain of [Lebanon's] national football team, at the 36 Olympic Games in Berlin, Pierre Jumayyil discovered the Italian team and their special style. Fascinated, back in Lebanon he established his circle of Phalangists, first as a sports association, later becoming a political movement with its own deputies and ministers, then a paramilitary group, which he ultimately transformed into a genuine, trained army. The Palestinians and the Syrians know something about that. So do the Shamunites who, with their 10,000 men, were helpless against Jumayyil's 40,000.

One after the other, like the [three] Horatius brothers defeating the three Curatii, the Phalangists eliminated the other Christian clans, which they accused of "double dealing and dangerous indolence." Among them was the faction led by Franjieh, 70, ex-President of Lebanon, who opposed a toll on the grain traffic imposed by Christian customs at the frontiers.

Someone may ask: what will Dany Shamun do now that he has teamed up with Franjieh, and the two have been "taken into serious consideration by the progressive Palestinians as allies in solidarity." It would be more to the point to ask instead what they can do against the strength of Jumayyil, who remains the only victor on the terrain. Of these three Christian clans contending for power, only one has emerged dominant--the Phalange Party. As Bashir explained, "Politics don't interest me. I have no personal ambitions. I would never have entered the arena if it hadn't been for the threat of a Christian genocide and the death of Lebanon."

But why this war among Christians today?

"Because there are too many abadays, small-time gang bosses, who rob, destroy like vandals, murder and run rackets--and, to cap it off, who are Christians, but not Christians of our stripe. I want to put an end to this anarchy, to this rabble-ocracy, drug smuggling, contraband trafficking, everything that dishonors us. They have forgotten that our war will go on until we free the country from the Palestinian and Syrian invaders. And if some Lebanese favor colonizing a part of the country, then we shall install ourselves independent and sovereign on the territory we control."

The New State

Bashir Jumayyil, now master of Christian Lebanon's destiny, tells me about the first measures his party has adopted: "Along the entire seacoast north of Beirut, from Tabarjah to Aquamarina, we are closing all the clandestine

ports, bays and coves to the smuggling of heroin. Internally we are taking charge of public order. The time of gangs, clans, bosses and underworld crime is over. The Christian forces are now unified, with a single uniform, a single flag, a single command, a single name: The Lebanese Forces. We are a strong military and political power, working to reunite all combatants, including the tiger cubs and the Volunteers of the Cedar, into a single force de frappe of 40,000 men. We have our own supply ports, our heavy artillery, our tanks, our helicopters and, very soon, our fighter planes on our own airfields. From Thursday, 17 October, on, anyone who is not a member of our army or our police force will be forbidden to wander around the Christian zone in battle-dress, armed or transporting a weapon. Only our Phalangists with a mission ordered by the Lebanese Army chief of staff will be authorized to wear the uniform and bear arms. Those who violate the law will be arrested and tried by our courts."

This new de facto state comprises some 2,000 square kilometers controlled by Bashir Jumayyil's cohorts, extending from the Rue de Damas in Beirut to the south as far as the port of Batrun, north of Byblos, and from the Mediterranean to the line marking the crest of Mts Sannin and (Bsharri). To defend this Christian minirealm, Jumayyil can mobilize another 40,000 men in the mountain villages within a few hours, like the Israeli reserves. Every man is already equipped with arms; he only has to don his uniform, load his weapon, and join his unit.

"Because the Lebanese police are inept," Jumayyil went on, "we are forming our own National Guard, which will not only oversee road traffic and public order but also concern itself with criminal cases. If someone steals your car, our agents will find it. Justice will be reorganized on the Phalangist model, with civil and military courts functioning on the Western style. In other words, we have determined to fill the void left by the Lebanese State, which exists only on paper, thanks to the 'good heart' of the Syrians and Palestinians. At the moment, for example, 10 Phalangists are subject to court martial and threatened with the death sentence for violating a 7 July order and killing civilians."

Meanwhile, in all Lebanon, wracked by a succession of wars and guerrilla forays, the Christian zone is the only one to heal the wounds, to rebuild everywhere and restore collective life. In the east, the Christian telephone system works better than the state exchanges in the western sector of Beirut. The Christian municipalities are operating as before, whereas the other city administrations are nonexistent. The streets are clean and illuminated, while elsewhere there is only filth and darkness. There is no shortage of doctors or medicine in their hospitals. The Christians provide public transportation, with regular service between Beirut and the mountains. They even have radio stations: the Voice of Free Lebanon, which transmits from Juniyah, and the Voice of the Cedar, from the eastern sector of Beirut. Within 2 months, the Christians will have their own television.

This neostate collects its own taxes to construct empirically brick by brick according to its various immediate needs. Industrialists, traders, service station owners pay taxes at a fixed rate. For a gallon of gas you pay a tax equivalent to roughly $.20. In Brumana, a smart district of Beirut, a gas station proprietor declared that the Phalangists "administer taxes better than all the preceding parliamentary governments." Every restaurant check includes a contribution to the Christian State: 2 percent of the total.

"We need this money," Jumayyil explains, "because we will not stop. We mean to emancipate all Lebanon. What would Carter or Kreisky say if they were asked to cede part of the United States or Austria to accommodate the Palestinians? We don't want to chase them away, we only want them to remember that they're not in their own home, they're our guests. Then why should it be demanded of us, and at our expense? To win respect for Lebanon, we must be strong. The areas occupied by the Palestinians must be returned to us, absolutely. That's why we've had to reunite, for love or for strength, under a single banner. One day we shall reunite with our brothers in the south, the troops of Major Haddad, a Christian. They have already liberated their territory and opened the frontier with Israel. Meanwhile, we're beginning to send Phalangist ambassadors out into the world. I, too, intend to go soon to the United States, where we have a powerful friend: Ronald Reagan."

9653
CSO: 3104

'ALI NASIR DISCUSSES UNIFICATION OF TWO YEMENS, ATTACKS U.S.

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 7 Jul 80 pp 8-13

[Interview with 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, prime minister of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, by Sarim 'Abdallah and 'Ali al-Shihabi; date and place not given]

[Text] 'Ali Nasir tells AL-HURRIYAH:

"Our confidence in ourselves and in the soundness of our progressive path is greater than hostile campaigns launched against us.

"Our basic task is to strengthen the party's leadership role and the conditions of mass organizations, and develop the state and our national economy."

Comrade 'Ali Nasir has been involved in the various stages of Democratic Yemen's struggle both before and after independence. During all this time he has maintained his revolutionary character which has always been like a compass which has oriented him in his relationship with the masses and their causes and led him to the forefront of the revolutionary leadership of the Yemeni people. Right now, he shoulders the responsibility of top man in this leadership. Nevertheless, he still finds time for theoretical, political, and revolutionary exchanges of views, with whoever has the opportunity to discuss with him the country's issues and domestic and foreign policy.

We wanted in this new interview with Comrade 'Ali Nasir to discuss new issues, particularly following the hostile campaign launched against Comrade 'Ali Nasir personally, against the party leadership, and against Democratic Yemen in general. The aim of this hostile campaign which follows recent developments is to suggest that things are not going well in the country, and that it has either taken a step backward, come to a standstill, or decided to make a change in its basic policies. In the face of all these hostile attacks, Comrade 'Ali Nasir gives a clear and frank response which demonstrates the confidence which this revolutionary

has in himself as well as in his party, people, and the masses of his country.

'Ali Nasir emphasizes that a progressive path has been well established in Democratic Yemen, and that there is a continual struggle to stay on it and move forward. He says that this confidence in the revolution is greater than all of the hostile propaganda attacks against it. Finally, Comrade 'Ali Nasir speaks very frankly about Democratic Yemen's recent political positions and activities, and about the international visits he has been making.

Here is the interview which Comrade 'Ali Nasir gave to two correspondents of the AL-HURRIYAH who posed questions to him and engaged him in a frank discussion. AL-HURRIYAH has continuously followed and espoused the ideological and revolutionary experiment in Democratic Yemen, with all the hopes and aspirations it holds for freedom-fighters, revolutionaries, and progressive-minded people in the Arab world.

[Question] Democratic Yemen has come to have a prominent political status in the Arab world, because of the stability of its progressive path and the steadfastness which it has shown in the face of a series of evil plots ever since it gained independence. When you took over the duties of secretary general and chairman of the presidium of the Supreme People's Council, in addition to your duties as prime minister, the imperialist and reactionary media unleashed a large-scale campaign of skepticism which aimed at slandering Democratic Yemen's progressive status. When these media were at the height of their activity against Democratic Yemen, they did not hide their dissatisfaction with you personally, because of your well-known progressive positions. This explains why these media resorted to publishing misleading information in which they said that your being the leader of the party and the government is only a temporary thing. They said this in order to create misgivings about the unity and cohesion of the Yemeni Socialist Party which is leading the revolutionary process in your country.

What is your appraisal of the outrageous media campaign which has been waged against you following the recent changes? And in what manner did you confront it on the political level, within the party and among the masses?

[Answer] We know very well that the enemies of the Yemeni revolution are an inalienable part of the movement which is hostile to the forces of progress, peace and socialism in the entire world. This hostility and plotting against the Yemeni revolution and its achievements will continue as long as the struggle between the progressive forces of nations fighting for their rights, on one hand, and the imperialist and reactionary forces, on the other, is waged on the international level. This is because the strengthening and consolidation of the revolutionary process in

our country is a cause of alarm and dismay for the imperialist and reactionary forces. These forces do not accept the existence of a progressive, revolutionary regime which defends its national sovereignty and participates, in an effective manner, in a struggle waged for the sake of Pan-Arab and international causes.

If we take a look at the series of plots which have been launched against the Yemeni revolution since the outbreak of the 26 September and 14 October revolutions, we find that hostile reactionary propaganda has been, and still is, one of the chief means utilized by hostile forces in their efforts to mislead public opinion and continue their psychological warfare against our nation and its progressive forces. For example, the forces hostile to our revolution beamed secret broadcasts to the northern part of Yemen during the hostile military campaigns which aimed at capturing revolutionary San'a' and bringing down the 26 September Republic. In addition to this, these hostile forces have engaged in biased media campaigns which are against all revolutionary developments in our country. They aim to create misgivings about our nation's progressive achievements through its patient and difficult struggle, in spite of the scarcity of our material resources and potential. These media campaigns have also sought to slander the relations of friendship and cooperation which bind revolutionary Yemen with all forces of liberation, progress, peace, and socialism in both the Arab world and the entire world.

It is no exaggeration that we were not at all surprised by this hysterical media campaign which was recently organized by forces hostile to our revolution. We expected a campaign such as this against all the new developments in our country. However, the confidence which we have in ourselves and in the soundness of the path we are pursuing has enabled us to face this hate-filled media campaign and make it backfire in the faces of those who are waging it.

The large-scale action we engaged in on both the domestic and foreign levels was very effective in more firmly establishing and consolidating the progressive, revolutionary course of the Yemeni Socialist Party and in establishing it as a rallying point for the masses. Also, the decisions of the 8th session of the central committee represent a consolidation of the militant revolutionary traditions of our party within a framework of democratic centralism and collective leadership, and of commitment to the basic charters of the party. On the economic front, the recent decisions made by the 8th session of the central committee were an expression of the attention which the party is devoting to the issue of continuing to boost our national economy as it proceeds along the course of comprehensive and planned development which aims at the material and spiritual improvement of the life of the working masses.

Likewise, the visits which we have made to Syria, the Soviet Union, and the northern half of our nation, as well as our meetings with the leaders of the Palestine resistance movement and the Lebanese National Movement,

have helped to consolidate the firm, basic line which we are following with regard to issues which concern us on the national, pan-Arab, and international levels.

[Question] Some notorious newspapers and news agencies have published news items that consideration is being given to making new changes in the leadership of the party and the government. Is there any truth to this?

[Answer] These news items have no basis in truth at all. They are merely a vehicle by which our enemies want to say that political stability in Democratic Yemen is now lacking. But let me tell you in all frankness that these poisonous news items and hostile rumors, which are being circulated here and there to create misgivings about the leadership of our party, are no longer something which we are afraid of. Our enemies have tried these conspiratorial methods in the past. Every time they did so, they met with utter failure and revealed how much they hate and are hostile to our revolution and our nation.

There is a great difference between yesterday and today. By this I mean that our circumstances today are far better than they were yesterday. And this is what strengthens our confidence in our nation and in the ability of our party to confront the different types of sabotage which are being directed against us, whatever forms they take and whatever sources they might come from.

[Question] Could you clarify for us the extent to which you have made progress in consolidating the leadership role of the party in your society?

[Answer] The issue concerning consolidation of the leadership role of the party in our society is one of our most important central tasks. Its accomplishment is crucial to the success of our struggle to achieve the tasks of the current stage of the democratic national revolution which leads to future progress. At the present time, we are devoting special attention to consolidating mass organizations, developing the government administration, and developing the national economy in order that the party may transfer its momentum to the masses and to society in general. This guarantees consolidation of the leadership role of the party in the process of building a new life for our nation.

[Question] It is well-known that up till now you have played a prominent role in the Yemeni revolutionary movement since the outbreak of the 26 September and 14 October revolutions. How do you assess the progress of the Yemeni revolutionary process in terms of the achievement of the principal aims which have been realized and in terms of the aims which the Yemeni people are continuing their victorious struggle to achieve?

[Answer] Before answering this question, I would like to refer to my recent visit to the city of Ta'izz in the northern half of our nation. This visit brought back to me memories of the course of our revolutionary struggle in Yemen. I had spent quite a long time in this city during the time we were getting ready for armed revolution in the southern part of our nation, and I also made frequent visits to this city during the revolution. During that period of time, the thing which bound us to our great cause, namely, the cause of liberating the southern part of our nation and reuniting our country, was a set of great and complicated concerns which reflected the enormity of the national task we were faced with.

Great are the moments when a man recalls the victories of the past as he continues the struggle to consolidate current revolutionary gains. My recent visit to the city of Ta'izz brought back to me memories of many of the original freedom-fighters who used to come to this historic city in order to supply themselves with weapons and the things which they needed to pursue the struggle against British occupation of Southern Yemen. I was also reminded of the difficult circumstances under which our revolutionary battle was waged for our people in both parts of our nation. I was also reminded of the conspiracies engaged in, by some who had been thought to be with the revolution, against the revolution both before and after independence.

[Question] It is clear that both the national and international dimensions of the Yemeni revolution are among the most important features of the revolutionary activity of the Yemeni people. This has become apparent on the national level in the basic, resolute struggle of the Yemeni revolutionary movement to achieve the unity of Yemen in terms of territory and people, since this is considered to be one of the most important strategic goals of the 26 September and 14 October revolutions. This has also been apparent on the international level in the firm strategic alliance between revolutionary Yemen and the groups of international revolutionary movements, at the forefront of which is the socialist camp which is led by the Soviet Union.

It is a firm fact that hostile forces have come to judge the orientations of revolutionary activity in your country in terms of the positions taken with regard to the cause of Yemeni unity and the alliance with the Soviet Union. Following the recent changes in your country, there was a flurry of activity against you on the part of the imperialist propaganda media. You stood up and defended yourselves against these hostile propaganda attacks.

Following all of this, we noticed that a British journalist wrote in the British magazine THE ECONOMIST: "'Abd al-Fattah favors unity and 'Ali Nasir favors unity. 'Abd al-Fattah is pro-Soviet and 'Ali Nasir is pro-Soviet. Only Socrates can tell us the real truth about them." This

reveals the fact that these news media realize that your revolutionary course has been set. It also confirms the vital importance of the issues of Yemeni unity and Yemeni alliance with the Soviet Union in the course of the revolutionary struggle of the Yemeni people, led by the Yemeni Socialist Party. This is something which both annoys and alarms forces which are hostile to you. Let me take this opportunity, dear comrade, to ask you the following: What has been achieved in the realm of Yemeni unity, and how do you see the future of the necessary struggle to bring it about?

[Answer] First of all, let me point out that we had a good laugh when we read what was written by the British journalist referred to in your question. The thing that was written in THE ECONOMIST is clear proof of the extent of the inaccuracy and sensationalism which afflicts imperialist news media. These news media have reached the level where their masters have become afflicted with confusion. This has robbed the people who work in the imperialist news media of the ability to comprehend the revolutionary developments taking place in our country. For this reason, they were forced to ask Socrates for aid in their search for the truth about us. Real strength lies in relying upon the masses which no power on earth can subjugate. We, the Yemeni revolutionaries, realize very well the power of relying on the people. By using our own resources, we managed to expel both the Turkish and British invaders, we were able to bring down the royalist regime and resist the onslaught waged against the Yemeni revolution by reactionary forces, and we were able to frustrate all plots aimed at eliminating the progressive gains and achievements realized by our people.

With regard to the Yemeni national cause, I want to emphasize the fact that the reunification of Yemen is considered to be one of the vital demands of the masses. Because this is true, the broad masses of the people, from the hills of the north to Aden in the south, are the forces we rely upon in our struggle to achieve Yemeni unity.

We know that there are hostile forces which are afraid of seeing Yemen unified. They want our country to remain fragmented and they want our people to remain under the threat of foreign reactionary political domination. They hope that they will be able to intervene in our internal affairs by means of this political fragmentation of our country. But our nation does not at all intend to allow interference in its internal affairs, nor will it allow any conspiracies against its legitimate struggle to reunify the Yemeni nation.

It is impossible for our nation to adopt any political concepts which justify fragmentation and consecrate it behind a facade of security and stability. This is because true security and stability are organically tied to the achievement of Yemeni unity. Events are confirming the fact that the enemies of the Yemeni people are trying to keep Yemen fragmented

in order to be able to plot against the security and stability of our nation and place obstacles in the course of our nation's tireless, legitimate struggle for social progress and a new life. This applies to the entire region and constitutes a source of constant tension which threatens the security, stability and progress of all nations of the area.

For this reason, we believe in our legitimate right to achieve social progress and reunification of our country, just as we believe in the right of any nation to choose its own course of independent development. We believe that nations having different social systems can peacefully coexist on the basis of mutual respect of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of others.

The fact is that we have made great progress by way of realizing our Yemeni national cause. It is impossible to abandon this cause, and our enemies will not succeed in stopping its growth, unless they strip the entire Yemeni people of their patriotism.

Yemeni patriots, as well as all honorable and upright people who believe in the principles of the 26 September and 14 October revolutions, are capable of carrying out the will of the nation by means of joint action and a responsible fraternal dialogue which lead to the achievement of Yemeni unity on the basis of peaceful and democratic principles.

Experience in joint action between the leaders of the two halves of Yemen, in keeping with unity agreements and declarations, testifies to the ability of honorable and upright Yemenis to solve the dilemmas of political fragmentation in a climate free of war and tension which foreign interference tries to promote in Yemeni internal affairs.

There is still a long way to go before our country is reunited. But we have already achieved quite a bit in our pursuit of national unity. We must preserve these achievements and continue to advance along the peaceful democratic course which the leaders of both parts of our country have adopted for the sake of realizing the unity of the Yemeni nation.

[Question] Among the Yemenis in both parts of your country, you are known to be a person who combines theory with practice and does not separate between them. This has been reflected in the position you adopted with regard to the issue of unity. You were the first one to sign the unity agreement in Cairo in 1972. Some people say that your conscious enthusiasm for the unity of your nation and people has earned you the love and respect of the Yemeni masses in both parts of the country. During your last visit to San'a', you enjoyed the broad support of the masses as was apparent in the tremendous reception you received in Northern Yemen from both officials and people there. How do you explain this?

[Answer] The leader of the great October Socialist Revolution said: "There is no revolutionary movement without revolutionary theory." All

practice is of necessity an embodiment of a theoretical position or particular view of life and of the world. In my opinion, there is no practice which exists in a vacuum and apart from a theoretical position. Reactionary practice is the application of reactionary theory. When the imperialists do something in practice, they are doing so in defense of the theory of capitalism. The difference between revolutionary practice and reactionary or imperialist practice is that revolutionary practice is practice which is progressive. This is because it is based on revolutionary theory, the theory of scientific socialism. When we in Democratic Yemen dialectically combine theory with practice, we merely strive to realize our revolutionary dream. This dream is the building of a society of material and spiritual abundance and prosperity which will be free of exploitation of man by man.

Our feelings about practice are also genuine when it comes to dealing with the issue of Yemeni unity. Eight years ago we had the honor of signing the unity agreement. We did not simply shout enthusiastic or emotional slogans of unity. We have transformed this slogan into practice and made it a part of our national struggle. When the 14 October Revolution occurred, it was essentially a revolution against the fragmentation which had been caused by the colonialists in the southern half of the country, and was a step on the road toward reunifying both halves of our Yemeni nation. The fact is that the unity of Yemen is regarded as being a sacred cause of the Yemeni people in the same way that the cause of socialism is a sacred cause for the Yemeni working class.

During my last visit to San'a', and, before that, during the visit of 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Ghani, the prime minister of the northern half of Yemen, to Aden, the masses clearly demonstrated that they held unity in just as high regard as the party does. Hundreds of thousands of people came out and demonstrated in favor of unity. Because unity is a sacred cause, it deserves struggle and sacrifice on the part of all of us Yemeni revolutionaries until it is achieved. While our conscious struggle for unity has earned us the high regard and respect of the masses, it has also furthered the status of the Yemeni Socialist Party to which we belong and which is the loyal fighter for, and defender of, unity. The Yemeni Socialist Party is considered to be unionist in the composition of both its leadership and rank-and-file, and in its political, organizational, and ideological life. Our explanation for all of this is the fact that our entire Yemeni nation, in spite of present circumstances, hungers for unity.

There is no power on earth which will be able to strip the Yemeni people of the ardent desire which they have to see their nation united. No matter how long it takes, our socialist party, as well as all other democratic national Yemeni elements and forces, will continue to pursue our struggle to achieve the unity of our nation. Our opinion is that the results which have been achieved so far can be considered positive and are providing the leaders of both halves of the country with the potential to continue the peaceful, democratic struggle to bring the dawn of the day of unity closer.

[Question] What is your analysis of the displeasure shown by American circles concerning your recent visit to Northern Yemen, as manifested in provocative statements, broadcast by the news agencies, made by American sources while you were in San'a'?

[Answer] It is only natural that American imperialist and reactionary circles should be annoyed by my recent visit to San'a' and dialogue with my friend Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. And you can be sure that these circles are now annoyed by the results of the visit. The results were positive and were valuable for the Yemeni nation. Why are these circles angry about the rapprochement of the two halves of the country and about Yemeni unity? The reason is simple, but is a very important one.

First of all, there is the strategic position of Yemen which holds the key to the southern entrance of the sea which is an international artery of maritime transport. Second, Yemen is close to the world's reservoir of oil which international imperialism depends upon to keep its economic machine going. Third, Yemen contains considerable human potential, a large geographical area, and national resources which gave it the potential to achieve rapid social development. Fourth, Yemen is a source of cheap manpower for the labor market. For all of these reasons, these circles are afraid of unity and of any rapprochement between the two halves of Yemen. Motivated by their own interests, they prefer to see the two halves of Yemen remain caught up in a whirlpool of tension and periodic crises.

These circles are very obviously striving and conspiring to upset the peaceful situation which exists between the two halves of Yemen and to create a rift between them, as they have done before. Imperialist and reactionary circles believe that the Yemeni patriots and revolutionaries do not see through the imperialist and reactionary game and the plotting secretly going on against Yemeni unity. We know what is being plotted in various places, and we know what was going on during our visit to San'a'. These actions on the part of the imperialist and reactionary circles clearly reveal that they do not want the Yemeni people to be united and to march along the road of progress, although they sometimes give lip service to the unification of the Yemeni people.

Yemeni unity is the fate and destiny of the Yemeni nation. Since this is true, our enthusiasm, backed by a resolute struggle, will never slacken. If some of these circles feel that it is a source of stability for this whole area for Yemen to remain divided into two parts, they should know that we will never cease striving for the unification of Yemen. This is because we believe that the existence of a united and democratic Yemen is an important factor of stability for the area, whereas the existence of two Yemens does not help to strengthen this stability. In fact it could be that such a divided Yemen, supported by these imperialist and reactionary circles, threatens such stability. Past experience has taught us a lot about this.

[Question] A few weeks ago, you made a visit to Syria and the Soviet Union. There are news reports now which say that you have decided to visit Saudi Arabia and some of the countries of the area. Could you please clarify to us the rationale of these visits in the context of Democratic Yemen's foreign policy, and could you tell us what future changes are to be expected as a result of them?

[Answer] It is well-known that our foreign policy is based on the principles of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect for the national sovereignty of other nations, and noninterference in the internal affairs of others. It is also based on the principle of a firm alliance with the international revolutionary movement in its struggle against international imperialism. It is a policy which ultimately aims at providing suitable international circumstances for the development of the revolutionary process inside our country.

It is on the basis of this premise that we view our visit to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. It is a visit within the framework of the efforts which Democratic Yemen is expending to achieve stability for the area and fruitful cooperation between the area's nations--cooperation based on a good-neighbor policy, mutual respect for the national sovereignty of others, and independence. In our estimation, the area right now, more than ever, is in need of stability. This stability cannot be strengthened, unless all of the countries of the area make a contribution through exchanges of visits, coordination of policy, and cooperation based on respect.

One of the motives of our program of visits to the countries of the Gulf is our legitimate concern about actions being taken by the imperialists. We have seen such actions embodied in the establishment of military bases in Oman and in the threats to use military force to intervene in the area to protect the oil interests of the imperialists and keep the oil flowing.

Their plan has become clear. It has alerted the countries of the area to the danger of the situation in the future and to the necessity of confronting it. We share the opinion of all of our neighboring countries which have expressed their disapproval of the aggressive aims of American imperialism. We add our efforts to theirs for the sake of resisting the danger of imperialism and defending the peace and stability of the area. Perhaps some circles are trying to portray the danger as coming from the Soviet Union and as resulting from the good relations which exist between it and Democratic Yemen. But these circles cannot hide from the nations of the area the true intention of the plans being hatched by the United States, which is an ally of the Zionists--the enemy of the Arab people. In any case, we hope that the results of our visit to the countries of the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf will be a positive factor not only in the development of relations of mutual respect, but also in the strengthening of stability and averting the dangers of the plans being hatched by American imperialism.

Concerning efforts to strengthen Democratic Yemen's status on the international level, we have planned a future program to visit a number of the countries in the socialist camp. They are Hungary, Romania, Poland and the German Democratic Republic. Naturally, visits to these countries are within the scope of international activity undertaken by our country to strengthen our relations of friendship and cooperation with the countries of the socialist camp. These relations are based on revolutionary internationalism and solidarity in the battle against international imperialism and the struggle for world peace.

Prior to the visits which we are going to be making, we have already visited our fellow-Arab country of Syria and our friend, the Soviet Union. The visit to Syria achieved very valuable results for us. The most important of these results was the strengthening of our ties with Syria in our mutual struggle. Syria is a country which stands on the front lines facing both the Zionist enemy and internal reactionary forces. Under these circumstances, Syria needs the backing and support of the Arab forces of national liberation and of all Arab regimes which are eager to promote Arab solidarity. Our visit to the Soviet Union was also one which acquired special importance. This visit emphasized the fact that our relations with the Soviet Union are basic and are deeprooted, and that their foundations cannot be shaken by anyone. The visit also emphasized the fact that the Soviet Union is a loyal friend of the Yemeni people as well as of all peoples who are freedom-loving and are aspiring to have a better future.

In short, the aim of the visits we have made, and are still making, is the creative application of the guidelines set by our Yemeni Socialist Party's first congress. The goal of these guidelines is the creation of international circumstances which are favorable to social progress in our country and to a growing international process of national liberation and world peace.

[Question] There has been talk of the existence of mediation between you and the Sultanate of Oman. What is your point of view with regard to recent developments in the Gulf area. In particular, we would like to learn what your position is with regard to this mediation, in view of the fact that the Sultanate of Oman is being transformed into a military base for American imperialism?

[Answer] All right, I will tell you my frank opinion about this subject. As you know, a number of historic and geographical factors bind our country to the Sultanate of Oman. We are neighbors, and there are close social and historic ties between the Yemenis and the Omanis. It is for this reason that, as you have noticed, our relations with the Omani people are special ones. The Omani people, like our people in Yemen, have been fighting for national liberation from foreign domination. Our Yemeni people and the Omani people have been faced by a single enemy, and

they have had common goals. Our revolution has been victorious, whereas the revolution of the Omani people has been confronted with some difficulties.

Naturally, the political developments which have occurred in the Sultanate of Oman were having effects reaching beyond its borders. The aim of the foreign presence in Oman was not only to prevent the emergence of Oman's independent personality and to deprive it of any essence of national independence. This foreign presence was also threatening the security of our country and our citizens. This has been proven by the attacks which the sultanate's armed forces have launched against the eastern areas of our country.

When the sultanate was confronted with the revolution being waged by the Omani people, opinions and remarks started surfacing here and there, the upshot of which was that a normalization of relations with Oman could be a contribution on our part toward removing the foreign presence from Oman. Developments took place, and we agreed to mediation by fellow-Arabs for the sake of normalization of relations on the basis that this would serve the interests of the Arab nation as a whole. We expressed our opinions about this matter, and said that return of the sultanate to the ranks of Arab solidarity, its exit from the group of nations supporting Camp David, and affirmation of the independence of the Omani people, would be important contributors to normalization of relations between us and Oman.

Recently, while we have been waiting for practical steps to be taken by this sultanate to return to the Arab ranks, we have seen it do quite the opposite. First of all, it is agreeing to grant America military facilities on its territory. Our fellow-Arabs have alerted us to the danger of the situation to the security of the Arabs. When this sultanate saw no resolute response on the part of the Arabs, it went even farther and signed a military agreement with America. According to it, some land, ports, and airports in the Arab nation of Oman have been transformed into hostile military bases to be used by the American imperialists. This not only represents a danger to our people in Democratic Yemen, but also basically represents an open challenge to the feelings and dignity of the peoples of the region. These people, due to the position taken by Oman and due to the American military bases, have come to be at the mercy of the bayonets and battleships of the Americans. In view of this how is it even possible to talk about relations between us and the Sultanate of Oman, or of what remains of the Arab mediation efforts to normalize our relations with Oman?

Oman itself has set up a barrier to having relations with us, and has been content to be remote from all Arabs to whom freedom and national dignity are dear.

[Question] What is your assessment of the situation with regard to the Palestinian revolution and Lebanon, both of which face conspiratorial plans?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the steadfastness of the Palestinian revolution and its alliance with the forces of the Arab and international national liberation movements, are among the most important factors which have helped defeat all the hostile and conspiratorial plans aimed at liquidating the Palestine cause and imposing Zionist imperialist hegemony over the Arab peoples.

We know very well that there are plans being hatched under the cover of darkness to crush the alliance between the Palestinian resistance movement and the Lebanese National Movement, as well as weaken the Steadfastness and Resistance Front. This is within the framework of the action taken by the imperialists, Zionists, and Sadat to liquidate the achievements of the Arab national liberation movement and tie the fate of the Arab peoples to the wagon of international imperialism. But the steadfastness of the elements of the Arab revolutionary movement, when confronted by all forms of conspiracy and treachery, and their alliance with the forces of the international revolutionary movement--in the forefront of which is the world socialist camp, led by the Soviet Union--constitute a firm basis for continuation of our Arab nation's struggle for liberation. This struggle is being waged against the plots and plans of the forces of imperialism and Zionism, for the sake of total liberation, social progress, socialism and democratic Arab unity.

The fact is that the Arab national liberation movement, led by the Steadfastness and Resistance Front, has already completely thwarted the conspiratorial plans hatched against the Palestine cause. The failure of the treacherous and conspiratorial Camp David agreements has emphasized the futility of any such effort which ignores the force of the Palestinian revolution and attempts to obliterate the rights of the Palestinian Arab people. Just as the American-Zionist-Sadat Camp David conspiracy has failed, failure shall also be the lot of the so-called "European initiative." This is a desperate attempt to touch up the ugly face of the Camp David conspiracy. We are confident of the abilities of our Arab peoples, led by their revolutionary forces, to challenge any such conspiracies against them, whatever form they may take.

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SOUTHERN POLITICAL SITUATION DISCUSSED

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Aug 80 pp 13-17

[Text]

In appointing his new Southern Region government in June, there were many factors for President Abel Alier to take into account: the tribal balance had to be maintained; experience weighted against new talent; the faithful expected reward; potential challengers had to be nipped in the bud; and public opinion and SSU principles had to be given their due. How did the new President make out? Regional editor Jacob Akol assesses the outcome.

THE VICTORY was overwhelming: the applause was clear and prolonged; the cheers appeared genuine – the handshakes, too! Even Vice-President Abel Alier, who had so far seen more victories than failures, was visibly moved by the response from the floor and the gallery of an Assembly that, until then, had never witnessed an open contest for the highest political office in the Southern Region.

Abel Alier: juggling with the odds

Samuel Aru: he held on to the end

Logali: curtailed ambition for unity.

Clement Mboro: trouble comes singly

For Alier's opponents, it was the end of the line; but for the man, it was merely the end of the beginning. He had yet to pick his team, a task only few would envy him.

Before the dissolution of the People's Regional Assembly in December, 1977, Mr Alier said (Current affairs, Feb '78), 'We have a difficult constitutional position. If someone offers himself to the electorate and he is not elected but immediately appointed to an executive position, it worries people a lot. I have felt this... there are sacrifices either way; sacrifices for the realm of democracy and vice versa.'

As far as ministerial posts were concerned then, Mr Alier had no worries – at least, for the first six months – about what to do with Dr Lawrence Wol Wol and Mr Natale Olwak Akolawin, both of whom, while having considerable ministerial experience, failed in the latest general elections.

Nor would he have to worry about Mr Clement Mboro, for whom troubles seemed never to come singly. Although the Assembly under his leadership had challenged the Executive, he had been forced out of office long before the Assembly was dissolved last February. Then, unexpectedly, he went and made it easier for Alier by failing to get elected at the last elections.

It would, of course, be naive for the victor immediately to consider his hardened opponents for executive posts, as it would be equally absurd and a mockery of one's principles if those opponents courted such offers. That neatly eliminated Mr Samuel Aru, who had contested to the finish; as well, perhaps, as Aru's closest lieutenant, Mr Ezekiel M. Kodi.

It is thought that Mr Hillary Paul Logali was promised a ministerial post just before he withdrew his candidacy for the Presidency of the High Executive Council. If that is true, his critics will undoubtedly consider his move opportunistic, although he sounded sincere and convincing when he told the Assembly that his supporters had persuaded him to curtail his ambitions in the interest of unity. But apart from his undoubted ex-

perience and prominence in Southern politics, he holds the vital tribal balance in the Juba area. He is now the Regional Minister of Public Administration, Police and Prisons.

Dr Gama Hassan has been appointed as Regional Minister for Agriculture. Tribal balance for the Loa and Nimule could explain this choice; although it could well be on merit, for although he has his critics, they are hard put to explain their precise objections to him. What appears to be his weaknesses, are, at one and the same time, his strengths. The fact is that the Regional Ministry of Agriculture is the best organised and most efficient in the Region, although Gama Hassan's critics are likely to credit this to Dr David Basioni, the Director-General of the ministry. Nevertheless, Dr Gama Hassan's flamboyant appearance and sometimes his unorthodox and even colonialistic approach to the running of his ministry – with staff having to stand to attention when he enters an office – must have a direct bearing on any failure or success it enjoys.

For the first time ever, the Zande representatives were split over whom they should back for the Presidency of the HEC, with the group backing Alier being led by Mr Samuel Abujon. Although the election of Mr Angelo Beda as Speaker of the Assembly is supposed to have gone a long way towards soothing tribal feelings in the area, the appointment of Mr Abujon as Regional Minister of Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism, although it may also reflect tribal balance, is regarded by many as reward for devotion to Alier's leadership.

Mr Joseph Oduho retains his post as Regional Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform, in spite of his previously outspoken opposition to Alier and his support for Joseph Lagu. His reappointment will hold the tribal balance in Eastern Equatoria, as well as defuse the potential counter-challenge from Lagu.

The appointments of Mr Andrew Wiew and Mr Martin Majier – and a number of others – to ministerial posts might be seen as the infusion of new talent, though Wiew is, of course, a seasoned politician.

Dr Zakariah Bol Deng's appointment as Regional Minister of Health was more than just the need for new talent. He has

Gama Hassan: weakresses are his strengths

been vocal about the ambiguous administrative and constitutional position of Abyei, his home area, which, though administratively part of the north – Southern Kordofan province – remains culturally and ethnically very much part of the South.

There were, of course, those whom Alier could not easily dispense with, even if he wanted to. As Alier's former Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Lagu's minister in the same post, as well as being his Vice-President, and then Acting President during the election period, Mr Peter Gatkuoth was well placed to contest the Presidency of the HEC. But he was tactful and far-sighted enough to shelve his ambitions – at least, for the time being – and to throw his considerable weight behind Alier early in the race. It would, therefore, have been unreasonable for Alier not to have appointed Peter Gatkuoth, who now holds the important finance and planning portfolio, as well as the prestigious Vice-Presidency of the HEC.

All considered, the announcement of Alier's initial appointments was, to put it mildly, surprising to many Southerners. This was due partly to the widely discussed reasons that were supposed to

Peter Gatknoth: tactful and far-sighted

have led to Alier's and Lagu's downfalls in 1978 and 1980, respectively. Although Alier's personal credibility, honesty and capacity for hard work were never questioned, he was constantly criticised for not taking a tougher line with those ministers whose public image had become tarnished for not having those qualities.

On the other hand, Alier's supporters insisted that if Joseph Lagu had given prominence to a 'government of unity' in 1978, instead of appointing only his supporters, there would not have been a constitutional crisis. Alier was, therefore, not expected to appoint almost half the ministerial posts from ministers of his previous government. Alier's action was widely seen as a return to pre-1978 policies, an acknowledgement that he had not changed – a slight to public opinion.

However, the later appointment of Mr Bona Malwal as Regional Minister of Industry had considerable impact in softening hostility to Alier's government. Bona Malwal, an SSU politburo member and a former minister in the national government, is, in the view of many Southerners, complementary to Alier.

Empathising with this point, a close friend of both men told *Sudanow*: 'Alier without Malwal is like having a car without an engine. Malwal without Alier is like a car with no brakes. Put them together, and you have a smooth and safe car.' One hopes so.

But adding the experience and influence of Peter Gatkuoth and Hillary Paul Logali, there is a chance that the South may yet see a period of stability and a vigorous and realistic approach to the problems of poverty in the Southern Region. ■

Bona Malwal: no-nonsense approach to problems.

Although Regional President Abel Alier's first executive appointments were generally received with guarded disapproval by many Southern politicians, underlying their fears, Sudanow learnt, was a genuine desire to bury the hatchet and get on with the development of the Region. Last month, our Juba correspondent Arop Madut and senior reporter Alfred Logune Taban sought the opinions of nine Southern politicians based in Khartoum. Their views:

OTHWON DAK, MP: 'The election of Abel Alier should be an advantage because he brings long experience into the government with him. But we hope that he has learnt from past experience and the two years he spent out of the government, to overcome the weaknesses and mistakes of the past – I mean the choice and control of the personnel with whom he works. It appears from his recent appointments to the cabinet and the SSU Secretariat, however, that not much has been learnt.

It must be remembered that Abel Alier was rejected by the South in 1978, not because of himself, but because of other people in his government. Most of them are now back in government, and in key positions. Abel is aware of these criticisms.

Othwon Dak

This is a disappointment to the many Southerners who had thought that the problem of national unity should have been tackled right from the start. Many will now think that Abel will sacrifice efficiency and effective contribution towards the regional and national spirit to personal loyalty. All five people appointed to the Regional Secretariat of the SSU are people who failed in the recent elections.

In a democracy, popular elections are the most critical measuring device. Anybody who fails in the election is automatically assumed to have lost the confidence of the electorate. The presence of these five men is going to affect the attitude of the people towards the political system itself. We think the appointments are unfortunate and should not have been made.

Another thing: on the eve of the HEC Presidential elections, a few people were trying to sell the idea of Dinka unity. We hope Abel will remain above this way of looking at Southern politics. We know that from the beginning of his political career, Abel has been a national leader, and that he doesn't have to resort to his tribal background to gain votes. In the past, and still now, he has been a man of national stature. The question of Dinka unity as preached by these few individuals was not, we suspect, meant for Abel Alier, but for the future ascendence of the preachers themselves.'

MARKO RUME, MP: 'I don't think the South is happy at the return of Abel Alier. I was in the South when it was announced that Abel had been successful. The situation looked as though a big chief had died and the people were in mourning. In Eastern Equatoria in particular, not a single human being was happy, not even children. A good number of people came to my house to ask my opinion. I told them that I sympathised with them. I asked a group of five people why they were unhappy with Abel. They replied by asking me what Abel had done in the six years he had been in power. I replied by asking *them* what Lagu had done in his two years in power.

They told me about the opening of the road to Kenya; the improvement in the road from Juba to Bor; the completion of the Shambe-Rumbek road; the improvement of conditions in Juba; the improvement of the Yei-Juba road and the Juba-Yambio road, which is near completion; and the ending of school fees. Orphans could not be educated in Abel's time they told me, because of school fees.

Therefore, I don't think Abel's government will last because he has put himself in the same shoes as he was wearing before, by bringing back the same people the electorate rejected in 1978.

Secondly, Abel, naturally, is tribalistic. He appoints and promotes people from his own tribe. There are cases of Dinka boasting of their positions. There are even labourers who challenge people from other tribes, saying: 'After all, who are you? We are the rulers.' This brings clashes. Abel should have spoken to his people and stopped this.'

OSMAN GAD EL RAB (MP): 'The events of the last two years demand wise leadership which is able to reunite the badly divided people in that part of our dear country. According to my observations of Southern leaders, such a leadership can be found only in the person of Abel Alier. One hopes that he will try to rule with an iron hand this time; to instill in the minds of the people a sense of responsibility, discipline, direction and respect for public funds and property. What I mean is that those who try to tamper with public funds and property should be made to account for their actions.'

AMBROSE WOL DHAL (MP): 'During previous administrations, Southern people hoped that sustained economic development would start immediately; unfortunately, nothing concrete happened except the declaration of intentions. On the contrary, the primary concern has been all along, how to render essential services, e.g. employment, to the people. This drained away the regional budget, while the economy remained in a state of stagnation. In the end the hopes and the aspirations of the people were frustrated.

The inability of the executive to tackle the problems of development also led to a popular desire for progressive government that should fulfill the aspirations of the people. But none of the previous governments was in the mood to achieve these ends.

On the other hand, the fact that both the Alier and Lagu governments were composed of groups without clearly spelt-out political and ideological philosophies to run the affairs in the Region led to manoeuvring. The needs of the people were, therefore, not given due consideration because of the persistent power struggle between those who were in and out of the government. Consequently, the economic situation in the Southern Region worsened. This was the state of affairs when the President of the Republic dissolved the Assemblies in February.

With Abel Alier now again in charge of the affairs in the Region, one hopes that the new administration will pledge itself to streamline the speed of progress in the South. This, in my opinion, demands clear understanding of the problems involved, and coordination with the central government.

Ambrose Wol Dhal

Another matter the new government should concern itself with is the way the meagre resources available in the Southern Region are being wasted. The excessive appointments and promotions without the necessary financial resources will always end in a complete ruin in the Regional economy, which to date is entirely dependent on the grants-in-aid from the central treasury.

Anyway, without economic viability, the autonomy, which is theoretically now being enjoyed in the Southern Region, will be meaningless. The new Regional administration should give this particular aspect serious thought and guard itself against unnecessary political squabbles intended to achieve individual gains.'

GABRIEL MATHIANG, MP: 'Before the elections, Southerners were divided, and after these elections, they remain divided. Unity would have been achieved if Abel had chosen his cabinet irrespective of whether they were his supporters, or of their tribal and ethnic origins. He should have formed his government on a broad basis. Now, for example, he wants to isolate Samuel Aru and his supporters.

The South faces many problems, especially of development. Such problems need a team of dedicated and righteous ministers. One would expect Abel to work to solve some of these challenges by appointing the right men to the right jobs. The same thing is happening in the SSU. Democracy in the South is being abused by appointing people who have not been elected to the SSU. In Lakes province, people were chosen to go to the National Congress in Khartoum in January and February, not because they won the elections, but out of loyalty to the commissioner. Now it is being repeated in the Regional Secretariat.

In conclusion, I hope that despite the difficulties the Regional government is bound to face, Abel has a chance to use his vast experience to deliver the goods and services and create stability in the Regional institutions. One must wait and see the success of his government in practical performance.'

Luigi Adwok Buong

LUIGI ADWOK BUONG: 'I think that time has come for the Southern Sudan to move positively towards socio-economic development and to render to the people the services they expect of their leaders. Therefore, those who are now in the leadership in the Southern Region should come together immediately and do what they can for the people by way of development, since their differences lie only in the ways and means to achieve the accepted goals. In short, Southerners now have the opportunity to learn from their immediate past – that they will never achieve anything by fighting among themselves.

Regarding the fears that the formation of the new administration is tribalistic, though the aim might have been to strike the tribal balance, I agree that that there was a basis for such fears. But these fears will die away the very moment people begin to see their leaders in terms of what they can do for their people, rather than the tribes to which they belong.

JOSEPH NYOK ABIEL (MP): 'Despite Abel Alier's obvious successes as an elected President of the Region in 1973, the fact that some of his inner circle were allegedly accused of corrupt practices led many to have reservations about him when he asked for a new mandate in 1978. His bringing some of these people back into his government is a challenge to the public. And unless these people take this also as a challenge and show that they have changed, the public will continue to have doubts about Alier's attitude towards those he rules and those who help him to rule. If they prove the opposite of what the public currently think of them, they could be welcomed like prodigal sons.'

JAMES AJING PATH (MP): 'The loss of trust in Mr Abel Alier's administration in 1978 was due to his lack of outspokenness about his attitudes towards national issues affecting the South, e.g. integration with Egypt and the Jonglei Canal. There was a lack of public enlightenment regarding the programmes connected with these issues.

Now that the South's confidence in him has been restored, one hopes that he will exert more effort to deal effectively with the problems. The best way he can do this is to have full public enlightenment and political education through the SSU's popular and syndicated organisations.'

ELIA DUANG AROP (MP): 'It became obvious immediately after the SSU National Congress and the dissolution of the Assemblies that Abel Alier would get the post after the elections. The reasons were as follows: First, Lagu's famous February reshuffle in which he brought into his government ministers previously in Alier's inner circles and gave them the key positions of security and finance, made many supporters of the wind of change movement feel that there was no clear differences between Lagu and Alier.

The second reason was Lagu's removal of all the Dinkas in key positions in his government, his anti-Dinka attitude and his treatment of those closely related or near to Alier in the South led many to sympathise with Alier.

The third reason is that Southern politicians accepted that elections should be run under Abel Alier's direct supervision, although after that he would be a candidate for the Regional Presidency.

Fourthly, there were the unfortunate events brought against Samuel Aru Bol, one of the outstanding potential challengers; that is the £s30,000 affair and the alleged letter to Sadig el Mahdi. These allegations led many members for the wind of change group to have reservations about Samuel Aru.

These facts put together, the members of the Third People's Regional Assembly had no choice but to look for a compromising figure. But in the absence of an alternative candidate with a progressive political programme, the choice went to Abel Alier due to his personal qualities and experience.

In any case, the so-called government of participation under brother Abel Alier, which included even those who were openly opposed to his coming into power, will not make any headway. Unless Alier comes out with a radical political programme based on self-reliance, and supplies the badly-needed exemplary leadership in the South capable of putting the only resources available to good economic use, his government will fall in the same way as its predecessors.'

SOLOMONA REFUGEE CAMP DISCUSSED

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Apr 80 p 25

[Text]

The Soviet-backed Ethiopian offensive of October 1978 resulted in not less than 100,000 displaced people. Yet all except a few chose to remain under EPLF administration in Eritrea, while others stayed in the EPLF-run Solomona camp in Sudan. Victoria Brittain of the British daily paper 'The Guardian' recently visited Solomona camp. This is her report.

SOLOMONA CAMP was set up in Sudan at the end of 1978 when the Dergue began their Russian-led ground and air offensive in Eritrea. The EPLF brought out one of the most vulnerable groups in their community – ten thousand people, of whom two thirds were children including 350 orphans.

They settled them in Red Sea Province, not far from the Eritrean frontier. As the camp also includes some 2,000 handicapped people, it sounds as though it should be the most pathetic of Sudan's refugee camps. In fact, it is the least pathetic – a triumph of will-power and organisation over what most people would have considered hopeless odds.

The camp lies along the stoney banks of a wide river which is almost dry for half the year. Steep hills rise behind, bringing torrents of water racing down to bisect the camp in the rainy season. For three months the camp is isolated except for access by camel. The sandy track from Port Sudan takes nine or ten hours at the best of times.

The turning to the camp off the rutted track to Karora is unmarked. The track twists between thorn trees and bounces over boulders. The first sign of the camp is an EPLF guard post where the car is briefly checked by two men. Our driver was an Eritrean with a brother and a sister in the camp. No stranger would ever find this place as every tent and every house is camouflaged with thorn branches and mud. From one end of the camp to the other is about ten miles.

Driving up the dry river bed the first signs of the camp are the water truck filling up at the pump and electric wire strung along a line of posts, indicating the presence of an electricity generator. On a flat space next to the river a group of boys are playing football. Other children are collecting bundles of firewood.

Everyone works in this camp unless they are in hospital. Outside the orphans' school are tiny vegetable gardens growing tomatoes, beans, peppers and onions. Each one has been carefully shaded from the sun by small screens of thorn branches and is watered daily by the children. In tent classrooms the small orphans, some as young as two or three, sit in rows on smooth mud benches singing about how the Eritreans will win and how they, 'small red flowers', are growing strong to replace the older generation. The children are undeniably happy, clean, well-organised, though their

classrooms have not even the simplest piece of nursery school equipment.

'That is a gun. . . this is a bomb. . . . that is a bullet. . . . that is an elephant. . . this is a hyena.' In the next tent seven-year-olds are learning English from hand-made cards. No one makes a mistake and every hand is raised to answer every time a new card is raised. The atmosphere of quiet gentle discipline would put most European primary schools to shame.

Children over the age of seven go to the 'Revolutionary School' a mile or more away down the valley. Here a new syllabus has been drawn up and the children are taught with books in Tigrinia printed in Eritrea. They also learn English and Arabic.

The headmaster explained: 'Our curriculum is quite different from the Ethiopian government one, where they concentrate on a few individuals. Here we train the children to serve the people for the future and to be able to improve the standard of living of the people. We need scientifically-trained youth. We also try always to relate all theory to practice, when teaching them engineering or science for instance. Thirdly, we encourage an attitude of comradeship and working collectively. Previously, there was no unity among them.' . . . . . .

There are a hundred trained teachers for the 2,500 children in the school, many of whose parents are still in Eritrea.

Farther down the valley lies the village of the handicapped where the first impression is that everyone is on crutches. Working with used war materials these men make high-quality cupboards with well-fitting doors and book-shelves which do not wobble. New watch straps are made from bits of canvas and broken shoe buckles. New *jikas* and food covers are made from used ammunition brought back from Eritrea. Since the battle of Nakfa in December they have the raw materials for weeks of carpentry work with Russian ammunition boxes piled high.

Substantial houses are being built from pieces of rock fitted together and plastered with mud. The first ones are being used for community activities in this village and they plan soon to make dormitories for the Revolutionary School. Now the dormitories are merely delineated by lines of stones in the dust and the children sleep under the stars.

But all the ingenuity and hard work will not keep these people alive and well. Fifty per cent of the 11,500 people now in the camp are estimated as malnourished by the camp doctor, who is a highly-qualified paediatrician and previously was a front-line surgeon. He has two qualified nurses, one of whom is a midwife, and a dresser working with him. The clinic takes between 200 and 340 in-patients a month and sees about 2,500 out-patients, including many Sudanese who will make several days' journey to see him.

One quarter of the patients are simply ill and weak from malnourishment. Another 21 per cent have TB as a result of malnourishment. As in most camps in Sudan TB is on a steady ominous increase month by month and there is an urgent need of effective TB drugs.

The clinic has a spotlessly clean dust-proof operating tent given by Kuwait. All babies are delivered in hospital in a special maternity tent. In another open tent, a Sudanese child lies attached to a drip. She smiled weakly as the doctor went past. 'I thought we would lose her, but now she seems to be coming back.' Her family had encamped themselves under a nearby tree, prepared to stay a week, a month.

World Food Programme dura and lentils are supposed to be the staple diet of the camp. But the supplies, which come every three months, barely last for one, according to camp officials. A protein supplement is badly needed, as is vitamin C. There were 600 serious scurvy cases in October. A gift of lemons cleared them all, but now it is beginning again. Respiratory infections numbered 800 cases last month, malaria 600 and internal parasites even more.

All these health problems, like the TB, are serious because of the underlying malnutrition which haunts the camp. All the children you look at closely show signs of anaemia in the eyes. So far, extraordinarily few show the lethargy and inability to concentrate which chronic malnutrition brings. That they do not is a tribute to the organising ability of the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) in Khartoum and elsewhere. ■

CSO: 4820

HIGHER EDUCATION IN NEED OF REVIEW

Current State of Education

Khartoum SUDANOW in English May 80 pp 10-12, 17

[Text]

Following the clashes at the University of Khartoum in March, in which one student died and several others were wounded, there has been much soul-searching behind the closed doors of the National Council for Higher Education (NCHE) committee rooms.

For many, the events of March pose questions whose scope extends beyond the campus of Khartoum University to touch upon the whole system of higher education in Sudan. Editor Fath el Rahman Mahjoub takes a look at the current state of higher education, including further education, in Sudan.

PREDICTABLY, THE RESPONSE to March's campus turmoil was the immediate formation of a 'fact-finding' committee, formed by the chairman of the Khartoum University Council, Dr Bashir Abbadi, to look into the events. More significant was the constitution of a committee, formed by Education Minister and NCHE chairman Mr Dafalla el Haj Yousef, to investigate the general 'phenomenon of instability in university campuses.' It was a recognition of the fact that the events at Khartoum University were far from being an isolated incident.

Similar events have occurred previously, both in the University of Khartoum itself and in other institutions of higher education. Only a few months ago, the students of both Juba and Gezira universities were on strike. Clashes between students were also reported in Juba, at the Khartoum branch of the University of Cairo and at Khartoum University, while last month, technical and some university students put in a claim for increased maintenance grants – a foreboding of future unrest.

The events at the University of Khartoum are thus only a symptom of a malaise which is general. They assumed such dramatic proportions simply because they occurred in Sudan's oldest and largest centre of higher education.

This malaise is not confined to students. In February, the academic staff of the University of Khartoum went on strike, followed in March by a similar strike amid final exams by the staff of the Polytechnic, who were pressing the NCHE for terms of service on a par with those of their colleagues in the University of Khartoum.

In a statement issued early last month, the trades union of the academic staff concluded that the only way to bring the University out of 'its deep and explosive crisis' is to 'conduct a critical and overall evaluation of all aspects of university life.'

The statement accused the University administration both of contributing to the problems facing the University and of

failing to face up to them. Dr Adlan Hardallo, president of the University of Khartoum academic staff trades union, told *Sudanow* that the Higher Education Act of 1975 deprived the university community of the right to contribute to the administration of its own institution.

'In the past the leadership was chosen through elections – now it is appointed either by the Chancellor himself or through his appointees,' he said. 'The democratic participation by the University community in the past,' he continued, 'meant that the leadership was accountable to that community and not to any outside influence. The present lack of participation results in an administration that is out of touch with both the academic staff and the students.'

Some have accused the committees formed to investigate the current problems of basing themselves on the assumption that the students, rather than higher education itself, are to blame for the instability. 'Why else would the committees be composed primarily of those directly involved in the administration of higher education?' asked one observer. It is unlikely, argue some, that those responsible for the administration of the system would be capable of objectively identifying its problems.

That higher education faces problems there can be no doubt. People point to a drop in academic standards, a lack of balance between the turn-out of professionals and that of technicians, and above all to the fact that the intake capacity of higher education is stagnant, if not falling, at a time when the revolution in general education has meant that there is a total of about two million school places compared to less than 50,000 in higher education. Furthermore, 20,000 of these places are not in Sudan but abroad. Thus, according to one senior executive of the NCHE, this year 60,000 secondary school graduates were chasing the 11,000 places annually available in higher education, compared to only 37,000 hopefuls two years ago.

The intake rates of higher education are failing to keep pace with the rising number of secondary school leavers. But more worrying is the fact that intake into higher technical institutes – which at the moment have only 3,000 places – has actually dropped from 917 last year to 902 this year.

This failure in the field of technical education is a clear case of the imbalance which exists between technical and professional education. While a source in the NCHE said that this is being rectified by directing most of those studying abroad into technical education, nonetheless, the imbalance continues to be aggravated by such factors as the brain drain and the gravitation of technicians towards the private sector in the capital rather than to development schemes in the provinces where they are most needed.

It is the pressure on higher education to expand which makes the review of, as the NCHE puts it, 'the concept, the system, laws and regulations' of higher education all the more necessary.

There is a widespread feeling that the achievements of higher education so far have failed to measure up to the amount of money spent on it. Mr Ibrahim Mohamed Osman, a director of the executive office of the NCHE, told *Sudanow* that the large concentration of funds on just a few thousand students makes it practically impossible to extend higher education to provide additional space for the increased number of secondary school graduates clamouring at the gates.

Certainly, there is a markedly uneven distribution of funds, with a few institutions covering only those students in Sudan using up nearly all the £s30 million budget. Of this, the University of Khartoum, with 9,000 students, receives almost half – £s14.3 million – thus occupying an undoubtedly privileged position.

Yet the budget proposals submitted by the University of Khartoum for the coming fiscal year amount to £s33 million – more than the entire budget for higher education. 'This sum,' says a member of the University's academic staff, 'is an expression of the feeling of bitterness people experience at the many shortages the University faces, particularly regarding equipment and funds for academic studies and scientific research.'

Another member of the academic staff told *Sudanow* that there is an acute shortage of equipment and chemicals, and that a certain department has officially announced that it is therefore becoming impossible to teach.

DISTRIBUTION OF SCHOOLS

PROVINCE	PRIMARY	GENERAL SEC.	HIGH SEC.	TECHNICAL
NORTHERN	336	115	16	1
N. DARFUR	328	46	6	2
N. KORDOFAN	410	82	10	1
NILE	402	139	18	1
RED SEA	159	29	8	2
KASSALA	389	63	9	3
KHTM	514	160	43	10
GEZIRA	1003	308	38	8
WHITE NILE	294	78	10	3
SOUTH KORDOFAN	278	48	7	–
S. DARFUR	237	33	4	2
BAHR EL GHAZAL	128	17	2	–
LAKES	66	9	2	1
JONGLEI	50	6	–	–
WEST EQUATORIA	128	8	2	–
EAST EQUATORIA	253	22	2	2
UPPER NILE	112	24	4	–
BLUE NILE	381	65	9	–

H.E. INTAKE CAPACITY

School year	*candidates for Sudan school certificate	U of K	Islamic University	Juba University	Gezira University	Higher technical Institute	Total capacity
1977/1978	37,000	1988	359	128	–	748	3223
1978/1979	48,000	1948	335	169	209	917	3578
1979/1980	60,000	1895	359	175	178	902	3309

* including private candidates (about half of the number)

At present the university has 670 academic staff, 110 of whom are expatriates. There are complaints, however, that this is not enough and that the University is suffering from a shortage. 'This is because the terms of service are unsatisfactory,' continued the lecturer, 'which contributes to the brain drain to foreign universities where better terms of service are normally found. Moreover, those who stay behind get involved in part-time activities to supplement their incomes, such as lecturing at other universities and educational institutes, running private clinics or working in offices. This leaves little time to spend on students and research.'

'There is no doubt that the academic standards of Khartoum University have deteriorated,' an expatriate professor, who had returned to the University of Khartoum after a period of absence, told *Sudanow*. 'For example,' he elaborated, 'I used to organise 14 practicals; now I think myself lucky if I succeed in organising four. There's no equipment and no research and it's impossible for a lecturer to be of any use to his students without these.'

Much of the expense of the University of Khartoum stems from the fact that it is a residential university. Historically it grew up as such, a result of the marriage between the Sudanese attitude towards students and the British 'liberal' concept of education. The word 'student' in Sudan always implied 'somebody who is paid for.' The *'Howar'* – the student of religion – used to enjoy housing and food from the surrounding community.

When the colonial administration began establishing schools early this century, to satisfy its need for local staff and technicians, hostels were built beside the class-rooms and students were supplied with food and other services. The University of Khartoum, which grew out of The Gordon Memorial College founded at the start of the century, was part of this tradition.

Such a tradition is expensive to maintain. According to Ms Aisha Hassan, students' affairs secretary for welfare, £s1.4 million of the University's budget for this fiscal year is being spent on expenses related to housing, food and other services and on already established infrastructure, such as buildings and furniture. On top of this is money spent on salaries for the vast army of service workers – 3,715 out of the University's 5,640 employees.

The new universities of Juba, established in 1977, and Gezira, 1978, are following in the footsteps of their sister university at Khartoum in the provision of services to students. A lecturer at Juba, trying to persuade the doubtful father of a student from the North that the university students do not suffer the commodity shortages of the Southern region, had to admit that food supplies for the University of Juba are specially flown in from Khartoum. Meanwhile, Prof. Mohamed el Obeid el Mubarak, Vice-Chancellor of Gezira University, expressed his concern, in an interview with the daily paper *El Sahafa*, that students had demanded services – such as water coolers – which failed to consider economic realities.

'The money spent on the welfare and accomodation of students and the way they are treated is far from being educative, since it does not prepare the student to be part of the life that is waiting for him outside the campus after graduation,' observed Mr Ahmed Mahdi, acting dean of students at the University of Khartoum. 'It creates dependence and lack of responsibility.'

SCHOOL PUPILS

Higher Secondary School	95,000
General Secondary School	260,000
Primary School	1,334,000
Total	1,689,000

STUDENTS IN H.E.

Abroad	20,000
University of Khartoum	9,000
University of Cairo Kht. Branch	13,000
Higher Technical Institutes	3,000
Others	3,000
Total	48,000

Other government-sponsored higher education institutes pay students grants for their maintenance and the students have to look after themselves. The present maintenance grants range between £s25-30 monthly for each student.

In March, eleven students' unions whose members are subject to this grants system, submitted a memorandum to the chairman of the NCHE claiming that £s52 monthly was the minimum necessary to meet the basic daily needs of students living in the capital, given the present rate of inflation. The number of students represented by those unions is estimated to be about 3,000, which means that a total of £s1.9 million is being demanded.

However, with most existing institutions of higher education concentrated in the capital and most students coming from the provinces, it is hard to see how students' basic needs could be met, if not by the government. Mr Suleiman el Amin Abbas, president of the University of Khartoum's Students' Union (KUSU), considers the benefits enjoyed by students at the University as necessary in principle, but in practice mismanaged. 'For example,' he said, 'a cup of milk is served to every student with each of his three daily meals. Yet, when we know that a large number of Sudanese children are suffering from malnutrition, this isn't fair. We are a part of this country and its grievances, and that shouldn't be forgotten.'

By contrast, 13,000 students studying in the Khartoum branch of the University of Cairo receive no money to cover maintenance or transport costs. These students receive their education, which is free, on a part-time basis, studying between four and nine in the evening.

However, while they cost the government nothing, the civil service is generally reluctant to employ those studying at the University of Cairo. More recently, greater coordination between the NCHE and the University has changed the system entirely, so that courses are now being held during the day; which raises the question as to how the students, who used to be free to work during the day, will be able to support themselves.

The 'phenomena' and 'fact-finding' committees have yet to disclose their findings. One thing is clear however, and that is that all parties concerned have an axe to grind.

The NCHE and its chairman have expressed their concern about the 'dilemma' of higher education in Sudan. As the chairman told *Sudanow*, long-term policies are needed to distribute resources more fairly as a prelude to the expansion and development of higher education.

'To put this policy into practice will take a number of years, as well as resources which are not readily available now,' he said. However, without greater cooperation all round, time and resources will not be enough to resolve the present crisis in higher education. ■

Necessity of Education Questioned

Khartoum SUDANOW in English May 80 pp 13, 14

[Interview with Dafalla el Haj Yousef, minister of Education and Guidance and chairman of the National Council for Higher Education by editor Fath el Rahman Mahjoub, place and date not given]

[Text]

Events at the University of Khartoum in March put higher education in the news. In the aftermath, many people are beginning to subject the system of higher education – including further education – to the harsh light of critical examination.

Is higher education an expensive luxury, of little relevance to a poor, developing country, or does it make a valuable contribution to Sudan's economic and social development? Editor Fath el Rahman Mahjoub put this and many other questions to the Minister of Education and Guidance and chairman of the National Council for Higher Education, Mr Dafalla el Haj Yousef. Extracts from their conversation:

SUDANOW: *Some people argue that the present system of higher education is simply a replica of those in developed, industrialised countries which are not suited to the conditions in, or the needs of Sudan. Do you agree with this criticism?*

Dafalla el Haj Yousef: I think that this criticism is completely unfounded. It has its origins, of course, in the fact that the higher educational institutions of most developing countries were established in the colonial era and when colonialism came under attack, so too did the institutions established under its rule. Khartoum University itself was at one time affiliated with the University of London.

Since then however, four new universities, a polytechnic and several higher technical institutes have been established. Besides this, the whole policy regarding higher education has been subject to constant review, culminating in the 1975 Reorganisation of Education Act. As part of this act, the National Council of Higher Education (NCHE) was established as the body in charge of higher education. The Council clearly defined the objective of higher education in Sudan, which is to provide manpower with the necessary skills and knowledge to meet the needs of economic and social development as embodied in the six year plan.

This is reflected in the way the universities are organised – in the structure of their courses and their methods of education. The emphasis placed on preventive medicine at the Gezira University; the admission of mature students at Juba; the new faculties of natural resources at both and the attention given to extra-mural departments are just some examples of the efforts being made to integrate higher education with Sudan's environment and its developmental needs.

Q *How would you estimate the contribution of higher education to Sudan's economic and social development?*

A: So far, higher education has provided the professionals and technicians needed both to administer and execute development projects. Also, before the National Council for Research was established, the Graduate College of the University of Khartoum was one of the most important research institutions. Over 150 post-graduate degrees were awarded for theses of outstanding practical relevance to the needs of Sudan.

We are always trying to maximise this contribution of higher education to development, and in our cultural protocols with the different countries which provide scholarships for Sudanese students, particularly Egypt, we always emphasise that the students should study science and applied technology.

At present, we are trying to expand the existing faculties and establish new ones geared to providing the manpower capable of adopting and adapting the

technology necessary for development. We are, however, facing two major problems in this. One is that there is a lack of coordination between the institutions of higher education and government departments – there is no attempt to quantify and stipulate the country's manpower needs and then plan higher education to meet those needs.

The other major problem is that of the emigration of trained manpower to neighbouring countries. If we set a target for the graduation of, for example, 1,000 doctors over a period of three years, we know that during this time 600 doctors may emigrate. So, we have to readjust our plans continuously.

Q: *There has been something of a revolution in general education over the past few years. The number of pupils enrolling in primary and secondary schools has increased markedly but, at the same time, there has been no proportionate increase in the number of places available in higher education. Why is this? Are there any plans to increase the intake?*

A: Certainly there has been a revolution in general education over the last ten years, with the number of pupils receiving general education almost quadrupling.

This year over 60,000 students sat for the general certificate of education and this does pose a very worrying question as regards their future as at present we have places in higher education for only 11,000 students. However, it's not true to say that there has been no increase in the number of higher education places. Two years ago, the number of students admitted was no more than three thousand but, through tremendous efforts, we managed to secure over 4,000 scholarships for students to study abroad. Meanwhile, we've been able to increase the intake in Sudan with the establishment of new universties and the expansion of the extra-mural departments of the University of Khartoum and the Polytechnic.

However, there is no doubt that we need to expand higher education further. The crucial question is one of funds. If we want to make higher education available to more people, then we have to make it cheaper. A detailed survey has been carried out by the World Bank, in addition to studies presented by the NCHE secretariat and the grants committee, with a view to reducing the cost of higher education and distributing the funds more equitably.

At the moment, we are faced with certain anomalies in fund allocation. For example, we spend a great deal on universities of Khartoum, Juba and Gezira, which are fully residential, yet very little to support students studying abroad and nothing at all for the students of the Khartoum branch of Cairo University.

Yet accommodation and transport problems in Khartoum make it impossible to make the University of Khartoum non-residential without adverse consequences for both the university and its students. The same applies to Juba, where most of the students are from the rural areas and so have to be provided with accomodation.

However, we are envisaging a long-term policy aimed at providing all universities with residential quarters and self-service restaurants, introducing a scholarship system and doing away with the preliminary year by adding a year on to higher secondary school education. To put this policy into practice will take a number of years and resources which are not readily available now.

Q: *Higher education in Sudan is, it is claimed, free. But what does 'Free' actually mean? There has been some unrest among students demanding higher maintenance grants. Can you tell us what expenses are meant to be covered by these grants?*

A: Higher education is, in fact, free. Facilities are available to successful students free of charge. However, again we come up against the problem of inconsistencies, as 'free' has different meanings in different institutions. 'Free' in the University of Khartoum, which has always been a residential university, means the provision of every facility – lodging, food, transport, sports facili-

ties. On the other hand, in other institutions, such as the polytechnic, 'Free' means a monthly grant of £s25 or £s30. Grants are not meant to cover all expenses; they are meant just to help a student support himself while studying. However, when some students see others getting more, this generates a feeling of injustice.

Q: *The number of students studying in higher education institutions abroad is now roughly equivalent to those studying here in Sudan Doesn't this interfere with the priorities we have set for education here?*

A: The number of students studying abroad is now roughly equal to the number studying in Sudan. There is a trend towards an increase in those studying abroad at their own expense as many of the over half million Sudanese working abroad can afford to educate their children at foreign universities.

We didn't have any control over such students in the past but the NCHE has recently been designated to control all study abroad, including that undertaken at private expense. We're trying to obtain places in faculties, and scholarships that cover the specialities we need for our development in line with our overall planning for higher education. Governments which are providing scholarships for Sudan have been very responsive to our requests in this respect.

Q: *What part does the NCHE have in determining academic standards and curriculum of the University of Cairo, Khartoum branch? Are you satisfied with the present relations between the University and the Council?*

A: Only students with very high standards are admitted to the University of Cairo. The question of the University generally and of its expansion projects has been the subject of several discussions – in which the NCHE was involved – with the Minister of Education in Egypt. This resulted in the formation of a joint committee, whose recommendations are in the process of being implemented.

The University's expansion is fully in line with the priorities of the NCHE and building is now under way to establish a new faculty of science and to expand the faculty of commerce, to allow particularly for fields of study not available in our universities, such as cost accounting, statistics and insurance.

There is now full coordination between the University of Cairo and the NCHE.

Q: *Some people say that higher education is not as democratic as it was in the past when the university community elected its own leadership. What do you say to this?*

A: One of the main features of higher education is the autonomy of higher educational institutions, something which has been emphasised by the establishment of university councils, senates and academic boards.

However, some people think that this autonomy is violated by the fact that vice-chancellors and deans are appointed rather than elected. Yet it is our experience that if the vice chancellor is elected, this opens the door to factionalism and division within the university. As things stand now, the vice-chancellor is appointed by the President of the Republic, based on the nominations made by the chairman of the council of the university, presumably after due consultation with the council's members.

Q: *There seems to be some reluctance among educational and governmental authorities to acknowledge the existence of political organisation within the universities and other institutions. The reality is that the freedoms granted to universities have resulted in strong political divisions which must, to a greater or lesser extent, reflect divisions in society at large. Why don't the responsible authorities admit these realities and tackle the problems accordingly?*

A: Student communities all over the world tend to find themselves in opposition to the establishment. A certain amount of latitude is always allowed to

students because of factors such as their age and idealism, while freedom of expression is important for students to develop their character. In developing countries, subversive elements try to exploit this freedom of expression, turning campuses into places of political division.

It's always difficult to try and draw a line between students' genuine aspirations and subversion, but the situation could be improved if strong contacts were established between students and academic staff. This could be a means of enforcing regulations which, while encouraging students to involve themselves in public affairs which will help them become the future leaders of the country, would also ensure the prevalence of discipline in the university and put an end to lawlessness and violence. ■

Places of Study

Khartoum SUDANOW in English May 80 p 15

[Text]

University of Khartoum:

Established in 1902 as The Gordon Memorial College and expanded to become a secondary educational institution in 1924, it was upgraded in 1947 to a university college with a special relationship with the University of London. By 1956, it had developed to become the University of Khartoum as it is known today.

Islamic University of Omdurman:

This was established as the Omdurman Institute of Religious Knowledge in 1912. In 1963 it was upgraded to become the Islamic College, an embryo of the Omdurman Islamic University it was to become two years later. It reverted once more to a college – the Arabic and Islamic Studies College – in 1969, to have its status as a university restored in 1975.

Cairo University-Khartoum Branch 'Foreign':

This was opened in 1955 as a branch of Egypt's University of Cairo.

University of Juba

Established 1977.

Gezira Unv. of Agri. & N. Res.

Established 1978 in Wad Medani.

Khartoum Polytechnic:

This was established in 1950 as part of the Department of Works, later to come under the jurisdiction of the Department of Education. Granted autonomy in 1965, it was, in 1975, enlarged to include institutes such as the Shambat Agricultural Institute, the Veterinary Training Institute and the Forestry Experts College.

College of Mechanical Engineering (Atbara)

Established as an Institute of Mechanical Engineering for technicians in 1971, in 1976 it was promoted to the status of college, affiliated to the Polytechnic.

College of Hygiene:

Established as the Hygiene School in 1932, it was reorganised in 1967 and renamed the Hygiene College. In 1971 it was affiliated to the then Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, to be upgraded in 1976 to the status of a higher education institution, with a special academic relationship to the British Royal Academy for Hygiene Officers.

Khartoum Nursing College:

This was established in 1956 under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Health. In 1972 it was transferred to the then Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. In 1976 it assumed the status of a higher education institution.

Ahfad University College for Women 'Private':

This was established in 1966 as a private institution of higher education for girls.

Institute of Music and Drama:

Established in 1967 under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Culture and Information, it became a higher education institution in 1976.

Abu Na'ama College of Agri. & N. Res.

This was founded, with the help of the World Bank, as the Abu Hagar Agricultural Institute, located near Abu Naama. It came under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources until 1976, when it was upgraded to a higher education institution as Abu Naama Agricultural and Natural Resources College. In 1977 it was affiliated to Khartoum Polytechnic.

Higher Inst. of Radiography & Radiotherapy:

Established in 1970 as a joint venture between the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the Ministry of Health, it became a higher education institution in 1978.

Higher Physical Education Institute:

This began life, in 1969, as a higher institute under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. Transferred to the then Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research in 1971, four years later it was moved to the Ministry of Youth and Sports. In 1978 it was upgraded to become a higher education institution.

Politics on Campus

Khartoum SUDANOW in English May 80 p 16

[Article by Abdel Rahman Abdel Rahim]

[Text]

IT IS NO SECRET that political groups are found among students in institutions of higher education. These fronts publish their own journals and organise their own political debates and rallies. And there is little doubting the influence that student politics has on the national political scene.

However, administrators have persistently refused to recognise the existence and activities of these fronts. It follows, then, that there has been no move to organise student politics into a legitimate and rational framework.

It is argued by many observers that it is this very refusal to recognise political reality that has played a major part in the crisis and tragedy in the university. Political violence finds a fertile soil in the absence of political democracy, said a leaflet published by the Khartoum University Academic Staff Association.

A number of students commented that they regarded political liberties as a necessity and something for which they were prepared to fight – indeed, have fought in the past. 'Democracy wasn't the cause of the violence. Rather, it was caused by the absence of democracy,' said Sidig el Zaila'i, the secretary of the Khartoum University Students' Union (KUSU).

The students, themselves, seem to be unfair. 'In the past, they used to agree on the basic point – the preservation of the union and of liberties on the campus,' said Professor Faisal Taj el Din Abu Shama, the deputy Vice-Chancellor. 'These liberties were provided to enable the students to study and to discuss ideas freely.'

'What is meant by these liberties is political freedom: freedom of thought but not of political activity,' he said. 'There must not be this exploitation of the campus as a centre of political activity.'

'Of course, there should be liberties,' said Adil Ibrahim Hamad, head of KUSU's executive council. 'And the rational use of these democratic rights is the only way to stop violence.'

'The promulgation of any law that prevents political activity on the campus is not in the interests of the university,' said Dr Adlan Hardallo, who is on the committee looking into the recent unrest. 'We must remember that university students are Sudan's would-be leaders.' He gave the example of the 1957 Independent Students' Committee, seven of whose members were in the cabinet in 1972. Dr Hardallo is head of the Department of Political Science at Khartoum University and president of the Academic Staff Trades Union.

Others argue that the Univeristy of Khartoum and other places of higher learning constitute a too-liberal island in what is essentially an illiberal country. Such freedoms as are found on campus, says Suleiman el Amin, president of KUSU, should be extended to people outside. Indeed, he argues, it is the possibility of genuine ideological politics that encourages political organisations – denied the possibility of expression elsewhere – to focus their activities and ambitions on the University. This, he says, partly accounts for the hard-headed conflict that led to the recent violence. Since 1973, the Union has become accustomed to the idea that to achieve any of its demands, it has to fight hard.

Nobody seems to object to the conflict of ideas within the university – indeed, isn't this one of the reasons for its existence? However, administrators are reluctant to extend the notion to include politics and they balk at the suggestion of organised, ideologically-based bodies. So, to a great extent, the

leading edge of campus politics is the line between what politicised students can effectively demand and what the administration can effectively resist – a sure formula for struggle.

KUSU took an important step forward late last year when its executive committee recognised student ideological societies. This, they say, is the first step towards establishing political and ideological bodies.

Much of the political argument between students and administrators reflects inadequate resources. The University simply does not have enough money and there is, inevitably, controversy over the way in which the little money they do have is spent. The University needs new lecture theatres, new laboratories, books and better hostels – and this last is a particularly bitter issue.

Lack of finance also affects staff, said Dr Hardallo, and leads to a rush for part-time work just to be able to pay for the basics of life. Time spent outside on part-time jobs means less time spent with students or at research, with a consequent threat to both academic standards and morale.

Students also complain of too much interference from the state in University politics, which has led to a marked hostility on campus to the state. In turn, this hostility has been manipulated for national political ends, they say. In 1970, for example, the government backed the, then, left-wing supporters of the regime, against the Muslim Brothers. Then, say students, in 1973, the government turned its back on the left and helped impose a right-wing leadership on the union.

However, this role is not played by the state directly. In practice, pro-government groupings would manipulate their patronage and connections, using this to suppress their political and ideological opponents.

The government-appointed administration is interested only in defending the interests of the state – even against those of the University, said a Staff Association leaflet published in March last year. The state, it said, moves into the campus when things are going against it and goes around with slogans urging the link between the University and the community.

Students would not mind this, provided, said the KUSU president, that it meant they could openly discuss the economy, development schemes and the State Security Ordinances.

— Abdel Rahman Abdel Rahim

CSO: 4820

PROBLEMS OF ETHIOPIAN REFUGEES DESCRIBED

Conditions in Camp

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Aug 80 pp 9, 10

[Text]

At the conclusion of the International Refugee Conference, held in Khartoum in June of this year, both the Sudanese government and various volunteer organisations set out to lessen the burden of Sudan's refugees, largely by promoting and assisting in the attainment of refugee self-sufficiency.

Freelance journalist and photographer Lynne Barbee attended the conference and travelled to several refugee settlements. Her view:

SOME REFUGEES are still building their huts, but already tea, coffee and suwa huts are mushrooming in Tawawa. For the 6,000 refugees in this new suburban settlement five kilometres from Gedaref, the problems are not of Sudan's making, nor can Sudan fully resolve them.

The overwhelming majority of Tawawa's population is made up of rural Tigraens, displaced for the second time in their lives – forced by hunger to leave their land in the southern part of Ethiopia's poorest province, men and women found work as labourers in the fields and homes of Humera, an agriculturally rich border town just east of Gedaref. Driven from Humera by fighting between the Ethiopian Democratic Union and the Ethiopian Army in 1976, they made their way to Sudan.

The refugee slum area in Gedaref, Raba'a, burned last November, largely because the authorities failed to get the fire under control. Most of the local residents were not particularly sorry to see the refugees go – Raba'a had been a tense and dangerous neighbourhood.

Refugees in Sudan, most of whom are Eritrean and Ethiopian, are of diverse social origin – lowland nomads, highland peasants, merchants, artisans and urban professionals. Their response to survival in a strange land has often been unorthodox, and although a few are successful, most are not.

One old man in Qala el Nahal settlement had been rich in Eritrea – he owned 300 goats, 100 sheep and 80 cattle. He fled with only five cattle, but this capital enabled him to begin smuggling from his new home near the border. His butcher's stall and sesame grinding mill in the settlement were funded by his meagre accumulation of wealth from smuggling.

For many of the urban refugees, the cheque from Saudi Arabia or Europe is the lifeline, and it is often the dream of

similar opportunity for themselves which motivates them to live and work in the towns.

Life in spontaneous settlements has been difficult; those in rural areas have suffered from malnutrition and professionals in the towns have often found work as tea-shop 'boys'.

From the Sudanese government's point of view, the spontaneous settlement of refugees has been a drain on the country's already overstretched resources and a waste of valuable labour, both skilled and unskilled.

'Sudan, despite its vast agricultural potential, is a developing country, and it can no longer absorb such vast numbers of refugees independent of its development plans,' said President Nimeiri in his opening address to the International Refugee Conference in June. The proposals presented at the conference are designed to integrate refugees with Sudan's overall developmental plans, while providing them with essential services and promoting self-sufficiency.

The proposals range from rural wage-earning settlements, with or without land, to animal husbandry and fishing projects; from small-scale industries to technical training centres. However, the attainment of self-sufficiency will be no easy task.

The settlement of refugees as wage-earners on government-owned agricultural schemes has encountered great difficulty (See box). Yields, and thus wages, cannot keep pace with world-wide inflation that is exaggerated by the usual infrastructural problems of a developing country. Wages on the private rain-fed farms are higher, but the season is shorter and the income still inadequate.

The government proposes to improve these conditions by distributing land to rural wage-earning refugees. Each refugee family settled on the Rahad scheme will receive five feddans. Where land is not suitable for rainfed agriculture – for example, at the El Suki scheme, each family will get 1½ feddans for an irrigated vegetable garden.

However, even on the land-based settlements of Qala el Nahal and Um Gargur, yields have been as low as ten sacks of dura for ten feddans of land. The lack of spare parts, cash and sufficient food led to late planting and poor yields. In Qala el Nahal, the refugees went to work on private farms to earn cash to pay for the ploughing of their fields. Circumstances forced some refugees to sell their harvests early at reduced prices. Explained one man from Um Gargur: 'When the time comes to weed my land, I haven't any food to feed my family, so I have to go to work for cash.'

Refugees, like everyone in Sudan, suffer from the consequences of national transportation problems. World Food Programme rations of powdered milk sat on the docks at Port Sudan for seven months, and so the refugees diet was restricted to sorghum, fat and beans.

Even with the milk, 'they receive maintenance rations,' said one expert, 'and it is debatable whether or not these rations are adequate to maintain the health and strength of agricultural workers.' More dura will not really resolve the problem – according to one conference delegate, 'the refugees need a balanced diet containing protein, vitamins and iron if they are not to fall victim to diseases such as malaria and tuberculosis.'

Refugees who have settled spontaneously in the urban areas have little or no access to assistance for food and shelter, but they are reluctant to be transferred. They have come to Sudan with the hopes of an education and an opportunity to use their skills. The Refugee Orientation and Counselling Service in Khartoum is able only to scratch the surface of the needs of urban refugees. According to Annemarie Russell, Social Consultant at the Service, most of the refugees are seeking further education. Given the difficulty of finding jobs in Sudan that are appropriate to their skills and ambitions, they see more schooling as the means for success in the future. Although proposals such as technical training centres may help refugees in the long run, there is little hope for self-sufficiency in the immediate future.

'The most important thing is that refugees do things for themselves,' said one conference delegate. 'Without participation, the best funded and organised project will flounder on the apathy which arises when refugees feel they have no control over their lives.'

Refugee self-sufficiency is in the best interests of both the refugees and the people of Sudan. Project proposals presented at the Refugee Conference are a beginning, but to see them fully implemented will take time and great effort. As Mr Neil Marten, head of the UK's delegation to the conference, said, 'The conference is over, and now the work must begin.' ■

Lack of Necessities

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Aug 80 p 11

[Text]

Refugee settlements in Sudan have met with varying degrees of success. The plan for Km 26, a camp in the New Halfa area, sounds good in theory. In practice, however, both refugees and authorities have run into considerable obstacles:

WHEN THE HIGH Commissioner for Refugees met with New Halfa authorities to discuss the settlement of refugees around New Halfa to provide labour for the agricultural scheme, two sites were suggested. Only one, Km 26 Village, was found to be suitable.

Km 26, first established in March 1977, took in additional refugees in April 1979 and January 1980, making its current population 4,500. The last group of refugees, brought from Kassala, has been temporarily resettled in tents and makeshift housing. Although a filtration plant is now under construction, the refugees' drinking water presently comes untreated from the New Halfa Canal. The refugees have one equipped classroom, a dispensary and a flour mill.

The settlement was designed to provide manpower for the New Halfa Agricultural Scheme, which produces cotton, groundnuts and wheat. Although the New Halfa Scheme Corporation claims that it can employ 10,000 workers on the scheme of 350,000 feddans, the Agricultural Director of the scheme, Mr Ramses Aziz Mekhail, asserts that, 'We really need 18,000 labourers, employed throughout the year, to work the cotton and groundnuts, and an idle capacity of 40,000 workers.' 'Idle capacity' workers need to be available only during harvest time.

A small number of refugees are self-employed within the settlement as grocers, barbers, tailors, coffee- and tea-shop owners and merchants. Most find employment at the scheme.

The demand for labour, however, seems to be unsatisfied – 30 per cent of this year's cotton crop never left the fields.

'The majority of refugees refuse to pick cotton within the scheme, despite the fact that the corporation is paying adequate sums and facilitating transport and food,' said Taj el Sir Abdel Gadir, Director of the Dibaira section. Potential employment for both skilled and unskilled workers at the cotton ginning factory and a nearby sugar factory has also been ignored by most of the refugees.

It seems that there are several reasons why the original plan to employ refugees within the scheme is not working. Eritreans, who make up the majority of refugees at Km 26, are classified by the corporation as city people or village farmers; obviously, the latter are preferred. The urban refugees are considered unsuitable for agricultural work by themselves as well as by the concerned authorities.

At the International Conference on Refugees, refugee self-sufficiency was promoted as the primary goal of both Sudanese government and volunteer organisations involved in refugee aid. But because there is insufficient rainfall to make rainfed agriculture possible, there are no plans to allocate land to the refugees; the inhabitants of Km 26 can only seek wage-based, or dependent, employment.

The Settlement Project is developing a vegetable plot, irrigated by the New Halfa Irrigation Scheme and worked by both Project and refugee labour, which will allow the refugees partial self-sufficiency. However, it seems that the denial of total self-sufficiency, immediately or in the future, is a deterrent to the motivation of potential workers.

The health of the refugees in Km 26 is also a factor. Aside from intestinal dis-

orders caused by unfiltered drinking water, many refugees complain of inadequate diet and medical care.

'At first, aid was presented every five days, then every fifteen days, and now it is once a month,' complained Osman Mohamed Mahmoud, the father of six children.

'We need soap, tea, sugar, coffee and vegetables,' said Halima Musa.

The usual transport delays directly affect the refugees, as World Food Programme and UNHCR rations rarely arrive on time. They are also in need of a car for emergencies and a refrigerator for storing medicines.

On the other hand, authorities complain of the refugees' laziness and inadequate security at the camp.

Outside the walls of Km 26, the acceptance of the refugees by the inhabitants of surrounding communities has been limited due to cultural differences and resentment based on the shortage of commodities. Within the settlement, there are occasional skirmishes between Ethiopians and Eritreans which have forced the authorities to hold raids. Some of the refugees leave the camp without permission to wander about the town.

There is a police station in Km 26, but officers complain that they lack the facilities to deal with the anticipated disputes between Arab nomadic tribes and refugees.

'As more refugees appear, security measures should be increased,' said one officer. 'We need better guns, a car and contact with our headquarters,' continued the policeman, who is one of a force of six policemen and one corporal who guard the camp.

The problems of Km 26 are jointly the fault of the authorities, who, in the absence of available background data, miscalculated the potential success of the plan and the importance of self-reliance to the refugees; and of some of the refugees themselves, who, because they are uncertain yet desirous of that self-reliance, have refused to work in the jobs offered them.

With the expertise and information now available in Sudan, it is hoped that exisiting settlements might be restructured and future settlements planned with the mistakes of the past taken into account and the goal of refugee self-sufficiency taken to heart.

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LAND DISAPPEARING DUE TO DESERT CREEP

Khartoum SUDANOW in English Aug 80 pp 49-51

[Text]

Much of northern and western Sudan is desert, and more and more of the country disappears beneath the blowing dunes each year. Apart from the threat to agricultural land, desert creep also poses a real problem to the tribes of nomads who eek out a living in the tundra areas just below the desert belt. In spring this year, Mike Asher visited Mellit, Northern Darfur, and found out just how extensive the problem was and what measures were being taken to combat the desert menace.

THE TRADITIONAL way of life of the nomadic tribes of northern Sudan is being threatened; not, as in Saudi Arabia, by the advance of modern technology, but by the increasing aridity of their own environment. Government forestry officials in Mellit in Northern Darfur have been worried for some time about the rapid rate at which the desert is moving south, destroying much of the traditional grazing lands of the tribes of Northern Darfur and Northern Kordofan.

The rate of 'desert creep' is estimated at between five and ten kilometres annually; and officials say that between 1958 and 1975, the desert moved at least 100 kilometres further south. This encroachment has had a devastating effect on the Kawahla, whose livelihood depends upon finding sufficient grazing for their sheep and goats. Many Kawahla families have moved further south, or fled into Chad.

Tribes which depend to a greater extent upon camels, such as the Meidob and Zayadea, are in a happier position, since the camel is more able to tolerate the harsher conditions. Yet even these tribes have not been unaffected. Much of their stock has died due to the lack of fodder and water-holes. Many young Meidobis have gone to seek their fortunes in oil-rich Libya, leaving fewer men to nurse the existing herds, the numbers of which have declined markedly as a result.

Some tribesmen say that the answer lies in digging more 'donkeys' – the local name for artesian wells. But, as Mr Farah Yousif Suleiman of the forestry department in Mellit points out: 'Digging more wells is not a solution to the problem. Too many water-points in a restricted area only exhausts the soil more quickly.'

Meanwhile, the situation for the nomads only worsens: the Zagawa tribe for example, until recently living the life that their ancestors had led for centuries, have now been forced to look for work in the larger towns. Indeed, the Zagawa now account for some 40 per cent of the settled population of El Fasher, with many of them working as casual labourers and traders. Zagawa have also settled in Fataburne, Kutum, Tino, Kena and Umbau.

Some isolated patches of vegetation which have escaped the great shift of the desert have inevitably become highly

prized and much sought after by local tribes. The largest of these is on the western side of Jebel Meidob, near Hellif, Jebel Esa, El Hara, Seleif and in Wadi Howar, in Northern Darfur. Here the Meidob have come into conflict with the Awajda clan of the powerful Kababish, with the Awlad Jerbe' section of the Zayadea, and with the Kawahla. In the past, disputes over ownership rights have led to violent armed clashes between the tribes and to camel-raiding; but local officials say that the situation has been peaceful lately.

However, successive years of drought have aggravated the problem, so that even settled tribes such as the Berti, have been forced to move. The entire population – save only the sheikh and his assistant – of the Berti village of Hashaba has moved to Libya. As with the nomads, the Berti have learnt that the shift to the city and employment as labourers was the only way to survive.

'This desert creep is a problem affecting not only Sudan, but all the countries of North Africa,' said Mr Farah Yousif. 'But what the nomads don't realise is that it is their own method of using the range lands which is helping to create the situation.'

There is a dispute among experts as to the precise cause of desert encroachment, but it seems likely that it is a combination of a number of factors.

'The goat has a lot to answer for,' continued Mr Farah Yousif. 'It not only defoliates, but destroys roots, which means that plants cannot renew themselves. The land is used continuously for so many years that it becomes exhausted, and as the nomads move south they take the problem with them.'

Both underground and surface water have decreased in proportion to the number of animals using it, and the presence of large belts of non-water-holding, or plutonic substrata means that there are additional problems in digging wells.

Deforestation is a direct cause of desert creep; trees have been cut down in regions where new growth is at best uncertain; and in Kordofan, large patches of forest have been removed to establish arable land. Acacia forests have also been destroyed accidentally by fire, usually because of carelessness by the nomads at their camp-sites.

Such drastic deforestation means that there is no barrier against the *kataha* – the shifting sand which sweeps across the desert, particularly between November and March, and which may raise the level of sand in a village by as much as 2.7 metres a year. The habit of some herdsmen, of burning off the dried *gesh* or straw, so that a new crop will grow more quickly, also helps to exhaust the soil.

'The encroachment of the desert has far-reaching effects beyond destroying the livelihood of the nomads,' said Mr Farah Yousif. 'The unstable, mobile dunes have obliterated many feddans of cultivated land and covered settlements even along the banks of the Nile.' Thus, it has led to a decrease in the production of millet, sorghum, groundnuts, sesame and the valuable gum arabic. It has also reduced the amount of timber available for fuel. 'Ten years ago,' went on Mr Farah Yousif, 'you could find wood within ten kilometres of Khartoum, but now you'd have to travel 500 kilometres.'

The question now is how to prevent the problem from becoming even greater. As usual, the difficulty is finance; or, rather, the lack of it. In Libya, the dunes are being stabilised by the use of waste products from the oil industry, of which the Sudan still has none. Expertise in forestry is, however, not lacking. There has been a well-established forestry school since the 1930s. 'As always,' said Mr Farah Yousif, 'we have the brains, but not the money.'

He believes that the problem can be solved by a careful programme of planting and cutting. Firstly, however, cultivation methods must be improved, and schemes for the conservation of water and grazing established. The only way to prevent soil exhaustion is to introduce rotation grazing, and this can be put into effect by the establishment of grazing cooperatives.

The government has plans to set up mechanised schemes at Umm Bayuda Sag el Narem, where the soil has high

fertility, and where pumps may be used for irrigation. The idea is to settle some of the tribes there and to allocate land to each family. But here again, the problem is one of money.

Forestry men like Farah Yousif believe that the ranges must be intensively seeded so that the sand dunes become afforested and stabilised, developing shelter belts to hold back the invading *kataha*.

If this can be achieved, then plant and animal life can be made to renew itself indefinitely; but this can be brought about only through cooperation between organisations and governments, and by the spread of knowledge among people everywhere about the delicate balance of their environment.

'What people must understand,' concluded Mr Farah Yousif, 'is that we are not trying to conserve nature against man; but actively and practically to conserve resources for man himself.'

The efforts of men like Farah Yousif and the forestry departments of the world may not be able to save the traditional way of life of the nomad, but with the proper application of skill and experience they may yet be able to halt the juggernaut advance of the desert monster and thus achieve something worthwhile for the benefit of all. ■

CSO: 4820

ROADS, BRIDGES BUILDING PROGRAMS DISCUSSED

Khartoum SUDANOW in English May 80 pp 31, 32

[Text]

Historically one of the most neglected aspects of infrastructural development, roadbuilding has gone a long way over the past five years as politicians and planners have gradually come to realise the importance – both economic and political – of a national, integrated road system linking the main regions of the country.

Much of this building has been concentrated on linking the central Nile area to Port Sudan. But other roads are turning to the South and the West. Senior reporter Berhane Woldegabriel reports:

MORE THAN ONE MILESTONE was passed last month in the road-building programme designed to link the capital, the main central Nile towns and Port Sudan. On the 9th of the month, President Nimeiri inaugurated the 227 km Gedaref-Kassala stretch of the main Khartoum-Port Sudan highway. The ceremony included a symbolic journey to the village of Umm Shajara, some 15 kilometres from Gedaref.

This stretch of the road – like the whole highway, seven metres wide – was built by the Yugoslav engineers, Partizanski Put, at a total cost of £s31.9 million. There were two separate contracts – both won by the Yugoslav company. The first was for the road itself; the second, for two major bridges: a 310-metre bridge across the River Atbara, and a 150-metre bridge across the River Gash at the entrance to Kassala

The contracts were signed in May 1975, and completed after almost exactly five years to the month. Even then, the contract was not finished on time, and last month officials were reeling off the, by now, all-too-familiar list of problems that bedevil major development projects: lack of transport, fuel shortages, random power cuts and delays in the transfer of hard currency through the Bank of Sudan.

Financing for both road and bridges came in part from the government, who provided £s13.7 million; the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development gave a hard currency loan equivalent to £s18.2 million. This loan was made in two parts, with Partizanski Put receiving the final instalment only last month, the delay reportedly due to still outstanding debts to the Fund from Sudan. A second loan of four million Units of Account came from the African Development Bank.

There is a guarantee period of one year following completion of the road and bridges, after which the RBPC is responsible for maintenance. Since the road has been handed over to the Corporation in

stretches, the guarantee period has in many cases already been passed, and the road is being maintained by the RBPC.

'Traffic counts conducted by the RBPC last December showed an average of 631 vehicles a day using the road. This included a good number of lorries and trailer trucks,' said Mr Abdu Mohamed.

Partizanski Put's project manager, Mr D. Jovanovic, became almost sentimental when he spoke of the strength of co operation among the 250 expatriate and 900 Sudanese staff involved in the construction work. Between them, he said, they had moved more than seven million cubic metres of earth while building the 107-kilometre road and the eight smaller bridges on it. Some 20,000 tons of asphalt and bitumen – about 85 tons for each hard-earned kilometre – were imported specially for the project.

Local people seemed pleased with the finished product. 'During the wet season,' said Mr Ahmed Musa, a driver from Umm Shajara, 'it used to take us all day just to drive into Gedaref. The 15 km journey now takes a quarter of an hour.'

The first stage – from Wad Medani to Sennar – of the 217 km road from Wad Medani to Kosti was opened by the President on the 22nd of last month. The new road will link centres of agricultural production and population with the main highway linking the capital with Port Sudan. It will also serve as the first step in a series of strategic roads linking the central region to the Nile towns in the south, and to the west and beyond.

The second stage, taking the road on to Kosti, is expected to be finished towards the end of 1981. The completed project will include five bridges carrying the road over major irrigation canals. The unusual geological nature of the area also necessitated the laying of an 80 km stretch of five per cent lime to provide a stable base for the road. This required 5,000 tons of lime and the construction of 24 lime kilns.

Some £13.5 million was provided by British aid. The London-based consulting engineers, Roughton and Partners were consultants to the project, which was undertaken by the Corporation.

One important side effect of the scheme, said Mr El Amin Hassan, the project manager, was the gaining of expertise and on-the-job training by more than 1,000 local staff. High school graduates would in the future be trained in the special techniques of road maintenance.

With the President forced by the pressure of events to return to Khartoum, his place at the foundation stone ceremony of the 286 km Sennar-Sinja-Ed Damazin road was taken by Mr Abul Gasim Hashim, the governor-designate of the proposed central region. Under construction since February 1958, the road is being built by Osman Ahmed Osman's Arab Contractors. It is being constructed in two parts: the main 230 km stretch, and a 56 km spur linking it to the Wad Medani-Gedaref road.

The estimated £s31.5 million cost is being financed by the government, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the Kuwaiti Fund.

Other developments in road construction have also been announced by the RBPC. Studies were completed last month of the proposed Kosti-Umm Ruwaba, Umm Ruwaba-El Obeid and Gedaref-Suki roads. The studies are now with the Ministry of National Planning to seek financial backing for the projects.

Plans have also been completed either to upgrade and widen the Khartoum-Wad Medani road, or to build a new road on the eastern bank of the Blue Nile. The Corporation also announced last month that construction of the Jebel Aulia-Ed Dueim road would begin after the rainy season. With World Bank financing, the road is being built by West German constructors. West Germany is to finance the Ed Dueim-Rabak road, tenders for the second phase of which are being invited this month. ■

CSO: 4820

PHALANGE SECTARIAN PARTITIONIST PLAN ASSAILED

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 14 Jul 80 pp 1, 11

[Article: "Countering the Isolationist Plan in Lebanon"]

[Text] Contrary to all initial estimates that viewed events of the last few days in the eastern areas of Beirut as a mere war of liquidation within the Lebanese Front over control of the political and military leadership of this front, all advance indications are that the campaign of liquidation launched by the Phalange Party against the positions of the National Liberal Party [NLP] is just the first phase of an integrated plan to assemble rightwing forces under the control of one party with a single political and military leadership. The purpose is to impose "de facto" control over part of the territory of Lebanon in preparation for establishing a sectarian partitionist entity constituting a base and launching pad to impose domination of fascist forces over Lebanon as a whole, and to resolve current political and social conflict over Lebanese territory by eliminating the legitimate authority and imposing the Camp David plan on Lebanon, after liquidating the Palestinian resistance and striking a blow at the Lebanese nationalist forces.

The statements of Bashir al-Jumayyil, the official spokesman of the Phalange Party, unveiled this plan following the end of the meetings of the Phalangist Political Bureau the day before yesterday. His statements contained three main points:

First: Jumayyil felt that the Phalangist militias have imposed security and legitimacy over the whole eastern area and urged the authorities to complete this task by deploying its army in the western area and other areas under the control of the leftist parties and what he termed the occupying forces, meaning the Palestinian resistance and the Arab Deterrent Forces.

Second: The official spokesman for the Phalange Party announced that it is intended to "consolidate firepower" by dissolving the armed militias of the Lebanese Front within a month at the utmost, and replacing them by "the national guard" which will handle the task of "liberating" the various parts of Lebanon!"

Third: Al-Jumayyil reaffirmed his rejection of the "2,000 square kilometer Christian" state, insisting that the whole of Lebanon would scarcely suffice for the ambitions of the Fascist plan!.

All of this was accompanied with a wave of actions abroad, such as the opening of 16 political and information offices in 16 American and African countries. The only thing left for the Fascist partitionist plan is to announce the establishment of the sectarian mini-state which would view itself as the sole substitute for the legitimate authorities. The perception of the isolationist forces is that objective conditions are now ripe for the success of the partitionist plan and for moving on to the stage of imposing total control over Lebanon.

During recent years, the legitimate authorities have dragged their feet in pursuing their unifying role and their duty of directing the dialogue between the various political forces on the basis of the announced principles for an entente in order to emerge with a common bottom-line program to save the unity of the country and people. Moreover, they have faltered in taking practical steps to rebuild state institutions and machinery capable of imposing their influence on the partitionist, isolationist entities. This helped to undermine the role of the legitimate authorities in bringing about a national entente. It also allowed the Fascist forces to exploit the position of the authorities; continue to reinforce their military capabilities; and receive various forms of outside support for the areas they control. The purpose is to complete the marshalling of their forces and begin their strategic offensive to dominate the whole of Lebanon.

In contrast, the National Front facilitated the tasks of the authorities, and did not hang on to any of the positions it had to control during the armed conflict to protect vital services to the citizens. It continued to seek a comprehensive political solution as an alternative to a military solution, and it expended much of its resources in confronting the Israeli invasion and aggression against Lebanese territory. There was an absence of effective action in this domain by the Lebanese army and by the forces of the Palestinian revolution. [Shortcomings] in this regard, though limited, cannot be justified by any criterion.

The Fascist forces feel that conditions are suitable for falsifying the essence of the existing crisis on the Lebanese scene, and portraying it as a Lebanese-Palestinian crisis on one hand, and a Lebanese-Syrian crisis on the other. These forces believe that Syria is preoccupied with countering the forces of the counter-revolution domestically and confronting the Camp David conspiracy externally. Therefore, they feel that an eruption of the armed struggle on the Lebanese arena on a broad scale would provide propitious circumstances to escalate the reactionary-imperialist conspiracy against Syria and expose its southwestern flank to the Zionist enemy.

These movements, which have quickly exploded in an attempt to impose a de facto situation, find a suitable cover in the unusual low-key coverage in the western or pro-western information media, as if the world is no

longer concerned about the crisis or interested in its impact. This dangerous conspiracy will place major responsibilities on the Lebanese nationalist forces, which oppose the Fascist plan, to preserve the integrity of Lebanon and its Arab people.

The Lebanese National Front is called upon to overcome any incidental differences within it, and unify its ranks on the basis of a uniform nationalist program of action and efforts to establish an alliance of forces opposed to Phalangist hegemony over the nationalist Christian community itself. This community has reaffirmed its patriotism and Arabism at all times. The front should thus pave the way for forming a national salvation front, including all forces opposed to the authors of the racist, Fascist plan to restore the political unity of the country. The legitimate authorities are responsible for achieving this through active assistance, as long as they are capable of doing so.

Achieving this goal, which Arab Syria has sought to accomplish through its call to establish "the broadest possible front of Lebanese forces," would ensure the creation of a nationalist antithesis of the isolationist plan and would defeat it.

If the isolationist forces are placing their bets on the assumption that Syria would stand by impotently looking on at the plan to destroy Lebanon and wreck its Arab affiliation, such bets are sure losers. Syria, which has borne many burdens and sacrifices in recent years to preserve the Arab character of Lebanon and to rescue it from fighting, destruction and partition, and has not lost its clear perspective of the nature of the threats facing the Arab nation because of the Lebanese crisis--Arab Syria will not stand idly by while attempts are made to revive the isolationist partitionist plan aimed at placing Lebanon under Zionist-imperialist control. Syria has sided and will side with all forces interested in the unity of the territory of Lebanon and of its people, and will remain capable of choosing the opportune moment and means to keep Lebanon a unified Arab country in its own way, not as desired by its enemies who are setting the crisis in motion and standing behind the isolationist plan.

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END

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Egypt: Opposition Press Coverage

13 May-July 1980

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1 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2191

EGYPT: OPPOSITION PRESS COVERAGE
13 MAY-JULY 1980

AL-SHA'B, Weekly Publication of Socialist Workers Party

AL-AHRAR, Weekly Publication of Socialist Liberals Party

AL-DA'WAH, Monthly Publication of the Muslim Brotherhood

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MINISTER OF INFORMATION ATTENDS AL-SHA'B ANNIVERSARY CEREMONY

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 13 May 80 pp 8-9

[Article: "Celebrating the First Anniversary of AL-SHA'B"]

[Text] The Socialist Labor Party (SLP) hosted a ceremony at the Engineers Union building Tuesday evening to celebrate the first anniversary of SLP's organ, AL-SHA'B.

The ceremony was attended by engineer Ibrahim Shukri, leader of the SLP; Mansur Hasan, minister of state for culture and information and assistant secretary general of the Democratic National Party; Kamil Zuhayri, dean of journalists; and representatives of other parties, journalists, members of the diplomatic corps and members and friends of the SLP.

Journal of the Free and Honest Word

At the outset of the ceremony, Hamid Zaydan, editor of AL-SHA'B and member of the SLP executive committee, delivered a speech in which he welcomed the assembled crowd and noted that AL-SHA'B, from the very first day of its publication, has always sought to make its voice heard without equivocation; to be true to its message of speaking freely, honestly and objectively; and to be faithful to its commitment to the principles and aspirations of the Egyptian people and the Arab nation. Hamid Zaydan affirmed that he will continue to abide by the rules of objectivity and responsibility as long as he is the editor of AL-SHA'B.

Ibrahim Shukri, the Living Martyr

Zaydan hailed engineer Ibrahim Shukri and described him as the living martyr who was picked by destiny to be the conscience of free opinion in Egypt and the Arab nation. He also described him as a patriot who has never abdicated his national responsibilities at any time of his life, and who is now as giving to the homeland as he has always been.

Zaydan then reviewed the national history and the struggle of the Young Egypt movement, and said that the SLP roots go back to that movement which gave Egypt scores of intellectuals who enriched the Egyptian struggle, including such persons as Ahmad Husayn, Fathi Radwan, Mustafa al-Wakil and Ibrahim Tal'at.

The Party of All Honest Men

The editor of AL-SHA'B emphasized that the SLP opens its arms to all the honest strugglers and believes that it is the locus of all honest groups of the Egyptian people. We even welcome those who left us on a given day, he said, because the SLP struggles every day to embrace all struggling and honest men, and believes that it is the party of anyone who has an objective statement to make either via the party or its newspaper.

At the end of his speech, Hamid Zaydan pointed out that AL-SHA'B worked hard throughout the past year in order to carry the word of the party and other opinions to the masses of the Egyptian people. Despite its limited resources, he said, it has managed to express the party's thought. He added: I promise you once again to be true to the honest and free word.

AL-SHA'B's Age Is Figured by the Number of Its Battles

Kamil Zuhayri, president of the Press Syndicate, also spoke at the ceremony. He lauded AL-SHA'B and said that the age of this newspaper is not measured in years but by the number of battles that it has waged. For the newspaper has repelled the assaults of the Nile, discussed the Law of Impropriety and defended the freedom of the press and the journalists. Its pages were positions, he said, its lines the pulse of the Egyptian people.

Courageous Press

Zuhayri said: "I welcome you on this great occasion. For a whole year now, Egyptian journalists were busy searching for a definition of the press and debating the various press bills and the various definitions of the press--wondering if the press is a popular mandate or authority or a heavy or light industry, or if it is perhaps a precision industry. He went on to say: But after having read everything, I still believe that the press is courage, that the mission of the press is to present correct views and true news to the reader. The first loyalty of the press should be to the reader because he has the first right to know the truth. The press cannot reach the readers unless journalists have moral courage."

From that perspective, Kamil Zuhayri went on, I salute AL-SHA'B for its moral courage. I am aware of the effort that a national, responsible journalist requires to put out a newspaper such as AL-SHA'B so that it may give expression to the other view courageously and responsibly.

The dean of journalists saluted engineer Ibrahim Shukri and said: I do not salute him because of what he writes only, but also because of his position in 1951 when he submitted a draft legislation opposing another draft legislation which would have restricted the press. He added that were it not for the motion of struggler Ibrahim Shukri and a motion submitted by the late 'Aziz Fahmi, the designs which were being connected against the press would not have collapsed.

Zuhayri also lauded all the members of the editorial staff of AL-SHA'B and said: I look forward to a day when there will be tens of papers like Al-SHA'B, all representing the other view.

AL-SHA'B Throbs with Thought and Opinion

Kamil Zuhayri was followed by Mansur Hasan who expressed his delight to participate in the ceremony and said: We are not celebrating AL-SHA'B from a professional point of view only, but we are also celebrating a free newspaper which pulsates with thought and opinion. And this is what we hope for the press in Egypt. He added that the press has begun to perceive its real position and prestige. This is what we mean when we call the press a popular authority which we hope to see occupy a proper place. He pointed out that this is the goal of the committee for press codification.

He added: I attend this ceremony as a respresentative of the National Democratic Party because no matter how much our political stances and trends differ, we differ, as we coordinate, for the sake of Egypt. Egypt is the more eternal.

Mansur Hasan praised AL-SHA'B saying that it has represented a positive pulse, defended freedom and the honest word and has taken the initiative in giving expression to the other view. These are all qualities which we all hope for our party and national papers.

He emphasized that the real value of the other view springs from correcting a wrong view and underscoring a correct view, and said: In that sense, I appreciate the vigilance of AL-SHA'B.

Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, leader of the SLP, then spoke. He greeted all those present and asserted that AL-SHA'B would not have achieved any success had it not been for the integrity and honesty of many honest writers who want to give true expression to the other view. He noted that many of those writers volunteer their contributions for free so that AL-SHA'B may be the journal of free opinion for all Egyptians. I have always tried to be candid in my writings, he said, and to get to the point as briefly as possible.

Ibrahim Shukri said: I welcome Mansur Hasan, not because he is a minister. Ministerial portfolios come and go, but human relationships prevail. I am also delighted to see among the guests colleagues from the other parties and other brethren who had played a role in Egypt's political life. This means that AL-SHA'B does not only gather writers, but also men of different views who are all ultimately working for the good of Egypt.

Shukri pointed out that this makes him look forward to a broader goal--to a time when the SLP and AL-SHA'B can play a wider role on the pan-Arab level which does not please anyone nowadays. He said: We will try to bring views closer and offer ideas on how to remedy what has happened among us and on the need to exert more efforts to cure the malady that plagues inter-Arab relations.

9254
CSO: 4802

STUDENT HOUSE FINANCIAL FRAUD EXPOSED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 13 May 80 p 9

[Article: "Financial Malfeasance in the Student Housing Project at the University of 'Ayn Shams"]

[Text] AL-SHA'B has obtained two extremely important documents which unmask serious fraud in handling funds earmarked for the student housing project in the student city at 'Ayn Shams University.

The first evidence is a bill of payment in the amount of 143,000 pounds recommended for disbursement by the adviser to the president of the university. He is the engineer who designed the project and who collects a fee amounting to 5 percent of every bill of payment. Since the bill includes costs of cement, iron and other construction material which were reportedly used in building the student housing project, the university's director general of engineering affairs had to review the bill.

We found the following comments made on the document [by the director general of engineering affairs]:

One--During my inspection of the construction, I noticed that the porches were built of reinforced concrete at higher cost--a violation of the specifications. The porches could have been built of bricks, as usual.

Two--The prices of the reinforced concrete were exaggerated.

Three--There are no steel pipes at the construction site. All that is there are cast iron pipes which do not conform to the specifications.

Four--The quantity of concrete used in stairways should be revised.

The second document is another bill of payment signed by the same advisor on 31 December 1978 for the amount of 261,000 pounds. Comments by the university's director of engineering affairs have also been added to the document. They are:

One--In the course of inspection, I found that the reinforced concrete had not been used in previous university projects. This would quadruple costs

and increase the burdens on the university. Brick could have been used instead.

Two--The bill says that drilling was made under the (water table). There is, however, no water table in this area.

Three--Sand filling operations used sand dug up on site. This means that the sum of 2,400 pounds cited by the builder as the coat of sand trucked in from outside for filling purposes is untrue and has not been disbursed.

Four--The water pipes which have been removed with all their supplements, according to the bill, should be handed over. The bill says that 200 meters of underground pipes have been dug out at a cost of 200 pounds. These pipes have not been delivered to the engineering administration and their value has not been deducted from the total value of the bill.

Because we found a lot of deletions in the quantities and costs of materials as originally entered in the bill, we talked about them to engineer Banub Sam'an, who had some comments and observations. He said: "The deletions in the quantities and costs were made with the knowledge of the person who approved the payment of the bill. The deletions were made when he learned of the comments I wrote on the bill. For example, I wrote that the quantity of the reinforced concrete used in the stairways was greater by one for every 100 meters--and later by one for every 50 meters--than it was in the previous bill. This adds up to a cost differential of up to 55,000 pounds which would be wasted and which would be paid out of the project appropriations for nothing in return."

There was also a comment to the effect that the quantity of concrete used for the roof of the project was adjusted upward in the bill so that it came to 96 cubic meters more than the figure cited in the previous bill. This means an additional cost of 10,000 pounds.

AL-SHA'B presents this case to all officials who are protective of the people's money, so that public funds may not go to brokers whose coffers would then bulge with money stolen from the people.

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GOVERNMENT SCORED ON CAMPAIGN AGAINST JUDICIARY, PRESS

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 27 May 80 pp 7, 15

[Article by Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad: "Are We Headed For a Massacre Against Judges and Journalists?"]

[Text] President Anwar al-Sadat has twice lashed out fiercely at members of the judiciary who expressed disapproval of the Law on Morality. The first time was on 14 May, when he was delivering a speech to the People's Assembly in his capacity as president. In the speech, he regarded his action as a political one. The second time was on 19 May. On this occasion, in his capacity as the head of the new government, he issued instructions to the ministers and governors at the first meeting of the new cabinet, and asked the minister of justice to deal with the situation by setting up a committee on values from within the judiciary.

At the same meeting, he called on the minister of state for information and culture to prepare the new press law on the basis of the pertinent constitutional amendment, so that the bill may be presented to the People's Assembly before its summer vacation. The bill would turn the Higher Council for the Press into a custodian over the press. The president also asked the minister to attach to the bill another bill which would require the re-registration of journalists.

These two directives brought back to mind the massacre of judges which took place in September 1969 and other incidents in which some journalists were reassigned to positions in fish and shoe companies.

People are now asking: Are we headed for a new massacre involving judges and journalists by orders of the highest authority in the state, in a regime which raises the slogan of democracy and the sovereignty of law?

Judges Entitled to Views on Morality Law

It is truly ironical that some members of the judiciary are being accused of carrying out political activities when all that they have done was to exercise a right. Indeed, they exercised a duty provided for in Article 173 of the present constitution which requires the government to sound out the Higher Council of Judicial Bodies on any bill dealing with judicial affairs.

The Law on Morality provides for the establishment of new courts to be called Courts of Values which, in addition to judges, would include public personalities for the first time in the history of the Egyptian judicial system. The law also concerns itself with the jurisdiction of the Socialist Public Prosecutor which is related to the jurisdiction of the office of the Attorney General. Constitutionally, this requires the government to seek the views of the Higher Council of Judicial Bodies. Indeed, the minister of justice made a statement to this effect at a press conference, and a similar reference is included in the preface of the law entitled "The Law of Protecting Values from Impropriety."

It goes without saying that the members of the higher judicial council feel that when they speak out they do not simply expresss personal views but represent the views of the judicial groups for which they act. The president of the Court of Cassation cannot express an opinion on a serious bill which involves functions and jurisdiction of the judiciary, such as the Law on Morality, until he has referred the matter first to the general assembly of the Court of Cassation. By the same token, the head of the state council has no right to express an individual opinion on such an important matter, except after hearing the opinions of his colleagues, the members of the council. Consequently, judges are entitled in general to discuss among themselves the various aspects of a bill which concerns itself with the judicial system and involves their work, life and careers. Such discussion cannot be construed as political action.

Why Is It That Judges Are Permitted to Praise Political Decisions?

Why is it that the action of judges in expressing opinions on bills related to the judiciary--action which is constitutionally permissible--is found to be improper simply because it is not in accord with the desire of the government and the ruling party? Also, why is it that the authorities have been blessing favorable opinions which praise political decisions? Can we deduce from this that what the government wants is to receive constant approval of its actions and to blot out any views which disagree with the positions of the ruling authority?

When the decision to abolish the state of emergency (the martial law) was taken, so-called nationalist newspapers published the views of some members of the judiciary in which they expressed satisfaction with the decision to abolish martial law and return to normal life where the provisions of the public law and the constitution prevail. In fact, on 23 May, some of those papers published the text of a cable sent by the president of the Judges Club to President Anwar al-Sadat, who is the leader of one of the political parties and the head of the present government, greeting him on the occasion of the May revolution anniversary and thanking him for putting an end to the state of emergency. Does the president consider the cable a judicial act or a political one?

What if a member of the judiciary expressed a different opinion on the abolition of the martial law? What if he said, for example, that the codification of many extraordinary powers established under the emergency law into permanent laws, such as the Law on Morality, which permits the arrest or confinement of citizens and the impounding of their properties and assets, and the Law on State Security Courts, which permits military magistrates, who can be discharged and who are not independent of their executive office, to sit alongside civil judges, are measures which strip the decision abolishing martial law of a great deal of its significance with regard to promoting freedom, judicial safeguards and normal legal procedures to which the people have been aspiring? Would a judge who says such things be in the same category as judges who express complete satisfaction with the abolition decision?

Minister Abu Sihli Responsible for the Misunderstanding

In my view, the minister of justice, Anwar Abu Sihli, is the cause of the misunderstanding of the facts. He considered that those who have expressed a different opinion on the Law on Morality have defied his authority as the political minister who is responsible for the passage of the law. He therefore fought that group of judges in the by-elections which were held to reelect those whose membership had lapsed. He fought them in different ways. In his meetings with members of the judiciary and visits to courts before the elections, he would announce that the success of certain candidates would anger the ruling party and thereby prevent him from meeting the demands and needs of the judiciary. In the leaflet or statement which was mentioned by President al-Sadat before the People's Assembly, members of a group cited the minister's attitude toward them, although they did not refer to him by name. Actually, no one from this or any other group is either with or against the ruling party. They are all neutral judges detached from politics and political ends.

We hope that history will not repeat itself, that minister Abu Sihli will not cause another judges massacre similar to the massacre caused by minister Abu Nusayr, God forgive him, in 1969 under the pretext that he was carrying out a reform movement and a purge in the ranks of the judiciary.

I do not want to talk in detail about the methods which are being used by minister Abu Sihli, the minister of justice, in this particular period--methods which lend themselves to misunderstanding and which are in fact unacceptable in view of the prestige and sanctity of the judiciary. I refrain from doing so in deference to and out of respect for the members of the judiciary. I am confident that all those methods will in no way affect the independence and neutrality of the judiciary.

I will confine myself, however, to a report by AL-AKHBAR on 23 May, 1980, about a meeting between the minister of justice and members of the judiciary in the Judges Club in the presence of engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, the dean of engineers, to discuss housing problems involving judges. At the meeting, the minister announced that he is considering a plan to extend the

service age for judges to 65 years, but that the extension will only be applicable to judges with high qualifications. This condition and stipulation are rejected, because they imply an attempt to influence the judiciary through the option of extending or not extending the age ceiling. This is unacceptable in the case of those judges who are 60 and have reached the top of their careers. In fact, this option of extending the service age to 65 is nonexistent in the case of university professors.

Inadmissibility of Consultative Council's Tutelage Over Press

Turning to the press and members of the press, the old image of the Socialist Union's ownership of press establishments seems to hold sway. In his instructions to the minister of information and culture, Mansur Hasan, President al-Sadat said that the owner of the press in Egypt is the Consultative Council [Shura Council] in its capacity as the council of the family, in accordance with the latest constitutional amendment, and that the Higher Press Council represents the press. The president also suggested that the press syndicate be converted into a club like the judges club.

The Consultative Council cannot constitutionally or legally own the press in Egypt. The constitutional amendment which has been put to a plebiscite recently provides that the ownership and funding of the press should be subject to the people's supervision. It did not say, as it was said in the previous plebiscite, that it should be owned by the Consultative Council or by the people. It also said that its ownership by public and private legal persons and by political parties is guaranteed under the law (Article 209, which is added to the constitution).

Even if we are to assume that the so-called nationalist press is owned by the people, the Consultative Council is not the people's representative. One third of the members of this council are appointed by the president in his capacity as the chief of the executive branch. The council, furthermore, is of a purely consultative nature and has no binding powers (Articles 194, 195 and 196, added to the constitution).

In the book by the able legal scholar Mustafa Mar'i, which was published this week under the title of THE PRESS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND RULER, the author notes that Article 29 of the constitution recognizes only three kinds of ownership: public ownership, cooperative ownership and private ownership. Since the papers known as nationalist papers are not privately or cooperatively owned, they should become public property. The government is the highest executive and administrative authority in the state, and not the Consultative Council. Therefore, the government alone is responsible for managing and protecting the public wealth (pages 84 and 85 of the book). Is the intention then to turn those papers officially into government papers? Is it not better to turn these papers into companies where citizens would be able to buy shares, provided that first priority be given to those working in these papers and that any one holder cannot own more than a certain number of shares so that the company would be truly owned by the people?

Journalists Right to a Syndicate

The journalists' right to the continued existence of their syndicate is one guaranteed by the present constitution--Article 56--and it is inadmissible for the law to interfere to arrogate that right. It can, however, intervene to safeguard it, as clearly mentioned in paragraph one of that article.

There are no grounds of similarity between the members of the press and the judges. The members of the press are members of a free profession, the same as doctors and lawyers, and not public servants of the state, as judges are.

The judges are members of the judicial branch which, like the legislative and executive branches, constitutes one of the three authorities of the state. The "press authority or estate," which is cited in the constitutional amendment, is not a state authority but an "independent, popular authority" (Article 206, added to the constitution). That is to say, it is an authority in the figurative sense only, since it has no jurisdiction or power to make binding decisions. It is likened to a state authority because of its profound influence on the public opinion, as was explained in the report of the committee set up by the People's Assembly to look into the constitutional amendment.

Since the latest constitutional amendment, under the heading of "The Press Authority," provided for the freedom of the press in more than one instance, control of the journalists by anyone outside their own ranks can be construed as an act of subjugation to the ruler--in other words, as restrictions on the freedom of the press.

Re-Registering Journalists A Wasting of Acquired Rights

Re-registering members of the press is tantamount to an inadmissible act of frightening journalists. The legal course of bringing to account those of them who have overstepped the bounds of permissible criticism is to take them to a criminal court, if the violation constitutes a criminal offense, or to a disciplinary court, if the charge against them is violation of the profession's code of ethics.

Re-registration is similar to the act, undertaken during the judges massacre, of re-organizing the judicial bodies as a means of eliminating certain judges from the judiciary. The Court of Cassation has condemned that action and regarded it as a blatant aggression against law and the constitution. Furthermore, re-registration would subject certain journalists to the prospect of being deprived of their profession, which is the source of their livelihood, and would clear the way for partisan retaliation and political tyranny.

The plea of bringing to account journalists who have overstepped their bounds abroad cannot be used as a pretext to impose this shattering measure. Failure to re-register these journalists will not affect their positions abroad. Indeed, non-registration would drive those journalists to intensify their attacks on the policies of the regime and would drive the host governments

to take greater care of them. Furthermore, this would give those states a new cause and added material for attacking and deriding the Egyptian government.

What I fear most is that the declared intention of penalizing journalists working abroad would be a mere facade for denying registration to those journalists at home who do not enjoy the approval of the regime and the ruling party.

Such a precedent would be extremely serious, for it can be applied to members of other professions as well. And if we are to assume the worst, how can we be sure that a day will not come when opportunists, climbers and self-serving toadies will advocate that education certificates and degrees should be reconsidered so that the non-loyalists can be deprived of their degrees and qualifications?

The ease of issuing legislation because of the sweeping pro-government majority in the People's Assembly cannot be used as a justification for the adoption of a legislative measure without first pondering its consequences and repercussions.

It is our hope, finally, that the remarks made by President al-Sadat about judges and journalists were no more than views which can be debated at the level of the cabinet and not orders to be carried out. It is our hope too that cabinet ministers should participate in drawing up the important policies of the state. Every citizen should fear God in discharging his duties, for the Day of Reckoning will inevitably come.

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FORMER WAR MINISTER DEFENDS SELF AGAINST SADAT

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 27 May 80 p 9

[Article: "Lt Gen Sadiq Defends Himself and Declares: Defense Line Was Ready Since 1969"]

[Text] In a special interview with AL-SHA'B, Lt Gen Muhammad Ahmad Sadiq, the former War Minister, responded to President Anwar al-Sadat's speech of 14 May before the People's Assembly in which the president accused him of treason. The treason charge stemmed from the president's belief that "the Israeli ground barrier east of the Suez Canal was higher than the Egyptian barrier west of the Canal. This made the Egyptian military positions exposed and weakened our defense capabilities."

There Was No Danger

Lt Gen Sadiq categorically denied the charge. To prove his argument, he emphasized that the Egyptian defense line was ready and completed since 1969. The Egyptian armed forces, he added, were highly trained in carrying out their duty and the line was in no danger. It had been erected after a thorough study of all eventualities and contingencies and on scientific bases, and was the result of the efforts of efficient officers. Our defense was active so that during the defensive period, our forces carried out more than 100 crossing operations into enemy territory to reconnoiter the enemy's defense lines. All the crossing operations were successful and provided the information on which the attack and crossing plan was based.

The Story of the Ground Barrier

Lt Gen Sadiq then recounted the story of the ground barrier. He said: The Egyptian command decided to erect a ground screen west of the Canal because the eastern bank of the Canal was higher than the western, thereby enabling the enemy to watch our movements on the west bank. The general command of the military units stationed in the area was therefore commissioned to set up the screen so that the frontline soldiers may be able to carry out their chores and duties without interference by enemy snipers and to prevent the enemy from watching our positions and movements easily. The enemy resorted to the same tactic. Any commander realizes that the screen does not seriously hinder the other side from reconnaissance and exploration. For there

are mobile towers, binoculars, balloons, aerial reconnaissance and various kinds of electronic reconnaissance, and all these have been successfully used.

No One Was Remiss

The former war minister affirmed that no one was remiss in protecting our movements and positions west of the Canal from enemy reconnaissance. If anything of the sort had happened it would have been the responsibility of the local commander or the immediate commander, but there was no evidence that any such commander had been remiss. They had the means to enable them to continue to add more soil to raise the ground screen in any area in which the enemy's ground screen was higher.

We Were Preparing for the Attack

In his speech, President al-Sadat said that he had given the sum of 20 million pounds to the war minister who succeeded Lt Gen Sadiq to use them in raising the Egyptian ground barrier. Responding to this, Lt Gen Sadiq said: The president and the commanders who were members of the higher council of the armed forces know that it was I who had asked for that sum of money. But I wanted it to use it to equip the positions from which the attack would begin. The Egyptian armed forces at the time were preparing themselves for the attack, in terms of planning, training and preparing the theater of operations. Equipping the positions from which the attack would begin was part of the plan to prepare the theater of operations. Since we were preparing for the attack, it follows that we had already completed our defense and defensive arrangements a long time before that. If Israel felt for a moment that it would have been able to penetrate our defenses, it would not have hesitated to do so.

Those Who Misinformed the President

Lt Gen Sadiq said that those who told President al-Sadat that an enemy ground barrier that is higher than ours would mean the collapse of our defense lines, which scared and worried the president and deprived him of sleep for a long time until the new minister informed him that the Egyptian barrier has been raised, have not been honest with the president and have misinformed him. Lt Gen Sadiq explained his view as follows: Those persons should have told the president that defense lines depend on well-equipped and fortified defense positions. They may depend on water or artificial obstructions or both. Furthermore, they depend on a computation of the quantity of ammunition per square meter, either in terms of small weapons, mortars, various kinds of artillery, missiles and aircraft missiles which the forces can muster and use to protect these positions from penetration. Behind these positions lie other positions to deter penetration. The forces operating through those positions are called anti-penetration forces. Then there are the positions of the mobile counter-offensive forces of all levels. After all that, there are the general reserve forces whose task it is to plug any loophole or gap which may develop.

No Justification

What I have already recounted means that there was no reason for President al-Sadat's concern and worry about our defense lines. The president, he said, can ask any of the present military commanders--whose combat efficiency, knowledge and patriotism I fully trust. They were all commanders who had assumed big responsibilities during that period and were fully aware of what was going on at the time.

Lt Gen Muhammad Sadiq had a few remarks to address to President al-Sadat. He said: His excellency is a man who strictly adheres to the morals and values of the villager and who has propounded the law of protecting values from impropriety. In view of this, I had not expected him to say that he has fired a minister. Can a president who espouses all such values and morals speak of a minister in this manner? The minister is a colleague who shares in bearing the responsibility of national action. Whether he succeeded in his mission or not and whether the president or any other political powers approved of him or not, he has every right as a citizen to be addressed in a manner that would not injure his dignity and pride.

Lt Gen Sadiq had more to say to President al-Sadat: The occasion which the president has chosen to accuse him of treason and to reproach him severely, despite the silence and isolation which he [Sadiq] has voluntarily imposed on himself since he was relieved of his duties, was the anniversary of the corrective revolution. President al-Sadat and our good and honorable people remember that during that extremely critical period of our history, God inspired me to stand by the president and to settle the dispute in favor of the president. The president has not used the term "treason" to describe the actions of the centers of power which had plotted against him, although he was making his speech on the 9th anniversary of the defeat of their plots against his regime. The president has not also leveled the charge of treason against any of the ministers who were tried and convicted in cases involving dishonorable actions. Why then am I singled out and accused of treason despite all that I have done for Egypt? Praise be to God for thanks to Him I have always chosen to take the side of right and truth.

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SUGGESTIONS FOR SOLVING THE HOUSING PROBLEM

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 27 May 80 p 13

[Article by Engineer Muhammad Hasan Durrah: "A Study on the Housing Problem; Contradictory Housing Policies Do Not Serve the Cause"]

[Text] In a previous edition, we explained the dimensions of the housing problem as delineated by studies undertaken by the National Housing Committee (NHC), which has been set up for this purpose, and the NHC's own ideas on a solution of the problem. We also reported that after the cabinet's adoption of the plan on 13 April, we were surprised to see that the plan proposed by the National Party has resurfaced with a conception that is totally at variance with the studies conducted by the NHC for the solution of the problem. We have showed that the National Party's housing committee should have presented its own plan to the NHC when it was in session, since the NHC was specifically commissioned by the National Party leadership to prepare a national plan for housing that does not change with the change of cabinets.

In the policy statement delivered by the prime minister of the previous cabinet, Dr Mustafa Khalil, before the People's Assembly on 15 December 1979, he said--and the housing minister later confirmed--that negotiations were going on with a number of European firms to build 100,000 housing units, in addition to the units provided for in the annual national plan, in order to bring up the number of housing units per year to 200,000.

In the preceding article, we warned that any new recommendations which are not in keeping with the reports submitted by the NHC will have adverse effects which would impede the housing plans prescribed in the plan, for several reasons. Here they are:

1. When the NHC formulated its report, it took into consideration all available capabilities in Egypt. Next to financing, the most important capabilities that had to be considered were mapping and preparing lands that are suitable for building and providing them with various utilities and amenities, labor and construction material and equipment, skilled labor and experienced technical and specialized talent. It believe that, given the present condition of those capabilities, we cannot build the originally planned 100,000 units, unless we replenish and reinforce these capabilities,

stop emigration, work at full capacity day and night or use advanced factories and factories producing prefabricated materials. These factories, however, are operating now within 5 percent of their capacity.

2. With regard to lands suitable and ready for building, I would like to point out that there is a shortage of land suitable for building and equipped with the necessary utilities. This shortage constitutes a major obstacle in the way of solving the housing problem. If within a year or two we can provide some lands suitable for building according to the scheduled plan or part of it, it would still be very difficult to equip lands that can absorb additional housing units without first planning the new townships and suburbs, providing them with utilities and re-designing the utilities networks of present cities and towns to cope with the large increase in urban development. All this requires intensive efforts in terms of financing, manpower construction materials and time. We will return to the subject of building lands to discuss it in greater detail later on.

3. With regard to construction materials and labor, it may be said that the European companies with which negotiations were taking place will supply the necessary iron and cement and would use advanced factories to cut down on the need for labor, but does that mean that these companies will supply the necessary professional and technical skilled workers and experts? And if the answer is yes, how much would such imported labor cost? No doubt, it will cost very dearly and will have a clear effect on the wages of local labor, which are already high and seek any opportunity to get even higher. It is well-known that Egypt is presently facing a severe shortage--indeed, a scarcity--in technical labor, especially in the building and construction profession, and the necessary technical expertise required to operate the machinery and equipment. This has been a major cause of the delay and retardation in the implementation of the construction and development plan which in turn caused a large and growing increase in wages, by dint of the law of supply and demand. This became quite obvious when work began in rebuilding the cities and towns along the Suez Canal at the beginning of 1974. Wages continued to increase until they amounted to 8 times or more what they used to be in the year before. With the scarcity of skilled and professional labor and the inability of the present manpower to implement the plan or a part of it, it is regrettable that the emigration of professional workers to various Arab countries continues in full swing without control or rationalization.

4. It thus becomes clear that if foreign companies were engaged to build 100,000 housing units above and beyond the units provided for in the original plan, the cost will be too high in view of the high cost of imported construction materials and ancillary local products, in addition to the high level of wages and the lack of adequate labor, which will have a bad--indeed, serious--effect on the implementation of the original construction plan set forth by the state. The inevitable result will be an inflation of wages and prices on the level of the state.

Actually, we are in dire need for those foreign companies, but only in the field of building new townships and only through the grant of concessions by the state to those companies. We will discuss this subject in detail when we examine the question of building lands and new townships. The truth of the matter is that all opinions and ideas are welcome and deserve praise. If they can be implemented, they would decisively help solve the problem, but ideas are something and the application of these ideas is something else.

The problem has been going on for 25 years. It has never abated during that period. On the contrary, it deteriorated year after year. The population flood continued to grow until it reached 1.2 million persons a year at the present rate. The solution is no longer a simple one, nor can it be obtained by statements, reports or special ideas. The experience of the past years is a lesson for us. Let me cite some examples drawn from operations which are being implemented or which we are promised will be implemented.

In 1976, a company was assigned to produce 5,500 housing units in the Nasr city. Not a single unit has been delivered to date. In 1977, the Nasr city company announced plans to establish 4,500 housing units. A foreign company was contracted to undertake the project and the Nasr city company announced that the apartments will be ready for delivery toward the end of 1978. 1978 and 1979 have already passed and nothing has been implemented. In fact, the foreign company has ceased operations. In the past two years or more, the foreign company only managed to set up the concrete framework of 300 units out of the total of 4,500 units. As a result, the Ministry of Housing was forced to withdraw the concession from that company and to invite new bids after the loss of three years of almost total waste. Moreover, since 1976, various housing ministers have announced plans for the construction of tens of thousands of housing units annually. In fact, 9 firms which own factories producing prefabricated building materials were asked to build 10,000 units each over a period of 10 years, that is 2,000 units annually which the capacity of each plant, on the assumption that work would start at the beginning of 1979. Years have passed, however, and nothing has happened. The production of the aforementioned plants thus far has not exceeded 5 percent of their capacities. Actually, most of those plants have not even begun producing. These are some of many examples. This does not mean, however, that there are not successful companies which have completed their commitments.

The Remedy We Propose

The problem is urgent and persistent. If we are really serious in our efforts to solve it within a plan that would produce safe results, we should then proceed along the path charted by the report of the NHC and consider the problem of housing and housing utilities as the problem of all Egypt. Furthermore, the new government, which has declared that it has come into being for the sake of relieving the suffering of the citizens, should throw its weight and use all its material and manpower potentialities to salvage whatever can be salvaged of the urgent plan which had been designed for

1980, namely, to build 100,000 fully equipped housing units for the first 5-year plan, as the NHC has proposed in its report. While we are aware that it is too late for the 1980 plan to be fully implemented, let us nevertheless rededicate ourselves to the task of completing the 100,000 units in question as of the beginning of the amended fiscal year, which is the beginning of July, God willing, and let us try by all means to have them occupied during the 1980-81 fiscal year. For we must all know that the fulfillment of the 100,000 units was no easy task and that it needs extraordinary and intensive efforts. When the state geared all its material and human energies to undertake the formidable task of rebuilding the Suez Canal cities and towns--and despite the fact that there was adequate financing at the time and that 50 percent of the construction cost was advanced to the pertinent companies ahead of schedule so as to provide them with financial liquidity, a basic factor in the implementation of any project, and that lands and construction materials were also available--the state managed only to establish 34,000 new housing units and their utilities in the years 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1977, that is about four years, in addition to repairing about 40,000 units which were damaged during the enemy shelling of those cities and towns.

Reports citing new amendments by the state also reported that the NDP's housing committee has announced plans for a housing project in the October 6 town through the acquisition of an area of one million square meters which will be divided into economy, medium and superior classes housing 20,000 units. The units would be built without government financing, on the assumption that income from the superior class of houses will offset the cost of economy class housing. I believe that this experiment will be a test for the success of that kind of concept, but such a plan should have no effect on the implementation of the original national plan.

In sum, it is still possible to salvage the situation by creating a powerful revolution in the construction sector and by mobilizing that sector to solve the housing problem by establishng the largest possible number of economy-class housing and some medium-class housing in accordance with the demands of the masses which are reeling under the impact of the housing predicament. The government should commit itself to that kind of housing and should give that plan a priority and cease work on operations that are not considered to be urgent so as to spare financing, labor and construction materials. This would be similar to the 1965 experience when the housing sector was mobilized to meet urgent housing needs and the 1970 experience when the government pushed through plans to build missile bases and offered various facilities to the private sector to tempt and encourage it to participate in the building effort.

Do we have the will and determination to work? And will our capabilities enable us to operate rapidly and complete our task quickly, or will the situation remain the same as it is now? And will the report of the NHC see the light of day or will it meet the same fate of previous reports?

Time alone will tell and provide the answers to these questions. In the meantime, we will have further encounters to discuss some of the present shortages, bottlenecks and negative factors which impede solution, in the hope that our discussions will light the way before the government and the people. May God grant us success and lead us to a path which would serve the well-being of our beloved Egypt.

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OPPOSITION LEADER CALLS FOR SUSTAINED COOPERATION WITH SUDAN

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 3 Jun 80 p 3

[Article by Ibrahim Shukri, Leader of the Socialist Labor Party: "Sudan, the Nile and the Future; Integration Policies Should Be Maintained"]

[Text] I write this after the return of the Socialist Labor Party's (SLP) delegation from a visit to the Sudan on the anniversary of the 25 May revolution. I took part in the celebration of that revolution. Our delegation's visit to Khartoum was a modest attempt on our part to tell our Sudanese brethren that we stand with them at all times and under all conditions.

I say a modest attempt because I believe that there could have been other official and popular delegations representing our national government and the majority party. This would always earn the appreciation of the Sudanese people and government. But I do not wish to get into the details of the circumstances which caused Egypt's popular and governmental representation at that anniversary celebration to be small. Those circumstances, after all, would not benefit the eternal fact which we always seek to underline and in which we always believe—that the peoples of Egypt and the Sudan who live along the banks of the Nile and its tributaries are bound by strong ties throughout history. Transient circumstances might blur the external surface of that fact, but the substance always remains strong, solid and full of hope.

We do not, however, like to surrender to that fact simply because it is a fact which may be invulnerable and immune against any external onslaught. The change of circumstances, an overlapping of interests among nations and great power rivalries and conflicts throughout the world might individually or severally threaten many facts and strongly held beliefs which have remained strong and cohesive for generations but which eroded or were undermined by subversion and ambitions as a result of neglect and the lack of maintenance.

The relationship between the inhabitants of Egypt and the inhabitants of northern Sudan is not only a question of sentiments and familial ties. This is an indisputable fact. I have even heard it told of President Nimeiri

that he once said that of every three marriages in northern Sudan one marriage at least involves an Egyptian spouse or a spouse descended from Egyptian parents. It is no coincidence, too, that since the Egyptian revolution in 1952, two of the three Egyptian presidents--President Muhammad Najib and President Anwar al-Sadat--have Sudanese blood in them.

The question, I say, is not one of sentiments and family interrelationships, for this is not unique to Sudan and Egypt, and many Egyptian families have ties with families in various Arab countries, either to the east in what is known as [greater] Syria, Hijaz and Yemen, or to the west in what used to be known as the greater Maghreb. These ties emerged as a result of economic relations, trade and mutual benefits as well as the fact that all or some of these countries at one time or another in history fell under a single, unified political influence.

In the case of Egypt and the Sudan, it is far more than that. They share the same reason for their neutrality, namely, that they depend on the same river--a great river which supplies its banks and delta with elements that once were the mainstay of the oldest civilization. In the sound and light display in Khartoum, I heard names of old kings of Sudan, such as (Ba'ankhi), the noble king and (Tirhaqa), the mighty king. This has tempted me to visit the national museum in Khartoum which I found to be part of the Egyptian Museum in Cairo. The old dynasties which reigned in eras preceding the birth of Christ are the same dynasties whose remains are exhibited in the Egyptian Museum. The subsequent Christian and Moslem eras are also displayed in the Coptic Museum and the Islamic Antiquities Museum at Bab al-Khalq in Cairo.

Even in the modern era we both jointly suffered under British colonialism. Colonialism exploited us equally, and there was even a similarity in the outward manifestations of the colonial government. In Khartoum, the white palace of the British governor was situated on a river bank shaded by Bengali (Phicks) trees. In Cairo's Garden City, the High Commissioner ruled from his palace which sat on the river's bank shaded by Bengali (Phicks) trees.

As colonialism turned Egypt into a large farm to supply its factories in Manchester with cotton, the major crop of Egypt, and organized the irrigation system in Egypt to fit this goal, the same thing was repeated in Sudan. Al-Jazirah became the largest cotton plantation in the Sudan and irrigation was organized in such a way as to service that major crop.

The Egyptian people, like the Sudanese people, struggled to get rid of the yoke of British colonialism and ultimately triumphed. Colonialism was purged from the soil of Sudan and the soil of Egypt as well, and we both faced the tough test--the test of development for the well-being of all the people. There was no longer a privileged minority and a vast majority which hardly maintained a subsistence level. Instead, a decent life for all became the aspired goal.

We find the economies of Egypt and Sudan undergoing changes and incorporating various industries which depend on available crops and raw materials. The textile plants and mills of Al-Mahallah al-Kubra and Kafr al-Dawwar for years processed and manufactured Egypt's cotton, while the textile mills of Khartoum Bahri and Port Sudan are manufacturing Sudan's cotton. There are many other factories in Egypt and Sudan dealing with several products from tires to canned foods and food materials.

But the volume or output of those factories is far below the consumption requirements of the people as well as the export requirements of both countries. We already see the early signs of a race in both Egypt and Sudan between raising the standard of living and increasing the people's consumption ability, on the one hand, and the general increase in prices caused by low supply and high demand, on the other. This creates severe hardships for a majority of the people whose incomes cannot keep up with the increase in prices.

I spent a few days in Khartoum with my colleagues as guests of the Sudanese Socialist Union. During those days we attended all the ceremonies commemorating the May revolution. Most of these were ceremonies inaugurating new important projects for economic and social development. This year's celebrations were marked by the presence of Ethiopia's President Mengistu. Indeed, many ceremonies were characterized by manifestations of welcome for the Ethiopian leader and praise for the friendship and spirit of peace which prevail between the Sudanese and Ethiopian peoples. I found this to be a logical state of affairs. Relations between two neighbors sharing long borders and common interests deriving from their dependence on the same river should be based on cooperation and friendship, not estrangement or hostility.

But when I returned to Cairo with my colleague Dr Hilmi al-Hadidi--indeed, even before my return--I heard some remarks about the effect of Sudanese--Ethiopian rapprochement on the Egyptian-Sudanese relations, despite the fact that Egypt issued a statement a few weeks before welcoming the improvement in relations between Sudan and its Ethiopian neighbor. It could be that the memorandum Ethiopia had distributed among African states with regard to Egypt's use of the Nile waters was directly responsible for stirring fears over Egypt's right to the waters of the Nile. It so happened that the Ethiopian memorandum was the first order of business which faced me at the People's Assembly after my return from Khartoum. Prompted by the Ethiopian memo, the Minister of Irrigation delivered a long statement detailing the rules and bases which govern the use of the Nile waters by the nine countries within the Nile basin.

I hasten to say to anyone who feels any sense of fear that the Ethiopian-Sudanese rapprochement is in keeping with the correct line which safeguards our right to the waters of the river. The agreements relating to Ethiopia which were cited by the Minister of Irrigation were agreements which were

signed between Ethiopia and the British government acting on behalf of Sudan. These agreements define the borderline between Ethiopia and Sudan and also define Sudan's rights with regard to the Nile waters. Sudan's interests in the Nile waters are tied in with Egypt's interests, and it is a far-fetched idea, for economic reasons, that Ethiopia would undertake projects on the Nile which would hurt Sudan before hurting Egypt.

It is entirely unlikely that Ethiopia would hold up large amounts of river waters for irrigation projects. The Egyptian agriculture is the least costly agriculture, and irrigation projects are relatively costly because they are unnecessary. This leaves power-generation projects involving the building of bridges and waterfalls. This would affect the supply of waters at certain times and might have some effects on irrigation projects in Sudan.

So we see in the end that the mainstay of life in Egypt and Sudan in particular is organically and strongly interconnected and that our similar problems require greater cooperation and solidarity. This is what is meant by the word "future" in the title. This future which I hope will be full of prosperity in the Nile valley requires integrated development and planning to exploit the vast resources of Sudan and Egypt. Since we have chosen the formula of integration, we should keep going by implementing all the projects that have been studied and initiated or those that are still under consideration. What Egypt and Sudan need is increased production of all kinds of crops and livestock. In that connection, joint coordination and planning to achieve quick results in providing all crops will be very beneficial not only for the future and future projects but also for the immediate present. I have noticed that prices of vegetables, fruits and cereals in Sudan have been rising. The same goes for Egypt.

The situation does not require long years to set things straight. Lands are abundant in Sudan and are not lacking in Egypt, in addition to the fact that water is available whether from seasonal rains in Sudan and southern Sudan [sic] or from permanent projects along the river.

The policies of complementarity and integration should go on because I consider infrastructure projects--primarily roads connecting Sudan and Egypt--to be extremely important for the success of cooperation and integration between Egypt and Sudan. I will not rest until I see a land route that would occasionally run along the river and follow the trail of the old caravans (Darb al-Arba'in), with wells here and there along its course to provide travellers with water, I would like to see that road used by camel caravans and small and big vehicles driving from the south and used by Sudan-bound Egyptians using all kinds of transportation means, including donkeys, and even walking. I would like to see that road begin at a point in southern Sudan, connecting all the central African states surrounding it then heading north to Khartoum and eventually to Cairo and Alexandria, thereby connecting the heart of the African continent to the shores of the Mediterranean, some of which fall in Europe. That project is the one that preeminently deserves

to be implemented and considered by all international and African organizations or by the various banks and funds which are concerned with the development of Africa and the well-being of its peoples--indeed, the well-being of the area surrounding it. Sudan, north and south, with its six provinces (according to the new reorganization plan) and Egypt with its countryside and delta, east and west, can truly be the wheat, vegetable, fruit and flower basket for all the rich countries surrounding us, whether they be the oil-rich countries to the east and the west or the technologically advanced countries of Europe where the level of consumption keeps growing and the patterns of consumption keep getting more diversified day after day.

To those who talk about establishing prosperity in Egypt and Sudan, I say: We have no choice, by God, except to muster our capabilities and mobilize the resources of our countries and cooperate with our Arab brethren. This is the right path which can enable us to weather all storms and greedy ambitions.

On to work. Long live Egypt. Long live the Sudan. God is the greatest and glory be to the Arabs.

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MILITARY ASSOCIATION WITH U.S. OPPOSED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 3 Jun 80 p 5

[Article by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabiri: "Egypt's Economic Security Before American Security"]

[Text] In a statement to the WASHINGTON POST, President Anwar al-Sadat indicated that he was ready to grant the United States defense facilities. Tom Reston, the spokesman for the American State Department, has stated that the American Administration is presently discussing with Egypt issues related to the common security of the two countries. He noted that the discussion is based on the suggestion made by President al-Sadat in his aforementioned statement, namely, the proposition that the United States stockpile advanced weapons in Egypt, including F-15 fighter aircraft, but without the stationing of American forces in Egypt.

The spokesman pointed out that the United States does not plan to manufacture F-15's or any other types of aircraft in Egypt, but that it is seriously studying the question of using those facilities in times of crisis in the Middle East. The spokesman said that the United States has previously used facilities provided by Egypt for the training of AWAC reconnaissance (spying) aircraft. If we add to that earlier reports that Egypt has provided facilities to the United States during the abortive attempt to rescue the American hostages held in the American embassy in Tehran, it becomes clear without doubt that there is some kind of military cooperation between Egypt and the United States. Neither party has denied the existence of that cooperation.

The United States and the Department of Defense have responded quickly to President Anwar al-Sadat's offer to provide defense facilities for the American forces. The official spokesman for the Department of State promptly announced that talks are under way between Egypt and America over President al-Sadat's suggestion. Earlier, however, President al-Sadat had repeatedly asked President Carter for large-scale economic aid to help Egypt overcome its economic problems. Our press talked profusively about a "Carter Plan," which was likened by America to the Marshal Plan, for the rescue of the Egyptian economy, and spoke of billions of American dollars which will be flowing into Egypt. Soon, however, these news disappeared and were replaced

by news of the military cooperation between Egypt and America and the defense facilities which Egypt will be providing for the American forces.

We wonder why has not the United States hastened to respond to respond to President al-Sadat's request for a "Carter Plan" to rescue the Egyptian economy, similar to the Marshal Plan which was instituted by the United States in Europe after World War Two. President Anwar al-Sadat was optimistic when he called upon America to provide Egypt with an aid program that would salvage the Egyptian economy and provide prosperity for Egypt and the Egyptian people. But instead of responding quickly to the President's request for a Carter economic plan, the United States is trying to drag Egypt into the policy of military pacts which Egypt has rejected for more than 25 years under extremely difficult political, economic and military conditions.

After having recognized Israel, ended the state of war with it, signed a peace treaty and declared time and again that the October war is the last war, we now allow ourselves to be dragged by the United States into a policy that serves only its oil and investment interests in the Middle East and the Gulf region.

Military association with the United States will provide us with no benefits. Our problem today is economic not military. Military association with the United States will widen and deepen the rift between Egypt and the Arab states and deprive us of the huge financial, investment and economic resources which these states (which the United States and all West European countries are trying to woo and deal with) can offer to us. Military association with the United States will weaken Egypt's position among the nonaligned states. Egypt was one of the founders of positive neutrality and nonalignment, and remained for a long time a leader of positive neutrality and nonalignment. Egypt has benefited politically and economically from its strict adherence to that policy and used to receive aid and loans from the two superpowers in appreciation of its role in international politics.

We are against military association with the United States or any other state. We do not want to involve ourselves in problems and conflicts between the two superpowers. We have enough of our own. If the United States is seeking its national security in Egypt, it should first seek with us our economic security.

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LACK OF APPARATUS TO SUPERVISE DEVELOPMENT

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 3 Jun 80 p 9

[Article: "Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq 'Abd al-Majid Admits Lack of Apparatus to Supervise Development in Egypt"]

[Text] Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq 'Abd al-Majid, the deputy prime minister for financial and economic affairs and planning, has admitted that for three years as planning minister in previous governments he knew nothing about development projects in Egypt.

In remarks he made at his first meetings with the People's Assembly's Planning and Economic Committees, the deputy prime minister said that there is no apparatus for development in Egypt at the present time and that all the figures and statistics that he used to receive about the various projects were wrong and inaccurate.

He went on to say that some $6 billion in foreign loans remain unused, the reason being that the loans were contracted to finance projects that were not listed in the economic and social development plan and therefore remained in abeyance. He said that this has also caused the arrival of equipment for projects which were initiated somewhere between 10 and 16 years ago but which remain unfinished, such as the Al-Mansurah Hospital and the Asyut University Hospital. The equipment has been sitting in boxes for years and has remained there without any local financing.

Dr 'Abd al-Majid said: "The wrong planning policy which has been adopted caused the suspension of many projects. I cite as an example the Al-Fayyum sewage project. The governor of al-Fayyum asked for 4 million pounds this year for the implementation of that project, but the state allocated 50,000 pounds only for the project. The governor has refused to receive that sum of money and the project remains unimplemented as a result."

Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq 'Abd al-Majid also said that he admits all the errors that have been committed in the planning policies of the past few years, on the grounds that ministerial accountability is a joint one. He also admitted the complications which have developed as a result of those errors. He noted that redressing the complications and repercussions was more serious than redressing the problem itself.

The deputy prime minister went on to say that rationalizing the economic course of the country involves more than just shifting the prices of commodities. It also involves the banking system, the public sector and the rationalization of foreign trade. Finding remedies for all those problems, he said, would go a long way toward solving the problem of inflation. The decrease in the size of deficit in the budget does not mean that the problem has been resolved.

He pointed out that there is no apparatus to supervise and oversee the process of disbursement of funds allocated for the development plan. The Investment Bank, he said, would reinstate the confidence that has been lost as a result of channeling funds to purposes other than those specified in the plan and would insure that each project would get its due, nothing more nothing less, and that funds earmarked for a certain project would not be spent on another behind our backs. He said that he would not endorse any check for any project unless the project touches all bases.

The minister referred to projects that have remained unimplemented since the 1960's, citing as examples all the hospitals that had been begun, the faltering pace of building schools and the expiration of the (presumed) durability or age of factories and the need to undertake urgent efforts to rejuvenate and replace those factories. He said that the major reason behind this problem is that projects are tied to specific annual budgets.

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SLP CALLS FOR SUSPENSION OF NORMALIZATION WITH ISRAEL

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 17 Jun 80 pp 4, 5

[Article: "Ibrahim Shukri Declares at a Popular Rally in Port Sa'id: Socialism Is the Right Path for Solving the Problems of the Masses."]

[Text] Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, leader of the Socialist Labor Party (SLP), said that the price decreases announced by the government recently have not included basic commodities needed by the people such as fava beans, oil and sugar, and that there is a shortage in many of these necessary commodities. The problem of prices, he said, is not the concern of the National Democratic Party (NDP) alone, but is a problem that concerns us all. The disappearance of commodities from the marketplace pushes their prices up. The correct way to reducing prices, he said, is to follow a real socialist policy, especially since the average income per capita in Egypt is no more than $350. The SLP leader was speaking at a popular rally sponsored by the party in Port Sa'id Thursday evening.

Engineer Ibrahim Shukri wondered how an Egyptian whose annual average income is so small can afford to secure his necessities while prices are constantly rising. He explained that socialism would define the most important problems from which the masses suffer and draw up a scientific plan to solve those problems with our own efforts.

He said that the SLP is prepared to support the NDP if it drew up such a plan, but although the ruling party calls its philosophy a socialist democratic philosophy, its conduct is not in accord with socialism.

An Opposition Party

The SLP leader referred to claims that the SLP emerged because the ruling party wanted to set up a new opposition party, and said that the SLP was established because there are men in Egypt who believe in democracy not in single opinions. When President al-Sadat called for a new party which he would lead instead of the Egypt Arab Socialist Party, I wanted to do something that others may refrain from doing. I said to myself that Mamduh Salim, the former leader of the Egypt party, is a man who did not have a major political history before the corrective revolution, and yet his party attracted so many people. So when a man like President Anwar al-Sadat, the

leader of the corrective revolution and the crossing [that is the 1973 war when Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal] and a man who has had a notable history before and after the [1952] revolution, calls for the establishment of the NDP, how can there be a chance for democracy then? The overwhelming majority of the people would join his party and there would be no other opinion to correct mistakes and offer options, especially given the kind of things that were being said about the opposition parties that existed at that time. The Neo-Wafd party was described as a party that wanted to push history back and the National Grouping Party was described as suspect opposition.

Guided by my conscience and out of a conviction that I am part of this people, I stepped up to form the SLP. I knew very well that I would not be accused of a desire to push the revolution backwards, for I have taken part in paving the way for the revolution. The Socialist Party's newspaper is the biggest witness to our struggle against the monarchy and colonialism. When the revolution broke out, I was incarcerated in the Cairo Prison on charges of slandering the person of the king. After the revolution I was always one of the defenders of democracy and the people's freedom. From the very first minute of the corrective revolution, I supported it because I was in favor of democracy.

In the light of all that, I decided to call for the formation of a new party. There were, however, legal obstacles over which I had no control. The law stipulated that 20 members of the People's Assembly should agree to be members of the party before the party can be legally sanctioned. This legal obstacle did not prevent me from continuing to realize all those things that I believe in. I told myself that all political parties were dissolved after the revolution under the pretext that they have corrupted political life in the country. But a popular referendum excluded the National Party and the Socialist Party from that corruption.

Without getting into any comments on referendums, the referendum legally annulled the previous decision to abolish the Socialist Party in 1953. At any rate, I proceeded with God's blessings and the support of sincere men, to form the SLP. In the process we were gratefully surprised by President al-Sadat's decision to ask the NDP members of the People's Assembly to sign the declaration documents required by the political parties' law. But, for the record, the SLP did not depend on that declaration to apply to the Arab Socialist Union. We waited for a number of days until enough members of the People's Assembly joined us so as to meet the legal requirements for the formation of the party. As soon as we had enough members of the People's Assembly to meet the legal requirements, we applied to the parties committee at the Socialist Union. The documents we submitted were those signed by 20 members of the Assembly, not those signed by hundreds of other members who deserve our gratitude for seeking with President al-Sadat to help proclaim the SLP.

A Statement of Account

Despite all those efforts by men who are concerned with democracy in our country, rumors continued to say that the SLP was formed to put an end to the other opposition. Those who knew me and know my career are fully aware that I can never be used as a bludgeon to put an end to the other opposition.

Now, nearly two years after our initiation, we say that, through speaking out freely and honestly at the People's Assembly and on the pages of AL-SHA'B, we have exercised objective opposition which defends the people's interests. We are not afraid of expressing opposition if what we say is in keeping with our principles and program.

Engineer Ibrahim Shukri noted that "there are many examples to sustain that. Immediately following our establishment, we opposed the donation of 16,000 pounds by the General Union of Land Transportation to the NDP because such a donation is in violation of the parties' law. We were not worried that someone would say that such a measure was an unfriendly gesture toward the ruling party, for the law is the law. This is how we understand democracy.

From that time on we spoke out against any action that was not in accord with the homeland's interests. We criticized reports in OCTOBER that Egypt would be sending Nile waters to Jerusalem. I spoke about this subject at the People's Assembly and pointed out the serious repercussions of such a measure on our relations with the African states. We hear nowadays of an Ethiopian memo about the question of how the Nile waters should be used. Although the memo does not mention Egypt by name, it is clearly directed at us, and this has prompted the minister of irrigation to make a statement at the People's Assembly reaffirming Egypt's right to use the waters of the Nile. We could have done without such a statement if only we pay attention in our actions to national issues."

"Furthermore," engineer Shukri went on, "the SLP criticized the Egyptian government's statements on sisterly Sudan. It is not proper for us to say: if the Sudan wants to sever its relations with us, then let it do so. I have reaffirmed in the People's Assembly that Egypt and the Sudan are one country and that the future of Egypt's food security is interwoven with our relations and cooperation with the Sudan. All scientific estimates show that we cannot meet our food needs no matter how much we increase our agricultural production. We import 40 percent of our food needs and 70 percent of the wheat we need. Our own wheat production can only sustain us for three and a half months. We may be getting food products from the United States, but we have to remember that those food deliveries are meant to hitch us to the United States. We have to remember that when the United States wanted to punish the Soviet Union following the Afghanistan developments, it embargoed wheat shipments to it. So food products, especially wheat, have become a weapon in the hands of the food producing countries in the field of international relations."

The SLP leader added that "if the independence of our national will is really the goal of the ruling party, as its slogan indicates, then we should rely on our own production and on cooperation with the Sudan and the other Arab

countries. It would be improper for anyone to say in reply that our view is at variance with the country's national policy. The SLP understands national policy as one seeking to promote the interests of this country. In accordance with this concept and understanding, our party demands that our ambassador be immediately recalled from Israel, that the Israeli ambassador be expelled from Cairo and that the process of normalization between us and Israel be suspended. Our party also demands that the Egyptian peace negotiators not go to Washington to discuss the suspension of the autonomy talks. Israel is still refusing to implement the second part of the peace treaty and to grant autonomy to the brotherly Palestinian people. It is still waging a battle of elimination against the Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and Gaza, building settlements on Arab lands and issuing laws claiming that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. It is doing all this to further rip apart the unity of Arab ranks, which was responsible for the great October victory, and to further isolate Egypt, the largest Arab country, from the rest of the Arab nation, because it knows that Egypt is to the Arab nation what the head is to the rest of the body, that Egypt's defeat spells defeat for all Arabs and its victory means victory for all Arabs.

Therefore, the SLP, which advocates in its program the establishment of the United Arab States, affirms that we cannot base our national policy on a permanent quarrel with the Arab nation and individual Arab governments, and that we have to look for a way to repair damaged inter-Arab relations and dress our wounds, lest Israel realize in peace what it has failed to realize in war.

The leader of the SLP concluded his speech by saying that the SLP will continue to represent the conscience of this nation truthfully and honestly regardless of the difficulties.

The popular rally in Port Sa'id had started with a recital from the Koran. Then engineer Ibrahim Shukri and the delegation accompanying him greeted Nabil 'Abd al-Latif, the rapporteur of the SLP's Information Committee in Port Sa'id, lawyer Ahmad Husayn, member of the Higher Committee and Fu'ad Hidiyyah, secretary of the SLP in the governorate.

Artist Hamdi Ahmad, member of the SLP's Higher Committee and Parliamentarian Committee, then spoke about the role of art in serving the issues and problems of the masses. He criticized the foreign television serials which are showing in Egypt nowadays such as The Green Man and the Six Million Dollar Man. He said that such programs distort the thinking of our children and bring violence into our homes, whereas the message of art is to enlighten people and give them a sense of security and comfort.

Artist Hamdi Ahmad gave an objective analysis of art and politics and how they both should involve truthfulness, integrity and purity. True art, he said, should be virtuous and upright, and so should the honest politician.

Stop Normalization

The floor was then given to Rif'at al-Shahawi, secretary general of the SLP, who demanded that the Egyptian government expel the Israeli ambassador from Cairo and stop the normalization process so that Israel may understand that we will not allow it to persist in its procrastination and deception with regards to the rights of the Palestinian people. He then said that the SLP was established to deepen the concepts of freedom and democracy in Egypt and defend the interests of the broad masses of the people, and that the party's struggle is dedicated to the sole purpose of serving the people.

The SLP secretary general reviewed the career and struggle of engineer Ibrahim Shukri. He said that President al-Sadat once said of engineer Shukri that he is a man who has earned the medal which we all covet, namely, the wound which he received from a bullet during the 1935 demonstrations in favor of democracy and a constitution. He thus gave of his blood to Egypt and is today resuming his march. Al-Shahawi said that we are exercising democracy for the sake of the Egyptian people and that we oppose anything that is against our views and party program and against the interests of our homeland and the Arab nation.

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PRIVILEGES GIVEN TO FOREIGN INVESTMENTS ATTACKED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 17 Jun 80 pp 8, 9

[Article: "Economic Study Warns: Egypt Will Revert to Financial and Industrial Feudalism; Exemptions Given to Foreign Investments Destroy National Projects and Create New Centers of Power and Influence"]

[Text] The present Investment Law will create in Egypt a kind of financial and industrial feudalism which will be no less harmful and dangerous than agricultural feudalism. This warning was sounded by a scientific study conducted by Dr Muhammad 'Ali Rif'at, the former secretary general of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization.

The study shows that Investment Law No 43 for 1974 as amended by Law No 32 for 1977 is based on the principle of "exemption" which only benefits foreign capital. According to that law, foreign capital is exempted from Egyptian public laws. Despite all those exemptions, investors are not satisfied and demand more concessions because they know that they will get what they want as long as the country's options are limited and demand for foreign investments is growing. The study cautions against the serious danger which threatens national projects as a result of this, especially if the government continues to ignore dealing correctly with this anomalous situation.

The major consequences of this situation can be summed up as follows:

1. Blatant discrimination between privileged and unprivileged projects operating in the same field which would eliminate competition among them and cause the deterioration of unprivileged projects which make up the bulk of the national economy, in the face of unfair competition. The losses which would be caused by such a situation cannot be recouped by the profits and gains expected to accrue from investment projects. This, in addition to the emergence of groups of profit-seekers--adventurers, brokers and agents--who will try to make quick profits by all legitimate and illegitimate means in the shadow of a law that is solely based on exemptions. Moreover, we will see talents and skills being snatched by foreign investments, especially rare and unusual skills. Privileged investment concerns have been known to tempt production workers with high salaries, thus adversely affecting the efficiency of the public sector because it is difficult to replace such talents and expertise.

2. Limited-term material concessions and privileges tempt investors, especially foreign investors, to favor quick-profit projects so that they can recover all their investment before the end of the concession period and return with their profits to their respective countries. In fact, those limited-term material privileges could have more serious consequences if the projects fold after the end of the concession period.

3. Privileged treatment tempts those responsible for privileged projects to squander resources and pay little attention to cost factors. This might lead to the emergence of high-cost industries that would be unable to compete in foreign markets.

4. The excessive reliance of privileged projects on loans to meet investment costs at the rate of 45 percent would overly burden these projects and seriously affect their future in view of the astronomical level of interest costs.

5. Discrimination in treatment on the basis of legal provisions often leads to deviation and corruption and encourages the emergence of financial and economic centers of power and influence.

6. Concentration on negative measures through exceptional treatment in addition to a fascination with privileged projects lead to laxity in searching for alternative positive measures.

7. Discrimination in treatment in the field of investment creates economic dualism which is one of the most serious and damaging maladies that can afflict the national economy, because such discrimination was the royal door to economic dualism whereby [line dropped]. The establishment of economic sectors or projects which become exclusively theirs, leaves for the helpless citizens backward traditional sectors whose remnants still plague the economies of developing countries. Economic experts rightly consider these to be the mark of economic backwardness.

The study calls back to mind the long suffering of Egypt when foreign capital controlled its economy for generations under the system of privileges for foreigners. The study expresses amazement that someone would contend that the law endorsing all such exemptions embodies a general policy laid down by the state. Is it logical, the study wonders, that a host of exemptions from public laws be an expression or a part of a public policy?

What is worse is that such a policy is meant to represent an economic open door policy, since an open door policy would not normally promote and uphold special exemptions, and that the allegation is made by the government apparatus which is entrusted with the implementation of the investment law.

They Laughed at Us and Said It's an Economic Open Door

The study emphasizes that neither Law No 43 of 1974 as amended by Law No 32 of 1977 nor any law preceding them contains the words "open door." If anything, the term "open door," in the context of the contemporary Egyptian

state of affairs, means a transition from one condition to another--from artificial obstacles to the disappearance of those obstacles and the return of public confidence in the laws which regulate economic projects.

Open Policy Innocent of Investment Projects

The study concludes that projects which emerge as a result of the investment law forfeit their claim to being part of the economic open door policy, in content and application. To demonstrate the veracity of its conclusions, the study reviews the report put out by the Investment Authority, which claims tutelage over the open door policy, about its achievements and the projects which it had approved since its establishment in 1971 and until 31 December 1978.

The report says: The number of projects at home approved by the Investment Authority was 591 projects with a total capital of 1,664 million pounds, 41 percent in local currency, 59 percent in foreign currency, while investment costs for all those projects was 3,045 million pounds.

The study points out that the report did not make it clear whether the foreign capital was actually received and investment expenditure has actually occurred, nor was it clear about the basis on which the exchange of foreign currency with Egyptian pounds was made.

Investment Breeds Banks

The study sheds more light on some aspects of the Investment Authority's report, saying that the most important part of the report was the one which dealt with the value of real production realized by the privileged projects which have begun production. The study says that the report cites extremely amazing statistics on production in 19 sectors, led by the banking sector with 78 percent of the total production of all projects. Behind it came the sector of professional industries (6 percent), tourism (4 percent), chemical industries (4 percent) and housing (2 percent).

The study says: The amazing thing in this official report is that the activities of the banks benefiting from the Investment Law added to the GNP 940 million pounds, or 78 percent of the output of all the investment projects. If these illogical figures are true, then there should have been as much efforts as possible to increase that strange banking activity.

The study wonders how can one interpret the statistics mentioned in the report, namely, that 21 banking projects which have begun operating or are about to do so, have had a total investment expenditure of 112 million pounds while their real production amounted to 930 million pounds, that is about seven times as much as its total capital. What makes it more amazing, the study goes on, is that the new banks, either the exclusively foreign banks or the joint banks all of which have found a good and stable grazing grounds in Egypt, have invested only a fraction of their new huge assets in new Egyptian projects. It is a well known fact that most of those banks invest

the greater part of their assets in financial markets abroad which do not benefit Egypt in any way, not even in taxes on profits. Why then, the study asks, are those banks exempted from all kinds of taxes and in whose interest is this being done?

The Investment Authority's Report

The study says that the data and statements contained in the report of the Investment Authority are not enough to draw reliable conclusions with regard to the accomplishments of the investment projects, especially the performance of the authority entrusted with the implementation of the Investment Law.

The study expresses amazement about the report's contention that the Investment Authority is the apparatus which is responsible for the implementation of the economic open door policy, although the authority was established in 1971, the open door policy was officially endorsed in the referendum which took place on 15 May 1974 to vote on the October Paper and the Investment Law was issued in June 1974 without a single reference to the open door policy.

The study emphasizes that the problem of foreign investments cannot be detached from the environment and climate of national investments because such a detachment would involve serious dangers.

The study comes to the conclusion that the question of foreign investments is a question of climate and that national investments share the ups and downs of that climate. Also, the practical value of foreign and national investments depends on the degree of stability they enjoy which would convince savers and investors alike that their interests are safe.

The climate should also be healthy, allowing movement toward economic development and advancement. Indeed, the term investment in modern societies is now synonymous with the development of production activities through the use of technology which requires large investments.

The study also stressed that a proper and healthy climate should be accompanied by an atmosphere of stability. This principally requires a rational social and economic policy and a capable economic management. These two elements provide the right indicator which would tell us about the future of foreign investments in Egypt, in particular, and the Egyptian economy, in general. The study says that this cannot come about unless we adhered to the correct concept of the economic open door policy. In accordance with such a concept, the economic situation in Egypt would be treated through liberating the means of productive activities from fetters, restrictions and obstructions. When this is done, a serious investor--foreign or national --would not need special privileges.

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HOUSING PROBLEMS ANALYZED, REMEDIAL MEASURES PROPOSED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 17 Jun 80 pp 10, 11

[Article by Engineer Muhammad Hasan Durrah: "A Study on the Housing Issue; Egypt's Area Is Vast and Yet a Crisis Exists in Building Lands"]

[Text] A million or about a million square kilometers--this has been the size of Egypt for thousands of years. It has not increased or decreased. A single thin green strip along the Nile--the Nile valley and the delta--accounting for one percent of the total area is the only area that has been exploited for thousands of years.

From a few million people, the population has soared to more than 40 million. It has been a huge explosion occurring in a few years and months. Indeed, it is occurring every second. All you have to do, to quote a favorite advertisement phrase, is look around you. Is it not a difficult and bitter formula by any standard?

Once again we take a look at one aspect of Egypt's national question, or actually the core issue in Egypt, namely, the question of housing. This time we look at it through research and study in order to devise, through sound planning, immediate implementation and careful followup, a solution which would eradicate the problem entirely. A temporary palliative would not eliminate the crisis, or silence the voices that are talking about it. Nor will the problem be solved by statements that are made for local consumption. Several recommendations have been made and several views have been expressed. Plans have been drawn up on paper and have earned their share--actually, more than their share--of discussion and debate. But they fade away soon enough and remain confined to files for years and years--mere ink on paper. While these plans remain locked up in desks and files, problems deteriorate, voices rise in anger or agony, and controversy and debate re-emerge. And after this storm subsides, things return to where they were before--mere ink on paper.

Change, movement and reform in our country are unavoidable. The problem, however, is that they are moving too slowly, that the age is pressing on at great, viciously crushing speed while we are poorly equipped or unable to cope and catch up with it. The alarm signals are flashing and screaming all around us and all we do is respond with the speed of a turtle. We turn our full attention to the symptoms and manifestations of a disease but ignore the genesis of that disease and yet think that we have cured the malady.

This is the problem of our country--more precisely, this is the problem of most of the countries of the Third World.

Back to Our Problem: The Housing Plight

Next to financing, which is the propulsive power behind housing projects, one of the most serious elements of the housing crisis has to do with lands which are unsuitable for building and are equipped with the necessary services and utilities. We cannot, of course, build a housing unit while ignoring water lines or the sources of water, healthy drainage and work and services opportunities for the inhabitants, as human beings who are in need of all those amenities.

As the prime minister said in this regard: "Hope is pinned on the building of new towns and the establishment of new communities for the solution of the problem of coming up with the necessary lands for the housing plan." I have reviewed the comprehensive statement delivered by the minister of housing at the People's Assembly on 7 February, 1976, that is more than four years ago, in which he dealt with all the problems of housing, including financing, utilities, employment, construction, building materials, availability of lands, the syndrome of speculation in land prices and housing laws designed to encourage the private sector and push forward work on building new towns. The minister said that the planning of some of these towns was begun in January 1975 and he mentioned other matters. If these matters were faithfully and carefully implemented in their time, we would not have reached the situation in which we find ourselves.

We regretfully repeat what we have said before, namely, that words and deeds are two different things.

The 20-Year National Plan

In that part of the report of the National Housing Commission (NHC) which pertains to the questions of lands and new townships, we find that the land needs of the plan over the next 20 years, that is until the year 2000, amount to 144,000 feddans which can accommodate 3.6 million housing units. This is what is specified in the plan, as we have pointed out in the preceding part of this study. These lands have to be made available from the following resources:

1. Neglected lands within the urban areas in the governorates.

2. The urban extensions around the major cities.

3. The new townships and communities.

Actually, an area of about 38,000 feddans, or 26 percent of the required total area, was found within the framework of the existing cities and around those cities. As for the 9 new cities which have been approved, namely, 10 Ramadan, 15 May, Al-Sadat, Al-'Amiriyyah, 6 October, Al-Amal, Al-'Ubur and

two other cities within the framework of greater Cairo, the total area of those cities amounts to about 28,000 feddans, that is about 19 percent of the land required by the plan. Thus, the total area of lands which have been found by the state came to about 66,000 feddans, or about 45 percent of the total required area. This area can accommodate 1.6 million housing units only. That is to say that the rest of the plan, namely, the construction of some two million housing units, requires about 78,000 feddans which must be found in areas that are being built up outside the Nile valley. These areas have to be found to accommodate new townships and communities which have to be equipped with utilities immediately throughout the length and width of Egypt.

If we bear in mind that the expected increase in population by the year 2000 will be nearly 24 million people, and that the present cities and towns are already incapable of absorbing more than 6 million persons, it means that the new cities and communities which have to be built must be able to accommodate at least 18 million people until the year 2000. This is the only way to solve the housing problem. The prime minister referred to this serious matter in September of 1979.

We know that the first five-year plan, 1981-85, requires 27,000 feddans. Of these, only 18,000 feddans were made available within the present cities, the new suburbs and the new cities and townships. It is thus necessary to provide immediately 9,000 extra feddans in open lands within the urban framework in the governorates and around the cities. It is also necessary to press on with work in the new cities to absorb larger ratios of the population.

Expected Confrontation Between Housing and Development Ministries

After having studied the situation and inspected the progress of work in the areas located within the around the cities, which constitute 26 percent, and the new, announced cities, which constitute 19 percent of the required surface land, we discover that the plan to provide these areas with utilities and services, which is a vital and difficult phase which requires many years has not been implemented on the required level. Actual implementation has actually begun in only three cities:

1. The 10 Ramadan city, along the Cairo-Alexandria road, whose potentialities depend on industry and agriculture. Work has already begun on this city more than three years ago and it has gone some ways. But there are still no large factories and plants which can absorb the working force which is the nucleus of this city and the core of its productive capacity. True, the city has several small plants, but we notice that the large factories still prefer to be situated along the northern and southern approaches to Cairo, which adds to the congestion in the capital.

2. The 15 May city in Hilwan. Work on this city is proceeding at a pace which is proportionate to the small and limited funds allocated for it. Perhaps the greatest justification for the building of this city is that it is designed to serve the workers in the present industrial city of Hilwan.

Some of the obstacles include the imbalance between the incomes of workers and the rents of the housing units.

3. The al-Sadat city. This city primarily depends on industry and modern advanced agriculture. It is situated near the Cairo-Alexandria desert road. Work on the city began in 1978 when some roads and administrative buildings were built, wells were sunk and utilities were begun, but the means of industry have not been established there yet. We are not sure whether this year's allocations will permit work to begin on public buildings and housing alongside factories.

All those new cities, as well as the areas established in present cities and the new suburbs surrounding them, lack the necessary plans to provide them with new utilities or at least to renew the old and exhausted utilities in the great cities.

As for the city for al-'Amiriyah, which is located along the Cairo-Alexandria road, it also depends on industry and agriculture and has the elements of an independent city quite separate from Alexandria. Work has not begun of that city yet, with the exception of the building of some roads leading to the city. Funds are being raised to spend on providing the city with utilities. Factories to be built in Alexandria are supposed to be catering to this new city so that it may get its share of development. As for the other cities, they have been merely planned on the ground, nothing more.

Huge Projects and Limited Allocations

The fact which emerges from the way in which work has been proceeding in the new cities, as we have shown, is that the national housing plan cannot be met. This is not due to negligence or laxity on the part of the ministry of development and new communities but due to the lack of adequate allocations for those planned cities, in addition to the lack of coordination on the question of building and establishing the means and bases of industries in those cities.

What is peculiar is that the sum of 32 million pounds was allocated in the 1980 budget under the heading of new cities and communities although the plan aims at the implementation of huge projects which cost some 156 million pounds. Can there be anything more inadequate than that? Even more peculiarly, the sum of 32 million pounds, after deductions pertaining to chapters one and two and various facilities, has dwindled to about only 8 million pounds of local currency which would be spent on various aspects of development in the new cities. Would such a miniscule sum of money bring about any aspect of the ambitious plan of the ministry of development and new communities? Therein lies the seriousness and truth of the situation.

How then can we solve this variable formula for the cities--a formula which involves a difference of at least 200 million pounds? As we take another look at the sums of money earmarked for the establishment of utilities in all the new cities, we wonder in whose interest we are laughing at ourselves and taking lightly questions and matters which are most serious.

As a result of the lack of new lands equipped with utilities, officials were forced to issue instructions ordering the erection of additional floors on present buildings and permitting the exhaustion of open lands in important areas. Buildings were raised from 20 to 45 floors, in violation of the housing law. This excess overtaxes the water, drainage, health and electric utilities. This, in addition to several other transgressions, such as the encroachment of new buildings on agricultural lands adjacent to cities in a haphazard manner which led to the exhaustion of present utilities and sent land prices to fantastic heights. Can one imagine that the price of land per meter in Imbabah, Bulaq al-Dakrur or (Al-Alwiyah al-Hamra') rose from one or two pounds 15 years ago to one hundred or two hundred pounds at present. The same situation exists in the rest of the governorates. Land prices have increased in the same ratio due to the decrease in land supply and an enormous demand for land because of the slowness of planning which should have been implemented some 30 years ago at least.

The Proposed Cure

The recoup some of what we have missed and to cope with our housing plans, we must necessarily invite international establishments of expertise and know-how which are specialized in the construction of cities to join Egyptian consultation bureaus which specialize in planning to set forth a new planning concept for the new cities and communities which would be in accord with the 20-year national plan.

The following steps are also needed:

1. All funding efforts should be consolidated. Egyptian, Arab and foreign capitals should be involved in the plan, and concessions should be given to world companies and Egyptian and foreign investors who are specialized in this field in order to build new cities and communities, as we have seen happening in the Cairo area. The government became a partner with a certain percentage in return for providing the necessary lands.

2. Pushing forward the work now going on in the new cities with the knowledge of the government, by providing the necessary large allocations, provided that factories required for the industrial cities be established. This could be done by means of selling lands to companies and coops which are able to undertake immediate construction, in addition to willing individuals. The revenue from all this would be used to support the allocations for such work.

3. Expanding renewal projects by means of demolishing the old decrepit areas in cities and re-utilizing them in a better economic fashion.

4. Transferring buildings occupying and housing military activities and training facilities which are located within the urban bloc in the Nasr city, Masr al-Jadidah and elsewhere to desert areas and re-inhabiting and re-utilizing them after planning them anew and providing them with the necessary utilities.

5. Abstaining from establishing more factories in Cairo and the major cities and to obligate those interested in setting up such factories to do so in the new cities.

6. Encouraging collective professional migration for young Egyptians so as to develop the new communities, especially those in the remote and desert areas, and to enjoy the fruits of the land.

7. Showing an interest in developing a concept of the regional planning required for the first 50 years of the 21st century so as to create new areas that would attract people.

In this regard, we have learned that one of our specialists in city planning has presented a detailed study on this problem to the higher authorities. He is Dr Ahmad Mukhtar, professor of planning at al-Azhar University's college of engineering and a former dean of the college and a member of the Higher National Committee for Housing. I appeal to the competent authorities to turn over such studies to the National Housing Commission (NHC) which should be in a state of continuous session so that important issues pertaining to housing may be referred to it.

8. Conducting a study, for long-term implementation, of the locations of cemeteries in the major cities, similar to the study which was the basis of the decision to move the cemeteries of Bab al-Nasr to desert areas removed from populated areas. This would make available vital lands for housing while also avoiding the effects of the presence of such cemeteries amidst densely populated areas.

9. Establishing government office complexes in the new suburbs after remapping and re-planning those areas so as to vacate the buildings used by government agencies which are scattered in various locations, on the one hand, and to make it easier for citizens to conduct their business in complexes located in the same place.

Can this approach enable us to save the situation and make up for the drawbacks and shortcomings of the past? More important, we should pose our usual question once again: Are we really serious in our intention to deal with the housing problem in our country?

This is a matter that is open for discussion by the public and our specialized scientists. It is part of the overall problem of housing which should be constantly debated.

In a future edition, God willing, we will examine the nerve center of the problem--financing.

May God guide us to the well-being and prosperity of beloved Egypt. God is the grantor of success.

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SLP VIEWS ON ELECTION SYSTEM, PRESS SYNDICATE, AUTONOMY TALKS

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Jun 80 p 2

[Article: "Important Political Decisions by the Higher Committee of the Socialist Labor Party: Boycott of Consultative Council Elections and Complete Support for Maintaining the Press Syndicate and Freedom of the Press"]

[Text] The Higher Committee of the SLP has issued a number of important resolutions at the meeting it held under party leader Ibrahim Shukri on the afternoon of 17 June. The agenda included the following points:

1. The party's position on the Consultative Council's elections.

2. The party's position on the status of the Egyptian press and the press syndicate.

3. The party's views on the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations.

The party leader and a number of the parliamentarian members of the party presented a summary of the deliberations which took place at the People's Assembly's session earlier in the day to debate the Consultative Council bill. They also summarized the objections made by representatives of the SLP to the bill and to the election system by party ticket which was proposed by the National Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP insisted on this system without regard to proportional representation. This would insure that the NDP would have all the seats on the State Council.

Most members of the Higher Committee criticized this distortion of the system of election by party ticket, which is followed in some democratic countries where seats are distributed in proportion to the votes received by any one party. That system would enhance the multi-party system, while the method proposed by the NDP would reassert something akin to the one-party system by insisting that the ticket which receives a majority of 50 percent plus one, would win all the seats.

Members of the Higher Committee agreed that it was important to issue a statement in the name of the party to show why the party would boycott the elections for the Consultative Council.

Conditions of the Egyptian Press

Discussions then shifted to the conditions of the Egyptian press. The conferres insisted on the need to maintain the press syndicate, and stressed the need to support it, grant it all the jurisdictions to which it is entitled in the regulations, protect journalists and secure press freedom.

The Higher Committee said that it adheres to that part of the SLP platform which said that there can be no tutelage over the press and the press syndicate by any authority or by the Higher Press Council whose establishment is opposed by the SLP.

The conferees also underlined the importance of turning the ownership of national newspapers to the people by turning them into joint-stock companies whose ownership would be shared by the public and those working in newspaper houses and the press syndicate within certain bounds and percentages which would prevent any one group from controlling the national press.

The Higher Council feels that the abolition of the Socialist Union in accordance with constitutional amendments is an opportunity to liberate the Egyptian press and that the Consultative Council or the Higher Council of the Press should replace the Socialist Union in controlling the destinies of the Egyptian press.

The Higher Committee decided to issue a statement on the conditions of the Egyptian press which would express the party's support of the principle of keeping and maintaining the press syndicate and safeguarding the freedom of the press.

Negotiations with Israel

The SLP Higher Committee discussed the faltering Egyptian-Israeli negotiations on autonomy for the Palestinians. It expressed the SLP's reservations over the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and said that positive steps should be taken to confront the intransigent Israeli policy and the Zionist terrorism in the West Bank and southern Lebanon.

The SLP's Arab Affairs and Foreign Relations Committee will hold an urgent meeting to prepare a study on the party's position in this regard.

Forthcoming Meeting

The SLP Higher Committee will resume its meetings on 30 June at the SLP headquarters.

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SLP DECIDES TO BOYCOTT CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Jun 80 p 4

[Statement by Ibrahim Shukri, Leader of the Socialist Labor Party: "The SLP Decides Not to Participate in the Consultative Council Elections"]

[Text] Great people of Egypt, the SLP came into being to reaffirm democracy and cement the multi-party system, thereby contributing to the abolition of one-party rule and the totalitarian system, so that all citizens may participate in constructing the political edifice of our great Egypt.

In the program it proclaimed on 12 October 1978, the SLP recorded the following:

The multi-party system is a safeguard against the dictatorship of the individual or the single political organization. Restrictions imposed on the formation of parties should be abolished, leaving it for the people alone to oversee these parties. No quarter should be permitted to impose tutelage over them, and if they were to deviate from the democratic, constitutional path, then they should be liable before the civil law.

Parliamentary opposition is a safeguard. Legislative provisions which guarantee the right of the opposition to express its views on all matters, especially matters of national importance; enable it to carry out its role; and protect it from pressure and aggression should be drawn up and set forth.

1. Out of its belief that free and honest elections are one of the basic components of democracy, the SLP participated in the People's Assembly elections of June 1979, only a few months after its inception officially.

Despite the transgressions which took place in the People's Assembly elections and the interferences made by officials to insure the success of the ruling party's candidate, the 176 SLP candidates who participated in the elections worked hard and campaigned energetically. The people supported them remarkably. They were thus able to receive about 30 percent of the total vote--about the same percentage received by the ruling party's candidates who took over the majority of seats in the People's Assembly, after a number of independent candidates and SLP candidates went over to the ruling party. Despite this, 30 members of the People's Council continued to lead

the opposition members. They committed themselves to the principle of being the other view, to objective solutions for the problems of the masses, and to monitoring the executive branch within the means available to them.

2. Furthermore, the SLP agreed to participate in the elections of the local people's councils, despite the fact that a large number of SLP members expressed the desire to boycott those elections in protest against what had occurred in the People's Assembly elections.

3. Out of a belief that the SLP should participate in all political activities, especially those of going into the street and fusing with the masses to defend their interests and present the party program to them, the SLP began to consider the idea of participating in the elections for the Consultative Council despite all our reservations about the manner in which the elections would be held.

Despite difficulties which deprive political parties of equitable opportunities to wage the elections battle, the SLP Higher Committee and its parliamentarian representatives held a series of meetings to discuss the question of participation in the Consultative Council's elections.

The party began to examine an electoral procedure based on a party ticket coupled with proportional representation to insure that the votes of electors are not wasted in vain, because a large number of candidates lost by a very thin margin. Actually, the loss was by a few voices which went to the winning candidate who may be representing 51 percent of the voters without regard to the 49 percent who did not vote for him.

The study showed that conduting the elections on the basis of party tickets and proportional representation would give each political party entering the elections an opportunity to win a number of seats proportionally equal to the percentage of votes received by the party. This would insure that any one party would not command an overwhelming majority after winning only 51 percent of the votes.

The NDP decided, however, to stick by its belief that the Consultative Council's elections should be conducted according to a system which was innovated by the NCP and never before applied in any state. The NDP insisted that the elections be conducted on the basis of party tickets but without proportional representation, so that a ticket which receives 51 percent of the votes would win in its entirety while a party receiving 49 percent of the vote would not be represented. Indeed, the NDP imposed a further restriction which provides that a party that does not receive 5 percent of the total votes in the governorates of the Egyptian Arab Republic would not win any seats in the Consultative Council even if one of its tickets won in a certain governorate. This is unprecedented in any democratic country.

4. The SLP records that the government which will conduct the elections is a partisan government formed by the NDP and that NDP ministers control the machinery which will run and oversee the elections. This, is in addition to the fact that all the regional governors in Egypt belong to the ruling party.

5. The SLP also records that the NDP government controls all the information media although the law specifies that the national press should be owned by the people and that political parties should be entitled to express their views and positions on the radio and television, especially during elections.

6. The SLP repeats its position that the NDP has exclusively taken over all the premises that belonged to the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) which was abolished by the recent constitutional amendments. It was normally expected that the various offices and premises of the ASU would be redistributed among the political parties in a fair and equitable manner so that the parties would have places and forums to hold meetings, practice political activities, meet with citizens and hold debates and panels between party candidates and voters.

The SLP also records that constitutional amendments involving Article 194 to 205 of the constitution which created the Consultative Council had defined the council as "an advisory council of the Egyptian family, expressing the views of all groups and organizations of the people on public issues."

It is clear from the statements which accompanied the emergence of the idea of the Consultative Council that the council was meant to be established on bases that differ completely from those of the People's Assembly. In that sense, it would be closer to the concept developed by some socialist systems (professional socialism) which provides that various groups can be best represented through elections within those groups. Therefore, the SLP was surprised when the bill pertaining to the proposed Consultative Council was couched in completely different terms which would not fulfill the objective prescribed by the constitutional amendment, namely, that the Consultative Council would be a representative of the Egyptian family, expressing the views of all groups and organizations of the people.

7. In view of all those impediments which might lead to the exclusive control of the Consultative Council by the NDP by shutting out the other political parties, the SLP cautions that such an action might drive citizens to despair of the success of the nascent democratic experiment and might lead to the reemergence of one-party dominance with all its tragedies, encroachments and dangers to constitutional life.

8. Accordingly, the SLP most regretfully announces that it is compelled to boycott the Consultative Council elections.

God is great. Long live the people.

[Signed] Ibrahim Shukri, Leader of the SLP.

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NPUG DECIDES TO BOYCOTT CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Jun 80 p 4

[Article: "The National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party Decides Not to Participate in the Consultative Council Elections"]

[Text] The NPUG has issued a statement in which it announced that it will not participate in the elections for the Consultative Council. The statement included the following:

The meaning of election by party ticket without proportional representation and the additional proviso that for a party to be represented in the council it should receive 50 percent of votes in all of Egypt, is that the ticket of the ruling party will win in its entirety and that no other party will be able to slip into the council, unless the ruling party condescends to allow it to do so. The upshot is that the Consultative Council will be a new kind of one-party dictatorship.

To this should be added the fact that the ruling party has ignored the rejection by the masses of the so-called Consultative Council and of the nature of that council which makes it indistinguishable from a parliamentary council, a trade union or even a charity. For the council has no decision-making role or a role of serving the masses and defending their rights, nor does it have any ties to the masses.

To this should also be added the fact that masses have been boycotting general plebiscites and elections, especially after the bitter experience of the 1979 People's Assembly elections which were marked by a glaring falsification of the will of the masses.

There is also the fact that repressive measures have been in ascendence and that there is an increasing tendency to suppress any opinion that does not agree with the opinions of the rulers, in addition to the fact that all the media--the printing press, radio and television--are controlled by the machinery and authorities of the ruling party.

If we add up all the preceding points, it becomes obvious that the NPUG's decision not to participate in the Consultative Council elections is a realistic necessity affirming the soundness of the principled position of

the party, especially since the regime is seeking, through the elections whose results are determined in advance, to obtain a false popular mandate that would reaffirm its claims, which are believed by no one, that it enjoys an overwhelming majority and popularity.

Our party cannot agree to participate in giving the regime this cover, which it needs to show to its allies and to justify the continuation of its policies, which are rejected by the people of Egypt.

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VIEWS ON HOUSING PROBLEM APPEARING IN THE PRESS SUMMARIZED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 24 Jun 80 p 11

[Article by Engineer Muhammad Hasan Durrah: "A Study of Press Headlines and Inquiries into the Population Problem: A New City for One Million Citizens Every Year Is Impossible"]

[Text] I apologize to the readers who are following the series of my study of the various components of the housing and population problem in Egypt, because I have to postpone my discussion for a few weeks. But I will stay with the population problem in this article, for the population problem is always on our minds. In view of the profusion of inquiries and sensational comments which have been appearing in the press lately, and which usually increase in tempo when cabinets change, about the housing problem which is generally perceived to be deteriorating, we saw fit to present to the readers some of these important inquiries and opinions on how to solve this problem. We do this because they spotlight various aspects of this multifaceted problem, and because the presentation of these views and our comments on them might clarify the vision of the officials responsible for housing and make it possible for them to seek ways to deal with the problem.

Wanted: A New City for a Million Citizens Every Year

Under this sensational headline, AL-MUSAWWAR reports in its edition of 16 May 1980 on an academic seminar sponsored by the Development and technological Planning Center at Cairo University. Among the participants in the 5-hour seminar were brother engineer Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, the minister of reconstruction, housing and land reclamation, and a number of our honorable scholars in planning, management and research.

Discussing one of the causes of the housing problem, the brother minister says: "The problems of population growth are increasing at a high rate in Egypt. The population of Egypt has doubled in less than 40 years, at an annual rate of growth of 2.5 percent. This represents a heavy burden that weights down on any development projects. Egypt still lives on 4 percent of its total area, that is about 40,000 square kilometers out of a total area of some one million square kilometers. Despite all those interrelated and complicated problems which are due in part to the neglect of efforts to expand the size of urban development and promote the expansion of population

centers for a long period of time, and in part to the behavioral pattern of the Egyptians who cling to their customs and traditions despite the intensity of the population problem--despite all those problems, 96 percent of the land of Egypt is not entirely useless desert. There are many areas in Egypt's eastern and western deserts which are rich with vast natural resources that can be immediately exploited, and this is what the state is seeking to do now."

The minister goes on to say: "The development plan is targeted on 5 development areas in which studies have begun. These studies have now concluded that priority should be given to projects of development and natural exploitation in areas that are considered to be potentially attractive population centers. The other line of action is to move toward the establishment of new cities. The ministry is now engaged in planning and implementing that line of action parallel with the other line. The minister concluded that the problem of housing can only be solved through searching for and finding new areas where the natural resources can be developed and exploited and to which new populations can be drawn in accordance with a plan of two parallel lines."

Dr Subhi 'Abd al-Hakim, the Vice President of Cairo University, added that a new strategy should be drawn up to develop the existing cities and towns in Egypt, and to bring them up to the level of the new cities where housing and employment opportunities are available. This way it would be possible to distribute the population in Egypt in accordance with available natural resources and urban development plans. Therefore, the type of new cities planned for desert areas should have all the sound means of housing and construction, because it is the area which creates the city and not the other way round.

Having faithfully summed up the most important points raised in the seminar, we would like to say that we appreciate the continuous efforts exerted by minister Hasaballah al-Kafrawi for the sake of building cities and solving the housing problem. We agree with the views of all the participants in the seminar. We may not be exaggerating when we say that we had fully analyzed all the points mentioned by them in the serialized reports on our "Study About the Population Problem" which are still being published by AL-SHA'B. We also believe that the solutions proposed at the seminar are all sound, but we wish to ask: What is the means of implementing those important theoretical solutions that have been proposed at the seminar and how is it possible to build new cities that can absorb one million citizens per year, as the sensational headline of the AL-MUSAWWAR article put it? Can our limited material capabilities enable us to do so, and can we simply find lands that are suitable for the establishment of those cities and supplying them with utilities? Perhaps what is desired and hoped for is something and what is possible is someting else. In fact, it is entirely impossible to achieve all that, unless we had a miracle from heaven. Unfortunately, the age of miracles is long past and we have no other choice but to examine reality without exaggeration and without adding to the suffering of those who are living in the sheer hell of the problem.

In our detailed study, we have examined the problem of lands and new cities in articles which were published in previous editions of this paper. We followed our analyses with solutions which we consider to be realistic, serious and constructive. We believe that without those solutions, the likes of such academic seminars will be useless, except as a means to providing an opportunity for longer debates and discussions which would be fruitless and not worth the long hours expended on them. The man in the street will continue to ask himself: Can we really solve the crisis by building a new city for a million people every year? How and with what means? This is, by God, impossibility itself.

Can House Rents Be Lowered?

Under this headline, AL-SIYASI of 15 June 1980 published an inquiry into the housing crisis. Said the paper: "The housing crisis is the talk of the town today and every day. The prices are constantly rising. Young people are desperately searching for just a room to begin their careers and lives in it. And despite the expansions carried out by the state in the desert, rising prices seem to be like a long-playing movie. Is there no outlet from all this?"

To look for that outlet, AL-SIYASI canvassed the views of young people to find a starting point along a difficult route and to search for an answer to a more difficult question. Is it possible to lower house rents and apartment prices in the general climate of lower prices which engulfs the country nowadays? The newspaper interviewed several people involved in this field, including contractors, landowners, brokers, apartment building owners and tenants. The interviews focused on the statements of those who explained the difficult circumstances in which building and construction are being carried out nowadays. These include the lack of the necessary technical labor, the high cost of such labor, the problem of land availability, the high cost of construction materials, the unavoidability of having to buy such materials on the black market most of the time and other factors which clearly show that the problem has completely deteriorated and that it is impossible for persons with limited incomes to find houisng because of high rents and because those persons do not have the means to pay the required key money.

The points raised in the newspaper's inquiry are known to all of us, but the most important point which the inquiry raised was a remark made by the owner of an apartment building. He said: "The owner of an apartment building is not guilty. The contractor sets the price and I pay. And because I have hildren, I did not forsake any apartment in the building which I put up. I paid 50,000 pounds to the contractor. If I want to rent it, of course I will try to regain this sum and more.

Concluding its inquiry, the newspaper said: The truth is lost between contractors, building owners and land-zoning companies. Several housing laws have not succeeded in solving the problem thus far. It is apparent from all this that the hope of lowering apartment rents and prices requires hard work. This means that the state has to address the housing sector as it

addresses the prices of basic goods. The house is no less important than the loaf of bread, for it is man's shelter where he lives, eats and dresses up.

This was the content of the inquiry. While we thank those who have conducted that valuable inquiry into an important aspect of the housing problem, we wish to emphasize, however, that the truth is not lost, as the inquiry concluded. The truth is that housing, as any commodity, is subject to the law of supply and demand. If a commodity is available abundantly, it would be easy to obtain it for proper prices and vice versa.

The housing crisis began to emerge about a quarter of a century ago and proceeded to deteriorate year after year for many reasons, primarily the lack of planning during that period of time plus the essentisl social changes which occurred in the life of the people. Many other factors and present shortcomings have helped to push the crisis to a dead-end road. One of these is the serious phenomenon of leaving buildings empty as a means to securing the biggest possible profit, either by changing the licensing designation from rent to condominium, or by getting the right key money or leaving the building empty in the name of the children, whether they be adults or minors, although the owners had received materials at government-supported prices and low cost. This situation will never alleviate the problem but will exacerbate it. In such a situation, there is no hope for persons of limited incomes that rents will come down or that they will find a suitable apartment. Therefore, the only solution--one which we have always advocated--is for the government to support economy housing and part of the medium-range housing, as it is doing in terms of supporting essential food materials, and to undertake the building of that kind of housing to help persons of limited incomes to find housing at a cost they can afford, because the house is no less important than the loaf of bread.

Winding up this review of our press, we re-emphasize that our problem cannot tolerate slogans and sensational statements inasmuch as it requires scientific discussion accompanied by a sincere and determined desire to work hard. This should be coupled by an effort to keep a periodic check on our achievements under the plan designed by the NHC which is the highest scientific and specialized reference in our country.

We ask God to grant us success and to grant our Egypt prosperity and love. We look forward to meeting you again in another part of our study of the housing problem, God willing.

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DETERIORATION OF FRUIT FARMING ACKNOWLEDGED

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 19 May 80 p 7

[Article: "Ministry of Agriculture Accused of Failure to Guide Peasants"]

[Text] Dr Mahmud Daud, the minister of agriculture, has admitted that fruit farming in Egypt has deteriorated with the results that output is down and prices are up. This, he conceded, has placed heavy burdens on the consumers.

The minister added: "The country as a whole has been neglected for a long time. The proof is that anyone who used to own a garden or a grove is now abandoning the idea of having one in order to escape the various state fees." For 20 years, he said, there has not been any effort to protect and maintain gardens and groves.

Ahmad Qasim, who had questioned the minister, rejected the minister's claims, saying that the deficiency in the citrus crop reached 50 percent, as evidenced by the fact that citrus exports last year dropped from 230,000 tons to 100,000 tons. The member of the People's Assembly added: "The major reason for that is the wrong pricing policy pertaining to citrus products." He said that the ministries of supply and economy determine pricing policy without giving any consideration to the real cost of production and without caring about the well-being of the Egyptian economy. This is in addition to the failure of the ministry of agriculture to provide guidelines and advice which would enable the peasants and farmers to protect and treat the fruit crop, as well as the high cost of pesticides and immunization.

The member of the People's Assembly said that most kinds of fruits have almost become extinct, such as grapes, lemons and mango.

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LAWYERS SUE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER, DEAN OF BAR ASSOCIATION

Lawsuit Explained

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 26 May 80 p 1

[Article by Ihsan 'Abd al-Maqsud: "Fikri Makram 'Ubayd In Court to Answer Charges of Breach of Promises to Lawyers After the Election of Al-Khawajah"]

[Text] The 'Abdin Plenary Court will convene Thursday morning to hear the lawsuit brought against Fikri Makram 'Ubayd, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Secretary of the Permanent Council of the National Democratic Party (NDP), and Ahmad al-Khawajah, the dean of the bar association. The lawsuit was brought by lawyer Amin Safwat who is filing for compensation for losses he and 5,000 other lawyers in the public sector have incurred as a result of unfulfilled promises by the deputy prime minister. He also asked that Mustafa Kamil Murad be (subpoenaed) in his capacity as the chairman of the board of directors of the newspaper AL-AHRAR and that he be asked to have his newspaper continue its campaign to unveil partisan aberrations.

In his petition, Amin Safwat said that Fikri Makram 'Ubayd, in an effort to persuade lawyers working in the public sector to support the NDP's unofficial candidate for the position of dean of the bar association, held a number of seminars and panel discussions in which he and the former minister of justice, counselor Ahmad Musa, pledged to submit to the People's Assembly a bill that would realize equality in promotions, annual salary increases and salaries between lawyers in the public sector and their colleagues in the Government Cases Administration. The bill in question would be something of a financial and compensatory system for those public lawyers which would relieve them of the deception of wayward company presidents and assure them of independence so that they would be subject in their work only to their conscience and duty.

The petition of the lawyers went on to say that on 25 July, AL-AKHBAR published a categorical statement in which Fikri Makram 'Ubayd announced that the People's Assembly will debate the project immediately after the 'Id al-Fitr holiday. On 30 July, AL-AHRAM published on an entire page, and AL-JUMHURIYAH published on its front page, statements by the deputy prime minister and his legal adviser in which they affirmed that the promised hope will be realized soon and spelled out details of the bill which were welcomed by lawyers. The deputy prime minister, however, backed down after having reassured lawyers during the elections campaign that he guarantees the issuance

of the law, and after having explained to the lawyers that he has two capacities, that of deputy prime minister and that of secretary general of the party, and that in these two capacities he will work for sure to push the bill through as the party has promised and pledged to do.

The petition also referred to Ahmad al-Khawajah, the dean of the bar association, saying that he has taken an obstructive position to prevent the issuance of the law so that the issue may be used again as a trump card in the next elections.

The petition went on to say that the newspaper AL-AHRAR on 3 September reported on a major scandal under the heading of "The Party That Laughed at the Lawyers." It is this article which made us seek to call AL-AHRAR as a witness, the petition said, and to call on it to continue its campaign to unmask that partisan deviation.

Lawyer Amin Safwat said in the conclusion of his petition: "Since most companies have completely suspended promotions for lawyers under the pretext that a special law for lawyers is about to be issued and since the behavior of the first and second defendants (Fikri Makram 'Ubayd and Ahmad al-Khawajah, the dean of lawyers) is not in keeping with their party and unionist commitments, it is incumbent upon the courts to order them to pay compensation for the definite material and moral damage which has befallen all lawyers and the claimant, as one of the lawyers. Therefore, the claimant (lawyer Amin Safwat) petitions that they be obligated by the court to pay him jointly the sum of 51 pounds [sic] as temporary compensation and expenses."

Case Postponed

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 2 Jun 80 p 1

[Text] The 'Abdin court has postponed until 12 June the hearing of the lawsuit brought against Fikri Makram 'Ubayd for breach of promises he made to lawyers. 'Atif al-Jawhari, 'Ubayd's defense attorney, asked that the case against his client be dismissed. He said that the lawsuit was brought against the defendent in his capacity as secretary general of the National Democratic Party, but that his client no longer holds this position following the reorganization of the state apparatus. He has now become the chairman of the permanent council of the party and not its secretary general. The court dismissed the plea of the defense and decided to defer the hearings until the plaintiff, lawyer Amin Safwat, changes the designation of Fikri Makram 'Ubayd to that of chairman of the permanent council of the National Democratic Party. The court authorized the plaintiff to include any number of co-plaintiffs he wishes.

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PROMOTION OF MECHANIZED AGRICULTURE SUPPORTED

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 26 May 80 p 2

[Article by Mahmud Fawzi: "Mechanized Agriculture--Why Has It Failed in the Countryside? Can 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman Do What the Agriculture Ministry Has Failed To Do?"]

[Text] The National Democratic Party's Popular Development Committee chaired by engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman has decided to set up a national company of service stations to promote mechanized agriculture.

AL-AHRAR wholeheartedly encourages that project and wishes it success because the condition of mechanized agriculture in the countryside nowadays is one of the major obstacles holding up the growth of agricultural production and the intensification of agricultural projects. The success of the project in question will lead to the following:

1. It will increase agricultural production by means of performing agricultural operations and services with high efficiency and in a short period of time.

2. It will cope with the large increase in the wages of agricultural workers. The increase in wages has reached a point where it impacted on the income of peasants from agricultural production. It should be noted that there is a big shortage in agricultural workers and that their efficiency is deficient for several reasons.

3. Free a large percentage of livestock so that peasants can use them for meat and milk. Machinery would decrease the need to use animals in farming which in turn would increase the availability of meat and milk.

4. Free large areas of alfalfa fields which were used by farming animals. These fields can thus be used to raise food security crops.

5. It would introduce modern technology into agriculture. Modern technology depends a lot on mechanized agriculture.

6. It would increase agricultural intensification by carrying out agricultural operations in a short time so that the land can be utilized to the

maximum degree. For example, agricultural intensification in Egypt is about 180 percent while it reaches 300 percent in many other countries. We are in great need of such increased intensification.

7. It would cut down the expenses of agricultural operations which in turn would result in increasing the income of the farmer.

8. It would cut down the size of loss in crops, especially those crops which require threshing by hand or with the help of an animal. As a result of such threshing, a good deal of these crops is lost.

To insure that mechanized agriculture would succeed in the countryside, we should take into our account the reasons for the failure of many mechanized agricultural projects so that we may not fall into the same pitfalls again. Some examples:

1. The government mechanical stations. These were the basis of the kolkhoz in Russia. The government had established stations for M.T.S. equipment--motors and tractors--which were renting various equipment and tools to the various kolkhozes in return for a nominal payment in kind from the produce. This system has failed for many considerations which have been discussed by Leberman. Primary among these is the fact that farms failed to take care of the equipment since they belonged to the government and not to them. The misuse of such equipment did not, therefore, bother the farms.

2. Agricultural equipment companies dealing with the peasants through coops.

3. Agricultural coops. Mechanized agriculture failed in these coops, saddling them with losses of 3 million pounds. More important, the tractors and equipment in those coops did not perform their role in serving and increasing production, for many reasons which include the following:

a. Many members of the boards of directors of the coops owned or co-owned tractors and irrigation machinery (although this is forbidden by law). It was in their interest, therefore, to disable the coop's tractors and machinery so that they can force the coop to use their own tractors and equipment at a cost which profited those members. The members who did not own tractors and equipment were not interested in keeping an eye on the condition of the coop's equipment since there was no material profit for them to do so.

b. The tractor driver in the coop received a fixed salary. Therefore, he sought to:

(i) try to put the coop's tractor out of order so that he may work for one of the private tractor owners for another wage, since his wage from the coop is guaranteed.

(ii) till a feddan for a certain farmer, for example, but agree with the farmer to say that only 8 kerats were tilled. This way, the tractor driver and the farmer would split the difference.

(iii) tamper with the tractor's odometer, if one exists, by using such methods as magnet, pin, etc.

c. If a tractor needed repair work, that work would go astray between the coop, the bank and the ministry of agriculture. I recall that a tractor in the governorate of Al-Jizah was sent to the workshops of the ministry of agriculture for repair work that should have cost 15 pounds only. The tractor remained in the workshop for three years and ran a repair bill of 300 pounds. The bank controls every single expenditure by the coop as if it is the owner of the coop's funds.

d. Equipment and machinery coops. This type of coops has scored a great success in spreading mechanized farming in a sound manner. Take Algeria, for example (I worked there as a United Nations expert on agricultural cooperatives). In Algeria, village coops and farmers formed specialized coops for farming equipment and machinery. The size of the areas which these coops served depended on many considerations, primarily the kind of crops, the kind of equipment needed to farm those areas, the space required for the economic use of the machinery, access roads and other considerations. The specialized coop has a number of machines which are adequate for the area they are supposed to service. There is also a workshop for quick repairs and for annual checkups and repair work, in addition to mobile repair units. All machinery and equipment are owned by the specialized coop. If one village coop is not using a piece of equipment, that piece is loaned to another coop in the interest of the economic and effective use of equipment.

The board of directors determines the operational schedule. It is made up of secretaries of all the village coops, all of which constitute a general system. The board runs the specialized coops, and the staffers of the coop's board have to implement the decisions of the board and cannot interfere in the decisions that are taken. They can, however, raise questions before the board as a whole.

e. The success of cooperation and incentives. An experiment to organize mechanized farming began in 10 coops in the Qalyub district, including such localities as Sandyun, Tinan, Qaha and others. The experiment began in 1971 when a member of the board of directors was assigned to each single tractor in the coop and required to implement the schedule of service fully in return for 5 percent of the tractor's daily intake plus expenses. The member would collect his money on a daily basis. Each feddan that runs over the average in terms of service gives the tractor driver an additional 10 piasters. In 1970, the Sandyun coop, for example, lost 1,179 pounds in tractor operations. But after the application of the above system, tractor operations chalked up profits of 3,500 pounds. When a tractor developed trouble, the member of the board of directors responsible for it would have it repaired in a day because the tractor became a source of income and livelihood for him. The average daily intake of a member of the board of directors was one pound.

AL-AHRAR is confident that the mechanized farming project will be successful, God willing, as long as it is headed by engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman because he is a serious, prctical and sincere man. Most of the credit for the

bridges and large installations which are the pride of Egypt goes to him. Those installations and bridges demonstrate his ability to implement projects. Most important, however, is that this project is not a profit-seeking enterprise, but one designed for service and benefit. This is the essential difference. When the general coop entered the field of mechanized agriculture its basic function and aim was to make a material profit. Therefore, its function did not go beyond taking a certain percentage from the revenues of tractors assigned to individuals and other coops. But the coop had nothing to do with delivery of the tractors nor did it concern itself with any part of the operations. Furthermore, it did not organize the mechanical farming operations and services in the countryside so as to improve them.

Egypt's countryside and peasants are in dire need of a serious and practical project of mechanical farming and all the organizing, implementation, repair and maintenance work that go with it, so that the project can provide agricultural services by mechanical means that are better, more effective, faster and cheaper than conventional methods. This way, agricultural production can be improved and its cost can be decreased. Any means to achieve this is a sound one. Cooperation is a means not an end, the village bank is a means not an end, and companies are a means not an end. A project owner has to select the means that is sound and practical and that can spread the use of mechanized farming at the right cost and the right time. This is what we need badly.

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COMMUNIST ELEMENTS OBSTRUCT WORK OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 26 May 80 p 7

[Article by Hilmi Salim: "Secretariat General of the Socialist Liberal Party Warns: Communist Elements in the Government Obstructing Resolution of People's Problems"]

[Text] At its annual meeting under the chairmanship of party leader Mustafa Kamal Murad, the general secretariat of the Socialist Liberal Party emphasized that the criterion by which any policy should be measured is the end result of that policy as felt by the masses. It said that the success of the government depends on the extent of its efforts to lower the prices of goods and services.

The secretariat pointed out that the Liberal party has preceded the government in perceiving the need to adopt a presidential system and the system of sectors in the cabinet; increase the powers and jurisdictions of local government, improve the situation in the public sector by establishing (control) companies; and delegate to the lower echelons of government authority to decide issues in matters pertaining to production and services in order to insure the speedy performance of such matters and make sure that the proper decision is made at the proper time.

Transfer of Powers

The general secretariat of the Liberal party held its annual meeting last Tuesday under the chairmanship of party leader Mustafa Kamil Murad. President Anwar al-Sadat's meeting with the ministers and governors was reviewed at that meeting. The secretariat expressed its satisfaction with the decision to transfer ministerial powers to the local administration. This is because such a measure would fulfill the desires and needs of the citizens, insure speed in making the right decisions, and help the citizens in solving their daily problems and improving the standard of services that are provided to the public. This is the criterion by which success of the government can be measured, because the majority of the people do not look at political details but are interested in whether a policy translates itself into prosperity and well-being for the citizens.

The party leader explained that the problem is that powers are concentrated in the hands of the higher and upper authorities. He said that those powers should filter down to the lowest levels so that things can be managed and dealt with quickly, instead of having things pile up in the offices of cabinet ministers, thereby retarding the ability to cope with the fast pace of life. He also emphasized that the concentration of power and the need to refer all things to the higher authorities tend to be obstructive and disruptive, which has a negative effect on services for the people. This requires a comprehensive reconsideration of the powers of government.

Guidebook on Ministerial Functions

Maj Gen Salah al-Rifa'i, deputy leader of the party, stressed that it is necessary that laws and decisions implementing them should be clear to those who are responsible for carrying them out. Since the masses of the people do not often understand the jurisdictions and functions of the various ministries, it is necessary to print all this information in a book. This book would be a guide to the functions and jurisdictions of the ministries, and would thus enable people to know where to go and what to do to conduct their business. It is also necessary, the deputy party leader said, that administrative bylaws and regulations be clear when they are implemented.

Maj Gen al-Rifa'i warned that there are communist and leftist elements in the government machinery who are impeding progress, because they do not believe in the present policies, and because they want to show that the government is incapable of solving the people's problems and fulfilling the people's aspirations. Al-Rifa'i added: "The government should exert maximum efforts to alleviate the burdens of the citizens, so that the people would feel that their government is successful in its efforts to provide the basic needs of the people and to offer an appropriate degree of services in a manner that would fulfill the people's hopes about their government."

Where Is Sound Planning?

Muhammad Murad al-Sabatasi, secretary general of the party, wondered if there is any sound planning in Egypt. He concluded that there is no such planning, saying that things in Egypt are running in an abnormal fashion. He cited, as an example, the fact that agriculture in Egypt is still not getting its fair share in the government's policies, although it is the mainstay of the Egyptian economy. He demanded that agricultural companies should be set up so that services can be mechanized. This, he said, would increase animal wealth by 20 percent as well as increase agricultural production. He also stressed the need to strengthen the river transportation system, especially since most of the populated areas in Egypt are along the Nile.

Al-Sabatasi added: "I am offering this as a counter-example to the kind of planning which looks good on paper but which is detached from the realities of life in Egypt... "[sentence incomplete due to printing error which dropped a line from the page].

Dividing Up Egypt

Maj Gen 'Uthman Radwan, member of the political bureau, advocated that Egypt be divided into only 6 provinces so that each province may have enough land to enable it to undertake and carry out various activities and projects. This would also enable the provinces to take advantage of greater manpower resources to fulfill their various policies. He said that this division is especially appropriate, because it would increase the size of natural resources in each province, thereby bettering its ability to solve its problems. He proposed that all taxes go to the province.

Maj Gen 'Uthman said that he favors that cabinet meetings be held on a weekly basis so as to keep up with new developments. He called for the abolition of ministerial committees, because their functions are unnecessary, in the sense that the operation of the executive branch is an integrated and indivisible one which cannot be apportioned. Thus, the cabinet would operate as an integrated, interrelated unit.

The Party's Viewpoint

Nafat Kamel, (deputy secretary general of the party) and member of the People's Assembly, talked about the need to step up party activities among the masses so that the people become more familiar with the party's viewpoint and its demands of the new government. She called for a quick plan of action to achieve that objective, and said that she will deliver a working paper on that subject at the joint meeting of the political bureau and the heads of party branches in the governorates. She said that the plan would also call for restructuring the economy and amending all the economic laws pertaining to the economic structure, so that it would be possible to set down a host of laws that would help build the new state and reorganize the various areas of production and services.

Elect the Governors

Maj Gen 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Sabki, member of the general secretariat, said that to equalize opportunities for the governorates and to provide the political parties with an opportunity to carry out their activities in the governorates, he proposes the following:

1. The Consultative Council should be made up of two representatives of the various groups and two representatives of the workers in each governorate. Elections should be held on the basis of a party ticket. A party that fails to receive 5 percent of the total votes will not receive any seats on the council.

2. In view of the fact that the governor is a politically responsible official, according to one of the president's speeches, a governor should be elected, so that the political parties may have an opportunity to operate in the governorates.

3. The president shall appoint the remaining third of the Consultative Council from experienced men who are members of the various parties or independent.

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DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ACKNOWLEDGES LACK OF CONTROL OVER FUNDS

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 2 Jun 80 p 1

[Article: "Deputy Prime Minister Looks Into Where Budget Funds Go"]

[Text] Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq 'Abd al-Majid, the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, has admitted that there does not exist a government apparatus to supervise disbursement of development plan appropriations. This year, these amounted to more than 3,000 million pounds. He said that the allocations were being shifted from one project to another without the knowledge of the cabinet. Indeed, the ministry of planning did not know what the development projects were.

The deputy prime minister emphasized that the economic problem cannot be solved by raising prices or taking care of the deficit in the budget, but we should find out where the budget funds are going.

Speaking at a meeting of the planning and economy committees at the People's Assembly, the deputy prime minister announced that all the information he has received from the various ministries when he was in charge of the planning ministry for 3 years was erroneous information. He said that he regrets that Egypt does not have an apparatus to follow up the use of public funds and to make sure that those funds are being spent soundly, especially the public sector funds which amount to 3,100 million pounds.

Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq, 'Abd al-Majid said that a number of projects listed in the development plan some 16 years ago have not been implemented until now. He cited, as an example, the al-Mansurah Hospital which had been listed in the budget of 1964 but remains uncompleted. Another hospital, the Asyut hospital, was entered in the general budget 10 years ago, but is still unimplemented. The deputy prime minister said that "there are 6,000 million pounds in foreign loans on which interest is being paid. But we do not utilize those loans, because the specific projects for which these loans were obtained were not listed in the budget."

He added that "foreign banks have become a problem, because each bank operates in its own manner, and we do not know anything about them. The aim behind allowing these banks to operate in Egypt was that they would serve

Egypt and the Egyptian economy. But what is happening is the opposite of that. Those banks transfer their money out of the country, and we do not benefit from their funds."

The deputy prime minister admitted that economic policy in Egypt is carried out in an erroneous manner. In previous cabinets, he said, we tried to change the economic course of the country but our efforts were insufficient, and I share in the responsibility. He said that economic policy is in need of a radical revamping in the public sector, the banking system and foreign trade.

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GOVERNMENT PROVIDES INSUFFICIENT AMOUNTS OF FERTILIZER TO FARMERS

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 2 Jun 80 p 2

[Article by Engineer Mahmud Fawzi: "Shortage of Fertilizers Behind High Prices; Ministry of Agriculture Makes Completely Unrealistic Decisions on Fertilizers"]

[Text] The prices of food materials are constantly rising. Corn prices have reached 23 pounds per ardeb. Vegetable prices have more than doubled since last year. The prices of fruits are constantly rising. No doubt, there are many factors behind the increase in prices, and all of them boil down to the economic law that cannot be ignored or circumvented--the law of supply and demand. The price of any commodity that is in tight supply will go up and vice versa. When production of a commodity increases without a parallel increase in demand, prices will go down.

The averages of agricultural production in Egypt are far less than the averages that can be acnieved. The production slack is due to a very important factor, namely, fertilizers. The majority of agricultural products in Egypt do not get enough fertilizers. This makes their production below average, thereby pushing their prices up.

For example, 'Abd al-Hamid Malash, a vegetables and crop farmer in Sandayun in the governorate of Al-Qalyubiyah, says that the fertilizers appropriated by the ministry of agriculture for vegetables are less than half the real needs. As a result, the yield falls short of the expected average and prices go up. Take corn, for example. The ministry of agriculture allocates 62 azute units to 400 kgs of fertilizers per feddan (15.5 percent). Last year, the average yield per feddan in his fields was 15 standard ardebs of corn. To get the same yield this year, he had to use 3 times the amount of azute allocated by the ministry of agriculture, that is about 190 units of azute. He had to buy the difference on the black market at 8.5 pounds per (yurba). The official price is 195 piasters.

He also bought Egyptian lime for 3.5 pounds per (shikarah) on the black market. The official price of that commodity is 195 piasters. 'Abd al-Hamid Malash says that doubling the amount of fertilizers appropriated by the ministry of agriculture would double the production of vegetables.

'Abd al-Mun'im Subayh, a Sandayun peasant, adds that the fertilizer allocations are not adequate. He raises eggplants, tomatoes and peppers. If he had to depend on the fertilizer quantities allocated by the ministry of agriculture, he said, his production will be too low. He uses, for example, 20 (shikarahs) of fertilizers for his eggplants, when the ministry of agriculture allocates only 12 (shikarahs). The same applies to the other vegetables. He has to buy the additional fertilizers on the black market at double the price. He says that buying additional fertilizers beyond the quantities appropriated by the ministry of agriculture would double production which justifies the extra price he pays on the black market.

Farmer Fathi al-Sayyid, Wasaf, of Al-Kawadi in the district of Ashmun, raises potatoes and vegetables. He says that the ministry of agriculture allocates 7 (shikarahs) of fertilizers and 31.5 percent of nitrates per feddan of potatoes. He uses 20-25 (shikarahs). Instead of 2 (shikarahs) of superphosphate, which the ministry of agriculture allocates, he uses 10-15 (shikarahs). This way he is able to increase the yield of potatoes per feddan to 5 to 6 tons, using government fertilizers, or 8 to 10 tons, using additional fertilizers. He spends an average of 30 pounds per month for extra fertilizers per feddan of potatoes, but he averages an additional income of 300 pounds from his potato production.

As for tomatoes, he receives 6 (shikarahs) of nitrates with local fertilizers from the government. This would yield about 7 tons per feddan. When he uses 17 to 20 (shikarahs) of nitrates, he gets about 20 tons of tomatoes--an increase of some 12 tons, which means an additional income of 840 pounds. He says that the ministry of agriculture should observe the real needs for fertilizers and fulfill them so as to enable farmers to increase production, eliminate the black market and lower prices.

Farmer Sami Jirjis Tadros, of Manshat Ghali in the (Hihya) sub-district, the governorate of Al-Sharqiyah, says that the fertilizers appropriated by the ministry of agriculture represent less than half the real needs of farmers. He adds that there are many peasants who cannot afford to use more fertilizers because they cannot afford to pay the exorbitant black market prices. For example, as a result of the shortage in the corn fertilizers, the price of corn per ardeb in the village has risen to 25 pounds per ardeb and the rent of a feddan of high quality corn has reached 120 pounds.

In the village of Sandayun in the governorate of Al-Qalyubiyah, the produce of onion (laden on cotton) has reached 100 kantars for (single reed) and 150 kantars for (double reed), with good fertilization and proper care. Some farmers have sold onions, including the twig, at 215 piasters per kantar. That is to say that the intake of a feddan of onions (laden on cotton) ranges from 215 to 320 pounds, aside from the price of the cotton. This would increase the production of onion, thereby bringing its price down, which is what the state is trying to do now.

Mabruk Hasan 'Ali of the Mahjub farm in Al-Minya favors this idea. He raises mellons, saying that the ministry of agriculture allocates only 3 (shikaras) of saline fertilizers, 15.5 percent, per feddan of mellons. He needs at least 6 (shikarahs) which he has to buy on the black market at exorbitant

prices. He also needs 60 ardebs of pigeon manure, at 7 pounds per ardeb delivered.

Another farmer who raises melons, Makrum Muhammad Husayn Rizq of Daght al-Khammar says that the amount of saline fertilizers which the ministry of agriculture allocates for one feddan of melons, 3 (shikarahs), is not enough to raise any melons. He says that he has to buy at least 3 addition (shikarahs) from traders in the black market at double the price. He said that the lack of adequate amounts of fertilizers this year has produced a poor quality of melons in Al-Minya. He notes that if the melon runners find no fertilizer in the ground, they will feed off the melon itself. Therefore, a great percentage of melons raised in Al-Minya are empty inside.

We sounded out a number of agricultural specialists and they told us that the appropriation of 60 units of azute for corn is completely insufficient, and that at least 30 units of fertilizers should be allocated for corn. Additional amounts of fertilizers should be used for raising the new American hybrid corn (Burner), so that it can reach its maximum yield, which is an average of 24 ardebs. Our inquiries in the villages, coops and village banks show that only 62.5 units of azute are allocated for corn and that there is no additional allocations for hybrid or any other kind of corn.

To keep quiet about the question of the insufficiency of fertilizers would be a serious matter, because it effects agricultural production and food security. The ministry of agriculture should revise its quotas of fertilizers in a manner that would insure the highest possible levels of production, so that supply would rise and prices would drop, especially in regard to vegetables, fruits, corn and other crops. This would also prevent the existence of a black market. We are in an age of full candor. The president, who is also the prime minister, would not hesitate to allocate adequate amounts of fertilizers for agricultural production, especially since the United States Agency for International Development has as one of its priorities the policy of providing fertilizers to other countries to increase the production of food in the world.

9254
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STATE LANDS USURPED DUE TO GOVERNMENT NEGLECT

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 2 Jun 80 p 3

[Article by Thana' Jum'ah: "A Free-for-all to Usurp State-Owned Lands"]

[Text] Encroachment upon and usurpation of state-owned lands have become a general and recurring phenomenon because of lax supervision and protection and remissness in eliminating encroachments due to the lack of adequate forces. The slowness of the competent authorities in taking legal action against usurpers due to shortage of personnel in the pertinent agencies is encouraging trespassers and encroachers to persist in their usurpation of state-owned lands.

Strangely enough, the financial administration in the governorate of Cairo is responsible for safeguarding state property and funds, but it does the opposite of that. It issues receipts to usurpers against any sum of money they pay to the treasury. On the strength of these receipts, the usurper turns into a tenant protected by law and recognized by the state.

The Railroad Authority went even further and offered lands on both sides of the Hilwan railroad line for rent at reduced prices that are quite lower than the rates set by the Cairo governorate's financial administration. The train conductors collect the monthly rents of those lands from the usurpers.

Usurpation Is Better

If it happens that the encroachments were eliminated, the land in question remains unattended and unguarded and without a fence around it--in other words, waiting for a new usurper who would be encouraged by the state. Citizens who petition to buy a piece of state-owned property at the price set by the board of a governorate or by the ministry of religious endowments or the Nasir Social Bank, are faced by the rejection of their applications, and they find it better as a result to usurp the land legally by paying a few millims to the governorate's financial administration or to the railroads authority.

The encorachments have been taking several forms, primarily usurping the land by squatting on it and acquiring it or renting a certain plot of state-owned land then encroaching upon a wider area.

And the Public Sector

The encroachments are conducted through the building of shacks or small huts. There are also encroachments on the popular housing units in 'Ayn al-Sirah and al-Abajiyah, where usurpers take over extensions close to porches. Beyond that there are encroachments that involve homes for the needy, kiosks, plants and large buildings such as the building of Jalal Abu Al-'ula near Mashrahah.

In the sub-division of al-Khalifah, large areas of land have been arrogated through the Arab Contractors Company on al-Fustat Street, the al-Jimhuriyah Company, Salem Siddiq Thabet Shakhlul and Sons and Kamal al-Tahawi on al-Fustat Street. The area of the lands that these people have taken over in this area comes to 38,000 square meters.

In the old Cairo section, there are encroachments by Faraq 'Abd al-Wahad, Rafiq Nasr, Faruq Muhammad Abu al-Sa'ud, Yusuf Ibrahim al-Laythi, Mustafa Husayn, Fathi Muhammad, Majdi Hasan 'Allam, 'Isam al-Sayyed Hasan, Muhammad 'Abd al-Hafiz and Husayn 'Abd al-Hafiz. This, in addition to the infringements of 'Ashur 'Ali Sa'd and (Art Gunther Kfeishah) on Zaynhum Street as well as the encroachments perpetrated by public sector companies. The encroachments made by the Arab Contractors Company in the Batr al-Baqarah area in al-Fustat involve an area of 70,000 square meters.

Rabi' al-Shaykh, director of the Properties Administration in southern Cairo, says: Law No 59 of 1959 has given the administrative authorities the right to put an end to encroachments upon state-owned lands. He says that when he is notified of an encroachment, he sends a signal to the competent police precinct which solicits a written pledge from the usurper to cease all encroachment activities. The encroacher, however, decides instead to complete his construction work very quickly and fill his property with people. Yet the authorities would go ahead and issue an order to eliminate the encroachment, but after that has been done the encroacher goes back and builds again.

Amending the Law

Ahmad Salit, former chief of the southern Cairo area, says that there are no penalties against encroachers upon state-owned properties. There are usurped lands where buildings up to 5 floors have gone up. A study is being prepared, he said, to confiscate those buildings and pay some kind of compensation to their owners. After that the buildings would be handled by the local authority would also collect the rent. This kind of action is being taken against 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Manzilawi and Muhammad al-Sayyed 'Abd al-Ra'uf whose cases are still pending in court. He added that at present there are encroachments in such areas as Qal'at al-Kabsh, Sur al-'Uyun and 'Ayn al-Sirah. When the utilities police try to remove the encroachment, they are sometimes physically attacked and shot at, as what happened in the case of al-Manzilawi. The present law should be amended so that a large fine and a penalty are prescribed for encroachments upon state-owned lands. In the area of southern Cairo alone, there have been 300 cases of encroachment. There are also many encroachments in the al-Madabigh area.

Strangely enough, the former chief of the southern Cairo area says that he has received requests from some politically responsible people asking that elimination and removal operations be postponed or warning him against going near the al-Madabigh area so as to avoid a tragedy.

Sami 'Ata Muhammad, chairman of the followup committee of southern Cairo's popular council, believes that the question of encroachments is due to negligence by housing officials in keeping an eye on state-owned land, and to the fact that those who are building on usurped lands are not ordinary people but powerful personalities who put up buildings and rent them.

Sayyed Khalil, chairman of the complaints and suggestions committee in the popular council of southern Cairo, says that the law empowers area chiefs to remove encroachments immediately. An area chief is required to prepare a program for the elimination of encroachments and to oversee the implementation of that program because he is primarily responsible. He said that encroachments should be dealt with immediately so that we may be able to eradicate this phenomenon altogether.

Recommendations and Decisions

The local council in southern Cairo has met to discuss this phenomenon and adopted several resolutions at the end of the meeting. They include the following:

1. With respect to the al-Madabigh area in old Cairo, the governorate should be advised to take urgent measures to set up an industrial city for hide tanning outside populated areas.

2. With respect to the housing buildings established on state-owned lands for several years in return for services rendered, they should be sold at current prices and considered permanent buildings that do not conflict with zoning plans. The owners of such buildings shall have priority in bidding on them.

3. With regard to the encroachments upon the popular housing complexes in 'Ayn al-Sirah and elsewhere, they should be surveyed and the tenants should be warned to remove the extensions and other means of encroachment. If there is no response by the end of the period of warning, removal should be administered or the houses should be vacated in accordance with the law.

4. The People's Assembly should make the usurpation of land legally punishable by issuing a law considering the usurpation of state-owned lands an arrogation of public money and property, hence a crime punishable by law.

5. An encroacher upon state-owned lands should be required to pay the estimated costs of the elimination of the encroachment.

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FREEDOM OF THE PRESS DEFINED AS FREEDOM FROM GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 2 Jun 80 p 5

[Article by Mumtaz Nassar: "What Does it Mean To Consider the Press an Independent Popular Power"]

[Text] It is not important that the press be prescribed in the constitution as a popular authority. What matters is for the journalist to be as independent, immune, objective and neutral as a judge. An independent, neutral, unbiased journalist who is not subject to removal or transfer is what makes the press a popular authority.

I liked what the leading journalist Mustafa Amin said in one of his "ideas" which he included in his latest book. He wrote: "To safeguard the freedom of the press, it is not enough to just call it the fourth estate, just as it is not enough to place on the door of the Liman Turrah prison a sign saying "The Egyptian University," and have the people believe that the prison has turned into a university--cells, shackles, guards, prisoners and all. Newspapers cannot be free when they are owned by the government or by the party which is in power. Nor can journalists be free when the government can hire or fire them by decree.

"Freedom of the press means that any citizen has the right to publish a newspaper even if it had one reader. It also means that it is the people who choose the writers they want to read and who can elevate those writers by reading them or relegate them to oblivion by not reading them. It does not mean that the government should impose those writers on the people, then jail them, punish them or keep them at bay at its own discretion. Freedom of the press means that the press should be the voice of the people not the government, that it should tell the ruler what the people want, not the other way round. It means that the press should throw light on the truth, on facts, and not try to conceal facts behind a screen of lies."

It is clear from the above that what matters is not merely to inscribe in the constitution that the press is an authority, but that the members of the press should be strong to give the press the weight that it should have in the life of the nation, and make it the voice which gives expression to the will of the nation and condemns what the nation does not want. To inscribe

in the constitution that the press is an authority when the word authority implies control and domination, cannot mean that the press has any such attribute, because the press is not a functionary of the state with a specific duty to perform and with powers and prerogatives guaranteed by the power of the government. Therefore, what concerns us is that the press should be free and independent, and should not be controlled by any agency of the government in any way.

Successive Egyptian constitutions have provided for the freedom of the press. Article 14 of the 1923 constitution provided that the press is free within the bounds of law, and that press censorship or the warning, suspension or proscription of newspapers is forbidden. Article 45 of the 1956 constitution says that "the freedom of the press and of printing and publishing is guaranteed in accordance with the interests of the people and within the bounds of law." Article 36 of the 1964 constitution is synonymous with Article 45 of the 1956 constitution. Article 48 of the 1971 constitution says: "The freedom of the press, printing, publishing and the means of advertisement is guaranteed, and it is forbidden to warn, suspend or close down newspapers by an administrative measure."

We recall in this regard that we have called for more than one amendment of the constitution, especially in connection with the way of electing the president, where we called for direct popular election of the president. We have also demanded that the position of the socialist prosecutor general be abolished to prevent duplication of authority, and called for a constitutional amendment that would bring about a balancing between the powers in more than one area. We have recorded all those suggestions in a memorandum which we presented to the speaker of the People's Assembly and asked him to distribute it among the members. He refused on the premise that the proposed amendment was not signed by a sufficient number of members as required by the constitution, and he filed the memo away.

We have recorded in the debates of the People's Assembly, as can be verified from the record of the 77th meeting, that we have submitted many suggestions with regard to amending the constitution and explained our position on the important aspects of amendments suggested by the majority. Accordingly, we agreed to a proposal specifying that the Islamic sharia (law) be considered as the primary source of legislation. We have also made clear our position on the amendment pertaining to the press and the Consultative Council, and expressed many reservations on that score. Yet we were not spared gentle rebuke from the eminent journalist Mustafa Mar'i. In his book THE PRESS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND RULER, he refers to us on page 68 with gentle rebuke, saying that we have agreed to the constitutional amendment pertaining to the press. He said verbatim: "God forgive the redoubtable Mumtax Nassar who agreed to the amendment as well as the report at the meeting on 19 July 1979, after he prefaced his statement with a word of thanks to the Speaker from the distinguished effort he has displayed in the report."

The fact of the matter, as can be verified from the minutes of the 77th meeting cited in the third legislative volume of 30 April 1980, is that I recorded in the minutes all my remarks and reservations about the constitutional amendment in question. As for the first meeting, which took place on 19 July 1979, there were no discussions or debate on the details of the proposed amendments. Discussion at that meeting was confined to procedure and formalities, namely, that the amendment should be proposed by the number of members required by the constitution. The details and specifics of the provisions and proposals were not debated. They were actually debated at a later date, namely, at the meeting of 30 April 1980. At that meeting, we recorded all our observations and reservations about the constitutional amendment. I cite this correction to spare the eminent Mustafa Mar'i a lot of effort since we care about his views and hold him in high esteem.

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APPLICATION OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY TO AGRICULTURE DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 9 Jun 80 p 2

[Article by Engineer Mahmud Fawzi: "Can Technology Be Introduced Into Agriculture? And Are We Serious About Increasing Agricultural Production?"]

[Text] Agricultural problems are myriad, and the need for increasing agricultural production is pressing and becoming more so as a result of the growth in population and the increase in the consumer needs of the people. The problems of agriculture are well-known and have been studied. Solutions are possible, and ongoing research comes out every day with new ideas and methods that make solutions more accessible and make the prospects of increasing production more possible and achievable. But are we serious about seeking to increase production? Is there serious, organized and planned action to introduce modern science, technology and the results of the latest studies, experiments and inventions into agriculture? Are we organized enough to accept any such possibilities and to make use of them?

The question of increasing production should receive double the attention it is receiving now, but our efforts should not be confined to drawing up plans and models without reforming the agricultural structure itself, because we cannot begin to increase production until we have reformed that system and turned it into a solid groundwork for the projected increase in production. The October war has taught us a lot. It has taught us that nothing is impossible as long as there are sound planning, solid determination, clear target and complete faith in what we are doing and what will be realized, with God's help.

So, to increase agricultural production, we have to reform the agricultural structure. The most important areas which should be immediately reformed are:

1. The system of land acquisition. The fragmentation of land ownerships has turned the tiny, scattered, and splintered acquisitions and holdings into an obstacle in the way of any real progress in the agricultural sector. They stand in the way of any sound application of mechanized farming and fly in the face of logic and reason. They also obstruct any necessary efforts to consolidate land holdings and any attempts to intensify farming and create

specialization, etc. There have been many experiments designed to improve this fragmentary system of acquisitions, either wholly or in part. The ministry of agriculture made one such experiment, namely, the consolidation of the agricultural utilization of the cotton crop since 20 years ago, following the success of the (Nawaj) experiment. But the ministry of agriculture then stood still and remained in a frozen position. It has failed to do anything else. It has not tried to consolidate the utilization of other crops in order to benefit more people, nor has it tried to go on with its attempts to consolidate agricultural utilization to the extent that would enable it to deal with the Lilliputian size of land holdings, although it could do so and although the need to do so is clear.

2. Changing the agricultural cycles in keeping with modern progress. It has been established that the present makeup of the crops does not maximize returns from the natural and human resources that are available and that are being used in agricultural production operations. The growth of the present makeup of the crops was originally designed as a means to providing enough supplies of food for those working in agriculture, who did not have enough food. The only increase in the food supplies was in vegetables and sugarcane. If the present makeup of the crops continue as it is now, we will be facing very soon problems that would be very difficult to overcome.

3. The intensification of crops. By this we mean the size of different crops in an area per year. If we plant two crops in the same feddan of land per year this means a crop intensification rate of 200 percent. The rate of crop intensification in Egypt is 180 percent although it is 300 percent in many states. The rate of intensification would increase by planting early-growth crops and co-planting closely-related crops, such as onions and garlic, with cotton. Countries like ours have been able to raise wheat three times a year and raise rice more than three times a year. The rate of crop intensification in vegetables reached 400 to 500 percent. The land is not allowed to go fallow for one day.

Besides changes in the agricultural structure, there are other matters which should have been taken up by the ministry of agriculture years ago but which were left without any serious study or consideration. They include the following:

1. The crops of the Green Revolution which began in 1944 with the Mexican wheat that was raised in Mexico (by the Rockefeller Singer mission), then moved to the Philippines where it developed a breed of rice called miracle rice. These achievements turned cereal-importing countries into cereal exporters. We introduced Mexican wheat into Egypt without first studying the strains that would be suitable for us, in terms of the color of the flour, the quality of the dough and the type of chaff that remains behind. As a result, Egyptian farmers turned away from Mexican wheat, although there are kinds that can satisfy the needs of the peasants.

2. Maximization of agricultural production by increasing land utilization. (I have proposed) to the ministry of agriculture a project that would combine cotton with wheat, providing at least one million extra feddans of wheat. Fields would be planted with wheat, then afterwards with cotton seedlings. But the ministry of agriculture was not interested in increasing the wheat produce by 1.5 million tons or in utilizing one million feddans of land to raise winter crops then plant cotton seedlings in them. Indeed, the idea of crop combination did not receive adequate attention although it would realize a greater income for the peasants and the state and would provide extra crops for exportation.

There are many early-growth crops which have been utilized by various states and which have led to a real green revolution in these states. The results of all such experiments are well-known and available and they can be tried in Egypt or used as a nucleus for raising new strains in Egypt.

3. Systematization of Irrigation. Water is the most important element in our agricultural system. If, through the systematic application of irrigation, we are able to reduce the water allowance per feddan from 8,500 cubic meters, for example, to 5,000 cubic meters, we would then be able to expand the arable area as well as lessen the (word unknown--tatbil) agricultural lands, which is the factor that threatens high-yield areas with the elevation of the water table. The innundation system of irrigation must be finally changed in the interest of the producers and agricultural production.

4. Mechanized farming. Mechanized farming is the basis of introducing modern technology into agriculture. The state of mechanized farming in Egypt requires a long practical and objective study, and our hope is great that the agricultural services company which was set up by the National Democratic Party will succeed. The company plans to apply mechanized farming in a sound manner that is not intended to reap profits but to serve the peasant, increase his income and the national income and serve the needs of food security.

5. Production Coops. The desired change in the countryside heavily depends on those coops. The president himself has urged that services coops be turned into production coops. However, the ministry of agriculture has made no effort to implement that, but left the coops exposed and vulnerable to the onslaughts of the village banks.

6. Livestock Production. Livestock production requires real efforts, for the struggle between man and animal over the land should not continue. It is a known fact that Egyptian livestock is among the lowest producers of milk and meat. If there were serious studies on raising livestock to produce animals of high quality in terms of producing milk and meat, and if mechanized farming is added, half of the fields which are now planted with alfalfa and other animal feed would be spared and used for farming while the production of meat and milk would increase.

7. Agricultural Expansion. Agricultural expansion should be established on technological bases that are completely different from the methods used in the past with regard to irrigation methods, the use of chemicals, the choice of crops and the method of farming and service. We make mistakes then repeat the same mistakes time and again. We have to know that agriculture in the future should depend entirely in scientific and technological progress.

8. The Use of Fertilizers. One of the most significant obstacles in the way of agricultural production is the shortage in chemical fertilizers. In many crops, the amount of fertilizers given to the peasants is no more than one third the quantity that has to be used. There are general complaints about this. Take corn, for example. To raise 30 to 32 ardebs of corn, a peasant needs at least 150 azutic units, but what he gets is 62 units which can produce no more than 9 ardebs. The entire world has expanded the use of necessary fertilizers, including compound--instead of simple--fertilizers.

The world is speeding ahead in agricultural production, but we are not able to move at the same pace or move with the speed and tempo required by the growth of population and the increase in the level of need. Since the president himself has taken over the role of prime minister and since the ministry of agriculture is held by an efficient and capable scholar and practical man, Dr Mahmud Dawud, our hope is great that the ministry of agriculture will begin to work seriously to take advantage of the scientific progress in the world.

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FICTITIOUS PRICE REDUCTIONS BY MINISTERS EXPOSED

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 9 Jun 80 p 1

[Article: "Imaginary Reductions in Prices; Three Charges Against Officials in Industry and Supply Ministries: 1) Forgery, 2) Insulting the People's Assembly, and 3) Deceiving the Masses"]

[Text] AL-AHRAR has exposed the most serious ruse designed to deceive the masses and mislead public opinion and the political leadership in Egypt; the ministries of industry and supply have announced fictitious price reductions to alleviate the plight of the masses.

The two ministries have issued lists that occupied full pages in the national papers over a period of three days within the past two weeks. The lists contained the prices of 183 items produced by the canned foods companies of Qaha and Edwina. The ministers of industry and supply Muhammad Zaki Taha and Ahmad Nuh proclaimed that the reductions run to as much as 40 percent, and they deposited the reduction lists with the secretariat of the People's Assembly.

AL-AHRAR has obtained the previous lists of the same items, which have been in effect in the markets until last week, to compare them with the new reduced prices. When the comparison was made, the exposure was complete. The comparison shows that the price reductions are not only fictitious, but actually represent an increase in prices. The increase in the prices of some items runs as high as 50 percent.

To carry deception a step forward, the national papers reported that some merchants and coops have refused to apply the new reduced prices under the pretext that they have not been advised of the new prices yet. The papers demanded that the merchants and coops abide by the new reduced prices.

In fact, the abidance with the new "reduced" prices will increase the suffering of the masses and further enrich the merchants who store ample quantities of these items. They will not be penalized or brought to account for selling the items at the new prices. On the contrary, they would be earning the thanks of the ministries of industry and supply.

This is the first time the government compels merchants to sell at increased prices and the first time that industrial companies deceive the masses in this fashion which would have passed unnoticed. Indeed, these companies may have even asked the government to allocate extra funds in the budget to compensate them for their losses as a result of the reduced prices!!

AL-AHRAR demands that those responsible for this serious ruse be brought to trial on three charges:

1. Forging official lists released by the ministries of industry and supply.

2. Insulting the People's Assembly by submitting fictitious statements to the Assembly members.

3. Deceiving the masses by claiming that prices have been reduced when actually they have been raised, and deceiving the political leadership by making it believe that price reductions have been instituted when in fact they have not.

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JUDICIARY MUST BE UPHELD AS INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 9 Jun 80 p 5

[Article by Mumtaz Nassar: "What Does It Mean To Consider the Judiciary an Independent and Neutral Authority?"]

[Text] Chapter Four of the constitution of 11 September 1971, deals with the judiciary. In Article 165, it says that "the judiciary is an independent authority exercised by the courts of various levels and specializations, which shall issue their verdicts in accordance with the law." Article 166 says that "the judges are independent, subject only to law in the performance of their duties. No authority shall interfere in the cases they handle or in the affairs of justice." Article 168 says that "the judges are not subject to dismissal and the law shall regulate the question of any disciplinary action against them."

The Judiciary: An Authority or a Utility?

These are the constitutional facts adopted by the constitutional legislator in our country. Before that, the status of the judiciary was a subject of debate and controversy on whether the judiciary is an authority or a utility. The issue was raised at a public meeting of the National Assembly--the 22nd meeting of the Assembly held on 2 April 1968 during the 5th ordinary session of the Assembly. The Assembly had before it then a bill on illegal profit. Based on the minutes of that meeting, a member of the Assembly called Muhammad 'Atiyyah Isma'il raised an objection about a sentence in the report prepared by the legislative committee. The sentence reads as follows: "The committee wishes to draw attention to the fact that the passage of that project has placed heavy burdens on the utility of justice." The member of the Assembly said: I object to this sentence, because the judiciary is not a "utility," but an authority--a power exactly like the executive and legislative powers. He noted that the constitution--chapter 4, Article 152--referred to the judicial authority and asked that the word "utility" be deleted from the report.

Dialogue Between the Speaker and the Member

The Speaker said in reply to the objection that "the honorable member was a member of the committee which presented the report. The member conceded in reply that he was a member indeed, but said that he is now asking the Assembly to remove the phrase because the Assembly has the right to make changes in the committee's report. The Speaker retorted that "there is no doubt that we all highly revere and esteem our judiciary, and I do not see any need for this discussion. I repeat that I meant by my remarks to make clear that the report, including the phrase which is challenged, was submitted by the legislative committee and the objector is a member of that committee." The minister of justice then rose and said the following: "In the modern constitutional system, there cannot be any authority in the state save that of the people. All else are just agencies and bodies performing their jurisdictions in the service of the people. The word "power" or "authority" was first used in France. It was then dropped in 1870 and changed to the word jurisdiction. Every agency is exercising jurisdictions but is not an authority. We mean by utility an apparatus that serves the people. There is no doubt that the utility of justice is performed by the judiciary." Assembly member Muhammad 'Atiyah Isma'il replied that the constitution provides for three authorities, including the judicial authority. The Speaker remarked that "we are not in disagreement over that."

The conclusion that can be drawn from the minutes of the National Assembly is that there are two views on the status of the judiciary and what its role should be.

Unwarranted Debate

The first view says that the judiciary is an authority. The second view says that the judiciary is a utility. That debate was absolutely unwarranted. All the Egyptian constitutions--those of 1923, 1956, 1964 and 1971--referred to the judiciary as the judicial authority. Therefore, it is clear that the reference to the judiciary as a utility is inconsistent with the constitutional provisions of our country.

Some writers have become accustomed to calling the judiciary a utility, but this kind of thinking is at odds with our traditions and cannot be endorsed by our type of socialism, because it is a socialism deriving from our life, religions and traditions that have been rooted in the hearts and consciences of the people for a long time, thereby becoming a part of the people and a constitutional reality that cannot be abridged. The idea that the judicary is a utility, like any other institution, is an imported idea advanced by researchers in the Communist countries. The idea has been largely scrapped, because it involves popular control of the judiciary which in turn would jeopardize the judiciary's immunity and independence. The Central Committee in the Soviet Union found it necessary in 1966 to caution about that and to recommend the removal of any control over the judiciary in order to fully insure that the judiciary would be fully safeguarded.

The Judiciary an Independent Authority

What seems to be clear is that most world constitutions, ours included, provide that "the judiciary is an independent authority." The point in that is that freedom is the other face of the judiciary. Freedom and the judiciary are interlaced and indivisible, because the judiciary is the legal underpinning of the concept of freedom and the natural framework for the safeguards of freedom. There can be no freedom without the supremacy of law because the safeguards of freedom are only necessary in the face of the authority of the state. The judiciary alone is capable of establishing the supremacy of law in the face of the state authority.

Since it is the role of the judiciary to insure the freedom of man, the judiciary cannot or would not be suited to perform this role unless three elements are guaranteed and endorsed by all the people and their various groups because they are the safeguards of every individual in the present and the future and whether he is a subject or a ruler, innocent or guilty. These three elements affect the members of the judiciary in their capacity as part of the people. They mean everything to the concept of justice and the the judicial system, in other words they involve this question: to be or not to be. These three major bases are the recognition of the judiciary as an authority independent of the legislative and executive authorities and the political apparatus, the insurance of the neutrality of the judiciary and the avoidance of any action that would infringe upon the judicial system's independence and entity.

Providing the Means of Neutrality

Having reviewed the meaning of the independence of the judiciary and the need to provide the judiciary with the means of neutrality, and to avoid infringing upon the independence and prestige of the members of the judiciary, it behooves us to comment on the president's speech of 14 May 1980, at the People's Assembly. In that speech, the president said that "some members of the judiciary who have expressed their opposition to the Law on Morality feel that they have performed a political act." In his address to the ministers and governors at the first meeting of the new cabinet on 19 May 1980, the president asked the minister of justice to set up a committee of values from among members of the judiciary.

Remarks About the President's Speech

In the light of our affirmation of the independence and neutrality of the judiciary, it behooves us to express our convictions with regard to the president's remarks on this subject. Apropos of the first point of view expressed by the president that rejection of the Law on Morality by members of the judiciary is a political act which a member of the judiciary should not practice, we disagree with the president's view. Article 173 of the constitution states that "the affairs of the judicial system shall be supervised by a higher council under the president of the republic. The law shall prescribe the manner in which the council shall be formed, its jurisdictions and its rules of

operation. The views of that council shall be sought on bills that regulate the affairs of the judicial system."

Since the bill on Morality provides for the establishment of new courts (Courts of Values) which shall include, in addition to career judges, other members selected by the executive authority from among public personalities, and since the bill also prescribes for the Socialist Prosecutor General powers that overlap with the jurisdictions of the Attorney General's Office, then Article 173 of the constitution requires that the opinion of the higher council of the judicial system be solicited on the matter. Accordingly, it is natural for the general syndicates which constitute the entire body of judges to express opinions on that bill which affect the work and functions of the judges. Views on that bill cannot conceivably be confined to the members of the higher council of the judiciary system, because those members are there as representatives of the syndicates of judges. With this in mind, the minister of justice, at one of his news conferences, called on the general syndicates of judges to express their views about the Law on Morality. If some members of the judiciary have rejected that law, they cannot be held accountable for doing so, and they should not be considered as having performed a political act. Therefore, we do not agree with the view expressed by the president in that regard.

As for the president's instructions to the minister of justice to set up a committee of values from among members of the judiciary, we do not see any need for such a committee at all. Such a committee has no place in the realm of the judiciary at all, for the Judicial Authority Law No 46 of 1972 has taken care of the issue and manner of bringing judges to account. This law makes the committee totally unnecessary.

Providing Safeguards First

To put things in perspective and insure the independence and neutrality of the judiciary, it behooves us to deal with the affairs of the judiciary in such a manner that would bolster its independence and provide all the safeguards that are required by the responsibility of effecting justice and applying it to all the people.

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CSO: 4802

OPPOSITION NOTIFIES PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OF FALSE PRICE REDUCTIONS

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 16 Jun 80 p 1

[Article: "The Fictitious Prices Before the People's Assembly"]

[Text] The Socialist Liberal Party has tabled an interpellation at the People's Assembly concerning the fictitious reductions in the prices of food materials which were listed by AL-AHRAR on 9 June. Liberal Party deputy Ilfat Kamil submitted the interpellation through Assembly Speaker Sufi Abu Talib to supply minister Ahmad Nuh and industry minister Taha Zaki on the subject of "the fictitious price reductions announced by the two ministries following President al-Sadat's speech of 14 May and his instructions to reduce prices."

The People's Assembly will take up this matter within days. In the meantime, supply minister Ahmad Nuh told AL-AHRAR that the previous cabinet raised food prices on 28 April, only 48 hours before the new cabinet came into office, but that he decided against announcing or applying the price increases. He said that the reduction in prices, which was made in accordance with the instructions of President al-Sadat, is based on prices as increased by the previous cabinet but not announced by the new cabinet when it assumed office. It thus appeared to the consumers that the prices were actually increased not decreased.

As an example, the minister cited the case of a can of food which was selling at 20 piasters. The previous cabinet, he said, increased the price to 32 piasters on 28 April, but that new price was not disclosed by the present cabinet which assumed office soon after the price hikes, nor was it applied. Instead, the can continued to sell for 20 piasters until the new cabinet formally reduced its official price from 32 piasters to 25. To the unknowing consumer, it appeared that the price has gone up by 5 piasters when actually it has gone down by 7 piasters.

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CSO: 4802

OPPOSITION BARRED FROM CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 16 Jun 80 p 1

[Article: "The Opposition Is Barred From Joining the Consultative Council; Elections Law Should Be Amended To Give Chance to the View of Others"]

[Text] The Socialist Liberal Party has rejected the Consultative Council bill which is now before the People's Assembly, affirming that the bill in its present format deprives the opposition from gaining access to the Consultative Council, and places obstacles which would deny the view of others the opportunity to express itself--an abridgement of the democratic system in Egypt.

At an emergency meeting of the party's general secretariat, chaired by Mustafa Kamil Murad last Saturday, the party demanded that several provisions of the bill be amended, primarily Article 13 which states that "members of the Consultative Council shall be elected on the strength of the party tickets which have received an absolute majority of all the votes," and that "in all circumstances, parties which do not receive at least 5 percent of the total votes cast throughout the republic shall not be represented in the council."

The Liberal Party objects to this article on two counts:

1. The stipulation that a party should receive an absolute majority of the total votes is contrary to the principle of proportional representation. Thus, in a district of 100,000 voters and 10 seats in the council, a party which receives 60,000 votes would win 6 seats, while a party which wins 40,000 votes would win the other 4 seats. This is the principle of proportional representation which would translate the real weight of the various political parties. Conversely, the stipulation that a party should win absolute majority, such as provided for in the proposed bill, means that a party would win no seats unless its ticket received more than half the votes in the district. This is a novelty which has been shunned by any state that applies the principle of election by party ticket and which would undermine this system which has become an established norm in democratic countries.

The Liberal Party emphasized that this novelty which has been devised by the government's party and incorporated in its bill will elicit the laughter of the democratic world and turn election by party ticket to election by district with the aim of enabling the National Democratic Party--with all its

capabilities and electoral tactics--to take over the entire Consultative Council.

2. The Liberal Party emphasized that the requirement pertaining to a minimum of 5 percent of the total national vote is one which is applicable in those states in which the party system has become fully rooted and established. There is no objection to that provision in principle, but in a country like Egypt where the party system experiment is still nascent this provision constitutes a major obstacle which would bar the opposition from the Consultative Council. Given its modest capabilities, an opposition party would be denied entry into the council, according to this provision, even if it were successful in some governorates. That is to say that an opposition party may win in some governorates but still fail to capture a single seat in the Consultative Council because it may not have won 5 percent of the total national vote.

The Liberal Party also objected to Article 3 of the bill which states that "each governorate shall be considered a single electoral district." The party's general secreatariat emphasized that this article reduces the chances of success as far as the opposition parties are concerned. It said that the bill should have maintained the initial plan published in the national newspapers which divided the large governorates into more than one electoral district. Dividing Cairo into 4 districts would provide the opposition with an opportunity to win one or more districts, but it seems that there is a fear of giving an opposition party the chance to win even a single seat in the Consultative Council.

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CSO: 4802

PARTIES, UNIONS DECRY PLAN TO DISSOLVE PRESS SYNDICATE

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 16 Jun 80 p 3

[Article: "Trade Unions and Parties Continue to Debate the Question of the Liquidation of the Press Syndicate"]

> [Text] Trade unions and political parties in Egypt continue to debate the inclination to liquidate the press syndicate and re-register journalists following the formation of a higher press council that would arrogate to itself the rights and prerogatives of the syndicate, primarily the right to register and discipline journalists. This week, there were three statements on the subject by the press syndicate itself, the bar association and the Grouping party. Using more than one conclusive legal argument, the three statements stressed that the tendency to dissolve the press syndicate is in fact an assault on the constitution and international agreements to which Egypt was a party. The statements pointed out that the move against the press syndicate may be a prelude to a general onslaught on the entire unionist movement. They also underscored the solidarity among the various trade unions and underlined the apprehension which political parties of all inclinations feel with regard to the prospect of abridging the freedom of the press in Egypt.

The Press Syndicate: Should We Turn Lawyers Into a Fifth Estate?

Ihsan 'Abd al-Maqsud writes:

The dean of the press syndicate Kamil Zuhayri has issued a statement in the name of the syndicate in which he said that calling the press an authority or an estate is merely a figure of speech, such as calling lawyers standing judges. It would be unreasonable to turn the law profession into a fifth estate and make lawyers into civil servants on the basis of the expression that judges sit and lawyers stand. Legal conclusions cannot be derived from verbal similies and figures of speech.

Kamil Zuhayri said "We defend the right of the press syndicate to continue as a professional organization which regulates and organizes the profession of journalism and which is based on the 1971 constitution and all the laws

pertaining to the press which were issued in 1941, 1955 and 1970. Our position is supported by pronouncements made by administrative courts and by the unanimous opinion of jurists. It is also backed and endorsed by the universal declaration of human rights.

"We caution against several legal errors, he said, if the syndicate is turned into a club. Primary among these would be a constitutional error, a disregard for Article 56 of the present constitution and a violation of the accepted legal definition of a journalist, namely, that a journalist is not a civil servant and not a worker who is subject to an employment contract."

Kamil Zuhayri said that Egypt follows the system of one union per profession, and that in view of the multiparty system, the trade union would necessarily include members of different persuasions. He warned against the damages which would befall journalists registered in the present press record, including material damages that would involve salaries, severance pay, annual leave, sick leave and advance notice before the termination of a contract. He said that these are material rights which journalists have acquired and won over a period of 40 years and which have been legally adopted.

Zuhayri went on to say that revision of the register would be unconstitutional because it would infringe upon the journalist's right to practice his profession, the principle that citizens are equal before the law and the acquired rights of the registered journalists. The register was revised only once since 1941. That was in 1955 when newspapers owners quit the syndicate.

Zuhayri emphasized that the syndicate is a juristic body within the public law, adding that there are scores of pronouncements made by administrative justice all attesting to the right of trade unions to register and discipline their members. Fortunately, the 1971 constitution is clear in guaranteeing the right to the formation of unions, and the Higher Constitutional Court and the administrative courts will deter any encroachment on the constitution, the law or the rights of the syndicate members.

Zuhayri said that there is nothing in the world that resembles the Higher Press Council. The legislators cannot give that council the prerogative of disciplining journalists, because the accountability of journalists is based on the penal code. The general attorney's office can bring suit against any Egyptian journalist abroad whom it considers to be guilty, in accordance with Article 80 of the penal code. The syndicate, or any other body, cannot do anything in this case until a final criminal verdict has been issued. By saying this, Zuhayri added, we are not defending the mistakes but merely defending the reputation of the supremacy of law, the reputation of the syndicate and the reputation of the regime.

The Bar Association: The New Legislation Designed to Organize the Press Infringes Upon Freedom and Democracy

Layla 'Abd al-Salam writes:

The bar association has issued a statement decrying the liquidation of the press syndicate and the revision of the press register. In its statement, the bar association said:

"Our people--with the bar association in the forefront--are following with great interest and deep concern what is being said these days about turning the press syndicate into a club and revising the press register. This trend, which is intended to be codified soon into a new legislation to regulate and re-organize the press, would do away with the entity of the sisterly trade union, the press syndicate, and deprive it of the rights and prerogatives guaranteed by the constitution and by current laws. This would be firstly and foremostly an infringement upon the cause of freedom and democracy which our people believe to be their means to a life of stability, progress and prosperity.

"The bar association, in keeping with its national mission and its true commitment to the cause of defending right, the constitution and the law, sees in this trend a clear deviation from the constitution and a violation of international covenants related to human rights and the freedom of trade unionism, for the following reasons:

"One: Article 56 of the 1971 constitution states that "the establishment of trade unions and federations on a democratic basis is a right guaranteed by law." Therefore, stripping the press syndicate of its character as a trade union and converting it into a mere social club would deprive the journalists of their constitutional right to establish a trade union of their own. On the other hand, the interference of the state in the affairs of the press syndicate in a bid to re-arrange its status, contrary to the semi-consensus decision of its members, involves a violation of International Agreement No 87 pertaining to the freedom of establishing trade unions and the need to protect such associations, which obligate public authorities to desist from any interference which would restrict the establishment of trade unions or impede the exercise of that right.

"Two: The call for turning the press into a fourth estate and for passing the ownership of national papers to the Consultative Council would rob the profession of journalism of its freedom and independence, turn journalists into employees and strip the press of the quality of being a free profession. The mission of the press, as a free profession, is inconsistent with the connotation of authority or estate, because an authority first of all assumes that the exerciser of that authority has the ability to wield power and say yes or no and subsequently the power to coerce others. This is something that has never been a characteristic of the press which has nothing but the power of the word.

"Three: To empower the Higher Press Council to run the affairs of the press and purge the press register of those journalists who are considered to be undesirable would be a violation of a basic human right as prescribed in Article 23.4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights: "Every person has the right to establish and join a union in protection of his interest." One of the first manifestations of trade unionism is that the trade union should be in full charge of its own register and have the first and final

say in all the affairs of its members. To strip a trade union of that right would undercut its entity and turn it into a hollow structure as well as deprive it of a prerogative guaranteed by the constitution. Article 56 of the constitution clearly says that the trade union is "responsible for makings its members account for their conduct in carrying out their activities, in accordance with certain codes of ethics, and for defending the rights and freedoms legally granted to its members." To consign this prerogative to the Higher Press Council would be a clear deviation from the constitution.

"Four: To consign tutelage over the press and journalists to a higher press council formed by a presidential decree runs against the goals of the recent constitutional amendments which included the return to a multi-party system that allows each party to have its own press. It follows logically that some of the journalists will be working for such party papers, and so it cannot be said then that those journalists should be deprived of their right to join a union that looks after their affairs.

"Five: The action that is being planned against the press syndicate, if it were to take place, would constitute a serious precedent that would not involve just the journalists who are being singled out for such measures but would jeopardize all those engaged in the profession of journalism. Indeed, its danger will spread out to include other free professions, thereby endangering the future of the entire trade unionist movement which is one of the pillars of democracy."

"In view of all this, the bar association appeals to all the constitutional institutions in the Egyptian Arab Republic to give this matter the attention it deserves. We also appeal to everyone to band together in order to preserve the entity of the press syndicate and all its rights which are guaranteed by the constitution and law.

"We do this in dedication to a democracy which we are seeking and a freedom that we would like to see fully established over all the Arab lands. God is the source of truth and the guide that shows us the way."

NPUG: Abolition of Syndicate's A Balatant Aggression Against the Press and the Rights of Journalists

Jamal 'Abd al-Sami' writes:

The NPUG said in a statement that the abolition of the press syndicate would contravene International Agreement No 87 pertaining to the freedom of establishing trade unions and the protection of trade unionism, which Egypt has signed. One of its provisions states that "workers and employers indiscriminately have the right to establish or join whatever unions they desire without prior permission and without being subject except to the rules and regulations of those associations. The public authorities shall refrain from any interference that would restrict this right or impede its legitimate application. The associations of workers employers shall not be subject to dissolution or suspension and shall be protected by the safeguards provided for in this agreement."

The new legislation collides with one of the most time-honored trade unions in Egypt which has played a pioneering role in the establishment of 18 Arab syndicates, the Federation of Arab Journalists, the Federation of African Journalists and the International Journalists Federation.

The abolition of the press syndicate and its conversion into a club represent a blatant aggression against the profession of journalism and the material and moral rights of journalists.

The statement of the general secretariat of the NPUG noted that the threat of such measures is not confined to the press and journalists--although this in itself is very serious--but would extend sooner or later to the entire trade unionist movement. Infringement upon any unionist organization is an infringement upon the basic rights of the working citizen and his right to resort to a democratic association to defend his rights.

While the government has singled out the press syndicate, it will not hesitate, if its onslaught were to put an end to the edifice represented by the syndicate of Egyptian journalists, to repeat its attacks on other trade unions and associations in different ways and by various other means.

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CSO: 4802

LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN MINISTRY PARTLY TO BLAME FOR BAD CROP

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 23 Jun 80 p 2

[Article by Mahmud Fawzi: "Who's Responsible? Two Million Ardeb Shortfall in This Year's Wheat Crop. Finger of Accusation Points to the 'Heat' and 'Thirst'"]

[Text] It was expected and hoped that the average yield of wheat per feddan this year would be higher than last year's average. But the actual crop indicates that this year's average yield per feddan was 2 ardebs less than last year's. To find out the facts about this year's wheat crop, AL-AHRAR toured several governorates and villages so that its findings would reflect the factual situation clearly, based on an on-site inspection of production centers.

Lack of Confidence

For an example, at the village of al-Bishah in the district of Manuf, AL-AHRAR met with farmer 'Abd al-Rahman 'Ashshub. He said that this year his one and a half feddans of land produced 12 ardebs of wheat, but that last year they produced 16 ardebs.

Farmer Hamed Wahbah said that last year and this year, he planted wheat in kerats [kerat equivalent to 1/24 feddan]. Last year, the area he planted yielded 2.5 ardebts of wheat, while this year it produced only 2 ardebs. That amounts to a decrease of 2 ardebs per feddan than last year. We asked him where does he get his seedlings from, and he answered that he does not trust government wheat seelings and that for the past 20 years he has been using the wheat of the previous year's crop as seeds. He also said that fertilizers are insufficient and that the impact of heat on the wheat stalks during the period when the kernels are forming is the cause of the decrease. The heat stroke during the period of kernel formation tends to reduce the size of the wheat kernel.

Farmer Ramadan 'Abd al-Maqsud adds that he raises 6 kerats of wheat, but that this year's crop was 2 ardebts lower than last year's. Last year, his crop was 2.5 ardebs against 2 ardebs this year.

We saw farmer Muhammad 'Abd al-'Aziz Hasab operating a winnowing machine which he had bought for 70 pounds 10 years ago. He says that the machine now costs 250 pounds and that it can handle 3 feddans per day. For his wage, he gets a kilah per ardeb. He said that the machine requires 4 persons to operate and that it brings in an income equivalent to 10 kilahs of wheat per day.

The Heat Wave

At 'Izbat Imam, farmer hajj 'Abd al-Halim said that he plants Mexican wheat in an area of one and a half feddans each year. His crop last year, he said, was 3 ardebs per feddan more than this year's crop. According to him, the reason is that the heat wave in April and May hurt the wheat crop during the formation stage and caused the grain of wheat to be smaller and lighter.

Farmer 'Abd al-'Ati 'Afifi raises 15 kerats of wheat in Hawd 'Afifi each year. This year he cropped 4 ardebs, while the same area yielded 5 ardebs last year. He said that he has been using Indian wheat seeds for 20 years. The government wheat, he said, is "no good" because the color of the flour is dark and the chaff is shunned by the cattle. He does not use government wheat although the coop in the village bank said that it will harass anyone who does not receive government wheat for seeds.

In the village of Tilwatah in the district of al-Bajur, farmer Mahmud Mustafa Higaz said that the heat wave during the period of kernel formation has reduced the yield per feddan from 12 ardebs last year to 8 ardebs this year. He is supported in that by farmer 'Abd al-'Azim 'Afifi al-Fiqi who said that the average yield per feddan in his land of 15 kerats has decreased than last year's average by 2 ardebs.

The Yield Is Less

At the village of Qalta al-Sughra, we met farmer 'Atiyyah Kamel 'Atiyyah as he was threshing the remainder of his wheat crop. He said that he raises wheat in an area of 15 kerats in Hawd al-Bustan and that this year's yield was 3 ardebs less than last year's. The same thing was said by farmer Jaber Khattab of Qalta al-Kubra. He pointed out that he planted wheat in an area of one feddan this year and that his crop was 9 ardebs versus 12 ardebs last year.

Farmer Anis 'Abd al-Sayyed adds that this year he planted 6 kerats of wheat which produced 2.5 ardebs, whereas last year he planted 15 kerats of wheat which yielded 8 ardebs.

'Abd al-Latif Wahdan, a farmer in the village of Rahim who raises 4 feddans of wheat, said that this year's crop was less by 2 ardebs on average than last year's because of the heat wave in April and May and thirst.

In the village of al-Shawashinah, Abshway district, farmer Muhammad Jabali who raises 2 feddans of wheat said that this year's crop in his land was

one ardeb less than last year's. Farmer Isma'il Muhammad Ibrahim of Tubash al-Khadra' in the Abshway district adds that the heat and thirst were responsible for lowering the average yield of his crop per feddan by 5 ardebs this year, as compared to last year. He plants 4 feddans of wheat.

In al-Qalyubiyah, farmer Mustafa Ahmad 'Abdullah al-Nahhal of Kafr Taha says that he raises Mexican wheat in an area of 2 feddans. Last year, his average yield was 13 ardebs per feddan, while this year the average was 11 ardebs due to the heat wave in April and May.

What Is Required of the Officials in Charge

All those meetings took place in the various villages and fields and they reflect the facts which AL-AHRAR wishes to submit to the competent authorities so that there would be no excuse in not maintaining supply levels for this year and the first half of next year.

Increasing agricultural production requires first of all and by necessity that the farmers have confidence in the ministry of agriculture and in its instructions and directives. The loss of confidence in the ministry has gone to the extent that some farmers have insisted on using seeds from their own produce of the previous year for 20 years without interruption. They have refused to receive government wheat, because they do not trust the ministry of agriculture, this is a very serious matter and should be avoided. The ministry of agriculture should seek to give advice and guidance to the peasants and farmers in a more convincing and acceptable manner. Pressure and intimidation will lead to no result.

The minister of agriculture, who is daily seeking to raise the level of efficiency in his ministry, will not allow matters to continue to run in that fashion. And now that the faithful President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat has taken over the responsibility of domestic action, the tactics used with the farmers should be radically changed. The situation should be faced truthfully and realistically so that we may be able to achieve the progress that is required in terms of increasing production to meet the requirements of food security.

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OPPOSITION FIGURE URGES ANTI-ISRAEL MEASURES

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 23 Jun 80 p 5

[Article by Mumtaz Nassar: "Freezing Relations with Israel Has Become a National and Nationalist Duty"]

[Text] It is clear from repeated statements recently made by Israeli officials during the autonomy talks between Egypt and Israel that Israel, as news agencies unanimously report, does not intend to give the Palestinians full autonomy, as agreed upon in the Camp David accords, and that it plans to perpetuate its sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a liberated area that belongs to it. It is clear that Israeli officials--hawks and doves alike--want more settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and want to strengthen the present settlements. It is also clear that Israeli officials consider a unified Jerusalem to be the eternal capital of Israel. The Isreali Knesset's measure in that regard was adopted with near unanimity. In view of all these clear positions by Israel, it behooves Egypt to adopt a position that measures up to its responsibility on that issue.

There is no doubt that to simply adopt a position of protesting the denouncing the Israeli actions wouldnot do, and would fall short of a typical position in accord with Egypt's history and its responsibility in the Arab world. Indeed, international law permits Egypt to refrain from fulfilling its commitments with regard to the normalization of relations and so forth, as prescribed in the Egyptian-Israeli treaty. Egypt is also entitled to freeze all relations that have been instituted between the two contracting parties. If America, which is a partner in the treaty, is not able, because of the elections and electoral circumstances, to twist Israel's arms, Egypt should notify Israel that, since it has impaired the peace initiative and process, it has become necessary for Egypt to review its accounts with Israel in the light of the new situation and freeze all its relations with Israel. Thus, Israel may realize that it has gone astray and disturbed peace and that it is ultimately the loser.

Were the state to take these measures, it would be reviving the hope of reestablishing pan-Arab solidarity which has been torn asunder thereby tempting Israel to take such intransigent attitudes. Once Israel realizes that by its behavior it has unified public opinion in Egypt about the need to isolate and deny Israel, it will repent and regain its senses.

Israel has not just committed crimes against the Palestinian people as a whole, but Jewish militants and diehards have gone to excess in committing individual crimes, such as the crimes committed in the past few days against the West Bank mayors which have aroused the condemnation of international organizations. We have raised this issue in an interpellation submitted at the People's Assembly and urged that Egypt should not content itself with just condemning the blatant aggression committed against the Palestinian people, but should go beyond that and freeze relations with Israel. Thus, Egypt may initiate the process of reviving pan-Arab solidarity as it existed during the glorious 1973 war.

Accordingly, I appeal to the ruling National Democratic Party, which is the majority party, to call on its government to freeze relations with Israel. Egypt as a whole should take this position toward a fanatical and arrogant state steeped in racism. One cannot imagine that such a state can have normal relations with other states, for it is an aberration which should be tightly contained. This should become a national and nationalist goal for every Egyptian, so that Israel may be denied the opportunity of growing and expanding at the expense of the Arab states.

Since the method which we have used with Israel has done nothing but create Arab disunity and feed Israel's arrogance and conceit, it is time to review all our accounts with that state which was planted in the body of the Arab nation to disrupt its movement and obstruct its progress. It has also become necessary to put things in perspective and to strive to re-establish pan-Arab solidarity. If Egyptians unite behind this principle, Israel's arrogance would disappear because it cannot possibly continue in the manner which we detect today in the behavior of the Israeli officials. This would be the method which Israel understands quite well and would work hard to avoid it. To depend on the prospect of American pressure on Israel would lead to no positive results because of the influence of American Jews on the American government and because those American Jews tend to be loyal to Israel and to promote the realization of Israeli interests in a manner that would please and satisfy Israel.

In closing, I appeal to all Egyptians to rally together in solidarity and to consider this a national and nationalist duty. "God, do not weaken our hearts after having guided us and grant us your mercy, for you are the giver of everything." [Koranic verse]

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CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

REJECTION OF NEW PARTY--The Political Parties Committee headed by Sayyid Zaki has objected to an application filed by lawyer Ahmad Kamil Qutub to form a party under the name of the Global Progressive Party. Qutub filed the application as a representative of the founders of the proposed party. Among the reasons for its rejection, the committee cited the argument that the party is based on fantasy and that it does not offer practical solutions for the problems of the Egyptian society. The committee said that the theory of "globalism" which underlines the party's belief in a new international economy, a new international defensive force and the abolition of borders among states is an illusory theory. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 19 May 80 p 1] 9254

FAILURE OF ANTI-ILLITERACY CAMPAIGN--Dr Subhi 'Abd al-Hakim, secretary of youth in the National Democratic Party, has stated that the party leadership has been talking for a year now about a plan to launch a national campaign to eradicate illiteracy, but that the party has done nothing thus far, although the year 1980 was dubbed as the year of wiping out illiteracy. Speaking at a meeting of the National Anti-Illiteracy Committee, the secretary of youth in the National Democratic Party said that the plans of the ministry of education to absorb those who are in the age of compulsory education have failed, and that the Higher Council for Adult Education has done nothing thus far. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 26 May 80 p 1] 9254

SALE OF COMPANY SUSPENDED--The minister of industry, Taha Zaki, has suspended contract procedures involving the sale of "Ideal" company to the (Thompson) company of France. The Central Accounting Bureau and the General Union of Engineering Industries had earlier recommended in a report that the sale be stopped. The matter was then referred to the industry committee in the People's Assembly. The minister of industry, meanwhile, has set up a committee to review the sale agreement, examine the advantage and feasibility of the sale, and discuss the objections. He gave the committee one month to complete its work and report to him. The minister will make his final decision on the French company's plan in the light of that report. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 2 Jun 80 p 1] 9254

OPEN DOOR POLICY CRITICIZED--Engineer 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman has criticized the economic open door policy. Speaking at a meeting of the development committee of the National Democratic Party, he said that the open door policy was not intended to exploit the Egyptian people. He demanded that the role of foreign and Arab investors be confined to productive projects and that consumer projects be left exclusively to local investors. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 9 Jun 80 p 1] 9254

CSO: 4802

NEW CIA APPROACH TO CONTROL ISLAMIC WORLD OUTLINED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Jul 80 pp 24, 25

[Article by Sami Sayyid: "The New Role of American Intelligence in the Islamic World; Is the United States Playing a Machiavellian Game to Undermine the Islamic Movement?"]

[Text] When the CIA was awakened by the collapse of the most classical dictatorial regime in the world--the shah's regime--it hurried back to its listening devices, satellites, monitoring stations and computers to find out what went wrong and why all those formidable machines had failed to predict the shock of the Iranian revolution. The CIA could get no answers from those machines. "On the contrary, the machines affirmed that Iran was an oasis of stability in the Middle East and a safe place for CIA operations in the Islamic world. Where was the error then? The error lies in the fact that the life of a Moslem is shaped and galvanized by certain basic dimensions and concepts and that those dimensions and concepts cannot be detected by a satellite, fed into a computer or picked up by listening devices.

There are two basic dimensions which shape the life of a Moslem and which are not understood by those who are controlled by materialism and are abysmally caught in its orbit. The first dimension is the concept of martyrdom, which is clearly evident in a hadith of the Prophet (God bless him and grant him salvation) that stands as a supreme example of revolutionism and prescience: "And you shall be ruled by princes who, if you obeyed them, will mislead you, and if you disobeyed them will kill you. They said: And what should we do, O Prophet of God? He said: Be like the followers of Jesus. They were sawed down and carried on wood. By God, he who holds the soul of Muhammad in his hand would do better to die in the obedience of God than to lead a life of sin."

The second dimension is not too different from the first. It is the concept which places a low premium on life--the concept that life is cheap, that it is only a commodity which God has bought from the faithful. ("God has bought from the faithful their selves and properties in return for paradise.")

The CIA has failed to comprehend those dimensions because it has failed to make a distinction between its two main enemies: the Soviets and the Moslems. While the CIA can gain knowledge and information about the Russians through the use of spy machines, satellites and listening devices, all such equipment and devices are useless when it comes to finding out anything about the Moslems. In the face of this perplexing enemy--the Moslems--the CIA had to look for a new role or approach which would enable it to deal with this enemy, fathom him up and find out how best to strike at him so that the tragedy of Iran does not repeat itself in another part of the Islamic world.

The CIA's search for a new role in the Islamic world is confirmed by the bill which President Carter recently submitted to the Congress. The bill is designed to amend the 1974 law pertaining to the central intelligence machinery, whereby the CIA will be given a free hand in foreign operations, without prior legislative oversight, and whereby the number of persons eligible to have access to secret files about intelligence operations and activities abroad would be reduced as much as possible. This is despite the fact that President Carter himself had focused his 1976 campaign on the illegality of CIA activities and the need to place the CIA under political control and oversight, that is to say that special Congressional committees should have prior notification about all operations planned by that suspicious American apparatus. The CIA's search for a new role against the Islamic world is also confirmed by the controversy now going on in Washington about the CIA's return to its old devious and mysterious operations.

Enlightened Approach and Outlook

Given the need to have an enlightened and informed outlook toward the future, we believe that the new role which will be played by the CIA will be a three-dimensional one: educational, diplomatic and informational.

With respect to the first dimension, the educational dimension, it can be basically summed up in the fact that the CIA finds it necessary to study Islamic Societies [or Brotherhoods] and other Islamic groups and organizations from within. It has to do so after it has been established that electronic devices, no matter how sophisticated, cannot probe or fathom these societies and other groups. It is, therefore, necessary to get closer to these groups, and even come into contact with them if possible. This goal can be attained by the following means:

a) The commission of local and governmental research centers and public opinion pollsters in the various Islamic countries to conduct research and studies about the Jama'at and others. The ostensible aim of such studies would be to collect scientific and scholarly facts and information, but the hidden aim is to furnish thorough and complete information and data about those groups.

b) The commission of American universities in Islamic countries to conduct studies and research about the Islamic groups, the Moslems in general, especially since most of the students of those universities are local Moslem

students. (I have heard that the junior class at the college of economics and political science at the American University of Cairo has been assigned to do a study on the Moslem Brotherhood). The most serious aspect of this educational dimension--about which Moslems should be very careful--is the possibility that a number of foreigners would convert to Islam in order to infiltrate the Jama'at, without having embraced Islam out of real belief.

c) Intensification of research work and studies conducted by foreigners, Americans especially, about the Islamic Societies. AL-'ARABI magazine [of Kuwait] has reported that CIA agent Richard Mitchell has prepared a comprehensive survey of all the Islamic movements and societies which no Moslem has ever done before. In addition to that, TIME magazine has published a detailed survey of all the Islamic movements, including clandestine movements, in a special cover story on Islam.

The Machiavellian Game

An observer of the situation recognizes that the CIA is thinking of returning to the Machiavellian game through an Islamic route. The game is based on the formula which the CIA has adopted in its dealings with the ruling regimes of the Islamic world, and which the CIA has become even more convinced of after the Iranian setback. Put simply, the formula can be summed up as follows: Sacrifice a friend to preempt a future and prospective enemy. The new thing about the Machiavellian game this time is that the CIA intends to play it in an Islamic fashion. Fleshed out, the rules of the game are that the United States, in its dealings with the ruling regimes in the Islamic world, is chiefly interested in the continuation of the regime which carries out its policies regardless of the person who heads that regime.

In the Iranian experience, the CIA failed to comprehend that the Moslem masses there could not accept any alternative short of the overthrow of the shah. When the CIA got the message, it was already too late. To make sure that the tragedy would not repeat itself, and that pro-American leaderships in the Islamic world are not overthrown--that is, that regimes that carry out the policies of the United States are not toppled--the United States has begun to make the necessary preparations to get rid of any ruler--no matter how friendly--who has reached the point of no return with his people. By so doing, the CIA would be preempting events and changing persons without changing the regimes, of course. This way it would be acting ahead of forces that would remove both the person and the regime, to the detriment of the United States. Here we get a clear understanding of the notion of sacrificing a friend to preempt a prospective enemy.

The CIA had applied this theory on several occasions through a series of military coups in the region. The new element in the game in the 1980's is that the CIA will use an Islamic front this time. The United States is fully aware that the overriding wave and sweeping current in the Islamic world are the Islamic wave and current, and that the United States must bend with the current, even if only in appearance. Accordingly, there is great likelihood that the United States will bring to power Islamic regimes in the Islamic

world which would act as a front to enable the United States to defuse the Islamic zeal, which is now firing the masses that thirst for Islamic rule, and contain the masses, while providing them with nothing but slogans and imaginary institutions. To add a finishing touch to this game, it is possible that the CIA will recommend the establishment of nominal Islamic Societies in order to use them in exploiting the Islamic revival that is sweeping the Islamic world. The CIA would not hesitate to lavish funds on such groups. At the same time, the United States would attempt to smear the real societies which truly express the will of the masses of the Islamic nation, so as to distort and ruin the image of these societies among Moslems. Attempts in that regard would reach the point of even accusing members of these societies of dealing with the CIA itself. The CIA has no compunction about incriminating itself if that would contribute to bringing about its desired goals.

The final dimension is the informational one. The CIA believes in the idea of keeping up a constant "buzzing" in the ears. Therefore, Carter has recently agreed to a plan to expand and increase broadcasts beamed to the Islamic world in Farsi and 7 other languages which comprise most of the languages spoken in the Moslem world. In addition to that, the American government is seeking to buy air time from the radio stations of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf states, to enable it to beam broadcasts to the more than 50 million Moslems in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the American government has agreed to spend $2 million to boost and improve the programs of Radio Liberty that are beamed to Soviet Moslems. You will realize the significance of expanding American broadcasts to the Islamic world when you know that such a step is the result of efforts by Paul Henze, a National Security Council adviser and former CIA chief of station in Turkey.

Of course, American propaganda has primed itself to disseminate lies and fallacies via such broadcasts. This is confirmed by Phillip Agee, the agent who turned against the CIA and who is considered by the agency to be its No 1 enemy. He had said that the CIA had an agreement with news agencies to put out certain news stories concocted by the CIA in order to create a certain impression or impact in the world or to avoid an unfavorable impact or development.

And yet, no matter how hard they play their game and how much planning and intrigue they engage in, the dimension of faith which welds us together and the Islamic mold which has shaped us are sure to thwart their games and machinations. Our Islamic personality will continue to tower and ride high, no matter how hard they try to melt it down.

O, honorable Prophet. How we wish you were with us now to witness the reawakening of your nation--an awakening that will shake the oppressor, humiliate the infidel, bring forth the springs of faith on earth and plant the spikes of creation. We are waiting.

9254
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CALL FOR REVOCATION, NOT SUSPENSION, OF NORMALIZATION

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Jul 80 pp 4-7

[Editorial by 'Umar al-Talmasani: "Suspending the Negotiations Is Not Enough, They Should Be Cancelled; There Is Only One Jerusalem in the Whole World"]

[Text] We are committed to the elimination of all the visible and hidden manifestations of normalization. Suspension is not enough. Cancellation is a must.

We are among those who believe that Israel does not want peace, not even a separate peace, unless this would bring it closer to the realization of its aspirations and designs. We ask God that those aspirations not be fulfilled, because they are not content with the goal of establishing greater Israel from al-Madinah al-Munawwarah in the south to the end of Lebanon in the north, and from the end of Iraq in the east to the end of Morocco in the west, but extend to the subjugation of Asia and Africa, if not the whole world. This is Israel and those are the Israelis, sons of the old and pre-old testament and the new and yet-to-come testament. This is their nature and those are their designs. But God is watching them and He is powerful enough to deal with them.

In accordance with this concept, we have opposed any agreement with those people who do not feel answerable to God Almighty and who have come to worship the dirham and the dinar rather than God.

Strangely enough, all the foreign correspondents, when they talk to us, do not ask us about our opposition to signing a treaty with Israel, but couch their questions in a mischievous manner which implies a clear accusation. Thus they ask: Why do you reject peace with Israel--as if Moslems hate peace. No Moslem hates peace. Indeed, this is quite contrary to his character and religion. God Almighty has ordered Moslems to rid themselves completely of the sentiment of hatred. A Moslem, therefore, does not hate a person but may hate that person's actions and behavior. As for the Moslem's attitude toward the usurpation of rights, if those rights were personal rights, he would handle the matter in a personal manner. But if the usurped rights relate to his creed and religion, he will then have to endeavor to regain those rights whatever the cost may be--even if that should cost him his life.

One Jerusalem

With this in mind, we have rejected and still reject the treaty with Israel, as long as it maintains its arrogance and claims and continues to hold the entire land of Palestine, including Jerusalem--or what they call east and West Jerusalem, when there is in the whole world only one complete Jerusalem with borders that have been known and determined since thousands of years. In our rejection, we are not coming up with a new notion which cannot be corroborated. Our rejection is corroborated by Israel itself, the United States and the Egyptian negotiator whose many and recurrent statements have been hounding Israel for its violation of even what it had committed itself to do and what it had signed.

Israel has been preventing the mayors of Palestinian cities and towns even from just protesting and submitting their protests to the quarters which would have to look into them--although we would not want for the people of Palestine to content themselves with mere protest, but urge them to mount a sweeping revolution even if that led to the death of all Palestinians. Protest will be of no use to them, exactly as staggering and writhing are of no use to a bird after he had just been slaughtered. This is our view.

Even when Sol Linowitz, President Carter's envoy to the Middle East and himself a Jew, presented suggestions on the settlements in the occupied territories, Israel defiantly and arrogantly rejected them, as if it gave no importance to President Carter's envoy. In fact, Menachem Begin emphasized that his government will not stop the building of settlements in the occupied Arab territories and that Israel believes in the right of Jews to settle anywhere in those territories, including Hebron (AL-AHRAM, Friday, 28 March, 1980). In this fantastic fashion, Israel's temerity has reached the point where it does not pursue the building of settlements in silence and does not desist from claiming what does not belong to it and where it officially and loudly declares that it will not stop building settlements. Furthermore, it does not stop at falsifying history by stating that it has a right to settle any part of the occupied territories, including Hebron, or rejecting the proposals of its protector and feeder, the United States, but goes on building settlements with total disregard for the feelings of Moslems throughout the world. It is not Israel's fault but that of the rulers of Moslem in all parts of the world who have given and still are giving Israel the opportunity to disdain and belittle all Moslems because of their disunity and dispersion.

Menachem Defies Carter

Even that has not satisfied Begin's conceit--or it could be that Begin's conceit cannot be satisfied for some other reason which I cannot prove. Have not you heard that Menachem Begin has informed the president of the United States that, at the forthcoming Washington talks, he will reject the United States' request that Israel freeze Jewish settlement in the West Bank. Yes, by God, this defiance of Carter by Menachem has actually happened. More than that, Menachem has informed Carter that the West Bank constitutes a part of the land of Israel. Swaggeringly, Begin says: Heaven will not fall on

earth if the autonomy talks were not completed by 26 May 1980. Indeed, denial of even recorded facts has reached the point where Begin even said that there does not exist a written document which refers to that date as a deadline....!!! What is the man saying and whom is he fooling and belittling? And who is lying? Unchecked, he went on boasting that no one can impose on Israel a Palestinian state, because such a state, he said, is a threat to our very existence, and there can never be peace under such circumstances. He even pointed out that the United Nations resolution [presumably 242] would destroy the foundations of the Camp David accords and the peace treaty. I swear that I was in doubt of the veracity of what I heard along these lines, but this is exactly what was published in AL-AKHBAR of 28 March 1980 and no one has denied it thus far. What is even more shocking is that while Menachem Begin was uttering those fantastic words of defiance in the face of the United States and Egypt, he sent his minister of energy to Washington to discuss with Carter's aides, and perhaps even with Carter himself who was the target of Begin's defiance and rejection, Israel's oil needs. That's right—to discuss with the United States Israel's oil needs. Would you suppose that the Israeli minister of energy will return empty handed or with millions of barrels of oil which he would order the United States to deliver? Can you deduce from all such games and antics a definite attitude between America and Israel? As for us, we were able to detect the facts years ago, and may God have mercy on us and on all those who are pained and distressed by the loss of truth and the denial of justice.

What Peace Should We Hope For?

To further confirm what we have been saying, Musa Sabri, the chief editor of AL-AKHBAR, has recently written that the government of Israel has come up with a new logic which contradicts all the principles prescribed by the Camp David accords, namely, that Israel's security is a matter for Israel alone to determine and to specify its requirements and safeguards. (AL-AKHBAR, 9 May 1980). What is then left for us and what are we waiting for? And what kind of peace can we hope to achieve with those people? To die to the last man is a thousand times more honorable for us than accepting this kind of disdain, scorn and belittlement.

Israel goes on scorning all values and honorable things in life by preventing Palestinian leaders from returning to their country. On 12 May, 1980, AL-AKHBAR reported that the Israeli police has forced shopkeepers in east Jerusalem to open their stores in a bid to break the strike called by the Palestinian National Guidance Committee in the West Bank.

Do you want more evidence that categorically proves that Israel in no way wants peace? Well, here is something which we have not said but was said by the American NEW YORK TIMES. In an article cited by AL-AHRAM on 14 May 1980, the NEW YORK TIMES accused Israel of following a policy which aims at controlling the West Bank forever. This was written while the Israeli military authorities continued their suppressive measures against the Arab inhabitants in the various cities and towns of the West Bank for the 10th consecutive day since the outbreak of the recent events. Here, brother, is a

testimony given by one of Israel's own kind. AL-AHRAM also reported on 16 May, 1980, that there is a secret Israeli plan to settle 45,000 Jews in the West Bank within 3 years. The rest is yet to come, and what is hidden is still even worse.

Never mind, let's review evidence derived from the conduct of the United States, the third partner--evidence which decidedly demonstrates that Israel does not act haphazardly but out of confidence that the United States would not do anything that would anger Isarel, even if Israel was wrong and guilty, because Israel deserves such pampering!

On Thursday, 8 May 1980, AL-AHRAM carried the following great tidings. It quoted the United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim as saying that the Israeli authorities explusion of two West Bank mayors and the Islamic judge of Hebron is contrary to international law. How wonderful of Kurt to take such firm positions to check Israel and put it in its place! Was Israel ignorant of the fact that its actions are contrary to international law, so that Kurt sought to draw its attention to this unbecoming violation? Or did he actually want to reassure Israel that it can go on its way confidently because this is the maximum that the United Nations and its secretary general can do? Thanks a lot, you did what you had to do and you saved the reputation of the United Nations!

Carter's Mediation

President Jimmy Carter of the United States graciously announced, according to reports carried on 12 May 1980, that the autonomy talks are facing a severe crisis with regard to final agreement on full autonomy and the implementation of the Camp David accords. Amazing! Was anyone unaware of that, Mr Carter? Or are you one of those who like to say the obvious? He went on to say that despite the many difficulties which encountered the talks during the past 3 years, the United States has succeeded in its role as a mediator between Egypt and Israel. Well, we will grant him that, for he was able to make the good country, Egypt, carry out all that it has committed itself to do. As for unruly Israel, he was able to achieve and do nothing--not as a mediator, a partner, an ally or the one who feeds Israel. To be half blind is still better than being completely blind! He goes on to say that America does not want to play the role of the dictator who imposes his will on the parties concerned, as long as the negotiations are proceeding faithfully and in accordance with the political principles prescribed in the Camp David accords. Can we ask, Mr President of the United States, if you believe that Israel's actions and behavior represent a faithful continuation of the negotiations, in accordance with the principles you have agreed upon at Camp David? If you consider this to be a faithful application of those principles by Israel, what would the unfaithful application of those principles be like? And if human fairness and complete neutrality make it incumbent upon you to shun the role of the dictator who wants to impose his will on others, what do you call your overlooking of Begin's actions, after you have completely denied those actions? What kind of neutrality is it when you immediately acceed to all of Israel's requests and supply it with the most modern weapons, some

of which have not even been used by your own armed forces, while you act with great deliberation and slowness when Egypt asks you for arms? Please excuse me, reader, for it is not my business to ask such embarrassing questions, but what can I do when what I see is ado about nothing! Patience, God.

The fair saint [Carter] goes on to reaffirm his commitment to be a partner in the talks despite the difficulties, procrastination, setbacks and the ever present prospect of the failure of the talks. Would you be clear, Carter? Who is it that is posing obstacles, causing difficulties and procrastinating? Egypt or Israel? Why cannot things be said openly and clearly and a spade called a spade, instead of this kind of generalization which conceals a deliberate intention not to face facts candidly? But you are free, of course, to do anything you want.

Carter goes on--oh, how he always goes on--to say that he does not see any cause for despair or for abandoning the endeavor to complete the negotiations. You are right! Why should you despair when Israel is going full steam ahead in doing anything it wants and in violating everything that it has agreed to? What would Israel want to do more than it is doing under the auspices of the negotiations and the treaty? No, no, do not despair, because you might cause Israel to miss the opportunity of doing anything that it wants to do. I just want to remind you of your promise in that statement--that you will not abandon the target date of 26 May 1980. You are a free man, and a free man always keeps his promise. Should we wait, for we understand from what you say that the outstanding problems cannot be solved before 26 May 1980? Which one of your two statements should be believed: that the talks would be completed before 26 May or that they cannot be completed before then? Enough insults against our intelligence!

A Charge That Scares Carter

But what can you do when you are in the heat of the presidential elections? Your opponent Kennedy is accusing your administration of betraying Israel--a charge that scares you more than anything else. At the same time, your new secretary of state has embarrassed you by saying that the negotiating parties have reached for the first time the phase of direct confrontation with the substantive issues that represent the crux of the conflict. Calamity! If they have just only today reached the substantive crux of the conflict, what were they doing all those years? And what were the parties and fanfares all about, champion of human rights? Although your minister has embarrassed you, he still is your brilliant disciple in politics, for he is using your own style. He said, for instance, that the United States will intensify its efforts as a full partner in the autonomy talks and that it will undertake a greater role in the next phase! If so, what was America's role thus far? Was America an incomplete partner? Or were its efforts diluted and not intensified?

At any rate, however, we say to your credit that your state department plucked up its courage, risked all and announced that it does not recognize Israel's annexation of east Jerusalem! What courage and daring! But this is, of course, the maximum you can do when it comes to Israel. The Moslems in all parts of the world must understand you completely so that they would not dance to the music of your justice and not be duped by your promises. If today they cannot reciprocate in kind, they should remember at all times that your promises are an act of depravation and falsehood and a narcotic designed to drug and lull anyone who is deceived by and unknowledgeable about you. Our hope is great that God will not allow the Moslems to continue as they are, because they are at fault if they continue to accept such humiliation upon themselves. It is either do or die.

We come now to Egypt and the Egptian negotiator and what he can do and how he can move. I am not asking that all the cards be shown, but I demand that there should be winning cards which the Egyptians can use to advantage. We do not want to hear mere statements, but we want action--we want deeds not words. We have said more than once that we appreciate the circumstances through which we are going, as any Egyptian--a ruler or a subject--does. But despite all those circumstances and their harsh impact, we believe that a movement launched by officials, al-Azhar ulema and members of the Islamic groups can prove to the world what Egypt is--and Isarel and its supporters will witness what the consequences will be. The aggressor shall pay for his aggression. But to be content with the position we are now taking is something that we cannot possibly endorse, whatever the excuse may be. Free and proud men were born only to be the fuel of noble sacrifices.

Lenience in Negotiating Position

What have we done in the face of Israel's defiance and America's laxness? Are we engaged again in a state of leniency and laxness in our negotiating stance?

We have heard the official spokesman for the foreign ministry say that the decision concerning (the two schools) is a new violation of the spirit of Camp David. And what's new in that? The whole world knows it. Do we face Israel's daily defiance and violation of international norms and values with old and repeated statements? And is it enough for our former defense minister to say that the policy of building settlements is a serious threat to security? Is this the duty of a soldier? Is it enough for our former defense minister to say that Israel's open and unabashed aggression against our rights is a serious threat to security? Or is it his duty to do what his enemy does and to confront his enemy with action that would check and stop him.

And is it any solace to Egyptians that Egypt has answered Israel's actions of deporting West Bank mayors, destroying the homes of Palestinians and building settlements with a letter of protest decrying those illegal actions which are in conflict with the Geneva convention pertaining to occupied territories

and the charter of the United Nations and all international norms? Were Israel and the world unaware of the illegality of Israel's actions? This is a position that does not befit us as a Moslem nation which believes that paradise lies in the shadow of the sword. And yet, do you know, esteemed reader, what was Israel's reply to all those vociferous protests? The Israeli ambassador delivered his government's reply to Egypt's protests at a meeting with the minister of state for foreign affairs that lasted for no more than three minutes! As if the reply was a war ultimatum. Some newspapers have also reported that the letter of Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir included weak and unconvincing replies about Israel's violation of basic human rights and the simplest rules of international conduct, norms and conventions. How can the government of Egypt accept this slight calmly? Anyway, Egypt stated again that Israel's decision on Jerusalem was in contravention of the Camp David accords and that Egypt calls on the United States to take a more effective position! Well, if America failed to take a toughter position, what are we going to do about it? Would we just satisfy ourselves with raising our voice in protest? We do not approve at all this stance by the Egyptian negotiators and think that it does not befit them.

One hope is left for us to talk about, namely, the president's statement cited by AL-AHRAM on 17 May 1980, that Egypt is re-evaluating its position toward negotiations after the Knesset's decision proclaiming Jerusalem the unified capital of Israel. The [Israeli] doves have now shown their talons, bared their bills and fluttered their wings. And the supporters of peace in Israel have not expressed any regret about this serious action. We are urgently and anxiously waiting to see what Egypt's reassessment of its position will come to. We hope that it will result in a practical and firm stance that will put an end to all the things that Israel has dared to do without regard for anyone.

We can withdraw our ambassador, because if he were to say there after Israel declared all of Jerusalem as its capital, this may be construed as a clear, not an implicit, recognition of Israel's right to do what it did. We will not die of fear if we asked the Israeli ambassador to go back to this country, for no one will ever regret the loss of his unwelcome presence among Egyptians. We are also obligated to put an end to all the open and hidden manifestations of normalization. There is a lot that we can do, provided that we sort out our own affairs among ourselves by holding country-wide meetings among representatives of the government and the people, where decisions would be taken and would be gladly accepted by the people. This is a matter that concerns the people and not just the government alone. So prepare the people, officials of the government, and ready them to wage the field of jihad. The overwhelming majority of the people is yearning to a paradise that straddles the full extent of the heavens and earth. Here is an opportunity for the people and the government to become integrated together, body and soul, when the people hear the government issuing forth the call to jihad. "God shall support he who upholds Him, for God is powerful and noble." God will not abandon us when He sees that we are sincerely determined to work for the sake of His saying "Or have you assumed that you will enter paradise when God still know not who among you have embarked on jihad and who are the patient." On the Day of Reckoning "Those whose faces shine with honor will live eternally in the mercy of God."

9254
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GOVERNMENT'S BIRTH CONTROL CAMPAIGN ATTACKED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Jul 80 pp 50, 51

[Article by Rabih Radi: "Look Around You--Another Moslem Baby!"]

[Text] "Look around you: A new baby is born every 24 seconds!" This strange, but most cleverly designed, public announcement has appeared on television screens and on the pages of magazines and newspapers. Another announcement along this line opened with two quotations from the hadith of the Prophet (God bless him). The first quotation was falsely attributed to him, while the second was said in a different context and for a different reason.

The first quotation goes like this: "The Prophet, God bless him, used to implore God for protection from 'juhd al-bala'.' When the Companions asked him one day what he meant by 'juhd al-bala', the Prophet said: 'it means too many children while there is a dearth of things.' "The second quotation runs as follows: "It is better for you to produce offsprings who are rich rather than offsprings who would be a burden, living off others." The two quotations are then followed by a list of names and addresses of birth control centers and by the greetings of the information and education unit in the General Information Authority.

It is clear that the people in charge of these public campaigns are directing their efforts at Moslems, in view of the quotations from the hadith, and because the Egyptian Coptic Church and the Roman Catholic Church in the Vatican prohibit birth control or family planning.

The quotation is not from the hadith and does not mean that one should limit his family to ward off adversity. What it actually means is that one should ward off adversity by hard work and the raising of a good and able Moslem generation in fulfillment of God's call: "Marry and procreate and you shall proliferate, and I shall then proudly hold you aloft among nations on the Day of Reckoning."

The second quotation from the hadith cited by the Information Authority is self-evident, for it is natural that a Moslem will do well to make his offsprings and heirs rich and affluent rather than poor and destitute. This proves that the idea behind that quotation from the hadith is to encourage work and struggle so that one's heirs are not left poor. This stands to reason and is not intended to admonish Moslems to restrict birth.

It is clear by now that those in charge of this campaign are either parrots unwittingly repeating what is dictated to them from outside the lands of Islam through foreign organizations, or agents seeking to weaken Islam and Moslems.

Otherwise, why is this campaign targeted against the Moslems alone? And why is the hadith being used mischievously and perversely to promote ideas that are quite removed from its true purpose?

The public announcement says: "Look around you, a new baby is born every 24 seconds." I say in reply: "Look around you, where is the plumber? Look around you, where is the mechanic? Look around you, where is the able engineer? Look around you, where is the teacher of Arabic and other languages and mathematics? Look around you in the countryside, where is the agricultural worker? Look around you, where are the skilled construction laborers?"

That Rabid Campaign

How can such a rabid organized campaign be launched when the country is suffering from a severe shortage in trained labor, to the extent that Korean construction companies, for example, had to build al-Salam hotel in Heliopolis and construct a huge building in Garden City. Egypt has never before suffered a shortage of trained labor as it is experiencing now. Herein then lies an extremely peculiar equation. The first part of the equation says that the population is increasing at a great speed. The second part says that there is a severe shortage in labor to the extent that there is a shortage of several thousands of Arabic language teachers, for example, and that the wage of an agricultural worker in the countryside has reached two pounds a day for a few hours' work.

The problem facing the country is not actually one of population growth. The human factor of the population is one of the elements of strength in nations and one of the sources of wealth in a state. Ultimately, however, the question is that of the efficient use or the misuse of available resources including--in fact, primarily--the human resource. Japan, for example, has a population of a hundred million people living in a group of islands that are poor in raw materials. And yet Japan managed to become a major power not by controlling its population of 100 million people but by training them well and building up their skills and abilities.

And the United States, with a population of more than 200 million people, yearly opens its doors to thousands of immigrants and is considered to be the richest and most powerful nation on earth. Most American states prohibit

abortion, except for medical or health reasons, and encourage population growth, because population growth is not the problem. Rather the problem is how to educate and train the people and increase their skills.

The Jewish state of Israel was established through the usurpation of a small portion of Palestine. Compared to the size of Egypt, Israel is still a small state, and yet it is seeking by all means to bring in more immigrants and is trying to develop the Negev desert.

Poverty Is the Fruit of Communism

Israel is also a case of how the human factor is put to good use. On the other end of the spectrum is a state such as the Communist state of Aden and Cuba. Nearly half of the population of Aden has emigrated, and yet the remaining population is living in abject poverty--so much so that at one time citizens of that country were searching for food in garbage cans. Cuba, meanwhile, has turned its population into a mercenary army working for the Soviets in return for food.

If we take sisterly Sudan, we find it a country of vast areas of good farming land and ample water resources. And yet these areas are not being planted and farmed. Why? Because of the lack of the efficient use of the available human resources. Jordan is a country with a very small population and it survives on Arab and foreign aid.

Therefore, we say that the real problem is not that of the growth of population or the lack of a large population. It is rather the efficient use of available resources, including the most important resource--the human being. In Egypt, even if the population dwindled to a million people, we will still have poverty and problems. The transportation crisis began when Egypt's population was 20 million people. The crisis began immediately after the nationalization measures and had nothing to do with the increase or decrease of the population. The housing crisis began with the beginning of the socialist era and did not emerge when the population reached 40 million people.

The meat crisis is not due to the increase in the numbers of mouths that need to eat meat, but to the misapplication of agrarian reform laws and the leasing of agricultural lands. The leasing resulted in the fragmentation of land which in turn made it impossible for land owners or tenants to raise cattle and livestock because there were not large enough areas of land for cattle to graze.

The Problem Not That of Population Growth

The problem is Egypt then is not that of population growth. The real problem lies in the fact that the centralized form of the state absolutely does not help to activate or advance economic life. We have simply taken the outer crust of decentralization, not its substance. The presidential prerogatives which were given to the governors are of no value except in the case of appointing or transferring employees. As long as financial appropriations

come from the central government in Cairo, we will remain in this state of backwardness. But if each governorate had its independent source of revenue, in the sense that a governorate will send to the central government nothing but the taxes that are necessary for defense and foreign policy affairs, while retaining the rest of the revenue it raises from taxes and fees, and if the governor, the mayors and the legislative council of a governorate are elected, say for a period of 5 years, and finally if a governorate is completely independent with regard to appointing, firing, promoting and determining the salaries and allowances of its employees--then such a system will produce real wealth in Egypt. Roads would be built, regional and community colleges and institutes would be established and regional and community newspapers and information media would emerge. The result would be unprecedented revival and progress.

It is regrettable that years after Port Sa'id was declared a free zone, the city is still without an international airport and without an elevated bridge linking it to the other bank of the Suez Canal, so that the city can geographically expand. Nothing of the sort can be done at all because the revenues from the free zone go in full to the central government in Cairo. But if the city were placed under a free popular supervision, Port Sa'id would today be no less thriving than Hong Kong or Singapore.

I wish to add too that family planning has not advanced the cause of progress in the country. The unsuccessful educational system each year turns out thousands of graduates who cannot find anything profitable to do except wait to be appointed in some working capacity. And when they are employed, those graduates do nothing but sign in and sign out every day, without really producing, because they are incapable of doing anything useful in the first place in view of the fact that the present educational system does not bring forth the creative talents of the individual or bring up an individual with an independent mind, strong will and stiff determination who can plow ahead and chart his own course in life. The educational system in fact produces nothing but misfits. And so we in Egypt are suffering from the misuse of the resources available to us, including the human resources, because of the centralized system of government and the failure of the present educational system.

I would like to remind the gentlemen who have become professional family planners that the early Moslems, the soldiers of the Prophet, God bless him and grant him salvation, were few in number. But he brought them up capably and efficiently and they in turn became the builders of the most powerful states and kingdoms in their age and the proponents of a grant Islamic nation and civilization. That great development ultimately was the result of the efficient use, upbringing and training of the human element, that is the Moslem individual.

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2 October 1980

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JOINT MEETING OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, ARAB LEAGUE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 24 Aug 80 p 4

[Article: "Klibi: It Is Time For the USA to Abandon Their Total Alinement With Israel" "Chatty: 850 Million Muslims Are Impatient to Free El Qods"]

[Text] In his address at the opening of the joint meeting of the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Chedii Klibi particularly stated:

"We are living in a time when Arabs and Muslims are equally confronted with various civilizational, cultural and intellectual challenges and are facing the expansionist plans of Israel, who does not hesitate to raise a sacrilegious hand to the places to worship and to trample underfoot human values, always ignoring the censure of world conscience.

"To establish communities, with the results that such an undertaking creates, in the area of solidarity and political and economic cooperation shows one of the characteristics of our times--an imperative for international action. We have witnessed the birth of solid and powerful communities, joining peoples who had little in common and who had even been separated by a deeply rooted hostility throughout history. The Arab world and the Muslim world also are in the best position to draw nearer, come together and cooperate, even more since they both have been bathed in the fire of the struggle for liberation, since the majority of their peoples has suffered foreign domination and since they swore to guarantee dignity and invulnerability.

"In fact the dangers to which our peoples are exposed are many, as are the problems with which they are faced, but there is every reason to believe that nothing threatens them as much as what is developing in Palestine, this piece of the Arab homeland, whose cause is considered by all Arabs, in Machrek and in Maghreb, and by all Muslims, wherever they may be, as being theirs.

"The decision recently passed by the Knesset declaring El Qods the eternal capital of Israel clearly showed up to what extreme the Zionist regime could go, not only in the non-recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, but in contempt for the feelings of the whole Arab and Muslim nation.

"The increasingly serious aggressions that Israel is multiplying against Lebanese territory--the last to date being the large-scale military operation launched Tuesday against Arnoun and the region that surrounds it, followed the next day by the bombardment of Nabatyeh, of Tyr and of the Palestinian refugee camps--are only one aspect of an expansionist policy aiming to thrust aside any possibility of a just peace based on respect for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

"The resolution recently passed by the Security Council is a test of the international community's ability to guarantee the effectiveness of its decisions and the credibility of its commitments.

"The international community can not any longer be contented with condemning Israeli aggressions, even more since by the measures it has just taken and by the whitewashing of these aggressions, whether they are in the occupied territories or in Southern Lebanon, Israel confirms that it is very little concerned about international legality. We also demand that one go beyond simple condemnations and that one put an end to aggression.

"It is time that the United States abandons its total alinement with Israel, an alinement having as a pretext their security needs, and that it proceeds to examine its positions. The Zionist regime having proven that it was continuing to defy the international conscience and was pursuing the putting into operation of its plans for aggression and the achievement of its expansionist aims, it is time that those who are hesitating listen carefully to the call of the Arab and Muslim nation, concerned about defending international legality and giving their support to every resolution imposing the appropriate measures for bringing Israel to its senses.

"At this opportunity that we have to coordinate Arab and Muslim efforts, we must proclaim before the entire world that the Arabs are at the end of their patience and that, strong in our proper rights and in international legality, we ask the world to take up its responsibilities and to take all useful measures for honoring its commitments.

"In this regard, we can only express the hope of seeing the Iranian revolution rid itself of the aftermath of the imperial regime and work conscientiously and seriously to strengthen stability in the area, thanks to relations of cooperation and understanding with the neighboring Arab states. This is the most appropriate means for supporting the Palestinian cause and guaranteeing the solidarity of the nations of the area in the face of all threats.

"As long as El Qods and the other occupied territories remain under submission to Zionist power, as long as the Palestinian people are deprived of their homeland and of their right to build a state, like all other peoples, the struggle of the Arab and Muslim nation will have to go on and all the means at their disposal will have to be set in operation to correct this injustice.

"What His Highness Prince Fahd advocated was good, when he asked that the struggle to which we are pledged be considered as a holy war for which we must mobilize all our energy, all our means, whether they be in the areas of politics, information or economy, in addition to military means.

"The favorable reception accorded this call represents the determination of our peoples to take up the battle seriously and resolutely.

"And since we are decided to not let ourselves be defeated or humiliated, we are certain to triumph, precisely because of our cooperation among ourselves and the efforts that we are putting forth in international agreements, which gives importance to our two organizations. But this cooperation demands the blending of tasks, accuracy in arrangement and an objective vision..."

For his part, Habib Chatty stated:

"On 20 June 1980 an important and constructive meeting took place in Jeddah, which allowed the two secretaries general to examine the prospects for cooperation, the achievement of which the two organizations aspire to, this cooperation having to strengthen Arab-Muslim solidarity in everything relating to the understanding of problems that concern Arabs and Muslims...

"What contributes to making the achievement of this ambition easier is the very nature of Arab-Muslim ties since the birth of Islam. The Arabs have raised high the banner of this religion, which they spread in the farthest regions of East and West. Today 850 million persons are Muslims. They are all impatient to free El Qods and to put an end to the hateful Zionist occupation of the Palestinian Arab land.

"Some are trying to sow dissension between the Arabs and the non-Arab Muslims. Arab nationalism, they allege, calls for the union of a limited community of Muslims, which does not correspond to the Islamic movement that calls for the unity of all of 'Omma.' We are gathered here to produce the proof that the two movements are complementary, that the unity of the Arabs is an indispensable element for the achievement of the ambitions of the Islamic peoples.

"The need to create community bodies that promote the achievement of common goals arose in the western world from recent political doctrines. The idea of 'assembling' in the Muslim world is found in the teachings of Islam, which call the faithful to show proof of solidarity for the triumph of good and of the faith.

The Islamic Conference, created the day after the aggression perpetrated against the El Qods Mosque at the end of 1389 (Hegira calendar) is aimed at strengthening Islamic solidarity and cooperation among the member countries in economic, cultural, social and scientific areas. It fights against racial segregation and colonialism in all its forms and contributes to the strengthening of peace and international security based on justice. This

organization also aims at coordinating efforts to protect the holy places and to support the struggle of the Palestinian people to recover their rights and the liberation of their lands. It supports the struggle of all the Islamic peoples to preserve their dignity, their independence and their national rights. The Islamic Conference finally undertakes to foster an adequate environment for better cooperation and better understanding among the member states and other states.

"By annexing El Qods and proclaiming this holy city the eternal capital of the Zionist entity, the common enemy only shows defiance and provocation in the place belonging to Arabs and Muslims."

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ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, ARAB LEAGUE REAFFIRM SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN STATE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 25-26 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Here is the joint communique made public at the end of the sessions of the joint meeting of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States, following the talks that took place at the headquarters of the Secretary General's Office of the Islamic Conference in Jeddah between Chedii Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States and Habib Chatty, secretary general of the Islamic Conference, following the joint communique published at the close of their meeting on 14 June 1980.

Out of concern for strengthening the spirit of Arab-Islamic solidarity and in response to an invitation from the Secretary General of the League of Arab States, a joint meeting including high level delegates from both organizations was held from 23 to 24 August 1980 in Tunis under the presidence of Chedii Klibi and Habib Chatty and with the participation of Baccari Diami and Mohamed Ben Slama, assistant secretaries general for legal affairs respectively of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States; Hamza Robbana, director of the Office of the Secretary General of the Islamic Conference; Hichem Mustapha Fares, director of the El Qods and Palestine divisions for the Islamic Conference, and Moncef El Mav, adviser of the Secretary General of the League of Arab States.

During the meeting the participants reviewed the issues that are troubling both organizations, especially the most recent events of the situation in occupied Palestine after Israel's decision to annex the Arab sector, El Qods, and to consider this holy place as the "eternal capital of the Zionist entity."

Both organizations reviewed the results of the meeting of the El Qods Committee that was held from 16 to 18 August 1980 in Casablanca and the stands of the League of Arab States. Moreover, they exchanged views on the measures taken. The two delegations affirmed the determination of the Arab and Islamic states to intensify the battle to confront the provocations launched by the Zionist entity in order to free El Qods from the yoke of occupation and to allow the Palestinian people, led by the PLO, to achieve self-determination, to recover their legitimate rights and to build an independent state on their territory.

The two delegations succeeded in completing a cooperation agreement between the Arab and Islamic organizations.

This agreement rests on the appropriate means to establish cooperation between the two organizations for developing brotherly relations between the Islamic and Arab countries in the areas of politics, economics, culture, science and information, and all of this within the framework of strengthening ties of brotherhood and protecting Arab-Muslim civilization, which is governed by the principles of justice and tolerance.

This cooperation is made within the framework of coordinating efforts to achieve more progress for the benefit of the Arab and Islamic communities and with the aim of protecting their common interests and fighting against colonialism, racism and exploitation in all their forms to strengthen these countries' safety and peace in the world.

The two organizations consented that the agreement be signed by the secretaries general of both groups and that it be passed on to the headquarters of the Secretary General's Office of the Islamic Conference in Jeddah for the exchange of documents, after their approval by the Council of the League of Arab States and the Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic countries.

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ISLAMIC CONFERENCE'S JURISTS BEGIN WORK IN COMMITTEE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 25-26 Aug 80 p 4

[Article: "Start of Work of the Committee of Jurists of the Islamic Conference"]

[Text] The committee of jurists entrusted with giving an opinion on the criminal practices committed by Israel in occupied Palestine began its work yesterday morning in the Hilton Hotel in Tunis.

The opening session of this meeting, which was presided over by Habib Chatty, secretary general of the Islamic Conference Organization, was attended by Dr Charfeddin Birzada, Pakistani minister of justice; Osman Goudiam, president of the Higher Council of the Bench of Senegal and member of the commission of the United Nations entrusted with investigating the crimes of Israel; Ambassador Midoune Val, former president of the United Nations committee for the immutable rights of the Palestinian people; Dr Mohamed Saker (Jordan); Walid Arafat (Palestine); Aberrahman El Hila, Mustapha Filali (Tunisia), as well as a delegation from the Islamic Conference.

In his address, Chatty stated that this meeting is held in accordance with the recommendations of the special session of the Conference of Foreign Affairs Ministers of Islamic Countries that was held in Amman last July. This session had entrusted the secretary general of the Islamic Conference with studying in cooperation with five jurists the measures to take on the international level regarding Israel's racist policy and its criminal practices, practices whose aim is to drive the Palestinian people from their homeland, to plunder their rights by employing repression and terrorism, to pursue the establishment of settlements for the Judaization of Palestine, and this beyond the recently enacted law decreeing El Qods the eternal capital of the Zionist state in occupied Palestine.

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CAMP DAVID ISSUE DISRUPTS ARAB LAWYERS' CONFERENCE

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 7 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Layla 'Abd al-Salam: "AL-AHRAR Is First Newspaper To Record Details of Events at Arab Lawyers' Conference in Rabat; Delegations of Rejection States Declare: 'We have Come Specifically To Attack Egypt'"]

[Text] The Arab Lawyers' Conference in Rabat developed into an arena for political disputes and splits. The rejection states launched a vicious attack against Egypt. The Syrian lawyers split into two groups: those sent by the government and those representing the now disbanded Lawyers' Association.

The conference began its activities in an opening session in the Marrakash City Hall presided over by King Hassan II of Morocco. King Hassan delivered a speech in which he said: "The Arab world is currently passing through a crisis of freedom and a crisis of law. For what has become of the search for truth? And what has become of the championing of right? And what has become of respect for the law?"

The conference began its meetings in the Hilton Hotel with 1,500 lawyers in attendance, including 300 from Egypt. The heads of the delegations delivered their addresses in succession. The spark which ignited the conference was set off when the head of the Iraqi delegation launched an attack on the Egyptian regime and the Camp David agreements. This aroused one of the members of the Egyptian delegation, and the commotion in the conference intensified. The situation became more and more critical, finally ending in a fight involving the use of chairs between the Egyptian lawyers and the Iraqi delegates. Both sides began cheering their respective countries, the Syrian and Palestinian lawyers joining in with the Iraqi delegation.

Amid the fighting with chairs and the conflicting catcalls, conference chairman Muhammad Ouldghiri threatened to dismiss the meeting. With extreme difficulty, Ahmad al-Khawajah, the leader of the Egyptian lawyers, was able to mount the platform and lead a cheer for Egypt and Palestine. Then, one of the members recited verses from the Koran until the storm

quieted down. Ahmad al-Khawajah was finally able to get the conference under control. Some members of the Egyptian delegation announced that they were withdrawing. The storm erupted a second time when the chairman of the conference requested that the delegation heads limit their speeches to 5 minutes. The delegations from the rejection states announced that they had come from their countries specifically to attack Egypt!

Seven Egyptians Expelled

Following the conclusion of this stormy session, the Permanent Office held a meeting in which it was decided to expel seven Egyptian lawyers from the conference. These lawyers were Ibrahim al-'Azizi, Sa'id al-Far, Ibrahim Jadu, Mustafa 'Abbas, 'Atif al-Jawhari, 'Abd-al-'Al 'Arjun and Mahir Muhammad 'Ali. The office decided not to expel 'Ali Mansur.

Arab Lawyers' Federation president Ahmad al-Khawajah and federation member Salah al-Sayyid abstained from voting on the expulsion of the Egyptians.

Mahir Muhammad 'Ali submitted a complaint to conference chairman Muhammad Ouldghiri in which he said: "This decision is invalid because it was issued by a majority without a quorum. The decision was issued without verification and failed to take into account the following facts:

"All that occurred was that the Egyptian delegation protested against statements issued by the Syrian and Palestinian delegation heads touching on Arab national considerations. After the Iraqi delegation head got through criticizing and rejecting the Camp David agreement, he proceeded to address the Egyptian people with inflammatory propaganda against their regime. Similarly, after the head of the Palestinian delegation got through criticizing and rejecting the Camp David agreement, he began to attack the current leadership of Egypt. The latter action was what prompted the protest. This is borne out by the fact that while nearly all the unions made criticisms of Camp David and some of their representatives issued strong statements, the Egyptian delegation did not protest against this, because every opinion should be respected. The protest was made because of the departure from the general framework of proper discussion into personal attacks."

Mahir Muhammad 'Ali continued: "The time has come for the conference to put an end to aggression and bickering and follow the noble formula advocated by the sponsor of our conference, King Hassan II, who called on us to deal with one another within a framework of conciliation, tolerance and objectivity. Therefore, we urgently request the following:

"1. The formal invalidation of the decision to expel the Egyptians and the rejection of this decision in substance.

"2. A demand for the rectification of the situation and the questioning of those who have attacked our delegation and our homeland.

"3. The directing of the delegation heads and speakers to omit inappropriate remarks and exercise objectivity when discussing matters."

However, the permanent office did not look into the complaint of the expelled member of the Egyptian delegation!

Split in the Egyptian Delegation

The meeting of the permanent office concluded with the distribution of the conference work to eight committees dealing with the following areas: the Arab homeland, public freedoms, regulation of the legal profession, the combating of colonialism, Palestine, the Arab economy, jurists, and fundamental law.

The Arab homeland committee was one of the most important committees in the conference. It consisted of 500 members under the chairmanship of the Egyptian association head, Ahmad al-Khawajah, and continued its activities for 12 consecutive hours.

The discussions of most of the delegations focused on the issue of the Arab-Zionist struggle. In the context of how to deal with this problem, most Arab delegations were in agreement on a unified position on the issue. This was not true for the Egyptian delegation, however, which split into two groups, one for and the other against [Camp David]. However, even the pro-Camp David faction asserted that the main problem for the Arab nation is the elimination of colonialism, beginning with the Zionist entity. It attempted to justify its support for Camp David by asserting that the purpose behind this support was to gain the power to confront the enemy. However, this group met with strong opposition from the other Arab delegations and two members of the Egyptian delegation, Ahmad Nasir and Muhammad Fahim.

Most of the Arab delegations agreed that the achievement of freedom for Arab man is a fundamental step on the road to confronting the Zionist enemy. Most delegations were also in agreement that Arab funds (from the oil states) should be invested in the Arab and Third World states rather than in the banks of the developed capitalist countries, and especially America and Western Europe.

The European Initiative

The Palestinian delegation on the committee focused on the European initiative regarding the Arab-Zionist struggle. It asserted that this initiative does not go any further than the American position on the Arab-Zionist struggle. In fact, the delegation asserted, the statement issued by the European Common Market states on 6 November 1973 is devoid

of any meaning since it was remarked in the recent European summit meeting that some progress had to be achieved in the European position and the initiative failed to accomplish this. Particular areas in which progress was required were the instatement of the Palestinian people as a primary side in the existing struggle; the recognition of the PLO as a legal representative; and the recognition of the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the establishment of their own national state.

The Iraqi and Jordanian delegations raised the question of Gulf security, the so-called Iranian threat to the Arab character of the Gulf, and the American presence in the Gulf and the Arabian Sea. They called for adherence to the pan-Arab charter proposed by Iraq as a minimum measure to counter foreign ambitions in the Arab homeland.

The delegations were in agreement that Arab problems should be solved through dialog and peaceful means, and they called for all Arab disputes to be overcome.

The committee also discussed the Lebanon problem, focusing particularly on the Zionist interventions aimed at destroying the unity and Arab character of Lebanon and eliminating the Palestinian revolution's presence on Lebanese soil. The delegations called for the provision of material support to the Palestinian revolution and Lebanon. The Lebanese delegation applauded the unity which presently exists between the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese National Movement in the cause of the defense of Lebanon's unity and Arab character. As for the members of the Egyptian delegation opposed to the Camp David agreement, Muhammad Fahim spoke of them in the Arab homeland committee chaired by Ahmad al-Khawajah. Mr Fahim said that Egypt cannot do without the Arab states and the Arab states cannot do without Egypt, and he refuted the claims made by some members of the Egyptian delegation who defended the Camp David agreement. These members were 'Umar Khattab, 'Ali Mansur and Bathinah al-Tawil.

In reply to Muhammad Fahim, these three lawyers stressed that the Arab problem can only be solved through peace, not through force. People's Assembly member Bathinah al-Tawil stated: "The tanks, planes and guns of the entire Arab homeland combined would not be able to liberate the usurped lands after we discovered that we were fighting America rather than Israel."

'Umar Khattab spoke about the rule of law and the freedom of the Egyptian citizen, but was interrupted by Ahmad Nasir, who said: "You are a liar. A lawyer is now being tried in Egypt for expressing his free opinion."

At this point, an uproar broke out in the hall. Committee chairman Ahmad al-Khawajah then expelled Ahmad Nasir from the session, saying to him: "Leave, Ahmad." Shouts of protest were raised by members of the

Iraqi delegation who demanded that attention be focused on the content of the pan-Arab charter proposed by Saddam Husayn and their rejection of the Camp David agreement and all agreements connected with it.

The Palestinians emphasized that the recovery of Palestine can take place only through armed struggle. They rejected the current settlements in the area, and especially the Camp David agreement. They emphasized the freedom of decision of the Palestinians and called on the Arab states to free the fedayeen organizations from tutelage and dependency.

They rejected the claim made by some members of the Egyptian delegation that there is no substitute for the Camp David agreements.

The delegations from Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Palestine joined in a shouting demonstration saluting Egypt as the birthplace of the free man Ahmad Nasir.

At this point, committee chairman Ahmad al-Khawajah decided to dismiss the session because of the disorder and the disagreements among the members of the delegations.

Attack on Camp David

The Palestine committee was chaired by Yasir 'Amru, the leader of the association of Palestinian lawyers in the occupied lands. The task of this committee was to discuss the Palestinian situation in the occupied lands, in particular, as well as the overall Palestinian situation. Ahmad Nasir joined the delegations of Palestine, Syria, Jordan and Iraq in an attack on the Camp David agreement and the Egyptian information media which have deceived the Egyptian people into believing that the Arab states chose to isolate Egypt and withhold aid from it following the October war.

When Mahir Muhammad attempted to join the Palestine committee, Yasir 'Amru expelled him.

When asked the reason for this action, Yasir 'Amru said: "There is a decision from the permanent office, which I endorse, expelling him from the conference."

Next, some of the Egyptian lawyers who support the Camp David agreement and defend the reasons which led to the signing of this agreement spoke. They said that the Arab world had chosen to isolate Egypt and withhold all aid from it, particularly after the October war.

Ahmad Nasir and certain members of the Syrian, Iraqi and Morocco delegations responded to the Egyptians, saying that their statements were incorrect and that aid was cut off from Egypt because it had joined forces with American and Zionist imperialism.

Ahmad Nasir said: "This agreement is against the people of Egypt and the Arab nation, and the previous Egyptian People's Assembly was dissolved because some of its members were opposed to the Camp David agreement."

Cheers for Ahmad Nasir

The Jordanian delegation requested that a moment of silence be observed in memory of the late Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. The Jordanian delegation then observed this moment of silence and was joined by the rest of the delegations along with Ahmad Nasir. After the observance, the Syrians and Iraqis cheered Ahmad Nasir.

One of the Palestinians called on the Arab states and the confrontation states to open their borders to the activity of the Palestinian guerrillas. The discussions also touched on the criminal actions which Israel carried out against the mayors of Nabulus and Ramallah.

The committee on the rights and freedoms of man and the rule of law, which was chaired by the leader of the lawyers' association of Iraq, discussed the rights of Arab man in the Arab countries. The Syrian lawyers spoke about the coercion, imprisonment and arrests plaguing the citizens of Syria. They said that all the rights of the citizens have been eliminated and only the members of the regime have any rights or freedoms. One of the most moved of these speakers was an individual who had been a member of the now disbanded Council of the Association of Syrian Lawyers. The adherents of the present regime in Syria clashed with the Syrian lawyers, who had called for rights and freedom for the people of their nation.

The delegate from Sudan said: "It is impossible for us to accept the fact that our brothers in Syria have been imprisoned and other representatives have come forward to represent the association, and the issue is not to debate the Syrian regime. I call for the release of all association members in Syria and the immediate restoration of the legitimate association."

The head of the lawyers' association of Algeria said: "Why single out Syria. Why not mention Libya. The legal profession in Libya has been abolished permanently."

At the conclusion of the conference, the Egyptian lawyers issued a statement in which they stated that many citizens of the brother Arab states do not enjoy the same climate of freedom as that which exists in Egypt at the present time. The statement conveyed a true picture of the freedom, democracy and rule of law which Egypt has enjoyed since the corrective revolution and the establishment of a permanent Egyptian constitution. The statement said that every Egyptian can express his opinion with complete freedom, even if it is contrary to the opinion of the government, as is evidenced by the fact that the Egyptian lawyers participating in the conference included some individuals who are opposed to certain decisions of the Egyptian Government and openly declare their opposition.

8591
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EXILED WEST BANK MAYOR ATTACKS ISRAEL, U.S.

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 12 Jul 80 p 18

[Report on interview with West Bank Mayor Fahd al-Qawasimi, by AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM correspondent, in Amman; date not given]

[Text] Shaykh Raja al-Tamimi, Sharia magistrate of Hebron, said that he and his colleagues--Fahd al-Qawasimi, mayor of Hebron, and Muhammad Milhim, mayor of Halhul--who were exiled by the Israeli authorities, will undertake a trip to the Arab countries at the beginning of the month of Ramadan.

"We are waiting for the decision of the Israeli court," Mr Milhim told AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM. "If the decision is in our favor, and we are allowed to return, we shall certainly return. If we are not allowed to return, we shall study every possibility of applying more pressure on the occupation authorities, so that we may return one way or another."

Mayor al-Qawasimi said: "We realize that the road of the struggle is long and difficult. It is full of violence and suffering. However, we must pursue it. The homeland will not return to us through mere hopes and prayers, but by cutting off more hands, feet and heads. The current tragedy of our people at home, or the real extent of the Israeli practices, cannot be imagined by anyone but those who are subject to them. The Zionists do not want to merely exile and destroy the nationalist leaders. They are now actually determined to kill the Palestinian people. The bombs planted in Jerusalem and Hebron, the murders in Bir Zayt, and the killing of female students in Bethlehem, as well as other daily practices, are nothing but definite proof that they want the land and do not want the local people to remain on it. They want the land, and want to drive the local people out. There is no more doubt about this. However, the will of the people has always been victorious, and we shall win."

"Europe has started to become aware," Mr al-Qawasimi said with reference to the reaction of public opinion in Europe to Israeli crimes, "that the Israeli Zionists are the real Nazi killers, not the Palestinian people. Both their real faces and intentions are being unmasked for the first time. In 45 days of continuous extensive and sustained

efforts, we have been able to ascertain that many [new] concepts are currently taking root in Europe and the United States. While this is only a beginning, there is no doubt that, if this development continues, it will have a tremendous influence not only on European and American public opinion, but also on European and American intentions.

"Since we were able for the first time to speak and find increasingly interested listeners, we addressed European and American public opinion through the television networks and the various media. We spoke through the press, and we gave talks, even at Harvard University. We spoke with officials everywhere. We even spoke with Jews. We spoke with them there. We did so in order to give a true picture everywhere. That is what happened during our 45-day trip."

[Question] What about the appropriate response to the American attitude, which is opposed to our nation and our cause?

[Answer] We have become used to the fact that America and the colonialist powers respect no one but the strong. We have to utilize the same method used by the United States. When the Soviet Union exiled the Zionist Sakharov, the United States cut off wheat shipments to the Soviet Union. When the Iranian students took 50 employees of the American embassy in Tehran hostage, the United States mobilized all its fleets, in the East and in the West, and tried to invade Iran. The United States even imposed an economic blockade of Iran, and asked Europe to do the same thing.

Let me ask you: as Arabs, do we not have such weapons at our disposal? Do we possess no such weapons? We can have all these weapons at our command. We have the Arab funds through which we can paralyze the pace of construction and progress, as well as financial, economic and monetary growth in the United States. We have Arab oil which represents the sinews of life both in America and Europe. Are we incapable of concentrating our determination--even for one single month--to face the despots who persist in supporting the deceit of our enemy, and provide this enemy with weapons of death and destruction to annihilate our people?

Zionist Swallowing Up of Land

[Question] What about Zionist ambitions regarding Arab land?

[Answer] If I speak about this topic, some people may accuse me of being pessimistic. However, I want to tell the truth. Zionist ambitions do not stop at Palestine. The best proof of this is their current attempt to swallow up the occupied Syrian heights and Sinai. They are not even satisfied with that, and are actually waiting for further opportunities. After succeeding in swallowing up and digesting the currently occupied territories, they will move to other areas. What is there to prevent them from reaching Damascus, Beirut and Medina itself, as long as we have no Arab force at our command capable of stopping them and checking their arrogance?

Waste of Time

[Question] What about calls for peace as a way to obtain our rights?

[Answer] There are those who are now talking about peace and lying to their people, especially certain leaders of our nation. They imagine that following the lead of our enemies could help us obtain our rights. Or they imagine that the European nations, or a Geneva conference or the United Nations, could direct us to the right road. The truth is that all this is a bunch of lies. In fact, all these solutions are a mere waste of time, a mere comedy, an attempt to put the Arab people and the Palestinian people to sleep. The road of resistance and struggle is clear. Liberation can be achieved only with the help of the noble Palestinian Arab rifle. [end of answer]

With regard to the possibility of unilateral application of the Camp David agreements, mayor al-Qawasimi said: "The fact is that this is impossible, unless they are imposed on the people of the occupied land by force, just as occupation itself was. Our people shall never willingly agree to let [the Israelis] establish any form of autonomous government. They will never be able to do so, because you will never find among our people anybody willing to submit his candidacy for election. You will never find among our people anybody willing to cast his vote for such an operation. However, if [the Israelis] want to impose autonomy by force of arms, as they imposed their presence and are currently imposing their settlements on us, this is something else. The occupation is there, not according to our wishes, but against our will."

New Sowing of the Land

With regard to response to the operations of liquidation and deportation, Mayor al-Qawasimi said: "Practical suggestions about retaliating against liquidations and deportations are to intensify the fight. You have to intensify the fight, O you people who are at home with every act of liquidation and deportation, the fire of the struggle must be fanned and the popular uprising must be escalated.

"The occupation must know that the acts of liquidation and deportation of a number of leaders of the occupied land, such as mayors of cities, will not stop the revolution in Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus or elsewhere. Our cities shall continue to resist and oppose the occupation of its methods.

"This is the only course open to our people in the occupied land. Abroad we have become weary of news speculation, contacts and peace-making efforts lacking forcefulness and originating from deceitful people. There must be real, practical response to those things. Practical response can only be based on more preparation and greater cohesion between the Arab leaders and their peoples. There must be more self-reliance, more determination to fight, more stress on liberation. This is the way to stop Zionist aggression, deportation and the liquidation of Palestinian citizens."

"With reference to the Palestinians who are abroad, we tell them: 'Intensify your fight and your struggle; intensify your revolutionary violence; sow the land with mines and guns; and sow the land with corpses of victims.' We are ready for martyrdom and self-sacrifice."

Regarding the proper way to strengthen [the people in] the occupied territories, Mayor al-Qawasimi said: "The way of financial support is a long one. We do not want at this point to put our people to sleep. Do you believe that the liberation of Palestine can be achieved with the help of $50 million or $100 million, which we may be given by wealthy Arab countries? We actually want this money to be put to use and sent to the fighters to buy guns. We want this money to be sent to Jordan and Syria to buy guns. We want weapons and an honorable fight. We do not want more villas and high-rise buildings in the Arab homeland. We want a war society."

Arab Character of Jerusalem Changed

Regarding Judaization efforts in the occupied areas, Mayor al-Qawasimi said: "Judaization actually goes back to 1967. We told Arab officials many times about it, but they did not believe us. However, I can give you a true picture of the situation. More than 1.25 million donums of land have been confiscated, I tell you. With reference to Jerusalem, let me tell you: there are 100,000 Israelis in Arab Jerusalem. More than 30,000 houses belonging to the Jews have been built in Arab Jerusalem. In spite of this, we still claim that Jerusalem is Arab, and that it will be returned through some compromise with the help of friends of those who support Israel! Is this possible?"

End to Occupation

Regarding the future of the Palestinian question, Mayor al-Qawasimi said: "The future is ours. However, as a people, we want to alleviate our children's suffering in the occupied homeland and shorten the long journey. The end is inevitable, and history will repeat itself. The Israelis will be defeated some day, and they will be crushed. This is what we told them. We said it in Hebron on 23 March 1980, at the Hebron conference. We told them when they wanted to settle in the heart of Hebron: 'Come back to your senses. See how the British Empire, on which the sun previously never set, collapsed in Great Britain itself, where it fell to pieces. Look at Hitler and the Nazis who imagined that they could occupy the world, who reached Stalingrad and Leningrad, and spread all over Europe. Germany collapsed and fell apart, and it now gravitates in the orbit of America. As to you Zionists, your fate will be the same.'

"However, we, the Palestinian people, want things to go faster. We want to see the liberation of Palestine with our own eyes. We want to see our young men, daughters and children no longer deprived of whatever we have been deprived of. We want to see our young men, children and young women lead, in their own country, a happy and stable life. This was denied to us, to the generation of the 1948 defeat and the 1967 relapse, and to the victims of the violations and catastrophes which have hit the cause and afflicted our people."

Facts and Data

With regard to the implications of the decisions of the United Nations, the silence of the Islamic world and the collusion and deceit of the American Government, Mayor al-Qawasimi said: "The United Nations has been unable to implement the decision concerning the return of three Palestinians to their country, from which they were unjustly deported under false accusation. How could we then trust this organization in the future when its decisions involve the Palestinian people as a whole?

"These facts must be emphasized to the international community before the international organization itself. If it does not respect its own decisions, what reason is there for it to exist? It must be emphasized to the Islamic nations that the spiritual values of Islam have been desecrated under the cover of occupation, and that the Holy Land is desecrated every day at the hands of the Zionists. We must turn to the Western countries which promote democracy, and tell them: 'What democracy is there in the measures taken by Israel and involving Judaization, liquidations and deportations?'

"We must emphasize to the American people and their present government, which never missed an opportunity to talk at length about human rights ever since it came into power, that when human rights were really involved the United States opposed the decision concerning the three Palestinians' return to their country. This confirms the deceit of the American Government, which claims to promote peace and pretends that it does everything to ensure an equitable solution in the area. In fact, it does not even go along with a resolution concerning the return of three Palestinians, who have committed neither crime nor offense."

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EXPANSION OF PETROLEUM PIPELINE CONTINUES

Paris LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE in French Aug 80 pp 14-15

[Article by Marie-Christine Aulas]

[Text] Since the war of October 1973, a new network of pipelines has gradually been put in place in the Arab countries of the Near East. The previous facilities, built in the era of the British and French mandates, or at the latest in 1950 (the Saudi tap-line) by companies with concessions (1), are each in turn being replaced by new ones, ordered and financed by the oil-producing countries. Today as in the past, it is a question of out-shipment of part of the crude from the Gulf regions to the Mediterranean, and of diversifying thereby the outlets for what is three-fifths of the production on the international market. What is different is the new geographic configuration of the network.

Up to now, the pipelines took the most direct path between the zones of production and the Mediterranean: coming from Iraq and Saudi Arabia, they converged on a limited area of the maritime face of Lebanon and Syria, north of Israel. Now, the facilities put into service or still in progress still end up at the Mediterranean, but by adopting totally different routes, all of which have the special feature of avoiding the zone of Israeli-Arab conflict.

Of the three new pipelines, the Saudi "trans-Arabian" still under construction, the "strategic pipeline," and the "Suez-Mediterranean" (SUMED) built by Egypt which is already in service, it is this latter which is undoubtedly the most unusual. On the one hand, it does not take oil from a well, but transports the crude from one zone to another, from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. This is the first Arab pipeline of this kind. Up to now, Israeli pipelines--Eilat-Haifa, built in 1957, then Eilat-Ashkelon, built in 1968--held sole monopoly over the region.

SUMED, which was finished in early 1977, is in some respects a complement to the Suez canal, whose [maximum] draught at present limits passage to ships not exceeding 69,000 Tpl [expansion unknown] loaded (2). Thanks to this line, bigger tankers (250,000 Tpl) can discharge at Suez the crude that

other ships can pick up at Sidi-Kreir, near Alexandria. The idea of building such a pipeline is not recent. It dates from a time prior to the closing of the Suez canal in 1967, when the latter was already beginning to be poorly adapted to the new oil fleets. But the October War had to come before studies and negotiations came to fruition. The Arab Petroleum Pipeline Company (3) was created on 11 December 1973 with a capital of 400 million dollars, and work was begun.

Built in the political and economic climate of "Infitah" ("opening-up"), SUMED's path reveals its strategic import. Far from taking the most direct route, alongside the canal between Suez and Port Said over 160 km, soon after Suez the pipeline bends toward the west, crosses the Nile delta, and ends in Alexandria after a journey of 320 km. Why this route? To supply the refineries of Alexandria? The latter are barely sufficient for Egyptian oil. To keep the facility safe from the consequences of possible fighting? In reality, by this path, a whole part of Egyptian territory would be exposed in case of conflict. In effect, SUMED being complementary not only to the Suez canal but also to the trans-Arabian pipeline, Egypt is now directly situated on the east-west petroleum route, providing a distinct link for the transport of Saudi crude. Taking into account the interests that SUMED involves, both upstream and downstream (producing countries and consumer countries), the country is already placing itself behind the front lines. Further, not only the Suez canal, but also the zone which separates it from the pipeline assumes a new strategic importance. The division which Ferdinand de Lesseps imposed a century ago between Egypt's Asiatic and African territories is enlarged today to that entire part of the eastern desert lying between the canal and the Nile valley.

The sanctions decided upon at the Baghdad Summit, following the Treaty of Washington, have not affected the activity of this pipeline, as had been feared. SUMED continues to function at 87.5 percent of its capacity (4).

Iraqi Preferences

By its name alone, Iraq's "strategic pipeline" reveals the designs of its builders. Unlike most of the producer countries of the region, Iraq has practically no maritime outlet, with the exception of several kilometers of coast between Kuwait and Iran, at the farther end of the Arab-Persian Gulf. This partly explains why, in 1933, Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) decided to build a pipeline linking the Kirkuk oil fields to the Mediterranean across Syrian territory. Following the nationalization of IPC in June 1972, Iraq took it upon itself to provide for the export of its oil, which represents 93 to 95 percent of the nation's production (106 million tons in 1976).

In August 1973 the Iraqi authorities decided on the creation of a new "reversible" pipeline capable both of moving oil to the oil port of Fao in the south, and also to the Mediterranean, this time through the mountains of Kurdistan and Turkey. This artful facility, the first of its

kind, was put in service in January 1976 (the southern branch), and the northern branch was activated in January 1977.

If Iraq today finds itself totally independent of other Arab countries in getting its oil to the Mediterranean, it is not by reason of geographic convenience. To the contrary, instead of the direct and relatively flat line taken by the Kirkuk-Baniya pipeline (5), the [Iraqi] authorities chose a winding path subject to the vagaries of a topography full of pitfalls. This basically political decisions throws light on some ambiguities of Iraqi policy. Baghdad explains its decision by the position taken by Damascus, which wants an exorbitant right of passage. In reality, outshipment via Turkey involves costs equally large, if not larger. Doubtless Turkish "royalties" are, at the outset, not as steep. But in each case, the country of passage is allowed to take as much oil as it needs at a discount price, and Turkey, as a larger consumer than Syria, would take more--which, from Iraq's point of view, amounts to the same thing. Further, Ankara having difficulty paying its oil invoices, the two governments have concluded an agreement by the terms of which the Turks promise to pay for Iraqi oil with agricultural products, to the detriment of Syrian exports.

In fact, whereas the Ba'athist regime in Baghdad wax eloquent in pan-Arabic exhortations, the authorities are trying to isolate themselves from the Arab political scene as much as they can. Abandoning the old Kirkuk-Baniya pipeline doubtless protects against any political or economic pressure, either Palestinian or Syrian, but at the same time this amounts to depriving Arab "brothers" of the indirect benefits or oil. Syria and Libya were affected, to the profit of Turkey, a non-Arab country, where there are risks of other kinds of pressure. Direct economic pressures, but also political pressures from Turkish opposition groups which, several times, have sabotaged pumping operations, thus simultaneously interrupting the use of the pipeline (6).

One thing seems clear: Iraq is trying to achieve security with the help of Turkey and, up until the recent events in Iran--[also with the help of] two non-Arab allies of the United States in the region. Since the signing in March 1975 of an agreement with the shah and up until the latter's departure, one could perceive a more or less explicit convergence of viewpoints between the two governments on the security problems in the Gulf. In exchange for "pacification" of Kurdistan, Baghdad would overnight withdraw its support for liberation movements on the peninsula, entrusting Iran with the role of "policeman." This equilibrium was achieved so painfully that it is understandable why Baghdad has been unceasing in its expressions of hostility toward the new leaders in Iran. However that may be, thanks to the "strategic pipeline," the oil interests of Ba'athist Iraq are safe from the hazards of the Arab political scene.

The Role of the Nile Valley

As for the new trans-Arabian pipeline under construction (7), it also answers to strategic imperatives. Sheikh Yamani, the Saudi oil minister,

said this in no uncertain terms at a conference at the University of Riyadh in April 1978: [Begin italics] "It must be pointed out, that Saudi oil is exported from only one outlet, the Arabic Gulf, which can be blockaded. This is a situation very different from that [obtaining] in Algeria, Libya, or Venezuela. This is why other outlets are in the process of being created on the Red Sea, in order to reduce this dependence." [End italics] (8). The Saudi official forgot to mention the Tap-line which, since 1950, has carried part of the nation's production, going through Jordan and Syria to its terminus at Zahrani in Lebanon. Categorically closed for export purposes since February 1975, the pipeline continues to supply refineries in Lebanon (Zahrani) and Jordan (Zarka) for their internal needs.

It was above all a concern about independence which led Riyadh to opt for construction of a new channel which traverses, over some 1,500 km, the Arabian peninsula from the Gulf to the Red Sea. On the one hand, the "trans-Arabian" crosses no frontiers (it is to supply the future petrochemical complex of Yambo, allowing Saudi Arabia to export refined products). On the other hand, the Wahabite kingdom will be less dependent than before on its outlet through the Gulf. Confronted with the impossibility of exercising military control over this zone, and fearful of the establishment on its borders of regimes which could endanger its interests, Riyadh is providing itself with the means necessary for its defensive strategy. As a result, the flow of Saudi oil is going to depend on Egypt, through which most of the oil arriving at Yambo will transit. This link, which assumes harmonious relations between the two countries, bears out the point of view of the oil interests on the future of the Nile valley, which henceforth is tied to their interests. At the same time, the Red Sea zone's strategic dimension is revitalized: more than ever, the said "security" problems will serve as arguments to justify various pressures on the political orientation of riverine countries.

Thus, in each case it is security concerns that constitute the ruling factor in the new pipelines. These concerns are at the base of their conception, and of their routing. Everything contributes, moreover, to divorce the interests of the Arab oil countries from those of their partners less harshly stricken by fate. The latter, directly affected by the Israeli-Arab conflict and by its effects (the Lebanese civil war, for instance), see themselves deprived of revenues which the passage of pipelines would procure for them. They are becoming more than ever dependent on the producing countries, subject to their political pressure. The oil order establishes itself precisely where the political and economic aims of the producers and the consumers naturally converge. This is the paradox of an age when oil has pretensions of being a weapon. A weapon for whom? A weapon against whom?

KEY:

1. Working oil-fields
2. Old pipeline, still in service
3. Pipeline of recent construction (or, in the case of the "trans-Arabian," under construction)
   A and B: northern and southern branches of the strategic pipeline
4. Territories under Israeli administration

FOOTNOTES

1. The Tap-line, built in 1945 by the mother companies of ARAMCO, has from the start presented itself as an independent transport company. This legal fiction has been put to use in several maneuvers (see Nicolas Sarkis, LE COMMERCE DU LEVANT, 24-27 May 1967.)

2. The figure should go up to 150,000 Tpl in 1980, according to E. Stanley Trucker in PETROLEUM ECONOMIST, February 1978.

3. The Arab Petroleum Pipeline Company involves Egypt (which holds 50 percent of its shares), Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi.

4. PETROLE ET GAZ ARABES, 16 June 1979.

5. Utilization of the Kirkuk-Baniya pipeline was interrupted in April 1976 following a dispute with Syria, then resumed in February 1979 with the proposed union of the two countries.

6. Since going into service, the operation of the pipeline has been interrupted five times, for technical reasons, as a result of financial disputes, or even because of sabotage (PETROLE ET GAZ ARABES, 1 October and 1 November 1978.

7. Work began in October 1978. It is expected to go into service this year.

8. INDUSTRIE ET PETROLE, No 499, October 1978.

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WOUNDED SOLDIERS INTERVIEWED ON THEIR CONFRONTATIONS WITH REGIME OPPONENTS

Kabul ANIS in Dari 21 Aug 80 p 3

/Text/ In one of the operating rooms of the Armed Forces Academy of Medical Sciences Hospital, I encountered a young man whose hand was encased in a plaster cast and who was demanding to leave the room. First, I introduced myself; then I asked him to introduce himself. He said, "My name is 'Abdulghayeb, and I am foreman at the government farm in Faryab Province."

I asked him, "Are you a member of the volunteer groups? Are you fighting against the enemies of the Revolution"? He said, "Yes. It is the conscientious duty of all patriots and all citizens of the country to fight against these thieves and highwaymen who are disrupting the security of the country. Naturally, our fight must continue until that moment when all of these filthy elements, who are acting against the best interests of the nation, have been obliterated and exterminated."

"Where were you wounded"?

"In a mountainous subdistrict of Faryab Province."

"Did the rebels attack there"?

"Yes. What else can these elements do except attack and commit sabotage. They attack the lives and property of the people; they set fire to public and private property, and then they flee."

"When you resisted them, were the rebels defeated"?

" Yes. We crushed them. A number of them fled, but we captured some of them and they confessed their crimes."

"What types of weapons did you confiscate"?

"Their weapons were all made in China, America, and England. To be specific, the missiles that we took from them were all made in China; twenty-five of the weapons that we obtained were made in America and England."

"What destruction did the rebels inflict? Did they burn the mosque and the school"?

"Yes, they burned a mosque in the Qeysar District, and they also burned some of the schools."

"If you could give a message to your fellow-countrymen, what would you say"?

"The only thing I have to say is that they must fight fearlessly to the death with complete faith and firm conviction against these anti-national and traitorous elements in order that our country might be completely purged of these filthy elements."

A soldier whose leg had been amputated attracted my attention in another room. I told him that I had come to interview him. He was very pleased and introduced himself as follows:

"I am Gholam Sakhi, a soldier in the 67th Regiment, 12th Division, Paktia Province. Originally, I came from Parvan."

"How did you lose your leg"?

Smiling, he said,"I lost my leg defending the nation and preserving the gains of the Thawr [20 Apr-20 MAY] Revolution and I am proud that I fought up to the moment when I lost my leg in order to safeguard the nation's principles and its territory."

"Where did you lose your leg."?

"On the Jaji Front, during the month of Mizan [23 Sep-22 Oct] last year. I had gone to Jaji to free the Jaji Road and to bring fuel. Counter-revolutionaries had mined the road and, during an attack, a mine went off and I lost my leg."

"Did you fight on any of the other fronts besides the Jaji Front"?

"Yes, I also fought on the Vaziri Front, the Tireh Front, and the Khateh Kandu Front."

"With what type of weapons do these rebels or counter-revolutionaries fight"?

"With Chinese, American and English weapons."

"Do you sometimes find these types of weapons during clashes"?

"Yes, once in a while."

"How much of your basic term of military service have you served"?

"I have served nine months in addition to my basic term of service, and, to protect my country, I will fight until my dying breath, even if my term of service is extended several more years."

"Are you not bitter that your leg has been amputated"?

"No. First of all, I lost my leg defending my country; secondly, I, and several other wounded men who have lost their arms and legs, will be going later to one of the friendly countries to have artificial limbs attached."

"What did you do before you joined the Army"?

"I was a laborer before I joined the Army; I worked in a shoe factory."

"Do you have any message for the soldiers"?

"Yes, my message to the soldiers is that they should fight to the last drop of their blood to defend the nation, to preserve the gains of the Thawr Revolution, and to maintain and guard the principles of the nation, because prosperity and success are ours. If, perchance a soldier dies pursuing this goal, and is martyred, he will never be forgotten and will be immortal."

8514
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ANALYSIS OF ALGERIA'S STATUS AS A CONSUMER SOCIETY

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 1-7 Aug 80 pp 9-16

[Article by G. Boutaleb and Y. Ould-Moussa: "Are We a Consumer Society?"]

[Text] Are we a consumer society? If we go beyond subjective considerations caused by episodic phenomena (Ramadan, festivals, marriages, pilgrimages) to answer this question for Algiera, we must consider the long-term tendencies of such determining variables as income levels, consumer expenditures, and available production.

Analysis has suggested to us that a consumer society is out of the question in an economic environment characterized by poverty and speculation. If a consumer society is an ideal to be attained, it cannot exist without sufficient production and a close-knit and active system of distribution.

Is it then possible to associate the notion of a consumer society--now linked with connotations of waste--with our society? Of course, waste does exist, but isn't it due less to personal consumption than to economic choices?

I: Providing a Decent Standard of Living

In the Larousse dictionary, "to consume" means to use something for its substance, to make use of or to use something up; "consumption" is the use made of goods and services produced.

But the word "consumption," when applied to a whole society, has a very special meaning nowadays. For a long time, the consumer society was a reflection of the "American way of life" and was advocated as an ideal to be pursued. Actually, the independence of colonial countries, and the monetary and energy crises were to show that the development advocated by the industrialized countries derives from their taking advantage of the Third World's underdevelopment and from their use of the Third World's nonrenewable resources. At present, the consumer society tends increasingly to be thought of as a "wasteful society," which is squandering mankind's heritage of natural resources (energy, raw materials, etc.). This society is the result of a long evolution that has seen the consolidation of the capitalist system, which is based

on various economic forces' questing for the maximum possible profit, which would theoretically tend (in the long run!) to maximize the collective interest.

Descartes' proof of existence, "I think, therefore I am," has thus been gradually replaced by "I consume, therefore I am" in the industrialized countries. Men and societies tend to imitate consciously or unconsciously the image (spread essentially through the media), which is objectivized and idealized, in the ruling and middle classes of the Third World countries.

Of course, any human society is necesszarily a consumer society by definition because it is intended to help satisfy essential needs and favor the very survival of the race.

Subsistence societies were gradually transformed into trading societies. Man went from food-gathering to agriculture to industry, and attempted increasingly to produce whatever would give him the greatest relative advantage. People thus specialized production according to the resources of their particular countries in order to maximize profits. This necessarily caused increased interdependence and led to domination by Western countries, which made conquered countries specialize to suit their interests.

Now we are seeing the consolidation of the so-called industrialized societies, which are draining off resources and organizing an international division of labor that will meet their increasingly diversified and often artificially created needs. Therefore, production precedes consumption. It is no longer intended to meet needs but to create them through pervasive advertising.

As a newly independent state, Algeria does not fit this pattern. On the contrary, it has had to struggle hard to preserve and develop its natural resources in order to promote the kind of development likely to meet the needs of a rapidly growing population and initially to "give each citizen a consumption model providing a minimum decent standard of living: housing, food, clothing, health care, education, culture, and leisure" (National Charter).

The Algerian state is responsible for the living conditions of every citizen, and has thus assigned itself the duty of creating all conditions under which "each Algerian may meet his basic needs in dignity," which especially implies the liquidation of the structures of domination, the elimination of unemployment, and the will to insure "the existence of those who cannot yet, can no longer, or can never work."

A Determining Variable

The development strategy set in 1966 and implemented in 1967 with the first 3-year plan thus established the priorities of creating jobs and meeting the basic needs of the people, two objectives that are closely related. From this standpoint, demographic data and their outlook definitely constitute a determining variable, given the importance attached to such essential needs as work, food, health care, education, and housing.

According to estimates based on the 1966 census, the working population in the various sectors came to 2,507,568, of whom 1,299,063 were in agriculture. Ten years later, the results of the general population and housing census made in early 1977 show a working population of 2,336,971, of whom 629,160 were in agriculture. Compared with the overall population figure for 1 January 1978, which was 17,272,000 people, the evaluation of the working population thus indicates that every worker actually supports 13.5 other people. With respect to the total potential working population, which generally includes adults between the ages of 20 and 60 (36.59 percent of the total) the support burden goes down by practically half but is still considerable: 7 people per worker. True, the largest age group is made up of young people under the age of 19, or 57.56 percent of the total.

In the next decade, the total population will grow by 10 million people, and the number of households will grow by 1.5 million. reaching nearly 4 million units in 1990. The school-age population (ages 6-15) will grow by 2 million and reach 6 million children.

These few figures quickly show the size of the needs to be met and the productive effort that must be made even considering the long-term prospect of a sizeable reduction in unemployment.

The 5-year plan presented by the ministry of Planning and Development states that the working population will grow during the next planning period at an average annual rate of about 4.8 percent, or about a million people, of whom about 70 percent will be working men between the ages of 18 and 59. The plan also forecasts a growth of nearly 1.2 million people in non-agricultural jobs, which would bring that total to 3.5 million (which is about the total employment estimated for 1977). It also calculates an agricultural working population of nearly a million people (estimated at 692,160 in 1977), which should theoretically shrink in the 1980-84 planning period.

The idea of employment in the agricultural sector is actually rather loose and difficult to define, but estimates issued by the same statistical service should make it possible to make useful comparisons by keeping the same criteria.

To achieve the goals set by development strategy, Algeria has allocated considerable financial resources (40-50 percent of gross domestic production, the highest rate in the world) to develop hydrocarbons and implement the 2nd 4-year plan (1974-77).

This kind of effort makes it more appropriate to speak of an "investment society" as far as we are concerned rather than a consumer society. But to achieve the rate of investment planned, especially in the industrial sector, which accounts for about half of the planning done so far, and especially in the context of worldwide inflation, financing has had to be done partly by anticipating future resources (by borrowing abroad) and by increasing the money supply. By the end of 1977 foreign debt almost tripled, and its ratio to the gross domestic product [GDP] and to exports has increased

considerably. This debt was evaluated at about 7 billion in SDR [Special Drawing Rights], 87 percent of which come from lending instutions and financiers. Since then, our borrowing from capitalist financial institutions has grown.

Also, even when investments have been achieved in monetary terms, they have not brought about any increase in the volume of planned and even less necessary production, whence there has been increased reliance on imports of goods and services, which is characteristic of the period.

We must not lose sight of the fact that the same available production supplies the two bases of investment and income intended for consumption, be it immediately available production or anticipation of future production. Of course, in the present context of worldwide inflation, foreign debt may prove advantageous in accelerating economic development provided this debt can be controlled, because it depends on ability to repay and, thereby, on increased production.

If we put together the figures for gross domestic production, especially from 1973 on (when a cumulative inflationary process was started in Algeria), and household consumption, the figures will make it possible to find, albeit approximately, the degree of inflation and the measures necessary to achieve the investment rates that have been planned for the next decade.

Household Consumption (in current billions) [* = estimated]

	1973	1977	1979	1984	1990
Food	9.2	13.1	29.0	39.0	54.0
Industrial products	4.4	7.9	18.5	29.8	46.6
Services	3.4	5.0	8.5	15.8	25.0
totals	17.0	26.0*	56.0*	84.6*	115.6*

Gross Domestic Production (value added by economic sector)

1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
30.8	47.74	50.34	61.04	72.75	86.84

Let us mention in passing that the added value for agriculture and the food industries amounted to 6.73 billion plus 3.05 billion or 9.78 billion in 1978; 4.96 billion plus 2.5 billion or 7.5 billion in 1977.

The general price index of goods and services as reported by the Planning ministry grew from 126 in 1974 (1969 = 100) to 167.1 in 1971 for a cumulative growth of 75 percent in 4 years; it is hard to understand that in 6 years, from 1973 to 1979, household consumption expenses tripled, as the reference figures show, even under the hypothesis (to be verified) that there was very substantial growth in the goods and services available for consumption in that period.

A Lower Level

It should also be emphasized that household consumption figures are the most trustworthy since they are based on actual expenditures in current dinars (thus discounting inflation). These figures cannot give a real picture of the change in living standards in the period under discussion. Besides, they are general expenses and do not show changes at the various income levels.

To guide action programs in raising living standards in terms of expenditures necessary for consumption, the overall consumption forecasts in the 2nd 4-year plan have been presented according to two models: the "urban" and the "rural" (residence criterion plus income criterion).

In 1973 both the urban and rural populations had an annual per capita disposable income of 900 DA [dinars]. The poorest families in the country, a little less than 10 percent of the total population, then had a living standard often at a level less than 400 DA, while the average for the rural population is estimated at about 550 DA. The increase in general consumer expenditures forecast in the 2nd 4-year plan (from 17 billion dinars in 1973 to 26 billion in 1977) should have improved rural living standards by bringing average per-capita consumption up from 550 DA in 1973 to nearly 800 DA in 1977, while per-capita levels of consumption less than 500 DA would be considered marginal.

In order to keep the disparity between the towns and countryside from worsening and to keep townspeople from cornering the planned increase in general consumption (and thus slow down the rural exodus), and to keep consumer demand from outstripping supply, a policy was advocated to limit incomes and consumption.

The projected 1980-84 five-year plan also emphasizes the necessity to manage incomes and to use regulatory and corrective mechanisms and measures to keep distortions from developing in buying power, supply, and prices. (The rise in incomes caused by balancing in the plan is on the order of 9.5 percent a year in real terms.) The priority actions to be undertaken are still aimed at "eliminating malnutrition among the broadest categories and populations and discouraging increased consumption of secondary products by categories of people whose income increases markedly." The first objective naturally implies supplying the poorest people with strategic products but also developing a coherent and continuous price policy consistent with what is possible for these people. The draft plan states that compensatory mechanisms will have to be maintained to protect buying power, whether by direct transfers through the governmental budget or through consumer price supports. In this respect it must be emphasized that in the 1980 budget most of the increase under "common charges" is intended for price supports increasing from 900 million DA in 1979 to 1.945 million DA in 1980 (ONACO [Algerian National Marketing Office] 370 million DA, SOGEDIA [Food Industries Management and Development Company] 80 million DA, SN-SEMPAC [expansion unknown] 370 million DA, OAIC [Interoccupational Algerian Grains Office] 1,100 million DA).

Also, the pressure on products in high-income, high population-density regions should not penalize the future supply of distant, poorer regions. "Action in the area of distribution and consumer prices will again tend to develop inexpensive (?) formulas for marketing, transportation, and storage."

The second objective that tends to discourage the growth of intermediate consumption is closely tied to the necessity of greatly reducing the growth of speculative income due to shortages mainly in housing, commerce, and the industrial production of secondary consumer goods.

Reducing the Deficit

Income accumulated through the movement of products and capital abroad, which has been facilitated by the existence of large savings through emigration, will have to be stopped, partly because it is a large source of speculative wealth and capital, but especially because of the foreseeable effects it has on the consumption model and the degradation of social behavior at many levels of the population"(5-year plan draft).

Under the next 5-year plan, it is estimated that per-capita consumption will grow from 3,000 DA at present to 4,000 DA in 1984 and improve quantitatively and qualitatively, on the obvious and heavy condition that the policy of income management actually makes it possible to improve consumption among the poorest categories of people and that production capacity adapts to meet the rapid growth in demand.

The adaptation of investments and production to meet the outlook for household consumption is an increasingly urgent matter. The rapid growth of incomes and of needs in housing, transportation, education, and health care will cause an explosive demand for industrial products and services.

As the notion of basic needs gradually widens to include secondary goods not yet available in sufficient quantity on the domestic market (especially electrical appliances), the 5-year plan even notes that it is economically and socially much more effective to import directly, in sufficient amounts, and at chosen prices articles considered to be secondary consumer items rather than to proscribe them and let uncontrollable, speculative black markets develop. As for household appliances, for example, the rate at which national needs were being met was 15 percent in 1979: 36,000 refrigerators; 17,500 stoves; 40,000 hot water heaters; and 20,000 air conditioners.

A new team's taking over in 1980 should make it possible to double production, since present capacity is sufficient, and thus meet about 30 percent of national demand. The production of black and white television sets came to 66,480 sets in 1979; there were also 4,200 color television sets and 4,500 record players.

In the present context of the general import program and the anti-shortage program intended to make up the deficit in this area, about 400,000 refrigerators, 270,000 stoves, 300,000 television sets, 400,000 heaters of all kinds, 120,000 hot water heaters, 400,000 radios, etc. will be imported.

In 1973, the planners estimated that considering the achievement of programmed objectives (the rest of the objectives to be achieved are still considerable in 1980) "rural"-model consumer expenditures could rise from 550 DA to about 800 DA per capita per annum. In 1980 these expenditures were estimated at 3,000 DA per capita. Does this mean that the people's standard of living, especially in the most disadvantaged strata of society, has risen proportionally? Besides the impact of the inflationary process, which is considerable,

and which cuts more markedly into the income of these very levels of society, doesn't the average overall increase that has been noted mainly reflect increasingly evident distortions in incomes? In any case, the analysis of incomes is essential to any meaningful approach to consumer expenditures, especially since the outlook for Algeria is for a substantial increase in incomes without a corresponding increase in available goods and services.

II--Worsening Incomes

In approaching the question of whether ours is a consumer society, it is also necessary to consider incomes in order to try to understand the negative phenomena occurring daily in the area of consumption.

We observe today that anything can be bought at any price from anybody. The sorry pictures of piecework, of organized theft made possible by speculation and the black market, and of real or contrived shortages are signs of the fragility of our economy.

By buying at any price, the citizen assists in the emergence of a new class of obscure or notorious loan sharks and speculators who have an enormous impact on the public spirit of the average citizen, particularly young people, because it makes them unfit for and contemptuous of work.

Of course, it would be tempting to think that because people buy anything at any price because we are all rich enough to do so and put up with the inflation it causes.

But actually, while incomes have grown in the last decade, their distribution shows great inequalities and disparities. Geographically, the rural sector has had a growth rate of 10 percent (up from 3.9 to 4.3 billion DA). This corresponds approximately to its rate of population growth.

On the other hand, urban incomes have grown 37 percent (up from 8.1 to 11.1 billion DA), clearly superior to the corresponding rate of population growth. At the sector level, it appears that productive workers, the industrial wage earners, have been least favored by the distribution of incomes created by their own work: an average per capita growth of 7 percent, as opposed to 17 percent in the salaries of administrators and businessmen and 9 percent in those of industrial entrepreneurs.

At the level of socio-professional categories, which had an overall salary supply of 40 billion DA in 1979, the gross earnings of non-wage earners reached 19 billion DA. Thus, half of the income is going to a quarter of the population.

Production sectors are receiving average wages lower than those of indirectly productive sectors (this is the case with agriculture, the building trades, hydraulics, and industry). One example: 580 DA for agriculture as opposed to 1,950 DA for the service sector. Studies have shown that 54 percent of productive workers receive 46 percent of gross wages; 12 percent of the service

sector workers receive 18 percent, and 34 percent of administrative employes receive 36 percent.

Thus, concentration in urban zones, the disaffection of farm workers and the rural exodus have further accentuated the inequalities in incomes that already existed between town and country. To this phenomenon should be added the sectorial disparities that the general status of the worker should make it possible to attenuate.

Also, with the intense rate of development that our country has gone through in the past decade, the general standard of living has improved despite a somewhat altered content due to the absence of a consumption model or rather to the diversity of models that Algerians are exposed to every day. Going beyond income growth to estimate the comparative growth of living standards, it is imperative to keep in mind what the real rates of inflation are and how able the various economic forces are to combat effectively the monetary erosion that aggravates distortions and increases the various opportunities to gain money through speculation.

Savings: Short Shrift

It is clear that strong pressures on the availability of consumer products and insufficient control over the formation and distribution of incomes mean that compensatory mechanisms must be maintained and strengthened to protect and improve the income of the most disadvantaged parts of society, which are fully exposed to monetary erosion, inflation, and speculation.

Observing the race for consumption at any price in the big cities, we might think, wrongly, that all the people have adequate means. We do not, and our judgment will have to be shaped by the questions Who buys? Who consumes? Who consumes what?

Of course, in the big cities, it often happens that in one family several members work and bring in no little amount of money, but this "union" or multiple-income commonality only makes it possible to hold the line against inflation and rising prices. But for a father supporting a family whose only resources are his monthly salary, things are different: food accounts for nearly 60 percent of his household budget. The bill is stiff, and it is hard to make it through the end of the month.

Having said that, it is possible to understand the "euphoria" we are presently going through; it benefits only some of the bourgeois, who take advantage of all the government's aid and support to first- and second-priority products, and all kinds of speculators, who use children to sell in all the stores in town and create their own parallel market.

These sorry pictures are, of course, emphasized by the many pitfalls of distribution, which continues to suffer from many shortcomings: political price infrastructure, etc.

Where is this taking us? When we consider that we are about to launch the 5-year plan and must expect an income growth of 9.5 percent a year with an increase in wages of 10 percent a year, we have reason to be disturbed about the future and nature of our society.

With a program added to the 500-billion DA overall import program, we can measure the seriousness of the situation; energetic measures are needed to improve production, restore the value of work, reinvigorate agriculture, clean up our distribution system, strengthen inspection, and stimulate savings.

Ah, that great word: savings! Who can and will save? The well-to-do have no need to save because, come what may, they can get whatever they want. Workers living on their wages cannot save, because daily living expenses take most of their money.

And then what good is it to save 500 DA for 10 months to get 5,000 DA that has lost buying power in the meantime? The predominant attitude is that everything that is available today is cheap, because it will be more expensive tomorrow. Of course, saving in such a spirit of frustration and defeatism concerns very few citizens who plan to get a place to live or a car and nothing else. Are even more attractive interest rates needed to encourage savings?

From a lack of savings to waste is only a step, which anyone can take lightly and unconsciously in the present atmosphere of shortages and momentary abundance.

Must ours be a society based on frantic and superficial consumption? Is it healthy for our economy to continue importing many things that we can produce ourselves? For how long? The solution does not consist of any import program, however extensive and consistent it may be. Of course, meeting social needs is the first purpose of our development policy, but there can be only one way of achieving it: work. Without it, all will be naught but illusion and false euphoria, which would be the source of a dangerous and painful future for our society, country, and economy.

Coherent wage-planning instruments, management of non-wage incomes, and price control are urgent objectives to be achieved if we wish to preserve the basic qualities of our society and its essential values.

Also, popular mobilization and support cannot take shape without these conditions and rules in a "game" where the development and promotion of our society are at stake.

8782
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CREATION OF PARTY CELLS FOR WORKERS WITHIN ENTERPRISES

Cohesion of All Workers

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 1-7 Aug 80 pp 6-7

[Text] The campaign to set up party cells within enterprises began to take shape in various wilayas [as published]. The campaign, under the aegis of the party's administrative office, was officially launched this week in Algiers. The operation is taking place under favorable conditions. Thus, it turns out that the launching of the campaign is wholly due to the initiative of the rank and file. To do this, they made an inventory of the main units of production, their distribution according to their type of activity, and took a census of all militants employed in them.

These new groups have before them a long-range task to mobilize the working class. They represent an additional means for the existing organs within the enterprises to help them cope with problems that come up. According to the rules adopted at the end of the second session of the Central Committee, the role of the party cells is to:

--spread the party slogans among the workers, the peasants, and the youth;

--work towards broadening the party base by calling forth and encouraging the workers, the peasants, and the youth to join the party;

--assure the success of a renewal in the administrative agencies elected within the different sectors, through the supervision of the candidacies by the commission;

--encourage the rise of the best elements among the workers, peasants, and youth, who would be able to hold an elective office;

--bring about a symbiosis between the organizations of the masses at the place of work, and direct their activities without replacing these organizations;

--coordinate the existing administrative agencies and various authorities of the organizations of the masses at work, and invite them to exercise unity in their thinking and actions, as well as to arouse within their ranks a feeling of nationalism, and to settle disputes according to established rules;

--through stringent controls, see to it that production means are properly used, and that the national patrimony is preserved;

--see to it that the basic texts of the social revolution are respected in their application.

The wide scope of the above-mentioned tasks requires that the militants always be vigilant in order to insure its success over the long run. Their mission should not go astray because of obstacles that are bound to come up. Perhaps, these obstacles come up mainly because of a wrong assimilation of the objectives used to set up these party cells.

Viable Enterprises

The future effort, as shown by the results of work done by the special congress, will be to render the enterprises viable. In this sense, the party cell within the enterprise is welcome.

The economic tasks of the 5 year plan promise to be complex. It is not only a matter of increasing the means for production, but also of making them productive through maximum exploitation. Being the political body in an enterprise, the party cell of the FLN must be an instrument of political emulation. This is the more necessary because socialism rests more on such emulation than on the ways of profit-making capitalism.

Generalizing material well-being involves laws that are more just than what is defined by the workers' general statute now being adopted. It also implies added production in national wealth.

These two factors together bring into play another element, not a material one certainly, but one which is not less real, that of revolutionary consciousness. The workers already show a clear awareness of the problems, since they condemn all existing forms of parasistism within the enterprises as well as in other sectors. Therefore, it is certain that as soon as they are ready to do the job, the party militants will have to respond to this expectation of the workers if they want to broaden the struggle.

Voluntary Service On All Fronts

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 1-7 Aug 80 pp 7-8

[Text] Eclipsed by the many political events that took place these past months, the campaign for the summer voluntary service did take place,

after all, but this time it was under rather special conditions. There were two reasons for a shorter campaign that only lasted 6 days. The first reason being the national conference on higher education, the second one being Ramadan, which came this year during July-August, the traditional time for the campaign. But neither one stopped the students from engaging in various intense activities, and to put into practice their work program.

However, one must note that the low turnout of students and the youth when compared to last year (2,500 as opposed to 5,000) was offset by the mobilization of other social forces. Thus, the workers of the Health Department have set up a permanent camp in Zemmouri before starting to do only medical work. In addition to the medical work that has benefited the rural population, the 150 volunteers, doctors, dentists, and nurses, have helped, in the evenings, with cultural activities very much appreciated by the fellahs who are not used to such enriching moments.

Specialized volunteer service, though sometimes hesitant, has the merit of arousing a lively interest in those who profit by it, and gives to those using it the opportunity to get to know in depth the cultural and sociological values of "real Algeria". Thus, there are different ways of looking at volunteer service, which seems to favor not only an osmosis between the social classes but also provides for an exchange in experiences rich in every way.

This summer, the originality of the campaign lies in the fact that it was begun last winter and continued until the summer. The important thing is that the campaign took place in spite of its limited success due to poor organization of the youth when compared to students coming from university committees.

How can an action be positive if it is not based on a clear and sound organization? The campaign against illiteracy could not be successful if there is no provision, from the start, for structures that can support it. It is true that one learns from experience. Moreover, the volunteers who fight illiteracy must be integrated either into university committees or into the UNJA [National Union of Algerian Youth]. Outside of these structures and other party organizations no serious work can be done and no positive results can be obtained.

Struggle Against Illiteracy

During the winter campaign, when considering an increase in the voluntary service, the great importance of studying methods for organizing the struggle against illiteracy was stressed. Based on this fact, the groups in charge of these studies would have to conduct all necessary investigations from which they will develop suggestions for a plan of action against illiteracy, one that would stretch over several years. They would also contribute to help spread throughout the country the progressive use of the national language by administrations and local communities in their dealings with the citizens.

As of now, we cannot say that the struggle against illiteracy is a concrete reality. Yet, it can be said that the fact that it is a concern of the voluntary service is a measure of its success. On the recommendation of the Central Committee, the party authorities are seriously working towards the general acceptance of a national language through the efforts of the voluntary service. The positive or negative results of this action will depend, to a large extent, on good organization. It would, therefore, be important to gether all necessary criteria in order to avoid the pitfalls and problems that come from poor preparation.

The increase in the voluntary service, which gave a multidisciplinary character to its actions, was very conclusive. Aside from its political aspect throughout the alliance of all social forces, there is an especially interesting economic aspect. In Drean (Annaba), the fellahs benefited from the technical help given to the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] camp, whose workers, coming from the El-Hadjar complex, had the assignment to repair and maintain the agricultural tools of the cooperatives.

Eloquent Numbers

The action that should be emphasized, perhaps because it has passed unnoticed, is the one regarding the volunteer's campaign for reforestation for 1979-1980. It was started on 21 December and ended 21 March 1980 with promising results. Only numbers can give an idea about the importance of the work done and the scope of the action undertaken. At the end of this campaign, in fact, over 15 million forest plants and almost one million fruitbearing plants were planted by 800,000 volunteers during 13 days of voluntary service. According to the office of the secretary of state for forests and land exploitation, this operation was assessed at almost 50 million dinars and has helped the administration gain 10 years of labor. Are these not grounds for satisfaction for the state and also for those for whom planting a tree has symbolic value.

Covering the whole national territory to Bechar, Tindouf, Tamanrasset, and Adrar, the campaign for reforestation has mibilized almost one million workers from all social and professional groups. At the end of this project, with maintenance and follow-up work assured for a month (from 16 May to 13 June 1980) by militants from organizations of the masses, it was considered possible, with increased volunteer service, to reach the highest objectives in reforestation, thus accelerating the whole reforestation process. The more so since the capacity for mobilization exists, for there is no shortage of workers among the masses. In addition, it is possible to extend the voluntary service to include all workers, and for the concerted action of all organizations to give a concrete form to a task that is of national interest.

It would be to the advantage of the voluntary service to set up a work program within the structure of the organizations of the masses and to coordinate them. The continuous results achieved during the year by the kasmas [as published] could not have taken place without a specific objective, unless, perhaps, it was a political one. For no one can say that the voluntary service has not evolved.

9465
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NEED FOR RESPONSIBLE SOCIALIST PRESS STRESSED

Algiers REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL in French 23 Aug 80 p 9

[Article: "A Socialist Press Must Be Forged Through The Struggle of Its Socialist Militants"]

[Text] Within the framework of a training seminar organized by the metallurgy federation Youcef Bournine, journalist on the staff of El Moudjahid and chief reporter of that daily newspaper in Constantine, gave a talk on "The Role of Information." Considering the burning appeal of that topic, which is now being examined by the party commission on information and culture, we publish extensive excerpts of the Bournine lecture, looking forward to the beginning of a syndical debate on information to which Revolution et Travail will contribute with the hope that it be as broad as possible.

If our press does not measure up to the requirements of the revolution it is proper to look for the causes and to dig up solutions.

The internal causes attesting to the accuracy, even partial, with which quite a few readers judge the press, can be catalogues as follows:

-refusal of certain officials to integrate information into the logic of socialist revolution (offensive and defensive weapons of the revolution);

-negation of the role of the journalist in the defense of the revolution, turning him into a mechanical message designed only to transmit the declarations of officials, previously expurgated of their essential content by other officials;

-replacement of journalism by a civil service system, banning critical observations, killing creative spirit, discouraging the spirit of initiative, and the commitment necessary to a honest exercise of the journalistic profession.

The general conditions surrounding both national press and journalists are characterized by:

-inadequate utilization of means of information;

-inadequate ideological formation of members of the press;

-lack of specialization and recycling;

-lack of solicitude toward material and social problems confronting the journalists;

-lack of democratization of structures that operate without the participation of the journalists;

-lack of political and professional prospects that obstructs the horizon of everyone, and kills emulation in work.

How to Break the Deadlock

Any rational man must recognize two truisms:

-impossibility to vanquish reaction without a really socialist press;

-impossibility to have such a press as long as an earnest and coherent struggle involving journalists and progressist militants is not directed toward that goal.

To achieve his task the journalist must defend an idea. He must be free from doubt; he must be for or against the revolution. In socialist Algeria, he can only be revolutionary and committed. Because he is the spokesman, the defender of the voice of the revolution. The press does not play its role if it boils down to reverberating official remarks. It must raise all the problems concerning the country and revolutionary progress. A press serving that end deserves our confidence. Thus, we can conclude that there exist the possibilities to forge a press expressing the preoccupations of the mass in keeping with the socialist guidelines recently consecrated by the National Charter and codified by the Constitution. What remains to be done is to translate these possibilities--as shown by the debate on the National Charter--into the need for a constructive and permanent criticism encompassing all sectors. At the same time, the national press has the compelling obligation to permanently affirm the results obtained within the framework of national construction tasks. In other words, there is no room for either embellishment or systematic negation in a truly committed, a responsible press. When reading an article, a reportage, a study, or an inquiry, we must be able to bring to light what is good for the progress or the strengthening of the revolution which must be reinforced and developed, and what is bad which must be overcome. Because national reality is not made exclusively of luminous aspects, nor of dark ones. The essential is that the former outplay the latter. Relying on a reality marked by deep revolutionary mutations, progressist militants must increase their effort to energetically reject tendencies

consisting in criticizing all that exists--amounting to rejecting progressist guidelines and the attainments of the mass. Likewise, they must fight the tendency to cover up weakness subsisting within the ranks of the revolution, because it only feigns to espouse revolutionary ideas and to protect them, but in fact it casts doubts on socialist options and the attainments of the mass. With such an approach the national press will be able to contribute to the irreversibility of our march toward socialism, and to warding off the dangers of reaction and of imperialism, thanks especially to genuine and powerful mobilization of the mass.

The national press must feed, if not stir up, that mobilization. In itself, it is a powerful political leverage. It is an irreplaceable tool of mobilization, which at the present time, if used with more initiative and dynamism, would excel in efficaciousness.

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THREE WILAYAS DESCRIBED IN DETAIL

Tlemcen's Diversity

Algiers EL DJEICH in French May 80 pp 11-22

[Article by M.S., translated from the Arabic by A. Laib: "Small Frames for Technological Expansion"]

[Text] No one arriving for the first time in Tlemcen, the wilaya seat, can help but be struck by the diversity and variety, beginning with nature itself.

In the city one feels one has plunged back several centuries. The wall surrounding the town symbolizes its resistance, and many other historic relics standing here and there attract visitors' curiosity. Tlemcen, in a few words, is a mosaic of varying aspects, colors and volumes. With its narrow alleys and its wide modern boulevards. Its small stalls where active and suspicious craftsmen work hard in front of the modern factories that are cropping up everywhere.

Its ancient people's quarters, with houses jammed together, the better to demonstrate the cohesiveness of their inhabitants, are surrounded by luxurious villas and modern neighborhoods.

Every day at sunrise, reflected in the sun's rays, all the pieces of the mosaic give a complete picture of the inhabitants' activities, of the development and expansion of this entire wilaya.

The population is estimated at 620,000, the density at 64 inhabitants per square km.

Assuming that the present known demographic growth of 2.2 percent will remain stable, very probably between now and 1990 the number of inhabitants will reach 764,000. For the year 2000 the estimated figure is approximately 950,000.

According to the last census the wilaya's total manpower is 91,705, as follows:

Agriculture is in first place. It makes use of some 32,710 workers, or 35.6 percent.

Service sector: 30,599 workers, 33.4 percent.

Industry: 15,319 workers, 16.8 percent.

Public works: 12,997 laborers, 14.2 percent.

These figures and estimates lead us to wonder about what this wilaya has done to meet increasing social needs; about future projects having to do with limiting demographic growth and extending urbanization; finally, how this wilaya has been able to bring about a combination of industry and agriculture.

Important Investments

The Tlemcen wilaya has benefited from a special development program decided upon by the government for the purpose of ridding this part of the territory of a chronic under-development and raising it to an estimable standard--on the economic as well as the sociocultural level.

The goal was to have this wilaya, like all those that have benefited from a similar program, participate in the blossoming of the country in all fields of activity.

Pillaged, exploited, ravaged by more than a century of fierce colonialist domination and by one of the most murderous wars, the Tlemcen wilaya, like all the regions of the national territory, has paid its tribute for independence. That domination produced thousands of victims, chiefly peasants who were forced to abandon the fertile lands taken over by the colonists.

Shortly after independence the Tlemcen wilaya had to confront many problems, the most time-consuming of which was taking charge of the hundreds of thousands of Algerian refugees who were coming from Morocco.

These refugees, forced to leave that country in haste, with the meager goods they were able to salvage, returned to their native villages and hamlets. But the war left its traces; nothing was left but ruin. The most serious are the mine fields, which still continue to kill. The result was an uncontrolled exodus to the cities, notably to the wilaya seat.

This migratory movement brought with it nearly insurmountable difficulties, illustrated by a high unemployment rate, by the abandoning of work on the land and related activities, as well as by the crowding together of a veritable human flood around the cities, chiefly Tlemcen. Hence, a housing crisis and the inability of the administrative services to deal with it.

Taking this state of affairs into account, the government has granted substantial aid intended to alleviate gradually the economic and social crisis. On 30 June 1970 the Council of Ministers decided to vote for a special economic, social and cultural development program for this wilaya.

The program's main objectives were to put in place an infrastructure that would be indispensable to the wilaya's economic take-off--a take-off that

would enable it to solve these problems on the one hand, and to participate fully in the development efforts.

Since that date a sustained effort has been undertaken to realize important projects in the various fields, whether economic, social or cultural: agriculture, hydraulics, industry, sociocultural services, infrastructure projects, etc.

Between 1970 and 1980 this gigantic effort seems to have born fruit by bringing about profound changes, at the infrastructural as well as the superstructural level.

That decade may be considered an important stage. It was during those ten years of multiple activities that the wilaya's face was transformed from top to bottom, with the accomplishing of the objectives contained in the special program and the realization of the two four-year plans.

The end result of the whole series of measures undertaken has been an appreciable rise in the inhabitants' standard of living. Thus were born, for the first time, modern industries, new roads, schools and high schools, as well as other sociocultural accomplishments.

Concerning investments in these various areas, the wali, Rachid Mirazi, told us: "The wilaya's development efforts required an investment on the order of 15,000,000,000 DA [dinars], of which 4,422,000,000 were allotted to decentralization operations for the period 1970 to 1979 inclusive."

The wali stated that the allotments affecting decentralization operations represent 2,000,000,000 DA.

Simple calculation reveals the difference that exists between the assigned goals and what has been accomplished, since the projects realized constituted 46 percent of the programs as a whole.

Although this proportion seems to represent less than half of the normal program (50 percent), this is because the development effort undertaken by the wilaya seems to have run up against many natural, administrative and technical difficulties, which we will explain a little farther on.

A clear picture of the various activity sectors may be provided by these figures (in thousands of dinars):

Development in time of drought: 109,634.

Ports: 158,800.

Primary and secondary education: 381,554.

Urban housing: 1,027,199.

Rural housing and agricultural villages: 349,403.

Hospitals: 51,487.

To this is added the budgetary envelopes allotted to the wilaya within the framework of the first and second four-year plans. (This does not take into account the investments carried out by local collectives and APCs.

In the second four-year plan may be cited (in thousands of dinars):

Rural development and modernization of agriculture: 117,534.

Dams and irrigation projects: 15,000.

Urban housing: 152,460.

Hospital infrastructure: 37,706.

Of course the government is fundamentally aimed at constant satisfaction of the population's basic needs and creation of a solid economic base that will make possible a permanent development.

What are the accomplishments of the Tlemcen wilaya? What point has it arrived at? Finally, what prospects are being set at a time when all the country's wilayas are looking forward to application of the first five-year plan?

Agriculture: Diversification Requires Promotion and Mechanization

In the light of what follows, the reader will see in what proportion certain objectives have materialized, and what problems have hampered the realization of some of them.

The Tlemcen wilaya, aside from the newly-created industries, is an agricultural wilaya.

Basically, its inhabitants draw most of their resources from working on the land. In fact, agriculture is the region's primary activity. The distribution of the population, according to the 1977 census, proves this point:

Number of inhabitants in the country: 328,884.

Number of inhabitants in the cities: 219,318.

The rural population represents 59.41 percent of all the wilaya's inhabitants.

The census also indicates that manpower in the agriculture sector is approximately 32,710 workers, which represents 35.6 percent of the total activity; the total number of workers in the wilaya does not exceed 91,705.

Usable agricultural area (SAU) is estimated at one third of all the wilaya's land, or 356,287 hectares out of 854,968. Uncultivated forested land and steppe (grasslands) account for 498,682 hectares (slightly over half of all the land).

The SAU in its turn is allocated as follows:

Private sector: 63 percent.

Self-managed sector: 31 percent.

Agrarian Revolution sector: 6 percent.

As a general rule the three sectors play an important role in the wilaya's economy, in the sense that the wilaya's agricultural production is quite diversified:

1. Large crops: Soft and hard wheat, oats, barley, etc.

The area reserved for this kind of crops reached some 173,452 hectares during the 1979-1980 season, the major part of it devoted to the hard wheat crop (67,683 hectares). In order to accomplish clearly positive results, various meetings were held to prepare seriously for that season.

2. Pasture crops: These crops take up fallow and irrigated land; but the latter are subject to many troubles. The lack of water in particular, and an almost permanent drought situation.

3. Dry vegetables: These crops get special attention among the leaders as well as among farmers; for both are concerned with increasing production.

The average yield per hectare reached 3 quintals during the last three years.

4. Industrial crops: This kind of crop was introduced throughout the wilaya as part of the application of the four-year plans and the special program. From this group sericulture (raising of silkworms) might be singled out.

For natural silk production a mulberry tree nursery (1,000,000 trees) was established. It makes possible 2 tons of natural silk per year.

Lavendar occupies an area of 1,000 hectares in the Sebdou region. This makes it possible to produce 9,000 kilograms of lavendar.

It is processed on the premises in a distilling unit.

5. Greenhouse crops: Introduced since 1970 within the framework of the first four-year plan, these crops are constantly being developed. They currently cover an area of 40 hectares. The average yield per hectare is 120 quintals.

6. Planting of fruit trees: The wilaya has agreed to huge efforts in this area, especially pertaining to the operations of development for drought, and of planting the trees.

These efforts have led to the development of fruit-tree culture; over 1,000,000 different varieties of fruit trees have been planted. They occupy an area of 4,000 hectares.

Currently the area--which was 3,400 hectares--has reached some 8,000 hectares in all.

Thus the Tlemcen wilaya is considered one of the most important fruit-producing regions.

7. Grapes: This group is currently going through significant changes, in the sense that the vines are gradually being replaced by table grape stocks.

Up to this point 550 hectares have been planted.

With regard to activities having to do with cattle raising, the effort has chiefly dealt with three main axes:

Improving sheep and cattle raising.

Putting sanitary structures in place.

Developing structures for aviculture and apiculture.

With this goal in mind, an experimental stable was built at Henaya with room for 400 dairy cows, before replacing the existing strain. The second objective is to improve dairy production by making possible a regular supply from the Tlemcen central dairy, which was started up in 1975.

It should be noted in this regard that dairy production at the wilaya level has greatly increased, having reached 2,856,000 liters in 1979.

As for apiculture and the gathering of honey, production has gone from 15,000 kilograms to 20,000 kilograms and the number of hives is 1,000.

As far as fowl breeding is concerned, a hatchery is in the process of being built. Upon its completion in 1981 it will be able to produce 50,000 laying hens, which will furnish 720,000 eggs annually.

These, succinctly described, are the three main agricultural sectors.

In the area belonging principally to the Agrarian Revolution, there seems to be a notable advance despite the hindrances created here and there at various levels of its application.

The representative of the Agrarian Revolution at the wilaya level indicated to us that the current phase is characterized by in-depth work toward completing the first and second phases, and to a lesser degree the third phase.

The work accomplished up to now was made possible by the creation of 102 Joint Exploitation Cooperatives (CAEC), bringing together 800 peasants who farm about 11,000 hectares.

In addition, 243 individual plots were allotted.

During the application of the second phase, 78 cooperatives (CAEC) were installed. They are exploited by 670 assignees and comprise 6,500 hectares. Similarly, 326 plots were allotted individually. They comprise about 3,000 hectares.

The third phase proceeded to create 10 CAPRAs [Agricultural Production Cooperative of the Agrarian Revolution] of 6 assignees each in the Sebdou region.

There are 17 more in the El-Ghour commune.

The representative stated that the management of these cooperatives is suffering no major problems, because their manpower is characterized by youth and stability.

With regard to rural housing, in the development program 57 villages were proposed; 13 have been completed and 4 others will be delivered soon. The remainder are still under study.

The representative said that the delay that is affecting these developments is not over six months on the average. The problem is due in large part to the lack of construction materials.

Agricultural Equipment and Temporary Breakdowns

The diversification of agriculture, the expansion of the useful area, the development of hydraulic resources in addition to very ambitious modernization projects have brought with them certain difficulties, which have had a negative influence on agriculture.

The most crucial problem the wilaya seems to undergoing is without doubt the lack of agricultural equipment, especially spare parts. For 628 hectares there is only a single combine harvester.

Similarly, the Agrarian Revolution sector possesses 357 tractors, 72 of which have broken down.

In general, the replacement parts problem is acute. The equipment situation is indeed quite disastrous. The following are broken down:

25 percent of the pneumatic tractors;

60 percent of the caterpillar tractors;

30 percent of the fertilizer spreaders;

30 percent of the seeders.

CAPCS [Communal Multi-Service Agriculture Cooperative] and ONAMA [National Agricultural Equipment Office] are busy repairing most of the equipment. But the effort of these two agencies is still ineffectual, which aggravates the situation, especially at the beginning of every season.

The second problem is irrigation water. Despite the existence of important hydraulic resources, the wilaya remains very poor in this area. Industrial projects and other utilities of a socio-economic nature use very large quantities of water.

Tlemcen water supplies even the city of Oran. The region most affected by this problem is undoubtedly the Maghnia plain, which specializes in irrigated crops.

Statistics show that only 180 hectares (of its 706 hectares) are reached by irrigation.

This is actually due to the drought that heavily affected the region during the last three years.

The technical services of this district are making efforts to increase the irrigated area by trying to bring it from 4,500 hectares to 8,000 hectares. The total area is 17,000 hectares. The project is certain to contribute important changes at the district level.

Marketing: the Main Thing is to Facilitate Operations

The marketing of fruits and vegetables is currently provided by the COFEL [Fruit and Vegetable Cooperative] of the wilaya and the OFLA [Fruit and Vegetable Office] agency; this is in accordance with the ministerial circular of March 1978.

Throughout the wilaya there are agencies of these two marketing structures. But here marketing runs into difficulties. Among which may be cited those having to do with equipment, in particular the absence of storage areas and areas for cold storage.

The difficulties in financing such means comes from complicated operations and steps that would have to be carried in the banking structures.

In spite of this, marketing in this wilaya is to be encouraged and supported, because this district provisions various other wilayas, among them Bechar and Ouargla.

What is important is that all the services at the wilaya level are moving with a view to resolving the difficulties being posed in the rural world. This promotion obviously requires:

Improvement of the technical skill of the peasants and stock raisers.

Setting up methods of exploitation and rational utilization of water.

This last point leads us to turn our attention to hydraulics at the wilaya level, to its accomplishments, its problems and its future prospects.

Hydraulics: a Vital Necessity

Activities in the field of hydraulics are basically oriented toward developing land and expanding the irrigable area, just as they deal with equipping wells located in the pastoral areas and, lastly, with water supply for consumption (drinking water).

Within this framework the irrigated Maghnia plain is viewed with special attention.

This plain extends over a total area of 17,000 hectares, of which 10,500 will be irrigated at first and some 6,500 other hectares will follow in a second period.

This ambitious project obviously requires that significant hydraulic resources be available; hence the plan for building two dams, the cornerstone for which was laid by the president of the Republic during his visit to this wilaya last February.

The first dam (the Souani), with its water reserve estimated at 14,000,000 cubic meters, will make it possible to enlarge the irrigated surface of the Maghnia plain.

The second, called El-Izdihar and located at Sidi-Abdelli, will contribute to the irrigation of an area estimated at 4,000 hectares. Its reserve capacity is 110,000,000 cubic meters.

In addition to these two developments, there are two other dams in the wilaya, the "Mafrouch" (16,000,000 cubic meters) and the "Beni Nahdel" (44,000,000 cubic meters).

In the near future, the wilaya authorities think the water from the Beni Nahdel dam can be used for the benefit of agriculture, after completion of the dam that will supply the city of Oran (Oued Cheliff).

Generally, the wilaya expects to realize ambitious projects in this area. Tlemcen in fact has a considerable expanse of water. But all of this has not been able to alleviate the effects of certain problems, especially the drought, which has affected agriculture in the wilays for the last three years, and the problem of non-delivery of means of irrigation. The problem is having negative repercussions on the Maghnia region. Losses amount to 30,000,000 DA at the present time.

Industry: to Ensure an Economic Take-off

The Tlemcen wilaya opted to put in place an industrial base, at the time of the special program as well as during development of the two four-year plans.

Moreover, special interest was accorded agriculture and its development, to create a balance between these two sectors.

Industrial activity is quite varied throughout the wilaya. In addition to the production of certain goods, it has made possible the gradual reduction of unemployment by the creating of 14,500 jobs, of which 7,100 are new jobs. Similarly, domestic savings, which was 4,000,000 DA in 1970, went to over 100,000,000 DA in 1979.

Industry occupies 16.8 percent of the manpower. Basically it produces material of a necessary nature: building materials, textiles, processing of agricultural products.

Building materials production has experienced a marked growth, which enables the wilaya to bypass the eternal shortages that seem to affect this kind of products, and especially to realize everything that was programmed in construction and housing.

The wilaya is currently producing, per year:

500,000 tons of cement at the Beni-Saf plant,

100,000 square meters of ceramic tiles (Remchi),

130,000 tons of red products at the Remchi plant (tiles and bricks),

600,000 sanitary ceramic units (El-Ghazaouet plant),

78,000 tons of breeze-block (Henaya plant).

To this effort is added another, manufacture from wood. Throughout the wilaya there are many production units, including the one at Nedroma, which annually produced 5,000 suites of modern furniture.

This sector will experience considerable expansion after completion of the projects in the course of development at Beni-Saf (carpentry); the latter plant will fill the wilaya's needs in doors, windows and building lumber (beams, etc.). It will go into production in 1981 and provide 800 jobs.

In the textile field, and considering that this wilaya has a chiefly traditional handcraft industry, it has become very difficult with time for the old textile plants to satisfy the craftsmen's demands for raw materials.

To fill the deficit, various projects have been adopted, including:

The natural silk and synthetic threat production complex which is in the developing stage. When it begins production in 1981 it will produce annually 15,000,000 meters of silk and approximately 60 tons of synthetic thread.

To this is added another rather important project specializing in making workmen's "blues." This unit will be installed in Sebdou. It will produce 12,000,000 meters of cloth per year. Moreover, in Maghnia there is already a similar unit, producing 30,000 garments per year.

With regard to the food processing industry in particular, the wilaya seems to be according it a certain interest in order to create a complementarity between agriculture and the food industry.

A flour mill is under construction according to the budget for the future; it will produce 2,000 quintals of semolina per day. Another project is also under construction in Maghnia.

It will specialize in daily processing of 200 tons of maize for production of a series of various projects, part of which will be used in the pharmaceutical industry.

In addition, other units will be put in place as part of the program of installing a small and medium-sized industry, the ultimate result of which will be to satisfy the needs of the population and create a number of jobs.

Heavy Industry and Technological Development

Industry has begun to expand in the Tlemcen wilaya, which seems to have gone beyond the first phase, which consisted of installing medium-sized and light industries. Large industrial complexes have been implanted here and there, throughout a plain with enormous potential.

The availability of certain materials in the wilaya and the presence of a coastal frontage have facilitated--or at least contributed to--installation of this industry. In fact this wilaya has two important ports: El-Ghazaouet and Beni-Saf, which play a large import-export role.

The wilaya seems to be very privileged in the mining field: iron at Beni-Saf (100,000 tons per year, all of it exported); a marble quarry at Ben Sekrane. Nevertheless, the latter is encountering difficulties in the way of rational exploitation. The most significant is difficulty in expanding, which heavily influences extraction.

Moreover, the wilaya has penetrated well and truly into the electronic era with the creation of a SONELEC [Algerian National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Electronic Equipment] unit for production of telephone equipment. It may be said that as of the present the wilaya is in every way experiencing a significant development in the industrial and agricultural fields. Renovating and improving land, air and maritime paths of communication will certainly help to alleviate the seriousness of certain problems and solve those that hinder importation and exportation, as well as exchanges with other wilayas.

Telephone Equipment Manufacturing Complex [Box]

The telephone equipment manufacturing complex at Tlemcen, whose official start of production was inaugurated by President Chadli Bendjedid during his most recent visit to this wilaya, is considered to be an important means of modernizing the national telecommunications system.

The complex occupies an area of 58 hectares. Its annual production of telephone exchanges (electromechanical equipment) is expected to reach 80,000 lines, divided as follows: 50,000 urban exchanges, 3,000 transit exchanges, 12,000 rural exchanges and 15,000 private exchanges.

In addition, production of semi-electronic telephone exchanges will be on the order of 20,000 lines, of which 10,000 will be urban exchanges and 10,000 will be transit exchanges.

Finally, this complex, which will produce 140,000 telephone handsets, will employ all told nearly 3,000 persons, including 150 engineers and higher-echelon executives, 288 higher technicians and production officers and 600 skilled workers.

Training and Education

The actions undertaken in the wilaya were not aimed solely at putting in place a single economic infrastructure, but also at establishing the bases of a true social and cultural policy.

For this reason education, training and public health are the object of attention and constant effort.

Education, with its four levels--primary, middle secondary, technical and higher--has undergone very considerable development at the level of the receiving structures as well as in the area of satisfying cultural and educational needs.

The percentage of children between the ages of 6 and 13 attending school was 73.3 percent between 1970 and 1979, whereas for the 1969-1970 period it was only 49 percent.

The number of primary school pupils has risen from 62,500 to 102,000.

Receiving this impressive number of pupils has necessitated building 1,409 classrooms and 653 housing units for the teachers.

In an interview with the director of education of the Tlemcen wilaya, we detected a certain optimism that seems to prevail in education circles, despite the existence of problems such as delays in school construction or the absence of housing for teachers.

The total number of middle education pupils is 25,500. In 1969-1970 the number was only 7,176. School attendance has increased 250 percent.

The continued increase in the total number of pupils has led authorities to consider the future. For this reason it was decided to build 17 CEMs [College of Intermediate Studies] whose delivery is expected for the period between 1980 and 1983.

Secondary and technical education are also undergoing considerable development: total numbers have increased 370 percent. The number of pupils has risen from 1,257 (1969-1970) to 5,680 at the beginning of the 1979-1980 school year.

In order not to suffer the repercussions of such growth, the wilaya has had to program two high schools capable of providing a boarding regime for girls. These two high schools are under construction, one in Remchi, the other in Beni-Saf. Their contribution to the training of girls from rural regions will be considerable.

As for higher education, there is in existence a university center which began normal operation in 1974. But efforts in its direction would have to be sustained and permanent, since registrations have increased by 800 percent. From 118 in 1974-1975 the number of students has grown to 1,080 in 1979-1980.

The university center dispenses training in various branches: exact and technological science, biology, economics, Arabic literature and law.

From that same interview we were able to learn of the problems that arise in education. In the first place is lack of housing, which constitutes a sure hindrance to development of this sector. Housing for teaching cadres--teachers and other trainers--is delivered with very significant delays, especially when it is known that the building of 100 classrooms must bring with the building of 100 housing units. Naturally this has repercussions on the effort to educate, which must take into account the increasingly impressive total numbers of pupils.

The same problem arises acutely in rural areas: despite the existence of housing in the schools, teachers flee these areas for the simple reason that the infrastructure necessary for a decent life is not available.

This is also found at the secondary level, where housing allotments are made only for foreign cooperants.

Nationals are left on the fringes, so to speak. Hence the high rate of absenteeism and lack of interest in the profession, the flight to other sectors.

Tourism: the Natural Framework Alone is not Enough!

Tlemcen is a city famous as much for its art as for its history. It has several views, sites and historic relics, which attract a significant number of tourists, Algerians and foreigners among them.

In addition, the Tlemcen wilaya encompasses in its high mountains very dense forest regions which allow for a good implantation of family tents, and beaches

with fine golden sand, a preferred spot for spending the summer vacation.

Despite the efforts deployed in the touristic field, this sector continues to suffer from a lack of receiving structures, more precisely a lack of touristic complexes.

In Tlemcen, the Ziyanid Hotel is still the only establishment frequented by tourists.

We note that this hotel has increased its number of beds from 366 to 666--for the whole wilaya. Now, this is still below the demand, especially when there are known to be other structures in existence which for their part, for one reason or another, evidence considerable delays in reception. We cite as examples the Rivaux and Marguerite Villas, which occupy a picturesque site and dominate the whole city of Tlemcen and the Albert I Hotel, which is in the center of the city.

Will serious procedures be undertaken that will contribute to starting these important establishments up again?

The Handcraft Industry: Between Profits and Originality

The Tlemcen wilaya assumes a specific aspect through its diverse traditional handcraft industries. In this respect what is truly regrettable is that this industry is tending to shrink.

In the rug manufacturing field, for example, the handcraft industry is subject to significant contradictions, especially in importing raw materials and exporting production.

The handcraft sector has also suffered a significant fall in production, from 428,000 cubic meters in 1970 to 44,000 cubic meters in 1979.

What is the cause?

In the course of our interview with a union leader from the handcraft industries, we concluded that this sector is suffering from several difficulties. The craftsmen are increasingly uninterested in their work, given that production costs are very high and raw materials are increasingly rare.

We also note the beginning of the disappearance of the old generation of craftsmen, of these different kinds of industry and a total disinterest on the part of young people in this kind of industry.

Concerning a question about the role the training centers are to play in the field of handcrafts industries, he said that the wilaya has only two centers and that they are much more occupied with production, to the detriment of training.

However, the work performed in these centers has for its primary objective a significant monetary profit from the sale of the various handcraft products, rather than reactivation of this kind of traditional activity.

Wherein, Then, lies the Solution to This Delicate Problem? Housing: Efforts, But...

The education sector is not the only one to suffer from a lack of housing, nor are the industry or agriculture sectors, and most workers, whatever their activity, find themselves confronted with this delicate problem.

The housing crisis is a "fait accompli," one might say, for not only is it an impediment to development, but it also has negative repercussions on the very behavior of the people.

The wilaya is well aware of this. Hence the effort now being started. The results may be meager, but what counts is the desire to smooth out this major difficulty, at all costs. The wilaya, through the development of urban housing, has been the beneficiary of an allotment of 10,190 housing units. But the delays in their construction are so considerable that only 2,000 have been completed. Another 4,000 are under construction.

Faced with this situation, the wilaya has encouraged the parceling out of communal reserves to stimulate individual building. For that purpose more than 1,700 parcels of land have been sold to private individuals. In a next phase 6,000 plots of land will be sold.

Rural areas have also benefited from this measure. Of 10,000 housing units programmed, 6,400 have been received and the rest are on the way to completion.

The Agrarian Revolution for its part has contributed to promoting the rural world, chiefly in the area of housing, where 13 agricultural villages encompassing 1,760 housing units have come into being. Currently there is talk of expanding them to satisfy the many demands of the assignees.

Health: Delayed Accomplishments

The public health sector is considered to be of particular importance.

The wilaya's interest in this sector is most extensive.

Although for the past 10 years this sector has had only 20 institutions at its disposal, scattered throughout the wilaya, today it has seemed necessary to make it more dynamic in order to absorb the strong needs of the population--especially the rural population--in matters of health.

These needs are being merely 25 percent satisfied; health structures are able to supply only one bed per 425 inhabitants and one doctor for 5,600 inhabitants.

The wilaya is obviously extremely worried. Hence the plan to create other health centers, among them three hospitals to be built in Sebdou, El-Ghazouet and Maghnia. But these projects are experiencing construction delays.

The problems currently besetting this sector were the subject of an interview with the director of health of the Tlemcen district.

The director told us that the major problem does not lie in the lack of medications, as some citizens think, but in the paucity of means such as the receiving infrastructure and equipment for medical consultation and intervention. This sector also runs into a problem of utilization of equipment of local origin and diverse foreign provenances.

A large part of the equipment is not utilized, so to speak, at all, for many reasons: lack of knowledge of how to operate it, or the nonexistence of replacement parts.

The second problem is that of supplying the hospitals with various materials, food products in particular.

In fact, organizations having relations with the health sector are known to impose very rigid clauses in their contracts with the hospitals; which naturally has negative repercussions on the quality of care.

Between the Objectives and the Reality

Our presence in Tlemcen enabled us to ascertain what seems to have beneficial future consequences for this wilaya, at the urban as well as the rural level.

The survey gave us an opportunity to evaluate the whole effort agreed to in the last 10 years. Although the development process has not yet arrived at its final phase, on the other hand work is being carried on without respite to put an end to certain negative aspects, born of the rapid changes in the wilaya.

In fact the wilaya is planning to realize ambitious projects in many areas. But reality shows that there is a difference between the plans and what has really been made concrete.

Various difficulties stand in the way of the effort undertaken by the wilaya and the state; efforts basically aimed at permanently satisfying the increasingly important needs of the population.

Statistical Sources

Statistical Data on the Tlemcen Wilaya, February 1980.

Budgetary Operations, Tlemcen wilaya, February 1980.

Agricultural situation, DARAW [expansion unknown], 1979.

Tlemcen Health Sector, March 1980.

The Tlemcen wilaya is in thirteenth place in the alphabetical classification of the country's 31 wilayas. Geographically it is in the extreme northwest.

Bounded on the north by the Mediterranean Sea, on the east by the Sidi-Bel-Abbes wilaya and on the south by the Saida wilaya, the Tlemcen wilaya's western borders are 150 km long, and the northern border follows the sea as far as the El-Arricha steppe plains.

On the relief map this wilaya may be divided into four distinct zones:

The Terrara countain chain: this is a fairly low massif. It separates the Sahel from the interior plain.

The interior plain: it is characterized by an antagonism between the climate and the nature of the land that forms it.

The Tlemcen heights (or Tlemcen plateau): this elevation contains the region's most important water reserve.

The high steppe plains: pastoral, covered with grass.

On the administrative map the Tlemcen wilaya covers an area estimated to be approximately 9,283.7 square km. It includes seven districts and 31 communes:

Districts	Communes
Tlemcen	Tlemcen, Ben Sekrane, Tirni Beni Hdyl, Ouled Mimoun, Ain Fezza, Beni Mester, Ain Talout, Sidi Abdelli
Remchi	El Hanaya, Remchi, Beni Ouarsis, Ain Youssef
Nedroma	Nedroma, Fellaoussen, Jebala
Sebdou	Sebdou, El-Arricha, Beni-Snous, El-Ghour, Sidi-Djillali
Ghazaouet	El-Ghazaouet, Souahlia, Bab-El-Assa, Marsat Ben-M'hidi
Maghnia	Maghnia, Hammam Boughrara, Sabra, Sidi-Medjahed
Beni-Saf	Beni-Saf, Oulhassa Gheraba, Honein



Key:

1. Tlemcen Wilaya
2. Mediterranean Sea
3. Political border
4. District border
5. Commune border
6. Wilaya seat
7. District seat
8. Commune seat
9. Scale: 1/600,000

Interview With Ahmed Kadri, the CNP [expansion unknown] of the Wilaya

[Question] The fundamental law of the party set forth the formation of the Wilaya Coordinating Council. What is the role of this council? And what have been the results?

[Answer] In fact, after the fourth congress of the FLN Party, the fundamental law of the party set forth the formation of a coordinating council at the commune as well as the wilaya level.

Its role is to coordinate all actions and important questions affecting the concerns of the citizens, as well as to find solutions to all problems by means of specialized authorities.

At the wilaya level the existing authorities were unable to understand all the problems that came up, in view of their ramifications. But after the Coordinating Council was formed, important problems began to be raised. They were brought up and discussed in order to make precise provisions for their resolution, either at the local level or with a view to submitting them to higher authorities.

In that connection, the Coordinating Council took charge of all internal questions, especially after the fourth FLN congress. Consequently, this will further consolidate the decentralization policy.

The last elections--communal as well as wilaya--turned out to be a good opportunity for the Coordinating Council to finally play a predominant role. In the course of this experiment we have been able to find a spirit of cooperation between the different parties concerned, and a complementarity in the serious work.

Nevertheless this experiment, even though its results are acceptable so far, has not produced the hoped-for results. And we hope the final results will be significant and positive, as soon as the determination and support for the present status are united.

At the commune level: in the current state of affairs we cannot evaluate the results achieved by this experiment, given that its activities in this area are still new. Thus, one comment should be made, whether the communal leaders are acting to coordinate their actions in the various areas.

Council meetings are set by Circular 1,639. This circular stipulates that regular meetings are to take place once a month. The Coordinating Council may also sit in extraordinary meetings, whenever important business necessitates such meetings.

[Question] Can you talk to us about the control, especially after the fourth FLN congress?

[Answer] Indeed, the fundamental law of the party defined control. As it also defined the role of the elected assemblies in this area. This kind of

mission requires much more militantism and we hope the special commissions will be equal to the responsibility entrusted in them.

[Question] And what can you say about the activity of young people and their membership in the party?

[Answer] Yes, young people have shown a great desire to belong to the party. On our side we have consolidated the party, before the last elections, through young cadres. We recall that we have received almost 2,000 requests for membership.

Today we are in the presence of a considerable number of young militants to whom new responsibilities have just been assigned, at the APC as well as the APW [Governorate Popular Assembly] level.

Moreover, we are very optimistic and we believe the future will undoubtedly belong to the youth who is aware that the party is the real area for serious work.

Because of this, this look toward the future forces us consequently to open a horizon for these young people, so the torch of militantism can be passed on to them.

[Question] Concerning the campaign of fighting social evils, what are the activities of the national commission of the party?

[Answer] Indeed, we have contributed to the quality of militants in the fight against social evils.

Knowing that this wilaya is experiencing a special situation, considering that it constitutes a stopping-off place between the interior and the outside, it is exposed to certain negative aspects. In this regard, our work has been oriented in the direction of protecting the revolution and the citizen. As it has also been centered on making the citizens aware through the various meetings devoted to that goal. Our work is also continuing on all levels.

One of the most important things we have accomplished has undoubtedly been the various activities undertaken by the CNP Cultural Center. This is an important center geared to the level of all the young people, where one is in the presence of different cultural means, and of prestige.

In addition to its cultural role the center is in charge of a political activity, making young people aware. Consequently this enters into the domain of the campaign of fighting social evils.

Interview with the Wali of Tlemcen, Rachid Mirazi

[Interview by S.M., translated from the Arabic by M. A. Taleb]

[Question] Mr Wali, Tlemcen is one of the country's wilayas that benefited from a special program in 1970. What image does it present after ten years of development in this exact framework?

[Answer] Since 30 June 1970, when the Council of Ministers adopted a special program for socio-economic development, Tlemcen has undergone radical changes in all areas.

From that you can consider the decade just past as being a point of departure for realizing the special program and a solid base for effective execution of the two four-year equipment and development plans. This multiform development generally has as its objective the expansion of this wilaya, so it can play its role of participating in the national building.

On that subject, since the adoption of Tlemcen's special program, several achievements have seen the light of day in the economic, social and educational areas.

Development efforts undertaken by the wilaya have necessitated investment expenses amounting to 15,000,000,000 DA, of which 4,422,000,000 DA were for decentralized work, in the period from 1970 to 1979. The rate of achievement of the special program in all sectors has reached 46 percent.

[Question] Broad prerogatives have recently been assigned to the popular assemblies, have been uncontested, and the assemblies have played their role. So what are their prospects for action in the future?

[Answer] Naturally, the assemblies have fully played their role in working out plans, in presenting studies or choosing terrains to serve as locations for installation of factories.

The APC in particular played a large part in realizing the greater part of the special investment programs of this wilaya. This in addition to the communal development programs which were realized for the most part by many APCs with their own means.

As for the future, the APC, which is also an economic and social institution, is to furnish still more efforts so that the next five-year plan may be in a position to have at its disposal all the means indispensable for its success.

And there I would like to make an important comment about the communes and their new assemblies, which must scrupulously organize their structures. For despite the good will of the elected representatives and their sincerity in the work, the expected good results cannot be obtained without the creating of specialized services under the protection of the APC, charged with studying, planning and directing the projects for realizing the programs and coordination. All this for the purpose of perfect cohesion in the realization, to put an end to certain negative aspects and thus guarantee that the positive work will continue.

[Question] Development generally requires technical skill. What about professional training in this wilaya?

[Answer] Training is very important and is closely related to development. Among efforts undertaken in several fields are elementary, intermediate, secondary and higher education; other training efforts had to do with improving agriculture, civil engineering and urbanism.

And to provide training, several enrollment structures have been created:

Enlarging the agricultural technology institute, thus bringing its enrollment capacity to 300 pupils.

Enlarging the Mansourah Agricultural Professional Training Center and building an agricultural training center at Maghnia, as well as one at Ouled Mimoun, with a capacity of 200 pupils.

Concerning civil engineering and urbanism, we have opened an institute for training technicians. Its enrollment capacity is 500 pupils. For professional training, the existing structures have been consolidated by the opening of a professional training center for adults in Maghnia, its capacity being 88 places, with board guaranteed for all the pupils. To this will soon be added the building of an adult professional training center for young women in Tlemcen and two other centers at Beni-Saf and Ghazaouet. The enrollment capacity of the first will be 132 places and that of the second 200 places.

[Question] Housing is among the citizens' major concerns. What are the wilaya's realities in this field? What has been done thus far? Is the wilaya encountering difficulties in this area and what are the causes?

[Answer] In fact, availability of housing to the citizens is more than a necessity, and the wilaya is continually making great efforts to satisfy the growing demands in this sector.

Within the framework of various programs the wilaya has been the beneficiary in urban housing of 10,190 housing units, 2,000 of them already built. Another 4,000 units are in the process of being built. The rest are in the planning stage or under study. Individual building, for its part, is being made use of to alleviate the crisis, when it becomes apparent that 1,700 plots of land have been sold and 6,000 other plots will be sold soon.

In rural housing, 6,400 units have been built and another 2,500 are on the point of being built, out of 10,000 units to be developed. To this are to be added 13 socialist villages encompassing 1,760 housing units, and 6 socialist villages in the process of development.

But despite all these accomplishments, the housing problem is still with us, especially in the districts of Tlemcen, Beni-Saf and Nedroma, whose buildable land is few and far between because these districts are much more mountainous.

Add to that the growing demands of the citizens, arising from this region's expansion. The wilaya receives daily about 300 requests for housing, not to mention the delays in building them.

[Question] Tlemcen is famous for its art and its history and possesses important historic relics. Has tourism in this area benefited from good investment? Is there a plan to protect and preserve the patrimony?

[Answer] It is true that Tlemcen, because of its geographic position and its varied topography, possesses important touristic assets, not to mention its dry climate.

Tlemcen may be considered a tourist region, thanks to the existence of beautiful beaches like those at Beni-Saf, Ghazaouet and Marsa Ben M'hidi, as well as a forested mountainous region suitable for camping. Moreover, there are historic relics in the city of Tlemcen and its region.

The wilaya is seriously inclined toward tourism. As witness the three hotels with a total capacity of 660 beds. As for welcoming foreigners, we hope the new Tlemcen airport will be an important factor in the development of this sector.

As for protecting and preserving the relics, the Ministry of Information and Culture is permanently in charge of this. Besides its concern for protecting the historic sites, every year it encourages the organization and holding of festivals of traditional music so it will not be forgotten and allowed to die out.

[Question] What would be your conclusion, Mr Wali?

[Answer] I should like to focus my conclusion on the fact that these ten years of development have proven, if proof is needed, that the decentralization policy has made possible a local economic take-off that will be a great contribution to building the nation. This period has also demonstrated that the state is clearly disposed to satisfy the needs of the citizens.

In the future the work will consist of optimally using the means for realization, which cannot fail to have a positive influence on our development.

Skikda's Topography

Algiers EL DJEICH in French Jun 80 pp 12-19

[Article by A. Laib and T. Bouanika: "A Wilaya in Search of Lost Time"]

Formerly a district of the Constantine wilaya, with hilly topography, wooded regions and small but very rich alluvial plains, Skikda has always been considered an area vital for the economy of the hinterland. As much for its supplying agricultural materials as for its being opened up by sea roads.

Since antiquity the port of Rusicada has played a large role in trade. In fact it was through that port that the Romans shipped the wheat from the high setifian plains to Rome.

But history being what it is, how is it with Skikda today, this wilaya of which very little is known, except perhaps for its petrochemical plants or, to football fanatics its football equipment--or even that heap of cliches, of preconceived notions that have come to light about human behavior, about juvenile delinquency? Two myths that are overrated, well-tended, amplified. Two

myths that poorly conceal the shocking reality of Skikda. A long veiled reality, distorted by the complacent speeches of certain newspapers.

We acknowledge first of all that Skikda is neither one of the small peaceful villages of the Mediterranean coast, nor, even less, is it one of those ill-famed towns of detective literature.

It is not so much the epiphenomena that are important in this wilaya, but rather the real causes that have engendered a visible--very visible--sickness in the city as well as in the country. And in Skikda the country is a mere stone's throw away; the proof, those shantytowns that have literally blossomed in recent years around it and have expanded so far as to penetrate into its most intimate corners. Bouabaz, Sebaa Biar, Le Match, Zef Zef. These are the names given to quarters that have been very rapidly submerged by those makeshift constructions built in one night, which scarcely differ from rural habitations.

Let us say right away that in Skikda there is a vast difference between the city and the country where, according to the most official figures, 80 percent of the population lives in shacks. The sole innovation: corrugated iron has replaced the traditional thatched roof, and--a sign of modern times that reminds us we are well into the 20th century--an occasional television antenna sticks up among the very precarious rooftops.

Key:

1. Skikda Wilaya
2. Mediterranean Sea
3. Wilaya seat
4. District seat
5. Commune seat
6. Seacoast

Industrialization in Skikda: is it a Mistake?

Struggling along, barely, clinging to a subsistence economy which is basically agrarian, the rural zones have violently suffered the repercussions of industrial development.

Already remote from progress, isolated, they have seen their situation aggravated with the putting in place of a very important industrial infrastructure only a few km from Skikda. A point of view bitterly defended by the great majority says that the great evils the wilaya is experiencing come right from those industrial installations that have absorbed a large part of the agricultural manpower.

Skikda, they say, is a basically agricultural wilaya, and excessive industrialization has upset the already fragile equilibrium on which the region's economy is based. In fact this has led to an unprecedented exodus toward Skikda in particular, where hundreds of families from rural areas have elected to take up residence. In shantytowns, of course.

Statistics show that 3,000 peasants are currently working in the industrial zone, where salaries are very alluring. This figure represents at least 35 percent of the region's farmers, who have abandoned their land almost permanently. Even the assignees of the Agrarian Revolution have not been able to resist the attraction cast over the whole surrounding countryside by this petrochemical area, a veritable Eldorado where the wages paid by foreign corporations are the highest in the country. The high rate of withdrawals alone illustrates this attraction. A moral pollution of the peasantry, says the wali. Of the 2,133 registered for allotment, only 1,183 remain. In the district of Skikda withdrawals have been the highest: over 75 percent. Another example, the agricultural village of Guerbes, 250 housing units, for which alone 20 requests have been registered for allotment.

The primary consequence of this exodus, which is encouraged by the fact that living is so difficult in the rural environment, is the marginalization of work on the land which has brought with it a heavy demand for fruits and vegetables; production having reached its lowest level.

Another consequence is the price explosion. Not only for fruits and vegetables, but for everything that can be sold. And although throughout the past--the recent past--the tight-fisted employers of the people (they cannot be called anything else) resorted to artificial shortages to justify such an increase, today they simply impose their prices--in the proper meaning of the word.

The high cost of living that hits the populations hard is also explained by a kind of competition established by the foreign colony working in the industrial zone. The merchants align their prices by basing them on the extremely strong purchasing power of the 6,000 foreigners living temporarily in Skikda.

The Origin of the Evils

But another point of view runs counter to the first. In the eyes of many leaders the effects of industrialization have never been negative. To them, the

error lies in the procedure followed by the development planners. In fact, agricultural development, although it has been part of the national political debate for years, has not followed industrial development. And in Skikda the imbalance between these two sectors is very visible. The most striking manifestations are in the contradictions that exist between the city and the country.

Actions or Sections	No. of Housing Units	1979 Deliveries	Payment for Deliveries 1980	1981-82
Individual construction	601	-	601	
Socialist villages	1,790	50	890	850
Stabilizing self-management sector	691	-	216	475
TOTAL	3,082	50	1,707	1,325

The first great difference is housing: the few permanent structures date back for the most part to the colonial epoch. Here and there farms can be noticed (or the vestiges of farms), mostly occupied by individuals having no relation to work on the land. According to the last census, carried out within the framework of the stabilizing of self-management fields, approximately 600 housing units are occupied illegally. To this phenomenon is added the enormous delays in building the agricultural housing written into the various national development plans. Until the present time the wilaya has had no agricultural socialist village (?). The one at Guerbes, whose emplacement is very poorly chosen (it would have made a marvelous tourist village, certain leaders think--very much aloud), will be completed this summer, they say.

For rural housing has its importance in stabilizing the peasants. As the wali says:

"I am convinced of the Algerian's peasant origin and that the Algerian is still tied to his land, even if he has been detached from it for years, for objective or subjective reasons.

"I am sure the Algerian will return to his land if he is given the means and if someone will create the conditions to do it. Moreover, this will enable us to give agriculture all the importance it should have, all the interest and all the efforts it requires."

The agricultural housing needs of the wilaya were estimated in 1979 at 9,130 units. Since 1974 the wilaya has only been given 3,082.

LOCATION	NUMBER OF UNITS	RATE OF COMPLETION	RATE OF COMPLETION ECSC*	ANTICIPATED INAUGURATION DATES
Guerbes	250	95	95	19/06/80
Beni-Ouelbane	120	50	-	1981
Emjez-ed-chich	150	45	-	1981
Collo	120	40	-	1981
Chetaibi	100	30	-	1981
Ain-Charchar	200	30	-	1981
Ben-Azzouz	200	10	-	1981
Menzel-El-Abtal (VG)	50	100	None	10/10/79
Zighoud-Youcef (VG)	50	60	None	End of 1980
Toumiette (VG)	50	90	None	Fall of 1980
Oued-Zhor (VG)	50	80	None	End of 1980
Salah-Bouchaour	150	Not started	-	?
Tamalous	150	Not started	-	?
Beni-Bechir	150	Not started	-	?
TOTAL	1,790			

Of 1,790 housing units provided for, 1,340 are in progress and 450 not started.
*[expansion unknown]

The delays are therefore enormous and the gap is difficult to fill, the wilaya's authorities believe. And this has led them to energize construction in the rural environment. The first measures: to accelerate projects in progress and create a wilaya company that will be in charge of building the agricultural villages, the SOPRECOVSKI [expansion unknown]. Adding to the relatively long list of other companies of the same type, the SOPRECOVSKI will build about four housing units per day, starting this year. It will work in close collaboration with the Rural Housing Technical Committee, an authority presided over by the wali which will be in charge of supervising the realization of all the programs provided for up until that time. Programs to which must be added 46 additional agricultural villages to be built under the five-year plan. These villages will all be designed by a wilaya study bureau, the SODESKI [expansion unknown].

All of these programs are addressed to the self-managers in the socialist agricultural sector, to the Agrarian Revolution assignees and to the cooperators from the CAPAMs [War Veterans Agricultural Production Cooperative]. Private farmers and citizens living in rural areas but having activities other than agriculture, will only see their problems solved by means of individual building, which is believed to be the most realistic solution. It would still be necessary for the aid granted by the state (17,500 DA) to be re-evaluated in terms of the current prices of construction materials, an APC chairman believes. A sizable problem arises before that solution can be applied: where to build? Most rural dwellers live on land whose legal status is still to be determined. In some zones with a heavy concentration of habitation and localities, citizens are formally forbidden to build any buildings at all. The solution, then, is to be found in land reserves. The authorities have asked whether the plots will be actually given over to the great mass which is chiefly concerned in the operation. In that case prices cannot be aligned on a price scale, but must be symbolic. What is important is that the problem be solved. The principle was adhered to at the first APC session last April, and its application is imminent.

A problem that is no less delicate remains to be solved. This is the clarification of the status of certain lands on which are established populations who have been there for generations. Many people request authorization to build on it without being satisfied: refusal, both on the part of the administrative authorities and the owners of the land (basically self-managed and CAPAM domains). It would be futile to attempt to convince these populations to move, unless the most objective conditions making it possible to do so were created there.

The Real Causes of the Decline in Agricultural Activity

They are numerous. Industrialization is not the only or even the main cause of the rural exodus, the abandonment of the land. It would be, rather, "the difficulty of living in the rural environment" that has led the active population to be uninterested in agricultural work. Young people especially prefer to seek their "fortunes" elsewhere, to emerge from poverty by going to work in the petrochemical field. For in this milieu that is both hard and rough, all that they lack--schools, health structures, means of transportation, roads, water, electricity--, the list of their needs is a long one. And the land is unrewarding. Only the old have stayed in the production units of the socialist sector and the Agrarian Revolution. In the CAPAMs and in the small private developments as well.

In Skikda the problem of agricultural manpower arises in a special way. Studied in its structural and social aspects, it reveals first that:

> the proportion of seasonal workers to permanent workers reaches 70 percent in the self-managed domains. In the CAPAMs it is--370 percent! One might as well say that the real seasonal workers are the permanent workers (and vice versa);

many of the permanent workers are of very advanced age. Thirty percent of the moudjahidine in the CAPAMs are over 55. In the self-managed domains 32 workers are over 60. In the cooperative sector of the Agrarian Revolution there are 102 assignees who are over the active age.

On this subject, the wali believes

"In this connection, we must seriously concern ourselves in the beginning with rural youth. Especially those who have been unable to pursue their studies. So we must take much more interest in those young people by creating training structures tied in with agriculture and setting up an agro-industry that will give importance to the agricultural product."

Secondly, the agricultural sector has at its disposal "a work force that includes everyone," a heterogeneous manpower. In the cooperative sector the criteria for allotment set forth in Art 119 of the Agrarian Revolution ordinance have not been respected. Hence a human component of varying perspectives, generally having no tie with purely agricultural activity. This has brought with it a low productivity and decreased agricultural production. And an under-utilization of the mechanical means arising from poor technical training and an absence of maintenance. In addition, the lack of spare parts, to which is added an infrastructure low on buildings and storage hangars, has caused a large number of tractors to be immobilized.

The wali said that a number of measures have been taken to meet this situation of anarchy:

"First at the CAPCS [Communal Multi-Service Agriculture Cooperative] level: we have returned them to their original mission, which is to be the technical-administrative support for the agricultural units; which has not been done without "damage," since over half of the directors of these multi-service cooperatives have been suspended from their duties; six of them have been brought to court for misappropriation of funds, thefts, etc.

"Then in the production units we have forbidden individual stock raising. This action, though very difficult--because enormous interests come into play--has been conducted with a certain success. From 40,000 head of cattle we have gone to 20,000. In the agricultural units the total number of head of cattle has been reduced 80 percent.

"In the third place, we have instituted plans for crops compatible with the wilaya's fruit and vegetable needs. Their application is compulsory. For 1979 these plans were 90 percent respected.

"Finally, we have begun to release elderly persons from agriculture in such a way as to rejuvenate and make the sector more dynamic. Moreover, we put everything to work to develop rural housing construction so as to sedentarize the peasants in their units."

It would have been more interesting to have had some figures related to the financing of the agricultural sector. These figures could have cast additional

light on the nature of the evils agricultural is suffering from. Unfortunately the information could not be furnished by the BNA [National Bank of Algeria] (because decisions are excessively centralized there).

Other problems stem in general from natural weather vagaries, not the least of which is the configuration of the topography. Only the districts of Azzaba and El-Harrouch are relatively well endowed with plain. One cannot speak of the Skikda plain, for it has almost disappeared, to give way to industrial installations and new housing towns.

In the area of hydraulics, although the wilaya records the heaviest rainfall in the country (2,000 millimeters per year), it is seen to be rather light. This wealth of water is very poorly exploited because present storage capacities are very meager. The only solution would be to build dams and small hillside reservoirs which will make it possible to increase the usable agricultural area and irrigate the land which is considered to be among the best in the country.

To these difficulties are added specific problems in the self-managed domains, CAPRA and CAPAM. They are mainly problems of parceling out the farms and the immense size of families. Eleven self-managed domains cover between 1,000 and 2,000 hectares. As for parceling, an example of this is given by CAPRA Belloucif (Zighout Youcef), which is comprised of 200 hectares, divided into--17 portions. The Lahki domain in Salah Bouchaour has 922 hectares and is divided into 19 portions.

SECTOR	NUMBER OF TRACTORS	TRACTORS IN DISREPAIR
Socialist sector	1,000	200
Private sector	400	70
TOTAL	1,400	270

Another specific problem is that the orchards are aging. Nearly 50 percent of the citrus fruit trees are over 35 years old. Moreover, the very important olive patrimony is still poorly protected, leading to double deterioration at the production level. Enormous losses have been brought about by the harvest methods (shaking down) and lack of maintenance (essentially pruning) of the already-old olive trees. Although the age limit for olive trees is easily over 1,000 years, nevertheless a process should be initiated of regenerating old plantations and developing new ones.

Comprehensive Solutions

Faced with the most difficult of situations, the wilaya's authorities have assumed as a first phase a body of very energetic measures. Measures that

appeared to be unpopular because they drastically changed many bad habits (see the interview with the wali).

In a second phase the authorities drew up a plan of action that denotes a desire to see the end of the most visible problems:

> In the field of hydraulics, the wilaya has taken the initiative in creating a wilaya-owned company in charge of drilling and developing irrigation projects (FORAGERSKI [expansion unknown]).
>
> In parceling, and the immensity of the farms, the agricultural leadership expects to find lasting solutions, consistent in their restructuring of the land. The operation that has been going on since December 1979 with a certain scientific rigor will soon be completed.
>
> Parallel with the rehabilitation of self-managed farms and the retirement of elderly persons, it is proposed that an ambitious technical training program for agricultural workers be drawn up.
>
> In order not to create an imbalance between rural areas themselves, the authorities have decided to distribute the technical cadres rationally among the regions and production units.

It is also believed that the communal delegations will be a large contribution to setting agriculture to rights. The plans for cultivation will no longer suffer the huge gaps so prevalent today. The technicians will participate in working them out.

But the cornerstone that largely conditions the success of the agrarian policy is still control of marketing. The effectiveness of the system put in place is closely dependent upon the production level of the agricultural developments, the Agrarian Revolution representative in the wilaya believes. These developments, he says, are producing only 20 to 25 percent of the fruits and vegetables; the greater part is supplied by the private sector, which prefers to market its production to middlemen, who are very powerful in the wilaya. The amounts turned over to the CAPCSes and COFEL are very low, which naturally results in the private sector being predominant; it becomes easy for the private sector to set prices. Prices that are among the highest in the country.

The authorities expect to find a solution to this major problem in reactivating the CAPCSes and furnishing them the means to make the cooperatives the technical-administrative support of the production units.

With the taking of a whole body of measures concerning sectors having a direct or indirect relationship with agriculture--and more or less affecting agricultural activity--, the authorities expect to be able to redress one of the most difficult of situations. It is difficult because it has inherited a very restrictive development concept. We add that it also comes from a style of thinking that has the visible imprint of demagogy.

Transportation: Eight SNTV [expansion unknown] Buses for an Entire Wilaya

[Box by A. Laib]

For the 22 communes of the Skikda wilaya the SNTV has made available to users the miniscule and ridiculous number of only eight buses!

In reality the wilaya was provided with 33 buses and coaches, a supply that some leaders with warped minds considered very adequate and far surpassing (sic!) the transportation needs of this wilaya.

This general conclusion arrived at by these aces of prediction led the SNTV to transfer 25 coaches to SONATRACH . Twenty-five coaches which the latter company is using two hours a day at the most, to transport its workers from Skikda to the industrial zone (less than 8 km away) and vice versa.

The citizens of the 22 communes and hundreds of hamlets that border on them are subject to the repercussions of the less than honorable practices of the SNTV, which does not deign to grant any power of decision at all to its Skikda agency.

The consequence of this "centralist" vision: little service is provided by the SNTV; it has no interest in relatively long routes.

Hence the paucity of communes and even districts directly connected with the wilaya seat.

A flagrant insufficiency of transportation can be noted between Collo-Skikda and El-Harrouch-Skikda. As for direct connections between Skikda and Azzaba, and Skikda-Zighout Youcef, that is simple: they are nonexistent.

In the matter of transportation for travelers, there is also a private sector, which does an equally bad job of fulfilling its commitments.

In Skikda may be noted the presence of 14 transportation contractors who have available a total of 26 cars. Very old cars, some of them over 30 years old; decrepit equipment constituting a permanent danger to travelers' security.

Until the SNTV becomes aware of the situation, until the problem of meager service is solved on the local scale--which the wilaya authorities are currently doing--the already serious situation tends to deteriorate further with the birth of a negative phenomenon, that of the clandestine taxis which impose their own law of price fixing for fares.

For about 10 km you will be made to pay 5 DA per fare. For a "round trip," to go and return, it will cost you 60 DA, and if you take your "taxi" well after nightfall that price might easily be multiplied by two. All this at your own risk and peril.

A Single Departure for Algiers

Although the Skikda wilaya is considered an industrial center, thus bringing about an incessant coming and going of people, up to now it has at its disposal only a single coach providing the connection (indirect) between Skikda and Algiers.

The departure time--0530--is very ill chosen; it is true that at that hour it is difficult, indeed impossible, to take any means of locomotion at all to get oneself to the bus station. A bitter trial for the inhabitants of the surrounding villages who must get up at 0300 to be sure of not missing their bus. A quite normal bus in which hygiene remains totally absent.

Health: an Infrastructure That Falls Very Short of the Needs

[Sidebar by A. Laib]

Divided into six health sectors, the Skikda wilaya has only seven hospitals with very small capacity, a total of 1,170 beds in all, and for everyone. Using the norms established by the Health Ministry--according to which the wilaya of Skikda should have 2,064 beds--the shortage seems enormous.

Moreover, the health buildings are too old: the El-Harrouch Psychiatric Hospital is 80 years old. The one at Azzaba should have been destroyed before independence. As for the Skikda Hospital--a former barracks--, it needs large-scale repairs. Finally, the Collo Hospital, of more recent construction, needs stabilization work; the land on which it is built is in perpetual motion.

Health coverage is still very poor because of an infrastructure considered to be very short of the needs. The Skikda wilaya has only three polyclinics instead of 17; eight health centers, whereas there should be 103; and 64 consultation rooms, whereas there is need--hang on tight--for 258!

Means for research are also a sizable problem because they are very inadequate.

There are only three centralized surgical units (one of them private) in the city of Skikda, four x-ray stations which are most often broken down, and four analysis laboratories (two in Skikda, one in Collo and one in El-Harrouch).

There are also six private offices; 13 dental chairs and 17 pharmacies.

This alarming situation continues to worry the authorities a great deal; they seem to be redoubling their efforts to alleviate its affects.

The first action in that direction to be emphasized is that the wilaya has endowed each commune with an ambulance.

The second action, still to the wilaya's credit: interesting national and foreign doctors by furnishing them with furnished apartments, which has enabled the wilaya to have a total of 26 physicians, encompassing all specialties.

The third action: creation of a paramedical school in Skikda and an annex in Collo.

But despite all this, the shortage remains quite significant in relation to the required norms. To satisfy the health needs would require 15 more doctors, 121 pharmacists and 118 dentists, just as 1,840 other paramedical agents would need to be added to the 735 already in place.

To the inadequate infrastructure--which will come to a kind of conclusion with the launching of a health construction and equipment program--is added the problem of medications, which would have to come from Algiers. In Skikda, it is being proposed that a wilaya warehouse be created, so that frequent inventory gaps need no longer be suffered.

With these very limited means the health leadership, to his credit, has registered a large number of mass actions, the most important of which was the systematization of school hygiene. And Skikda may be considered one of the few wilayas to have decreed an effort in this direction.

Health checks have affected 400,000 pupils who possess all their reports (the reports that follow them throughout their schooling). Each pupil is checked, not by a health technician, but by a physician. Which has made it possible to detect and diagnose many diseases in time.

The second large mass action was written within the framework of purification. It dealt with codification of all water locations existing in the wilaya (environmental hygiene), and massive vaccination of all children from birth to six years of age.

Tourism: Unexploited Resources

[Box by A. Laib]

Skikda has enormous unexploited touristic assets, In fact, in this wilaya is found the most beautiful bay in the world, Chetaibi.

Yes, Chetaibi Bay is the most beautiful in the world, with its natural beauty and its marvelous contours eclipsing those made to seem like Eden by publicity hoop-la.

I arrived hardly believing it. And Kamel Lassoui, assistant director of the Altour agency in Skikda, smiled at my astonishment. It was he who gave me this information in an interview he kindly granted me to inform us about tourism activity in this wilaya.

First of all, he said, Skikda is a coastal city, thus offering summer visitors the possibility of swimming recreation. In addition to Chetaibi it has three beautiful beaches in the districts of Collo, Skikda and Azzaba.

Then, Skikda is a mountainous wilaya, thus being capable of satisfying lovers of mountain tourism. Although fires do enormous damage every year, the forest remains very dense in some regions.

Finally, it offers possibilities for green-country tourism appealing especially to students (vacation colonies) and senior citizen tourists.

But the absence of welcoming infrastructure and roads with access to certain areas constitute a handicap to the development of tourism in this wilaya.

Altour has only one urban hotel, Es-Salam, a four-star establishment that instead performs the function of dormitory for the executive personnel of foreign corporations.

This being so, the authorities know full well that the development of tourism goes hand in hand with the creation of certain conditions, chiefly material and infrastructural. Thus, for the project of constructing a touristic complex at Stora, an ancient Roman port located 3 km from Skikda, the authorities are first planning a number of infrastructure projects before installing the complex itself. Stora, as the wali said, will become the Sidi-Fredj of the Skikda wilaya.

Education: no High School Built Since 1962

[Sidebar by A. Laib]

The Skikda wilaya is in ninth place in the rate of schooling, with its 73 percent of educated pupils. The very poor enrollment infrastructure is responsible for the relatively low rate. In fact no high school has been built since 1962. The two institutions of this type have a very limited capacity and the only girls' high school, En-Nahda, dates from 1924. It has only 200 boarding beds.

The El-Larbi Tebessi boys' school, although more important, does not satisfy the requests for admission to the boarding regime.

The board of education tries to satisfy as well as can be expected the expressed needs in school matters, at the primary as well as at the intermediate and secondary levels.

By practising "veritable gymnastics" on the classroom curriculum, the board has managed to create four additional secondary institutions.

Institutions that stay alive thanks to classes taken in the intermediate school, which itself struggles along with the help of the primary school.

The delay in school building is considered enormous. Hence a large-scale action to build a very large number of schools, CEMs [College of Intermediate Studies] and two large-capacity high schools (1,000 places each, of which 300 are for boarders).

With regard to teaching personnel, Skikda's ITE [Technical Education Institute] continues to train some of them, the rest being supplied by Constantine.

The board of education expects to Algerianize the intermediate course in 1984.

School Bus Service: to be Regulated Locally

Because they generally live very far from their schools, the children of the rural areas have to use the most bizarre means to get there. Those who live on heavily-traveled roads are relatively better off than their comrades whose homes are in isolated regions.

As an example, the children of the "Djenane El-Anab" locality (on the Skikda-Azzaba axis) have to cut through by way of the mountain to reach Beni-Bechir (Skikda-Constantine axis), or go along the Skikda-Azzaba-Constantine side road, in the hope of catching some means of transportation.

A means presented in the form of--or rather, strangely resembling--a bus. A private bus belonging to a long-gone period, whose appearances are at once short and furtive. Absences, on the other hand, are curiously prolonged.

Aware of the gravity of the situation, the wilaya leaders have taken over this phenomenon, which, one hopes, will come to an end with the creation of local government control and transportation syndicates in each commune.

Already, as an early temporary solution, the wilaya has endowed the communes with trucks equipped to transport pupils. Although many settlements are not yet affected, it is believed that all the difficulties having to do with school bus service will be ironed out in a very short time.

Medea's Development

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[Article by Kamal Zemmouri: "Medea: the Development Dams"]

[Text] When one thinks of development and starts looking for its fruits, one sets out to enumerate the plants recently installed: the industrialization-development partnership has become one of our faults. If one leaves it at that for the wilaya of Titteri, one will quickly arrive at the conclusion that the wind of development has never blown on this immense territory in the center of the country. The total industrial investment in the region is ridiculous. Only Berrouaghia, with the SONACOME [National Mechanical Engineering Company] complex, has experienced a mini-industrial upheaval. Everywhere else the priority has been given to agriculture. Fate is fair.

Medea: a wilaya beyond all reproach. This at least is the message that men of the soil and the city will pass on; a message supported by a sometimes dry and arid countryside. The effects of the different development plans will constitute, according to the sacred word in this region, more of a "sprinkling" than anything else. The former Titteri is immense. The new wilaya of Medea, although reduced to more reasonable proportions, is nevertheless still very vast. The fruits of development, especially of the special program, are thus sometimes concentrated in an urban center, sometimes disseminated right in the country. So it is hard to draw up with the naked eye a first balance sheet of

Titteri's special program, as its operations are diverse and ostentatious. The "special" will have given priority first to agriculture, then to education. Industry occupied a laughable place there, something about which no one dreams of complaining.

Thus, to speak of the Titteri "special" is chiefly to speak of agriculture. Over a fourth of the credits will be dedicated to an integrated agricultural development plan for the region. As will be seen later on, the bases for future development existing today in this great region in the center of the country, have to do with union between East and West, North and South. Another positive observation is the judicious nature of the sectors to which credits are allotted. Above all they have been eager for the region not to deviate from its real economic vocation, but that it fortify it, with the help of the agricultural plan induced by the "special," and also by the famous Sidi-Slimane plan.

The third wing that constitutes the basis of regional development: hydraulics. In that area there is stagnation. Without these three elements nothing can be done downstream.

The Medea wilaya is situated on a privileged axis that supports most of the North-South traffic. This situation should enable it to play a decisive role in the national economy and consequently assure it of a swift and harmonious development. But the diversity of its geographical aspects is going to form resistance to prompt actions.

With a total area of 8,704 square km, the Medea wilaya is divided into three large natural zones: the north, where the mountainous tell forms a quasi-continuous band encircling the region from Ouarsenis to the Tablat massif; the center and the west, where the plains of the Tell are situated (the Merachadas and Beni-Slimane plains); lastly, the south, where the southern piedmont and the steppe plains are stretched out.

However significant it may seem, however, the total area of these zones is only one sixth of the area useful to the agricultural economy, the region's main economic activity. In fact, 77.5 percent of the wilaya's active population works in agriculture and makes a living for almost all of the regional population, which is estimated at 48,395 persons.

The Titteri special program made it possible to immobilize a considerable mass of credits to enable the region to emerge from a chronic under-development. Agriculture, which with training made off with the better part of the credits (30 percent and 26 percent), saved the region from the hazards of a rural exodus, as happened in other neighboring wilayas ;the absence of heavy industrial solicitation made the people "cling" to agriculture, the region's future. There are virtually no shantytowns in the wilaya. The urbanization rate (22.9 percent) is still very low (out of 483,954 inhabitants, 350,586 live in rural areas).

The financial envelope granted by the government as part of the special [program] was 1,000,000,000 DA, distributed as follows: 30 percent for education

and training; 26 percent for industry and handcraft; 11.5 percent for housing; 8 percent for social equipment (hydraulics, 7.4 percent; tourism, 1 percent; transportation and communications, 7.8 percent; public health, 1 percent; administration, 2.3 percent; miscellaneous, 5 percent).

More Than Tail-End Operations

The Titteri wilaya has undergone important changes, as much on the economic level by means of the combined effect of investments in all activity sectors, as on the territorial level as a result of the administrative division that made it possible to cut this immense territory down into more homogeneous areas, for greater efficiency and more strictness in the actions of men, by means of the appropriate structures. The economic transformation of the region which, still a long way from having permanently eliminated the under-development, has nevertheless imprinted the irreversibility of its having surpassed itself; this is basically due to the impetus of the special. Today it can be said that the program has been realized almost in its entirety; there remains only what specialists call "tail-end operations." The order has just been given to bring all the special program operations to an administrative end.

By acting more intensely than elsewhere on agriculture and training, the special program made possible a combined action on two factors fundamental to the economic take-off: man and the land. In education and training, the realization of the program enabled this region to be enriched by 2,000 primary classrooms, 4 high schools, a normal school, two teachers' training centers and 10 CEMs, for a total of 14,000 places. The rate of schooling thus will go from 32 percent in 1970 to 95 percent in 1980. This action was to be supported by the construction of a whole new sports and recreation infrastructure, including 8 youth clubs, 6 multi-purpose rooms, 6 stadiums and 7 games areas, one swimming pool and one specialized center.

The improvement in the standard of living of the region's citizens has been considerable. In housing, the former Titteri wilaya has received 2,000 individually-built housing units and 1,724 housing units, of which 511 are semi-urban.

The road network has been expanded, thanks to the building of 95 km of wilaya roads and 339 wilaya lanes, to which are added the 72 km of the first plan.

Under the heading of means of realization, corporations have been created to take charge of the planned projects. Thus, the Wilaya Works Company, born in 1971, has from its earliest years been entrusted with a fair number of projects. SOREC-SUD [expansion unknown] and EPBTP [expansion unknown], two other companies with regional interests, have reinforced the existing potential. The execution of the operations of the school program, which were launched on the terrain, are a good illustration of this strengthening of the region's capacities. Of the 13 CEMs and the 4 high schools (combined plans), SOTRATIT [expansion unknown] is building 3 high schools and 3 CEMs, the EPBTP is building 3 CEMs, the Medea Communal firm is building 3 CEMs, the remaining 5 being entrusted to local private firms.

From 30 percent for agriculture to 1 percent for health, the difference is very great and yet--the results are there and are eminently positive, considering the low investment. Efforts were focused in very precise directions, which was apparent in the resolutions recently taken by the Central Committee of the party in the national health policy area. The wilaya's health infrastructure is rather like what one finds elsewhere, that is to say a large-scale hospital center in the regional capital, several polyclinics scattered here and there. Also, the wilaya's authorities are concerned with drawing its isolated populations closer in, by creating structures and training personnel for communities of 100 inhabitants. There are 4 polyclinics and 14 health centers for nearly 600 douars [translation unknown] of 100 to 1,500 inhabitants, for preventive and curative needs. Now the needs of the micro-communities (100 inhabitants minimum) are beginning to be considered. A mobile team is systematically "sweeping" the communes for one to two weeks, to fulfill the population's real needs (vaccination, school hygiene, rural water treatment, diagnosis of tuberculosis and malaria, etc.). At the same time these trips provide complete knowledge of the health situation of the people and are a palliative until such time as light structures can be established.

Easy access to health care is available today to 60 to 65 percent of the population. The 100 percent figure will be reached in 1990.

Since 1975 the Medea Paramedical School has been training people for the wilaya's own needs (local recruitment). Algerianization is going full swing (85 percent of the physicians practising in rural areas are foreign). From 150,000 in 1973 the number of consultations increased to 550,000 in 1979, although the personnel increased only one and a half times. The effort of the health workers should be emphasized. "With 20 percent or 1 percent of the program authorization, the results would have been the same for the health sector," we are told. A paradox? No, given the dispersed nature of the population. The prospects for the third plan are clear: complete the putting in place of average health structures and then one can speak of hospitals and improving hospital structures.

The Best Part

Agriculture has had the best part of the "cake." What is more natural? It was necessary to set in motion a huge program of recovery and development of the soil. Also, studies of topography, morphopedology, hydrology and socio-economics were carried out in their entirety. They made it possible to release a development plan integrating water, stock raising, arboriculture, terrain for courses, defense and restoration of the soil and finally agrofood industry. A complete process of development, in short.

In the Medea wilaya the word "integration" is more than a theoretical idea discussed in meetings; it is a tangible reality whose impact has been strengthened through the years. In the four corners of the wilaya the countryside is taking on a new look. New lands are emerging from the void, erosion is shrinking back on the mountainous slopes where every year 4,000,000 [hectares of] arable land were being eliminated. Terraced crops have made their appearance in the northern of the wilaya, right on the Tell; a new perspective for the peasants. Trees too, to which they were little accustomed, have made a very much noticed and no less appreciated entrance.

Development of the road system has made it possible to open up some isolated regions and better disseminate socio-economic progress. The bases for a potential development effort are now laid in the Titteri wilaya, to see that men do not allow this capital to be eroded.

Of the 930,000 hectares that make up the wilaya, 840,000 are agricultural and 330,000 form usable agricultural area, the SAU [expansion unknown] or productive land. The remainder being in courses, pastures, etc. The agricultural land is divided as follows:

Self-management: 58,500 hectares (40,000 SAU)

ENRA [expansion unknown]: 520,000 hectares (45,000 SAU--first and second phases of the RA [expansion unknown].

Private sector: 305,000 hectares (270,000 SAU).

As may be seen, the private sector receives the lion's share.

The agricultural investments of the special have been characterized by special parameters in the three geographic zones that make up this region: for the mountainous zones of the north, action has dealt mostly with strengthening the forested massifs, implanting fruit and grape orchards, and large cattle units. In the interior plains small cattle raising development has been carried out, with aviculture and soil development. Finally, in the steppe-covered zones in the southern part of the wilaya, the main activity has been prospecting for and developing water sources, as well as course lands, with direct effects on the third phase of the Agrarian Revolution.

To examine these operations in detail, we note that in four years 2,000,000 plants were distributed to the small producers of the region, making possible implantation of 1,000 hectares of vines for production of table grapes. The results of this operation were made complete by the creation of 92,000 working days of work and 360 new permanent jobs. Every year sees additional production of 37,000 quintals of table grapes. Fruit arboriculture has been substituted for food cereal crops which were in the wrong place on these slopes (12 percent) where trees adapt better than anything else. The peasants are taking part in it today, and are pleased with this initiative, which has affected 3,000 hectares and created 744 new permanent jobs, with an annual fruit production of 109,400 quintals.

The agricultural part of the "Medea special" has also been characterized by the putting in place of tree nurseries: 30 hectares of plants offer a production capability of 300,000 plants per year, making it possible to cover 250 hectares per year. Out of its own capabilities the Medea wilaya in a position from now on to make its planting programs concrete.

To Gain Ground

Under the heading of animal production, the "Medea special" has given birth to an infrastructure for promoting cattle raising. The goal of these cowsheds

(four), which include 400 heifers, is not to produce milk or beef, we are told, but to "gain ground." One might speak of a nursery for cows in which genetic performance of the beasts is the principal preoccupation. Since 1977 the Medea wilaya has put on the national market 100 heifers per year, "always at least that many to be imported," or an integral foreign currency savings of 600,000 DA. In this region in the center of the country we are witnessing a self-centered development guaranteeing the bases of agricultural development. "Self-sufficiency must be provided first of all, then in a future stage, dissemination to the border regions." The increase in beef will be 50 tons per year and in milk, 600,000 liters per year. These four cowsheds have made possible the creation of 54 new permanent specialized jobs.

In the context of this integrated program one is witnessing the promotion of small stock raising. Before the special went into operation there was virtually no aviculture tradition in this region: marginal aviculture being the panacea of an insignificant female manpower. Three criteria militated for creation of an aviculture cooperative at Berrouaghia: the protein shortage, the improved rural income and the climatic conditions. They are "producing" (one day's chicks are sold to the breeders) 200,000 chicks per year, again the nursery idea. An annex is in charge of veterinary care and the distribution of adequate food, as well as popularizing modern breeding methods.

The regional avicultural center has already expanded beyond its original framework, since breeders in neighboring wilayas are supplying themselves with chicks from Berrouaghia. Today it is believed that this development by the special is providing an additional white meat production of 380 tons per year and egg production of 1,200,000 eggs per year.

But everything is not going well for this pilot center. The concern for placing avicultural workers, who are neither industrial workers nor farmers, under the protection of a legal status guaranteeing them social coverage they can be sure of, has caused the center to be transferred to the ONAB [expansion unknown]. Well, since then production seems to be plummeting!

Apiculture has also attracted the attention of the programmers because a 5,000,000-dinar credit has been granted for apiculture promotion. In the special nursery spirit in this wilaya, an infrastructure was set up to supply hives and swarms. Actions are being conducted, upstream and downstream, to extract and market the honey, as well as to popularize the working methods of apiculture. Before the special there was a traditional apiculture which was operated from the cork oak trunk. Now there are 1,000 apiculturists with wide experience in modern methods. In three years 10,000 hives have been distributed. Regional honey production has gone from 2 to 3 tons per year to 30 tons per year.

In the city of Medea a multi-service veterinary center is operational. "It is an impediment to the agriculture services," we are told. Another paradox? It was later explained that the planner had operated in a 1980 perspective, in which everything was to be in a rational economic beginning. The accumulated delays in realizing the objectives of the special causes this center to be ahead of the wilaya's overall agricultural development. Its profitability varied only in the old days.

The three axes of agricultural development in the region illustrate the concern for safeguarding the natural balance between north and south. This balance involves preserving speculations by favoring their integrated development. There is hope for implanting an agro-food industry (PMI [small and medium-sized businesses]) for conditioning and processing products, a natural complement to an integrated agricultural development. The effects of agricultural development on employment are of course sizable, but they alone will not solve the question of the future job market. Although it has been possible to contain the rural exodus, only the judicious establishing of units of small and medium-sized industries (adapted to the lack of water and the region's interests) can be a solution.

To Safeguard the Natural Balance

Following the example of other wilayas, the Medea wilaya is not sheltered from vicissitudes due to its meager water capacity. Without water there is no development, agricultural or industrial. The rainfall in the wilaya varies. It goes from 300 millimeters in the south to 800 millimeters in the north. Subterranean potential is poor. As for hydraulics, the special program's impact represents 80 liters of water in 100 for the wilaya, which is chiefly concerned with the drinking water supply as well as numerous purification operations. However, given the scattered character of the population, it is still difficult to answer the growing needs; "From how many houses grouped together can one supply water at home?", they are wondering in Medea. The criterion remains to be defined. The norms are 150 liters per day per inhabitant in the cities. The figure is 120 in rural areas. These norms are rarely reached; in Ksar-el-Boukhari for example the inhabitant has only 67 liters per day at his disposal. Moreover, the imbalances between real and theoretical flow bring out serious water management problems; is it were necessary to add up the quantity of water lost one would certainly arrive at frightening figures. For the city of Medea, every group of 50 houses has its own distribution system; there the situation is good, for the average threshold of 120 liters per day per inhabitant is reached.

All the settlements in the wilaya have been affected by the hydraulics program. Distribution systems in very good condition, often new, exist nearly everywhere. Unfortunately, as was emphasized about hydraulics, "we have too often found a total absence of maintenance, insufficient exploitation of the pumping stations, non-existence of individual water meters and flat rate taxation, which causes water cut-offs. Evaluation of needs satisfaction must obviously take these factors into account."

Considerable effort, often with limited means, has been made in hydraulics in Medea.

As for water supply for the industrial zones, this is provided from the urban systems. It is therefore the same water that is divided between the city and the industrial zone. By doing this Medea risks experiencing serious difficulties if radical measures are not taken. In fact, the city is currently being supplied by the treatment station of Oued Chiffa. The flow furnished by that

EVALUATION OF DEVELOPMENTS STILL TO BE REALIZED, BY SECTOR AND PROGRAM

(In 1,000 DA)

	1st 4-Year Plan		Special Program		2nd 4-Year Plan	
	A.P.	R.A.R. 31/12/79	A.P.	R.A.R. 31/12/79	A.P.	R.A.R. 31/12/79
Industry	-	-	8,964	697	35,434	26,040
Agriculture	-	-	159,117	4,534	256,083	177,373
Hydraulics		-	146,030	9,739	17,320	9,360
Tourism	-	-	14,000	4,820	5,200	3,722
Economic infrastructure	-	-	8,360	-	113,056	50,689
Education/training	9,578	2,300	326,517	3,652	430,011	223,177
Social infrastructures	126,400	37,179	121,947	16,525	989,632	664,511
Administrative infrastructures	-	-	40,472	4,563	2,350	1,000
Realization firms	-	-	-	-	32,000	4,843
GENERAL TOTAL	135,978	39,489	825,407	44,530	1,881,086	1,160,715

A.P.: Program Authorization
R.A.R.: Still to be Realized

Source: SAPEC [expansion unknown], Medea wilaya.

installation climbs to 10,000 cubic meters per day in winter and falls to 6,000 cubic meters in summer. Which has led to launching projects for the transfer of water from Oued Djir to this station and harnessing sources in the city to compensate for the summer shortage. However, this same stabilized flow will not suffer because Medea is currently is giving Berrouaghia one third of the flow supplied by Chiffa. It is anticipated that in the summer of 1981 this situation will be adjusted, since the regional capital will receive from Berrouaghia at that time 4,000 cubic meters from the Ghrib. With this reversal of the situation, Medea should no longer have water problems, as long as the antibiotics factory currently under construction is not put into operation. That industrial unit, in the excavation stage at this time, is expected to use 5,000 cubic meters of water per day in 1983 and 10,000 cubic meters of water per day in 1990, which is the equivalent of the consumption of the whole city. To prevent what would be a real catastrophe for the Medeans, it was decided that a direct Ghrib-Medea pipeline should be built, to accommodate a flow of 24,000 cubic meters per day. Work is to begin in 1981.

In purification and supply of drinking water and industrial water it may be said that the situation is in good hands and if the delicate question of the management of this vital patrimony is settled, everything will go well in the future in the Medea wilaya.

Nevertheless, the water question will not be settled for all that. One of its basic aspects is still in question, the whole basis of the development of this region: irrigation. Irrigation with what? We have previously emphasized that water resources are laughable, the quality of the water when there is any is often mediocre. The wadis are not what the "perennial" specialists say they are; their flow is not only inadequate but very irregular. The wells yield less than 6 liters per second.

Although special credits for hydraulics have been focused on answering social needs (AEP [expansion unknown] and purification), from now on stress will be placed on more ambitious projects, such as dams and water reservoirs. Here, optimism seems seriously affected. The five-dam project, which would have given this region national quality food granary, seems to be sleeping at the bottom of some drawer or other. The new Mitidja has not yet been born. The Beni-Slimane plain is waiting for water. On the hillside basins of this great valley thousands of trees have been planted, sometimes on family land. Families have been moved and have converted to other crops.

Beni-Slimane is a plain of 270,000 hectares of which, if water flows profusely, 5,000 to 6,000 hectares will be developed. After a long silence the project seems to be starting up again with the initiation of a number of projects: 11 all told, of which six are in progress.

But it was not without humor that we were told in Medea that the five-dam project had "fallen in the water." There lies the problem: without water in sufficient quantity, nothing of consequence, of regional or indeed national dimension, can really be done. Flight from responsibility? Everyone delights in laying the blame on someone else. "Beni-Slimane began with a special program, then a decentralized program, then it was sitting on a centralized plan,"

we were told in the wilaya. This program has been neither abandoned nor challenged, but it is nevertheless compromised by problems of realization.

Meanwhile, the peasants of Beni-Slimane go on with their daily lives. Seventy percent of the land belongs to the private sector and there are 70 inhabitants per square km.

DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORKING POPULATION ACCORDING TO SEX AND ECONOMIC MILIEU

	Agriculture %	Industrie 1 %	B.T.P. 2 %	Transports et communicat. 3	Commerce %	Administration 4 %	Autres Services % 5	Total
WILAYA DE MEDEA 6	49,8	11,0	12,5	3,5	5,5	11,9	6,0	100
ALGERIE 7	29,6	17,2	14,8	5,7	7,9	16,9	7,9	100 %

Source : R.G.P.H. 77

Key:

1. Industry
2. Building construction and public works
3. Transportation and communications
4. Administration
5. Other Services
6. Medea wilaya
7. Algeria

Source: RGPH [expansion unknown] 77.

The project is defined by the "administrative" texts as "rural renovation is in agreement with the whole and with the overall result of the actions; when conceived and realizable according to a coherent plan, their goal is to cause all sectors of the economy to pass at the same time from the traditional or conventional state to the most modern state possible in an area determined by the national territory," and they add, "such conditions are only realizable with exacting preliminary planning and a massive intervention." What would have been the case for Abadla would not have been the case, at least for the moment, for Beni-Slimane.

On the local level, what can be done is being done today. Reforesting operations have resumed (developing the hillside basins of the eventual water reservoirs)--tree plantations are increasing--sylvan-pastoral areas are being developed (arboriculture, cultivation and stock raising in partnership).

Beni-Slimane is in a way a presentation of Algerian agriculture with its ins and outs, on a reduced scale.

Then what is preventing this ambitious project from seeing the light of day, this wealth from blossoming? Water, always that indispensable water, which comes back like a haunting leit-motif to remind us that without it nothing is possible. Well, we have learned: to save the plain from silting up and guarantee its development, it is necessary to mobilize at least 60,000,000 cubic meters of it. We note that on the Beni-Slimane plain, in the hillside basin of Oued Isser, superficial runoff has been estimated at 267,000,000 cubic meters per year. Runoffs from the hillside basin of Chelif are mobilized by the Bouzghoul and Ghrib dams and are utilized in the wilayas downstream.

Five dams for a total capacity of 50,000,000 cubic meters should in principle satisfy the needs of the plain (Ladrat-Besbes-Annasseur-Mellah East and West). What is the status of these projects today?

The Beni-Slimane is considered Isser's water reservoir, on which is based a very important hydraulic program, chiefly depending on the realization of a dam necessitating a holding capacity of 250,000,000 cubic meters. At the central level it would seem that this large-scale project--which is national and therefore a priority project--might run the Beni-Slimane hydraulic project. In Medea official and competent voices affirm that the five dams are called upon to pour their waters into the Isser wadi. The two projects are not contradictory, but highly complementary.

The integrated Beni-Slimane program is thus dormant for lack of water, but also for lack of man's sensitivity at all levels. The populations of the high mountains who were displaced by reforestation are waiting for someone to solve their social situation, which solution is constantly being postponed for lack of an answer where the dams are concerned. No one can be satisfied with impromptu solutions indefinitely. New and profitable lands in the irrigated valley are the only compensation that can be offered to these people. In Beni-Slimane, the early optimism has suffered a blow.

Actions currently being undertaken are of course an achievement, but they are stagnating. Are we at the point where it is necessary to redefine Beni-Slimane's overall vision, on which all the projects were based?

In this region, where the population is nearly 100 percent rural, the peasant has not been solicited very much by the interveners. Motivation and popularization are two things unknown in Beni-Slimane. That has caused much damage in the management of investment. "When you tell a peasant his land is only good for DRS [Soil Reclamation Directorate], why then should he entrust to a business firm what he could do himself?" Cereal intensification, soil and crop improvement, DRS work, are so many operations with which the peasants can be intimately associated. The peasant must be helped to get away from the welfare mentality. Now, according to what we were able to find out in Beni-Slimane, that is very far away. One of the wilaya's young officials told us in this connection that only the rural leadership can "provide the mental ability to assume development."

Special Program: Program Authorization for the Titteri Wilaya

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31/12/69.....339,622,000.00

31/12/70.....626,938,000.00

31/12/71.....848,788,000.00

31/12/72.....979,073,000.00

31/12/73.....1,047,461,000.00

31/12/74.....1,019,754,000.00

31/12/75.....1,087,851,000.00 (new administrative division)

31/12/76.....999,372,000.00

31/12/77.....981,288,000.000

31/12/78.....841,654,000.00 (transfer of operations for the benefit of neighboring wilayas: Bouira, Djelfa, M'Sila, Tlaret) (operations sold off)

31/12/79.....875,090,000.00 (reevaluation by the AP [expansion unknown]

Source: SAPEC, Medea wilaya.

What more is there to say of Beni-Slimane, this always-postponed answer to the needs of a whole region of the country, than that all the pitfalls encountered have already made possible a better approach to the macro-economic realities by contributing the solution to a number of theoretical problems.

Independently of all the difficulties inventoried, the Beni-Slimane question has to do with project management.

Like the Abadla, Haut-Chelif and Bou-Namoussa plains projects, this ambitious project must be supported by an exceptional structure, given its integrated and exceptional nature. In acting thus, one will be in a position to affect the means--financial, material and human--, to provide the coordination that has been lacking so far, in order to put the project into a dynamic that it should always have.

We will borrow our conclusion from the wali of Medea, who correctly commented that "the Medea wilaya can, because of its proximity to the capital, contribute toward reducing migratory movements. It can play the role of buffer and also--and especially--the role of stopping place between Algiers and the south, thus making it possible to provide the starting point for a true development policy for the territory, aimed at reconquering the high plateaus and the south toward a redistribution of the population, which we conceive as the priority for the coming decade."

8946

CSO: 4400

LABOR SITUATION IN COUNTRY ANALYZED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 15 Jul 80 p 17

[Report on the Labor Conditions in Bahrain: "University Graduates Are First on Unemployment List; Bahrainis Receive Lower Salaries than Foreigners"]

[Text] The subject of labor is of basic importance, particularly to all Gulf nations. Due to the similar working conditions in these countries, they all face the same problems. The workforce in all the Gulf nations is divided into 2 major categories: 1) Local, represented by the national labor force; and 2) Foreign, represented by foreign (imported) labor.

As an Arabian Gulf nation, Bahrain suffers from the same problem. The area's nations have been subjected to an influx of various foreign emigrants (from the Indian peninsula, Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Thailand). This immigration has resulted in many new problems, and has become so large that it is difficult to assess the extent of the risks of ignoring failing to deal with it in a programmed, scientific manner. This quick review of the labor situation in Bahrain will dwell on sound labor conditions as visualized by some specialists, officials and researchers in the field. This does not mean that we will be able to cover and discuss this subject from every angle. But we will highlight the negative impact of the use of [foreign] labor on the national workforce in Bahrain, and the economic, social and political implications of the importation of labor for the government. We will try to discuss, in a direct way, the reasons which led to the increased demand for foreign labor. We will then present some solutions which we find necessary to solve the labor problem in Bahrain.

Reasons for Increased Demand for Labor

Petroleum was discovered in Bahrain in 1932. During the following year, the government of Bahrain received its first revenues from petroleum amounting to 29,000 rupees (around £ 2,000). During the past 30 years, from 1936 to 1965, total petroleum revenues were 2,673 million rupees (around £ 200 million).

These petroleum revenues helped achieve better economic conditions, as a large number of those who worked in traditional businesses (pearl fishing, agriculture and commerce) shifted to the petroleum industry (Bahrain Petroleum Company Limited, BAPCO). A distinguishing and useful economic feature of Bahrain is its being a major seaport midway between the East and the West, where ships (and previously sailboats) anchor for food supplies and fuel during their long journeys across the oceans.

A sudden transition occurred, described by specialist as a "leap": A transition from a traditional agricultural and fishing society to an industrial society, represented by the petroleum industry.

In the 1970s, Bahrain was trying to move forward through industrial development. Its first industrial moves were: the establishment of the Aluminum Company of Bahrain (ALBA), which is an association of British, Swedish, French and American companies; the Bahrain Engineering Company; the fishing industry and other light and heavy industries, which are useful locally and to the Gulf in general due to the availability of natural gas.

According to 1965 statistics, there were 694 workers in the petroleum sector, 8,328 workers in the construction sector, 5,920 workers in retail commerce and 5,494 workers in the transportation sector. The number of workers in the fishing and agricultural sectors decreased to 4,654 workers, most of them foreigners (particularly Omanis).

At the beginning, the phenomenon of importing foreign labor was for the purpose of filling in managerial, administrative and technical positions in industrial projects, due to the area's shortage of sufficiently trained professional workers. Citizens ignored certain technical and scientific jobs as a result of competition represented by the imported, trained foreign workers.

Groups of Workers

Some specialists divide the foreign workforce in Bahrain into 4 groups:

1. The Adminstrative and Highly Skilled Group. This group was initially brought in to fill major administrative positions in the industrial sector and in companies and organizations (in the private sector). Although they represent a very small percentage of the incoming workforce, they cause problems and difficulties for local workers, because of their tendencies, as foreigners, to favor foreign workers, and because they insist on using the English language in all their daily transactions and correspondence. This problem clearly creates unemployment problems among both high school and university graduates.

2. The Technical Group. This group includes a list of technical professions such as: Engineers and assistant engineers, craftsmen,

electricians and sophisticated equipment operators. This group could have been eliminated, had there been an organized plan for training nationals. However, such a plan was never taken up by government officials for serious consideration.

Recently, the minister of labor and social affairs, Shaykh 'Isa ibn Muhammad al-Khalifa, resigned. He had presented to the cabinet futuristic projects that could help the local workforce, but the cabinet rejected or, to be precise, put off consideration of these projects for fear of the risks involved in adopting these projects, or "national plan," especially the project to form a "labor council" which would ultimately direct the various aspects of labor affairs and oversee labor information policy in Bahrain.

3. The Unskilled Group. This is the largest of the 4 groups. The members of this unskilled labor group are brought in from East Asian countries, India and Pakistan to fill the gap in the labor market. These perform work that does not require any skills, but could be learned in time and through experience. These jobs include construction, cleaning, security, building roads and sewers, and other jobs that require a lot of physical effort.

4. The Servant Group. This group is currently increasing. It specializes in house cleaning and child care. It is a result of social change--the disintegration of the family system. It also reflects the beginnings of change in existing social conditions, like women going to work.

We would like to point out an important point here, which is that the concentration of imported labor in Bahrain in particular and the Gulf [area] in general has several political, economic and social implications. We will not dwell on this point or its causes. A review of the percentages of imported versus local labor reveals the following:

In 1970, imported labor [as a percentage of total labor] was 37.1. The percentage was higher for scientific and technical positions (40.2 percent), still higher for managers, administrators and business managers (47 percent), and still higher for service workers (53.7 percent).

We can see the picture more clearly through Table I, which shows the percentage distribution of vocations within each of the local and imported work groups. This table shows the latest detailed statistics prepared by a group of specialists.

Unemployment and its Causes

In recent years, the estimated rate of unemployment among females was 74 percent, while it was 26 percent among males. However, most of the unemployed among both sexes are graduates of Arab universities and institutes.

On the other hand, there is a group of employed nationals who have clear problems, the main one being obvious discrimination in favor of imported labor in many ways--some financial and some, which are more important, moral. This is known to and acknowledged by the officials. The officials may not acknowledge some issues, but they cannot refute their existence.

Table II indicates the relative distribution of national and imported workers according to salary scales, based on the last statistics prepared in 1976-1977 by the Manpower Administration of the ministry of labor and social affairs.

We can see the picture more clearly through the following examples:

. The Arab Company for Ship Building and Repairs employs 611 foreign and 359 local and Arab [non-Bahraini] workers.

. The Bahrain Company for Ship Repairs and Engineering employs 464 foreign and only 72 local workers.

This is according to 1978 statistics. There are some industrial organizations that do not employ any local or Arab workers, such as the Gulf Aluminum Factories (95 foreign workers) and the Bahrain Marble Factory (30 foreign workers). Even simple positions in these organizations are filled by foreigners.

There are also simple and easy jobs, all or most of which are dominated by foreigners (such as tailors, carpenters, blacksmiths, welders, and workers in restaurants, bath houses, agriculture, jewelry, hotels, etc).

Suggestions and Solutions

Based on these facts related to the labor force in Bahrain, which we have tried to state as briefly as possible, some suggestions and solutions have been made in economic, social and political studies to overcome the barriers of neglect of and negativism affecting the national workforce. The following are some of the proposed and visualized solutions:

. The government should achieve effective coordination between the manpower, production and educational structures. This can be achieved through development plans which would bring about change and provide work and necessary training to the citizens of this country. This requires an overall reorganization of present conditions through a program based on scientific precision.

. Educational and training methods (technical and vocational) should be organized, developed and planned. Sound objectives and policies for the development of human resources in the country and raising their productive levels to meet development requirements should be drawn up.

. The government should work on "Bahrainizing" all positions and professions in the government and private sectors. The English language should not be a prerequisite for any job. Instead, all organizations must be required to use the Arabic language in all their daily transactions. Work should be undertaken to qualify and train graduates to be eligible to work, acquire experience and achieve personal development and competence.

. The government should discontinue the policy allowing the transfer of sponsorship [of foreign workers] within the government and private sectors, so as to control the influx of [foreign] labor and achieve stability.

. More organizational and legal measures should be taken to check the illegal entry of foreign workers. Also, Arab workers should be brought in when qualified local workers are not available.

. The government should stop the trade in and exploitation of foreign workers for personal profit. This trade takes two forms:

a. The worker pays a specific amount to his sponsor, ranging from 150 to 250 dinars annually for non-technical workers, and from 250 to 400 dinars for technical workers. This amount is paid to the sponsor in return for his allowing the worker to reside and work in the country.

b. The second form of trading in foreign labor is through visas or work permits. The increase in the volume of trading in foreign workers is a result of the many gaps that exist in the present system, and the lack of a sense of responsibility and strict application of the law.

. The government should plan and program the operation of importing foreign labor so that no surplus should develop in certain specialities in excess of the actual development requirements of the local economy.

. The government should provide the necessary protection to local workers. They should be given incentives and priority, and provided with necessary health insurance and social security benefits.

These solutions are almost identical with those of the scientific studies [presented at] the recent symposium held to study the dimensions of economic and social development in the Arabian Gulf.

Table I

Type of Work	Citizens	Incoming Workers	Percentage of Incoming Workers
Technical & Scientific	7.6	8.7	40.2
Administrative & Business Managers	1.4	2.2	47.0
Businessmen	10.4	5.7	24.4

Retailers	10.7	5.7	22.2
Services	12.2	23.9	53.7
Agriculture & Fishing	8.2	5.0	26.2
Production & Transportation	45.2	48.4	38.7
Miscellaneous Trades	4.3	0.9	11.3
TOTAL	100 %	100 %	37.1

[Last column represents percentage of incoming workers to total workers for each category]

Table II

Salary Ranges (in dinars)	Bahrainis	Non-Bahrainis
40 - 60	7.6	26.2
70 - 89	13.3	12.8
90 - 119	25.4	13.8
120 - 159	40.3	23.6
160 - 249	11.0	12.9
250 - 599	2.8	7.9
600 or more	16 %	2.5

[Data are as published]

9455
CSO: 4802

GUIDANCE TO REDUCE NATIONAL OIL CONSUMPTION URGED

Cairo AL-BATRUL in Arabic Feb-Apr 80 pp 18-21

[Article by Yahya Muhammad Zamzam: "The Way to Guide Oil Consumption in Egypt"]

[Text] The high rise in oil prices should alert responsible officials in Egypt to a number of serious matters. The most important of these is the necessity for moderation in the consumption of oil and the need to hasten the search for alternative sources of energy. This must be done to conserve Egypt's petroleum reserves, which are still in the ground, for a longer period of time.

There are many ways to institute guidance for oil consumption in Egypt. But whatever method of guidance is chosen, it must depend upon changing some of our national habits, which are no longer in keeping with methods of development in the world. Among the most important methods of guiding oil consumption are the following:

1. The weekend should be 2 days for all government institutions, except schools and universities.

2. Television transmissions should end at 11 P.M.

3. Working hours in both public and private sector commercial establishments should not be broken into 2 periods.

4. Work in all state institutions should begin at an early hour, and we should go back to using summer daylight saving time.

5. The only commercial establishments permitted to stay open from 6 P.M. to 11 P.M. would be restaurants, grocery stores, coffee houses, and pharmacies.

The high and rapid rise in world oil prices, which has been accompanied by tremendous jolts to the economies of the nations of the world; the rise in the prices of industrial goods; and the skyrocketing prices of gold, have become a cause for dismay and alarm. Why have we had this tremendous

rise in oil prices and what are its effects on the Egyptian consumers and the Egyptian economy?

Will the various Egyptian government agencies fail to take quick and positive action to institute and firmly implement methods of guiding oil consumption in Egypt? Consumption of all types of petroleum products is increasing daily, at very rapid rates. It is both exhausting the country of much of its foreign currency reserves and preventing it from exporting increased amounts of oil.

In Egypt, oil is the source of everyday life in the domains of energy, industry and transportation, and will continue to be so at least until the end of this century. Egypt, thank God, has sufficient oil for itself and exports about 40 percent of its oil production to other countries. Oil still occupies first place among Egypt's exports. For this reason, it is our duty not to squander this scarce and valuable source of wealth in the space of just a few years. If this happens, we would have to start importing oil (energy) from abroad at very high prices. This would constitute a tremendous drain on our reserves of foreign currency at our present stage of development.

We must also take into account the fact that alternative sources of energy such as solar energy and wind-generated energy are still in the experimental stage. Here in Egypt, solar energy could become a basic source of energy in view of the fact that Egypt enjoys sunshine the year round. Also, it would be possible to utilize wind-generated energy in the coastal areas. Likewise, in both Upper Egypt and the Delta, it would be possible to generate additional energy using plant and animal remains.

For this reason, we should conserve petroleum not only to use it as fuel, but to use it as a raw material in many existing industries, such as the fertilizer, iron and steel, and petrochemical industries.

In spite of the fact that petroleum on the world market has undergone numerous price increases, its local prices for Egyptian consumers have not been affected by these increases. To realize the dimensions of the problem which we will be talking about, and for us to know the value of each drop of petroleum we consume, we must be aware of world market prices of petroleum products consumed in Egypt. We must then compare them with the local prices for which these products are sold to Egyptian consumers. They are shown in the following table:

Product	World Market Price (15 Nov 79) (CIF)	Sales Price to Egyptian Consumers*
	Eg. Pounds	Eg. Pounds
Bottled gas (per cylinder)	3.950	0.650
High-octane gasoline (per liter)	0.207	0.130
Regular gasoline (per liter)	0.200	0.110
Kerosene (per liter)	0.223	0.030
Solar [fuel] oil (per liter)	0.226	0.030
Mazut (per ton)	105.000	7.500

*Takes into account an increase of 20 milliemes per liter of gasoline and 5 milliemes per liter of kerosene, solar oil, and diesel oil which went into effect 15 December 1979.

The above table suggests that the government is taking great pains to provide Egyptian consumers with their needs of petroleum products at prices which are far lower than world market prices. It is doing this by providing a subsidy amounting to about a billion dollars in foreign currency (the difference in amount between what Egyptian consumers pay for petroleum products, at local prices, and the world market prices of these products). This situation alerts us to the necessity of guiding consumption in Egypt without raising the prices of petroleum products, except in the case of some products which will be mentioned later on. This is because any increase in local prices imposed by the government would affect the prices of many everyday commodities and needs such as bread, agricultural products, industrial products, etc.

It is clear from the prices appearing in the above table that a cylinder of bottled gas is sold to the Egyptian consumer at about 16 percent of the cost of importing it. Also, gasoline is sold to the Egyptian consumers at about 60 percent of the world market price, and kerosene and solar [fuel] oil are sold to them at about 13 percent of world market prices. Finally, the price of a ton of mazut to consumers in Egypt is about 7 percent of its world market price.

We should bear in mind that in Egypt petroleum is our principal energy resource. We should know that water-generated electric power (from the High Dam and elsewhere) constitutes only about 10 percent of the total energy utilized in Egypt. In addition to this, petroleum is still the raw material used to produce more than a third of the electricity generated in Egypt. This use is increasing at a rate which constitutes a cause for alarm. If we consider these circumstances which govern oil consumption in Egypt, and take into consideration the constant increase in population, we can understand the increase of about 50 percent in oil consumption which took place during the 5-year period 1973-1978.

There has been a noticeable and unusual annual increase of 18 to 20 percent in the consumption of bottled gas. The fact is that Egypt imports about 70 percent of the bottled gas which it consumes from foreign countries at unbelievably high prices, the current price being 450 dollars per ton (the equivalent of 315 Egyptian pounds). This is in addition to expenses incurred in Egypt for transportation, storage and delivery of the bottled gas. At the same time, a ton of bottled gas is sold to Egyptian consumers at a price of 52 Egyptian pounds. This means that the Egyptian government pays 263 Egyptian pounds for every ton of bottled gas consumed. The amount of bottled gas expected to be imported in 1980 is 281,000 tons. This means that the subsidy paid by the government for this quantity of bottled gas, so that it may be sold to the consumers at a price of 65 piasters per cylinder, will amount to about 74 million pounds.

For this reason, all government agencies should make it their national duty to guide oil consumption in Egypt. It should be the goal of all of us to strive toward optimum and more efficient use of petroleum products so that we may economize and conserve. The reason for this is that every barrel of oil which the country conserves and does not consume can be exported abroad to earn revenue in foreign currency, which can be used to finance development projects, raise our standard of living, and support the national economy.

We urgently need to begin right away to put into practice methods of guiding oil consumption, and must see to it that the benefits from petroleum product subsidies are enjoyed by those who are entitled to them. Since this is the situation, the most appropriate thing for us to do is to begin right now to study and apply scientific means and methods of sound conservation in oil consumption. We must utilize all the media to promote oil conservation awareness among our citizens, and we must explain the dimensions of the situation and its importance in relation to the future of Egypt. We must also urge all of our citizens, wherever they may be, to cooperate in the implementation of this policy of conservation. We can all do so by borrowing some of the methods of energy conservation which have been successfully applied by the advanced industrial countries. We should borrow the methods which fit our circumstances and which would be easy to implement, especially if they do not involve any investments for which the

government would have to assume the financial burden. Some of these conservation ideas are as follows:

1. Spreading Oil Conservation Awareness

This involves preparing guidlines for conservation in oil consumption, and publicizing them through all the information media; keeping track of how they are implemented; organizing information campaigns; calling upon all economic enterprises to participate in this program; and establishing criteria for measuring conservation. This is a task for the Higher Council for Energy.

2. Non-Centralized Approach in Implementation

This means that each government, industrial, or economic unit is considered responsible for implementing energy conservation guidelines and keeping track of the success which is achieved in this regard. Each unit or enterprise which consumes large quantities of energy must assign an engineer, responsible for energy affairs, to monitor energy consumption and apply conservation methods. He should periodically make a presentation of data regarding energy consumption and the conservation which has been achieved, and should draw a comparison between these data and those of previous time periods.

3. Two-Day Weekends

All state institutions including banks and companies, (with the exception of alrge stores), should change their weekend from 1 to 2 days. There is no doubt that this would lead to conservation of a great deal of the energy used to run buses, trains, subway lines, and private cars, as well as the energy used for elevators, lights, and air conditioners. However, large public sector stores should be open during this 2-day weekend so that people who are employed in state agencies would be able to take care of their needs. The weekend for people working in these stores should consist of 1 weekday.

4. Business Hours of Commercial Establishments Should Not Be Broken Into Two Periods

Business hours for these establishments should be from 10 A.M. to 5 P.M., with a half-hour rest period. This system would bring about a large saving in the energy used for light and air conditioning in these establishments. At the present, they are open till 9 P.M. In addition to this, under the new system, employees of these establishments would be using transportation from their homes to work and back two times a day, instead of four times, as at present.

As Egypt is a country which has a hot summer, when the sun rises early in the day, Egyptians should make use of the length of their day during this season. During the summer, work in state agencies should begin earlier. This system would bring about definite conservation in the consumption of energy and would not require any investments on the part of the government.

6. Television Transmission

Television transmission should end at 11 P.M.. The authorities should reorganize the schedule accordingly.

7. Bottled Gas

We should hasten to implement the plan to supply residences with gas through a pipeline distribution system. This would mean that the government would save a great deal of the money it spends every year to import approximately 70 percent of the country's needs of bottled gas. Another suggestion is to reduce the subsidy paid by the government when this product is distributed. This could be done by selling bottled gas to embassies, foreign enterprises, and hotels which operate in Egypt at prices which approximate the import prices of bottled gas. Ordinary consumers of bottled gas could receive coupons with which to buy cylinders of bottled gas at prices subsidized by the government.

8. Gasoline

There has been a noticeable and unusual increase in the number of vehicles on Egypt's highways and streets. There is no doubt that one reason for this increase is the low price of gasoline for consumers in Egypt. Another reason is the open-door policy which the country has pursued. All of this has led to an unusually high annual increase in gasoline consumption--15 percent a year. To put the brakes on this increase and guide gasoline consumption, the government has raised the price of a liter of gasoline by 20 milliemes.

9. Traffic and Transport

a. Concentrating on the government sector (the civil service and the military) to control gasoline consumption. This could be done by assigning a monthly ration of gasoline for each public sector vehicle or car pool.

b. Regulating traffic in places where traffic jams occur at certain hours of the day.

c. Promoting the use of car pools by private car owners living in the same areas.

Broadcasting immediate bulletins over radio and television concerning streets and roads where traffic has been detoured because of accidents or road repair, so that no traffic jams or bottlenecks may occur.

e. Implementing beltway projects around the city of Cairo to help eliminate traffic jams and bottlenecks inside the city which cause an increase in fuel consumption.

f. Improving the service and operation of single-fare buses in order to encourage private car owners to use these buses. This would decrease the use of private cars in some areas.

g. Encouraging the use of small cars. This could be done by lowering their prices, reducing the customs fees paid on them, and increasing the tax on larger cars. Also, an appeal should be made for vehicles traveling on fast highways to reduce their speed.

h. Decreasing, as much as possible, the long-distance transportation of all types of goods by means of trucks. This method of transport is costly, as it entails the consumption of large quantities of fuel. Transportation of such goods should be done more and more by other more economical means, such as railroad and river transport. In the case of river transport, though, it will be necessary to eliminate the obstacles which prevent easy use of the Nile River and inland-shipping canals, on a large scale, as means of transport which serves the national economy.

9468
CSO: 4802

EGYPTIAN NATURAL GAS RESOURCES OUTLINED

Cairo AL-BATRUL in Arabic Feb-Apr 80 pp 8-10

[Article by 'Abd al-Hadi Qandil, vice president for operations of the Egyptian General Petroleum Agency: "Natural Gas"]

[Text] It has been 10 years since natural gas was discovered in Egypt in commercial quantities. The first natural gas field to be discovered was the Abu Madi field, in the northern part of the Delta. Then, the Abu al-Gharadiq field was discovered in the Western Desert. This was followed by the discovery of the Abu Qir offshore natural gas field in the northern part of Abu Qir Bay.

The appearance of natural gas definitely helped to change the pattern of consumption of petroleum products in Egypt. Industrial enterprises began to use natural gas as a fuel instead of mazut. This is becuase it is easy to handle and circulate natural gas, and becuase the use of gas in industrial furnaces and machinery reduces the cost of maintaining them. This is particularly true of Egyptian natural gas, because it is completely free of sulphur compounds which subject furnaces and machinery to corrosion. In addition to this, gas has a higher thermal value than does mazut. Natural gas contains 23,000 British thermal units per rotl, whereas mazut contains only 18,000 British thermal units per rotl.

Consumers of natural gas do not require the construction of warehouses for storage of their fuel. This means less capital investment and lower operational costs, and this helps to cut costs for industrial projects.

Another advantage of natural gas is the geographical location of its fields. In terms of economics, it has been very fortunate that Egypt's natural gas fields are close to the industrial regions and power plants. The power plants have already begun to utilize natural gas instead of mazut, particularly in gas-powered units, for generating electric power. Recently the electricity sector has expanded its program of constructing such units.

Natural Gas Fields

1. The Abu Madi field: Natural gas reserves in this field total 20 billion cubic meters. This would be enough to satisfy consumption for 20 years, on the basis of extracting gas at a rate of 3 million cubic meters per day.

2. The Abu al-Gharadiq field: This field has reserves of 20 billion cubic meters. This would be enough to satisfy consumption for 20 years, on the basis of extracting gas at a rate of 3 million cubic meters per day.

3. The Abu Qir offshore field: This field has reserves of 27 billion cubic meters. This would be enough to satisfy local consumption for 30 years, on the basis of extracting gas at a rate of 3 million cubic meters per day.

Exploitation of the Natural Gas Fields

Exploitation of the natural gas fields began in 1975, as follows:

1. The Abu Madi field: Gas from this field is being supplied to the fertilizer plants in Talkha and is being used instead of naphtha, which is now being exported.

Also, preparations are being made to supply the power plant in Talkha with natural gas, to be utilized in place of solar [fuel] oil with particular properties which is being imported, at high cost, especially for power plants.

Likewise, natural gas, in place of mazut, will be used by the textile, dye, and supply companies in al-Mahallah al-Kubra.

At the present time, the daily yield from this field is valued at about $500,000. In coming years, the effective yield will go up to about $1 million, as a result of conserving large quantities of naphtha and mazut, and as a result of saving money utilized to importing special solar [fuel] oil.

2. The Abu al-Gharadiq field: Exploitation of gas from this field began in 1978, when its gas began to be supplied to the cement production plants in the Hulwan and Turah areas, as well as to the iron and steel plants in Hulwan. It has replaced mazut. The result of this has been a saving in the consumption of mazut to the tune of about half a million dollars per day. In addition to this, there has been an increase in the rate of production in companies which utilize gas.

3. The Abu Qir offshore field: This field began to be exploited in 1979, when its gas was supplied to the fertilizer plants in Abu Qir and nearby power stations. The yield of this field has been valued at about 400,000 dollars per day. This corresponds to the value of the quantities of naphtha and mazut, otherwise consumed in these areas, which it has been possible to conserve.

Use of Natural Gas Instead of Liquefied Gas in Homes

Home fuel consumption basically depends on butagas [bottled gas], both for gas ranges and hot-water tanks. Local production of this commodity is not

nearly enough to meet the needs of the population. This has led to the importing of large quantities of it in order to meet consumer demand which is increasing every year, at rates of more than 15 percent annually. For this reason, the Egyptian General Petroleum Agency has undertaken a study on implementation of a project to supply residential areas with natural gas instead of bottled gas. This will result in a saving of foreign currency which is used to import the bottled gas.

As a first phase of this project, it has been planned to supply natural gas to residential areas in Hulwan, al-Ma'adi, Madinat Nasr, and Heliopolis. These locations have been chosen for the following reasons:

1. These areas are on the outskirts of Cairo.

2. Residences, as well as street planning in these areas, are appropriate for initiating implementation of the project.

3. These areas are presently experiencing population growth, and will continue to do so in the future. It will be feasible to set up natural gas distribution systems similar to those for other utilities such as electricity, water, and telephones.

4. In these areas, it will be easy to begin setting up natural gas distribution systems. They will be compatible with those for other utilities, such as water, electricity, and telephones.

At the present time, this project has begun to be implemented, and it is expected to be completed by 1982.

Savings Which Will Result From Household Use of Natural Gas

It is estimated that the initial quantities of natural gas which will be used will be about 200,000 cubic meters per day.

This is the equivalent of about 80 tons of bottled gas per day. This amount will increase gradually till it reaches 600,000 cubic meters a day, that is, the equivalent of 240 tons of bottled gas per day. At current import prices, this quantity of bottled gas costs about $120,000 a day. Using natural gas will also relieve the government of some of the burdens it is assuming. For example, there will be a saving in the use of the cylinders necessary to provide bottled gas service. It takes two cylinders to service each cylinder in the possession of the consumer, and the government pays for this. This is in addition to the expenses of filling the cylinders, transporting them, inspecting them, reconditioning them, etc.

Price of Supplying Natural Gas to Consumers

Pricing policies are always subject to nation-wide government planning. This is because the government often chooses to provide price support for a product in order to provide price stability to the consumer.

There is no doubt that the government will devote special attention to this subject, because it wants to assess the cost of providing services to the consumer.

Possibilities of Producing Liquefied Gas From Natural Gas

Methane and ethane are considered to be the basic components of natural gas which has been discovered and is currently exploited in Egypt's fields. They constitute about 90 percent of the components of our natural gas. The remaining part consists of heavy hydrocarbon components which are extracted in condensed form and which are redistilled, resulting in gasoline, kerosine, and solar [fuel] oil. However, there is a considerable proportion of propane and butane in the gas from the Abu al-Gharadiq field. This propane and butane is extracted and carried to locations where it is bottled in gas cylinders. In this way, the Petroleum Agency is trying to make optium use of the compounds of Egypt's natural gas.

Future of Natural Gas in Egypt

The three natural gas fields currently being exploited are considered to be the nucleus around which other fields, rich in natural gas, will be discovered. A lot of data has been collected which justify optimism about such further discoveries in the Delta area. Since our goal is to make full use of the prtroleum and gas we produce, serious steps are being taken at the present time to implement the project dealing with collecting associated gas in the Gulf of Suez area. The gas is being collected there in order to use it in fertilizer and cement manufacturing projects as well as in electric power plants in Suez. It will be supplied to this area by means of a pipeline which will go from the Shuqayr area to the Suez area.

Current Uses Made of Natural Gas

Natural gas is currently used in the following ways:

1. As a processing material in the manufacture of fertilizers as well as iron and steel. Preparations are also being made to utilize it in the sponge iron project in al-Dakhilah.

2. As fuel for the fire in the furnaces of cement plants, electric power plants, and textile mills. There, it is used in place of mazut and solar [fuel] oil.

3. As a replacement for liquefied petroleum gas (butagas) for household purposes.

9468
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PLANNING PROCESS DISCUSSED, NEED FOR IT EMPHASIZED

Cairo AL-BATRUL in Arabic Feb-Apr 80 pp 14-17

[Article by 'Abd al-Fattah al-Bardi, director of the Planning and Follow-up Division of the Egyptian General Petroleum Agency: "Development Planning in Petroleum Sector"]

[Text] The General Importance of Planning

One of the basic aims of any society which strives to achieve progress is to raise the standard of living of all of the individuals of that society. There are two routes one can follow to achieve this objective:

1. Increase productive capacity by adding new productive resources, or

2. Improve the utilization of current productive capacities, that is, raise productive efficiency.

To determine the manner and priority of following either of these two courses, one must engage in definite planning which incorporates the objectives to be achieved and the means by which they are to be achieved.

Planning is considered to be one of the most important principles of modern administration. In its general sense, planning means preparation for the future. The process of planning basically begins with the hypothesis that the future shall differ from the present. For this reason, it is necessary to become thoroughly familiar with the present situation in order to be able to plan for the future. The process of making predictions for the future is considered to be the first essential step in the overall planning process. Its purpose is to visualize the best possibilities the future holds in order to prepare appropriate alternative plans.

The prediction process requires collecting facts which pertain both to the past and to the present. After this is done, and after an analysis is made of all relevant factors which influence the conditions of society, an assessment is made of future circumstances and needs--both for the near

and distant future. Careful prediction is the basis of the hypotheses on which planning is based. Good planning relies on the degree of effort and care taken in the preparation of data concerning the past and the present. This is because these data are the basis for outlining the strategy of the prediction process, and, consequently, of the planning operation.

Planning and Government Commitments

The government has committed itself to responsibilities which exceed its resources and capabilities. In addition to its responsibility to defend and liberate the land, it has undertaken:

1. The responsibility to guarantee employment or self-employment for everyone.

2. The responsibility to provide social welfare in terms of housing, health, education, and services.

3. The responsibility to protect administration of all state institutions as well as most of the production enterprises.

5. The responsibility to make goods available to the masses and supply basic goods and services at prices which are often less than their real cost. It does this by means of both direct and indirect subsidies.

Responsibility for these commitments has led to the fact that the burdens being assumed by the Egyptian economy are much greater than the resources it is able to draw upon, including resources provided by the efforts of Egyptians and those obtained by attracting foreign capital.

It is clear, then, that planning cannot take place in either a partial or haphazard fashion. It has to be basic and comprehensive. Otherwise, efforts which go into planning--no matter how intensive they quite often are--will be in vain. Thus, the problems of planning must be dealt with by means of a complete and integrated approach.

The Progress of Egypt's Development Plan

In the late fifties, Egypt began to use the methods of short-term planning (in most cases, annual planning). Egypt drew up its first 5-year plan in 1960 with the object of doubling Egypt's national product in 10 years. However, although this was an integrated plan with defined economic and social objectives, it was overcome by the economic conditions and major changes which followed the issuance of the nationalization decisions in the middle of 1961. The result was that the first 5-year plan no longer expressed the aims of the new Egyptian society.

In the second development plan, which was for the years 1965 to 1969, the emphasis was clearly on the production of goods and the establishment of basic industries in an effort to bring about progress in the national

economy. A large proportion of the plan's investments was concentrated on heavy industry. In view of the economic circumstances which prevailed during the greater part of this time period, we find that the following considerations were observed in preparing assessments of the investments needed for some of the years of the plan:

1. Postponing completion of past projects which had not been implemented to any great degree.

2. Slowing the pace of construction down to the necessary minimum.

3. Postponing new projects which, by their very nature, could be put off without causing any harm to the national economy.

Then, from 1970 to 1977, planning was done on an annual basis. Wartime conditions made it necessary to give a strong impetus to projects which would bring immediate results or which would basically serve the needs of the war or the domestic front. As a matter of fact, the economic, political, and social problems faced by Egypt during the previous periods, in spite of the existence of 5-year plans, forced Egypt to resort to planning on an annual basis in most cases. This was because making predictions for periods of time of more than 1 or 2 years was considered impossible, due to the high frequency of surprise developments.

But things have changed nowadays. There is no doubt that the nature of planning today differs from the concept of traditional annual planning which was applied before. Planning nowadays is carried out on the basis of profound study of problems and factors of change, both nationwide and by sectors. Studies make use of past experience and of forecasts relating to the time period of the next plan within a framework of long-range planning and a comprehensive cultural strategy.

Planning of this sort clearly requires additional effort, work, and time. It also requires mature study and creative thinking consistent with the nature of the economic, social, and political factors of change.

It is on the basis of these principles that 5-year plans began to be prepared in Egypt as of 1978. According to these principles, if a change in circumstances should occur, it would call for partial or isolated corrective action without tampering with the "basic strategy." The latter defines the general direction toward achieving society's greater objectives in the future and in the long run.

Determining the Priorities of Investment Planning Factors

On the national level, the objective of the development plan is to guarantee proper use of capital to increase production, and to guarantee that there will be a balance between the production of goods and services. Another objective is the achievement of social justice.

Defining the plan's objectives, or defining the dimensions of the economic problem, is what determines the manner of choosing and determining the plan's investment factors. We clarify below the most important elements which affect determination of the order of investment priorities:

1. The large deficit in the balance of foreign trade.

2. The inability of national investments--savings--to meet the demands required by economic and social development.

3. The failure to reformulate ideas of development strategy to keep pace with the requirements of the nation's people.

As a result of this, alternatives have arisen on the basis of which the priorities of the investment plan in the country can be determined. These alternatives may change as the years go by, or as implementation factors or economic or social conditions may change. On this basis, determination of the priorities of the investment plan could be as follows:

a. Implementing necessary projects for replacement and renovation in order to maintain productive capacities and raise productive levels. Renovation of plants with worn-out machinery includes supplying them with modern industrial technology to improve quality, cut costs, and eliminate bottlenecks.

b. Hastening to complete projects which are currently being implemented, on a priority basis. This should particularly apply to projects whose implementation is well under way or which are very near completion. The purpose of this is to reap the economic and social yields expected of them as soon as possible, and eliminate the phenomenon of too many projects which are not productive.

c. Implementing the new projects on the basis of priority to those which have ample sources of funds through loans, easy terms provided by suppliers, or joint ventures. This is within the general framework of the government's policy.

It is also possible to determine the order of priorities of the plan's factors as follows:

a. Allocating the necessary investments to projects to put idle capacity to work, or increase the efficiency of existing productive capacity, be it to increase production of goods for local consumption or goods for export.

b. Allocating investments to joint projects which have access to foreign money, and promoting the economic open-door policy which is oriented toward doing business with the advanced countries of the world, especially in areas which require advanced know-how and technology, and involve the participation of Arab or foreign capital.

c. Allocating investments to projects which meet or further the requirements of reconstruction and development, particularly projects which increase the efficiency and raise the technological level of the contracting and construction sector. The purpose would be to enable this sector to a assist in the implementation of the various projects of other sectors. This is particularly relevant, becaure the basic bottleneck in development efforts is due to the fact that investments allocated to the construction industry are inadequate.

d. Completing ongoing projects.

e. Implementing replacement and renovation projects.

It is also possible to reorder implementation priorities as follows:

a. Directing investments to projects which concern the needs of the masses and correspond to needs of the consumers, especially projects which have to do with providing an adequate food supply, clothing and housing.

b. Concentrating on renovation and expansion of basic facilities and utilities which have been noticeably neglected in past years. This is because these are considered to be a basis for activating and expanding the country's capacity to absorb additional foreign investment and aid from abroad.

c. Directing investments to projects which serve to improve or guide consumption and are in keeping with the policy of revitalizing large pl a policy which has the objective of modernizing, developing, and increasing productive capacities so as to keep pace with modern technological developments.

d. Making investments in projects which would lead to improving the balance of payments situation or which can obtain funds from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development or other international sources, or through joint ventures. A comprehensive plan should be prepared concerning the utilization of foreign aid. This plan should determine the areas in which such aid would be most effective. Efforts should be made to utilize such aid and loans within a definite time frame which corresponds to Egypt's needs for them.

e. Giving the local and foreign private sectors a basic role in the implementation of production projects and in substantive participation in development projects.

There is no doubt that defining the objectives of the investment plan on a national level will guide us in choosing the basis for determining the priorities of investment projects. Flexibility of implementation may require changing the basis for making this choice from time to time. But strategy becomes more definite as we develop our ability to determine our resources

and needs in a more accurate fashion. This means continually reveiwing the investment plan, bearing in mind changes which may occur. Changes will be taken into consideration, and the plan will be modified in light of actual implementation and in light of realistic needs. But such modifications would be within very narrow limits, so that the plan's basic objectives can be achieved. Also, the plan should be reviewed at the beginning of every year. New investments would be added, previous investments would be deleted, and new factors of change would be incorporated as needed.

9468
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PERES CRITICIZES CAMP DAVID ACCORDS

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 15 Aug 80 p 16

[Article by Shimon Peres: "The Jordanian Option--The Real Substitute for the PLO"]

[Text] Mr Menahem Begin repeatedly claims in the name of King Hussein that territorial compromise is, in his eyes, a non-starter for negotiations. In his opinion, the absence of a negotiating partner apparently invalidates the objective of the negotiations. If this is the situation, it would have been interesting to hear from the prime minister the identity of the partner from the heads of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for his autonomy plan. Even the negotiations with Egypt on the autonomy have failed because Egypt is not ready to accept the Israeli interpretation, and Israel is not ready to accept the Egyptian interpretation.

However, if the "full autonomy" plan has not yet revealed a partner ready to accept it, it has already succeeded in bringing about a Palestinianization of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The document which the government of Israel signed at Camp David was a kind of "Balfour Declaration" for the Palestinian state, and its author (by an irony of fate, his name is Menahem Begin) is, unwillingly, one of those who has laid the legitimate and political foundation for a Palestinian infrastructure within the 1967 borders.

All the obfuscatory actions of the Likud government will be to no avail. It has committed itself in writing--and the United States Government also signed this commitment--that "the solution from the negotiations on the final status" of the West Bank and Gaza "must also recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements." This is stronger language than that of the Balfour Declaration, and it contains an explicit recognition of the existence of a "Palestinian people" with legitimate rights and just requirements. Mr Begin himself was apparently shocked by the language of the document which he signed in English (and this is the language which commits the parties) and requested President Carter's permission to write in Hebrew "the Arabs of the Land of Israel" instead of the "Palestinian people." President Carter is not Eliezer Ben-Yehuda, and he apparently believes that if a prime minister wants to improve his image in the eyes of his people, then this is an aesthetic issue, not a political one. Permission was given, and Mr Begin disseminated an imprecise translation of his commitment at Camp David.

It must be remembered that the autonomy plan is a temporary plan--for 5 years. The subsequent period will be determined in negotiations in which "Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and representatives of the Palestinian people" will participate, and the purpose of which will be "the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects."

In other words, the government of Israel committed itself to a solution of the problem of the Palestinian people in two stages for everything concerning the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The first stage--a self-governing authority, the second stage--a complete resolution of the Palestinian problem. It takes more than a little chutzpah for someone who initiated this unfortunate idea to cast the blame on someone else, regarding the creation of PLO option because negotiations with Hussein would transfer, as it were, territories to the PLO. Mr Begin "forgot" to point out that even in regard to the negotiations with Hussein, the Alignment announced that it would insist that the IDF and the network of settlements remain along the Jordan Valley and that no foreign army will be able to cross the river.

Mr Begin has prepared for himself an awesome alternative for the future: either a PLO option within the 1967 boundaries or another military confrontation.

The Alignment is not interested in annexing an additional 1,300,000 Arabs to the State of Israel against their will. It believes that it is not worth it to sacrifice the Jewish and Zionist character of Israel on the imaginary altar of "not an inch." The real dispute is not over the annexation of territories but over the annexation of inhabitants. Only for Marc Chagall are the inhabitants cut off from the land. In actuality, whoever wants to annex Shekhem is also prepared to annex its inhabitants to Israel. A state with 3 million Jews and 2 million Arabs will naturally change from a Jewish state a Jewish-Arab state with both sides competing for every plot of land, for every street, for every house. Such a state will also lead to a dezionization of the Jewish people--from a working people, it will become an administrative people living as a dependent on the work of others.

For these reasons the Alignment is seeking a geographic solution which will permit us to withstand external dangers, and a demographic solution which will permit us to withstand an internal danger--the conversion of the Jewish settlement in Israel to a settlement which lives in diaspora conditions in its own land.

In order to defend Israel, Israel needs defensible borders in the Golan Heights, the Jordan Valley, and the Sinai Desert.

In order to remain Israel, we require a clear, solid, and vital Jewish majority and that most of the labor in Israel be Jewish labor.

As for the Palestinian problem, we believe that it is one problem, and therefore, one solution must be sought: a Jordanian-Palestinian state, a state within which there will be a majority of the Palestinians who are obviously inhabitants of Jordan and the inhabitants of Judaea, Samaria, and

Gaza who are obviously citizens of Jordan. We are opposed to two solutions--in the Likud version--a separate Jordanian solution and a separate Palestinian solution. The two solutions will in time naturally become two states, and the two states will have two armies. The states will continue to compete with each other for mutual domination, and the two armies will lengthen the conflict between each other and between them and ourselves. We oppose the idea of exchanging one conflict for another and calling it a "solution." Therefore, we are opposed both to the separate Palestinian state and the separate Palestinian option of the Likud.

We favor inviting King Hussein to the negotiations. If he comes, good. If he doesn't come, he will bear the burden of the refusal. There is no reason for Israel to appear as a "rejectionist front" which every morning states its "no's" when in truth, it is seeking a "yes" to peace and a "yes" to security. It is likely that King Hussein will oppose a "territorial compromise." However, he has agreed to Security Council Resolution 242. The evacuation of "all the territories" was expressly removed from this resolution in which "the evacuation of territories" is stated. It is necessary, therefore, to try to conduct negotiations with Hussein, not on what he has not yet agreed to but on what he has already agreed to: 242.

Not only our adversaries but our friends are asking us a number of questions regarding this option, the Jordanian option, and we must respond to them. Why, they ask, didn't you conduct negotiations with Jordan previously, and if you did, why have they not been fruitful? The answer is that we did conduct negotiations, and they were fruitful. Not ostentatious and ceremonial fruit, but real fruit. The fact is that there is virtually no infiltration of terrorists into Israel from Jordan. The fact is that bridges of far-reaching normalization span the Jordan. The fact is that a system of ties between the West Bank and Israel has developed without adversely affecting the system of ties between the West Bank and Jordan. We have not reached a formal peace because of Jordan's location on the Arab map, more than because of the system of relations between it and Israel. We have understood that Jordan cannot be the first candidate for making peace with Israel. It is this limitation which also now offers renewed hope for an attempt at talks with Jordan in that there is already a large Arab country, the largest of the Arab countries, which has signed a peace treaty with Israel. The precedent exists, the continuation is sought.

Why, they ask, does Hussein respond negatively whenever the possibility of negotiations between us is mentioned? The truth is that for the most part, Hussein's reactions are rather selective. He says that he is not ready to conduct negotiations on the basis of Camp David, however, he has not retracted his agreement to Resolution 242.

It must not be forgotten that Sadat also spoke with the language of the Khartoum decisions ("no negotiations, no recognition, no peace with Israel") until he came to Israel. Just as his words did not distrub his actions, it must be assumed that the life of the Rabat language (that the PLO will conduct negotiations on the future of the territories) which Hussein uses will be extended until it is possible to begin real negotiations.

Isn't there too great a gap, they ask, between the positions of Jordan and those of Israel? Certainly there is such a gap. Each side is involved in stating its full positions, without trying to bridge them, because there is no need for bridging as long as real negotiations are not being conducted. It is indeed possible that even in the negotiations we will be able to bridge the positions of the parties only partially. Then there will be a partial agreement. However, a partial agreement is preferable to a deepening confrontation.

We prefer the Jordanian option for reasons of viewing Israel as a Jewish State. We prefer it to the Likud's Palestinian option which is likely to bring Israel up against a stone wall and to another confrontation. We prefer it not because it has no complications and difficulties but rather because without it, we will continue to pave the way for the PLO which has achieved a not insignificant impetus since Camp David.

5830
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SUPPORT OF CAMP DAVID ACCORDS URGED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Aug 80 p 9

[Editorial: "The Process Refuses to Die"]

[Text] The deputy foreign minister of Egypt responded to Mr Begin's letter in a cautionary (though not threatening) tone, when he emphasized that there was no prospect of renewing the autonomy talks if Israel refused to fulfill certain conditions. Yet, at the same time, he avoided cancelling any prospect which might lead to the renewal of the talks. Egypt is finding it very difficult to continue the discussions as long as Israel persists in taking certain unilateral measures, according to the Egyptian diplomat. "But we are not dispairing of them (the Israelis)...I would not say that the situation is hopeless."

The passage of the legislation on Jerusalem (the product of Geula Kohen) has pushed Anwar Sadat into a confused position. There were enough problems in the dispute over settlements, and there was no need to add to that the differences over Jerusalem, especially after we had avoided the issue in the Camp David accords. Nevertheless, the mistake was made, and not even Mr Uzama el-Baz can expect the Israeli Government to change the law. One might even conclude from his expression that he does not expect the law to be repealed. On the other hand, he is practically begging Israel not to take any further unilateral action. We would not err if we guessed that Mr el-Baz was referring to the move of the prime minister's office to East Jerusalem. It may be assumed that the prime minister will close his ears to any such appeal. It was his personal idea to transfer the prime minister's offices to East Jerusalem, and since the Renaissance party has harvested achievements from the law, it is unlikely that the prime minister's party will give up his one achievement.

This is also the case regarding another Egyptian request, which Mr Uzama el-Baz avoided mentioning, but it is believed that Cairo will raise the issue in the letter which it is now preparing in response. This refers to the Egyptian demand that Israel declare that East Jerusalem, i.e., the sovereignty over it, will be a subject for negotiation--if not in connection with autonomy, then at the end of the 5 year transition period. Mr Moshe Dayan, the former

foreign minister, referred to this when he said that all issues were up for discussion, even those on which Israel had fixed its position. Mr Begin could meet Cairo on this question, without giving up the principle of his position, but it is unlikely that the prime minister will be so inclined as to accept the advice of Mr Dayan.

The prime minister can ignore the signs which are emanating from the Egyptian side. He can also appreciate the fact that, for the present, we will lose nothing in continuing the exchange of letters, and that this will enable us to continue to discuss matters with the Egyptian president without actually negotiating. However, our political position will not improve in this way, and the freeze which has already yielded the Venice declaration of the European Common Market countries, and could yield an initiative on the part of the president of Rumania, which Mr Begin would find difficult to condemn as a new manifestiation of the spirit of Munich. From one of the comments of General Kamal Hasan Ali, it may be concluded that Cairo is not enthusiastic about the initiative of Mr Nicolai Ceauscescu. It would prefer to pursue the Camp David process, and to seek a summit meeting with the U.S. president, whose international position is being strengthened following his victory in the struggle to win the nomination of his party for the U.S. elections. The Camp David process is struggling to stay alive. It will not die easily, nor will it be easy to bury. Apparently, Egypt is not interested in its demise, and it does not want to be its grave digger. It would be well if this job does not fall to the Israeli Government.

7075
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SOVIET COOPERATION SEEN NEEDED FOR MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Aug 80 pp 13, 20

[Speech by Nahum Goldmann delivered at a meeting of the executive committee of the World Jewish Congress in Amsterdam on 10 July 1980 in a discussion of Soviet Jewry]

[Text] In recent years I have been completely cut off from all formal Jewish activities concerning Soviet Jewry, and I have avoided making public statements. For a long time I served as chairman of the special committee which Ben Gurion established with the participation of Golda Meir, Zalman Shazar, and Moshe Sharett, the purpose of which was to deal with the subject of Soviet Jewry in strict secrecy, until I resigned because of a disagreement over policy. I did not participate in the Brussels convention, however, I agreed that the World Jewish Congress would be one of the international organizations under whose auspices it would be arranged. If I am speaking out today, it is because I believe that it is my obligation to tell you about my completely different approach to the entire problem. I will endeavor not to be controversial, and even if you are likely to feel resentment regarding the information which I will relate and the interpretation I will give it, I ask you to be patient.

For more than 40 years I have been in constant touch with the Soviets. I first met Maxim Litvinov (the then foreign minister) in Geneva in 1935, and in March of this year I spent 4 hours with Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington. Between these two, I have surely met with at least about 12 important Soviet diplomats. In recent years I met regularly with Tito and Ceausescu. I also frequently see those who are considered experts on the subject of Soviet Jewry, including my friend Calman Shulman from the State Department. While I reported on this regularly to the members of the Labor Party government in Israel, I do not report to the Begin government. I did this twice--to no avail.

When we come to consider the problems of Soviet Jewry, the crucial importance of the general picture in the world becomes known. The Jewish problems throughout the world, including Israel, are dependent first and foremost on the attitude of the Jewish people, however, the world situation stands in second place. The famous saying of Ben Gurion, "It is not important what

the goyim think, what is important is what the Jews do," was, of course, completely absurd. Without world public opinion and the United Nations resolution, a Jewish state would not have been established in 1948.

The Tragedy of America

The basic fact, in my opinion, is that the United States can no longer be decisive on any important issue in the world today without cooperating with the Soviet Union. This is the tragedy of America today. For more than 20 years I was an American citizen, and when I gave up this citizenship in order to become an Israeli, Dean Rusk repeatedly asked me not to do it. I sympathize with America, it is a place which arouses much love, however, it is also very doubtful. My attitude today to America is one of much sorrow and empathy. As I see it, the United States has suffered a tragic fate in the last 50 years. Through the years the Americans have been very isolated and fortunate. Then came World War I in which they were forced to intervene and then World War II, after which they had to be the number 1 power. They were not ready for this: in psychological terms, generations are required in order to become a world power, and the United States never had this aspiration.

The Americans were very happy as long as they were generous, good-hearted, and democratic but with no global burden on their shoulders. However, fate suddenly called upon them to assume world leadership. Even before they had managed to adjust to this situation, they ceased being the number 1 world power. They must now recognize that they must discuss every important issue with Russia, that they cannot, for example, solve the problems of the Middle East without the Soviet Union. Russia is growing stronger and stronger. Europe is no longer exclusively bound to America, and if it unites, it is likely to become a superpower itself. Within 10 years, China can also become such a power. As of now, the United States is one of the two superpowers.

This is the general background. It is absurd to assume that we can solve the Middle East problem and the problem of Soviet Jewry by confrontation with the Russians. It was a great mistake on the part of American Jewry and Israel, to slander the Soviet Union as anti-Israeli. Our entire policy on Russia has been completely mistaken, and I do not believe that the development of the current situation was unavoidable.

The Conflict With The Russians

We could have maintained the best relations with the Russians. This applies both to Israel and to world Jewry. Already in 1942, when Weizmann leaned toward accepting Wedgewood's advice that a Jewish state should become the seventh member of the British Commonwealth, I warned him: Do not do this, boss, you will abandon every prospect that the Russians will at some time vote for the establishment of a Jewish state, as I believe they will do.

During World War II, the Soviet Union rescued hundreds of thousands of Jews by permitting them to enter Russia from Poland, and later, it permitted most of them to leave for Israel back through Poland. In the vote on the partition proposal in the United Nations, Gromyko caused a sensation when he supported it (Sharett almost fainted from emotion, however, I saw that the Soviet vote would be affirmative).

After the partition was approved by a two-thirds majority, Truman's aides--Marshall, Acheson, Patterson, and (Lovett)--asked the president to withdraw his support from the partition of Palestine, on the basis of a prediction that one day the Jewish state would come to an end with the slaughter of Jews, and instead grant the United Nations a mandate for 3 more years. In such a case, a Jewish state would never have been established in our time. One of the main reasons which motivated Truman to eliminate this option was Gromyko's comment to Dean Rusk that, in such a case, the Soviet Union would veto the American proposal.

When the War of Liberation broke out, who saved Israel? The Soviet Union. I heard Ben Gurion say often--privately and publicly--that he was pained over Soviet policy. However, he admitted that without Russian assistance, a Jewish state would not have been established. During that period America did not send one single rifle. In my office in New York, as chairman of the World Zionist Organization, an FBI investigator visited me throughout the year to determine if we had smuggled weapons to Israel through Mexico. It was the Soviet Union which provided weapons through Czechoslovakia.

The Soviets became hostile since Israel ceased being a neutral country. During the course of the talks which I held for many years with Soviet diplomats before the Holocaust, they had one complaint against a Jewish state. "You will be pro-American," they claimed, "since all the money will come from the United States." This was before we knew about the extermination of the Jews of Europe by Hitler, and I argued: You are mistaken. The Jewsish state will be built by manpower and money. Manpower which is more important will come from you, from the Jewish state in Eastern Europe, and the financial support will come from America. Therefore, we will have to be neutral.

With the establishment of the State, Ben Gurion, Sharett, and even Silver vigorously defended Israel's neutrality. It was then called a "non-aligned policy." They all agreed that we had to be neutral so as not to lose the support of the Soviet Union. However, when the Arab-Israeli wars came one after the other, and Israel was forced to depend more and more on the supply of American weapons, we were no longer able to depend on Russian assistance; as such, we grew increasingly dependent on the United States. This is how our conflict began with the Soviet Union.

However, I completely reject the view that the Russians are not for the existence of Israel. They proved this first by their support in the past; without the Russian vote, there would not have been a two-thirds majority in the United Nations. Secondly, they can always incite the Arabs against Israel, however the moment there will be no Israel, God forbid, they would be committed to the Arabs and would be unable to maneuver. There was a stage when they had virtually reestablished diplomatic relations with Israel. The matter depended on several votes in the Politburo. At the last moment they decided against such action, however, Dobrynin asked me to establish contact for him with the then Israeli ambassador Simha Dinitz, which I did. However, it led nowhere since ambassadors today, in the words of Kreisky, are "messenger boys."

The Soviet diplomats through the years refused to meet with any Jewish representatives, however, they always received me, and at my recommendation, Klutznick and Bronfman, since they knew that the World Jewish Congress was trying to be neutral.

After Stalin

The Soviet Union is not interested in the disappearance of Israel, and it is ready today to guarantee, together with the United States, the borders of Israel if there is a settlement. Among the many mistakes of which American Jewry is guilty, the most serious one was made when, under pressure from Israel, they motivated President Carter 3 years ago to cancel the agreement signed between Vance and Gromyko for the convening of a Geneva Conference. The Russians agreed at that time to be guarantors, together with the United States, of a comprehensive peace settlement; they would have found a way to bring the PLO into the talks as a part of an Arab delegation.

One of the reasons for the Russian invasion of Afghanistan was the removal of the Soviet Union from a negotiating position in the Middle East. Russians considered this American "brazenness." Russia is closer to the Middle East; therefore, how does the United States dare prevent them from taking part in dealing with this issue? There will not be a peace in the Middle East until another Geneva Conference is convened, and the Camp David Agreement alone will not bring a comprehensive peace.

Although it is true that in the past there were clear signs that the Soviets support Israel, a change took place in the last years of Stalin--when he was no longer rational and pursued everyone. The "doctors' plot" was only one episode, and it is possible that millions of Jews would have been killed had he lived. During that time I was the chairman of an unofficial committee which we set up without any publicity, and whenever we met with Gromyko or another Soviet official, I had a list of many Zionists who were in prison and in Siberia, a list which was provided by the Israeli organization Magen. The Russians customarily claimed that no Zionist was being held in the Russian prisons, and they demanded that I give them the names of such Zionists. I did not do this since in the Stalin era, they would shoot them. Since then, the situation has greatly improved. Today, we cannot only turn over the names but also cause a tumult. When the dissidents protest, they do not shoot them. In the worst case, they are sent to prison.

I do not justify this. I reject communism, and I am disgusted by all the sovereign nations. By nature, I am an anarchist, however, without bombs. Of course, I do not support a militarist regime, however, we must recognize facts: in comparison with the Stalin era, Russia today is a Garden of Eden.

We began to argue openly with the Russians after Stalin's death. I have often been accused of being too soft and moderate. However, I was the one who convened the first protest meeting against Russia in Paris, when Martin Buber and I spoke and telegrams of support came from Bertrand Russell, Eleanor Roosevelt, and many others. For 3 months the Soviets tried to block it. It was the first major protest on behalf of Russian Jewry. It was a diplomatic event, unlike the Brussels meeting which was a demagogic display.

Throughout the sixties and seventies, I spoke at dozens of meetings, however, I always said: "You must treat the Soviet Union as a superpower. We had to regard Russia as a major nation which it was, a nation which could like without Jewish support but which could bring a Holocaust on the Jewish people if it became anti-Semitic and anti-Israeli. We must continue to protest but in a respectful manner. Carter made the same foolish mistake. The expression "we will punish Russia" is infantile. Is it a girl's school? Do you punish a superpower? The United States can threaten the Soviet Union with war, that it will fight, protest--but not punish.

The Dual Aspect

And we made another major mistake. The Soviet-Jewish problem has always had two aspects: emigration and Jewish rights in Russia. The most important aspect in my opinion is not the struggle for emigration but rather for the rights of Jews. In the best case we can hope to extract 200,000 to 300,000 Jews; only a small percentage of which are determined to live as Jews in Israel. The remainder want to leave Russia primarily because they want a better life. Therefore, by ignoring the problem of existing in the Soviet Union, we would achieve the rescue of about 50,000 good Jews and the sacrifice of 3 million. We should have insisted at the very beginning on the right to maintain an organized Jewish life in Russia, at the same time with the struggle for the right of Jews to emigrate. By law, the Jews are recognized as a minority in the Soviet Union, where tens of such minorities live and have the right to have their own theaters, schools, and so forth. The Jews, however, unlike the other minorities, are not concentrated in one area. The Russians gave them Birobidzhan, where the Jews were able to use Hebrew as their official language, however, they laughed at this proposal, and justifiably so.

As I said to Gromyko, Jews are intelligent people. Why should they go to Birobidzhan next to Mongolia? Give them Kiev or Odessa and they will go! However, Dobrynin often asked: "Why didn't they ask for another territory?" To which I responded: Since Russian Jewry has no spokesman. First establish a body which will represent the Jews of Russia, and then they will be able to negotiate on a territorial concentration in one form or another.

The World Zionist Organization and most of the American Jewish organizations rejected my position that the struggle for the right of emigration and the struggle for the right to maintain a Jewish life in the Soviet Union are of equal importance. To mention one dramatic incident, I was invited to speak before the Zionist Congress in 1972 on the subject of "80 Years of Zionism." Several weeks before that, I spoke at the Council of Representatives of British Jewry, and I defended my position on the dual aspect of the struggle for the rights of Soviet Jewry. As a result, L. A. Pincus, who was then the chairman of the Zionist Executive Committee, canceled his invitation.

Without mentioning the discourtesy and the impropriety of this action, it was symptomatic of the one-sidedness of our policy on Soviet Jewry. The tone of the anti-Russian campaign in the Jewish community in America was no less damaging. When I once told the NEW YORK TIMES that it was ridiculous to compare Soviet anti-Semitism with Nazism, there was an uproar and the Presidents' Conference called me a traitor.

There are many signs that with another policy we would achieve much. However, much is also dependent upon the foreign policy of Israel. If we were striving more energetically for peace with the Arabs, the Russians could serve as intermediaries, together with the Americans. I told Ben Gurion many times: Just for the sake of 3 million Jews, the largest concentration of Jews after Israel, it would be worthwhile to change our Arab policy. From the point of view of this situation, what Israel is doing is bad and what American Jewry is doing with its "outcry" is bad. However, I have stopped arguing with Jews. I believe in the saying: What is intellect will not do, time will.

Everything depends on the world situation not deteriorating, and personally, I am optimistic. The Russians want detente, and Afghanistan was a lesson for them not to go too far. As I said to an important Soviet diplomat: Don't talk to me about pacts, etc. I know that in politics, treaties are only a screen. If you want to apply them, you use them; if you want to violate them, you forget them. He could not admit that they made a mistake, however, he responded that he understood me. The Soviets now want to save their prestige, and they are very grateful to Chancellor Schmidt for serving as an intermediary.

If the Jewish people, mainly the American Jews, learn from the past and choose to adopt a policy of diplomacy recognizing that you cannot successfully attack the Soviet Union but must negotiate with her with proriety and self-respect) while constantly raising the issue of Russian Jewry before public opinion because it must never seem as if we have forgotten them--then, I hope for the best, and I am rather optimistic. If one day, Israel institutes a different policy toward the Arabs, and the Arab countries reach an agreement with Israel, I still will not give up hope.

I believe that in such a case we are likely to receive an additional 100,000 Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union, and also Jews from that country will be able perhaps to enjoy broader religious and cultural rights. It is possible, however, that we are approaching the zero hour in order to achieve this. In the Soviet Union, there are 3 million Jews--many more than those registered in the population census as Jews because many make use of their right not to be registered as Jews--and there is a possibility that we will be able to save many of them and to regain them as members of the Jewish people. In order to achieve this, it is necessary that detente continue to be the basis for international policy, and that a more intelligent policy be adopted by the Jews. I am optimistic about the first condition, and unfortunately, less so about the second.

5830
CSO: 4805

COUNTRY ASKED TO ASSERT ITSELF WITHOUT BURDENING WEST

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 6 Aug 80 p 7

[Article by Dov Afal: "Improvement of Relations with USSR--A Mission Without Illusions"]

[Text] Recently, in public forums and in the press in Israel, ideas and proposals for improving relations with the USSR have been discussed. There is no reason for seeking justifications for Israel's interest in re-establishing relations with the USSR, relations which were severed by Moscow as punishment for our victory in the Six-Day War. However, it must be remembered that it is no secret that the USSR has made clear more than once, through unofficial channels and in speeches by its leaders (including Brezhnev), as to the circumstances and conditions under which it would agree to a renewal of relations with us.

The conditions are: Israel's agreement to withdraw from all of the territories occupied in the Six-Day War; involving the PLO in negotiations with Israel on a final solution to the Palestinian problem; including a solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees, and the realization of the Palestinian right to self determination by the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. We may add to this that Moscow officially supports the UN resolutions which recognize the right of the Palestinian refugees to return to their homes within Israel, or to receive reparations. The USSR has declared its readiness--within the framework of a comprehensive settlement--to participate with other members of the UN in giving guarantees of the security and independence of all countries in the region, including Israel.

Israeli governments--the Alignment as well as the Likud--have rejected these conditions and have worked to eliminate the USSR as an active factor in our region. In this repsect, there is no difference between the policies of the governments of the late Golda Meir, Yitshaq Rabin, and of Menahem Begin. It may even be assumed that the present Israeli prime minister views now, as one of the great achievements of Israeli diplomacy, the burying of the Vance-Gromyko declaration of October 1977, which marked out lines for Soviet-American cooperation in the solution of the problems of our region. This

"achievement" by Begin and Dayan prevented American-Soviet cooperation in the settlement of the dispute in our region. It strengthened among the Soviet leaders the recognition (which was in any case strong among most of them) that the official leaders of Israel are not at all interested in the reconstruction of Soviet-Israeli relations, and in the placing of them on a strong and stable basis.

So, there is no logic or reason in all of the declarations regarding the need to seek ways to re-establish relations with the USSR, as long as it is not stated explicitly that Israel must recognize the right of the USSR to participate in a constructive way in the general and final solution of the Israeli-Arab dispute.

This does not mean that Israel must adopt the conditions, as formulated by Moscow after the Six-Day War, for the ending of the dispute. There is reason to assume that the USSR, as a full participant with the U.S., would not adhere to extreme pro-Arab demands and conditions (such as returning hundreds of thousands of refugees to the territories, or the withdrawal of the IDF to precisely the Green Line), which would cause a breakdown of the negotiations at Geneva or anywhere else.

Moreover, the USSR rejects the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and the Camp David agreements in their entirety, and identifies with the PLO, Syria, and Libya.

However, let us assume that in October 1977, Moshe Dayan would not have succeeded in burying the agreement between Vance and Gromyko, or let us imagine that Israel would have "bet" on the realization of the declaration of the two foreign ministers of the USSR and the U.S. and would have subjected the joint platform of the USSR and the U.S., as it was formulated in the statement of the two ministers, to the test of reality.

In the journal of the Soviet Communist party, KOMONIST, of June, Professor Yevgeny Primakov (during the Nasser period a reporter for PRAVDA in Cairo, and now a member of the Soviet Academy of Science--Near East section) mentioned the "key problems" to a general solution of the Israeli-Arab dispute, listed in the Vance-Gromyko declaration of 1 October 1977: "the evacuation of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the 1967 war; the Palestinian problem--including the assurance of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people; an end to the state of war and the establishment of normal peaceful relations, on the basis of mutual recognition of the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence." Professor Yevgeny Primakov is not numbered among the friends of Israel. It is possible, therefore, that he would willingly improve and update the text of the declaration by the foreign ministers of the USSR and the U.S., and introduce some changes, such as the explicit demand that the PLO participate in negotiations for a peace settlement, and the assurance of the right of the refugees to return to their homes beyond the Green Line. There is no reason to engage in the game of "what would happen if," but we still can ask: Would Foreign Minister Gromyko, as one of the two chairmen of the peace conference, have troubled Prime Minister Begin to give up all of the Sinai in return for a peace settlement with Egypt? Would Gromyko

have been opposed to a transition period of 5 years? Or to the idea of autonomy in itself as an interim temporary solution to the Palestinian problem? There is of course no possible logic in answering such a hypothetical question. In any event, it may be assumed that the USSR would be very interested in collaboration with the U.S., in settling the dispute in our region.

It is also permissible to raise the idea that both the U.S. and the USSR would stand by an explicit definition of the substance of autonomy and its scope, so as to prevent the failure of the process towards achieving a general peace settlement.

In theory, it could be said that the agreement of all interested parties (i.e., the Egyptians, Syrians, Israelis, Jordanians, and Palestinians) could put an end to the dispute between the Arabs and the Israelis in a comprehensive form without the participation of the Russians. It must also be taken into account that the USSR could bring about the failure of a general settlement, if, as a participant in the negotiations, it insisted on the return of the refugees from across the Green Line, on the absolute withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the Green Line, and the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, as the only solution to the problem. There is also a basis for suspecting that some important factors in the Russian upper echelons hope that a Palestinian state would need and ask for its aid in realizing Arafat's "dream" of establishing a democratic Palestinian state in the whole area of Palestine, by exploting the demands of the irredentist Arab minority in Israel.

Nonetheless, we must also make clear to ourselves that the participation of the USSR in general negotiations should convince extremist factors in the Arab world in general, and within the PLO in particular, that their hopes and struggle for the dismantling of Israel through the aid of the USSR are anchored only in their illusions and dreams, with no connection to reality.

There is also no basis for any illusions that the USSR, since the countries of Western Europe have expressed their support for the participation of the PLO in negotiations of a general settlement, will now proclaim its withdrawal of recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. There is also no basis for the illusion that the USSR will give up its demand for the creation of a Palestinian state just now, when the UN General Assembly, by an impressive majority, has affirmed the realization of this demand. There is also no basis for the dreams of an "about face" from the American orientation of Israel, and the machiavellian notion of the possibility of maneuvering between the USSR and the U.S. No informed stateman, either inside or outside of the USSR believes that Israel can deviate from the American line, both for economic and military reasons, as well as because of its special relations with American Jewry.

Let us also note that, unfortunately, the demographic and economic balance of power between the Arabs and Israel is stable, and is not going to tilt in favor of Israel. One may not expect the USSR to respond to attempts by Israel "to endear" itself. The USSR (like most other countries in the world) will continue to give overriding importance to its relations with the Arabs, as compared to any special relations with Israel.

There is also a reasonable possibility that the USSR will view the establishment of good relations with Israel, which maintains special relations with the U.S., as an important component in its efforts to maintain peaceful relations and cooperation with the U.S., within the framework of the new and updated version of detente for the decade of the 80's. This possibility is worth consideration by the Israeli Government, which might free itself from the Don Quixote vision of the special strategic mission of Israel, as the "only stable country in the Middle East, worthy of special treatment by Western Europe and the United States."

The real problem for Israeli policy now is to garner its strength to protect its security and future, without becoming a concern to the Arab world and a factor in its confrontation with the USSR.

7075
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EBAN: LIKUD HURT RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Aug 80 p 5

[Article: "Israel and Latin America"]

[Text] Of 33 countries called for the establishment of the state of Israel in November 1947, 13 of them were Latin American. When Israel struggled for admission to the UN (and as a result to all international agencies), 18 of the 37 affirmative votes came from Latin American countries, which at that time numbered 20 in the UN. In 1967, when the USSR and the Arab countries supported passage of a resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal to the June 4 lines, without peace--all 22 Latin American countries voted against the resolution.

It is clear that the countries of that distant continent played a decisive role in Israel's struggle for international recognition and acceptance in the world community. Since Israel had arrived late in that arena, an imbalance was created: Latin America gave to Israel what Israel was unable to give to Latin America, which had already achieved independence and sovereignty before Israel--and before most of the countries of Asia and Africa.

This fateful partnership came as a surprise to us. Due to its distance, Latin America was cut off from all Jewish life in Europe and the first steps towards Hebrew settlement in Israel. When the curtain rose on the Jewish tragedy in Europe, because of World War II, the Jews turned to countries far and near for support and encouragement. There was reason to suspect that the countries of Latin America would not accept the Jewish nature of the Zionist aspiration. Many of those among the Jewish leadership expected spiritual difficulties stemming from the theological concepts of the Catholic church. The helping hand which was extended from Latin America imparted an atmosphere of comfort to our struggle for liberation. This friendship was not part of any "debt" or "ultimate end." We could realize the principle of mutuality only in the sphere of a feeling and recognition of thanks. In time, the state of Israel developed a network of connections with the countries of Central and South America, and its flag flies throughout the continent. Public opinion in Israel grew so accustomed to sympathy from Latin America, that no attention was paid to another phenomenon: the readiness of many Latin American countries to locate their embassies in Jerusalem, the capital of Israel, in contrast to the hesitant and reserved position of the great powers.

Against this background, it is difficult to avoid shedding a tear because of the development in relations between Israel and Latin America in the last half decade. At the emergency session which ended last week, only two Latin American countries (Guatemala and the Dominican Republic) voted against the votes of 22 countries of that bloc, which had voted the other way 13 years earlier.

This change is due in part to changes in the social structure and world outlook of the countries of Central and South America. The formation of the "Third World" front brought the Latin American group closer to the Arab world, and moved it away from Israel. The oil organizations, especially OPEC, created common Arab and Latin American positions, but to my sorrow it is impossible to explain this deterioration in relation only to factors beyond our control. To a substantial extent it is due to Israeli neglect.

The termination of aid programs and Israeli participation in Africa after the Yom Kippur War could have freed up budgets and manpower, for expansion of cooperation and development projects in Latin America. From 1974 on, the opportunity was not exploited in its full scope. In spite of the devotion of ambassadors and workers of the AMLAT section of the foreign ministry, there was an atmosphere of apathy in the highest levels of government which bred oversight and carelessness. I have had the opportunity to evaluate this process from the point of view of personal experience. When I was a member of the cabinet under the late Levi Eshkol and the late Golda Meir, I made official visits to 10 Latin American countries. There were dozens of visits to Israel by Latin American heads of state and foreign ministers. Since the revolution in 1977, this movement has almost completely ceased.

During the Likud regime the prime minister or a foreign minister has not made one visit to a Latin American country. At every session of the UN General Assembly it was my practice to hold briefing and discussion sessions with the whole Latin American contingent. This tradition was abandoned several years ago, and not renewed. In discussions by the prime minister and foreign ministers in the Knesset and in the media since the rise of Likud to power, there has been almost no mention of the existence of the Latin American continent. During my tenure as ambassador to the UN, I attached great importance to the Latin American group. I insisted that the full importance of it could not be appreciated without controlling the language of most of the countries of that continent, with all of the sweat and effort involved in such a task. I have not heard that my successors have viewed this dimension as essential and irreplacable for anyone who wanted to fully plumb the possibilities of advancing Israel's relations with this large group of friendly countries. And I am speaking of a continent, in which Arab nationalism and Islam are not represented to the extent that they are in Asia and Africa.

Now the Likud government has reached the acme of its carelessness in that it has developed a demonstrative and verbal policy regarding Jerusalem, without even superficially taking into account the attitudes of the Latin American countries. The announcement by the government of the move of the prime minister's office to what it defines as East Jerusalem, brought about the

announcement by the government of Venezuela of its departure from the capital city. I am certain that MK Geula Kohen attaches no importance to the international dimension of Jerusalem. Her whole inclination is to attack the achievements of the Camp David accords, and in her eyes Jerusalem is only "a means to an end" in that quest.

I am not claiming that the existence of several national flags in Jerusalem is the central basis in the new reality that the people of Israel is in its capital. However, every Jew with historic imagination must recall the special universal element of Jerusalem in Jewish thought in every generation. "Jerusalem--the navel of the earth." "Jerusalem will be a light to all nations, and they will walk in its light." Generations in Israel have thrilled to the visionary words and poetry which present the image of "the mountain above the hills" to which "the nations flow" in a covenant of peace and justice with the creator of the world. The state of Israel has "merited" a government which prefers an official building on Shaykh Jarakh over the existence and nurturing of the international image of the covenant of Israel. The broad continent which is the home of liberation movements and stormy struggles, whose fate crossed with that of the people of Israel at a decisive moment--this continent has not once crossed the consciousness or lips of the Likud government in the 3 years of its tenure.

Another abandoned one which shall remain in the wilderness--until there is a change in the regime in Israel....

7075
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JEWISH AGENCY PLANS 70 NEW WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS

TA180939 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Sep 80 p 1

[Report by Dani Rubinstein: "The Settlement Department Plans 70 New Settlements in the West Bank"]

[Text] Despite the government's announcement on the establishment of only 10 more settlements in Judaea and Samaria, which would complete the Jewish settlement plans in the West Bank, the Jewish agency's settlement department headed by Matityahu Drobles yesterday published its plan to establish 70 new communal and urban settlements in the West Bank between now and 1985.

The plan specifies the blocs of settlements that would stretch from the southern Hebron hills to northern Samaria in the following order: the Yattir bloc--7 settlements; the western front Hebron bloc--3 settlements; the Giv'on bloc--2 settlements; Halamish and Modi'in in western Samaria--4 settlements; the Bet Al and Shilo bloc--5 settlements; the Ari'el and Qarne Shomron blocs--5 settlements; the Qedumim and Elon More blocs (near Nabulus)--6 settlements; northwest of Nabulus and the Shave Shomron bloc--6 settlements bordering on the green line in Samaria; the Rehan bloc--3 settlements; northern Samaria (Janin area)--5 settlements; the Tirza bloc--4 settlements; the Jordan Valley and northern Dead Sea--8 settlements (4 of them near Jericho). [figures as published]

According to the lists and plans published by Matityahu Drobles, these settlements include only part of the 10 settlements that the prime minister said would complete the settlement complex in the West Bank.

The settlement department--whose activities are coordinated with the government--has now published this settlement plan for establishing 12 to 15 settlements a year in accordance with the master plan Drobles submitted to the government about 2 years ago.

The plan does not make any mention of Begin's pledge to limit settlement activities to only 10 more settlements. Such a pledge was given to the United States, and Minister Ari'el Sharon reiterated it to Ambassador Sol Linowitz during the latter's recent stay in Israel.

In his plan Drobles explains that a race against time should be launched now in order to establish facts in the field and to "remove any traces of doubt regarding our intention to keep the territories of Judaea and Samaria forever." The date cited on the plan is September 1980.

The DAVAR correspondent noted that the government's announcements about the upcoming completion of settlement in the West Bank stirred ferment among Gush Emunim members who in the last few days announced their intention to resume the organization of settlement nuclei in the West Bank.

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

QALQILIYAH PROTESTS ELECTRICITY LINES--The Qalqiliyah Municipality headed by Hajj Amin al-Nasir has sent a protest to the military government about Israeli Electricity Corporation lines being extended through the town. The electricity lines being extended through Qalqiliyah are intended for settlements in western Samaria. [Text] [TA210951 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 21 Sep 80 p 3]

RAMALLAH ART GALLERY CLOSED--Today the military government closed an art gallery in Ramallah which exhibits paintings by Palestinian painters, claiming that an unlicensed exhibition was shown in it. A military government officer summoned the gallery owner and confiscated the keys to the gallery. The paintings of East Jerusalem artist Sulayman Mansur had been exhibited in the gallery. Mansur told our correspondent Arye Gus that the themes of his paintings were not political but folkloristic. Two weeks ago the military government confiscated five paintings by another artist. [Text] [TA212018 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 21 Sep 80]

CHILDREN ALLOWANCES--The military authorities in Judaea and Samaria will pay allowances for children to the military government [Arab] employees for every child under 18 years of age. Up to four children the allowance will be about 250 Israeli pounds per child and from the fifth child upward the allowance will be about 140 pounds per child. Our correspondent Arye Gus notes that Jordan pays allowances for children only up to the fourth child while Unwra pays up to seven children. [Text] [TA181952 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 18 Sep 80]

GOVERNMENT, E. JERUSALEM COMPANY--The government and the East Jerusalem Electric Corporation have agreed to open negotiations to settle the crisis developing between them. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari has learned that the Energy Ministry has promised not to start local procedures against the corporation in the near future and has even promised to strengthen it by supplying it with generators and other assistance. The corporation has agreed to discuss changes in the area under its concession and our correspondent mentions possibilities such as ceding the electricity supply to the Jewish settlements and IDF camps or to the Jewish neighborhoods of Jerusalem. In return the corporation will be allowed to supply electricity to Hebron. The chairman of the board of

directors, Anwar Nusaybah, presented this agreement to the corporation's directorate today and no opposition was voiced. In contrast, the corporation workers' committee rushed to release a statement that rejects any changes in the corporation's concession. Our correspondent notes that in the past this committee had already foiled a compromise attempt with the government. [Text] [TA181825 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 18 Sep 80]

UNEMPLOYMENT DATA RELEASED--Over 53,000 people were unemployed during the first half of 1980. According to data released by the Central Bureau of Statistics the number of employed men has decreased while the number of employed women has increased by 2.5 percent. During the first half of 1980 the number of unemployed was higher by a 55-percent average compared with 1979 and by 31 percent compared with 1978. The number of unemployed actively looking for jobs during this period reached an average of 53,000, which is equivalent to 4.1 percent of the civilian manpower as compared to a 2.9 percent unemployment rate in 1979 and 3.6 percent in 1978. The number of those seeking jobs through the employment bureaus reached 29,000 during the first half of 1980. In addition, the number of those seeking jobs for a long 5-week period reached 38,000, almost three-fourths of all unemployed during the first half of 1980. In general, the civilian manpower in Israel totaled nearly 1.3 million. [TA182001 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 18 Sep 80]

PARTY FUNDS FOR AHVA--Yesterday the Knesset decided that the Democratic faction--which consisted of six Knesset members until July 1980--split into two three-member factions: Yiga'el Yadin, Shmu'el Tamir and Binyamin Halevi (Democrats) and Shmu'el Eliyahu, Shafiq As'ad and 'Aqiva Nof (AHVA). The implication of this decision is that the AHVA faction will receive party funds. Each one of the factions will receive about 4.25 million Israeli pounds at the rate prevalent in September 1980. [Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 18 Sep 80 p 2 TA]

'ITIM' DIRECTORATE--The annual ITIM meeting held in Tel Aviv elected a new directorate. Amir Davidson, Yisra'el Dori, Shabtay Himmelfarb, Shalom Weiss, Alter (Welner), No'ah Moses, Aharon Krausz, Yosef Qarni and 'Amos Schocken are members of the directorate. Mr Shabtay Himmelfarb was chosen chairman of the board of directors, Mr No'ah Moses, the chairman of the consulting committee for editing, and Mr Yosef Qarni and Mr Aharon Krausz were elected members of the staff committee. [Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1443 GMT 16 Sep 80 TA]

CSO: 4805

JORDAN TAKES CREDIT FOR ILO CONDEMNATION OF ISRAEL

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 29 Jun 80 p 20

[Report on press conference held by the Jordanian Minister of Labor, 'Umar al-Nabulsi, in Amman; date not given]

> [Text] Al-Nabulsi Explains Jordan's Role in International Labor Organization's Adoption of Resolution Condemning the Zionist Settlements Policy in the Occupied Arab Territories.

The conference of the International Labor Organization condemned the establishment of Israeli settlements in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories. This was in a resolution adopted by the conference during its 66th session held in Geneva from 4 to 25 June.

During a press conference held on 28 June, Jordan's minister of labor, 'Umar al-Nabulsi, said that the Jordanian delegation had submitted this resolution to the conference where it was supported by a sweeping majority. The draft resolution, according to al-Nabulsi, was presented by the Jordanian delegation at the request of the Arab group of nations, which authorized Jordan last March to submit a draft resolution condemning the establishment of Israeli settlements in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories.

Al-Nabulsi said that the adoption of this resolution by the International Labor Organization has a special significance and is an indication of the progress of the just Arab cause. This action represents, in itself, strong support for the Arab position vis-a-vis the Israeli occupation and arbitrary measures which violate international laws, agreements and custom, especially with regard to the confiscation of Arab land, the establishment of settlements and the interference with the cultural freedom of Arab workers in Palestine and other Arab occupied territories.

Al-Nabulsi emphasized that the resolution represents a rejection of the policy of "accomplished facts" which Israel tries to impose illegally and by force upon the Arab citizens. This resolution, according to al-Nabulsi,

reaffirms the role of the International Labor Organization to follow up on all forms of injustice which affect workers, in accordance with its constitution. Accordingly, the organization sent delegations to the occupied territories. Their reports exposed the negative effects of the Israeli settlement policy upon the social and economic situation of the Arab labor force. The delegations' reports emphasized that the continuation of these policies frustrates the Arab citizens in their everyday life and work.

Al-Nabulsi talked about the resolution adopted during the 1974 conference of the Internatinal Labor Organization concerning the policy of racial segregation adopted by Israel toward Arab workers in violation of their traditional freedoms. He added that the Israeli change of section 83 of the Jordanian labor law, at the beginning of this year, constitutes open interference with the traditional rights of Arab workers and forbids them from organizing themselves into union groups. Al-Nabulsi said that another measure of oppression taken by the Israeli authorities against the Arab citizens was the announcement by the Israeli minister of energy concerning Israel's intention to confiscate the Electric Company of Jerusalem. Al-Nabulsi talked about the resolution of the International Labor Organization which condemned the actions of the Israeli authorities concerning the establishment of settlements on confiscated Arab land. The resolution:

1. Expresses concern over the establishment of Israeli settlements in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories and the serious economic and social consequences of this on the rights and socio-economic interests of the Arab labor force.

2. Strongly condemns the establishment of Israeli settlements in Palestine and other Arab lands occupied in June 1967.

3. Urges the Israeli authorities to stop immediately the construction of settlements in Palestine and other Arab occupied territories including Jerusalem and to dismantle any existing settlements.

4. Calls upon all its members to stop all aid to Israel, especially aid which could be used for the establishment of settlements in the occupied Arab lands.

5. Calls on the board of directors and the director general of the International Labor Bureau to do the following:

a. Offer all kinds of assistance to the Arab citizens in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories, in order to develop their technical and economic capabilities to face the consequences of occupation and the Israeli policy of settlements.

b. Take all necessary measures in order to carry out this resolution.

6. Requests the director general of the International Labor Bureau to submit annual reports to the conference concerning the situation of Arab workers in Palestine and the other occupied Arab territories, in keeping with the provisions of this resolution.

Al-Nabulsi talked about the draft resolution which was submitted by the Jordanian delegation to the conference. It stated that based upon international principles, the international community has witnessed, since the Israeli aggression in 1967, open and deliberate policies and actions by Israel to establish settlements in Palestine and the other Arab territories in violation of the charter of the United Nations and the Geneva agreements.

The Jordanian draft resolution stated that "The occupation authorities, which have continuously defied Jordanian society, have recently escalated the confiscation of Arab land and intensified the establishment of settlements by evicting and disregarding the rights and interests of Arab land owners. It is necessary to emphasize that such practices are prohibited by the fourth Geneva agreement and are considered to be in serious violation of this agreement.

"The resettlement policy of the Israeli occupation authorities has and continues to have a serious and directly negative effect on employment and income of the local citizens due to the growing confiscation of the natural resources of the area, such as agricultural land and water sources for the use of the new Israeli settlements. This policy has led to a dangerous level of unemployment as well as to other dangerous labor problems resulting from the dispossessing of small farmers and others of their land and property. This policy creates a multitude of difficulties in an atmosphere of growing insecurity created and maintained by Israeli official plans to establish additional settlements in the rest of the occupied Arab territories.

"This Israeli policy and its impact on the livelihood of workers in the occupied Arab territories have led to dangerous results which obstruct economic and social development, and drive workers and farmers out of their fertile land.

"This policy of occupation has led to the dispersement of Arab society in the occupied Arab territories and Palestine. It has also caused social, economic, cultural and material damage to the workers of this land and to the future of their families.

"On this occasion, we would like to point out, Mr Chairman, the 12th point which includes paragraphs 99 to 102 of the third supplement of the report of the director of the International Labor Organization to the current session concerning the labor situation in the occupied Arab territories.

"The International Labor Organization and its previous conferences have taken pains to study the situation of Arab workers. For this reason, the current session is called upon to condemn the Israeli settlement policy and to take immediate measures to guarantee putting an end to the deteriorating situation of the Arab workers as stated in the draft resolution. This is a necessity, since the deteriorating economic, social and material situation of the Arab workers in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories is a result of the settlement policy adopted officially and publicly by Israel in defiance of all international laws and of the constitution of the International Labor Organization.

"Foreign military occupation is abnormal, is condemned by the international community, and is illegal. For this reason, it is our duty as an international family to take this situation into account in dealing with the situation of Arab workers. No one can deny that the establishment of settlements and practices resulting therefrom are a blunt violation of the rights of the Arab workers and a threat to economic and social security in the occupied territories and the entire Arab world."

Al-Nabulsi added that the draft resolution was adopted by the conference after heated debates between the countries supporting it and the western countries which tried to block it under the pretext that it was a political resolution unrelated to the purpose of the International Labor Organization.

The Jordanian minister expressed his gratitude to the countries which supported and made this resolution successful.

8988
CSO: 4802

FOREIGN DEPOSITS OF JORDANIAN BANKS ANALYZED

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 29 Jun 80 p 6

[Article by Jihad al-Ra'i: "On Foreign Investments of Jordanian Banks"]

[Text] In comment on Fahd al-Fanik's article entitled "Where Are Foreign Investments of Jordanian Banks Heading" published under the "Economic Sphere" column of the Jordanian AL-RA'Y issued on Wednesday, 18 June 1980, and in view of the proposals and opinions which the article expresses on the basis of narrow conclusions that are far from the essence of the issue altogether, I have deemed it fit to write this comment:

Al-Fanik has attributed the reason for the increase in the assets which the Jordanian banks have abroad to two things:

First, "earning high and guaranteed interest for these assets instead of lending them to Jordanian projects."

Second, "the income tax law exempts foreign income and this opens the door for claiming that the interest earned for the assets deposited abroad is not subject to Jordanian taxes, even if the interest belongs to a branch existing in Jordan and even if the source of the interest earned is the citizens' deposits. The interest paid [by the banks] for these assets is counted as bank expenses for the purpose of taxes."

Because al-Fanik has not been able to go any further in defining the framework of this problem and its effects on the Jordanian economy in a manner that enables him to follow a course that leads to proposals dealing with the essential issues, rather than just observe some superficial points to discuss such a complex and thorny issue in reliance on some secondary symptoms, I will try to make some analyses to answer the conclusions of the writer.

First, al-Fanik specific statemant that all the assets of the Jordanian commercial banks abroad are investments in the scientific sense of the word is not true. Had al-Fanik taken the trouble of analyzing these assets and studying the reasons why any bank maintains assets outside the kindgom,

he would have found that this practice is in accordance with regular formulas aimed at facilitating a bank's work and at serving its customers well.

Second, the Jordanian foreign currency control laws permit the banks to open non-resident accounts in foreign currency for residents and non-residents with the aim of bringing in foreign investments and the deposits of non-residents because of their effective role in bolstering the currency reserves and strengthening the kingdom's balance of payments. The same laws also permit free withdrawing and depositing in these accounts on encouraging terms to achieve the desired goal.

As a result of this permit, the banks are allowed to maintain sufficient foreign currency deposits abroad to meet their foreign currency commitments and remittances from and to these accounts. Al-Fanik has forgotten something in his comment on the City Bank budget when he said: "In 1979, City Bank was a model of the successful bank that deserves congratulation and that encourages other banks, especially our national banks, to improve their efficiency and their competitive situation in order to be able to stand fast and to protect their share of the banking market in Jordan."

Had al-Fanik examined the City Bank budget well, he would have found that most of its foreign deposits are assets belonging to non-residents and deposited abroad in foreign currency.

Assuming that the figures which the writer has sited at the outset of his article--figures that point out that the banks' deposits in foreign currency have increased from 12 million dinars in 1975 to almost 100 million dinars at present--are correct, then we find it extremely surprising that he considers this figure large when compared with the foreign assets in Bahrain which amount to 25 billion dollars even though the income of Jordan as a country is equal to Bahrain's income. It is surprising that the writer finds this figure large, especially in light of the basic principle seeking to transform Jordan into a successful center for the attraction of foreign deposits and investments at a time in which Jordan is passing a successful transitional period to bolster its economy and to maintain the exchange rate between the dinar and foreign currencies.

As for the al-Fanik's explanation of this increase in the deposits as the greed to earn high and guaranteed interest rate and, consequently, as a concealed means for evading income taxes, the current international interest rates are the best answer refuting this explanation. Rather, the increase in the interest rate for the Eurodollar from eight percent to almost 20 percent from the beginning of 1980 till March 1980 has exhausted the savings of all the developing countries and has led to a deficit in their balances of payment, considering that this increase led to an increase in the cost of local savings without the ability to correct local lending due to the presence of definite [interest rate] ceilings. Moveover, the international rise in the interest rates--a rise occurring as the result of reasons and

goals visualized by the United States and the industrial countries to curtail the current international inflation--has had a negative impact on all the public and private economic sectors of the developing countries and at the expense of their savings.

It is concluded from this that the rise in the interest rates has not been in the interest of the developing countries. Consequently, this explanation denies the presence of any policies aimed at investment outside the country and at evading taxes at a time when the economy is suffering from recession, inflation and some liquidity [sic]. Moreover, this explanation confirms the lack of the ability to contain the negative influences on our national economy. Therefore, the talk about levying taxes on the so-called interest which the banks earn from abroad will have a negative impact on the process of developing and increasing the deposits of non-residents in the Jordanian banks. Moreover, the equation embodied in the desire of all concerned to increase government revenues through taxes on the one hand and to keep developing Jordan's role as a central financial center in the Arab area is an equation that requires detailed and careful study so that no measures harming this equation and, consequently, acting against all aspects of the national economy may be taken.

As for al-Fanik's explanation regarding the inclination of the Jordanian banks to invest outside the kingdom rather than lend their monies to Jordanian projects, the answer to this explanation is evident in the attempt of some Jordanian companies and establishments to borrow in U.S. dollars from the international Euromarket as of the beginning of 1976--an endeavor which continues until the present.

If these companies and establishments want to transfer their debts in Eurodollars into local loans, they have to pay the Jordanian banks interest prices and commissions similar to what they have paid the foreign banks and they have to offer the Jordanian banks the same guarantees that they have offered the foreign banks. At the same time, they have to follow the policy of favoring the foreign side.

Finally, I ask al-Fanik to review his article after a detailed study of the effects of the decline [ruju'] in the interest rate on the dollar and the increased floating of the interest rates paid for loans from the Eurodollar market so that he may understand the causes and dimensions of the problem and may offer us more of his invaluable opinions and suggestions.

8494
CSO: 4802

MINISTER CONCLUDES WOOD AGREEMENT WITH MALAYSIA

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 28 Jun 80 p 2

[Article: "Minister of Finance's Return From Malaysia; Agreement to Supply Jordanian Lumber Company With Tree Trunks for Unlimited Period"]

[Text] Amman--Salim al-Masa'idah, the minister of finance, returned to Amman at noon yesterday after a visit of several days to the Republic of Malaysia.

Al-Masa'idah has said that during the visit, he held talks with the president of the Malaysian State of (Sarawak) on supplying the Jordanian Lumber Company with its wood needs.

The minister added that a joint agreement has been signed by the two sides in this regard and that in accordance with this agreement, the State of Sarawak undertakes to supply the Jordanian Lumber Company with good-quality tree trunks for an unlimited period and at the prevalent prices.

It is expected that Jordan's need of lumber will amount annually to 100,000 cubic meters valued at 4-5 million dinars.

The agreement was signed on behalf of the government of Sarawak by the state's prime minister and on behalf of the Jordanian government by Salim al-Masa'idah, the minister of finance.

The minister has also said that he held discussions with the Malaysian officials on the means to bolster and strengthen the existing economic cooperation between the two countries, to increase the trade exchange and to enhance the volume of imports and exports between the two countries.

Al-Masa'idah has further added that the discussions with the Malaysian officials also dealt with the possibility of setting joint projects by the two countries and of exploiting the means of transportation operating between the two countries to ship the crude Jordanian potash and phosphate exported to the southeast Asian countries.

It is to be noted that the Jordanian Lumber Company was founded with a capital of 3 million dinars and that the government and government establishments own more than 50 percent of this capital.

The company, located in the city of al-'Aqabah, is expected to start production at the beginning of February 1980.

The minister was received at the airport by the ministry undersecretary, the director of the Land and Survey Bureau and a number of high-ranking ministry officials.

8494
CSO: 4802

NEW PETROLEUM INVESTMENT COMPANY FORMED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 6 Sep 80 p 6

[Text] The newly-formed $380 million Kuwait Petroleum Investment Company is a departure from the previous policy of the government which had earlier confined all oil sector activities to the control of the State. While the four earlier companies are to continue to be state-owned, the new one will have a 30 per cent participation of the public.

Informed sources in Kuwait were reported as saying that the new policy was partly due to the desire of the government to create new avenues of investment within the country for Kuwaiti citizens. The flight of the capital in the past, in search of better interest rates and investment opportunities, had created a series liquidity situation in the country.

The Kuwaiti government will be in effective control of the company as it owns 70 per cent of the shares. Besides, the Board of Directors of the new company will have representatives from the Ministry of Finance and Commerce.

The new company will take over the downstream operations like trading in all types of oil derivatives, marketing and management of oil projects. Since downstream operations are mostly abroad, the new company is likely to be involved in joint ventures and acquiring share in oil installations abroad. It will also be investing in pipeline construction, refineries....

The $3.7 billion Kuwait Petroleum Corporation will continue to be the umbrella organization for all oil sector activities in the country. The 4 companies directly affiliated to it will be supplemented by divisions for marketing and planning.

The Kuwait Oil Company will manage exploration, production and drilling. The Kuwaiti National Petroleum Company will be confined to refining and the Kuwait Oil Taners Company [as printed] will concentrate on maritime transport. The Petrochemical Industries Company will produce petrochemicals.

The Kuwait Petroleum Corporation will also control gas production and marketing. A new company might be formed to manage gas production and marketing as the volume of trading increases.

The Arabian Oil Company, which operates in the neutral zone, will not be affected by the corporation's functioning. The Arabian Oil Company is jointly owned by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and a Japanese company.

CSO: 4820

SOVIET INITIATIVE IN LEBANON EXAMINED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 8 Jul 80 p 2

[Article by Sarkis Na'um: "The Soviets, Unification and the Army"]

[Text] The meetings which have been taking place for some time between Soviet Ambassador to Lebanon Aleksander Soldatov and Bashir al-Jumayyil and former President Camille Sham'un, as well as the Soviet ambassador's continual meetings with the staffs of the National Movement and the Palestinian resistance, have given everyone the impression that the Soviet Union currently supports the efforts to achieve reconciliation among the Lebanese themselves and between the Lebanese and the Palestinians and Syrians. This impression is reinforced by the fact that Soviet officials have not revealed any position to the contrary.

Individuals who have recently visited Moscow confirm this view. They say that the enthusiasm with which Soviet officials talked about the necessity of Lebanese reconciliation surprised them greatly, going far beyond their expectations.

These individuals say that the Soviets expressed their appreciation of the general principles of unification as announced by the administration a few months ago, especially since they view these principles as being in harmony with the political solution put forward previously by the National Movement through Walid Junblat. They also heard a sincere appeal for an end to the series of security disruptions and cooperation with the existing Lebanese Army, which is now in the process of being rebuilt in a manner which will satisfy all Lebanese.

The visitors indicate that they also heard a call for the elimination of the disparity in the positions within the National Movement regarding the issue of the army and the provision of assistance to help the authorities regain their military effectiveness. According to the Soviet appeal, this should be accomplished through political efforts and dialog before circumstances make it necessary to deal with this matter through means which are completely inconsistent with the principles of dialog and democracy.

The visitors themselves think it unlikely that this Soviet position will result in an initiative in the full sense of the word. They do say, however, that they sensed a determination to make a broad and peaceful move in this direction.

What are the motives behind this Soviet determination to achieve reconciliation and remove the obstacles blocking it?

Officials in the Kremlin say that behind this determination is a desire to see Lebanon regain its vitality, its role, its unity and its peace. But they also say, according to visitors to Moscow, that there are many other factors behind this Soviet position, the most important of which are the following:

1. The Soviet Union's desire to protect Syria, its friend and main ally in the area, from any pressure in Lebanon which might cause problems for it. This desire is heightened by the fact that Syria is currently the target of intense pressure both within the country and in the Arab and international spheres. This pressure is aimed at weakening Syria's resolve in the face of the American policy tied to Camp David and its offshoots and forcing it away from the Soviets in order to make the area largely closed to Soviet influence once again.

In this connection, the Soviets are earnestly afraid that new domestic and foreign developments might force officials in Damascus to withdraw their forces from Lebanon--or at least a large portion of them. Such a move would take place under the shadow of an explosive Lebanese situation, and this could ignite the entire area. The sole beneficiary from such a development would be Israel.

2. The Soviet Union's desire to protect the Palestinian resistance which maintains an effective presence in Lebanon. A continuation of the present climate, which has had a considerable effect on the relationship between the Lebanese and Palestinians at the popular level, would not be very encouraging, especially if it deteriorates further and is exploited by enemies of the revolution. For this reason, the Soviets would like to see a thorough clearing of the air between the Lebanese authorities and the resistance, as well as between the resistance and all segments of the Lebanese people. In this connection, circles close to the National Movement and the Islamic public say that the PLO wishes to restore the climate of trust between itself and the authorities and is working toward this goal. Resistance leaders have confirmed this more than once in their meetings with Lebanese parties initiated in Sidon and to be completed in Beirut. However, these sources also say that the resistance should only approach circles capable of delivering on pledges. This is because it is no longer possible to polarize the general public, with whom the resistance nearly ran into problems, and use it as an ally against everybody else, including the government.

3. The Soviet Union's conviction, based on information in its possession, that Israel may launch a military attack against south Lebanon which this time would cross the red line and reach the proximity of Saida. Such an attack would probably take place immediately before or after the American presidential elections when American desire to prevent or protest such action would be in limbo. The results of such an attack under a state of complete Lebanese reconciliation and good Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian relations would be considerably different than under a state of continued fragmentation and explosiveness in Lebanon and a slump in relations between Lebanon, Syria and the PLO. The Soviets believe that the time is now ripe to achieve reconciliation, especially since there is presently a crisis, in their view, between Israel and members of the "Lebanese Front" who have been dealing with it.

8591
CSO: 4802

BA'TH PARTY FORMS REGIONAL COMMAND, ANNOUNCES PROGRAM

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 3 Jul 80 p 5

[Article: "Results of Eighth Regional Congress of Ba'th Party Organization; Qansuh Announces 'Phased Political Program'; New Regional Command and Dissolution of Pan-Arab Front"]

[Text] Engineer 'Asim Qansuh, the secretary general of the Arab Ba'th Party Organization, has announced the "phased political program" approved by the eighth Regional Congress which was convened from 29 to 31 May 1980 and elected a new regional command.

Before noon, Qansuh held a press conference at the organization headquarters in the presence of the regional command members and representatives of the various parties and organizations of the National Movement.

In a long statement he read, Qansuh defined the Lebanese, Arab and international issues that have to be tackled or confronted. At the local political level, Qansuh spoke of the "active imperialist-Zionist scheme to fragment the area and to turn it into racist entities with the aim of guaranteeing Israel's racist presence, of justifying this presence, of guaranteeing continuation of the acts to plunder the Arab nation's resources and of tightening the control over this area."

At Lebanese Level

For Lebanon's unity, Qansuh called for struggle "to abolish all forms of partitionist government that are actually existing in some areas (Eastern Beirut, Kasrawan and Border Strip), to eliminate their political, military, administrative and security instruments, to urge the legitimate authority to spread its control over all the Lebanese territories and to confront all the political calls for numerous decentralized entities and for all forms of declared and concealed partition."

Qansuh has also expressed the belief that the other part of the plot is intended to "strike the Arabism of Lebanon." Qansuh has also called for "declaring the official Lebanon's abidance and all the Lebanese people's

abidance by the Arabism of Lebanon, for fully confronting and Zionist enemy by virtue of his being the fateful danger to the homeland, for struggling to put an end to the Israeli occupation of a part of the south and to the false entity called the border strip and for denouncing and bringing to trial all those who deal with the enemy."

Qansuh then praised the "historic decision taken by comrade struggler Hafiz al-Asad on the entry of the Syrian Arab forces to Lebanon to put an end to the blood baths" and spoke of the success of these forces in "putting a stop to the sectarian interfighting (...), obstructing the partition, preserving Lebanon's Arabism and unity and protecting the resistance and the national and pan-Arab forces." He also pointed out that the Deferrence Force "has faced an unacceptable position because of the state's hesitant policy and because of the plotting of the forces that are tied to the Israeli enemy. This has dwarfed the role of these forces that have accepted, out of concern for the safety of Lebanon and of its people, to turn into a police solving the citizen's subsidiary problems."

Qansuh stressed the need for "Lebanon to abide by the requirements of its Arab belonging, foremost of which are participation in the Arab confrontation against the Zionist enemy, the struggle against the two Camp David accords, affirmation of Lebanon's commitments to the Palestinian cause, respect for the Palestinian resistance's right to struggle for restoration of the usurped land, entrenchment of the Palestinian-Lebanese relations on the basis of the agreements concluded between the State of Lebanon and the PLO and regulation of the distinguished relations between Lebanon and Syria in an atmosphere of trust and respect and strengthening these relations on the basis of the common pan-Arab destiny."

To fight the resettlement scheme, Qansuh said "our party believes in the struggle for:

"A national declaration signed by all the national and progressive forces and parties rejecting all forms of resettlement and condemning all of its manifestations so as to preserve the unity of the homeland's soil and people.

"A Palestinian declaration signed by all the Palestinian resistance factions rejecting and condemning all forms of resettlement and considering anybody involved in such resettlement a traitor to the pan-Arab cause and to the Palestinian cause.

"Efforts to put an end to all the security and non-security violations, to condemn their perpetrators and to bring them to trial before the Lebanese public opinion, as well as efforts for all the resistance factions' commitment to Lebanon's national destiny especially the fate of Lebanon's southern part.

"The presence of the Lebanese legitimate establishments in their various forms and with their various instruments in southern Lebanon, facilitating

the work of these establishments and helping them to carry out their national and social duties.

"Condemnation of any action giving the impression that a substitute to the Lebanese legitimate authority is established in the south and bringing to trial the perpetrators of such actions on the charge of national treason.

"Considering the plotting forces as forces colluding in the resettlement plan as long as they work to establish areas under the control of the terror of their armed militias because this action prevents the Lebanese authority from performing its role and aims at weakening and toppling this authority so as to pass all the schemes for dividing Lebanon into sectarian and racist mini-states."

Government and Army

Qansuh said that to develop the government, the Ba'th Party "will abide by the democratic political struggle to develop Lebanon and to put an end to the various forms of factional and sectarian domination and armed control by any faction or sect, to realize democratic participation in government, to amend the parliamentary elections law so as to strike the sectarian representation formula, to secure the necessary balance between the authorities and to preserve the democratic liberties and guarantee their continuation."

As for building the Lebanese army, what is required is "a complete national plan emanating from the adoption of a clear national defense policy (...), the formulation of mobilizational and educational programs to develop the national sentiment and the sense of national and cultural belonging to the Arab nation (...), striking the imported programs, applying the national service law to all the Lebanese, creating formulas that serve to link the army with the national destiny of the Arab nation, adopting an armament policy on the basis of the national and pan-Arab interest, carrying out the military plans and training on the use of weapons with the Arab armies, especially the Syrian army, and strengthening, developing and increasing the numbers of the internal security forces."

Frontal (al-jabhawi] Action

After a historical review of the party's action, Qansuh demanded "a progressive national front that determines the tasks of the current phase" and that has "a unified and united political visualization, independent national decision and a sound popular course" and that focuses on "Lebanon's Arabism and the unity of its territories, strengthening the struggle against world imperialism, led by the United States and that has a program for a comprehensive confrontation against Arab reaction and supports the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front." Qansuh has urged "all the forces that stand in the confrontation and combat trench against the racist fascist forces, represented in the Phalanges and Liberal Parties," to join this front.

Social and Development Sphere

In the social and development sphere, the party has demanded the right of work for all and has called for dealing with the problems of education and school fees, for creating work opportunities for women in order to bolster their freedom, for supporting the productive economic sectors and for realizing the principles of social and developmental harmony so as to help the more backward areas. Economically, the attention has been focused on opposing "the domination of foreign capital, forcing the foreign banks to invest a part of their capital and deposits in the country protecting the national economy against the infiltration of foreign capital, establishing a fair lending policy for the productive economic sectors, struggling against the open-door policy represented in the free economy, enhancing the public sector's role in the foreign trade and demanding that the state take advantage of the socialist camp markets."

At the Arab level, Qansuh has attacked the two Camp David accords and has called for the establishment of "the broadest Arab front of the Arab liberation movement's factions within the framework of the Arab People's Congress and its Permanent Secretariat, supporting the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, supporting Syria's steadfastness and considering Syria the first bastion of steadfastness in the face of Zionist aggression, supporting the struggle of the Arab masses in Egypt, led by the Egyptian National Front, bolstering the steadfastness of our people in the occupied territories and considering the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, supporting our people in Oman against the regime of Qabus, supporting the Eritrean revolution, condemning the suspect movements of some Arab regimes that are trying to outflank the Baghdad resolutions, especially the Iraqi regime, struggling for the reunification of the two parts of Yemen, supporting the Libyan Jamahiriyah, condemning Arab reaction and uniting the Palestinian resistance factions."

At International Level

At the international level, what is required is to "strengthen the relations between the Arab progressive organizations and parties and the progressive communist parties in the world, enhance the Arab nation's relations with the socialist bloc countries, led by the Soviet Union, confront all forms of the U.S. imperialist aggression against our nation, support the oppressed peoples and the world liberation movements, support the struggle of the Islamic revolution in Iran and condemn the U.S. intervention attempts, support the Afghan revolution and condemn the Pakistani-U.S.-Arab reactionary aggression against this revolution, support the Soviet backing of the Afghan people and condemn the European initiative seeking to give Camp David a new form that can be passed against the interests of our Arab nation."

New Command

The statement concluded by declaring the names of the organization's new regional command which is comprised of: 'Asim Qansuh, 'Abdallah al-Amin,

'Abd-al-Amir 'Abbas, Nimr Haydar Ahmad, 'Abdallah al-Shahhal, 'Ali Miqdad, Suhayl al-Qassar, Habib Daghir, Asad Suwayd, Haydar Hawmani, Dr Muhammad Shari, Muhammad 'Ali Qansuh, Dr 'Abd-al-Amir Dakrub and 'Umar "Umar.

Dissolution of Pan-Arab [al-qawniyah] Front

At the end of the conference, Qansuh was asked about the fate of the Pan-Arab Front after the Ba'th Party Organization's departure from it. He said: "When the sphere of national action becomes broader, more comprehensive and clearer--and this has characterized the local, Arab and international political line of the National Movement--then all the national and progressive forces should assume their role in the national movement. It must be pointed out here that one of our allies has taken stances that cannot be approved by the national or Islamic principles and that this ally has become in an unenviable position. Therefore, it has been better to solve the Pan-Arab Front after our departure from it and we are declaring here the dissolution of this front. As for our colleagues in the National Confrontation Front, we are in constant contact and alliance with them through this front's chairman, Minister Talal al-Mar'ibi."

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CSO: 4802

TRADE DELEGATION'S TRIP TO EAST EUROPE DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 5 Jul 80 p 4

[Article: "Delegation of Lebanese Chambers of Commerce and Industry Assesses Trip to Eastern Bloc Countries; Increasing Imports; Lebanese Production Weeks"]

[Text] The delegation of the Lebanese chambers of commerce and industry to the meetings of the joint chambers of the eastern bloc countries has made an assessment of the outcome of its trip to Hungary, the GDR and Poland.

The chairmen of the Lebanese chambers have asserted that the results of the trip have been positive and that the eastern side has expressed its understanding of all the issues brought up at the meetings by the Arab side and has promised to eliminate the causes of all complaints and to exert efforts to bolster economic cooperation between the eastern bloc and the Arab countries.

The chairmen of the chambers have also pointed out that the Lebanese delegation drew up the attention of the eastern side to the deficit which the Lebanese trade balance with the eastern bloc suffers and demanded that these countries' imports from Lebanon be increased in order to realize as much balance as possible in trade exchange.

The Lebanese delegation also urged the increased organization of joint fairs, the sending of delegations to Lebanon and the Arab area in view of the effect of such visits on the growth and enhancement of trade, on strengthening the relations and on familiarization with products.

During the meetings, the discussion dealt with organizing Lebanese weeks in the eastern bloc countries to introduce the Lebanese production and sell it to the eastern consumer. This idea has been welcomed and supported in principle by the four [sic] countries visited by the delegation. It has also been decided to continue the discussions with these countries' officials to crystallize and carry out this idea.

The chairmen of the chambers have further pointed out that the discussion with the joint chambers also focused on the issue of setting up joint

projects in the sphere of tourism and industry and that the eastern side has expressed its full readiness to discuss the details of setting up such projects which are beneficial to both sides.

The Lebanese side also brought up the issue of supplying technical and technological expertise and of training Arab manpower, especially since there are numerous spheres in which this expertise is needed. The eastern side has expressed its readiness to offer such expertise and to exert efforts to bolster economic cooperation with Lebanon and the Arab countries in the various spheres.

The meeting [sic] was attended by 'Adnan al-Qassar, Gabriel Badaru, Muhammad Lama' (Beirut chamber), Najib al-Manla and Joseph Bulus (Tripoli chamber), and Alfred Skaf (Zahlah chamber).

The meeting was also attended by Dr Ilyas Ghantus, the assistant secretary general of the General Federation of the Arab Chambers of Commerce.

8494
CSO: 4802

PROMOTION OF ARMY OFFICERS REPORTED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 4 Jul 80 p 6

[Article: "Decree on Promotion of Army Officers Affects 79 First Lieutenants and Lieutenants"]

[Text] AL-NAHAR publishes the following decree No 3196 on the promotion of army officers after having published yesterday the names of a number of officers affected by the promotion, in addition to publishing the decree promoting Brig Gen Dr Jirjis Qumayr, chairman of the Military Hospital, to the rank of medical major general.

Following is the text of the decree:

"Article 1. The following army officers shall be promoted to a higher rank as of 1 July 1980:

"1. The following first lieutenants shall be promoted to the rank of captain: Jan Pierre Mawsalli (physician), Nabil Wakim (engineer), Majid Shams (engineer), Faris Ziyadi, Michel al-Dam'ah, Bashir Nashshabah, Habib Buraydi, Ghassan Karam, Durayd al-Kanj, Sami 'Abdallah, Zayn Khalifah, Tony Gharib, George Ma'luf (navy), Hasan al-Qurq (navy), Kamal Rashid (engineer), Salim Karam, Fu'ad Mukanna, Hammam As'ad, Naji Sallum, Sharbil Mazra'ani (pilot), Ilyas al-Khuri (pilot), Ibrahim al-Far (administrator), Sa'id Ilyas 'Id (adminstrator), Edmund al-Khuri (administrator), Khalil Habballah (pilot).

"2. The following lieutenants shall be promoted to the rank of first lieutenant: Antoine Haddad, Surin Abu-Samra, Salim Kharyati, 'Ali Rammal, Mustafa Hamdan, 'Abdu 'Atallah, Tawfiq Hannun, Nabil Bayadu, Salah Fadlallah, Uhannis Ughasipian, Emile Hanna, Fawzi Subayti, Salim Ra'd, 'Abd-al-Qadir al-'Aris, Suhayl Zahr-al-Din, Bassam Abu-al-Muna, Nasif 'Ubayd, Walid 'Uwaydat, Joseph Francis, Shawqi Hamdan, Ghazi Riman, Muhammad Baydun, Hanna al-Maqdisi, Ilyas Rihana, Husayn Khalaf, Misbah al-Husami, Nazih Rahbani, Ahmad Dib, Nabil Abu-Mulhim, Yasir al-Khatib, Joseph Dahir, Samir al-Qadi, Radwan al-Khayr, Hasan Jabir, Muhammad Banayuti, Fayiz Badi' 'Azar, Muhammad Shabbu, 'Izzat Dib, Eli Hajjar, Victor Shuqayr,

Rif'at Shukr, Marun Abu-Hamad, Michel Nahhas, Hani Diyab, Sharbil Abu-Antun, Fu'ad Shahadi, As'ad Haddad (pilot), George Sadaqah (pilot), Ghassan Khalifah (pilot), Sultan Mundhir, Michel al-Hashim (navy), Yusuf Rufayil (navy) and Ibrahim Ghantus.

"Article 2. This decree shall be published and shall be conveyed to the authorities concerned."

Decree No 3188 dated 28 June 1980 has also been issued retiring the following air force officers at their request: Squadron Leader Jan Tudur [Theodore] Maradidis, Flight Lieutenant Niqula Fu'ad Majdalani and Flight Lieutenant Sulayman Tanyus al-Khuri.

The three officers have been appointed in the reserve force for a period of 15 years following their retirement. Each of them shall maintain the military rank that he has held while in the active service.

Decrees No 3187 and No 3186, dated 28 June, have also been issued, retiring Col 'Abd-al-Ghani Hamad from the internal security forces and commissioners first class in the internal security forces Rafful Badawi and Najib al-'Asrawi.

8494
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

RENTAL EXEMPTIONS FOR MILITARY--The parliamentary management justice, finance, public works and defense committees approved yesterday decree No 2909 which provides for exempting the military personnel of the army, the internal security forces and the public security forces from the municipal fees paid on house rents for the year 1978 and the preceding years. The committees held their joint session yesterday morning under Munir Abu-Fadil, the deputy speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. The session was attended by deputies Shafiq Badr, 'Abduh 'Uwaydat, 'Ali al-'Abdallah, 'Abd-al-Latif Baydun, Salim al-Ma'luf, Mahmud 'Ammar, Tawfiq 'Assaf, Michel Ma'luli, Bashir al-A'war, Salim al-Dawud, Sam'an al-Duwayhi and Subhi Yaghi. It was also attended by Dr 'Ali al-Khalil, the minister of finance. After the session, Abu-Fadil said: "In view of the fact that the ministers concerned, with the exception of the minister of finance, have not attended the session and in accordance with the decision of the committees not to study any bill in the absence of the minister concerned, the discussion on the bills before the committees has been postponed." The decree approved by the committees states the following: "Article 1. The military personnel of the army, the internal security forces and the public security forces have been exempted from the municipal fees paid on housing rent for 1978 and the preceding years. The exemption applies to those members who were in the active service on the given date. Fees already paid may not be reimbursed. Article 2. This law shall go into force upon its publication in the Official Gazette. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 6] 8494

PROMOTION OF ARMY OFFICERS--Decree No 3195 was issued yesterday promoting Brig Gen Dr Jirjis Yusuf Qumayr, chairman of the Military Hospital, to the rank of major general as of the beginning of July 1980. Issued also was decree No 3196 which provides for promoting 15 first lieutenants in the army to the rank of captain and 18 lieutenants to the rank of first lieutenant as of the beginning of July 1980. The first lieutenants promoted to the rank of captain are: Nabil Wakim, Kamal Rashid, Habib Buraydi, Hasan al-Qurq, Tony Gharib, Edmund al-Khuri, Bashir Nashshabah, Fu'ad Mukanna, Majid Shams, Salim Karam, Durayd al-Kanj, Najib Sallum, Sami 'Abdallah, Khalil Habballah and Ghassan Karam. The following lieutenants have been promoted to the rank of first lieutenant: 'Abd-al-Qadir al-'Aris, Antoine Haddad, Yasir al-Khatib, Emile Hanna, 'Ali Kammal,

Hanna al-Maqdisi, Ghassan Khalifah, Ramzi al-Ayyubi, Muhammad Shabbu, Nasif 'Ubayd, Ibrahim Ghantus, Mustafa Hamdan, Fawzi Subayti, Radwan al-Khayr, As'ad Haddad, Muhammad Baydun, Michel al-Hashim and Hasan Jabir. As for the decree to promote officers with the rank of captain and above, it is still frozen until a decision is made on the problems involving it--problems that have caused Prime Minister Dr Salim al-Huss to refrain from signing it since December 1979. This has caused the promotions of nearly 200 officers to be frozen. [Text] [Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 3 Jul 80 p 6] 8494

CSO: 4802

FIRST ISLAMIC LAW SENTENCES TO BE EXECUTED ON 19 SEPTEMBER

AB181529 Nouakchott Domestic Service in French 1400 GMT 18 Sep 80

[Excerpts] An editorial of the MAURITANIAN NEWS AGENCY has officially announced that the execution of the first sentences passed by the special criminal court whose verdicts are based on the Sharia [Islamic] Law will take place tomorrow. Concerning the practical organization of the executions, the Nouakchott District Council will place at the disposal of the inhabitants of the capital and the surrounding districts a number of vehicles which will, as of 0700, insure their transportation to the place of the execution situated some 2 kilometers from the town opposite the radio transmitting station [few words indistinct].

The execution of the sentences will begin at 0900. A murderer will be shot, while several persons guilty of theft will have one hand amputated. A tent will be erected for this purpose and after the operation, those amputated will have to raise the arm before the public on coming out of the tent.

The national press has interviewed the deputy governor of Nouakchott District, Mr (Hamoud Ould Bou), and Mr (Mohamed Tabana), judge of the fifth city ward and member of the special criminal court. Concerning the organization of the executions, the deputy governor explained that the chairman of the Military Committee of National Salvation and head of state and government, Lt Col Khouna Ould Haydala, has approved the execution of the verdicts which, as we have already said, concern cases of murder and theft.

For his part, Judge (Mohamed Tabana) recalled that Islamic law, and especially the Maliki rite, stipulates that a person guilty of deliberate murder must be killed in the same manner in which he committed his crime, but that one is allowed to execute the sentence with a sword. However, with the consent of the head of state, the special criminal court has specified the use of the gun in carrying out death sentences.

CSO: 4400

CROWN PRINCE DISCUSSES YOUTH AFFAIRS, PROSPECTS

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 29 Jun 80 p 3

/Article by Turki Nasir al-Sudayri: "Crown Prince, in the First Comprehensive Talk about Youth Affairs: My View of Youth Today Is Filled with Optimism and Regard for Youthful Powers"/

/Text/ What is new in this conversation in that it is new of its kind. We wished to remove it from the various issues of politics, domestic and foreign, so that we could devote ourselves to talk about young people in their various groups and the government's programs for caring for them and guiding them. His Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the crown prince and deputy prime minister, is also the chairman of the Supreme Youth Care Council, in addition to the other sectors his highness supervises directly or through his leadership position in the regime, concerning education, culture, and youth care.

Therefore the conversation with his highness was replete with everything one could discuss on our young people today and the government's programs to develop the various youth care sectors, as his highness was kind enough to answer all AL-RIYAD's questions in this conversation, which is to be considered his highness' first comprehensive one regarding youth issues and youth care programs.

Here is the text of his highness' interview:

Optimism and High Regard for Our Youth

/Question/ How does your highness view the situation of our young people today?

/Answer/ Our view of the young is filled with optimism and regard for the youthful powers which have established their full qualifications for bearing responsibilities and effectively participating in building a great nation.

With my faith in the youthful capacities which have proved their worth in serving the nation, I aspire to more activity from the young, in order that they may attain knowledge and be furnished with qualifications which will be adequate for the requirements of the age. The awakening resurgence in their country requires their minds and arms so that they may fill every vacuum and become specialized in every branch of knowledge and labor and achieve our hope that their nation will be built through their youthful arms.

Our Faith Is the True Armor

/Question/ Many various currents and ideologies are surrounding our society, especially those which are contrary or hostile to our faith. How can one immunize our youth against them, now that they have started to open out toward the world in various ways, including travel and contact with Western societies, reading and the influence of various media?

/Answer/ There is no dispute that today is not like yesterday. The well-developed areas have come closer and means of communication, as well as the media, which are developed, have contributed to a large extent in influencing societies with what is going on in other societies. However, this does not make us lose sleep with anxiety over the young people of our country. They have a true armor which will guarantee that any weapon aimed at them is crushed, an armor which is represented by our tolerant faith, in which there are teachings and strength which go beyond the greatest of deviations and the methods of those who embrace and propagate them. Faith in God complemented by useful knowledge through God's strength and power, are able to immunize our young people against every heretic and destroyer.

There are living examples before us in the current reality we are experiencing. The youth of our country have attained maximum refinement and many have lived in societies which are alien to them, seeking knowledge and learning, and have returned more firm and committed to their genuine religion and the lofty customs and traditions of their society. When the home and the school cooperate and a child is brought up between both replete with faith, then it is very difficult if not impossible for him to be influenced by currents and laws which man has set forth to combat the revelations of the great creator. Here the responsibility is jointly that of all,starting with the home, the mosque, the school and the university. When the mare is proper its brood must be good.

We Are Anxious To Provide All Means for Youth Care

/Question/ What are the Supreme Youth Care Council's plans and programs to raise the athletic level so that it will complete development programs in the cultural and pedagogical sectors?

/Answer/ It gladdens us to see various youth care activities proceeding successfully and with increasing development from the standpoints of quality and quantity, without having the success of one occur at the expense

of another. As the athletic services offered to the youth of our country are progressing grom good to better, in a proper, palpable manner, the cultural, pedagogical and social services provided for them are also developing and achieving a great deal of success. This is the general youth care plan and we are anxious to provide all the means to guarantee that it realizes its goals.

The Activity of Feet and the Activity of Heads

/Question/ It is observed that sports influence the tendencies and concerns of young people in our country to a large degree, diverting them from all other cultural interests. Why are there no cultural plans within this trend, in the sense that sporting clubs could play an effective role which is not just confined to athletics? The same goes for athletic festivals and celebrations.

/Answer/ We believe that there is much that responds to these queries in our previous answer. Nonetheless, we are requesting athletic clubs to increase attention to non-athletic activities. There is no doubt that literary clubs play a great role in this sphere but we do not consider it appropriate to content ourselves with what literary clubs are doing. The notion of introducing cultural activities into the sporting clubs themselves has been raised and in my opinion is worthy of study and attention, because it has been observed that young people are not sufficiently receptive to the literary clubs. It is necessary to think about shifting cultural activity into athletic clubs, because we do not just want people's feet to be active, or just people's heads. Building a nation comes about through the mind and the body together, and both must be sound, proper and active. In my view it is necessary to think of creating different types of combinations of youth care activities.

On introducing National Education Curricula

/Question/ Our young people--I mean many of them, not young people in general--lack national feeling in many of their activities inside and outside the country, in fact abroad in particular. That is embodied in much conduct which harms our reputation, in their conduct inside the country, in front of foreigners who come here, and in addition there is a deficiency in their sense of active participation in our struggle for development. Aren't there programs to introduce national education courses, in some form, into the educational curricula?

/Answer/ Unfortunately there is some exaggeration in what you have mentioned. Feeling of citizenship in its loftiest sense is present among the young people of our country and their participation in the struggle for development is good and clear. As for deviant individual conduct, that is not a criterion. Our hopes are great that our young people will continue as they have been, the best representative of the Saudi citizen, people who are proud of their genuine roots and high morality in every place and

time inside and outside the country. As for the insertion of new courses into the curricula, studies on this subject have not stopped, and all matters that serve the public interest are being carried out.

Concentrated Studies To Develop the Curricula

/Question/ The preceding question leads us to subordinate ones:

First, on the state of our curricula, which are now considered very defici ent in keeping abreast of our developmental aspirations.

Second, the draft system, which is part of the national education system.

I would like to receive a clarification from your generous highness on these two issues.

/Answer/ The process of development in our country is progressing, thank God, with speed and stability in all fields. Development requires constant change so that the general situation can keep abreast of the process of development and not be an obstacle to it. Therefore, thinking and planning have not stopped at all, and this applies to education and the curricula. This subject enjoys the exceptional attention of the highest levels in the government, research and studies on it are intense, and change will occur in a manner corresponding to the results of this research and these studies in order that the cirricula and educational methods selected will be among the best and most suitable.

Early Response to the Draft System

As regards the draft system, we have talked a great deal about it and the statute bearing on it will have all the details and data responding to the questions which might be in young people's minds. Here we are anxious to praise the great early response which we have felt among the young people from the first moment the idea was announced, and we hope that its implementation will contain the ingredients for realizing the interests of the young and the nation.

Skilled Technical Personnel--an Urgent Matter

/Question/ The presence of foreigners and people coming in to the country who participate with us in construction now is being observed in development programs and conversely our young people are absent from the fields of government and domestic activity, especially vocational activities, preferring to relax and rely on revenues which do not require production in various areas of investment. How does your highness view this situation?

/Answer/ As we have stated above, the great process of resurgence which the kingdom is passing through requires intense manpower to implant various projects, and that entails recourse to non-Saudi capabilities to meet

the deficit. The role of our young people in this sphere is clear and conspicuous and there is a receptivity to vocational and technical training which bodes well, with God's permission, giving proof of the consciousness the young people of this good country enjoy. We hope that receptivity to this type will increase; the need for it is growing intensely, as the days pass, especially following the construction expansion. What is felt is that skilled specialized technical personnel are very much needed and the future of this type of education will be good, God willing.

Journalists Are the Object of the Government's Attention in Guaranteeing Their Rights and Appreciating Their Work

/Question/ May your generous highness permit us to ask about a group of young people who are assuming their national responsibilities of building the identity of this nation in a field which has exceptional importance and grave responsibilities, but are not being allotted any privileges in exchange for their difficult tasks? They are your children the journalists, and there are no statutes to reward their efforts and the problems they face in their work, either work or social insurance statutes, as is the lot of any ordinary worker or employee in a company. This certainly does not benefit them, except in the case of work disability or death; during their presence on the job, they have nothing but their salaries, which sometimes are much lower than the wages and salaries of company workers and employees.

The question is, how does the government now view the status of our press? Consequently, are there plans to support press organizations and encourage journalists with material and moral incentives which will entice them to exercise their responsibilities with greater desire and passionate enthusiasm?

/Answer/ The government is anxious to look after its people in every sphere, and those working in the area of journalism have been and still are the object of attention. Direct directives have been issued by the Ministry of Information to press organizations to issue an organizational schedule of their employees, noting down their rights and showing their duties. Some organizations have completed this and have conveyed the schedule to the Ministry of Information. From the general standpoint, study of the status of the press and journalists in general is continuing in a good, profound fashion, encompassing all existing subjects in the field of the press now, and sudden matters which might come up. What is important is that we are anxious that this serious study will bear fruit to guarantee that the rights of journalists are preserved, their work is appreciated and their future is guaranteed.

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CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

AL-QATIF SOCIAL SERVICE--The social service center in al-Qatif carried out a total of 69 projects and programs in the past 5 years, and 119,548 citizens in al-Qatif and its villages have benefited from them. In the annual statement issued by the center on the occasion of the conclusion of activities this year, it was said that the expenditure budget for the center playground project totalled 1,053,415 riyals for this period and that 2,500 male and female children benefited from it. The budget for programs of expenditures for projects to improve housing came to 1,920,007 riyals, and 619 people benefited from them. In the field of national committees, branch committees and boards of directors of youth club programs, the center spent the sum of 39,449,962 riyals, and 34,582 people benefited from them. In addition, there were the committee's other projects totaling 319 million riyals. In addition, 8,313,796 riyals were spent in the form of various programs and aid. The report pointed out that 35,500 riyals were spent on women's accreditation programs and 890 women benefited from them. In addition 30,000 riyals were spent on the child's club and anti-illiteracy project, and the number of beneficiaries came to 60. In the field of the model woman and kitchen program /words missing/ and in the field of the cultural section the sum of 95,500 riyals was spent and 6,073 people benefited from it. /Text/ /Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 14 Jun 80 p 3/

NEW AGRICULTURAL WELLS--The great al-Washm water project is among the giant projects which our righteous government, represented by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water, is implementing. This massive project will supply the towns of Shaqra', Marrat, Ushayqir, al-Qara'in, Ghasalah, Uthaythiyah, Tharmada' and some palaces and farms lying on the road. The Ministry of Agriculture, in its implementation of this project, has graciously realized the hopes which have long been aimed at by the citizens of these towns and every citizen in these towns gives thanks to all the workers who exerted efforts to bring the project into being and carry it out. In another area, the second part of the project has been assigned; that is the drilling of five artesian wells, which was assigned to the 'Abdallah al-Kharif Sons Company on 27 April 1980 for a contract with an estimated value of 3,971,180 riyals. Implementation of this project will take 8 months. The anticipated producibility of each well has been set at about 300 gallons per minute and the total anticipated depth is 450 meters. These wells lie

at the end of the road passing from the al-Hijaz Road to the al-Qusaym Road, passing through al-'Asilah; these wells will lie on the right-hand side of the road. From these wells, the abovementioned towns will be supplied with potable water in adequate quantities. The contracting company is continuing the extension of its activity of laying pipes in streets and connecting them to homes. May God make those carrying out this project, foremost among them the minister of agriculture, succeed in what is good for the country and the citizens. /Text/ /Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 14 Jun 80 p 2/

ABQAIQ FIELD STUDY- An agreement has been signed by the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources in Dhahran with the Intercomp consulting engineering firm to conduct a detailed geological and engineering study of the Arab D zone in the Abqaiq field. This field was discovered in 1940, production in it began in 1946 and its current rate of production is 650,000 barrels a day of light oil. The agreement, whose value comes to $2.9 million, requires the company to conduct a comprehensive survey of the Abqaiq field and determine its characteristics and features in detail in order to determine the most suitable plans for producing and preserving its oil reserves. This project is considered the early part of the Oil Ministry's work in third 5-year plan, which is aimed at preserving oil resources, constantly evaluating oilfields and determining the best ways of operating them to conserve natural resources. /Text/ /Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 20 Jun 80 p 8/

RAILWAY PLANS--His Excellency Shaykh Faysal al-Shuhayl, general director of the Railway Organization in the Eastern Province, has announced that 4,499,000,000 riyals have been allocated to railway projects in the third 5-year plan. He went on to say that the organization's budget for the new fiscal year totalled 780 million riyals, to enable it to carry out the projects it is implementing. Shaykh al-Shuhayl said that among the authority's projects there is one to construct a direct rail line connecting al-Dammam to Riyadh by way of Khurays. A project to renovate the existing track is currently under construction; about 250 kilometers have been completed, the remaining 300 kilometers of track will be done in the next 2 years and the project will cost 450 million riyals. /Text/ /Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 20 Jun 80 p 8/ 11887

CSO: 4802

FOREIGN MINISTER GIVES COMPREHENSIVE DESCRIPTION OF POLICIES

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 16 Jun 80 pp 8, 9

/Article by Muwaffaq Madani: "A Comprehensive Conversation Extending from Reconciliation in Lebanon to Strategic Balance with Israel: 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam to AL-SAFIR: We Are Not an Alternative to Any Party in Lebanon"/

/Text/ A conversation with a competent, experienced politician like 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam is enjoyable and difficult.

Enjoyable because the man has presence of mind and well organized thoughts and is always ready for any question; difficult in the professional sense for the same reasons: you cannot "trap" him or entice him into saying what he does not want to say.

In any event, in this conversation with AL-SAFIR, which went on for more than 2 hours, a great deal concerning Lebanon and the political parties struggling there along the road to national reconciliation, the Palestinian resistance, the political directives which govern its base and command, Europe, and its "initiative" which ended dramatically at the hands of its allies the Americans.

The deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Syria was specific in his answers and precise in his choice of words, especially as regards the position on specific parties in Lebanon, from the government, the Phalange Party, President Chamoun and the Amal movement, up to President Franjiyah and the nature of relations between him and Syria.

It is true that Khaddam recognized that the chances of the "cabinet of activities," or "the political cabinet" as he prefers to call it, are no better than 33 percent, but, like President Sarkis, he considers that it is a try which merits some effort. If it is successful, that is good, and if not it will be of use in determining the positions of those who will be opposing its establishment in the future.

In the estimate of one of the major engineers of Syrian policy in Lebanon, and one of the most prominent persons in charge of carrying it out, the

complication of the situation in Lebanon is represented by the issue of dealing with Israel. If a solution is found to this matter, it will be possible to enter into the core of the requisite, desired solution to the Palestinian problem.

Thus the complication is not a "Maronite one," as some like to call it in Lebanon, but a complication with Arab dimensions, and Syria therefore considers that it is concerned with it and with the means for solving it. The matter is not one of a tribal reconciliation between President Franjiyah and the Phalange Party or the al-Jumayyil family, but is a sign of a trend whose direct effects go beyond Lebanon and affect Syria, the Palestinians and the other Arabs.

This is as regards Lebanon; regarding Syria and its domestic situation, Khaddam said that what preoccupies its leaders now is the attainment of a stragegic balance with Israel, that is, so that Syria will be able to confront probable Israel aggression alone and crush it. This subject will be the basis of relations with "Arab brethren" (outside the perseverance front). Those who support Syria and stand alongside it on this subject are those who stress through their position that they are against Israel, al-Sadat, Camp David and the plans for American dominance; those who are silent resemble those who openly declare their allegiance to Camp David.

Therefore, Khaddam views the European summit in Venice and what issued from it as a mere rejuvenation of Camp David and he calls on the Arab brethren to "bring down the fantasies on political settlement for once and for all."

In any event, Khaddam's statements here are those of a "statesman" more than anything else; therefore composure and balance govern him, although he is not lacking in clarity.

This is the text of the conversation.

Syria and the Reconciliation

We began our conversation with 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam on where relations now "stand" between Lebanon and Syria. We asked him, "It is being bruited about in Beirut that Syria's position on the issue of reconciliation is unclear, especially from the standpoint of details, outside the context of desires, and that your visit to Ba'abda did not clarify what has been concealed. What exactly is your position on reconciliation?"

'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam said,

"I do not know why some people consider that our position is unclear. However, I do know that it is not Syria's place to talk about details or participate in them. By virtue of the nature of relations between the two countries, by virtue of Syrian contribution to the deterrent forces, and

by virtue of the national responsibilities which Syria has taken on its shoulders, Syrian can contribute general directives, not detailed ones, because details of this kind continue to possess characteristics which concern the Lebanese parties themselves. In our discussions with our Lebanese brothers, especially with his excellency President Sarkis, Premier Salim al-Huss and Minister Fu'ad Butrus, the talk focused on principles and bases which can be relied on an a prelude to the process of national reconciliation, proceeding from the premise that reconciliation is the safest prelude first to restoring matters to their natural state in Lebanon and second to constituting a political front comprising all forces in Lebanon and standing up to the Israeli enemy.

"That is, reconciliation must achieve two objectives:

"The first objective is domestic and Lebanese: to protect the legitimacy, strengthen national unity in the country, and the phenomena of discord on the Lebanese scene, which are draining and fragmenting the government, and re-establish the identity and sovereignty of the state.

"The second objective is national and bears on the confrontation with Israel and the need to orient oneself toward that confrontation. If there is a domestic element and Lebanese domestic unity, as well as a national element; the stand on Israel."

A Front against Israel

/Question/ Is it possible to state how, in practice, one can establish a political front to organize the various Lebanese parties, in your opinion!

/Answer/ By front I do not mean political tactics or a political front in the sense that is used; I mean that the Lebanese people should be in a united front against Israeli aggression because Israel is not just now aiming at parts of the Lebanese territory but is aiming at all Lebanon.

/Question/ Could one consider the principles which President Sarkis set forth as a basis for establishing this front?

/Answer/ Yes. What President Sarkis set out is to be considered a proper basis and a common denominator which could serve as a prelude and a base for commitment to the course of national reconciliation.

/Question/ However, most Lebanese parties consider the format which the regime has set forth to be merely obvious points and they are asking for a clear specific working plan which will be a basis for the implementation of these principles and for the attainment of reconciliation.

/Answer/ It is correct that what President Sarkis is setting out are obvious points, but what the Lebanese actually need is agreement on these

obvious points. If all the Lebanese agreed on the obvious points, the situation which exists now would not exist.

Consultations and after

/Question/ Do you believe that the consultations President Sarkis held lately can provide us with the domestic front you are talking about?

/Answer/ There is a difference between a domestic front which has been formed and the fact that specific political parties have set out on the road. If you want to ascertain my personal opinion, I do not believe that these consultations have now achieved the desired results; rather, the goal is to achieve these results, and this will require the cooperation of all parties and their serious real commitment to the process of reconciliation and to the principles set forth. It is not desired just that one declare a political or media position, but also that one act in practice.

By the nature of the case, this program must pass through numerous stages, one of them, indeed the first, being these parties' serious commitment to principles, to matters which are taken for granted, and these parties' shift under the umbrella of the Lebanese state toward the promulgation of a tentative practical program to bring these principles about.

Toward a Political Cabinet

/Question/ Do you believe that it will be in the power of the cabinet formed in the light of these consultations to attain a stage in setting this program out?

/Answer/ In reality, our opinion now is the same as that which we previously declared in various circumstances in the past, namely that a political cabinet is necessary in Lebanon, that is, a cabinet which will combine the parties to the struggle and combine the interests of Lebanon and the interests of the Arab nation, since Lebanon is part of this nation.

However, it seems that there have been obstacles in the way of formation of such a cabinet. A cabinet of technicians was formed first, then a cabinet of technicians supplied with politicians. It seems that need has become urgently conspicuous to form a political cabinet.

/Question/ There is a belief in Lebanon that your position regarding the formation of a cabinet of "political" activities is unclear; would you like a cabinet of activities, or do you hold to a different format?

/Answer/ There are two formats for action in Lebanon. The first is for the government to take the initiative of adopting a decision, in accordance with its notions, set forth an action program, and impose this program on everyone, using the power available to it to do this. This is one solution and one method.

The other method is for the combatants to come under the umbrella of the government, set out a program and strive to carry it out.

Either solution has its negative and positive aspects, and neither solution will be adopted in isolation from existing circumstances.

/Question/ Now what do you advise, the first solution or the second one?

/Answer/ As I said, each solution has its circumstances. In the past phase, the first solution might have been better, but now new elements have become significant and what was valid in one phase may not be valid in another one.

Dealing with Israel

/Question/ Regarding a cabinet of people combating with one another, or what we in Lebanon call fighting one another, problems exist among the parties, and the consultations the president made did not eliminate them. Therefore the matter of forming a cabinet of people fighting one another seems difficult now.

/Answer/ In my view, through the contacts and discussions I held with a large number of our brethren in Lebanon, the main issue, or the main obstacle, is the subject of dealing with Israel and the position on that.

If this problem ends and clear, practical measures are adopted toward it, I do not believe that serious dispute will remain among the parties concerned, especially if the desire to achieve reconciliation is real.

/Question/ Some parties say that the Syrian position on the manner of settling the issue of dealing with Israel is not sufficiently clear and claim that they are awaiting clarification from you in order to specify their final position.

'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam said decisively, "Our position is clear,we have declared it many times. What is necessary is that these dealings in all their forms and types be eliminated and that a decisive position on them be adopted."

The Statement and the President's Role

/Question/ It has been said that you recently demanded or pointed out that an official statement should be issued on parties accused of dealing with Israel in which the areas where they do deal with Israel are spelled out. This has not yet happened.

In fact, a lead editorial appeared in the newspaper AL-'AMAL recently referring to this point, considering it an attempt to cause a rift between you and the Phalange. In the political information being passed around in

Beirut, this type of statement has actually been written and presented to you. What is the truth?

/Answer/ No, it has not been presented to us. What has been presented to us are formulas or notions of recommendations which are supposed to appear, in the event of a reconciliation, in the form of statements, information or the like.

In any event, the subject of dealing with Israel must end in a clear, specific fashion, without ambiguity, and this ending must be announced and certain, but how? This is an issue which can be discussed between President Sarkis, considering that he is leading the process of reconciliation, and the parties directly concerned with the problem of reconciliation.

The Maronite Complication

/Question/ It is stated in Beirut that President Sarkis is relying on you, as the support for the process of reconciliation, in eliminating the Maronite complication.

/Answer/ Since the first moment Syria has been claiming that national reconciliation among Lebanese is necessary, and when there is reconciliation among them, Syria will not be able to be an alternative to any group nor will it arrogate to itself the right to play the role of any group. However, it can help through its brotherly relations and gracious efforts. This is what we are doing, and we believe that ending the Lebanese problem is something which will help us get greater powers in motion against the main scheme, represented by the Camp David policy, and against the conspiracy which is threatening to liquidate the Palestinian cause.

/Question/ Is it possible to cast clear, penetrating light on the dimensions of the Syrian-Phalange dialogue and the effects that imposes on the course of reconciliation?

/Answer/ In reality, there is no dialogue in the meaning of the word. "Dialogue" is an imprecise term. However, there are contacts, in the sense that we have not yet attained a dialogue and consequently there are no specific issues for discussion in front of us. There are contacts, as I said; these contacts were made and announced at their time.

/Question/ Is there a possibility that these contacts will be realized and will result in dialogue?

/Answer/ Yes--that is, as far as we are concerned, there is no absolute yes or absolute no.

/Question/ So there is a yes in Abu 'Ammar's fashion. What do you expect specifically from the Phalange in the course of this dialogue?

/Answer/ First we expect support for the legitimacy and acceptance of the existence and the sovereignty of the state, and an effort to liquidate all pockets which have dealt with or are dealing with Israel and the termination of these dealings, and we expect it, as I said, to help the state regain its sovereignty.

Chamoun and the Surprise of the Allies

/Question/ Are there corresponding contacts with President Camille Chamoun, on grounds that he is an ally of the Phalange?

/Answer/ From time to time, some politicians from Lebanon come to us bringing President Chamoun's thoughts.

We told 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam:

"Let us speak more bluntly. Some of your allies in Lebanon say that the Syrian-Phalange dialogue was a surprise to them and created confusion in their positions, especially since this dialogue would reshuffle the cards in Lebanon. Is it possible to explain and interpret what the consequences of the Syrian-Phalange dialogue will be?"

The "permanent" deputy prime minister and foreign minister of Syria replied by saying,

"I can state, first, that we have not surprised anyone. In all the contacts we have held with the Phalange, we have kept others informed about what went on.

/Question/ But it has stirred up doubts.

/Answer/ The other point is that Syria's policy is not open to public auction where one party can accept it or another one reject it. Syria has a clear political and national path and it exercises political activity in the light of that path.

When we say we want a reconciliation in Lebanon, this reconciliation will not be with one group but with all conflicting parties, regardless of our opinion about those parties and their policies and practices. However, we must provide all the circumstances to build smooth national ground for the reconciliation process. When we can attract all these parties to this ground, we will have contributed to achieving a great domestic act and a great national act in Lebanon.

Most frankly and objectively, I state that we cannot talk about a national reconciliation while political parties remain outside this reconciliation. We must act to bring these parties into the arena of reconciliation and eliminate all the causes preventing them from getting into this arena.

If we can do that, that will be good. If we cannot, we will have made an effort on behalf of the good.

I do not believe that anyone has doubts about our policy, because this policy is based on clear, specific traditions, principles, experience and practice. I would like to be blunt and say that our contact with any Lebanese group absolutely do not affect our relations with any other party and does not mean that we are exchanging our friendship and relations with one group for another.

The tentative goal before us is how to go about closing the Lebanese file so that we may be more capable of moving to confront what is being drawn up in the Palestinian file.

/Question/ Taking the Phalange Party, specifically, and the various stages Lebanon has passed through and is passing through now, could we have an idea of your evaluation of this party as a political phenomenon which exists in Lebanon?

That is, if we take the issue of dealing with Israel, for example, are these dealings part of Phalange policy or are they a new policy for this party?

'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam said,

"The axis of discussion is to arrive at a reconciliation in Lebanon. As I have said, there are parties. Regardless of our opinion on these parties, or their political path and political movement, Lebanon's interest is to provide a climate for the reconciliation to take place on smooth ground. Consequently, helping parties eliminate obstacles, whether those obstacles lie in the parties' constitution or in their policies, or in the constitution and policies of others, will be aimed at arriving at this goal.

"We by nature of the case always hope that no Arab citizen will have relations with Israel and that no Arab citizen will be implicated in dealing with Israel, because dealing with Israel is against the soul, is against the country, and is against the nation."

On Franjiyah and the Phalange

/Question/ Let us go back to the point on the Maronite complication. How can one arrange political relations between President Sulayman Franjiyah and the Phalange Party in order to facilitate a reconciliation in isolation from the circumstances of either, considering that Franjiyah is one of your most prominent friends in Lebanon?

/Answer/ President Franjiyah, a beloved and honored friend of the Syrian leaders, is a nationalist and a man with a good domestic and national past. Our relationship with him was not established after he assumed the presidency

but is much older than that. Franjiyah the man has borne much pain for the sake of the political path he was presented, especially in confronting dealings with Israel, and consequently our relationship and friendship with Franjiyah are permanent and solid.

As to how to solve what you have called the Maronite complication, or "the difference between President Franjiyah and the Phalange," we are not concerned with that matter; it concerns the parties directly.

/Question/ It is said that Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus, on his latest visit to you, asked you to help the regime in Lebanon solve this problem.

Khaddam replied tersely,

"We didn't discuss this matter."

He then turned to us, smiling in a manner which indicated that he would say no more; we had to discuss another subject, and asked him:

Amal and the National Movement

/Question/ Let us talk about the latest meeting, which included representatives of the Amal movement, the Palestine resistance and the Lebanese National Movement, which took place under your sponsorship. What is your concept of the developments of the situation and the dimensions of this meeting, in terms of the relations among the parties you met here?

/Answer/ Our opinion was clear when the unfortunate dispute occurred; in brief, that is that this dispute would affect the domestic ranks.

I state with all frankness and objectivity that according to the information which was available to us at that time we concluded that there was some prejudice against the Amal movement. By the nature of the case, we considered that this movement was a major element in the domestic ranks in Lebanon and that it must be given an opportunity to exercise its domestic role in full. Consequently, any attempt to create rifts in domestic ranks will ultimately have negative consequences on all parties to these ranks.

In the meeting which was held in Damascus, a wholly positive attitude was discovered on the part of the Amal movement leaders, as with the representatives of the National Movement and the Palestine resistance.

This helped us arrive at the attainment of agreement among these brothers.

/Question/ Some modifications recently occurred in the political council of the National Movement. Walid Jumblatt was elected president of the National Movement and the Ba'th Party organization and the Socialist Union joined it. What is your appraisal of the modification which has occurred?

/Answer/ We consider this a good step along the proper road. Solidarity and cooperation among all national forces in Lebanon must be strengthened. We always hope that the scope for national action will expand in Lebanon and comprise everyone. What has happened is a step along this road.

/Question/ In your opinion, is the coordinating committee among the National Movement, the resistance and Amal a better context for an alliance, or must this alliance be developed by introducing Amal into the National Movement in addition to some other organizations?

/Answer/ The best way naturally is to shift from the state of mutual killing to that of alliance, mutual understanding and cooperation, then solidarity, unification or unity.

/Question/ Do you believe that the contradictions among these parties have ended and that the Damascus meeting established bases for serious alliance and cooperation among them?

/Answer/ We must all continue to exert efforts to eliminate the causes which lead to this sort of secondary contradiction. But have these contradictions been eliminated? That depends on the parties present on the stage.

/Question/ What about the subject of renewing the Arab deterrent forces, especially in the light of what some Arab parties are saying to the effect that they will not make their financial contributions?

Khaddam said succinctly with a smile "We are not concerned with this matter."

/Question/ Will there be a renewal of the deterrent /forces/ or not?

/Answer/ We are not concerned with their being renewed or not. This is all I have to say: we are not concerned with this matter.

His smile expanded, and we smiled with him.

Security and the Responsibility for Deterrence

/Question/ Let us move over to the issue of the security situation. It is being observed that there is no Syrian-Lebanese security plan to deal with the security situation in Lebanon, in the sense that the deterrent forces today are more of a reserve than a security force.

/Answer/ The problem is that if the security situation in Lebanon stays as it is now, which is unacceptable, and if the deterrent /forces/ continue to perform routine activities instead of Lebanese security, that also is unacceptable to us and to others.

We have chosen this task in order to get the parties to relax. Naturally we did not go into Lebanon to perform the role of a traffic policeman; routine activity is for the Lebanese policemen. Therefore it was necessary to take some measures first to urge all parties to a reconciliation and consequently to strengthen the role of the state in the security process, provided that that take place within the reconciliation process.

Therefore certain measures were necessary such as assembling the deterrent forces, so that we could remind the Lebanese that a day might come when the deterrent forces would not be responsible or ready or present to perform routine security tasks.

Security Is a Political Decision

/Question/ Do you believe that by forming a cabinet of activities, a cabinet of "people who are fighting one another," it will be possible to arrive at a secure security plan and formula which will be carried out on the ground?

/Answer/ Naturally; this is what must be at the head of its tasks.

/Question/ Does that mean that the security plan will not precede the political one?

'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam said:

"Security in Lebanon means political security, in the sense that if there is no political reconciliation among the parties, there will never be security, especially if there is no Lebanese decision to act decisively in this matter."

Measures before a Cabinet

We asked about the results of the talks Fu'ad Butrus held in Damascus, and Khaddam said,

"We agreed on the overall ideas which our brother Fu'ad Butrus brought, first of which was that of a political cabinet or a cabinet containing all persons who are committed to the reconciliation formula. We also agreed that it was necessary for the parties to take practical measures on the ground before forming a cabinet, imparting an impression of seriousness to the process of carrying out the reconciliation."

/Question/ What measures?

/Answer/ There are matters related to security, matters related to dealing with Israel, matters related to laxity and to the occupation of government institutions, and numerous other procedures.

/Question/ Do you and President Sarkis anticipate that the parties will respond to this concept?

/Answer/ If I say that we do not, that will mean that the road we are traveling is not a proper one. (He laughed.)

/Question/ That is, we can be optimistic.

He laughed.

al-Huss' Resignation and Construction of the Army

/Question/ It has been said that al-Huss' resignation was related to numerous things and many causes, among them, and most important, the issue of constructing the army.

/Answer/ We do not know exactly why al-Huss' cabinet resigned, because numerous sources gave us conflicting and contradictory information.

/Question/ But Premier al-Huss' information has it that you were in on the resignation before it occurred.

The European Initiative

We moved on to another subject with the foreign minister of Syria, and asked him:

"Did you expect that the Venice summit would end with what is called the 'European initiative?'?"

/Answer/ Assuredly we fully expected what happened. Through our analysis of the international political situation, and Europe's situation in it, we concluded that Europe would not be able to move very far away from American policy and that any European movement or European initiative would consist of a refined version of Camp David.

By the nature of the case, some of our Arab brothers experienced some illusions and waited for the European initiative, while the Europeans themselves were declaring that Europe would not be able to stand against American policy or oppose American policy in the Middle East--just as those Arab brothers had done with us with respect to the Americans, telling us, "Wait for this president, wait for those elections, and then America will do such and such."

We answered them, "The American president told us such and such, the American minister told us such and such, how do you want us to believe you and lie to the people who are directly concerned?"

The fact is that what we expected was what actually came out. The European initiative consists of the reinjection of new blood into Camp David, and I believe that the purpose in issuing this statement is to outflank the Arab position and prevent the formation of a strong Arab position against American policy in the region. We have taken the statement, analyzed it paragraph by paragraph, and found that in spirit it corresponds to and in many of its stipulations is almost a verbatim copy of Camp David.

In any event, some Arab parties have traveled more than they should in the direction of illusions, such as the illusion that Europe always has said "we will recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization if the organization recognizes Israel." The Europeans have never linked Israel's recognition of the Liberation Organization to the Liberation Organization's recognition of Israel.

Then some paragraphs in the statement speak of Israel's right to security and existence and talk of justice for all peoples, among them the Palestinian people. That means that they have given Israel security and existence, that is, specific demands, and have given the Palestinian people floating words, which are the same ones which were used at Camp David.

They have offered the word self-determination, but in the context of a comprehensive settlement and suitable resolutions to the struggle in the Middle East.

Thus self-determination is connected to Egypt and Israel, that is, to the parties to the struggle who were represented in Camp David, Egypt and Israel, while self-determination, as is customary and as is stipulated in the United Nations resolutions, is not connected to anyone.

That is, Egypt, Israel and Jordan are the ones which will determine the destiny of the Palestinians, and what is meant by the right to self-determination is those Palestinians who are in the West Bank or Gaza! Will they be given the right to return or to choose to return?

There are many major issues which lie within the contents of Camp David.

As regards the paragraph dealing with the Palestine Liberation Organization, some people unfortunately consider it a positive action whereas in our view it is a negative one. The text states that all parties to the struggle, including the Liberation Organization, must accept these principles. Consequently, they have linked the organization to this paragraph, and they have used the word "linkage" and not the word "participation." "Linkage" means that it have relations via a third party, which might be Egypt, Jordan, Singapore, Italy or whatever.

They took 4 hours of discussion to determine whether to use the word "linkage" or the word "participation," and they chose the word "linkage."

Thus they therefore have not said that the Palestinian people have the right to a national personality and self-determination and they have not distinguished between the Palestinian people and the Palestine Liberation Organization. This means that the organization could play another role through some detachments while other parties have another role.

In brief, the statement in its totality is a new Camp David.

An Attempt To Contain Syria

/Question/ There are people who say that this statement reflects some of ficial Arab policies, in the sense that it enjoys the endorsement of some of the Arab parties concerned and is perhaps the result of the current Arab position.

/Answer/ This will not change the facts at all. As long as Syria does not accept this statement, acceptance or rejection of it by others will not mean anything.

/Question/ Does that mean that it will not affect Syria's position or that it concerns some parties but not others?

/Answer/ What was requested of the initiative was that it include the Syrian position in the Arab stand.

/Question/ By whom? France?

/Answer/ I am not saying France. I am saying that America's attempts are to contain the Syrian position, but this will not change anything and will not contain our position. Our policy is inspired by the nature of our domestic situation and the national situation, and by many ingredients; therefore, it is not affected by the positions of one state or another, especially since the positions of Arab parties are mostly theoretical ones.

Perseverance and Europe's Arabs

/Question/ Let us turn to talk about the Syrian position in the Arab and international contexts. The fact is that there are two Arab lines besides al-Sadat's.

/Answer/ There is a line which is betting on the European initiative, and consequently is trying to draw close to the Egyptian regime; the other line is that of the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front, in which Syria is a founding party, and this clashes with the former line.

/Question/ Do you anticipate the a clash will lead to a complete rupture with those who are going to America via Europe?

/Answer/ In reality, the current Arab position must not be a surprise. In the past we propounded the slogan of Arab solidarity, in the conviction that the struggle with Israel was a national one and in the conviction that it was important to mobilize all powers in the national arena and realize the difficult circumstances in the Arab nation in an objective fashion. We realized that we might not be able to attain a unified Arab position in a serious, practical manner from where we were, but we always concentrated on the issue of solidarity for moral and national considerations.

Moral in the sense that we wanted to isolate al-Sadat's line and not provide it with an Arab covering; consequently we said that everyone who was against al-Sadat was with us. We realized that the position on al-Sadat was not sufficiently serious, and many Arab brethren did not really boycott him. The proof is that there still are Arab embassies in Cairo and there are a large number of diplomats there. Just withdrawing an ambassador means that the political boycott has not occurred in a serious manner. The economic boycott has not been carried out in a serious fashion either.

However, as I said, we wanted to preserve a minimum of solidarity because going beyond this minimum will serve al-Sadat and will serve Camp David.

Going beyond the Minimum!

Khaddam went on to explain what he wanted to get at by saying:

"At the summit conference in Baghdad, we arrived at this minimum at that time. Today, however, this minimum in our opinion is no longer acceptable, and there is a great deal of significance in that.

"At the Baghdad summit, we were not able to come up with a resolution condemning Camp David; what we did come up with was non-agreement to these agreements and rejection of their conclusions, while at the summit of non-aligned countries in Havana we did attain the condemnation of these agreements and branded them crimes. This reflects the current Arab situation. American imperialism is aware of the elements which make up the Arab position. It has worked and is now working to use these elements to go beyond the minimum and create a psychological state of despair and hesitation by creating peripheral disputes among Arabs, giving it a better opportunity to carry out its schemes.

"As regards Arab solidarity, I state simply that this solidarity, in its traditional sense, must be reviewed in a serious manner. It is not important that we talk about solidarity--what is important is that we talk about what this solidarity has achieved. If it has achieved the results we wanted, that is good, and if it has not achieved what we wanted, we must conduct a review of it.

"We hope that relations among all Arab countries will be normal and that brotherhood and good neighborliness will dominate relations. However, the

goal of solidarity must not just be that of good neighborly relations among Arab countries. The main goal of solidarity is to provide the requirements of the struggle against Israel; if we do not use this solidarity in the direction of attaining this goal, that means that we are not travelling along the proper road."

'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam added, stressing specific notions to get at what he wanted to assert:

"In reality, the withdrawal of the Egyptian regime and its alliance with Israel and America constitutes a new element, a quantitative element; we state that it is an important landmark in the history of events and developments in the Arab region. Consequently, we have started to face a new state which we cannot confront through the means and policies with which we faced the situation before Camp David. The situation after Camp David is a new one, different in essence from the one before it, and confronting this state by previous methods will not be possible, in the sense that when we face the post-Camp David stage with the same previous methods we will be like someone facing a tank with a pistol. Therefore we in Syria consider that we must week new means which will enable us to cope with the new stage.

"By the nature of the case, this requires a radical review of our various policies, and this is what we have done and are doing now. We have started the review, and the national party conference next month will adopt radical decisions including all our policies. We are preparing for this today. As I said, one cannot face a new situation and a new conspiracy with previous methods."

/Question/ When will you set forth your new position?

/Answer/ Through the resolutions of the national conference in the party, then through the conference of Arab foreign and economics ministers which will be held next August, in the process of preparing for the Arab summit in November. We have prepared ourselves for this conference and during it we will present a full detailed work program of plan which we presume will respond to the challenges of the current stage.

We Must Create an Alternative

/Question/ Your statement inspires one to believe that there is a dividing point today which will become apparent following the conference of Arab foreign ministers, or exists and is apparent even without conferences.

Now, a specific format has been dropped from the Arab alliance, and Syria is demanding another format which it will present, while at the same time Arab parties are taking a tack which is totally at variance with Syria's; this has been observed in Syria's relations with some Arab countries.

/Answer/ There is no doubt that there is a new stage which will be imposed on us. America, Israel and al-Sadat have imposed a new stage.

The question which is raised is, can the formats which now exist liberate, regain the rights of the Palestinian people and stop the American attack on the area?

The regime in Egypt has started to give America military bases; 2 days ago it was announced that American forces will conduct serious joint maneuvers with the Egyptians.

Israel, al-Sadat and America today are working in a form different from the past, that is, Egypt, having been one of the major confrontation states, has today gone over to Israel's side and is outside the battle. Indeed, Egypt's power and all it represents have gone over to the other side as a result of al-Sadat's treason. Will it be possible, in the light of these conditions, to confront this situation with the relations existing among the Arabs today?

If it is possible, that is good. However, if it is not possible, and if an alternative is necessary, it will be necessary to look for this alternative.

'Abd-al Halim Khaddam went on to stress the slogan which has been raised in the Syrian political milieu: strategic balance with Israel. He said,

"What is important is that we exert efforts to provide this alterrative. What is required today is an Arab decision and a strategic military balance between Syria alone and Israel, not between the Arabs and Israel. This problem is a major one as far as we go and we therefore state that the formula we will propound and our policy in the future will set forth from this issue. Anyone who wants to join with us and place his resources for the confrontation with us we say is with us and against Israel, and we will struggle to get every Arab to be with us.

"In the past, our action was concentrated on Arab governments and we closed the door to interaction with and orientation toward Arab peoples. Today we will correct this course and will orient ourselves toward Arab peoples, since it is necessary to appeal and act so that the Arab masses may regain the initiative and regain their role of leading Arab action and guiding it in a national direction, that is, in the direction of the struggle with Israel."

Perseverance and Strategic Balance

/Question/ Is that the position of the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front?

/Answer/ This is a general position of the front's, but it will be set out in a specific manner at the coming meeting of the Arab foreign and economic ministers, then at the forthcoming Arab summit.

We in Syria consider the issue of strategic balance with Israel to be a major one and we will strive to provide the conditions for it, in any form and under the pressure of any circumstance, because we do not imagine that it will be possible for us alone, with our current resources, to confront this sordid American-Israeli-al-Sadatist tripartite alliance or the Carter-Begin-al-Sadat alliance. Therefore one must strive to achieve this strategic balance so that we will be able to make a confrontation.

As regards the perseverance front, I am anxious to point out that it has taken steps along the road to attaining the goals desired of it, in spite of the observation that our brothers in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah are facing extreme pressures, most conspicuously overt preparations by al-Sadat's regime to attack Libya. It goes without saying that I stress that we will stand alongside Libya and will consolidate its resources to confront any probable aggression, which will be a single battle, and we will not enable al-Sadat and his allies to achieve their objectives here or there.

Developments Domestically

/Question/ Talk about strategic balance with Israel certainly presupposes essential developments on the internal level in Syria, politically, socially and economically.

/Answer/ Yes, and President al-Asad has expressed this orientation in our policy on every occasion.

/Question/ Let us presume that you intend to refer to the need to expand the national progressive front and liberate the powers of the people. However, what practical measures have been or will be taken on the ground to achieve this orientation?

/Answer/ First, strengthening the role of the national front, strengthening the role of the progressive line in the country, strengthening the role of the forces with a real interest in the revolution--which are the workers and the peasants--and exerting efforts to build a domestic economy which will in a specific range enable us to provide the requirements for defense and the basic needs of the citizen.

These are the orientations the leaders are working to carry out at present, and they have started to do so.

/Question/ But it is being observed that there is an unjustified revival of the private sector at the expense of the public sector. Are there measures to limit this growth of the private sector and to limit the growth of

the parasitic bourgeoisie which has grown along the fringes of the public sector and benefited from it?

/Answer/ Naturally there is a decree in this regard on the part of the leaders and we are now intending to carry it out. We are working to strengthen the public sector's leadership role in the domestic economy and are working to eliminate parasites and the flaws which plague the structure of the domestic economy in general and the public sector in particular.

Naturally measures are being discussed and carried out in this direction and I would like to state that the public sector is the commanding sector in reality in Syria. The total money invested in the public sector exceeds 90 billion Syrian pounds while the money invested in the private sector does not exceed 200 or 300 million Syrian pounds.

As regards the growth of the parasitic bourgeoisie, the necessary measures have been taken to prevent its growth and to eliminate it.

/Question/ You talked about strengthening the national front. What are the parties involved in the expansion of this front?

/Answer/ Every power which is committed to the goals of the front, its charter and the struggle to achieve these goals and this charter is considered to belong to this front.

What Crisis in Syria?

/Question/ The world's radio stations, Western ones particularly, have been actively disseminating much news and many stories about the presence of a domestic crisis in Syria, and intense emphasis has been made in talking about factional crisis. Explosions and the assassination episodes have been used as proof of the fact that there is a political crisis with a factional aspect in Syria. What is the nature of the crisis which exists in Syria? Is it possible to talk about measures which have been taken to confront them, what they have called dragnet operations and so forth?

/Answer/ First, I do not share the view that there is a crisis in Syria. There are vexations which have been visited on Syria, but there is a difference between a crisis and vexations. When we say "crisis," that means that there is a crisis in the regime, a crisis in the country, a crisis in resolving domestic problems. When we say "vexations," this means that there are foreign sources for these vexations.

I state, bluntly, there is no crisis in Syria, but Syria, at one stage, was exposed to some vexations, and I believe that these vexations, imported to us from abroad, will continue because they are connected to our continuing political line.

When we challenge American policy in the region, and stand against it, and against Israel and against al-Sadat's regime, we expect some vexations to occur. This is not an inference; facts confirm it. The main objective of these movements and vexations is to face Syria with two alternatives: to choose the Camp David road, whereupon the vexations will end and the country will relax, but our people and our nation will be split up because to follow the Camp David road means total liquidation of all the aspirations and the role of the Arab nation, or to continue traveling the other road, for Syria to continue its current policy, and consequently for it to be concentrated on, crushed and eliminated as an obstacle, because the main obstacle to Camp David is here in this country.

The Syrian word "yes" is a distinctive word in the region, and the Syrian word "no" is also a distinctive one in the region.

What is desired, at least, if there is no yes, is that there be no no, and consequently that Syria be eliminated.

Therefore attempts have been made which have taken the form of assassination attempts and explosions in order to stir up a factional climate. Those who are scheming realize that the atmosphere in Syria cannot be a factional one. France divided the current Syria into five statelets, these statelets could not exist, and France continued to try for 25 years but could not establish a foundation on a factional basis.

If direct imperialism (France) could not establish such an atmosphere, and failed to do so, do the schemers abroad anticipate success, especially now after more than 34 years of independence? By the nature of the case, when the schemers failed with the murders which were aimed at spreading a climate of factionalism, their orientation changed. I can give an example of this by saying that more than 10 religious men were assassinated in Syria on grounds that they were dealing with the government.

/Question/ Perhaps the entities which practice killing are numerous.

/Answer/ No, the murderer is a single one, a single body. It is the band of Moslem Brothers which is practicing the killing, and when it kills it announces the fact. That means that the issue is no longer hidden.

I can say that after they failed to stir up factional strife through murder they shifted to the stage of "national assassination." That type of assassination was aimed at blowing up the situation in the country, specifically in the first week or the first half of March. By the nature of the case, their conspiracy failed and ended. The government entities concerned are actually following up on the security question with full determination. In brief, one can state that some vexations have been caused for us in Syria which have assumed the nature of security problems and and which might in another stage assume another form, that is, the form

of vexations of political pressure or economic pressure. They might assume the form of direct Israeli military aggression.

This is all aimed at carrying the Camp David conspiracy through, but we will persevere and fight.

The War and America's Scheme

/Question/ Talk is now proliferating inside and outside Israel about the likelihood of war, war against Syria specifically. How do you view this kind of likelihood?

'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam said:

"The Middle East region is the most important one in the world from the strategic standpoint and from the economic standpoint. It is clear that any disruption in the situation in the region will be reflected in the world economy and on world peace and security. America is now trying to strengthen its grip and dominance in the region, and if it can close the area off to the advantage of American policy, that will first mean tightening its grip on Europe, Japan and the third world and surrounding the Soviet Union. It is certain that the United States will always try to eliminate all obstacles in its way, and Syria is an obstacle in America's way.

"By the nature of the case, direct Israeli military action may have some results which would have the effect of thwarting American action. Therefore the orientation now is to use non-military means. However, if they become convinced that these means are failing, the strategic importance of the area will become more important than the consequences which will result from Israeli aggression. Thus the likelihood of war continues to exist."

/Question/ Let us continue the discussion on strategic balance. Is it in Syria's power to achieve strategic balance with Israel apart from the Soviet Union, considering that that is the friendly international party which is close to its political premises?

/Answer/ We in Syria have decided to attain a strategic balance and to use all the policies and means which will lead to this balance. Among these means and policies is the attainment of a qualitative improvement in relations between us and the Soviet Union.

/Question/ Are there practical measures?

/Answer/ The question is, how can we? This is a matter we discuss in the party leadership and with our brethren in the Perseverance Front. That is, we have approved the principle and are now discussing ways of qualitatively improving these relations with the Soviet Union.

/Question/ A military meeting was held lately in Damascus in the context of the Perseverance Front to carry out the resolutions of its latest summit.

/Answer/ Correct, and so far as I know this military meeting was very successful. The resolutions adopted in it were very good, especially as regards the Palestine resistance.

Relations with the Resistance

We asked 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam:

"What about Syrian-Palestinian relations? There are people who talk of, or perhaps express a desire for, a dispute between the resistance and Damascus."

/Answer/ All I know is that when our Palestinian brethren come to Syria they talk nicely to us and praise Syria's policy, positions and what Syria is enduring for the sake of the Palestinian cause, and we have not heard anything different from any of them.

I can truthfully state that there is no dispute with brothers in the resistance, and the noise that is going on about disputes probably arose from a difference in political vision and appraisal along the edges of the contacts which our brothers in the resistance sometimes make and which we are informed about after they happen, although when we meet and discuss matters we find that our viewpoints are in agreement and that it is not necessary for allies to make the same movements to prove their solidarity.

Our goals are clear: against Camp David, in favor of liberation; the Palestine cause is the central cause and any movement in that direction, especially after Camp David, cannot take place within the framework of what is called a political settlement. To talk about political settlement is to talk about surrendering to Israeli demands. It makes us live through illusions of imminent peace whereas the Israelis are moving within the realities of war.

Some of us are still investigating a word in a statement by some country or another which is talking about peace while at the same time Israel builds new settlements. In spite of this we consider that the issue of the illusion of settlement must be reviewed. We might disagree with some of our Arab brethren and might disagree in our views with some Palestinian brothers, but the Palestinian context, in our opinion, is in general on the side of the political path Syria is propounding. The climate of the FATH conference, which I attended, strengthened the path of rejection of the illusions of settlement and the firmness of the movement's combative stand.

The statement issued reflects the combative atmosphere and not one word of it contradicts our political policies. Naturally the base and leadership organizations of the Palestinian revolution are not in favor of Camp David or the plans or illusions of political settlement.

Perhaps the climate of enthusiasm with which those at the conference received the statement I made before the FATH movement reflect the notions I am driving at.

In brief, Israel and America will not form and will not allow the establishment of a Palestinian state, and anything they propound on the Palestinian issue consists of mines to blow up the Palestinian stage by creating contradictions in it. No one who tries to be friends with America and be on its side realizes that it wants to crush him. The Americans want agents, not friends, slaves who have no hand in decisions. I believe that the Palestinian stage is opposed to America and to Camp David and al-Sadat, by the nature of the case, all Palestinian organizations with a popular and leadership character have adopted specific positions, and there is no anxiety over this matter.

/Question/ Many Lebanese assume that agreement to a tripartite Lebanese-Syrian-Palestinian formula will constitute an entree into a solution of the Lebanese crisis. Do you believe it is possible to arrive at these proper trilateral relations?

/Answer/ This is what we are striving toward. What is important is that the situation in Lebanon not continue in the current manner, because its continuation will strangle the Lebanese and Palestinians and will lead to more contradictions and problems in national ranks, and this will be negatively reflected on the Palestinian position. Weakening the national ranks will weaken the position of the Palestinian resistance. Therefore it is necessary to make serious urgent efforts to shift the current situation in Lebanon to a new stage, a stage in which the Lebanese and Palestinians will relax, and we will relax with them.

11887
CSO: 4802

DEFENSE MINISTER LAUDS DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 29 Aug 80 p 4

[Article: "Today the Fight Means Efficiently Contributing to the Work of Development"]

[Text] Mr Slaheddine Baly, Minister of National Defense on Wednesday went to Meknassy where he presided over a people's meeting.

In the speech he gave on this occasion, the minister discussed the efforts made by the government in all fields to assure dignity for all citizens in spite of the modest resources of the country. The minister mentioned particularly the manyfold encouragements given by the state to incite citizens to improve production. In this connection he gave tribute to the citizens of Meknassy for the work they are doing in land improvement by practicing irrigated cultivation. This is all the more gratifying, insisted the minister, as Tunisians have become conscious of their duties and responsibilities.

Mr Baly then emphasized the concern of the "Supreme Fighter" for the young regime of Sidi Bouzid, recalling that the head of state devoted his whole life to assure the dignity of the Tunisians by fighting for the country's independence in the first stage and for the amelioration of living standard and the promotion of the whole people in the second stage.

After reviewing the glorious past of the Sidi Bouzid government in the struggle for national liberation, Mr Baly underlined the importance of direct contact in Bourguiba politics which made it possible to lay the foundations of a modern society and to launch the country on the path of development on a solid basis.

The minister then explained that today the fight means efficiently contributing to the work of development, notably by the creation of jobs, increase of production. He mentioned that the army also shares in this work in the form of national service.

Moreover, discussing the importance of agriculture in the national economy, Mr Baly stressed the need to encourage young people to work on the land.

He also indicated that the government spares no effort to rehabilitate distressed areas and to encourage all those wishing to work for the good of the nation.

The minister concluded in exhorting the citizens to strengthen their loyalty to the Bourguiba regime which embodies the aspirations of all citizens, to remain watchful in the defense of national assets and to foil all attempts at hindering the march of the country towards progress and prosperity.

At the end of the meeting Mr Baly distributed several prizes as an encouragement to young people and granted in the context of the rural development program.

8696
CSO: 4400

PLANNING, FINANCE MINISTER DISCUSSES TUNISIAN-STYLE SOCIALISM

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 28 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] On Tuesday Mr Mansour Moalla, Planning and Finance Minister chaired, at the Center for Training of young executives, a free platform organized by the regional student committee in the Sfax district.

Taking stock of the last two decades the minister stressed that the results of the last 20 years are on the whole positive despite some negative aspects. Among positive results Mr Mansour Moalla cited the liquidation of the aftermath of colonialism which required great and long-term efforts such as the establishment of State institutions which could be improved upon in order to fulfill properly their mission according to the aspirations of the nation. The last 20 years also have seen the elaboration of a basic infrastructure, the generalization of education and the launching of a diversified Tunisian industry. On that point the minister underlined that all these results are assets which have to be safeguarded and strengthened.

Mr. Moalla then discussed the efforts Tunisia still has to make to reach the standard of developed countries. This task, he stressed, requires the coordination of everybody's efforts and great determination to overcome the emerging difficulties.

Reinforcement of the Collective Sector

Answering further to questions raised by the students concerning economic development, the minister reaffirmed Tunisian adherence to the socialist line, indicating that Tunisian socialism is a socialism characterized by a policy of balance between all sectors and by the quest for economic payoff. The Tunisian economy, observed Mr Moalla, constantly develops and evolves for the good of the whole nation. He added: Tunisian socialism is not incompatible with the existence of a private sector provided the

latter fulfills its duties, notably in connection with the distribution of income, taxes, job creation and social intercourse which must be built on foundations which do not consider labor as a simple means of production on the same level as equipment and machines. The state itself has other priorities to which it must bend its efforts, particularly since certain key sectors require the special interest of the state which must not neglect them in view of the role they play in the life of the citizens.

As to the collective sector, continued Mr Moalla, we shall come back to it progressively, particularly in the field of consumption. The state is determined to strengthen this sector by appropriate legislation guaranteeing it all possible success.

Regional Development Plans Integrated

Recalling furthermore the experiment of collectivist policy undertaken in Tunisia, Mr Moalla stated that its failure and the subsequent reactions are caused by the methods used in the experiment's implementation.

The collectivist regime, he pointed out, is above all mutualistic and therefore requires as an essential premise the conviction of the participants, their enthusiasm and their loyalty. Thus the cooperative is an economic institution, not a political one. To impose this regime by force can only lead to failure. The minister was then led to speak on the balance between regions in the development programs foreseen for the next Plan, underlining the care of the government to grant special treatment to the Western regions of the country, regions which in the past did not benefit from advantages similar to those granted to the coastal regions, due to lack of money and also other considerations related to efficiency. He also stated that the administration plans to create some projects of integrated development for these regions in collaboration with the districts.

These regional plans are going to comprise the implementation of agricultural, industrial, touristic projects with the purpose of giving to these regions their part in the work of development and at the same time to achieve regional balance. This action by the way is linked to the administrative decentralization decided upon by the government.

To Maintain the Balance between Salaries and Prices

On the subject of rural development policy whose programs started in 1973 the minister said that this policy aims first of all at improving living conditions in the rural districts and making possible for the young people of these regions to obtain an adequate professional training and stable employment.

Talking then of the balance between salaries and prices, Mr Moalla emphasized the will of the government to do its utmost to maintain and reinforce this balance, the more so as a serious action has begun to curb inflation.

In his answer to interruptions by students who pointed out the negative aspects of the law of April 1972, the minister denied the allegations that this law was promulgated to encourage foreign capital. This law he insisted profits foreigners as well as Tunisians. The advantages proposed by Tunisia to foreign investors concern the creation of an appropriate environment allowing their enterprises to take root in Tunisia in order to help us to solve the problem of unemployment.

Concerning tax policy Mr Moalla stressed that the Administration envisages measures capable of inducing the citizens to discharge their fiscal duties.

The minister devoted the last part of his speech to the cooperation of Tunisia with brother countries and friendly countries indicating on that score that the development of cooperative relations of Tunisia with the Arab countries is defined in the context of coordinated action aiming at strengthening Arab power.

Such a cooperation does not keep us from turning to industrialized countries, all the more as we endeavour to acquire a technology allowing us to achieve our own development with the least delay.

In conclusion Mr Moalla exhorted the students and young people in general to take part efficiently in the implementation of our development objectives, all the more as the government and the Party labor presently to surmount the obstacles which hindered the dialog at a given time.

8696
CSO: 4400

PARTY CHIEF EMPHASIZES PARTY'S CONCERN FOR YOUTH

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 29 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Mr Mongi Kooli, Party Director and Delegate Minister to the Prime Minister chaired on Wednesday the last session of the regional seminar of Destourien students in the Sfax governorship.

On that occasion he gave a speech in which he explained the objectives aimed at by the Party through the organization of such seminars. He also insisted that the Party always had as main concern the establishment of direct contacts with Tunisian students wherever they are.

Later, answering the students questions, Mr Mongi Kooli explained, concerning the responsibility within the party, that a responsible destourien must have as sole concern the common interest rather than his personal interest. The "Supreme Fighter" added Mr Kooli always taught us that responsibility is a burden and not a distinction.

The party director mentioned furthermore that the party's traditions command us to oppose anybody who would be tempted to deviate from this principle, just as they call on us to fight against deviations by legal and democratic means, since, in the Destourien ethic, there are no differences between Destouriens and only honesty and loyalty distinguish one from the other.

The Welcome to Young People is not a Slogan

Mr Mongi Kooli then explained that the constant concern of the party to remain open for young people expresses in fact the party's desire to be a people's assembly, where generations meet in a happy symbiosis. This open approach, added Mr Kooli, will not be at the cost of those not so young any more, especially as the party needs all the energies and as the enthusiasm of the young is complemented by the experience of their elders.

You must know, said Mr Kooli addressing his audience, that the opening to youth is not a propaganda slogan but expresses a sincere wish to establish an harmonious bond between the generations of our new society.

At the same time the party director exhorted the Destourien youth to draw its inspiration from the struggle of the "Supreme Fighter" and to conform to the instructions contained in his many speeches which remain the best means to orient the citizens and to inculcate in them the virtue of patriotism.

Mr Kooli also noted that the meetings of the different branches of the party are always occasions for taking stock of actions carried out and for self examination.

They are therefore manifestations of democracy. On that account the party director insisted that the Destourien must have the courage to express himself in all frankness within the party. This courage requires however the need to be disciplined and to yield to the majority's will.

The Law Is Above All

The party director then warned the participants against rumors and slanders, insisting that the party prohibits squarings of accounts and that Bourguibian ethics do not authorize the spirit of revenge. If some measures are taken against some old officials of the Party, this is only proof that in the Tunisian regime the law remains above all.

Mr Mongi Kooli concluded in emphasizing that the Party is the best shield for the regime and that our loyalty and our attachment to the Supreme Fighter order us to work for the strengthening of the Party so that it can continue its noble mission aiming at promoting the Tunisian citizen who is the means and the end of every act of development.

At the close of the meeting the participants addressed a message of support to the Supreme Fighter.

8696
CSO: 4400

ITALIAN-TUNISIAN GAS LINE TALKS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Aug 80 p 4

[Article: "Mr Mzali Receives the President of "SNAM": The Gas Pipeline Between Algeria and Italy at the Center of the Discussion"]

[Text] Yesterday morning, at the Government Palace in the Casbah, Mr Mohamed Mzali received Mr Lorenzio Roasio, president of the Italian company "SNAM" [National Gas Pipeline Company], in the presence of Messrs Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of the national economy, and Mezri Chekir, director of the prime minister's cabinet.

At the end of the interview, Mr Roasio declared that the discussion had dealt with the state of progress of the work for completion of the gas pipeline which was to carry Algerian gas to Italy by passing over Tunisian territory.

He also indicated that he had informed the prime minister of his impressions as to the progress of this work, the construction sites for which are now only 200 km from Tunis.

"The work is progressing in accordance with the estimates worked out," added Mr Roasio, who declared himself "satisfied with the competence of the Tunisian staff and with the harmony which reigns on these sites between Tunisians and Italians."

Mr Roasio also indicated that the construction sites on the Cap-Bon line include 1,000 workers of whom 80 percent are Tunisian.

Mr Roasio, who was accompanied by the director general of SNAM and by the president of the Pipeline Construction Company, concluded by expressing the hope that Tunisian-Italian cooperation would increase and would be extended to other areas.

9434
CSO: 4400

ITALIAN-TUNISIAN SOCIALIST PARTY RELATIONS ASSESSED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 20 Aug 80 p 4

[Article: "Mr Mzali Confers with the Secretary General of the Italian Socialist Party: Exchange of Views on Relations Between the Two Countries"]

[Text] Yesterday morning at the Government Palace in the Casbah, Mr Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and secretary general of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party], received Mr Craxy, secretary general of the Italian Socialist Party, in the presence of Messrs Mongi Kooli, ministerial delegate to the prime minister and director of the party, and Mezri Chekir, director of the prime minister's cabinet.

At the end of the interview, Mr Craxy made the following statement:

"Relations between the Italian Socialist Party and the PSD are developing normally, in a spirit of mutual respect and fruitful cooperation. I had the pleasure of meeting Mr Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister, and we proceeded to an exchange of views on questions concerning the international problems of the moment and the relations between Tunisia and Italy.

"We are all interested in having, in the Mediterranean, a region of security and peace. And we are determined to work toward eliminating destabilizing factors and crisis points in the region.

"On the level of bilateral relations, it is in our mutual interest to accelerate all forms of cooperation. We are good neighbors, but we have not gone deeply into all the possibilities of cooperation, which are very broad.

"I hope," Mr Craxy concluded, "that the Tunisian and Italian governments will have the opportunity to meet at a very high level to lay more solid foundations for this cooperation."

Mr Mongi Kooli had previously had a discussion with Mr Craxy in the presence of Mr Sadok Fayala, responsible for foreign relations at the party headquarters.

9434
CSO: 4400

BOURGUIBA DENIES SENTENCED CRIMINALS RIGHT TO LABOR UNION RESPONSIBILITIES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 28 Aug 80 p 1

[Article: "President Bourguiba Receives Ennaceur and Sfar. The Social and Union Situation Meeting's Focal Point. UGTT Congress: Those Condemned to Forced Labor Penalty Do Not Have According to the Law. The Right to Participate in Union Responsibilities"]

[Text] President Bourguiba, yesterday morning in the Essaada Palace in Marsa, received Mohamed Ennaceur, minister of social affairs, and Rachid Sfar, minister of public health, in the presence of Mezri Chekir, director of the prime minister's cabinet.

At the end of the interview, Ennaceur made the following statement:

"The attention of the President of the Republic was directed toward the social and union situation, as well as toward the preparations for the next UGTT (Tunisian General Federation of Labor) congress. In order to remove any ambiguity, the Chief of State recommended respect for the law regarding the requirements for candidacy to union responsibilities, emphasizing that those condemned to the penalties of forced labor and prison, having received a presidential pardon, do not have the right to hold such responsibilities."

9545
CSO: 4400

DECENTRALIZATION IN AGRICULTURE, HEALTH

Regional Health Administration

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 25-26 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] A work session bringing together high officials of the cabinet and the Ministry of Public Health was held yesterday morning at the health ministry's headquarters. The session was presided over by Rachid Sfar, the minister of public health, and Moncef Belhaj Amor, deputy minister to the prime minister for Public Office and Administrative Reform.

This meeting is part of the project to effect administrative reform and a policy of decentralization, such as determined at the joint meeting of the Offices of Policy and Government, which was held on 28 July 1980.

The meeting, which also falls within the framework of a series of meetings that Belhaj Amor is holding with the ministers concerned, aims to examine the measures intended for making workable the decentralization decided by the government.

Thus it was decided to move toward creating a Regional Health Administration in each governorship in order to gradually increase the number of these administrations from 6 to 19.

These administrations will be headed by a director who will be the regional representative of the Ministry of Public Health.

In this regard, Sfar and Belhaj Amor advocated the need to allow the regional director a broad power of decision in matters of regional health.

As a result, they agreed that the regional directors will benefit from being assigned powers qualifying them to go ahead with recruitment and the administration of personnel, up to then done in Tunis.

"All these measures are designed to relieve congestion in the administration and will allow the latter to better fulfill its role of creating ideas for coordination and supervision, with the regional administration from now on retaining the power of decision in execution," stated Sfar.

Moreover, the ministers were particularly interested in methods of facilitating relations between citizens and the health administration. Thus they directed that there be presented as soon as possible a regulations draft allowing regional health services to deliver locally the equipment and certificates requested by users, a function until then in the central administration's jurisdiction.

For this purpose, Sfar and Belhaj Amor examined a draft for an assignment of powers that will qualify the regional health director to judge and to deliver the authorizations for opening or closing health establishments such as pharmacies, laboratories and private clinics located in his geographical jurisdiction.

This measure, the ministers emphasized, answers the incessant increase of establishments built at the initiative of private individuals.

Therefore, the reduction of procedures will encourage this initiative and will give private individuals the opportunity to contribute to improving our hospital organization.

Within this same framework, it has been decided to entrust the regional director with the decision to approve using private ambulances. In addition, to create careers and to allow the initial formation of regional administrative staff, Belhaj Amor informed the participants of projects for support to aid regional officials. This support deals with allowances for length of administrative service, as well as financial encouragements.

Decentralization of Agriculture Ministry

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 29 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Lassaad Ben Osman, minister of agriculture, and Moncef Belhaj Amor, deputy minister to the prime minister for public office and administrative reform, presided over a meeting bringing together high officials of both departments, on Thursday at Ministry of Agriculture headquarters.

During this work session, held within the framework of the decentralization policy decided by the government and the policy office at their joint meeting last 28 July, Ben Osman and Belhaj Amor examined measures concerning the Ministry of Agriculture and tending to further strengthen the decentralization of its services in administrative, financial, technical and economic areas.

Ben Osman and Belhaj Amor agreed on the need to give the regions qualified administrative staff in order to guarantee the success of the decentralization and to allow citizens to manage on the spot and with maximum swiftness the problems that they face.

An organization and methods committee created in the Ministry of Agriculture determined, in agreement with all the administrations, the methods for reducing detours, the powers that there is room for decentralizing, as well as the redeployment of personnel and of methods of service to benefit the governorships.

Concerning regional structures, the 19 regional offices for agricultural development are managed by high level technicians and cover 130 districts.

The redeployment, gradually achieved, of technical personnel will contribute to strengthening these regional structures.

The division of the administrative staff--about 26 percent for the central administration and about 74 percent for regional services--will benefit the latter even more after the next selection of engineers comes forward.

Moreover, aware of the need to place technical services within immediate reach of agriculture in the most remote areas, especially in agricultural popularization and aid to the small and medium farms through supervised loans, Ben Osman and Belhaj Amor agreed to effect a second redeployment inside the governorships themselves up to the delegation and sector (Imadat) level. In this regard, 150 technicians have been assigned in a first stage at the level of delegations and regional popularization cells.

As for the powers to be entrusted to the regional services, their transfer will be effected gradually up to 1 January 1981 and will affect all the functions of the ministries.

These measures, joined to the new regional structure, will allow the local offices to better serve agriculture and will accordingly lead to taking up the challenge of nutrition.

Bringing Together Administration and Administered

This transfer more particularly concerns the Ministry of Agriculture's powers in matters of land-holding, plant production, forests with hydraulic resources, cattle breeding and fish.

Thus, the delivery of authorizations for licenses and certificates of possession (collective, state and enzel lands) (as published) from now on will be in the jurisdiction of the regional commissioners.

In the area of agricultural credits, decentralization will give freedom to regional services to decide the granting of loans within the framework of a program determined by the central administration.

Thus, farmers will have only to recur to the CRDA and to the agencies of the BNT (Tunisian National Bank) for the complete handling of their records until the final decision, made locally. These measures are designed to reduce delays and to grant a loan in the required time.

The measures will be followed by the adjustment of certain legislative and regulatory texts.

Regarding the administration of personnel, the determined decentralization will allow the CRDA to directly manage all personnel in categories B, C and D.

Moreover, with the aim of supplying the local offices with finances and even having them master their problems, it was decided to grant them allotments of loans for operations as well as for equipment. Thus expenditures for operation and maintenance will be the object of a broad decentralization starting from 1 January 1981. The same will be true for the equipment budget regarding loans for regional purposes (reafforestation, building of water stations, hydraulic power, etc....)

In this regard, Belhaj Amor specified that accompanying measures studied at the cabinet level will make this financial allotment easier. Thus, there will be created regional supervision of expenditures in each governorship, just as the ceiling of the regional market commission will be raised. The aim of these measures will be to allow regional services to initiate and to carry out projects appropriate for their regions and therefore to assure the speed of their execution and follow-up.

Ben Osman and Belhaj Amor finally examined the measures being prepared to reduce and simplify procedures establish the broad outlines to create a guide for the administered person with the object of informing the citizen about the routes and procedures allowing him to manage his business within the permitted legal time period.

9545
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

CLASH WITH MOROCCAN FORCES--The Saharan Information Ministry has issued a new military communique stating that fighters of the Saharan Popular Liberation Army carried out a sweeping attack on 17 September against Moroccan soldiers who were supported by the 10th division. During the attack, which took place in the area between (Bishat) and (Abatih) and lasted for 16 hours, the Saharan forces inflicted heavy losses on the invading forces. They killed or wounded hundreds of Moroccan soldiers and destroyed or seized a large quantity of military hardware, including armored vehicles, various types of trucks and light and heavy arms. Scores of the invading soldiers were also taken prisoner. The Saharan Information Ministry communique also reported that the Polisario fighters opened heavy fire the same day against the Moroccan garrison at (Bur al-Hashishah) on the border between Morocco and the Saharan Republic, inflicting heavy losses of life and materiel on the occupation forces. [Text] [LD182042 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 18 Sep 80]

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END

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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SAUDI-IRAQI RELATIONS SEEN STRESSING IMPORTANCE OF ARAB UNITY

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 16 Aug 80 pp 2-6

[Excerpt] Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Ben Abdel Aziz declared earlier this week that the Israeli Knesset decision to consider unified Jerusalem as the eternal capital of Israel was both a challenge and a threat to the Arab nations. He stressed that the Arabs must reconsider their strategy and rebuild their unity and solidarity to confront the new situation and, quite surprisingly, he said that "holy war" was the only possible retort to the Israeli move.

Coming from one of the top officials of one of the Arab states that are considered as most moderate, the declaration raised questions among observers as to its far-reaching meaning and consequences. The fact that it came a week after the oil-rich kingdom and Iraq issued a joint declaration announcing that measures would be taken against any country which recognized the Israeli decision gave even more momentum to the declaration and triggered speculations on the policy that Saudi Arabia was planning to draw up for the coming months.

The Iraqi-Saudi Statement. On August 6, Saudi Arabia and Iraq issued a declaration which said they would cut political and economic ties with any country which accepted Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem. The communique, which was issued after Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's visit to Saudi Arabia, said that "the two sides agreed to sever all political and economic relations with any country which responds to the decision of the Zionist entity and retains its embassy in Jerusalem."

The statement also condemned the Israeli move as "a new dangerous situation in a string of continuing Zionist aggressions which threaten the security, peace and stability of the region and the world." It also said that Saudi Arabia and Iraq valued those countries which had withdrawn their diplomatic missions from the disputed city following the Israeli action and urged other countries to do the same, and not to stand "had-tied in the face of such evil Zionist activities."

The Saudi-Iraqi communique was issued after Iraqi President Saddam Hussein returned home from a 24-hour surprise visit to Saudi Arabia; the first visit to the oil-rich kingdom by an Iraqi President ever since the Hashemite monarchy was overthrown in Iraq in 1958.

The visit came as a complete surprise even to Saudi officials who, according to Saudi press reports, were taken aback and until the last moment did not know how to make protocol arrangements. Saudi reports said that when the Iraqi President's plane landed in Taef, Saudi officials thought of making a declaration saying that the President Saddam Hussein was coming to perform the Umrah ritual in Mecca, on the occasion of the month of Ramadan. The same reports added that, however, the Iraqi delegation insisted that the visit be called and regarded as an official one.

Some sources said that the Iraqi President may have surrounded his visit with complete secrecy for security reasons but the major questions that were raised dealt with the reasons behind his trip. It is worth noting here that Mr Saddam Hussein visited Saudi Arabia in late 1978 when he was Vice President, but his visit at the time was described as a private one conducted for religious reasons; it had nevertheless drawn attention to the relations between the two countries. These relations have been consistently improving ever since 1978.

Speculations had it that the Iraqi President's surprise visit was prompted by the deteriorating internal situation in some of the Gulf states, or by the latest Israeli decision on Jerusalem, both issues which are of vital importance for the two oil-producing countries. Another view was that Iraq, which will be hosting the OPEC summit slated for November, was seeking to ensure the success of the forthcoming meeting and to settle a number of questions related to oil production and oil prices.

It was noted that Saudi King Khaled personally accompanied the Iraqi President from Taef's Howaya Airport to the Guests' palace.

Interpretation. The joint Saudi-Iraqi declaration was described by some observers as the first step towards the establishment of a Saudi-Iraqi axis which would play a decisive role in both the Gulf and Middle East regions. This view was prompted by the fact that since the fall of the Iranian monarchy, Iraq has emerged as the leading military power of the Gulf region and has repeatedly expressed its determination to play a major role on both the security and political levels in the Gulf region, especially to maintain this region outside the realm of international conflicts and domestic disturbances. This position is shared by the Saudi Kingdom and, since April 1978, security agreements have been concluded between the two countries, but the consequences of these agreements had not yet appeared; perhaps because of the two countries' disagreements over oil question, or because of the 20-year friendship and cooperation treaty concluded between Iraq and the Soviet Union.

Following the conclusion, in February 1979, of a security agreement with Saudi Arabia, Iraq cracked down on Communists inside Iraq in a move which raised questions as to its future relations with Moscow. The treaty was maintained and one of the leading interpretations of the Iraqi crackdown was that 1) it wanted to eliminate the possibility of domestic troubles, and 2) it was eager to reassure the West as well as the moderate Arab states as to its intentions.

Among the interpretations given to the Saudi-Iraqi decision, one, put forth by AL NAHAR's columnist Marwan Iskandar said that its importance derives from the fact that the two countries are major oil-producing nations. They jointly produce 48 percent of all OPEC's oil and that the industrialized world could not, at this stage, bear a reduction in oil production superior to 30 percent of the current level. He said that this will prompt the EEC nations, Japan and the United States to avoid recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel because the Saudi-Iraqi declaration is tantamount to a warning that they would resort to the oil weapon to serve the Middle East cause.

However, western diplomatic sources in Beirut were reported in the press last week as saying that although selective economic measures, including the rupture of oil contracts, could be imposed against individual countries, it was unlikely that there would be any general use of the oil weapon. The sources said that both Saudi Arabia and Iraq have recently resisted pressures from Arab hardline states to cut their oil production.

In this context, the declaration made earlier this week by Saudi Crown Prince Fahd could be taken as yet another warning which represents the position of most of the Gulf states this time since the joint declaration was backed by at least 8 Arab states so far: Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Algeria, Jordan, North Yemen and Mauritania.

An Iraqi-Saudi Axis. The major question now is whether one can speak of a Saudi-Iraqi axis or whether one of the two countries will emerge as a polarizing Arab power around which all the others would rally. For some observers, it is Saudi Arabia which will assume the leading part because of a number of conditions that were not available before.

The main condition is the decision which Israel took in regard to the status of Jerusalem. The matter has been deemed serious enough to prompt Arab states to forget about their marginal and secondary conflicts to pool their efforts in the face of the new challenge posed to them. As one observer put it, the road to Arab unity passes through Jerusalem.

The second condition which contributes to promote the role and leadership of Saudi Arabia is the fact that the oil-rich kingdom is the only Arab state which maintains sound and balanced relations with all Arab states, from the most moderate to the most radical, including Marxist-oriented

South Yemen. In recent weeks it has also improved its relations with Syria and the thaw in their relations was overtly proclaimed when the Syrian president's brother, Rifaat Al Assad, made a visit to Saudi Arabia last month requesting its assistance to fight the Moslem Brotherhood organization.

Saudi Arabia also maintains relations with Egypt, despite its opposition to the Camp David accords and the separate peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel.

This promotes the idea that Saudi Arabia will lead the movement for Arab unity or at least Arab consensus on a joint strategy to face the coming stages of the Middle East peace process. In addition, the declaration made by Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Ben Abdel Aziz marked a clear hardening of the Saudi position and precluded the possibility of a Saudi participation in the Middle East peace process in the near future and the current conditions. The declaration, marking a clear-cut position, is bound to lead to a definite rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and the hardline states.

CSO: 4820

CREATION OF ARAB MONEY MARKET URGED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 4-5 Sep 80 p 1

[Text]

RIYADH, Sept. 3 (SPA) -- Saudi Arabia Wednesday called for greater Arab role in international finance and for a broad-ranging Arab money market to boost the Arab world's economic development. Finance Minister Sheikh Muhammed Aba Al-Khail said the Arabs should be more active in world financial institutions and also play a positive role in interntional currency reform. He was addressing a conference of governors of Arab central banks in Riyadh.

The governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), Sheikh Abdul Aziz Al-Quraishi urged an Arab strategy at the annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank in Washington next month.

This would help reduce the impact of world inflation and instability of major currencies in Arab economies, he said.

He said that although Arab governments with funds had been helping needy Arab states, there was still a pressing need for private Arab capital participation in economic development financing.

This could only be achieved through an unrestricted and sophisticated Arab money market, Sheikh Abdul Aziz said. He urged government support for existing Arab financial markets.

The Finance Minister said his government continued to support common Arab economic ventures without reservations.

"We hope the coming decade will be a decade of joint development to raise living standards in the Arab world," he added.

Earlier meeting of the governors of central banks and monetary authorities in Islamic states adopted here a number of resolutions including the seating of the Palestine Liberation Organization — PLO — at the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as observers.

The World Bank had rejected, under American pressure, an application by the PLO to sit at its meetings as an observer. Now this application receives the support of the major bankers of the Arab and Islamic states which the bank may find even more difficult to ignore.

The final communique of the Muslim governors also decided to promote trade exchanges and the reduction of barriers put up against inter-Islamic imports. It called for increased trade by direct or indirect means and the transfer of capital from one state to the other without much difficulty.

CSO: 4820

ARAB STATES AGREE TO UNIFY PENAL CODE, SECURITY PLANS

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 31 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Jeddah, Aug. 30 (SPA)--Arab interior ministers have agreed on a wide-ranging $30 million master security plan for the Arab world, the Interior Ministry announced Friday evening.

The plan is aimed at reducing crime, improving inter-Arab law enforcement and organizing Arab penal codes into a common system based upon the Sharia, Islamic law. The ministers were holding their third conference in Taif.

The program, which runs between 1981 and 1983, will be financed by a joint Arab fund. The cost will be borne by member states and through voluntary donations from Arab countries.

Improvements will be made in the training of Arab security men, and funds will be made available for the purchase of better communications and laboratory facilities, weapons and cars.

A system will be devised under the plan to inform Arabs about the negative effects of certain types of entertainment, and touristic and cultural programs.

The special body set up to unify Arab penal codes will work out their administrative and technical structure along with other religious, cultural and social programs. Arab countries will be bound by the body's opinions and recommendations.

The ministers also decided to create a committee to monitor the media. The carefully selected committee members will define fixed criteria and will grade the materials reviewed as follows: good for all citizens, good for adults only, nefarious for security and public morals, and without any redeemable social value.

A joint command will regulate the operations of frontier guards to prevent smuggling, and cooperation will also be improved between Arab customs officials.

An Interior Minister's Council will be set up in the Arab League to prepare a final draft of the program which the Interior ministers will approve at their next meeting. Member states will then specify their financial commitments to the master security plan.

CSO: 4820

ORIGIN, STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATION OF ISLAMIC CONFERENCE STUDIED

Mecca THE JOURNAL OF THE MUSLIM WORLD LEAGUE in English Aug 80 pp 27-31

[Text]

The Organisation of the Islamic Conference is the premier international body representing nearly one billion Muslims all over the world. It represents the fulfilment of their desire to work towards the realisation of their common aspirations for unity and co-operation in political, economic, social and cultural fields.

The idea for setting up such a representative Islamic International Organisation was put forward at the Rabat Summit meeting of Muslim Heads of State and Government. The OIC now comprises 42 member states (two namely, Egypt and Afghanistan are currently suspended from membership) and several observer organizations, including the observer status of Nigeria and the Turkish Federated State of Kibris.

The Heads of State and Government of 24 Muslim States met for the first time in September 1969 at Rabat to express their grief and stock at the sacriligeous act of burning of Holy Al Aqsa Mosque of Jerusalem in August 1969.

The leaders participating in the Islamic Summit in Rabat also took the opportunity to express together their conviction that "their common creed constitutes a powerful factor bringing their peoples closer together and fostering understanding between them." They declared that "their Governments shall consult together with a view to promoting between themselves a close co-operation and mutual assistance in the economic, scientific, cultural and spiritual fields, inspired by the immortal teachings of Islam." The Summit also decided to set up the Islamic Conference Organisation with its Secretariat in Jeddah.

In accordance with the Declaration of the Rabat Conference, the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Conference held their first meeting at Jeddah on 23-25 March, 1970.

The Third Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers held in Jeddah in 1972 adopted the Charter of the Organisation of Islamic Conference which laid down the following objectives for the Islamic Conferece:

(a) to promote Islamic solidarity among member States;

(b) to consolidate co-operation among member States in the economic, social, cultural, scientific and other vital fields of activities, and to carry out consultations among member States in international organisations;

(c) to endeavour to eliminate racial segregation, discrimination and to eradicate colonialism in all its forms;

(d) take necessary measures to support international peace and security founded on justice;

(e) to co-ordinate efforts for the safeguard of the Holy Places and support of the struggle of the people of Palestine, and help them to regain their rights and liberate their land;

(f) to strengthen the struggle of all Muslim peoples with a view to safeguarding their dignity, independence and national rights;

(g) to create a suitable atmosphere for the promotion of co-operation and understanding among member States and other countries.

The Charter also laid down that in order to realise the objectives mentioned in the preceding paragraph the member States shall be inspired and guided by the following principles:

(a) Total equality between member States;

(b) Respect of the right of self-determination, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of member States;

(c) Respect of the sovereignty independence and territorial integirity of each member State;

(d) Settlement of any conflict that may arise by peaceful menas such as negotiation, mediation, reconciliation or arbitration;

(e) Abstention from the threat or use of force against the territorial integirity, national unity or political independence of any member State.

The Charter also provides that the Conference is composed of the following:

i. The Conference of Kings and Heads of State and Government;

ii. The Conference of Foreign Ministers; and

iii. The General Secretariat and the subsidiary organs.

Subsidiary Bodies

The work of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference extends to all aspects of co-operation among the nearly one billion Muslims all around the world. In nearly a decade of its existence the Islamic Conference has been able to establish close co-operation among member States in the political, economic

and cultural fields and an institutional framework has been created for the achievement of these purposes. Following are the main organs and subsidiary bodies of the Conference.

ICEA&SA

The Islamic Commission for Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs is the principal organ of the Conference which supervises the implementation of the resolutions of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers. After a thorough review of the progress of implementation of these resolutions, the Commission makes recommendations to the Annual Foreign Ministers Conference for their decisions. Thus, the Islamic Commission plays the dual role of supervision and of making recommendations of future course of action.

The idea of establishing the Islamic Commission was conceived at the Second Islamic Summit held in Lahore in 1974.

The Lahore Summit decided to establish a Committee of Representatives and Experts from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Libya, and the UAE for devising ways and means for the attainment of the following objectives:

i. Eradication of poverty, disease and ignorance from the Islamic world;

ii. Regulating the terms of trade between developed, and developing countries and improving the supply of raw material and import of manufactured goods and know-how;

iv. Ensuring the sovereignty of Muslim states, and eradicating control of the developed countries over their natural resources;

v. Mitigating current economic difficulties of the developing countries due to recent increase in prices; and

vi. Mutual co-operation and solidarity among Muslim countries.

This committee later evolved into the Islamic Commision for Economic, Cultural and Social Affairs and was instituted by a resolution of the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Islamabad in May 1976. The Istanbul Resolution visualised for the Commission the role of supervision, co-ordination and review of the efforts to promote economic co-operation among Islamic countries. The first Session of the Islamic Commission was held at Karachi in December 1977. The Commission which meets bi-annually has so far held 5 Sessions. Its last session was held in Conakry (Guinea) in January 1980. The recommendations of this session came up for consideration at the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, held in Islamabad.

Islamic Solidarity Fund

One of the major decisions of the Lahore Islamic Summit was to establish a fund to be called

Islamic Solidarity Fund to meet the needs and requirements of Islamic unity, Islamic causes, enhancement of Islamic culture, values and universities. The objective of Islamic Solidarity Fund is to do everything possible to promote the status of Muslims in the world, safeguard their faith, support the solidarity and struggle in all fields, especially in the following areas:

1. Alleviating the consequences and results of crises, natural calamities and social conditions that may befall the Islamic countries and communities and providing the necessary material aid.

2. Organising the granting of material aid and assistance to the Islamic countries, minorities and communities to raise their religious, cultural and social standard and contributing to the construction of mosques, hospitals and schools that may be needed.

3. Organising the dissemination of Islamic Da'wah, the message, precepts and ideals of Islam, and supporting the Islamic centres in Islamic countries and elsewhere for the good of Islamic communities and the dissemination of Islamic thought.

4. Promoting scientific and technological research, establishing and financing Islamic Universities wherever required in response to the needs of the modern world and supporting the existing universities.

5. Supporting and organising activities of the Muslim youth in the world in spiritual, social and sports fields.

6. Organising seminars of leading experts and specialists working in Islamic fields to consider the issues of ligislation, codification, administration, economics, culture and science that should be manifest in Islamic thought, as needed by the Islamic world.

7. The execution of all other projects adopted by the Islamic Conference and whose implementation falls within the jurisdiction of the Islamic Solidarity Fund. The planning and preparation of the programme of action of the Islamic Solidarity Fund is carried out by a permanent Council.

The present outlay on the activities of the Fund for the year 1980-81 is expecteed to be around US Dollars 20 million. The main heads of allocations of expenditure of the Fund are: disasters and catastrophes; Mosques; hospitals and schools; community and minorities; propagation of the Islamic Dawah and consolidation of Islamic centres and associations; promotion of scientific research and financing of Islamic universities; protection of Muslim youth; study seminars; fight against the Judaization of Jerusalem; activities related to the advent of the Fifteenth Hijra Century and running expenses.

Jerusalem Committee

During the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967, Israel had occupied the whole of the West Bank and Ghaza Strip including Jerusalem. For the Israelis, it was the fulfilment of an ancient Jewish dream resurrected by the Zionist movement. On the other hand, the loss of Jerusalem was a historic setback for the Muslims, particularly the Arabs, whose difficulties were aggravated due to dislocation of Arabs from their ancestral homes and properties.

Openly defying the international law and the insistence of the international community on the temporary nature of the occupation, the Israeli authorities embarked upon a policy of integrating the occupied Arab lands with the political and economic system of Israel. Israel's designs on Jerusalem became abundantly clear when it declared Jerusalem as its capital and insisted that it would never give up the Holy City. Since their occupation of Jerusalem in June, 1967, the Israeli authorities have pursued a premeditated plan of systematic obliteration of the physical, demographic and cultural heritage and features of the Holy City with a view to presenting the world with fait accompli.

The Palestine question has been of central concern to the Islamic Conference. Exhaustive and comprehensive resolutions have been passed by all the Islamic Conferences held so far, calling for immediate and unconditional vacation of occupied Arab territories, recognition of the inalienable national rights of Palestinians represented by their sole legitimate representative, the PLO, and the restoration of the Holy City of Jerusalem to Arab-Islamic soveriegnty. For this purpose a Permanent Committee was established in 1975 and entrusted with following tasks:

i. To study development of the situation in Jerusalem.

ii. To follow up the implementation of the resolutions of the Islamic Conference and those passed by other International Oraganisations on Jerusalem.

iii. To submit to member States and all concerned organisations proposals of appropriate measures to be taken to face new developments or implement resolutions.

The Tenth Islamic Confernece of Foreign Ministers held at Fez (Morocco) in May 1979 decided that Jerusalem Committee should meet at the Foreign Ministers level under the chairmanship of King Hassan II of Morocco. It was also decieded to dedicate the Tenth Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers to Palestine and Al-Quds and to declare the year 1400 A.H. corresponding to 1980 A.D. as the year of the Holy

Jerusalem. The Fez Confernce considered the liberation of City of Al-Quds and the preservation of its Islamic reponsibility. The last session of the Jerusalem Committee was held at Marrakesh under the chairman ship of King Hassan II of Morocco in March 1980.

Jerusalem Fund

In order to counter the Judaization policy of the Israeli occupation authorities and to sustian the heroic resistance of the Palestinian Arab population in Jerusalem and other occupied territories, a Jerusalem Fund was set up in 1976. The Jerusalem Fund is administered by an autonomous goverining board of the members, including the PLO which is elected by the Jerusalem Committee for two years term.

Chamber of Commerce

In order to promote co-operation in the commercial and industrial fields, through the private sectros within Islamic world, the Islamic Cahmber of Commerce, Industry and Commodities Exchange has been established with headquarters at Karachi.

The Islamic Chamber has been charged with encouraging trade, industry and agriculture and promotion of investment and joint ventures in Islamic countries.

The Firts Assembly of the Islamic Chamber met at Dakar from 24-28 February 1980. The Headquaters of the Islamic Chamber at Karachi were for mally inaugurated by the President of Pakistan in April 1980. While inaugurating the Chamber, the President said:

"The Islamic Chamber of Commerce & Industry has the distinction that its member-countires possess almost all economic inputs for progress and prosperity. By the Grace of Allah, the oil revenues have generated a large amount of foreign exchange. Skilled manpower is available in abundance. There is no dearth of raw material. The deficiency in the technological field can be overcome in a short period through a judicious use of capable personnel and foreign exchange. What is needed is that we should utilize all our resources through mutual co-operation in the true spirit of Islam, so as to promote the progress and prosperity of all mankind. Therefore, I feel that the Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry should set for itself the important task of preparing ground for joint industrial ventures in the various member states with the co-operation of the private sector. The Islamic Chamber should prepare the blue prints of practicable industrial and agricultural plans for such ventures so as to enable the Islamic world to emerge into a new age of trade and industry."

Islamic News Agency

The Islamic world was in dire need of its own news collection and distribution services in order to raise the voice of Islam and bring communities spread all over the world, closer together. Therefore, the IINA has been set up at Jeddah to increase exchange of information.

When fully functional, the IINA will be maiking a vital contribution to the unity and co-operation among member states of the Islamic Conference. Currently the IINA transmissions in English and Arabic are being received by 19 countires.

In the present climate of misunderstanding and distortion of the news of the Muslim world, the IINA can be an effective instrument for a correct projection of the events and developments in the Muslim world.

Broadcasting Organization

With a view to creating greater consciousness of the identity and destiny of the Muslim Ummah, an Islamic States Broadcasting Organisation (ISBO) has been set up at Jeddah.

The ISBO has also been charged with dissemination of Dawah Al-Islamiah. The ISBO will thus be performing the vital functions of spreading the message of Islam and correcting the extraneous values and practices that have crept into Muslim communities in various parts of the world.

There is a great need to disseminate the message of Islam to all parts of the world. The ISBO programmes are explaining the simple and rational religion of Islam and are thus helping to remove prejudices spread by foreign sources.

Ankara Research Centre

In order to facilitate the overall economic development of the Ummah, the Islamic Conference felt the need for an indigenouseconomic and social research and training centre of its own. A Centre for Statistical, Economic and Social Research and Training was, therefore, established in Ankara in 1978. The basic functions of the Centre are:

(a) Collection, collation and dissemination of information on economic and social status of the member states with a view to developing data bank of the Islamic community;

(b) Study of evolution of economic and social development in the member states with a view to generating proposals that will initiate and enhance economic co-operation among the member states.

(c) Organisation of training programmes geared to the need of member states as well as to the overalll economic objectives of the Islamic Conference.

Dacca Centre

To meet the need of skilled manpower and instructors in technology and trades a Centre for Technical and Vocational Training and Research has been established in Dacca. The Centre became operational in

May 1979. The Centre has the following objectives:

(a) To train instructors, technicians and tradesmen in technology and trades needed in member states;

(b) to conduct research on the requirements of technical and vocational education of the Islamic countries.

(c) to initiate, promote and guide technological and technical research having a bearing on problems connected with the development of manpower and technical and vocational education.

(d) to promote technical co-operation, exchange technical know-how and disseminate basic informations in the field of human resources in general and technical vocational education in particular.

History, Art and Culture

A research centre for Islamic History Art and Culture is being set up at Istanbul with the generous donation of the Islamic Solidarity Fund, Saudi Arabia and the Government of Turkey. The objectives laid down for the Research Centre are:

(a) to set up an instituion where scientists, historians, writers and artists from Islamic countries will carry out research on the common cultural heritage of Muslims in order to promote better understanding among Muslims all over the world.

(b) to create objective conditions for close co-operation among historians and writers of member states in order to eradicate the preiudices spread by some foreign writers regarding the history of art and culture of Islamic people.

(c) to publish books, monographs and to arrange seminars and symposia for a better under standing of the cultural and historical environment of Islam.

In addition to the above, projects for the establishment of several other specialised subsdiary agencies like the Islamic Science Foundation, Commission for Preservation of Islamic Cultural Heritage, International Committee of Red Crescent, Islamic University in Niger and Uganda and Islamic Centre in Guinea-Bissau have been taken up by the Islamic Conference.

Islamic Development Bank

There was a long-standing desire on the part of the Muslim countries to co-operate in the task of financing economic development and to establish an interest-free banking system. To this end concerted efforts had been made by Muslim scholars in several countries. The culmination of this process came with the setting up of the Islamic Deveopment Bank at Jeddah.

The purpose of the Bank is to foster economic development and social progress of member countries, and Muslim communities. Membership to the Bank is open to all members of the Islamic Conference.

The functions of the Islamic Development Bank are to invest in equity capital and in productive projects and enterprises in member countries. It also extends loans to the private and

public sector for the financing of productive projects, enterprises and programmes in member countries.

Islamic Banks Association

In order to meet the growing demand for guidance and expertise in setting up Banks which would function strictly according to the Islamic Shariah, an International Association of Islamic Banks has been set up with headquarters at Mecca. The organisation aims at strengthening ties between Islamic Banks and has the following objectives:

(a) Giving technical assistance and expertise to Islamic communities wishing to establish Islamic Bank.

(b) Establishing procedure regarding setting up of Islamic Banks and encouragement of their activites and their evolution.

(c) Seeking promotion of free capital movement between the Islamic Banks; and

(d) Undertaking research on money, credit and banking and prepare guidelines for Islamic Banks.

CSO: 4820

DAYAN INTERVIEWED ON WEST BANK, PALESTINIAN ISSUES

TA271447 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1200 GMT 27 Sep 80

[Interview with Moshe Dayan by Shim'on Ayalon "in Dayan's home" near Tel Aviv; date not given--recorded]

[Excerpt] [Dayan] I think that, basically speaking, Egypt and Israel do see eye to eye what the peace treaty means and are ready to honor it and implement it, to live up to it, but the major point which there are differences of opinion is the Palestinian issue and here are two elements. The first is that the Egyptians said, right from the beginning, that they cannot and will not have a separate peace, so, legally, we got the Israeli-Egyptian treaty standing on its own footing, but politically the Egyptians said, and it is the true political position, that they cannot just take care of their own interests, have Sinai, etc., but they must have at least another party joining this peace process and the only party--not just another one, the only one--are the Palestinians. Here you can't really expect the Syrians to come in and now Lebanon is under the Syrian control and when we talk about Jordan, or the Palestinians, practically it is the same.

We have no conflict with Jordan, with the Jordanian kingdom as such, east of the river Jordan. So, when some of the Israeli parties say that they want a Jordanian option, what would they discuss with Jordan? They will discuss the West Bank and Gaza and when others say that we have to negotiate, or to reach an agreement with the Palestinians, it's about the same people and the same territory and the same problems of Jerusalem, etc. So, the--not only the next--one, but practically the only one country, or issue, that should be dealt with after the peace treaty with Egypt is the Palestinian one and I think that here there are major differences of views.

[Question] Do you think that there is any way that Israel can come to some arrangement with the Palestinian Arabs, which will definitely not include any representatives of the PLO?

[Answer] That depends on what you mean by representatives of the PLO. I think that the answer is yes, I do think so, that we can reach not a written agreement, or signed agreement, but in reality situation, by which both parties would cooperate, like the open bridges or the working of the Arabs from Gaza Strip and the West Bank in Israel. There is no agreement about that, but it is a fact, it is reality, with no written agreement. Now, talking about representatives of the PLO, I am sure that many of the Palestinian mayors and others are devoted, theoretically or ideologically, PLO, just like others who sit in Lebanon. I don't think they are engaged in terrorism. I am talking about the mayors; but who is planting explosives every week or so in Israel? It's not coming from over the border, it's done by Palestinian Arabs here, so, what I am trying to say is that I think that we can reach an unwritten, unsigned agreement, a de facto agreement, about how to live together and it will not be an ideal one; probably the Arabs will take it only as a stage, a first stage, keeping their aspiration for a Palestinian state to be implemented one day, but cooperating in the meantime, during the transitional period. I do think that they will consult with the PLO, they will go to Beirut, they will meet Yasir 'Arafat, they will try to coordinate with them what they do, they would listen to the PLO, but I think that, one way or another, we can insist and achieve it, get it, that the people that we would be dealing with would be only those that live in here, in the territories here, in the West Bank and Gaza and those that we have no criminal charge against them, that they stayed free.

[Question] When we look at the events in the West Bank over the past year or so, there seems to be a growing trend toward extremism amongst the Arabs of these areas.

[Answer] How about Israel? Isn't it the same?

[Question] The extremism has also been growing in Israel....

[Answer] And in Poland and....

[Question] You have recently been meeting, over the past year or so, with a number of Arab leaders and, most recently, with, once more, with the mayor of Gaza, Mr Rashad al-Shawwa. Would you say that there is a growing extremism amongst the general Arab populace, or are we just seeing a fringe element here?

[Answer] I want to tell you that every time that I meet with an Arab leader or representative, I get out more encouraged and this is with the recent cases, too. Now, the way that I see it, there is a distinction between two issues. The first is their ideology. Ideology, and aspiration--you are right about that. What can you expect a Palestinian mayor to say, or think, when the European countries call for a Palestinian state? Do you want him to be less Palestinian than the

head of state of the European community? Surely not. So, as far as their aspiration for self-determination, Palestinian state and that we should go back to the old line and dismantle the Israeli settlements and move the Israeli forces, they are absolutely extreme in their formulas and their aspiration and demands, etc. But, on the other hand, when you talk business, practical issues; for instance, I think they would hate more than anyone else to see another war here and they are scared about it, because, if there will be a war between us and any of the Arab neighboring countries, then the first victims would be the Arabs and they would become refugees and I am just quoting what they tell me, that if something like that would happen between Jordan and Israel, Nabulus would be destroyed and finished and they had enough of becoming refugees.

Or, the other point, over which all of them really, not only agree, but they, it's their desire, to keep the free access, free coming and going between their territories and, their places and Israel, between Gaza and Israel, between Nabulus and Israel; of man and goods. They want to keep it. None of them want to reestablish the barrier between the West Bank, or Gaza, and Israel. All of them want to go on the way it is now. As a matter of fact, it's an unbelievable picture. I think that this year more than 130,000 summer visitors--not Arabs who live in the West Bank and Gaza, but Arabs who come from other countries, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc., they cross the Jordan bridges, come to visit their relatives, but they do go to Tel Aviv and Netanya and why wouldn't they, without any checkpost, without any restrictions. So this kind of way of life is not only acceptable, but I think that the Arabs, the Palestinians would not like to give it up. They don't have any alternative for their people looking for jobs or for their commodities that they want to sell, vegetables or fish that they catch in Gaza, etc.

So, what--trying to answer your question--there is more extremism now, in ideology, in aspirations and they really want it, it's not just for export when they say that. They really want it, but, on the other hand, they want to achieve it by political means and they don't want to be cut away from Israel, so when I think about what can be done and if I really avoid, say, let's say, cut out and forget about the war, on their initiative, count it out, and that they would like to keep the free contact with Israel.

[Question] You mentioned the fact that Europe, the position that Europe has taken; do you think that Israel has become more isolated amongst the countries of the world, not only because of the growing threat, the actual use of the Arab oil weapon, but because, really, when it boils down to it, all of the rest of the world, including the United States, would be a lot happier if Israel were to just cease to exist and to get rid of the headache?

[Answer] Almost, I would accept and agree with you, but with slight modification of the formula. I agree that they would be happier--I wouldn't generalize and say everybody, all the countries, and America, it's too much. There are distinctions. But, let's talk about most of the European countries. Leave alone America, for the moment. I think that they feel that they would be better off without Israel, but, when you talk about Israel ceasing to exist, that is to say, once that this, that the country is a fact and that the way that the conclusion from your formulation should be that Israel would be destroyed, or something like that, liquidated, then I don't think that they really think or that they would have liked to see that. So they are just ignoring hard facts and they are looking for some formula that would satisfy their interests, but they wouldn't say, and I think that in the bottom of their hearts they wouldn't support the destruction of Israel; but, had Israel had to be established now, they would rather not have Israel than establishing it or supporting it.

[Question] When it comes to the crunch, how much can Israel rely on these countries and what can Israel do to combat this...?

[Answer] To rely less on these countries, to insist on our most essential things and not to deal with, or to take such action which are not essential. Not to add to the anti-Israel feeling, the more by such action that we are taking which are not really essential for ourself, but, on the other hand, things that are essential for ourself, we have to go on doing them, like establishing, building settlements in the West Bank and Gaza and keeping the Israeli forces and keeping Jerusalem as our capital and enlarging the Israeli Jewish population in Jerusalem. I think these elements are very essential for ourself and we should go on doing it whether other people like it or they don't like it and if they tell us that we shouldn't have--I am talking about West Jerusalem--that we shouldn't have that as our capital, we should tell them, mind your own business. I can use even stronger words about that. Say, what do you mean by that? Are you really going to tell us where our capital is? Is anyone really questioning that West Jerusalem is a part, a legitimate part of Israel? Even those that want us to go back, even the Arabs that say that we have to go back to the 1967 lines, they do not really include West Jerusalem in the area that we have to evacuate. So, if we want to have our capital in West Jerusalem, how can they say that we can't do it, that we shouldn't do it, they won't recognize it? Of course they can, that's what they do, but I think that we shouldn't listen to them and so that's what they want, but we have to go on our way and this is the only answer to the conflict. But, on the other hand, we really have to avoid taking such actions that are not essential and really necessary for our security or for our national objectives.

CSO: 4820

'JERUSALEM POST' PUBLISHES DATA ON PROPOSED AMENDED BUDGET

TA241203 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 24 Sep 80 pp 1, 15

[Report by Meir Merhav and Shlomo Maoz: "Treasury To Print IS2.56 Billion; IS5 Billion Deficit in New IS90 Billion Budget Proposal"]

[Text] The Ministerial Economic Committee yesterday tabled an updated 1980/81 budget of 90.1 billion shekels in the cabinet, with a deficit of 5.22 billion shekels, based on an expected inflation rate of 123 percent. It was also announced the treasury now expects it will have to print 2.56 billion shekels, far more than the originally planned 2 billion shekels.

The government has not concluded its discussion of the updated budget, which includes a proposal for a further 7 percent cut in the purchases and investment outlays of the various ministries. The discussion will be resumed on Friday, when the cabinet will also have to decide what, if any, tax concessions to abolish and whether to raise taxes. Proposals to at least partially reduce the budget deficit by increasing taxes are still on the agenda.

If the cabinet approves the proposals of the Ministerial Economic Committee on Friday, the updated budget will be tabled in the Knesset immediately after the recess, in the second week of October. Delay in Knesset approval may create serious difficulties for the government ministries, who will be left without a legal allocation of funds.

The forecast deficit of 5.22 billion shekels is exactly twice as large as the 2.61 billion shekels deficit provided for the original budget proposal.

The government's domestic excess demand--the difference between the total demand generated by government outlays and the foreign currency expenditures--is estimated at 5.46 billion shekels. The original budget had foreseen a 350 million shekel surplus of receipts over outlays--for example, an absorption of demand by the government.

The increase in the deficit is the combined result of shortfalls in revenue and of government spending beyond the limits foreseen in the original budget. Wage payments were 1 billion shekels higher than expected, various subsidies paid by the government cost 880 million shekels more than foreseen--mainly because price increases were delayed--and 1.1 billion shekels more than predicted were transferred to the local authorities.

Revenues fell short of what was foreseen by 880 million shekels mainly because imports fell off and the purchase of durable consumer goods declined. In addition, the national insurance institute and the local authorities failed to collect all the money due them, because the necessary legislation which had been planned, was not passed.

While the government expects to generate an excess demand of 5.46 billion shekels in the entire fiscal year, data for the first five months already show an excess demand of 2.8 billion shekels. However, treasury economists believe that the inflationary pressures that boosted the government's excess demand in the first half of the year will be considerably weaker in the second half.

Finance Minister Yiga'el Hurvitz is due to leave next Sunday for the annual meeting of the board of governors of the International Monetary Fund, and will be absent for three weeks.

The adjustment of the budget to the rate of inflation was foreseen by the treasury when it presented its first budget, based on an expected inflation rate of 65 percent. The original budget proposal stated that if inflation was higher than that the ministries would have to absorb the additional cost.

That, however, was not accomplished.

The present budget proposal says that in order to maintain the real level of expenditure foreseen in the original budget, it would have had to be 85 percent larger than the 1979 budget, whereas the nominal increase was originally held to only 54 percent.

In the first half of the fiscal year, the new budget proposal says, expenditure cuts of some 1.7 billion shekels have been effected: 880 million shekels in defence; 350 million shekels in housing: 280 million shekels by cuts in government employment; 110 million shekels by the eliminating of various government activities; and another 100 million shekels through efficiency measures.

The updated budget is 38 percent bigger than the original budget, and 112 percent bigger, nominally, than the 1979 budget.

On the revenue side, the budget is predicated on collection of 45 percent more in income taxes (as compared with a 38 percent increase in the total budget), but only 15.5 percent more from value added tax, and virtually no change--signifying a decrease in real terms--in other indirect taxes, such as customs duties, and purchase tax.

The treasury expects that revenue from the employers tax, which originally was expected to bring in 1.37 billion shekels, will yield 2.55 billion shekels--nearly twice as much as budgeted in the beginning of the year.

Informed sources doubt the realism of these revenue estimates, and consider them an attempt to reduce the visible size of the budget deficit. If these revenue estimates are not realized, these sources say, the actual budget deficit may well be 2 billion shekels larger than provided for in the budget, and total 7.5-8 billion shekels.

The same sources also point out that the updated budget includes 12.1 billion shekels in domestic loans--some 51 percent more than foreseen in the original budget. This amount includes 2.1 billion shekels from national insurance, which is 400 million shekels less than originally expected. The money to be raised from gover bonds and other domestic loans is therefore now estimated at nearly twice as much as in the original budget.

CSO: 4820

ISRAELI PRESS COMMENTS ON IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT

TA270640 [Editorial Report] The Israeli press commentators on 26 September 1980 are in general agreement that the current Iran-Iraq conflict, while superficially weakening two of Israel's enemies, may well represent a serious threat in the future.

JERUSALEM POST in English on 26 September carries a commentary by David Richardson, pages two and three, entitled "Winds of Gulf War Blow Ill for Israel," in which he states that "the strategic implications for Israel of the fighting in the Persian Gulf are seen by local analysts as at best of short-term benefit, while an Iraqi victory would eventually pose a serious threat." The eastern front against Israel may well be weakened for the moment, but whether there is a clear Iraqi victory or a stalemate--local analysts appear to agree that Iraq has emerged strengthened and potentially dangerous. It is in this context they recall Baghdad's bid for a nuclear capability."

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew on 26 September 1980 carries a commentary by Amir Oren entitled "Al-Nasir of the 1980's" in which he compares Saddam Husayn with Al-Nasir in the former's aim to stand at the head of "three combined circles--the Arab, Muslim and the African." This is defined as the desire to replace Al-Sadat as the leader of the Third World movement toward "decolonialization" as well as eventual control of the Persian Gulf. After an analysis of the political situations in the neighboring Arab countries, the commentator discusses Saddam's policy of "maneuvering between Washington and Moscow. Both the superpowers have recently been courting Iraq, which treats them both with a mixture of benevolence and intransigence."

Further historical comparisons are made with Al-Nasir and precedents taken from the Pakistani-India conflict are quoted, stressing an "additional aspect: U.S. hesitation between the two hawks, when this time Brzezinski has been sentenced to play Kissinger's role of 9 years ago, perhaps once more as the person giving the presidential hint about 'inclination' to the benefit of one of the sides (then--Pakistan, now--perhaps--Iran) perhaps as the main witness of U.S. helplessness

in its aim to influence the results." If navigation through the Straits of Hormuz is seriously disturbed, the commentator writes that "such a disturbance would provide Carter with justification to do what Lyndon Johnson did not do when Al-Nasir informed him of the blockade of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli navigation: use force." However, this would help Carter, but not Khomeyni, since Saddam Husayn would be the gainer from this.

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew on 26 September 1980 carries a commentary by Erol Guiney, entitled "The Israeli Angle in the Iraq/Iran Crisis,"in which he analyzes the implications for Israel of the current struggle, pointing out that the first conclusions to be drawn are that the "undisturbed flow of Middle East oil to the Western industrialized countries does not only depend on a solution to the Palestinian problem." Unfortunately world public opinion has not yet realized this; however, the current conflict may help Israel to make it plain that "the entire world--and especially the United Nations--is hypnotized by the Palestinian problem," out of all proportion to its genuine importance. This will be a difficult barrier to overcome and it will take time. In the meantime, if the fighting causes a further price increase in oil Israel will suffer greatly, along with the Western countries. There are other, no less important lessons to be learned from the conflict: while it may appear that Israel will benefit from Iraq and Iran, its enemies, weakening each other in the fighting, "this issue also has other aspects, such as, for example, the military experience these armies are acquiring as they fight." If it should occur that Iraq is the loser in the conflict "this should be regarded as a very positive development, since Saddam Husayn is Israel's most dangerous enemy" and if he emerges victorious and gains a nuclear potential sometime in the near future, "this is a thought that can make us shiver." However, the commentator thinks that Iraq will emerge victorious.

Aside from the military strength Iraq will then have gained, if Iran is vanquished the commentator predicts that the Soviet Union will increase its presence in the Persian Gulf. "It is hard to predict in advance what the Americans will do in such an event. If they do no more than they did after the invasion of Afghanistan, the situation will be bad; if they do more--taking advantage of the fact that they have some 30 warships and 2 aircraft carriers in the vicinity--there may be a danger of a clash between the superpowers." This is why both superpowers are now trying to end the conflict by use of the UN Security Council, "but the Soviet Union is in a more convenient position to use its influence since it has relations with both countries involved, while the United States has no relations with either of them."

For Israel the best solution would be for the UN Security Council to succeed in ending the conflict, since whoever emerges as victor in the conflict, Israel would eventually suffer and "if the victor is Iraq--somethat that appears to be a reasonable assumption--it may very well

then turn its forces against Israel" Also using cooperation with Jordan and such a united front would be most dangerous for Israel. Israel's greatest fear is that the four Arab countries, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Libya, should unite against it, but "for the moment this does not appear to be a realistic possibility." However, "anything can happen in the Middle East." "All the latest developments in the Persian Gulf emphasize the need to strengthen U.S.-Egyptian-Israeli cooperation." This does not necessarily mean U.S. bases on Israeli soil but should certainly include much broader cooperation in economic and military fields, which require further progress in the autonomy talks as a way of "paving the way for some sort of strategic cooperation between Israel and Egypt." This may be difficult, since the Iran-Iraq conflict may harden Al-Sadat's position so that he can present himself as a genuine rival of Iraq as the leader of the Arab world. If Egypt can only be made to understand that Iraq represents as great a threat to itself as to Israel and "if the Iranian people show enough commonsense to understand where Khomeynism is leading" then the current events in the Persian Gulf may actually have a positive result. The commentator concludes by saying that even if the Middle Eastern countries cannot be relied upon to use logic and commonsense, we may at least hope for the West to learn the most important moral: "their economy, and we may say that even their very existence, are in a most vulnerable situation as long as they continue to depend on oil from the Persian Gulf."

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew on 26 September 1980 carries a commentary by Shmu'el Segev, page nine, entitled "The Peace Agreement for Shatt al-'Arab Cancelled This Week by Iraq in the Course of the War Was Achieved Through Al-Sadat's Mediation in Order To Gain Baghdad's Support for a Settlement With Israel." After covering background history to the current conflict, Segev discusses the role played by Saddam Husayn in two sets of events: "The negotiations for the elimination of the Kurdish rebellion and the circumstances that led to this week's violent outbreak against Iran." The commentator details Saddam Husayn's past history, mentioning Al-Sadat's quarrel with Syria over additional settlements with Israel in the Golan Heights and Sinai, as a result of which Al-Sadat tried to "isolate Syria by guaranteeing Iraq's support for his moves." The author points out that "it would be a mistake to attribute the sudden conflagration on the Iraq/Iran border only to Saddam Husayn's desire for revenge." There are involved considerations of economics, oil and historic rivalry. These considerations are described in depth and the commentator concludes without any discussing any implications the war may have on Israel.

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew on 26 September 1980 carries a commentary on the Iran-Iraq war by Shmu'el Schnitzer, on page eleven, entitled "Flames in the Persian Gulf." Opening with the comment that "It is impossible to conquer a certain feeling of joy at hearing the reports of the severe blows Iran is taking in the opening stages of the war in the Persian Gulf," the commentator points out that, after all of Khomeyni's tirades against U.S.-Israeli imperialism, "the bitter truth

is that the Iraqi attack was only made possible by the insane anti-U.S. policy of the Iranian revolutionary regime." It is true that the average Israeli inclines toward supporting Iraq in the conflict, because of the "pact signed between Khomeyni and Yasir 'Arafat." These two have nothing in common other than a hatred for Israel, but the pact could represent a serious threat. As for the U.S. role in the conflict, "the U.S. declaration of neutrality and the emphasis that it does not intend to intervene in the conflict between Iran and Iraq are the results of helplessness, not of a firm, well thought out policy." The United States "cannot be neutral in this conflict" since whoever wins, the results will affect oil supplies to the West and "if the Iraqis win, this will, to a great extent, also be a victory for the Soviet Union." The USSR has apparently given up hope of influence in Iran and now hopes to gain a strong foothold in Iraq "and nobody will believe that such a development is leaving Washington calm."

The commentator believes that the United States must intervene; "The Soviets have no need to intervene; the Iraqi army is doing its work even without the entry of Soviet units into action." If the superpowers do not actively intervene, it is clear that Khomeyni's regime will fall and Soviet influence in the area will increase.

The current conflict has also exposed another "lie" which is the theory that "it is necessary to supply semiprimitive societies with weapons so that they may defend themselves against Soviet expansionism." Iran was provided with enormous supplies of U.S. weapons and technology, but did not know how to use them and they have "disappeared from the face of the earth." A further lesson to be learned from the conflict is that "within the Muslim world there are contradictory interests no less severe than those existing in the Christian world." This situation may change, but in the meantime "no Muslim artillery is shooting at imperialist targets and much artillery is shooting at Muslim targets." The commentary concludes by saying: "Now the question arises of whether the belief that all the Muslims are capable of fighting together for a common cause is also not one of the fairy tales that do not stayd up to the test of reality. It was only a week ago that the conference of Muslim countries met in Fez and decided that a jihad against Israel must be prepared. Now the Persian Gulf is in the grip of flames; and if there is anything in this to cause concern, there is, paradoxically, also something that can cause us to relax."

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

JERUSALEM LAW--Tel Aviv--Just over half the public supports the enactment of the basic law: Jerusalem, according to the latest JERUSALEM POST poll conducted by the Modi'in Ezrahi Applied Research Centre among a representative selection of 1,289 adults. In response to the question: "Do you think the basic law: Jerusalem should have been enacted by the Knesset?", 51.7 percent said yes, 41.7 percent said no, and 6.6 percent were undecided. According to centre director 'Amiram Yarqoni, a high level of support for the Jerusalem Law was found among the young (67.9 percent of the 18-22 age group), primary-school leavers (59.7 percent), orientals (62.5 percent), religious (71.1 percent), lowest income (60.3 percent), blue-collar workers (62.6 percent), Moshavniks (83.1 percent), supporters of the Likud (75.3 percent), the National Religious Party (70.1 percent) and Tehiya (94.4 percent). Opponents of the law were found among the better educated and the better-off, western communities, the secular, and labor supporters. [Text] [TA260840 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 26 Sep 80 p 3]

W. BANK, GAZA CORRIDOR--Egypt is seeking the creation of a corridor between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank to establish a Palestinian territorial continuity between the two areas in which autonomy is to be implemented. Our political reporter says this is one of the demands contained in a document presented by Egypt to the U.S. administration in Washington. Political circles in Jerusalem have rejected the demand out of hand. Our reporter also says that in contacts with the U.S. administration the Egyptians expressed disappointment with the reports submitted by U.S. autonomy negotiator Sol Linowitz. Egypt said the document accepted Israeli position about substantive issues relating to the implementation of the autonomy plan. [Text] [TA240834 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 24 Sep 80]

DEMAND FOR WORKERS--The demand for workers in the second third of this year dropped sharply compared with the previous 4 months. In construction and technical jobs demand fell by 19 percent and for professional men and clerical workers 17 percent. [Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 29 Sep 80 TA]

CSO: 4820

NEW PRIME MINISTER OUTLINES POLICY IN FIRST MAJOR INTERVIEW

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 19 Jul 80 pp 20-21

[Interview with Jordanian Prime Minister Qasim al-Rimawi by Hani Khayr, in Amman; date not given]

> [Text] In His First Press Interview, Prime Minister al-Rimawi Says: "Jordan Is Looking for New Sources of Energy and Weapons.
>
> "Palestinian Question Has Been in Existence Before Resolution 242 Was Passed. Jordan, Therefore, Has Called for an Alternative Resolution To Achieve a Just and Comprehensive Peace."

Three weeks filled with work and responsibilities have so far gone by since the government of Dr Qasim al-Rimawi was formed. He participated in the funeral of his brother-in-law, the late al-Sharif 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf; he conducted the affairs of his cabinet which he was charged to form and which he reformed in less than 24 hours; he showed interest in the Conference of Arab Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economy which was held in Amman; he showed interest in the Conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Islamic Countries which was also held in Amman; and he made preparations to host the Arab Summit Conference which is supposed to be held next fall in the Jordanian capital.

Dr al-Rimawi has been as busy as the mother of a bridegroom and the mother of a bride. He has not slowed down, and he has not rested. Even though Dr Rimawi's policy will be a continuation of the Jordanian policy established by his predecessor, the late Sharaf, and although al-Rimawi has kept the same team that worked in Sharaf's government, al-Rimawi remains the second officer in command of the Jordanian ship that is piloted by King Husayn. AL-MUSTAQBAL asked Prime Minister al-Rimawi to respond to a number of questions about Jordan's political and economic course. We conducted this interview, which was the first given to an Arabic publication by the new Jordanian prime minister.

[Question] Several conferences were held in Jordan recently under your administration. They took place under critical circumstances that our Arab nation is experiencing. Please give us a brief view of the outcome of these conferences and the results that you expect will be implemented on the Arab and international scenes.

[Answer] The conferences that were held in Amman recently--the conference of Arab ministers of foreign affairs and economy, the conference of ministers of foreign affairs of the Islamic countries, and the conference of Arab ministers of health--took place in the context of joint Arab action and considered Arab planning to confront the challenges and the dangers that are facing the pan-Arab cause whose essence lies in the question of the Palestinian people and their rights. The Social and Economic Council studied the problem of strengthening economic integration and the integration of development planning on a pan-Arab scale. The council recommended adoption of a national economic plan for the Arab world to meet the needs of Arab development in the next decade. This method of Arab planning is considered to be a far-reaching change in Arab action whose objective is to weave one integrated Arab fabric; to remedy the existing discrepancy between the economic structure of one Arab country and another; and to utilize Arab resources in building a strong base for a joint Arab economy that would bolster the structure of the Arabs' own power and the Arabs' steadfastness.

What is new in this conference is the shift to build institutions for joint Arab action on well-considered, scientific principles in the context of strong, long-range planning that constitutes an Arab economic strategy to strengthen the integration of various Arab energies and capabilities and bolster the prestige of the Arab nation in the face of the Zionist danger. This requires the mobilization of all the means of the Arabs' own power in all political, military and economic areas on an equal basis. In addition, the conference focused on another significant economic dimension: putting international Arab economic relations to work to serve pan-Arab interests and causes and to complete this important dimension in confronting the growing Zionist threat to the Arab nation.

The conference of the ministers of foreign affairs of Islamic countries was held in the context of joint Arab-Islamic action to champion the cause of Palestine and the sacrosanct objects of Islam, and to give the Palestinian question its Islamic dimension insofar as it is the most serious challenge facing the Islamic world, considering the fact that Palestine and Jerusalem are part of our spiritual Islamic heritage. The conference was characterized by its inclination to take practical steps to support our people in occupied Palestine, to give Jerusalem special attention and to take deterrent measures against the agencies that are assisting the process of making Jerusalem a Jewish city or supporting the Israeli colonizing occupation of the holy city and the occupied Arab lands. All these are positive indicators and pressures that are being channeled into the joint Arab effort to put an international noose around the Israeli measures, to

reveal the truth about Israel's objectives and to strengthen Arab-Islamic solidarity.

[Question] Jordan was a pivotal factor in bringing about rapprochment between Jordan and the other Arab countries on the basis of establishing coordination among the Arab countries and including the PLO as a party with direct responsibility in solving the Palestinian question. How does your excellency evaluate this effort?

[Answer] Jordan's action on the Arab scene is predicated on its firm belief in its role and in its pan-Arab responsibility towards the Arab nation. Under the leadership of Husayn, Jordan played a prominent role in preventing the collapse of the Arab front after Egypt's departure from the Arab scene and its isolation. Jordan played a prominent role in strengthening the spirit of confidence in the Arab front by adopting a new Arab position at the Baghdad Conference, which is based on rejecting the deviation embodied in the Camp David Accords and on [establishing] Arab solidarity in the face of the penetration of the Arab front and the isolation of Egypt from the Arab scene. Jordan played a prominent role is bolstering positive Arab action and in striving to strengthen pan-Arabism and the integration of the Arabs' own power. Jordan also played a prominent role in maintaining with the world a dialog based on principles that assure a just and comprehensive peace as well as the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine to achieve sovereignty over their land and freedom to determine their own destiny. These principles call for total Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory. It is natural for the PLO, in its capacity as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians, to be a party to joint Arab action and to be a basic party in the process of searching for a just and a comprehensive peace.

[Question] Is Jordan taking new action regarding the subject of proposing an alternative to Resolution 242 or to the Camp David Accords? King Husayn had previously made such a statement to several foreign newspapers. He had explained Jordan's position during his visit to the United States, and he had called for the necessity of coming up with a program to replace the floundering in Arab policy. Would you comment on this?

[Answer] His Majesty King Husayn had explained that Resolution 242 was no longer adequate in itself as a remedy for the question of the Palestinian people. The resolution was issued in 1967 to remedy the effects of the 1967 aggression on the territories of three Arab countries. The Palestinian question was in existence before this resolution; its tenets pertained to the legitimate rights of the people of Palestine that were recognized in other UN resolutions. During his recent visit to the United States, His Majesty King Husayn explained Jordan's position which is based on advocating a just and comprehensive peace that would deal with all the aspects of the question, as well as

with its essence--the question of the people of Palestine--so as to achieve a permanent peace which future generations can accept. King Husayn affirmed that the present action within the Camp David framework had failed to achieve a comprehensive peace, and that there was an urgent need for broad international action based on going beyond the impotent policies of Camp David and on adopting fundamental principles upon which a just and permanent peace can be based.

Jordan's actions on the international scene are based on basic principles that constitute a framework for joint Arab position and an Arab consensus. These are principles which guarantee Palestinian rights; call for the evacuation of the occupation forces; and seek to guarantee the Palestinian people's freedom to determine their own destiny on their occupied land.

[Question] Will His Majesty King Husayn visit the Soviet Union as had been previously decided? What is the purpose of this visit?

[Answer] Jordan has been intent on establishing relations of cooperation and friendship with all the nations and countries of the world. The Soviet Union is among them. Jordan wants to establish such relations on a foundation of mutual respect and cooperation so as to serve the Arab cause. Jordan has good ties with the Soviet Union, and there is a standing invitation for His Majesty King Husayn to visit the Soviet Union. His Majesty will accept the invitation at an appropriate time.

[Question] Mr Khalid al-Hasan, member of the PLO, told one of the Arab newspapers that Carter's success would be to some extent in the Arabs' interests, because the Jewish lobby was working for Carter's defeat and for fragmenting electoral vote by nominating Anderson as a third candidate. Thus, Vice President Mondale would be brought in, because the U.S. constitution provides that Congress would elect the president in case neither the democratic candidate nor the republican candidate gets the votes required by the constitution for winning the election. What does your excellency think about this?

[Answer] What is happening in the U.S. elections is not the primary factor in [our] situation. What is important is what is happening on the Arab scene. A though the U.S. scene is very important in relation to the Middle East question, the evolution of the U.S. policy into a balanced position is contingent upon the evolution of the situation on the Arab scene. The Arabs' success in building a unified Arab position and [establishing] clear principles for action on the international scene, as well as their success in building their own power and investing all their energies and tremendous economic and strategic prestige in the world to bolster the Arab position are the catalytic agents in [the process of] altering international positions and influencing countries to champion Arab rights. If we were to realize this, what happens on the U.S. electoral scene will inevitably be affected by the magnitude of U.S. interests in our countries. This is the yardstick we have to use.

[Question] Reactions among the Arab masses to the statement made by the secretary general of the Arab League after the conclusion of the Conference of Arab Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Economy were not what they were expected to be. What is your excellency's comment on this situation?

[Answer] The special session of the Social and Economic Conference [was convened] to establish a strategy for economic and developmental integration in the Arab world and [to find] means for confronting the Zionist enemy in the coming phase. This step is being taken in the context of long-range, well-considered, scientific planning. This step must be viewed and its results must be evaluated in this context.

[Question] People in Jordan are talking about the investigations being carried out by duly authorized agencies in Jordan. These investigations deal with the existence of petroleum and with Jordan's determination to utilize oil shale for the extraction of petroleum since the economic feasibility of this process has been proven following the rise in oil prices. How far have these investigations and studies gone?

[Answer] Looking for oil and also leaning towards diversifying the sources of energy and providing guidance for energy use constitute the established national policy of Jordan. This is because Jordan imports all the oil it needs from abroad. There were and there still are continuous attempts to search for oil in Jordan. At present, Jordan is cooperating with several international corporations in an effort to search for oil in its territories. Jordan is allocating the necessary amounts of money for this effort every year. Studies are now being made about the possibility of utilizing shale oil, a large reserve of which has been discovered in south Jordan. We are still studying the economic feasibility of this process and the possibilities of utilizing shale oil in some heavy industries. We are also looking into the modern technology which this use of shale oil would require. Jordan is looking into this because of the tremendous burden placed on its shoulder as a confrontation state, in view of the continuing escalation of oil prices in a manner that is draining a large portion of the national revenues we need for building up and developing our national capabilities and the structure of our nation.

[Question] Does your government intent to submit a cabinet statement to the Advisory National Council in keeping with the traditions that have been followed in recent years?

[Answer] The government is committed to the statement that was submitted to the Advisory National Council by the cabinet of the late al-Sharif 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf. It is committed to the principles that were included in the royal message that commissioned his cabinet. The new cabinet considers itself an extension of the previous cabinet in following its principles. It will abide by national and pan-Arab principles

and by the government policy proposed by the late al-Sharif 'Abd-al-Hamid Sharaf. It will especially abide by the pan-Arab policy that was planned for Jordan by His Majesty King Husayn. It will bolster the national structure and national solidarity. It will strive to build a new society based on unity, the sharing of responsibility, social awareness, integrity in government and mobilization of national capabilities in the context of a long-range national plan whose objective is to strengthen national foundations of independence, social security and continued progress and development.

8592
CSO: 4802

FOREIGN MINISTER REJECTS LEBANON'S CRITICISM OF LACK OF SUPPORT

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 8-14 Sep 80 pp 46-48

[Interview with Sabah al-Ahmad, Kuwait foreign minister, by Mona es-Said; date and place not given]

[Excerpts]

Kuwait's deputy premier and foreign minister, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, last week rejected Lebanese officialdom's bitter criticism of all Arab countries for their failure to do anything about the continuing and escalating Israeli attacks on South Lebanon.

The questions and answers in full:

■

Kuwait has supported Crown Prince Fahd's call for a *Holy War* to liberate Jerusalem, but there seems to be some confusion about this call:

a) Is it a call for military confrontation? Does this mean that Kuwait is ready to enter such a confrontation with Israel directly, or that Kuwait is ready to support the Arab confrontation states in a war against Israel? Or does it mean that Kuwait is ready to issue a call for volunteers to engage in such a war and establish military training camps for them, as the PLO proposed at the Casablanca meeting of the Jerusalem Committee two weeks ago?

b) Is it a call for economic and political confrontation with the states which are supporting Israel? Is Kuwait ready to use the oil weapon in such a confrontation – either by resorting to a boycott of the U.S. and possibly Western Europe, or by reducing production, or by raising prices?

c) Does Kuwait make its call for a *Holy War* conditional on the acceptance and participation of all Arab countries? If so, doesn't the present Arab situation preclude any Arab action against

Israel, be it *Holy War* or anything else, in view of the many inter-Arab disputes?

We have noticed that the United States has dismissed the *Holy War* call as unimportant. The U.S. State Department has said that the call does not signify any change in the Arab position. Why do you think Washington is so certain that the Arabs will do nothing of significance about the annexation of Jerusalem or the continued occupation of Arab land, and what do you think the Arabs can do to change the American view of them — short of waging economic or military war?

There is no confusion about the call for a *Holy War*. A *Holy War* is not restricted to any one aspect at the expense of the other. It involves humans and riches, i.e., human lives and finances.

If solutions with the enemy through peaceful means prove beyond reach, we would have no choice but to resort to a *Holy War*. In this context, Kuwait is but part of a whole. And, as I just said, a *Holy War* has an all-inclusive character which includes all ways and means that are conducive to the recovery of (one's) rights.

This being the case, it is immaterial to us whether the United States takes the *Holy War* call seriously or dismisses it as unimportant. It is free to formulate its own opinion. But it must realize that the patience of peoples and nations has a limit which, if exceeded, could lead to a catastrophe. And a catastrophe is bound to affect all parties.

■

Much has been said about growing instability in the Gulf, including Kuwait.

a) Judging by the arrests that have been made so far and the statements made by the suspects, who do you think is behind this attempt to promote unrest in Kuwait?

b) The Kuwaiti ambassador to the United Nations has told *Monday Morning* that in his view, Kuwait should rid itself of the foreign majority in the country and restrict the entry of foreigners to Kuwait in the future. Are you thinking in those terms?

c) Do you think that the return to parliamentary democracy in Kuwait will help block the destabilization attempts in the country? Are those attempts behind the decision to resurrect parliament?

True, a lot has been said and continues to be said about growing instability. But those who are saying this stop short of naming those who stand behind it. Why? Who are those who are instigating confusion, anarchy, instability and troubles in the Gulf?

I don't think there is anyone who doesn't know their identity. They are the deceitful foreign hands, Israel being one of them. They will not hesitate to do anything to achieve their mischievous designs and ambitions.

As for the return to parliamentary democracy in Kuwait, it has nothing to do with the security of the Gulf, those trying to destabilize it, or those who think they could take advantage from fomenting troubles.

The return to parliamentary democracy is in line with a pledge made by His Highness the Emir of Kuwait. He is now fulfilling the pledge made to the people after a pause for reflection and deep thinking aimed at correcting Kuwait's democratic course.

And thus it was.

■

How does Kuwait view the establishment of an American swift intervention force for the protection of Western interests in the Gulf? What do you think the Gulf countries can do to avert a superpower struggle in their area?

We view such intervention with indignation and revulsion — whether it is called swift intervention or creeping intervention. We are not sure whether such interveners have a right to meddle in our affairs under the pretext of protecting Western interests.

■

The proposed Security Council resolution of sanctions against Israel has been pushed aside. Does Kuwait believe that it should be put to the council again, despite the certainty of an American veto? If so, what would the Kuwaiti reaction to the American veto be?

I don't understand why the United States alone opposes a resolution by the Security Council members. It is about time to look into this so-called veto power.

Would you give us your response to the threat made by Palestinian leaders recently to the effect that the Palestinians would attack the Arab oil wells or oil routes if the Arabs continue to refuse to use their oil as a weapon?

I told you earlier that if the time for *Holy War* comes, it will involve the use of all means.

■

The Lebanese authorities have been very bitter in their criticism of all Arab countries for their failure to do anything about the continuing and escalating Israeli attacks on Lebanon. Other than statements of support, what do you think the Arab states should do to help Lebanon? And what is Kuwait ready to do, regardless of the attitude of other Arab governments? For instance:

a) Lebanon's U.N. Ambassador Ghassan Tueni has called on the Arab countries to help Lebanon turn its southern region into a "peace zone." This means that the Arabs should help Lebanon persuade the Palestinians to end their armed presence and activities in the South and to allow the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL to take over the entire area.

Do you agree? If so, what can Kuwait do to help in that direction? If not, could you explain why?

b) Mr. Tueni and other Lebanese officials have said that if the Arabs do not want to help create a "peace zone" in the South, they should help in the war that is being waged in the South. Do you agree? How is Kuwait ready to help?

Had the Lebanese authorities been serious about solving the Lebanese crisis, the situation would not have reached this stage of anarchy

and insecurity which has led to fratricides, the destruction of the country and its economy, and the neglect of all the resolutions and agreements which were put forward by the Arab brethren. This being the case, what do you want the Arabs to do?

■

Before and after the latest Israeli attacks on the South and the latest Syrian-Israeli air clash over the South, there have been many predictions of an imminent Israeli invasion of South Lebanon which, it is said, is bound to lead to another Middle Eastern war. Do you think the predictions are justified?

As long as the situation remains unchanged and since our Lebanese brethren do not want to listen to reason, the chances of Israeli attacks remain justified and may be borne out — whether on Lebanon's South or its North.

■

Would you give us your impression of the proposed EEC peace initiative after your talks with Mr. Gaston Thorn?

When will it start? What line will it take? What importance do you attach to it?

We support any peace initiative provided it is based on right and justice. We are proponents of peace. We seek the peace that we and the world believe in, not the kind of peace based on usurpation, the defiance of world community resolutions and the disregard of the Security Council, which represents the will of the world at large. ●

CSO: 4320

MINISTER DISCUSSES DEFENSE ISSUES, ARMS PURCHASE

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 28-29 Aug 80 p 2

[Text]

TAIF, Aug 27 (SPA) — Defense Minister Prince Sultan indicated that the United States agreed to provide additional equipment for the 60 F-15 fighters sold to Saudi Arabia. He told reporters here that "this is a foregone conclusion, and as I said before we do not make requests that are denied to us."

Referring to objections by Israel and its supporters in Washington to the Saudi Arabian request, Prince Sultan said "we shall not allow our enemies to obstruct our requests." He made his statement during a brief encounter with reporters covering an Arab interior ministers conference in the city.

U.S. officials said last June that Saudi Arabia sought fuel pods and multiple ejection racks that would permit much larger bomb loads on the F-15. The pods would extend the two-way range of the plane from 450 miles to more than 1,000 miles.

Prince Sultan said the government was carefully studying a plan to introduce the draft. "It is being studied with care so that we may be sure of the benefits of the decision," he said. The draft proposal was revealed two years ago.

Asked about Crown Prince Fahd's call for jihad to liberate Jerusalem and other occupied Arab territories, Prince Sultan said Jihad was the aim of peace and stability "if the Muslims cannot regain their lost rights by peaceful means." Jihad, as it is well known, involves sacrifice and struggle in defense of our religion, our people and our holy places," he said.

"If the Muslims cannot achieve their objectives by peaceful means which we seek, then jihad will be resorted to," he added.

CSO: 4820

MINISTER EMPHASIZES DIVERSE NATURE OF ARMS SOURCES

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 3 Sep 80 p 1

[Text]

TABUK, Sept. 2 (SPA) — The Kingdom's armament policy is based on diversifying the source of arms, Defense Minister Prince Sultan said here Monday. This has led to separate arms agreements between Saudi Arabia and the United States, Britain, France and Sweden and others.

Producing its own weaponry also is an aim of the Kingdom, and its industries in Kharj serve as both a training ground as well as a production center. About 600 youths are trained each year, and already, 3,600 men are working at the industries.

Speaking at a press conference here at the end of King Khaled's visit to the northern province, Prince Sultan said his government looks only for those arms it needs, from whatever source. "There is no commitment of any kind between us and any other government regarding armaments supplies," he said. "We seek anything new and useful... we can get from our friends."

Included in the group of Saudi Arabian arms suppliers are Japan, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria. The government studies the systems available from these and other countries, he said, then makes its purchases.

Prince Sultan said that during his recent visit to Austria he signed agreements for the purchase of light weapons including machineguns, transport vehicles and ammunition. A Saudi Arabian military mission visited Austria later for the same reason.

Collective Arab efforts to produce arms make sense, the prince said, but has to be viewed without forgetting the Arab Industries Organization (AIO) which was based in Egypt. After Egypt signed its peace treaty with Israel, the deal collapsed.

The AIO was financed by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait. When the four countries withdrew, Egypt continued operations alone.

The vastness of the Kingdom demands military installations throughout the country, Prince Sultan pointed out. Part of the King Khaled Military Complex will be ready in two years, with the remainder expected to be finished in four years. Since the defense plan covers the entire country, defense installations won't be confined to just one corner, the prince said.

Other projects in the works include King Abdul Aziz Military College — which was begun a few months ago — military schools in Qasim and Al-Dawasser, and the completed paratroop and special forces training center in Tabuk.

Also in Tabuk is the new military hospital in the eastern region, which includes training and teaching facilities for local medical and nursing students, as well as various specialty facilities.

Included in the current five year development plan are major military projects like the King Faisal Air Academy and the new air base in Kharj. A tender for its construction has been accepted and the main runway already is constructed, Prince Sultan said.

"This will become one of the finest air academies in the Middle East," the prince said adding that "it should be operational at the end of the (five-year) plan."

CSO: 4820

USSR RODINA SOCIETY ESTABLISHES CONTACT WITH SAUDI ARABIAN UZBEKS

Tashkent OZBEKISTAN MADANIYATI in Uzbek 1 Jun 80 p 4

[Article by Ahmadjan Luqmanov, Department Director of the Rodina Society: "Love of Fatherland"]

[Text] Among the spiritual riches of mankind, there cannot be a gem greater or more precious than the love which exists in the treasury of an honest man's heart for the Fatherland. Wherever a man with love for the land where he was born and his forefathers were buried may be, in whatever conditions he may live, an inextinguishable fire burns in his heart. In particular, it is natural for a man to suffer forever from longing for the Fatherland when, as fate will have it, he renounces a life's dearest and most inexhaustible treasure as the result of a wrong step taken without hesitation and without understanding it well. Are there only a few who speak of the Fatherland, who look homesick for its enchanting greetings and salutations, who listen to its voice and echo, who have retired from the mortal to the immortal? They are very numerous. Love for the mother earth is, to say it briefly, love for the Fatherland when the nightingale's speech and the turtledove's cry are drawn into a man's heart. This moaning of the heart pours out as lines on white paper; it breaks the heart of a man into a hundred pieces.

Our countryman (originally from Andijan) Yaqubkhoja Mahjurii who is residing in Saudi Arabia has sent a few poems on the Fatherland to the address of the Uzbekistan Society for Cultural Relations with Countrymen in Foreign Nations (the Rodina Society), and has requested that we place them in the press to be presented to the judgment of poetry readers in Soviet Uzbekistan.

Below, we offer you two muvashshah poems by the poet.

"Andijan"

Hey, zephyr, find the cure of cures for us, too.
O, bring news from the forlorn regions to us, too.
When you pass the days of early spring on that field
of flowers,
Pick a handful of melancholy lilies for us, too.

Turn the pages of my book of love and flaunt them to the
nightingale.
Take as a memento some thin leaves for us, too.
If you get a chance, tell about my solitary state, too.
If you are one who understands, bring some good news
to us, too.

Meet the poets and singers in the early dawn.
Carry by hand some works written in that dawn to us, too.
Mähjuriy does not omit his name in every peom.
Take books in his name from that city for us, too.

* * *

Lament with the tambura, so that the nightingale will
not sing
About the rose garden of hearts, which is the sign of the
nightingale.

Rose face, nightingale voice, play a simple song
In the makam style, and let me present a gift of rose
bouquets of poetry.

From time to time, travel through the corners of the heart
with a saz,
So that pain and suffering will not find a permanent place
in the heart.

Would you not make my color more rosey than the sculptor
of my statue?
It has turned yellow through sorrow and separation.

When Zebunisa describes his Indian quality,
I call the esteemed doctor as smooth-tongued as tutty.

Hey, singer, quick, compose a makam on "Shahnaz" and "Gulyar."
Let heaven and earth sing of what they know.

See off Mänjuriy with music and a melody.
For a night, have him go through the motions of a dervish
dance.

9439
CSO: 1810

RIYADH GOVERNOR DISCUSSES DEVELOPMENT, OIL PRODUCTION

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 7 Sep 80 p 2

[Text]

RIYADH, Sept. 6 (SPA) — The Governor of Riyadh has disputed reports that the Kingdom has only 25 years of proven oil reserves, saying instead that the oil here would last for hundreds of years.

Prince Salman, speaking to Saudi Arabian students in Denver, Colo., said experts realize the great volume of oil that lies still untapped in Saudi Arabia. Now, the country produces about 9.5 million barrels of oil daily, with its reserves said to be in the billions of barrels.

Prince Salman is touring the United States to meet with students from the Kingdom, talking to them about their country and answering their questions.

He said that the present rate of oil production, highest in the country's history, is necessary because of the current development plans here. " We may push ahead with the many projects covered by them (the plans)," he told students.

The government was taking care to develop the entire country, the prince explained, so that it may reduce the rate of population shift from the rural areas to big cities.

" We are developing fast," he said, " while at the same time controlling inflation which it on time reached 40 per cent before dropping to seven or eight per cent."

The economic welfare of the world is considered as the government plans its oil policies, the prince said. Especially important are considerations for the developing nations, who rely heavily on oil imports to fuel their industrial growth.

" We can reduce oil production," Prince Salman said," but this would adversely affect our development plans." Therefore, he explained the government raises production to a certain level so that it would serve its own interests better and boost the rate of development here. Once the government decides it would be in its political and economic interest to lower the oil production, it would do so, he said.

Speaking on other matters, Prince Salman pointed out that the basic system of law announced by King Khaled last year would not be a constitution as such, for the Kingdom's basic law is the Quran. King Khaled has promised a basic system of government, a consultative council and a provincial system as well.

The consultative council will be formed of various educated men, nominated by the King, to advise him on matters of state. A committee under Prince Naif, the interior minister, was formed to draw up details for the three systems.

" These systems require a great deal of study and preparation," said Prince Salman, noting that no time limit has been set for the review. All existing laws and regulations will be incorporated in the basic system of government, he said.

The Kingdom may embark on a plan for compulsory military training, the Prince also said. The council of ministers now is studying that issue. However, few details are available now.

Prince Salman said the call for jihad, or a holy struggle to regain the city of Jerusalem

from Israeli control, is not a new one, and similar calls have been made before by Saudi Arabian rulers. Crown Prince Fahd called for jihad last month following the formal annexation of Jerusalem and the declaration by Israel that the holy city was the eternal and undivided capital of the Jewish state.

King Abdul Aziz made the call in 1947 and 1948, and it was reiterated in 1969 by King Faisal after the fire in the holy mosque of Aqsa.

Both war, and political and economic restraint should be prepared, Prince Salman said, " because what was taken by force must be regained by force. "

If the Arabs can reconcile their differences, the prince noted, they would become a serious force throughout the world. He made it clear that the problem with Israel is not only the occupied Golan Heights of Syria or the Sinai in Egypt, but also Palestine — the central issue in the whole question.

Saudi Arabia believed the Camp David accords will not achieve the Arab objectives, he said. Since the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, sponsored by the United States, did not deal with the Palestinian problem, the Arab states rejected the agreement.

" Although President Sadat of Egypt had promised to uphold Arab rights during his visit to Jerusalem, he did not, and in fact (ignored) them especially regarding Palestine and Jerusalem, " the prince said.

CSO: 4820

CONSTRUCTION OF POLICE INSTITUTE NEARS COMPLETION

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 27 Aug 80 p 2

[Text]

JEDDAH, Aug.26 (SPA) — Construction of a SR400 million Arab Institute for Police Studies in Saudi Arabia has begun and will be completed soon, Interior Minister Prince Naif said Monday on the eve of the third Arab interior ministers conference opening in Taif Tuesday.

Establishment of both the institute and an Arab Studies Center had been decided by second Arab interior ministers conference held in Baghdad, and Prince Naif said the conference in Taif will consider merging the institute and the center in the Kingdom.

He also said the board of the center has already been formed under the Saudi interior minister.

In addition, the conference will discuss the security of Arab society in the present and future, and the establishment of a Permanent Council of Arab Interior Ministers. He denied reports to the effect that a Gulf Interior Ministers Conference would be held soon. There is only an Arab Interior Ministers Conference at present, he said, and during the session, bilateral meetings would take place between Gulf ministers as is customary in such conferences. He said we are at the stage of global Arab efforts.

Meanwhile, Sheikh Muhammad ibn Khalifa Al-Khalifa, the Bahraini minister of interior who arrived in Taif Monday evening with Sheikh Sorour ibn Muhammad Al-Nahayan, the head of the office of the UAE president, said that the conference has particular importance since it will deal with the security of the Arab world at a time of intense superpower conflict.

The Kuwaiti Interior Miniser, Sheikh Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Sabbah, and Ahmad Ould Baba, secretary general of the Mauritanian Interior Ministry, also arrived Monday evening and were met at the airport by Prince Naif and other officials.

CSO: 4820

DETAILS OF GAS, OIL DISCOVERY REVIEWED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 23 Aug 80 pp 11, 12

[Text] A new offshore gas field now being developed in Abu Dhabi could more than double the reserves of the UAE to 44.5 trillion cubic feet; oil industry sources in the Emirates said last week.

The sources said the Umm Al Shaif field, midway between Abu Dhabi and Qatar is estimated to contain 24 trillion cubic feet of gas. The UAE government has not yet announced figures on the field's reserves.

The UAE's total gas reserves were 20.5 trillion cubic feet at the end of 1979, OAPEC figures show. The UAE sources told Reuters that an exploratory well was drilled at Umm Al Shaif to between 15,000 and 16,000 feet at the end of 1979 and development drilling was now underway.

The field is being operated by the Abu Dhabi Marine Operating Company (ADMA-OPCO). The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) has a 60 percent share in the company, the rest is being held by the British Petroleum Company (BP) with 14.67 percent and Compagnie Francaise de Petroles (CFP) 13.33 percent and Japan Oil Development Corporation 12 percent.

The sources said ADMA OPCO has started test-drilling in the Zakum offshore field and hopes to reach the target depth in autumn.

In another oil development in the UAE, the Qatar News Agency reported that one exploratory well in the offshore Butinah well indicated reserves of 1,000 million barrels of oil.

The UAE at present produces about 1.7 million barrels of oil a day, mostly in Abu Dhabi. UAE Oil Minister Dr. Maneh Said Al Otaiba said earlier this year that his country's oil and gas reserves were far bigger than commonly reported, adding that the country was continuing to find new deposits of oil and gas in new sites and at different levels in fields already being exploited.

Meanwhile the UAE newspaper Al Bayan reported that ADNOC has discovered new oil reserves which are eight times Abu Dhabi's total 1979 output.

Since Abu Dhabi's oil production last year totalled 500 million barrels the new reserves are estimated in the region of about 4,000 million barrels, Al Bayan quoted Chief of ADNOC's production and exploration department Rashid Nuwar as saying.

Nuwar said a vast quantity of natural gas was discovered in Umm Al Shaif field at a depth of 15,000 feet. There were signs indicating that the existence of one of the biggest gas fields in the world.

Nuwar added a new offshore field was discovered near Butihan. Oil reserves in this field were estimated at 1,000 million barrels, according to experiments on only one well, he said.

Nuwar said that the implementation by ADNOC of a new policy on exploration resulted in the discovery of Umm Al Shaif Gas field. According to the new policy ADNOC has begun to explore deeper areas. It will also launch a comprehensive survey of all the Abu Dhabi fields at the end of 1980, he added.

CSO: 4820

RESTRICTED LICENSED BANKS TO INCREASE OPERATIONS

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 30 Aug 80 pp 18, 19

[Excerpt] Restricted Licensed Banks (RLBs) in the UAE are reported to be in a state of flux. While the majority of them view the setting up of the Central Bank as an opportunity to play a greater part in the economic life of the country, one RLB has decided to close down its office by the end of the month: the Bank of Nova Scotia in Dubai. An announcement by the Bank said the decision to suspend its operations was part of its new strategy for the Gulf. The Bank's interests in the UAE will be looked after by its Offshore Banking Unit in Bahrain.

Other RLBs, however, believe that under the new monetary set-up, now emerging in the country, they may be allowed to extend the scope of their operations and a few do not even rule out the possibility of being able to convert their restricted licence into a full licence soon.

Two of them have ventured into new fields: Amro Bank, an Amsterdam-based international bank, is venturing into the diamond trade and has also opened an investment banking department at its office in Dubai. The bank also hopes to develop a primary and secondary market in bonds as well as an active Guilder market.

The American Express International Banking Corporation, which runs an RLB in Dubai, is also offering new services to its customers. It has started direct foreign exchange dealings, including such facilities as swap arrangements, forward deals and investment banking. The idea in starting these new operations is to see that local businessmen no longer have to go to London, Tokyo or New York for every bit of work connected with investments.

According to the UAE currency Board document which first mooted the setting up of RLBs, "they are expected to impart greater dynamism to the UAE financial system; they may also become a useful link in the evolution of the UAE as an important financial centre."

As an innovation in Gulf banking, RLBs have taken some time to find their feet, according to the KHALEEJ TIMES, but the success of their operations at the national level is reflected in recent Currency Board statistics. These show a steady increase in their assets, despite restrictions, from Dh.1,665.5 million at the end of 1978, to Dh.2,229.4 million at the end of March this year.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

NEW PROJECTS IN FUJAYRAH--Projects with outlays of about two billion dirhams are to be implemented in the Emirate of Fujeirah this year. They include the seaport where two quays are to be built at a cost of 175 million dirhams, in Fujeirah and another seaport at Diba at a cost of 100 million dirhams. This port will also provide berths for fishing boats. (the latest data reveal that 5,118 tonnes of fish are hauled in the emirate). Another harbour at an outlay of 18 million dirhams is being built at Marbah to shelter small fishing boats. The other projects are a 200-bed hospital to be built at a cost of Dh.200 million and a cement factory with an annual production capacity of 120,000 tonnes. Two thousand low-cost houses are being built in different parts of the emirate at a cost of 280 million dirhams. A 50-bed hospital costing 50 million dirhams will be constructed in Diba. Road projects costing Dh.206 million and other buildings costing 145 millions are also envisioned. Also slated for implementation are a number of federal projects including schools, mosques, low-cost houses and roads costing Dh.400 million. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 30 Aug 80 p 17]

PORT CONTAINERIZATION EXPANSION--A sum of about Dh.5,200,000 is to be spent on more container carriers for Port Rashid as its container traffic touches new highs. Three Valet straddle carriers, which lift containers around the port after they have been unloaded, will arrive towards the end of the year, according to a Dubai Port Services spokesman. The number of containers handled by the port has been rocketing. In 1977, 46,000 units were handled and this figure has grown to 133,537 in 1979. So far this year, around 102,000 units have been processed and a total of about 200,000 units is expected to be handled by the end of the year. The port has five straddle carriers now. The three new carriers due to arrive are being built in Finland and will be able to lift up to 30.5 tonnes. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 30 Aug 80 p 17]

CSO: 4820 END

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ARAB LEAGUE SECRETARY GENERAL ON JIHAD CALL, OTHER ARAB OPTIONS

LD191157 Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Sep 80 p 7

[Article by Michel Deure: "Chadli Klibi Explains Bases of New Arab Strategy"]

[Text] Tunis--At the opening session of the Franco-Tunisian Joint Grand Commission meeting in Tunis on 3 September Jean Francois-Poncet delighted his interlocutors by confirming that France will continue to defend Tunisia's interests in community bodies with even greater care now that the question of expanding the EEC to include Spain and Portugual has been raised.

The foreign minister was more cautious, however, in his reply to the wish for "joint investment" expressed by his Tunisian colleague Hassan Belkhodja. He merely said: "These proposals are being carefully examined by the French administration in conjunction with French business circles. I can assure you that this detailed examination is being carried out in the most constructive spirit."

Mr Francois-Poncet, whose visit ends this Thursday evening, was also due to meet President Bourguiba, Prime Minister Mzali and Arab League Secretary General Chadli Klibi, who has visited several European capitals to explain the meaning of the call for holy war recently launched by Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, which will be first on the agenda for discussion at the Arab summit scheduled to take place in Amman in November.

"This appeal is both a resolution and a method of struggle," Mr Klibi told us before meeting the Frency minister. "The resolution expresses, above all, the determination of all Arab states to face the Israeli challenge, not to bow before Zionism's blows and to struggle tirelessly. The method of struggle consists of gathering all the means at our disposal: political, diplomatic, economic, and, of course, as a very last resort, military, which must neither be feared nor [apparent line drop] means have been used judiciously and in a convergent way by all Arab countries at the same time."

The league secretary general considers that the Arab states now have "many trump cards" and that their main strength lies in the fact that they defend "a just cause and essential values such as peoples' freedom to determine their own future, peace and the abolition of racism."

The Arab political strategy which will be defined at the summit will, according to Mr Klibi, comprise two main aspects: "An internal aspect aimed at giving Arab solidarity very broad economic bases--this is the aim of the Arab development plans from now until the year 2000--and an external aspect which will implement all the Arab countries' means of struggle in order to obtain the international community's support, including support from these countries which at present continue to help Israel--some because they do not understand the real major problems and others because of an erroneous analysis of the overall political situation which prevails in the region."

CSO: 4800

DFLP SECRETARY GENERAL HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 5-6 Sep 80 p 5

[Report on press conference of Nayef Hawatmeh, secretary general of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in Algiers; date not given]

[Text] (APS) In a press conference held late in the afternoon at the Hotel Aurassi in Algiers, Nayef Hawatmeh, secretary general of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, rejected "the recent moves" of West Europe relating to a search for a solution to the conflict in the Middle East, moves he labeled as "maneuvers aimed at gaining time and enabling the current American administration to devote itself solely to the coming presidential elections."

The Palestinian leader, who was accompanied by representatives of national liberation movements accredited in Algiers, used his press conference to denounce the maneuvers of certain West European countries which, following behind American diplomacy, are trying to save the content of the tripartite Camp David Accords, "particularly their second current phase, which consists of instituting that which is called internal autonomy."

According to Hawatmeh, the Europeans' move is expressed in an attempt to "update" Resolution 242 of the Security Council. Those European countries are drafting a proposed resolution that would be submitted to the UN session in the fall and which, like Resolution 242, would deny the Palestinian people's national rights to a homeland and would deny the Palestine Liberation Organization its status as the legitimate representative of the fighting Palestinian people.

"The imperialist-Zionist plot against the progressive forces of the Arab world, with the Palestinian resistance in the vanguard, therefore turns out to be in two parts," declared the secretary general of the DFLP, "one political and the other military. The political part is carried by the move of the European countries belonging to the EEC, in "coordination with American diplomacy, in order to bring the Camp David Accords out of their current impasse and prepare a neocolonial, capitulationist way in which

certain reactionary Arab regimes would be partners. The so-called 'military' part is left to Israel, which every day commits acts of aggression marked by incredible savagery against Southern Lebanon in order to destroy the camps and bases of the Palestinian resistance."

Hawatmeh hinted that this aggression would be expanded in the days to come in order, it is hoped, to physically annihilate the Palestinian resistance and prevent it from thwarting the new political plot hatched by the Europeans.

After stating that the Palestinian resistance was still strong thanks to the active solidarity of the countries belonging to the Front and the firmness of progressive and nationalist forces throughout the world, Hawatmeh asked West European countries to "take their own position" on the American policy concerning the problem and to vote "positively" in favor of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and to a homeland by the next session of the United Nations.

11,464
CSO: 4400

COOPERATION IN SECURITY MATTERS TO BE ESTABLISHED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 4 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Minister of Interior Driss Guiga returned to Tunis yesterday afternoon after participating at the head of a Tunisian delegation in the work of the Conference of Arab Ministers of Interior, held recently in Talef, Saudi Arabia.

Driss Guiga said in a statement that the conference's work resulted in the setting up of a Council of Arab Ministers of Interior under the League of Arab States.

Driss Guiga added that the meeting also made it possible to draw up a working document in which the Arab ministers of interior put on record recommendations calling for the establishment of inter-Arab cooperation and complementarity in security matters (training, the exchange of experiences, technical cooperation, material aid to the security apparatus of the Arab states, and so on).

The minister of interior also noted that apart from the work of the conference, he had spoken with a number of his colleagues concerning bilateral relations and security matters affecting the Arab world and the Palestinian cause in particular.

He said, "During those talks, I noted the consideration and respect shown by the Arab brothers for the Supreme Fighter because of the stands he has taken on Arab causes, including in particular the Palestinian cause."

Concerning his private visit to the FRG, Driss Guiga emphasized that he had talked with several West German officials about bilateral cooperation in all areas and about current problems.

Driss Guiga was welcomed on his arrival here by several high officials of the Ministry of Interior and by Hans Kahle, West German ambassador to Tunis.

11798
CSO: 4400

ARAB BRAIN DRAIN TO U.S. DISCUSSED

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 10 Jul 80 p 17

[Article: "Arab Brain Drain to the U.S.; Six Thousand Specialists and Engineers Have Migrated and the Numbers Are Increasing; Congress Encourages Asian and African Immigration After Previous Reversal"]

[Text] Now and then a voice rises in the Arab world to say: "Stop the brain drain." However, this problem, which greatly affects our future, still remains (manageable?). The reasons are many--some financial, others ethical, political, and cultural. The United States is the main importer of Arab brainpower, and the following investigation of this development by "Orient Press" is based on Arab and American statistics and sources.

The "Grey Hemorrhage" is the term used by experts to describe this emigration, but Claude Chaissons, European Common Market development representative, considers it a "double edged weapon in the underdevelopment game." John Zeigler describes it as "chic imperialism."

The Arabs, who possess one of history's great fortunes (and favorable geography) are leading contenders for victimization. Zeigler says that if he lives until the year 2000 he expects to write a book entitled "DEATH OF A FORTUNE." If the Arabs continue as they are, Zeigler says, they will find themselves some day "crying like children over a lost fortune which they failed to guard as men should."

Statistics published by the French magazine INTERNATIONAL REPORT (issued by Orient Press) maintain that between 1966 and 1977 six thousand Arab engineers and specialists in different disciplines emigrated to the United States. This number represents 5 percent of the total specialists coming to the United States during that period from all over the world. Two-thirds were engineers, one-fourth scientists, and the remainder social scientists.

Egyptian Brainpower

Two-thirds of the Arab brain drain is Egyptian. Iraq and Lebanon are also at the top of the list, each contributing 10 percent to the total Arab

brain drain. Syria and Jordan follow with each contributing 5 percent to the total drain. Palestinians compose 4.5 percent.

The average annual rate of the drain is 480 persons. This rate grew from 162 in 1966 to 1,215 in 1970, fell to 271 in 1974, and rose to 400 in 1977. Each concerned Arab country treats emigration as annual dues paid to U.S.

U.S. Public Law No 414, passed in 1965, gives each part of the world an immigration quota and has contributed to an increase in the Arab brain drain. This legislation gives preference to Asian and African immigrants over northern hemisphere ones.

The decrease in immigration between 1971 and 1974 is due to American decisions, and not to Arab attempts to retain Arab brainpower. Washington officials noticed that immigration during the 1969-71 recession led to increased unemployment among American specialists. Congress responded by amending Law No 414 in 1971 and required that immigrants possess certain skills. However, expansion of the American economy between 1974 and 1977 led once again to an increased Arab brain drain.

The Egyptian population increase has made that country the leading exporter of Arab brainpower. After 1974, the civil war put Lebanon in second place. Lebanon remained in first place on a per capita basis--210 persons per million choosing to emigrate. The rate in each of the north African countries does not exceed 15 persons per million.

Saudi Arabia: One in a Million Emigrates

War is not the only factor determining emigration; standards of development and culture also play prominent parts. The great development of wealth in the petroleum producing countries makes them the lowest contributors to the brain drain. Saudi Arabia exports only one person per million population.

Many of those receiving American student visas do not take advantage of immigration opportunities; engineers and specialists, however, receive special consideration by immigration authorities. Between 1966 and 1977, 100,000 foreign students registered for study in American universities, and 40 to 50 percent of these students studied engineering and science. Most of these changed their student visas to permanent ones.

Arab studies of this problem are quite limited in comparison to its great importance. The Western Asian Economic Congress organized probably the most important meeting on the brain drain in Beirut, on 4 to 8 February 1980, under the title of "Arab Skilled Emigration."

Dr Rida Bukra', professor at the Center for Social and Economic Studies of the University of Tunis, linked the Arab brain drain to cultural imperialism. He noted that the latter is characterized by a concentration

of scientific and technical knowledge in those areas of the world possessing sophisticated technological structures. Patterns of organization, production, and consumption are forced upon the remainder of the world. Therefore, similarities with the West encompassing all aspects of daily life emerge.

The dominant culture becomes a yardstick for other "marginal cultures." Cultural imperialism dominates technology and knowledge and controls the spread of these systems with its power over educational systems. It thus creates polarization in the world characterized by a dominant centralization, which in turn leads to an explosion of popular cultures and the creation of cultural-economic entities reflecting cultural estrangement.

Dr Bukara' emphasized the role of cultural estrangement in creating confusion and increasing emigration. Dr Fatma Zahra Afriha (Algerian) studied the causes of the Algerian brain drain. She brought forth hypotheses which may be applied to other Arab countries though there may be some limited differences.

Dr Afriha classified the various reasons behind the brain drain under two headings--push and pull.

Women't Role

Pull factors:

Advanced countries attract Arab skills. A polorization controls relations between advanced and developing countries and may be interpreted through its cultural dimensions. It is a pull of skills from south to north in the general direction of the former colonial powers. (The United States currently represents all former colonial powers.)

The spread of education in the dominant culture's language forms a first stage for "destruction of the local culture." After education in this language is deeply rooted in a country, a second stage arises leading to the isolation of intellectuals who are bearers of a culture more advanced than the one to which they belong. These intellectuals' separation from their native cultures depends on the extent of their grounding in their culture and its backwardness, such backwardness being defined according to the social traits attached to a culture. Instead of these intellectuals becoming catalysts for change and advancement, they become prisoners of a foreign language and culture--they become foreign in every sense of the word. This situation springs from a lack of thought and from historical rigidities, which in turn have devolved from a lack of imaginiation and innovation. The attraction of Arab intellectuals to western women falls within these cultural dimensions. These women pull Arab youth towards attempts at becoming submerged in foreign social milieus.

One basic pull element is economic, which particularly influences those possessing practical skills. Those most influenced in this fashion possess superior preparation and skills enabling them to operate the mechanisms of production, education, and training in their native countries. There are many reasons for this pull, including:

1. the high level of nominal and real income in the advanced countries, and the availability of various consumer goods to which students become accustomed during their stay abroad.

2. the availability of better employment opportunities, particularly in well managed, large corporations possessing a clear picture of highly skilled employee needs.

Marriage Traditions

Push

Push elements form the other facet of the problem and may be analyzed within any Arab country on three different levels: third world status, Arab world status, and national peculiarities.

There are a number of social and political elements, which do not yield readily to analysis, but which seem consistently to lie behind the third world's brain drain. Marriage traditions, the respective status of the two partners, and relationships between the sexes in Arab culture constitute push elements. An Arab nation characterized (for example) by development efforts emphasizing industrialization needs to train large numbers of people abroad within a framework of international technological achievements.

Of course a number of these skilled persons decide to settle in the western countries where they have been trained, particularly in the U.S. where the elements of pull are most effective.

We cannot overlook the political element. Military setbacks (increasing Israeli strength is accompanied by consistant failure in the Arab unity movement) and continuous retreat in democratic practice cause many scientists and engineers, who of course belong to the intellectual class, to settle in countries with a minimum level of "freedom." One way or another, this represents self-inflicted loss on the part of the Arabs.

Arab Brain Drain to the United States, 1966-77

Total Arab Immigrants	109,253
Specialists and Engineers	5,798
Engineers	3,939
Scientists	1,513
Social Scientists	346
Total World Immigration of Scientists and Engineers	117,559

Table of Arab Emigrant Specialities and Nationalities
[Col 1 equals Cols 2+3+4]

Country	Specialists and Engineers 1	Engineers 2	Scientists 3	Social Scientists 4
Asia				
Iraq	615	432	150	33
Jordan	323	235	60	3
Kuwait	5	4	1	--
Lebanon	623	492	80	51
Oman	1	1	0	--
Palestine	265	190	57	18
Qatar	3	2	1	--
Saudi Arabia	11	10	--	1
Syria	380	287	58	35
Yemen	13	9	3	1
Other Countries	4	4	--	--
Africa				
Algeria	35	7	6	--
Egypt	3310	2113	1039	158
Libya	19	13	6	--
Morocco	90	56	27	7
Sudan	45	32	10	7
Tunisia	43	24	6	13
Total	5798	3938	1513	347

9669
CSO: 4802

SYRIAN-LIBYAN UNITY PART OF SOVIET PLAN

LD220727 Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 18 Sep 80 p 6

[Editorial: "Soviet Moves in the Middle East"]

[Excerpts] The Soviet military plan to invade Afghanistan has failed. The Soviet plan was aimed at capturing Afghanistan within a month or two with a lightning strike similar to what Hitler used to do. For this reason they concentrated in Afghanistan 90,000 troops with arms and equipment the like of which they did not possess in World War II. The Soviets calculated that after this lightning strike they would proceed to implement their plan in Iran and spread their influence and domination to the Middle East through the Gulf, the Arabian Sea, Iraq and Syria and thus get into a position to bring direct pressure to bear on the oil resources.

When the Soviets began invading Afghanistan their agents began to move. But the hopes which the Soviets pinned on their plans and calculations were frustrated because they found in Afghanistan a strong, Muslim and tenacious fighting people as well as a rugged terrain of mountains and valleys.

The Soviets have been unable to defeat the strong resistance of the Afghan people, have been compelled to exchange their forces several times for better combat trained forces and have resorted to their well-known propaganda about Islam and the freedom of exercising Islamic religious rites.

But the Soviets have been unable to achieve their objectives and plans in Afghanistan and have therefore realized that if this situation remains for too long they will face defeat and their objectives and ambitions in Afghanistan will fail.

The Soviets have therefore begun moving through their agents in the Middle East and have used these agents as tools and means to create difficulties in the area. The merger unity between al-Asad and al-Qadhdhafi is only one of their moves whose aim is to create disturbances in the Middle East. It is not a matter of unity through merger or non-merger but of an al-Asad/al-Qadhdhafi axis to activate the agent basis against the other countries and to threaten the oil areas and resources. It was strange that the statement

they issued about unity should claim that it is unity for all Arabs and for the sake of all Arabs and yet say at the same time that the task of this unity is to work against the reationary, imperialist and colonialist countries. The reactionary countries, as al-Qadhdhafi and al-Asad call them, are none other than the Arab oil countries.

Recently the 'ALAWITE BA'TH newspaper attacked Saudi Arabia because it finances resistance against al-Asad and described it as a reactionary state.

The alleged unity between Syria and Libya or between al-Asad and al-Qadhdhafi is only the beginning of Soviet moves in the Middle East and in the Arab area by which the Soviets want to cover up their position in Afghanistan.

CSO: 4802

TUNISIAN-ALGERIAN RELATIONS REFLECT COMMON GOALS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 4 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali's upcoming official visit to Algeria will breathe new life into the fraternal relations that have studded the common history of the two brother countries. If we look back at the development of Algerian-Tunisian relations, it seems obvious that they are based on a shared past and development. During their struggle to liberate their respective countries, Algerian and Tunisian officials gave proof of that desire for rapprochement, solidarity, and fraternity: Sakiet has remained the example and symbol of this.

Today, as sovereign and independent states, Algeria and Tunisia--whose common history and struggle foreshadowed the shape of the Greater Maghreb--have given concrete expression to that desire for cooperation based on good-neighbor relations, mutual respect and, above all, constantly expanding relations in all areas, whether political, economic, cultural, or social.

And that desire has been given concrete expression at all levels and in all proceedings between the two countries. During his visit to Tunisia early last April, the Algerian chief of state, President Chadli Benjedid, emphasized once again the fraternal relations that link Algeria and Tunisia. In a telegram addressed to President Bourguiba following that visit, Tunisia's illustrious guest noted "the good relations which unite our two countries and which we are striving to develop and expand to serve the interests of our two brother peoples." And he expressed satisfaction "at the similarity of our views as regards all international problems as well as the need to coordinate our action and to work together to achieve the noble objectives of our two peoples and serve the causes of our Arab nation."

The periodic visits that are regularly made by Tunisian or Algerian officials to the other country demonstrate a constant concern and a continuing determination to revitalize bilateral relations and give constantly renewed impetus. Not a month passes without one country or the other recording a visit by a delegation from the brother country. Those consultations are as frank as they are continuous. They take place from the standpoint of building the Greater Maghreb, since they are concerned not only with the development of

bilateral cooperation in all areas and its expansion but also with consultations on international problems, notably those of the Arab world. Throughout those consultations, there has been apparent not only a sincere desire to continue and intensify them but especially a similarity of views and an identical approach to the problems and questions discussed. That is an undeniable sign of the continuity and strengthening of the close ties which a common history has forged through the years and which a common development will continue to affirm even further.

11798
CSO: 4400

COMMITTEE FOR SOLIDARITY WITH PALESTINIAN PEOPLE TERMINATES ACTIVITIES

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] (APS)--The strengthening of the resistance of the Palestinian peasants and people in the occupied territories and the materialization of the solidarity of peasants all over the world with the Palestinian people are among the main themes contained in the resolutions and recommendations of the follow-up committee which emerged from the Standing Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian Peasants and People.

Made public in Algiers on Tuesday following a meeting that began on 24 August, attended by federations of peasants belonging to the Standing Committee for Solidarity with the Palestinian People, these resolutions note in their preamble that the work done in Algiers first of all reviewed the decisions and recommendations of the Second International Congress for Solidarity with the Palestinian Peasants and People held in Baghdad from 30 March to 2 April 1980.

The documents approved by the delegates recommend publication of a quarterly bulletin drafted by the General Union of Peasants and put out in several languages. Its distribution should cover all parties, federations and agricultural cooperatives throughout the world.

The committee also recommends proclamation of Earth Day (30 March) as a day of Arab solidarity with the Palestinian fellahs and people. It further recommends validation of the representation of this institution and that of Arab peasant organizations in the countries of East Europe, Greece, India, Nigeria, France, Mexico and Cuba. It asks for a guarantee of necessary contact in view of the participation of all committee members in the Warsaw meeting to be held on 30 March 1981, which will prepare for the Third International Congress of Solidarity with the Palestinian Peasants and People scheduled for 30 March 1982.

In the documents, delegates emphasize the reinforcement and materialization of solidarity throughout the world with the Palestinian people, particularly among farmers in Western countries.

11,464
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

UAE GRANTS YAR $10 MILLION--An agreement was signed this morning by the Abu Dhabi fund for Arab economic development granting the YAR $10 million to finance the second stage of the Southern Heights project in the YAR. The agreement was signed by Surur ibn Muhammad, the chief of the president's office and the chairman of the fund's board of directors, and by Muhammad Husayn Jamman, under secretary of the YAR Ministry of Agriculture. The ceremony was witnessed by Nasir Nuways, the fund's managing director. Muhammad Husayn told the Emirates news agency that the UAE plays an important role in the YAR's agricultural development projects. The Abu Dhabi fund had previously granted the YAR $10 million to finance the first stage of the project. He expressed the gratitude of the YAR Government and people to UAE president Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan al-Nuhayyan for his attention and assistance in developing the YAR's agricultural projects within the framework of the fraternal relations linking the two brotherly nations. [Text] [GF141346 Abu Dhabi Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 14 Sep 80]

MEETING WITH BAHRAINI MINISTER--Yesterday, Chedi Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States, met with Dr Hussein Mohamed B'harna, Bahraini minister of legal affairs, who was accompanied by Bahrain's permanent representative to the League. In a statement, the Bahraini minister indicated that he and Klibi had exchanged views on current Arab problems and the activities of the League of Arab States. The meeting also concerned the idea of summoning an Arab conference on Palestine, attended by Arab thinkers who would debate the question outside the framework of government and in a scientific manner in order to find elements that might serve as a basis for solving the Palestinian problem. The Bahraini minister emphasized that the idea of organizing such a conference is being studied by the League of Arab States and said that the secretary general of the League believes that such a conference should be organized by the cultural and scientific institutions and organizations of the Arab countries. He concluded with the hope that a proper formula will be found for calling such a conference with the greatest possibilities of success. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 02 Sep 80 p 7] 11,464

TALKS WITH PLO REPRESENTATIVE--Yesterday morning at the Government Palace in the Kasbah, Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali received Hakam Balaoui, the PLO representative in Tunis. Following the interview, Hakam Balaoui said he had discussed with the prime minister questions having to do with the situation that currently prevails in the Arab world, the Palestinian cause in particular, and the plans aimed at damaging the Palestinian revolution and the struggle by the Palestinian people. Balaoui added, "The prime minister expressed to us his complete understanding and reaffirmed Tunisia's continuing support and backing, under the leadership of President Bourguiba, for the Palestinian revolution in all areas until the objectives chosen by the Palestinian people--and aimed at the establishment of an independent Palestinian state on its own territory and under the leadership of the PLO--are achieved." [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 5 Sep 80 p 4] 11798

CSO: 4400

U.S., EGYPT ACCUSED OF PLOTTING AGAINST AFGHANISTAN

Kabul ANIS in Dari 25 Aug 80 p 4

[Editorial]

[Text] The splendid Saur Revolution that resounded with happy news of freedom and well-being for the working masses all over our country and the region has encountered a hidden and open hostility of imperialistic and reactionary circles. They have armed bands of murderers and mercenaries with various weapons to create terror and fear and disturb peaceful and ordinary life of our hard-working people. They have sent these bands from the other side of the border to the towns and villages of our homeland. These terrorists have been armed with all kinds of murderous and destructive weapons supplied to them by imperialist, reactionary and chauvinist circles for the performance of sabotage.

According to reports in the press of various countries, recently a secret treaty has been concluded between the United States and Egypt, in accordance with which the government of Egypt is supplying arms made in the Soviet Union to saboteurs and plunderers to perpetrate all kinds of wicked acts against our revolution and our people. The government of Egypt, which from 1972 on has transformed Egypt into an anti-Islamic, anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian base, is serving at present the interests of the United States of America and has cut off its relations and solidarity with the Arab world and is completely obedient and subservient to orders and instructions of its American master. To be sure, in exchange for its shameful actions Egypt receives from the United States the most modern weapons.

Despite this, it is obvious that the foreign forces and agents will never be able to affect in the smallest way the determination and will of our people, and that in spite of all cunning intrigues and conspiracies of imperialism and its shady deals with antirevolutionary elements that were headed by the infamous Amin, the agent of the CIA, our revolution has now entered a new stage of its development and thus the dirty and ill-starred designs of the enemies of our country and revolution had failed; quite on the contrary, our people continue on the road of the progress and development they have chosen, with steadfastness and strong belief in annihilation of saboteurs and antirevolutionaries.

If the imperialism and reaction intensify their instigations or conclude secret or open treaties against our revolution and our country, they cannot achieve the slightest effect on the firm determination of our working masses, and the process of the development of the victorious Saur Revolution will continue, for millions of the common people of our country are ready to sacrifice themselves and defend in the trenches the great achievements of the revolution and of its new stage of development. There is no doubt whatever that the murderers, brigands and mercenary servants of imperialism and reaction will not be able to withstand the stormy waves of our revolution.

The secret treaty of the United States and Egypt against Afghanistan is another shameful stigma that they have left on their brow. It will likewise generate severe aversion of the peace-loving people all over the world toward signers of this treaty. For the people of Afghanistan after incessant centuries wish now to proceed rapidly on the road of progress and development and to shake the dust of backwardness from the sacred attire of their beloved homeland, imposed on it by colonialist circles.

Imperialism headed by the imperialism of America, that world-devouring monster, which derives its profits from the poverty and deprivation of nations and masses of toiling people of the world, now intends, in collaboration of its accomplices in crime, through the use of bands of saboteurs and robbers to put spokes in the swift advances of our revolution. Such actions, however, will achieve no other benefit than to make more obvious their antiprogressive and antihumanitarian nature, and create ever greater aversion of the free people of the world.

Our revolution traverses its stages of day-by-day increasing development. The unity of the people and the government of Democratic Republic of Afghanistan under the leadership of the Khalq Democratic Party of Afghanistan becomes stronger each day, for our cause and aspirations conform to the wishes of the people and to our times.

1015
CSO: 4903

AFGHAN LEADER CONFIRMS EGYPTIAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO MUJAHIDIN

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 21 Jul 80 pp 40, 41

[Interview with Afghan leader Sayyid Muhammad Musa Tawana in Cairo; date not given]

[Text] Somewhere in Cairo, I met with 2 leaders of the Afghan revolution. They had come on a secret mission that took 48 hours, after which they left for Saudi Arabia and some Arabian Gulf emirates before they returned to Peshawar in Pakistan. One of these leaders is Dr Sayyid Muhammad Musa Tawana who studied at al-Azhar University. He lived in Cairo for 7 years during which he received his doctorate degree from al-Azhar. His dissertation was entitled: "Diligence in interpretation of the Koran."

The other leader is Muhammadjan Ahmadzay. He belongs to the Zay tribe, known for its fierce battles with the Soviets. This tribe had declared the holy war against the Soviet invasion of its country. All its members joined the rebels in their fights. This Afghan leader graduated from the School of Islamic Law at the University of Kabul in Afghanistan. He was taught by Afghan teachers who studied at al-Azhar.

Both Afghan leaders are members of the Afghan Revolution Council which includes 35 members. This council was established after all Islamic parties and organizations engaged in the Afghan revolution agreed to unite their efforts in the battle to liberate their country from Soviet imperialism.

My meeting with the Afghan leaders was arranged on one condition: That I will not publish this interview until after they had left Cairo and were safely back in Peshawar in Pakistan, as they wanted to ensure the success of their secret mission to Cairo.

I went to see them at the appointed time. Dr Tawana smiled and said: "When I came to Cairo for the first time, I stayed at the Family Hotel in the Sayyid al-Husayn Quarter. I later moved to the city of Islamic studies where I stayed for 7-1/2 years."

[Question] I am interested in knowing how long can the Afghan revolution hold out against the Soviet invasion of its country?

[Answer] We will fight to the last man, even if the war between us and the Russians lasts 10 or 20 years. What is important to us is that the Russian forces leave our country.

[Question] The Russians claim that they have pulled out part of their forces from Afghanistan.

[Answer] The forces that the Russians pulled out consisted of some administrative units and some tank units that were no longer useful in the mountain fights against us. Our information sources confirm that they brought new forces into Afghanistan.

[Question] According to American intelligence reports, the Russians have around 85,000 soldiers in Afghanistan.

[Answer] This may be correct. But we also have to take into consideration that more than 40,000 other Soviet soldiers are using Soviet bases within the Soviet Union to shell the rebel bases in the northern areas adjacent to the USSR borders.

[Question] What is the true current military situation in Afghanistan?

[Answer] It is enough to assure you that the Afghan Mujahidin were able to administer several blows to Soviet forces even within Soviet territory. It is anticipated that, in the next stage, we will move the war into the major cities which they control. I can confirm that the Mujahidin have inflicted heavy losses on the Soviet forces. I do not think the Kremlin had anticipated such losses.

[Question] What about weapons?

[Answer] We are fighting with whatever weapons we take from the Russians themselves and with what the Afghan soldiers who join our forces bring.

[Question] Do you receive weapons from Islamic and Arab nations?

[Answer] This is no longer a secret. The Afghan revolution receives weapons and ammunition from Egypt. I do not wish to say that Egypt is the only Islamic and Arab nation that offers us all the weapons and ammunition we need.

[Question] How about other Islamic and Arab nations?

[Answer] Unfortunately, all that we receive from those nations is some financial aid, and sometimes kind words.

The Afghan Mujahidin feel sorry and bitter about the stand of some PLO leaders who sold themselves to the Soviet Union through their strange declarations of their support of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

The Afghan people took well-known positions at the UN and in international circles in support of the Palestine cause. Until now, they have not recognized Israel. Therefore, the Afghan people expected the PLO leaders to support them, and not stab the Afghan people's struggle in the back while they are fighting to free their country?

[Question] Is it true that the Afghan Revolution Council issued a religious ruling allowing the Mujahidin to break their fast during Ramadan because they were in a state of war against the Soviets?

[Answer] During their fights against the Russians, the Mujahidin were able to fast for 2 or 3 days until they found some food in the mountains. The Afghan Revolution Council did not issue such a ruling. However, it is customary among the Mujahidin that, during the month of Ramadan, each will go to fight fasting, and will continue to fast as long as he can. I do not think that fasting during the blessed month could weaken the Mujahidin's zeal to fight.

[Question] What news of the Mujahidin have you brought from Peshawar?

[Answer] A massacre inside the communists' prisions where many educated Afghans were killed.

[Question] How many do you estimate were killed during this massacre?

[Answer] At least 1,000 educated [Afghans,] most of them lawyers, doctors and engineers. [End of answer]

This is what I heard from the Afghan leader who came to Cairo on a secret mission that only took 2 days.

The most important thing the Mujahidin need these days is anti-aircraft and anti-tank rockets to face the increasing raids on their locations by the Soviet invasion forces.

It is true, as the Afghan leader told me, that the Mujahidin were recently able to shoot down a number of Soviet helicopters and also succeeded in destroying a large number of Soviet tanks. However, the Mujahidin need more rockets to be able to deal a decisive blow to the Soviet forces.

The Mujahidin attack Soviet tanks with hand grenades and with whatever Soviet weapons they acquire, while they shout: "Allah Akbar. Allah Akbar." Increased losses of Soviet tanks prompted the following joke among the Afghan Mujahidin in the mountains: The Soviet commander in

Kabul sent a message to Moscow requesting a new weapon to fight what he described as a secret weapon used by the Afghans, called "Allah Akbar."

Four Leaders Are al-Azhar Graduates

According to the latest reports from Peshawar at the Pakistan-Afghan borders, the leaders of the 6 national movements that lead the Afghan revolution took Cairo's advice. An agreement took place among 5 of them to work in a united front that functions as an Afghan Revolution Council, under the name of the "Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan". This front was formed under the leadership of one of the Mujahidin leaders, 'Abd al-Rasul Sayyaf. The leader of the 6th national movement agreed, during a meeting held this week in Geneva, to join this front. It was decided that each movement have 7 representatives in the union [council].

It is not common knowledge that 4 of the leaders of these national movements who joined this front have studied in and graduated from al-Azhar. Among them is Mr Burhan al-Din Rabbani, the chairman of the Islamic Afghan Organization, who received his masters degree from al-Azhar. He was the dean of the school of arts at the University of Kabul before the communist revolution against the late Afghan president Muhammad Dawud took place.

They also include al-Shaykh Sibghat Allah al-Mujaddidi, the chief of the National Front to Save Afghanistan. He is the cousin of Shaykh Sadiq al-Mujaddidi who was the Afghan ambassador to Cairo. He is one of the most prominent Afghan tribal leaders. He is also a graduate of al-Azhar. He used to teach at the Islamic Law School at the University of Kabul. He was arrested during the late president Dawud's regime on the charge of plotting to assassinate Khrushchev during his visit to Afghanistan. He was sentenced to 5 years in jail. After his release, he went to Saudi Arabia where he was chosen by King Faysal to become the chairman of the Islamic Center in Copenhagen, Denmark. When the Soviets attacked his country, he resigned to lead his movement against Soviet imperialism.

Very few people also know that one of the Mujahidin is a blood relative of the late Iraqi leader Rashid 'Ali al-Gailani. His name is Mr Ahmad Gailani. He is the head of a national movement called the National Islamic Party of Afghanistan. His father was the head of descendants of the Prophet in Afghanistan. He is a member of the al-Gailani sect in Iraq, and his followers are spread out in Paktia province in southeast Afghanistan.

9455
CSO: 4902

NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN TO REFLECT DECENTRALIZATION

Better Choice of Investments

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 4 Sep 80 p 4

[Article by A. Bllaha]

[Excerpts] Oran--Within the framework of preparations for the new 5-year plan, the interministerial commission now making a working visit to the western region of the country arrived here Monday afternoon from Tlemcen. The delegation spent 3 days on committee work drafting projects for the region.

The perspective of the new plan reflects the policy of decentralization. It has become necessary and wise to define actions to be taken within the framework of future plans on the basis of methodological orientations of work, specifically, a strategy of action for the next 5 years. It is both a provisional and sectoral strategy. In addition, practical guidelines relating to short-term actions will be followed this year in order to try to eliminate or at least attenuate existing limitations.

Interministerial Region Visiting Regions

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 2 Sep 80 p 1

[Excerpt] Following the adoption of the main guidelines by the Special Congress of the FLN, the five-year plan is once again being studied by regional bodies so as to determine precisely what projects will be included for the period (1980-1984).

The interministerial commission, made up of representatives of the ministries of Interior and Planning who have been in Tlemcen for 3 days, finished its examination of the governorate's proposals for the 1980-1984 Five-Year Plan yesterday.

Choice of Plan Projects

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 2 Sep 80 p 4

[Excerpts] Oran--An interministerial delegation will meet in Mascara on 8, 9 and 10 September to study proposals for the 5-year plan. The three days of work will enable the delegation to meet with local officials and elected representatives of the APW [Governorate Popular Assembly] and draw up the final list of projects to submit for government approval.

The governorate of Mascara does not have sufficient technical and financial means, a handicap to economic development, particularly agriculture, which requires urgent rehabilitation in order to make Mascara a real national "breadbox." Agricultural recovery is especially urgent in the Halra Plain, where the situation is truly alarming.

For over 10 years, a swamp has been forming on the plain (addition of Sig and Mohammadia), extending over thousands of hectares and threatening the entire agricultural area. The other two plains also have problems. The rich Ghriss Plain is experiencing a decrease in the phreatic layer because of intensive garden crop growing (three crops a year), which also depletes the soil. In the other part of the region at Beni Chograne as well, erosion is taking its toll and year after year, the amount of arable land decreases.

The water situation also needs particular attention because the situation is very precarious. Because of the rapid deterioration of facilities, irrigation capacities are declining. There is also the problem of silting which has existed for several years. The Chorfa (Sig) Dam is outdated.

All the communes have major problems: housing crisis, inadequate means of communication, a lack of drinking water, and so on. The communes believe that property reserves and individual construction will be the only answer to this problem.

In rural communes, unemployment is acute. Only the establishment of small industries will be of general help.

Tlemcen: Development of Agriculture

Tlemcen (APS)--The 1980-1984 Plan has been under study for several days in order to draft a program of projects for Tlemcen.

In this governorate, where agriculture is the basis of the economy, the program of proposals emanating from local collectives and department heads include many actions whose completion seems to determine the future of this vital sector.

A series of actions has therefore been proposed relating to the development of land. Development will mainly be aimed at stepping up grain production

with the main effort directed toward improving yields. According to agriculture departments, winter grains would go from 7.2 to 12 quintals [sentence incomplete]

The same departments emphasize that at the conclusion of this effort, grain production will reach 1.83 million quintals, or a 600,000-quintal increase compared with the 1979-1980 season.

In the course of the 1980-1984 period, emphasis will also be placed on the development of other grains such as corn and sorghum. Production estimates between now and the end of the plan are 7,500 quintals.

More land will be set aside for dry vegetables. Some 6,800 hectares will permit the production of chickpeas and beans to triple.

The governorate estimates that current arboriculture production easily meets the region's needs, but emphasis will be placed on the development of crops best adapted to the region, mainly almonds and olive trees.

Regarding olive trees, some 1,200 more hectares will be planted and by the end of the plan, production should total 43,000 quintals, compared with 24,000 at present.

Concerning citrus fruits, 450 hectares will be reconverted in order to reach a production of 191,000 quintals, compared with 139,000 in 1979.

As a result of these actions, the governorate will have 18,400 hectares in trees instead of the 13,000 at present. Plants will be supplied locally by nurseries in the governorate.

Industrial crops now cover some 758 hectares. This area will be extended to 1,300 hectares during the plan.

Concerning vineyards, there are plans to rehabilitate 1,500 hectares in order to improve yields of wine grapes and to develop table grapes on a area of 580 hectares. Some 100 hectares will be reserved for raisins. Over the next 5 years, there will be an increase in table grape production amounting to 50,000 quintals.

Also within the framework of agriculture, there is great interest in expanding two crops: potatoes and tomatoes.

It is estimated that 2,400 more hectares will be planted in potatoes, reaching a production of 360,000 quintals by 1984. Tomato production estimates for the end of the plan total 132,000 quintals.

Proposals for forage crops have been studied, governorate officials say, based on new needs created by the development of cattle and sheep raising.

The majority of these needs will be covered by an increase in rotation cropping. It has been proposed to develop vetch oats and introduce new forage crops such as bersim and sorghum-corn.

Milk production, which exceeded 19 million liters in 1979, will reach 26 million liters in 1985, according to estimates.

In order to achieve that goal, it is proposed to import 1,050 high-yield heifers.

Regarding sheep production, emphasis has been placed on the purchase of 13,300 head in order to create conditions favorable to an increase in lamb meat amounting to 130 tons by the end of 1984.

With other proposals concerning the establishment of semi-industrial hatcheries, the program should ensure 100-percent coverage of the governorate's meat and egg needs.

Other actions have also been proposed by the governorate for the development of agriculture and rabbit raising in the region.

Forestry projects submitted to the interministerial commission grant priority to soil conservation in the Ghazaouet, Sidi Abdelli and Ain Youcef basins.

It has been proposed to allocate 140,000 hectares for agricultural waterworks, soil reclamation techniques, torrential correction, and finally, adapted agricultural techniques.

The reforestation of 4,000 hectares has been proposed, along with new soil reclamation projects and major rehabilitation projects covering 9,000 hectares. Maintenance and planting supervision over an area of 8,000 hectares will help fight parasites and disaster prevention is planned for 38,000 hectares.

New Projects for Tlemcen

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 31 Aug 80 p 2

[Excerpts] Tlemcen (APS)--An interministerial delegation made up of 40 members including representatives from the Ministry of Interior and the Office of Secretary of State for Planning arrived in Tlemcen on Saturday. Within the framework of committee work, projects included in the 5-year plan will be studied for the region.

The governorate of Tlemcen intends to give priority during this plan to completion of projects already underway. By 31 December 1979, projects remaining to be completed amounted to 2,300 billion dinars, representing 35 percent of all investment objectives set for the 1970-1979 decade.

In addition, the monthly situation as of the first half of 1980 showed that the following percentages of credits had been used: Special Program, 61.67 percent; First Five-Year Plan, 39.20 percent; Second Four-Year Plan, 56.70 percent; PDC [expansion unknown] and PMU, 67.29 percent, or an overall average of 59.45 percent.

With the new projects in the 1980-1984 Plan, the governorate of Tlemcen aims to achieve three main objectives which, the committee chairman explained, include the institution of a regional economic balance throughout the region, intensive mobilization of water resources, modernization and development of agriculture and finally, reinforcement of local industries and development of profitable cottage industries.

Within this framework, the foundations must be laid for a solid local industrial sector, while strengthening existing activity and developing rural space by wide-ranging actions. Soil conservation efforts and certain crop-raising and grazing practices are aimed at intensifying agricultural production, restoring balance between the richer and poorer areas and finally, stabilizing the population.

These broad actions will be completed by the production of tourist activity and the infrastructure needed to satisfy social needs in all areas: water, energy, education and professional training, health, housing, marketing, and so on.

11,464
CSO: 4400

NEW WILAYA, DAIRA LEADERS INSTALLED IN OFFICE

Official Installation Ceremonies

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Said Smail]

[Excerpts] Maghraoui Mostefa, new governor [wali] of El Asnam, took office yesterday.

Maghraoui succeeds Mohamed Lamine Ghraieb, named governor of Setif.

Another official ceremony is scheduled soon in the capital of the governorate [wilaya] in the course of which the governor will officially install the new secretary general replacing Allal Tayeb, who has been assigned to another post.

Annaba

The secretary general of the governorate and the director of regulations and the local administration recently named for the governorate of Annaba were installed in office yesterday. Bentabet Mokhtar was appointed secretary general of the governorate, replacing Amara Ahmed Salah, who was transferred to the governorate of Setif. Kara Ahmed replaces Boutaiba Belgacem, named head of the district [daira] of Tebessa, as director of regulations and the local administration.

New District Heads

The governor of Tizi-Ouzou, Hamed Sidi Said, officially installed new district heads yesterday who had been recently appointed by the country's political leadership. The governor presided over four official ceremonies in Draa El-Mizan, Bordj Menaiel, Arbaa Nait-Irathen and Tizi-Ouzou, where Messrs Ben Aoudane, Mechentel, Ghermouz and Arbadji succeeded Arbadji (Draa El-Mizan), Nait Larbi (Bordj-Menaiel), Belalem (Arbaa Nait-Irathen) and Ben Arab (Tizi-Ouzou).

Today, the governor of Tizi-Ouzou continues his activities, presiding over other ceremonies at which the new heads of the districts of Tigzit, Ain El-Hammam and Azazga will be installed. Guellai Djenidi, Bouterfia Ahmed and Yacer Sid Ahmed succeed Idir Smail, Ait Ahmed and Bahloul Hacene.

New Governor of Constantine

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 5-6 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Cherif Haddad]

[Excerpts] Ait Abderrahim Chabane, new governor of Constantine, assumed office Thursday as head of the governorate of Constantine.

At a ceremony presided over by Abdelkrim Abada, member of the Central Committee of the FLN and national party commissioner, Serradj Mohamed was installed as secretary general of the governorate of Constantine, replacing Salim Kessous, who has been named secretary general of the governorate of Bejaia.

New District Heads in Setif

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 27 Aug 80 p 3

[Excerpts] In the capital of the district of Ain-Oulmene, Ali Bahloul will replace Mohammed Ouali Mouahab. In Ras El-Oues, Brahimi Mohammed Ould Tahar was installed in office, replacing Salhi Abdelkader.

Ahmed Salah Ammara was appointed secretary general of the governorate, replacing Abdelghani Zouani, who was assigned to another post. Amor Bouchengoura replaces Tahar Ferkane as director of regulations and the local administration. Finally, Abdelkrim Benkaida was installed in office as head of the district, replacing Mostefa Merad.

Mostaganem, Sidi Ali, Mazouna

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 7 Sep 80 p 5

[Excerpts] Mostaganem (APS)--In the governorate of Mostaganem, Cherif Kheireddine, Hamadi Ahmed, Cherifi Mohamed and Benarab Rachid were officially installed on 3 September in their new offices as secretary general of the governorate, director of general affairs, regulations and the local administration, head of the district of Mostaganem and head of the district of Sidi-Ali.

Benremouga Chaffai, governor of Mostaganem has installed Benaissa Maamar as head of that district.

Jijel, Bechar Officials

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 4 Sep 80 p 4

[Articles by B. A. and R. B.]

[Excerpts] Henni Mokhtar, new governor of Jijel, assumed office yesterday in the course of a ceremony held in the capital of the governorate.

Henni Mokhtar, formerly secretary general of the governorate of Blida, succeeds Debagh Abdellaha, former governor of Jijel.

At a reception recently given in the capital of the governorate, Bessayah Abdellatif was officially installed as head of the district of Bechar.

Bessayah succeeds Akhamouk Bey, appointed to head the district of Laghouat.

11,464
CSO: 4400

AGRICULTURAL OFFICIALS RELEASE HARVEST FIGURES

Grain Harvest in Setif

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 3 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Setif (APS)--Agricultural officials in the governorate of Setif have announced that 1,534,145 quintals is the total figure for the winter grain harvest begun throughout the governorate on 20 June.

The initial objective of 1.8 million quintals was not attained. Agriculture departments believe that this year the harvest was only average because of the 2-month drought (January and February) which affected the plowing and planting operations.

The area planted in grain this year (all varieties: hard and soft wheat, barley and oats) was about 270,842 hectares, or 78,093 for the socialist sector, 20,001 hectares for the Agrarian Revolution sector and 172,748 for the private sector. Some 5,000 hectares of this total were damaged by hail or fire.

The harvest by sector of activity is as follows: 451,118 quintals for the socialist sector in hard and soft wheat, barley and oats; 93,183 quintals for the Agrarian Revolution sector in all varieties; and 989,844 quintals harvested by the private sector, which totals 1,534,145 quintals.

By variety and for the three sectors combined, the hard wheat harvest is estimated at 750,721 quintals, soft wheat 250,495 quintals, barley 492,791 quintals and finally, oats 40,138 quintals.

Regarding equipment, the governorate received 165 threshers and other machines this year. It should also be noted that ONAMA [National Agricultural Equipment Office] organized mobile crews that traveled throughout the governorate repairing agricultural machinery as long as the harvest lasted.

The governorate's storage capacity is generally adequate. The two cooperatives in Setif and Bordj-Bou-Arreridj can by themselves store nearly 1 million quintals, without counting the CAPCS [Communal Multi-Service

Agriculture Cooperative] storage units and other agricultural production facilities set up throughout the governorate.

While on the whole, this harvest which came to a close last week enjoyed good conditions throughout the governorate, agriculture departments nevertheless complain about the lack of workers, which is felt more heavily every year at the time of the grain harvest.

Production Nearly Doubles

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 1 Sep 80 p 1

[Article by A. Belkhodja]

[Text] Oran--The 430,946 hectares planted in grain in the governorate of Tiaret were completely harvested during the threshing season, yielding 2.7 million quintals.

Although it was judged an average harvest, an increase of a million quintals was recorded compared with last year.

As they customarily do, the CCLS [expansion unknown] are temporarily using the premises of the production units to store the grain. In addition to these new facilities, it was necessary to use open-air storage areas for 450,000 quintals.

The hard work required needs no further commentary, but the harvest this year coincided with Ramadan. Depending directly on machinery, the harvest calls on the governorates of Oran and Mostaganem, which loaned Tiaret 20 threshing machines in order to keep up the pace and complete the work.

Actually, out of 882 threshing machines which the governorate has, only 552 were operable because repairs demand a large number of spare parts. Whether it be a question of plowing, cultivation or the harvest, it is always spare parts that are needed.

One must consider that every season, the number of breakdowns never seems to diminish. Consequently, the shortage of agricultural machinery is due, on the one hand, to the lack of spare parts and second, to the inadequate maintenance characterizing several production units.

The other phenomenon that emerged during the harvest was the lack of seasonal labor. The CAPRA [Agricultural Production Cooperative of the Agrarian Revolution] assigned to each self-managed unit had to lend workers in the socialist sector a hand.

It was thanks to this *touiza* that the harvest had no serious disturbances.

Agriculture in the governorate of Tiaret would be seriously compromised if such a situation were to persist. Solutions will have to be provided within the framework of the restructuration of self-managed domains now planned.

Labor is also scarce in areas reserved for dry vegetables, which this year covered nearly 24,000 hectares.

Market garden crops occupy only a small area of 255 hectares. The development of large areas is planned within the framework of projects in Ain-Sekhouna, Nahr-Oussel and Oued Touil.

Another expansion involving 400 hectares is planned for the Takchemaret perimeter. These operations will develop production capacities for market garden crops and will attenuate the deficit already accentuated by private sectors' watermelon crops, which do not require much effort. Watermelons attract a whole host of unscrupulous businessmen who speculate on booking expecting to make huge profits. The water that should be used to increase the production of market garden crops frequently goes to watermelons, which are not a basic commodity.

Grape Harvest in Oran

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] Oran (APS)--Beginning on 7 August, the grape harvest spread to 11 communes in the governorate of Oran this week. According to the representative of the Vineyard and Wine Institute at the level of the governorate's agricultural directorate, estimates drawn up for this harvest were set at some 300,000 quintals for an area of 16,200 hectares, including 15,800 hectares for wine grapes.

Preparations for this grape harvest were begun in July. Contacts between the different offices involved in the operation made it possible to review all the problems that had arisen during the preceding harvest, when production was 130,000 quintals.

According to the Institute official, production this year will double thanks to favorable climatic conditions. In order to ensure smooth operations, daily bonuses of 3 to 4 dinars were granted to cutters and carriers by the ONCV [National Office for Marketing Wine and Wine Products] this year. If all conditions are met, especially at the ten vineyards in the governorate of Oran, the grape harvest will be completed on 15 September.

Objectives Exceeded in Guelma

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] Guelma (APS)--The harvest, which began somewhat late this year in the governorate of Guelma because of bad weather, has by and large exceeded its objectives.

Begun on 14 June in the earliest zones (districts of Bouchegouf and Guelma), the harvest spread to the rest of the governorate on 30 June and was completed on 11 August 1980 with a harvest of 1.67 million quintals.

Preparations began in the beginning of April and were marked by a series of meetings presided over by Governor Abderrahmane Baazizi and attended by all technical and administrative personnel.

All problems linked to the harvest were debated and officials took certain measures to smooth out difficulties, including the pooling of machinery.

This method, in limited use in previous harvests, yielded good results and made it possible to make up for lost time.

Concerning the governorate's machinery, the system of two crews was adopted so as to make maximum use of the means at hand.

Given the size of the governorate and the diversity of the climate, work was planned by technical departments taking early zones into account.

In an effort to limit the risk of fire, safety measures were taken, to wit, the establishment of a station on the farms and a fire brigade with every machinery pool.

These crews were equipped with a tank, a tractor sprayer and a plow.

Priority was given to fields exposed to fires (roads and urban centers in particular).

Regarding the reception of the harvest and in order to encourage the private sector to deliver its production, the Algerian Interoccupational Grains Office was asked to increase the number of collection points and to set up stations.

With an objective of 214,000 hectares, the governorate of Guelma and those of Batna, Oum El Bouaghi and Setif are mainly grain growers. However, unlike the latter, Guelma has a better climate.

This year, the water shortage was mainly felt in December and January, which explains why the harvest objectives were generally exceeded.

Actually, harvesting amounted to nearly 214,200 hectares for the three sectors combined (Agrarian Revolution, self-managed and private sectors) and production on 18 August 1980 was 1.67 million quintals, exceeding estimates by 400,000 quintals.

The private sector provides 60 percent of all production, given the amount of land it uses (122,100 hectares). Generally speaking, this harvest, which was relatively better than those of preceding seasons, improved because of the means used and the efforts made during the plowing-planting, fertilization and weeding by different agriculture departments.

Regarding equipment, it should be pointed out that there has been a clear improvement in machinery with the purchase of 120 new harvesters.

In addition, the availability and continuing supply of spare parts from ONAMA made it possible to act effectively in repairing broken down machinery.

The governorate's needs for various products (fuel, bags, and so on) were covered throughout the season.

From the technical standpoint, coverage of the operation was ensured by a team from the Agricultural Directorate and the departments of the Algerian Agricultural Equipment Office.

The machinery used included 488 threshing machines. As for storage, the difficulties encountered during preceding seasons were smoothed out to the great satisfaction of producers.

Naturally, there are still some difficulties, but they are temporary, the Agriculture and Agrarian Revolution Directorate states.

This situation will be solved gradually with the reception at the end of August of an 80,000-quintal silo in the commune of Belkheir, the construction of two more in Oued-Zenati and Tamlouka and a 25,000-quintal storage facility in M'Daourouche.

By 18 August, 833 quintals of grain had been delivered to the Guelma and Souk-Ahras cooperatives, which continue to make substantial efforts to deliver the maximum production.

11,464
CSO: 4400

IDF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ON IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT, U.S. POLICY

TA281554 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Sep 80 pp 1, 6

[Report on Ze'ev Schiff interview with the chief of the IDF Intelligence Branch, Maj Gen Yehoshu'a Sagi, at the Intelligence Branch headquarters: "The Soviet Union Will Stand to Gain at any Rate; Washington Moves Show U.S. Weakness"; date not given]

[Excerpts] In the office of the chief of the IDF Intelligence Branch at the general headquarters, Maj Gen Yehushu'a Sagi, there is no optimism regarding the effects of the Iran-Iraq war on the stability of the region and on Israel. The major general estimates that in any event, the Soviet Union will stand to gain from this war.

The Washington moves are interpreted in this region as a U.S. weakness. Saudi Arabia is seized with fear and the question of the United States credibility will again be raised. If 12 Iraqi divisions are stationed on the Saudi border, Egypt will be unable to provide a solution or a counterbalance for this threat, this is the gist of the chief of intelligence's assessment in a special interview with HA'ARETZ.

In my opinion, he says, Baghdad has not coordinated in advance the war with the Soviet Union. It is noteworthy, however, that the Iraqis have a good infrastructure of ammunitions and spare parts. Regarding the Iranian army, it is not clear whether their ammunition will be sufficient for a long war.

"An Iraqi victory," Major General Sagi says, "will mean Iraqi hegemony in the Persian Gulf, a fact that will effect the entire region. It is a big question whether or not Khomeyni's regime could absorb such a blow. Three major developments are possible: 1) a weak Iranian regime that will accept dictates from Iraq; 2) Iran's disintegration due to the separatist tendencies of the Kurds, the Baluchis, and the Azerbaijanis who have always been demanding independence--in addition there is the Iraqi claim to Khuzistan; and 3) the possibility of the rise of the Iranian left. The Soviet Union stands to gain from all of these possible developments. According to Major General Sagi there are no signs now that the Iranian generals want to take over control in Iran.

An Iraqi victory will strengthen the Jordanian-Iraqi axis. According to Major General Sagi this constitutes a direct danger to Israel. This is a future threat. The situation may even worsen in 6 months. In this war Jordan has taken a decisive step. It has allowed Iraqi aircraft on its airfields, notwithstanding the Syrian hostility toward such a move.

[Question] Will not the stationing of Iraqi units in Jordan be detrimental to the early warning level of Israeli intelligence?

[Answer] The stationing of an Iraqi army in Jordan will be bad from the military as well as from the intelligence aspect.

[Question] Then why did Israel tacitly consent to the stationing of Iraqi transport planes in Jordan? Tomorrow it may be fighter aircraft or other equipment.

[Answer] We can oppose it of course, but we must take into account that, as a result of Israeli opposition hostilities between Israel and Jordan and other Arab states could flare up.

The U.S. penetration into Egypt and military aid for that country are not directly related to the war in the Persian Gulf, but Major General Sagi's answer to this raises the question of the overall U.S. policy toward the region. "Israel has been requested not to interrupt the process of the U.S. involvement and it has also been requested to pay the price for those U.S. achievements. If the United States had changed its approach, Israel could have served as a powerful lever for the United States in the region. However, Israel is now neutralized," Major General Sagi concluded.

CSO: 4805

'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTS ON IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT

TA261946 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Sep 80 p 11

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "The Dangers of the Neighboring War"]

[Excerpt] Israel has nothing to regret over the fact that two countries that are its enemies are spilling each other's blood and causing damage and casualties to each other; but the problem does not end there. Even a war between enemies can produce negative results from Israel's viewpoint. It is true that Israel can today claim more vigorously that the danger to the oil flow to the West does not spring from the nonestablishment of a Palestinian state and that there are greater dangers, but these claims do not even solve our public relations problems.

If we have any interest in this war it is that the Iraqi side should be beaten and defeated and that the flow of oil to the West should not be harmed. With all the horror Khomeyni's regime in Iran evokes, it would be better from our viewpoint if the Iranians were to beat Iraq. However, this is not how matters appear today and we will discuss this later.

Iraq is the greatest danger to Israel. It is the main military power on the eastern front in spite of its distance from our border. This is the most extremist country in terms of aims and plans. It is building a military nuclear option for the future that may jeopardize Israel's existence. In spite of its links with France and some other European countries the United States has no moderating influence on it. Although Iraq's basic targets are in the Persian Gulf, it is clear that it is developing another option in the direction of Israel. The Iraqi-Jordanian axis developed over the past year is an example of this. There is a real danger in this axis and Israel must keep a careful watch to make sure that Iraqi planes landing in Jordan because of the current war in the Gulf will not set a precedent and become a permanent system. Tomorrow these will be fighter planes and the day after that Iraqi emergency reserve units may be established in Jordan, with all that implies as far as Israel is concerned.

An Iraqi victory in the war with Iran would be a threat in the future to other countries in the Persian Gulf. Iraq may renew the old dispute with

Kuwait. Such a victory would certainly cause panic in Saudi Arabia, which has a long common border with Iraq, but its reaction could be greater consideration for the "rejectionist countries" and greater caution about a link with Egypt. Warning voices are already heard in Cairo on this matter. A long time ago President as-Sadat predicted the possibility that Iraq would take advantage of the vacuum left in the Persian Gulf after the Shah's downfall. Israeli experts also saw what was being born.

It is true that Iraq has recently been developing links with France, but Iraq still keeps a Russian orientation. To this moment there is a question about the amount of coordination between Iraq and Moscow on the issue of the war. The evaluation is that the Iraqis surprised even the Russians. But matters will only become clearer in the future.

CSO: 4805

ISRAEL AMONG WORLD LEADERS IN MILITARY RESEARCH

TA231825 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 23 Sep 80 p 4

[Report by Avraham Peleg, scientific affairs correspondent: "Survey by the Development and Research Council: The Military Research in Israel is Proportionately as Big as in the United States"]

[Text] In relative terms, military research and development in Israel is similar to that of the United States. In terms of the overall size of the entire system of military, civilian and scientific research, relative to the Gross National Product, Israel is one of the leaders in the developed Western world.

This finding was reported in a survey on the issue of "research and development systems in small countries--reference to Israel" by Dr Menahem Karmi. The survey was conducted on behalf of the National Council for Research and Development attached to the energy and infrastructure ministry.

The survey reported that "Israel is an outstanding exception among the small developed countries in the field of research." From the point of view of the relative size of the scientific research, Israel is in the same category with the superpowers and three small countries: Switzerland, Sweden and Holland.

Proportionate to the size of the population, Israel is in first place in the publication of research works. According to the survey, in 1976 the number of publishing scientists per 1 million population was: 1,102 in Israel, 741 in the United States, 146 in Japan, 582 in England, 516 in Sweden and 450 in Denmark. The average number of publications (per million) of the small and large countries is about 500, while it is double this figure in Israel.

In contrast with this achievement a more negative situation is noted in the number of patents issued (in the United States). While small countries, such as Austria with 137 patents, Holland with 67, Sweden with 128 and Switzerland with 146 (in 1976) had a relatively large number of patents, Israel that year registered only 24 patents (for $100 million worth of exports.) In other words, the industrial research effort in Israel does not match the achievements in university research.

Dr Gershon Metzger, assistant director of National Council for Research and Development, noted that until recently industrial research and development in Israel had largely lagged behind the decisive majority of the developed countries. The university sector occupies the central place in the civilian research system in Israel, and Israel leads the developed Western world in expenditures for university research.

The author of the survey, Dr Karmi, noted in conclusion that the tendency of decentralization in the government research and development mechanism due to the Katchalski Committee recommendations has gone too far and the opposite tendency is now needed: more centralization in research.

CSO: 4805

GAZA'S MAYOR CITED ON HYPOTHESIS OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM GAZA

LD221249 Paris LE MONDE in French 16 Sep 80 p 5

[Article by Francis Cornu: "Mayor of Gaza 'Fears' a 'False Withdrawal' by Israelis from His Territory"]

[Text] Gaza--Could the inhabitants of Gaza territory discover one day soon that after 13 years of occupation, the Israelis have suddenly "partially" withdrawn? Mayor of Gaza Rashad al-Shawwa does not hide the fact that he "fears" such an eventuality and would like to know whether his anxiety is really founded. This attitude is not as paradoxical as it might seem. Like the vast majority of the 400,000 Palestinians in the territory of which he is the main political figure, he was wanted the Israeli Army to go for a long time but he is afraid that the Jerusalem leaders may be planning a "false withdrawal" and even a trap.

A recent meeting with [former Israeli Foreign Minister] Moshe Dayan and current rumors within the Israeli military administration in Gaza are behind his fears. These fears are so acute that Mr al-Shawwa told us on 14 September that he had just sent a message to [PLO leader] Yasir 'Arafat to inform him of the situation.

The former Israeli foreign minister visited Mr al-Shawwa on 6 September and explained to him the plan he has constantly upheld since he left the government almost 1 year ago: Israel should not await a hypothetical agreement on the autonomy plan to alter the situation in the occupied territories by withdrawing some of its troops and its administration. Mr Dayan thinks that, since negotiations have reached deadlock, the Israeli government should make a "unilateral" gesture as soon as possible to try and create a "new atmosphere."

Mr Dayan asked the Mayor of Gaza: "What attitude would you take if Israel were to carry out a partial withdrawal and if you, therefore, had to take over control of some of the territory's administration?" Mr al-Shawwa is well aware that Mr Dayan's ideas are far from being shared by Mr Begin's government. He also knows that Mr Dayan's approach was a private one and that Mr Dayan assured him he was only speaking on his own behalf. However Mr al-Shawwa also knows how much influence Mr Dayan can have and he is now wondering whether the former minister was not after all indirectly given the job of sounding him out before a decision was taken.

Mr al-Shawwa added that his suspicions were increased when he learned in the past few days that the Gaza military governor's headquarters was making plans for considerably reducing Israeli administrative staff in Gaza territory. "It may just be a coincidence," Mr al-Shawwa said, "but I prefer to consider all possibilities because this is a very serious matter."

The mayor of Gaza answered Mr Dayan's question in a completely negative way: "We must categorically reject this plan whose one aim is to divide the Palestinians by dissociating Gaza's fate from that of the West Bank.... Gaza is already isolated and the aim is to complete that isolation once and for all. In addition how can we accept that the Israelis should abandon some of their responsibilities overnight after 13 years of occupation. They really have not prepared us for taking over--that is the least I can say. Who will police the territory, for instance? I fear that trouble might start as soon as the troops leave. That is probably another aspect of what the Israeli leaders aim to achieve; if disorder broke out they would have a pretext for returning and continuing the occupation after showing international opinion that we are not capable of governing ourselves."

Finally Mr al-Shawwa stressed that any Israeli withdrawal would be completely hypocritical since it is much easier, he stressed, to control Gaza than the West Bank. "Gaza is not only an island," he added, "it is an island of sand, there is not one stone to throw. The border is only 4 km from here and the army could return as quickly as it had left."

The plan mentioned by Mr Dayan, which might be adopted by the Begin Government this time, is not really an innovation. For almost 1 year the preliminary talks between Israel, Egypt and the United States have often discussed the question of applying autonomy to the Gaza territories "first," if, as seems probable, it proves impossible on the West Bank. President al-Sadat is not hostile to that solution but he has stated that he wants an all-embracing agreement on the principles governing this autonomy before an experiment is tried in Gaza. What the mayor of Gaza now fears is that this "Gaza first" solution be replaced by a prelude, in that a general agreement on autonomy seems a long way from being achieved at present.

CSO: 4800

DENIAL OF PLAN FOR PARTIAL GAZA WITHDRAWAL CITED

LD221309 Paris LE MONDE in French 17 Sep 80 p 4

[Article by Francis Cornu: "The Authorities Deny the Existence of a Plan for Partial Withdrawal from Gaza"]

[Text] Jerusalem--Rashad al-Shawwa, mayor of Gaza, has not had to wait long for clarification about a possible Israeli initiative on the future of the Gaza territory. Military government headquarters in the territory has just categorically denied that there are any preparations for a withdrawal or a redeployment of the army for the slightest change in the administration. Numbers of the prime minister's entourage in Jerusalem also deny that Israel is engaged in unilateral implementation of the autonomy plan; it has been stated that this idea has never been discussed in the cabinet.

In addition it has been pointed out that Israelis and Egyptians have on several occasions envisaged applying the autonomy plan in the Gaza territory first but on conditions that an all-embracing agreement concerning the West Bank too has first been reached. A government source indicates that President al-Sadat referred to this possibility in a recent letter to Prime Minister Menahem Begin.

These explanations imply that an Israeli initiative in Gaza could not be one of the "gestures" which Cairo and Washington expect from the Jerusalem leaders to facilitate the resumption of negotiations and discussions during the next tripartite summit which is to take place in the United States at the end of the year. In addition these denials prove that the Israeli government is not prepared to follow adivce from former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan who maintains that Israel should take a unilateral decision and hence partially withdraw from the occupied territories without waiting for a general agreement on autonomy.

CSO: 4800

EGYPTIAN DEFENSE MINISTRY TO HANDLE AL-'ARISH TERMINAL

TA231422 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 23 Sep 80 p 2

[Report by 'Ezra Yanuv: "The Sinai Egyptian Terminal to be Transferred to the Egyptian Defense Ministry's Responsibility"]

[Text] The Egyptian authorities have recently decided to turn over responsibility for the Egyptian passenger terminal in al-'Arish to the defense ministry and station army officers there instead of citizens to cope with the problems developing because of the increase in the number of people crossing between Israel and Egypt.

Hundreds of tourists have complained to the Egyptian authorities that processing at the Egyptian terminal is very difficult as compared with the convenience at the Israeli side. Up to 1,000 passengers can move in both directions per day. Most of the passengers are Israelis, tourists and inhabitants of the Gaza Strip and northern Sinai.

The number of infiltrators from the Egyptian to the Israeli side has grown recently. The reason for the infiltration is to find employment in Israel. Since there is no fear that the infiltration has a hostile intent, the tendency is to allow every Egyptian citizen who is caught to return to his home within 8 hours of his capture. Nevertheless, several people suspected of being designated to head Gaza terrorist squads were caught not long ago.

CSO: 4805

PERES PUBLISHES 'OPEN LETTER' TO BEGIN

TA191523 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 19 Sep 80 p 44

[Labor Party Chairman Shim'on Peres' "Open Letter to Prime Minister Begin"]

[Text] Honorable Mr Begin,

The 10 days of repentence were given to the people of Israel to allow them to take stock of their deeds. I have no doubt that you, like the rest of us, will do this now.

Since you already chose to do so both personally and politically as prime minister in the Moqued television program, I feel it is my personal and national duty to answer you. At this fateful hour the future of the state and the people calls for a sober, well-considered view of the remarks you made, especially since they were made with an unfounded tone of satisfaction.

With a smile you attempted to dismiss the harsh criticism leveled at the faulty functioning of the government; with a slip of the tongue--as explained by your deputy--you "rehabilitated" poor neighborhoods; with empty talk and Latin you tried to cover up the breach with our best friends in the United States and in the Jewish diaspora. You know full well that your government and its policy have remained friendless and without support. Have your eyes grown blind to the sights observed by the majority of the people?!

Mr Prime Minister, do not fall prey to untruth. A happy mask is short-lived and mere whitewash will not cover abysses and chasms. [Here Peres is referring to biblical Prophet Ezekiel, 13, verses 10-12, who is critical of the prophets who delude Israel, telling them that they daub the wall of peace illusions built by the Israeli people with a whitewash of lies that will be broken by God].

Scenes of disintegration--in the political, social and economic fields--stare at us from every corner, and you do not see, or rather, see and ignore, whitewash and beautify.

At this holy and awesome time, I am addressing you the honorable prime minister, transcend the everyday, trivial settling of accounts, and when

you pray [here Peres quotes a verse from a Jewish source read on Yom Kippur asking for forgiveness for spoken sins] ask yourself whether you have not gone wrong and misled others. Ask yourself if you are telling all the truth, if the time has not come for you to draw the following conclusion: to restore to the people the faith that had stirred their hearts.

Pardon and forgiveness for the past and a road of truth and faith for the future.

May God sign all in his good books,

Signed: Shim'on Peres

Chairman of the Labor Party.

[Label printed at the bottom of the open letter reads: "Together to Save the Country"]

CSO: 4805

RABIN RECOUNTS TALKS WITH AL-SADAT, IMPRESSIONS, CONCLUSIONS

TA191119 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Sep 80 p 14

[Report on interview with Israeli MK Yitzhaq Rabin by Mark Segal: "Dialogue in Alexandria"]

[Excerpts] Former Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin returned from a meeting with President Anwar al-Sadat this week convinced that the Egyptian leader still cleaves to the peace process within the guidelines of the Camp David agreements, as he interprets them.

Rabin prefaced his report of the visit by emphasizing that what he had to say to the JERUSALEM POST was based on his impressions of the president's underlying intentions. "Al-Sadat considers the peace process based on the Camp David agreements as a revolutionary change, not only within the Arab-Israeli context but within the broader scale of the Middle East's position in world affairs," Rabin said. Al-Sadat intends to forge ahead with the peace process in accordance with his concept of it; he wishes to end the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of what he has been saying repeatedly since his address to the Knesset in November 1977: Full peace and normalization in exchange for withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem.

Rabin contends that al-Sadat is pursuing a three-stage policy: First, peace with Israel; second, the implementation of the autonomy scheme in keeping with his interpretation of Camp David; and third, a permanent settlement.

Although al-Sadat says officially that he would like the autonomy scheme to proceed according to the timetable set down at Camp David, Rabin believes he is in fact prepared to be flexible about this. The Egyptian leader had told him: "If we don't reach our target in November 1980, then I'll wait until November 1981."

When I asked whether al-Sadat was hinting at a likely change of government in Israel, Rabin replied: "He was not only making a hint on that level but also stating his flexibility regarding the negotiating timetable. He is more concerned about the overall peace process than with the timetable details."

But al-Sadat feels it is essential to achieve a tripartite agreement between Egypt, Israel and the United States on the implementation of the autonomy scheme, which is the main issue on the agenda.

Rabin confirmed that al-Sadat expressed firm opposition to co-opting Jordan at this stage of the negotiations. He explicitly told his Israeli visitor that the inclusion of Amman would "blow it up."

I interjected by quoting Prof Shim'on Shamir, who said on Sunday, during a Labor Party meeting on the Jordanian option, "I know what al-Sadat said against Jordan to Rabin, but I heard otherwise." Rabin rejoined by noting that the conversation had been taped, and added: "One's answers often depend on the kind of questions one asks."

He stressed that although al-Sadat was very firm in seeking to exclude King Husayn from the talks at this juncture, he certainly contemplated Amman's participation, along with self-governing Palestinian representatives, in the final phase of the negotiations--as laid down at Camp David.

Al-Sadat has adopted a strong position on the Jerusalem question, far beyond the terms of reference of the Camp David accords, even as the Americans interpret them. "Only recently I was given some insight into the American position by U.S. special envoy Sol Linowitz--the United States regards Jerusalem at this stage of the autonomy talks through one prism: the awarding to East Jerusalem residents of voting rights for the autonomouc council. However, it was my impression that al-Sadat wants to go much further than that target, which will undoubtedly make the negotiations that much more difficult," the former premier held.

During their exchange of views, Rabin proposed two alternative approaches to the "Gaza first" suggestion. First, that the implementation of the autonomy scheme in Gaza should follow an agreement in principle that the autonomy scheme would be applied to the entire West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Strip. The second approach involved "Gaza first" being regarded as a "subphrase" before the autonomy scheme is worked out in its entirety.

Rabin spoke of "Gaza first" as a kind of pilot plan that should be set going irrespective of developments in the rest of the territories.

"From his reaction," said Rabin, "I gathered that al-Sadat disliked the second alternative, which to my mind offered the most practical formula. He insisted on an overall agreement on the autonomy scheme for the entire area, with Jerusalem at the top of the list, and Gaza rather way down."

It was Rabin's considered opinion, in appraising al-Sadat's response, that the Egyptian president was placing difficulties in the path of the peace process by emphasizing Jerusalem and opposing the "Gaza first" approach, which, ironically, was originally put forward by al-Sadat himself.

Rabin had not pressed the question whether Egypt regarded Gaza as an integral part of its territory, for he had perceived that by putting Jerusalem ahead of Gaza, al-Sadat was proffering an insight into his approach to the

Palestinian issue--meaning the autonomy scheme as outlined at Camp David. However, the only conclusion Rabin could draw was that al-Sadat did not regard Gaza as a special interest of Egypt (as claimed by Prof Shamir, for example) but rather as an integral part of the Palestinian issue: "Otherwise he would have agreed to the pilot-plan proposal," Rabin observed.

There were strong religious overtones in al-Sadat's references to Jerusalem. Rabin quoted him as saying: "If Jerusalem is holy to 13 million Jews, it is just as sacred to 80 million Moslems, not forgetting many millions of Christians, and thus a compromise must be found."

In reply, said Rabin, "I asked him why Jerusalem's holiness to Muslems and Christians had to have a political solution and not a religious one. I proposed the separation of the religious from the political aspect. I told him, 'let us distinguish between Jerusalem the living city and Jerusalem the holy city of the three great religions.' At first he did not quite grasp my meaning, but soon enough he responded by emphasizing his preference for a political solution to the religious problem."

Discussing the concrete application of the conclusions he had drawn from the al-Sadat visit, Rabin said he wanted the Labor Party "to see the facts as they are." His party should stick to both the Palestinian and the Jordian options for the autonomy scheme's transition period of five years. He felt that labor should go much further than the Likud was willing to in offering full autonomy to the Palestinians, except in security zones, which he envisaged as enlarged versions of the Camp David concept of security locations. In this category he would include the Jordan rift, greater Jerusalem and the southern end of the Gaza Strip. The rest of the West Bank and Gaza, in other words the bulk of the territory and populated areas, should enjoy home rule, but with three conditions: acceptable internal security arrangements are made; Jewish settlements stay put; and there is mutual agreement over customs, the free flow of traffic and utilization of water resources.

According to Rabin's plan, Palestinians would have greater self-rule; but, he said, "without any prejudice to one's position on a permanent solution" as phrased at Camp David with an eye to five years ahead.

The above refers to what he called the Palestinian option, and Rabin would already now have the Labor Party take the initiative by talking over matters with the moderate leaders in the territories.

As for the Jordanian option ("I am quite unsure whether the Labor Party has adopted a formal resolution on this issue"), he envisaged an Israel-Jordan trusteeship over the West Bank and Gaza for five years (specifically excluding East Jerusalem). He felt that there could be an amicable division of responsibility under such a trusteeship. Jordan would be administratively responsible for the Palestinian inhabitants and be committed to help them develop self-rule. The Israel defense forces would be suitably deployed so as to protect Israeli security interests from the river westwards. There would be joint Israel-Jordan responsibility for internal security he said, adding, "I think we can depend on the Jordanians to deal with any terror threat."

This plan could work if Israel reiterated that UN Resolution 242 was the basis for a permanent solution. In relation to this, Rabin pointed out that the appropriate phrase in 242 referred to "withdrawal from territories" but did not say "from all" and not "from the." He conceded that there were different interpretations of the resolution; but Israel can stipulate that there will be "a significant withdrawal." At any rate, the withdrawal issue has to be settled only at the end of the five years mentioned at Camp David, he noted.

Unlike the Likud leadership, which resolved that "no foreign rule or sovereighty be permitted to the west of the river," Rabin would offer a much broader framework for negotiations. "I am not demanding of Jordan or the Palestinian leadership that they agree at this point to territorial compromise. Because I am aware that any such demand would blow the whole process sky high; so I leave it open until the end." The fundamental difference between the Likud and Labor, he stressed, was that the former said there could never be any withdrawal, while the latter said there could.

Here he added a caustic note: "I am not one of those who claim that if we get back to power the entire world will applaud, and that Jordan and the Palestinians will immediately join the negotiations. But if we offer the Palestinian and the Jordanian options, as I envisage them, as alternative policies to the Likud, I believe we can reconstruct the national consensus around our right to security. I also believe that they offer a basis for limiting the deepening division between Israel and the diasora communities."

As someone acquainted with the American scene from his years at the Washington Embassy, Rabin was convinced that his proposals would have a positive effect on American public opinion because of their emphasis on the Jordan River as Israel's security border, on Jerusalem remaining united, and on access for Jordan to the Mediterranean through Gaza. Moreover, there is no aspiration to rule more than one million Palestinians or hold on to most of the territories.

Support throughout the U.S. would find its political expression in Congress, said Rabin, "and it is doubtful whether any president would act against any policy that enjoys broad support across the nation and in congress. Thus I believe that armed with such an approach Israel could win official American support," he maintained.

CSO: 4820

POLL PREDICTS 19 KNESSET SEATS FOR WEIZMAN-DAYAN-TAMIR PARTY

TA222050 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 22 Sep 80 p 19

[Report by Errol Guiney: "Opinion Poll by Israeli Institute for Research of Contemporary Society: 19 Seats for Party Headed by Weizman, Dayan and Tamir"]

[Excerpts] If a new center party is formed on the eve of the next elections headed by 'Ezer Weizman, Moshe Dayan and Shmu'el Tamir, it may receive 16 percent of the Jewish vote, namely, 18 to 19 Knesset seats. Eight to nine of these seats will be at the Likud's expense and four to five seats at the alignment's expense. However, even if such a party led by the above-mentioned men is established, it will not be able to undermine the predicted victory of the alignment in the elections to the 10th Knesset. The alignment is supposed to receive 40.1 percent of the total Jewish vote (46 to 48 seats) and the Likud will receive 17.1 percent (19 to 20 seats).

These are the conclusions of a comprehensive survey conducted by the heads of the Israeli Institute for Research on Contemporary Society, Prof Eliyahu Zamzob and Ben-or Gurpal. The survey included over 500 people representing various levels of the Jewish population in Israel.

The people polled were given two alternatives to the question "who will you vote for in the next elections": A) Should the current partisan structure remain unchanged and B) Should a party formed by Weizman, Dayan and Tamir be established.

The pollsters concluded that the Likud would suffer a considerable loss of strength. However, they did not confirm earlier polls, which predicted a majority to the alignment. Nevertheless, in spite of the general trend to return to the alignment, there is a large section of voters that, in spite of their disappointment with the DMC, still believes in a new political party adorned with glittering names like those of Weizman, Dayan and Tamir. Such a party could muster about 20 seats in the next election.

Another conclusion is that the strength of the Revival Party is superior to what had been assessed thus far, and it can gain 5 seats in the next elections. It should be assumed that the majority of those voting for the Revival Party will be people disappointed with the Likud, who regard the

Revival Party as the legal successor of the Herut movement in Israel's political right wing. The pollsters predict that the Hadash movement (formerly Rakah) will gain about 45 percent of the Arab vote, which constitutes about 7 percent of the total Israeli vote. The few votes it will receive from the Jewish sector together with the Arab votes will give Hadash 7 to 8 seats in the next Knesset. The remaining 55 percent of the Arab vote--which constitutes 9.5 percent of the general vote--will apparently be divided among the alignment, Shay, Sheli and independent Arab lists.

	If the Political Structure Remains Unchanged	If a New Center is Established
Alignment	44.1 percent	40.1 percent
Center Party List	--	16 percent
Likud	24.2 percent	17.1 percent
Democratic Movement	0.7 percent	0.4 percent
Shay	3.1 percent	2.2 percent
NRP	10.2 percent	10.2 percent
Revival Party	4.1 percent	4.1 percent
Citizens' Rights Movement	0.8 percent	0.7 percent
Independent Liberals	0.6 percent	0.5 percent
Agudat Yisra'el	3.4 percent	3.4 percent
Sheli	1.1 percent	1.1 percent
Hadash (Rakah)	0.5 percent	0.5 percent
Other groups	2.0 percent approximately	1.0 percent approximately

CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS ALIGNMENT'S LEAD NARROWS

TA261359 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 26 Sep 80 p 1

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT public opinion poll: "The Alignment is in the Lead--But the Gap is Narrowing"]

[Text] The Alignment is still in the lead, but from July to September there has been a slight trend toward weakening its lead compared with a relative strengthening of the Likud.

There is still a high percentage of abstainers--more than one-third of the public--and Rabin continues to head the candidates for the premiership. These are the main results emerging from the routine poll conducted by the Institute for Applied Social Research and the Institute of Communication of the Hebrew University at the beginning of September. The issues discussed were those suggested by the YEDI'OT AHARONOT editorial board.

Question: Would you prefer the Likud or the Alignment to form the next government?

Month	Likud	Alignment	No Preference
July	15	45	40
August	16	41	43
September	19	41	40

Question: Who would you like to see as the next prime minister?

The Preferred Candidate	July	August	September
Begin	10	13	15
Weizman	7	6	6
Peres	16	16	14
Rabin	25	26	27
Others	19	16	16
No Opinion	23	23	22

The poll also showed that the balance between the Likud and the Alignment shifts toward the latter as the education level of those interviewed increases.

CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS SOME OBJECTION TO NEW SETTLEMENTS

TA231658 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Sep 80 p 3

[Pori public opinion poll: "Of All Polled 30 Percent Believe: Refraining From Establishment of New Settlements is a Way to Resume the Autonomy Negotiations"]

[Text] Refraining from the establishment of new settlements in the West Bank is viewed by the public as the most important way to resume the autonomy negotiations. Halting the transfer of the prime minister's office to East Jerusalem, the postponement of discussions on Jerusalem's future status and agreement to an Israeli-Egyptian-U.S. summit are viewed as additional important factors in the resumption of the autonomy talks. These are the findings of the nation-wide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute at the request of HA'ARETZ.

Of those polled, 30 percent said that refraining from setting up new settlements in Judaea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip is a step that Israel must take to lead to the resumption of the autonomy negotiations.

Additional means for achieving the resumption of the negotiations as viewed by the public are: refraining from transferring the prime minister's office to East Jerusalem (25 percent), putting off deliberations on the future of Jerusalem to a later date (23 percent), agreement to an autonomy summit among Israel, Egypt and the United States (23 percent) and consent to include deliberations over Jerusalem's future status in the autonomy negotiations (10 percent).

Of those questioned, 19 percent said they do not know what measures Israel should adopt to achieve a resumption of the autonomy negotiations.

The poll encompassed a representative sample of 1,200 men and women personally interviewed in their homes throughout the country.

CSO: 4805

POLLSTER ANALYZES RECENT PUBLIC OPINION TRENDS

TA241902 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 24 Sep 80 p 22

[Third of a series by Pollster Hanokh Smith called "Election Forecast"; "Begin Fifth as Prime Minister; Peres Third in the Opposition"]

[Text] The Israeli political system tends to emphasize ideologies and ministerial teams because it presents parties to the election for the Knesset and not individual representatives. When an individual leader rose and gained prominence without the backing of a strong partisan mechanism or an ideology with a wide public acceptance, his success was short-lived, albeit attainable.

The first big test of this basic premise was David Ben-Gurion's attempt to establish Rafi in 1965. This list attracted only 7.9 percent of the votes and ultimately returned to the Labor Party. The greatest success scored by a list led by an individual was Yiga'el Yadin's "Democratic Party for Change" (DMC), which recieved 11.6 percent of the votes in the last elections. This party has lost almost all of its public support. Polls have shown that the Israeli public is currently reserved about small new parties.

Therefore, in this type of election, the focus is on the party and not the individual leader. But this is true not only for Israel. In the last election in Britain, polls showed that the "conservative" candidates enjoyed an absolute advantage of 5 percent in the constituencies and could gain a paliamentary majority. But asked whom they would prefer as prime minister, 60 percent of the voters replied that they would chose "labor's" Callaghan over "conservative" Margaret Thatcher. As is well known, the conservatives scored a great victory and Margaret Thatcher became prime minister. The results of the polls on the question of who is preferable as prime minister were interesting but not to the point; sometimes they were even misleading. Such errors should be avoided in Israel.

However, this does not mean that the personalities are not important, especially when they are party leaders commanding the political arena. Often they wield great weight on the voter's ultimate choice.

Menahem Begin no doubt controls the cabinet. All the more so since Moshe Dayan and 'Ezer Weizman resigned. His public standing has a crucial significance and consequently would have a certain bearing on the voting, were elections held today.

In each of the four polls I conducted, the public was asked whether Menahem Begin fulfilled the prime minister's duties well or not. The percentage of people who thought that he was functioning well or very well is shown in the following table and is set against the percentage of people who said they would vote for one of the parties constituting the government coalition on the same date:

How does Begin fulfill his job as prime minister and how will the respondents vote [figures in percentages]

	Begin as Prime Minister is Good	Will Vote For a Coalition Party	Will Vote For the Likud
May 1979	59	40	26
Sep 1979	53	35	23
Feb-Mar 1980	40	31	20
Aug-Sep 1980	41	30	18

The findings indicate, first of all, that the decline in the number of people who would have voted for the Likud or the coalition parties in general between May 1979 and February-March 1980 was accompanied by an even steeper slump in the number of people who thought that Prime Minister Begin was handling his job well. However, in all the cases the number of those who maintained that Begin was functioning well substantially exceeded the willingness to vote for a coalition party. This means that many voters prefer either parties that are not in the cabinet or opposition parties and that those voters who have not yet made up their minds believe that Menahem Begin functions well as prime minister.

The current poll shows that, compared to February-March 1980, Begin's popularity has remained intact, or even somewhat increased, whereas the support for the Likud has continued to decrease. This cannot be completely explained by the statistical results of the survey, but other data sheds some light on the subject.

The primary explanation for the latest grading of the prime minister in his post most likely results from his positions on a territorial compromise in East Jerusalem and some parts of the occupied territories--positions that have become more inflexible--as well as the increasing support for the Sharon-Gush Emunim position regarding the settlements in the territories.

This trend can perhaps be partially explained as constituting a sharp Israeli public reaction to the UN resolutions and to other positions held by countries considered friendly to Israel. Some of the political advantages of this intransigency were probably attached to the prime minister's personal stand.

At the same time, these developments also have a negative aspect. As we saw in the previous article, the percentage of people who thought that the cabinet is successful--either completely or partially--in its foreign policy went down by 11 percent in 6 months so that only 20 percent of the public believe that the government is successful in this area. Begin's vulnerability in this sphere is also illuminated by the replies given to the following question, presented in the last poll: "From among the following political leaders who have expressed their views on foreign policy, with whom would you personally identify?"

With which leader who has expressed his views on foreign affairs issue would you personally identify?

[Figures in percentages]

In the Government	Previously in the Government	In the Opposition	Others	Undecided
Begin--16	Dayan--18	Eban--15	4	15
	Weizman--14	Rabin--13		
		Peres--5		

According to the above table, only 16 percent identified with the prime minister's pronounced position, and he is considered the government's sole spokesman. Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir was not included in the list because he is relatively new in his post and very few of the people polled chose to insert his name instead of those who appeared on the list.

The greatest support was given to Moshe Dayan--18 percent, and former Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizman also attracted many people's support. Together, the two ex-ministers received almost one-third of all the votes.

A similar degree of support was given to the opposition spokesmen, the most popular of whom, with 15 percent of the votes, is former Foreign Minister Abba Eban, followed by Yitzhaq Rabin with 13 percent. Of all the opposition's spokesmen, Shim'on Peres received the least support (5 percent).

Among the chief spokesmen on foreign affairs there are at least five persons who attract votes, but there is no outstanding personality among them. Yet the person who should be most concerned is Prime Minister Menahem Begin. This emerges even more clearly from the replies to the question intended to discover how the Israeli Jewish populace regards its prime minister in a

historical perspective. The question was: "Of the following prime ministers, who, in your opinion, was the best; who was second best?"

1. Ben-Gurion
2. Levi Eshkol
3. Golda Me'ir
4. Yitzhaq Rabin
5. Menahem Begin
6. Others, no opinion.

At the obvious top was David Ben-Gurion: 60 percent thought he was the best and an additional 11 percent thought he was second best. A strong second position is taken by Golda Me'ir: 14 percent thought she was the best and 29 percent chose her as next to the best. The other prime ministers were much less favored. In third place is Levi Eshkol with 6 percent in first place and 16 in the second. After him comes Yitzhaq Rabin with 21 percent: 6 percent favoring him in first place and 15 percent placing him second and finally Menahem Begin with 5 percent placing him at the top and 1 percent placing him second [percentage as published]. (Moshe Sharet, who served as prime minister for a relatively short period 20 years ago, was not included in the list.)

One should note that Menahem Begin is still an acting prime minister and that history's judgement is a matter of time and perspective. Both David Ben-Gurion and Golda Me'ir knew times of sharp public criticism. At the same time it is interesting to observe the current public perspective, even though perspectives are liable to change.

It appears as if the prime minister's status has stabilized in the last 6 months on a higher level than the support for his party or the coalition parties together. This shows him to be a powerful political force in the cabinet and a person with a great potential. However, is the rate of 40 percent support encouraging to the prime minister of Israel? Before the Yom-Kippur war, Golda Me'ir received the support of 93 percent of the Israeli public for good performance at her job. Yitzhaq Rabin enjoyed only 45 percent support in the period of his personal problems on the eve of the 1977 elections.

Menahem Begin undoubtedly faces a great challenge.

CSO: 4805

'HA'ARETZ' ON JORDANIAN ROLE IN TERRITORIES

TA282120 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Sep 80 pp 9, 10

[Commentary by Yehuda Litani: "Between Two Committees"]

[Excerpts] "Clearly and continually Jordan is adopting a new line in handling the territories. Not only were offices for issuing passports opened throughout the West Bank and in East Jerusalem, but the Jordanians have recently increased their involvement in the developments in the territories. In recent weeks a symposium on labor was held in Amman to which residents of the territories were personally invited by Crown Prince Hasan. Another symposium is to take place on economic planning, with the participation of persons from the territories, and now there is the establishing of a special ministry for the affairs of "the occupied homelands." "In my opinion, the Jordanians decided to take matters into their own hands." This is the statement of a leading member of the National Guidance Committee, the central organization of PLO supporters in the territories, whose relations with Jordan so far have been ones of mutual hostility.

That person's statement may be somewhat exaggerated but his feeling is well founded. Reports published by a Kuwaiti newspaper and by Monte Carlo Radio (which is at present the most reliable foreign radio station of the Palestinians and has replaced the BBC) said that Abu Jihad, who is now No 2 man in the hierarchy of the Fatah Organization after Yasir 'Arafat went to Amman with a delegation of his organization not only to participate in the talks of the joint PLO-Jordanian committee but, mainly, to protest the establishment of the new ministry for "the occupied homeland" affairs to be headed by Hasan Ibrahim , whose brother is the mayor of Ya'bad in the West Bank.

The joint committee for handling the affairs of the territories was founded as a result of a decision at the Baghdad Conference in late 1978, thus constituting a climax in Jordan-PLO cooperation. The rejectionist organizations in the PLO could not consent to that. Since the beginning of the conciliatory campaign between Yasir 'Arafat and King Husayn the PLO rejectionist organizations have been attacking both parties and they have been expressing vociferous opposition to a move that seemed surprising a few years ago.

It is hard to guess where the present tension between Jordan and the PLO about the establishment of the new ministry lead. This decision is justified by the Jordanian authorities by technical reasons (concentration of efforts, etcetera). It indicates, nevertheless, their increased involvement in the territories. That member of the National Guidance Committee with whom I talked believes that at this stage no rift between the two parties is expected, and that Jordan will take care to improve relations with the PLO because now the two parties do not deem it worthwhile to reach a total rift. He thinks that Jordan does not wish at present to break from the Arab consensus and this may happen rapidly if a rift with the PLO is created. The PLO--Fatah to be more exact--does not want to remove itself from its new base in Jordan for that would mean that it would no longer be able to keep its hand on the pulse in the territories.

What about the activity of the National Guidance Committee in the territories? An impression is created that the strict restrictions imposed by the military government: the bar on the mayors making statements to the press, limitations on the movements of the leading members of the National Guidance Committee, including three newspaper editors, the deportation of the mayors of Hebron and Halhul, and most recently, the arrest of Qalqilyah Mayor Amin An-Nasir (who is a member of the National Guidance Committee) because of publication of a pamphlet without the permission of the censorship and the military government, and the wounding of Ramallah Mayor Karim Khalaf and Nabulus Mayor Bassam Ash-Shak'ah have considerably lowered the profile of the Guidance Committee and its activity was reduced to almost naught.

The member of the National Guidance Committee with whom I have talked thinks that this is a mere "temporary calm." He hinted that protest demonstrations are planned against a number of the military government imposed limitations, particularly the restrictions recently imposed on higher education. The military government, in its oppressive measures adopted so often, heightens our protests, the man says; they are not soley on our own initiative. You will hear from us and if Israel decides to deport us we may well remember that since the beginning of the occupation in June 1967 1,600 people have been deported from the territories. The protest activity against the occupation and the occupants is always continuing. If we are deported others will replace us, the man said.

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WEST BANK GNP STATISTICS ISSUED

TA262003 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Sep 80 p 4

[Report by economic correspondent: "Gross National Product in Judaea and Samaria Rose by 7 Percent in 1978/79"]

[Text] The Gross National Product [GNP] in permanent prices in Judaea and Samaria rose during 1978 and 1979 by 7 percent a year, as it did during the years 1977 and 1978. In Gaza and Northern Sinai the GNP, at constant prices, in 1978 and 1979 rose by 8 to 9 percent a year in comparison with an annual rise of 5 to 6 percent in 1977 and 1978.

These details were reported by the spokesman of the Central Bureau of Statistics based on figures for Judaea, Samaria, Gaza and Northern Sinai. It will be noted that the annual changes in the GNP are affected by variations in the olive harvest and by problems in measuring foreign trade with Israel. The biannual averages are, therefore, more significant than the data for a single year.

The GNP in Judaea and Samaria is figured from the local output from the various branches of the economy (75 percent) and net income from work in Israel and other countries (25 percent). In 1977 and 1978 the product resulting from income from work outside Judaea and Samaria, in constant prices, rose by 10 percent a year.

During this period the number of work days in Israel of people from Judaea and Samaria rose by 7 percent a year: there was a relatively steep rise in the number of people going to work in Arab countries and their income reached 30 percent of the total income of workers employed outside Judaea and Samaria.

The local product of the various branches of the economy in 1978 and 1979 rose by 6 percent a year, similar to the rise for 1977 and 1978. The estimates for the single years (not a biannual average) indicate a drop of 4 to 5 percent in 1979 compared with a rise of 18 percent in 1978 and a drop of 3 percent in 1977. This development was affected by the fluctuations in the agriculture branch, particularly in the olive yield.

In the other local branches of the economy in 1978 and 1979, a rise of 9 to 10 percent a year should be noted in the product of the construction branch compared with a rise of 7 percent a year in 1977 and 1978. The product of the industrial branch rose by 6 to 7 percent compared with a rise of 2 percent a year for 1977 and 1978.

The Central Bureau of Statistics says that private consumption, at fixed prices, in Judaea and Samaria rose during 1978 and 1979 by 6 percent a year (4 to 5 percent per capita) compared with a rise of 2 percent in 1977 and 1978.

CSO: 4805

GOLAN OIL PIPELINE PARALYZED

TA261158 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Sep 80 p 2

[Report by Mikha'el (Gerti): "The Pipeline in the Golan Heights is Still Paralyzed"]

[Text] Despite the increasing difficulties encountered in transporting the oil exported from Saudi Arabia--as the fighting between Iraq and Iran increases--the oil pipeline stretching from Saudi Arabia to Sidon Port in Lebanon remains virtually paralyzed. No steps have been taken to renew the flow of oil through it.

The oil pipeline leaves the Ra's Tannurah Terminal in Saudi Arabia and crosses the Arabian Peninsula, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. A 50 km section of this pipeline (called the (Tapline) Pipe) passes through the Golan Heights and is within the territory held by Israel since the 6-day war. The pipeline was in use and had transported oil until the beginning of the Lebanese civil war. Since 1975 the quantities of oil transported by the pipeline began to decrease until it was virtually shut down.

The main reason for the disuse of the pipeline is that one of its ends is in an area under the control of the Palestinian terrorist organizations, near Sidon in southern Lebanon. Because of its location, oil tankers have been prevented from reaching the port where there have been many incidents--something that has caused an unwillingness on the part of shipowners to jeopardize themselves, a rise in the rate of naval insurance and demands for higher salaries by sailors--similar to the current situation in the Persian Gulf.

The oil pipeline that passes through the Golan Heights has an appreciable flow capability: about 0.5 million barrels a day out of Saudi Arabia's total output--which is 9.5 million barrels a day and is marketed via the tanker route through the Straits of Hormuz.

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

ARABIC JOURNAL JERUSALEM DEBUT--A new Arabic literary monthly, the first to be published by an East Jerusalem Arabic daily, made its debut yesterday. AL-AFJR's literary supplement is edited by 'Ali Khalili and appears in a 16-page tabloid format selling for 1.5 Israeli shekels. Most of the contributions come from writers on the West Bank and in East Jerusalem. Hanah (Siniora), chief editor of AL-FAJR newspapers, which include the Arabic daily and an English weekly, said that preparations for a Hebrew weekly were well advanced. He said that he hoped that the first Palestinian publication in Hebrew would appear within a few weeks. [Text] [TA210920 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 21 Sep 80 p 3]

DEVALUATION OF SHEKEL--The devaluation of the shekel in the first eight months of the year lagged behind the rate of inflation by about 12 percent, according to data released this week by the Bank of Israel and the Central Bureau of Statistics. While inflation was 68.8 percent in this period (168.8 points, taking December 1979 as 100), the devaluation of the shekel was 48 percent (148 points compared with the same base). This lag caused the Bank of Israel to accelerate the devaluation of the shekel from the beginning of this month. The rate of devaluation is now 6-7 percent below the rate of inflation. The Bank of Israel's declared policy on devaluation is to keep it equal to the difference between the domestic rate of inflation and the rate prevailing abroad. The shekel is devalued to keep pace with domestic inflation, deducting the inflation "imported" from abroad. [Text] [TA191112 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 19 Sep 80 p 3]

AUGUST IMMIGRATION--Aliya continued to decline last month, with only 1,748 immigrants in August compared to 3,919 the same month in 1979. The biggest decrease was from the Soviet Union. Only 211 came here last month from that country, compared to 1,511 in August of last year. Only Rumanian aliya was up, while that from the U.S., South America, England and South Africa were all down. [Text] [TA232010 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 23 Sep 80 p 3 TA]

EXPORTS UP--Israel's exports during the first 8 months of the year were $3.8 billion, a 26 percent increase over the same period a year ago. During that same period, imports amounted to $5.3 billion, oil imports account for 30 percent of all imports. [Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 23 Sep 80 TA]

EGYPTIAN TOURISM--Tourism circles yesterday noted a dramatic turn for the better in the normalization of tourist traffic between Israel and Egypt, despite a renewed attempt to link such a concession to the return of a monastery to the copts in Jerusalem. Since 10 September, the sources said, the Egyptians have granted some 500 tourist visas to Israelis, many of whom had been waiting for months for an answer to their applications. At the same time the Egyptians also shortened the time it takes for their own nationals to acquire a second passport, needed to visit Israel. Both El Al and the Nefertiti Airlines are fully booked for the next few weeks, with long waiting lists for every flight. There is also at least one busload in each direction daily. [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 22 Sep 80 p 6 TA]

HOUSING AID INCREASED--The aid plans for the rural Arab sector have been updated and adjusted to the aid schemes for everyone eligible by virtue of belonging to the housing and construction ministry schemes, jews and druze alike, both in the urban and the rural sectors. This was reported by the minister of housing and construction's aide, Uri Oren. The loans given to Arabs in the rural sector have been increased 4 or 5 times and now amount to 655,000 Israeli pounds for families without housing provisions compared with 140,000 pounds given in the past. The sum of 500,000 pounds is now given to families possessing housing accommodations, but living in distressing conditions compared with the 100,000 such families got in the past. The initial monthly returns will not exceed 4,200 pounds. [Text] [TA241457 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 24 Sep 80 p 3]

FAMILIES SEEK PERMANENT SETTLEMENT--Forty families of the Giv'on Settlement new Jerusalem have left their camp this morning and have arrived at the site which, according to them, has been designated to become the permanent site of the settlement. They argue that they have been staying in a temporary camp for 3 years, and that all the promises made to arrange their transfer to the permanent settlement have not been met. Our correspondent Hayim Zisovitz reports that an officer of the military government arrived on the site and asked the settlers to leave the premises voluntarily. The settlers, however, demand to meet with Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhai Tzipori to discuss the future of the settlement and unless this demand is met, they will refuse to leave the site. [Text] [TA260648 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 26 Sep 80]

CABINET'S DECISIONS ON BUDGET, TAXES--The government decided to impose a tax, the rate of which has not been set yet, on every person earning 750,000 or more Israeli pounds annually. A tax, whose rate has not been determined yet, will be imposed on firms. The government has also endorsed all the expenditure items in the new budget. The government decided to refer to a committee the decision on reducing tax on stock, and the reduction of exemption from taxes for border settlements. The government has annulled 11 types of tax exemption, including the exemption on value added tax for tourists. These decisions have been made in a cabinet meeting that lasted for over 5 hours. Minister of Finance Yiga'el Hurvitz said that these

decisions constitute an expression of confidence for him, and encouragement for his work. [Text] [TA261230 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 26 Sep 80]

FURTHER DETAILS ON CABINET DECISIONS--The government has decided to impose a special tax on every person who earned over 750,000 Israeli pounds last [fiscal] year. Our correspondent Gid'on Selinger says that apparently a 5 percent tax will be decided upon. This means that the minimum tax would amount to 37,500 Israeli pounds. It will be collected in installments and the treasury revenue from it will amount to several million Israeli pounds. The government also decided to cut 6 percent from the investment and purchase budgets and also canceled several tax exemptions and benefits that will amount to some 8.5 billion pounds. The tourists exemption from the value added tax has been canceled. The automatic deduction on dividends from nonnegotiable stocks was raised to 45 percent. Tax exemptions for gifts and meals given by employers to their employees have been canceled. The tax exemption given to marketing boards on 3 percent of their income has also been canceled. It was decided to increase the fine for a delay in the paying of taxes to up to 1 percent a week, and to increase the interest for a delay to up to 120 percent. A meeting will be held on a number of other issues such as the taxation of stocks and a reduction in the number of settlements enjoying tax deductions. [Text] [TA261716 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 26 Sep 80]

COMMUNIST PARTY SUPPORTS KHOMEYNI--Rakah supports Khomeyni against what it calls the "Iraqi aggression." The Rakah Arabic-language organ AL-ITTIHAD has expressed firm support for Iran against Iraq's bloody regime under the leadership of Saddam Husayn. Rakah members are accusing the Iraqis of aggression against the Iranian revolution which is fighting U.S. neocolonialism. However, it is very possible that in its next edition AL-ITTIHAD will retract its firm stand. Last night, in its broadcasts in Hebrew, Moscow Radio broadcast an article published in PRAVDA, the organ of the Soviet Union's communist party, containing a balanced commentary praising Iraq and its revolution which destroyed the Baghdad Pact and Iran and its Muslim revolution which buried the Cento Pact. The PRAVDA article concludes with the words: "It would be better for the border dispute between Iran and Iraq to end, since it is of no benefit to anyone except the Americans and Israel." The Soviet paper expresses no position for or against either side. [Text] [TA261927 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 26 Sep 80 p 2]

NEW NAHAL SETTLEMENT--This afternoon, a ceremony marking the settling of the Nahal foothold at Bet Ha'arava took place in the Jordan Rift Valley a few kilometers from the dead sea's northern shore. The new foothold is located near the area where the original Bet Ha'arava was located until it was deserted in 1948. The Nahal soldiers who came to Bet Ha'arava were congratulated by Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori. [Excerpt] [TA281751 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 28 Sep 80]

RELIANCE ON U.S.--The majority of the Israeli public relies on the United States for help in weapons "in the event that the existence of Israel is placed in danger in another war with the Arab states." That opinion emerges from a nation-wide opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute at the request of HA'ARETZ. Of the respondents 35 percent are certain that the United States would give Israel, in such an event, "all the arms aid it needed." Another 35 percent hold the opinion that the United States "would give us limited weapons aid." Only 3 percent believe the United States "will send its army to aid us." In other words, over 70 percent of the public believe that aid in weapons could be expected from the United States in case of another war with the Arab countries. "In contrast, 9.2 percent said that at most the United States could be expected to give us political and moral support" but would not give us weapons and 3.3 percent believe that in such a case that United States would take a neutral stance and "would stand by." Over 14.5 percent of the respondents said they "do not know" how much aid the United States would be willing to extend Israel in case of war. The poll included a representative sample of 1,200 men and women who were interviewed individually. [Text] [TA281530 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Sep 80 p 3]

STUDENT EXCHANGE--Israel and Egypt will exchange delegations of medical students next summer. This is the first practical result of the first official meeting of student representatives from Israel and Egypt held in Cairo late last August. This meeting was held in the framework of the annual General Assembly of the Organization of the International Federation of Medical Students. It was the first time that a student delegation from Israel took part in an official event in Egypt. [TA290810 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Sep 80 p 4]

POLL SHOWS RABIN FAVORITE--Yitzhaq Rabin continues to be the preferred candidate for the premiership. Second is Menahem Begin and Shim'on Peres takes third place. These are the findings of a nation-wide Pori Institute public opinion poll commissioned by HA'ARETZ. Replying to the question: "If you were faced with the choice, whom would you prefer to see as prime minister: Menahem Begin, Shim'on Peres or Yitzhaq Rabin?" Some 38.2 percent preferred Yitzhaq Rabin, 23.2 percent favored Menahem Begin and 17.2 percent opted for Shim'on Peres. Some 13.1 percent said they want neither of these three personalities as prime minister and the remaining 8.3 percent said they "do not know" which of the three is fit to serve as prime minister. The conductor of the poll, Pori Institute Director Refa'el Gil, noted that the gap between those who support Rabin for the premiership and those who support Peres for the same post is even greater among the Alignment voters. While among the general public the gap between Rabin and Peres is 21 percent, among the Alignment voters it is currently 27 percent, with 58.5 percent favoring Rabin as prime minister as against 31.5 percent who want Peres as prime minister. The poll included 1,200 people of both sexes, who were interviewed individually. [Text] [TA291457 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Sep 80 p 3]

LABOR PARTY ARABS--Some 13,000 Arabs from 90 villages have so far joined the Labor Party. This has been reported by the Labor Party Arab department head, Ra'anan Kohen. On 25 November the Arab sector will for the first time elect its delegates to the Labor Party conference. [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 30 Sep 80 p 8]

MUNICIPALITIES AWARDED GRANTS--Bethlehem, 22 Sep--Military commander of Judaea and Samaria Brig Gen Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer visited the Bethlehem and Bayt Jala municipalities on Monday. He conferred with the mayors and members of the city councils and awarded each town a grant of 1 million Israeli pounds for the development of urban projects. The ITIM correspondent notes that the two municipalities have recently warned that they were having budgetary difficulties. The mayors requested to leave for Jordan in order to procure funds from the joint Jordanian-PLO Committee. [Text] [TA230849 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1810 GMT 22 Sep 80]

HADDAD ASKS FOR AID--Today Major Sa'd Haddad called on the leaders of local councils and local authorities in the Galilee and the northern part of the country to assist the Christian and Shi'ite villages. He requested investment for the construction of joint manufacturing plants and for Lebanese villages to be connected to Israel's national electricity network. Haddad says the terrorists in the an-Nabatiyah platteau control the electricity supply for Marj 'Uyun and al-Qulay'ah and they are able to disconnect it any time. Major Haddad also asked for aid for the construction of a telephone line, water supply system and for moral support for the residents on the front line of the joint front. Heads of local authorities in the north promised to do their best to help him. [Text] [TA212052 Jerusalam Domestic Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 21 Sep 80]

SOLDIERS MUST SERVE IN TERRITORIES--The High Court of Justice this morning rejected the appeal submitted by soldier Gadi Elgazi who has refused to serve in the territories. The court ruled that the IDF was authorized to compel any soldier to serve beyond the green line in accord with the army's needs. Our correspondent Moshe Negbi notes that the decision was adopted unanimously by Justices Hayim Kohen, Moshe Baisky and Shlomo Levin. In his ruling, Justice Kohen stated that in view of the numerous cases of soldiers refusing to serve in the territories due conscience, the IDF was permitted to set a comprehensive policy that would deal with such requests. In the past the army had taken such appeals by soldiers on a case by case basis. Justice Kohen expressed his skepticism about the benefit to the IDF of imposing its will on soldiers. On the other hand, he recommended that the appeallant and his colleagues desist in their action and not insist on sitting in a military prison because the presence of peace-minded soldiers in the territories helps promote peace in the area. [Text] [TA231417 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 23 Sep 80]

CSO: 4805

AL-ASAD URGED TO RESTORE SYRIAN-IRAQI HARMONY

LD220939 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 17 Sep 80 p 11

[Article by Najib 'Abd al-Hadi: "Mr President"]

[Excerpts] A few days ago we addressed a message through this newspaper to His Excellency President Saddam Husayn of Iraq appealing to him to surmount the differences existing between Damascus and Baghdad in order to make it possible to achieve the Arab aspirations and fill the frightening vacuum which al-Sadat's Egypt has left by tearing itself away from the Arab body. In my message to the Iraqi President I said that this vacuum can be filled only by the unification of Syrian and Iraqi efforts so they flow in one stream.

Yesterday, we published Iraqi President Saddam Husayn's comprehensive reply to my message. Your Excellency [President al-Sada] has most probably purused its contents.

Mr President Hafiz al-Asad, because we are eager to see that the current situation does not continue and that all obstacles are eliminated--although their elimination is not as easy as some imagine--we have written to you in your capacity as one of the October War heroes and on the grounds that Syria is the pulsating heart of Arabism and the citadel of steadfastness and confrontation which the hostile forces are trying to fragmentize in order to implement the capitulationist solutions according with the plans of the Camp David agreements.

We are aware, Mr President, that the downfall of Syria--God forbid--means the downfall of the Arabs--all the Arabs--that support for Syria is the duty of every Arab and that the disputes existing between you and revolutionary and Ba'thist Iraq are not of a type that are difficult to resolve or surmount. We also realize that Syria's al-Asad is aware of the importance of Iraq and its unlimited capabilities and that the utilization and employment of these capabilities in the service of our national and pan-Arab causes would strengthen the position of the Arabs and enable them to confront all the dangers facing this nation and homeland. But--woe to this word "but"--how can the Arab aspirations be achieved?

What we are demanding, Mr President, can only be achieved through a bold decision that would restore serenity and affection to the Arab atmosphere--a decision that would establish amity among the hearts, unify the efforts and frustrate all the conspiracies that are tearing the Arab body apart in order to weaken it, make it bleed and subject it to delusions and to the blows that are being dealt to it by wicked murderous hands whose only concern is to keep the Arab body weak and staggering under the impact of blows, tragedies and tribulations.

Mr President Hafiz al-Asad, we are writing to you and we have great hopes that the Iraq-Syrian rapprochement will be restored, bright and cohesive. We also hope that the pulsating heart of Arabism will once again beat strong. This can be achieved only through the unification of the Iraqi-Syrian aim, efforts and forces.

We wonder, will we live long enough to see that day? Will we see the day in which al-Asad from Damascus will embrace Saddam from Baghdad?

CSO: 4802

COMMITMENT TO ARAB UNITY KEY TO ACHIEVING ARAB AIMS

LD250837 Kuwait AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 23 Sep 80 pp 1, 19

[Editorial: "The Fes Conference and the Simple Fact"]

[Excerpts] The Islamic States Ministerial Conference, which concluded its meetings in Fes, Morocco, recently, rolled up its sleeves and decided to reject Resolution 242 as a settlement between the Arabs and Israel. It also decided to work for expelling Israel from the United Nations during the current UN session.

The Arabs and, consequently, the Muslims are becoming increasingly aware that this resolution does not solve the problem but makes it more complicated. The only Arab state which accepted this resolution, tactically at first but then unilaterally proceeding to resolve the issue on its basis, is Egypt.

But the United States continues to defend this resolution and to work toward imposing it as the only means for a solution. Because the United States and Israel do not want any Palestinian political entity to be established, the formula represented in this resolution is the only thing that conforms with and fulfills their desire.

It remains for us to ask what the Islamic conference has done, more than past Arab conferences, in the way of preparations to make its decision stick and achieve Israel's expulsion from the United Nations. Most probably, the decision was made without any plans to support it and then impose it as a fait accompli on the United States and Israel.

Although it is beneficial in the way of propaganda to win the largest section of the world public opinion to our side at the United Nations or in any other international forum, the simple fact remains that the world trends to support and to yield to the strong.

As long as the Arabs do not act on the basis of this fact, every effort they make will be utter nonsense. The way to realize this simple fact is well known. It is hopeless to expect to change the image of Arab weakness unless

we change our behavior--that is, unless we are able to make one united move without entertaining delusions and doubts toward each other.

War, as one can see, is waged only in cooperation with a major source of arms. The Iraqi-Persian war is the best proof of this. To wage a successful war, we must unite our forces in a joint active front to counterbalance the might of American-Israeli arms. Most probably, the United States will not be the source of our arms.

Iraq is not communist and will never be, yet it went to the Soviet Union to ask for arms.

War has its rules, and anyone who wages war or has no alternative but to wage it in order to regain his rights must act according to these rules. Otherwise he will be a member of the pauper club.

CSO: 4802

SIGNIFICANCE OF SEMINAR OF CADRES NOTED

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 27 Aug 80 pp 1, 8

[Editorial by "Chaab": "From Words to Action"]

[Text] The seminar of cadres devoted to "the economic situation and prospects in our country" concluded its work late yesterday evening.

The seminar, which lasted a week, had an extremely fruitful dialog between national leaders and cadres concerning the current and future development situation in our country. Without any exaggeration, it was a symbol of our determination to follow the path of recovery.

The seminar provided an opportunity to strengthen the democratic experiment underway since 10 July and enlightened our cadres in their search for an original development strategy designed by Mauritanians serving their country.

In this connection, one must hail the positive move of national leaders, who have opened the way to the broadest concertation, without restrictions, throughout the debate, hearing all voices. In this way, they have helped national cadres to emerge from their isolation and to realize their responsibilities to the task of building their country. One must also welcome the massive response of cadres to the national leaders' summons to attend the seminar.

Our cadres engaged in their discussions in an attempt to find an original path to development. They made a noteworthy intellectual effort and completed a diagnosis of the country's economic situation.

They analyzed the situation and made proposals concerning ways and means of improving it in order to meet the challenges our country faces from hostile nature, international inflation, and effects of war, poor management and a mediocre administration.

Actually, in both cases, it was a duty which both groups made in order to seek the path of salvation. In the final analysis, the most important thing is to adopt that path as a method in order to move constantly forward,

whether it be a question of this concertation or any other positive move to be undertaken in the future. The value of the seminar therefore resides in the effect it will have on the thinking of our cadres and on their behavior, wherever they may be, but also in the impact it will have on the economic situation of our country and all our people.

Moved by this spirit, Lt Col Mohamed Khouna O. Haidalla, president of the CMSN [Supreme National Military Committee], head of state and the government, was anxious to attend the debates of the seminar and closely followed all proceedings. It was in this same spirit that he closed the seminar, after reaffirming that the success of any development strategy depends on a change in thinking on the part of those who apply it. He said that the problem of the administration is above all linked to ways of thinking. The seminar will not have been fruitful if our cadres did not become aware of the dangers threatening our country.

Our cadres must become aware of their responsibilities and demonstrate a great willingness to do their patriotic duty.

They must show a spirit of sacrifice in order to serve the higher interests of their people and the nation.

After the seminar is over, the essential thing is for our cadres to understand that they must link words with constructive action. They must individually and collectively help in the national effort undertaken in order to rehabilitate the country's economy.

In addition, there is the responsibility of the national leadership, which must use the results of the cadres' seminar, taking the constructive viewpoints of our cadres into account.

Lt Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, president of the CMSN, chief of state and the government, made a commitment in this area which we are convinced will be honored. In general, the seminar will only have achieved its objective when the participants have understood that they best position they expressed in their speeches is their commitment to their nation and history.

They must therefore understand that they must honor their commitment to faithfully serve their country and contribute to the overall recovery effort undertaken by the nation's leaders.

11,464
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

OPPOSITION LEADER'S APPEAL--The "free" return to his country of former Mauritanian president Mokhtar Ould Daddah "would restore the dignity and credibility lacking in Nouakchott." This statement was made yesterday in Paris by the founder of the National Unity Movement (MUN, in opposition to the regime of Colonel Ould Haidallah), Ahmed Moilid. Moilid, who has resided in Rabat since the overthrow of former Mauritanian chief of state Ould Daddah by a coup on 10 July 1978, said that Colonel Ould Haidalla, currently president of the Supreme National Military Committee (CMSN), "is an invention of the POLISARIO Front and is totally in line with the policy of the Libyan chief of state, Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. Recommending "the complementary nature of the Rabat-Nouakchott-Dakar axis" because of the "historic coexistence of bonds linking the three countries," Moilid also came out in favor of a military presence in Mauritania, "providing the people with security," he said. The exiled leader branded the "defeatism" of the current government and called on the Mauritanian people "to mobilize against the enemies of the nation." "We must save Mauritania at a decisive time in its history," said Moilid, who also denounced the "persecution of opponents by the Nouakchott government." [Text] [Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 9 Sep 80 p 18] 11,464

CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

MINISTER COMMENTS ON PROJECTS--Brother 'Abd al-Ghani 'Abd al-Qadir, member of the central committee and minister of industry, has affirmed that the Ministry of Industry is aspiring to set up new industrial units centered in factories dependent on local raw materials. Foremost among such industries will be those of cement manufacturing and marble-making and the processing of local raw materials such as cotton in order to develop the local textile industry. In the area of electricity, Brother 'Abd al-Ghani said in a statement to the radio that there are a number of projects which will be implemented during the second amended 5-year plan. Work is now progressing on building two powerstations in Wadi Hadramawt and Wadi Abyan. During the next few weeks work will begin on the Mansurah power station. Work is also in progress to construct a geothermal plant at Hiswa. In the course of his statement, the minister said that the government is giving great attention to the Aden refinery. It will be developed to keep pace with the other refineries in the region. [Text] [LD132059 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 13 Sep 80 EA]

VISIT OF SERVICEMEN TO USSR--A delegation of young servicemen, under Brother Capt Salih Husni 'Abdallah, chief of the youth section in the Political Department of the Ministry of Defense, left Aden this afternoon for the USSR, at the invitation of the Komsomol organization of the Red Army. During the visit they will exchange views and experiences in the sphere of military work between the Army of Democratic Yemen and the Soviet Red Army. [Text] [LD041841 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 4 Sep 80 EA]

CSO: 4802

LONDON ARAB PAPER URGES ACTION TO 'COOL' IRAQI-IRANIAN CONFLICT

LD221009 London ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 19 Sep 80 p 5

[Article by 'Irfan Nizam Ad-din: "The Gulf Fear"]

[Excerpts] The situation in the gulf area has reached the danger point following the recent developments represented by the Iraqi-Iranian battles and Iraq's abrogation of the 6 March agreement which was concluded in Algiers between President Saddam Husayn (who was deputy chairman of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council at the time) and the departed shah, whereby Iran obtained navigational "concessions" in Shatt al-'Arab.

Amid the prevailing state of watchfulness and anxiety, everything is possible as to which direction the crisis might take. It is definite however that the crisis would not remain confined to Iraq and Iran, were the situation to continue to deteriorate and war break out, but would affect the entire gulf area and whole Arab and Islamic world.

Therefore, there is an urgent need for swift action to cool the atmosphere and pave the way for fraternal negotiations between the two countries to resolve their problems peacefully and put an end to the unnecessary squandering of Islamic forces which only serves their many enemies, particularly Israel.

The critical situation the Arab nation is experiencing calls for vigilance and watchfulness and for avoiding becoming dragged into peripheral crises at a time when the Zionist campaigns are intensifying to consolidate Israeli occupation of the Arab territories and turn the area into an arena for international conflict.

Without entering into the details of the Iraqi-Iranian dispute and its reasons, the two sides must be asked to have recourse to reason and patience and to dialog instead of arms. It would be better for the Arab states to move collectively to achieve this matter and to reach a new formula for cooperation based on noninterference in internal affairs, on refraining from provoking sensitivities and hatreds and on ending the logic of domination and the "policeman" policy invented by the departed shah.

It is in the interest of everybody to devote attention to building the intrinsic power, to implementing the development projects and to consolidating the ranks to confront the biggest danger posed by the Israeli presence.

CSO: 4802

QATARI PAPER COMMENTS ON PALESTINIANS LIVING IN GULF

GF201910 Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 18 Sep 80 pp 1, 10

[Editorial: "Palestinians in the Gulf"]

[Excerpts] In a statement to the Lebanese paper AL-SAFIR, PLO Central Committee member Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) referred to Palestinians in the Gulf and what our enemies are trying to do by creating problems between these Palestinians and Gulf natives. Palestinians in the Gulf are carrying a message for humanity and civilization in the fields of education, economics and construction. Gulf citizens have welcomed them and received them with amity as their brothers. No unusual problems have arisen between Palestinians and Gulf citizens. What has happened here is normal and happens everywhere.

But the crisis to which Abu Iyad refers is that there are persons who "have an interest in creating a rift between Arab expatriates in the Gulf and native Gulf citizens. Therefore some persons provoke personal and security incidents and attribute them to the Palestinians."

Those individuals who are fighting Arabs in general and the Palestinian cause in particular want to kindle the fire between Palestinian Arabs and Gulf Arabs. They are attributing, without justification or proof, any acts aimed at harming the security of the Gulf to the Palestinians. But we must face this attempt and foil it at an early stage.

Abu Iyad says: "We do not object to the trial of any Palestinian offender. However, we are against any such campaign directed at Palestinians that may spread to schools, factories and institutions and lead to undesirable results."

This is what we must guard against and totally reject. Our decisive stand against such acts is part of the defense of the Gulf and the security of all Arabs against the tragedies being created by our enemies everywhere. This is what we should do at a time when true cooperation must exist between the Arabs themselves--cooperation based on mutual interests and the Arab homeland.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

IRAQI-IRANIAN CLASHES STATEMENT--The Deputy Amir and heir apparent, Shaykh Hamad Ibn Khalifah al Thani, presided over the weekly cabinet meeting in al-Dawhah Palace today. At the beginning of the meeting the cabinet discussed current events between Iraq and Iran. In this regard Information Minister 'Isa Ghanim al-Kuwari made the following statement: The cabinet today discussed reports on the escalating bloody conflict between the two neighboring Muslim countries, Iraq and Iran. The government of Qatar, which is following with extreme anxiety and great pain the development of this conflict between the two countries, hopes that the appeal of wisdom which provides for the resolution of differences among brothers by peaceful means will win out. In this way the bloodshed can end and the strength and energy expended can contribute toward our Islamic nation's struggle in the face of the aggression by our common enemy against our Arab rights and Islamic holy places. Also, no opportunity will be created for foreign intervention, which we are all anxious to avoid. The cabinet discussed the topics on its agenda and adopted the appropriate decisions. [Excerpt] [GF241119 Doha Domestic Service in Arabic 1030 GMT 24 Sep 80]

CSO: 4802

INDEPENDENCE IN CHOICE OF ARMS SUPPLIER EMPHASIZED

LD171119 Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 2 Sep 80 p 1

[Editorial: "The Freedom to Arms"]

[Excerpts] The question of armament is no longer a problem for the Middle East countries, since the area has become the biggest consumer of arms of various types. Arms purchases have reached billions of dollars, which has made arms manufacturers drool and made them compete strongly to promote their goods regardless of the political implications involved, especially in view of the political ties which most countries in the area have had for more than a quarter of a century.

The question of armament is now particularly sensitive, and this has prompted most Arab countries, particularly the Gulf countries, to crack the monopoly and break away from the domination of the two giants, so as to obtain good quality arms from other countries, especially France, Britain and Germany, whose arms are to a large extent superior to Russian and U.S. arms.

The problem for the countries of the area lies not in the purchase of arms, since they have plenty of money to conclude the biggest deals despite the competition and the political strings, but in training the men to use, control, maintain and insure proper utilization of those arms. This calls for great efforts and large amounts of money, which in most cases exceed the cost of the arms themselves. This also means the need for a correct training policy based first and foremost on providing efficient instructors, building of the necessary installations, and planning a sound defense policy in which the citizen is the cornerstone and the prime mover.

Proceeding from these clear basis, the kingdom has begun drawing up its comprehensive defensive policy on the basis of the principle of general defense rather than of concentrating on one particular area, as his highness the defense minister said at his important press conference.

The principle of diversifying armament, as his highness pointed out, is also a commitment undertaken by the kingdom and considered one important step toward breaking the arms monopoly which Washington and Moscow have in the Arab world.

His highness' reference clarifies an established fact and rules out any link between politics and armament, although some arms-exporting countries insist or make it a condition that a certain policy be adopted in return for obtaining a certain arm.

The right choice of the source of arms with total independence is evidence of nonbelief in the axis policy, which the kingdom has always rejected and warned against involvement in.

CSO: 4802

ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANY NOT VIEWED AS IMMINENT

LD171055 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 4 Sep 80 p 1

[Report by Yunis Muhammad Ishaq: "Saudi Arabia Has Acquired Its Share in Aramco, and Arrangements for the Establishment of the National Company Will Be Completed"]

[Excerpt] Jidda AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT Bureau--Dr 'Abd al-Hadi Tahir, governor of the Saudi General Organization for Petroleum and Minerals (PETROMIN), has emphasized that the Saudi Arabian Government acquired full ownership of Aramco shares as of 10 March 1980.

The PETROMIN governor added in an exclusive statement to AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT that this acquisition does not mean the imminent establishment of the national petroleum company, since there is no hurry about completing the necessary arrangements.

He explained that many things ought to be resolved before embarking on the establishment of this company, particularly how to manage it.

Dr Tahir pointed out that immediate commitments will not be affected if production is reduced to 8.3 million barrels a day. He said: The additional quantities produced are not part of the original basic quota sold through companies. Discounting these quantities therefore has nothing to do with the subject, because they are not included in the basic quota in any case.

The PETROMIN governor said that present production is 1 million barrels a day higher than the fixed maximum. He added that the Saudi Arabian kingdom's production capability has now reached 11 million barrels daily. He added that this figure could be increased to 12 million barrels daily by mid-1985.

CSO: 4802

ADEQUATE CORN CROP, SHORTAGES IN DARFUR DISCUSSED

Khartoum AL-SAHAFAH in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 1

[Text] Dr Umar al-Amin, minister of agriculture, nutrition and natural resources confirmed that during the last harvest, the nation's production of corn totaled 1.8 million tons, thus maintaining the national average for seasonal production. The sum of the crop and the general reserve exceeds national consumption by 600,000 tons. The combined supply of corn in both the public and private sectors will enable the state to withstand any slack in production in any particular region of the nation, should it occur.

Dr al-Amin reviewed the efforts of central state agencies to cope with shortages of corn in western and southern regions of the Sudan. These efforts began with the maintenance of a general reserve. Executive Popular Councils are allowed to obtain corn at official prices without [advance] payment commitments. State agencies even contribute to the transportation cost of the corn to needy areas. The ministry of transport is committed to transporting the corn via the railroad, even if passenger trains have to be cancelled to do so.

This information was given in a statement delivered yesterday in the People's Assembly by the minister of agriculture, Dr al-Amin, in response to an urgent question submitted by 64 members of the western governorates regarding a potential corn shortage, high prices and a resultant specter of starvation. Dr al-Amin asked the local agencies in the governorates to obtain their needs of corn without delay in order to make this basic nutritional staple available to the citizens in western and southern Sudan. He also called on all agencies and organizations to urge the citizens in western Sudan and throughout the nation to plant corn, whose season has started, to secure their needs and preclude crises in future years.

In a statistical review of the situation, the minister of agriculture said: "The nation's average production of corn last season dropped from 2 to 1.8 million tons. This is due to the decrease in the areas planted with corn in the irrigated sector as well as in the traditional sector. This decrease amounted to 1 million acres. The average production in the

western governorates dropped from 400,000 tons annually to 260,000 tons in the last season. The traditional planted area decreased by 200,000 acres, while the level of production in the mechanized sector in south Kurdufan was maintained. In spite of all this, the corn crop along with the national reserve exceeds annual consumption by more than 600,000 tons."

Dr al-Amin referred to the fact that only limited quantities of corn had been exported and that this would not affect the abundant supply available for domestic consumption. He added that the corn reserve at the Agricultural Bank has reached 434,000 sacks. The state maintains this reserve every year in order to direct it to areas of need and to sell it on the market to stabilize the price of corn.

Dr al-Amin stated that the first reports indicating the seriousness of the corn situation in the western provinces were received from the governors of North Darfur and South Darfur in mid-May 1980. Following that, an emergency meeting chaired by the minister of finance and economy was held. It was decided that 50,000 sacks of corn from the Agricultural Bank warehouse would be allocated to South Darfur under guarantee of the finance ministry. The price was set at 7.8 pounds per sack. The corn will be transported by railroad to Niala, the ministry of finance will absorb 50 percent of the transportation cost. All preliminary steps for this transaction were completed, but representatives of the South Darfur governorate have so far not been able to sign the contract and take delivery of the corn.

Dr al-Amin indicated that he had learned only yesterday [30 June] that the representatives of South Darfur had requested a special type of corn which they wished to buy directly from the private sector. Therefore, they were requesting the ministry of finance to give them the money to make this purchase. Naturally, the minister of finance did not approve this request. Dr al-Amin mentioned that the ministry of finance had approved an allocation to North Darfur last May, and had paid for it. But until now, the transactions have not been completed for similar reasons as above.

Dr al-Amin gave figures representing quantities of corn which were transported via railroad to Niala. These quantities were: 20,000 sacks from Khartoum through the private sector in February-March 1980; 26,000 sacks from Dabibat to South Darfur in March-April 1980; and 10,000 sacks to South Darfur in April-May 1980.

A total of 8,400 sacks of corn have been shipped for Niala by the private sector, but they have been held up between Kusta and al-Rashif railroad stations, because the governor of South Darfur wanted to give priority to other supplies.

Dr al-Amin emphasized the readiness of the railroad authorities to transport the corn needed by the people of South Darfur, once the priorities requested by the governor are completed.

Dr al-Amin emphasized that the authorities had not received information about a corn supply crisis in the western governorates. He stated that the ministry is ready to solve any problems which might impede the availability of corn to the citizens everywhere. Dr al-Amin said appropriate measures have been adopted in this regard from May to July 1980. Thus, the minister of finance issued a decree stopping the sale of corn by the Agricultural Bank until 20 July 1980, and the minister of transport issued a decree to transport corn to the western governorates by railroad, cancelling passenger trains if necessary. Also, 60,000 sacks of corn were allocated to the southern region to be transported from Kusti at the expense of the finance ministry.

In conclusion, Dr al-Amin said that the ministry of agriculture has begun preparations to carry out a special pest-control program in the western provinces in the next six months. The program has been referred to the council of ministers for approval.

9607
CSO: 4802

TUNIS TO OPEN EMBASSY IN MALTA

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 23 Aug 80 p 5

[Article: "Concern of the Two Countries To Promote Cooperation"]

[Text] Hassan Belkhoja, minister of foreign affairs, yesterday at noon in the headquarters of his department received Maurice Abdela, secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malta, who was accompanied by the chief of the Arab Division of the same office and by a Maltese member of parliament.

The meeting was carried out in the presence of Taleb Sahbani, secretary general of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who met beforehand with the Maltese guests.

In a statement at the conclusion of the meeting, Abdela said that he had examined with Belkhoja and Sahbani several issues concerning particularly the means of strengthening cooperation between Tunisia and Malta.

In this regard, Abdela emphasized that the decision of the Tunisian government to very soon open an embassy in La Valette and the coming meeting of the Tunisian-Maltese Joint Commission that has to examine the program of cooperation between the two countries, represent their concern to promote relations between them, to develop their cooperation and to strengthen their ties of friendship.

Abdela concluded by emphasizing that his visit to Tunisia is made within the framework of periodic contacts and harmony between the leaders of the two countries to achieve these objectives.

9545
CSO: 4400

ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH KUWAIT REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 23 Aug 80 p 5

[Article: "Optimism for Prospects of Development of Tunisian-Kuwaiti Cooperation. Toward Creation of a Joint Bank for Development"]

[Text] Abderrahman Salem Al Atiki, Kuwaiti minister of finance, left Tunis yesterday after having participated in a meeting of the Arab Economic Council, the result of the Conference of Arab Ministers of Foreign Affairs held in Amman at the beginning of last July.

In a statement, Al Atiki praised the excellent Tunisian-Kuwaiti relations which, he emphasized, are based on mutual respect, reciprocal esteem and serious labor that was made possible thanks to the enlightened policy of the Supreme Warrior and to his actions benefiting cooperation between the two countries.

Al Atiki moreover expressed his satisfaction regarding the state of Tunisian-Kuwaiti cooperation and the pace of its development, explaining his optimism for the prospects of development of this cooperation in the future. In this regard he noted that the success of cooperation between the two countries is due to several factors, especially the good results obtained and the success of programs achieved within the framework of this cooperation. Thus, explained Finance Minister Al Atiki, Kuwaiti investments in Tunisia have brought the hoped-for results, especially in tourism.

Al Atiki stated in this connection that because of this success, other initiatives will be taken, including particularly creation of a Tunisian-Kuwaiti bank for development. Emphasizing the interest of Arab investments in Arab countries, Al Atiki reaffirmed Kuwait's full inclination to strengthen such investments even if they were less profitable than those in other countries. He explained that investments in Arab countries must be based on the common interest within a concern for achieving economic and social development in the Arab world.

Al Atiki was attended on his departure from the Tunis-Carthage international airport by Mansour Moalla, planning and finance minister; Abdelhassen Zalzala, assistant secretary general of the League of Arab States, entrusted with economic affairs and Majran Ahmad Al Hamad, ambassador of Kuwait to Tunis.

9545
CSO: 4400

ECONOMIC, TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH TOGO

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 27 Aug 80 p 4

[Article: "Desire To See Cooperation between the Two Countries Strengthened"]

[Text] At the end of the official visit to Tunisia from 21 to 23 August by Kwassivi Kpetigo, Togolese minister of industry and state companies, a final communique was published, the text of which is the following:

At the invitation of His Excellence, the Tunisian Minister of National Economy, Abdelaziz Lasram, His Excellence, the Togolese Minister of Industry and State Companies, Kwassivi Kpetigo, made an official visit to Tunisia from 21 to 23 August 1980.

This visit provided the opportunity for the two ministers to exchange views about cooperation between the two countries in economic and technical areas and especially in the area of industry and state companies.

For this purpose His Excellence, Mr Lasram, presented to the Togolese minister a summary of the results obtained by the Tunisian Government under the guidance of President Bourguiba in his efforts to promote the economic and social development of the Tunisian Republic.

His Excellence, Minister Kpetigo, after having thanked the Tunisian Government; its party, the Destourien Socialist Party and President Habib Bourguiba, in the name of the Togolese Government, its party and its president, Army General Eyadema, described to Minister Lasram the broad outlines of Togolese policies regarding economic, social and technical development.

In observing the condition of Tunisian-Togolese cooperation, the two ministers congratulated each other on the excellent state of this cooperation and on the vast possibilities available for pursuing and strengthening it.

During their stay, the Togolese delegation became aware of the dynamic quality of the Tunisian economy, when they visited certain Tunisian

Government projects in areas such as: mining, metallurgy, manufacturing, agro-industry, tourism, etc.

At the conclusion of this visit, the two ministers expressed their desire to see cooperation strengthened between Togo and Tunisia especially in the areas of:

Economics--through trade exchanges and joint projects.

Technical matters--through exchanges of technicians, and professional training, in order to set up the necessary structures for the industrial development of their countries out of concern for improving living conditions.

His Excellence, Minister Kpetigo, quite sensitive to the brotherly welcome accorded him and his delegation, warmly thanks Minister Lasram and, through him, his colleagues and all the regional and local authorities who have not spared any effort to make his stay fruitful, and he asks to please convey to the President of the Tunisian Republic his thanks and a brotherly greeting from the President of the Togolese Republic.

Minister Kpetigo invites His Excellence, Mr. Lasram, to pay an official visit to Togo at his convenience.

9545
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH BULGARIA--Lassaad Ben Osman, minister of agriculture, received, yesterday morning at agriculture headquarters, Ivan Abadjiev, ambassador of Bulgaria to Tunis. The meeting dealt with strengthening cooperation in agriculture and studying irrigation and breeding projects in anticipation of the next joint Tunisian-Bulgarian commission, which will be held in Sofia at the end of September 1980. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 28 Aug 80 p 4] 9545

CSO: 4400

OIL MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON OIL PRODUCTION, PRICING POLICIES

JN131103 Doha QNA in Arabic 1005 GMT 13 Sep 80

[Excerpts] Abu Dhabi, 13 Sep (QNA)--Dr Mani' Sa'id al-'Utaybah, UAE minister of petroleum and natural resources, has called for removing the oil weapon from outbiddings that call for using it as a threat, so that oil will not lose its value.

In an interview with the Abu Dhabi newspaper AL-WAHDAH today, he said: We are ready to use the oil weapon in the service of our Pan-Arab causes and to suspend its export to any country proven to be fighting the Arabs, whether the United States or any other country, because in this matter there is no difference between East and West.

Dr al-'Utaybah reiterated his country's consistent policy of continuing to decrease its oil production. He said: We are determined to carry out more oil production reductions before the end of this year and early next year regardless of whether there is a surplus on the oil market. However, the UAE minister did not define the rate of such reductions.

Dr al-'Utaybah said that his country will not permit oil price reductions even if it becomes necessary to close down its oil fields.

Dr al-'Utaybah expressed pessimism on the possibility of unifying prices under the current circumstances. He said: It is very difficult to achieve this at present because OPEC needs more time to gradually unify prices. This should be achieved in stages and not at one time because of the possible effects of such a step on the world economy and its political repercussions.

Dr al-'Utaybah denied any knowledge about news reports that Saudi Arabia intends to raise its oil prices in the range of $4 per barrel. He stressed that his country is not ready to increase its oil prices at present in the range of $4 at one time.

CSO: 4802

'SDAR' COMMUNIQUE REPORTS MILITARY SUCCESSES AGAINST MOROCCANS

LD211348 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 21 Sep 80

[Text] News agency reports this morning carry the story of a new sweeping attack by the Saharan fighters on the city of El Aaiun, capital of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic on 18 September. The reports cite the communique issued by the Saharan Defense Ministry this morning announcing that on 18 September naval units of the Saharan Popular Liberation Army attacked the port of El Aaiun, occupied by the Moroccan invasion forces and were able to free it for a while. The communique notes that the Saharan fighters destroyed a significant part of the port's warehouses and also destroyed the ducts carrying the city's fuel and water and the port's electricity lines.

The communique also notes that during 13-15 September, the Saharan fighters shelled the town of Semara, killing 7 Moroccan soldiers and wounding 10 others. On 16 September, forces of the Saharan Popular Liberation Army attacked the garrisons of Rous-el-Ouk and Rous-el-Sabt at Oued Dras in southern Morocco. This shelling led to the killing of 29 soldiers, the wounding of 16 others and the destruction of several military fortifications. The Saharan communique also notes that on 17 September, Saharan fighters attacked Moroccan military installations at Bu Ghirbah in southern Morocco, first for 30 minutes and later for another 15 minutes. This led to the killing of eight Moroccan soldiers, the wounding of four others and to material losses.

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END

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No. 2196

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8 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2196

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DATA ON U.S., FRENCH, SOVIET MADE TANKS IN MID-EAST

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 21 Jul 80 pp 36-37

[Article by Tawfiq Nakhalh Ibrahim: "Tanks M60, T-72, AMX-30; Jordan Arms Itself with American Equipment, While Saudi Arabia Adopts French Equipment"]

[Text] Three tanks have been created for which the Arab nations are competing with each other: The American, the Soviet and the French. The Soviet T-72 has clearly superior charactersitics. Israel has entered the field with the MIRKAV, known for its low speed.

The Jordanian army is to be provided with two hundred M60 American medium tanks. These machines are equipped with a night vision system which operates on infrared rays.

The Israelis have protested this transaction, but this protest is unwarranted. On one hand, the two hundred new tanks will never make the Jordanian ground forces a power whch poses a danger to Israel. If the tank is of the M60 model, it is the most modern equipment which the American army uses, because the new X-M-1 tank has not yet been placed into actual service (its speed is 80 Km/h, and the American tank drivers liken it to a Cadillac). The Americans intend to provide the first batch of XM-1 tanks with new engines (Rolls Royce) operating on diesel fuel. The Shir tanks which Iran ordered during the reign of the Shah used to be equipped with these engines.

The design of the M60 tank is now considered obsolete. The tank's speed is 48 Km/h. However, never models of this tank, especially the M60-I-3 model, equipped with a strong engine and a rangefinder which operates on laser beams, aside from its great ammunition storage capacity, is considered among the best equipment.

However, what Jordan will be provided with, is not tanks of the M60-I-3 type. It should be noted that the M60 tanks, which Jordan will not obtain before 1981/1982, are not equipped with modern electronic firing systems, which could make them terribly effective. However, the positive point of this tank, of which Saudi Arabia owns 250 units, the thickness of its armor, (its weight is fifty six tons) and its type of gun (105 mm), is that it is made in the United States.

In the United States, the M60 tank is still considered to be a good medium-heavy offensive tank, probably thanks to the thickness of its armor, especially when it is driven by an inexperienced driver and exposed to hits by the enemy.

On the other hand, we find that the French AMX-30 tank has light armor. However, it is well-equipped with modern equipment. Its weight is 36 tons, its speed is 60 Km/h, and it is distinguished by tremendous mobility. However, it's relatively light armor requires that its driver be proficient in order to avoid exposing the tank to enemy hits.

This tank, designed in 1957, is equipped with a rangefinder which operates on laser beams, and with a semi-automatic 105 mm gun. It is possible for its projectiles to penetrate an armored wall 36 cm thick from a distance of 3 km.

Saudi Arabia (which owns 250 AMX tanks), Iraq, Morocco and Libya have chosen to provide their armies with this type of tank, also equipped with a 20 mm gun and with a 7.62 mm machinegun. In 1978, Lebanon ordered 30 AMX-30 tanks. The solution upon which Saudi Arabia has relied by equipping itself with American M-60 tanks and French AMX-30 tanks is considered an intelligent solution, because it adds defensive capability to offensive capability.

The primary concern of nations manufacturing the tanks remains to provide maximum protection for the tanks from enemy hits, in order minimize loss of armored equipment. Thus, research has been directed toward manufacturing new armor plate such as (Shobham,) or such as that which the Soviets introduced on the T-72 tanks. It is well known that the Soviet T-72 tank currently found in the Middle East theater of military operations is the most modern of armored vehicles in the region, and is much superior to other existing armored vehicles, in spite of certain defects found in it.

The T-72 tank, designed by the Soviets in the late sixties, with its special characteristics, is considered a technical success. It weighs around 45 tons and moves at a speed of 80 km/h (the Soviets claim 100 km/h, but this may be an exaggeration). It is equipped with a 125 mm gun, with a 7.62 mm machinegun, and with a "Doska" mounted on its turret. Its gun is loaded automatically, at a rate of 10 to 12 rounds per minute. It has a three-man crew.

The Soviet Union produces about 2,000 T-72 tanks annually. These tanks, over a period of two years, will replace the T-54 and T-55 tanks, and will replace a large portion of the Syrian and Iraqi T-62 tanks. Syria currently has about 100 T-72 tanks. Iraq and Libya have the same. One of the drawbacks of this tank is that ammunition storage is located on the sides, and that fuel (which practically under the right fender and part of the left fender) is vulnerable to enemy hits. Therefore, the Soviets are working on using nonflammable diesel fuel. However, it is difficult to store a new type of fuel for one type of armored vehicle in petroleum producing countries where regular fuel is available in abundance. Thus, it is likely that these tanks will operate in Syria, for example, using regular fuel. This makes them very dangerous.

The T-72 tank has the most modern of tank technology, especially the laser beam system and the infra-red system for night battles.

Future tank battles will be carried out for the most part at night, as modern tank divisions will not wait for daybreak to mount their attacks. At around 0300 hours, T-72, M-60 and AMX-30 tanks are capable of waging battle as though it were broad daylight. It should be noted that tanks such as the American M-47 and M-48, which date back to the period immediately following World War II (Jordan has 250 of them, Israel 650, Iran 400 and Morocco 100), can be equipped with infra-red systems for night firing and control.

In the past year, the Israelis have produced 40 armored vehicles of a new type called MIRK (Vehicle), equipped with a semi-automatic 105 mm gun. When these armored vehicles were demonstrated to Western experts, these noted that there were two small doors in the rear of the armored vehicle. The experts learned later that the small doors were used for storing ammunition. However, this armored vehicle is not fast, and this constitutes one of its most important defects in the theater of military operations.

9605
CSO: 4802

PDRY, OMAN DIPLOMATIC MOVES ASSESSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 20 Jul 80 p 8

[Article by 'Ali Hashim: "Moves of South Yemen and Oman; Oman Attempts to Avoid Isolation; Aden Mediates between Area and Soviets"]

[Text] The Arab Gulf is stifled by burning summer heat, 50 degrees centigrade temperature, and 100 percent humidity. On top of this, the month of Ramadan arrives to bring all activity to a standstill. Nobody receives guests, nobody discusses anything, and everybody abstains from food, activity, and conversation!

However, despite this calm, people in the Gulf are not tranquil. They are to some degree confident, but also afraid, hesitant, and questioning. What is going to happen to their area? What is in store? What will be the fate of the oil?

More and more talk goes on in private gatherings--more than in public ones. Questions follow one another. You try to ask questions, but others turn to you with their own, hoping to hear a reassuring answer.

Two moves took place in the area this week. A PDRY move by president 'Ali Nasir Muhammad al-Hasani, and an Omani move which did not attract too much attention.

There was silence in the Gulf following the revelation that Oman had given military concessions to the United States. No one had the courage to take a stand regarding it, with the exception of Iraq. There, a statement was published in AL-THAWRA, official newspaper of the ruling Arab Socialist Ba-ath party, attributed to Latif Nasif Jasim, minister of culture and information, and Hamid 'Alwan, minister of state for foreign affairs.

Of course, declarations are made rejecting the idea of granting bases to any major power and maintaining that the Gulf's security is the responsibility of its own people. But if any reference is made to the Omani concessions, it is made in whispers, and it never mentions or attacks the sultanate by name. It is as though the Omani bases concern Alaska, not the Gulf, the Sea of Oman, and the Indian Ocean.

The Omani Move

Yusuf al-'Alwi Abdullah, undersecretary of Omani foreign affairs, made a surprise visit to Saudi Arabia accompanied by Maj Salim al-Ghazali, undersecretary of defense and most powerful officer in the Omani armed forces after Sultan Qaboos bin Said himself. The communique issued at the end of the visit stated that the Omani delegation gave King Khalid ibn 'Abdal-'Aziz a message from Sultan Qaboos concerning the situation in the area and Saudi-Omani relations.

Al-'Alwi then returned to Muscat, while al-Ghazali went to Doha to give the Amir of Qatar, Shaykh Khalifa bin Hamad al-Thani, another message from the sultan.

In Jiddah, the Omani visit resulted in no official comments, and the visit of the Omani undersecretary of defense likewise drew no comments in Doha. When questioned, officials merely replied: "Just a friendly message."

"Friendly messages" exchanged between Gulf officials may carry news of "invasions" or may only contain greetings. These messages are part of tribal traditions, such as visiting and inquiring about a neighbor's health. But they may also express complaints, worries, and mutual requests.

The Omani move coincided with the move of the president of the PDRY. After 'Ali Nasir Muhammad visited Jiddah, he went to Abu Dhabi, capital of the United Arab Emirates, for lengthy discussions with its president, Shaykh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahayyan.

Therefore, the Omani messages and visits were not undertaken just to check on the health of neighbors. They were much more important.

Breaking Loose

What do knowledgeable Gulf sources say about these developments? A high official told AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI that the Omani visits were meant to break loose from the isolation of the sultanate following its unilateral agreement providing facilitations to the U.S.

While the Gulf countries did not rise in protest against this agreement, at least in the press, their silence did not mean recognition or acceptance of the fait accompli.

Oman was worried most about leaks that Saudi Arabia was taking steps to improve its relations with Marxist South Yemen, without South Yemen first improving its relations with Oman, as previously agreed upon.

The country closest to Saudi Arabia in the area is Qatar, because both follow the Islamic Wahabi doctrine. Therefore, the Omanis concentrated their efforts on Saudi Arabia and Qatar.

As to the United Arab Emiratis, they have firm relations and old accounts to settle with the Sultanate of Oman. In light of this, the sultanate does not find that any steps taken in Abu Dhabi would affect it adversely, since such steps must take into account "sensitive issues" as well as common interests between the two, particularly the border issue which is still not a closed subject, although it is on its way to a final settlement.

What about Kuwait? For some time now, Kuwait has been seeking to resolve differences in the area. Based on its balanced foreign policy and lack of embroilment in marginal disputes, it has been trying to bring about a reconciliation between north and south Yemen, and, subsequently, between the Aden regime and Oman.

Therefore, the Omanis had only the Saudi and Qatar positions to worry about, and acted accordingly to thwart any move to isolate Oman.

The Road to Moscow

What about the objectives of the PDRY move? As hot weather and poltics settle over the Gulf, observers continue to ask: Will there be war? Will the oil go up in flames? Or will there be a settlement? On the very day that 'Ali Nasir Muhammad was in Jiddah, and about to leave for Abu Dhabi, 'Ali Muhammad Nasir 'Antar, PDRY minister of defense and strong man of president 'Ali Nasir's "group," was in Moscow.

The PDRY move was inevitable, because the resignation of the former president, 'Abd al-Fattah Ismail, created an easing of the situation between the Aden Marxist regime and the conservative Gulf states. Ismail was trying to outdo Moscow itself in socialism, nationalism, Marxism, Leninism and even Stalinism.

'Ali Nasir Muhammad changed things, though not totally. South Yemen took on an Arab nationalist stance and returned to Islam, though not the brand advocated by Khomeyni, the Kuwaiti religious reform group, or the Saudi Wahabis. 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's philosophy of government is grounded in the Arab and Islamic history of the Gulf area. But at the same time, he maintains an ideology based on scientific socialism.

Reservations in the Gulf countries about the Aden regime disappeared with Ismail's departure and Nasir's coming to power. Discussions based on common Arab aims were inevitable. Good relations between Aden and Riyadh are necessary, and 'Ali Nasir is expected to seek further improvements, particularly in developing good relations with the Emirates. The latter's president is an ardent nationalist who generously gives large amounts of aid to the non-petroleum producing countries of the area, such as Somalia, the two Yemens, and Djibouti.

Of equal importance to 'Ali Nasir are relations with Kuwait, for many reasons. Kuwait has a special section in its foreign ministry for providing aid to non-petroleum producing countries, including the PDRY. Kuwait did not stop aid to the latter in spite of pressures to do so on a number of occasions,

particularly at the Tunis summit, which recommended severing relations with Aden when forces of the latter invaded the Yemen Arab Republic (the north).

A common denominator between the PDRY and Kuwait is that they are the only two Gulf nations, aside from Iraq, which have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This brings us to the basic purpose of 'Ali Nasir's trip. Having been accused of turning his country into a Soviet military base, he wishes to deny these accusations and maintain that relations between countries can be based on mutual respect of sovereignty. He has the Kuwaiti example in mind. In the case of Kuwait, a conservative country is maintaining diplomatic relations with Moscow and Peking without becoming communist or being influenced by those countries.

Nevertheless, 'Ali Nasir's motives include explaining his version of reasons for establishing relations with Moscow.

Moscow's Road to the Gulf

'Ali Nasir began "evangelizing" to dispel the Gulf region's fears of the Soviets in the midst of events percipitated by the Iranian revolution and the "legitimate" Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. He is playing the Afghanistan card and opening Moscow's road to the Gulf, even if at the start only diplomatically. This oepning will involve oil--for a price--at the final stage.

Several officials and observers in the Gulf are almost convinced that diplomatic relations with the Soviets are at hand, not to spite the U.S., which is assembling naval and strike forces in the area, but as a hedge against the future. Gulf nations would thus be following the example of West European nations. These are with the U.S. within NATO, but maintain a dialogue with the Soviets.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union could avert a war that the Americans may be preparing for in Don Quixote fashion, unilaterally and without consulting the rest of the world, including what Washington calls "the world of allies."

9669
CSO: 4802

TOP PALESTINIAN SPOKESMAN DISPARAGES EUROPEAN INITIATIVE

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 29 Jun 80 p 10

/Article by Samir Sa'd-al-Din: "The Head of the Palestine National Council Talks to AL-RIYAD: The European Activity Is Not Serious"/

/Text/ The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the secretaries general of various Palestinian organizations and a number of members of the Palestine National Congress recently held a joint meeting in Damascus to review setting the time and place for holding the new session of the Palestine National Congress, in order to discuss new developments on the Palestinian stage, including increasing the members of the Executive Committee and international and Arab influences on it. Those at the meeting decided that the 15th National Congress session would be held toward the end of August in Damascus.

AL-RIYAD had this meeting with Khalid al-Fahum, head of the Palestine National Congress, on this session, the political and organizational matters which might be discussed in the light of the program set out for it, as well as the official Palestinian view on the Venice declaration which, the Arabs had expected (as they had been promised by the European countries) would take the form of an initiative based on recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a sole legitimate representative and these people's right to return and determine their destiny, the theses which appear from time to time concerning future relations between Palestine and Jordan, in view of the organic and spiritual links and interests the two countries possess, and the popular revolution in the bank and the strip which has begun to take serious dimensions against the colonialist Israeli presence.

AL-RIYAD : There has been much talk about the place and the convening of the new Palestine National Congress session. When might that take place? What subjects are listed on its agenda? What is the truth of the statement that some resistance detachments which are not represented on the Executive Council will enter it for the first time, especially the small ones?

al-Fahum: At the last meeting it was decided that 31 August 1980 would be the date for the convening of the 15th session of the National Congress and that Damascus would be the site. As regards this session's agenda, a special committee consisting of our brother Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization Executive Committee, the secretaries general of the detachments of the resistance movement, and the chairman of the national congress will now proceed to hold continuous meetings to reach agreement on all political and organizational matters to be presented to the congress.

As regards political matters, there is total agreement over the importance of and unanimity on the political program which the National Congress approved at its last session. Thus the political program remains the firm basis for united Palestinian political movement on the Arab and international stage. Naturally, political matters which have arisen recently will be presented to the congress, especially European activity in the context of the statement issued by the Venice conference and Palestinian-Arab relations, so that united Palestinian positions may be taken with regard to these issues.

Here I have not referred to the subject of Camp David, which is without a doubt a conspiracy to liquidate the Palestinian cause, on grounds that the political program ratified at the congress' 14th session deals with all the minutiae of this subject. As far as Camp David goes, our position is firm.

As regards the Executive Committee, it is natural that a new committee will be formed in which all the detachments of the resistance movement will be represented, especially since some of them, as everyone knows, are outside the Executive Committee--although in their totality they, that is, the detachments of the resistance, are represented in the Palestine National Congress. We hope that our coming congress will be the background in which better Palestinian relations may be realized, and that we will make large strides toward national unity, especially in the political, military and financial fields.

AL-RIYAD: What is the true state of current and future Palestinian-Jordanian relations, in the light of the ideas and plans that are presented from time to time regarding the future of the Palestinian cause?

al-Fahum: Any talk about future relations with the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or any other Arab country assuming a constitutional form is premature before the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. Priority, as far as the Palestine Liberation Organization goes, now goes to struggline with every means to realize the fixed national rights of the Palestinian people, that is, their right to return, determine their destiny and establish an independent Palestinian state on Palestinian soil. We are cooperating with all our Arab brethren, including Jordan, proceeding from the resolutions of Riyad in 1974, Baghdad in 1978 and Tunis in 1979. Therefore, any discussion about constitutional relations or any other form will not be made before establishment of the Palestinian state.

AL-RIYAD: What about the Venice declaration, and the observations the organization has adopted on it, especially since we had heard before it was issued that the Europeans would present an initiative founded on a basis of recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and these people's right to self-determination?

Answer: The Liberation Organization's official position on the declaration is that expressed by the official organization spokesman after the conclusion of the Executive Committee meetings, but to what the official spokesman said I would like to add that any serious European activity will have to take basic objectivity into consideration, if Europe wants to contribute to solving the Middle East problem.

First, any European activity must take into consideration that the Camp David agreement, and the results it produced, are unacceptable and must announce its failure in categoric, final fashion; any European activity based on the premise of Camp David, or acceptance of the results it produced, is something which cannot be accepted in the Palestinian or Arab context.

Second, no European activity can acquire a serious character unless it begins with recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a sole legitimate representative in this people's name. This is something the Europeans must carry out with utmost speed if they want to start serious, objective, realistic movement.

The statement issued at Venice did not achieve these two obvious things, and therefore we cannot state that the European movement is serious or that its premises for a comprehensive solution to the Middle East problem are correct. Our position regarding any future European movement can be defined only in the light of consideration for these two points. This is in addition to our conviction that the issue of investigating the facts which the Europeans will carry out, is only aimed at postponing all European activity until after the American elections. During his visit to the Arab Gulf states and Saudi Arabia, the French president received a clear notion of the Palestinian and Arab viewpoint, and the same was true when Schmidt, the West German chancellor, visited Saudi Arabia.

AL-RIYAD: How can we explain the organized wave of terror directed against the Palestinian people and their fighting men in the occupied territories, in the light of what the citizens and mayors are exposed to?

al-Fahum: The policy Israel is proceeding with, which its prime minister Menachem Begin is directing, is clear and well known to the Palestinians, the Arabs and the whole world. Begin the terrorist is stating publicly repeatedly, in earshot of the entire world, that he does not consider that the West Bank and Gaza are occupied territories but are an integral part of the land of greater Israel, and that greater Israel, as the Zionist

fanatics, headed by Begin, see it, has no specific borders but is capable of expansion whenever the opportunity arises. The Camp David agreements gave Begin the cover he required, I mean, the presence of a big Arab party which would make it easy for him to implement his aggressive policy.

Everyone knows the truth of the heroic role which our Palestinian Arab people and their national leaders in the bank and the strip are playing to thwart the Camp David policy and the agreements which resulted from it.

Everyone without a doubt knows that our people in the occupied territories have been the basic force preventing application of the autonomy agreements which will incorporate the bank and Gaza to Israel by law and permit them to be occupied militarily for an unspecified time.

Absolute Palestinian rejection of the autonomy agreement was basically what brought this agreement down.

Everyone knows that Menachem Begin's policy, which calls for the incorporation of the West Bank and Gaza into Israel, requires that both be emptied of their inhabitants so that incorporation will be easy and the absorption smooth. Therefore it is not surprising that Begin should launch an attack against the national leaders in the occupied territories by banishing them sometimes and trying to assassinate them at other times, as happened recently to the devoted sons of Palestine Fahd al-Qawasimah, Milhim, al-Tamimi, al-Shak'ah, Khalar and al-Tawil.

This is not new. The sequence of terror, banishment and assassination has been going on since 1967 and is a matter which is in harmony with the nature and personality of Menachem Begin as a terrorist with deep roots and a founder of the expansionist Zionist movement.

We urge our Arab nation and all Arab officials to continue their stand of support for the combatants and our people within who are in isolation challenging all the force Israel possesses, especially since information has it that the settlers in the bank have started to increase arming themselves and have received the agreement of a number of senior officials in the state of Israel that they may maintain law and order alongside the army within the West Bank, which means that our homes and our honor will be at the mercy of the settlers and the inhabitants in the settlements--settlements situated in the heart of the villages and towns of the bank and the strip and in direct contact with our people. Here I would like to point out that our people in the occupied territories are now embarking on a bitter struggle against the Zionist presence and that the first light of a popular revolution has now appeared. Proof of that is that there is a large rate of increase of molotov cocktails in the field which people are manufacturing, as well as an increase in mass acts of violence against policemen and Jews entering Arab sections and places. The source of the trouble the people are facing is not, as the friends of Israel state, Jewish extremists, and the assertion that the government has no knowledge

of it is contrary to the truth. They are facing an organized terrorist onslaught run by the government of Israel under the leadership of Menachem Begin.

As regards the fighting men, they have full appreciation and greetings from us, which through the newspaper AL-RIYAD, I would like to send to them, especially our brother Bassam Shak'ah, whom I visited recently in Amman and who was without a doubt a source of inspiration to all of us and all the people of Palestine and the Arab nation in their splendid perseverance and adherence as Palestinians and Arabs to their positions of principle, their absolute rejection of all the Camp David schemes, and their rejection of all the pressures and conspiracies to which they and their brothers are exposed.

Each of us must be like al-Shak'ah, at the apex of challenge and determination to continue the holy war against the Zionist occupation which is passing through special severe conditions.

This was the end of the report, which took extensive time from an official who has time only for work.

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BRIEFS

SOVIET FORCE IN PDRY--During his recent meeting with King Khalid in Riyad, the president of South Yemen, Muhammad 'Ali Nasir, tried to convince King Khalid not to attach too much importance to the military euqipment (surface-to-surface missiles, Mig-23 aircraft and T-62/72 tanks) obtained by Aden from Moscow. 'Ali Nasir informed the Saudi officials that the presence of a batallion of sharpshooters and a squadron of Soviet Mig-25 aircraft in Aden is temporary. However, King Khalid stressed to the South Yemeni officials the need to honor the principle of barring the presence of foreign forces in the region. [Text] [Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 21 Jul 80 p 37] 9605

SAUDIS FINANCE WEAPONS PURCHASES--Arab political sources here have told AL-SAFIR that the Saudi Arabian government recently agreed to finance a "basic portion" of Tunisia's weapons requirements. The sources say that most of the weapons will come from France and will consist of fighter planes, helicopters, and antiaircraft guns. The sources added that the Saudi government will also pay for training Tunisian military forces in the use of these weapons. They said that during a recent visit of the Tunisian foreign minister, Hasan Belkhodja, to Saudi Arabia several joint Saudi-Tunisian committees were formed to deal with "broad issues." These committees were headed by the foreign ministers of the two countries. [Text] [Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 27 Jun 80 p 1] 9669

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AFGHAN CRISIS STUDIED IN VARIOUS ASPECTS

Afghan Crisis: Questions Abound

Florence POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE in Italian Feb 80 pp 3-28

[Text] Even without the diversity in ideological or alignment positions, of which there are clearly considerable, deciphering the Afghan crisis requires a number of keys. The most striking thing about it is the international reactions it has triggered: Carter called it the gravest crisis since World War II. Official U.S. reactions in areas ranging from disarmament (a freeze of SALT ratification) to economic relations (the embargo on 17 million tons of grain) and even to the threat to boycott the Moscow Olympics, which as we all know reached out to all kinds of people all over the world, even people with no politics to speak of, have combined to give top priority to international aspects of the crisis. In this context, in addition to the East-West dimension, with its impact on U.S.-USSR relations, there is the North-South dimension to consider, with the effect the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has had and may have on relations between Moscow and the Third World (and we have already seen some of this at the UN and at the Islamic Conference); also calling for assessment, though, is the part powers such as the European nations can play in keeping the processes of radicalization and polarization from inexorably smothering the last hopes of cooperation and detente. The Afghan crisis, however, has its own inner dynamics, very heavy-handed foreign interference has subverted, though not totally nullified, and which could, under less tense conditions, return to their own autonomous ways of dealing with the matter.

At the root of it all lies the coup d'etat in April 1978, which set off a "revolution from the top," perhaps limited in its actual consensus but nevertheless endowed with its own unquestioned capacity for innovation and an objective legitimacy of its own, and has as its protagonists the civilian and military cadres

that work together in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, out of which have come all the presidents who have succeeded one another in power in Kabul during these 2 years of strife and tragedy in Afghanistani history. The results of that revolution are still controversial, and in any case have not led to any visible stabilization. Still to emerge is any well defined social bloc to take the place of the one that had held power, first under the monarchy and later under Daoud, the prince-president who was overthrown in 1978. The reforms spelt out with remarkable clarity on paper but launched amid too much resistance from many quarters to be really effective, particularly since there had been no proper preparation for their implementation, met with opposition on all sides: with their impact on custom, on property, and on social relationships they affected traditions and power positions that had seemed immutable and naturally all who felt themselves dispossessed turned to whatever help they could find, from Islamic fundamentalism to armed efforts to reverse the situation. The combined upshot has been endemic guerrilla warfare which has only made the whole picture still more precarious by weakening the regime's ability to make changes and win support while inviting outside intervention.

There is a good deal of speculation as to how much or how little of such involvement there actually was. Was the 1978 coup spontaneous? or was it remote-controlled from Moscow, which had always had special ties with the small but homogeneous communist group there? And to what extent did China, Pakistan, the United States, and even Iran actively try to make the Taraki experiment fail? Because, in the event, it was the international scenario that took over, these are questions worth looking into in depth, not written off as irrelevant, on the argument, correct though it may be, that all revolutionary processes succeed or fail in the final analysis depending on how deep their roots reach into the historical, social, and cultural fabric upon which they must work.

POLITICA INTERNATIONALE dealt with the Afghan revolution in 1979 (n°4, pp 29-37) in an article by Gaetano La Pira, presciently titled "From Feudalism to Imported Socialism." Feudalism held out over the revolution thanks to the flame of Islam, and the high import duty on socialism, while Taraki was beaten by Amin, his second in command, and while Amin was abruptly ousted by a conspiracy in which Babrak Karmal, a victim of earlier purges, enjoyed the open and direct aid of the USSR, turned out to be even steeper than expected. The headlong rush of events requires that we update our analyses and check into the impact of the latest twists and turns. To do this, we are devoting three articles to the Afghan crisis; although they do not exhaust the whole subject, they do attempt to shed light on the various processes, domestic and foreign, without regard to overlapping one

another if doing so will help provide a pluralistic and even a dialectical overview of a state of affairs as complex and confusing as this one.

Renato Sandri, a scholar and politician, not only wants to understand the reasons for the crisis but asks how Afghanistan might call upon its existing relations to avoid being drawn into the vortex of cold war. The superpowers have a logic all their own, which is not necessarily the sort that small and middle-sized powers, like those of Europe, should take as their model. The wound inflicted on Afghanistan's independence is still there, but the idea here is to figure out how it might be feasible to use a policy of detente to reconstruct those areas of autonomy in which even the Third World countries -- as the experience of non-alignment, now in very serious trouble, teaches us -- can find safer ground on which to play.

In Giorgio Vercellin's article, which centers primarily on the reach of Islam as the dominant cultural point of reference, seeks to show the impact of the reforms instituted first under Taraki and then under Amin, whose regime after all did not have all that much time to go further, if the reports and various versions now making the rounds even in Afghanistan are true, than recourse to the most brutal repression. Was Afghanistan, a desperately poor and wretchedly backward country, really impermeable to the "wind from the East" or was it clever orchestration by class enemies, whose historical ascendancy Vercellin traces with such perception, that brought about the rising tide? Afghanistan had ancient traditions of instability and perhaps even anarchy at the tribal level, and the Muslim guerrilla war fed on all these factors which predisposed it to "permanent counterrevolution." It was in order to put an end to this state of insecurity, at least formally, that the USSR's intervention was triggered, damnable though it was, whether you take your precedents from Budapest and Prague or from Saigon during the Sixties, where even presidents were attacked and overthrown on instructions from the secret services of a great power. Soviet intervention was partly the spectre that Taraki and Amin, but Claudio Moffa says the ax-grinding editorials of the Western media as well, both sought to avert and wound up making inevitable.

Claudio Moffa also looks at the power struggles within the regime, at the real potential in the reforms, and at their grip on the country's reality: the forcible action of December 1979 was, in some ways, a "moderate coup," in that it replaced Amin with the more malleable and reasonable Karmal. It is yet to be shown, however, if and how Karmal will be able to carry off the role of his country's Kadar, in which some have tried to cast him.

The alarm events in Kabol have set off all over the world is equal to the questions -- not all of them merely academic -- to which those events give rise. They have to do with the real balance of power inside Afghanistan, to measure the chances for success of a policy of swift transformation in a land of the Deep or Super-Deep South. They have to do with the way in which the relations between internal processes and hegemonic or sub-hegemonic policies work in an area like Central Asia, since the USSR is not the only protagonist in the foreign meddling, and in view of the fact that ever since last December's invasion and even today the Afghan rebels are at the core of "major maneuvers" that bring some very high-ranking personages to the Khyber Pass. They have to do with the thinking that might have driven the USSR to infringe so violently upon the sovereignty of a state which, no matter what its political system, had been picked to act as the "Asiatic Finland." And they have to do with the outlook for detente at a particularly critical juncture in international relations arising from the simultaneous explosion of situations that had for too long been artificially clamped under tight lids. One more reason not to give up -- even in the teeth of an event so tragic as this one -- on the uses of sweet reason, because international relations are a very delicate blend of actions and reactions which a rash or divisive decision, no less than a misstep, can plunge into irreversible crisis.

Can Detente Survive Kabul

Florence POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE in Italian Feb 80 pp 5-10

[Article by Renato Sandri]

[Text] The military insurrection that toppled Daoud in April 1978 was in fact a "revolution from on high," confined to the urban perimeter and to small segments of society. Venturing outside the cities, the revolutionary process ran up against tooth-and-nail resistance of a religious and tribal nature, which further restricted the area of consensus. The factional strife within the Democratic People's Party opened the way for growing Soviet interference, culmination in the country's invasion. To save detente, Europe must refuse to get involved in the merits of the dispute and must offer itself as spokesman for the Third World countries anxious to break away from great-power hegemony and to be left in peace as they go about building a new international order.

The facts about the situation inside Afghanistan available to the observer who wants to understand the motivations -- relevant to that situation -- behind the Soviet intervention are far from complete, and yet they seem to be sufficient. Sufficient at least for a try at coming close that must be made: not merely an academic exercise, but an "operational necessity" in the face of the grave nature of that event and of the complexity of its consequences to every area of international relations.

The People's Democratic Party (PDP) government, born of the military and popular uprising of 27 April 1978 in Kabul, seized power in a republic which, in many areas, had been bogged down in national conditions -- social and cultural -- inherited from the monarchy stripped of power by Prince Daoud in 1973 with the bloodless ukase that turned Mohammad Zahir's Italian holiday to permanent exile. The monarchy had held the nation's international position in shaky balance since 1919, when Afghanistan was the first state to establish diplomatic relations with the infant Soviet Union, then proclaiming its neutrality during World War II, and lastly taking the initiative, among the five sponsoring countries, of the Belgrade Conference which in 1961 saw the birth of the non-aligned movement. At home, Zahir had started a timid reform in dress, ending the requirement that women wear the veil in 1959, and updating the country by means of 5-year plans beginning in 1957, whose end result was shattering shortages in 1971 and 1972, when about a million Afghans died (lack of irrigation infrastructures, drought, hunger, disease, etc.).

The first enormous problem the new republic had to cope with was that of making a nation of its inhabitants -- 18 million or so of them, of whom 55 percent were Pashtun, 25 percent Tajiks, and the rest were Uzbeks, Halzaras, Beluchis, and some 2 million were nomads: the Kochi. The choice of Pashtun (Afghan-Persian) as the nation's lingua franca and the primacy of the Pashtun ethnic group, backed up by the monarchy, marked the confines of the grouping, which remained fluid, prey to tensions and conflicts made even more intractable by their being part of a social structure at once heterogeneous and inflexible. Unwieldy traces of pre-feudal society, such as the nomadic shepherds, were part of the predominant feudal production relations in the rural areas, the owners of land and water which was channeled and sold to renters or small freeholders, along with the widespread practice of usury, extending over arable land that was in very scant supply, amounting to only 22 percent of the total. In the cities, embryonic capitalism was foundering in the fog of petty trade, an impoverished artisan class, and haphazard businesses, plus growing masses of a lumpenproletariat pouring into the cities from the rural areas. Its structures are typically bone-poor Third-World, with a single product for export

(the hides of millions and millions of karakul sheep, a.k.a. Persian lamb), and with a chilling fit into the parameters set forth by the UN for its list of the 29 "poorest countries" in the world: average yearly per capita income less than $100, industry's share of the GNP less than 10 percent, and an illiteracy rate of at least 80 percent of the population (actually the rate in Afghanistan is 92 percent).

The country had not been truly unified either by the monarchy or by such other institutions as the Jirga (a kind of senate made up of the highest-ranking notables), or the Grand Council consisting of more than 1,000 delegates from all parts of the country, from every province and every tribe; nor yet by the Pushtuwali (the unwritten law dating back to the dim, dark past which stipulates the rules of honor in peace and in war -- but the rules are those of the dominant ethnic group). The glue that held it together was Islam, practiced by 99 percent of the population -- the vast majority of them Sunni -- and in reality the bulwark of the unchanging and unchangeable order, with particular reference to woman's condition. And despite the legal abolition of the obligation to wear the veil, a dereliction from Koranic jurisprudence -- the shari'ah -- in force in other Islamic countries, the Afghan woman was deprived of all property rights, according to tribal custom, not to mention her subjection to polygamy, to imprisonment at hard labor, and illiteracy.

Daoud's regime was very swiftly brought to a halt by the immovable viscosity of this "social roadblock," the expression as it was of a low-level compromise between the old feudal sectors and the nascent urban bourgeoisie. Over the 5 years the efforts at reform petered out, while the country slowly drifted into Iran's sphere of influence, which the shah's paranoia was seeking to erect between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan into a pillar of imperialist domination of the Arabian Gulf and the Indian Ocean (look for instance at the plans and advance financing for the railroad that would have crossed the country to link Iran with Pakistan, as well as for a chain of airports, etc.).

From his quest for consensus, Daoud moved to repression of the progressive groups, even though they had supported the birth of the republic; among the hardest hit was the People's Democratic Party (better known as the Khalq Party) and the Parcham Party, both of them leaning toward Marxism, and subsequently merging to form the PDP, not to mention the straggly labor organizations in the towns. In early April 1978 the police shot down Amir Khyber, the Kabul labor leader, and went on to massacre more than 200 citizens during the protest demonstrations over the assassination and against the arrest of other labor leaders (among them Nur Mohammad Taraki). On 27 April, while Daoud, his family, and the presidential guard were put to the sword by the military uprising, a detachment of tanks and APCs was demolishing the

walls of the prisons, and in the process freeing Taraki, who with the PDP took over national leadership.

Of course this was a military coup, but it was touched off in the midst of determined mass movements in the capital by groups with their roots in the PDP with its years-long history of clandestine operations: it was the specific driving force behind a "revolution from above," both by virtue of the urban setting for its explosion and by virtue of the features of the party itself. The party had surfaced in 1965, then split into two factions before getting back together on the eve of the insurrection. Its Parcham wing, headed by Babrak Karmal, had been concentrating primarily on winning adherents among the military (a good share of its officers were graduates of Soviet military schools), among civil servants, students, and intellectuals; one very active member of the party's leadership was Anahita Ratebzad, a prestigious lady who for years had been fighting for women's liberation. The Khalq Party, headed by Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, had done its recruiting not only among the petty bourgeoisie, but among activist worker nuclei, and had, albeit without much success, sought support among the poor peasants of the outlying provinces.

When you take over a government, your impact is not in the least diminished when you say that everything starts over with you, particularly in a backward and dependent country. And the new government did begin with a program that reasserted Afghanistan's position as a non-aligned nation, on the basis of its friendship -- not to say alliance -- with the USSR; in domestic policy the backbone of its program was agrarian reform, accompanied by two fundamental policy thrusts: one was equal social and legal rights for women, and the other was compulsory universal education.

On paper, this read like the program of a democratic, anti-feudal revolution; yet the first schism within the PDP, which set the Khalq wing against Parcham (with the ouster of B. Karmal, A. Ratzebad, and others from the government and their posting abroad as ambassadors in posts they quickly resigned to chose exile in Prague, Belgrade, and other socialist countries), above and beyond the rivalries which certainly had something to do with it, assuredly had its roots in the disagreement over the rate at which the revolution was to be stepped up; the winning side was the more radical, while those who lost were better attuned to the nation's "readiness" to accept revolutionary change.

As it ventured out of the cities the revolutionary process instantly ran up against resistance, which rose steadily all through the fall. First came the gusty winds from the South, stirred up by the Islamic movement in Iran; then friction

begotten by the agrarian reforms of 1 January 1979 triggered furious agitation by the dispossessed landowners. Meanwhile such measures as the abolition of dowries for women or the new law requiring that they be taught to read and write, by flying in the face of thousands of years of the dominant culture, helped stir up feelings against all these "new ways," stirring up the boiling lava of instincts, of habits, and of the fiery preaching of the mullahs.

Afghanistan's food relations with the USSR -- as already noted -- dated from 1919 and had improved still further even in the final period of the monarchy. In that connection, one need only recall that U.S. "aid," which up to around 1966-67 had constituted around a third of all international "aid" received by Afghanistan, by 1969-70 had declined to 3 percent of the total, not so much in reflection of its absolute decline (although that happened, too) as by reason of the steep increase in Soviet "aid," which over those 2 years ran up to 70 percent of the overall total of international "aid."

However, with the advent of the new regime, not only did Soviet aid grow steadily more generous: it underwent a qualitative change, taking a hand even in handling current affairs (we are sticking here to known facts: consider the involvement of Soviet personnel in the tragic and ill-fated attempt to save the American ambassador to Kabul from the hands of Islamic extremists -- or provocateurs? -- who killed him in the spring of 1979). There are two different but convergent reasons behind that change: one was the weakness of the domestic revolutionary movement which was looking for practical help in Soviet support, along with models for action and ideological counsel; and the other was the USSR's interest in beefing up its own presence and control over this crossroads of the enormous region that had suddenly moved into a phase of destabilization.

This poured more oil onto the embers of the nationalist-religious coals that had begun to glow and which were manifest not so much in occasional outbursts of xenophobia directed at Soviet citizens, civilian or military, in bazaars here and there, but in far more massive form, particularly along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The border region, known as Pashtunistan, had been divided when Pakistan was founded along the so-called Durand Line. Afghanistan had never been reconciled to this amputation of its territory, and the Pashtun population living astride that artificial frontier had continued to take an active part in Afghan life. And yet, only a few months after the birth of the new regime, the irredentist movement reversed its signals, sucked in by pressures from the "Islamic republic" in Pakistan (while the same thing was happening, although to a lesser degree, to the southwest, in the Iranian-Afghan Khorasan border region).

There, all of a sudden, was Islam which in the crumbling of the ancient state-to-society relationship was shaping up as a potent factor in a unification movement transcending more than one frontier.

It is a matter of record that the area of consensus in the infant revolution began to shrink back from its initial perimeters, not to mention its initial potential; the response from the group running things in the new regime to guerrilla warfare in the mountains and to creeping paralysis afflicting the urban masses was a steady forward fugue: repression, radicalization of government measures, uncontrolled and painful "personality cult" around Taraki, and ceaseless showers of propaganda lauding socialist achievements. These were surrogate responses, quite out of touch with reality; the infighting within the PDP leadership, drained by never-ending purges, did the rest.

We remember Taraki at the Havana summit meeting of the nonaligned nations. He held the spotlight at the press conferences, but he looked and acted like a sleepwalker. He spoke of stability, of advancement, of victory -- and all the while even the least informed among the reporters sent word back home that he was already dead. There is little point here in going over the record of events in the period that followed, all too familiar to all in the actual facts surrounding its end (and equally obscure and impenetrable insofar as the behind-the-scenes drama is concerned). From the assassination of Taraki (just back from Havana and after his stopoff at Moscow airport where he was welcomed with the highest honors by top Soviet leaders) at Amin's instigation, to the extension of guerrilla control over a good share of the provinces, the only response to which the government was able to come up with was a plea -- quickly acceded to -- for a larger Soviet military presence and thence step by step to the intervention of the USSR expeditionary force, with the execution of Amin, the "hard-liner" who never let a day go by without some flattering reference to his Soviet ally and with the return to government (one of history's dirty tricks) of Babrak Karmal, Anahita Ratebzad, and the others who had been exiled as "opportunists" or "bourgeois nationalists."

What we have here is the chronicle of the gradual isolation and defeat of a revolution. Naturally, pressures and infiltration and support of all kinds for subversion were brought to bear in Afghanistan from Iran, from China, and most of all from Pakistan. But this is the inevitable lot of every revolution (today often with the "Chinese factor" thrown in as an extra). It's all part of the rules of the game, in this particular Afghan instance further restored to balance by the far more massive and not merely geographical contiguity of the USSR.

The "revolution from the top" on 27 April 1978 never managed to get beyond the Kabul city limits; on the contrary, it merely heightened the city-country conflict, owing to its inability to find the right ways and means and pace to launch the process of unifying and integrating the country behind the task of organizing real democracy and hammering out a national identity. Mass social mobilization slipped gradually under the hegemony of enemy forces; the revolution's lack of creativity and the internal strife that ripped and tore at its leadership, then that leader ship's retreat to the shelter of the USSR alliance as the prime guarantor of the process -- all of them combined to trigger the explosion of the endogenous causes (aside from the conflicts that had arisen out of foreign invasion) that led to the final collapse. Meanwhile, the Red Army's intervention, with the execution of Amin (who only a few hours after his bloody rise to the presidency had received the warmest of congratulations from the Soviet government) emerges as the end result of a commitment which, in the hellish cogs and wheels of events, gave the upper hand to the strategic factor, to reasons of state, right up to and including the occupation of Afghanistan. A slice of history, if you will; but was it also the heavy price of a revolution defeated so that the hope of one could be saved?

We are not even ready to venture a guess now as to whether that revolution, or some tenuous shred of it, might find expression in the Karmal government. Why? Because in the practical context of the regional situation, and in that of the no less troubled world situation, the occupation of Afghanistan turns out to be something quite different: the conquest and holding of a geopolitical outpost of tremendous importance to the socialist superpower, in the global confrontation that pits it against the capitalist superpower and its network of alliances.

Giuseppe Boffa (see UNITA, 13 January) quite properly reminded us of the Khrushchev-Bulganin trip to Afghanistan, India, and Burma in 1955, which touched off the "great policy" of detente, feasible just insofar as it might prove possible to find a toehold in the Third-World non-aligned movement (and this is where you will find those alliances with the "national bourgeoisies" of the nations just then emerging from their colonial past that took up so much time in the CPSU's 20th congress). We should like to add a reminder of the Tashkent Conference in 1966, while Kosyghin was chairman, which led to the peace between India and Pakistan and thereby marked one of the high points in the USSR's role vis-à-vis the Third World and, more generally, in active coexistence on an international scale.

Now that relations between the USSR and the Third World are running out of the scope and the specific objectives they had in those days, are those relations beginning to settle back into

concepts and practice of "tightening the ranks?" And still another question arises out of the events in Afghanistan, which are unquestionably having serious impact on the non-aligned movement, coming on top of the countless centrifugal pressures to which they are subjected by imperialism (ranging from penetration by the multinational corporations to power-plays by medium-size nations like France, to official U.S. threats to OPEC. Is the menacing hint of dislocation in the nonaligned movement one more open clue to the collision course upon which the two superpowers are embarked (along with their respective systems of alliances) in the crisis that is shaking every corner of international relations, as the inevitable outcome of the very logic intrinsic to counterposed blocs?

Whatever the answers may be, here we see taking shape the tasks for us Europeans (not only in the EEC meaning); for us as the democratic forces in Europe, in government or in the opposition.

First of all, vis-à-vis the Third World. Down through the past 30 years the nations of the Third World, committed to the struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism for the conquest of their own political independence -- in the more radical forms thrust upon them by oppression -- which was objectively incompatible with the dominant system: help from the USSR which, proffered in the heat of competition between the rival social systems and politico-military blocs (which are one of its expressions), wound up begetting the bloc logic even in those countries, with all its inherent evils: rigidity, interference, and docile compliance with one model and one policy. (To see the process in action, just glance down the list of nations that voted either against or abstained from voting on the motion introduced on 14 January deploring the USSR's intervention in Afghanistan and calling for withdrawal of "foreign troops.")

And should such a country openly break out of the Soviet sphere, it either moves into or goes back into the U.S. sphere as a prime candidate to be used as the conflict between the superpowers starts to heat up again: just as Sadat's Egypt was in this tragic situation.

The Vietnamese people's battle, fought just to be their own masters and to speak and act for themselves, acquired as it went on extraordinarily broad autonomy; but the Sino-Soviet quarrel (I do not intend to go into its causes and dynamics here), eventually involving tormented Indochina, showed us how truly the big game in which the stakes are the peace and the future of the world is still one in which only two can play. Make that two plus one.

Between the two extreme wings wavers the "center" zone of the Third World -- and of the non-aligned movement -- torn at once between solidarity and alienation by its own internal and growing disparity, by the need for its "second independence," by the burden of its backwardness, by its need for the West, despite the blows the West has dealt it in the past and just recently -- from the aggression in Vietnam or the occupation of Santo Domingo to the strangulation of Unidad Popular -- and by its mindless greed that keeps digging the chasm between "development" and "underdevelopment" deeper and deeper.

Looking back over the past 30 years, particularly the most recent ones, we see how for Vietnam and, on the opposite front, for Egypt, not to mention the entire "central" area of the Third World, what has been missing is a sympathetic listener who would help them get out of the suffocating confines of the contest between the superpowers; who would restore practical content and hence validity to the original motives of the non-aligned movement, which emerged as an independent factor in international relations specifically to leave politico-military blocs behind, to foster the full unfolding of the dialectic between classes and nations into true independence, as well as into cooperation among nations. That sympathetic listener, that pole for diversification in the Third World's economic and political relations should have been Europe, and the sudden acceleration in the current crisis in Afghanistan (while the world's economy is in disarray owing to the "irresponsibility" of the dollar) is interfering with North-South and East-West relations alike, underlines with unmistakable force that it cannot go on missing the rendezvous, playing the idle onlooker, as it is, to the march of events governed by a logic whose inevitable outcome would be "the unthinkable."

These days there are leaders and groups listening to one another who until yesterday were leery of any revisionist, philistine, reformist talk, of any hint of a Europeanist discourse, who are calling now for "Europe's role" with the contrite fervor of activists in the dawning hours of the Federalist Movement. The fact of the matter is that we must not be misled. Western Europe today swings back and forth between subordination and squabbling, between resignation and awareness of its destiny, which would be crushed by cold war and by its divorce from the deepest needs and aspirations of the Third World.

Europe's democratic parties, in and out of government, must seek out the ground for understanding where they can turn a hand to building the new world economic order rooted in cooperation among equals. In Europe, its principal pole for dialogue with the Third World lies in furtherance in the West, according to whatever timetable the march of history may impose, of the transition

from the culture based on the "American way of life" to another culture, one that would consume different goods and enjoy greater human wealth; one that would not allow every "opening" to the Third World to be more hypocrisy and more plundering in a new disguise. Inseparably linked with this effort -- and with all there is of immeasurable greatness linked with it in every area -- cultural, political, productive -- stands Europe's second fateful rendezvous, to which it is summoned by the tiny margin of time left for negotiations between the superpowers: that from the restoration of the minimum climate of trust and confidence it rise once again to the challenge of nuclear disarmament, to the abandonment of any perverse trend toward the creation of "axes" or "encirclements," and of the crude effectiveness of the usual responses to that sort of thing. There are only a few months between us and the Madrid Conference.

We have been alerted just recently to the fact that the very prospect for global coexistence is rooted in general principles: in respect for the sovereignty of states and in recognition of the United Nations as the supreme forum for negotiated solutions to international differences.

No less acute, though, as we measure the perilously narrow ridge along which the world is moving, is our perception of the need for every one of us to shout out his refusal to go down into either line of bunkers in the cold war. Should this not happen. the collision routes would eventually, perhaps very soon, proliferate out of all control. Clearly, that refusal must be translated from an ethical stand into positive political positions on the part of parties, social forces, and governments. This, though, iswhere we must start from, from a refusal to choose between trenches. And that is exactly where the world crisis seems, yet again, to be leading us.

Reform, Islam, Tribal Society

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[Article by Giorgio Vercellin]

[Text] The author, a teacher in the Iranian and Afghan Affairs seminar at Venice University, argues that the reforms introduced by the Taraki government did not conflict with Islamic tradition or the people's religious beliefs, but were a response to widely felt social needs. Opposition to the regime was not motivated so much by religious issues as by ethnic and tribal quarrels. Refusal to accept the dominance of the ruling ethnic group by the other groups that make up the

ethnic mosaic called Afghanistan, combined with opposition from the privileged classes, explains the gradual weakening of the revolution.

The year 1979 began in the Middle East with an event which unquestionably marked a turning-point in history: on 11 February the last of the "javidans," the "immortals" who formed the personal guard of Muhammad Reza Pahlevi, King of Kings and Light of the Aryans, surrendered to the people's revolt that had been going on for more than a year. At that moment, the embryo of the future Islamic Republic of Iran was born. Such a reversal, though it was a consummation devoutly wished by the Iranian people, seemed until a very short time ago, in the view of almost every international political commentator, a most unlikely eventuality.

The pundits based their predictions on a set of apparently sound assumptions: the immense wealth available to the shah and to his ruling class were adequate to fund development programs that would satisfy the needs of the population; the interests of the U.S., Japanese, and European corporations that had invested capital and were involved in local projects provided an umbilical cord for economic, cultural, and political exchanges between Iran, only now emerging from backwardness, and the developed world; furthermore, and most important, the geographical and strategic position of the country, allied with the West, on the border of the Soviet Union and in the richest oil-producing region in the world, made the shah seem untouchable, because his overthrow would be too traumatic and destabilizing at the global level.

Despite the initial reaction of dazed disbelief, however, Pahlevi's downfall did not give rise in the West to any major questions or attempts at analysis which might be, as the saying goes, equal to the situation. On the contrary, all, or almost all of them very swiftly settled on the "Islamic" factor in the revolt, while some even drew superficial parallels between the leader of a revolution that had the support of millions of Iranians, the Ayatollah Khomeyni, and Savonarola, as TIME magazine did in February last year. This certainly not accidental demonization of a new movement full of promise, purposely overlooked by the Western mass media, is still dominant in the most disparate forms which involve political forces on both the right and the left (1), and which continue to gain currency in a situation that is steadily deteriorating (or was it actually taken for granted from the outset that it would be?).

Then in 1979 there were other chances to observe that the problem of which the Iranian revolution was a factor, perhaps the most visible, could not be dismissed as merely an unforeseen and

historically meaningless revival of Islamic fundamentalism. To any who cared to understand it was increasingly clear that in relations among states we were in a crucial phase, at a turning-point and a redefinition of reciprocal relations.

To add to this already complicated picture of conflicting tensions came the USSR's December military intervention in Afghanistan. Immediately the commentators began scurrying about for more or less pro- or anti-Soviet explanations, either kind, of course, still seen primarily through the prism of the two blocs taking advantage of one another to move into the "grey areas." These analyses, though -- which might have contained some portion of the truth -- are obviously inadequate to respond to all the variables moving across the Middle East chessboard.

In fact events over the past few months force us once again and in increasingly unavoidable fashion to look at and deal with the world of today from a lay point of view, free from any ideological prejudice and from any preconceived notions. This holds true particularly for those who for the last several decades have at least shared in the management of international power. We must, in other words, reread carefully and perhaps a bit self-critically the record of events hitherto dismissed out of hand as unimportant, once and for all jettisoning that bogey now conjured up by everybody (perhaps to exorcize it) known as "Eurocentrism."

Islamic Tradition and Revolution

One of the prime requisites for reaching that goal is the most accurate and thorough knowledge of the individual realities in the process of change. To do this, for example, it is wrong to perceive in Islam alone the driving motive behind everything happening in the area, let alone reading the Islamic phenomenon from a schizoid angle. In Iran, it is indeed painted as the vector element in all that is most backward, reactionary, regressive, and xenophobic, while in Afghanistan it is protrayed as the bulwark of respect for healthy primitive traditions and customs against the godless reforms of a regime in alien bondage. And yet for the media people, who see opposition to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as consisting of "Islamic guerrilla fighters" warring against the anti-Muslim measures promulgated by the Kabul government, such as abolition of the dowry, it would be enough simply to read Decree number 7, readily available in English (2), to realize that nothing of the sort is in fact going on.

Then there is the fact that, even before getting down to the heart of the matter, we must bear in mind the meaning of the issue in Afghanistan, with at least a touch of historical perspective: for many men of modest income, the dowry (it would be

more accurate to call it the price the groom pays to the bride's family) used to mean, because of the large amount of money involved, enforced celibacy that could last to age 40 or 50, if not longer. In a country ranked by the United Nations among the 29 poorest in the world, this writer was told in the Kabul bazaar that a Hazara or Turkoman woman would cost 300,000 or 400,000 afghani, which is something like 7-8 million lire. A Kabul bricklayer then earned around 60 afghani a day (1,200 lire): clearly, for him to contemplate spending that kind of money meant he was absolutely forced to go into debt, if he could. For this reason the issue had already been considered in various ways by other rulers, but never to any practical end.

One of the first acts of Nur Mohammad Taraki's government after it took power with the coup d'etat on 27 April 1979 was precisely in that direction (perhaps partly owing to the work done in the women's rights field by Anahita Ratebzad, then minister for social affairs, and back in the Kabul government today along with the other members of the Parcham group). True, the dowry decree does prohibit the sale "in exchange for money or goods" of any woman (Article 1): specifically, though, it is Article 3 that deals with the marriage gift, the one we actually call the dowry, which is sanctioned for Muslims by the Koran itself, which says: "Freely shall ye give women dowries" (Koran, LV,4). It is, in Islamic canon law, a "God-given right," making it a fundamental part of the social order which cannot be waived. And in fact the policy laid down by the Kabul leaders had carefully avoided violating that principle, relying instead -- and theirs was a strategy we shall encounted again elsewhere -- on the elbow-room provided by Islamic jurisprudence itself. Since, unlike other instances, neother the Koran nor the sunna, the "body of tradition," stipulates any economic definition of the size of the dowry, the RDA lawmaker took advantage of the law's silence. The decree sets a limit on the dowry, an act which is, Islamically speaking, the clear right of any ruler, and for which many precedents may be found in similar governmental measures both ancient and modern.

Briefly, what the government did was to set 300 afghani as the upper limit of the dowry or bride-price -- a sum within the reach of any citizen. In so doing, and in keeping within the most complete and unimpeachable compliance with Islamic law, against which neither canon judges nor mullahs could adduce logical argument or pertinent precedent, the new regime made it practically possible for anybody to marry. Clearly in some cases this decree had what might be called unfortunate results: for families with a lot of daughters, it meant a net loss of capital. But over and against such cases stand the spectacularly opposite cases of families blessed with many sons, not to mention those of a lot of men (and somen) who can now see their way to forming a family without going into debt for the rest of their lives.

Be that as it may, it did avoid a different danger, and this was something the RDA leadership perhaps had in mind, once again to dodge giving any practical pretext for attack by the religious conservatives. I am referring to the risk that, with the bride-price fallen so low there might be a rise in cases of polygamy (the decree says not a word about that).

The same argument holds, even more specifically, with regard to agrarian reform. Afghanistan, like most of the developing countries, is a predominantly agricultural state; even in 1975 85 percent of the population lived in some 10,000 villages, four fifths of which with less than 500 inhabitants, with no links whatever to the outside world -- if we except mule-drivers and transistor radios. There are very few big landowners, while most lesser freeholders had farms too small to support a family, no matter that Afghanistan's farmlands are potentially good.

Furthermore, in the years just prior to the April 1978 coup, the situation had deteriorated markedly, partly as a result of the 1970-1971 famine which, according to FAO, brought death to more than 500,000 people, partly because of the use of tractors and other mechanical devices to bring land under cultivation but which only the richest farmers could afford, and partly because of the constant shrinkage in plot sizes owing to repeated land division for purposes of inheritance.

When Taraki took to the radio on 9 May 1978 to announce the broad outlines of RDA policy, he gave first place to "completion of democratic land reforms, in the interests of the workers on the land and with their active participation." A few months later came ammouncement of the legislation that would do this: here again, as had been hinted, the lawmaker had tried to forestall any pretext for criticism from religious quarters. In fact, one of the law's articles provided that "no family may own more than 30 giarib of prime land or its equivalent" (Art. IV).

As we know, the life of every Muslim true believer is governed by five duties which he must perform to prove that he truly belongs to the Muslim community, and which are indispensable but not sufficient to his soul's salvation. Among these five duties is almsgiving, which is the canonical tithe paid by the believer on all he possesses, by means of which an ordinary tax is replaced by a religious obligation which enables the entire community to perceive itself as a whole in its institutional patterns. There is nothing more sacred than such "almsgiving," no obligation more binding on a Muslim. However, according to Islamic jurisprudence, it must be given only by those who can give or, as we would put it, only those with the "minimum tax liability": this is the nisab mentioned in the Afghan agrarian

reform act. In introducing this concept, the RDA lawmaker showed his sensitivity to the religious aspects of the issue, in that, by allowing ownership of the minimum required for almsgiving, he was guaranteeing that every true Muslim would have the means to fulfill his own spiritual life.

But there is more: lay society calls for sacrifice only upon those who are also bound by the demands of the religious society, placing no burden upon those who are considered "poor" by both. And here we have what looks like a paradox, if we look at it from the usual approach of the western pundits: the lay Afghan leaders showed that they were far more in sympathy with indigenous (Islamic) feelings than the "intransigent" propounders of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran were to do. What they did in fact, as grounds for the shari'ah (cf. note 6) deduction on the basis of the ijtihad or reasonable procedure, feel the need -- unjustified by anything except western acculturation -- to cite as remedy a latter-day "supplement" to that ijtihad to wit: "utilization of the latest in science, technology, and experience, and of whatever is designed to improve them."

In my view, this clearly indicates extreme care on the part of the Taraki regime in dealing with the whole corpus of problems that add up to Islam in its juridical and legal aspects. In short, this was no "godless" government, but an ordinary "laic" regime striving to force the religious strata in Afghan society to come to terms with itself on the grounds of practical choices. And that laic position was decidedly modern and far more advanced even than the one tested or implemented in the "Islamic" republics of the USSR (which, by comparison with countries like Iran, Libya, or Pakistan, are not, from the legislative point of view, "Islamic" at all any more).

If these were then the "religious" aspects of the agrarian reform law, the technical side of it looked just as sound. In a debate on the theory of agrarian reform (5) an English scholar argued that "the question of feasibility demands a bottom limit on the size of farmland holdings," and that therefore "it is better to give small landowners enough land to provide them with a decent living rather than to turn the landless peasants into mini-freeholders without a chance of making even a subsistence living." Furthermore, this same savant suggested that a 5 to 1 ratio between the maximum allowable (in land grants) and the subsistence level (for a single nuclear family) would cushion the impact on large landholders who are also good farmers, and would give the farmers in general no incentive to stick with inadequate habits of husbandry."

This writer is in no position to make a critical judgment between such arguments: this does not conflict with the fact that they

sound to him like views with facts and figures to back them up. sound, and worthy of sharing. And positions of this kind were taken into consideration in shaping Afghanistan's agrarian reform act, whose Article 3 in facts provides that every family shall have the right to own "no more than 30 giarib of prime farmland, while Article XII stipulates that "to every person having the right and to his family land shall be granted free of charge according to the following procedures" etc. Article XXIV, which sets down the levels of priority for land grants, gives top priority to "landless peasants or smallholders who work the land to be distributed [and to] landless peasants and smallholders whose lands have been taken by the government under condemnation procedings."

A problem often encountered by governments that have launched agrarian reforms has been the choice of deeds upon which to base grants; this hurdle of course sprang up before the RDA leaders, too, since they had no registry of deeds to refer to because the previous regimes had kept none. This is why, in the enabling regulations for Decree number 8 on land (meaning the agrarian reform act) considerable space is devoted to property deeds. Once again, we must admit the groundlessness of the allegations that the Afghan People's Democratic Party (PDPA) had strayed from existing tradition. Article IX of the enabling legislation says, in fact: "property deeds shall include: 1) governmental and ministerial decrees and bills of sale of government property...; 2) shari'ah records of sale, transfers of ownership, and inheritance...; 3) tax records...; 4) records in customary law..." As you can see, in status the Islamic records and deeds come second only to government acts and ahead of administrative action, and their religious nature is reemphasized again in the clause in Article X stating that [administrative actions] must, in order to be valid, be "recorded with the Court of the Cadi." Not does it affect the opinion stemming from the final limitation, which provides that "the person holding title (shari'ah title) as of the date of issuance up to the date when said title is produced, or a year prior to that date, shall have paid taxes [thereon]", inasmuch as a like provision applies to all property deeds, be they Islamic, civil, or customary.

Yet further evidence of the good will and care devoted by the RDA leaders to dealing with the problem of altering economic and social relationships in the rural areas came, in fact, from the publication in September 1978 (3 months prior to promulgation of the agrarian reform act) of the model charter for cooperatives, whose aim was to "organize small landowners, improve agricultural production, raise the social consciousness of the peasants, elevate the standard of living for the gallant and noble classes that labor in the fields and eliminate feudal-style relationships dating back to the Middle Ages" (Article I). This is not

the place for a critical examen of the content of this model charter for cooperatives. Nevertheless, using only the brief excerpts from it quoted here, it seems clear to me that the RDA government had drafted a reform plan which was not utopian or demagogic -- the kind that too often emerges from regimes that have come to power through a coup d'etat and who thereafter go searching for mass support from the people; rather, it looks to me like a plan that could be the start to practical solutions to the problems of the peasants.

Only trouble is -- the plan never got off the ground. There were numerous reasons: the difficulties in implementing it in almost inaccessible regions, where the old landowners often stirred up the peasants against the government agents, many of whom were actually killed; there was a bitterly hard winter in 1978-79, which destroyed the harvest at a particularly critical time; and, most of all, the lack of the required capital. Aggravating this last factor, and multiplying its effects were the problems ignited by Decree number 6, the first act of the new government in the economic area, which abolished both mortgages and usury.

This, mark you, was a practice harshly condemned in Islam, although it was widely practiced (through solutions we should call "jesuitical") -- so widely that in the early Seventies an expert studying the country's agricultural situation wrote that "the mullahs would find in this (the fight against usury) a good pretext for declaring a holy war, rather than inveighing against miniskirts or hurling anathemas at the few inns that dispense alcoholic beverages." (7) This does not alter the fact that in the socio-economic structure of the Afghan village, this kind of loan, even at very long term, did perform a useful function in that it was a way for the poor peasants to find seed-money for their annual planting, and also the wherewithal to put food on the family table in cases of extreme need. After the ban on usury this form of credit -- illegal but a realistic response to local realities -- suddenly disappeared, to be replaced, in the PDPA plan, by cooperatives. Unfortunately, the RDA's economic and political situation right then made it impossible for the government to solve the peasants' problems.

The Roots of Guerrilla Warfare

All of this was of course aggravated by the guerrilla war that called itself "Islamic." As far back as the Twenties, the experiments at reform tried by King Amanullah (1919-1929) were violently cut short by an insurrection brandishing "Islamic" slogans against the king's "godless" measures. The fact is, as recent research has proved (8), that then, as now, the fight was mounted to keep economic and political power in the hands of certain groups (tribes, landowners, religious leaders) who opposed the changes that curtailed their hitherto free hand.

The clue to the continuity between the events of 1929 and what we are seeing today is provided, physically, by the presence at the head of the rebellion of descendants of the leaders of 60 years ago: we find among those who rose up from the start against the Kabul government such dignitaries as Sibqatollah Mogiaddadi, president of the National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (FNSA), a descendant of Hazrat-e-Saheb of Shor-Bazar. His ancestor was a religious leader who, after escaping from the Soviet Union where he had fought in the anti-communist uprising of the Basmaci, had settled at Jalalabad (one of the areas in which the anti-RDA resistance is most active today), where he quickly won himself fame, veneration, and large estates. In 1929, he even threw in with his country's traditional foes, the English, and successfully fomented the tribes and the most conservative strata of the Afghan population to revolt against the sovereign's reforms which -- here again -- threatened his political and economic power far more than it did religious orthodoxy.

As for the opposition forces ranged against the Kabul government right now -- since the Soviet military intervention and the consequent higher level of attention on the part of the international media to developments in the area -- we hear that there is a merger afoot among various and sundry movements (nobody seems to know precisely how many: TIME magazine sets the number at 60, no less (9). This is hardly a recent trend, inasmuch as in the 2 years that have elapsed since the April 1978 coup d'etat there has been one merger after another under one unified command after another, just as there has been one split after another. The reasons behind all of this are numeerous; first of all, ethnic and tribal feuds, which -- as we shall see -- severely hamper the Kabul government, are visible in the ranks of the opposition as well. For instance, there is the Afghan Islamic Union (Jami'yat -e-Eslami, or UIA), said to be led by Seyyed Rabbani, which apparently is made up exclusively of Pashtun, the majority group that for 2 centuries held power in Afghanistan. Then there are the people who speak Dari (Afghani Persian, the mother tongue of a good many ethnic groups and widely used as an inter-ethnic lingua franca), who are to be found in the Afghan Islamic Party (PIA or Hezb e Eslami) head by Muhammad Nabi, who some observers say -- but cannot prove -- has ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in Pakistan.

In addition to this first element, and to social distinctions (many refugees are peasants fleeing from the food shortage due in part to the failure of agrarian reform and in part to the very inclement harvest season, who find themselves sharing the lot of rich landowners and religious leaders who managed to get part of their wealth out in time and are now, on top of all that, speculating in foreign aid materials), there are still

further subdivisions caused by the conflicting goals of the individual groups: the UIA seems to want a republic along the lines of the Iranian one, and the PIA hopes for the return of King Zahir, overthrown by Daoud's coup d'etat in 1973; and then the FNSA "is trying to create an economic and social order consistent with the Islamic concept of social justice." There is of course no lack of mutual accusations of collusion with the enemy, who is not necessarily identified either with Kabul or with the Soviets: frozen out of a very recent -- perhaps the nth merger was the Islamic Revolution Movement (Enqelab-e Eslami) because it was accused of being "in contact with the CIA." (10)

These groups, running on religious slogans, are not the movements really active in the fight against the RDA: in it as well are pro-Chinese and Marxist-Leninist groups, like Setam-e Melli (Oppression of the People). As for the former, active in the country since the Sixties with the Shol'e-ye Giavid (Eternal Flame) group, they were split into two or three factions, one of which collaborated with the Muslim Brotherhood, to the point where, as early as April of last year, Indian sources, picked up by Moscow and Kabul as well, were reporting that guerrilla fighters were getting training on Chinese territory, and that among them were 200 Muslim Brotherhood warriors. It is more than likely that now, under pressure from Peking, the pro-Chinese groups have got together again and are strengthening their ties with the Islamic movements.

Setam-e Melli, though, is a group that surfaced after a split in the ranks of the PDPA itself at the end of the Sixties: back in 1975 they put together an uprising, quickly put down, in the Badakhshan region, where even now the fiercest fighting is centered, and they were also accused by the Kabul government of responsibility for the February 1979 kidnaping of U.S. Ambassador Dubs, ending in his death, with the cutoff of U.S. economic aid to Afghanistan and deteriorating relations between the White House and the Kremlin, and were under suspicion of direct involvement in the tragic conclusion of that episode. Setam-e Melli says it is Marxist-Leninist, its main article of faith is that "the main conflict in Afghanistan is not class conflict, but conflict among nationalities," and it denounces the PDPA as "an agent of Pashtun hegemony." From this position stems its practical coincidence of interests with Peking, which has always viewed the problem of Pashtunistan (the region the English colonials split into Palkistan and Afghanistan and in which the great majority of Pashtuni live, as a tool devised by Moscow to dismember its own ally in the area, the Islamabad government.

Still another element can be attached to the "religious" rebels and the political groups already mentioned in the ongoing struggle against the Kabul government, although coming from quite

another direction: I mean the tribes. What they are actually doing is taking advantage of existing tensions to reassert their own autonomy with regard to any central government (Kabul today, but tomorrow it might just as well be Islamabad, should they feel threatened from there) and also to capture more modern weapons than the ancient Enfield rifles they captured from the English in 1839 and in later conflicts.

In view of all this, it is altogether natural that when the RDA government launched its reform program, the situation immediately radicalized. It could hardly be otherwise, given the fact that at the same time there was a heating up in the never-settled conflict we just mentioned between any central government seeking to impose its authority and the centrifugal forces of a tribal society whose life-style requires total freedom from any domestic ties. Actually, the tribes rose up at the very time when they became aware of the fact that the new regime in Kabul, owing to weakness connected with its internal stabilization, with the troubles encountered in implementing the reforms, and with the problems created by alien forces, could not maintain control (except in the very random fashion it had been trying to do so) over the outlying areas. However, I would stress once again, this came about in response to reasons of tribal policy, not because of religious issues.

I referred earlier to the problems stemming from the variety of ethnic and linguistic groups. Since 1747, when the chiefs of the Pashtun confederation of the Durrani declared their autonomy of the Persian kingdom of Nadir Shah Afshar, who after centuries had reunified the territories of what is now Afghanistan, whatever government sits in Kabul has been run either by Pashtun or by Pathans, also known simply but incorrectly as Afghani. These people, who live mainly in the eastern and southern regions of the country (as well as in the northwest province of Pakistan known as Pashtunistan) are nomads organized into tribes, with an agricultural-pastoral culture they feel beyond comparison with that of the sedentary Tajiks who live in Herat and in the other areas bordering on Iran.

These people, who make up the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, feel toward the nomadic herdsmen the mistrust and condescension they would show toward anybody with no fixed address, and reputed to live a primitive or backward life and suspected of religious laxity into the bargain. Mutual hostility is further deepened by the fact that the Tajiks for centuries have played a major economic role in trade between the towns and the country districts, whereas of recent years Afghanistan's rulers have given preference in the foreign trade that has been taking on increasing importance in local life with the hated Pashtuni.

Nor is that all: during the Sixties, for instance, the experts sent out by the international organizations were utilized mainly in the capital or in the Pathan zones where development projects were under way, whereas in the Tajik city of Herat, even though it is in the middle of an oasis with tremendous agricultural potential, there were only four foreign technical experts.

Nor is this merely a recent state of affairs: back in 1863, a Hungarian traveler wrote that "never has any ruler or conqueror been so loathed by the inhabitants of Herat as the Pashtun; in a region where they are called upon to play a major role, these Afghans have made themselves the objects of hatred. This is why the people of Herat would immediately plunge once again into a desperate struggle rather than recognize Afghan supremacy." (11)

So here, in my view, unlike what is taking place along the Pakistani border, is where the underlying cause of the rebellions that have occurred in the western regions of Afghanistan lies: now, just as it did a year ago, when in March 1979 a rebellion swept the city of Herat and was strangled in blood. This is above and beyond other factors, which unquestionably have been accumulating steadily (provocation on the part of the Tehran regime; occasional anti-Soviet feeling -- which in any case was not very widespread in the country; revolt against agrarian reform and the other decrees; pro-Shiite and anti-Sunni religious sympathies spreading beneath the surface throughout the area), but which were only the detonator for hostility already centuries old. What I mean to say is that the uprising last March, like the tensions still running high along the Iranian border, where most of the people are Tajiks, was simply but tragically the outbreak of popular hostility not so much directed against the RDA as -- above all -- against Pashtun domination, however historically represented.

Proof of this can be found in the very pattern of last year's revolt: insofar as we know, and unlike the situation on the Pakistani border, the rebels here sought no aid from any quarter, and were supported by no one (possible Iranian intervention was not absolutely decisive, nor have there ever been reports of the formation in Iran of organizations of exiles from Herat comparable to those active in Peshawar), nor yet have they indicated any desire to join with Iran or of wanting to form a "Greater Khorasan" (the geographical region which historically included the city of Herat, the city of Mashhad in Iran, and the town of Marv in the Soviet Union) as an independent entity.

The March 1979 uprising in Herat came about despite the RDA's leaders' having taken a series of steps in favor of ethnic minorities in a radical break with the policies of previous

rulers. Those governments had always given privilege of place to the Pashtun language, despite the fact that the latest constitutions (those of 1964 and 1977) declared Dari an official language as well, but totally omitted any mention of all the other languages (no fewer than 34) spoken in the country. Only 3 weeks after the 27 April 1978 coup d'etat, the RDA government gave the"(relevant) ministries a mandate to begin broadcasting programs in the Uzbek, Turkoman, Baluchi, and Nuristani languages and to introduce the cultures of all the tribes and nations of our one land, our beloved Afghanistan." Nor were these early measures the only ones: magazines in the various languages were published; an Academy of Science was opened in which there were provisions made for the various minorities; textbooks were printed (initially only in Turkoman and Baluchi).

In short, contrary to all allegations in the foreign press, the RDA's action during the early days of its power was aimed at implementing measures designed to help the social strata and the social and ethnic groups that had been most underprivileged heretofore and also, because of that, the easiest prey to the influence of the conservative sectors. But who were the RDA's leaders? Who made up the cadres of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan?

A Party Divided

Alone among all the states sharing borders with the Soviet Union, in which, after 1917, "a mixture of refugees, students, prisoners of war, and emigrant workers succeeded in forming organizations under the tutelage and inspiration of the Russian revolution, no communist party was created in Afghanistan during the Twenties," partly because "there was no point, for the Bolsheviks, in setting up a separate Afghan communist party (in that) their main concern was ... to consolidate relations with Amanullah, who ruled the only country in the world that was willing, in those days, to cooperate with the Bolsheviks." (12). This did not mean that various "leftist" movements of one kind or other have not always been active in the country, particularly in the late forties, when for the first time some of the RDA's leaders-to-be, including Taraki and Karmal, emerged upon the national scene.

The official birth of a progressive, pro-communist movement in Afghanistan is usually dated as 1 January 1965, when the PDPA was founded. Its advent must of course be viewed within the context of the Afghan situation at the time: just the year before, a new constitution had been promulgated in order to lay down the guidelines for more up-to-date national development and for political integration of the new classes emerging as the fruit of Daoud's work during the previous December (the military, the bureaucrats, teachers, import-export dealers, and the like).

In that basic law of the land provision was made, for the first time in Afghan history, for political parties: that meant that the PDPA was part of a general trend in offering progressives a channel for voicing their own demands.

There is no record of the identities and numbers of those who came together in the semi-official PDPA (since King Zahir never got around to issuing the enabling regulations for the 1965 constitution). Other clues would indicate, however, that its size was by no means small -- by Afghan standards, of course (but in any case its membership was confined to intellectual and urban middle-class circles).

There is, however, one major problem in connection with the PDPA in the causes and extent of the differences between the Khalq (People) faction, headed by Taraki, and the Parcham (Banner) faction under Karmal. On the basis of material available in the West it is not possible, for the time being, to grasp the practical motivation that led in 1967 to the split (probably only at the summit, and in any case a relative thing, since we do know that the two factions worked together even afterwards), or above all what their relations were with the Daoud regime (it would appear that Khalq backed him only at the outset, whereas Parcham was actually part of the governing group, but was ousted from it for good in 1975). Nor is it clear whether the USSR ever expressed or indicated a preference for one faction over the other: outright support would seem, however, to be ruled out, in that the Kremlin preferred, for so long as possible, to deal directly with the governing leaders in Kabul. Only after 1976-77 did it become clear that Daoud was growing increasingly dependent on the shah of Iran (who had not only promised tremendous amounts of financial aid -- which was never forthcoming -- to Afghan development, but had used his influence in Kabul to the point that members of Savak -- the Iranian secret police -- were serving in the Afghan army); only at this juncture, then, does there seem to be specific direct Soviet intervention in connection with the PDPA (which in July 1976 "officially" reunited).

And so it was that in April 1978, when the coup came that overthrew Daoud, and everywhere you looked the symptoms of the impending revolution were rife in the pervasive bloody uprisings, the first RDA government embraced both Parcham and Khalq members. That collaboration was not long-lived, however. In July of that same year Taraki ordered a purge, in the course of which he sent several Parchami -- including Karmal and Ratebzad -- out of the country as ambassadors.

To go into the details of occurrences in Afghanistan during the months that followed, illuminating though it might be, is most assuredly impossible: in brief, it may be said that while the

"out" faction went underground and refused to return home even when Taraki ordered them to do so in August of 1978, just as news broke of the discovery of a conspiracy (this, according to a number of commentators, handily providing Moscow with a second team should Taraki's programs fail) the domestic political situation centered, in the opening months of 1979, on the split between the RDA president and his prime minister, Hafisullah Amin. Amin has been fingered by some observers as the government's strong man, more pro-Soviet than his rival: the one thing that is certain, though, is that when reunification between the warring factions was under way, he was the one entrusted with the job of political activity inside the army, which since the Fifties had been commanded by cadres trained in the USSR, and hence conditioned to accept a message along the PDPA's progressive lines. While he was engaged in this task, Amin must have made intimate contacts with certain military circles which were subsequently to serve him well: unequivocal proof of this can be found in the fact that the one and only PDPA member who was not arrested by Daoud's police on the eve of the 1978 coup d'etat was -- Amin.

Be that as it may, Amin's shady dealings seemed to be matter for concern in 1979 for the Soviets as well. On his way home from Havana where he had been a delegate to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations, Taraki stopped off in Moscow where he was granted an audience with Brezhnev: rumor had it, even before the recent Soviet intervention, that Amin's banishment and the return home of Karmal and his group were decided upon at that meeting. Karmal was being recalled to support Taraki, who still enjoyed some support in the Kremlin, partly because the problems it had encountered there had proved more serious than anticipated. The catch was, though, according to these same sources, that Amin had got wind of the fact, while he was setting up Taraki's overthrow, just a few days before he returned home. Clearly, this contretemps not only gave rise to considerable irritation in the Kremlin at the elimination of a leader it had just lately pinned considerable faith on, but also at the need to review its own Afghan programs. There you have the "Afghan" motives for the Soviet intervention, which, in my view, cannot be adequately explained either in the strength of the guerrilla forces (the Kremlin was already providing the Afghan army with ample supplies of weapons and advisers) or in Kabul's economic woes (it is much harder now to provide food as aid to Afghanistan than it was before, when there were no United States restrictions on grain sales). Any reading of events must perforce turn at this point to the global options of the superpowers, and their "need," in the void left by the fall of the Iranian keystone, to redefine the boundaries of their respective areas of influence.

FOOTNOTES

1. I could cite countless examples, in Italy and alsewhere: I shall cite only one among the many here, "Ayatollah's Christmas Message," which appeared in NEW STATESMAN magazine (21-28 December 1979, pp 992-993). In it, the author (David Caute) puts Khomeyni in the stocks by offering, as answers to economic and political questions, quotations from the French translations of (mainly theological) works by the Ayatollah, with results readily imaginable.

2. Hadi Rabban, "Decrees of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan," Kabul 1979. An Italian translation of the decrees -- from the original Dari and Pashtu -- is to be found as an appendix to Giorgio Vercelli's "Afghanistan 1973-1978: from Presidential Republic to Democratic Republic," Venice 1979. Quaderni del Seminario di iranistica, uralo-altaistica e caucasologia dell'Universita degli studi di Venezia, nº 4, distributed by Herder, Rome. The reader is referred to that paper for a more detailed discussion than this one.

3. One giarib = 1,952 square meters.

4. Article 2 of the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

5. Michael Lipton, "Toward a Theory of Agrarian Reform," in Italian translation in POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE, 7, July 1979, pp 51-70.

6. The Shari'ah is the behavioral code of the Islamic community, unwritten but not the same thing as customary law because it derives from "divine will," which is deduced in parallel with direct revelation (Koran); from the opinion of the prophet (hadith) for Sunni Muslims, and those of the prophet and of the imams for Shi'ites; from community consensus and rational procedure (analogy for Sunni, reasoning for Shi'ites).

7. Gilbert Etienne, "Afghanistan ou les aleas de la cooperation," Paris, 1972, p 102, nº 1.

8. Leon B. Poullada, "Reform and Rebellion in Afghanistan, 1919-1929. King Amanullah's Failure To Modernize a Tribal Society," Ithaca, 1973.

9. TIMES, January 1980, p 31.

10. LE MONDE, 8 January 1980.

11. Arminius Vambery, "Travels in Central Asia... Performed in the Year 1863," London, 1864 [reprint New York 1970] pp 271-273.

12. Fred Halliday, "Revolution in Afghanistan," in NEW LEFT REVIEW, 112, November-December 1978, p 10.

'Normalized' Revolution

Florence POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE in Italian Feb 80 pp 21-28

[Article by Claudio Moffa]

[Text] The roots of the conflict are to be sought in the Democratic People's Party, split from its beginning in 1965 into a moderate, pro-Soviet wing, known as Parcham, and a radical wing, the Khalq, which was internationally independent, and headed by Taraki and Amin. Long story of internal feuding and the clash between the two lines. The Islamic guerrilla war and its function in the strategy of the dispossessed interests. Soviet intervention put a stop to the radical turn taken by Amin's guidance of the revolution and returned the moderate Karmal to power.

Overwhelmed by the tidal wave of dispatches filed on the varying fortunes of the war and by the reams of commentary on the actual or assumed strategies of the superpowers in southern Asia and the Middle East, the overthrow of Hafizullah Amin, Afghanistan's president from 16 September to 27 December 1979, and member of the central committee of the PDP since its founding, went almost completely unnoticed, as if it had been a minor "incident" in what the Soviets had been up to in the midst of their massive intervention in Afghanistan. And yet, it is our opinion that in that sudden change at the summit lies one of the principal keys for understanding the complex and sanguinary game the Soviet superpower is putting together in the area, with its eye not so much on Afghanistan as on neighboring Iran with its latent civil war; and for understanding, on the other hand, the U.S. reaction against a Soviet military presence in Kabul dating back, although in far smaller dimensions, long before 27 December 1979 (not to mention those economic ties of much older vintage).

Just who was Amin, who is now branded by Soviet propaganda and by the new Afghan government -- Stalinism dies hard -- as "an

agent of imperialism" and a "mass murderer"? What sort of quarrel set him against his successor Babrak Karmal, leader of the PDP's Parcham faction?

While available material on Afghanistan is scanty([1]), it is adequate to provide fairly exhaustive answers to these questions. The People's Democratic Party (PDP) was founded on New Year's Day 1965, the day when a whole string of Afghan intellectuals -- including Amin, Karmal, and other such lesser lights as Dastagir Pandjsheri, Akbar Khaybar, and Sherai Giawgezani -- got together in Kabul at the home of Mohammad Taraki to hammer out the policy foundations for the nascent organization. With its eye on a monarchy that had enjoyed Stalin's open support through the Twenties and that still maintained not unfriendly relations with the Soviet Union in the context of the region's geopolitical balance, the PDP went on record with the statement that it was too soon to abolish the crown, at least "in this phase of the nation's development"; but at the same time it took a stance against feudalism, calling for the abolition of large land-holdings and for agrarian reform that would redistribute the land among the destitute peasants.

These economic goals were a natural part of the "nationalist democratic revolution, the first and necessary phase in the socialist revolution" typical of all revolutionary processes in the emergent world.

Yet it was on precisely this point, on the interpretation to be placed upon the "nationalist democratic" phase of the revolutionary process, that, a scant year later, brought the first open dissent among the leadership and set off the first split in the PDP. Arrayed on one side was the minority Parcham (Banner) wing headed by Babrak Karmal, who argued for what amounted to a moderate interpretation: all the anti-feudal classes on a footing of equality, around a program of cautious, "modernizing" reform. On the other side was the Khalq (People) faction, led by Taraki and Amin, advocating a more radical strategy, symbolized by the postulate of hegemony for the working class over the rest of the democratic and anti-feudal united front as it already existed and as it would develop. In view of the fact that the working class in Afghanistan was and is practically non-existent, this statement of principle was to be understood as a more resolute and muscular leadership of the anti-feudalist movement on the part of the party which -- as a Marxian-inspired group -- was the true repository of the proletarian ideology.

The basic strategic difference was reflected later on in other aspects of the political line. At the level of internatonal alignment Parcham was always identified as the pro-Soviet component of Kabul's revolutionary intelligentsia; the Khalq

faction under Taraki and Amin, on the contrary -- and never mind the countless gross inaccuracies in the Western media after Daoud was overthrown in 1978 -- held firmly to "by common recognition, an independent position." (2) This is not to say that Khalq was not part, root and branch, of the "Soviet-Leninist" tradition in its ideological and policy sense, which rejected the Mao-Lin Piao strategy of war by the country people: a tiny splinter of Khalq was openly pro-Chinese, and argued that the rural areas should be the strategic center of revolutionary action; its members broke with Taraki and Amin in 1968, but never did manage to rally any serious mass following. (3)

Khalq and Parcham had their differences, too, on the practical action level: while Khalq urged a complete break with middle- and upper-middle class circles, to which most of its members belonged, and directed its mass work toward the lower classes in the capital and in the outlying rural areas, Parcham -- which was not idly dubbed the "communist monarchical party" by its foes -- was preaching infiltration of the feudal state apparatus, including the military hierarchy. In this connection it should be remembered that the royal army's officer corps had traditionally been trained in the military schools of the neighboring Soviet Union.

Behind these strategic and practical differences, too, there are those who perhaps rightly see the stamp of Karmal's and Taraki's personalities: Karmal, son of an army general, came from a rich and influential family; Taraki was a child of poverty (a Pathan tribe, the Ghizlai clan), who had to work his way through school.

The Parcham-Daoud Alliance (1973-77)

At first events seemed to prove Parcham right: although it had always espoused the more cautious position in the PDP as to the type of regime and the monarchy-republic option, Karmal's faction suddenly and unexpectedly found itself with an edge over the rival Khalq faction when in 1973 the "Red Prince" Daoud took power, announcing major reforms that were to change the face of the country, and the creation -- more or less in line with Parcham's own program -- of a "broad front of all nationalist, progressive, and patriotic forces."

Daoud's experiment, however -- in which Parcham had a first-hand part with major positions in the ministries and in the civil service in general -- soon proved a failure: the promised democratic elections would never be held. Further, the quasi-traditional option of non-alignment in foreign policy seemed shaken when Daoud paid a visit to neighboring Iran, eliciting an indignant protest from Parcham. The understanding with the shah, most important of all, involved some watering down of Kabul's claims

to Beluchistan, which it had claimed from neighboring Pakistan for longer than anyone remembered. Above all, as a close relative of the deposed monarch, the prince could not find it in his heart to break with the landowning class: that meant that the argarian reform plans boiled down to a little "green revolution" with disastrous consequences, which, combined with the effects of the world economic crisis, further impoverished the already bone-poor masses of the Afghan people. From 1970 to 1975 the annual growth rate in the GNP, which during the Sixties had been 1.6 percent, dropped to 0.2 percent; a wave of inflation hit the towns and cities, particularly the food markets; about a million unemployed were driven to emigrate to neighboring Iran and the Arab Emirates, or stayed home to swell the ranks of the urban lumpenproletariat. Kabul's population rose from 450,000 in 1970 to 740,000 by 1976.

As the crisis deepened, it swallowed up whatever margin of time there had been for the effort to transform the country gradually that Parcham had been preaching: and so conditions grew ripe -- Afghanistan is not the only country to have experienced this sort of thing during those years -- for the radical shift of 1978. The year before, called to account by Kabul's intelligentsia and students, Parcham duly recited its mea culpa and rejoined the Khalq-PDP in a minority position. At the same time, Khalq had been revising its line of action, and launching -- this too is a symptom of the bankruptcy in long-term strategies -- a campaign of inflitration among the armed forces: this was the only way out for a revolutionary party which, considering ways of overthrowing the feudal monarchy, at the same time rejected, as we have seen, the route of armed struggle and of a people's guerrilla war.

Daoud's Overthrow and PDP Reforms

The positive effects of the break between Parcham and Daoud and of mending the breach between the two PDP factions came on 27 April 1978. The prince, after trying partial liberalization of the system, had once more turned the screws of repression on his country's politics, and his police had arrested, among others, Taraki himself. He was overthrown in a PDP-fomented uprising, in which several army detachments openly took part. It was a coup d'etat, yes, insofar as its "Blanquist" and insurrectionary technique was concerned, but it was decidedly not a military coup nor yet one engineered by the USSR, as the western media would go on repeating day after day. It began with an all-but-unforeseen -- though obviously organized by Hafizullah Amin for one -- reaction to Daoud's order for a wave of arrests: "The leftist coup d'etat of 27 April was more the upshot of an impromptu action than of any formal plan" (4) In the second place there were only three military men among the 21 members of the new

government. In the third place, despite Parcham's active participation in the rebellion, the Khalq faction swiftly took the situation into hand. "Despite numerous allegations to the contrary, we believe that the Soviets were not directly involved in the random operation of 27 April." (5)

For that matter, Taraki went on repeatedly, in the course of the weeks following the seizure of power, stressing the new government's loyalty to the principles of non-alignment, and the "homegrown" and "new model" nature of the "Afghan revolution."

The convulsive events that followed the revolutionary turnabout, at least until Taraki was overthrown by Amin (September 1979), can be boiled down to three fundamental givens.

1. In the first place, the moderate wing of the PDP, and the one with the closest ties to the USSR, Parcham, was soon squeezed out of the party by the Khalq under Taraki and Amin. As early as July 1978 Babrak Karmal was removed as prime minister and made ambassador to Prague while, a few days later, Gen Kadir, a moderate nationalist-Muslim, was politically eliminated and arrested on charges of conspiracy. It should be noted that Parcham's alienation from the government occurred concomitantly with the PDP's promulgation of revolutionary decree n°6, which abolished usury, a traditional scourge in the country, particularly in the rural areas: with one pass of the sponge a total of 600 billion lire in debts -- debts owed by millions of peasants -- were wiped out by that law.

2. In the second place, and conversely, the radicalization of the social class and the revolutionary process was beginning to chip away at the non-alignment stance officially reiterated by both Taraki and Amin: as the new government was tightening cooperation agreements with the USSR to finance the forthcoming reforms, Pakistan and Iran -- the latter already shaken by the popular uprising against Reza Palhavi's dictatorship and, furthermore, already economically involved in Afghanistan -- were steadily stiffening in their attitude toward events in Kabul. The Federal Republic of Germany -- to which earlier regimes had followed the practise fairly widespread in the pro-Western Third World and entrusted the training of its police -- voluntarily withdrew its military advisers once the corps had been suitably neutralized by the new government for fear of reactionary coups. And thus the groundwork was laid -- under the aegis of the western media campaign against what was a purely imaginary "pro-Soviet" switch in Kabul (in 1978) -- for the pro-Soviet switch that did indeed come to pass a year later, thanks to Amin's overthrow and Karmal's takeover with direct support by Soviet tanks. The Soviet military presence was to increase steadily, keeping pace with the feudal "vendée" organized or at least financed by the CIA from Pakistan, spread and thereby imperilled

the nation's stability and implementation of agrarian reform programs.

3. The third of our basic givens: the reforms launched by the new government and their impact on the social and ethnic conflicts inside the country. Of the eight decrees issued by the revolutionary government between April 1978 and July 1979, three were truly fundamental: one was the abolition of usury, which we have already mentioned; the second was the one calling for equality between the sexes, for reduction of the bride-price (total abolition would have conflicted with Islamic tradition), and banning forced marriages -- a practice widespread in rural areas, with the approval of the religious authorities (decree-law No 7): and the third was agrarian reform, which took effect on 1 January 1979 (nº 8). It was the keystone in the revolutionary process in a country where 75 percent of the population works on the land. The "democratic agrarian reform" called for confiscation of large land-holdings and redistribution of title to family plots among the landless..."Something halfway between Mao-style cooperatives and the Yugoslav type based on individual ownership of the land." (6) In September of 1979 a count showed that 600,000 hectares had been redistributed to a total of 300,000 families.

Along with these revolutionary decrees, the new government launched a set of measures also designed to break up the country's old social, political, and cultural order. Thousands of political prisoners were freed and members of the royal family and of the nobility jailed. A campaign for multilingual literacy was launched (abolition of Pathan as the "official" language applied to radio broadcasts as well), under which more than 600 new schools were opened and more than a million adults were involved. A start was made at overhauling the ancient government bureaocracy through wholesale purges and arrests of the old regime's civil servants, and the insertion en masse of party cadres into the central and provincial administrations. The work of providing political education to the armed forces went on from its timid start under Daud; and, as we have seen, the police force was neutralized by disarming it mere days after the 27 April turnabout.

Islamic Opposition

And so it was that Afghanistan, through a "revolution from the top" typical of so many Third World countries, struck out on the road to far-reaching transformation. Clearly, though, it was inevitable that any such process would run into widespread obstacles and resistance. The problems the new regime had inherited from the past were as numerous as they were thorny. There was the heavy burden of underdevelopment: industry -- except

for textiles and a few cement factories and sugar refineries -- was practically non-existent. As for agriculture, of the potentially arable land (14 million hectares) only a tiny share (3 million hectares) was actually under cultivation. Cultural and sanitary conditions were the most backward imaginable: 90 percent of the population illiterate, 30 percent suffering from one or another form of tuberculosis, and tens of thousands of lepers. The social stratification was only partly "simple" and dichotomous: in the rural districts the landless masses (36 percent of the peasant population) was "easy" to win over to the revolution when the big estates were broken up and redistributed. But there were also millions of smallholders (45 percent of the peasantry) who, although they too were poor (their holdings were never more than 4 hectares) were nevertheless hierarchically arrayed among themselves, and were relatively privileged by comparison with the rest of the rural population. Also at work in the country districts was the age-old web of patterns of control by the old feudal establishment over the peasant population, which operated through the traditional village headmen (mirab, malek, arbab, etc.,) and the Islamic mullahs.

Lastly, the government was also facing the manifold unresolved national questions in the country: the artificial offspring of British imperial policy in southern Asia, Afghanistan is a mishmash of disparate ethnic groups. The Pathans (or Afghani) are by far the majority ethnic group (some 7 million of them); then there are more millions of Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkomans, Hazaras, etc. Many of these populations are nomadic (2.5 million in all) or semi-nomadic, and they are an obstacle to agricultural development.

It was out of these complex problems we have listed here that there began to emerge early in 1979 a mass opposition to the regime: significantly (PDP members are mostly Pathan in origin) it takes on tribal characteristics in non-Pathan regions, but feeds on the religious factor where Pathans predominate. The latter brand is far more widespread: of the ten or so anti-government guerrilla groups on which there are hard data today, most are Islamic in orientation.

The Islamic-tribal opposition to the regime -- bearing in mind the opinions provided us by the western press on the matter -- raises at least two problems of interpretation. The first has to do with the opposition's real nature, its "social" and political stamp: from this point of view the often-drawn comparison between the Iranian revolution and the Afghan feudal "vendée" emerge as the really superficial and hasty judgments they are. They fail to allow for the fact that the Islamic opposition in Afghanistan, unlike that in Iran against the Reza Palhavi regime, has a decidedly reactionary tinge. There are a number of clues

pointing that way: it was first openly manifested shortly after the issuance of the decrees for liberation of women and for agrarian reform; there is the spread of reaction against the reforms which, although it is indeed a "grass-roots" thing, is hard to share and hard to estimate: "In many cases husbands, urged on and manipulated by religious spokesmen, have turned out en masse to "get their wives back," set fires to schools, and driven away or actually killed agents from the ministry of education." (7) And then there is the fact that the overwhelming majority of the Afghan population (12.5 million out of around 17 million) are of the Sunni rather than the Shi'ite persuasion, meaning that they profess the most conservative variety of the Islamic faith. The only shi'ites in Afghanistan are the Hazara nomads: but that ethnic group's opposition to the central government -- in October 1979 its tribal chiefs set up an Islamic Revolutionary Council -- is based on nomadism, on their anything but "progressive" refusal to accept the new government's still very tentative plans to get them into permanent settlements.

If to all these facts we add the vaporous and ambiguous nature of the Islamic organizations' programs (the struggle against "atheism" and against "Marxism") which are held up as rivals to the solid practicality of the government-sponsored reforms, not to mention the international support and connivance these same organizations enjoy (the U.S., China, and Pakistan: symptomatic is what can only be called the lukewarm support they get -- at least thus far -- from Iran), the reactionary and pro-feudal nature of the Afghan guerrilla war emerges clearly, even in the few cases where it does not openly call for the return of the Zahir monarchy.

The second problem has to do with the real strength of the rebellion: the impression one gets, bolstered by the pictures we have been getting from a number of recent and very recent TV specials, is that once again the western mass media have failed to convey an objective picture of the situation. The Afghan Islamic opposition is certainly a mass phenomenon: and yet, at least up till the Soviet intervention, it was never really shown to be widespread. The 40 to 50,000 strength attributed by the western press to the anti-government organizations (figures obtained from Pakistani sources) is not all that big for a country with a population of 17 million, particularly when set against a PDP which (according to American sources) has 10 to 50,000 active members. As for the large numbers of "refugees" in Pakistan -- 300 to 500,000 -- they also cloak a more complex reality, particularly the nomadic habits of large segments of the population: "Often semi-nomads, the Pathans drift more or less freely back and forth between Afghanistan and Pakistan," reported LE MONDE on 26 September 1979. On the other hand, it is the very lack of any widespread Islamic opposition to the new government -- at least

prior to Amin's ouster -- that makes the Soviet intervention still more unacceptable and "imperialistic."

Even with all this, we would repeat once again with emphasis, the guerrilla war was a mass phenomenon, and constituted a serious problem -- particularly in hindsight -- for the new government; it was no accident that from the moment Daoud was toppled, it took a pretty cautious attitude toward the religious problem (typical, a propos, of some of Taraki's tactics: going to the mosque for prayer, refraining from too outspokenly Marxist terminology in official pronouncements, etc): in effect, the underlying "dualism of power" between the old state in the process of demolition and the new one being built made the solution to that question an absolute necessity, the more so in that the armed forces -- and this was indeed "opposition" often underestimated -- were a long way from enthusiastic over the new direction, and had repeatedly shown that they were the prime focus of possible reactionary countercoups. Between April 1978 and September 1979 there were numerous coup attempts and desertions, sometimes by entire military units.

The Taraki-Amin Clash

So we see that the Islamic opposition in any case posed a serious problem to the Taraki government, and it became the focus for all the other issues clustered around the "phase" of the revolutionary process: from restructuring the armed forces to agrarian reform and its advancement -- apparently -- from the individual family farm to the cooperative stage. And this was precisely the point, contemplation of this vast array of issues, where dissent and all the divergences that seemed to have been got rid of when the moderate Parcham wing was severed in the summer of 1978, floated to the surface once again. This time the polarization resolved itself around Taraki and Amin: it was Amin's increasingly swift climb into the upper reaches of the party hierarchy and of government (in March Amin became prime minister, while still holding fast to his place as PDP secretary general and his foreign affairs portfolio) that increasingly worried the then president. On the one hand Taraki, who favored some softening in the process and compromise settlements with the Islamic opposition, and on the other Amin who -- after having been the man mainly responsible for the breach with Parcham -- sought to make the revolutionary process still more radical.

This is what emerges from three illuminating reports in IL MONDO on 17, 19, and 20 September 1979. From them we extract another crucial given: Amin was not the "pro-Soviet" sympathizer we had been given to understand from several quarters. His coup had taken the Soviet Union "by surprise," and thereby had made him

an inconvenient ally in the geopolitical context of western Asia. Actually, secure in his own power support network that was beyond the reach even of the Soviet advisers already on the scene in Afghanistan, Amin successfully parried Taraki's attempt to cut him down to size (on Amin's own admission according to a report quoted by LE MONDE on 22 December, to assassinate him) and thus to do unto his adversary as he had been done by. And he succeeded in doing just that against the desires of the Soviets, who were supporting the Taraki-led moderates. The western media error was no accident, either; it was part of an already familiar pattern, in which the object is to aim at the "pro-Soviet" until -- as happened in the Karmal case -- the "pro-Soviet" eventually appears. In the meantime, though, ignorance and failure to understand the real internal dynamics of the pro-Soviet bloc prevailed over any objective approach.

According to LE MONDE, Amin, "aware of opposition from part of the army, tended to rely increasingly on the armed civilian militia" (20 September 1979): once he had held firm in defense of his commitment to revolutionary reforms, he had perforce to set up a strong people's force to protect those same laws. A dispatch dated August 1979 had already reported that the peasants were being armed in the Herat zone and in the regions north of Kabul. Amin, according to reliable sources, was apparently trying to play on the U.S.-USSR conflict to make his country more independent of Moscow, following a nonalignment dodge fairly common among "Soviet-leaning" countries these days.

As things turned out, though, events took another turn, culminating in an attempt to turn things around completely: the Soviet-engineered "coup" on 27 December 1979 represented a complete break with the radical course upon which Amin wanted to strike out, and an attempt to restore dialogue between the Islamic-feudal opposition and the government, under the aegis of constituting what Karmal himself had borrowed the old Parcham program's language to style "a broad front, with participation by all the nationalist and democratic forces." The statements in favor of the new government emanating from the Kabul ulema only a few days after Karmal had taken power, are symptomatic. In much the same way, the very recent hints at the possibility of some revision in the agrarian reform laws (or is this merely a breathing-stop at the status quo, an indication that the reforms will go this far and no further?) shed some light on the anything but secondary scope of the infighting at the top echelons of the PDP. Defeated after the failed Daoud experiment and consigned to outer darkness after April 1979, Parcham was restored to full power within the Afghan People's Democratic Party.

Soviet Intervention

Some conclusions can be drawn, then, if we purposely skip over all considerations of the tragic consequences triggered internationally by events in Afghanistan.

1. First of all, the ouster of Amin, the Soviets' embarrassing ally, was something the Soviets themselves wanted. Carter is unquestionably quite right in charging the Kremlin with lying when it says that "the Afghan government" had asked for its intervention. If by that he means intervention against Islamic reaction, this is absolutely true. Yet in the process of their intervention the Soviets violated the sovereignty and legitimacy of the only real Afghan government in existence on 26 December 1979, which was Amin's. And so what the USSR could not bring off in Angola (the Nito Alves business) or even in Ethiopia (there have been many reports of the Kremlin's mistrust of the "radical" Mengistu) worked in Afghanistan: the country's geographical placement -- 1,500 to 2,000 kilometers of it borders on the territory of the Soviet superpower -- transformed it, with the help of that domestic instability for which the American secret services are at least partly to blame, into a "Warsaw Pact country." Even so, be it added, the rhetorical comparisons with Czechoslovakia really don't stand up all that well, in view of the fact that those taking issue today with the new pro-Soviet government have very little in common with Dubcek's democratic socialist option. The "principal contradiction" in the Afghan revolutionary process in this phase is still the one between the anti-feudal front and pro-feudal reaction.

2. The pro-Soviet coup in Kabul is an attempt at a moderate change of course by comparison with the social conflict in that country: evidence to that is the Parcham story, Karmal's statements on the morning after the seizure of power, the ulema's official recognition of the new government, and the coolish Iranian attitude to the whole thing. In this context, the heightened tension in the U.S.-USSR confrontation immediately following the turnaround of 27 December 1979 is not quite so paradoxical as it looked at first: superpower policy, apparently, does not necessarily or invariable automatically reflect class conflict inside this or that country. However, it may be tending toward "automation": Soviet tanks in Afghanistan to back a moderate switch at the top of the Kabul government are, for the United States, far more of an immediate threat than any "radical" leadership such as Amin's might have turned out to be.

3. All this can be explained by the real motives behind the Soviet intervention, which have a lot more to do with the regional situation -- neighboring Iran -- and with an "imperial" logic of operations on one of the planet's basic strategic chessboards --

the Middle East -- than with domestic events in Afghanistan. The Soviets overthrew Amin -- the same Amin who in August had delivered a blistering attack on the "fanatics in power in Tehran," accusing them of supporting the Afghan guerrilla war -- with an eye and a half on Iran. Not so much in the sense that the American impasse in Tehran had left them a free hand in the Kabul coup (this too), as in the sense that the policy of compromise with Islamic reaction in Afghanistan was useful to the USSR in getting a firmer toehold in among the internal tensions of the Iranian revolution, during a phase when it is radicalizing and when the likelihood of a full-scale civil war is mounting.

4. That still leaves open the question as to whether the Soviet-Karmal ploy will work or not: apart from western reactions to the USSR's move -- clearly unforeseen in the Kremlin -- a great many obstacles lie in the way of success for "operation Kabul;" those obstacles might well thwart the attempt to turn the Afghan revolution off its moderate course. Here are the main obstacles in its way: from the tough reaction to Karmal's softness toward Islamic reaction -- which can now claim the "solidarity" of the western media as grounds for upping its price -- to the possibility that even the Iranians and Khomeiny himself -- with the issue of anti-Iran economic sanctions by the UN out of the way -- might be driven to take a tougher stand vis-à-vis Moscow; to the no less significant fact that in view of the scarcity of trained Parcham cadre in the "renewed" PDP, Karmal may well have to come to terms with the Khalq apparatus once run by Amin, only part of which has been purged or jailed.

FOOTNOTES

1. Among the sources we consulted, we would acknowledge Fred Halliday's "Revolution in Afghanistan" in the NEW LEFT REVIEW, November-December 1978; Gaetano La Pira's "Afghanistan from Feudalism to Imported Socialism," in POLITICA INTERNAZIONALE nº 4, 1979; two reports in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (July 1978 and January 1979); a lengthy article by L. Dupree, "Afghanistan under Khalq," in the July-August 1979 issue of PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM; an official interview with a PDP leader in the NUOVA RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE, January 1979; a single issue of the Italian review IL VELTRO devoted to Afghanistan (nº 5-6 October 1972); as well as LE MONDE's periodical coverage over the past 2 years and the extremely rare articles appearing in the Italian press over that same period.

2. PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, cit., p 34

3. This was Rahim Mahmudi's Shu'la (The Flame" organization.

4. PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, cit., p 46.

5. PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM, cit., p 42.

6. Giancarlo Lannutti, writing in L'UNITA on 9 September 1979.

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U.S. MILITARY PRESENCE IN EGYPT EXAMINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 2 Sep 80 pp 1, 5

[Article by Ahmed Fattani: "What Is Behind Egyptian-American Cooperation?"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the Afghanistan affair, Carter's America has set up several support points for possible military intervention in the Near East and the Indian Ocean. Only recently, Washington and Cairo announced the establishment of the third U. S. base at Ras Banas on the Red Sea in Egypt. It is American dollars that will pay for the construction and facilities of this naval air base, just as they have elsewhere in Oman, Somalia and Kenya. The Pentagon has not concealed the fact that it plans to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to modernize the base from which the B-52 strategic bombers and the KC-135 supply planes could take off and land.

Since the Camp David accords, the United States has had two bases, one located near Cairo, housing about 15 F-4's, and the other on the Nile at Qena. It was from this base some 500 kilometers from Cairo that the planes which were to make the attack on Tabas in Iran took off. A wide range of sophisticated equipment, radar and other detection devices have been installed there and have been operating for several months. Observation missions, especially satellite spying, is carried out by American pilots. The F-4 that recently crashed was stationed there and revealed to public opinion that the American bases in Egypt had a different objective than the one officially announced by Egyptian and American officials.

It is a secret to no one that Sadat's Egypt is destined to be a military base of aggression serving the United States.

Dollars are raining down on the Nile. The proof? The Pentagon has just officially admitted that it will spend some $400 million on modernizing the Ras Banas military airport alone. Once completed, the base could accommodate 16,000 men, according to statements made by the Americans themselves. Ras Banas would then be a decisive element in controlling the straits, the Red Sea and the Arabian Gulf. It would be a relay station strengthening the U.S. bases at Berbera (Somalia), Monbasa (Kenya) and Massirah (Oman). These are definitely preparations for war in which Washington is zealously engaging from Sadat's Egypt.

What is concealed behind the sudden generosity of Uncle Sam toward a country which until 10 years ago was the leader of Arab nationalism, the epicenter of the fight against imperialism and support for Third World liberation movements?

After the disappearance of Nasser, America succeeded, with Kissinger's help, in taming the Arab country having the strongest army in order to drag it into the most condemnable undertaking in history: surrender to the Israeli enemy. It came about because one man was ready to offer his services and become America's factotum in the region. Today he wears his Harlequin costume, like a cowboy in the West seeking new adventures.

In 1980, political observers easily discovered that the Camp David accords were nothing more than a screen for a new American plan of military offensives in the world, shrewdly put together by Pentagon strategists. This new plan would respond better to the strategic needs of a United States constantly showing its teeth rather than looking for real peace in the region.

After being booted out of Southeast Asia, the United States saw its sphere of influence diminish over the years. In the Third World, it is the scapegoat blamed for everything and to which all ills are attributed. In Angola in 1975, the agents of American imperialism were brought to bay and did not even put up a fight.

Neither Savimbi's UNITA [National Union for the Total Independence of Angola] nor Roberto Holden's FLNA [Angolan National Liberation Front] were able to contain the people's force led by Agostino Neto's MPLA.

The rise of the socialist current on the African continent and in the Arab Machrek is perceived in Washington as an alarming sign for the future of the influence exercised throughout the world by the United States. Ford is gone and the new White House tenant, Jimmy Carter, calmly readies his weapons. He sees that the geopolitical map has undergone profound changes since 1975. In the Pentagon, the losses are counted: Haile Selassie's Ethiopia, the Iran of Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, the departure of British forces from South Yemen, which opted for a people's democracy and Afghanistan.

On Egypt's western borders, it is Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi's Libya that arouses the ire of the American-Israeli-Egyptian trio.

All of these factors affected Carter's decision when he invited Sadat and Begin to work out the Camp David accords.

The Egyptians, who in October 1979 -- at the time of the celebration of the sixth anniversary of the Ramadan war -- saw American F-4 planes for the first time, had already understood that Sadat was offering Carter all of Egypt to serve as a base from which aggression would be launched against future objectives in the Maghreb, Africa, the Machrek, the Gulf and Asia.

The Americans entered Egypt by the front door. Under pressure from the White House, the American Congress approved a military aid program amounting to $4 billion over 5 years, while the Pentagon agreed to supply Sadat with new weapons: 550 troop transport vehicles, 240 tanks and 40 F-16 planes. Gen Kamal Hassan Ali had already received 800 troop transport vehicles and 86 campaign trucks.

After long negotiations, Douglas-McDonnell concluded an agreement to build F-14, F-15, F-16 and F-18 bombers in Egypt.

It goes without saying that in order to defend Israel better, the United States prefers to invest billions of dollars for the establishment and maintenance of their military bases in Egypt. The Israelis have understood this very well, recognizing that "the American bases in Egypt are an advantage (for Tel Aviv) if President Sadat should die or be overthrown."

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COOPERATION INTENSIFIED WITH SEVERAL COUNTRIES

Meeting With Bulgarian Minister

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 29-30 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] (APS)--On Thursday, Abdelaziz Khelef, member of the Central Committee and minister of commerce, and Ali Oubouzar, secretary of state for foreign trade, met with Assen Stamenov, deputy chairman of electronics and electrical equipment of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

The meeting dealt with the evolution of commercial relations and cooperation between Algeria and Bulgaria and prospects for further development.

Special emphasis was placed on preparations for the 12th session of the Algerian-Bulgarian joint committee, which will be held in the coming months.

Hungarian Delegation in Algiers

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 3 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] Istvan Soltesz, minister of metallurgy and the machine industry, accompanied by a large delegation and the Hungarian ambassador to Algiers, met yesterday with Abdennoun Bekka, minister of posts and telecommunications, who was assisted by the secretary general of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.

In the course of the meeting, the possibilities of developing cooperation between the Algerian and Hungarian Posts and Telecommunications ministries were discussed.

The two ministers expressed their satisfaction with the quality and level of cooperation and said they were optimistic about the consolidation of the cordial bonds existing between officials of the two countries in the field of posts and telecommunications.

Industrial Cooperation With Hungary

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 5-6 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] (APS)--Thursday afternoon, Mohamed Nabi, secretary of state for professional training, received Soltesz Istvan, Hungarian minister of metallurgy and the machine industry, at the Ministry of Labor and Professional Training. Istvan is in Algeria to attend the 17th International Fair in Algiers.

The meeting was also attended by the Hungarian ambassador to Algeria. The officials examined possibilities of broadening cooperation between the two countries in the different areas of professional training.

On Wednesday, Secretary General Boudjemline of the Ministry of Light Industries, met with Istvan Soltesz, Hungarian minister of metallurgy and the machine industry, and the delegation accompanying him for the purpose of attending the 17th International Fair in Algiers.

The meeting dealt with Algerian-Hungarian relations in the field of light industries and on prospects and the expansion of industrial cooperation between the two countries.

Improved Relations With Italy

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 5-6 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by A. Z.]

[Text] With the official visit to Algiers which Minister of Foreign Trade Enrico Manca began Wednesday, accompanied by a large delegation of high officials from his ministry, Italian participation in the 17th International Fair in Algiers seemed to augur well for Algerian-Italian relations.

During his visit, the Italian minister was able to examine real possibilities of developing those relations and measure the quality of our ties, which began before our independence and which are favored by many historic and geocultural affinities.

Taking these prospects for cooperation into account, Italy's participation in the International Fair was expanded to 80 firms, which exhibited a diversified range of products from all priority sectors of the Five-Year Plan: machinery and equipment for public works and the construction industry, valves for water, gas and steam, tractors and power-driven cultivators, facilities for water treatment, machinery for the processing and packing of agricultural products, prefabricated buildings, naval shipyards, the electronics industry, engineering, machines for bottling, and so on.

Covering an area of 5,500 square meters, the Italian pavilion is filled with the very latest equipment from Italian industry, which generally covers the Mediterranean market.

Their competitiveness is such that it incites Italian manufacturers to further intensify their presence in regional fairs.

In his successive talks with the Algerian ministries of Commerce, Energy and the Petrochemical Industry, Transport, Light Industries, Finance, Public Works, Heavy Industry and the Office of Secretary of State for Foreign Trade, Manca reviewed cooperation between our two countries and provided a note of optimism concerning its growth under better conditions, thereby confirming the spirit of the recent visit to Algeria by the president of Italy, Sandro Pertini.

On the occasion of Italy's "national day" Thursday, the climate was most cordial between ministers Manca, Khellef and Oubouzar.

Harmonious Relations With Sweden

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 3 Sep 80 p 3

[Interview with Swedish Minister of Industry Nils G. Asling, conducted in Algiers by A. Zouied; date not given]

[Text] In Algeria since Sunday on an official visit to the 17th International Fair in Algiers, Nils G. Asling told Abdelkader Zouied, during an interview granted us, that "Our discussions (with Algerian officials) have been fruitful, concrete and have even covered specific projects." Asling had met with high officials from the ministries of Commerce, Finance, Energy, Housing, Transport and Heavy Industry.

"It is my impression that our relations are bound to enjoy harmonious development," he said.

In answer to a question about good prospects for our relations, Asling said: "We are of the opinion that it is not merely a matter of stepping up commercial trade, but also of achieving technological transfers that will truly contribute to the Algerian development effort."

Evoking the image his country has of Algeria, the Swedish minister of industry said: "We view Algeria as a modern nation whose struggle is watched with enormous sympathy by the Swedish nation." He underlined the need to "demonstrate our common political determination to cooperate" in the spirit of the new international economic order -- thereby hailing the move of the Group of the 77 -- by engaging in concrete overall negotiations.

[Question] Mr Minister, can you tell us anything about relations between Sweden and Algeria in the light of the meetings you have just had with Algerian economic officials?

[Answer] First of all, I would like to emphasize the warm welcome extended to me and the open attitude I found among the Algerians. Furthermore, I would like to mention the common basis we have on both sides for cooperation between our two countries, especially as regards fundamental principles.

Our discussions were fruitful, specific and even dealt with individual projects. My impression is therefore that our bilateral relations are very positive and assured of harmonious development. This can be seen from Sweden's participation in the International Fair in Algiers.

[Question] In the course of your talks, did you consider giving them new impetus in keeping with the objectives of our Five-Year Plan?

[Answer] At the time of the visit to Sweden of Algerian Minister of Finance Hadj Yala, we began fruitful discussions on improving conditions for financing Swedish exports to Algeria.

These efforts were crowned with success because we reached an advantageous framework credit agreement and we firmly believe that it can serve as a framework for the development of our economic relations. I am optimistic and I still have the impression that our Algerian colleagues share our hopes about the future of our cooperation. We also believe that it is not solely a question of increasing commercial trade, but of effecting technological transfers that will truly contribute to the Algerian development effort.

That is why my visit to the International Fair in Algiers is important because it shows the interest the Swedish Government has in furthering our relations.

[Question] What image do the people in Sweden have of Algeria?

[Answer] First of all, I must remark that the image Sweden has of Algeria was sealed once and for all by the Algerian people's fight for their independence.

It was a struggle that was followed closely by the Swedish people with enormous sympathy. It generated lasting respect and admiration for the Algerian people.

The efforts which Algeria has made, despite all the difficulties, to achieve development have only reinforced our impressions.

I was able to see that these feelings were well founded when I visited the international pavilions at the Fair in Algiers.

In Sweden, we regard Algeria as a modern nation that is rapidly industrializing with the help of its large gas and petroleum deposits, which ensure its growth and the development necessary for the well-being of the Algerian

people. We are also closely following its international action along the lines traced by the late President Boumediene, particularly regarding the establishment of a new international economic order.

[Question] In this connection, Mr Minister, the Algerian and Swedish approaches to the major international economic problems seem to coincide in some ways. Could you tell us more about the attitude of Sweden toward the overall negotiations on international economic cooperation demanded by the Third World countries at the current special session of the UN General Assembly?

[Answer] We are living in an indivisible world, in which no one can resolve his problems alone. For a better future, we must therefore have a dialog with all partners. The need for such a dialog amidst solidarity is deeply anchored in the Swedish people, who fully support the government in its effort to contribute to the establishment of acceptable economic and social justice within an overall framework.

With that backing, our government has already made its contribution in public aid to development countries in the amount of 1 percent of our GNP.

We believe that with such a level of resources transferred, the industrialized countries could considerably change the international situation and thereby increase the purchasing power of Third World countries, benefiting the world economy as a whole.

We therefore all need one another. We are interdependent and hail the overall North-South negotiations as an important opportunity to solve together the problems that concern all of us.

Finally, since I have the honor of being in Algeria, I would like to tell you of my impression that Algeria and Sweden have a great deal in common. We are fighting on the same side of the barricades for greater economic and social justice and are both following a policy of national independence. In the final analysis, we must express our determination to cooperate in our bilateral relations.

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FIRST PARTY CELL INSTALLED IN ALGERIAN INSURANCE COMPANY

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 31 Aug 80 p 1

[Article by R. S.]

[Text] In keeping with the recommendations of the Fourth Congress of the party, political and administrative officials in the district of Bab-El-Oued proceeded yesterday morning to install the first party cell in the banking and financial sector. The ceremony took place at the headquarters of the general directorate of the Algerian Insurance Company (SAA).

Attended by local officials, the general director of the company, representatives of mass organizations and members of the workers assembly of the enterprise, the ceremony provided officials with an opportunity to review the scope of this undertaking, which will serve to heighten the degree of political awareness of workers in this sector of services and prepare them to face the new requirements of the national development plan.

For the coordinator of the FLN kasma in Bab-El-Oued, this party cell in the SAA will be an ideal framework in which members and workers will forge their destiny and mobilize all their energies to give the company the right image while accelerating the process of settling cases submitted by the insured.

For his part, the general director emphasized the role played by the party cell, while stressing the close cooperation of members with all workers in carrying out the mission assigned to the insurance sector.

Ensuring the political role, the insurance sector remains an indispensable tool in preserving our economy from obstacles to its development.

In conclusion, the company official formulated the hope that he would see the installation of the cell further strengthen the ranks of company workers in order to fulfill all objectives set forth by the revolution.

The last speaker, the coordinator of the Bab-El-Oued FLN Federation, outlined the true context of the installation, whose main purpose is the participation and effective involvement of workers in everything done in the country.

He then stressed the encouragement that will be given to the cell to act as its field of endeavors is broadened and as the basic laws of the revolution are carried out.

Through these installations of party cells in enterprises, the exercise of democracy is promoted and there is expanded reflection on the search for the most effective means to ensure that the institution will play its true role in participating in the vast and noble task of nation building at all levels and in all fields. The ceremony came to a close with the presentation of the council made up of 17 members and the appointment of the cell bureau.

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PRIME MINISTER INSISTS ON LINK BETWEEN WAGES, PRODUCTIVITY

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 3 Sep 80 p 1

[Article]

[Text] Algiers (APS)--The debates on the social situation, begun Monday, continued yesterday in the interministerial council chaired by Mr Mohammed Banahmed Abdelghani, the prime minister.

Work relations between the different partners within the production units was the subject of special attention.

The participants stressed that the mechanisms for consultation and concertation set up in the framework of the GSE [Socialist Management of Businesses], and in a more general way the trade union organs, were conceived to create a climate of dialog and confidence in the work world.

In his remarks, the prime minister reiterated once again that the decisions announced by the president of the republic and secretary general of the FLN in December 1979, with a view to readjusting the wages of certain vocational categories, as also the measures linking wages and production ordered in May 1980, must imperatively be implemented and with the least possible delays.

As to protecting and improving the purchasing power of the workers as a whole, this constitutes a permanent priority objective of the political leadership.

This important matter will be submitted for review by the next council of ministers.

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TLEMCEN TO HAVE INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 2 Sep 80 p 4

[Article]

[Text] Tlemcen (APS)--Starting on 1 November of this year, Tlemcen will be linked directly to France with the launching of air connections with Paris, in the first phase, and with Marseilles in the second phase.

The Tlemcen-Zenata airport, completely renovated and enlarged with the construction of a modern terminal endowed with all the appropriate equipment, will have a reception capacity equal to that of Oran-Es Senia.

The regional representative of Air Algeria said that the opening of the new airport to international air traffic will make possible an easing of the congestion at the Oran airport, toward which all travellers from western Algeria converge. With the inauguration of international flights originating from Tlemcen, beyond the advantage that will redound to the [local] populations thanks to this policy of decentralization, other voyagers from neighboring wilayas will transit through Tlemcen in order to go abroad.

Also, the touristic and historic attractions of Tlemcen should add to the flow of foreigners drawn by the remains to be found in the region. In this respect, the airplane turns out to be one of the most practical means of transport for traversing the Mediterranean.

However, putting this program in operation is not going to be without problems, notably those linked directly to infrastructure for Air Algeria, the national company. The only [ticket] agency operating in Tlemcen is no longer adequate to the ever-larger needs of the population. The very tiny premises can no longer hold the hundreds of people who form a long line every day in front of the doors of the agency.

With the establishment of the international program which will add to the normal quota of national flights and those leaving Oran for abroad, thrice-weekly guaranteed flights from Tlemcen to Algiers, the Air Algeria agency, which also houses the regional delegation (Tlemcen-Bel-Abbes) will no longer be able to cope with the situation.

Moreover, this situation is known to the local authorities, and their energetic efforts will clearly be required to make possible a rational utilization of air traffic starting from this region of the West.

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SECURITY FORCES ACTIVE IN SKIKDA

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Rachid Souilah]

[Text] Launched several months ago throughout the country, the campaign of sanitation and struggle against social ills is continuing in an effective way in Skikda where the security services of the wilaya and of the Darak El-Watani are making proud efforts in this direction.

In effect, since the launching of this felicitous national operation which aims at assuring the security and tranquillity of the citizens, very good results have appeared.

These results, moreover, can be actually seen in the calmness and normalcy which has returned to the town of Skikda, once troubled by disorder and insecurity, once characterized by incidents and provocations on the part of "black sheep" who victimized innocent citizens.

The beneficent activity of the security services has thus borne fruit, if one considers that order, hygiene, and tranquillity reign everywhere, both within the city and on the coast, which is under permanent surveillance--both day and night--by units of the police and of the Darak El-Watani.

In the face of such efforts conducted in the public interests, there must be general satisfaction. It is, however, to be hoped that the sanitation operation will be permanent, for everyone knows that its objectives aim at the radical elimination of the social ills that constitute a very serious danger for society.

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SETIF 1980 HARVEST SEASON ANALYZED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 4, 5 Aug 80

[Article by Brahim Taouchichet: "A Harvest of Hope"]

[4 Aug 80, p 1-2]

[Text] A silver lining to the clouds. That is the characteristic of the harvesting-thrashing 1980 season. The growers who were pessimistic at the beginning of the year because of the lack of precipitation have regained their hope. Improvements of precipitation conditions in April and May eliminated the threat of a poor cereal crop harvest as had been the case in the preceding 3 years. Worse, "400,000 hectares in grain crops would have been lost."

In Setif Wilaya the spring rains accounted for a great deal of the enthusiasm of the farmers encouraged by the prospects of a good crop assessed at over two million quintals. The harvesting-thrashing campaign, which started on 15 June, is 80 percent completed. Preliminary estimates confirm the forecasts and call for an average of 10 quintals per hectare. In the central area of the wilaya and in the semimountainous north some varieties of cereal crops have yielded 30 quintals per hectare. In order to insure the best success of the harvesting and thrashing campaign material facilities were increased: 459 harvesting-thrashing machines are at work in the wilaya; mobile ONAMA [National Agricultural Equipment Office] workshops take care of equipment breakdowns.

Paradoxically, this year the harvest has created some problems. In addition to that of manpower which, today, has reached full size, an urgent problem of transportation has arisen. The inadequacy of the rolling stock of the OAIC (Algerian Interprofessional Cereal Crops Office) has been reduced by resorting to the services of the producers themselves, thus mobilizing a manpower which is far more needed for harvesting and thrashing.

Storage facilities as well have not matched the output. A major shortage has been revealed in this area. The DWA in Setif has pointed out that

no investment has been made in the development of the infrastructure of storage facilities. This failure is not limited to the Setif Wilaya alone. On the national level there is a shortage of storage facilities for 6.5 million quintals. Yet, the projected output is 22 million quintals of cereal crops.

"In April we were quite worried by the poor growing of the wheat. Everyone was expecting a catastrophic harvest. However, improvements in precipitation eliminated this threat." This assessment of the development of the growth cycle of cereal crops was provided by Toufik Nait Dahamane, an agronomical engineer in charge of crop production for the agriculture office of Setif Wilaya. It sums up the entire period of apprehension and almost of discouragement experienced by the farmers in the area whose last harest was disastrous. The proof is that the yields in this area, reputed as the "granary of cereal crops" dropped to under three quintals per hectare. It did not exceed six quintals at best. Actually, this shortage of cereal crops did not affect the Setif Wilaya alone. Since 1976 the national output has been declining steadily. Weather conditions played a primary role in this decline. The harvest of the previous year was no more than 1.4 million quintals, a ridiculously low figure compared with domestic consumption needs. In comparison, the current harvest appears more promising. On 20 July last the initial crop estimates for 57 percent of the harvested areas (the total surface under cereal crops is 3.2 million hectares) called for 13.5 million quintals. At the same date last year 44 percent of the harvesting was over, whereas this year's estimate was 57 percent. This percentage, showing two substantially different rates, is, above all, an indication of the development of the current campaign, described as positive, particularly in terms of the speed of harvesting operations. Yet, "no new measure has been applied." Therefore, the reasons for such progress achieved in the 1980 harvesting campaign should be sought elsewhere.

The Producers' Enthusiasm

In Setif, Mr Zitouni, wilaya agriculture director (DWA) mentioned the enthusiasm of the growers. The latter are showing great motivation in their work "for," according to the director of the Merazga self-managed farm of the Ain-Oulmane Daira, "this year's output is good." He added that, "Last year the farmers were discouraged from the very beginning of the harvesting campaign by the very low output." Indeed, this is a determining factor for the results of the efforts of the fellah. Suffice it to walk through the huge cereal crop fields of the Setif Wilaya to see an unusual excitement in the wheat fields.

In the torrid heat and despite their fasting the peasants are methodically harvesting. Like giant ants, the harvesters are gobbling up the hectares in crops, followed by the tractors which pick up the wheat bags.

This operation is no less difficult. It is even more trying in the month of Ramadhan, bearing in mind the physical effort it requires. At a first glance, lifting a one quintal bag of wheat or barley may not seem difficult. However, it does become difficult when the operation is repeated several times daily. Thus, in Ras El Oued Daira, a fellah who was assigned the job was unable to withstand the effort and had to be urgently taken to the hospital. Despite such difficulties, however, the growers work conscientiously. Work begins very early in the morning, far before administrative offices or plants open their doors, and ends late in the evening. At dawn the farmers make the equipment ready by maintaining and lubricating the harvesters, and so on. No harvesting is possible in cool weather (the jaws of the harvester cannot grip moist wheat stalks). That is why the growers were forced to stay idle for 3 days at the beginning of July (because of the coolness). They start toward 1000 hours. Harvesting stops at 1800 hours, after which the night work begins: the gathering and hauling of the hay and the bags of grain.

The Setif DWA points out that "compared with the two previous years there is greater work motivation," adding that, "We are receiving a lesser number of claims even from private growers." In the fields this evaluation is quickly confirmed by the growers who give the impression of enjoying better working conditions. This remark applies to a number of farms in the Setif Wilaya. The frequent answer of the peasant to the question of what are the difficulties in the work is "no problem."

Anyone accustomed to seeing the grower facing a large number of all sorts of problems would consider such an answer unusual. Boukel, director of crop production at the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, claims that instructions were issued "so that the grower will not be left to cope by himself but will be given the necessary help." In accordance with a memorandum issued by the MARA [Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Revolution] a practical stipulation is being applied in Setif. The harvesters used in a specific area may be moved elsewhere only after having finished with the entire harvest in all farms, regardless of their status.

Original Features

Despite its geographic location which puts the Setif Wilaya behind, the rate at which the harvesting campaign is advancing has reached, according to initial estimates, 80 percent of the total. There are greater delays in the harvest in the semimountainous areas north of National Highway 5. This makes the use of machinery if not dangerous at least more difficult, therefore encouraging the use of traditional harvesting methods. This poses the problem of gathering data on the harvest in private farms.

"The organization of municipal offices," explains the official in charge of crop production in Setif, "should enable us to surmount this difficulty thanks to better cadres put at the disposal of the growers."

In Setif the harvesting campaign is developing on the basis of an organization which takes into consideration the specific features of the area. That is why the campaign was initiated in the Ras El Oued and Ain Oulmane dairas whose climate is hotter. Gradually, it was extended to the central area along National Highway 5, ending in the semimountainous northern part of the wilaya. Generally speaking, this year's output is considered "satisfactory." The average yield per hectare for barley, hard grain and soft grain ranges from 8 to 10 quintals. However, yields vary substantially from one zone to another. Whereas in Bougaa overall cereal crop yields do not exceed seven quintals per hectare, a different situation prevails in the other dairas. Thus, in Mahdia, in the Ras El Oued Daira, in Setif and in El Eulma, the average has been 27 quintals for barley, 22 quintals for soft wheat, and 17 quintals for hard wheat. Such yield differences among zones is caused by the different climate and soil structures which have a great impact on output, according to Lounes Hachemi, member of the National Institute for Major Crops in El Harrach. He has stated that "the Setif Wilaya has original features based on the existence of "spots" of rich crops and high yields, surrounded by poor and primitive crops." The same characteristics may be found in the Bougaa area. However, south of National Highway 5 the production of cereal crops is lower, with the exception of several farms which have averaged 10 quintals per hectare. Here, as a farm director in Ain Oulmane explained, "working the land is a vital factor. It insures one-half of the output." The accuracy of this statement becomes obvious by looking at the area south of the Setif Wilaya.

In addition to the natural poverty of the soils and the lack of water, both of which are not very helpful in terms of soil irrigation, extensive areas have been salinized and calcified. Land which only a few years ago was productive has been abandoned today because of lack of reclamation. Whereas the production of cereal crops is based on proper and properly balanced precipitation [part missing] is also largely determining. The example is provided by two self-managed farms in Ain Hadjar in the Ain Oulmane Daira: They have the same amount of land. One of them is straggling behind the other because of less experienced manpower.

[5 Aug 80, p 2]

A Basic Target: Obtaining Self-Sufficiency

In Setif the harvesting and thrashing campaign of 1980 brings with it hope, thanks to the April and May rains, as the farmers acknowledge. "Without the rains," emphasizes Lounes Hachemi, from the National Institute for Major Crops in El Harrach, "from 350,000 to 400,000 hectares in

cereal crops would have been lost this year." The whims of the rain directly affect the growers. Discouraged by the results of the three preceding harvests, the latter were displaying an openly pessimistic attitude as to this year's output, particularly after the droughty period at the beginning of the year. The future of the plowing and sowing campaign was determined by the rains which fell from mid-April to the end of May. Their effect would have been null had they fallen after that time, as the growth cycle had been completed. The official in charge of crop production of the Setif DWA claims that several farmers surmounted their hesitation to sow their fields following the rains.

Today they are frenetically plunging into harvesting and threshing campaigns. They are also motivated by the concern for gathering the crops before the Aid El Fitr. The harvesting campaign is quite advanced in Setif. According to initial estimates, the cereal crop harvest should total 2,138,917 quintals, of which 1,017,372 quintals of hard grain and 620,860 quintals of barley. On the national level, the crop estimate is 22 million quintals, compared with 14 million last year. Rough assessments are more optimistic, calling for 30 million quintals. However, we must take into consideration a 7-8 percent loss due to the inadequate handling of machinery (tuning, etc.) and domestic consumption. The 16 million quintals allocated for consumption would barely meet one-half of overall domestic demand. This has led the director in charge of crop production of the MARA to state that even though this year the output will be good it will nevertheless be below target which calls for reaching self-sufficiency in terms of cereal crops. Algeria, in effect, remains dependent on wheat imports. It is within this perspective that the battle for production assumes its full importance. Success in the harvesting campaign is an element of this battle.

More harvesting-threshing machines have been supplied to the Setif Wilaya: 459 of them are in operation, 105 of which were received in June. "This year," claims a DWA official, "we received the machinery on time. It has already happened that harvesters may be sent to us at the end of the campaign." Even though the rate of one harvester per 300 hectares has not been reached as yet, the fleet of such agricultural machinery makes it possible to cover adequately the needs of the wilaya. This does not prevent some owners of harvesting machines to offer their services at the rate of 120 DA per hour. We know, however, that the CAPCS [Communal Multiservice Agriculture Cooperatives] lease such machinery for 70 DA per hour. The service for repairing machinery on the spot, in operation over the past several years, seems to be functioning properly.

The wilaya is crisscrossed by four mobile workshops of the ONAMA [National Agricultural Equipment Office] along with three cars belonging to the same organization for the purpose of repairing equipment on the spot. The most frequent breakdowns are due to broken transmission belts, which happens all too frequently. Some farms have taken the precaution

of stockpiling spare parts. The intervention of cruising ONAMA teams has proved its effectiveness in cases of minor repairs. Whenever they are called by the presidents of farm enterprises, ONAMA technicians go to the place where the machine has broken down. It has been pointed out, however, that the rate of breakdowns has been reduced in the wilaya. Furthermore, the delivery of new harvesters has eliminated difficulties this season. It is worth noting, furthermore, that the training of the users of such machinery will make it possible, unquestionably, to extend the service life of the harvesters. It has been pointed out that improper handling and maintenance of such machinery is frequently the reason for breakdowns, the more so since the imported machinery is more sophisticated.

Lack of Manpower

Like the other wilayas, Setif Wilaya has not escaped a phenomenon which keeps repeating itself year after year on a large scale. Even though considered a lagging area in terms of harvesting and thrashing, because of its rugged topography, Setif Wilaya has shown an appreciable progress in crop growing. Nevertheless, this improvement cannot compensate for the strongly felt lack of manpower, regardless of an average level of mechanization (one harvester per 780 hectares). "The problem arises above all during peak periods," a grower said, adding that "we are forced to use retirees." Seasonal manpower is hard to recruit when the pay is 35 DA per day. Sixteen-year-old adolescents, high school students in particular, used during this exceptional period, may be available. However, they are handicapped by their inexperience for which they are silently blamed by their elders. Another grower has even pointed out with some bitterness that, "The young would rather swell the ranks of the unemployed or sell knick-knacks on the parallel market rather than work in the fields." However, the peasants are not caught short by this difficulty. They have organized themselves in order to complete the harvest on time. Occasionally they stop the harvesting and thrashing to haul the grain bags. Yet, this work is done by the rolling services of the Algerian Interprofessional Cereal Crop Office. Nevertheless, according to a grower, the office haulers do not risk going into the fields. The use of tractors, in addition to the fact that it requires additional manpower, is tiring and inefficient because slow.

On the other hand, there is the risk that, once hauled, the grain may not be fully stored under normal conditions of safety and hygiene. Whereas the crop has been assessed at two million quintals, storage capacities at the Setif Wilaya could accomodate no more than about 1.2 million quintals. Twelve storage units have been opened in Setif and nine in Bordj-Bou-Arreridj, whereas no such facilities are available at the Ain Oulmane, Ras El Oued and Bougaa dairas. The Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Revolution is considering some temporary means to remedy the shortage of storage facilities which, on the national scale,

amounts to 6.5 million quintals. That is why open air storage is contemplated "under safe technical conditions."

The cereal-crop harvest of the 1980 season is considered encouraging. However, bearing in mind the already known results we already have a storage problem. What would happen should the output come closer to the targets?

The Problem of Overgrazing

Let us point out that the 1980 cereal-crop harvest is not exceptional in the least. Equally good harvests were recorded in 1972 and 1976. Even though the harvest benefitted from adequate precipitation, it was also the result of the work and the steady treatment of the soil. This should be intensified even further. The mastery of farming technology largely determines yields. This is exemplified by a variety of "Mexican wheat" introduced in a number of areas in the Setif Wilaya with poor results. This was due, on the one hand, to the difficulties in adapting this variety (which, in the best of cases, yields six quintals per hectare) and to the lack of follow-up work, as the official in charge of crop production of the Setif DWA explained. He also mentioned the need to instruct and inform the peasants. Following is one of numerous examples confirming the usefulness of this suggestion: Some growers continue to oppose the spreading of fertilizer from the air, believing that it was an error in the dosage of the fertilizers that resulted in the loss of serveral dozens of hectares. Others, nevertheless, recognize that this method yielded concluding results. Actually, the quality of output in areas where cultivation technology was applied is obvious. The contrast between it and crops to which lesser attention was paid is significant.

Within the framework of possibilities to improve the production of cereal crops, Mr Hachemi, from the National Institute for Major Crops in El Harrach, formulated the hypothesis of the development of a local variety. To accomplish this "experimental teams must be set up, for it takes 10 years to develop a local variety which could withstand the hard weather conditions and be adapted to the nature of the soil . . . The first experiment attempted in this area, said he, has begun to yield results only this year. "We must also struggle," he added firmly, "to have such innovations accepted." In accordance with weather and farming conditions, the natural reproduction of elements which would promote fertilizing of the soil is a feature which must be taken into consideration. However, this will be challenged by the moving of the flocks. The harvesting and thrashing will be followed by overgrazing. . . .

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CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

NEW IMPETUS TO FISHING--(APS)--A meeting of cadres was held in the Office of the Secretary of State for Fishing yesterday morning, presided over by Benfreha Ahmed, member of the Central Committee and secretary of state for fishing. In remarks made on the occasion, Benfreha Ahmed recalled the recommendations of the Fourth Congress of the FLN and presidential guidelines, emphasized the strategic and economic importance of the fishing sector and outlined action to be taken to promote it within the framework of the 5-year plan. The secretary of state urged cadres to work in close cooperation with the nongovernmental sector with the single common objective of meeting the people's needs. "We must not only develop the state sector," he said, "but at the same time provide our aid to small fishermen because our goals are one: development of our 1,200-kilometer coast." Benfreha Ahmed emphasized the importance of effective decentralization and recommended the establishment and promotion of new fishing units in coastal governorates. "Our work must go beyond the bureaucratic compartmentalization and extend to the very field of production so as to make up for the lag allowed to accumulated in the sector for years," he added. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 31 Aug 80 p 1] 11,464

KASMA COORDINATORS MEETING--Oran (APS)--The general situation of kasmas in the governorate was examined Thursday morning in Oran by kasma coordinators meeting under the gavel of Ali Riahi, deputy national commissioner of the party. In the course of the meeting, members of the assembly reviewed problems existing in the nine kasmas in the city of Oran and in the districts of Arzew and Mers El-Kebir. The major problems raised by the different coordinators had to do with social and cultural questions which citizens face. Among them are the drinking water supply, electrification, road repair, public hygiene and the limited number of cultural clubs. Members emphasized the predominant role which the APC [People's Communal Assembly] must play in settling these problems. In addition, dossiers will be prepared to take up the different points discussed so as to plan for the next meeting of the kasma-APC coordinating council. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 5-6 Sep 80 p 3] 11,464

CSO: 4400

OPEN LETTER ACCUSES QOTBZADEH OF BETRAYING REVOLUTION

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Sep 80 p 7

[Open letter by Hosseyn Talebi, computer specialist and member of the Islamic Association of the General Tire Company to Qotbzadeh]

[Text] At 11:00 pm of 2/6/59 [24 Aug 80], in a seemingly well-calculated TV program on channel 2, you (Mr Qotbzadeh), in a violently strong tone poured slander against popular and revolutionary elements. You, who with your well-tailored clothes and cleancut appearance, still smelling of French, British and American boutiques, and you, who once used to talk about the barefooted, are not perhaps aware that 70 percent of Iranians lacked the most elementary necessities of life, and some have not yet seen a pair of shoes or even ties. You are not perhaps yet aware that groups after groups of our peasants die because of lack of food and medicine, doctors and basic elementary health services.

Yes, had you looked at yourself in a mirror with your western clothes on, you would have never felt yourself to be so close to the Imam of the nation, who is a perfect example of the simple leader and supporter of the oppressed. You should have realized at the very beginning that your line and that of the Imam are 180 degrees apart. It seems as if you have not even seen the oppressed on a TV screen.

Unfortunately, we observed you on TV, how, with your innocent look, you tried to describe popular revolutionary institutions as being opposed to knowledge and specialization, even calling them reactionaries and sterile, while, at the same time, considering yourself to be as virtuous as Abazar, and the best, as a specialist. You described the action taken by the student followers of the Imam as nothing but show, claiming the hostage-taking had been condemned by all governments. To emphasize your point, you recounted an anecdote which indirectly slandered the students.

Mr Qotbzadeh--the man who is least concerned with people but supporting governments all the time--should be asked, was it not this revolutionary action by the militant moslem students which disgraced the criminal U.S. throughout the world? In addition to make the world hear the rightful

cries of our innocent and oppressed people, the action made all the oppressed and innocent people and liberation organizations realize that the United States was not capable of doing a darn thing, and that the criminal superpowers could be resisted and brought to their knees through faith and clenched fists. Is the action taken by the militant students just a slogan? If so, why is the U.S. challenging us with all its might and why does it create events and incidents such as the unsuccessful air operation of Tabas and the recent abortive coup d'etat?

What is more important, Mr Qotbzadeh, views of governments which are dependent on the East or the West about the "spies" that you refer to them as hostages, or the opinion of oppressed nations and liberation movements? Which liberation movement has condemned the action of our militant student followers of the Imam? If you do not consider views of liberation movements as being important, then why is it that in connection with the breaking of diplomatic relations with Argentina, you reasoned that it did not occur because it had not been asked by the Argentine Liberation Movement?

Why is it that in matters that are not in the interest of the United States, you consider government views as important, and where the interest of the U.S. is involved (such as not breaking diplomatic relations with Argentina), views of liberation movements become important?

You are not even prepared, Mr Qotbzadeh, to call spies by their correct names and always refer to them as hostages.

Has not the Imam always supported these dear students and their action, Mr Qotbzadeh? If you are so close to the Imam as you claim to be, why are you challenging them (the students)?

Which institution and school of thought, Mr Qotbzadeh, has ever considered and claimed knowledge and specialization to be worthless? Even if they have, it is not the specialization that they condemn. It is the specialization of the likes of Amir-Entezams, Nazihs, Bakhtiars, the Savakis, the westernized and the conspiring aristocracy and supporters of committed governments. They most certainly do not have in mind the knowledge and specialization of such people as physicians who serve in rural areas and other honest and devoted individuals who strive in the direction of non-commitment, or the students who give their lives for their people, their Imam, and their ideology.

Mr Qotbzadeh, I am an educated specialist myself and must confess that I discovered my real worth after the revolution and through revolutionary and ideological institutions. It is true that this humble soul does not wear Yeves St. Laurent ties and Pierre Cardin clothes or shoes to match the color of my hair or tie, but I am capable of feeling the pains of a child who does not have clothes to wear or the cries of our sisters and brothers in the remote rural areas who are dying because of lack of medical attention. Under no circumstances can I tolerate the type of nonsense uttered by the likes of you, aimed at smearing all these actions.

Why don't you, Mr Qotbzadeh, leave this long-oppressed nation and those who enjoy popularity among them, alone? Why don't you heed the Imam's words, urging the support of the ideology, Islam and the revolutionary institutions?

You, Mr Qotbzadeh, who now insult the radio and the TV, perhaps remember that when you were running them, you used to appear on TV at least a few hours every week so that people could see you. You used to take part in radio debates often and said all you wanted to say. During the presidential elections, too, your photographs adorned the streets all over while you were making speeches about yourself at every occasion. Why don't you look back at your presidential election record? Why don't you admit that because of your thinking, your approach, behavior and your views on foreign policy, you have no bais among the masses. Why do you continue to spread so much poison, brother?

Your Aims

As an analytic viewer of your recent interview on channel 2, let me tell you bluntly, Mr Qotbzadeh, that these are your aims?

1. Attacking and weakening of individuals and institutions that enjoy popular support by slander and charges that they deny value of knowledge and specialization, thus depicting them as reactionary and simpleminded. (Nowhere have I read or heard that revolutionary institutions and responsible individuals have denied the value of knowledge and specialization, except from American, Israeli and London radios, and sometimes from local aristocrats.

2. To defend your nonideological foreign policy which caused our revolution remain unknown outside the country and consequently isolating Iran and preventing exportation of our revolution.

3. To convince people that hostage taking was condemned by all governments and, as a result, open the way for the release of the spies

4. To demonstrate that the fate of the Islamic Republic depended on the Imam, meaning that after the Imam was no more our revolution will face certain defeat and that people should pin their hopes on you and follow your line and obey you (while the Imam, in all his speeches, tries to create hope and confidence in people, and thus punches in the face of those coveting our revolution).

5. To discourage people who, in spite of the poisonous propaganda, join demonstrations and marches by the million, defending Islamic ideology and revolution, and prepare the way for intervention by superpowers.

6. To change the direction of attack on the U.S. and, as a result, help make the number one enemy and the great satan be forgotten through untimely and unusual attacks on the Soviet Union (while, in all his speeches, the Imam has always called the U.S. the principal enemy, and as long as Soviet intervention is not proven, it should not be attacked. This, of course, does not mean that we should lean to the East. As we observed, the Imam's response to the message of sympathy sent by Brezhnev in connection with Gachsaran tragic incident).

In conclusion, I would like to know why the responsible officials of channel 2 TV allow the airing of such unfair and well-planned programs? Is this freedom or a plot? If this was freedom, then why the revolutionary organ that were slandered were not allowed to be present during the same program so they could defend themselves?

9561
CSO: 4906

BACKGROUND OF NEW PRIME MINISTER EXPLORED

Tehran JAVANAN-E EMRUZ in Persian 18 Aug 80 pp 6-7

[Text] Who Will Be in the Future Cabinet--Iran's First Post-Revolution Legal Government?

Where Does Raja'i Come From? How Old Is He? Where Was He Educated? What Were His Struggles? What Services Has He Rendered?

What Does the Man on the Street Say About Raja'i and What Are His Expectations from Raja'i's Government?

After a lot of tug of war and long drawn-out debates and suggesting many names as nominees for prime minister, finally Mr Raja'i was appointed Prime Minister upon the President's proposal and on the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles). Although Raja'i has been recognized as the Acting Minister of Education after the revolution, yet he is not quite known to the entire population and not a familiar face to the public. This [obscurity] is attributed to his piety, lack of hypocrisy and unpretentiousness. With a view to the importance of the momentus duty he is to be charged with as Prime Minister, we decided to present to our readers a glimpse of his life so that our dear readers may get better acquainted with him.

Born in Qazvin city region (shahrestan) in the Year 1312 of the Solar Hegira Calendar [21 Mar 1933 - 20 Apr 1934], Mohammad Ali Raja'i completed his primary education in his birthplace and received his six-year primary education completion certificate there. In 1327 [21 Mar 1948 - 20 Apr 1949] he left Qazvin for Tehran. In 1328 [21 Mar 1949 - 20 Apr 1950] he entered the Air Force and served there for five years, during which period he pursued his study in night classes until he received his high school graduation diploma. At the age of 21 he left the Air Force and enrolled at the Teachers Training College to obtain his Bachelor of Art degree. Upon completion of his study in 1339 [21 Mar 1961 - 20 Apr 1961] he was employed by the Ministry of Culture (Education). In 1342 [21 Mar 1963 - 20 Apr 1964] Mohammad Ali Raja'i became a member of the

Freedom Movement of Iran (Nahzat-e Azadi) and became intensely involved in political activities. He was arrested and imprisoned the same year. After his prison term he taught at Kamal, Refah and Tarbiat schools. In 1353 [21 Mar 1974 - 20 Apr 1975] he was arrested for his link with the Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq and was turned over to the so-called Anti-Subversion Joint Committee. He was subjected to the longest interrogations and tortures in the solitary cells of the Committee prison for about 2-1/2 years. In 1354 [21 Mar 1975 - 20 Apr 1976] he dissociated himself from the Mojahedin-e Khalq while they were in the process of embracing Marxism. He started struggling against the Mojahedin for their "borrowed" ideology. Finally, at the crescendo of the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1357 [21 Mar 1978 - 20 Apr 1979] he was released from prison and joined the tumultous sea of the resurgent people of Iran.

After his release from prison, Raja'i took up struggle again and in Mehr 1357 [23 Sep 1978 - 22 Oct 1979] he succeeded in officially creating the first underground Islamic teachers organization called the "Iranian Teachers Islamic Association." During the Revolution the Association played a major part in multiplying and distributing the Imam's statements as well those calling on educators to strike. Upon the Imam's return to Iran, he had the honor of playing host to the Imam at Refah School. In 1358 [21 Mar 1979 - 20 Apr 1980] Raja'i was appointed Acting Education Minister. A noteworthy feature of his incumbency was that he succeeded in making all schools public and uniform. Thus he took a step in the direction of equitable distribution of educational resources throughout the country. Of course, this policy met the opposition of some people at the time and even Mr Yadollah Sahabi, Minister of State in Bazargan's government--now a member of the Majles--issued a statement to call his action "the firming up of the footing of communism in Iran!" Another point of interest about him is that during the rule of the provisional government, the Revolutionary Council was receptive to the idea of appointing him Education Minister for his revolutionary stature. However, Mr Bazargan was against this promotion and the plan was not translated into practice; he remained Acting Minister of Education.

Finally, Mr Raja'i ran in the elections to the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles) and got elected as deputy from Tehran. Mr Raja'i is characterized by his fondness of Dr Shari'ati and of children to whom he takes quickly.

Concerning the formation of the cabinet, Mr Raja'i has said that whoever is to become a member of the cabinet should be a follower of the Imam. In this effort [for appointing the cabinet ministers] he will enlist the assistance and cooperation of all the revolutionary institutions. He relies particularly heavily on the Revolutionary Guards Corps and on the Reconstruction Campaign Organization. He says if he finds a suitable person there he [that person] shall be appointed minister. This is a very positive and hope-inspiring point, one which is indicative of the fact that he abides by the statement of the Imam and intends to appoint

young, faithful revolutionaries. It shows that he pays attention to the young people who have proved their revolutionary sincerity afield, in the arena of martyrdom, in the farthest villages of Iran.

Of course, there is a lot of talk making the rounds. But one of the persons named as a most likely candidate for membership in Raja'i's cabinet is Dr Assadi, an old friend of Raja'i's over the past 15 years. Dr Assadi himself has spent a long time in prison. It is narrated about him that when he heard the news of the arrest of his daughter, he took it most stoically, so much so that the only effect on his normal daily routine was that he missed his morning exercise on that day. From among other likely members of Raja'i's cabinet mention can be made of Dr Sorush, currently the Minister of Energy; mention is also made of Musa Kalantari. It is said that Jalaleddin Farsi is slated to become the Minister of Foreign Affairs or of National Defense in the cabinet--but this is not highly (because the President is against it). Others named as likely candidates are Shams Ardakani, currently Iran's Ambassador to Kuwait, for Foreign Minister, Mirsalim for filling the position of Interior Minister, and Chamran for Defense Minister and Zali for Agriculture Minister.

The President's View

The selection of the Prime Minister was concomitant with some differences of views which made the process very difficult. But agreement was arrived at over this problem in the long haul. It is in place at this juncture to air the opinion of President Bani-Sadr of Mr Raja'i. In his letter to the Majles about Mr Raja'i, he has described Mr Raja'i's characteristics as such: ". . . As far as his adherence to the Islamic ideology, sincerity and integrity are concerned I accept him and rate him even more highly than the other candidates. But Mr Raja'i is the kind of person to whom you expound what you want him to do and he may even acknowledge his acceptance, but when he leaves the meeting he pursues his original thoughts. Secondly, his knowledge of national affairs is scant. Therefore, his administration is bound to be weak."

However, as it has been reported in the news that the misunderstandings that existed between Bani-Sadr and Raja'i were removed after a meeting they held.

Opinion of Tehran Prayer Leader

The Prayer Leader of Tehran, Mr Khamene'i, on the Fetr Festivity, had the following to say about Mr Raja'i: "He is fortunately a decisive, devout and zealous person. I do not forget the tortures and hardships he suffered over months on end in the horrid prisons and torture chambers of the previous regime. After the Islamic Republic was established--thank God--he has been engaged in tasks, services and activities."

Hashemi-Rafsanjani's View

One of the key problems, after the formation of the government, is the harmony required between the government and the Majles. But Mr Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Majles spoke about this matter in an interview and said that with the uniform mood governing the majority of the Majles deputies and Mr Raja'i, the progress of the matters would be facilitated.

What Do the People Say?

We asked a number of people their views on Mr Raja'i's Prime Ministry. The following are their views:

Mr Khodai, Primary School Teacher:

[Question] What is your view about Mr Raja'i as Prime Minister?

[Answer] Well, I believe that I cannot find in Mr Raja'i's person the good and competent prime minister I want. He is a revolutionary individual but he is not as incisive in foreign affairs as he should be. Dr Peyman would have been a better choice.

[Question] What Do You Expect From Him?

[Answer] Security and welfare must be ensured. Primarily the security and secondly the livelihood of the workers, farmers, merchants and, categorically, all strata should be ensured.

[Question] Which persons should in your opinion be selected for membership in the cabinet?

[Answer] Persons who are devoted to the Revolution; people who can preserve freedom in the country.

Hamid Reza Tayyebi, Student:

[Question] What is your view about Mr Raja'i as Prime Minister?

[Answer] Were there to be so many differences about the appointment of Mr Raja'i, it would have been better to nominate Mr Jalaloddin Farsi. Mr Raja'i is a good person but I am not so confident that he will achieve anything. All the same I hope he can choose good ministers.

[Question] What do you expect from him?

[Answer] The most critical problem which has been a cause of worry for the people is the difference between the Majles, the government and the President. I believe that the first thing he should do is to create the needed harmony.

[Question] Which persons should in your opinion be selected for membership in the cabinet?

[Answer] Mostly from among revolutionary youths. For instance it would be really excellent if they were the same type of persons as the students following the line of the Imam.

Mr Mahmud Reza Najafian, Office Worker

[Question] What is your view about Mr Raja'i's Prime Ministry?

[Answer] Raja'i is a known person. But does Mr Bani-Sadr accept him or is he forced on Mr Bani-Sadr as his prime minister? They can work together only if their relationship is good. Otherwise, there will be filibustering. I feel uneasy about such a possibility.

[Question] What do you expect from him?

[Answer] First and foremost, the nation's security takes precedence over all other considerations. So long as there is no security in the country things will be done half-baked. Another issue of importance is unity, accord and harmony. If there do not prevail, nothing gets done. Even if the statements of various groups vary they should be integrated.

Civil Servant (prefers anonymity)

[Question] What is your view about Mr Raja'i's premiership?

[Answer] Raja'i's selection means Bani-Sadr has been defeated. I do not think this is in the interest of the people. To be Islamic and religious is not enough. It is also important to be capable to run the affairs of the country.

[Question] What do you expect from him?

[Answer] I do not believe he can put any plan into effect because there is a conflict between the Majles, the Prime Minister and the President.

[Question] Which persons should, in your opinion, be selected for membership in the cabinet?

[Answer] The cabinet should be effective, efficient and pursuant.

Mr Mohsen Zabih, Bank Employee

[Question] What is your view of Mr Raja'i's premiership?

[Answer] I think that he is a good person and a proper choice for this position.

[Question] What do you expect from him?

[Answer] He must treat the path of true Islam. He should tend to the conditions of agriculture and economy. He should also put an end to the incoordination among various groups.

[Question] Which persons should, in your opinion, be selected for membership in the cabinet?

[Answer] Persons who apprehend the grievances of the workers and tend to them.

Ms Fatemi, Student

[Question] What is your opinion of Mr Raja'i as Prime Minister?

[Answer] When Mr Raja'i was Minister of Education, apart from a number of things that he did right, his performance was in most cases not correct. I do not think he is fit for the position of Prime Minister.

[Question] What do you expect from him?

[Answer] To provide jobs for the jobless. To curb price hikes. To lower housing costs. Briefly, to solve the problems people face in their day-to-day living.

[Question] In your opinion, which persons should be selected as members of the cabinet?

[Answer] People-oriented persons who listen to others, who substantiate their opinions, who can drive home their message.

Mr Abdolkhaleq Paki, Jobless High School Graduate, now vending cigarettes.

[Question] What is your opinion of Mr Raja'i's premiership?

[Answer] Mr Raja'i is very suitable for prime ministry because he is in the line of the Imam and of the Revolution.

[Question] What do you expect from him?

[Answer] To eradicate unemployment, later on to bring about security; to do away with the high costs of living.

[Question] Which persons, in your opinion, should be selected for being on the cabinet?

[Answer] Persons who are competent and in the Imam's line.

Mr Abbas Najafpur (an old man who says he has been a peddler for 40 years).

Sir, what can I say? What is it to me who is whose prime minister? They appoint whoever they want. I mind my own business here and win my bread. Why should I care who becomes the prime minister? And who makes him one? I have been leading this very life style for 40 years. So many prime ministers came and went. What did they do for me? Only promises. All gave but promises. So many prime ministers were appointed and dismissed. Which one of them ever worked for the good of the deprived class? Which one of them paid any heed to my plea for help? This one will be one of the same run. There was Mr Bazargan who put us in the lurch with his step-by-step policy. What has changed for us? Mohammad Reza's statue has been pulled down but its pedestal is standing. They have left the doors of the banks open so that the rich can send the monies out; these are the monies of this poor nation. Why? If the prime minister wants to be effective he must work for the benefit of the people, for the benefit of the lower class, lower income people. He must exterminate the species of the traitorous big shots. Otherwise nothing will work.

The voice of the old man rings in one's ears. As if his cries echo the wishes and hopes of the people. Yes, Mr Raja'i! So many prime ministers have come and gone that the nation has become indifferent to their coming and to their going alike. The people seek something else in you. They want you to be revolutionary and capable. After years of agony and suffering, our people want to regain, under the aegis of Islam, a decent life befitting the dignity of man. Therefore, no step-by-step policies! No compromise! We should act in a revolutionary manner. We should cast aside differences. That is what pains our people. As the Imam put it, "Is it your father's legacy for which you are wrangling?" You should shed the quarrels and heed the problems of the people. As our worldly wise old man said, "The generation of the traitors and of the big shots must be exterminated. Each minute of our time after the revolution counts as valuable as years. To waste even one minute of it would be ingratitude and a waste. It is throwing to the wind the hopes of the followers of the faith. We wish you good luck in the great mission that you have undertaken. We hope that you will succeed in your efforts in the path of God and in following the Imam of the Moslems.

9695
CSO: 4906

EFFORTS TO PACIFY FARS PROVINCE UNDERWAY

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 30 Aug 80 p 11

[Article: "There Is No Difference Between Khans and Robbers, and Their Slightest Move Will Be Put Down. The Activities of Khans and Highway Robbers Are Not To Be Confused With the Tribesmen--The Governor of Fars"]

The tribes and other oppressed classes of Fars do not condone the disruption of security in this province.

Eighty percent of the province's construction budget has been allocated to the villages.

[Text] Shiraz--The night before last several armed thieves fired upon and damaged a highway patrol car of the "Baba Hajji" pass on the Shiraz-Kovar road. The highway patrol personnel reported the incident to the Gendarmerie and the Revolutionary Guards so that the guard and the military could go to the area immediately and take steps to clean up the aforesaid pass and road. Reports arriving from Shiraz indicate that the Gendarmerie and the Revolutionary Guards are now pursuing the lawless armed attackers and that the sentries have been reinforced at Kovar, and people have been sent to help. An officer of the Shiraz Gendarmerie regiment, while confirming this news, announced: During this holdup the thieves stripped the passengers of one of the automobiles.

Highway Robbers Are Not To Be Confused With the People

In a press interview, Mohammad Bani-Habibi, Governor of Fars, also commented on the adventures of a handful of feudalist servants and people out to get more than their share on the province's roads. Mr. Habibi spoke first concerning the current year's construction programs in the province of Fars: Eighty percent of the Fars construction budget is allocated to the villages. In some areas, such as Lorestan, up to 85 percent of the construction budget is allocated to districts and villages.

In answer to a question concerning plans afoot in Firuzabad to stage a showing of activity in the area, the governor said: We are not optimistic about those who have surrounded themselves with riflemen, but until they make a move of some kind we will merely observe them.

We will respond decisively, however, to the slightest move against the sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The only thing we are trying to do is make a distinction between highway robbers and common tribesmen, so that if the necessity should arise for military action, the government will not actually take these steps against tribesmen, but against those who are doing things aimed at destroying security. We advise our brother tribesmen that opposition to the Islamic government and blocking the roads is really opposition to the Imam and Islam, and the people of Fars. Military and law enforcement authorities will not permit such aggression.

There Is No Difference Between Khans and Highway Robbers

Concerning recent road robberies in the vicinities of main roads, the governor of Fars said: Highway robbery in the Province of Fars did not begin during the period of Islamic rule. Existing files show that highway robbery has been going on for years. We have seen no clear relationship between recent road robberies and the tribal khans, but in any case our view is that there is no difference between tribal khans and highway robbers. According to the governor of Fars, a decision has been made in the province security council to confront all kinds of highway robbery, whether related to the khans or not, with measures that have already been planned.

The governor of Fars asked the people to help government officials identify thieves in areas where these robberies are likely to take place. In another portion of his remarks, the governor of Fars commented on the unseasonal movements of some tribesmen: The unseasonal movement and the kinds of rumors circulating among tribesmen cannot be unrelated to persons who, in the name of khans, or on any other pretext have organizations and whose interests in the Islamic government have been threatened.

9310
CSO: 4906

GUARDS ATTRIBUTE INTELLIGENCE NETWORK TO ADM MADANI

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 18 Aug 80 p 2

/Article: "Firuzabad, Army of Guards Commander: Madani Has Formed a Comprehensive Network of Tribal Chiefs in the South"/

/Text/ Dr Masha'ollah A'in, commander of the Firuzabad army of guards of the Islamic revolution,stated, in a conversation concerning the untimely migration of the Fars tribes," Following the disclosure documents on them, the tribal chiefs and spies have decided to form an overall system of chiefs in the southern region under the leadership of Seyyed Ahmad Madani, another American spy, and to foment trouble in this region."

Regarding the reason for the untimely migration of the tribes, he said, "the American spy-chieftains, that is, Khosrow, Naser and Abdollah Qashqa'i, following the disclosure of their espionage documents, have decided to set up a comprehensive system of chieftains in the southern region under the leadership of Seyyed Ahmad Madani, another American spy, and stir up disturbances in the souther, southwestern and southeastern area of Iran in the near future, thereby proving their devotion to their American masters. They have thus compelled the Moslem tribes to set out toward the warm areas directly and indirectly, by spreading rumors and creating an atmosphere of suppression and terror."

He added, "For example, they have spread the rumor 'if you stay along the borders the army of guards will bomb you.' They have also declared 'Anyone who stays along the borders and does not migrate to the warm areas is our enemy,' and in this manner the majority of the downtrodden masses of the tribes, in spite of their own desire, have been compelled to leave the borders a month and a half before the seasonal time and move their livestock and homes from the roadsides and their weapons from the hills toward the warm areas. The chieftains' agents falsely told them 'the army of guards has the intention of disarming you,' and have caused the tribes to move their arms from the hills or transfer them to the hills by means of these rumors."

Dr A'in added, "As a consequence, the suffering children and toiling women of the Moslem tribes are moving to the warm areas in the hot season, enduring heat and discomfort and bearing much suffering."

Responding to a question on the plans the government had for the welfare of the tribes, the commander of guards of Firuzabad said, "Because of the presence of the treasonous hireling agents who have been present in that region for the past 15 years, and probably are also there now, the government has unfortunately not yet done anything for the tribes, but now, with the approval of 200 million tomans in credits for the implementation of welfare, health and development plans for the tribes, if this money is spent in a revolutionary way plans can be drawn up for the welfare of the tribes. In this connection, we propose to the executive authorities of the province that they quickly spend these sums, with the participation of the committed young Moslems of the tribes, in order to eliminate deficiencies in the tribal areas and make roads, water, livestock fodder and welfare available to the tribes."

On where the tribal chiefs are now and what they are doing, Dr A'in, the Firuzabad guards commander, said, "At the present time the chieftain spies are ensconced in a mobilization area situated in the hills to the northwest of Firuzabad with about 180 armed people. They control an area covering a radius of 20 kilometers and recently even stopped holy war of reconstruction automobiles in that area."

When asked "in view of the atmosphere in the region, do you predict that incidents will occur in the region in the future or not?" Dr A'in replied, "If the American chieftains' centers of conspiracy are not crushed quickly, scattered disturbances will arise in the future. For this reason the recommendation of the Firuzabad army of guards to the honorable Moslem tribes is that they pay no heed to rumors from the hireling chiefs and that they continue their migration without fear of being disarmed. I give assurance that the Firuzabad army has absolutely no intention of disarming the downtrodden tribes, is always brothers with it, and will mobilize all its resources in order to help them."

On what the tribal chiefs' agitations in the region were, he said, "The chiefs are constantly making rumors and are trying to assemble greater forces by creating an atmosphere of oppression and fear so that they may perhaps be able to attain their evil designs. However, they are falling on deaf ears, because the Moslem tribes will never perform an act against Islam and the country. With the help of God the committed Moslem tribes themselves will dig these chiefs' grave."

Regarding the persons he considered responsible for the incidents in the region, he said "Khosrow, Naser, Abdollah, Malek Mansur, Daryush and Vereydun Qashqa'i and also Seyyed Ahmad Madani."

Responding to a question on the program he had for strengthening the army, the commander of the Firuzabad guards said, "Programs are being carried out which are at present secret but the mobilization of the tribes and the people themselves against these American mercenaries heads the list of our activities."

As to whether aid is given to the Qashqa'i chieftains in the form of arms, equipment and financial affairs, Dr A'in said, "A quantity of arms and equipment, including some heavy weapons, recently arrived from the southern ports for the chieftains, but their volume is not yet significant. The criminal America is intending to give aid in the form of money and weapons to the network of chieftains in the south; in this matter Seyyed Ahmad Madani, the American spy, is carrying out an important role."

Regarding the army's cooperation with the people, he said, "The people in the region, especially the tribes, are cooperating with us to the utmost and are even in the process of forming an army organized through the tribes themselves to crush the spy chieftains. They constantly visit us and state 'Give us arms and we ourselves will strip off the beards of these mercenaries in the area.'"

11887
CSO: 4906

MAJLES MEMBER DENOUNCES FEUDAL LANDLORDS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 18 Aug 80 p 3

/Article: "Most Arable Lands in Khodabandeh Are in the Hands of Big Feudalists"/

/Text/ After the views of the people's spokesmen in the Islamic Consultative Council were received regarding the presentation of their electoral districts' issues and problems and appropriate recommendations and solutions in this matter, Hojjatoleslam Mohsen Rahami, parliamentary representative of the District of Khodabandeh, who is a communications engineer in the microwave field, has studied in the Physics Department of the National University and is now a student in the Faculty of Law and Political Science of Tehran University, described the problems and demands of the people of his district in a conversation with KEYHAN'S correspondent.

At the outset, referring to the geographical location of this town he said, "Our area is one of the forgotten regions in the nation, to the point where and when I stated in the parliament that I was the representative of Khodabandeh, a group of people did not even know where Khodabandeh was. Ours is a deprived area surrounded by Abhar, Zanjan, Bijar, Qazvin, and Hamadan and has an area of more than 9,000 square kilometers, 400 villages, a town and a population of close to 200,000."

The representative of Khodabandeh then proceeded to describe the problems and needs of his electoral district and added, "The people of Khodabandeh and the villages around it derive their living from agriculture in a situation where the lands are in the hands of the feudalists and the so-to-speak heavies of the area. Since the Province of Zanjan is basically an area of descendants of tribal chiefs and feudalists, you cannot find a village where a tribal chief or feudalist does not have most of the fertile land at his disposal. On the other hand, since the people cannot live by other means and do not have an adequate amount of land or water, they are thus compelled to go to the towns and the capital to work in the factories and factory centers. Most times not only do these migrations not provide the wherewithal for their comfort and tranquility in the towns--to the contrary, as well as creating social problems, they cause the level of

agricultural and livestock output to decline noticeably. I recommend that the government put the establishment of industrial centers in this region at the top of its future developmental measures."

The representative of Khodabandeh then continued, "There is not even one hospital or one hospital bed for the region's population of 200,000. If someone needs a doctor or on occasion an operation he must be taken by minibus to Zanjan and a basic problem existed and still exists even in this matter, and that is the lack of ambulances. There is just one ambulance for the entire area and that is in the central clinic of the town. Aside from this, one can also count the clinics themselves on one's fingers and, again, those that exist lack adequate health facilities. Of course, important and vital as the consequences of these deficiencies are, it is clear to everyone that problems are created for the people when there are not numerous clinics."

He then criticized the state of education in his region and pointed out that there is one secondary school in the entire area of Khodabandeh and most of the time even that is closed because it does not have a principal and a teaching staff. There are also four or five guidance schools in the region; again, because educational resources especially teachers and principals do not exist, they are always facing problems. The cultural level of the region is therefore very low and one can perhaps estimate the proportion of illiterates of between 95 and 100 percent. It is natural that as long as this problem, that is, illiteracy exists, subsequent issues and problems will not be solved either.

The representative of Khodabandeh then referred to other problems of his electoral district and stated "The problem of the lack of a suitable road for rural inhabitants is more or less similar in all the deprived areas of our country; in our area this problem unfortunately seems many times greater and more intense, to the point where it has caused many resources which could be available to the villagers from the centers of the province to remain lacking and excluded. Then the issue of water, electricity and health, are also, in their own place, individually among the basic problems of the region. The problem of the lack of potable water is one of the main issues and one of the highest priority demands of the people of the Khodabandeh region and the villages around it."

Continuing his statements, talking about a small portion of the measures of the holy war of reconstruction in the Khodabandeh area, he complained about this institution and said, "The holy war of reconstruction has not been as active as it should have been in our area. Except for three or four cases where superficial activities have been carried out, no other measures have taken place. Of course the budget allocated in this field is also a problem, since the credits which have been set aside for the area of Khodabandeh and outskirts are very minor in comparison with the needs and requirements of the people. If adequate credits are set aside for the region of Khodabandeh, the conditions and manpower for creating many agricultural and livestock complexes also exist in adequate amounts and I think

that this is the best way to prevent rural inhabitants from leaving for the towns. Therefore we hope that investigation will also be made into this matter in the near future."

The representative of Khodabandeh then proceeded to describe the issue of security forces and the provision of security in his electoral district. Pointing out that few guards are engaged in carrying out their duties in the region as a whole, and that there is no sign of a committee, gendarmerie post or police in the area, he requested that the responsible authorities take immediate steps to strengthen the security and policy institutions and perforce the army of guards in this region. He pointed out "This matter possesses special importance since due to its special location Khodabandeh is at all times exposed to likely dangers of aggression and counterrevolutionary conspiracy. Of course I have mentioned this matter to the honorable minister of the interior, the revolutionary public prosecutor and the other relevant officials. On this accasion, the area is also faced with a problem in terms of judiciary courts. For example we in our region just have a district court, and the district court, in light of the judiciary laws of the past, cannot respond to the needs of the people. This region still does not have a revolutionary public prosecutor, an Islamic law judge or a Friday emam. Therefore matters related to law cases are referred to Abhar and since the revolutionary public prosecutor rarely goes to that town either big problems have always been and are being created for the people from this standpoint. Another problem which I consider it necessary to mention here is that of the telephone. In spite of the existence of a population whose statistics I already mentioned, Khodabandeh is deprived of an automatic telephone; the telephone which has been installed in the region is of the magneto variety and is usually out of order. So this is a problem which is added to the others, and so on."

In conclusion, expressing hope that the government and the parliament would devote priority in their plans to propounding and implementing construction and development plans in the rural areas, he said, "Certainly providing a living for the people, especially the rural inhabitants, goes along with Islamic justice, and the two complement one another. I believe that there is no possibility of establishing Islamic justice without providing a living for rural inhabitants; in such a situation, there is no justice and I will not consider the Islamic government to be more than a verbal state. We have promised people everywhere that what has happened so far, where justice has not been done, one should not consider the fault of Islam. God willing we will overcome the problems with the cooperation in the near future of the people and the Islamic Consultative Council."

11887
CSO: 4906

ARMY UNDERTAKES PAY REFORM

Tehran KEYHAN in Persoan 3 Sep 80 p 16

[Article: "In An Exclusive Interview With KEYHAN, Brigadier General Fallahi Announced: "A Plan for Increasing Salaries and Redressing Inequalities in the Army"]

[Text] The salaries and benefits of retired and active duty armed forces personnel in the Islamic Republic of Iran are being increased in order to redress existing inequalities.

Brigadier General Valiollah Fallahi, acting chief of the Joint Army Staff of the Islamic Republic of Iran, said while announcing this news during a four-hour interview with KEYHAN: Bills concerning increases in salaries and benefits, and redressing inequality and discrimination among army personnel have been approved by Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, President of the Republic and Commander in Chief, and have been submitted to the Islamic Consultative Assembly by the Ministry of Defense for drafting and approval.

During the announcement of the salary increase for armed forces personnel in the Islamic Republic, Brigadier General Fallahi said: With studies that we have put into effect we have eliminated all forms of inequality. Concerning the amount of the salary increase for armed forces personnel, Brigadier General Fallahi said: The bill for increasing salaries of armed forces personnel is under careful study, as are all aspects of the Ministry of Defense. He said: Since this bill had already been prepared before the official beginning of Majles activities, the Revolutionary Council has submitted it to the Majles for drafting and approval. Fallahi added: The annual payroll increase for personnel in the Islamic Republic of Iran is about 12 billion tumans. Among retired people, the salaries of about 300 retired people will be increased by 30 percent, meaning they will collect about 80 percent of their active duty salaries. The acting chief of the Joint Army Staff of the Islamic Republic then added: The bill for salary increases will eliminate the only existing salary inequalities among armed forces personnel in the Islamic Republic. Fallahi said: In the new bill differences are only related to academic attainment or years of service. We have, however, taken a look at the value of academic credentials.

Salaries of personnel in the Islamic Republic will be increased on this basis. Fallahi added: Armed forces personnel drew various benefits. For example, technicians drew technical salaries, Air Force personnel had special privileges on the ground, the same as pilots or people working aboard warships. He said: All special privileges will be removed on the basis of the new bill. It will be left to the discretion of the army to distribute between 20 to 80 percent of salaries as technical, hardship, and hazardous occupation pay. In this way some of the inequalities will disappear. He added: Until this bill is approved, we have also submitted a number of other bills for eliminating inequalities. For example, after the triumph of the revolution we noticed that burial rights were unequal between non-commissioned officers, soldiers, and officers, meaning the officers drew the most, followed in succession by non coms and enlisted men. How bad it was that in the Islamic Republic of Iran, burial rights, which are a totally separate thing, and are absolutely religious and Islamic, should be unequal.

He also said: Allowances for food, quarters and clothing were also unequal between enlisted men, non coms, and officers. We also equalized these, and in order to redress all forms of discrimination and unequality, all officers' and NCO clubs have been consolidated. In another segment of his remarks Fallahi said concerning the changes that would be introduced into the army system by the new organization: Renovations by the new organization are from within, meaning it is a process that will guide the army closer toward a "divine" system. These renovations will place the army squarely on the side of the Imam, Islam, and the nation. If these basic changes of the new organization are completed, and we hope for that, and we must also strive to complete them, the army will not be so vulnerable. It will be an army that is not subject to influence, and a religious, Islamic, people's or in other words, a unified army, cohesive from within. An army that is cohesive from within will not take it as a major problem if its tools of war and weaponry are not in good condition. This is a problem when the army is not cohesive from within. If the organization renovation from within which has begun is completed, we will then be able to change the nature of war, meaning we will be able to carry on irregular activities, and we could fight in that way for months or years. In the army we want to form, if it is formed, it will have characteristics that are not outdated. The closer we come to war, and beyond war, the army will be more revolutionary and more aggressive. Meaning if the equipment deteriorates its spirit will not deteriorate. Such an army is a people's army, a well-established and enduring army. The army will not die. Such an army is within the nation, of the same color as the nation. Such an army can back the nation, and conversely the nation can support such an army. Such an army can begin reconstruction, and when such an army is founded it will be possible to sever dependence entirely. Otherwise, an army with ties on the outside can never completely sever dependence and it will not be an army that can change the nature of war. An army that is cohesive from within can be a military university for the nation, and within such an army the nation can learn. Solidarity between the army and the nation in such circumstances will be a true and spiritual solidarity, and this is the result of such organizational renovation.

9310
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FORMER SUPERVISOR DENOUNCES DECISION ON CLOSING UNIVERSITIES

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Aug 80 p 6

/Article by Dr Mohammad Malaki: "Open Letter to the Revolutionary Cultural Council: Special Characteristics of Islamic University from the Doctrinal Viewpoint"/

/Text/ When schools were started up in Iran through the efforts of the Great Amir and others, so that sciences such as physics and chemistry could be taught in these schools, what did they do, brother, when they resorted to the weight of religion to impose a class stamp on education and a faction rose to combat this activity and propagandized among the religious masses which had been able to put their children in school, stating "People, why are you staying quiet? They want to turn your children into irreligious polytheists, they are talking about chemistry, physics, sulphuric acid and similar matters in the schools, these ideas came from the West, and do you know what sulphuric acid means? It means that there is no God." The result of this pre-arranged plan was that most of the children of grocers and the like pursued their fathers' jobs lest they become irreligious, and the children of the top brass and the kings and politicians filled up the new schools and became doctors, engineers, specialists and politicians, seizing all the affairs of the country in their own hands, dealing in such a way with religion, the country and the people for about 100 years that people still feel the pain of their yoke on their backs. Today nobody is saying, "Look, chemistry and sulphuric acid did not come from the West and do not mean the negation of God but are rather the proof of God." The father of the science of chemistry, Jahir ibn Hayyan, was a Moslem scholar and, at a time when the Moslems considered the quest of knowledge, understanding, and the search for science to be an Islamic obligation, even if that was in the remotest corner of the world ("seek knowledge even if it is in China"), at a time when the leader of our creed, Emam Ja'far Sadeq, established the first Islamic university and established the bases of free discussion and the confrontation of ideas for us, and at a time when scholars like Jabir ibn Hayyan (to whose name the world of science still gives reverence) transformed society, no scholar in the West had the right

to think except within the confines of the sacred book established by the church, and people burned free thinking scholars and intellectuals alive. What did they do, brother, when, after the passage of several centuries, the situation changed to the point where, with the arrival of Western spies at the Safavid court, influence at the court, and the transformation of Alawite Shiism to Safavid Shiism, the scholars were the only persons who studied religion, and even that within the religion limited to the Safavid Schiism, and renunciation, threats and legal slaughter took the place of free discussion and the confrontation of ideas--to the point where the meaning of sulphuric acid became the denial of the existence of God? When pelple saw that they were compelled to open universities and higher institutes, even in this country, whether they liked it or not, all their efforts went to endowing the universities with two special characteristics, Western orientation and a class character. During the more than 40 years which have passed since the establishment of Iran's first university (the University of Tehran), the satanic regime, exploiting various techniques, tried to keep the universities from belonging to the people and stinted no form of treason to this end. But can one stop the movement of history? It was no longer the children of the prominent who occupied the universities--rather, the number of students who rose from the heart of the society increased year by year, to the point where almost all the students consisted of children of the middle and lower classes and the satanic government, subservient to imperialism and capitalism, prohibited any kind of radical structural change which would prevent the universities from being dependent on the West and would allow the universities to return "to themselves." It created a university whose job became to waste students' time on subjects which for the most part were not useful in meeting the needs of society and to give degrees whose recipients had no other distinction than to sit behind administrative desks.

The mistake of the political figures following the triumph of the revolution: The people rebelled against the satanic regime and were victorious. The imperial regime should have been replaced by the Islamic regime, which would only have been possible through a basic change. The temporary government came into office and the prime minister, before starting work with the University of Tehran, presented his statements to the people. He was not an unknown person; everyone knew what his thoughts and ideas were. The sentence "my ignorant brother, come and be free" indicated his policy and thinking in the government.

In those days no one objected or stated that the revolution would get nowhere with this conduct. I do not intend to defend anyone, since when Eng Bazargan was in power I myself made the most intense criticisms of him, but today, now that every party is subjecting him to attack, I consider it my moral, human and Islamic duty to state the facts. To those who today are apparently preparing a court to try the revolutionary government /I say/ are Bazargan and the temporary government alone responsible for the mistakes of the past? Why were you silent about the people who were running the country behind the scenes? If treason was committed,

many indeed participated in it. Eng Bazargan's big sin was to say, from the first day, "This is what I am," and never claim to be revolutionary. As if you performed much revolutionary activity after the resignation of the temporary government! Brothers, seek council with yourselves awhile and consider that God is the witness and the supervisor of your acts. I will now leave this question to its proper place, where I have statements to make in this regard. In any event, following the triumph of the revolution, we did not make much haste to open every place up and return work to its ordinary state, and not much insistence was placed on keeping the university open. At that time, benefiting from the revolutionary spirit of the people, we could have closed the doors of the university for a few months, sent professors, students and employees to rural areas and towns on such jobs as roadbuilding--something which other revolutionary countries have done--and organized a plan to transfer the university into an Islamic university during that period, so that, after about 16 months of the revolution had elapsed, the emam would not have cried out that "the universities must be unified," "the universities must be for us ourselves" and "the universities must become Islamic." The universities were kept open while there was no possibility of continuing the previous situation any longer; we began as many efforts toward structural changes in the universities as possible and, in spite of all obstacles, took steps in this direction to which reference will be made later.

What Have You Done To Islamize the Universities So Far?

Through a revolutionary act, they decided to close the doors of the universities and higher institutes, in accordance with a plan previously drawn up. It was their decision that this act would take place in May. The president intervened and, at a meeting which the university people did not attend, it was decided that the universities would be shut down on 5 June. No matter how much we cried out that they should not do this, that they should close the universities a month later at the most so that a large number of students could graduate and go to work for the country and not go about in a daze, they not only paid attention to our words but also laid the charge of traitor, counterrevolutionary, anti-emam and so forth against us.

Brothers Come, for the sake of God, out of friendship for the people, for those hundreds of thousands of families who have become vexed by the fact that the universities and higher institutes are closed today, and explain whether the act of closing the universities was a revolutionary act along the path of the revolution or a political factional act for private objectives. I, as a teacher, who for about 20 years in Tehran University has had active participation in all the occurrences which have taken place in that center, am ready to prove that the shutdown of universities like the University of Tehran will only turn out to the benefit of the counterrevolution, and that not only will it not solve problems in the future but the fact that these scientific institutions are closed will add to the burden of problems with every day. What steps has the Cultural Revolution Staff

taken so far to Islamize the universities? Except that you sent a questionnaire to the teaching staff, which was not expected of the revolutionary staff, moreover a staff selected by the emam of the nation, after this period after about 2 months had passed? Would it not have been better, instead of asking questions about matters which are all reflected in the teaching staff's file and instead of wasting a number of people's time in studying the response to the questionnaires, to have referred to the individuals' files, so that it could be known what the investigations on everyone was, what educational and other work they have performed so far, and what use is being made of these persons in current revolutionary conditions, then to have given a judgment on everyone, according to his type of specialization so that some action might be taken to advance the revolution? Would it not for example have been better had they asked me, whose specialization is nutrition, "now that the university is closed and your presence in the university cannot be benefited from now, go to Sistan and Baluchestan, to the factories, schools, mosques and so forth, and teach people what they should do to avoid food poisoning or how they should keep their water and food so it does not become rotten and polluted."

Would it not have been better, during this period, for you at least to determine the special characteristics of the Islamic university so that people could start planning for all those whose hearts beat for Islam and the revolution? To what extent do you know the people who are participating in the commissions? Let them not be smart people who have made 180 degree turns and who are the same as those up to yesterday who participated in sessions investigating the problems of the white revolution and today are planning in meetings for educational revolution and creating Islamic universities. Why instead of a dialogue of the deaf don't you raise these questions with the people? The fact that the universities and higher institutions are closed is not a small matter. It is linked to the lives of about a million families. Why don't you act in a revolutionary way? In your opinion is closing and destroying or building and opening more revolutionary? Come first determine the objective, then overturn the obstacles to reaching the goal, and build and pave the way to arrive at it.

What Class Suffers from the Fact That the Universities Are Closed?

I do not think that anyone would doubt that ours is still a society of classes. The downtrodden remain downtrodden and the haughty remain haughty. The regretful palaces and the regretful huts are still in place. The several-thousand-square-meter houses and the several-million-square-meter palaces are many and the shacks and damp rooms in the process of collapsing which are homes to families of many people are abundant. If you stand for a few minutes to get a bus along Mosaddegh Avenue or Dr Shari'ati Avenue, not a few, but dozens of luxury cars, costing thousands of tomans, will pass by you. While most people hope for 2 sirs of frozen meat, groups of people provide fresh meat, meat without gristle, for their dogs and cats. In an environment where the biggest entertainment and recreation for a large segment of the people of Tehran is to go to the parks, pass along Mosaddegh Avenue and go under the grees of Behesht-e Zahra by pickup or

truck, factory owners, big landowners and honorable merchants travel several times a year to California, Los Angeles, Paris, London and so forth to visit gentelemen and examine money and banking affairs in monstrous airplanes which prevent the water in their bellies from being shaken. It is natural, in a class society, that it is obvious what classes have suffered from the fact that the universities are closed: classes which have the ability to send their darling beloved children to well known universities in America and Europe to continue their studies, or people who are not even able to fill their children's stomachs? Don't think that the matter has ended yet, or that these things are unheard of in the Islamic Republic. A year and a half after the triumph of the revolution, cast a glance at notices in the newspapers and many matters will become clear to you. I will just refer to one example. On page 3 of KEYHAN, issue 11,067, of 13 August 1978, a short notice: "Spain, Austria, pension, language classes, university and other services, language preparation classes, telephone such and such." Now tell me, do those million families which are disturbed over the closing of the universities belong to the downtrodden or the haughty? To dependents of the 60,000 martyrs and the 100,000 wounded, or the princes, courtiers, capitalists and owners of gold and coercion? Downtrodden sister and brother, beware; do not let it happen today that they will be able to make the haughty dominate you with the slogan that sulphuric acid means there is no God, that they close the door to science and knowledge in your face by closing the universities so that you will once again pursue your father's work and they will follow their fathers'.

Distinguishing Features of the Islamic University through the Doctrinal Viewpoint

"The goal of government is to nurture people in movement toward the divine system (Valiollah ol-Masir). For the sake of the appearance and development of capabilities in order that the manifestation of the dimensions of the divine nature of man may be provided ("be formed in God's morality"), which can be possible only under the aegis of the active and extensive participation of all elements of society in the process of the transformation of the society," /About one line missing./ From the introduction to the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, we realize that from the doctrinal viewpoint everything is a means to one goal in an Islamic society, and that is the "divine nature" of man and the creation of people who are fit to "represent God" on earth. Thus what is at issue is the selection of the proper means and the approach to that. It is clear that one of these means is "to know--to know how one must proceed from "being" to "becoming." When we see that Islam relies on knowledge, science and knowing, to the point where it swears by the pen and, in the first message of the revelation, declares "he taught man what he did not know," we see that it raises this question in evaluating knowledge:

"Are people who know the equal of those who do not know?" They never have been. Islam's prophet considered the learned men of his nation to be his successors and stated, "pursue knowledge, even if that is in the rembtest

part of the world." He gave such importance to understanding that he told "heathen slaves" in the hands of the Moslems "if you teach Moslems how to read and write, you will be free." It is because of this that, in the words of those who wrote the constitution, "the groundwork for the appearance and development of capabilities in order that the manifestation of the dimensions of the divine nature of man may be provided." Now, in order to continue this course, is it possible that one may ignore the role of the universities as a means? Not at all. So how can we create a university which will be Islamic and aimed at "the goal?" What are the distinguishing features of this university? What university can be a better model and form for us than the one which the leader of our creed, Emam Ja'far Sadeq, established?

What we have learned from the body of the writings and the sayings of the scholars of religion, clerics and learned men of Islam is that in order to make the universities Islamic one must first carry out three fundamental principles:

1. Purification and cleansing of the universities. They should be purged, in accordance with Emam Khomeyni's command, of the corrupt elements and servants and obedient followers of the previous regime, and the dependents and devotees of foreigners should have no access to them, so that the educational environment may be a center for the creation of model men who are divine in nature.

2. Freedom of thinking and expressing opinions, since man does not grow and cannot follow the road toward divine nature except through the intermisture of ideas. We learned this from the conduct of Emam Sadeq (on whom be God's peace), since his university was a center for the commingling of ideas.

3. In order to provide an Islamic nature and to have all members of society take part in all stages of decisionmaking, it is necessary that all the affairs of the universities take place through consultation, since in the opinion of those who wrote the constitution "the divine nature of man can be possible only under the aegis of the active and extensive participation of all the elements of society in the process of the transformation of society."

If these three fundamental principles (purification, free discussion and consultation) are carried out within our universities, that will be a big step toward their Islamization; otherwise we sill have just contented ourselves with changing the name of the imperial universities to Islamic universities. After acceptance of these three principles, planning for the sake of putting higher education at the service of the masses in a manner responding to the requirements of the revolutionary society will be easy.

Brother Members of the Council of the Cultural Revolution:

Some people are of the opinion that you, as an institution which must be "revolutionary" have not succeeded in your work in this period, which has lasted more than 2 months. Certainly you pursue discussions of this matter at your meetings. I do not know what conclusions you have reached, but, as I have said many times, in our opinion, until we make it known what economic, social, political and other characteristics our Islamic society will possess, we will not be successful in planning, including planning for the universities. You have the experience of a year and a half of revolution before you. Why have plans been so unsuccessful and the emam's cry has become so loud?

Let us learn from the past that means are necessary to reach the goal of "the divine nature of man." Until we realize what these means are and use them, we will not draw close to the goal, but will be remote from it.

Brothers: to attain the demands of the people, which they have been crying out for--that is, "the freedom and independence of the Islamic Republic--we are badly in need of devout, self-sacrificing scholars and specialists. What have you done to this end so far? do you think that sending out certain circulars and forming some commissions is enough? During the time you are making decisions, all the universities remain shut down for at least one term and you have no plans for absorbing people's powers. To whose benefit is the bewilderment of tens of thousands of students, professors and employees? Come, before it is late, and set the problems of the job truthfully before the emam and the nation, for, if you do not do so today, tomorrow, God forbid, may be late.

Peace be upon you.

11887
CSO: 4906

GOODS DISTRIBUTION CENTERS TO SPUR ECONOMY

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 21 Aug 80 p 13

[Article: "The Role of Centers for Procurement and Distribution of Merchandise in Economic Reconstruction']

[Text] Foreign trade under the former regime was based as much as possible imports, the daily expansion of a culture of brokers and middlemen, the replacement of domestic production with imports, and putting forth as much as possible the profit motive over the work ethic. Since foreign trade yielded ever increasing enormous profits, most people were awed by this, fell all over themselves in droves to go the way of capitalism, and sought to obtain trade licenses. Getting a trade license was a sure way to multiply one's wealth several times over in a short time. For the same reason there was no longer any incentive to establish production units, and every day the number of people going into foreign trade increased. Unfortunately we were also faced with an increase in foreign trade on the part of profiteers (increasing imports, of course, and not exports) because besides assuring a huge, legal profit (!), this was a way to make huge illegal profits by introducing fraudulent factors, in which the price of goods was inflated. As a result, the way was opened for smuggling and other operations.

With the ratification of the constitution and the insertion of Article 44 based on nationalizing foreign trade, a great change was set in motion in the history of our country's foreign trade, and the full implementation of this article can be a useful and lively step in the country's economic reconstruction.

The Ministry of Commerce, after several months of study and deliberation, has finally gotten the executive regulations of this plan approved by the Revolutionary Council, and has decided to put this article into force by establishing 16 merchandise procurement and distribution centers. About three months ago it set up three of these 16 centers, the metals center, the paper and wood center, and the textile and fabrics center, bringing the importation of such goods directly under its own control. Although there are still importers working in these fields, they are totally under

the control of these centers. According to the Ministry of Commerce, during this period the established centers have had noticeable success, and they have been able to bring about 30 percent of the volume of the country's imports under their own mantle. The Ministry of Commerce has expressed the hope of setting up all 16 of the aforesaid centers by the end of this year and to take control of all imports. We also hope that this article will be fully implemented before the end of this year, because, for the same reasons that the Ministry of Commerce has given, the claims of numerous difficulties and the lack of specialized knowledge do not establish the need for more time for the implementation of this article so that we allow a great many of these merchants to carry on their plundering for several more months. These centers must be conclusively established as soon as possible in order to put a stop to the abuses of numerous profiteers. Here we will summarize the effects of nationalizing foreign trade on the country's economy.

Control of Imports

Before now every private importer, without any form of control, ordered every kind of merchandise in whatever quantities he wished. How often the different merchants ordered so much of one good that prices went way down because of oversupply, to the point that it was no longer economical and they would even abandon them to customs. This problem caused the accumulation of merchandise in customs warehouses, and also the waste of a great amount of the national wealth. On the other hand, because of the lack of individual control, sometimes many different varieties of one type of good were imported from different countries, all of them satisfying only one need. For this reason the variety of imports has now exceeded 24,000 kinds. With the full establishment of the basis for nationalizing foreign trade, the centers for procurement and distribution of merchandise can at least economize both from the point of view of the quantity of orders and from the point of view of reducing the variety of imported merchandise and of ordering necessary goods and not sumptuous, deluxe goods to be bought with savings.

Protection of Domestic Products

With the full implementation of this article, by not importing items whose equivalents are produced inside the country, and by assuring higher prices for imports, these centers can protect domestic products and bring about factors that will encourage domestic producers. In this way traders also, with cutbacks on other profits, with no incentives to remain in this business, will undertake to set up production units and the amount of domestic production will increase. Then the dependence on imports, which now make up about 70 percent of consumer goods, will decrease.

Obstacles to Implementation

The nationalization of foreign trade endangers and will endanger the interests of many. The implementation of this article will be confronted on the one hand by the protests of many domestic merchants, whose enormous profits that they have put in their own pockets until now, will be stopped. On the other hand there are the foreign companies, brokers, and middlemen, who received commissions from both domestic producers and traders before the appearance of this article. According to reports from the managing directors of these established centers, these foreign companies' attacks on Iran have begun, especially since a number of them have been drawn to the brink of bankruptcy. They are trying to prevent producing companies from seling merchandise directly to Iran, in order to force Iran to import goods through these brokers in the old decadent way. The only way to fight these foreign brokers is to resist as much as possible in order to force them out of the picture. Domestic insiders who work in this field, however, also number about 23,000. They can either set up cooperative distribution and consumer companies, or they can set up production units. Considering the fact that setting up cooperatives will not be that profitable, it is better for them to go with industrial and production units than to both make more money and pay the price of the largely random production that faces the country and which they have either not been aware of until now or else have repressed, thinking they were fulfilling their moral and human responsibility by engaging in business.

9310
CSO: 4906

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Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 37, 21-28 Sep 80 p 15

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IRAQI AMBASSADOR AMASH NEW DEAN OF HELSINKI DIPLOMATIC CORPS

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 2 Jul 80 p 3

[Article by Vesa Haapala: "Amash To Become Dean of Diplomatic Corps Next Winter"]

[Text] The ascendency of the Iraqi Ambassador, General Saleh Mehdi Amash, to the position of senior foreign diplomat in Helsinki's diplomatic corps is causing concern and confusion in diplomatic circles.

The Israeli Embassy is experiencing particular uneasiness since as countries Israel and Iraq are officially in a state of war. In his diplomatic duties in Helsinki in the latter part of the 1970's General Amash has not been shy about presenting stands condemning Israel and Zionism. Frequently these two issues have been combined in the same stands.

The duties of the dean of the diplomatic corps will be transferred to General Amash in the early part of winter. At that time the present dean, Dutch Ambassador C. G. Verdonck-Huffnagel, will be leaving his post in Helsinki. He has unofficially announced that he will leave Helsinki at the end of next February.

The duties of the dean of the diplomatic corps include the management of the joint interests of the diplomatic community and the presenting of expectations with resepct to the host country. At receptions and state visits the dean frequently represents all the diplomats accredited to the country. The duties of the dean also include the arrangement of receptions for departing as well as arriving ambassadors.

Embassy Secretary Gad Cohen of the Israeli Embassy states that they intend to proceed from the fact that no proplems will appear in the future. Cohen considers that there might be a possible problem between General Amash and the Finnish Foreign Ministry.

"We hope that there will be no difficulties," says Gad Cohen.

Outside Conditions

Indeed the representatives of Chile and the Vatican have been accredited to Helsinki longer than General Amash, but since the Ambassador of Chile is in Stockholm and Papal Nuncio resides in Copenhagen, General Amash must accept the duties of the dean of the diplomatic corps next winter.

Outwardly, at least, good conditions exist for this since the palatial Iraqi Embassy completed on Kulosaari will be in full use at that time. The collosal, eastern style embassy, which was built with great speed on Vahaniityntie on Kulosaari, will receive its baptism by fire on the 16th of this month when a large group of invited guests will come to celebrate Iraqi national day.

Indeed this national day is actually on 14 July, but the French Bastille Day also falls on the same day. The French will celebrate their national day on the actual date. It is presumed that the Iraqis feared a loss of guests inasmuch as the celebrations would have come on the same day and many might have placed greater value on the French invitation.

The general who searched for Jews and Zionists hiding in Finnish corporations in the early spring now intends to establish roots in Finland. In addition to the climate, the general is also attracted to a piece of land in Kirkkonummi.

Recently horses were brought there to be raised. The came from the same place the general does, Iraq.

General Salem Mehdi Amash

10576
CSO: 8117

NATION'S MANY SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS LAUDED

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 17 Jul 80 pp 8, 9

/Article: "Iraq on the Road to Comprehensive Development"/

[Excerpt] Women's Takeoff

The Iraqi revolution has devoted conspicuous attention to women, who were neglected and lived on the sidelines before the revolution occurred. This concern arose from women's weight and importance in building a new society and dozens of laws have been codified on their behalf so that they may assume their full role in the process of development and construction. Women, by virtue of the application of this law, have become teachers, oil engineers, policewomen, operators of gas pumps, officers and pilots.

Among the most important things women have achieved is the Personal Status Law, which has given all Iraqi women reaching legal age the right to request a divorce and to reject forced marriage. They have also received the right to be electoral candidates and be elected to the National Assembly, as actually occurred about 3 weeks ago when for the first time Iraqi women took part in the first elections held in Iraq for about a quarter century. These resulted in the victory of 16 women--the highest figure to be found among Arab parliaments.

Working women in Iraq have enjoyed the achievement of numerous gains and accomplishments. Legislation embraces everything which uplifts the status of women in general and provides the wherewithal for their liberation, their resurgence and their exercise of roles in society which are as worthy and competent as those of their brother men.

The Labor Law for the year 1970 is to be considered a true mirror of revolution's intellectual orientation toward women's issues. It underlines the need to incorporate women in labor and give them the scope to engage in work while providing all legal guarantees and caring for their special circumstances and their role in society as mothers and workers.

This law allotted a special chapter to regulating the jobs of working women. This contains legal sections which stipulate that one may not employ women in industry on night jobs except for administrative work or work related to special technical or social activities, with permission from the competent bodies, in places where health and recreation facilities are available to them.

The Labor Law prohibits the employment of women in harsh, difficult circumstances and makes it obligatory to give working women a rest period of no less than 11 consecutive hours per day in addition to a vacation of 1 month from the date they give birth, with confirmation by a medical certificate from medical bodies. It prohibits their employment in night or overtime work, or work which is harsh and detrimental to their health and the health of their fetuses during periods of pregnancy. It also sets work hours for pregnant women at 7 hours per day.

Upbringing of Youth

A mass organization, the Iraq General Federation of Youth, is in charge of preparing and bringing up young people in Iraq. This consists of three organizations: the first, the Vanguard Organization, is concerned with small children ranging from 9 to 14 years of age; there is the Youth Organization which deals with the 15- to 19-year-old group; and there is the Young Person's Organization dealing with youths who are 20 years old and above.

In Iraq there are 87 youth centers and 11 youth homes dealing with matters of art and literature, 78 sporting clubs, and five educational care centers which are all concerned with various youth activities. The Ministry of Youth supervises these.

Technology and Planning

In constructing a new economy, Iraq relies on the programmed planning system. It prepares annual 5-year plans to absorb financial revenues, which increased after it nationalized oil in 1972. Allocations to the 5-year plan for the years 1965-69 came to 631 million dinars, and the 1970-75 national development plan for 1970-75 to 3,008,000,000 dinars. Total allocation for the years 1976-79 were 9,903,600,000 dinars.

The new 5-year plan for 1981-85 consists of balanced development of the various economic sectors. It devotes special attention to rural development and is based on the premise of coordination and economic integration among Arab countries.

From this premise, that of constructing a strong national economy, officials in Iraq consider that planning assumes central importance in building the economy and all its branches and in developing it in accordance

with current and future national and domestic requirements. It also considers that the process of socialist construction is inevitable and necessary.

National Income

What has been achieved in this context may be attributed to national income, which came to 9,792,000,000 dinars last year, as compared with 850 million in 1969 or an annual growth rate of 27.7 percent. Per capita income rose from 92.3 to 763.8 million dinars, or an annual rate of growth of 23.5 percent.

Wages paid to employees and workers increased by great rates over their pre-revolution level. Out of concern for the application of socialism, these increases were concentrated in a manner covering the main classes of society, such as workers, low-level employees and people with limited incomes, and the minimum wage rose by 122 percent.

Investments

The figure on investments allocated to the annual plan in the current year comes to 5.24 billion dinars, or an increase of 176 percent over total investments allocated to all plans set out before the 17 July 1968 revolution.

Concomitant with the program which officials in Iraq are following, the government has offered Arab investors the requisite facilities, they number about 400 investors in various sectors, and their total investments come to about $7 million.

Continuing in the development sphere, we can point out that work has recently been increasing in the General Building Authority, which is carrying out 721 development projects at a total cost of about 1.3 billion dinars. The costs of projects contained in the plan for the current year comes to about 768.49 million dinars, while annual allocations came to 334.5 million, an increase of 200 percent over last year's allocations.

Of these projects, 343 have attained a high rate of completion; these consist of various facilities spread over all areas of the country.

Among the most prominent projects to be carried out in the current year are the technological institutes which will prepare intermediate and technical staffs in the Provinces of Maysan, Irbil, al-Ta'mim, Nineveh, Babil and Basrah, at a total cost of 62,374,000 dinars, and teachers' training institutes in the Provinces of Baghdad, Nineveh and Maysan at a cost of 32.19 million dinars.

Work is on the verge of completion on all the projects for industrial schools, a number of which were recently delivered throughout all governorates at a cost of 45 million dinars.

The General Building Organization will start preparing studies and designs for the construction of soccer fields in the governorates of Babil, al-Qadisiyah and Nineveh.

Work is also continuing on the construction of a number of socialist sector building projects, most prominent of which are the planning agency complex, the Council of Ministers, the General Motion Picture and Stage Organization, the site of the Economic Commission for West Asia with a special housing complex, buildings and machinery for AL-THAWRAH newspaper, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Baghdad University.

Development of Telephone Services

The National Development Plan for the Years 1976-80 has given great attention to telephone projects in rural areas, in order to provide modern services and eliminate differences between urban and rural areas.

Iraq's Ministry of Transport and Communications plan is aimed at connecting Iraq's districts with a reliable automatic system consisting of telephone and cable services as part of a project containing exchanges with capacities ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 lines.

The project also includes the construction of 97 microwave stations spread about over all areas of the country. This will be characterized by the use of mobile air conditioned vehicles until completion of the communications complexes which will accommodate installed exchanges with capacities based on actual need.

These vehicles, with their equipment, will be moved to subdistrict seats to cover most rural areas in the country with their services. The project will be outfitted with central supervisory and control equipment to keep close supervision on activity in the vehicles.

The project will help stop migration from rural to urban areas by providing all the requirements for living in rural areas which exist in the towns, such as health, telephone, electric, and clean water services and other important services; in addition it will help regulate the marketing process by accelerating communications among cooperatives and crop gathering centers of various types.

Road and Bridge Projects

In the context of roads and bridges, the General Construction Contracting Company at the present time is carrying out a number of road, bridge and

pier projects at a cost of 260 million dinars distributed among the provinces. These include the al-Qa'im-'Akashat-al--Ramliyah road, the al-Qa'im-Akashat railway and stations and birdges belonging to that, the airfield tunnel, the barrier for the town of al-Sa'diyah, the Kirkuk-Fathah bridge, the road connected to it, and 10 strategic piers at Umm Qasr.

The Umm Qasr pier project will cover an area of 900,000 square meters on the west bank of Umm Qasr. Its total cost will come to 95 million dinars and it will consist of 10 commercial piers and a special track on which 26 large cargo unloading cranes will operate.

In another area, the General Agency for Constructing Southern Roads built 285 kilometers of roads and three pontoons last month at a cost of 10 million dinars. These are distributed among the Provinces of Basrah, Dhi Qar, Maysan, al-Muthanna and al-Qadisiyah. The agency is now continuing the construction of 961 kilometers of roads in these provinces at a cost of 49.34 million dinars.

Social Affairs

The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs' Plan for the years 1985-86 consists of effecting a major qualitative shift in the context of the social services the ministry's agency provides, in light of the requisite volume of change and development and the demands of objective reality, as well as construction materials whose effects are not isolated from field conceptions.

As regards disabled persons, the relevant body supervising these people has decided to establish a special town in every province for them. The area of each town will be 65,000 square meters. Special designs have been made for them at a cost of 93 million dinars preparatory to startup of construction early next year.

It should be added that every town will include a nursery, kindergarten, primary school for deaf and dumb and retarded children, and shops for practical training in sewing, carpentry, ironwork, ceramics, drawing and weaving.

It will also contain a boarding area for children afflicted with numerous disabilities, a center for disability diagnosis 2,000 square meters in area conforming to the most modern developments, a large common hall for activities in various departments, and all other services relating to food, movies, sports and daily activities.

Five million dinars have been allocated to the board, which is headed by the minister of labor and social affairs, Mr Bakr Mahmud Rasul, to provide all necessary equipment and facilities for the disabled.

The sum of 450,000 dinars has been allotted to renovating the al-Amal institute for the deaf and dumb and increasing the serivces it provides; in addition, the board has received 30 buses, will soon receive another 20, and then will get another 100 to provide transportation for the disabled who are covered by the new Employment Law.

The board recently opened new institutes for the retarded in the town of al-Thawrah, a ceramic shop in al-Waziriyah, and an institute for the mentally retarded in the al-Harithiyah area, as well as transferring some social development centers to centers to serve the retarded.

In the course of the past 6 months the board opened 26 projects to serve the retarded and is continuing its work of preparing the curricula which they will operate in the coming school year. Among these projects are 10 institutes for the retarded in Baghdad, three in Basrah, two each in the Provinces of al-Najaf, Karba'a', and Irbil, and the expansion of spaces in existing institutes.

Special Child's Care

Among the types of care which officials are providing for all citizens, there is special care for children, the generations of tomorrow. As of last year,85 mother and child care centers had been established in the country, including 16 in Baghdad, to perform health and guidance care for the pregnant in order to eliminate deviations and moral disturbances. Thus there is a concentration on child care and the provision of a suitable climate for balanced growth. In the light of experiences in actual practice the health boards have recommended the establishment of 25 new centers and the performance of a comprehensive study to cover Iraq's needs according to geographic and population distribution.

The government has given great care and attention to nurseries and kindergartens and the specifications and conditions on the basis of which these types of educational and service organizations are constructed are recorded. The number of kindergartens in Iraq total 43, ranging from national government organizations to mass organizations and benevolent societies. The Iraq General Federation of Women is prominent in this vital educational and service sphere, and it has established a prominent prsence in directing experience in it as regards the construction of children's kindergartens. Sixteen schools are being opened with a capacity of 200 children each.

On behalf of children, also, a decree has been issued on compulsory free education, meals in schools, institutes and schools devoted to the affairs of disabled children, and coverage of free time by providing a healthy cultural and recreational atmosphere and providing sports, art and games to develop talents, children's playgrounds, publication of a children's

paper and children's museums, and stage, movie and television activities devoted to children's psychological and pedagogical affairs.

The Social Care Law

Officials have been directing these vital affairs for about 3 weeks with the issuance of the Social Care Law, in which a stipend is allotted to every family whose monthly income is below the minimum wage for unskilled workers, if it consists of five or more persons below 70 percent of this wage if it consists of four persons, /below/ 70 percent if it consists of three persons, /below/ 66 percent if it consists of two persons, or /below/ 33 percent if it consists of one person.

Every widow, every divorced woman who has a minor child living with her, every minor orphan and every person totally disabled by sickness or old age will be entitled to the family care stipend in accordance with the law.

The law allots a monthly stipend of 13 dinars to heads of households, 9 dinars 100 fils to wives, and 5 dinars 200 fils to children.

In its first part, the law describes the general objective it has in mind. Amont these are:

Article One. Social solidarity is the primary basis of society and its intent is that every citizen should perform his obligations toward society in full and that society should guarantee the citizen all his rights.

Article Two. The government will strive to provide social care for all citizens while they are alive and for their families after their death.

Article Three. Work is a right whose provision the government guarantees for every citizen and a duty for everyone who is able to perform it. It is required by the need to participate in the construction, protection, development and prosperity of society. The government has the goal of providing social insurance for all citizens in cases of disability or old age.

Article Four. Government support for families with low or non-existent incomes is a tentative obligation which will decrease the more the country progresses on the way to socialist construction. The need for this support will lessen when a society of progress and welfare is achieved, providing work for everyone who is able to work and providing social insurance for all members of the population.

Article Five. The basic objective of family insurance is to maintain human dignity, eliminate negative effects on the family and children in the present and future, and put the family in a position where it can help to create a new society with awareness and sincerity.

Article Six. Children are the future of the nation. Therefore, the government looks after the stage of childhood by various means, among them establishment of government homes.

Article Seven. The government is trying to reduce the phenomenon of disability in society, to look after the physically and mentally disabled by strengthening them, qualifying them and encouraging them to work in accordance with their abilities preparatory to assimilating them into society, and to look after those who are totally unable to work from all material, health, social and psychological standpoints.

Article Eight. The social care of the physically and mentally disabled is aimed at realizing the duty of the government and the society toward citizens who are partially able to work or wholly unable to do so, by qualifying them and providing social, medical, psychological, educational, vocational, and cultural services to enable them to overcome the effects which have arisen from their disability.

In its third part, the law talks about children and child care, as follows:

Article 29. First, government houses have the objective of looking after children who suffer from states of family fragmentation or the loss of one or both parents, providing a sound atmosphere for them compensate for the family warmth they have lost, and warding off anything which might make them feel that they have no one to care for them.

Second, the government will provide all housing, clothing and food requirements and pocket expenses for children, young people and youths in accordance with the instructions issued by the chief of the General Social Care Organization.

Article 30. the Department of Social Services of the General Social Care Organization will establish and manage government homes in various parts of the country and will provide all accessories and an adequate number of employees and workers for them.

In the fourth part, the new law discusses the care of disabled persons and declares:

Article 45. Every disabled person has the right to accreditation and care, and the government will perform these services free of charge in accordance with the following principles:

First, accrediting disabled persons and returning them to the activities and professions they engaged in before their disability or qualifying them for other activities and professions which are in keeping with the abilities they still possess and require modern scientific, technical and educational vocational, health, social and intellectual equipment, so that they may play their part in building a socialist society.

Second, qualifying persons with severe disabilities who are partially able to work and orienting them toward protected workshops, productive cooperative societies or any other work places which are compatible with their actual abilities.

Third, care for people who are totally unable to work (the severely disabled or the aged) by establishing social, medical and psychological care centers in which all services are integrated in a manner guaranteeing that a calm dignified life is provided.

Article 46. Every disabled person will have the right to use vocational qualification services by belonging to a vocational qualification unit conforming to the nature of his disability.

The causes justifying the promulgation of this new law declare that, with advancement along the road to socialist construction, the citizen's bonds with society and the government will become firmer, his relations with others will become based on firm, objective foundations, new relations will take the place of tribal, feudal and capitalist ones, raising the status of the individual and the family, giving the trade union, vocational and cooperative organizations in the rural areas and the towns the key role in rearranging social relations, assimilating the individual into the new society gradually and creating a common life in which socialist notions and values will constantly grow and flourish.

While the regulation of material and moral production impose specific tasks upon individuals and groups who are capable of working, the society, as represented by the government, is in turn compelled to provide adequate care, primarily for families with low or nonexistent incomes, children, and the mentally, physically and psychologically disabled and to help them keep abreast of and join the caravan by qualifying them and encouraging them to join in the productive process and exploit the powers they possess.

This law has come about in order to cover classes which are in the most intense need for care, indeed whose inclusion under this care will give the caravan further socialist import and will elevate its status. With progress in the building of socialism, no individuals or groups lacking the social care they deserve will remain in the future.

Health Care

Officials in Iraq devote great attention to health affairs. The most modern hospitals have been established and spread about, along with various clinics and dispensaries, in various areas of the country to provide comprehensive free care to all citizens in accordance with the most modern pharmaceuticals medicine has developed and specialized human staffs.

The last 10 years have witnessed great attention to health care for citizens, especially in rural and poor ordinary areas. The number of

hospitals in 1976 totalled 194, comprising 23,324 beds, and the number of other health institutions, aside from hospitals, came to 2,047, that is, an increase of 19 percent over the figure for 1968. In addition, officials prepared the necessary staffs of doctors, dentists and practitioners of health vocations, and their numbers rose at rates of 58, 61 and 164 percent respectively in 1976 in comparison with the figures prior to the revolution. Thus the ratio of doctors to the population now is one to 2,200 as compared with one to 4,200 in 1968. The ratio of practioners of health vocations totals one per eight hundred inhabitants now as compared with one to 1,700 before the revolution. The necessary requirements have been provided to offer the best services to citizens, and the revolution has given special attention to mother and child care, especially in the rural and ordinary areas of the country.

Iraq has striven to provide medical and treatment services to citizens free of charge or at token fees with the goal of reducing the burden on the poor classes, especially in villages and rural areas.

An Integrated Medical Complex

In addition to the massive medical city in the capital, and other modern institutions in Iraq, the coming year will witness the start of construction of the medical complex buildings in the city of Mosul, covering an area of 250,000 square meters.

The health projects which the General Building Organization is carrying out are now receiving exceptional attention from the organization's technical staffs so that they may be completed by the specified date.

The organization is now building five public hospitals with a capacity of 400 beds each, distributed among the Provinces of Baghdad, Salah-al-Din, Dhi Qar, Irbil, and al-Najaf at a cost of 57.5 dinars.

It is hoped that these hospitals, on which work was started last October, will be completed by the start of 1982.

This month startup on the construction of six other hospitals, also with a capacity of 400 beds, apportioned to the Provinces of Baghdad, al-Anbar, al-Muthanna, al-Qadisiyah, al-Ta'mim and Wasit, will be announced.

Improvement in Education

The educational stage and institutions have passed through a major process of improvement on the qualitative and quantitative levels. Among the most prominent of these achievements has been the decree making education free at all levels and applying compulsory education to provide all citizens with opportunities for education. Higher and vocational education have received the care and attention which will place them at the service of constructing the new man and strong comprehensive development.

Investments allotted to the education sector have increased from 78 million dinars in the 1970-75 plan to about 726 million in the 1976-80 plan--that is, by 831 percent.

Students in all educational stages in Iraq in the 1979-80 year totalled 3,752,250, of which 70,418 were children in kindergartens, 2,608,933 were pupils in the primary stage, 897,700 were students in the secondary stage, 54,026 were students in vocational education, and 22,761 were in homes and institutes train male and female teachers. University students totalled about 100,000, distributed among six universities in various areas of Iraq. The number of students in higher studies came to about 2,200. Preparations are being made to construct the al-Rashid University in Baghdad and the Islamic University in al-Najaf.

As regards al-Rashid University, the startup of work on advanced designs will begin soon. Invitations have been sent to a number of specialized international consulting firms to offer preliminary design ideas to choose one of these international firms to participate with the National Center to carry out advanced designs which respond to scientific and traditional developments for this university and to introduce the best construction systems and service layouts to it, as well as making the Arab and Islamic nature of the building complex and its distribution stand out.

This university will be distinguished from other Iraqi universities in that it will accept 15,000 male and female students and may be expanded and enlarged to accommodate 20,000, including higher studies.

38,000 in Universities and Institutes

In the coming academic year, 1980-81, 38,160 male and female students will enter the universities, the technical institutes organization and the higher institutes of health.

In the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research plan for the coming academic year, which was recently approved by the Council of Ministers, consideration has been given to the indices of the Ministry of Education up to academic year 1983-84 and the Ministry of Planning on the national development plan requirements for qualified staffs up to 1985.

In other university areas, the Higher Committee for Attention to Arabic Language Affairs recently approved the final formats for admission of students into Arabic language departments in Iraqi universities, starting with the coming academic year.

The committee determined that linguistic ability, talent and desire would be the bases for preference among students applying to these departments, in order to guarantee that a strong base will be provided for training Arabic language instructors and language leaders capable of seriously participating in improving language performance among students.

The committee also approved the opening of special language courses in government organizations to raise the capability of people employed in them, especially as regards composition of official letters and the avoidance of mistakes in their places of work.

In Iraq's celebrations of the 17 July revolution these days, the inauguration of the Technological Institute and the boarding areas attached to it is taking place in the Province of Nineveh; this cost 11,236,000 dinars.

The project comprises 26 main buildings, including administration buildings, an auditorium, and classroom buildings, in addition to rooms for professors, department heads, laboratories, a modern library, a movie room, a stage and many other installations.

Eradication of Illiteracy

In the sphere of elimination of backwardness and the upsurge of national development, Iraq has decided to eliminate and eradicate illiteracy. On 1 December 1978, the organization of a broad compulsory anti-illiteracy campaign was begun. The government consecrated all its attention to making it succeed. This campaign is aimed at abolishing illiteracy among 2,212,630 Iraqi citizens, accounting for 19.3 percent of the total population. Peasants and workers make up a large percent of them.

The campaign is 36 months long. Students join it in two shifts, each of which is of two sessions, in which the students receive lessons in reading, arithmetic, and general culture, including lessons which will help them implant the skills which they have acquired. At present there are 26,726 centers in which all the necessary ingredients for making the plan a success are present. Almost all those who have been enrolled in the plan have graduated and will enter ordinary schools at the fourth grade primary level. This cultural experiment has been studied by researchers at Baghdad University and it has become a prominent one, by the acknowledgment of Unesco, which gave Iraq a badge of appreciation in this field last year.

Allocations allotted to the plan came to 66,951,000 dinars, along with annual allocations of 1,695,000 dinars, or from 26 to 260 dinars per student.

The first of the comprehensive compulsory anti-illiteracy campaign stages has ended, represented by the base and complementary stages, and the second and final stage, the ordinary school or cultural education stage, for which Iraq is distintuished, will begin.

In the ordinary school plan provision has been made for a 22-month period in which instruction will be in three stages: the fourth grade stage, followed by the complementary stage, 7 months long, then the fifth grade stage, also 7 months long, and the sixth grade stage 8 months long, within a special curriculum for each of these stages.

The ordinary schools have the objective of achieving five main points:

1. Establishing basic reading, writing and computation skills in a manner guaranteeing that they are adopted as a means to develop personality and vocation.

2. Strengthening the self-confidence of the citizen and his confidence in his abilities, implanting national, domestic and socialist notions in work and life.

3. Enabling citizens to grow inwardly in a manner enabling them to continue to learn, develop their skills, abilities and tendencies, and use this to build society.

4. Forming new values, customs and practices among citizens in a manner harmonious with the goals of the revolution.

5. Achieving a total marriage between knowledge, skills and the requirements of the vocation.

The number of people enrolled in the ordinary schools, which began officially on 1 March 1980,was estimated by the end of March at about 1.7 million male and female students, including people included under followup programs, and there are about 76,000 male and female teachers attending the centers and ordinary schools in all areas of the country.

A Dwelling for Every Citizen

In the context of the other numerous services which the government provides for its citizens, planning is being made to have every Iraqi have a clean dwelling. Among the new actions in this sphere, citizens in Baghdad and other provinces of Iraq will receive 8,000 housing units which are now being constructed by the General Housing Organization, along with public service projects for these residential sections, by the end of this year.

Construction of these housing units is taking place within integrated service districts which include paving, water, sewers, electricity, parks, open areas, shops, health centers, schools of various stages, telephones, and so forth; this is taking place as part of the provision of suitable housing for citizens in various areas of the country.

Mr Muhammad Fadl Husayn, Iraqi minister of housing and construction, states that the exceptional concern for the housing sector is being realized through the adoption and authorization of scientific programmed planning which has the objective of providing suitable housing for every citizen, so that he may take effective part in implanting society, and offering him and his family happiness and confidence. This goal is the cornerstone of housing policy.

He adds, "The amount of work we are anticipating is represented by the construction of approximately 3.38 million new housing units of various types, in addition to improving and maintaining about 255,000 housing units existing now, in the next 20 years, while preserving the existing housing stock, considering that a national resource which must be preserved and developed."

The total housing units to be constructed this year, as listed in the General Housing Organization plan, come to 34,756 housing units with a total cost of 450 million dinars, including services.

Among these units, distributed among all the provinces, there are 546 housing units being built by prefabricated methods. The services which will accompany the construction of the housing units are inner and outer road systems, large waterworks, electricity, schools of different types, central markets, kindergartens, health centers, mosques, green areas, and children's playgrounds.

Recently 22,497 housing plots were set out in the province of Babil, preparatory to the distribution of deeds for them to citizens in stages during the current year.

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NATION'S MASSIVE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS REVIEWED

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 17 Jul 80 p 10

/Article: "Big Industrial Projects Are Turning Iraq into an Advanced Country"/

/Text/ In this industrial era, which is raising the developing countries to the ranks of the advanced ones, Iraq is trying to establish an industrial base which it will be able to rely on in building a strong national economy, where production and exports will be diversified for the sake of strengthening economic independence, responding to the needs of development, and providing the maximum possible manufactured goods for production and consumption purposes in all sectors.

Thus Iraq entered the sphere of strategic heavy industries, and the current development plan (1976-80) is aimed at developing transformation industries supplied with technology, and reducing dependence on crude oil from about 88 percent in 1976 to 79.8 percent in 1980.

Total allocations to the industrial sector in the investment program for the year 1977 came to about 966 million dinars and the value of industrial output in 1978 came to a total of 851.63 million dinars, 234.6 million dinars of which were for the private sector.

Numerous strategic industrial projects were carried out in the last two years, including the chemical fertilizer (urea) project with a capacity of 1 million tons per year;

The petrochemical complex, with a capacity of 150,000 tons of plastics per year;

The iron and steel complex, with a capacity of 1.2 million tons of sponge iron and 400,000 tons of steel products per year;

And, in addition, numerous projects in the sphere of the oil, textile, and other transformational industries.

Massive Projects Transform Iraq into an Advanced Country

The coming 5-year plan (1981-85) represents a qualitative transformation in Iraqi industry, as it will primarily be based on a policy of industrialization and the avoidance of assembly in the industrial process.

Mr Tahir Tawfiq, minister of industry and mines, states that this plan includes a number of giant strategic projects in addition to expansions in a number of existing projects, as imposed by the country's pressing needs and the dimensions of the current national development plan in general.

Implementation of the coming 5-year plan projects will be apportioned within a time ceiling to be specified in accordance with their importance and the objective circumstances which Iraq and the Arab nation are going through and in harmonious balance with the basic needs of the Iraqi people. In addition, the orientation within the industrial situation, in the context of this plan, will attempt to create some heavy industries such as automobile and tractor manufacture, implant the technology of this industry, and train personnel who will absorb and develop this technology.

In addition, transformational industries will witness great development and expansion in the production of chemical, phosphate, and compound nitrogenous fertilizers which will help develop the agricultural sector. The petrochemical (plastics) industries and industries related to them will occupy an important aspect of development during the coming 5-year plan and the establishment of projects related to machine manufacturing industries, which will contribute to the process of technology transfer and implantation.

In the sphere of electric power generation, Iraqi rural electrification and the provision of electrical requirements for purposes of industrial and household consumption throughout the country is progressing toward completion.

Development of Old Industries

The minister points out that the ministry has determined to develop some old industries and upgrade their type of output to a level which will realize /the country's/ ambitions, in view of the accumulation of a good amount of expertise and knowledge regarding their output, marketing and durability, such as the textile and foodstuffs industries.

This, in general, concerns the projects for the coming years. Their status in the national development plan proceeds in principle from the development ideology in the country, which is focused on the establishment of a firm industrial base, creation of a developed, multifaceted economy, and the reduction of dependence on oil; as a consequence, the industrial projects will possess importance in the national development plan.

As regards the industrial status of the nation of Iraq, relative to the Arab countries and the developing countries, Mr Tahir Tawfiq stated that this matter is determined in terms of the criteria of comparison. From the standpoint of the volume of industrial investments, manpower employment, and value added, Iraq is to be considered advanced, and on the international level Iraq will shorten the time gap in the coming plan and will be transformed from a developing country to an advanced one as a result of the international growth rates which the coming plan will exclusively enjoy, in view of the giant strategic projects it contains.

The Coming Plan Is an Extension of the Past One

Concerning industrial achievements in the current 5-year plan, which is on the verge of being completed, the minister said that this plan was a historic extension of and complement to the plan that preceded it, but is distinguished by qualitative changes from the standpoint of content and execution. Its reliance has basically been on the general developmental trend, which proceeds from the economic and social changes created by the increase in revenues available for development following the act of the nationalization of Iraqi oil and the increases which have occurred in oil prices through the current five-year plan. With a comparative glance at previous plans, it is clear that there has been growth in investments and in the value of production.

We can define the rate of development in the value of production between 1976-80 and 1980 (planned, not actual) as follows: textile industries, 0.016, food industries, 0.0210, construction industries, 0.0276, chemical industries, 0.047, extraction industries, 0.0117, electric industries, 0.0428, total rate of development, 0.0201.

The figures in general seem to us to be acceptable, since progress has been realized in the basic industries, those which are considered the core and basic focus of industrial development, such as electric power generation, machinery industries, and extraction and construction industries.

The bases and ingredients the ministry has relied on for the industrialization process in the current 5-year plan have concentrated on all aspects of the national economy through scientific planning programmed through the execution of plan projects in a manner which will ensure their success and the construction of an industrial base in the country within the framework of a versatile economy.

In addition, attention is being focused on development of the industrial sector and the elimination of all obstacles facing it, in order to bring the quality of production up to the level of the ambitions contained in the current plan, in accordance with new formulas, with the goal of increasing the productivity of labor and investment.

New Industries

Among the important strategic industries which are being carried out now, there is the 'Akashat project, which consists of two main sections, first the phosphate mine project and road leading to it, where the percentage completion up to the end of last year came to 78 percent, and second the project of the chemical complex in al-Qa'im, where the percentage of completion at the end of that period came to 46 percent. The Ministry of Industry is also constructing two integrated residential towns to house people belonging to the project at the site of the mine in 'Akashat and the site of the complex in al-Qa'im; the rate of completion is 5 percent.

The petrochemical complex project is important strategic; the completion rate in that totalled 91 percent by the end of last February. Operation has started on the service units to produce industrial water, nitrogen gas and so forth. Operation started on the main unit last month and it is hoped that that will be completed in final form and put into commercial operation at the end of this year. As regards the paper mill in Maysan, the project has been completed and is in the preliminary stages involving test operation.

There is the project on the iron and steel complex, which is considered the firm base of heavy industry in Iraq. This includes:

The semi-integrated iron project; test operation has started successfully on all sections of this text. That is in the preliminary production stage, and its annual design capacity totals 400,000 tons of round reinforcement rods, (al-Rasitah) iron, angles and water wheels.

The sponge iron project, which includes the small unit with a capacity of 440,000 tons per year; this will be the primary material for the semi-integrated iron project, and test startup began at the end of last March.

Regarding the major unit, whose design capacity totals 750,000 tons of sponge iron per year, most of the work is on the verge of completion and it is hoped that its test operation will begin at the end of this year after some technical problems are overcome in coordination with the contracting company.

Progress in Oil

Oil production gradually increased from 1,465,000,000 barrels (75 million tons) per year in the year of nationalization (1972) to 3.45 billion barrels (175 million tons) last year , 1979. Proved reserves increased several times since nationalization as a consequence of the exploration and development activities pursued by national agencies relying on Iraqi staffs.

Control over oil production is now subject to considerations of national development requirements, first, and the requirements of fraternal Arab

countries, friendly countries and those in the developing world in particular.

Iraq is now striving to make radical changes in its economic structure, to transform it from a one-sided economy depending on oil as a basic source of financing to an economy with diverse revenues and a firm industrial and agricultural base, by following a policy of linking oil production and revenues to development needs on the one hand and creating new sources which are by nature long-lasting.

At the start of last month, Iraq celebrated the anniversary of the nationalization of oil and transfer of ownership of Iraq Petroleum Company to the state, making Iraq the first third world country to dominate its oil resources in full, giving other oil countries scope to emulate its experiences in the realm of oil production and marketing beneficially.

After some months of deprivation, during which Iraqi management proved great skill in oil production and marketing, Iraq began to reap the fruits of its great victory, since the oil sector became inforporated into the overall domestic economy, greatly helping development plans which turned Iraq into a broad workshop, in addition to the massive financial aid which it offered Arab countries and third world countries.

Iraq, through the Iraq Foreign Development Fund, which provides facilities, loans and aid to developing countries and through bilateral agreements, has offered more than $1.5 billion in 1 year, in addition to effective contributions to numerous joint development funds such as the Special OPEC Fund and others.

Iraq has also committed itself to implementing its special proposal to aid developing countries unilaterally during the past 7 months of the past year, offering countries contracting to buy oil from it $254 million in discounts off from official surcharge adjustments introduced into prices of Iraqi oil during this period. This means that the increase in Iraqi oil prices has not added to the burden of the developing countries, because it is continuing to make strides in its programs to aid these countries.

New Projects

The General Agency for Oil Construction in Iraq has begun to carry out a group of oil projects whose costs come to 20 million dinars.

The new projects include five massive oil tanks in the areas of al-Mushahidah, Hamam al-'Alil, Kirkuk, al-Karkh and al-Rusafah, development of the al-Mishrif oilfield at South Rumaila, a central garage in al-Mada'in, and the laying of a broad oil pipeline system in Basra and al-Bayji.

Next year work will begin on construction of an important strategic petrochemical project in Nineveh Province.

Next September Petrochemical Complex Number One in the Province of Basra will offer its new petrochemical product output for the first time. The first sections in the complex have started primary operation and these were followed 3 months later by the productive units, preparatory to full operation.

The complex has been planned in accordance with the most modern international designs to produce 150,000 tons of plastic products per year, broken down into 60,000 tons of ABS, 30,000 tons of high density polyethylene, 60,000 tons of low density polyethylene, and 42,000 tons of caustic soda.

The complex's new products will meet Iraq's requirements for materials involved in the construction of plastic pipe, electric cables and household equipment and appliances.

Development of Oilfields

It was recently decided to form a Supreme Technical Committee under the chairmanship of Mr Tayih 'Abd-al-Karim, minister of oil, to take charge of adopting the measures necessary to study, design and implement projects to develop the al-Halfayah, Majnun, Nahran 'Umar, West al-Qurnah, and East Baghdad oilfields of the National Oil Company in the quickest, most appropriate possible ways.

The decree stipulates that all the fields the committee develops or supervises under the provisions of the Major Projects Implementation Law No 157 for the Year 1973 are to be developed and will enjoy all the privileges and exemptions listed in Article Six of the law. The committee may exempt some projects it does not consider essential from application of this law.

The committee includes, as members, the undersecretary of oil for organization affairs, the president of the National Oil Company, the chairman of the General Southern Oil Organization, the chairman of the General Northern Oil Organization, and one or more persons possessing expertise or specialized background in financing, law and engineering.

The decree also stipulates the formation of a projects department within the organizations of the National Oil Company headquarters which will take charge of performing general supervision over the various necessary works and activities for the implementation of development projects, coordinating with the executive organizations and departments, assigning the Planning Council powers stipulated in the instructions and powers bearing on implementation of the annual plan for 1980 and the powers of the board of directors of the Iraq National Oil Company, and assigning any organization or department belonging to the Ministry of Oil to implement any activity in projects to develop fields.

In addition, Iraq National Oil Company recently signed a contract with an Italian company to develop an important new oilfield in the country.

The contract is aimed at developing the field in integrated fashion to exploit its oil and gas reserves simultaneously in short time frames.

The two parties will cooperate intensively in carrying out reservoir and engineering studies and determining rates of field crude oil and gas production and the size and volume of surface installations preparatory to inviting international engineering firms to supply the equipment and carry out installation activities.

Development of the field lies within a carefully studied plan, and a group of matters have been considered within it, such as the proximity of fields currently producing, their processing facilities, pipelines, tanks, pump stations and loading docks, in order to make use of them and merge crude oil and gas production from the new field into the production of operating fields in accordance with principles which are being relied on for the first time in the country.

The field development process will rely on the technique of secondary recovery from the anticlines by injecting water into the formations to remove the crude oil and increase its flow into the wells, starting with the initial production stages, in order to extend the life of the oil trap.

Agriculture Is Permanent Oil

In addition to industry and oil, agriculture receives great attention in Iraq. Since the July revolution, the volume of agricultural investments, especially after the oil nationalization act of 1972, has increased: the agricultural sector's share in1977 alone totalled 389,877,000 dinars while the sum of 366 million dinars was allotted to the sector during the years of the 5-year plan (1970-1974).

Agriculture in Iraq is dominated by the mode of cooperative production, collective farms, and state farms, in addition to the private sector. The number of peasant cooperative societies came to 1,987 last year and the number of collective farms to 79 in 1978.

Expansion has occurred in the use of mechanization in the agricultural production process. The standard of living of inhabitants of rural areas has risen noticeably, which has led to a reduction in the difference between them and those in the towns.

In the field of irrigation, modern technology in the transmission and use of water and preservation of water quality has expanded and the application of sprinkler and drip irrigation has been applied in many government agricultural projects. There is a tendency to apply the automatic operation of irrigation projects generally, and in the 5-year plan for 1981-85 work

will start on reclamation of 2,054,000 donums of agricultural land and construction of irrigation and drainage systems for other projects. Massive dams will be built, such as the Mosul, Hadithah, and Hamrin dams, the latter of which will be inaugurated this month.

Recently sources in the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform announced that the reclaimed areas the ministry has completed and on which it is expected to complete construction activities at the end of the current year come to about 900,000 donums.

The source stated that of these lands an area of 540,000 donums will be delivered; they will be distributed among a number of agricultural projects so they may be exploited in agricultural production activities in the coming production plan.

They mentioned that the remaining area of this group of land, totalling 360,000 donums, is now in the stage of leaching, planting and other supplementary activities.

University Research To Evaluate Agricultural Projects

The Ministry of Agriculture recently formed a committee to supervise and coordinate activity with university teams so they would continue their research activity bearing on the subdivision of agricultural projects.

The university has requested all agricultural organizations, installations and committees to address themselves to the committee on all problems and obstacles requiring study, with the objective of coordinating with the university teams to remedy them and establish the necessary criteria for them.

The ministry will give compensation for the accomplishments these teams make in the context of their study of remedying the work obstacles and development of productive processes in agricultural projects.

The Plan To Develop Fruit Production In the Next 5 Years

The plan includes the establishment of orchards over 96,000 donums, 75 percent of which will be peasant cooperative society and private sector lands; the rest of the area will be distributed to the lands of agricultural agencies state farms, the General Orchard Committee, the General Forest Committee and the Kirkuk Irrigation Project.

By virtue of the new plan, the irrigated orchard area in 1985 will rise to 780,000 donums from 688,000, and the area of unirrigated orchards that year to 50,000 donums from 46,000.

The plan has stressed the production of 24.9 million deciduous fruit tree seedlings, 2.6 million olive seedlings, 7 million citrus seedlings,

200,000 trees citrus origin, and 15 million trees deciduous fruit origin.

In another area, 300 greenhouses are to be built in a number of agricultural projects, schools and institutes in the province to grow vegetables.

The number of technical institutes in Iraq in the coming academic year will rise to 24, now that the Technical Institute Organization opened five new agricultural and technical institutes this year.

$990 Million for Irrigation Projects

In the context of irrigation, the ministry is preparing detailed studies and necessary designs and surveys for the construction of 22 small storage and dam projects on the Tigris River and tributaries and watercourses in the autonomous region.

The government has allocated $990 million to the construction of irrigation projects and land reclamation projects this year.

The plan this year included the construction of the Mosul Dam in northern Iraq, with a storage capacity of up to 12.8 million cubic meters of water per year, and completion of the Bukhmah dam with a capacity of 8.3 million cubic meters of water per year.

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POLL EVALUATES PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MINISTERS

TA011250 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Oct 80 p 19

[Fourth in a series entitled "Election Forecast" by pollster Hanokh Smith: "The Ministers Received a Lower 'Rating' Than the Coalition; Hammer Leads With 57 Percent, Hurvitz Dropped But is Still Popular"]

[Text] The president of the state, Yitzhaq Navon, is above everyday politics in Israel, but he is also above everyone else in terms of his personal popularity. Our poll, conducted between August and September, indicated that 93 percent of those polled believe he is either good or very good as president, and 80 percent think he is very good. This is a unique achievement in our political life.

The prime minister is the ruling personality in the Israeli government, but the auxiliary team of ministers also plays a part in shaping the public's view of the government's overall functioning.

The "Smith Research Center" polls asked the public to periodically evaluate the performance of certain ministers. One must, however, be careful in interpreting these ratings--which are very limited--particularly on the professional plain. The public does not normally have close contact with the ministers, nor is it in a position which would enable it to objectively assess that rating. The public sees the ministers mainly through the eyes of the media or through a much lower level of contact with the government ministers. This, also, has to do with what happens to the ministers and the public in reality in view of cabinet resolutions. The public's rating of the ministers is thus a function of their overall rating as part of the government's performance and that is why one should not attach too much significance to these evaluations. A minister who does his job properly and quietly might--perhaps because he does not make the headlines--receive a rating lower than a minister who is always subject to public scrutiny and who does not adequately perform his job.

The best way to evaluate ministers could perhaps be to examine to what extent their reputation is higher or lower than the number of votes the government coalition received in the poll in question. First let us review the areas of defense and foreign policy, which have traditionally been the fields deeply involving the prime minister.

No doubt the prime minister has lost allies by the resignation of Moshe Dayan and 'Ezer Weizman. It appears that Yitzhaq Shamir has not yet gained wide public support. The following is the percentage marked in four polls:

The Reputation of the Foreign Ministers and the Defense Minister

[Figures in Percentages]

	Dayan as Foreign Minister	Shamir as Foreign Minister	Weizman as Defense Minister
May 1979	67	--	79
Sep 1979	55	--	76
Feb-Mar 1980	--	--	64
Aug-Sep 1980	--	20	--

Both Dayan and Weizman received good ratings by a large share of the opposition and the undecideds alike. Prior to their resignation, both were involved in an argument or some sort of dispute that cost them some loss of public support even before they resigned. However, the findings indicate that Shamir has not won over the public and that some portion of the loss of confidence in the government regarding its handling of foreign affairs and its security policy should be attributed to the resignation of these two popular ministers.

Whereas the Begin government lost public support when Dayan and Weizman resigned, it gained--at least temporarily--from Yiga'el Hurvitz' joining it.

The role of finance minister is usually the most unpopular in Israel. When Pinhas Sapir was finance minister, he was always the least popular among the front-line ministers. Even during the days of Golda Me'ir only 32 to 42 percent evaluated him as a good finance minister. The fate of his predecessors was much worse. Yehoshu'a Rabinowitz, Rabin's finance minister, was assessed in 1977 as being a good finance minister by only 12 to 15 percent, whereas Simha Ehrlich received even less than that in 1979. The finance minister has always occupied the lowest rung on the ladder of cabinet ministers' rating.

Yiga'el Hurvitz changed all this. His energetic approach first gained remarkable public agreement. The February-March poll was conducted almost 5 months after he took office. He may have been over the peak of his support by then, but he was still very popular. To the question of "Do you believe Yiga'el Hurvitz' economic plan could curb inflation?" about 18 percent replied that he would clearly succeed and 32 percent thought that he would at least have partial success. All in all, 50 percent of the population thought that he would be at least somewhat successful. His personal rating was, considering that he is finance minister, still very high: 44 percent thought he was doing a good job.

Now, 6 months later, the enthusiasm is gone. Replying to the same question now, only 10 percent replied in the affirmative and another 25 percent thought that he will have some success. Compared with the rate of 50 percent of the population believing that he will at least have some success as per the February-March poll, only a little more than one-third of the public currently believes he will succeed even partially.

His personal rating, too, went down, although not as much. It declined to 36 percent, which is still a high rating for a finance minister. The poll's findings even show that his personal popularity exceeds the success of his policy. At the same time, the two are interconnected. The loss of confidence in the economic policy certainly strengthened the process of the decline of the "Likud's" popularity in the public opinion polls and the 4-percent decline--from 18 to 14--in the percentage of those who thought the government's economic policy was successful.

Yiga'el Hurvitz' diminished popularity between the February-March and the August-September polls was coupled with a steep decline in the popularity of housing, construction and absorption minister David Levi, who enjoyed sympathy from the ranks of people who did not support the coalition as well. The February-March support indicated that 47 percent of the people interviewed thought he was doing a good job. In the last poll, that figure declined by 11 percent, reaching 36 percent.

All the other Likud and DMC [as published] ministers whose status was polled received a relatively low rating. Here are some of the results:

The Prestige of Other Cabinet Ministers

The Minister	The Date of the Poll	Percentage of Those Who Believe He Is A Good Minister
Likud:		
Ehrlich--Finance	May 1979	10
Pat--Commerce, Tourism and Industry	Feb-Mar 1980	15
Moda'i--Energy and Infrastructure	Aug-Sep 1980	22
Sharon--Agriculture	Feb-Mar 1980	26
DMC:		
Yadin--Deputy Prime Minister	Sep 1979	27
Katz--Labor and Welfare	Mar 1979	24
NRP:		
Burg--Interior	Sep 1979	27
Hammer--Education and Culture	Aug-Sep 1980	57

In general, both the Likud and the DMC ministers received a much lower rating than the percentage of people who would vote for a coalition party. Of special interest is Yiga'el Yadin. Whereas 26 percent of all those polled in the September 1979 poll thought he was doing his job well, only 3 percent of those who voted for the DMC in 1977 held that view. Yisra'el Katz' situation was slightly better.

Again, the religious ministers fared better. In September 1979, Yosef Burg received 38 percent whereas, in the last poll, 57 percent expressed their view that Zvulun Hammer was doing a good job as education minister. Thus, according to the last poll, he was the minister who received the highest rating vis-a-vis his performance.

The results of the above poll might hint that the Israeli public has recently been particularly harsh toward the political leaders. However, Hammer's high rating could contradict this. Moreover, even now it is possible to attain such high ratings as Golda Me'ir did prior to the Yom Kippur war.

When we look at the ruling ministerial team, Prime Minister Begin stands out from among the Likud ministers as the one who arouses relative satisfaction with respect to the fulfillment of his job. The disappearance of Dayan and Weizman from the defense and foreign affairs fields was not countered by the emergence of anyone popular. The greatest reinforcement in the last year was Yiga'el Hurvitz, who first received a large measure of public support but, according to the latest poll, seems to receive waning public backing. The other relatively popular minister from among those listed, David Levi, suffered a steep decline in public support over the last few months. None of the Likud or DMC ministers seem to attract wide support.

One can, of course, argue that these polls merely exemplify the assessment of ministers at a certain time whereas more extensive polls could provide different results. This is undoubtedly true, but such an exercise might overrate the significance of the personal factor. The above examples indeed give a valid picture of how the public reacts to prominent ministers.

In the last article I wrote that the percentages of people who thought that the government was generally successful or largely successful went down from 25 to 17 percent in 12 months whereas the part of those who would not vote for a coalition government decreased, over the same period, from 35 to 30 percent. Most of the ministers assessed vis-a-vis the performance of their jobs received ratings lower than the coalition as a whole. This certainly does not mean that they are the cause of the decrease, but it indicates that they are not likely to contribute in the way of overturning the trends as the election time approaches. Few ministers of public support could help the prime minister in the difficult task of obtaining massive support again at the 1981 election.

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SHARON PREFERRED AS DEFENSE MINISTER IN ISRAELI POLL

TA011232 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Oct 80 p 10

[Pori public opinion poll: "Sharon--the Preferred Candidate for the Defense Minister's Post"]

[Text] Ari'el Sharon is the preferred candidate for defense minister, much more than all other candidates. This is the finding of the nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute and commissioned by HA'ARETZ.

On the question, "In your opinion, who should be defense minister," Ari'el Sharon received 30.2 percent of the vote. A distant second is 'Ezer Weizman with 19.4 percent. The prime minister's candidates for this post, Professor Arens and Foreign Minister Shamir, received a very small number of votes. Arens received 3.5 percent and Shamir only 0.8 percent.

Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori, who demands the defense portfolio, received only 1.7 percent. Moshe Dayan is still enjoying some popularity and 4.5 percent want him as defense minister.

Other personalities chosen by those polled were Yitzhaq Rabin (3.1 percent), Shim'on Peres (1.4 percent) and Hayim Bar-lev (1.1 percent). Chief of staff Refa'el Eytan, Yiga'el Yadin, Hayim Herzog, Mordekhay Gur and Matityahu Peled received less than 1 percent each.

Prime Minister Begin, who holds the defense portfolio, is viewed as suitable for this job by only 1.7 percent.

An analysis of the findings according to Likud and Alignment voters indicates that 47.6 percent of the Likud voters support Sharon for defense minister, in contrast with only 12 percent who support Weizman; while 26.8 percent of the Alignment voters back Weizman, as compared with 24.7 percent who back Sharon.

An analysis of the findings according to social strata indicates that support for Sharon is especially strong among young people who were born in Israel and people with less education or of Asian and African origin; whereas support for Weizman is particularly strong among women, middle aged people, veterans and people with higher education or people of U.S. and European origin.

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COMMANDER COMMENTS ON ARMY SIZE

TA011229 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 1 Oct 80 pp 11, 14

[Interview granted by Israeli commander of the southern command, Maj Gen Dan Shomron with military correspondent Ze'ev Schiff; date and place not given]

[Excerpts] Question: Do you not think that we can reduce the size of the regular army?

Answer: I am in favor of reducing the size of the career army but against reducing the fighting power of the regular army. I will explain what I mean. One must not cut down the regular army when we are faced with a situation where the opposite side has such large regular armies. The regular army plays a central role in any kind of a surprise war. Any other solution may paralyze a large economic potential due to the need for reserve forces on a permanent basis. In addition, the security policy is mainly intended to deter--to prevent war. The smaller the regular force, the more the danger that this deterrance will be impaired. Nevertheless, since IDF is mainly a reserve army we have many regular army commands--commands without forces with stockpiles--so that a very large part commands stockpiles and lacks power.

Question: Will a cut in the number of commands lead to dismissals in the career army?

Answer: In my opinion, yes, of course. The size of the career army grows yearly. I accept what Minister Sharon says on the issue of cutting back on the number of career army personnel.

Question: Do you favor the view that standards of manpower will not be set in the IDF but will be dictated to the army as in the United States?

Answer: I am seriously inclined to think so. I will accept this if this is carried out with negotiations, explanations and bargaining. A country that allots such a large budget for security may demand to know how this budget is spent.

Question: From your remarks one can understand that the general headquarters has, over time outgrown the desirable proportions. Is this true?

Answer: Yes, and unnecessarily. I was told that it was not only the general headquarters but the army as well that has grown. This is true but one had better take a look at the increase in the number of officers and their ranks. When the units grow larger most of the officers should be on the lieutenant and captain levels since this is the major section. It seems however, that since 1973 the number of captains has become seven times as great while the number of brigadier generals has increased by about 100 percent. I am not at all referring to the addition of personnel over and above the manpower standards. The standards themselves manifest terrible irregularities and they are unrealistic. In my opinion there is no connection between the rise in the size of the army and that of the general headquarters just as one should not enlarge the brigade or the battalion command when another company joins the brigade. One should then add a company commander.

Question: In other words, you are for a reduction in the number of the career army officers.

Answer: Not only the officers. The career army has many master sergeants as well as many officials and drivers. If you ask me about the technical level, here too cuts can be introduced as a great many of the emergency stockpile units are being turned over to the ground forces stockpiling system.

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DEBATE ON JORDANIAN OPTION IGNORES PLO ROLE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Aug 80 p 14

[Article by Yehudah Litani: "On the Road of All the Terrible Stations; Anyone Who Thinks Settlements in the West Bank Can Be Removed by Words, Threats, or Even by Military Force, Ignores the Mood in Those Settlements; Those Who Are Endlessly Repeating the Magic Words 'Jordanian Option' Must Accept the New Reality Which Means Cooperation With the PLO"]

[Text] In the debate which took place on Wednesday at the Van Leer Institute on the subject "Israeli Policy in the Territories--Past and Future," Yehoshua Porat of the Hebrew University said that, in his opinion, a correct understanding of the situation should have impelled Israel to avoid succumbing to the temptation of conquering the West Bank. According to Porat, the conquest of the West Bank has halted the Jordanization process, a positive process from Israel's standpoint, in that it took out the sting of the Palestinian problem through a natural process. If we had been aware of this important process which was taking place among the Palestinians on both sides of the Jordan, in that the refugee camps in Amman and in the West Bank's cities were becoming an integral part of the cities, and that Palestinians were becoming progressively integrated in Jordan, we would have not been tempted to conquer the West Bank. He said that we had known about it, and that the British ambassador to Jordan spoke of it publicly until the war broke out.

So much for the past. As for the future, all the participants in the debate agreed, each in his own way, that Israel's most desirable option is the Jordanian.

Prof Amnon Cohen of the Hebrew University said in the debate that Israel should not "play into the hands" of Jordan. Jordan must not be shown that it is the only option. It should be made to see that there are other options. Menahem, also of the Hebrew University, said that Israel must reward the more pragmatic leaders in the territories, those who are willing to cooperate with Israel on the Jordanian option and territorial concessions, and give nothing to or even impose sanctions on those leaders who refuse to recognize Israel's existence. He spoke for direct

involvement of Israel in the territories by way of supporting pragmatic leaders, thus helping them disassociate themselves from the PLO.

Prof Amnon Cohen spoke against this approach and said that "artificial leaders cannot be cultivated in the long run." Tzvi Alpeleg of Tel Aviv University argued in the debate against Israel's seesaw policy in the territories--now in favor of Jordan and now against it, now assisting the PLO and now punishing its supporters. He said that he accepted the Jordanian option. Professor Porat argued that Israel had worked consistently against the Jordanian option and against the pro-Jordanians in the territories since 1967, and quoted retired Maj Gen Rifa'el Vardi, former operations coordinator in the territories and commander of the West Bank.

The organizers of the debate did not include in the panel anyone who advocates other options on both sides of the Jordanian option--the Palestinian or PLO option and the Israeli option which favors annexation of the West Bank and Gaza by Israel. The panelists expressed opinions before an audience which is well versed in the subject as if the year were 1970 rather than 1980, 10 years later. During those 10 years many facts have changed. There are no longer few settlements in the Jordan Valley and in the Etzion Bloc, but rather settlements of varying sizes in different parts of the West Bank and, to a lesser extent, in the Gaza Strip. Although the number of Israeli settlers in the territories is not impressive (11-12 thousand in the West Band), the new reality in the area is a stumbling block to any serious attempt to negotiate with Jordan, with the Palestinians, or--the most likely possibility--with both.

Permanent Construction

With the idea that this is the last year of the Likud government, Minister of Agriculture Ariq Sharon is working diligently to increase the number of settlements, to expand the permanent construction, to add hundreds of dunhams to settlements on the West Bank. All of which, in his words, is designed to foil any plan of returning any part of the land of Israel to any outsider and prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state.

This month hundreds of dunams (400) were expropriated from residents of the villages of Dir Al Hatib near Alon Moreh to pave a bypass road to the settlement. The road is already being built. The first settlement established in Samaria, Kadumin (alias Kadum, or Alon Moreh; to avoid confusion it should be pointed that the settlers of Alon Moreh lived first in Kadum, moved to Alon Moreh on the lands of the village of Rujayb, and after they were evacuated were forced to relocate to Mount Kabir. The settlement there is now called Alon Moreh, and is the only Alon Moreh), is now adding a new, permanent construction section, on an area of 100 dunams which were recently given to the settlement (by the committee for examining the status of lands in the settlements, headed by Minister Sharon).

The Shave Shomron settlement is also adding a new permanent section. In Alon Moreh on Mount Kabir, land is being cleared for industial plants. In the Shiloh settlement where the settlers first came as an "archeological expedition," the settlers are getting ready to build permanent structures instead of the "do it yourself" type. Only to mention a few examples.

On the other side of the fence, in recent years the prestige of the leaders who support the PLO has gone up in the territories, and it can be said that it has skyrocketed. Anyone who saw the royal treatment which was accorded Bassam Shak'a, the wounded mayor of Nablus, when he came to East Jerusalem (to visit the relatives of the Nafha jail prisoners who are striking at the Red Cross in the eastern part of the city), could understand the status of this leadership. Even Shaykh Ali Jabri was not welcomed in this manner in his own town, Hebron, at the zenith of his power. The more Israel curtails the activities of the PLO in the territories, the higher its prestige will go up. Last week, restraint orders were issued against seven members of the "National Steering Committee." [Committee for National Direction] Their pictures were flashed across all East Jerusalem's newspapers and their prestige went up dramatically. What more can Israel do which it has not done already? According to the mayors, the military government monitors all their incoming and outgoing telephone calls, and in recent months the mayors in the West Bank have not been able to leave their towns without explicit permission from the military government.

At the same time, the prestige of the pro-Jordanian leaders is going down constantly. Not only have some of them grown old without finding replacements (Shaykh Jabri has passed away; former Nablus Mayor Haj Ma'zuz al Misri and his relative Hikmat al Misri, former chairman of the Jordanian parliament are over 70; Gaza Mayor Rashid al-Shawwa, is 70; younger men are the two Jerusalem Anwars--Anwar Nusayba and Anwar Al Hatib, both 65. The youngest pro-Jordanian leader is Elias Freij, who is 60), but also their position has been weakened in face of the growing public sympathy for the members of the "National Steering Committee." The real power of Jordan in the West Bank and Gaza is not reflected in the status of the leaders who support it in the territories. The power of Jordan is much greater, and has a great potential.

The "Jordanian option" as it is seen now, is bound by the close ties which have been formed in recent years between Jordan and the mainstream of the PLO. Anyone who speaks today about the Jordanian option must know that at this stage of the game King Hussein does not want to rid himself of his ties to Al Fatah, his former enemies. In the territories, too, the supporters of the PLO and of Jordan say that any negotiations between Israel and Jordan will involve--indirectly--the PLO, or at least Al Fatah.

Thus, the debate which took place this week at the Van Leer Institute (in which were present the former ministers Israel Galili and Mordekhai Bentov, senior officers past and present, professors and many students), focused on the Jordanian optionn without Al Fatah and the PLO on the one hand, and the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza on the other.

The maze we have found ourselves caught in, in the territories, has reached the point that we no longer seem to have control over it, and holding up this option or the other which was a good 10 or 5 years ago is of no use now, especially after 3 years of Likud rule which has stressed the difference between itself and the Alignment by establishing more and more settlements.

Anyone who believes or hopes that it will be possible to evacuate the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza by using words, threats, or even the army, ignores the mood in those settlements. Its residents feel that every new house, every physical item in the area is permanent, and cannot be removed. Anyone who knows the feelings of the settlers understands that at least some of them would rather fight than leave. They know that the threat of civil war will make those who want to give up parts of this land shy away from doing so.

A Tough Partner

Those who keep repeating the magic words "Jordanian option" must take into account the new reality and understand that a Jordanian option means the inclusion of Al Fatah. It is an option which will demand many concessions from Israel, and which will focus on the question of East Jerusalem. Even if Hussein agrees to rid himself of Al Fatah (under the present circumstances this would be most difficult), he will be a tough partner in the negotiations, according to the king's men in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

In his poem "Half of the People in the World," Yehuda Amihay says:

> ...and to go out on the roads
> Made only for return
> All the terrible stations--
> The sand, stick, fire, water, butcher,
> The kid, and the angel of death?...

I recalled those lines this week as I considered the future difficulties of the Alignment--if it wins the next elections--in initiating talks with Jordan, viz, debates during the election campaign with the Likud, the Tehiyah, and the MAFDAL; internal disagreements on the substance of the negotiations with Jordan and on withdrawal from the territories; disagreements with the settlers; disagreement with the MAFDAL, its coalition partner; American pressures; divisions between Jordan and the PLO; ferment among PLO supporters in the territories; and finally, differences which are bound to surface between Jordan and Israel. Indeed, a torturous road

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ISRAEL SEEN FAILING TO UNDERSTAND ARAB REALITY

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 8 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by Kassim Zaid: "Needed: Change of Concept; Israel's Arabs' Red Line" (Part Three)]

[Text] "The Arab intelligentsia is bankrupt--it is undergoing a grave psychological and ideological crisis. The old guard has failed. The traditional leadership is also bankrupt, including the political leadership. The establishment leaders have failed worst of all." These are the words of Dr Dami Mar'i, director of the Institute for the Advancement of Arab Education in Haifa University.

His is one of the various opinions voiced by different leaders who disagree politically--which will be quoted later on--though it seems that there is a meeting of the minds among the various segments of the Arab population in Israel.

Dr Sami Mar'i is full of complaints and he states them sharply. He sees the condition of Israel's Arabs today, especially after the passing of the anti-democratic laws which are most detrimental to Arabs, as extremely bleak: "Israel's Arabs are at a crossroads. There is ferment in Arab society. Various forces are in conflict, various currents which are the result of self-growth and political maturation." In his opinion, "Israel's Arabs, as an ethnic group, are split into groups which have severely suffered from internal and external struggle."

The State Pulls Out the Rug

Dr Mar'i does not see the logic in the state's position in regard to Israel's Arabs: "It actually pulls the rug from under them. We hear many statements, of which the most aggressive are Rabbi Kahane's. But there are other, contradictory statements, and contradictory plans. I feel that the majority does not recognize the Arabs of Israel. They are considered hitchhikers on the state wagon."

In his opinion, "The majority--the Jewish majority, that is--is more bankrupt than the minority. This can be seen in the attitude of the

majority to Israel's Arabs. The Alignment is the first among those who have failed, since it is the only body which has tried to deal seriously with the problems of Israel's Arabs, and therefore it has failed more than the others. As a result, the trust of Arab intellectuals in the Alignment has reached an all-time low. The present administration competes with the Alignment on this issue in a fascist manner."

Who has not failed?

According to Dr Mar'i, the citizen who belongs to the silent majority has also failed. "Because he sees how the crime is being committed and remains silent. Thus, he is an accomplice. His responsibility is greater than that of the oppressor. The silent majority sees the Arab students being persecuted and even executed, and does nothing about it. In short, the majority should break its silence and show courage by standing up to the rising wave of extremism. It is political blindness which stands in its way."

A Maturing, Unifying Public

Dr Mar'i believes that RAKAH has been wiser than the rest of the parties in Israel. "It was aware of the others' bankruptcy--which gave rise to the idea of the Democratic Front for Peace, which has strengthened RAKAH's position. Israel's Arabs are a growing ethnic group which shows a high degree of solidarity. Its apptitudes are improving. Its self-confidence is growing. If the policy of observation posts, of neglect, injustice, and physical threat continues, the Arabs will start to believe the government is showing them the way in which they must follow."

Why didn't this happen in the past?

"Because the government is not aware of and does not wish to recognize the degree of maturation and self-awareness of Israel's Arabs. Even among the academicians, there are those who refuse to believe that all teachers in Arab schools are Arabs. They do not believe that there is a surplus of Arab physicians. The quality of the Arab is improving constantly, not because of the government's policy, but because of the ancient Arab civilization."

"Arabists and Political Stupidity"

In Dr Mar'i opinion, "the retaining of the Arabists (i.e., the heads of the various departments of Arab affairs) is political stupidity, precisely from the Jewish standpoint. From the Arab standpoint it is an incredibly underhanded policy. "Israel's Arabs as a nation--according to him--"are a power which creates itself. There are dominant forces among Israel's Arabs who can occupy positions on the international level. There are talents which the state must call upon to mould the image of Arab society.

"I am not willing to respect any government which maintains that Emanuel Koplowitz (director of the Arab Education Department in the

ministry of education), for instance, is a genius, while at the same time considers us backward. I, for example, am asked to do planning in the Jewish educational system, while I am denied the right to do the same thing in the Arab system.

"The ministry of education has created an advisory council for Arab education, headed by Prof Menahem Milson, who did not attend any sessions. I met Milson and I asked him why he did not participate in the sessions. He told me, 'this is not my area of expertise and I know nothing about it.' He even authorized me to express his beliefs at the meeting in his name.

"The Ministry of Education appointed Nisim Dana, director of the Druse Department in the ministry of religion, in place of Professor Milson. When we, the members of the Arab council, asked for an Arab to lead the council, the director general of the ministry of education refused. Professor Milson has said that it is stupid to appoint a Jew as the head of the council for Arab education."

Not Only a Matter of Good Will

"Building good Arab-Jewish relations should not be predicated on good will only, as has been the case until now. If the relations are not based on equality--it will only be empty words. Where decisions are made there should be equal opportunity. There should be objective economic relations based on mutual interest.

"We are not trusted. We develop and improve our capabilities. But the more we do it, the more we are told to stay in our place.

"The Israelis cannot accept the fact that we are here to stay, since our presence foils the plan of a pure Jewish state. It does not square with their plan. Worse yet, our presence here creates tensions in the plan of the Jewish state. The Israelis are not even willing to deal with the problem."

An Existential Fear

According to Dr Mar'i, "this situation creates among us an existential fear. Why? Because we have no faith in the future. We are not allowed to plan and take care of our interest by ourselves. This is a real danger to our existence and to coexistence. I have tried all along to get Jewish lecturers to do smoething jointly with us for Jewish-Arab relations, but I have been turned down. 'Forget it!' Why do the distinguished lecturers act this way? Because they do not wish to go against the growing fascist trend."

In Dr Mar'i's opinion, "there is a difference between what is and what should be. Everyone is dreaming of what should be, but reality is different and much more painful than we can imagine."

Is there one body which works toward Jewish-Arab understanding?

"No, and yes. Shim'on Peres, for example, argues that he opposes the government's policy toward Israel's Arabs. If this is the case, why doesn't he convene the center of the Labor party and issue an official proclamation opposing this policy? If the Alignment opposes ideologically the government's policy why doesn't it make noise? We know that the Arab departments are headed by Alignment people, and that they are faithfully carrying out the Likud's policy."

"Extremism Is Slanderous"

Are Israel's Arabs truly extremists?

"This is slanderous. Israel's Arabs are excessively moderate. Even if all half million of Israel's Arabs demonstrate on Dizengoff Street against the crying injustice, in my opinion they will remain moderate. Israel's Arabs have not yet reacted as they should in light of their difficult situation.

"How can you imagine, for example, that half of the students in Um al-Fahm study in rented rooms in subhuman conditions? Even if the residents of this large village blocked the main road they would remain moderate. Since, after all, all they are asking for is parity with their Jewish fellow-citizens. Is this demand, which shows their good Israeli citizenship, considered extremism?"

Dr Mar'i does not hesitate to turn to such a sensitive topic as security. "What are Israel's Arabs doing against the security of the state which has been used as a sacred cow against the Arabs? We did not hear that the residents of Um al-Fahm attacked the bus in droves, or undermined the security of the state. The number of Jews opposing the state far exceeds the number of Arabs. What is the purpose of this panic which is being created among the population? What is this fear, if in one village or another there are some Sons of the Village members? Is this the end of the world?"

As a result of this blindness "they think that an Arab who demands his rights is a member of the PLO. The terms are totally confused. If we want to be Israelis in every way, are we extremists? Where is the logic? How incredible--the very thought of a discussion to open an Arab university in Nazareth is causing undue excitement. Member of Knesset Orah Namir demanded that Minister of Education Zevulun Hammer put a stop to the experiment. Even if you killed me, I wouldn't be able to understand why different Jewish groups can open universities because of the differences between secular and religious Jews, and we, as an ethnic group, are not allowed to. All we want to do is take advantage of our educational and cultural rights."

"The Solution--Participation in Decisionmaking"

We asked Dr Mar'i: What is the solution to this difficult dilemma?

"The only solution is the active participation of Arabs in the decision-making process, not only in matters which concern them, but also those which conern the entire country. A senior Arab minister should be appointed. This is the only way to insure the brainwashing of the extremists.

"The solution must come through a fundamental and drastic change in the Zionist approach to the Arabs in Israel. What kind of a solution is it, when Ariq Sharon continues with his observation posts policy. Such policy must be nipped in the bud. A conceptual change must take place in Zionist ideology, in order to reach a stage where it becomes clear that there is no contravention of Zionism in a Zionist state absorbing non-Jews."

Dr Mar'i reached the "red line" when he said: "If the current situation continues, I invite public opinion in Israel to prevent me from becoming a fascist. Can anyone offer advice on how this can be done?

"Just as the Middle East cannot be conceived without the state of Israel, so the state of Israel cannot be conceived without Arabs. The Israelis must recognize the imperative of cooperation with the Arabs, and extend us their arm and ask for our cooperation. We will then be able to extend our arm."

Regarding the idea of creating an "arab lobby," Dr Mar'i says: "Theoretically, it is a healthy idea. But the creation of such a lobby will not do much for Israel's Arabs, since such a lobby will not have power to put pressure on Israel to solve the problems of its Arabs. The solution is establishing an independent Arab party, which will recognize first and foremost the existence of the state of Israel and the existence of the Palestinian people."

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WEST BANK RESIDENTS VIEW JORDANIAN OPTION

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Aug 80 p 8

[Article by Dani Tzidkoni: "Jordanian Option Viewed by West Bank Residents"]

[Text] As in the motion picture Rashumoon, the opinions of the experts on territories in Israel are divided on what the residents of the territories want. These experts may be journalists, military government officials, or politicians, who believe--like the journalists--that the honest truth of what the residents of the territories want is what they were told in tete-a-tetes with residents who are important or not so important people. Not once was I taken by surprise when someone gave someone a version of his "true" political opinion different from the one he had previously expressed, in keeping with the rule of "truth and honesty."

This is why I have recently refrained from publishing a report I received from a senior official of the military government, according to which he had gotten the impression in his talks with Arab leaders in the territories, that if they were given the power to decide they would prefer the "Jordanian option" to that of the PLO. By this they do not mean the Peres proposal, but rather Israeli withdrawal from all the territories back to the 1967 borders, and a political solution in conjunction with Jordan. The senior official's impression is undoubtedly sincere. The question which is up in the air is, is what he was told true? In any case it is plausible, as can be seen in the fact that mayors and delegations from Gaza and the West Bank attended the funeral of the Jordanian prime minister. Consoling the mourners, as it is well known, is not the only reason for attending funerals.

Since I choose to believe that I am able to have honest conversations with residents of the territories, for, among other things, it is good for my ego, I tend to believe that others are also capable of--even after taking all critical and intellectual precautions--falling into this trap, which causes Israelis to argue among themselves about the wishes of the territories' residents. Sadly, as a result of Arab terror there are two channels of communication between the residents and Israel.

The official one maintains that any public statement follows the PLO party line. The unofficial one is where we hear about the leaning toward the Jordanian option in the West Bank and to some extent in Gaza, and toward the Egyptian option in the Gaza Strip. The upshot of all this is that it may be preferable for Israel to remain in the territories rather than establish a state headed by the PLO.

A Confusing Situation

My impression is that both the nationalistic aligning with and the fear of the PLO of a great many people in the territories are sincere. This refers to people to whom the PLO, as the standard-bearer of oppressed Palestinian national pride in the territories, is the focus of success and the rallying point. This, despite the fact that they are afraid that the PLO, as a band of terrorists, may very well plunge the Palestinian nation into a terrible bloodbath. I believe that whoever tells me this--and it has been told to me more than once--speaks honestly. But the yearnings and aspirations of the Palestinians, as well as their fears, do not form a basis in the present reality for bringing an end to the bloody conflict between the two nations. It is a pity that Mina Tzemah or the Pori Institute do not have an office in the territories--if indeed polls can be taken there--since public opinion polls in the West Bank and Gaza could help determine our political activity, and perhaps even create new concepts regarding our policies in the world's public opinion.

What is clear is that until we can employ democratic methods which will enable us to obtain an accurate picture of the residents' opinions, we will have to find out about their wishes from the open statements of their leaders, whose enthusiasm for the PLO can go up and down, but whose fear of the PLO is a constant. We can also base ourselves on conversations which cannot be publicized or which can only be reported "without giving the source" or "not to be quoted," in which the leaders of the territories will express their opinion before Israeli government and opposition leaders, officials of the military government, and Israeli and foreign journalists.

Prefer Strong Government

This, then, is the present state of affairs, confusing as it may be. The "Jordanian option" which has been reported lately is for the moment more of the Labor party's making than the residents'. It is possible that if Labor wins the elections, it will be able to impose this option on the residents more successfully than Begin is able to implement his autonomy plan. There is a real possibility that an Israeli "Jordanian option" may enjoy more support in the territories than the Likud's "people's autonomy" plan. It should be mentioned that the only one who has been able to deal successfully with the PLO is King Hussein. The silent majority in the territories prefers, in any case, a strong government. It will not fight the PLO, but it will certainly be willing to have Hussein fight it on its behalf.

What is clear is that the treatment of the residents cannot continue as before. If the autonomy plan fails Israel will have to find new and bold ways to solve the problem of the territories. The territories have presented a problem even before the Gush Emunim, simply because their residents are Arabs and we are Jews.

The "Jordanian option" is one of the possibilities, but to say that it is popular among the Arabs is inaccurate, just as it is inaccurate to say that they reject it.

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BREAKDOWN OF AUTHORITY IN TERRITORIES ANALYZED

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 15 Aug 80 pp 15, 20

[Article by Dani Rubinstein: "Danger Lurks From Within; Deterioration of State Authority in Israel and Territories Should Not Be Underestimated"]

[Text] In Miha'el Bar Zohar's book on Isar Har'el and the Security Service (The Chief, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, Jerusalem, 1971), I found the following passage: "The first clash in the War of Independence took place between the nucleus of the nascent state and the undergrounds which refused to disband. In the second stage, the undergrounds which cropped up again within the state and attempted to destroy its government were eradicated. The adversaries of the state in the third stage were not only undergrounds. This time the struggle took place in the open, publicly, under the guise of a battle for justice and law.... The danger to the state stemmed from the seemingly new character of the struggle. Now, too, the main adversary of those who opposed the government was the Security Service. However, it was not prepared for a sophisticated public battle. The service was trained for a struggle against classic undergrounds and was not ready to deal with public storms. In order to stand up to the new methods employed by the adversary, it needed new tools, and it had to resort to action which aroused a great deal of criticism."

This passage is the opening paragraph of a chapter titled "Danger Lurks From Within," in which the Hastner Trial and the battle of the Security Service against the "Volunteers' File" and Attorney Elyakim Hatzni, the Olam Hazeh weekly, Shmu'el Tamir, Dr Israel Scheib (Eldad), and others is described, those who were then known as the adversaries of the government. In Isar Har'el's opinion those people had undermined the state's authority 25 years ago and therefore the Security Service was turned on them.

All of this happened many years ago, and Israel then is not Israel today. The political system has undergone shocks and crises. I assume that the Security Service has changed and has grown in size (back then there was a quarter of a million Arabs under Israeli rule, while today the number is quickly approaching two million). What has not changed is the target of the Security Service, which, according to Har'el are those who are a

"danger to the government," who wish to "bring down the Israeli Government," and who "undermine the authority of the state."

When such activity is clandestine, certainly when it is violent, the entire Israeli security system is turned on it, full force. Things are clear and unequivocal when it is a terrorist activity by one of the arms of the PLO, or when it is a case of espionage or assistance to the enemy. Things become fuzzy when it is overt political activity, controversial and demonstrative. Who can decide what the difference is between dangerous "undermining" and open political struggle? On the periphery, the line between the two is hazy and the intervention of the security services is difficult to determine. On the periphery, we find the extreme left--such as the offshoot of Matzpen whose members were accused of espionage; nationalist Arab groups, like the Sons of the Village; and the Organization of Progressive Students. There are also groups of Jewish zealots who resport to violent and clandestine (?) action against Christian missions, and there is Rabbi Kahane's group.

As can be learned from reading the newspapers, the security authorities in the state follow a policy of strong measures when the activists of those marginal groups shift from words, proclamations and preaching to violent action and clandestine activities. But the haziness and the confusion grow when the undermining of authority reaches broader internal circles. From time to time someone suggests to outlaw RAKAH (the communist party), so that it may go underground and its members could be put under arrest. As far as I know the security system opposes it. It should be stressed that RAKAH's leaders keep insisting that they are Israeli patriots, more so than others, and that their activities are cautious and within the law. On the other side there are such groups as Gush Emunim who, because of their excessive patriotism, can be included in Har'el's definition of "those who" undermine the authority of the state," even when most of their activities are overt and public.

I am writing these lines against the backdrop of what correspondent David Halevi wrote in the Washington Star and the strong denial of the head of the Security Service of everything in the article. Official spokesmen refused in recent months to play up the possibility that it was Arabs who attacked the mayors in the West Bank, and this possibility is being carefully checked out. When the load of explosives left by the terrorists detonated recently in the Neve Ya'akov section of Jerusalem, it was announced immediately that it was the same kind of explosives which had been found in the mayor's cars, which indicates that it was the work of Arabs. Or, as was reported in the organ of the Jewish settlers in the territories: "The PLO people murder one another, which is old hat" (Nekudah, June 27, 1980). It seems to me that the possibility that it was done by Israelis is the most dangerous one for Israel, and is the one which should be investigated among those who had rejoiced when they heard about the attacks which took place on the thirtieth day of the murderous attack on the settlers of the of the Kiriat Arbah section of Hebron.

For a long time the activities of the settlers and of Gush Emunim on the West Bank have been an overt political demonstration. The establishment of makeshift settlements, secret settlement expeditions, secret invasion of the Hadassah building, innumerable clashes at the Cave of Mahpelah, breaking the rules of the military government, all of this has taken place as part of an aggressive political struggle, which the governments of Israel had to yield to. As Rabbi Levinger has said: "we show the mumbling government the right way." Back then, the settlers wanted to show the military government the right way to deal with the Arabs.

In 1967 the residents of Kiriat Arbah restored order during the disturbances in Hebron. Once they caught Shaykh Rajab al-Tamimi (who had since been expelled) and at the point of a gun forced him to remove a barrier which Arab youths had set up on the road. Later, they stopped Arabs and "taught them a lesson" with the help of a dog and with beatings. The police had to interfere when the settlers broke into Arab homes and caused damage, or when the suspicion arose that someone from Kiriat Arbah shot and killed an Arab boy and an Arab girl who demonstrated in Halhul (he was put on trial and was freed).

After the Begin government established the settlements in Ramallah and Nablus areas the clashes increased (it is correct to say that this government too had to yield to Gush Emunim after the scuffles of the 1977 patrol). The many instances of settlers engaging in acts of retaliation, shooting, searching, detaining suspects, etc, are known, and each person can draw his own conclusions. The settlers did not cease arguing that the military government and the security service abandoned them and forced them to resort to self-defense. Once they even put two Arab workers of the electric company in jail in Ofrah, after they came to collect debts from the settlement. In other incidents, the settlers refused to hand over their weapons to the representatives of the military government who ordered them to do so. In Ofrah and Kiriat Arbah the settlers even went so far as to establish their own security committees.

The next stage was unusual and interesting. Instead of combatting the vigilantism of the armed settlers, the latter were put under the law through a restraint order. Each reserve soldier among them was taken out of his regular army unit and placed in the "area defense" of the settlements which was established on the West Bank. The concept of area defense is an old one in the IDF. After the unsuccessful experience of the settlements in the Golan Heights in the Yom Kippur War it was decided by the defense system to improve it. In the past, the area defense of border settlements operated against enemies from across the border. The innovation in the Gush Emunim settlements is that now the area defense is used for internal security, to guard against the surrounding Arab settlements (as was the case in the War of Independence).

Consciously or unconsciously a situation was created in the West Bank similar to the pre-state days, in which settlers, civilian soldiers, fight Arab marauders, whether they are children throwing stones or terrorists using firearms (in those days there were called "gangs"). The area

defense units in the Gush Emunim settlements are politically homogenous military units, which are integrated in the security activities of the border guard and the IDF in various sections.

The problem begins when the suspicion arises that members of the area defense units of Gush Emunim do not act exactly (an understatement) according to routine military orders and directives. Unfortunately, we do not know who attacked the mayors in the West Bank; we do not know who put explosives a few days ago at the marketplace in Hebron, who placed a bomb around the same time at the home of the head of the village of Surayf, and we do not know who had put a bomb a few days ago at the offices of the AL FAJR newspaper in East Jerusalem. When I asked official spokesmen, I was told that it could have been Jews or Arabs, or even secret agents of outside bodies active in the area. After all, the Gush Emunim people participate in the security of Ramallah and Nablus as part of the IDF, and only in one instance a suspicion arose as to their failing to do their duty.

It happened after unknown persons broke the windows of scores of Arab vehicles in Ramallah and Al Birah, during a few hours one night, destroyed stores and property. A border guard barrier discovered in the middle of the operation a vehicle from the Bet El Yeshiva on its way to Ramallah, carrying stones and a hammer.

The passengers of course belonged to the area defense of Ramallah and had the unit's army radio. The IDF checked to see whether they were on duty and who was on active reserve duty. It was not possible to find out what the purpose of their trip to Ramallah was. A police spokesman said that they were arrested but refused to cooperate with the investigators. Be it as it may, it is hard to put someone on trial because of intentions, and the case was closed.

To judge from this suspicion and from the fact that explosives were found in the attic of the Kotel Yeshiva in the old city (here two soldiers were accused of keeping explosives without permission, using military vehicles without permission, and passing for officers--since no evidence was found of any intentions to engage in terrorist activities), it seems that we are dealing here with a dangerous political subversion trend. It is most important to find out who is carrying out these acts of terrorism in the territories, especially when it could be Jews. Finding a legal angle is peripheral compared to discovering a militant and aggressive political trend which becomes subversion. The Security Service is making an effort to find out who had put the explosives in the mayor's cars, but Israeli governments, especially the present one, neglect the underpinnings of the undermining of the state's authority which started with Gush Emunim and which is growing both in Israel and in the territories.

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BANK GOVERNOR OFFERS RECESSION CURE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Aug 80 p 1

[Article by Arye Lavi, HA'ARETZ writer on economic affairs: "Negotiated Package To Make Shorter Restraints Possible"]

[Text] Negotiation of a package for freezing prices, wages and taxes will make it possible to shorten the period of restraints, the Governor of the Bank of Israel Mr Arnon Gafni said yesterday in an interview with HA'ARETZ.

If a negotiated package is not signed, and the prospects for achieving agreement are few because of the political situation in the country, restraints will be continued for a longer period; it will be necessary to cut the budget and credits even further. Mr Gafni stated that his position on this issue is known to the finance minister, but that he does not know whether he will support the idea of a freeze.

The governor believes that now is the right time for the economy for a negotiated package which will put an end to the inflationary spiral. In his view, it is desirable for the sides to reach agreement even if there can be no full agreement.

As to the allegation of the president of the Manufacturers Association Mr Avraham Shavit, that there is no place for a freeze agreement after the payment of wage increases of 70 percent, Mr Gafni said that the cost-of-living accord was signed by Mr Shavit and had he not been able to pay, he surely would not have signed such an agreement. Cost-of-living increments which have been paid are for the increases which have taken place already and now agreement should be reached which will prevent additional increases.

In the governor's opinion there have not been any realistic wage increases this year and all of the increases merely compensated for the cost-of-living advances which have taken place up to now. An orderly freeze of prices, taxes and wages would also bring about a reduction in the number of unemployed and make possible a renewal of economic growth.

The chairman of the Chambers of Commerce Association, Mr Avner Ben Yakar, yesterday expressed support for the governor's proposal. That is, on condition that the agreement include as well a freeze on the foreign exchange rates. He said that he had suggested the idea of a freeze to the governor, in a letter which he had sent to him more than a week ago.

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FINANCES LIMIT POLICE ACTIVITY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Aug 80 p 13

[Editorial: "The Police Force--Not Projects Alone"]

[Text] Twelve billion Israel Pounds--that is the amount required, according to the national headquarters of the police, to rehabilitate and reorganize the Israel Police Force in the next five years. The force has a complement shortage of 5,000, its weapons are inadequate and obsolete, its motorized fleet suffers constant accidents as a result of a shortage of parts and poor maintenance. The Inspector General, Commander Herzl Shapir, told the press about the diminished physical fitness of the police officers and of his intentions to advance the retirement age of police personnel.

These are all important factors which explain the failure of the Israel police in its war against rising crime that is sweeping the country in an unprecedented manner--and we have already evaluated the crime situation in the country as severe.

Reporters who spoke with the finance minister following his visit to the national headquarters got the impression that Mr Hurvitz understood the need for infusing additional funds into the police force in light of its severe situation, despite the overall goal of cutting the budgets of governmental ministries.

It may thus be assumed that the multi-year plan of the police, Plan "New Wine," will be accepted by the government when it is brought up for approval in another 2 weeks. The new Inspector General, Commander Shapir, will be able to interpret that as a personal victory. Since taking up his duties on 1 January 1980, he has dealt primarily with the working out of the plan. The public has, without a doubt, gained thereby. It is possible that the citizen complaining about a break-in of his apartment will now have to wait less time for the investigators to arrive at his home, and that we shall see in the cities' streets more mobile police and more police officers--and perhaps even stronger police officers able to prevail over the hoodlums.

Yet it is difficult to escape the feeling that in Plan "New Wine"--or at least in what has been made public about it--and in the funds that will be invested in it, there is not enough to guarantee automatic success to the police department in its war against crime. The plan is designed, principally, to improve the operational capability of the police department. This is without a doubt an important goal, yet when crime is as organized and sophisticated as it is today physically fit officers and superior operational organization are not sufficient. No less important --and perhaps even more important--is the capability of the police department to investigate and solve sophisticated crimes with no less sophisticated means. What is required is: to enlarge the weight of the investigative arm within the police department, with a constant utilization of the police intelligence and operational activity to implement the findings of the investigation, as the last link in the chain.

These were the recommendations of the Shimron Commission, and it appears that they have remained within the realm of desire. The poisonous plague cannot be eliminated by night raids on settlements, and the gang wars these days cannot be overcome by night sweeps alone. Such operations will not bring about a solution for a single one of the 27 (of 51) murders which have been committed during the first half of this year and remain unsolved, the majority of which have been described as "the settling of accounts of the underworld." Operational capability, be it even the best, will aid but meagerly in the elimination of the branch of "contractors" for arson and bombings in the criminal world which has existed for years, and about which only recently it was reported in a secret report of the police department intelligence division.

It is to be assumed that the Inspector General, after he has been freed from his extended preoccupation with preparations for Plan "New Wine," will give his attention also to this aspect of the police department's organization.

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HOUSING SHORTAGE SAID CAUSE OF RESENTMENT AMONG YOUNG

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Aug 80 p 8

[Article by David Moshiev: "The Housing Shortage--A Time Bomb"]

[Text] The ongoing demonstrations by young married couples, and the incursions of apartments and buildings are indicative of the severity of the housing shortage in Israel. The precipitous rise in the price of apartments in the country above and beyond the cost-of-living increases which appear on the scale of the high price of construction--only aggravate the problem. Many people who formerly were able to acquire apartments on the free market are unable now to do this, because they were not born to millionaire parents or because they did not win millions in the lottery or in the sports pools.

The housing shortage exists not only in the urban sector, but in the depressed neighborhoods on the outskirts of the cities as well. There is a particularly acute housing shortage in the worker settlements, and especially in specific smallholders' cooperative settlements [moshavim]. There are many hundreds of people of moshav origin who reside in abandoned cattle sheds near the homes of their parents for lack of other housing. The problem in these moshavim is severe. The birth rate in them is high, above the national Israeli average; the returning sons are unable to build a "family nest" for they lack the housing and the government does not help.

The pathetic situation in which the country is immersed in the area of housing was caused by the Likud government which promised "to do well by the nation." Alignment governments (at all times and during all periods) were concerned about keeping government construction at a high level and maintaining a substantial inventory of apartments in the market, something which influenced the prices of apartments. In addition to that, bonuses were granted and savings plans were offered to all the citizenry so that they might achieve housing.

The Likud government upon its rise to rule, did away within a very short time with the inventory of apartments which were on hand in Israel and

which had been constructed during the term of the Alignment, through fear of losses, thereby enriching the speculator elements, which were able to pay cash for the apartments offered them on relatively good terms. But this is not its only sin. In parallel to this activity, the Likud government most drastically limited government housing starts. Thus, the inventory of apartments in Israel is particularly meager. When we add to that the galloping inflation--with the compliments of the government--and the high price of apartments, we find that an apartment has become a commodity far removed from the capability of the average citizen in the market.

Only the most massive and expanded construction of housing units in various parts of the country, granting of convenient and reasonable terms to those lacking housing who are eligible for it, but who are unable to bear the payments of millions of pounds for acquisition of an apartment--can help in the solution of the crisis of the housing shortage in the country.

The Labor party should, even now, prepare a comprehensive and detailed plan for solution of the problem, which will answer all of the needs in the cities and in the villages. There will be the need for the implementation of such a plan immediately after the Israeli voter, on the day of elections, gives a mandate to the Alignment to make up the next Israeli government.

The Likud government failed seriously in the matter of housing in Israel, and demonstrated its total helplessness in this area. There is no salvation for Israel in this government, and the citizenry of the state will be unable to acquire apartments as long as it continues "to do well by the people."

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ABSORPTION DIFFICULTIES IN THE NEW TOWNS

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 7 Aug 80 p 12

[Article by Shim'on Weiss: "To Stem the Exodus From the Development Towns"]

[Text] An insufficient number of the heads of local jurisdictions in the Galilee assembled recently in the community center in Safad, to confer and find solutions to the wave of emigrants which is now plaguing the development towns in the Galilee, and to the almost total freeze in the number of people being absorbed in the Galilee. Less than 10 heads of local councils assembled in Safad to listen, among other things to the gloomy forecast for next year, as it was presented by the manager of the Center for Direction to Development Towns, Zohar Gindel. "The period of the long summer vacation is the time for moving to new settlements by most of the citizenry and the Center for Direction, which year after year was flooded with hundreds of applicants and interested people, today stands before an empty trough. Although in the year 1978/79 an increase in the number of those coming to the Galilee was reported--I fear for the coming year. The situation is undoubtedly serious. There is a halt in the movement of settlers in the Galilee, and to the development towns generally. My forecase is that with the existing and foreseeable figures in the employment and housing market, there will be a drastic drop in the number of applicants and there will be almost no absorption of new settlers in the development towns."

According to Gindel, this kind of situation did not exist for many years in the Center for Direction to the Development Towns which is quartered in Tel Aviv but whose branches reach into all the development towns in the country. Citing the figures on the number abandoning the development towns in the north was sufficient to demonstrate the seriousness of the situation, and the gloomy future. According to data from the Central Statistics Office 14,080 residents left the Galilee in the year 1978/79 and informed sources point to an even larger number. Many of those abandoning the towns remain "residents of the development towns in theory," so as not to lose the privileges that they are afforded as such inhabitants.

A New Plan

The Center for Direction to the Development Towns recently completed a plan which will ease, possibly, the distress and find answers to a portion of the problems. "We must make cooperative efforts in 2 areas," says Gindel. "The one, strengthening the absorption system and preparing the settlers who have arrived in the development towns and the second--organization and action to prevent exodus." The proposal which was developed by the Center for Direction and which was brought to the meeting at Safad, discusses appointment of an absorption coordinator in each city and the setting up of local absorption committees, in which the community workers will participate in the relief bureaus. Gindel details the functions of the absorption coordinators and the committees: "Assembling data regarding the principal reasons why a family abandons, pinpointing the immediate factors requiring care for and aid to the new families, dealing with the problems of the children in the educational institutions, planning and help for the new families to take root in the community activity in the settlement, planning special activity for new families in the stages of their absorption, and creating personal contacts and ongoing follow up." The absorption coordinator, on the other hand, will be the one with overall responsibility and will match the implementation of the goals placed upon all the absorption factors in the settlement. According to the proposal, the mayor or the municipal council will head the absorption committees, and the Center for Director to the Development towns will direct the work of the committees from a professional standpoint.

The mayors and the council heads who participated in the conference in Safad accepted with appreciation the mobilization by the Center for Direction to deal with the difficult situation which had been created, but according to the expressed opinions of the participants, it is doubtful whether they see in the absorption committees and in the coordinators the most important thing. Menahem Ariav of Nazareth Ilit alleged that the government favors only a small number of settlements in the Galilee to which it grants the incentives and the funds, resulting in damage to all the others and to a distortion of the balance. As an example, Ariav cited Carmiel which, since its establishment in the mid-sixties, enjoyed intensified industrialization and various concesssions the result of which, it would appear, were not long in coming.

By contrast, Aharon Nahamias, mayor of the Municipality of Safad, was optimistic. According to him, despite the present data being discouraging there is at least one positive aspect and that is that in comparison to the first 5 years of the decade of the seventies there occurred in the second five years a steady increase--albeit moderate--in the number of people absorbed in the Galilee as compared with those abandoning it. With respect to the future, Nahamias does not hide his trepidation. "We hear of unemployment and housing shortages even in places considered strong and immunized such as Carmiel, and all this in addition to an almost total drop in the bonuses and the various loans which reach those arriving at the

development towns. At one time there was free school tuition for the children of the development towns. Today--all must pay. Today everyone recoils from linked mortgages, so what's left? We must press and apply wherever necessary with a demand that the system of incentives in the development towns continue high relative to the rest of the country--and in that way only will they come to us."

Bennie Shalita, head of the local council at the moshava Menahemia, commented during the conference that if the settlements in the Galilee were included in the statistical categories of the development towns the numbers and the graphs would appear differently, far more positive. People in the Galilee are the evidence that 8 settlements in the Galilee are blooming today. Shalita argues that day after day tens of applications to be absorbed in the moshava which is in the Jordan Valley reach his desk and he is unable to respond to them positively since all the housing units are occupied "and all of this is taking place without publicity, without fanfare and without a Center for Direction--only with true quality of life and serenity." According to him, the root of the evil is in the governmental officialdom which prefers to equalize in every way the development towns remote from the middle of the country and from the large cities and thereby to cause itself fewer headaches. It is impossible for there to be equality of incentives between a dense Tel Aviv and the sparsely populated development towns and that everything be seen only through figures, merely because this is more convenient for the clerks in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv. This is mockery to the poverty-stricken. Today, it is not enough to draw settlers by a mere call to come to 'quiet and to quality of life.' People want to know prices, too, and it is not possible for the municipality of Tel Aviv and me to be the same. We must cry out against this incredible equality."

In-Depth Survey

According to Amos Lutan, adapter of government activities in Galilee and himself a Safad resident, the solution lies not only in the setting up of absorption committees, with all the importance of those. "People are abandoning the Galilee today even after many years of living there and exaggerated bonuses. There must be an in-depth examination of the reasons for the abandonment, not merely a look at the dry figures. We're talking about level of life, about education, about society--these are the dominant factors that shape good absorption and by extension--the good life. Take Carmiel: it had been planned from the start with a proper base for absorption and today it is decisively altering the balance of abandonment of the Galilee, and making it more positive, at least from a statistical standpoint. All the other villages were hastily constructed so as to find refuge for immigrants who came during the fifties and needed a place, even a temporary one, to establish themselves. Aid during those years was for a short time, if at all. And afterwards all the immigrants were left to their own devices."

In Lutan's opinion it is easier today to stem the exodus than to build a complete absorption system, and that is why we must examine what is to be done in the cities themselves to improve the atmosphere and what is granted to the residents within the various limits. His suggestion to the head of the jurisdictions is to freeze the construction and housing budgets and transfer them to improving the quality of life in order to do right by the settlers who linked their fate with settlement in the Galilee. In this connection Lutan proposes to conduct a sweeping and fundamental survey of the factors for abandonment of the Galilee and to conduct a widely representative symposium in which all delegates of the factors related to the Galilee will take part. "This will at least increase the awareness among the public and the higher levels of the state of the issue of the Galilee," he says.

All were in agreement on at least one fact--that Carmiel is a good example of absorption. Despite the distresses of the present and the early signs of unemployment which exist in this city too, in recent years it has absorbed more than any other development town in the country. When Avi Orenstein, director of the absorption department in Carmiel, described the work which his department is doing and the results, his colleagues were only able to envy him and the residents of his city. Everything had been accomplished there in an official and approved manner; the absorption department in Carmiel has allocated to it a greater share of the budgets and the personnel. Most of them, incidentally, do their work as volunteers. The follow-up is already begun at the former place of residence of the new family and intensifies with the family's arrival at Carmiel and during its early period there. Four years after its arrival, the new family is still "under follow-up," which continues until everyone is convinced that absorption of the family has been concluded in the best possible light. It is not surprising therefore to hear Orenstein state: "Our fear is that we shall be unable to fulfill our mission, because week after week we receive over 200 applications to come and live in Carmiel."

Time will tell if, in the other development towns as well, the fear of a minority of arrivals will convert to a fear of the large number of arrivals.

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BRIEFS

SPOKESMAN DENIES ISRAELI AID--The spokesman of the Kurdish Democratic Party today denied that Israel had supplied the Kurdish rebels with weapons when they were fighting against the Baghdad authorities. A few days ago Prime Minister Menahem Begin disclosed that Israel had helped the Kurdish rebellion in various ways. Today a Kurdish spokesman, in a conversation with our London correspondent, said that no such aid had ever been given and he accused Mr Begin of an attempt to disrupt the good relations between the Kurdish Party and Baghdad. [Excerpt] [TA011326 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 1 Oct 80]

AIRFIELD QUALITY, FUNCTIONALISM--[Declaration by Defense Minister M. Tzipori: "The Airfields in the Negev Will be Operational and of the Required Quality"] The airfields being constructed in the Negev are to be completed by the month of April 1982 in the required quality and will be operational, it was reported yesterday at a meeting which the Assistant Defense Minister, Mr Mordekhai Tzipori, while talking in his office to the commander of the American Corps of Engineers, Lt Gen John Morris, in charge of construction of the airfields as representative of the American administration. Participating in the meeting were the Director General of the Defense Ministry, Mr Yosef Ma'ayan, Air Force Commander Major General David Ivri, Chief of the Negev Airfields Administration appointed by the IDF, Brigadier General Moshe Bar Tov, the appointee of the American administration for management of the Negev airfields, General Paul Hartung, as well as senior officers. Commander of the American Corps of Engineers accompanied by the Director General of the Defense Ministry toured the airfield sites: Mitrad and Rimon in the Negev, observing close-up the tempo of progress in the construction of the fields. [Text] [Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 7 Aug 80 p 4] 8090

CSO: 4805

IRAQI ACTION AGAINST IRAN 'RIGHTED A WRONG'

LD241219 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 22 Sep 80 p 1

[Article by Ahmad al-Jarallah: "The Ability to Rectify Wrong Situations"]

[Excerpts] Iraq has done what Iran did, with the difference that Iraq has righted a wrong by force, whereas Iran obtained by force what was unjustly sought.

When the shah was strong and conceited he demanded what he wanted and in so doing he relied on his worldwide influence and good international relations. He also exploited Iraq's weakness when its foreign relations were strained and nobody wanted to cooperate with it because it was unstable, while Iran was stable and had close relations with the United States and good relations with Russia. The Soviet looked at him from a standpoint of "better to have an understanding enemy than an ignorant one." Japan and Europe supported the shah because they saw in him the future man of the region. The shah used his influence against Iraq--influence strong enough to force certain Arab countries to bring pressure on Iraq to be flexible even at the expense of its interests and national sovereignty. In fact, Iraq was told then: "Accept so as to win Iran over." This is what happened 5 years ago, but now Iraq has rectified the situation at a time when Baghdad is enjoying the same advantages which the previous Iranian regime enjoyed in the past. Baghdad now has good international relations with the Soviets and with the free world countries, which find in the Baghdad government a regime with which understanding can be reached.

Iraq has benefited from a favorable international situation in which Iran's relations with the two superpowers are strained, its relations with the free world are bitter, and its relations within the area are tense because of political mismanagement resulting from an abnormal revolution and a change in the regime that went beyond all calculations.

It is up to Iran now to show flexibility, something which it has not really lost, just as Iraq was flexible over something for which it paid with its national rights and which the time had come to recover.

CSO: 4802

SOVIET RELATIONS WITH LEBANESE FRONT EXAMINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 12 Jul 80 pp 12-13

[Article by Ibrahim Salamah: "From Kabul to Bikfayya"]

[Text] The Idea of the Lebanese Front Contacting Moscow Originated in al-Kaslik [locale designates major Maronite monastery near Juniyah]

Amin Al-Jumayyil: Our Relations with the Soviets Are Not Strong, Because They Are Our Adversaries' Allies

The Soviet Embassy's Staff in Beirut Met with Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, with Amin and Bashir al-Jumayyil, and with Dany Sham'un, First in Secret, Then in Public

Throughout the past 30 days, Lebanese-Soviet relations have developed in a surprising way. This was expected by few people concerned with international policy in the Middle East. Two Lebanese delegations arrived in Moscow, one after another, within a period of 20 days. The first was composed of Walid Jumblatt, head of the Progressive Socialist Party, and secretary general of the Lebanese National Movement. He was accompanied by Samir Franjiyah, nephew of former President Sulayman Franjiyah, and one of the prominent Maronite dignataries in northern Lebanon.

The second delegation represented the central committee of the Lebanese Communist Party, and was composed of Georges Hawi, the party's secretary general, along with a group of comrade members of the Lebanese Communist Party's political bureau. Two prominent members of the Soviet Communist Party's political bureau, Andrei Kirlinko, who is currently the number three man in the pyramid of Soviet power, and Boris Bonamaryov, who is the official responsible for Third World Liberation movements and who currently holds the post of secretary of the Soviet Communist Party's central committee, met with the two Lebanese delegations.

This was in Moscow. In Beirut, it was recently announced that the Soviet ambassador to Beirut, Soldatov, had three lengthy meetings with three of the most prominent leaders of the Lebanese Front, former President Camille Sham'un, Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, member of parliament for al-Matan, and his brother Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, leader of the "Lebanese Front."

Observers have dwelt extensively on analyzing the Soviet initiative in Lebanon. Some say that it is the beginning of Moscow's new policy in most Middle East areas, through which Moscow will attempt to return to the political scene in the Middle East, by means of renewing or reviving its old alliance (of Czarist days) with racial and sectarian minorities in the countries of the Arab East.

Others have not lent importance to the matter, viewing the Soviet initiative as certainly intended to counter the American and European initiatives in the Middle East.

However, the basic question remains: What motived the Lebanese Front leaders to get in touch with Moscow's representatives?

The answer to this question calls for caution, because both parties (Moscow and the Lebanese Front) are maintaining secrecy about the dialogue which has been held, and, so far, there has not been the slightest indication of any basic change in the two sides' positions.

From Paris, AL-MUSTAQBAL contacted Shyakh Amin al-Jumayyil, seeking an explanation. This information comes direct from the member of parliament for northern al-Matan and a prominent leader in the Lebanese Phalange Party: "Our relations with the Soviets are long-standing, beginning with the time of Sarfar Azimov, Moscow's ambassador to Beirut (before the war). At that time, the Soviet ambassador visited Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, head of the Phalangists, and extended an invitation to him to visit the Soviet Union as a member of a high-level Lebanese delegation, including such prominent members as former Premier 'Abdullah al-Yafi and Imam Musa al-Sadr. When Azimov was transferred from his post in Beirut, the invitation was not renewed. We contacted him and remonstrated. The outgoing ambassador thereupon gave a party in Shaykh Pierre's honor. The discussion with my father was kept under wraps at that time."

Shaykh Amin continued: "In that period, I met with Azimov, who invited me to visit the Soviet Union. I accepted the invitation, accompanied by two friends, Michel Edde and Fariq al-Taybi. The visit lasted 20 days. That visit could be considered the beginning of serious relations between us and Moscow."

[Question] What happend after that?

[Answer] Since Mr Soldatov's selection to represent the Soviet Union in Lebanon, it was clear that he was in favor of the Palestinian Resistance and its Lebanese allies who are known as the National Movement. Therefore, no meeting between us and the Soviet representative took place throughout the

2-year war. The first meeting occurred during the autumn of 1979, at the home of former Minister Farid Rufayil in the Hazamiyah district. Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil and Pierre Far'un, in his capacity as agent for Soviet commercial shipping lines, attended on the Lebanese side, apart from the host, former Minister Rufayil. On the Soviet side, there was Ambassador Soldatov, accompanied by the first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Beirut, Alexander Mosayef.

After this meeting, there were repeated meetings between us and Soviet representatives.

I met more than once in Beirut with the embassy's first secretary. In one of the meetings, we were joined by Dany Sham'un, President Camille Sham'un's eldest son. The meeting was held in the town of Faqra, in the mountains of Lebanon. Then I met again secretly with Soviet Ambassador Soldatov. After that, the Soviet ambassador met with Shaykh Bashir some months ago at Pierre Far'un's house in al-Ashrafiyah. Then there were the recent public meetings between Soldatov and President Sham'un and Shaykh Bashir.

[Question] In your estimation, what were the results of these meetings?

[Answer] So far, just good feelings, because the Soviets are linked with the National Movement as well as the Palestinian Resistance. We asked them on more than one occasion to free themselves from the "joint communique" signed on their part with Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat], which unequivocally stipulates the Palestinians' right to fight using Lebanese territory as a starting point. Their answer was: "We do not interfere in Lebanese internal affairs."

In the opinion of [myself] Shaykh Amin, the Soviets began to get close to the front after they heard and read our critical remarks about America's policy on Lebanon in particiular, and on the Palestinian issue in general. So far, there is nothing serious between us and them. [end of answer]

This was a summary of the views of Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, a prominent official in the Phalange Party. Non-Phalangist Lebanese political circles look at the matter from another angle. Here is a summary of their views:

The Lebanese crisis has lasted longer than the most pessimistic persons expected. The reason for the situation remaining as it is is mutual international and Arab understanding, which Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil described, in his speech at the Yacht Club on 22 June, by saying: "Our desire is to take over all of Lebanon, along with every Lebanese fighting for Lebanon. The day we decide to take over the government in the eastern sector, we will give the Palestinian a present, so that he can take over the government in the western sector. This will be Lebanon's partition, and the Americans will be happy."

A new development in the chain of events of the Lebanese war is what could be described as a crisis of confidence between yesterday's allies. After Dany Sham'un's statement in L'ORIENT-LE JOUR, in which he expressed his

"disappointment with respect to the United States and Israel," Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil stated clearly, in comment on the crisis: "We felt as if we were being turned out of our own house. Our friends sold us out and conspired against us. Lebanon is not abandoned territory, nor is it an American or Soviet province." (Yacht Club speech--AL-NAHAR, dated 29 June 1980)

The state of Lebanon (the legitimate one) shares the view of the Lebanese Front leaders regarding the attitude of the West toward the Lebanese crisis. The Lebanese Government's relations with the French authorities are worse than lukewarm and are almost semi-severed. Three events confirm this crisis of lack of confidence.

The first is French President Giscard d'Estaing's refusal to visit Lebanon during his recent tour of most of the Arab capitals.

The second is Lebanese President Sarkis' receiving Mr George Marchet, the French communist leader. He is one of the leaders of the French opposition, that is, Giscard's opponents.

The third is Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus' statement, in which he declared: "Britain's position regarding the Lebanese crisis is more clear and better understood than the French Government's position."

There is an international diplomatic and media blockade of the Lebanese crisis. President Sham'un talked about this crisis when he stated, criticizing the regime's moves in international policy: "Minister Butrus and President Sarkis must be learning international policy from Abu 'Ammar." The interpretation of the former president's words is that the Lebanese Government must maintain ties or men bridges with all friendly and neutral international parties, in the hope of reaching a satisfactory solution which would restore peace and soveriegnty to Lebanon.

Following Sham'un's statement, the question arises: To what extent is it possible to develop the Lebanese-Soviet flirtation?

If the objective of this flirtation is to annoy Washi[illegible] as Shaykh Amin believes, then this tactic is fragile. But, if it turns into something of a strategy, then it means that Moscow's leaders are no longer betting on just one horse on the Lebanese racecourse as they did in the past, and that their new kind of struggle with Washington might force them to assist and flirt with the strong and active minorities in the Arab East.

The idea of contacting Moscow is not new on the Lebanese scene. At the height of the 2-year war, on the exact day Washington sent its representative, Dean Brown, to Beirut, some priests of al-Kaslik broached the idea of extending a hand [of reconciliation] to Moscow. The author of the idea was Abbot Qazi, who at one time headed the college of Lebanese monastic orders.

An eyewitness recounts the details of the conversation between Mr Brown and Abbot Qazi along the following lines: Abbot Qazi said: "Mr Dean, let us put the war aside. Is it in America's best interests to abandon the Christians

of Lebanon, despite cultural and humanitarian aspects?" Mr Dean replied, "Excuse me, but I must make America's position very clear to you. In short (and he said this in English) Lebanon's Christians can go to hell. We are not fighting for Christians in the East, and you must understand that, for the last time."

Immediately after that meeting, the al-Kaslik group began to study ways of getting in touch with Moscow, on the basis of a theological, philosophical theory that the theory of dialectics, which is the backbone of the Soviet system, is the product of the industrial, Christian society. This theory cannot be widely disseminated in the Islamic, Arab World. Therefore, a time will come when Moscow will clash with the majority of Middle Eastern people. Moscow will not find anyone better able to understand it than the Chrisitians of Lebanon, and some other minorities. It was Abbot Qazi's belief that "there is nothing wrong with solidifying good relations with Moscow, if Moscow aids us, in deed and not words, in rescuing Lebanon from its ordeal."

It is obvious that the analysis of al-Kaslik, especially Abbot Qazi's, was not just a summer night's dream. Moscow was expelled from Egypt in an unseemly manner. Then, her relations with Somalia became strained, and it had to move its guns from the Somali port of Berbera to the Ethiopian port of Massawa. Finally, Moscow has been engaged for several months now in a difficult war in Afghanistan, opposed by the masses with strikes, insurrection and all kinds of weapons.

From Kabul to Bikfayya?

Why not?

There is no room for sentiment in politics, because common interests are eternal inducements for such reversals as these. Although, as some many think, the Phalange is a right-wing party and former Presdient Sham'un is no socialist, Moscow has in the past cooperated with and supported right-wing regimes and non-communist parties, led by the Arab Ba'th Party itself, which was created basically to stop the communist spread in countries of the Arab East.

A strategy or a tactic? That question has become somewhat secondary. With the passage of time, especially in the Arab World, tactics might turn into strategies. Let us wait and see, as the English say. Perhaps the Lebanese war, which began unexpectedly, will end in an unexpected way.

7005
CSO: 4802

SOVIET RECONCILIATORY ROLE IN LEBANON ANALYZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 12 Jul 80 p 14

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Soviet Wood to Cook Lebanese Reconciliation Recipe! Moscow's Positive Neutrality Enters Phase of Practical Initiatives!"]

[Text] Moscow has let it be known that it is ready to offer its good offices for the achievement of Lebanese-Lebanese and Lebanese-Palestinian accord, on the basis of Soviet conviction that the situation in Lebanon must not remain unchanged, and that steps must be taken to correct it.

Informed political sources in the Lebanese capital couple this readiness to mediate with Moscow's current belief that the Lebanese situation, as it now stands, has begun to develop into a factor serving Camp David plans concerning the region.

The Soviet ambassador to Beirut, Mr Soldatov, was charged with conveying his country's readiness to Lebanese Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus during the meeting the two had a few days ago.

Informed Soviet sources in the Lebanese capital declined to clarify whether this Soviet readiness reflected a mere gesture of good will, or constituted a Soviet initiative on behalf of accord in Lebanon. At the same time, the Lebanese foreign minister chose to speak openly and in detail about his meeting with the Soviet ambassador regarding this matter. However, with regard to whether Ambassador Soldatov agreed with him on initiatives which would begin within a specific timeframe, Mr Butrus, in a private meeting, was content to say that the Soviet ambassador discussed the Lebanese situation with him in all its internal, Arab and international dimensions, and expressed his country's readiness to assist in achieving reconciliation.

Ever since the beginning of the crisis, or Lebanon's ordeal, the Soviet Union's public positions have remained limited to public expressions of support for Lebanon's unity and independence. This is the first time that Soviet statements have been made on readiness to participate in solving specific aspects of the Lebanese crisis, namely, Lebanese-Lebanese and Lebanese-Palestinian reconciliation in Lebanon.

One must refer at this point to the fact that this Soviet readiness was preceded by several meetings and dialogues between the Soviet ambassador to Beirut and the Lebanese Front, represented by both former President Camille Sham'un and Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, head of the war council of the Lebanese Phalange Party. As has become known, these dialogues dealt with the Maronite position in general, the Syrian role in Lebanon, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, and what guarantees Moscow could give regarding the Syrian role and the future of the Palestinian presence.

Those who are knowledgeable about the Soviet contacts with the Lebanese Maronite front are aware that the dialogue which took place was conducted in a positive atmosphere. They emphasize that the readiness conveyed by Ambassador Soldatov to Minister Butrus was a result of the dialogue which Soldatov had with Camille Sham'un and Bashir al-Jumayyil. This dialogue represented moves started by Moscow to create the necessary atmosphere for a new political initiative. This time, it would be comprehensive in nature, not confined as before to the Palestinians and their leftist allies in the Lebanese National Movement.

The Soviets have not so far begun to translate their new readiness into practical steps and initiatives. The conviction which continues to be held by senior Lebanese officials, especially President Ilyas Sarkis, is that any practical Soviet assistance to Lebanon has to start with the Palestinians.

The simple explanation for this Lebanese belief is that Moscow, as a superpower, has by itself sufficient influence on the Palestinians to convince them of the need to carry out whatever would help Lebanon to regain its unity and accord among its people.

Some Lebanese officials believe that if this positive Soviet readiness is motivated by a desire to combat Camp David plans and pull the Lebanese situation out of the zone of pressure being applied by the Camp David parties, the results of this Soviet readiness would surely appear now and manifest themselves in facilitating the success of the efforts of Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis to form a government of national reconciliation.

Efforts to form this reconciliatory government are apparently still at an impasse, and are awaiting the results of the continuous efforts of the Syrian Government to resolve the difficult problem of former President Sulayman Franjiyah. He still rejects the formation of and his participation in a cabinet of political activists, as long as it requires effective Phalange Party participation in it.

The outgoing prime minister, Dr Salim al-Huss, who has played an indirect advisory role in creating this conviction [in Soviet ability to influence the Palestinians], is the winner in this situation, especially following a meeting held between him and President Ilyas Sarkis. Right after the meeting, al-Huss told some of his political friends that the president had lost hope with respect to forming a government of political activists, and that he is now in the process of investigating alternatives.

A day or two before President Sarkis met with al-Huss, the presidential palace had not completely switched to this new frame of mind. But a close friend who has just visited the palace confirmed the feeling that President Sarkis has begun preparing to turn his attention away from a government of activists.

This politician friend asked the president to clarify this point, and put the following question to him: "In the event a government of reconciliation and political activists cannot be formed, to what extent would you say there is a possibility of forming a government like the one that has resigned, or at least re-establishing the outgoing government?"

President Sarkis replied, "We do not wish to talk just yet about alternatives to a government of activists. If we did so, we would weaken the idea of such a government and the climate in which it grew. And we would thereby turn the spotlight on matters of form at the expense of substance."

The President went on to say: "Therefore, I would not want to even talk about a different type of government, even though I have very little hope left of being able to form a government of activists. We must continue to devote our total attention to a government of national reconciliation, and all initiatives and contacts must be based on this idea."

The political friend returned from his visit to the palace completely convinced that the president is serious about pursuing the task of forming a government of reconciliation, and that he would not cease his efforts in this regard, even if it took the entire month of July. The President feels that if he became ultimately convinced that all doors are shut in the face of a government of activists, there would be no problem in forming a new government, like the one that resigned, with an hour or a very few days at the outside.

The issue, with regard to President Sarkis, is not a simple matter of winning or losing in this effort. The initiative to form a government of reconciliation began with and continues to stem from a deep-rooted conviction that a government of activists would provide the right solution [for the crisis]. At the same time, such a government represents a last opportunity for President Sarkis before the end of his term, of which only 2 years remain. It also represents a last opportunity for a united Lebanon whose single entity is still threatened with disintegration and extinction. Consequently, failure to form a government of reconciliation would mean a very great deal. Success would also mean a very great deal, because it would mean the beginning of the end [of the crisis] as President Sarkis says.

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CSO: 4802

CORRUPTION OF MEMBERS OF PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES DISCLOSED

Tripoli AL-ZAHAF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 30 Jun 80 pp 20-21

[Article: "Serious Facts Discovered by the People's Committees"]

[Text] Beware of the Danger of Foreign Companies.
Busts: A Study Presented by the People's Committees.
Arab Slaves or Jewish Capitalists?

As a result of the serious facts uncovered by the People's Committees on the basis of conclusive evidence, it has become evident to the revolutionary people that some of those who live among them pretend to be pure and honest, but in reality are filled with deadly poison. These elements want to ruin the people who took it upon themselves to protect the gains and capabilities brought about by the revolution of the conqueror.

The bad practices of the exploitative society, of those who have sick souls and petrified consciences, are enough evidence of betrayal by these people of their nation. The nation always paid a heavy price of blood and wealth for their sake in the hope that they would rise to relieve the nation of its heavy burdens. But through their ugly practices, of which the People's Committees are presenting samples, they wanted to harm their nation and to drag it into unwanted aimless imperialistic schemes.

The People's Committees are busting corrupt people wherever they are found. Without any desire to seek fame or praise, these committees are trying to make the corrupt drop their imperialistic masks behind which they always try to hide. They pretend that they want to help the developing countries through companies which hide poison in their fangs.

The People's Committees seek to warn the helpless nations and to request that they right wrongs and take measures to reform past imperialist corruption and thwart continued imperialist efforts to corrupt. These nations should learn from their mistakes to become immune to the deceptive practices of imperialism, its conspiracies and its hatred for the peoples who seek freedom.

Competition Between Money and Conscience

The secretary general of the People's Committee for al-Mukhtar (al-Amin?) sold his conscience for 420 [sic] DM to a German company in 1978-79, and deposited this amount in his private account in Zurich.

During a period of 2 years, 1976-1977, he received from the Yugoslavian Milyunoritsch company the sum of 14,000 dinars, and an additional sum of 20,000 dinars in the month of August 1979. He deposited all this money in his private account in Zurich. He also received a commission of £10,000 from a British company, and he deposited this amount in his account in London. He has accounts in America, in Germany and in Switzerland. In America he has $6,000; in England, he has $9,000 and £700; and in Switzerland he has 210,000 DM. In addition, he has received a total of 29,000 dinars in cash bribes and gifts.

This was all taken at the expense of the masses which put him in his position.

He spent 1.185 million DM in bars and nightclubs. He used foreigners who work in Libya to smuggle his money, such as an engineer in the Misrata Road Construction Company, and a contractor who owns a consulting firm in Tripoli and has a branch in Germany.

He purchased foreign currency equivalent to 1.782 million dinars. His bank account in Libya is only 300 dinars, but he owns the following:

A Mercedes 450 SAL costing 20,000 dinars,

A BMW 520 costing 7,000 dinars,

(Land Carriers?) costing 30,000 dinars,

A camper costing 3,700 dinars,

A Fiat 131 costing 700 dinars,

A house under construction in which he has so far invested 50,000 dinars,

A total of 7,000 dinars in cash in his house.

Withdrawals from his bank account totalled 339,736 dinars.

He employs 13 foreign male and female employees of various professions.

He used these employees to smuggle his money outside the country.

A False Statement for 4,000 Dinars

The president of the transportation union in Ghiryan and vice president of the union in Tripoli was able to take illegal cash bribes from certain contractors.

He received a bribe of 4,000 dinars in return for delaying the takeover of a quarry that belonged to someone else, and for issuing a false statement on the radio to the effect that the takeover had actually occurred. This was done without the knowledge of the responsible committee.

He also received 500 dinars for the purpose of purchasing furniture for the union. Instead, he kept the money.

He also received a Peugeot 504 from a road construction company and 7,000 dinars from a contractor.

He received a bribe of more than 4,000 dinars from the Five Continents Company.

In addition, he received a bribe of 3,000 dinars from al-Amal company. Another 3,000 dinars were given to him by a contractor in exchange for a letter allowing the contractor to bring workers from abroad.

Prefers the Zionists Over the Arabs

This man is an accountant in the general administration of the postal service. He is in charge of all accounts related to projects and contracts. Being the only employee responsible for these accounts, it became very easy for him to do anything he wished. He has been in this job for 8 years and has received bribes in the form of money from foreign companies in return for certain favors during the execution of their projects. He studies the bids of these companies and then draws up the financing of the proposed projects. He received a bribe of 14,300 dinars from the French (Tousson?) Company through the company of Bleu-Duron-Asmar. He also received a bribe of 1,500 dinars from the representative of that same company.

From the Japanese company, Linsbun, he took a bribe of 12,770 dinars through Aytu-Sada-Hamanka-Kujima company.

From an American communications company, he received, through the company's representative, Cordyred, the sum of 25,000 dinars. In addition to all these bribes, he received commissions and luxurious trips at the expense of foreign companies. In fact, these corrupt actions were committed at the expense of the Libyan treasury. The conscience of these people were bought at the expense of the Libyan people who trusted them, in return for this trust, the people received ingratitude.

As for the bank accounts of this postal service man in Arab and non-Arab banks, he has 14,200 dinars in the International Bank of London; 2,700 dinars in the Arab Bank in Amman; 1,400 dinars in al-Zarqa' Bank in Jordan; and 50 dinars in the main office of the National Commercial Bank in Libya.

Favors to Foreign Companies and Bribes from the Peoples' Money

A surveyor working as a supervisor in the department of highways received bribes totaling 28,920 dinars from foreign companies in exchange for certain favors.

He received a bribe of 8,870 dinars from a representative of a French company, and a bribe of 4,000 dinars from a representative of another French company called Coursac.

From the Japanese company, Nisbun, he received 6,550 dinars in addition to other cash bribes he received from individuals.

Bribes and Cars in Return for Favors

The commercial director of the National Company of Trade and Machinery received a total of 16,000 dinars in bribes from foreign companies.

He was expecting a bribe of $203,000 and a BMW car from a certain individual.

He received from the Belgian company, Holmz, 30,000 dinars directly; 30,600 dinars through a person in Switzerland; and 7,850 dinars through a person in Italy.

The sums of 15,000 dinars from a person called Sahandal, 118,000 dinars from the Conitho Caro company, and 15,000 from another person were on their way to him.

Favors from Libyan Banks and Foreign Accounts

Banking favors to a businessman and previously a contractor at the al-Wafa' Contracting and Trading Company totaled 760,000 dinars from al-Wahda Bank, 200,000 dinars from the National Commercial Bank and an additional 160,000 dinars from the same bank.

As for his foreign accounts, he has 25,000 dinars at the Deutche Bank in Germany. Also, he was able to smuggle 200,000 dinars to Alexandria in order to enrich the treasury of the defeated Sadat.

As for bribes, they were all in gold and silver with an estimated value of 2,800 dinars. This is in addition to the numerous properties he owns.

The estimated cost of buildings he owns is 210,000 dinars. In addition to that, he has 15,000 dinars worth of land, 900,000 dinars worth of machinery and agricultural equipment.

The Love of Money Twisted His Mind

The total value of bank transfers to foreign countries, for the secretary of the Mediterranean Hotel Company, reached 305,000 dinars. The transfers amounted to 286,000 dinars to the Agricultural Bank in Rome; 12,000 dinars to a bank in Lausanne, Switzerland; and an additional 3,500 dinars to this same account. From the owner of Juwandi Company, he received 4,000 dinars, in addition to other bribes. He took all this by virtue of the position he was trusted with by the people. The proverb says: "Beware of those to whom you have done good."

Computer Would Fail to Add Up the Wealth of One Person

The wealth of a contractor in Benghazi could be invested in productive projects which would be beneficial to the people. The glitter of money dazzles these individuals who rob the people and deposit their loot in foreign banks to be used for imperialist purposes.

Another example of such persons is a contractor who owns buildings on al-Fatih Street. The buildings which contain 40 apartments and 16 stores are valued at 450,000 dinars.

He owns a store for spare parts which has an estimated value of 160,000 dinars.

He has purchased a 100 donum farm for 100,000 dinars. On this farm he has what is worth 200,000 dinars in buildings.

He owns an asphalt making factory valued at 60,000 dinars and road machinery valued at 100,000 dinars.

He has other investments in some factories, such as the tile factory in which he has invested 17,000 dinars.

In addition, he owns a quarry valued at 50,000 dinars, a herd of 600 sheep, and gold valued at 10,000 dinars.

What this immoral person owns now is estimated at two million dinars.

Bribes, Smuggling and Punishment

The secretary of the National Committee for Trade and Equipment used his position to accumulate wealth at the expense of the people.

He received bribes totaling 162,100 dinars from foreign companies operating inside and outside the country. This was in return for importing construction materials for sale in Libya at exorbitant prices. He used his position to facilitate transactions for a businessman who smuggled 65,000 dinars to his son who fled to live in an enemy country.

Has a Monthly Salary of 550 Dinars and Receives Bribes!

In a very short time, a member of a certain peoples' committee was able to receive a 24,000 dinar bribe, 13,000 dinars in commissions and a trailer.

8988
CSO: 4802

MILITARY SECURITY IN GULF NATIONS SURVEYED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Aug-Sep 80 pp 53-72

[Article by Philippe Rondot]

[Text] The holding of the American hostages in Iran and the failure of the attempt made at liberating them, the occupation of the Great Mosque in Mecca in Saudi Arabia, exacerbation of the tension on the border between Iraq and Iran and the reinforcement of the American and Soviet fleets in the Indian Ocean, on the doorstep of the Straits of Hormuz, even while the Red Army tries to "normalize" Afghanistan, have only increased the chances of conflict in this zone of ultra-sensitivity for the industrialized world.

In a recent edition, August-September 1979, Admiral Henri Labrousse and Philippe Rondot focused their attention on the Gulf, already the subject of growing fears in the West since its Persian coast had become the theater for a revolution which it was feared would spread. Bringing his observations up to date on a region he has traversed from Dhofar to Shatt al-Arab, Philippe Rondot, deputy mission chief at the Center for Advanced Studies on modern Africa and Asia, today sketches, in broad strokes, the outline of this potential theater of operations.

An editorial in the newspaper TIMES OF INDIA published in 1899 ended with this somber prediction: "It is around the Persian Gulf that the political storms of the future are preparing [to be born], and it is there that the real battle for political domination will be fought." At the time, the British had just imposed their protectorate on Oman (1891) and Kuwait (1899), and had secured against [the danger of] pirates free circulation of commercial vessels. They were thinking only of their Indian empire. In 1980, the Emirates, independent now, are profusely wealthy from their oil; Great Britain withdrew, in 1971, to the west of Suez; the Iran of the

Pahlavis, which had turned itself into the protector of the Gulf with the consent and assistance of the United States, has become an Islamic republic; the Soviet Union, with its army now in Afghanistan, could tomorrow sweep down on the Straits of Hormuz; the Americans, disabled, are trying to redeploy their military strength. The conclusion of the editorial in the TIMES OF INDIA could be that of the pages which follow.

Doubtless many of the fears that many feel at this time for preservation of peace in the Gulf are not new, since the oil crisis born out of the last Israeli-Arab war of October 1973 clearly demonstrated the West's energy dependence. They were considerably aggravated for several months, especially after the President of the United States, in his State of the Union message before Congress, in Washington, on 23 January, clearly stated that "any attempt by an external power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region would be considered as an attack against the vital interests of the United States and it would be resisted by all means including the use of armed force." (1)

The Gulf has thus become a potential theater of operations about which it would be good to understand the important political and military facts, in their national aspects and in their regional and international contexts, before examining the appropriate means of providing for its security.

A Tangle of Sensitive Points

A long (800 km) arm of the sea with a surface of about 250,000 km^2, the Gulf, whose steep Iranian shoreline contrasts with a flat and often marshy Arab shoreline, offers an exceptional concentration of sensitive points: social (populations), economic (oil installations), and strategic (communications); all these can be targets for political or military action. Their overlap among the states, most of whom at their young age must remain fragile, adds to their vulnerability.

Despite the fears expressed, the riverine Arab countries have not so far suffered the effects of the Shiite revolution on the opposite bank. President Saddam Husayn has made use of all arguments, including that of [the use of] force (2), to forestall an uprising of Iraqi Shi'ites (5.5 percent [of the Iraqi population]), who moreover differ rather significantly from their better organized and more politicized Iranian co-religionists. The threat, however, remains: in Kuwait (35 percent Shi'ite), in Bahrain especially (60 percent), in Saudi Arabia (about 5 percent), in the United Arab Emirates [UAE] (Dubai first of all), the vigilance shown by the authorities, accompanied on occasion by relatively severe repression, has contained an Islamic-populist effervescence which was expressed by various mob activities and inflamed speeches. This apparent calm should not generate any illusions: because of the role played by Islam, the impact of the Iranian revolution has been serious enough to affect not only Shi'ites, but also some Sunnites. The existence of a Shi'ite majority [sic] in Iraq, traditionally restive, concentrated mainly in the south part

of the country and still imperfectly integrated into political life, like the presence of numerous Shi'ites (35 percent) among the oil workers in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia (the Qatif region), are potential centers of agitation (3).

The resurgence of nationalist feelings in the ethnic minorities constitutes another factor of instability. The Kurds of Iraq, who for long years successfully opposed the central government, are not all equally content with the implementation of the autonomy that was granted them in March 1974. Those in Iran, their weapons in their hands, show their discontent at not having obtained from the new leaders any more consideration for their rights than in the time of the shah's reign. They may be joined, in these autonomist demands, by the Azerbaijani Turks, the Turcomans, the Baluchis, the Pashtuns, and the Arabs of Khuzistan. A handful of irreducible Dhofari rebels is still resisting the army of Sultan Qabus of Oman. The exploitation of these regional particularisms which are still flourishing--the Kurds and Arabs by Iraq against Iran, the Baluchis by the Soviets against Pakistan, the Dhofaris by South Yemen against Oman--is no longer, in some cases, a mere hypothesis.

Another nationalism can be exploited with even more serious results: that of the Palestinians. There are 300,000 in Kuwait in a populace wherein the nationals (less than 45 percent) are already in the minority. There as elsewhere, their competence and dynamism have often placed them in positions of responsibility. Since Yasir Arafat, head of the PLO, threatened to send his commandos to block the Straits of Hormuz or blow up the oil wells (4), one is aware even more keenly of the influence wielded by this Palestinian community present everywhere in the Gulf, except in Oman, and which up to now has remained relatively peaceful.

Moreover, it is partly due to the influence of the Palestinians that the local leftist forces have obtained the establishment of some form of democracy. Kuwait first, then Bahrain in this way for several years benefited from their only parliamentary experience. If it was put to an end, in August 1975 in Bahrain and in August 1976 in Kuwait, in order to curb progressive pressures, the re-establishment of this practice is not excluded by the leaders. In Iraq, the Baas party in power has agreed to parliamentary elections, the first in 22 years (5). In Saudi Arabia, King Khalid decided in March 1980, that a consultative council of some 60 appointed members should exercise legislative powers (6).

Preoccupied by the awakening of these socio-political forces, the government is not always certain to present a united front. In Iran, the multiplicity of centers of power enfeebles the authority of the government. In Iraq, tensions within Baas maintain a dangerous climate of suspicion. In Saudi Arabia and in the Emirates, intra-dynastic rivalries, which show up in the apportionment of official conferments and in successions, require a continual effort at balancing of powers, often at the cost of efficiency.

To these concerns for internal order is added the persistence of border conflicts or territorial claims involving Iran (Iraq-Iran, Bahrain-Iran, UAE-Iran) and also the Arab states among themselves (Iraq-Kuwait, Qatar-Bahrain, Saudi Arabia-Oman-UAE, Saudi Arabia-Yemen). Reconciliations, even when translated into treaties, have a character all the more ephemeral because external threats are often brandished as a means of re-solidifying national cohesion.

This cohesion also suffers from the presence of a multitude of immigrant workers (55 percent in Kuwait, 60 percent in Qatar, 75 percent in the UAE, 20 percent in Saudi Arabia) who could play a swing role for forces thirsting for power (7). The fact that a large number are employed in the oil industry aggravates the vulnerability of these installations, which by their concentration are already quite vulnerable (8).

Finally, one last sensitive point, and not the least: the celebrated Straits of Hormuz through which pass, as we know, 80 super-tankers per day. Its two navigable channels, in a rough area strewn with islets and rocks, in shallow water (45 to 65 m), within artillery range of the two banks (35 km wide) can be controlled, indeed blockaded, with little difficulty. Soviet bombers starting from Afghanistan are in direct range of this vital artery.

Local Disparate Military Potential

The national armies of the Gulf were fashioned in accordance with the ambitions or concerns of the riverine states. These latter being diverse, even opposed, for reasons that are at once geographical, demographic, or political, no balance of forces exists. One constant, however, emerges: all the countries, except perhaps Oman, have the financial means necessary to create an effective instrument of defense (9).

In order to make his country the dominant power in the region, the shah of Iran wanted to make his army the finest in the East. His objectives--the augmentation of mobility, almost total mechanization, sophistication in armaments, the creation of special rapid intervention forces--were attained, with the help of the United States (10), even though he lost his throne, without even being able to use this formidable battle force to serve him (if it would) as an ultimate recourse. Even more than the land army, largely deployed in the south starting in the Seventies, the air force, whose strength in manpower grew eightfold between 1965 and 1976, benefited from this effort. As to the navy, whose development was equally impressive, based on new facilities built at Kharg, Bouchir, and Bandar-Abbas, it had a sphere of action extending far beyond the Gulf, to the configuration of which it was perfectly adapted (a flotilla of hovercraft), for extending beyond Hormuz into the Indian Ocean.

In passing from the traditional military authority to the poorly defined guardianship of the Islamic republic, the Iranian army lost much of its operational efficiency. Suspiciously viewed at first by the new regime

which feared the emergence within it of a counter-revolutionary current, weakened by desertions (60 percent), next committed in the bloody repression of Kurdish separatism, it presently shows signs of malaise serious enough that the government is thinking of totally reorganizing it (11). Only the navy, perhaps, has been able partly to escape this disintegration. In any case, the air-naval maneuvers of May 1980 in the Straits of Hormuz, supervised by President Bani Sadr, would tend to prove (and to make known) that republican Iran remains determined to maintain in the Gulf some of the ambitions of the fallen empire.

Saudi Arabia, seeing as early as 1970 the impressive arsenal of the shah and desirous of setting bounds to his hegemonic designs, undertook in its turn to strengthen its military capacity. It tried to compensate for weakness in manpower levels (44,500 men) by effectiveness and sophistication of equipment, which explains the very high level of military expenditure ($1,000 per inhabitant in 1976-1977). Parallel with the army, a national guard of more than 20,000 men recruited from the tribes of the Nedj, commanded by Prince Abdallah (12) is specially entrusted with the protection of the dynasty and the surveillance of oil installations. But this defense apparatus is not yet effectively cohesive.

The conditions in which occurred the occupation of Mecca by "renegades," in November 1979, and the difficulties in subjugating them, showed not only weaknesses in the general security apparatus of the kingdom, but also the inadequacies of the forces and of some of the staffs. The reorganization of commands, improvements in training, the establishment of obligatory military service, the decision to build up the army to 300,000 men and the national guard to 75,000 men by 1985, the construction of several multi-functional military bases spread out all over the kingdom (13), and the creation of a navy (with the help of France) are the next steps Saudi Arabia wants to take in the climb to power it is presently pursuing.

The small Emirates of the Gulf have more modest plans. Bahrain and Qatar have only a few battalions, rather well equipped to be sure, charged with maintaining internal order and coastal surveillance. Their air forces, practically nonexistent, could eventually be equipped with Mirage 2000's (14). Kuwait was the first Emirate to provide itself with a small modern army, well supplied with armor, airplanes (18 Mirage F-1's) and means of anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense. These precautions are explained by the fact that its powerful neighbor to the north, Iraq, has not completely backed off from its territorial claims, and that tension persists on the borders separating the two states.

The Federation of United Arab Emirates disposes of fairly considerable forces if one compares them to the population and the dimensions of the country. It is true that, despite the existence of a federal army, several emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and Ra's al-Khaimah) also maintain l al armies, one of which, that of Abu Dhabi, is clearly bigger than that of the federal state. The decision, made in November 1976 by the supreme council, to unify the military forces, like that of May 1975 to authorize

the federal force alone to dispose of air, land, and naval armaments, is thus not formally implemented. The presence of a majority of mercenaries (Omanis in particular) and the traditional rivalry between Sheikh Rachid of Dubai and Zayed, emir of Abu Dhabi and president of the federation, add to the confusion, paralyzing a defense system which is having trouble freeing itself from tribal constraints.

The army of the Sultanate of Oman is distinguished from the other armies of the Arabian peninsula by the fact that it is the only one to have fought a rebellion, namely that of Dhofar. Staffed by British officers, composed partly of mercenaries (Baluchis), supported starting in 1973 by an Iranian expeditionary corps, it succeeded in putting down the revolt at the end of 1975. Since then, Sultan Qabus has continued the modernization (acquisition of 12 Jaguars) and has been trying to "Omanize" his troops. On permanent state of alert against the ever-present possibility of a resumption of the Dhofari rebellion, the Omani army is thus maintaining itself at a high operational level. Foreign assistance, since the Iranian withdrawal, is nevertheless still indispensable.

The Iraqi army is the strongest Arab army in the Gulf, although at least until recently its missions did not particularly extend to this zone. Strongly politicized, by tradition (15), it has been trained and equipped, with the help of the Soviets, to contribute to the Arab war effort in the Near East conflict. While this army has effectively participated in [that effort] (in 1973, 13,000 men and 250 tanks were dispatched to the Syrian front), it has above all been used to fight against Barzani's Kurds, from 1969 to 1975. The crushing of the Kurdish movement is not so much due to the effectiveness of its campaigns as to the fact that the shah of Iran, in accordance with the terms of the Iranian-Iraqi agreement of March 1975, brutally ended the support he was giving to Mustapha Barzani.

Endowed with an imposing armor-park, having a high-quality air force (especially the Mirage F-1's), the Iraqi military is not yet capable of ranging enough warships (16) to claim to figure honorably in the Gulf. This insufficiency of naval forces also explains why up to now Baghdad has not risked aggravating the dispute with its Iranian neighbor. It explains also why Saddam Husayn too has decided to get himself a naval force, in the creation of which France should be involved. Alongside the regular army there is a popular force of more than 75,000 men, endowed with its own materiel and forming the pretorian guard of the Baas regime.

Foreign Military Presence

The foreign military presence in the region must be distinguished according to whether it is deployed within or outside the Gulf, that is, in the Indian Ocean and the riverine countries (Oman, South Yemen, Somalia, Kenya, and India), and also according to whether it is of a permanent or temporary nature, and finally according to the diverse forms it assumes: bases, port calls, advisers, arms supply.

Even within the Gulf, this presence remains limited: all the riverine countries are against the ostentatious deployment of foreign forces. In Bahrain the United States has only port facilities in the military part of the port of Jufair formerly run by Great Britain: piers, some military huts, light maintenance personnel for three warships, whose flagship is the "LaSalle." On 27 June 1977, Bahrain and the United States decided to terminate an agreement giving the American fleet the right to utilize the installations (17).

It certainly seems that this was only a false retreat, for the American presence, indeed discreet, remains. The isle of Bahrain in fact offers the advantage of being in the heart of the Gulf and of being a principal node for aerial communications in the region.

What the Soviet navy has in the Iraqi port of Oum Qasr is scarcely better: there too it is just port facilities, with supply depots and repair shops. The United States and the Soviet Union are set upon keeping these facilities because they justify their units taking shore liberty frequently there and because they offer the possibility of reinforcing an armed naval presence at any moment.

With respect to Moscow, this privilege assumes greater significance, since it results from the implementation of the Soviet-Iraqi treaty of friendship and cooperation of April 1972, which apparently seems not to have suffered as a result of the fairly tangible cooling of relations between the two countries since 1977 (18). More than 800 Soviet advisers are helping the Iraqi army, for which the Eastern countries remain the principal source of supply. If Kuwait, which along with Iraq is the only Arab country in the Gulf to maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, has embarked with this country on a modest program of military cooperation (purchase of missiles) since 1976, at least it refuses to expand this [cooperation] to the presence of advisers (19).

The apparent ambiguity of American-Saudi relations, which suffers (20) from misunderstandings or from differing views on the modalities of peace between Arabs and Israelis, is not translated into a slowdown in military cooperation, even if one discerns, among Saudi leaders, considerable irritation with American vacillation in Iranian affairs and with White House reluctance to authorize the delivery of more sophisticated armaments. It is notwithstanding the case that least 60 percent of Saudi military contracts are signed with the United States, which underwrites the biggest share of arms supplies (with the exception of French tanks), technical assistance, personnel training, conception, realization of logistical infrastructure, and maintains in the country several hundred advisers or technicians, civilian and military.

The disorganization of the apparatus of state prevailing in Iran does not permit us to be sure whether the Soviet Union can hope to turn the eviction of the Americans to its advantage and launch [a program of] military cooperation (21). It is also not certain that the present leaders would

be disposed to do so, those who support the Afghan revolt against the Red Army. The time will come however when Tehran will have to think seriously about re-filling its inventory of materiel, which already suffers from the absense of upkeep and spare parts.

The foreign military presence within the Gulf, where on the Arab bank the United States seems to hold the advantage, has less reason to be circumspect once outside the Straits of Hormuz. Opposite its outlets, in the Sea of Oman, American and Soviet fleets are building up and watching each other. The Soviet Union now has some 30 warships cruising (10 combat, 16 support), supplemented during maneuvers by several nuclear attack submarines or the aircraft carrier "Minsk." Several hundred marines are on these ships which include electronic warfare craft and logistical support vessels. The United States for its part is doing no less, and can bring to bear as much naval transport from the West (25). The necessity for the Soviet Union to become an oil importer, starting in 1985 probably, is another explanation of its effort to penetrate the Gulf. Moscow denies it, of course. The Soviet Union "does not covet the wealth of others," Leonid Brezhnev says, in January 1980, but it could not notice without reacting to the appearance "on its southern border of a source of serious threats to its security," he adds. In other words, if the region belongs to a "sphere of vital interest," it is rather that of the Soviet Union than that of the United States.

The disappearance as a regional power of the Iran allied with the Americans, chosen and equipped by them to stand guard in their place over their interests in the region, has provoked a fresh review of their local strategy. The present doctrine seems to start from the principle that there must be no more reliance on "proxy-powers," but rather to guarantee the threatened order by itself, through a combination of its own military and economic power (26). Washington would also like to rely on its Egyptian and Israeli allies who dispose of the two most powerful armies in the Near East and are agreed to supply to the [American] co-signatory of the Camp David accords the logistical facilities (use of air bases) [needed] to complete its dispositions to the west of the Gulf. In fact, what men like Zbigniew Brzezinski and Harold Brown in Washington would like is the constitution of a veritable regional military alliance which would include not only Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, but also Israel.

The still uncertain future of the Iranian revolution, and the still less foreseeable future of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, have certainly sensitized the Arab regimes in the Gulf to their defense problems, but not to the point that they would rush to get under an American "umbrella," whose flimsiness moreover has been shown by recent events. To entrust its security to the West would require assurance that the latter will have the means and above all the political will to intervene. It would also require a definition of the conditions and limitations of intervention in such a way that there would be no doubt (or ambiguity) about intentions. It would, finally, imply the ability to squeeze out a consensus on this subject. The capabilities of the West being in doubt, American intentions remaining unclear, and unanimity being far from being achieved, the Arab

countries of the Gulf have, without exception, beginning naturally with Iraq, clearly expressed their intention not to leave the responsibility for maintaining internal order in the Gulf to any but their own forces.

This option, which Saudi Arabia reconfirms again in January 1980, by affirming that it does not want to accord any military facilities to the United States or to tolerate the presence on its territory of foreign troops or equipment (radar-aircraft notably), implies that the riverine states are redefining their defense policy. Thus one sees that the share of the budget reserved for the armed forces has grown perceptibly in 1979-1980, and that purchases of armaments, along with technical assistance, mostly from Western firms, have grown larger (27). The United States, but also France, Great Britain, Italy, and the Federal Republic of Germany are thus making, indirectly, their contribution to the defense of the Gulf. But this effort in equipment remains futile without the human resources [needed] to use the materiel acquired. This is doubtless not the case with Iraq, but it is already to some extent with Saudi Arabia and most certainly with various Emirates, those that must resort to a large number of foreigners for their forces.

However, the most serious aspect of the question is not in recruitment, even if it is an immediate problem, but rather in the difficulty of integrating into a system of collective security these different forces, some of which lack any truly national character. The problem is not new, since already in the time of the shah it was posed but couldn't be solved (failure of the Muscat conference of October 1976), because of Iranian pretensions (to remain the kingpin) and Iraqi fears (concerning the preservation of freedom of navigation). The Khomeyni revolution then came to give the Saudi leaders the opportunity to renew the discussions, leaving Iran aside. After having dropped the abiding suspiciousness with which it viewed the Iraqi Baas regime, by proceeding to sign, on 20 September 1979, a treaty of mutual defense with Iraq, Saudi Arabia on 16 October convokes a conference at Taef. This comes to grief on the choice of alliances to set up: American for the Sultan of Oman, to whom the United States had just promised $100 million for the protection of Hormuz, inter-Arab for the other participants, among which group, however, Iraq is not found. On 8 Feburary 1980, this country will propose a charter condemning all foreign military presence in the Arab world and calling for the formation of an inter-Arab force capable of coming to the rescue of any member state of the Arab League whose security should be threatened.

Despite the failure of Taef and despite ideological conflicts, several accords now exist between these different Arab states at the level of police and intelligence organizations, but Iraq, Kuwait, and even more so North Yemen remain still opposed to the establishment of a regional defense pact as well as to the Omani initiatives aimed at "internationalizing" protection of the Straits of Hormuz. Riyadh is thus still searching for an Arab defense formula which, in spirit, would cover not only protection of the Gulf but would also neutralize the threat from South Yemen, felt even more keenly in the wake of the Mecca affair.

Iran, for its part, is concerned both by the pressure of Iraq on its borders and by the consequences for the economy of a solid American blockade. The tour of the Arab Gulf made by Sadeq Ghotbzadeh in May 1980, in the course of which he mentioned the possibility of calling for large-scale cooperation with the socialist bloc and hinted at the role Shi'ite minorities could play, illustrates the pressures to which the riverine Arab countries are subjected. If their leaders, who today are demanding strategic independence, delay in coming to agreement on a plan for collective defense, it is because they fear that to make it credible they would have to fall into dependence on a third power, in this instance the United States (28). If that should be the case, they would have to take into account the opposition from their own people, who may be more sensitized than they seem by the "anti-imperialist" professions of faith emanating from Tehran or elsewhere.

It is indeed important for the West to demonstrate its solidarity with the Arab countries of the Gulf. It is no less important for this to be accomplished with discernment, taking into consideration these constraints of every kind, quickly summarized, that prevail in this zone of tensions.



Key:

1. Legend
2. Scale: 1 to 2,000,000
3. Flow of maritime traffic
4. Depths are expressed in meters

1 **Tableau : les potentiels militaires des pays du Golfe**

	2 Arabie Saoudite	3 Bahrein	4 Fédération des Émirats Arabes Unis	5 Irak	6 Iran (prérévolutionnaire)	7 Koweit	8 Oman	9 Qatar
10 Superficie (km²)	2.225.000	598	77.400	438.446	1.648.000	17.820	300 000	10 360
11 Population	7.984.000	355.000	905.000	12.730.000	39.330.000	1.200 000	870 000	210 000
12 Service militaire	conscription 38 a/c 1980	volontaire 39	conscrits 40	2 ans 41	1 an 42	18 mois 43	volontaire 44	volontaire 45
13 Forces armées	44.500	2.300	25.150 (1)	222.000	415 000	11.000	19 200 (2)	4.700
14 P.N.B. (1977) en dollars	64.2 M (4) (1978)	1.7 M	12.0 M	15.5 M (1978)	75.1 M	11.9 M	2.55 M (1978)	1 M
15 Dépenses militaires (1979) en dollars	14.18 M	98 m (5)	750 m	2.02 M (1978)	9.94 M	336 m	688 m	61 m (1978)
16 **Armée de terre :**								
17 Hommes	35.000	-	23.500	190.000	285.000	9.000	16.200	4.000
18 Chars	623	-	60	1.800	1.870	400	-	18
19 Blindés légers	1.886	102	371	2.900	2.000	200	36	70
20 Artillerie sol-sol	260	-	20	1.600	710	318	36	12
21 Artillerie A.A.	175	-	80	1.500	1.900	140	?	15
22 **Armée de l'Air :**								
23 Hommes	8.000	-	750	28.000	100.000	1.900 (2)	2 100 (2)	300
24 Chasse	180	-	39	354	447	55	24	11
25 Transport	33	-	13	39	+ 90 (3)	4	28	-
26 Hélicoptères	37	12	38	228	+ 350	36	21	6
27 **Marine :**								
28 Hommes	1.500	-	900	4.000	30.000	200	900	400
29 Patrouilleurs	4	-	9	29		25	9	9
30 Vedettes	4	3	10	10		3	-	11
31 Dragueurs	6	-	-	5	46 Voir	-	-	-
32 Débarquement	6	-	-	3	Tableau	-	-	-
33 Sous-marins	-	-	-	-	annexe	-	-	-
34 Divers	17	10	16	8		5	7	-

35 (1) Seule a été prise en considération l'armée fédérale
36 (2) Nationaux seulement
37 (3) Dont des ravitailleurs en vol
47 (4) M milliards
48 (5) m millions

Key: (Table)

1. Table: Military Potential of the Gulf Countries
2. Saudi Arabia
3. Bahrain
4. Federation of United Arab Emirates
5. Iraq
6. Iran (pre-revolutionary)
7. Kuwait
8. Oman
9. Qatar
10. Surface area (km^2)
11. Population
12. Military service
13. Armed forces
14. GNP (1977) in dollars
15. Military Expenditures (1979) in dollars
16. Land Forces
17. Men
18. Tanks
19. Light Armored [vehicles]
20. Ground to Ground Artillery
21. Anti-aircraft Artillery
22. Air Force
23. Men
24. Fighters
25. Transport
26. Helicopters
27. Navy
28. Men
29. Patrol Boats
30. Vedette-boats
31. Sweeps
32. Landing Craft
33. Submarines
34. Miscellaneous
35. (1) Only the federal army has been included.
36. (2) Nationals only.
37. (3) Including In-Flight Refueling Craft.
38. Conscription a/c [expansion unknown] 1980
39. Volunteer
40. Conscripted
41. 2 years
42. 1 year
43. 18 months
44. Volunteer
45. Volunteer
46. See Annex Table
47. (4) M = billions
48. (5) m = millions

Tableau annexe :

1 **La marine iranienne (avant la révolution)**

2	Personnels	12	30.000 h dont 3 bataillons de Marines
3	Sous-marins		1
4	Destroyers	13	3 (avec missiles surface-air)
5	Frégates	14	4 (avec missiles surface-air/surface)
6	Corvettes		4
7	Patrouilleurs		20
8	Dragueurs de mines		5
9	Débarquement		2
10	Support logistique		2
11	Hovercrafts		14
15	1 escadron de 6 P-3F Orion.		
16	1 escadron de 6 hélicoptères de lutte anti-sous-marine.		
17	Hélicoptères divers		55
18	Étaient en commande	19	3 sous-marins de type Tang
		20	4 destroyers de type Spruance
		21	12 patrouilleurs rapides
		22	2 navires de débarquement

Key:

1. The Iranian Navy (before the revolution)
2. Personnel
3. Submarines
4. Destroyers
5. Frigates
6. Corvettes
7. Patrol Boats
8. Minesweepers
9. Landing Craft
10. Logistical Support Craft
11. Hovercraft
12. 30,000 men, including 3 battalions of marines
13. 3 (with surface-air missiles)
14. 4 (with surface-air and surface-surface missiles)
15. 1 squadron of 6 P-3F Orions.
16. 1 squadron of 6 anti-submarine-warfare helicopters.
17. Diverse helicopters
18. Equipment on order at the time...
19. 3 Tang class submarines
20. 4 Spruance class destroyers
21. 12 fast patrol boats
22. 2 landing ships

FOOTNOTES

1. Jacques Vernant has commented in these pages, in his column of March 1980, on the scope of this commitment comparing it with the contents of the message to Congress from President Eisenhower on 5 January 1957.

2. The ayatollah Bagher Sadr, spiritual leader of Iraqi Shi'ites, is supposed to have been arrested on 5 April 1980 and executed 4 days later (LE MONDE of 24 April). According to Amnesty International, more than 60 Shi'ites were executed between July 1979 and February 1980. Finally, the purge which followed the conspiracy brought to light in July 1979 in Baghdad affected several members of this community visibly.

3. Selim Turquie: "Anxieties of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates," in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, January 1980.

4. Thus, on 3 May 1980, Yasir Arafat reiterated in Kuwait his threat to blow up the oil wells in the Gulf should the United States attempt to intervene militarily in the region.

5. On 20 June 1980, the Iraqis elected a national assembly of 250 members to serve 4-year terms.

6. On 10 January 1980, Prince Fahd also announced that a proclamation of "the basic system of government" would be drawn up, which would take the place of a constitution.

7. It is generally considered that the "non-nationals," representing some 30 different nationalities, constitute more than 30 percent of the population of the Arabian peninsula.

8. Fires, whether criminal or not, are a regular occurrence, especially in Saudi Arabia. The oil province of Khuzistan, in Iran, because of the presence of Arabs, is even more exposed.

9. For a complete study see Alvin J. Cottrell and Frank Bray: "Military Forces in the Persian Gulf," THE WASHINGTON PAPERS, Vol VI, No 60, 1978, put out by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.

10. Among the numerous works devoted to this study, we mention that of Edward M. Kennedy, "The Persian Gulf: Arms Race or Arms Control," in the review FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Vol 54, October 1975.

11. See dispatch of J. M. Durand-Souffland for the newspaper LE MONDE of 21 May 1980.

12. Prince Abdallah, second vice-president of the council, is also the second prince in the line of succession, after Emir Fahd.

13. These bases, 5 in number, should be able to hold 50,000 soldiers, 70,000 auxiliaries, and 150 combat aircraft, thus permitting the army to move rapidly from one end of the territory to the other. The overall budget for these projects would be on the order of $20 billion.

14. Mr Yvon Bourges in mid-May 1980 visited these two countries which, already equipped with French light-armored vehicles (Bahrain) and AMX-30 tanks, are thinking about completing their armaments.

15. The Baas party in particular owes the success of its July 1968 coup to the army.

16. With a very small maritime side (924 km^2 of territorial waters), and 2 small naval bases at Bassorah and especially at Qum Qasr, Iraq basically concentrated its effort on the land and air forces in order to respond to more immediate concerns.

17. This accord, concluded in 1971, and strongly criticized by the Bahraini opposition, was abrogated in October 1973, before being renewed in March 1975. On this latter date there should have been in Bahrain 475 American military personnel using 20 hectares of land surface for their installations. These latter were mostly in support of a signal facility.

18. One of the articles stipulates: "in case of circumstances endangering the peace or constituting for one of the two parties a threat to the peace or a breach of peace, the two parties will immediately consult with a view to coordinating their position to eliminate the danger or restore peace."

19. Aryeh Yodfat: "The USSR and the Persian Gulf Area," in the review AUSTRALIAN GUT LOOK, Vol 33, No 3, April 1979.

20. In April 1979, a study put together at the request of Congress (John M. Collins and Clyde R. Mark: "Petroleum Imports from the Persian Gulf: Use of U.S. Armed Force to Ensure Supplies") contemplating armed intervention to control the oil wells, made a great stir.

21. There has been mention of a possible purchase of airplanes. Otherwise, by the terms of an accord signed 24 April 1980, the Soviet Union guaranteed to Iran that it would be able to make use of 3 primary commercial routes into the USSR, in order to be able to deal with a possible blockade by the United States of Gulf ports.

25. [sic] Admiral H. Labrousse: "Oil and Tensions in the Gulf," in the review DEFENSE NATIONALE, August-September 1979.

26. Selim Turquie: "A New American Doctrine," in LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, February 1980, and, among others, two articles appearing in the magazine NEWSWEEK of 4 February 1980: "Can We Defend the Gulf?" and "Line Around the Persian Gulf."

27. Serge de Klebnikoff offered an interesting recollection of DEA [expansion unknown] from this point of view: "New Strategies and Weapons: The Case of the Arab Countries in the Gulf," September 1979.

28. The absense of a political solution to the holding of the hostages in Tehran, and the consequent possibility which cannot be excluded of a significant American military intervention, are not, on the other hand, the kinds of things to calm Arab fears.

9516
CSO: 4800

MECCA GOVERNOR DISCUSSES FUNCTIONS OF HIS POSITION

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 16 Jun 80 p 15

[Interview with Mecca Governor Prince Majid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz; by Ramzi Sufiya, in Mecca; date not given]

[Text] Prince Majid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, governor of Mecca, believes in the necessity of stimulating municipal councils to make them more effective and capable of coping with the daily problems of the citizens. In this interview with AL-SIYASAH, after he became governor of Mecca following a long period as minister of municipal and rural affairs, Prince Majid presents a number of new ideas and administrative programs which he sees as more conducive to doing a better job.

He still believes in the necessity of establishing an association of Saudi contractors to replace big foreign companies which inflate prices. Prince Majid also believes in the principle of administrative decentralization which facilitates flexible and quick action in conducting general affairs.

Summarizing his administrative policy, he describes it as an "open door" policy which eliminates routine barriers between citizens and officials. In the final analysis, he says, we have to go by God's words: "Do your work [well], for God and His prophet and the faithful will witness its results."

The following are excerpts from this comprehensive interview.

[Question] Your appointment as governor of Mecca is an indication of high royal trust in you. What are your first impressions since you assumed your new position?

[Answer] I assumed my position fully aware of its burdens and the nature of the very important phase which my country is going through. It is a phase of cultural development, reconstruction, and building of a modern state. This state adopts modern methods and concepts, but retains, at the same time, its immortal spiritual values, its deep-rooted heritage and the heritage and the principles of the true Islamic religion.

I ask God the Almighty to help me carry out my duties, be worthy of the trust of my king, and fulfill as much as possible the wishes of the citizens of this country. There are many problems and concerns. But I believe that faith, sincerity, seriousness and commitment can make miracles happen.

[Question] What is the ideal climate that you deem necessary for the achievement of your goals?

[Answer] The ideal climate is represented by two very important elements: Security and stability. During these glorious years, we are carrying out the biggest operation in development which the country has witnessed in its modern times. We are doing it through very ambitious 5-year-plans and intensive economic and social development programs and projects. This can only be accomplished under secure and stable conditions, where the Saudi citizen feels that his life, money, honor, present and future are always safe.

The economy can develop and flourish, and progress and prosperity can be achieved in such a climate. Based on this, I see a very strong connection between development programs and security.

Thank God, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a paradise of security, stability and prosperity, because it is protected by God's law--the law of love, peace, brotherhood, compassion, solidarity and mercy which are the best guarantees of security and stability.

[Question] What are your expectations in the realm of development in the coming phase?

[Answer] I will do my best to offer support and assistance to all authorities concerned to help them implement their development projects and programs. I will offer all the support and control they need to maintain their progress toward their developmental objectives.

The western region has received one of the largest shares of development projects and programs in the country. Several of these have already been implemented. It is now steadily moving toward accomplishing a cultural change operation, on the basis of studied scientific plans, in this suitable climate of security and stability. As I previously mentioned, I consider such a climate essential for any constructive and creative effort. Under it, the citizen can enjoy human dignity and total security for his money, honor and life.

[Question] Your success in all responsible positions you have held makes me wonder what method you use in decision-making?

[Answer] My decisions are based on developing a complete understanding of the matter or problem at hand, and all the circumstances surrounding it.

I live in the heart of society. I stay in touch with reality. I apply to a problem both my mind and my heart, and then I make a decision. This is why I always come up with a sound and correct decision based on an ideal solution for it.

I do not believe much in "memos," "reports" and "paper work." I believe in field work and in direct contact with the problems and matters that call for a decision.

The most useful decisions are those that are inspired by reality, not those made in isolation behind a desk in a closed office.

[Question] How do you evaluate the present system in Mecca, following the period you have so far spent as governor of Mecca?

[Answer] I think a lot of changes are necessary in the emirate's system.

[Question] In what ways?

[Answer] As you know, our country is open to pilgrims, to te of thousands of people seeking work in development projects and programs, and to others who come for different purposes and who are involved in various businesses. You can imagine the situations that are created by the arrival of these huge numbers of people in the western region. In this human flow of people, each individual has his own morals, behavior, good and evil tendencies, ideas, ideologies and beliefs which have an impact on the country. This is why I mentioned the necessity of developing the emirate's system to face all these matters.

[Question] What are the most important ideas you have relative to the cultural program you are responsible for in the Mecca emirate?

[Answer] I have the honor of being responsible for the most sacred Islamic holy places and the Great Mosque. This, in itself, is enough to give me the enthusiasm and will to work.

You ask me about the ideas I have. I will do my best to serve this holy place which bears the mark of the Prophet's mission and has a very special place in our hearts.

However, if you are asking about development projects and programs, you probably know that these are mainly the responsibility of the various ministries. Each concerned ministry sets up its projects and programs in accordance with budget allotments for these projects. My duty is to provide the best conditions for these ministries to implement their projects in the best manner, and on time.

Thus, my role in relation to projects is not related to planning or implementation. It is support, assistance and cooperation which I will offer to all the ministries concerned.

My primary concern is my ties with the people, my human relations with them, and my seeing to it that they are comfortable and safe.

[Question] As governor of Mecca, what, in your opinion, are the dimensions of this responsibility?

[Answer] It is anticipated that the law of the provinces will define the role of the governor. When this law is complete and becomes effective, one of its main features will be to define the responsibilities of the governors.

However, there are certain natural and self-evident truths regarding the governors' functions. The most important of these are: To administer justice among the people; protect their lives, property, wealth and honor; and offer all possible assistance to ministries and government agencies to implement their development projects. I may as well point out some misconceptions about the governor's duties. The governor does not punish the guilty or put those who deviate from the right path in jail. He is the one who promotes the spirit of love, affection and unity among the people; brings them together through the strong ties and teachings of the true Islamic religion; makes them aware of good and evil, and of what is harmful and beneficial to them; learns about their conditions and worries; and tries to find solutions for their problems and ways to provide them with a comfortable life. At the same time, his function is to apply God's laws against those who do wrong, become corrupt or harm society.

The ultimate goal of a wise governor is to build a happy society, protect the rights of every citizen, provide people with all means of comfort and make services available to every citizen, as these services are a natural right which must be provided.

This is one side of a governor's function as I see it. As to the other side, it is related to projects that are important to the region. These projects, as I previously mentioned, are implemented by concerned ministries and government agencies. The governor's role is to assist and support them in implementing these projects, and bringing wealth and prosperity to the whole region.

[Question] How do you see the spiritual role of the Mecca Emirate from the standpoint of organizing the lives and relations of Muslims?

[Answer] The Mecca Emirate is carrying out its full duties toward the Muslims. It has, in this respect, a distinguished 1400-year history. It annually welcomes the pilgrims and provides Muslims from all over the world with this great annual meeting place where they discuss their mutual interests. In this respect, Mecca lives up to its full responsibility to serve Islam and the Muslims. We do not have to overburden it [with other responsibilities].

[Question] How about the Emirate's role in the overall development of the area?

[Answer] I have chosen for myself a very useful method to fulfill the public's needs. This is to follow up on government projects in the region without interfering with the prerogatives of the ministries or government agencies. Thus, I go beyond the traditional concept of the governor's function, which is to act on complaints of the people and provide them with security. In this century, a governor's role must go beyond such narrow and classical boundaries.

[Question] Are you thinking of expanding the role of municipal councils to cooperate with the Emirate in studying and meeting the area's requirements?

[Answer] From my experience as minister of municipal and rural affairs, I can say that these municipal councils are almost inactive. The people of the area, in general, do not wish to participate in these councils and consider this to be a waste of time, forgetting their legal duty to give their opinions and suggestions to help in the development and progress of their area.

People keep from attending to the public interest, because they are busy attending to their private interests. This negative phenomenon prevails even among young people who are dominated by a narrow individualistic outlook. For this reason, I think we should first attempt to first stimulate these municipal councils to carry out their current primary responsibilities. We would then think of broadening the scope of their responsibilities at a later stage.

[Question] What administrative method have you chosen to carry out the responsibilities of your position?

[Answer] I have chosen to hold periodic meetings with the Emirate's officials and open meetings with the chiefs of the Emirate's districts, to discuss all matters that are important to the area. I also visit various areas in the Emirate of Mecca to establish direct contact with the people and learn their needs and requirements.

[Question] Your wise call for the establishment of an association of Saudi contractors is still echoing in all circles. Is your enthusiasm for this call still the same?

[Answer] Yes, and I still call for this and say that scattered efforts are useless. I made this suggestion when I was minister of municipal and rural affairs, and I still advocate it in my new position. I call for the coming together of Saudi contractors to replace big foreign companies that charge high prices, carried away by the spirit of greed and exploitation, especially as the Saudi contractor has proved his ability and efficiency in all the projects assigned to him.

[Question] Which method do you prefer? Total centralization or decentralization?

[Answer] I will follow, without reservation, the decentralization method, delegating certain authorities to other officials, instead of centralizing all authorities in one person who would fall under heavy pressure, drown in a sea of routine work, and spend his time signing mountains of paper. This will be achieved by applying the principle of "the right man in the right place."

[Question] The reader would be very pleased to meet the "other side" of your personality--the personal side, particularly "Prince Majid, the father."

[Answer] I have seven children. The eldest is my daughter Masha'il who, God willing, will study medicine at the University of Edinborough in Scotland, specializing in heart surgery. I also have Mash'al, 'Aziz, Basmah, Jawahir and Sarah.

[Question] What method of upbringing do you follow in raising them?

[Answer] Being their friend before being their father, teaching them the true religion of Islam, giving them independent personalities, and deepening their spirit of belonging and loyalty to this great country.

9455
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OPPOSITION LEADER TALKS ABOUT INTERNAL STABILITY, ARAB UNITY

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 27 Jul 80 p 15

[Interview with Ahmad Ben Salah by Hamidah Na'na'; date and place not given]

[Text] Ahmad Ben Salah's experience in Tunisia is considered to be one of the manifestations of the crisis that faces Third World countries which gain their political and administrative independence, but maintain ties with their former colonizers through their economic structures and their political, educational and cultural orientations.

In 1960, when Bourguiba summoned Ben Salah--who was then minister of health and a well-known labor leader who had come to government from the Tunisian General Union of Labor [UGTT]--to charge him with the task of building and restoring the structure of the Tunisian economy, it was not clear in Bourguiba's mind that Ben Salah would make decisions and undertake measures that would affect Bourguiba's closest allies in the government.

It was also not clear in Ben Salah's own mind that it was impossible to reform the economy without reforming the political power. He thought he would be able to change the infrastructure of Tunisian society and that this could lead to a change in the government system. By means of what may be called socialist capitalism, Ahmed Ben Salah tried to establish a system of "mutual cooperation" which resembles the system of cooperatives. The result of that system was that the interests of the middle class were hurt. A policy of austerity was proclaimed, which primarily hurt the working class and the farmers. Meanwhile, Tunisian capitalists maintained their life of ease and comfort because they were protected by western industrial organizations.

Ben Salah was not able to touch the interests of the major capitalists and feudalists who were directly protected by the palace and by Bourguiba himself. After his experiment was attacked, he discovered that it would be difficult to build socialism in a country whose orientations and ties on the foreign policy level continued to be with the imperialist camp.

The first crisis between him and Bourguiba developed in 1969, and it worsened early in 1970. Ahmed Ben Salah was arrested on 25 May 1970, and was stripped of his ministerial and party positions and duties. He was charged with high treason and sentenced to 10 years of hard labor. However, he was able to escape from jail in 1973 and has been in exile ever since.

Ever since 1973, Ahmed Ben Salah has been considered one of the prominent figures of the Tunisian opposition. He spoke to AL-SAFIR about conditions in Tunisia, about the prospects for change there, and about his experience in government.

[Question] We will begin with the existing situation in Tunisia: the open door policy, the cabinet of Mzali, and their results.

[Answer] The regime has conditioned us to look for a relationship between violence and malevolence. I believe that major malevolence is in store at this stage. It may at first appear that there was a retreat from injustices and inequities, but the regime does not in fact intend to make any radical changes in its policy. The people who were there in the past are the same people who are [in power] now: they have not changed, including the prime minister. Very few people who work with Bourguiba have their own personal influence or political power. This is because Bourguiba is everything, and everything goes back to him.

For the last 10 years, Tunisia has been experiencing instability, unrest and trials. There have been more than 100 trials, and there have been many explosive situations. The 26 January 1978 [incidents] and the recent events in Gafsa are examples of these. It is true that there was a difference between the two eruptions: the 26 January eruption was carried out by labor elements and revealed the violent nature of the regime. Gafsa involved a group of young people who despaired of any change and rebelled against the regime. But what is new in the matter this time is the fact that non-Tunisians did intervene. I believe that Tunisian police departments had knowledge of these interventions and used them to settle domestic accounts. One of the most important results of Gafsa on the domestic scene was the disappearance of Hedi Nouira and Mohamed Sayah and the advent of new people to power.

Tunisia's crisis may be summarized in the fact that the regime, like its president, is suffering from old age. It is now experiencing political crises, since it is no longer possible to concentrate all powers in the hands of the group's leader and allow the rest [of the group] little room for action.

The Adulterated Unity

[Question] The opposition in Tunisia and abroad is living in a stage of partisanship and fragmentation. Are there programs for national unity? Have you thought about this? Is there a new reality for this opposition after what happened in Gafsa?

[Answer] I do not believe that there is a serious Tunisian opposition that wants to do away with the regime. There are oppositions that dream of changing the regime, but this is a dream shared by all factions of the opposition. We did try in the past to propose a five-point national unity program. However, of 16 persons who participated with us in the discussion, we discovered that 11 were working for Tunisian intelligence. The result was that most of our fighters in Tunisia were arrested. I was sentenced to prison for 8 years, and some factions of the opposition accused us in their newspapers of dealing with the regime.

Internal unity is not in demand now. The Arabs are afflicted with the disease of unity, even if it were adulterated. With regard to the Tunisian opposition, let me say that now there are people who are professional members of the opposition inside the country and abroad. Members of the opposition cherish that position just as a minister cherishes his ministry.

[Question] There are two principal forces now on the Tunisian scene.

1. The labor movement.

2. The religious tide.

It is now known that there are communications between the regime and the labor movement. What is the nature of these communications and where could they possibly lead?

The religious tide, however, rejects all factions of the opposition, including yourself.

[Answer] Yes, for months there have been communications between the regime and the labor movement. This is an attempt by the regime to gain time. But I do not believe that the labor movement which sacrificed its people on 26 January can accept a change in its programs and in its radical position vis-a-vis the regime and its nature.

With regard to the religious tide, it is one of the factions of the opposition. If the religious movement is rejecting us all, it is welcome to make the changes by itself, and we will wait for its experiment.

The religious tide which has become active in Tunisia and in most of the Islamic countries is only the result of the disappointments that followed independence in the Arab world. People discovered that independence was no more than a superficial, administrative independence, while the substance of the culture in those countries remained colonialist. Therefore, a strict adherence to the Islamic faith and to Islamic morals was a response to the alienation that the regimes forced upon their peoples. What is unfortunate, however, is the fact that Arab reactionaries are now using these tides in their own interests to eliminate other inclinations such as Arabism and socialism.

[Question] The wife of Bourguiba, Mrs Wasilah, did contact you in Paris. What did she want? Did she suggest that you return to Tunisia?

[Answer] She did contact me 2 years ago, but there has been no contact since then. Mrs Wasilah contacted one of our colleagues and asked him if she could meet me. My response was that that was impossible for security reasons. My life is still being threatened, and it is known that there was an attempt to assassinate me in Switzerland. This attempt was made by one of the well-known figures in the regime: Bashir Rizq al-'Uyun.

[Question] What is left of the experiment you made in Tunisia? What are the reasons for its failure, and how was the regime able to do away with it so quickly without encountering any opposition?

[Answer] Much remains. If we were to try to account for things, we would find that most of the production power in Tunisia after my departure had been financed in the sixties. We tried to establish foundations that would not yield their results within a short period of time. Therefore, we imposed a belt-tightening policy, and [those who succeeded us in government] benefited afterwards from our policy. It is necessary to call to mind the fact that the socialist experiment at that time had encountered major difficulties and required many sacrifices. Tunisia was weak then, and it was coming out of a crisis. The extension of loans was forbidden; there was no oil nor were there petro-dollars. Nevertheless, we were able to a large extent to liberate the economy of Tunisia from tutelage and from ties with the West, but we were vigorously contested.

Chief among those who fought us was Bourguiba. He feared the creation in Tunisia of new conditions and powers that would be the result of the change in the economic structures, and he feared losing the power to make decisions. The regime is concentrated on the authority of one person, and it is extreme in its concentration.

One of the most important results of the experiment of the sixties may be the fact that people began to look at Bourguiba in a different way, and he began to sense the danger of that. He sensed that people had begun to assemble, to make decisions, to discuss [matters] and to dismantle the regional government upon which he builds his regime. People even went so far as to threaten strikes against personal and foreign interests. Bourguiba became very fearful, and he dealt a blow to the experiment. His objective was not to deal a blow to the policy of mutual cooperation specifically as much as it was to save his own individual power.

[Question] Nevertheless, it took him 24 hours to succeed in doing away with the experiment without encountering any resistance!

[Answer] This is not true. The foundations we tried to establish in Tunisia are still there in one form or another. The mutual cooperation systems constitute a power inside the country that is not to be ignored. The successive explosions that have been taking place since the early seventies are but an indication of the state of dissatisfaction that is prevalent among the Tunisian people.

[Question] You are being accused of giving the regime at a certain stage a progressive identity and of prolonging its life.

[Answer] I did not give the regime this identity, and I did not prolong its life. What I did was for the Tunisian people, and my actions remain as a reaction to the injustices and the attempts to liquidate me. I did believe that by changing the economic, cultural and educational structures we would have been able to change the power that was not in our hands.

[Question] You had seven ministries under you!

[Answer] But we did not have power; it was Bourguiba who had power. Nevertheless, when I came to the government, I was convinced that there was no other way for bringing about change.

Tunisia and the Arabs

[Question] The Tunisian regime has been isolated by the Arabs as a result of the pan-Arab positions it had taken and as a result of its relations with the West. But now this isolation has culminated in the presence of the Arab League in Tunisia, and the new government is making claims about pan-Arab inclinations. Do you believe that the regime has really changed its direction?

[Answer] What changed? The Arabs acknowledged that the Tunisian regime had not turned its back to the question of Palestine or to the Arabs. I think that by taking that position it is the Arabs that did turn their backs to the question of Palestine following Camp David, whereas the Tunisian regime turned its back to the question of Palestine before Camp David. Naturally, the Arab position is more serious, but it is better for us to stay quiet.

Let me say this about the previous period: the battle between us and the regime because of the positions it took on pan-Arab questions have never ceased. I was the only one who went to 'Abd-al-Nasir after the well-known crisis, and I was convinced that Tunisia could not survive apart from the Arab world. Bourguiba visited Egypt in 1965 after my mediation. I believed that there was some similarity between the experiment that we were conducting in Tunisia and 'Abd-al-Nasir's experiment. This was always the subject of the conversation between us. I believed that for the two experiments to succeed, a geopolitical solidarity was essential, and regardless of the difficulties that would face this solidarity, we would have to confront them because unity consists of battles that must be waged.

Tunisia is one of the countries whose people are most sensitive to Arab solidarity. We are Arabs and we are affiliated with the Arab nation.

This is a deep feeling amidst the people of Tunisia.

However, it was the government that stood in the way of establishing this solidarity. Bourguiba believed that the correct way for the advancement of Tunisia was what (Shaban Dalmas) or (Edgar Fur) had been thinking about. Hedi Nouira became the victim of that. Bourguiba is the product of the Arab nation's inability to confront the enemy.

[Question] Is this his own inability?

[Answer] And it is also the nation's inability. Had this not been the case, how else can we explain the existence of al-Sadat?

The Old Age of the Regime

[Question] Do you still believe in the possibility of change within the regime? What prospects for change do you see? Who are the principal powers that can contribute to it?

[Answer] No. After 25 years of independence we may say that the political regime which had forced itself on Tunisia has now reached the stage of old age and is today running the risk of a political crisis. It has become evident that its isolation is increasing daily, and the prospects for radical opposition to the regime are becoming clearer. The characteristics of the popular forces are clear despite the layers of fog that surround them as a result of the regime's oppression and the various games it plays. There are labor movement forces and young people's forces that are vital, steadfast and movement oriented even though they are members of cells that are far apart from each other.

With regard to our faith and our struggle, we in the popular unity movement are affiliated with these forces and with the future they hold. There is a group of democrats which is advocating reform and which is being courted by the regime that did approach it after deciding to restore it to the fold. We do not know what the reckoning will be that will make this group play another role in the regime's escape to a state of numbness and manipulation; nor do we know what the reckoning will be that will make it withstand illusions.

It is known that there are various groups and movements, that these groups and movements are scattered, and that they comprise various affiliations of communists who are "determined to defend the national territory" against the neighbors, and especially of those who like China and who work in every direction. We hope that these groups will go back to their Tunisian origins and to their African, Arab, Moroccan origins so that they can combine their powers and become constructive.

The Army: a Disaster!

[Question] The army took action twice: once on 28 December 1978 to subdue the labor movement and once in Gafsa. Will it take action a third and a final time? Don't you believe that Tunisia after Bourguiba is in danger of a military coup?

[Answer] I don't know anything and I don't want to know anything about the army. You talk about the army. This is the disaster of the Third World. I will fight so that the army would not come to power.

[Question] What will be your position if you were to be surprised by a military coup?

[Answer] My position will be in accordance with the direction such a military coup might take. We do not take positions before the fact. I do not think it likely that Tunisia will be surprised by a military coup unless the forces that protect it decide upon a military coup.

[Question] What is your relationship to international socialism? Is the Popular Unity Movement a member of international socialism?

[Answer] The People's Unity Movement is not a member of international socialism. We had asked for observer status so we could have a platform from which we could express our opinion without being subjected to persecution. However, I have had personal ties with a number of the leaders of this movement ever since I was in government and even before then when I was a fighter in the ranks of the labor movement. We succeeded to a large extent in influencing some of them to change their positions on the Palestinian question.

[Question] Was that done through the proposal that Kreisky and Brandt were making for a western solution to the Palestinian question?

[Answer] This was their proposal, but we have our own position. We are the ones who are talking about a solution that would be acceptable to the Palestinians--that is, if the Palestinians are interested in their cause. We cannot ask Kreisky or Brandt to assume positions that are more radical than the position of some Arabs.

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UN DELEGATION HEAD'S RESERVATIONS ABOUT MEXICAN PROPOSAL

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 10 Sep 80 p 7

[Article signed S.M.: "Mr Mahmoud Mestiri's Declaration to LA PRESSE: 'Tunisia is Expressing Reservations About Mexican Proposal'"]

> [Text] New York: Mr Mahmoud Mestiri, head of the minister of foreign affairs' staff, and head of the Tunisian delegation to the UN special session on economic problems, is probably best qualified to evaluate the work now in progress in Manhattan's "Glass Palace." A former chairman of the Group of the 77, Mr Mestiri has, in fact, acquired a well-established reputation at the United Nations as "an exceptional diplomat, well-briefed on the matters under discussion and, above all, an authority on all problems concerning the North-South dialogue. So Mr Juliani, spokesman for Dr Waldheim.
>
> This is why we have asked him to give us a "general synthesis" of the session, of the problems it must face, and of the prospects it opens...

"Two major themes dominate the debates," Mr Mestiri told us, "on the one hand, the strategy of development for the decade beginning in 1981 and, on the other hand, global negotiations, first to solve the most urgent problems and, second, to give a new impetus, on new bases, to the restructuration of the world's economy so as to achieve the new international economic order advocated by the United Nations."

"This new order is all the more urgent as, at present, there no longer is any order to be safeguarded... What we have is disorder! A new order is, therefore, necessary and it can only be the order decided by the United Nations, by all countries in the world, developed and under development."

"Strategy and global negotiations are two useful steps toward a restructuration of the world's economy. This restructuration, this new order cannot take place in one day or in a short time, through a revolution, but they will result from a series of reforms spread over 10, even 20 years."

No Progress In Strategy

Can we expect concrete and positive results from this session?

"Yes, it could achieve that," Mr Mahmoud Mestiri answered. "At present, the prospects are not encouraging, but the present session might well reach an agreement on global negotiations, procedures, and the question of the central organization to coordinate and supervise development actions, in particular those of organizations which are not under UN control, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the GATT."

"However, I must be frank: while it has been possible to achieve progress with respect to global negotiations, no new development has taken place with respect to strategy. The present strategy is exactly the same as the previous two strategies... although a revolution in international economic thinking has taken place in the interval."

During this session, Tunisia has offered to aid countries which are on the verge of "taking off," while the vast majority of member countries are urgently calling for an aid to the poorest countries... Is our position realistic?

"We all believe that the poorest countries should receive particular attention," Mr Mestiri stated, "but there are also countries which--like Tunisia--have reached different stages of development, here they are called 'medium-income countries,' with 1,000 or more dinars of national gross product per inhabitant per year. Should we then give all our assistance and mobilize all our resources to aid the poorest countries? We believe that countries which have made efforts and are about to take off should not be penalized."

Aid for All, Priority to the Poorest

"In this respect, we must stress that the aid given to medium-income countries cannot hurt the poorest countries. On the contrary, it reflects the line adopted by the Group of the 77, namely: "Aid for all, priority to the poorest."

Does Tunisia support the Mexican proposal concerning a limited North-South summit meeting to break the present impasse?

"We have reservations concerning the principle of such a meeting," Mr Mestiri answered. "Each country, within the limits of its sovereignty, is free to organize meetings... some countries, such as Jamaica, have had the 'practical' idea of bringing their friends together to discuss certain problems informally. This is not a bad idea, on the contrary. It is a positive fact that each Third World country may take steps on its own to work toward the new international economic order."

"I am afraid that the Mexican proposal may be more ambitious and may clearly infringe on the role of the Group of the 77. What is at stake there, is the organization of a summit which would place itself above the United Nations and the Group of the 77 and would purport to make decisions on the line of the report of the Brandt commission."

The Brandt Report Contains Nothing New

"Besides, this commission is not representative of anybody and is not accepted by anybody, since each group of countries has subscribed only to that part of the report which suits its own interest. The Brandt commission report, this must be said, only summarizes all too well known ideas and does not contain anything new."

"This does not diminish in any way the part played by ex-Chancellor Brandt who is a man of good will and may still play an important part in North-South relations, as he did in East-West relations."

"Therefore, what is going to take place in Mexico will engage only those who will be there, certainly not the United Nations or the Group of the 77."

9294
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ACTIVITIES OF JOINT FRENCH-TUNISIAN COMMISSION

Tunisian Labor in France

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 3 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Jean Francois-Poncet, French minister of foreign affairs, will arrive today in Tunis to preside over his country's delegation during the proceedings of the eighth session of the General Joint French-Tunisian Commission. The Tunisian delegation will, in turn, be headed by Hassan Belkhojz, minister of foreign affairs. The meeting of this commission assumes greater importance since Tunisia is getting ready to begin the work of preparing the Sixth Plan and since it therefore needs to know in advance the financial, technical and other arragements made by its French partner, as well as the guarantees or insurance which it is in a position to furnish with regard to the Tunisian labor which is now located within France.

The level of commercial and technical cooperation between our two nations is certainly satisfactory. Nevertheless, Tunisia expects, as has been pointed out by Mohammed Mzali, its prime minister, much more from France and, above all, a much larger contribution on its part to the realization of the great industrial and agricultural projects in Tunisia which can provide employment for several thousands of individuals. In view of its political stability, its geographical location and even the goal that it has set for its social and economic development, Tunisia has indeed the right to demand that our relationships with France should be raised to a much higher level.

Now, whether we are talking about relationships between Tunisia and France or between Tunisia and Italy, these relationships between countries on opposite sides of the Mediterranean Sea can only be developed in a framework of peace and stability. This assumes and requires the existence and maintenance of political cooperation between our two countries which shall be as broad as possible. At the time that the world is practically divided into two blocs and that the most "liberal" nations resort to protective measures to safeguard their economies, Tunisia and France, which believe in the same values and share the same concerns with regard to peace and security, therefore must understand each other better in order to cooperate better.

Joint Communique

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 5 Sep 80 p 6

[Text] The General Ministerial Joint Commission, established by a joint declaration published on 30 June 1972, held its eighth session in Tunis on 3 and 4 September 1980.

The Tunisian delegation was led by Hassan Belkhoja, minister of foreign affairs. The French delegation was headed by Jean Francois-Poncet, minister of foreign affairs.

Jean Francois-Poncet was seen by His Excellency Habib Bourguiba, president of the Tunisian Republic as well as by Mohammed Mzali, the prime minister.

The work of the General Commission was conducted in an atmosphere of complete cordiality, due to the ties of mutual friendship, confidence and understanding which unite the two nations. This work illustrated the mutual desire to improve a state of cooperation which has a long history and had already achieved great success. This attitude was inspired by the historical visits of President Bourguiba to France and of President Giscard d'Estaing to Tunisia.

Both ministers were pleased to observe that both governments, at all levels, were maintaining close contact which permitted the mutual exchange of information and continuous cooperation with regard to all matters of common interest.

They proceeded to conduct a braod survey of problems dealing with international policy. They confirmed the affinity of both countries to the cause of peace and security with respect to independence of nations and their territorial integrity.

Both ministers examined the situation in the Near East and expressed their serious concern regarding the worsening situation in this region. They recognized that the solution to the Palestinian question plays a dominant role with regard to the establishment of a just and lasting peace. They emphasized the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination in accordance with a comprehensive settlement providing for security in the region with the participation of all the parties concerned, which implies participation of the PLO as well.

Furthermore, they reaffirmed the necessity for having Israel evacuate all of the occupied Arab territories, including the holy city of Jerusalem. In addition, they rejected the recent illegal decision to unilaterally change the status of the city.

Then, referring to the declaration issued by the heads of state and the governing body of the European Economic Community in Venice on 13 June 1980,

the Tunisian representative stated that, although this declaration did not satisfy all of the aspirations of the Palestinian people, it constituted a positive contribution to the search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. With regard to this point, the Tunisian representative expressed the desire to see Europe play a constructive role in the search for peace in this area.

Both ministers brought up the situation in central Asia. With regard to Afghanistan, they observed that the events in this country imperilled detente and stuck a blow at international law. They expressed a desire that the appropriate resolutions of the United Nations be observed.

The two ministers also dealt with the situation in Africa, expressing the concern of Tunisia and France with regard to the risk of increasing tension which endangers the security of the African Continent and which constitutes a great obstacle to its efforts towards development.

Both delegations condemned the policy and practice of apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa and reaffirmed the need for making every effort to have Namibia proceed rapidly, in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations, to full and complete independence.

Both ministers believe it indispensable that the African Continent be maintained free of outside interference so that security and peace, the responsibility for which depends on the Africans themselves, be safeguarded and that they may work in peace towards its development.

Both parties emphasized the importance which they attached to a renewal of the European-Arabic dialog in all of its aspects including that of policy. They agreed to step up their consultations with a view to taking the initiative towards such a renewal of dialog.

Particular attention was paid to examination of the Mediterranean situation and the necessity for developing political and economic collaboration and cooperation between these Mediterranean neighbors. Both ministers repeated their conviction that European security and cooperation cannot be separated from those of the Mediterranean. In preparation for the next meeting of the CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), they agreed to act in unison so that the non-European Mediterranean nations might play the role incumbent on them during this meeting.

The relationships between Tunisia and the European Economic Community were thoroughly examined. The modes of application of the cooperation agreement between Tunisia and the European Economic Community signed on 25 April 1976 as well as the prospects for broadening the Community received special attention.

Both ministers agreed that it was time for the French Government to take effective action to permit agricultural and industrial Tunisian products to be sold in greater quantities on the Common Market. They desired that a

great deal of attention be paid to the security of employment and residence of Tunisian workers in the countries of the European Economic Community.

The Tunisian delegation expressed the desire that an agreement should be reached between Tunisia and the European Economic Community during the negotiations for expansion of relationships. The French delegation expressed its understanding for the Tunisian concerns and that it would refer the Tunisian suggestions to its partners in the Common Market and the Communities Commission, insisting on the need to take into account the interests of Tunisia.

The French delegation indicated that the first documents dealing with the consequences of expansion of relationships with the Mediterranean nations had been submitted by the Committee of the Communities Council. It believed that these documents constitute the first stage in taking into consideration Tunisian concerns and is part of the desire to pursue and expand on the thoughts expressed.

The Tunisian delegation expressed its interest in the French proposal for trilateral cooperation among the Arab, European and African nations and called on the parties concerned to intensify collaboration in this regard.

The French delegation expressed its satisfaction for this support and reaffirmed its backing of the implementation of the trilateral cooperative agreement recommended by President Bourguiba since 1973.

Both delegations examined all aspects of Franco-Tunisian economic and financial relationships and expressed their desires to expand the scale of cooperation between them.

In the first place, a thorough analysis has been made of the commercial exchange situation. For this purpose, both delegations studied the various means of arriving at a reduction of the unbalance of exchange rates which are disadvantageous to Tunisia and to encourage joint initiatives and actions that would permit the promotion of Tunisian exports to France.

Both ministers also agreed that economic relations between Tunisia and France should be slanted towards cooperation in the area of production. For this purpose, it was decided to encourage a policy of industrial cooperation. With this in mind, the French delegation declared that it was ready to encourage the installation in Tunisia of industrial plants simultaneously with a real transfer of technology.

While emphasizing that the new Franco-Tunisian cooperation effort should be furnished with an adequate means for permitting a quick start, the Tunisian delegation brought up the idea of creating an investment bank with which French banks would be associated. The French delegation agreed to the objectives sought by the establishment of such an organization and made known its desire to activate the study that had already been initiated.

Both delegations decided to establish a cooperative effort in the field of energy. This effort will deal particularly with economic measures as well as activities concerned with research for new types of energy.

Both ministers registered satisfaction with the promise that negotiations dealing with French governmental assistance will take place very soon in Tunis.

Both delegations pointed out that cultural, scientific and technical cooperation continues its upswing. They reaffirmed their advocacy of Arab education in French secondary schools to which the Tunisian Government would contribute its share.

Furthermore, they emphasized the interest that they had in strengthening of technical cooperation and concentrating it in the most important areas of the Tunisian development plan in order to favor the transfer of technology.

A thorough study was made of Tunisian-French social and consular relations, particularly in regard to matters dealing with labor, professional training, social security and movement of individuals.

The French delegation emphasized the importance that it attached to the problem of transferring funds that the French nations would want to send home from Tunisia and its desire that a solution to this problem be found. The Tunisian delegation made note of this point.

In order to allay the concerns expressed by the Tunisian delegation on matters dealing with the Tunisian community in France, assurance was furnished by the French delegation that the situation of Tunisian nationals would be jointly examined in an atmosphere of close ties and mutual trust between the two countries.

Joint Commission Meeting

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 4 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] The General Tunisian-French Joint Commission began its work at its eighth session last night at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the joint chairmanship of Hassan Belkhoja and Jean Francois-Poncet.

In addition to the ministers of foreign affairs of both countries, the delegations included the following members: Tunisia was represented by Hedi Mabrouk, Tunisian ambassador to France, Ahmed Ben Arfa, ambassador and director of the International Cooperation Agency, Moncef Ounayes, Office Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Noureddine Meidoub, Director of Political Affairs for Europe and America as well as representatives of the Ministries of Planning, National Economy, Agriculture, Social Affairs and the Tunisian Central Bank. France was represented by Pierre Hunt, French ambassador to Tunisia, Serge Devaix, Director of the North African-Middle

East Division, Eric Desmaret, Technical Advisor to the Office of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as representatives of various offices in this department, in particular Treasury and Industry.

Established by the joint Tunisian-French declaration of 30 June 1972, which crowned the official visit of President Bourguiba to France, the General Joint Commission meets every year, alternately in Tunis and in Paris, for the purpose of examining the various phases of the cooperative effort between the two countries and the methods of intensifying this effort.

Opening the meeting, Hassan Belkhoja first welcomed his French counterpart, assuring him of Tunisia's ardent desire "to impart new vision to our cooperation and our friendship which is ceaseless oriented into the future."

After having brought attention to the fact that the greatest portion of Tunisia's foreign trade is carried on with the member nations of the European Common Market, the Minister underscored "the uncomfortable position, to put is mildly, in which Tunisia has been placed due to the protectionist measures taken by the European Economic Community." In this context, Hassan Belkhoja launched an urgent appeal so that France might act to achieve a reexamination of these measures which contradict the terms of the cooperation agreement of 1976 between Tunisia and the European Economic Community and also contradict the concept of cooperation. He expressed the desire to have France take into consideration the interests of its close friends to whom it is linked by history and geography and to employ all of its influence to have the European Economic Community reconsider its protectionist policy with respect to Tunisia, to open its markets to Tunisian agriculture and industrial products and, together with its Tunisian partner, to exert itself to find adequate solutions to the problems of the emigrant workers.

In order to assure true economic promotion of Tunisia, this new multilateral policy should, in our opinion, be accompanied by a new spirit in our bilateral relations. In fact, we wish that our economic relations with France may develop into cooperation with respect to production. We desire that Tunisians and Frenchmen may henceforth participate in joint investments and take joint economic risks. We would like industrial cooperation to lead our two nations to the realization of great industrial projects of a type that will create the maximum number of jobs, to distribute products in French and foreign markets and to conduct a real transfer of technology. These sentiments were presented by Hassan Belkhoja who expressed the hope that, in order to assure the financing of such projects, the Tunisian proposal dealing with the creation of a Franco-Tunisian investment bank will be realized very soon.

Hassan Belkhoja indicated that, in this crisis-ridden world where sources of tension and conflicts abound, the French trilateral project recommended by President Giscard d'Estaing and the Tunisian idea of "development contract" proposed by President Bourguiba may succeed in eliminating an untenable situation.

Furthermore, the minister directed attention to the fact that the awareness that is presently occurring in Europe with respect to its worldwide role in the principal international affairs constitutes a new factor which we encourage enthusiastically.

Our desire, he said, is that Europe should take the initiative with respect to ideas and actions so as to create a stir and to deliver its message. The importance of the role that it will play will then be determining and will be able to return confidence to the Third World and dissuade it from being won over by ideologies which are foreign to it.

France and Tunisia are therefore called on today, more than ever before, to collaborate and to attune their actions so as to favor Tunisian-French cooperation in the interest of the nation itself and of world security, said Mr. Belkhoja in conclusion.

In respone to the statements made by Hassan Belkhoja, Jean Francois-Poncet noted that "Franco-Tunisian relations are those that permit reciprocal confidence. They are founded on deep friendship which binds together not only the leaders and their staffs but also unites the two peoples." He expressed the conviction that the work of the General Joint Commission will bring about a new manifestation of this friendship, emphasizing the concern for permanent collaboration which impels both governments.

After expressing great satisfaction with the intensity of Franco-Tunisian relations, Jean Francois-Poncet called attention to the fact that the reason for the existence of the Franco-Tunisian General Joint Commission is precisely this desire for permanent collaboration.

The chief of the French Diplomatic Corps considered it necessary that, by means of this General Joint Commission, it would be possible each year to take a complete inventory of this cooperative effort, pointing out that the agenda and the rate at which work is performed by the Commission reflects the evolution of relations between nations.

With regard to economic and financial questions, both delegations will have to prepare an inventory of our joint efforts, to identify carefully and precisely the difficulties encountered and to think about the future, added Jean Francois-Poncet.

"It is not without precedent that France has pleaded in favor of the interests of Tunisia before the European Economic Community. France has always done so and I will say that it does so even more now that the problem of expanding to other Mediterranean countries has been posed.

"We are familiar with the problems that such expansion can create for other Mediterranean economies. We have made it understood to candidates for expansion that these problems should be studied and dealt with together with the interested parties, beginning with Tunisia, before the final decisions concerning such expansion are made," said the Chief of the French Diplomatic Corps in essence.

"Rest assured that we will practice this policy of faithfulness with regard to Tunisia," continued Jean Francois-Poncet who recognized that one of the duties of industrialized nations is to furnish access to their markets for the products of nations which are developing their industries.

It is nevertheless believed that these nations should understand the social and economic characteristics that this policy may require and therefore accept the fact that certain stages and a certain amount of adaptation over a period of time be provided for such guidance.

The chief of the French Diplomatic Corps referred to the proposals made in June 1980 by Tunisia aimed at imparting new dimensions to the already very old and very close economic cooperation existing between the two nations both at governmental and business levels. He pointed out that these proposals furnish the basis for a very careful examination on the part of French government agencies working jointly with interested business circles. He furnished assurance that this examination is proceeding in a most constructive vein.

Mr Francois-Poncet expressed his belief that cultural and technical cooperation was an important and essential matter. He was delighted to observe that this type of cooperation was being actively pursued and was being futher developed. Moreover, he announced that the Joint Cooperation Commission would meet next 29 September in Tunis to conduct an exhaustive examination of this phase of bilateral relations.

"Our concern in this area is to maintain cooperation at a very high level, to constantly match our actions to the priorities of the economic and social development of Tunisia and to take care that such cooperation does not interfere in any manner with the takeover by Tunisian staffs," he added.

With respect to social and consular matters, Mr Francois-Poncet noted that the General Commission should consider all problems met by the nationals of both nations and therefore should deal with the important subject of the situation facing the Tunisian workers in France.

In conclusion, Mr Francois-Poncet assured the Tunisian delegation that it would find that its French counterpart was extremely openminded, was anxious to be understanding and exhibit an attitude of esteem and friendship as borne out by this meeting. Finally, he declared that he felt persuaded that these contacts with the highest level Tunisian officials would permit the imparting of additional vigor the the already exceptionally active relations between France and Tunisia.

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SIXTY SIX THOUSAND JOBS TO BE CREATED EACH YEAR OF NEXT DECADE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 9 Sep 80 p 4

[Article: "Mr Mezri Chekir brings to a Close the Regional Students' Conference in Nabeul"]

[Text] Friday evening in Nabeul, Mr Mezri Chekir, head of the prime minister's staff, brought to a close the regional students' conference in the presence of the governor and of the general secretaries of the Coordination Committee and of the National Union of Youth Organizations.

During this conference, delegates discussed matters related to student life and to the state of the country in general.

Answering questions raised by the delegates, Mr Mezri Chekir stressed the importance of contacts and dialogue with the youth because, he said, youth is the leading force in the country.

He then praised the maturity, realism and moderation of the students of Nabeul. These qualities, he stated, to which the Supreme Soldier always appealed, represent decisive factors in the stability of the regime and the achievement of greater solidarity between Tunisians.

Mr Chekir also pointed out that democracy should be understood as a means of reassuring citizens as to their future, of creating conditions enabling them to live in dignity, and of giving them an opportunity to express their opinions freely. He added that all political streams could coexist within the Party, provided that they always take the general interest of the country into consideration. Mr Mezri Chekir also indicated that, in Tunisia, the press is free as long as information is managed according to principles of good faith and a sincere and constructive criticism.

Mr Mezri Chekir pointed out that the Party is open to the new ideas brought by competent youths desirous to take a part in political life.

Touching on the economy, Mr Chekir stressed that development during the next decade will require large credits which will be used to create 66 thousand jobs each year. He added that the success of the Sixth Plan depends on the social and political stability of the country and on the joint efforts of all Tunisians. Such political stability, he noted, is our best argument in

dealing with those who wish to help us in the financing of many socio-economical projects. Concerning agriculture, Mr Chekir stated that development in this sector will be a major option in the next Plan, and he announced that several measures will be taken to promote agriculture, especially with regard to the property structure of certain tracts of land, the granting of credits, the marketing of production, and an increase in agricultural product prices.

With respect to the administrative reform, Mr Mezri Chekir recalled that the government has already started implementing its policy of administrative decentralization and procedure simplification, so that the mission of the central administration will soon consist mainly in planning, programming and controlling.

Concerning Tunisia's foreign policy, Mr Mezri Chekir stressed the importance of cooperation between Maghrebian countries, and his political will to create a unified Arab Maghreb.

In concluding, Mr Mezri Chekir promised the students of the Gabes Higher School of Engineering that he would study the problems they are facing, and he stressed the necessity for them to study under good conditions, in view of the essential part they will play in the country's social and economic development.

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CSO:4400

MINISTER OF EDUCATION DISCUSSES VARIOUS ISSUES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French, 10 Sep 80 p 5

[Article: "Mr Abdelaziz Ben Dhia to the Students of Jendouba: 'Universities Will Be Located in All Areas Fulfilling Conditions'"]

[Text] Monday in Ain Draham, Mr Abdelaziz Ben Dhia, minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research, chaired a meeting of the regional students' conference of the Jendouba governorate; also present were Messrs Abderrazak Kefi and Mohamed Hedi Ben Farhat, respectively governor and general secretary of the Coordination Committee of the area.

During the discussion which took place on this occasion, students raised several questions concerning higher education, the policy of decentralization as well as the programs, the attribution of scholarships, university selection and guidance, cultural animation and the representation of students in unions. Other questions concerning the development of industry and tourism, the balance between regions, the price and wage policy, employment, rural development and economic cooperation with Arab countries, were also discussed.

Answering these questions, Mr Abdelaziz Ben Dhia first stated, concerning university selection and guidance, that there are definite criteria which must be complied with--use of computers for the selection and guidance of students is not questioned--indicating that the data supplied to the computer are prepared at three different centers.

In this connection, the minister stated that every student, after one year of study in the field assigned to him the first time, may take part in the competitive examination for admission to the field of his choice, which takes place every year in May.

He also warned students against false rumors alleging that a selective policy is being applied.

Concerning the decentralization of higher education, Mr Ben Dhia stated that the government is contemplating the creation of universities in all regions, provided that the conditions for such a creation are met.

The minister went on to talk about the attribution of university scholarships; he pointed out that all applications submitted had been examined by the departments concerned within the prescribed time.

He also indicated that the amounts of these scholarships are sufficient to cover the needs of the beneficiary, taking into account the fact that room and board do not exceed 12 dinars and that the student receives 10 monthly payments in addition to the additional subsidy intended for the purchase of university supplies, the amount of which varies between 30 and 50 dinars.

As for students who have to stay down, the minister stated that Tunisia is one of the few countries where those among such students who have a grade average higher than 8 out of 20 are granted 80 percent of the scholarship amount.

Mr Abdelaziz Ben Dhia then talked about the UGET [General Union of Tunisian Students]: he first recalled the decision made in this respect, inviting the students to form a representative committee, and he pointed out that the prime minister himself had announced this decision which is intended to guarantee free and democratic elections.

Answering other questions concerning development, the minister stated that the reduction of the imbalance between regions is a political decision made by the government as well as one of the main objectives of the Sixth Plan. Besides, the decision of the Supreme Soldier to convene an extraordinary congress of the Party is consistent with the desire of the regime to fulfill all conditions necessary to achieve success in this direction.

As for economic cooperation with brother and friendly countries, the minister remarked that Tunisia has consistently worked toward the opening of new horizons in the field of economic cooperation. For this purpose, it has always called for the adoption of a common Arab economic strategy, for the development of inter-Arab exchanges and the creation of an Arab Common Market.

At the end of his speech, Mr Ben Dhia urged the students to take a more effective part in the animation of cultural life in the area.

Prior to that, answering questions on regional matters, the governor had suggested that a special fund be set up in the area, to finance students' activities.

The delegates to the conference also formed a Regional Students' Bureau.

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CSO:4400

WHEAT STORAGE PROBLEMS DISCUSSED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 10 Sep 80 p 2

[Article signed N.O.: "Agriculture: Wheat Storage Problems"]

[Text] No country can have food reserves if its infrastructure and storage capacity are inadequate.

In our country, where agricultural activities still provide jobs for over 60 percent of the active population, and to the extent that the agricultural sector still depends on climatic conditions, the creation of such reserves is considered to be a guarantee that the country will be normally supplied with food.

Once the granary of Rome, the northern area in general, and the northwestern area in particular--where agricultural activities predominate--present a strange and distressing sight to the eyes of the ordinary traveller.

Thousands of wheat sacks, the result of a full year's work, are piled up on the ground, unprotected against rain and storms at a time of the year characterized by sudden weather changes. That wheat may get weevil-eaten or washed away by rainwater, yet nothing appears to have been done to remedy the problem and prevent losses.

In all centers, the storage infrastructure has not appreciably improved over the years; the street, with all its risks and hazards, becomes a place for temporary storage.

At a time when wheat is becoming a "green weapon" in the hands of the large producers who are competing against one another to sell it, it is becoming essential for a developing country like ours--striving to achieve food self-sufficiency--to create an adequate infrastructure which will take into account both production and consumption trends.

Why, then, this discrepancy between storage capacity and production?

Since wheat collecting and marketing are managed exclusively by cooperatives under administrative control, why not allocate to them the means to enable them to create a storage infrastructure which would take into account the geographical distribution of production?

The problem of storage is not new in Tunisia, and the responsibility for it is shared by all. No effective action was taken when it first occurred, and the same problems now arise cyclically each year: silos filled to the brim although production (some 11 thousand quintals this year) is far from sufficient to satisfy our consumption which is estimated at 16 millions of quintals per year--still less than anticipated by the development plans.

The actual storage capacity did not change after the country became independent. While production and consumption have almost doubled, storage capacity has increased by 15 percent, i.e. 5.4 thousand quintals, with the following breakdown:

- Grain office: 3 thousand quintals
- COCEBLE [expansion unknown]: 1.2 thousand quintals
- CCGC [expansion unknown]: 1.2 thousand quintals

Storage never got its due because investment in this sector is not considered immediately profitable; amortization is very slow. Contrary to tourism, this sector did not benefit from large capital investments.

In addition, cooperatives such as COCEBLE or CCGC do not have sufficient resources to build new silos or even to maintain existing silos when these need repairing.

The storage premium determined by the Ministry of Agriculture remains low and does nothing to encourage effective action which would change the present situation.

In addition, because of the priorities and choices they adopted, past development plans have not lent any particular attention to the restructuration of this sector.

Financial aid to the cooperatives managing this sector has now become mandatory. The immediate construction of metallic silos (not very costly) should be considered in areas where storage capacity is insufficient.

In the future, we should take a closer look at this sector and give it the place it deserves in our next development plan, now in preparation.

All the more so as the report of the Large Crop Committee (1979-1980) has stressed the necessity of:

- preparing a master storage plan which will take into account the geographical distribution of storage and marketing capacities;

- overhauling the existing storage infrastructure of the country;

- encouraging farmers farming over 200 hectares to change their harvesting method to adopt a bulk method.

In the meanwhile, we must use all means now available to us to protect the wheat exposed and reduce our losses to a minimum.

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BRIEFS

MZALI AT UN--We have it from a reliable source that Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali will travel to New York on 3 October 1980. During the regular session of the general assembly there he will deliver an important speech from the podium. He is doing this on the invitation of UN secretary general, Kurt Waldheim. We may recall that the invitation was extended to Mr Mzali during Dr Waldheim's visit to Tunisia last July. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 1]

END

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FATAH'S ABU SHARAR ATTACKS JORDAN'S ATTITUDE TOWARD PLO

LD191547 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 17 Sep 80 p 11

[AL-WATAN report: "Abu Sharar to AL-WATAN: 'Jordanian Move To Cancel PLO's Role'"]

[Text] Rome--Fatah Central Committee member Majid Abu Sharar has accused Jordan of making enormous financial gains since the Baghdad summit conference which allocated $1.25 billion for Jordan's steadfastness. In a press statement to AL-WATAN, Abu Sharar said: "Jordan has done nothing to confront Israel during all these years." He added that Jordan, through the joint Jordanian-Palestinian committee for consolidating steadfastness in the occupied territories, has gained a great deal but lost nothing and has participated in managing the affairs of our people in the occupied territories and expanded the pro-Jordanian front.

The Palestinian official pointed out that "Jordan has recently begun to present itself as representative of the Palestinian people alongside the PLO."

He said: "We can now say that we are in an opposed position." Abu Sharar expects this contradiction between the [Palestinian] resistance and Jordan to explode in the next few months.

He added: "We are now gathering information on Jordan's diplomatic moves in Europe, America and the Arab area. We have evidence proving that the contacts that have taken place center on cancelling PLO's role as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

IRAQI-SOVIET TREATY--A spokesman for the Iraqi Embassy in Kuwait has denied a report published yesterday by AL-QABAS that Moscow expects Iraq to annul the Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty. The press attache in the Iraqi Embassy in Kuwait, Harith Taqah, said: The press department has confirmed from high official sources that the friendship and cooperation relations with the Soviet Union are proceeding in a very normal manner. [Text] [GF301124 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 29 Sep 80 p 1]

CSO: 4802

CHRISTIAN MISSIONARY ACTIVITY IN ISLAMIC WORLD SEEN AS MENACE

Tripoli AL-ZAHAF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 30 Jun 80 pp 16-17, 11

[Article by Mukhtar Sawisi: "The Voice of Islam Must Resound; Serious Colonialist Challenges Seek the Destruction of Islam; Islam Is Equality and Destruction of Class Structure; Islam Is Historic, Cultural Message Based on Inspired Book"]

[Text] When Islam dawned on the Arabian Peninsula, when it spread over the horizon and expanded to the farthest countries of the earth, the age of ignorance and paganism which used to control all of humanity vanished. Islam was neither an unexpected incident nor a reform movement. It was rather a historic, cultural message based on a divinely inspired book sent to God's noble prophet who was the guiding light for humanity. People found in him their ultimate salvation from slavery, oppression, tyranny and the control of idols which do not benefit those who worship them and ask them support or protection from danger.

Islam was a revolution against polytheism, against ignorance, against a preoccupation with vice and against floundering in murky darkness. Islam was a radical revolution that changed the face of the universe which had been steeped in corruption, error and the consecration of material idols carved by human hands from different materials in the shape of dolls. When the light of Islam dawned and illuminated the universe, the unfair relationships established by a small group of pre-Islamic noblemen to serve their interests and enslave humanity changed.

Islam came to undo tyrannical relations, establish foundations of equality and justice, and assure the human being of freedom in a free and happy society.

Islam has been a universal appeal to the entire world for the welfare and deliverance of all of humanity without exception from all kinds of injustice and tyranny. God Almighty spoke to His noble prophet and said, "We have sent you forth as a blessing to mankind" [The Prophets: 107].

The law of Moslems is the Holy Koran from which no evil can come. God Almighty said in His beloved book: "Believers, obey Allah and the Prophet

when he calls you to that which gives you life" [The Spoils: 24]. He also says, "Allah is the patron of the faithful. He leads them from darkness to light" [The Cow: 257].

"This path of mine is straight. Follow it and do not follow other paths, for they will lead you astray." [Cattle: 153]. Islam is the religion of truth and welfare for all; and it is the religion of deliverance from the yoke of slavery. It is also the religion of man's liberation from the gloom of darkness; it brings him out into the light of equality, justice and the paths of righteousness and welfare where he can enjoy worshiping the one and only God.

The Arab and Islamic nation fell prey to the conspiracies of western imperialism and racist Zionism when it neglected Islam. These conspiracies were mixed with hatred, malice and intrigues against Islam. Their purpose was to weaken Moslems, to break their power and misrepresent the Islamic Arab character. We cannot fail to see the state of weakness and submissiveness which the Arab and Islamic nation is in today as a result of the western colonialist intellectual invasion which began to act on and extend its influence through the body of the Arab and Islamic world.

We are not unmindful of the efforts that have been made to abort and to exterminate Islamic thought through the missionary expeditions that came to the Arab world from the west many ages ago to pave the way for intellectual colonialism and to establish the reactionary bases for this colonialism. At first these expeditions came under the guise of missions whose outside appearance was meant to conceal their reality. But they soon expanded their activities and led armies of crusaders to the land of Islam. Their purpose was to destroy Islamic thought, obliterate the features of Islamic culture, take over the holy places of Islam, and turn them into centers for spreading Christianity by various ways and means, such as the establishment of hospitals, societies, and Christian schools and universities to teach Christianity to the residents of any area where Christians may land. These Christian missionary establishments pledged protection and care to all those who joined them, were attracted to them, or enticed by them.

Some of those who joined these organizations were sent to study in Europe. As soon as they returned to their home countries, they were nominated to leadership positions for the purpose of gaining control over these countries. Yesterday, Jerusalem fell, and until this moment it remains defiled by Zionism. Today, Lebanon is being subjected to the same conspiracy: Christians are playing a major role in this conspiracy as intermediaries. They are doing so to pave the way for the Zionist, colonialist attack, and for the fall of Lebanon into the grip of Zionist colonialism.

Some Arab countries may be subjected to the same conspiracy in the future, especially under these critical circumstances which the Arab and Islamic nation is experiencing wherein the Islamic religion is being aborted and destroyed. We have sensed the hatred and the religious fanaticism of the

Christians. It is evident to all through the vile conspiracy being perpetrated against the Arab and Islamic nation by international imperialism and Zionism, with the assistance of their reactionary allies and all the malicious forces which are trying to finess their conspiratorial designs under the pretext of protecting Islam.

Unless the Arab and Islamic nation resists, unless it intensifies its efforts to foil the conspiracies that are being perpetrated against it, the final result will be the irreversible elimination of Islam and Islamic culture. Afterwards, God forbid, Islam will be no more than a passing memory which future generations would read about.

We want to take this opportunity to shed light on the Society for Islamic Missionary Activity. We want to know the extent of its efforts and activities in spreading the Islamic message and opposing the attempts that are being made against Islam for the purpose of aborting it.

The Goals of the Society

The goals of the Society for Islamic Missionary Activity are to spread the Islamic message all over the world by all possible means, but especially as follows:

* The Holy Koran is to be made known, and an effort is to be made to have it taught, memorized and disseminated by all means.

* The holy tradition of the prophet is to be made known, and the lofty principles of the prophet's life, may God bless him, are to be brought to light.

* Islam is to be presented in a manner that encompasses all the aspects of its faith, its ethics, its rites of worship and its dealings. Such a presentation is to be easy and free of distorted notions, dialectics and interpretations that are foreign to the essence of Islam.

* Islam is to be interpreted in a manner that stays in step with all the branches of human science and learning.

* An effort is to be made to prepare missionaries who would carry out the duty of Islamic missionary activity.

* Periodicals, magazines, Islamic encyclopedias and books are to be prepared and published to present the principles and instructions of Islam; to present the tradition of the prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation; and [to present] the values of Islamic civilization. An effort is to be made to have them translated into all languages.

* Meetings for Moslem students and young people are to be organized for the purpose of making Islam known and making an effort to spread the Islamic message.

* Religious and scientific agencies and organizations are to be contacted so as to achieve the dissemination of the Islamic message.

* The Arabic language is to be disseminated by all means because it is the language of the Holy Koran. All the Islamic countries are to be requested to make Arabic the official language and to teach it in all the stages of education.

* Islamic countries are to be urged to make the Koran the law of a Moslem society and to amend their laws so as to make them consistent with the principles of Islam.

* The board of the society, under the supervision of its secretary, manages the affairs of the society, conducts its business and directs its activities so as to achieve its goals. It makes the decisions that are necessary to achieve the purpose for which the society was created in accordance with the provisions of its bylaws and the rulings that are issued accordingly. It has the specific [authority] to do the following:

* The board is to set up the programs that are necessary for Islamic missionary activity in the different countries in accordance with the conditions and the circumstances of each country.

* It is to establish branches for the society in the other countries.

* It is to convene Islamic conferences and debates.

* It is to approve the society's proposed budget and its [annual] financial statement, and it is to develop its resources in legitimate Islamic ways.

* It is to establish the administrative, professional and financial rulings that are necessary for organizing the business of the society.

* It is to study the reports that are submitted by the branches of the society; it is to evaluate and to follow up on the business of these branches; and it is to issue instructions that are necessary for them.

* It is to accept contributions, donations and bequests, and it is to manage the religious endowment that is offered to the society.

* It is to write rules to regulate financial and material assistance grants as well as other assistance within the purposes of the society.

* It is to hire employees; to approve lending and delegating them [to other institutions] and determining their areas of specialization.

To achieve the objectives of the Society for Islamic Missionary Activity, this society spares no effort in championing and elevating Islam. To do so it pursues several courses: either it organizes practical or educational programs or it attends international gatherings and participates in Islamic

and international meetings. During the 11th session of the Islamic Conference in Islamabad, the secretary of the society affirmed several essential and significant points in his address to the conference.

Some of these points were brought up in the following quotation from his address: "The Society for Islamic Missionary Activity came into existence with the emergence of the glorious First of September Revolution which was an Islamic revolution. It raised the banner of Islam and it worked for victory for Moslems in all the corners of the world. It is a society that undertakes popular action to advocate the religion of the One and Only God and to strive by all means to make the Holy Koran the law for Islamic societies. The Society for Islamic Missionary Activity did perform its duty in many of the Islamic and non-Islamic countries. It had hundreds of missionaries who invited people to [adopt] Islam. Their efforts, thank God, had their effect, and hundreds of people adopted Islam. The society's projects and programs--which were prepared and written by scientists and professionals from many Islamic countries--achieved great results. Numerous mosques, Islamic centers, schools for the Koran, vocational institutes, academic colleges, hospitals, university libraries and students' homes have been established. Many Moslems' sons have been given scholarships at intermediate institutes and at the university for undergraduate and graduate work. The society has distributed the Holy Koran in numerous interpretations of its noble meanings. It is cooperating with various Islamic countries and societies for the sake of Islam and for giving Moslems power on earth."

The Necessity of Collecting and Amassing All the Factors of Support

In his address, the secretary of the society called upon Moslems to be solicitous about Islamic missionary activity. He said: "In the context of this conference, we must remind ourselves of the necessity of being solicitous about Islamic missionary activity on the broadest [possible] scale. All the necessary organizational, human and material factors that are necessary for achieving the major cultural objectives which are enjoined upon us by the principles of Islam are to be collected and amassed.

"In the recent past Islamic missionary activity was disdained, ridiculed and ignored by enemies and friends alike; it was even ignored by the Moslems themselves. This [attitude] used to constitute a major obstacle to the return to God's true religion. Due to the influence of imported cultures Moslems used to view Islam in the same way they viewed other religions, considering it at best to be a religion that focused on the purely spiritual aspect of man. [In their view] the age had gone beyond that view [and espoused] modern philosophies and ideologies [that had come] from the west and the east."

In his address, the secretary of the society also warned against the wave of serious colonialist challenges that seek the destruction of Islam.

"Today, after the truth has become plain, after contemporary Islamic revolutions that had proposed Islam as an all-encompassing way of life

have gained victory, and after man has risen in rebellion to realize his liberation and find the right path, Islamic missionary activity finds itself facing a new obstacle from the enemies of Islam who want to involve Islam in marginal problems. They want Moslems to escape from life to a kind of monasticism they devised. As has been their custom they began to establish centers for scientific, political, psychological and social research which concerned themselves with studying the Moslem mentality, the makeup of Islamic societies and the content of the Islamic faith for the purpose of subjugating Moslems and changing the directions of the Islamic revolution which is now attracting the Moslem masses everywhere. They want to make all this vanish in temporary reform programs that dwindle away in the tumult of western materialistic thought.

"The matter went beyond that too to a race between the enemies of Islam in the west and in the east to reduce the Moslems to servitude in the name of Islam so as to achieve their own objectives, and especially with regard to the plans of the superpowers. All these plans are in agreement about conspiring against this religion and extinguishing 'the light of Allah with their mouths: but Allah seeks only to perfect His light, though the infidels abhor it' [Repentance: 32].

"Islam is a message [that advocates] truth, justice, freedom, welfare and equality. It is against injustice, fraud, persecution and oppression. It is a religion for all people and not a religion for those who own property, who are wealthy and who are masters. Nor is it the religion of the aristocracy in any of its forms; it is the religion of the masses wherever they may be.

"In advocating Islam we must recognize that if we do not face the real problems; if we do not recognize the suffering of those who are deprived, those who are treated unfairly and those who are helpless; and if we do not help [all those] rebel against injustice and deprivation so they can achieve justice, equality and freedom in its noblest sense, we would be like someone who spoke a language that people in this or in any other age did not understand. We would not have the ability to compete with other missionary movements and ideological messages that are making attempts to solve the problems which people are facing.

"In this age we have failed to become aware of these serious facts which the tradition of the prophet, may God bless him and grant him salvation, indicates he had an interest in and found solutions for."

Islam Is a Permanent Revolution on the Road to God

The secretary of the society also affirmed in his statement that every Moslem is to heed the Holy Koran and the principles of Islam.

"Islam is a permanent revolution on the road that leads to God; it is incombatible with tutelage by any creature whatsoever. In this sense Islam is the natural right of every human being, and, consequently, we

must allow each individual to devote himself to the Holy Koran so he would become familiar with that immoral divinely inspired book which is the last message from heaven. [We must allow] every person to live according to its rules and principles. Everything that Moslems may do will be of secondary [importance] if they do not succeed in making every Moslem aware of the message and the principles of the Holy Koran. It is then that religious, political, economic and social tutelage is repudiated. In this case a Moslem and a Moslem society become models for free men and for free societies, that are controlled by no man, government or institution. Homage then is due to the one and only God; all the idols would fall; and justice would be achieved." It is the fact that they have strayed from the Koran and adhered to changes which reflect individual interpretations of the Koran that are governed by specific historical, geographical and social circumstances that separated Moslems from each other in the past and led to their backwardness, their disunity and their partisanship. Today, the Koran is our route to genuine deliverance in a happy Islamic society."

The Superpowers and The Extension of Influence

The secretary of the Society for Islamic Missionary Activity also referred in his address to the superpowers that are engaged in a fierce struggle against Islam. He said it was necessary to confront them so as to oppose the dangers that are threatening Islam from every direction. These dangers seek to obliterate the religion, the culture and the principles of Islam. He said:

"Many people spoke in this conference about the major dangers that are threatening the Islamic world from every direction. The real weapon [that can be used] to confront these major challenges is a deep-rooted faith in the principles of Islam and an insistence on applying the teachings of the Holy Koran and making it the law and the way of life for Moslems. Afterwards [it is necessary to] become acquainted with the sources of these dangers and to confront them with force that emanates from an enlightened, awareness of self sharpened by a determination to fight in a holy war.

"With regard to the foreign sources of these dangers, we find that the superpowers are competing with each other to spread their influence on numerous Islamic countries and to interfere in their affairs and firmly establish the foreign occupation of these countries. Palestine has been the foremost of these countries; instead of the Moslems succeeding in liberating it, Egypt was lost after it. The enemies of Islam who usurped Egypt after succeeding in occupying Palestine were victorious. We now hear [expressions of] diplomatic enthusiasm in favor of making the occupation authorities in Palestine change their decision about declaring Jerusalem their capital. We are all forgetting that the first head of state to visit this occupied city was the Egyptian president who sold his nation's cause. Instead of taking the economic measures that are necessary against those who were on our side one day and then sold themselves to the enemy, we are now imploring those enemies to give up gains they had won by force."

The Pope Tours the Dark Continent

The programs of Christians and missionaries in some African countries--and Central America is among them--have been successful. These countries were occupied again by the Christian forces of the west after the Islamic efforts that were made by al-Jamahiriyah succeeded in the Islamic missionary activity, and those countries became Islamic.

The pope is touring the dark continent these days. He is pleased with the obvious victory [that was achieved] after Moslems failed to champion their brothers in many corners of the Islamic world. The results have always been more refugee camps and hundreds of thousands of poor, needy and sick people who became a burden to international relief organizations while we begrudge them even the approval of forming an Islamic red crescent that would take pity on them and show them mercy and extend that pity and mercy to the needy everywhere.

As a result of deep psychological influences that developed from the ages of oppression and corruption, Moslems have become accustomed to taking matters lightly when matters are serious. They accept lagging behind when it is time to take action. When disaster befalls one of their homelands, they vie with each other in mourning the loss; they hold conferences to study the reasons for the loss; and they [also] excel in eulogizing that country which suffered the loss.

Today, the only thing Moslems have to do is to overcome this delusion that is oppressing their hearts and rebel against their reality so as to change it. "Allah does not change a people's lot unless they change what is in their hearts" [Thunder: 11]. This change will not take place unless it stems from them and from their own will. It is not to be a change effected in response to what is dictated to them by their enemies who are now expounding upon Islam to conquer it.

The First Project of the Islamic Mission Society

At a time when book, periodicals, printed publications and radio and television broadcasts are considered principal means for promoting the Islamic message, the Moslem missionary is considered to be of major significance. He is the pivot upon which Islamic missionary activity rests. The missionary represents the direct and continuous link which is based on direct contact and on a one on one relationship that is undoubtedly influential and greatly effective in spreading Islam. Along the lines of interest in [those] missionaries a conference is being convened in Libya from 18/8/80 to 31/8/80. It is a meeting to which all the missionaries of the Islamic Mission Society are invited--and there are about 500 missionaries--to achieve the following objectives:

1. To stimulate Islamic activity and to give it a new impetus.

2. To strengthen intellectual ties with the missionaries.

3. To strengthen relations among the missionaries themselves and to manifest the principle of getting acquainted among them.

4. To find out about their psychological preparedness, their cultural capabilities and the extent of their commitment to adhere to the course of missionary activity and also to find out about the effect they had on Moslems and others around them.

5. To find out about the obstacles and the problems that are facing the missionaries and to consider proposals to overcome them.

6. To utilize the missionaries in finding out about the reality they are experiencing and in finding out about the economic and social condition of Moslems and the extent of their awareness of the cause of Islam and the dangers that surround it. These dangers are manifested in the missionary and Zionist movements as well as in other destructive movements.

7. To enable the missionaries to find out about the new Libyan reality which is based on Islam; which succeeded in realizing social justice and freedom through socialism; and which achieved freedom by giving people authority on the basis of the fact that [freedom and justice] are the foundations of Islamic life, and especially to enable the missionaries to find out about the doubts that are aroused by the enemies of Islam against the Islamic experiment in Libya.

8. To make them aware of the necessity of advocating true Islam from its primary source which is the Holy Koran that was sent by God to Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation. Their missionary activity is to be quite remote from narrow, prejudicial sectarianism.

These goals could be achieved by means of [the following]:

* Lectures.

* Discussion meetings.

*Debates.

*Personal visits.

* To attend some popular celebrations that are held to commemorate the anniversary of the great 1st of September Revolution in some areas of al-Jamahiriyah.

* To make field visits to the locations of the Libyan people's accomplishments.

The lectures at this meeting should be around the following subjects:

* The Islamic message and the attributes of a missionary.

* The goals of missionary activity and oriental studies.

* The Christian penetration of Africa and Asia.

* The reality of Moslems and their path to deliverance.

* The Koran as the law of society.

* Islam and solving economic problems.

* Islam, the religion of freedom.

* Zionism and its danger to religions.

* The third universal theory.

* The 1st of September Revolution as an Islamic Revolution.

* The role of the 1st of September Revolution in spreading Islam.

* The posture of the 1st of September Revolution vis a vis the liberation movements in the world.

* The ideal course for Islamic missionary work.

* Oratory and its role in spreading Islam.

8592
CSO: 4802

KURDISTAN REVOLUTIONARY WORKERS' ORGANIZATION CALLS FOR ARMED STRUGGLE

Stockholm RIZGARIYA KURDISTAN in Turkish Jan-Feb 80, pp 16-19

/Text/ From the Kurdistan Revolutionary Workers' Organization to peasants and rural workers and our brothers and sisters in the south.

When the Iranian people initiated the revolution to end dictatorship, the peasants did not contribute much to the struggle. They said, "If the Shah goes, feudalism and the old ways will come back."

Now we see that the feudal lords are surrounding Kurdistan on all sides. They are buying guns, attacking the peasants and crushing them, taking everything they have. In other words, what our brothers said has come true.

This shows us the wisdom of the peasant. Another reason the peasants did not join the struggle was that they did not know what would happen to their own world or who would come out the winner. But if they had joined the struggle in the beginning to prevent the advance of the feudal lords, they would not have been able to hold up their heads now.

Measures must be taken before the calamity comes. We know that the wild boar is nasty and dangerous and must be prevented from wreaking havoc. Or, when black clouds start gathering in the sky, the tobacco farmers cover their tobacco before the rain begins.

Therefore, as we said, the peasant did not join the struggle, because to an extent they did not know what would happen to their own world. To be more precise: There were no political parties to talk with the peasants or to organize them. The existing parties, while talking nonsense to the peasants, at the same time rose and fell with the landlords and feudalists and supported them. And still support them.

It is our duty for our peasant brothers and workers to draw their attention to the situation, especially the situation in the rural areas, in order to defend them against all pressures, including the new forms.

We hope that the following will summarize developments in the rural areas.

On What Landlords and Feudalists Do and Efforts of Peasants

1. Two weeks ago, Husen Agha from Bize and his brother Qarani Agha and their collaborators attacked Ballan villagers. They bound some of the villagers, tied ropes around their necks and dragged them out of the village. Later they demanded taxes for the past 15 years from the villagers. The Free Revolutionary Council (pro-government, translator's note) turned a deaf ear and did nothing about the situation.

2. In Suma Village in the Bradost region near Urmiye, collaborationist feudal lords like Jihangir Khan robbed some of the peasants and demanded extortion (rent) from others.

3. Jander Agha, the owner of Sard Awa Village in the Bokan region, surrounded the village mosque and dispersed by force of arms the villagers who had assembled to form a Village Revolutionary Committee.

4. After the Shah fled and the government led by the traitor Bakhtiyar fell, Abdullah Khan from Hawraman, landlord of Dizli, sent a letter to his people saying, "The law is now dead." He later attacked the villagers and tried to seize their expansive lands.

5. The magistrate of Geozeh Kereh Village in the Merivan region seized the villagers' lands by force.

6. Ahmed Agha of Goleh Village terrorized the villagers for the purpose of intimidating the people.

7. In the vicinity of Kermanshah, former collaborators of Kamyaran began a robbery campaign in the surrounding villages in order to intimidate the people. They would plunder a different village every night. As a result of this thievery and plunder, the peasants of Kani Lili left their village and migrated to other regions. Other villagers nearby took their rugs and all the household furnishings left behind to the homes of their relatives living in Kermanshah and Sanandach. Some villagers said, "Even the Shah's regime was better than it is now."

Now Let Us Talk About What the Peasants Are Doing

1. The people of the Kamyaran region rounded up guns again and decided to get organized to join forces. For example, when armed robbers tried to plunder Kani Isa Village, the people of Uzmaneh Village with their young men and brave youths ran to the aid of their neighbors and turned back the attackers.

2. In the Sardesht region, the Alwatan gendarmerie station commander had obtained weapons for Selim Agha of Alwatan. But the villagers took measures against this and Selim Agha was left without guns.

3. In the Kamyaran region, residents of Yaminan Khwaru drove the government's rent men out of the region last year. These forces and robbers together attacked Yamani Village several nights ago, cut down and burned the trees in three fruit orchards; the villagers then opened fire on them, forcing them to abandon the village.

4. Farmers in Bluanwa and Dedana near Sanandach seized the private farms which had been wrenched from them earlier by cruel feudal lords and began plowing them.

5. Landless farmers from 12 villages in the Bokan area demanded equal distribution of the farms of large landholders and arranged a demonstration in Bokan on 22-12-57 (12 March 1979, translator's note).

6. Khelil Melichi Agha, the owner of Kani Sur Village in the Sakiz area, came to Rahim Gujyag Village two years ago with fifty tractors and seized the land and some of the pasture of a dozen or so farmers.

These families -- a total of nine families -- are now going to Sakiz to make the situation known and to get the support of the people. One of these of our brothers who was robbed said, "Our land is our life. We will definitely get it back and plant crops again. If only we had a few guns. We will not hesitate to give our lives for this purpose."

7. Kamyar, grandson of Hama Rashid Khan and long-time henchman of Barzani, has begun raiding in the area around Saran Village in Baneh region. With his armed gang, he has taken 20,000 tumans (Iranian monetary unti, translator's note) by force from workers. The Boneh Khwaru villagers have bought guns and are defending themselves every day against this traitorous gang. They were the ones who fled and took refuge in the police station. As for the armed thieves of these traitors, they are not brave enough to approach us.

The following announcement was made by the Merivan Peasant Union:

"In the name of God the Almighty -- on 16 Efsand 1357 (5 March 1979, translator's note), each of the following villages sent two representatives to attend a meeting held in Na-Na Village. The names of these villages are: Na-Na, Chor, Almaneh, Hajmneh, Merg. Sarincmar, Daga Shekan, Goze Koreh, Darseran, Gagel.

"The text of the proposals and decisions of the meeting is as follows:

"1. We invite the farmers of Merivan and other regions to unite, as other citizens have done, to work toward ensuring mutual assistance and solidarity in harmony with all other classes and under the flag of Islam.

"2. Since most of the people of Merivan are agricultural workers and since this class is the most oppressed class as compared to other classes. we will unite, we will recognize our enemy and we will be ready to answer his attacks.

"3. We all know that the remnants of the former shah's clique are trying to infiltrate us and destroy our unifying bonds. We will be vigilant and foil their plans.

"4. Valued farmer! At this moment as we wish to unite, our enemies are trying to make us out to be 'communists.' They have spread this slander among the people to prevent our union. But this is not important. It is like the dog howling at the full moon. We will expand our union under the banner of Islam.

"5. Wherever a village is oppressed, we will gather there. We will defend it without fear of sacrifice.

"6. We will stand against all rules imposed by the landlords.

"7. We will overcome those who speak against our religion or those who defend ideas opposed to our religion.

"8. The mullah we want is the one who stands by the peasant, who speaks the truth and does not walk behind the cruel landlords.

"9. The one who should set prices on grain and other produce is the peasant. He must accomplish this in his own way.

"10. We, the peasants, are defenders of our nation. We will never permit foreign tyrants to enter our nation.

"Long live the Merivan Peasant Union! Death to the tyrants and enemies of the peasants!"

Two things are clear from these reports. First, the feudal lords and reactionaries are armed and they are suppressing the peasants. But on the other hand, our peasant brothers are refusing to remain silent in the traditional way and are defending their own rights. If the peasants do not take their own rights themselves, it does not matter what kind of government comes to power, it will not give the peasants their rights. We hope that the new government which has come to power in Kurdistan will deliver the rights of the peasants first of all; that is, that it will lift all pressures on the peasants. These duties may be listed as follows:

1. To help the peasants get rid of the feudal lords and armed robbers. If the government really wishes to help the peasants, it will arm them and help them disarm the bloodsuckers and it will try all of those who have oppressed the peasants.

2. To eliminate rents and interest payments on debts and, in the case of small landowners, the government must take the burden of these payments upon itself.

3. To nationalize the land, water and resources in the possession of large landowners by allowing them to hold no more than the average amount going to the peasant. Increased amounts must be distributed free of charge to the peasants who are without land or whose holdings are very small.

4. All debts and interest debts owed by peasants to banks, cooperative companies and lenders must be cancelled.

5. To raise the prices of grains, other agricultural produce and farm products (oil, livestock, etc.) with the intention of preventing the peasants from going to the cities to seek jobs and encouraging them to work on their own land.

6. At the same time, prices of tea, sugar and other commodities must be reduced.

7. When there is a question of peasant children's performing military service, they must be trained in Kurdistan and not forced to go to other regions.

8. To establish factories and farms in Kurdistan in order that Kurdish workers not be forced to move to distant regions in order to make a living. Kurdistan must be developed on a par with the other regions of Iran.

9. Village affairs must be directed by the farmers and no city authority must interfere in these affairs except by the full approval of the peasants. Also, regional council directors must be elected by the local people. Region administrators and multiregion general administrators must be elected by the local city and village people. Those involved with village weaving affairs must have the trust of the village people. Lawmaking bodies authorized by the councils in a region must be formed by the participation of representatives which the peasants elect according to their percentage of the population of the entire region. If, for example, 50 percent of a region's population consists of peasants, 50 percent of the representatives must be from the villages.

10. The language of education in the schools and higher education must be Kurdish. Official bodies in Kurdistan must use Kurdish as both the spoken and written language in administrative correspondence. The expenses of farmers' children who attend middle-level schools and university must be met by the government.

11. The government, in cooperation with the farmers, must provide the people the following resources: roads, schools, public baths, energy generating plants, water mains, public health organizations, clinics and medical centers.

12. To provide interest-free credit to the peasants for the development of agriculture and farming.

13. The Kurdish masses must have the right to determine their own destiny and to plan their lives for the future. This means that: Local government which will operate in Kurdish regions must be composed of Kurdish workers and and must be supervised by them. Kurdish workers must live side by side with other workers of Iran, without inferior treatment of any kind, in fact, as brothers, not as master and servant as was once seen in relations between the communities.

Valued worker brothers! In the 13 items we have listed above, we have demanded that the new Iranian regime perform its duty vis-a-vis our farmer brothers and all Kurdish people. We have done this (demands presented to the government, translator's note) briefly and in summary. However, the farmers have gained the right (deserve, translator's note) more than this. Therefore, we will debate these demands and other demands which are the logical conclusion of these in broader detail in the future. And we will disseminate our views from person to person throughout Kurdistan. Also, we will cooperate with all groups and parties which support the workers and all of us will work together for the realization of our demands and to achieve our goals. It is the duty of all progressive and honorable groups to sacrifice and to struggle for the realization of workers' rights. We, like other world progressive and revolutionary forces, recognize the duty to submit to you our highest humanitarian sensibilities and to channel all our forces toward realization of your needs. Perhaps there may be those who tell us that your goals and purposes are a kind of idealism, but we say who could have imagined at this time last year that things could have changed in such an extraordinary fashion? We saw how the Shah's regime collapsed and how its grisly conformity was destroyed by the masses. The united front of the masses is capable of demolishing the filthy dungeons of the tyrants.

On the other hand, we know that "if we cannot survive the harsh winter, we will not see the fruit and flowers of spring in our gardens and orchards."

Workers,

Unite arm in arm in the city factories and on the farms.

Beloved worker brothers!

To achieve our goals, we must strive to the utmost and move forward immediately. While demanding fulfillment of our demands from the government on the one hand, at the same time we will marshal our forces to seize our rights on the other. The most urgent duties ahead which our revolutionary worker brothers have already begun are these:

1. To organize peasant units in every region in the spirit of the Merivan revolutionary peasants in order to defend all villages and all farmers.

2. Landless farmers are confronted -- more than anyone else -- by the excessive repression of the feudal lords. This is why they hate the feudal lords more than anyone else. It is their right (landless peasants, translator's note) to make the large feudal lands public property and use them for themselves and other landless farmers. It is their duty to support them (landless peasants, translator's note) in every way possible, to unite the others against the influence of the feudal lords and to encourage and persuade them to struggle beside their farmer brothers. This means that the only way to advance is to join with the landless peasants.

3. It seems that the enemies of the peasants are armed, so the peasants must be armed also in order to be prepared to defend themselves. We must demand that the city councils, the gendarmerie stations and the army barracks provide us weapons. Moreover, it is very important in fact that the peasants buy weapons whenever their strength is sufficient or, if the village residents prefer, they can buy weapons for their own self-defense.

4. Many of the city people, such as city workers, most of the teachers, professionals and shopkeepers, support the farmers and workers and are ready to work together with our organizations to help us.

5. Infiltration of peasant units and influence over them by collaborators will be prevented. Their kind are only trying to get into the units in order to be agents for the tyrants. The feudal lords and some reactionary, collaborationist mullahs have launched a formidable campaign to prevent the farmers from uniting and especially from uniting with the progressive forces in the cities, spreading such groundless rumors as "They are atheists and communists" and the like. But the wise and experienced worker will know by their deeds and actions who is friend and who is foe.

The tyrants cannot cover up their exploitation and cruelty with these lies and groundless rumors.

Long live the tillers of the soil and the landless peasants!

Victory belongs to the armed struggle of the peasants and landless peasants!

Down with feudal lords and lackeys!

8349
CSO: 4907

ARMY REVAMPS REGULATIONS, FALLAHI REVIEWS POSTURE

Bahonar on Reform Measures

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 16 Sep 80 p 12

[Text] Hojjatoleslam Dr Mohammad Javad Bahonar, following the publication of the Revolutionary Council's report on the afternoon of the day before yesterday, participated in a press and radio/television interview. In answering the questions put to him by reporters, he talked about the procedures of the purge and the attempts to attract people to government employment as well as Iran's foreign policy, the activities of the Reconstruction Crusade and the Mostaz'afin Foundation, wage increases for workers, attracting unemployed manpower to cooperatives and the work of the Revolutionary Council for the benefit of the downtrodden people. He said: So far, in the area of education, thousands have been purged and 14,000 people have been retired. In the armed forces, first 7,997 people were purged, but later, after investigations, 829 were reinstated. And in other ministries, those who were purged or retired are as follows: In the Ministry of Justice, 312 Freemason and other judges; in the Ministry of Post, Telegraph, and Telephone, 2,000 people were retired and 600 purged; in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 798 out of 1,600 personnel were purged; in the Ministry of Energy, 600; in the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare, 800 were purged; in the Ministry of State, 491 were retired, 151 were purged, and 35 people were bought out.

Hojjatoleslam Bahonar said, in another part of his talk, that some of the standards for purging have not been clear and some individuals have been purged for no reason. Concerning the revamping and other undertakings in the armed forces, he said that the most important activities carried out in connection with the armed forces are in the 13 following areas:

1. A new office, the Office of Political Ideology, was established in the joint headquarters of the armed forces, which will work to raise the cultural level of the Islamic revolution and Islamic ideology within the armed forces.

2. The ranks of General and Lieutenant General were abolished.

3. The retirement of all chiefs of the armed forces.

4. Expansive purging within the armed forces.

5. Many acts of discrimination in the armed forces were stopped.

6. The use of privates as servants and physical punishment were abolished.

7. The standards for command were changed.

8. Islamic societies were formed in the armed forces.

9. Meetings for religious sermons have become common.

10. The monthly activities of the armed forces were changed to harmonize with the Islamic revolution.

11. All arms and colonial contracts were nullified.

12. An office for industrial research was created within the Ministry of Defense.

13. A plan for a people's army with an ideology.

Premium Pay Rules

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 16 Sep 80 p 12

[Text] Premium pay and benefits for military personnel of the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran were determined and announced to the Ministry of National Defense of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In accordance with the legislative bill, the premium pay for military personnel eligible according to the employment law of the armed forces, although there has been no change in the wage charts, is as follows:

Enlisted Soldier, Gendarme, and Policeman Third Class, 12,500 rials per month; enlisted Private First Class, Gendarme First Class, and Policeman Second Class: 12,700 rials per month;

Corporal and Policeman First Class: 13,850 rials per month; Sergeant Third Class and Police Officer Third Class: 16,000 rials; Sergeant Second Class and Police Officer Second Class 17,500 rials; Sergeant First Class and Police Officer First Class: 18,000; WOJG: 20,000 rials; CWO: 22,000 rials.

In accordance with this legislative bill, which was approved as a single article in one of the last sessions of the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, there will be a 15 percent increase of the premium pay of other grades whose total monthly salary and benefits are less than 80,000 rials, provided that the total does not then exceed 80,000 rials.

Also, the premium pay of the groups of the above mentioned military grades who work in the offices of the central administration has been set at a rate of 10 percent less than the above mentioned figures. In addition, the premium pay of those persons who work in technical fields has been set at 5 percent less than the above figures.

The report states that the benefits and premium pay of those individuals who serve in areas of disturbance will be 10 percent and those serving in war zones 20 percent above the aforementioned premiums and benefits, when applicable.

Also, in accordance with the bill passed by the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the amendment to Chart No 3, Article 1 of the wage and benefit law for the personnel of the armed forces is nullified, and ranking officers and the above mentioned will benefit from this legislative bill.

Also, it has been reported that in the legislative bill concerning the daily premium pay for personnel who participate in military activities within the country, following the approval of the Revolutionary Council of Iran, the phrase "to each ranking officer and pilot of the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran" has been changed to: "to each of the personnel of the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran."

In accordance with this legislative bill, all personnel of the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran who participates in military activities inside the country will be paid for every day of their active participation on the basis of a wage factor of 9 in addition to the daily premium which they will receive.

The daily military action premium for a private will be calculated on a basis of one and one-half the wage factor. Also, no sum will be deducted from the premium pay for food and lodging. This law is to be implemented from 3/21/79 [1/1/58]. The kind and period of military action will be determined by the joint armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Observations of General Fallahi

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 15 Sep 80 p 16

[Interview with General Fallahi by Mahmud Hojrat]

[Excerpts] [Question] General Fallahi, why is the news of the skirmishes in the west of the country and along the Iraqi border not reported clearly and precisely; in other words, why are the facts always hidden? What is your response to this problem?

[Answer] The facts concerning the country's borders and the internal areas are conveyed. However, they are conveyed a little later. The reason is that at times, the problems are vague. Sometimes reports come from various areas. At the present time, we do not have a centralized information system to direct and supervise the information. At the same time, everybody and every organization in an area, whether responsible or not, immediately sends reports about border incidents or incidents this side of the border. As a result, collecting these reports, coordinating them, and receiving the true report is sometimes delayed a few days. The delay is partly due to the numerous centers who are not responsible and who know nothing about the problem but who send these reports, at times disturbing and confusing the public. Consequently, in order to clarify things for the public and to give them accurate news, we have to collect information for two or three days after an incident. The news must be recorded, evaluated, and interpreted; then, it should be translated into information. And there should be an information center from which we can give accurate news to the people. Of course, sometimes there are communication problems as well. For example, in the border regions, the brothers of the pasdaran, gendarmery, or military are scattered in groups along the border. At times, there are no real communication facilities for sending precise news. At the present time, we have these problems, but we do not intend--God forbid--to give incorrect news to the people. As I have mentioned, the alert conscience of the people refuses to accept inaccurate news.

[Question] General Fallahi, having in mind the six conspiracies discovered among the military thusfar, have you devised a system for strict control and prevention of probable future conspiracies?

[Answer] There are two ways to eliminate conspiracies. One is to neutralize a conspiracy; another is to find its roots and to take steps to eliminate the breeding ground for conspiracies. Neutralizing conspiracies is a temporary solution. It requires an extensive information system which at the present time the people of Iran will not accept, because of the bitter memories they have of the former military counter-intelligence system and of SAVAK. At the same time, the people of Iran believe that there should exist a people's informational organization. At the present time, conspiracies are mostly discovered by responsible, faithful military personnel who believe in the ideology. On the whole, these conspiracies are discovered from within the armed forces and then neutralized. In certain other instances, we have received outside help. But the most essential thing is to eliminate the breeding ground for conspiracies, which is partly the result of discrimination and inequality in the military. A series of steps bas been taken to reorganize the armed forces, which has been done from within. Of course, this work requires sufficient time, because reorganization from within is a difficult task, which, when it is finished, will eliminate all breeding grounds for conspiracies and then we will not have to search to discover and neutralize them. Instead, this reorganization will be accomplished, and when it is instigated from within, and on the whole, existing inequalities are uprooted, there will be no excuse for conspiracies and we will not have to discover and neutralize them.

[Question] General Fallahi, it has been said that military spare parts are indirectly obtained from the United States. What do you have to say in this regard? In any case, since most of our military equipment is American made, what will you do to ensure that spare parts will be obtained?

[Answer] The first part of your question, that we receive our requirements from the United States, I deny and reject.

Since the victory of the revolution, we have not received any parts in any form directly or indirectly from the United States. But we have received a series of minor, small parts from free world markets and non-aligned countries, whose intentions are less exploitive, and that amount is insignificant. But what have we done? We have had somewhat of a stock from the previous regime, which had spent much of this

nation's money and had bought many spare parts which are readily available in storage. And these spare parts will be available for some time to come. Another area concerns those vehicles which, because of age and use, are unrepairable--a problem which exists in all the armies of the world. We have used parts from unusable vehicles and have met our needs in this manner. Of course, I do not deny our material needs. But the spiritual needs of the military personnel are much stronger. That is to say, we must try to eliminate discrimination and inequality within the armed forces and have a truly ideologically Islamic, monotheistic people's army and attain a state of internal purity, where internal complexes are released and as a result our spirits are not merely not weakened but strengthened. But we have a number of difficulties concerning living and welfare facilities, the most important of which is housing. During the despised previous regime, several times there was talk of creating a collective residence for military personnel, but none of these plans were completed. The despised previous regime proved that it could not even afford to create a housing complex. As a result, in the military, too, certain housing complexes were started and at the present time, even though it has been 18 months since the victory of the revolution, they are still uncompleted. The problem that we have had is due to the fact that the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development had been responsible for the supervision of the completion of military buildings, which, during the last 18 months, has fallen into the clutches of bureaucracy. We went to the president, who was kind enough to transfer the supervision over to the military. Since a short time ago, we have begun work on the unfinished buildings. At the present time, however, 7 percent of the ground forces have military housing but 93 percent do not. In certain cases, the families of two ranking officers share one room in Dasht-e Azadegan. Building housing for the remaining 93 percent will require much money, which has not been allowed for in this year's budget. But, some funds have been put at our disposal to finish the incomplete buildings. When these unfinished buildings are completed, part of our problems will be solved. Recently, the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development has put 25 billion rials at the disposal of the Ministry of Defense to be given to the military through Sepah Bank. With this money, an organization has been created within the Ministry of Defense. But with my experience of 29 years in the service, I do not think that the military can do without using heavy equipment such as artillery, tanks, airplanes, and helicopters, although we are using similar equipment in our training, which has reduced the workload of such equipment to a certain extent. For example, instead of teaching the personnel to drive on the tanks, we use trucks.

And we have been successful to a certain extent Some of the rapidly consumed parts are difficult to produce domestically. But if we get involved in a war, we must change the nature of the war. That is, it will be the nation who will fight, not merely the military. For this reason, a mobilization organization has been formed and the military supports the arming and training of the mobilization organization, which is that very army of 20 million. If there is a war in the region, and if this war is an extended one, we will seek help from these mobilized forces and all the people. And we will change the nature of war. That is, we will emphasize night battle. We have presently begun night training in order to prepare for night operations, to be safe from invading planes. We will also carry out an irregular war through the people and the army, that is, through preventive operations and disruptive operations. We will change the nature of war from its regular, geometrical form. And if the war lasts only a few months, we will have no problems concerning spare parts. On the other hand, if we cannot finish the work of the mobilization organization and if we are soon involved in a regional war where we have to use airplanes, war ships, tanks and artillery, we would certainly face difficulties concerning spare parts.

[Question] Can the problems between Iran and Iraq and the frequent border skirmishes only be solved militarily, or is it possible to resolve them through political and diplomatic channels?

[Answer] The Islamic Republic of Iran will not tolerate the interference of the Iraqi Ba'th government and it will not compromise with a government which is not genuine. If Iraq would not allow its borders to be crossed, for sure, we would not have the border problems we do now. Iraq allows, encourages, and even helps people to enter and exit from its borders and still expects the Iranian revolution to be confined to Iranian territory. All its efforts are expended in trying to bridle the Iranian revolution here in the center of the Islamic Republic of Iran and to prevent its spread. Of course, the Iranian revolution is genuinely Godly. It is not merchandise to be exported. But the Iranian revolution will spread. Iraq's efforts are futile. This process is not artificial. This is an internal matter, a matter of beliefs. Iraq's attempts may postpone its spread a little. But it will spread and one day the Iraqi government will explode. When that day will be cannot be predicted.

9593
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HELICOPTER PROPOSED TO SERVE FUTURE DEFENSE NEEDS

Tel Aviv MA'ARAKHOT in Hebrew Feb 80 pp 6-9

[Article, first of three in this issue: "The Attack Helicopter and Defense Objectives"]

[Text] The profile of war is a subject mired in controversy, and it is difficult to find agreement about it. But we must consider the possibility, as we examine the profile of war as the basis for developing the military, that the IDF will have to fight in a very difficult situation. It must, therefore, be built in such a way as to stand up to such conditions and assure that in its time of trial, it will be the one to determine the course of the war. Emerging from this assumption is a war profile in which the IDF is taken by surprise, its reserve forces, the major part of the IDF, have not yet been called up, and battles are breaking out on several fronts at once.

The Next War in the Eyes of the Arabs

Ever since the Yom Kippur War, Arab publications have been enlarging on the possibility that another war will break out. Many Arab commentators have been trying to analyze events of 1973, learn lessons from them, and draw the scenario of the next war. Most of the scenarios emphasize the following points:

--Surprise: Just as Israel was taken by surprise in the past, so it can be surprised in the future.

--Concentration of forces: Israel bases its strength on its reserves. We must, therefore, strike immediately at the beginning of the war with the greatest possible force, before Israel can recruit its full forces.

--Relations with political powers are working to the advantage of the Arabs: Israel is limited in its activities while the Arabs enjoy a freedom of political activity which stems from their control over oil supplies. This freedom will allow the Arabs to carry out a limited military operation whose objective is: "disturbance of the faith in the doctrine of Israeli security by some kind of conquest in the region."

The Syrian JAYSH AL-SHA'B of November 1977 describes it as follows: "Two clear facts have emerged from the events of October 1973 in the Middle East: the great effectiveness of the antitank missiles and the surprise attack of the Arabs which confused the Israelis. There is no doubt that in the future, this kind of surprise attack, which deceived Israeli and American intelligence, must be uppermost in the thoughts of the attacking nation." In another Syrian publication (AL-MAJALLAH AL-'ASKARIYAH, November 1976), the following was said on the same subject: "The October War represented a very important landmark in the Middle East conflict, and its lessons represented a turning point in the development of the Arab armies. To date, 3 years after the war, it is up to the Arabs to effect these changes by means of training and troop exercises before the next round; from the point of view of consequences for the region, the October War was a tie and did not bring about a decisive victory. As long as there is no decisive victory in Palestine, these rounds of war will continue." The Arab commentator al-Ayyubi, in his talk published in the Lebanese AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI of October 1977, also agrees that it is possible to repeat the surprise element in the Yom Kippur War. "Perhaps Israel will be caught off guard as it was on Yom Kippur because Israel believes that the Arabs are again not united and incapable of deciding to wage another war."

How will the Arabs carry out their assault? The Syrian AL-MAJALLAH AL-'ASKARIYAH (16 November 1976) sees a massive attack operation whose purpose will be to saturate the battlefield with arms and manpower. This attack will be based on armor and boosted by tactical surprise of time and place. The armor and the Syrian [armored infantry] would have air cover based in antiaircraft guns and missiles which would advance together quickly with the land forces. The English commentator, Steven Rosen, emphasizes (in a study published in the publication INTERNATIONAL SECURITY No 2, 1978) that "the 1973 war demonstrated that the combination of land-to-air missiles and antiaircraft guns like the SA-2, SA-3, SA-6, SA-7 and ZSU-23x4 can cause many losses and lessen the effectiveness of air power which is trying to aid the land forces and/or can work to disrupt the enemy's ranks. Short range antiaircraft missiles like the Stinger, the Blowpipe and the SA-7 will be used in large quantities in the fifth war." The Syrian AL-MAJALLAH AL-'ASKARIYAH emphasizes this point: "The Syrian army must cancel out the Israeli air superiority and limit the fighting to two dimensions only."

What will be the outcome of the Arab assault? The Arabs themselves know that a "final" victory over Israel is not yet within their reach. But, "as long as the Arabs, in contrast to Israel, enjoy political freedom which allows them to carry out hostile acts, their tactical capability is superior to Israel's conventional strength (JAYSH AL-SHA'B, 16 November 1977). The British commentator, Rosen, develops the argument that the next Middle East war will have a political rather than a military character. "It is worth pointing out that if the Arabs decide to go to war, it is reasonable to assume that it won't be out of a calculation to achieve decisive

victory.... One can expect that the Arabs will seek a few local victories in specific campaigns.... They can rely on the fact that the great powers will bring about a ceasefire to prevent the total destruction of the Arab armies. The professional military men... will be forceful in demanding limited and attainable war objectives which will give them credit for future bargaining."

And, more specifically, the Arab armies will develop their strategy "around a number of symbolic objectives. Such goals as the following are likely to be included: ...conquest again of the slopes of the Hermon or the hills near Qunaytirah; bombing of Dimona; or even some specific and minor but symbolic penetration beyond the green line. It doesn't matter if the victory is great or permanent. What is important is the feeling that the Arabs are advancing, however slowly."

A Preemptive Strike

It is generally accepted, as leaders in Israel and high-ranking officers in the IDF have said, that Israel cannot afford to lose territory in a war, because, apart from the blow to morale that such an event would bring, every lost piece of territory would be a bargaining card in the political negotiations after the war.

This approach suggests the possibility of solving the problem of loss of territory through the option of a preemptive strike. The Arabs, like various observers outside of Israel, are aware of the fact that Israel, if it can spot signs of an approaching Arab attack, is likely to strike a preemptive blow. However, given international pressures, there are those who are doubtful about Israel's ability to decide to make a preemptive strike. In the Lebanese publication AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI (11 July 1977), the argument is presented that Israel will not be able to start a war, stick with it, and achieve positive results if the United States does not agree. The United States will not agree, for fear that the war would hurt its own interests. Every additional piece of territory conquered by Israel will create new security problems, and will arouse international public opinion. For the world demands a retreat from the territories captured in 1967. This kind of aggression will also bring into play the weapons of oil which could result in the Western world being brought to economic collapse." The British commentator, Rosen, believes that, in contrast to what happened in 1973, in the future, when the opening of the next round of war is certain, it is likely that "Israel will have to adopt the strategy of the first blow," but, in any case, it is reasonable to assume that the Arabs will try to open with an attack "in an effort to achieve both strategic and tactical surprise."

The accepted way of dealing with this kind of problem is to set up a strong line of defense based on obstacles and powerful forces which will stand ever ready to stop the enemy. But such a line of defense calls

for a deployment of forces in the area to man the defenses. From Israel's vantage point of the "few against the many," where the major part of the fighting force of the IDF is located most of the year behind the lines and where the emergency fighters are also everyday citizens engaged in economics, industry, and agriculture between wars, it is not possible to maintain permanent forces which can stop a massive attack.

As a result of this, there is a need for advance warning which will allow them to call up the reserves. But the intelligence service warning, which is the logical one in such a situation, did not stand the test of reality in the past, and I believe that it is likely to fail in the future as well. In any case, I prefer that we prepare for the worst possibility from our perspective, and that is that we will fail once again. The concept of a massive line of defense has not proven itself in the past, nor do I recommend it as a solution for the future. Thus, in approaching the subject of developing the IDF and deciding about the proper balance between various types of fighting apparatus, we must develop a deterrent force which will keep the enemy from attaining its goals which are the following: swift control of territory, disruption of processes for organizing defenses as well as for organizing for attack.

The Answer--The Attack Helicopter

The Israeli Air Force can respond to the problem of defending the rear. It is the job of the interception system of the army. It can also, in my opinion, adapt itself to the demands for defense on the front. The deterrent force on the front must be a force with high mobility, a capability for destroying armored forces and for surviving, and all of this under front-line conditions. A look at the characteristics of the war equipment existing in the IDF today points to the fact that with such a profile, it would not do to base it on land forces which would be on the front line in time of surprise. And it would also be hard to base it on air power since the major part of this force will be busy defending the rear and preparing for attack. The cost of air restraint by means of attack planes for close support is high compared to the benefits, and there also exists the possibility that bad weather conditions would limit their potential activity.

The Attack Helicopter Is the Answer to the Problem of a Primary Restraint for Israel

The appearance of the helicopter altered the traditional clear-cut division of transport by land, water or air. It added a fourth to the above three dimensions--the hovering dimension. The hovering dimension differs from the three traditional dimensions in every respect. It gives the helicopter ability to wage a different contest depending on the features of the area and the existing field conditions in a modern war. By being,

in essence, an instrument of flight, its advantage over the tank lies in its high mobility without having to depend on the passability of the territory, inits ability to lift up to a height which allows it a wide and deep field of vision, and by its skill in assuming different positions very rapidly. Its advantages over the plane are seen in its ability to fly at low altitudes (5 feet), at different speeds appropriate to the area, in its ability to hover and make use of the landscape and the cover to hide and to carry out ambushes, in its ability to stay at the front for long periods, to refuel, to be equipped in the area and thus remain in the battle zone without time limits, to remain near the forces, to receive (and transmit) the latest intelligence information, and to remain in direct communication with every element on the battlefield. In the absence of land forces (with whom it works), the helicopter can even operate independently.

In the past, it was assumed that the helicopter was vulnerable, and would not have a place on the modern battlefield. The myth of the vulnerable helicopter was already destroyed during the Six-Day War when helicopters carried out four major strike missions during the days of fighting, dozens of recovery missions from within enemy territory and from active battle zones, and hundreds of missions for the evacuation of wounded from the battlefield, and all of this without losing a single helicopter. And in the course of the war of attrition, dozens of missions were carried out across the border, and not a single helicopter was destroyed. And in the battles mentioned, the technique of ground contour flight (NOE) did not yet exist. This technique represents one of the major factors adding unequivocally to the survival capacity of the helicopter. The Vietnam War, in which thousands of missions were carried out by helicopter, serves frequently as an example of the low survival of the helicopter on the battlefield. But the facts about this war show an entirely different picture.

Helicopters and Fixed Wing Planes

Year	Combat flights/ Attacks/ Strikes/ Suspension charge	Helicopter losses	Ratio of losses to flights	Combat flights	Plane losses	Ratio of losses to flights	Ratio of losses in favor of helicopters	Comments
1966	1,293,887	123	1:10,519	170,780	69	1:2,475	1:4.25	End of the bombings in the north
1967	2,324,949	260	1: 8,942	226,156	73	1:3,098	1:2.8	
1968	3,368,711	496	1: 6,791	281,686	107	1:2,632	1:2.58	
1969	3,538,990	459	1: 7,710	257,209	68	1:3,782	1:2.03	
1970	2,956,230	417	1: 7,089	131,464	29	1:4,333	1:1.56	
1971	1,567,427	230	1: 6,814	39,457	17	1:2,321	1:2.93	
Total	15,050,194	1,985	1: 7,581	1106,752	363	1:3,048	1:2.48	

Explanations:

The data in the foregoing table were taken from the numbers of missions recorded in the book, "The Air War in Indochina," pp 267-272. The number of missions was listed in the book under the heading, South Vietnam (that is, not including North Vietnam). I am assuming that this number represents the total number of missions carried out in Southeast Asia. The number of losses recorded in the book is divided into South Vietnam and North Vietnam. In the calculations, the ratio of missions (listed only for South Vietnam) to losses is only for South Vietnam. If the calculation had been done for losses of both North and South Vietnam, the ratio would be even more favorable for helicopters because helicopter losses in North Vietnam were insignificant because the number of flights was insignificant there. At the same time, losses of attack planes in the North were great as the following data show:

Year	Helicopter losses		Losses of attack planes		Comments
	South Vietnam	North Vietnam	South Vietnam	North Vietnam	
1966	123	1	69	280	
1967	260	4	73	326	
1968	496	2	107	141	
1969	459	-	68	2	End of the bombings in the north
1970	417	-	29	4	
1971	230	-	17	6	

Explanations:
Key dates.
End of 1968: Cessation of bombings in North Vietnam by the Americans.
End of 1973: Ceasefire.
End of 1975: Evacuation of the Americans from Vietnam

It turns out that a judicious use of the helicopter's advantages earns it a very high grade in terms of capacity for survival on the battlefield. The helicopter can fly low (under 50 feet) and slowly. It is also able to hover, to hide, and to make use of all kinds of features of the land and cover. This skill allows it to defend itself against heavy missiles and antitank armor coming from any direction. The helicopter can also hide, hover or slow down. This ability makes it possible for it to reveal the enemy and receive exact intelligence at the right time and to remain outside the region of light antiaircraft and to keep the enemy from discovering it.

The appearance of the long-range antitank missile allowed the helicopter to remain outside the danger zone (far away and low) but still influence the battlefield, and turned it into a lethal piece of equipment against the armored forces of the enemy. The combination of all these qualities, added to the capacity to carry out all the goals of restraint in a flight over our territory, turns the helicopter, under the conditions reigning in Israel, into a primary restraint for the IDF.

Helicopters on the Modern Battlefield

In looking at the helicopters which exist today in the armies of the world, we need to differentiate between two configurations: the heavy attack helicopter, armed with antitank missiles, a 20 mm gun, a 7.62 minigun, rockets, a 40 mm gun, and the light attack helicopter (antitank helicopter) armed only with antitank missiles. In Israel, the heavy helicopter is modeled after the Cobra of Bell Co.

Belonging to the heavy class are the YAH-64 (made by the Hughes Co), the future attack helicopter of the U.S. Army, the German-French PAH-2 (still in the planning stage), and the Augusta 129. The light helicopter is represented in Israel by the 500 MD of the Hughes Co. Also belonging there are the German BO-105 and the French Gazelle. The two approaches are being tested in the area. The parameters being tested now include: firepower, maneuverability, weight, cost, and so forth.

The Cobra helicopter which is now in our hands, is armed with 8 TOW missiles with a range of 3.57 km, a 20 mm gun with an effective range of 1,400 meters, rockets, a 400 gun, and a 7.62 minigun.

The mode of operation of the helicopters should be like the one proposed by the Americans. Colonel Miller of the U.S. Army proposes, in his article, "Air Superiority at the Height of the Treetops" (Cyclon 5, November 1979), a fit between reconnaissance helicopters, whose job is to pinpoint targets, and escort helicopters which will secure the battlefield and allow the attack helicopters to attack the armored forces of the enemy.

Low altitude flight is one of the chief components in the high survival capacity of the helicopter. In a ground contour flight, the problem of navigation is difficult and compounded when battle conditions make things even more difficult.

In order to give the attack helicopter a free hand on the front, the pilots have to know the area in which they are flying. The U.S. Army, which worries about restraining the masses of armored forces of the "Warsaw Pact" stretched along the border of the two Germanies, is attempting to apply a solution to fit the A-10 planes on the mainland (see MA'ARAKHOT, 269). These planes, which are designated to destroy

enemy armored forces, have areas set aside for them from the outset. Every pilot practices, usually on a specific section, until he knows it well. In this way, the specific area becomes the pilot's "home base." He knows every tree and bush, and if he is sent out over targets in the area, he can find his way immediately without needing navigation or even communication. This kind of solution applies also to the operation of attack helicopters. Proper cooperation during the practice sessions with the forces in the area will also bring about a close relationship between the forces and the pilots in the squadron. The personal acquaintanceship and the shared language which will be developed contribute a lot to the consolidation of a powerful restraining force.

In summary: The special conditions of Israel which is fighting a battle of the few against the many require the establishment of a deterrent force which is mobile, has high survival capacity and can destroy armor. The attack helicopter is one of the most significant solutions to this challenge.

Just as the interceptor plane is the deterrent and defender of the rear, so is the antitank helicopter the primary deterrent force on the front. Thus, the contribution of the antitank helicopter to the front is like the contribution of the interceptor plane in the rear.

After the next war, when the statisticians relate and summarize the contribution of each force and section to the victory, it will be clear that while the major destroyer of tanks is still the tank gun, the primary deterrent force is the attack helicopter. It will prevent the enemy from conquering territory, allow the IDF to get organized, and allow the transfer of tank guns to take place. It will allow the air force to organize its attack and the interceptor force to defend the skies of the nation and attack the enemy on its territory.

9348
CSO: 4805

POLL SURVEYS VIEWS ON EMIGRATION

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 15 Aug 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] The inclination toward emigration from Israel has increased about 1 percent since May. Of the total Jewish population aged 18 and over, 6.9 percent declare that they consider themselves candidates for emigration, and another 4.9 percent say they "might" emigrate. Overall, therefore, 11.8 percent are considering emigration. In May (HA'ARETZ, 16 May 1980), 10.9 percent declared that they wanted to emigrate. These are the findings of the nationwide public opinion poll of the Pori Institute sponsored by HA'ARETZ. To the question, "Do you or do you not consider yourself a candidate for emigration?" 6.9 percent answered yes, and another 4.9 percent answered maybe, which makes a total of 11.8 percent of the adult population.

Prominent among those declaring that they would definitely emigrate are younger persons, aged 18 to 29 (11.8 percent), native-born Israelis (9.8 percent), persons in academic and managerial occupations (8.6 percent), persons with below-average incomes (8.4 percent), persons with better education (8.0 percent), and persons of Asian or African origin (7.7 percent).

Of those polled, 38.6 percent said that they knew "people who intend to emigrate"; 18.8 percent have close relatives--sons, daughters, brothers, sisters, parents--who have emigrated, and another 5.6 percent have close relatives who intend to emigrate. That is to say, members of 24.4 percent of Israeli families have either emigrated or intend to emigrate.

Prominent among those declaring that close relatives had emigrated were long-time (pre-State) residents, persons with better education, persons in academic occupations, and white-collar workers.

But the majority of the public does not approve of emigration. To the additional question, Do you or do you not approve of emigration?", 68.7 percent answered no, while 22.1 percent answered yes. Another 5.2 percent said that approval or disapproval depended on the circumstances in each individual case. The remaining 4.2 percent had no opinion.

The director of the study, Pori manager Rafael Gil, points out that especially prominent among those approving of emigration are younger persons, aged 18 to 29 (31.2 percent), persons of Asian or African origin (27.4 percent), and manual workers (26.4 percent).

The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women who were interviewed personally in their homes in all areas of the country, with full preservation of privacy.

9045
CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

DECLINE IN INVESTMENTS--In the first half of 1980 there was an actual decline in investments of about 20 percent. The decline is showing itself also in the implementation of investments and in long-range planning of investments. According to data of the investment center of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Tourism, the total number of investment programs submitted for approval declined 31 percent. The number of new projects submitted for approval declined from 70 last year to only 44 this year. There was a more moderate decline in approvals of investment on additions to, and enlargements of existing projects, where there has been a 14 percent decline since the beginning of the year. Data on the import of investment equipment and the domestic manufacture of such equipment also indicate that in the first quarter of 1980 there was a decline of 10.2 percent. It is estimated that in the second quarter the slowdown in import and domestic manufacture of investment equipment increased, and that the actual decline in this branch will reach 20 percent compared to the same period last year. In the first 5 months of this year there was also a decline in the number of development loans approved and implemented, amounting to 25 percent. The deputy general manager of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Tourism, Avraham Asheri, reported that the causes of the investment slowdown are the indexing of development loans, the credit freeze, and the prevailing uncertainty concerning the condition of the domestic market. Mr Asheri said that the decline in investments must give concern to those who are planning on an increase in exports in the coming years. He pointed out that in the long run, an increase in exports and a change in imports are possible only through the implementation of new investments, and that there is no doubt that the major portion of the accelerated growth of exports this year is due to the maturing of investments of recent years. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Aug 80 p 7] 9045

POLL ON TERRORISM--Two-thirds of the Israeli public is opposed to a terror-against-terror system in the hands of nongovernment Jewish organizations, while one-fourth of the public supports such activity; this was learned from a nationwide public opinion poll of the Pori Institute sponsored by HA'ARETZ. To the question, "Do you favor or oppose a Jewish terrorist system in the hands of nongovernment Jewish organizations as a

reaction to hostile activities of the Arabs of the Occupied Areas?" 67.4 percent answered no, while 23.9 percent answered yes. Another 2.1 percent were ready to support terror-against-terror under specific conditions, such as: if only those who injure us are injured, if this is the only way to put an end to Arab terror, and depending on world reaction. The remaining 6.6 percent had no opinion on the subject. The director of the study, Pori manager Rafael Gil, points out that support for the terror-against-terror system was especially high (32.4 percent) among persons of Asian or African origin, in contrast to 16.4 percent of persons of European or American origin. Greater opposition was recorded among persons of better education, persons in academic and managerial occupations, and long-time residents of Israel. Within these population levels, opposition to Jewish terror was close to 80 percent. The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women in their homes in all areas of the country, with full preservation of privacy. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 12 Aug 80 p 3] 9045

PEACE POLL--A plurality of the Israeli public (47.8 percent) is of the opinion that the Begin government is not qualified to complete the peace-making process; this was learned from a nationwide public opinion poll of the Pori Institute sponsored by HA'ARETZ. A response of 34.6 percent indicated that the government is qualified. Another 6.8 percent said that the matter depends on particular factors, such as what the Arab position will be, whether the government will remain in power for another term, the state of Mr Begin's health, and whether the Begin government will be more flexible and less fanatical in its positions. The remaining 10.8 percent had no opinion. Prominent among those who consider the Begin government unqualified are persons with better education (55.4 percent), persons in managerial and academic occupations (56.1 percent), persons of higher income (55.2 percent), persons of European and American origin (56.3 percent), and long-time (pre-State) residents (51.5 percent). The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Aug 80 p 3] 9045

POLL ON PRIME MINISTER--A majority (52 percent) of the Israeli public is of the opinion that Prime Minister Menahem Begin cannot continue in office in the present state of his health, it is reported in a national public opinion poll of Pori Institute sponsored by HA'ARETZ; 35 percent said that he was able to continue; 2.4 percent said that the matter depended on the actions of the other government ministers, "if they don't aggravate him," and on the decisions of the physicians; and 10.4 percent had no opinion. Prominent among those believing that the prime minister is unable to continue in office are persons in academic and managerial occupations, of whom 59.1 percent held this opinion; persons with higher income (59 percent); persons with better education (55.6 percent); and persons of European or American origin (58.3 percent). Prominent among those believing that he is able to continue are persons of Asian and African origin (41.9 percent), persons with less education (40 percent), and persons aged 18-29 (38.2 percent). The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Aug 80 p 3] 9045

POLL ON WEIZMAN--A majority of the Israeli public (53.7 percent) would like Ezer Weizman to return to the post of minister of defense; this was learned from a nationwide public opinion poll of the Pori Institute sponsored by HA'ARETZ. Another 33.1 percent do not want him in this post; 2.2 percent said that they would like to see Weizman back at his post, but "not in this government"; the remaining 11 percent had no opinion. Prominent among those wanting Weizman to return were persons of low income (60.0 percent), manual workers (59.3 percent) and persons of Asian and African origin (58.3 percent). Prominent among those not wanting him to return were persons with better education (40.7 percent) and in academic and managerial occupations (40.9 percent). Women favored Weizman's return (60.3 percent) much more than men (47.2 percent). The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Aug 80 p 3] 9045

CSO: 4805

LEBANON-ARAB LEAGUE DIFFERENCES REVIVED OVER ABORTIVE KLIBI VISIT

LD181557 Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 16 Sep 80 p 1, 19

[Fatin Hamawi report: "Acute Crisis Between Lebanon and the Arab League: Lebanese Foreign Ministry Refuses To Receive Chedli Klibi"]

[Excerpts] Beirut--A dispute between the Lebanese authorities and the Arab League has resulted in Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi's being prevented from visiting Lebanon.

This was confirmed in one way or another by official sources in Beirut. AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM is certain that the secretary general was indeed prevented from going to Lebanon last Thursday.

The details so far available on this subject, whispered in Arab diplomatic circles, are as follows:

Last Thursday night, the Lebanese foreign ministry received a cable to the effect that Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi was on his way to Beirut by air. A few minutes later, it was discovered that Klibi's plane, which was expected at Beirut airport, did not land but proceeded eastward and landed in Damascus. The departments concerned began inquiring what had happened. It transpired that Foreign Minister Fu'ad Butrus had instructed officials to cancel Klibi's visit because relations with the Arab League were not very good. Everybody was surprised by this behavior, which led to a crisis. Mediation to resolve the crisis have failed so far, in view of the fact that Minister Butrus's decision came in the wake of a violent Lebanese political and propaganda campaign against the Arab League. The campaign started especially when the PLO called for an emergency meeting of the joint Arab Defense Council. The Lebanese Foreign Ministry strongly objected to convening the defense council on the pretext that the PLO, by calling for the council meeting, was encroaching on the Lebanese Foreign Ministry's jurisdiction and interfering in Lebanon's affairs.

Lebanese political and PLO officials were waiting for the Arab League secretary general last Thursday when it was discovered that he would not be arriving in Beirut. Soon afterward, late on Thursday night, PLO executive

committee chairman Yasir 'Arafat left for Damascus and met Klibi, contrary to news sources' belief and to Lebanese official information media broadcasts. 'Arafat returned early Friday morning. This crisis related to Arab League Secretary General Chedli Klibi's visit to Lebanon has led to the reemergence of Arab-Lebanese disputes over the role of the Arab League, the role of the Arab states in helping Lebanon and the Lebanese official attitude to developments in the area.

Before Chedli Klibi was due to visit Beirut, an intensive campaign was launched against Klibi's envoy to Lebanon Hammadi al-Sayd. Lebanese official circles accused the Arab League of failing in its duty to Lebanon and of failing to make tangible efforts to resolve the Lebanese crisis in a serious manner. Certain information media linked to official circles on the one hand and to the Phalangist Party on the other also accused the Arab League of plotting against Lebanon and encouraging Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

PLO SILENCE ON CONFLICT--AL-RAYAH has been informed by well-informed Palestinian sources that Yasir 'Arafat has instructed Palestinian officials and representatives abroad not to make any statements on the Iraqi-Iranian war. The sources attribute these instructions to 'Arafat's desire to perform his mission silently and without highlighting the Palestinian role so this role will not be misinterpreted or distorted. [Text] [GF281709 Doha AL-RAYAH in Arabic 27 Sep 80 p 1]

CSO: 4802

ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM SEEN AS INCREASING PROSPECTS FOR BALANCED DEVELOPMENT

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 26 Jul 80 p 28

[Article by Fath al-Rahman Mahjub: "The Sudan Begins Political Decentralization Experiment! Division of the Country Into Six Provinces With Separate Governments and Assemblies; Development of Sudanese Transportation to Accompany New Political and Administrative Changes"]

[Text] The Sudanese National People's Assembly has passed some new constitutional amendments with the approval of the president. According to these amendments, the country will be divided into five regions, in addition to the southern region which gained autonomy in 1972. Each region will become autonomous with its own regional government and legislative assembly. With this move, Sudan has voluntarily chosen to change from a centralized state to a federation of six units--a remarkable step in a world in which slogans of unity contend with slogans of partition among the citizens of the same nation.

But what will this renunciation of centralized government lead to?

This question came up as soon as the decision-makers started working on a formula to establish the Sudan's internal borders and define the characteristics and boundaries of its various economic, administrative and political structures at the regional level. Moreover, this took place at a time when factors for unity and reconciliation were being much discussed, especially at the national level.

Now, six new regions are being established based on the constitution. Originally, there were to have been five regions: a western region, a northern region, an eastern region and a central region, in addition to the existing southern region. However, the proposed western region leaned toward division into two sections, probably due to historical and emotional considerations embraced by the inhabitants of the region when the issue was raised before the national conference of the Sudanese Socialist Union early this year. Thus, the proposed western region became two regions, Darfur and Kurdufan.

The constitutional amendments stipulate that "the establishment of regional government shall not involve any encroachment on the unity of the Sudan or its economy, the freedom of movement of citizens and of services and goods by rail, or the national government's conduct of affairs relating to sovereignty, national defense, national security, foreign affairs and other areas of responsibility defined by law." Moreover, the provisions of national legislation take precedence over regional legislation "to an extent which eliminates any conflict between them."

In response to a question by AL-MUSTAQBAL, Minister of Culture and Information Dr Isma'il al-Haj Musa stated that regional government compounds and augments the responsibility of existing organizations to maintain contact with the masses on both the local and national levels through all cultural and informational channels "in order to reinforce common national feeling and strengthen the fabric of national unity." This is because the division of a country into regions out of economic and administrative necessity can produce the opposite results if racial or tribal prejudices are awakened.

The main forces which influence the Sudanese do not fit into the framework of the traditional kinds of conflicts which develop within a state of equilibrium--conflicts involving peripheral considerations ranging from economic factors all the way to foreign influence which generates conflicts between Copts and Moslems, Arabs and non-Arabs, and Sunnis and Shiites.

Perhaps it is this fact which prompted Isma'il al-Haj Musa to follow up his emphasis on the importance of coordinating the impact of communication, which ties the different regions of the Sudan together, by stressing the need "to develop and stimulate local cultures so that they can plan their full roles in fashioning the Sudanese national culture."

This diversity on the geographical map of the Sudan is accompanied by a great disparity in physical appearance, tastes, means of livelihood, and modes of thought and behaviour. For example, the Sudan includes representatives of all the major language groups in Africa, with the exception of the (Khubabsan) language group of South Africa. There are about 500 local languages which belong to these main language groups, and these are united by a single common language, which is Arabic. The use of Arabic in this role extends even to the southern region, which colonialism sought for a long time to dissociate from the north which has been more influenced by Arabic and Islam.

Whether the reasons for the conflict which compelled Sudan to adopt regional administration are primarily economic, social or historical in nature, a regionalization process must be accompanied by material safeguards in order to become a motive for unity and cohesion--aside from giving each region the opportunity to pursue its own course in developing its resources and culture and governing itself within the general framework. Perhaps one of these safeguards is the strengthening of the means of communication at the technical level--the areas have been connected by a microwave and ground satellite system for some time--as well as developing the means of transportation.

The vastness of the areas of the country, the low population density and the inadequacy of the means of transportation have helped to maintain those differences which have characterized Sudan's regions. Authorized sources in the Ministry of Transportation told AL-MUSTAQBAL that work is now in progress on the development of the means of transportation to go along with the new political and administrative changes, especially since the demands of the big development projects constitute a burden on the transportation capacity at a time when complete balance in the overall distribution of these projects throughout the regions has not yet been fully achieved. This is one of the reasons which have made these projects a national treasure which is not the sole possession of the region in which specific projects are established.

8591
CSO: 4802

BOURGUIBA CALLS SPECIAL SESSION OF CONGRESS IN 1981

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 5 Sep 80 p 1

[Article: "President Bourguiba Sets the Party's Special Congress for Spring 1981"]

[Text] President Bourguiba met with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali yesterday morning at the Essaada Palace in La Marsa; after the meeting, Mzali made the following statement:

"Because of the importance that the supreme combattant places on the next decade for the decisive orientation of the country towards economic prosperity and socio-cultural progress, and in order to assure real invulnerability, as the next 5-year plan is important in this program, and considering the chief of state's concern to have the party cadres think along the lines of this plan, President Bourguiba has decided to call a special session of Congress of the Destourien Socialist Party for the spring of 1981.

"The main goal of this congress is to study the major elements of the 5-year plan as well as the means by which this plan will meet with psychological and human success, so that Tunisia might reach a new level on its way to realizing its developmental objectives during the next decade."

9572
CSO: 4400

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FOLLOWING ITALIAN MINISTER'S VISIT

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 3 Sep 80 pp 1,4

[Article: "Toward Re-examination of the Cooperation in Fishing Matters"]

[Text] Following Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Emilio Colombo's visit to Tunisia, this communique was published:

In response to Tunisia's Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Belkhoja's invitation, Emilio Colombo made an official and friendly visit to Tunisia from 31 August 2 September 1980.

Mr Colombo had an audience with His Excellence Habib Bourguiba, president of the Republic of Tunisia. He met with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali.

During the conversations, which took place in an atmosphere of warm friendship and of mutual confidence, the two ministers and their collaborators proceeded to an exchange of exhaustive views on bilateral agreements and international questions of common interest. They gave particular attention to the promotion of bilateral realtions, expressed their satisfaction concerning their efficient development, as well as with their collaboration in all areas. They agreed to a more involved Italian participation in the Tunisian development effort of the Sixth Plan. They also agreed to promote industrial cooperation between the two countries, thereby favoring a technological transfer.

An ad hoc committee will meet in the near future to study the different aspects of financial cooperation between the two countries: the amount, means of payment, and conditions.

--Tunisia Must Keep its Interests in Mind While Negotiations for the Enlargement of the CEE (Communaute Economiqne Europeenne) Goes On

The two ministers also agreed that a mixed group of experts would meet during the month of October 1980 to examine the new basis of cooperation between the two countries in fishing matters.

The two ministers also examined the problems of Tunisian nationals in Italy and Italian nationals in Tunisia, and agreed that negotiations would begin as soon as possible towards conclusion of an agreement on social security and a convention on manpower.

The commission appointed 16 May 1979 will meet to examine the results of the work of sectorial committees already cited and to adopt the necessary decisions early in 1981 in Rome.

The two ministers closely studied the relationships of Tunisia with the EEC and agreed upon an efficient course of action which would permit Tunisian agricultural and industrial products to be sold more easily throughout the Common Market. The two parties also agreed that it is of the utmost importance to take Tunisian interests into consideration during negotiations concerning the expansion of the Community.

The two ministers then proceeded to an exchange of views on the most important international problems.

Their exchange of views resulted in great agreement on most of the questions discussed. The two ministers thus decided to intensify the rhythm of their political consultations in the future.

--Middle-Eastern Conflict: Toward a Global Solution

The discussions dealt especially with the multiplication of crisis areas in the world, especially in the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, in Africa and in Asia, and on the current deterioration of the international climate.

The two parties agreed on the necessity to bring about peaceful solutions to the conflicts, all the while fully respecting the rights of both the peoples and the countries to peace, as well as to the independence and sovereign choice of means of development protected from all foreign intervention or meddling.

As for the Mediterranean, the two parties indicated the price they attach to the maintenance of stability and security in this region. In this respect, they emphasized that security and cooperation of Europe. This is why they feel it is necessary to pursue dialog between Europe and the Mediterranean border countries which did not sign the Helsinki pact.

The two parties hope then, that the Mediterranean non-European countries can play their due role during the next meeting in Madrid.

The two ministers also agreed that Tunisia and Italy will take the same stance on bilateral and multilateral affairs in the fight against pollution and for the ecological protection of the Mediterranean.

Closely examining the Middle East situation, the two parties reaffirmed the necessity to reach a global solution for this conflict which would consider

all the essential aspects of the problem and which would recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people for self-determination, and would demand Israel's retreat from all 1967 occupied Arab Territories, including Jerusalem, on the basis of pertinent UN resolution principles.

They denounce any unilateral action which aims to modify the statute of Jerusalem.

The two ministers emphaiszed that the Palestinian question, which constitutes the essence of the Near East crisis, should be resolved with the participation of the PLO at the negotiations.

The two ministers also expressed their uneasiness over the event in Central Asia, particularly the latest developments in Afghanistan, which brought a serious blow to the politics of detente and which could lead to grave dangers for international peace. They feel that it is important, in order to resolve this crisis, to scrupulously respect pertinent UN resolutions and the principles of the UN Charter.

As for the situation in Southern Africa, the two ministers congratulated one another on Zimbabwe's independence and repeated their condemnation of apartheid politics and racial discrimination in South Africa and Nambia.

In addition, the two parties emphasized the importance they attach to European-Arab dialog, and agreed that they greatly hope to pursue this form of regional cooperation and to confirm all the components, including the political dimensions. In this respect it was decided that Italy and Tunisia should make a concerted effort to give this dialog new verve.

The two ministers expressed their satisfaction with the results of the visit. Mr Colombo expressed his gratitude for the warm reception and traditionally friendly hospitality he received during his stay in Tunisia. He invited the Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs Hassan Belkhoja to make a similar official visit to Italy. This invitation was accepted with pleasure. The date of the visit will be fixed at a later time.

9572
CSO: 4400

END

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10 October 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2198

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10 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2198

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DISCORD WITHIN KARMAL GOVERNMENT REPORTED

Lahore MASHRIQ in Urdu 23 Jul 80 pp 1, 7

[Article: "Two Karmal Opponents Hanged; Many Officials Mysteriously Disappear From Kabul"]

[Text] Kabul, 22 July (BBC Radio report)--Major battles are being fought between the Mujahidin and the Russian army in Nangarhar, Asmar, Paktia and other places. The Mujahidin claim that they have surrounded the Afghan army in Asmar and have destroyed many tanks and armored cars in Nangarhar. At the same time, the Russian air force is bombing Afghan villages recklessly. Hundreds of houses have been destroyed in Nangarhar province by this bombing.

Meanwhile, the Babrak Karmal government is experiencing discord within its own ranks. The minister of the interior has been arrested. Two anti-government activists have been hung. Another 10 have been sent to jail.

According to TASS, 12 opponents of the Karmal government have been jailed by a revolutionary court. They were accused of murdering six pro-government people, illegal possession of firearms, and anti-government activities. They were also accused of distributing anti-government pamphlets and having connections with foreign agents. According to TASS, tanks have been stationed on the bridge on River Kabul in order to strengthen Karmal's position. Artillery has been installed on all roads going out of Kabul.

According to diplomatic sources, purges on a large scale have been ordered.

Russian war planes have bombed many villages in Nangarhar province destroying hundreds of homes. The Mujahidin claim that they have destroyed many Russian tanks and armored vehicles in Nangarhar. They have also captured a jeep and attacked the Jalalabad airport where they destroyed three helicopters and six tanks. They killed 20 Afghan and five Russian soldiers. A battle has been raging for many days in Asmar. The Mujahidin have surrounded the Russian army in one place. The Mujahidin claim that they have killed 50 Russians in this battle. According to one announcement by the Mujahidin, more than 500,000 people have been killed since Karmal came to power.

According to PPI, Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan has announced in a press release that the Mujahidin are fighting the Russians fiercely in (Kinha?) province. In this battle, 12 local communists were killed in addition to a large number of Russian soldiers. An armored vehicle and a military truck of the enemy were destroyed. According to a report from Pikita, the Mujahidin barricaded a road in (Hani) Khel and burned a Russian tank which was protecting a company of Russian soldiers.

7997
CSO: 4203

BRIEFS

KARMAL TRIP CANCELLATION MYSTERY--Peshawar, 19 July--Afghanistan's president, Babrak Karmal, who was being sent to Moscow for 2 weeks by the Russians, was made to return from the airport. When Karmal arrived at the airport to leave for Moscow, he was whisked back to the People's House in a military vehicle. It has not been disclosed why he was being sent to Moscow, or why his trip was cancelled. [Text] [Quetta JANG in Urdu 20 Jul 80 p 1] London, 22 July--According to diplomatic sources, the head of the pro-Soviet puppet government of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, was rushed back from the airport because of a heart attack. The Russian authorities took Karmal to a hospital where he was specially treated by Russian doctors for 1 week. He was transferred to the presidential mansion, the People's House, after his treatment. It is said that when President Karmal got out of his car to board the plane for Moscow, he fainted. He was rushed to the hospital in a car. He is being treated at the People's House. [Text] [Lahore MASHRIQ in Urdu 23 Jul 80 pp 3, 8] 7997

DOCTORS REJECT RUSSIAN WOUNDED--London, 22 July (MNI)--Teachers and students at the Medical College in Jalalabad have refused to treat wounded Russians. About 30 Russians were taken there recently for treatment, but the doctors refused to see them. The Russians closed the Jalalabad Medical College in retaliation. All doctors and teachers were ordered out of the hospital. Twelve teachers and 15 doctors were arrested. They are being accused of inciting other doctors and teachers against the Russian regime. Some 8,000 more Afghan families have entered Pakistan as a result of the continuing war in Afghanistan. According to Doctor Fazil Mohammad, president of Hizb-e-Islami of Nangarhar, these refugees came from Deh Pala, Miznia, Ispola and Kot. Their villages were destroyed by Russian bombing. Hundreds of children, old people and women were killed in these bombings. These refugees succeeded in making it to Pakistan, saving their own lives. [Text] [Lahore MASHRIQ in Urdu 23 Jul 80 p 3] 7997

CSO: 4203

BRIEFS

SISTAN, BALUCHISTAN NEW ROADS--Tehran (Pars).--A spokesman of the Ministry of Roads and Transportation has announced the following: Roadbuilding and expansion operations are being carried out on a continuous basis in the province of Sistan and Baluchistan and, at present, secondary roads are being pushed forward through Delgan, Bampur, Khash, Zaboli, Paskuh, Suzan, Zahedan, Cheshmen, Ziarat, Suran and Saravan as well as part of the Hashak-KENARAK road--altogether totaling 525 kilometers and costing 4.85 billion rials. They will begin service shortly. This report states that the General Department of Roads and Transportation of the Province of Sistan and Baluchistan is building rural roads in that province so that work on them will be completed before winter comes and they can be used by the inhabitants. At present, about 342 kilometers of rural roads are being built in this area by crews of the Ministry of Roads and Transportation so that the final stages have already been completed and they can be put into use shortly. The spokesman added: Construction work on the main roads of Torbat-e Heydariyeh - Birjand - Zahedan (443 kilometers), Shurgaz - Zahedan - Mirjaveh [156 kilometers), and the junction road of Zahedan-Birjand-Zabol (128 kilometers) is being carried out by contractors and will be completed shortly. [Text] [Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Sep 80 p 14]

CSO: 4906

EXILE DISCUSSES KURDISH STRUGGLE IN IRAQ, IRAN

LD251121 Rome AVANTI in Italian 20 Sep 80 p 9

[Interview with 'Ismat Sharif Wanli, exiled Kurdish leader, by Mirella Galletti: "It Is My People Who Must Decide About Their Resources and Their Future"--"some weeks ago" in Italy]

[Text] A small man with a thin face which still bears the scars of an attack carried out by Iraqi "diplomats" in Lusanne 4 years ago. He is 'Ismat Sharif Wanli, a Kurdish leader who has been living in exile for years, sometimes holding delicate diplomatic posts. For a long time he was Mullah Mustafa Barzani's representative in Europe. About a year ago he founded the "Kurdistan Freedom and Progress Party" which, according to its political adversaries, has little following in Kurdistan. But with his work as scholar and politician, Wanli is one of the prominent figures in the Kurdish National Movement. The interview took place some weeks ago during Wanli's visit to Italy.

[Question] What are the reasons which prompted you to found the party Kurdistan Freedom and Progress Party?

[Answer] The Kurdistan Freedom and Progress Party differs from the other Kurdish parties in two respects. The first is that the latter regard themselves as the repositories of the people's will and refuse the autonomy offered by the central governments. We, on the other hand, do not want to make other people's decisions but intend to create the conditions so that the Kurds can choose the kind of solution that they prefer--autonomy, independence or a union with other national groups.

The second aspect is that our party addresses itself to all Kurds, since the Kurds constitute a single nationality, for instance the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is represented in all the strata into which Kurdistan is subdivided, but the Iranian KDP has a different strategy and different aims from the Iraqi KDP.

The Kurdistan Freedom and Progress Party, however, has a single leadership though obviously the organization is different for each area of Kurdistan. It is a progressive socialist party with a social program, but it is not Marxist-Leninist.

[Question] What is the strategy of the Kurdish movement as a whole?

[Answer] The first objective is for the Kurds not to be dependent on the ruling fascist and chauvinist governments in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria. There is now a natural convergence of interests among the Kurds and oppressed people of the other nationalities. They want an administration capable of exploiting Kurdistan's resources for the benefit of the Kurdish people and reject the power politics pursued by the central governments. But the governments' nationalism is so deeprooted that it will take time to attenuate the extremist stances.

The Kurds are prohibited from enjoying their own country's natural resources and every method is being tried to eliminate their desire for unity. Why should the Kurds not be united among themselves instead of with Arabs, Persians and Turks, as they are at present?

[Question] You visited Iran immediately after the victory of the Iranian revolution. After a year what can you say about the situation of the Kurds in Iran?

[Answer] Khomeyni had the merit of expelling the monarchy. But we must not forget that the Iranian revolution was carried out by the Iranians, in the plural. Khomeyni played a major role but the mass demonstration against the shah took place not only in Tehran but throughout the country and above all in Kordestan. The imam himself acknowledged this activity when he congratulated the Iranian Kurds during his exile in France.

During these struggles the shared hope was to gain from the revolution freedom and guarantees for the solution of the problems of the national minorities.

But the Iranian peoples' revolution was confiscated. By a theocratic and fanatical government which manipulates the unemployed as an oppression force against the people. The notorious Pasdaran.

There is no democracy now in Iran. The freedom of the press is more and more limited. The social and economic problems remain unresolved and the minorities' problems have not been resolved. Iran is composed of a mosaic of peoples and a federation would be a solution to this state of affairs. Instead Khomeyni wants to unite the Muslims and rejects this solution. The imam does not belong to this century and it is not a matter of being against Islam. The present Iranian government will not last long.

[Question] Press rumors have reported that Iraqi KDP Chairman Masud Barzani's Peshmerge is being helped by Khomeyni in the struggle against the Iranian Kurds. Can you elucidate?

[Answer] I would rather not talk about this. In general it can be said that there is a vicious circle in the Kurdish parties which are trying to gain advantages from the contradictions among the states to secure aid and conduct their struggle. It is a lamentable policy because the governments are manipulating the Kurdish movement. The result is the accentuation of the differences among Kurds.

What the Kurds are doing in Iran is positive. They have not lost the war. They have abandoned the cities to be able to wage guerrilla warfare in the hills. It is something new for Iran that there is open talk, especially among the opposition forces, of the problems connected with resolving the minorities' problems.

[LD251123] [Question] How do you assess the situation of the Kurds in Turkey?

[Answer] In that country there is convergence between the Kurds and the Turkish working class with regard to overthrowing fascism and reaction, which are the main obstacles to the Kurds' self-determination and to democracy in the country. I fear that the Western governments are making the same mistakes in turkey as they made in Iran. They are giving the fascist government weapons to use against the population and trying to save the country from bankruptcy.

The Kurdish movement in Turkey is very active but also very divided. They must not make any mistakes and must identify who are their real friends.

[Question] What about Iraq?

[Answer] The situation of the Kurds in Iraq is the most tragic, on account of the Kurds' mass deportation. Over 700,000 Kurds have been deported to the country's southern and western areas. This means that one-fourth of the Kurdish population is dispersed and families have been split.

The autonomy given to Iraqi Kurdistan is a myth and the Kurdish parliament is a tool in the Baghdad government's hands. But now in Iraq we are witnessing the unity of the opposition. A national front has been formed, embracing the progressive Kurds of the "Patriotic Union of Kurdistan," the al-Nasirites, the communists and the Ba'th leftwing.

CSO: 4404

AUTONOMOUS REGION LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL ELECTIONS CONCLUDED

JN201806 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1650 GMT 20 Sep 80

[Excerpts] Irbil, Autonomous Rule Center, 20 Sep (INA)--The results of the elections for the First Legislative Council of the Autonomous Region, which were held yesterday through direct, secret and free ballot, were announced here today.

A statement issued by 'Izzat Ibrahim, Revolution Command Council vice chairman and head of the higher commission supervising the elections, said that the elections were held with great awareness and large popular incentive and enthusiasm, which emphasized the rallying of our Kurdish people's masses around their revolutionary leadership.

The statement explained that this exercise of democracy was a lively expression of our people's awareness of their historic responsibilities and continuation in form and content of the exercise of democracy Iraq witnessed on 20 June to elect the council's members. [sentence as received]

The statement gave the names of 50 persons constituting the Legislative Council's members.

About 700,000 citizens took part in the Legislative Council's elections, held to elect 50 members from 194 candidates in 11 constituencies, which comprised 177 electoral centers distributed in the 3 autonomous rule governorates.

Under the Legislative Council law, the Legislative Council of the Autonomous Region will be in charge of drawing up and ratifying laws concerning the region's affairs and discussing its general budget.

The Legislative Council law has not permitted dual membership in the National Assembly and the Legislative Council, but has allowed the candidate who has not won in the National Assembly elections to renominate himself for the Legislative Council elections.

The Legislative Council will hold its meetings in Irbil City, center of the autonomous region. The council's term of office is 3 years.

This electoral process comes to complete the construction of the democratic institutions and to develop and deepen the exercise of democracy in Iraq.

CSO: 4802

DEPUTY RCC CHAIRMAN ON RELATIONS WITH ITALY, TURKEY

LD190915 Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 16 Sep 80 pp 1, 11

[Unattributed article on press conference held by 'Izzat Ibrahim, deputy chairman of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council, in Rome on 15 September]

[Excerpts] Deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council 'Izzat Ibrahim has affirmed that Iraq and Italy have agreed on developing their relations on the basis of the interests of the two friendly countries' peoples.

Speaking at a press conference in Rome attended by a large number of Italian and international newspaper and news agency correspondents, he said: We hope that all the active and influential forces of the Italian people will participate with officials in Iraq and Italy to strengthen this policy and achieve its desired objectives, because cooperation between the two countries stems from the friendship between them and because of the geographical positions of Iraq and Italy. This friendship and cooperation are the great objective in the development of relations between the two countries, despite attempts by hostile forces to disrupt relations between their peoples.

He added: We strongly and effectively resist such activity whether by internal or external forces. The media in both countries must clarify this truth to the two friendly peoples who are struggling for their own interests out of their common desire--the desire that has been expressed by the Iraqi delegation's visit to Italy.

Ibrahim then reviewed the 17 July Revolution's achievements in mobilizing the masses and fostering cultural development on the basis of the principles of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party.

He said: On the basis of these principles we have established developed relations with Europe, particularly the countries which have shown considerable change in their policies toward our problems. Our clear and declared policy at this stage is evident in the adoption of an independent course and the strengthening of our relations, particularly with

Italy and France, because of the change in their attitude to our cause and the Palestine problem and of their response to our desire and ambition to develop our country culturally.

'Izzat Ibrahim said that Iraq's attitude to the transfer of technology and economic and military cooperation with Italy is increasingly clear and frank, in response to the sincere and frank Italian attitude and in the light of the development of the Italian situation.

He explained that Iraq will continue to supply Italy with oil within its capabilities and on the basis of honest friendship and cooperation and mutual benefits and interests. Accordingly, friendly relations involve obligations and rights. As far as we are concerned we have fulfilled our obligations. We also ask our friend to fulfill such obligations not on a one-for-one basis but in the general sense of our agreement.

Speaking about Iraqi-Turkish relations, the deputy chairman of the Revolution Command Council said that Iraq has no problems with Turkey and enjoys developed relations with it, relations that we respect very much just as Turkey respects our policy. Iraq has also extensive economic relations with Turkey. We look at the recent coup d'etat as primarily an internal matter, since Iraq believes in Turkey's need for political and social independence because it concerns us. We hope that the new regime will place Turkey in a better position.

CSO: 4802

OFFICIAL CRITICIZES COMMUNIST PARTY'S NATIONAL STANCE

LD191551 Baghdad ATH-THAWRAH in Arabic 12 Sep 80 p 4

[Interview with Hashim 'Agrawi, Iraqi minister of state and member of the National and Nationalist Progressive Front--date and place not given]

[Excerpts] The higher committee of the National and Nationalist Progressive Front achieved important results during its recent meeting. The Front's higher committee approved the expulsion of the Iraqi Communist Party from the Front because of its numerous excesses and violations of the National Action Charter.

ATH-THAWRAH met with Hashim Hasan 'Agrawi, minister of state and member of the National and Nationalist Progressive Front, to discuss this matter. He said:

The Iraqi Communist Party joined the National and Nationalist Progressive Front not because it profoundly believed in the Front's aims and sought to promote the front's work and consolidate its democratic role in society. It joined the Front for a tactical political purpose and not on the basis of long-term strategy and horizons. This becomes clear by noting the Iraqi Communist Party members' conduct inside the Front. It can be said that the party tried to exploit the Front and its presence in the Front to achieve private aims and objectives inconsistent with the spirit of democratic action and the cohesion of the Front, which must be strengthened.

Exasperation began to show on the faces of the Communist Party representatives and in their behavior in the National Front when the Ba'th Party began to make efforts to implement the clauses of the National Action Charter and deservedly gained the leading position in the front. It is the Ba'th Party which founded the Front and proposed its charter out of its belief in the need for Front action and a Front role in serving the course of the revolution and consolidating its great achievements. Our masses were aware of the practical leading role the Ba'th Party was playing in the Front. This prompted the Iraqi Communist Party to raise obstacles to the Front's progress. It thus deviated from the principles of the Front charter which it signed and approved.

An example of this is what the Communist Party did with regard to the armed forces. It tried to disseminate its organizations inside their ranks when the Ba'th Party is the commander of these forces and is entitled to disseminate its organizations in their ranks, out of its belief in building the armed forces ideologically. This is stipulated in the charter and was agreed by all the Front parties. Only the Iraqi Communist Party openly violated the charter provisions.

Moreover, the Iraqi Communist Party opposed many of the national stands and policies of the 17-30 July revolution. It is worth mentioning that the said party used to offend some of the states with which Iraq maintained good relations. It used to exploit its internal and propaganda publications for this purpose. It also used to support some sides which were against our national struggle and which adopted stands prejudicial to our Arab causes.

The Iraqi Communist Party felt the Front because it realized that it was completely "bankrupt" and that the 17-30 July Revolution has fulfilled all the people's aims. It was aware that it had lost our masses and could do nothing that would serve the masses in their leading march. In order to cover its miserable failure, the party adopted a hostile stand and went across to the opposing trench. This can simply be described as a stand hostile to the people and their aims. The Communist Party tied its fate to that of the nation's enemies and their conspiracies. However, we believe that the revolution is stronger than all conspiracies and schemes. We also believe that the Front will continue on its path with strong determination, inspired by the noble concepts contained in the National Action Charter. The Front will continue on its road to achieve all the national and pan-Arab aims, unaffected by the Communist Party's departure from the Front. Whoever leaves the Front is discounted by the people forever.

CSO: 4802

ARAB MAJORITY SEEN TRYING TO ORGANIZE POLITICALLY

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 1 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by Kassim Zay: "The Sane Majority Movement in the Arab Community; The Red Line of Israel's Arabs" (Part Two)]

[Text] Last Friday a group of Arab public figures convened, in order to examine the possibility of establishing a suprapolitical organization, the first of its kind in the Arab community. Those convened agreed unanimously, that the establishment of such an organization was necessary in light of the serious deterioration in both the Jewish and the Arab communities.

According to the initiators of this new organization, the existing political structure in the Arab community does not satisfy the complex problems of this community, especially since most of the parties do not take the voting powers of the Arab citizens seriously. Worse yet, incitement against Arab citizens has become the common fare of most ministers in the government. According to the organizers of the new body, the recent statements of the prime minister and other ministers show the way for the Israeli public.

The Arab leaders maintain that such statements delineate a policy which will be anchored in anti-Arab laws, such as the Terror Law, the Civil Rights Law, and the Bedouin Law.

"You Are Right? What's Next?"

Attorney Muhammad Masarwa, former head of the local council of the village of Kara, is familiar with the mood in the Arab community in particular and in the political map of Israel in general. Creating a new organization, in his opinion, is a positive and necessary step. Masarwa maintains that "the incitement against Arab citizens including Arab students is a grave and unprecedented matter."

"We can take comfort in the fact that the present government is transitory, but its actions today are guidelines and instruction for the Israeli public," he goes on to say. In his opinion, "there are laws today directed against the Arabs, which will be very difficult to revoke once they have passed."

Masarwa relates how in recent years he has met with leaders of the Labor party and has tried to make them aware of the crying injustice Arab citizens were victims of. "Each time I met with Labor leaders I would hear the same reply: You are absolutely right. The question is, what's next? How can one cash in this promissory note of "you are right?"

As a legalist Masarwa mentioned several laws which discriminate against Arab citizens and legitimize acts of incitement against Israeli Arabs: "The Basic Law of Civil Rights was approved without taking into consideration the opinion of the representatives of the Arab community. The Bedouin Law, is designed not only to expropriate the Bedouins' lands, but also to deprive them of their right of appeal. The Tamir Law is directed against Arabs."

"Each Arab Has a Black File"

According to Masarwa, the Tamir Law came in the wake of the last speech of Member of Knesset Tufik Ziad in Nazareth. The intention of that law is not to allow any Arab students to remain in the universities, since as a result of this law every Arab student has to furnish a good conduct certificate for his daily conduct. There is quite simply a tendency to give every Arab a "black file." Masarwa argues that "in most parties there is a consensus to keep Arab representatives in the minority so as to minimize Arab influence in the decision making process. For example: in the Labor party it was decided not to admit more than 5,000-7,000 Arab members to the party. Most parties' attitude toward Arab citizens is one of "suspect him and respect him."

At the same time Masarwa does not see any contradiction between membership of Arab citizens in the new organization and their membership in political parties. Nor does he rule out the membership of any Arab professional body in the suprapolitical organization. Masarwa supports the establishment of such an organization, which will be similar to the American Jewish Congress.

Dealing With Burning Issues

Each member in the organization could belong to any political party, but the new organization will be a mass movement and will operate on a larger scale. "The new organization will have to determine its basic principles and be suprapolitical, but is is not unlikely for members of the organization to meet with representatives of the parties, including the leadership of the Alignment."

"I know that the Alignment will be an alternative to the existing government, but there is no reason for us not to announce unequivocally that we align ourselves with it. The new organization will have to work primarily in the political arena, since the burning problems of the Arab community cannot be delayed. The organizers of the new body will have to deal forthwith with daily problems. Contacts will have to be established with the representatives of the present government without ruling

this government out. We must initiate a dialogue with the present government, and demand of the party which will rule after the elections to take a stand now. We will be able to tell the Alignment: We are ready for the possibility of cooperation between us, but we cannot remain in no man's land."

"To Prevent Taking Control"

Ibrahim Shbat, who discussed the basic principles of the new organization, said that "the new organization will be made up of sane people who believe that Israel is the common homeland of the Jews and the Arabs who live in that land. The new body will be a suprapolitical organization and will have to stand fast not to allow any other body to take control of it."

Shbat, analysing the political map in the Arab community, said that "RAKAH (the communist party) is a demagogic party which engages in slogans which are removed from Israeli reality, since the ears of the Jewish public are closed to RAKAH's statements. RAKAH widens the gap between the Jews and the Arabs in Israel, and narrows the bridge of understanding by mouthing slogans which change regularly by orders from the Kremlin."

"RAKAH, and all the organizations which are spawned by it, deal with a foreign policy which does not interest the Arabs of Israel. About 95 percent of its slogans do not deal directly with the daily life of Israeli Arabs."

According to Shbat, "the main preoccupation of the new organization should be internal Istaeli problems which affect the daily life of Israeli Arabs. Ninety five percent of its activities should quite simply be local affairs. The founders of the new organization should be patient, and not act in haste. The establishment of the organization should not be heralded with too much fanfare, and each of its steps should be carefully calculated." Shbat, too, sees the Alignment as the only framework which can be dealt with; "but until now the Alignment has dealt with us on the basis of charity rather than rights."

Shbat believes that sanity should be the guiding light for the founders of the new organization. "We must act sanely. Sanity should be our only quality and only in this way we may last."

Sbhat reiterates: "We see the new organization as an independent body which faithfully represents the problems of Israeli Arabs. We also regard the Alignment as the right address for cooperation without becoming dependent on it."

"Walking Through a Mine Field"

Attorney Jamil Shalhub, former Haifa councilman, is concerned that the intention of forming a suprapolitical organization open to everyone is

like attempting to walk through a mine field. "We have tried all along to serve our constituency through the Alignment. We must make the Alignment aware of the gravity of the situation and to impress upon it that the patriotic duty is to right the wrong. Still, if we are looking to form a new organization--it must be the domain of those loyal to the labor movement, and we have to enter into dialogue with the leadership of the Alignment and make it aware of the grave situation of the Arab citizens. We have to emphasize the need for coexistence. The Alignment must be cognizant of our feelings and should not, in my opinion, put stumbling blocks before us and act like an ostrich. This means that our main task is to bolster the periphery of the Alignment in the Arab community, and the Alignment must know how to appreciate it."

Shalhub did not hide his reservations and misgivings. "We must act in a rational manner and not admit people who will spoil it for us. We must make the Alignment understand that it is the interest of both parties which guide us, and we must also explain another fact: until today the Arabs of Israel have been given rights on paper. The time has come to make those rights a reality."

9565
CSO: 4805

PERES PREPARES PLAN TO REDUCE INFLATION, SPUR ECONOMY

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Jul 80 p 7

[Article by Yosef Pri'el: "Peres Is Doing His Homework; Chairman of Labor Party Formulates Economic Plan Designed To Reduce Inflation and Revitalize Economy"]

[Text] Economic expertise is not, unfortunately, one of the things which have distinguished Israel's prime ministers. Circumstances have forced Israel's leaders to deal mainly with military and political matters, which have over shadowed economic matters and, in turn, have been exacerbated by them.

The chairman of the Labor party, Member of Knesset Shim'on Peres, is seriously preparing for the possibility of heading the next government. He is trying to learn from his predecessors' mistakes, mainly the social and economical ones--which in the final analysis have determined the fate of their governments. Peres is busy these days formulating a broad economic plan, and from a conversation with him it appears that he has familiarized himself with small details, perhaps more than necessary.

The essence of his approach is changing the course of the economy; reducing the inflation and stimulating economic growth. The next government will have to fight inflation mainly through drastic and realistic cuts in the budget. The first thing which must be done according to Peres is stop all allocations related to the settlements. "Between Hebron and flight hours, I prefer flight hours," Peres says. Yet he is aware of the need to significantly reduce the power of the IDF. This can be done through shortening reserve duty and compulsary service, and reducing the size of the regular army. In addition, the armed forces could perform civilian tasks since, according to Peres, reducing the military work force and creating new teams to work on new projects will be more costly and less productive than utilizing the existing military work force. Thus, it is not likely that the new sea canal will be dug by personnel of the IDF Corps of Engineers rather than by civilians employed by the administration which will be set up for this new project.

Peres strongly opposes unemployment. In a country with a high number of workers engaged in defense, there is no reason to consider economic recovery through unemployment. In order to provide work for those presently unemployed and for those who will lose their jobs because of cuts in the defense budget, Peres presents a vast program of investment to the tune of 10 billion dollars, in a relatively short period, which will revitalize the economy. This sum will be obtained through renewed commitments from Jewish investors from abroad for the development of Israel, as well as through a one-time request to the government of the U.S. and West Germany to defer payment of Israeli debts for investment purposes by renewing the loans. The burden will thus fall upon the shoulders of the Israeli taxpayer, especially through lowering the level of consumption of the more affluent classes.

Peres sees three major components in his plan of investment:

--Expanding some 20 established enterprises with a high growth and export potential.

--Establishing an industrial park for science-based industries in the Galilee, which will add 200,000 inhabitants to the area with a higher income level and higher living standards.

--Digging the sea canal with international capital (mainly European). Peres says that in its southern route the canal should be dug only through Israeli territory (within the green line) while looking for regional cooperation in the project (especially with Jordan).

The chairman of the Labor party sees a need to turn the tide by revoking the massive tax exemptions granted by the Likud government. He envisions the possibility of a short term package deal worked out by the government, the Histadrut, and private employers. This deal will include a price and wage control, and profit restraint. To stimulate exports Peres believes it is necessary to subsidize the added value of export, and to reinstate the subsidies for staples at the uniform rate of 30 percent, to enable the resumption of agricultural planning.

The plan which is being developed in consultation with Labor's economic and social expoerts, academicians, and Histadrut leaders, also deals with the housing crisis. It offers the possibility of giving land to tenants instead of builders, and building housing projects with subsidized rent.

Peres' conception of the economic team of the government he may be called upon to form calls for a consensus on policy before the formation of the government, thus overcoming the mistakes of previous governments which were severely undermined by interpersonal conflicts and disputes. Peres is not willing to reveal at this time who will be the members of this team. He only promises and hopes that they will be allowed to join the team, only if they agree ahead of time to work as part of the team and will agree on basic principles. It will be interesting to see whether the homework Peres is doing now will not be forgotten, if and when he is called upon to implement it.

9565
CSO: 4805

GALILI APPOINTMENT TO PLATFORM COMMITTEE ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Jul 80 p 9

[Article by Member of Knesset Ehud Ulmrat: "The Fig Leaf of the Doves"]

[Text] The appointment of Israel Galili to a central position, for the purpose of formulating Labor's party platform for the forthcoming elections to the Knesset, has caused emotional reactions. Thus, the issue became public instead of remaining an internal party matter. It is not common for rival parties to be concerned with such appointments, but this time the matter could not go unnoticed.

Most of the reactions to the Galili appointment cam from frustrated doves in and outside the Alignment. Yosi Sarid promised his supporters in Nazareth he would continue to proudly uphold the banner of the doves. His friends in the circle for alliance have shown consternation over Galili's hawkish stance. National Religious Party member Avraham M'lamed, who is on good terms within his own party with Greater Israel people like Z'vulun Hammer and Ben Tzion Rubin, has taken Galili's appointment as a personal affront, as though it meant breaking a personal commitment to him.

The gist of all these reactions is a fear that the Labor Party is about to foresake its patently dovish stands which Shim'on Peres has been espousing lately. It could conceivably return to its traditional stands which have represented the mainstream of the Israeli public for decades, and of which Galili has been one of the most salient and creditable spokesmen.

An Illusion of Change

This fear is unfounded. Peres has no intention of changing his position. He is definitely interested in creating the illusion of change, an outward appearance of toughness, a pretense of hawkishness. In actuality, he does not intend to create a new internal balance in his party, which will weaken the growing power of the extreme doves who provide most of his support within his party.

In recent years when Peres was linked to Dayan inside the Labor Party, he attempted to assist his senior partner in the fight against a consensus

based on the Allon Plan. This fight gave birth to the compromise known as the "Galili Document." This document established a framework for the Alignment policy in the West Bank which attempted to continue the momentum of settlement within the restricted borders of the Allon Plan, the policy open bridges, and the bolstering of the Israeli foothold in those territories while denying the principle of territorial compromise.

The Alignment policy, as enunciated today by Peres, strives conspicuously to give up most of the territory in the West Bank. According to hints dropped lately by Peres, the Alignment under his leadership will be prepared to make these concessions on the basis of an interim agreement. In other words, even without a final and blinding peace, with the attending economic and diplomatic relations, Peres today is prepared for a near-total withdrawal, with "insignificant border changes."

A huge gap exists between Peres' present position and his past one. Whatever the reasons for this change, the fact is that his present position reflects the consensus of the doves within his party. No wonder that Yosi Sarid, Abba Eban and others are the main supporters of Peres in the Labor Party. It is also no surprise that MAPAM is not excited about the expected struggle between Peres and Rabin.

A Cosmetic Change

The sharper the public debate leading to the Knesset elections becomes, the clearer it will be to most voters that Peres' labor party is quite different from the party which ruled through a consensus among Golda, Dayan, and Galili. Peres knows that an excessive dovish image projected by the Alignment may hurt him in the elections. He needs an outward cosmetic change. This is why he has turned to Galili. Galili's role is not to shift the center of gravity within the party to new hawkish positions. He is rather expected to help change the image, and create the illusion of change.

We can understand Peres. It is a bit harder to understand Galili. Israel Galili has always appeared to his political opponents both on the left and onthe right as a man of stable views, who knows how, public pronouncements notwithstanding, to maintain a position known as balanced hawkishness. This position has striven tenaciously and systematically toward broadening the base of Jewish settlement in the territories, strengthening Israeli expansion in areas vital to its security, and making concessions only when it was vital and absolutely necessary to do so.

Galili has drunk the cup of bitterness because of members of his party who had put excessive blame on him and others for the events of the Yom Kippur War. He did deserve, however, some of the credit for being one of the architects of the policy, rightfully named after him, which contributed toward the expanding of the settlements, the proliferation of outposts in Judea, in the Jordan Valley, in the Golan Heights, and in the Gaza Strip.

In the present political reality, the Labor Party will not repeat, even with Galili, those past performances. Galili knows this better than others. In the best of cases Galili will be the fig leaf which will camouflage, outwardly, Peres' true intentions of returning the territories, including the settlements, most of which had been established by the Labor Party.

The question is not whether Galili deserves to be given a position in the Labor Party, but rather how will he reconcile the contradiction between his stance and the platform he is called upon to formulate. It seems to me that Galili's gift of drafting documents will not suffice to bridge the gap.

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DETAILS REPORTED ON GAZA MAYOR'S ATTITUDE TOWARD EGYPT

Refusal To Host Egyptian Ambassador

TA222036 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 22 Sep 80

[Text] Gaza Mayor Rashad al-Shawwa says that he will not meet with the Egyptian Ambassador. He made this statement to a group of Israeli newsmen in Gaza today. Among them was reporter Jerry Cheslow.

[Begin recording] [Cheslow] Political observers in the Gaza Strip say that Rashad al-Shawwa has been disassociating himself steadily from Egypt, and his statement that he would not meet with the Egyptian ambassador can be seen in this context. The mayor hinted that he thought that in his position the meeting would not be advantageous. But when pressed to explain more clearly, al-Shawwa replied:

[al-Shawwa] Well, there are many Arabs. I do not invite them all to my home.

[Cheslow] Al-Shawwa denied that there are growing commercial ties between the Gaza Strip and Egypt. This, in spite of the fact that more than half of the thousands of Gazans that cross into Egypt via al-'Arish weekly are businessmen trying to set up agencies to export Israeli goods or import Egyptian ones. The rift between al-Shawwa and Egypt is further aggravated by the question of universities. Until last year, about 2,000 Gazans were accepted by Egyptian universities annually. But then President al-Sadat closed the door and only 16 Gazans were admitted. Gazans who are close to Egypt say that al-Sadat has given clear signs that what would be required to reopen that door would be a visit to Cairo by a delegation from Gaza headed by Mayor al-Shawwa. This would give a nod to Egyptian policy. But al-Shawwa says the door was closed because of Egypt's large number of students and refuses to consider going.

[al-Shawwa] I personally don't see there is anything that would prevent such a delegation to go. But personally I cannot go. I have got a special status. I can't be in that delegation.

[Cheslow] Meanwhile, the Egyptian influence in the Gaza Strip continues to grow. Besides the preparation by Gazans to become an economic bridge between Egypt and Israel, 67 different Egyptian newspapers are sold in the Gaza Strip every day. And, from the Egyptian side, hundreds of people seeking jobs or higher pay are caught trying to sneak across the border each week and are sent back after 8 hours detention.

Rejects Autonomy Without Palestinian State

TA222142 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 2030 GMT 22 Sep 80

[Text] Gaza, 22 Sep--Today Gaza Mayor Rashad al-Shawwa expressed his opposition to a sudden and unplanned withdrawal of Israel from the Gaza Strip. Al-Shawwa, who met with newsmen who toured the Gaza Strip, said that Israel plans to pull its forces out of the Gaza Strip without prior announcement and to leave the region in a state of uncertainty as far as internal security is concerned.

According to al-Shawwa, Israel should determine "a timetable" of 2 or 3 years for a complete withdrawal, and then it will be possible to plan Palestinian independence. He again rejected the autonomy plan in Gaza and said that he, like any Palestinian, rejected a piece of an autonomy plan that would not clearly lead to independence and to the establishment of a Palestinian state. According to al-Shawwa, only a just peace with all the Arab states, while recognizing the full rights of the Palestinians, will bring about peace in the region. This will not be achieved by the Camp David accords, which are unacceptable to all of the 4 million Palestinians throughout the world.

In the presence of the commander of the area, Brig Gen Yitzhaq Segev, the mayor complained about the restrictions that limit his movements both to Israel and to Judaea and Samaria and abroad. He also complained about the shortage of policemen, the inability to control the traffic and the unruly situation in the markets due to the shortage of police.

Replying to a question, al-Shawwa voiced harsh criticism of the fact that Israel is developing the economy of the territories for its own purposes and prevents the occupied territories from gaining economic independence.

Mr al-Shawwa argued that he had never presented himself as the representative of Gaza or of the Gaza Strip but as a son of the Palestinian people. He expressed his views which, according to him, are shared by the majority of his people. He also rejected the accusation that he opposed holding elections for the municipality.

The commander of the region, Brig Gen Yitzhaq Segev, who was asked questions later on, denied the charges concerning the alleged restrictions on al-Shawwa's movements. He said that al-Shawwa had been abroad only 2 months ago, that 6 months ago he had visited Arab states and that his movements into Israel are completely unlimited.

BRIEFS

ARREST OF W. BANK MAYOR--The Qalqilyah Municipality has denied the accusations of the military government that the pamphlet published by the municipality about its achievements--which cause the detention of the Qalqilyah mayor--contains any elements of instigation. The Qalqilyah Municipality met in emergency session this afternoon and decided to send protest cables to the defense minister and to the Judaea and Samaria commander with the demand to release the mayor. Notables in Judaea and Samaria told our correspondent Arye Gus that the arrest of the Qalqilyah mayor is another step in the military government scheme to depose the mayors that have been elected by the population. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari reported details from the pamphlet that led to the arrest of the mayor. In the preface to the pamphlet the Qalqilyah mayor wrote that he hoped the residents would continue to live on the fatherland's soil in spite of the difficult conditions of the occupation. He scores the former municipal council for having attached Qalqilyah to Israel's electricity grid. The pamphlet cover depicts the municipality emblem in the colors of the Falastin flag. About 1,000 copies of this pamphlet were printed, half of which were sent to Libya, which has adopted the Qalqilyah Municipality. [Text] [TA231900 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 23 Sep 80]

IDF ARMS TO TERRORISTS, CRIMINALS--IDF arms and sabotage materials have been used in dozens of terrorist acts perpetrated by terrorists and underworld figures. The police command has recently warned against this in meetings with senior IDF officers and the matter has been brought to the attention of Chief of Staff Rafa'el Eytan. Many terrorist squads have used explosives stolen from IDF camps. Also the explosions in Jaffa, whose purpose involved settling accounts, used IDF explosives. The handgrenades thrown in Dimona were stolen from an IDF camp, and a few days ago the police captured a Ramla resident who tried to sell 10 IDF-made handgrenades to a Gaza Arab. According to information from the police, more than one weapon is stolen from the IDF daily. The police believe that criminal elements and especially drug addicts who were recruited into the IDF as part of mobilization and the uneducated, underprivileged youths steal arms and explosives in order to buy drugs. The police claim

that the IDF does not do enough in the way of orderly supervision and registration of soldiers receiving arms. The criminal identification department has occasional difficulty identifying the source of the IDF arms found in the possession of terrorists and criminals. The police view the IDF--so I was told by a senior officer--as a major source of arms for hostile elements and the underworld. [Excerpt] [TA191518 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Sep 80 pp 1, 2

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SIGNIFICANCE OF PHALANGE OFFENSIVE AGAINST NLP DISCUSSED

Review of Past Developments

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 14-20 Jul 80 pp 6, 7

[Article by Yusuf Ibrahim al-Asmar: "The War of the Two Parties"]

[Text] What happened last week between the Phalange and Liberal Parties in the eastern area of Beirut and the areas of Matn, Kasrawan and Jubayl was a major turning point in the history of relations between the two parties and the whole situation in Lebanon. The consequences and dimensions of the bloody clashes witnessed by the eastern areas exceeded all reasonable expectations of the allies and supporters of the two parties. What happened was not merely "isolated incidents" or actions by "undisciplined" elements which happened and were dealt with by rapid contacts.

Although Camille Sham'un and Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil still proclaim their "unbounded" solidarity, the reality imposed by the "war of the two parties" has demonstrated indisputably that in the eastern areas, the Liberal Party has become a mere political party with no military strength.

However, the question raised by observers has been: Was the objective of what happened to contain the Liberals militarily preparatory to a political containment, or was it to consolidate party forces under the banner of "the Lebanese forces," as Phalangist forces have been eager to say since the bloody clashes began?

In trying to answer this question, one has to go back and spotlight earlier developments.

Two weeks ago, at a popular meeting with economic and social notables in Kasrawan, Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil was engaged in a dialogue marked by a high degree of candor. During this dialogue, there was raised the excesses about which the citizens were complaining in the eastern area as well as the imposition of the "payoffs" on them by every organization, something which was a real burden to them. Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil responded to these observations, acknowledging that there were excesses and affirming indirectly that the party machinery had failed to exercise contol in these matters. He moved on to a discussion of the role of "the Lebanese forces" at the present stage and raised the issue of the

lack of their consolidation under an effective leadership. He focussed on the necessity of effective unification of all forces of the parties of the "Lebanese Front," bringing up the many attempts that had been made in this regard, and finally saying, "If these forces are not unified in an amicable manner, some madman will have to unify them by force, despite all the difficulties." He raised a slogan since he said that there could be no military unity of the parties under the shadow of political pluralism, using as a premise the necessity of preserving the democracy advocated by the Phalange Party "because there could be no Lebanon without democracy and no democracy without unarmed political and party pluralism and no civilian political pluralism without unified forces removed from politics."

Only a few days after the statement of Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, the incidents broke out in al-Ashrafiyah between the Phalange and the Liberals, the comrades of the one rank and the two members of the "Lebanese Forces." However, these incidents were able to be confined within a narrow framework and the two parties avoided facing "the stern test."

The First Downpour

A few days later there were clashes in Wadi Shahrur in Ba'abda District between the Phalange and the Liberals. The effect was isolated at first but then they spread and became general, beginning to move from one area to another and involving Basus, Kafr Shima, Batshiyah, al-Mardashah, Basaba, etc. These villages were reckoned as falling within the Liberal Party's area of influence and military officials there figured the Phalange's chances for loss there were great and that allied forces had doublecrossed them. One of the negative consequences of these battles was that there were a number of casualties, mostly Phalangists. These villages surrounded the areas of Badadun and Humal in 'Alayh District which for some months had witnessed clashes between the Phalange and Liberal Party ending with the army's entry into the two areas.

To prevent the situation from worsening in Wadi Shahrur and the neighboring area, the army came in with the approval of the two parties involved. The Liberal Party viewed what had happened as a victory for it within the context of the victories it had won when the army entered 'Ayn al-Rumanah and Farn al-Shubbak and, before that, al-Hadath following bloody clashes between the two parties. At the same time, Phalangist sources, particularly those close to Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil felt that the Wadi Shahrur incidents had been contrived and accused the army of collusion with the Liberals and with facilitating the movement of supplies to them which had made the battle unequal. The Liberals blew up Phalangist headquarters in Wadi Shahrur and Batshiyah and killed a number of Phalangists.

People in Beirut following the events noticed that Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil had refused to comment on what happened in Wadi Shahrur and declined to attend the meetings convened to deal with the deteriorating situation there. Statements coming from him to confidants carried a great deal of censure for the Liberals.

Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil recognized the gravity and ramifications of this interval, seeing a dark cloud on the horizon of the relations of the two parties, and hastened to get in touch with President Sham'un to contain possible events, particularly since the reports that the head of the Phalange had seen indicated that something was in the wind. The leading elements of "the Lebanese Front" held a meeting in Bikfaya marked by complete candor about the present situation. Al-Jumayyil proposed to Sham'un that the two parties should unite under Sham'un's leadership to cut the ground from under any dispute between the comrades of "the single trench." This proposal was announced to the reporters and Sham'un accepted it with thanks, praise and appreciation, announcing that it would be necessary for the proposal to be studied by the leading elements of the two parties.

The two allies decided to meet the following day to discuss this issue and to revive the activity of the joint committee that had been formed in the wake of the al-Ashrafiyah incidents two weeks earlier to take "steps in depth" to put a stop to the problems.

What Is Written Is Written

However, the course of events altered that day and neither of the two leaders knew that their efforts would be frittered away by unlimited clashes.

Just as each incident begins in an isolated manner, "the war of the two parties" began in Tabarja when a Phalangist official was seriously wounded by gunfire. This incident was the spark that ignited the whole eastern area.

There were fierce battles along the Kasrawan coast, particularly in the strongholds of the Liberals in al-Safra, Kafr Yasin, Tabarja and Adma. Along with this, the Liberals' headquarters were occupied, Deny Sham'un's home was burned and his sister was wounded. There was fierce fighting which left 50 dead in al-Safra alone. The homes of Liberals were blown up and others occupied throughout Kasrawan, and the Liberals were left with no more military presence in the area. Their major stronghold, the Ghasta barracks, also fell.

There were bloody clashes in al-Ashrafiyah lasting 2 days, followed by the occupation of 5 centers of the Liberals and a major barracks in al-Sayufi, attacks on the home of President Sham'un and firing on the Phalangist barracks. During a 48 hour period, the Liberals' positions fell, either through military force or voluntarily after President Sham'un ordered his fighters to withdraw from al-Ashrafiyah and to hand over the centers to the Phalange. So another stronghold of the Liberals in a sensitive area fell.

There was fierce fighting in the Jubayl area ending with the fall of the Liberals' 'Amshit barracks and the surrender of all other centers in Jurud al-'Aqurah and al-Laqluq.

There were sporadic clashes in the northern Matn which ended with an agreement between the officials in the Liberals an Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil to spare the area of any conflict and the Liberals handed over their positions, barracks and the port in Dhabiyah to the Phalange voluntarily. There was only one incident in Barmana arising from an old score to settle between the two parties there.

Fuqra, where Dani Sham'un, secretary of defense in the Liberals, set up positions after his home was burned, fell and part of it was destroyed and he had to move to al-Hazimiyah after announcing his resignation from the party and attacking Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, describing what the Phalange had done as a "doublecrossing crime." Al-Jumayyil's son accused Sham'un's son of exploiting his father's position (President Sham'un) to become a leader of the Christians as his successor.

Security Operations In Earnest

While the Liberal Party accused the Phalange of resorting to genocide because of both its political and military presence, circles of "the Phalangist Military Council" say that what ignited the eastern area was "security operations which were undertaken by an extremely earnest decision to consolidate ranks, end the incidental clashes and put a stop to the internal strikes to which the Lebanese Front had been subjected." These sources went further, describing what had happened as "an operation to sort out the ground between the allies and allied subordinate elements." These sources drew a link between what had happened and the necessity of closing "the drug ports and the gambling and hashish clubs, of dissolving the joint financing and consolidating the military presence on the ground to make the slogans of unification a living reality."

These sources stressed that what had happened "was an attempt to disarm politicians and remove politics from the hands of the military out of concern for a unified position and a unified decisionmaking process on the one hand, and a unified fighting front for Lebanon."

However, Dany Sham'un held to another position since he viewed what the Phalangists had done as a plan to implement the policy of a single party, linking what had happened in al-Safra to "a second Ihdin operation" targeting him personally because had be been at home at the time of the attack against it, he would have been killed. He reiterated his rejection of any cooperation with the Phalange, announcing that he would refuse to meet with "the criminals" at the same table. He and his brother Dory chose to meet in al-Hazimiyah where the army has a strong presence with the area located under the control of the legitimate authorities.

It has also been reported that President Sham'un decided to leave his home in al-Ashrafiyah after ordering his supporters to withdraw from their positions and that he will move to the area of 'Ayn al-Rumanah, al-Hadath or al-Hazimiyah or, in the worst case, to Dayr al-Qamr where he began building a mansion some time ago.

It is clear that "the war of the two parties" resulted in a true estrangement, particularly on the grassroots level, since President Sham'un and Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil took pains to hold meetings and to appear together in Tyre and also in making statements.

The Sole One and the Strongest

Observers have proceeded to analyze the ramifications of what happened last week and summed them up in some specific elements involving the following points:

1. The Phalange Party has become the sole and strongest party in the eastern area of Beirut, regardless of whether what happened was under the slogan of facilitating unification or of "containment."

2. The party has proven that it is capable of taking decisive action, whatever the consequences.

3. The fate of "the Lebanese Front" is in jeopardy because the withdrawal of the Liberals from it, after former President Sulayman Franjiyah pulled out, reaffirms that the Phalange Party will tolerate no political or military partnership with any other party.

4. A contradiction has emerged in the positions of the Phalange because the attitude represented by Skaykh Amin al-Jumayyil does not agree with what happened, having opposed the occurrence of any incidents in the Matn area.

5. The Phalange will be more and more inclined toward political isolation and "the areas mentality" since the Islamic faction and "the nationalist faction" will take a harder line toward any possibility of cooperating with the Phalange.

6. Any attempt to form a national union government bringing together all Lebanese factions has been aborted given the increased number of parties who refuse to participate in the same government with the Phalange. This is what was implied by Dany Sham'un when he said that he had reservations about participating in any government which included Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil.

7. Apprehensions have mounted that the Phalange will venture to proclaim some specific step in the areas which they dominate now that it has begun to make political and military movements freely and unopposed, something that could whet the appetites of other quarters, particuarly in the north, for adopting similar positions.

8. Any role which the army could play in the eastern area of Beirut at the present stage has been eliminated since the Phalange Party does not agree to such a role despite statements made here and there in this regard.

In the opinion of observers, the specific elements brought forth by the "Phalange-Liberals war" have turned the political situation in the country upsidedown because they involve profound and manifold significant indications involving the relationship of the two parties with each other and then with other parties.

These people say that the deeprooted disagreement over policy between the two parties were behind what happened and that covering them by calling them isolated incidents was nothing more than an attempt to erase the real causes. Among these disagreements was the Liberals' unhappiness over the unilateral opendoor attitude of the Phalange toward Syria and the renewed courting between Damascus and the Phalange, with the Liberals left out of it, keeping in mind that President Sham'un had indirectly criticized the renewal of this dialogue and had advocated that any contact with Damascus should be through the Lebanese Government. Moreover, the contacts which Sham'un had made during recent days with the resistance on the one hand, and the Soviet ambassafor on the other had not left much satisfaction with the Phalange who, while having talked with the Soviets, were eager to attack the Palestinians violently. Also, the Phalange accused the Liberals of establishing security and political coordination with President Sulayman Franjiyah in the north.

While the Liberals are charging the Phalange with liquidating it politically and militarily, Phalangist sources say that what happened was nothing more than an attempt to straighten out the abnormal situation that prevailed in the area, a serious attempt to restructure the party political presence on a pluralistic basis and the party military presence on a unification basis. In this context, Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil said that the weapons that the Phalangists seized from the barracks of the Liberals would not be used against party members but for the sake of the pan-Arab and national objectives for which the Lebanese forces were working, "the most important of which was the continuation of the battle of liberation."

However, a question remains: Does what happened in the eastern areas go beyond the framework of military change to that of geographic change with the objective of partition, or does it fall within the framework of "the battle for influence?"

It is premature to answer the first part of the question though it might be in the negative as long as all parties reaffirm the importance of the unity of Lebanon and their struggle to keep it as one entity within political, social and democratic pluralism.

Analysis of Anticipated Events

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 21-27 Jul 80 pp 10-11

[Article by Yusuf Ibrahim al-Asmar: "Unification of Lebanon or Division of the Maronites?"]

[Text] To the same extent that the agreement of the Phalange and National Liberals Party and their cohesiveness constituted one of the most important

components of the Lebanese war in the past, their bloody break constitutes a dangerous leap into the unknown and a dramatic step toward "the greater events yet to come" in Lebanon and, perhaps, in the area.

What is yet to come is a common subject of speculation, as newspaper headlines attest, some well known local ones refer to the partitioning of Lebanon, the emptying of the south and its economy, division of the maronites, prevention of entente, and the end of the rule of the "Emirs." Some which are not local refer to solution of the Palestine issue, putting all parties to this solution on the line, resettling the Palestinians, the Palestinian state, autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza, etc.

It is difficult for observers to define the goal of the Phalange in liquidating the military power of the Liberal Party which, as of 7 July, became "the ally of yesterday" in search of allies among "the enemies of yesterday." In the meantime, the Phalange has not managed to contain the situation of hostility between it and another "ally of yesterday," former President Sulayman Frankiyah, after the Ihdin massacre on 13 June 1978.

Some see what happened as a new phase in favor of "the conspiracy," one objective of which is to strike a blow at the Maronites or, at least, to split and weaken them, making it easy to resettle the Palestinians and, consequently, resolve the Palestinian issue.

There are also those who optimistically believe that what happened may prompt the largest illegal military force (that is, the Phalange) to use the dominant position it has won in favor of the legitimate establishment in return for the exclusive rights and privileges it can exchange it for.

The specific factors are still amorphous. What is certain but not in definite form is that what happened between the Phalange and the Liberals moved a piece on the chessboard of the solution in the area. As for Lebanon, there is nothing wrong with hoping for the best but everyone is asking: Will the decision be Lebanese?

Where is Lebanon Headed?

This is the question that is raised in political circles and official quarters after the Lebanese war entered the heart of two allied parties, almost becoming a Maronite-Maronite war after having been a Maronite-Palestinian war.

What is meant by a Maronite-Maronite war and what are its objectives?

Some of them say that the conspiracy against Lebanon which had schemed to displace the Maronites, ships even having been sent to take them from Lebanon and distribute them among the American countries to facilitate solution of the Palestinian issue on the basis of resettlement, failed because of the efforts of the Maronite fighting man so the aspect of the conspiracy transformed into a war from within against the defiant

Maronites with the objective of containing them, taming them and forcing them to accept the resettlement they now reject; otherwise, partition.

Others say that the Maronite-Maronite war may be the beginning of the implementation of a plot to create sectarian mini-states in the area as the best means to safeguard the security of Israel and, consequently, the security of the oil, the conspiracy which Dr Kissinger planned. The preoccupation of the United States with the presidential elections could be a propitious opportunity to implement it. It might also be the way to freeze conditions and prevent any solution, even a partial one, for the Lebanese crisis, even only its internal aspect.

When the Lebanese Government proceeded with the entente process in the hope of forming a government of effective elements who would deploy the army in all areas and restore the sovereignty of legitimate authority to them, it by this movement overstepped the red lines because it or any other party was forbidden to accomplish any solution ending the crisis before the picture of the comprehensive solution of the Middle East crisis had emerged.

Achieving entente among the Lebanese and formation of a government of effective elements would mean that the Lebanese crisis had ended or had been disengaged from the crisis of the area. This was unacceptable because it would nullify the schemes laid down to resolve the Middle East crisis as an outgrowth of the Lebanese crisis that was intensifying it.

Solution of the Lebanese crisis in isolation of a solution to the area crisis, by entente and formation of a government of effective elements, would require withdrawal of the Arab Deterrent Force from Lebanon and, consequently, withdrawal of the international forces from the south so that the Lebanese army could be deployed in all areas to establish the sovereignty of the state over all territory and there would no longer be any armed presence, Lebanese or Palestinian, except that of the legitimate government.

Is this possible now, before arrangements are made for the comprehensive solution of the Middle East crisis, keeping in mind that senior officials in friendly and sister states have repeatedly stressed that the crisis of Lebanon is linked with the Middle East crisis and that the only solution of the Lebanese issue will come with solution of the Palestinian issue?

So, how can there be a Lebanese decision to resolve the Lebanese crisis while Arab and international resolutions on the highest levels have been unable to resolve it, or do not want to solve it?

Any premature solution will fail through political action or a military blow as shown by the fact that when the nine European countries tried to present a solution for the Middle East crisis and to present an initiative in this regard, the United States hastened to direct a strongly worded warning to them and they stopped the presentation of any solution and

merely announced principles. Even the Chancellor of Austria, Bruno Kreisky, halted any move for solution of the Middle East crisis until the American presidential elections are over on the argument that the important thing now is not to look for a solution but to use every possible means of pressure to prevent Israel from detonating the situation in the area in a way that would sabotage the principles that would be suitable for a just and comprehensive solution.

Therefore, while the recent security incidents have some positive elements such as establishing security in the eastern area and preventing excesses and crimes, the negative elements, or to put it better, the objectives that they intentionally or unintentionally achieved, involve freezing any solution to the crisis and strengthening the status quo, leaving no room for discussion to achieve entente among the Lebanese or to form a government of effective elements. This means that every party to the dispute on the Lebanese scene is still in place and there willbe no room to discuss the withdrawal of the Arab Deterrent Force of the disappearance of the Palestinian armed presence. The portrayal of Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil after the recent bloody events as the "bogeyman" for the western area and as having formed a force of 40,000 fighting men to liberate this area makes the leaderships there refrain from demanding the entry of the army because, given its present state, it could not provide protection for them and what can provide this protection is the continued Syrian military presence, in addition to the Palestinian armed presence.

A complex of fear now rules the western area. The leading elements there say: If this is what happened where things are good in the eastern area, what havoc would be wrought in the bad western area?

Does the situation now face a stage of stagnation until the American presidential elections and will any solution to the crisis of Lebanon be through a solution to the Middle East crisis with the way things are?

Will the solution be at the expense of Lebanon, bringing resettlement and partition or fragmentation or will the solution keep in mind the unity of the land, people and institutions of Lebanon, if one is to believe the statements of senior officials in friendly and sister countries?

Informed sources say that it will be difficult to restor Lebanon to what it was politically and geographically, particularly if resettlement takes place. All signs indicate that resettlement is happening, and that the sentence is being passed to be carried out at the appropriate time.

King Hussein, through his extensive activity, has been able to avert a solution at the expense of his country. He has agreed to enter negotiations with Israel after Begin's government departs and the Labor Party government comes in and, this would also be after anticipated developments and changes in the area permit the convening of an Arab summit that would authorize King Hussein to hold negotiations to regain

the West Bank for establishment of a Palestinian regime linked with Jordan within the framework of a confederation.

This authorization would abrogate the resolution of the Rabat summit that treated the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and gave it alone the right to negotiate the restoration of the West Bank and to establish a Palestinian state on all or part of the Palestinian territory.

The proposal now is that the PLO should take part in the peace negotiations, as set forth inthe statement issued by the nine European countries in Venice.

In order to accomplish this, the same sources expect Israel to venture upon a military strike against the Palestinian resistance with the objective of containing and weakening it so that the proposed solution will then be on a par with its cause because this solution does not now measure up to the size of the resistance.

This military strike will deal with the steadfastness of Syria in the face of solutions that are not fair to the Arabs and do not give the Palestinians their full rights, the objective being to strike a blow at this steadfastness and to force syria to accept a possible solution to the area crisis.

They also expect this military strike to be followed by the fall of the Begin government. At that time, the peace negotiations will enter a new phase with moderate negotiators since the hardline negotiators will have disappeared or will have been contained and tamed. Execution of the settlement sentence will begin without constituting a death sentence for Lebanon; rather, the sentence will be commuted to hard labor, if not for life, for many years.

What can grow out of resettlement once the forces oppsing it have been struck or contained? The political fiefdoms which used to rule Lebanon could be transformed into administrative units in which a sort of autonomy is established within the framework of a confederation of federation.

These units are being defined in the light of what will have happened to the map of political leaderships in the country. Confirming it is what President Sarkis himself made public when talking about effecting political powers in the country, that is, augmented administrative decentralization without going into detail in defining this decentralization.

Prime Minister Salim al-Huss went into greater detail in explaining the decentralization he was proposing as part of an integrated reform plan he had prepared. In accordance with it, Lebanon would be divided into regions corresponding to the boundaries of the present provinces and departments corresponding to the present districts.

Each district, or department, would have an administrative council composed of a specific number of members elected by the mayors from among their own number and augmented by the deputies from the area, except for the capital, Beirut, whose administrative council would comprise members of the municicouncil, augmented by the deputies from the city. Each district would have the right to set up a reserve development and reconstruction budget besides its ordinary budget.

A special feature of this decentralization is that it keeps close at hand the sources of public services and the handling of citizens' affairs and the development of local development projects and preserves the unity of the homelanc and state, establishing a sort of close tie between local administration and the central administration through the governor because the proposed decentralization maintains the unity of the army, the internal security forces, educational programs, the general budget, development planning, legislation, information and foreign representation.

Will Lebanon move toward a system of canton or a federal system if resettlement is brought to it within the framework of a decentralization accomplished by agreement on delineating its borders and thereby achieving the security of Lebanon just as, through resettlement, the security of Israel and, consequently, the security of oil is achieved?

Emile Khuri

What Comes After the "7 July Movement?"

It will not be easy in the short term, at least, for relations between the Phalange and Liberal Parties to return to what they were before 7 July, the date "war" broke out between the two parties leaving, according to available information, about 150 dead.

This impression which has been formed by observers in Beirut is the talk of about all local and Arab political circles represented in Lebanon and the talk of Western and diplomatic circles. It appeared as well in the reception given by the French embassy on 14 July and also at the reception given by the Iraqi embassy on the anniversary of 17 July and so it was about time for the average Lebanese to encounter the same impression.

The war between the two parties went past all reasonable bounds and, given its results, turned into a set of factors preventing the restoration of any alliance between the two parties, at least on the rank and file level and certainly on the level of the military forces.

Day after day, information disclosed what had taken place during the 3-day war, aggravating the estrangement and cutting the ground from under any attempt to heal the cut. This estrangement is intensified by the disparate points of view of Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, chairman of the Phalangist Military Council and commander of the "Lebanese Forces," and

Dany Sham'un, secretary of defense in the National Liberal Party and commander of the "Tigers of the Liberals" who suffered a major defeat during the recent incidents. The dispute between the two men, which had reached a final breaking point, has begun to threaten the future of relations between the two parties first of all, and then relations between their leaders, President Camille Sham'un and Shaykh Pierre al-Juamayyil, who despite what had happened had continued to maintain contact, meetings between them to find a new formula for working together having been revealed. On more then one occasion they stressed their "eagerness" to continue cooperation between the two parties although this "eagerness" had not been translated into any actual agreement to put a stop to reports of an imminent break.

Persons who met with President Sham'un the week after the incidents felt that he was deeply bitter over the results of the clashes and, in talking with his visitors, went so far as to raise question marks about the goal sought by the Phalange Party in what happened in the eastern area. He revealed to confidants that he would prefer to dissolve the Liberals' military forces rather than merge them with those of the Phalange were the two parties unable to reach agreement to restore matters to the status quo prior to Monday, 7 July, that is, restoration of the centers, barracks and light and heavy weapons now in the hands of the Phalangists.

Was Dany Sham'un Quick or Overhasty?

President Sham'un also disclosed to visitors that the Liberal Party had lost the battle militarily and some of its key leaders had been killed but it had made political gains from it and so was now stronger morally and politically but weaker militarily.

He also told his visitors that he would make no "dramatic" decision under the pressure of emotion but would continue to study the issue from all angles in the hopes of reaching a solution. He, however, expressed fears that it would not be possible to erase what he termed "the effects of the massacre" at any early date which means that for the immediate future, the situation will remain neither pending nor settled between the Phalange and the Liberals.

While the position of the elder Sham'un is to maintain an acceptable moderation toward the Phalange, the stances of his son, Dany Sham'un, have imposed a new reality which cannot be ignored since he is drawing pictures of new alliances on the horizon of Lebanese political relations which could turn the situation upside down politically and militarily.

Sham'un, who abandoned his caution and spoke harsh words about the Phalange and its leader, Skaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, and his son, Bashir al-Jumayyil, has been quick to take positions offensive to the allies of yesterday. It would appear that he took these positions on purpose to achieve political victories to make up for the military loss he and his forces had suffered.

In addition to accusing the Phalange of a powergrab and describing its leaders as "criminals," Dany Sham'un moved quickly, some say too quickly, to try to attract a large measure of support from the "enemies of yesterday," or at least those who had not been in agreement with the "Lebanese Front." He began his contacts with Walid Junblat and reached agreement with him on an early meeting. He met in secret with Yasir 'Arafat, head of the PLO Executive Committee. He went north and met with Sulayman Franjiyah and talked comfortably about "the Phalangist fascist terrorism," "the domination of one party" and "the perpetrators of the Ihdin and al-Safra massacres."

Although he only spent a short time in the north, Dany was able to sketch out for the former president the preliminary bases for the establishment of "a national Christian front" that would move to oppose "the Phalangist plan aimed at partitioning Lebanon." He proposed as candidates for this front President Franjiyah, President Sham'un, Doyen Raymond Iddih and "all Christians who had been harmed" or "who had been dispossessed from the eastern areas. Reportedly the effective agreement which was reached with Franjiyah was to coordinate things in depth politically and militarily and to consolidate action to achieve the overall objective which Sham'un wanted as a working basis, that is, to oppose the Phalange Party.

Dany set forth the broad lines of these bases to Prime Minister al-Huss when he visited him one night. He was accompanied to al-Dawhah by a force from the Syrian special units which provided him protection starting from the Sim'an Gallery to al-Dawhah, passing through Sabra, al-Awza'i, Khalde, al-Shayyah, etc.

The Gallows or the Electric Chair

Dany did not confine his contacts within this framework but also contacted ex-Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam and officials in the Murabitun, as well as a number of resistance leaders. An observer could sense from the statements Sham'un reiterated in the meetings the degree of antipathy he had come to feel toward any dialogue with the Phalange, particularly with Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, who he said intended to establish the state of "(shakhbut)" and whom he described as "a war criminal who deserved the gallows or the electric chair." In his criticism, he did not spare Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil who he said was "a liar and rejected the stationing of the army because he was a (fi'wi)." However, in the positions which Dany adopted, he did not propose any specific formula as a basis for action to counter "the schemes of the Phalange" which means that this formula is still vague or needs clarification. The point he made in everything he did was to criticize the Phalange and reaffirm his willingness to oppose it politically and militarily, emphasizing the importance of forming a Christian front to resist "the fascist type Phalangist outreach."

Observers have taken a long look at the contradictory positions of the elder Sham'un and his son. The former is still stressing his continued relationship with the Phalange while the latter is predicting the early "end of the Phalange and the liberation of the eastern areas." They are wondering whether roles have been assigned or whether President Sham'un is not really convinced that the Phalange can be politically and militarily shaken at the present time.

On a par with the positions of Sham'un and his son are discordant stands held respectively by Skaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil and his two sons, Amin and Bashir. The former is apparently taking pains to keep relations between him and President Sham'un on clear and firm bases and he is prepared to concede anything the head of the Liberals wants. Amin is pursuing a similar course as reflected during the meetings which he has held with Sham'un and his son, Dany, despite the strong language and accusations which Dany has used, and, on more than one occasion, he has been careful to strss the failure of the policy of violence, warning against continuing the tragedy to the point of no return.

Bashir Talks About Dany

Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil has taken a position different from that of his father and brother although he is in agreement with them on the necessity of preserving the role of President Sham'un and his political weight. Shaykh Bashir, who is considered to be responsible for the Monday, 8 July operation, has been careful to say that what happened that day was to control the way things were getting out of hand in the eastern areas, a situation that, in his view, would lose more of the positions which had been held by the "Lebanese forces," such as Wadi Shahrur, 'Ayn al-Rumanah and Farn al-Shubbak, which the army had entered following the party clashes. He stressed that the purpose of "the 7 July operation" was to reconsolidate the military strength of the "Lebanese forces" in a new framework and to halt the illegal smuggling and port closures which the Liberals had been accused of being behind. Bashir al-Jumayyil recognizes the gravity and ramifications of the operation and says that the Phalange faces two choices: Either the Monday operation is the end of the Lebanese cause and the beginning of the catastrophe that could ensue, or it is the beginning of deliverance and a genuine unification and reorganization of existing forces, the Lebanese Front" and the Lebanese Forces."

Bashir al-Jumayyil placed great stress on denying any Phalangist desire to impose one-party control in the Christian areas or to succeed in imposing autonomous security, emphasizing at the same time that the army will enter the eastern areas only if it also enters the Islamic areas, the south, the Biqa' and the north. He felt that what happened on Monday, 7 July, "was nothing more than a restructuring of the armed presence in the eastern zone until the state can enter the other areas to discharge its responsibilities."

Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil does not conceal his annoyance at the stands of Dany Sham'un, saying that he acted too hastily in taking steps that will hurt him as a person and as a party. He also says that he tried repeatedly to persuade Dany that he must give up protecting certain elements who are trying to injure both parties but he refused and, in fact, covered up their activities. He feels that the clashes between the Phalange and the Liberals stem from the presence of a number of "strangers" whom the Liberal Party had "embraced" after the 2-year war, including the pan-Arabs, the Syrians, the Palestinians, the communists and the leftists. He says that they are behind every problem. Besides this, Bashir says that Dany had not coordinated things with "the Lebanese Forces" and had refused to take part in their meetings and activities which left the Liberals' participation in the field only token participation, things having been left to the Phalange.

However, Dany replies to this accusation by saying that "the Lebanese Forces" were never allied forces "since the Phalangist Military Council controlled them and used them to serve its own interests.

The fact is that there is an endless file of accusations back and forth and each side has its comments on the other which may or may not be true but they exist and the two sides have been constantly exchanging them during the past 2 weeks and the newspaper columns have been filled with "the dirty linen" of the allies of yesterday.

Terms of the Elder Sham'un

While the military situation has quieted on the Phalange-Liberals front since the former has been able to impose its authority in the field, the issue is still interacting politically in the midst of developments which indicate that there will be no speedy reunification of the two parties.

The leaderships of each party have been unable to emerge with a common solution to ensure renewed agreement and understanding. All the formulas proposed in this regard have failed because of the two conditions laid down by President Sham'un in connection with restoration of weapons and the centers still have received no clear Phalangist response, according to Liberal sources. The Phalange does not object to returning the centers but will not agree to hand over the "confiscated" weapons, the issue being in the hands of "the Lebanese Forces." There are successive party meetings with no result except the issuance of statements of the "hear and be cheery" type.

Basjir al-Jumayyil's Mini-State and Isolation

The Phalange-Liberals dispute goes further to involve other parties, particularly the Muslim side and "the Nationalist Movement." Both sides were startled at what happened in the eastern area and went on guard for fear that Bashir al-Jumayyil wanted to establish autonomous security

as a forerunner to partition of the country. Outcries followed one another from every side demanding that the incidents be stopped and that Bashir al-Jumayyil's mini-state be prevented. Participating in the anti-Phalange campaigns were Prime Minister Salim al-Huss who forcefully attacked the Phalange, as well as "the Islamic Grouping," "The Front to Preserve the South," "The Nationalist Movement" and the Palestinian resistance. The latter was not cautious but rather plunged into the fray and 'Arafat accused Bashir al-Jumayyil of coordinating things with Begin. Even Damascus, through the information media there, attacked the Phalange, accusing it of "wanting unilateral control over the Christian areas and the imposition of partition in Lebanon."

These campaigns kept pace with the positions taken by Dany Sham'un and his opendoor posture toward the Islamic areas and their leaders to form a link in the chain of movements designed to "isolate" the Phalange once again, the late Kamal Junblatt having tried to isolate it the first time in 1976 adter the 'Ayn al-Rumanah incident, the spark that ignited the 2-year war.

Many individuals tried to hasten to apply the principle of isolation but there were others who held off from proceeding with this scheme because any negative attempt along this line would bring the Phalange the full support and sympathy of the Christians, as had happened 5 years ago, causing the plan to fail and the Christians to rally further around the Phalange. A number of leaders sensed that an advocated using another approach for action the outlines of which have not yet crystallized. Even the Phalange Party itself blocked any new attempt at isolation, laying down a two-pronged plan of movement covering both the local and Arab spheres to explain what ahppened in the eastern areas, one essential element being to contact Damascus to find out what it really thought about the incidents and their consequences.

At the same time the party wants to firm up its relations with the Armenians to reassure them and to set up coordination between the Phalange and their parties to avoid any clash or involvement, particularly since there have been many rumors that the Armenians might share the fate of the Liberals if they do not surrender their arms. The plan also provides for gradually removing the Phalangist presence" from the streets and making "the Lebanese Forces" carry the responsibility for controlling the security situation and the illegal closure of the ports--this was done last week--and for trying those persons accused of the excesses which were brought out by the killing, theft and looting.

Phalangist sources feel that such steps will calm the nerves of the citizens and persuade them that the objective of "the Monday, 7 July operation" was not to eliminate the Liberal Party as a rival party as much as it was to put a stop to the excesses and to the persons demanding payoffs who were [word not understood] under the aegis of the Liberals.

What Alliances, What Agreement?

However the questions that remain are what shape will the new alliances take if the Phalange and Liberal Parties do not reach agreement, and if this agreement is reached, will it remain a partial one as long as Dany Sham'un refuses to sit down at the same table with Bashir al-Jumayyil?

It is hard to answer this question because what happened in the eastern area reshuffled the deck but the cards have not been redealt in a proper and clear fashion. It is premature to say that some alliance can be established between Dany Sham'un and "the Nationalist Movement," for example, or with the resistance to isolate or oppose the Phalange because of their disparate points on a number of issues. Moreover, Walid Junblatt is still moving slowly on reviving relations with Dany or even opening any speedy or effective dialogue. He has been so cautious that he has not invited Dany to visit al-Mukhtarah or the Shuf, for example, although Dany announced that he was prepared to go to this area and to Dayr al-Qamr in particular. Yasir 'Arafat, according to informed sources, tried to persuade Walid Junblatt that it would be beneficial to revive the dialogue with Dany Sham'un but he has not gotten any final, positive response.

With regard to an alliance with Damascus, the specific elements are lacking at the present time to bring it about because it is not enough for the Liberal Party "to be at odds" with the Phalange to restore normal relations with Syria.

The Possible Alliance Expected by Sham'un

There is still the question of an alliance with President Franjiyah. This could come about but it is still in a purely Christian framework because Dany Sham'un refuses to resume any dialogue with Prime Minister Rashid Karami who he regards as responsible for what happened during the 2-year war and, because of this position, categorically refused to visit him while he was in the north.

The fact is that there are attempts underway to create "some sort of a front or grouping" in which Dany Sham'un would be one of the key people since it has become difficult to relaunch relations with the Phalange despite the efforts being made along this line by Deputy Amin al-Jumayyil. During the latter's meetings with Dany Sham'un a few days ago, he took pains to emphasize the necessity of halting the media campaigns and resuming a dialogue in a calm climate, stressing that any solution must preserve the honor of all parties concerned.

However, in the view of observers, the real thing stopping the establishment of any new alliances at the present stage is that President Sham'un is continuing to hold to his positions toward the Phalange Party and is keeping a dialogue going with Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil. As long as he has not cut off the dialogue, the establishment of any new alliance or front with his son Dany as one of the key players would be ineffective because

President Sham'un is still the flagship for the real Christain leadership and no one but he can take any fundamental or decisive position. The former president is still keeping an eye on the situation and, in anticipation of developments, has made no final decision.

Phalangist observers feels that given the present "no position" situation, Sham'un may be able to extract some "profits" from the Phalange which he might have lost or might be unable to extract were he to adopt a final position, whether negative or positive. Accordingly, for him to stay in al-Ashrafiyah and not to leave it is profiting him a lot and is making the Phalange take care to be responsive to him because, were he to decide to leave al-Ashrafiyah for another area, the Phalange would then lose a lot of the political cover it is still enjoying because of Sham'un's non-negative stand on what happened. This has prompted the former president to state frankly to the key players in his party that he is stronger politically because he now enjoys the support of those who do not support the Phalange, plus the support of those who originally supported him and the Phalange as well.

Until President Sham'un reaches a final decision, the situation will remain as it is, fluctuating between meetings and contacts and studying solutions and proposals. However there are apprehensions about any military development to which some will turn if the attempts to establish alliances fail and any military action would plunge the country into a civil war, the signs of which are looming on the horizon following the statements by Dany Sham'un which were supported by a number of "the new allies."

What about the position of the state?

On the surface the state is neutral. President Elias Sarkis has stated that he wants to deploy the army to the areas which saw the fighting but he said that this would be done only with the consensus of the parties concerned. He is still awaiting a positive response from the Phalange Party set as a prerequisite for the army to enter "its areas" that the army be deployed in the western area. Until this complication is resolved, Sarkis has been careful to announce that the state rejects any sort of autonomy, as a direct response to the intention of "the Lebanese Forces" to form a national guard, police, etc.

Anticipation of any development, a question remains: Will the contacts now going on behind the scenes be useful in softening the position of Dany Sham'un, restoring the rapproachement between the military wing in the Phalange and Liberal Parties, or will these efforts fail and contact between the Liberals and the Phalange on the political level throught the heads of the two parties continue until one of the leaders of the military wings of the two parties is able to overcome the other?

In such a situation, what alliances could be produced by the war between the two parties which was characterized by the radio station of "the Lebanese Forces" as "the 7 July Movement" which it talked about as if it was a rectification movement.

These are questions that may find answers soon.

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SHIITE LEADER DISCUSSES TRIP TO IRAN, PROBLEM OF SOUTH LEBANON

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 27 Jun 80 pp 12-14

[Interview with Shiite leader Shaykh Muhammad Shams al-Din, by Amin al-Siba'i, in Beirut on 26 Jun 80]

[Text] Shaykh Muhammad Shams al-Din went on an official visit to Iran to spend 2 weeks beginning on 15 May. He spent a whole month there and was still not able to finish all his business. He will return to Iran to complete discussions he has started and to participate in two conferences that will be held there soon.

Aside from his personal belongings, the vice-chairman of the Higher Islamic Shiite Council carried on his trip a number of files related to several issues. The most important of these, of course, is the "problem of the south [of Lebanon]."

Upon his return to Lebanon last week, his house in al-Dawhah was packed with crowds of clerics and politicians of various denominations. He was showered with questions about the results of his discussions in Iran, especially since these discussions took place with Imam Khomeyni, President Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr and other Iranian officials, and involved Islamic and Arab problems, including the Palestinian problem and the dangers threatening south Lebanon.

It took Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din a full week to explain the results of his visit to Iran and answer all questions, despite his urgent need for a period of rest, which he said he will not be able to take before the fall. Those who sought specific answers to their questions actually represented various groups and classes.

When AL-HAWADITH visited him at his home on 26 June with a long list of questions, the vice chairman of the Shiite Council was explaining to a large group of ulema [Islamic scholars] his views on the nature of objective, realistic handling of the crisis in the south and of relations with the government and the Palestinian resistance. He then moved to a circle of delegates from the Ba'labakk area, then to a circle of American University students, and after that, to a succession of groups, including delegations from various areas of the south.

Shaykh Shams al-Din enjoyed answering all the questions. While he was passing on information, his children were offering Iranian sweets made of "Manna," which the Iranians call "Gaz."

In the course of the never-ending questions, one of the ulema asked: "Where does our crisis stand, and how do you see it now in the light of the clashes and incidents that occurred while you were in Iran?"

Shaykh Shams al-Din answered: "The phase of fatalism and defeatism in the ranks and souls of Shiite Muslims is over. It will never return, despite the efforts of some to restore it. We have been reborn and we will continue to grow along diverse but clear lines in an Islamic environment. Our position will not be as proposed early in 1975, but will be a receptive cultural position.

"The second issue is the Arab national question. The state has to aim at wiping out mistakes in the actual conduct of its business, and to provide justice for people in all walks of life. Lebanon is part of the Arab world. AL-HAWADITH published an article I wrote over 2 years ago in which I said in discussing our problem that 'Lebanon is part of the Arab world with equal rights and obligations.'

"The driving force behind this loyalty is a combination of factors, including fear. We hope everybody believes us when we say that we are afraid. We have fears regarding our political fate in the face of the dangers surrounding the south and the dangers of occupation, partition and resettlement [of the Palestinians]. We seriously consider the matter of resettlement to be a real danger which was previously implicit in international maneuvering regarding the Palestinian problem and the Middle East. After "Camp David," resettlement became the principal element in the situation and in the objective of these agreements.

"Reference to the issue of resettlement gives rise to angry reactions or hurt feelings. But we bring it up, not to embarrass or condemn any side, but to warn against it and work to prevent it from happening.

"We would not be the only victims of resettlement. The Lebanese south and its people would not be its only victims. The Palestinian cause itself would also be its victim. This has been said many times but has not been understood very well. Honestly and truly, resettlement would be the graveyard of the Palestinian cause and of justifications for continuing the Palestinian struggle. This is because if resettlement took place here, it would not stop here, but would develop into a basis for a solution [of the Palestine problem] in all the Arab countries. The Palestine question would be done with and would turn into a cause of hollow slogans lacking a popular or political base.

"Resettlement would undoubtedly mark the beginning of a chain reaction all over the Middle East region. I would advise you to refer back to the Sykes-Picot agreement, to the Paris Peace Conference and to the projects to divide

up the region on the basis of sectarian and tribal affiliations. All these projects would be revived by this [Palestinian resettlement] operation. It would be like throwing a rock into a quiet peaceful lake to create new waves which open the way for intervention by the big powers."

We asked Shaykh Shams al-Din: "Is it possible for you to shed more light on the Arab attitude or [sense of] responsibility in this regard?

[Answer] Unfortunately, the Arab mentality has grown accustomed to hold out in the face of problems until the last minute, and then to try to solve them at any cost, just to create an imaginary sense of relief, even if this generates greater and more serious problems. I imagine that we are now facing our destiny with this kind of mentality.

At least we, in Lebanon, will not allow this type of mentality to prevail. We will never allow that.

[Question] How? What capabilities do you have to confront this situation?

[Answer] The capabilities are that we exist and our political resistance exists. It will be enough for us to say "No," to hold on to our land and to return our refugees to their land despite all opposing forces.

[Question] From a practical point of view and with a few exceptions, the Arab position with regard to south Lebanon appears to be neutral, if this is the right expression. The Palestinian Resistance discussed the resettlement problem during the Damascus conference, and regard some of those who inflate the issue as intent on discrediting the true intentions of the resistance. The Resistance emphasized their clear commitment to refuse all forms of resettlement and to continue the fight to recover the land seized by Israel. What is the practical way to prevent the resettlement from taking place?

[Answer] This is what the Palestinians say, of course, and we are glad to hear it once again. I have heard this several times from the Palestinian brothers. It is important to find the political means to make this talk an existing political reality and not just a media slogan. Of course, I will seize the first opportunity to meet with Palestinian leaders, as there are many things that must be reexamined. The political formula is to refer to the facts. We face a security and political setup in the south which neither serves the political security of the south nor really serves the Palestinian resistance.

We know that the south is currently divided into three zones: The Israeli zone, the U.N. zone, and the Palestinian zone in a specific area. This is one reality. The other reality is that there are at least 200,000 [Lebanese] refugees from the south who live away from it. The frightening thing about this reality is that these people are forced to start a new life from scratch wherever they are now at. This includes economic life, social life,

and adaptation to a new political environment. This is what we call "effective migration." At the same time, these people left behind them a void in the south. In this void, a new life, or parasites will grow. Or, the Israelis will have the political opportunity to deal with a vacant land in the manner that suits them best.

There is another reality which we all face. This is the reality of international political moves in line with "Camp David" and the substitute [schemes] that are currently being prepared. These moves are looking for a solution for the Middle East problem which would safeguard the raw material concessions enjoyed by the Western world. In my opinion, the price of this solution is Lebanon, particularly south Lebanon. We do not want to say that we can perform miracles, but there are possibilities of facing this danger. These possibilities begin with the Lebanese southerner living in the south and remaining on his southern land. If it means his death, let him die in the south. This is our concept of accepting life with minimal security.

Last winter we were faced with the catastrophe of new waves of refugees and campaigns to vacate the south and force its people to face the hazards of a new life elsewhere. We faced the possibility of maximum security in the south. This would mean elimination of any Palestinian presence in the south, and surrender to the political aspirations of imperialism against our Palestinian cause. It would mean fulfillment of the Israelis' wishes. We openly and loudly rejected such maximum security.

We were content with minimum security. This meant that after 30 years of hardship, and until the bitter end, we would continue to bear the dangers, anxieties and responsibilities of the Palestinian problem. It meant continued human, economic and other sacrifices for this problem. Being agreeable to live with a minimal state of security would allow the southern refugees to return to their cities and villages, and restore economic activity to the south, which would give the people work opportunities and a chance to rebuild their lives and hold out.

Steadfastness cannot be achieved by refugees in the streets of Beirut, but from within the south. The existing situation is one of defeat not steadfastness. Refugees are clear proof of defeat, while steadfastness means giving the people a chance to remain on their land and continue living, not safely, but in the shadow of danger. We have practiced steadfastness in the shadow of danger for 30 years, and we are ready to continue to do so for another 30 years. I believe that if we honestly deal with political realities in Lebanon we can find a formula for minimal security through the state and its agencies, if possible, or without the state until it becomes capable of providing it.

The south is now divided into three spheres, has three political identities, has no actual government authority, and lives in the shadow of Israel's refusal to maintain the truce agreement. The Israeli slogan is: "The south

is a land with no master." I believe that by staying put and maintaining the present situation, we actually pave the way to lose the south and offer it as a new hostage to Israel, thus dispersing its people and turning them into refugees. Would this serve the Palestinian cause? Would it serve Arab nationalism? Would it serve the security of the area? I do not think the answer is positive to any of these questions.

The present situation is another defeat for the Palestinian cause and a new defeat for the Arab cause. It will create an atmosphere for sectarian and tribal partition in the area. It mainly serves the American purpose of keeping the area boiling until the late 1980s; until alternative energy sources are discovered to replace oil; or until the area is reorganized in a way that guarantees the continuous flow of petroleum.

Political wisdom is that which avoids catastrophes, not that which runs after them. Political wisdom is that politicians should avoid making mistakes, not make mistakes under the influence of imaginary success, and later try to remedy the results of such "success," as Arab politicians have done in the past. They tried to remedy disappointments in Palestine in 1936. Then they tried to remedy them with defeats in 1948, followed by setbacks in 1956, and disaster in 1967. It seems to me that the Arab mentality continues to subject reality to a romantic or poetic approach. The sad thing is that, in the past, this mentality was guided by morality and honesty. But now, I am sorry to say, it has lost the sense of honesty even with itself. Its characteristics have become hypocrisy and deceit, rather than innocence and honesty.

[Question] Your visit to Iran was long and took place during difficult Lebanese and Arab situations. It raised various questions which call for clarification of the truth and revelation of the results of your discussions with Imam Khomeyni and other Iranian high officials about the situation in south Lebanon and the possibility of finding new formulas to deal with this crisis.

[Answer] I begin with the results of the visit to say that, thank God, it was very successful. It received all the necessary political (answers?). Our visit to Imam Khomeyni and his welcome was one of our great pleasures. The meeting was characterized by great concern and exceptional care on the part of Khomeyni, which exceeded our expectations. He clearly and firmly revealed his great and continuing concern about the provision of security to Muslims in Lebanon, and, in particular, to Muslims in South Lebanon, as it is the area exposed to danger. All Iranian leaders share this same care and concern. They realize very well that any dangers affecting the destiny of south Lebanon would not stop at the Lebanese borders, but would spread to the rest of the area. They feel that these dangers cannot be resisted with hollow fantasies, but with effective action based on reality. Any political action must be based on facts.

[Question] Did Imam Khomeyni and the Iranian officials contemplate any definite moves relating to south Lebanon?

[Answer] They see the Israeli threat to the south as one of the leading threats to which they themselves are exposed, because the Israeli danger is a danger to the whole region. The weakest point is the south of Lebanon. They are willing to face this danger the way we decide to face it. The Iranian minister of foreign affairs clearly expressed the Iranian view when he visited Lebanon. Understanding the situation would never mean making peace with Israel. It means confrontation, but it must be confrontation which takes into account the objective dictates of reality.

[Question] You just said that the southern Lebanese refugee must return to his land. This would require the availability of the necessary resources to hold out, such as weapons, economic aid, political action, and the ability to rebuild social life. Without these elements, the southerner can neither bear the woes of war, hold out and fight resettlement and partitioning, or support the Palestinian struggle. How can the southerner be induced to return [to the south], and what are the possibilities of his getting help? Is he going to be urged to revolt or embark on a holy war?

[Answer] Yes. The southerners will return, and it is their duty to do so. With what spirit will they return? They will return with a defiant spirit, not the spirit of someone who is going to lead an easy life. They will have what we called the minimum level of security which allows steadfastness. We have to think first of use of the resources of the Lebanese state to support this steadfastness. This is a matter which we have previously discussed with the government and will work on now. The government has enough funds allocated to the south. We are not satisfied at all with the way these funds are spent. We believe that these funds should be allocated to civil defense organizations and to build a steadfast life, not for peaceful development. The responsibility of supporting steadfastness is ours as individuals and as a state. Of course, steadfastness has a religious war connotation; there should be no doubt about that. But we must understand, and hope our brothers inside and outside Lebanon will also understand, that this religious war readiness also serves as a positive element in Lebanese politics. This does not mean alienation from others, but the addition of a spiritual element that will add vitality to steadfastness and Lebanese safety. What is Iran's role? Of course, our brothers in Iran know and declare that their duty is to be ready and present in this domain.

[Question] What kind of presence?

[Answer] What kind of presence are you asking about?

[Question] Presence means the presence of men, or of material support, or of moral or other type of support. Does it not?

[Answer] We have repeatedly stated with regard to the presence of men, that we are not in need of the element of men to defend the south. In Iran, they are aware of their political responsibility with regard to the political fate of Lebanon, and the fate of the Muslims of Lebanon in particular. This is a very clear point in their minds. I say that the south

is the object of attention by virtue of its being Lebanese as well as Muslim. They are aware that the south is not in need of men to defend it, because its own men who are concerned about it will be in charge of its protection.

[Question] How do you visualize the new relationship with the Palestinian resistance in the light of the consequences of the clashes that occurred in the southern suburb of Beirut while you were in Iran?

[Answer] I was following the sad news from the suburbs of Beirut practically on a daily basis. They were, of course, painful and very frightening. There were similar incidents in the past, and I am afraid there will be more in the future, as long as some groups aim at and seek to kill the new spirit of rebirth I talked to you about at the beginning of this interview. Through propaganda and assaults, it is intended to turn two political illusions into facts which can be easily exploited. The first illusion is repeatedly raised on diverse occasions in relation to a Sunni-Shiite sectarian problem. The second illusion is also frequently aired with regard to a Shiite-Palestinian problem. There is constant pressure to stir up rumors about the existence of a Shiite-Sunni problem and a Shiite-Palestinian clash. These are all illusions which some try to turn into facts. I say with absolute confidence, as I have already said to some political leaders, that there is no sectarian crisis or problem among the Muslims. The simple Muslim does not carry within himself any political problem. These are all illusions that some politicians have, because they can only survive by using scare tactics and appointing themselves as protectors of one sect or another. I say to those: "The Muslims are in good shape. The gentle, simple Muslims who espouse the cause of Islam do not base their political beliefs on being Sunnis or Shiites. Their thinking may be related to the region or environment they live in. But, in general, they think as Muslims and as Lebanese. I view with great suspicion the stirring up of fears over Islamic unity. Muslim politicians are called upon to work with one another as Muslims. Their groups should not work against one another as if each group represented a different nation, creating rifts and scars among the people. I am confident of the safety of the unity of Muslims in Lebanon--ideological, cultural as well as political. We are working to protect this unity and to express it in various ways.

The second illusion is the Shiite-Palestinian problem. There is a southern problem related to the security of the Lebanese southerner, whatever religion or sect he may belong to. In the Bika', there is no Shiite problem of destiny. In the south, there is a Lebanese, not a Shiite problem of destiny. The Shiites exist not only in south Lebanon, but throughout the country's regions. Why do people talk about a problem between the Shiites and the Palestinians? The problem in the south is a result of the particulars of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon. It also arises from the fact that Palestine is on the borders of Lebanon. Since the majority of the Lebanese southerners are Shiites, they are the ones who are the most affected by this problem. This brings us to our call to condition Palestinian

activity in the south. I say frankly that the purpose of this is not to force the Palestinians out of the south. Its purpose is to ensure a minimum level of security, to overcome the dangers of living there, and to live with the intention of holding out. I cannot ignore the fact that we do have a problem, but we did not create it. We have to face it with the objective facts that we have frequently overlooked in the past. We have often thought that we could bypass these facts only to discover at the end that we cannot.

The southern-Palestinian relationship will [always] exist. It will be governed by considerations of Jihad, steadfastness and loyalty to the Palestinian cause. But to be able to stay in control of this relationship and to direct it along a national and Islamic course, our Palestinian brothers must assist us. We cannot work alone to keep this relation strong and sound. We need their help to remain the advocates of the Palestinians in Lebanon, and remain capable of inducing ourselves and our people to pay the tax for steadfastness and bear its consequences in terms of human and economic risks. As to the clashes that have taken place, I have conclusively determined that we were the victims. We were attacked. The only thing is that this time we did not keep quiet. Of course, we have bitter criticism for some of those with whom we shared the same trenches. But this criticism will remain in our heart and conscience, and we will not express it to anyone. This method of dealing with each other cannot continue. It would serve no one.

These clashes, in which we were assaulted, were intended to break our new spirit and extinguish it. But this will not happen. We are doing our best to prevent more clashes, even if we are wronged, because we realize that such clashes do not serve national stability, the Islamic cause, or the Palestinian cause. They only serve Israel and the enemies of Islam, be they inside or outside the country. Clashes are not in our interest at all. Everybody knows that since 1975, we, in the Higher Islamic Shiite Council, have not hesitated to toe the most difficult line of not getting involved in unrest, and not taking sides. This is because we believed that political reform to do justice to the Muslims cannot be accomplished through violence, but through civilian political action.

Our stand has not changed. Our involvement in 1975 and the following years will not be repeated. This painful war which takes place every once in a while in Beirut or the south is caused by those who benefit from it. Why are southern villages shelled for no reason? Why is the southerner insulted and his pride and freedom suppressed? Why can't the southerner express his opinion freely and clearly?

Who benefits from this military and intellectual repression? It only serves to promote despair and devilish ideas which cause deep splits within partisans of the same camp and objective. Why is one specific village surrounded and bombed as if it was an enemy village? Why is war declared on a whole quarter or a whole village, if only one person is suspected of doing wrong?

Who does this serve? We know that it serves to continue the discord in Lebanon. It maintains the benefits and effectiveness of those who take advantage of destruction and discord. We will not allow this. We will never allow it. We will not allow the south or the Beirut suburbs to be victimized. There is no power on earth that can force us to accept humiliation or suppression of freedom and dignity. No, we will never allow that. We are exerting every effort to prevent the renewal of abject sedition, and we ask God to help us in this. We also hope all our brothers will help us.

[Question] Dr Waldheim was clear in his last report when he held Sa'd Haddad responsible for obstructing a solution in the south. What is your opinion on the deteriorating situation resulting from the Israeli policy applied by Haddad?

[Answer] The Israeli occupation phenomenon in south Lebanon, called the Sa'd Haddad phenomenon, is the basic cause of the disasters and risks that south Lebanon is subjected to. It gives political and security justification for the continued tragedy of the south. It is a phenomenon that no one should allow to continue and it should be resisted with all means and methods. The first thing we can think of are the reactionary political elements which find ways to justify their silence about this phenomenon inside Lebanon. There are Lebanese political forces which bear a great responsibility for providing justification and cover for the continuation of this phenomenon and finding imaginary reasons for its existence. It should be looked at not as a Lebanese phenomenon of departure from normality, but as a real Israeli occupation covered up by a number of Lebanese who should rectify their attitude. If they do, we will be in a better position to deal with the situation in the south than we are now.

What means does Sa'd Haddad use to spread his influence beyond its strip and into and beyond the UN forces' zone? We are seriously looking into this dangerous reality and reject it as we did from the beginning. We call on all people in Lebanon to stand in the face of this phenomenon and fight it in any possible way to free Lebanon from the Israeli occupation that hides behind the name of Sa'd Haddad.

[Question] What is new in the case of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr?

[Answer] Imam Musa al-Sadr's case was naturally a major topic in all my discussions in Iran with Imam Khomeyni, president Bani-Sadr, government and political leaders in Qum and Tehran, and various Islamic parties and revolutionary guards. Our Iranian brothers consider Imam al-Sadr as one of their deep and main concerns. Adversaries of this case who imagine that the Iranians are not very concerned about it will discover that they are wrong. The difficult questions about this case will be asked by our Iranian brothers. We have to appreciate the great problems that the Islamic revolution is facing in Iran and which sometimes make some people

think that the Imam al-Sadr case has been shelved. I was happy to realize that it was not in the shade, but under a bright light. It is a matter of deep concern and has reached the Majlis and the Islamic Consultative Council. It is and will remain on its agenda. As soon as this council convenes, the Imam's case will be on its agenda among major Iranian and Islamic issues. The investigation committee, which was going to investigate [the Imam's disappearance] and was delayed due to certain complications, will be reestablished to begin its mission. There are many other ideas under discussion regarding this case.

[Question] Is there any new information in Iran about the fate of Imam al-Sadr and his two companions?

[Answer] I cannot specifically say there is information. But if we carefully, or even not so carefully, review Imam Khomeyni's expressions during his talks with us, they clearly point to the fact that Imam Khomeyni has great hope in his heart that Imam Musa al-Sadr is safe. Frankly, he prayed for his safety, saying: "May God keep him safe." We know that Imam Khomeyni does not speak at random. This prayer is only said for the living. Imam Khomeyni, in his elevated position, has access to far more facts and hypotheses than we have.

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CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

RADAR DETECTION OF TERRORISTS--UNIFIL troops in southern Lebanon have recently begun to use sophisticated radar to detect terrorist squads. UNIFIL has over 60 radars in its 8 battalions. Our military correspondent Shmu'el Tal reports: UN troops have recently begun to adopt a firm attitude toward the terrorists in southern Lebanon. They are carrying out ambushes and surprise patrols at day and night even in locations they did not check in the past. The Norwegian soldiers are accompanied by trained dogs in their night patrols and have scored several successes. The latest innovation introduced by UNIFIL is a sophisticated radar to detect forces moving on the ground. As said, the UN has over 60 radars of this kind. They enable UNIFIL's permanent positions and patrols to follow terrorist movement during the day and at night even if they move through wadis. The radar also makes it possible to track vehicles at night and to distinguish between caterpillar vehicles and cars equipped with rubber wheels. The miniature ground radar has a range of several hundred meters, depending on topographic conditions. We were told that the radar is very effective. [Text] [TA231254 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 23 Sep 80]

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

DECISIONS AFFECTING PUBLIC CORPORATIONS--Nouakchott, 25 Sep (AFP)--A compulsory annual profit will be set for the public and semi-public corporations in Mauritania, the military committee of national salvation (CMSN), the ruling power of Mauritania, decided at the end of an ordinary session. This measure falls within the framework of the improvement of the operations of public and mixed status corporations, an official communique states. The CMSN on the other hand, has recommended the broadening of the jurisdiction of the special military court of justice so that it can handle acts of embezzlement of public funds, corruption and maladministration. The CMSN also recommended a linking of the cities of Nouakchott and Nouadhibou (northwest) with the international telecommunications network; the development of selective tourism which preserves the cultural, moral and religious values of the society; the integration of the information sector within the process of development strategy, as well as the establishment of a compulsory national service for all young Mauritanians who wish to continue their studies on the state's account. [Text] [AB251612 Paris AFP in French 0624 GMT 25 Sep 80]

CSO: 4400

SOCIALIST FEDERATION OFFICIAL DISCUSSES DOMESTIC THREATS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 13 Jul 80 p 15

/Article by Khalil al-Taqi: "A Talk with the Syrian Socialist Union Party Assistant Secretary General, Safwan al-Qudsi: What We Are Experiencing Is More Serious Than Assassination Attempts"/

/Text/ Although Mr Safwan Qudsi was not appointed minister in the Syrian Arab Republic cabinet of Dr 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Kasam formed after the cabinet of Mr Muhammad 'Ali al-Halabi, which resigned in the wake of the Seventh Regional Conference of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party--which political observers considered an important, illuminating prominent point in the history of the party because it came at a time when Syria was going through its most intense struggle domestically and in the Arab and international contexts since the dawn of independence--Safwan Qudsi has not ceased his political activity. Indeed, he has developed it, in order to take care of all details and seek out its true and grave dimensions. Mr al-Qudsi has marshalled his literary resources on behalf of the nation's struggle, from his position as a writer who has a specific vision of Arab nationalism and the unity of the Arab nation.

In a meeting with Mr Safwan Qudsi, editor in chief of the magazine AL-MAWQIF AL-ADABI, which is issued by the Federation of Arab Writers in Syria, and the assistant secretary general of the Arab Socialist Union party, he says:

"What is happening on the Syrian stage, in its capacity as the center of the struggle, and the plotters' goal of trying to destroy it, is more serious than the assassination acts which a wayward group is carrying out against important figures in the country under a factional covering which Syria did not experience in the past, cannot accept at present and will not embrace in the future. It is deeper than the sabotage acts and explosions to which various economic institutions have been exposed since the Egyptian president started his peace voyage and went over to the ranks of the enemies of our Arab nation, alongside racist Zionism and American imperialism.

"Counterrevolution is not just a political term; it is at the same time an intellectual and cultural one.

"In fact I can go beyond that and say that before counterrevolution declares itself in one political form or another, it declares itself in one intellectual and cultural form or another. It starts with an idea and culture in order to end up with a policy.

"In this sense, counterrevolution is preparing for its political outburst with an intellectual and cultural one. It breaks out intellectually and culturally, then politically."

Brainwashing

Mr Safwan Qudsi continued his discussion on the counterrevolution, saying,

"I am trying to state that counterrevolution does not flinch from preparing for its political action through cultural and political action. It disappears from sight politically but always engages in intellectual and cultural activity. When the suitable moment arrives, counterrevolution also starts to pursue its political activity as well.

"Thus one can say that counterrevolution always exists, exists in one form or another, but declares itself politically only after it has prepared the stage. It declares itself only after it has engaged in a group brainwashing process which it carries out in one sector or another.

"I can go a step beyond that and say that, in confronting this counterrevolution, our efforts must proceed along a path which is parallel to our political efforts.

"Why?

"Because as long as the counterrevolution is an intellectual and cultural fact, it will quickly declare itself politically when it finds that the time has become ripe for such a declaration, and the real revolution, which counterrevolution was established only to react to and enter blatant confrontation with, must take into account the fact that political action will be sufficiently effective and influential only when it relies on a clear intellectual and cultural foundation which will result in no form of ambivalence or misunderstanding.

"In order for this intellectual and cultural action, which we say constitutes the natural prelude to political action, to be sufficiently effective and influential, it must be based on a group of facts.

"It is correct that we cannot set ourselves apart from others through fanaticism or one dimensional vision.

"It is also correct that we cannot allow ourselves to be transformed into racehorses with blinkered eyes obsessed with revolving around themselves.

"This is all correct, but it is also correct that we must have clear vision which will allow us to retain our intellectual identity and cultural personality, because, without this identity, without this cultural personality, our political existence will appear fragile and breakable.

"When one of us proceeds to look closely into the written and unwritten history of major revolutions, he quickly puts his hand on a fact, the gist of which is that these revolutions would not have got where they did had they not completed the formulation of their intellectual identity and cultural personality. This intellectual identity and cultural personality are the cornerstone of any revolutionary structure which wishes to achieve major national and social goals. It is the basis of this cultural personality, and the basis of its existence which any political edifice is built upon. Indeed, it is a base without whose existence there can be no decisive political action."

The Shot and the Voice

Mr Safwan Qudsi, continuing his discussion with AL-QABAS, says:

"More than that, counterrevolution is not a political expression of a single intellectual trend, it often is an expression of mutually opposed intellectual trends, which, however, are all in agreement on one goal, which is to bring down the revolution.

"The difference, which is really striking, is that the forces of counterrevolution are in agreement over a single goal which they will not dispute under any circumstance; the goal over which the forces of counterrevolution are in agreement is a stupid hostility to Arab nationalism in all its political and social aspirations and ambitions. It is true that our partisanship of Arab nationalism has various roots, but it is also true that the partisanship is of a force which causes these mutually conflicting and contradictory forces to be in agreement over a single goal, which is to bring down the national socialist revolution.

"After that, let me move on another step and state that it is incumbent on us, in confronting this counterrevolution, to act in two directions at once.

"These two directions are the liquidation of the intellectual and cultural base of the counterrevolution and the construction of the intellectual and cultural base of the national socialist revolution. Indeed, one cannot basically liquidate the intellectual and cultural basis of the /counter/ revolution without starting to build the intellectual and cultural base of the national socialist revolution.

"In a previous discussion I said that the counterrevolution is not just a shot fired from the barrel of a gun but is much greater than that.

"Let us clarify the matter as follows: the shot fired from the barrel of a gun is only the last quarter hour of a 24-hour day. It is the last page of a book which contains hundreds of pages.

"In this sense, one can say that this shot is not the counterrevolution but is the voice by which the counterrevolution declares itself.

"I am trying to say that the counterrevolution is not just a passing fancy, a fleeting fit, temporary stupidity or a momentary technique--it is an organized effort which is ultimately expected to realize a political objective, one result of which will be to turn the table upside down and make us walk on our heads rather than our feet, performing a collective brainwashing and making our muscles grow at the expense of our minds.

"More than that, the counterrevolution is not a random shot in the air but a shot at a specific target, which when it hits it will result in destroying this genuine experiment in national and domestic action, knocking out the sensitive nerves in a body which is trying, as much as it can and is able to do so, to make something of significance. It is a shot in the direction of our national experiment, in which, no matter how much talk is made about it, the positive outweighs the negative. It is a shot in the direction of our social experiment, of which President Hafiz al-Asad has made a statement whose gist is that to build a society with one class, that is, to dissolve the differences between the classes, which was the favored expression of the great leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir, is the objective and destination of this experiment."

Rearranging the Chemical Composition of the Arab Mind

Mr Safwan Qudsi continues his talk by saying,

"Then the counterrevolution does not arise in a vacuum. It is founded on an intellectual and cultural base which is founded on reducing the stature of our national values, reducing the significance of our social struggle, and stirring up doubts on the effort exerted to build our national experiment.

"In this sense, the counterrvolution is not a social structure or economic formation alone--it is, first and foremost, an intellectual and cultural structure.

"Building on this statement, one can say that it is through thought and culture that we build, that is, through intellectual structure comes the beginning.

"The social or economic base on which the counterrevolution is founded is not the only thing which one must work to extirpate and uproot; there is

also the intellectual and cultural base. When the counterrevolution succeeds in snaring a given citizen and strengthening a given group, that means we have not given thought and culture the attention they deserve.

"When the counterrevolution proceeds with attempts which are made to rearrange the chemical composition of the Arab mind, when the counterrevolution proceeds in its attempts to carry out a collective brainwashing and when the counterrevolution continues in its efforts to ensnare the Arab mind and deprive it of its history and its national reality:

"When the counterrevolution does all this, the response to it is to smash its intellectual and cultural foundation and build an alternative one, the foundation of national socialist revolution.

"Once again, the counterrevolution is not a social structure, or an economic structure, alone, but, at the same time, is an intellectual structure and a cultural organization.

"When the counterrevolution is an intellectual structure and a cultural organization, venturing on a decisive confrontation with it will take place through reliance on an intellectual structure and cultural organization which will have the effect of extirpating this counterrevolution by its deepest roots, by which I mean the intellectual and cultural ones."

Yes to a Review, Not a Regression

Mr Safwan Qudsi, the assistant secretary general of the Arab Socialist Union party in Syria, talks about the causes which led to the removal of Fawzi al-Kayyali from the party command at the beginning of last May, saying:

"It is not my nature to give in to attempts to force me to change my intellectual and political convictions, and it is not my nature to surrender to any heated efforts to make me decide to change my ideas at the same speed as I change my clothes.

"At a certain time, some people who were afflicted with the symptoms of intellectual and political confusion intended to make attempts of this type, and the effect of yielding to it would have been to make me, in turn, fall under the influence of this political intellectual confusion and consequently to make me move from the position in which I am standing to a totally different one.

"When I was engaged in a dialogue with those certain people on a given subject, I made statements which were limpid in their clarity, namely that I do not adhere to any idea, or any position, except insofar as I possessed the deep-rooted conviction that this idea is still correct to some degree and that this position is still based on solid ground--indeed, I made more intensely clear statements, which were that I was prepared to review my

convictions when I felt that there was something calling for such a review, and when I felt that these convictions were no longer firm in my mind and conscience in a manner which made me most secure in them.

"When I expressed this readiness to conduct this review, I immediately realized that what was expected of me was to regress, not to review. This was beyond what I could bear or endure.

"It is true that I am not like people who are content to be lax in the face of intellectual and political persuasions which do not evolve or change.

"It is true that I am not among the partisans of this intellectual and political certainty, which I view as a malady which we must not allow to destroy our minds and consciousnesses.

"However, it is also true that I am not one of those people who fall lightly under the influence of any form of intellectual and political opportunism, or any style of viewing ideas as being no more than a piece of clothing which we take off and put on whenever we want.

"It was clear that these certain people who were afflicted with this intellectual and political confusion accepted nothing less than that I strip myself of all my convictions and put new ones in my mind which would have the effect of making me a new being which my self would reject and my being would loathe.

"Should I say more than that?

"Should I say that this intellectual and political confusion prompted those certain people who were afflicted with it to declare ideas and positions of which the least that could be said is that their links with their national roots are severed?

"Shall I say that this political and intellectual confusion has made these certain people continue to exert efforts which it is hoped will spread this confusion to every mind by contagion?

"Shall I state that this intellectual and political confusion has caused these people to proceed to make efforts which it is hoped will cause a given party organization to reject its history, to turn itself inside out and to leave its skin?

"However, some of us still are immune from this intellectual and political confusion.

"If a given head has been afflicted by this confusion, many other heads are still able to retain their equilibrium.

"This is exactly what happened on 1 May 1980 when new leadership was formed for the Arab Socialist Union in Syria."

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CSO: 4802

INTERNAL SECURITY SEEN AS GOVERNMENT'S TOP PRIORITY

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 18 Jul 80 p 26

/Article: "Field Courts Paralyze the Brothers!"/

/Text/ The statements Western papers have made to the effect that the Syrian regime has begun seeking the aid of security officials from the Soviet Union to quieten the domestic disturbances which were aggravated recently may not be true, but it is true that the severe measures the regime has taken have started to do their work in stabilizing the security situation and paralyzing the Moslem Brothers' activities.

It was clear, from the formation of the field courts and the People's Assembly vote on the law to execute the Moslem Brothers, that the Syrian government is putting the security question at the top of the priorities. The strict punishments, in which there is no leniency, do not just fall on active persons belonging to the Society of Moslem Brothers but are indeed the lot of their relatives, family, aides and others who are dependent on them. This intensified activity has had a noticeable effect on domestic security, especially since the government also considers ordinary people responsible for security and requests them to pursue any element who might be suspected of having a hand in sabotage activities in public places.

Before the law was issued and put into effect, Syrian security agencies conducted broad dragnet operations involving the cities of Aleppo and Hume and most northern towns, a number of people were arrested, arms caches were discovered and diverse skirmishes occurred in which dozens of people were killed or wounded.

It appears that the dragnet operation was so extensive that it encompassed other opposition people besides the Moslem Brothers. Some of these opposition figures, who had no connection with terrorist activity, believe that the latest security laws will embrace them in the end because the charge of membership in the Society of Moslem Brothers is hard to prove, especially in exceptional circumstances like these.

The Syrian regime chose the execution law and intensification of security in making use of a group of factors which cause it to refrain from acting

more liberally toward other forces or from giving concessions to opposition forces which are not affiliated with the brothers. It realizes that national forces, either participating in the progressive front or outside it, are condemned to support and reaffirm the security measures the government is taking against the Moslem Brothers, however intense they may become. It also knows that Iraq and groups in sympathy with it cannot support the Moslem Brothers' movement, since that poses a similar danger to them. What the al-Da'wah Party in Iraq gets at the hands of Iraqi security agencies is no less intense than what the Moslem Brothers get at the hands of the Syrian security agencies. The Syrian regime itself has not referred to Iraq either secretly or openly in this context. When President Hafiz al-Asad declared at the Perseverance and Steadfastness Summit held in Tripoli last April that neighboring countries were involved in stirring up unrest within Syria, stating "I prefer not to enter into a war of words with these countries but have decided to crush the reactionary forces in Syria itself," some people thought he was referring to Iraq. However, Minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam soon mentioned Jordan by name, saying that his country had categoric proof that the Society of Moslem Brothers receives its training in Jordanian camps. However, Jordanian officials who visited Damascus recently returned with another impression, the gist of which is that the charge was not directed against them.

Unconfirmed rumors also state that quantities of weapons have found their way into Syria from Lebanon.

What applies to the Syrian regime's position on Iraq concerning the Moslem Brothers applies to its position on Saudi Arabia. It did not refer to Saudi Arabia strongly or fleetingly in this context, although the British conservative newspaper DAILY TELEGRAPH pointed to what it called "Saudi hands in the Syrian disturbances." However, observers in London do not take this talk seriously but consider it part of the touchiness between Britain and Saudi Arabia that arose recently from the crisis over the film "Death of a Princess!"

It may be inferred from the corpus of press and diplomatic reports being circulated in Western capitals that President Hafiz al-Asad has succeeded in establishing order and security in Syria. A British diplomat who has worked in the Middle East for a long time states that the Syrian regime, by the standards of the Middle East, is a relatively stable one because it has stayed in power the longest. The length of duration in power is the soundest criterion of stability, regardless of the miscellaneous events which may occur here and there in corresponding patterns of time. What has helped it, in his estimation, is the lack of a reliable alternative. The regime is strong because the opposition is weak; even if the regime is weak, the opposition is weaker.

There is a feeling on President al-Asad's part, as those knowledgeable about the inner nature of things in Syria say, that his campaign to liquidate the Moslem Brothers is one aspect of the problem and while he

has given it priority because of its security repercussions, he has not ignored the other side, which involves the pursuit of a difficult, painful cosmetic operation on the ruling party's agencies. It is stated that the investigating committee on unlawful gain will resume its activity now that Mr Ahmad Dhiyab has resigned from the chairmanship of it, because of his inability to rid the country of bribery and corruption, and Mr 'Abdallah al-Ahmar has taken his place. Reliable Syrian sources say that al-Ahmar may also resign from the committee after a conflict with a German company which was to have executed a contract for 4.5 million German marks to out fit the Ba'th House in Damascus with furniture and aluminum partitions which caused the Syrian government to proceed to abrogate the contract although Ba'th House was to have been a model modern building.

The German company, known by the name MFVB, claims that it paid a commission of 700,000 Syrian pounds to get this contract, but so far only the payment of 200,000 Syrian pounds has been proved, to the engineer Ghassan Taraqji, who is said to have arranged the deal, causing the Syrian government to abrogate the contract in its entirety without cause.

It is said that the Syrian government has decided to ride a difficult vessel in dealing with the internal situation, whether that be the committee to liquidate the Moselm Brothers or the committee to clean house from within, now that it has become clear that foreign remedies will not work. Because of the domestic situation in Lebanon and Iran, the possibility that an effective Syrian-Iranian-Palestinian alliance may be created which could upset the balance of forces in the region has become weak. Foreign pressures to which Jordan has been exposed because of the Camp David agreement have in turn reduced the possibility that the Jordanian-Syrian alli ance might be revived as it existed some years ago. Above and beyond that, there are the disturbed relations between Syria and Iraq since last July, following the collapse of the union talks between the two countries and Saddam Husayn's rise to power as a result of broad party purges. At the time Baghdad said that was a plot in which the Syrians had a hand, though the Syrians deny this and state that it was the Jordanians who provoked the Iraqis against them!

With the success of the Syrian regime's campaign against the Moslem Brothers, the refrain in the west to the effect that Syria is determed to sign exceptional agreements with the Soviet Union to cope with domestic foreign dangers has let up, in spite of the increasing number of Soviet military and non-military delegations to Damascus. Perhaps this was one of the reasons which prompted the Syrian regime to adopt the decision to make a decisive confrontation itself, to prove that it was still able to cope with the situation domestically and abroad.

It is apparent from this that the Syrian regime has transcended the latest crisis, to which it has devoted great efforts over the past year.

Nonetheless, many are anticipating developments, foremost among them the corrective measures President al-Asad is said to be busy studying as a prelude to executing them.

11887
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

JAPANESE VEHICLES--The Japanese Mitsubishi automobile manufacturing organization declared yesterday that it won a 3.5-billion yen ($16 million) contract with the Syrian Board of Machinery and Equipment Trade, by virtue of which it will export 450 passenger vehicles and trucks to Syria. The vehicles are to be shipped next September. Mitsubishi pointed out that the vehicles will be used in transporting Syrian agricultural products to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and countries bordering on Syria. /Text/ /Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 12 Jul 80 p 15/ 11887

CSO: 4802

AGRICULTURE IS PRONOUNCED TOP NATIONAL PRIORITY

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 31 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Moncef Ben Hadj Amor, minister attached to the prime minister for civil service and administrative reform, chaired on Friday in Soliman a regional sectorial conference on agricultural development organized by the Nabeul Coordination Committee to discuss irrigated crops in Cap-Bon.

During the opening session--held in the presence of the governor and the Coordination Committee secretary general--Moncef Bel Hadj Amor underlined the importance of agriculture in view of the key role it plays in the national economy. It is a fact that the agricultural sector alone employs half of the country's labor force.

The minister mentioned how interested the party and government are in developing that sector and how the head of state is anxious to turn agriculture into the country's green weapon.

This solicitude explains the importance that our development plans attach to agriculture with a view to guarantee our food supplies and promote our exports of agricultural goods.

Expansion of Irrigated Areas

In this connection, the minister specifically mentioned the government's efforts in the sphere of investments which are constantly increasing, so much so that 810 million dinars were invested during the 10-year period now ending compared to 272 millions invested during the sixties.

He noted that 38 percent of these investments went into irrigation. The remaining 62 percent was allocated to agricultural machinery, afforestation and livestock.

Bel Hadj Amor pointedout that these efforts had led to an expansion of the irrigated areas, now covering 200,000 hectares, and to a 50 percent increase in the agricultural production.

Consequently, during this last decade the average production of olive oil amounted to 115,000 tons compared to 55,000 tons in the sixties. During that same period, a similar rate of growth was registered in the production of citrus fruits which jumped from an average of 77,000 tons to 140,000 tons.

As for farming in Cap-Bon, the minister stressed its importance given that area's contribution to the development of the country's economy and given the essentially agricultural character of that region which is famous for the diversity of its production and for the vast expanse of its arable lands (174,000 hectares of arable lands out of a total area of 290,000 hectares).

Agricultural Loans: Substantial Reduction of Administrative Formalities

But this expansion is curtailed by the water shortage in that region since its yearly water requirements amount to 90 million cubic meters. In this connection, the minister said that a project to bring water from the north into the Cap-Bon area, a project included in the plan, will improve the water situation without completely solving the problem mainly because the water requirements of the various sectors are always increasing.

In this connection, Bel Hadj Amor urged local farmers and experts to resort to methods of artificial irrigation which allow a more efficient utilization of the existing water supplies. He pointed out if they used the method of irrigation by sprinklers they could cut down consumption by 40 percent while increasing production. Other methods of irrigation, such as utilization of residual waters from purification plants, could also be used.

The minister went on to speak about the agricultural loans policy and said that the new trend adopted by the government is to authorize banks and their local branches to grant loans to farmers with considerably less administrative formalities.

He stressed the role which these institutions are being called upon to play by giving guidance to the farmers.

Sixth Plan: Agriculture Gets Preferential Treatment

On the subject of the decentralization of the services of the agriculture department, Moncef Bel Hadj Amor started by recalling the measures recently adopted to bring the department of agriculture closer to the field noting that with the new allocation of senior cadres throughout regional offices more than 78 percent of those cadres will now be working in the regions. The remaining 22 percent of those cadres will continue to work in the central administration.

This step is part of the policy to give guidance to the farmers and to popularize modern farming methods.

After noting that the government has given preferential treatment to agriculture in the forthcoming plan encouraging that sector and providing the means to guarantee a stable and decent income for the farmers, the minister mentioned the changes registered in agricultural wages and in production. The purpose of these changes is to maintain a balance between the interests of the producers and those of the consumers.

Among the reforms envisaged by the next plan, Bel Hadj Amor mentioned the project to restructure the marketing distribution chain. For instance, the price of some agricultural products will be set even before the season gets underway. Also, a balance will be established between imports and exports of agricultural products on the basis of the needs of our domestic market and our foreign markets requirements.

To Make Our Agriculture More Competitive

The minister emphasized the need to make our Tunisian agricultural products more competitive in foreign markets in general, and in the markets of Arab countries in particular, as well as the need to attract Arab investors to agricultural projects in Tunisia to insure that our products are better represented in the markets of our brother countries.

The minister devoted the second half of his speech to the question of the administrative reform aimed, he said, at bringing the administration closer to its beneficiaries. On this subject, he said that it was necessary to work together to ensure the successful outcome of this reform.

Finally, he said that he was certain that all the interested parties along with the representatives of national organizations and local authorities will not spare any effort to achieve the development goals which we have set ourselves in conformity with the directives of the Supreme Combattant.

At the end of the meeting, the participants sent a message of support to the president of the republic.

8796
CSO: 4400

YOUTH URGED TO CONTRIBUTE TO PARTY OBJECTIVES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 2 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] Rachid Sfar, member of the Political Bureau and minister of public health, chaired on Sunday evening, at the Palace of Congresses in Monastir, the opening session of the Fourth Conference of the Socialist Destour Youth which is meeting from 31 August to 3 September under the theme "An Effective Participation in Political Life."

The opening session was attended by Abdessalem Dimassi, secretary general of the UFOJ [Tunisian Federation of Youth Organizations]; Mohsen Gheminade, secretary general of the Destour Youth National Bureau; by the governor, the secretary general of the Coordination Committee and representatives of large national organizations with offices in the governorate of Monastir.

Rachid Sfar started by conveying to the conference participants greetings from the Supreme Combattant, from the party secretary general and from members of the government and of the Political Bureau.

He then asked the particpants to observe a minute of silence in memory of the martyrs of Monastir who died on 31 August 1953 on the field of honor under the bullets of the colonial authorities.

The minister also pointed out that the closing session of this Fourth Conference will take place on the anniversary of 3 September 1934, the day when the leader Habib Bourguiba was deported to southern Tunisia, a measure which signaled the beginning of the demonstration of force launched by the Neo-Deatour against the supporters of the protectorate.

Rachid Sfar also remarked that the conference had opened on the anniversary of that day, in 1955, when documents were exchanged granting internal autonomy to Tunisia. In this connection, he urged the Tunisian youths to muse over the lesson contained in all these historic events which illustrate the perspicacity and political genius of the Supreme Combattant.

Then, the minister underlined the importance of the current period in Tunisia's history now that the next development plan is getting its finish-

ing touches, a plan--he said--that calls for the united effort of us all if it is to be carried out. He noted that on that score the Destour youth has been assigned a crucial task and has the duty of always standing on the frontline of the militants setting an example for other groups of young Tunisians.

Mr Sfar went on the declare his certainty that the Fourth Youth Conference will not fail to achieve results calculated to increase the party's influence and to enable the Socialist Destour Youth Organization to continue acting as the designated spearhead in the political and civic education of young people, as the uniting element of the living forces of the nation to further increase the ranks of the party.

He also emphasized the great responsibility assumed by this organization to defend the Destour options and to mobilize the youth in the party arena.

The minister of public health also said that he was very pleased to see that an overwhelming majority of the people favors the development strategy adopted by the party and he pointed out that the Destour youth has the duty to constantly enrich its own Destour culture and consolidate its education so as to be in step with progress and contribute to the implementation of the party programs and objectives.

All the same, Mr Sfar pointed out that neither the state nor the party claim to have arrested all facets of under-evelopment, nor have they given concrete form to all the aspirations but, nonetheless, they are driven by a firm determination to fill the gaps and to eliminate the last effects of underdevelopment. "Although we still have a long way to go on the road that leads to the final takeoff," he said at the end of his address, "The fact that we now have enough cadres capable of leading the march of development under the bestpossible conditions is a good reason to feel optimistic."

Earlier, Mohamed Ben Nasr, Abdessalem Dimassi, Mohsen Gheminade and Khelifa Jebiniani, the conference chairman, spoke to the participants emphasizing the importance of this Fourth Conference of the Socialist Destour Youth in the decisive period through which the country is living in its effort to become a developed country and they underscored the role assigned to young people for the success of this endeavor.

Afterwards, Rachid Sfar paid a visit to the mausoleum of the martyrs of Monastir where he recited the Fatiha in memory of the martyrs of the events of August 1953.

8796
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

INTERIOR MINISTRY NEWS--The Ministry of Interior has decided to send Lt Col Hamid Sayf Hamid Rashid, deputy director of the Sharjah Police, to England to attend the Chiefs of Police Seminar to be held at the Police Training Academy in Brahms Hill from 29 September to 12 December 1980. The Minister of Interior appointed Maj Rashed Salem al-Shamlan as deputy director for security affairs at the Ministry of Interior, in addition to his present position as director of the Department of Criminal Investigation and Research. The following 9 police officers and warrant officers will be sent to Jordan to attend a 6 weeks' training course on criminal investigations beginning 15 September 1980: 1st Lt Jum'ah Sayf 'Obayd (al-Fujayrah police); 2nd Lts Hassan Sa'id (Sharjah), Saleh Salem (Ra's al-Khaymah), 'Obayd al-Asli (Dubai), and Sa'id al-Misbah (Umm al-Qaywayn); Chief Warrant Officer Muhammad Gharir (Department of Naturalization and Immigration). [Text] [Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 24 Sep 80 p 4]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

SAWR FIGHTERS CLAIM VICTORIES--The Saharan People's Liberation Army continues its just armed struggle for freedom and complete sovereignty over its own country. A communique issued by the SADR Information Ministry today said that the Saharan fighters on 23 September shelled the Moroccan garrison in Mziriga in southern Morocco for 15 minutes using heavy artillery. The concentrated shelling caused heavy human and material losses to the invaders. The Saharan communique also stated that the Saharan fighters on 24 September attacked for 45 minutes the royalist Moroccan forces stationed in Lemcid and inflicted considerable losses on them. [Text] [LD291646 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 29 Sep 80]

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END

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No. 2199

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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PALESTINIAN LEADER CALLS FOR WIDER REPRESENTATION WITHIN PLO

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 25 Jun 80 p 14

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Fattah Ghanim, member of Political Bureau of Palestine Liberation Front by Ibrahim al-Barghuthi; date and place not given]

[Text] Abd al-Fattah Ghanim, member of the Political Bureau of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) said that the Zionist enemy will increase terrorism and assassination attempts against members of national movements in the occupied territories, following his attempts to assassinate three West Bank mayors.

He called for representation of all organizations (Palestine Liberation Front, Popular Front, Palestine Communist Organization, and People's Resistance Front) on the executive committee and all other institutions of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). He called for an end to individualist and autocratic actions and internal alignments. He asked for severance of links between the PLO and reactionary symbols and personalities in the occupied territories, as well as a decrease in the number of independents on the PLO executive committee.

In an exclusive interview with AL-WATAN, he warned against attempts to dress up the European initiative, which is nothing more than an extension to the Camp David agreements, resting on the same set of premises. Here is the interview:

Uprising in the Occupied Territories

[Question] What is your assessment of the present situation in the occupied territories following the assassination attempts on three West Bank mayors?

[Answer] The growing uprising of the masses in the occupied homeland is assuming unique dimensions characterized by the offensive nature of the uprising against occupation forces and Zionist settlements in the occupied territories; the defeat of the Israeli decision to expel the fighter Bassam al-Shak'ah; and the forcing of the Zionist enemy to cancel the Alon Moreh settlement. The popular movement in the occupied homeland is clearly taking on universal dimensions. In addition to widespread uprisings on

the West Bank, solidarity movements have appeared in the triangle and Haifa, and the uprising has moved to the Gaza sector. All these developments have forced the enemy to form, so to speak, a secret Israeli army along the lines of what the French did in Algeria, when the balance of power started to swing in favor of the continuously growing movement of the masses.

I would like to discuss two incidents. The first is the expulsion of the mayors of Hebron and Halhul as well as the sharia judge of Hebron. In the past, Israel attempted to give its repressive and fascist deeds an appearance of so-called legitimacy, and expulsion of Arab nationals required the consent of higher Israeli courts. However, the Israeli ministry of defense this time dispensed with these formalities and gave orders to hand over the three fighters--Fahd al-Qawasmah, Muhammad Milhim, and Shay'kh Rajab al-Tamimi--directly to the forces of the Israeli agent, Sa'd Haddad in southern Lebanon. The second incident is the recent criminal attempt to assassinate the brother fighters, Bassam al-Shak'ali, Karim Khalaf, and Ibrahim al-Tawil, which marks a transition of the government of the Israeli enemy into open gangsterism. We believe that what is going on can only be the beginning of a real predicament for Israeli occupiers of our lands. This predicament is revealed in the sharp exchange of accusations between Weizman and Begin, and between Weizman and Barlev, in a clear attempt on the part of enemy leaders to clear themselves of responsibility for what is going on in the occupied territories.

We can clearly see the growing influence of the Palestinian national cause in the fact that the three fighters' expulsion became an international issue discussed by the UN Security Council. The expusion of al-Shak'ah a few months ago was also of interest to the entire international community. The UN General Assembly took a clear stand at the time, holding that the Israeli decision was illegal. We can also emphasize that the criminal actions of the government of the terrorist Begin have been totally exposed. This is so much so, that American imperialism itself was unable to use its veto in the Security Council in the face of the complete unanimity of all other members in condemning the expusion and calling for the return of the three fighters.

In our estimation, these developments call for more advanced forms of popular resistance, which will entail redevelopment of the existing organizational structure in the occupied homeland. This calls particularly for merging all elements of the Palestine revolution and all national and democratic forces into the Palestine National Front. It also calls for providing the necessary assistance to secure the steadfastness of the Palestine National Front in its struggle against the Zionist forces of occupation; severing links with reactionaries such as Hikmat al-Masri, Rashad al-Shawa, Elias Fray, and Anwar Nusaybah; and channelling funds appropriated to support the steadfastness of our people in the occupied homeland in such a way as to actually serve the steadfastness of our national organizations.

National Council Meeting

[Question] In the light of your analysis and the 15th meeting of the Palestine National Council, what should be achieved politically and organizationally by this session?

[Answer] At the 14th meeting of the Palestine National Council, revolutionary groups agreed on a step-by-step political program. In spite of this, the organizational program decided upon at that meeting faltered. Important and dangerous new political developments have taken place since that meeting, namely, the complete switch of the Egyptian regime to the camp of the historic enemies of the Palestine revolution and Arab liberation movement; the overthrow of imperialism's agent in Iran; the achievement of several victories by world forces of liberation in Afghanstan, Zimbabwe, and Nicaragua, and the growing efforts of the reactionary imperialist-Zionist alliance to impose its aggressive plans on the Arab world, the most obvious example of which is the autonomy talks. In addition, there have been attempts to dress up the European initiative, which is nothing more than an extension of the Camp David agreements and is based on the same objective of destroying the exclusive legitimate representation character of the PLO.

These important new political developments call for a clear position regarding the European initiative which would unmask its sponsors and the dangerous schemes they intend to finesse through it in our area. The PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Any form of delegation of authority or attmept to create a partner for the PLO in representing our people is rejected.

The revolutionary situation in Lebanon must also be given special attention, since the Lebanese theater is the major center of gravity and impact on the Palestinian revolution. This requires strengthening bonds of militant relations and common destiny with the Lebanese National Movement, and preventing the fascists and isolationists from achieving their programs in Lebanon. These programs are just another facet of the Camp David agreements. It is also necessary to attach special importance to the struggle of the masses in the occupied territories, to intensify military operations against the occupation, and to stick to armed conflict as the primary form of the national Palestinian struggle at this stage.

The National Council must also emphasize the importance of the Jordanian arena, since it contains huge segments of the energies of our Palestinian people, and should once more become a focal point of the Palestinian revolution. This calls for intensifying the struggle for the right of the Palestinian revolution to exist in Jordan, and to use that country as a base. The National Council must challenge all attempts to place restrictions and difficulties in the way of the free movement of our Palestinian people in most Arab countries.

Emphasis must also be placed on regarding American imperialism as the principal enemy of the Palestinian revolution. The role of the PLO within the steadfastness and Resistance Front must be reinforced.

"No," to the Policy of Internal Alignments

On the organizational front: In order to make it possible for these political positions to be faithfully translated into practice, we must have the organizational tool to do so creatively and realistically. We should be free of individualist or autocratic action or of internal alignments which aim at dividing our united national effort and weaken national Palestinian solidarity at this time.

On this basis, we in the PLF believe that it is quite necessary to represent all elements of the revolution and national democratic forces, including the Palestine Communist Organization of the West Bank, on the executive committee of the PLO and all its subsidiary organizations within a framework of close national unity. At the same time, we see the necessity of decreasing the number of independents on the executive committee and other institutions of the PLO, while increasing representation of mass organizations, so that members of these institutions may become accountable in their work to elements of the people.

The best message that the Palestine National Council could send to our people in the occupied territories, in appreciation of their valiant uprising, would be for it to unite national forces by defeating American imperialist plans embodied in the Camp David agreements, the autonomy conspiracy, and the European initiative. It should also move to escalate national resistance to destroy the occupation and enable the Palestinian people to determine their own destiny and create a democratic nation in their homeland.

I would like to point out the democratic nature of the Palestinian revolution during the past years. Democratic commitment requires persistent efforts to deepen democratic practices within every element of the Palestinian revolution and among all ranks of its national progressive forces. This is based on our belief that promoting democracy releases the energies of our Palestinian masses and channels them in the service of our national interest during the inevitable struggle against our enemies.

9669
CSO: 4802

PALESTINIAN LEADER DISCUSSES MIDEAST, CRITICIZES PLO, FATAH

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 22 Aug 80 p 17

[Interview with Nayif Hawatimah, in Beirut; date not given]

[Text] For 3 long hours, AL-SIYASAH discussed with the secretary general of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), Nayif Hawatimah, the Middle East's hottest problems. The interview dealt with Lebanon, the Arab world, and issues of international import. Items discussed included terrorism, the wave of political assassinations, the war in Lebanon and what lies ahead for that country, American interests and inter-Palestinian relations. The text of the interview follows:

[Question] The Palestine National Council (PNC) was expected to hold a new session late in August of this year. Have you reached an agreement with the other Palestine resistance groups on what might be accomplished?

[Answer] The committee in charge of preparations for the next council session has set up an agenda aimed at ironing out differences over political and organizational issues, as well as reaching a consensus on future plans of action. We can say at this point that we are moving in a positive direction. Our hope is that our aspirations will be translated into concrete action. The agenda includes a number of the more important political issues facing the Palestinian revolution and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Foremost among these are:

1. The situation in the occupied territories and Israeli plans;

2. The Camp David alliance and possible developments as a result of the impending changes in Israel's political leadership;

3. An assessment of Palestinian-Jordanian relations in the light of 2 years of work by joint committees;

4. An assessment of Palestinian-Arab relations in the light of our experience of the past 20 months, with particular emphasis on recent serious Arab moves that could jeopardize our cause and endanger directly the position of the resistance movement and the PLO.

5. An assessment of the [recent] political moves by West European countries leading to the Venice declaration of 13 June 1980, and the subsequent moves by the United States, which are expected to intensify after the November elections.

In addition, the council must consider potential American-Israeli efforts to rescue the hard-pressed Camp David accords and push them to completion. All these massive political issues demand the attention of the council. Furthermore, the actions of the PLO during the past 20 months in connection with the phased political program which the PLO has endorsed, are giving rise to many legitimate questions among our people and fighters. The PLO does not appear to have lived up to its commitments in this regard. In fact many significant PLO actions have been contradictory to the phased program, and have failed to serve the interests of the Palestinian people or to advance its case with respect to self-determination and the creation of an independent state. These actions have also failed to advance the unconditional return of other occupied Arab territories. On the contrary, PLO actions have, in one form or another, fallen in line with Western plans in general and with the Camp David accords in particular. Of particular concern in this connection is the 5-point program advanced by Khalid al-Hasan.

All these issues are on the agenda of the planning committee. The agenda also includes a number of organizational matters dealing with the occupied territory; the need to implement the PNC's resolution of January 1979, which called for beefing up resistance in the occupied territory; and a review of the PLO's organizational structure and makeup for the purpose of carrying out democratic reform which would check the detrimental influence of corrupt, bureaucratic elements. These are the problems on the agenda of the planning committee, and we are in the process of debating them. Our hope is that they will receive full and serious attention and that we will succeed in agreeing on a number of political, organizational and military decisions, which, collectively, will form a modest, but qualitative improvement in the posture of the resistance movement and the PLO.

[Question] What are the chances of reaching such an agreement?

[Answer] That does not depend on us alone; it depends on the various resistance groups and their willingness to accept a common denominator, a joint policy that is more effective than the one pursued so far. The agreement reached at the last session of the PNC was a big step forward. Unfortunately, that agreement was not put into practice on the political or organizational level. Example: The phased program is against favoring the new American-West European initiative, and contradicts the position expounded by Khalid al-Hasan during his tour of Western Europe.

The organizational program adopted at the last session of the PNC emphasized collective leadership of the revolution and the PLO from top to

bottom. However, during the past 20 months, we have witnessed repudiation of collective leadership and efforts by individuals to gain and monopolize control. We shall attempt at the next council session to scale our decisions to our actual ability to implement them. We would thus avoid creating a glaring gap between our ability to adopt resolutions and our ability to carry them out as happened at the last session. Example: During the last council session, guidelines were laid down for Palestinian-Jordanian relations in the best interests of both peoples and the Arab nation at large. These guidelines were designed to insure implementation of the Baghdad summit conference resolutions dealing with Palestinian-Jordanian relations and other resolutions resulting from previous Arab summit conferences. The joint committees, however, failed to implement these guidelines.

We are determined that the next session should remedy this situation and generate resolutions which can be implemented. We must also end the struggle for political leadership within the PLO if we are to gain credibility. Our most valuable assets are our people and the Arab masses, together with all progressive forces throughout the world. If the gap between our resolutions and our capacity to implement them continues, the PLO will lose its credibility and the support of the masses.

[Question] Do you really believe that forthcoming resolutions will be more successful than previous ones, keeping in mind that things have not really changed?

[Answer] It is true that many previous resolutions were shelved, giving rise to skepticism. But we must not forget that the Palestinian posture has improved noticeably. Support among our people has grown, and the revolution is on a firmer footing. Our leaders are being watched more closely, and their ability to execute important policy decisions is coming under greater scrutiny.

We must also follow through on the positive efforts of our people with the occupied territory and outside it. We must limit the gap between what we say and what we do, between decisions and our capacity to implement them. We must also note that our enemy is becoming increasingly isolated, with little room for maneuvering. It is hemmed in between the PLO and the Arab and world community. In light of these developments, we hope that the next council session will produce resolutions capable of implementation. Otherwise, no resolutions are necessary.

[Question] Together with Fatah, your group was among the strongest supporters of the phased program--the program calling for the creation of an independent Palestinian state in stages. But, judging by the resolutions adopted at its fourth conference, Fatah appears to be retreating from its former position in favor of a hardline strategy. How will this affect your position?

[Answer] It is true that the Democratic Front and Fatah were the strongest defenders of the phased program for our people, the revolution and the PLO. Even those who originally opposed the program accepted it unconditionally in January 1979. As it turned out, this program proved to be the only meaningful answer to Zionist expansionist policy and [Sadat's] surrender policy. It is also evident that the program will be the only viable countermeasure to the Camp David accords and future designs connected with them, following the American elections in November 1980 and the Israeli elections in May 1981.

The central issue of the Middle East conflict is the Palestinian issue, the right of the Palestinians to return to their homeland, determine their own destiny, and to create an independent state. This is precisely what had been denied at Camp David and in subsequent declarations such as the Venice declaration. This is also the line that will be pursued after the American and Israeli elections. The Israeli Labor Party is proposing a post Camp David program for the creation of a Palestinian-Jordanian federation. The proposal is new ploy to further divide the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Consequently, our most effective weapon is to adhere to our program and insist on the right of return, self-determination, and establishment of an independent state. These demands must be the essence of our continuing struggle. We must also insist on the unconditional return of all occupied Arab territory.

As for the resolutions adopted at the fourth conference of the Fatah organization, observers are wondering about the apparent hardening of the organization's position. Frankly, I do not share this view and wish that that was indeed the case. The resolutions of the fourth conference are exercises in generalities. They do not pertain to the exigencies of the present situation, nor do they respond to the immediate problems facing our people, the revolution, the PLO or the progressive forces throughout the Arab world.

The resolutions of the fourth conference deal with long range problems relating to future Palestinian Arab-Israeli Jewish relations in the framework of one democratic state yet to be created in Palestine. The resolutions bypassed present problems: What to do about the situation in the occupied territory? What are the options? What are the means to implement them? How do we close our ranks? What is the status of the revolution within the occupied territory, and what is its immediate outlook? Under what banner do we continue the struggle? What is our principal option in the steadfast front?

The resolutions of the fourth conference ignore all the current American and West European tactics, initiatives and plans. These should be a central issue at any political conference in the Arab world, especially a Palestinian conference. None of these matters was discussed.

We will gain greater control [of our destiny] when our conferences begin to seek solutions to our immediate problems, and when we stand united against imperialism and the designs of imperialism against the Palestinian cause. We will become stronger when we begin to deal democratically with each other, in a manner calculated to solidify our relations with our people in the occupied territory, rectify Palestinian-Jordanian and Palestinian-Arab relations; and reform conditions within the PLO itself by exposing the elements whose real intentions and strategies are kept concealed. For this reason, the political declaration issued by the Fatah conference will have no effect on the coming PNC session. The political declaration is a rehash of old positions. It is not a step forward. We need a more meaningful program.

Ever since the political declaration was issued, there has been no noticeable change in the policies of our Fatah brethren, despite the new realities of our present situation. We need answers. There has been some revived adherence to the phased program, as expressed in the speech of Abu al-Lutf before the emergency session of the United Nations General Assembly. In general, however, there has been a continuation of policies preceding the [Fatah] conference, such as with respect to internal Palestinian, Palestinian-Jordanian, Palestinian-Arab, and Palestinian-international relations.

[Question] Do you expect any noticeable changes in the composition of the Executive Committee? If so, what kind of changes?

[Answer] We are working to get a committee that is committed to the phased program and to upholding the council's resolutions. Our experience of the past 20 months is evidence that the present committee would not provide these assurances. Palestinian groups which bear the bulk of the responsibility for the struggle must be represented adequately on the Executive Committee. Similarly, the so-called independent groups must receive special consideration.

[Question] But, in view of the current state of affairs, don't you think that this demand is a little too ambitious?

[Answer] I believe that the balance of forces as well as public Palestinian sentiment are such as to make this possible. We have already witnessed the defeat of numerous rightist tendencies.

[Question] There is much talk of "settlment" these days. Are there any serious settlement programs being proposed, and how do you feel about them?

[Answer] It is evident that the Camp David accords have reached a deadend. But America and Israel refuse to retreat and to accept this new fact of life. The Camp David accords are meaningful only to the Egyptian-Israeli front. They are devoid of legitimacy on the Palestinian, Arab, regional, or international scenes.

In view of this reality, a serious attempt is being made to find a new opening for the Camp David accords, in the form of a complementary, follow-up move. West European initiatives appear to be premised on such a move.

After the American elections, Western Europe is expected to submit a new resolution to the Security Council. It will support the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including the rights of self-determination and representation on any conference on the Palestine problem, but will stop short of mentioning an independent state or the PLO, in order to avoid an American veto. This initiative appears to have been coordinated with a large number of Arab capitals, and is based on hopes that it would have the support of some Palestinians.

Preparations are under way for the return of the Labor Party to power in Israel. The Labor Party, known for its strong support of the Camp David accords, is ready to implement self-rule in the Gaza strip in order to satisfy al-Sadat's demands and to get him out of his dilemma. This party is also preparing to propose the creation of a Jordanian-Palestinian federation and to renew its effort to divide the West Bank further. Under this proposal, the Labor Party hopes to annex 40 percent of the West Bank to Israel, leaving 60 percent for the federation.

This proposal will also be offered as a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. While some of the refugees will be permitted to settle in the territory belonging to the federation, others will be settled in Arab and foreign countries. These steps are some of the links in the unbroken chain of events that began with the Camp David accords and which will continue. The question is: How will this proposal be implemented? We believe that the proposal will be met with unrelenting Palestinian resistance, stronger than the one put up-to-date against the Camp David accords.

The question of Palestinian rights is no longer a local or regional issue; it is an international one. Nearly the whole world is clamoring for the rights of the Palestinian people. Furthermore, our experience in resisting such proposals, the worldwide support for our cause, and the development of our armed forces and the PLO will prevent this proposal from becoming a reality. We must, however, be aware beforehand that the dangers implicit in such a proposal include the following:

1. An attempt to paralyze the PLO, if and when it undertakes to enlist Palestinian or Arab aid in resisting any of the Camp David follow-up moves;

2. An attempt to destroy unity in the Arab world, which is solidly opposed to the accords. The attempt may take the form of an appeal to persuade some Arab countries to save what they can. The success of such a move will divide the Arab world into two groups: those who go along, and those who remain faithful to the phased program.

3. An attempt to recast the Palestinian problem as an internal Arab issue, rather than the world issue which it is. Such a move will attempt to pit some Arab countries against the PLO, in a bid to force the latter to accept post-Camp David proposals. This is precisely what our enemies and the Camp David alliance wish to accomplish--a transformation of the problem into an inter-Arab conflict. It is precisely what Henry Kissinger alluded to when he called for turning the Palestinian problem from a world issue into an Arab one.

[Question] It seems that [Palestinian] Resistance is beginning to rely more on diplomacy than on arms. We no longer hear of daring operations as was the case in the mid-70's. Any reasons?

[Answer] Armed resistance remains the principal form of our struggle. Our major problem now is how to develop that form of resistance within the occupied territory, in addition, of course, to other forms of resistance from outside. Any deviation from this basic policy is an error, regardless of who proposes it.

Our struggle must be integrated on the military, political, diplomatic, and ideological fronts. But the principal form of our resistance must remain the armed struggle. It must be noted that armed as well as other forms of resistance have developed significantly, and have become more effective in the occupied territory, despite the fact that they are not laced with spectacular events of propaganda value in the Arab world and abroad.

According to Israeli statistics, there is an average of 2 military operations every 3 days. Palestinian accounts claim more. These operations are carried out without letup against the enemy and his administrative and police agencies. The enemy is kept constantly alert and bleeding. In addition to the armed struggle, there are other forms of resistance in the occupied territory, with great effect on world public opinion. Israel, which for too long has been an expert in the art of complaining, is being faced with a reverse effect. It is now the target of complaints. This is the result of its occupation policy.

We are constantly working to make our armed struggle more costly to the enemy and less costly to us, particularly with regard to losses in human resources. This is a step forward despite the fact that it does not possess the spectacularness and propaganda value of past suicidal missions that took place at Ma'alot, Sakhoi, and Bisan. Our suicidal missions reached their highest levels in the years 1974, 1975 and especially 1976. But in the occupied territory our armed resistance is being mounted on a daily basis, and has been so for the past 2 years. Israeli reaction to these has been more violent than it was to our more spectacular missions. One result of these daily operations has been the direct 1978 Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, which was followed by an 8-month long war of attrition. Our new tactics are hurting the enemy more than ever.

This does not mean, however, that large-scale operations have no place in our resistance strategy. On the contrary, these operations will remain indispensable. The only proviso is that they become extremely costly to the enemy. As we prepare to carry on the resistance for a long time, we should not for one moment lose sight of the necessity to escalate the struggle on the political, diplomatic, and ideological fronts. We should not forget the example of the Vietnamese people, who, while fighting in the field, carried on their struggle on the political, diplomatic, and ideological fronts. At any rate, and with respect to our armed resistance, we cannot but refer to the obstacles placed in our way in certain quarters. We, therefore, have no choice but to rely principally on our efforts within the occupied territory.

[Question] You mentioned earlier that you expected a large-scale explosion in Lebanon in the near future. On what factors do you base this assessment?

[Answer] Anticipated developments on the eve of and after the American elections, and follow-up moves to bolster the Camp David accords, all point to one direction. We can expect a hot period politically and militarily. The American-Israeli enemy is determined to implement the policy aimed at Arab surrender. It threatens our people's rights, and simultaneously tries to convert the Palestine problem into an Arab issue by forcing a confrontation between some Arab countries and the PLO.

This is why we are cautioning loudly and have already taken measures to avoid being caught by surprise. As one example, we are studying the attempts to create a government of reconciliation in Lebanon, one comprised of all political factions. While the effort appears innocent on the surface, its ultimate designs are evil. Should such a move succeed, it would in a matter of months deliver a powerful blow against us.

Under the cover of forming a government of reconciliation, those behind the move plan to station the sectarian [Lebanese] army in East and West Beirut as well as in the city's suburbs, in order to pin down the Palestinian forces in their refugee camps and deprive them of their protective belt. A second aim of this move is to force the deterrent force [Syrian army] out of the capital and its suburbs. All this is to be accomplished under the cover of a noble effort to bring about a political reconciliation. The real intention, however, is to create new problems between the resistance forces and their allies in the national movement, as well as dissension within the Palestinian resistance. But, thanks to strong opposition from the independent Nasirites, the "Murabitun Group," and Sulayman Franjiyyah, as well as to changes in the Syrian position, the move wil not succeed.

[Question] What form will this conspiracy take? Will it, for example, be a return to open war as happened in 1975-76?

[Answer] The conspiracy could be carried out in a variety of ways. In the occupied territory, the conspiracy could take the form of a greater tightening of the iron-fisted occupation policy, particularly in response to the mounting [Palestinian] resistance in that territory. In Lebanon, the conspiracy could take the form of a severe blow to the Palestinian revolution and its allies in the Lebanese National Front. The blow will be delivered by Israel in south Lebanon, and will be accompanied by new initiatives by rightist, isolationist groups. The two-pronged attack will aim at sandwiching the Palestinians between Israel and the agent Sa'ad Haddad in the south, and pitting them against the isolationist front and its supporters in the capital [Beirut].

[Question] In the wake of the wave of assassinations in the Arab region, the future appears extremely gloomy. All indications are that the wave will intensify. What, in your opinion, is the motive behind this campaign of terror?

[Answer] The problem of assassination is a complex one. As you know, we in the Democratic Front, condemn any form of individual terrorist activity, be it politically motivated assassination, a skyjacking, or a Munich type attack. The aim of the current wave of assassinations is to demoralize the national forces and weaken the common effort to conduct a united struggle politically and militarily. Political assassinations are intended to create havoc and sow fear and suspicion. They are symptomatic of the increasing bankruptcy of certain groups who seek to protect their deteriorating positions by turning to this form of terror. Resorting to this form of violence reveals that the perpetrators are in deep trouble and that their end is in sight.

[Question] Do you expect the wave of assassination to spread?

[Answer] Yes. This form of terroristic activity is likely to spread, particularly since some governments--those not serious in their opposition to imperialism and Zionism--insist on solving their problems in this fashion. These governments are unable to solve their social problems, which, as a rule, is the result of a vast gap between an increasingly impoverished majority and a small selfish minority whose legendary riches were built on the sweat and blood of the poor majority. Faced with discontent, these governments resort to individual assassination as a tool to eliminate opposition and maintain economic, political, social and educational control of their people. But the harder these governments seek to impose their authority, the harder will progressive national forces resist, and the greater will be their determination to achieve economic justice, end this transitional period, and take control of their countries' affairs.

[Question] You say repeatedly that the Camp David accords are in deep trouble, but don't you agree that our national forces are the ones in trouble?

[Answer] We have never denied this. Anyone who peruses the Democratic Front's documents will observe that we are portraying the situation as it really is. While we say the Camp David accords are in trouble, we do not deny that failure to scuttle them is due to the crisis that our revolutionary, progressive, and liberation Arab forces are going through. The Palestine revolution, the PLO and the entire Front of Steadfastness are in a crisis.

We do not hide the fact that the means to defeat the Camp David accords and preempt further developments that may ensue from them is to change the strategy of the revolution, the PLO, the Steadfastness Front and all the liberation and progressive forces in the Arab world. We have already pointed out some of the needed changes in the PLO's structure. As for the Steadfastness Front, a series of far-reaching democratic changes are necessary. The liberation forces in the Arab world, particularly the Leftist and the Democratic wings, must adopt a realistic revolutionary program, one capable of implementation and providing solutions, and must enlist the support of the masses.

Do we have the capacity to accomplish this? The answer is yes. We have what it takes to begin. The Palestinian masses, for example, are strong enemies of imperialism and Zionism. Political sentiment within the Palestinian movement appears to move toward a more progressive political philosophy.

[Question] The American elections are almost here. If you had a choice, which of the candidates, Carter or Reagan, would you opt for?

[Answer] We have no choice in this matter and the argument is academic. We must observe, however, that America's imperialist policy is not determined by a single person. America's foreign policy is based on a number of aggressive colonialist principles designed to guarantee America's interests. Any occupant of the White House is bound to implement these policies. Will Reagan prove to be more stridently opposed to our cause than Carter? We cannot answer this question despite the fact that Reagan's platform suggests as much.

We must remember that Nixon was more aggressive than his Democratic opponent. The Republican Party is traditionally more conservative and rightist than the Democratic Party. Yet when Nixon won the presidency he opened the way for the signing of the SALT I treaty. The Helsinki conference to settle post-World War II boundaries and relieve tensions in Europe also took place during the Nixon Administration. Nixon was also the one who went to Peking.

As another example, consider President de Gaulle. He was to the right of the Fourth Republic. He came to power with the support of French generals extremely dedicated to the maintenance of France's colonialist

policy in Algeria. They, in fact, led a coup d'etat to insure the survival of that policy. Yet de Gaulle was the one to offer his "Peace of the Brave" proposal, followed later by an offer of self-determination and, ultimately, an agreement giving independence to Algeria.

This is why we must concentrate on the substance of things. I am reminded of an editorial in AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, a reprint of an article that appeared in 1944 in AL-NAHAR by Father Jubran al-Tuwayni. In that article, Father Tuwayni discussed American presidential elections in terms identical to those used in the Middle East today.

We must be extremely careful in discussing the Palestinian problem and America's policy with respect to it. The same care must be used when discussing the positions of the Democratic and Republican parties with respect to Zionism and Israel. The Democratic Party has consistently given more aid to Israel and the Zionist movement than the Republican Party. The clout of the Zionist lobby is concentrated in the Democratic Party. The Republican Party has traditionally been the party of big business, big oil and the military-industrial complex. The party's commercial interests in the Middle East are of a different character. The battle between Carter and Reagan, between the Democrats and Republicans, should not concern us. We must concentrate on America's foreign policy and plan accordingly.

[Question] Some Palestinians view Begin as their friend, because his extreme hostility has served the Palestinian cause. Would you rather have Begin continue in office or do you prefer a return of the Labor Party?

[Answer] The martyr Kamal Nasir once said: "Israeli fanaticism is more helpful to our cause than Arab nationalism." Begin, with his legendary inflexibility, leaves no room for maneuver to anyone else. His "generosity" to Egypt meant demilitarization of the bulk of the Sinai desert. According to the Israeli-Egyptian agreement, Egyptian military units must remain 250 kilometers away from Egypt's international border. On the other hand, Israeli forces are within 3 kilometers of the border. Israel, at a moment's notice, can mount a lightning raid and reoccupy Sinai for a fourth time.

Begin's "generosity" with Egypt reached its highest level in connection with the autonomy proposal, the scheme to give Palestinians administrative authority over their affairs. The Labor Party, in my opinion, is not less dangerous than Begin. While the Likud Party appears more ominous in tactics, the Labor Party strategy threatens to liquidate the Palestinian problem by converting it into an inter-Arab dispute, a question of boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors, Jordan in particular. The Labor Party is prepared to propose a regional solution at the end of the 5-year transition period stipulated in the autonomy proposal.

Begin is an undisguised enemy in an undisguised fashion. He leaves no room for maneuver. Things will be more complicated and difficult when the Labor Party returns to power. We should never forget that the Palestinian tragedy and all the subsequent tragedies visited upon the Arab world took place under the Labor Party. This party is responsible for four Zionist invasions. It is responsible for Zionist immigration, for the creation of the enemy state, and for four wars. The Labor Party is the one which annexed Jerusalem 2 weeks after the city was captured; it is the one which built a series of settlements extending from Sinai to the Gaza Strip, from the West Bank to the Golan Heights.

[Question] We have learned that you have met with President Ceausescue of Romania. Do you think Romania will play a special role in Middle East affairs in the future?

[Answer] We do not believe that Romania and a number of other small countries could have a direct, serious and effective role in Middle East problems, despite the fact that each of them has an opinion on our situation. But we cannot ignore the fact that the Romanian leadership is privy to a great deal of information and knows about the plans and tactics of many countries, a fact that is useful to us in our discussions regarding the Middle East and other international hot spots.

We have had frequent and long discussions with President Ceausescu in which both sides expressed their views candidly. Our views were different on Egypt, al-Sadat's policy, the Camp David [accords], and the current situation in the Middle East. President Ceausescu, for example, favors the convening of an expanded international conference to deal with the Middle East without the prior condition of declaring the Camp David accords null and void. We do not agree on this point, and insist that the Camp David accords, the Egyptian-Israeli treaty, and the autonomy proposal should first be voided. Only then could such a conference search freely for a political solution to the Middle East problem.

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FRENCH SAY MIDEAST SECURITY DEPENDS ON REGIONAL NUCLEAR BALANCE

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[Article by Hasan Hamadah: "Giscard Changes Direction of European Initiative, But Refuses To Give It Up; Middle East Security Depends on Regional Nuclear Balance; Story of Secret Contacts Which Put Off Abu 'Ammar's Visit to France"]

[Text] When a senior Arab official visited Paris this year, he urged the French government to take its time before submitting a draft resolution on the Middle East, opposing the Camp David accords, to the Security Council.

The French were surprised by this approach by a prominent Arab official representing a nation opposed to any separate peace with Israel which does not include the PLO.

French amazement was increased by the fact that the Arab official was expressing a point of view similar to that of the Soviet Union.

In subsequent discussions it appeared to the French that the Arab official, a man totally opposed to the principle of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations and their resultant damage to the Palestinian cause, was trying to avoid the minefields planted by the Americans and the Soviets around their respective positions. The French and the official reached mutual understanding of each other's position, in spite of the official's apprehensions regarding the opposition the French initiative will run into, and the French disregard for this opposition.

However, the French subsequently changed the direction of their initiative, without giving it up. Thus, they concurred with the official, although they had not disagreed with him on substance. French diplomacy then directed all its efforts to achieve a united European position on the basis of which the European Community would submit a resolution to the Security Council. Thus, the idea of the European initiative was born.

While the Americans openly expressed their opposition to the European initiative, the Soviets were not sympathetic either, although it would return them to negotiations they had been driven out of by the Americans. The reason is Soviet conviction that American fumbling of their policy would be beneficial to the Soviets, while the emergence of the European bloc as a new principal party in the Middle East would be harmful to them. The Soviet Union does not want anyone but itself to replace the United States in Middle East negotiations. But why should it openly oppose the European initiative so long as the Americans will prevent its emergence? And if the Americans should fail to stop the European initiative, the Soviet Union could always use its right to veto any resolution submitted to the Security Council as a result of the European initiative.

Also, how could it benefit the Russians to contribute to the electoral defeat of President Carter so long as his Republican opponent is an unknown quantity and is inexperienced? The Soviet Union inevitably influences the American presidential election through the positions it takes, and the Camp David agreements represent the big horse the American president is betting on in his reelection campaign.

The French had all these considerations in mind as they concentrated their efforts on removing the American stumbling blocks in the way of their (European) initiative. They failed, slowed down their effort, and convinced their partners to issue a communique at the end of the 12-13 June European summit in Venice, in which the members of the European community declared their support. However, at the second Venice meeting, which included the heads of government of the Western industrial nations, nothing concerning the Middle East was announced.

Nevertheless, the French initiative reappeared with new impetus, clarity, and "radicalism" at a press conference held by President Valery Giscard d'Estaing a few days ago. Giscard's comments on the Middle East included three new points and put emphasis on a fourth, and all were set forth with clarity unprecedented in French foreign policy.

The first new point is that the security of Israel and her neighbors is tied to the types of modern (nuclear) weapons that the area may acquire and does not depend on occupation of land and strategic positions. In the course of his talk about Israel's security needs, president d'Estaing said, "I wish to warn that the real threat to Israel's future security will not come from 'specific' borders or from across a specific river, but from the introduction of new weapons into the area that have greater capability and range than weapons currently available. In the past, I had an opportunity to take steps to prevent the introduction of such a new type of weapon, knowing that negotiations on contracts introducing such a weapon were under way." President d'Estaing continued: "Therefore, international guarantees would be appropriate and would be available."

High level sources in the French foreign ministry explained this passage of d'Estaing's news conference as meaning that France views the existence of nuclear reactors in Israel, and the nuclear weapons which could be developed in the Jewish state, as adequate security guarantees negating any need to occupy and hold Arab lands for their strategic position. This concerns Israel. Concerning Israel's neighbors, the French president's words clearly indicate that their possession of atomic weapons would constitute a greater threat to Israel than any return of lands or "strategic" positions to their Arab owners.

The high level source in the French foreign ministry emphasized that President d'Estaing used the phrase "in the past" in the course of his reference to his opposition to the introduction of new kinds of weapons into the Middle East. The use of this phrase has two meanings. The first is that "in the past" does not apply to the present or future. The proof of this is that contracts previously signed with Iraq, for example, concerning nuclear reactors are still in effect, and are being carried out exactly as stipulated in the contracts. At the same time, France denied such reactors to Libya and Pakistan. The second meaning of this phrase is an assertion to Israel that its security is tied not only to the United States but also to international guarantees including France. President d'Estaing brought up this point after warning Israel about its recklessness and lack of respect for international guarantees. Mutual security in the Middle East will eventually rest upon a regional nuclear balance, which is contrary to the theory of "security through superiority," which Israel and the United States adhere to.

This new [French] theory is being aired for the first time and will constitute a new factor in the life of the Middle East in the future. It removes absolute control over the region from the hands of the United States and the Soviet Union, and turns France into one of the powers responsible for guaranteeing any future Arab-Israeli security agreement or peace. The Soviet Union would perhaps be more affected by this new factor than the United States. This is yet another reason for the Kremlin to oppose and view with great suspicion the French initiative aimed at resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The second new point made by President d'Estaing is that withdrawal from the lands occupied in 1967 is not a matter for negotiation between Arabs and Israelis [and must precede negotiations]. The American position is that there should be negotiations on the withdrawal and its extent, which means that withdrawal would come as a result of negotiations and not vice versa.

The third new point is France's adoption for the first time of the idea of establishing a completely independent Palestinian nation. D'Estaing used the phrase "the Palestinian people should organize themselves" following Israel's withdrawal from occupied lands, starting with the

West Bank and the Gaza strip. This new French position is based on the following scenario: Israel withdraws from the occupied lands, and the Palestinians organize their affairs and form a state. Therefore, the Palestinian issue is an Arab and not an Israeli issue, because the Palestinian nation will be established on "truly Arab" land. President d'Estaing considers that the right of the Palestinians to organize themselves must be absolute and "recognized without restrictions, except the recognized borders of neighboring countries," because they have "the right to self-determination as do all other peoples of the world."

The high level source in the French foreign ministry said in explaining President d'Estaing's statement, that the French government has definitively approved the principle of an independent Palestinian state, and that the president's remarks point in that direction.

It is worth mentioning that the French foreign minister, Jean Francois-Poncet, announced in Washington 2 days prior to the first Venice summit that an independent Palestinian state is one of the proposed solutions, but not the only one. Nevertheless, President d'Estaing tried to include a reference to this issue in the final "Venice declaration." Italy agreed, but Britain and West Germany objected. So, this effort failed. The Italians subsequently announced their "total agreement on all subjects with the American government." This was during President Carter's visit to Rome on 19 June, when he said: "The Camp David agreements are the only effective framework for solving the Middle East crisis." For this reason, France decided to clarify its position in a final and definitive manner.

The fourth point is that the French president did not use the phrase "the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" in referring to the PLO. The French foreign ministry source did not explain why. However, the emphasis on the Palestinian's right to complete self-determination and to establish an independent state; the statement that creation of a Palestinian state is an Arab and not an Israeli issue; and the fact that the PLO is a full member of the Arab League and is recognized in the Arab world as the sole representative of the Palestinians, make it logical that France would recognize the PLO as their sole representative.

The reasons for Abu 'Ammar's [Yasir 'Arafat] not going to Paris, in spite of rumors of a visit, continues to be a source of speculation. Is it France's nonrecognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people which has prevented a visit?

Definite facts which have not yet been published indicate that the French government contacted the PLO at the end of the summer of 1979 and extended an invitation for Abu 'Ammar to make an official visit. Abu 'Ammar sent a special representative to Paris to arrange for the trip, and a decision was made for the visit to take place on 4 November 1979. Several meetings followed at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs between three members

of the Palestinian Resistance and Mr (Robin), the director of political affairs at the foreign ministry. The French asked that a communique be issued at the end of the visit containing references to a number of issues. The Palestinian Resistance preferred not to get involved in these issues which had no relation to mutual recognition between the PLO and Israel. The Resistance then insisted on not issuing a communique following the visit, so that neither side would embarrass the other.

The negotiations stumbled, and the French government sent (Robin) to meet with Abu 'Ammar secretly in Beirut with the intention of solving the problem regarding this communique. Robin met with the Palestinian leader at the Resistance headquarters and discussed the matter with him, but returned to Paris without reaching any conclusions. The Resistance took the position that the proposed communique contained points they would prefer to omit. When the French insisted on their position, the PLO leadership proposed a substitute communique containing excessively revolutionary passages. The French then refused to accept these passages, describing them as obstructive. Thereupon, the Resistance asked that the visit be postponed indefinitely without such postponement affecting PLO-French good relations. The French consented, and the two sides parted on friendly terms and agreed to maintain contacts.

Following this, Jacques Chirac, former prime minister and leader of the Gaullist party, suggested to the Resistance the idea that the Paris mayoral council extend an invitation to Abu 'Ammar. The latter declined saying that his first visit to France should be at the invitation of the French government, during which he would meet with President d'Estaing at the Elysees Palace. He likewise declined when the leader of the French Communist party, Georges Marchais, extended a similar invitation.

The Resistance justified its rejection of these invitations because of what happened in the summer of 1979 with regard to the meeting of Abu 'Ammar and the Austrian Chancellor, Dr Bruno Kreisky. At that time Abu 'Ammar was on an official visit to Czechoslovakia, and the Austrians contacted him and told him of Kreisky's desire for a meeting. The Vienna government had previously expressed a desire to meet with Abu 'Ammar, and decided to take advantage of his presence in Prague to arrange a meeting with him there, so as to avoid arousing public feelings by inviting him to Vienna. However, Abu 'Ammar responded that he would only meet Kreisky in Vienna or at the Sabra camp in Beirut. Negotiations continued, and it was decided to officially invite Abu 'Ammar to Austria. Thus took place the Vienna visit, and the meeting with Kreisky and former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt.

All this indicates that something affecting the Middle East is developing in Paris on the basis of supporting the Palestinian position and Arab demands and pursuing a surprise initiative with regard to the

Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, it is not surprising to hear d'Estaing say at his press conference: "I could say more about the [new] proposals, but I leave that to our diplomats."

What are the exciting proposals that the French president has yet to announce?

Would there be anything more exciting than peace through regional nuclear balance?

9669
CSO: 4802

GUERRILLAS PUSH WAR AGAINST RUSSIANS

Reporters View Battle

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 18 Aug 80 pp 46-49

[Eyewitness reports on the war in Afghanistan and four interviews by Herve Valette and Lucien Zanella: "The Broken Army"]

> [Text] Moscow's tanks do not dare to venture into the mountains. On the plains, Islamic guerilla warfare gives the Soviets no truce. Here are witness reports, collected at various points at the front, of the bloody struggle between the turbaned Muslims and Brezhnev's cohorts.

Every now and then threads rip in the tight net that shrouds the war in Afghanistan, barred to witnesses, and some word on what is happening there leaks out. But the obstacles against obtaining information are innumerable. To gather the facts in Afghanistan is not easy--from the Soviets and the government virtually impossible. But recently, two Swiss journalists, Herve Valette and Lucien Zanella, of the NOUVELLISTE ET FEUILLE D'AVIS DU VALAIS, a Sion daily, brought an arduous exploit to a successful conclusion. With a few tricks and some personal risk, the two went into Afghanistan twice, the first time to join the guerrillas, the second, a few days later, to meet with Afghan communists. Here, published exclusively in Italy, is their account.

"Do you want to watch a fight between the guerrillas and the Soviets? It's not hard." So we were assured by Ahmad Sayed Gaelan, chief of the biggest formation (he says) of Mujahedeen, the Islamic National Front, numbering 90,000 armed men deployed mainly in Kabul, Wardak, Kandahar, Moquor and Herat. "I warn you, however," he added, "that you must do a lot of walking." Gaelan's house stands on Warsak Road in Peshawar, Pakistan, just beyond the Afghan frontier. Like the houses occupied by the chiefs of the other five or six guerrilla movements, who maintain their headquarters in this extraordinary capital of the resistance, his home is surrounded by a walled enclosure and guarded by armed men.

We are entrusted to the man responsible for the Front's military operations, Hassan Sayed Gaelan, nephew of the chief (in the other guerrilla groups, too, the military command seems to be largely a family monopoly), who briefs us. It will be a 4-day journey, the first day by car, the other three on foot, at 109° F [43° C] in the shade and with forced marches of 8 hours each across rocky mountains. We are given a "paklum," the national Afghan dress, a brown tunic and very wide trousers. We must always wear the turban, which descends into a shawl to cover the face. We will be accompanied by 10 armed men, who have been ordered to participate in no battles but only ensure our safety. And we must do everything possible to pass ourselves off as one of them.

For one day we travel jammed together aboard a small Toyota truck to the village of Myramshah, the last before the frontier, and spend the night in the home of a family of Mujahedeen. The next morning we cross the frontier (nothing more than a chain across the road) on foot, almost without realizing it. No one inspects our documents, we do not even have to lift our shawls; we only get an indifferent glance from the two guards, likewise in paklum, who ask no questions about our submachine guns, highly efficient Soviet Kalashnikovs, and ancient British Enfields.

On the Afghan side, there is no border control. It will take a 2 day hike to arrive at our [first] destination, the base camp at Taddi; from there, another day to reach the Khwost plain, where we have been promised a battle. The plain is an immense shell over 100 kilometers in circumference, surrounded on all sides by rock-strewn mountains, 5,000-6,500 feet [1,500-2,000 meters] high. In the middle of the plain stands Lalegai Base, one of the Soviets' biggest in Afghanistan. At least 20,000 Soviet and Afghan troops occupy the base, the surrounding villages and the nearby town of Zadran.

They are isolated on their plain, although not actually besieged. All means of overland communications are controlled by the Mujahedeen, nevertheless the Soviets and Afghans, undisturbed, receive their supplies from the sky via an airport where their Antonov planes and helicopters land. The law of this guerrilla warfare provides that the Soviets control the plains and air routes, the Mujahedeen the mountains and practically all roads. One side cannot appropriate the other's territory because the Russian tanks cannot drive up the mountains nor can their cannon flush out the rebels hiding among the rocks, while the Mujahedeen lack the strength to take the plain and have no ammunition to knock out the tanks or bring down the armored Mi24 helicopter "flying wagons."

"We're prepared to fight for years until we decided to leave," explains our guide, Mirwais, a 25-year-old engineer and Kabul graduate, who speaks a little English he learned from books. "The Russians can never catch up with us. Outside their tanks, they're no good on this terrain. But we can march for 3 days and nights without food or drink."

At sundown of our second day's trek, we arrive at the base camp. We detect nothing until the very last moment. From a distance the camp looks like any clump of trees. Instead, under the trees and bushes we find a swarm of at least 200 men, with a few tents and mattresses set up under the branches, now and then a bonfire. Here supplies arrive from Myramshah--mainly fresh foods because the mountains have nothing to offer--shared by some 20 small camps situated within a range of a few hundred yards to several kilometers.

We are received in the tent of the chief, Maharam, who offers us refreshments--water, tea brewed from local herbs and a drink made of curdled milk, called lassi. "It'll be tomorrow afternoon at 5," Maharam informs us, explaining his overall plan of action. The guerrillas will try to approach Lalegai Base as close as possible to cut the only conduit that furnishes the Soviet and Afghan troops with water, tapped from several sources on the mountain. Should their exploit succeed, it will be a serious blow to the invaders. But the Mujahedeen have no doubts about the outcome of the battle.

The next day, another 8 hours' hike to cross the mountain ridge and descend on the other side. There below is Lalegai Base, about 2 kilometers away as the crow flies. We count 100 tanks and about 30 helicopters. From above, we watch the movements of men and motor vehicles.

The battle begins punctually at 5. We see about 30 Mujahedeen swoop down the mountainside, firing their light arms. They have neither artillery nor missiles. We are told that other units are also descending from various points. The entire valley comes alive with resounding shots and cries. The base replies with cannon, rockets and heavy machine guns. Puffs of smoke burst over the mountain slopes--random shots fired against an enemy who keeps invisible beyond a very short distance.

We observe some tanks attempting to climb up toward us. They can only advance along the dry beds of a few streams up to a certain point. This is a mortal trap. Sooner or later some tank will be stuck between rocks, unable to move forward or backwards. Thus it becomes an easy prey of the Mujahedeen, who assault it with handmade bombs or Molotov cocktails, the only antitank ammunition they possess, some losing their lives inthe fray. This is how a T-54 and an armored troop transport, both of the Afghan regulars, end up. Three guerrillas sacrifice their lives for those two quarries, while the dead on the other side number 10. The next day we return to view the corpses and the tanks, still smoking.

The battle continues until far into the night, during which three helicopters spray the mountain with machine gun fire and drop bombs. The guerrillas have nothing to repel these airborne monsters. Their shots and machine gun fire rebound off the thickly armor-plated fuselages. "If we only had some rockets!" Mirawais sighs, pointing at a helicopter flying undisturbed a few hundred feet overhead.

In the small hours of the night we return to the base camp as the firing dies away. Later three radiant Mujahedeen arrive at Maharam's tent, carrying a pipe about 20 inches long: a segment of the water conduit they've blown up. This bit of pipe has cost the lives of 5 Mujahedeen (and 10 of the enemy), all the same it signals a victory for the guerrillas. Under tomorrow's implacable sun, the lack of water will compound the invaders' woes.

Afghan Soldier Defects

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 18 Aug 80 pp 48, 49

[Text] The phenomenon that worries the Soviet military strategists more than any other is the fact that over a period of 8 months, the regular Afghan army has been decimated by desertions. The revolt of the 14th Afghan Motorized Division stationed at Gazni and only recently subdued by the Soviets with heavy losses on both sides, is only the latest in a long series of similar episodes. By Western calculations, of the 80,000 effectives in service at the time of the invasion, perhaps 50,000 have deserted. Eventually the Soviets could find themselves confronting the Islamic rebels alone, without even the pro forma support of a local army.

The following is the account of a deserter, Mohammed Zahed, a 35-year-old artillery captain.

Question: Who is now commanding the Afghan Government army?

Answer: General Mohammed Raffi. I know him well because we're the same age and he's been my companion-in-arms for many years. He commanded the army's armored troops and he's a first-rate specialist in tanks. He comes from Parman, 25 kilometers from Kabul. When Mohammed Daud pulled off his coup d'etat against King Zahir Shah in 1974, Raffi, then commanding an armored battalion, helped him considerably.

Question: Why did you decide to desert?

Answer: Because both the factions of the Khalq ("people") Communist Party, the first to hold power, and the Parcham ("banner"), now in power, have no other objective than to sell the country to the Russians.

Question: How and when did you desert?

Answer: On 8 May at 1600 hours I received an order from my superiors to wipe out the Mujahedeen infesting the area south of Kabul. The fighting had already begun, so I had to make a quick decision. As commander of the artillery, I knew I'd have to make carnage of my Islam brothers. So with the help of four officer friends, I killed all our superior officers, and then we raised the Afghan national flag over the camp and gave ourselves up to the Mujahedeen, with all our arms.

Question: Yet, before deserting, you led actions against the partisans.

Answer: Yes, but in a somewhat special way. Through clandestine connections I had established with the guerrillas, I warned them in advance of every attack. When we had to fire on them, I gave the order to aim our cannon above their positions so that no one would be hit. By fraudulent means, I even arranged for parachute drops of weapons and supplies to the guerrillas.

Question: Do you mean that the Afghan regulars only pretend to fight the guerrillas?

Answer: Many of them are behaving as I did. We still maintain excellent communications with the men who haven't yet been able to desert and join the Mujahedeen.

Question: What are the Soviets doing to prevent the desertions?

Answer: They're afraid of a general revolt, so they've scattered the Afghan regulars around the whole territory to isolate them from the population. At night they lock them up in their barracks. They shoot many of those who refuse to obey their orders or try to escape.

Question: How do they go about calling up new recruits?

Answer: Often by force or on pain of death. They compel boys of 15 to fight for them.

Interview with Former Ambassador

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 18 Aug 80 p 49

[Interview with Touryalli Osman, former ambassador to Italy]

[Text] For 3 years during Daud's regime, Touryalli Osman served as Afghan ambassador in Rome. Now he has been in Peshawar for several days, having been obliged to flee Kabul precipitously to save himself and his family from arrest. Osman, in fact, had organized a resistance group in the capital. His story is the first detailed report on the activities of the clandestine movement in Kabul.

Question: What was your group doing? Who formed it?

Answer: It was a group of about 30 intellectuals, all long-time friends (you can't risk including informers; it's too dangerous). In all, the resistance movements, mostly of limited dimensions, number about 20. Our aim was to write and distribute typewritten manifestoes in preparation for the people's uprising.

Question: What was the content of your messages?

Answer: For a long time we urged the people to keep calm, to avoid rushing into isolated, hopeless acts. We said that the revolt was being organized in two separate phases: first the preparation, second the action. Now the first phase is concluded and the second is just beginning.

Question: How did you distribute your manifestoes?

Answer: That was a very tough job. Paper is scarce, and to find an old typewriter, we had to deal with eight different persons and wait over a month. The manifestoes were then distributed, mostly by students.

Question: To whom?

Answer: To the few remaining intellectuals, but also to the common people and even to Soviet occupation troops. I'm sure it was this intense clandestine propaganda that incited a whole garrison of 240 Soviet soldiers from Tajikistan to mutiny.

Question: What happened to them?

Answer: As far as I know, they were all shot. Another 16 Soviet soldiers of Muslim origin deserted to fight with the Mujahedeen. First we got men from the areas bordering on Afghanistan, men who spoke our language and looked like us. Now they're all Ukranians, tall, blond, and blue-eyed.

Karmal Brainwashed

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 18 Aug 80 pp 50, 51

[Interview with Aziz Afghan, member of royal family, exiled in Europe many years]

[Text] Member of the royal family, physician, exiled in Europe for many years, Aziz Afghan is one of the few outstanding intellectuals of the Afghan resistance movement. In this interview he tells about the rapport between the Babrak Karmal, president of the Afghan Republic, and the Soviets.

Question: Who is the real head of Afghanistan today?

Answer: It's number four of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul, Vassili Safrantchuk. Today only Soviets are heads of the administration and the party.

Question: People say that with their invasion, the Soviets have succeeded where all Afghan governments failed: in uniting the different ethnic groups in the country. Is that true?

Answer: Afghanistan is populated by a multitude of different peoples. With their invasion of our country, the Soviets have indeed incited the various clans to unite.

Question: Yet the resistance movement is still split into six groups.

Answer: Recently five of them banded together around a united resistance committee. Only Gulbuddin Ekhmatiar, chief of the Afghan Islamic Party--the strongest--chose to stay out. The others--Mojaddedi's National Liberation Front, Gaelan's Islamic Revolutionary Front, the Islamic Revolution of Mohamadi, Rabani's Islamic Group, and Golkan's tribe--are now beginning to cooperate. In any event, these chiefs and clans existed before the communists came. It isn't altogether true to say that there's hostility among them; they've divided up different regions geographically and ethnically.

Question: What nations are actively supporting the Afghan resistance?

Answer: Pakistan, Iran, the other Muslim countries or the Western nations do not want to get involved in the war. They're all afraid of the Russians. Only from Egypt and Iraq do we get anything at all, but very little.

Question: How do you explain the incredible courgage of the guerrillas, who hurl themselves against Soviet tanks with only their bare hands or homemade bombs, knowing they'll be killed?

Answer: Faith in God. For us Muslims, to kill a Soviet--an atheist--is to earn a place in paradise. To be killed by a Soviet is to become a martyr, therefore also to earn a place in paradise. The Afghans identify paradise with their own country, their own people. This is the real secret of the Mujahedeens' heroism.

Question: Who is Babrak Karmal actually?

Answer: My family knows him well. Under the reign of Zahir Shah, Karmal was a deputy in the National Assembly in Kabul. He opposed the monarchy and espoused very nationalistic ideas. Karmal was then an excellent politician, gifted with an exceptional talent for public speaking. Knowing Babrak Karmal, we cannot accept the falsehood that he is willingly betraying his country or that he is doing it in full command of his mental faculties.

Question: Are you implying that the president's mental condition is not normal?

Answer: We have followed Karmal's speeches on television. His face is no longer the same, his speech is broken, hesitant, poorly articulated; his eyes are empty, he's shaken by strange tics. Therefore I think I can say with assurance that the Soviets have brainwashed him. He's under the influence of some drug. Certainly he's living in a sort of ivory tower,

converted into a prison. He doesn't know that his people are being exterminated by his own regime. He doesn't know that the Soviets are massacring students in Kabul and burning villages with napalm. Karmal is being kept in total isolation. What's more, he has attempted suicide--not only once, as they've been saying, but three times.

Jalalabad Communist Leader's Views

Milan PANORAMA in Italian 18 Aug 80 pp 49-51

> [Text] The war will end with a triumph for the communists. That is the belief of Nassir Charki, leader of the Jalalabad Communist Party. "It will be a political, not a military, victory. Our people are in agreement with the Soviets."

It is night at the Spinghar (White Mountains) Hotel in Jalalabad. Officially we are two students of archaeology (Western journalists don't get visas), and we can remain in Afghanistan for 4 days. A man about 40 years old approaches us. "Foreigners?" he asks in French. "Yes," we reply. "Communists?" he wants to know. "Yes, we're Swiss communists." A shadow of mistrust disappears from our interlocutor's face and gives way to a broad grin.

Thus began our friendship with Nassir Charki, secretary of the Afghan Communist Party for Jalalabad Province and the highest political authority in the district. We told him we were reporters for communist publications. That was the opening he was waiting for to expound his authentic view of the Afghan war.

"The Soviets came to our assistance because the Western imperialistic powers were laying hands on Afghanistan," he explained. This is the official pretext frequently repeated by communist sources. But Nassir Charki's authentic view became more interesting and original as, little by little, he got down to particulars. "The Soviet contingent consists of no more than 10,000-12,000 men," he informed us. That's one-tenth the number known in the West. "And they'll pull out when all our problems are solved." Jalalabad's party chief predicted that the Soviets will take their leave sooner than anyone expects--"The end of this year or in the first months of next year," he swore. That is, within 6 or 7 months at the most, the war will be over, ending in a communist victory, of course. It won't be a military victory but a political one."

A wierd type, this Nassir Charki. Convinced that practically the whole population is on his side, nevertheless he travels around with an escort of seven bodyguards armed with Kalashnikovs, and he is armed himself. He said he'd been a Communist for 14 years, but confessed that he hadn't yet arrived at a satisfactory level of ideological preparation. For example, he didn't yet understand all the implications of historical materialism.

For now, his convictions are few but ironclad. Babrak Karmal is a genius. And if he allows himself to be photographed occasionally with some mullah, he only does it to give a little weight to that sector of the population which is still ignorant and religious. "Here, too, to abolish religion it will take at least 20 or 30 years," he says. In his view, there is no doubt: it's religion that keeps the people backward. "What's all this foolishness about Ramadan? What sense does it make to fast from morning to night for 1 month? It debilitates the body and the mind, it drains the will to work, certainly it doesn't help a people to develop." In that month of Ramadan, he ate and drank without a trace of guilt.

Tomorrow this Parcham boss of Jalalabad will have an official car waiting for us in front of the hotel, a white Volga. Two soldier escorts will show us the town, and we'll see that all is calm. The bazaar is open and teeming with people, as usual. We see Soviet soldiers buying wares. Soviet and Afghan tanks circulate through the streets, and every 5 minutes a patrol of three helicopters streak across the sky. At strategic points, voices blare out political slogans over loudspeakers. This must be normal in Jalalabad since no one seems to pay any attention to the tanks, the helicopters or the slogans.

Four kilometers away is the city's air base, one of the most important in the country. From afar we behold some 60 helicopters and 20 Antonov transport planes. Seemingly unperturbed, Nassir Charki wants to know something about communism in the outside world. He's heard about Georges Marchais, PCF secretary, but he doesn't even know the name of Enrico Berlinguer. "Is he a friend of the Russians or the Chinese?" he asks somewhat anxiously, and to quell his fears, we give him the answer he wants to hear.

"When it's all over I want to come to Europe to meet Berlinguer and Marchais in person," he says. "Certainly they, too, are honorable men, beloved by their people, like our Karmal."

9653
CSO: 4404/26

AIRLINE EMPLOYEES ARRESTED IN PLOT AGAINST KARMAL

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 31 Jul 80 pp 1,6

[Article: "Employees of Ariana Airlines Arrested for Plot Against Karmal; Plan to Destroy Plane Taking Babrak to Moscow Masterminded by Gulabzoi, Minister of Interior; Mujahidin Free Nandraj and Ali Nagar Districts of Laghman Province"]

[Text] Kabul, 30 July (APP/PPI)--The Mujahidin have badly defeated the Russian army in various places in Afghanistan. Many Russians were killed in a day-long battle in (Arshak) District of Takhar province. Seven tanks were also destroyed. The Mujahidin attacked a Russian company in (Shajo) district Zabol [province] and, in an all-day battle, killed many Russian soldiers and destroyed seven trucks and a jeep carrying wireless equipment. They also burned 24,500 kg of wheat.

The Mujahidin attacked a Russian company which was leaving (Maroof) in Kandahar province for the state's capital and fought it for five days. One hundred Russian soldiers were killed and 15 tanks were destroyed in this battle. In two other battles fought in Kandahar province, 140 Russian soldiers and 17 Russian agents were killed, and three Russians were captured.

According to another report, the Mujahidin have liberated (Ali Nagar) and (Nandraj) districts of Laghman province. The Mujahidin killed 60 Russians and wounded another 60 in that battle. One armored truck and two regular army trucks were also destroyed. This is the first time that a Bulgarian commander is reported to have taken part in a battle in Lugman province.

According to another report the Mujahidin killed 18 communists in (Mausi) Khel in Paktia. In a fierce battle in Kandahar, 300 Russian soldiers were killed and the Mujahidin seized a large amount of ammunition.

The 12 employees of Ariana Airlines convicted of mutiny were connected with the Khalq Party. They were accused of kidnapping the president of Ariana Airlines who is a staunch supporter of Babrak Karmal. According to some sources, the minister of interior, Sayed Gulabzoi, had masterminded

this plot to overthrow the Karmal government. The plan was to destroy the plane carrying Babrak Karmal to Moscow. Two of the 12 employees were first sentenced to death, but this sentence was later changed to life imprisonment. The remaining ten were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment.

According to some experts, Russia needs 250,000 more soldiers if it is to control Afghanistan. At present, it has a total of 120,000 soldiers, an increase of 30,000. In the cantonments of (Khairkhana) and (Bala Hissar), there is increased military activity due to the increase in the number of soldiers. Last month, a squadron of Mig-21 fighter planes and two squadrons of helicopters were seen here. Now, there are two squadrons of Mig planes and the airport is crowded with helicopters.

The Russians and the Mujahidin are both strengthening their positions in Kabul.

7997
CSO: 4203

BRIEFS

ISLAMIC COUNCIL FORMED--Kabul, 29 July (PPI)--The common people of Afghanistan have set up a 68-member Islamic council. Hasan Gaylani, a graduate of Kabul University and commander of the Mujahidin in (Paktia?), has been appointed president of this council. Mr Hasan Gaylani said that the purpose of this non-political body is to find ways to make the Jihad more effective and foster unity among Afghans. Babrak Zai, formerly a high court judge in Afghanistan, has been elected vice-president. Mohammad Hakim will be secretary and spokesman. Mr Gaylani has appealed to everyone who loves Afghanistan to help the council. He said that the Afghan people are fighting for their lives. Unarmed people, innocent children, and women are falling prey to the Russian atrocities. He further said that this council will establish branches all over the country, and that a central government with a president, a prime minister and several ministers will be announced in the near future. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 30 Jul 80 pp 1,6] 7997

MUJAHIDIN DESTROY RUSSIAN EMBASSY--Kabul 31 July--The Afghan Mujahidin have destroyed the Russian embassy in Kabul. According to the ASSOCIATED PRESS, tourists arriving in New Delhi report that this was the fourth attack on the Soviet embassy since the Russian invasion. The embassy has been heavily guarded since this attack. The Kabul airport is bristling with MIG and helicopter activity. Russian planes land and take off every minute. Some planes and helicopters were seen flying toward Ghazni. According to one report, large convoys of Russian army vehicles are passing through Kabul at night. The two factions of the ruling party are still fighting among themselves, while the whole of Afghanistan is facing a serious food shortage. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 1 Aug 80 p 3] 7997

CSO: 4203

IRAQ DENOUNCED FOR HARBORING ANTI-KHOMEYNI RADIO STATIONS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 31 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] A recent article in the Financial TIMES dealt with the Persian-Language broadcasts that are now being beamed daily into Iran from abroad. In addition to the old established American, British and Russian radio stations there are now others, based most probably in Basrah in Iraq and in Cairo, which pour daily abuse on the Islamic Republic of Iran and do their utmost to spread discontent, stir up opposition to the new regime and encourage dissidents.

Of these stations, the most prominent are "Radio Iran", which disseminates the messages and propaganda of Shapour Bakhtiar, and the "Free Voice of Iran" which acts for Gholam Ali Oveisi, the notorious brutal general of the former shah. Both of these stations are situated in Iraq, and the expenses for their operations are commonly assumed to be paid for out of the budget of the CIA.

The existence of these stations is a natural outcome of the deeprooted oppositions of the present Iraqi regime towards its Islamic Republican neighbor.

An interesting talk on "the background to the Iraq-Iran crisis" by Muhammad Iqbal a member of the Moslem Institute in London throws new light on the reasons for this implacable hostility. Iqbal traces the rise of the Middle Eastern states that emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, the virtual take-over of Iraq by Britain under its mandate from the League of Nations, and the rise of the Ba'th Socialist Party. Iqbal then describes how emerging Arab nationalism in Iraq looked first to Communism for ideas and support, and how the Ba'athist regime turned back again to the capitalist West when clerical opposition to Communism made it realize that the main obstacle not only to the drift towards the left but to Iraqi Arab nationalism itself was the Moslem clergy and people.

In Iran, the Pahlavi dictatorship has propagated Iranian nationalism and racism, to the detriment of Islam, and though the opposing nationalisms of

the two neighboring countries inevitably led to conflict, it was eventually realized by both sides that the real enemy of the two regimes was Islam. As soon as it was seen that they had too much in common to waste their energies in pointless hostilities, their long-standing feud was swiftly patched up.

But now that the Islamic Republic has been established, and has vowed to export its ideology, the Ba'thist regime once again sees Iran as the major threat to its existence. The Republic's success represents a constant encouragement to its own Moslems, particularly the Shi'ite population, and a grave threat to its own power. Hence the new collaborations of the Ba'thists with the formerly despised capitalists in fomenting a counter-revolution in Iran; hence the murder of the Iraqi Shi'ite Leader Muhammad Baqer al-Sadr, the expulsion of tens of thousands of Moslems to Iran, and the constant stream of subversive propaganda, directed at the Islamic Republic.

CSO: 4920

CONCEPTS FOR KHOMEYNI SOCIAL POLICY OUTLINED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 1 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] The current issue of the weekly magazine SOROUSH contains a commentary under the title of 'Social Stratification and its Effect on the Government.' Referring to social stratification in Iranian society and the moral, social and ideological characteristics of the different strata, the article says, "Generally speaking, Iranian society consists of two different strata the first, including the majority of society, is desirous of independence, freedom and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It comprises all classes, including workers, farmers, students, intellectuals, bazaar merchants, guild men, the clergy, teachers, etc.

This group is quite prepared to tolerate poverty, shortages, economic and political pressure, even famine. They have risen up for Islam, not for materialism, and are ready to struggle against the pressures imposed by foreign powers, wielding the weapon of faith in Islam. For those who follow the line of Imam Khomeini, the honesty of the imam is an unquestionable principle.

The second including stratum comprises the small minority that is after economic prosperity. From the very beginning of the victory of the revolution, this group has endeavored to achieve this aim. Being unable to bear a prolonged struggle, they are ready to remain economically dependent so as to ensure their economic welfare. They never think of the day when the gap between the developed countries and an independent Iran will be filled and political and economic relations are balanced and just. This class acknowledges the backwardness of Iran and thinks that the only way to escape it is to resort to Western styles.

However, the arming of the revolutionary system against the old regime's institutions will further help the establishment of the Islamic Republic. The members of a responsible government should obviously be selected from among the first stratum, that is, from those who are faithful to the "ideal of" independence, freedom, and an Islamic Republic! The wrong policies of the provisional government (of Mehdi Bazargan) stemmed from the fact that

some of its members thought first of economic prosperity. Any coalition of people from these two strata would be an obstacle to the progress and the export of the revolution. Therefore, the new cabinet should consist of united, sympathetic ministers.

The article then refers to the more sensitive and influential posts of the government and analytically describes their main duties and responsibilities as follows:

1) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The foreign policy of Iran should be based on the spirit of the Islamic Revolution and the guidelines of the imam. The imam has emphatically repeated that "we will export our revolution to the world," that we should support world liberation movements and all the oppressed peoples. The main duty of the Foreign Ministry is to introduce the Islamic Revolution of Iran to the world.

Iranian embassies abroad should become centers for the propagation of Islamic culture and the Islamic perception of reality. Psychological war is one of the most destructive weapons of the enemy, who is therefore energetically seeking to impose this war by forming and coordinating a front including SAVAK agents, fugitive army officers, counter-revolutionaries, proponents of economic prosperity, and disatisfied groups and organizations.

2) The Ministry of National Guidance. This ministry has the duty of resisting the propaganda of the enemy inside the country. Preparing the people to encounter a prolonged fight is another duty of the ministry. The psychological war imposed by the enemy with the help of SAVAK mercenaries and pro-essional anti-revolutionaries inside the country, can be easily nullified by the efforts of the National Guidance Ministry and the mass media.

3) The Ministry of the Interior: This can be the main designer of the internal policy of the country. The future fate of the revolution depends on the judicious appointment of the Interior Minister, governors-general, governors and police heads all of whom have wide authority. Selecting these people from among the second stratum (the proponents of economic prosperity) will endanger the future of the revolution.

4) The Ministry of Culture and Higher Education: one of the duties of this ministry is to train individuals who can carry the Islamic Revolution forward to its final stage. The 'educational revolution' launched against the western educational and cultural system dominating our society will achieve its final results with the help of this ministry.

5) The Ministries of Agriculture, Industries and Mines and Labor. The stronger the officials of these ministries are in leadership, the closer will we be to the economic independence of Iran.

CSO: 4920

COUNTRY'S FOREIGN INVESTMENTS DIVERSIFIED

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 17 Sep 80

[Article by Ug: "Diversification of Kuwait's Investments--Insufficient Absorbing Capacity of Domestic Economy"]

[Text] Kuwait, September--By virtue of its extensive petroleum reserves, Kuwait is one of the wealthiest countries in the world--measured by per capita gross national product. Since only part of the vast flow of money coming in can be absorbed by the domestic market, the Kuwaiti government is investing heavily in the industrialized world, with its investments aimed at long-range security.

Return Flow of Money Into the Petroleum Sector

In 1979, the state of Kuwait took in approximately 4 billion dinars (about 25 billion Swiss francs) from its petroleum business. Given a 20-percent increase in production to 911 million barrels--to compensate for the sharp decline in Iranian production--this meant that revenues were nearly twice those of the preceding year. Even though exports have been cut back by 25 percent to 1.5 million barrels per day, there will probably be a marked rise in this year's proceeds as well, since on the one hand the new price increases will be having an impact and, on the other hand, Kuwait is meanwhile selling a large part of its production on the open market. One of the most important tasks facing the ruling amir, Sheikh Jabir al-Ahmad [al-Sabah], and his government is that of putting this income into domestic and foreign investments which will be as profitable and safe as possible. Unlike Bahrain or Oman, for example, Kuwait will have no particular concerns about shrinking crude oil reserves, at least for the present. Its more than 70 billion barrels--the second-largest stocks in the world--will make continuous production possible even beyond the next 100 years.

Investment in the petroleum sector is one of the strategies being employed to absorb domestically a portion of the petroleum revenues which, incidentally, still initially land in U.S. banks. At the beginning of this year, the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) was formed, bringing together the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), the Kuwait National Petroleum Company (KNPC), the

Petrochemicals Industries (PCI) and the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company (KOTC). The new corporation, whose original capital amounts to 1 billion dinars, will not only concern itself more with the sale of petroleum (purchasing contracts with BP, Shell and Gulf Oil expired at the end of March); it will also be investing heavily in the prospecting, transport and "downstream" sectors. The Kuwaiti tanker fleet, for instance, which already consists of 15 petroleum, liquid-gas and products tankers, is to be expanded to 27 vessels by the end of 1982. In addition, there are plans to increase by about 50 percent--to at least 750,000 barrels per day--the output of the refineries by 1982-83; then Kuwait would itself be processing half the oil it produces. More than the equivalent of 1.5 billion Swiss francs has been tied up in a single gas liquefaction plant that was opened in 1979 and can produce up to 560 million cubic feet per day. Plans have also been made to broaden the petrochemical industry's product mix.

Kuwait glories in its reputation as a classic welfare state. The improvement of social services is in fact one of the most important attempts to share portions of oil wealth with the people. Education and health care are free, while generous social legislation provides for old-age and disability pensions; even low-income segments of the population are assured their own land and adequate housing through an extensive housing construction and loan program. The sums spent by the Kuwaiti state on the social sector are apparent: For example, the 1980-1981 budget provides for a total of 150 million dinars for housing construction; 184 million dinars for the education sector, which continues to enjoy priority; and nearly 128 million dinars for health care. Yet, many of the social services cover only the approximately 560,000 Kuwaiti citizens, but not the majority of the population--namely, the circa 800,000 foreigners from 114 nations.

Development of the Infrastructure

Development of the infrastructure is another form of the domestic use of petroleum revenues. The electric power production capacity presently amounts to about 2,200 megawatts, but because of the rapid development of demand--electricity consumption is rising by an average of 15 percent per year--the construction of new electric power plants is an urgent necessity. Calculations based on the present growth rate show that in as few as 20 years, Kuwait's entire petroleum production will be needed to operate oil-fired power plants--a vision that gives little joy to Kuwaiti planners. There is also a growing demand for drinking water, increasing by about 20 percent a year. At the present time it is possible to remove the salt from around 270 million liters of sea water per day; the construction of new installations is planned. Plans also exist for expanding the harbor, the highway network and telecommunications facilities. The need to provide recreational facilities has also been recognized of late.

Curiously enough, Kuwait places little value on a streamlined long-range planning system. Neither the first five-year plan, from 1967-68 to 1971-72, nor the second, from 1976-77 to 1980-81, ever gained legal validity--to the

consternation of the planners--because the National Assembly either had been unable to arrive at any decisions or had been dissolved before it could do so; a third attempt is now under way. To be sure, there are quite specific conceptions for developing the city of Kuwait. It has been divided into zones of use, and it is with great pride that Kuwaiti officials speak of a recently completed model that shows a modern city of Kuwait in the year 2000, consisting of strips of open space, tall buildings and multi-lane expressways.

Unlike Qatar, for example, Kuwait is being very restrained in the matter of industrial expansion. Above all, there is no thought of establishing prestige projects which in all probability would produce no gains. Furthermore, those in positions of responsibility do not want to add to the influx of foreign labor, for it is virtually inconceivable that Kuwaitis--most of whom work as merchants, silent partners for foreign entrepreneurs or government employees--would hire themselves out to steel or aluminum plants. So Kuwait's interests lie more with the establishment of a small- and medium-scale private industry that takes care of everyday consumer needs. The Industrial Bank of Kuwait, founded in 1974, has already financed far in excess of 100 projects of this kind.

Marked Accumulation of Reserves

Despite every effort, however, the total income from the oil business cannot be spent at home. As a "low absorber," Kuwait has therefore been pursuing for some years a policy of foreign investments and accumulation of reserves oriented toward long-range security. Kuwait's declared reserves at the end of 1979 amounted to 12.8 billion dinars (more than 80 billion Swiss francs), nearly 40 percent more than for the preceding year. The current state budget for 1980-81 again provides for an abundant accumulation of reserves: 737 million dinars are to be channeled into the government's reserve fund and 928 million into the "Fund for Future Generations," established in November 1976. Most of the reserves have hitherto been invested in the United States, where Kuwait owns at least $1 million worth of stock in virtually all the leading corporations; Europe occupies second place on the list. At the end of 1979, 66 percent of Kuwaiti surpluses were located in these two regions; 28 percent were in Kuwait, 5 percent in other Arab countries and 1 percent in Japan.

Kuwaiti investment activity has undergone a change in recent months, however. An uneasiness over the freezing of Iranian assets in the United States is one of the major reasons why the Kuwaiti Finance Ministry, which is responsible for administering the government surpluses, has been pushing for greater regional diversification. Thus, the government has recently revealed a predilection for Japanese companies and now has a financial interest in Toshiba, Hitachi, the Mitsubishi Electric Company and the Mitsubishi Corporation. Japanese financial circles estimate that petroleum-exporting countries have invested around $1 billion in the Tokyo market--led by Kuwait.

The German market--in which the Kuwaiti government cooperates closely with the Deutsche Bank and the Dresdner Bank--seems to have maintained its drawing power. Kuwait has followed up its acquisition in December 1974 of 14 percent of the Daimler Benz Corporation's capital stock with a 33-percent financial interest in Korf-Stahl [Korf Steel] and a 10-percent interest in the Metallgesellschaft [Metal Company]. And it is now in on the VW corporation as well, since a short time ago it acquired from the Brazilian Monteiro Aranha holding company 10 percent of the stock of VW do Brasil for $115 million (VW still has 80 percent, while Monteiro Aranha has 10 percent). According to private estimates, Kuwait's investments in England amount to around 1 billion pounds. To be sure, the declared holdings of the Kuwait Investment Office, which functions as the government's agent, were significantly lower last spring, listed at approximately 225 million pounds. (In England, only those foreign partnerships which exceed 5 percent have to be made public.) Mainly insurance companies and financial enterprises appear to be in demand, but also hotels, industrial enterprises and firms with real estate holdings. Kuwait is content for the most part with participating shares of between 5 and 10 percent and with the role of a silent partner, although one exception is the total acquisition of Hay's Wharf, a holding company with significant real estate holdings on the banks of London's Thames [River].

Investments in Arab countries are apparently not in great demand at present. Finance Minister 'Abd al-Rahman Salim al-'Atiqi confirmed recently that although Kuwait had been the first country to invest heavily in the Arab world, it now preferred to go back to its Western markets because of the administrative hurdles that exist in the Arab countries. But a major portion of Kuwaiti development aid does go to its fraternal states. In 1978-79, it accounted for 61 percent of the nearly 100 million dinars in loans that were granted by the Kuwait Fund for Arabic Economic Development (KFAED), one of the most important channels through which development aid is provided. All told, Kuwait spends a substantial 5 percent of its gross national product on development aid, though part of it has to be regarded as bilateral support of countries and organizations that are especially prominent in the struggle against Israel.

Political Uncertainty

The government has been so careful in selecting its foreign investments--shareholdings, bonds, deposits and real estate--that its reinvestment of financial returns, which are estimated privately at about 1 billion dinars for 1979, is beginning to create problems. In any event, it appears that the amir is having success with his plan to provide sources of financing for the country which it can fall back on if its river of oil should dry up one day. Nevertheless, the confused domestic political conditions and the tense situation in the [Persian] Gulf region constitute a weighty factor of uncertainty. There has been no parliament since August 1976. The amir at that time, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad, had rescinded important articles of the constitution, dissolved the National Assembly and transferred all power to the

executive branch following lengthy confrontations between the government and parliament. These orders had been limited to 4 years, and last February a committee had been charged with revising the 1962 constitution. But several events affecting internal security then gave rise to doubts that the parliamentary system of government would actually be restored in the near future: the unsolved attempt on the life of the visiting Iranian foreign minister, Ghotbzadeh; acts of arson perpetrated against supply installations; bombings; and a mysterious skyjacking by two Palestinians carrying Jordanian passports. At the end of August, the amir put an end to the speculation for the time being by setting next February as the date for parliament to convene. To be sure, no one knows yet how parliament is to be constituted. The introduction of women's suffrage is at least being discussed.

While internal opposition does not appear to be a major concern, trouble could come from the many foreigners against whose rights there is considerable discrimination. Although the most important group, the 160,000 Palestinians, has a substantial interest in maintaining the status quo by virtue of its supporting position in the Kuwait administration, some political observers nevertheless fear--largely because of the growing tensions between Iran and Iraq--that Kuwait could become another Beirut: a battleground of parties, tribes, sects and states, all at odds with one another.

[Table on following page]

Table 1. Eurobonds Offered for Subscription
-- Data by the SKA, Zurich

Amount of Bond	Coupons	Debtor/Warrantor	Expiration Date	Issue Price	Subscription Period
$ 25 million	7 3/4%[1]	Jaccs Co, Ltd (Japan) convertible bond	1995	100%	10 Sep - 18 Sep
$ 20 million	8 1/2%[1]	Tricorp Oil and Gas N.V./ Triton Oil and Gas Corp convertible bond	1995	100%	10 Sep - 17 Sep
$ 10 million	8 1/2%[1] (semi-annually)	Huffy International Finance N.V./Huffy Corporation convertible bond	1995	100%	15 Sep - 22 Sep
$100 million	12%	GMAC Overseas Finance Corp N.V./General Motors Acceptance Corp	1987	99 3/4%	12 Sep - 18 Sep
$ 25 million	minimum of 7 1/4%[2]	Banca Serfin S.A. (Mexico)	1986	100%	10 Sep - 17 Sep
$ 25 million	minimum of 6 1/4%[2]	Banco de Santiago	1986	100%	12 Sep - 23 Sep
$ 20 million	9 1/4%[1]	Marion International Finance N.V./Marion Corporation convertible bond	1995	100%	15 Sep - 23 Sep

[1]Probable rate

[2]Minimum floating rate notes, coupons semiannually

7458
CSO: 4403

LIBYAN OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON CURRENT CONCERNS

Palermo GIORNALE DI SICILIA in Italian 8 Jul 80 p 15

[Interview with Mohamed Tabet, a leader of the Libyan People's Revolutionary Committee, by Francesco Marotta date and place not given]

[Text] During the 11 years which have passed since Colonel Qadhdhafi came to power, Libya has undergone profound political, economic and social changes, which have made it one of the leading countries of the Arab world and of the Third World. The Libyan experiment of an "Islamic socialism" together with that form of direct democracy which finds its expression in the People's Revolutionary Committees created in 1973 has been viewed with sympathy by some elements of the European left which consider it a third way between Western capitalism and Soviet socialism. The important role of Tripoli in an area of the world such as the Middle East, where there are concentrated the most serious points of crisis of the international equilibrium, increases the importance of knowing Libya's position on the major problems of the moment. This occasion is given to us by the presence now in Sicily of Mohamed Tabet, one of the principal exponents of the Libyan People's Revolutionary Committees, to whom we posed a series of questions.

[Question] What is the current state of relations between Libya and Italy?

[Answer] Relations with Italy are good and we are willing to improve them by broadening the possibilities for economic cooperation. The presence of Italian firms in Libya is appreciated by our people and is considered a great contribution to the industrial and agricultural development of our country.

[Question] What is your position on the problem of fishing, which interests Sicily particularly?

[Answer] On the question of fishing, there are no problems on our side. Everything depends on you. We are ready to negotiate an agreement. In Libya, a dozen Sicilian companies are already at work and we would like to broaden the possibilities for cooperation. As early as 1977, we signed an agreement for cooperation with the Sicilian region. This document has not been put into effect and not through our fault. We are still willing and interested in implementing it if the regional authorities meet us halfway and, if necessary, we are ready to initiate new talks to bring it up to date.

[Question] Italian and European public opinion has been impressed by the recent murders of certain Libyan opposition members who were living abroad. What is at the origin of these forms of violence?

[Answer] This is a problem which concerns only the Libyan people, because in Libya all the power is in the hands of the people. The people consider the opposition members as thieves who have carried abroad the riches of the country. Those who have accepted the invitation to return to their homeland have not been punished and now they are respected and they live freely and have jobs. The objective of the Libyan people is to give complete freedom to all. Those who did not accept the invitation to return to Libya have been judged by the same Libyan people who requested their physical elimination.

[Question] What is Libya's position on the question of the Middle East in the light also of the increased tension in relations with Egypt?

[Answer] The relations between the Libyan and the Egyptian peoples are relations of brotherhood; concerning our relations with Sadat, we are strongly opposed to his objectives, which are neoimperialistic. We want the Mediterranean to be a peaceful sea. Peace is the prime objective of the Libyan people, who want the welfare of all the nations of this area. For this reason, we are opposed to the presence of military fleets, especially American ones, in the Mediterranean. Sadat wants to grant sea and land bases to the United States to dominate the Egyptian people and the Arab nations adjacent to Cairo. The American presence in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean has the aim of dominating the Arab peoples to exploit them. Imperialism is the great disease of the United States which was born in the process of chasing from their land and oppressing the Indians of America. The same thing happened in the Middle East, with the Palestinian people being chased from their land by the Jews who had come from the United States, Europe and the USSR. The Middle Eastern crisis will be resolved when these lands are returned to the Palestinians who were born there. Only in this way can a Palestinian state be created, a state in which even the Jews of Arab origin can live in peace. Israel's objective and that of the United States is to destroy the Arab people and we will always be opposed to this and we will support the PLO, which only wants to get back the lands which belong to the Palestinian people. We consider the Camp David agreements useful only to American and Israeli interests and a betrayal of Palestinian interests. Now all the Arab peoples have the task of destroying these agreements and even the Egyptian people are committed in the struggle to cause the fall of the Sadat regime which is the artisan of these agreements.

[Question] What importance do the rumors of opposition between Libya and Arafat, spread recently by certain press organs, have?

[Answer] We support the Palestinian people in all areas in carrying out their objective to liberate Palestine. The reports of opposition between us and Arafat are inventions of Israeli propaganda and the proof of the contrary is in the welcome which the Libyan people paid to Arafat when he came to Tripoli.

[Question] What is Libya's strategy within OPEC?

[Answer] Oil is an economic asset which concerns all the peoples of the world and they must all do their share to protect this asset and to act in such a way that it can be used peacefully by all.

[Question] What is your opinion of the Iranian Islamic revolution and of the question of the American hostages?

[Answer] We consider the Iranian revolution to be a revolution with a profound human responsibility which aims to increase the freedom of men and fight colonialism. The question of the hostages concerns only the Iranian people, they alone must decide.

[Question] What is your position on the Afghan crisis and on the struggle of the Afghan rebels?

[Answer] The Afghan crisis is a problem which concerns only the Afghan people who must have the last word.

[Question] Some European press organs have spoken of Libyan support of terrorist groups, including the Italian ones. What do you think of these accusations?

[Answer] These reports are slander against Libya by Israeli and American propaganda, as are false the rumors of attempts against Qadhdhafi, who enjoys excellent health and is in power with the full support of the Libyan people. Libya aids all the peoples struggling for independence from colonialism and supplies aid to all the movements of liberation. Freedom, well-being and peace for all the peoples of the world are the fundamental objectives of the political revolution.

8956
CSO: 4404

IRAQ, IRAN URGED TO ACCEPT ISLAMIC MEDIATION

GF301400 Dubayy AL-BAYAN in Arabic 28 Sep 80 p 16

[Editorial: "The Urgent Task Is to Stop the Fighting"]

[Text] The Islamic mediation between Iraq and Iran must succeed. Its success is in the interest of both countries. This is a war in which the victor will emerge defeated and the winner encumbered with losses.

The mediators' urgent task is to bring an immediate end to the fighting, whatever the conditions. Every hour of fighting means scores of dead on both sides of the border, hundreds of wounded, an attrition of the two countries' national resources and a rapid dissipation of their military capabilities.

This is the only urgent task at present. Everything else can be postponed and is open to negotiations that can take any form other than that of devastation and resorting to arms.

Once this urgent task has been accomplished the mediators can continue their role of restoring the relations that have been spoiled by the war, lay down solid bases that would guarantee that there is no need to resort to war again and bring about an agreement that would put a complete end to the disputes between the two neighboring countries. The mediators are indeed asked to continue their mission. But all this depends on the extent of their success in ending the fighting--a necessary first step for achieving the other tasks.

The mediators' success in ending the fighting is dependent on one condition, namely that the two belligerents accept the mediators' mission and accept the mediators as arbiters in their dispute. Of course, the arbitration will not be biased toward any one side or at the expense of any party. Both sides are dear to the Islamic world. Their interests are an indivisible part of the interests of the Islamic world.

The two sides' acceptance of the mediation is the beginning of real victory. An end to the fighting is a victory over death, destruction and bloodshed. It is the beginning of a long and necessary road toward establishing better relations between the two fraternal countries based on resolving outstanding problems between them in a brotherly spirit.

The two sides' acceptance of the principle of Islamic mediation will be clear evidence of their concern for the feelings of the Islamic world, which is now sending its mediators to the battlefield, and a true test of their respect for these feelings, which have almost been slaughtered by this fratricide.

Both sides are called upon to accept this mediation, facilitate its task and ensure its success.

CSO: 4802

ABU DHABI ECONOMIC STATISTICS REPORTED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 3 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by Ahmad Muhsin: "Statistics Released by Planning Bureau in Abu Dhabi; Gross National Product in 1979 Surpassed 50 Billion Dirhams; Plans Are Being Made To Switch from a Service Economy to One of Production"]

[Text] Abu-Dhabi--The Bureau of Planning in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi has confirmed that increasing the capacity of the production sectors has become a fundamental strategic goal in the effort to diversify and increase sources of revenue in the UAE, particularly in Abu Dhabi.

The bureau said that its specialists are preparing studies of all economic activities. These studies will ultimately be translated into a program for economic and social development in the emirate. The bureau's office of statistics is preparing several analytical studies using information appearing in statistical records it has published, as well as statistics provided by all of the country's bureaus.

This information is reported in the annual statistics released by the bureau yesterday on the emirate's accomplishments during 1979. The report contains statistics on the following subjects: population, the social fabric, production, trade, distribution and the economic sectors. AL-BAYAN here offers a brief analysis of the statistics.

Population

Population figures are estimated on the basis of the following: the 1975 census; the results of the 1978 inventory of homes and housing units; and birth and death statistics according to group and nationality. These figures indicate that the population of Abu Dhabi in 1979 was approximately 347,093. Between 1975 and 1979 the population is estimated to have increased by approximately 135,280 persons, 64 percent.

On the other hand, information released by the Ministry of Health clearly shows a different increase. However, it is in the health service areas.

Abu Dhabi's hospitals admitted 34,051 patients in 1979, as against 25,696 in 1978, an increase of 33 percent.

Hospitals in al-'Ayn admitted 18,617 patients in 1979, as against 16,013 in the previous year.

The number of live births in Abu Dhabi in 1979 is estimated at 7,817, of which 35 percent were citizens. The number of live births in al-'Ayn is estimated at about 5,228, of which 57 percent were citizens.

Civil Servants

According to information released by the Department of Organization and Administration, the number of civil servants in the various government bureaus rose from 16,122 in 1978 to 18,635 in 1979, an increase of 16 percent.

Education

The statistics showed that the increased educational potential of the population is a major sign of progress, inasmuch as progress and modernization continually require new skills in all fields. The emirate has broadened educational opportunities in a very short time. The number of schools has risen from 99 to 105.

The number of classrooms has risen from 1,189 to 1,323.

The number of students has risen from 29,524 to 32,776 males and females.

The number of students in the University of the Emirates rose from 519 males and females in 1978 to 1,015 in 1979, a 96 percent increase. The vast majority of the students were citizens, 87 percent in 1978 and 81 percent in 1979.

Tourism

Turning to the hotels and tourism sector, the number of hotels in the emirate rose from 12 to 14, an increment of 2. The number of rooms rose from 1,234 to 2,242, an increment of 1,008.

Agriculture

Agricultural statistics demonstrate the emirate's concern with creating a sufficiently diversified agricultural base in accordance with predetermined priorities. The explanatory material accompanying the figures shows clear development in the agricultural sector. The number of farms in the al-'Ayn region rose from 771 in 1978 to 980 in 1979, an increment of 209, and a 27 percent increase.

The area under cultivation rose from 36,549 dunams to 43,089, an 18 percent increase.

Livestock resources rose sharply. Fish production in the same period rose from 5,837 tons to 6,421, a 10 percent increase. The value of the production rose from 52 million dirhams to 64.2 million, a 23 percent increase.

Oil and Gas

Oil and natural gas figures show that the number of producing wells rose from 336 to 366--an increase of 30 wells--from 1978 to 1979. As a result, production capacity rose by 5,813 barrels [per day]. In 1979 524,720,000 barrels of crude oil were exported, 2,087 [barrels per day] more than in 1978.

Industrial data show that 1979 saw production begin in the cinder block factory--in which an investment of 30.6 million dirhams was made. The factory has a production capacity of 9 million bricks.

Production in the petroleum refinery rose from 522,570 metric tons in 1978 to 549,634 metric tons in 1979, an increase of 5 percent.

Production in the liquified gas plant rose from 1,687,048 metric tons in 1978 to 1,983,310 metric tons in 1979, an 18 percent increase.

The statistics show that electricity consumption in Abu Dhabi rose from 1,121,522 megawatts in 1978 to 1,499,011 megawatts in 1979, a 34 percent increase.

In the same period actual production of generated electricity rose from 1,369,066 megawatts to 1,723,911 megawatts, an increase of 26 percent.

Actual daily production of generated electric power rose from 300,857 megawatts in 1978 to 446,151 megawatts in 1979, an increase of 48 percent.

Water consumption in Abu Dhabi rose from 5,352.6 million gallons to 7,576.4 million gallons, an increase of 42 percent.

Construction

The section on construction contained information on construction activity in the emirate. The information is based primarily on the 1978 survey of buildings and housing units. The total number of building permits issued by the Bureau of City Planning in Abu Dhabi in various areas rose from 1,619 to 1,720, an increment of 101 permits.

Foreign Trade

The value of imported goods rose from 6.31 billion dirhams in 1978 to 7.75 billion dirhams in 1979, an increase of 23 percent.

The total amount of imported goods followed the same trend, inasmuch as it rose from 1.69 billion tons in 1978 to 1.97 billion tons in 1979, an increase of 17 percent.

In general, the trade surplus rose from 21.5 billion dirhams in 1978 to 33.1 billion dirhams in 1979, an increase of 54 percent.

Gross National Product

In addition to the preceding, there is information on economic activity in the areas of transportation, communications, currency and banking.

By aggregating every economic sector in the emirate, the gross national product is computed to have risen from 34.4 billion dirhams in 1978 to 51.2 billion dirhams in 1979, an annual rate of growth of 49 percent.

Fixed capital formation rose from 9 billion dirhams in 1978 to 16.1 billion dirhams in 1979, an annual growth rate of 79 percent.

In sum, according to the statistics, economic activity in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi is currently thriving in all economic and social sectors. Although in the past the concentration has been on the service sectors to establish the groundwork, moving towards increasing the capacity of the production sectors has become a basic strategic goal in the effort to diversify and increase sources of revenue. That is what the country needs at the present time.

9123
CSO: 4802

GROUND RULES FOR SUBMISSION OF MINISTERIAL BUDGETS OUTLINED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 29 Jul 80 p 2

[Article: "The Ministries Are Now Preparing the 1981 National Budget; Hamdan Issues a General Directive Calling for Compliance with Expenditure Guidelines and Preparation of a List of Each Office's Requirements; Final Draft Will Be Completed by 6 September; It Will Be Discussed by the Cabinet by 30 October"]

[Text] Dubai--Abu-Dhabi--Executive measures were taken yesterday to prepare a preliminary national budget for the UAE for the coming fiscal year 1981.

Shaykh Hamdan ibn Rashid, the minister of finance and industry, yesterday issued a financial general directive--number seven--to all ministries and government agencies. It announced that preparation of a preliminary budget for the coming year must begin so that it can be completed and submitted to the Ministry of Finance by 6 September 1980. The preliminary 1981 budget will then be submitted to the cabinet by the end of October.

The Budget Has Four Sections

The directive included an outline of the structure of the budget. It consists of four sections. The first section deals with salaries and wages, and is subdivided into five parts: salaries; wages; allowances; pensions; and cash and noncash privileges.

Section two is subdivided into four parts: supply and service requirements; various service expenditures in the form of compensation of nonemployees; current operational expenses; and special operational expenses.

Section three deals with capital expenditures.

Section four includes investments and "fixed investments"--that is, projects to be completed and new projects to be implemented by the various ministries and the Ministry of Public Works and Housing.

Eight Rules the Ministries Must Follow

The general directive outlined the general rules for preparing the national budget, and included the essential legal principles to be considered in preparing it. It called for compliance with the text of article 129 of the UAE provisional constitution. This article calls for submission of the proposed annual national budget, with estimates of revenues and expenses, at least two months before the beginning of the fiscal year, to the national Federal Council which will discuss it and make comments on it. In accordance with the provisions of national law 14 of 1973 pertaining to preparation of the national budget, each ministry must comply with the following general rules:

1. Every proposed budget and modification thereto which is submitted to this ministry must be authorized by the minister or deputy minister. No proposed budget will be accepted from any ministry if it is not signed by one or the other of the aforementioned.

2. The Ministry of Finance will discuss the budget proposals submitted by each ministry.

3. Agents of the Ministry of Finance have the right to request any necessary additional documentation of explanations.

4. Proposed budgets submitted by each ministry must contain all the data called for in this general directive, and in any other general directives issued by this ministry in the future.

5. Each agency must give an explanation of the reasons for all sums which are sought under any existing legislation, and must justify any increases and their purpose in accordance with the detailed procedures given in the current general directive, or in previous or future ones.

6. The proposed budget for fiscal year 1981 must be prepared in accordance with fiscal general directive 13 of 2 July 1975, as amended, detailing expenditures as required.

7. Each ministry will inventory all sums it owes and is unable to pay before 31 December 1980. They must be taken into consideration in preparing estimates, and will have priority when the 1981 budget is determined.

8. The budget office within the Ministry of Finance will answer all inquiries by the various ministries about the classification of specific expenses, so that this will be done properly. It will also provide any other necessary explanations. The budget office is also empowered to add new categories of expense.

Expenses and Investments

With regard to expenses, the general directive mentioned article 9 of national law 14 of 1973 which requires the various ministries to submit a preliminary estimate of expenses to the Ministry of Finance in September, prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. Article 10 of the same law, which is also mentioned in the directive, authorizes the Ministry of Finance itself to estimate these expenses on the basis of each ministry's budget for the current year, in the event that any ministry fails to submit its own estimated budget.

Article 15 of law 14 (1973) requires the Minister of Finance to submit the proposed national budget, together with a report, to the cabinet for approval by the end of October of each year.

The Ministry of Finance has set 6 September as the final date for submission of each ministry's budget proposal for fiscal year 1981. Each ministry must send specific schedules regarding the first section showing job vacancies up to the date on which the budget is prepared. Each ministry must also send any announcement of new job openings for fiscal year 1981, which has been distributed to the various relevant offices and divisions of each ministry, to the Ministry of Finance and Industry.

The Ministry of Finance must be furnished with details about each ministry's fixed investment projects. Additional copies of these details--whether the projects involved have already been started or new--must be sent to the Ministry of Planning, whose representatives will be present at the discussion of the projects. A separate budget will be calculated for the first section, for jobs in each agency or division, in accordance with the organizational structure existing under the budget of fiscal year 1980. The schedules of total expenses showing the total proposed budget for each ministry will then be calculated.

Expense Guidelines

The general directive noted that the Ministry of Finance will prepare a report on revenue following contacts with the other ministries and concerned agencies. This report will be completed by the end of August.

The report on revenue will be prepared in accordance with articles 2 and 3 of national law 14 (1973), which call for an estimate of the various types of revenue. The principles of the estimate include a comparison of the previous year's estimates and the reasons for any possible differences between the two years.

The general directive called on all ministries to carry out their revenue estimates on scientific principles, basing them on last year's actual revenue, without overestimating.

With regard to current practices, the general directive called for following general expenditure guidelines and commitment to definite rules concerning expenditures, so that costs for required goods and services may be reduced to an appropriate level.

Ordering Priorities

In order to achieve these goals the general directive called for preparation of the budgets in such a way as to clearly show expenditures for every service on the basis of economic studies and research through analyses of the actual results of budget implementation in previous years, using criteria which lead to the achievement of economic growth.

Budget estimates must also be linked to the apportionment of funds to every type of program, so that the desired goals can be achieved by preparing the budget in conformity with these programs. The ministries must indicate priorities relating to their requirements according to the importance of their programs. An explanation of these priorities must be included.

The budget proposals submitted by the ministries must be based on a careful study of their programs. Total funds appropriated for all programs must be equivalent to the total of the first, second and third sections of the budget. Investment programs must add up to the total of the fourth section.

In preparing the estimates for the national budget for fiscal year 1981, principles related to each section of the budget must be complied with.

The Ministry of Finance and Industry has assured all the ministries that it is always ready to help them and answer any inquiries. It also emphasized the necessity of providing the required statements and data mentioned in the general directive, so that the necessary steps can be taken to submit the final version of the proposed national budget within the time specified in the constitution and law. Thus, the various ministries could operate under the new budget at the beginning of January 1981.

9123
CSO: 4802

LOCAL FOOD PRODUCTION DATA REVIEWED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 2 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by 'Ali Lashin: "Food Security in the UAE: Local Production Supplies 37 Percent of Consumer Requirements; 643,000 Tons of Food Are Imported by Merchants Annually"]

[Text] In a special statement to AL-BAYAN, Hamad 'Abdallah Salman, deputy minister of agriculture and fisheries, said that the ministry is sincerely trying to help the UAE become self-sufficient in food.

He said, "The contribution of the ministry is currently about 37 percent. According to statistics for 1978--which we have right here--the country's net imports of foodstuffs amounted to more than 643,000 tons. This represents about 63 percent of all available food that year. During the same period local production amounted to about 243,000 tons."

The minister added, "If we examine the individual figures we find that they represent the principal food groups. This will become clear in the accompanying table.

"From the table, it is clear that the Ministry of Agriculture's local production meets 20 percent of the country's requirements for livestock and meat.

"It also meets 38 percent of the country's requirements for eggs and dairy products; 29 percent of its fruit and vegetable requirements; 88 percent of its fish requirements; and 60 percent of its fodder requirements. These percentages are not bad."

Salman added, "There are actually several kinds of vegetables grown in the UAE in which we are self-sufficient during the peak growing seasons. There is even a surplus of these which can be exported. They were actually exported to certain neighboring Arab countries during the last year. These crops include tomatoes and watermelon. There are great and encouraging possibilities for raising the local production capacity of many other kinds of produce, if new production projects are carried out, or if large-scale

projects to fatten and raise livestock, such as cows, are introduced. If a plan for production is devised, the locally produced portion of the nation's food needs can be raised to more than 57 percent of the country's actual requirements, through pioneering projects and by allocating the necessary funds."

Salman continued, "There is no way to avoid importing from abroad certain food items, such as wheat, rice, sugar, tea, spices, coffee, vegetable oils, preserved foods and certain types of fruit which cannot grow in our country's climate. However, the UAE has lately been encouraging increased production of wheat in the al-'Awhah production project in al-'Ayn. This project has proved successful to the point that it may forecast general application of this type of production. But it remains dependent on the possibility of providing the necessary water and modern irrigation technology which is currently being employed on this project, in addition to reclaiming additional wide areas of land for this kind of production.

"President Zayid has given orders to use an additional 5,000 hectares for growing wheat (two crops a year).

"Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that the UAE is not able to produce all of its requirements of these strategic goods.

"Implementation of joint projects for the production of grains and fodder in the UAE and the Arabian Peninsula will play an important part in insuring food security for the nations of the region, with respect to products which are an important source of food for the citizens. They represent a positive step towards achieving comprehensive food security in this connection."

The deputy minister concluded, "If we examine post-1978 development we find that the UAE acquired new actual productive capacity, particularly in the area of meat, chicken and egg production.

"Local production of beef and dairy products is expected to rise once the project of the Arab Livestock Company in Ras al-Khaymah is completed. Production of dairy products is expected to rise by 3,500 tons and meat production is expected to rise by 1,200 tons. Moreover, production at other dairy farms in the UAE is expected to rise.

"As far as fruits and vegetables are concerned, vegetable production amounted to 83,000 tons. The increased production from greenhouses and the employment of modern methods of irrigation and farming helped to provide many vegetables for the longest possible period of the year.

"In its 1980 plan, the ministry has attempted to implement a collective farm project and a fruit farm project in Daba which will play an important part in our becoming more self-sufficient through local production.

"In addition, it has encouraged the farmers to build greenhouses, use the drip irrigation system, and modernize irrigation networks through a systematic program of agricultural loans and funding support that have been allocated this year."

Table

Food Item	Local Production as a percentage of total consumption	Total	Imported	Local Production
Meat and livestock	20	48.9	39.1	9.8
Eggs and diary products	38	65.7	42.2	23.5
Fruits and vegetables	29	411.0	291.8	119.2
Fish and fish products	88	72.8	8.4	64.4
Fodder	60	44.2	17.8	26.4
Total	37	642.6	399.3	243.3

9123
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

DIPLOMATIC INSPECTION BUREAU--Abu Dhabi, Sept. 24 (WAM): The objectives of the recently-established inspection bureau are achievement of good performance and coordination among the headquarters departments and diplomatic missions abroad, according to the Foreign Ministry. The bureau comprises a president, a permanent secretary and several diplomats. It is responsible for inspecting the Ministry's tasks and compiling periodical reports on the Ministry's performance. Such reports will be submitted to the Ministry's Under-Secretary. The president of the inspection bureau alone is entitled to assess the performance of the head of diplomatic missions. The Minister Plenipotentiary in the Foreign Ministry, Abdul Rahim Mohamed, has been promoted as Ambassador and has been assigned the task of supervising the bureau. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 25 Sep 80 p 3]

TRIPOLI SCIENTIFIC GROUP INVITATION--Abu Dhabi, Sept. 26 (WAM): The UAE has been invited by the Arab Organisation for Administrative Science to attend a scientific meeting scheduled in Tripoli from November 1 to 20. The UAE has also been invited by the Organisation's General-Secretariat to attend the meetings of the Organisation's Executive Council scheduled in Amman from November 9. The agenda includes a review of the Organisation's plan for 1981, the projected budget for the same year, the appointment of an assistant-general director for the Organisation and discussion of several issues submitted by the Organisation's General-Secretariat. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 27 Sep 80 p 3]

END

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15 October 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2200

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15 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2200

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TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER MZALI PAYS OFFICIAL VISIT TO ALGERIA

Tunisian-Algerian Ties Strengthened

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 7 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Mr Mohamed Mzali's official visit to Algeria will come within the framework of the two countries' present friendly, good-neighbor relations. It will contribute to strengthening the ties of unity woven between the Tunisian and Algerian people throughout their long history and more especially during their joint struggle for freedom, dignity and independence.

This visit is likewise in keeping with the Maghreb procedure in Tunisia which resolutely believes that our countries have a common destiny for which, after all, in 1958, Tunisians and Algerians paid with their blood at Saqiyat Sidi Yusuf.

United in their struggle against colonialism and by the bonds of language, religion and culture, it is our duty at all times to unite our efforts toward this Maghrebian structure which militants have been dreaming about since the very beginning and to which rising generations aspire.

If some clouds still hover over the area, we should make every effort to derive from within ourselves and from our leaders' wisdom the means to surmount the combination of difficulties and obstacles, in order to preserve undiminished the possibility of advancing toward a future founded on solidarity, understanding and complementarity.

In this respect, Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali again and again stressed that "the Maghreb is at the very heart of our concerns" and that "this economic and cultural structure, this significant potentiality, this power in which generations of patriots resolutely believe," could come about tomorrow.

The prime minister, drawing inspiration from the line which President Bourgiba and other Maghrebian leaders drew up, will focus his attention on the bilateral plan to formulate together with the Algerian authorities the principles capable of stimulating cooperation, of strengthening it and establishing it on a firm and broad basis.

On the political level, Mr Mohamed Mzali's visit to Algiers should make it possible to give new impetus to the united action between the two countries on our region's problems, on the expansion of the international situation and on the important problems which pertain to peace, progress and our people's gradual growth.

Moreover, they will, no doubt, focus attention on a careful survey of prospects for development and the diversification of exchanges between the two countries in every field. Within this context, they will not fail to stimulate to the benefit of all a strong development in trade and tourism across the Tunisian-Algerian border.

There is also reason to expect that these talks in Algiers are stressing the development of Tunisian-Algerian economic cooperation. There is a strong desire on both sides to move forward and to take advantage of the various possibilities for cooperation and complementarity in order to promote economic and socio-cultural relations between the two countries.

They have, in fact, achieved considerable success. The last one to date assumed a special importance: it concerned a gas pipeline which is to convey Algerian gas toward southern Italy on passing through Tunisian territory. It is necessary, however, to pursue the strengthening of cooperation by reactivating existing agreements on the one hand and, on the other, by extending this cooperation to other sectors.

With this in view, the next meeting in Tunis of the enlarged joint Tunisian-Algerian committee will provide the opportunity for putting into practice the directives which will be decided upon in Algiers.

In this way, it will be possible to consolidate the unity and the bonds of friendship and good neighborliness existing between the two countries and to elevate them to the level of history and our people's longings.

Tunisian-Algerian Joint Official Statement

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 10 Sep 80 p 6

[Text] The following is the Tunisian-Algerian official joint statement issued at the end of the visit to the Algerian Democratic and Popular Government of Mr Mohamed Mzali, party secretary general and prime minister: "In response to an invitation from Mr Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani, a member of the National Liberation Front (FLN) Central Committee and prime minister of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Mr Mohamed Mzali, secretary general of the Destourien Socialist Party and prime minister of the Republic of Tunisia, has led an important delegation on an official visit to Algeria from 7 to 9 September 1980.

During his stay, Mr Mohamed Mzali was the guest of his excellency, President Cheli Bendjedid, FLN secretary general and president of the Democratic and

Popular Republic of Algeria, to whom he conveyed a message of friendship and fraternal relations from his fellowman, the eminent combatant, His Excellency, President Habib Bourgiba, president of the Tunisian Republic, and expressed the sentiments of good will and regard which the Tunisian people pledge to their fellow Algerian people.

This visit is in keeping with the general pattern of brotherly encounters and joint meetings engaged in between these two countries as also the fusing of the historical bonds which unite them. It moreover strengthens the relations of brotherhood, of friendship and union in the struggle in which they have joined side by side to defend the rights of the people of Arabian Maghreb and the Arabian nation and to protect the dignity of our people and actualize their longings for freedom and progress.

This visit also ties in with honoring the treaty of brotherhood and good neighborliness signed in Tunis on 5 January 1970.

In a friendly and open ambiance, Mr Mohamed Mzali engaged in talks with Mr Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani. Participating in them on the Algerian side were Messrs:

--Mohamed Ben Yahia, minister of foreign affairs;
--Haj Yaala, minister of finances;
--Oueld Kablia, Ministry of the Interior secretary general;
--Mohamed Al Yassine, minister of heavy industry;
--Abdelaziz Khelaf, minister of commerce;
--Salah Dambri, Ministry of Foreign Affairs secretary general;
--Ali Kefi, Algerian ambassador in Tunis;
--Ahmed Bagheli, director of the Arab World Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
--Youssef Gherajeb, director of consular affairs;
--Maameri, general manager to the prime minister;
--Abdelmojid Bouzbid, assistant general manager at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
--Touati Belgacem, director of the Maghreb division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

And on the Tunisian side Messrs:

--Hassan Belkhaja, minister of foreign affairs;
--Driss Guiga, minister of the interior;
--Mongi Kooli, deputy minister to the prime minister and leader of the Destourien Socialist Party;
--Abdelaziz Losram, minister of national economy;
--Amore Fezzoni, Tunisian ambassador in Algiers;
--Abdelkerim Moussa, adviser to the prime minister;
--Mohamed Amamou, director of political affairs for the Arab World at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;
--Hedi Grioui, mission assistant on the prime minister's departmental staff;

--Ridha Ben Slama, mission assistant on the prime minister's departmental staff;
--Mondher Zneidi, mission assistant for the Ministry of National Economy;
--Khaled Ben Ammar, PDG [expansion unknown] of the Tunisian Company Construction Materials Industries (SOTIMACO).

The talks dealt with various aspects of bilateral relations and the means of strengthening them, with developments in the situation in the area, in the Arab World and in Africa as also with the international situation. The two Parties held the same opinions regarding the main questions studied.

Revitalize the Agreements and Treaties Made Between the Two Countries

On the bilateral level, the two parties, fully aware of the stability of the relations which unite the two friendly countries and which are deeply rooted in history and strengthened by religion, civilization and the joint struggle for supreme authority, dignity and progress, expressed their determination to strengthen their relations and once again affirmed their two countries' unshakeable desire to reinforce them. With this political objective in mind, the two parties stressed the need to release the news of their cooperation in order to respond to the two peoples' longings. They agreed to exchange visits by turns at the prime minister's level every 6 months. The first meeting will be held 8 February 1981 on the occasion of the commemoration of the Saqiyat Sidi Yusuf events when the friendly Algerian and Tunisian people mingled their blood and bore witness to their sacrifices and to their joint struggle and common destiny.

They also agreed to reactivate the Algerian-Tunisian joint committee and to convene at a meeting in Tunis on 13 and 14 October 1980. They also resolved to give new momentum to the treaties and agreements concluded between the two countries.

The two delegations, moreover, highlighted the need to increase contacts and the exchange of visits and delegations at all levels.

Appeal to All Arab Countries to Strengthen Palestinian Opposition

The two countries, fully aware of the pressing need to continue their joint action for building up the Greater Arab Maghreb on the foundation of brotherhood, unity, complementarity and joint interests, expressed the hope that the wise men meeting at present in Freetown will succeed in arriving at a lasting and peaceful solution to the "Western Saharan Affair."

The two delegations, on surveying the Middle-East situation, reaffirmed their adherence to the Baghdad and Tunis summit-meeting decisions and their firm resolve to lend their full support to the Palestinian people's struggle under the leadership of their sole and rightful representative, the Palestinian Liberation Organization [PLO] for the recovery of their lands and the restoration of the rights of which they were despoiled, to promote the establishment

of an independent Palestinian state and the pursuit of the movement for the withdrawal of Zionists from all occupied Arab territories including the Holy City of El Qods.

They likewise again affirmed that the separate agreement entered into with the Zionist enemy constitutes a rupture in the creation of Arab unity and a blow aimed at the Arab nation's struggle insofar as it sanctions the Zionist imperialist settlement and causes considerable harm to the Palestinian cause, to the Palestinian people's sacrifices and to their longings for freedom, dignity and sovereignty.

On this subject, the two parties are addressing an appeal to all Arab countries to muster every possible force in order to strengthen the Palestinian Resistance and the front-line countries to prevent the Zionist enemy from making El Qods its capital. The two countries are making an appeal to the international conscience and to all forces longing for peace to bar the way to the realization of Zionist designs.

The two parties emphasized the importance of supporting the Lebanese government in order to thwart the Zionist struggle to destroy Lebanese unity and strike a blow at their sovereignty.

On the other hand, the two parties stressed their interest in making the Mediterranean a haven of peace and security and expressed their concern to make every effort to eliminate every hotbed of tension in this vital area and to set up there new bases of a fruitful and sincere cooperation in the service of world peace and security.

Zeal for the Non-Aligned Movement

On the African level, the two parties restated their support for the peoples of Namibia and South Africa's struggle for freedom, independence and dignity.

They addressed an appeal to the international conscience to oppose the apartheid policy and colonial domination which the white minority imposed in South Africa on the Namibian people.

The two parties, moreover, denounced the continual unprovoked assaults which the Pretorian racist government has inflicted on bordering African countries.

The two countries highlighted the importance of unity and cooperation between the African and Arab countries because of the historical bonds which unite them and their joint struggle against a common enemy and because of the joint longing for a better future relieved of every form of domination and exploitation.

The two countries again affirmed their dedication to the Non-Alignment Movement and their determination to cooperate closely to safeguard this movement, its principles, its unity, and to strengthen its non-alignment based on the

conviction that it is a significant factor in solving the problems which confront the international community, by contributing effectively to the strenthening of world peace and in this manner enhancing its prestige and its part in initiating a new more just and more equitable world-wide economic order.

The two parties likewise highlighted the important part which the Non-aligned Movement played in the United Nations and in the group of the 77 in order to establish new political and economic relations between the industrialized and developing countries.

The two parties paid special attention to the international economic crisis and stressed the need to unite every effort to replace the present economic system with a new worldwide economic system built on the foundation of justice and equality among all nations.

The two parties expressed their contentment regarding the positive results achieved during this visit and stressed the importance of continuing these meetings between the two countries on every level.

Mr Mohamed Mzali, PSD secretary general and prime minister of the Tunisian Republic expressed his admiration and high esteem for what Algeria has accomplished in its promotion of progress and prosperity. He also thanked Mr Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani, a member of the FLN Central Committee and prime minister of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, and also the Algerian people for their warm welcome and hospitality given to the Tunisian delegation.

Mr Mohamed Mzali also extended to his counterpart, Mr Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani, an invitation to visit Tunisia which the latter graciously accepted. This visit, set for 8 February 1931, will take place at Saqiyat Sidi Yusuf.

Major Joint Committee To Meet

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 9 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] It has come to our attention that the Tunisian-Algerian working session held yesterday morning at the government palace in Algiers and chaired by the Algerian and Tunisian prime ministers, Messrs Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani and Mohamed Mzali, was outstanding for its frankness and the convergence of viewpoints in all the questions with which they dealt.

The talks, which lasted about an hour and 45 minutes, took place in a friendly and optimistic atmosphere permeated with a spirit of fruitful cooperation. They touched particularly on questions related to strengthening cooperation between the two countries in the areas of secondary and higher education and the exchange of teachers to provide for Algerian needs in trained teaching personnel.

The two parties again affirmed the importance of a bilateral cooperation and coordination in matters of scientific research. They also took advantage of the occasion to revise the agreement draft relating to the areas of commercial exchanges between the two countries with the intent of promoting economic relations between the two countries.

During this meeting, the two parties expressed the wish to pursue the dialogue and the discussions between the two countries. That is why they decided to set up an exchange of visits at the prime minister level to take place every 6 months and to maintain a permanent exchange of ideas at the minister of foreign affairs level.

The two parties also resolved to convene the Tunisian-Algerian Greater Joint Committee around mid-October. This meeting is to be preceded by sectorial meetings.

Mr Mzali's Press Statement

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 9 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Mr Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and Party secretary general, arrived in Algiers Sunday evening for an official 3-day visit.

Aboard the chartered Tunis-Air Plane were the prime minister and members of the official Tunisian delegation, among whom were in particular Messrs Hassan Belkhoja, minister of foreign affairs, Driss Guiga, minister of the interior, Mongi Kooli, deputy minister to the prime minister and Party leader, and Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy. The plane landed in Algiers at the International Houan Boumediene airport at 1750 hours.

Mr Mohamed Mzali was greeted at the passenger steps by Mr Ahmed Abdelghani, Algerian prime minister and FLN Central Committee members, surrounded by government members as also by Mr Amor Fezzani, Tunisian ambassador in Algiers.

Accompanied by his Algerian counterpart, Mr Mohamed Mzali first of all saluted the flag while the band struck up the national anthem of both countries.

The prime minister then reviewed a detachment of troops of the republic infantry which paid him their respects. He then greeted the various personages who had come to welcome him, among whom were Algerian high-commissioned officers, members of the Algerian and African diplomatic corps, Tunisian embassy officials and representatives of the Tunisian colony in Algiers.

At the request of the Algerian and international press, Mr Mzali made the following statement:

"Today I am making my first official visit to Algeria as prime minister of the Tunisian Government. That I am making this visit to Algeria at the

invitation of our brother, Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani, and heading an important delegation made up of government members and high officials, bears witness to the strengthening of the brotherly bonds between our two countries, bonds which date from both ancient and modern history, and to the common struggle in which we both have been engaged together to free our countries from colonialism. This visit also testifies to our renewed determination to build up our common future just as in the past we have won our independence. I would like to take advantage of this occasion to extend to President Chadli Bendjedid the greetings and the token of the highest esteem from his fellow combatant, President Habib Bourguiba. In my name and in that of my colleagues, I also extend to my esteemed colleague, Mr Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani, and to the Algerian people, our sincere sentiments of warm friendship and our best wishes for a glowing future for our two peoples and the entire Arab Greater Maghrib."

On the other hand, in response to a question asked by a representative of an international press agency regarding the possibility of Tunisia playing a mediation role in the Western Saharan conflict, Mr Mohamed Mzali stressed that Tunisia is ready to take any initiative insofar as the interested parties call on him for his assistance. He expressed the hope that all Arab Greater Maghrib problems would be resolved within a Maghrib framework.

Mr Mohamed Mzali left Tunis Sunday afternoon for Algiers. On this visit he was accompanied by an important delegation including Messrs Hassan Belkhoja, minister of foreign affairs, Driss Guiga, minister of the interior, Mongi Kooli, minister delegate attached to the prime minister's department and PSD leader, Abdelaziz Lassam, minister of national economy, Amor Fezzani, Tunisian ambassador in Algiers, Mohamed Amamou, manager of political affairs for the Arab World at the Ministry of the A.E., Abdelkrim Moussa, special adviser to the prime minister, Hedi Grioui, delegation assistant at the prime minister's office, Ridha Ben Slama, delegation assistant at the prime minister's office, Mondher Znaidi, delegation assistant at the Ministry of National Economy, Khaled Ben Ammar, PDG [expansion unknown] of SOTIMACO (Tunisian Industrial Company for Construction Materials), Col Abdelkader Ammar, aide-de-camp and Mr Naceur Tebessi, deputy director of protocol.

Shortly before his departure, the prime minister made the following statement to the press:

"I am delighted to respond to the gracious invitation of my colleague and friend, Mr Mohamed Ben Ahmed Abdelghani, Algerian prime minister, to pay an official visit to nearby Algeria and to get in touch with Algerian authorities in order to strengthen the fraternal cooperation existing between the two countries. I take great pleasure on this occasion in conveying to His Excellency, President Chedli Bendjedid, the greetings of our eminent leader, President Habib Bourguiba, and to make known to the government and the Algerian people the brotherly sentiments of regard and friendship which all Tunisians devote to their Algerian brothers."

On his departure from the Tunis-Carthage International Airport, the prime minister was bid farewell by Dr Sadok Mokaddem, chairman of the National Assembly, the members of the government and the Policy Bureau, some high party and administration officials, as also by Mr Mohamed Taoufik Kara Turki, Algerian charge d'affaires and the members of the Algerian embassy in Tunis.

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CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

MAURITANIA-ALGERIA COOPERATION TALKS--The president of the Military Committee of National Salvation [CMSN], head of state and government, returned to the capital late yesterday afternoon from Algiers at the end of an official visit to Algeria at the invitation of President Chadli Bendjedid. On his arrival at the VIP lounge of the airport, the head of state declared that his visit to Algeria gave him the opportunity to hold talks with His Excellency President Chadli Bendjedid on regional, Arab, African and international issues. Bilateral cooperation and means to develop it were at the center of these talks. He said he was very satisfied with this country and the climate of brotherhood and mutual comprehension which prevailed throughout the period of his visit. The talks were fruitful and the results positive. The Algeria-Mauritanian cooperation has been strengthened by the visit. I think, he added, that this visit will have a positive impact on the countries of the Maghreb and on Arab-African cooperation. [Text] [AB021503 Nouakchott Domestic Service in French 0700 GMT 2 Oct 80]

IRAQI DEMONSTRATION IN MAURITANIA--The Iraqi community in Nouakchott yesterday afternoon organized a support march in favor of their head of state, President Saddam Husayn, on the occasion of the conflict between Iraq and Iran. The march, which started at the (Larabi) school, headed towards the Iraqi Embassy after passing through the principal streets of the capital. One could read on their placards such slogans as: [word indistinct] Arabistan for Arabs; All behind Iraq for the repeal of the 6 March accord; Manage Arab sovereignty in a [word indistinct] constitutes treason against the whole Arab nation. [Excerpt] [AB011637 Nouakchott Domestic Service in French 0700 GMT 1 Oct 80]

CSO: 4400

PARTY MILITANTS HEAR SPECIAL CONGRESS' RECOMMENDATIONS

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 22-23 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] The revival of Party activities was the purpose of a working session held last Wednesday at the Bougaa daira headquarters and which brought together members from the kasmas offices of the council executives and authorities from public organizations from the Bougaa, Bousselem, Tal Ifacene and Guenzet districts.

During this working session, chaired by Mr Abdesselam Belattar, national representative of the Setif Party, they emphasized the recommendations of the Party's extraordinary congress and in particular, the role of the Party's fighting wing in the district's economic, social and cultural development. Moreover, during the same meeting, they also discussed projects pertaining to the coming 80-85 5-year plan, those from the last development program which still remain to be completed, and each district's economic, social and cultural problems.

In the balance sheets submitted, it is evident that such problems as housing, the supply of drinking water are still a matter of deep concern for all the dairas and in particular for the Bougaa district whose citizens for more than 2 months now are being supplied by tank trucks.

In addition, the committee members are focusing their attention on the Bougaa farming village where the work has been abandoned and left in ruins for more than a year.

Finally, let us point out that similar meetings have taken place or will take place at the level of each daira county seat in the Setif wilaya.

8870
CSO: 4400

SOCIOECONOMIC ACTIVITIES EMPHASIZED AT PARTY GRASSROOTS LEVEL

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 22-23 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Recently, in accordance with recommendations from the FLN Extraordinary Congress, meetings and working sessions are being held at the level of different national territorial regions. This revival of party activities, which has been noted for some time, makes it possible particu larly for authorities, locally elected candidates and citizens to discuss several questions of the moment. Some questions as different as housing, improvement of sanitation or other social problems still at times sharply arise in some areas. The meetings, which are held with this purpose in view, in their endeavor to get to the heart of the questions, clearly make it possible to seek the best possible solutions.

In Algiers, Mr Labidi Bartal, the party's associate national representative of the Algiers wilaya, Thursday morning chaired a meeting of coordinators from the Party's federations and kasmas and secretary generals from territorial and council associations and the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] wilaya, in the presence of Messrs Ahmed Sebaa and Ali Lasfar, Central Committee members and respectively, department president of the grass-root organizations in the Party and UGTA national secretary.

During this meeting, which is within the framework of a series of meetings the Party's national department in the Algiers wilaya is holding, they discussed reports on problems raised at the level of economic undertakings and for which some suitable solutions have been submitted.

In the course of his address, Mr Labidi stressed the importance of avoiding the lack of clarity which prevails in some economic sectors, of striving harder and more earnestly than ever, to keep an eye on the observance of the laws made by the policy board and the need for the workers to take part in the quest for solutions to the problems they encounter.

He concluded by urging the authorities to give good example to the workers, and to assume fully their responsibilities.

Then taking the floor, Mr Ahmed Sebaa in his turn invited the participants in the meeting to redouble their efforts and to take every measure necessary

to put an end to all the difficulties which the workers encounter in carrying out their assignment and then went on to say that those in authority should fulfill their obligations in order to win the workers' confidence in the struggle for production and productivity.

We recall that a very similar meeting took place last Monday. It was devoted to the study of the transport situation in the capital and more particularly to that supplied by the RSTA [expansion unknown].

Within the next few weeks, similar meetings will be set up at the level of Syndical and ATU [Algerian Trade Union] sections of the economic units established in the Algerian wilaya in order to study the problems inherent in the distribution section with the view to solving them as soon as possible.

8870
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

COMMISSIONS TO STUDY 5-YEAR PLAN--On Monday 25 August at 1500 hrs, the People's National Assembly standing committees will begin the study of the text of the bills which the People's National Assembly board has referred to them. Starting on this date, they will undertake the study of several bills, especially the appropriations bill for 1981 and the bills respecting the 1980-84 5-year plan. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 20 Aug 80 p 1] 8870

WALIS, DAIRA HEADS MEET MINISTER--Dr Boualem Benhamouda, a member of the policy committee and minister of the interior, yesterday met with the new Walis and Daira heads at his ministerial department headquarters, before their return to their posts. On this occasion, the minister recalled the main lines given by the president of the republic and the party's secretary general, who had insisted that on applying the law, government officials, while always taking general interests into account, should act in accordance with the spirit and the text of the charter, the resolutions of the party's first extraordinary congress and the Central Committee's resolutions. They should work to fulfill the needs of the general public while always maintaining a behavior worthy of their mission and of the trust placed in them. The minister asked the new Walis and Daira heads to act in such a manner that the movement undertaken in no way affects the carrying out of the programs underway and the detailed build up of the 5-year plan. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 20 Aug 80 p 1] 8870

CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

NEW HEALTH CENTER--On 30 August 1980, Crown Prince and Minister of Defense Shaykh Hasan ibn 'Isa Al Khalifah opened the Sitrah Health Center, which contains treatment rooms, a pharmacy, a lecture hall, a maternity ward, two dental clinics, and an X-ray clinic. The center will start with a staff of about 50, including four doctors. [Excerpts] [Manama AL-MAWAQIF in Arabic 1 Sep 80 p 5]

CSO: 4802

HOUSE USED AS PLOTTERS MEETING PLACE RAIDED BY REVOLUTION GUARDS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 17 Aug 80 pp 1-2

[Text] A plot network having armed underground activities against the Islamic Republic of Iran was discovered in Tehran and members of it arrested.

A Central Komiteh strike group discovered a "team" house during the past several days which was connected with the "Kumeleh" and Peykar [Struggle to Free the Working Class] groups which had secret activities in Tehran against the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. A number of this network's members were arrested in this connection.

In the examination which the Guards made of the house, a large number of important documents and papers in connection with overthrowing the Islamic Republic of Iran, initiating revolt in the country, the Gonbad, Kordestan and Gorgan incidents, and furthermore announcements of the Feda'i-ye Khalq guerillas, were discovered and seized.

At the same time, a number of books of official documents with forged stamps, forged army discharge cards, several forged pass-cards of the Komiteh, and a number of documents for the training and preparation of persons for domestic sabotage were acquired.

A spokesman for the Central Komiteh, while announcing this news, stated in an interview with our correspondent that: A while ago we were informed of suspicious comings and goings from a house situated near Amirabad Street. Upon receipt of this information, the Guards immediately placed the aforementioned house under surveillance. After a period of surveillance they realized that activities against the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran were taking place in that house. They also realized that most of those persons entering and leaving the house were youths, who entered the house with empty hands and left carrying a package. Finally, after the requisite surveillance and on order of the prosecutor, the Guards eneterd the house, and arrested about six persons there.

The spokesman added: Following interrogation of those arrested it became clear that a sabotage network had been organized in that house, and that they had coordinated their program of activities with the Kumeleh Party and Peykar. These persons confessed in their interrogations that they had held political activities in the house. Of course it became clear that their activities had been against the Islamic Republic of Iran, aimed at creating fear, terror and unrest in the country. Following investigation it became obvious that these persons had organized a "team" house, that they drew unaware and deluded youths to the house, furnished them with weapons, and trained them in their use. Simultaneously the members of this network brainwashed these unaware and deluded youths with provocative words, and used the weak points of these youths to incite them against the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. At the end of the training course, these youths were given missions by the network's members to create disorder, fear and terror in the city. The spokesman added: Simultaneously a number of important documents and papers connected with the Kordestan and Gonbad incidents were acquired in this network's hideout. Following examination it became evident that this network's members had sent a number of armed persons to those war zones in order to aid counterrevolutionaries in their struggle against the Guards and the army. Meanwhile these members had infiltrated the factories in order to incide the workers, and had engaged in spreading poisonous lies to do so.

This spokesman added: Charges against the members of this network include: Creating strikes and distributing illegal bulletins in factories; recording names and addresses of workers and youths in order to delude them; organizing a "team" house for counterrevolutionary and illegal activities in connection with the "Kumeleh" and "Peykar" parties; procuring weapons, training and preparing armed persons for missions in the western regions and inside cities; interference in the Gonbad events, and trips to Kordestan and Gorgan in the thick of battle; making counterfeit stamps for books of official documents, and forged military service discharge papers; theft of Komiteh pass cards; sending persons to factories, and infiltrating workers councils for purposes of sabotage and interruption of production; preparing motion picture equipment; printing and xeroxing for counterrevolutionary activities.

The spokesman said in closing: During the first nights of the Guards' surveillance of this team house, they were suddenly fired upon by an armed group during the early morning hours.

9597
CSO: 4906

MINISTER OF ROADS EXPLAINS NEW CONSTRUCTION PROGRAMS

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 4 Sep 80 p 4

[Interview With Musavi Kalantari]

[Text] AZADEGAN: It is hoped that promises and pledges are turned into action and become a reality, and the oppressed and poor members of the society, who had previously heard so many promises from officials of the former regime and its mercenary criminal ministers, could, by the grace of God, witness the realization of their hopes and desires, during the rule of the revolutionary government of Prime Minister Raja'i.

With that in mind, we asked Mr Kalantari to explain, for the benefit of our readers, his ministry's new plans and programs.

[Question] What are your overall plans in the new government?

[Answer] In order to explain our plans and projects, we must first try to understand what the ministry is. The Ministry of Roads is composed of many departments, each as big as a ministry itself. They include the Department of Civil Aviation, The State Railways, Ports Organization, Meteorological Department and Soil Laboratories Department. In the next government we will continue carrying out the projects already started and we hope that we will not have to spend so much time in the future to make them [other government agencies] cooperate with us. We will, instead, concentrate all our energies on our work. One of our major problems in the past was fighting against counterrevolutionary elements who, sometimes, were able to prevent our efforts by closing our workshops through agitation. Sometimes they were even able to deceive revolutionary forces in their confrontation with us. It was then that we were able to realize that they were trying to fish in troubled waters. We feel that we are not going to have the same problems in the next government and will be able to get busy with our job. Our main problem is that of working with the Plan Organization and the Ministry of Finance. This, I had often said in the past. Our next problem will be the counterrevolutionaries. In the future our efforts will be directed towards making our projects people-oriented, especially projects such as Sarakhs-Mashhad railway which needed a "sondage" [drilling] at the cost of 18 million tumans, that we no longer want to spend.

"Sondage" is the testing well that is dug from the top of a mountain to where a tunnel is to pass. This is to test the soil. It was suggested by the Soviets, and when we asked them if they used the same method in the Soviet Union, they said no, because it was costly. During the old regime there had been extravagances such as this, the beneficiaries of which had been mostly Americans, Japanese, French and Italians.

1. Next we will clean our working conditions, a major part of it already is done, and we intend to use the services of young, intelligent people who are anxious to work.

2. We will try to make our provincial departments self-sufficient. In the past, everything was so centralized that if they wanted to build a road in the remotest part of the country, the project had to be approved in Tehran. There were various resons for that. Aside from bureaucratic reasons, officials were motivated by financial gains through kickbacks. This is no longer possible in a revolutionary government. Provincial departments will be given more authority and freedom of action.

3. We will do away with unnecessary and hindering regulations, the number of which is not few. We started this last month and will continue doing it. We hope to continue the cleanup of our various departments in the next government. We also have some "practical" projects some of which I will mention here. These will be carried out provided we are given the necessary means. These include:

1. In the field of "practical" projects, our main effort will be concentrated on rural roads. We do not have enough roads in the country, and for the next 30 years if we continue to build roads and railways we will still need more roads. Highway networks will be completed, also. On our frontiers, we only have 100 kilometers of paved highway and that is located in the Moghan Plain. The rest are dirt roads, and in some areas we don't have any roads at all. This shortage of roads is more felt in an area where a war is imposed on us. We will soon pave the existing dirt roads in the border zones and build new roads where there are none.

2. We have some railway projects including the connecting of populated areas and the nation's ports by railways. If possible,we will try to link the trans-Iranian railway with that of Pakistan.

3. We plan construction of small ports in the south, designed to solve unemployment, one of the most acute problems in the country. By constructing the small ports we hope to be able to attract our youths from all over the country to fishing industry to help both eliminate unemployment and raise production (of foodstuff).

Construction of Airports In Iranshahr and Ardabil

4. Another project concerns construction of small and inexpensive airports in remote towns where road building is not possible at this time.

Take Ardabil, as an example, a fairly large town, lacking proper roads. We will build an airport there. There are also towns with roads but so remote that physicians refuse to work there, like Iranshahr. They will have airports, too.

Meanwhile, efforts will be made to improve conditions at existing airports, by rate increase, and through expanded use of electronic navigating gears.

5. Regarding the Metereological Organization, it now only serves the radio and TV news services and the airline, which is not in line with the Islamic revolutionary conditions. It must be put into more uses, such as in agriculture. We hope that this organization will become, like its counterparts in other countries, involved in research work.

6. We also have projects designed to make us independent from other countries. In the field of highway construction, we are not depending on others, as far as experts are concerned. In certain departments, such as Ports Organization and Civil Aviation Agency, a false need is felt but every effort will be made to remove that and become selfsufficient.

The Ending of Dependency

We will try not to be dependent on foreign experts. We will train the experts we need. As far as spare parts are concerned, we are badly dependent and could be put under pressure. There are plans to make some of the spare parts we need, at a lower level. In Iran, we have some of the most modern locomotives, but unfortunately we are badly dependent for spare parts.

Efforts will be made to manufacture the tools we need and not depend on colonialist powers. Soon we will be able to build some of the road building equipment and machines we need, and as far as technical experts are concerned, we are not deficient.

7. As you know, they say that unemployment is widespread. I have suggested that we will solve this problem. I have proposed that unemployed be put to work at road building projects, and if necessary, we build roads by hand. This way, we can help eliminate unemployment, and build roads at the same time.

[Question] Regarding the surfacing of the roads in western parts of the country, not much has been done and the surfacing of a road between two frontier towns had begun. Can you explain the reason?

[Answer] Four groups are working in the west. I am not trying to defend myself, because at a time when the blood of a guard is being shed, I have no right to defend myself. But I would like to say a few words about what we are accomplishing there. At this moment, there are four groups at work in the western section of the country. These groups are from Mashhad, Kermanshah and Esfahan. The latter group is made up of 44 men. The oil company does not send us the needed tar on time, even though the Minister of Oil has given

his orders. In the meantime, road surfacing is not as simple as spreading water on the road. In most parts of the country we do not even have dirt roads to cover them with asphalt. In the south, for example, there is a road between Bandar 'Abbas and Chahbahar to Jask. From there on we don't even have a dirt road. Some people claim that roads on the Iraqi border areas are surfaced. They did it 2 years ago and now have imposed a war on us.

It takes 6 months to set up an asphalt mixing plant and yet we have surfaced 40 kilometers of roads.

It must be taken into consideration that setting up an asphalt mixing plant takes as long as that of a cement plant. Six months. That is why we proceeded with surfacing the roads with cold asphalt and have, so far, surfaced some 40 kilometers of road. It is not, of course, a high quality asphalt but there was little that we could do. Had we tried to set up a rock-cracking plant for making asphalt, the winter season would have arrived, and surfacing of roads is not possible in wintertime. I understand the uncomfortable situation that our brother guards are in, but there is a limit to what we can expect. We have done the best we could and have assigned two of my deputies to the western areas and have been sent there very often. My two other deputies were sent there today, 1-/6/59 [1 Sep 80].

Antirevolution Hinders Our Development Programs

Greedy and profit-seeking contractors are not accepting contract works in that area. We are, therefore, building the roads with our own facilities and the help of devoted individuals. Recently, all our equipment were destroyed by RPG's [Rifle propelled grenade] and our graders and trucks have struck land mines.

[Question] Why the Ministry of Roads is not executing major projects such as the electrification of the north-south railways, and why the completion of the Tehran-Esfahan highway has been postponed. Why is it that the Ministry of Roads has turned into a reparing instrument of the highways?

[Answer] We are opposed to some of these projects because we consider them as being more of a luxury, like the ones you mentioned.

9561
CSO: 4906

BOUCETTA REVIEWS EFFORTS TO INITIATE TALKS WITH ALGERIA

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 13 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] Morocco is "ready to welcome any initiative which would contribute to a convergence of the points of view (between Morocco and Algeria) in the western Sahara conflict," affirmed Mr Mohamed Boucetta, Moroccan minister of foreign affairs.

In an interview published Tuesday by the Paris Arabic-language daily AN NAHER ARABE ET INTERNATIONAL, Mr Boucetta says that "his country, having always been anxious to put an end to the tension which prevails in the region, has never refused the missions of good offices which have been proposed to it."

"Thus," he added, "there was a first attempt on the part of President Bourguiba, which was followed by several Saudi attempts. Finally there was the visit of the Tunisian minister Mr Mzali, whom we briefed on the situation." "But," stressed Mr Boucetta, "none of these initiatives proposed to us constituted real mediations. At the most they were a search for a path to open a dialog," he said.

Concerning the relations of his country with Algeria, the chief Moroccan diplomat emphasized that he had not noted any "significant change" and affirmed that his country would not miss any opportunity to encourage economic development and cooperation with all the countries of the region."

6108
CSO: 4400

PEACE IN SAHARA SEEN DEPENDING ON ALGERIA

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 13-14 Sep 80 pp 1, 2

[Excerpts] We have already explained the reasons for the presence of Morocco at Freetown during the meeting of the ad hoc committee of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This was a decision that was reached by His Excellency Hassan the Second after considerable deliberation for the purpose of informing and convincing, in order to reaffirm our rights by once again presenting all of our historical, juridical, political and humane arguments and our determination to retain what belongs to us, since the Sahara is our home.

Indeed, our presence in Freetown has proved to be positive. In spite of the serious offense committed by the Committee in inviting mercenaries, we are right in expressing satisfaction with the conduct of the debates which were generally honest and correct. Algeria and the mercenaries expected to convert this meeting into a platform for presenting their propaganda, for accusing Morocco and for setting up a tribunal. However, by consenting to the request of Morocco to hold closed meetings, the Committee has permitted peaceful, and even serious, conducting of debates. Furthermore, we have strong arguments and do not need to employ propaganda whereas in the case of our opponents, exactly the opposite is true.

Finally, the mercenaries have not benefited from the privileged status on which they were counting. They have been considered as just another organization.

Everyone was able to notice that these Saharans had come from within the Saharan provinces and that the mercenaries had come from Algeria. It was also an easy matter to demonstrate that the spokesmen for the mercenaries were mostly Mauritanian opponents who had nothing to do with the Sahara and that the few Moroccans present in the movement such as El Ouali, who was killed before Nouakchott, were subversive leftists.

In fact, the Committee proposed that the Saharan people be requested to choose between Morocco and independence. However, the choice had already been made.

If the Sages had been really wise, they would have drawn from the impressive demonstration of the real representatives of the Saharan people the conclusion that was obvious, that is, that the Polisario has no right to representation and that the people expressed their decision unequivocally, particularly during the elections which were held in the Saharan provinces, these elections after all being perfectly free ones where the people voted in mass and which permitted all of the political factions to be represented in the assemblies.

Finally, it can be seen that the recommendation adopted by the ad hoc committee has presented no new ideas, that it is speaking in generalities and that actually it is simply expressing a pious wish. However, there is a positive aspect to its presentation in that it makes no reference to the socalled Polisario, which is a step in the right direction.

Consequently, we were right in making the trip to Freetown which furnished us with a new opportunity to present the real problem. The present conflict is not taking place within the Saharan provinces themselves but along the borders. Therefore, we are witnessing an international conflict and not an internal one as Algeria would have the world believe. This is why a referendum is not necessary.

The only solution consists in the conducting of negotiations between the two conflicting parties, namely, Morocco and Algeria. Consequently, reestablishment of peace in this region depends on Algeria and on Algeria alone.

7619
CSO: 4400

MOZAMBICAN RECOGNITION OF POLISARIO CONDEMNED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 31 Aug 80 p 1

[Article by Fatima Belarbi]

[Text] Mozambique and the mercenaries of Algiers have decided to establish diplomatic relations...at the ambassadorial level.

One wonders whether the Mozambican officials took the trouble to send a scout into the region were it only to inform themselves as to the geographic limits of the phantom "SDAR" [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] and as to the site for the new Mozambican embassy...at least for the sake of the security of the new Mozambican ambassador.

Too preoccupied with slogans which no longer mean anything, and with so-called principles which have no foundation, neither juridical, nor historic, nor even humanitarian, the Mozambican leaders make decisions lightly, without concerning themselves over the future of either African peoples or of the African continent.

Mr Samora Machel, as onetime leader of the liberation movement (FRELIMO), should know that such a movement does not grow up in a day, and that at the time when Africa was struggling for its independence, what is today called the POLISARIO existed neither in spirit nor in letter.

Mr Machel had never heard of POLISARIO before a certain date. Does not Mr Machel, who is well known in Rabat, and who also is familiar enough with Morocco to have come here several times to ask its aid, realize that the Moroccan people have claimed these Saharan provinces for decades? In 1972, at the time of the OAU summit in Rabat, which Mr Machel attended, did he hear a single African leader speak of the "POLISARIO"?

Some people have very short memories. But the [line dropped] remember, and the Moroccan people themselves have not forgotten, the support and aid they gave to FRELIMO for the independence of Mozambique, and they recall sadly the "gratitude" of a man who could show himself "worthy" of that support, who postures today as an enemy of the Moroccan cause.

However much Mr Machel may commit in new expenses for "his new embassy" in Algiers, the Moroccan people will not be dissuaded from continuing their fight for the integrity of their country.

We only hope that the new ambassador--if, after all, he is ever named--will not someday be ranked with the mercenaries of Algiers and presented to the press as such.

9516
CSO: 4400

KING ANNOUNCES RENT REDUCTION, HOUSING CONSTRUCTION INCENTIVES

Details of Speech

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 21 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Casablanca 21 August (MAP)--His Majesty Hassan II gave a speech yesterday evening at the royal palace of Casablanca commemorating the 27th anniversary of the Revolution of the King and the People.

The speech, which began at 21 hours GMT lasted 40 minutes and focused on three main points, the reduction of rent for wage-earners whose income does not exceed 1500 dirhams, exemption from taxation for 15 years for all those who build houses, and the appeal to the interested agencies to hold national education days.

His Majesty the King, who was surrounded by their Royal Highnesses Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed and Prince Moulay Rachid, gave the speech commemorating the 20th of August 1953 in the presence of the members of the government, headed by the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice Maitre Maati Bouabid, the president of the Chamber of Deputies, Mr Dey Ould Sidi Baba, the advisers of his majesty the king, senior officers of the general staff of the Royal Armed Forces, the king's procurator with the Supreme Court, the high commissioner for former resistance fighters, former members of the liberation army and members of the provisional council of former resistance fighters and former members of the Liberation Army.

The sovereign made an historical reference to this crucial period of our national history marked by two important dates: that of the sacrifice of 20 August 1953, and that of the return of the liberator of the nation in November 1955 who on this occasion announced the end of the protectorate and of colonialism and the beginning of that of liberty and independence. During this speech his majesty the king developed three main ideas inspired directly by the historic comment of His Majesty Mohammed V, who had said at the time that we had emerged from the little holy war to embark on the great holy war. Far-seeing and pragmatic, His Majesty Hassan II, who lives in harmony with his people, made three important decisions. Employees whose wages do not exceed 1500 DH will have the right to a reduction of a

third of their total rent. And in order not to injure those who are building or who want to build for personal use, a tax exemption is granted for 15 years.

"Thus we will have increased the activity in this sector," said his majesty the king, "the state will have more housing units built by it to put at the disposal of the citizens, for even if it undertakes to build with all its might, it will not succeed in meeting the needs of the population between now and the year 2000; we will also have relieved the consumer, created jobs, increased exchanges, and lightened the burden on the compensation fund."

With regard to the problem of national education, His Majesty Hassan II decided to call upon the representatives of political, trade union, and student organizations, parents of school-children, high officials, members of the parliamentary commission and various other interested sectors to debate this question between now and the end of the month under his chairmanship.

"Whether it takes 10 days or a month, these education days should result in solutions which satisfy everyone," said the sovereign, "and if we find a program, a path for all, this will calm the concern of our children for their future and save them from doubt and uncertainty."

Finally his majesty the king made homage to the Martyrs, headed by the father of the Nation, His Deceased Majesty Mohammed V, and to the chouhada "who are daily falling on the field of honor in the Sahara, for the defense of the territorial integrity of the fatherland."

Ahmed Alaoui Comment

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 28 Aug 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] In the speech which he gave last August 20, His Majesty Hassan II announced that new residential houses would be exempt from all taxation for 15 years.

This step completes the decisions made with regard to rents and is designed substantially to encourage real estate investments. Certain promoters might actually consider, in the light of measures taken in favor of economically disadvantaged renters, that interest in construction would decline, or even disappear altogether.

In order to dispel this fear and to encourage developers in a valid way, his majesty the king took these steps of tax exemption, which will have important consequences for economic and social plans.

At present, actually, the total deficit is a million housing units. Between now and the end of the century there will be 20 million more Moroccans who will need 4 million housing units.

We must therefore build, in 20 years, 5 million housing units if we wish to assure each citizen decent and dignified housing conditions. These figures explain the present situation, in which the demand is well above the supply, as the Sovereign explained so clearly: "In the present state of affairs, the heavy demand on the one hand, and the inadequate supply on the other, has brought about an imbalance to the point that the law of supply and demand, applied purely, necessarily causes voracious leases."

This situation has been aggravated as a result of the changes which are occurring in Moroccan society whereby the young married couples wish to live independently and not at the side of their parents. The present shortage therefore causes economic, social, and in the final analysis also political problems.

Hence the importance of the measures applied by His Majesty Hassan II for, if one wants people to build, they must be encouraged to do so, and the best means in this field, as in all others, is tax exemption. Thus the period of 15 years which has been established is long enough to permit the amortization of the construction. The step taken on behalf of the developers seems therefore to be quite exceptional because the situation itself is exceptional. It is a question of responding to a social and moral need; one could even say a primordial need.

Furthermore this measure will have very positive results on the economic level. The strongly stimulative effect of construction is well known; all are aware how it creates jobs and activity both directly and indirectly. In order to achieve the established goals, 250,000 housing units actually have to be built henceforth per year: one can thus judge the extraordinary development of many activities from the cement plants to the carpentry shops.

And one knows that the best taxpayer is prosperity in the end. Thanks to the surge of all the direct and indirect activities of construction, taxation will find new resources.

But people will ask whether it is possible to build 250,000 housing units per year. As elsewhere, this is a question of political will. The state, for example, is perfectly capable of building in 20 years a million housing units for its officials, or 5 million people, a quarter of the total requirement.

Industrial enterprises and quasi-state services, thanks to the concessions granted to them both on the financial and on the tax level, will also be able to build as many housing units.

Only three million housing units would remain to be built. This task, let us emphasize in passing, will be facilitated by the new policy on rural housing. The Minister of Housing and Development of the Territory, Mr Abbes El Fassi, will start the construction of 180 pilot villages during the next plan. These will constitute magnets of urbanization in the zones where

housing at the present time is scattered. This policy will make it possible to provide the populations, which are deprived of them, five essential services which they desire: roads, potable water, electricity, dispensaries, and schools, to say nothing of administrative services, like justice, or social services which the present scattered housing makes impossible to establish.

Intense building activity will spring up around these villages, and experience which can only be conclusive will thereby be enhanced.

It is therefore a question of a comprehensive housing policy which must be maintained and developed through new steps, particularly a Housing Charter, for the year 2000. The 40 million Moroccans who we will comprise should then possess 5 million more housing units than today, but one may rest assured that the necessary efforts, thanks to the example given by His Majesty Hassan II, will receive increased impulse, for it must not be forgotten that Morocco, during the next 20 years, will undergo a change greater than we have yet known, in this Morocco in which, let no one doubt it, everyone will live happily.

6108
CSO: 4400

ANNOUNCED BENEFITS MUST NOT BE NEGATED BY PRICE INCREASES

Casablanca AL-BAYANE in French 3 Sep 80 p 1

[Editorial]

[Excerpts] The latest council of ministers has announced the adoption of two important social measures.

These are the approval of a proposed decree-law concerning a one-third reduction in rent for people whose income does not exceed 1,500 dirhams, and the decision to provide, in the year ahead, a wage increase for minor functionaries.

There is no denying the social value and the import, in these critical times, so difficult for the popular masses, of these two measures.

Indeed one can ask oneself, legitimately, about their [prospects for] development and implementation, especially with regard to the decision to proceed to the one-third reduction in rents. Right here and now, in fact, it certainly appears that putting into practice such a measure will run into many stumbling blocks and a number of obstacles, none going so far as to predict that it could backfire against the very persons supposed to benefit from it...

But if one credits certain persistent rumors, these measures [illegible] emptied of any practical import, since an official price increase for basic necessities is in preparation.

In sum, the social policy of the government would [then] be like PENELOPE'S TAPESTRY: What's given with the one hand is taken back with the other!

Now what about those rumors?

Is it true that the government is getting ready to eliminate state aid, which takes the form of subsidies to the Compensation Fund, on indispensable products such as tea, sugar, oil, flour?

In this case such increases--which certain speculators have already anticipated--would plainly and simply annul the effects of the above-cited measures.

This is why we, for our part, consider it absolutely essential not to abandon the subsidies for basic necessities.

The people, for their part, bear the brunt of the crisis. It would be logical and just to preserve their purchasing power--already so limited--and to go get the money from where it can be found--through the tactic of an authentic tax reform such as it proposed by the PPS [Party of Progress and Socialism].

9516
CSO: 4400

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT SPENDING REVIEWED

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 29 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] A total of 1.76 billion dirhams is now reserved for the program financed by the special fund for regional development, in the framework of the 1978-1980 Triennial Plan. It is primarily made up of 1977 appropriations recycled for 1978. These appropriations were held with the aim of completing operations begun during the 1973-1977 5-year plan.

Several projects were thus effectively completed in the various provinces of the kingdom in the course of the years 1978 and 1979. Nevertheless, achievements could have been greater without the budgetary restrictions imposed at the national level which affected all sectors and types of projects. FSDR [Special Fund for Regional Development] disbursements thus experienced a mild decline in 1978 by comparison with the year 1977 (428 million dirhams against 452 million dirhams) and may well be weak in 1979 (164 million dirhams up to the end of October).

The main sectors concerned are: basic economic infrastructure as well as social and administrative equipment.

The geographic distribution of expenditures in 1978 shows that close to 30 percent went to the southern region including the Recovered Saharian Provinces.

The problems which have hindered completion of FSDR projects have had negative effects mainly on promotion of small and medium-sized businesses which are in general the main market principals involved in execution of these projects.

In the future this important aspect of the problem will be taken into account. Similarly, taking into account project locations in decisions on restriction of credits would allow for alleviation of pressures which could affect employment in the least advantaged regions.

The Development Fund for Local Communities (FDCL)

Credits reserved for the financing of these items was increased to more than 1 billion dirhams. The size of the appropriations to the local communities with respect to their equipage denotes the concern of the government to accompany the transfer of new powers to the communal councils with concomitant resources, especially financial, in order to give concrete content to the policy of decentralization.

The distribution of these credits by year and by region is as follows:

Régions	1978	1979	1980	TOTAL
1) Le Sud	8 649	35 000	60 000	103 649
2) Le Tensift	6 457	30 000	70 000	106 457
3) Le Centre	29 152	65 000	120 000	204 152
4) Le Nord-Ouest	23 580	60 000	100 000	173 580
5) Le Centre-Nord	9 668	20 000	60 000	89 668
6) L'Oriental	12 250	20 000	40 000	72 250
7) Le Centre-Sud	4 992	10 000	40 000	54 992
8) Toutes régions	94748	280 000	490 000	804 748
9) Opérations d'intérêt commun ou crédits à transférer par les ministères	6 252	178 300	110 000	293 552
Total	100 000	398 300	600 000	1098 300

Key:

1. South
2. Tensift
3. Center
4. Northwest
5. Central North
6. East
7. Center South
8. All regions
9. Operations of common interest or ministry transfer credits

These investments are aimed at the building of community infrastructure, specifically: sanitation, potable water, rural electrification, urban transport, urban electrical distribution, urban and rural improvements, personnel training in the local communities, specialized buildings, local road conditions, and some social infrastructure.

Beyond the social end of these subsidies given by the state, they are part of the vaster framework of the strengthening of the process of decentralization.

Decentralization

The first two years of the Triennial Plan were devoted to effectively putting into operation certain major aspects of the organic law of the local communities which gave the communal councils more extensive powers especially in the economic and social domains.

This is why in light of decentralization the FDCL has been given sizable credits like those mentioned above.

These credits have allowed the municipalities to undertake, by themselves, the realization of several projects of a local nature, and it has also allowed the autonomous centers and the rural communes to launch their infrastructure programs under the responsibility of the governor, who, in this case, has been given secondary authority over the credits.

9516
CSO: 4400

BANKS CONSORTIUM LOANS $250 MILLION

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 27 Aug 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] Paris, 27 August, (MAP)--Mr Abdelkamel Rerhaye, minister of finance, signed on Tuesday in Paris a loan agreement for $250 million granted to Morocco by a consortium of international banks.

This loan, said the kingdom's embassy in Paris, will be used to finance economic and social development projects, especially in agriculture, fishing, and energy research.

The consortium which granted this loan includes many Arab, European, and American banks, particularly the Union of Arab and French Banks, the Abu Dhabi Investment Company, the National Bank of Paris, Barclays International Group, Citicorp International Group, and the Commerzbank AG.

The signing ceremony took place in the presence of the close collaborators of Mr Rerhaye and several personalities of Paris financial circles who did not fail to stress that this loan is testimony to the confidence which the international financial organs place in the Kingdom of Morocco.

Thus Dr Mohamed Aboushadi, president of the Union of French Arab Banks (UBAF), said that this loan was favorably received by international financial circles because of the good management of the Moroccan economy and economic achievements in various sectors despite a difficult international situation.

Likewise the president of the UBAF praised the politico-economic system of the Kingdom of Morocco, which was characterized by "the application of liberal economic structures which have largely proved themselves."

In conclusion Mr Aboushadi expressed his confidence in the future of economic development in Morocco and his eagerness for the attainment of the goals of the future Moroccan 5-year-plan.

Replying to Mr Aboushadi, Mr Abdelkami Rerhaye, minister of finance stated in particular that: "This loan is the best testimony of the interest and confidence which international financial circles still have in my country, and the culmination of this operation is for us both a stimulus and an object of satisfaction.

"The results of the efforts exerted during the past 3 years are considerable in several respects, and particularly in 1980, which will show a growth rate of 6.5 percent. In the same year our exports will increase by 36 percent, which will make possible the reduction of the deficit in external accounts by 20 percent compared with 1979. In addition, the increase in private investment observed this year shows that the encouragements inaugurated by the authorities, particularly in the sectors of fisheries and small and medium enterprise, has begun to produce fruits."

"We are therefore in a position," adds Mr Rerhaye, "to enter into the new 5-year period with more calm and confidence in our possibilities of pursuing economic and social development and adapting our economy to the deep changes which have taken place on the international economic scene."

Furthermore, Mr Abdelkami Rerhaye declared that "one of the basic priorities of the future 5-year plan will be to increase national production, especially in agriculture, so as to insure a maximum coverage of the needs of the country for food products and to develop further our exports of agricultural products. Similarly, deep sea fishing, which contains great potentials which are insufficiently exploited, will benefit from our entire attention in order to develop and modernize it."

"In the field of energy," said Mr Rerhaye, "we are counting on implementing a program focused on the mobilization of national resources and on the rationalization of energy consumption. Stress will be placed on the search for petroleum, on the exploitation of oil shale, and on the completion of hydraulic equipment."

"With regard to industry, the next 5-year plan will favor the development of the sectors oriented toward exploitation and the industries substituting for imports, and it will especially provide a choice place for small and medium-sized industries which create many jobs."

"Parallel with these actions," added Mr Rerhaye, "we will continue to devote all necessary attention to internal and external balances so that they will not jeopardize the pursuit of progress."

"In this picture the development of our exports will be a favored tool for facing up to the pressures on the level of our balance of payments, pressures will result necessarily from our effort to acquire equipment. To this end the programs to develop and make profitable our main mineral resource, namely the phosphates, will be accentuated. Likewise the range of our export products will be diversified to the extent possible and a greater competitiveness of our products will be sought."

"On the level of internal accounts we have already undertaken a program of eliminating waste from our public finance, and we will take other measures designed especially to encourage national saving."

"This whole policy which we plan to follow during the coming 5-year period, the main lines of which I have traced for you," said Mr Rerhaye again, "enjoys the support of international financial institutions like the IMF and the World Bank."

"Actually, on the basis of programs agreed with these two institutions and which are being included in the framework of our future 5-year plan, these institutions will grant to Morocco during the next 3 years substantial financial contributions which will fill out our own means of financing and help us to make the necessary adjustments."

In conclusion Mr Rerhaye emphasized that the coming 5-year period "will be a period of profound change for the Moroccan economy." "We are firmly convinced," added the minister, "that we are capable of overcoming our difficulties rapidly and increasing our efforts for socioeconomic development."

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'AL-BAYANE': THOUSANDS LAID OFF IN CASABLANCA METAL INDUSTRIES

Casablanca AL-BAYANE in French 3 Sep 80 pp 1, 3

[Article]

[Text] The crisis is spreading, factories are shutting down. Thus, the metal industry in Casablanca (economic capital of the country) is more troubled than ever. In fact, the various production units in the sector are closing one after the other. This disturbing situation is going to get worse, since nothing has been decided on by officials, whereas increasing numbers of workers are finding themselves deprived of any source of income and work.

The social tragedy is widespread, as whole families are being condemned to loss and calamity.

We publish below a dramatic list of the factories which have closed their doors and sent their workers home:

THE RENNI WORKSHOPS:

The factory shut down on 1 September--40 workers laid off.

CIMM: [expansion unknown]

This establishment ceased operations on 25 August 1980, that is at a time when the annual leave of 20 workers had expired.

SECOMAC: [expansion unknown]

25 workers unemployed since 25 August 1980.

AFRICAL: [expansion unknown]

This establishment has been shut down since 18 August 1980. As a result, 35 workers are unemployed.

GROSSO:

The 250 workers at this establishment have been without jobs for some time. They continue to stay on site.

CARROSSERIE MARTINEZ: [Auto assembly]

The workers have been living under the gun since the unit was Moroccanized. In the end, the new manager decided to lay off all the personnel. And it is a tragedy for the many families that depended on the factory...

SHIPYARDS:

This enterprise has been closed for more than 2 months, with the authorization of the public authorities. About a hundred workers are unemployed.

CARROSSERIE BAHRI: [Auto assembly]

In this factory the workers are on strike; as for the management, it considers that the employees are already laid off: about 30.

MACONAVAL:

This factory has been on strike since 1 July 1980. It has 130 workers. Management rejects any rehiring of the 10 discharged workers.

SOMATIC:

Here too the "bankruptcy of society," 65 men without jobs since the beginning of summer.

For its part, SOMACA remains on strike, while the decision has been made to lay off 300 workers in this big automobile assembly plant.

This list, which is not exhaustive, expresses in a sadly eloquent way the scope of the crisis which the metal industry sector is experiencing, and the extent of unemployment which is hitting thousands of people: the laid-off workers and their families.

In the face of this situation it becomes urgent for the authorities to respond by preventing the lay-offs which are proceeding in tandem with the flight of capital.

For its part, the Casablanca working class will not sit with arms folded before this liquidation scheme.

9516
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INDUSTRIALIZATION POLICY, MOROCCANIZATION DISCUSSED

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 9 Sep 80 p 4

[Interview of Mohammed Belkhayat by MAGHREB-ARABE PRESSE]

[Text] "What characterizes Moroccan industrial policy is its opening up of foreign commerce" stated Mohammed Belkhayat, head of the Office of Industrial Development.

In an interview granted to the agency MAGHREB-ARABE PRESSE, in connection with the meeting on promotion of industrial investments in Morocco, which was held at Rabat, Mr. Belkhayat pointed out that Morocco has developed a firm and precise industrial strategy based on the following:

1. Valorization of phosphates by expansion of the Maroc-Chimie complex and establishment of Maroc-Phosphore, while other similar units are being planned.

2. Preparation and execution of a sugar plan which has enabled the construction of a dozen sugar mills and the production of two-thirds of the national consumption while expecting to satisfy all of the country's needs by the year 1990.

3. Activity in the cement and construction materials industry which made it possible to raise the production level to 4.5 million tons in 1979 whereas it amounted only to one million tons in 1960.

4. Development of the textile industry. In fact, Morocco, which in 1969 obtained nearly all of the textiles it required by importation, now meets all of its domestic requirements by production and exports approximately 800 million dirhams worth of these products.

In summary, domestic industry is meeting the requirements of the country with respect to everyday consumer products, it was pointed out by Mr. Belkhayat who nevertheless said that Morocco has contracted to produce intermediate products concerning the areas of mechanics, electronics, plastics and steel products.

The share of industrialization in the gross national product rose from 12 percent in 1912 to 18 percent in 1979, it was indicated by Mr. Belkhayat who added that the annual rate of increase of industrial exports has been 18 percent and that the number of industrial projects completed annually, which had been between 100 and 150 before 1972, is now between 600 and 650, which shows the enormous effort undertaken by the Moroccan government in the industrial field.

In answer to a question regarding the evaluation of the meeting for promotion of industrial investments in Morocco, Mr. Belkhayat emphasized the psychological impact of this forum which witnessed participation of more than 300 international firms comprising 32 different nations. This, he said, has permitted releasing the attention of the promotors and thus creating a climate of emulation which is favorable to the economic development of Morocco.

When asked about the role of the Office of Industrial Development with regard to small and medium business, Mr. Belkhayat referred to the creation within this office of a component charged with furnishing assistance and aid to those small and medium businesses which wish to receive it.

This component, which consists of a team of specialists and experts of the European Economic Commission, is charged with examining on the spot the problems of the small and medium businesses and to assist in solving them.

With regard to the present situation of small and medium businesses, industrial development has required that they adapt themselves easily to the situation and the government encourages this development.

Finally, in response to a question dealing with the development of Arab investments in Morocco, Mr. Belkhayat brought up the importance of Arab businessmen at this forum, which denotes the interest that they exhibit.

It should be pointed out that, during this meeting, he furnished the participants with a memorandum defining the regulation as well as the philosophy of Moroccanization.

The principle of Moroccanization was established by the decree of March 2, 1973. Operationally, it deals with the gradual taking over of the centers of economic decision by Moroccans so that efforts to expand the modern sector permit the beginning of growth.

Moroccanization constitutes participation rather than nationalization. It constitutes one of the phases of the Moroccan policy for economic development.

Thus, the Prime Minister was able to say during one of his statements on this subject: "We hope that Moroccanization will reveal, for any given sector, the preferred form of the association and that they take shape as far as possible by increases of capital connected with expansion of the sector."

Consequently, certain economic activities are reserved for individual and legal entities. The decree dealing with Moroccanization states the following: "Moroccan companies are defined as those which have their headquarters in Morocco and also satisfy one of the following criteria: (a) A corporation at least half of the capital of which belongs to Moroccan citizens. (b) Legal entities of a private nature, a majority of the members of the Board of Directors and the President of the Board being Moroccan citizens."

The economic activities concerned by the Moroccanization decree are determined by the application decree of May 8, 1973.

The economic activities appear on two lists. The non-Moroccan individual and legal entities carrying on one of these activities upon this date must conform to the provisions of the decree of March 2, 1973 no later than May 31, 1974 in the case of activities appearing on list number 1 and no later than May 31, 1975 in the case of activities appearing on list number 2. These lists may be obtained from the Ministry of Commerce.

As pointed out by the prime minister in one of the interviews dealing with Moroccanization, these lists are limiting in nature and concern the tertiary sector. Nevertheless, they concern those activities of a commercial nature such as assembling activities or those which are at a standstill and need to be put into motion.

In the case where a company conducts two distinct activities, one of which is covered by the decree and the other is not, the company should separate these activities, for example, by creating an affiliate which would be Moroccanized in accordance with the law or else should Moroccanize the entire company.

It should be pointed out that during the making of new foreign investments in Morocco, not only will financial participation be a great help, but also association with Moroccans will offer undeniable advantages by furnishing foreigners better knowledge of the local market, by furnishing them all contacts necessary with the Moroccan government and by providing them with facilities for obtaining raw materials, etc.

Recently, some businessmen (particularly Germans) expressed their regrets at not being able to find Moroccan partners or at finding Moroccan partners who possessed the desired qualifications but did not have sufficient capital.

In order to permit a large number of domestic businessmen (particularly those not possessing sufficient capital) to participate in Moroccanization operations, a Moroccanization fund was created by the government.

7619
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GOVERNMENT TO SUBSIDIZE RESTORATION OF OLD CITRUS PLANTATIONS

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 10 Sep 80 p 6

[Interview with Ahmed Derrab by Mohammed M'rani Alaoui]

[Text] Tomorrow (Thursday), at 10 A.M., the Association of Citrus Growers of Morocco will hold its annual meeting at the Salle des Fetes. This meeting has been delayed somewhat due to an exceptional season (770,000 metric tons exported), particularly with respect to late crops.

In order to inform the readers of this sector of the domestic economy, MAROC SOIR conducted the following interview with Ahmed Derrab, Secretary General of the Association of Citrus Growers of Morocco.

MAROC SOIR: Mr. Derrab, can you tell me in a few words what is the status of domestic cultivation of citrus fruits?

AHMED DERRAB: At the present time, it covers an area of 70,000 hectares, beginning at Berkane on the east and extends to the Souss plains, passing through Gharb (including Larache), a narrow strip between Rabat and Casablanca and finally Beni Mellal and Marrakech.

Our country produces five varieties of citrus fruits, namely the "noble variety" (that is, the clementine), navel, blood orange, early orange and late orange.

M.S.: The domestic industry of cultivation of citrus fruit is presently classified as small and medium business which makes it less competitive on the international market. What can be done to remedy this situation?

A.D.: It should first be mentioned that all of the plants are combined under FRUMAT where growers,the Marketing and Export Office and foreign cutomers each own approximately one-third of the capital.

We are pleased with the decision that has just been made by the government of His Majesty the King in this regard and which consists in authorizing the growers to own 50 percent of the capital.

This will permit better valorization of the domestic production which amounts to approximately one million metric tons and serves three principal clients, namely, exporting (70 percent), consumption by the domestic market of fresh fruit (20 percent) and processing plants (10 percent).

M.S.: Has this industry been reproached for favoring foreign markets and neglecting the domestic market?

A.D.: This unbalance constitutes one of the weaknesses of our sector and makes us directly dependent on foreign trade with its accompanying hazards. In order to avoid this situation, our association has seriously undertaken a policy of organizing the domestic market.

M.S.: What are the practical measures that have been taken in this regard?

A.D.: Our approach is two-pronged, the first one being to increase domestic consumption. It is absurd that this consumption is restricted to 9 or 10 kilograms per capita per year in our own country, where we grow the fruit, whereas in the non-producing countries, where the cost of this food amounts to 5 or 6 times that of the price in our country, the consumption reaches a value of 13 to 15 kilograms in the case of France and Germany and as high as 20 kilograms in Holland.

The second prong of our approach is "moralization" of the citrus fruit industry since the consumers' price is, on the average, six times the production cost.

In practice, let us assume that an advertising campaign is conducted on radio, television and various organs of the domestic press.

With regard to price, we operate at the level of the processing plants through which 80 percent of our domestic production passes.

When it comes to sorting, we require that the quality of the product earmarked for consumption be better than that of the fruit to be crushed with minimum prices going to the grower. What we can't figure out is how to determine the price to the consumer.

M.S.: Are the distribution costs a constant problem in this business? Why doesn't this branch of the industry work for itself?

A.D.: The ideal solution would be for us to own the entire infrastructure and the equipment required for transportation, handling and processing of our product.

However, it happens that we have inherited part of this infrastructure (the processing plants already installed). We are not resting on our laurels. On the contrary, we have converted to a policy of integration which is aimed at having the growers own the processing plants so that they may handle their own harvests themselves.

This policy has already begun to be implemented. At the present time, 60 percent of the processing plants belong to the growers.

The small growers have not been neglected. The Marketing and Export Office has been requested (and has agreed) to build processing plants reserved for the small growers and run by the Marketing and Export Office for these growers.

I would like to mention that the Association has very recently completed the construction of a processing plant at Marrakech which will be operated by the Marrakech growers.

With regard to transportation, the National Transportation Office refuses to allow the growers to use their own vehicles to move their crops.

M.S.: Vehicles bearing the initials of the Association of the Citrus Growers of Morocco would guarantee to the National Transportation Office that the growers would not use such an authorization for several days during the year and the problem would be solved, wouldn't it?

A.D.: The Association of Citrus Growers of Morocco is a non-profit organization and cannot lend itself to any trafficking -- with the exception of Saudi Arabia.

M.S.: How can you explain the absence of Moroccan oranges in the Middle East and in the countries bordering the Persian Gulf?

A.D.: Exporting of citrus fruits depends on the Marketing and Export Office which holds the monopoly. Nevertheless, upon the request of the growers, the regulations governing the Marketing and Export Office have been revised in such a manner as to be able to participate with this office regarding exporting and sales. In this connection, the representatives of the Association of Citrus Growers of Moroccco have seats on the Board of Directors of the Marketing and Export Office.

Similarly, officers and technicians of the Association of Citrus Growers of Morocco meet together with the Marketing and Export Office within commissions and technical committees, the most important of which is the Permanent Citrus Growers Committee which, on the one hand, combines the governing staff of the services concerned by the citrus growers with the Marketing and Export Office and, on the other hand, the members of the Board of Directors of the Association of Citrus Growers of Morocco.

For this purpose, delegations are sent to the principal foreign markets in order to conduct on-the-spot investigations of conditions of distribution and marketing of citrus fruits.

M.S.: During the 1979-1980 season, 1,037,000 metric tons of citrus fruits were grown while during the 1978-1979 season only 876,000 metric tons were produced. Can't the Association of Citrus Growers of Morocco do something to control the production levels which appear to be at the mercy of climatic conditions?

A.D.: Contrary to the case of industrial production, all agricultural production depends not only on production conditions but also on climatic conditions.

With regard to climatic conditions, nothing can be done about the chergui [Arab word for hot desert winds], hail, very heavy rains or the seasonal effect, where a tree that has a heavy yield one year will produce less the following year.

However, the area where we can exert some influence is that of production conditions, namely, irrigation, manure, fertilizers, and the use of trained technicians who are distributed among the citrus growing regions of Morocco. This is what we do.

M.S.: On July 30 at Police Headquarters, a meeting of the Board of Directors of the Marketing and Export Office, presided over by His Majesty the King, was held in connection with royal directives to be transmitted to the growers. The sovereign insisted upon returning to the concept of the orchard and upon increasing the areas devoted to citrus cultivation. What was done in this direction?

A.D.: With respect to this suggestion, the citrus profession proceeded to reconvert the varieties grown by removing the poor ones and replacing them with the best ones.

Furthermore, in order to encourage the replacement of old orchard plantations with new ones and, taking into account the exorbitant cost of a hectare of citrus fruits (33,000 dirhams from the first to the seventh year), the Association of Citrus Growers of Morocco requested aid and incentives for the growers.

The government has just answered our appeal by granting a subsidy of 3500 dirhams per hectare for five years with a deferred amortization of five years at a preferential interest rate.

As for an increase of area devoted to citrus growing, the rate of new planting set for the five-year plan (1981 to 1985) has been set at 1500 to 2000 hectares per year.

What most delighted the members of the citrus growing profession was the fact that the incentives granted by the government be allotted to the growers as soon as possible.

EXPORTS for 1979-1980 = 770,000 metric tons (Value = 160 billion centimes) as compared with exports for 1978-1979 of 543,000 metric tons (Value = 116 billion centimes)

COUNTRY	No. of metric tons
France	213,000
West Germany	141,000
Other member nations of the European Economic Community	63,700
Great Britain	30,400
Scandinavia	44,200
Other West European nations	3,200
Total for Western Europe	496,300
Soviet Union	194,300
Poland	20,600
Saudi Arabia	47,700
Canada	6,300
Other nations	3,000
Total for nations other than Western Europe	273,700
World total	770,000

Production of citrus fruits by variety and season

VARIETIES	1979-1980 season	1978-1979 season
Clementines	267,000	232,000
Navels	216,000	200,000
Blood oranges	78,000	68,000
Salustianas	13,000	13,000
Early oranges	18,000	23,000
Late oranges	432,000	326,000
Miscellaneous citrus fruits	12,500	14,000

Total production for 1979-1980 season = 1,037,000 metric tons
Total production for 1978-1979 season = 876,000 metric tons

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ON ORIENTAL REGION INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 13-14 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] The economic Oriental region which consists of the provinces of Oujda, Nador and Figuig and which covers a total area of 82,820 square kilometers, constitutes a coherent and complementary ensemble possessing large scale basic infrastructures and equipment.

The port of Nador-Beni Ansar, which can receive ore ships displacing 60,000 metric tons, will bring new blood to the Oriental region and its Mediterranean coast, will confirm its vocation and will favor its opening to Europe, the Mediterranean countries and the Middle East.

In addition to its political impact, the port of Nador-Beni Ansar, the first phase of which was constructed at a cost of 145 million dirhams, will permit saving time and money with regard to import and export operations. For a long time, the Oriental region has been supplied from Casablanca although it is located at a distance of a few hundred kilometers by ship from Europe.

Another port which is smaller than that of Nador is now being constructed at Ras Kebdana (pleasure boat and fishing boat port) and, in the future, we expect to see port installations extending along the coast from Nador to Saidia.

Moreover, construction of the steel complex at Nador at a cost of 1,000 billion centimes, probably motivates construction of the port of Nador, as well as establishment of the railway link between Nador and Taourirt. The first Moroccan steel plant will be completed at Nador, near the iron mine which the Spaniards began to operate more than seventy years ago.

The steel and chemical complex, as was predicted some time ago by Moussa Saadi, Minister of Energy and Mines, will have a leading effect on the entire region. Several industrial plants will be established at Nador as well as at Taourirt, Oujda and Berkane (pharmaceutical and plastics industry and possibly mechanical and automobile construction).

One of the measures that is forecast by officials is the establishment of industrial zones at Oujda, Nador, Taourirt and Berkane, probably in anticipation of the industrial development that will occur in the region in the future but also to satisfy the demands formulated by the industrial enterprises and corporations.

The economic Oriental region also includes a sugar mill and a cement plant. The former uses cane and sugar beets whose cultivation was undertaken on a large scale along the irrigated perimeter of Zaio (site of the sugar mill) and Berkane. As for the cement plant, inaugurated two months ago by Azeddine Guessous, Minister of Commerce, Industry, Merchant Marine and Maritime Fishing, it satisfies all the needs of the region and sometimes sells merchandise to Casablanca, Fes and Melilla.

Establishment of a port, a steel and chemical complex, a cement plant (the first of its type in Africa), a sugar mill, a railway link between Tatourirt and Nador and other valuable large scale projects will be of extreme importance to the development of the oriental region.

It should also be stated that the oriental region includes the largest thermal station of the kingdom of Morocco which is located at Jerada, near the coal bed of this town, which is considered to be the second ranking labor center of the kingdom after Khouribga and Youssoufia, and employs approximately 6,000 workers in the mining of coal.

In fact, the oriental region harbors large ore reserves of iron (Nador), lead (Oued El Himer), anthracite (Jerada), iron (Ouixan), zinc (Boubker), manganese (Bouarfa), copper (Jbel Klakh) and Fuller's earth (Nador) which are presently being exploited.

Indeed, it appears that industrialization of this region carries top priority due to the fact that the subsoil is very rich in minerals and that both climatic conditions and the nature of the soil are often not very favorable to the pursuit of agriculture.

Nevertheless, agriculture has not been completely neglected. The first dam to be constructed in independent Morocco was the Mohammed V dam followed by the Mechra Hammadi dam which irrigates nearly 60,000 hectares. The regions of Berkane and Zaio, which are under the jurisdiction of the Moulouya regional office of Agricultural Development, is rich and prosperous. A variety of crops including citrus fruits and legumes are grown here.

Nevertheless, although the search for water in the southern portion of this region is being conducted, it appears to be absolutely necessary to intensify prospection operations for water and to undertake irrigation of the great plains of Naima, Tafrata and Dahra.

Irrigation of these plains, which extend over tens of hectares, will contribute not only to regional and national prosperity but also to conservation of the soil, to moderation of climate and to social stabilization. It is true that it will be necessary to construct a dam over the Za wadi and to irrigate the 8500 hectare Garet plain, beginning at Moulouya, but it will be necessary to step up the pace of work so as to keep the population where it is now and to avoid any exodus such as those which particularly affected the inhabitants of the southern region in recent years following the occurrence of droughts. Water is also of vital importance for animals. In this connection, it should be kept in mind that the livestock of the Oriental region numbers approximately 3 million heads.

Futhermore, construction of modern roads and repair of old ones is more necessary than ever before. Development of domestic and foreign tourism depends on this to a great extent. Several inhabitants of other provinces of Morocco would like to visit this region but are afraid of the dangers of the road which is either narrow or impassable at certain places. A modern road which furnishes easy access to the region, which is relatively mountainous, is indispensable. It will also be necessary to think about the construction of roads leading to tourist sites, to beach resorts, summer resorts, and spas such as Zegzel, Debdou, Sidi Chafi (Goutitir), Tafogalt, Ben Kachour and about the creation of new links so as to permit direct access and reduce travel time.

7619
CSO:4400

BRIEFS

ARREST OF AUTO WORKERS--While the strike of the workers of the SOMACA is about to enter its fourth month, the workers continue to be victims of arbitrary measures. On the 25th of this month, for example, four SOMACA workers were arrested, namely Ajemaane Mohamed Majid, Belasri Mohamed, El Betti Abdellah and Lansar Lefkih. These unjust arrests occurred at a time when discontent among the workers reached a high point. They thus confirm the arbitrary behavior of a managment which imposes its views on officials who refuse to intervene in a positive way and prefer a worsening of the situation while labor legislation in effect is violated and the most elementary rights of the workers are flouted. This is what we have confirmed throughout the strike which the workers began last 3 June. The immediate and unconditional freeing of the workers should occur without delay. This would be a just measure which the authorities should take on an urgent basis. This is what AL BAYANE demands, in solidarity with the workers of SOMACA. [Excerpts] [Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 26 Aug 80 p 1] 6108

SARDINES FOR NIGERIA -- A total of 600,000 cartons of sardines canned in vegetable oil were delivered to Nigeria during 1980. This large contract which was signed by the Moroccan Marketing and Export Office and by Nigeria, constitutes nearly thirty percent of Morocco's exports of canned sardines, which amount to 2.2 million cartons per year (average of the last five seasons), and more than 80 percent of our sales of canned sardines to African markets, the average being 720,000 cartons per season. Moreover, this contract covers 23 percent of the planned exports of sardines for the 1979-1980 season, its total value amounting to 59,275,000 dirhams. [Text] [Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 13-14 Sep 80 p 1] 7619

CSO: 4400

INTERNAL CHANGES SEEN AS ENCOURAGING

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 9 Aug p 1

[Text] Something new is now appearing in Tunisia, and in a discreet but genuine way one has the firm impression that the political climate is changing, for the better, moreover.

When Mohamed M'Zali was named prime minister, some hoped that the situation, which had been fixed and immobile for a number of years, was going to change. This prediction was based on the confirmation that the Tunisian regime was being carried along by a new reality, particularly characterized by popular desire, expressed in various channels, to modify drastically the political status-quo.

This is actually what is happening. The trend of thinking outside the single party in power is increasingly enjoying a certain organizational latitude and right of expression.

Thus the "social-democrats," represented partly by former minister Ahmed Mestiri and his friends, have obtained authorization to publish two dailies, one in Arabic, the other in French.

More significant and highly positive is the fact that Tunisian political prisoners, members of organizations like "Al Amil Tounoussi," or "The Perspectivists," the trade unionists loyal to Habib Achour, and others, have been freed. This measure of clemency is a sure sign of a timid but positive evolution of the Tunisian regime, marked by the omnipresence and omnipotence of the Destourian Socialist Party.

The fact that Mr Masmoudi, the former minister may finally emerge from house arrest and that an opposition faction is now forming within the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] itself, testifies to the fact that Tunisia is progressing toward democratization, ardently demanded by the people's masses on various occasions and in diverse ways.

The revival of the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] which had been transformed into a tail appendage of the authorities after the dramatic

events of January 1978, the launching of the process of democratization, and a certain opening up of power.

All this is worth emphasizing and assessing at its true value. The Moroccan people, attentive to Maghreb questions, can only encourage such a development especially since it is true that the situation in Tunisia was explosive due to the immobilism of the authorities in power.

The bloody events of Gafsa, the result of an adventurist and completely mistaken vision of a group manipulated from abroad arrived to act as the tocsin. The ruling political class understood that the alert had been a warm one, even though the commandos who attacked this workers' city received no support from the population.

The absence of democracy, repression of progressive organizations, internal struggles within the "elites" heading the country, on a background of a serious economic and social crisis are the objective factors which enabled some people to attempt their blameworthy operations against Tunisia. They failed, and one can say that in a certain sense they marked the beginning of a change which is being confirmed at the present time.

In this connection one must note and regret that the Tunisian authorities failed to show itself to be equal to its responsibilities by ordering the execution of death sentences pronounced upon members of this group of young fanatics manipulated by a neighboring state.

It seems to us that clemency would have been preferable, for the failure of this adventure had been total and complete, the Tunisian members of the commando being no more than blind and deluded simple tools.

This being the case it is important for the good of Tunisia, for its future, and in conformity with the aspirations of the brotherly people, to deepen this process, to expand and pursue it.

In this sense one thing is crucial. This is the lifting of the unjust ban which has affected the Tunisian Communist Party since 1963, a vanguard, patriotic and responsible revolutionary organization. This step, as well as the authorization of the publication of the Tunisian Communist press would confirm the desire for an opening and democratization on the part of the government of Mr M'Zali.

Morocco itself is following a path which bears many similarities with that followed in Tunisia. One can even note that it is the first to have embarked upon it in the region, but one must perfect it, pursue it in a serious spirit and with an opening of the mind.

In this sense the freeing of the remainder of the political prisoners in Morocco is necessary, since it is true that a process should always be completed.

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END

JPRS 76628

16 October 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2201

EGYPT: MILITARY SERVICE LAW AND VARIOUS ARMED FORCES REGULATIONS

FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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JPRS 76628

16 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2201

EGYPT: MILITARY SERVICE LAW AND VARIOUS ARMED FORCES REGULATIONS

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NEW MILITARY SERVICE LAW PUBLISHED

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic 10 Jul 80 pp 9-40

/Text/ Law No 128 for the Year 1980

Issuing the National Military Service Law

In the name of the people:

We, the president of the republic, have issued the law whose text follows, which the People's Assembly has approved:

Article One. The provisions of the National Military Service Law attached will be in effect as of 1 December 1980. Law No 505 for the year 1955 re- regarding national military service will be abrogated as of that date.

Article Two. Every male who has reached 30 years of age by the publication of this law but will not be 35 by 1 December 1980, or who has reached 30 years of age but whose draft status has not been determined, must proceed to the related conscription and mobilization area by a date no later than 30 November 1980, to be dealt with as follows:

A. People who have not reached 35 years of age by 30 November 1980 will be compulsorily drafted for the period stipulated in accordance with the provisions of the abovementioned Law No 505 for the year 1955 but will not be drafted for an additional year.

B. The punishment imposed on violators who have reached 35 years of age by the time of issuance of this law or 30 November 1980 will be a fine of no less than 500 and no more than 1,000 pounds.

C. The provisions of the accompanying law will be supplied to any person mentioned in Paragraphs A and B above who fail to present himself to the related conscription and mobilization area by 30 November 1980.

Article Three. This law will be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH and the provisions of the preceding article will be in effect as of the day following the date of its publication.

This law will be stamped with the seal of the state and will be implemented as one of its laws.

Issued by the Office of the President, 6 July 1980.

/Signed/ Anwar al-Sadat.

National Military Service Law

Part One

Imposing National Military Service

Article One. Military service will be imposed on every male Egyptian who has reached 18 years of age, and national service will be imposed on all males and females who have reached 18 years of age, in accordance with the provisions stipulated in this law.

Article Two. National military service includes:

First, active compulsory military service, which is performed by males in the following organizations:

A. The armed forces of various branches.

B. Police and government departments and authorities with a military system specified by decree of the president. None of the persons stipulated in Paragraph One of Article Four may perform his service in any of these bodies.

C. National work brigades which are established by decree of the Council of Ministers and in which those serve who are fit for military service and become surplus to the requirements of the armed forces before the period of 3 years stipulated in Paragraph One of Article 35 has elapsed.

Individuals will be apportioned to these organizations in accordance with the rules set out by the minister of defense, by his own decree.

The decree of the prime minister on the establishment of national work brigades will describe the type of work, mode of organization of work, and mode of treatment of individuals in terms of living allowances, housing, service period, work hours and other matters related to service in them.

Second, service in national organizations, by which are meant:

A. Performance of public service for males and females of groups subject to the provisions of Law No 76 for the Year 1973 regarding public service for young people who have completed educational stages, in accordance with the provisions of that law.

B. Performance of public service for persons other than those mentioned in the previous paragraph belonging to the group stipulated in Article Five, in accordance with the conditions and terms issued in a decree of the prime minister.

Article Three. First, the period of compulsory active military service is 3 years.

Second, the period of compulsory military service in the national work brigades is a maximum of 3 years.

Third, the period of service in national organizations is 1 year.

Members of the national work brigades and the national organizations referred to in Paragraphs Second and Third will not be compelled to serve in the reserve.

Article Four, the period of compulsory active military service stipulated in Paragraph One of Article Three will be reduced to:

A. One year for graduates of university faculties and higher institutes in the Arab Republic of Egypt or their equivalents abroad.

B. Two years for persons receiving intermediate or above-intermediate diplomas or any other equivalent diplomas abroad, provided that they be granted a comprehensive monthly stipend equivalent to the starting salary stipulated for their peers in the administrative system of the state during the last 6 months of their compulsory service.

The diplomas referred to in Paragraphs A and B will be adjusted in accordance with laws and bills and will be considered within the scope of the reduced military period as part of the academic qualification the individual had received on starting his admission to actual service, which will end with his transfer to the reserve. A decree will be issued by the minister of defense regulating these persons' performance of compulsory military service and their release dates in accordance with the provisions of this law.

C. One year for those who have memorized the holy Koran in its entirety but do not possess credentials. A decree will be issued by the minister of defense, with the agreement of the minister concerned with al-Azhar affairs, regulating the conditions and terms for meeting this condition.

Second, a period of not more than 6 months will be deducted from the period of 3 years stipulated in Section First of Article Three for persons

possessing skills and crafts the armed forces require. These skills and crafts, the reduction periods, and the conditions of their jobs will be specified by decree of the minister of defense.

Article Five. Males surplus to the needs of the armed forces will be called up for the national service stipulated in Paragraph B of Section of Article Two after the period of 3 years stipulated in Section First of Article 35 of this law has elapsed.

Article Six. The following will be exempted from application of the provision of Article One:

First, persons appointed to serve in the armed forces, the police, or a government authority with a military system at the rank of officer.

Second, students in faculties and institutes prepared for the graduation of officers in the armed forces or officers in the police, government departments and authorities with a military system, on condition that the students continue with their studies until graduation. If they do not complete their studies successfully the period they spent in the faculty or institute will not be computed as part of the two sections of the period of military service.

Third, persons enjoying citizenship in the Arab Republic of Egypt who have actually performed military service in the army of a foreign country, if they have held ordinary residence in that country and have been committed to performing this service by virtue of its laws.

Fourth, classes on the rules and terms of exemption for which a decree is issued by the minister of defense, in accordance with the requirements of the public interest or security of the state; a decree on the exemption will be issued by the minister of defense.

The students stipulated in Section Second must present themselves to the related conscription and mobilization area within 30 days of the date on which the cause has lapsed.

The directors of faculties and institutes and those under their jurisdiction must inform the related conscription and mobilization area of every student who for any reason has not completed his studies in the faculty or institute.

As regards persons assigned to work in the armed forces at a rank of officer, it is stipulated that they have performed military service or have been exempted from it in permanent fashion.

Article Seven. First, the following will be permanently exempted from military and national service:

A. Persons who do not possess medical fitness for such service.

B. Only sons of fathers who are deceased or permanently unable to earn a living.

C. The oldest person subject to the draft who is the brother or son of citizens who have been killed or afflicted with an injury permanently rendering them incapable of earning a living as a result of war activities.

D. The oldest person subject to the draft who is the brother or son of officers, ordinary soldiers or volunteers who have died as a result of service or have been afflicted with a disease or disability as a result of service, if that has had the effect of permanently rendering them incapable of earning a living.

Second, the following will be temporarily exempted from military and national service:

A. Only sons of living fathers.

B. Only dependents of fathers who are incapable of earning a living as well as the only dependents of a brother or brothers who are incapable of earning a living.

C. Only dependents of mothers if they are widows or permanently divorced or if their husbands are incapable of earning a living.

D. Only dependents of an unmarried sister or sisters.

E. The oldest person subject to the draft who is the brother or son of officers, ordinary soldiers, volunteers or citizens who have been missing because of war operations. This exemption will lapse when that person returns or it is proved that he is still alive. People absent in military operations will be treated as missing until their status becomes clear.

In all cases of temporary exemption, the exemption will lapse when the cause for it lapses, and anyone whose cause of exemption has lapsed must present himself to the related conscription and mobilization area within 30 days of the date the cause has lapsed so that he may be properly dealt with in terms of conscription.

Third, if one of two or more brothers is mobilized or called up for service in the reserves in accordance with Article 33, the other remaining brother or brothers will be temporarily exempted from compulsory active service after those who are incapable of earning a living have been removed.

It is stipulated that none of the brothers have avoided conscription, be past 30 or be exempted from the draft.

The exemption will lapse when the compulsory military service or period of call up to reserves, ends, he runs away, or he ceases to be unable to earn a living.

Anyone whose cause for exemption has lapsed must present himself to the related conscription and mobilization area 30 days of the date when the cause has lapsed so that he may be properly dealt with in terms of conscription.

Fourth, the minister of defense will, by his own decree, specify the conditions of medical fitness for military service and the conditions of permanent and temporary inability to earn a living.

Article Eight. Active compulsory military service may be deferred for study in peacetime for military students and those engaged in full-time study whose description follows, until they receive the academic credentials for whose sake their service is deferred:

A. Students in secondary schools and the equivalent inside or outside the republic, on condition that the student's age during the deferment period not exceed 22.

B. Students in al-Azhar secondary institutes and students in al-Azhar teachers' training institutes and the equivalent, on condition that the student's age during the deferment period not exceed 24.

C. Students in institutes where the study period is 2 years following general secondary school and the equivalent and students in institutes, schools and training centers where the study period is 5 years after the preparatory stage and the equivalent, on condition that the student's age during the deferment period not exceed 25.

D. Students in institutes where the study period is 3 years following general secondary and the equivalent, on condition that the student's age during the deferment period not exceed 26.

E. Students in faculties of the universities of the Arab Republic of Egypt and higher institutes and schools and the equivalent inside or outside the republic, on condition that the student's age during the deferment period not exceed 28.

With respect to students in the al-Azhar University faculties, it is conditional that the student's age not exceed 30.

If the age of the student in the last paragraphs reaches the maximum age referred to in Paragraphs A, B, C, D and E of the Subsection One, his draft deferment will continue until the end of the academic year, on condtion that the student's age not exceed 30 years and 6 months with respect to students in the faculties of al-Azhar University.

The minister concerned will, in agreement with the minister of defense, determine the faculties, institutes, schools and training centers which will be considered equivalent to the faculties, institutes, schools and training centers stipulated in the foregoing paragraphs, and this will be issued by a decree of the minister of defense.

Students whose draft has been deferred must in all cases present themselves to the related conscription and mobilization area within 30 days of the date on which the cause has lapsed so that they may be properly dealt with in terms of conscription.

The deans of faculties and institutes, the directors and supervisors of institutes, schools and training centers, their equivalents and the government's consuls abroad must inform the related conscription and mobilization area of the departure of the student from the faculty, institute, school or training center for enrollment in which or his attainment of academic credentials his service was deferred, or the mere fact that he has reached the age referred to in Paragraphs A, B, C, D and E of the Subsection First within 30 days of the date of the lapse of the cause.

Article Nine. It is permissible, by decree of the minister of defense, to defer compulsory service for a period the minister deems appropriate for individuals of the following description:

First, graduates of faculties and institutes whose certificates by nature require spending a study or training period after acquiring higher credentials, provided that the indivdual not have failed to appear for an examination or conscription without an acceptable excuse and on condition that the age of the individual during the deferment period not exceed 28 years, or 30 years with respect to graduates of faculties of al-Azhar University. If it is in excess of that they must be called up for conscription.

Second, graduates of universities and higher institutes whom the state sends on missions abroad or domestically who are entitled to the temporary exemption, provided at least 3 years remain until their cause for exemption lapses, provided that they present themselves to the related conscription and mobilization area at least 6 months before they reach the age of 30.

People sent on missions abroad must register before traveling.

Those whose draft has been deferred in the abovementioned cases must present themselves spontaneously to the related conscription and mobilization areas when the cause for the deferment lapses so that they may register their names or be drafted by the dates determined by the minister of defense.

The directors of the bodies to which they belong must inform the related conscription and mobilization area within 30 days of the date of the lapse of the cause for deferment or their attainment of the age specified in the preceding paragraphs.

Part Two

On Organization and Specializations

Article 10. For purposes of the performance of military and national service and mobilization activities, the Arab Republic of Egypt will be broken down into conscription and mobilization areas subordinate to the Conscription Department.

In each governorate, a conscription and mobilization branch will be established, and a conscription and mobilization center will be established in each police precinct or center. These will all be subordinate to the conscription and mobilization area situated in its area of specialization, and a decree will be issued by the minister of defense forming and allocating these areas, branches and centers.

Article 11. The areas of mobilization and conscription and the branches of conscription and mobilization in the governorates will be concerned with reviewing requests for exemption, exception and deferment from military service inside or outside the Arab Republic of Egypt, when the conditions are present at any time, each within its area of specialization.

The areas of conscription and mobilization and the branches of conscription and mobilization in the governorates will also be concerned with reviewing newly arising causes for the exception, exemption and deferment of conscripts and will also be concerned with reviewing newly arising causes for the exception and exemption of people appointed to reserve service.

Anyone requesting exception or exemption from military service or deferment of compulsory military service, in accordance with the stipulations of Articles Six, Seven, Eight and Nine, must present the documents confirming his entitlement to that.

The bodies competent to issue these documents must give them to those persons when they demand them, and the minister of defense will determine the requisite documents in each case by his own decree.

The government's consuls abroad, or those acting in their place, will be the final authority regarding compulsory service deferment requests, in accordance with the stipulations of Article Eight, if conditions for those requests exist, with respect to persons living abroad, and the consuls must inform the related conscription and mobilization area immediately.

Persons whose compulsory service is deferred by finding of the consuls and whose deferment causes have lapsed because of the acquisition of credentials, attainment of the stipulated age, exhaustion of the /allotted/ failure times, or dismissal, must return to the homeland and present themselves to the related conscription and mobilization area within 60 days of the date the cause has lapsed so that their draft status may be determined.

Article 12. A military medical council will be attached to each conscription and mobilization area comprising various specialists no less than five in number. After eliminating those it decides to exempt permanently or except, the council will perform medical examinations on those persons it desires to draft in order to determine the degree of their fitness for military service and determine their medical level.

The medical council will also examine fathers and brothers to evaluate the extent of their ability to earn a living, when they are transferred to it by the director of the Conscription Department for the directors of the conscription and mobilization areas.

This will take place in accordance with conditions determined by the minister of defense by his own decree.

Another medical military council may be established in the conscription and mobilization areas to conduct medical examinations on people desired for the examination stage in the conscription and mobilization branches in the governorates to evaluate the extent of their fitness for military service and determine their medical level, on the dates determined by the director of the Conscription Department by his own decree in accordance with the general program issued in this regard.

The director of the Conscription Department may if the situation requires at any time order that a second medical examination be given on persons who are not fit for military service or fathers and brothers who are not able to earn a living by presenting them to a higher medical committee formed under the chairmanship of the chief of the medical branch in the Conscription Department, with at least two doctors with a rank of not less than major as members chosen by the director of the Medical Services Department from its specialized physicians who have not previously given a medical examination on the persons presented to this committee. A decree appointing them will be issued by the director of the Conscription Department.

The director of the Conscription Department may, in accordance with a recommendation by the chairman of the medical branch at the Conscription Department, after examining the case, order that a medical examination be given a second time on persons who are medically fit before they are transported to the corps they have joined on presenting them to the abovementioned higher medical committee to determine the extent of their fitness for military service.

This committee, following the agreement of the director of the Conscription Department, may seek the recourse of one or more specialized physicians in the Medical Services Department in the event of a difference of opinion.

Article 13. A technical committee will be formed in every conscription and mobilization area to select and distribute persons fit for service to the organizations stipulated in Paragraph One of Article Two.

Another technical committee may be formed in each conscription and mobilization area to conduct psychological, cultural or vocational tests on persons who are called for the examination stage in the conscription and mobilization branches in the governorates, determining the degree of fitness of each, within the periods determined by decree of the director of the Conscription Department within the limits of the general program.

The minister of defense will by his own decree organize methods for preparing special records on them and dealing with those of them who remain absent. This decree will also determine the areas of specialization and measures of these committees.

Article 14. Every male who has reached the compulsory service age will have a card known as the military and national service card which he must permanently carry as soon as he receives it. He may not obtain more than one card. In the event he loses or destroys it, he must inform the related conscription and mobilization area within 7 days of the date it was lost or destroyed so that measures may be taken to draw up another card.

The form of the card, the data which must be established, the entity which will issue it, its period validity, the measures for drawing it up and the examinations and records regulating conscription will be determined by decree of the minister of defense.

This decree will also determine the amount of the fees to be paid to draw up a replacement for the person who loses or destroys his card, provided that that not exceed 500 milliemes.

The conscription and mobilization area for dealing with the individual with respect to conscription will be the area in whose jurisdiction the administrative body by which the military and national service card was drawn up the first time lies. The Cairo conscription and mobilization area will be considered that for persons who have had proof of identity cards drawn by consulates of the Arab Republic of Egypt abroad.

Article 15. Every person who has completed 18 years of age must present himself, with the proof of identity card in his possession, to the conscription and mobilization center in whose jurisdiction he resides in the month of December of the year in which he completes that age in order to receive a military and national service card specifying the date of the callup for the examination stage. There will be no need to inform him to attend at the specified time.

The conscription delegate must deliver the military and national service card to the person after ascertaining his identity.

Everyone who has completed 19 years of age but regarding whom the conscription action taken has not been entered on the military and national service card must present the card to the conscription and mobilization center in which it was drawn up within 30 days of his completion of that age so that the mode of dealing with him with respect to conscription may be determined.

If a person has not had an identity card drawn up, or has not presented his birth certificate or an official copy of it, he must be presented to the medical council stipulated in Article 12 for a determination of his age and the manner in which he is to be dealt with with respect to conscription.

Article 16. Everyone, from the date on which he receives a military and national service card until he completes 30 years of age, will be bound, in the event he changes his place of residence or work, to present himself to the precinct or center to which he changed residence, with the proof of identity card in his possession, within 30 days of the date the change occurred.

The precinct or center must notify the conscription delegate in the administrative body from which the person has received his military service card of a change in his place of residence.

Article 17. The faculties of Egyptian universities, al-Azar University, the higher institutes and schools, their equivalent, the secondary and al-Azhar institutes, training institutes, schools and centers where the study period is 2 years or more following the general secondary /stage/ and their equivalent, or 5 years following the preparatory /stage/ and their equivalent, and the secondary schools and their equivalent, must prepare special records on conscription activities in which the names of the students in the final years will be noted down. These faculties, institutes, schools, and training centers will present lists to the conscription and mobilization areas of the names of these military and member students and figures on their examination.

The administrative apparatus of the state, local administration units, general authorities, public sector units, other legal authorities, private companies, societies and organizations and employers will be obliged to prepare special records on conscription activities in which the names of those employed in these bodies who are between 18 and 30 years or 31 years, according to the circumstances, will be noted down, while observing the provisions of Article 36 of this law.

The minister of defense, by his own decree, will determine the form of the records and lists previously mentioned, the information to be set down, the number of copies to be sent to the Conscription Department and the dates on which they are sent.

Article 18. Grievances on conscription decrees will be made before a committee made up of two senior armed forces officers and a member of the Council of State with the grade of deputy within at most 30 days of the date of the announcement of the grievance on the issuance of the mobilization decree. A decree will be issued by the minister of defense forming this committee and describing its procedures.

This committee's decisions will be final only after their approval by the minister of defense, and the approval must take place within 60 days of the date the grievance was presented to the committee. Failure to issue the committee's decision and approve it within the deadline will be considered tantamount to a rejection of the grievance.

Claims for the abrogation of these decisions will not be accepted before the judiciary until a grievance has been raised on them in the abovementioned manner.

Part Three

On Callup for Military and National Service

Article 19. A number of people whose medical fitness has been established in accordance with Article 12, or for whom a grade (cultural, vocational or psychological) has been determined in accordance with Article 13, and persons who were absent from the examination stage, will be called up annually under the jurisdiction of the conscription and mobilization centers for assignment to one of the organizations stipulated in Paragraph First of Article Two. The minister of defense will by his own decree organize the manner of the callup, the announcement of these persons, and treatment of those who are called up but are absent.

Their period of compulsory military service will begin as of the date the directors of the related conscription and mobilization areas or those taking their place agree to their being assigned to them.

Part Four

On Volunteering

Article 20. First, any male who has reached compulsory service age but has not yet been called up for service, whose turn has not yet come in accordance with Paragraph First of Article 35 or who has been exempted from service, may volunteer for the armed forces or national work brigades upon agreement by the minister of defense for a period equal to that of compulsory service, and the provisions bearing on persons who have been conscripted compulsorily will be in effect for them.

Second, any male who has not reached compulsory service age may volunteer for the armed forces following agreement by the minister of defense in accordance with the conditions he sets forth by his own decree. The

provisions bearing on persons who have been conscripted compulsorily will be in effect for them, except for the date on which they are entitled to be released from service.

Third, any male may volunteer or be appointed to service in the police or a government department with a military system upon agreement by the minister of defense, upon completing the military service stipulated in Paragraph First of Article Two, and the period of volunteer service in this case will be calculated as part of service in the reserve.

Fourth, any male who has reached compulsory service age or has not reached that age may volunteer for service in the armed forces on condition that he possess a vocation, skill, specialization or qualification which these forces require, as stipulated by the minister of defense by his own decree.

If the volunteer's service ends in the first 3 years of his volunteer service and he is bound to military service, it will be permissible to conscript him for the period which will complete the general compulsory military service period stipulated for him, and if his volunteer service period exceeds that period, the surplus period will be calculated in his service in the reserve.

This provision will not apply in cases of the dismissal of volunteers on whom a decree is issued by the minister of defense.

If any male referred to above in Paragraphs First and Fourth presents himself for volunteer service who has previously been stipulated to be exempt from service because of medical fitness and is found to be fit for military service upon volunteering, he will be compulsorily conscripted, and if this fact is discovered only after he has volunteered, he will be considered to have been compulsorily conscripted as of the date his service began. In addition, it is a condition of acceptance of the volunteer service of a person who has not reached the age of compulsory service that his father or guardian agree.

Article 21. It is permissible, by decree of the minister of defense, to consider any individual who has been compulsorily conscripted into service in the armed forces to be a volunteer, as of the date of approval of his volunteer status, if he possesses a vocation, skill, specialization or qualification stipulated in Paragraph Fourth of Article 20, in which case its provisions will apply to him.

If the volunteer's service ends because he has not continued his studies successfully and it is mandatory that he perform military service, he may be compulsorily conscripted for the period stipulated for his stipulated compulsory active service.

In this case the period of study will not be calculated as part of the two segments of his military service.

Article 22. It is permissible, by decree of the minister of defense, to open volunteer service to females in some armed forces units or the national work brigades stipulated in Paragraph C, Subsection First of Article Two, showing the method for such volunteer service and the period, conditions, and stipulations for it.

These women will not be bound to serve in the national organizations stipulated in Subsection Second of Article Two.

Part Five

On Reserve Service and Dismissal

Article 23. The period of compulsory active military service will end with transfer to reserves, and this transfer will occur annually in groups to be determined by the minister of defense.

All conscripts in the first group which falls due after conclusion of the period stipulated for their service will be transferred to the reserves.

Active compulsory military service or service in the reserves will also end in accordance with the states stipulated in the Law on Conditions of Service and Promotion for high ranking officers, aides, noncommissioned officers and ordinary soldiers in the armed forces.

Article 24. The minister of defense may suspend the transfer of conscripts to reserve by his own decree in case of war, mobilization or emergency. In this case all the provisions of the laws, decrees and statutes bearing on members of the reserve will apply to them as of the date stipulated for transferring them to reserves.

The minister of defense may also in case of need decide to transfer a group of conscripts to reserves before its time falls due.

Article 25. The service period in the reserves is 9 years beginning with the date of termination of the period of active compulsory military service. This period may be reduced in cases and conditions on which a decree is issued by the minister of defense.

Article 26. Conscription and mobilization centers, conscription and mobilization branches in the governorates, and conscription and mobilization centers in the precincts and police centers will assume responsibility for the mobilization of armed forces reserves in their various branches, police, and departments and authorities possessing a military system, within the limits of the planning set out by the competent body in the Ministry of Defense.

Registration and mobilization measures will be regulated by decree of the minister of defense.

Article 27. The military medical council in the conscription and mobilization areas may conduct medical examinations on reserve members to determine the extent of their medical fitness for such service, in cases where that is required.

Article 28. Some or all members of the reserves will be called up by decree of the minister of defense in the following cases:

A. For purposes of training for a period not to exceed 8 weeks per training year.

B. For completion of pay for units for one period of 6 months or another if that does not extend beyond 1 year from the date of the callup.

C. In case of war or the declaration of mobilization or emergency, until that ends.

Article 29. A decree will be issued by the minister of defense determining the conditions and cases in which it will be permissible to grant exemptions from callup for reserve service to persons whose work in public facilities demands that. The exemption will be by decree of the minister of defense in accordance with a request from the competent minister.

Article 30. It is not permissible to keep a reserve member in his place of work or to have him continue in it if an order is issued calling him up.

The heads of the bodies in which they work must remove them when they are called up.

They will be permitted to return to their work or to continue in it only after submission of a letter authorized by the competent military body which will be approved by the minister of defense, by his own decree, stating that their callup has ended.

Article 31. Everyone whose name is included in the reserve list must state his place of residence and work address and inform the related conscription and mobilization center of any change occurring in this data within 30 days of the date this change occurs.

In the event he does not give notice of the change, his notice to appear at the original location will be considered valid.

Article 32. Places of work will be committed to preparing special registers of individuals listed in the reserves and they will inform the related conscription and mobilization centers of any change which occurs in this data as soon as it occurs.

Article 33. The following provisions will be observed in calling up persons in the reserves:

First, the period of callup to the reserves in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 for persons who are working in the bodies stipulated in Paragraphs Second and Third of that article will be considered an exceptional vacation at full salary or wages. During this period, their promotions and periodic raises will be kept for them and all material and moral rights and other benefits will be observed for them, including raises and allowances which have a permanent character and are stipulated in their original places of work, in addition to the money the Ministry of Defense pays them for the callup period.

Second, the administrative system of the state, units of local administration, general authorities and public sector units will defray all wages and salaries and all other rights and benefits of reserve persons who are among their employees, during their callup period.

Third, private companies, societies and organizations and employers will defray all wages and salaries and all other rights and benefits of reserve persons who are among their employees during their callup period.

In the event the number of employees in these bodies is less than 50, the Ministry of Defense will defray all these obligations for periods in excess of 12 months.

Fourth, the Ministry of Defense will disburse a comprehensive monthly stipend during their callup period to members of the reserves who are called up and are not in the bodies stipulated in Paragraphs Second and Third of this article. This will be equal to the first salary level of the grade of military personnel of their status who possess high salaries in addition to the military compensations and stipends stipulated for members of the reserve, except for reserve compensation and service extension raises, according to the rank of the persons who are called up.

Working people called up for reserve service from the bodies stipulated in Paragraphs Two and Three of this article will be granted stipends and production bonuses at the rates which their colleague workers who actually contribute to increasing production receive.

Fifth, persons in reserves will be prohibited from the material entitlements stipulated in this article during their periods of absence in callup periods.

Part Six

General Provisions

Article 34. First, 1 year will be added to the conscription period of anyone absent from the stage of examination or conscription call who is absent or does not present himself to the related conscription and mobilization area after the cause of his exemption or deferment has lapsed within the stipulated period, when he joins military service.

Persons absent from service will be exempted from that year /of service/ if they join the service within a maximum of 3 months of the date of their callup for conscription or the date of the lapse of the cause of the exemption, if they have comported themselves well during their conscription period in accordance with the rules and conditions contained in the Service and Promotion Law for high-ranking officers, aides, noncomissioned officers and ordinary soldiers in the armed forces.

Second, 1 year will be added to the conscription period of anyone who conceals his academic qualifications, his degree of competence in reading or writing, or his profession,vocation or specialization at the start of his conscription and this results in his being treated in a manner different from what he is entitled to by law in terms of conscription.

If that results in a decree to deal with him in terms of conscription in accordance with the provisions of Subsection First of Article 35, the penalties stipulated in Article 50 will be applied to him.

Article 35. First, the persons whose description follows will be placed under call to meet the requirements of the armed forces for a period of 3 years:

One. People who have not yet been called up to complete the requirements of the organizations stipulated in Subsection First of Article Two by the end of the conscription year.

Two. Persons who have been called up during the conscription year and have been placed under call in excess of need.

The 3-year period will be calculated as of the date on which they are placed under call.

The persons stipulated in this article may not be conscripted after the period of 3 years has elapsed except in case of war, mobilization or emergency by decree of the president.

Second, people who receive their credentials and go beyond the maximum conscription deferment during the academic year in their final classes, and whose deferments are extended until the end of the academic year in accordance with Article Eight, will be placed under call until the end of December of the year in which they receive the credentials.

Article 36. No one who has completed 30 years of age may be called up for military service. Students of the faculties of al-Azhar University referred to in Paragraphs Two and Three of Subsection E of Article Eight will be excepted from that, as will persons receiving credentials after completing 30 years of age, but they will fail to be called up for military service upon completing 31 years of age.

The provision of the previous paragraph will not be in effect in the event of war, mobilization or emergency, by decree of the president.

Article 37. Permission may not be granted any male between the ages of 19 and 30 enjoying citizenship in the Arab Republic of Egypt to leave the country unless he receives permission from the minister of defense or presents one of the following justifications:

A. A military and national service card stating that he has attended the first stage of conscription (examination), with respect to persons who wish to travel during the year in which they reach 19 years of age and have not exceeded 20.

B. A certificate of exception from military and national service, in accordance with Article Six.

C. A certificate of exemption from military and national service, in accordance with Article Seven.

D. A certificate that the conscription period has not reached the person in accordance with Subsection First of Article 35.

E. A certificate from the competent body of performance of military or national service.

F. A certificate of completion of or exemption from reserve service.

G. A compulsory service deferment form in accordance with Article Eight, as regards students enrolled in a faculty, institute or school outside the republic.

The provision of this article will not apply to those who have left the country for purposes of emigration, although the provision of this law will apply to them in case they return permanently from emigration.

Article 38. No student may join or belong to any faculty, institute, school or training center in the republic or remain in it after completing 18 years of age unless he possesses a military and national service card.

No student may remain in the abovementioned faculties, institutes, schools or training centers between the ages of 20 and 30 unless he possesses one of the certificates or forms stipulated in Article 45.

No student may be registered in a regular fashion or enrolled in a college, faculty, school or training center on 1 September of the year in which he is enrolled or joins if the maximum year for conscription deferment referred to in Paragraphs A, B, C and D of Article Eight has elapsed, unless he presents one of the certificates or forms stipulated in Article 45, except for the compulsory conscription deferment form, in accordance with the provision of Article Eight. However, the latter form may be presented once by students who apply to enroll in or transfer from one faculty, institute, school or training center to another one which is or is not similar.

The provision of the foregoing paragraph will not apply to students who have exceeded the maximum deferment conscription (period) during the academic year in their final classes, whose deferments have been extended to the end of the academic year in accordance with Article Eight, and who have been put on call until the end of December of the same year in which they received the credentials in accordance with Subsection Second of Article 35.

The provisions of this article will apply to students who join faculties or institutes abroad upon review of their conscription deferment, in accordance with the provisions of Article Eight.

Recruits and volunteers may be enrolled as members of the faculties, institutes, schools or training centers referred to above if they present a permit from the competent body in the Ministry of Defense agreeing to their enrollment.

No enrollment which occurs contrary to the preceding provisions will be considered by the Conscription Department.

Article 39. One may not employ any individual after he has completed 18 years of age, keep him in his position or job, grant him permission to practice a free profession, or register him in the chart of employees unless he possesses a military and national service card.

Such employment may not be permitted, either, in the case of anyone between the ages of 21 and 30 unless he presents one of the certificates stipulated in Article 45, a certificate of performance of service in national organizations, or a form that the individual has been placed on call for a specific period. A worker who does not present one of the certificates or forms stipulated in the obovementioned Article 45 will be suspended from work for a period of 60 days, after which a decision will be issued severing him from his position or job.

As an exception to the condition of full-time study referred to in Paragraph One of Article Eight, the following students will be permitted to work in temporary fashion in summer holidays:

A. Students whose conscription has been deferred in accordance with the provisions of Article Eight.

B. Students whose studies require such work by nature.

The minister of defense, in coordination with the competent minister, will issue a decree specifying the bodies, cases, rules, conditions, period of work and all matters related to that.

Article 40. Without prejudice to the stipulation of Article 39, heads and managers of government departments, local administration units, general

authorities, public sector units, other legal bodies, private authorities, companies and organizations, and employers may not refrain from appointing anyone who has not reached 19 years of age or those temporarily exempted or put on call for a specific period to vacant positions by claiming that their draft status has not been definitively determined.

Article 41. Persons conscripted and put on call for service in the national action brigades may present themselves for service in the units of the administrative apparatus of the state, units of local administration, general authorities and public sector units. Those of this group who have been conscripted will be considered to be tantamount to persons on loan after their appointment.

They may also present themselves for work in private companies, societies and organizations and individual projects, and their positions or jobs will be held for them after their appointment in accordance with the provisions of Article 43 of this law.

Conscripts and those who have completed their compulsory service will have priority in appointment over their colleagues who have been nominated along with them at the same passing grade. If appointment to a position is by competitive examination, they will have priority in appointment over their colleagues who have passed the examination along with them and have equal passing grades or degrees in the examination. In order to benefit from this priority, it is conditional that one acquire a moral grade of not less than good or satisfactory secret reports.

If the candidates passing the competitive examination from the abovementioned groups are numerous, appointment from among them will be by highest grade in the examination. Nonetheless, those among them who have attained the necessary credentials for occupying the post will be exempted from the competitive examination.

Article 42. Conscripts, persons being kept on and persons who have been called up and perform well in military operations will be appointed to the bodies mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the previous article when they meet the conditions for appointment to the position. They may be exempted from some conditions of appointment, except for the necessary academic credentials for occupying the position, in accordance with the rules and in conformity with the conditions and terms issued by decree of the minister of defense. It is conditional that they submit their applications to these bodies within a period not to exceed 6 months of the date of completion of the final service in which they have performed well in military operations.

The candidates' appointment will be with a bonus if there are no vacant financial groups in the bodies stipulated in the first paragraph of the previous article within the limits of 10 percent of the number of people working in the bodies on which stipulation is made in the previous article.

The administrative apparatus of the state, units of local administration, general authorities and public sector units, whatever the number of people working in them might be, as well as private companies, societies and organizations, and employers whose workers number no less than 10, must notify the body specified by the minister of defense of their vacant positions within a period of at least 1 month before the competitive examination is held or appointments or contracts are made. These bodies may fill the positions the armed forces reserve if nominations are not made to them within 60 days of the date on which the body specified by the minister of defense is notified of them.

Article 43. The administrative apparatus of the state, units of local administration, general authorities, and public sector units, whatever the number of people working in them might be, as well as private companies, societies and organizations and employers whose workers number no less than 10, must hold the positions or jobs, or corresponding positions or jobs, for those workers who are drafted until they finish performing military and national service. The position or job of the draftee may be occupied in temporary fashion during this period.

The provision of the previous paragraph will be in effect for employees on temporary contracts or contracts for specified times in the administrative apparatus of the state, units of local administration, general authorities, and public sector units until the end of their contract period, and these bodies must place these employees in appropriate positions which they vacate during their conscription period or keep them, and they must notify the military units that the draftee's position is being held within a maximum period of 30 days from the date of their notification of the employee's conscription.

The employee or worker will be returned to the position or job held for him if he so requests within 30 days of the date of his discharge from military and national service, and he must be returned to work within 60 days of the date of submission of the request. The date of the submission of the request will be considered the date of his return to work.

If he has become unfit because of a disability which afflicted him during military and national service but can perform another position or job, he will be placed in that position or job, provided that care be given to put him in a location which is in keeping with his original position from the standpoint of level, seniority and salary.

If the employee or worker does not present his application on time or does not take over his job within 30 days of the date of the order to return to work, it will be permissible to reject his request to return, if the delay is not for a reasonable excuse.

The employee or worker, as well as those who are kept on, will retain the salaries and raises to which they are entitled during their presence in

military and national service, as if they actually performed their work, and the periods of their service there will be included in their work periods and computed for bonuses or retirement pensions. In addition, their additional service and auxiliary periods will be calculated in computing this bonus or pension, in accordance with the provisions of Law No 90 for the Year 1975 on Armed Forces Retirement, Insurance and Pensions.

The service period will be considered to have been successfully completed if the appointment was under probation and they will be paid all the material and moral rights and other benefits, including allowances, stipends and production bonuses, paid out to their peers in their original places of work, in addition to what the Ministry of Defense pays them for the holdover period, during the holdover period.

Article 44. The period of actual good military and national service, including the holdover period following the period of compulsory active service for draftees whose appointment occurred during their conscription period or, after its completion, in the administrative agency of the state, units of local administration, general authorities and public sector units, will be considered as if it has ended with civil service, and this period will be considered part of seniority and entitlement to the stipulated raises.

It will also be calculated as a period of expertise and seniority for employees of the public sector and bodies which request or make expertise a condition for appointment or promotion, and they they will be entitled to the stipulated raises for that.

In all cases, the computation of this period, in the foregoing manner, may not result in having the seniority or period of expertise of recruits exceed the seniority or period of expertise of their graduation colleagues who have been appointed to the same body.

The provisions of this article will be in effect as of 1 December 1968.

Article 45. The Ministry of Defense will grant the following certificates and forms upon payment of the levies stipulated by law.

First, certificates:

A. Certificate of exception from military and national service, in accordance with Article Six.

B. Certificate of exemption from military and national service, in accordance with Article Seven.

C. Certificate of deferment of compulsory service, in accordance with the provisions of Article Nine.

D. A certificate that the individual's draft cycle has not fallen due in accordance with Subsection First of Article 35.

E. Certificate of completion of military service.

F. Certificate of completion of reserve service.

Second, forms:

A. Form of compulsory service deferment in accordance with the provisions of Article Eight.

B. A form that the individual is under call for a specified period.

These certificates and forms will only be given out following presentation of the military and national service card.

The temporary certificates and forms will be in effect until the end of the period specified for them.

Article 46. The competent agencies in the Ministry of the Interior will be in charge of offering all information required for the implementation of the provisions of this law to the competent agencies of the Ministry of Defense, notifying individuals called up for conscription and summoned for reserve service, and recording those who are absent.

Article 47. The Christian calendar will be used as regards the application of the provisions of this law.

Part Seven

On Penalties

Article 48. The following individuals will be subject to the Law on Military Verdicts:

A. Those whom the related conscription and mobilization area has decided to draft, until the time of their discharge.

B. Those who are absent from reserve callup, from the date specified for their callup.

C. Those called up for the examination or conscription stage who are absent and whose excuse for the absence is not accepted.

Article 49. Without prejudice to the provision of Article 36, everyone over 30 or 31, according to the case, who is absent from the examination or conscription stage will be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than 2 years and a fine of not less than 500 pounds or greater than 1,000 pounds, or one of these two penalties.

Article 50. Everyone compelled to perform military service who frees himself, or seeks to free himself, of service by deceit or by presenting invalid documents which are contrary to fact and as a result of which he is excepted or exempted, his conscription is deferred, or he unrightfully avoids service, will be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than 3 years or more than 7 years, without being exempted, excepted him, deferred or allowed unrightfully to avoid service, without prejudice to the obligation to conscript the individual if he is fit to perform military service.

Anyone who lets a person avoid or purposely tries to let him avoid military service, exempt or except him from it, or defer his conscription unrightfully, either by neglecting to include his name in lists, registers and cards, removing it, or adding it to them unrightfully, by giving false data, giving the name of another person to someone assigned to implement the provisions of this law, or by other means, will be punished by the same penalty.

Also, anyone hiding persons to cause them to avoid military service will be punished by the same penalty, except for mothers or wives.

The punishment will be prison for a period of no less than 7 years, in case of repetition or if the perpetrator is an employee of the conscription agencies of of an agency cooperating in implementing the provisions of this law who is referred to in Article 46.

Article 51. Anyone causing, by himself or through others, a wound, affliction, or disability from which results in permanent medical unfitness for military service will be punished by prison for a period not to exceed 7 years.

Article 52. Anyone called for service in the reserve who is absent without an acceptable excuse will be punished by prison for a period of no less than 1 year and a fine of no less than 200 pounds, or one of these two penalties.

Article 53. The statute of limitations for the right to file a suit against persons compelled to perform military and national service will be in effect only when the person reaches 42 years of age, and he will be punished for starting to commit any of the crimes stipulated in this law by the full penalty for the crime.

Article 54. Any other violation of the provisions of this law will be punished by prison for a period of not less than 2 years and a fine of not less than 200 pounds or more than 500 pounds, or one of these two penalties.

Article 55. The penalties stipulated in this law will not prejudice the imposition of any more severe penalty in the Penal Law or any other law for the act committed.

Article 56. The director of the Conscription Department, his aides, the directors of the conscription and mobilization areas, their aides, inspection members and legal affairs members in the conscription apparatus, the heads of conscription and mobilization branches in the governorates, and the commanders of conscription and mobilization centers in the police precincts and centers will have the character of judiciary seizure personnel as regards the application of the provisions of this law and the decrees issued in execution of it.

Inspection personnel of the Conscription Department, conscription and mobilization areas, and conscription and mobilization branches in the governorates will have the right to inspect conscription records and files of persons working in the administrative apparatus of the state, local administrative units, general authorities, public sector units, other legal bodies, public bodies, companies, societies and organizations, and persons, and the conscription and mobilization records and files of students in universities, higher institutes, technicians' training institutes, vocational training centers and various schools to confirm that the stipulations included in this law and the decrees issued in execution of it are being carried out.

The officers of the personnel branch of the Organization and Management Authority of the Armed Forces, on whom a decree will be issued by the authority chairman, will also have the character of judiciary seizure personnel in the realm of inspection of travel permits written by the Organization and Management Authority in implementation of the provisions of the first paragraph of Article 37.

The officers of the personal affairs branch of that authority, and people on whom a decree is issued by the chairman of the authority, will also have the character of judiciary seizure personnel in the sphere of implementation of the provisions of Articles 41, 42, and 43 of this law.

Part Eight

Temporary Provisions

Article 57. The provisions of this law will not be in effect for anyone who has already been permanently excepted or exempted from military service, except for those who are given a further medical examination in application of the provision of Article 12.

The provisions of this law will apply only to those who have previously been exempted temporarily and those whose conscription has been deferred as of the date the cause for the exemption or deferment lapses in accordance with the provisions of the law on the basis of which they were dealt with.

Article 58. The ministers, each within their area of specialization, must implement this law, and the minister of defense will issue the decrees

necessary for carrying it out. The decrees, orders and instructions issued before this law goes into effect will remain in effect unless they conflict with its provisions, until they are modified or abrogated.

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SERVICE, PROMOTION CONDITIONS FOR OFFICERS AMENDED

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic 12 Jul 80 pp 3-16

/Text/ Law No 132 for the Year 1980

Modifying Certain Provisions of Law No 232 for the Year 1959 Regarding Service and Promotion Conditions for Officers in the Armed Forces

In the name of the people:

The People's Assembly has decreed the law whose text follows, and we, the president, have issued it:

Article One. The following provisions will take the place of Articles Four (Subsections Four and Five); Eight (Paragraph One); 12; 14 (last paragraph); 15; 21 (first paragraph); 28; 31 (last paragraph); 34; 35; 36; 39; 40; the title of Subsection Four of Chapter Two of Part Four; Articles 41; 43; 44; 48; 50 (Paragraph Three); 77; 78; 78 (bis); 79, 86 (Paragraphs One and Five); 93; 100 (bis) (Paragraph One); 112 (Paragraph One); 122 (bis) (1) (Subsections A and B of Paragraph Two); 123 (Paragraphs Two and Three); 134; 138 (Subsections Three and Four); 139 (Paragraph One); 148; and Subsection Two of the subsections appended to the schedule of salary classes of Law No 232 for Year 1959 regarding the service and promotion conditions of armed forces officers:

Article Four, Subsections Four and Five:

4. Promotion to the ranks of brigadier and major general.

5. Extension of the service of officers of the ranks of brigadier and major general.

Article Eight (Paragraph One). The Officers' Committee may not impose a disciplinary penalty on officers until they have been informed of what has

been attributed to them and have been confronted, for at least 30 days, to investigate the aspects of their defense. They may present a defense in writing during this time.

Article 12. Active officers in the armed forces will be appointed from the following groups:

A. Graduates of military faculties prepared to graduate active officers.

B. Graduates of military i tutes prepared to graduate active officers.

C. Graduates of university faculties, civilian higher institutes or their foreign equivalents who are accredited by military faculties for appointment as active officers in their fields of specialization.

D. Female graduates of university faculties or civilian higher institutes appointed in their fields of specialization.

E. Doctors, dentists, pharmacists and veterinarians.

F. People with scientific credentials which are above the initial university degree and are not available in the armed forces, who must of necessity be appointed.

G. First technical specialists and their equivalents who possess fields of specialization whom the armed forces need to appoint.

H. Other groups specifying which a decree will be issued by the minister of defense on the basis of a recommendation of the Officers' Committee of the armed forces.

The minister of defense, in accordance with a recommendation of the Armed Forces Officers' Committee, will determine detailed regulations bearing on the system for appointing each of the groups stipulated in the last six subsections in accordance with the provisions of this law.

Article 14 (last paragraph). As regards air force navigators or lieutenants who are not to be confirmed at the end of the first probation period because they are not medically fit for flying or their level of competence is low, their services will be dispensed with or they will be transferred to another section of the air force which conforms to their condition. They may be confirmed on transfer if the Officers' Committee finds that they are fit for this confirmation or they may be given a new probation period in the section to which they have been transferred for a period of 1 year, at the end of which they may be confirmed and placed in their original seniority, or their service may be dispensed with, according to their condition.

Article 15. As an exception to the provision of Paragraph One of Article 14, the appointment of officers will begin at a rank higher than that of lieutenant in the following cases:

A. Graduates of military faculties in which more than 4 academic years are stipulated for study will be appointed to the rank reached by their peers in secondary credentials who joined it in the year they were supposed to obtain these credentials in military faculties in which 4 academic years are stipulated for study.

B. Graduates of Civilian universities and higher institutes who have joined military faculties upon completion of special military study will be appointed to the rank reached by their peers in secondary credentials who joined the military faculties in the year they were supposed to obtain these credentials.

C. Doctors, dentists, pharmacists and veterinarians, as well as graduates of civilian faculties and higher institutes, will be appointed to the rank reached by their peers in secondary credentials on the date of their appointment to the armed forces who joined the military faculties in the year in which they were supposed to obtain these credentials.

The year in which one is supposed to receive secondary credentials means, as regards those appointed in accordance with any of the foregoing subsections, the year obtained by adding a period to the date of appointment equal to the period of civilian or military study following the attainment of those credentials, aside from any period of absence or deficiencies preceding or disrupting that study or preceding admission to military faculties or appointment to the armed forces.

In determining the rank of peers who have graduated from the military faculty, the rank reached by officers of the first group who joined the faculty with secondary credentials in the year in which one was supposed to have reached it will be considered.

D. People possessing the special qualifications stipulated in Subsection F of Article 12 will be appointed to the rank reached by their peers in the first academic degree who joined that rank in the armed forces in the first group following their attainment of it.

The appointment of the groups referred to in the preceding subsections will be considered under probation for a period of 1 year, at the end of which they will be dealt with in one of the manners stated in Article 14.

The provisions of this article will not apply to the appointment of officers who are pilots or navigators.

Article 21 (first paragrph). The seniority of officers appointed in accordance with Subsection D of Article 15 will be determined at the end of the group comprising their peers in the first university degree stipulated in the abovementioned subsection.

Article 28. Promotion to the ranks of colonel and brigadier and major general will be by selection, restricted by seniority, with attention to the considerations listed in the executive bill, in addition to the conditions and terms stipulated in Articles 27 and 33.

Article 31 (last paragraph). The officers stipulated in Article 15 may be promoted by seniority to the rank above the rank in which their appointment was made, without restriction to the minimum period for remaining in the rank, when their turn for promotion comes, by virtue of the seniority they have acquired in the group in which they are included or the group corresponding to theirs, according to conditions, on condition that they meet the other conditions for promotion and pass the probation period successfully.

Article 34. If the turn for promotion for a lieutenant colonel, colonel or brigadier general whose qualifications have been completed but who has not been included in probation, or has reached retirement age in his rank before that, falls due, he will be transferred to retirement at the rank following his rank, by force of law.

If the turn for promotion for a lieutenant colonel, colonel or brigadier general who is not recommended for promotion or who has reached the retirement age at his rank before that falls due, he will be transferred to retirement by force of law.

Article 35. The period of service for brigadier generals will be 3 years and their service may be renewed annually after that by decree of the Armed Forces Officers' Committee unless they have reached the retirement age at their rank or their turn for promotion precedes that.

Article 36. Extension of the service of officers in the two ranks of brigadier and major general will depend on the presence of the following elements of competence:

A. The committee must conclude that they have succeeded in holding the position or positions they have assumed in his rank.

B. The Officers' Committee must conclude that they are fit to hold the highest positions of the one they have held in both ranks.

C. The competence reports presented on the brigadier generals must not be less than good.

If it is not decided to extend the service period of brigadier or major generals owing to the absence of any of the foregoing elements of competence, they will be transferred to retirement by force of law.

Article 39. The provisions included in Articles 31 through 38 (bis) will apply to naval officers.

Article 40. The provisions included in Articles 31 through 38 (bis) will apply to air force officers.

Fourth: On Border Guard Forces

Article 41. The provisions included in Articles 31 through 38 will apply to border guard force officers.

Article 43. The provisions included in Articles 31 through 38 will apply to doctor, dentist, pharmacist and veterinary officers provided that the minimum promotion period to the rank of captain for first lieutenants who have completed credentials will be at least 2 years for doctors.

Article 44. Appointment will be to the rank of technical lieutenant for graduates of armed forces technical institutes which are prepared for graduating technical officers.

Technical lieutenants appointed from among the graduates of these institutes will be included for promotion until the rank of technical brigadier general.

It is also permissible to appoint outstanding technical first warrant officers junior grad by selection to the rank of technical lieutenant in accordance with terms and conditions issued by a decree of the minister of defense, on the basis of a recommendation by the Armed Forces Officers' Committee.

Article 48. Armed forces officers who are not graduates of military faculties and institutes prepared to graduate active officers and who join the armed forces with credentials lower than university or higher credentials may be promoted to military ranks by seniority up to the rank of lieutenant colonel.

Those of this group who are outstanding may also be promoted to the rank of colonel.

Appointment may be made to the rank of brigadier general, by selection, from among colonels who have acquired university or higher credentials which are suitable to their specializations during service.

A decree will be issued by the minister of defense on the basis of a recommendation by the Armed Forces Officers' Committee defining the terms and conditions for promotion to the ranks of colonel and brigadier general.

Article 50 (Paragraph Three). Officers acquiring local rank will have all the military rights granted to the corresponding original rank with consideration for the provision of Article 78 regarding their treatment in terms of salaries and compensations.

Article 77. Officers will be entitled to the starting salary level of the rank to which they are appointed.

They will also upon promotion be entitled to the starting salary level of the rank to which they are promoted or one of its raises, whichever is greater. That will not affect their entitlement to periodic raises at their regular time.

The salary of appointed or promoted officers will be listed in accordance with their entitlement to periodic annual raises until their salaries reach the starting salary level of the following rank, and they will be given periodic raises for the raise group of that rank, until their salaries reach the top of its salary level.

The period of the year at whose conclusion the periodic raise falls due will be computed as of 1 January following the date of appointment.

The raise will fall due periodically at 1 January of each year.

The salary which is equal to the entitlements of those officers who have completed their service before the date on which the periodic raise falls due will be computed by adding a percentage raise equal to the period they have spent in service, starting with their last date of entitlement to a raise and ending with the date on which they complete their service.

In all cases, periods of lost service, periods of provisional retirement and periods of special leave without pay will not enter into the calculation of the value of the periodic raise.

Article 78. If an officer is promoted to a local rank, he will continue to receive salaries and compensations on the basis of his original rank.

Article 78 (bis). In the event an officer is demoted from rank, his salary will be reduced by the amount of one periodic raise per full group, until the last periodic raise he has received.

This treatment will be in effect starting with the beginning of the month following the date of approval of the verdict or decree calling for the demotion in rank. That will not change the date of entitlement to periodic raises.

Article 79. The salaries of officers transferred to provisional retirement will be determined as follows:

A. In the first year of provisional retirement, they will be granted three-quarters of the basic salary they were entitled to before being transferred to provisional retirement, without aviation salary or any compensation.

B. If the provisional retirement period exceeds 1 year, their salaries will be reduced during the excess period to the equivalent of half the basic salary they were entitled to before being transferred to provisional retirement.

Those who have been transferred to provisional retirement for deficiencies in promotion examinations, must, starting with the date of their transfer to provisional retirement, have exhausted at least three chances to take the promotion examination in order to be treated according to Subsection B of the preceding paragraph. If that is not the case, their treatment in accordance with that subsection will begin as of the date on which they exhaust the examination chances allotted to them.

Article 86 (Paragraph One).

1. It is permissible, by decree of the president, to grant officers in the armed forces the following compensations:

A. Compensations specified to meet actual expenses.

B. Compensations specified to meet special circumstances or dangers.

C. Nature of work allowances.

D. Residence allowances for persons serving in areas where the circumstances of life require that these allowances be proved during residence in these regions.

E. Educational or vocational compensations for persons who have acquired specific credentials or who occupy a specific position or perform a specific vocation.

Officers employed in vocations or specializations whose practitioners are entitled to an allowance, raise or compensation for the vocation, specialization or credential, by virtue of laws on service in the general staff or special staffs in the state, will be entitled to this allowance, raise or compensation in the groups and rules stipulated for their equivalents in these laws, and they may not be combined with any compensation specified for the same purpose in the armed forces. Whichever of the two is better will be granted.

(Paragraph Five). Acceptance salaries and other military allowances, as well as compensations stipulated for actual expenditures defined by a decree issued by the president, will not be subject to tax.

Article 93. Officers will be granted a leave at full salary and compensation to perform the religious obligation of the pilgrimage once during their service in the armed forces, including previous service in the ranks. Military orders will specify the system for granting them and their period, provided that they not exceed 15 days including travel time in both directions.

Article 100 (bis) (Paragraph One). Officers may be granted a special leave without pay not to exceed 4 consecutive or nonconsecutive years during the period of service in the armed forces, including previous service in the ranks, for reasons which the officer gives and are evaluated by the competent officers' committee according to service requirements, provided that this leave not be affixed to the provisional retirement period. It may not be granted during the period of placement under probation either.

Article 112 (Paragraph One). Disciplinary penalties which may be imposed on active officers are:

1. Lapse of promotion.

2. Transfer to provisional retirement.

3. Transfer to retirement.

4. Dispensing of service.

The provisions of Articles 21 and 27 of Law No 90 for the Year 1975 regarding issuance of the Law on Armed Forces Retirement, Insurance and Pensions will not be in effect for those who have ended their service in accordance with Subsections 3 and 4.

Article 122 (bis) (1) (Subsections A and B of Paragraph Two):

A. A monthly award of 30 pounds if the badge is Class One, and 20 pounds if it is Class Two, during their period of service. The persons wearing the badge will retain this award if their military service ends and it will be paid out in full, in addition to their wage or salary from their public position or pension or their heirs' pension. This award will be exempt from tax.

B. Their education, and the education of their wives, children and brothers who are dependent on them, free of charge in the other educational stages in all schools, institutes or faculties owned by the state, along with their exemption from acceptance conditions as regards age and total grades, in accordance with rules issued by decree of the president.

Article 123 (Paragraphs Two and Three):

Anyone granted this badge will be entitled to a monthly award of 20 pounds throughout his period of service and will retain it if his military service ends, and it will be paid out in full, in addition to his wage or salary from their public position or pension or heirs' pension. This award will be exempt from tax.

Those receiving this badge will also be entitled to the benefits stipulated in Paragraphs B, C, D, E and F of Subsection Two of Article 122 (bis) (1).

Article 134. Officers will be transferred to provisional retirement in the following cases:

1. On the basis of a request from the officer for reasons he expresses and the competent officers' committee evaluates.

2. If a disciplinary decree is issued by the competent officers' committee to that end.

3. If they are deficient three times in the promotion examinations specified for their rank.

The maximum period for provisional retirement will be 3 years in other cases.

The transfer of officers to provisional retirement on the basis of their request will be limited to 1 year which may be extended within the limits of one more year. The extension may also be repeated as long as the provisional retirement period does not exceed the maximum period in accordance with the foregoing paragraph.

The decree issuing the disciplinary penalty will specify the period of provisional retirement in a manner not exceeding the maximum for it.

Persons transferred to provisional retirement because of deficiencies in promotion examinations will be considered restored to actual service as of the date on which they successfully perform the examination in the subjects in which they were deficient.

If the maximum provisional retirement period ends but the officer has not completed the promotion examination, his case will be presented to the competent officers' committee in accordance with Article 26.

Article 138 (Subsections Three and Four):

Three. The issuance of a final verdict against them of dismissal from public positions or removal from service as an original punishment, in consequence of the imposition of a criminal punishment, or as a consequence of sentence by final judicial verdict for a crime prejudicial to honor, with the grant of a verdict against them depriving them of liberty which does not entail comprehensive detention.

Four. Their removal from service by decree of the main officers' committee concerned consequent to the issuance of a final verdict of imprisonment against them without comprehensive detention or their sentencing by final judicial verdict for a crime prejudicial to honor, with a verdict against them of a penalty other than imprisonment or a penalty of imprisonment whose execution entails comprehensive detention or any military penalty.

The Armed Forces' Officers' Committee will be competent to issue a decree on a case if the minutes in regard to which the verdict is issued have been proved to officers from more than one major officers' committee.

Article 139 (Paragraph One):

Officers may request that they be transferred to retirement when they have spent 20 years in actual service, with attention to the fact that their period of actual service following their return from any study mission or leave is not less than 7 years, in accordance with the terms and conditions specified by the armed forces bills.

Article 148. The service of officers of the armed forces who are not graduates of military faculties and institutes whose scope for promotion ends at the rank of colonel or brigadier general will be for a period of 3 years in either of these two ranks and may be extended for 1 year, then another, for a maximum period of 2 years, unless the officers reach retirement age before that.

If the officers are of the rank of lieutenant colonel and do not possess the conditions stipulated for promotion to the rank of colonel, their service will continue at their rank until their promotion period falls due, if they have not reached retirement age before then.

In all the foregoing cases the transfer of officers to retirement will have the force of law.

Subsection Two of the subsections appended to the schedule of salary classes:

Two. With attention to the provisions of the Law on the Service of Higher Officers, Noncommissioned Officers and Ordinary Soldiers in the Armed Forces, persons appointed or promoted from noncommissioned officers' ranks will be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Article 77, with the following annexes:

A. On starting their appointment or promotion, the persons promoted or appointed will be given the starting salary level for the rank to which they have been appointed or promoted, or one of two raises for the rank will be added to their salary, whichever is greater. Their entitlement to promotion raises will continue in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph Two of the aforementioned article.

B. The appointment or promotion will not change the date of entitlement to periodic raises on 1 January based on their period of service, starting with the date on which they acquired their last periodic raise in their previous rank in noncommissioned status, and periodic raises will be granted to the class of rank in whose starting salary level their salaries lie, in a manner whereby that will not exceed the raise group for lieutenant colonels. Their salaries will gradually rise with periodic raises until reaching the final salary level of the rank of lieutenant colonel.

C. Persons promoted to the rank of major and higher will be treated in terms of gradually increasing periodic raises and wages in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph Three of this article.

Article Two /of the law at issue/. Article 17 and Paragraphs Two and Three of Article 18, Article 19 (bis), Subsection Fifth of Section Two of Part Four, and Articles 42 and 99 of Law No 232 for the Year 1959 referred to above, will be abrogated.

Article 3. A new paragraph will be added to Article 26 of Law No 232 for the Year 1959 referred to above, whose text is as follows:

If after hearing the different aspects of the officer's defense, it appears to the committee that he is not fit to continue in service in the armed forces, it may transfer him to retirement. In this case he will be dealt with in accordance with Article 139 (bis) (1).

A new subsection will be added to Chapter Two of Part Four of Law No 232 for the Year 1959 referred to above, whose text is as follows:

Third (bis): In the air defense forces.

Article Four (bis). The provisions listed in Articles 31 through 38 (bis) will apply to air defense officers.

The following texts will also be added to this law:

Article 90 (Subsections with numbers seven and eight).

7. Pilgrimage leave.

8. Maternity leave for female officers.

Article 100 (bis) (1). Female officers will be entitled to a maternity leave at full salary and compensation for a period of 3 months after giving birth three times during their period of service in the armed forces, including the previous period in noncommissioned ranks.

Article 138 (bis). It is permissible, by decree of the competent main officers' committee and the agreement of officers whose medical unfitness for service resulting from wounds in military service or the like has been determined, to keep them in service when the committee considers that it is possible for them to perform an activity in keeping with their medical condition, while subjecting them to periodic medical examination to guarantee that service has not affected their medical state.

Article 139 (bis). The pensions of persons transferred to retirement in accordance with their request, following their inclusion by selection in promotion to a selective rank in accordance with the provisions of Article 27 of Law No 90 for the Year 1975 referred to above, will settle when they have completed a period of 20 years of actual service in the ranks of officers in the armed forces and have completed the minimum period of time stipulated for remaining in the rank before requesting transfer to retirement.

Article 139 (bis) (1). The pensions of persons transferred to retirement because they do not possess the conditions of fitness for promotion in accordance with Article 32 will be settled in accordance with the last salary they received and their service period computed in the pension. They will not be entitled to retirement compensation on completing their service for the abovementioned reason, nor will they be entitled to the bonus stipulated in Article 139 (bis) (2).

Article 139 (bis) (2). When officers' service is terminated other than by their request, but not for a disciplinary or criminal cause, they will be granted a bonus equal to the total final salary and fixed compensations they received for 6 months.

In the event the officer is killed in combat or dies, the value of this bonus will be granted to those who are entitled on his behalf in accordance with the provisions of Article 76 of Law No 90 for the Year 1975 referred to above.

To be entitled to this bonus on transfer to retirement, it is conditional by force of law, in order for the period of promotion selection to fall due, that the officer be included in the list of persons recommended for promotion.

This bonus will be exempted from tax and different types of levies.

Article 142 (Paragraphs Three and Four). Officers who resign are obligated to repay the armed forces for what they have spent on them for their education in military faculties or institutes, if they have not spent 5 years in good actual service as of the date of their graduation. The education expenses will be assessed by decree of the board of the faculty or the competent institute.

If they have entitlements upon completing their service the cost of these expenses will be deducted from them.

Article 144 (new paragraph). Violation of the provisions of this article will be considered a crime whose perpetrator will be punished by imprisonment for a period of not less than 1 year and a fine of not less than 500 pounds or greater than 2,000 pounds, without prejudice to any more severe punishment or other effects the law may devise.

Article Four. The modifications contained in Article One of this law on the benefits stipulated for persons who have obtained the Badges of the Star of Sinai and the Star of Honor will apply to persons who have already obtained either of these two badges as of the date on which this law goes into effect, although financial differentials will not be paid for the past.

Article Five. The first periodic raise for officers and higher officers present in service when this law goes into effect will be received at a rate equal to their service periods, calculated in the raise, as of the date on which the last periodic raise, in accordance with the provisions of Article 77 of Law No 232 for the Year 1959 referred to above.

As regards officers and higher officers who complete the period of 1 year stipulated for entitlement to periodic raises after this law goes into effect, on the date before the first date for disbursement of the periodic raises listed in Article 77 referred to above falls due, their periodic raises will be granted in full for the period of that year and they will then be dealt with in accordance with the previous paragraph.

Article Six. If it happens, as a consequence of the application of the provision of Article 77 of the aforementioned Law No 232 for the Year 1959, in accordance with the provisions carried in Article One of this law, that the salary of a senior officer or higher officer is lower than that of one with less seniority on the seniority list in which his name is listed, the salary of the senior one will be increased until it is equal to the rank of the junior one.

Article Seven. Armed forces officers who are not graduates of military faculties and institutes and have joined active service with less than university or higher credentials, and whom military requirements dictated receive the credentials of a master's degree in military science before this law went into effect, will be dealt with in terms of scope for promotion in accordance with the provision of Paragraph Two of Article 48 of Law No 232 for the Year 1959 referred to above.

Article Eight. This law will be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH.

This law will be stamped with the seal of the state and will be executed as one of its laws.

Issued by the Office of the President 12 July 1980.

/Signed/ Anwar al-Sadat.

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CSO: 4802

MILITARY RETIREMENT, INSURANCE PROVISIONS AMENDED

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic 12 Jul 80 pp 18-24

/Text/ Law No 133 for the Year 1980

Modifying Certain Provisions of Law No 90 for the Year 1975 Issuing the Law on Armed Forces Retirement, Insurance and Pensions

In the name of the people:

The People's Assembly has approved the law whose text follows and we, the president, have issued it:

Article One. The texts of Article Five, Subsection A first paragraph; Article Seven, second Paragraph; Article 18; Article 35, Subsection A; Article 113; and Article 112 of Law No 90 for the Year 1975 issuing the Law on Armed Forces Retirement, Insurance, and Pensions will be replaced by the following Texts:

Article 5, Subsection A, first paragraph: Expressing a desire in writing that all or part of these periods shall be calculated and that a start will be made in paying the sums due, by a date not to exceed the date of conclusion of service. Otherwise the provisions listed in the last paragraph of Article Four will be in effect for these periods. If a desire for inclusion is expressed, it may not be modified for any reason.

Article Seven, second paragraph: However, as regards beneficiaries or people with pensions who pay reserve pensions for the period in instalments for life or periods in excess of 15 years, collection of instalments from them will be suspended after 15 years as of the start of collection have elapsed and that will not result in the repayment of any financial differentials for the past.

Article 18. If the pension of the beneficiary or person entitled to it is less than 50 pounds a month and his service period is greater than 28.8 years, his pension will be settled on the basis of his full service period at a maximum of 36 years but must not exceed 50 pounds per month. If his service period exceeds this, the surplus service bonus stipulated in Article 17 will be paid to him.

The beneficiary or person entitled to it may request in 3 months of the date of notification of the assessment of the pension, in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, that it be settled on the basis of the last salary and a service period at a maximum of four-fifths the last salary the beneficiary was entitled to. The bonus stipulated in Article 17 will be paid out for the period in excess of 28.8 years. In this case an exceptional pension may not be specified for them or for those entitled on their behalf.

Article 35, Subsection A. The entitled persons' combined income and pension will not exceed 30 pounds per month, without prejudice to the right to combine salaries and pensions in excess of this limit possessed by those employees who have had this right by virtue of any of the laws stipulated in Article 2 of the issuing law.

Article 113. With attention to the provisions of Law No 62 for the Year 1976 regarding the amendment of some provisions on expenses, one may not block or reduce the pension of a beneficiary or owner of a pension, or beneficiaries or entitled persons, except to pay off the following debts, within the limits of one-fourth:

1. Expenses.

2. Sums due in accordance with the provisions of this law or to reclaim amounts which were unrightfully paid out in violation of its provisions.

3. Loans from the Armed Forces' Officers' Loan Organization.

4. Loans from the Armed Forces' Evacuation Fund Organization.

5. Money due the Armed Forces General Economic Company.

If there is any overlap between the debts stipulated in Subsections 2 and after and the expense debt stipulated in Subsection 1, the expense debt will be deducted at the outset within the limits of the portion which may be blocked in order, deducting the price to pay other debts from that.

If there is an overlap among the debts stipulated in Subsection 2 and those following it, the sum which may be blocked will be distributed among the creditors.

It is also permissible to block and deduct money from the pension of a beneficiary or person on pension in order to pay replacement instalments and loans from the Nasir Social Bank due from him.

In the event the beneficiary or person on pension dies, collection of the amounts due from him before death in the form of replacement instalments or loans from the Armed Forces' Officers' Loan Organization and the General Armed Forces' Economic Company will be frozen from the amounts to which heirs, beneficiaries or entitled persons are entitled, proportionate to the shares of each, provided that the deduction not exceed one quarter of the pension due him.

The Armed Forces Insurance and Pension Department may accept instalment payment of the sums stipulated in the abovementioned Subsection 2 owed by the beneficiary or person on pension in instalments not to exceed 100 or to suspend collection of these instalments in case ofdeath or the termination of service because of physical unfitness.

Article 122. The pensions to which persons on pensions are entitled, as well as the pensions of entitled persons for beneficiaries or persons on pension who are treated in accordance with the provisions of the pensions laws prior to 21 March 1964, will be increased by 10 percent of the basic pensions to which they are entitled, except in cases which are readjusted in accordance with the provisions of Law No 116 for the Year 1964 and laws amending that, people on pensions and entitled persons who benefit from the provision of Subsection 4 of Article 118 of Law No 90 for the Year 1975, persons who benefit from the provisions of Article 120 whose peers' salaries were determined after 21 March 1964, and cases where the pension was raised exceptionally, unless the 10 percent rate is preferable.

In any case, the increases in pensions will not result in any modification of the cost of living allowances stipulated for them, and it is not permissible for an increase over the maximum specified in Article 19 to result from this increase.

Article Two /of the law at issue/. The following case will be added to the cases in Table One accompanying Law 90 for the Year 1975 issuing the abovementioned Law on Armed Forces Retirement, Insurance and Pensions:

Number of Case	Entitled to Pension	Shares of Entitlement to Pension		
		Widow or wife	Children	Parents, Brothers & Sisters
12	One or two parents, one or more brothers or sisters	/_nil_/	/_ nil_/	One Quarter for any or all jointly

The provisions newly created in this article will be in effect for cases which occurred before this law went into effect, provided that financial differentials for the past are not paid out.

Article Three. Rule No 12 of the rules appended to Table One accompanying the abovementioned Law No 90 for the Year 1975 will be replaced by the following rule:

If one parent dies in the two Cases 10 and 12, his share will revert to the other parent. In case he dies the parents' share will revert to the brothers and sisters in a volume which will not exceed the share stipulated in Case 11.

This provision will also be in effect in the event of death of the parents in Case Two provided that the share reverting to the brothers or sisters be within the limits of one quarter the inherited pension.

The provisions newly created in this article will also apply to cases which occurred before this law went into effect, provided that financial differentials not be paid out for the past.

Article Four. The text of Article Six of Law no 52 for the Year 1978 amending certain provisions of Law No 90 for the Year 1975 will be replaced by the following text:

Persons in the branch armed services (coasts, borders, ports and lights, and fisheries) who are in the military and completed their service before 2 January 1969, as well as persons entitled for them in terms of pensions, will be dealt with by the provisions of the laws on military pensions in effect on the date their respective services ended, provided that the pension paid to them not be less than the minimum for military pensions, in observance of the following:

First, application of the provision of Article 117, Subsection 5 of Article 118 of the abovementioned Law No 90 for the Year 1975, and Article Five of Law No 52 for the Year 1978.

Second, they will benefit from the increases stipulated in the abovementioned Law No 90 for the Year 1975 and Law no 45 for the Year 1978 increasing military pensions.

The pensions of people entitled on behalf of persons killed in battle will be readjusted to equal the pensions of their peers at the same rank or base grade who are members of the main armed forces.

The General Insurance and Pensions Authority will take charge of settling and disbursing pensions due in accordance with this article, as well of the pensions of beneficiaries by virtue of Article 120 of the abovementioned Law 90 for the Year 1975.

Article Five. The following texts will be added to Articles Four, Six, 17, 89 and 105 of the abovementioned Law No 90 for the Year 1975:

Article Four. The following will be added to the end of Subsection J:

"Except for conscription periods, the periods stipulated in the first paragraph of this subsection will not be calculated for those whose service ended in accordance with their request, resignation, dispensing of services, expulsion or dismissal."

Article 6. A second paragraph whose text follows will be added to that:

"The reserve pension stipulated in the previous paragraph will be computed in accordance with Table Four accompanying the Social Insurance Law issued by Law No 79 for the Year 1975 on the basis of the age and wage of the beneficiary on the date his civilian service ended."

Article 17. A final paragraph whose text follows will be added to this:

"In the event the beneficiary returns to service or the decree transferring him to retirement is abrogated after a bonus is paid out, that will not be reclaimed from him and that part of the bonus which was previously paid out and is stipulated for him or those entitled on his behalf will be deducted on completion of service, according to the conditions."

Article 89. A second paragraph whose text follows will be added to it:

"If the person receiving the pension is missing, a monthly subsidy for his absence will be paid to persons entitled on his behalf equivalent to the pension stipulated for him, on the assumption that he has died, as of the first month in which he was missing, until it becomes apparent that he is alive or his death has been established in fact or by decree. When death is established, the remainder of the rights stipulated in this law will be paid to persons entitled to them on the date the death is established, with attention to the provision of Paragraph Three of Article 77. Payment of the subsidy previously assessed will continue to be paid, being considered as a pension, and will be applied with respect to missing persons on pension, whose death will be reported by force of the general stipulated rules."

Article 105. The following text will be inserted between Paragraphs Three and Four:

"Without prejudice to the levies stipulated by law and the exemption stipulated in Paragraph Three of Article 109, a fixed levy amounting to 200 milliemes will be imposed on written documents requested by persons on pension or entitled persons from the Armed Forces Insurance and Pensions Department or bodies disbursing pensions.

"A fixed levy amounting to 100 milliemes will also be imposed for the disbursement of any amount besides the pension to which one is entitled in accordance with the provisions of the abovementioned Law No 90 for the Year 1975, if the value of the sum exceeds 10 pounds."

Article Six. A new paragraph will be added to Article Four of the abovementioned Law No 52 for the Year 1978, whose text is as follows:

"The provision of the previous paragraph will be in effect as regards officers who have held the position of minister of war or undersecretary of war and completed their service before 1 October 1975."

Article Seven. All officers, high officers, noncommissioned officers, volunteer soldiers and persons whose service has resumed at high salary before 1 January 1960 but have not been entitled to a pension will be granted a pension of 50 percent of the last salary they were entitled to, provided that that not be less than the minimum for military pensions.

If the beneficiary has died, the pension will be paid to those entitled on his behalf who are alive on the date this law goes into effect.

However, it is stipulated that to be entitled to the pension, one must possess the condition of the period stipulated in Article 22 of Law No 90 for the Year 1975. When this period is calculated, attention will be made to rounding off the fraction of a year to a full year, if that will have the effect of completing the period necessary for entitlement to the pension.

Annexes and additional periods will be added to the service period computed in the pension in accordance with the laws with which they are treated on completing their service.

Persons benefiting from the provision of this article will be exempted from returning the bonuses which have been paid out to them. The bodies which adjusted their conditions upon completion of their service must assess and disburse pensions to beneficiaries by virtue of this article as of the date on which this law goes into effect.

Article Eight. The cost of living subsidy stipulated in the two Council of Minister Decrees of 19 February 1950 and 30 June 1953 will be due for the pensions stipulated by law before they were increased by Law No 46 for the Year 1974 and Decree of the President No 1220 for the Year 1975.

Article Nine. Savings instalments collected before 1 January 1979 will be considered valid, as will the savings sums disbursed or due before that date.

Article 10. The pensions stipulated for persons whose service ended by 1 October 1975 or persons entitled on their behalf will be increased by

10 percent, provided that this increase not exceed 8 pounds per month or be less than 2 pounds per month.

The provisions of Articles Two and Three of the abovementioned Law No 45 for the Year 1978 will apply regarding this increase.

This increase will be considered part of the pension in applying the provisions of Law No 62 for the Year 1980 on additional cost of living subsidies for people on pensions and entitled persons.

The provisions of this article will apply to persons in regard to whom the provisions of Article 120 of the abovementioned Law No 90 for the Year 1975 apply.

Article 11. If a pension for total disability, death, death in battle or absence is less than the pension for partial disability due when the same causes occur on the same date of termination of service, the former pensions will be increased to equal the partial disability pensions.

Article 12. Persons with total disability pensions will be entitled to monthly subsidies of 20 percent of the monthly pension to which they are entitled if the General Military Medical Council decides that they need permanent subsidies from other persons to bear the burdens of their daily life.

Rights to this subsidy will lapse with death, the enrollment by the persons on pension in any work, or the discontinuation of their need for the subsidy, by decree of the General Military Medical Council.

The provisions of this article will apply to cases of termination of service because of a total disability which preceded the date on which this law went into effect, without the disbursement of financial differentials for the past.

Article 13. This law will be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH and will go into effect as of the first of the month following the date of its publication, with attention to the following:

1. The amendment to Article 35 of Law No 90 for the Year 1975 cited in Article One will go into effect as of 1 October 1975.

2. The amendment to Article 122 of Law No 90 for the Year 1975 cited in Article One will go into effect as of 1 July 1978, without payment of financial differentials for the past.

3. The provisions of Articles Four and 11 of the current law will be in effect as of 1 July 1978, and the financial differentials resulting from that will be paid out.

4. The provisions of Articles Two and Three, the amendment to Articles Six, 17 and 89 cited in Article Five, and the provisions of Articles Six and Nine will go into effect as of 1 October 1976, without the payment of financial differentials for the past.

5. The provisions of Article Eight will be in effect as of 1 January 1976 and the financial differentials for the past will be paid.

6. The provisions of Article 10 will be in effect as of 1 January 1980 with payment of financial differentials for the past.

This law will be stamped with the seal of the state and will be implemented as one of its laws.

Issued by the Office of the President on 12 July 1980.

/Signed/ Anwar al-Sadat

11887
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END

JPRS 76636

17 October 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2202

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17 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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ARAB LEAGUE BACKS PRINCE FAHD

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18-19 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Mr Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States, made the following declaration public:

"We have respectfully received the appeal of His Highness Prince Fahd supporting holy war to deliver Jerusalem from Israeli occupation.

It is clear that the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia has expressed the deep desire of the Arab nation and its unanimous determination to fight to the bitter end to recover the occupied territories, liberate Jerusalem, and put the Palestinian people in a position to exercise their legitimate national rights, particularly that of building an independent state.

It is also clear that the Israeli challenges to this Arab will are of the kind which will provoke the League states into changing their plans of action and elaborating a strategy which will allow them to face in better circumstances the situation created by the Israeli decision to annex Jerusalem and make it the capital of Israel.

The meetings organized by the League in coming months will be called upon to react to this decision, the first one being the meeting of the ministerial committee set for the end of this month and meant to bring together seven foreign affairs ministers in addition to the League secretary general."

9631
CSO: 4400

KLIBI'S DENUNCIATION OF ISRAELI AGGRESSION AGAINST LEBANON REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States, left Tunis yesterday morning for Beirut, where he and Lebanese leaders, headed by President Elias Sarkis, will study the situation in Lebanon, especially the latest Israeli aggressions perpetrated against Lebanese territory.

Afterwards Mr Klibi will go to Baghdad to attend the first meeting of the Board of Directors of the Arab Industrial Development Organization.

On his departure the secretary general of the Arab League was saluted by Hussein Al Abdallah and Abdelmalek Al Yassine, the permanent delegates from Lebanon and Iraq, respectively, to the Arab League, as well as by the deputy secretaries general and several highly-placed officials of the pan-Arab organization.

During a press conference on Wednesday, at the end of the work of the 74th session of the Council of the League of Arab States, Chedli Klibi announced that "This visit was planned well before the Council was held and was postponed until this week by common agreement with the Lebanese government, because of a heavy schedule."

Chedli Klibi also indicated that he will study with the Lebanese leaders, especially with President Elias Sarkis, the situation prevailing in Lebanon, especially the Zionist aggressions perpetrated in recent weeks against his territory and those being suffered by the Lebanese and their Palestinian guests.

"These talks," he said, "will clarify for the League the path to be followed in order to help Lebanon surmount its difficulties and strengthen its authority over all of its own territory."

On the other hand, Chedli Klibi announced that he was going to Baghdad after his trip to Beirut, to attend the first meeting of the Board of Directors of the Arab Industrial Development Organization, which will establish its headquarters in the Iraqi capital.

The secretary general of the League expressed the hope that he could meet with President Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi foreign affairs minister, Dr Saadoun Hamadi.

To a question about the content of the conversations he had recently in Damascus, Mr Klibi replied that urgent questions required that he make contact with the Syrian government, in particular assertions by Israeli officials, according to whom Syria was preparing an offensive against the Zionist state.

He said he believed that the real meaning of these assertions was that Israel is preparing the ground for a premeditated aggression it is getting ready to launch against Syria on the pretext of preventing an attack by the Syrians.

Chedli Klibi stated that he had also taken advantage of the occasion to talk with President Al Assad and Syrian Foreign Affairs Minister Abdelhalim Khaddam about the plan for union between Syria and Libya, as well as a number of subjects concerning joint Arab action.

Mr Klibi indicated further that in Damascus he had had a talk with Yassar Arafat, the president of the Executive Committee of the PLO, on the subject of the dangers that are threatening the Palestinian resistance, and the modalities of an immediate Arab counter-offensive in case of an Israeli aggression against the Palestinians.

The secretary general of the League on the other hand denied that some participating delegations are opposed to furnishing any aid at all to the Eritrean people, adding that the Council believed only that those organizations are adopting a common position so that the League of Arab States can have only one interlocutor to face.

Mr Klibi also said he was concerned about the events taking place on the Iran-Iraq borders, and that he hoped the difference between the two countries would not degenerate into an armed conflict.

On the subject of the possibility of establishing coordination between the League of Arab States and the Islamic Conference Organization for the purpose of finding a settlement to the Iran-Iraq difference, Mr Klibi revealed that he had agreed with Habib Chatty, the secretary general of that organization, on the need to establish such coordination in all areas of common interest.

To a question about the position of the Council of the League concerning the existence of foreign bases in some Arab countries, the secretary general indicated that the Council had charged him with making the necessary contacts and studying the record in the interest of preserving the Arab national interests and respecting the charter of the League of Arab States.

Chedli Klibi in conclusion made it known that several heads of delegations on many occasions exalted the efforts deployed by the secretary general since the League headquarters were transferred to Tunis, just as they were pleased with the work accomplished by the secretary general personally toward bringing about the growth of the structures related to the general secretariat and the League of Arab States.

8946
CSO: 4400

KLIBI APPEALS TO WORLD COMMUNITY TO PRESERVE PEACE IN MID-EAST

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 15-16 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States, has issued an urgent warning of Israeli preparations for an attack on Lebanon.

In a speech pronounced before the 74th regular session of the Council of the League of Arab States, which began Saturday evening in Tunis, Chedli Klibi stated that he had disturbing information telling of Israel's preparations for an attack on Lebanon.

Klibi, who met with Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad and Yasser Arafat, president of the PLO, in Damascus on Friday, made an appeal to the great powers, urging them to use all "means of dissuasion to prevent these events" and to "face their responsibilities so that the situation in the Middle East is not further complicated."

Klibi stated that "the information in our possession is disturbing. It tells of Israeli preparations for once again presenting the international community with a *fait accompli*, whether it be achieved directly or through local agents acting in its behalf. We cannot remain silent, waiting for the irreparable to occur at the expense of Lebanon's sovereignty, the forces of the revolution or any other Arab territory.

"We must appeal to nations to assume their responsibilities for maintaining the peace, to use suitable means of dissuasion to prevent these events before it is too late. We ask that they meet their responsibilities so that the situation in the Middle East is not complicated further, making it even more difficult to settle the problem."

The secretary general of the Pan-Arab organization also emphasized the Arab nations' need to act so that Israel will be certain that if it undertakes a new act of aggression, it will find itself facing the entire solidary and united Arab nation."

Klibi also expressed satisfaction with the new union of Syria and Libya.

After hailing "efforts undertaken by these two brother countries to combine their means and build solidarity," Klibi expressed the hope that "this new experiment will be undertaken judiciously so that it will be assured of success."

For his part, Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization, emphasized the "deterioration of the situation in the Middle East due to Israel's terrorist practices of penetrating occupied Arab territories and the annexation of the Holy City."

Kaddoumi, who is presiding over this session of the Council of the Arab League, condemned the Camp David accords, which have had "very harmful effects on the Arab world, entirely cutting Egypt off from the Arab world of which it was the main force."

11,464
CSO: 4400

KOOLI'S STATEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR PLO REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Mongi Kooli, director of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] and ministerial delegate to the prime minister, talked yesterday morning at the Party House in the Kasbah with Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the political department of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In a statement the Palestinian leader indicated that he had discussed with Mr Kooli "the Middle East crisis and the tension that prevails in the region because of the negative repercussions the Camp David accords have had on the Arab world and because of the terrorist practices of the Zionist enemy in the occupied territories.

"The interview also dealt with the necessity of strengthening solidarity and joint Arab action, to win more support from friendly countries and peoples, and so that the Palestinian cause will remain at the center of the concerns of the international community," Mr Kaddoumi added, and he noted in conclusion that Mongi Kooli had reaffirmed Tunisia's support for the just struggle the Palestinian people are waging for realization of their national objectives and the establishment of an independent state.

Attending the talk were Hakam Balaoui, representing the PLO in Tunis, and Sadok Fayala, in charge of foreign relations for the PSD Board.

8946
CSO: 4400

HAWATIMAH STRESSES NEED TO OPPOSE CAMP DAVID AGREEMENTS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 27 Aug 80 p 17

[Report on interview with Nayif Hawatimah, Secretary General of Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), by Khalil al-Taqi, in Damascus; date not given]

[Text] DFLP Secretary General Nayif Hawatimah told AL-QABAS that in cooperation with some Arab regimes, Europe is trying to promote a Western European initiative which would be tantamount to a Trojan horse to rescue the Camp David parties from their deadly dilemma.

He stressed the need to convene the Palestine National Council as quickly as possible, today and not tomorrow, in order to adopt a resolute, clear Palestinian position towards the plots and conspiracies aimed at extricating the Camp David agreements from the dead end they have gotten into by virtue of our people's struggle within the occupied homeland and outside it and the struggles of all Arab steadfastness forces. The council would issue its verdict on all the dubious schemes which are pouring out of the Camp David mill.

It is known that the Palestine National Council will hold its fifteenth session on 4 September, and that the Palestinian leaders have begun holding intensified meetings to prepare for this session.

At the beginning of his talk with AL-QABAS, Mr Hawatimah said, "Our region is experiencing some very complicated circumstances. After the parties to the Camp David conspiracy failed to carry out the program for their agreements throughout 1979 and during the first half of 1980, by virtue of the struggle and steadfastness of our people in the occupied areas and the struggle and perseverance of the national Lebanese-Palestinian front, and by virtue of the unanimous national Palestinian rejection of the agreements and the autonomy plan and insistence on our people's right to return, determine their own destiny and establish an independent state, side by side with the struggle of the Arab steadfastness forces--after all of this, American imperialism, the Zionist enemy and al-Sadat

are continuing their offensive against the Palestinian revolution and the Arab liberation movement, to rescue the Camp David agreements from the failure they have met with.

"Here Western Europe and some of the Arabs are trying to promote a Western European initiative, and are preparing themselves to be a Trojan horse for the Camp David parties.

"In order to further their goals, they are trying to transform Lebanon into a heated arena in the face of the Palestinian revolution and its allies from the Lebanese patriotic, nationalist and progressive movement and Syria. On the other hand, they are trying to concentrate their efforts to push western regimes into taking other steps for the benefit of extricating Camp David from its mortal predicament."

The DFLP's secretary general added, "We can say that under th present circumstances we are struggling on a number of fronts. The first is consolidating the phased patriotic, national program, rallying all revolutionary groups and the entire Arab national movement around it, insisting that the central point of this program be return, self-determination and an independent state, and thwarting all attempts to prevent this.

"Therefore, the untiring struggle to consolidate the phased program, protect and anchor national unity within the context of the PLO, and promote a unity which includes the revolution in the occupied lands within the context of the Palestinian National Front, is the most effective weapon in our people's struggle."

"Our immediate struggle is concentrating on achieving a union of revolutionary forces in the occupied areas within the context of the Palestinian National Front, inasmuch as this front is a tool for the principal struggle of the PLO within Israel, as stipulated in the resolutions of the fourteenth session of the Palestine National Council."

"The second front in this stage of our struggle is reacting to attempts to entangle our people's rights, and their sole representation by the PLO, in dubious projects, the most recent of which is the European initiative, supplementary to the Camp David plot, whereby the Western European states, after the failure of the so-called autonomy talks, are trying to extricate the Camp David agreements from their dead end by means of an initiative based on a new resolution issued by the Security Council recalling the clauses of Resolution 242 and adding a clause about the Palestinian people's rights couched in obscure, easily stretched phrases so as to evade the effective, tangible standards which deal with recognizing the national rights of the Palestinian people, the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of our people, and the Palestinian people's right to return to their country and determine their destiny within the context of an independent state.

"In its initiative, Western Europe stopped at a very limited understanding of the Palestinian rights, inasmuch as it was responding to the concepts of the Camp David framework and was paving the way for shattering the isolation of the al-Sadat regime, all the while constituting an attractive factor for some Arabs."

Mr Hawatimah told AL-QABAS, "In Lebanon, where we are anticipating the escalation of Israeli and American political and military operations and pressure, we are confronting these hostile tendencies with a greater alliance with the Lebanese patriotic, nationalist and progressive movement and Syria.

"Our Palestinian revolution also requires vigilance for the implementation of the Tripoli Steadfastness Summit resolutions, so that the Arab steadfastness movement can shift over from the defensive to the offensive against the Camp David agreements."

"In confronting all of this, we are continuing our efforts to escalate and expand our struggle in all its various forms--in the military sense, by escalating our armed struggle quantitatively and qualitatively within the occupied territory against the enemy's organizations and its vital economic installations and its military presence and its settlements, along with increased mass uprisings and other forms of struggle."

"This also requires spurring our military struggle on all the Arab fronts according to the Rabat and Baghdad resolutions, as well as defending our revolution's presence on the Lebanese scene and reacting to Israeli aggression, which has become increasingly ferocious during the last few months, by raising our vigilance and readiness, reacting to aggression, developing means of response, and ensuring all forms of protection for the battlefields of the revolution and for the masses of our people in the tent camps."

"On the political level, we must expose all solutions which encroach on our people's rights--solutions which have all ended in failure. Without the recognition of the proven national rights of our Palestinian people to return, determine their own destiny, and build an independent state with the leadership of the PLO, peace and stability will never be established in the region. At this stage we have to struggle to transform the sweeping failure with which the autonomy talks ended into permanent failure."

Relations With Syria

Speaking of Palestinian-Syrian relations, Mr Hawatimah said, "Relations are good between the various Palestinian resistance groups and Syria. We are two parties in the national perseverance front, and our relations are built on the common national struggle against the racist, imperialist, Zionist enemy and the Camp David plots. Relations with Syria are based on frankness and clearness through dialog and continual meetings.

"Also, we and Syria stand together in the hot front line with the enemy, and in the struggle against the Egyptian regime and the capitulatory, compromising Camp David agreements directed at the entire Arab nation in general and against Syria and our Palestinian people in particular."

"The Syrian and Palestinian fronts are the cornerstone of Arab steadfastness, without which there is no steadfastness or reaction. Perseverance will be determined by shoulder-to-shoulder struggle with the Syrian and Palestinian front, and strategic, political, military and economic integration among them."

"In this particular stage, when the efforts by American imperialism and its allies to beautify the Camp David agreements, extricate them from their impass, and extend them to other nearby fronts are intensifying, especially through Western European attempts to consummate the agreements, we need to consolidate the alliance, straighten up the ranks, and continue the dialog and the meetings between Syria and the Palestine revolution, in order to expedite the application of the fourth steadfastness front summit's resolutions and promote the various ways of confronting the Camp David agreements in order to defeat and topple them."

"Furthermore, continued consolidation of the joint struggling alliance between Syria and the Lebanese partriotic, national and progressive movement and the Palestinian resistance groups is the real entrypoint to reacting to the Camp David parties' plots against lebanon."

In his talk with AL-QABAS, Mr Hawatimah stressed that "an important part of the joint concern on the part of Syria and the Palestinian revolution must be concentrated on achieving higher degrees of coordination between them and the national movement and the Lebanese patriotic, progressive and national forces, in order to ensure joint security for Syria, the Palestinian revolution and Lebanon, especially since our collective experience affirms that the Camp David parties have plotted, and are still plotting, to transform Lebanon into an arena which would exhaust Syria, the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national progressive forces, preparatory to weakening these combined forces, imposing a plot to Zionize Lebanon, and subsequently dragging it, as a second circle, into the framework of the capitulatory Camp David solution."

Mr Hawatimah spoke of the plot to which Syria is exposed, saying, "Syria's steadfastness in the face of the Camp David agreements, and its insistence on overthrowing these agreements, explains the American-Zionist-reactionary offensive against Syria, whereby the Camp David parties are working to arrange and embrace all acts of mass or individual sabotage, murder and assassination in Syria. All of this is clearly shown in the timing of this plot, which followed Syria's rejection of the capitulatory, low, shameful agreements."

"In the face of this offensive, the Arab steadfastness forces must support the battlegrounds on the front lines against the Zionist-imperialist enemy, especially the Syrian and Palestinian fronts."

"The stiffening of circumstances on the steadfastness front necessitates the stiffening of the Syrian front and its political, military and economic reinforcement in the face of the attack by the imperialists and reactionaries, who intend to direct a strong blow to the struggle of all the Arab steadfastness forces by striking at Syria, in view of the important role which Syria plays in reacting to the big plot."

The Soviet Stand

Mr Hawatimah ended his talk with AL-QABAS by evaluating the stands of the Soviet Union vis-a-vis fateful Arab causes, especially the Palestinian cause. "Principally, the Soviet Union is the major supporter of the struggle of our Palestinian people and the Arab nation to liberate the occupied Arab territories and ensure the rights of the Palestinian Arab people to return to their homeland and determine their own destiny in the context of an independent Palestinian state."

"The Soviet Union is also the major supporter of the Arab nation's struggle for liberation, full independence, and social progress."

"This is what the fourth Arab steadfastness front summit clearly defined and specified when it took stock of the friendly front and the hostile front."

"All the time the Soviet Union was standing at the head of the friendly front, on the side of all the peoples' just patriotic and national issues, America was standing at the head of the hostile front, on the side of imposing surrender on the Arab nation."

"Over the last 30 years our Arab nation has learned through experience who is its friend and who is its enemy. Therefore, the steadfastness front has stressed that there is no neutral ground between friends and enemies."

"The steadfastness front's decision to promote relations with the Soviet Union, so as to strengthen our nation's ability to overthrow Camp David and ensure Arab rights, was an expression of just how necessary it is to develop relations with our nation's strategic allies in its struggle for liberation, progress and unity, and to expose propaganda aimed at damaging Arab-Soviet relations and equating friends with enemies under the false cover of neutrality."

8559
CSO: 4802

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE APPEALS TO CHRISTIAN WORLD

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] On the occasion of the Day of Islamic Solidarity with the Palestinian people, Mr Habib Chatty, secretary general of the Islamic Conference, made the following statement:

"On this same day during the year 1389 of the Hegira, the criminal hands of Zionism reached out to defile one of the most exalted places of Islam by setting fire to the El Aqsa mosque in defiance of the nation of Islam. Today, what's more, and 12 years after that hateful sacrilege, Israel is annexing the Arab part of Jerusalem and making that city its capital, thereby succeeding in showing the highest disregard for the feelings of two billion Moslems and Christians throughout the world.

The nation of Islam, which considers Jerusalem an integral part of the Islamic homeland, is determined to face up to the religious and racial war Zionism is declaring against it. It reaffirms its determination to carry on the struggle to deliver Jerusalem from Zionist occupation.

The Jerusalem Committee, which recently met in Casablanca, has given voice to the determination of Islamic countries to work by any and all means in an effort to make sure the heroic struggle of the Palestinian people goes on and to give total and unlimited support to this struggle until Jerusalem is liberated and a Palestinian state is established.

Given the present serious circumstances, we salute the Palestinian people who in Jerusalem and in all the territories of occupied Palestine are heroically resisting the policy of terror, repression, genocide and banishment carried out by Israel. We affirm to them the respect and regard of the nation of Islam which supports and backs them in their holy struggle for the liberation of Palestine and Jerusalem under the leadership of the PLO.

We issue an appeal to the nation of Islam, which is showing Islamic solidarity with the Palestinian people on this occasion of the commemoration of the El Aqsa mosque fire, to work to translate into deeds its

anger and bitterness, and to take serious and effective initiatives to free the El Aqsa mosque from Zionist occupation and to alleviate the misfortunes Moslems are subjected to.

The Islamic Conference organization, set up just after the El Aqsa mosque fire, is also issuing an appeal to the Christian world to save Christ's native land as well as to all peoples who love peace and justice, to stand up to Israel's arrogance and its scorn for all feeling, for international law, for human rights, and for the holy places in occupied Palestine."

9631
CSO: 4400

USE OF MODERN WEAPONS AGAINST ENEMY DEEMED IMMINENT

Beirut AL-HURRIYAH in Arabic 1 Sep 80 pp 23-25

[Interview with Lt Col Mamduh Nufal, Commander of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, by Sami Shahin; date not given]

[Text] In an important interview with AL-HURRIYAH Magazine, the commander of the armed forces of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Lt Col Mamduh Nufal evaluated from a military point of view the Israeli enemy's operation in al-Shaqif, Arnon and Kafr Tabanit. He also dealt in general with the military situation of the resistance in Lebanon: its positive points and its gaps. He warned against broader Israeli raids and eruptions coordinated by Israel with the Phalangists and the Deuxieme Bureau [Lebanese Government Intelligence Agency].

The text of the questions and Brother Mamduh's answers follow.

The Enemy Chose a Style Closer to That of Guerrilla Warfare

[Question] What is your evaluation of the battle of al-Shaqif, Arnon and Kafr Tabanit and of the overall recent Israeli military operations in the South?

[Answer] The al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle is considered one of the most notable defense operations in which the forces of the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement were involved successfully. It has been known for quite some time that the enemy has been launching a series of attacks against the forces of the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement on Lebanese territory and especially in the South. [It is also known] that the enemy has pursued in these operations a style that is closer to guerilla warfare than it is to regular attacks. The enemy chose this kind of operations against the forces of the revolution and the Lebanese National Movement after realizing through the battle of the south that took place in March 1978 and the series of attrition operations that were launched by the air force throughout 1979 that the effect of such operations on the forces

that oppose the Palestinian Revolution has become limited and that the forces of the revolution are now able to coexist and to live with this kind of operation. This kind of operations gave the forces of the revolution and of the national movement an Arab and an international moral position and of the national movement an Arab and an international moral position that helped reveal and disclose the terrorist practices of the enemy against the Palestinian people and the Lebanese people.

At that time, this kind of operations aroused world public opinion against Zionist military aggression, and, accordingly, the enemy chose this kind of guerrilla offensive operation, thinking that with this kind of operation he would be able to inflict major, direct material losses on the forces of the revolution and the National Lebanese Movement. The enemy thought that with this kind of operation he can avoid the political uproar and the international political reactions to his aggressive acts. With these operations the enemy has also been trying to establish the artificial image of the ideal, invincible Israeli soldier. The enemy has been trying to arouse terror in the ranks of Palestinian and Lebanese citizens, and he has also been trying to influence the morale of the forces of the revolution and the national movement. With this kind of operation the enemy has also been trying to raise the morale of his troops and to provide an opportunity for some of his troop formations to carry out the necessary drills and exercises to become acquainted with the terrain of the south in preparation for subsequent operations that would be undertaken by the forces of the Zionist enemy.

The Enemy Was Forced To Enter into Serious Combat

Hence we view the al-Shaqif, Arnon and Kafr Tabanit operation to be part of the open war of attrition against the forces of the revolution; it is a war that has been going on for a long time. We can say in this defensive battle that the forces of the revolution and of the Lebanese National Movement forced the enemy to engage in serious combat. This had not happened in the al-Qasimiyah operation and in the operations that had preceded it such as the landings that took place along the beach and in the area of Dayr al-Zahrani. The fighters of the revolution and the Lebanese National Movement succeeded in forcing the enemy to engage in serious combat for more than 4 full hours, and they also succeeded in inflicting heavy losses on the enemy's ranks. This may be considered a preliminary step that was essential for the forces of the revolution and the National Movement, [enabling them] to shift from a state of passive defense to one of active defense in preparation for regaining the initiative and the offensive against the forces of the enemy by means of launching offensive, combat operations inside the occupied homeland.

Through this success, the forces of the revolution are reaffirming that they are capable of taking the initiative and that they can embark upon this kind of operation, that is, launching a raid and responding to a raid. The forces of the revolution had launched a series of operations

that were more successful than the Israeli military operations which the enemy had recently carried out. The operations at Ma'alot, Bisan, Nahariya and al-Khalsah, as well as other military operations that were carried out by the fighters of the Palestinian Revolution in past years, were more successful than the operations that were carried out by the enemy in the area of al-Sarafand, al-Sa'diyyat, Dayr al-Zahrani or the Arnon Citadel. The al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle occurs in the context of the Camp David plan which seeks to exhaust and to weaken the forces of the Palestinian Revolution.

The defense combat capability of the forces of the revolution and the Lebanese National Movement proved to have grown and improved during the al-Shaqif, Arnon and Kafr Tabanit battle. Small groups of the revolution's troops in a number of defense positions were able to foil an attack by an Israeli force which was thought to have been a battalion that was supported by the best Israeli troops. This was equal to five times the Palestinian and Lebanese defense troops. Despite the superiority that the enemy enjoyed in equipment, materiel and numbers these small groups were able to inflict heavy losses on the enemy who acknowledged that he had sustained 15 injuries even though information from the battlefield and from elsewhere indicated that the enemy's losses were many times that figure.

But the al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle also revealed numerous basic and secondary weaknesses in the work of the forces of the revolution and the National Movement. Among these weaknesses was the fact that the defense combat capability of the forces of the revolution and of the Lebanese National Movement was still in need of further development and progress. The battle affirmed that the revolutionary forces were better at offensive operations than they were at defensive operations. The groups that had started out from the rear mobilization centers in the direction of the battlefield succeeded in entering the battle and in directing a series of effective blows against the forces of the enemy on the battlefield and during combat.

The al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle also affirmed that it would have been possible to inflict heavier losses among the enemy's ranks had there been relatively larger reserve troops under the control of the local command and had there also been a firing plan that had been previously coordinated with the forward defense units and with the artillery formations and the rear support weapons. It may also be said that this battle did affirm that when the Palestinian or Lebanese soldier can make a political decision to use everything he has to resist and to oppose [the enemy], this soldier is capable of taking action, of influencing the struggle and of confronting the forces of the enemy regardless of the size of these forces, their level of training and the kind of equipment they own. Our troops were not able during the battle to complete the second part of the mobilization position which is represented in forcing the enemy to leave some of his casualties and his wounded on the battlefield.

The battle revealed that the defensive combat in which the forces of the revolution were engaged was not carried out according to a defense plan that covered all locations -- a plan in which the defensive task of every one of these positions was determined in the context of a single plan for all positions in the area. The battle proved that the defense forces had waged their battle without serious fortifications that would have helped them withstand for a longer period and would have spared them the airplane raids and the pounding of the artillery. The battle also revealed that telecommunications between the forces of the revolution and the forces of the National Movement were poor. Besides a shortage in equipment, the communications devices were not standardized into a single network. At the decisive moments when the circumstances of the battle required that the area of operations be lit, there was no illumination because of a shortage in flares and other devices. The battle affirmed the importance of amassing larger forces in one location. It affirmed that scattered positions that have few people do not help oppose large attacking forces even though they may reduce losses during air raids.

The battle revealed the importance of having the fighters of the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement, who are working in the same area, acquainted with each other's positions. It affirmed the importance of the availability of air defense agents on all the lines of combat.

In addition, essential military equipment is to be made available to enable the fighters to prepare themselves in advance and to put them in a state of alert before the forces of the enemy advance. Advanced equipment and night vision devices can enable an entrenched soldier on the front lines to discover enemy forces advancing on foot. Besides, the battle affirmed the necessity of reconsidering the defense system that the forces of the revolution and of the National Movement are following. This system is based on assigning combat duties on one line and on one boundary to forces whose training has been dissimilar and whose organization and formation are different. We believe that dividing the confrontation front with the enemy, whether that be the coast which extends from Beirut to south of Tyre and also the areas of the north, or the confrontation front which extends from Tyre to Jabal al-Shaykh and to the liens and military boundaries, and making every platoon of the Palestinian Revolution bear the responsibility for defending one of them, does represent an advanced step on the road to organizing defenses that are stronger and more organized. Such a distribution of responsibilities actually helps develop the forms of defense of the Palestinian Resistance.

By determining the responsibility of every one of the revolution's platoons and by determining the duties of every platoon in defending this or that line, this platoon or the other will find itself facing a moral and a material mission that would force it to place major capabilities to develop the defense on the line that had been determined for it. This [defense mode] would also create forces whose training, armaments and furnishings are unified and subject to one, clear and specific combat order. The

al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle indicated that the variety and the difference in the kind and level of training and armaments of the forces that are defending the area as well as the weak level of coordination between them had a limited negative effect which did not contribute to the development or improvement of the standard of defense from that of a dynamic, positive defense to that of pursuing and hunting the enemy. Besides all this, any objective evaluation of the al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle cannot but take note of the heroism and bravery of the defenders. The fact that the enemy amassed this number and this kind of troops to attack the fighters of the revolution and the Lebanese National Movement on this line does in itself represent a testimonial for them--for the fact that they do represent an effective force that carries weight in the ongoing struggle with the enemy.

The Enemy Will Escalate; We Have To Improve Coordination and Effectiveness

[Question] Do you expect Israeli Military attacks to escalate and Israeli tactics to develop? What are the measures that the joint forces are taking to confront this escalation and these tactics?

[Answer] Commenting on the al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle Menahem Begin said, "We will continue our military operations, and we will maintain our preemptive strikes against the saboteurs. We will not wait for them to carry out their operations against our settlements and our military positions before we direct our strikes against them. We will rather continue to strike against them wherever possible." This candid, obvious position enables us to say that the enemy will certainly repeat his military attacks against the forces of the revolution and the national movement. Besides, we expect more blows and more attacks because the parties to Camp David are seeking to force the Palestinian Revolution to capitulate, and they are seeking to force the revolution and the PLO to abandon the national objectives of the Palestinian people.

A state of capitulation and surrender cannot be forced on the Palestinian people unless the vital, fighting force of the Palestinian Revolution is shattered and the Arab positions of opposition and resistance, especially Syria, are shattered. The military operations that are expected may assume various forms. In addition to guerrilla operations and mobile ambushes behind the lines, we can expect the enemy to resume his heavy use of the air force. We can also expect the enemy to use the artillery to force the largest possible number of Palestinians and Lebanese who are residents of South Lebanon to leave so as to create more problems for the revolution and for the Lebanese National Movement. In addition, the enemy will probably undertake special, relatively broad operations in which naval forces would participate with paratroopers who would be transported by air and by the air force itself. We also have to expect the enemy to carry out some operations against the rear command positions and offices and against the leading figures of the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement.

The measures that are taken by these joint forces to confront these escalations and these new tactics are still to a large extent dependent on the measures that are taken by each one of the revolution's platoons. Joint measures and tactics come in second place, not because they are less important, but rather bacause this is realistic. This most certainly places us in a situation that is more complicated, more dangerous and more difficult with regard to confrontation. It places us in front of joint military and security missions, the most important of which is to upgrade the standard of military and security coordination among the various forces of the revolution's platoons. This means defense lines are to be reconsidered, and joint military commands on regional and linear levels are to be given more authority. More capabilities are to be allocated to them so they can play their leadership role. This also requires that the greatest energies and capabilities be amassed in the defense battle against the enemy to force him from his offensive position into a defensive one.

In this regard, the military command of the revolution did pause after the al-Shaqif, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit battle to take preliminary measures that would relatively strengthen the leadership role of the joint military command. The command also took a few preliminary steps to amass and mobilize the energies of our people on the Lebanese scene; it subjected the students of secondary and preparatory schools to compulsory training. A serious effort has also been approved to furnish some of the requirements and the technical equipment, which if well used and distributed can provide better combat opportunities for the fighters of the revolution and the national movement. I believe that the moment is at hand for using few of the kinds of modern and heavy equipment which the forces of the revolution have--and our troops are among them. We cannot continue [to act as] spectators, watching the Israeli artillery and air force bombard the camps of our people and the Lebanese villages at a time when we have effective weapons that can reach the Zionist villages, cities and settlements and can inflict tremendous destruction on them. The fact that the enemy continues to bombard us with his artillery compels us to respond in a similar manner with all the kinds of heavy or light weapons that we have.

Phalangists and Deuxieme Bureau in Collusion with Israel

[Question] Do you think there is a possibility that the Phalangists and the other client forces may enter the line of battle during the next few months against the resistance and coordinate their entry with Israel? What are the possibilities for this, and what are the means for confronting it?

[Answer] The Phalangists and the other client forces have entered into the line of battle; this is an existing fact and not a possibility and a supposition. It is in front of the magnitude with which the Phalangists and the client forces will enter the line during the coming period that we can pause, inquire and made a careful investigation. The events and the details of executing the Arnon, al-Shaqif, Kafr Tabanit battle--and

before it the battle of al-Qasimiyah and most of the Israeli military operations that were waged against the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese National Movement, such as the landing at al-Sa'dyat, at Dyar al-Zahrani and at al-Sarafand--affirm that the other reactionary client forces on Lebanese territory--and this includes the Phalangists--played a role of assisting Israel. Most certainly the clients of the Deuxieme Bureau and the other client forces played and are still playing an intelligence role, and they are helping the forces of the enemy. The coordination between Israel, the Phalangists, the Deuxieme Bureau and the other client forces on Lebanon's territory has been in existence for a long time, to say nothing of the role of the client Sa'd Haddad who not only offered aid and support to the enemy and facilitated the movement of the Israeli troops, but he also participated directly throughout the past period in shelling the positions of the revolution and the national movement in the south.

In the next few months we expect an escalation in the role played by the Phalangists and the other client forces, and we expect a development in their level of participation; [we expect this escalation and development to take place] in the military operations they will carry out against the resistance and against the Lebanese National Movement. Preliminary information indicates that there is more than an Israeli motorized infantry brigade in the area of Muthalath al-Matallah, Dayr Maymas-Marja'yun. Besides this motorized infantry brigade, the enemy's forces also have an artillery regiment in that area; this has been confirmed by the UN emergency troops. This concentration of Israeli troops is most certainly a preparatory step that is being made to carry out a few broad operations against the Palestinian Resistance and the Lebanese National Movement in the South and especially on the al-'Ayshiyah, al-Jarmaq, al-Rayhan line and on the al-Nabatiyyah, Arnon, Kafr Tabanit line.

We are not to think it unlikely that the Zionist enemy will in the next few months make a limited military push when circumstances permit for the purpose of occupying these areas and delivering them to the troops of Sa'd Haddad, or at least internationalizing them or delivering them to the UN forces so that the client Sa'd Haddad can expand the sphere of influence of his state and so that the client Haddad can have greater opportunities not only for geographic expansion, but also for attempting to establish communications with the Phalangists and with the other client forces inside Lebanon, and especially in the area of Jazin. It is Arab weakness and silence that is tempting many Israeli generals to carry out such an operation. Besides, Israel has always dreamed and wanted to remove the resistance forces, and especially their heavy weapons, from [positions where] it would be possible for them to shell the settlements. It is known throughout this area--that is, the al-Nabatiyyah sector and the eastern sector--that the forces of the revolution and of the national movement can reach the enemy's settlements and principal cities with their heavy weapons. With this operation the enemy too would be able to exert

further military and moral pressure on Syria and to lure its forces, which are in Lebanon, and force them into a battle whose time and place he himself determines. The purpose of such a battle would be to deal a blow to these troops, especially in the western al-Biqa' region, and in the other areas as well where they hinder the Phalangists from expanding and from communicating with Sa'd Haddad's state.

When the situation is evaluated in the next few months, what happened in the eastern area in July must also be taken into consideration. The 7 July operation which was carried out by the Fascist Phalangist party against its historical ally, the National Liberal Party, clearly indicates that the Facist Phalangist party is determined not only to control its area, that is the al-Kantun area which is represented by East Beirut and the areas of Kasrawan al-Jabal, but it is also determined, as it proclaims daily in the words of Bashir al-Jumayyil and Pierre al-Jumayyil and the leaders and commanders of the Phalangist party "to liberate Lebanon from all foreigners." By foreigners, the Phalangist party means the Palestinian Resistance, Syria and the Lebanese national and progressive forces. As we know the Phalangist party did establish a close relationship with Israel during the years of the Lebanese civil war and afterwards. We also know that Israel is using all its capabilities and its energies to develop the combat capability of the Phalangist party and the client forces in Lebanon. Israel relies on them as basic forces inside Lebanon to direct blows against the forces of the revolution and the Arab deterrent forces.

Bashir al-Jumayyil's Statements and the Anticipated Explosions

In this context we believe that the next few months will bring about explosions on a broad scale. The parties to Camp David and all the hostile forces are preparing for a heated round of combat which they hope will be decisive. They hope it will exhaust the forces of the revolution and of Syria and make them incapable of rejecting the European initiatives and the other initiatives that are complementary to Camp David. In this context too we are not to think it improbable that the forces of the Phalangists and the other client forces will launch a series of operations against the forces of the revolution and the Lebanese National Movement in Beirut and in al-Jabal. The statements that Bashir al-Jumayyil made in the last few days, holding the Palestinian forces responsible for some of the explosions that occurred in the eastern region, indicate, if they indicate anything at all, that there are deliberate hostile intentions against the resistance and against the Lebanese National Movement.

The means for confronting these possible developments lie first in strengthening the Palestinian-Syrian-Lebanese national relationship and establishing that relationship on clear and firm bases. This would enable these three powers not only to oppose this plot which is supported and put into action by the parties to Camp David, it will also enable them to strike at it and to abort it. Confronting this hostile plan also requires

that the forces of the Palestinian Revolution conduct a larger scale mobilization of their material and human capabilities and their military combat energies to prepare for confronting all expected developments and possibilities. It also requires that the Lebanese National Movement prepare its own military forces for such possibilities so it would assume its pioneering role in opposing [the enemy] and in leading the battle against the client forces. In addition, the energies of the masses are to be mobilized, and their level of preparedness to sacrifice and to confront all possibilities is to be improved. This is to be done not only by stopping all excesses, but also basically by giving the masses a clear and a specific political position that would place them face to face with their enemies and side by side with their allies and friends. Besides their defensive combat missions the escalation of the armed struggle and the expansion of specific combat operations remain the more prominent missions for which the forces of the Palestinian Revolution are responsible.

8592
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

ARAB LEAGUE COUNCIL MEETING--The 74th regular session of the Council of Ministers of the League of Arab States began its work in Tunis yesterday afternoon, attended by Qais Abdul Munim Al-Zawawi, Oman's minister of state for foreign affairs, Farouk Kaddoumi, head of the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States. Qais Abdul Munim Al-Zawawi, who presided over the 73d session of the Council, delivered an opening address in which he emphasized that the current phase in which the Arab nation and the Palestinian cause are going through requires that the Arab nation unify its efforts to consolidate joint Arab action in the service of Arab causes. He expressed satisfaction with the fact that Palestine will preside over the 74th session for the first time in the history of the League. He then turned over the presidency to Farouk Kaddoumi. Following the opening session, the Council of the League of Arab States held a closed meeting devoted to the adoption of the agenda for the session. Work will resume at 1000 hours this morning in meetings of committees formed by the League Council, to wit: the political committee, the economic committee, the social and cultural committee, the administrative and financial committee and the legal committee. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 14 Sep 80 p 5] 11,464

CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

MAURITANIAN-ALGERIAN COMMISSION—The fifth session of the Mauritanian-Algerian joint commission for cooperation ended this evening in Nouakchott. The meetings of this session centered on trade relations, mines, mining research, sugar refinery, oil refinery, fishing and maritime transport. It has been agreed to set up a Mauritanian-Algerian company for maritime navigation and to revive the Mauritanian-Algerian company for sea fishing. It has also been agreed on the need to exchange information and experiences in the fields of culture and information in addition to Algerian help to the Mauritanian Press Agency and to the Mauritanian establishment for (?industry). In the fields of health and communications, it has been agreed to revive cooperation in these two sectors. Thus, an Algerian health mission will arrive in Nouakchott shortly. Algeria will also build a communication station linking Nouakchott with Nouadhibou. The two sides decided on new cooperation in the field of agriculture. Algerian universities will this year receive a number of Mauritanian students. [Text] [LD280916 Nouakchott Domestic Service in Arabic 2030 GMT 27 Sep 80]

CSO: 4402

KPD PAPER PRAISES KARMAL'S MEASURES

Duesseldorf UNSERE ZEIT in German 15 Sep 80 p 4

[Interview by Michael Opperskalski: "Solving Problems Jointly with People"]

[Text] Journalists Michael Opperskalski and Guenter Neuberger joined by photographer Gerhard Paul recently spent more than 3 weeks in Afghanistan, looking for rebels, talking to mullahs and bazaar shopkeepers. One of the most interesting experiences they had was a conversation with the secretary-general of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal. Major excerpts from the interview conducted by Michael Opperskalski are given below.

Opperskalski: After the Amin regime fell on 27 December 1979, a violent hate campaign against Afghanistan commenced in the western press. Even today, the bourgeois newspapers are full of distortions and false accusations. What changes have taken place in Afghanistan since that day ?

Karmal: 15,000 political prisoners were not only released but saved from certain death; all democratic freedoms were secured and protected; freedom of worship is since assured and Islam is being protected. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has extended economic aid amounting to more than R 100 million in various forms which we have used to rebuild our country and, above all, to give help where there was the greatest devastation.

Numerous conferences and meetings have been held in which all segments of the population have participated, above all including the clergy. This has created a basis and has led to the formation of a National Patriotic Front under the leadership of the DPPA.

Another very important development was the reestablishment of party unity on the basis of democratic principles. The party was reconstituted as a party of a new type. For the first time in history, democratic rights were and are being secured and revolutionary justice was and is being meted out in the ADR.

The big gangs that had entered our country from the outside were to a large extent destroyed. The government was reformed; parasites and corrupt followers of Amin were removed. The government is here to serve the people. We introduced the second stage of the land reform program. Our peasants received generous help; they were given free seed and free tools. As a result, there have already been bigger harvests in a number of areas.

Another important task for the future is to improve literacy and popular education. In this field, too, we have already made appreciable gains. Nonetheless, of course, we still face a lot of problems and difficulties; but we are optimistic about solving them gradually and unhurriedly, in close cooperation with our people.

Opperskalski: How did Hafizullah Amin fall ? What was the background ?

Karmal: Let me explain to you in full detail why Amin was brought down and why the people, under the leadership of the DPPA, destroyed the Amin regime. But to do this, I must go back in time a little.

When the reactionary, feudal Daud regime collapsed in 1978, this was a blow against the aggressive strategy of imperialism. The victory of the Afghan revolution put an end to U.S. plans of welding together Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran which at the time was still suffering under the tyranny of the Shah into a pact system opposed to progress and the liberation movements of the region.

Following the victory of the Afghan revolution, international reaction and imperialism altered their tactics. The CIA and its accomplices attempted to turn the social deprivation of Afghanistan to their advantage-- above all the massive problems connected with this backwardness.

Opperskalski: What forms of interference were actually employed ?

Karmal: In Pakistan alone, imperialism and reaction established 57 camps, eight inside China along the border to Afghanistan and several others in Iran where agents and counter-revolutionaries were and still are being recruited and trained. So, interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan started just a short time after the victory of the revolution.

And, there was a heavy flow of arms and equipment reaching the counter-revolutionaries. These goods come from Egypt, the United States, from China, Pakistan and Israel. The petro-dollars of the reactionary Arab regimes are making this possible: thousands of tons of arms and many instructors are so being dispatched to Pakistan.

Amin was one more tool of imperialism. He and his followers arrested thousands of innocent people --workers, peasants, businessmen, members of the clergy and of the DPPA-- subjected them to fascist methods of torture and killed them. Acting according to the age-old "divide and conquer" strategy of imperialism, Amin sowed discord among the different tribes and nationalities and carried on an aggressive hate campaign against the neighboring countries.

Prior to 27 December, a total of 14 calls for help went out to the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union knew that the Afghan army was strong enough to resist the imperialist mercenaries and therefore did not respond. But the Amin regime systematically paralyzed all military and popular power in Afghanistan. Defending the country against military aggression and the imperialist hate campaign thus became almost impossible.

Opperskalski: What was the policy Amin followed inside the DPPA and how did his downfall come about ?

Karmal: After the victory of the April revolution, I discharged my duties as "No 2 man" in the party, the government and the revolutionary council. There were not only 1,500 partymembers who fell victim to Amin's conspiracy against the party; many others were arrested or disappeared; still others were driven into exile after being appointed to ambassadorships. I was made ambassador to the CSSR.

Although there still were some party members holding on to positions in the party and the government, all fields had already been infiltrated by the Amin bandits. After comrade Taraki was murdered, we entered Afghanistan illegally,

going to Paktia province. Those of our comrades who were still close to Amin supplied us with information about that crook's contacts to the CIA and to counter-revolutionary elements. We also got word that the Amin clique was making plans for a plot in January of this year which would have surpassed all their previous misdeeds. The majority of the revolutionary council as well as comrades from the party and the army then decided at an illegally held conference to make every effort to topple the Amin regime.

But prior to that, the majority of the revolutionary council as well as of the party and the army pressed Amin to ask for Soviet military assistance. At that time, Afghanistan was in acute danger. There were more than 60,000 bandits under arms inside Afghanistan. The Pakistani army had been alerted and substantial parts had been moved to the Afghan border. At the same time, American military presence in the Persian Gulf was substantially increased.

About 4 or 5 days prior to the fall of Amin on 27 December, our request for assistance was answered. The news from the Amin camp was becoming more and more alarming. Amin was planning to have all political prisoners put to death, to throw tens of thousands more into jail and to commit genocide on three to four million people.

With the help of our comrades in the army and in the revolutionary council and with the help of thousands of armed party members, we brought Amin down, arrested him and placed him before a revolutionary tribunal, which sentenced him to death. Soviet assistance, both overall and militarily, has preserved Afghanistan's sovereignty, has prevented both war and civil war from breaking out and has kept Afghanistan out of the grasp of imperialism. In this way, the Soviet Union's assistance also served to protect the liberation movements of the region. All in all, one can say that the assistance by the Soviet Union has saved the world from terrible consequences.

Opperskalski: Regrettably, the FRG plays a rather inglorious role in supporting Afghan counter-revolutionary elements and in the hate campaign against Afghanistan. What chances are there for good relations between the FRG and the DRA in the future in your estimation ?

Karmal: The DRA is very much interested in good and friendly relations with the FRG based on the principles of coexistence. FRG policy toward us depends in the first instance upon the desires of the FRG leadership.

I ask myself why the FRG, which is among the world leaders culturally and economically, could not occupy a front rank in the fight for peace, disarmament and friendly cooperation.

But I do not believe anything much can be achieved by pleading or uttering pleasantries. The improvement of relations to the DRA, among others, will depend on the amount of pressure applied on the ruling circles of the FRG by progressive elements and above all the working class of your country. How can lies and vituperations be reconciled with the culture and the progress of the FRG ?

I have heard broadcasts of Deutsche Welle and RFE. How can a civilized country like the FRG permit the existence of such lie factories ? My message is: Let the FRG assume first place in the fight for disarmament, peace and international cooperation!

9478
CSO: 4403

OVER 64,000 OPPONENTS OF KARMAL IN PRISON

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 17 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Frankfurt, Sept. 16--Tabibullah Balchi, chief pilot of Afghan airline Ariana's DC 10, one of the crews who defected to West Germany on Sunday, said in an interview with a Frankfurt newspaper that the Afghan people would "fight to death" to defeat the Soviet and allied occupation troops, whose strength he put at 2,00,000.

Balchi estimated that 64,000 opponents of the regime were being held in Kabul's Central Prison and at a military airbase near the capital.

Many had been tortured and some had been buried alive, he said.

The plane by which Balchi was to have returned to Kabul landed here on Sunday with yet another defector, pilot Abdul Rachman.

Rachman told newsmen here that East German specialists were in Afghanistan to build up the secret service. He said there were East German, Vietnamese, South Yemeni and Cuban troops in Afghanistan, in addition to the Soviets.

He said Soviet units, armed with some 2,000 tanks, were at present engaged in heavy fighting with rebel forces in the Panjshir Valley, north of Kabul.

He estimated that a million Afghans had been killed since the Soviet invasion late last December. Some 1,00,000 had been executed.

Schoolgirls' Murder

Meanwhile, the murder of two schoolgirls in Afghanistan was described in a BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) television interview in London last night by an Afghan airline's pilot who has sought refuge in West Germany.

Capt Abedi said he witnessed the incident in April. Girls from a high school were screaming "Russians leave Afghanistan," he added.

A Russian officer gave the command to a soldier to shoot them, but the soldier, who was an Afghan, refused to do so, Capt Abedi recounted.

Then the officer talked to another Afghan, wearing civilian clothes, with a light machine-gun. He was a party member, of course, and he shot them right in the head six or seven times.

Another pilot, Capt Zia Ahmed Parwiz, told the BBC that Russians were in control of the planes, because Afghan Air Force pilots had fled or had been arrested or were in jail, or even had been killed.--DPA AFP

CSO: 4920

MUJAHIDIN DESTROY 50 USSR TROOPS, 100 TANKS

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 15 Sep 80 pp 1, 8

[Text] An Afghan Army officer who has now joined the freedom fighters has said the Mujahideen have destroyed some 100 Soviet tanks and armoured vehicles and killed more than 50 Soviet troops 107 k.m. south of Kabul, reports Radio Pakistan, quoting AFP.

The agency also reported that the Mujahideen have trapped some 150 Soviet tanks by closing the only entrance of a narrow pass surrounded by high mountains.

PPI reports from Peshawar:

The Mujahideen have killed 40 Soviet soldiers and destroyed 9 Soviet armoured cars and five tanks in Herat. The Soviets retaliated by killing and wounding 120 people. They also resorted to indiscriminate bombing of a gathering at a mosque in Herat city.

In Parwan Province, Soviet bombers destroyed 21 villages, killing 115 villagers. Fierce fighting was also reported between the Mujahideen and Soviet forces at Kohistan in the north of Bugram airport.

In Madyan Province, Soviet and Afghan forces facing tough resistance from the Mujahideen, bombed and destroyed many villages and killed a large number of innocent civilians along with their livestock.

The Soviet and Afghan forces were suffering such heavy casualties at the hands of the Mujahideen that a new coffin factory had been established in Kabul city where 250 carpenters have been employed to make 300 coffins daily for carrying bodies of Soviet and Afghan troops.

Two Afghan Ministers and two high-ranking officials were shot dead by the Mujahideen of the Hizbe Islami after their summary trial in village Saidkhel, Paktia Province on Thursday.

This was announced by Maulvi Mohammad Yunus Khalis, Chief of the Hizbe Islami, a component of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan in Peshawar today.

The announcement named them as Faiz Mohammad Minister for Borders, Engineer Nazar Mohammad, Minister for Public Welfare; Habib Olaswal and Khan Mir Prikoti.

According to the announcement the two Ministers along with some high ranking officials were busy in parleys with two tribes, namely Maizey and Direykhel in village Saidkhel when they were beseiged by the commando groups of Hizbe Islami, led by Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqani. They arrested the two Ministers and some officials and put them under summary trial. The Mujahideen summary court awarded death sentence to them and the verdict was put into action immediately.

A very highly reliable report from Punjshir, Parwan Province, gives the details about the fighting in that area from August 26 to September 11.

According to a Press release of Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan after a day of preparation in Gulbahar, Russian troops started their attack on Panjshir on August 26. The Mujahideen killed 50 Russians and in Tawakh the Mujahideen killed 14 Soviet troops.

In Chantal Warda, one of strong holds of the Mujahideen, seven tanks and five trucks were destroyed. In Hasarak 50 Russians were killed.

According to the report, one Afghan army officer and one Tajik Russian joined the Mujahideen. Three hundred and fifty persons were killed and three tanks, one ammunition truck, on etanker were destroyed in Paranda and Manjabar.

Mujahideen casualties were relatively low. The Russians killed defenceless villagers in Barak and in many other parts. Thirty women and children were martyred in Farak and 48 in Ghaja.

Russian troops were using heavy tanks, artillery, helicopters, jet-bombers and rockets fired from planes and several types of new weapons unknown to the Mujahideen. About 2,000 artillery and rockets were fired in one day by Russian forces.

A Press release of Hizbe Islami quoting reports from Takhar Province, said the Mujahideen have been involved in widespread operations in the centre of Takhar province. In these operations, two tanks were destroyed, 30 Russians and 50 Parchamies were killed.

Reports from Gedaen Masjeed front of Wardak Province say during this month 600 Russian and Militia troops were killed and a number of tanks and armoured cars were destroyed in these conflicts. About 400 Mujahideen were martyred.

An Afghan helicopter crashed near Chamak area, Kabul radio said last night.

The copter was on exercise when it crashed due to some technical fault, the Radio said while announcing the death of the pilot, Abdur Rauf.

APA reports from New Delhi: Afghanistan Government Radio confirmed on Saturday that the Government has demanded the return of an American Television reporter on charges of ordering "the torture and stoning to death" of three Afghan farmers.

A Kabul broadcast heard in India quoted confessions by two accused Afghans and witness accounts as saying that the three peasants were fatally stoned in Fatehabad village of Mangarhar province's Surkhroad district on the orders of "an American in a group of journalists."

CSO: 4920

MUJAHIDEEN KILL 60 SOVIET, FIVE BABRAK SOLDIERS

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 17 Sep 80 p 3

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Sept. 16: Mujahideen destroyed three tanks and killed 60 Russian soldiers and five Babrak soldiers, according to a reliable report from Bajnan in a fighting that took place between Mujahideen and Russian troops in Darra Shekagi on Aug 28.

A Press release of Islamic Alliance for Liberation of Afghanistan, says the invading troops were forced back but they destroyed most of houses in Gundak by heavy bombardment.

According to another report from Balman, Mujahideen shot down one Russian helicopter in Shahjhan west of Balman city on Sept. 3, eight Russians were killed in this operation.

According to a report from Kunar, Mujahideen impeded Russian troops who were going from Asmar to Barikot. During heavy fighting, Mujahideen destroyed 10 of the 15 tanks in the convoy as well as destroying six trucks.

The life casualty of the invading troops was 80 Russian and Babrak soldiers dead and 82 Afghan soldiers joining the Mujahideen. In the fighting 10 of the Mujahideen were martyred.

A report from IALA Mujahideen in Aibak of Samangan Province, says that as a result of continuous efforts and heroic sacrifices of freedom loving Mujahideen who had taken away rest and peace from the enemy the local Parchamis and Khalqis of Samangan left their houses and villages and under the support of their masters' helicopters, jets, artillery and tanks took refuge in Aibak city, provincial capital But the heroes of history followed them there as well.

The heroic and victorious attack by Mujahideen on Sept. 4 and on the Aibak city, they hit strong, smashing strokes on the enemy and forced the self selling slaves to flees from the city.

The masters also failed to support them although they did not hesitate to use any kind of weapon.

Mujahideen by their most modern as well as ancient weapon of "Allaho Akbar" entered the city they even had the Governor's and general commander's headquarters under their control for a while.

Enemy's casualty was high, but from Mujahideen just one person was injured.

Mujahideen also destroyed one tank and captured 10 pieces of heavy and light arms and some ammunitions. Some food supply and logistic supplies also fell in the hands of Mujahideen.—PPI

CSO: 4920

USSR REPORTEDLY SUFFERS CASUALTIES IN PANJSHER

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 15 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 14--Soviet forces may be giving up their latest attempt to wrest the Panjsher Valley from Guerilla tribesmen after losing about 1,500 dead and several hundred wounded in their two-week offensive near the mouth of the strategic gorge in northeast Afghanistan, a report from Kabul said today.

Despite heavy air and armoured support, special counter-guerilla units and Afghan mercenaries, the Soviets were unable to advance beyond Rokha, 30 kilometres into the 160-kilometre long valley, said the report from a source with access to insurgent and Government information who in the past had been accurate.

At Rokha, insurgents blasted boulders down the mountain sides, halting the advance and trapping some of the Soviet units for days, the report said. The Russians on Thursday fought their way out of the trap through heavy fire from guerillas holding the mountainsides, suffering heavy casualties and the loss of more than 10 tanks and artillery pieces, it added.

The fighting later slackened, possibly signalling the end of the 13th attempt to take Panjsher Valley from insurgents.

Indiscriminate Bombing

According to latest reports, Mujahideen killed 40 Soviet soldiers and destroyed nine Soviet armoured cars and five tanks in Herat. The Soviets retaliated by killing and wounding 120 people when they resorted to indiscriminate bombing of a gathering at a mosque in Herat city.

In Parwan Province, Soviet bombers destroyed 21 villages, killing 115 villagers. Fierce fighting is also reported between Mujahideen and Soviet forces at Kohistan in the north of Bugram airport.

In Madyan Province, Soviet and Afghan forces who are facing tough resistance from the Mujahideen, bombed and destroyed many villages and killed a large number of innocent civilians along with their livestock.

Meanwhile, the Soviet and Afghan forces are suffering such heavy casualties at the hands of Mujahideen that a new coffin factory has been established in Kabul city where 300 coffins are made daily.--APA PPI

CSO: 4920

ADDITIONAL REPORTS ON PANJSHER FIGHTING

Change in Tactics

Karachi DAWN in English 15 Sep 80 p 1

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In Madyan province, Soviet and Afghan forces who are facing tough resistance from Mujahideen, bombed and destroyed many villages and killed a large number of innocent civilians along with their livestock.

In New Delhi, a spokesman of the US embassy said that those 200 Afghan refugees who had taken refuge temporarily in India are expected to be resettled in the United States, reports BBC.--APA/PPI/Reuter

Fighting Appears Over

Karachi DAWN in English 20 Sep 80 pp 1, 10

[Text] New Delhi, Sept. 19--Afghan rebels inflicted heavy casualties on a Soviet armoured force trapped in the Panjshir Valley northeast of Kabul, according to reports reaching the Afghan capital quoted by diplomatic sources here today.

The sources said most reports circulating in Kabul considered that a Soviet military offensive in the strategic valley had failed.

But they said some observers said the operation had been a partial success for the Soviet troops who had managed to contain the rebels and isolate them from other guerilla groups east of Kabul and south of Panjshir.

The sources, however, said there was no hard information on the fighting in the valley which appeared to have ended last week.

Fresh fighting took place around Sarobi, about 40 kilometres (25 miles) east of Kabul, two days ago when anti-government rebels attacked army units according to the sources.

They said clashes also broke out at Karizner, 17 kilometres (10 miles) north of Kabul. But no details were immediately available.

According to State Department sources in Washington, Soviet casualties in Afghanistan — counting dead, wounded, and troops on the sick list, particularly due to malaria — may have approached the level of 10,000 to 15,000.

The spokesman, who had been questioned about a report in a US newspaper, said he had no confirmation of the figures.

He added that the State Department had indications that the Soviet army was no longer repatriating all of its dead to the USSR, and was burying some of them in Afghanistan.

Meanwhile, in London, today's edition of "The Times" said in a Kabul-datelined article that the Soviet forces were changing their tactics and their troops in Afghanistan.

The independent daily said conscripted recruits were being replaced by older and more experienced Soviet soldiers, and that Cuban and Vietnamese advisers had been brought in to help red army units against Muslim guerilla rebels.

The Times said that, with the first snowfalls due over the rugged Afghan terrain within six weeks, the Soviets were making rapid preparations for a long stay in the country.

SURVEILLANCE

Meanwhile, telephone lines have been cut to the American embassy building in Kabul and military helicopters continue hovering overhead in what appears to be stepped-up surveillance of non communist embassies there, sources close to the Indian Foreign Ministry said today.

The security precautions follow the United States refusal to turn over to Soviet authorities a Soviet soldier who sought refuge in the embassy on Monday, and demanded political asylum in the United States.

The source, who asked to remain anonymous, said the number of Afghan police and armed militiamen stationed near the embassy had doubled since Wednesday, and the entire area had been closed to ordinary traffic.

Plain clothes Afghan police were tailing cars with diplomatic licence plates, and visitors were being discouraged from approaching the embassies, he said.

The Indian Ministry in Kabul sent a detailed report to the Ministry here expressing concern that the US refusal to turn the soldier over to Soviet authorities could trigger a major incident, it was reported.

The ministry source pointed out that the incident marked the second, delicate diplomatic incident for the American embassy in Kabul since Afghanistan turned to communist rule in a bloody military coup in April, 1978.

When the US Ambassador Adolf Dubbes was killed in February last year, the Americans were faced with a major dilemma, he said, and now again they have a very complex problem to solve. The reports said there are 16 American staff mmebers at the US embassy in Kabul and six US marine guards. The building is 1.3 kilometres (less than one mile) from Kabul international airport.

Britain has protested to Afghanistan over what it considers unusual surveillance of its diplomats in Kabul, a foreign office spokesman said today.

He confirmed that Britain's Charge d'Affaires Michael Powell had made a low level protest to the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Soviet soldier who defected to the American embassy in Kabul this week, is believed to be a 21-year old Tadjik and a driver in one of the armoured unions of the Soviet army garrisoned at the outer perimeter of Afghan capital's international airport, a "Times report" from Kabul said.

It is believed that at a meeting chaired by Soviet 'adviser' at Afghan Interior Ministry which was also attended by Afghan Deputy Prime Minister, Mr Sultan Ali Khristmand, as well as by the Afghan Interior and Defence Ministers, a decision to refuse permission to take the Soviet defector out of Afghanistan was taken.

According to the Times report, a 'procedure of action' was being devised in meetings with the American, Indian and Polish diplomats in Kabul with the Afghan protocol chief.

The report said Mr George Griffin, the American Consul in Kabul is expected in New Delhi Friday and may hope to be able to bring the defector with him. —Reuter/APA.

Helicopter Downed

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 16 Sep 80 p 8

[Excerpt]

Meanwhile, reliable reports from Banian say, the guerillas destroyed three tanks and killed 60 Russian soldiers and five Babrak soldiers in fighting in Darra Shekagi sometime in the end of last month.

A Press release of Islamic Alliance for Liberation of Afghanistan says the invading troops were forced back but they destroyed most of houses in Gundak by heavy bombardment.

According to another report from Baiman the guerilla tribesmen shot down one Russian helicopter in Shahiban west of Baiman city on Sept. 1. Eight Russians were killed in this operation. More news trickling in through the borders say the guerillas impeded Russian troops who were going from Asmar to Barikot in which 10 of the 15 tanks in the convoy as well as six trucks of the invading troops were destroyed.

The heavy fighting left 260 Russian and Babrak soldiers dead whereas only 10 guerillas lost their lives.

In Aibak of Samang province, as a result of continuous efforts and heroic sacrifices of freedom loving Afghanis, the local Parchamis and Khalqis of Samangan left their houses and villages and under the support of their masters' helicopters, jets, artillery, and tanks took refuge in Aibak city.

But the heroic and victorious attack by the guerilla tribesmen on Sep. 4 on Aibak City, forced the Parchamis and Khalqis to flee.

POLITICAL ASYLUM: Crews of a state-owned Ariane Afghan airlines plane said yesterday they would ask for political asylum in West Germany, a television report said.

The ARB network news broadcast quoted the chief pilot as saying more than 252 of the airlines personnel had already defected. The airline had only seven pilots left and could not maintain its international schedule, he said.

The pilot said the crew were to have taken over a DC-10 airliner at Frankfurt to fly it to Kabul but they all intended to stay in West Germany.

He and other Ariane colleagues claimed that the Soviet-backed Afghan Government had forced them to fly arms, ammunition and troops to areas where fighting was going on with Afghan Mujahideen, the network said. –APA/PPI/Reuter

CSO: 4920

SOVIETS HAVING TOUGH TIME IN TAKHAR

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 18 Sep 80 p 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Sept. 17: Mujahideen of Hizbe Islami Afghanistan under the leadership of Engineer Gulabeddin Hikmatyar are involved in widespread guerilla operations in Takhar Province.

The guerilla operations carried out by the Mujahideen against the Russian forces have been outlined in a Press release issued by the Hizbe Islami here today.

On Sept. 7 a guerilla group of Mujahideen attacked a tank and Russian jeep killed two high-ranking Russian advisers on the spot.

On the following day an armoured car containing weapons, bulletu and some ammunitions was blasted as a result 10 persons in the armoured car died.

A tank came forward to defend the armoured car but it also met with the same fate.

On Mujahideen side one person was injured. House of a Mujahid Nik Mohammad s/o Qali Mohammad who helped the Mujahideen was destroyed by the Russian forces.

A report from Chahb of Takhar Province say that on Sept. 8 a group of Russians and Parchamis attacked the Mujahideen of HIA in this district. Conflicts took place between the two sides at night lasting four hours. As a result Mohammad Wali Khan, the commander of the invading forces including two second lieutenants and 12 soldiers were killed while the Mujahideen captured 22 different kinds of weapons and 10 horses from the government forces.

The report adds that the clash took place between the Mujahideen and Russians in Chahb District again and as a result three soldiers were killed.

Reports received recently say that heavy fighting took place between the Mujahideen of HIA and Russian troops five kilometres in the north of Palkoona, the capital of Takhar Province. The fighting lasted four and a half hours. Four tanks were destroyed and 65 Russians were killed. As the Russians suffered a shameful defeat they called in new forces to support them against the Mujahideen from the surrounding province of Takhar. The strategic points were mined by the Mujahideen, six tanks were destroyed completely.

GOVT. BID FAILS: In New Delhi, diplomatic sources said today an attempt by the Afghan authorities to take advantage of tribal rivalries to defeat insurgents in the Panjshir Valley, North-East of Kabul, had failed.
—PPI/Reuter/AFP/APP

CSO: 4920

RUSSIAN CONVOY ATTACKED, DESTROYED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 15 Sep 80 p 4

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Sept. 14: A Russian convoy was attacked by Mujahideen of Hizb-e-Islami, Afghanistan in Dana area while on its way to Urgaon District from Ghazni in order to reoccupy the liberated areas. In this attack, six tanks were destroyed, 12 weapon-loads of vehicles were burnt up and 300 soldiers of the puppet regime killed, said an HIA Press release.

Heathen forces were defeated greatly by the brave Mujahideen of HIA. In this attack the Russians faced heavy loss.

A reporter adds that heavy fighting is going on in Taree Pass, Khoost and Ghulang between Mujahideen and the Russian forces.

Reports from Sharan District of Paktia Province that the Russians landed infantry forces by helecopters in order to attack the centre of Mujahideen.

The Mujahideen killed 27 Russian para-troopers.

On the Mujahideen side one was killed and another was injured.

Seven tanks were destroyed and three armoured cars burnt up by explosions in Ghoorband District, says a report from Parwan Province.

As many as 81 Russians were also killed.

In an other report of Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan, the Mujahideen under the command of Maulvi Mohammad Younas Khulis, attacked the helicopter carrying Faiz Mohammad, Minister for Frontier Affairs, Engineer Nazar Mohammad Minister for Public Affairs and other high ranking army officers. As a result both the ministers alongwith other army officials were killed.

DEMAND: All Jammu and Kashmir Awami Majlis-e-Amal has demanded immediate withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan to strengthen the cause of peace and to end the chances of war in the region and emphasised the need for search of a political solution of the crisis.

A meeting of the office-bearers and workers of the Majlis in Srinagar on Tuesday under chairmanship of Mir Waiz Mohammad Farooq adopted a resolution which urged the Indian Government to work for permanent political solution of Afghanistan issue in collaboration with non-aligned nations particularly Pakistan and Iran.

American diplomats in Afghanistan said yesterday that Afghanistan has demanded the return of American Television reporter Dan Rather for trial on charges of participating in the "torture and fatal stoning" of three Afghans last March.

Rather, a CBS correspondent, said in New York "I deny these lies absolutely, completely and without equivocation." CBS news said in a statement the allegations were "totally preposterous and absolutely untrue."—PPI/APP/APA

CSO: 4920

OVER 100 CUBAN ADVISORS ARRIVE IN KABUL

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 13 Sep 80 p 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Sept. 12: A Cuban civilian advisory group arrived recently in Kabul, Western diplomatic sources said here today.

The sources said no information was available on the purpose of the group, but there were unconfirmed reports that it numbered about 100.

There was no evidence to support rumours that Cuban troops had arrived in Afghanistan, the sources said.

Soviet helicopter gunships and troop-carrying helicopters continued to make sorties from Kabul airport during the last few days, the sources said.

The helicopters were heading north, probably to the Panjsheer Valley where heavy fighting has been reported and southwest to Wardak Province.

Soviet air transport planes continued to fly in and out of Kabul Airport day-and night though at a slightly reduced rate, the sources said.

The renewed appearance of Soviet troops patrolling Kabul had also been noticed in the Afghan capital, they said.

Night-time assassinations and kidnappings were reported to have increased in Kabul and conscription into the depleted Afghan Army would soon be extended without age limit.

The sources quoted official Kabul reports on Wednesday that 400 members of the Democratic Youth Organisation left for three northern provinces to fight the Soviet troops.

All but the lowest quality of wheat has disappeared from the Kabul market and there has been an 8 per cent increase in the price of wheat in the last week, the sources said.

Small convoys of T-62 Soviet tanks and armoured personnel carriers were seen commuting between the Soviet Army garrisons in Kabul and the strategic power generating township of Sorobi, halfway between Kabul and the eastern town of Jalalabad, the sources said.

Vehicles of the regular Afghan Army have been immobilised in Kabul for unknown reasons, the sources said. Soviet-backed Afghan troops clashed with rebels around Kabul this week, they said. The Charikar-Kabul Road was closed for those two days and heavy fighting was reported in Guldara and Shakadara, two villages some 12 miles north of the capital.

Clashes were also reported from Kalakany and Mir Bacchakot, 30 miles north of Kabul, the sources said.

Several people were killed when a wedding party of a member of the Parcham faction of the ruling party was attacked last Friday at Galai Wahid, about six miles east of Kabul, the sources said.

The sources gave no details and refused to say whether the attack was mounted by members of the rival Khalq faction.—Reuter/AFP

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

USSR LOSSES IN SHILGAR--Peshawar, Sept. 23--Heavy fighting is going on between the Mujahideen and the Russian forces in Shilgar, in Ghazni province. According to a Press release of Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan, the Soviet forces suffered heavy casualties during these conflicts. The Russian attacked Shilgar, with one thousand tanks, armoured cars and other weapons. Fighting continued for four days. The Russians were supported by 30 helicopters and 13 jets. The Soviet forces attacked this area with savagery and brutality. They bombarded the entire district. In these air strikes many villages were devastated and innocent people, including children, women, and old men were killed. The Russians also burnt all the houses in the area. In some of the bloodiest encounters in the district 40 Russian soldiers and two high ranking officers were killed and seven tanks and four armoured cars were destroyed. As the fighting was on in Shilgar district, the Mujahideen attacked the Ghazni air base at night. In this attack six helicopters and two jets were burnt. The Mujahideen also destroyed the control tower of the airport.--PPI [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 24 Sep 80 p 8]

CSO: 4920

SIGNIFICANCE, ROLE OF UGTA COMMENTED ON

Algiers REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL in French 6 Sep 80 p 3

[Editorial: "What Remains to be Done"]

[Text] It is quite obvious that the political leadership is giving priority to settling the socioprofessional problems of workers and citizens. The last Interministerial Council, in which the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] participated, which it salutes as devotion at the highest level to the virtue of dialog, and to which the National Secretariat made a loyal and responsible communication on the social, economic and political situation, is further evidence. The prime minister reminded the members of the government of the urgency and priority of swiftly applying all the measures taken by the political leadership to stabilize the situation and the social climate. This is understood to mean, in particular, the temporary measures, the worker sharing in the results of his business, connecting wages to production, but also texts aimed at improving living and working conditions in the public service sector, as well as application decrees enacted as part of the preparation of the conditions for applying the worker's general statute.

For the worker this is an experience that confirms the new and fundamental orientations of the party's congress, in which each and every one can discern the aspirations of the working class expressed in the resolutions of the fifth UGTA Congress. However, it may seem paradoxical to speak again of temporary measures which, having been taken in December 1979, should have been applied in March 1980, retroactive to January. There is a fundamental explanation for this, that must be considered in all its significance by union authorities and workers. This explanation, which is serious because it is eminently political, is that certain levels of decision execution in the political leadership react slowly, even balk or show inertia in making appeals.

In a word, the bureaucracy in all its political meaning continues to rule over the structures of the executive apparatus. And the UGTA verifies this every day by the troubles it has in imposing dialog and consultation, in accordance with the directives of the secretary general of the party and President Chadli Bendjedid. Well, union leaders and workers must read this explanation politically. Two facts then become obvious: the workers have increasing awareness of their problems and are demanding correct solutions to them.

On its side, the political leadership does not want development on credit, and intends that development to have the economic and social fallout for which it was designed and set up. Consequently, we have two convergent attitudes that can only evolve toward symbiosis. And in fact there is increasing symbiosis between the political leadership and the masses.

Consequently, any obstacle, any lack of concern or any curb on the execution of the political leadership's decisions can only be analyzed--outside of a political deviation from the party's statutes and resolutions--as an insidious process of undermining that convergence and that symbiosis between the base and the summit. We must not ignore the fact that in the executive structures there still are people who are politically and socially uninterested in what the working masses and political leadership are doing to continue--in profound unity and determination--the rigorous and methodical application of the National Charter. Those are the people whom the UGTA disturbs when it throws all its weight into imposing dialog and being the true cement that welds the base and the summit closely together. And those are the people who want to "break" the union by breaking up the dialog or orienting it toward a technician's path that would be prejudicial to the settling of the problems.

Also, the line of action and the progress of the union authorities and the workers in this 1980-1981 season opening, must be clear: it is first of all to take charge of the concerns of the laboring masses, according to a program that takes into account the urgency and extent of the question to be studied. And within this framework there is good reason to banish all demagogy and all sensationalism, which play into the reckless hands of those who are hostile to the revolution abroad (imperialism) as well as inside the country. And although, thanks to union democracy, which today has become a rule and a practice of the union movement, the gates of our organization are wide open to all initiatives for taking better charge of our current battle, the battle for production and management, the workers must close the door to the demagogic voices that practise a deceitful worker control, the better to smash the constructive momentum of the laboring masses and prepare the altar on which they will permanently and at the appropriate time sacrifice the workers themselves. In fact, the workers must learn a lesson from what happened seven years ago in Chile, and respond to the leadership's political determination to solve our development problems by showing in the field that they correctly perceive the political, economic, social and cultural facts of the country.

In the second place it is important at this opening to fight more than ever to impose at all levels the path of dialog, a responsible and effective dialog, a dialog in which are discussed (but not haggled over) the socioprofessional problems of the laboring masses, and through which solutions will really be found.

8946
CSO: 4400

ALGERIA STRIVES TO STRUCTURE SUCCESSFUL IMPORTS PROGRAM

Trade Situation Discussed

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 18 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Yesterday morning, the minister of commerce, Mr Abdelaziz Khellef, chaired a meeting of wilaya business managers in the presence of the secretary of state for foreign trade, Mr Ali Oubouzar.

During this meeting they studied both the trade situation in general and questions relating to supply and distribution.

The reports which the wilaya business managers submitted made it possible to acquire an adequate comprehensive view of existing problems in the light of available funds on hand and consumption expectations.

This meeting was a continuation of previous meetings held during the Ramadan months between the minister of commerce and the executive councils of national trust corporations.

The purpose of these meetings, which aimed primarily at ensuring the Algerian citizen a better life, was to find the effective means for improving supply and distribution.

In the course of his address, Mr Khellef made known his ministerial department's wish to place at the wilaya's disposal every means necessary for achieving the objectives designed by the imports program.

The minister very especially stressed the role of business managers in the struggle against speculation with a view to protecting the consumer and safeguarding his purchasing power. For this purpose, he announced the establishment of a committee made up of four managers responsible for studying the problems in each wilaya management.

Mr. Khellef pointed out that the present objectives are ambitious for which reason there is a need for coordination in order to comply with priorities. Decentralization, he went on to say, for which we are striving, is to enable us to guarantee the anticipated results.

In conclusion, the minister appealed to the members to strive even harder, and emphasized that the lack of means must not constitute an excuse for any apathy at the expense of the common good.

Interview With Ali Oubouzar

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 26 Aug 80 p 3

[Interview with Ali Oubouzar, secretary of state for foreign trade]

> [Text] On the occasion of the 17th International Trade Fair in Algiers, we set out to get a general view, which was not intended to be exhaustive, of the problems relating to imports and exports, by means of an interview with the secretary of state for foreign trade, Mr Ali Oubouzar, who willingly agreed to answering our questions. It is obvious from his replies that some steps, which will be touched on, are about to be taken at the Secretariat of State for Foreign Trade level.

[Question] What significance is attached to this year's 17th Algerian International Fair?

[Answer] The Algerian 17th International Fair is to be held a few months after the Party's Extraordinary Congress and, inasmuch as it is an occasion for promoting foreign trade, it will register its work in line with the Congress's resolutions and recommendations for a better life.

This means that national representatives at this Fair will highlight the efforts put forth for the quantitative and qualitative improvement of procuring supplies for the people, as also for the improvement in national economic achievements: within this framework, factors contributing to the increase of work productivity, to making previously made investments pay and to the development of activities supportive of production and consequently of the development of small and average business undertakings.

Although international representation is not basically changed, it is undoubtedly toward this very type of business and activities that relations of Algerian and foreign operators will move.

This should result particularly in a progressive development of longer-term cooperative relations between economic operators rather than simple pinpointed business relations.

With this in mind, we should take note of the republication and profound study of the system of "technical days" and "company days" devoted to a certain number of selected topics as also, as a result of the activities begun at the fair level, the launching of specialized exhibits.

It seems to us that these various factors should make the Algiers 17th International Fair a promotion effort not only on behalf of business exchanges but also for production and development.

[Question] How does our balance of trade return look?

[Answer] Algerian trade exchanges abroad in 1979 sowed a positive balance of 5.11 billion DA [Algerian Dinars]. Considering that the total foreign-trade volume amounts to 67.9 billion DA, the balance brings the import margin rate to 116 percent instead of the 73 percent in 1978.

The 1979 export increase is largely owing to the increase in value of "energy and lubricants;" but along with this there is also a considerable decline in the value of imports which average around 3 billion DA.

This decline overlaps a slight pinch in consumer-goods imports, but more importantly, a significant drop in equipment goods and semi-finished products, owing to the rather pronounced interruption in investments during the transition period between two plans as also to the completion delays caused by the general situation at the time.

These delays were to be over by 1980, not only within the framework of implementing the first annual section of the Five-Year Plan but also through the complementary importation program (+5 billion DA as compared with the general imports program). The favorable increase in oil prices was to make it possible to cover these increases; in any case, our endeavors will be conducive to our obtaining an at least equitable exchange balance.

[Question] What measures do you consider necessary to put an end to, or at least significantly reduce, the almost systematic dependence on imports?

[Answer] It is perhaps not quite accurate to think that there is an almost systematic dependence on imports.

Imports, especially because of their importance and their nature, have been encouraged by the choices by our country which selected as an economic development pattern one centered mainly on setting up a very important, multiform production system, such as is apparent throughout the various national development plans.

Consequently, if we bear in mind that our country inherited its independence from an economic situation in which industry was totally lacking, in which farming was carried out with conventional means, and moreover, if we recall their urgency to set up a productive device capable of answering to and satisfying the needs of the country and its people, we are obliged to acknowledge that the only way we could get equipment, raw materials and other useful intermediary expendable items was by resorting to imports.

This stage of setting up production equipment is not yet completely over. We must now learn to operate this equipment better, to manage it better

and better organize the output. It is only then that our national output will increasingly exceed imported products, and--why not?--produce over-surpluses intended for export.

Moreover, there are some imports which I shall classify as inelastic and which affect the very life of man, which are absolutely necessary and which will not as soon as all that be reduced: it is essentially a matter of foodstuffs: oil-yielding products, sugar, coffee, milk, butter, flour.

These imports, dependent at one and the same time on the increase in the population and on the revenues from our country's ability to produce substitute products, are virtually inevitable.

In short, therefore, I shall say that the decrease in our imports is connected with making the greatest possible use of our output capacity, for its improvement and its diversification.

[Question] What are the prospects for our exports? Are there any inducements to encourage our concerns to direct their course toward an output suitable for export purposes?

[Answer] The promotion of our exports is one of our greatest concerns and comes directly within the framework of our diversification policy. However, our economy's deeply extrovertive character has not allowed the immediate restructuring of our export trade, the flow of which is still made up of 97 percent of hydrocarbons and the remainder largely divided among mining products, plums, wine and dates.

The explanation for this is the fact that the work our country agreed to in the output area was to result first of all in replacing imported products by national output.

This explains why our country's new products in both the area of foodstuffs and equipment are entirely absorbed by national demand which after all regularly expands with the increase in population and the increase in income.

Nevertheless, exportation is still one of our objectives for which we are now taking the necessary steps for its implementation.

At the output level, a rather strict control will be balanced by a better utilization of production capacities and therefore by an increase in output. This output, for some years to come, will be conducive to absorbing the deficits accumulated in our country, but will then release exportable amounts (in the petrochemical and in the processing industry sector, some heavy industry...).

On the market level, the settlement of business agreements, participation in fairs, or the coming opening of business agencies in the international market will make it possible to find outlets for these products. Moreover, inducements such as financial incentives are now being studied.

[Question] It is evident from observing markets that our purchasing agents sometime buy products indiscrimately, that is to say, without any demand or any useful purpose for our country and our nationals. They likewise do not always bear in mind the balance of payment. What should we infer from this?

[Answer] I think that we have to consider our purchasing agents untrained or unaware of the facts of everyday life and the restraints of our economy. There could be some deficiencies there particularly in the appraisal of needs, in the planning of supplies or in coping with a given product; but there is no general disorder as you imply.

In my opinion, the following observations will explain some of the deficiencies known to exist:
--Algeria does not yet have a clearly established consumption pattern;
--Algeria does not yet have a very strict foreign exchange plan;
--there are not as yet any automatic and mandatory unified regulations among Algerian importing firms.

The combination of these three phenomena could indeed lead to apparently useless imports which are poorly timed and in insufficient quantities. Nevertheless, the decisions which the Policy Board has made, particularly in planning matters, will correct these defects. As a matter of fact, the establishing of annual plans at all levels will encourage a better approach to needs and a better supply planning intended to satisfy them.

Moreover, the establishment of the Secretariat of State for Foreign Trade testifies to the Policy Board's desire to provide the country with a combined, coordinated and controled operational foreign-trade plan.

These plans, at the foreign trade level, will be completed by plans to be made at the national level for a self-contained and systematic organization of national economy and the defining of a consumption pattern which takes into account at one and the same time our people's desires, our economy's actual economic possibilities and our country's basic choices for a socialist and social development.

Need for Import Planning

Algiers EL MOUJAHID in French 12 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by A. Benslama]

[Text] Ramadan is over. The sweltering heat which persistently and doggedly prevailed made it unbearable. But if the test was an arduous one, it was none the less stoically endured on the strength of religious faith.

Ramadan has left some traces and not only on the physical plane.

It was equally productive in all kinds of lessons and most especially in the socio-economic area. As a matter of fact, it is indisputably true that the people's life style, the consumption pattern and purchasing power are constantly undergoing change and every year at the same period, they are established on new terms. This is, of course, a subject of meditation for sociologists and planners and lies beyond our competence.

However, it is not absolutely necessary that one be an acknowledge expert to notice that the purchasing and consumption capacity of every household, regardless of its social status, has appreciably increased. National offices and organizations in charge of supplies have undoubtedly noted those who are no longer to be satisfied with basing their estimates only on the number of inhabitants but also on other collective standards.

In fact, and despite the tremendous efforts they have made this year to satisfy the citizens' need, purchasing agents have given the impression if not of being short of breath at least of acting impulsively to fill in the gaps.

Save some imported products which arrived late, strictly speaking, there was no serious shortage, but some periodic tensions regarding one or other product which accentuated the mistakes noted in the planning; mistakes not solely because of unusual circumstances but meant to ensure permanent supplies regardless of these circumstances.

The problem is obviously quite an intricate one, but it is mainly a problem dealing with organization and men.

It is true that we are no longer in the experimental stage but rather in a period of very strict and serious planning. And in this respect, the retail trade with its complete and final stabilization, more than ever demands our attention. The reentries in the new national trade register can no longer be delayed, for they are prepared to cut down very appreciably the operations of unscrupulous business men whose trade operations and speculative deals present the facts in a wrong light.

In this area, the APC [People's Commercial Assemblies] have a role of prime importance to play fully and straightforwardly by steering clear of any subjectivism and laxism. They should display a spirit of initiative, play an effective part in recentralization and control. The bad example given not too long ago by Constantine who illegally approved the opening, reconversion or provisional expansion of 30 businesses is to be outlawed forever.

The new registrations should also be in conformity with the law not only on the legal plane but also in their purposes and their distribution. To return to this Ramadan 80, we point out that the marks it has left are not like those we further back referred to as solely of a physical nature. The money markets have also in fact lowered the exhorbitant prices of some products, mainly those of meat and some fruits.

However, semolina and beverages which are so much in demand at this time have not always been available at retail dealers, but let us not be too demanding, for on the whole, the situation which could have been better has distinctly changed for the better compared with that of past years.

It now remains to roll up our sleeves and make a special effort to engage strenuously once more in the production battle.

It also remains to pursue the development of numerous projects already drawn up in various plans, particularly those of the PCD [expansion unknown] dealing very especially with housing, water supply and socio-cultural substructures.

8879
CSO: 4400

DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-ALGERIAN EXCHANGES DISCUSSED

Algiers REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL in French 6 Sep 80 p 11

> [Text] On the eve of the official opening of the FIA [Algiers International Fair], those in charge of the Soviet pavilion held a press conference in which they analyzed the area, the depth and the interest of the mutually advantageous cooperation between Algeria and the Soviet Union and declared themselves united in their common struggle for a new international economic order.

One of the oldest in the existence of the FIA, the Soviet participation is also centered, this year, on equipment goods, which everyone knows the country needs badly. This steadfastness is reassuring, inasmuch as, though many firms and countries have been guided by the same analysis of the development, some others unfortunately are offering us this year an opportunity to see that their representation tends to cause, stimulate or develop some aspects of the class consumption the country does not need. Once more, therefore, the Soviet Union is exhibiting at the fair equipment and technology in the subject in which it is tried and tested and in which we Algerians have experimented in the field, even though many are unaware of it.

In fact Algerian-Soviet cooperation is just as old as it is important.

The first economic and technical agreement between the USSR and Algeria was signed in 1963, one year after the victory won by the Algerian people in its heroic struggle for national liberation. That agreement was the continuation of the selfless aid given by the Soviet people to the Algerian people during its struggle for independence.

During that period, simultaneously with the solution of the most urgent tasks, foundations were laid for cooperation in solving the long-term important problems like the development of industry--steel first of all--, the discovery and rational utilization of Algeria's natural resources, the training of national cadres. On 3 July 1964 two fundamental Soviet-Algerian agreements were signed that were the basis for cooperation in the areas of steel and training national cadres.

In accordance with the intergovernmental agreements and the contracts signed by the Soviet organizations and the national companies, projects were carried out related to nearly 100 works.

The commitments contracted for for 65 of them have already been fulfilled, which has contributed tangible results very important for Algeria's economy.

Soviet-Algerian cooperation in the oil and gas industry, a principal branch of Algeria's economy that provided the major part of the foreign currency necessary for the country's economic expansion, began in 1966. In accordance with the terms of the contracts concluded between V/O [expansion unknown] "Technoexport" and SONATRACH, Soviet specialists were sent to Algeria to contribute to the realization of geologic, geophysical and petroleum seismic prospecting projects; the Soviet Union furnished equipment for the appropriate prospecting teams. Of great importance to this branch is the creation of the central laboratory at Boumerdes, partly equipped with Soviet equipment. For this laboratory the USSR delivered calculating equipment, including the "Minsk-32" computer.

Highly qualified Soviet specialists have been working since 1971 in Algeria's Energy and Petrochemicals Ministry and at SONATRACH. In all, nearly 250 Soviet oil specialists are currently working in Algeria.

The largest work built under Soviet-Algerian cooperation, whose ceremonial opening took place in 1971, is the steel mill with a capacity of 410,000 tons of steel per year, built at the El-Hadjar metallurgy plant. When this project went into operation Algeria virtually set up its steel industry; before that, in Oran, there had been a refining plant with a capacity of nearly 20,000 tons of steel per year. The new steel mill laid the foundations for development of national production of ferrous laminates necessary for various sectors of economic development--above all, for construction of pipelines and gas pipelines.

On the basis of the mercury deposits prospected in the course of the cooperation by Soviet and Algerian geologists, a mining and metallurgy firm was created, supplying 317 tons of mercury per year (it was expanded later). This plant was built according to the plan by the Tachkent Sredazniprotsvetmet Plans Institute. The firm has enabled Algeria to become one of the world's largest exporters of mercury.

Nearly 1,000 Soviet teachers are working in the technical institutes and colleges created with the help of Soviet organizations in the universities of Algiers, Oran, Constantine, etc., with the participation of the Soviet Institute for Establishing Higher Educational Projects (Gulprovouz), which drew up a whole series of plans for technologic equipment for teaching establishments created in the course of the cooperation. Plans are currently being prepared for expanding and modernizing the Oil, Gas and Chemical Institute.

The teaching of new specialities is being introduced in the National Light Industry Institute. To that end new laboratories and workshops are being constructed, and a system of training scientists and teachers is being put in place.

8946
CSO: 4400

BANI-SADR CRITICIZES REVOLUTION COURTS, MOSADDEQ CRITICS

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 8 Sep 80 p 11

[Text] In an interview with ENQELAB-E ESLAMI newspaper, President Bani-Sadr said that he hoped that a small part of what had transpired in the past 13 months in the name of Islam were defensible. In most cases nobody defended what had happened but everybody aspired to "become Islamic," he said. For instance, "it is hoped that our courts are 'Islamicized'," he added. He cited a "living" case in which a person had been condemned to death in Hamadan, the President's own birthplace. His case was referred to Qom where it was judged, upon seeing the case, that neither the person's properties could be confiscated nor he could be executed. The verdict had apparently been issued 11 months ago. Those who had insisted on the death sentence in Hamadan knew that Qom would not be impressed with their judgment but that it would overrule it. Three days prior to Qom's verdict upsetting the previous judgment, the victim was executed against the law, in contradiction of Islam and in contempt of all principles. "Well, it is obvious that the perpetrator is a killer. Now, we shall see whether or not in the Islamic Republic this person would be punished as a murderer. If he is punished, we shall thank God and we shall know that the others will realize that there are certain criteria and rules in the Islamic Republic after all. For that is what makes security. If it is possible to condemn and kill only to find out later that the convicted person was not guilty after all, and if it is possible that nobody asks who caught the man and who killed him, then this republic will not be a proper republic. They began their injustice in meting out punishment to the oppressors in the previous regime. Otherwise, they would obviously have been found out if they had not started with the oppressors. But now they are gradually getting around to the oppressed. Now look who the regular customers of these organizations are. Are they the oppressors? No, they are mostly from among the masses, the workers, the farmers. It is the turn of these groups to be decimated."

"Therefore, if we want justice to prevail, we must put our feet down firmly at the very start, at the trials of the oppressors, and prevent injustice right there. If it is done at that stage, it will be done in later stages as well. I mean, it is the enforcement of the law that can

change the social system. That is it. Otherwise, force shall perpetuate the previous social system."

Criticizing those who attack Dr Mosaddeq and nationalism, Bani-Sadr, himself once a follower of Dr Mosaddeq as a youth, said, "I believe Dr Mosaddeq does not represent nationalism in its Western concept. He represents what he himself said: that "I defend the Islamic and Iranian values." He meant that he would defend the Iranian independent identity within Islam. I came to know him as such and with that attribute I rate him as an extremely cherishable personality in the contemporary history of Iran. I believe that those who want to destroy his image and wilfully capitalize on certain statements in order to achieve this purpose are the same people who want to undermine the foundation of our solidarity and resistance."

9695
CSO: 4906

CABINET APPROVES NEW REGULATIONS ON FOREIGN MISSIONARIES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 4 Sep 80 p 9

[Text] At a meeting on 27/5/59 [18 Aug 80], the cabinet issued a decree approving a Ministry of National Guidance proposal requiring all foreign missionaries, coming to Iran for educational, religious, medical and charity activities, to submit their application for entry and residency in Iran to the Ministry of National Guidance 2 months prior to their intended travel to Iran. Applications should be forwarded to the Ministry of National Guidance through embassies of the Islamic Republic. According to the new regulations, the number of people in every mission in the country will be limited to the minimum number needed by various missions in the country. Missionaries are not permitted to engage in any political activity other than specifically allowed by law. Violators will be expelled at the first notice. Missionaries are also required to report to the Ministry of National Guidance their addresses, place of work and the name of the countries of which they are citizens of immediately after arrival. Any changes in the address or the place of work must be reported immediately. Under the new regulations, foreign missionaries are allowed to attend, by invitation, Islamic seminars and conferences. They are free to perform their religious rites and ceremonies to the same extent religious minority groups are permitted under the constitution. Host organizations, assisted by the government, will help in providing the needed facilities.

Under article 6 of the new regulations, missionaries may work subject to approval of the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare and in accordance with the employment regulations for non-Iranians. If missionaries are paid from the fund raised by the country's religious minorities, their total pay must not exceed the amount needed for an average standard of living which will be determined by the Ministry of National Guidance. As for sending money abroad, missionaries are subject to the existing exchange regulations. Exceptions could be made by special cabinet permission. Should a missionary decide to leave the country before his time is up, his substitute will be subject to the same regulations.

Violators of the new regulations, in addition to being expelled, are also subject to a fine as well as punishment defined in article 59 of the Labor Law.

Police Department and the Ministries of Labor and National Guidance are responsible for the implementation of the new regulations.

9561
CSO: 4906

MULLAHS TIGHTEN GRIP ON PROSTRATE COUNTRY

Hamburg DIE ZEIT in German 5 Sep 80 p 5

[Article by Andreas Kohlschuetter: "Can Iran Be Governed? The Mullahs Advance: After the Formation of the Cabinet: The Power Struggle of the Elite Rages Behind the Scene"]

[Text] Has Iran, shaken by revolutionary fever, threatened by chaos and national destruction, now become governable again and capable of reaching decisions through the installation of a new cabinet? From an organizational point of view at least the political and constitutional reestablishment of that power is completed which came to power through the revolution of the masses against the government of the shah. At the end of March 1979 the Islamic Republic as a form of government was approved by plebiscite, in December the Islamic constitution was adopted by referendum. In January the election of Abdul Hassan Bani-Sadr as chief of state followed, in March and May the election of the parliament, in August finally the selection of the new head of the government, Mohammad Ali Radjai, who was forced upon Bani-Sadr by the clerics. Triumphantly the Ayatollah and Imam Khomeyni speaks of the "unprecedented success" of the revolution, which "in a period of only 18 months has managed to mobilize for the new republic all the necessary institutions."

However, there can be no real talk of a consolidation of power in Khomeyni's kingdom. It resides nowhere, wanders about, remains diffuse and ineffective. The impression prevails of a tense, vascillating situation in which nothing is certain, everything is continually questioned and upset again and again. For the revolution within the revolution goes on, and the militant radical clerics are advancing in the name of God and the "disfranchised" (Mostazafin), in the sign of religious and class struggle. They hunt down not only henchmen of the shah, but they also seek out new groups of enemies, like the "counterrevolutionary" middle class, the "Westernized" intellectuals, liberals, democrats, technocrats, ethnic and religious minorities, like the Kurds and disciples of the Bahai sect.

The scene is dominated by fear of persecution and imprisonment, of secret vehmic and summary courts without any central control. Wild rumors of insurrections and conspiracies and the specter of a bloody civil war circulate. Bombs explode on the oilfields and in government buildings. Sharp shooters attack barracks and military convoys. President Bani-Sadr warns of a "takeover of anarchy." Even Khomeyni sometimes indicates that he also sees the continual danger of revolutionary self-destruction: "No one from the outside needs to do us any harm; we are cutting our own throats and destroying ourselves."

The reasons why Khomeyni's Islamic Republic cannot rest after the natural catastrophe of the fall of the shah lie, on the one hand, in the total lack of political experience and tradition of this country wracked by despotism and foreign domination; on the other hand, in the complex nature of this multinational state laden with minorities, whose divergent interests could always only be contained by an iron hand; above all, however, in the birth defects, weaknesses and contradictions which characterize the revolutionary Khomeyni regime.

Khomeyni has long become a monument as a towering and moreover uncontested fuehrer personality, disassociated from everyone yet at the center of everything. As stimulator, motor, whip, referee, and final judge of the Iranian revolution the Ayatollah escapes every narrow institutionalization and organizational pigeon-holing. He sees himself as the founder of the republic and an antidespot. He has allowed himself, however, to be groomed as the religious-political commander-in-chief (Velayat Faqih), as the "religious shah" with practically unlimited rights to exercise power and to intervene, which explodes any republican context. He appears in the middle of everything, continually starts new revolutionary fires on his own, wherever it suits him, makes decisions on purges, American hostages, the selection of the head of the government and the composition of the cabinet--the distribution of constitutional powers here or there.

Fanatic and dogged, at the expense of permanent unrest and an unhealthy radicalization, Khomeyni pursues his goal of establishing the "first truly Islamic nation" on earth: "We must return to the former Islam; the Koran contains everything that we need." With this motto he subverted up to now all attempts to return to governmental and political normalcy. The oppressive statement: "Khomeyni is a genius where there are things to destroy, and a fool where there are things to construct," comes from the late Ayatollah Talaghani, that irreplacable integrating figure of the Iranian revolution.

Behind the external facade of a complementary national and governmental apparatus lies concealed the irreconcilably deep split of the revolutionary elite, who banded together to topple the shah. Their irreconcilable political views did not unleash the constitutional and power struggle

which is by no means over between the chief of state, Bani-Sadr, and the parliament dominated by the Islamic Republic Party--it is led by the Ayatollah Mohammed Beheshti, a powerful hatcher of plots. On the one hand, there are the Islamic modernists and technocrats who speak for modern problem solving techniques on as broad a base as possible. According to Bani-Sadr, "competent people must govern; we need a leadership which represents all interests, not just those of one group to lead the country truly." On the other hand, there are the Islamic fundamentalists and doctrinaire mullahs who, supported by the illiterate masses overchallenged by modern times, seek refuge in the old ways of faith and the secure world of the prophets. Khomeyni spoke to thse people and from the heart when he demanded of the new government that it be "100-percent Islamic, doctrinaire, and revolutionary."

Shock Troops in Action

The conflict between the democratic republican facade and the autocratic grab of the mullahs for a monopoly of power characteristic of the political process in Iran since the fall of the shah is growing more pronounced. The political pluralism which opened up during the Tehran Spring has been eliminated step by step by the Shiite clergy. First came the liberals around the former head of the government, Bazargan, then the national-communist left of the "Fedayin Khalk." Then the shock troops of the "Hisbollahi," "God's fellow travelers," were let loose against the Islamic socialist "Mojaheddin Khalk," and finally the universities were closed for an indefinite period to purge "un-Islamic" and "counterrevolutionary" professors and students. Then the drugs were beaten against Bani-Sadr, whose election by an overwhelming popular majority amounts up to now to the only setback on the road to a mullah dictatorship. Khomeyni underscored the theologian tyranny in which this Islamic Republic is engaged and which condemns it to harsher and harsher repressive measures when he recently commanded the newly commissioned "Council of Safety," which has as its assignment the examination of laws passed by the parliament for their Islamic purity: "You are only to respect God, not the people."

The chaotic polycentricity of the power structure which confounded Bazargan and caused his downfall and has also prevented any effective governing under Bani-Sadr has by no means been eliminated. Like a plague of rats the armed revolutionary committees, revolutionary guards, revolutionary tribunals and "Hisbollahi" gangs have spread across the country. All establish their authority in Khomeyni--of course, not in the government--in most all cases, however, they act, administer, and execute on their own. The state agencies with actual jurisdiction can consider themselves lucky if they are informed at all after the fact about decisions reached by the Islamic Mafia collectives. Thus, Bani-Sadr and his administrative apparatus, for example, must helplessly witness the outrages of revolutionary lynch and murder justice. The president, in fact, courageously and openly denounces the mass executions, which "are largely unjustified," but he cannot stop them.

In the backdrop of seeming governmental normalcy Khomeyni and his mullahs, as dogged and unyielding as ever, strive for total clerical control, for the construction of an Islamic government "of Shiite stamp according to the will of God" and therefore unassailable--in the name of God and the Imam hidden for more than 1,000 years. But the khomeyni revolution lacks any national plan of action; it is politically without content. Through the destruction of the shah's empire and the purging crusades against all Western influences empty spaces have developed which somehow must be filled. The mullahs, weak in cadre and totally inexperienced in political, economic, administrative and military matters, with their Koran verses and their motto "Islamization" are unequal to the task.

Very serious social crises are developing in this Iran of 4 million unemployed, 50 percent inflation, stagnant industries, and rapidly sinking oil incomes, which are hardly sufficient to fill the hungry mouths. The unrealistic, theocratic politics of "100-percent Islam" will not be able to divert and suppress the concentrated existential cry of the underprivileged masses much longer--in the 1980 budget there is 14 times more money for religious and religion-based things than for work-related and social matters. The more ruthlessly Khomeyni tries to set up his Shiite Imamate utopia--and nothing would indicate a change of heart in this regard--all the more bitter is the resistance of Sunnites, ethnic minorities, oppressed opposition forces, and also the discord between the various clerical factions struggling for positions of power and succession to Khomeyni--the more of this the greater the internal discord.

International Vacuum

The internal political emptiness corresponds to the international vacuum into which the wildly flailing Khomeyni has driven his Islamic Republic. The Islamic revolution did not bring Iran any closer to its Arabic neighbors. On the contrary, it drove, above all, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrein to collective defense against the Khomeyni plague. It is indicative of this that the Gulf state Iran, just like during the coldest isolation under the shah, has been excluded from all recent summit meetings of Arabic states that line the Gulf. Khomeyni sees his theocratic Iran as the "avant-garde of an international movement of oppressed." And Beheshti went so far as to claim: "The Islamic revolution is not a regional revolution, but a world revolution." Just as Lenin once had to, so too must the Iranian exporters of revolution modify their goals.

The "Splendid Isolation" of the Khomeyni empire appears much more consequential to the outside world with an eye toward the Soviet Union which is patiently waiting to spring. The Kremlin undoubtedly has not abandoned hope of transforming the American power deficit in Iran into a Soviet power credit. The bill has up to now not come due. Only a short while ago a spokesman of the Islamic Republic Party warned: "The revolution will deal with the Soviet Union if it does not desist in its 'three conspiracies' against Iran." And he named "the provocations of the

(communist) Tudeh Party, the arms shipments to Iraq, the murder of our Afghan brothers." At the same time Foreign Minister Gotbzadeh fired off a furious letter to Gromyko in which the Russians were charged with "unpardonable border provocations," also "supporting the counterrevolution in Kurdistan," as well as the deployment of the Tudeh Party "as a fifth column." Finally, Khomeyni himself personally criticized after America the Soviet Union as a "Satanic world power."

The clerical radicalization of the Iranian revolution, its lack of political order, the rabid exclusion of the moderate liberal middle, dammed up social and economic tensions, the bridges to America and Europe broken by the hostage drama and the sanctions, the flood of anti-Western resentment from the wash of which the Islamic Republic was born--all these factors taken together weaken, despite all the anti-Soviet verbage, the immunity of this Iran vis-a-vis the Russian world power neighbor which is just waiting its chance. Before he left office Foreign Minister Gotbzadeh, supported by Bani-Sadr and the remaining bunch of rationally and empirically oriented politicians, evoked in dramatic words the danger of the Russian colossus on the other side of the more than 1,000-kilometer common border: "He wants to drive us into the corner and see us helpless, so that out of desperation we will turn to the north. His policy is unmistakable: to force Iran to its knees and then to set conditions for it according to whim." It is more than questionable that the Ayatollah Khomeyni, the "Superman" and "Representative of God," according to Radio Tehran, equipped with his divan-given guarantee for success, will recognize this danger soon enough and will draw from it the necessary internal and external consequences.

9485
CSO: 4403

'LE MONDE' VIEWS DIVISIONS AMONG IRANIAN OPPOSITION

LD291053 Paris LE MONDE in French 28-29 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Paul Balta: "The Iranian Opposition in Exile Seems too Divided To Take Advantage of the Situation"]

[Text] On Friday, for the first time since the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in April 1979, Iranian Radio and television played the former national anthem, not the shah's national anthem but the one which the nationalists preferred under the monarchy since it sang glory to "eternal Iran" and not to the monarch. This anthem had virtually been banned by Imam Khomeyni who, also for the first time, launched an appeal for a holy alliance not in Islam's name but for Iran in order to contain the Iraqi invader.

In Paris, however, Baghdad's offensive is causing some exiles to smile: "It is no accident," they say, "that Saddam Husayn has placed his airforce in safety in Jordan and that his army gives the impression of having failed in its lightning strike. The reason it is marking time is to more effectively immobilize the Iranian Army. This is an attempt to create a diversion aimed at preparing the ground for an offensive by the opposition forces who are awaiting a signal on D day." According to others these opposition troops have already penetrated Iran taking advantage of the explosive situation constituted by the presence of Iraqi forces around Abadan and at various points along the border.

For the past few days there have been many reports on this subject, some conflicting. The LONDON TIMES announced that a group of officers in exile, under Marshal (Aryana), think that Khomeyni's regime is about to collapse at any time and are preparing to charter an airplane for Tehran. The marshal, a former chief of staff sacked by the shah in 1969 for having failed to organize an effective response to Iraqi Army attacks, is almost 80 years old and does not have much support in the various opposition groups which he has courted more than they have put him forward as a leader.

General Oveysi's Army

A more serious contender is General Oveysi who, according to the TIMES, has just returned to Iraq from the United States to lead 5,000 dissident soldiers.

According to the Hamburg weekly STERN he has at his disposal 45,000 men trained by some 10 officers in 20 camps situated along the Iranian-Iraqi border and 25,000 more scattered throughout the Gulf Emirates. In particular Bahrain and Oman and 3,000 more in Cairo. All are apparently awaiting orders from the Paris headquarters whence the general is apparently coordinating preparations. The next few days or weeks will show how much credence should be given to these assertions.

According to well-informed oppositionists it is very difficult to put forward specific figures and virtually impossible to assess the size of the various groups since many soldiers are forming a "floating mass" vacillating between several leaders and having multiple or successive alliances. For instance, officers faithful to the Pahlavis are also offering their services to former Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar, because they feel that he has most chance of restoring the dynasty. Others, however, favor Mr Bakhtiar as a nationalist leader, threatening to withdraw their support if he were to envisage a restoration rather than proclaiming a republic.

To find your way in this maze you have to consider the army as it was when the monarchy fell in February 1979. The crack forces--50,000 to 60,000 men --belonged to the Imperial Guard and the paratroopers in the army. In the airforce they belonged to the fighter pilot corps and to the Homafarim (technicians trained in the United States), and in the navy they belonged to the marine fusiliers contingent. Many--but nobody knows exactly how many--managed to emigrate while others are hiding in Iran. On the whole they have remained loyal to the Pahlavis.

In addition to this crack force there are professional infantry, armored division and technical services officers who were generally hostile to Imam Khomeyni without necessarily being unconditional supporters of the shah. Indeed these groups contained a considerable proportion of nationalists and Mossadeqist who rallied to Mr Bakhtiar.

"Oveysi is to Bakhtiar what Beheshit is to Bani-sadr," some exiles say to stress the splits which exist both in the government and the opposition, deploring the fact that the opposition is sometimes portrayed as one bloc when it is more divided than ever. The former primer minister's supporters admit that contacts have been made with General Oveysi but they maintain that the two men do not have a great deal in common.

According to them the man who was nicknamed "the butcher of Tehran" is also in touch with the Pahlavis but, like Mr Bakhtiar, would conclude tactical alliances in order to have more chance of winning power for himself. They point out that this methodical man comes originally from Qom and that, despite the energies he devotes to "the state's service" he is a convinced and practising Muslim and hence could hope to win over religious men in the present regime should it collapse. In short there is rivalry rather than alliance among the three factions.

The "Pahlavi Clan"

Still on the military plane there are some 20,000 to 30,000 armed Kurds who are ready to sell their services but who in the final analysis are Kurds and pay some of their money into the nationalist movement. Finally, the 60,000 or so Savak agents are still the main unknown quantity. Some have been eliminated and others have been won over by the regime. Some of remaining masses have joined forces with Mr Bakhtiar and others with General Oveysi and the Pahlavis without anybody knowing in what proportion they have done so.

At political level the monarchists can be divided into three groups: the "anti-Pahlavists" who want the (Qadjar) Dynasty to be restored. There are very few of them. The "Pahlavi Clan" itself contains two groups: that of Princess Azadeh, Princess Ashraf's daughter, supported by young officers who publish the weekly FREE IRAN and think that the family ought to regain its right naturally, and the group supporting former Empress Farah Diba, whose Paris representative, former minister (Houchang Nahavandi), is the leading figure in the Iran Liberation Front. He favors a constitutional monarchy in which Republicans and Democrats could be associated.

The noncommunist left contains former members of the national front, Mossadeq's heirs, Iran Liberation Movement members and former Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan, social democrats and also bazaar traders. The bazaar traders who had supported Imam Khomeyni fully have since changed their stance and many have gone into opposition or support Ayatollah Shari'at Madari since the regime, at President Bani-sadr's instigation but with the imam's approval, has nationalized foreign trade, thereby preventing them from importing directly and making substantial profits.

"In the Wake of the Iraqi Army"

These opponents are to be found either in the people's movement for the liberation of Iran or in the union for freedom whose members are prepared to cooperate with Mr Hasan Mazeh but reject any alliance with Mr Bakhtiar who they regard as too deeply compromised with the former regime.

However, for some time now, relations between the former prime minister--he has just made a short visit to Egypt whose object is not known--and the Pahlavis have deteriorated considerably. The Pahlavis suggest that Bakhtiar has "sold himself to Iraq" and maintain that they will never agree to "return to Iran in the wake of the Iraqi Army." Mr Bakhtiar's friends proudly retort that those accusations are ridiculous.

At the beginning of the summer oppositionists in Paris maintained that: "In 3 or 4 months there will be an uprising in Iran and the mullahs' regime will collapse." By launching their offensive almost 1 week ago the Iraqi forces clearly intended to encourage such a collapse although the few reports coming from Tehran do not suggest that the provincial populations demanding autonomy, notably in Kordestan and Khuzestan, have

taken advantage of the opportunity--at least not yet--to carry out a mass uprising. Quite the reverse; the impression is that the Islamic government has built a new union around it while the opposition groups abroad remain particularly divided.

CSO: 4900

PRIME MINISTER MOHAMMAD 'ALI RAJA'I BIOGRAPHY

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 4 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, was born in 1312 [21 Mar 1933-20 Apr 1934] in Qazvin. He lost his father in 1316 [21 Mar 1937-20 Apr 1938] and completed his primary education in the same city under the keeping of his brother. At the age of 14 he went to Tehran and worked in the Bazaar for a few years. At the age of 17 he was employed by the Air Force on a fixed-term contract. His acquaintance with Ayatollah Taleqhani and Feda'iyan-e Eslam, familiarized him with the original line of the humanizing ideology of Islam.

Raja'i's attendance in the meetings of the Feda'yan-e Eslam taught him ideological struggle. His resignation from the Air Force in 1332 [21 Mar 1953-20 Apr 1954] coincided with his graduation from high school. He turned to education by becoming a primary school teacher in Bijar city region (shahrestan). He never separated from the task of educating except in the years he was in prison. He began his political activity when he was a student at the Teacher Training College. His acquaintance with Engineer Bazargan and Dr Sahabi came about in this period. In 1339 [21 Mar 1960-20 Apr 1961] he was a high-school teacher of mathematics in Khansar. Later on when he studied for his M.A. in statistics, he also taught at Kamal School. He was then transferred to Qazvin.

In 1342 [21 Mar 1963-20 Apr 1964] Raja'i was arrested and put behind bars on charges of distributing the statements and publications of the Freedom Movement (Nahzat-e Azadi) and of membership in that organization. When he was released from prison, he formed a group for politico-cultural activity in cooperation with Jalaleddin Farsi and Dr Bahonar. The establishment of Refah Girls School was the product of the "Islamic Welfare and Cooperation Foundation" (Bonyad-e Refah va Ta'avon-e Eslami) which was made possible with the cooperation of a large number of strugglers who were believers in the 15 Khordad Movement. When Jalaleddin Farsi left Iran in 1349 [21 Mar 1970-20 Apr 1971] to form the nucleus of a guerrilla organization, Raja'i acted as his liaison with the members of the organization in Iran. He went to Damascus once to exchange information with Jalaleddin Farsi. His return to Iran coincided with the arrest of a number of the

members of the Sazeman-e Mojahedin-e Khalq. It was at this point that he came into contact with Hanifnezhad. This acquaintance made it possible for Raja'i to keep in contact with the members of the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization out of prison through the family members of those Mojahedins who were incarcerated. His weekly meetings with Hanifnezhad and Ahmad Reza'i and later on with Reza Reza'i took place regularly for a long time. After the martyrdom of Rez Reza'i, he was in contact with Bahram Aram and Lotfollah Meysami and cooperated in the Mojahedin-e Khalq Organization. In the month of Azar 1352 [22 Nov to 21 Dec 1973], he was once more arrested and imprisoned. Interrogation from him took as long as 15 months. SAVAK failed to pump any information out of him. But when Afroukhteh's group was betrayed, Raja'i, too, was betrayed by Manizheh Ashrafzadeh Kermani, whereby SAVAK learned that Raja'i was in possession of extensive information which he had not revealed before. Interrogation was resumed and Raja'i was transfered to Evin Prison. While in prison, Raja'i tried to get the range of the difference between the thinking of the Mojahedins and that of the Marxists, but he failed. On Eid-e Thadir festival [in commemoration of the Prophet appointing Ali, his son-in-law, as his successor] in 1357 [21 Mar 1978-20 Apr 1979], he was released from prison as a result of the unrelenting struggles of the Moslem people. That put a seal on 4 years of suffering as a result of incarceration and torture at the hand of the previous abominable regime.

Raja'i is now 47 years old. He was married in 1340 [21 Mar 1961-20 Apr 1962] and has two children.

9695
CSO: 4906

PRESENT TEHRAN SCENE CONTRASTED WITH PAST

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 15 Sep 80 p 9

/Article by Ulrich Tilgner: "Iran's Capital No Longer Manageable"/

/Text/ Fruit stands, bakeries, meat markets, hardware shops and furniture stores. Behind the bazaar in Djawadiye in the south of Tehran, people are crowding around the fruit stands. There is more than enough available even if the high prices scare many a veiled would-be customer away.

The owners have happy faces. In front of a bird-seller's shop three elderly men are sitting on the curb drinking tea out of small glasses. Their answers to the question of what changes have taken place are almost identical: "Khomeini has liberated the country from imperialism." A small boy cries: Neither East, nor West-- Islamic republic."

I am looking for a more precise answer. Things are "good" now, the owner of a snack bar selling hamburgers and Coca Cola says. What changes are there in everyday life ? The answer is much the same. "Everything has gotten better." There is water and electricity in this part of town, yes. But then a schoolboy comes up with a more detailed answer. Both at the head and at the bottom of this long street a new school has been built. And, there now is a sports field and a public health station. The boy also tells me how life has changed. "We have grown more conscious of things, step by step," he says. "Things are different now." An old woman says: "I know what has changed. Prostitution is gone once and for all and young people no longer become heroin addicts." And an old man says: "Lest we forget, SAVAK is no longer around."

This part of town is totally overpopulated; the narrow alleys are teeming with little children. There is no sign of any large-scale urban renewal efforts having taken place after the revolution. But the people are content. They, too, are affected by the terrible unemployment in Tehran. Many

of those who are working have gotten wage increases since the revolution. Also, they do not grumble in front of a foreigner. "Keep up the boycott for all I care," a 45 year-old man says, folding his hands on his stomach. "I have not gone hungry yet. We have everything we need and sooner than depend on others again we will all go on a fast. God will not forsake us." Those who are listening to us conclude the conversation by saying "Allah akbar"-- Allah is great. The world is still in order here and there is Islamic identity. People live close together and help each other. Here, the extended family takes on the role of an unemployment insurance and social security scheme.

During the afternoon rush hour it takes 45 minutes to cover the three kilometers to the southern edge of the city. This is where the Mustasafin, those deprived of all rights, live in utter squalor; the poorest of the poor who have built their own huts which do not even afford protection from the wind and the rain.

In the year following the revolution, many of the huts were replaced by stone houses, many of them equipped with water and electricity. Some of the slum dwellers have moved into these houses or have even occupied them outright. Not only was their place taken over by new arrivals; new huts were built on the edge of the old "settlement" and electric power lines were illegally laid.

Under the Shah, the police would go into action in such cases. There were dead and wounded in the course of altercations with the municipal eviction squads. These days, the new laws calling for fines and prison terms still do not keep the population from building shelters. Government support is scanty; frequently there are committees which extend financial aid and bring in food. The people are hoping for an improvement in their living conditions. But, alongside much criticism directed against the government and the politicians, there is a deep faith in Ayatollah Khomeini. There is a great deal of public construction going on in this part of the city. Roads are being paved; sewage drains are being dug. Part of the sewage no longer seeps into the ground right in front of the houses as it used to do.

Muhammad Tavassoli, lord mayor of Tehran, wants to use his 40,000 city employees to do away with the worst of the problems. From his office on the 24th floor of city hall originally built to house the Shah's unity party, he can survey

the southern sections of the city. Enumerating the history and the problems of the city, he cites a number of pertinent statistics.

During the Shah's dictatorship, Tehran was built up as the capital of the country; in time, it got much too big. There was a veritable population explosion in Tehran following the Shah's so-called land reform in the sixties. There was no industry to speak of in the city. In the factories on the edge of town, which were no put up right next to the army barracks by sheer accident, goods were assembled but not really manufactured.

Nor did the revolution serve to turn the population trend around. Ill-considered promises made by the revolutionary leadership had in fact led to an additional increase of 1 1/2 million people. By now, there are 6 million living in Tehran-- one million families, 300,000 of which do not possess adequate housing. Tehran's problems, the mayor said, are incredible.

The 42 year-old mayor, who has been active in the Islamic revolutionary movement since the early sixties and went to jail because of this for a year in the early seventies, is proud of the gains he has made in the fight against the city's chaotic traffic conditions. For several months now, the inner city has been closed to passenger cars until 10 am. One million vehicles cannot enter until that time.

The only vehicles that may are buses and taxis but they must carry up to five passengers at a time with no additional passengers permitted to board. The mayor is also proud of the fact that the city bus transport system, employing 12,000 workers and twice the number of buses, is transporting 800,000 more people daily than it did under the Shah.

Tavassoli says that the main problem after the revolution was to reduce popular antagonism against the employees of the city administration. A start was made by a large-scale street cleaning program. 15,000 sanitation workers are on the job early every morning, picking up refuse. They are paid DM 17 per day, which is four times as much as before the revolution. But in view of the inflation, this is not enough to feed a family in Tehran.

The mayor is not sure how Tehran can be rehabilitated. The problem, he says, is how all of Iran is to be rehabilitated. To be sure, it is prohibited by law to set up administrative facilities or new industry in a 120-kilometer radius around Tehran but it will take economic progress in the provinces and in the other cities of the country to reverse the population trends. The city has little money and is deliberately not starting to rehabilitate by putting up new housing.

As far as Tavassoli is concerned, priority must be given to sewerage, road building, the construction of schools and public health facilities as well as of municipal fruit markets (to fight inflation). Over the past few months, one million trees were planted in the southern part of the city both in order to help improve climatic conditions and to forestall the erection of further slums in the open spaces still available there. For the present, penalties for illegal construction are not being invoked; the ordinances of the revolutionary council are merely being promulgated as a deterrent. But they may very well be invoked, if efforts to resettle people in the country do not succeed.

But Tehran is not only a city of the Orient with its veiled women in the south, its huge, roofed-in bazaar in the old center of town; it is not only a city of indescribable poverty but also a center of wealth and western life style. In the higher-lying districts north of the city center, there are unmistakable signs of Western influence. The streets are wider here; there are pleasant parks and comfortable houses in the main, many of them with large gardens and some with swimming pools.

Half of the earnings of all of Iran are concentrated here. Supermarkets and stores a good deal more expensive than those in the southern part of town signalize the difference in life styles. Many an Iranian restaurant has had to make way for a pizzeria. Those who live in these sections of the city are offering resistance to Islamization. But this spirit of resistance cannot take hold among the masses because the poor on the edges of town view these people up here in the north as symbolizing the era of the Shah and as the enemy camp in terms of the domestic political conflict.

After the revolution, rents and prices for houses collapsed; now they are climbing again just as in "the good old days." In the north of the city, the uncertainty that followed on the heels of the revolution has passed. People are

taking their Mercedes 450's, which are four times as expensive in Tehran than in the FRG, out of the garage again; in the evenings, there are parties even if alcoholic beverages are only dispensed on the sly.

But the pre-revolutionary night life of the city no longer exists. Instead, the number of weddings has increased since the revolution. And when long lines of cars honking their horns roll through the deserted streets at midnight, then these are not intoxicated soccer fans celebrating the victory of their team but wedding guests conducting the newlyweds to their new apartment.

9478
CSO: 4403

RELATIONS WITH U.S. EXAMINED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 23 Jul 80 p 13

[Article by Fred Halliday*: "Washington and the Iraqi Card"]

[Text] America is interested in Iraq for three reasons--its economic strength, its hostility to the Soviets, and the stability of its regime.

There are two things which prevent a resumption of diplomatic relations between Iraq and America--America's position concerning Palestine, and America's support of the Kurds. During the last few months rumors have been streaming out of Washington, the upshot of which is that the Carter administration is interested in setting up a new alliance with Iraq. It has been said about Brzezinski that, at a meeting of the Council of Foreign Affairs last March, he made a point of the fact that Iraq has already become the most influential country in the Arab world. And on 16 April he stated that there is no basic conflict between Iraq and the United States. And although there have not been diplomatic relations between the two countries since Iraq severed them after the 1967 War between the Arabs and the Israelis, this has not prevented American policy planners from counting on a new cooperation with Iraq by means of which Iraq, with its growing wealth, self-confidence, and hostility to the Soviet Union could exercise influence which the United States' other allies, such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are not able to exercise. And Iraq could take the place of Iran under the shah as the leader of opposition to communism in the Middle East.

According to American thinking there are three principal reasons why Iraq should play this role. The first reason is that Iraq is on its way toward becoming a significant economic power. Its petroleum reserves are estimated at about 100 billion barrels, and in this respect it occupies second place after Saudi Arabia. Its income from oil, in the year 1979, was estimated at about 24 billion dollars. Also, Iraq has

*Fred Halliday, a colleague in the Trans-National Institute in Amsterdam, visited Iraq in April and wrote this exclusive article for AL-SAFIR.

made efforts to limit OPEC's price increases and has undertaken to raise its oil production to 3.5 million barrels a day in order to make up for large quantities of oil no longer produced by Iran. In 1980, Iraq will be spending 17 billion dollars on development. Although Japan and West Germany occupy first place in Iraq's foreign trade, it nevertheless exports 100,000 barrels a day to the United States. Also, Iraq is importing more and more American products, including Boeing airplanes. And a number of American firms operate in Iraq. In addition to this, it is believed that Iraq has invested up to 5 billion dollars in U.S. treasury bonds.

The second reason for America's interest in Iraq is the fact that Iraq has become an influential diplomatic power in the Third World. In November of 1978 Iraq hosted the Arab summit conference which was in opposition to the policy of Sadat. Also, Iraq has reached unannounced security agreements with Saudi Arabia. And it has been decided that Iraq, in 1982, will host the summit conference of non-aligned nations. In addition to this, Iraq is utilizing its petroleum reserves in order to secure aid for countries in the Third World which are friendly to it. But it is not merely a matter of Iraq--with its income and its population totalling 13 million people--being able to undertake an effective role in the Arab world and set itself up as the "fortress of the Arab revolution." There is also the fact that Iraq increasingly sees itself as an enemy of two forces in the region which the United States also regards as enemies--the Soviet Union and Iran. Although the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty, which was signed in 1972, is still in effect, Iraq is continuing to criticize the role of the Soviet Union in Ethiopia, Democratic Yemen, and Afghanistan. During the last two years, the rulers of Iraq have executed dozens of communists, even though the Iraqi Communist Party has been participating in the government. Their pretexts have not been restricted to the fact that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan gives the United States a legitimate excuse to engage in similar intervention. They have also been making the claim, perhaps a bit exaggerated, that the Soviet Union might try the same thing in Iraq. An Iraqi official in Baghdad said to me: "Since Babrak Karmal was able to invite the Soviets into Afghanistan, what is there to prevent the Iraqi Communist Party from attempting to do the same thing?

Iraqi-Iranian relations have been deteriorating ever since Khomeini came to power, and both governments are broadcasting statements which demand the overthrow of the other government. At the same time that Khomeini has been giving secret support to Iraqi Shiites who are against the regime in Iraq, Iraq has been providing Iranian opposition forces with military facilities and radio stations.

This Iranian opposition, which includes in its ranks some of the former shah's generals and followers of former Prime Minister Bakhtiar, is still not able to mount an all-out offensive inside Iran. But there is little doubt that the Iraqi government would offer its full support if the

opposition in Iran tried to overturn the Khomeini regime. The third reason for America being interested in Iraq is the fact that the Americans are convinced that the Iraqi regime, at least according to the criteria of the Middle East, is a relatively stable regime. And in spite of the fact that Iraq's agriculture and industry are not at all effective, the regime's oil wealth has enabled it to provide social services for most of Iraq's inhabitants. The regime has managed to liquidate all of its opposition (more than 100 people have been executed this year) and it has been using its cash in order to create party cadres which are loyal to the regime. President Saddam Husayn, who is 43 years of age, has concentrated all the power in his hands. He has created an atmosphere of whole-hearted dedication, and he is capable of acting like a man of the people, in contrast to the ostentation and cult of personality with which he is surrounded officially. Although nobody is able to guarantee total security against repeated attempts to engage in conspiracies against the regime, nevertheless repression, oil, and strong leadership have contributed toward making the Ba'thist government a model of political stability.

Iraq Does Not Want To

The problem with the American view is that America supposes that the Iraqis would like to enter into this game. But the fact that the Iraqi government right now is taking a position which is critical of Moscow does not simply and automatically mean that it is going to be pro-Western.

Iraq's oil wealth has enabled it to adopt a policy which is to some degree independent and politically distinct from that of either the Eastern or Western bloc. The diversity of policies in the Western nations has enabled President Saddam Husayn to establish extensive commercial relations with France and to buy 64 Mirage planes without falling victim to the plan which the West had made for Iraq.

The main obstacle to an Iraqi-American rapprochement is Washington. Saddam Husayn recently stated: "The United States is occupying Arab land because Israel is occupying Palestine by virtue of America's power. And as long as the United States continues to occupy our lands, we will always have to consider the United States as an enemy of the Arabs." And concerning the subject of diplomatic relations, he said: "We will not beg America to send its envoys to us. During the last 5 years, not one year has passed without the United States trying at least twice and sometimes ten times to use all possible means to resume diplomatic relations with us. But we have rejected all of these efforts, not because of fear but because of love for the Arab people."

Relations In Absence of Diplomatic Relations

The Iraqis do not need actual diplomatic relations in order to have dealings with the United States. Economic relations are continuing even though there are no ambassadors. And the foreign minister of Iraq,

Sa'dun Hammadi, who was educated in the United States, met with Cyrus Vance, the former American secretary of state, on more than one occasion at the UN. Also, Saudi Arabia is considered to be an appropriate channel for the exchange of messages between the two parties. The United States is mistaken if it imagines that Iraq's position is merely one of rhetoric. The fact is that its position regarding Palestine is the expression of a deep-seated feeling. Also, this position taken by Iraq is considered to be an appropriate means by which the rulers of Baghdad can set themselves up as heroes who are fighting for the causes of the Arabs.

Cooperation Between America and the Ba'thists?

The thing which draws one's attention is the fact that, in spite of the recent conflicts between Baghdad and Washington, in the past they have cooperated with each other concerning many issues. In the mid-fifties the Iraqi government, which was a monarchy at that time, helped to establish the Baghdad Pact and was the pivot around which revolved the alliance of countries in the area which were supported by America in order to oppose communism. When in 1958 the leftist republican regime, supported by the Iraqi Communist Party took power, it was violently opposed both by the Ba'thists and the United States. In February of 1963 the Ba'thists and their allies were able to overthrow this regime. By doing this they were able to inflict a bloody defeat on the Iraqi Communist Party--a defeat from which the communists are still suffering. Hundreds of communists were killed during 3 days of slaughter that went on in the streets of Iraq's cities. Likewise, hundreds more communists were killed later on in prison after about 10,000 of them had been arrested. This defeat was an overwhelming one for the communist movement in the Middle East, and was a greater defeat than was the one which occurred after the 1953 overthrow of the Mossadegh government in Iran. The facts concerning the American-Ba'thist cooperation at that time have still not been revealed. But many observers, including Jordan's King Hussein, have mentioned that the CIA provided the Ba'thist forces of revenge with lists of the names and addresses of Iraq's communists. In fact the leader of the Ba'thists' coup, 'Ali Salih al-Sa'di, briefly referred to the role played by the United States when he said: "We came to power on an American train.

The Ba'thists were kicked out of power during the latter part of 1963, but they returned to take over the reins of power for good in July of 1968. Moreover, reports have pointed to the fact that America also played a role in this coup d'etat. But there is no doubt that relations between the Ba'th Party and the United States deteriorated and weakened in 1970 after the CIA discovered for itself a new role in Iraq. This role was that of supporting the Kurdish opposition, in a huge secret operation in cooperation with the shah of Iran, in order to make Baghdad more pliable to Iranian demands. It is possible that the Iraqis, because of regional pressures, might revise their position and resume diplomatic relations with Washington. But it is not possible for easy reconciliation to take place between the two governments, nor is it possible for Iraq to easily forget the huge and bloody price which American-Iranian hostility to Iraq forced it to pay a few years ago.

Perhaps the best way to view the Ba'thists is to see them as an Arab version of what the Kuomintang Party was in China during the twenties of this century--a highly nationalistic party, dependent on armed forces and yet not subordinate to them, hostile to all racial minorities, and capable of besieging its communist allies whenever such a move would be appropriate. And if a party such as this one has demonstrated that it cannot be a firm ally of the Soviet Union, it would nevertheless also be a worrisome partner to the United States even if Washington were now prepared to ignore Baghdad's human rights violations. Perhaps events will eventually force the Ba'thists to make a choice just as the Kuomintang was forced to make a choice. But if Washington cherishes any hopes that there will be a quick end to Iraqi hostility toward America, it should know that these hopes probably will not be realized.

9468
CSO: 4802

OIL MINISTER DISCUSSES VARIOUS OIL-RELATED ISSUES

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 5 Jul 80 p 18

[Interview with Tayih 'Abd al-Karim, Iraq's oil minister, in Baghdad, by 'Abdallah al-Qaq; date not given]

[Text] "We will sign a technical cooperation agreement with Kuwait within the framework of OPEC."

"We will present a working paper to the economic summit conference of the OPEC nations."

"Unifying OPEC's oil price structure is more important than increasing the prices."

"We support the use of oil as a weapon in order to deal with challenges and provocations."

"We reject the fragmentation of the Arab world's political and economic interests."

Mr Tayih 'Abd al-Karim, a member of the Iraqi Revolution Command Council and oil minister, said that arriving at a formula for unifying OPEC's oil price structure, and examining the extent to which corrective action must be undertaken in order to maintain actual price levels, is much more important than raising the prices of oil, because this will help OPEC set a long-range strategy for itself. He added that regulating oil production is the only step which can enable the OPEC countries to deal with the plans of the Western countries which aim at continually upsetting the balance of supply and demand by means of their stockpiling of oil. He went on to say that Iraq will present a working paper to the economic summit conference of the OPEC nations which is to be held in Baghdad next October and which will deal with "the sum total of the topics currently brought up, international economic issues, international relations, and the future dimensions of OPEC's role as model experience for the Third World." Then he added that Iraq knows the truth about American aims and threats and "we will not permit America to prevent us from fully exercising our legitimate rights, either with regard to our oil policy or with regard to issues which affect our future."

He said that Iraq considers it "necessary to use oil as a weapon in order to confront present-day challenges and provocations and in order to resist blatant intervention by the great powers in matters and affairs concerning oil." He said that Iraq's position with regard to the dialogue between the Gulf countries and the European countries is one of principle "based on the desire to maintain unity in the ranks of the Arabs and based on rejection of fragmentation of the Arab world's political and economic interests, both on national and regional bases."

He denied that his country has already made contacts with other countries in order to engage in the bartering of oil in exchange for nuclear reactors to be used for peaceful purposes. He said: "We have never resorted to any form of bartering at any time."

Mr Tayih 'Abd al-Karim gave this interview to AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM's correspondent during the latter's recent visit to Baghdad. In the interview, he touched upon a number of economic issues concerning the Arabs and the rest of the world. Asked about the fact that the foreign press has dubbed him as one of OPEC's prominent "hawks," he answered: "We are all hawks. We cannot surrender to the interests of the great powers. This is because our goal is to serve the interests of our Arab countries and our Arab nation, to preserve our petroleum resources, both on the national and pan-Arab level, for as long a period as possible, and to develop alternate sources of energy."

Iraq's Position Concerning Kuwait's Decision to Reduce Oil Production

Therfirst question which was put to the minister concerned his opinion about the decision Kuwait has taken to reduce its oil production.

[Question] Do all of the OPEC Countries support this? And how much surplus oil is there on the world market?

[Answer] I want to remind you that Iraq has taken a firm position with regard to the subject of oil production. From our point of view, the important thing is not whether production is reduced or increased. The important thing is to regulate and plan production in order to achieve a balance in international supply and demand so that the basic needs of the world, particularly the needs of the developing countries, are provided for. Regulation of oil production is the only step which will enable us to deal with plans made by the Western countries which aim at continually upsetting the balance of supply and demand by stockpiling oil.

The fact that some oil-exporting countries are reducing their production basically reflects these countries' assessment of their oil situation and production policy, on the one hand, and their assessment of the current status of the world's oil market, on the other hand. There is no doubt that this reduction in oil production will tend to contribute toward

preventing a surplus in oil supply. But what we need at this critical stage is to arrive at a formula for regulating production, within the framework of the OPEC organization, in order to guarantee market stability.

An Iraqi Working Paper

[Question] Iraq is getting ready to hold an OPEC summit conference next October on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the founding of OPEC. Could you tell whether or not Iraq will be submitting a working paper during this conference? And how do you visualize OPEC during the next 10 years? Do you expect OPEC's effectiveness to increase? Or do you think OPEC will fall apart, as the American Department of Energy is always predicting?

[Answer] Yes, Iraq will be submitting a working paper to the OPEC summit conference. It will contain the country's views concerning all of the topics currently brought up, international economic issues, international relations, and the future dimensions of OPEC's role as model experience for the Third World.

The International Energy Agency [sic], which was basically set up as an organization to deal with the oil-exporting countries, has planned, and is still planning, to achieve its dream of bringing about the downfall of OPEC. But the solidarity of the OPEC nations has proven that OPEC is stronger than all of these efforts directed against it. The decade of the eighties will definitely see an increase in the scope and nature of OPEC's effectiveness. The oil-exporting countries right now are entering into a new struggle--the struggle to achieve comprehensive economic and social growth--after having achieved their victory in the struggle to regain their petroleum wealth from the clutches of the international oil monopolies. The struggle to achieve growth requires broader formulas of cooperation between the OPEC member nations on all levels. In addition to this there is the fact that the status which the oil-producing nations occupy among the nations of the Third World has invested these countries with new international responsibilities.

American Threats and Iraq's Position

[Question] By means of following your public statements, your meetings with people at OPEC conferences, and through my frequent visits to Iraq, I have learned that Iraq rejects the constant threats directed toward it by foreign countries. But it seems to me that these threats, especially threats from the United States, have been carried to the extreme lately with regard to the possibility of occupying the oil fields. What is your opinion about these statements, and what position do you think the Arabs should take regarding this at the present time?

[Answer] Saddam Husayn, who is our leader and president of the republic, has emphasized that Iraq resolutely rejects all imperialist threats against the Arab nation and against the oil-producing countries. And he issued the warning that "any aggression against any Arab or oil-producing country will set the region's oil fields ablaze and will, first and foremost, burn the heads and tails of the aggressors." We in Iraq know the truth about, and the aims of, these threats. And we will not permit them to prevent us from fully exercising our legitimate rights, either with regard to our oil policy or with regard to issues which affect our future.

The position which the Arabs must take at the present time is one of total commitment to the principles and bases of the statement made to the Arab world by our president and militant leader, Saddam Husayn, and their position should be one of keeping the Arab countries outside of all of the various international conflicts.

The Effectiveness of Using Oil As a Weapon

[Question] Do you believe that oil can be used effectively as a weapon in the conflict which is going on at the present time? And if this question arises, what do you think the response of the Arab OPEC countries will be?

[Answer] The use of economic resources to defend the political and economic interests of the countries which possess these resources, as well as to protect their national security, is a legitimate right which is sanctioned by international law and tradition. Since it was founded, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party has stressed the importance of Arab oil as a weapon, in our decisive national conflicts, in order to achieve the liberation of Arab lands which have been usurped and in order to achieve the building of the edifice of the economic and political unity which we so desire. And if the large countries do not hesitate to use their economic power in order to exert pressure on the smaller countries, then the Arab countries should also not hesitate to use their principal weapon, which is that of oil, in order to confront the challenges and provocations which they are currently faced with and in order to resist blatant intervention in the region's affairs by the great powers. The steady growth of awareness and insistence on the part of the masses throughout the Arab world has made us increasingly confident of the fact that all of the Arab oil-exporting countries are full aware of these facts.

Cooperation Between The Gulf Countries Concerning Oil

[Question] Could you please tell us what Iraq's daily oil production is? And what plans does Iraq have for future development of its production and for discovering new oil fields? And what hopes does Iraq have for cooperation between the Gulf countries concerning oil?

[Answer] Our current production capacity is more than 4 million barrels a day, and it is constantly increasing due to the efforts made by our Iraqi personnel. Our actual level of production varies between 3 and 3.7 million barrels a day, depending on the situation in the international oil market, on the one hand, and depending on our need for capital to finance our development plans and our financial commitments to other countries in the world. We have undertaken drilling and exploration operations both in order to discover new oil fields and to develop our present ones. So far the results have been promising and this has been reflected in what our president and leader has said about the fact that Iraq will produce one of the last two barrels of oil which the world produces.

As for cooperation with our fellow-Arab countries in the Gulf area, we are pursuing this on three levels. We are doing this on the bilateral level, for example, with Kuwait. Our oil ministry is going to conclude a technical cooperation agreement in the field of petroleum production with the Kuwaiti oil ministry. We are also pursuing such cooperation with the Gulf countries through OAPEC and through OPEC.

We believe that these three levels of cooperation among the countries of the Arabian Gulf, particularly in the field of oil production, are a clear and graphic way to demonstrate fraternal relations between these countries.

The Soviet Union and the Importing of Oil

[Question] It is said that the Soviet Union may become an importer of oil during the next 20 years. And it is said that this is what has impelled it to occasionally take action to move toward the waters of the Arabian Gulf, via Afghanistan. What comments do you have regarding this?

[Answer] It is virtually a unanimous opinion that the world will be suffering from a shortage in energy supply beginning in the mid-eighties unless rapid and effective steps are taken to limit wasteful consumption of this vital resource and to develop alternate sources of energy.

As for the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq has strongly condemned it on the basis of Iraq's adherence to the principle of equality among nations, mutual respect of nations for each other, and non-intervention in the internal affairs of others. We strongly reject any attempts on the part of any foreign party to intervene in the Arabian Gulf, no matter what form this intervention might take.

The imperialists are attempting to exploit the mistake which has been made by the Soviet Union in its invasion of Afghanistan. They are trying to obtain military facilities in the form of air and sea bases, and they are beefing up their naval presence. They are using the carrot-and-stick method. Already they have filled the waters of the Arabian Sea with their armed naval units. This exposes the region to the probability of a

confrontation between the two giants or to the probability of these two giants concluding an agreement to divide the region up into spheres of influence. In either case, this is not at all in the interests of our Arab nation and people.

The Charter of National Action, announced by our president and leader, Saddam Husayn, expresses the aspirations of the people of the area. It emphasizes the necessity of keeping the Arabian Gulf area outside the realm of conflict and stresses that the area should be free of any foreign military presence and that the matter of the area's defense and protection should be left to the peoples of the area themselves. What this means is that we, who reject Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, also strongly reject attempts and maneuvers on the part of American imperialism.

The North Sea and Its Danger to OPEC Production

[Question] Do you see the production of oil in the North Sea as being a danger to the oil production of the OPEC countries? How do you assess the effect of its production on the other oil-producing countries?

[Answer] The development of new sources of oil would lighten the burden which is being assumed by the member states of OPEC. This burden consists in the fact that they are maintaining high rates of oil production and quickly exhausting their petroleum reserves due to their desire to provide for the world's needs for this vital resource. In light of this fact, OPEC has stressed, and is still stressing, the necessity of developing both traditional and non-traditional sources of energy in order to help prolong, as long as possible, the life of the petroleum reserves which have been granted to the world. The development of oil fields in the North Sea and in other areas does not at all constitute a danger to OPEC. In fact, it lifts from its shoulders a part of the burden of providing for the world's increasing oil requirements. The danger lies in the fact that the development of oil fields in these other areas may lead the principal industrial oil-consumer nations to continue their wasteful consumption of oil and to neglect implementing programs for developing alternate sources of energy and energy conservation programs.

The North-South Dialogue

[Question] It appears that the North-South diaglogue still has not yielded any results. What is your opinion regarding the reactivation of this dialogue? And we would also like to ask you about the dialogue on oil production which is being conducted by the Gulf countries? Do you think that this dialogue will take the place of the Arab-European dialogue? That is to say, do you think that there sill be a dialogue between the Gulf countries and the European countries involving uniform cooperation between these countries without sufficient participation on on the part of the other members of the Arab League?

[Answer] The North-South dialogue ended in failure in 1977 due to stubbornness on the part of the principal industrial countries, especially the United States, and due to their refusal to offer even a minimum of concessions for the sake of setting up a new world economic order. And as long as the principal industrial countries are showing no initiatives to review and rectify their positions with regard to all of the economic problems from which the world is suffering, it is impossible to expect success from any attempt to resume the North-South dialogue, whether in the form of the Paris dialogue or in the form of comprehensive international negotiations within the framework of the UN.

As for the dialogue between the Gulf countries and the European countries, Iraq's position with regard to it is clearly a position of principle. It is based on Iraq's rejection of the fragmentation of the Arab world's political and economic interests, both on the national and pan-Arab levels.

Carter's Program to Stop Inflation

[Question] President Carter recently has suggested a new program to put a stop to inflation. This program was received with a feeling of relief by some countries, whereas others saw it as being something which would only benefit the American economy. Could you please tell us Iraq's position with regard to this?

[Answer] The measures which were recently announced by President Carter are aimed exclusively at helping the American economy. This is because the rates of inflation and unemployment in the United States have reached very high levels in comparison with the other industrial countries. These steps should not be interpreted as being an attempt on the part of the American government to support international economic stability, in general, or to support the economies of the developing countries, including the oil-exporting countries, in particular. The important thing is not the fact that the measures are being taken, but rather the extent to which these measures will be seriously applied and the results which they achieve. OPEC's experience since 1973, and in particular since 1976, has shown that the United States is not seriously prepared to take steps which would guarantee long term solutions to the problem of inflation and the decline of the exchange rate of the dollar on the world money market. We have seen that the United States has encouraged sharp declines in the rate of the dollar since 1976 in order to exhaust the financial resources of the oil-exporting countries, on the one hand, and in order to consolidate its position in international trade at the expense of the principal industrial countries, on the other hand.

No Bartering For Nuclear Reactors

[Question] Some foreign newspapers have referred to the fact that Iraq has decided to obtain nuclear reactors to use them for peaceful purposes, and will offer oil to some European countries in exchange for these reactors. What is your opinion with regard to this? And have contacts been made in an effort to obtain these reactors?

[Answer] We feel that it is our duty, and that we owe it to our future generations, both on the national and on the pan-Arab level, to preserve our petroleum wealth in Iraq for as long a time as possible. One of the most important means of conserving this wealth of ours is to develop alternate sources of energy, and this includes atomic power. Right now our goal is to set up an electric power plant which runs on nuclear power.

But as for bartering oil for nuclear reactors to be used for peaceful purposes, we have never resorted to bartering with any country. Before we take the decision to sell oil to any country, we carefully weigh our political, economic, and technological relations, taken as a whole, with this country which wishes to buy oil from us.

Differences Within OPEC

[Question] In spite of the OPEC conference which was held in Algeria, there are still differences in points of view between the OPEC countries concerning oil prices. What is your opinion about settling these differences and about creating the solutions necessary to achieve this?

[Answer] Iraq was the first country which made an appeal to have a uniform price structure for OPEC oil and to work toward achieving stability in the oil market. Iraq has made efforts in the direction of arriving at a formula for uniform prices which would guarantee the interests of the oil-exporting countries. We are confident that the circumstances that have been encountered by the oil market since the beginning of 1979 have made it abundantly clear how important this matter is. And we are sure that all of the member countries in OPEC are aware of the importance of being able to control prices by means of a uniform price structure and by not leaving the prices free to be determined by speculation engaged in by the oil companies and middlemen. On the basis of this premise we expect the conference of OPEC ministers, in its next regular meeting in Algeria, to arrive at a formula for a uniform price structure.

[Question] May we ask your opinion with regard to the fact that the two-price system continues to proliferate? Does this affect the OPEC nations? And what are your thoughts concerning finding a solution to this difference in points of view?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the diversity of prices and the lack of a clear basis for setting prices for the oil of the OPEC countries do not serve the interests of these countries. I say this in view of the fact that this increases the intensity of the instability which the world oil market has been subjected to since the beginning of 1979. Naturally, the negative effects brought about by the continuation of the diversity in oil prices will be even more dangerous in the long run. In our opinion, the ideal solution is to agree upon a formula for a uniform

general price structure for oil which would take into consideration the actual price level and then would involve planning production in such a way as to guarantee the permanence of this uniform formula. At the same time, it would guarantee that prices would gradually increase to a level which reflects the fact that oil is a depletable resource and would reflect its economic value in uses other than its uses as a source of energy. It would also reflect the costs of developing alternate sources of energy and the continual rates of inflation in the prices of goods imported by the OPEC countries from the industrial countries.

In addition to all of this, it should reflect the instability of the exchange rates of the principal currencies in the international currency market. The most important thing is first of all to arrive at a formula for a uniform price structure. Then the thing to do is to examine the scope of rectification which must be undertaken in oil prices in order to maintain the actual price level in accordance with the principles which are included in the long-term strategy of the OPEC nations. With regard to the present rates of inflation, everything seems to indicate that, during 1980, these rates of inflation will be higher than they were in 1979. Indications also show that the principal industrial countries, in particular the United States, have not succeeded in putting a stop to the fluctuations which occur in the currency markets. And we have no reason to feel optimistic that the situation in these currency markets will change for the better during this year.

9468
CSO: 4802

STUDY OF IRAQ'S OIL PRODUCTION POLICY CITED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 15 Jul 80 p 12

[Article: "Oil Fields Are Producing Only 20 Percent of What Iraq Can Produce"]

[Text] In a study which came out recently it was said that Iraq's oil production up till 1973 did not exceed 1.5 million barrels a day, that is, about 75 million tons per year. But due to constant efforts on the part of local personnel, there has been further development in fields which are actually producing oil. Also, many new discoveries of oil have been made, and this has brought production up to 3.7 million barrels a day by the first part of this year. The study also says that Iraqi oil production has been increased for the purpose of dealing with the requirements of Iraq's development plans, on the one hand, and in order to help the countries of the Third World, on the other hand. This is why Iraq, up till 1978, engaged in searching for loans to finance its ambitious development plans. Because of its production commitments to the world oil market, and in light of the various quotas, Iraq was not able to provide for the needs of its development plan. All of this was true until 1978. But now Iraq's oil policy, which includes increased production, is based fundamentally on the necessity to program and organize this production in accordance with the actual requirements of the world market. The policy is no longer designed to go along with speculation and bidding by the oil monopolies for available quantities of oil.

Helping the Developing Countries

The study says that, at the same time, this policy has borne in mind the interests of the consumer nations in the Third World, especially the poor, developing countries toward which Iraq feels that it has moral obligations. And this is not at all in conflict with the aim and desire of Iraq's leaders to preserve this national resource.

The study has also revealed that Iraq's oil fields which are actually producing oil at the present time are producing only 20 percent of what Iraq actually has the capability of producing. The study referred to what the

Iraqi president, Saddam Husayn, had previously said about the fact that one of the last two barrels of oil produced in the world should be a barrel of Iraqi oil.

Gas

Concerning natural gas in Iraq, the study, which was prepared by the Iraqi Informational Studies Office, said that the decade 1970-80 had been a phase in which Iraq had utilized 20 percent of its flare gas after showing great interest in the utilization of such gas.

The study says that in 1982 a stop will be put to the practice of wasting gas by flaring it. This will conserve about 5 million tons of gas, from the fields in both the north and the south, which will then be exported after local market needs have been taken care of.

The dry gas which is separated will enable Iraq to conserve from 9 to 10 million tons of petroleum by-products because it will serve as fuel for all of the industrial projects in the northern, middle, and southern parts of the country.

Setting Prices

As for setting oil prices, the study says that Iraq is following an independent policy which is based fundamentally on the need to rectify these prices so that they will be compatible with the rates of imported inflation as well as with losses which result from drops in the exchange rate of the dollar, which is the unit of value used in the oil market.

The Iraqi oil minister says that Iraq is against freezing oil prices. He is also against sudden increases in oil prices because that would upset the economies of other countries, especially the developing countries.

The minister says: "We are in favor of gradual increases in oil prices which take into consideration the rates of inflation as well as the decline in the exchange rate of the dollar."

"Iraq is still seeking to arrive at stable oil prices because this would free the oil market of confusion and would prevent the speculation undertaken by the oil monopolies in order to earn huge profits."

Oil Policy On the National Level

The Study says that Iraq's oil policy is based on two principal hypotheses:

1. Oil is a depletable resource, and there is no doubt that it is running out.

2. Of the last two barrels of oil which the world produces, one of them should be a barrel of Iraqi oil.

For this reason, the principal goal which Iraqi oil policy is striving to achieve on the national level is the goal of carrying out the operation of transforming Iraq's economic structure as well as its production activities as quickly as possible. Iraq wants to derive the most benefit possible from its oil revenues by means of utilizing them to achieve its ambitious development plans and thus enable itself to be less dependent on oil as a primary source of national income.

For the purpose of achieving this rapid growth rate, Iraq, in 1977, allocated the sum of 966 million dinars to its industrial sector, whereas allocations to this sector during the planning period 1970-74 totalled no more than 391 million dinars. The result of this huge increase in allocations has been that the industrial sector's rapid rate of growth, during the period from 1968 to 1979, has been approximately 18.4 percent per year.

Likewise, allocations to Iraq's agricultural sector in the year 1977 amounted to 390 million dinars, whereas allocations to this sector during the planning period 1970-74 amounted to no more than 366 million dinars, for the entire 4-year period.

The study says that the purpose behind Iraq's oil policy has been to provide for Iraq's welfare, to guarantee its future, and to guarantee the life of its future generations. And the study says that in order that Iraq's citizens not turn into being merely wealthy consumers, there has been effective organization and well thought-out programmed planning for the coordination of Iraq's investment policy with the consumer needs of its citizens. Thus the largest allocations have gone to Iraq's national development plans and its investment needs. At the same time, though, Iraq's citizens have been achieving a better life and a more decent standard of living. In this regard, the study points out the great increase which has taken place in individual income--from 100 dinars per year in 1969 to more than 700 dinars per year by the end of 1978. Also, the average income of an Iraqi industrial worker has jumped from 250 dinars a year in 1969 to 834 dinars a year in 1979.

9468
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DECLINE IN VEGETABLE HARVEST REPORTED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 8 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] Shortcomings by state organisations have led to a surprising fall in harvests of fruit and vegetables in Iraq this summer despite favourable weather, the official daily ATH-THAWRA charged last week. The newspaper, the organ of Iraq's ruling Baath Party, said crop yields were down by from 20 to 50 per cent. It added that lower output had occurred even though there had been increased efforts by the public authorities to improve distribution, notably by eliminating middlemen.

ATH-THAWRA points an accusing finger at three main state-controlled organisations. First, the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform which, it says, should step up its information services advising farmers to adopt multiple-crop agriculture. Second, ATH-THAWRA points out, the General Union of Peasant and Cooperative Societies should do more to encourage the peasants to grow more than one kind of product. Lastly, blame is directed at the General Agricultural Marketing Organisation, which, the daily says, has failed to provide cold storage facilities which it has been promising for five years.

Citing figures for vegetable production this summer, ATH-THAWRA reports a 50 per cent drop in tomato production during July as compared with the same month of last year. From 10,123 tonnes in July 1979, tomato output fell to 5,211 tonnes this summer. Similarly, the production of okra declined by nearly 60 per cent, going from 1,750 tonnes in July 1979 to 750 tonnes two months ago. Onions, aubergines as well as other fruit and vegetables were also in short supply.

It would appear furthermore that state-appointed agents of the Marketing Organisation responsible for the balanced distribution of agricultural output on the public markets, have themselves become new middlemen. ATH-THAWRA indicts these vehemently on the grounds that they are often selective in buying the farmers' crops and tend to choose only those which sell for the highest price. Consequently, the farmers are left with a surplus of produce, shunned by the agents, while consumer are faced with a shortage of certain products. Moreover, ATH-THAWRA reveals that because of the lack of a special market for

restaurant owners, farmers and agents often make private contracts and presumably illicit deals with restaurateurs to provide these with their needs. Such deals escape the supervision of the Central Inspection Bureau and go unnoticed by the inspectors of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

CHINESE BUILD JAPANESE REFINERY--Chiyoda of Japan has been contracted by Iraq to build a refinery using Chinese labour. Some 700 Chinese labourers will be employed to do the work. This is the first time a Japanese company uses Chinese labourers for an overseas contract. The project consists of building a refinery capable of treating 150,000 barrels of crude daily. The refinery, which will cost some ¥ 124 million will be built in Buaija and will be on stream by March 1982. In Beijing Mitsui signed a technical co-operation agreement with Communist China, a spokesman for Mitsui announced last week. The spokesman said the agreement was signed by Mr. Wang Yateng representing the Chinese Council for International Trade Promotion and Yushizu Okida Mitsui's chairman. Under the agreement Mitsui will provide technical assistance to Chinese firms in light industry, agricultural production, energy, chemicals and foodstuffs. [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 9 Aug 80 p 9]

TRADE PACT WITH SINGAPORE--The government of Singapore is to sign a trade agreement with Iraq in October covering oil supplies and commercial links between the two countries, the Singapore magazine BUSINESS WEEK reported last week. It said the agreement would be signed in the Iraqi capital during a visit by a Singaporean delegation to the Baghdad International Fair. The delegation will later visit Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Oman. The total value of trade exchanges between Iraq and Singapore rose from $394 million in 1978 to $714 million last year. Iraq exported to Singapore 4.1 million tonnes of crude oil and 55,000 tonnes of fuel oil in 1979. Iraqi exports to Singapore were worth $647 million last year, 99 per cent of this sum from petroleum; Singapore exported rubber, vegetable oils and timber to Iraq. [Excerpt] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 25 Aug 80 p 4]

OIL DEAL WITH SWISS FIRMS--Iraq, the second-largest exporter in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries is negotiating what was described as an unusual deal to sell its crude oil to Switzerland. The deal, if it goes through, will get round the problem of Iraq's insistence on negotiating only with State companies, following its break with the oil multinationals. Switzerland has no state companies. The proposal is for Iraqi oil to be sold to a group of private Swiss firms with the backing of the Swiss Government. An official Swiss spokesman said the government would be ready to give

its support to the deal. The details of the deal might be discussed at next month's Swiss-Iraqi Trade Commission talks in Bern. The commission first met in 1978 and met again last November. Iraq has not sold oil to Switzerland for nearly a decade. Last year it imported Swiss goods worth about 144 million US dollars, but, by contrast, its exports to Switzerland totalled less than 200,000 dollars. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 30 Aug 80 p 14]

DEAL WITH THOMSON-CSF--Paris reports that the major French company Thomson-CSF had snatched a 400 million sterling pounds contract in Iraq from the British company Plessey were neither confirmed nor denied by the French company. After two years of negotiations, Plessey was almost certain to have obtained the major electronics contract to supply Iraq with a wide range of electronic equipment. Political relations between Baghdad and London have been strained for sometimes, but it is understood that the French are offering a much better credit deal backed by the government's export credit organization, Coface. Quite apart from credit terms, Franco-Iraqi ties are improving rapidly. Iraq is now France's second supplier of crude. France is supplying Iraq with a nuclear research reactor and is heavily involved in helping the development of Iraqi agriculture. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 30 Aug 80 p 14]

COOPERATION WITH INDONESIA--Iraq and Indonesia have agreed to step up economic and technical cooperation after week-long talks last week in Djakarta. The chairman of the Indonesian Middle East coordinating team said that there were many opportunities for his country to participate in Iraqi development projects, especially in the construction field. The leader of the Iraqi delegation said his country was interested in stepping up trade but there were problems still to be solved in sea transport. Iraq has offered to import palm oil, natural rubber, tea, coffee, timber and textiles and Indonesia has offered to buy sulphur, dates. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 30 Aug 80 p 14]

PHILIPPINES WINS ROAD CONTRACT--The Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines has won a $258 million contract to build a 140-kilometre expressway between Baghdad and the Gulf port of Basrah. The six-lane, asphalted road is part of a projected 1,200-km highway, known as Iraq Expressway No 1, linking Syria and Kuwait. The Philippine National Bank is putting up $40 million in guarantees for the contract. Announcing the deal last week, CDCP's president, Rodolfo Cuenca, said that work would begin as soon as the Iraqi authorities had given clearance for 1,700 Filipino workers. He gave no completion date for the work. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 8 Sep 80 p 12]

CSO: 4820

KNESSET WARNED ON IRAQI NUCLEAR DEVELOPMENT

Tel Aviv BAMAHANEH in Hebrew 6 Aug 80 pp 8-9

[Report on exclusive interview with Professor Moshe Arnes, chairman of the Knesset Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defense by Reporter Yanon Shenker: "Efforts To Prevent Development of the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor Must Not Slacken"; date of interview not given]

[Excerpt] The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee [FADC] of the Knesset is one of the important and influential committees in the Israeli legislative house. Its members are in the first line of political life in Israel. Almost all of the deliberations of the FADC are secret and privileged, and only at rare intervals does the secretary of the committee transmit an official announcement to the press, which brings to light the barest hint of the deliberation on a topic of special public interest.

On the occasion of the adjournment of the summer session, the correspondent of BAMAHANEH in the Knesset met with the chairman of FADC, Knesset Member [MK] Moshe Arnes, and heard from him about the work of the committee, its powers, and his opinions on the central issues occupying the committee these days; with the focus of the interview on the defense budget, the peace process with Egypt and the nuclear reactor in Iraq.

The following is an excerpt from the full text of the interview.

[Question] Israel has always stressed that it will not be the first to introduce unconventional weapons to the Middle East. Since it is clear that the aim of Iraq is to develop nuclear weaponry with the aid of the reactor it is about to build--doesn't Israel have to change its approach?

[Answer] There is no need for that, since Israel is a country much further advanced than Iraq in the technological and scientific area. We are considered to be among the advanced countries of the world in nuclear technology, and it is no secret that we have two experimental reactors and faculties in nuclear physics and nuclear engineering, and that those are among the best in the world.

But it is important to remember that the creation of a "nuclear Middle East" or what is labeled possibly erroneously the "balance of terror" in the region does not solve the problem. The nuclear weaponry, if it does reach Iraq, will be in such hands, that I very much fear are not to be depended upon, and I mean thereby that it is possible that on the other side there will be no consideration of the worth of use of this weapon. Thus, it is so important to take steps that will prevent a situation in which Iraq will hold nuclear weaponry.

[Question] What, then, are the immediate actions that Israel must undertake in order to prevent the development of an Iraqi reactor?

[Answer] Activities in the diplomatic area are not devoid of hope and prospect. Iraq is one of the unstable countries in the world, perhaps even of the unstable ones among the Arab countries--all of which are unstable. I think it is clear that nuclear weaponry in the hands of rulers of a country such as this constitutes a hazard to the world, and not only to the State of Israel. Thus, I believe, that informational activities and diplomatic activities have a prospect. Pressure must be brought upon France not to bring the matter to fruition. Nor is Iraq a developed country from the technological and scientific standpoint, fortunately for us and for the world. Therefore, it is clear to us that Iraq will need ongoing support, for a relatively long period on the part of a country such as France. In spite of what has already been supplied to Iraq, we should attempt to bring about the cessation of such support. Thus, it will be possible at least to postpone the development of nuclear weaponry in Iraq for a sufficiently long time.

[Question] On the matter of Jordan's arming--is the FADC able to operate against this arming process, since the supplying countries are the U.S., Britain and other countries having contacts with Israel?

[Answer] We are faced by the problem of the arming of Jordan and Syria and, in effect, all of the Arab nations. Let's deal with them one at a time: Iraq and Syria get their arms mainly from the USSR. But not from it alone. Iraq procures warplanes from France, Syria has British attack helicopters with French anti-tank missiles. These are but a few examples of arms in considerable quantity and of high quality which reach Iraq and Syria. Jordan is currently arming itself with Western weaponry only, from England and the U.S. and from France, and we have even heard about feelers that have been put out to the Eastern Bloc. Saudi Arabia arms itself with American, British and French weapons. Egypt--most of whose weaponry is Soviet--is currently beginning to receive a very great deal of arms particularly from the U.S. This preparation constitutes a problem for us. It is possible that the preparation by Egypt does not pose a threat to Israel, because of the peace agreement that has been signed. This is not the case when we speak of Syria, which proclaims its intention to enter into an additional confrontation with Israel. Furthermore, I believe that every Israeli understands that Egyptian arms may pose a threat one of these days. Therefore, we are required to consider those arms and to prepare ourselves accordingly. We must not disregard it.

What can the FADC do on this matter? First of all, the FADC is involved and participates in deliberations on the issue of the arms race and the policy of arms procurement for Israeli security, while at the same time attempting to find solutions to various questions, such as: what should we procure, how are we to prepare ourselves, what do we do to formulate strategy, war science, and all of this so that we shall be able to match ourselves with the flow of armaments, with the inventor whom we shall be facing.

The members of the committee, or certainly several of them, are also active in the informational and diplomatic area. I, for example, visit the Senate and the House of Representatives on almost every trip to the U.S. meeting with those whose function is similar to mine, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and attempt to explain that this army constitutes a threat to the State of Israel but in addition to that, it does not serve the interests of the U.S. in the region

The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee is one of 10 permanent committees in the Knesset, and it has three functions (not necessarily in their order of importance): First, legislative functions. Every law touching on the defense system, on the security services or on the foreign policy of Israel is worked up in the committee in preparation for its being brought to a second and third reading before the full Knesset. Second, the committee has the function of overseeing the executive branch (the government) in the area of security and foreign policy. And thirdly, the committee is the factor involved in one form or another in the process of formulating policy in the aforementioned matters.

The division of time which the committee devotes to dealing with matters of security and matters of foreign policy is at the ratio of 3 to 2. And this ratio is also expressed in the sub-committees of the committee itself. On matters of foreign policy there is only one sub-committee whose concern is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its personnel, whereas on matters of security several sub-committees deal with such topics as: Lebanon, intelligence services, arms procurement and manufacture of security products, headquarters of field forces and more.

[Question] How is the connection maintained between the committee and the defense establishment?

[Answer] According to the rules of the Knesset, a request by the committee for information or for the appearance of a representative of the Ministry of Defense must be transmitted through the Minister of Defense and, in effect, he controls the decision as to whom to send to the committee. In general, there are no problems. The committee applies to the Office of the Minister of Defense with a request that he himself or the Director General of the Ministry of Defense of the Chief of Staff or any commanding officer at all or any head of service at all, appear. Most of the time, the people whom we request do appear before the committee.

Further, there are regular surveys: of the defense minister, of the chief of staff, and of the heads of the Intelligence Services. There are almost regular tours by the committee to the commands and to the arms of the IDF--so that there is a specific tempo adjusted to our need for more urgent reports, in accordance with the situation in the area or with events in the region.

[Question] Are you satisfied with the manner in which this contact is being maintained?

[Answer] Yes. The contact is carried on well, and in my view neither the committee nor its head has any cause for complaint about not having at hand all the required information for the fulfillment of their functions.

At very infrequent intervals we come upon a problem, that information required by us is not forthcoming. In general, this is a matter of time: the information reaches the committee in 2 or 3 days, at most within a week after the committee has requested it. For the rules of the Knesset require the minister to appear before the committee or to provide it with the information.

The true problem is, in effect, another one: It is perhaps possible to ask, does the committee know what to request? It is possible that there are things, decisions, that the committee knows nothing about and therefore does not request them. It is possible that some decisions had been taken in the Ministry of Defense but were not brought to the attention of the committee. It is possible that in the area of defense services things were done, and the committee was not in the picture. Today such a prospect is small, especially because of the formation of sub-committees. These are small committees, and based upon the experience of the last three years the people of the defense establishment have no reason to allege that they do not wish to deliver information to them for fear that it might be revealed. There has not been a single instance of leakage from the sub-committees! In the sub-committees we also attain a certain degree of expertise.

[Question] Does the committee have any power of decision at all on various matters in the security establishment?

[Answer] The committee has decision power on two matters only: on the matter of legislation, that is, in deliberating for the second and third reading in the Knesset, on topics of foreign policy and security. And on topics of security budget, a topic with which the committee deals together with finance committee through a joint sub-committee composed of members of both committees. This sub-committee deals with details of the security budget, and at a joint meeting of both full committees they approve or disapprove, in accordance with conditions, the security budget.

[Question] And the possibilities for recommendation?

[Answer] The committee may recommend, but the government is not required to accept its recommendations. There is here possibly a moral power and the recommendations of the committee must be taken into account. The most obvious example for differences of opinion between the committee and the government (and it must be borne in mind that the committee is not a unified body, there are representatives of the various factions in it, and for the most part its recommendations are not arrived at unanimously) is the Aryeh aircraft, regarding which the committee decided almost unanimously with but two abstentions 2 years ago to recommend to the government that it begin development. The matter was presented to the prime minister but the government did not accept the recommendation. By the law of the land, the government need not accept the recommendations.

[Question] The cut in the defense budget is still causing waves in the IDF. What is your position on this issue?

[Answer] It is possible to say something general, comprehensive, and therefore not meaningful: in every body, in every system, especially if it is a large system, it is possible with effort to find ways to increase efficiency; this means, in other words, cuts in the defense budget.

Perhaps I should elaborate upon the problems we face as we approach the matter of economies in the defense establishment. First of all, we must concentrate on those cuts which are likely to contribute to the war against inflation, and on those cuts which are likely to improve the balance of payments of Israel. And what are those? With respect to the balance of payments, especially, these are cuts in arms procurement from abroad. In my view, there is room for such cuts. In many cases, perhaps in most cases, there should be substitution by locally manufactured systems. This is a change, an immediate improvement in our balance of payments, and another important thing--diminishing dependence upon others. In my view a significant number of systems which we procure abroad can be shown to be worth cutting and reducing and replacing with systems developed and manufactured and ordered from Israeli industry. We must bear in mind that the defense arms procurement abroad is an exceedingly important, perhaps dominant factor in our trade balance deficit. That is at a time when we have one of the best defense industries.

[Question] But you are talking about development of means of waging war, of investment over many years. Is it possible to maintain the tempo in light of the immediate requirements for arms in the defense system?

[Answer] The answer is positive, if we give our attention to these matters in enough time. We have an advantage over the Americans from the standpoint of delineation of the systems, inasmuch as we are more experienced, to our sorrow, than the Americans in warfare. In anything associated with the forecast, the appearance of the future battlefield, the character of the future aircraft, the future tank and the future weapon of war--in my opinion we are simply waiving an advantage of knowledge, by the very decision to procure arms in the U.S. instead of beginning the process of development and manufacture in this country, at a time when in almost all of the cases it would appear that this is far cheaper. Two shining examples of this are the Kfir aircraft and the Gabriel missile.

From the standpoint of the war against inflation: the cuts which are likely to bring about an improvement in the structure of the Israeli economy are a contribution to the war against inflation. For example, reducing the number of reserve service days, or the length of service, is damaging to security, to the degree that these people invest service time or reserve time in productive work in the economy; this will contribute to the war against inflation. In my view, under the present situation, we cannot permit ourselves a reduction in the length of service, even if it were to contribute.

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BEGIN MAY LOSE BOTH PEACE, ELECTIONS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Aug 80 p 13

[Commentary by Amnon Rubinstein: "There Is no Chance that Begin's Attack on the Opposition Will Succeed. It May, However, Be Harmful to the Whole Country."]

[Text] Today it is already clear to all: Prime Minister Begin decided to base the next election campaign on one central issue--that of the Land of Israel. The first shells have already been fired at the Alignment. It will be followed by all out attacks and then the whole front will clamor. The accusation is clearcut and incisive in its simplicity--the election of the Alignment means the establishment of a PLO state in the heart of the Land of Israel. In order to prevent the danger of being stabbed by the PLO knife the public has to give its mandate and support to Likud.

Mr Begin, who is a seasoned politician, navigates Likud's ship in this offensive direction because he knows full well that on internal and economic issues he cannot present the electorate with impressive achievements, to say the least. Indeed, it is going to be very difficult to convince the public to support the perpetrators of a 500 percent plus inflation so they can continue their job. Actually, there is not one internal area where Likud can point to a real accomplishment. During its tenure many of the negative phenomena intensified, those phenomena which Likud was committed to fight if elected. Anarchy and crime have reached frightening proportions. Dependence on foreign money increased and nothing is left of our posture except talk, and we are going to pay for that, too.

The best proof of the government's inability to convince the public of its accomplishments can be seen in the general disdain which the list of its achievements--as prepared by general manager of the prime minister's office, Mr Mattityahu Shmulevitz--was received. It is therefore only natural that Likud faces the voter with its sword raised against its adversaries, not pointing to its own merits.

Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether even this move will help the party in power. There are some objective obstacles which will not render the job any easier.

It is difficult to believe that a large audience will believe Likud's accusations regarding the "PLO knife" which the Alignment is preparing. After all, the Alignment is a known entity and its leadership has not changed since it lost power. Recently, hawkish tendencies within it have increased, and Galili's appointment does not portend a change toward concessions and dovishness.

There are two ministers within the government--Yadin and Katz--who support, at least theoretically, the same policy of territorial concessions which Begin regards as "a knife in the back," and other such awful pronouncements. If indeed an agreement for concessions on the West Bank has the one outcome of a Palestinian state, then how can Begin appoint as his deputy and acting prime minister someone who supports this dangerous view? (The question of how Prof Yadin can continue as a cabinet member of a government as this, is no longer being asked).

Moreover, there is no proof that there is any electoral chance for an election campaign based on a no-concession policy on foreign affairs. Actually, there are many arguments to the contrary.

Ben-Gurion led his party to victory in the fourth Knesset (47 members of Knesset compared with 40 in the third Knesset) following the withdrawal from the Sinai and the Gaza Strip--a withdrawal under pressure and without peace. The parties opposing withdrawal lost the election. Hawkish Adhdut Ha'Avoda lost three of 10 members of Knesset; Herut gained two seats, but the rightist wing--GAHAL--went from 27 down to 25. All told the parties which supported Ben-Gurion and the withdrawal gained 10 seats and the right sank to a new low only to remain isolated and weak. Those impressive demonstrations which Begin organized did not at all strengthen his position, but rather, weakened it.

Following the Yom Kippur War the Alignment managed to remain in power--in spite of the ineptness, in spite of the failure--particularly because of the establishment of the Geneva Conference which the Alignment presented in its campaign as the key to peace.

Yitzhaq Rabin attained a strong position within his party and the nation in the fall of 1976 following the second Sinai interim agreement which actually meant a unilateral withdrawal from large and important sections of the Sinai and its oilfields. The feeling of success was such that many in the Alignment wondered if it would be prudent to take advantage of the situation and call for new elections.

Mr Begin attained the height of popularity and public sympathy at a time when he made the most concessions: immediately after Sadat's visit. When he published his plan for withdrawal from the Sinai his popularity

in public opinion surveys climbed and by mid December it reached 78.3 percent (!)--an increase of 22.5 percent in one month. When the Camp David period arrived he was already on the decline, but still, following the signing of the agreement, and when the dimensions of the concession became clear, his popularity rose 5.7 percent, and in May reached 53.4 percent.

Likud itself came to power not because of its campaign on the Land-of-Israel issue, but on the contrary: while playing down this very issue. The stress was on internal and economic issues. The adherence to the idea of a whole Israel was lowered to second position.

Does the cumulative meaning of the above statements meant that the public is dovish and moderate? Not necessarily. As in other places, the Israeli voter's first concern is with immediate problems--the economy, livelihood, housing, law and order--while counting on the leaders for foreign affairs. The voter follows the leaders on defense and foreign affairs with the belief--not always justified--that they know what they are doing in those areas. These are too much for laymen. In this context extremism is meaningless and there are signs which point to the electoral advantage of a moderate approach, capable of concessions.

Likud's electoral chances are its own affair and if it were not for a national interest it could be left alone to stick to its own dreams and roll in defeat. But the way that the prime minister is showing his party is full of dangers from the standpoint of national interest--and on these matters, in spite of his position as prime minister, his word is not questioned. His new attack and basing the campaign on a rigid approach have already caused two negative results.

First, the Labor Party reacts to Mr Begin's attack not with any self-confidence, as behooves a party in power, but with fear and anxiety, by way of "what will the neighbors say?" The unfortunate and shocking decision to vote for the Jerusalem Act of HaTekhiya, showed the panic that has taken hold of the party's Knesset delegation. Labor Party leaders reiterated the danger of the law, but decided, as if forced to, to vote for it. Actually, the Alignment is like the Knesset--a rainbow of opinions starting with Gush Emunim and ending with SHELI. Because of this heterogeneity and because of the absence of a confident leadership with clearcut policies there are growing fears that Begin's attack on the Alignment will not only influence the public, but will also strengthen the already strong hawkish element within the Alignment.

Second, the prime minister's new approach mandates a further hardening of positions that Israel has taken in the autonomy talks, as on other issues related to the peace process with Egypt. These developments, coupled with Egypt's increasing isolation in the Arab world and the United States' weakness, reduce the chances of stability and strength of the peace process. These facts are obvious and well known; there is

no need to expound on them. It means that we are desparately approaching the worst danger of them all--that we will have neither the Sinai nor peace.

At the same time Likud will be losing the one and only card with which it could come to the voter--that of peace with Egypt. In other words, the route which Begin's government is pursuing ensures two losses: Israel will lose both the Sinai and peace; Likud will miss out on its only success and historical accomplishment.

This is what they call a policy. This is what they refer to as politics.

8646
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DAVAR' VIEWS AL-SADAT CREDIBILITY, CHANCES FOR GENUINE PEACE

TA031151 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Oct 80 pp 11, 14

[Commentary by Hagay Eshed: "Can There Be an 'Israeli Peace'"]

[Text] In one of his latest interviews President al-Sadat disclosed that King Husayn had called him at Camp David during the talks on the peace agreement and had expressed his willingness to join in the talks and the agreement. Al-Sadat scored Husayn, stopped him from coming to Camp David and told him to wait for him in Morocco, as though he was deaf, insane and a child, or diseased and suffering from leprosy. Why did al-Sadat keep Jordan away from the peace agreement? He claimed that this is how he saved the peace talks because King Husayn would have foiled their success. But it is more reasonable to assume that President al-Sadat did not want to share the beginning of the peace with King Husayn in the eyes of history and U.S. public opinion. It is a fact that President al-Sadat dismisses not only Husayn, but the PLO, too.

This behavior by the Egptian president has been repeated over and over again. Whenever it seemed that there was a moderation in the position of Jordan, Saudi Arabia or the PLO, al-Sadat hurried to set up obstacles in their way, first by insulting them (one was a "lunatic," the other just a "dwarf," the third a "black sheep" and the fourth an unconscionable liar) and then putting them off and sending them away. Al-Sadat repeats to the Americans that he is the only ally they have and can have in the Middle East. None of the other candidates want to or can be efficient, reliable allies. This applies to all the other Arab countries and to Israel. Al-Sadat aspires to being the only one in his relations with the United States, not only in the immediate range of getting economic aid, but also by implanting his image in the consciousness and subconsciousness of the United States as a man of peace and the only ally in war.

If this evaluation of al-Sadat's intentions is correct, then the conclusion to be drawn from it is that the president is not genuinely interested in completing the peace agreement with Israel; neither through incorporating Jordan nor through incorporating the PLO. Al-Sadat finds it more convenient

for Israel to remain a moral and strategic debtor in the eyes of the United States--one that does not want, nor is capable of fulfilling its commitments in the two fields where Egypt has the advantage--both in the realm of making peace, in achieving a solution to the Palestinian problem and in the "strategic pact" against the Soviet Union. Israel is incapable of playing a strategic role within an Arab or Muslim establishment--or even against it. Israel is neither withdrawing from all the territories nor making sufficient concessions, either to Jordan or to the Palestinians; in addition to the fact that it is establishing settlements and annexing Jerusalem. From time to time al-Sadat gives Israel a grace period in order to repay its commitments, or perhaps to expose its weaknesses and shortcomings which cannot be corrected. The longer this situation continues, the more Israel's main base of strength--its (former) preferred status in U.S. public opinion --is undermined, both as a strategic asset and as a moral value. The more Israel's status is undermined, the more Egypt's status is strengthened.

President al-Sadat will not blow up the U.S.-Egyptian peace process. Al-Sadat will consolidate and deepen the process as he is doing now prefering the Camp David agreement to remain partial, temporary, fragile and undermined, without Jordan, without the PLO, without the Europeans and without the Soviets. Al-Sadat prefers that Israel's face should continue to be blackened and the feeling of U.S. dependence on its only ally in the Middle East--which is Egypt--to be strengthened and deepened. He also prefers the U.S. awareness of gratitude for the tolerance and forgiveness shown by al-Sadat, the man of peace, to Menahem Begin the refuser, who offends the Americans and entire world public opinion, should be strengthened. Al-Sadat will be interested in the continuation of this process at least until after the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from all of Sinai in April 1982.

This peace process, which is primarily a "U.S.-Egyptian peace," is founded on an Israeli error springing from a deep yearning for peace now--full, comprehensive, genuine peace. This deep yearning for peace now has existed as long as the state of Israel. It has existed since the days of the Ben-Gurion illusion that a peace agreement could be attained with al-Nasir after a 5 minute face-to-face talk, and since the days of Golda Me'ir's "shopping basket" in the Cairo suburbs. After the Yom Kippur war a strategy of a prolonged transition period with many stages, from a situation of war to one of peace, was formulated. This future peace situation should have been based on a new map and defensible borders, whether in accordance with the "Allon Plan" or that of "fleshing-out the borders" prepared by the IDF planning division after the Yom Kippur war. This strategy of a transition period from war to peace was founded on three basic premises which are equally valid today.

The Arab oil dictate is so strong and definite that no Israeli withdrawal will be able to power the level of Palestinian expectations, to quench the thirst of the Arab world, to reduce the temptation to continue to weaken Israel and regard it as the scapegoat for all the internal Arab troubles.

The global and regional balance of forces between the two superpowers is far from being equal. The power of the United States will continue to weaken before, perhaps, it becomes stronger. The power of the Soviet Union will continue to become stronger before it may weaken from the inside. In any event, there is not yet any firm basis for detente--even in the Middle East. The Soviet Union has the motivation and the ability to undermine the foundations of any peace agreement to which it is not a full partner. The Soviet Union will consider any peace it is not a party to to be a peace against it. (The Soviet Union could accept a partial, temporary arrangement, which does not make any pretensions of being a permanent agreement.)

These are the three basic premises that prevent the foundation of a genuine, comprehensive peace agreement in the Middle East. What emerges from them is the unavoidable conclusion that any agreement claiming to be a permanent peace agreement contains within it these contradictions and deviations. This is the root of Israel's distress since it signed the Camp David agreement. This distress is caused by an increase in world hostility, in the rejectionist countries, the Third World countries, the Soviet Union and even Western Europe, an undermining of the U.S. position, a strengthening of the dangers of war on Israel's eastern front and, in any event, an increase in Israel's security and economic burden.

The political alternative "peace now" embodied in the Camp David agreements is a gradual return to the previous Israeli strategy of a transition period from war to peace until the Arab oil dictate is weakened, until the level of Palestinian expectations stabilizes at a realistic point of equilibrium and until regional and global equality is created between the two superpowers. The most desirable form this equality should take would be dividing the Middle East into two areas of influence as in Europe, based on direct Soviet and U.S. military presence. In such a format of stability and security, there could, perhaps, be a structure of stable, permanent peace between Israel and the Arab countries.

Until the foundations for the stable structure are built, the very fact of Israel's existence relies on the IDF and its proven operational ability. Confronted with the Arab oil dictate, Israel has no defense other than the IDF sword. The West European countries, which fear a flame of war in the Middle East that would set fire to the oil and give the Soviets an excuse for military intervention, must take into account that the attempt to sacrifice Israel in order to prevent these dangers could actually bring about the opposite result. Instead of Israel being the sacrifice, it will defend itself with its military might against the oil dictate and cause the oil to go up in flames and the Soviets to intervene. As stated, Israel will be pushed into this not intentionally, but because it will have no ther way to defend itself. Until the end of the current transition period, Israel has no alternative but to live by its sword and to defend itself.

This is the essence of the Israeli need to postpone the policy of "peace now" until after the Arab oil dictate is weakened and equality is created

between the superpowers in the Middle East. This is not a policy of sit down and do nothing in the political sphere. This is a policy of many and various peace initiatives based on partial and temporary agreements, in accordance both with their contents and substance and the cost of the price involved in their implementation.

The chances for an alternative Israeli policy could improve as a result of the Iran-Iraq war. The war is a long way from its end, but even now it will necessarily act as an incentive to all the Western countries to increase their investments in searching for alternative sources of energy to Middle East oil. In any case, the urge to reduce the Arab oil dictate has increased. The Iraq-Iran war will also necessarily serve as an incentive for the United States to quicken attempt to strengthen its power and military presence in the Middle East and create equality between it and the Soviet Union before it is too late. This war will necessarily have an affect on lowering the level of Palestinian expectations, because it has already undermined the monopoly the PLO has had up to now--as the element capable of threatening peace and stability in the Middle East.

From now on we should prepare for a gradual change in Israeli policy. The strategy of "peace now" as embodied in the Camp David agreement which, in the final analysis, is "U.S.-Egyptian peace" paid for in full by Israel, should be abandoned cautiously. We should return, cautiously and gradually, to the previous strategy of a transition period between war and peace, which can only end when the regional and global foundations for a comprehensive, secure "Israeli Peace" are built. The Iraq-Iran war could contain military dangers for Israel if the eastern front is strengthened by the increasing strength of Iraq and Israel's economic situation could worsen if oil prices increase. However, it also foreshadows a possibility of shortening the dangerous, debilitating transition period from the current state of war to a state of Israeli peace in the Middle East in the future.

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GOVERNMENT FAULTED FOR PRICE HIKES

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 13 Aug 80 p 3

[Commentary by Levi Morav: "Likud Government's Economic Policies Are Cynical and Irresponsible"]

[Text] The deeds and misdeeds of the Likud government are a continuous chain of cynicism and sheer stubbornness. The most recent link are the new price hikes which it initiated.

How many times over can one write about the bankruptcy of the so called "economic policy?" About massive revocation of real estate taxes and failing to collect taxes from industrialists, on the one hand, and about a determined refusal, verging on malice, to update allowances?

Anger is usually bad council, and this writer is trying to channel it in a constructive direction. But how can one be indifferent to explanations of the Finance Ministry that recent price hikes constitute "house cleaning" before the holidays? It is incomprehensible that Finance Ministry spokesmen see fit to add insult to injury. Are the price hikes not enough for them? Why do they have to be augmented with explanations? It is difficult to find more infuriating phrases than: "House cleaning" and "before the holidays" at that! This is "brain washing" and "tooth cleaning!"

The Histadrut reaction is also regrettful. Senior officials reacted, or so the media reported, "with shock and anger." The anger is easily understood, but where does the shock come in? What can be expected of this "bunch" that these Histadrut circles still call "economic leadership?" It is doubly offensive to refer to them as leadership and append to it the undeserved title "economic." They have no idea what it is all about. This author accepts the testimony of 'Amiram Sivan, the outgoing general manager of the Finance Ministry, who said that the present finance minister not only does not understand economics but his behavior is unpredictable.

Now is the time, after salary and cost of living payments were agreed upon, for the Histadrut, together with the workers, to channel their anger and discontent to real action in order to shorten the days that this clique remains in office; the clique that leads us to world record inflation and that makes our lives in this country so miserable.

A Deal with Someone Responsible

The Histadrut ought to declare war to the end against this government. Not because of "political" considerations, but because of concern for the fate of this country--because of pure Zionist considerations. The Histadrut has the tools and the public's support to engage in this kind of a struggle. It has to be conducted in an unconventional manner. A special team has to be put together, to look, and undoubtedly to find, the best ways to hurt this government, to force it to stop this running amok against the workers.

The author's heart goes out to the Israel Bank commissioner who proposed the idea to arrive at an agreement among the government, the Histadrut and employers to stem the continued price hikes. Just one day after the Finance Ministry publicly announced its support of the "package deal" its mine exploded in the form of planned price hikes: frozen meat, poultry, flour, margarine, oil, communciations, water and let us not forget fuel and electricity which went up just 2 weeks ago.

A package deal can be implemented with someone responsible who can appreciate the Histadruts' sacrifice--without regarding it as a sign of weakness.

It seems that the time has come to tell Hurvitz that Kupat Kholim is not a Finance Ministry hostage. Periodically, whenever the Finance Ministry has problems with the Histadrut, there are threats to cut Kupat Kholim's budget.

One must remind Yig'ael Hurvitz that there is an end to everything. Very soon he may find himself bared in Puerto Rico, in Tenah Nogah or West Bank land, in the slaughter house in Haifa or somewhere else where his sons have a business. Yig'ael ought to be reminded that people who live in glass houses should not throw stones.

We all remember the finance minister saying that we are a poor country. But there are many wealthy people here. They do not eat pita bread, they do not use oil and they hear about margarine only when prices go up.

When economic commentators on radio and television discuss the stock market they say that the public has a lot of money. Who is the public? Those who will pay another 12 percent for frozen meat?

Large Bank Depositors

The bank supervisor just published some very annoying statistics. His data show that 73 percent of savers have less than IL50,000. Another 20 percent had up to IL200,000. But 7 percent of depositors had sums between IL500,000 and IL5 million. Their number is 20,000. This is the public that has money. This is the public that buys savings bonds of "your state," the way Israel Bank advertises them. This public really does not care how much more public transportation will cost or what the price of 1 litre of milk is. This public only cares that the index goes up "nicely" so as to give them a realistic return on their investment.

This cynic exercise of the Finance Ministry to raise prices under its control immediately after the July raises will bring about an increase of more than 10 percent in the August index (according to economic estimates).

The rusty, used arsenal of the finance minister contains just one last tool to improve the economic picture--high unemployment. It is now clear that the attempt to stem price hikes, which had some encouraging signs, although only partial, has died a natural death. The government, which loosened all restraints, is raising the price of all products and services. It has effectively given up on stemming inflation. The latter will continue to bite into workers' real income.

When the Histadrut is threatened with cuts in Kupat Kholim budgets and workers are threatened with pink slips, Hurvitz hopes to have a free hand to meddle in this matter, which he insists, for some reason, to call an "economic plan."

The finance minister has violated the cease-fire. He has opened a massive attack on workers. They, together with the Histadrut, have to take advantage of the situation and take the war to his territory. It has to be understood and accepted that we are not dealing with an unfaithful ally but with an adversary who has nothing to lose. It has already lost its power. Now the enemy is conducting a cleanup operation.

8646
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RABIN AND SHARON--TWO RENEGADES

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Aug 80 p 9

[Commentary by Eliyahu Salpeter: "Rabin and Sharon, Both too Outspoken, May Be an Asset, To Their Respective Opposing Parties"]

[Text] It should be hoped that the Labor Party knows how to appreciate the electoral treasure it has encountered in the person of Ari'el Sharon. There must be someone on 110 HaYarkon St. who is writing down everything that the agriculture minister says about the prime minister ("charlatan," "shallow," etc.) and what the prime minister and other ministers have to say about the danger to Israeli democracy should Sharon accept the Foreign Ministry.

The Labor Party will probably suggest that Likud explain to the voters how someone who is accused of being a charlatan, and someone who is suspected of dictatorial ambitions can serve together on the same government for 3-4 years. It will not be easy to find a satisfactory answer.

It would be better if leaders of the Labor Party not fool themselves into believing that the mutual praising of the prime minister and the agriculture minister outweigh the struggle between Mssrs Rabin and Peres. One Rabin is worth to Likud what two Sharons are worth to the Alignment.

To begin with, with all due respect to Minister Sharon, his statements simply do not carry the same weight with the public as do Rabin's. Whether Mssrs Peres and Begin like it or not, many take statements of the former prime minister more seriously than they do those of the present agriculture minister.

Secondly, what Sharon says and does only supplies ammunition--albeit heavy--to the Alignment's heavy propaganda, which has enough targets as is. On the other hand, Rabin's campaign against Peres is the very target for Likud's arrows. This is so because this feud is reminiscent of the internal struggle which contributed to the defeat of the Alignment at the polls in 1977, and also because it puts a question mark on Peres' leadership.

It is doubtful whether the public considers Peres' declarations, that Rabin will be able to participate in his government if "the cabinet acts as a team without feud," as well as being very wise and profound, politically. The question one hears from laymen, who do not delve deeply into the intricacies of the internal power struggle, is how can Peres be willing to tolerate what Rabin wrote about him in his book and what he has been saying about him since. People who are somewhat more sophisticated wonder if Peres may be convincing himself that he and Rabin can indeed work together in one government, as a team, and if so, what will this government be like?

The main contribution of the Rabin-Peres feud to Likud's propaganda is in the fact that Rabin has been adopting political stands close to those of Likud. Thus, he not only obliterates the differences between the opposition and the government, but he prods Peres to cooperate in this trend. It is difficult to say what Alignment people should complain about. Should they complain that Rabin criticizes his party's chief more than he does Likud's leader, or should they complain about Peres, who is incapable of changing this weird situation?

Things look strange to outsiders, too. The American historian, Arthur Schlesinger, who was on the White House staff during John Kennedy's administration (and who cannot forgive Rabin his support of Nixon) wrote an article a few weeks ago, following a visit to Israel. The Wall Street Journal is now the paper with the highest circulation in the United States. In that article he wrote: "A visitor from the United States is surprised at the surge of that maverick Yitzhaq Rabin, who, according to at least one public opinion poll, is more popular among Labor Party voters than is Peres. As the ambassador to the United States in 1972, Rabin unashamedly intervened in the American elections on Nixon's behalf--which certainly should not make any Democratic administration in Washington love him. It then seemed that a personal scandal removed him from Israeli politics. But just like his American hero, Rabin has the knack of returning (to the rink)."

As was mentioned, Prof Schlesinger loves neither Nixon nor Rabin. It may be interesting if he thought of the idea that in an American election year, Rabin's supporters may decide that what Democrats do not like must sit well with a Republican administration.

8646
CSO: 4805

LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE IN LABOR PARTY

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 15 Aug 80 pp 4, 11

[Commentary by Yehuda Yadin: "The Struggle Within the Labor Party Should Be Conducted in a Democratic Civilized Manner"]

[Text] Whatever the outcome of the struggle, the Alignment will face the crucial campaign with Likud headed by a collective leadership which symbolizes and expresses experience, realism and accomplishments in the construction, defense and policies of the Zionist-Socialist camp.

There is no need to treat too lightly the potentially serious consequences of the ongoing feud between Rabin and Peres. It is very easy to fall in its trap, to unncessarily get involved, and to inadvertently even enmesh the Labor movement in self defeat. It would be very easy to add one more bitter drop of disappointment to that bitter lot that has been with this nation ever since the upset. There is no shortage of overt enemies, who are waiting for every mistake, or so called friends, with excessively wagging tongues. The feuding parties themselves are not sitting idle and are making their contribution to muddle the atmosphere. Naturally, under these circumstances, Likud cannot be expected not to take any opportunity to divert the public's attention from its total failure to the internal upheaval in the Labor Party.

Mr Rabin is right in his claim that the idea of a struggle was not his and that he was not the one to force it on the party and the Alignment. But there is a basic difference between the situations then and now, and someone like Rabin cannot ignore it. Four years ago no one imagined the possibility of an upset. The Alignment was the central and decisive power in the government and it was still possible to ignore upheavals in public opinion. It seemed that the struggle was on a job that the Labor Party was sure to hold on to, and the problem was only over who was to be entrusted with the responsibility. Is it at all necessary to describe how different things are today? The labor movement today faces a battered nation, bitter and disappointed, a nation that is gradually losing faith that any leadership can bring about the revitalization of the country and Zionism. The party itself has yet to reconcile itself to its defeat.

This author does not think that these circumstances automatically preclude a struggle for opinions, positions and influence. Sometimes, an ideological struggle, incisive and to the point, within the camp, is needed in order to rejuvenate the mission of the whole movement. However, at this point we have not been convinced that this is what the struggle is all about, and that the feuding parties really have substantial, credible differences of opinion or that there is a real difference between them. Undoubtedly the biographies, personal and political, of the two comrades contain a wealth of material upon which to draw conclusions and to decide on preferences. Yet, this does not justify the attempt to embattle the whole camp anew and endanger the crucial, central goal--the toppling of the Likud government. One must admit that during the last campaign there was a lot of exaggeration--at that time it, and its shenanigans were forced on Mr Rabin. But the camp which surrounded him was just as much to blame. This author sees no cause to be sorry for MAPAM's preference of a PALMAKH man, a former chief-of-staff. To be honest, one ought to remember the ultimatum of those days which really went overboard. That ultimatum was not only to the point, but was also a doubtful way out of the dilemma of the internal struggle within MAPAM on the future of the Alignment.

Now, as was mentioned, the objective reasons for the struggle are totally different. It is obvious that both candidates can derive power and inspiration only from the movement, and that their chance--if they are really serious about putting together a government--depends not on the moving dunes of public opinion, but on true support and real backing of the whole camp. Nevertheless, the struggle should not be prevented by administrative means; although it is not fair to prevent it altogether, because that would be prejudicial. The interest of the party requires that it set its scope, form and meaning. The Alignment parties--and MAPAM is a weighty factor in the inner struggle even without a formal vote on the candidate--should lead the contestants and show them the limits, rather than be led by them and their initiatives. If the Alignment has a sober, serious but balanced approach, free of exaggeration, it will add respect to the movement and liberate the public from the heavy feeling that this struggle is but another natural catastrophe which burdens the nation at a time when it is not lacking problems.

It also seems that it may be the best way to help both comrades to better know their expectations, the party's limitations and those of themselves, for their own good.

There is one aspect to this struggle which cannot be separated from the general background of the Labor Party and the labor movement. Ever since death has taken its toll of its exalted founding leaders, it has had a vacuum which has yet to be filled. The vital process of the emergence of a new leadership and its establishment will not happen after a one time struggle or organizational decision. That leadership has to have the stature befitting the movement's goals. The ineptness of the Yom Kippur

War, the last years of the previous government, the defeat at the polls and whatever followed it, killed the myth of the "young leadership" as a solution to all the problems and pains of the country and the labor movement. It turned out that age is not the most important component in the very complex composition that the leadership of a party needs.

The Labor Party is headed by first class people, famous nationally and internationally, people who have many accomplishments in the service of the nation and the country, and who have invaluable experience. The military leaders, diplomats and economists among the party ranks can contribute to the makeup of government and public institutions more so than the Likud who could barely muster from within its own ranks or borrow from others. In all honesty and responsibility we ought to admit candidly that the Labor Party as yet has no leadership to stand up to the challenges of the period. This period demands theoreticians, fighters, those who built the Zionist labor movement, thinkers--and thought is, after all, the source of everything--those who founded the kibbutz movement and who were the original activists and fighters of the Histadrut. Conditions now demand a new ideological attack, in order to point the way out of the crisis that is gnawing away at the affluent Israeli society; to lead it in a direction of productivity and work, responsibility and social and economic rehabilitation of that part of our society that has remained on the wayside. A tremendous ideological and educational effort is needed in order to stop the disintegration of the working class into interest groups and start its reestablishment as the backbone of Zionist-Socialist implementation. What we need is brave thinking in order to reestablish the centricity of Israel--not only as an object of support and identification, but as a crucial arena for the struggle for the future and national survival of the Jewish people.

We do not need "think tanks" to figure out order, details of plans, good or bad, on any subject. What we need is Zionist-Socialist thinking, nurtured on principles which are not to be neglected or forsaken. We need to be shown the goals and the ways to carry them out. All this has to be done under today's circumstances with an effort that makes demands on each and every one of us.

The younger generation of working Zionism has turned its back to thinking, and has devoted itself solely to implementation. Immediate needs cropped up and the establishment of the state opened wide avenues to deeds which supposedly contained all the solutions. It then turned out that solutions also create problems and that without ideology one soon reaches a dead end, without any way out. This author believes that any generation can grasp the meaning of its mistakes and transgressions. It is incomprehensible that people who have exhibited so much intellectual skill never paid attention to changes of direction and regression of the ideology of their movement. This author does not doubt their ability to channel their skills to think in ideological directions as well. There is no doubt that the feeling of spiritual strangulation will probably return

young and old alike to reassessment of the ideological challenges. However, in the meantime we are talking of an interim stage and we are dealing with a struggle in which the issues, so vital to the survival of the labor movement, have not yet been decided upon. The Labor Party is not choosing a one-in-a-generation leader. It is just as well that it knows that there is no choice or substitute to collective responsibility of the leadership of the whole movement.

This is what should be stressed on the eve of the expected struggle. The disproportionate reporting in the press and on television, the hectic groupings, the spotlights aimed at just one position--all these are confusing the issue more than they uncover the substance and real goal of the struggle. There has been an attempt to bring in ingredients of a presidential form of government, which does not exist in Israel. A candidate for prime minister is being selected, a person who has to work with colleagues, as a team, on the basis of collective responsibility with an organized program. It is no easy job, but it is no more than expected in Israeli politics.

Moreover, in the previous struggle there was room to attribute to both candidates different political conceptions. Now, the claim is that there is no difference of opinion between the two contestants--not on political issues and not on economic issues either. This author is one of those who has some reservations and pragmatic wishes. Yet he is not upset with the fact that the contestants have bridged their differences and are now closer to an approach which is basically common. The public, closely watching what is happening in the Labor Party, can be consoled by the fact that even if there is the noise [thunder and lightening] of a struggle, its outcome will really change nothing. They probably cannot change the attitude toward what is common to the Alignment. There is no escape from the conclusion that if a struggle cannot be avoided, at least it should be brought down to its proper proportions so we can live with it. It should be regarded seriously, while proper perspectives are being maintained and over dramatization is shunned. If the struggle exists, the Labor Party and the Alignment will conduct and oversee it. This author would recommend to leaders of the Labor Party and MAPAM to avoid loud declarations of sympathy and forming well defined camps, ready to fight. Let everyone maintain his loyalties and preferences but be content with quiet public relations and secret ballots when the time comes. "Spontaneous" organizations, overt and covert, outside of the party and the Alignment, in frameworks such as Urim and Alef, should be forbidden. These frameworks are not bound by party discipline and their members play politics without making a commitment to participate in carrying the heavy load of party responsibility on the gray day following elections. Rabin's veto ought to be withdrawn. It is only an ultimatum in disguise. At the same time it should be made clear and in no uncertain terms, that if Peres wins the movement will--under no circumstances--forego the participation, with a proper appointment, of Rabin in a future Alignment government. Both of them should reflect on what happened even to a leader like Ben-Gurion when he insisted on ouster all the way.

More than anything, all involved ought to be reminded that most of the effort should be directed toward the workers--the source of power and hope for our organization. Only thus will the Alignment's credibility be strengthened as well as its willingness to answer the call when it comes.

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'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTATOR ON AIMS OF LIKUD SETTLEMENT PLAN

TA031150 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Oct 80 p 11

[Commentary by Yehuda Litani: "The Settlement Mines"]

[Excerpts] The Nahal foothold Bet Ha'arava, whose establishment has aroused memories and sentiments connected with the good old eretz Yisra'el, is one of six settlements being established in the Jericho area by the Likud government with the aim of "closing" the Jericho corridor and preventing the Alignment government--if the Alignment defeats the Likud in the next elections in a little over a year--from implementing the "Jordanian option" or, as the Herut members phrase it: "Preventing the establishment of a PLO state."

Every government settlement program is primarily intended to undermine the next government's political programs and, to a lesser extent, to establish a serious infrastructure of settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In a booklet recently published by the number one expert on settlement affairs in Israel and the head of the Jewish Agency settlement department, Prof Ra'anan Weitz, he writes, among other things: "The current method of dealing with settlement can be described as 'running amok,' being satisfied with simply driving pegs in the ground. In the West Bank, which is the area densely settled by Arabs, only 21 settlements have been established, all of them of a purely temporary nature. Nevertheless, because of their difficult situation and the enormous expenditure on groundwork, nearly 10 billion Israeli pounds (1 billion shekels) have been invested in these settlements. This improper method of dealing with settlement and the inept strategy have led to a very serious economic situation in the existing settlements."

Anyone who has a mining operation, rather than a serious settlement plan in his sights, will not be satisfied with what already exists and will want to add more and more settlements--mines for the next government--in order to prevent the establishment of a PLO state of a return of some of the territory to the Kingdom of JOrdan. Therefore, the declaration cited by Prime Minister Menahem Begin, that "only four settlements" are going to be established, should not be taken seriously.

One way of circumventing the declaration about the four settlements is to establish new settlements on the green line, which are established mostly on land within "smaller Israel," but which also occupy West Bank territory. Anyone who looks at the "master plan for the development of settlement in Judaea and Samaria" of Matityahu Drobles, the second head of the Jewish Agency settlement department, will notice several proposed settlement blocs of this type proposed for the slopes of the Hebron hills, another four settlements proposed for the Yatir bloc to the south of the Hebron hills, four more settlements proposed for "Gush Ma'arav" northwest of the West Bank. The same applies to "Gush Halamish," "Gush Mod'in," both of them in the center of the West Bank, and another bloc called the "Northern Samaria Region." In the above-mentioned blocs at least another 15 settlements can be established (and all of this in accordance with well-known, overt plans). There is almost no doubt that this is an option that will be used by the Likud government's settlement captains--Ari'el Sharon, Matityahu Drobles and members of Gush Emunim.

Another way of establishing new settlements while bypassing Begin's declaration is the "amoeba system," of splitting an existing settlement into two or even three settlements. The military government and the Israel land administration are locating plots of land near existing settlements (government-owned, rocky land and, when justifiable on the grounds of necessity, sometimes private land, too) where some of the settlers are located to form a new "quarter" of the settlement. As time goes by the quarters become a settlement with all that involves. This is what happened in the case of Mitzpe Yeriho settlement, which, when it was first established, was considered to be a "quarter" of Ma'ale Ha'edumim, in spite of the 8 km between the two points.

By using this system at least 10 more new settlements can be established without this being considered (at least by the Government of Israel) as the establishment of new settlements; not to mention the fact that dozens of new settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are now in some stage of building, planning or approval. Only a qualified accountant can now, at the beginning of October 1980, decide exactly which four new settlements the prime minister meant. Who knows exactly which settlements have already been approved? When? By whom?

Until recently Likud spokesmen could say that settlement X being established in such and such a place had been approved back in the time of the Alignment government. Now this is more difficult. But it must be admitted that this government is more frank on the matter of the settlements than were the Alignment governments. The plans for future settlements are available to anyone be he an Israeli or a foreigner, an inhabitant of the West Bank or on the staff of the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv.

The settlement "mine" is, as stated, intended for the Alignment government, which is expected to take over after the next elections (if the current dispute between Peres and Rabin does not set the Alignment back to the

situation of the eve of the June, 1977 elections). An enormous amount of money is now going to the settlements, particularly to those in the West Bank which are the Likud government's "step children." A small--and not the most outstanding--example of this is the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Since 1967, 143 settlements have been established in the territories, most of them--for the moment--described as non-religious. In spite of this, the Ministry of Religious Affairs maintains in the territories 197 full-time rabbis, 140 part-time ritual slaughterers and 177 part-time employees in the ritual baths. [miqvot].

The same is true of many other settlers who also fill government posts. Thus, for example, Beni Katzover, one of the heads of Gush Emunim and a member of Elon More settlement, also acts as the head of the religious council in the region. The settlers fear that if the Alignment comes to power it will try to cut back this trend. As they see it, the Alignment will be afraid of open, physical confrontation, resulting from evacuation attempts, which were unsuccessful even during the previous [Likud] term in office. So (and this is being discussed more or less openly by Alignment heads) they will use the method of "drying up the budgets."

The current government treats the settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip generously, perhaps too generously, since it regards them as an obstacle to a Palestinian-PLO state. A subtle hint of this was given last week by Jewish Agency chairman Arye Dulzin, a member of the Liberal Party, during a tour of the West Bank. He said that when he was treasurer he had erased various debts owed by "these wonderful people" (the members of Gush Emunim). How much did he erase? Tens of thousands? Hundreds of thousands? Millions? Mr Dulzin did not go into detail. If the Liberals, who are not among the Likud's leading proponents of settlement, think this way, how do members of Herut and Rafi, for whom settlement is a chief concern, behave?

If the Alignment really does return to power and is brave enough to try to disarm these mines, it will have to do so with a great deal of common sense and patience. Haste comes from the devil, according to the well-known Arab proverb. Indeed, anyone who tries to change the new reality too rapidly over such a short period of time will explode the mine instead of disarming it and, of course, will emerge the injured party.

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JORDAN ANTICIPATING NEXT CONFRONTATION

Tel Aviv BAMAHANEH in Hebrew 6 Aug 80 pp 10-11

[Article by Hayim Raviv: "The Army of Jordan: Preparation for War"]

[Excerpt] "I cannot promise that the tanks which are now to be supplied to the Hashemite Kingdom will not cross the Jordan River. Such a promise would be deception. Jordan is taking into account the possibility of war with Israel, and thus needs these tanks. Jordan also needs them because of the danger of an attack upon it by Syria or Iraq." This testimony was delivered at the end of last week by Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State of the U.S., to members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the American House of Representatives in an attempt to justify the decision of the administration to supply Jordan with 100 modern tanks. Harold Saunders spoke the truth but judging by the quotation attributed to him in the media--this truth is only partial. Therefore, the danger of deception regarding which Saunders sounded the tocsin [alarm] remains in effect.

Jordan sees in Israel an exclusive military threat. This basic assumption feeds its military effort, and leads its army into the various areas of activity, such as preparation, arms procurement and training. As are the other confrontation armies, so too is the Jordanian army arrayed in a defense pattern, but is capable with no special complication, of passing over to an attack pattern. Its two mechanized divisions are arrayed at a forward line in the zone between the Jordan River and the peak of the mountain. Its two armored divisions are deployed on the peak of the mountain. South of the Dead Sea, a brigade of tanks is stationed with a mission of securing the southern flank. A force is stationed at 'Aqaba which is there to protect the region, while in the area north of 'Aqaba there are relatively sparse forces. In contrast to this, on the Syrian front Jordan maintains small forces which deal with ongoing defense activity, mainly the prevention of penetration into the area by undesirable elements. The Jordanians do not see in Syria--at least at this stage--an actual threat, and there are several reasons for that. The most important reason is that Jordan is not perceived by its neighbors as an enemy against whom war preparations must be made. More than that, Jordan has excellent relations with Iraq, which was defined by Harold Saunders as a possible enemy.

As to arms procurement, the type of weaponry and military equipment that the Jordanians choose indicates that the goal is to find an appropriate response to the challenge of an armed confrontation with Israel. The Jordanian arms procurement policy is conducted according to a single yardstick, and that is: the needs of the Jordanian Army to face the challenge, and on this matter they have no financial difficulties at all. The single difficulty is to reach the correct decision in the choice of the best and most appropriate weaponry, both from the standpoint of maintenance as well as from the standpoint of operational capability.

Reduction for Improvement

Financing of the Jordanian arms procurement is done by the countries which participated in the Bagdad Conference who oppose the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. Thus, for example, the Chieftain transaction with Britain was made possible by Saudi-Iraqi-Algerian financing. These countries ply Jordan with monies for military and other purposes, with the aim of holding it "short"--that is, to prevent its defection to the peace camp--with the aim of incorporating it when the time arrives in a general war on Israel. The third element which points to the direct tie between the Jordanian Army's preparations and the future war against Israel, is the system of combined operations of this army. What has become readily apparent recently is the goal of coordinating not only with the Syrian neighbors to the north but also with the very powerful Iraq to the rear, in anticipation of the possibility of its participating in that war on the side of the Jordanian forces.

Indeed, the Jordanian Army is preparing for that war with perseverance and with confidence. The face of this army is changing, and it is not a cosmetic but rather a qualitative change, which when completed--in another 2 or 3 years will appear as a modern army, equipped with the best of Western armaments, and enjoying a high degree of mobility. The beginning of this process took place 3 years ago, when King Hussein began to reorganize his army. Within this framework, the order of battle of the army was reduced and it now stands at four divisions as opposed to five in the past. This reduction stemmed from the desire to found the army on an improved qualitative base. An inner balance has now been created in the land forces. Two of four divisions are mechanized and two are armored. One of the armored divisions will be based on tanks of the Chieftain class, which will begin to arrive in Jordan next year, as a result of the transaction signed with Britain to supply 275 tanks of this class. The second armored will apparently be based on 300 improved Centurions. The mechanized divisions will be reinforced by 200 M-60A3 American tanks which are to be supplied to Jordan in the near future. As of now, the Jordanians have in their possession 100 M-60A1 tanks. The modern tanks, which are in operational service in the U.S. army, will bring about a significant improvement in the fighting capability of the mechanized divisions under all conditions of visibility. The surplus tanks (M-60) will be used to set up new formations--for the second half of the decade of the eighties and thus the Jordanian Army will stand on an order of battle of some 900 tanks. This concentrated effort to absorb the modern British and American tanks will

not affect the level of battle preparedness of the Jordanian Army, inasmuch as it is equipped with reserve tanks capable of bridging the gaps in the timetable up to the period of absorption of the new armor.

A qualitative "overturn" is anticipated during the coming year in the Jordanian Airforce, too--when it is equipped with French Mirage F-1 aircraft. Jordan has ordered 36 of this type plane, which is considered more advanced than the American F-5 model which is also in the possession of the Jordanian Airforce (22 planes of the 34 which the U.S. has committed itself to supply). There will be a readily apparent improvement in the haulage and parachuting capability of the forces of the air as they are soon to be equipped with L-130 planes from the U.S. and L-212 planes from Spain as well as with S-76 storm helicopters, "which will serve to transport forces across the Jordan River, at a time of need," in the words of the Jordanian King. As to the future aircraft of the Jordanian Air Force, there are several possibilities and it would appear that the Jordanians have not yet decided what to choose. One of the possibilities is the F-16 plane regarding which there have been recent contacts, but it is not clear whether any conclusion has been reached.

Currently, there are about 100 fighter bombers in the Jordanian Air Force; 15 helicopters and 15 transport planes. Its principal bases are spread throughout the kingdom--at Amman, at Mafrak, at 5-H, at Al-Azrak and at Djefer, and are manned by 6,650 persons beside the 30,000 persons of the reserves. The Jordanian pilots are considered to be good, although they are short on battle experience as is the case with pilots of the other air forces in the theater.

Mobilization--Compulsory, But Controlled

Significant improvement has also taken place in the Jordanian military within the area of anti-aircraft defense. During the Six-Day War the Jordanians learned the meaning of lack of an efficient anti-aircraft system the hard way, and subsequent to that war they devoted great effort to the development of air defense capability; so much so, that presently the main sections of Jordan are "covered" by efficient anti-aircraft forces--improved models of the Hawk ground-to-air missiles, the great majority of which have already been integrated. Likewise, Jordan is about to acquire from the U.S.: about 300 Redeye type personal ground-to-air missiles and 100 Vulcan self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. According to reports from Arab sources, it is possible that the Jordanians will turn to the Soviet Union through a desire to purchase from it self-propelled anti-aircarft armament.

As to the Jordanian infantry--it is for the most part mechanized: of the six brigades in today's Jordanian Army--four brigades are equipped with armored troop vehicles and tanks are organic to every single one of them. One brigade in each division continues to retain its form as an infantry brigade--with three infantry battalions. The Jordanian infantryman is well armed. Beyond the personal M-16 rifle, he is equipped with anti-tank missiles--a Dragon at the battalion level, and a Tau at the brigade

level. He enjoys good artillery support, including 155 and 203 mm. cannon. (The artillery in the Jordanian Army is almost exclusively self-propelled with long-barrel M-109 and M-110.) Included in the infantry are the parachute battalions and the Special Forces, numbering three, which in the future, as has been stated will serve as missions are required--for parachuting from the air, after integration of the S-76 helicopters within a year.

Within the framework of the newly reorganized Jordan Army, King Hussein instituted compulsory mobilization in 1976. Up to that year this army was based upon permanent volunteers. The compulsory mobilization law for 19 to 40 year-olds contains a number of risks: on the one hand, the professional level of soldiers in the army is impaired, in that while it is possible to elicit the maximum from a permanent man who serves for long years, within the framework of his professional or his battle service--it is difficult to say the same for the obligatory soldier, whose period of service is a mere 2 years.

On the other hand, unlike the past, the army today is no longer subject to the pressures of manpower shortage. The increase in the mobilization cycles makes possible an increase in the army, and as a result--entry into new weapons systems.

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ISRAELI POLL INDICATES ALIGNMENT CONTINUES TO LEAD

TA030919 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Oct 80 pp 1, 2

[Pori public opinion poll: "Alignment Supported by 50.4 Percent and the Likud by 19.1 percent; a Drop of 1.5 percent for the NRP"]

[Text] The alignment continues to lead with more than 50 percent of all votes (50.4 percent). The Likud is assured of only less than 20 percent (19.1 percent of all voties). The NRP dropped by 1.5 percent, from 7.9 percent in July to 6.4 percent now. These are the major findings of a Pori public opinion poll conducted in September and commissioned by HA'ARETZ.

If the elections had been held in September the alignment would have gained 50.4 percent of all votes (50.6 percent in the July poll) and the Likud 19.1 percent(19.7 percent in July).

The NRP has lost 1.5 percent of its power; 6.4 percent in September in contrast with 7.9 percent in July. This may be the effect of the police investigation of irregularities in the Religious Affairs Ministry.

The Tehiya movement continues to lead among the small parties with 2.6 percent.

Following are the results of the poll, also compared with the July poll and the ninth Knesset election results:

	September poll	July poll	Ninth Knesset
Likud	19.1	19.7	35.3
Alignment	50.4	50.6	24.8
NRP	6.4	7.9	9.2
Agudat Yisra'el-Po'aley Agudat Yisra'el	3.1	3.6	4.7
Democratic Movement	0.2	0.2	11.6
Shay	0.6	0.6	--

	September poll	July poll	Ninth Knesset
Others	6.8	7.1	8.2
Minorities	not asked	not asked	--
Abstentions	13.4	11.1	--
	100.0	100.0 [figure as published]	100.0 [figure as published]

The 6.8 advantage of the small parties are divided among: the Tehiya--2.6 percent, Sheli--2 percent, Citizens Rights Movement--0.9 percent, Independent Liberals--0.3 percent and other parties--1 percent.

There are many former DMC and Likud voters who declare they will now vote for the Alignment. Of the polled 25.6 percent who declare they will vote for the Alignment today voted for the Likud in the previous elections while 11.2 percent who will vote for the Alignment now voted for the DMC in the 1977 elections.

Less than half (45.2 percent) of those who declare they will vote for the Alignment today voted for it in the previous elections as well.

The Alignment voters today are younger than the Likud voters. The average age of the Alignment voters is 30.8 while the average age of the Likud voters is 33.7 percent. There is also a high percentage of Alignment voters of European and American origin (57.7 percent) whereas the high percentage of the Likud voters is of Asian and African origin (59.6 percent).

Today the Likud is leaning mainly on its former voters and very little on the voters of other parties in the previous elections. Of those who declare they will vote for the Likud today 83.8 percent voted for it in the 1977 election.

Only 3.1 percent of those who declare they will vote for the Likud today voted for the Alignment in 1977 and only 1 percent voted for the DMC.

A check of the abstentions indicates they come mainly from former Likud and DMC voters. Of this 27.6 percent voted for the Likud and 11.7 percent for the DMC in the last elections. Of all those abstaining 22.6 percent did not at all participate in the previous elections.

The poll encompassed a representative sample of 1,200 people eligible to vote. All eligible voters were personally interviewed in their houses with full confidentiality.

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

MEASURES, SPECIAL TAX APPROVED--The economic minicabinet has decided that the one-time tax on people with high incomes will be a maximum of 6 percent and progressive. All people who earned more than 750,000 Israeli pounds last year will be taxed. Our correspondent Moshe Nestlebaum reports that the economic minicabinet has also approved the imposition of VAT on tourism, a regulation that will take effect at the beginning of April. The tax will be imposed on all services [received by tourists] including tours and car rentals but not on hotel bills and food. [Text] [TA031311 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 3 Oct 80]

CSO: 4805

OIL MINISTER GIVES VIEWS ON OPEC'S VIENNA MEETING

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 29 Sep 80 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Sheikh Ali Khalifa al-Sabah, Kuwait oil minister, by Randa Takieddine, date and place not given]

[Text]

Most of the world's press zeroed in on what OPEC ministers failed to do during their meeting at Vienna. This was not, however, the attitude displayed by one of the leading actors, Kuwaiti Oil Minister Sheikh Ali Khalifa al-Sabah. Soon after the OPEC ministers ended their deliberations, Sheikh Ali sat down with *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*'s Randa Takieddine to review the meeting and its meaning for coming months. Sheikh Ali, as the following exclusive interview shows, is far from pessimistic.

Q: The decision of the oil ministers (to freeze oil prices in return for Saudi Arabia's agreement to raise the price of its Arabian Light crude to $30 per barrel) came as a surprise. Could you explain and comment on the final communique, which sets the price of the marker crude at $30 although you had agreed in Algiers on a $32 benchmark price? What does this mean?

A: The decision is a very simple one. Essentially, before the decision, the situation was as follows: we did not have a marker crude price. We had a maximum price for the marker crude but we did not have proper differentials between the various groups. The differentials tended in some cases to be on the side of exaggeration.

What we decided upon was a fixed marker crude at $30 and to allow countries – or recommend to countries – that they maintain their prices at their current levels. Those who are at $37 remain at $37 on the assumption that (at OPEC's summit meeting) in Baghdad, after the adoption of our long-term strategy, the price formula (contained in the strategy plan) will be applicable. This will raise the $30 price to $32 and beyond as we go along. This would remove the existing disparities between the various crudes...

Q: But the problem of differentials remains unresolved at present?
A: Then (after adoption of the strategy), you can introduce differentials which are more realistic, more scientific – but without changing current prices too much.

Q: How?
A: Let us take for example the price of North African crude at $37. This price would assume that the true differential is something in the neighbourhood of $4 to $5 per barrel. Now, if they wait long enough, as the formula for long term pricing is applied to the base price of $30, the price of the marker crude is going to be $32 to $33. In the long-term strategy there is a formula to be applied on a quarterly basis to the marker crude. Let us suppose that we have adopted this formula in November. Come December, we would apply it and it will raise the price of the marker crude from $30 to a higher price, bringing the North African crude at $37 into line with a marker price of $32 or $33.

Q: Do you consider that putting up the price of Saudi oil from $28 to $30 was a compromise move aimed towards unification of the pricing system?
A: It is unlike previous compromises. It has within it the seeds of unification, especially if you add to it the long-term strategy committee's recommendation on the formula. There is a way towards price unification.

Q: But in the short term, what is happening to differentials?
A: They are still messed up. Nobody is going to touch the differentials until there is the prospect of adjusting them without too much of an adjustment. Nobody is going to change the price of his crude by $1 down or $2 down. But as the price of the marker crude moves up, then an opportunity will arise for us to introduce again more reasonable differentials – but on the basis that it would not involve us in changing prices downwards.

Q: Do you have the feeling that the $30 price for marker crude will soon move to $32?
A: Not necessarily. The decision is that the new price is valid until the end of the year.

Q: How can one then say that it is a step towards unification?
A: If we approve the formula in Baghdad, then in December – only three months from now – let us say that the formula produces a change of 8 or 9 per cent in the price. When you apply that to a $30 base, you get an increase of between $2.50 and $3.

Q: Throughout our discussions, you have been assuming that an agreement will be reached on the long-term strategy pricing formula. But it seems that only 10 member countries agreed on its principles. What do you do about the three remaining countries when Algeria has expressed reservations on the pricing formula?
A: Ten countries are already committed to the formula. Algeria and Libya are not too far from accepting it – I think they have already accepted the principle deep down in their hearts. There is no room for amending the long-term strategy formula for pricing.

Q: Production seems to be a difficult problem for OPEC to tackle on a long-term basis. Do you feel there will be a consensus on this very important issue?
A: I think the production question will become almost irrelevant within a short period of time. I think people tend to exaggerate present difficulties and that this is affecting their point of view. As to the market outlook for the medium term, I think that, as people realise that the market is not as bad as they feel it is and as pricing indications come in towards the end of this year and as the pressure on them is reduced on a daily basis, people will be considerably more relaxed, more willing to compromise. Part of the difficulties we had here was due to the fact that the spot market was not going to help. Product prices were dropping, etc. This is a short term phenomenon. I think that by December the outlook would have changed – and when the outlook changes, attitudes change.

Q: Can one in fact say that the OPEC meeting in Vienna of foreign, finance and oil ministers failed to agree on an agenda for the Baghdad summit in November?
A: There are three items on the Baghdad agenda:
a. the pricing strategy – and on this a consensus is emerging, no matter what people are saying.
b. the relationship with developing countries, which has to aspects: our aid to them – and there is a commitment to increase the resources available to developing countries; the ministers of finance are going to meet in Quito to do something, but at any rate, our present figures are high; the basic idea is to have a commitment on a *modus vivendi* to reach agreements in the future for replenishment of the fund; it is not important to put a figure of $20 billion and then have these $20 billion spread over 10 years; big deal!; but if you agree on a method of replenishment, then the right thing has been done; the second aspect is the security of oil supplies to developing countries and on this I think some ideas are emerging.

c. the last item is global negotiations with the industrialised world, and again some kind of consensus is emerging.

Q: Will the global negotiations take place within the UN?
A: Not necessarily within the UN.

Q: You have decided to hold another meeting of oil ministers on October 14. What are the prospects for such a conference?
A: Essentially, what will be on the agenda is to look at all documents, seeing that they are in the right, proper form and to do what is needed to be done in terms of a final compromise and to prepare them in their final form for the ministerial meeting which is going to be held one day before the heads of state meet in Baghdad.

Q: Do you think that political developments in the Middle East will affect and hinder the working of the OPEC Baghdad Summit? What I have in mind are the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, Syria's union with Libya and the tension between Syria and Iraq.
A: Why should they?

You are speaking of the conflict between Iran and Iraq. In the past, we have managed to keep politics away from the organisation. When Saadoun Hammadi was Iraqi Oil Minister, he was in Tehran signing the Tehran agreement when there was conflict between the two sides on the borders. In Algeria in 1975, the Shah and (Iraq's then Vice President, now President) Saddam Hussein were there when there was an outstanding conflict between them; this happened to provide (Algeria's late President Houari) Boumedienne an opportunity to try to patch it up.

I am not saying that this is what is going to happen this time. But the point is that they were not prevented from attending a conference together even though they had disputes on borders and on the Kurdish problem.

If you think that Syria is going to affect Libya's position over attending the OPEC Summit in Baghdad, you must remember that Syria attends conferences with Iraq despite political differences that exist between them. They work very well together in conferences.

CSO: 4820

KUWAITI PAPER SAYS VICTORY FOR IRAQ IS VICTORY FOR ALL ARABS

LD301221 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 26 Sep 80 p 9

[Article by Najib 'abd al-Hadi: "Possibility of Iraqi Victory Terrifies Israel"]

[Text] Even Israel does not want Iraq to score a victory against Iran; it is asking the United States to intervene in favor of Iran and to prevent its defeat.

Why does Iraqi victory terrify Israel and why is Israel appealing to the United States and urging it to support Iran?

The answer to this is simple and well-known: Israel realizes that an Iraqi victory definitely means the restoration of Arab cohesiveness and the emergence of a conscious Arab leadership around which all the Arab masses will rally, which, of course, threatens the "security," stability and continued existence of Israel.

Israel realizes that an Iraqi victory strengthens the Arab position in the Arab world. It also regains respect for the Arab soldier, revives in him the spirit of sacrifice and encourages him to engage in other heroic fighting.

For this reason it can be said that the heroic achievements which Iraq has realized under Saddam Husayn's leadership will be an asset for all the Arabs, will lift them from their humiliating position and will put them in their appropriate place among peoples and nations.

The battle Iraq is fighting now is an Arab battle in the full sense of the word. Victory in it means victory for the Arabs and defeat--God forbid--means defeat for all the Arabs. Therefore, all the Arabs without exception are called upon to stand with all their capabilities and resources on the side of Saddam Husayn who is fighting the battle of freedom, dignity and defense of Arab rights, which some imagined could easily be devoured.

Saddam Husayn's battle will determine the entire future of the Arab nation and the future of the whole Arab homeland. We must all realize before it

is too late that just as defeat has a price that the future Arab generation will pay victory also has a price, a very high price which, nevertheless, remains cheap if compared with the gains for the future generations.

In view of all this we can realize why Israel does not want Iraq to triumph.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

INDIAN OIL SEARCH--As a direct consequence of the talks held by His Highness the Amir in New Delhi, India and Kuwait are likely to cooperate in the field of oil exploration and prospecting in India. It is learnt here that Kuwait has shown interest in participating in one of the oil concession areas which the Indian government had recently decided to offer for foreign participation. Six foreign cartels are bidding for concessions in India and Kuwait is likely to team up with one of them, to combine Kuwaiti investment and Western know how for exploration preferable off-shore off the Western coast of India, reliable sources said. The Kuwaiti participation would either be through the Kuwait Petroleum Organisation or through the newly created Kuwait Petroleum Investment Company, the sources added. The joint statement issued at the end of the Amir's talks had made it clear that the two countries will cooperate in exploration and exploitation of the oil resources. There is also the possibility that Kuwait will supply India with crude oil, India is believed to have asked for buying up to 2 million tonnes of oil each year from Kuwait either on cash, or on barter, or even credit. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 20 Sep 80 p 21]

UNDERGROUND TRANSFORMERS--An official source said yesterday that all above-ground small electric transformers will be removed in the near future. The Ministry of Electricity and Water plans to replace these transformers with new ones to be placed underground within a space of no more than 100 square meters. The purpose of moving the transformers underground is to place them out of reach of children and troublemakers, and to improve the surroundings of buildings and homes nearby. The Ministry of Electricity and Water is currently contacting some Kuwaiti engineering firms regarding the design and implementation of the project at a later date. The matter of moving the transformers underground had been subject to a dispute between the municipality and the Ministry of Electricity and Water since 1978. The cabinet arbitrated the issue. To settle the dispute, the two parties agreed that the transformers be housed underground within the city. Outside the city, the ministry will continue to install them above-ground. [Excerpts] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 22 Aug 80 p 3] 9455

CSO: 4802

DETAILS ON INITIAL APPLICATIONS OF ISLAMIC LAW

Paris LE MONDE in French 21-22 Sep 80 p 6

[Text] Nouakchott (AFP [French Press Agency])--The sharia or Islamic law, restored in Mauritania this year, was applied for the first time on Friday, 18 September 1980 [as published] at Nouakchott, where a sentenced prisoner was executed by firing squad and where three others had a hand cut off. Several thousand persons witnessed these first executions of judgments by the special Islamic court established by a decree of 10 May. The government had indicated that it was creating this court because modern law was not sufficient to stop crimes.

The authorities wanted to play the event up big by using the execution to set an example. Early Friday morning, the site among the sand dunes several kilometers northwest of the capital had been crowded by thousands of persons who got out of trucks and private vehicles made available to them. Everybody wanted to be in the front ranks to witness the execution.

Before that, the authorities had erected a white wall in the middle of the place. The eight members of the execution squad were lined up several meters away, their faces hidden by black turbans. Further away, a completely covered tent had been set up for the hand amputation operations.

The four prisoners were taken to the place and made to sit on a bench. A member of the court read the verdict and the letter by which the chief of state had authorized the execution. Verses from the Koran were recited and then the first prisoner was taken before the firing squad, his face covered by a red hood. The first salvo was welcomed by long applause and shouts of "Allah ou Akbar" (God is Great); but it was only after the second volley that a doctor was able to report the prisoner's death--a finding which was received with new applause from the crowd.

Sidi Ould Matalla had just died in accordance with Islamic Sheria [as published] for having killed one of his fellow workers whose wife he had wanted. The other three prisoners, whose hands were to be amputated, were then taken into one tent where surgeons from the Nouakchott hospital

officiated. After several minutes, a doctor came out of the tent, waving the right hand of the first amputee, Boubou Sow, and then the hands of the other two persons who were sentenced for theft, Mohamed Ould Bla Blal and Mourali Sikosso. The three hands thus amputated were suspended from a string to permit the public to get a good look at them.

5058
CSO: 4400

FACTORS OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY ASSESSED

Democracy Feared by Rulers

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 4-10 Aug 80 pp 22-23

[Text] Kuwait--This is a tour to survey the affairs and the anxieties of the Gulf. Gulf rulers manifest fear in their complaints and in their talk about the future. Lebanon is an example for all; they learned many lessons from it.

"Yes, they can do in the Gulf what they did in Lebanon. Nothing is difficult for them. No one is immune or secure. We are all Arabs in this boat."

It was with these words that a senior Kuwaiti official took me by surprise. He has been in the government for 15 years, and is one of the chief members of the ruling family. He is known for his flexibility and openness and for [his ability] to stay on top of events and to analyze them.

The discussion was about the "internal danger" in the Arabian Gulf. I am one of those who espouse the idea of defending the Gulf and its holding out against attempts to upset domestic security, or disrupt and explode the domestic situation.

It is my opinion that the citizen of the Gulf feels more peaceful and secure under the regimes that rule him, than the Lebanese citizen did under the regimes that ruled him. I said that the citizen of the Gulf, for example, would not kill a fellow citizen for 100 pounds, nor would he bomb the ruler's residence for 1,000 pounds. This is because his loyalty to the regime is stronger than that of the Lebanese citizen to his regime. What took place in Lebanon may not be repeated in another Arab country; but if it is repeated, it will not be in the Gulf.

He said, "Listen, what you said may have been the result of the fact that you are convinced and you are confident that the difficulties of the citizen of the Gulf is less than that of other Arabs. The present and the future of the citizen of the Gulf are guaranteed. His future is guaranteed even before he is born, even when he is still an idea for the future, that is,

when his prospective father marries his prospective mother. When they marry, the parents receive a government 'grant' that is not less than 100,000 Lebanese pounds. If the husband has a limited income--that is, if his salary is around 5,000 pounds (since there are no really poor people in the Gulf) he has the right to receive free popular housing which [eventually] becomes his property in return for nominal payments that decline in time. He has the right to a job; whether he gets it or not, he receives his salary. In addition to his job, he runs his own private business. He has health insurance and social security. He is even buried after his death at the government's expense. Furthermore, he is entitled to an expenses paid vacation in London, Paris or anywhere else in the world on the grounds of looking for a remedy for an imaginary illness for which local physicians, in his opinion, could not find a cure.

"Then a child comes along. His father receives aid for him. When the child is four years old, his schooling is guaranteed free of charge along with this food, his clothing and his 'allowance.' After secondary school, he goes to the local university free of charge and receives an incentive allowance until he completes his education. Or he is sent to any university abroad at the government's expense, all expenses paid. When he graduates, his job is ready for him. Then, there is a marriage allowance and a housing allowance. He is ensured until death."

The Shaykh paused, took a sip of tea, and went on: "But none of this precludes the existence of rejectionists among citizens of the Gulf--rejectionists of the regime, the style of government, the government's Arab and foreign policy, or the discrepancy in wealth among the citizens. You know what the frame of mind of young people has been in this Arab state of anxiety and loss of stability. There is a dark view of the future. Coups and revolutions have taken place on the outskirts of the Gulf introducing overt and covert doctrines. There is talk of liberation, reaction, imperialism, national rights, citizenship, naturalization, equality, justice and so on.

"There are lapses and pitfalls in the Gulf. The proverb says, 'People are never content with what they have.' Do you know of anyone who can please the people, all the people, in a world that shifts from one madness to another? This is a world where infection is transmitted quickly since media outlets have become widespread. Citizens of the Gulf continue to travel abroad for recreation and to mix and mingle with the world [and learn about] the accomplishments and aspirations of others."

What We Have Is Like What You Have

I asked: "But don't you believe there is some loyalty to the homeland in the Gulf?"

The Shaykh answered: "Loyalty, yes; but there is a type of people who renounce everything--even the homeland. Don't forget that foreign countries are trying to destroy us by all means. Do you believe that foreign countries

are incapable of using doctrine, money or other enticements to turn people against the homeland? They would do so not to destroy the homeland, but rather to change it, develop it or 'liberate' it. This is exactly what happened in Lebanon, and here lies the problem."

What the Shaykh said is now the reality or cause of hardship of the Gulf. His statement had been secret. It was made before the incidents which took place in Kuwait and Bahrain, and whose fallout one day reached the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and the Sultanate of Oman. However, the most serious factor in the Gulf is that which was revealed by the Crown Prince of Kuwait, Prime Minister Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Sabah and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah.

Following the explosion at the printing presses of the Kuwaiti newspaper, AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM, senior officials clearly and openly accused foreign agencies, without naming them. They also hinted at elements inside the country, inspired by foreign sources.

The point in this case is that the Gulf is not immune to sedition, nor will it be immune to revolution. What happened means that someone lit the fuse, but will the barrel of gunpowder explode?

Actions and Cells

Before answering this question, one must know what is in the Gulf--what is inside the gulf other than oil, gas and precious and non-precious metals.

Security officials acknowledge that the region is not free of what they call "red [communist] spots."

Not all these spots are red. In fact, they fall into two categories:

-Some seek to change and democratize the regimes, so that they would adopt a parliamentary system. The people's voice should be heard by the ruling families who would relinquish their rule by "divine right" and their exclusive way of madking decisions.

- Others seek to blow up these regimes altogether and establish popular democratic republics that would adopt the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (Aden) as their model.

Organizations of either category are numerous. It is not one of the functions of the [foreign] press to reveal their identities, because it is not in charge of the destiny of the peoples of the area.

But it is known in Kuwait that party organizations, which are officially outlawed, are widespread. They are called groupings or blocs, and their activites are known to government offices and to the newspapers, just as they were known previously to the National Assembly (the Chamber of Deputies) before it was dissolved.

In addition to these organizations there are undoubtedly cells which have been mentioned by more than one Kuwaiti official in statements made to the press. The structure of these cells may be Kuwaiti, although Kuwaitis may constitute a minority of its members. However, in the aftermath of events in the area, they have become a burden felt by Kuwaiti society, because they have planted in Kuwaiti soil the seeds of the disputes among the Arab regimes, as well as the seeds of the dispute between some Arab regimes and the Islamic regime in Iran.

In Kuwait, foreigners make up 60 percent or almost two-thirds of the population. Not all of these support the regime, the people, the soil or the society of Kuwait. They do not consider Kuwait their homeland, but rather a temporary refuge. Some of them do not want to live in Kuwait in peace, realizing their ambitions to amass fortunes. Their ambition is rather to use Kuwait as a stage for expressing their beliefs or what they think would ensure the interests of their mother country. Some countries exploit their citizens living in Kuwait as part of their intelligence network or sabotage groups.

This is the situation in Kuwait. What about it in other countries on the Arabian Gulf?

In other countries on the Gulf, such activities are no longer secret. Liberation fronts have been implanted here and there, and their activities, especially in Bahrain, are sometimes so open as to be open demonstrations. The cells that have been secretly implanted have leaders that are working in more than one place in the Arab world and abroad. These cells consist mainly of students, disadvantaged workers and the poor classes whose poverty is exploited to create unrest.

There are extensive activities outside Bahrain, especially inside the United Arab Emirates. These activities are carried out by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. There were arrests more than once of members of this front in Ra's al-Khayman and Dubai.

The sultanate of Oman knows about this. It is for this reason that one reads day after day of the arrival of an of official [from Oman] to one of the emirates. This official travels not to look into the border question, as the official media state, but to look into what are called illegal activities.

The Danger Exists...But?

The internal danger in the gulf does exist, but it has not yet reached the explosive level. Most of the danger does not in fact lurk among the citizens of the Gulf as much as it does the hundreds of thousands of foreigners who are referred to as "visitors" or transient workers. Police agencies in the region have not yet reached the stage where they can tell who is coming and who is going. These agencies themselves had to hire some of these "visitors" when they were being established. And there may

or may not be among these agencies elements of the organizations the country is now suffering from.

The question is one of a race against time. The percentage of foreigners in some countries of the region exceeds 80 percent. They are not Arabs, but rather the oddest mosaic of people the world has seen: Baluchis, Pathams, Indians, Pakistanis, Bengalese and Philippine citizens. So far, and despite all the rules and regulations that have been enacted and all the security measures that have been taken inside the country, on the coast, at airports and at the borders, thousands find their way into these countries every day. There are tens of thousands of illegal residents in these countries.

The Mentality of the Middle Ages

The activity of the "visitors" may be understood, but why are the people of the country restless?

There are 1,001 reasons for this restlessness. We would need scores of pages to enumerate them, but we may be able to summarize them at least in passing so as not to give rise to hurt feelings.

The primary reason for this restlessness is the fact that there is a lack of agreement and mutual understanding within a majority of the ruling families in the region. Some of these families suffer from ambitions, the simplest of which is owning paradise.

There are disputes among brothers, fathers, sons and grandsons. There are disputes between the son of the first wife and the son of the second wife or the third or fourth. Everyone desires Layla, but which one of the suitors does Layla want? [Sentence implies that everyone wants to be boss].

The settlement of disputes is carried out entirely through patch up operations. If one agrees to something, his agreement is temporary. He would wait for the opportunity to change his mind, in the hope that time would work to his advantage.

There are no radical solutions and no permanent accords. Nothing said on official levels represents the whole truth.

The second reason for this restlessness lies in the method of government. The method itself is acceptable to the people, because it is the original tribal democracy. Every citizen can have access to the prince or to any official whenever he wants to. He can express his opinion openly regardless of how painful it is. The prince or the official would listen to him, and if his request is legitimate, it would be granted. If what he wants is reasonable, it would be carried out.

But this democracy which worked in the 18th and 19th centuries is no longer suitable now. This is because the affairs of state are basically known only to the prince and to some of his advisers, most of whom are "visitors" whose only concern is to satisfy the prince.

Scores of thousands of the area's young people have graduated from major universities in the world or from Arab and national universities. These young people have not yet found for themselves the right niche under the regime; no one asks for their opinion or listens to them.

The third reason for the restlessness lies in the fact that some of the regimes do not budget their revenues. If they do prepare budgets, these budgets are hypothetical. In some countries, one-third of the national revenue goes back to the prince; the second third goes to the ruling family; and the last third remains for the state's expenditures and reserves.

In fact, there are many more reasons than these three.

The question that is being raised is whether or not adopting parliamentary democracy would make matters easier.

Democracy was at one time adopted in Kuwait. It was then frozen for a period of time to avoid its errors, and the constitution was amended so that the experiment would be repeated without errors.

It was adopted in Bahrain once, and then it was repealed without holding discussions about the possibility of reinstating it.

In Qatar and in the Emirates there is the experiment of an advisory council in the former, and a United National Council in the latter. In Qatar, the prince himself selects the members. In the Emirates, the Supreme Union Council, which includes the rulers of the seven emirates, selects the members of the United National Council. The two councils have an advisory capacity only. They discuss, for example, the price of sweet potatoes and importing fresh meat for citizens. They have nothing to do, however, with the higher policy of the state. The decisions they make are compatible decisions that may or may not be followed.

When the issue of democracy is raised, it is said that tribal society is living its own democracy and is comfortable with it, and that anything alien to this society should not be adopted, because one may not force a hat on a head that had grown accustomed to the local headgear.

Furthermore, officials in the Gulf are fearful of the parliamentary experiment, and even of freedom of the press, in view of what has happened in Lebanon where democracy, freedom and people have been destroyed.

But there is something that cannot be denied: the Arabian Gulf is going through a period of danger--danger at home and from abroad.

Oil started out as a blessing, but in time it almost became a boon. It has spoiled societies; broken up families; and made the bears and the wolves abroad bare their teeth, as they eye the Straits of Hormuz, the oil passageway and bottleneck of the Gulf.

Lebanese Style Disruptions Feared

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 8 Aug 80 pp 18-19

[Text] When the Americans carried out their unsuccessful landing in Iran to free the hostages, tension in the area was at its highest. Some Gulf newspapers stated that more officials in the gulf were pursuing their usual hobbies. Some of them were hunting, and some were involved in camel races. Observers were surprised by this lack of concern on the part of Gulf officials while the world around them was in turmoil. In fact this behavior was openly criticized by some Gulf circles themselves. But the rulers of the Gulf were looking at matters differently. They considered their preoccupation with sports on that day to be an indication of confidence. They were confident, and they wanted to assure people.

Although news of the stock exchange, of camels, of fishing and of social activity dominated offices and councils of the Gulf, there was a sense of anxiety in the air. Some [people] blamed the Iranians; some blamed the Iraqis; some blamed the Palestinians; and some blamed all foreigners without exception. It is said that when the offices of the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in the district of al-Shuwaykh in the city of Kuwait were blown up last month, 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Masa'id, the publisher said, "These are the harbingers of the deterrent forces in Kuwait!" He was borrowing an expression relative to the situation in Lebanon to refer to the fact that the powder keg in the Gulf had gotten close to the fire.

The general calm in the area of the Gulf which until recently was characterized by peace, began now to be tarnished by signs of tension. Like the Lebanese, the citizens of the Gulf do not want their countries to become a battlefield between foreign forces. They are blaming some Lebanese groups for making this matter easier. They are, therefore, not lenient with citizens of the Gulf who provide an opportunity for this kind of divisiveness. It is for this reason that the government of Kuwait took firm measures against members of the al-Mahri family: it sent them to Iran despite the fact that they are related to Imam Khomeyni. The fact is that strong feelings have been aroused against any cause of unrest in the Gulf, no matter how simple or trivial. The government of Sharjah was severly criticized last spring for allowing a popular demonstration against high gasoline prices. This was considered to be an introduction to security disruptions on similar occasions in the future. The case was the same when there was a personal dispute at a circus in the course of which one of the parties, a police official, was insulted. The police led an armored division to regain his prestige. Gulf citizens commented that if armored divisions can leave their barracks for such a reason, it will be possible for them to leave their barracks for more minor reasons in the future.

In the Emirates, which is considered one of the most tolerant and open Arab countries, a feeling of irritation with the rivalries among the rulers began to emerge even with regard to the costly rivalries in development projects. This is because such rivalries would ultimately lead to divisiveness. A

well-known journalist in the Emirates said at a private meeting, "Shaykh Sultan has gained fame for building bridges; Shaykh Rashid has gained fame for digging tunnels; but ultimately we don't know who will cross over these bridges or who will travel through these tunnels." He added, directing the conversation to his Lebanese guest, "We used to make fun of the Lebanese people when they coined the expression, 'Cyprusize Lebanon,' more than a year before the war broke out in their country. Do you think they will make fun of us when the term 'Lebanonize the Gulf' is used in reference to us?"

This happened only 3 months before an explosive package blew up in the National Bank of Iran in the city of Dubai. [This was followed] by the explosion of a bomb in Abu Dabi, resulting in the death of one Iraqi diplomat and the injury of two others. The concerned authorities were bewildered by these explosions, and tried to impose a news blackout on them. Announcement of the incidents was delayed until news about them spread abroad by coincidence. One person who was on his way to a European capital related what happened to a friend who questioned a colleague employed at a news agency about the incidents. The agency contacted its representative in Bahrain, presented the news to him and merely asked him to confirm or deny it. He confirmed it. As a result, two information policy opinions developed in the official circles of the government of the Emirates. One opinion favored announcing such incidents as a kind of guidance whose objective is to rally people. Another opinion favored ignoring them so as not to arouse fears and uneasiness among citizens, businessmen and financiers, especially as the economic cycle of the country is picking up following a period of sluggishness in the past 3 years.

What Gulf citizens now fear following the incidents in the Emirates is that their area may be turned into a battlefield between Iranians and Iraqis. Citizens of the gulf are torn between their interests on one hand and their emotions on the other. It is in their interests that the area remain calm and stable as it has been in the last 10 years. Emotionally, they want the area to remain Arab in appearance and in language. Those who have this feeling constitute two groups: one group looks at what is happening in a neutral way and states that the Gulf states should stay away from the Iranian-Iraqi conflict and strive to reconcile Tehran and Baghdad. The other group states that the conflict is not an Iranian-Iraqi contest as much as it is a Persian-Arab battle, and that the citizens of the Gulf should take Iraq's side rightly or wrongly. However, the two groups are in agreement about the fact that their area should not be a battlefield.

It is the opinion of some circles in the Gulf that the situation in the area has been radically different after the fall of the Shah and the advent of Khomeyni to power in Tehran. During the Shah's administration, the Iranian-Iraqi conflict was taking place over Iraqi territory. In this sense it was remote from the Gulf despite the expansionist ambitions of the late Shah. Internal stability at that stage was different, because Iraq was not a direct factor in this stability as it is now. Stability then was

based on the unity of Palestinian-Gulf ranks against Iranian ambitions. There was popular power that was capable of maintaining stability. These circles are saying that the early effects of the Khomeyni wave, which were accompanied by fears on the part of the governments of the area over the break-up of Palestinian-Gulf ranks, have resulted in a tentative look towards Iraq to maintain Gulf stability.

Regardless of opinions on past or future stability, the Iranian-Iraqi or the Persian-Arab conflict is now taking place all over the Middle East. Because of its geographic proximity to the feuding parties, and because of its unique population makeup, the area of the gulf appears to be more likely to be ravaged by the fires of war. There are governments in the Gulf that believe that danger to the Gulf does not emanate from the Iranian-Iraqi conflict (in their opinion the Iranian-Iraqi conflict is a permanent struggle that assumes different forms) but from Soviet expansionism towards the warm waters. However, other circles in the Gulf believe that the foreign danger is more remote than the local danger.

In this regard a Gulf official says, "What we say is one thing, and what we really feel is something else. It is this lack of honesty which is dangerous to us. We do not tell the truth when we say that we are not afraid. Bullet-proof Mercedes vehicles have become necessities for us. I personally do not travel in my car unless I have a machine gun beside me. However, when one asks a Gulf citizen what he is afraid of, he gives a vague answer."

The old people of the Gulf still believe that the British would have the right answer [for this problem], because they ruled the area for a long period of time, and know its ins and outs more than anyone else. But nationalists among the people of the Gulf consider the Iranian-Gulf problem to be a problem created by the British. They regard the internal divisions as well as the border problems between Iraq and Iran to be creations of the British also. The matter came close to the brink of war more than once between Iraq and Kuwait; more than once between the Sultanate of Oman and the Emirates; and more than once between the Emirates and Saudi Arabi over the al-Barimi Oasis before agreement about it was reached. The matter is the same between the Emirates and Iran regarding the islands which the Shah occupied right after the British left [the area] in accordance with an agreement he had with them. And there are problems even between Bahrain and Qatar over an island that does not [even] appear on the map!

The bitterness Gulf residents feel towards the British is unequalled these days by anything but their lack of trust of the American umbrella, which exists only because of the Soviet threat, as acknowledged by U.S. officials themselves. In case of a Soviet threat to the Gulf, the Americans will not interfere unless they are "asked to do so by the friendly governments in the area." A western newspaper responded to this U.S. condition by asking a question to which Washington does not respond: "What if unfriendly governments were to be set up in the area?" This question assumes that U.S. policy regarding the Gulf has not changed, and that the Americans would interfere against a direct Soviet threat. However, in case of internal

disturbances, they would find no fault with having one of the regional powers interfere to establish its control over the area. This role that had been designed for the Shah before he fell.

The West in this context views the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the same way it viewed the incursions of the Cossacks during the reigns of the Czars of the 19th century. This view may be summarized in the writings of the British diplomat George Kurzon about the Russian invasion in Asia under the title, RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA IN 1889 AND THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN PROBLEM. This was the time when Britain was playing the current U.S. role on the Asian continent. Kurzon says in his book, "Belief in the permanence of Russia and in the Russian invasion is an important factor in explaining the basis of Russia's strength. Forward progress, whether it be achieved voluntarily or under the pressure of circumstances is a matter that one cannot regret or retract. No return tickets were issued to the advancing Cossack troops, and [their] advancement was followed by annexation [that was carried out] under the slogan of "I will stay where I am." This is a French slogan, "J'y suis J'y reste." Enflaming the situation with Russia so as to force it to withdraw for peace, for economic considerations or to protect the lives of men is of no avail. The hornet's nest that is being built over [the country that is being invaded] is not followed by the withdrawal of the interfering party, but rather by the wholesale extermination of the rebelling wretches."

The Americans, like the British, know that there can be no going back on the Soviet control of Afghanistan. They know that the next step that will be taken in Asia is towards the Gulf. They are convinced, despite the propaganda campaign and the din in the media that the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan has achieved its objectives. This is what U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said openly when he was interviewed last week by U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT.

In responding to a question in that regard about whether or not the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan had failed, Brown said, "No, it did not fail. I believe that the Soviets did achieve what they felt they needed to achieve, and that is removing the possibility that a non-Marxist Islamic government assume power in Kabul. The Soviets wanted control over the population centers and the basic roads, and they wanted to impose indirect political and military pressure on the neighboring countries and on the Gulf region."

The U.S. secretary of defense devoted most of his discussion to the Gulf region. He said, "European interests in the Gulf are far greater than those of the United States. When the United States defends the Gulf, it does so in behalf of the Europeans and the Japanese who cannot do so." Brown does, however, agree with the Europeans that defending the Gulf is not merely a matter of military capability, but that it rather requires the establishment of stability in the countries of the Gulf. This, in his judgment, requires that military aid be offered to some of these countries;

that economic aid be offered to others; and that political support be offered to all.

With regard to the security of the Gulf in general, it is Harold Brown's opinion that "The countries of the area must constitute the first line of defense with regard to resisting political unrest, sabotage activities and attacks that are carried out in behalf of others." It is, however, unrealistic "to expect the countries of the Gulf to withstand a direct Soviet attack." This can only be done by the United States. It is the opinion of the U.S. secretary of defense that this is contingent upon the United States' readiness and its ability to continue to be prepared for such a contingency. This readiness is to be countered by political support to the area.

Brown disagrees with those who say that the Soviets' objective of advancing towards the Gulf or of overwhelming this area with unrest stems from their need for oil. It is Brown's judgment that the Soviets will not import oil before 1990, and that they will not import then more than five percent of the oil they need. They would be able to obtain that oil from the Gulf in a normal fashion. The Soviets' real objective in Brown's opinion is to control the arteries that provide western Europe with life rather than monopolize these arteries for themselves.

Although the Europeans are in agreement with Brown's theory for strengthening European defenses within NATO so that the United States would have the opportunity to place more of its capabilities in position to defend the Gulf, they have doubts about the United States' ability to play that role, especially after the alarming defeat of the U.S. military operation in Iran to free the hostages. This doubt which Europe has about the United States' capability has created a climate in European capitals, especially in Paris and in Bonn, that advocates coming to an understanding with the Soviets and sharing interests with them even in the Gulf area, provided that the Soviets help in the establishment of political stability in the area.

The Soviets in turn are using Europe's position as an excuse to further the doubts about the United States both in the Gulf and in Europe. They consider U.S. efforts to alarm Europe and the countries of the Gulf and Washington's rush to search for military bases in the area to be the principal reasons for tension and unrest in the area.

But unrest and stability, as one may deduce from the conversation of the U.S. secretary of defense, constitute a problem that cannot be determined abroad. It is the nature of outside factors, within possible limits, either to stimulate unrest or establish the stability. This is because stimulating unrest is easier than establishing stability, and this is exactly what happened in Lebanon and is still going on until this moment; it may even go on for a long period of time into the future. The European interpretation of Brown's statement, viewed in the light of the U.S. military failure, is that the Soviets and the Americans are in agreement at a certain point with regard to the security of the Gulf.

The Soviets do not stand to win anything from the stability of the Gulf, but they may benefit from its unrest. The Americans would win with stability, but they do not stand to lose much with unrest, and this is acknowledged by their secretary of defense. According to Secretary Brown, "The loss from unrest would be far less than the total cost of establishing stability."

It is in this assessment in particular that the fear of the citizens of the Gulf lurks: they do not fear a direct Soviet threat, but rather the absence of a reliable guarantee of stability. The Lebanese experience has been a valuable one for the superpowers. The lesson it taught is that limiting losses is better than an unguaranteed gain. Harold Brown's aforementioned statement signifies in sum that if matters got worse [in the Gulf], wisdom would dictate that losses be limited. However, the Americans' losses in the Gulf are losses from profits; therefore, their willingness to endure them is clear and well-considered.

Now that the winds of unrest are blowing on the Gulf from here and there, the expression, "Lebanonize the Gulf," is no longer ridiculed by Gulf residents who have begun to realize that the key to stability lies in their hands even though the key to unrest is in the hands of others.

8592
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

GAS EXPLOITATION -- A West German consortium has submitted a comprehensive plan costing 15 billion dollars to exploit the al-Dawm gas field, which is one of the largest gas fields in the world. The plan undertakes to build a gas liquefaction plant with a capacity of one billion cubic feet per day, to begin production in 1986. The factory will cost 3 billion dollars, in addition to the construction of a maritime station for lading ships, having a capacity of 500 million cubic feet per day and costing 275 million dollars, and other requirements costing 350 million dollars, as well as two ships for carrying liquid gas. The plan will necessitate subsequent construction of two similar plants to bring the rate of production up to 3 billion cubic feet per day in 1990. At the same time, the Netherlands Royal Dutch Company is undertaking to perform another study to exploit all of the [other] products of the field, such as crude petroleum and methanol, to use them to operate the aluminum mill, and to produce fertiliser and household fuels. The reserves of the al-Dawm field have been estimated at 120 million cubic feet of natural gas and 2 billion barrels of condensed gas. [Text] [Manama AL-ADWA' in Arabic 13 Sep 80 p 4]

CSO: 4802

ECONOMIC COOPERATION WITH KUWAIT DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 22 Aug 80 p 11

[Article: "Kuwait-Sudan Economic Cooperation Below Expectations"]

[Text] The latest issue of KUWAIT ECONOMY, the magazine of the Kuwait Chamber of Commerce, carries an article by Sulayman al-Qudsi dealing with certain aspects of economic cooperation between Kuwait and the Sudan.

After a quick review of the economic structures of Kuwait and the Sudan, Dr al-Qudsi examines the three main areas of economic cooperation between the two countries, namely, commercial exchange, and the movement of manpower and capital. Details of these three areas follow.

Commercial Exchange

International trade between the Sudan and Kuwait serves each country with regard to some of its daily economic needs. During the years 1975 to 1978, Kuwait's exports to the Sudan amounted to around 9 million dinars, while its imports [from the Sudan] were less than 2 million dinars. This volume of commercial exchange is undoubtedly far below our economic expectations. Kuwait imports over 91 percent of its total food requirements from various Arab and non-Arab countries. Its current food import list is estimated at around $700 million.

On the other hand, 70 percent of the Sudan's workforce are employed in agriculture. The Sudan also has a potentially large supply of meat which would satisfy the country's needs and provide a surplus that could be exported.

But the truth is that productivity of the agricultural worker in the Sudan is noticeably low.

Thus, commercial exchange between the two countries remains far below what is possible or hoped for.

Manpower Mobility

Relative to workers leaving their country, it is often said that the existence of workers outside their country brings the labor-exporting country 3 economic benefits:

First, the volume of national savings increase through the citizens who work abroad and transfer part of their income to their country.

Second, the workers acquire experience and training in the host country which increases their potential.

Third, the rate of unemployment in the exporting country decreases. This may be accompanied by an improvement in average individual income, especially if the exported labor earned very little in its own country.

The record of movement of workers between Kuwait and the Sudan shows that only 5,000 out of the 17 million people in the Sudan work in Kuwait. This represents less than 0.2 percent of the Kuwaiti population and around 0.4 percent of imported labor in Kuwait.

Movement of Capital

Dr al-Qudsi then discusses the movement of capital, which is another form of economic cooperation between the two countries. He finds that actual accomplishments in this area are close to expectations.

Kuwait, of course, has a relative advantage over the Sudan in relation to capital funds. Thus, capital flows from Kuwait to the Sudan.

As of the mid-1970's, the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development [KFAED] became the organization through which Kuwait's capital flows into the Sudan, other Arab countries, and other developing countries.

According to the latest KFAED report available to us, the Sudan had received by mid-1978 two loans. One loan financed the Sudan railroad administration's need for technical assistance, equipment, cars and engines necessary to build the railroad. The other loan helped finance the construction of a sugar plant in al-Kinanah which has an annual production capacity of 330,000 tons. The latter loan amounted to around 5 million dinars.

Such capital flow from Kuwait to the Sudan has favorable economic effects represented in the following:

1. It has a favorable effect on local interest rates and the balance of payments. At least theoretically, the flow of capital into the Sudan, especially in the form of hard currency, increases the supply of funds, and induces a decrease in local interest rates. Thus, it encourages investments and stimulates the volume of production.

2. It eases the dearth of foreign currency. Economic growth is frequently limited by the small amount of foreign currency a developing country has to import capital goods and basic materials for the production process. Accordingly, [developing] nations usually resort to borrowing, thus increasing their burden of debt to the outside world.

This is exactly what happened in the Sudan. Statistics of the Ministry of National Planning show that between 1970 and 1975, foreign debts increased at an annual rate of 25.5 percent, while exports grew by only 9.4 percent.

3. It promotes integration of labor and economic resources.

4. It serves to improve the distribution of national income.

Despite the above, it is important to note that rising petroleum prices may create undesirable pressures on economic cooperation between the 2 countries.

9455
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

PETROLEUM AFFAIRS COUNCIL FORMED--President Gaafar Muhamed Nimeiri issued a presidential order on 26 August forming a Petroleum Affairs Council in accordance with Article 5 of the Petroleum Resources Law of 1972. The Council will be chaired by the Minister of Energy and Mining, with the following as members: the Undersecretary of Energy and Mining; the Undersecretary of Finance and National Economy; the Undersecretary of National Planning; the Undersecretary of Industry; and the Undersecretary of Cooperation, Trade and Supply; the Director of Industry, Trade and Supply in the Southern Region; the Chief of the Geology Department at the University of Khartoum; Mahmud Ahmad 'Abdallah of the International Gulf Organization; the Director General of the Department of Geology and Mineral Resources; and the Director General of the Survey Department. [Text] [Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 27 Aug 80 p 1] 9455

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

NEW SCHOOL -- Recently, Director General of Technical Affairs in the Ministry of Public Works 'Abbas Ja'far announced that the ministry of education is going to build a school in the district of Abu Baqarah. It is expected that work on the construction will begin on 7 October 1980 and will be completed on 2 August 1981. The cost of the project will be about 175,000 riyals. The school will have 12 classrooms, a study hall, and administrative offices. [Text] [Muscat 'UMAN in Arabic 16 Sep 80 p 8]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

INCREASED TRADE WITH FRANCE--Syria is expected to import goods from France worth FF1.5 billion ($365 million) in 1980, according to French diplomatic sources in Damascus last week. This is an increase of about FF250 million ($60 million) on Syria's imports from France in 1979. Crude oil was the main commodity imported by France from Syria in 1979, when the French purchased 2.15 million tonnes of crude worth FF1.195 billion ($290 million). France, according to the sources, has reduced its liftings of Syrian crude in 1980 but has stepped up its purchases of refined oil products from the Homes refinery. The sources said talks on increasing Franco-Syrian trade would be held in the Syrian capital during a visit by Guy Carron de la Carriere, the Director General of the Centre Francais du Commerce Exterieur, for the 27th Damascus International Fair, which opened on August 20. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 25 Aug 80 p 5]

CSO: 4820

BOURGUIBA RENDERS ASSORTED DECISIONS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Yesterday morning, President Bourguiba met with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali at Essaada Palace at Marsa, following which Mzali issued the following statement:

The meeting with the chief of state concerned political, economic and education questions.

The president of the republic has decided to raise the price of wheat to producers by 1 dinar per quintal for the 1981 agricultural season as an incentive to farmers.

President Bourguiba was anxious to announce the decision immediately in order to encourage farmers and incite them to work even harder, use select seed and the necessary fertilizer and to wage a fight against weeds.

The decision fits into a framework of different incentives recommended by the special commission emanating from the Council of Ministers.

In addition, President Bourguiba considered ways of increasing the prestige of secondary school teachers.

The chief of state approved the establishment of a rank of principal teacher. The decision joins measures already taken in recent weeks to improve the situation of directors of primary schools, particularly in rural areas, and that of directors of secondary schools and the various classifications of education inspectors.

The chief of state also signed decrees relating to the appointment of certain ambassadors and high officials for Tunisia, including:

A decree appointing Mahmoud Besbes first president of the Auditing Office; a decree naming Noureddine El Joudi general comptroller of spending; a

decree naming Abdelmajid Saheb Ettabaa chairman of the board of the Tunisian Trade Office; and a decree appointing Raouf Henaein chairman of the board of the National Oil Distribution Company.

The president also signed a law concerning judicial cooperation in civil, commercial and penal matters and a personal code between Tunisia and Kuwait.

11,464
CSO: 4400

MZALI ADDRESSES GROUP FROM BRITAIN'S DEFENSE COLLEGE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali met this morning with a delegation from Great Britain's Royal Defense College, headed by Rear Admiral Whetstone. The meeting, held at the Government Palace at Kashah, was attended by Slaheddine Baly, minister of national defense, Mezri Chekir, chief of staff of the prime minister, and the British ambassador to Tunis.

Prime Minister Mzali outlined the major points and guidelines of Tunisian policies. "In the course of our struggle for national liberation," he said, "we waged a political fight without hatred and without rancor to achieve the independence and emancipation of our country. In the same spirit and based on the same values, we have, once our independence was won, stretched out our hand to all countries for mutual cooperation."

The prime minister also sketched the history of Tunisia, a land of moderation, good sense and dialog, a meeting place of characteristics typical of its genius and vocation.

Tunisia is a Muslim country. Islam is a source of tolerance, effort and brotherhood. It is located on the banks of the Mediterranean Sea, which is not an obstacle but a link.

Mzali then told of the historical role played by Commander in Chief Bourguiba, who is a "leader from the people. He embodies their personality and has been able to institute a direct dialog with Tunisians, who have identified with him. The Tunisian shaped by the Bourguibian ethic is a man who is willing to die for dignity and freedom but who retains a human vision of things, who remains open in the friendly relations he maintains with all countries. The Tunisian is cooperative, but jealous of his independence."

The prime minister then described the government's action which joins two objectives: on the one hand, demands for justice and socialism and on the other hand, aspirations to freedom and democracy.

This balance is achieved within the framework of a policy and plan of economic development aimed at the creation of wealth and fair distribution among all citizens. In this connection, Mzali said: "The goal is to raise the Tunisian's standard of living so that he may be free and responsible."

This policy is articulated around major choices, including universal education. Some 80 percent of all school-age children are now in school. This education is modern in content, because of the important place assigned to living languages, and progressive because of the place given to sciences. It is aimed at eliminating the Tunisian's fatalistic attitude and making him responsible.

Mzali then told of the task of liberating Tunisian women and of the positive effects of the Personal Code, which is in the vanguard of everything done in the world. "There we have true democracy and true freedom," he said.

The prime minister also outlined Tunisian policies on population and family planning, a humanistic policy based on progressive legislation whose purpose is to make the citizen responsible. All these social actions have, because of their high cost, created certain economic difficulties, Mzali said, but we are determined to overcome them through our efforts and means, despite the inadequacy of our resources.

11,464
CSO: 4400

INTERIOR MINISTER DISCUSSES PARTY OBJECTIVES, PLANS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] In the Regueb delegation, Driss Guiga, member of the Political Bureau and minister of interior, opened the partial legislative election campaign in the governorate of Sidi-Bouzid, as head of the party's list of candidates for the elections.

Guiga went to the People's Hall to preside over a meeting attended by regional cadres headed by Mohamed Ben Rejeb, governor of the region, Mohamed Sdlah El Ouni, secretary general of the party coordinating committee, and Abdelkader Cherif, on the list with Guiga.

In his speech, Guiga first of all indicated that his colleague and he were running in the elections representing the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] and that they intended to apply the party program. He emphasized that they therefore had no election promises or commitments to make. "Our slogan at all the people's meetings is that the party and all Destourians are determined to remain faithful to the commander in chief, President Bourguiba, and to work to achieve the objectives defined by the party, objectives aimed at ensuring the community's common good.

Guiga reaffirmed the importance of direct contact with citizens as an exemplary method of work that should enable leaders to take up the people's concerns and better approach their problems. He recalled the frequent visits which President Bourguiba made to the different regions of the country during the liberation struggle, visits that enabled him to raise the morale of the people and arouse their enthusiasm.

Nothing could therefore keep the commander in chief from completing his noble mission, he said, neither passing difficulties nor the very hostile political situation that existed at the time because he was aware that the revolution would be successful only if started by the people themselves.

The minister of interior emphasized the need to preserve the same enthusiasm that enabled the people to triumph over the colonizer and struggle against all aspects of underdevelopment, obscurantism, sickness, deprivation and anything else that might hinder the country's march toward development.

"Our struggle today demands as much cohesiveness, solidarity, coordination and cooperation between all the live forces of the nation," he said.

Action of Government and Individual Effort

Guiga continued: "We are determined to guarantee the success of our struggle for development in every corner of the territory.

"However, our action must first of all reach areas requiring more than others the deployment of additional efforts."

He added that the political awareness now characterizing citizens must be accompanied by an economic and social awareness making it possible to eliminate all aspects of underdevelopment and strengthen national unity.

The minister recommended that a fight be waged against anything that might cause dissension and against the remnants of tribalism that could damage the people's unity.

He also emphasized the need to encourage a complementariness of action between what the government does and individual efforts to develop the country and guarantee all citizens of a life with dignity. He stressed that true development is subordinated to the effective contributions and enthusiasm of citizens.

Guiga explained that the authentic militancy of the people requires that they work for the welfare of all citizens, particularly those of modest means. "That is why the drilling of wells to reach water is one aspect of the militancy that we preach and an act of solidarity with the people, like the construction of schools and lycees and the development of land."

11,464
CSO: 4400

STATEMENTS BY INTERIOR MINISTER ON PARTY PLAN

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 15-16 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Within the framework of the partial legislative elections, Driss Guiga, member of the Political Bureau and minister of interior, presided over a meeting in Ben Aoun (Sidi Bouzid) on Saturday in the course of which he announced that the special party congress decided upon by the commander in chief will begin on 12 May 1981, a date coinciding with the 100th anniversary of the occupation of Tunisia by colonial forces.

The choice of this date symbolizes the party's determination to put an end to the aftereffects of colonialism and show its ability to launch the country into a new era guaranteeing all Tunisians of political, economic and social security, reviving their pride in belonging to this nation and freeing them from deprivation and underdevelopment.

The minister of interior added that in making the decision to hold a special party congress, the chief of state intends to provide the rank and file with an opportunity to speak out on the next development plan, which the commander in chief sought to make a mirror reflecting the suggestions of citizens and whose drafting cannot be solely the work of high officials or ministers.

The next plan will be a turning point in the evolution of Tunisian society in different domains, Guiga said. He emphasized the government's interest in regions with limited resources. Such regions will have priority when it is a question of distributing the fruits of development with the greatest fairness.

Guiga also seized the opportunity to stress the place which jobs will have in the next plan. The government is determined to offer employment to all those seeking it, he said.

Tunisians have the right to be proud of their achievements and of the great moral force motivating them, the minister said. They are firmly determined to bring about the failure of all attempts at demobilization and never to succomb to the siren songs aimed at sowing doubt. The people are perfectly

aware of the stakes of the development battle and intend to pay whatever price is necessary to win this historic battle on which the nation's future depends so much.

Guiga also stressed the preponderant place occupied by agriculture in the Tunisian economy, emphasizing that farmers are now capable of assimilating all technical innovations in working the land based on scientific criteria.

Far from lapsing into smug self-satisfaction, the minister added, the party has constantly reminded citizens of the needs of economic and social renewal and is constantly in the vanguard of the fight, always desirous of fulfilling the profound aspirations of the masses through perfect communion of the hearts and minds of the people and their leaders.

The minister of interior had previously distributed aid from the Rural Development Program to beneficiaries and laid the cornerstone of a socio-cultural complex in Jelma.

In Bir El Heffay, Guiga learned about the activities of the municipality during a meeting with local officials. On that occasion, he encouraged commune cadres to serve citizens with speed and devotion and to spare no effort in hastening the development of that rural area.

Finally, the minister of interior announced the decision of the commander in chief to create a delegation at Bir El Haffey.

Party's Strength

Guiga also presided over a meeting of the Jelma delegation in the governorate of Sidi Bouzid on Saturday. He emphasized the need to fight all attempts to damage national unity, noting that Tunisians everywhere must be considered as full citizens, irregardless of the region they come from.

The minister then emphasized that Destourians must work to provide conditions ensuring the success of the country's economic and social development effort through their fight against outdated traditions and complacency.

After praising the militancy found in the region of Sidi Bouzid, Guiga said that the party's strength resides in the worth of its members, particularly in their moral probity and ability to overcome difficulties, to resist and to withstand tests.

The party's strength also resides in its ability to regenerate itself by introducing new blood into its ranks and young leaders, which has enabled the party to be in the vanguard of the struggle and to constantly renew its mission, now consisting of eliminating all aspects of underdevelopment.

11,464
CSO: 4400

MINISTER OUTLINES MAIN ELEMENTS OF NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 15-16 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] On Saturday evening, Moncef Bel Hadj Amor, minister attached to the prime minister for Civil Service and Administrative Reform, presided over the closing session of the Economic Days in the governorate of Bizerte. The meeting was held at the Palace of Congress in Bizerte and was attended by regional cadres, headed by the governor, the coordinator of the provisional coordinating committee, and several heads of economic enterprises.

Amor delivered a speech at the meeting in which he noted that the Economic Development Days are of great interest in preparing the next development plan, whose projects must spring from the economic and social situation in the different regions and not from offices in the Central Administration.

Amor then turned to the coming decade and emphasized that the development effort during that period will require increased diligence and greater effectiveness. Drawing up the balance sheet for the 1970's, the minister noted that the results recorded have been good on the whole, with a growth rate of 7.3 percent compared with 4.6 percent for the 1960's. This rate is also very good compared with that of other countries. Moreover, investments amounted to 6 billion dinars, compared with 1.3 billion during the 1960's. As for financing from national savings, it totaled 75.5 percent of all investments, thanks to the increase in the price of oil, phosphates and olive oil.

Amor also said that the next decade will be more difficult than the previous one although the 1970's can be called "satisfactory on the whole," inasmuch as an annual growth rate of 7.3 percent was registered during that period. This in itself is a good performance, especially when compared with the rate of 4.6 percent barely recorded in the 1960's and with the averages achieved by other developing countries.

Furthermore, the overall volume of investments amounted to 600 million dinars per year between 1970 and 1980, compared with 130 million dinars during the previous 10 years.

In his analysis of the socioeconomic situation, the minister took up the matter of employment, noting that despite the creation of 40,000 new jobs annually, additional demands for employment have not been totally met because of the growth in population, which has been greater than predicted. At the same time, there has been a decline in the migratory movement, along with increased demands for jobs from women, which have also surpassed predictions.

Amor then outlined prospects for the 1980's, emphasizing that the current situation is good and can therefore serve as a point of departure for the phase to come.

He indicated that the new 5-year plan is based on the following points:

1) employment: the creation of 65,000 jobs a year and the absorption of unemployment;

2) agriculture: making up for the lag in the agricultural sector so as to achieve self-sufficiency in food; and

3) regional decentralization and development: correcting interregional imbalances and paying particular interest to the poorest regions, whence the principle of a geographical redrawing of economic regions and industrial distribution, not at the level of the governorates, but rather, at the level of delegations.

The minister pointed out in this connection that three studies are underway for the northwest, central Tunisia and the south. These studies have been undertaken by the government with the aid of the World Bank and several American and French institutions.

Speaking of decentralization, Amor said that the government intends to endow regions with the necessary prerogatives enabling them to take over their own administration and directly take charge of their own development.

He added that the achievement of industrial decentralization will necessarily be based on administrative decentralization so that there may be complementariness and balance between regions and economic sectors and in order to create incentives stimulating private initiative and encouraging private parties to launch development projects generating jobs.

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NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONDEMNS JERUSALEM ANNEXATION

Tunis LAS PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] The presidency of the National Assembly has made the following official statement public:

"The National Assembly, after having examined the latest events which have taken place in the Middle East area, events which threaten the Palestinian entity, peace in the region and security in the world,

- Given the stubbornness of the Zionist authorities and their persevering in a policy of robbing the Palestinian people of their rights by resorting to repressive and expansionist methods,

- Faced with the sad news which has appalled the Arab and Islamic world and the international community, by announcing the annexation, unification and adoption of Jerusalem as Israel's capital,

- The National Assembly considers this measure a challenge to international opinion and an obstacle to all peace efforts,

- It firmly condemns this decision which once more reveals the expansionist and warlike intentions of Israel which is defying international opinion and the feelings of all Moslems and Christians of the world.

It considers this reprehensible initiative a flagrant violation of all UN principles and decisions.

The National Assembly calls on international opinion and all peace-loving forces to stand up to these base manueverings to prevent Israel from achieving its expansionist aims."

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DESTOURIAN PARTY DIRECTOR COMMENTS ON UPCOMING CONGRESS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Mongi Kooli, minister-delegate to the prime minister and director of the party, presided over a general meeting at the headquarters of the phosphate group in Tunis yesterday. The meeting was organized by the Destourian cell of the Maghrebian chemical industries and the Investment Promotion Agency.

In a speech delivered on that occasion, Kooli responded to addresses by participants in the meeting and noted with satisfaction the frankness and sound thinking demonstrated by the speakers.

"It is a pleasure for me to meet with militant brothers belonging to one of the key sectors of the national economy," he said.

Dream

"As you know, the chemical industries constitute a young industrial sector that owes its creation to the prosperous Bourguibian era. Actually, after the country gained independence and following the consolidation of the government, the Bourguibian regime directed all its energies toward the path of socioeconomic development in order to assure all the Tunisian people of prosperity, thereby making an old collective dream come true.

"The establishment of such modern industries requiring high-level technological competency was considered to be in the realm of the impossible before independence. But Bourguiba's genius overcame all obstacles and accomplished the miracle of the establishment of chemical industries in Tunisia, just as he had previously achieved the miracle of independence and national sovereignty."

Bourguiba's Regime Created Men and Riches

"I remember that one of our French teachers at the Sadiki School during colonial times, a fierce defender of colonialism, used to tell us that 'your country is one of the most important phosphate producers in the world,

but they are phosphates with derivatives which you cannot extract because you have neither the means nor the men.' Those remarks and others along the same line wounded our pride. That is why I am proud and happy to be with you today in order to work together on anything dealing with this pilot industry which is based on the processing of one of the most important raw materials we produce and which the Bourguibian regime set up on the soil of our beloved land after creating the men and riches necessary for such an undertaking."

The director of the party recalled how in colonial times the Tunisian phosphate was sold in the raw state at modest prices. "Before independence, we suffered one of the most odious forms of exploitation of our natural resources. But today that the dream has become a reality, we have the right to be proud of the establishment of chemical industries in our country and to consider this as an achievement and a feature of development of Bourguiba's Tunisia."

Chemical Industries Help Form Mining Riches

Drawing the conclusions from the foregoing, Kooli emphasized that the processing of Tunisian phosphates by our own means in order to extract all kinds of derivatives prevents the abusive exploitation of that national resource by others for their own interests and confers added value beneficial to our national economy. This processing by Tunisia of its phosphates also makes it possible to create many jobs for Tunisians and proves the concern of the Tunisian Government for working our mining resources wisely by Tunisians and for all Tunisians.

It also shows that the Tunisians are capable of acquiring and mastering modern technology.

Professional Cell

After warmly congratulating the Tunisian cadres who head these industries (engineers, technicians and workers), Kooli indicated that the meeting fits within the framework of a series of direct contacts he proposes to initiate in the different enterprises because of the importance of the role of party cadres in these enterprises.

These cadres are actually being called upon to demonstrate, more than anyone else, a spirit of self-sacrifice and devotion to serving others. They must be particularly careful not to use their status as party cadres to obtain advantages or privileges in any form.

Kooli recommended that party leaders within the enterprises make every necessary effort to be examples, model workers, in their behavior and in their output so as to honor the party and increase its prestige. In this way, the influence of the party gains in intensity and its following among the people grows.

Vigorous, Balanced Economy

In response to a question from a participant, the director of the party spoke of the mission of the professional cell. He emphasized that the professional cell is neither a union nor an administrative structure. Its mission is essentially political. Above all, it consists of informing workers of party policy and its choices in the political, economic and social domains and of persuading them of the accuracy of that policy and those choices. Just as the territorial cell has the task of having direct contact with citizens in order to educate them, train them and teach them the party's principles, the professional cell must initiate a dialog with agents in the enterprise so as to enlighten them about the evil designs concealed behind certain positions and about dangers to which the smooth operation of the enterprise and its prosperity could be exposed due to the adoption of such positions. Seen from this angle, the professional cell needs more moral support than material support in order to facilitate contact with workers in the enterprise.

Speaking in response to a question about the place of industry in the Tunisian economy, Kooli emphasized that the challenge of development facing the Tunisian Government can only be won if we manage to build a balanced national economy in which industry, agriculture and commerce complement one another. "We are trying to see that each sector plays its role. Tunisia needs developed agriculture as much as it does modern industry and healthy, balanced trade.

"For the administration of all sectors, we are applying a well studied plan based on enlightened planning having the participation of the citizens themselves. The next party congress, which will be held while we are preparing to draft the Sixth Development Plan, will take up our fundamental orientations and set the order of priorities."

In conclusion, Kooli called on cadres to develop the militant spirit of which the commander in chief, President Habib Bourguiba, is the supreme example.

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GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO SOLVE PROBLEMS IN UNIVERSITY

Increased Student Representation Sought

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Hechemi Amri, chief of staff of the minister of state in the Office of Prime Minister and director of the party, presided over the closing session of the Regional Conference of Students in the governorate of Sidi Bouzid on Monday morning. The ceremony was also attended by M'hammed Ben Rejeb, governor of Sidi Bouzid, and Salah El Ouni, secretary general of the party coordinating committee in Sidi Bouzid.

In an address delivered on the occasion, Hachemi Amri emphasized the concern of the party and the government for improving the climate in the university and creating the political, social and psychological conditions that might help solve the UGET [General Union of Tunisian Students] crisis and promote the emergence of a student organization that will enable students to participate in decisions concerning them.

Recalling the speech delivered by Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali at the opening session of work of the committee to reflect on the question of student representation, Amri noted that the speech should serve as a point of reference for everything having to do with the future of the university, especially since the prime minister clearly emphasized the concern of President Bourguiba, the party and the government for the student organization and the determination of all officials to endow the organization with everything needed to make it a powerful, responsible, competent and outstanding body.

Amri emphasized that students must have the necessary courage to choose their representatives freely and democratically so as to contribute to the formation of an organization able to embody the aspirations of students and possessing the following and influence necessary among all students.

Amri warned students against those who set preliminary conditions for solving the problem and who do not want the problem solved.

He emphasized that now that the political climate has been rectified, there is nothing to justify the continuation of the crisis.

Amri noted in this connection that the reputation of Tunisia, its position and the future of its children must be placed above any other consideration and emphasized the party's concern for bringing young leaders into its action.

Solution Before Year's End

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] Driss Guiga, member of the Political Bureau and minister of the interior, presided over the closing session of the Region Conference of Students in the governorate of Bizerte Monday evening. The session was also attended by Tahar Ben Rejeb, governor of Bizerte, and other regional leaders.

After hearing the text of the closing motion of the conference and the remarks of several students who dealt with problems relating to university life in general, Guiga delivered a speech in which he emphasized that it is possible to solve all problems if two conditions exist: the establishment of a franc and sincere dialog and the emergence of a student organization that is a valid interlocutor in the dialog.

Guiga added within this context that the question of UGET can be rapidly solved because the government has clearly expressed its intention of solving it and of enabling students to freely elect their representatives in order to have a representative student organization. The minister of interior stated that the government refuses to impose solutions that could be interpreted as control by it or the party.

Concerning the method to be followed for the election of representatives, Guiga noted that while the opinions of the students on this subject are many and diverse, it is important to choose a method that will be effective and definitive.

"For my part," Guiga said, "I believe that the scientific councils of the schools and other establishments of higher education, led by the deans, can supervise these elections since these councils are entrusted with the task of defending the rights and interests of students. This formula would make it possible to go beyond disagreements on the structure that is to supervise the elections."

The minister of interior pointed out that the Union of University Professors can intervene to reconcile the views of students on this problem, but it must express the desire to do so itself because the government does not want to propose anyone, just as it refuses to intervene and remain the arbiter in the situation. The government's sole concern, Guiga said, is that a solution be found for the problem before the end of the year in

order that a special congress of UGET may be held during the February vacation. The government wants to find a representative and competent interlocutor as rapidly as possible so that it can discuss the students' problems and find appropriate solutions.

The minister said that in order to solve the problem in UGET, students must come to an understanding among themselves and forget -- even if only for the time being -- their secondary problems.

Speaking of the university's orientation, the minister said that this problem has emerged gradually in the course of the search for fair solutions that would reconcile the aspirations of candidates for higher education, on the one hand, with the material limitations and development needs on the other. But whatever the difficulties might be, the problem can be overcome. As is done in other countries, one could contemplate doing away with the baccalaureat and replacing it with a diploma for completion of secondary school not automatically conferring the right to go on to higher education. Access to higher education would then be on a competitive basis. Every school or establishment of higher education would organize competitive examinations to recruit the number of capable students, based on its capacity. The competition would not be organized all at the same time but would be spread out over official vacation so as to provide candidates with the best possible chances. Candidates could then participate in several competitions. Students would no longer have to go through orientation.

Nor does the government have a rigid position on this matter and wishes to find a fair method able to satisfy everyone. This would not be possible without concertation with a structure representing the students.

Speaking of programs and the content of higher education and the recruitment of professors, Guiga said that the government has endowed the education committees in the establishments of higher education with broad powers, including the recruiting of professors.

The minister of interior emphasized that the government hopes that students will participate in and make their contribution to the discussion of the country's current problems, particularly those affecting young people.

He recalled that the commander in chief, President Habib Bourguiba has demonstrated marked interest in this question, prompting him to call a special party congress to discuss Tunisia's current problems and the main guidelines of the policy of the party and government.

In conclusion, Guiga emphasized the need to safeguard national cohesion and coordinate efforts so as to fulfill the aspirations of the Tunisian people to progress and prosperity.

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AMBASSADORS', CONSULS' CONFERENCE MEETS IN TUNIS

Problems of Diplomacy

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18-19 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Yesterday morning the conference of Tunisian ambassadors and consuls stationed abroad was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, presided over by Mr Mohamed Mzali, prime minister, and attended by Mssrs Hassan Belkhodja, minister of foreign affairs, Mongi Kooli, minister attached to the prime minister and party chairman, Mansour Moalla, minister of planning and finance, Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy, Fouad Mebazaa, minister of information and cultural affairs, Mohamed Fredj Chedli, minister of national education, Moncef Belhadj Amor, minister attached to the prime minister for civil service and administrative reform, and Taieb Sahbani, secretary general of the Foreign Affairs Ministry.

During the conference Mr Hassan Belkhodja delivered an address at the beginning of which he welcomed the prime minister, emphasizing that this conference will be followed by other meetings which will enable the Tunisian consuls to examine the problems they run up against in carrying out their mission and to receive the prime minister's directives regarding the country's foreign policy, a policy which rests on fixed foundations and is defined by the chief of state.

He also observed that the changes which will take place within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will be of an administrative and structural nature such that they may respond to how our foreign policy is evolving with regard to both officials employed in our chancelleries and the increase in the number of Tunisian diplomatic establishments abroad.

Then conference participants spoke up to raise several questions, particularly concerning diplomatic operations and ambassadorial relations with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other ministerial departments as well as with international bodies and others.

For their part Mssrs Mansour Moalla, Abdelaziz Lasram, Fouad Mebazaa, Mohamed Fredj Chedli and Moncef Belhadj Amor gave exhaustive explanations

regarding development policy in Tunisia and the projections of the sixth plan.

We are presenting below a reconstructed version of Mr Mohamed Mzali's address:

Mzali Addresses Conference

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18-19 Aug 80 pp 1,4

> [Text] Mr Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister who presided over the opening of the conference of Tunisian ambassadors and consuls stationed abroad, delivered an address which was focused on the need to struggle against administrative routine and to show a greater interest in the psychological and patriotic sides of bureaucrats, on the need for and importance of integrated diplomatic representation, and on the Tunisian concept of cooperation with foreign countries taking into account the Tunisian character and along the lines of the Supreme Soldier's directives.

In this connection, Mr Mohamed Mzali expressed the hope that this conference will give the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the chance to give further expression to Tunisian policy, to strengthen the Tunisian presence and influence in both friendly countries and brother countries as well as within international bodies. The prime minister expressed his thanks to Tunisian diplomats for the way in which they carry out their duties, observing that he was aware, because of the official visits he had made in different capital cities, of the problems and difficulties met with by ambassadors.

The prime minister then observed that, after only 25 years of independence, Tunisia has managed to acquire great prestige on the international scene, thanks to the Supreme Soldier who was the first minister of foreign affairs of independent Tunisia, and thanks to his policies which gained for Tunisia the esteem and respect of foreign countries and allowed him to play an important role on the international scene.

And the prime minister added:

"All this has been made possible as well thanks to the good qualities that Tunisians have, and more particularly their strong character, their very extensive culture, their influence, their powers of imagination, and their capacity for coming up with solutions."

Mr Mzali referred as well to aspects of the Bourguibian policy, which is noted for its moderate stands, its firmness in defending just causes, its sincerity, and its loyalty.

The prime minister urged Tunisian diplomats to carry out their mission along these lines, in order to preserve the prestige Tunisia has won. After having achieve these gains, Mr Mohamed Mzali went on, duty orders us to think today about the future and to strive together with a view to strengthening the basic aspects of our policy and the Tunisian presence in the world by developing all the conditions necessary domestically and outside the country to firm up Tunisia's prestige abroad.

The first condition consists of making the civil service into effective machinery able to come up with solutions, and to raise the morale of bureaucrats; for diplomats are fighters who actively work to give concrete form to the government's policies and spend their time properly representing their country and [line(s) missing]

"Cooperation requires mutual respect among the partners involved and that their interests by reconciled," he maintained.

Furthermore, while mentioning the shortages certain embassies suffer from in terms of materiel and personnel, Mr Mohamed Mzali reiterated the government's determination to strengthen the capabilities of these embassies to fulfil their mission in the best of conditions.

The prime minister moreover specified that the government has decided to recruit specialized attaches in the economic, commercial and cultural areas for diplomatic representation to be effective and to take on a balanced character and so that embassies adapt to the surroundings within which they operate and best take care of the Tunisian colonies placed under their guiding hand.

Regarding Tunisia's foreign policy, the prime minister indicated that we must remain faithful to the special characteristics of this nation and bring our country's Arab, Islamic, African and Mediterranean sides into harmony, especially since we are defenders of justice struggling together with all free men in this world for the eradication of racism and exploitation.

"Because of this it is incumbent on the ambassadors who represent the chief of state and their country to be completely up to snuff on the government's policy, to express it as sincerely as can be, to defend it, and to aspire to even more competence and conviction in order to present as accurate an image as possible of Bourguibian Tunisia."

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MOKADDEM LEAVES FOR GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] Dr Sadok Mokaddem, president of the National Assembly, left Tunis yesterday morning for the German Democratic Republic, heading a delegation made up of deputies Tawfik Essid, Abderrahmane Toukabri, Habib Chaouch and Larbi Mallakh.

In a statement, Dr Mokaddem said that the National Assembly delegation will participate in the work of the 67th session of the International Parliamentary Union to be held in Berlin from 16 to 24 September.

The session will study the political, economic and social situation prevailing in the world and will take up motions drafted by the Preparatory Conference held last month in Oslo.

The Parliament members will discuss the situation in the Middle East and all the contributing factors and will look at development prospects for the coming decade.

"As a member of the Executive Committee and vice president of the Union," Dr Mokaddem said, "I shall participate in the work of the Executive Committee beginning on 14 September, and I shall also participate in the work of the Interparliamentary Council meeting on 15 September to adopt the recommendations of the General Conference."

The Tunisian delegation will also meet with delegations from brother and friendly countries in order to coordinate positions on questions on this session's agenda.

In conclusion, the president of the National Assembly recalled that the Interparliamentary Union includes 90 nations with a parliamentary system.

Dr Mokaddem and the delegation were greeted upon their arrival by Helmut Burke, ambassador of the German Democratic Republic to Tunis.

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LABOR COMMUNIQUE SUPPORTS GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 15-16 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] The Tunisian General Federation of Labor (UGTT) has issued the following communique:

The administrative committee of the UGTT met on Friday, 12 September, and Saturday, 13 September, presided over by Tijani Abid, secretary general of the UGTT. The committee examined the general trade union situation.

Following the debate and discussion, Abid delivered a speech in which he addressed several questions relating to trade union action in the present and the future, both on the domestic and international levels.

In response for requests for clarification from members of the administrative committee concerning the planning committee for the next UGTT congress, whose composition was recommended by the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party], Abid explained that the task of the commission is confined to supervising preparations for the congress and that the committee will have national and regional subcommittees open to all good suggestions.

Speaking of relations between the party's professional cell and the trade union in the enterprises, Abid emphasized that these relations are based on cooperation and that neither one can replace the other.

The secretary general of the UGTT concluded by stressing the need to strengthen ties and contacts between all trade union groups and to pay increased attention to the concerns of the workers so as to find adequate solutions for them that are compatible with the economic and social situation of the enterprises.

Following the meeting, the UGTT administrative committee published the following motion:

After examining the general situation in the country, the UGTT administrative committee:

Expresses its satisfaction with the liberal policy of openness and democracy which the commander in chief has recommended. It is also satisfied with the

premises of that policy emanating from the members of the government and the Political Bureau, led by Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and secretary general of the party. The committee wishes the policy the greatest success.

The administrative committee approves the principle of creating, in keeping with the recommendations of the party, a committee whose task will be limited to supervising preparations for the next UGTT congress. The administrative committee also approves the party orientation aimed at improving the atmosphere in trade unions so that the next congress of the UGTT will be held amidst a spirit of freedom, democracy, and in keeping with the UGTT statutes. The administrative committee will be called upon to elect the members of the committee in charge of planning the congress.

The administrative committee recommends that the Executive Bureau work to combine its efforts with other social partners for the revision of collective contracts.

The administrative committee recalls the need to continue the dialog with the government in order to revise statutes covering the Civil Service and government employees, national offices and companies, as well as special codes governing the various ministries so as to adapt them to the country's economic and social evolution.

The administrative committee reaffirms the need to reactivate the committees emanating from the High Civil Service Council so as to revise salary and bonus scales.

The administrative committee recommends that all workers step up their efforts in order to ensure the success of the government's economic and social policy within the framework of the national options defined by the current development plan, which will be adjusted in the course of the plan.

Tijani Abid
Secretary General of the UGTT

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MEASURES AIMED AT DECENTRALIZATION

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Yesterday at the Ministry of Public Works and Housing Messrs Mohamed Sayah, minister of public works and housing, and Moncef Belhadj Amor, minister attached to the prime minister for civil service and administrative reform, presided over a joint meeting bringing together high level bureaucrats from the two departments.

During this working session, held as part of the decentralization policy decided on by the government and political bureau at the time of their joint meeting of 28 July 1980, the two ministers reviewed the measures having a decentralizing impact on services for which the ministry of public works and housing is responsible.

It has been decided to provide each governorate with an arrondissement level of administration. Thus four arrondissements have been created at Beja, Siliana, Sidi Bouzid and Tozeur.

Measures have been settled on as well with a view to allowing the regional structures to serve citizens better. Real decision-making power is delegated to them and each region is provided with a local public works and land use subdivision as well as a construction subdivision and another for housing.

These measures will allow adequate coverage and coordination at the regional level for Public Works Department activities.

Furthermore, as part of a land use policy oriented toward promoting genuine economic regions, the creation of a structure for coordinating the different building, industrial, tourism and housing agencies has been examined at the level of the Ministry for Public Works and Housing.

The ministers insisted on the need to immediately take steps aimed at giving more flexibility to the management of administrative and financial affairs as well as raising the level of loans issued to citizens.

To this end, it was decided to decentralize budget management in favor of the arrondissements, by agreeing to delegate to them credit authority relating to the operating budget, based on an allocation established at the national level, and allowing them to completely provide for the management of personnel and materiel and guarantee the upkeep of public works.

Regional parks will be developed while ensuring that they are utilized in an optimal fashion.

Soon to be published texts will formally establish these arrangements and will define the new powers of the arrondissements. Another decision: power over public works budget credits will be delegated to the regional level with a view to simplifying procedures and permitting regional civil servants to more actively participate in the process of economic development. In this vein it was decided to delegate to the heads of the arrondissements authority over funds for studies and construction for projects whose cost does not exceed 200,000 dinars and to put them in charge of supervising and implementing them.

To this end, the ministers are agreed on the need to revise the ceiling for contracts within the jurisdiction of the regional commission of markets.

As for projects whose sums are between 200,000 and 500,000 dinars, the regional structure will be entitled to take charge of their implementation. In the area of land use, so as to permit local communities to manage their usage plans better, taking into account the citizenry and the requirements of socio-economic development, detailed usage plans and town planning regulations will from this point on be established and modified by decree, after notification by the local communities.

In this context, the development of a town planning code will likewise be proposed in the National Assembly to facilitate operations having to do with building authorizations, and for the approval of subdivision plans, which approval has already been decentralized and the procedures for which are going to be simplified, arhitects will be detailed to small municipalities.

As far as the National Fund for Housing Improvement (FNAH) is concerned, aside from preliminary case investigation which is already decentralized, decision-making will from now on come directly from the arrondissement head who will manage funds the allocation of which will continue to be under the jurisdiction of the national level of the civil service. The preliminary investigation of loans by the National Retirement and Welfare Fund (CNRPS) will be done on the arrondissement level as well.

State organs responsible for land management and real estate development, aside from regional agencies which have already been formed, will be represented at the level of each governorate.

Finally, regarding public buildings, it was decided to set up a commission responsible for appointing architects and overseeing studies for projects for which funds are being managed by a region.

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EEC INDUSTRY COMMISSIONER'S ACTIVITIES IN TUNISIA REPORTED

Audience With President Bourguiba

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 30 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Yesterday morning, President Bourguiba received in audience Etienne Davignon, the European Economic Community (EEC) industry commissioner, at the Essaada Palace in La Marsa. Also present were: Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy; Mansour Moalla, minister of plan and finance and Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, Tunisia's ambassador in Brussels and Tunisia's representative in the EEC.

After the audience, the European commissioner said that he felt honored to have met with President Bourguiba. I saw for myself, he added, the interest which the head of state attached to the development of relations between Tunisia and the EEC.

He also said that he had told the president of the republic how anxious the EEC was to define even more precisely its cooperation with Tunisia in spite of the difficulties created by the international situation and by the expansion of the community.

This definition will take place on two levels.

The first level is of a political nature in view of both parties' wish to maintain and strengthen their cooperation.

The second level consists in translating that wish into concrete actions in the spheres of commercial and industrial cooperation.

On this score, the EEC representative noted that these two subjects will be further discussed during his talks with Tunisian officials.

He explained that President Bourguiba's expressed wish to strengthen the relations of cooperation with the EEC is a very encouraging sign. It is important that we, Europeans, should answer that wish in a precise and concrete manner, the Viscount of Davignon concluded.

Let us mention that before receiving the Viscount of Davignon, the head of state talked with Abdelaziz Lasram and Mansour Moalla.

Working Relations

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 30 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Yesterday morning, Abelaziz Lasram, minister of national economy, and Etienne Davignon, EEC industry commissioner, chaired a working meeting held at the Department of National Economy and attended by, among others, Ambassador Ahmed Ben Arfa, director general of international cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and by Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, Tunisia's ambassador to the EEC.

On this occasion, Lasram made a statement on Tunisia's economic development drive, its objectives and the means to achieve them.

Then the two sides discussed relations between Tunisia and the EEC and their bilateral cooperation, in particular as regards olive oil and textiles.

Both sides stressed the need for united action, dialog and exchange of information on matters of common interest.

Lasram insisted that it would be advisable for Tunisia to participate in the agreements and negotiations that the EEC may conduct with other partners as regards the marketing of some commodities, such as olive oil and textiles, to avoid the snags and difficulties which have occurred in recent years.

He explained that cooperation between Tunisia and the European Community must take into account the objectives of Tunisia's economic development and must encourage new investments which will strengthen the options adopted in the sphere of industrialization.

Mr Davignon made a statement in which he described the working session as a "very important and thorough one" since it went beyond theoretical and general issues and dealt with very specific questions. It reaffirms, he said, the mutual determination of both sides to attach an ever increasing importance to relations between Tunisia and the EEC in spite of their own problems.

In this connection, he noted that both parties had mapped out several procedures to deal with questions presenting more complementarity, more security and more chances of success in the context of Tunisia's next economic development plan.

"We have agreed," Davignon went on to say, "on a method which will make our relations more fruitful and will offer more guarantees as well as creating greater understanding."

He noted that this meeting had given them the opportunity of fully analysing the relations between the two parties and of becoming better acquainted with the problems of their bilateral cooperation.

"Both sides are quite confident, and even if difficulties should arise we will be able to resolve them in a positive manner," Davignon concluded.

Prior to the working session there was a brief meeting attended by Abdelaziz Lasram, by Minister of Plan and Finance Mansour Moalla, by Etienne Davignon and the delegation accompanying him and by Ahmed Ben Arfa and Abdelaziz Hamzaoui.

Meeting With Belkhodja

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 30 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Yesterday afternoon, Foreign Affairs Minister Hassan Belkhodja met with Etienne Davignon, EEC industry commissioner, and with the delegation accompanying him. Were present at this meeting: Taieb Sahbani, secretary general of the Foreign Affairs Department, Ambassador Ahmed Ben Arfa, director general for international cooperation in the same department, and Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, Tunisian ambassador to the EEC.

After the audience, Davignon made a statement in which he said that the meeting had dealt with the assurances and guarantees which the EEC could offer to Tunisia and with the development of bilateral relations so as to make them more advantageous for both sides in the various spheres of activity stopping them from being one-sided.

He noted that the talks were marked by the same spirit of and desire for cooperation which had characterized the rest of his talks with Tunisian officials.

Lasram Gives Luncheon in Davignon's Honor

Let us mention that Abdelaziz Lasram gave a luncheon yesterday at the Hotel Sidi Bou in honor of Etienne Davignon.

Were invited to this luncheon: Hassan Belkhodja, Mansour Moalla, Ahmed Ben Arfa, Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, as well as Pierre Courtier, EEC representative in Tunis, and Andre Brink, the Netherlands' ambassador to Tunis.

Talks With Agriculture Minister

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 31 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Yesterday morning, the minister of agriculture, Lassad Ben Osman, received in his ministry office Etienne Davignon, EEC industry commissioner, and the delegation accompanying him.

In a statement which he made following this meeting, Davignon said that his talks had been a follow-up to those he had on Friday with Tunisian officials.

"Our talks with the minister of agriculture," he said, "dealt in particular with the question of improving cooperation between Tunisia and the EEC in the sphere of agriculture and with the future prospects of this cooperation."

Davignon also said:

"The minister and I had an exchange of views which enabled us to raise a number of issues concerning both Tunisia and the community. As a result, we were able to define a new method which consists in making a better use of the possibilities offered to Tunisia in the agricultural sphere.

"Finally, we discussed how to make it possible for Tunisia and for the EEC to expand their bilateral relations, more particularly in the sphere of agricultural cooperation," the EEC industry commissioner said in conclusion.

We should also mention that Etienne Davignon left Tunis yesterday in the early afternoon.

Davignon said at a news conference that during his stay in Tunisia he had talks with Tunisian officials and pointed out that these talks had given both sides the opportunity to discuss matters concerning the reinforcement of cooperation between Tunisia and the EEC.

After declaring that both parties had been able to define a new method which will allow the development of bilateral relations in various spheres, Davignon noted that Tunisia and the EEC have agreed to hold further talks which will guarantee conditions leading to the success of joint projects in the field of electronics and secondary processing of goods.

On his departure from Tunis-Carthage International Airport, Etienne Davignon was seen off by Ambassador Ahmed Ben Arfa, director general for international cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, Tunisian ambassador to the EEC and by Pierre Courtier, EEC envoy to Tunis.

8796
CSO: 4400

NEW AIRPORT TO BE BUILT WITH SWEDISH COOPERATION

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] The ninth day of study for economic development in the governorate of Bizerte was devoted yesterday to Sweden's participation. Actually, about a dozen Swedish enterprises participated along with Tunisian cadres and enterprises in working out certain projects that could be set up in the region within the framework of Tunisian-Swedish cooperation.

The day was directed by Hassan Belkhoja, member of the Political Bureau and minister of foreign affairs. It was held at the Palace of Congresses and attended by regional cadres, headed by the governor and the coordinator of the provisional coordinating committee, the ambassador of Sweden to Tunisia and several Tunisian and Swedish businessmen.

Belkhoja delivered an address in which he praised the Bizerte governorate for its initiative in organizing the days of study. He pointed out that the development days are in keeping with the government's economic orientations and prepare the way for a real boom, particularly in the industrial domain since cooperation with other friendly countries strengthens the development effort. The region of Bizerte provides favorable conditions and an environment for industry and a new airport is going to be built between Tunis and Bizerte.

Speaking of Tunisian-Swedish relations, Belkhoja emphasized that these relations are very solid, especially since Sweden was one of the first countries to establish bonds of cooperation with Tunisia since independence. The minister also recalled the visit made by the Commander in Chief to Sweden, which opened broad prospects in relations between the two countries.

Turning to certain aspects of Tunisian-Swedish cooperation, Belkhoja singled out commercial trade and the export of Tunisian products to Sweden and technical and financial cooperation in the agricultural domains such as livestock raising, fishing and gums. There are Tunisian-Swedish joint ventures in the sectors of medical equipment, household appliances and the infrastructure.

Belkhoja noted in this connection that in speaking about cooperation with Sweden, one should point to cooperation with all four Scandinavian countries, which are establishing solid ties with other nations based on sincere cooperation free of any complexes, whence the great openness of these countries which provide a market for Tunisian fruits and vegetables and handicrafts. There are also great possibilities of cooperation with these countries in the industrial and technological domains and the creation of enterprises. Belknoja emphasized that the important thing is for Tunisian businessmen to have sufficient courage and initiative to invest in these fields. Contacts are now being made and there is a sincere determination to meet commitments, especially since Sweden and the other Scandinavian countries are basing their efforts on planning and good organization.

11,464
CSO: 4400

PROMOTION OF AGRICULTURAL ZONES SURROUNDING TUNIS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Tuesday evening at the institute for education and refresher training for agricultural cadres in Sidi Thabet Mr Lassad Ben Osman, minister of agriculture, presided over a working session bringing together the agricultural cadres of the region, with Mssrs M'hadheb Rouissi, governor-president of the Tunis dstrict council and Moncef Ben Romdhane, director-general of the Mejerda Valley development office, present.

During this meeting the minister elaborated on several themes relating to the state of the agricultural sector in the Tunis governorate, the preservation of the capital's green belt, and the possibilities of extending irrigated perimeters to the Hessiane, Bouhnech and Kalaat Andalous sectors.

The participants felt they had to raise various questions which touched on:
- The extension of irrigated perimeters
- The mobilization of new water resources of irrigation
- The continuous upkeep of agricultural roads
- Setting up refrigerated warehouses and sorting centers for agricultural products
- Giving up certain plots of land belonging to the OMVVM [Mejerda Valley Development Organization]

In his response to these appeals, Mr Lassad Ben Osman maintained that it was high time for the promotion of certain rural zones surrounding the capital which ought to be slated to provide the capital with fruits and vegetables.

The minister of agriculture indicated that after having studied the situation in the zones he visited, several decisions had been made regarding it particularly:
- The completion of the installation of an efficient network of agricultural roads in the Hessiane and Bouhnech sectors
- Making the agricultural land productive in those two sectors, which are to benefit from water brought in from the La Charguia and Chotrana purification stations
- The drainage of most of the Mejerda valley land and giving it back to private parties
- Supplying the Borj Touil zone with drinking water
- Strengthening collaboration between the OMVVM and the region's farmers especially regarding experimentation in agricultural techniques
- Energetic struggle against unauthorized construction

9631
CSO: 4400

GRAIN PRODUCTION DISCUSSED IN DETAIL

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by Larbi Chennaoui: "Is Grain Self-Sufficiency Within our Reach?"]

[Text] During last June the Council of Ministers, presided over by the chief of state, devoted its work to examining the situation of the grain sector.

Since then two increases in the price of wheat at the producers' level have occurred. The most recent was the one announced in the course of the meeting held on 12 September at UNA [National Farmers Union] headquarters.

At the onset it should be said that the increases by themselves do not contribute very much.

They will only bear fruit if they are reinforced by other measures.

Of course measures are not lacking. They deal chiefly with soil and seeds. Their effect will not be slow to be felt. If one confines onself to the prospects offered by the climate, the nature of the soil and the human factor combined, Tunisia is in a position to fill all its needs without having recourse to importation of grains. Are we on the road to self-sufficiency? "That is the question."

Tunisia is comprised of three large-crop zones:

A humid zone. This is by far the best zone, since it includes very fertile land suitable for large crops. Everyone knows that the land of Beja and Fritissa, for example, have a productivity unequaled in Tunisia. In fact, whatever the climatic conditions, the production of this land never falls short of a determined quantity, in view of the fact that the drop in the rain gauge is never more than 30 percent in any case.

According to the least optimistic estimates this zone is in a position to produce 6,000,000 quintals (or 30 quintals per hectare). Its area is 200,000 hectares.

An intermediate zone (neither humid nor dry). This zone differs rather appreciably from the first.

Thanks to the action conducted by the Grain Office, production in recent years reached 12 and then 15 quintals per hectare.

According to studies conducted by the Office, production may go up to 20 quintals per hectare.

These studies take into account the drought, a cyclic phenomenon that occurs every five years.

The dry zone. In this zone production barely exceeds 5 quintals per hectare. Here the drought often takes on worrisome proportions.

Parallel with this traditional distribution there are a number of pilot farms (100 farms all told) which can meet the country's grain needs by themselves, because they are the object of intensive exploitation, according to the most modern standards, with total mechanization.

In the present decade production has not kept pace with consumption. Which is likely to contribute to an increased volume of grain imports.

In fact, in 1980 soft-wheat production per hectare is only 6.1 quintals (as compared to 5.3 in 1970). Hard-wheat production per hectare in 1980 is 6.3 quintals (compared to only 4 quintals in 1970). Barley production went from 3.6 quintals per hectare in 1970 to 5.3 quintals per hectare in 1980.

The importation stampede stems in a direct line from the increasingly prominent lack of adaptation between production, which tends to become stationary, and consumption, which is exceeding all estimates.

This stagnation comes at a time when there are less than 800,000 hectares of land that lends itself perfectly to large crops in the north, and 600,000 hectares in the central and southern parts of the country. All of these lands are far from producing the yield they should produce.

Several factors are responsible for this great imbalance:

First, the natural factors known to everyone (great variations in weather, a very irregular rainfall, a large pluviometric imbalance between the different zones described above).

Next, in the area where our responsibility lies, are the purely human factors. Some are a legacy from the past, which it would always be useful to abandon (the large parceling of land suitable for large crops, the use of archaic techniques). Others come from the inadequacies observed in agricultural orientation and popularization conducted just about everywhere. This explains the under-development of the land still manifested, due to ill-founded reservations and poor selection of the varieties of grain to be sown.

Aware of these gaps, the authorities are continually intensifying the orientation.

In the last two years they have established a map showing the nature of the soil, so it can be adapted to the right type of grain.

That is a sizable remedy that constitutes the framework of any rational action.

Self-Sufficiency is Within our Reach

The second step the authorities are in the process of taking is none other than crop rotation. It roughly involves alternating grains with starchy products. These two remedies are accompanied by orientation--constantly increasing and supported by the farmers--toward techniques that have proved their effectiveness. Up until now this praiseworthy action has involved only 200,000 hectares. It guarantees a production of around 6,000,000 quintals (30 quintals per hectare). It should be noted that this production is equal to that of 600,000 hectares located in the north, which does not exceed 10 quintals per hectare. Thus the difference in yield is enormous. According to the experts, the lands in the central portion and the south are capable of producing 3,000,000 quintals over and above this amount annually.

Theoretically, all these lands as a whole can produce about 15,000,000 quintals; which narrowly surpasses local consumption (14,000,000 quintals per year).

In reality, our production will certainly not go above 11,000,000 quintals. Importation, however, will always be acceptable.

The Fifth Plan provides for consolidating the large crops in the north. Such consolidation can be conveniently brought about by:

Reviewing the seed varieties.

Using nitrate fertilizers advisedly.

Systematically pulling up the weeds.

Improving crop rotation methods.

Improving the soil preparation.

Taking increasing interest in the working conditions of technicians and farmers.

What emerges from this investigation is that grain self-sufficiency is within our reach. All that is required is to smooth away the obstacles and come to the end of reservations about the value of work on the land, insofar as possible.

In conclusion, one cannot fail to recall that increased grain prices at the production level are a guarantee of productivity. The latest increase, on 12 September while those responsible were holding a meeting with the farmers at UNA headquarters, brings the price of wheat per quintal at the production level to 9d,500 [expansion unknown].

This gesture is proof of the authorities' interest in the grain sector.

8946
CSO: 4400

INCENTIVES GIVEN TO AGRICULTURE TO PROMOTE PRODUCTION

Self-Sufficiency in Food Sought

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 14 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] Within the framework of the campaign for the partial legislative elections in the governorate of Sidi Bouzid, Driss Guia, member of the Political Bureau and minister of Interior, presided over a people's meeting in Ouled Haffouz on Friday evening. The meeting was attended by regional cadres, headed by the governor and the secretary general of the party coordinating committee in Sidi Bouzid.

Guiga delivered a speech at the meeting in which he discussed the role of national organizations in national life and the task awaiting Tunisians in the current phase of the country's march toward development.

In this connection, the minister called upon organizations to place their action within a patriotic perspective and to put the country's higher interest over any other consideration. He said that national organizations must work to serve the interest of the Tunisian people as a whole, not a given social class. He also emphasized the need to work for national unity and to remain faithful to the principles of the party and its leadership, while warning against secondary quarrels. "The real battle which Tunisians must wage is the battle for the country's development, in order to achieve economic and social propserity for the Tunisian people," Guiga said, while at the same time recalling the fight waged by the Tunisian people led by President Bourguiba in order to gain access to independence.

The minister emphasized that the party which led that fight continues to guide the Tunisian people toward economic and social progress in all domains. He called on citizens to spare no effort in uniting around the party just as in the time of the liberation struggle in order to ensure the success of the development battle in which Tunisia and all its forces are engaged.

Conforming to national imperatives does not prevent a diversity of opinions, however, Guiga said. Every person is asked to express his opinion and to make proposals for the good of the community.

The minister then took up a number of economic questions, emphasizing the choice spot occupied by agriculture and its development in the government's economic policy.

He mentioned the different incentives which President Bourguiba has ordered to be given to farmers to encourage an increase in farm production. Guiga stressed that the objective assigned to agriculture is to ensure the country's self-sufficiency in food, noting that the incentives which the chief of state has ordered for farmers and his concern for them should cause them to remain faithful to President Bourguiba and give their absolute support to the party as they did during the liberation struggle.

It should be noted that in the course of his visit to Ouled Haffouz, the minister of interior laid the cornerstone of the People's Hall and presided over the official opening of the regional almond festival. He also gave an official send-off to a drinking water project for Chouachia, Mbarkla and Hanla and distributed aid to small farmers within the framework of the Rural Development Program.

Importation of Livestock

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] At the Farmers Hall yesterday, Minister of Agriculture Lassad Ben Osman presided over the first meeting of the National Livestock Raising Federation.

In his address, the minister of agriculture recalled the privileged spot occupied by agriculture in the national economy and the means necessary in order to achieve the objective of self-sufficiency. The government intervenes only for training and in order to provide farmers with the means needed to increase production and yield.

Ben Osman indicated that the convergent action of UNA [National Farmers Union] and the Ministry of AGriculture should give a new boost to work toward objectives set forth by the plan.

In his speech, the president of the National Livestock Raising Federation described the disturbing situation of the sector.

After the difficult years of the drought, which gravely affected livestock and forced breeders to make enormous sacrifices, the government has proceeded to make massive imports of milk cows to rebuild the existing herd and get milk production off to a new start.

The participants asked for general application of the price of milk to producers at 130 millimes, the establishment of regional milk collection centers and the availability of sufficient quantities of concetrate to livestock breeders. They also asked for a revision of terms for agricultural loans and the proper priority for livestock raising.

In order to make breeders aware of the importance of selective breeding in increasing production and achieve self-financing, participants asked for the establishment of permanent regional organizations which would regulate the market and the liberalization of the price of beef.

In response to questions and suggestions, Ben Osman said that the Ministry of Agriculture has taken a series of measures aimed at correcting insufficiencies and at rehabilitating the livestock sector.

In keeping with the objectives of the Sixth Plan, it has been decided to import 40,000 head of livestock, including 20,000 milk cows, in order to improve the existing herd and step up milk production.

Some 5,000 head will be brought in every year, with priority being given to regions having irrigated areas and to breeders with suitable knowledge and means. It has also been decided to rehabilitate the Hbibia livestock raising center where 2,000 milk cows have been sent.

Ben Osman said that he was optimistic about the future of the cattle raising sector, which will enjoy great growth over the next 2 years, he said.

He recommended that thought be given to adaption of the milk industries' means, where powdered milk is currently used while awaiting production of fresh milk. The minister emphasized that the country will be self-sufficient in meat and perhaps even capable of exporting it if conditions favorable to livestock raising are created.

Ben Osman noted that there is no problem with freeing beef prices if the proper steps are taken to protect the consumer.

The minister of agriculture concluded that all these measures will tend to ensure the country's food security. By supplying material and technical assistance, the government intends to reach the objective of self-sufficiency and lighten the heavy burden now resting on the economy because of the importation of large quantities of meat and milk.

More Credits to Agriculture

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 13 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] On the eve of the new crop season, Mohamed Ghedira, president of UNA, went to the Farmers Hall yesterday morning to preside over the first meeting of the national committee for major crops.

After emphasizing the difficulties caused by the growing grain shortage, the president of UNA described the means needed to undertake the fight for self-sufficiency in grains and reduce the country's dependency on foreign countries.

After a brief speech by the president of UNA, there was a reading of the evaluation of the previous season and of preparations underway for 1981.

The amount of arable land increased during the past season by 3 percent and the use of select seed by 90 percent, going from 115,000 quintals to 220,000 quintals in 1980. Despite praiseworthy efforts made by farmers and an encouraging beginning, the drought which lasted 2 months hurt production considerably, especially in the Northwest.

Production, estimated at 11 million quintals, is under the estimates stated in the Fifth Plan.

The evaluation report enumerates problems hindering development of the agricultural sector and makes recommendations to farmers and others involved in production.

Aid to small farmers, which use 65 percent of all arable land, the spreading of agricultural experiments in the regions of the Northwest, the extension of credits to small farmers and the restoration of the storage infrastructure constitute the main points developed.

In their speeches, those present formulated their request for a revision of terms governing loans. The excessive taxation (between 5 and 6 percent) worsens the farmer's indebtedness.

Among the other problems mentioned were the lack of fertilizer and the shortage of storage space.

In addition to tardy supply deliveries due to transport and storage difficulties, crates do not always arrive with their normal weight.

Those at the meeting noted that storage problems result from the low storage fee charged cooperatives which handle the marketing and purchase of production. Set at the beginning of 1964, this rate does not even suffice to cover transport costs. The lack of cover (awnings, wood) is an additional threat to crops, which may be hurt by rainfall this season with abrupt changes in climate.

After the discussion, Ghedira informed farmers and others present of the decision made by the president of the republic to raise the price of grain to producers by 1 dinar per quintal. The decision, the second made by the president (the first was made on 20 March 1980 and amounted to 1 dinar), is applicable to the 1980-1981 season. It is aimed at encouraging farmers to work for self-sufficiency within the next 2 years.

Ghedira also announced that between now and 15 October, large farmers will be able to receive larger loans in order to better prepare for this season.

For every hectare, the farmer may receive a credit varying between 50 and 80 dinars. The farmer must evaluate the amount depending on his needs and his ability to repay the loan.

Regarding small and average-size farmers, delegates and local committees of the regions involved must decide upon the granting of credits as soon as possible. The president of UNA informed those at the meeting that loans for the purchase of fertilizer will be granted to farmers starting next year.

Ghedira said that this new move shows the government's interest in the agricultural sector, which is called upon to play a more dynamic role in the national economy in order to reach self-sufficiency in food.

11,464
CSO: 4400

NEW FISHING PRODUCTS GROUP TO BE SET UP

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 14 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by Larbi Chennaoui]

[Text] At a meeting attended by Minister of Agriculture Lassad Ben Osman, a group of fishing products canners, Mohsen Hamza, general commissioner for fishing, and Slaheddine Ben Dai, president of the Fishing Federation, it was decided to establish an Interprofessional Fishing Products Group (GIPP) and to do everything possible so that the organization might go into operation as soon as possible.

How did the idea of setting up GIPP emerge? What will its prerogatives be? Is it possible to predict the impact it will have on the fishing sector?

In order to organize and improve both the canning and freezing of seafood such as shrimp, octopus, squid, cuttlefish, and so on, and given the problems of hygiene involved, the industry decided to group producers in a private organization to be known as GIPP.

Naturally, GIPP was not created from nothing, for it is true that GICA (Interprofessional Food Canning Group) already partially represents the profession. Actually, this organizations includes all fishing products canners.

The advent of the General Commissionership for Fishing made it possible to connect all fishing activities.

Being basically an administrative organization, the Commissionership is not capable of responding to all demands, particularly those emanating from the profession. That is why it was decided to set up GIPP.

Several Objectives

Actually, GIPP's objectives are many.

The first major concern of this new fishing organization — which can only belong to it, in fact -- is to develop the sector. Such development will

only be possible if the producer is given every guarantee for the marketing of his catch. How can this be done? The answer is easy: GIPP's main role will be to take the surplus production and then market it on foreign markets, without this surplus being spoiled in any way. The best technique remains freezing. Given the existing conditions, freezing is not the sector's panacea; far from it.

In the opinion of Sadak Belhaj, deputy director of economic promotion in the General Commisshionship for Fishing, the processing of products for export is not well developed at present. It is a fact that these products are frequently poorly preserved or even spoiled. Consequently, they are sometimes refused by our traditional markets, which are France, Italy, Spain and to a lesser degree, Japan.

The problem is particularly acute with regard to octopus, now exported in bulk -- that is, without any preliminary processing. Some countries buy specific quantities and process them at home with great pains before reselling at quite high prices.

GIPP will fill this gap. Among its tasks is to oversee the impeccable processing of octopus and shrimp to safeguard the Tunisian label.

Regarding exports, GIPP will undoubtedly try to find new markets, particularly in the Middle East.

In recent years, there have been difficulties with the marketing of sardines. Actually, some countries refuse to buy our product in cans even though the sardines are of quite good quality. Consequently, some canners are determined to put new cans on the market. The form and even the metal (this is where the problems lie) will be substantially different.

It is to be hoped that GIPP will perform all the tasks it is assigned for the good of this vital sector, fishing.

11,464
CSO: 4400

INCREASE REPORTED IN UAE BALANCE OF TRADE

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 20 Sep 80 pp 1, 3

[Text]

Abu Dhabi, Sept. 19 (WAM): The Currency Board report on the UAE's economic development in the first six months of 1980 has highlighted the heartening state of the country's economy.

It said that the balance of trade rose remarkable in 1979 as compared to that of the previous year. The balance of trade was heartening in the first half of 1980. This is attributed to the increase in oil prices. It is expected that gas exports will play an increasing role in the balance of trade situation as their prices have been linked to those of crude.

Exports and re-exports are expected to register a big increase as long as Dubai continues to provide facilities as a free commercial centre for neighbouring countries.

Imports' value is expected to shoot up not only to meet the increasing requirements of local demand but also to meet a part of imports needed by other Gulf countries. Therefore, it is expected that the value of 1980 imports may rise to Dh. 35.5 billion compared to Dh. 26.5 million in 1979.

The report said that the rise in crude prices helped in increasing the surplus of the current account balance estimated at about Dh. 24.7 billion in 1980 as against Dh. 17.22 billion in 1979.

The report expected that the private capital flow and individual deposits abroad to continue at their high rates and with a limit of Dh. 23.7 billion in 1980 as compared to Dh. 15.7 billion in 1979. This includes the deposits of the rising profits of the oil sector abroad and those of expatriate workers, in addition to other private deposits (private investments abroad) and other services.

The report expected that the capital account which only includes official transactions would continue to be in deficit but not an acute one. Official grants and loans are expected to reach Dh. 8.5 billion compared to Dh. 6.4 billion in 1979. Reserve item and associated items are on the rise because of the increase in the Government's net foreign assets which basically reflect the increase Abu Dhabi Investment Authority assets. The net assets' situation of commercial banks expected to improve.

The balance of trade surplus is expected to be Dh. 14.5 billion in 1980 as compared to Dh. 9.56 billion in 1979.

Regarding crude oil, the report said that the production capacity of oil refining will increase nine-fold in 1982 and production will rise to 135,000 barrels a day as compared to 15,000 barrels a day in 1978 with the completion of Al Ruweis refinery expected to go on stream next year.

The UAE will meet its requirements of refined oil with about 33,000 barrels a day while its exports will reach 100,000 barrels a day.

The report observed that the reduction in crude production was not limited to Abu Dhabi emirate alone but also covered Dubai and Sharjah. It also observed that the value of crude

exports had increased sizably because of the rise in oil prices.

Regarding crude exports' destination, the report said that statistics about them were only availabe in respect of Abu Dhabi from which Japan continued to import 33.8 per cent of its needs, followed by the US with 11.1 per cent, France 10.9 per cent, Holland 7.5 per cent and West Germany 6.5 per cent. Exports to Britain witnessed an increase after a three-year decrease with oil exports rising to 3.4 per cent.

Abu Dhabi gas exports increased in recent years and the exports of natural and liquefied petroleum gas were valued at Dh. 422.7 million during the first quarter of 1980 as compared to Dh. 98.1 million during the same period in 1979.

The report said that the UAE raised its gas prices four times during the first half of 1980 and production of liquefied petroleum gas will reach about three million tonnes a year.

The report does not expect that the Soviet gasline from Siberia to Europe will have any effect on the marketing of the UAE gas as most of its by-products are exported to Japan, India and other countries in the Far East.

Non-oil exports and re-exports will witness a remarkable development next year because the State is giving increasing attention to industries of which a part is directed to meet local consumption while the remainder is exported to meet the requirements of neighbouring countries.

Traditional exports of the UAE like leather, dates and dried fish are diminishing and are giving way to new manufactured goods.

The report said that the value of non-oil exports increased from Dh. 115 million in 1978 to Dh.238.3 million in 1979, while the value of re-exports increased from Dh. 1,790 million in 1978 to Dh. 2,706 million in 1979.

After the establishment of the free trade zone in Dubai, the volume of re-exports is expected to rise in 1980 as it was in 1979. Iran accounted for 30.9 per cent of re-exports, Saudi Arabia, 27.2 per cent, Qatar 10.2 per cent, Yemen Arab Republic 12.6 per cent and other countries, 19.1 per cent.

The report added that the UAE's gross imports during 1979 including re-exports barring the transit trade registered a sharp increase and were valued at Dh. 26.5 billion as compared to Dh. 20.8 billion during 1978, registering an increase of 27.7 per cent of the total imports of 1979. Dubai's imports increased from 60.9 per cent of the State's total trade in 1978 to 62.9 per cent in 1979. The share of Abu Dhabi and Sharjah registered a drop.

Regarding the 1979 transit trade, Sharjah continued to dominate it accounting for 91 per cent. The UAE freight operations increased in 1979 with 39 per cent compared to that of 1978 and their value was Dh. 1.2 billion. Their value this year is rise to Dh. 1.6 billion.

It added that in 1979 the imports of consumer goods accounted for 30.2 per cent as compared to 1978 including food and tobacco imports.

Capital goods imports registered a slight increase of 7.2 per cent while those of semi-processed goods registered a big increase – 114.3 per cent – proving the existence of small industrial projects in the country which depend on imports of such goods.

The 1979 imports from Western Europe and some industrialised countries dropped from 79.8 per cent in 1978 to 72.3 per cent in 1979, while imports from Arab countries increased from 4.6 per cent in 1978 to 9.4 per cent in 1979. Imports from Eastern Europe and China dropped during the same period while imports from some Asian countries increased.

CSO: 4820

RECLAMATION OF HADIRAT ISLAND DISCUSSED

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 22 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] Abu Dhabi, Sept. 21 (WAM)--The Executive Council held a meeting under the chairmanship of Crown Prince and Lieutenant General Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed and discussed the project of reclamation of Hadirat and Bu Al Sayaeef islands and making them one island linked with a bridge with the Abu Dhabi main island to face the expansion of population.

This project is implemented in accordance with the directives of His Highness President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan following his recent visit to these islands.

The project necessitates the transport of 35 million cubic metres of sand and the distance of the new island will be about 9 kilometres.

The Council also discussed a project for the development of the southern channel in Abu Dhabi which necessitates the increase of its distance to 300 metres instead of 100 metres and with a depth of 6 metres.

The Council also discussed the project for setting up a power station in Umm Al Nar west 7 and 8 which includes the installation of two steam turbines with a capacity of 160 MW for each turbine and the installation of four desalination units with a capacity of 20 million gallons of water per day.

The Council reviewed several issues on the provision of services to the citizens and the allocations of additional funds for Bida bin Saud and Al Zaala projects in Al Ain and the new financial allocations for the afforestation projects of Abu Dhabi municipality.

CSO: 4820

UAE MAIL RESTRICTIONS EXPLAINED

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 16 Sep 80 p 3

[Text]

Dubai, Sept. 15 (Ittihad): The General Post Office in cooperation with the competent Ministries and departments has prepared a list of the materials and items the entry of which into the UAE through the mail is banned.

The list has been sent to the International Postal Union (IPU), which in turn, will distribute it to post offices throughout.

The list was also circulated to local post offices countrywide for reference in regard to the incoming and outgoing mail.

According to director-general of posts Mohamed Ali Al Major, the banned items include arms and ammunition and their spare parts, butane gas lighters; celluloid or materials made of it; aerosols; radiating materials; explosives and other dangerous materials.

Other contraband items include radio receivers and transmitters unless licensed; pork and its byproducts; seeds; plants unaccompanied by health clearance certificates, pesticides; and medicines without import licences.

Also banned from entry by mail are toxic materials; narcotics; alcoholic drinks; political publications; pictures of wholly or partially naked humans; publications abusive of Arabs, Muslims, Islam or the country's symbol; pornographic films; uninsured gold, platinum, diamonds, silver and pearls.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

ACCORD FOR REFINERY EXPANSION--Abu Dhabi, Sept. 21 (WAM)--Ruler's Representative in the Eastern Region and ADNOC Chairman Sheikh Tahnoun bin Mohamed today signed an accord with a consultant company, Pullman Kellogg, for expansion of Umm Al Nar refinery to increase its capacity from 15,000 barrels to 75,000 barrels a day. The signing of the accord is considered the first practical step for implementing the project in 33 months. The project is part of the state plan for increasing the output of locally refined oil as well as for providing sufficient supplies to the home market of petroleum by-products. The plan includes similar expansions at Al Ruwels refinery under construction. Pullman Kellogg was the company which build Umm Al Nar refinery. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 22 Sep 80 p 3]

ALLOCATION FOR ABU DHABI--Abu Dhabi, Sept. 16 (WAM)--The Executive Council meeting under the chairmanship of the Crown Prince Lieutenant-General Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed, today approved the allocation of 81 million dirhams for the execution of several projects in Abu Dhabi and Al Ain. The Council approved, among other items, a tender for the execution of the 9th phase of construction of Al Ain roads at a cost of Dh. 46 million; additional works for the supply and installation of 33 KV sub-stations in Abu Dhabi and Al Ain at a cost of Dh. 21 million; a tender for the afforestation of 200 hectares in Al Fina area estimated to cost Dh. 8 million; additional works costing Dh. 6 million for expanding the airport road; payment of installments to contractors; the maintenance, repair and operation works for the Corniche Hospital air conditioning system; and the appointment of a consultancy firm for the water desalination station in Al Sela and for eight agricultural projects in Abu Dhabi. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 17 Sep 80 p 1]

UAE-PAKISTAN PANEL POSTPONED--Abu Dhabi, Sept. 21 (WAM)--Mohamed Khalifa Al-Yusuf, Director of the Department for Economic Affairs and International Cooperation at the Foreign Ministry, today received Pakistani Ambassador Rifat Pasha Sheikh. During the meeting, the two sides reviewed economic relations between the two countries. Al-Yusuf asked the Ambassador for the postponement of the meetings of the joint committee which was originally to be held in October as Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Rashid Abdalla will be in New York at the time to attend the meetings of 35th session of the United Nations General Assembly and will also visit Denmark between October 12 and 15. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 22 Sep 80 p 1]

CSO: 4820

MOROCCO SATISFIED WITH RESULTS OF FREETOWN MEETING ON SAHARA

Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Sep 80 p 6

[Article by Roland Delcour: "Hassan II is Happy With Results of Freetown Meeting"]

[Text] Rabat--"Freetown II was a big victory for Morocco when compared to Freetown I," read the front-page headline of the pro-government journal LE MATIN DU SAHARA on Wednesday, 17 September, following the analysis made by King Hassan II regarding the meeting of the "committe of wise men" on the conflict in the western Sahara (LE MONDE, 14-15 September). The sovereign as a matter of fact the night before, in his palace at Ifrane, had addressed the representatives of the Saharan population around Freetown in the presence of members of the National Security Council.

Created 2 years after the raid by the POLISARIO [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] against the city of Tan-Tan, this organ includes the representatives of the majority and the opposition. The king told them--as he had done earlier on Monday night in talking to a group of high-ranking officers--what his viewpoint was on the conflict's political and military developments.

"We can say that there is reason for great satisfaction because this Freetown meeting is a big victory compared to the earlier one (the July summit). Thanks to God, we developed policies which go hand in hand with our military successes," the monarch said. Surprising though it may seem, this analysis is supported by many official and semi-official commentators.

They note that the Freetown resolution recommends the institution of a ceasefire starting in December 1980 and the organization of a referendum by the OAU with the help of the UN (the Moroccan prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs had criticized this resolution, particularly those two points); but it does not mention the POLISARIO Front, nor the possible admission of the Saharan Republic to the OAU. Some people even go so far as to say that it would not be inconceivable for Morocco to agree to negotiate on the idea of a referendum in the former Spanish Saharan territories. "After all, neither the Moroccan government nor the

Moroccan troops were invited to withdraw from the Sahara, as was the case in December 1979 at Monrovia. Under these conditions, a referendum would have every chance of success as far as Morocco is concerned." This assumption however seems improbable since it would mean abandoning the idea held by Morocco according to which the Saharan people have already expressed their desire to be Moroccans on several occasions.

5058
CSO: 4400

'AUTHENTIC' REPRESENTATIVES OF SAHARANS ADDRESS OAU COMMITTEE

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 12 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by special MAP correspondents in Bargache and Mejjou]

[Excerpts] Freetown, 12 Sep--For over 4 hours, chiefs of state belonging to the Committee of Wise Men met Wednesday afternoon in Freetown, capital of Sierra Leone, to hear ten movements, associations, deputies and local elected officials from the Saharan provinces, representing the authentic inhabitants of the Sahara formerly under Spanish domination but now liberated and attached to the mother country.

Irregardless of their political affiliations and their domestic choices, every group testified before the group of Wise Men and before history to the evolution of the nation's decolonization process.

AOSARIO

The movement made up of residents of Saguiet Hamra and Rio de Oro (AOSARIO) made the following statement to the president of Sierra Leone, acting president of the OAU and chairman of the ad hoc committee on the Sahara formerly under Spanish domination, and other members of the committee:

First of all, we would like once again to draw attention to the fact that the AOSARIO is made up of liberation movements that fought colonial domination in order to achieve the unconditional return of these provinces to the mother country. The AOSARIO has set as its objective the struggle for the liberation of our people taken from their native land by the Algerian Army, which for years has held them in concentration camps in Algerian territory.

The movement, formed at the beginning of 1976, includes soldiers and resistors who fought colonialism. It also has cells made up of emigres from these provinces now residing in Europe, particularly France, Belgium, Holland, the Federal Republic of Germany, Spain and the Canary Islands.

In coming before the OAU Committee of Wise Men for the first time to defend the true aspirations of the people whose political spokesmen we are, we have

the firm conviction that this dispute created within the framework of the hegemonic policy of certain parties will find a just solution making it possible, in this hospitable land, to have a meeting of the two parties, which are none other than Morocco and Algeria.

We hope that to achieve this purpose, it will not be necessary to go any further. We have said that Africa is as concerned as Algeria and Morocco, naturally anxious to safeguard peace and security in the region.

Naturally, we do not know all the members of the committee. We can even say that until this moment, part of the committee has heard only the "sound of the Algerian clock."

Algerian Designs

Having said this much and in order to put an end to any misunderstanding, we would like to speak solemnly to everyone to say that the bloody events going on in our region are but the continuation of what the government in Algeria has, since independence, stirred up against the established power and against the security of our mother country Morocco.

Our country has undeniably proved to international opinion that the hand outstretched to Algeria was fraternal, as history proves, for it was from Morocco -- and no one can deny this -- that the military actions of the Algerian FLN originated. It is also in Morocco that tens of thousands of Algerians who fled colonial repression took refuge. It was the Moroccan people who consented to share their little bread with the very ones who, in return, decided upon the creation of a puppet organization behind which the army of that country has attacked, murdered and kidnapped our brothers and sisters from their native soil.

The history of that puppet creation is, moreover, nothing more than the history of a handful of influential men in the Algerian Government who have unscrupulously used Algerian nomads, Malians, Mauritanians, Nigerians and Moroccan opponents whom they manipulate, compromise and shape.

Furthermore, we naturally find this tiny group lodged in fancy hotels, stuffed with money and propaganda, flitting from capital to capital. It merely serves as an alibi and screen for an overall hegemonic strategy. These same individuals deny their relatives and roots to help a regime that aims to dominate our region. We therefore propose to your honorable committee that you go to the Sahara, particularly that part of the Moroccan Sahara once under French domination, in order to meet yourselves with the relatives or even the parents of those people, who call themselves the spokesmen of the puppet organization that we just had the opportunity to describe and to which we shall repeatedly have occasion to refer in our address.

Algerian-Libyan Coalition

While the Algerian Government had already exposed its double play, dominated, not by any authentic spirit of liberation for the Sahara as a whole, but by other designs, it has now called upon another regime, that of Libya, with which it shares its affinities. The events known to the people of Chad, Tunisia and Uganda are there to give you a taste of what we are now experiencing in our country.

For history and for international opinion, the Algerian-Libyan coalition has reached a stage where it is very difficult for it to conceal its true objectives because the time has come to account for that obscure past and especially for the lives of our brothers and sisters who disappeared into Algeria and concerning whom we shall accept no bargaining, much less distorsions of the facts.

When the Algerian Government claims to have nothing to do with this affair and particularly, when it proclaims from the rooftops that it is but a disinterested party regarding the destiny of this region, it is false.

It is false because the Algerian Government has always opted and planned in terms of the colonial policy laid down and followed by the colonizer, a policy and planning which were aimed purely and simply at the creation of a ministate that would have fallen right into the Algerian lap.

Tindouf

Allow me to make this clarification, which will be useful and instructive for the dossier which you have in your hands and for international public opinion as well. Regarding the 10 percent of our brothers and sisters, we shall continue to use these statements and accusations against the Algerian Government, which we hold responsible for their kidnapping, even their relocation, as long as the government which we accuse has not demonstrated the contrary by organizing a census and by agreeing to accept a committee of authentication.

As you know, the Algerian Government constantly displays the existence in its territory of refugees from our country.

Since the Algerian Government persists in its obstinacy, we have no other choice but to ask the UN High Commission on Refugees for a list of the names of these imaginary refugees. However, that commission has already informed us that the Algerian Government has refused to respect international conventions recommending the application of such a census. We have therefore understood that the Algerian Government is not refusing simply as a matter of form but because it is afraid that international opinion will discover its secret. I hope that you have understood because its attitude needs no further comment.

The silence which has thus far veiled the odious crimes of Tindouf is unpardonable. That is why we have decided to lift a corner of the veil and appeal to international justice. Whole families have been torn apart and subjected to constant blackmail because a relative was taken as a hostage at Tindouf and they face the worst forms of extortion. Children are tortured and delivered like cannon fodder to the intensive training of Qadhdhafi's Qadhdhafi's commandos. Those who have managed to deceive the vigilance of the repressive guards and get through the barbed wire have returned to Morocco and fled Algerian repression. Their accounts are an overwhelming indictment of Algeria and Libya. They describe Tindouf as a hell. They still carry the scars of torture and repression and predict a horrible future for those who did not manage to escape.

It is horrifying that Western opinion, so prompt to condemn any violation of human rights, should not have reacted to the calvary of Tindouf. Do all of our brothers have to be murdered so that men of good conscience will wake up? A murderous reality, one distorted by Algerian propaganda, is emerging and gaining in strength, unknown to public opinion but against it also, one resembling a holocaust.

Thank you.

MOREHOB

Speaking on behalf of the MOREHOB [Blue Men Resistance Movement], Bohoy Sidi Ahmed made the following report to the Committee of Wise Men:

First of all, I should like, before beginning my report, to outline the history of the movement for which I am the political spokesman and the representative to your committee. The MOREHOB was formed in 1969 in the territory under Spanish domination and it has cells throughout Europe and in neighboring countries. It is a petitioner to the United Nations and had an office in Algiers until the end of 1974, when it had to leave that country and break with its leaders, for it had been asked to deny the true purposes for which it had been formed -- that is, to fight Spanish colonial domination for the unconditional return of these provinces to the mother country of Morocco.

Bohoy said that in going to Algiers, the MOREHOB was seeking the opening of an office in order to be near other liberation movements, just as it had offices in several European countries.

Before concluding his speech, the representative of the MOREHOB read a memorandum addressed to the African chiefs of state and the Committee of Wise Men.

FLS

The committee then heard the speech by representatives of the Sahara Liberation Front, who explained that the Front has pursued its struggle against colonization for 25 years.

The representative of the FLS, Mr Zeroual, then drew the committee's attention to the kidnapping of Moroccan citizens of the Sahara and their imprisonment at Tindouf. He added that some of the kidnap victims have been forced to bear weapons against their brothers, adding that the residents of Saqiet El Hamra and Oued Ed-Dahab have expressed their will and renewed their allegiance of 1956 and after the recovery of the Saharan provinces. They have participated in the legislative and communal elections and actively contribute to the economic and social development of their country. Zeroual said that the only remaining problem in the Sahara is the one created by the vestiges of Algerian expansionism, which endeavor to cut Morocco off from the African continent by finding access to the Atlantic Ocean for the ores found in the region of Gara Jbilet, which the FLS considers to be an integral part of Moroccan territory.

Zeroual added that the FLS will remain faithful to its principles and will defend the territorial integrity of Morocco, just as it guarantees the security and rights of the Saharans imprisoned at Tindouf who return to their homeland. He asked the Committee of Wise Men to work for the liberation of the Tindouf prisoners because, he said, that in itself would be a historic success for the OAU and would help find a solution to the conflict between Morocco and Algeria.

FLU

In his speech, the representative of the FLU [Front for Liberation and Unity], Douihi Rachid, first of all thanked the members of the committee for hearing the views of one of the organizations which expresses the true will of the citizens of the Sahara.

He then explained the reasons that have caused Algeria to set up a puppet liberation movement. He added that any solution not taking the national sovereignty and Moroccan territorial integrity into account would not only not have any effect but would constitute an attack on the Saharans dignity.

In conclusion, he asked the committee to act in order to put an end to aggression against the Moroccan territory and for the liberation of Moroccan citizens imprisoned in the Tindouf camps.

Veterans of Liberation Army

The representative of the former resistors and veterans of the Liberation Army, Lahbib Habbouha, first of all said that the residents of Sakiet El Hamra and Oued Eddahab who contributed to the completion of the territorial integrity of their Moroccan homeland and who are setting an example for African liberation movements expect continental leaders to be concerned about preserving their dignity and the unity of their native land.

He then told the members of the committee that the former resistors and veterans of the Liberation Army are determined, if any decision should place the Moroccan nature of Saquiet El Hamra and Oued Addahab in doubt,

to take up arms again to defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the kingdom.

He added that the future of Africa would be extremely gloomy if mercenaries or nations with expansionistic aims should succeed in creating factitious ministates. He concluded that the authentic representatives of the inhabitants of the Sahara are proud of their Moroccan nationality and ready to defend it at the cost of any sacrifice because the national unity of Tangiers in Lagouira is more sacred than resolutions inspired by Algerian and Libyan greed.

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END

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17 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2203

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FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTESTS SECRET VISIT OF U.S. REPORTER

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Sep 80 p 1

[Text]

KABUL, Sept. 14, (Pakhtar).— The protest note of the DRA Foreign Ministry, addressed to the Embassy of the United States of America in Kabul:

Two members of the counter—revolution mercenary band named Shaiekh Mullah Mir, and Mudeer Mohammad Gul who have recently been arrested by Afghan authorities testimoned during an interrogation that late in March of last year a group of American journalists who had entered Afghanistan illegally from Pakistan joined their group.

The American jornalists, disguised in national Afghan costumes were carrying along a complete filming unit.

When the journalists were together with the said band the plundering members of the band attacked the Fateh Abad village of Surkhrood, Afghanistan, and captured three toilers who were engaged in the irrigation project. One of the American journalists instructed the thieves to first severely torture the workers, then stone them and then behead them and of course this tragic scene was filmed by the Americans.

Sometimes later the commentator of CBS television network of America named Dan Razer in an inteview with the Christian Science Monitor daily told a story that in late March heading a filming unit he had entered secretly into Afghan territory disguised in national Afghan costume and made a film entitled "The Struggle of Afghans for Freedom". The evidences presented by Dan Razer is the same that have been obtained from the plundering mercenaries.

No doubt, Dan Razer personally took part in the savage torture and killing of three Afghan

workers. As such this bloody murder has been committed on the soil of Afghanistan. There are some witnesses in this connection and the name of one of these murderers is known and he is Dan Razer, the citizen of the United States of America.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan summoned the Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of the United States of America in Kabul to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Sunbula 19, 1359 (September 10, 1980) and handed him over a protest note. In this note the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has lodged a strong protest against the illegal crossing of the Afghanistan's borders by the American nationals which is a violation of the sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and their participation in the incidence and killing of three Afghan nationals.

In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has demanded the trial of these criminals and asked the American side to desirably compensate the relatives of the demised persons for the material and moral damages caused.

CSO: 4920

FOREIGN MINISTRY DENOUNCES DAN RATHER 'CRIMES'

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 18 Sep 80 p 2

[Excerpts]

The protest note handed over by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to the Charge d'Affaires of the Embassy of the United States of America in Kabul is a manifestation of the interference of US imperialism in the internal affairs of the sovereign, independent and revolutionary Afghanistan. The crimes committed by the American journalists in Afghanistan were a flagrant violation of the national sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Among many examples of US interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan we can cite the criminal acts committed by an American television unit in one of the villages in the Eastern part of Afghanistan. Documents and evidences clearly show that the American television team not only violated the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan but also ordered the murder of two Afghan workers engaged in agricultural extension project in the Fatah Abad village in an attempt to make a sensational television film drawing a false picture of the situation in Afghanistan.

What is seemed more strange is the confession of Dan Razer, the head of CBS television film unit which was made to the Christian Science Monitor daily last March. He admitted that while he and his colleagues were disguised in Afghan costumes they joined an armed rebel band and committed a number of crimes including the tragic murder of two workers. The story told by Dan Razer is quite the same as the testimony made by and the evidences obtained from the two members of a counterrevolutionary band who are arrested by the armed and security forces of Afghanistan.

The tragic murder of the two Afghan workers under the instruction of Dan Razer is remembered by the Fatehabad villagers and the crimes of the American journalists are told here and there.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan had every right, on the basis of international norms and clear documents and evidences, to lodge a protest to the government of the United States of America against the crimes committed by the American nationals in the land of revolutionary Afghanistan.

CSO: 4920

MOSLEMS, SOVIETS CELEBRATE 15TH HEJIRA IN TASHKENT

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 15 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by Nikolai Obotov]

[Text]

The conference of the Moslems of the USSR, "the 15th century of the Hejira should become a century of peace and friendship among nations," ended its work in Tashkent, the capital of Soviet Uzbekistan.

About 300 persons, including numerous guests from 28 European, Asian and African countries took part in its work.

In the interval between sittings I had the opportunity of speaking with Mufti Zyautdinkhan Ibn Ishan Babakhan, the chairman of the conference's organising committee.

"It seems to me that the theme of the current conference makes clear the aims which its organisers have set themselves," began the head of Moslem board for Central Asia and Kazakistan. "I must say that the Moslem organisations functioning in the Soviet Union are taking a most active part in the struggle for peace and friendship among nations.

"To begin with, Soviet Moslems have broad international links and maintain close contacts with their brethren—in — faith in almost 80 countries. Every year large delegations of Moslems from other countries come to visit to Soviet Union. And Soviet Moslems make reciprocal visits.

"Representatives of the Soviet Moslem clergy", continued Mufti Babakhan, "take part regularly in international and regional meetings and also in forums sponsored by different organisations that come out for peace and solidarity. Participants of these meetings discuss not only purely religious problems, they are also discussing friendship, among nations, and the conditions in which their brethren — in— faith in other countries live.

"It gives me pleasure to point out that in the past few years alone Soviet Moslems have held six large international gatherings in which many well—known Moslem leaders and also the editors of Moslem publications in various Asian, African and European countries took part.

"On the initiative of the Moslem clergy a number of international conferences were held in the Soviet Union. Among them was the conference for the defence of the just struggle of the peoples against imperialism and neo—colonialism (1970), the conference in defence of the just struggle of the Arab people against Israeli aggression (1973), scientific conferences on the occasion of 1200th birth anniversary of Imam al—Bukhari (1974) and the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Moslem board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan (1976).

"If you remember, I made the main report at the international conference" religious leaders for a lasting peace, disarmament and just relations among nations, held in Moscow in 1977.

Then I called on the participants of the international Moslem symposium which took place a year ago in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, to make the 15th century of Hejira a century of peace and disarmament.

Believe that each one of these meetings has become an important factor in consolidating the ranks of Moslems and promoting better understanding.

"At present there are functioning in the Soviet Union the Moslem board for Central Asia and Kazakhstan with its centre in Tashkent, the Moslem Board for the European Part of the USSR and Siberia with its centre in UFA, the Moslem board for the northern Caucasus with its centre in Buinaksk and another one with its centre in Baku.

"In their effort to make the greatest possible contribution to the cause of peace and friendship among nations these four Moslem organisations in the Soviet Union are constantly coordinating their activities.

"We, religious figures, who are following the behests of the Holy Koran should spread the ideas of peace and international friendship and make our contribution to the cause of progress and prosperity so that all people should live in peace, well—being and happiness guided by the principles of goodness and justice. The Holy Koran teaches that the unjust will be punished.

"Celebrating the advent of the 15th century of the Hejira we Soviet Moslems realise that the current international situation imperatively demands a more active struggle on the part of all peacelovving forces, more effective cooperation of all Moslems and all people of goodwill in order to stop the arms race, to achieve detente, to thwart the aggressive actions of imperialist groups and their henchmen.

"I can assure you that Moslems in the Soviet Union and the rest of the world clearly realise that the drive for peace and social justice will be more successful if all people who pursue these goals will unite and expose imperialism, zionism, hegemonism, the enemies of detente and friendship among people".

CSO: 4920

PUBLICATION OF NEW YOUTH WEEKLY HAILED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 13 Sep 80 p 2

[Excerpt]

The publishing of "Darafsh-i-Jawanan" as an organ of the Executive Committee of the Democratic Organization for AfghanYouth is a firm and important step taken towards the enlightenment of the Afghan democratic youths of the country.

In the long history of Afghanistan this is the first time that a periodical is published by the Afghan Democratic Youths for the Afghan youths.

It is in fact the product of the new phase of the glorious revolution, the phase which has brought many changes in different aspects of the life of Afghanistan in the interest of the working people.

The commencement of this weekly periodical is an important event not only in the life of the Democratic Organization for Afghan Youth but also the entire people of Afghanistan. The Darafsh-i-Jawanan which means the banner of youth has been shouldered with very important and formidable responsibility to consolidate Saur Revolution and fortify the foundations laid for establishing a new world for the hard working people of Afghanistan.

We are living at a time when the Saur Revolution and especially its new evolutionary phase, dawned following the heroic uprising of December 27, 1979, has brought great hopes for our people to eradicate illiteracy from Afghanistan and let our people enjoy the fruit of progressive social and economic services to be rendered in the interest of the masses of workers, peasants and all industrious elements.

CSO: 4920

AGREEMENT FOR SOVIET ADVISORS SIGNED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 22 Sep 80 p 4

[Text]

KABUL, Sept. 22, (Bakhtar).—The agreement for the employment of experts to design and manage the workshops for the repairing of transportation vehicles of the state sector was signed between the Ministry of Transport and Tourism and the Soviet Company of United Export-Import of Prom Mash Export at the Ministry of Transport and Tourism yesterday.

It was signed by the Deputy Minister of Transport and Tourism, Dip. Eng. Ghulam Jailani and Bkaryovich Ginadi Yoginovich, Deputy Economic Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy and Victor Botov, representatives of Tekhno Stroy Export and Tekhno Export of Soviet Union to Kabul.

On the basis of this agreement some experts are to come to Afghanistan to gather necessary information for designing and management of the workshops in Kabul, Hairatan port, and Puli Khumri to repair transportation vehicles of the state sector.

A source of the Ministry of Transport and Tourism said according to the projected plan two workshops would be constructed in Kabul and Hairatan at the capacity of repairing 25 vehicles at one shift. And another workshop be built in Puli Khumri to repair 15 vehicles at one shift.

The ceremony of signing the agreement was also attended by some departmental heads of the Ministry and some members of the Soviet embassy.

CSO: 4920

VOLUNTEERS LEAVE FOR BATTLEFRONT

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 18 Sep 80 p 1

[Text]

GHAZNI, Sept. 18 (Bakhtar). — In line with great and historical decisions of the PDPA CC 3rd Plenum decisions, large number of activists, members of the Democratic Organisation for the Youth of Andar district, Ghazni province, voluntarily left for the battle front yesterday to crush the rebels, the enemies of our working people and progress of the homeland.

Prior to their departure a number of Andar elders while expounding on the role of the youth and real combatants in safeguarding the honour of the homeland and gains of Saur Revolution said: "having with us such heroes and youth we are confident that we succeed in our just struggle against rebels, the servants of international imperialism, Chinese chauvinism, Pakistani militarists and US world imperialism".

CSO: 4920

BALKH CLERGY BACK GOVERNMENT POLICIES

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 17 Sep 80 p 1

[Text]

MAZAR-I-SHARIF, Sept. 17, (Bakhtar).— Religious Scholars, clergymen and members of the Islamic affairs in a meeting held at the governorate yesterday expressed their full support to the new phase of the glorious Saur Revolution and readiness to work for the implementation of public utility programmes chalked out by the DRA government under the leadership of PDPA.

At the meeting held on this occasion a local government cadre spoke on the lofty objectives of the Saur Revolution and its new evolutionary phase, urging the participants to explain to the people the policy of the revolutionary government based on principles of the Holy religion of Islam and in view of the decisions of the Conference of Religious Scholars and Clergymen of the DRA.

In response Maulavi Mohammad Karim and Maulavi Haji Mahmoud on behalf of the participants expressed every kind of cooperation in this regard.

CSO: 4920

HAZARADJA LEADER DISCUSSES RESISTANCE, PROSPECTS

Capetown MUSLIM NEWS in English 5 Sep 80 p 10

[Interview with Said Ali Behishti, head of Hazara union, by correspondent of MUSLIM NEWS, date and place not given]

[Text]

Fifty-year-old Said Ali Behishti is the leader of the Hazara union — ten parties opposing Barbrak Karmal and the Russians in the province of Hazaradja. Behishti, with headquarters in the village of Waras, has managed to overcome centuries old rivalries to unite 2 million proud people based in the legendary Afghan hills. The area is laid among towering ranges, and the Russians have blockaded it trying to starve out the population. But the Hazara have held on fiercely to the region, creating a state within a state which, while challenging the Russians today, may one day challenge the Afghan nation itself if their dream of a liberated Afghanistan is not fulfilled. As Behishti makes clear:

'Once we have beaten the Russians, we will set up a genuine Islamic Republic. All will be equal, we will abolish all discrimination, ethnic or religious; even the Hindus will be allowed to practise their faith.'

According to Behishti 34 districts belong to the Hazara union and he was appointed leader by the first assembly. Each district chooses its four representative to a permanent assembly that meets twice a week to discuss routine matters. Five committees: war, economics, law, unions and culture, have been set up by the assembly to administer the region. Behishti explains how the committees work:

'Each committee is headed by a chairman and several assistants.

'The war committee is led by Hadji Mohammed Hussein. Eleven units of 2000 men are permanently under his orders. If need be the entire population will fight with this army. To back up our voluntary soldiers, we have established compulsory military service, but the duration varies from region to region and according to our needs.

'We have also restructured taxes and we fix the prices of basic necessities brought in from the cities outside. We have thus managed to avoid rocketing prices.'

What problems are there so far as the war is concerned?

'Arms, we lack arms. Nobody helps us out. All we have received from Iran is a small amount of money. We have only about 250 to 300 cartridges per soldier. And to buy these we have often had to sell our possessions or borrow. We have virtually no doctors or drugs for our wounded.'

And despite this the Russians have been turned back each time.

'They (the Russians) have never managed to enter Hazaradja. But since the war began, they have killed 50 000 of our people: many women and children.'

Behishti thinly disguises his disagreement with the groups set up in exile in Pakistan — some he says are CIA-backed.

'Victory would be easier if all the Afghans returned to fight in Afghanistan, then we would soon throw out the Russians, and chase them back to Moscow.

'I know very little about the groups set up in Pakistan. As far as ideas go, we think in different ways.'

On the other hand, he has respect for Ayatollah Khomeini:

'Khomeini's revolution was 100 per cent successful. He has laid the path.'

The Hazara mujahideen conduct the war against the Afghan army on the periphery of the province, trying to keep them out, for Hazaradja is 'free'. All the Khalquis (communists) were killed when Jihad was first declared, the tale goes. The army made two or three feeble attempts to regain control. But each time they have been forced to turn back: Hazaradja's vast mountains are no mean opponent.

The population's sole problem has been supplies. Last year, everyone was too involved in the war to think about the fields. Then the Russians set up a blockade of Hazaradja and hunger crept in. But the Hazara soon found a way out. Hundreds of donkey convoys began plying secret paths to the cities: Kabul, Ghazni and Kandahar.

And people went back to their fields: men working on small plots clinging to the hillside, their methods unchanged, with sleepy bullocks ploughing the steep fields with small wooden ploughs.

The tranquility of this setting does not, however, hide the firm resolve of the Hazara. As Behishti's lieutenant, Hadji Nader Ali, who spent five years in prison, since the days of Daoud, says:

'Nothing is worse than selling one's land to the foreigners, as the Khalqui have done. We have the duty to hand our land intact to our children, as our fathers left it to us. This is why we must throw the Russians out. We have no fear of them. Our entire people is committed to the Jihad.

'Do you know our children's favourite game? They make clay figures of Brezhnev or Karmal, stand them up and stone them to pieces. At four or five, they know already who the enemy is, and that he must die.

'As to our women, they push us to buy bullets rather than corn. So we will win. Even alone. Because the world knows what is happening in our country, but follows it like a game on television.'

CSO: 4920

REBELS ARRESTED IN HERAT

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 11 Sep 80 p 3

[Excerpt] Mazare Sharif, Sept. 11 (Bakhtar)--The Lackeys of international imperialism who are assigned by reaction of the region, in collusion with Chinese hegemonists, led by US imperialism to carry out terroristic and subversive acts will be arrested and punished by security forces, police, party activists with cooperation of people wherever they may hide themselves.

According to a report from Balkh a group of rebels who had hidden themselves in a market here and wanted to disturb the peaceful life and tranquility of people through subversive activy was recently arrested by security forces with the cooperation of noble people here. A number of guns were found with ruffians. Those arrested are under interrogation.

According to another report a group of rebels who were engaged in robberies and plundering the personal effects of travellers on the roads between Chamtal Shulgara-Mazare Sharif have been arrested by security forces of Balkh province and now security is ensured on the said roads.

The robbers who are being interrogated are Hakim, son of Zia, Mohammad Hassan, son of Khan Nazar and Sayyed Jan, son of Nazar Mohammad, residents of Chemtal district.

Similarly, Shah Mohammad, son of Khair Mohammad and Jan Ali, son of Baba Yadgar village who had committed terroristic and criminal acts in Mazare Sharif have been recently arrested and confessed to their shameful and inhumane crimes.

Likewise the brave soldiers and officers of Division 17 of Herat have succeeded in routing a group of rebels who had been disturbing the tranquility of people by terroristic acts in the vicinity of Herat city. Various weapons and thousands of ammunition have been seized from the rebels.

CSO: 4920

CAPTIVES OF REBELS FREED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Sep 80 p 1

[Text]

JALALABAD, Sept. 14, (Bakhtar).— According to reports from Nangarhar province 170 elders, women and children from Zawah village Nangarhar province, who were imprisoned in stables in Pachir and Agam sub-districts two and a half months ago by the rebels, the murderers and enemies of human beings, without taking into consideration the human dignity, were released by security forces and party members of that province recently soon after they were informed of the inhumane act of the criminal murderers.

Our oppressed compatriots were welcomed at Nangarhar provincial committee by party and government cadres and some Jalalabad citizens.

A number of tearful women and elders of the oppressed group disclosed the crimes and inhumane acts of the rebels, the functionaries of US world imperialism. They pledged every cooperation and sacrifice in eliminating the ruffians, the servants of US imperialism.

CSO: 4920

REBELS DESTROYED IN SAMANGAN

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 18 Sep 80 p 1

[Text]

KABUL, Sept. 18, (Bakhtar).— A large group of rebels was destroyed in Khwaja Baghlanak mountains of Samangan province and hundreds of the traitors and lackeys of international imperialism, Chinese Chauvinism and Pakistani militarists operating under direct leadership of US imperialism were arrested recently after armed clashes with armed and security forces and party members with the active participation of the local inhabitants.

Various types of US and Chinese made arms have been captured from the murderers, the enemies of our oppressed Moslem people, the homeland and Saur Revolution. The culprits are under interrogation.

According to a Bakhtar despatch from Samangan a happy function was held yesterday to mark the triumph of the military forces, the police and party activists against large groups of rebels in that province.

During the function a number of religious scholars, elders and craftsmen spoke of the sacrifice rendered by the patriots and devotees of Saur Revolution to safeguard the sacred homeland, and gains of the Revolution and wished them further success in wiping out the enemies of our country.

CSO: 4920

MILITARY CADETS FINISH CRASH COURSES

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 18 Sep 80 p 1

[Text]

KABUL, Sept. 13, (Bakhtar).— Certificates for cadets, graduated from the Military Academy crash courses, were distributed in a ceremony by Maj. Gen. Mohammad Rafiee, DRA Minister of National Defence in a ceremony held at the Academy yesterday.

The function was attended by some Generals and departmental heads of the Ministry of National Defence.

Following recitation of a few verses from the Holy Koran and playing of the national anthem the certificates and gifts were presented to the graduates.

The Minister of National Defence, in a speech drew the attention of the officers to their grave and heavy duties and wished them successes. He said, "You are graduated at a time when our homeland is in its sensitive historical stage and the armed forces is in need of you young valorous officers.'

You are aware that after victory of the Saur revolution especially its new evolutionary phase, the internal and external enemies in an unholy alliance have unleashed vile propaganda and shameless interference against the revolution of Afghanistan."

Similarly, commander and head of political affairs of the Academy delivered speeches.

CSO: 4920

GDR, YEMEN JOURNALISTS SEND CONGRATULATIONS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 22 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Kabul, Sept. 22 (Bakhtar)--Journalists Union of the German Democratic Republic has sent the following message addressed to Central Council of Journalists Union of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan:

In the name of the Journalists Union of GDR and on behalf of its 7,000 members, we congratulate the newly established Afghanistan Journalists Union and hope for further victories of the people of Afghanistan in their just struggle for freedom and in serving the people of Afghanistan.

It is a matter of great pleasure for us to welcome you in the family of international progressive journalists and see you alongside the international progressive journalists.

Hoping for freedom and peace in the world, victory over imperialism and hoping for joint efforts and our further consolidation.

Regards,
Chairman of Journalists Union, GDR.

Similarly the Central Council of Journalists Union of the Democratic Republic of Yemen has sent the following message addressed to the Central Council of Journalists Union of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan:

With great interest we followed the meeting of the constituent congress of Afghan journalists. On behalf of the Journalists Union of Democratic Yemen, we congratulate you on the establishment of your union which will play a prominent role towards the development of journalistic movement and in defending the Afghan revolution.

We are fully confident that consolidation of relations between the journalists unions of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and Democratic Republic of Yemen will help achieve the common goals of progressive journalists of the two countries.

Please accept our best wishes and comradely greetings.

General Secretariat, Central Council, Journalists Union of Democratic Republic of Yemen.

CSO: 4920

GOVERNMENT PROMOTES CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 18 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan as a non-aligned country and on the basis of its peaceloving policy desires to maintain friendly and cordial relations with all countries of the world. Therefore we have maintained commercial relations with most peaceloving countries. At present Afgahnistan has contact with various international companies especially those companies which have honest deal with us.

The Chambers of Commerce and Industries has 21 import unions under its frame which undertake their activities on the basis of their charters. These trading unions have agencies in the provinces of Kandahar, Nangarhar, Herat and Balkh. The above was stated by Sarwar Murid, Vice President of the Chambers of Commerce and Industries in an interview published recently in the daily Anis.

When asked about the role of the above trading unions and the responsibility of national traders with regard to improvement of trade activities in the country, he said the Chambers of Commerce and Industries of Afghanistan as the main centre cooperating honestly with national traders is always ready to solve the problems which may arise in the way of trade activities of national traders. For instance on the application of national traders and proposal of the Chambers of Commerce and Industries, Ministry of Commerce, the national traders were exempted from the payment of dimurrage for goods which had been pending in the ports. Similarly in order to develop the financial capacity of national traders the organisation reduced the percentage of its commission rates, solving numerous other problems facing national traders and trade companies through Revenue Department of the Ministry of Finance.

Hence the Chambers of Commerce and Industries hopes that all national traders should maintain contacts with various trade

companies through this organisation as it is established for the purpose of helping the national traders. They should avoid individual contact with all foreign companies as under such circumstances the foreign trade companies cannot mislead them such as unnecessary raising of prices, cheating them on the quality of commodities they are offered and pending of offers etc., which may result in bankruptcy of our traders. Besides our national traders ought to avoid importing of unnecessary goods. Instead they should import essential commodities in best quality and reasonable prices from the companies which are honest in their deals.

Similarly the Chambers of Commerce and Industries sincerely wishes that all noble Afghan people cooperate with their national and democratic government. In order to help their national traders and the country's economy. They must inform the sources concerned about the smuggled goods which they come across in any part of the country and also avoid purchasing of such items from the market. Moreover they are requested to avoid purchasing of luxury and unnecessary goods and help their national traders in this regard so that they should not place order for such goods which are against their interest and that of their country.

In reply to another question about his assessment of the trade affairs prevailing in Afghanistan prior to the emergence of the glorious Saur Revolution and after the triumph of the Revolution especially after its new evolutionary phase, he said commercial affairs prevailed in the country prior to the launching of the Saur Revolution was totally unhealthy and unguided. Our national traders used to arrange the affairs without any proper management, which resulted in bankruptcy of some of our national traders as the whole thing was in the hand of the despotic governments. In those days national traders had to deal individually with all foreign brokers and compradors.

Fortunately following the triumph of the glorious Saur Revolution and after the commencement of its new phase national and patriotic traders formed their trading unions under the supervision of the Chambers of Commerce and Industries and in this way a national trade spirit emerged in the country and national traders began their routine activities with confidence and without any worries.

In the light of the new evolutionary phase of the revolution and in view of the government policy reflected in the DRA Fundamental Principles protects and encourages all patriotic and national traders.

The Vice President of the Chambers of Commerce and Industries said that in the light of the above measures the following factors should be taken into consideration as regards proper and purposeful development of trade activities, under the present condition. He suggested that as a first step all national and patriotic traders must strive to develop their trading unions with full unity under the leadership and protection of their democratic government. It is then that they can succeed in their aim. We must cut off the hands of foreign brokers and compradors so that our national traders should be in a position to directly contact the foreign companies with the cooperation of the Chambers of Commerce and Industries. This would help national traders to gain more profit by avoiding payment of commission to the foreign brokers, he added. It would also help them to obtain the best kind of goods in the shortest possible time.

CSO: 4920

NEW MARTIAL, MEDICAL LAWS PUBLISHED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 13 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Kabul, Sept. 13 (Bakhtar)--The Penal Law for crimes against combat preparations of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the regulations for practising medicine in the private clinics have been published in the official gazette and enforced thereof.

A source of the Ministry of Justice said that the Penal Law for crimes against combat preparations of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the regulations for practicing medicine in the private clinics were published in the Official Gazette on Sumbula 15 (September 6, 1980) and went into force on the same date.

The source adds that the Penal Law for the crimes against combat preparations of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has been approved by the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of DRA and sanctioned by the President of the RC for the purpose of consolidating the revolutionary lawfulness, legal order and discipline in the Armed Forces of DRA, strengthening struggle against aggressions made against the security of DRA and the struggle against running away from military service.

Likewise, the regulations for practicing medicine in the private clinics has been approved by the Council of Ministers and sanctioned by the President of the DRA Revolutionary Council. The regulation determines the limits of authority, responsibility and the rate of fees of the medical doctors, assistant doctors, stomatologues and assistant stomatologues, dentists who practice medicine after official working hours in their private clinics.

The Penal Law for crimes against combat preparations of the Armed Forces of DRA has 19 articles and the regulation for practicing medicine in the private clinics 30 articles and four charts attached.

The above Penal Law and regulations will be published in the press for the information of dear compatriots according to article 40 of the DRA's Fundamental Principles.

CSO: 4920

SOVIET-SUPPLIED CONSUMER GOODS DISTRIBUTED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 11 Sep 80 p 4

[Text]

KABUL, Sept. 11, (Bakhtar).— Distribution of Soviet-supplied consumer goods aid continues for deservers in center and provinces.

A large number of workers and employees of Karkar coal mine, working people of Jabul-Seraj, Surkhe Parsa and Kapisa districts workers of Gulbahar Textile Mill, deserving people in Charikar, Parwan province, resistance groups, and police of Laghmani and Bayan of Parwan, students of Administrative Accounting Institute, students of Kabul Mechanical School and Ibni Sina technicians school received the consumer goods during the week including clothing and various footwear supplied by the Soviet Union.

During the functions held on the occasion in the above places some party and government authorities and a number of recipients while appreciating the friendly Soviet Union's timely aid, spoke on amicable relations and fraternal ties existing between the two friendly countries and wished for further consolidation of the friendly ties betwen peoples of the two countries.

CSO: 4920

MAZAR-I SHARIF SILO 35 PERCENT COMPLETED

Kabul KABUL TIMES in English 22 Sep 80 p 1

[Text]

MAZAR-I-SHARIF, Sept. 22, (Bakhtar).— The construction work of Mazar-i-Sharif Silo has progressed 35 percent whilst the construction work of its workers residential quarters has advanced 40 percent.

A source of the Food Procurement Department of Balkh province said a group of workers have been absorbed in the project on reasonable salary who enjoy all facilities. The workers render indefatigable services toward construction of the project in the light of the new phase of the glorious Saur Revolution.

The source added the construction work of the Silo project had started at the end of last year whilst the work of its residential quarters began three months ago. The work of the project is going on successfully on the basis of the programme.

CSO: 4920

DISPLACED FAMILIES RETURN HOME

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 11 Sep 80 p 3

[Text]

ASSADABAD, Sept. 11, (Bakhtar).— The working people of Afghanistan who during the reign of Amin the hangman and his fascist band had been compelled to abandon their dwellings with the realistic of their historical mission toward defence of the honours of the country and the gains of the Saur Revolution and by utilising the humanitarian policy of their revolutionary government, return to their homes in different groups, expressing readiness to render revolutionary work for the blossoming of the beloved Afghanistan and routing of the enemies of the Revolution.

In this connection some families belonging to Katar valley and Korbagh village of Dari Parich district, Kunar procvince who had been forced to quit their houses during the reign of Amin the traitor last Monday returned to their homes amid expression of joy and pleasure and patriotic sentiments for their revolutionary government. They promised every kind of cooperation to their government in a bid to uproot the enemies. Local party members and government officials welcomed the returnees.

CSO: 4920

ACTIVISTS APPROVE 3RD PLENUM DECISIONS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Sep 80 p 1

[Text]

PROVINCES, Sept. 14, (Bakhtar):— To back the historical decisions of PDPA CC 3rd Plenum meetings were held by cadres and party activists of Ghor province police command, Enjeel District, Herat province, Livestock Company, officers, soldiers and students of Military School. During the meetings a number of participants while speaking on value of the 3rd Plenum decisions, on behalf of others pledged relentless struggle in routing enemies of Saur Revolution.

The meeting ended by issuing of resolutions expressing readiness in translating into action the 3rd Plenum decisions.

Similarly, large number of local working inhabitants of Enjeel and Guzarah districts, Herat province, in a gathering at the governorate hall welcomed the important and constructive decisions of the 3rd Plenum on behalf of the local people they pledged for revolutionary work and struggle in its implementation.

According to another report, the elders from various villages of Pashtoonkot district, Faryab Province in a gathering at the governorate campounds pledged their honest services in flourishing the beloved homeland. They also promised relentless struggle in routing the enemies of the Saur Revolution.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

BAGRAMI ARTILLERY EXERCISE--Artillery units no. 88 has begun exercises in Bagrami District from September 9 and will continue until September 22, day and night. Kabul citizens and inhabitants of above district should not be worried by the noise. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 11 Sep 80 p 4]

TERRORISTS ARRESTED IN JALALABAD--Jalalabad, Sept. 13 (Bakhtar)--A large number of counterrevolutionary elements who on the instigation of their masters had created disturbances to the local people were recently arrested as a result of the heroic activities of our armed forces at Pachiragan region leaving behind various kinds of weapons made in US and China, consisting of machine-guns, rockets, communications equipment and large quantity of bullets. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 13 Sep 80 p 1]

NOMADS RETURN--Kabul, Sept. 13 (Bakhtar)--A large number of Kochi families (nomad) belonging to Sultan Khail Sharan, Paktika province in pursuance of the decisions of the third PDPA CC Plenum and full confidence for the honest conducts of their revolutionary and progressive government recently returned to their home. According to a Bakhtar report a group of elders of the above region after expression of support for their revolutionary government informed the governorate that they safely returned to their home adding adding that a large number of other families too wanted to return to their beloved homeland but the Pakistani military government creates obstacles for their return. But despite obstacles created in their way the dear compatriots have been trying to return to their homeland in the earliest possible time. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 13 Sep 80 p 1]

GENERAL QADAR TO CUBA--Kabul, Sept. 24 (Bakhtar)--Member of the PDPA CC, RC President left Kabul for Havana yesterday at the invitation of the Communist Party of Cuba to participate at the ceremony commemorating the 20th anniversary of the establishment of resistance groups of Cuba against local and foreign reactionary elements. He was seen off at the Kabul International Airport by some members of the PDPA CC, the RC Presidium, the DRA Council of Ministers, Deputy Chief of Protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Cuban Ambassador. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 24 Sep 80 p 1]

CSO: 4920

FORMER FRENCH OFFICER ARRESTED IN ALGERIA

Paris LE MONDE in French 11, 13 Sep 80

[Two-part article by our own correspondent D.J.: "Disappearance of the Head of the Lebanese Shiites--A Former French Officer Imprisoned in Algeria Since August 1979"]

[11 Sep 80, p 42]

> [Text] A spokesman of the Libyan "people's bureau" (embassy) in Paris, categorically denied on Tuesday, 9 September, that Imam Moussa Sadr, spiritual leader of the Lebanese shiite community, who had mysteriously disappeared on 28 August 1978 at the conclusion of a trip to Tripoli, had been kept a prisoner in a Libyan military camp in the proximity of the Algerian border. Repeating an article published on Sunday by the Spanish newspaper EL PAIS, RTL [expansion unknown] had announced on Tuesday that Imam Moussa Sadr had been kidnapped with the help of a former French officer, Major Jean-Jacques Laporte (our last issue dated 10 September). At the same time, it was discovered that the former officer had been imprisoned in Algeria for almost one year and accused of "making an attept upon the security of the state." Investigations concerning Imam Moussa Sadr had been started again by Teheran, an important personality close to Imam Khomeini having stated that the latter had become aware of some documents according to which the Lebanese religious leader was alive in Libya.

It has been confirmed in French diplomatic and consular circles that a French national, Jean-Jacques Laporte, was imprisoned in Algiers, having been arrested in August 1979 by the military security forces and charged with "attempt upon the security of the state." The French authorities learned of this arrest only at the beginning of 1980 and up to the present time have been unable to exercise their right of visitation, as provided by the consular agreement between the two countries. Algerian officials have not furnished any information as to the motives for this arrest.

Little is known of Laporte, only that he is about 40 years old and was not registered in the French consultate as a resident in Algeria. It seems that he was a former military man, leading an adventurous life whose activities remain mysterious. He had been questioned once before by the Algerian security forces in November 1978, then was set free until he was apprehended again. According to various rumors he was implicated in the Cape Sigli affair, but it is hard to see how. In December 1978 a C-130 airplane, identified by the Algerians as being a Moroccan plane, had dropped several bundles of arms, munitions and explosives by parachute on the Kabyle coast, and they were retrieved a few hours later by the constabulary who had been forewarned by witnesses.

A few days later six arrests had been made among former underground fighters from Willaya 3, native inhabitants from Petite Kabyle. The inquirty had revealed that the head of the "conspirators," a certain Benyahia Mohamed Sadek described as an embittered and temperamental person, had taken advantage of some business trips in Morocco and France to get in touch with the Moroccan intelligence and persuaded them to furnish arms to "kabyle resistance," which existed only in his imagination.

To tell the truth, this rather confusing affair had been widely exploited by the news agencies and had contributed to the organization of the population against outside danger during President Boumediene's illness. Since then no one has heard anymore from the "conspirator" and his accomplices.

Never, at any time, had anyone heard the name of Laporte mentioned in connection with this affair.

It is also difficult to understand why the Libyan intelligence would use a Frenchman who happened to be in Algeria, to kidnap Imam Moussa Sadr while the latter was in Libya at the time of his mysterious disappearance on 28 August 1978 and, according to RTL, confine him in a camp 50 km from the Algerian border.

Anyway, up to the present time the Algerian authorities have not made any comments in regard to these "revelations." However, taking into account the time elapsed since these events took place, one wonders if the stolid silence which surrounds them is still due to the requisites of the inquiry. Whatever the eventual seriousness of the actions with which Laporte is charged, the secrecy in connection with his incarceration maintained for over a year, is regrettable.

[13 Sep 80, p 6]

[Text] Jean Laporte, former officer in the French army implicated, according to information received from Morocco and published by RTL, in the "kidnaping" of Imam Moussa Sadr (LE MONDE 11 September), was arrested by the Algerian intelligence on 2 February 1978 inside the

Aurassi hotel, where a meeting of the "Front de la formite" [the resolute Front] was being held. He was indicted and was issued a warrant for imprisonment.

He was charged with seeking information illegally, in plain language, he was engaged in intelligence activities. He is imprisoned in Blida. This is the only exact information we could find on Thursday, 11 September in Algiers.

In other respects it should be noted here that Laporte, readily called in private "an adventurer," who seemed very familiar with the Arab countries, could not have been involved in the Cape Sigli events since they happened in December 1978, almost one year after his arrest. The same argument can be applied to the disappearance of Imam Moussa Sadr, since it happened in Libya in August 1978.

There is much astonishment in Algiers in regard to this so-called "fantastic" information broadcasted by some of the media in Europe which coincides, as observed here, on the one hand with the meeting in Freetown of the OAU ad hoc committee on the western Sahara question, and on the other, with Libya and Syria's merger, as if the objective sought was to "create problems in the region" and to deal Algeria's credibility a blow by arousing suspicions in a matter in which it is not at all involved.

7993
CSO: 4400

REORGANIZATION OF CUSTOMS ADMINISTRATION OUTLINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 14 Jul 80 pp 16-17

[Article: "Heaven Showers Promotions on Customs Men"]

[Text] The Customs Administration will be reorganized in August, in accordance with the reorganization authorized by the Central Agency for Organization and Administration. This will be accompanied by the biggest promotion movement ever seen in the Customs Administration.

It is expected that the deputy minister of finance, Muhammad 'Abduh, will issue within a few days a decision informing employees of the new organization.

Budge Appropriations

Husayn Amin, undersecretary for customs affairs in the ministry of finance, announced that the appropriations necessary for the promotions included in the reorganization have been made.

The reorganization provides for promoting the head of the Customs Administration to the rank of first undersecretary, after amending republic decree no 557 for 1977.

It also provides for appointing three undersecretaries of the ministry of finance:

The first will be chief of the Cairo and the Southern Region Customs Sector. The second will be chief of the Port Sa'id Region Customs Sector. The third will be chief of the Alexandria and Western Region Customs Sector.

The Customs Administration had proposed that two more undersecretaries be appointed, one for technical affairs and the other for fiscal and administrative affairs, but these were not approved.

Twenty-four General Directors.

The ministry of finance approved 24 positions of general director, whereas Customs had requested 27.

The positions of general director on the basis of which promotion will take place are:

Anti-Smuggling Operations

Organization and Administration

Customs Institute

Security

Legal Affairs and Investigations

Inspection

Information and Enforcement

Prices

Exemptions and Special Regulations

Claims

General Director of Alexandria Customs

General Director of al-Mahmudiyah Customs

Customs for Passengers and Branch Offices

Customs for Tobacco, Exports and Automobiles

Exemptions and (Concessions?) (two positions: Cairo and Alexandria)

Cairo Airport

Cairo Customs and Branches

Free Zone

Port Sa'id and Branches

Suez and Red Sea

Sinai Customs

Fiscal Affairs

Workers' Affairs

The following three positions will be Grade 1 positions occupied by officials having the title of Director General:

The Director of Automated Accounting, and

The Directors of Traffic of Goods and Relinquished Goods in Cairo and Alexandria.

An Abundance of Grade 1 Positions

The agency approved 132 Grade 1 positions distributed as follows:

1. Eight positions within the subgroup of legal employees: Office of Customs Law Research; Office of Legal Opinion and Rulings; Office of Legal Cases; Office of Investigations; Offices of Legal Affairs and Investigations in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Sa'id; First Legal Researcher.

2. One position of Director of Office of Public Relations.

3. Two positions within subgroup of security employees: Individuals and Installations, and Information and Communication.

4. A total of 121 positions within the following subgroups:

a. Finance and Accounting: Investigation and Seizure; Anti-Smuggling Operations in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Sa'id (3); Offices of Inspection in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Sai'd (3); Office of Analysis; Office of Tariff Schedules; Examination of Imported and Exported Commodities; Export, Import and Currency Regulations; Customs Regulations; Conferences and Research; Collection and Classification of Commodity Prices; Publication of Prices and Inquiries; General Exemptions in Cairo and Alexandria (2); and Technical Affairs Section.

b. One position for each of the following: Office of Free Zones; Provisional Permits; Provisional Clearances; Late Payments; Tariffs; Collection and Enforcement; Special Regulations; Exemptions; Accounting Expertise.

c. Three positions for Tariff Affairs, Enforcement and Prices in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Sa'id Special Arrangements.

d. Customs Affairs relating to the Port and other organizations in three cities; Affairs of Outlets in Cairo, Alexandria, Suez and the Red Sea; and Postal Packages.

e. Six positions for the Customs Office in Alexandria; five for Passenger Customs in Cairo, Alexandria, Port Sa'id, Suez and Sinai; and ten for Customs at al-Sallum al-Sabatiyah, Aswan, Luxor, Port Sa'id, Damietta, Suez, Saffajsh, al-'Arish, and al-Tur.

f. Four positions for Automobile Customs at Alexandria, Cairo, Port Sa'id, Suez and the Red Sea.

g. One position each for Lumber, Shipyards and Dry Dock in al-Nubariyah; Office of Inspection of Trade and Supply; Alexandria Port and Airport Tariffs, Enforcement and Provisional Clearance; Tobacco; Exports, Free Zones and Markets; Air Exports; Air Imports; Personal Belongings; Provisional Clearance of Automobiles; Land Exports and Imports; Diplomatic Exemptions; and Free Zones.

h. Five positions for Tariffs and Regulations in the ports of Alexandria, Cairo, Port Sa'id, Suez and Sinai; two positions for (Auxiliary Facilities?); and three positions for Exemptions, Provisional Clearance and Special Regulations in Cairo, Port Sa'id and Sinai.

i. One position each for the following: Free Markets; (Publications?); Chief Traffic Manager; Chief Technical Inspector; Chief Tariff Manager; Imports, Exports and Currency; Free Zone; Free Zone Autos; Goods and Unclaimed Goods in Port Sa'id; Tariffs, Regulations and Exemptions; Fiscal Affairs, Purchases and Stores; Accounting; Budgeting; Expositions.

j. Fifteen positions for the Administrative Development group, distributed as follows: Employee Placement and Work Force Planning; Organization and Work Methods; Training; Customs Institutes in Cairo, Port Sa'id and Alexandria (3); Office of Followup and Supervision; Employment Affairs; Pensions; Fiscal and Administrative Affairs in Cairo, Port Sa'id and Alexandria (3); Office of Fiscal and Administrative Inspection.

k. Four positions for Support Services: Secretariat and Archives; Administrative Services; Records and Files; Termination of Service.

Grade 2

Grade 2 positions were approved for the following in Finance and Accounting: Director of Office of Bills of Lading and Movement of Goods; Office of Physical Plant in Cairo and Alexandria Customs (2); Auctions and Settlement (2); Office of Bills of Lading and Unclaimed Goods in Suez and Alexandria (2); and Administrative Offices (5).

In the Administrative Development groups, the following will be promoted to Grade 2 positions: Director of Manpower Budgeting; Director of Illegal Profiterring; Director of the Treasury; Assistant Accounting Offices; Assistant Archieves Offices; Assistant Personnel Offices.

The reorganization provides for Grade 2 positions for the Chief of [Motor Pool] Drivers, the Supervisor of Weights, and the Supervisor of Maintenance.

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BRIEFS

NEW TYPE OF PASSPORT--Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il, deputy prime minister for services and minister of the interior, met yesterday with Dr 'Abd-al-Zaraq 'Abd-al-Majid, deputy prime minister for economic affairs, to discuss steps to speed up the issuance of the new type of passport, and to make arrangements for the necessary appropriations for this project, so as to put an end to the forgery of Egyptian passports. It was decided that current passports will be valid for 2 more years, or for 7 years rather than 5, until they are replaced by the new passports. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 17 Jul 80 p 1] 7587

CSO: 4802

WEST BANK SEEN AS STRATEGIC NECESSITY

Tel Aviv MA'ARAKHOT in Hebrew May-Jun 80 pp 6-13

[Article by Colonel (Ret.) Professor Yuval Ne'eman: "Samaria--Foundation of Israel's Security"]*

[Text] Thirteen years after the Six-Day War, the terrible vulnerability of the state of Israel within the borders which preceded that war has been forgotten by many. Before the war everyone was aware of Israel's instability and vulnerability along the "slim sections" of the two corridors, the Jerusalem corridor and the coastal one. In 1953 the general staff held discussions attended by the minister of defense, which led to the conclusion that within such borders Israel could not afford a surprise attack, and inasmuch as such an attack became imminent, Israel had to strike first. This is what we did in 1956[1] and in 1967, despite tremendous misgivings. During the 1949 to 1956 period we lived under constant tension, with frequent mobilizations. After 1956, when UN troops were stationed in the Gaza Strip and Sinai, it seemed that we had reached a calm, and Abba Eban even spoke of "the spirit of Tashkent."[2] The Six-Day War came as a surprise.[3] Fortunately Nasser acted slowly, with every move happening not of his own initiative. This enabled us, although we were surprised, to mobilize, deploy, and foil the enemy's plan.

During its 32 years, Israel has experienced many broken cease-fire agreements, corridors which did not last, UN troops which disappeared during crises, and guarantor states which did not honor their guarantees when we needed them. And yet we are going back today to all these arrangements, relinquishing our real positions. This article is not intended to explain the need for the Six-Day War borders in their entirety,[4] but to emphasize the strategic importance of Samaria.

The Samaria Position--The Vulnerable Heart

Since the inception of the state, the population has been concentrated in the three major cities and in the coastal strip from Gedera to Hadera. The dispersion of the population was always considered of supreme importance in terms of the quality of life and for security reasons.

The existence of a few major centers creates strategic targets for air and ground bombardment, for occupation by ground forces, and even for decision in war. The density of travel in concentrated areas makes it hard to maneuver and supply, especially during mobilization of the reserves and deployment of forces. Under such conditions bombardments acquire greater importance, since they can prevent the mobilization of the IDF as well as the effectuation of its total military potential.

The effort to disperse the population (until 1960) succeeded somewhat in reducing the geographical concentration (a fourth, though somewhat small center was created in Beersheba). Nevertheless, more than two thirds of the population still live in the Jerusalem-Lod-Haifa arc, in a strip of a ten kilometer average width, including 76 percent of Israel's industry workers and 70 percent of its energy production. If we continue this arc to Bayt Sh'an it will include 75 percent of Israel's resources. In effect, the Jewish population is concentrated today in the area of the Jewish settlement (and the JNF lands) of the late years of the British Mandate.

In terms of its fighting potential, the defense of the state is based on mobilization in this area and the transfer of troops to the front. After the mobilization phase, the area (especially the Gemera-Hadera zone) becomes a logistic base for the campaigns, wherever they may happen to take place. This area is the heart of the state, also in terms of Israel's ability to act, by pumping blood into its arteries.

For an Arab planner this area, especially the coastal strip, is a prime military target. Vietnam fell when Saigon fell, to cite an example from the recent past (two years after signing a peace treaty accompanied by Nobel prizes). There is a great resemblance between the above described Israeli deployment and the Crusader state, especially during its second stage (1154-1270), which is a cause for grave concern.

The Domination of Samaria

In the center of the vital arc is Samaria. Whoever occupies it threatens internally all the centers of the state. Of course, the force directed against us from Samaria has to secure its flanks. But once it mounts its attack it has no trouble keeping its initiative and winning. Since the area makes it possible to move troops internally from north to south and from east to west, Israel must commit considerable forces to the coast to keep it from being cut off, and to keep the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area, as well as Jerusalem and its corridor, Haifa, and the Valley of Jezreel, from being overrun. Samaria is the classical strategic bridgehead, combining defensive compactness and direct access to all strategic targets. The occupier of this area is like a chess player who is able to threaten with check-queen-pawn. All this, incidentally, also applies to terrorist activities. More on this later.

In the War of Independence we had the advantage of the lack of coordination among the Arab armies, each of which looked for exclusive targets. Today, on the other hand, coordinated and concentrated action could commit 4000 tanks

to Samaria alone (of the 7000 in the eastern front). Such a force could be lined up in depth, with only half of it in Samaria in the initial stage.

The land of Israel has known three historical conquest routes: from Egypt (the sea route), from the north, and from Samaria (used by Joshua). The Book of Joshua provides a detailed script for using Samaria as a bridgehead for attacking all vital areas in the land of Canaan. What took many years in Joshua's day can take a few days when it comes to modern armor.

Israel may be able to mount local counterattacks and to repel the advancing force at certain points, but it will not be able to stop the thrust of the enemy when the latter has the initiative in a zone chosen by the enemy for its main effort. To stop the advance of thousands of tanks a minimal depth of 10-20 kilometers is needed. Suffice it to remember the assault of 1000 Syrian tanks in the Golan Heights, which was stopped by a retreat and delay battle along such depth. On the coast and in Jerusalem there is no such depth, hence a concentrated force of several thousand tanks can reach the seashore, the center of Tel Aviv, and even take Jerusalem. This accounts for the sensitivity of defense in all these sections, and the need to deploy forces to defend all of them.

Mountains have a special value in another respect. The value of observation has not disappeared in modern warfare. On the contrary, with the advance of electronic means and fire ranges, high mountain regions are of decisive value in control (including radar) and communication. Control requires line of sight as well as control intelligence. The use of missiles (of any kind) can be countered if there is a free line of sight. Communications intelligence also requires line of sight.

For example: in the Yom Kippur War, the air force could not stop the advance of the Syrian armor because of the loss of Mount Hermon at the start of the war. The bold, successful Syrian assault affected the potential of the electronic systems which are a must for dealing with missiles along with the air force. The air force had to fight missiles directly, at great cost.

Samaria has complete control over the territory within the green line. The day the autonomy administration, the Palestinian state, or Jordan install suitable antennas (as the Egyptians did the day after they entered El Arish), they will be able to severely curtail our electronic means of communications and control, and to effectively use those means. They will also be able to zero in on us with any kind of weapon and score highly effective hits. While we are there, we control both sides of the Jordan Valley.

The wide-spread argument, according to which "space of no importance in the age of missiles," is a likely story. Somehow both the Americans and the Russians continue to hold on to every electronic base at their disposal, even though they have intelligence, control, and camera-equipped satellites. The reason: a satellite can hold a few instruments, an airplane can hold dozens, yet a ground base can hold thousands!

The Danger of a Strategic Surprise

The aforesaid leads to one essential conclusion: Israel within the green line (in the West Bank) cannot withstand an attack from Samaria. Such attack can result from the following:

a) A strategic attack, such as the Yom Kippur War. Such an attack can succeed not only when enemy armor is positioned in Samaria. Without the IDF occupying the ridges and mountain passes of Samaria, an armor stationed in Jordanian camps east of the Jordan (such as Karama) can reach the hills in a few hours. It can be particularly successful if its entry is assisted by a local or infiltrated irregular force, which will seize key positions in the initial stages. Within 4-6 hours the enemy can threaten Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, the coast or Haifa, and from that moment on it can through direct assault prevent the mobilization of the IDF. As a former intelligence person, I can state that one cannot rely upon an intelligence warning. Such warning can announce the arrival of the forces, but the moment such force is stationed permanently or temporarily near the Jordan (as it did near the border of the Golan Heights and along the Suez Canal in September-October 1973), there is no guarantee that we will know about any plans of attack. Intentions have no intelligence value. One can only list possibilities. Thus, we may mobilize the IDF for a long period and paralyze our economy, and when we finally let the readiness subside the attack will come.

b) A situation may arise in which we are taken by surprise, and yet the political conditions do not enable us to start a preventive attack, which is the only solution under such circumstances. I could fill several volumes of memoirs, not only of the agonizing which preceded the preventive wars of 1956 and 1967, but also the story of attacks which were not authorized, and resulted in permanent losses for Israel. Political conditions, decline in morale, inept leadership, could turn doubt (that perhaps the enemy is not planning to attack after all) into a decisive argument to postpone the decision, even when the military picture is perfectly clear. Even the decisive leadership of Golda Meir ruled out the initiative on the morning of the Yom Kippur War. With the IDF stationed on the borders of the Six-Day War the situation is not fatal. Within the green line the outcome can be catastrophic.

Alternatives to Israeli Control

I would like to discuss each of the claims made by those who suggest that we should give up Samaria.

a) We will not pull out the IDF. Even in the autonomy plan the IDF remains in several bases for five years after the start of the autonomy.

b) We will keep the settlements in the Jordan Valley.

c) We will maintain a fortified line from Jerusalem to Haifa (the Maginot Line idea).

d) Samaria will either be demilitarized or in parts of it limited Arab forces will be allowed. Buffer zones will be manned by an international or an American force.

e) We will improve the warning system, and if threated we will retake Samaria.

f) A friendly Palestinian state will be established in Samaria.

IDF Bases in the Autonomy

During the first 5 years there will be no significant change in the status of the IDF as a foreign power,[5] but it should be emphasized that its presence will be temporary. At the end of the 5 year period the IDF is out of the picture in the West Bank, although it is not to be expected that our security problems will have disappeared.

On the face of it there is no difference between the present situation and what will happen during the 5 year period, except for the reduction of force, the limiting of bases to a set number, and the foregoing of our internal security. Yet the Camp David Accord states that these are transitional arrangements for a period not to exceed 5 years (section (A) A1 in the framework accord). One may ask: will we break the agreement and return the IDF full force each time a large concentration will occur east of the Jordan during or after the five year period? One should also take into account the possibility that the administration of the autonomy may declare itself a sovereign Palestinian state even before the 5 years. The UN will no doubt recognize it by an overwhelming majority (even the Europeans will not abstain). Any action on the part of the IDF will then constitute an attack on a sovereign state!

In the Camp David Accords it was agreed that a "strong" Arab police force will be established, which will serve the self-ruling administration in fighting terrorism (this will not be done by the IDF). Such a force can also be a factor in preparing the invasion of the enemy, by seizing key positions for the enemy in the area.

And what about ongoing security? Will we indeed rely on the "strong police force" to do away with the terrorist organizations, or will we continue to retaliate against them in Samaria? Let us not forget that one can return to the green line border within 30 minutes after laying a bomb in Mahane Y'hudah market, in the Carmel market, or on the beach in Natania.

Keeping the Jordan Valley

It is doubtful whether someone will be found who will agree to such a "territorial compromise." The candidate is of course King Hussein; as if we could unreservedly bet on him... The days of royal dynasties in Arab lands are numbered, and whoever relied on the Shah now tends to rely on the Jordanian king. What will happen to the compromise if the Hashemite dynasty collapses after the agreement, once we have given up Samaria?

As for the solution. We saw what happened to the fortifications along the Suez Canal in the Yom Kippur War. The array of settlements in the Jordan Valley has a similar (important in itself) value of local warning. Once the alarm is sounded the settlements cannot stop the onslaught of the penetrating force. True, crossing the Canal the Egyptians did not hasten to capture the Gidi and Mitla passes before we could dig in. The Syrians did a better job in the Golan Heights. It is safe to assume that the Jordanian armor will act as decisively as it did in the past, and will be quick to capture Maale Adumim, Maale Efrayim, and the passes which guarantee control of the hills. It is also certain that the Jordanians will be assisted locally. The valley settlements will be left behind like the Suez fortifications, since they cannot prevent the capturing of Samaria by Arab armies. It should be pointed out that in terms of time and space such penetration, initiated at existing bases in Jordan will only take 3-4 hours. Inasmuch as Israel is taken by surprise, the penetration will succeed even if it takes a whole day. It is to be expected that the Iraqi army will be stationed in Jordan and ready to join forces (which won't be the first time. Israel has already gotten used to the presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon).

Demilitarization, Buffer Zones, International force, Third Party Guarantees, and Justified Causes for an Israeli Attack

Here are some examples from distant and recent history of the state of Israel relative to the above.

War of Independence: on 10 June 1948 the first truce went into effect. Within 24 hours the Egyptians broke the truce, seized positions along the Ashk'lon-Hebron line and cut off the Negev. Israel complained, but did not resume the fighting. On 10 July 1948 the first truce ended at 10:00. The Egyptian army attacked Beit Daras on July 8 at 20:00. On 19 July 1948 the IDF took Kartia and gained access to the Negev. The second truce went into effect on 20 July. A day later the Egyptians returned and deployed in the area and cut off the Negev again. Israel had to start its campaign again to liberate the Negev in October. Israel found at the time an excuse for new attack (Egyptian attack on a convoy to the Negev), but today such an excuse cannot be used. The media would refute it before the convoy went out.

1948-1956: We did not react to the Syrian occupation of Hamat Gader (in the demilitarized zone) in 1950. Nor did we react to the presence of Egyptian force in the demilitarized zone near Nitzana. Toward the end of 1955 we took an Egyptian force out of the Israeli side of the demilitarized zone in Nitzana (Sabha), after a long series of reprisals.

Tiran Straits, 1967: the 14 powers which guaranteed free navigation in the straits kept quiet when Egypt blockaded them in 1967. France, who headed the guarantors in 1956, said in 1967 that we did not have a legal claim to Elat... In the end Israel reacted and went to war, but who will guarantee that the circumstances will repeat themselves, in which the composition of the government will change, public pressure will increase and sympathy for us will grow on the part of the United States?

Moving the missiles in 1970: this was the worst of all the incidents. On 10 August 1970 the ceasefire and the freezing of the front went into effect (viz., partial demilitarization). Within 30 hours the Egyptians advanced their missiles toward the Canal. Israel complained to the guarantor (the U.S.), who eventually recognized the veracity of the complaint. Nevertheless, we did not resume the military campaign. Instead, we received at the time the first half a billion dollars and used it for welfare after the Panthers demonstration. Soon after the Egyptians beefed up the SA-2s and SA-3s and added the mobile SA-6s, which together formed an awesome and unprecedented wall of missles. The fiasco of the Yom Kippur War was a direct result, since in all of the IDF's plans the air force could not do its job since the missiles covered the crossing!

The violation of the demilitarization in 1970 (typical salami method--see above regarding 1948) accounts for the heavy losses in the Yom Kippur War and the political defeat, despite the IDF's victory in the field...

Three causes of the defeat: losses of human life, the successful Egyptian crossing of the Canal, and the "overrunning of the Bar Lev Line." All of this created the impression in the world of an Arab victory. The fact is, the war ended without our being able to uproot the Egyptian bridgeheads east of the Suez.

The War of Attrition against the bridgehead in "Goshen": In December 1973, the Egyptians violated the 22 October 1973 ceasefire, infiltrated sniper units, and started a war of attrition east of the Canal. Israel did not retaliate. According to one testimony the minister of defense wanted to renew the fighting, but his intention was foiled by the regional commander.

The Peace Treaty with Egypt and the Disappearance of the International Force

We have just signed a peace treaty with Egypt. The treaty includes demilitarization arrangements and prevention of Egyptian penetration of the evacuated area by a UN controlled buffer zone. If the UN did not approve it, the introduction of another international force would follow. The guarantor--the President of the United States--made this committment in a written document. When the time came for us to withdraw, it became clear that the U.S. was not going to honor its commitment. We did not postpone our withdrawal because of the collapse of the arrangement, despite sharp words from the foreign minister. Yet again, it was proven that we cannot base our security on demilitarization or on guarantees.

Reading the history books shows then that no demilitarization is kept! By using the "salami method" the "honest" party can swallow the whole cow and get used to a new amd more dangerous situation. As for Samaria--if we add to these givens the preparatory role which the Arab population and the "strong police force" can play, then demilitarization has no meaning, and guarantees even less.

The Wall of China or a Maginot Line

This is a concrete technical possibility, but anyone who feels the economical and regional hardships which were caused by the withdrawal from Sinai (a third airfield at Israel's expense, a base, roads etc.) can imagine what will happen if we have to turn the coast into a fortress. The IDF will have to constantly mobilize; and in time the long line and the enemy operating internally will be our undoing.

Recapturing Samaria in Case of Danger

We have already considered the possibility of surprise and the absence of warning, and the difficulty in starting a deliberate war under certain political conditions. We have shown that even when there is a formal justification, such as the moving of the missiles, facts are accepted and decisions are postponed. We have also discussed the impracticality of breaking the agreement on our part as a result of any change in the deployment of forces in the eastern front. As for warning, there is no way of warning about the intentions of the enemy. Once its forces are deployed in the area--which is already the case--we cannot benefit from warning. How, for example, could the Arabs warn about the Suez Campaign or the Six-Day War when the Israeli decision was reached only 48 hours before the attack?

Will the Intention to Destroy Us Disappear?

Some say that there is a trend to accept our existence, even on the part of the PLO, and that peaceful relations will exist between us and a Palestinian state. There is no other way of reacting to such prognosis than calling it a dream. At a time when the hostility of militant Islam toward us is increasing, when Arafat and Khomeini keep declaring their total agreement in their outlook, it is strange to think of a change of attitude of Palestinians toward us. We should also take into account the fact that the Arab world includes a Kaddafi and an Assad, and that there are those in Lybia and in Iraq who stir up trouble constantly, knowing that the distance from Israel protects them from our wrath in case of a blowup. To this we must add the Soviet Union. Even the extreme doves admit that the USSR has embarked on the road of expansionism. Our situation in the next decade will grow worse at a time when the U.S. is looking for a foothold in the Arab world, in order to make sure it is not ejected from this part of the world. It has been written[6] how Washington has assumed the role formerly played by Gamal Abdul Nasser, and in the past decade by the Soviet Union of using the Palestinian problem to unify the Arabs behind it. Under such conditions it is certain that the enthusiasm of the PLO will not subside, nor will its hopes to destroy Israel disappear.

Israeli Sovereignty

Samaria is the most central part of Israel, the place of our most ancient capitals--Sh'hem and Shiloh. During the First Commonwealth it was the heart of the country, the land of the tribes of Joseph and the house of Ephraim.

The ruins of Samaria remind us of the ancient kingdom of Israel. The names of the villages and the ruins everywhere evoke the memory of Israel living on its land.

Security analysis shows that there is no escape from our continued presence in Samaria. We have the choice--will we stay there as an occupying army, or as a people living in its own land? Instead of seeing Samaria as a frontier for safeguarding the centers of the state, we will look upon it as an Israeli patrimony worthy of love, safeguarding and protecting from any aggressor. The presence of an occupation army demoralizes our people; protecting the homeland strengthens his spirit. Many of the crises of the last decade have been the result of our lack of determination to fulfill the Zionist vision both in Samaria and Judea. The 1948 state is not a goal in itself--the goal is Zionism, and the state is the tool.

I am not entering into an ideological analysis. Suffice it to take a look at the map to understand that the 1948 state was geographically unhealthy, and that it is vital to correct this by settling the center of Israel with a dense Jewish population. The argument concerning "densely populated Arab areas" voiced by those who oppose the settlements is based on a wrong impression. One may drive along the longitudinal roads in Samaria to see how sparse the Arab population is. Bet El and Ramallah are on the same longitude, as are Jenin and Hadera. Between those two lines there are two million Jews living within a strip of 15 kilometers, with less than half a million Arabs in a section 35 kilometers wide. A robust planning of population dispersion would transfer one million Jews from the coast to the hill. There is hardly an area of life quality and security in Israel (including matters of the nuclear age!) which will not benefit from it. As of this writing the settlement format invented by Gush Emunim was replicated for the outposts in the Galilee. It turns out that for each dwelling unit there are four candidate families. Such settlement has undoubtedly great possibilities.

Much has been written about the legal aspects. Only Pakistan and Great Britain recognized Jordanian rule in the West Bank during the 19 years of Jordanian occupation. We are the ones who accepted the UN partition plan, while the Arab states turned it down and invaded us in order to destroy the state of Israel in its inception. The Palestinians receive their national rights in Jordan, which was created by the partition of the land of Israel during the British Mandate in 1922.

The introduction of Israeli sovereignty does not require granting Israeli citizenship to the Arab residents of Judea and Samaria. It is common practice in democratic states to grant full citizenship to a person who, after a trial period, is willing to pledge allegiance to the state, and be tested on the history, language and culture of that nation. If any of the residents of the territories are willing to identify with the Zionist state of Israel, to be tested in Hebrew and Zionism, to serve in the army and pay taxes, they should be granted Israeli citizenship. If there will be those who are willing to live under Israeli rule but refuse to identify with the state of Israel and serve in the army, they should be granted resident status, which provides all the rights except for political rights. It is to be assumed that this is

what the majority will choose (as can be seen in the case of the Arab population of Jerusalem, which to this day has not taken advantage of its right to Israeli citizenship). If there will be those among the Arabs who will refuse to live under Israeli rule, they have the option which the Jews of Algeria chose. Jews had lived in Algeria even before the Islamic conquest and yet, when Algeria became an Arab state they left it voluntarily. Incidentally, part of the Arab population (350-400 thousand in the West Bank and Gaza) has refugee passports. Those are the Arab refugees whose refugee state was perpetuated by the Arab countries so that they may come back and demand Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Lod, Ramle etc. Eventually they will have to find a permanent home (this was also agreed in the Camp David Accords). Such a home could not be here, and as we have absorbed the Jews from Arab lands, the Arab countries will have to absorb the refugees. In the meantime their status certainly does not require that we grant them political rights.

Even if we evacuate Judea, Samaria and Gaza and a Palestinian state is established, the refugees will remain in their camps, and will help the Arab point an accusing finger at us, as has happened when we left Kuneitra in the Golan Heights. Their destination will continue to be Jaffa and Haifa. The only difference will be that as soon as they resume the acts of terrorism (which will be immediately!) we will have to engage in dangerous and ineffectual reprisals, whereas now we simply arrest the terrorists on the spot.

In a television program, filmed in the Gaza Strip in February 1980, the local residents voiced the fear that Egyptian workers may enter Israel who work for low wages. Wouldn't a million Egyptian workers threaten the Zionist social structure? Such demographic problems are not mentioned by those who would give up Judea and Samaria, while supporting peace with Egypt.

Summary

We have proved that giving up Samaria makes Israel indefensible in case of a surprise attack or an open attack which cannot be countered by a preventive attack. We have also shown that there is no substitute for Israeli rule, and if so--sovereignty in the area is preferable.

In 1971, a giant booster costing 400 million dollars was developed at the Fermi Laboratory in Chicago (the largest in the world). My friend the physicist Robert Wilson, the laboratory director, was invited to testify before Congress on the importance of this booster. One of the sympathetic senators asked a lead question: "Is the booster important for the defense of the U.S. and does it insure developing defense measures?" To which my friend responded: "Mr Senator, this booster is one of the things which make the U.S. worthy of defense." The same applies to Samaria. Keeping it is vital for Israel's defense, but it is also worthy of occupying a central place in the rebuilding of Israel, the security of which we are insuring.

FOOTNOTES

[1]The Sinai Campaign took place in the Sinai against Egypt, but at the time Israel faced a threat from the West Bank border when Jordan joined the Syrian-Egyptian alliance on October 25, 1956.

[2]The place where India and Pakistan signed a peace treaty. Since that treaty they have fought another terrible war, in which Pakistan lost half of its territory.

[3]At that time too leaders of the defense system said that there was not going to be a war in the next ten years, as Dayan said later in 1973.

[4]See my article in Ma'ariv on June 18, 1967.

[5]Like the British who remained at the Suez Canal several years after Egypt became independent and were thrown out in 1954.

[6]See my series of articles in Ma'ariv, January 1980.

*This article only reflects the views of the author. The editors consider this article a continuation of the open discussion on the subject of Israel's secure borders, which was dealt with recently in this forum by Major General (Ret.) Aaron Yariv in his article "Strategic Depth--An Israeli View (MA'ARAKHOT 270-71).

9565
CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

ASIAN INVESTMENT BANK--Kuwaiti Banks, the International Investment Company and the Social Insurance Institute will establish "the Bank of Kuwait and Asia." It will have a capital of $50 million, 25 percent of which have already been paid in. The new bank will be 100 percent Kuwaiti-owned, and will be headquartered in Bahrain, as an exempt foreign financial institution. The purpose of the bank is to coordinate the activity of Kuwaiti financial institutions in the countries of East and Southeast Asia, such as Japan, Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong, as studies indicate that growth was formed after the particiapting parties saw a need to diversify Kuwait's foreign investments in both the public and private sectors by seeking new areas. It was noted that Kuwaiti investments in East and Southeast Asia were not well distributed, especially as the government tends to always invest in Europe. The new bank will be a link between East Asian and Gulf countries through money exchange transactions, commercial exchange and direct investment. The reason the Kuwaiti shareholders chose Bahrain as their headquarters is that it is now regarded as a financial center for Gulf area banks. The new bank will have branches in Tokyo, Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong. [Excerpts] [Kuwait AL-HADAF in Arabic 26 Jun 80 p 6] 9455

JAPANESE TO BUILD SUPERTANKERS--The Kuwait Oil Tanker Company [KOTC] yesterday [9 July] signed an agreement with the Japanese company I.H.E. to build 2 giant tankers, each with a capacity of 290,000 metric tons. Both tankers will cost 170 million dollars. The agreement was signed by Mr Faysal Thanyan al-Ghanim, chairman of the board of KOTC and Mr Khalid al-Madaf, director general of operations of KOTC, in the presence of Shaykh 'Ali Jabir al-'Ali al-Sabah, member of the board of directors of the Kuwait National Petroleum Company [KNPC]. In a statement to the Kuwait News Agency following the signing ceremony, Mr al-Ghanim said that KOTC has a contract with another Japanese company to build 4 other ships to be delivered by the end of next year. In answer to a question about the slump in the petroleum tankers markets, Mr al-Ghanim said that these contracts for the sale of Kuwaiti petroleum obligate buyers to use domestic tankers. [Excerpts] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 10 Jul 80 p 15] 9455

JAPANESE BOND SALE--The Japanese company, Ito Yukado, sold 5 billion yens ($25 million) worth of convertible bonds with a 10-year maturity. This is the

first transaction of its kind in the Middle East. The Kuwait Investment Company [KIC] arranged the issuance of these bonds together with the Japanese Bonds Syndicate, (Numura). A large percentage of these bonds was sold in Kuwait. These bonds are considered unique, because they can be directly converted into [stock] ownership of the issuing Japanese company, which owns a large chain of commercial stores in Japan. Japanese companies usually issue this type of bonds in Europe, especially for West German marks, Swiss francs and other major European currencies. The Middle East area was not a main center for Japanese companies to seek such investment funds, especially in Japanese currency. Western investment experts say that the recent tendency of the Japanese government to issue bonds in the Middle East aims at soaking up Arab monetary surpluses and utilizing them to pay large Japanese petroleum import bills. Financial experts say that the issuance of these bonds may be a sign of increasing Japanese interest in the Middle East as a source of investment funds in Japanese currency, so as to diversify and turn away from the weak American dollar as a source of investment funds. Ito Yukado bonds yield an annual interest rate of 7.3 percent. [Excerpts] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 10 Jul 80 p 14] 9455

PRC FOREIGN TRADE MINISTER INTERVIEWED--Kuwait, 4 Oct (KUNA)--The Chinese Minister of Foreign Trade Li Qiang arrived here Saturday leading a trade delegation on a four-day official visit to Kuwait. He was received on arrival by the Minister of Commerce and Industry Iabd al-Wahab Yousuf an-Nafisi. The visiting minister told KUNA that he would discuss with an-Nafisi the possibility of establishing joint ventures in the field of chemical industry. He will also discuss with other Kuwaiti officials sales of oil to his country saying that China will submit a purchase order for one million tons of Kuwaiti crude per year. The minister expressed satisfaction over development of trade relations between China and Kuwait and said that these relations had developed remarkably in the recent years on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. He added that exchange of visits and frank viewpoints on bilateral relations would also push forward the wheel of understanding between the peoples of the two countries. [Text] [LD041320 Kuwait KUNA in English 1149 GMT 4 Oct 80]

CSO: 4820

SULAYMAN FRANJIYAH INTERVIEWED ON PARTITION OF LEBANON, OTHER ISSUES

LD021055 Paris AN-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AD-DUWALI in Arabic 29 Sep-5 Oct 80 pp 10-2

[Interview with Sulayman Franjiyah, former Lebanese president by 'Isa Makhluf; place and date not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] They [not further identified] are using the subjects of partition [of Lebanon] and settlement [of the Palestinians in Lebanon] as a general slogan. Can you define to us your attitude toward these two matters?

[Answer] I say and repeat that there is an Israeli-American scheme whose aim is to partition Lebanon. By partition I mean the establishment of a Christian state on a part of the Lebanese territory. What remains of this territory would be left to our brother Muslims by virtue of their overwhelming majority. In such an event, there would no longer be any objection to the settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon. The only one to gain from this scheme would be Israel because all the demands for the return of the West Bank and Gaza sector would then disappear. The quarter that is trying to implement this scheme is the Phalangist Party which sought to establish itself as the only ruling party in the Lebanese republic. But when it failed in its quest the Phalangist Party was content with a small section of the Lebanese territory and left the other parts for the Palestinians and whoever wishes to remain on Lebanese territory. That is, briefly, the purpose of partition and settlement.

In addition to this, there is an idea which might be impossible to implement internationally. It takes the form of the occupation of a section of the Lebanese territory in the south for a long time during which the inhabitants would be made to emigrate so that that section could then be given as a state to the Palestinians.

[Question] Some believe that partition is nothing more than a distraction process to enable the implementation of the "Camp David" policy. Others believe that serious attempts are being made to impose partition as a fact and a reality. What is your opinion?

[Answer] The scheme to settle the Palestinians in Lebanon had been endorsed and attempts had been made to implement it before "Camp David." At that time and in the wake of the shuttle visits that the U.S. secretary of state made to the Arab area, it was decided to make the Christians emigrate from Lebanon and to leave the whole of Lebanon to the rest of its people and the Palestinians. However, that plan failed, thanks to the Lebanese steadfastness against it. I hope that the fate of the settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon will be the same as the fate of the partition scheme--utter failure.

[Question] Some say that one of the important reasons for the assassination of Tony Franjiyah was his being the most likely candidate to succeed President Ilyas Sarkis?

[Answer] Since every Lebanese maronite has this right [the right to become president], I would not be surprised if it is said that Tony Franjiyah was assassinated for this reason. However, it is a fact that his assassination was not based on a plan against him but on an international plan aimed at dividing the Christians in Lebanon so that when a new scheme against Lebanon is to be implemented, the Christians would not be united to defend their homeland. Regrettably, this plan has succeeded.

[Question] Among the many plans being propunded, there is a plan for setting up cantons in Lebanon. What is your attitude toward this plan?

[Answer] I was asked the same question a long time ago and I answered it by saying that the term "cantons" was based on the saying that "everything that is foreign is good." Why call them cantons? Lebanon is divided into five provinces and this is the term we adhere to. Lebanon cannot be better divided administratively than it is today. If the officials are to do something useful, then they should give powers to these provinces to make them administratively independent of the capital. I repeat, administratively.

[Question] In other words, you support administrative decentralization?

[Answer] Administrative decentralization in order to facilitate the citizens' business. What is done by the director general could be done by the governor; what is done by the head of a department in Beirut can be done by the head of a similar department in the province having the same capabilities.

[Question] Will this not lead to political decentralization?

[Answer] There is no objection to political decentralization in the future if the administrative experiment succeeds.

[Question] Your security plan for the widespread deployment of the army is regarded as a change of attitude. What is the new formula for the army to impose its control over the country?

[Answer] The army will not be able to implement any plan as long as the present man is its commander. The malady lies in the identity of the man at the top.

[Question] The "Free Lebanese Agency," which speaks in your name, has opened a dialogue with a number of political personalities like Raymond Iddih, Rashid Karami, Fu'ad Lahhud and Walid Junblatt some of whom have called for the establishment of a comprehensive national front under your leadership. What would be the front's comprehensive plan should the front be established?

[Answer] There is no drawn-up plan for this front. There is only one aim which is known to everybody: we want Lebanon to be as it was before 1975--fraternal coexistence among all the Lebanese. This is our only aim. We consider everyone who believes in this as a member of this group.

[Question] Some Lebanese sides have proposed that Lebanon join the Syrian-Libyan unity. What is your stand on this?

[Answer] The Syrian-Libyan unity is only a few days old. Let us wait. If it turns out to be good for the two countries, then we would consider whether it is possible for us to join it.

[Question] In your comments on Prince Fahd's declaration of a Jihad, you said: "Let him draw his sword and march in front of the Mjhahidin because if he does not implement this declaration, history's judgement of him will be very harsh." Do you expect this declaration to be carried out?

[Answer] The day the declaration was made, I had great confidence that the declaration will be carried out on the morrow. But today, after the declaration has been made conditional upon international attitudes, I no longer expect it to be implemented, especially since one of the conditions is to wait for the attitude of the European states. I repeat--and history has taught us--that he who calls for Jihad must march in front of the men.

[Question] It is being reiterated that there is a possibility that Israel will occupy the south. What is your opinion?

[Answer] I am not surprised. When the partition plan fails completely, I do not exclude this possibility.

CSC: 4802

BRIEFS

GOLAN LIBERATION FRONT ESTABLISHED--A new organization called "The Golan Liberation Organization" has been established in Beirut. It includes fighting elements from various Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian groups. The new organization will be proclaimed soon after it executes a mission or a big military operation against Israel or the forces supporting Israel in Lebanon, Europe or the United States. AL-'ASR has learned that the new organization meets wide-scale support from the Syrian authorities and the Palestinian resistance and is qualified to absorb all small pro-Syrian organizations within its ranks and action. [Text] [NC261813 Nicosia AL-'ASR in Arabic 26 Sep 80 p 7]

STUDENTS UNDERGO MILITARY TRAINING--The number of Palestinian students who have been subject to the military training decision in Lebanon is 30,000. Their training has been confined to the current summer season and is in accordance with the decision for general mobilization of the Palestinian forces announced by Abu 'Ammar [PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat] to deal with the developments in the situation in Lebanon. [Text] [LD011311 London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 27 Sep-3 Oct 80 p 10]

CSO: 4802

SHIFT AWAY FROM MARXISM SEEN IN RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 13, 15 Jul 80

[Article by Hazim Saghiyah: "Directions Taken By the Power Struggle in Democratic Yemen"]

[13 Jul 80 p 14]

[Text] The National Front and the Long Road to Power

Usually the struggle for power in the progressive countries is presented as being one of two things--either an imperialist plot or a communist plot.

Democratic Yemen is one country whose politics and affairs have been surrounded, to an exceptional degree, by an air of vagueness and mystery which both its friends and enemies, to an equal degree, have participated in creating. For this reason, whenever this country undergoes an internal change at the higher levels of government or in the main guidelines of its policies, this change is interpreted as being either an imperialist or a communist plot.

During the recent months, Aden has witnessed a number of changes. The former president, Salim Rubay' 'Ali (Salimin), was removed in the course of a bloody power struggle which victimized the president himself. After that, 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il was removed as president of the nation and secretary of the ruling party, and was made "chairman of the party." Finally, outside the confines of the power struggle, President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's trip to Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf countries provided new grounds for speculation.

The following is an attempt, claiming to possess some degree of objectivity, to make some observations about the nature of the power struggle which has been taking place in Democratic Yemen.

South Yemen, like most fragmented and dominated countries, was no exception to the prevailing pattern of contrasts whithin its society. As a result

of Aden's economic development under British rule, particularly the employment opportunities which were provided by the oil refineries, port, and British military bases, thousands of tribesmen from Northern Yemen and the rural areas of South Yemen streamed into Aden. This gradually undermined the economic base of these other areas.

The number of Northern Yemenis alone, living in Aden, rose from 25,000 in 1951 to 100,000 in 1965. Most of them were unskilled laborers who maintained their traditional ties to North Yemen and viewed Aden's prosperity with misgivings and resentment. In this sense, the budding feeling of Yemeni unity which these people had, and which was adopted by the Nasirite trend and the Arab nationalist movement, was not separate from the struggle between the rural areas and the more fortunate urban area. This became particularly the case because the British rulers strove to aggravate these contrasting trends in the rural-urban relationship.

Later on, a Yemeni scholar wrote that public education, which was available to very few, "was reserved for those who had Adenese birth certificates. The result of this was that people from the rural areas of South Yemen and from North Yemen, who worked in Aden, were deprived of education." The same thing was true with regard to political rights. In the elections which the British held in 1959, for example, only the 21,500 Adenese, out of a total of 180,000 (which included the non-Adenese inhabitants of South Yemen as well as North Yemenis living in Aden), were allowed to vote.

The Desire to Achieve Power

This system of relationships aggravated the struggle for power and increasingly associated it with illegality. This was taking place in a general climate of rising Arab nationalism represented by Nasirism.

As for "Aden" itself, its political feelings had already been growing and was characterized by hostility to the rural areas. The slogan "Aden for the Adenese" was coined by the first Adenese political movement, the Aden Association. It was led by Muhammad 'Ali Luqman, along with some of the capital city's merchants and "old established families" who dominated the commercial sector through alliances with the British rulers and with some foreign families, particularly those from Asia, who were living in the capital city. But those among the Adenese who were members of the working class maintained their civic "integrity" by participating in patriotic action. During the period of the struggle for independence, most of them took sides with the Liberation Front which was apart from the National Front. The latter, as a workers' organization, also sought to attract non-Adenese workers living in Aden.

Almost the same thing applies to the eastern half of Democratic Yemen, that is, the area around the Hadramaut valley, where the Arab nationalist movement and the National Front movement did not show any particular growth. Hadramaut (especially through its port at al-Mukalla) experienced a relatively "capitalist" development which contributed toward the rise of

political feelings of the Adenese. It seems that Hadramaut emigres, who had brought back the first seeds of "political awareness" from Indonesia and Britain, did not go beyond calling for the independence of Hadramaut. In this respect, they were doing what their Adenese peers did when they coined the slogan "Aden for the Adenese."

At the same time, there were stirrings among the people in the rural areas and small towns of the western half of South Yemen in response to economic and political isolation. In this context, there arose in Lahij in (1951?) the South Arabian League which was led by some of the commercial elements in the rural areas and small towns, in addition to a small number of sultans and princes who were grumbling about the fact that the British were allowing them less and less participation in government. They "found in Muhammad 'Ali al-Jifri, the chief judge of Lahij and a graduate of al-Azhar University, a figurehead leader for the League's party. They also found in the Sultan of Lahij at that time, 'Ali 'Abd al-Karim, their behind-the-scenes leader."

Hostility to the British

This political group, originating in the rural areas and small towns of the western half of South Yemen, constituted the first nucleus of people hostile to the British. At that time, it included some personalities who were engaging in patriotic activity such as 'Abdellah al-Asnaj, and 'Abdallah Badhib, who later joined a communist movement which was not destined to grow.

The "policy" of the rural areas and small towns of the western part of South Yemen was more "unionist." The South Arabian League called for Yemeni unity, allied itself with Nasir's Egypt, and benefited from both the aid from Egypt and its alliance with the Imam of North Yemen in its confrontation with the sultans who were more submissive to British rule.

The Adenese alliance with British imperialism, and the attempt by the Adenese to expand their partnership with British imperialism at the expense of the rural areas, small towns, and their ruling sultans, succeeded in assuming a legal political framework, and in stripping their opponents of any shred of legality.

The interesting thing is that the British set up the South Arabian Federation in the western half of what is known today as Democratic Yemen. This is where the illegal opposition movement represented by the South Arabian League was concentrated. It was characterized by a greater degree of underdevelopment than the eastern half of the country centering around Hadramaut. The original nucleus of the the Federation was Bayhan, al-Dali', al-Fadli, al-'Awdhali, Lower Yafa', and Upper 'Awlaqi. This area was where the British received both their warmest support and fiercest opposition. Both the support and opposition--in spite of the gap between them--were a result of the same underdevelopment. Dathinah and Yafa', for example, witnessed a series of tribal rebellions against their sultans and rulers.

This was something which the British scholar, Fred Halliday, attributed to the "existence of remnants of primitive communistic and Carmathian beliefs."

Arab Nationalism and Marxism

The matter does not end here. It is from precisely this (western) area, especially the small towns and surrounding areas in Bayhan, al-'Awlaqi, Dathinah, (Abyan), Yafa', and Lahij, that the Arab nationalist movement drew its strength. And it was from this area that the National Front got most of its leaders and rank-and-file. The ties that these people had with the city of Aden were very casual or shallow. Some of them were students who had studied in Aden, such as Muhammad 'Ali Haytham and 'Ali Salim al-(Bayd), or were labor-union leaders of non-Adenese origin such as 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, Mahmud 'Ushaysh, and Muhammad Salih al-'Awlaqi. The National Front inherited the rural-urban struggle and added to it its most radical tool for seizing power--Arab nationalism followed by Marxism-Leninism. This way, the National Front was able to storm onto the stage of political power play, which had been beyond its traditional reach.

'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il was born in al-Tawahi in Aden, but he is from a peasant family whose origins go back to North Yemen. He worked in a British oil refinery till 1962. After that he spent a year in the teaching profession. Salim Rubay' 'Ali was from the village of al-Mahall in the province of (Abyan). He served in the Hadramaut Bedouin Legion established by the British. He also worked as a tribal "judge" who solved conflicts among the peasants and bedouins. This earned him the "political qualities" which he maintained until he was killed.

'Ali Nasir is from the Hasaniyah tribe in the province of (Abyan). He worked as an elementary school teacher, and then he became the principal of a small school. He was able to achieve this, because, in spite of his peasant origins, he had managed to study in a teachers' training institute and graduate from it in 1959. Things were much the same for Muhammad 'Ali Haytham, a member of the Dathinah tribe in the third border province, who worked as a teacher. Salih Muslih and 'Ali Salim al-Bayd are from (Abyan), whereas Salih Muti''s origins go back to Yafa'. As for 'Ali 'Antar, his background is definitely a tribal one, and goes back to al-Dali', where the northern and southern tribes meet in the two northern provinces of Ibb and Rida'.

In their political activity, these personalities belonged to two labor unions in Aden. Their experience was limited to the milieu of laborers who came from North Yemen and from the rural areas of South Yemen, as in the case of 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, Mahmud 'Ushaysh, Muhammad Salih 'Awlaqi, and Ahmad al-Sha'ir, and to the milieu of militants and freedom-fighters from the rural areas, as in the case of 'Ali Nasir, who worked against the sultans in Bayhan, Rubay' 'Ali, who led the (Dufau) uprising, and 'Ali 'Antar, who fought on many fronts in the countryside.

The City Takes a Moderate Position!

The rural and regional origins of these people, in addition to their status, combined to keep this group of people outside the framework of political legitimacy, or the framework of successful moderate activity permissible to an opposition. Their social standing was unlike that of the other political leaders, be they the rival leaders of the Liberation Front or the leaders of the right wing which was removed from the National Front in 1969.

'Abdallah al-Asnaj does not share with the leftist members of the National Front their marginal and obscure social position. He was both a political and labor-union leader. Between 1951 and 1962, he worked as an official of the Aden Airlines Co., and eventually became the secretary-general of the Labor Union Congress. He founded and led the Socialist People's Party, which was an organization representing a political compromise between labor union reformists. With this as a base, he promoted meaningful ties with the British Labor Party. 'Abd al-Qawi Mak'awi is a lawyer whose origins go back to Upper Sharihah, and is from Aden's middle class. He was the head of a company in Eritrea and in Aden. He was also the leader of the parliamentary opposition to British rule. In March of 1965, and on the basis of a compromise agreement which was not destined to last for long, he managed to occupy the post of head of the government.

The origins of Qahtan and Faysal al-Sha'bi go back to a middle-class family in Lahij. In the fifties, the former was employed as head of the Land Registry Department, whereas the latter was the secretary of the minister of trade in the government of the South Arabian Federation.

The Countryside Besieges the City

Another thing which blocked access to positions of power for those who later on became the leaders of the National Front was the average age of those leaders. Al-Makkawi was born in 1918 and Qahtan al-Sha'bi was born in 1920, whereas (Salimin), the oldest member of the generation of leftists, was born in 1935. 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il and 'Ali Nasir were born in 1939, and Muhammad 'Ali Haytham is only in his middle forties.

Furthermore, it could be said that the generation of leftists first became interested in political activity when changes in the Arab world were taking place in the middle fifties, especially when the Suez Canal was nationalized. Their pan-Arab consciousness was one of the elements which enabled them to storm positions of power from outside. This was unlike the method used by people in the generation of al-Makkawi and al-Sha'bi, who had begun their political life when the British colonial administration was trying to modernize its version of colonial rule and to expand its social base.

Similarly, one could say that independence was achieved because of the fact that South Yemen's rural areas gradually besieged the city of Aden. The revolution began in the Radfan Mountains in the heart of the western

half of South Yemen. In spite of the fact that the National Front occupied the Kraytir area [of the city of Aden] for 20 days on the eve of its victory, the decisive factor in its victory was the fact that it liberated al-Dali', Yafa', al-'Awadhil, Dathinah, (Abyan), and Ja'ar. This led to the isolation of al-'Awaliq, Bayhan, and al-Wahidi from Aden, and this is what cemented the Liberation Front's victory later on. It should also be pointed out that Kraytir and al-Shaykh 'Uthman were the two areas of Aden which were densely settled by migrant laborers from North Yemen who came to work in Aden.

Significance of the Beginning of the Struggle

Although the removal of Qahtan al-Sha'bi from the National Front is considered to be a principal event in the history of this struggle, the first step in the purging of the National Front actually began during the first two years of the armed conflict. This first step was the removal of some of the prominent tribal leaders, who, at the beginning, had joined the National Front, such as Salih Ibn 'Awwas al-Hawshabi and 'Abdallah al-Maj'ali.

By means of this step, the National Front demonstrated that it was not merely part of a legacy of hostility to Aden. It was also demonstrating that it was a "modern" organization capable of taking over the reins of power in the post-colonial period of the strength of broad-based ideology.

However, the post-independence conflict with the right wing of the Front, represented by the family bloc led by Qahtan and 'Abd al-Latif al-Sha'bi, had more significance and complexity. The most important points of friction between the Front's left wing and Qahtan al-Sha'bi revolved around the problem of controlling the army. This was something that the minister of the interior, Muhammad 'Ali al-Haytham, had demanded.

Solution of this problem would have far-reaching results. In the final analysis, it would affect the economic program which the new country was going to adopt. It was in this context that the Front's fourth congress was held in Zanjabar in March of 1968. At this congress, the leftist majority was able to come out with some radical resolutions which soon enabled the leftists to fortify themselves in their confrontation with Qahtah al-Sha'bi. In any case, victory in the congress did not mean victory on the governmental level. High-ranking officers promptly carried out a military coup on 20 March, led by Husayn 'Ashal and 'Ali 'Abdallah Maysiri. As a result of this coup the cadres and leaders of the left wing of the National Front were arrested.

The people's demonstrations which were organized by elements on the Front, on the one hand, and the pro-Saudi leanings of high-ranking officers, on the other, forced Qahtan al-Sha'bi, who desired to maintain good relations with Cairo, to disassociate himself from those who carried out the coup. He took advantage of the growing balance of power within the country and consolidated his hold on the reins of government. This he was able to do by arresting some members of the military and by removing, from the

government and from sensitive positions, the leftist elements which he had been forced to set free. The response of the leftists was to organize and lead a series of rural revolts, the most important of which was the revolt in the province of (Abyan) which was led by (Salimin). At the same time, there were numerous attempted coups which were supported by the Saudi regime.

The Saudi Danger

Faced with the aggravation of the "Saudi dauger," 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, the leftist leader who had just returned from Bulgaria (where he had gone after Qahtan al-Sha'bi had removed him from the government), suggested arriving at a compromise with al-Sha'bi to make South Yemen immune to the dangers posed by the Saudi threat and to regulate South Yemen's internal power struggle.

The result was a compromise which allowed the leftists to achieve some degree of presence in the government. Some of the agreements reached in the bargain were: the appointment of political commissars in all army units, strengthening the National Front's militia, and the formation of the National Guard.

The Front was able to purge its ideological base and to practice restraint in its quest for power. But it was not able to establish itself within the spinal chord of the power structure, so as to be able to compete with Qahtan al-Sha'bi where it counted most. However, al-Sha'bi's alliance with some high-ranking officers and with remnants of the old regime began to disintegrate as the role of the Saudis surfaced. The National Front managed to consolidate its alliance with the lower-ranking officers. Muhammad 'Ali Haytham played a pivotal role in this regard through his influence with the officers of Dathinah, his native region.

Thus, on the eve of al-Sha'bi's removal from power, it appeared that the contest was between two forces. There was Qahtan al-Sha'bi, together with remnants of the military "right wing," against an alliance of the low-ranking officers, the People's Guard, and the guerrilla fighters who had acquired increasing influence through their role in warding off hostile military action Saudi political efforts.

In June of 1969, the climate was right for the downfall of Qahtan al-Sha'bi.

[15 Jul 80 p 13]

[Text] The Authority of the Ideological Textbook and the Beginnings of "Revisionism"

'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, as a person and as a leader, was an example of the weakness of the ideology which invaded the "society" of South Yemen without taking into account its special circumstances. All other figures involved in the power struggle (Qahtan al-Sha'bi, al-Haytham, Salimin, and perhaps also 'Antar and Nasir Muhammad(had a plan for government less bound to

ideology and were in closer touch with the "reality" of South Yemen than is 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, who is from North Yemen.

In the climate of consecration of the "socialist experiment" in Democratic Yemen, it is possible for the textbook of socialist ideology, which is imposed from the top, to bestow disproportionate importance upon those of South Yemeni descent who have firmer ties to the land where the "socialist paradise" is being built.

These [Southern] symbols played bigger roles than 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il--who is the symbol of "ideological ambition"--in the two processes of achieving power and maintaining it. In the end, these symbols were closer to the spirit of the countryside and to the war which it waged, leading to the siege and fall of the city of Aden, where 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il was doing his fighting as part of a labor union movement. The latter had tried to bestow an exaggerated urban character upon the war of independence in South Yemen.

One of the first victories achieved by the National Front was 'Ali 'Antar's conquest of the region of al-Dali' and his capture of its ruling prince. When Egyptian aid stopped coming to this Front, contributions from the people of the two provinces of Ibb and Rida' in North Yemen made up for it. Tribes in these provinces are related to 'Ali 'Antar's tribe in al-Dali'. Since December 1969, 'Ali 'Antar has been called commander of the Yemeni armed forces. This has enabled him to dominate most of the key positions in the power apparatus.

(Salimin) also operated in the rural areas and led the revolution in Radfan, in addition to leading the takeover of the Kraytir area in the city of Aden. (Salimin) and Muhammad 'Ali al-Haytham were instrumental in overthrowing Qahtan al-Sha'bi, whereas 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, during most of the conflict, was with Qahtan al-Sha'bi in Bulgaria.

When al-Haytham was removed, the decisive rôle was played by 'Ali Nasir. And when (Salimin) was eliminated, it was 'Ali 'Antar who played the decisive role. In other words, the "ideological approach" was unable to find tribal or regional support, nor was it able, as we shall see, to seize control of the army--the nerve center of power.

An overall view of the conflict suggests that, in the final analysis, the idea of socialist "purity" was developing on unsteady foundations. It had started among some of Aden's labor unions (which, in any case, are composed mostly of non-Adenese). These unions inevitably ended up in an alliance with the security apparatus which was overseen by Muhammad Sa'id 'Abdallah, generally known as "Muhsin." If the level of economic and social development of a country like Russia did not preclude dependence upon people like Beria to build socialism--a socialism which had its share of severe coercion, what would building socialism be like in a country such as South Yemen, which has no economic base?

Elements having good socialist intentions, which aim to change the course of history by grabbing it by the neck, allied themselves with a security apparatus which, couplied its severity (in dealing with difficulties caused by the reality of the country's social situation) with true loyalty to "the interests of the revolution."

It appears that the party elite, which came to be almost totally dependent on the security apparatus, began to be incompatible with both the government bureaucracy and the army which wanted development to take place with less supervision and fewer ideological hurdles.

Alliance Between the Party and the Security Apparatus

It may be that the ideological self-delusion of those in the alliance between the party and the security apparatus, represented by 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il and Muhsin, led them to think of trying one last time to secure key positions of power, especially in the army, since they had achieved so many victories previously.

This is indicated by some newspaper reports which were written before the resignation of 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il. The Lebanese newspaper AL-NAHAR had the following to say: "What happened in Yemen is an internal problem which, since 1979, had begun to develop over the issue of 'Muhsin,' who wanted to consolidate his hold over the armed forces. 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il had appointed him as Minister of State Security. He wanted to impose his control over the military intelligence apparatus which, at that time was under the minister of defense, 'Ali 'Antar, an old friend of 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il. 'Ali 'Antar strongly objected to the demands of 'Muhsin'. In the end, 'Ali 'Antar achieved something of a victory, when the minister of the state security was dismissed. He was replaced by a committee formed under the chairmanship of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, the head of the government.

"The winners in this confrontation (the stage for which was set at a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party during the first half of August 1979) were 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and 'Ali 'Antar."

One weekly magazine which did not contradict the opinion of AL-NAHAR said that the results of the conflict were as follows:

"'Ali Nasir was able to achieve:

1. The removal of Muhsin as minister of state security, and the formation of a collective committee to decide security questions.

2. The consolidation of 'Ali 'Antar's position in the ministry of defense.

3. The promotions of Muhammad Salih Muti' and 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali.

"'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il was able to achieve:

1. The calling of an extraordinary session concerning 'strengthening the leading role of the party.'

2. The appointment of Lt Col Ahmad Salim 'Ubayd, a member of the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party, as head of the political office in the ministry of defense."

It is said that 'Ali 'Antar reluctantly agreed to this appointment of Lt Col 'Ubayd. It is also said that the Soviet Union, along with some of the communist parties in the eastern part of the Arab world, tried to mediate the conflict, but that the two sides rejected this mediation on the grounds that the problem was a domestic one, and that it amounted to no more than some grumbling by 'Ali Nasir, 'Ali 'Antar, Muti', and 'Abd al-Wali about "excesses" committed by 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il and Muhsin.

In any case, many analyses were offered to explain the "resignation" of 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il. On 22 April 1980, for example, the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-SIYASAH said that 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il had offered his resignation at the end of last February, but that he had been asked to postpone it until the party congress could be held. Another story was that 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il would not have met with defeat in the party, were it not for the intervention of forces which were closer to, and had more influence on, the real sources of power. These prevented a number of members of the Central Committee from attending the decisive meeting.

Regional Factors

The important thing is that developments in the region, starting last year, began to gradually make things difficult for the Yemeni "abnormality."

The Iranian revolution revived Saudi Arabia's plan to shift the American presence to the Gulf region. Iran under the shah, had been a strong and successful competitor, in fact more successful than Saudi Arabia, [in confining American interest to Iran].

Also, the escalation of events in Afghanistan (a situation which became very grave recently due to the Soviet military intervention) led the Moslem countries to impose tight isolation around the small republic which had previously been condemned for favoring non-Arab and non-Moslem Ethiopia over Arab and Moslem Somalia and Eritrea.

Perhaps it became too difficult to reconcile a policy of pure [Socialist] principles with a very complicated real world. Riyad had previously invited 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il twice to visit Saudi Arabia, but both times the visit was postponed. Information (probably inflated) began to leak about the existence of Soviet bases in Democratic Yemen and the presence of Yemeni troops in Afghanistan!

The treaty which Yemen signed in the latter part of 1979 with the Soviet Union was by way of necessary precaution against any conflict with the Gulf countries and Saudi Arabia. In this context, it may be appropriate to wonder what effect the news of the military facilities, granted to America in the ports of Mombasa, Berbera, and Masirah, might have on "trial and error" men such as 'Ali Nasir and 'Ali 'Antar, who are not much in favor of engaging in open confrontations with their [Northern[Yemeni and other conservative neighbors. Developments such as these are likely to raise serious questions concerning the regime's stability, or perhaps even its existence, at a time when turbulence is the order of the day. Maybe it was chiefly due to this feeling that South Yemen sent Salim Salih Muhammad, the minister of foreign affairs, on a visit to Saudi Arabia last March--a month before 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il's "resignation."

The important thing is that Isma'il's "resignation" was accompanied by a large-scale effort to improve relations with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries. The most eloquent evidence of this effort was the trip undertaken by the head of the government, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad. Its results were described as "very positive," at a time when 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il was embarking upon a "convalescence journey" to the Soviet Union.

In any case, on the day after 'Ali Nasir Muhammad began his trip to Saudi Arabia, the minister of defense, 'Ali 'Antar, arrived in Aden, having returned from Moscow where he had held "very successful military talks" with the Soviets. It was also announced that 'Ali Nasir Muhammad would make a trip to Eastern Europe after finishing his trip to the Gulf area. Many interpretations have been made by commentators concerning such a trip to Eastern Europe at the heels of the resignation of 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il. Some characterized it as an effort to achieve a balance in Soviet-Arab relations. But other commentators portrayed it as an indication that South Yemen was adopting a formula which has become all too familiar in some of the countries of the Third World. This consists of maintaining friendship with the Soviet Union, while, at the same time, dishing out harsh treatment to those inside the country who are pro-Soviet.

The Pattern

Sometimes it seems that "Marxism" in Aden may end up following a pattern which was followed by "Arab nationalism" there. This pattern was one of gradual disintegration following near success in efforts to get closer to the reins of power.

The short time period (4 years) it took the Yemeni revolution to triumph, coupled with the late birth of the Marxist left wing of the National Front (1968), were among the factors which naturally led to the adoption of Marxism as an experiment in government whose results could not be foretold. Thus, those who "became Marxists" filled the same cup, which they had used to drink juice of Arab nationalism, with juice of Marxism-Leninism.

Perhaps this explains the remarkable shift from left to right, even in the direction of positions taken by Saudi Arabia (al-Haytham, for example), as a result of the difficulties of putting Marxism into practice and of achieving development under South Yemen's conditions of poverty, underdevelopment and total lack of revenue-producing resources.

Has the cycle of extremism come to an end, through the liquidation of Qahtan and Faysal al-Sha'bi, Muhammad 'Ali al-Haytham, and Salim Rubay' 'Ali, preparatory to gradual reversal dictated by the fact that extremism has now become incompatible with the requirements of holding onto the reins of power?

Developments like these are not exclusively characteristic of the "Marxism" of South Yemen, as opposed to other countries of the Third World. But they have been more striking in this country which is fragmented, extremely poor, and far away from the Soviet Union.

After the National Front seized power, the struggle for power was influenced by factors attributable to the fact that ideology had been superimposed on reality. But after this had happened, it became quite feasible for a somewhat ordinary person who did not possess any exceptional qualities, to announce from his position in the army or in the government a new direction, based on providing more "democracy" at home and more "equilibrium" in regional and international relations.

It is known about the present head of government, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, that he is well built and quite "realistic." As an administrator and an executive, he has succeeded in bringing a relative degree of orgnaization to the government administration, in spite of South Yemen's lack of qualified personnel. He also managed to (advocate?) economic flexibility in an environment of inflexibility in a country which had suffered from poverty, war, the emigration of proficient manpower, and the closing of the Suez Canal.

'Ali Nasir Muhammad has been credited with a number of early "realistic" steps which he managed to take even within the framework of a generally "irrational" policy. He was the architect of rapprochement with Kuwait. His name is the one associated with the 1974 5-year development plan--which aimed at building an infrastructure for the South Yemeni economy. And he is the one who participated so effectively in the negotiations which, in March of 1976, led to the normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia.

On the other hand, it appears that the amount of authority, which was concentrated in the hands of the army, had begun to infringe upon the system of the hierarchy of authority dictated by the establishment of the Socialist Party. 'Ali 'Antar, the army man, is now described as effectively the number two man in the country, although he is still merely a candidate for membership of the party's politburo. Seen in this light, it is possible that 'Ali 'Antar has become the man who makes the final decisions.

Did these apprehensions haunt 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il when both he and 'Ali Nasir, on 26 October 1978, were named brigadier generals in the army in honor of their great contribution to the national struggle?

It appears that, in the case of South Yemeni politics, facts cannot be discovered right away. It will probably be a long time before we have get a clear picture of the dimensions of the revision which is likely to take place in South Yemen because of the alliance between the army and the government administration.

But the fact remains that it is urgent for us to know, as soon as possible, what the extent will be of the change which may take place regarding South Yemen's policy toward the Arab countries and its role in the Steadfastness and Controntation Front.

If we put aside the question of "Yemeni unity", it appears that the regime in South Yemen succeeded to a great extent throughout the past 13 years in shutting off the interest of Arab countries in South Yemen, except with regard to pure strategic considerations, particularly the location of South Yemen at Bab el Mandeb.

Perhaps the expectation is legitimate that South Yemen's revisionism will reach the point where this detached view of South Yemen's strategic location will be completely changed by a South Yemeni open-door policy towards the Arab world. This is something which could take place in the near future or during the next few months. In case it does happen, it would be a positive development in South Yemen's situation.

9468
CSO: 4802

'RELIEF' FELT AT STATIONING OF AWACS IN SAUDI ARABIA

LD061345 Kuwait AS-SIYASAH in Arabic 2 Oct 80 pp 1, 17

[Unattributed report: "Gulf Economic Circles Feel Relief"]

[Text] The immediate reaction among the Gulf economic circles yesterday to the decision to send four U.S. AWACS aircraft to be stationed in the Saudi Arabian Kingdom's eastern province in order to protect the oilfields was a one of relief. In response to telephone contacts by AS-SIYASAH with several Gulf economic circles, these circles expressed the view that strengthening Saudi Arabia's defense capability with this type of sophisticated aircraft eliminates the feeling that their oil is endangered. Such feeling causes anxiety not only among the countries and peoples of the area but also among peoples and countries of the whole world and could lead to the major powers intervening in the area militarily, which intervention is rejected by all.

The economic circles, which feel relieved, are convinced that it would not have been easy for the countries of the area to obtain such aircraft whether individually or collectively. Therefore, the feeling is that their use defensively in order to prevent the spread of war to the rest of the oil region would, regardless of how this will be interpreted by certain regional and international parties, contribute to checking the spread of the flames of war to other areas that live in a state of prosperity from which the whole world benefits as much as the peoples of the area itself.

It is worth noting that this sense of relief in the region's economic circles as a result of this defensive development, which involves no encroachment on national sovereignty, was reflected on the entire economic sector as well as on the public psychological climate. In brief, the question being asked is: is it better for the area and the world to have this defensive means as a precautionary measure or let the war spread so as to consume all the achievements of the region and render the Gulf the target of international military interventions under the pretext of protecting the oil?

CSO: 4802

MZALI ADDRESS ON END OF PARLIAMENTARY YEAR PUBLISHED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 30 Jul 80 p 4

[Text] Yesterday morning the National Assembly held a plenary meeting at the Bardo palace, under the presidency of Dr Sadok Mokaddem, president of the assembly, and in the presence of the members of the government headed by the prime minister, Mohamed Mzali.

At the beginning of the meeting the assembly discussed a project for a complemental finance bill for 1980.

It appears from the report relating to the project of the proposed bill that the ordinary state revenue would show an increase in a supplementary amount of 14 million dinars. The ordinary revenue will thus rise from 751.6 million dinars to 765.6 million dinars. This increase will be derived from direct taxes in an amount of 4 million dinars and from oil revenues in an amount of 10 million dinars. This project also proposes an increase of 12.4 million dinars for the enclosed budgets.

This increase will derive from the budget of the PTT (Posts and Telecommunications) (1.1 million, dinars) and of the RTT (Tunisian Radio and Television) budget (300,000 dinars).

This supplementary revenue will make it possible to cover the increase registered for expenses which will be allocated to justice (300,000 dinars), foreign affairs (850,00 dinars), to interior (3.8 million dinars). National education (2.55 million dinars), agriculture (500,000 dinars), and finances (6 million dinars).

Eleven deputies said a few words to discuss this bill. The interventions referred to the interest of the dublic debt, strengthening of public savings, improvement in the country's security, consolidation of Tunisia's representation abroad as well as questions of interest to national education and agriculture.

The first to reply to these interventions, Mansour Moalla, planning and finance minister, stated that the additional budget amounts to 14 million dinars, of which 10 million were necessary due to the exceptional circumstances which the country has lived through at the beginning of this year which were impossible to foresee at the time of the preparation of the state budget for 1980. These 10 million dinars, added the minister, will permit, in an amount of 6 million dinars, to reinforce the means for the security of the country and 4 million dinars to make up the deficit resulting from the increase in the interest of the credits incurred on the international financial market.

In relation to these credits Moalla explained that they cover two categories. Some bear a constant interest, the others a variable interest. The interest rates of the latter credit category which are supplied by the international financial institutions, added the minister, vary according to the economic situation and could reach, as was the case a short time ago, a rate of 18 percent. However, specified the minister, Tunisia only has recourse to this category of credits as an exception.

Then replying to a deputy who had raised the question of the need to proceed with fiscal policy reform, the minister underlined that this reform appears at this time on the first plan of the priorities defined by the government. It will be entered in the sixth plan, specified Moalla, who announced the intention of the government to proceed with progressive reforms in the framework of the next Finance bill for 1981.

The minister indicated that strengthening of national savings will also be considered as one of the priorities of the next plan. The government, he added, intends to create adequate structures and take all necessary steps, in the framework of financial reforms, to encourage savings in public administration as well as in enterprises and individuals.

Following Moalla, Mohamed Frei Chedli, on his part, replied to the interventions inherent to the national education sector, on the subject of using foreign co-operators in secondary education, and gave some figures on the efforts made in Tunisia since independence--on the process of "Tunisification" of the teaching body.

It appears from these figures that the number of Tunisian professors increased from 581 in 1955 to 10,900 in 1979, while foreign teachers rose from 631 to 640 in the same period. This evolution he pointed out, demonstrates that foreign teachers who represented 52 percent of the teaching body in 1955, represented only 5 percent in 1979. This small number of foreign teachers, he added, is still necessary as we do not have as yet a sufficient number of Tunisian teachers in the scientific and technical subjects.

Recalling a question on the debts registered in the administration of some teaching establishments, Frei Chedli underlined that these debts result from many factors, especially in increased cost of living and location of the stores.

Reinforcing Security Services

Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali spoke next and was happy to note the interest shown by the deputies in the field of security and reinforcement of the nuclei and security agents. The prime minister underlined that the level of recruitment of the security cadres falls in with the earnest desire of the state to remedy the present situation and to equip the security service with superior cadres capable of assuring the duties of command and organization in this domain.

Mohamed Mzali observed that in this context reinforcing the security service means not only to increase the means for the defense of the country against attacks from the outside, but also to insure the security of the citizens internally. It is also necessary to allow the country to face the changes which pervade the social and moral order in many of the countries, and especially in the Western countries due to the escalation of violence. He indicated that the government is bound to equip the security services with all the cadres they need to overcome their difficulties and to carry out their mission to the best of their ability.

The prime minister underlined in this context the need to improve the situation of the agents detailed to frontier posts, recalling that an interministerial committee had examined this question and studied the measures to be taken to bring up the moral and material level of this category of agents, and especially the means needed to provide them with decent lodgings.

As regards the article concerned with the upgrading of Tunisia's diplomatic representations abroad, Mohamed Mzali stated that this measure coincides with the Supreme Combatant's, president Habib Bourghiba, absorption with the reinforcement of Tunisia's presence abroad, a presence which actually engenders a very appreciable economic return.

On this subject he underlined the need to develop Tunisia's relations and cooperation with various other countries and to prospect unceasingly for new markets to sell Tunisian products. He especially recommended that the bonds of cooperation with the African countries, as well as with all the brotherly and friendly countries, should be strengthened.

On this subject the prime minister pointed out the high level and competence of the cadre attached to the Tunisian embassies and consulates abroad.

The vote was called and the bill was passed.

The assembly then examined the bill connected with the adoption of the social security convention concluded between the Tunisian republic and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.

This bill refers to the regulations regarding citizens' rights in both countries in the matter of social security.

The convention, subject of this bill, foresees the compliance of the citizen to the bond of work in one or the other of the two countries, as well as the accumulation of the periods relative to the right connected with insurance.

After the unanimous adoption of this bill, without discussion, the assembly examined the bill relating to the 1978 ratification of the protocol connected with the 1973 international convention on the prevention of pollution originating from ships.

After the reading of the report relating to this bill, deputy Mokhtar Tebourbi raised the question of the removal of a ship which had foundered on the beach of Bizerte quite a while back, and was proving to be exceedingly dangerous.

In his reply, Sadok Ben Jomaa, minister of transports and communications indicated that the competent authorities had taken all necessary precautions to avoid the dangers that can arise due to the immobilization of this ship in the proximity of the coast. He also indicated that his department will work very hard in the future to improve the repairs of ship breakdowns.

Reorganization of BCT (Central Bank of Tunisia)

This bill was adopted unanimously by the assembly, who, later on, began to review the bill relating to the amendment of the law dated 19 September 1958, bearing on the creation and organization of the BCT.

It appears from the report relating to this bill that the financial organization of the BCT is not conforming any longer, after having been founded more than 22 years ago, with the present economic and social data of the country.

This bill proposes the reorganization of BCT through the creation of the office of vice governors and one secretary general and abolishing the office of director general.

Many deputies succeeded each other and accentuated the reasons which brought some of the deputies to express their reservations when this bill was discussed by the commission of political affairs and the commission for finance and the plan. This attitude is the result, according to deputy Mohamed Yaalaoui, of the ambiguity of the amended articles which define the function of vice governor of the BCT.

Replying to the intervention of the deputies, Mohamed Mzali tanked all those who participated in the discussion of the bill bearing on the amendment of the 1958 bill relating to the Central Bank, for their circumspection and their desire to make it possible for this institution to fill its important mission under the best conditions possible.

He especially specified: "Our common conviction is that the central bank constitutes one of the pillars of Tunisian sovereignty and the foundation of the national economy. By the creation of this institution Tunisia has freed itself from economic and financial dependence. We are anxious to do everything possible for the bank to keep its role and the prerogatives which were assigned to it by the chief of state, that is to say independence, stability and the positive contribution to economic dynamism and to the reinforcement of national development. And this, particularly, in the present stage where Tunisia finds itself on the threshold of a new national development plan. A plan which we want, for a definite take-off. "

Mzali added that the government is anxious to restructure this important institution in order that it may fully assume its mission.

BCT: The Governor's Prerogatives Are Intact

The prime minister made it known that this bill does not interfere in any way with the power and prerogatives of the governor of the bank. The objective of this amendment is being the reinforcement of the means for action by this institution and the consolidation of the powers of the governor which will assist him in his administrative functions.

Mzali was quite astonished by this unjustified apprehension since the governor enjoys the guarantees and prerogatives set forth by the law of 1958.

The prime minister suggested that an amendment be added to the first paragraph of the new article 14 which should read as follows: "The governor of the bank is assisted by two vice governors and one secretary general, who is directly under his authority, and charged with keeping watch permanently over the smooth running of all the departments of the central bank.

The governor confers on his assistants the prerogative and the power which make it possible for them to fulfill their mission--the governor defines the prerogatives of the secretary general".

Mzali also proposed that article 15 should read as follows: "the two vice governors are nominated by decree as proposed by the prime minister and upon the decision of the governor."

The National Assembly then adopted the bill unanimously.

Before closing the meeting the assembly heard Mohamed Mzali, who on the occasion of the closing of the 1979-1980 parliamentary session, delivered an address in which he declared:

"Upon the cloture of the present parliamentary year, I wish to express, in my name, as well as that of all my colleagues, my most heartfelt thanks and warmest congratulations for the diligence you have put forth and for the ideas, the analyses and the positive critisicm which you have contributed to the dynamism of parliamentary life and assumed your role in Tunisian legislation."

The prime minister recorded with satisfaction the harmony which exists between the National Assembly and the government, exalting the mutual confidence which has been established between the legislative and executive powers.

"When I had the honor of reading the declaration of the government before the National Assembly, he added, I had announced that a certain number of measures and actions were to be undertaken, and perhaps you will not forget that we have started to examine quite a few of them, and we plan to continue this work during the coming weeks. I hope we will have the occasion to continue this dialog frequently, and to discuss together the important questions of the hour and of our fundamental options, especially those that concern the economy, education, cultural and social policies.

We are resolved to work steadily in order to conceretize our aspirations which are those of the Supreme Combatant, for the dignity and progress of the Tunisian people, with your collaboration and the living forces of the nation, being anxious to keep a sense of measure but at the same time with quickness of execution. It is for this reason that we go forward and manifest imagination and daring to fight against routine and anachronic traditions, doing this we will give ourselves the means to act on the issues rather than submit to them. This can be done if we conjugate our efforts and each one of us considers himself responsible."

A Call to All Tunisians.

Mohamed Mzali declared further that doubt and scepticism engender stagnation and despair. "I wish, he said, that every Tunisian man and woman participate in this march and that all Tunisians devote themselves to the general interest in such a way that there would not be one person with an attitude of wait-and-see to watch our blunders." In this connection the prime minister launched an appeal to all Tunisians to participate by all possible means, as well as by their words, their action and reflection in the reorganization of the situation until our country can rise to the highest degree of material and moral prosperity." "I invite you to contribute through all forms of participation to the realization of this objective as well as to impregnate yourself and your surroundings with the hope, action generator, and our hope to see Tunisia rise to the level of the sacrifices subscribed by its martyrs and the Supreme Combatant. For this we must work in a complementary and osmose spirit, and with devotion and abnegation which our Supreme Combatant has taught us."

Mohamed Mzali concluded by wishing the members of the national assembly a happy holiday.

Before declaring that the parliamentary session was closed Sadok Mokaddem made a speech in which he thanked the prime minister for the few words he directed to the deputies of the national assembly specifying that the 44 plenary meetings which were held during the session just concluded, as well as the numerous committee meetings permitted the national assembly to examine many bills, to study the various aspects of government policy and to follow governmental action closely. The parliamentary year which is coming to an end, added Dr Mokaddem offered us the opportunity to have a dialogue with the government and I am taking this occasion to congratulate the prime minister for the cooperation which exists between the government and the national assembly, a cooperation which bears the best witness to the success of the Bourguibian regime.

In addition the president of the national assembly thanked the information agencies for their splendid coverage of the parliamentary proceedings, and in conclusion he underlined the Supreme Combatant's interest in the national assembly and his desire to follow the debates...

Finally, he offered the congratulations of the deputies to the chief of state on his 77th birthday.

Dr Mokaddem then declared the 1979-1980 parliamentary session closed.

7993
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

HOUSE ARREST--Brahim Hayder, a leading figure of the Popular Unity Movement (MUP) in Tunisia, is under house arrest in Jendouba, his hometown in northwest Tunisia, according to acquaintances. Hayder was forced to return to Jendouba on Friday, 26 September. He was given no reasons for the action. In a communique the Socialist Democrat Movement said it was "surprised" at the action "since it is in contrast to the spirit of openness prevailing in the government." [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Sep 80 p 8]

CSO: 4400

CABINET APPROVES PRESS, PUBLICATIONS DRAFT LAW

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 20 Sep 80 p 27

[Text] The United Arab Emirates cabinet approved on Monday 15 September a new Press and Publication Law guaranteeing freedom of expression in the country.

The draft law, containing 109 articles was approved by the cabinet in its weekly session. It is aimed at bringing the country's journalism at par with the Arab and international standards. It provides for more "responsible freedom" for the journalists and, at the same time gives the government a legal framework for reasonable control over the affairs of the Press in the country.

The law also stipulates the basic requirements of the editors and reporters working for newspapers and news agencies.

According to the new law, the chief editor will be responsible for whatever appears in the newspaper. The law stipulates that he should be a national with a high educational qualification, besides professional experience. The law, however, provides clauses for protecting those editors and writers who do not possess proper professional qualifications.

The new law guarantees newsmen access to sources of information and freedom of expression within reasonable limits. But it strictly prohibits writings which may offend Islam, incite people against the government or tend to serve foreign interests which are contradictory to the national cause.

The law also streamlines the censor machinery to ensure that no publication, film or literary work violates the law or undermines public interest.

The new law also guarantees freedom of expression to the correspondents of the foreign newspapers and press agencies.

CSO: 4820

NEW PHASE OF PETROLEUM EXPLORATION LAUNCHED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 17 Aug 80 p 3

[Interview with Kamal Mu'ammar, Deputy Director of the Exploration and Production Department of ADNOC; date and place not given]

[Text] One of the significant realities of the petroleum industry is that daily production from fields that have been discovered means a decline in the known or confirmed reserves. If this decline is not countered by new oil discoveries, there would be a trend towards depletion of the oil resources. In other words, the life of the oil fortune would be shortened.

Many of the oil producing countries have actually begun to suffer from the trend towards depletion of their oil resources, and from the fact that they are being converted from oil exporting countries to oil importing countries, now that their oil wells have aged and exploration operations have failed to reveal any new, young fields.

During the first inquiry we conducted yesterday with the director of the Exploration and Production Department of the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, ADNOC, a splendid fact emerged in front of us. We record it here with much appreciation and pride. As a result of the exploration efforts in 1979, for example, the quantities of oil that have been discovered, that is, the quantities that have been added to the oil reserves are equal to eight times the quantities of oil that have actually been produced during the same year. Naturally, we only take into consideration approximately 30 percent of the reserves or discovered supply, on the basis of the fact that this is what can actually be produced from any known reserve by the modern technological means which petroleum technology has so far achieved.

We had this radiant fact in mind when we met with Kamal Mu'ammar, deputy director of the Exploration and Production Department of ADNOC. We began to look for the details: how did we achieve this upswing in our oil supply? From which fields did this supply or this new reserve come?

Kamal Mu'ammar said, "We can talk in general terms, without referring to the discoveries of one year or one area. Let us begin with the offshore areas."

New Offshore Fields

Kamal Mu'ammar opened his files, and started a review of facts and figures.

The Satah Field was discovered in 1975 after ADNOC had asked the Adanah Company to drill in that location. Preliminary studies affirm that the supply of that field is not less than 700 million barrels. Drilling operations have been completed this year to determine the area of the field and the volume of the reserve. The results have been good indeed.

The (Hayr Dalama) field used to be considered a natural gas field, not an oil field. But a short period after a well was dug in al-Makbas, oil was found in quantities that were not inconsiderable. The (Hayr Dalama) field thus acquired more importance. At the present time tests and studies are being carried out on the second well.

The Sarnin Field: We expect the supply of this new field to be about 50 million barrels in addition to large quantities of gas.

The Dalama field: We expect that the supply there will come to 80 million barrels, in addition to large quantities of gas.

Vertical Expansion

The new development in exploration operations is that these operations are no longer confined to horizontal expansion; rather, vertical expansion operations have begun. This means that exploration operations have now begun under the layers that are known to be producing at present. This came after the development of seismic survey operations, and after the drills became capable of drilling deeper under the surface of the earth. This is what we have actually begun in the offshore field of Umm al-Shayf.

[Question] The deep drilling that you have done in Umm al-Shayf field has confirmed that the cap rock which you reached at a depth of 15,000 feet promises a huge return. Are you making plans for further study of this underground stratum?

Exploring the Deeper Strata

[Answer] Cap rock strata in fact exist in most of our offshore and onshore fields. We recently began drilling to reach the cap rock in the offshore field of Zakim. Preparations are also being made at present to drill an exploratory well in the onshore field of Buhasa. In addition, we have a drilling program to determine the location of the cap rock in the Umm al-Shayf field.

[Question] Is there something in particular that you expect as a result of this deep drilling that you are doing to reach the cap rock in existing and previously discovered wells?

[Answer] Experience has taught us not to be overly optimistic. But regarding the subject of deep drilling to discover what lies hidden in the deep layers of this earth, what we have succeeded in discovering with regard to the cap rock of the Umm al-Shayf field encourages us to continue in this direction and promises to give us a major return. But exploration operations are never free of the spirit of adventure. Who knows what lies hidden for us in these depths?

Seismic Surveying Operations

[Question] What about the seismic surveying activity in the onshore areas.

[Answer] Seismic surveying operations in onshore areas began in 1977. During that year the area southeast of Abu Dhabi between the Shah field and the borders of Oman was surveyed. We were able to survey 1,200 kilometers.

In 1978, we completed the survey in the same area, in addition to the area located north of the Buhasa field. We were able to survey 13,000 kilometers.

In 1979, we carried out complementary surveying operations in the area of (Jurn Yafur) and [in the area] north of Sahal field. The length [sic] amounted to 240 kilometers.

Preparations are now underway for a seismic survey that is very advanced in nature to determine the locations of (cap rocks?) in various areas such as al-Ruways (south of the area where the industrial projects are currently being built) and in the areas of al-Ramithah and Jurn Nafur where limited quantities of oil have been found.

[Question] Do you mean that we now have new oil fields with these names: al-Ruways, al-Ramithah and Jurn Nafur?

[Answer] So far, testing activities for these fields have not been completed, and the results have not been studied in a decisive manner. But the drilling that has been done so far promises a good return. The areas where these fields are located will be subjected to advanced seismic surveying operations.

[Question] Have the seismic surveying operations and the exploratory drilling operations in the onshore areas produced any oil discoveries other than what we mentioned?

New Discoveries

[Answer] Of course there have been numerous discoveries. The al-Qaswirah field and the Mandar field southeast of Abu Dhabi have been discovered. Drilling will be resumed this year to determine the quantities of oil in these two fields. However, preliminary estimates indicate that the supply in al-Qaswirah field amounts to 950 million barrels, and that it is 45 million barrels in the Mandar field.

Exploratory drilling of the lower strata that had been previously surveyed in the fields of Buhasa and Sahal has been completed. The presence of oil in these strata has actually been confirmed. The supply of oil in the lower strata in the Buhasa Field is expected to be approximately 800 million barrels; in the Sahal field, it is expected to be 200 million barrels.

In the area of deep drilling, we drilled a deep well to reach the strata of the (Hurasi) epoch in the Bab field--the first field that was discovered in onshore areas. We were convinced of the existence of large quantities of gas in that location. However, that gas contained a large percentage of sulphur.

Talking about exploration implies the pleasure of giving, especially in an age during which the world is anxiously looking for oil everywhere. This is to prolong the life of civilization and humanity at a time when oil has become dear and expensive and is necessary for scores of thousands of modern industries. [End of answer]

This interview would not be complete without our shedding some light on the courageous, pioneering step carried out by the ADNOC, the government's national petroleum agency. The Executive Council of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi issued a decision to grant the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company [ADNOC] special concession areas where it can work independently without a foreign partner.

ADNOC and the New Concession

The deputy director of the Exploration and Production Department in ADNOC said, "Companies doing business in Abu Dhabi did give up parts of their concession areas in accordance with agreements concluded between them and the government. Concession areas given up which were not subject to exploratory operations amounted to approximately 60 percent of the total area of Abu Dhabi, including land and sea. Accordingly, ADNOC gave these areas its special attention.

[Question] Practically speaking, what do you mean by special attention?

[Answer] This means that we cannot neglect those areas that were given up by the operating companies, or accept results to the effect that the existence of oil there is not possible. Special attention means evaluating

these areas by reviewing all the previous results of seismic surveying operations and exploratory drilling. This is what ADNOC has actually done.

[Question] When did the executive council make its decision to grant you the special concession to prospect for oil?

[Answer] The decision of the executive council was issued on 7 April 1980. The decision stipulated that only ADNOC be given the right to prospect for hydrocarbons in specific parts of the areas given up [by the concessionaires]?

[Question] What is the area of these parts?

[Answer] Approximately 35 percent of the total onshore and offshore area of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, specifically 34,000 square kilometers. The company may carry out in these regions all the operations provided for in its charter number 7 for 1971.

(The map attached to this interview [see map at end] indicates the areas of concession in detail). We notice from this map that the offshore regions of this concession total 8,000 square kilometers, whereas the onshore areas total 26,000 square kilometers.

Magnetic Aerial Survey

[Question] What about the work completed after the decision of the executive council was made and ADNOC obtained the concession.

[Answer] The first step we took was to carry out a magnetic survey from the air of all the areas of Abu Dhabi to determine the makeup of the basic strata of the surface of Abu Dhabi. There is a special airplane that makes daily flights to complete these magnetic survey operations from the air. This magnetic survey is currently being evaluated. The records of the former seismic surveys for these regions are also being re-analyzed to identify those areas where oil deposits can possibly be found.

[Question] This is what is happening at present, but what about the future?

[Answer] We will soon carry out a seismic survey of offshore block 1 and offshore block 2 to determine their rock formation, and to study their suitability for exploratory drilling. We expect to carry out the seismic survey of the onshore areas that are in our concession early next year. There is a timetable that has been approved by the company's board of directors with regard to work steps that are to be made in our offshore and onshore concession. [End of answer]

And Then...

This interview on the offshore and onshore exploration activities in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi has been scrutinized and reviewed by ADNOC officials. This means that it has the characteristics of an accurate scientific investigation, not just a press inquiry. Accordingly, it carries information on the subject of explorations in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, published for the first time.



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ABU DHABI'S OIL EXPORTS DECLINE

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 17 Aug 80 p 2

[Article: "14 Percent Decline in Abu Dhabi's Oil Exports; 39.2 Million Barrels Were Exported Last July; Japan Is Chief Importer of Emirates' Oil"]

[Text] Abu Dhabi's crude oil exports last July declined by 14.14 percent from what they were in the same period last year.

This [information] was mentioned in statistics sent yesterday by the Petroleum Directorate in Abu Dhabi to the Ministry of Oil and Mineral Resources.

Total oil exports from the four ports of export--Jabal al-Zannah, Das, Mabraz and Abu al-Bakush--amounted to 39.2 million barrels, while the volume of exports in July of 1979 was 45.8 million barrels.

According to the exporting companies, the ADCO Company was in first place. Its total exports last month amounted to 22.5 million barrels, compared with 26.8 million barrels for the same period last year.

It was followed by the ADMA Operating Company, which came in second, with a volume of exports that amounted to 14.5 million barrels, compared with 15.9 million barrels for the same period in 1979.

The (Tuthal) Abu al-Bakush Company came in third place. Its exports amounted to 1.6 million barrels, compared with 2.4 million barrels for the same period in 1979.

Then came the ADOC Company whose total exports amounted to half a million barrels, compared with 700,000 barrels in July of last year.

Geographic Distribution

According to geographic distribution Japan maintained its lead over the countries importing oil last month. Exports to it came to a total of 14.6 million barrels.

France came in second place with total exports to it amounting to 4.4 million barrels.

The United States came third with total exports to it amounting to 3.1 million barrels.

Then came West Germany; total exports to it amounted to 2.7 million barrels.

Then came New Zealand; total exports to it amounted to 2.6 million barrels.

Then came the Netherlands: 2.4 million barrels.

Then the United Kingdom: 1.9 million barrels.

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SUBSIDIES USED TO FIGHT INFLATED FOOD PRICES

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 15 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by 'Ali Lashin: "High Prices Fought in Emirates by Subsidizing Food; Sugar Sold in Markets at Three Times the Price Charged by Municipalities to Those on Limited Income; Rice and Flour Sold 50 to 90 Percent Over Subsidized Prices"]

[Text] The price of a 50 kilogram bag of flour is about 65 dirhams in the free market. A 90 kilogram bag of rice is sold for 300 dirhams, while a 50 kilogram bag of sugar is sold for a price that is between 160 and 170 dirhams. These goods are sold in the same pakcages at the municipality's distribution centers which distribute subsidized goods at the following prices:

A bag of flour is sold for 35 dirhams.
A bag of sugar is sold for 45 dirhams.
A bag of rice is sold for 200 dirhams.

When we compare these prices, we find that the difference between them is vast. Free market prices exceed the subsidized prices by about 90 percent in the case of flour; by about 50 percent in the case of rice; and by as much as 300 percent in the case of sugar.

Why did the price of sugar reach this high a level?

In an attempt to answer this question the food supply official in the municipality of Dubai, Ibrahim 'Abdallah made a special statement to AL-BAYAN in which he said [the following]:

"Flour and rice are available at the distribution centers affiliated with us. We distribute every month about 2,000 bags of the first commodity and about 5,000 bags of the second.

"But we have only received 2,550 bags of sugar since we began implementing the United Emirates' subsidy policy on 14/8/1979. We distributed this quantity as soon as we received it, and since then we have not received any additional quantities. That is the reason for the insane increase in the price of sugar."

He added, "subsidizing a certain commodity and having it available at the distribution centers affiliated with the municipalities does undoubtedly help reduce its cost in the free market.

"But the opposite happens when that commodity is not available. Merchants control the market and force [us to pay] the prices they like and they seek."

Along the same lines another source in the municipality of Dubai said, "Experience has proven that the subsidy policy is the most successful method for fighting high prices. Before we put the subsidy into practice throughout the Emirates, we did practice it in this emirate with regard to rice whose price had risen to 300 dirhams per 90 kilogram bag in the free market. We reduced its price through subsidies to 175 dirhams. This was between 1974 and 1976. At the end of last year the price of rice in the free market declined and fell to 5 dirhams below the subsidy price. The municipality then decided to remove the rice subsidy which was then distributed by the Emirates Corporation for Foods. The total subsidy that had been earmarked for rice was 90 million dirhams. In this year's budget, however, that subsidy does not exceed 50 million dirhams."

Ibrahim 'Abdallah went on to say, "To put into practice the government's slogan of delivering the service to those who deserve it wherever they may be, the municipality of Dubai opened four centers for the distribution of subsidized goods in Dayrah, al-Sutwah, al-Rashidiyah and Hatta. Citizens of approximately 12,000 families are benefiting from these centers. Each family has a ration card according to which it gets the subsidized goods that are due to it according to the following regulations:

From one to three individuals: one bag of flour and one bag of rice every 4 months.

From four individuals to eight individuals: one bag of flour and one bag of rice every 2 months.

From 9 to 15 individuals: one bag of flour and one bag of rice every month.

A family of 16 persons receives three bags of rice and three bags of flour every 2 months.

Families that have more than 16 persons receive two bags of each kind every month.

After this quick review of a few aspects of the policy of subsidizing basic goods, it is the opinion of AL-BAYAN that a number of other food goods be introduced under the subsidy umbrella to reduce the burden of the cost of living on the citizens. Chief among these goods are sugar, milk, shortening and soap. The prices of these goods are very high in the market, and this constitutes a concrete burden on those who live on limited incomes in the country.

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20 October 1980

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OBJECTIVES OF 29TH ARAB SOCIAL-ECONOMIC COUNCIL MEETING

Trade, Investments, Proposed Statutes

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 9 Sep 80 p 4

[Speeches by Walid Kamhawi, chairman of the 29th ordinary session of the Arab Social-Economic Council and head of the Palestinian delegation, and Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States, on the need for a single Arab nation, in Tunis on 8 September]

[Text] "We have only two paths from which to choose: continue the current rivalry among our countries and step up the internal conflicts within our societies or consider that there is only one position to take in the area: that of pitting the Arab nations as a whole against Israel and the forces which are supporting it."

This is how Walid Kamhawi, chairman of the 29th ordinary session of the Arab Social-Economic Council [CESA], addressed those attending the opening ceremony of the session being held from 8 to 10 September at Hotel Africa in Tunis.

Succeeding Muhammad al-Zubayr, Oman's minister of commerce and industry, as chairman of the council, Walid Kamhawi, head of the Palestinian delegation, emphasized that the Arab world is currently suffering from three evils: partitioning, underdevelopment and dependence on others. "Because of these three evils," he added, "we are rejected by industrialized countries as withholders of legitimate rights, investors with the same rights as others and even as tourists. We are accepted only as depositors of capital whose purchasing power, moreover, is continuing to drop, a situation which international speculators are using to exploit the peoples of the Third World, including the Arabs."

Mr Kamhawi then stressed the importance of joint Arab economic action for the Arab individual and nation. This action, he felt, should be based on the following points:

The need to invest Arab capital within the Arab world and especially in vital sectors such as agriculture to put an end to the rural exodus and dependence on others for food.

The need to furnish oil to Arab countries which are importers of that raw material and at preferential prices and the need to favor Arab countries suffering from a lack of water by providing them with surplus water from Arab rivers, particularly since current technology makes it possible to divert water being needlessly lost toward Arab countries which lack that vital necessity.

The need to make the concept of the strategy of joint Arab economic action a reality through operational institutions such as the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development.

The need to establish an Arab Bank for International Development which will tie Arab interests directly to those of Third World countries and to study the possibility of transferring Arab capital to that bank consolidating the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as long as these institutions continue to be under Zionist influence.

The need to establish an Arab strategy on a scientific basis to strengthen the struggle of the Palestinian people and the reconstruction of their fatherland.

"We must not let this unique historic occasion escape," Mr Kamhawi concluded. "In fact, we have a choice between approaching the 21st century as scattered, underdeveloped and exploited tribes and approaching it as a united nation, developed and called upon to play an important role in a new world. That is why it is our duty to work toward the success of the next Arab economic summit meeting and direct our joint Arab economic action toward the achievement of collective security and overall development of the entire Arab world."

Let us note that at the opening of the work session Muhammad al-Zubayr, chairman of the 18th session, stressed the urgent need for the Arab nation to devote all its energy to the development of the Arab peoples as a whole. For this reason it should use all its experience and that of others to reach the goals it has set for itself.

After reviewing the action taken by the experts and the results of that action, the speaker invited the council members to study the conclusions reached by the experts, particularly concerning the use of Arab capital and inter-Arab trade.

Speaking in turn, Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States, analyzed the current international economic situation characterized essentially by "galloping inflation" and resulting in a "dizzying price rise" on the world markets, increased unemployment and a rise in the rates

of interest paid to investors. "This situation," he added, "has had repercussions on developing countries of which Arab nations are a part.

"But despite all these difficulties," the secretary of the league stated, "the general outlook of the Arab world is largely promising." In fact, the Arab states have been unanimous in acknowledging "the need to accept the challenge and overcome the underdevelopment stage, partitioning and dependence on others by strengthening their cooperation and working harder to achieve unity." In this connection, two plans were drawn up: one to facilitate and increase inter-Arab trade, the other to encourage Arab investments. "The preparatory ministerial committee," Mr Klibi recalled, "has recommended the opening of a special account within the framework of the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund whose mission would be to assure at particularly favorable conditions the social development of the least developed Arab countries and enable them to establish the necessary infrastructures. It has also recommended the establishment of a special account within the framework of the Arab Monetary Fund for the purpose of helping to bring about favorable conditions and assisting the least developed Arab countries to restore their balance of payments.

"In this decisive stage of our history," Mr Klibi continued, "we must face up to our problems in a modern spirit, that is, undertake collective action based on a sound perception of the higher national interest, each state being permitted to recognize its right to choose the economic and social model most favorable to the realization of the hopes and aspirations of its citizens."

Then citing the need for a national plan of joint Arab economic action, Mr Klibi asserted that such a plan is subordinate to the elaboration of a charter of economic action whose aim would be to safeguard the joint action from the traumas engendered by political conflicts and the upheavals provoked by ordinarily transitory predicaments. "This charter should bring about a reduction in divergences among Arab countries, the observance of the principle of mutual assistance and the use of Arab economic trump cards in the service of domestic causes."

Reviewing the principal points on the agenda of the 29th CESA session, Mr Klibi emphasized that the participants will essentially have to adopt a common position with regard to international problems brought about by the group of 77, countries of the nonalined movement or the Islamic Conference, as matters having considerable importance and being taken up in meetings of the IMF and World Bank, all the more so since the Arab states share to a considerable extent in the financing of those funds, while its administration is guided by policies which are not always compatible with those desired by the Arab countries or friendly developing countries.

The council will also study the draft of a new agreement aimed at facilitating and increasing trade and designed to replace the 1953 convention,

the draft of an Arab agreement on investments aimed at strengthening mutual development, the draft of statutes of an Arab training institution and the draft of a plan to establish an Arab study and training center for social development.

Historic Turning Point

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIA in French 9 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] After the secretary general of the league finished speaking, Mansour Moalla, minister of plan and finance and head of the Tunisian delegation, welcomed the meeting's participants on behalf of Tunisia, its president, its people and its government.

"I am honored to convey President Bourguiba's greetings to all of you. He is particularly interested in our council's meetings and has asked me to extend to you an invitation to visit him."

Mansour Moalla then placed the Tunis meeting in its proper context by recalling the various stages through which we passed on the road to inter-Arab cooperation since the Bagdad summit meeting.

In this regard, he indicated that the Bagdad summit meeting was a decisive turning point in that it enabled the Arabs to alter their political, social and economic realities and reaffirm their political will to engage in joint action.

"The Tunis summit meeting," he said, "has pointed out the path to follow and the broad outlines of an Arab economic strategy for the next two decades.

"The objective of this strategy," he continued, "is to convert into fact the legitimate aspirations of the Arab world for better mutual economic assistance and greater progress and prosperity."

In addition, he noted that the special session of the CESA held in Amman in July had succeeded in establishing the basis for a common Arab economy by devising a suitable strategy.

Mansour Moalla then went on to say: "We are meeting at this time to pursue this long-range task with the same determination and enthusiasm. Therefore, we shall continue to keep abreast of the Arab and international situations, study ways to strengthen cooperation among Arab countries and come up with a new form of cooperation between the Arab world and the other countries of our planet so that the Arab community may occupy the place it deserves in the concert of nations." He pointed out that the council is now being called upon to pass seriously and realistically through new stages on the way to inter-Arab mutual economic assistance by drawing up a plan for national economic development and studying the drafts of two conventions: the unified Arab convention of investments and the inter-Arab trade convention. These two conventions are designed to bring about an interdependence of interests among the various Arab countries.

Mansour Moalla said he is convinced that the participants will not fail to make bold and timely decisions so that the 29th CESA session will also be a turning point in the realization of the objectives of the Arab nation and in the action taken to accept the challenges presented.

He further emphasized that we owe it to ourselves to prepare the next Amman summit meeting with great care so that, let us hope, it will also be a historic turning point in the realization of inter-Arab mutual economic assistance and unity in the Arab world.

When Mansour Moalla finished speaking, Dr Walid Kamhawi adjourned the opening session.

Moalla on Arab Plans, Aspirations

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIA in French 9 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Yesterday morning President Bourguiba received Minister of Plan and Finance Mansour Moalla at the Es-Saada Palace in La Marsa.

After the meeting was finished, Mr Moalla disclosed that he had informed the head of state about the inter-Arab meetings to be held in Tunis this week. "The first of these meetings," he stated, "is to be an ordinary session of the economic council of the Arab league and, at the same time, will be an extension of the extraordinary session recently held in Amman. The Tunis meeting," Mr Moalla further indicated, "will deal with the preparation of the Arab summit conference to be held in the Jordanian capital in November. This conference will be a decisive turning point for mutual assistance and joint action on the Arab scene," the minister presumed.

As for the second and third meetings, they are to deal respectively with the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund and the Arab Monetary Fund.

"These two Pan-Arab institutions," Mr Moalla said, "will meet in extraordinary session at the recommendation of the CESA conference held in Amman for the purpose of considering a sizable increase in their respective capitals and studying a revision of their methods of action in order to adapt those methods to the requirements of Arab development.

Mr Moalla pointed out that these meetings had aroused President Bourguiba's interest and that he was quite willing to receive the delegation heads next Wednesday.

The minister of plan and finance added that he had also informed the head of state about efforts currently being made with brotherly countries for the creation of powerful financial institutions in the form of joint development companies or banks which would be endowed with a capital of 100 million dinars each.

In this regard, Mr Moalla indicated that an initial project of this kind had already been arranged with Kuwait during the latest visit Kuwaiti Minister of Finance Abdul Rahman Salim al-Ateeqi made to Tunis.

"We shall continue these efforts until we establish a network of financial institutions designed to help increase domestic savings on the one hand and, on the other, to use Arab financial resources for the benefit of the payees and make Tunisia an international financial center connected with the financial world," Mr Moalla stated. He further indicated in this regard that the head of state had approved the idea of strengthening the Tunisian Economic Development Bank directed for many years by Habib Bourguiba, Jr. who has taken effective action in the area of economic development, particularly in the tourist and industrial sectors.

Mr Moalla further advised that a proposal will be presented in this respect to the administrative council of the Tunisian Economic Development Bank and to those of COFIT (Financial, Construction and Industrial Company) and the Arab Investment Company with a view to merging these three institutions into a single development bank for the Tunisian economy, endowed with a capital of 100 million dinars.

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SYRIAN-LIBYAN UNITY NOT SEEN SLOWING TIES WITH USSR

LD031609 London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 3 Oct 80 p 32

[Article by Farid al-Khatib: "Unity With Libya Will Not Slow Syria's Rush Toward the Soviet Union"]

[Excerpts] When Yasir 'Arafat told President Hafiz al-Asad at dawn on Sunday, 22 September, that he intended to visit Baghdad and Tehran following the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war, the Syrian president made no comment.

This happened at the Syrian-Palestinian meeting that lasted from 0030 until 0500 Sunday morning and was attended by Syrian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam and a number of Fatah movement Central Committee members, including Salah Khalaf, Hayil 'Abd al-Hamid and Muhammad Ghunaym. The Syrian president had raised the question of the war during the meeting and said he was against it and that neither of the parties would gain from it.

Prior to Abu 'Ammar's departure for Tripoli at the head of a resistance delegation, Abu Iyad [Salah Khalaf] talked at the meeting about Syrian-Libyan unity. He said: "It must not be allowed to fail." President al-Asad said: "Syrian-Libyan unity is a ray of hope in the Arab darkness. It is no longer sufficient to confront Camp David with speeches and emotional attitudes. It is an answer to President Al-Sadat's challenging question: "What is the alternative to the Camp David accords?" He added: "Colonel Mu'ammar [al-Qadhdhafi] is enthusiastic about it; it is for the sake of Palestine." Addressing the Fatah delegation, he said: "You will not leave us alone nor will we leave you alone!"

Early last week it was reported that Colonel al-Qadhdhafi was likely to arrive in Damascus on 28 September, the anniversary of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir's death, in order to sign the unity documents within the period of time (one month) specified by both sides to prepare for unity. It

was said that it would not necessarily be unity in the sense of a merger but rather unity of attitude and coordination between the two sides that would enable Syria to break the ring of isolation around it and receive financial aid from Libya. According to reports following YAR President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's visit to Tripoli, his country is not enthusiastic about joining this unity. During the visit the Yemeni president stressed the achievement of unity between the two Yemens.

During the Syrian-Palestinian meeting President al-Asad also said: "The time has come to organize our relations with the Soviet Union well." Subsequent reports indicated that the Syrian president will visit Moscow for 3 days beginning next Wednesday for talks with senior Soviet officials and in order to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation. Syrian sources said that the new Syrian-Soviet trade would make it possible to establish a "strategic balance" with the United States in the area and to build new Syrian military brigades. It would also enable Soviet forces to come to Syria "in order to prevent Israel from entering Damascus" if it launches a war against Syria and it would also deter Israel from waging such war. Minister Khaddam informed the five Arab countries he visited of the news of the Soviet treaty. He avoided visiting Jordan and Iraq.

Al-Asad also said at the meeting in question: Israel wants to make the Camp David agreements to succeed more with war than with politics. In view of this we in Syria are ready but we are careful not to let the enemy dictate the location, time and form of the battle to us. However, we will not allow a "deadly blow" to be dealt to the Palestinian revolution.

The estimates of observers, who expected Syrian-Libyan unity to slow Syria's rush and the rush of "the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front" toward the Soviet Union after the other Arab countries let Syria down, have thus proved wrong. At the Syrian-Palestinian meeting, prior to the signing of the documents of unity with Libya and the treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, President al-Asad seemed satisfied.

At the meeting President al-Asad attacked Jordan's attitude. He said that the greatest help the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria receives comes from Jordan. He mentioned a certain figure which he said was the total aid the brotherhood has received since 1976. He said that to date the Syrian Government has been able to liquidate 80 percent of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.

The attack [on Jordan] was significant in the absence from the Syrian-Palestinian meeting of Fatah Central Committee member Khalil al-Wazir who was then in Jordan. This was his first visit to Amman following the formation of the new government under Mudar Badran and the creation of the ministry "of occupied territories affairs" which was assigned to Hasan Ibrahim.

CSO: 4802

KLIBI CONFERS WITH ARAB AGRICULTURE DEVELOPMENT HEADS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 9 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Chedli Klibi, Secretary General of the League of Arab Nations, met yesterday morning with Mohamed Tazi, permanent delegate to the League from Morocco, who announced at the end of the session that he had discussed future meetings with the Secretary General in the context of the League of Arab Nations and that they had had wide-ranging discussions on the general state of the Arab world at present just after Klibi's recent round of visits.

Chedli Klibi also conferred with Dr. Hassen Fahmi Jomaa, General Director of the Arab Agricultural Development Organization, who is participating in the regular meetings of the Arab Social and Economic Council.

Dr. Hassen Fahmi said that he informed the League's Secretary General of the actions undertaken by his organization since its ninth meeting in Riyadh in particular in regard to its programs to assure Arab food supplies.

He specified that he had reported to Klibi on projects which have been completed for seven basic agricultural products including grains, livestock, fishing resources, sugar, oil, natural resources.

The General Director of the Arab Agricultural Development Organization further stated that he had given to the Secretary General of the League of Arab Nations the results of the investigations carried out by research groups delegated by the Organization to study the needs of Arab citizens and to work up a long-term strategy which would permit the Arab nation to achieve self-sufficiency in the area of basic agricultural products.

After going over the most important points in these results and the considerable loans which would have to be sought to achieve the planned objectives, Dr. Fahmi indicated that he also brought up with the Secretary General the need to coordinate to some extent the structures of the League of Arab Nations with the institutions and organizations working with the League from the point of view of planning as well as production and financing.

Chedli Klibi also met with Hussein Al-Abdallah, permanent delegate to the League from Lebanon, with whom he discussed the situation in Lebanon after the repeated attacks by Israel.

8693
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

TUNISIAN-SAUDI INVESTMENT COMPANY--Sheik Mohammed Abalkhail, Saudi Arabian minister of finance and economy, and Mansour Moalla, minister of finance and planning, recently held talks to consider the proposed establishment of a joint Tunisian-Saudi investment company which will help finance economic projects in Tunisia. Both parties agreed to the establishment of such a company. The governmental agencies involved from both countries will continue negotiations toward completing the formalities necessary for the formation of this company. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 11 Sep 80 p 1] 8963

ISRAEL BOYCOTT BUREAU RECOMMENDATIONS--The Conference of Liaison Officials of the Israel Boycott Bureau, held in Tunis the 1st through the 8th of this month, ended its sessions yesterday morning by adopting a series of recommendations aimed at establishing measures for dealing with Zionist plans. The participants at the conference investigated the case of foreign companies which had or still have relations with Israel and decided upon measures to warn certain companies against any collaboration with the Zionist enemy. In particular they looked into the case of certain American companies which, ignoring the appeals by the boycott bureau, continue to collaborate with Israeli companies thus flaunting the laws in effect in Arab countries. Failure to respect these laws, the final communique of the conference states, will result in the prohibition of these businesses from operating in Arab countries and the refusal to su ply them with raw materials from Arab countries. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 9 Sep 80 p 4] 8693

ALGERIA-LIBYA YOUTH EXCHANGE--Two delegations, one Algerian and one Libyan are travelling, respectively, to Algiers and Tripoli for a few days, according to a program to strengthen exchanges established by youth organizations from the two countries. These two visits are also part of a program to strengthen fraternity and friendship ties between Algeria and Libya youth. After arriving in Algiers, the Libya delegation had many contacts with Algeria youth, during which they exchanged views about problems concerning arab youth in general. The Libya delegation also visited tourist sites and points of interest, as well as historic monuments in Algiers. The Libya delegation, which arrived 18 August in Algiers, has left the capital, early this morning to begin a tour of the country. Accordingly, a delegation of the National Union of Algerian Youth has left for Tripoli. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 22-23 Aug 80 p 2]

CSO: 4400

AGRICULTURAL ACTIVITIES IN VARIOUS GOVERNORATES REPORTED

Harvesting-Threshing in Tlemcen

Algiers EL MOUDJADHID in French 12 Aug 80 p 3

[Article: "Appreciable Yield Increase in Tlemcen"]

[Text] The harvest-threshing program has come to an end in Tlemcen after 2 months of hard work.

A governorate official was obliged to say that it was accomplished in a record time never before attained by this program which, each year, mobilizes all agricultural forces in the region.

From this perspective, an average yield of 10 hundredweight per hectare was also obtained. The Program was seriously affected by the drought, which damaged about 30,000 hectares of grain [producing] soil in the region.

Last year, the area planted covered 130,000 hectares as compared to 168,500 hectares this year. The most important lands have been reserved for hard wheat (68,000 hectares) and for barley (53,000 hectares).

Meanwhile, this year, the governorate's agricultural services have exceeded their goals in barley and oat [production].

Grain cultivation is linked to an important agreement in favor of soil recovery and improvement. According to this and after 1970, the Tlemcen governorate has recovered about 60,000 hectares of new soil, regained from fallow land. Still, 15,000 hectares of land improvement is predicted to become a reality before the end of the year in the Tlemcen Wilaya, according to the second plan.

These land improvement operations certainly had, as a consequence, noticeable results in grain soil yield, which increased, from an average of 6.5 hundredweight per hectare, in 1977 to 10 hundredweight per hectare in 1980.

Production reached 1,700,000 hundredweight, compared to 500,000 hundredweight in 1979, during this program.

It was necessary to mobilize all the depot's equipment for the region to achieve these results. The contribution of offices, such as ONAMA [National Agricultural Equipment Office] and CAPCS [Communal Multi-Service Agricultural Cooperative], was certainly considerable this year.

During this program, the Tlemcen governorate has increased its equipment force through the acquisition of 51 combines as short-term investments. This new aquisition has greatly influenced the programs results and also made it possible to increase the number of [pieces] of equipment, which [now] amount to 337 combines, of which 59 are out of service, due to lack of parts and 25 are under repair.

Three trouble-shooting maintenance teams have been on hand, during harvesting. The main problem is the shortage of drive belts for the depot's permanent maintenance, as well as the delivery of equipment in the proper condition.

The depot's trouble-shooting effort, in each region, was organized by pooling. Also, the Tlemcen governorate is agriculturally differentiated by three early yield zones: Beni Saf, Ghazaouet and Nedroma. The last zones initiate the harvest program each year.

Resources were accordingly mobilized on lands pertaining to the socialist sector, the small fellahs or the Agrarian Reform. The 31 CAPCS [Communal Multi-Service Agricultural Cooperative] should assure resource allocations for these last two sectors.

Harvesting-Threshing in Saida

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 20 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by A. Belkhodja in Oran: "Appreciable Yield in Saida"]

[Text] The commission overseeing the progress of the harvest-threshing program in Saida, met recently at the seat of the regional government to set-up a balance sheet for the operations, which are now being concluded. This year, the harvest-threshing program did not have any problems. Agricultural delegations, from now on developing at the communal level, regularly followed the operations.

On 15 August, 134,847 hectares were harvested in an area of 145,682 hectares, almost half of which is in the private sector. The crop, estimated at 1,300,000 hundredweight, has tripled, in comparison to that of the preceding year, which had a very low rate of rainfall.

The amount of wheat to be harvested, according to initial predictions, will be reduced by almost 100,000 hundredweight. This is explained by the private sector's partial delivery of the product, because it keeps some for its self-consumption, as well as seeds.

OAIC's [Interoccupational Algerian Grain Office] depot destined to transport grain, could not keep up with the demands of all combined units. This inadequacy was compounded by the use of the depot's means for farming self-managed units and CAPRA [Agricultural Production Cooperative of the Agrarian Reform]. The same happened in storage capabilities. Many grain collection points were organized on the harvest site, forming, then, intermediate warehouses and offering a storage capacity in the order of 1,000,000 hundredweight.

Concerning equipment, 159 combines organized in trouble-shooting "pools," plowed agricultural land in the Saida and Hassasna dairas. In this region, an early yield area is also planted, to be compared in yield to the regular crop. This explains the need of using the equipment in farming the early yield area. Meanwhile, reticence of those responsible for self-managed units is to be deplored. They voluntarily immobilized tractors, stating that it is impossible for them to take part in harvest operations. Despite those negative reactions in some operations, the harvest-threshing program is being achieved under good conditions. Better still, Saida's governorate officials are getting ready to move the agricultural equipment to the Tiaret governorate, where crop gathering efforts are still under way.

A certain problem is reported this year in the Saida governorate. It has led agricultural officials to intervene in the southern zone in the interest of harvesting some plots of land, farmed by the small peasantry. Some say that farming is illegal in the pastureland. Meanwhile, areas farmed this year are located in wadi margins and the oasis' low ground. Generally, farming done in these areas is considered, by mutual agreement, to be at least, risky. This type of farming is destined, in great part, to self-consumption and has a very low yield rate. In addition, it leads to soil damage, posing a serious threat to the steppe.

The small peasantry knows it is subject to official reports. Without any doubt, it is rooted in the southern governorate by tradition and does not hesitate in farming areas, where it must contend with the uncertainty of a crop. But, since this year nature has seen fit to show clemency, farmers are faced with an unexpected harvest. With 10 hundredweight per hectare, they can even give themselves the luxury of "trading."

Helping the Cultivation of Dried Vegetables

With the impossibility of resorting to manual labor, because laborers are rare and very costly, the small peasantry consulted agricultural officials who, after realizing the exceptional nature of this operation, due to the appreciable yield rate, took over harvest-threshing operations in the area concerned.

Taking into consideration the yield rate never recorded in the past, governorate officials opened a technical dossier. As a matter of fact, a study is currently under way. It will allow them to assess areas susceptible to be turned over to agricultural use, without bringing about damage to the steppe course.

This year, livestock feed storage was canceled. On one hand, there was a distinct improvement of surface cover and, on the other hand, this decision greatly weakened previous speculations, concerning ovine fattening practices and secret trading.

From this balance sheet, the governorate commission noted conclusive results. The commission remarked, nevertheless, that a lot of effort remains to be made, concerning dried vegetable cultivation, especially lentil production, recalling that this cultivation enjoyed a reputation some years back, due to the quality and quantity obtained on High Plateaus soil. This year lentil production was very low in the region. Reports show that this was due to two things: on one hand, weeds caused damage. On the other hand, planting procedures--which should be inspected--reduced yield rate.

Concerning grain fire fighting and prevention, quick intervention and preventive measures, reduced loss rate this year. This season fire affected no more than 10 hectares of grain fields. However, the commission recommends enforcing preventive measures which are often neglected in the private sector, bordering forest areas.

Harvest-Threshing in Batna

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 26 Aug 80 p 3

[Article: "1,264,356 Hundredweight Yield in Batna"]

[Text] The harvest-threshing program, launched 25 June 1980 in the Batna governorate was concluded after many years of drought. Batna had become a disaster area. The 1979-1980 program produced excellent results: 1,264,356 hundredweight were produced for the three combined sectors: the self-managed sector; agrarian reform sector; and private sector.

At the beginning of the program, planting benefited from very favorable weather, particularly for the month of September 1979, when we registered an average rainfall of 57.7 mm.

Grain storage, amounting to 224,463 hectares were divided in the following manner: socialist sector (12,911 hectares); agrarian reform sector (25,162 hectares); and private sector (186,390 hectares).

Planting began at the onset of the first rainfall, in the very best of conditions. It slowed down towards the end of the program, because of the drought especially in the governorate's southern dairas where the goal is 29.5 percent.

Add to that, no-interest loans to the private sector, depleted after 4 years of consecutive drought.

Therefore, the total profit taking did not exceed 83.27 percent; i.e., a farmed area of 186,921 hectares for a planned yield of 224,463 hectares.

Differences in farmed areas are especially apparent in the private sector, which farmed not more than 149,695 hectares of the 189,390 hectares predicted.

The other sectors attained 98.72 percent for the self-managed sector (12,746 hectares) and 97.28 percent (24,480 hectares) for the agrarian reform sector. Batna's grain cooperative greatly contributed, regarding seed supplies. In addition, 921 tractors, intelligently used, allowed the program to run smoothly.

Drought reports, from the end of October to the end of January and their particular repercussions were prepared in great detail, under the direction of agricultural officials, in direct collaboration with UNPA's [National Union of Algerian Peasants] governorate committee.

Technically and to assure a smooth [running] program, 34 trouble-shooting teams were put into action, during harvesting: Eight for each one of the Kais, Batna and Merouana dairas; four for Arris and N'Gaous dairas; and two for the Ain Touta daira. Harvesting did not begin until the second half of March. Meanwhile, the frequency of spring rainfall rectified the situation and made possible the prediction of a good yield.

A primary evaluation was made during April. Production was estimated at 735,585 hundredweight. Good rain distribution, registered in this critical period, turned previous estimates into sure bets.

ONAMA's [National Agricultural Equipment Office] Teams Efficient Intervention

The harvest-threshing program which, this year, had 158 combines harvesters-threashers: 45 for the self-managed sector; 77 for the agrarian reform sector; and 36 for the private sector, used this equipment to assure the program's success.

The 1,264,356 hundredweight harvested during this program came from: The self-managed sector (81,591 hundredweight); the agrarian reform sector (153,952 hundredweight); and the private sector (1,028,813 hundredweight).

To correct minor equipment failure, ONAMA [National Agricultural Equipment Office] mobilized two departments (at Batna and Kais) for local maintenance.

Concerning storage methods, all space was made available (CAPCS [Communal Multi-Service Agriculture Cooperative], production units and the OAIC [Interoccupational Algerian Grains Office]). The problem surfaced only at the Batna daira, where sheds are filled with imported barley for livestock feed and wheat for the SN Sempac [expansion unknown] supply. This also happened in the Seriana commune (Merouana daira), because of the non-existence of an OAIC [Interoccupational Algerian Grain Office] warehouse.

9626
CSO: 4400

ISRAELI ANNEXATION OF JERUSALEM CONDEMNED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 11 Aug 80 p 1

[Article: "Zionist Contempt for International Norms and Ethics"]

[Text] (APS)--At a time when the international community, through the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly's Seventh Extraordinary Emergency Session fought to pass a new test of its will to work at establishing fair peace in the Middle East, proclaiming the urgency of re-establishing inalienable national rights for the Palestinian people and the evacuation of all Palestinian and Arab occupied territories, the admittedly serious and realist first condition for all settlement, the Zionist movement took another step towards the escalation of tensions.

In putting into effect their intent of sanctioning the annexation of the Holy City of El-Qods in their internal legislation, despite United Nations' warnings and admonitions, Zionist officials are showing, once too often, the full measure of their contempt for international norms and ethics.

Their diligence in placing the international community before a fait accompli, which has its source in the very essence of Zionism, wouldn't have been possible with impunity were it not for imperialism's guarantee to the Zionist movement, through the destabilizing role it has devolved in the region.

Therefore, after multiple acts of violation and profanation of El-Aksa's Holy Mosque and other Holy Places, land and real estate expropriations, the deportation of El-Qods' arab population, the adoption of legislative measures, bearing the annexation of the Holy City of El-Qods, this clearly appears as a new phase in the execution of a minutely staged plan to substantiate the senseless dream of a "Great Israel."

May the Christian opinion consider its reaction, for just a moment, if some puppet government, powerfully sustained by world trusts, were to seize The Vatican and make if its capital...

Already criminal in itself, for usurping that which it tries to sanction, the chauvinism it subtends and the racism from where it proceeds, this deliberately arrogant act is not revested of any known legality or benefits from any complacency from the international community.

Basically illegal because, by colliding head on against an impressive series of UN Security Council's and General Assembly's decision and resolutions and by turning its nose at the principle of inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by force, the decision of annexing El-Qods is besides, a serious threat to international security and peace.

Algiers holds that the Security Council cannot passively suffer incessant transgressions of its injunctions and repeated violations of international law.

In face of this extremely serious defiance, it is the Security Council's job to fully assume its responsibilities in taking coercive measures provided for in the charter, to induce the Zionist movement to conform with international law.

For often having expressed its condemnation of Zionist actions, the international community is, today, in a position to appreciate the emptiness of verbal objections, in face of Zionist officials' sneaky determination to veto numerous UN decisions, concerning EL-Qods.

More than ever, now that Zionist expansionism is daily substantiated in the shadow of false statements of faith in peace, contradicted by [their] deeds, the international community owes it to itself to no longer show resignation in face of defiance and the fait accompli.

The very racist nature of the Zionist ideology germinates the seeds of continuous agressiveness, which the international community has the duty to destroy, under penalty of aiding a new conflagration in the region.

As a matter of fact, the Zionist cancer, implanted by imperialism in the heart of the Middle East, is one of the worst calamities in this second half of the 20th Century. It is synonymous with agression, warmongering, racism and the denial of justice in the highest level.

The Algerian Revolution has always fought against Zionism, and even before, Algeria did not suffer opressing colonialism gladly.

Incessantly it has denounced these actions and it has made it a point of honor to strongly participate in thefight undertaken by the Arab Revolutionary Forces to provide a front [to Zionism] on arab land.

Through the years, after more than 3 decades, it has daily, farther proved that the Zionist movement is nothing more than a foreign body transplanted into Arab soil to undermine the stability of the region, to oppose, a

priori, all effort towards arab unity, in a global divisionary and Balkanizing strategy, benefitting imperialistic designs.

Loyal patriot! What manner of revolutionary; what manner of progressist individual could put up with this and not work towards its elimination.

With imperialism's blessings and substantial aid, Israel has imposed--by provoking wars of agression--a fait accompli policy which has allowed it to increasingly expand its dominance on Arab soil, beginning with theft, pillage and ransacking.

In the same manner, especially after the historical Sadat treason, Zionism's arrogance did nothing more than grow and today, it doesn't know any limits. Each compromising by Cairo's government has entailed new impudence and greed and a greater pretention by Sadat's "friends."

Algeria vigorously condemns the annexist measure taken by the Zionist movement and declares itself resolutely compelled to act, together with members of fraternal countries in the League of Arab States and Islamic Conference to reestablish Arab sovereignty in El-Qods and to recover the Holy City's ancient role as the city of peace, tolerance and the birthplace of three monetheistic religions.

Palestinians know that their fight germinates the seeds of their liberation and that in their exemplary battle against the Zionist oppressor and Camp David's monumental plot, it is assured of the complete support of the Algerian people and of all who love justice and liberty.

For all the Arab-Moslem world this is the last straw. Beyond religious considerations, certainly enough to provoke unanimous ire, this political act--because it is under these terms that we want to pose the problem--we want to state that this act will not remain without consequences.

And all who would be tempted to fall into step with the zionist movement, know this.

May they know that if here and there there is talk of rupture of relations, it is nothing more than an elementary measure, which could not be avoided without a pure and simple denial.

But, above all may they know that the Arab-Moslem world have at their disposal other weapons with similar repercussions, which they could well use without reservations or hesitation.

9626
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

SELF-MANAGED AGRICULTURAL OPERATIONS--About 400 agronomists who, in the near future, will be called to oversee restructuring operations for the self-managed sector, participate, since Sunday, in a recycling seminar, organized by the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. The seminar, being held at the Technological Institute, not far from Surcouf, was opened by Mr Bouzid Hamiche, general secretary to the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform. The seminar's objective is to implement resolutions arrived at during the course of FLN [National Liberation Front] Central Committee's Third Session on agricultural problems. After recalling and commenting upon the strong guidelines of Algeria's agricultural policies, Mr Hamiche indicated that the decision to restructure self-managed farming in the agricultural sector does not mean, in any way, to question the present agricultural system. "Restructuring is a long term and permanent job, destined to bring about necessary corrective measures to strengthen the agricultural sector, allowing to play an efficient role, as well as becoming an instrument of alimentary self-sufficiency. Restructuring will allow us to create economical and profitable agricultural units, using true and effective management autonomy," concluded MARA's [Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform] general secretary. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 25 Aug 80 p 2] 9626

SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIAN PEASANTS--Mr Aissa Nadjem, member of the Central Committee and UNPA's [National Union of Algerian Peasants] general secretary presided, yesterday afternoon at the Hotel Aurassi, over a permanent committee meeting in charge of implementing the International Congress' resolutions in support of Palestinian peasants, held in Baghdad 30 March 1980. During this meeting, the participants studied the Baghdad's congress declarations and adopted a course of action, as well as some proposals, which will be submitted to the permanent committee, meeting in Holland at the beginning of the next year. This meeting was attended by the following: The general secretary to the General Union of Arab Agricultural Cooperatives; the president of Iraq's Cooperatives Association; the president of Libya's Agricultural Union, the general secretary of Palestinian Peasants General Union, the official responsible for international relations for the General Union of Syrian Peasants, as well as members of UNPA's [National Union of Algerian Peasants] National Secretariat. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 25 Aug 80 p 2]

CRITICISM OF AL-SADAT--"I'm the one running after the U.S., offering them military facilities in my country," said President al-Sadat recently. He spelled out that those facilities were intended to "serve" any Arab or Muslim country that fell victim to aggression. Now since it is usually the U.S. that does the running when it is eager to grab hold of a piece of foreign territory, the Egyptian leader's sprint looks much more like a headlong flight from the perils facing his administration. And since the occupation he so desires is nothing else but aggression, and Egypt is an Arab and Muslim country, it is clear that for Cairo's leaders the "aggression" that is so greatly dreaded can only spring from the Egyptian people themselves. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 15 Sep 80 p 5]

CSO: 4400

LETTER TO BANI-SADR WARNS HIM OF INACTION, DESPAIR

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 Sep 80 p 7

[Open Letter to Bani-Sadr, by Javad Sarhaddi]

[Text] On Monday, 3 Shahrivar [25 Aug], the result of a meeting between Prime Minister Raja'i and President Bani-Sadr appeared in both the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC and ETTELA'AT newspapers under the title of "Mr President, I Keep Quiet so that People Could Remain on the Scene". A newspaper reporter, in spite of all his cleverness, had not been able to get anything out of Mr Raja'i, but had been able to interview Bani-Sadr. I read the interview several times, from top to bottom. I was not able, unfortunately, to find anything in it except repetitions, complaints, sense of despair, hard feelings and things that should not have been revealed. I find it my religious duty, and in accordance to what has been quoted from the Prophet (quotation in Arabic), to write this letter to you, hoping to, while performing my duty, get some questions answered... My dear brother, your excellency Mr Bani-Sadr, I strongly criticize your method and your ideological approach and would like to first ask you why you are not serious in your dealings with the nation and the revolution? Why are you leading us down the slippery road of division? Why do you make revolutionary people lose their confidence? Why are you, by your pessimism and onesidedness, emphasizing negative points? I want your frank answers to these questions. You admit yourself that people expect action and a sense of responsibility from you. My dear brother, I am deeply saddened and hurt by having read tens of your articles, interviews and speeches.

Your Statements Concerning Questioning of Ideas

Your Monday interview shows that your pessimism is at its climax, reflecting a disturbed and vindictive character. In reply to a question by a reporter on the issue of questionings, you replied: "If you are referring to questioning in the Ministry of Education, Mr Raja'i had denied it, saying that such a thing could not be possible." Yet, you try to elaborate further, taking advantage of the presence of two ladies as witnesses, and talk about some "scandalous affairs". Tell me in a brotherly manner, how do you justify such behavior?

First, you should know, and be sure one hundred percent, that the reporter was not referring to questionings in the Ministry of Education or to any particular person. He was talking in general terms and, thanks to your help, an entire newspaper column was devoted to it. The issue had been raised in the Majiles before and had been answered by Mr Raja'i himself. We had learned that the integrity and honesty of the Prime Minister was beyond reproach. Yet, you continue with your pessimism, and in your interviews and articles you raise unwanted questions thus subconsciously providing "food" for the enemies and opponents.

Misuse by Enemies

You are certainly aware that enemy radios (U.S., London, Iraq and Israel) by quoting you, broadcast the news about the chaotic economic condition, inflation and explosion (six), all based on your statistics, to the world that cannot tolerate us or our revolution. And their audience, dissidents of otherwise, believe it as dependable news. Are you aware that as a result of minor differences great secrets of our revolution are given out to the enemy? Do you know that because of repeating and revealing our problems, vital secrets about our economy and the pulse of our revolution have come under the control of our enemy, to the extent that they know the number of loaves of bread on our dinner tables? My dear brother, you consider yourself as being an elected official of a revolutionary people, and in most of your interviews you refer to the 11 million votes cast for you. We admit this to be true. We also know that of the 16 million votes one third of it was yours. We also remember that the total number of our voters, as was proved in the referendum of the spring of 58 [22 Mar-22 June 79], is over 21 million, all active in the political arena. Let me say that all those who did not vote for you are with you, as ordered by our Imam, and accept your election as a means of protecting and strengthening the revolution. No committed Moslem individual allows himself to weaken the government and the President unless their minds are filled with doubts and suspicion to the extent to succumb to illogical acts.

120,000 Letters

Dear brother, your excellency Mr Bani Sadr, in your interview of 25 Shahrivar [25 Aug], you referred to 120,000 letters you had received and said: "A number of these letters reflected lack of knowledge of realities and therefore had no answers". I would like to ask, what are these realities and the lack of knowledge of them you were referring to? Dear brother! I know that you believe that every society must have a policy to be carried out by its leaders and the people, a policy that must be based on consultation, with both responsible for its implementation. If it is not carried out intelligently, corruption will seep into the society, government will disintegrate and enemies will triumph. It is the right of every individual of the Moslem people to control and supervise the affairs of the society, and will have to pay the price if they failed to do so, and will be held responsible for any possible event. I cannot, therefore,

accept your statement that those letters do not deserve any answer and that the writers are strangers to realities and facts.

How could your commitment to guide and lead the nation be interpreted? I emphatically declare that this letter is one of 120,000 letters that, as you can see, need to be answered to help us grasp realities. I sincerely hope that you will accept this and not be worried by ideology and law. The law has its guardians, the Majiles a caretaker and the nations are living and awake. There is no need for agitation or invitation.

A Look At the Waiving of Bank Interest

Here, I must go back a little and take a look at your success in the presidential elections.

You surely remember that before becoming a candidate for president you brought up the issues of nationalization of banks and the waiving of bank interest. They were good and interesting subjects but you must admit that while it brought you success there were no benefits in it for the nation. The issues were abandoned after they had given you millions of votes and after you too forgot the issues, bank interest reached its highest peak and was left like a bullet in the air. And now, we are faced with a 50 percent inflation, closed plants, economic embargo and an acute housing problem. But we are not and shall never be despaired because we are walking free, in the shadow of the Imam, and follow Islamic egalitarianism. If we overcome the enemy, we have done our duty and will be filled with pride. And if we be overcomed by the enemy we will be delivered as we have done what was to be done as our duty.

A Policy Detached From Reliance

My dear brother, believe me that when I look at your disappointed and despaired figure on the TV screen I think of the future of our revolution and the country. And when my feeling of depression is deepened I seek refuge in the spirit of our great religious leaders, prophets and the leader of the revolution. I think back of how these great leaders had stood steadfast at the history-making moments, never giving in to despair and pessimism. I must bluntly add that in spite of having been sincere and a believer in the ideology (of revolution), your approach had been mixed with hopelessness and void of reliance on God. It is not an exaggeration to refer to your newspaper as a "repository of sorrow". For a nation filled with pride and a source of hope for the oppressed nations of the world, with tearful eyes and yet smiling in the face of torture by their enemies, it is sad to have to hear its leaders talk of inefficiency, sabotage, excuses and work slowdown, which only help make them sick and lose their spirit.

My dear brother, I believe that your policy and method are influenced by your own writings. In your book "The Personality Cult" [?], for example, you attack the worship of personality, megalomania, foolish pride and the lust for power. You are right in doing that. But in practical political

life, you dismiss those who disagree with you as megalomaniacs and power-hungry. Perhaps you are influenced by your own book, just like an actor who has become so wrapped up in the role he plays that he acquires the character of the person he portrays for quite some time. You judge your opponents by what you have said in your book, not relaizing that all could not be measured with the same yardstick. They [the opponents] have Islamic characteristics and political personality. They do not view and measure people who disagree with you the way you do. The reason is that they have always been available as part of the society, having been able to pass the test.

The Extent of Our Expectations

In conclusion, I wish you will excuse me for having been so frank with you and hope you will not interpret my action and views as an effort aimed at creating an atmosphere of intrigue and agitation. I do not belong to any faction, party or group. I am but an uncommitted Moslem and a follower of the line of the Imam and firmly believe that he [the Imam] too is following the commands of the Messengers of God. I do not expect praise or flattery from any one. My last words, Mr President, are that our nation does not expect you to be as honest and straightforward as 'Ali [first Imam of the Shi'ites] nor want you to follow a policy like that of 'Omar [the first Caliph of Islam]. They do not expect from you more than is within your ability. I hope that your efforts aimed at the realization of the ideals of the nation and the establishment of a just government meet with success.

Respectfully yours, Javad Sarhaddi.

9561
CSO: 4906

TEHRAN POWER STRUGGLE SEEN GROWING SHARPER

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 15 Sep 80 pp 154-158

[Text] Religious zeal is currently the most important qualification for an Iranian minister. President Bani-Sadr is opposing the power of the fanatical Moslems.

In the Majlis, the Tehran Parliament, one person, of whom it had been least expected, intervened for law and order: Shaykh Sadeq Khalkhali, the bloody and aritrary judge of the Islamic republic.

Khomenyi's highest placed spokesman for law blasted the unjustified pressure being exerted on the president and condemned the "forces that are hampering the president in the execution of his assignment."

The deputies were told by, of all people, a man who pronounces death sentences after trials of only minutes that they should kindly respect the constitution.

Until now the chief justice had revealed himself only as an opponent of President Abol Hassan Bani-Sadr. Now he was hastening to the aid of the president, probably because his arbitrary justice is arousing concern even among radical Moslems.

Ostensibly Khalkhali took exception to the new Prime Minister Ali Raja'i having his list of ministers read out in Parliament without previously having obtained the president's consent, as the constitution requires. A few hours later Bani-Sadr's party newspaper INKELAAB ISLAMI (ISLAMIC REVOLUTION) came out with this headline: "The president cannot agree to the list of names."

The "cabinet dilemma," in the words of the TEHRAN TIMES, was complete. At the same time it was also the temporary climax of a bitter power struggle between the radical mullahs of the Islamic Republican Party who, under the leadership of the archconservative Ayatollah Beheshti, have a majority in Parliament, and President Bani-Sadr, who still has the support of some liberal and democratically minded deputies around former Prime Minister Bazargan.

The two sides are irreconcilable and are clearly seeking a decision. Bani-Sadr, 48 years old, educated in France, is striving for a strong presidency like that in Paris. He wants to pursue a policy which is not determined solely by the Koran, but also "by reason and political realities."

A coalition government would correspond to the president's ideas, made up of men whom he trusts and members of the IRP--but they would bring political experience and knowledge to the job. Bani-Sadr's formula for a cabinet like this: "A government of understanding."

This is going much too far for the Islamic fundamentalists. Loyalty to Islam and revolutionary zeal are sufficient qualifications for them. Behind Bani-Sadr's ideas they detect conspiracy and collusion with the West, from which the president has never cut himself off completely. Beheshti and Prime Minister Raja'i are demanding that the "Imam's line" be made Persia's guideline.

Consequently, everyone in Iran today sees in Imam Kohmenyi's line what he wants to--often with curious results. Zealous Moslems even closed down laundries which were patronized by Christians. According to them, mingling the laundry of unbelievers and of the orthodox could be a sacrilege. Even the Imam himself cannot or is unwilling to state what his line is. All that can be heard from those around Khomenyi is: "Orthodox, young and revolutionary Moslems follow the line of the Imam."

A simple calculation for Prime Minister Raja'i, a former mathematics teacher, is: Young zealots must be in the cabinet. The average age of the ministers presented by Raja'i is 37.

The youngest, 27-year old Asghar Ibrahimi, who was put forward as the new oil minister, is one of 5 out of 21 candidates who have studied at an American university. It was qualification enough for the oldest, Sajjed Assadollah Ladshewardi, 45, that he had helped to blow up the Tehran office of the Israeli airlines El Al--he was proposed as minister of trade.

Raja'i was unable to find any candidate for the post of defense minister. But he presented Hussein Musawi, 39, to Parliament as the successor to former Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbsadeh. IRP member Musawi previously published the party newspaper ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. He possesses as little pertinent experience for the foreign ministry as Raja'i's other men for their positions. They are all devout Moslems, however, "men," as Raja'i says, "who have faced bullets."

Bani-Sadr was appalled. In meetings which lasted for hours he tried to make clear to Raja'i that it was a matter of rebuilding an economically ruined country and that Persians had not overthrown the Shah only for the sake of Islamic doctrine but for "bread and water" too.

Raja'i appealed to the authority of Khomenyi, who declared in a fiery speech in June: "We did not bring about the revolution for grapes and peaches, but for Islam."

At least the Ayatollah did not abandon his president for the time being. Khomenyi, who was unwilling to become involved in the argument about the new parliament, last week pointed out Bani-Sadr's right to refuse candidates.

Thus the president finally succeeded in removing seven men from Raja'i's list, among them the candidate for the foreign ministry Musawi.

It was not only filling the ministerial positions that caused difficulties. The ministries are now short of civil servants.

A foreign diplomat complained: "The doors are open in the Foreign Ministry, scarcely one office is occupied, you have to shout the name of the person you are looking for down the corridors in the hope of seeing a familiar face."

The diplomat had recently made several attempts to find a competent partner for a discussion--in vain. "The level had dropped from mediocrity to absolute stupidity. Nothing is running any more."

Businessmen give similar gloomy accounts of their experiences in other ministries. The trained officials have almost all been dismissed after a purge.

Chaotic conditions like this again led Bani-Sadr to reproach the radical mullahs last week with having "their talons everywhere." He said that the Iranian people were being panicked and frightened with fictitious reports about enemies of the revolution and supposed conspiracies.

It was an open challenge to the mullahs for the president to describe opposition to the free expression of opinion as "un-Islamic." "A country in which freedom of thought is suppressed," he emphasized, "is a heathen society."

On the following day Prime Minister Raja'i fired back, pillorying Bani-Sadr's "deviationist line in Iranian politics," which knew only material needs, but not "ideal goals."

The Americans found out last week what the new prime minister understands by ideal goals when they again turned to Tehran in the hostage question after the failure of the liberation mission in April.

U.S. Secretary of State Edmund Muskie, who had sought "a channel of communication" in a polite letter to Raja'i, received a discouraging answer from the Iranian prime minister. In a speech in Tehran Raja'i stated: "We would talk with you, if we were sure that you are truly penitent."

Compassionately Raja'i informed the Americans which paths lead to penance: "The decision not to repeat your sins" and "to eat only what purifies your bodies of all that religion has forbidden."

Raja'i concluded: "These are the stages through which we Moslems pass, when we repent. If you do the same, we are prepared to talk to you."

9581
CSO: 4403

SHAPUR BAKHTIAR GIVES VIEWS ON SOLVING IRAN PROBLEM

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 5 Sep 80 p 73

[Interview with the Iranian ex-Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar, by Jean-Louis Gaziniaire--date and place unknown]

[Text] [Question] After the attempt of 18 July against you and which cost French lives, do you feel you have the right to engage in political action while in France?

[Answer] I do not at all consider myself a political refugee. I travel light. In fact, I do nothing reprehensible on the French soil.

[Question] You have nevertheless made an appeal to the Iranian people?

[Answer] Indeed, I founded the Iranian National Resistance Movement. But after all, when I was head of government in Tehran, Khomeyni, in French, vituperated with his usual indelicacy, and multiplied the contacts one knows... with the indulgence of the French Government! I feel at home here, in spite of the threats against my life. France is my second homeland: and I say it in spite of the tolerance this country has displayed, in a recent past, towards the presence of Mr Khomeyni at Neauphle-le-Chateau. This said, I haven't organized anything yet in the strict sense of the word. I only observe my appeal has been geard. I am even visited from Iran! No one until now dared to speak or act. It is a beginning. One dares at last to shed fear and [come out of] silence. But I have no structured plan. I await the inevitable rise of the popular discontent. You know, the French Resistance was "structured" 3 years after the appeal of General de Gaulle...

[Question] What kind and how many Iranaians do you expect to rally to your cause?

[Answer] First, it is not a question of "my" cause, but that of Iran. I think I have the support of the intellectuals, the tribes of my religion, the middle class... and of all those who have had enough of the chaos into which Mr Khomeni has plunged the country. But beyond these categories, I

appeal to all nationalists and progressists. Two qualities are essential: the country must be saved and led towards progress.

[Question] "I propose the third road." Is there no religious notion in this definition...?

[Answer] I am a fervent Moslem. But I do not think that politics should be the concern of ayatollahs or mollahs. The former led Iran towards ruin and disaster, the latter execute their will. The Iranian people deserve better.

[Question] What would you do if you were to return to Tehran in power?

[Answer] I would rejuvenate the economy and strengthen the army. First to put the country back on its feet, second to insure its security, and keep the infection from the East, the Iran of Mr Khomeyni, from returning to our country

[Question] What regime would you propose?

[Answer] The republic, of course. But an authentic republic. In any case, I am convinced of the little importance of the "packaging" that is given to a nation's constitution: little does it matter whether it is a monarchy or a republic, as long as man is respected, and that freedom and progress are guaranteed.

[Question] Who would be your allies?

[Answer] Any country who wouldn't put into question Iran fundamental interests.

[Question] Which Iran?

[Answer] Not that of Khomeyni. That one goes toward catastrophe. Khomeyni has visibly nothing to construct. He is content to destroy and spread terror, with daily slaughters, and the grotesque show of force of the mollahs whose vocation is, should be, quite different. He will not last long. Iran's production is 20 percent less than it was 2 years ago. Without the money obtained from petroleum, in the beginning, Iran would be at the bottom of the pit. If the West had not flirted with Khomeyni, just as it had with the shah, by the way, the present regime would have been swept away a long time ago, because Khomeyni is isolated inside and cornerd-in outside.

[Question] You are the Khomeyni No 1 enemy, the man to kill. On the other hand, there seems to be no possibility of establishing any ties between you and the monarchists. Do you therefore want to rally a movement in your name only?

[Answer] Exactly. As the enemy of Khomeyni, without intercourse with the imperial family, I represent--and I propose--the 3d road; that of wisdom, and of salvation for Iran.

9670
CSO: 4900

DAYAN PROPOSES UNILATERAL AUTONOMY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Aug 80 pp 15, 20

[Interview with Moshe Dayan: "Dayan Responds to Nahum Goldmann"]

[Text] HA'ARETZ: The principal claim of Dr Nahum Goldmann is found, perhaps, in one paragraph of his article which was published on Monday in HA'ARETZ: "The question is whether in the political and military isolation of today, depending on its own strength alone, Israel can be more secure in the long term than within the framework of concrete and formal guarantees, to be implemented over a number of years by the stationing of foreign troops on its borders with the Arab countries. In my opinion there is greater danger contained in the first alternative. For reasons of finance and manpower, Israel will be unable for many more years to compete with the Arab countries, with their unlimited financial resources and their populations of tens of millions." How do you respond to this argument?

Dayan: There are two parts to this. I agree with the claim that there is a limit to Israel's ability to enter into armed competition. I already wrote in my book "Milestones," after the Yom Kippur War, that in terms of manpower I had no doubt that Israel had more or less reached the limit of its capability. In the long run, it would be difficult to increase the size of its army, and to add a great number of additional planes and tanks. This would involve not only enormous financial burdens, with improvements and refinements of weapons, but also the enlistment of many young people into the military service at the same time that Israel would continue a normal civilian life of construction and creativity, of education, of absorption of immigrants, of settlement, and of industrialization. Thus, Israel would have to ensure its balance of forces against the Arab world, which is growing stronger at a rapid rate, by increasing the quality of its weapons--a quality which would make certain that any Arab attempt to conquer and destroy Israel would result in the destruction of their forces. I agree then that Israel cannot continue in an arms race, and that it must emphasize quality in the area of weaponry. I am not going into details here. I am satisfied with the concept of quality. Indeed, this is a varied concept--it ranges from nuclear weapons to electronic equipment to conventional weapons.

But the second, and principal part of Goldmann's comments are, I think, unrealistic. I refer to his alternative. If the question were simply this: what must and can Israel do to be able to withstand the growth of Arab power, the answer which I would propose is--it must strengthen itself within the framework of its capability, and try to avoid a war, and to achieve peace settlements, even if they require many compromises, to solve to the best of its ability the Palestinian issue--and if not to solve it, at least to defuse it. It is not possible for us to completely solve this issue in all areas, and at the same time to maintain the best possible relations with the superpowers which can help us--primarily the U.S.--with arms, political support, and economic aid.

Put simply, Goldmann's formulation is first of all not realistic. As for the proposal of guarantees by the great powers, I do not think that such have been advanced anywhere. He is engaging, if I may say, in a pastoralization of political events. He creates a world of a chocolate box, in which the state of Israel would be such that the superpowers, at least the two main ones, would participate in guarantees of its security, joined by the Arabs, who would want to, although I do not know why they would. On the other hand there are in his article not only imprecisions, but also distortions, perhaps unintended, where he describes Israeli policy as not seeking great power guarantees, but rather seeking as it were a way to be strong by itself, and to depend upon its strength alone. This is incorrect. This simply is not in accord with the facts.

[Question] You yourself were at least a disciple of the idea of American guarantees.

[Answer] I was, and I still am. Not only I, but also Ben Gurion, my master and teacher. He very much wanted to get guarantees for our security, wanted us to be accepted into NATO, wanted that from the Americans, wanted and was ready for us to be a dominion within the British Commonwealth. When De Gaulle said in an offhand manner that we were allies, Ben Gurion seized upon these words as though De Gaulle had actually signed some sort of agreement with us. In personal and private conversations he used to say that he did not believe that these countries would actually come to save us, but he hoped that such an alliance would prevent the Arabs from attacking Israel. He was ready for this wholeheartedly, and he knocked on all the doors of these powers, but they were unwilling.

[Question] But if the guarantee of one power is good enough to deter them from attacking Israel, why isn't the guarantee of two powers a good idea?

[Answer] I am not saying that it is no good. I am only saying that it is unrealistic. I am not rejecting it, but am only observing that what Goldmann says is not realistic. This alternative does not exist, and every time he cites the sources, he in fact trips himself up.

First, let us consider 1956. There was a joint demand of the U.S. and the USSR that we evacuate the Sinai. Ben Gurion agreed to this, and in exchange

a UN force was stationed there for the first time. The USSR participated in this force with observers. The two superpowers decided that there would not be any American or Soviet soldiers, but only observers. At that time, that was the maximal guarantee, which Israel agreed to, and in exchange for it Israel withdrew. What came out of these guarantees? In 1967 Nasser sent it home--with no resistance from the USSR. Remember what transpired between the Soviet ambassador and Eshkel. Eshkel proposed that the ambassador send his military attache together with other attaches or by himself, to the Syrian border to see that we were not attacking anyone, and then we would have remained at the 1967 border.

I assume that Goldmann does not propose that we withdraw behind the 1967 borders. For the moment he is not speaking of withdrawal. But I assume that he understands that Soviet-American guarantees--as he calls them--will be given only for borders which are accepted by the Arabs. And it may be assumed that these borders would be the borders of May 1967, with some sort of demilitarization agreement.

Israel once had such borders, and we did not control the old city of Jerusalem, but only had the new city, and it was the Soviets who pushed the Syrians to embark on a war. Nasser faced a situation in which he could not but respond to the Syrians and collaborate with them, and so he moved his forces to the border.

Thus, the first question regarding that period is: there was Soviet-American collaboration in the Middle East a) in the demand of a French, English, and Israeli withdrawal; and b) in the solution of stationing UN forces. Did Israel oppose it? Did Ben Gurion oppose it? I am dealing with two things. The first--Goldmann's claim that Israel has pursued a policy which negates such a thing. Ben Gurion was a disciple of guarantees, he wanted them more than the Americans and the Soviets combined. Secondly--according to Goldmann, the Israeli policy was one of provocative buildup, which was simply untrue.

[Question] Essentially, the principal thesis of Goldmann--putting aside for the moment his proposed alternative--is that we are unable to depend upon our own military strength. As for the question of "what will be," already many years ago you said "we shall live by our sword." The question which Dr Goldmann is raising is whether this statement still holds. It is impossible to ignore reality. There is fatigue, there is emigration instead of immigration, and the troubling question is whether we can maintain our position for another 10-20-30 years without making some profound compromise. Ben Gurion used to say that we do not have to depend upon the gentiles, but only upon ourselves. The question is whether this conception is still holding today.

[Answer] No, that is not true. Ben Gurion never said that we should depend exclusively upon ourselves. He said that we should never get into a war without a great power as an ally.

[Question] Ben Gurion said something very wise--it is not important what the gentiles say; it is important what the Jews do. He did not say that what the gentiles do is unimportant.

[Answer] Ben Gurion's conception, especially in the realm of security, was that we should not be isolated. That was his primary goal.

[Question] Nevertheless, the question is what should we do today. That we are isolated is undisputed. There has been a loss of faith. The question is whether or not we really do have to make some profound compromise in our political conception, so as to escape the isolation.

[Answer] We are talking about two different spheres. Goldmann speaks--and with this I agree--about the seriousness of our situation. I do not want to be fatalistic about "what will be if." Three question marks and three periods after that, and finished. Just because our situation is serious does not mean that Goldmann's proposal is realistic. What he proposes is unrealistic. I separate two things: as to our situation, I say it is serious. Do we have to find ways of bettering it, of escaping the isolation? I say yes, and have proposed things to achieve that. But that does not mean that every step has a responsive step, and that Goldmann's response is realistic.

If we are talking about Goldmann's proposal--it is not enough to say: do you, Moshe Dayan, think that we can live this way forever, and if not, than let us accept the guarantees of the great powers. The question is: are there really such things as guarantees by the great powers?

[Question] Even Goldmann does not deny the great difficulty in reaching that solution which he wants. He himself has said that there is no certainty that the superpowers are ready to grant guarantees to Israel. He recalls Ben Gurion's appeal to the U.S., seeking guarantees, and he says that the Americans did not respond. He argues that today, the U.S. cannot solve world problems by itself. It must solve problems through cooperation, coordination, and understanding with the second superpower, the Soviet Union.

You mentioned the solution which was proposed after the Sinai Campaign. Then there really was cooperation between the U.S. and the USSR, and in any event the arrangement lasted for 10 years. There is an impression that the Russians were not so satisfied with what happened in 1967. Perhaps this example shows that basically, there is a possibility of cooperation between America and Russia to ensure peace in this region.

[Answer] What I am saying is that Goldmann incorrectly describes political reality. The question is not a hypothetical one of "what would I want." The question is: "What do I want, and what do I do," and not "what would I want." We can sit here and make an idealization of the world, where there is cooperation between the USSR and the U.S., where the two of them will view Israel as an unimportant and non-decisive factor in their

struggle, and will agree to make Israel into a Switzerland, and so forth. I do not want to play "what would be if," as if the question were: "if there were such a possibility, would you support it?" This is not my nature, and I do not want to get involved in it. I want to deal with this question: "what exists, and what is possible; what has existed and happened in the last 30 years, and what can we expect in the future; what can and must we do?"

[Question] Didn't this possibility exist three years ago?

[Answer] No. I want to take this example. It was not Israel which cancelled the Soviet-American agreement of 1977, nor was it American Jewry. With all due respect, Goldmann is misleading on this matter, or else he does not know what he is talking about. In that same period, Israel reached an agreement with the U.S. in the form of a working paper which was not based on cancellation of the American-Soviet agreement. Sadat was the person who cancelled the Soviet-American agreement. Until that time, the agreement between us and the U.S. spoke of going to Geneva, and the meaning of Geneva was the "co-chairmanship" of the Soviets and the Americans--this was the agreement we had made. It was I, your faithful servant, who signed the agreement in the name of the Israelis government, to go to Geneva, meaning the co-chairmanship of the Soviets, while at the same time the Arabs appeared as a united group, including Syria, and Syria meant the Soviets. This was the agreement with the Americans.

Goldmann claims that American Jewry scuttled the Soviet-American agreement. This never happened. On the contrary: Israel tried the path to Geneva, and the Israeli government of Begin agreed to this. What happened later, and why was it scuttled? Because Sadat, without consulting with the Americans, came to Jerusalem, and he explained this when he said that he was aware of two things, a) that the other Arab countries did not want peace--he was referring to Syria, b) that the road to Geneva would not lead to peace, but would only bring the Soviets back into the Middle East--something which he did not want. He then called, as an alternative to Geneva, for the Cairo conference, without the Russians, and he invited the UN, the Americans, and all of the other Arab countries. Before, we spoke of 1957. Now I am talking about 1977, twenty years later. Israel did not halt the Geneva process, i.e. Soviet participation. The political reality, initiated by Sadat--I do not disagree with his estimate--was that which upset the process, and which scuttled the joint policy.

[Question] Didn't the Americans give up on the working paper even before Sadat started his initiative?

[Answer] No. On the contrary, they accepted the working paper.

[Question] Did the Egyptians accept the working paper?

[Answer] No. All of the Arab countries said that they wanted changes in the working paper, and later, Sadat began his move.

[Question] At that time, did the Egyptians say anything against the Soviet-American document?

[Answer] Not until Sadat went to Jerusalem.

[Question] Did the Soviet-American document push him to that?

[Answer] Yes. Sadat is not ashamed to say that he was opposed to Soviet participation and going to Geneva, thereby bringing the Soviets into the Middle East.

[Question] But you, as the foreign minister at that time, what were your reasons for being so sharply opposed to the Soviet-American document?

[Answer] Because within that document there were changes in the American policy with respect to Israel and with respect to the Palestinian issue which went against our favor. I refer to the "legitimate rights" and other things. This document, through terminology, changed the American policy. It was not a situation in which the Soviets agreed to accept American policy with respect to the non-establishment of a Palestinian state. Rather, in order to achieve a joint Soviet-American statement, the Americans gave in to the Russians, at our expense.

[Question] We also accepted it at Camp David.

[Answer] It is not worth jumping from one issue to another here, and I do not favor a cross examination. We are talking about the Soviets. We brought up two examples--1957 and 1977--in both of which it was not Israel which rejected participation. I am not saying that we were enthusiastic about it, or that I regret that the USSR was not included. But I am arguing against the conception of Goldmann, and I am saying that he is pastoralizing political life and has been ignoring reality for decades.

Take the situation today. There are basic differences between the U.S. and the USSR, and perhaps a fraying of relations between them. Not with respect to Israel. It began with Iran, and later Afghanistan and the oil question, Saudi Arabia, and all the rest. Things are connected. They do not operate alone. There is a deterioration, perhaps to the point of ending detente. It is impossible to come forward today and speak about superpower guarantees for Israel as though it were just over the wall, in hand's reach, and that the thing which is upsetting it is Israel's policy, of relying on our own strength rather than relying on international guarantees, or at least viewing them as a solution.

Now I would like to shift to what I consider to be the positive side, to what I view as the solution. I am not proposing that we each cry on one another's should about how bad things are, about how there is no propsect of competing in an arms race. That leads nowhere. Look--we made a peace treaty with Egypt, and in that agreement there is one element--relating to security--which I consider to be of utmost importance, which I hope will be preserved, and not silenced.

The positive element is that in the peace agreement between us and the Egyptians, the Americans accept upon themselves--and only themselves--in a generally expressed form, the responsibility of guaranteeing the preservation or realization of the peace agreement between us and Egypt, on the common border. This is implemented in the stationing of the multinational force and the fulfillment of American obligations in the defense agreement, and in political reality--first of all by the fact that today Egypt depends on American weapons and American political support. The entry of America into this agreement began with Carter acting as broker, and its being a partner in it, and a signatory to it, and being ready to work for it, i.e. to maintain American military or civilians there, and so forth, and America's being the political back and weapons supplier for Egypt. All of this means that America has guaranteed the Egyptian front. According to this guarantee, if Egypt--if Sadat or anyone else--tries to breach the peace agreement and attack Israel on that front, we have a kind of American guarantee, not defined, but in fact no different from the stationing of UN troops in the past.

When the Americans, the Egyptians, and ourselves wanted to bring the agreement to the General Assembly, the Security Council, so that the UN would adopt it--and then we would be talking about UN and not American forces--the Russians exercised the veto. What does Goldmann say about this reality? When Sadat came to Jerusalem should Israel have refused to make a peace agreement with Egypt? To say that a bird in hand was better than two in the bush? To say that we do not want a peace treaty with you, but prefer Russian participation, a general peace, when he explained that the other Arab countries do not want peace? I do not think that Israel should reject any hand which is extended to it. If it is possible to get a peace treaty, we should do it, even at the price which we paid for it.

In this peace agreement, there is a unilateral and realistic guarantee regarding those things which in daily life and in the present situation, the U.S. is ready to guarantee or to participate in. On the other hand--because of Soviet-American relations and the rift between the rejectionist states and Egypt--there was no possibility at all of the agreement being accepted by the UN, or the use of UN forces, because of the expected Soviet veto. This is reality, and not the reality described by Goldmann.

[Question] How do you explain the fact that the USSR in 1977 was ready to be a co-chairman at Geneva, but cast a veto in the Security Council, and opposed this solution--UN guarantees in the Sinai?

[Answer] Because it was not Geneva. It was an American-Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, contrary to the wishes of Syria and the other Arab countries, and that the USSR did not want. It wanted to go together with all of these countries--including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the PLO. We have not even touched on the issue of the PLO, which is a problem in itself, and at the moment perhaps the most decisive of all of the issues. The USSR spoke of a general agreement at Geneva, not about a Cairo agreement, not about a Sadat initiative, and not about a separate peace.

[Question] Good, if we were to reach a general agreement--ultimately the Egyptian agreement stems from the assumption that there will be a general agreement--it is possible that this conception would again be more practical, as it was once close to being.

[Answer] I do not want to play the game of "if." The question is either "what are we doing, and what is the policy" or it is hypothetical as in "what would I do if." Was there something incorrect in Israel's policy of seeking international security, etc? Was Israel the one which pursued a policy which was different, or opposed to that, and if so--when and where? This is what Goldmann claims--that another policy is possible, and that in the past it was possible to pursue such a policy, and that Ben Gurion wanted by force of arms to take Mt Hebron, and another war, and another occupation, and so forth.

I say that this is a distortion and twisting of the truth. Goldmann ignores the daily policy which transpires in the world, not because of us or anything we do, but because of other factors, while we--in this policy--have to assure to the best of our ability the security of Israel, again by achieving peace with the Arabs, and so forth. Then you say: "If there were an agreement, a general peace treaty..." Why wasn't there a general peace treaty? Because of us?

[Question] The question is also what are we striving for? If we were striving wholeheartedly and with a readiness to pay a price as high as the one we paid in Sinai, for a solution to the problems on our eastern border, perhaps we would have created conditions which would have made the existence of Israel easier. This is not merely a hypothetical matter of "if" but it is also a question of what we are doing and for what we are striving. This is what Goldmann is writing about.

[Answer] We are striving for peace with all countries. Here two questions arise--first of all, the "next stage" was always considered to be the Jordanian-Palestinian stage more than the Syrian stage. I think all of us agree on that. Negotiations with Jordan continued throughout the whole Alignment period, on the basis of certain territorial compromises. Other than SHELI and the Communists, I never heard Goldmann or anyone else propose going to the Jordanians more than the Alignment was ready to do. The party who refused was Jordan and not Israel.

Now, in my opinion, the situation is much more complex, and here we have to take into account the factor of the PLO. Now--and Goldmann must deal with this and it is one of the principal difficulties in an agreement with Jordan--the problem is the PLO, which in its position in the world and the Arab world with its aspirations, wants a Palestinian state. It speaks not of a territorial compromise with Jordan, but of a Palestinian state. When we talk with Jordan today, the question is not only how the border will be drawn, but what Jordan will do with territory handed over to it by Israel. If the Alignment returns to power and returns all or most of the

West Bank to Jordan, will the formula of two countries--Israel and Jordan--be preserved, or will a situation of three countries develop, because Jordan says it will let the Palestinians do what they want, and we know what they want.

If tomorrow a Palestinian state is established on the West Bank and in Gaza, it will not be able to absorb one refugee, beause each year more and more Palestinians are leaving the West Bank and Gaza than they are able to absorb. Thus, if the PLO accepts the Arab state, it will not say that it has thus solved the problem. What will it do with the refugees in all of the other countries?

Therefore, when we talk to y of being ready for more concessions on the eastern front for a peace treaty with Jordan, we have to consider not only whether we are ready to give Jordan larger pieces of territory, but whether we estimate or guess or expect as to what will happen to those territories, and whether or not we see the possibility of the establishment of a Palestinian state there; if and when a Palestinian state is created there, will it signal the end of the dispute, and reasonably peaceful relations, or will it be a base for attacks against Israel, as the PLO says. This is the question regarding the eastern front.

[Question] But before we get to the problems with Jordan and the rest of the Arab countries which reject Camp David, isn't there a prior stage: according to the Camp David agreement we must reach an agreement on autonomy which takes into account the participation of the Palestinians, but it has also been taken into account that the Palestinians will not participate, and Sadat has said: you can also do it with us. But in this area we are not making any progress. Don't you think that in the meantime we are worsening our situation in that we have not perfected the agreement with the one partner who did sign with us?

[Answer] True, I completely share the opinion and even champion it, for the matter is so important and essential to us that even if there is no agreement--neither with the Palestinians, nor with Jordan, nor with Egypt--we must realize the essential matters in this issue even unilaterally. Now that I am writing a book, I have come across a document and discussion which I had with Begin very early on, when I had already begun to discuss with him the virtue of unilateral realization. I also wrote a letter to the legal counsel, in which I requested an opinion from him regarding my proposal of unilateral realization of this agreement. I definitely agree that in the agreement with the Egyptians, we must do everything we can to expand it, and there is much that we can do in this matter to expand it to the West Bank and Gaza--even in a unilateral manner. I should only note that this is not in accord with Goldmann's conception.

If this is a case of Dayan vs Goldmann, then I say that what he proposes does not exist. We must see the realistic political options which have been opened before us, and the possibility of our working to realize them so as to achieve peace with the Arabs. If we are talking about our

security and the security of Israel, I do not know if we could depend upon the guarantees of outsiders; I do not know if we could achieve them. But there is no doubt that peace with the Arabs is an essential element, even if the alternative is to depend upon our own strength--it is preferable first of all to achieve peace with the Arab countries but the question is what to do.

[Question] Practically speaking, when you say unilateral steps, what do you mean?

[Answer] I have said this many times, but I am ready to repeat it: we must remove the military administration from the Arab population, and allow them to run their lives themselves--including their own police and links with Jordan--as they see fit. We must stop telling the Arabs what to do, and get out of their lives, and confine the IDF to Israeli settlements, and to recognize Arab leadership, without elections. I do not care. I know the Arabs of the area. Why should we reject the Council for National Direction? Let them take their leadership from it, or from wherever they want, and it will be the political leadership. This also has meaning if we call it administrative council, according to Camp David, but in fact the issue is political.

[Question] Would you recognize the present Arab leadership?

[Answer] I say that I am agreeable to anyone who in a legal manner is here and is elected or appointed by them. It makes no difference whether it is elected or appointed. What would we do if, under the terms of Camp David, it was these people who were elected? We agreed that it would be they and not we who would elect their leadership. All the talk of our being able to nurture a moderate leadership is foolishness. Aside from Quislings, we couldn't raise anyone.

[Question] Would they participate in such an arrangement?

[Answer] They would participate. In my opinion, definitely.

[Question] Doesn't Shak'a, no less than Arafat, want the destruction of Israel?

[Answer] I say yes. As long as he doesn't violate the law, I do not want to know what he wants in his heart. If they make it possible for terrorist bases to be set up in their cities, then we will go back in. We will not pull out of Gaza so that every day a sabotaged car can leave for Tel Aviv. I am not talking about that. I am talking about leaving Gaza so that two peoples can live in peace.

When I talk about leaving unilaterally, I do not mean that we should throw out the baby with the water, but rather going to them and saying: we want to realize the Camp David agreement, we are ready to leave without arranging anything, without signing, without anything, but on the basis that you

are able and ready to conduct your lives yourselves. This had to be done without an agreement, unilaterally, for no one would sign such an agreement with us.

[Question] You mean the Egyptians wouldn't sign? Isn't that what the Camp David accord requires in fact--that we achieve an agreement with the Egyptians on the details of autonomy?

[Answer] I see that after a year and a half, we have made almost no agreement with them. We sit and talk with them, but agree on almost no issue. I started from the asumption that from the moment that the Palestinians, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia rejected Camp David, they also rejected the idea of autonomy. So I say that we have to do this unilaterally. I have brought this example too many times, and still I have to repeat it: if we were asking Jordan to make an agreement with us regarding the bridges--we would reach no agreement. However, when they are faced with the possibility of closing the bridges, they have preferred not to close them.

When we first agreed that Arabs could freely enter Israel, the PLO opened fire on workers who went to work in Israel. When we wanted to hold municipal elections for the first time, the PLO said it would fire on anyone who participated, and the mayors did not want to stand for election. But when we did it unilaterally, we forced elections on them, and we said that if they did not go along we would put them in jail, then they all went and ultimately they loved it. I believe in continuing the peace process by giving self rule to the Palestinian Arabs, on the condition that it not damage our security, and this has to be insured by the remaining of the IDF, and it is assured by the Camp David agreement, and by our unilateral declaration that we are leaving unilaterally, as long as enemy bases are not developed. This must be done, and they must be allowed to elect or choose their own leadership.

[Question] If we were to do this unilaterally, don't you think that the Egyptians would view it as a breach of the Camp David agreement?

[Answer] I think not. I believe that I read in the press two months ago that Sadat said--and I almost praised myself in that he adopted my formulation--that he did not understand why the Israelis did not unilaterally start the autonomy. Sadat said this in a speech, he used my terminology, and I assume that he heard this formula and used it.

I do not accept the approach which says that there is no alternative. The whole world recognizes the PLO, a Palestinian state will be established, there is no escaping it. At the moment that this formula is accepted, there will be no alternative. Then it will no longer be a question of whether I want it, but rather whether I will throw up my hands and refuse to be a partner to it.

[Question] Many people still look to you. What do you--Moshe Dayan--say we have to do in this situation?

[Answer] a) I am in favor of accepting great power guarantees, not guarantees but a military alliance I prefer. We discussed this with the Americans, and they asked: do you or don't you want American guarantees? I said that I wanted to be a member of the club, I wanted to be a partner to some kind of framework--please, expand NATO to include Israel. We would view that as an enormous achievement for us; we would have your commitment and you would have ours. They did not and do not want it. I am ready for less, that they should help us maintain our strength. Even Goldmann does not propose that we disarm in the face of the Arab countries. Do we want a lame country in the face of modern weapons? Does anyone really want this country to get into a wheel chair? Not even Goldmann wants that. So for the time being, the end of days has not come, there is no disarmament, no nuclear inspection, etc.

So I think that what we must do is to strive for peace with the Arab countries as much as possible, under realistic conditions; and to get guarantees, or a military alliance, as much as possible, with the great powers. Today, it is the U.S. Before this meeting, I put a pink notebook on the table. I don't know if you remember. I remembered it and searched for and found the resolution of the three great powers. Do you remember it? In 1950, the three great powers were for the limiting of arms sales, and so forth. They agreed among themselves to sell no arms to either Israel or the Arab countries, except by mutual agreement, and at the same time to prevent agression. If anyone breached the agreement, then they--either through the U.N. or by their own force outside of the U.N. framework--would work against the breach of the agreements. Even you don't remember it. It was there on paper. Good. Once there was such a thing. What happened? Political reality erased it. Not we. Political reality erased it, and joined France and England, and so forth, and created other things, and there was a development into something else. In any case, Goldmann sees a superpower guarantee as the solution to our problem. I cannot forget, and one should not forget, that in 1967, after the U.N. forces were pulled out, we appealed to all of the powers, to France, the U.S., England, and I remember the British Foreign Secretary Brown, who went to the USSR. He went to the USSR with his request. And what were we asking from all of them? That the border of the Green Line be preserved, and that Nasser lift the blockade of Sharm al-Shaykh. Johnson said: "We are not the policemen of the world." We asked him who was the policeman. He said that there was no world police force. So the question is, does Goldmann really think there is such a concept. Look what happened to the UN forces in Lebanon. In 1980, is there a realistic effective concept of guarantee, according to which "we would go out to war immediately..."

[Question] The two great powers did reach an agreement with respect to West Berlin. There is an agreement, and the matter is closed, without changes.

[Answer] I am not saying that there cannot be an agreement between the great powers. There can be a SALT agreement or an agreement on Berlin.

I am talking about the guarantee for one small country, such as Goldmann imagines, a small country which would be protected from the Arab world, the Khomeinis, and those who want to destroy it, by means of forces acting on behalf of the powers. It is not whether or not there can be an agreement between the powers, but whether we can rely on it, and whether there is such a thing as a world police force which would preserve order or protect us, and if the answer is yes, who is prepared to do it, and under what conditions.

I do not reject this. All countries and powers will tell you that a first condition is a peace agreement between us and the Arab countries. They will guarantee nothing except on the basis of a peace treaty. If there is a general peace treaty, the USSR can be a partner to it. If there is a separate peace treaty, such as with Egypt, only the country which is Egypt's ally--the U.S.--will guarantee it. What happens in the meantime, and the alternative is whether we should spurn the outstretched hand of Egypt. Let's agree that there is such a hand. Let's make a treaty with them if we can reach an agreement, and let's accept the partial guarantee of the U.S. for that part--if the U.S. is ready for it, and if from our point of view it is a condition for really assuring Sadat's word of honor.

[Question] But why do you believe in this American guarantee? Why don't you think that its fate will be the same as that of the document you showed us?

[Answer] On this planet, I know of nothing more trustworthy, at least for a limited period of time, then a commitment passed by the U.S. Congress; and if we say that today 242 is broken, we must remember that resolution 242 was passed in 1967 and 13 years have passed since then. We are talking about a document signed by Carter a year ago, which will enter into force in another 2 years.

It is possible that when the time comes, there may be a new political reality. But I think there is no escaping it. Unlike Goldmann, I cannot sit and advise Israel. I have no choice but to read the reality and its realism. Sadat came, that was the situation; the American-Russian agreement was cancelled; the question was whether to accept or reject. In the treaty with Sadat, there is a specific American guarantee, and it may be that on the day when it is breached, they will not stand by it, and then we will have to face a new reality: to withdraw or not to withdraw. There is no escape. And in the meantime, Khomeini has happened, and Afghanistan. Talk about great power guarantees over 30 years, which are not tested each year by reality is simply unrealistic.

[Question] Which means that you claim there is no prospect of such guarantees. Goldmann too says that it is not clear, and that he cannot promise that it will be so. And you propose that we unilaterally impose independent administration.

[Answer] I claim that we have to live a political life, and do the best possible. If we can make peace with Egypt, we should make peace with Egypt. To accept American guarantees? Let's accept American guarantees. But first of all we have to terminate the military administration and give the Palestinian Arabs self rule, without affecting our security. If we cannot make an agreement, we have to do it unilaterally.

[Question] OK. We give them self rule under the conditions and in a form which you think is appropriate. After the self rule, there will be problems, there will be road blocks and disturbances in the cities, and we will have to intervene, and there will be wounded and dead. The Arabs will call for a Security Council session where they will denounce the self rule as Israeli oppression. We have already reached the point where there are anti-Israel resolutions in the Security Council...

[Answer] Yes, but not because anything happened which you describe, but because it did not happen. We have not granted self rule. What are the UN resolutions about? Are they because we left Gaza and they blocked the roads? That is theory. It is possible that such developments will occur. I have heard such dark prophecies from Sapir and others: what will happen if we removed the road blocks between Gaza and Israel, so that any Arab worker will be able to come to work in Israel? He will bring a grenade in a basket. I argued then that the last Arab to bring a grenade in a basket would be one who came to work, because we would know where he worked and where he lived. If he would want to carry a grenade he would not want to work. Only a non-worker would bring a grenade.

I do not know if, following the exit of the military government, Gaza would want to destroy all of this, and turn its life into a hell. It would be their life and not ours which would become a hell. I do not know. What I do know presently is that the Arabs are the greatest opponents to war, because they say to themselves that in a war they will be destroyed, they will become refugees. This assumption is not an uncertain scenario. In any case, I think we have to grant the option of self rule. Part of it we can do now, by civilianizing the offices. Let them run their ministry of health, their education, and their agriculture as they see fit. Let them have it. I am interested in the agriculture of Nahalal. If they want us to help them develop their agriculture, fine. They do not want to be under our ministry of agriculture, our plastics, our fertilizer? Fine, let them do what they want. We should get out of their lives.

[Question] And who will administer the water system?

[Answer] There has to be cooperation in the administration of water, for they depend upon us and we upon them. We have to do it together.

There are two questions in the matter of water and public lands. There are a lot of questions. Who will judge an Arab who kills a Jew, or a Jew who kills an Arab? Which court will have jurisdiction? I do not know all of the answers to these questions, but they are not decisive.

The question is the fundamental political course which must be in two things expressed: to let them conduct their own lives, and to let them set up theirown administration. Anyone who wants to be elected--which means anyone who is not in jail here, who does not have a case against him--can be elected. If he can be a mayor, he can be in the leadership.

[Question] Before you resigned, you had a series of meeting with West Bank leaders. Was it your impression that their extremist leaders would participate in the unilateral implementation of self rule.

[Answer] I believe they would cooperate. They would not sign anything. They would repeatedly say: this is not our idea, we are not part of it, we did not ask for it, and we are not signing anything. We want a Palestinian state. We want the removal of all of the settlements, the IDF, etc. This would be the formula of their demand. But they would not oppose the departure of the IDF from Gaza and the creation of a local police force. They might even say: we need an additional three months to enlist additional police officers. They might request police officers from Jordan, under the terms of the Camp David accords. Do you think they would oppose the removal of the Israeli police flag from the police station in Gaza, and the unfurling of the flag of the local police? They would say good riddance to us, and celebrate for a week. I hope that the celebration would not include sending terrorists to Yad Mordekhai or Kiryat Gat.

[Question] When you were a foreign minister, you had a lot of contact with European countries. Do you think that if your proposal were implemented, and there were an independent administration in place, do you think that this would ease our isolation from Europe today?

[Answer] Not formally. Formally the Europeans are behind the rejectionist front, and demand the removal of the settlements and the IDF and a return to the old borders. They demand a Palestinian state, with international guarantees for Israel's security.

If you ask them what kind of security, they answer: like the UN forces in Lebanon. We know what that is worth. Aside from the question of whether Israel is ready to leave the West Bank and the Golan Heights, I am not ignoring it; in any event, I do not belong to the group which would abandon what I call the "patrimony." For me it is very important, not to be a stranger in Shiloh or Jericho. In this respect I am a disciple of Berl Katznelson, and when Ben Gurion was for the partition and Berl was opposed, and they asked him--why? He said: a people has a tomorrow, and not just a today. They asked him--what are you giving up? Can't you give up anything? You can give up what you have and you can give up what you don't have. He said: I am giving up tomorrow.

I think that the motivation of every Zionist movement is in these areas. Again I would quote Berl, what Berl called the patriotism of verses: see what is happening now with respect to Jerusalem. Let's leave the Jerusalem Law and the Old City. Not one country has ever recognized West Jerusalem

as Israel's capital, including the U.S. But can the Zionist movement really give up Jerusalem as the capital?

In substantive Zionist terms--the very substance and spirit of the modern return to Israel--Israel could give up Jerusalem as the capital, but then we would return to the Uganda of Herzl, or the proposal to set up a Jewish state in Sinai. From my view, the territories on the West Bank are our spiritual significance.

I am not saying that we have the exclusive right to the West Bank. I am not saying that the Arabs should not feel at home there, for it is their home as much as ours. But I am looking for a way so that I will not be a stranger there, so that I will not have to be cut off from there. I am happy with the deal we made under which any Arab can travel to Israel without a visa, that he is not a stranger, and does not need permission to go to Netania. And not just from the territories. All the summer visitors, the 130,000 Arabs who come from across the borders and cross the bridges, come here without visas.

So the same status which we have granted for the last 13 years, I hope will remain for us in the territories, and that when there is a final treaty, we will not be strangers and we will be able to continue to settle there.

In any case, when you--not Goldmann--ask what will be the practical results, there is no way of avoiding these things. But something has been accomplished in the last 13 years. You are familiar with my approach to the Golan Heights. I do not think that we should have sat with folded hands for 13 years and rejected proposals. When we said we were ready to leave the Golan Heights and Sinai, we were really ready, within the framework of a peace treaty. When Nasser said no peace, no recognition, and what was taken by force will be retaken by force, we began to build. We built Yamit and we built the Golan Heights, on the assumption that if this was their response, we did not have to sit with folded hands and do nothing. With some limitations, we did not build settlements and villages on the Gulf of Suez. There were such proposals, and we rejected them. But at least we got out the oil.

In terms of political reality, just as there is a PLO reality, there is also a Jordanian reality and an Israeli reality regarding what has happened in the last 13 years. Anyone who points to the decline in morale, etc must also recognize these elements. How could one strike this people from within? By giving up the settlements in the Jordan Valley? To let it all go back to Jordanian or Arab sovereignty? Will that save or help us? We need a pragmatic view at each step: let's do now what can be done now. Let's deal now with what we can now. Sadat came--we dealt with an Egyptian peace treaty.

This is the case regarding the Camp David accord with respect to Gaza and Judea and Samaria. We must do now what can be done now, and see what happens later. I think that this is more realistic than Goldmann's approach which says: let us create a thesis for ourselves now regarding the future, and then we will work to realize it.

7075
CSO: 4805

ISRAEL VIEWED AS DETERMINED TO MAINTAIN NUCLEAR SUPREMACY

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19 Jul 80 pp 1, 19

[Editorial: "Israel Between Peace and Nuclear Horror"]

[Text] Since Iraq signed an agreement with France for the purchase of uranium and two nuclear reactors to be used by Iraq for peaceful purposes, Israeli and Zionist enemy circles have been waging a fierce campaign of falsification and allegations. The purpose is to block the great accomplishment sought by the sister nation of Iraq in the field of technological and cultural development.

Israel, which has been planning for a long time for nuclear horror in the area, for the purpose of achieving military supremacy and carrying out aggressive and expansionist policies, is now creating a storm on the international scene. It is ignoring the fact that it has already used every illegal way to develop its nuclear capabilities and deny the rights of others to do that which Israel has allowed itself to do.

A brief comparison exposes the nature of the Zionist aggressive mentality and its schemes to create nuclear horror in the area:

--Israel refuses the suggestion of the UN secretary general to conduct an inspection of the nature of Israel's nuclear research in the reactors of (Dimonah?), the Technion and other areas. Israel's refusal is a way of hiding its military nuclear development, while Iraq has accepted such inspection as well as the conditions placed upon it by the French government for this purpose.

--Israel did not sign the international treaty to limit the use of nuclear weapons while Iraq did.

--Israel was able to acquire the nuclear reactor of (Dimonah?) and uranium from France at the beginning of De Gaulle's regime. Iraq is purchasing its reactor from the same source and under more detailed and defined conditions.

--Israel was able to acquire uranium by means of bilateral agreements and by stealing uranium from American reactors, as was disclosed about 2 years ago. At the same time, Iraq will acquire specific amounts of uranium and return any excess to France, according to the agreement between the two countries.

--On several occasions, Israeli sources disclosed that Israel has a nuclear bomb. It is possible that reports which circulated about Israel's nuclear test in South Africa are evidence of Israeli nuclear capability. On the other hand, neither Iraq nor any other country in the area expressed a desire to own this weapon or to bring it into the Middle East.

Israel's determination not to allow nuclear technology to enter the Arab countries, even for peaceful purposes, is not due to fear of nuclear weapons, even if we suppose, for argument's sake that the Arabs have them. Israel's purpose is to maintain its military supremacy in the area. Israel also intends to threaten the Arab world with the nuclear weapon, which we do not doubt it has, if the Arab countries should ever try to put a stop to Israel's military aggression and Zionist expansion into Arab territories.

This explains the fierce campaign launched by Israel against France, and its threats to the French government that it will use every means to prevent Iraq from acquiring the two reactors. Israel's fear of a just and total peace in the area always puts it in a vicious circle of fear and horror.

The determination of the Arab nation to develop its potentials, based upon international technological development, will not prevent Iraq or any other Arab country which follows this path, from realizing such an accomplishment. The people who believe in peaceful cooperation for the bettering and the progress of human beings, such as the French people, will never allow Israel to remain as a permanent element of danger to peace and security in this part of the world.

8988
CSO: 4802

CABINET APPROVES RECORD 1980-81 STATE BUDGET

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Jul 80 p 3

[Article: "The 1980-81 Budget Is the Largest Budget in Kuwait's History"]

[Text] On 27 July the cabinet approved the general state budget for the fiscal year 1980-81. It is considered to be the largest budget in the history of Kuwait.

It is officially announced that public revenues [Part I of budget] total 4,640,227,000 Kuwaiti dinars. Of this total, 4,493,456,000 dinars--96.8 percent of the total budget--are revenues from the sale of Kuwaiti oil. And 146,771,000 dinars--3.2 percent of the budget--are revenues of various ministries and government agencies.

Public revenues are 1,398,904,000 dinars higher than last year. Of this increase, 1,372,919,000 dinars are revenues from the sale of oil.

The first section of public expenditures [Part II of budget], which covers salaries and wages, amounts to 449 million dinars--33 million dinars more than in last year's budget. The second section of public expenditures, covering general expenses, amounts to 185 million dinars--an increase of 61 million over last year. The third section of public expenditures, covering development projects, amounts to 444 million dinars--49 million more than last year. A total of 200 million, 50 million more than last year, is allocated under this section for other public projects. The fourth section, dealing with unclassified expenditures and transfer payments, amounts to 1,597 million dinars--482 million more than last year.

[In Part III of budget] 928,045,400 dinars of the state's public revenues--20 percent of the total--are allocated to the reserve fund for future generations. Half of this figure is allocated in compliance with Law No 106 of 1976; the other half is allocated as an additional amount.

The capital account of the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development received an increase in the budget amounting to 50 million dinars. Allocations to various components of state reserve totaled 737,181,600 dinars.

[In Part IV of budget] distribution of budget expenditures in terms of sectors is as follows: A total of 17.24 percent is allocated to public services; 9.37 percent to defense; 19.91 percent to social services; 10.05 percent to community services; 33.68 percent to the economic services sector; and 9.96 percent to unclassified services. It is estimated that 0.21 percent--6,077,000 dinars--will not be spent.

The following table gives a detailed account of the budget.

General State Budget for 1980-81 (in thousands of dinars)

I. Revenues	1980-81	Percent	1979-80	Percent	Increase
Oil revenues	4,493,456	96.8	3,120,537	96.3	1,372,919
Revenues of ministries and agencies	146,771	3.2	120,786	3.7	25,986
Total	4,640,227	100.0	3,241,323	100.0	1,398,904

II. Expenditures	Budget plan		Budget allotments		
	1980-81	Percent	1979-80	Percent	Increase
Section 1 - Salaries	499,000	17.1	466,000	20.7	33,000
Section 2 - General expenses	185,000	6.3	124,000	5.5	61,000
Section 3 -					
A. Development projects	444,000	15.2	395,000	17.5	49,000
B. Other projects	200,000	6.8	150,000	6.7	50,000
Section 4 - Unclassified expenditures and transfer payments	1,597,000	54.6	1,115,000	49.6	482,000
Total	2,925,000	100.0	2,250,000	100.0	675,000

III. Distribution of Revenues	1980-81	Percent	1979-80	Percent
Reserve fund for future generations				
A. Law no 106 of 1976	464,023	10.0	324,133	10.0
B. Additional amount	464,023	10.0		
Increase in capital of Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development	30,000	1.08	50,000	1.54
State reserves	737,182	15.89	617,190	19.04
Allocation for expenditures [Parts II and IV]	2,925,000	63.03	2,250,000	69.42
Total	4,640,227	100.0	3,241,323	100.0

[Table continued on following page]

[Table continued]

IV. Distribution of Expenditures

	Amount	Percent
1. Public services (includes organizational services, financial services, security and justice, foreign commitments)	504,270	17.24
2. Defense	274,058	9.37
3. Social services (includes educational services, health services, social security and social affairs)	582,531	19.91
4. Community services (includes information services, religious services, housing, public facilities)	293,855	10.05
5. Economic services (includes mining industry and extraction operations, transportation, communications, water and electricity, commercial and industrial services, agriculture and fishing resources)	985,103	33.68
6. Other unclassified services (includes services of the Ministry of Public Works, other projects)	291,260	9.96
7. Expected not to be spent	6,077	0.21
Total	2,925,000	100.00

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CSO: 4802

CAREFUL STUDY OF NUCLEAR POWER, ENERGY CONSERVATION URGED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 29 Jul 80 pp 1, 20

[Editorial by Jasim Ahmad al-Nisf: "Our National Duty and Nuclear Power"]

[Text] The cabinet recently decided to form a committee under the chairmanship of the minister of electricity, including two members each from the Ministry of Planning, the Ministry of Oil, the University of Kuwait and the Kuwaiti Institute for Scientific Research, to prepare a study on the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. The decision was not made out of a desire for luxury or to squander resources. The reasons for this decision were necessary and urgent; their goal is to secure the electric power and fresh drinking water needs of our citizens in the future.

The energy problem has become a very real one following the growth in population and urban development in all countries of the world, particularly in those countries that do not have sufficient natural resources to increase their energy production.

In spite of the fact that it has large petroleum reserves, Kuwait faces the problem of a lack of trained, technical personnel to build and operate the numerous electric power plants which it must have in order to deal with its demographic growth. Preliminary estimates by specialists and researchers show that the government of Kuwait, during the next 20 years, will spend a total of $20 billion on the production of electricity and on desalinization of sea water. This will be the cost of the fuel used in power plants if only electric power is depended on during this future period.

This is why we feel that energy production will steadily and increasingly eat up our oil revenues which go into the public treasury.

Thus, it was up to the government to think of some sort of basic solution which would keep the petroleum resources of the country from being entirely consumed as "fuel" to produce energy, and conserve our wealth for use in productive projects.

This gave rise to the idea of the need to utilize nuclear power for peaceful purposes. But how will we be able to achieve progress in this domain?

We must not embark upon this step until we have adequately studied the project from the economic and technical points of view and from the point of view of safety. We will also have to conduct a detailed comparative study of the cost of producing electricity and fresh water by means of nuclear reactors as opposed to the costs of producing them by traditional means.

Also, we should right at the outset conduct a study of methods which would enable us to prevent, or systematically reduce, energy waste. Numerous countries have shown that they are able to reduce their waste in energy by 30 percent or more, by taking "steps" which limit this waste.

Studies undertaken by experts have shown that, in a country like Kuwait, it is possible to conserve energy by building houses or large buildings using insulation materials that maintain a certain temperature. These studies have also shown that it is possible to reduce energy waste by setting a speed limit for cars on the highways and by decreasing excessive use of unnecessary luxuries.

Some experts suggest that summer daylight-saving time be used in public and private offices and establishments to conserve a considerable amount of energy which is presently being wasted. It is a known fact that most of us wake up very early. We could take advantage of this fact and start working an hour or two earlier in the morning to conserve the electric power used up in establishments which operate in the evening hours.

At this point, what we need first of all is to sense our responsibilities toward our nation. We also need to be aware of the fact that the "oil blessing" will perhaps not last forever. We need to be aware that building the nation on sound foundations, is based, every step of the way, on our performing our duties toward each other and toward our future generations. We need to do all this before we can enter the age of nuclear power.

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PAPERS NOTE ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET POLICY

'MAROC SOIR' Comment

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 4 Sep 80 pp 1-2

[Article by Ahmed Alaoui]

[Excerpts] On the occasion of the 22nd anniversary of the reestablishment of the diplomatic relations between Morocco and the USSR, the Soviet ambassador to Rabat granted an interview to MAP [Moroccan News Agency] to emphasize the importance of this anniversary and of the event itself.

In his statement to the MAP Ambassador Nersesov expressed his pleasure that relations between the two countries have remained friendly and warm for the past 22 years and that the cooperation which has developed between them has been fruitful and diversified.

The ambassador recalled the agreements:

"The conclusion in 1978 of the agreements between Morocco and the USSR covering the fields of phosphates and sea fishing represented an important stage in the consolidation of our economic cooperation.

"The protocol on trade in chemicals, covering a 30-year period, concluded on 10 March 1978, as well as the long-term trade agreement, concluded on 3 July 1979 between Morocco and the USSR, open new and important possibilities for an upsurge in economic cooperation.

"The years which have passed since have fully confirmed the fact that Soviet-Moroccan trade relations are characterized by a steady growth trend. In 1979 the volume of trade was 2.3 percent compared with 1978, totaling about 700 million dirhams.

"Currently the USSR is considered one of the leading trade partners of Morocco."

Relations on the diplomatic level are excellent. In fact, Morocco is deeply attached to peace as it is to the struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism. Morocco is in favor of cooperation among nations whatever their political and economic systems and is against interference in each other's affairs. On numerous occasions Morocco and the USSR have been on the same side because, let us repeat it, Morocco is a truly non-alined country both as regards East and West.

However, this does not prevent us in the least from being critical toward the superpowers. We approve of them when their actions meet our concerns. We criticize them when their actions violate the principles we support. Our alinement, in fact, is not unconditional: it is positive and objective.

This attitude has been perfectly understood by the Soviet Union which has frequently expressed its satisfaction with our attitude. This is one of the reasons which have made it possible for our cooperation to develop and expand.

Therefore, we are pleased by the quality of such relations and by the positive aspect of our cooperation. Yet, there is a but....

Even though we maintain an attitude of friendship toward the USSR, why is it that on the question of our territorial integrity that great country has adopted a stand which makes it the objective ally of our enemies? Is it not, in fact, the Soviet Union that supplies them, through Qadhafi all the weapons and means they are using against us?

That is something the Moroccans fail to understand.

Ambassador Nersesov states that,

"We support and will continue to support peaceful initiatives," he emphasized, "believing that any conflict, whatever its origin, including that of the Arab Maghreb, could and should be resolved peacefully. It is only thus that peace and the best conditions for the multilateral development of countries and nations could be guaranteed."

Well, it would be easy for the USSR to make its contribution to this peace it desires: In order for such a statement not to be a simple slogan, it would suffice for the Soviet Union to stop supplying arms to our enemies. This would put an end to the conflict.

After all, concluding all these cooperation agreements with us, the fishing agreement in particular, which covers all of our territorial waters, the USSR has quite clearly recognized our sovereignty over the Sahara provinces, the way we have recognized its sovereignty over the Baltic

states which, however, have nothing in common with Russia, whether ethnically, linguistically, or historically, at the time when we resumed our diplomatic relations.

Also, on the occasion of this 22d anniversary, we would like to express our satisfaction with the statements of the USSR ambassador to Rabat and wish to share his optimism. However, we would like to find in our partner as much friendship and understanding as we are showing him. That is why we emphasize the fact that the Soviet attitude must be clarified and freed from any equivocal or ambiguous facts. The best possible contribution which the USSR could make to the reestablishment of peace in the Maghreb would be by no longer supplying abundant armaments to our enemies.

'L'OPINION' Comment

Rabat L'OPINION in French 7 Sep 80 pp 1, 3

[Article by Laila Tazi]

[Text] Ever since it gained its independence, Morocco has been one of the countries which has scrupulously and steadily observed the principles of nonalinement, and one of the rare developing countries not to have deviated from its policy of neutrality and independence toward the Western and Eastern blocs.

The very important and very satisfactory statements recently made by the representative of the Soviet Union in Rabat, on the occasion of the 22d anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations and relations of cooperation in various areas of great importance, between the USSR and our country, are a brilliant homage to our foreign policy based on healthy principles and practiced frankly and sincerely.

The results of 22 years of excellent relations between his country and ours, summed up by Nersesov, Soviet ambassador to Rabat, could not have been more positive.

We note with satisfaction that "the USSR is considered one of the leading trade partners of Morocco today;" it was not without a reason or likely that the Soviet diplomat emphasized the will of the two countries to develop their cooperation "based on reciprocal advantages and common long-term interests."

On the political level, let us note, for the sake of history and for our occasional detractors, that the representative of the Kremlin loudly stated that "Moscow and Rabat are waging a joint struggle for detente and for peace throughout the world." He thus acknowledges, on behalf of his country, that Morocco has been and remains a supporter of the peace. All of us are quite happy to see that Moscow is finally publicly acknowledging

that Morocco is not a factor of war as some would like us to believe, since the ambassador of the Soviet Union did not hesitate to adopt on behalf of his country the firm position held by Morocco according to which any conflict, particularly that of the Arab Maghreb, should be settled through peaceful means.

This finally, clearly and officially clarifies Moscow's position toward the artificial tension created in our area of the African northwest. It should encourage some countries which are displaying more gratuitous hatred than concern for the preservation of African unity and for the greatest interest of our continent, to display greater wisdom and less "ordered" prejudice whose "profitability" is only temporary.

It remains now for the Soviet Union to take specific and immediate measures by making sure that countries which it supplies with weapons, including the most sophisticated ones, that such instruments of death be used for their self-defense rather than for aggression against Morocco and for shedding unjustly the blood of its sons.

Finally, we also note with satisfaction and pride the homage rendered by the eminent representative of Moscow in Morocco to the effective action of the Al Qods Committee which recently met in Casablanca. His statements prove that the USSR is remaining faithful, through its attitude in terms of the struggle waged by the Arab people of Palestine, to its principle of support of the struggle of the peoples, whoever they may be, against imperialism, the occupation of their territory by force, and the enslavement of their populations.

As to the grave problem of Al Qods, we also note with happiness and pride that the USSR is officially taking into consideration the Islamic desire of its 14 million Muslim citizens whose appeal in favor of the liberation of Al Quods and of the occupied Arab territories was recalled by the Soviet diplomat, together with the appeal of hundreds of millions of their coreligionists throughout the world.

We also wish Moscow to take into consideration, on the question of Afghanistan, the viewpoint of all Muslims, whether Soviet or not, by rectifying the political error committed in this area, so that a number of people will no longer believe that through its armed intervention in this Muslim country the USSR stuck a knife in the back of Islam struggling for its survival in Asia, Africa and the Middle East.

We would have been very happy to see Moscow help, in a spirit of reciprocal respect for independence and for the freedom of the peoples, the Afghan people to leave behind the country's underdeveloped nature, thus gaining for itself, possibly in the only possible way, the grateful friendship of this great Islamic people, instead of imposing upon the Afghans through

force an unpopular system which is itself divided and whose members settle their accounts like Chicago gangsters.

Whatever the case, after such very important and official declarations made by Mr Nersessov, we would like to hope that an ever closer development of ties will take place between our country and his, both of them carrying their historical missions, and the development of ever more active and effective cooperation between the USSR and the Arab-Islamic countries, thus together helping to achieve a more stable peace throughout the world and the happiness of their peoples.

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CSO: 4400

RISE IN BASIC PRICES CRITICIZED BY PRESS

Government Announcement

Rabat L'OPINION in French 6 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] (MAP) The Department of the Prime Minister has made public a communique on the new public prices of prime necessity goods. The text of the communique follows:

Consequent to the successive increases in world exchange rates and production costs of main staple goods, the subsidies provided by the public treasury to the Compensation Fund should be close to 180 billion centimes for 1980.

Therefore, price revisions of some commodities have become inevitable, the more so since the prices of some staples have remained unchanged for a number of years.

Therefore, as of 5 September, the new prices to the public for staples of prime necessity will be as follows:

I. Sugar:

- a 2 kilogram loaf	5.70 DH
- lumps, kilograms	2.85 DH
- granulated, kilograms	2.20 DH

II. Oil:

- Liter	4.00 DH

III. Milk:

- Liter	2.10 DH
- Half-liter	1.05 DH

IV. Butter:

- Kilogram 10.50 DH

V. Flour:

- National soft wheat flour, kg 1.00 DH

Regardless of this revision these commodities continue to benefit from heavy state subsidies, for the deficit of the Compensation Fund, which will be reduced by only 30 billion centimes, will total 150 billion this year.

Furthermore, all appropriate measures have been taken to insure the normal supplies reaching the market so that sufficient quantities of these products will be available to the citizens. Furthermore, all the necessary measures have been taken for the implementation of the High Decisions of His Majesty the King, may he glory in God, concerning the preservation of the purchase power of the deprived strata.

Furthermore, a strict and rigorous control will be maintained throughout the kingdom over prices and quality. Severe penalties shall be imposed on anyone illegally raising prices or engaging in speculative operations.

'L'OPINION' Comment

Rabat L'OPINION in French 6 Sep 80 p 1

[Editorial by Mohamed Idrissi Kaitouni]

[Text] As of yesterday the prices of prime necessity goods (sugar, milk, flour, oil and butter) were substantially raised. This will not fail to trigger major repercussions on the purchase power of the working masses and on their general living standard.

These official increases, added to the illicit increases caused by the fact that some such products are being sold on the black market, can only increase the burden of the disinherited strata.

There have been plenty of justifications to explain the need for such increases (higher international exchange rates, and inability of the Compensation Fund to continue to play its price support role). Nevertheless, in fact such measures are detrimental to the overwhelming majority of people's masses, the rural masses in particular, whose food consists essentially of bread and sugar.

The well-to-do strata will not be concerned in the least by such increases, since their income is very high, thus insuring them a living standard totally different from that of the poor strata with their limited resources.

Therefore, it is in terms of social justice that the question should be raised, and it is through the lens of an equitable distribution of revenue that we should analyze these measures and their repercussions.

It is obvious that, taking into consideration the interdependence of international economic relations and the conditions in which world trade is conducted (most frequently to the disadvantage of Third World countries), Morocco as well is suffering from the price fluctuations recorded on the world market. Actually, this is the reason for which the Compensation Fund was set up, for the initial purpose was that of protecting the consumer from the effects of such fluctuations in world rates and led the state to take care of them by supporting the price of basic consumer goods. Yet, faced with increased public expenditures and, above all, bearing in mind the imperatives of the defense of our national integrity, the state is finding it ever more difficult to subsidize the Compensation Fund and maintain its role as price stabilizer. That is why some "technocrats" have been tirelessly suggesting the pure and simple elimination of this fund and a price-setting system based on international rates. Even though this unfair and unpopular suggestion was not adopted, the authorities seemed to have chosen a partial and apparently temporary solution, that of easing the burden of the Compensation Fund (by 30 billion centimes) and, respectively, raising the prices of basic staples.

In our view, this is an imperfect solution, for it is not paralleled by an increase in the income of the strata which will be the most affected by such increases, the more so since the wages of workers and employees have not been raised and that the number of people "without a fixed income" is steadily growing day after day.

It goes without saying that these raises will have a definite inflationary effect, for they will inevitably lead to raises in the prices of all goods based on sugar, oil, butter, milk or flour.

That is why it would have been more equitable to consider other solutions in order to maintain the price of basic staples on the same level and for the Compensation Fund to be supported by the rich classes which most frequently spend a substantial portion of their income uselessly and purchase totally unnecessary luxury goods.

It would also be important to review the agricultural policy of our country through radical agrarian reform and seriously to consider the problems of management affecting Moroccan sugar refineries which are still not able to reach self-sufficiency and meet domestic demands for sugar and sugar products.

Therefore, it is a choice to be made in accordance with the interests of the toiling masses with limited income, within the framework of a new policy for the redistribution of the national wealth.

'MAROC SOIR' Article

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 2 Sep 80 p 1

Article by A. A.

Text: We pointed out that an unjustified, unfair, and scandalous rise in prices had taken place following the announcement that the prices of some commodities subsidized by the Compensation Fund were to be raised moderately. This outburst is a real economic subversion.

It is sabotage.

In fact, whenever social measures are taken, parasites and speculators who have no morality other than that of money try to do everything possible to deprive such measures of their substance.

A second category of saboteurs may be added to these promoters of high costs, inflation and imbalance. The king had hardly announced the measures relative to rents that landlords immediately raised the rents of vacant apartments by 50 to 100 percent. Therefore, a 600 dirhams rent was raised to 900. Should the owner be required to reduce it by 30 percent, he would charge 600 dirhams and if the new tenant earns more than 150 dirhams monthly, this will be an additional profit for the dishonest landlord.

Such practices deprive the royal decision of all meaning. We already see landlords exerting pressure on their tenants with a view to raising apartment rents.

Such actions are simply criminal. Once again we note that it is always the same people who use and abuse the situation. We could consider them as a real fifth column acting in favor of our enemies.

The only answer to such sabotage, treason, or crimes would be penalties and repression. At a time when the country is asked to insure maximum mobilization and sacrifices, those who engage in such scandalous practices should be treated as criminals.

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CSO: 4400

PRESS GRANTED CONCESSIONS AFTER TALKS WITH OFFICIALS

Casablanca AL-BAYANE in French 9 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] The Moroccan National Press Union (SNPM) has made public the following communique:

As a result of the 15 August 1980 meeting between the prime minister and Maati Bouabid, minister of justice, on the one hand, and a delegation of the SNPM, three meetings were held at the level of the services dependent on the prime minister's council to consider the union claims regarding the national press organs and some concerned ministries and services.

The union has the pleasure to inform its members and the entire professional family that it has received an official document issued by the services of the Council of Ministers, which reads as follows:

Instructions have been issued granting journalists a 50 percent price reduction in the use of the facilities of the CTM and the ONCF [National Railroad Office] and the internal lines of the RAM.

Newspapers will be carried free of charge by the CTM and will be charged 0.10 DH per ton-kilometer by train.

Newspapers will be carried free of charge by airplane to the Saharan provinces and to Agadir.

A meeting will be held in the near future to study the question of air transport to foreign countries.

Instructions have been issued to the hotels partially owned by the state to give price reductions to journalists. Contacts will be established with hotels managed by private companies aimed at achieving similar measures. A list of such hotels will be submitted to the SNPM.

Such advantages will be granted to the carriers of the new press card which will be issued only to professional journalists. The executive bureau of the SNPM is pleased by the adoption of such measures which are

and result of the fruitful cooperation between the concerned services and the union which is an organization which protects the material and moral interests of the profession.

The bureau informs all its members that it will publish a pamphlet containing further specifications the moment the other aspects of such measures will have been cleared with the concerned services. These are positive welcome measures which can only help the work of the Moroccan press.

PRESIDENT OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT DISCUSSES COOPERATION WITH TUNISIA

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 5 Sep 80 p 7

[Interview with European Parliament President Simone Veil, by TUNISIA PRESS AGENCY, date and place not given]

[Text] Mrs Simone Veil, President of the European Parliament, will pay an official visit to Tunisia on 5, 6 and 7 September, on the invitation of National Assembly President Sadok Mokkadem.

In an interview granted to the TAP [TUNISIA PRESS AGENCY] on the eve of this visit, the President of the European Parliament discusses the prospects of cooperation between the European and Tunisian Assemblies, the Tunisian-EEC relations and Europe's position with regard to the North-South dialog and the Near East conflict.

[Question] On the eve of the visit which you will be paying on 5, 6 and 7 September, on the invitation of your Tunisian counterpart, Dr Sadok Mokaddem, what are, in your opinion, the prospects of cooperation open to the two Assemblies?

[Answer] I believe that the prospects of cooperation between the two Assemblies are very favorable and very open. In any case, this cooperation between the two Assemblies has been expressly planned in the agreement for cooperation signed between Tunisia and the Community on 15 April 1976. Up to now, contacts have taken place at the level of the secretaries-general of the two institutions, but for different reasons, in particular the election of the European Parliament by universal suffrage, there has not been so far any contact at the parliamentary level. My meeting with the president of the Tunisian National Assembly is therefore, in my opinion, very important, for it marks the beginning of this cooperation between the delegations of our two elected assemblies. At any rate, the European Parliament delegation, which will be assigned to the establishment of these contacts, has already been appointed, including its chairman. Like all our delegations, it is representative of all the political groups of our assembly.

The talks which I will be having in Tunis will thus permit the concrete establishment of the permanent link needed for a proper cooperation between the two institutions.

Respect Signed Agreements

[Question] For obvious reasons, Tunisia is apprehensive, and justifiably so, of the expansion of the EEC to include Greece, Portugal and Spain. What are, in your opinion, the actions which should be taken at the level of the European Parliament, to guarantee the protection of the interests of Tunisia, the traditional partner of the EEC?

[Answer] I understand that Tunisia may be, a priori, worried about the expansion: it is certain that on the economic and commercial level, Tunisia is in competition with the aforementioned countries. But it is true that the Community, through the voice of its various organs, and in particular the Parliament, has always expressed its desire to act in such a manner, that the countries with which agreements of cooperation have been signed, which is the case for Tunisia, should not be penalized by the expansion. When it signed that agreement with Tunisia in 1976, the Community was fully aware that the expansion was contemplated. It is therefore with full knowledge of the facts that it engaged itself to certain commitments with Tunisia. It is so much aware of this that, while it is negotiating with the three Mediterranean countries, possible future members, it is proceeding to an overall study of the consequences which this expansion would mean, in particular with regard to the engagements to which it is committed with the other Mediterranean countries.

As regards Tunisia, several visits to Tunis of ministers of foreign affairs and members of the Commission in the past few months have made it possible to study, point by point and in a detailed manner, all the problems which could arise, so that the necessary measures may be taken to respect the agreements signed with Tunisia.

It is by the way, one of the missions of the European Parliament delegation, to ensure that the past agreements signed with Tunisia, and which are the basis not only of good commercial relations, but also of the overall policy which we wish to maintain for Tunisia, to which we are linked by deep bonds of friendship and solidarity, be respected.

The Parliamentary delegation will study these questions and it will make known its opinion to the Commission and the Council, on the measures which may be taken. The very fact that it will remain in permanent liaison with the delegation of the Tunisian National Assembly will very naturally lead it to remain particularly vigilant.

[Question] An increasingly wide gap is arising between rich and poor nations. But the different dialogs taking place between the two sides, whose destinies are nevertheless linked, are making little progress.

Does not the role of the European Parliament consist, as certain parliamentary members have rightly suggested, in assuring the peaceful co-existence of rich and poor countries, by acting in such a way, that the standards of living of both should become closer to each other, rather than drawing further apart?

[Answer] First of all, I would like to say that among the developing countries, Tunisia is, after all, one of those which have "emerged", thanks to the commercial and social effort which has been accomplished. The increase in the gross national product has been very considerable in the past few years. We must give credit to Tunisia for its efforts.

At the general level, the North-South relations have been one of the main preoccupations of the European Parliament. In a first phase, our assembly's attention was directed particularly towards the preparation and implementation of the Lome agreements. Within this framework, the existence of a consultative ACP [African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries]-EEC assembly has allowed European Parliament members to display creative imagination in the area of cooperation with the countries which were signatories of the Lome agreement.

Furthermore, the European Parliament is well aware of the fact that, whatever has been achieved within the Lome framework, represents a model which should now serve as an inspiration for the dialog between North and South, the more so as, because of their equal representation basis, the EEC-ACP consultations are proceeding in a spirit of mutual respect and equality, taking into consideration the aspirations and interests of each of the partners.

Aid to Poor Countries

But the European Parliament has also shown that it meant to contemplate as a whole the problem of the relations between rich and poor countries: during the first months after its election, last year, it had already devoted a first debate to the problem of hunger in the world. This was but a prelude to a much more important debate arranged for the session which is to be held in two weeks' time, and which will discuss, even beyond the problem of hunger in the world, the various aspects of relations between the industrialized and the developing countries.

The European Parliament members intend, naturally, to display their solidarity on a humanitarian level, but their full awareness of this problem leads them also to emphasizing the need for considering globally the economic and financial difficulties of the poorest countries.

Europe is called upon to be closely interested in these problems, not only because of its specific weight with respect to the developing countries, but also because its own survival depends on it. If one considers all the figures, all the data of international politics, the economic and

demographic graphs, the raw materials market, etc., it is absolutely necessary for us to help the countries concerned to find solutions to these problems.

It is therefore my hope that the debate which we will shortly be conducting will lead to very concrete resolutions.

I would also like to put forward the fact that, for the first time, a delegation of the European Parliament attended the last special UN session devoted to the dialog between North and South. This delegation indicated clearly that it would invite the governments of the member countries of the Community to commit themselves, within the framework of the strategy of the third decade of development, to devote 0.7 percent of their GNP to help the developing countries.

I am struck by the observation of the extent to which the members of the European Parliament feel directly concerned, when it is a question of showing their solidarity with the poor countries, and that this concern is felt more deeply than at the national level.

I hope that the stands taken by our assembly will lead to results which will be translated into facts, as was the case of the Lome agreements.

[Question] Do you not think that, in view of its political unity which appears to be increasingly consolidated, Europe ought to play an intermediary role in the Middle East conflict, giving its contribution to a just and lasting peace in this part of the world, especially by recognizing the just and inalienable rights of the Palestinian nation?

[Answer] I remind you that Europe, through the voice of the European Council expressed in Venice its wish to play a role in the peace processes through better information leading to a better dialog. The mission entrusted to the acting chairman of the Council, Mr Gaston Thorn, who is a prominent personality, was conceived within this framework. I believe that before arriving at proposals, we must be acquainted with the position of each of the partners. I hope that Mr Thorn may be able, in the light of this mission, to put forward suggestions, representing a positive step forward and permitting progress on the way to peace.

9018
CSO: 4400

TUNISIAN CENTRAL BANK REPORT ISSUED

High Growth Rate Preserved

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 15-16 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] The annual report of the Central Bank was presented to the president of the republic yesterday by the bank governor. Among other things, the report contains chapters on the domestic economic situation and the international situation.

In its introduction, the report takes up the situation on the domestic market and describes the behavior of the Tunisian economy in the face of the economic crisis raging in the world and the difficult circumstances that marked last year (1979).

Despite a certain deceleration compared with the previous year, economic growth continued at the satisfactory rate of 6.9 percent in real terms, or a rate higher than that predicted in the Fifth Development Plan and in spite of the particularly troubled international situation.

It was thanks to the vigor of the manufacturing industries and the accelerated progress of the added value in the mining and energy sectors, along with a good performance by the tertiary sector, that this economic growth could be maintained at such a rapid rate.

Industrial Sector: Rapid Growth

Continued rapid growth in the manufacturing industries occurred thanks to rapid growth in the building materials branch, on the one hand, and to an acceleration of the rate of progress of the mechanical and electrical industries, on the other hand. Likewise, the resumption of activity in the textile and shoe sector contributed to this new vigor of the manufacturing industries. The mining and energy sector owes its performance to the strengthening of the production of phosphates, oil and electricity.

Tourism, which benefited from a very favorable climate, saw its added value rise 16.2 percent in real terms, compared with 7.5 percent one year previously, thereby confirming the recovery that began in 1978.

Domestic Demand: Main Stimulus

The effect of the deceleration of added value in the agricultural sector and fishing (due to persistent unfavorable climatic conditions) was compensated for by the rapid growth of production in nonagricultural sectors.

Domestic demand was the main stimulus of economic growth in 1979. Actually, domestic demand rose 6.5 percent in real terms. Although lower than the rate registered in 1978 (year of recovery), it still clearly surpasses the figure predicted for the Fifth Plan (5.3 percent). This evolution is due to the continued increase in final consumption as well as to improved investment planning. This final consumption increased less rapidly than the GNP, whence the consolidation of national saving, which went from 496 million dinars in 1978 to 627 million in 1979.

This in turn affected the financing of investments, whose evolution was favorable for the second consecutive year. This increase in national savings made it possible to cover 74.6 percent of all investments by national resources, compared with a figure of 66.6 percent in 1978. Likewise, the completion rate for programmed projects went from 90.3 percent in 1978 to 98.5 percent in 1979. The result was a clear improvement in the level of formation of permanent capital, which went from 6.7 percent in real terms in 1978 to 10.1 percent in 1979. In value and at current prices, the amount of permanent capital built up was 856 million dinars, an increase of 18.1 percent over 1978.

Concerning the slower rate of investment growth, even the decline in some branches such as tourism, it is due to the concern of officials for making existing equipment profitable in order to prevent a disproportionate increase in investments from engendering an underutilization of productive capacities and a lamentable waste of resources.

The increase in investments had an effect on the number of jobs created. In 1979, 44,000 new jobs were created, 10 percent more than the previous year.

On the social level, the interoccupational guaranteed minimum wage and the agricultural guaranteed minimum wage doubled and the rate of the CPE [expansion unknown] was revised to aid lower-income groups. The Central Bank report adds that these measures made it possible to neutralize the effects of the higher cost of living.

Tunisia's foreign trade evolved favorably, continuing to be concentrated on a limited number of partners and having only a small diversification of products sold. Export receipts, which rose 53 percent, made it possible to increase the rate of cover of imports by some 10 points. Purchases abroad increased only 28 percent, meaning that the deficit in the trade balance did not rise for the first time since 1974.

Consolidation of Balance of Payments

The deficit in the trade balance was more than compensated for by the traditional surplus in the balance of services and transfers and by the net capital receipts. The balance of payments surplus was therefore consolidated, totaling 51 million dinars. International reserves increased as a result, reaching some 200 million dinars.

Conclusion of Report: Normal Economic Trend

Despite the repeated and increasingly serious crises affecting the world economy, Tunisia has been able to preserve its high rate of growth and main balances, the report concludes, since most of the country's economic indicators evolved favorably or at least in keeping with objectives set.

The report then reviews two decades of development and the results registered on both the economic and social levels, analyzing Tunisian finance and investment policies and looking at results achieved in the area of savings, policies which made it possible to consolidate and structure the financial system over these two decades and diversify activities.

The report concludes that in its current phase, Tunisia must face new problems that are both complex and delicate, especially since certain aspects of its economic and social development have not yet been totally mastered.

Reducing Gap

The report adds that it is becoming essential to reduce the gap between the extremes of household spending. Priority must be given to the social group made up of the poorest people, whose legitimate right to a decent life requires that they be guaranteed minimum food, health, housing and education. At the same time, consumer abuses must be contained. Employment must continue to receive particular attention. The adjustment of the number of jobs to a constantly increasing demand naturally receives sustained effort, but the task remains of adapting jobs to the requirements of enterprises if one wants to bring about a better balance of the employment market through the establishment of a sufficiently integrated education system above and below.

In order to attenuate regional imbalances, economic and social action must cover the entire territory of the country, remedying contrasts and disparities between the regions, helping every area to make its contribution to the national development effort. This cannot be done, the report adds, without a total and effective decentralization of the administrative machinery and production apparatus, action the government has already undertaken with firmness and determination.

Finally, turning to the situation in the agricultural sector, the report specifies that its contribution still remains insufficient. The stimulation and consolidation of activity in the sector remain dependent on sufficient

remuneration for agricultural production and for working the land, as well as on effective advancement of the rural world.

Solving these problems requires an identification at all levels of the real obstacles that continue to hinder the development process.

Revision of Price System Needed

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] The annual report of the Central Bank of Tunisia (BCT) presented to the chief of state by the bank governor a few days ago makes a complete diagnosis of the economic situation in Tunisia.

The chapters making up the report concern all domestic economic factors and their relation to the international situation.

We are presenting excerpts from the chapter on prices, the policy and legislation followed in this field.

The rise in prices has continued everywhere in the world over the past 10 years. But in Tunisia, thanks to the vigilance of the government, price increases for basic commodities have been contained within tolerable limits. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the social objective was given priority in certain cases, government intervention engendered a relatively high economic cost, as illustrated by the increased burdens of the General Compensation Fund and the persistence of certain distorsions in production and the consumption of some products, especially agricultural products.

Evolution of Prices

As a result of the price increase affecting a number of taxed products since May 1979, the overall consumer price index has shown a slight upward trend, as has the wholesale index.

Evolution of Wholesale Prices

Although in the case of most products, wholesale prices experienced a certain relaxation in the course of the fourth quarter in 1979, the evolution of the overall index -- using an average of the 12 months -- shows for the entire year an increase of 7.3 percent compared with 3.1 in 1978. The trend shows up even more clearly if one considers the evolution of the index at the end of the year. From December 1978 to December 1979, it went up 10.2 percent compared with only 2 percent the preceding year. This escalation is also attributable to the increased prices of local products and the higher import prices.

The acceleration in the increase affected the prices of the different products, particularly food products, in varying degrees.

Bearing the mark of the clear increase in meat and sugar prices, the food product price index registered the greatest progression, some 12 percent.

On the whole, prices of industrial products went up 11 percent. The increase is attributable to the increase in import prices much more than to the increased price for products made locally.

As for the price of energy products, the rate of increase was relatively moderate, about 5 percent, despite the effect of the price of oil products, which, however, make up only 30 percent of the weighting in the energy column.

The same is true of nonfood raw material prices, whose index showed a rise of about 4 percent.

Evolution of Consumer Prices

Reaching 177.2 points in 1979, the monthly average for the 12 months, the specific family consumer price index was up 7.7 percent compared with the previous year.

But from December 1978 to December 1979, the increase in prices came at the higher rate of 9.6 percent compared with 5.7 percent 1 year previously. Just as for wholesale prices, the increase is essentially attributable to the increased prices of food products.

The higher food prices began to be felt in May, with the increase in taxed prices on grain products, meat and edible oils.[1] Since that time, the upward trend has been maintained by the higher cost of fishing products and especially of beef, whose price has been totally deregulated. From December 1978 to December 1979, the food product price index went up over 13 percent.

With the effect of the higher prices for certain cleaning products and especially the cost of hygiene, the price index for the "cleaning, hygiene and healthcare" column went up 7 percent. The housing cost index practically evolved at the same rate because of the higher cost of housing equipment and the increased cost of maintaining homes.

Clothing costs increased at a relatively moderate rate. The increase of 6.5 percent reflects the higher price of shoes and secondhand goods.

Public transportation rates remained practically stable and the 2.6-percent increase in the transportation price index can be attributed to a certain increase in the cost of private transportation, essentially because of higher gas prices.

Finally, the price index for other expenditures relating to the home rose 5.8 percent, mainly because in the higher cost of articles for school.

Need To Check Compensation Charges

As long as the compensation system remains tied to a policy of freezing taxed prices, the financial burdens resulting therefrom can only increase disproportionately, putting a strain on public finances. Moreover, such a system hinders the smooth operation of the market by distorting the rules of supply and demand.

Amounting to 60 million dinars in 1979, two-thirds of the receipts of the General Compensation Fund come from taxes on fuel and the special compensation tax instituted in 1979, which continues to drain off increasingly substantial sums. For the second consecutive year, the marketing of sugar has made it possible to realize a surplus amounting to 3 million dinars.

At the current level, the annual receipts of the Fund are insufficient to cover all the compensation charges pledged during the corresponding fiscal year while at the same time paying arrears that accumulated in previous years.

Estimated to total 79 million dinars at the beginning of the year, compensation charges finally came to 73 million, a level which is still high because it corresponds to nearly one-fifth of all government spending pledged for that same year to the equipment budget.

The increased sum of compensation charges is mainly due to the increase, particularly at the end of the year, of import prices. Affecting practically subsidized products, this increase neutralized the effect of adjustment measures taken in May 1979.

As before, grain products made up most of the compensation spending because by themselves, they required a sum of over 40 million dinars. This amount was spread out as follows: 10 million for livestock feed and 30 million for human consumption, including 16 million for soft wheat and 14 million for hard wheat.

Just as in the case of grain, the increase in consumer prices did not make it possible to reduce compensation charges for oil, which totaled some 12.5 million dinars.

The savings anticipated from the partial adjustment in consumer prices for grain by-products decided on in January 1980 will partly cover additional compensation expenses resulting from the March 1980 increase in grain prices to producers.

Whatever the case, for all subsidized products, consumer prices remain clearly under cost prices. Furthermore, the latest predictions made for 1980 indicate a compensation deficit on the order of 7 million dinars which, if not made up for by a budgetary allocation,[2] will be added to the Fund's unpaid debts whose total at the end of 1979 had reached 115 million dinars.

The compensation system would gain by being redefined so as to enable it to achieve the assigned objectives without exaggerated costs. If it can be maintained in principle, compensation must be limited -- as far as the purpose is concerned -- to absorbing the major errratic or situational fluctuations in import prices in order to play the role of a price stabilization mechanism rather than that of a permanent subsidy.

Nevertheless, the compensation system cannot be advantageously applied as long as the incoherencies connected with price formation mechanisms are not eliminated. On another level, the imperfections afflicting the operation of the price system reduce the effectiveness of economic policy measures that can be taken by government, particularly in the areas of taxation, the distribution of income and the setting of interest rates.

Price Formation System; Need for Improvement

Drawn up 10 years ago, legislation applied regarding prices has practically not evolved in order to take the sometimes rather far-reaching changes in the behavior of economic factors and the structure of the Tunisian economy and the international environment into account. Although certain modifications have been made, they have been limited in scope.

It is true that the tax system has made it possible to achieve relatively stable prices for the products concerned, but the persistence of that stability seems to hinder the normal progression of production and what is even more serious, to encourage consumption to the point of waste. Furthermore, it constitutes a source of profit for middlemen who, taking advantage of the sometimes very large difference between taxed prices and those that might be accepted by part of the consumers, do not hesitate to charge excessive prices.

In the current context, the system of approval cannot be effectively applied for the products concerned, especially since there are no manufacturing norms for most of them. The same is true for the self-approval system since the establishment of standard rates by the administration is often thwarted by the excessive increase in charges.

The pressure of expanding demand in the face of a relatively inflexible supply engenders high prices that are often sources of excessive profits for which the consumer and sometimes the producer must pay the cost.

As applied at present, the regulation of prices does not seem to incite producers and middlemen to compress their costs prices as much as possible. Since the goods and services market is not very competitive and since control is not always adequate or effective, it is not always easy for the government to check price increases and do away with excessive profits.

Price Disparities

While it is true that the selective price policy followed thus far has promoted activity in certain branches of industry, it does not seem to have played a major role in the development of agriculture. Inasmuch as farm products seem to have depreciated somewhat, mainly due to the stagnation in prices, agriculture scarcely presents the criteria of profitability likely to attract investment promoters, particularly those sufficiently dynamic to bring about a modernization of operating procedures.

Products from the agricultural sector, at least the most important ones, continue to be sold at truly low prices, while in the case of other products, especially from industry, prices are continually rising because of the increasing cost of raw materials and imported equipment.

Only a revision of the price system will make it possible to eliminate the disparity between sectors, rehabilitate agriculture and restore the scale of values between goods and services exchanged to make it more in keeping with the true situation. Only within such a context will it be possible to use prices as an instrument of economic development and promote the realization of a better allocation of resources.

FOOTNOTES

1. See annual report of the Central Bank of Tunisia for 1978.

2. It has been proposed to grant that allocation by taking funds from oil income.

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REORGANIZATION OF HOUSING INDUSTRY REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 2 Sep 80 p 6

[Text] Mohamed Sayah, minister of public works and housing, and Moncef Ben Hadj Amor, minister attached to the prime ministry in charge of civil service and administrative reform, chaired yesterday morning a working meeting attended by senior officials from both departments and held at the Ministry of Public Works and Housing.

The participants studied the following items:

a) Preparation of draft regulations to organize the regional administration of public works and housing based on the new duties assigned to that department.

b) Reorganization of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing central administration for the purpose of bringing it into line with the increased powers of the ministry's regional administration in accordance with the decisions adopted during a working session held on 20 August 1980 which particularly dealt with the prerogatives granted to the regional administration.

The new reorganization of the Ministry of Public Works and Housing is dictated by the nature of the duties which this ministry is called upon to fulfil within the framework of the central administration, particularly, in the spheres of creativity, coordination and control.

In view of the fact that as regards the plans of development, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing is in charge of carrying out the national projects of basic infrastructure, the new reorganization of the ministry's central departments will be such as to enable the technical cadres to carry out their work directly on the field.

c) Need to guarantee that there is an effective coordination between the various partners involved in working out programs and carrying out housing projects such as national companies, banks, savings institutions and the technical administration, to make sure that the planning and execution of urban projects meet all the efficiency requirements.

d) Reform and simplification of formalities applicable to urban development projects.

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ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIONAL ELEMENTARY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OFFICES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 2 Sep 80 p 6

[Text] Yesterday morning, the minister of national education, Mohamed Fredj Chedli, presided over the opening session of a seminar held at the Teachers' National College at Place du Leader, in Tunis, to discuss the teaching of numerical operations and arithmetic in Arabic language in the elementary schools.

The 2-day seminar, attended by elementary school teachers, education experts and regional inspectors, is part of a cycle of meetings periodically organized to review and update the methods of teaching mathematics and the exact sciences in elementary schools.

The minister emphasized the importance of this seminar devoted to a topic which has been a constant cause of concern for the department of national education, namely, the teaching of mathematics and the exact sciences in Arabic.

He noted that the Arabization of education is a challenge taken up by the government and assumed by the educators who are anxious to consolidate the Tunisian individuality, anxious to give education an authentically Arabic character and to prove that Arabic is as good a vehicle for the exact sciences as any other living language, or even a better one.

Mohamed Fredj Chedli announced that from now on greater efforts will be brought into the training and retraining of elementary school teachers of mathematics and to provide further training for those who supervise this category of teachers such as inspectors and educational advisers. He also announced that a program will be mapped out to organize in every region of the country 1-year courses for inspectors and educational advisers working in the elementary school system.

The minister also announced that his ministry is seriously planning to alleviate the administrative burdens which consume much of the working time of inspectors and district heads of the elementary school system in order to allow them to devote more time to their mission as educators.

he also announced that elementary educational level regional offices will be created in the very near future.

Fredj Chedli ended his address by urging teachers in general and inspectors in particular to increase their efforts to improve the standard of education and to stress the fact that the school opens up towards the environment which means that there must be a better adequacy between training and jobs.

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REMARKS BY SECRETARY GENERAL OF UGTT

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 31 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] On Friday evening, Tijani Abid, member of the Political Bureau and secretary general of the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor], chaired an open forum attended by trade union cadres from Ariana and from La Charguia which was held at the People's House in Ariana.

In the speech which he delivered on this occasion, Tijani Abid said that the rumors about the future of the labor federation have no foundation whatsoever, particularly in view of the clarification given by the Supreme Combattant which does not allow for any ambiguity.

This clarification, he said, binds the labor union to reinforce social peace in the country.

On the subject of the forthcoming meeting of the labor federation, Abid noted that it will be marked by respect for the UGTT statute and internal regulations.

In addition to the precise details which you have already been given, Abid added, we must tell you that the commission which will be created as announced, will in no way replace the Executive Bureau. The commission's only role is to supervise the voting operations.

The UGTT secretary general also told civil service employees that, on Friday, the government had sent to the labor federation the draft of the new statutes for civil service employees and for employees of public enterprises of an administrative nature, a draft which had been previously examined by the preparatory commission.

The civil servants association, which is under the authority of the UGTT, will also study that draft so they can give an answer to the government as soon as possible.

As regards the revision of collective agreements, Tijani Abid noted that talks are scheduled to open next month between the UGTT and the government.

He also explained that the labor federation rejects any type of workers' exploitation and any attempt to snub or intimidate them particularly when directed against union representatives.

Finally, he emphasized the need for the workers' unions to uphold the qualities of honesty, courage and loyalty in their activities noting that the UGTT has always worked hand in hand with the party and will continue to support the Bourguiba regime.

At the end of this meeting, the participants sent a message of support to the president of the republic.

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CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

GUIGA VISIT TO FRG--Minister of Interior Driss Guiga arrived in Bonn on Friday evening coming from Saudi Arabia where he headed the Tunisian delegation to the Third Conference of Arab Ministers of Interior held in Taief. On Saturday morning, Mr Guiga, who is on a 5-day private visit to the FRG, went to the Tunisian Embassy in Bonn where he was greeted by cadres from the embassy, the consulate and from Tunisian organizations with offices in the FRG. The minister of interior reassured his audience on the subject of President Bourguiba's health saying that the Supreme Combattant remains at the helm of the state and manages the country's affairs. Mr Guiga also presented a lengthy and detailed report on the current situation in Tunisia with special emphasis on measures and reforms undertaken by Mohamed Mzali and his government which are primarily intended to reorganize and simplify the administrative machinery and to turn it into "an effective instrument to serve the Tunisian citizens and not to enslave them." Mr Guiga also pointed out the government's efforts in the administrative and economic spheres aimed at guaranteeing a balanced and harmonious economic development in Tunisia. Hans Juergen Wischnewski, deputy chairman of the West German Social Democratic Party, gave a dinner on Sunday evening in honor of Driss Guiga who is currently on a private visit to the FRG. During the dinner, Guiag and Wischnewski reviewed the relations between Tunisia and the FRG as well as current international problems. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 2 Sep 80 p 5]

CSO: 4400

TRENDS OF NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN CONSIDERED

Sharjah AL-KHALIJ (BANKS, INSURANCE, INVESTMENT SUPPLEMENT) in Arabic 22 Jul 80 p 3

[Article: "The Trends of the New Five-Year Plan"]

[Text] Five-year plans are not new to the economy of the United Arab Emirates or to the economy of the member emirates. The first five-year development plan that Abu Dhabi has had was for the years 1968-1972. At that time the sum of 295.9 million Bahrain dinars, or what is equal to 3 billion Emirate dirhams, were allocated for that plan. This is a large sum of money if we were to take into consideration the difference in international rates between the year that plan was approved and current rates for 1980.

Federal five-year plans and annual development plans followed afterwards. There were many negative factors in these plans. The most notable of them was the fact that the volume ofinvestments and the goals of those plans were not realistic. Nor were the state's young agencies capable of absorbing and implementing the investments that were designated for them.

The most recent official study in this regard states that approximately 39.8 percent of the investments of the recent five-year plan have been spent. That is 2,966,300,000 dirhams from the total investments that were estimated for the plan.

The investment program for 1979 was characterized by realism. The program took into consideration implementation capabilities that were available. Agencies in question invited state agencies to take part in determining their needs in detail. These agencies were given priority to complete the implementation of previous projects, in addition to a few new projects.

The study made it clear that the total volume of appropriations that has been determined for 1979 amounted to 1.154 billion dirhams and that the part of that sum [which was earmarked] for completing projects was 11.5 million dirhams. [These funds were allocated] to complete the implementation of the national economy's basic structure.

A New Five-Year Plan

In March 1979, the Supreme Council for the Union, relying on a memorandum submitted by the Ministry of Planning, decided to prepare the preliminary studies for a new five-year plan for economic and social development.

This plan has special significance because it is the first long-term development plan to be implemented in the state after completing the construction of the basic structure of the national economy, the state's public facilities and of the various administrative agencies of the state. More importantly, this plan comes in the wake of radical changes during which upturns in spending had come to an end and the economy and labor had begun to shape up and to stabilize in natural proportions that are consistent with the real needs of the country.

The state has reinforced this trend with a series of measures whose objective is to overcome the economic and social complexes that were formed during the previous period, such as bringing an end to the crisis of real estate liquidity [sic] and establishing a central bank and various specialized banks such as the real estate bank, the industrial bank and the agricultural bank. In addition, [this new trend was reinforced by] the new labor laws that would bring an end to surplus labor and especially non-specialized labor which is now exerting considerable pressure or rather posing a serious threat to the security and stability of the country.

Features of the Plan

The objectives of the principal features of the plan are [as follows]:

*Achieving food security in stages. In the light of successive international statistics about the efficiency of the world's food production vis a vis the tremendous population explosion [in the world], every state must seek to achieve maximum self-sufficiency in this area.

Therefore, the plan will focus on land reclamation, irrigation projects, the development of the fish industry and the establishment of fish farms. Following the lead of Saudi Arabia, the plan will grant the farmers incentives to encourage them to produce and to encourage them to stay on the land and not to emigrate to the cities. The plan will also provide them with the necessary services and facilities.

In a statement made in the latter part of last June Mr 'Ali 'Abd-al-Salam the undersecretary of the Ministry of Planning said that the Emirates may not achieve self-sufficiency during the course of this plan, but that it will increase agricultural production to the maximum possible level.

*Establishing industry on two principal points of focus: these are, [first], the petrochemical industries to develop the production of industrial, organic oil derivatives and to achieve self-sufficiency in fuel and energy, such as oil refineries and gas liquefaction plants. The second point of focus is the conversion industry which relies to the maximum extent possible on local natural resources such as oil and construction materials products such as cement, asbestos, glass, table salt and light bulbs.

*The decline in the number of non-skilled labor will take place in a natural manner as a result of the nature of specialized professional labor which is needed by the new industries. In addition, the new laws and measures [that have been enacted will reduce non-skilled labor] and will stabilize the quantity and quality of those who are coming into the labor market.

In addition, large numbers of the young people of the Emirates are to be qualified for administrative and professional activities so as to replace gradually those workers who would be coming [from abroad] immediately and in a relatively short period of time.

*Stimulating the establishment of the local money market. [This will come about] when the central bank appears on the scene and the appropriate legislative framework for money market activities is prepared. Foreign investment operations would thus take place as much as possible through the local market. There is an energetic movement in that direction in official agencies and in the private sector.

Figures for the new five-year plan have not yet been announced. But the various advisory, planning and executive agencies are continuing their work to bring this plan into existence at a suitable time.

Specialized committees have begun adopting some projects whose economic feasibility has been studied with regard to their suitability to the general strategy of the plan.

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PRIVATE SECTOR URGED TO ENTER DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Sharjah AL-KHALIJ (BANKS, INSURANCE, INVESTMENT SUPPLEMENT) in Arabic 22 Jul 80 p 29

[Article by Dr Fa'iqah al-Rifa'i, Assistant to the Director General of the Currency Council for Research and Statistical Affairs: "Time Has Come for Private Sector To Play Its Role in Development; Completing Establishment and Standardizing Stock Exchanges of Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah Being Requested; A Standard Currency for Gulf to Stabilize Currency and Maintain Its Real Value; Supreme Authority for Gulf Investment to Develop Money Market"]

[Text] The economy of the United Arab Emirates is characterized by its dependence on a single source of income: oil production. The average daily production of oil in the three emirates that produce oil is approximately 1.74 million barrels per day. The likely average price of oil from the Emirates in July 1980 is about 33.47 dollars per barrel. Accordingly, it is expected that oil revenues (that is, proceeds from exports) will amount to approximately 75 billion dirhams.

Among the basic features of the country's economic structure is the difference that exists in the base of production from one emirate to another. The other emirates suffer from a shortage of natural resources Besides oil, Abu Dhabi depends on the principal oil industries, the fertilizer and the cement industries, the liquid gas projects, etc.

Dubai also depends on the fact that it is an international trade center which ties the east to the west. It is also moving quickly to diversify the sources of its income by concentrating on industries for assembling goods, on the construction materials industries, the aluminum project, the liquid gas project, the oil refinery, the dry dock, etc.

Sharjah, however, focuses its efforts on projects that would make the emirate a vital point for international navigation, providing international trade services to the Gulf area. Sharjah is focusing its efforts on becoming a services center for the Gulf states and for the Middle East. The other emirates, however, depend to a large extent on fishing, on agriculture and on a few various industries.

Highest Income

The average per capita income in the Emirates is one of the highest in the world. At present it approaches 60,000 dirhams annually. Savings also amount to a sum that is equal to 45 percent of the median income. This too is the highest rate of savings in the world. The Emirates has had a surplus in its balance of payments since 1973 despite the large amounts of money that are transferred abroad by incoming labor. Hence emerges a question: Is it possible to do away with economic development and to rely on creating an advanced currency and money market in the state that would yield material returns and monetary stability? The answer, of course, is negative. The currency and money market in the state cannot be developed unless such development takes place alongside economic development and the creation of productive projects.

The money market in the Emirates must be of no less importance than the efforts that are being made for development. Efforts made for the money market and for development must rather proceed on a parallel course, and that is the correct course. Some people wonder whether an advanced currency and money market can be established in the Emirates without competing with the market in Bahrain!

The Necessity of Coordination

And here we want to affirm the necessity of coordination between the two countries in this regard so that the two markets would complement each other rather than having one become an alternative to the other.

But what are the components of establishing an advanced money market?

It is here that one touches upon the subject of the Emirates' excellent location which ties the east and the west. The Emirates is also characterized by the existence of a direct communications system that allows it to be constantly in touch with the principal centers in the world. One of the components of creating an advanced money market is the pursuit of a free trade policy which is considered one of the significant features of the Emirates' economic policy. In addition, there is a large number of banks representing the various nationalities of the world. With the monetary surpluses they have available in the Emirates and in the neighboring countries, the banks can play a prominent role in recycling Arab monetary surpluses by creating in the Emirates an advanced regional currency and money market that can assume in the future a position of prominence in the world.

The Role of the Currency Council

There has been much talk about the role played by the Currency Council in creating the currency and money market in the country. We are referring

here to the measures adopted by the council to encourage banks to issue certificates of deposit in dirhams. Among the significant steps [that have been made] to develop the money market was the creation of a syndicate of investment companies in the country. Serious steps have also been taken towards industrialization to achieve a balanced development that is characterized by economic stability. At present the council is guiding the banks that have limited permits to focus their activities on developing the currency market in the country. According to Article 22 of the charter of the Currency Council, the council is empowered to undertake the following:

First, the council may purchase and sell the bonds that are issued or guaranteed by the government, sold to the public, paid for in dirhams and mature in no more than 20 years.

Second, the council may purchase treasury notes paid for in dirhams when they were sold to the public. The council may sell these notes; it may discount them; and it may re-discount them.

Third, the council may grant licensed banks loans for periods of time that are not to exceed 3 months. These loans are to be secured by the rates of the assets referred to in the two items above and by other securities.

To Develop the Money Market

In addition to the council's efforts in this regard, the following is called for to develop the stock market in the country:

1. Investment companies are to focus their efforts on strengthening the local market. This is in addition to the business they do abroad on which they are now focusing their efforts. Over 85 percent of the activities of investment companies are concentrated abroad. These companies have not yet affirmed their existence so as to encourage citizens to invest their funds in a productive manner inside the country instead of keeping those funds in the form of deposits in foreign banks abroad. These companies can thus mobilize savings and direct them towards development in the country, especially since the state's contribution to the capital of these companies is not less than 2 billion dirhams. These companies are also to undertake the business of firms that secure bond issues.

2. The federal government is to take steps to issue treasury notes and special government bonds to finance vital federal projects. Naturally, this will not come about unless the federal government in the long range sets up its revenues on specific kinds of direct and indirect taxes, and especially taxes on people with high incomes, or more correctly with fantastic incomes, as a source of financing the budget. This would take the place of depending totally on the contributions of those emirates that can make financial contributions. So far the private sector has not assumed its responsibilities in bearing at least a small share of [the responsibility] to finance development, which is still dependent on govern-

ment generosity. Such contributions by the private sector would strengthen the structure of the federation and the capabilities of the federal government to contribute to economic development.

The Redistribution of Income

There is no doubt that direct or indirect tax contributions (fees to renew automobile permits; tolls paid by cars passing from one area to another on recently paved roads; television right of possession fees; etc.) do bring about a better redistribution of income. At the same time, they strengthen the government's financial position. A stronger financial position would enable the government to borrow from the local market so as to issue treasury notes, etc. [It would also enable the government] to make contributions to finance development, especially in the less wealthy emirates, and also to offer services more efficiently than they are being offered now.

3. A stock market is to be established. And here we refer to the efforts that seek to create a stock market in Sharjah. The introduction of stock transactions at the Dubai stock exchange for shares and limited goods, where business is still confined to principal goods, is to begin. And here too it may be beneficial to establish a stock market in Abu Dhabi, provided that the three stock exchanges be tied together so they can operate as one. The establishment of an organized stock exchange would create and circulate intermediate and long term funds. This would replace reliance on the short-term funds that are provided by banks. It is therefore necessary to create such stock exchanges so that they would play their positive role in encouraging the exchange of stocks that are issued in the country and in the other Gulf states and to expand this in the future so as to include the other Arab countries. The establishment of such stock exchanges would encourage the creation of new [bond] issues and would encourage savers and investors alike.

4. Kuwait's announcement that it would turn its stock market to a stock market for the Gulf is to be taken advantage of. Investment companies in the Emirates are to be allowed to deal in stocks that are issued by institutions established in the other Gulf states as well as stocks of Kuwaiti corporations. Investment companies in the Emirates will do so by participating in the Kuwait stock exchange, by tying their activities there with their activities in the local market and announcing those activities daily to the public.

5. Cooperation between the stock market in the country, the central banks, the currency institutions in the Gulf states as well as the investment institutions in those states is to be strengthened. There would be no objection to encouraging the issue of bonds that are appraised in dirhams in the markets of the Gulf, especially in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Efforts must be made here to coordinate [activities] between the central banks and the currency authorities of the Gulf states to develop the currency market and the stock market in those states. The time has

come for closely intertwining the efforts that are being made to establish a supreme authority for Gulf investment into which part and not all of the monetary surplus that is directed for investment abroad would be channeled. With the resources that are available, this authority can thus guide the currency market, work for its stability and also develop the money market in the area. Not only will positive results be reflected on the area, but this will also stabilize the world currency market. The Gulf states represent more than 75 percent of the OPEC countries.

Strengthening Bank Relations

6. The banking system in the Emirates is characterized by free competition. Small banks do business alongside big banks. The Currency Council (or in the future the central bank) is thus obliged to make an effort, on the one hand, to strengthen relations between it and these banks and, on the other hand, to strengthen relations among these banks by encouraging the issue of joint securities (certificates of deposit or bank bonds) that are issued by more than one bank. Among the matters that are worthy of note here is the problem of insuring savings. There is no doubt that the fact of banks insuring their deposits, both the direct deposits or those that are made in return for issues, will encourage the availability of liquid funds [in amounts] suitable to banks. In turn, this would enable the banks as issuing and investment agencies to play their part by purchasing commercial securities and contributing to the effort to encourage the financial market.

7. The capabilities of the Abu Dhabi Investment Agency would enable it to play a prominent role in strengthening the financial market. According to its charter it can purchase the securities that are issued in dirhams by the federal government and also by the corporations of the public and the private sectors. This is a kind of investment that is no less stable nor does it yield less than its counterparts which are issued by foreign governments and corporations. The Abu Dhabi Investment Agency can also cooperate with the Supreme Authority for Gulf Investments whose establishment is being proposed in an effort to stabilize the currency market in the country and in the area in general. The establishment of this authority is being proposed in the context of setting up a clearly defined strategy and a framework for action on sound principles.

8. Among the agencies and organizations that would help develop and strengthen the money market in the country, we mention [the following]: representation offices--there are more than ten--that encourage joint investments and insurance companies whose number exceeds 70. Although these insurance companies have organized themselves into a society whose main office is in Dubai and although membership in that society is open to all the companies that do business in the country, the activities of those companies are still limited. It is here that we see the need for the Currency Council--or for the Central Bank in the future--to draw up a plan whose objective would be to stimulate the role of insurance companies

in developing the currency and the money market in the country. There are also the financial brokers on whose shoulders the burden of developing these markets falls. There is no doubt that cooperation in the Gulf on this matter is necessary.

The Emirates: an International Center

This makes it evident that the Emirates has the financial institutions, the support agencies and the financial capability that would enable it to become a prestigious international financial center, especially since the state is about to establish the Central Bank which will have the right to control and supervise [transactions] in a manner that would concern itself with developing the structure of the currency and the money market in the country.

Opportunities [in this regard] are equal for all citizens [of the Emirates] and for citizens of the other Arab countries. We mention in particular [the following]:

1. Currency conversions from and to the country are not subject to any bank control.

2. Most of the transactions that take place abroad are in U.S. dollars. The U.S. dollar is still (hard?) currency in the Gulf states.

3. The Emirates' dirham and the Gulf currencies are stable in the local market and abroad.

4. There are no restrictions on deposits and loans from banks. This, however, is tied to the borrower's stable and secured financial position.

5. All citizens of the Arab countries receive preferential treatment with regard to contributions and participations by non-citizens in the various projects and corporations in the country.

6. Non-citizens of the Emirates may purchase and sell shares in investment projects. [These transactions] are subject to the issuing organization's rules only.

7. There are no restrictions or conditions required by the state with regard to communications and transactions carried out with expert firms that abound in the country to provide information about investment opportunities and related data.

There is no doubt that the suggestion to establish a standard Gulf currency--and this has not seen the light of day yet--is a matter that deserves follow up and study since its positive effects would encourage the reassuring

flow of funds; stabilize currency in the area; and protect the real value of these countries' revenues. Likewise, the establishment of a banking information center in the Gulf is a vital matter. The Arab Currency Fund may play a role in this regard by creating a highly efficient center for information and specialized studies so that knowledge maybe furthered and transactions in the currency and money markets in the Emirates may be enhanced.

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21 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2205

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JERUSALEM PROBLEM HEIGHTENS WAR ANXIETY

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 25-31 Aug 80 pp 20-21

/Article by Maha Sumarah: "The Arabs and Israel: Will the Fifth War Break Out?"/

/Text/ Observers are afraid of the repercussions of the Knesset decree unifying the city of Jerusalem and the political and military complications which might arise in the region and lead to a further blowup which could ultimately lead to the outbreak of a fifth Arab-Israeli war.

In the opinion of these observers, the first blowup has actually occurred, striking at the Egyptian-Israeli peace based on the Camp David treaties. The latest Israeli decree related to Jerusalem, in the view of Arab and foreign strategists--including the American magazine NEWSWEEK--has dealt a "finishing blow" to the Camp David agreements, on grounds that Camp David has reached a dead end now that its main goal, a separate peace between Egypt and Israel, has been achieved, and it is no longer a framework for peace, as it was considered yesterday, but has now become more like a framework for war, after the political and diplomatic efforts concentrated on Camp David reached the stage of political paralysis.

This paralysis is paving the way to military surprises--narrowly explosive ones or ones based on limited war. Explosion or possibility of war might seem unlikely or not imminent, but the more political and diplomatic efforts in the Middle East are installed and come up against a blank wall, as was the case in two important periods of the history of the Arab-Israeli struggle, in 1967 and 1973, the only thing to follow the paralysis will be war. Therefore some circles feel that the winds of despair and anxiety are blowing, giving proof of the impossibility of attaining a just comprehensive peace before a fifth war occurs.

Three Areas for a Blowup

The machinery of war is advancing three areas for lethal conflagration in the region. These are:

The West Bank, and the possibility that the Palestinian guerrillas will transform the current upheaval into a comprehensive revolution; this has caused Israeli authorities to embark on a policy of evacuating the territory of its inhabitants by expelling the Palestinian leaders and chiefs and creating excuses and pretexts for getting rid of the generation of young Palestinians who have started to resist the occupation by fire, blood and all types of civil disobedience.

Lebanon and the possibility of a blowup in the situation in a manner resembling that which prevailed during the 2 years' war (1975-76). It is not to be ruled out, in case of an explosion, that Israel will conduct operations against the Palestinian presence in the south, in the effort to eliminate the political and diplomatic role of the Palestine Liberation Organization, which enjoys support and understanding on the international stage, distressing Israel and adding to its isolation. It is believed that if war breaks out in the south, it will not be confined to the Palestinians alone, but that Israel will try to draw Syria into a confrontation inside and outside the Lebanese borders, with the aim of directing a strike at the Syrian war machine, which constitutes the backbone of the Eastern front--that is, the front rejecting Camp David.

The Arab Gulf, since it is not to be ruled out that various explosions could break out in the countries of the Arab Gulf and that the population, ethnic and religious mixture there could be exploited along with a crisis of the transfer of rule in those countries from the tribal and clan family stage to the stage of democratic and trade union organizations and institutions, conflicting with international and regional schemes which are attempting to impose influence and extend dominance over the oilfields and oil routes--which are considered the vital arteries of the industrial world and the biggest economic force man has known. Therefore some people are afraid of an international struggle over the Gulf and are sorry over the fact that the region's territory will be considered far more important than the people in it. It is suggested that the secure countries of the Gulf will experience disturbances, crises, and dissension of various forms, sources and goals, similar to those taking place in Lebanon.

Therefore Arab and European strategists are striving to set out an alternate strategy to Camp David which will prevent paralysis and the danger of a blowup, fill the vacuum and preserve efforts to search for peace.

Thorn and post Camp David

It is believed that the visit by Gaston Thorn, the current president of the European Common Market states group, to the area was a preparation and prelude to an action plan and would follow the Camp David treaties by personally listening to Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese viewpoints rejecting Camp David. Europe's interest in the post Camp David stage is interpreted, in the wake of the issuance of the Jerusalem decree, as serious Western European interest in thwarting explosive intentions in the area and a

full-fledged effort to prevent the outbreak of Arab-Israeli war, because Western Europe is afraid that the flow of Arab oil it depends on will be cut off and that the flow of its industrial and commercial products to the Arab consumer, who started to be considered the prime importer in its balance of trade after the oil price hike, will be stopped.

On account of its interests, the group of European countries has preserved a balance between the Venice summit resolution, which called for self-determination for the Palestinian people and the need to include the Liberation Organization as one of the Palestinian parties in the search for a solution, and abstention from voting on the latest General Assembly resolution which ignored Israel's right to exist and demanded Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Therefore some people explain that the approval by the European country group of a hammer-and anvil policy is a wise one which dictates its respect and makes it acceptable to both parties of the struggle. One should bear in mind that Israel has not welcomed the European role or the European efforts, charging that its position is the result of an oil, financial and industrial swindle now that the Arab oil countries have become the major importer of European military and consumer industries.

The Absent Soviet Role

In spite of the Israeli position on European efforts, some people in the American delegation to the United Nations have welcomed the European policy in disguised form, considering that it is the soundest way to save Camp David. These people have ascertained that Europe is moving to protect the American eagle and does not intend to compete for its major, decisive role in attaining a settlement, but rather supports this role from broader premises. Therefore the notion has gained prominence among some American circles concerned with creating a solution to the Arab-Israeli struggle that the European role should be considered beneficial as long as the political isolation Israel is experiencing today from those who were and still are its most ardent enthusiasts, such as the Western Europeans, who enjoy traditional political, cultural and economic stock among the Arab countries, is apparent.

In spite of Europe's real demand that the United States participate actively in the settlement plans from the beginning, it remains more certain and secure that the Soviet Union must participate in any settlement to the Middle East issue to some extent, perhaps after the American stage, because any settlement of the issue of the Arab-Israeli struggle which rules the Soviet Union will be deficient, as was the case with Camp David. If it is not in the power of the Soviet Union to play a major role in bringing about Arab-Israeli peace, as the United States is doing, it is within the power of the Soviets to sabotage and destroy the peace directly or through an intermediary if they do not participate in creating it or guaranteeing it, especially since some Arab countries are coordinating with them politically and are wholly relying on them militarily.

When we talk about the anticipated blowup which might occur as a result of the Knesset decree related to Jerusalem, the great question concerns the meaning of this blowup and the body or bodies which will take responsibility for it. The theoretical possibility remains relevant, if the collective Arab response to the decree is military. If the answer is positive, it is possible that a fifth Arab-Israeli war will take place, but it is to be ruled out that the Arabs will take the first step as long as the military balance of power is not in favor of the Arabs, especially the Arabs rejecting Camp David, headed by Syria, the Palestine Liberation Organization and the perseverance and steadfastness front.

Following Egypt's military and political departure from Arab solidarity, the rejectionist Arabs lost sufficient power to launch a preventive war similar to that which took place in the afternoon of 6 October 1973. Whoever does not enjoy military and political power will not enjoy the freedom of movement to make war, to say nothing of independence of decision. But if the answer to the Jerusalem decree is as appeared in the words of Emam Ayatollah Khomeyni, who asked the Moslem millions to parade to Jerusalem to regain it, war is not impossible in the future--although one should realize that the call is not practicable since battles are not won just by emotions.

The Arab Response

So far no Arab signed has been emitted on the possibility that the military option might be relevant in responding to the Jerusalem decree. Any Arab summit or even Islamic conference can arrive at the promulgation of a specivic conception in this regard.

The first Arab response to issue forth on the decree incorporating Jerusalem came from the al-Ta'if meeting which concerned Iraq's President Saddam Husayn and King Khalid. The two oil chiefs demanded that the Arab countries sever diplomatic and economic relations with all countries shifting their embassies to Jerusalem. Eight Arab countries supported this resolution--the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Algeria, Oman, Kuwait, Syria and Jordan.

Syria criticized the notion of an economic and political boycott, considering it inadequate for confronting a policy which has imposed an Israeli fait accompli, as the newspaper AL-BA'TH, the spokesman for the ruling party, stated when it wrote that the Arab countries' response to the aggressive Israeli act of incorporating Jerusalem "cannot be restricted to the framework of acting within the international organization or to statements of condemnation and threats to boycott countries which recognize the Israeli resolution, but requires the use by the Arabs and friendly countries of all the resources available to them against Israel and the United States of America equally. Short of this, the United States will remain in an inactive state and the Israeli aggression against the Arabs will go unpunished."

However, the Arabs rejecting Camp David lack much of the political, military and security coordination needed to apply the minimum Arab solidarity which was agreed upon at the 1978 Baghdad summit, know that the wars between regimes and struggles between intelligence agencies inside and outside the Arab nation have got out of control.

Today Arab solidarity appears to be in need of a review, an evaluation, and the reattachment of limbs, now that more than one axis has gained prominence and relations between more than one Arab front and regime have deteriorated. Therefore the Arabs need to set forth a common strategy, if only at a minimum, now more than at any time in the past, before time passes and all rights are lost. Therefore it is believed that tentative Arab contentment with hinting at cutting off political and economic relations with countries recognizing the Jerusalem decree is not in keeping with the gravity of the situation. Regarding the Arabs' bitter previous experience with the 30-year principle of economic and commercial boycott of Israel, and the experiences of others in the policy of boycotting Rhodesia, South Africa and Turkey, the result in our case, and that of others besides us, has been that boycotts do not work, since there always are third countries which can take the place of the countries calling for the boycott and provide everything the countries concerned demand. When Lebanon applied the boycott to Israel and prohibited vessels from unloading in the port of Beirut if they were on the blacklist, the port of Alexandria received them.

During the oil embargo which the Arab countries imposed in the wake of the 1973 war, some Arab countries did not restrict themselves to the decision and opened the oil spigots, bringing their treasuries fantastic profits. If the Arabs really had adhered to the Arab boycott for a longer period, as Syria had asked them to do, the Syrian negotiators would have been able to obtain greater political and territorial gains during the separation of Syrian and Israeli forces which took place under the supervision of former American secretary of state Henry Kissinger. It is well known that Syria held out alone in 1973 when the war of attrition lasted more than 100 days, trying to realize better terms, while the oil Arabs hastened to lift their embargo and Egypt hastened to sign the Egyptian-Israeli separation of forces at Kilometer 101, leaving Syria isolated.

It is certain that anticipated Arab reactions to the Jerusalem decree, especially large-scale military ones, explosions, or economic and oil embargoes, are governed by international conditions and the political interactions of the two great powers, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. For both Washington and Moscow to follow up on the Jerusalem issue and its ramifications with concern--that is, before the Arabs or the Israelis are able to adopt a specific military or economic step--the Arabs must take the international positions which are turning toward non-violence and preservation of the status quo into consideration.

Some international political circles are bewildered by the Israeli position, while some rule out the possibility that Israel will accompany its

decree incorporating Jerusalem with a military step, large or small, as long as it is in its power to incorporate and hold onto the lands which it occupied by easy means lowest in human cost, such as the promulgation of a basic law such as the Jerusalem Law, which imparts a specific current status to the policy of the fait accompli which has been drawn up for 13 years. Some sources do not rule out the possibility that elements loyal to the extremists or "hawks" in the Knesset will venture to issue other unjust laws which will impart legal Israeli dominance to the other occupied territories, such as the West Bank and Golan, considering them part of the territory of Israel. Meanwhile, a third group leans toward Israel's permanent use of the logic of force with the Arabs by creating fear over the need to preserve Israel's security as long as it enjoys freedom of movement and self-determination unfettered by major pressures before the American elections and is not informed about or concerned with the political and international isolation around it.

The first, most important conclusion of the Jerusalem decree lies in the weakening of Camp David. Since the passage of the specified date for the conclusion of the autonomy talks, last May, President al-Sadat has been trying to emerge from his isolation and play various roles. In spite of his tremendous ability and personal proficiency at the art of political acting and conspiracy, he has tried playing both ends, sometimes that of Camp David, sometimes that of the Islamic conference resolution calling for Israel's withdrawal from the West Bank; the United Nations General Assembly voted against Israel and the resolution got 122 votes. Al-Sadat tried to unravel the isolation imposed on his policy by the latest General Assembly resolution, but this "twisted and corrupt" policy, as a historian specializing in the modern Middle East has described it, was not destined for success, especially since the Camp David treaties consecrated the separate Egyptian-Israeli peace, and the Palestinians and rejectionist Arabs have no access to it.

The treaties just serve Egyptian national interests, and al-Sadat's hands ought to be removed from other things. In addition, the other Arabs rejecting the treaty, such as Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization, for instance, do not want al-Sadat speaking in their name and they are indeed not in need of his services, first because their road toward peace is different, especially since the treaties stipulate that the destiny of Jerusalem should be discussed in 5 years. If al-Sadat repeats his criticism of the Jerusalem resolution, Israel may perhaps brandish its unwillingness to relinquish the third of Sinai which is still under its jurisdiction and fail to return it to the Egyptian authorities in 1982, as the treaty stipulates. It is not to be ruled out that Israel might change its opinion, since some settler-officials have gravitated toward the possibility of staying there for a longer period.

The American Error

In talking about the ramifications of the Jerusalem decree and the possibility of a rupture of the Camp David treaties and a farewell to the

Arab-Israeli peace, one must pause before the position of the United States, godfather of the peace and the treaty.

Current American policy, toward the end of the era of President Carter's administration, stresses that the United States stands to gain time in order to end the presidential elections, and the Carter administration hopes and is striving with all the pressure and influence it has inside the Israeli and Arab camps, and among the Zionists in America, to provide efforts to guarantee that these next 4 months will end and pass without turmoil or problems. Therefore it is to be believed that the possibility of a rupture now would harm America and that America wants only a freeze on the situation. President Carter is anxious to be re-elected and wants to return to the White House. The only success his administration has achieved in international affairs is founded on an Arab-Israeli peace where it managed to get the biggest and strongest Arab country together with Israel at the negotiating table.

Naturally there are many weak points in the American position. It was not in the Americans' calculations, when they discussed the bases of Camp David in September 1978, or at the signing of the treaties in March 1979, that the autonomy negotiations would be prolonged and would stumble. Indeed, President Carter's administration was betting that the terms and process of peace would be completed before that time, in order to give prominence to Carter's historic role in establishing peace in the Middle East.

The latest error to slip the mind of the American negotiators and full participants, showing their ignorance of the Arab mentality, is the Americans' belief that they will not succeed in having Egypt sign a peace with Israel alone, but that the other Arabs, like Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and others will be compelled to join al-Sadat and sign Camp David. The major error is that the Americans have not understood the Arabs' feelings toward the city of Jerusalem specifically and what Jerusalem means to the Moslems, who cannot conclude a peace with Israel now that Israel has occupied east Jerusalem, distorted its Arab and Islamic character, expelled the Palestinians from their homes and sections, and deprived Moslem pilgrims from completing their pilgrimage by ascending to the holy shrine.

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PHALANGISTS DENOUNCED, OPEN JORDAN-WEST BANK BRIDGES SUPPORTED

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 18 Aug 80 p 18

[Report on interview with Talal Naji, member of Executive Committee of PLO, in Amman; date not given]

[Text] PLO Executive Committee Member Talal Naji told AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM that the resistance has received reports that Phalangist Party Military Commander Bashir al-Jumayyil met with Gen Eytan, chief of staff of the Zionist enemy forces, at Juniyah, prior to the wiping out of positions belonging to Camile Sham'un's party, and that he received the green light from the Israeli chief of staff for this operation. But this does not mean that Sham'un is clean or has no relations with Israel. All it means is that Israel is changing an old horse for a young one, so as to ensure the continuation of its plots. The same thing happened with the Shah of Iran, whom the United States figured on replacing after achieving its purposes through him.

Naji said that what happened between the Phalangists and the Liberals was but one link in a plot aimed at Lebanon, the Palestinian revolution, Syria, and even at the Arab nation's steadfastness.

Naji said: "Bashir al-Jumayyil has the most fascist force within the Lebanese right wing movement, and is planning on his party's gaining military control over eastern Beirut, Kisrwan and Jubayl. Sham'un's party would remain as a political entity, while the military tool would be in the hands of the Phalangist Party. This would make it easy for Israel to carry out its plots in Lebanon. We believe that al-Jumayyil's step proves that the war in Lebanon has not been a sectarian war as they made it out to be, when they said that the Syrians, Palestinians and nationalist Lebanese want to kill the Maronite Christians. What Sham'un's daughter said, after having been exposed to a kidnapping and assassination attempt by Bashir al-Jumayyil's followers, may be the truest expression of the plots going on in Lebanon. She said, 'We have been saying that the Palestinians and Syrians want to kill us Maronites. What will we tell the Europeans now?'

"Bashir al-Jumayyil wants to kill the Maronites. He can no longer claim that he is fighting in defense of the Lebanese Maronites. Political Maronism in Lebanon has historically had four symbols. Camile Sham'un is considered the first symbol and leader; he is now the enemy of the Phalangists--in fact, their target. Then there is Sulayman Franjiyah, the original mountain Maronite, who is now the obstinant enemy of the Phalangists, who killed his son and some members of his family. There is Raymond Iddih, who is living in Paris, a fugitive from Phalangist violence after the murder of his sister at Phalangist hands. They have also tried to assassinate him more than once. The question is: Can the Phalangists now claim that they represent the Lebanese Maronites?"

Fleeing Phalangist Violence

Talal Naji said, "Thousands of Christians have come to western Beirut fleeing Phalangist violence and seeking security. They have found everyone ready to receive and reassure them.

"What Bashir al-Jumayyil did is one link in a plot. As for the other link, we have information confirming that Israel is ready to attack Palestinian revolutionary positions in order to strike, destroy and eliminate them. This is to be accompanied by a Phalangist attack from eastern Beirut towards the western part of the city for the same purpose and at the same time. Without a doubt, Syria is the main target, for Israel and the Phalangists are planning a smashing blow against its forces in Lebanon, accompanied by increased disturbances within Syria."

The General Assembly Resolution

Speaking of the 29 July 1980 General Assembly resolution about the Palestinian cause, from which France, Austria and some other nations abstained, and which American and Israel opposed, the Palestinian official said, "The General Assembly resolution was a reaffirmation by the foremost international organization of the Palestinian people's proven national rights to a land and a homeland, and their right to return, determine their own destiny, and establish an independent Palestinian national state on their own soil. The fact that 112 nations voted for this resolution indicates the growing recognition of these proven rights and the realization, by the great majority of the countries of the world, that the basis of peace in the Middle East is for the Palestinian people to attain their proven national rights. The fact that only seven nations, led by America, oppose this resolution, clearly indicates the extent of international isolation surrounding Israel and the United States. It also plainly indicates that the perpetual attempts by the United States to pressure the small and developing nations, especially those which share interests with the United States, and force them into adopting a stand contrary to their convictions, have been of no use. The Palestinian cause has come to have a place in the mind of international public opinion and all the nations of the world."

Europe Submits to Intimidation

With reference to some states' abstention from voting, Naji said, "This abstention means that these states, even though they are convinced of the proven national rights of the Palestinian people, are still subject to American and Israeli intimidation, and are still taking a stand contrary to their peoples' conscience and convictions by adopting a negative stand. Those officials cannot defy their people by rejecting the resolution; therefore, they avoid the issue by abstaining from the voting. One difference is that some states, such as France and Austria, claim that they have always understood the rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination and national sovereignty, and their demand that Israel withdraw from the occupied territories. So why did they abstain from voting? The answer to this is that French and European decision-making is still fettered and restricted, and is not independent. France still needs a new De Gaulle, and Europe still needs more than a De Gaulle--someone who would sense its dignity and independence and its right to express its mind apart from American domination. While waiting for this to come about, we are satisfied that 112 nations expressed, through direct, open voting, their conviction in the national rights of the Palestinian people and the aggressiveness of Zionism and Israel."

Support for Steadfastness

Reviewing his evaluation of the Joint Palestinian-Jordanian Commission's activities in supporting the steadfastness of the Palestinian people in the occupied homeland, Naji who is a member of the commission, said, "There is no doubt that the joint commission's accomplishments in supporting steadfastness are positive ones, since they have enabled our people in the occupied territories to face the harsh living and economic conditions which the occupation authorities are imposing on them in order to get them to emigrate from the occupied territories. It is no secret that through the joint commission we are trying to provide our people in the occupied land with the means to stand firm, cling to their homeland, and increase their endurance, in order to thwart the Zionist enemy's schemes to empty the land of its people and its resources forever.

"We have drawn up plans to support steadfastness in such a manner as to influence all aspects of our people's life within Palestine. By supporting perseverance, we don't mean unplanned expenditures of money on individuals or organizations. We have drawn up a budget based on scientific principles for achieving the desired goal of supporting steadfastness. I can say that I am very happy and pleased in general with the results we have achieved so far. There is no action without mistakes. Mistakes come from action. The important thing is to recognize actual mistakes and work to correct them. This is what we are continually trying to do.

"We are receptive to any complaint or criticism about the manner or manners of supporting steadfastness. We are ready to discuss criticisms or mistakes and work to remedy any error."

Insignificant Commitments

[Question] But are you satisfied with the steadfastness funds allocated by the Baghdad summit?

[Answer] I reveal no secret when I say that $100 million were allocated to support steadfastness in the occupied territories at the ninth Arab summit held in Baghdad, a sum which the joint commission can spend to support steadfastness in the occupied homeland. These commitments have not been fully paid by the Arab nations. The commission has received about three-quarters of this amount, even though it is basically a very modest, paltry sum which we are going too far in calling a "fund to support steadfastness." At this same time, the Zionist enemy is spending billions of dollars to establish settlements on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip in order to gain control of the land. It has established more than 100 settlements on the West Bank and in Gaza, even though there are only 15,000 settlers living in these settlements. How can we call such a tiny, modest sum a "fund to support perseverance in the occupied homeland?"

The Palestinian official asked, "Is this sum indicative of the real resources available to the Arabs to thwart the autonomy plots and Camp David, and to enable our people to achieve this goal and stand up to Israeli terrorism and repression?"

Give a Billion Dollars

The Palestinian official added, "We are convinced that $1 billion dollars must be provided to support our people's steadfastness in the occupied homeland. This is what we will demand from the coming Arab summit in 'Amman, according to the figures and the principles on which the support issue is based.'"

Yes To Open Bridges

Speaking about the issue of open bridges between both banks of the Jordan River, Talal Naji said, "The official Palestinian stand on open bridges was stated by the head of the Palestinian delegation during the Amman meetings of Arab foreign and economy ministers. It is a continuation of the open bridges policy, because of the negative effects which accompany the closing of the bridges with respect to our people's vital issues in the occupied territories. Consequently, closing the bridges negatively affects their steadfastness in the face of the Zionist enemy's plots."

Two Sides To The Bridge

He went on to say, "Naturally, open bridges have their negative and positive aspects. We believe that it is proper to be cautious about the negative aspects, and to draw up more controls to prevent the infiltration of Israeli goods. We should also prevent the Zionist enemy from benefitting

from the bridges, or at least try to reduce the Zionist enemy's benefits from the open bridges. Likewise, our people in the occupied land should be instructed to be cautious, and to use the bridges in a manner conducive to the development of the positive aspects and to the reduction of the harms which might result from them. If the bridges are closed, this action might have its positive aspects. But it might also harm our people in the occupied land, and weaken their ability to stand fast, although not their desire to do so. If Gaza oranges, West Bank olives, and all the agricultural produce from the bank and Gaza are not sold throughout the Arab countries, this will destroy the national economy of our people in the occupied lands, and delight the Zionist enemy. Supporting our people's national economy will have a significant effect in attaching the Arab Palestinian citizens to their land. Consequently, it will enable them to continue living on this land. There is also the importance of contact between the people of the occupied land and those outside it. The closing of the bridges would mean severing links between the members of a single family. It might be said that this is one of the most natural results of foreign occupation of any nation. This is ture, but when international pressure succeeds in enabling our people to communicate, why don't we benefit from it? Of course, we should stress that contacts between families do not necessarily mean recognition of the occupation's legitimacy? In fact, this is an incentive to continue the struggle against this occupation, and even escalate it."

The Positive Results

He added, "Naturally, we are not blind to the benefits which the Zionist enemy is reaping from the open bridges policy. But the question is a relative one, measured by the positive and negative results. So far, our view has been that the positive results outweigh the negative ones. This does not mean that we are ignoring the negative aspects. On the contrary, we are exerting greater pressure to reduce them as much as possible.

The National Interest

Talal Naji added, "The question has become one of national interest. That is, when we become convinced that the open bridges policy will achieve benefits for our enemy which would adversely affect the national cause, at that time there will have to be a sacrifice by everyone. At that time, the closed bridges slogan will become the national slogan which we will have to work to achieve."

There Must Be Islamic Pressure Against America

The Palestinian official spoke of the "pressure-exerter" role which the Islamic countries must play. He said, "The Zionist enemy basically gets his strength from the United States, which gives him all kinds of support, from bread to 15,000 or more technologically advanced weapons. Here we must ask an urgent question. If the Islamic states are convinced of the

need to adopt measures against the Zionist enemy, in view of the crimes he is perpetrating in the occupied land and against the holy places, do they not necessarily have to exert pressures against the United States, which supplies the Zionist enemy with various means of support and resources to sustain his occupation and aggression? Accordingly, is it not strange that these Islamic states are bound to the United States by firm, developed relations, at a time when the vicious offensive against our people in the occupied land is escalating, and Israel is deciding to make Jerusalem its permanent capital, inspite of the fact that al-Aqsa Mosque, one of the holiest Islamic shrines, is within it? There are also Christian holy places, including the Church of the Resurrection, and other archeological treasures in Jerusalem.

"Isn't this a crucial flaw? How can we be convinced of the seriousness of the Islamic summit resolutions when we see a contradictory situation like this? The western economy in general rests on Arab and Islamic capital, and Arab-Islamic oil is given to the United States and the Western world without restrictions or conditions!"

[The following insert appears at end of this item]

AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM Is Still the Pulpit For Honest Speech

Talal Naji said that AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM has had a long history of free expression of opinions and ideas. Therefore, it has a patriotic attitude regarding the conspiracies to which the Arab nation is continually exposed. This is especially so as AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM has expressed public opinion in no uncertain terms, and has even helped mobilize Kuwaiti and Arab public opinion against the Camp David conspiracy and the autonomy plot. It has called for Arab steadfastness in confronting these plots. If this free pulpit is attacked, the attack is a cowardly act. A person with a cause must counter argument with argument, and refute opinion with opinion. If anyone is convinced of his view, let him present it, even in AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM. He should not go blow it up. This criminal act is, in my estimation, an onslaught against free, honest, respectable journalism which uses the pen to serve the national cause. While nationalist journalism is exposed to attack, yellow jouranlism enjoys tranquility and a shower of money from all sides. In any case, the attack direct against AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM and all nationalist newspapers is something to take pride in. It is testimony that AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM is following a correct course.

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ARAB LABOR ORGANIZATION OFFICIAL SURVEYS ARAB LABOR PROBLEMS

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 21 Jul 80 p 5

[Report on interview with al-Hashimi Banani, director general of the Arab Labor Organization, in Amman; date not given]

[Text] Mr al-Hashimi Banani, director general of the Arab Labor Organization, praised the efforts of Jordan during the conference of the International Labor Organization held in Geneva. These efforts led to adoption of a resolution condemning the establishment of Israeli settlements in the occupied Arab territories.

In an interview with AL-DUSTUR, Mr Banani said that he has held discussions with Jordan's minister of labor, Mr Umar al-Nabulsi, and with other officials to pursue implementation of the resolution which condemned the establishment of settlements; to call on governments to withhold any assistance which could help the establishment of settlements in Israel; and to assist Arab workers in dealing with the effects of Israeli settlement policy, deportation and loss of means of livelihood.

Mr Banani said: "The Arab Labor Organization reached an agreement with Jordan and the PLO to open an office in Amman to study the conditions of Arab workers in the occupied territories. The office will submit a report to the organization which will help to detect violations by the occupation authorities, and expose Israeli legislation and actions against the Arab workers and against the Arabs as human beings in the occupied territories. Such a detection would unmask Israel before the world. The cost of running the office will be paid by the Arab Labor Organization."

A Technical Cooperation Agreement

Mr Banani said that his visit to Jordan and his discussion with Jordanian officials were for the purpose of preparing the draft of a technical cooperation agreement between Jordan and the Arab Labor Organization. Experts and specialists of the organization will be studying this draft.

Mr Banani added that the draft agreement is based on three main points:

--The first point deals with health and occupational safety. The Jordanian government is showing interest in the health conditions and safety of workers, and is planning to establish a specialized unit for this purpose. Naturally, Jordan will seek the assistance of the Arab Labor Organization and of experts from other Arab countries to secure the establishment and success of this unit.

--The second point deals with promoting labor education in Jordan.

--The third point deals with organizing training sessions for employees of the various departments of the ministry, particularly with regard to manpower planning, labor statistics, hiring, policies, work inspection and industrial relations.

Labor Support

It is important, according to Mr Banani, to support the [Jordanian] social security agency by means of training sessions for its staff to acquaint them with the experience of other developed countries which could be applied in Jordan.

Concerning support for the General Federation of Labor Unions in Jordan, Mr Banani said that he discussed with officials of the federation the possibility of participation by the Arab Labor Organization in supporting labor education in Jordan. This is one of the programs of the federation which intends to establish a special academy for this purpose. Mr Banani also discussed the need to hold leadership training sessions for educated workers and the possibility of supporting the federation in its effort to establish labor clinics and new headquarters.

Mr Banani pointed out that his discussions in Amman dealt with proposed agreements between specialized Arab organizations and the Arab Labor Organization.

The Jordanian Labor Law

Mr Banani said that during his meeting with the prime minister, Dr Qasim al-Rimawi, he expressed his appreciation of the Jordanian effort in presenting a draft resolution, in the name of the Arab community, to the International Labor Organization. Mr Banani added that he expressed the desire of his organization to see the Jordanian labor law enacted as soon as possible. According to Mr Banani, the prime minister emphasized that his government is anxious to see the ministry of labor do its utmost to serve both fields of social affairs and development; and to secure enactment of a most modern labor law which takes into consideration the points of view of all concerned parties.

An Arab Tour

Mr Banani indicated that he will be leaving Jordan today [21 July] to visit Damascus, Beirut and Morocco to discuss with officials of these countries the subject of cooperation agreements between these countries and the Arab Labor Organization. He added that he will be discussing with PLO officials subjects related to projects which could be executed in favor of Palestinian workers outside the occupied territories, especially in the field of vocational training, and the possibilities of supporting Arab workers in the occupied territories.

He added that the Arab Labor Organization has offered 200,000 to deal with the social effects of Israeli aggression against Lebanon on Palestinian and Lebanese workers.

Mr Banani noted that the subjects of his discussions in Morocco will include the creation of the Arab Employment Agency which is to be headquartered in Morocco. Its purpose will be to collect information on Arab workers, study labor employment markets in the Arab world, and study the labor needs of the various Arab countries.

Mr Banani said that his organization will begin in November a survey of the labor force in the Arab world, beginning with Morocco. The survey will evaluate the Arab labor force now and in the eighties.

Mr Banani disclosed recent discussions he had with government and union officials in France and Belgium on providing opportunities for the children of Arab workers in Europe to learn the Arabic language and be in touch with their Arab culture. He said that the Europeans welcomed this idea on condition that the Arab countries participate in this campaign.

Mr Banani added that he discussed with the French minister of labor all arbitrary laws and measures directed against Arab workers and the concern of the Arab countries over these measures.

Foreign Workers

Mr Banani warned against the continuous influx of foreign workers to the Gulf area. He said that the continuous increase of foreign workers might jeopardize the Arab nature and security of the Gulf.

He called upon the Arab nations to employ a higher percentage of Arab workers in any contract or project undertaken by any foreign company in the Arab world. He wondered how Arab labor conditions can improve when Arab workers are out of work in one Arab country, while foreign workers are taking their place in another.

Mr Banani criticized the propaganda and statements published by hostile newspapers which promote fear of the presence of imported Arab workers in the Arabian Gulf, and thus hurt those workers. He said that such antagonistic statements serve the interests of the greedy and the foreigners in reaping high profits at the expence of the Arabs and the Arab workers. Mr Banani said that the Arab worker is more protective of Arab land and Arab security than the foreign worker whose aim is to exploit and drain Arab wealth.

The Arab Worker

Mr Banani called for the execution of balanced development programs which would take into consideration the social and economic characteristics of the Arab world. He also called for the need to improve work conditions of Arab workers, and heed the law of progress so that the Arab world may not pay the price of taking the wrong path. Development projects are carried out by man for the benefit of man, and the worker is the basic means of accomplishing development and bringing about necessary change, he said.

As for the effects Egyptian-Israeli normalization on the future of the Palestinian labor force in the occupied territories, Mr Banani warned that if the Egyptian-Israeli plan is executed, and Egyptian workers begin replacing Palestinian workers, it will be a catastrophe for the Palestinians as well as for the Arabs in general. Mr Banani added that Israel will intensify its efforts to uproot and deport the Palestinian worker. According to Mr Banani, Israel's measures in this regard will assume horrendous proportions.

Concerning the role of the Arab Labor Organization in protecting the labor union rights and organizations, Mr Banani said, "The constitution of the organization stresses the protection and development of union rights and liberties in the Arab world. In keeping with this goal, the organization is working through the committee of union rights, to deal with general conditions related to union liberties, especially complaints received in this regard. The organization has reviewed some complaints relating to certain Arab countries, and is trying to induce Arab officials to guarantee the freedom of union activity. We are trying to reach practical results quietly and without bombast and noise in this vital area of the organization's goals.

8988
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EXPERTS, BANK MANAGERS DISCUSS GULF FINANCIAL SITUATION

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 22 Aug 80 pp 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53

/Article: "Lost Liquidity in the Oil Banks"/

/Text/ Banks are sources of funds and cash and are the place to which eyes turn, when their coffers are filled with wealth and currency--this is the picture which Arab citizens conjure up when they hear the word "bank." For this reason nothing is more difficult than to persuade these citizens that Arab banks are suffering from liquidity shortages. Perhaps it is even more difficult, or impossible, to convince them that the oil banks of the Gulf, specifically, are suffering from a liquidity shortage, though this is actual fact. AL-HAWADITH has sought to ascertain the reasons and consequences of this problem in the Gulf by various ways and means, in terms of its effect on each state in the region. In order to give the Arab reader a true picture of this phenomenon, which by the traditions of the ordinary citizen is perverse, it made a tour of the Arab Gulf region, in which it met with more than one Arab and foreign bank and investment organization manager. In its discussions with them, AL-HAWADITH did not just raise the problem of liquidity--it also reviewed more than one issue preoccupying the Arab world, foremost among them being the issue of the massive financial surpluses which the oil revolution produced, where this wealth is being spent, how the rest of it is being invested, where, why these fantastic funds are leaving the Arab region, what dangers they face outside their homelands, the extent to which the region needs them, what the benefit is in having such a large number of banks in a country like Bahrain whose population does not exceed 370,000 (34,000 of whom are Indians), and what the soundest banking system is in the Gulf at present.

AL-HAWADITH inquired about the seriousness of the Arab states' orientation toward industry, where Arab resources are headed, what the percentage of risk they are facing at a time when political and economic disturbances in the world are stressing palpable facts which could lead to the loss of these funds, and other questions on the scope for investment and coordination among Arab Gulf countries.

Offshore Banks Have Improved Banking Services and the Gulf Dinar Is Not a Possibility Because of Different Economic Systems

[Interview with Mr Nur al-Din Nur al-Din]

The first meeting was with Mr Nur-al-Din Nur-al Din, manager of the Bahrain National Bank. AL-HAWADITH asked him if Bahrain was suffering from a problem of proliferation of funds and a failure to find ways of investing them, and he said,

"Incomes in the region differ from country to country. Bahrain is a country with a limited income and it does not suffer from the problem of the proliferation of funds; rather, it has a budget which is balanced between revenues and expenditures. However, countries like Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates enjoy a great income which they cannot spend on the development plans and projects the governments set out; this results in a surplus which must be invested. In addition, individuals have obvious surpluses which they invest in the Arab world through Gulf investment funds. This is the technique the Kuwaitis have created.

"I believe that the need to open new investment horizons remains pressing, so that they can acquire a suitable yield."

/Question/ We gather from that that part of the funds allotted in neighboring countries are not pumped into Bahrain's banks and markets.

/Answer/ As you know, we have a large number of banks, especially "offshore" banks--foreign banking units which are aimed at acquiring deposits from Gulf countries. However, these banking units do not have the main share of these deposits, since most of these are invested directly in the international banks at their headquarters, which are distributed between America and Europe.

/Question/ How is this situation continuing, since we are the people most in need of development?

/Answer/ Ambitious, massive development plans in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are continuing on a large scale, but these plans cannot wholly absorb oil revenues. Therefore the financial abundance which has resulted must be invested at a time when it cannot be invested domestically, which makes people turn toward the international money markets to obtain suitable yields, instead of freezing the money.

/Question/ The goal is to support and develop Arab banks through deposits derived from the surpluses. Last year, a British bank realized profits totalling about 549 million pounds sterling. This figure is several times the capital of the biggest Arab bank.

/Answer/ The profits of British banks last year did not result from Arab deposits. The rise in interest rates, rather, was the direct reason for

for the realization of these profits, and in addition there were massive British deposits in these banks alongside the Arab deposits.

As for why Arab deposits go to big foreign banks, that may be explained by the small size of Arab banks. It is difficult for an Arab bank with capital not in excess of $50 million to receive a big $500-million deposit.

To encourage Gulf governments and organizations to deposit in Arab banks, it is necessary to establish banks with large capital on the lines of the Kuwaiti-Libyan Bank, whose capital totals $1 billion. A bank of this sort can absorb and receive deposits of tens of millions. I believe that in the near future it will be in the power of Arab banks to accept big deposits.

/Question/ It is stated that delegates from Britain and Switzerland came to the area last month, to Saudi Arabia specifically, to arrange not to have more funds sent to these two countries, because of an inability to reinvest them. Is this reasonable?

/Answer/ I do not believe that that is correct, but I would not be amazed if it happened. Why? What is important to international banks is not just acquiring funds and locking them up in treasuries; rather, they strive to invest the funds in the Eurodollar market by lending them out to other countries which need financing, such as developing countries.

The obstacle which has arisen now is that foreign banks cannot offer loans to everyone knocking on their doors. Some developing countries are going through unstable political circumstances and some do not have the guarantees or the ability to pay these loans when they fall due. In addition to that, most developing countries are passing through continuing stages of development and will need two decades to be able to develop properly through their development projects.

/Question/ To what extent has the banking movement in Bahrain been a success? Does its success depend on a flow of Gulf funds?

/Answer/ In the past 4 years Bahrain has succeeded in creating a good financial center in the region. We now have 100 banks representing most major banks in the world. This reflects the degree of success of the plan drawn up for this sector, which was aimed at turning Bahrain into a financial center for the area.

I do not believe that the banks present here depend totally on the funds of the region. Many of them make use of Bahrain's status as a springboard for international operations, obtaining deposits from various areas in the world and lending them out again to other areas.

/Question/ Will the Kuwaiti-Libyan Bank, whose headquarters will be in Bahrain, be an alternative to the united Arab bank which can offer its services on the Arab level?

/Answer/ My information has it that other countries in the region will join the Kuwaiti-Libyan bank. My personal opinion is that this bank, as it seems to me, is not regional, because the door is open to all Arab countries to participate in it. It is not a bad idea that Kuwait and Libya have ventured to establish it, since there is broad scope for others to enter it as participants.

In spite of that, I do not see any obstacle to the establishment of an international Arab bank which will include all Arab countries.

/Question/ What are the effects of the drop in the interest rate in America and international markets in general on the Bahraini financial market, in terms of investment?

/Answer/ The currencies of the countries in the area are directly affected by the rise in the interest rate on the dollar, because these currencies are directly or indirectly connected to America's currency. The effect is inevitable, as a result of the fact that oil revenues are collected in dollars.

The drop in interest rates has a positive effect on banking activity in the area, since the liquidity crisis is in the process of being solved because of the lack of transfers to dollars and exploitation of its former high interest rate.

As far as we in Bahrain go, we have not been affected by the former high interest rates, since the Bahrain Monetary Organization was able to provide liquidity for local banks.

/Question/ To what extent can Bahraini banks develop beyond the status they have today?

/Answer/ From the standpoint of technical and administrative development, I can say that our banks are keeping up with the most modern ones in the world. From the standpoint of quantitative development and expansion, the last 10 years have witnessed obvious development in these banks.

/Question/ Is there competition between you and foreign (offshore) banking units?

/Answer/ In my opinion, the offshore banks have helped our local banks develop; the presence of these banking units has created a market where our local banks can take part in international financial operations. This was not open to us in the past. However, there is competition, although limited. In spite of what is said about the offshore banks, they have improved banking services in Bahrain and in the area by competing to perform the best services. Positive competition creates development.

/Question/ What losses have befallen Bahraini banks from the decree the Kuwaiti Ministry of Trade and Industry adopted prohibiting dealing in Gulf shares?

/Answer/ I am not opposed to the Kuwaiti decree, because it is aimed at protecting people from stock speculators. In 1979, registered investment companies were established in Bahrain and the people were quite receptive to underwriting them through local commercial banks, to the point where they were covered more than once. Later it appeared that speculation reached its zenith in the stock of these companies, which had not yet embarked on their activities. Therefore it was natural that officials in Kuwait should suspend transactions in their shares.

We, as a bank, say that if the Kuwaitis had not adopted this decree we would have realized greater profits and companies of this type would have proliferated in Bahrain. I am not saying that we have lost, but we have not profited.

/Question/ If the Gulf dinar is destined to come into being, will the banking system in Bahrain remain as it is?

/Answer/ It is not possible to create a Gulf dinar in the foreseeable future, although that is desirable and to be wished for. The reason it is difficult to create it lies in the differences of the economic systems of the Gulf countries.

In reality it is a surprising question for me, because such an issue had not occurred to me and I had not thought of it, because of the difficulty of achieving it. [End of interview with Nur al-Din Nur al-Din]

Arab Regimes Are Governed by Personal Caprice, Which Constitutes a Danger to Investment!

[Interview with Mr Hasan Zayn al-'Abidin]

The financial surpluses which the Gulf states possess are insufficient for financing comprehensive development plans in the region, because comprehensive development priorities still do not exist. The paved roads are still substandard and the requisite foundations for development are lacking. Therefore, to state that there is financial indigestion among the Gulf states is an exaggeration and does not correspond to reality in many of its various aspects. There are funds surplus to the plans and annual budgets of the countries of the region, true, but these are part of future budgets yet to be disbursed.

This is what Mr Hasan Zayn al-'Abidin, appointed board member of the Bahrain Investment Company, says, adding:

"I do not believe that banks in Bahrain or the Gulf region are complaining of financial surpluses. The scope for investment is limited since we still are rallying around the banner of the developing countries. Building

schools, hospitals, road systems and sewers, providing water and electricity, industrial processes, and agricultural plans require that large amounts of money exist which can be invested over a period of many years.

"It is the governments which possess the surpluses and invest them in international projects."

/Question/ This view might apply to Bahrain but not to some Gulf countries.

/Answer/ We cannot say that we have completed a development plan for a given time period in full in time, since every plan calls for the implementation of many sbusequent plans in series. We are still at the stage of building such foundations for the economy as roads, railways, communications and banks. Take for example the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It cannot complete an industrial plan in Yanbu' without having a bank to perform services for companies and workers who execute this plan.

/Question/ You say that the banks are not suffering from a deficit of funds while at the same time Kuwaiti, Bahraini and Abu Dhabi banks are suffering from a liquidity deficit. Why don't the rich Gulf states pump their surpluses into local banks, especially domestic Bahraini banks?

/Answer/ Deficits or absences of liquidity are an economic indicator. From low liquidity levels it may be understood that there is a recession and decline in incomes. The phenomenon we are talking about may be the result of a leakage of funds from countries in the area, out of a desire for high interest rates on the dollar or other currencies, or they may be the result of political circumstances. This is a temporary phenomenon and is not reaching a level where we could call it a liquidity problem. Revenues are available and oil prices are increasing; therefore I say that our liquidity shortage is a temporary one.

/Question/ Yours is the first company of its kind in Bahrain. What are your fields of investment?

/Answer/ Our fields are numerous. We finance industrial, commercial and tourist projects and construction and development projects. On the international level, we administer and organize international loans in participation with other financial institutions. We buy stocks, bonds, financial paper and gold. We prepare feasibility studies on economic projects. As for our investments, these are distributed geographically among most countries. The lending operations we performed in 1979 were 27 percent in Arab countries, 3 percent in Asia, 15 percent in Europe, 10 percent in North and South America and 5 percent in other countries.

The sectoral distribution of these loans was 14.5 percent for oil and gas projects, 10.5 percent for the industrial sector, 21 percent for banking activities and 16 percent for real estate. Trade's share was 7 percent and the rest was distributed to communications and hotel projects.

/Question/ How do you view the future for investment in European countries?

/Answer/ My view regarding investment is that it should not go beyond the Gulf countries and the Arab countries in general. Many people may not agree with me on this, but I state that investment areas in Europe and America are limited, as these countries are on the verge of completing their development processes and have become fully saturated in various sectors.

I state bluntly that our funds abroad are exposed to danger since there is a fear that the Western countries will resort to nationalizing our funds on the pretext that they constitute a financial invasion of their markets. In the long range the Arab investor will be the only loser.

/Question/ Does that mean that Arab money is in danger?

/Answer/ Not only in danger, but, if we look at yield and profitability in the West, we will be surprised to learn that it is less than that in our Arab world when guarantees and protections exist. Our countries are still fledgling ones and the scope for investment is still broad and open.

/Question/ So why are investment companies in the area still caught up in investing outside the Arab region? There are companies in Kuwait which have bought whole islands in America and turned them into tourist cities, as well as buying massive buildings in various European countries and America.

/Answer/ They know their investment policies best, but there are unfortunate objective circumstances on the Arab level. Arab regimes are dominated by personal caprice and here is where the danger lies, since investors do not dare continue with their Arab investments. Until the Arabs distinguish between politics and economics, Arab investments will avoid entering Arab countries which need them. For example, all studies show that the Sudan can feed the Arab world, but does the investor have the freedom to take money out of the Sudan? The answer is no. These are the most important obstacles facing Arab investors. I hope that Arab regimes will strive to isolate economics from politics so that the Arabs may benefit from one another.

/Question/ We gather from this that the failure to invest in Arab countries is the responsibility of regimes, not owners of capital?

/Answer/ Certainly. I hope that we will arrive at a solution to these problems, which are represented by the encroachment of political disputes among Arab regimes on joint economic and investment projects.

/Question/ What is your view of this large number of banks in Bahrain?

/Answer/ The official and popular tendency is to create an international financial center in Bahrain. This is a sound, well-studied tendency, when we look at the limited nature of income in Bahrain as compared with our neighbors in the Gulf. Bahrain is also currently oriented toward services in order to increase its income, and many banks in Bahrain provide employment opportunities for Bahraini citizens and grant facilities for the construction of real estate, hotel and other construction projects.

/Question/ On the subject of the hotel sector, it is observed that much money is being invested in this sector at a time when this sector is facing a serious slump. What is your opinion?

/Answer/ The hotel sector complements the service sector. I imagine that the absence of clear plans for this sector has led to this large number of hotels. Also, the current recession in the hotel sector may be attributed to the heavily charged political atmosphere dominating the region. Commercial activity also affects these crises, and, if everything goes well, I believe that the hotel sector will be stimulated though it will not resume the unusual upsurge which occurred in the early seventies. There was a second goal in establishing such hotels, and that was to create a causeway between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain to link up the two countries and facilitate the task of moving businessmen around.

/Question/ There are persons who link the recession in hotels to the high rates for lodgings in them. Businessmen come to Bahrain in the morning and leave in the evening, through the rapid means of transport available in Bahrain.

/Answer/ The upsurge in hotel construction and operation and increasing demand for rooms has been accompanied by a rise in construction and operating costs. However, after a period the rate of hotel occupancy dropped to 50 percent, causing hotels to fail to meet operating expenses, which caused a rise in the costs of staying in these hotels.

As regards the lease of transportation between Bahrain and other countries of the world, in my opinion that is desirable, since it reduces transport costs and attracts many people. The hotels do not depend for their profits on room occupancy but on other services such as meals, parties and other hotel activities.

/Question/ How do you regard the real estate sector at the present time?

/Answer/ The real estate sector in Bahrain is still good, and there is a demand for good houses at appropriate prices. I believe that in another 2 years we will find a shortage in the real estate sector and there will be an upsurge in building and construction, because our country has managed to be a country of services and constantly needs offices and apartments.

/Question/ Why don't you direct most of your investments toward consumer industries?

/Answer/ To establish an industry, any industry, factors must exist for that industry's success, such as manpower, primary materials, market size, and money. As far as Bahrain goes, this is to be considered a country without primary materials, its market is limited and manpower is low. However, one can overcome that with modern factories.

The problem as far as we in the area are concerned is the lack of coordination among Gulf countries. Talk has begun recently about coordination among governments in the area to avoid overlap and to avoid incurring losses. If this coordination is established, it will be useful. If the requisite formulas for coordination are not arrived at, it will not be a bad idea to establish modest industries after determining that they are feasible.

/Question/ Fear of investing in Western countries has become evident following the political disturbances sweeping the world. Do you have new investment plans?

/Answer/ I consider that investors must turn toward the Arab area. The first step in this is to eliminate obstacles and provide guarantees, since there is no alternative to investing in the Arab world.

[He continued, emphasizing his words] Frankly, there are obstacles among countries in the region, in spite of the homogeneity and similarity of their customs, traditions and political and economic systems. I, as a Bahraini, cannot own one share in a Kuwaiti or Saudi company. Therefore we must accept the justifications for the flight of capital, as long as coordination is absent or nonexistent.

/Question/ The rise in gold prices and the aggravated inflation have caused paper currencies to lose much of their value. What is the future of these currencies?

/Answer/ This picture is correct, since inflation is lowering the buying power of paper currencies, which retain their major role in transactions. I am afraid that gold will suffer a relapse following this great price escalation. Therefore I say that it is carefully studied investments which will provide good results, if the goals are economic and not speculative.

/Question/ Do you expect a severe drop in gold?

/Answer/ I do not expect a severe drop but the likelihood of rises and falls remains present. Gold went up to $800 an ounce then dropped to $500. In spite of that, gold remains an important vehicle because its reserves are not frozen or controlled by foreign banks. However, as to how long gold will continue to play that role, this is something no one can predict.

/Question/ Do you believe that it has become urgent to establish a stock market in Bahrain? Why are some people afraid of it?

/Answer/ Bahrain is in palpable need of a money for financial paper, stocks, bonds and commodities like copper, sugar, tin and tea. By creating such a market we will be able to advance toward the establishment of a stock market in every sense of the word.

/Question/ Last year the Kuwaiti Ministry of Trade and Industry adopted a decree prohibiting transactions in Gulf stocks. What damage befell local banks?

/Answer/ We as a Gulf state are placing obstacles in the way of capital transfers. If we want to establish a Gulf market it will be essential to grant freedom and facilities for capital transfers, along with guarantees. As regards Gulf stocks, most of the people who own them are Kuwaitis and they are the ones who profit from these stocks. Therefore I see no justification for suspending transactions in them. Losses have befallen some people dealing in Gulf company stocks since the decree suspending dealings in them in Kuwait. [End of interview with Hasan Zayn al-'Abidin]

The Hotel Sector: Empty Rooms, High Prices And a Failure to Pay Are Disadvantageous to Banks

The hotel sector in the Gulf, and in Bahrain in particular, is headed for something resembling a crisis, now that it has started to decline and shrink.

A month ago a businessman traveled to Doha and stayed in a first class (five star) hotel with 400 rooms that had more than 150 employees and laborers. This hotel of 400 rooms, as the businessman says, had only 21 occupants. The tariff for 1 night in a single room was 320 riyals; that dropped to 280 riyals, and it is expected that it will drop again.

This might be one of many pictures one could give of the situation in the hotel sector in the Arab Gulf.

People responsible for this sector are anxious, especially as regards the state of Bahrain, which has planned for a decade to be a service center in the Gulf, providing all facilities to that end, including facilities bearing on the hotel management profession, so that that could be one of the pillars of the service center of the region following the destruction of Beirut.

People who are not responsible /for it/ speak bitterly about the wealth in this sector and expect that it will experience further recession and regression. In fact, some people point an accusing finger to people responsible for the country's planning, while others are afraid that ownership

of the hotel sector will revert to those financing it, namely the banks. The picture one comes up with on getting into the subject of the hotels in Bahrain is a real one, and one can understand the meaning of pessimism when one talks to the people in the hotel sector in the Gulf.

The manager of the Abu Dhabi Bank analyzes the story of the hotels in the course of a discussion of "the all-encompassing liquidity after 1973 resulting from the rise in oil prices," stating:

"The upsurge in real estate which the area, and Bahrain in particular, experienced was deficient in planning. How so?

"Local banks rushed in along with the impetuous to finance real estate projects, proceeded to give loans, and proceeded to receive interest on these loans, which they paid off in just 2 years from the date the loan was granted because of the high revenues on real estate structures. Real estate paid out capital in 3 years at most. This made the banks prefer this kind of investment. This situation continued until the country reached the saturation point, the cycle of economic retrenchment began to turn, and the banks began to complain of their loans, which were frozen in real estate from which there were no longer any economic returns. This was in 1977 and it has continued up to now; debts and interest have piled up to the point where the banks have started to come very close to owning these real properties and hotels."

He said, "The value of the real property is now being paid back in no less than 15 years and in some cases 20 years. In other cases there is no hope that the capital expended will be paid back."

He added that the victims of the financial upsurge are innumerable. They are in three sectors: real estate, stocks and hotels. Hasan Jum'ah, general manager of administrative affairs of the Bahrain National Bank, says "Fifty percent of the hotel rooms are empty and the rates are still high." He wondered about the purpose in constructing new hotels and held the Ministry of Trade and Industry of Bahrain responsible for the consequences of the current situation.

These are the views of two people involved in the banking sector in Bahrain on the hotel sector, whose share prices have dropped from 5 dinars to 1 dinar. Many people expect that the price will drop to half a dinar after the construction of three new hotels, the Sheraton, Diplomat and Regency, is completed. Their capacity is estimated at 1,400 rooms.

Bahrain and Qatar are in the same situation.

In Qatar, 10 million riyals were paid previously for a hotel named the Qatar International Hotel but today its worth does not exceed 5 million, and it is expected that its owner will sell it at that price.

[Interview with Mr Ghazi al-Musawi]

Let us return to Bahrain to see what Mr Ghazi al-Musawi, the deputy director general and branch manager of the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, has to say about investment in the hotel sector, which has been shrinking and regressing for about 2 years.

He says, "The situation the hotel sector is going through is natural. If we go back to the beginning, to the days when the hotel industry was like a milk cow which poured out money, we will see that this sector drew capital from every direction, and as a result the number of hotels increased to a point in excess of the need for them. This was not clear at the beginning, when the financial, developmental and investment upsurges covered all the negative aspects it was expected would occur. In addition, the growth rates recorded during the past 3 years cannot be compared in terms of volume with the growth rates recorded in the sixties."

Mr al-Musawi believes that the hotel sector will suffer more when the three new hotels are built.

The final conclusion, in Mr al-Musawi's opinion, is that expansion in this sector lacked previous planning. Mr al-Musawi agrees with the two previous observers that the destiny of the hotels will ultimately be to revert to the banks which financed them. The failure to pay loan instalments and the accumulating interest will ultimately be disadvantageous to the banks.

Mr al-Musawi goes on to say, "If the entities responsible made a rapid decision to prevent the construction of new hotels, that could save existing banks from falling into the abyss."

Mr al-Musawi describes "the important story" in the hotel sector by saying, "Its labor is foreign and the costs of this labor are high in comparison with local labor, since the former requires housing, facilities and other needs. In addition, the foreign labor, whose expertise we are buying, leaves with the money. This is unfortunate."

Governments Are Acting in the Place of Banks and Politics Impedes the Smooth Flow of Money:

AL-HAWADITH had a conversation with Mr Ghazi al-Musawi, deputy general manager and manager of branches of the Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait, on a number of issues at question, including investment in the region, agricultural investment and its requirements, the problems of smooth flow of money into the Arab world, inflation, high interest rates, the flight of capital, the dangers it is exposed to, and the good and bad points of the offshore banks.

The talk dealt with the hotel industry in Bahrain from various standpoints, beginning with a question on Bahrain's banks in particular and Gulf banks in general, were they suffering from an excess of money?

/Answer/ In my opinion, there is no crisis in creating different features of capital investment in the region. There might be a crisis in creating funds in Gulf currencies to finance the needs of the region.

/Question/ Why don't Arab banks invest part of their money in Arab projects, such as agriculture, for example, which requires capital, in enormous stretches of the Arab nation and Africa?

/Answer/ Agricultural investment needs expertise and acquaintance with agricultural needs. It needs banks with specific ability in this field. I consider that the Gulf states have started to take the place of the banks in this field. They back, support and participate in Arab agricultural projects at the Arab level in general. The need for specialized agricultural banks is great, and there are few such banks at present.

/Question/ But the Arab agricultural banks are short of money for realizing their agricultural programs.

/Answer/ The shortage you are talking about is basically dependent on possibilities for the smooth flow of capital from one Arab country to another. This smooth flow is subject to numerous factors. Political, social and economic factors stand as an obstacle to the ease of the flow and free transfer of money.

/Question/ Last year Bahrain received a $70-million loan from foreign banks, with a minor contribution from local banks, to expand the Alba aluminum plant. Why didn't local banks perform that task instead of the foreign ones, which got the interest?

/Answer/ When the government of Bahrain put the loan up on the international market it was natural that the foreign banking units would contribute the major share, in view of the inability of the three banks in Bahrain to finance a project of this size. The small size of our banks limits their ability to finance major projects. Is it banking policy for a bank to lend out a sum equivalent to its capital to one borrower? The collapse of the project would mean the collapse of the bank.

/Question/ Depositing in international banks has become one of the broadest fields of investment now. Is this tendency of benefit to the investor, especially since the rate of inflation is increasing every day?

/Answer/ For the first time, the existing balance between the interest rate and the rate of inflation has been disrupted. It was well known that the interest rate was below the inflation rate, especially in the dollar market. However, in the last few months the interest rate has risen and exceeds the rate of inflation. This has caused investors to deposit their money in the world's banks, to get a high interest rate. The limited nature of the markets in the area and elements of risk in investing in local

projects and companies with a relatively small volume have helped the emergence of the phenomenon of the flight and deposit of money.

I believe that the outgoing currents will change as a result of the recent drop of interest rates. I also believe that the United States has ventured to devalue its currency--to correct its balance of payments, for example, or for another reason, which might be political.

Therefore the local investment climate remains more secure and confident than that for transfers to foreign markets.

/Question/ However, the flight of money has caused the emergence of a liquidity crisis in the banks.

/Answer/ The effects have not been confined to the creation of a liquidity crisis. Rather, they have transcended that to local negative effects, among them the rise in the price of local borrowing as a consequence of the paucity of local currency.

However, following the drop in American interest rates, I expect that most of the money which fled will return to take its place in the local market.

/Question/ How much time will it take to return?

/Answer/ The answer is difficult because of sudden events which happen every day without warning. Most analysts in the world did not expect rises and falls of such speed and intensity in the dollar.

/Question/ What does the drop in the interest rate on the dollar mean as far as you are concerned?

/Answer/ That event concerns us and concerns all owners of capital, since it reduces pressure on the sources of local currencies exchanged for dollars.

/Question/ The chairman of the Arab Monetary Fund said that Arab countries were suspending investment of their funds in America.

/Answer/ I have no interpretation on that. Some Arab countries might not have invested their money directly in the United States, or through projects in America, but as long as oil revenues are paid in dollars, it is necessary to find a place for them in the American market, if just for a limited time. The dollar is no longer a domestic American currency but has become a standard for determining the prices of requirements; that is, it is a worldwide currency.

The failure of Arab countries to invest directly is something I cannot make a judgment on, because it is related to political decisions. As far as investment in the United States goes, it is a risk, and I consider that

it would be better if our investments were distributed temporarily preparatory to being pumped back into the Arab development process.

/Question/ What is the benefit of offshore banks, which now have reached 45 in number?

/Answer/ The offshore banks are branches of international banks. They possess the power to conclude and make contracts, as do the banks of which they are a subsidiary, and they came to Bahrain for numerous reasons, among them to benefit from the absence of taxes in Bahrain and to get closer to the sources of money represented by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. As far as Bahrain goes, it has benefited by having its citizens work in these institutions and from the rental of offices, shops and buildings and stimulation of the market. More important than all that, Bahrain has been transformed into a growing developing financial center. Advanced banking service is one way of guaranteeing that Bahrain turns into a service center in the region.

/Question/ There are people who say that foreign banking units have not been sufficiently successful because there are no good middlemen.

/Answer/ That talk in general is not valid. Some organizations or banking units have realized great success thanks to their activity in the market, and some have not, just because of administrative mistakes.

/Question/ What is your opinion about investment in the hotel sector, which is now regressing?

/Answer/ The stagnation in the hotel sector is natural, since it lacked planning and many hotels were constructed, whose resources exceeded demand. In addition to that, annual growth rates in the past 5 years were not in balance with the upsurge in construction and employment, which had become dependent on greater growth rates, as in the early seventies. I expect that hotel ownership will revert to the banks because of their failure to pay instalments on the loans they received and the interest which is increasing year after year. [End of interview with Ghazi al-Musawi]

Arabs Are Failing To Play an Intermediary Commercial and Banking Role

Mr 'Abd-al-Latif Jinahi, general manager of the Islamic Bank of Bahrain in Bahrain, stressed in a conversation with AL-HAWADITH that his country's banks are suffering from a liquidity shortage as a result of their activities and practices in the past. He said, "Positive measures on the part of monetary authorities have lessened the severity of the crisis."

On the connection between the liquidity crisis and the surplus money available to countries in the region, Mr Jinahi pointed the blame to the countries in the region, stating "Bahrain is a country open to various types of

of investment and is considered an important money market, but why invest these surpluses abroad?" He said, "This question must be raised before decisionmakers in the area."

He denied that offshore banks had any influence on the Islamic Bank of Bahrain because the points of emphasis on which commercial banks rely are different from those in the Islamic Bank.

On the Arab banks' role as intermediaries, Mr Jinahi stated that they have not played that role. He called for the training of Arabs who will be able to play this role in various fields, since in our various commercial transactions we rely on foreign imtermediaries.

He denied that the process of mediation in banking and commercial activities required talent. He said, "Our existing agencies have not yet crystallized, and the matter is one of time and need." He stated that there is something called the foreigner complex, which is causing us to lose confidence in ourselves and our powers and abilities. He pointed out that the recent period witnessed some activity on the part of good domestic personnel at a high level of understanding and consciousness.

Mr Jinahi called on Arab peoples and governments to cooperate, coordinate and give support among themselves in order to catch up to the cavalcade of civilization and progress: "Otherwise we will remain behind and no one will notice us."

On the Arab Insurance Organization for whose establishment a contract was recently signed in Bahrain by Kuwait, the Emirates and Libya, with a capital of $US 3 billion, Mr Jinahi said, "The capital subscribed to that does not exceed 5 percent of its permitted capital. To judge an insurance project of that magnitude is premature, because it depends on the activities which will be handed over to this project. As far as the permitted capital goes, that is tremendous and reflects the Arab market's need for a similar amount." He added that creation of an Arab insurance market was vital and essential, especially as a result of fraudulent activities and increased insurance fees on vessels, ships and tankers plying our waters on the excuse that ours is a war zone.

Mr Jinahi concluded his statement by saying,

"The resources exist to create an Arab insurance market paralelling the world markets, since the Arab market is vast, relations with the world market are good and we have the resources, if they are chosen well."

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CSO: 4802

BILLION-DOLLAR RISE IN JAPAN'S SALES TO GULF REGION

Manama GULF MIRROR in English 6-12 Sep 80 p 17

[Text]

JAPAN this week announced an increase of more than one billion dollars in its export trade with the Gulf and Saudi Arabia during the first six months of this year, and reported unprecedented heavy buying by Arab investors in the Tokyo Stock Exchange.

Figures released by the Japan Tariff Association in Tokyo show that trade with Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia totalled $3.67 billion in the first six months of this year, compared with $2.45 billion (at present exchange rates) during the same period last year.

Meanwhile, during the last week in August the Nikkei Dow Jones average on the Tokyo Stock Exchange leapt 24.36 points to a record 6,910.52 following the heavy Arab buying.

Exports to the whole Middle East during the first six months of this year were well up on those in the first half of last year: $7,357.4 million compared with $4,909.2 million.

Car sales to the region were up significantly. Toyota Motor Corporation, for example, reported sales up by 84.1 per cent to 142,377 vehicles while Nissan sales were up by 51.9 per cent to 77,062.

The Japanese electronics industry has also increased its exports to the Middle East, particularly in the sale of video machines, with Japan supplying more than 50 per cent of all machines sold in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia.

Construction business continues to be a regular source of income for Japan, with the country winning 8 per cent of all contracts awarded in the Middle East during the first six months of this year. The deals were worth a total of $1,462.4 million.

The increased trade with the region helps Japan to offset part of its balance of trade deficit. Japan is more dependent on imported oil than any other industrialised nation.

In the first six months of 1980, Japan spent $22,847.2 million on imports from the Middle East compared with $11,832.4 million in the same period the previous year.

Japanese exports to the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, January to June.
(Figures in million US dollars at current exchange rate):

	1980	1979
Bahrain	75.346	67.57
Kuwait	563.22	334.744
Oman	131.32	68.50
Qatar	107.01	112.27
Saudi Arabia	2,195.75	1,473.95
UAE	602.3	389.39

CSO: 4820

TRADE COOPERATION AMONG GULF STATES URGED

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 7 Oct 80 p 3

[Text]

Dubai, Oct. 6 (WAM): The Federation of the Gulf Chambers of Trade has called for strengthening of communications and liaison between the Arab Gulf countries and approved a project on mediation and trade arbitration between Gulf countries, Head of Dubai Chamber of Trade and Industry Saif Al Ghurair said here today.

Ghurair returned here after attending the meeting of Gulf Chambers of Trade, Industry and Agriculture Federation and the Arab Chambers of Trade, Industry and Agriculture Union held in Tunis. He has also attended the Arab-British Chamber's executive office meeting held in London.

Ghurair said that the Gulf Chambers' Federation discussed the issue of fraud in sea transportation and decided to ask the Paris-based International Chamber of Trade to seek its plans for setting up an international office for sea transportation as one of the means to cure this problem.

The Federation also decided to take part in the international seminar to be organised by the Gulf Studies Centre of Basra University on the future of the Arab Gulf and the strategy of joint Arab work to be held from March 29 to 31.

It also decided to organise a symposium on the obstacles delaying the economic integration of the Gulf Arab countries.

On the meetings of the Arab Chambers of Trade, Industry and Agriculture Union, Ghurair said that the Union discussed some administrative issues and topics which aim at strengthening Arab economic cooperation.

The Union expressed the hope that the Arab economic summit to be held in Jordan next month be a basic step in supporting and directing the joint economic work.

It decided to prepare a memorandum on the Union's viewpoint on the strategy of the joint Arab economic work to be submitted to the proposed summit.

The Union welcomed the organising of an economic conference for representatives of the Arab and African private sectors to be held in Kenya during next year.

Ghurair said that the Arab-British Chamber's executive office reviewed its progress of work, the various administrative issues and the work of the technical committee charged with preparing proposals on the best ways to help the Chamber in achieving its goals.

CSO: 4820

ZAYED APPROVES AFRICAN ISLAMIC CENTER SET-UP

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 2 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

Abu Dhabi, Oct. 1 (WAM): His Highness President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan today issued a federal decree sanctioning the memorandum of association of the Khartoum-based African Islamic Centre.

Six Arab countries are taking part in the agreement establishing the Centre. They include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Sudan, Egypt and the UAE.

The Centre's activities include propagation of Islam, serving the Islamic countries in general and the African Islamic countries in particular and cooperating with the Islamic missions in propagating Islam and Islamic culture.

The Centre is administrated by council of trustees comprising representatives of the six participating countries plus the director of the Centre who is appointed by the council for a three-year period.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS LOAN--The Kuwait-based Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD) this week announced at $125 million lending programme for 1980 to finance agricultural and other projects throughout the Arab world. Part of the money will be used to finance field studies into the possibility of a new microwave communications connection between Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria and Jordan. Other AFESD projects include a $19.4 million road scheme in Sudan, a $7 million agricultural programme for South Yemen and a $20 million farm development plan for Morocco. The fund will also finance a $9.5 million aerial testing station in Algeria. AFESD is also preparing studies on the formation of an Arab engineering consultancy, following proposals made at the Algiers meeting of Oapec. The fund is also financing industrial and mining schemes in the Arab world with a $199 million budget. [Text] [Manama GULF MIRROR in English 6-12 Sep 90 p 17]

CSO: 4820

PROBLEMS OF ISLAMIC MOVEMENT SIMILAR TO THOSE OF PAN-ARABISM

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 11 Jul 80 pp 20-23

[Article by Nash'at Al-Taghlibi: "Islamic Tide in the Region Stricken by the Same Nemesis as the Arab Tide"]

[Text] In the thirties, a Syrian-Jordanian-Saudi comission was set up in Syria to study the prospects of reviving the Hejaz railway line from Damascus to the Islamic holy places via Jordan, so as to facilitate the movement of pilgrims and avoid hardships encountered along the desert road. At the time, airliners had not yet started to operate, cars were not available and roads were very poor.

Like many other inter-Arab projects, this project never saw the light of day, either because of political disputes among the three states now and then, or because of differences over funding, or as a result of unexpected circumstances. Now and then, the papers would report the news of the joint commission with a sense of earnestness and optimism on the whole, but as days passed, news of the commission became a source of tongue-in-the-cheek entertainment and amusement. Eventually, the public forgot all about the commission and could not care less. The members of the commission changed several times as regimes and circumstances changed. Some of them died, and, with the advent of the age of cars and airplanes, almost nobody gave railroads another thought.

The unexpected surprise, however, is that the commission is still alive, according to press reports. More than 45 years after the emergence of the idea of the project, the commission is still meeting and drawing up plans.

On 14 May 1948, the late Syrian President Shukri al-Quwwatli received a number of journalists at the presidential palace. Martial law had been declared in Syria, war preparations were in full swing and the papers were full of the news of the unprecedented victories scored by the Liberation Army led by the late Fawzi al-Qawuqji from his headquarters in Beirut. Addressing the journalists, Shukri al-Quwwatli said: "This is one of the most illustrious days in our history. Tomorrow the Arab armies will enter Palestine to extricate it from the claws of Zionism

and restore justice to the rightful people. We will be victorious, God willing." When a journalist asked about the differences among the Arab states and the possible effect of those differences on military operations, al-Quwwatli answered: "As God is my witness, we will abstain from engaging in any differences until we achieve our goal and score the great victory. The fast of Ramadan lasts 30 days, but we are willing to go on a longer fast in which we will abstain from indulging in differences for 2, 3 months, even a year, so as to fulfill our nationalist goals which are precious to all of us."

The great fast was declared indeed. Unfortunately, it was not a fast in which the Arab states abstained from engaging in differences. It was a fast in which they abstained from fulfilling pan-Arab goals. This fast has been going on for 32 years and had developed in the course of time into 2 fasts, or a compound fast. To date no one knows how this fast will end and when the crescent of the political 'Id al-Fitr will be sighted. [When the new moon of the month of Shawwal is sighted, the fast of Ramadan ends and 'Id al-Fitr holiday begins.]

In 1948, the Arabs were not able to remove the Zionist enemy from the area of Palestine assigned to them under the partition plan. For 19 years they daydreamed and threatened to throw Israel into the sea, but they failed to make any preparations to carry out their intentions, while Israel did nothing but make preparations to throw the Arabs into the desert.

In 1967, the second fast began, when Israel "surprised" the Arabs and seized all of Palestine and expanded into other Arab territories. The second fast has been going on now for more than 13 years. Meanwhile, revolutions have taken place, the pile of slogans has grown bigger, and plans and strategies have become more diversified. And yet we are still where we were 32 years ago. Our national goals are forgotten, but not our differences. The only difference between 1948 and 1980 is that at the beginning of the age of "struggle" we used to challenge the whole world, believing that we could depend on ourselves and on the slogans of "united action" or "united ranks." Now, however, we depend on what others can do for us to help us regain our lands, achieve our victory and restore our dignity and pride! Arab summits have not been able to prove their effectiveness or to arrive at a plan of action--not to say a strategy--that can be implemented. Pan-Arab agreements and conventions which were signed at the inception of the Arab League remain unfulfilled and unimplemented. And the Arab information media have failed to prepare the public for "national liberation," because the media have turned into instruments serving the various regimes and making meaningless sounds when they are not directing their attention to stoking up dissension or praising rulers.

Now, the world is in turmoil, Israel is racing against time, and we are silent, waiting. We are also supposed to wait until November to see if the upcoming Arab summit will agree to a "joint strategy" or not. That is to say that we have to wait until the American presidential campaign goes into its final phase before we can tell black from white.

Observers and political experts everywhere agree that the Palestine question is primarily a pan-Arab question. The Arab regimes have inundated people with promises none of which has been fulfilled. It is said that any regime which promises the people more than it can deliver will cause the people to be disappointed in it--that is, if it does not become disappointed in itself.

Observers and political experts everywhere agree that the Arabs, who were supposed to have become a unified bloc, at least after a number of Arab countries gained "independence," and after a number of "revolutions" took place among them, have now become three blocs. One bloc depends on the Soviet socialist bloc, the second depends on the American bloc, and the third was in between until it saw salvation through the Western bloc represented by the European Common Market. That is to say that there does not exist a unified pan-Arab bloc which depends on itself and employs and utilizes the political differences in the Western world.

Observers and political experts everywhere agree that democracy is the best means of mobilizing the forces of the people and securing the people's participation in the national struggle. Even if democracy is not feasible under certain regimes, it should exist among the states which need to cooperate with each other, if these states believed in democracy. This kind of democracy is defined as "enabling each party to say what it wishes to say, so that when supporters and opponents of an issue have said all there is to be said, all parties will then agree on a line of action that would secure for each of them a place in which it can utilize its talents, capabilities and power for the sake of all."

In the Arab world, democracy is still unknown among the people as well as among the states. This is why our disputes and conflicts continued to be the axis of our lives. This axis continued to be the strongest element, because other elements prevented us from seeing what is happening among us within our own countries, as well as what is happening around us. The world has concluded that the Arabs are divided into three blocs. In fact, each one of these three blocs is divided into several sub-blocs. This is due to the weakness of the political structures and the impact of that on military structures. In the view of military experts, "politicization" deprives armies of their basic qualities and capabilities, because the politicization of armies makes them an active element in domestic politics. In such an event, certain means, such as organizations and militias, become necessary to protect the regimes from their armies. This in itself lessens the ability of armies to undertake effective action outside their own borders.

And so, the compound Arab fast has continued for all this long period of time without a glimpse of hope that there will be an early end to it. The anti-Zionist Jewish writer Alfred Lillienthal recently pointed to one potential element of Arab strength. He said: "The Arabs have not developed the means of using their dollars--that is their wealth--in the

service of their goals, in contrast to what the Zionists do. Indeed, there are those who believe that Arab funds invested in American banks serve Israel more than they serve the Arabs, who could impose their will if they could muster enough courage. But if the Arabs remain inactive and passive, they will be the losers."

Fahd al-Qawasimi, the mayor of Hebron, recently said that "40,000 Palestinians have entered Israeli prisons since 1967," that is since the beginning of the second big fast. The road to these prisons is still open!

Khalid al-Hasan, one of the most prominent figures in the PLO, said a few days ago: "The Arabs are heading for a critical period that might burn more than one Arab country." Is this a warning or is it a fact? Whatever the case may be, we are facing a reality which we cannot deny. We as Arabs have been facing, until now at least, a state of complete incapacity resulting from our "complete" failure to depend on ourselves, our failure to clearly define our goals, and our failure even to understand our "friends" or "allies." We are unable to see what they are capable of giving us, what they want to withhold from us, where their interests begin, or how our interests get sucked into the swirl--if not the hell--of their interests.

Those who have lost their confidence in Arabism, Arab nationalism and Arab unity--even in the unity of Arab ranks--are searching for a way to regain their confidence through the phenomenon of the "Islamic tide" in the region. Those people have become recently convinced of the saying by Shaykh 'Abd al-Hamid Ibn Bades (1889-1940), which has since become a proverb, that "The Arabs have agreed not to agree." But have Moslems agreed to agree? Like the Arabs, the Moslems are also divided. They fall into three major groups: conservatives, revolutionaries and in between. Beyond that, they are divided into various sects and sub-groups.

'Ali Murad, the Algerian thinker, is the director of the Collegiate Institution for Arab and Islamic Studies which he established in Lyons, France, in 1948. Along with another Algerian, Muhammad Arkun, Muhammad Talibi of Tunisia, Khalid Muhammad Khalid of Egypt, Sayyid Nasr of Iraq and other intellectuals, he has been seeking to steer Islam clear of the blemishes that have sullied it, and that have occasionally led to a kind of fanaticism which is at variance with the tolerance of Islam. Commenting on the new phenomenon, he said: "There is no doubt that Israel's intransigence and occupation of Jerusalem, Islam's third holiest place, whose history is closely associated with the creed of Islam; its occupation of Hebron, which contains the tomb of Abraham, who is holy to all Moslems; and the inability of 600 million Moslems to face 3 million Israelis are all factors that have driven Moslems of all classes to adhere and cling to the only thing available to them, namely, Islam. But it is also beyond doubt that the bankruptcy of the Arab governments since their independence was also a major factor [leading people to turn to Islam]. With regard to religion, we find that the problems faced by Islam, which have been the

cause of incapacity and failure and which have at the same time attracted and polarized the desperate people, are primarily due to ignorance." He cited the example of a number of ulema who condemned the conquest of the moon "because the astronauts who landed on the moon were not in a state of religious purity." Other ulema described the abolition of the death sentence as "an act of aggression that contradicts the Islamic faith," despite the fact that God's name occurred 56 times in the Koran accompanied by the adjectives "the merciful, the compassionate."

At any rate, the outbreak of "the Islamic revolution" in Iran has, since 1978, revived the hopes of Moslems in "the emergence of an Islamic unity or union." While it may not contribute directly to a solution of the Palestine question, that union would at least contribute to the liberation of Islam's third holiest place. Indeed, the Islamic tide, which has assumed a seemingly homogeneous character in several areas, has stirred the concern of the West and the United States, and especially worried the Soviets. Neutral observers considered it to be "one of the more stimulating factors in international life."

More than that, it has lately transpired that in 1975 Israel had begun to prepare detailed studies about "the potentialities of contemporary Islam," the possible effects of that potential on international politics, and the means to deal with these effects. As Westerners, the rulers of Israel pay attention to time and utilize every minute of time, whereas the Arabs and Moslems, because of their characteristic temporization and patience, which they developed out of their sense of fear and anxiety during the successive ages of colonization and subjugation, pay little attention to time and have no sense of its value.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Afghan problem became a touchstone of Islamic power. That problem overshadowed all Arab and Islamic problems, including the problems of Eritrea and Somalia, the problem of "atheistic" influence in regions that have an Islamic character that outweights its Arab character, and the Palestine question itself. The world was closely watching the actions of Moslems with regard to Afghanistan to detect through those actions the prospects and potential of Moslem actions in Palestine. But Moslem action vis-a-vis the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was not any better than the behavior of the Arabs vis-a-vis the Palestine question. From the very first moment, the Islamic states disagreed over how to deal with the problem. This disagreed over whether it was a problem of "invasion and occupation" or a question of "liberation and rescue." It was self-evident then that the Islamic governments, who were incapable of confronting the Soviet invasion even with the means available to them, would disagree over priorities. Should priority be given to dealing with the Afghan problem, which is the center of danger against the Islamic world and Arab and Islamic areas rich in resources, hence a menace that could deprive the Arabs and Moslems of their most important means of liberating Palestine, or at least solving the Palestine problem? Or should priority be given to the Palestine

question itself, confining support to Afghanistan to enthusiastic slogans and some aid that does little good.

This situation reassured Israel and the entire West, especially after the Moslems, like the Arabs before them, proved incapable of conducting a dialog that would crystallize ideas and advance rationality. The Moslems ignored anything that is capable of guaranteeing the development of thought and reason. In addition, there were attempts to invest Islam with a new ideology that would strip it of its spiritual values and give it a radical political character, as we see in Iran. There, the regime and the masses are caught in a vicious circle from which they do not know how to exit. The president of Iran no longer knows how to act or behave, because Khomeyni told him: "If you are incapable, you have to go." Iranian Moslems no longer know who is a real Moslem and who is a phony, because Khomeyni has declared that "the so-called Moslems who claim to be mujahidin or the people's fedayeen have misrepresented and misinterpreted Islam."

All Moslems in the world began to wonder whether it is true that "all the prophets have failed to achieve success and lay down the foundations of justice in the world." This is what Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni said in a broadcast to the people marking the 15th of Sha'ban, which he identified only as the anniversary of the anticipated birth of the Mahdi.

Moslems outside Iran waited for a correction or a verification of Khomeyni's statements. But after waiting for a few days in vain, they became certain that the statements attributed to Khomeyni were actually made by him, and that they even involved the Prophet Muhammad, the prophet of all Moslems. Khomeyni had said: "Even the Prophet Muhammad, may God bless him and grant him salvation--the last of the prophets who came to reform mankind and implement justice--was unsuccessful in his time. The person who will succeed, lay the foundations of justice all over the world and correct deviations, is the expected Mahdi." Khomeyni explained the absence of the awaited Mahdi by saying: "God almighty has kept him as a reserve for the sake of mankind." He added: "The reason why God almighty extended the [absence?] of the awaited Mahdi, peace be upon him, is that there was no one in mankind who could undertake his major task--not even the prophets or the saints."

At this point, people began to wonder how Muhammad could be the last of the prophets and be unable to fulfill the mission which God had entrusted to him and which complements the mission of those who came before him? And who could the Mahdi be, if "there is no one in mankind who could undertake such his major task--not even the prophets or the saints"?

Without getting into a religious argument which should better be left to the ulema, it was the right of Moslems to search their souls and refer to the Koran in which all Moslems believe to ascertain whether all the prophets ending with Muhammad, may God bless him, had succeeded in their tasks and had fulfilled their missions or not. The people found that the holy

book did not cast doubt on the prophets and threatened those who did not believe in the prophets with death and destruction. Were the prophets required to make miracles or were they supposed to be "preachers and warners"--that is messengers entrusted with carrying God's words to his worshippers? In the Koranic chapter of the Spider, there is an answer to this question: "A messenger's job is to relay and explain."

What is important, however, and we have to be candid here, is that the differences in sects and interpretations made many Moslems deviate from the most important teachings of their religion, and immerse themselves in marginal disagreements that have come to endanger not just their major causes but also their very existence. This is not the fault of the prophets inasmuch as it is the fault of those who fast and abstain from food and drink for 30 days, but, at the same time, abstain from adhering to the words of God for ages (just 32 years in the case of the Arab leaders). God has exhorted his people to close ranks and not to allow divisions and enmities to come between them. He also exhorted them to examine the verses of His book so that they may be guided and see the light. Indeed, all observers and experts on politics and war everywhere have emphasized that if the Arabs and Moslems were to be "guided and see the light," they would be able to rescue Jerusalem, hence protect all their religious and national sanctities. They would then be able to deter agression and ward off invasion of any Arab and Islamic land, including Palestine and Afghanistan.

But the fast has gone for too long, and no one has seen the light yet. As a result, we have not taken a single step forward. Indeed, we have taken several steps backwards. Our aspirations continued to depend on others rather than on ourselves. We know, however, that Europe which said that "it has realized lately the right of the Arabs in Palestine, and the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination, along with Israel's right to exist," has been unable to go beyond this drowsy sense of realization, because it is incapable of doing anything more and because we have laden it with more than its ability to bear.

As for the Soviet Union, which was the first to recognize Israel, and which still supplies it with human resources and refuses to countenance any infringement of Israel's entity, is interested in the Arab cause only insofar as this is necessary to the realization of its interests which started out with limited influence in the area, but have now expanded to include the occupation of Afghanistan. Nobody knows where these interests would end.

As for the United States, there is no one who does not know the extent of its military and economic aid to Israel and its willingness to mobilize all its capabilities to protect Israel, as we have seen happen in the 1973 war, as well as before and after it. There is no one who does not know its sham support of the Arabs and its interest in bringing about a "just peace" while placing obstacles in the face of that very peace. Last week, Israel

received the first 4 F-16's out of a total of 75 such aircraft which will be supplied by the United States. By the end of this year, Israel will have received 32 of these aircraft. The delivery schedule has been advanced by 2 full years to enable Israel to strengthen its military forces. Three years ago, the United States supplied Israel with F-15 aircraft, which became the spearhead of Israeli attacks on Arab countries, especially Lebanon. Military experts say that the two new models of American warplanes are superior to the best Soviet aircraft models, and that Israel will have the best air force among the "states of the Western bloc."

On the other hand, the United States, despite Arab and Moslem efforts, continues to refuse to recognize the PLO and the Palestinian people's right to establish their own state. It had previously objected to the establishment of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and to Israel's attempts to change the status of Arab Jerusalem, but recently it has openly opposed the redivision of Jerusalem, and opposed the dismantling of Israeli settlements. The U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Donald McHenry, commenting on the 7th censure of Israel by the Security Council within 3 months, said that "It is impractical for the council to call for the undoing of previous measures" (his statement included Jerusalem and the settlements). He added: "We have to find a way that clearly and openly affirms that the city will not be redivided, and that followers of all faiths will have free access to the holy places." The American secretary of state criticized 40 Moslem states for submitting a draft resolution to the Security Council condemning Israel. His spokesman, Thomas Reston, said: "We believe that the status of the city of Jerusalem should be determined through negotiations."

Egypt itself no longer places serious hope on the possibility of resuming the autonomy negotiations with Israel, following the positions taken by the Begin government which have closed the door finally in the face of any possibility of negotiation. Some are saying that Egypt's hope is now pinned on Israeli public opinion. But can there be hope even in Israeli public opinion?

Let's look at the facts alone. Although Menachem Begin pledged to the American ambassador in Tel Aviv that he will not move his offices to east Jerusalem in the near future, the city of Jerusalem has been functionally annexed since 1967. Several new sections have been added to it. Following the terrorist acts to empty the city of its Arab population, that population has dwindled to 70,000 people versus 350,000 Jews. The economy of the eastern sector of the city has been merged into the economy of Israel. And now, the Jews are insisting on the removal of some Moslem holy places that lay over the buried ruins of the old temple of Solomon. The Jews believe that the greatness and full soverignty of Israel will be realized only when the temple is rebuilt. Last year, some 40 radical Jews illegally seized the Hadassah hospital [in Hebron]. Soon the hospital became a military institution which would include two rabbinical seminaries, which Begin had made a promise to build to the radicals who support him, like rabbi Moshe Levinger, the spiritual leader of Gush Emunim, and rabbi

Meir Kahane, the terrorist. The first rabbi is the one who led the forceful entry into the Arab city of Hebron. The two rabbis also work with the "Action Movement for the Completion of the Land of Israel."

In the Jerusalem area, the Jews established the large Shiloh settlement near Bethlehem, in addition to several small settlements. They confiscated 70 square kilometers near Bethlehem and Bayt Sahur, and 70,000 donums near Al-Khan al-Ahmar. Seven agricultural settlements and three kibutzes have been established between Jerusalem and Jaffa.

In the Jordan valley, the Jews established 10 new settlements. In the West Bank, 8 settlements were built in the highlands and 2 on the Nablus-Ramallah road. Arab lands have been confiscated to the east of Nablus and Tubas and to the southeast of Al-Birah and Ramallah. In Nablus itself, Gush Emunim is trying to build a Jewish temple in the section adjacent to the old Khan al-Tujjar, while other religious groups have stormed the village of Mashah near Tulkarm. In 1967, the Jews obliterated the villages of 'Imwas, Yalu, Bayt Nuba and Zita. In that same year, Yigal Allon, who has been classified as a moderate, propounded the doctrine of "The least possible Arabs, the most possible land." Recently, HAARETZ disclosed a third plan which it said that Yigal (Callahan), of the ruling Likud bloc, has prepared. The plan provides for intensifying the establishment of settlements in the West Bank to absorb 8 million Jews after 20 years.

Some Arab politicians are attributing everything happening now to Menachem Begin, the terrorist, saying that if the Begin government were to fall, there might be a basic change in the manner of dealing with the Arabs. But the Israeli leaders themselves provided the answer to that question. Their answers show that they may differ over the approach, but not over the goal--in contrast to the Arabs and Moslems who must differ over everything. On 14 June, the weekly LE FIGARO published statements by Israeli leaders who are most likely to assume power in Israel. The following is a summary of their answers:

a) Menachem Begin: Unified Jerusalem is the capital of Israel, and will not be divided. As for the West Bank, we have concluded an agreement at Camp David which we will ultimately carry out. We call the West Bank Judea and Samaria.

b) Moshe Dayan: We will seek to turn the Jordan valley into a line of defense for Israel. Our capital is Jerusalem. We will be ready to return to Jordan those areas in which a Palestinian majority lives. But Jerusalem should remain within Israel. As for our security, we refuse to be subordinated to anyone, or to subject our security to any conditions and terms.

c) Yitzhak Rabin: The Camp David accords have opened the way, but they do not constitute a final solution. I do not expect a new war, and the dialog with Egypt should continue. The Palestinians expect from us clear

ideas, so let us give them those ideas, and let us tell Jordan openly what it should expect from us.

d) Shimon Peres: Autonomy should be given to the Gaza sector quickly and without reservations. This is a simple matter, because the Jerusalem question is not involved there, and the PLO's influence is nil. We do not intend to give autonomy to the West Bank, but I am convinced of the need to invite King Husayn to negotiate a "territorial settlement" that would lead to the establishment of a Jordanian-Palestinian administration in the territories which would be returned, provided that these territories are annexed to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. If we are against the establishment of a Palestinian state along our borders, it is because we do not want Israel's existence to be jeopardized.

Israeli public opinion seems to be more radical than its leaders. As (Ilyakim Hitsni) puts it, Israeli public opinion feels that the real Israel is Nablus, Jerusalem, Hebron and Beersheba; that Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) are Jewish land; that there can be no coexistence between Jews and Arabs; and that "neither the PLO nor al-Sadat can make us leave our country."

Professor (Yoffa Nieman), who once held the post of assistant director of intelligence in the Israeli army, and who has made a number of nuclear discoveries, turned his back on everything last October to form a radical party under the name of "Renaissance." (Nieman) says: "God does not enter into my equation. Begin abandoned at Camp David the eastern area which protects Israel. Victories have turned into defeats. Why is it that only the Arabs cannot live as a minority in a country like Israel? Agreement to the removal of Jewish settlements, even in Sinai, is a deviation from Zionist practice. When the state becomes weak, counter-terrorism becomes inevitable."

Professor (Fulamor), director of the Humanities Institution in Jerusalem, says that there should never be an Arab force that can cross the river Jordan. (Katsofer), the teacher from Kiryat Arba, has gathered around him a group of people who support the idea of filling "Judea and Samaria" with 200,000 to 300,000 settlers "according to God's promise to Abraham," as he puts it. He adds: "There is no government that dares to go backwards and accept the establishment of a Palestinian state."

Through such samples of opinion among the Israeli public, the terrorism which existed before and after 1948 has found a new outlet. When the question of the possible return to the 1967 borders began to be discussed, merely discussed, Zionist terror immediately went into action. It is true that the Begin government, by its nature, is terroristic, but it is also true that the Israelis themselves, by their historical makeup, on the one hand, and the capabilities they have amassed over a period of 32 years, have made terror their favorite means of achieving their ambitions and goals. When reports announced the emergence of a clandestine terrorist

Zionist organization known as (T.N.T.), denoting the words "terror counter terror," people were surprised to see the name of that organization appear on Arab walls, bringing back to mind such organizations as the Stern, Irgun and Haganah. It is no coincidence that Israel's interior minister himself is the leader of a fanatical religious party. In that sense, he cannot and would not want to control terrorism or even monitor the activities of such an organization as Gush Emunim, some of whose members are also members of his party.

If we turn to recent history, we find that Lenin himself changed overnight from an advocate of a political theory to an advocate of a terroristic theory. It is said that the incident which made him adopt that method of political struggle was the incident in which the Russian czar quelled a demonstration of 200,000 people in San Petersburg on 9 January 1907. The czar's action led to the death of 500 people and the wounding of 3,000. On that day, Lenin, then a refugee in Switzerland, addressed letters to his comrades in Russia in which he said: "Marxism does not reject any form of struggle."

A year later, Lenin laid down the strategy of terrorist battles. From Geneva, he wrote to his supporters: "Spit on all plans. Throw all rights and principles in hell. Teach each group a simple and short way to make a bomb." From that day, the world has known "revolutionary terror" and "revolutionary dictatorship." The first teacher was, and still is, a Jew.

We, the Arabs did not have a teacher. Therefore, we turned to history and began to delve into it in search of past glories and old "Saladins," because we could not find a new Saladin.

Until when will this compound fast continue? Only God knows. Tomorrow Ramadan begins. As usual we will begin our fasting. Once the 30 days of fasting are over, and the Shawwal crescent is sighted, writers will outbid each other in repeating the same sentence they have been saying since the Arabs were plagued by colonialsim, followed by Zionism: "O, holiday, just look at our condition." What is important is that no Arab yet has ever used the saying with which Jews greeted each other in the Diaspora: "Next year in Jerusalem." The urge to think of and look forward to what should happen next year has not developed yet [among the Arabs] for innumerable reasons. Some of these reasons can be found in this article if anyone cares to reread it.

9254
CSO: 4802

PHILIPPINE-ARAB CONSTRUCTION COMPANY TO OPEN IN BAHRAIN

Manamah GULF MIRROR in English 30 Aug-5 Sep 80 p 19

[Text]

A PHILIPPINE-ARAB construction conglomerate is to be launched as a Bahrain exempt company shortly. One of those closely involved predicts it will become "a major economic force in the Gulf."

Bahrain's Ministry of Commerce this week announced approval "in principle" for the establishment of Consolidated Gulf Services and Industries (CGSI).

The news comes a week after Allied Banking Corporation began OBU operations in Bahrain — the first Philippines bank to open a branch in the region.

It also marks a concerted effort by the Philippines to follow its Far East competitors, Japan and South Korea, into lucrative Gulf markets.

The company will be involved in housing and electrification projects, water and sewer systems, ports management, hospitals and health care, agriculture and fisheries schemes and general engineering.

Its paid up capital will be $100 million spread over 1,000 shareholders. The majority stake will be held by Bahraini, Kuwaiti, UAE and Saudi Arabian businessmen and industrialists.

The main Philippine component will be Landoil Resources Corporation, the archipelago's main private exploration firm with assets totalling $150 million.

Landoil already has more than $800 million worth of contracts in the Gulf — mainly building and building-associated work. It has offices in Jeddah, Riyadh, Damman, Yanbu, and Jubail in Saudi Arabia, plus Kuwait and other Arab and European countries.

According to Landoil president Jose de Venecia, who visited Bahrain this week with a Philippines Government mission on its way to Saudi Arabia, it will pave the way for major Asian-Arab joint ventures.

Bahrain chosen

He said: "The time has come for Asian companies in alliance with Arab capital to locate multi-national and regional businesses in the Middle East. Up to now Asian companies have only had 'transit stations' here rather than a permanent presence."

"CSGI can become a major economic force in the Gulf," said Mr De Venecia, adding that in anticipation of its registration the group was already bidding for new projects in the region and the Middle East generally.

Bahrain was chosen as the headquarters because of the government's enlightened policies, attractive incentives and impressive achievements, he said.

CSO: 4820

RELIGIOUS AWAKENING SEEN IN ARAB COMMUNITY

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Aug 80 p 19

[Article by Yosef Tsuriel: "Ramadan Holiday Reveals Process of Religious Revival in Judaea and Samaria"]

[Text] Organizers of sermons for the Ramadan fast at Bir Zeit University didn't imagine that such large numbers of students would be interested in attending. 'Ali Ibrahim Rab'ah, who grew accustomed to walking alone to the mosque each day, was surprised this month when his two grown sons decided to fast and accompany their father to prayer.

Extremists among West Bank Arab youth wish to view this as the beginning of the "Islamic Revolution" in the area. But the moderates express it in the same way as members of the military government. They say that this is the beginning of a religious awakening among educated youth.

A brief conversation with 'Ali Ibrahim's two sons reveals what is happening among those Arab youth thought of as rejecting religious values and tradition. I met them on Friday, on their way to the mosque with their father. They wore holiday clothes.

The elder son is about 30 years old. Unlike his father, he received a primary education. After completing school with honors, he received a scholarship to high school. Today he is an accountant. The younger son followed in his brother's footsteps, and following completion of high school, plans to continue his studies in a European university.

The period of Ramadan is also a time of mass prayer at mosques. Though the Rab'ah family makes do with prayer at the local mosque through the week, on Friday they go to the Al-Aksa and Omar mosques in Jerusalem. Here, as the oldest son puts it, they feel "a part of the greater Arab people."

The Faith is Within

The father says: "I was sorry for years that my children didn't follow my ways. They behaved like unbelievers, didn't fast, fooled around with

girls, smoked and acted irresponsibly. They even showed their father and mother disrespect. Now, of their own will, they have returned to the faith. If only it lasts!"

The elder son: "I haven't returned to the faith. It was within me. Last year I felt the need to fast several days and twice went to the mosque. It happened through the influence of someone older than myself, a person I respect. He suggested that I read two books about the history of Islam. I read them and gradually became interested in my heritage. Today, I feel that religion is essential to my daily existence."

The younger son: "I see religion as a framework for living. It unites people. If we were under Jordanian rule today, you probably would not see me going to the mosque with my father, and I certainly wouldn't fast during the month of Ramadan. But, we don't have a country. For 13 years we have been living under Israeli rule. Religion is capable of uniting us today."

The story of the Rab'ah family is not exceptional. In the past, denial of religious faith was a clearly manifest trend in institutions of higher learning of East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Over the past 2 years a process of return to Islam has become apparent. Young people willingly accept, among other things, the prohibition on eating and drinking during the Ramadan fast.

Fewer Infractions on the Law

The decrease in the number of cases brought to trial for desecrating the fast during the month of Ramadan is an obvious sign of the religious influence upon youth in the occupied territories. Even in a "rebellious" city like Ramallah, few dare to flaunt religious disrespect. Restaurants are deserted. Most owners prefer to close during the daylight hours, both for the sake of tradition and economic considerations. Restaurants open only after sunset, when eating and drinking are permissible.

The month of Ramadan, is thus, a most clear expression of what radicals in the occupied territories refer to as the "Islamic Revolution" sweeping over them. During the past two years there has been a steadily increasing demand for religious books. There may or may not be a coincidence between Khomeini's rise to power in Iran and the dramatic increase in interest in Islam. The best-selling religious book in East Jerusalem and the occupied territories over the past year has been Khomeini's "The Islamic Republic." There is also great demand for other religious books, such as "Reviving Religious Science," by [al-Ghazali], "The Moslem Brotherhood" by ideologist Hassan al-Banna, books dealing with the way of life of the Islamic woman, the Islamic family and the Islamic child, Kor'an explained for children and youth and Islamic stories and legends.

In Israel, the term "Repenters" is applied to those returning to religion. Among West Bank Arabs this is spoken of in different terms, such as

awakening, revival or unification. Another difference is that this religious awakening is not intended to serve the needs of the individual. It is a means for achieving political aims. It forms a barrier against "foreign rule." It is a tool with the power to close the ranks, both in the short and long term.

About 6 months ago, a student from Bir Zeit University wrote that the only realm in which it is possible to strike back at the Israeli military government lies in religion. It is not surprising, therefore, that young people are seizing religion as a means to achieving two goals: gaining support from the same values which preserved the Islamic nation in all generations, and consolidating the ranks vis-à-vis Israel.

8770
CSO: 4805

MINISTER SHARON JUSTIFIES STAND ON SETTLEMENTS

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 15 Aug 80 p 20

[Interview with Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon, in Jerusalem, by Dov Goldstein; date not given]

[Text] Arik Sharon has friends and enemies. He is loved as well as hated. Sharon isn't the type of dispair over the fact that his political enemies and others who hate him are more vocal than his friends. He has always been strong willed and thick skinned.

There is one thing he is extremely sensitive about, and I hope he forgives me if I am revealing a secret to his political arch-rivals: He can't bear the claim that he embodies a danger to democracy, a claim that has been expressed more than once in various ways. It troubles him.

He has more evidence to destroy this accusation than he can use publicly. Some of this evidence is contained in the reports of closed and secret meetings. He cannot use such evidence.

I met Sharon this week at his Jerusalem office. He is tanned, quiet, and enjoys telling and hearing a good joke.

[Question] Did you get such a great tan from heated discussions with the prime minister?

[Answer] No, I spent the entire day yesterday at a fruit-picking area of the Gaza Strip. I was at Nahal Netsarim which became a civilian settlement a few days ago. I had a wonderful time. What wonderful people...it was a pleasure.

No, I wasn't escaping from some kind of struggle. I didn't run away. But experience has taught me that when you're involved in serious things and you enjoy doing them, stones thrown at you will miss their mark.

[Question] What are you and the prime minister fighting about now? Is it the "Herut" and Likud leadership?

[Answer] No. I'm not fighting with Mr Begin over leadership. So far as I'm concerned, this is not a personal struggle. I am fighting, and will continue to fight unrelentingly, over one single issue: the absolute necessity to appoint a full time defense minister whose sole responsibility is this post and who is the person best able to handle this job.

[Question] And are you this person?

[Answer] I have never claimed that I am the only person capable of filling the post of defense minister. Another agricultural minister could be found. Another prime minister could be found. Someone other than myself could be found to serve as defense minister. But I can say without hesitation that given the present circumstances and in light of Soviet military strategy in the Middle East, American weakness in the area, unprecedented gains in Arab strength, the yet unfulfilled Soviet arms buildup consisting of thousands of tanks, thousands of artillery pieces, and hundreds of new aircraft, all accumulating in the stockpiles of the Arab countries, threats from the eastern front, given all the above I would suggest that we take this situation seriously, because the Arabs intend to destroy Israel by war. Terrorism has increased. Israel is being confronted by the United States, still our greatest friend, and by Europe, but most important, by the most grave and dangerous plan now taking shape which threatens to bring nuclear weapons to the area, both through activities underway to build the nuclear reactor in Iraq and Libyan intentions to obtain nuclear weapons. In light of all this, I don't believe that there is anyone more capable than I to act as defense minister at the present time.

Once and for all, the rhetoric has to be dropped. Let's set the record straight without false modesty. Some people see the defense minister's appointment as a personal gain. This is the wrong way to look at it. Israel's defense minister has a most difficult and thankless job. One after the other, Ben Curion, Lavon, Eshkol, Dayan and Weizman; who didn't get burned at this job?

I take the nonchalance with which the question of the appointment of a defense minister is faced, quite seriously. There is an attempt being made to "safeguard," as it were, against the personal advancement of the appointee. I'm not looking for advancement or power. I could end my government service with impressive achievement in the agricultural sector, which I returned to a strong footing from a state of collapse, and in settlement, where I succeeded in creating a new political map which cannot be ignored in any future political solution. But I know that in these hard times I can and must serve as defense minister. The public knows this. Many Likud members know this. Ministers know this...

[Question] The prime minister also wants to appoint a defense minister. Why is he wary of you, as you claim, and not fearful of Yizhaq Shamir's advancement?

[Answer] Because the "safeguards" against personal advancement apply only to "outsiders," those who aren't "our men."

[Question] You're an "outsider?"

[Answer] Yes and no. As regards the Land of Israel, I'm an "insider" and more. I do things. I don't talk about legitimacy. I create a new political map.

As concerns other matters, I'm an "outsider." I am excluded.

Understand... I was raised in a family that rooted itself in the earth of the Land of Israel. We didn't talk about it. The Land of Israel, the soil, physical labor: these are values I was raised with. We didn't philosophize about legitimacy. I was brought up to defend an obvious legitimacy with my own hands. In our house, every new settlement in the country was cause for celebration and flying flags in our hearts. Do you understand... that style bothers me...

[Question] Whose style?

[Answer] That style... I won't specify whose. I think it's obvious. In my family we talked quietly, did things quietly, judged quietly, without attempting to influence anyone through loud and dramatic rhetoric. That style, that style...it kills me...my parents were educated people. My late father was one of the greatest intellects I have ever met in my life. He had an unusual command of literature, music, languages. He was truly fluent in Latin. But he was modest. It enriched his knowledge and gave him creative strength, but he never used it for show. Never threw in Latin words when he spoke in order to impress people. Demonstrativeness is foreign to me. It bothers me. Maybe its a weakness.

[Question] Perhaps you're not where you belong?

[Answer] I admit: I have a problem. A serious problem. If others in the old MAPAI party, as it once was, still truly believed in, and not just paid lip-service to, settling the land of Israel (in the early 30's a Shomer Tzair settlement group clung to Shechem) I certainly would be in that party rather than in my present political surroundings. But unfortunately that party has hardly preserved a shred of the ideology which was its main strength. So I can't be there.

[Question] And you're an outsider in your present camp?

[Answer] No, but I'm treated like an outsider. Not by members of the party. They treat me very cordially in their departments and at meetings. But among the party leadership, particularly among the prime minister's entourage, the feeling prevails that all will be lost in the coming elections, that the party hasn't a chance, and that at least good positions

should be secured for "our people." So far as they're concerned, I'm not included in that category.

[Question] Do you believe that it's all over?

[Answer] Certainly not! The Likud's position would be lost if this defective process continued unchecked, but if instead of pursuing personal conflicts the Likud channelled its efforts towards the relevant goals, nothing would be lost.

[Question] The prime minister said this week that you were his candidate for defense minister, but that the Liberals and Democrats objected. Maybe Mr Begin himself doesn't want you as defense minister and is hiding behind your rejection by others.

[Answer] The answer is: Yes! Absolutely! When Mr Begin wanted to appoint Mr Dayan to serve as foreign minister, he did so despite everyone's opposition. If the prime minister sincerely wanted me as defense minister, he has the strength to have his way. He is committing an error that will affect the state, the Likud and himself, when he sends a matter of vital national interest down a narrow political track rather than considering vital national needs. Mr Begin had, and still has, the strength to rise above worthless arguments. This has not happened yet.

[Question] The prime minister wanted to teach you a lesson in democratic processes this week. Do you need remedial lessons in this subject?

[Answer] No, I don't. In marked contrast to what has been publicized, I have never suggested that the minority decide against the will of the majority. I proposed, demanded and warned that at least in matters of life and death we should find a different way of elucidating problems, studying issues and reaching decisions: using a broader and more fundamental approach and refraining from hasty decision making. The majority will decide in the end. That is clear. I accept this. No one needs to teach me how democracy operates.

The minority will not decide against the will of the majority. These are precisely the words I used at a meeting last week in the government forum dealing with a certain subject. These were my words and they are on the record of that ministerial committee. If, despite this, the prime minister tried to teach me a lesson in democratic procedure and if one of his colleagues went to the trouble of leaking this to the media, I saw it as a clear, open and serious provocation to which I couldn't help but react.

[Question] Perhaps you need to improve your ability to face provocation rather than your concept of democratic processes?

[Answer] I can face and withstand provocations. They have been numerous in the past and I have withstood them. However, there is another kind of

provocation which I cannot accept. I cannot restrain myself and must react immediately: This is the provocation aimed at trampling my name in full public view and presenting me as a danger to democracy. It is unfounded and was never true. The result of such a provocation is a long-term and lasting drop in favorable public opinion, sometimes for a period of many years. I have already observed this: In January 1978 an attempt was made to hold me responsible for the establishment of additional settlements in the Rafi'ah region, despite the fact that this was a clear government decision. I never heard a single person, including the prime minister, declare that the accusations against me were libelous. But then I still thought that for the sake of government unity it would be best to remain silent and take the insults. I'm still paying for that today. My decision has been not to ignore things like this anymore. I have explained this decision to my colleagues in the government as well as the Knesset.

[Question] Can a minister remain in the government after he accuses the prime minister of making irresponsible security decisions?

[Answer] Can a prime minister remain at his post after having said that if one of his ministers was appointed to the defense post he would surround the prime minister's office with tanks? Fact: the prime minister apologized and remained prime minister. I retracted my statements and remained a government minister. As the clamour for my appointment as defense minister grows among the public, in the Likud and among Knesset members, I am increasingly provoked and I won't remain silent. Let there be no doubt about that.

[Question] And now, since you have retracted the most serious accusation a minister can level against the prime minister of a government he is serving, can we all rest assured that the prime minister-defense minister reaches major decisions with complete responsibility, and only after thorough consideration?

[Answer] I offered my apology and can only add that even the late Ben Gurion would have been unable to fill both positions, as prime minister and defense minister. No one man could bear this burden. We have a wonderful army and excellent officers. The best of our youth is in ZAHAL. From the standpoint of strategic readiness ZAHAL is among the best armies in the world. It has modern weapons, among the most advanced in the world. There is a fighting spirit. ZAHAL will succeed in any assignment it is given. But the defense network is very broad, very complex and full of problems. In the peace framework we have undertaken great risks. We must now alter the structure of the army and constantly test ourselves and sometimes make difficult decisions affecting the structure and organization of the entire network. This requires active, daily, constant participation and a complete familiarity with the network at first hand. The defense minister must be familiar with every component of the network and with the network as a whole. Penetrating clarifications and deliberations must also be made on the effect of defense needs on the economy, and on the details of complicated operational decisions. Our situation is unlike that of other

countries. We are still in the midst of a life and death struggle. The dangers are steadily increasing. Defense cannot be handled on a "part-time" basis. A defense minister must be appointed without delay. This appointment must be made unhampered by the confines of narrow party considerations.

I informed the prime minister that if I feel that I am being made to seem unfit for this appointment I will have no choice but to offer my resignation. If the prime minister does not want me as a partner in the difficult struggles facing the country, I cannot force him to accept me.

[Question] Something in your position is unclear: So long as the prime minister keeps the defense portfolio, you don't resign, though it is clear to you that he cannot devote the necessary time to defense. But if the prime minister appoints a defense minister who will be able to devote all his attention to defense, you will resign. Why?

[Answer] The present situation cannot last a long time. The prime minister knows this too. The situation is temporary. As long as the prime minister hasn't appointed anyone to this post, there is still a chance that the person who is the most suitable candidate will be appointed. So, the present situation is preferable to an inferior permanent appointment. If the prime minister doesn't appoint me, I will leave the government.

[Question] Defense matters nearly always involve life and death decisions. Do you believe that every minister should have an equal voice in defense decision making, or that minister with considerable military experience should have a greater voice, beyond proportional numbers?

[Answer] In any event the majority decides. But no issue, particularly one involving decisions over human lives, should be brought to final vote until all decision makers, with or without military experience, are supplied with all the necessary information and given the opportunity to voice their opinions.

It is shockingly stupid to say that democracy necessitates unfounded decisions. The contrary is true: Because each voice carries equal weight, without the bias of experts, it is necessary that all possible information be provided and decision-makers be able to deliberate as required before deciding, so that democracy can survive intact.

[Question] It isn't that way now?

[Answer] The system exists. Its effectiveness depends upon allowing those who are best qualified to deal with military affairs the opportunity to do so exclusively.

[Question] The prime minister reminded you this week of your sins and the charitable way he has dealt with you. While you ran as the head of

"Shlomzion" in the previous elections and attacked Herut and Likud, he, despite the fact that you received only two seats, put you into "Herut" and the government. Are you grateful to Mr Begin for his generosity to you?

[Answer] In politics there are no winners and no righteous. That isn't the foundation upon which politicians' behavior rests. Mr Begin prefers to remember, selectively, certain things and ignore others. For example, he tends to forget and blur my decisive role in the establishment of the Likud, which was the cornerstone of the victory in the 1977 elections.

I don't suppose that the prime minister included me in his government as an act of personal charity. He had other considerations. He probably now believes that he doesn't need me anymore, as he has until now. In reality, it is clear that the prime minister was mistaken about this in the past and he may be mistaken again.

The reasons why Mr Begin needed me in his government until now have not changed. Perhaps they are even stronger now, in the face of difficult struggles facing the country. I conscientiously carried out the declared policy of the government, perhaps to a greater extent than any other minister.

[Question] Can it be confidently stated today that in coming elections you will appear on the Herut and Likud lists, or are you considering possible alternatives?

[Answer] Israel needs two large political blocs--the Likud and the Alignment. This was always my aim and I still strive for Likud unity. The polarization of the Likud and the Alignment will steadily increase. Should parts of the Land of Israel be handed over to strangers, or, as we maintain, should the Jordan River be Israel's border. Under the present circumstances, the Alignment's return to power poses a threat to Israel's wholeness and security.

If you are asking whether I have no option before me but running in the Herut and Likud framework, the answer is that it doesn't depend entirely on me. The actions of the Likud and its leaders could influence my decision. I never said that I'd always consent to their treating me like an outsider.

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JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVIEWED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 6 Sep 80 pp 38-29

[Interview with Marwan al-Qasim, Jordan's Minister of Foreign Affairs by Hani Khayr, in Amman; date not given]

[Text] Jordanian foreign policy has been taking a new direction ever since the mid-seventies. This direction was confirmed after the Camp David Accords were signed. Jordan has become an important center in the Middle East, and the attempts made by the United States to force this country, which has endured long and much of the burden of confronting the Israeli enemy, to follow al-Sadat's capitulatory policy proved to be useless. In fact, the U.S. attempts increased Jordan's conviction to adhere to a policy that contrasts with and opposes the Camp David policy.

This interview with Jordan's minister of foreign affairs, Mr Marawan al-Qasim is an attempt to examine the directions of Jordan's foreign policy and Jordan's positions with regard to the developments of the Middle East crisis and what may derive therefrom.

[Question] You returned a short time ago from the meetings of the Jerusalem Committee which were held in Casablanca. Do you believe that the decisions that were made are realistic and that there is an intent to implement them?

[Answer] The Jerusalem Committee made several recommendations and resolutions to confront recent developments in the holy city of Jerusalem following the announcement by Israeli authorities of annexing the city and considering it Israel's unified capital. These resolutions came after intense meetings during which agreement over the following was reached:

1. All the countries of the Islamic Conference Organization are to be compelled to implement all the resolutions that were issued by previous Islamic conferences, and especially those that pertain to the holy city of Jerusalem.

2. Aid and assistance to the PLO and to the confrontation countries with Israel are to continue.

3. The Arab-international dialogue is to be intensified on all scenes, and all the Arab and Islamic capabilities are to be utilized to serve the pan-Arab question.

4. An emergency meeting of the Jerusalem Committee is to be held next September 18 in Morocco to follow up on the implementation of the resolutions that had been adopted either at that meeting or at conferences that preceded it.

[Question] What do you think about the call for a holy war? Do you believe that the Islamic world is prepared to engage in this holy war? Have there been previous preparations for embarking upon this battle?

[Answer] The destiny of the Arab nation for 30 or more years has been to resist a persistent and a continuous aggression that has been imposed on it. The daily experience of the Arab region is not free from struggle: this is either a direct struggle with Israel or with the power that stands behind it and threatens this area for various and different objectives and purposes. As Arabs and Moslems we believe that self-defense is legitimate and natural and that the fact of a holy war has been relevant ever since the challenge [against us] rose to the level of occupation, eviction, murder and expulsion. These methods have been practiced by the aggressor ever since the Israeli presence was established on Arab land. The Arab nation has recognized ever since then that it has to double the effort, intensify the preparations and build up its own material and moral power by relying on the tremendous material and human resources it has to become capable of taking action on the various levels of the struggle.

[Question] Do you believe that a new chief for the Israeli government instead of Menahem Begin will be able to make change?

[Answer] We in Jordan have had a long and a notable experience with the Israeli enemy. This has created in us a belief that the Israeli command with its various leaders and their different names is implementing a complete and prescribed plan from which it does not deviate. Israel has one, specific objective which all its leaders are trying to achieve even though there may be a variation and a difference in the method they use. Therefore, we do not expect anything new from any new command that assumes the reigns of power in Israel. On the basis of that fact, we have always been alerting associates and brothers to the fact that the capacity for change stems from our own power and not from the fact of change in the Israeli governments.

[Question] The Arabs rely quite a bit on President Carter's winning [the elections]. Do you think that the re-election of President Carter will contribute to solving the difficult Arab questions such as the question of Palestine?

[Answer] The Arab nation must not always stand in the framework of reacting, but it must rather capture the initiative in its questions. Therefore, we in Jordan do not think that the Arab nation is to look at Carter's success or failure [in the elections]. We should have rather reached a stage of preparedness [that would enable us] to influence international decisions and political trends in this world. With regard to President Carter himself, he is still the head of the government in the United States. We do not need a new experience to understand his position. Solving Arab questions, and chief of them is the Palestinian question, stems above all else from our unified position and our self-reliance. It would then be easy for President Carter or for another president to see the Arab right and to go along with the countries of the world in implementing the international treaties. It would also be possible for the United States to have the opportunity that would in fact enable it to participate in achieving a comprehensive, just peace in the area, and this would keep away the specter of destruction and wars not only from the area but also from the entire world.

[Question] Some Arab agencies view the European initiative as an attempt made by the countries of the European market for purely economic objectives. Arab agencies think that that initiative will not come to light before the U.S. elections. They think that during the waiting period for these elections the European countries will try to investigate the facts for the purpose of drawing up a paper that will include suggestions for solutions. Was this the purpose of (Gaston Turin's) tour in the Arab countries? During his visit to Jordan and his meeting with your excellency did (Turin) offer new suggestions to solve the Palestinian question? Has the investigation touched upon Resolution 242?

[Answer] I want to explain some facts that I rely on in answering this question.

1. Europe and the Arab world have common political, economic and cultural interests.

2. The European position is influenced by the U.S. position, and the reverse of that should be true.

3. There is a change in the European position in favor of the Arab question.

It is in the light of these facts that we saw in the European announcement a positive step even though it was an inadequate one. We asked that this position be driven closer to Arab rights and that it exert pressure on Israel to make a complete withdrawal from occupied Arab territory, including Jerusalem. We in Jordan believe that the Arab nation, in its dealings with the countries of Europe, has to act on the basis of pan-Arab interests at a time when we realize and Europe realizes that it has vital and major interests in the Arab region. This makes it incumbent upon us to place all Arab capabilities to work in the service of the pan-Arab question, especially when we know that Europe has begun to sense that the situation in the area has become dangerous and explosive as a result of the Israeli aggression

and the intransigence of the Israeli authorities regarding implementing the international resolutions. This situation is threatening international peace and security. We in Jordan have advocated more than once the necessity for intense Arab action whose purpose would be to get the Arab-European dialogue to the stage where Europe would assume its responsibilities and help the U.S. administration take its rightful position to establish a just and a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian question. We are being helped in this by the fact that we agree with the Europeans on two principles stated in the recent proposal they made on the question.

The first is the necessity for the full withdrawal of the Israeli troops from all Arab territory occupied in 1967.

The second principle is that the question of the Palestinian people is a political question and not a question of refugees or a humanitarian question.

Mr (Turin's) visit to the area came, as you mentioned, to implement the Venice Communique. During his visit we informed him about the Jordanian position which had been proclaimed; it is a position that is firm and clear and does depend on the principles of the single Arab position which was determined by the summit conferences in Baghdad and Tunisia where the Arabs' word was unified on the bases of a just and a comprehensive peace. This constitutes a minimum in any political settlement that is based on achieving full Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands, including Arab Jerusalem, and on recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to determine their own destiny on their national soil.

When Mr (Turin) came as a representative of the European community, he proposed Resolution 242 as one of the proper foundations for solving the Palestinian question. We emphasized to him that that resolution did not deal with the Palestinian question in its entirety and that it had been proposed to remedy the Israeli aggression of 1967 against the three Arab countries: Jordan, Egypt and Syria. We assured him that Jordan had explained on various occasions that Resolution 242 included principles stipulating Israel's full withdrawal from Arab territory occupied in 1967 and that it also stipulated that land cannot be occupied by force. However, events as well as the complications and developments of the question have gone beyond the other items of this resolution.

[Question] The Arabs have called upon each other at every meeting or conference to take their resentment out on the Camp David Accords and on the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, but no new plan has been devised for an alternative formula to these proposed solutions. Has Jordan adopted [the responsibility] for coming up with such a formula to put an end to this floundering in international politics?

[Answer] The Baghdad Conference has established the minimum which the Arabs will accept as a basis for a comprehensive and a just political solution. This is based on Israel's full withdrawal from all the Arab land it occupied in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem, and on recognizing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and especially their right to determine their own destiny on their national soil. This unified position and these just and reasonable demands have been accepted by all the countries of the world including many American countries. Jordan has also affirmed on more than one occasion that building its own political, economic and military power was the only guarantee for achieving the framework which was outlined by the resolutions of the Baghdad and Tunisia summit meetings.

[Question] Contrary to what the Zionists are doing, the Arabs have not developed the means for utilizing their fortunes to serve their political and pan-Arab objectives. In fact there are those who swear that Arab funds which are deposited in foreign banks serve Israel and its aides more than they serve the Arabs. How can these fortunes be turned into an influential force that would be effective in serving our national questions and especially the question of Palestine.

[Answer] Any development in the method of using Arab wealth must stem from a comprehensive plan that would be devised by all the Arab countries in accordance with their views and their capabilities. It is known that there is a concrete Arab trend in that direction. That trend is represented in an increase in the volume of aid which is offered by the Arab countries who can afford it to the Arab countries who need it. It is also represented in the completed projects of development funds, in joint projects or in loans and contributions. Once we complete the stage of domestic, Arab development, we can venture out into a broader framework of formulating an Arab economic strategy whose purpose would be to invest Arab capabilities to serve national questions. In its emergency session that was held in Amman last July the Arab Economic and Social Council approved this principle and established foundations for this strategy which is based on the following principles:

First, surplus Arab funds on deposit in foreign countries must be utilized to serve pan-Arab interests.

Second, Arab investments in the private and public sectors in friendly countries are to be encouraged, and friendly countries are to encourage Arab investments.

Third, a practical and an effective plan must be outlined to regulate foreign trade between the Arab countries and the countries of the world, provided that the trade exchanges be subject to the considerations to which these countries agree.

Fourth, the policy of loans and aid which is offered to other countries must be subject [to conditions] that would guarantee that these countries strengthen and continue their support for Arab questions.

We must also not forget to caution here that these funds must be used properly and that the articles of this strategy must be implemented according to a considered program that takes into consideration insuring and investing these funds and not infringing upon the food and the economic security in the Arab world.

[Question] What are the best methods that you suggest be used to exert pressure on the countries that still have embassies in Jerusalem to move those embassies?

[Answer] The Jerusalem Committee adopted a plain resolution in the recent meeting it held in Morocco to deal with this subject successfully on the Islamic level. Some countries that have embassies in Jerusalem have responded to this resolution.

The subject has also been dealt with on the Arab level with the Saudi-Iraqi proclamation which was supported by Jordan and by most of the Arab countries. Accordingly, an Arab and an Islamic economic and political boycott will be enforced against those countries that ignore these demands. The recent Security Council Resolution on Jerusalem also gave the countries that have their embassies in Jerusalem the justification to move those embassies quickly and not to recognize the annexation of the holy city and the Israeli expansionist measure. Jordan is now waiting for the remaining countries that still have their embassies in Jerusalem to comply and to reconsider.

[Question] Do you think that the establishment of a policy of coalitions in the Arab world is in the interests of the Arab question at the present time?

[Answer] Jordan has decided to reject the policy of coalitions on the Arab scene, and it has publicly affirmed that the policy of coalitions and blocs within the Arab community is inimical to the principle of Arab solidarity and a waste of the one effort and the joint action. Its results only serve the plans of the Israeli enemy which are forever seeking to tear up and fragment the Arab position and tear down any real trend to build up its power. Jordan has advocated the necessity of building a single Arab coalition that would include all the Arab countries along with international countries or blocs in one clear, pan-Arab position that represents the Arab point of view and defends that point of view and its pan-Arab interests. Israel is forever seeking to create Arab coalitions in the Arab community that would fight and contend with each other so that this would be one of the guarantees for its continued occupation. We also find that the practices of the superpowers [imply] a new attempt they are making to divide the area into spheres of influence. We think that the best weapon that can serve this policy is to create these coalitions and these blocs, to distribute loyalties outside the borders and to polarize the small countries so they would revolve in the superpowers' orbit, carry out their wishes and serve their interests.

[Question] It is being said that there is a conspiracy against Lebanon and that that conspiracy includes the question of partition and the question of colonization. How do you view what is happening in Lebanon?

[Answer] Lebanon has been subjected for a long time to a conspiracy whose objective is to divide it and to put an end to it. As soon as we know who stands to benefit from the success of this conspiracy, we can easily know that Israel and those who support it are the ones who contrived this conspiracy against Lebanon to direct attention to it first and to force solutions at the expense of its territory and its people second. Because we know Israel's objectives, we as Arabs and Lebanese are responsible for not making this conspiracy succeed in Lebanon easily. We therefore hope that the people and the leaders of Lebanon will become aware of the partitioning and the division that are being planned for their country, and we hope they will oppose this by proclaiming the slogan of unity among all. We hope that the Arabs will adhere to their pan-Arab responsibility towards the fraternal country of Lebanon to deliver it from the partitioning plan which Israel is trying to bring about.

[Question] What is your view at the present stage of Jordanian-Syrian relations on the one hand and Jordanian-Palestinian relations on the other?

[Answer] Jordan's foreign policy depends on building good and fraternal relations with all the Arab brothers. This is because Jordan believes in its national duty and its pan-Arab commitments, and it adheres to the principles of the necessity of establishing bridges of confidence between the Arab countries. Such bridges would strengthen solidarity and confirm the unity of the rank in the presence of an Israeli attack. Israel is making plans to spread a spirit of division and doubt among the brothers and associates. Israel knows that any agreement between any two Arab countries will inevitably be at the expense of its arrogance and the success of its aggressive and expansionist plans. On the basis of this principle Jordan finds in fraternal Syria one of the positions for the struggle and the confrontation. Syria's safety is synonymous with Jordan's safety, just as Jordan's safety is synonymous with Syria's, and safety in both countries is synonymous with the safety and strength of the Arab nation in its entirety. We are confident that any attempts to cast doubts [among the Arabs] or make any plans to fragment them will be deterred, condemned and confronted by the Arab nation. What applies to our relations with our brothers in Syria applies to our relations with all the Arab countries and with the PLO. We are always coordinating [efforts] and consulting with the PLO and we have many meetings so as to achieve joint coordination [that would enable us] to confront many questions and matters.

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JORDAN'S PRESENT, FUTURE ENERGY RESOURCES DISCUSSED

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19 Jul 80 p 5

[Report on interview with Dr Fakhri al-Daghistani, assistant director general of Royal Scientific Society, by Muhammad al-'Ibadi, in Amman; date not given]

[Text] Dr Fakhri al-Daghistani, assistant director general of the Royal Scientific Society, has called for the formulation of a general energy policy in Jordan. It would include searching for additional and alternative sources of energy, and guiding energy consumption.

Dr al-Daghistani stated that there is still hope that oil and natural gas will be discovered in Jordan. He also said that alternatives to oil, such as nuclear power and energy produced by using oil, shale, water, wind, the sun, and subterranean heat, could be utilized in Jordan and abroad.

These statements by Dr al-Daghistani were made during an interview in which he answered a number of questions dealing with the relationship between consumption and economic and social development in Jordan; Jordan's options as far as energy is concerned; the possibility of discovering oil and natural gas; and the use of nuclear power and other sources of energy in Jordan. He put emphasis on the issue of decentralized production of energy so that every household in Jordan could meet its own needs on various types of energy by utilizing solar and wind-generated energy.

Energy and Development

Dr al-Daghistani had the following to say about the relationship between energy consumption and Jordan's economic and social development:

"It is not possible to achieve progress in economic development without increasing energy consumption. The growth rates of the advanced industrial countries are accompanied by similar rates of increase in energy consumption. As for the developing countries, the increase in the rate of energy consumption is twice as high as the rate of economic growth. There are many reasons for this. They include the need to build a basic infrastructure and the lack of efficiency in the consumption of energy, especially in the sector of production. This is true in the case of Jordan.

"It is now known that the economic growth of Western Europe since World War II is due mainly to the fact that Western Europe was able to purchase Arab oil at very low prices. There are studies which indicate that, in 1960, the share of the Arab nations was 6 fils out of every 100 fils paid by the citizens of Western Europe for Arab oil. We also find that the advanced industrial countries, both the Eastern and Western blocs, consume 85 percent of the world's energy, whereas there inhabitants constitute only 30 percent of the world's population.

"We notice that since 1971, economic development in Jordan, has been accompanied by an increase in the consumption of energy. Jordan's oil refinery production in 1971 totalled about half a million tons. In 1976 it totalled 1 million tons, and in 1980 it will be 1.5 million tons. We should mention at this point, that during this period of time the share of energy used in the sectors of production was not adequate.

"For example, we find that the industrial and agricultural sectors consume about 20 percent of available liquid fuel, whereas about 25 percent of this fuel is consumed for household purposes. We find that 45 percent of available electricity is consumed by industry and agriculture, whereas 30 percent of it is used for household and lighting purposes.

"However, it should be mentioned that we do not have sufficient detailed information concerning the use of energy in the various economic sectors or the economic return from the use of this energy. The Royal Scientific Society will undertake studies in this field during the period of the next 5-year plan."

In answer to a question about Jordan's energy options, Dr al-Daghistani gave the following answer: "Right now Jordan depends totally upon imported oil. Several months ago, the newspapers mentioned that the cost of importing oil into Jordan is about the same as the revenue Jordan receives from all of its exports. This is an economic and strategic problem. To a great extent, the price is being paid by Jordan's treasury and citizens. The price subsidies which are now borne by Jordan's treasury will be paid for indirectly, in the long run, by Jordan's citizens. The problem, then, is not a problem of the government providing price subsidies for energy. It is a national problem which our citizens must be aware of, because it has an effect on their lives and the life of future generations.

"There are no quick and easy solutions to this problem, unless sufficiently large quantities of oil and natural gas are discovered. For this reason, we need to adopt a long-range strategy which includes searching for additional sources of energy, especially local sources, and guiding energy consumption. Sources of energy that could be considered are: oil and natural gas, if discovered; nuclear power; oil, shale; water power; subterranean heat; wind-generated energy; and solar energy."

Oil Exploration and the Use of Atomic Energy

Concerning the possibilities of discovering oil and the use of nuclear power in Jordan, Dr al-Daghistani said:

"Let us first begin with oil exploration. The National Resources Agency, in cooperation with companies in this field, is making seismographic and geological studies in preparation for drilling test wells. The Agency is considered to be capable of carrying out its plans in this regard, but the main obstacle is the huge cost of the operation of drilling these wells. The cost of drilling a single well is estimated at about $20 million. But there is still hope that we will discover oil or natural gas. Also, it is probable that the technology of oil exploration in the industrial nations will develop rapidly during the next decade so that it will be possible to determine, in a more accurate fashion, locations for drilling test wells. This will then lead to a decrease in the costs of oil exploration.

"Concerning nuclear power used to generate electricity, it can only be utilized jointly with one or more of our neighboring fellow-Arab countries. The difficulties in the utilization of this type of energy are economic, technological, and political.

"The economic difficulties lie in the economic scope of a nuclear power station. Economic nuclear power stations have a production capacity of 1,000 megawatts. This is in excess of Jordan's present needs, but in the nineties it will be just right for Jordan's needs. The cost of building a nuclear power station such as this, at current prices, is about 1.5 billion dollars. The actual costs will go up while the project is being implemented, because it takes at least 10 years to finish construction of a station, starting with the date when design of the station begins. It is possible that construction of a nuclear power station such as this will be more profitable economically, if it is linked to the desalinization of sea water by utilizing part of the steam generated by the turbines to distill water. There are also technological difficulties caused by the danger of possible atomic radiation. They involve possible defects in the power station, and hazards in the transportation of nuclear fuel and the disposal of nuclear waste.

"Also, it takes at least 10 years to train specialized, technical personnel qualified to run a nuclear power station. As for the uranium fuel which is used in power stations such as these, it is possible to extract it from phosphates which have small percentages of it. This material is also available in moderate amounts in Algeria.

"The political difficulties consist of the obstacles which the industrial nations place in the way of the developing nations that wish to adopt this technology. The industrial nations consider that construction of nuclear power stations is the first step toward developing capability to produce nuclear weapons."

Other Sources of Energy

On the possibilities of utilizing other sources of energy, Dr al-Daghistani said: "Jordan does not have much in the way of waterfalls. It is only possible to generate 5 megawatts of power from the King Talal Dam, and only 30 megawatts from the Maqarin Dam. By the year 1990, these will meet only 5 percent of Jordan's electricity needs."

"As for other long-range possibilities, we can mention the flow of water from the Red Sea, at 'Aqabah, to the Dead Sea, which is 400 meters below sea level. It would be possible to add water to the Dead Sea in amounts which equal the evaporation of water from it.

"But I do not think that this would generate more than 100 megawatts of power. It should be mentioned here that about 10 percent of Jordan's energy is consumed in the pumping of water.

"There are large quantities and good varieties of oil shale in Jordan. In the long run, it will be possible to use oil shale in petrochemical industries and as fuel for the generation of electric power and the extraction of petroleum.

"The Natural Resources Agency has already initiated intensive efforts in this field for the purpose of studying the possibility of utilizing oil shale in al-Lujun. It should be mentioned that the extraction of oil from oil shale requires large quantities of water. This is something that Jordan does not have.

"As for wind-generated power, it is possible to use it in several areas in Jordan where the wind blows at a speed of 4 meters per second. It is believed that wind-generated power is best used for pumping water. This can be done through direct mechanical pumping of water from wells which are no more than 30 meters deep. However, in the case of wells which are deeper than that, that is, 30 to 250 meters deep, it is possible to use windmills to produce electric power, and then use this power to operate regular water pumps.

"The fact that wind does not always blow at the same speed is considered to be the main problem in producing electric power for other uses, except on a small scale. Right now there are windmills which operate efficiently, produce 10 kilowatts of power or less, and can be used in Jordan. As for windmills with a larger capacity, they are still in the stage of research and development. Some European countries, such as Germany and Denmark, are planning to build windmill farms. These will be places where they will put large numbers of industrial windmills, near the sea, in order to produce electric power. These windmill farms will be set up on an experimental basis. It is expected that, during the next 10 years, they will develop huge windmills which will produce up to 10 kilowatts of power.

"Concerning the use of energy derived from subterranean heat, Jordan, has this potential but on a small scale in areas near hot springs. The Natural Resources Agency is undertaking studies to learn what technical and economic possibilities there are in this field.

"As for solar energy, it is possible to derive it in Jordan up to amounts of 5.5 kilowatt hours per day. Jordan is considered to be one of the earth's areas which is most exposed to the rays of the sun. There are many ways in which solar energy can be used. They include heating water, generating electricity, heating homes, refrigeration, and dehydration."

Jordan's Energy Future

Dr al-Daghistani said the following with reference to the future of energy in Jordan: "Jordan should undertake studies and research concerning energy, and should formulate a general energy policy. In order to implement such a policy, it is necessary to establish an organizational structure within present institutions or build new institutions. This policy should provide for searching for all types of additional and alternate sources of energy locally. It should also provide for utilizing all these sources of energy in a manner which yields high economic benefit and serves social justice.

"This policy should not be limited to traditional methods of generating and distributing energy. Consideration should be given to the possibilities of decentralized power production by means of using and applying various types of energy. The pumping of water can be accomplished through wind-generated power, solar energy, or both. Also, households could utilize solar energy in order to conserve energy. For this to be done, though, houses must be architecturally designed differently so that they can retain heat during the winter and stay cool during the summer.

"It is possible to heat household water by using solar heaters. And it is possible to light households by using solar power cells which generate electricity and which can operate household electrical appliances."

A Suggested Plan of Action

Dr al-Daghistani offered a plan of action for conserving energy in Jordan which could be summed up as follows: 1. Encouraging scientific research and technological development, concentrating on methods and technology which have already been proven feasible. 2. Developing local industries.

Dr al-Daghistani stressed the fact that many of the advanced countries have no oil. They import it and depend on their progress in the field of industrial production. Switzerland and Japan are examples of such countries.

9468
CSO: 4802

CABINET APPROVES TWELVE MONTHS RECONSTRUCTION PLAN

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 19 Jul 80 p 6

[Article: "Twelve Months Reconstruction Plan Approved; Plan Mainly Affects the South, and Is Financed by Arab Aid to Lebanon"]

[Text] During its last session, the cabinet approved the plan of the Council of Development and Reconstruction for the implementation of a number of projects during a period of 12 months beginning in 1980. They are financed by Arab aid to Lebanon.

Most of the projects in this plan will be implemented in south Lebanon.

This plan is part of the general reconstruction plan prepared by the Council of Development and Reconstruction.

The following is a list of the approved projects by area:

1. Housing
a. In the south:
--The building of new homes,
--The rebuilding of homes which were damaged during the disturbances.
b. In other areas:
--The building of new homes,
--Implementing the new project (decree No 6 dated 17 May 1980).

2. Drinking Water
a. In the south:
--Providing installations and equipment of Jabal 'Amil and Ra's al-'Ayn,
--Equipping artesian wells and drilling new ones.
b. In other areas:
--Implementing the project of drawing water from the wells of Damur, Na'ima and al-Mashraf to Beirut (50 million Lebanese pounds), (Cabinet decision No 31 dated 28 May 1980),
--Work and equipment for the project of procuring drinking water to al-Kharrub district in al-Shuf (5 million Lebanese pounds),
--'Ayn al-Dilba water network (4 million Lebanese pounse).

3. Hospitals and Clinics
a. In the south: See list below.
b. In other areas:
--Installations of the Tripoli Hospital (15 million); Eastern Beirut Hospital (25 million); Western Beirut Hospital (25 million); reconstruction work on Ba'labakk Hospital (4 million) and clinics (5 million).

4. Reconstruction of Roads
a. In the south:
--Purchase of asphalt, gravel and equipment; widening and resurfacing major highways; general maintenance and construction work on the seashore road of Khaldi--Damur--Jiyyih--Zahrani.
b. In other areas:
--The projects noted in the cabinet's decision No 34 of 18 June 1980 (45 million),
--The road of Hirmil-Qasr-Fisan-Ruwayma-Qubayyat (15 million) (cabinet decision No 8 of 28 May 1980),
--The road of Hadath-Ba'labakk-Afqa (10 million) (Cabinet decision No 31 of 26 March 1980),
--The project of rebuiding roads according to the plan of the Council of Development and Reconstruction.

5. Rebuilding the seaport of Beirut:
--Project of the Council of Development and Reconstruction
--The seaport committee.

6. Support for steadfastness in the south: Digging wells and shelters and a rebuilding project.

7. Government buildings
--Complete the rebuilding and repair of the government office building in Beirut (20 million),
--Rebuild and repair the cabinet office building in al-Sana'i' (5 million),
--Renovate the parliament building and its furniture (9 million),
--Renovate the [art gallery?] in Beirut (2 million).

8. Recondition and improve the coastline--first stage.

9. Aid to the south
a. Projects of the Council of the South to assist the steadfast whose homes were destroyed or damaged,
b. Hospitals and clinics in the south,
--a mobile hospital,
--New installations and equipment for the hospital in Saida,
--Reconstruct and reequip health care in the districts,
--Equip three mother and child centers,
--Reconstruct and equip other hospitals,
--Construct underground levels in the hospitals of Tyre, Marji'yun and Tibnin,

--Equip the temporary hospital in Hasbayya,
--Study the condition of the hospitals of Saida and al-Nabatiyya,
--Rebuild the health center in Bint-Jubayl,
--Complete reconstruction work on the hospital of al-Nabatiyya,
--Establish 31 health clinics,
--Reconstruct two health clinics in Kafardunin and al-Naqura, and complete construction work on the health clinic at Qaluba,
--Equip 37 health clinics.

8988
CSO: 4802

ECONOMIC SITUATION IN FIRST HALF OF 1980 REVIEWED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 18 Jul 80 p 6

[Report of Commission for Coordinating Economic Policy on First Half of 1980]

[Text] The "Commission for Coordinating Economic Policy," which was formed at the beginning of this year to analyze financial and economic policy and its effects, during the phase of development reconstruction, on monetary conditions and inflation in Lebanon, has completed its report on the financial situation during the first half of the current year.

The report was presented by the commission chairman, Dr Samir al-Maqdisy, to the chairman of the Council of Development and Reconstruction, Dr Muhammad 'Atallah; to finance minister, Dr 'Ali al-Khalil; and to the president of the Lebanese Central Bank, Michel Khoury. It shows that government borrowing from the Central Bank has decreased by 233 million [pounds] during the first half of the current year, in comparison to 1979.

The report states that the receipt of $132 million in the form of Arab financial aid and subscriptions to government bonds, contributed significantly to the improvement of the government financial situation by the end of June 1980.

The report indicates a significant decrease in the treasury deficit for the current year, in comparison to 1979, when it reached 1.6 billion pounds. The report states that this improvement is neither a result of improvement in government revenues, nor of a decrease in expenditures. Rather, it is a result of foreign aid transferred to the government account.

In spite of this improvement, the report notices that a similar improvement did not occur on the wave of inflation in Lebanon, since the positive financial development was not the result of internal factors related to steady revenues for the treasury or to a decrease in expenditure in general. The report also shows profits made by the government through revenues of the Central Bank from its investments in foreign currencies abroad.

As for the value of the Lebanese pound, the report indicates that it decreased in relation to the dollar by 4 percent at the beginning of the current year, but that it improved during the months of May and June 1980.

The report mentions the reserve surplus of the banking system, stating that in mid-April the surplus was 520 million. In mid-June it increased to 814 million, but that it decreased to 763 million by 21 June 1980.

The report mentions the inter-bank interest rate, saying that a small number of banks control this interest rate.

The following is the text of this report which is currently being discussed by the Ministry of Finance, the Lebanese Central Bank and the Council of Development and Reconstruction:

Subject: A preliminary review of some important financial developments during the first half of 1980.

This report summarizes some important financial developments during the first half of 1980 for the purpose of clarifying the financial picture of the first half of the current year and evaluating planned financial and development goals in the light of anticipated changes during the second half of the current year. We shall confine this summary to the following sections:

1. The government's borrowing from the Lebanese Central Bank and by means of treasury bonds.

2. The general balance of payments and changes in the rate of exchange.

3. The liquidity situation of banks and the change of interest rates internally and externally. This report will be followed by another one which will include a summary of development expenditures on the various projects, loans obtained and amounts withdrawn from them during the first half of the current year. The report will also include a summary of the general level of borrowing during that same period.

1. The government's borrowing from the Lebanese Central Bank and by means of treasury bonds during the first half of 1980.

Table 1 summarizes the net borrowing of the government (not for the entire public sector as a whole) during the first half of 1980. The figures are preliminary and subject to revision.

a. During the months of May and June, the government issued treasury bonds with a net value of (that is, after redeeming matured bonds) approximately 660 million Lebanese pounds.

b. The government received $133 million of Arab assistance. This assistance was deposited in the government's accounts at the Lebanese Central

Bank. The net increase in the treasury bonds reached, during the first half of the current year, a value of 696 million Lebanese pounds. If this amount is added to the net borrowing from the Lebanese Central Bank, then the total net government borrowing during this period would add up to 462 million Lebanese pounds.

It is clear that the Arab financial assistance to Lebanon which reached 450 million Lebanese pounds by the end of June 1980, has significantly contributed to the improvement in the government's financial situation vis-a-vas the Lebanese Central Bank. The ability of the Ministry of Finance to issue treasury bonds with a comparatively high value also contributed to the decrease in the government's dependency on the Lebanese Central Bank which had advanced to the government, by the end of April 1980, approximately 322 million Lebanese pounds in net loans.

In comparison with the budget deficit of 1979 which amounted to approximately 1.6 billion Lebanese pounds, the developments of the first half of the current year show a noticeable decrease in this deficit, especially with regard to net borrowing from the Lebanese Central Bank. This in itself agrees to a large extent with the authorities' financial and monetary goals. But it is important to notice that the improvement of the government's financial situation was neither the product of an increase in the average tax or other similar revenues, nor a result of a decrease in the average expenditures of the government. This financial situation, as we noticed, is to a large extent a result of foreign financial assistance which was transferred internally to the government's accounts.

Inflationary effects differ in each situation. Raising tax levels or lowering the level of expenditures control internal inflation and decrease the pressure on the balance of payments. On the other hand, foreign assistance supports the balance of payments, but does not necessarily contribute to the decrease of internal pressure levels. The contrary could be true. It is important to note here that government revenues for the first half of the current year included a large sum of money earned from the Lebanese Central Bank's foreign investments. This in itself caused internal effects similar to those caused by foreign assistance.

2. The general balance of payments and the exchange rates.

As known, the change which occurs on the level of net foreign assets of the banking system (the Lebanese Central Bank and other commercial banks) reflects the total changes of the balance of payments. Its increase would be an indication of a surplus and its decrease would be an indication of a deficit. The existence of a surplus leads to the strengthening of the Lebanese pound; the reverse weakens it. Based upon this, the Lebanese balance of payments registered a surplus of more than 2 billion Lebanese pounds during the year 1979 and another surplus of approximately 300 million Lebanese pounds during the first quarter of 1980.

However, evaluation of the change in the value of the Lebanese pound should take into consideration changes occurring in local deposits in foreign currencies, in view of the importance of such deposits on Lebanese banking conditions. Such changes are not taken into account in the balance of payments, but they have an effect on the exchange rate. The increase in total deposits in foreign currencies means an increase in total exchanges from the Lebanese pound to foreign currencies, and creates an element of pressure on the Lebanese pound. A decrease means the reverse.

Table 2 shows the change in the net foreign assets of the banking system and in the local deposits in foreign currencies. It also shows the changes of the monetary value according to the indicators adopted for the dollar.

The table shows that if we add the change occurring in the local deposits to the change occurring in the net foreign assets of the banking system, the surplus of the balance of payments for the year 1979 and for the first quarter of 1980 would be translated into a deficit (entailing pressure on the Lebanese pound).

From this perspective we see that the decrease in value of the Lebanese pound (on the basis of weighted price as well as on the basis of the dollar's value) in 1979 compared to 1978 (when the average dollar value was approximately three Lebanese pounds) reflects the pressure which existed that year [1979] on the Lebanese pound as is shown in item 3 of the second table. During the first quarter of 1980, the surplus of the balance of payments was also transformed into a deficit as a result of the increase in local deposits in foreign currencies which reached approximately 1.1 billion Lebanese pounds. This period also witnessed a high increase in interest rates abroad (Eurodollar/rate) but that rate began to decline afterwards. (See the table of average interest rates). In comparison to the average value of the Lebanese pound during 1979, the interest rate declined during the first quarter of 1980. It registered a slight increase in relation to the average price of the Lebanese pound during the last 2 months of 1979.

Measured by the weighted price, the value of the Lebanese pound decreased slightly during the first half of the current year. Measured by the price of the dollar, the decrease was more evident (it did not exceed 4 percent). But if we compare the price of the Lebanese pound with the level of its value during the last 2 months of 1979, we find that the value of the Lebanese pound increased gradually at the beginning, and then leveled off during these 2 months.

It should be noted that the Lebanese Central Bank intervened several times in the currency exchange market for the purpose of making certain that a gradual change in the exchange rate would occur.

3. The reserve surplus of the banking system and the changes in interest rate averages.

Available estimates show that the reserve surplus of the banking system is still very high and that it has risen during the past 2 months from 52 million Lebanese pounds in mid-April to 814 million pounds in mid-June. It fell to approximately 763 million Lebanese pounds on 21 June. Based on available statistics, the total mandatory reserve was estimated on 21 June at 2,111 million Lebanese pounds out, including 1,056 million in cash, and 801 million in the form of bonds. Thus, additional capacity to put bonds in reserve reached 254 million Lebanese pounds then.

It is also known that the reserve surplus is not evenly distributed among the commercial banks, since a few of these banks own most of it, while the other banks do not own more than small amounts of reserves.

This kind of distribution of deposts and reserve surplus means that the inter-bank interest rate is controlled by a few banks, and that the issuance of treasury bonds might require positive cooperation by these banks. On the other hand, the purchase of such bonds by banks and the public is regulated to a large extent by the prevailing averages of interest rates and by the prevailing differences between the interest rate of treasury bonds and the other available interest rates inside and outside Lebanon. These interest rates have great effects on the level and direction of exchange between the Lebanese pound and foreign currencies.

The third table shows the changes in average interest rates during the first 5 months of 1980 in relation to: Term deposits, inter-bank deposits, rediscounted commercial paper, treasury bonds and "Euro-dollar London."

The table shows that the level of interest on treasury bonds was, during that period, higher than the interest level on term deposits, but lower than the level of interest on inter-bank deposits. The interest on treasuty bonds and the interest on inter-bank deposits drew close during the months of April and May.

We cannot at this point analyze interest rate policies, but we can say that a drop in the level of interest in the Euro-dollar market could help reduce pressures on the Lebanese pound resulting from conversion into foreign currencies. It would also result in the successful sale of treasury bonds, in case this step is taken in the near future. It is natural that the existence of a large reserve surplus facilitates the issuance of treasury bonds under the right conditions.

Table 1

Government Borrowing (in Millions of Lebanese Pounds)

The Lebanese Central Bank	End of 1979	1980 Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May 23	Jun	Total First Half
1. Increase or decrease in net borrowing (government deposits minus loans to the Ministry of Finance	897	(79)	79	(107)	27	(178)	(377)	(635)
2. Transfers from account 115	615	--	--	200	202	--	--	--
3. =(1) + (2)	1,512	(79)	79	93	229	(178)	(377)	(232)*
Treasury Bonds								
At beginning of period	1,054	1,166	1,171	1,221	1,241	1,200	1,529	7,528
At end of period	1,166	1,171	1,221	1,241	1,200	1,529	1,862	8,224
4. Increase or (decrease)	112	5	50	20	(41)	329	333	696
5. Total increase or decrease [3 + 4]	1,624	(74)	129	113	188	151	(44)	463

*Thus, the net borrowing of the Ministry of Finance from the Lebanese Central Bank decreased by about 233 million Lebanese pounds during the first half of 1980.

Social security deposits are not included.

Government revenues include a large amount representing transfers of profits of the Lebanese Central Bank to government accounts.

Table 2

	End of 1979	1980 Jan	Feb	Mar	May
1. Net foreign assets of banking system (in million pounds)	11,641	11,529	11,832	11,940	
yearly change	* 2,074	(112)	303	108	
2. Local deposits in foreign currencies (in million pounds)	5,606	6,064	6,483	6,710	
yearly change	* 2,911	458	419	227	
3. 1 minus 2 [sic]	* 6,035	5,465	5,349	5,230	
yearly change	* (837)	(570)	(116)	(119)	
4. Weighted price of the Lebanese pound (Dec 1975=100)					
Commercial index	(1)1,125 (2) (120.6)	1,175	1,181	1,185	1,215
Financial index	(1) 324 (2) (339)	327	330	338	341
5. Average dollar price (Lebanese pounds per dollar)	(1) 3.24 (2) 3.39	3.27	3.30	3.38	3.41

*In comparison with the end of 1978

(1) yearly average
(2) average of Nov and Dec 1979

Table 3

Interest averages (%) in Lebanon and Euro-dollar Market

	(1980) Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May
Term deposits (1)	6.95	7.34	7.49	7.68	7.76
Interbank deposits (2) (3 months)	12.58	13.51	13.23	12.63	11.00
Rediscounted commercial paper	9.50	10.00	10.00	10.00	10.00
Treasury bonds	9.50	9.50	9.50	10.25	10.25
Euro-dollar London (3) (3 months)	14.27	15.75	18.28	16.66	10.71

Source: The Lebanese Central Bank and London Currency Report

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(1) These figures represent average interest of 12 banks.

(2) These figures represent interest of two main banks and "Butler."

(3) The monthly average of interest in effect in the middle of each week. Source: London Currency Report)

MONETARY POLICY RECORDS GAINS IN PAST 6 MONTHS

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 18 Aug 80 p 5

/Article: "$565 Million Surplus in Balance of Payments; Loans Increased 9.3 Percent, Mostly in Foreign Currency"/

/Text/ The Bank of Lebanon issued a directive on 5 August to introduce further flexibility into ceilings on bank credit to the private sector, amounting to an additional 2 percent for commercial credit and 3 percent for industrial and tourist projects.

Here is an evaluation of banking developments in the first 6 months of 1980 as performed by Mr Nasim Saliba, member of the Bank Surveillance Committee, showing the changes which have occurred in the balance of payments, the volume of local liquidity, the development of credit, and fluctuations in the exchange price of the Lebanese pound, as well as fluctuations in the interest rate.

Bank Liquidity

Domestic and foreign pressures to which the Lebanese pound have been exposed since early 1979, which were accompanied by a rise in prices, prompted the Bank of Lebanon to adopt a series of measures within a specific monetary program aimed at supporting the stability of the exchange price of the pound and helping to contain price inflation by controlling expansion in public liquidity in a form consonant with the real needs of the economy.

Controlling growth in the volume of credit to the private sector and orienting it toward productive sector financing has been one of the basic points of emphasis on which the Bank of Lebanon has based its monetary program. One can state that as a result of its intensified intervention in the retail market between late 1979 and early 1980 to support the exchange price of the pound the Central Bank has managed to absorb the surplus liquidity in the banks and consequently to control their ability to expand lending in the first months of the current year.

Available data shows that the volume of free cash reserves in the possession of the banks (cash reserves less compulsory reserves for deposits less an excess credit grant less loans from the Bank of Lebanon) totalled about 148 million pounds last November, then dropped to nearly zero at the end of 1979. Out of its concern to provide necessary financing for the economic sectors, the Bank of Lebanon responded to all the banks which requested credit facilities at the time; this amounted to a maximum of about 350 million pounds at the end of January 1980. However, the constant improvement in liquidity enabled the banks to pay back what they had borrowed and consolidate their liquidity in less than 3 months. Their free cash reserves rose to a relatively high level, reaching a rate of about 460 million pounds last June. In addition there was the possibility that they might subscribe to treasury bonds, whose value came to 550 million pounds in the quarter of the current year.

Table One: Consolidated Cash Condition of the Banking System (in millions of pounds)

	End-1978	June 1979	End-1979	June 1980
Assets				
Current assets (net)	9,528	10,360	11,641	14,228
Local credits	11,476	13,617	15,840	17,316
To the public sector (net)	(1,467)	(1,644)	(2,701)	(2,821)
To the private sector	(10,009)	(11,973)	(13,139)	(14,495)
Total	21,004	23,977	27,481	31,544
Liabilities				
Money supply	6,227	6,634	6,747	7,161
Less: money in circulation	(3,285)	(3,293)	(3,506)	(3,697)
Quasi-monetary	11,509	13,318	15,700	18,489
Less: Deposits of residents in foreign currency	(2,695)	(3,657)	(5,606)	(7,122)
Total local liquidity	17,736	19,952	22,447	25,650
Other liabilities (net)	3,268	4,025	5,034	5,894
Percentage changes	1977-78	June 1977-78	1978-79	June 79-80
Local credits	32.8	18.7	38.1	9.3
Loans to private sector	24.1	19.6	31.3	10.3
Local liquidity	19.4	12.5	26.6	14.3
Money supply	23.0	6.5	8.3	6.1
Quasi-monetary	17.7	15.7	36.4	17.8

This improvement in bank liquidity may be ascribed to two basic factors: financing of the public sector deficit in the first quarter of the year through loans from the Bank of Lebanon (455 million pounds) and the attainment of a large surplus in the second quarter, as will be apparent subsequently.

Table Two: Factors Influencing Local Liquidity (Millions of Pounds)

	1978	June 1979	1979	June 1980
Changes in local liquidity	2,885	2,216	4,711	3,203
Money supply	(1,165	(407)	(520)	(414)
Quasi-monetary	(1,720	(1,809)	(4,191)	(2,789)
Changes in factors influencing liquidity	2,885	2,216	4,711	3,203
Foreign assets (net)	509	832	2,113	2,587
Local credits	2,834	2,141	4,364	1,476
To the public sector (net)	(889)	(177)	(1,234)	(120)
To the private sector	(1,945)	(1,964)	(3,130)	(1,356)
Other liabilities (net)	-458	-757	-1,766	-860

(minus sign is the factor of contraction in the development of local liquidity)

These developments in the condition of the public sector and balance of payments earnings are reflected in overall local liquidity (money and quasi-money supply) in the first half of 1980. It is to be observed from Tables One and Two that local liquidity increased by 14.3 percent in this period, that is, by an annual rate of 28.6 percent, or by 12.5 percent for the first half of the past year and 26.6 percent for that year as a whole.

It is necessary to point out that this increase in local liquidity in the half year is to be considered high, but its inflationary effects are limited since the bulk of it is represented by residents' deposits in foreign currencies, which rose in the same period by 27 percent, constituting 27.8 percent of total local liquidity as compared with 15.2 and 25 percent at the end of 1978 and 1979 consecutively. The rate of increase of these deposits began to trend toward zero at the start of April when compared with previous rates (108 percent in 1979 and 20 percent in the first quarter of 1980), as a result of the decline in interest rates on the dollar and the 10 percent rise in the second quarter of the year and 2.6 percent in the second half of 1979 on interest rates on the Lebanese pound.

Development of Credit

As contrasted with the past 2 years, when the expansion in local credits (to the public and private sectors) was the basic factor influencing the volume of local liquidity, the increase in credit in the first half of this year was relatively limited, increasing by 9.3 percent as compared with 18.7 percent in the corresponding period of last year and 38.1 percent in the whole year.

From the statistics available, one may conclude that net credits to the public sector increased by only 4.4 percent (120 million pounds), but that

does not reflect the real development in the public sector; the fiscal deficit was greater than may be inferred from the statistics, because the bulk of it was covered in accounting terms by recording the value of the first instalments of the Arab aid the government received in the second quarter ($133 million) under the subsection of government deposits in the Bank of Lebanon budget. Thus the public sector's net commitments to the banking system declined by the same amount. That means that if the value of the aid is excluded, the public sector deficit financed by the banking system will total about 570 million pounds, or an annual volume roughly equal to the deficit last year.

As regards private sector credits, it should be mentioned that the monetary program of the Bank of Lebanon specified a ceiling for the increase in commercial loans of 20 percent, broken down among the four quarters by 6, 4, 5 and 5 percent, respectively. Thus the Bank of Lebanon permitted banks to grant the private sector additional credits of 5 percent to finance operations related to the sectors of industry and tourism.

The rate of increase in credits to the private sector in the first half of the year came to 10.3 percent, an increase which appears in keeping with the limits set out. However, one must state that most of this increase reflects an expansion in credit to residents by some banks in foreign currencies, which remain outside the stipulated credit ceilings; these rose by 67 percent (Table Four), while the increase in credits in Lebanese pounds did not exceed 3.3 percent--a low rate when compared with the permitted increase or the increase recorded during previous periods.

The main reasons for the limited expansion in lending to the private sector in Lebanese pounds and the high expansion in foreign currencies may be summarized by the following:

1. The tightness of liquidity in the Lebanese pound, which a number of banks suffered from in the first quarter of the year, and these banks' anxiety to preserve a relatively high level of liquidity.

2. The fact that many of the banks (about 40 banks of varying sizes) exceeded their credit ceilings in the first months of the year or reached the limits of their ceilings or retained narrow margins below them which they did not want to use up in full before the end of the year.

These two reasons are basically behind the great increase in credits in foreign currencies, especially since the major portion of them were recorded in the first quarter when the tightness of liquidity was at its most intense, with the limited ceilings in credit.

3. The policy of contraction in a number of banks, because they expanded rapidly the previous year or because they were drawing up a cautious policy in the light of current political and security conditions.

4. Almost total suspension of the grant of credits to finance real estate speculation and speculation in foreign currencies and precious metals, which is what occurred in the first half of last year, in response to the Bank of Lebanon's policy, in spite of the desire of the Bank Surveillance Committee to preserve the soundness of the banking system on the one hand and to avoid monetary, social and economic problems on the other.

5. The rise in interest rates on bank loans might have some effect on the volume of loan applications.

The Balance of Payments

It has previously been pointed out that the improvement in the balance of payments was the main element contributing to the increase in local liquidity.

It is apparent from the movement of the banking system's net foreign assets, adjusted in accordance with fixed exchange rates, that the total balance of payments surplus in the first half of the year came to about $525 million as compared with $323 during the past year. Preliminary indicators for the month of July show that the balance is continuing to improve, since the surplus that month alone is estimated at about $100 million at least.

Attainment of this balance of payments surplus may be attributed to numerous causes, among them:

1. The effectiveness of the Bank of Lebanon's monetary policy, especially in absorbing surplus local liquidity in the first quarter of the year, with the accompanying rise in interest rates on the Lebanese pound.

Table Three: Condition of the Bank of Lebanon (in Millions of pounds)

	end-1978	June 1979	end-1979	June 1980
Assets				
Foreign assets	6,674	6,569	6,242	7,621
Credit to public sector (net)*	485	700	1,635	1,205
Credit to private sector	76	86	110	120
Credit to banks	77	52	72	49
Total	7,312	7,408	8,059	8,995
Liabilities				
Primary currency	5,384	5,029	5,205	6,067
Currency in circulation	(3,285)	(3,293)	(3,506)	(3,697)
Currency in banks	(384)	(250)	(212)	(231)
Private sector deposits	(24)	(15)	(22)	(19)
Bank deposits	(1,692)	(1,471)	(1,465)	(2,120)
Foreign liabilities	75	60	71	70
Capital and reserves	212	213	278	370
Other liabilities (net)	1,640	2,106	2,505	2,488

*Government use of sector's book profits enters into these figures.

2. The drop in the interest rates on the dollar from the maximum level of 20 percent to less than 10 percent in the second quarter.

3. The government's receipt of the first instalment of Arab aid ($133 million). Here it must be stressed that this aid will pay off part of the increasing gaps in government spending, especially from the social and

Table Four: Consolidated Condition of Commercial Banks (in millions of pounds)

	1978	June 1979	1979	June 1980
Assets				
Cash reserve	2,032	1,751	1,390	2,159
Foreign assets	6,063	7,182	9,379	10,929
Loans to the treasury	982	944	1,066	1,616
Loans to the private sector	10,009	11,887	13,029	14,375
Less foreign currency	(1,013)		(1,424)	(2,386)
Total	19,086	21,764	24,864	29,079
Liabilities				
Demand deposits	2,918	3,227	3,219	3,445
Savings and term deposits	8,814	9,661	10,094	11,367
Residents' deposits in foreign currency	2,695	3,657	5,506	7,122
Foreign commitments	3,096	3,331	3,909	4,252
Loans from Bank of Lebanon	77	53	72	49
Private funds	683	758	878	998
Other liabilities (net)	803	979	1,086	1,846

developmental angles, and in addition will enable the government to allocate the local revenues it might have at its disposal to cover great increases in ordinary expenditures. In this sphere, it is sufficient to point to the anticipated increase in wages and the escalating cost of imported fuel to more than $750 million in the current year. Therefore the continued flow of foreign aid and loans will help alleviate pressure on monetary policy, preserve the exchange value and contain inflation rates.

It is apparent from Tables Three and Four that the bulk of the balance of payments surplus has been reflected in the state of the foreign assets of the Bank of Lebanon, which increased by about $300 million to $1,832,000,000 (aside from Bank of Lebanon gold reserves), that is, to the level which it reached at the end of 1978, while the commercial banks' net foreign assets rose by $265 million.

While about 44 percent of the increase in the foreign assets of the Bank of Lebanon is represented by the Arab aid the government has received, the other portion (about $165 million) constitutes revenues from the purchases the Bank of Lebanon made on the currency market. One should bear in mind that the bulk of total purchases will be used to finance public sector foreign purchases.

Exchange Rates

It is pointed out that the Bank of Lebanon's intense intervention in the currency market in December 1979 and the first half of January 1980 had a noticeable effect on improving the exchange rate from 3.50 pounds to the dollar to about 3.27 pounds. As a result of the measures the American administration adopted in mid-February, new pressures appeared on the exchange rate of the pound, but the effect of this pressure was relatively limited after the Central Bank succeeded in absorbing the surplus liquidity in Lebanese pounds, strengthening demand for local currency and limiting the possibility of transferring it to foreign currencies, especially the dollar, out of desire for the high interest at the time. That appeared conspicuously in the limited retrenchment of the exchange rate of the pound relative to the dollar (at the rate of 3.50 percent in February and March) and its improvement relative to most other major currencies (the German mark, the French franc and the Swiss franc), which retrenched before the dollar at higher rates. The result of this was that the real exchange rate of the pound relative to the basket of currencies which constitutes the authorized commercial index of the currency rates in the Bank of Lebanon improved in the first quarter at an average rate of 2.3 percent relative to the average rate of the exchange rate index of the basket of currencies in December 1979. With the drop in interest on the dollar starting early last April, most major currencies registered a noticeable improvement vis-a-vis the dollar, while the exchange rate of the pound relative to the dollar stabilized at a level ranging from 340 to 342 piasters up to the end of July. Thus the real exchange rate retrenched by 2.3 percent in past months (April-July) as compared with the average rate of the exchange rate index of the basket of currencies in the first quarter, in spite of the great balance of payment surplus.

The commercial index of the exchange rates (the base average rates for 1977 equalling 100):

November (1979): 120.03
December 1979: 120.8
January 1980: 117.5
February 1980: 118.1
March 1980: 118.5
April 1980: 119.3
May 1980: 121.3
June 1980: 121.8
July 1980: 122.0

This relatively limited retrenchment in the exchange rate of the pound may be attributed to the continued rise in residents' foreign currency deposits, though at a lower rate than before, and to the intervention of the Bank of Lebanon as a purchaser in the currency market to provide the government's needs and strengthen its foreign reserves. This led to increased liquidity and a drop in the interest rate on the Lebanese pound.

Interest Rates

One of the basic goals of the Bank of Lebanon's policy was and still is to raise the interest rate on the Lebanese pound to narrow the margins between that rate and the rate paid for the dollar and other currencies, in order to limit transfers abroad or retain foreign currency deposits, and consequently to strengthen the exchange rate of the pound. The Bank of Lebanon succeeded in a large extent in reaching this goal, especially at the end oflast year and the early part of this year, when the level of interest rates on creditor accounts rose to record levels ranging at their maximum between 10 and 11 percent on frozen deposits and 12 and 13 percent debtor accounts (except for hard currencies). Thus interest rates on interbank transfers recorded great increases which in mid-February came to 12 percent on demand deposits and 14 percent on 3-month deposits.

In response to this increase in the interest rate, the Bank of Lebanon gradually raised the rediscount rate from 7 to 10 percent (28 January 1980), and the government was compelled to increase the interest on short-term (3-month) treasury bonds from 6.28 percent in October to 9.5 percent in the first quarter of 1980. Nonetheless, the banks did not subscribe to the bonds and confined their subscriptions to 75 million in the National Social Insurance Fund and the National Deposit Insurance Fund. Consequent to the government's need for funds and in response to the Bank of Lebanon's desire, the government conducted two issuances of treasury bonds worth 81 and 287.7 million pounds, respectively, in the fourth and fifth months, at an interest rate in keeping with market rates (10.25 percent).

With the great improvement in the liquidity situation of the banks, especially in the second quarter of the year, interest rates on the Lebanese pound started to decline. While the public's frozen deposits ranged from 8 to 9 percent, interest on interbank deposits dropped to 4 or 4.5 percent on demand and 6.5 or 7 percent for a period of 3 months. This decline might be somewhat less than what was expected, by the standards of the circumstances which prevailed during and before 1979.

One may ascribe that to numerous causes, among them the banks' general eagerness to retain a relatively high rate of liquidity after the liquidity tightness they had suffered from in the early part of the year, in addition to the public's increasing awareness on obtaining the highest possible interest rates on deposits and comparing them to those paid on deposits in foreign currencies.

It seems that the interest rates on debtor accounts did not decline by the same rate as interest rates on creditor accounts. One may explain this to some extent by the nature of banking activity in Lebanon and most banks' lack of desire to expand lending.

To that end, the government's issuance of treasury bills at reasonable market rates in quantities sometimes in excess of its need helped create

opportunities for investing a portion of the surplus liquidity in banks and consequently limiting the decline in interest rates on the Lebanese pound. In the first 7 months of the current year, the value of short-term bonds came to 827 million pounds.

In response to the decline in interest, the government, in agreement with the bank of Lebanon, gradually lowered interest on its issues to 8 percent at the last issue, producing a record figure of 337.8 million pounds. It is worth pointing out that the issue, which will be made on the 20th of this month, is at 7 percent interest.

With this decline, the Bank of Lebanon in turn lowered the discount rate to 9 percent per year.

Adjustment of the Credit Ceiling

This 5 August the governor of the Bank of Lebanon issued Directive No 268 introducing certain modifications to the credit ceilings defined in accordance with Directive No 251 dated 29 December 1979. The modification included a rise in the general specified credit ceiling to the end of 1980 from 20 to 22 percent and a rise in the percentage of additional raises allotted to the industrial and tourist sectors from 5 to 8 percent. The directive also allowed the banks to consign to one another part or all of the unused margin of the specified increase after acquiring prior agreement of the Bank Surveillance Committee.

The Bank of Lebanon approved these adjustments after it had noticed that the productive sectors, including the foreign trade sector, were not obtaining the necessary financing, going by the drop in the rate of increase on credit in Lebanese currency and many agents' shift to borrowing in foreign currencies, bearing their high interest and the risk of fluctuations in currency prices. Encouraging the Bank of Lebanon to take its step was the continued attainment of an encouraging balance of payments surplus and the fact that the exchange rate of the pound was in a satisfying position, in addition to the fact that if the banks used all the margin of increase they were allowed (an impossible supposition), the expansion for the current year as a whole would have exceeded 20 percent.

If the basic goal of the latest adjustments in the credit ceilings was to stimulate economic activity and guarantee the greatest possible amount of locally produced or imported goods to contain the increase in prices, the increase in the ceiling and mutual consignment permission to the banks will help the small banks which have approached or exceeded the ceilings to raise their credits to a level enabling them to cover their increasing operating expenses and perhaps enable them to achieve some profit.

It is well known that a bank's consignment of some or all of its unused margin to other banks is subject to prior agreement of the Surveillance Committee, in the light of some criteria, among them the activity of the

bank to which the margin is being consigned, the volume and type of its credit and the volume of its capital, in addition to the monetary situation in general. The consignment will be final and the bank which has made the consignment will be able to regain what it has consigned only in the event of a waiver by the beneficiary bank.

The monetary policy which the Bank of Lebanon has endorsed, which has led to noticeable positive results, makes continued coordination between the bank and financial authorities mandatory, proceeding from the importance of knowing in advance the government's needs for domestic and foreign financing, in the desire to enable the Bank of Lebanon to intervene in the currency market in a more organized manner which is more effective in maintaining the power of the exchange rate and maintaining a balanced volume of liquidity which will guarantee interest rates in accordance with international interest rates and the volume of domestic inflation. It is no secret that coordination in the issuance of treasury bonds, from the standpoint of timing and the interest rate, remains an important factor in these circumstances in achieving harmony between the effects arising from the treasury bonds and the purchase of foreign currency and the effects of this on the volume of liquidity and the interest rates.

11587
CSO: 4802

POSTWAR ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN NATION REVIEWED

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 16 Aug 80 p 5

/Article: "How Have the Enterprises Which Departed the Trade Center Fared and How Are They Functioning in Their New Locations?"/

/Text/ How did the Trade Center, whose economic enterprises were driven into exile by the Lebanese war, fare before the war and where have the enterprises gone? This is what a descriptive study conducted under the supervision of the General Civil Regulation Department is answering.

The study gives the area of the Trade Center as 1,418,536 square meters, of which 14,346 square meters are for al-Shuhada' Square, broken down into 1,960 plots of land with an average area of 344.5 square meters; 40 percent of these plots are less than 300 square meters in area.

There are 25,000 center inhabitants in 5,043 dwellings; of these, 9,000 in the east of the center have left and 3,195 dwellings remain with an average area of 134 square meters.

The shops number 7,092 with an area of 263,852 square meters. These provided 39,000 jobs. The offices numbered 5,597, with 148 medical clinics covered 466,563 square meters in area and had 34,000 prople working in them.

Occupations and industries, 1,368 in number, had 8,000 workers and they were in their totality occupational in nature.

There were 702 warehouses with an area of 731,422 square meters.

The hotels and lodgings in the middle of the city numbered 343, including 13 luxury hotels. There were 361 restaurants, 45 bars, 49 garages and 143 mosques, churches, schools, movie houses and so forth.

Shops and Offices

Enterprises which departed, including commercial ones, differ as to the

eastern and western areas. In a study of a sampling of these shops, the following was evident:

1. The eastern area: 1.8 percent of commercial shops are kiosks, 42.9 are privately owned and 55.3 are investments.

2. The western area: 43.2 percent are kiosks, 33.3 percent are privately owned and 23.5 percent are investments.

It is also evident that 10.8 percent of the enterprises which departed started operation in their new centers (eastern and western) in 1975, 43.9 percent in 1976, and 45.3 percent in 1977.

Income

As regards daily income, that declined 5.1 times on ordinary days and 4.1 times on special holidays. The income per shop in the eastern area declined from 6,700 pounds per day in the middle of the city to 1,050 pounds per day, and for shops in the western area from 2,800 pounds to 800 pounds.

General average sales on ordinary days declined from 4,750 pounds to 925 pounds for all shops, and from 9,500 to 2,340 pounds on special holidays.

Capital of the shops in the center of the city included in the sample was 327,000 pounds when they opened; on the eve of their departure this totalled 891,000 pounds, and after their departure (1977) it was 390,000 Lebanese pounds.

Customers

The customers have also changed.

Regarding shops in the eastern area:

A. On ordinary days before the departure they were 78.5 percent Lebanese, 10.5 percent Arabs, and 11.0 percent foreigners. After the departure they became 93, zero and 7.0 percent, respectively.

B. On special holidays before the departure they were 95.5, 8.5 and 6.0 percent, and became 91.3, zero and 8.7 percent following the departure.

Regarding shops in the western area:

A. On ordinary days, before the departure they were 82.4 percent Lebanese, 11.4 percent Arabs, and 6.2 percent foreigners. They became 90.6, 7.5 and 1.9 percent following the departure.

6. On special holidays, before the departure they were 74.0 percent Lebanese, 17.3 percent Arabs, and 8.7 percent foreigners. Following the departure they became 90.6, 9.4 percent and zero.

Finally, activities which have opened temporary new centers have started to acclimatize themselves. Their number has increased by 26 percent over what it was in the center.

11887
CSO: 4802

INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS FALL IN AUGUST

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 15 Sep 80 p 6

[Text]

Lebanese industrial exports in August which were granted certificates of origin by the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry were 26.49 per cent lower in value than in July and 38.8 per cent below their June level. Exports were valued at LL134.599 million (LL1 = $0.292) compared to LL183 million in July and LL219 million in June.

This drop in Lebanese industrial exports was reflected in most major export markets. The value of exports to Saudi Arabia dropped 34 per cent, to Jordan 38.3 per cent, to Iraq 43.8 per cent. Exports to Syria, however, rose 39.94 per cent and to Kuwait 48 per cent. Lebanese industrial exports to these countries account for 87.6 per cent of total exports registered.

Exports of foodstuffs fell back from LL5.5 million in July to LL2.8 million in August, while exports of mineral water dropped from LL2.1 million in July to LL4.7 million in August. Exports of beverages dropped from LL2.1 million to LL1.5 million during the month. Exports of textiles and ready-to-wear garments dropped sharply from LL26.6 million to LL4.4 million (these had risen in July in preparation for Eid-al-Fitr and were sold mainly to Saudi Arabia). Exports of rugs and carpets also fell from LL9.1 million during the month while exports of aluminum products fell from LL11.9 million in July to LL8.1 million in August. Exports of electrical equipment were LL2.3 million below their level in July and were at LL5 million.

Exports of cement were valued at LL25.4 million, 8.5 per cent higher than in July while chemical industry products rose from LL2.5 million in July to LL4.7 million in August.

The market for Lebanese industrial exports spread to 30 countries in August. Saudi Arabia topped the list, importing 48.8 per cent of total industrial exports during the month, three points below average imports.

Second was Iraq, whose imports reached LL27.5 million or 20.4 per cent of total Lebanese exports. Exports to Syria were valued at LL20 million, 15 per cent higher than in July, while exports to Kuwait amounted to LL4 million or 3.1 per cent of the total.

Lebanese Industrial Exports by Destination
August 1980

Type of Exports	Value in (LL'000s)	Destination	(in LL'000s)
Foodstuffs	2,888	Saudi Arabia	64,863
Soya Beans	7,276	Iraq	27,579
Mineral Water	4,712	Jordan	6,145
Beverages	1,510	Syria	20,514
Garments	4,433	Egypt	612
Textiles	3,315	Kuwait	4,201
Carpets and bedspreads	1,075	Libya	1,486
Tanned hides (excluding shoes)	1,362	The Yemens	100
Shoes	1,802	Abu Dhabi	1,622
Wooden furniture and crafts	3,719	Bahrain	226
Chemical products	4,758	Dubai	1,208
Paints	3,777	Qatar	1,259
Pharmaceuticals	2,458	Oman	884
Paper and paper products	4,894	Sudan	63
Cardboard products	1,468	France	384
Non-mineral extracts	7,531	Italy	100
Portland cement	25,453	Britain	832

CSO: 4820

TAPLINE MODIFIES AGREEMENT WITH GOVERNMENT

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 15 Sep 80 p 10

[Text] The American-owned Trans Arabian Pipeline Company (Tapline) last week presented the Lebanese government with new conditions for supplying oil to the Tripoli refinery in northern Lebanon. The new conditions would amend an agreement between Tapline and the Lebanese authorities over transport from Saudi Arabia of six million barrels of crude oil during the second half of the current year.

Under the proposed amendments, the Lebanese government is expected to pay for the deliveries during the last fortnight of each supply month. A penalising monthly interest rate will go into effect in the event of delayed payments. In counterpart, Tapline will be required to bill the government during the last five days of each supply month in accordance with market prices at Ras Tannoura (Saudi Arabia), which at the moment have been set by the Saudi government at $28 per barrel.

Furthermore, Tapline's conditions hold the Lebanese government responsible for any losses or damage to the deliveries after the transfer of the oil from the company's pipline to a government-designated tanker in the southern Lebanese port of Zahrani, whence the oil is transported to the Tripoli refinery. Moreover, the company will have no liability in additional expenses incurred by any delays in deliveries, whatever their cause, and any injuries or accidents involving the company's workers will be the government's responsibility.

Tapline's proposals also require that oil refined at the Tripoli plant only be marketed domestically; the quantity of oil delivered will be evaluated by the company, in the presence of an official representative of the Lebanese government.

Under these new terms the Tripoli refinery has already received 1.488 million bbl of oil worth $42 million, for which the Lebanese government is required to pay by September 15. The Tripoli refinery has an annual capacity of 12 million bbl and until 1978 was supplied by the Iraqi Petroleum Company, IPC.

CSO: 4820

INVESTMENT GUARANTEE INSTITUTE IS THRIVING

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 15 Sep 80 p 11

[Text]

Lebanon's publicly-run National Institute for the Guarantee of Investments registered a 33 per cent growth during the first half of 1980 in the number of contracts it has underwritten since the beginning of 1979. The Institute, which underwrites private industrial, commercial and philanthropic investments, now has 36 guarantee contracts worth LL75 million (LL1= $0.292) of which 20 worth $27.5 million were undertaken this year. Furthermore, 13 new contract projects estimated at LL476,000 are currently being considered by the agency.

All contracts signed during 1979 were renewed this year with the amounts guaranteed by the Institute at the end of August reaching LL100 million for fixed assets alone. This figure is LL26 million higher than for the previous month, July.

The agency's bill of health is further attested to by its very respectable financial position: against LL238,318 of expenditure the Institute boasted revenues of LL515,986 during the first six months of this year, a surplus of LL277,688.

Investments underwritten by the insurance body up until August 31 were mainly in the industrial and commercial sectors. LL61 million worth of industrial investments and LL35 million of commercial ones were guaranteed by the Institute. The remaining LL4 million investment guarantees went to health services.

The National Institute for the Guarantee of Investments, though modest, is one of the less elusive governmental efforts towards more stable economic development in Lebanon. The Institute was created in the aftermath of the 1975-76 war to help reactivate the economy within the government's general, and as yet largely unimplemented, reconstruction and development plan. Its contracts run for between one and 10 years at an annual premium not exceeding 2 per mil. In the words of its director, the Institute's guarantees can be considered to be free of charge.

CSO: 4820

INCREASE IN EXPORT EARNINGS REPORTED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 22 Sep 80 pp 5, 6

[Text]

Lebanon's export earnings in the first half of this year have been estimated at LL 1.767 billion, a 48 per cent increase over the similar period of 1979. According to a report recently released by the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry, this estimate is based upon the assumption that between 65 and 70 per cent of total Lebanese exports are registered with the Chamber. In the first half of this year earnings of registered exports came to LL 1.148 billion.

Inflation, in the form of price rises in raw materials and higher insurance rates and overheads, is thought to account for 15 per cent of the increase in first half export earnings. In 1979 prices, the value of Lebanese exports during the first six months of this year went up by 29 per cent compared to the similar period last year, when export earnings were worth LL 1.193 billion.

Lebanese exports by destination (in LL'000s)

Destination	1st half '80	% of total	1st half '79	% of total
Saudi Arabia	485,763	42.3	323,193	41.7
Iraq	271,565	23.6	104,371	13.4
Syria	100,723	8.7	96,157	12.4
Jordan	53,943	4.7	58,463	7.5
Kuwait	50,539	4.4	29,739	3.9
UAE	46,139	4.0	25,893	3.4
Egypt	19,723	1.7	41,725	5.4
Europe	38,590	3.4	21,887	2.8
EEC	29,637	2.6	14,494	1.8
Others	21,227	1.8	4,705	0.6
Totals	**1,148,965**	**100.0**	**775,303**	**100.0**

Source: Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry

Note: Percentage figures do not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Even though export earnings went up from LL 209 million in January to LL 406 million in June of this year, much of the increase is attributable to non-productive factors such as higher costs and the vicissitudes of the Lebanese pound. Since figures available are only partial and because much illicit trade goes on through Lebanon's post-war "parallel economy," the interpretation and significance of the present data is at best tentative.

In the first six months of this year 28.9 per cent of export earnings came from construction-related materials. Of these, aluminium and other metal products were worth LL 148.3 million, while non-metal mined products, such as cement, brought in LL 135.5 million. Chemicals accounted for 12.7 per cent of total export earnings, with sales of LL 146.1 million this year against LL 124 million in 1979. Textiles exported were worth

Lebanese Industrial Exports by Sector

Sector	First half, 1980 (in LL'000)	(% of total)	First half, 1979 (in LL'000)	(% of total)	% difference
Livestock and meat products	5,169	0.4	3,679	0.4	41.0
Vegetable products	47,221	4.1	48,270	6.2	−2.0
Oils and fats	18,703	1.6	4,175	0.5	357.0
Foodstuffs and beverages	84,313	7.3	60,668	7.8	39.0
Mineral products	135,503	11.7	81,872	10.5	65.6
Chemicals	146,137	12.7	124,293	16.0	17.7
Synthetics and rubber	41,601	3.6	24,948	3.1	67.0
Leather products	7,432	0.6	9,610	1.2	−73.0
Wood and wood products	9,328	0.8	5,526	0.7	68.2
Paper and paper products	58,777	5.1	47,968	6.1	23.5
Textiles	154,419	13.4	83,792	10.8	84.5
Shoes, rainwear and scarves	21,643	1.8	10,924	1.4	98.0
Stone, cement & glass products	52,202	4.5	45,016	5.8	16.0
Precious & semi-precious minerals and jewelry	37,995	3.2	16,410	2.1	131.0
Ordinary metal products	140,884	12.5	140,730	18.1	2.0
Electrical equipment	129,915	11.3	50,351	6.4	158.0
Transport equipment	29,631	2.5	7,768	0.9	284.0
Optical equipment	9,347	0.8	304	–	–
Arms and munitions	45	–	–	–	–
Other manufactures	15,791	1.3	9,042	1.1	74.0
Art works and antiques	–	–	131	–	–
Totals	**1,148,965**	**100.0**	**775,303**	**100.0**	**48.0**

LL 154.4 million in 1980 against LL 83.7 million in the first six months of last year. Electrical equipment and machinery reached LL 129.9 million, representing 11.3 per cent of total export earnings for the first half of 1980; this compares with LL 50.3 million in the same period of 1979. Exports of foodstuffs and beverages registered a 39 per cent rise in value, going from LL 60.6 million in the first half of 1979 to LL 84.3 million in the corresponding period of this year. Notable exceptions to these increases were the 73 per cent fall in value of exported leather goods (apart from shoes) over the periods under review, and the 2 per cent drop in value of exported leather goods.

The destination of Lebanese exports remains unchanged since the 1975-76 war, when the Arab world was importing more than 90 per cent of Lebanon's exports. Before that time Arab countries had represented only 66 per cent of Lebanon's foreign market. Saudi Arabia, which has consistently been Lebanon's single largest export market in the last few years, has again increased its share this year, taking 42 per cent of exports in the first half of 1980 against 38 per cent in the corresponding period of last year. Iraq has been in second position since 1979, with its imports going from LL 83 million in the first half of 1978 to LL 271 million this year, but Jordan's share of Lebanese exports has dropped dramatically. Jordan's imports from Lebanon have fallen from LL 119 million in 1978 to LL 54 million this year, for the periods under review.

Lebanon's exports are thought to make up 40 per cent of total domestic production.

CSO: 4820

BEIRUT'S PROSPECTS AS A BASE FOR BUSINESSMEN EXAMINED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 29 Sep 80 pp 4, 5

[Text]

The following survey on the prospects for a return by Beirut to its once pre-eminent place as a regional centre for foreign businessmen was written for *An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO* by Dr Paul Huygelen, a consultant on development:

Just spend an hour or two in the Beirut branch office of one of New York's leading stockbroking firms: telephones ringing every 30 seconds and the bustle reminiscent of Wall Street and Hong Kong make one realise that Beirut, after five years of turmoil and psychological uncertainty, is not the shipwreck, rudderlessly adrift, which political commentators often associate with Lebanon.

The business community, the banking sector, insurance and real estate brokers, and many a progressive industrialist are all flourishing: this is the inevitable observation today of foreign visitors. One of them, an American banker, recently inquired: "Where is this civil war we keep on hearing about?".

Yet a survey last week of representatives of European, American, and Japanese business firms revealed – if revealing indeed was necessary – that many head offices remain sceptical about the viability of Beirut in 1980 as a regional centre in spite of the fact that the basic communications media of the international businessman – telex, international telephone, and airport facilities – are more efficient today in Beirut than at any time prior to 1975; the postal service is not functioning any worse than in 1975 and, with respect to the Arab countries, possibly better than in years gone by; moreover, personalised courier services abound. Banking facilities remain proverbial and second to none, including those available to "offshore" companies in Amman, Nicosia, and Athens.

What is missing is not confidence, for the resident vice presidents and expatriate managers do have the confidence of their respective headquarters. What is missing for those companies "sitting it out" elsewhere is the green light from the State Department in Washington, DC. It is there that the red light was switched on in 1975 which led to the sudden mass exodus of Japanese firms, etc. in the wake of the Bechtels, etc. The situation is broadly speaking comparable to the case of Egypt in the early 1950s and probably in due course, *mutatis mutandis*, to the green light that signaled the American businessman's invasion of Cairo as from 1978/79. This attitude is less prevalent with European companies whose head offices seem less imbued with the civil service attitudes of large American corporations; maybe, as a legacy of their colonial traditions, European companies have retained abroad a tinge of their entrepreneurial past.

Some 400 American business concerns with regional offices in Beirut were listed in the 1974/75 edition of the US embassy's directory of such establishments. Today's embassy listing comprises about 90 companies, a quarter of which are managed by American citizens (several of Lebanese origin). Most of them are no longer entrusted, as control offices, with regional coverage of the Middle East, but instead deal basically with the local Lebanese market. This localisation of interests also applies to most other nationalities, though one Japanese company happens to have retained Cyprus as part of its territory. There are a few exceptions, however, such as Lockheed Aircraft, Uniroyal, SNAP-ON Tools, System Development Corporation, Hoechst and maybe others, who provide area-wide services or cover at any rate the Near East from their Beirut liaison office.

Athens, which was but a backwater five years ago from which to cover the Near and Middle East, now boasts the continued presence of scores of foreign companies including over two hundred American firms thanks to the extraterritoriality provided them as regards all taxes and fees "present and future" by Greek Law No. 89/1967. Jordan in 1975, inspired by the Greek initiative, passed its law No. 46, and Cyprus amended their income tax statutes in 1976 to attract in a similar fashion overseas entities interested in establishing offshore companies. Even more so than the political green light, this triple cordon is what is sterilising Beirut's opportunity to regain a front seat in the international business arena.

By the mid-1970s foreign headquarters viewed each overseas operation as a profit centre to assess performance; hence invoicing became a means to attain that assessment. The ability of an offshore company in Amman, Nicosia or Athens to invoice customers abroad without incurring local tax liabilities is a major incentive to maintain their presence there. With the exception of a

handful of cases, the foreign entities that remain in Beirut are those with purely local market interests, including commercial banks, which had no choice but to stay, and banking organisations providing management expertise under contract to Lebanese banks.

Tapping labour market

Others, such as McDermott International, maintain a presence here to tap the expert Lebanese and Palestinian labour market to provide skilled workers such as welders, etc. for the construction of oil and gas drilling platforms in the Gulf area, by serving the Gulf countries, these men also provide sizeable bank transfers to their families in Lebanon.

What is sometimes not realised or often forgotten is that by 1975 expansion of foreign companies was no longer possible or realistic in Beirut. Until October 1973, most of the regional offices in Beirut covered the geographical "left-overs" stretching irregularly from Nepal or Ceylon for some, to Malawi or Morocco for others. In 1973 and 1974 Middle East managers became the "blue-eyed boys" at boardroom meetings in Europe and America: new offices were set up in Tehran, companies were registered in Sharjah, satellite branches were planned elsewhere in the Middle East and equipment manufacturers seconded technicians to their distributors in Saudi Arabia rather than have them travel from Beirut. Baghdad, Abu Dhabi, Jeddah became separate operations for a leading German company whereas Amman, Dubai and Riyadh attracted an American company that used to have 190 employees in Beirut and now limits itself to the local market with a total workforce of 32, none of them Americans. Apart from transferring its regional office to Cairo, as a result of the turmoil in Beirut, in 1975 and 1976, a major Japanese firm opened offices in Damascus and Amman as well as others in the Gulf Emirates. Most British firms leaned towards the Gulf as a result of historical factors.

What was changing in the mid-1970s was not Lebanon but the whole Middle East itself, to the extent that last week the manager of a major American company in Beirut stated "nobody is asking the question any more" as to whether companies' regional operations will return to Beirut; it is an outdated concept for many. The spilt-up was not caused by what happened in 1975-76 as the manager of a West European manufacturer commented: "it just gave it a push."

Other ideas try to take root

Other management concepts were trying to take root with some companies, for instance product line organisation versus regional organisation. The war in Lebanon activated the implementation of this concept, sometimes on a trial basis, whereby sales engineers travel from and report directly to the actual fabricating or manufacturing plants. In some instances this resulted in duplication, friction or inefficiency as if a symphony orchestra had to perform without a conductor. As one manager commented last week: "Our greatest handicap in doing business in the Middle East is American legislation," notably the anti-boycott regulations, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and antitrust laws. Hence, for some, the de-regionalisation of management introduced additional worries that inhibit sales personnel's motivations. For those companies that pulled out of Beirut into non-Arab centres (as distinct from those that went to Amman, Bahrain, Cairo, etc) these problems loom larger because of the lack of daily exposure to the Middle East business climate.

In the past Beirut was a stepping stone into the Middle East. The validity of this concept is awakening again amongst American and European companies that have had no presence hitherto in the Middle East. A major American producer of agricultural chemicals is at present contemplating opening a small office for regional control and service in West Beirut. (The non-existence of high class hotels in East Beirut is a factor that strikes every foreign visitor, who does not want to be driven all the way to Beit Meri for a night's sleep.) An interesting factor in this case, and in other instances that have been analysed here, is that when the American company's decision-maker is a European (say a British director of personnel in Britain or a Swiss Vice President/Marketing in Geneva) Beirut's advantages at the crossroads of East and West are realised and acted upon. When the decision-maker sits in the US, negative newspaper headlines or a telephone conversation with a cautious counselor in Washington seem to rule the day.

Those foreign companies that are in Beirut and are reduced to the local market's opportunities had to adjust their eyesight at first. "We have to go after the small fish," said one executive, "instead of the major Saudi contracts" now handled from Nicosia. But the company's sales within Lebanon are six times as much as what they used to be before the 1975/76 turmoil. Another company's manager concluded: "We are participating in the

Beirut boom, but not equally with all our product lines." The failure of some product lines is apparently due to the sizeable quantities of smuggled goods entering the country so that licit entries are unable to compete over prices.

It is clear that the attitudes of foreign companies lie on three planes: those that by now have a well-established market in the Middle East and feel they can bypass the Beirut stepping stone, those that concentrate on the local market, and those interested in opening up the Middle East market for themselves via Beirut. The largest single concentration of the first group insofar as products are concerned are the foreign companies offering oilfield equipment and services for whom, in pre-1975 days, Beirut's Phoenicia Hotel was the greatest pumping station in the information and public relations pipelines that linked the Arabian Gulf to Europe and th US. For the third group, the concept of "offshore" extraterritoriality will have to be espoused by the Lebanese authorities to provide advantages at least equal to those provided by Amman, Nicosia, and Athens for regional operations. This third group will be encouraged to know that an important initiative was undertaken recently when a group of some 30 locally established businessmen, all branch offices of German, American, and British corporations or banks, helped to constitute, following Ministry of the Interior approval, the Beirut Business Forum with the express intent of providing unbiased information, up-to-date intelligence, practical counsel and personalised assistance to companies of any nationality regarding the true opportunities in Beirut today.

CSO: 4820

DEMANDS OF CIVIL AVIATION TECHNICIANS MET

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 17 Jul 80 p 6

[Article: "Cabinet Rectifies Conditions of Airport Technicians and Gives 50 Percent Pay Increase to Firemen"]

[Text] Yesterday [16 July], the cabinet approved a bill to rectify the conditions of employees of the General Civil Aviation Administration. The cabinet decided to increase the vitality and pressure allowance from 20 to 40 percent of the basic salary for all technical employees of the administration.

The cabinet also decided to give an allowance for responsibility for civil aviation safety, amounting to 10 percent of the basic salary, to all personnel having the rank of technician and above. It also decided to give airport firemen a pay increase of 50 percent of the basic salary, which will put them on an equal footing with firemen of the city of Beirut.

The cabinet decided to authorize reorganization of the General Civil Aviation Administration, to codify all related laws, and to prepare a set of regulations for the firemen of the General Civil Aviation Administration, similar to that of the firemen of the city of Beirut.

These demands were met by the cabinet on the basis of the agreement which was reached on 13 July between the minister of public works, Butrus Harb, and the follow-up committee representing the technical employees of the General Civil Aviation Administration. The text of the bill approved by the cabinet, to be referred to parliament for enactment, follows.

Article one:

1. The technical employees of the General Civil Aviation Administration will be given a monthly allowance called "vitality and work pressure," equivalent to 40 instead of 20 percent [of the basic salary] awarded under law No 26 dated 11 November 1973. Employees holding positions mentioned in sections A, G and D of article three of this law are excluded.

2. Technical employees of the General Civil Aviation Administration holding the rank of technician (Step 2, Grade 4) and higher will be given a monthly allowance called "allowance for responsibility for aviation safety," equivalent to 10 percent of basic salary.

Article two:

Contrary to any other text, promotions are allowed to the rank of technician or senior technician in Grade 4 in all technical departments of the General Civil Aviation Administration, within the maximum number allowed. The number of employees holding the rank of assistant technician, technician and senior technician in Grade 4 in each department, should not exceed the total number allowed for this particular category in table one appended to decree number 1610 dated 26 July 1971. The candidate for such a promotion should meet all appointment conditions defined for the job to which he is promoted.

Article three:

1. Firemen of the General Civil Aviation Administration will have a special work schedule of 24 hours of duty followed by a 48-hour rest period. They will receive in return compensation equal to 50 percent of their base salary.

2. In extreme circumstances and within defined time limits, the government can, according to the next article, put firemen on duty for 24 hours followed by a 24-hour rest period. However, these particular firemen will receive payment for the additional working hours entailed by such a schedule.

Article four:

The additional compensation provided for in article one, item 1 and article 3, item 1, of this bill are not taken into account with regard to the ceiling put on employee compensation as stated in the law promulgated by decree number 3732 dated 3 February 1972.

Article 5:

The government may through decrees adopted by the cabinets following approval by the Civil Service Commission, within a period of 1 year from the date this law goes into effect:

1. Reorganize the General Civil Aviation Administration, amend its tables of organization and hiring practices, and modify grades and salary scales and allowance established for it.

2. Establish a special system for the firemen of the General Civil Aviation Administration similar to that of the firemen of the city of Beirut. This

does not apply to their rights with regard to discharge from service or retirement.

Article 6:

Article 4 of law No 26 dated 29 November 1973 as well as all provisions contrary to the provisions of this law are hereby canceled.

Article 7:

With the exception of articles 1 and 3 which went into effect on 1 July 1980, this law will go into effect as soon as it is published in the official gazette.

Regulating Working Hours

The cabinet also approved the following draft decree regulating working hours for technical employees, administrative employees, general attendants and firemen as follows:

Article 1:

Article 1 of decree No 5036 dated 13 July 1966 is amended as follows:

The weekly number of working hours for the employees of the General Civil Aviation Administration whose department regulations require them to work continuously, are set as follows:

a. 32 hours for permanent technical and administrative employees, except for general attendants, drivers, guards and firemen.

b. 38 hours for permanent general attendants, guards and drivers.

c. 48 hours for working firemen.

Article 2:

This decree will be published when needed.

The cabinet issued another decree setting the [additional] compensation for each hour of night work for employees of the General Civil Aviation Administration at 1 over 150 [monthly] wages in the public sector.

8988
CSO: 4802

LEBANESE COMMERCIAL FLEET CONSISTS OF SMALL, OLD SHIPS

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 19 Jul 80 p 5

[Article: "The Lebanese Commercial Fleet in 1979; 209 Ships with a Capacity of 298,000 Tons; Complaints Concerning the Small Size and Old Age of These Ships"]

[Text] The number of ships registered with the Association of Lebanese Shipowners reached 209 in 1979, compared to 142 ships in 1978--an increase of 47.2 percent.

Total goods carried by this commercial fleet in 1979 was 411,608 tons. The fleet unloaded 240,763 tons of goods at the seaport of Beirut out of a total unloaded cargo of 2,001,968 million tons, or 12 percent. The fleet carried 57,375 tons out of 220,871 tons leaving the seaport of Beirut, or 25 percent.

The annual report prepared by the president of the Association of Lebanese Shipowners, Mr 'Anwar Ghazzawi, says that the increase in the number of ships registered with the association during the year 1979 consisted mainly of small ships whose capacity does not exceed 1,500 tons each.

Size and Age of the Ships

The report says that the modest contribution of the fleet to shipping operations from and to the seaport of Beirut is due to two reasons: the small size of the ships and their old age. The classification of ships registered with the association (209) shows that 49 percent of them have a capacity of less than 1,000 tons, and that 15.7 percent have a capacity ranging from 1,000 to 1,500 tons. The following table shows the distribution of the fleet according to capacity:

Capacity in Tons	Number of Ships Registered with the Society	Percentage
from 100 to 500	19	9
from 500 to 1,000	82	40
from 1,000 to 1,500	33	15.7
from 1,500 to 2,000	15	7.1
from 2,000 to 2,500	7	3.3
from 2,500 to 3,000	8	3.7
from 3,000 to 3,500	10	4.7
from 3,500 to 4,000	3	1.4
from 4,000 to 5,000	10	4.7
from 5,000 to 7,500	16	7.6
from 7,500 to 10,000	6	2.8
	209	100.0

The report mentions that the age of these ships is as follows: 23 percent older than 25 years, 43 percent between 20 and 25 years old and 20 percent between 15 and 20 years old.

The report adds that the fleet is experiencing a shortage of spare parts due to the change in ship technology. This is a matter seriously taken into consideration by insurance companies. The report notes that there should be serious efforts to modernize this fleet.

The following table shows the distribution of the fleet by the age of its ships:

Age of the Ships	Number on 31 Dec 79	Percentage
from 1 to 5 years	2	.1
from 5 to 10 years	5	2.5
from 10 to 15 years	19	.9
from 15 to 20 years	43	20.5
from 20 to 25 years	91	43.5
older than 25 years	49	23.5
	209	100.0

Fuel

The report shows that the average monthly consumption of fuel by the Lebanese commercial fleet reached a total of 4.5 million liters of gas oil and 1.6 million liters of fuel oil during the last third of 1979.

The report expects the average monthly consumption of fuel during the current year to increase by 20 percent, reaching 65 million liters of gas oil and 23 million liters of fuel oil.

It is known that the Lebanese ships, in spite of the fuel price increases during the past year, benefit from special price subsidies which do not apply to foreign ships. Lebanese ships receive every 1,000 liters of gas oil for 700 Lebanese pounds and every 1,000 liters of fuel oil for 425 Lebanese pounds.

The association is very active in several areas for the purpose of developing the Lebanese commercial fleet by means of training people and acquiring technical and financial assistance from the international specialized organizations. The association is also very active in seeking international agreements and treaties which will help increase transportation shares of national fleets.

8988
CSO: 4802

SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVIEWED BY AUSTRIAN DAILY

AU190741 Vienna KURIER in German 18 Sep 80 p 3

[Heinz Nussbaumer interview with Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia, during the OPEC conference held in Vienna--date not given]

[Text] It was a quiet anniversary: 2 years ago yesterday since Egypt and Israel laid the foundations for their separate peace at Camp David, the breakthrough for a total settlement of the Middle East conflict, however, has not been achieved since then. The oil kingdom of Saudi Arabia, however, acted as a silent bridge, preventing the total severance of relations between the Arabs and al-Sadat's Egypt. Taking the opportunity of the OPEC conference, our KURIER reporter Heinz Nussbaumer spoke with Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal, the minister of foreign affairs of Saudi Arabia.

Statement About al-Sadat

"We used to support him without reserve when he was aiming at peace within the framework of Arab solidarity, when he deviated from this principle, we said we were going to wait and see what he was capable of achieving alone by himself. Actually, we know that Israel does not wish true peace, but only the splitting of the Arab world. We have nothing against President al-Sadat personally, as an individual and a political leader, however, he abandoned the path of joint actions and is now pursuing a trend where we cannot follow him."

Statement About the "Holy War"

"In this connection there is a great confusion of terms. The so-called "Holy War" is supposed to be something like the crusades of the Christians, the church's calling for war against the heatherns, but this is not what Saudi Arabia has in mind, the so-called "Jihad" is something quite different. It is a cry of despair for protection of the basic living interests of a nation; it is the joint effort of the Islamic community to alleviage misery and to protect ourselves against the disaster which Israel has inflicted upon us, there is nothing aggressive about it."

Statement About Jerusalem

"If Israel was truly looking for a place of refuge after the holocaust, as the Israelis always claim, then it should have first of all tried to win the understanding the good will of the Arab people of Palestine, instead of continuing the tragedy on the other side.

We were ready for peace in the long run--despite occupation, despite expulsion. There are proofs for this. The reply, however, was new expansion, finally in Jerusalem. How can the capital of three world religions, the most sacred site, became the capital of only one, aggressive, religious state? The only solution is: To give East Jerusalem back to Arab sovereignty, all other solutions about which there are so many discussions can be nothing but "made-up" solutions without any real substance. Why should the flag of Saudi Arabia, for example, have over the sacred sites of Islam in Jerusalem, as some people suggest? This city does not belong to us! Jerusalem is not a commercial good that can be bought and sold."

Statement About the PLO

"The Palestinians do not wish to destroy Israel. They have very often stated what they really want--and what they have a right to claim: to go back to their own homeland and to enjoy real peace, there is only one country in the Middle East that wishes to liquidate someone else. This country is Israel! The Palestinians have to disappear, whether they should be in Jordan, Lebanon or far away in Nepal--the Israelis will never cease persecuting them, all this talk about Israel recognizing the PLO is without any meaning--the Palestinians are no state, they are a problem, the living symbol of unfilled rights."

Statement About Islam

"Islam--this is a term used by the western media. Islam has always been strong, but as long as the East was occupied and exploited no one cared about it. The West has been considering us with prejudice for many generations. Whoever follows the reports about Iran can feel the danger of new prejudices."

Statement About Relations Between Iran and Iraq

"As Islamic brothers and neighbors we are deeply interested in a prompt improvement of these relations. However, Saudi Arabia is not playing the role of intermediator in these controversies."

Statement About the Future

"As long as the world proves incapable of exerting control over the actions of Israel there is no light at the end of the tunnel. Israel is pushing us toward a new drama."

POLITICAL BUREAU TO STUDY SPECIAL CONGRESS OF PSD

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 11 Sep 80 p 1

[Article: The Political Bureau Examines the Question of PSD Special Congress: The Secretaries General of the Party Constituency Will Not Be Candidates for the Next Coordination Committees"]

[Text] The PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] Political Bureau held its regular meeting under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, the secretary general of the party.

At the beginning of the meeting, the Political Bureau examined questions concerning Tunisia's relations with certain fraternal countries. In this connection, the results of the secretary general and prime minister's visit to Algeria were discussed in the light of a report on this subject by Mohamed Mzali.

The Political Bureau was delighted with the brotherly atmosphere in which this visit took place and reviewed with satisfaction the promising prospects for cooperation between the two countries in all fields.

Briss Guiga then reported the results of his recent visit to Saudi Arabia.

Examining questions concerning political life, the Political Bureau discussed the upcoming special party congress which the president of the PSD, the Supreme Soldier President Bourguiba recommended convening.

After this, Mongi Kooli, the director of the party, informed the Political Bureau about the functioning of the party's structures.

Concerning the coming meetings of the Coordination Committees and in compliance with the rule on alternating responsibilities with a view to having the greatest possible number of militants participate in party activities, the Political Bureau decided that the secretaries general of the party constituency will not be candidates for the next coordination committee.

9380
CSO: 4400

MINISTER FAVORS STUDENT UNION

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 6 Sep 80 p 5

[Article: "Favoring the Emergence of a Legitimate, Representative Student Organization: Belhaj Amor Closes the Regicnal Student Conference in Beja"]

> [Text] On Thursday evening in Beja, Moncef Belhaj Amor, minister delegate attached to the prime minister in charge of public office and administrative reform, presided over the closing of the regional students' conference in the presence of the governor and the secretary general of the party coordination committee.
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> The participants were supposed to have raised several questions concerning university affairs, the next UGET [General Union of Tunisian Students] congress and the future of this organization. They also brought up certain problems arising on the regional level, the objectives of administrative reform and support for the Palestinian resistance.
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> In response to these speeches, Moncef Belhaj Amor first put forward the importance of dialog as the foundation of government and party policy.

In order to be fruitful, he said, dialog requires a good knowledge of the facts and the creation of a favorable climate by cleaning up political life and setting up structures representative of all social strata, especially youth.

Cleaning up the political climate, he added, can only help to meet the challenges of development and to accelerate the triumphal march of the country despite interference from foreign tensions.

In this regard, Belhaj Amor stressed the necessity of promoting the emergence of a legitimate and representative student organization capable

not only of helping students resolve their daily problems but also of giving them an appropriate framework within which they could express themselves freely and make their concerns known.

In any case, Belhaj Amor further said, dialog cannot be considered a short-lived fashion but rather a permanent practice started by the Bourguiba regime. Moreover, it is important to deepen this dialog still further and to involve all Tunisians in it indiscriminately.

The minister also said that everything possible will be done to give youth the means to blossom and to view the future with optimism.

Next in discussing the question of university selection and guidance, Belhaj Amor pointed out that this process had been made necessary by the country's needs for personnel, the capacity of the employment market and the potentialities of the university. He clearly indicated, however, that selection and guidance does not mean neglect of the student's inclinations and intellectual abilities.

With respect to the decentralization of the student residential blocks, the minister indicated that this choice is in keeping with the more general pattern of university and administrative decentralization, emphasizing that this question will receive special attention.

In another connection Belhaj Amor said that the government lavishes constant concern on Tunisian students abroad, recalling that the number of these students is declining from year to year because of the rapid evolution of the Tunisian university which will henceforth include all branches of instruction.

With respect to the next UGET congress, Belhaj Amor pointed out that this question essentially concerns the students themselves and that the government's role in this regard will be limited to helping find the best possible formula which will make it possible to overcome this problem.

The government, he said, has the firm political will to guarantee the autonomy of this organization which will have complete freedom to choose its own path, something which will make it a valuable and credible interlocutor.

In another connection, Belhaj Amor declared that Tunisia is on the verge of a new challenge-filled decade of development which requires the mobilization of all the country's vital forces, considering the determinant stake which it constitutes. He indicated that creating the maximum number of jobs and channeling the energies of Tunisian youth will figure among the principal concerns during this decade. The same holds true, he added, for the socioeconomic promotion of the areas of the interior where all conditions for a dignified and prosperous life will have to be created.

In this connection, he called on youth to display self-sacrifice by participating actively in this exciting work and by contributing to the success of the large rural development projects.

Finally mentioning administrative reform, the minister indicated that this reform will essentially take the form of a grant of extensive prerogatives to the administrative structures in the regions with a view to efficiency and speed.

9380
CSO: 4400

ALGERIAN-TUNISIAN-ITALIAN GAS LINE START-UP SCHEDULED IN 1981

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 6 Sep 80 p 2

[Article: "Algerian-Tunisian-Italian Gas Line: Entry Into Service Scheduled for 1981"]

[Text] In an article entitled "Algerian-Italian Gas Line: A Beneficial Development for Tunisia" which appeared in LA PRESSE of 24 February 1980, we mentioned, rather briefly, the impact of this large project on the Tunisian economy.

In the present article we intend to emphasize the fundamentally technical side of this project, placing it in time and consequently in space.

How Do Matters Stand With the Work?

To tell the truth, the gas line has a thoroughly exciting history all its own, of which the public at large is apparently unaware.

An event marked an epoch in this history: on the night of 24 April the Italian Costare-6 rig placed the final part of the first pipe of the gas line which will supply Europe with natural gas from Algeria. During the 130 days of work which followed, it proceeded to lay pipes 60 cm in diameter in the sea at a maximum depth of 608 meters.

The pipe was laid, of course, in the Mediterranean, more precisely between Cap Bon and the Sicilian port called Mazaro Del-Vallo.

All things considered, the amount of steel used until very recently is of the order of 156,000 tons. Most of this amount was used in the form of pipes.

It should be pointed out that all the pipes were manufactured in workshops specially created for this purpose in Cap Bon. These materials are periodically unloaded in the port of Bizerte.

End of Work: 1981

From the studies conducted it appears that the laying of the "nest" of pipes will be completed during 1981.

The caliber used effectively makes it possible for 4 billion cubic meters to flow from the Hassi Rmel gas field bound for Europe via Tunisia.

Once in Italy, the Algerian gas will proceed towards certain other countries of Europe (especially the FRG) after having passed through "distributers" located in Bologne (Italy). The pipes will be hermetically sealed beforehand and then subjected to an anticorrosive treatment which will prevent premature deterioration.

As of this writing, the persons responsible for this large project are predicting an appreciable increase in gas flow. As a matter of fact, this increase will not take place until 1983, the date when a suitable distribution system will be put into service in Europe. According to the least optimistic estimates the amount of gas will consequently go from 4 billion to not less than 10 billion cubic meters. In all likelihood, this amount will increase in 1985 to 12.3 billion cubic meters.

It will be remembered that this project was the result of an agreement between the Italian National Company (ENI [Italian Hydrocarbons Agency]) and the Algerian Company (SONATRACH).

The validity of the contract has been set at 25 years. According to the two contracting parties this duration is fully sufficient to amortize the enormous costs of the project (or $2.5 billion). The 152 km long section placed in the sea alone costs $250 million.

The impact of this project on the Tunisian economy occurs at two levels which are quite distinct from each other:

First, the Tunisian manpower required for the construction of this project (limited impact in time, since it will end with the completion of the work).

Second, the right of passage assigned to each cubic meter of Algerian gas in transit across Tunisia (an impact as lasting as the gas itself).

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CSO: 4400

TUNIS-TURKI HIGHWAY TO BE OPERATIONAL IN OCTOBER

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 6 Sep 80 p 2

[Article: "Tunis-Turki Highway Will Be Operational in October"]

[Text] GP 1 constitutes the backbone of the country's road system. In fact, the latter connects the entire Tunis littoral to the extreme south of Tunisia, and all or practically all the roads of the interior converge on it. This privileged position and this preeminence of GP 1 explains the intensity of the traffic which it carries daily. The ever growing number of vehicles in transit over it also explains the freeway beginning given years ago to the southern exit from Tunis.

After the planning of this southern exit and the construction of the freeway section to Ezzahra, the construction work of the Mornag-Turki section is nearly completed.

Scheduled for the end of the current month, the official opening of the new freeway will take place in early 1981. This delay is essentially due to the difficulties resulting from expropriations operations on one hand and related to the terrain itself on the other. In fact, regarding the second point it should be noted that certain sections have required drainage in view of the existence of subterranean pools of water.

The new segment of the Tunis-Turki freeway will be 32 km long. The two roadways will each have two 3.5-meter lanes (7 meters in total width). As for the median strip, it will be 12 meters wide and will allow future enlargement of the freeway if necessary. The total cost of this new freeway section has risen to 15,000,000 dinars; its realization has necessitated the building of construction works at each kilometer, or a total of 16 bridges and adaptations.

In order to avoid the difficulty which heavy-weight traffic, which is authorized on this highway, could present, lanes for these heavy vehicles have been planned on certain sections as a compromise. These heavy-weight roads will facilitate the flow of other, lighter vehicles to Khanguet, for example. The authorized speed, will be 100-120 km/hour for the 12,000

vehicles which will use this new road. In order not to isolate citizens living near the new freeway, access roads have been planned. Running alongside the road, they feed into the nearest overpass and make it possible for the residents to avoid crossing the speedway lanes. The former secondary roads and highways have all been completely repaired.

While the official opening of the new freeway is scheduled for 1981, its actual opening will take place in October. Many motorists are already using it frequently despite its uncompleted side.

It should be pointed out that this unofficial opening will take place in October. The road signs will not be completely installed, however.

This new freeway, which will be completely ready in 1981 (traffic lights at the entrance, road signs) will enable southbound motorists to avoid the busy GP for a distance of approximately 40 km.

Once this new stage of the southern freeway is completed, it is very likely that the next will be the Turki-Hammamet section or approximately 20 km. The utility of this project is indisputable, and GP 1 users are the first to benefit from this new freeway and the advantages it offers. In fact, by facilitating traffic on this neuralgic north-south axis, it is opening the entire Cap Bon tourist area and facilitating access to it.

9380
CSO: 4400

FEDERAL LAW ON MINISTRIES, MINISTERS

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 28 Sep 80 p 3

[Text]

Dubai, Sept. 27 (Ittihad): Electricity and Water Ministry today received from the Ministry of State for the Supreme Council Affairs a copy of Federal law No. 12 of 1980 amending some articles of the Federal law No. 1 of 1972 on the jurisdiction of Ministries and Ministers.

The Federal law on these amendments was approved by the Supreme Council and issued by His Highness the president of the State.

According to this law, the prerogatives of the Electricity and Water Ministry will include among other things, the following:

- Proposing the general plan on the production and distribution of electricity and water in accordance with the scientific development and in a way which attains the objectives of socio-economic development plans.
- Collecting and analysing data on electric power in the country according to the articles of the law No. 9 of 1974 on the organisation of statistics and census in the state.
- Making all the arrangements to regulate the development of underground and surface water sources.
- Guaranteeing the continuity of water sources and finding new sources to support the present ones.
- Setting up plans and programs on the training of national cadres working in the field of water and electricity in the State.
- Executing all power and water projects and allied works within the limit of the funds allocated in the Federal budget.
- Administering, operating and maintaining power and water stations.
- Providing spare parts and the required materials for the operation and the maintenance of electricity units and electricity and water stations and networks and their connections and extensions.
- Other jurisdictions entrusted to the Ministry by a law or rules.

The new law will be put into effect on the date of its publication in the official gazette.

CSO: 4820

DECREES ISSUED ON EDUCATION, AUSTRALIAN ACCORD, INSURANCE

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 4 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

Abu Dhabi, Oct. 3 (WAM): His Highness President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan has issued three federal decrees.

The first decree granted approval for the UAE-Australian accord on economic, commercial and technological cooperation, the second approved an accord for the recognition of educational studies, educational certificates and degrees in the Arab world and the third approve the establishment of the Arab Insurance Group whose founding members are Kuwait, Libya and Saudi Arabia.

The Arab Insurance Group was established on April 19 in Bahrain which has became the Group's permanent headquarters. The company has a cpaital of three billion American dollars, each of the founding members contribute one-third of it. The company's membership is kept open for all Arab countries which wish to join in its activities which cover all forms of insurance and reinsurance.

The UAE-Australian accord aims at promoting cooperation between the two countries in the commercial and technological fields. The accord stipulates that each of the two respective governments shall facilitate, each within its own country and according to its laws and legal system, the necessary facilities for commercial establishment of the other country to implement projects pertaining to commercial activities and the utilisation of natural resources, as well as the exchange of visits by delegations from both countries, professional consultants, construction contractors and representatives of research and designing institutes as well as other similar specialised organisations.

The accord further encourages participation in international exhibitions in the both countries and facilitates the imports of merchandise, exempted from customs duties for exhibition purposes.

The accord will be valid for five years. As for the educational accord, it aims at promoting cooperation between Arab countries in this vital field.

CSO: 4820

DUBAI PORTS SET TO HANDLE CARGO FOR IRAQ, IRAN

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 1 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

Dubai, Sept 30 (Ittihad): The Director of the Dubai Seaports and Customs Department Colonel Abdalla Bulhoul has said that Rashid and Jebel Ali seaports are ready to receive food, medicine and general cargoes which destined for Iran or Iraq and that such goods will be re-exported to the two countries by various ways as they are considered goods essential to the two Muslim peoples in the present circumstances.

Seven international shipping lines have inquired about the possibility of unloading general merchandise from their vessels, headed for both countries, if they are unable to unload in Iranian or Iraqi seaports, he said.

The department had expressed its readiness to receive these vessels provided they are loaded with general merchandise or foodstuffs and without reserving any fixed berths for them as they could also unload their cargo or part of them in some other Gulf seaports, he said.

Colonel Bulhoul confirmed that the department is not ready to receive any vessels with military or hazardous cargoes, except with the permission from the official and concerned authorities and from the Foreign and Defence Ministries.

He added that average arrival of passenger vessels to the State is so far normal and that the shipping movement also continued normal yesterday, when all vessels arrived at their fixed timings and according to set schedules at Rashid and Jebel Ali seaports.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

IRAQI FARM EXPERTS ARRIVE--Dubai, Sept. 27 (WAM)--Two experts from the Regional Project of the Palm Trees and Dates in Baghdad, Dr. Mohamed Hamid Hassanien and Dr. Samir today arrived here for a short visit to the country at the invitation of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Resources. The visit aims at collecting and preparing data jointly with the Ministry for the development of palm. Meanwhile, Dr. Mohamed Abdul Moniem Al Sheikh, the economic researcher in the FAO today arrived here to participate with the Ministry of Agriculture in drawing up its 5-year plan--1981-85--on the development of the agricultural and fisheries and animal resources in the country. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 28 Sep 80 p 3]

DIPLOMATIC SYMPOSIUM--Abu Dhabi, Sept. 29 (Ittihad)--The Foreign Ministry has started preparations for its ninth annual diplomatic symposium to be held in January. The Ministry has sent invitations to a number of Arab and foreign personalities to take part in the symposium. About 20 intellectuals are expected to lecture in the forthcoming symposium on political, economic, historical and legal subjects. The symposium will last for four months with five lectures in each month. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 30 Sep 80 p 3]

CSO: 4820

END

JPRS 76670

22 October 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2206

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22 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2206

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SOVIET COLUMNS REPORTED BOGGED DOWN IN PROVINCES

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 16 Sep 80 pp 6-7

/Article by Frederic Smelt: "We Are Driving Amid the Debris of Soviet Convoys for 30 Kilometers"/

/Text/ It is one of the oddities of the Soviet Union's war with Afghanistan that, in August 1980, a tourist may obtain at least a transit visa by which to enter or leave the country at the traditional border points: Islam-Qala with Iran and Spinboldak and Torkham with Pakistan.

We can only speculate about the reasons. Perhaps the intention is to maintain the illusion that there is no war in Afghanistan; possibly the Soviet Union does not mind if, in addition to Afghans, a handful of foreigners witness the destruction of the country, especially because foreigners rarely get to the bombed villages far off the main roads. In any case the Soviets cannot block the major overland routes, because there is only one road in each direction of the compass.

Whatever the reason: Anyone nowadays crossing Afghanistan from West to East must breathe a sigh of relief upon arrival in Pakistan--despite the heat of the monsoon--, and although even there the traveler is still pursued by the tragedy of the country. In the two Pakistani border provinces--North West-Frontier Province and Baluchestan--the white tented camps of Afghan refugees stretch for many kilometers. The government of the host country has officially announced that just about a million Afghans have been registered as refugees, and that every day approximately 40,000 more are asking for asylum. No longer to be traced in Afghanistan are the people whom I had intended to visit there. Villages I used to be familiar with are no more than a collection of deserted mud ruins.

The first large city reached from Iran is Herat which, in the past 2 years, was the stage of repeated rebellions against the communist government in Kabul and the Soviet experts and soldiers--all equally disliked. Life is normal on the surface, at least in the daytime; by night shots ring out. One side uses machine guns, the other replies with some scattered rifle shots. As a rule a tank finally restores the nightly calm.

There is little obvious destruction. The famous Friday Mosque of the Timurid era glitters intact in the morning sun. It is untouched just like the long pine bordered avenue which stretches to the city limit where a small convoy is collecting. Drivers here are not ordered to join convoys, but in view of the general insecurity nearly all of them seek the protection of the herd. The foreigners are put in the middle; if the road were wide enough, outriders would ring them on all sides, so that the guests should not be harmed. Considering the Afghans' hospitality and concern we feel ashamed to be citizens of European nations who are mere spectators of the Soviet invasion of this country. Just once is an Austrian asked why his country had sent an Olympic team to Moscow. However, he is quickly saved from having to answer by the reminder that, after all, it is not his fault.

Initially nothing indicates any danger; even the Russian armored car personnel, busy with their morning ablutions, seem deceptively peaceful. Some 50 kilometers on mujaheddins stop our small column. Once informed of their nationalities, they totally disregard the foreigners. The Afghan drivers are made to show their identity papers and say why they are on the road. At this point nobody asks them to recite the Islamic creed. Usually this is one of the more touching than effective criteria for the Islamic fighters: After all, as a rule even communist officials are quite familiar with that creed.

An old man with an imposing gray beard, obviously the leader of the group, observes our departure without moving a muscle. His outline is sharply sketched against the brown of the mountains and the blue of the sky: at this moment it seems a symbol of Afghan resistance. Still retaining this image we meet a Soviet tank unit; its soldiers are not watching the road and thus missed the mujaheddin. That also, we are told, is far from rare.

Getting near Kandahar we hear artillery fire. After walking a while, we spy a small oasis surrounded by tanks. The muffled impact of the cannon fire is answered by only the odd rifle shot. Nobody can explain why the tanks do not simply occupy the village.

We must proceed to Kandahar where, in 1747, Ahmad Shah Durani was crowned the first king of Afghanistan. His empire stretched well beyond the modern borders of the country.

Our saunter through the local bazaar begins with a somewhat spectral scene: On the central square of the new city, the Chahidanu-Chawk, looms a monument to those killed in action at Maiwand where an English unit was defeated in 1880, the time of the second Anglo-Afghan war which was also a civil war. Now a heavy-set man, dressed in wide breeches and loose shirt, sits under the small azure canopy and, rifle in hand, guards that which he evidently considers public order in Kandahar His militia, though not wearing any uniforms, randomly stop men who return from shopping via the square and frisk them for weapons. Often the faces of these guardians of public order

are covered up to the eyes by kerchiefs. Are they protecting themselves from the dense dust--or do they want to remain incognito?

Obviously the whole procedure is designed only to humiliate the men of Kandahar, because weapons are hard to find by this method. Everyone carrying arms knows what is going to happen and only has to turn off into a small street in the bazaar. Neither the regular nor the military police set foot in that tangle. One of the spectators murmurs in English: "What do you think of these achievements?" We silently communicate by eye contact. Nothing else is possible because just at that moment three tanks clatter through the throng of people. All hatches are closed: Soviet soldiers here do not ride on top of their armored vehicles as they do in Kabul.

In a restaurant we are served a meal covered in dust because the square has been so churned up by the tanks that no more than tiny fragments of asphalt remain. The emaciated waiter who is certainly more likely to have led the life of a slave than that of a lord, explains why, in his opinion, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan: "They want our country. They want our fruit. Here in Kandahar they can easily buy grapes, pomegranates, water melons, rice, meat, bread--simply everything."

A young man compelled to study in Moscow had assured him that nothing like this is available in Moscow. Besides, he had with his own eyes seen the rations supplied to the Soviet forces.

According to him the average rations doled out to the occupying forces consist largely of cans containing indefinable fish and meat. Morsels of meat swim in yellow fat. The consumption of Soviet black bread presumes an excellent set of teeth.

His description may or may not be accurate. It is interesting, though, that this contempt for the Soviets is pervasive, though the occupying forces daily demonstrate their technical superiority to the Afghans: For one this is a means for revenging oneself on the oppressors without incurring any danger, secondly the Soviets are considered wicked heathens, and lastly the Afghans display surprising self-confidence, especially in rural areas.

At dusk Kandahar is transformed into what appears to be a deserted city. Temporarily in abeyance seems to be the custom of spending the cool of the evening in a teahouse. Sleep does not come easily in these Kandahar nights: we are awakened twice by the rattle of tanks moving out of the city, once by a brief and distant exchange of shots. Unfortunately these military interludes also arouse all the dogs in Kandahar, and they do not leave the city. The road from Herat to Kandahar was originally constructed with Soviet aid: after Kandahar begins the American road section. Long gone are the times when the two superpowers peacefully competed by way of development projects, and Afghanistan benefited from their rivalry. Hindsight allows us to note that in those years also the Soviet Union proceeded in

accordance with a definite plan, and that the United States assigned the country to the Soviet sphere of influence. This serves in part to explain its present-day indifference and helplessness.

From Kandahar a good asphalt road runs to the 25 km distant airport and, beyond it, to the Pakistan border. The Americans built the unduly large airport as a counter to Kabul Airport, constructed with Soviet aid. However, it soon emerged that, as a result of massive miscalculations, they had erected a "cathedral in the desert." At present the Soviets derive a great deal of benefit from the American experts mistake, because this airport is their most important strategic stronghold in southern Afghanistan, defended by a ring of camouflaged tanks. Anyone approaching this fortress too closely soon hears a rustling somewhere, and a shirtless soldier topped by a sun helmet looks at him in some astonishment.

Road checks are left to Afghan soldiers. These display much talent for improvisation and have constructed a kind of tank from the damaged rods of the destroyed toll booths. We are made to stop and make way for the Soviet convoy from Kabul. Surrounded by protective tanks, 87 supply trucks turn off to the stronghold. At the time we thought that the drivers looked relieved upon reaching their goal; later on burnt-out Russian vehicles on the road provided an explanation of that relief. About half the vehicles carry motor fuel, others coke, food, weapons and people. Occasionally a boyish face peeps from the slits in the armored personnel carriers. Contrary to some Western reports the Soviets still seem to send mostly recruits to Afghanistan, or at least it appears so from our observations on the road. What may be their thoughts when they never meet a foreign class enemy, such as in January last Soviet soldiers obviously expected to see in Afghanistan?

Close to the airport we notice the ruin of a yellow house and several shot up mud huts. They are evidence that the mujaheddin have launched some minor attacks on this Russian fortress, albeit in vain. Five kilometers further on the sovereign territory of the mujaheddin begins again. In the wide semi-desert valley stretching for 120 km to the Pakistani Kundal Pass we encounter two small vaulted mud buildings at the edge of the road: They are still inhabited, though some buildings in the village further inland are destroyed. We ask for information how to behave and are told: The entire area is controlled by the mujaheddin. No representatives of the Afghan Army or the Afghan Government are to be med until Spinboldak, the Afghan border city. The mujaheddin are unlikely to stop us. We are told that foreign vehicles (here signifying largely Pakistani vehicles) are left alone.

We are driving through a sparsely inhabited desert valley. On the horizon ragged mountain tops loom, mauve colored and surrounded by dust devils which look like Aladdin's genie, escaped from the bottle. Ruined bazaar streets indicate that once upon a time the area was livelier. Finally a small mud settlement and three trees emerge, and screeching brakes remind

us that, in the summer of 1980, it is advisable to look at the road ahead, even though there is no traffic: We come to a stop just before a deep hole in the road, caused by a mine set to destroy a bridge. Evidently the explosion did not make the bridge collapse. Later we see many half-destroyed bridges which bear mute witness to the resolution as well as to the technical problems of Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation forces.

The small border city Spinboldak slumbers peacefully in the sun. Except for some Afghan soldiers at ease in front of the public buildings nothing reminds us of war. A few kilometers further on is the waterless border post. In the old days there used not to be any formalities, because Pashtuns live on both sides of the border. Now Afghan soldiers in sun-bleached uniforms search every package, frisk every young man for weapons and hand their commander any fragment of paper with writing on it because they are of course illiterate. The commander, correct but obviously discontented, does his duty. Two ancient and bent nomad crones, intending as usual to walk straight past the guard post, are sharply whistled back. Despite their shrill complaints their bundles of herbs are thrown in the dust; then they are graciously permitted to limp on because, despite the almost unbelievable (for Afghanistan) punctiliousness of the border checks, the soldiers would of course not dream of touching the women. Although the latter are unlikely to do so, they could actually carry all kinds of information underneath their voluminous torn skirts. However, this is a useless speculation because the mujaheddin and others are able effortlessly to pass across the mountains which are not guarded by Afghanistan.

The driver of a melon truck is made to feel the sovereign Afghan ire. He had apparently forgotten to bring one of the required papers. The other documents are therefore thrown at him--and that is how something is done for the education of the people. Later the melons are allowed to proceed to Pakistan. True, something may be hidden underneath them, but it would be impossible for the staff of the border post (possibly 10 men) to inspect every truck after making it unload.

As we do not have an exit visa, we must return to Kandahar where, in the course of an evening, we are told about the recent battles fought in the province. It is impossible to ascertain how many villages have been destroyed and residents killed; the reports diverge far too much, and too many are second or even third hand. Moreover, all of us have repeatedly visited Afghanistan in the past and are fairly familiar with the Afghan's cavalier treatment of figures. Still, none of these reservations can change the fact that the Russian invasion forces use tanks, helicopters and strafing jet fighters to destroy Afghan villages if they believe that the villages harbor mujaheddin. And yet, as a rule, the latter have left the village by that time, and the attack hits only the civilian population. Although some of the local people can take to the mountains and later flee to Pakistan or the larger cities, the sick, the aged and children who cannot run quickly, are often killed or maimed.

The authorities allow travelers freely to leave Kandahar. The convoy, this time compulsory, collects about 13 km further on in a village bazaar. During their long wait the travelers refresh themselves with tea, cookies and fruit. At last all vehicles, people, sheep and freight have been checked, and the roughly 50 vehicles of today's convoy to Kabul are allowed to leave for the mountains in small groups.

No Soviet forces are visible for the next 300 km (or thereabouts). We drive across the steppe, brown and arid in the summer heat, across ochre colored hills where the grazing camels can barely be distinguished from their surroundings, across rugged mountain ranges sometimes gleaming blue with lavender colored thorn bushes, through steppe valleys relieved from time to time by small oases--their trees and fields gleaming like emeralds in the sunlight.

Only four burnt-out Russian tanker trucks, damaged bridges, holes in the road and frequent tank tracks remind us that Afghanistan is at war. The vehicles must have been destroyed quite recently because such remains are quickly scavenged and recycled: Twice we meet trucks carrying away wrecks. If the vehicles are not badly damaged, they are immediately used again. Our convoy includes a windowless bus, artfully hammered back into its original shape. Admittedly, no friendly or curious faces look out of the window frames; instead the bus carries bewildered sheep and goat, soothingly talked to by their herdsmen.

In larger villages we do see ruined schools and other public buildings. This tactic of the Islamic liberation fighters does not really manifest Islamic hostility to education. Their chief purpose is to bring public life to a stop as long as the Soviet Union tries to dominate the country with the aid of a puppet government.

In former times the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan knew some real social commitment, not only the personal power calculation which suggested that the key to Kabul could be turned only with Soviet aid. Now this commitment has decayed into miserable propaganda. The most vehement critique comes from former party members who are horrified to see their dream of having physicians, teachers, farm experts and better qualified officials sent to the villages turn into the nightmare of Soviet occupation forces.

Afghan soldiers are rarely in evidence. Less of them than a year ago appear to be stationed in the garrisons of Kalat-i-Ghilzai and Mukur, the two largest provincial cities between Kandahar and Ghazni. The situation is similar in some of the "desert barracks." Armed forces personnel confirm this observation; many recruits do not return from leave. Formerly entire valleys were searched for deserters. Now in most cases the necessary personnel is lacking.

The members of the caravan slowly assemble in Mukur. From here to Ghazni we are compelled to proceed with one armored car ahead and another one

bringing up the rear. Of course, in case of an attack they would not be able to prevent a car being fired on; the terrain from now on is much too mountainous and dangerous. To approach Afghan road checkpoints these days makes for some tension. We are never quite sure which may just be passed through, and which must be respected: At times the soldiers stationed there seem to make up their minds at the last moment whether to adopt the one or the other attitude. The procedure is similar at the toll gates, because the barriers are often in ruins or the post unoccupied for other reasons.

We are moving on across the mountainous steppe. Often herds and herdsmen slumber together in the valleys, and not even the watchdog has enough energy left to bark at and chase the cars. In the black tents woven from goat hair, erected usually at some distance of one another, work has come to a stop. Occasionally colorfully dressed and unkempt nomad children stand around in the thorny steppe. Only the camels are unfazed by the heat. They munch on the thorn bushes or gracefully weave through the herd, seemingly melting into the landscape.

Near Ghazni the destruction is once again more visible. Some buildings show signs that military force, not the wind or father time have caused their walls to fall. Sometimes the ruins are smoke blackened. The destruction in Ghazni itself is less than we imagined after reading the newspaper reports. Deserted and in some cases hit by rockets, the 10 buildings of the lower barracks line the outer edge of the city. Close by Russian forces are encamped. At the gas station, where gasoline is available for the first time for hundreds of kilometers, everybody talks of the helicopter attacks on the Ghazni barracks. Ten-year old boys volunteer the information that they will expel the Soviets as soon as they get a bit older. Though Afghan guards do not join the boys chant of "death to the Russians," they look on benevolently. Other men silently indicate the Soviet military vehicles which are only 300 meters away.

We are at liberty to drive into Ghazni, but a policeman tells us that we should hurry if we want to go on to Kabul, because the road is controlled by the mujaheddin from 17.00 hours on. A moment later he seems to remember his official function and uses the official term "opponents, enemies." The road is totally unguarded, the bridge unprotected though it bears traces of bomb attacks and some of the telephone wires are cut. Only one explanation is possible: The Afghan Army survives only in tattered remnants, while the Soviets do not yet have enough personnel in Afghanistan to patrol the roads.

With the exception of the northern roads which carry their reinforcements, the Russians do not control any roads in Afghanistan outside the cities. Evidently they are reluctant to deploy the enormous manpower necessary to do this, especially because they are able in an emergency quickly to build a pontoon bridge or drive in the riverbeds which carry no water in summer. Moreover the mujaheddin's technical potential is still quite negligible. The numerous attempts to blow up the bridges show that the Soviet reinforcement routes are in no serious danger.

Just after coming across a burnt-out Russian tanker truck we meet a Russian supply convoy of 37 vehicles. We get a demonstration of the soldiers' uneasiness of moving in a hostile country: Two vehicles have broken down. Immediately a tank rolls up, and men armed with machine guns surround the crippled trucks.

The Kabul Valley begins with fertile villages; the harvest has been brought in everywhere. At the city limits Kabul receives us with a display of military might leadings us to assume that a small attack force has collected behind us. The gun barrels of five tanks are aimed threateninely at the road, and a substantial force of police and soldiers begins to search the convoy vehicles. All that follows us, though, is the wrecked bus with the sheep and goats as well as a truck carrying sanitary appliances. Some time later we pass through the checkpoint where we are surprised to see female police. We have the oppressive feeling of entering an occupied city. However, we soon forget that, because the visible population of Kabul seems to be busy shopping, and only two open trucks carrying Soviet soldiers and two stationary armored personnel carriers remind us of the real rulers of the city.

A few days later we leave Kabul for Pakistan. Once the Kabul police and armed forces checks are past, the Afghan security authorities concern themselves with the travelers at only a few locations, probably because not many people still pass across parts of the country. Most provincial officials indeed hope to survive the civil war and the Soviet invasion by keeping strictly to their offices. They certainly have no intention of leaving them for any kind of official operation.

The road from Kabul to Jalalabad and Pakistan runs via breathtaking canyons, the Tangi-Ghard, through which the Kabul River, joined later by the Panshir River, wends its way. Water power is used by three major hydroelectric plants: Mahipar, Naghlu and Sarobi. In August last they were fortified so as to become small fortresses. Every building has at least one protective tank to itself, the more important ones are ringed by armor. All central switching plants are guarded by Soviet forces, Afghan units are confined to ancillary buildings. Buildings close to the road are also surrounded by sandbag barriers to protect them against mujheddin attacks.

The road crosses hilly terrain; the rather low ranges sometimes approach the road, at other times the Kabul Valley opens out. Of course it would be more accurate to write "the remnants of the road," because some 50 km off Jalalabad it becomes a battleground. One bridge after the other is half blown up, and the railings look bizarre suspended in the air. Entire road sections are devastated by mines and other explosives and, like the bridges, can be traversed only with an effort; often we pass only a fraction of an inch by a bomb crater. Also often we think that we will directly land in a waterless riverbed, next to a wrecked car already down there. Occasionally we have to avoid sore tank chains which snake in the dust, occasionally a wrecked truck--but most trucks have been pushed off the road into the abyss.

The mujaheddin employ two kinds of tactics. Either they fasten a mine to a bridge, and when a Russian convoy vehicle triggers it, other vehicles tend to pile up and are damaged also. Or they shoot out the tires of a truck before the truck itself is burnt. This tactic also tends to result in the destruction of several vehicles because the trucks following in the convoy are unable quickly enough to take evasive action. Oddly enough the Soviet forces are not changing their driving habits: On the contrary, the more dangerous the roads become for them, the more closely their vehicles stick together. In any case we normally see four wrecked trucks at the places of ambush.

We drive through this pile of wrecks for nearly 30 km. Most of them are ruined supply trucks which have shed their loads all about them. However, we also come across two tanks and the remains of four armored personnel carriers, though these are removed most rapidly because it has become almost routing for Russian convoys to have two gun carriages bring up the rear. Whenever the trucks were laden with glass food containers, a pile of glass covers the entire vicinity. Most of the wrecks belong to Soviet convoys, but Afghan civilian vehicles are sometimes involved also. The last attack must have happened in the early morning hours: The trucks were still smoking and the tires, though torn, still spun madly. Nowhere along this section did we meet either police nor military personnel. The mujaheddin also hid from curious eyes.

11698
CSO: 4403

IMPACT OF IRAN-IRAQ WAR ON WESTERN INDUSTRY

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 20 Sep 80 pp 8, 9, 10

[Text] In a report on the gravity of clashes between Iran and Iraq, FINANCIAL TIMES military analyst writes that Iran-Iraq war is, undoubtedly, more dangerous for Western industries than most other border clashes in the Middle East.

Both countries are among the major oil producers and both are located right in the center of an oil region and navigation route.

Saddam Husayn's unilateral decision last Tuesday to abrogate the 1975 treaty with Iran regarding Shatt-al Arab had been interpreted as a "declaration of war" by Tehran government.

Even though the timing of the announcement took diplomats by surprise, it is believed that the move is part of the long-term policy of Saddam Husayn, aimed at making Iraq a new power in the Arab World and replacing Iran as the dominant force in the Persian Gulf.

The vacuum created by the signing of peace agreement with Israel by Anwar Sadat, and his hostility towards the Iranian Revolutionary regime, have speeded up the events.

The Ba'thist regime of Saddam Husayn is made up, mostly, of Sunni moslems. Therefore any attempt by Iran at exporting its Shi'ite revolution, which make 50 percent of population in Iraq, is of great concern to the regime.

At the same time, Saddam Husayn, who came to power only 14 months ago, is trying to build up a prestige for himself. Even though he had been the "strong man" of Iraq in the past 7 years, his action regarding the Shatt-al Arab removes the stain from that country's pride.

Shatt-al Arab, the confluence of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, flowing into the Persian Gulf, is Iraq's only waterway. On the one side of this 180-kilometer-long waterway, Iraq's main port of Basra is located. On the other side is Abadan, the site of Iran's largest refinery. Oil pipelines of both countries are at the mouth of the waterway.

Abadan refinery, with 600,000 barrels a day capacity, is the most vulnurable. It is located at the mouth of the waterway which is only few hundred meters wide.

Tankers do not call directly at the refinery. Its terminal is at Bandar Mahshahr, some 35 kilometers east of Abadan. Kharg Island, which is the loading terminal for Iran's unrefined oil, is even farther from Iraq.

Khorramshahr is still one of Iran's main ports, handling a major portion of the nation's cargo. It is, at the same time, a naval base for small fast missile boats and other small coastal defense gun-boats.

Ever since the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which controlled both banks of the Shatt-al Arab, the dispute over the waterway has been going on continuously. Most of the time Iraq had the control of the estuary, but in 1975, during the OPEC summit conference in Algiers, Iraq was forced to come to terms with the Shah.

Under the agreement, the Shah withdrew its support from the rebellious Kurds who were fighting Iraq for their independence. In return, the midline of the waterway became the border between the two countries. As a result, the costly war with the Kurds came to an end but at the expense of Iraq's national pride. Iraq now intends to regain that from a weakened Iran.

Weakened

Iraqi officials obviously hope that Iran, because of having been weakened, will not become engaged in a full war with Iraq. Iraqi forces last week advanced at least 16 kilometers in some areas in Iran and it seems that all efforts to push them back have failed.

Built up of the Iraqi armed forces through the purchase of the latest arms and equipment from the Soviet Union and western Europe coincided with the weakening of the Iranian military which was equipped with American-made arms and equipment. Military experts believe that Iraq could confidently expect to win air and ground battles but could not be so sure in the war at seas because Iranian navy was very little affected by the revolution.

Should Iran try to challenge Iraq in the Persian Gulf by interferring in its shipping, the dispute, as far as the West is concerned, will take a serious turn. At the same time, the Soviet Union, because of the strategic importance of the Gulf and the fact that it is enjoying port facilities at the mouth of the estuary in Iraq, is closely watching the situation.

Meanwhile, Saddam Husayn has involved himself in a very big gamble, for if Iran is able to limit its oil exports through military operations he must turn to the pipelines carrying Iraqi oil through Turkey and Syria.

During a short period of time last year, because of normal relations with Syria, this pipeline was put to use again but the projected plans for unity did not materialize and the relations between the countries deterriorated to the point that any moment the pipelines could be shut off once again.

Saddam Husayn must also think of the effect of the dispute on the OPEC summit meeting that is to be held in Baghdad next month, and also the role he will have to play as the host of the conference of the non-aligned heads of states in 1982 through which he hopes to improve his world image.

At this time, it is as difficult to guess the reason for Saddam Husayn's decision to intensify the dispute with Iran, as it is to foresee the reaction of the very unstable Iranian officials. The situation should be a great cause for concern both for the 2 superpowers and the oil consumers in the world.

Another important factor to be born in mind in any hightening of the crisis is the attitude and behavior of the Arabic-speaking majority in Khuzestan who is dissatisfied with the Persian-speaking people who was attracted to the province by the oil industry.

Bitterness

Ever since the start of the Iranian revolution, Iraq has tried to increase the awareness of this Arabic-specking group. Arab separatists, who had been trained in Iraq, were responsible for the explosion last February of the oil pipelines. Even though these activities did not prove to be an obstacle to crude oil production, they were sources of continued headaches and concern.

In the meantime, bitterness between Iran and Iraq was in evidence last week during the OPEC meeting in Vienna, which was the reason for the extension [sic] of the summit conference that is to be held in Baghdad next month.

Iran was recognized to be the biggest obstacle in reaching agreement on long-term production policy and the pricing of oil. And it [sic] declared that OPEC and Iraq were the culprits that constantly raised the production.

Iranian nervousness had been intensified by closer ties between Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The disagreement in the OPEC [conference] in the election of its chairman was a sign of that. Iraq's representative was able to block Iran's delegation from the chairmanship and make the conference elect Algerian representative as chairman. (NAME-YE RUZ: Reports from Vienna said the opposite had been true.)

A Comparison Between the Two Partie's Military Power

Iran: Army, 120,000 to 150,000. Tanks, 1100.* Artillery, 800 pieces. Aircraft, 447.* Navy 20,000.

Iraq: Army, between 120,000 to 200,000. Tanks, 2100. Aircrafts, 350. Artillery, 1,800 pieces. Navy, 4,000.

(*Facing shortage of spare parts).

9551
CSO: 4906

PILOTLESS FIGHTER-BOMBER PROPOSED

Tel Aviv MA'ARAKHOT in Hebrew May/Jun 80 pp 13-15

[Article by Capt (Res.) Dr Azriel Lorber: "Pilotless Combat Aircraft - Pseudoscience or Reality of the 90's?"]

[Text] Whenever the subject of "the future combat aircraft of the air force" comes up, there is a penetrating debate focusing repeatedly on the question: Should the State of Israel produce this aircraft itself or procure it? However, aviation and electronic sciences have advanced significantly through the years, and it seems that the time has come to concentrate on questions of a completely different type: Is it necessary at all to develop or to purchase a new manned combat aircraft, or perhaps it is desirable and worthwhile to think of a pilotless aircraft with a reasonable performance level and at a reasonable cost which would fulfill most of the functions of a fighter-bomber. Is it possible to develop such a pilotless aircraft and produce it within the next 5 to 10 years?

Consideration of the subject of the pilotless combat aircraft first requires a response to two main questions:

Is the pilotless combat aircraft possible with the current technology, or perhaps the technology is still not ready for this?

Is the pilotless combat aircraft -- or beyond this, an air force based significantly (a minimum of 30-50 percent) on pilotless combat aircraft -- a worthwhile long-range subject (and not necessarily from the financial aspect)?

Let us first consider if an effective pilotless combat aircraft is indeed feasible. In order to justify such a pilotless aircraft, the following conditions must exist:

A. Its flight performance must be identical to or surpass that of future aircraft.

B. Its ordnance-bearing capacity must be identical to or surpass that of future aircraft.

C. Its ability to deliver this ordnance to its target must be identical to or surpass that of future aircraft.

D. Its cost, including the life cycle cost, must be lower than that of future aircraft.

Let us begin with performance. The fact that it is manned means that the conventional combat aircraft has a disadvantage which limits its maximum performance. Aircraft performance does not only mean speed and fuel consumption but also maneuverability expressed in G's. Because of this, the performance of the modern combat aircraft is limited to about 6-10 G's, and even this is for extremely short periods of time and with the assistance of auxiliary instrumentation. A manned combat aircraft maneuvering regularly at 10-15 G's, not to mention 20 G's, is unthinkable.

Performance is also a function of weight. The lighter the aircraft, because of certain designs and engines, the better its maneuverability and fuel economy and the shorter the runway required for take-off and landing. In a manned aircraft there is an enormous waste of weight in terms of pure engineering. The pilot himself requires a supply of oxygen, air conditioning, and an ejection seat. In addition, it must be noted that all the information on flight and combat conditions which the aircraft produces by means of super-sophisticated instrumentation must be translated into an audio or visual form so that the pilot can absorb it with his natural senses. As a result, the equipment which provides the information adds tens of kilograms to the weight -- a factor which complicates the aircraft and increases its vulnerability to mishaps because in the air, the additional weight is known to have much more serious implications than on the ground. Every additional kilogram and cubic decimeter in flight means, therefore, an immediate increase in the aircraft, its weight, its fuel consumption, and so forth. In other words, in terms of weight considerations alone, a pilotless aircraft can be built around the same engine and its flight performance will far surpass that of a manned aircraft, its ordnance-bearing capacity will be identical, and it will only be 60-75 percent as large as a manned aircraft.

There is a claim, and apparently a not insignificant one, that a pilot in an aircraft has an advantage over every automatic system. The pilot can absorb changing information on the situation, analyze it immediately, and make the appropriate decision. These facts are essentially correct, however their interpretation is suitable for a past generation as will be explained below.

Let us present the facts in a somewhat precise form: What is the pilot's function in a modern fighter-bomber? Today he is responsible for take-off and landing, checking the instrumentation for navigating the aircraft to its target; checking the instrumentation which indicates the existence or non-existence of targets (air or ground); checking the instrumentation which will bring him close to his target; and then (and only in the case of an

attack on visible ground targets and at times in air combat) to look outside, to activate or release the ordnance and depart, ideally while absorbing information on the success of the attack. At the same time, to the extent that additional information becomes available during the course of the mission, the pilot must analyze it and change the mission or the manner of its execution as necessary. In other words, the pilot plays an active role for seconds in a framework of a mission which lasts hours.

I want to reemphasize that 90-95 percent of the pilot's time is spent in checking various instruments. Moreover, in that the information which they are providing varies and changes (continuously to some extent), the pilot is unable to absorb it and analyze it rapidly or even continuously. He actually acts on a sampling of the information, aided by whistles and colored lights which signal the approach of critical limits in the most important ranges while even this information, as was stated, must be translated for the pilot on very large A scopes and dials. When there are sufficient sensors in the aircraft, then in the first estimate about 95-100 percent of the decisions in air-to-air combat and about 80-90 percent of the decisions in a ground attack mission can be carried out by a modern, sufficiently sophisticated computer which can be installed in a pilotless aircraft of reasonable size. If one is prepared to accept a certain amount of real-time communications with a human controller, it will enable one to overcome the excessive uncertainty involved in the implementation of these missions. It is only proper to note at this point that even in manned aircraft today there is a significant degree of ground control over fighter bombers, mainly because of the heavy but extremely effective instrumentation (radars and computers) possible on the ground. Air superiority aircraft, for example, are guided to their targets from the ground. The Russians do this more than the West as was evident from an inspection of the MIG-25 whose pilot fled to Japan. Bombers also now require an increasing degree of target indication from the ground in order for them to be able to unload their ordnance directly on the target. Although communications with the rear constitutes a potential for a peck of troubles, and theoretically a manned aircraft does not require these communications from the moment of take-off until landing, in actuality, the word "theoretical" is the determining factor. In the event of a complete blockage of such communications nets, the missions of manned aircraft will also suffer. On the other hand, under certain conditions, pilotless aircraft for air superiority can also be programmed 100 percent. At the same time, achieving a complete blockage of the entire spectrum is something which appears to be impossible today, and it is almost certain that if the technology of electronic warfare improves to this extent, the technology of counter-electronic warfare will follow suit.

Another argument occasionally raised emphasizes the importance of the pilot as one who can overcome technical problems in flight. Although the pilot can press buttons and switch communications channels or something similar, in contrast, unlike in a space vehicle, he cannot crawl outside with an electric soldering iron and a wrench and attempt to fix an overheated

engine or a stuck landing gear. If the problem is serious, the pilot can only hope for the best and try to return safely to his base. Although the pilot can continue on his mission if the navigation system fails, on the other hand, the number of systems required by the very presence of the pilot has increased significantly. There is a basic rule in reliability that an increase in the number of subsystems decreases the overall reliability of the system. In other words, "removing" the pilot along with the specific auxiliary systems for a manned aircraft is likely to increase the overall reliability of the pilotless aircraft and decrease the need for correcting problems.

We have assumed so far that the performance of the pilotless aircraft would equal that of regular aircraft. Let us now consider that the requisite technology for this purpose does indeed exist. Let us see if the state of the art of all the systems is such that it is possible to develop and build a pilotless combat aircraft armed for operational missions in a high intensity battlefield and which would be a substitute to a significant degree for manned combat aircraft. It should be remembered that advanced reconnaissance pilotless aircraft which fly thousands of kilometers are a routine matter today, and we are speaking actually about additional advancement, from reconnaissance to combat and not about the basic development of pilotless aircraft.

A combat aircraft is composed of the following systems: structure, including materials and aerodynamics; propulsion; control and communications, including sensors and computers; armament.

Systems and structure: The pilotless combat aircraft in its general concept can be, as was stated, a continuation of existing pilotless aircraft or manned aircraft. Although there is no aircraft today with a maneuverability as high as 10-20 G's, steps are being taken to solve these problems. The Americans, for example, have developed and are beginning to fly the HIMAT (high maneuver aircraft technology) which is a special performance pilotless aircraft. They have recently flown an unmanned scaled-down model of the F-15 in order to test certain flight characteristics. It must be assumed that until appropriate tests are arranged for such a project and a decision is made (a matter which can take years), there will be much more information on aerodynamic subjects. In terms of structure, the technology of materials, production methods, and so forth, the aircraft can be completely conventional even under conditions of the current state of the art.

Propulsion: It is possible to build a pilotless aircraft on the basis of current propulsion technology and even on the basis of existing engines. Even existing or future engines can be developed for a shorter life since statistically it is clear that in light of the pilotless combat aircraft's missions and operational conditions, it will be subject to substantial wear.

Sensors: The current technology of off-the-shelf sensors responds to all the reasonable requirements of the pilotless aircraft which, in this respect, will be equivalent to a manned aircraft. This includes radar and television systems. The latter are connected, of course, to a system of computers for analyzing data and making decisions on the spot or in the transmission of raw data directly to the rear. For purposes of communications security, a more sophisticated computer is understandably preferable, however the proper consideration for this matter must be made within the framework of an analysis of much more complex systems than is possible or desirable to be described here.

Computers: A distinction must be made between two types of computers. The first type consists of microprocessors for control of the routine functions of take-off, flying, and landing, including control of difficulties. The system found in every sophisticated electronic game is sufficient for these tasks. The second type consists of computers with a decision-making capability under combat conditions. Although these computers are more complex than the first ones, if we remember what they come to replace (in terms of weight, complexity, hazard, and so forth) and if we add to it a modest degree of communications with a rear operator, we will see that the picture is not so black. Moreover, the computer's reaction time is immeasurably faster than that of a human, and under certain conditions, the prospect of obtaining the correct response is greater precisely because of it.

Communications: This apparently is the weak link in the entire system, although not necessarily to weak. Systems for enciphering and encoding, frequency changes, and all the other methods under development for the modern battlefield in its entirety are also suitable for the pilotless aircraft. Most of this technology exists, and the problem in general is which one to select. The future saturation of the battlefield with encoded target notations permits a decrease in communications with the rear, even in an attack on ground targets or lowering it to a level of simpler data, a change which will decrease the chances of blockage.

Programming: This is actually the only factor which requires development since programming on such a scale has never been developed for such a purpose. However, once the receiving system and the computer are available, the development of the appropriate programming is only a matter of the capability of the programmers and time. No investment in equipment or even the development of new technology is required here.

Armament: Actually off-the-shelf and dependent upon the size of the pilotless aircraft. It is almost certain that it will be worthwhile even to plan the pilotless aircraft around the existing armament since this armament was initially planned for certain targets which are not likely to be changed in the near future. The only point which may require updating is in the fact that the earlier armament which was designed to be carried by a certain aircraft will now be carried by a much "hotter" aircraft.

Let us now move to the desirability of the pilotless aircraft. Desirability has two facets, one is purely economic and the other is based on less concrete factors. It is customary to examine these matters in accordance with concepts of cost effectiveness. Put more simply, in comparison to the manned aircraft, what is the cost of every kilogram of armament on the target? Let us first consider the financial factors. Will the cost of the pilotless aircraft, including the life cycle cost, be lower than that of future aircraft. The modern fighter-bomber today (the beginning of 1980) costs between 10 and 15 million dollars apiece at the time of purchase, that is about one-half billion pounds per aircraft, a sum which does not include operational costs. We will assume that the performance of the pilotless aircraft in which we are interested must be equivalent to or surpass that of a manned aircraft and cost less or at least not more than a manned aircraft.

The performance specification of a new weapons system stems from the operational requirement developed by the requesting service, in our case the air force. History has shown that the specification of the requirements for a new weapons system is a stumbling block which time after time has foiled the very best. Practically every item in the world weapons depots has encountered this obstacle which impedes development for many years. Evidence of the extent to which this factor at times deteriorates to the absurd can be found in the fact that an important development project was once subject to a lengthy delay because of a dispute over the color of the characters on the A scope. Here the situation is simpler. A specification of the performance requirements of the pilotless aircraft can be copied directly from the performance requirements of a counterpart conventional aircraft. For example, if we are talking about an F-18, then a pilotless aircraft with an identical or better performance than the F-18 is acceptable. It must be remembered that the proposal or intention here is not for a weapons system which will do something revolutionary or even new. It is a proposal for a modern weapons system which will do something completely routine: maintain air supremacy, assist the ground forces in achieving their objectives, and disrupt the enemy's rear. Every air force in the world has had plans for decades to carry out these missions precisely. In other words, a significant part, but one which is not sufficiently stressed, of the development cost is the result of the delays and the problems in the final specification of the system. Since the specification of the system. Since the specification depends upon the mission, and this is already specified by conventional aircraft, this component is dropped at the outset.

Let us move to the second point. Every manned aircraft today carries an enormous quantity of electronics, most of which is designed to translate various types of data for the pilot and to assist him in carrying out his tasks. The cost of this electronics today is dominant in the cost of the aircraft and can even amount to 60 percent of the cost. Although the absence of a human pilot will require greater sophistication, in contrast to the certain effort involved in fulfilling this requirement, it must be

emphasized that the data in the pilotless aircraft will be direct and simpler and in view of the absence of the pilot it will be possible to use less stringent specifications and as a result, less expensive items.

As was previously stated, many of the systems required for the pilotless combat aircraft already exist. The trick will be the proper integration of the components without introducing the human element into the system. However, the development of a modern combat aircraft is precisely the same thing, the taking of the components and their integration into one weapons system.

Although at this point we have not yet proved numerically that the pilotless aircraft will be much cheaper than a manned aircraft, it is already clear that a thorough study of the subject, dealing with the pure engineering/economic points, will indeed confirm this estimate. It must be noted that a comprehensive study of the subject will not be complete if we do not consider additional factors which, as was stated, also are determinants in the long-term calculations.

a. The large-scale introduction of pilotless aircraft into service will reduce the requirement for pilots. It is no secret that in the State of Israel high caliber manpower is a serious problem, and many elements are competing for the existing human potential. The operation of the pilotless aircraft, even by ground controllers, requires people of a certain level, however they need not necessarily excel in the special qualifications required for a pilot. The physical requirements, and in part even the psychological ones, will be reduced, and the probability of finding more qualified people will increase.

b. When it becomes evident that the pilotless aircraft system with all its components is significantly cheaper than a manned aircraft, it will be possible to procure more of them for a given sum. It is doubtful if we will henceforth be able to produce more aircraft than the Arab air forces, however it is absolutely certain that we will be able to reduce the existing gap this way. This action is in itself a significant factor because of the possibility of saturating the enemy systems.

c. The fact that the pilotless aircraft are unmanned enables them to be sent on "suicide" missions (which do not necessarily end in their loss but rather the prospects of return are slimmer). The decision to send pilotless aircraft will always be easier, and such missions can be much more successful. As a general rule, the more defended a target, the greater its importance to the enemy.

Although it is very difficult to quantify the three aforementioned factors, they are no less important than the economic question, and therefore they must be expressed in any serious study.

We have not yet touched upon the question -- "to purchase or to develop?" The answer is clear in part: since there is nothing to buy, it must be developed. On the other hand, the argument is heard: "If the pilotless aircraft is so good, why haven't the Americans developed it yet?" The response to this argument, in my opinion, is not rooted in technology. Whoever has managed to land automatic space vehicles on the moon and Mars can easily build a pilotless aircraft which will meet every operational requirement. Moreover, as was stated, the Americans are actually making their first moves in this direction. Information on this subject is publicized from time to time, and in 1972 the first serious analysis was published. I believe the problem is rooted in psychology and inertia. It is an enormous step in a completely new direction, and the Americans, like every big organization, change directions very slowly. We do not have to have such inhibitions; therefore, the argument that "the Americans also do not have a pilotless combat aircraft" should be rejected. Moreover, even the Americans make foolish mistakes. There was a similar occurrence with the Gabriel. At that time also we heard the argument that the Gabriel doesn't have a chance because the Americans do not have a similar system. Although there were development problems and failures, thanks to the stubbornness of one who was obsessed, the project came to a successful conclusion.

Another argument which maintains that "we should wait until others develop it and then copy or purchase it" acknolwedges that the technology exists and the idea is essentially a good one. A country which is struggling for its right to develop a manned aircraft for the eighties must be able to develop an effective pilotless combat aircraft, and it is worthwhile to be first. This has very many advantages.

A decision to enter the era of the "robot air force," at least in the combat segment, is undoubtedly a daring step but one with great prospects. There is no intention here to eliminate the air force. Transport aircraft, communications aircraft, helicopters, and even a significant percentage of combat aircraft will be operated even in the future by pilots. However, wherever the lead is flying and wherever it is possible with the same degree of effectivenss to introduce a conglomerate of copper wires and silicon chips instead of a human, it is the correct approach, especially in a country which claims that human life is its foremost consideration.

5830
CSO: 4805

FUEL PRODUCTION FROM PLANTS VIEWED AS PROMISING

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV 11 Aug 80 p 18

[Article by Aharon Priel: "In the 'Garden of Energy Plants' in Bet-Dagan, They Are Growing the Fuel of the Future: 'The White Gold' of Volkney Institute As An Answer to the 'Black Gold' of the Arabs"]

[Text] Sources of oil, the fuel which presently moves the wheels of the world economy, are dwindling. All the studies indicate that by the end of the 20th century, the Eden of oil will end and be followed by a new era of the Eden of coal as a major source of energy production.

Researchers in the area of energy feel that the present crisis of energy sources is causing unjustified panic. The crisis is really a psychological matter stemming from a fear because of the lack of a source of power which is simple, and which the world industry and economy are based on, including the petrochemical industry.

This opinion is shared by Mehahem Tsur, the head of the department of plant cultivation at Volkney Center in Bet-Dagan. He says, "the total worldwide consumption of liquid oil, used to operate automobiles, represents 10 percent of the total consumption of energy in any form. An additional 10 percent serves as raw material for the petrochemical industry's production of plastic products. The rest goes to industry, to power stations, to ocean traffic, to heating and everything else.

Therefore, considering the fact that coal is likely to be one of the major sources of energy production, and, if we add the nuclear reactors and the sun as additional sources, the whole crisis appears to be a transient phenomenon without basis or justification. It is an artificial crisis being used in a powerful way for purposes of political and economic pressure.

"Today there is a simple and effective solution for fuel production which would neutralize the power of the well owners: plants. Scientists know that the liquid oil produced today is a product of the decomposition of plants. There is no simpler way than to return to the plants and to try to extract from them directly this precious fluid."

In fact, in several countries, particularly in Brazil and the U.S., the fuel is being extracted and marketed to operate automobile engines. In Brazil, all government vehicles run on alcohol derived from sugar cane. The auto industry in Germany has already produced the first model of engines powered by "ethnol," alcohol extracted from plants. In the U.S., special gas stations have already been built which sell the alcohol fuel.

Researchers at the Volkney Center in Bet-Dagan, one of the most important centers of agricultural research in the world, have demonstrated that it is possible and worthwhile, from a professional and economic point of view, to use certain plants as a source of fuel to run engines. In doing so, they have made a breakthrough on a global scale (achievement of world records).

About 2 years ago, a research team at Volkney Center began an unusual project: growing plants with a high potential for producing a material rich in sugars which could then be turned into fuel by means of simple industrial cultivation processes.

The researchers in the department of plant cultivation concentrated on two plants: sugar cane and the cassava plant. There is a high concentration of sugar in the stalk of the sugar cane. By means of pressing and fermentation, the "ethnol" can be extracted from the sugar. This "ethnol" is alcohol which can be mixed in a 15 percent solution with benzene to operate engines. And this can be done without changing or adapting the engine.

This sugar cane, which has been adapted to growth conditions in Israel, comes from Florida. The cassava comes from Latin America. This plant contains a very high concentration of starch--about 30 percent. The "ethnol" can be extracted from this vegetable starch by means of relatively simple industrial cultivation processes.

The problem has been--what is the economic profitability of extracting fuel from plants? The contribution of the Israeli researchers has been in their success in producing record crops of sugar cane and cassava and in making the cultivation of fuel-producing plants into a profitable economic sphere of activity.

Mr Tsur says that out of thousands of strains of sugar cane, a plant which grows in tropical regions, the Israeli researchers have isolated frost-resistant strains which can be grown in Israel. "Not only that, but we even managed to grow the Israeli sugar cane in salt water containing more than 1000 mg. of chlorine per liter of water, and even by means of irrigation with wastewater which contains the raw materials of fuel production."

The researchers have already produced sizeable amounts of alcohol from these two plants which are growing on experimental lots in the "garden of energy plants" in Volkney Center at Bet-Dagan. The first results produced a yield of about 20 tons of sugar cane per dunam [~ 1/5 acre] (50 percent higher yield than the sugar cane crop in Brazil) with a sugar content of about 18 percent, a very high concentration of sugar. "From this crop of sugar cane, we produced

about 1200 liters of ethnol per dunam. We have also gotten record yields from the cassava plant--5 to 8 tons per dunam. From that we produced about 850 liters of ethnol per dunam."

The petrochemical industries manufacture plastic products. Plastic in all its forms and compounds is, at present, one of the most important components in world industry--whether as raw material or as a finished product. Last week, we found out that it will be possible to take care of the 10 percent of liquid oil used for the petrochemical industry by means of the semi-viscous white fluid found in abundance in the tissue of an almost beautiful plant called the "wolf's milk" plant. [A pilot study has been set up at the Volkney Center in collaboration with Nobel Prize winner Professor Melvin Calvin from the University of California at Berkeley. (Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Aug 80 p 9)]

"We have found," said Mr Tsur, "for the first time anywhere, that the white fluid found in the tissue of the wolf's milk plant is a raw material well suited for the petrochemical industry. This fluid--the white gold--is a true substitute for the black gold."

The wolf's milk plants were first adapted to growth in Israel by Menahem Tsur. Now, at the end of a series of experiments, it is clear to researchers that the "white gold" of the wolf's milk plant is an excellent raw material for the petrochemical industry.

The research being carried out at the Volkney Center on sugar cane and cassava for fuel production has received grants and support from the departments of agriculture and energy. According to Mr Tsur, members of the department for plant cultivation have begun additional studies with several plants which have a high potential for containing the raw materials for fuel production. These plants, which are presently growing on experimental lots in the "energy garden" in Bet-Dagan, include: sweet potato, sweet sorghum, and Jericho sunflowers.

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DEVICE FOR USING OCEAN WAVES FOR ENERGY PRODUCTION

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR 4 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by Bezalel Rubin: "Ocean Waves for Energy Production"]

[Text] Eliahu Givati, 52 years old, head of the woodworking department in the port of Eilat, who has won several efficiency prizes for all sorts of projects and inventions, has come up with a device this time which is likely to be seen in days to come as the invention of the century.

Givati's invention, which has already been registered for an international patent, has to do with the use of ocean waves and their transformation into electrical energy.

This invention will transform the latent energy in the ocean waves into usable energy which can be collected and stored. The invention includes a float, which rises and falls with the movement of the waves, an arm attached to the float in a fixed way or by means of a vertical pole. This depends on the conditions of the waves in the place where the device is operating.

How the Device Works

The float (1) rises and falls according to the movement of the waves. The movements of the float are communicated to the arm (2) which is attached to the float in a fixed way or by means of a vertical pole, all according to the state of the waves in the place where the device is operating as was explained above.

The arm is supported in its position by means of a horizontal pole. Every movement of the float, rising and falling, causes a movement in the opposite direction in the arm. As a result of these movements of the float, the arm operates a water pump or water pumps (4) permanently connected to the arm of the float. The pump draws water from a feeding pool, forces it into a collecting pool which is at a height necessary to produce an artificial and efficient waterfall. The artificial waterfall, by means of rotary motions, is used to produce electrical energy.

The Department of Energy and other scientific forces in Israel, among them the Technion, have received the specifications of Eliahu Givati's invention, but their attitude towards it has not gone beyond polite letters, an explanation about the lack of norms for follow-up experiments, and other such excuses.

It is known that Japan is investing large sums of money to carry out experiments on the subject of using ocean waves.

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CROWN PRINCE EXPRESSES VIEWS ON MIDDLE EAST, CAMP DAVID

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 13 Sep 80 pp 34-36

/Interview of Crown Prince Hasan by Hayi Khayr: "The Occupation Issue Is a Single One and Jerusalem Is at the Heart of It"/

/Excerpt from text/ It is well known that Prince Hasan, the crown prince of Jordan, has for a long time been engaged in looking after economic and development affairs in the Kingdom of Jordan. However, this of course does not mean that a man of Prince Hasan's importance and status can be remote from politics, which ultimately is part of economics, and thus there occurred this politico-economic talk with the young prince which our correspondent held in Amman.

/Question/ Israel has decided to unify western and eastern Jerusalem and consider it a united capital of Israel. At the same time, Israel continues to carry out a policy of establishing settlements in the occupied Arab territories. What is your highness' opinion on these measures, and how can the Arabs prevent Israel from continuing the constant process of usurpation and aggression?

/Answer/ The issue of the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Golan, is a single one, and Jerusalem the city and the region--or what is called greater Jerusalem--constitutes the spiritual, political, economic and social heart of the Palestinian Arab identity. For that reason the policy of judaization and Israeli dominance through the introduction of more than 90,000 colonialist settlers into the West Bank is to be considered obvious proof of the importance of the incorporation step "in the Israeli sense." In addition, unilaterally imposed legislation based on the logic of force, is not receiving and never will receive the respect of the international community. The true solution will come only through a return to a comprehensive view of the results of the occupation policy in distorting the Arab features of Jerusalem and other occupied Arab territories in terms of the effect on the notion of the sovereignty and civil, administrative, and religious rights of the Arab citizen in the occupied territories. The Arabs must try by every

means to win over world opinion through objective ways, at the same time as they are working to perfect the intrinsic Arab power to ensure that rights are restored.

/Question/ The Arab atmosphere is clouded over and dominated by clouds of disputes and peripheral struggles, from the Gulf to the Atlantic. These disputes have a strong obvious effect on the unity of Arab solidarity, aside from the axes which have begun to appear in various places. What is your highness' comment on these disputes, and how can we deal with these problems, which have begun to threaten unity of ranks and speech at a time when we are in the direst need of this unity and solidarity?

/Answer/ There is no doubt that Arab disputes here and there do not just influence the unity of Arab solidarity--indeed, they are splitting up the Arab forces until they collapse economically, socially and militarily because of the fragmentation of efforts and the lack of comprehensive carefully studied scientific planning which will mogilize their powers and point them on the sound road. In addition, this fragmentation weakens the image of the Arab world abroad, affecting the way these countries deal with us in the manner they should. How it amazes me, when I feel that the Arabs have not yet realized the real dimensions of Zionist designs on our economic resources and our strategic position in the region! It is sufficient for us, Arabs and Moslems, that the Palestine cause alone is an example prompting us to unity of action, causing disputes to be forgotten, with the aim not just of regaining what has been plundered but also of putting a limit to the tyrannical Zionist onslaught which threatens all Arab peoples with designs on their natural resources.

/Question/ For many years, since the October war, Arab oil has been propounded as a strong effective weapon in the struggles for liberation. Recently new trends have begun to appear, calling for the alienation of the oil weapon, because the use of this weapon will threaten the world economy and expose it to danger. Does your highness consider it necessary to use this weapon as a means of exerting pressure to influence the positions of countries hostile to the Arab cause, be they American, western or European?

/Answer/ In the light of the conferences of Arab foreign and economics ministers which have specialized in discussing political integration based on the notion of perseverance and power, a long-term Arab strategy must be crystallized with which Arab economic resources may be used to uplift the Arab nation in a manner enabling it to impose its will and consolidate its rights in a modern civilized manner.

/Question/ Jordanian-Palestinian relations are in good state and are constantly improving, and there is permanent coordination between Jordan and the Liberation Organization. Does your highness consider that this mutual understanding will realize the hopes fixed on the future?

/Answer/ There is no doubt that the good relations between Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization are one of the buttresses of the desired Arab solidarity, especially since the organization and Jordan are aware of the true state of the Arabs in the occupied territories and together are striving to establish the Arab identity under occupation. Such cooperation needs more support from Arab brethren, in order that the Arab people's desired hopes may be realized.

/Question/ Will the declaration of holy war which His Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz made yield its desired fruit and achieve its noble goals which the upright Islamic religion intended /to occur/ before the comprehensive psychological, economic, political, media and human mobilization? What are your highness' expectations on this subject?

/Answer/ I believe that Arab and Islamic consensus for the Arab and Islamic nation on the strategy of action which will lead to the liberation of the territories and the restoration of dignity is tantamount to a constant holy war which we front-line states feel by the nature of our daily contact with the challenges imposed on us and the people in the occupied territories. We all are looking forward to the Arab and Islamic summit conferences in Amman and Mecca so that these meetings may result in giving meaning and sense to joint action, in keeping with the challenges of the age in the current decade.

/Question/ There are conflicting views on the results of the American elections. Some Arab politicians believe that a victory by President Carter will help resolve the deep-rooted Palestinian question more than a victory by the other candidate Reagan would. It has been said that Carter, who cannot be a candidate a third time, in 1982, will find himself relatively free from Zionist pressures following his re-election next November. What is your highness' comment on that?

/Answer/ The American peace initiatives in the area are of necessity not affected by the policy of one party to the exclusion of another. There are interests which impose themselves on the American administration, although Zionist influence has had a well-known traditional effect and as a result has led to America's aligning itself toward Israel with moral and financial support. The interests related to the Arab world are qualitatively and quantitatively greater than this influence, although the Arab voice is not heard during election campaigns. Hopes are that such objective political initiatives as the European initiative, for example, will be effective, along with the international consensus expressed in meetings of the General Assembly at the exceptional session and the weight of European condemnation of Israel's repulsive measures, especially regarding Jerusalem. Hopes also are that all these factors will lead to early pressure on the next American administration, whatever it is, so that America may again objectively and clearly play the role of a great nation in achieving peace, without discrimination.

/Question/ They state that a change in Israeli leadership, currently represented by Menachem Begin, and the advent of another leader in his place, would reduce difficulties and eliminate the obstacles Begin is putting up to obstruct the attainment of peace in the Middle East area. What are your highness' findings on this matter?

/Answer/ There is no doubt that the current Israeli government has arrogated positions to itself which in their scope go beyond the limits of the imagination in distorting the Arab identity of the Arabs on their territory and the Islamic and Christian Arab rights to their Jerusalem. That has become clear in the last 2 years, through the designs of the World Zionist Organization to move 27,000 Israeli families--that is, close to three-quarters of a million new settlers--starting in 1983 onto occupied Arab territories, aside from the fact that there is an absolute determination to turn the Arabs into minorities on their territories as in the racist protectorates in South Africa. Until the issue of the territory which was occupied in 1967 on the West Bank, Gaza and Golan, in the traditional well-known sense of territory, becomes the issue of the hour, no Israeli government's position can change and the policy of the fait accompli will continue until there is powerful, effective pressure from the international community, in particular from the United States of America, which has viewed Israel as a first and last investment in this area, ignoring the demands of stability through an overall view of the Middle East region.

/Question/ Do you believe that the latest Israeli aggressions against the south of Lebanon are a consecration of the partition of Lebanon and revival of the settlement process?

/Answer/ I believe that these Israeli acts of aggression, in this period of time specifically, when the attention of the world and the great powers is being fragmented, may be described as a great risk to the future of peace in the world and, if they continue, will lead to an indisputable "balkanization" of the region. It saddens us to see international unanimity scoffed at by the Israelis and consequently to see the continued pain, tragedy and hardships of our Arab people in Fraternal Lebanon. It is necessary to contain these encroaching dangers through a clear, explicit Arab position.

/Question/ It is apparent and noticeable that the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty have not achieved the goals hoped for from them in bringing about peace, because these agreements contained no articles specifying an end to the occupation and the granting of their legitimate rights to determine their destiny and live on their national soil to the Palestinian people. Recently, the Venice summit declaration was issued, then followed by the agreement of the European market countries, setting forth a policy coordinated with a new European initiative as an alternative to the Camp David agreements. Do you consider that the group of European countries can play an effective role in achieving a desired

just peace? What is your highness' opinion on the visit by Mr Gaston Thorn, president of the group of European countries, to Jordan, and what are your impressions of him?

/Answer/ There is no doubt that the group of European countries can play an important, effective role in realizing peace, because the European voice is heard clearly in the nations of the world, especially by the big powers, in view of the firm bonds this group has with the various countries of the world, especially the Arab world. I also believe that the Madrid meeting will preserve the continuity of these efforts, which are aimed at reimposing the proper framework based on European consensus and calling for an end to the Israeli occupation and approval of the human right to self-determination. Approval of the human right to self-determination will be fundamental in creating a Palestinian identity on its national soil. The Venice declaration was a positive step in the right direction, but it was not enough to move the issue of peace and justice in the region forward. For this reason we welcome any other initiative aimed at ending the occupation and establishing the rights of the Palestinian people, and we hold the utmost appreciation and respect for Mr Gaston Thorn, president of the European market nations, and his visit, which was aimed at collecting facts which would help the European group adopt a practical step which would actually contribute to the efforts made to achieve a comprehensive just peaceful solution in the region.

/Question/ It is well known, inside and outside Jordan, that your highness is one of the leaders most intensely interested in problems of economic development. You were the first to plan and design to bring the 3- and 5-year development projects into being and implement them. Today, now that the 3-year plan has been completed and we are on the last stages of the 5-year plan, do you consider that these development plans have met the objectives and goals for which they were drawn up?

/Answer/ Our endeavor to create a better life for the citizen is one of the major foundations on which Jordan's mission in our modern era has been based. It is a mission which is to be considered an extension of the mission of the greater Arab revolution at the beginning of this century. From this premise, we in Jordan have realized, since the start of the second half of this century, that development, as an economic and social movement, is continuous and requires preparation and planning first of all.

Therefore it was necessary to set forth development plans. We as a developing country have been able, with our limited resources, to achieve successes in economic and social spheres. Development plans in our view are not just action programs for future years but rather are a living example and a great model of the seriousness of contributing to work, action and sacrifice, creating the habit of working constantly within specific plans.

Jordan's experience in this realm is not unique. Like other developing countries, we have gone through positive and negative stages in execution.

The financial and palpable achievement of the various plans we have authorized this decade have been good, and in some programs we have gone beyond the planned investments and projects and per capita income has risen. The fruits of the projects have been reflected on those who have contributed to them. However, the circumstances of the pressures of occupation and the responsibilities laid upon the Jordanian economy have greatly limited the positive value of the achievements. To this I might add the high prices of international commodities and the local inflation problem, which are a tax that we are living through. We are now trying to concentrate on overcoming these obstacles within the context of Arab cooperation in our coming 5-year plan.

/Question/ The conferees at the Arab economics and foreign ministers' conference are embracing the principle of setting out and preparing a just comprehensive economic plan for the Arab states, preparatory to presenting it at the next summit conference in Amman. Do you believe that setting out that kind of Arab economic plan for comprehensive development will be a means for building a giant Arab economic force which will have an international worldwide effect and influence, helping our Arab nation to solve its endemic economic issues?

/Answer/ If we go back to the previous questions and answers, you will find an answer to this question of yours between their lines, since it is natural that any coordination, cooperation or single plan among Arab brothers will have a certain result through the appearance of the economic power of the Arab nation, which will have a great effect in drawing up a new map of the Arab nation before the world, which will be the start of the flow of the tides of comprehensive union among fraternal Arab countries through the passage of the years--as is the dream of every Arab who aspires to a modern, up-to-date advanced life.

/Question/ The potassium project is one of the greatest Jordanian projects, absorbing study and research for many long years. Implementation of the project has taken many years because of a shortage of money. Could you explain the benefits of this project to us? Will its production be offered on the world market soon, and will this production have a financial and economic yield which will lighten part of Jordan's economic burdens and help its economic welfare? One should realize that some biased Israeli newspapers and books have mentioned that the project is exorbitantly expensive and that its economic feasibility is not encouraging.

/Answer/ This project represents a dream which Jordan has been trying to realize for a long period. Like any great project, it needs great financing, and its output needs time to yield fruit. In addition to that, it, like other projects in developing countries, is subject to domestic and international obstacles. Thank God, project implementation has gone beyond the two stages of study and financing, since a large part of it has been completed, and the project will provide revenues of $180 million a year on reaching maximum productive capacity in 1984-85, in addition to the social,

educational and health benefits and other services it will provide the residential town at the project site. Technical and economic project feasibility studies have proved that its net yield will not be less than 18 percent of total investments, as is stated in a World Bank report, refuting the biased claims, especially Israeli doubts which have been cast on this matter, since the project is competing with an existing Israeli one. Israeli aggression is not limited to destruction and occupation but extends to all spheres in which an Arab country might advance and flourish.

/Question/ The phosphate mining, production and processing projects are among the greatest Jordanian economic projects to be established in the thirties. The Jordanian public has attributed a great deal to the phosphate projects, in its belief that phosphate production will take the place of oil production in the oil countries; however, this hope, or dream, has not been realized. What is your highness' followup on that?

/Answer/ I would like you to permit me to state that phosphate cannot take the place of oil in any case, but may constitute an important source of revenue, especially since Jordanian phosphate is considered one of the highest quality types in the world and constitutes a good source of foreign exchange. However, the dream you mentioned has in fact been the dream of our pioneers since the thirties, to achieve integration among Arab countries, since phosphate complements oil in one of the most important profit-making industries, that of chemical fertilizers. We are not hiding secrets of the obstacles which have faced us in the ambitious expansion of productive capacity, but we are on the way to overcoming them, with God's permission.

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GROWING TERRORISM IN NATION REVIEWED

Paris AL-MAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 8-14 Sep 80 pp 10, 11

/Article by Nihad al-Mashnuq: "From the al-Ta'if Conference to the Incident of the American Ambassador: the Terror of Beirut Witll End When the Crisis Ends"/

/Excerpt from text/ Starting with al 'Akawi

The story began, if we wish, with the explosion that killed Tal'at al-'Akkawi in the eastern section of Beirut in January 1977. A car parked in the heart of the crowded traffic blew up, causing a number of deaths and a large number of injuries. In the same month 2 years later, an automobile was detonated electronically by a woman overseeing the street from an apartment overlooking it, killing Abu Hasan, a FATH leader, and a number of his companions. The rosary was repeated, not for the last time, with the explosion of a car in front of a movie theater and cafe in the mountain town of Rifun, killing and wounding dozens of people.

No Lebanese or non-Lebanese politican remains who has not been exposed to an explosion from a car parked along the side of the road. The head of the Lebanese Front, Camile Chamoun, Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, who lost his daughter in an automobile explosion after physical indisposition prevented him from going to his office as was his daily habit. Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil, saved by a few seconds from an exploding car and afflicted with light wounds. Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, saved by the speed of the car he was driving, or an error in timing the explosion of the car. An automobile blew up in the area of the Jarti pharmacy in al-Ashrafiyah, where there is a large population, killing and wounding people.

A Datsun, specifically, blew up with a young man and woman inside who were on their way to the eastern section, because of a mistake in timing. Booby-trapped cars were found in the Palestinian camp area and along the road usually traveled by resistance leaders in the vicinity of the Arab University and the al-Mazra'ah Corniche. Some of these cars are detonated by a clock set at a specific time and others are detonated electronically--

that is, someone plays the role of an observer in a site looking out over a parking place and sets it off when the targeted car passes by.

An Attempt at a Solution

The solution? In the western section of Beirut, advanced equipment has arrived, which is placed in a cruising car to disclose the presence of explosives in cars parked on both sides of the street. This car has been making continuous patrols since the "custom" of setting up exploding cars came into common use. It is said that this equipment has made it possible to discover a number of booby-trapped cars before they exploded, including one filled with dozens of kilograms of explosives near the Mar Ilyas Camp.

In the eastern section, authorities have stipulated that a special tag is to be placed on parked cars giving the name and other details of their owner and the car; otherwise it will risk being confiscated after it is broken into.

The consequences of these precautionary measures have not yet appeared. Terror continues by these or other means in Lebanon. The detonation of booby-trapped cars is only one aspect of the terror in Lebanon.

Ambassadors, Embassies, Airplanes

From personalities to institutions, a simple statistic, by way of example, not exclusively, shows that all official and quasi-official Iraqi institutions have faced armed attack in the midst of the Iraqi-Iranian disputes; most recent of these was the rocket pointed at the Iraqi Rafidain Bank, which was discovered before it was set off. All Iraqi personalities in Beirut, or personalities belonging to the ruling Ba'th Party in Iraq, consider themselves prone to assassination following the assassination of Mr Musa Shu'ayb, member of the regional command of the Ba'th Party in Lebanon, and the assassination of an Iraqi employee and the wounding of his colleagues at the entrance to Unesco. Likewise, all persons active in Iranian politics, by support or affiliation, have faced or are exposed to assassination.

The body of the press has been hit in the person of its union leader, Riad Taha, Salim al-Lawzi, and others. American cultural centers and the American Embassy have been exposed to armed attack, to say nothing of the assassination of the American Ambassador, Francis Meloy, whose corpse was found in al-Ramlah al-Bayda' in the summer of 1976, and the attempt to assassinate the current American ambassador, John Gunther Dean, on the road to the Ba'abda Palace. Even the Soviet Embassy has faced telephone threats.

Arab embassies which have been exposed to armed aggression, like those of Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Libya, have received telephone threats and this has made most Arab countries dispense with the presence of their

ambassadors in Beirut, contenting themselves with a small number of employees headed by a charge d'affaires.

Five airplanes have been hijacked from or to Beirut to publicize the cause of the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr. A plane was hijacked from Beirut to Kuwait by an invalid from Tripoli who was at his wit's end for treatment as he was poor. Four ships bearing arms come to Lebanon every month, two to eastern harbors and two to the western ones; the number rises and falls according to supply and demand. This is in addition to the weapons which come in by land, smuggled or by permit, to the Palestinian resistance from the Syrian government.

An Attempt on the American Ambassador

Why the escalation in assassinations, explosions and terror in the recent period? Does Lebanon deserve all this?

A senior Arab diplomat says that the purpose in the escalation is to change the direction of Lebanese thinking which adheres to Lebanon's independence and sovereignty and supports its legitimacy, insisting on its thinking in spite of the war, toward other formulas which will bring about the results which had been hoped for from the war but have not yet been realized. The diplomat adds that Israel is the major beneficiary of the shift in the direction of thinking from that of a united Lebanon to arrangements which it is considered will offer salvation from the state of terror the country is going through, even if it does not agree with its unificationist, legitimate tendencies. The charge of benefiting from the terror in Lebanon has not been withheld from other parties.

The senior Arab diplomat says that circles close to the American ambassador tend to accuse Lebanese elements which have acted on Israeli orders to carry out the operation to assassinate Ambassador Dean, following the statement he made on the Israeli aggression in the south. He supported Lebanon and condemned the operation to the point where his position was in principle removed from that of the Department of State in Washington. The Arab diplomat stresses that no one accused of this incident has been detained. Even if anyone has been, that has not been definitively announced, because there are types of detention which are more harmful to the detaining authority than to the detainees.

al-Qadiri from al-Ta'if

The answer to the second question appeared in a statement the acting Lebanese minister of the interior, Prof Nazim al-Qadiri, made before the conference of Arab interior ministers in the town of al-Ta'if in Saudi Arabia. He wondered about the desired role in Lebanon, stating "If the Arab security plan presupposes integration of the links in the chain of unity, there is the link of Lebanon, which has been afflicted by Arab

contradictions and clashes among Arab countries. Winds are bearing the seeds of change from Lebanon to other countries."

This statement turned the conference from a technical one, which the host country had wished for in order to avoid opening the file on Arab disputes, into a political one which began with Minister al-Qadiri's statement on the role of the Arabs in Lebanon and ended with a recommendation from the Lebanese delegation, which included Samih al-Sulh, director general of the interior, Muhammad Shuqayr, the minister's personal counsellor, and two military men, that political crimes be included in the next conference's agenda; they had not been included in the agenda for this one.

It was noted that the Tunisian minister of the interior, Driss Guiga, whose country is complaining of problems of a "Lebanese" character, was the only person to visit the Lebanese delegation. However, after Minister al-Qadiri's statement, delegation heads came in groups to the Lebanese delegation and all expressed a readiness which did not go beyond a "market place of sympathy" for Lebanon, in the phrase of the Lebanese interior minister. The head of the Libyan delegation expressed his country's readiness to help Lebanon, but he imposed the condition that the Lebanese government agree to the establishment of "air cover." Minister al-Qadiri replied that the establishment of air cover would require missile bases; the Lebanese government has the smallest share of territory among the forces present on the Lebanese stage, and therefore has nothing to give.

The conference was replete with administrative resolutions which did not lead to practical results. The Syrian delegation demanded that emphasis be laid on reviving the treaty on the extradition of criminals among Arab countries, demanding that some Arab countries extradite persons accused of crimes to Syria, but got no response. The Palestinian delegation, headed by Hani al-Hasan, put the blame for everything happening in Lebanon, especially for keeping the army from entering the south, on Israel. He asked the Arab states to stress treatment of the Palestinians as Arab subjects, lest they be sent away, as happened in some Arab countries.

The discussions in the hallways did not lead to any practical political results either. However, Lebanon, being a traditional commercial export-import center, is an import-export center for terrorism. Some of the things happening there are considered punishment for the terror it exports to all areas of the world, Arab and foreign.

Opponents and Clients

All opponents of Arab regimes are present in the Lebanese capital, or were there then left. The day after any Arab regime clashes with its opponents, you will find people telling you that some of these opponents have arrived in Beirut. Why? Beirut international airport is open to everyone, in spite of all the measures taken. That is the situation the airport experienced before the war--to a lesser degree of course. There are good will

agreements between organizations and some airport authorities to let in people these organizations designated without receiving entry permits in advance. In addition, organization vehicles which come to Beirut pass through without being inspected. On top of that, there are the illegal ports.

Right, Left and Others

All the left-wing and right-wing organizations in the world have come to Beirut, been trained, and received the facilities they want--the German Baader-Meinhof, the Japanese Red Army, the Italian Red Brigades, the Turkish organization. It once happened that a Turkish left-wing group met a right-wing group of the same nationality on a public street. They clashed, then one of them went to complain to a major Palestinian official that since they were fighting in Turkey, how could they be training in one place? The Palestinian official replied, "Every shot fired in the world benefits me."

It also happened that two Iranian groups exchanged fire in a public street; one of them, supporting Emam Khomeyni, charged the other with being an agent of the Shah. That was before the victory of the Iranian revolution.

There are organizations from Latin America which issue publications in the Arabic language in Beirut on their activities. If one develops the habit of strolling in a specific area of Beirut he will in time observe all nationalities there, which have no job but to get in contact and coordinate. There you will find types of currencies which you will not find anywhere else in the world.

Even when an Arab regime schemes to liquidate its adversary abroad by indirect means, it will find someone in Beirut to carry out that task--voluntarily most of the time.

Thus the group which carried out the operation of taking the OPEC-state ministers hostage in Vienna started in Beirut, and there were Lebanese among them. The attempt to assassinate Shapur Bakhtiar was arranged in Beirut and a Lebanese was in charge of those who carried it out. Zuhayr 'Akashah, the Palestinian residing in Beirut, killed the Yemeni judge 'Abdallah al-Hajari in London, then hijacked a West German airplane to Mogadiscio, the capital of somalia, where he and a comrade were killed.

The Eastern as in the Western

In the eastern sections of Beirut, as in the western ones, Western foreign experts and even Israelis, may be observed, bearing Western European passports, in public places.

In the investigation made after the assassination of 'Ali Salamah (Abu Hasan), it became clear that a Lebanese organization helped carry out the

operation by supplying the group with the explosives placed inside the car which ended his life and the lives of his companions.

Some Lebanese have also been accused of facilitating the task of the group which carried out the Verdun massacre which ended the lives of the three Palestinian leaders in 1973. One of these was killed during the fighting on being thrown from the balcony of his home in the same area.

How far will the limits of this terror go? Internationally, the initiatives from Beirut are declining and may stop, in the midst of further diplomatic and political activity on the part of Palestinian leaders. In the Arab context, one can control them only from abroad; the more the intensity of the Arab disputes lets up, the more the reciprocal terror will too.

In the Lebanese context, this terror will stop only within a new political format for Lebanon which abandons all that is old and exemplary, such as the unity of the land, the people, sovereignty and legitimacy. The statement by a well informed Arab ambassador expressed the view that the people responsible for the continuing conspiracy use terror to reach their political goals. If these goals are attained, the terror will stop.

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REDEVELOPMENT COUNCIL CHIEF OUTLINES PLANNED PROJECTS

Beirut AL-BAYAN in Arabic Aug 80 pp 20, 21

/Article by Sabah Ramadan: "Muhammad 'Atallah, chairman of the Development and Reconstruction Council, Talks to AL-BAYAN"/

/Text/ The task imposed on the Council of Development and Reconstruction must be translated into a general context for the redevelopment process. Proceeding from that point, the council has set out to promulgate a framework for the reconstruction process, taking the current security and political conditions prevailing in the country into consideration.

The Redevelopment and Reconstruction Council has set out on its difficult course, relying on cooperation with ministries and general departments to perform its responsibilities for preparing plans and programs, carrying them out, handing them over and following up on them.

Its first but not last concern has been to mobilize financial resources domestically and abroad and to prepare competent executive personnel. The financial resources needed for the construction process greatly exceed what can be provided inside the country; therefore, the council has had to strive to bring declared and undeclared financing resources into actuality, and it has had to develop the ability to administer, start movement, and provide the human and material means to play the part expected of it.

Proceeding from this premise, the meeting took place with the chairman of the Development and Reconstruction Council, Dr Muhammad 'Atallah, who spoke incisively about the council's activity and the reconstruction project at this stage.

The Reconstruction Project

Dr Muhammad 'Atallah said, "In the framework of the second reconstruction plan, the council has set out the reconstruction project, which comprises the exceptional missions which must be carried out to bring Lebanon back to its natural state."

/Question/ What are these missions?

/Answer/ These missions embrace the reconstruction effort in the private and public sectors. In the private sector--especially in the sectors of agriculture, industry, tourism and others--the cost of the necessary investments has been appraised at about 12 billion pounds. The council has recommended that the government provide one-third of this, that is, 4 billion pounds, in the form of easy loans to private sector organizations. As regards the public sector (except for construction of the army, the security forces and government structures), the cost of the basic reconstruction projects has been estimated at more than 10 billion pounds.

Method of Spending

/Question/ How will the money be spent?

/Answer/ The 10 billion will be spent in the following basic areas:

Housing: 4.5 billion pounds will be spent on repairing and rebuilding destroyed houses, on aid programs to the south, and on the plan to construct new housing units for people with incomes that do not exceed 15,000 pounds per year.

Potable water: 350 million to provide water for Beirut and the provinces.

Re-equipping public schools and hospitals: the cost of that will come to about 400 million pounds.

Re-equipping the road system: total cost comes to 1 billion pounds.

Re-equipping the port of Beirut: cost of that comes to 300 million pounds.

Re-equipping Beirut international airport: its cost comes to 700 million pounds.

Re-equipping telecommunications: costs of that come to 800 million pounds.

Reconstructing the Trade Center in Beirut: the costs of this come to about 900 million pounds.

The costs of these projects in current prices have risen by 50 percent, bringing the cost of the reconstruction project in the public sector closer to 15 billion pounds.

Projects Which Have Been Carried out

/Question/ What implementation has taken place on these projects so far?

/Answer/ Work is now underway to grant easy loans for the repair and rebuilding of destroyed houses; the value of the loans taken out comes to 100 million pounds. The actual housing unit project designs have been completed, following the basic studies for it, which were completed some time ago.

The potable water project, especially for Beirut, is still wavering, for psychological reasons, and for security reasons in specific areas.

The re-equipping of public schools has been completed only in limited form, because financing is not available.

As regards the re-equipping of the road system, the Development and Reconstruction Council has presented the Council of Ministers with a recommendation to organize and finance the first stage of this project. Work has started in the project agency and it is expected that field work will begin in the next few months.

As regards projects which have almost been completed, these are:

Provision of financing to re-equip the port of Beirut from the World Bank, the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and the Abu Dhabi Fund for Economic Development. The Development and Reconstruction Council has taken direct charge of implementing the re-equipping activities.

The preliminary re-equipping processes have been completed on the airport with financing from the Kuwait Economic Development Fund.

Financing, re-equipping and upgrading of the al-Jiyyah thermal plant has taken place through a loan from the European Investment Bank.

Financing is now underway on telecommunications repair and equipment.

Finally, the plan would have started work on reconstruction of the Trade Center in mid-August 1978; however, reasons why this has faltered have been lack of security and the failure of the promised financing to arrive.

/Question/ Here it appears that security is the main condition for takeoff of the reconstruction process.

Security Obstacles

/Answer/ The Development and Reconstruction Council has begun to carry out some projects, in spite of certain security obstacles which have occurred. However, if security exists, the council will be able to make a great takeoff in implementing all the projects the country needs, and consequently its ability to mobilize financial resources will increase.

How the Reconstruction Council Has Worked

/Question/ How has the Development and Reconstruction Council worked the past 2 years?

/Answer/ During this period the council has devoted itself to mobilizing financial resources and has been concerned with relations with specialized bodies in the Arab countries, especially the development funds. It has received loans from some of them. The council has also been concerned with relations with institutions specializing in foreign aid in some friendly countries, such as the American Agency for International Development, the French Foreign Aid Institute, and others. It has managed to procure some grants and loans from them.

The council has also consolidated relations with the European Common Market group, coordinating the distribution of the loans collected to basic projects with them.

The council has concentrated on relations with the World Bank and its systems, and here I can state that these organizations' efforts have begun to be oriented toward actual participation in the reconstruction field Lebanon needs.

Arab Aid

/Question/ What about Arab aid?

/Answer/ In the light of the Tunis summit resolutions, the first signs of money have started to appear. The council has asked the Council of Ministers to adopt exceptional measures to control the spending process. The process of spending Arab funds will take place in the aid programs in the south, to which the Tunis resolutions allocated half the aid over the next 5 years. The other portion will be spent on reconstruction projects as prepared by the council.

Development?

/Question/ What about the development process, now that we have talked about reconstruction?

/Answer/ The development process will start with the building of man. What the legitimate authorities are propounding will proceed from the principles of reconciliation, to be followed immediately by continuous discussion of the lives of citizens and the life of the nation, from which they will emerge gradually, with a renewal of national objectives in all fields, and the organized mobilization of all the resources of the country will advance to reach them.

11887
CSO: 4802

FATE OF BEIRUT'S COMMERCIAL CENTER DEPLORED

Paris AL-MAHAR AL-ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 9-14 Sep 80 pp 34, 35

/Article by Michel Murqus: "The Center of Beirut: This Is What It Was, This Is What It Has Become"/

/Text/ "The center of Beirut has been dragged into a race of increasing speed, and one fears that it will jump into the unknown or be enveloped by a darkness which is outstripping its vitality in order to dnvelop the area. One must set forth solutions in the light of strong beacons, because if the vortex goes on and we cannot see, madness will take over."

With these words, the General Civil Regulation Department finished the conclusions of a survey on the City of Beirut as it was in 1974. The survey was made in April 1977; its conclusions were published and printed in May 1980 and are in the process of being distributed.

The survey also says "Life goes on without the center of the city of Beirut. Offices, commerce, and activities are shifting to other areas, conditionally to be independent and become acclimatized while waiting to return. However, the war is also continuing in the center of the city and at the same time centers to receive the departing activities are growing, are becoming outfitted and are growing strong."

A war in the middle of the city has caused the development that surrounds it to pass by.

But what development can the eyes of light do when the heart is dead and is passing deeper into darkness, unless the objective is to replace this heart with transplanted members?

How Was the Commercial Center?

Five thousand forty-three dwellings, 7,092 commercial establishments, 5,597 offices, 148 medical clinics, 1,368 industrial units,702 warehouses, 343 hotels and lodgings, 361 restaurants, 45 bars, 49 garages, and 143 mosques, churches, theaters, movie houses and schools--all this in an area

of 1,418,536 square meters, 14,346 of which was the area of al-Shuhada' Square. That is, this center covered 143 out of a total of 2,300 hectares which is the area of the city of greater Beirut.

If the area of the port is excluded, there remain 130 hectares, 62.5 of which are a free zone or allotted to roads. Fifty-five hectares are for buildings, 2.5 hectares for parking spaces, and 10 hectares for green spaces.

This area is broken down into 1,960 real estate properties with an average of 344.5 square meters each. Forty percent of these are less than 300 square meters in area; the big areas are for hotels and the public sector (the municipality, the palace and so forth).

The built-up areas are broken down among residences (67.55 hectares, or 33.6 percent, besides the port), offices (45.85 hectares, or 22.7 percent), commercial enterprises (26.38 hectares, or 13.1 percent), warehouses (6 percent), industry (3.4 percent), and other activities (21.2 percent), which are broken down as follows: hotels, 51 percent, parking spaces, 14 percent, bars and restaurants, 8 percent, and others, 27 percent.

1. Housing: 25,000 people in 5,043 dwellings. Of these, 9,000 have gone and the number of dwellings totals 3,195, just one third of which are less than 50 years old, that is, were built after 1925. These dwellings are 675,576 square meters in area, an average of 134 dquare meters per dwelling. The areas range from 90.42 to 15[illegible] square meters. The population density was 176 persons per hectare before the events; this has dropped to 112 persons per hectare.

2. The shops in the center of the city number 7,092 and cover an area of 263,852 square meters. The average area per shop is 37 square meters. The area varies, according to district, from 30 to 45.42 square meters. The damage rate totals 76.3 percent in the al-Najmah Square area.

These shops provided 39,000 jobs, and the population density in them comes to 600 persons per hectare by day.

3. Offices. These number 5,745 offices and medical clinics (or 5,597 offices and 148 clinics). Their area, with the clinics, is 466,563 square meters, or an average of 82 square meters per office. They provided 34,786 jobs (before April 1975) and had a density of 267 per hectare (including the port).

4. Shops and industry: These numbered 1,368 industrial units dominated by a shop character, since the labor in most of them amounted to fewer than 7 workers, for a total of 8,000 workers or wage earners. They were 69,614 square meters in area, and the average area per unit was 51 square meters.

5. Warehouses: These were 702 in number with an area of 731.422 square meters, an average of 173.66 square meters, including the port, or 104.2 square meters besides the port.

6. Hotels and lodging: These totalled 343 in the center of the city, with an area of 214,330 square meters. These hotels are of three classes:

First class, consisting of 108 lodgings with an area of 16,070 square meters, an average of 149 square meters per lodging.

Second class, one-star hotels where transients pass the night; these are 222 in number and 74,940 square meters in area. The major hotels number 13 and are, in area, 123,320 square meters an average of 9,486 square meters per hotel.

7. Restaurants number 361, covering an area of 25,729 square meters, or an average area of 73 square meters per restaurant.

8. Bars, except for hotel bars, number 45 and cover 10,445 square meters in area, or an average of 232 square meters per bar.

9. Forty-nine garages with an area of 56,680 square meters.

10. Others, 143 (mosques, churches, schools, halls, theaters, movies and so forth) with an area of 111,273 square meters.

The Departure of the Activities

This is the way the center of the city of Beirut was before April 1975. This center lost its activities and the element of its life. How have these activities been distributed, and how are they living, now that they have left, along with the human personnel?

Two hundred fifty commercial establishments and offices were in the commercial center, then left, and were presented with questionnaires. They occupy 320 locations, 186 of which are in the western section and 134 in the eastern section of Beirut.

The new branches are 269 in number; 148 of these are in the eastern section and 121 are in the western section. As for their legal status, 132 are owned and 137 are rented.

New shops number 320 and are broken down by activity and legal form as follows:

First, 48 offices, 12 of which, that is, 25 percent, have been bought or are investments (23 percent in the eastern section and 29 percent in the western section), while 36, that is, 75 percent, are rented for an average monthly rate of 550 pounds.

Second, 272 shops, 132 of which, that is, 48 percent, are owned or for investment (36 percent in the eastern section and 65 percent in the western section), and 140, that is, 52 percent, are rented for an average monthly rent of 450 pounds. Fifty percent of the new shops in the western section use kiosks (20 percent owned and 30 percent rented). In the eastern section there are no kiosks and of the shops 16 percent are owned, 60 percent are rented, and 24 percent are investments.

The daily sales in shops dropped from their previous level in the center of the city; the daily sales of shops which moved from the center of the city to the eastern section dropped from 6,700 Lebanese pounds (in the center of the town) to 1,050 Lebanese pounds in the area to which they went. The daily sales of shops which were transferred to the western section dropped from 2,800 to 800 Lebanese pounds.

This drop is different during ordinary days from special holidays. It is apparent that the multiple of the decline is as follows:

Area departed to:	Ordinary days	Special holidays
Eastern district	6.4	3.8
Western district	3.5	4.6
Both districts	5.1	4.1

The number of customers on special holidays is double the number on ordinary days anywhere. In the districts, the number of customers totals one-quarter what it was in the center of the city; on special holidays it is four times less in the eastern area, and five times less in the western area, than it was in the center.

The number of working hours in the center of the city ranged from 8 to 11, dropping 2 hours in ordinary days and 1 hour for general commerce.

The Source of Goods and Primary Materials

In the center of the city 52 percent of the goods were Lebanese by source, 3 percent Arab by source and 45 percent foreign by source.

In the new area, Lebanese goods have held their share, 52 percent, Arab goods have dropped to 1 percent, and foreign goods have risen to 47 percent. These rates vary between the eastern and western sections.

In the eastern section, the source of goods and primary materials is 45 percent Lebanese, 52 percent foreign, and 3 percent Arab. In the western section it is 62 percent Lebanese and 38 percent foreign.

As for the way the goods arrive, 33 percent of the shops in the eastern section rely on land routes, 35 percent on air routes and 32 percent on sea routes. In the western section reliance on land transport is the base

(56 percent), followed by sea transport (28 percent) and air transport (16 percent).

The mode before the departure was as follows:

A. Shops which moved to the eastern section: 35 percent land transport, 22 percent air transport, 43 percent sea transport.

B. Shops which moved to the western section: 55 percent land transport, 8 percent air transport, 37 percent sea transport.

The capital of shops which moved to the eastern area, when they had opened in the center of the city, was 338,000 Lebanese pounds. Just before they left that rose to 1,078,000 pounds, and after their departure declined to 540,000 pounds (April 1977).

The capital of shops which moved to the western section, when they had opened in the center of the city, was 316,000 pounds and on the eve of their departure had gone to 705,000 pounds. After departure, it totalled 241,000 pounds.

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NEW PLAN FOR HOLDING COMPANIES DESCRIBED

Beirut AL-BAYAN in Arabic Aug 80 pp 22-25

/Article: "Khalil Abu Hamad Talks to AL-BAYAN: One Must Prepare for the Lebanon of Tomorrow"/

/Text/ Professor Khalil Abu Hamad is known for his dynamism in his work on the legal, political and social planes. The vitality of the lawyer and diplomat arises from his faith in creative, innovative man who has been given his mind by the creator in order to polish and use it in the service of him.

In spite of all his local, Arab-wide and international preoccupations, Professor Abu Hamad found enough time to set out plans and studies which will have the effect of serving the economy of Lebanon and drawing in major Arab and foreign companies, with their massive capital.

Professor Khalil Abu Hamad recently set out a plan to establish holding companies in Lebanon containing numerous enticements over which the mouths of Arab and foreign financiers will water, attracting them to establish holding companies in Lebanon similar to those they have set up in countries which are considered paradises for tax evaders--Liechtenstein, the Bahamas, Luxemburg, Bermuda, the Caymans and so forth.

Professor Abu Hamad's plan has long been called for by businessmen in Lebanon and the Arab world who have sought refuge in the abovementioned countries to establish companies. We in AL-BAYAN have been demanding that this plan be set out since 1972, but those in charge of matters turned a deaf ear to us!

The editor in chief of AL-BAYAN met with Professor Abu Hamad in his office, which, as opposed to many law offices, was jammed with activity, and presented him with several questions on his plan, to which his answers were clear, objective and beneficial to everyone reading them.

Why the Holding Companies?

AL-BAYAN: Professor Abu Hamad, what prompted you to set out the holding company plan?

Abu Hamad: On 15 February 1978 I was reading the newspaper HERALD TRIBUNE and my attention was drawn to news about Liechtenstein, a country whose per capita income came to about $11,055 a year in 1977, that is, more than that in America, where the per capita income came to $9,320, West Germany, with $7,865, and Japan, with $4,920. I was fully aware that the reason for the high income of citizens in Liechtenstein may be ascribed to its system, which permits the establishment of holding companies and gives them great tax breaks and facilities enabling them to function in an atmosphere full of confidence and security.

At that time I wondered why Lebanon didn't imitate that small country, especially since Lebanon has advantages which do not exist there, most conspicuous being the sound, healthy banking sector, which managed to persevere during the events, function in accordance with the law and reap profits. In addition there is Lebanon's geographic situation, the availability of communications, staffs, languages, advanced modern legislation and the flexibility of the tax departments. Let me go back and state that the system of establishing holding companies requires the presence of a sound, integrated banking sector, and since that exists in Lebanon I decided to set forth the plan (the reader will find the text of it alongside this conversation /sic/), in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance, since it met with a response from all officials.

AL-BAYAN: Was promulgation of the draft law the result of the impulse of a personal initiative on your part or by some official's request?

Abu Hamad: I set it forth on the impulse of serving the public interest and presented it to officials who agreed to it and endorsed it.

AL-BAYAN: There is no doubt that you have had recourse to international laws in setting out the law.

Abu Hamad: I have had recourse to laws which are applied in certain countries on companies of this type--Bermuda, Panama, the Bahamas, Liechtenstein, and Luxemburg. I have been anxious to adapt them in a manner in accordance with Lebanon's interests, since Lebanon is better than those countries for people wishing to establish holding companies, and the free economic system which Lebanon is following and whose legislation has progressed are in addition to what I already mentioned, among the benefits which all constitute a guarantee for the companies, in spite of the security situation the country is passing through.

Tax Is Two-Tenths of a Percent

AL-BAYAN: In your draft have you specified tax and duty rates, or have you left those to the Ministry of Finance?

Abu Hamad: I have presented an integrated draft which stipulates a low token tax and duty rate which will encourage companies to register in Lebanon. For example, I have recommended that the tax be two-tenths of one percent on the value of the capital or 1 percent of the profits the general assembly decides to distribute--that is, the Ministry of Finance can choose which is preferable in the interests of the treasury.

Comprising All Sectors

AL-BAYAN: There is no doubt that the draft comprises all sectors--banking, insurance, trade and industry.

Abu Hamad: Yes, it comprises all sectors, and if you like I can spell out to you what a holding company is. It consists of some businessmen with a lot of money who want to invest their money in various sectors, provided that they have most of the stock, in order to manage the companies in which they participate; they establish a holding company in a country which has a special statute for holding companies, and, proceeding from the holding company, they set about participating in existing companies, factories and banks. These companies continue to pay taxes as usual, in accordance with the law, while the holding company pays a token tax, as stated previously--two-tenths of a percent. The treasury loses nothing here because the taxes owed by the existing companies are paid as usual, in addition to the token taxes for the holding companies. Refer to the text of the law.

AL-BAYAN: What is the rate in other countries?

Abu Hamad: In Luxembourg for example it is 2 percent.

Benefits of the Plan

AL-BAYAN: Did you want to attract companies to Lebanon by reducing the rate?

Abu Hamad: Without a doubt, since Lebanon will reap great profits through companies' headlong competition to register here. The benefits which will accrue from the project are numerous. Among them I might mention:

The rental of offices, since landowners will benefit, the municipalities will benefit from rental tax, the Telephone Department will benefit from the communications, accountants will benefit from the designation of oversight delegates, and the government will be assured an annual income besides the existing one. That is, the establishment of holding companies

will provide the country with a group of services and benefits, and let us not forget how many employees and workers the companies will require.

AL-BAYAN: Isn't there a fear that the holding companies will dominate the domestic ones?

Abu Hamad: There is no fear at all, because their activity will be within the scope of Lebanese Laws.

If they are to participate in a bank, for example, they will not have the right to acquire a majority of shares. If they are to participate in commercial firms, there will be nothing to stop them because the law allows foreigners to own companies.

AL-BAYAN: Do you believe, Professor Abu Hamad, that the existing situation in Lebanon will encourage the establishment of such companies?

One Must Prepare for the Lebanon of Tomorrow

Abu Hamad: In spite of everything, there are dozens of Arabs and foreigners with money who are awaiting the passage of the law so that they can come to Lebanon and establish companies here. On this occasion I can state that the Lebanese must prepare for the future of Lebanon starting today and if there is no great receptivity to registering at present, owing to the prevailing conditions, why don't we prepare for what will come after this stage? We must prepare as of today.

AL-BAYAN: We noticed, while attending an Arab conference, that many want Lebanon to have a special statute on holding companies so they may register there rather than in Bermuda or other places.

Abu Hamad: Everyone is interested in registering in Lebanon, because the structure of the system here is encouraging. Ask people who have left for Athens how they functioned and are functioning--languages are not available, communications are not easy, and the banks do not function as they do in Lebanon. I can specially mention banking secrecy, which is the pride of our banking laws and which the world envies us for.

AL-BAYAN: Doesn't the bank secrecy law need amending?

Abu Hamad: Not at all. It is exemplary, better than the Swiss law, which they have shot full of holes and no longer inspires the confidence of those dealing with Swiss banks. It is half a law now!

Bank Interest and Rules

We raised with Prof Khalil Abu Hamad, in his capacity as lawyer for the Society of Banks of Lebanon, the subject of the interest on loans which individuals receive from banks and whether it is permissible for that to

exceed 9 percent. Prof Abu Hamad's answer was that he recently set out a study of the interest issue on the basis of a request from the Society of Banks of Lebanon which concluded by asserting the following:

Debtor Loans of 9 Percent

"Lebanese law unanimously agrees on supporting the judgment which concludes that the legal interest rate should be set at 9 percent for debtors' loans.

"Agreement on an interest rate on debtors' loans, if above the legal rate, is not permissible, effective with the issuance of the Law of 24 June 1939 and the 1 March 1943 Law."

Commercial Debts

Agreement to an interest rate in excess of the legal rate, that is, 9 percent, for commercial loans is not prohibited by law and consequently is permissible: "One can rule that the interest rate agreed on in commercial matters is free of the reservations applying to the general legal provisions bearing on errors of good faith stipulated in Article 202 of the Law on Contracts and Obligations.

"The interest stipulated in collateral contracts must be free if the debt which is secured by the collateral is a commercial one."

The Three Rules

Prof Abu Hamad spells out the three legal rules which are fit to be the bases for transactions:

The first rule: No crime of usury exists for financial loans concluded for a commercial goal, whether or not they are secured by real estate collateral.

The second rule: Any interest in excess of 9 percent on non-commercial loans constitutes a crime of usury and will be punished by law.

The third rule: The only exception to the rule of not exceeding the rate of 9 percent on debtor loans arises when these debts are secured by real estate collateral.

Exceeding the Interest on the Laon Principal

As far as exceeding the interest on the loan principal goes, he states, basing himself on the judgments of jurists and definitive judiciary rulings:

"The interest may not exceed the capital."

As regards compound interest, the study says:

One may not capitalize interest every month or 3 months. An agreement which reaps this form of capitalization is void. It is not permissible to reach prior agreement on capitalizing interest either, legally, on the due dates.

Summary

Debtor loans: 1. The legal interest rate has been set at 9 percent and may not be exceeded. 2. Based on the foregoing, one may exceed that rate on loans secured by real estate collateral, provided that does not exceed a maximum of 12 percent.

Commercial loans: 1. The legal interest rate has been set at 9 percent, and one may reach agreement to exceed that rate. 2. As regards loans secured by real estate collateral, one may agree to exceed the rate of 12 percent.

Paralysis of the Courts

AL-BAYAN: What recommendations do you have for getting the Palace of Justice process moving, since justice must not remain in permanent paralysis?

Abu Hamad: The Palace of Justice issue is part of the whole, but it is possible to move the wheels of justice by special legislation. Before that, I would like to spell out the three factors which have led to paralysis in the Palace of Justice:

First, some judges have not yet sat behind the arch, though some improvement has been recorded.

Second, numerous lawyers' offices were destroyed entirely, in a manner whereby files were destroyed, burned or lost.

Third, it has been impossible to notify litigants.

Therefore if we set forth legislation which will allow notification by AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH, the newspapers, and the Lawyers' Union as regards lawyers, so that they will be compelled to give notice, as well as making it mandatory to make very stringent investigations to ensure that judges are present and verdicts are issued, especially if the files are complete, it is obvious to state that the government must provide the security measures necessary to preserve reverence for the Palace of Justice and the safety of judges and litigants.

Justice First of All

AL-BAYAN: Do you not consider it impossible to issue verdicts in the light of the prevailing security situation, since issuance of a verdict on some cases is tantamount to a risk for the judge issuing it?

Abu Hamad: When we realize that the criminal court in Beirut, under the chairmanship of Chairman Amin Nassar, issues verdicts on serious criminal cases, we find that convening other courts is natural, taking into consideration the conditions in some regions.

The Arbitration Statute

Prof Abu Hamad goes on:

"There is a heartening new phenomenon in Lebanon which has started to play its part and assert its importance, and that is the phenomenon of arbitration. In view of the importance of this matter, I have started to set forth an arbitration statute, to which draft there are numerous advantages:

First, economy in Palace of Justice fees, which are very exorbitant.

Second, freedom of persons to choose those they want to arbitrate among them.

Third, periods of time will be short, since the dispute will be terminated in a month or two, rather than 2 or 3 years.

AL-BAYAN: What countries follow this system?

Abu Hamad: All the countries in the world.

AL-BAYAN: We believe that that sort of system exists in Lebanon.

Abu Hamad: Yes, it does, in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, but there is no receptivity to it because the system is not exemplary and consequently the people have not become accustomed to it. Today, however, circumstances have made it mandatory that people submit to it, and they have become eager that it be created and that they be freed from their problems.

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BRIEFS

SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS--Rabat, 8 Sep (MAP)--Aleksey Shvedov, chief of the African Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arrived in Rabat Sunday evening for a working visit to Morocco. He will meet, beginning Monday, with Abderrahman Baddou, secretary of state for foreign affairs. Shvedov is accompanied by Victor Zhuravlev, section chief of the same department. [Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 8 Sep 80 p 1]

CSO: 4400

GULF SOLIDARITY TO FRUSTRATE U.S. PLANS URGED

GF051240 Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 2 Oct 80 p 1

[Editorial: "From Blackmail to Threats of War"]

[Text] The United States is moving in several directions in the region and encircling the Arab oil region. As these moves are being carried out by senior U.S. military officials who have visited Egypt, occupied Palestine and the Gulf region, the image of the U.S. move seems more serious than ever before, especially at a time when the region is passing through a very difficult situation that is linked to the regrettable situation between Iraq and Iran.

When the Americans intensify their political and military activities in the Arabian Gulf region, "they seek to defend their interests and the interests of the Western world, because the Gulf region is an extension of U.S. national security," according to a political statement publicized recently by President Carter. This necessarily means that U.S. intervention in the region's internal affairs has entered the phase of actual implementation after finishing the preliminary preparations.

Yesterday's statement reflects a serious insistence on intervening in the region's internal affairs by exploiting the present conflict between Iran and Iraq to serve the interests of the United States and the West. It also wants to extend international reactions to the conflict by involving the Soviet Union in this issue, which has become a difficult one, through inviting Moscow to participate in a Western action--that may be adopted under the banner of the United Nations--in order to calm the situation in the region, or in order to secure the flow of oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz and keep this strait open. At the same time, certain U.S. sources have said that the early warning devices dispatched to the region are designed to observe any foreign counter-offensive in the Gulf region, as if it were not the United States that has been threatening the Gulf's security but the Arab states overlooking the Gulf, Iran and the Soviet Union. This is not a paradox but a bitter fact indicating that the United States is willing to involve other parties in order to justify its intervention in the region.

By intervening in the region, the Americans do not intend to encircle the oil wells with antiaircraft missiles and highly sophisticated electronic instruments. This task is part of the Arab oil states' defense affairs and pertains to the right of sovereignty and self-defense in each of these states. All that the Americans seek by intervening in the internal affairs of the Gulf states is to insure the continued flow of oil to the Western consumer countries in large quantities and at very cheap prices, coupled with the continued flow of manufactured commodities, cereals and foodstuffs to Arab and Third World states at very high prices, which are sometimes extraordinarily high. They want to do this without linking these prices to inflation and the entity's complications that shake the Western economic system daily and are about to doom it to failure.

If civilization can be damaged if a war breaks out between the United States and the Soviet Union, the same kind of damage can also occur if a war breaks out and threatens to expand to regions that are considered vital by the Soviet Union and the United States. The damage to civilization may be devastating if a military conflict breaks out in the petroleum region with the palnned intervention of the superpowers aimed at dividing the world once more between them. This is actually what the United States has been unsuccessfully proposing to the Soviet Union. However, it has achieved partial success in its invitation to Western European states to establish joint naval coordination in the Arab warm waters.

To date, U.S. interests in the Gulf region have not been violated; there have been no actions that may cause the United States to worry about petroleum. The battle between OPEC and the consumer countries on linking oil prices to international economic inflation has been won by Western consumer countries. Even the humble achievements of the recent Vienna OPEC conference on reducing the oil production of some Arab states by 10 percent have been wasted due to the war between Iran and Iraq. Senior officials from oil producing countries have stated that oil production may be increased. Or, as Iraq has put it, production may be set at its maximum level. This leads to the conclusion that the U.S. pressure exercised against the Arabian Gulf region is intended, in one way or another, to reshuffle the Arab oil flow to Western consumer countries. It is also intended to influence the price of oil in these countries so they can purchase arms and weapons from the industrial consumer countries. In this way, it is manifest that the U.S. method--which is the method of Western countries--of dealing with the oil states, particularly the Gulf states, starts with blackmail, threats of war and finally economic and political blackmail.

The Gulf states have stressed that in order to prevent the United States and its allies from blackmailing the Gulf peoples and stealing their resources, the region's problems must be solved on the basis of solidarity, joint interests, avoidance of violence, constructive coordination within the framework of the Arab League Pact and the principles of Islamic solidarity and by giving the interests of the peoples of the region priority above all other interests.

If the Iranian-Iraqi conflict has exposed some defects that may be exploited by the enemies of the Gulf and the Arab nation--above all the United States and the Zionist entity--the security of the Gulf and the protection of the region's peoples can be achieved by solidarity, joint action, paying respect to the national rights and sovereignty of each state and by frustrating the plans of Carter and Brzinski, who consider the Gulf to be part of U.S. national security interests.

CSO: 4802

EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON ESCALATION OF GULF TENSION

GF051100 Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 30 Sep 80 p 16

[Editorial: "The U.S. Plan to Escalate Tension in the Gulf"]

[Text] Ever since the Iraqi-Iranian conflict developed into a crisis--which has resulted in the 9-day-old war--the UAE has been supporting every effort to stop the fighting and settle differences through dialogue, negotiations, arbitration or any other peaceful means that will safeguard each party's rights and restore amity and good neighborliness to both countries. Both are linked by mutual interests, Muslim brotherhood, affiliation with international organizations and the unity of belonging to the Gulf region, which seems by all criteria to be a most sensitive and vital spot because of its oil and strategic position.

The UAE and other Arab Gulf states' media have never desisted--even from the first day of the war--from calling sincerely and urging incessantly for an immediate halt to this fighting. But the United States, with its allies and agents in the area and because of its unconcealed regional ambitions, is trying and even planning to exploit this war to achieve these interests and ambitions. The United States and its agents know very well that the UAE has never taken and will never take a hostile stand toward either of the two fighting parties.

In spite of this, the United States is trying through lies and intrigues to pit Iran and the UAE against each other, aiming at escalating tension in the area and at expanding the circle of war, with its destruction, fire and devastation. America's objective is evident to anyone who knows its ambitions and those of the Soviet Union and their struggle to control the destinies and riches of nations. The achievement of this objective, in the logic of the superpowers--especially the United States--requires a favorable atmosphere and a reasonable justification for intervention.

There is no doubt that anyone who tries to expand the circle of war is aiming, even unconciously, at serving the interests of those who are intending to repress the peoples of the area and plunder their wealth.

As for the Gulf region, from which and through which oil supplies to the entire world flow, especially to the industrialized states led by the United States, the suitable climate for those who have ambitions in this region is to have it encircled by a state of tension and the atmosphere of war in such a way that the oil wells and passages to them--and thus the interests of the industrialized states, their factories, economies and even their very lives--become exposed to danger. In this way, the climate becomes suitable for intervention. Therefore, the United States and its allies and agents are exploiting the war between Iraq and Iran to fuel malice and weave intrigues and plots.

It is neither in the interest of Iran nor the region to escalate the crisis and expand its scope. It is in the interest of the United States and other countries that have ambitions in the whole and not part of the region.

It is in the interest of the area, especially Iran and Iraq to end this war and settle their differences peacefully. In this way, the wealth of the area remains for its people, and doors are closed in the face of the United States and its ambitions.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

NO PROPOSALS ON THREE GULF ISLANDS--Informed sources in Baghdad have asserted that Iraq has not suggested to the UAE any plans or proposals regarding the three Arab islands [Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunb], and that there is no truth to reports on this matter. Iraqi Defense Minister 'Adnan Khayrallah had said UAE officials are free to act on the islands issue in accordance with their judgment of the international situation, and that the UAE has legitimate rights in these islands. The Iraqi defense minister said his information confirms that the UAE has submitted a memorandum to the United Nations demanding that the islands be returned to UAE sovereignty. [Text] [Correspondent's dispatch from Baghdad] [GF281356 Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 27 Sep 80 p 1]

CSO: 4802

MZALI DISCUSSES COUNTRY'S ACHIEVEMENTS, CULTURE, FOREIGN RELATIONS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 5 Sep 80 p 5

["Exclusive" interview with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali--date not specified]

[Text] [Question] You recently stated in an interview given to a widely circulated daily French newspaper that Tunisia is entering a new phase. Mr Prime Minister, would you like to elaborate on the tenor and objectives of this phase?

[Answer] The independence of Tunisia was proclaimed about 25 years ago. In the history of nations, that is not a long time ago. In the history of a nation as young and as demanding as ours is, it nevertheless represents something. However, the most important is that, during this quarter of a century, dramatic changes have taken place, which have made of the Tunisian people, emerging bloodless from the long colonization period but impassioned by the epic struggle for freedom and the right "to exist," a people completely transformed, deeply transformed. It was hard work. The struggle was long. After having fought to provide the protocol of 20 March 1956 with real content, and it was merely a protocol, our struggle for development could only be difficult because it was serious. We have even faced trials, crises, upheavals. But is Tunisia worn out for all that? Some have thought so.

As for us, we sometimes had our moments of anxiety. However, we never lost the militant hope that has always been in us. We never wavered from our bourguibian determination that has always inspired the bourguibian militants that we are.

And then, thanks be to God, Bourguiba is still here. The helmsman and the wind--! If we like to reminisce, rightfully and with pride, about our accomplishments, our successes, we also know how to learn from trials, courageously recognize our mistakes, see with clarity the new phases that we must pass through to meet the aspirations of our young people, to go forward.

This is our ammunition at the outset of this new decade, of the step that we will be taking.

What target will we have? How fast will we move?

Our unit of measurement will first of all be the aspiration of the people. What do the people aspire to?

More dignity, more authenticity, more prosperity, more liberty...

Does this mean that the Tunisian people have not enjoyed freedom up to the present, or that they could not hope for prosperity, or that they had lost their dignity or their identity? Certainly not! However, they would like to attain it in its fullest. In this aspiration, the Party and the Government of President Bourguiba can only be in the foreground of the battle, at the head of the troop, as they have always been in the past.

Will you ask me for tangible evidence?

Read the papers and listen to the radio, I would answer!

[Question] You mean the openness, Mr Prime Minister, if I understand well. But from having been used in so many different contexts, the concept of openness has become far too abstract. What meaning do you give to it so that everyone, and namely the young people do not feel cheated?

[Answer] Our openness in regard to ourselves, to others and to the future has always been one of the foundations of the bourguibian ethic. The young people are not as skeptic as you seem to think. Make available to them the columns of your paper. Let them express themselves freely. You will see that they are full of hope and vitality. You will see that they are patriotic and progressive. If you are worried about what they might say about the government, that is the government's business.

There are no more political prisoners in the Tunisian prisons. The workers and the young people, all young students as well as factory workers and farmers are invited to take charge of their own destiny, to participate more efficiently in the fight against underdevelopment, to train themselves, to readapt themselves, to develop their personality, to sharpen their critical judgment in order to be protected from empty slogans, deaf to the lures of demagogy, to convince themselves that [word missing in French text] with the others, for the others in voluntary discipline.

[Question] Do you believe that the existence of opposition in Tunisia is normal? To what extent are the different leanings which exist in Tunisia affected by the effective and thorough dialog that you are advocating?

[Answer] I believe that the overwhelming majority of Tunisians, men and women, are behind Bourguiba. In reality, there are some Tunisians that are not in agreement with the Party and the Government. There are some even that claim to be organized into groups. Actually, they are party members that have broken with the Party or that the Party has excluded. If you

are asking me what I wish, I would answer: that the Party be the great focal point for all the dynamic forces of the nation. It is the duty of our Party today to organize itself better, to work sincerely and loyally, to renew itself, to speak the right language, in order to be this unifying movement which would include an ever-increasing number of Tunisians who would agree on a common platform founded on patriotism and the national interest, who would not necessarily have the same thoughts, but rather obtain the greatest richness, thus the greatest strength, from differing opinions and different sensitivities.

The debate would take place, as it has since 1934, within the Party itself and our action would then be founded on the broadest consensus possible.

If in spite of this there remain what you might call oppositions or rather oppositionists in Tunisia, what can I do? What I must remind you of, is that we are still opposed to coercion, and that we respect the free expression of opinions by all.

We wish even to integrate the Tunisians who do not always think as we do into the reflection process on national problems and projects.

[Question] What is the status of the trade union representation question?

[Answer] We have always said, and we repeat it, that it is up to the workers to decide their destiny as far as the organization of unions is concerned. And thus, they should convene a congress to choose leaders that would represent them. The role of the Government and of the Party is simply to aid in the normal development of the process. You know that the Political Bureau took the initiative and proposed the institution of a commission that would represent all the trade union tendencies in preparation for this congress.

As things stand now, I do not believe that anyone would risk contradicting this thesis, by advocating for example that this or that man, or such and such a direction be imposed on the workers. I do not believe either that it would be in the interest of the workers to have this congress, that is the trade union representation problem, stalled because of a matter of persons. Let us give evidence of imagination and sacrifice at the same time, let us place ourselves in history and respond to the fervent wish of the workers. What is the fervent wish of the workers? To be able to have a trade union organization that is representative, responsible and dynamic. Individuals must know how to stand aside in light of this national imperative. Especially when they say they are patriotic.

[Question] Concerning the problems of the UGET [General Union of Tunisian Students]. Do you think that you can overcome the reticences of the students and their divisions?

[Answer] I thought it my duty to recommend a course of action, because for years I have been very close to the university problems.

This course of action is not new. It is very similar to the circular that I addressed, as Minister of National Education, to the Deans at the beginning of 1973.

The months to come will be an indication of whether 7 years have allowed the problem to mature. If so, all the better for the University, especially for the students, who will then be able to participate more fully in all pedagogical as well as political decisions that will map out their future.

If not, we will wait.

We will wait till the extremists of all sorts have been exposed by the overwhelming majority of students who are of sound judgment, sincere and patriotic.

[Question] The role of the press in the general development of the country is no doubt important. Mr Prime Minister, what policy is the government following in order to encourage and help the mass media develop and diversify itself so as to better reflect the citizen's concerns and thus contribute more fully to the development of the country?

[Answer] I will tell you that it is up to the mass media themselves to find the best way for a harmonious evolution that would parallel the changes taking place in our country. We believe moreover that information is the one area above all that should exclude any kind of tutelage, any manifestation of paternalism.

The government in actual fact considers that it is necessary to encourage such an evolution, to aid the various mass communication means to play their part to their fullest. That is, to be open to currents of opinion, to live the concerns of their society, in one word, to harbor all voices and writings that wish to express themselves, identify themselves with the reality of the country.

As you may notice, there is no pressure or consorship. The journalists who wish to do so can, if not must, treat all subjects without taboo or veto.

With respect for the law and their conscience, while avoiding inaccurate news, dishonest bias, pandering to the passions...this improvement in content is the condition sine qua non of all development.

What will be the role of the State in all this? To promote this change by encouraging but also holding the journalist responsible. In light of this, we are planning to propose various legislative or regulatory improvements

in order to strengthen this tendency. But there also, one must avoid dramatic and demagogic actions.

[Question] The identity of a people is measured by the originality of its culture. You believe, Mr Prime Minister, as you stated before the National Assembly, in the possibility of a mass culture for our country. What are the measures that need to be taken to implement this objective?

[Answer] Original culture? And how! Is not culture the consciousness of a people, more precisely the expression of this consciousness? Historically, we are Arab-Moslems, deeply rooted in this land of civilization, the Maghreb. All that our brains can produce, all the anxieties and hopes that we have within our hearts can only generate a certain kind of culture. A culture that is specifically national, plus the Tunisian specificity. Which means, what comes from the depths of this people, from its sufferings, its hopes, its dreams...

Where are we today? Is there a welling up of culture? I believe so. There are springtimes. But the swallows come and go, preferably during the summer. Without mentioning all the festivals that take place during this season especially. I might shock you, but I feel a certain anxiety in the face of this absence of anxiety which is the cause for dryness in all seasons. To be more lenient, I will say that there is not enough anxiety, not enough question marks.

In a country such as Tunisia, where the heavens and ocean are magnificent, history is full of trials, and young people are filled with dreams, literary and artistic works should break all barriers, large and small, flood the bookstore windows, and be of the utmost importance to young and old. What can the State do? Fling the windows wide open, encourage the blossoming of talent, and allow young people to be on stage, to be seen on television and heard on the radio.

Books and magazines are expensive, you will say. I know a little about this. And it is true for books as well as films and any other artistic creation in general. I can assure you that the cultural question will be one of our priorities.

Mass culture? And how!

It is a sacred right for the people. The government, everyone recognizes it, has done a lot in this area especially since 1961. Cultural centers with their various activities have multiplied rapidly throughout the Republic. This is only one example. But there is still a lot to be done. There is especially a need for reform. One needs to find organizers, stimulate imagination, talent and especially protect cultured men from the bureaucrats of the culture.

Wherever there is a concentration of Tunisians, in new cities, in popular towns--especially--as well as in the business world, everywhere there is

a need for a cultural infra-structure worthy of its name. An infra-structure that will be able to avoid in our cities, in our countryside, these "dead periods," this emptiness, the lack of leisure activities, the soullessness in dormitory cities, inhuman cities suited to encourage dullness, weariness and eventually delinquency.

This is why we have opted for a live, daring avant-garde cultural policy. In one word, creative.

It is in this sense that one must understand the bourguibian development plan for a mass culture that would, of course, not be reserved just for the elite, but which will not allow insignificance, mediocrity, banality. Culture must not be the poor relative. Tunisian culture should measure up to the Tunisian genius.

The Government true to itself and to the options of the country, following the directives of the Supreme Fighter, will not fail to encourage a wholesome atmosphere favorable to creation. It will continue with force and determination to help creative individuals both materially and especially morally. The administration, and in particular the local communities must strongly encourage the construction of cultural centers, and especially their judicious use.

But it is up to the creative individuals themselves, whether they are writers, artists, film directors, producers or architects, to show initiative, imagination, creativity and audacity.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, you will be undertaking in the near future an official visit to Algeria. What can the Tunisian people expect from this visit, on the bilateral level but also on the Maghrebian level?

[Answer] I am going to Algeria. I will convey the fraternal salutations of President Bourguiba and of the Tunisian people to President Benjedid and to my counterpart and brother Si Abdelghani. I am convinced that the conversations in Algiers will be followed by concrete steps towards a more profitable cooperation of continued contacts.

All that I can say for now is that there is much to be done and that the Tunisians and Algerians will accomplish it with conviction and optimism, so that there might be more than mere commercial transfers between us: an exchange of experiences, ideas, related visions, a sustained collaboration, an accomplishment that can measure up to our aspirations.

What a Tunisian can expect, what he has the right to expect from exchanges with a fraternal country is first of all a continuous improvement of fraternal relationships, a daily reinforcement of relations that can weave real bonds of neighborliness. Thus, more contacts, friendship, fraternity.

Moreover, it is normal and legitimate for Tunisians and Algerians to be individually interested in the official aspect of the relations between

the two countries. To ascertain this, one only needs to note the quality of human contacts on both sides of the border and the number of Algerians that spend their vacation in our country.

Now, frankly speaking, the citizen is interested in the economic, cultural and commercial relations that could be reexamined, to measure up to the fraternal relations that bind the two countries.

At the level of political relations, what we are hoping for, what our citizens are hoping for are more and more contacts between us, more and more working together on bilateral issues of course, but also on every aspect of the geopolitical zone that is ours.

And it seems at least desirable that there be more coordination and working together within the framework of the North-South dialog for example, in our relations with the European community, or even in the defense of the just causes in which Tunisia and Algeria believe.

Your mentioning the Maghreb was good. Tunisia, who has firmly believed in the Maghrebian ideal, has always insisted that the reinforcement of its relations with brother countries and neighbors be always done within this Maghrebian perspective, in the direction of all our aspirations for a unified Arab-Maghreb.

The Maghreb, tomorrow, could be this economic and cultural construction, this considerable potential, this force in which patriotic generations firmly believe.

The Maghreb, today, and we cannot hide it, is still somewhat covered with fog. This is a real concern for us and we can only hope that these clouds rapidly disappear. Maybe the solution to the problems that appear difficult now lies in a dialog that could have as framework the Maghreb. And we are ready if necessary to work towards such a solution.

9592
CSO: 4400

INFORMATION MINISTER REPORTS ON COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 19 Sep 80 pp 1,5

[Text] The Council of Ministers held its weekly meeting yesterday morning, Thursday, 18 September 1980, at the Government Palace in the Kasbah with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali presiding.

At the end of the meeting, Minister of Information and Culture Fouad Mbazaa made the following statement:

As proposed by the minister of information and culture, the council adopted a draft bill authorizing Tunisia to sign the Hague Convention for the protection of cultural property in the event of an armed conflict.

The aim of that international convention is to strengthen the protection of cultural property in danger of being damaged and destroyed. It stipulates in particular that in the event of an armed conflict the occupation authority must abstain from any action to directly or indirectly damage cultural property.

In 1974, Tunisia signed the international convention for the protection of the world's cultural and natural heritage.

Ratification of the UNIDO Charter

Next, the council adopted a draft bill ratifying the charter of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) signed by Tunisia's representative on 8 April 1979 in Vienna.

By virtue of this charter, the organization becomes a specialized agency of the United Nations family like UNESCO, FAO or WHO. But UNIDO is particularly important because it is the first UN specialized agency whose aim is to help establish a new international economic order by promoting and accelerating the industrialization of developing countries.

Increase Capital for the Company for the Study and Development of Sousse-Nord

Based on a report presented by the minister of national economy, the council adopted a draft bill authorizing the state to subscribe 500,000 dinars in cash to the capital growth of the Company for the Study and Development of Sousse-Nord.

The purpose of this increase of capital is to enable the said company to comply with the financing regulations in the tourist sector and to start building the second phase of the Sousse-Nord tourist complex.

The volume of investments which the company will be making in coming years amounts to 32.2 million dinars.

Next, the minister of plan and finance presented a report on the implementation of the budget and the state of the public treasury.

The report shows a growth pattern in government returns, a normal rate of operational expenses and a relatively low rate of expenditures for basic capital projects.

Commenting on that report, the prime minister noted the satisfactory state of the public treasury and the improvement of tax receipts. He recommended to step up work in projects and to complete the construction of civilian buildings and housing units on schedule to help improve the living conditions of the citizens and to create jobs.

Economic Cooperation With Arab Countries

Next, the minister of plan and finance reported on the meeting of the 29th Ordinary Session of the Arab Economic and Social Council which was recently held in Tunis.

The Pan-Arab organization examined in succession: a general outline plan for an Arab economic strategy, a proposal of a standardized agreement concerning investments of Arab capital in Arab countries and, finally, a proposal for an agreement to facilitate and develop trade exchanges between Arab countries.

The minister told the council about the contacts and talks which he had with his Arab counterparts outside the meeting and which dealt, in particular with the creation of joint financial institutions where Tunisia will be a partner of other Arab countries as is the case in the Tunisian-Kuwaiti Bank the creation of which was announced a few days ago.

The minister also told the council that a conference on Arab investments will be held in Tunis this coming 27 October.

The prime minister expressed his satisfaction at the creation of joint banks grouping Tunisia and fraternal Arab countries. He noted that these institutions will offer new possibilities of financing various Tunisian projects in the industrial, agricultural and tourist sectors. These financial facilities will lessen the burden of the state in that sphere and will bring added stimulus to the growth of the national economy.

8796
CSO: 4400

DECENTRALIZATION SEEN AS NEW STIMULUS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] Lately, the policy of industrial decentralization has been substantiated by recent decisions to relocate the administrative offices of industrial and other units in the regions where they have their production plants. This is how a company such as the Gafsa phosphate company has relocated its offices in the capital of that province.

The ground had been prepared by legislation introduced several years ago to regulate the creation of specialized agencies such as the AFI [expansion unknown], the API [expansion unknown] and the FROPRODI [expansion unknown] and the creation of the rural development program in the agricultural sphere.

The main purpose of the economic and administrative decentralization is to make every region in the country enjoy the advantages of the development action initiated several years ago but which, so far, have not been adequately apportioned on a regional level. The regional unbalance is, indeed, a reality and a matter of concern. Some parts of the country, particularly the hinterland areas (such as the frontier provinces), have yet to reach the level of development attained by the coastal regions.

It so happens that one of the objectives of the decentralization is to close the gap and reduce the disparities between the various regions of the country and this goal can only be achieved by means of an effective and general administrative decentralization. The decentralization must be carried out at the administrative level as well as at the economic level. It is by delegating greater power to the regional authorities, and by promoting the enterprises of the interior through incentives, that the production apparatus can be decentralized. Right now, the industrial plants are concentrated around the capital city and around some big coastal towns. A well-planned decentralization will ease the congestion around the capital city which attracts and monopolizes a large portion of the production apparatus. This attraction is also explained by the advantages that Tunis offers being near the ports and airports and having a developed and dense network of communications which links

Tunis to the interior. To this must be added the fact that most of the administration is concentrated in Tunis while the regions lack decentralized authorities who are capable of making the necessary decisions. In fact, it is not unusual to see local contractors having to come to Tunis to solve problems of a purely administrative nature.

This situation, now gradually becoming more exceptional, is one of the many problems curtailing the decentralization of industry. An additional problem is the fact that in some regions the network of roads has not been developed which creates many difficulties for would-be developers who are attracted by the substantial incentives offered by measures encouraging decentralization.

It is obvious that decentralization does not mean an extreme dispersion of the production apparatus. Decentralization is really necessary but it must be economically feasible. The creation of regional industrial poles, such as Gabes with its chemical industrial plants, Sousse with its electrical engineering factories, Bizerte with its refinery and steel works, and so on, are bound to stimulate the entire surrounding region through the element of attraction that it will inject into the economy of the region concerned. It is a fact that the creation of any industrial plant encourages the creation of subsidiary and subcontracting units. A certain plant, for instance, will promote the creation of a small subcontracting packaging unit or the creation of service firms (such as cleaning firms). In addition to this, there is the pulling effect of decentralization on the commercial activity of the region. This pulling effect of decentralization is important and can have a big impact on the economy of the region and, therefore, on the economy of the entire country.

As far as jobs are concerned, the decentralization will create jobs at the regional level and will contribute to reduce the volume of the rural exodus which affects not only Tunis but also other large cities in the country, cities which are constant poles of attraction for the rural population.

8796
CSO: 4400

PROTOCOLS ALLOW TUNISIA GOVERNMENT CREDITS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 19 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] The Tunisian-French Joint Commission for Economic and Financial Cooperation ended its work yesterday afternoon. The outcome of the meetings was the signing of financial protocols allowing Tunisia to receive government credits under favorable conditions and guaranteed credits (COFACE) [French Insurance Company for Foreign Trade] to a total amount of over 50 million Tunisian dinars assigned to finance investment programs in conformity with the objectives of Tunisia's development plan, such as industrial projects, aid programs, lines of credit to finance small and medium-sized businesses and to promote small and medium-sized agricultural businesses.

This last activity falls within the framework of the new guidelines in Tunisian-French cooperation agreed by the two governments in the course of talks held in Tunis during the recent visits of Minister of Foreign Trade Jean Francois Deniau and Foreign Affairs Minister Jean Francois-Poncet.

After the financial agreements were signed, Ambassador Ahmed Ben Arfa, director general for cooperation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and chairman of the Tunisian delegation, made a speech in which he expressed satisfaction at the spirit of friendship and understanding that presides over the new guidelines in Tunisian-French cooperation which we wish to be more consistent and exemplary, he said.

Referring to the aid in food supplies, Ben Arfa noted that the 1980 quota of 24,000 tons of wheat had been delivered to Tunisia in full and he hoped that the same will happen next year.

For his part, Michel Condessus, head of the French delegation, said that the negotiations had been constructive: "It is with the same determination and in the same spirit that we are going to work towards those new guidelines in Tunisian-French cooperation," he noted.

Let us point out that the French delegation left Tunis yesterday evening.

8796
CSO: 4400

RA'S AL-KHAYMAH RULER COMMENTS ON IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT

NC021159 Doha QNA in Arabic 1040 GMT 2 Oct 80

[Excerpts] Abu Dhabi, 2 Oct (QNA)--Shaykh Saqr ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi, ruler of Ra's al-Khaymah emirate in the UAE, has said that the discussion of the question of the three islands, which Iran is occupying, is the responsibility of the UAE and not of Ra's al-Khaymah. He stressed that any contacts taking place with Iran in this respect are the concern of the UAE.

Shaykh Saqr al-Qasimi revealed that he had contacts with Iranian religious leader Imam Aytollah Khomeyni at which he obtained his agreement on reaching an understanding concerning the three Arab Gulf islands--Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa--which Iran occupied in 1971.

These statements by Shaykh Saqr were published today in the Abu Dhabi newspaper AL-FAJR, as well as in the British newspaper THE FINANCIAL TIMES. He called for mutual respect among the states in the area and nonaggression as two conditions for coexistence in the Gulf area.

On his views on the present war between Iraq and Iran, he said: Our views are summed up in that Iraq is claiming its rights. Therefore, an understanding must be reached for a solution; namely, for Iraq to achieve its right in order to prevent a repetition of what happened when Iran expelled the people of Ra's al-Khaymah from Lesser Tunb, one of the three islands

Asked whether he would assist Iraq in restoring these islands to Arab hands, Shaykh Saqr said: When the Iranian revolution broke out we hoped it would eliminate this injustice which took place during the shah's era. But, when responsibilities change hands and the responsible man strays along his course, oppression becomes harmful to both sides. We condemn and denounce this.

Asked whether he believes that the states in the area would take part in the Iraqi-Iranian war, Shaykh Saqr said that the states in the area do not want the war but they would not surrender to anyone. The states in the area desire peace, we have no one to confront. He said: Our area is the land of peace as long as its leaders called for peace. This is evident in President Saddam Husayn's call for peace while he is engaged in the war. How about those who did not enter the war?

CSO: 4802

EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR

GF281213 Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 24 Sep 80 P 1

[Editorial: "With Justice Against the Third Party"]

[Excerpts] Our stand in support of the Arabs in regaining every inch of their soil is unquestionable and based on principles. Our land was usurped 10 years ago, when the steel heel of the tyrannical shah trod with ostentation and pride, on our rights in the three islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb. At the same time, he deleted Shatt al-Arab from the Iraqi map. The purpose of this war must be limited right from the start by preventing the armed struggle from excedding its assigned objectives. It is a war into which we were driven by necessity to seek a remedy for an old error. Therefore, it must not be turned into a continuing epidemic.

For both the Arab and Islamic worlds, the Iranian revolution was a new victory that heralded the triumph of man's will against the gigantic powers that are aided by international aggression.

For the Arab and Muslim, its nobility was manifested in the breaking of ties between Muslim Iran and Begin's Israel, when the Palestinian flag replaced the Israeli flag, and when the 40 million Iranians replaced the 40 million Egyptians in the confrontation front after the latter were driven out of this front by force. This was God's compensation for those who were led astray by the submissive leadership. We remember this well. We will not forget that the atmosphere is clear for reconciliation and the solution of land disputes in view of Muslim brotherhood. But this possibility has been eliminated by the work of someone who widened the gap between the two sides and planted mines among their good intentions.

There is a third party benefitting from the events. This fact makes us more determined than ever to limit the war to regaining land usurped by the defunct regime, which was hostile to both peoples.

The United States and particularly Israel cannot conceal their joy at this struggle. They have begun to count the booty and deduct the number of victims and planes from the remaining power they have to face.

What is troubling is that the longer the war lasts, the further it strays from its assigned objectives, which must not be ignored. This action defers a more effective and grander action. Our common enemy is getting stronger through our weakness resulting from our tragic fighting.

We didn't want this war to erupt, but we knew that old accounts needed settling. We knew many parties wanted to fuel this war and are still trying to escalate and intensify it. Therefore, we must be wiser, stronger and bolder to make it a beginning, not an end, and to turn it in our favor. We must try to solve it promptly in the interest of avoding another inevitable battle.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

RATIFICATION DOCUMENT--After reviewing the Cultural agreement between the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), and the People's Republic of China (PRC), dated 23 April 80, the Protocol on Cultural Cooperation between the YAR Ministry of Information and Culture and the Ministry of Culture of the PRC, dated 23 April 80, and the documents pertaining to all the constitutional procedures necessary for the approval of these documents by the Executive and the Legislative authorities according to the YAR Constitution, we have issued Republican decree No 18 of 1980 approving the aforesaid agreement and Protocol. Based on the mutual trust between the parties to this agreement, and our total conviction of the beneficial results, and the cooperation resulting from the entry into force of this agreement, we declare our approval and our final ratification of the aforesaid agreement, and our respect of all its provisions. According to the above we append our signature to this document next to the official seal of the state in witness thereof. Registered in the Presidential headquarters 22 Sep 80 Colonel Ali Abdallah Salih President of the Republic-Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces. [Text] [San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 23 Sep 80 p 2]

CSO: 4802 END

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PAPER DEPLORES IRAQ-IRAN WAR, CLAIMS ONLY ISRAEL WILL BENEFIT

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24 Sep 80 p 1

[Editorial: "An Armed Conflict Which Can Only Weaken Arabs and Muslims"]

[Text] Algiers (APS [Algerian Press Service])--It is with profound sadness and growing anxiety that the Algerian people and all Arab and Muslim peoples as a whole are reading daily about the bloody--and increasingly serious--confrontations between Iraq and Iran. How could one not be sad, how could one not be anxious at the sight of two neighbor and brother countries waging murderous battles against each other? Battles which can only weaken Arabs and Muslims just as they rejoice and strengthen their declared enemies, imperialists and Zionists in the first place...

In truth, it is also with some perplexity that our peoples are watching this drama, and they are wondering about the consequences of such a conflict at such a time. Until the past few weeks, in fact, the reality of the Arab and Muslim world was characterized by two essential facts: on the one hand, imperialism and its advanced bastion, Israel, were becoming more virulent and aggressive and--thanks to the complicity of the Cairo regime--were increasing their oppression of the Palestinian people, and they had consummated the worst provocation, the pure and simple annexation of the sacred city of El Qods. On the other hand and above all, a number of factors had greatly contributed to closing the ranks of Arab and Muslim peoples, to reinforcing considerably their power and to giving an indication that they could hope to oppose victoriously the attacks of their enemies, in particular the arrogant challenge of the Zionists.

But suddenly there arose this fratricide war between Baghdad and Tehran. Who could benefit from it, but Tel Aviv?

Press agencies mention border disputes.

The essential fact today is that Israel has challenged the whole Muslim world at El Qods, it is the declared intention of Zionists to perpetuate and consolidate their brutal occupation of Arab land. This, to an Arab and to a Muslim, is the essential fact. The rest is and should be only accessory.

Algeria, the Algerian people, want to believe that wisdom will prevail, that disputes will be resolved, as they should, through peaceful talks, through solutions discussed between brothers, in an atmosphere of sincerity and frankness. This is certainly fervently hoped for by all Arab and Muslim peoples who, in these gloomy days, are worried about, and revolted by a conflict in which they instinctively know that, in the end, they will be the only losers. Arab emancipation and the affirmation of Islam were contemplating a propitious road ahead of them. Who, facing hundreds of millions of Arabs and Muslims, would wish to put these in question again because of an "accident along the road?"

9294
CSO:4400

REVIVAL OF COOPERATION BETWEEN ALGERIA, MAURITANIA

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 21 Sep 80 p 3

[Article: "Revival of Algerian-Mauritanian Cooperation. A Large Algerian Delegation Goes to Nouakchott"]

[Text] Algiers (APS [Algerian Press Agency]--Mr Djelloul Bakhti Nemmiche, member of the central committee and minister for Veterans' Affairs, left Algiers yesterday morning, at the head of a large delegation; he is chairman of the Algerian delegation to the joint Algerian-Mauritanian committee.

Prior to his departure, Mr Nemmiche underlined that this meeting "is not an ordinary meeting, but represents a revival of the cooperation between the two countries, who are friends and neighbors."

He stressed that the questions discussed in Nouakchott will include the finalization of several projects and the beginning of their execution in the near future. Among others, these include, the Nouadhibou oil refinery, the Nouakchott sugar refinery, and the revival of the joint fishing company which had ceased its activities after Mokhtar Ould Daddah had become involved in the Western Sahara conflict.

The joint committee will also examine an agreement on mining and geological exploration: Mauritania intends to create an office specializing in this field, with the participation of Algerian technical personnel.

Cooperation also includes job-training, public health and education.

The minister of Veterans' Affairs specified that all projects are at an advanced stage of their preparation. "Our visit to Nouakchott," he said, "corresponds to their implementation." It should be stressed that normalization of the cooperation between the two countries started last November, when the Algiers-Nouakchott airline was reopened.

9294
CSO:4400

SEVEN RUSSIAN GENERALS REPORTED KILLED IN AFGHAN FIGHTING

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 5 Aug 80 pp 3, 6

[Article: "Seven Russian Generals and 39 Soldiers Killed by Afghan Mujahidin; One Tank and Two Armored Vehicles Destroyed in an Attack on Kandahar's Military Complex; Two Helicopters Downed in Jalalabad"]

[Text] Kabul, 4 August (PPI/Radio Report)--According to the latest news from Afghanistan, fierce battles were fought between the freedom fighters and the army of the Karmal government in Balakh Province. According to Radio Kabul, the Mujahidin used knives, swords and other such weapons in these skirmishes. The activities of the Mujahidin have increased in all Afghanistan, and they are attacking army caravans, remote military cantonments, and communication stations. The Mujahidin attacked a military training school in Kandahar and killed 39 soldiers there. They also destroyed one tank, two armored vehicles, two jeeps and a number of other army vehicles.

According to some sources, seven Russian generals have so far been killed in Afghanistan. The Russian officials are very concerned about this. They have begun to think that their involvement in Afghanistan will be as costly as the American involvement in Vietnam. The Mujahidin are still very active in Jalalabad, even after the increase in the Russian Army stationed there. The Mujahidin attacked the airfield in Jalalabad and destroyed one tank and two helicopters. The Russian soldiers are forced to erect fortifications at various points on roads to fight off the Mujahidin.

According to the BBC, a high ranking officer of the Russian intelligence agency was killed outside his residence in Kabul. The BBC added that this news was received a week ago, and has been confirmed by a source found to be highly reliable in the past. The russian officer was a brigadier and was charged with all intelligence activities in the border area adjoining Pakistan. He was responsible for recruiting agents from among the tribes in those provinces where anti-Karmal activities are heavy.

The same sources also report that the Russian Army spent 10 days to crush the rebellion in the 14th Armored Afghan Battalion. This revolt was caused when attempts were made to appoint a member of Parcham party as officer of this unit.

The government has decided to recruit teachers to increase the number of troops. Last night, Kabul Radio announced that all teachers were required to join the army.

7997
CSO: 4203

MUJAHIDIN KILL NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF KHALQ FACTION

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 13 Aug 80 pp 3, 14

[Article: "Rebellion by Babrak Karmal Soldiers Feared by Russian Army; Mujahidin Kill Dozens of Khalq Party Members; Successful Attacks at Various Places; Afghan Children Still Being Brainwashed, Tortured Until Oath of Allegiance Is Taken"]

[Text] New Delhi, (APP/PPI/UPI/APA/Radio Report)--Afghan Mujahidin attacked Pul-I-(Sakai) and killed many members of the Khalq faction. The Mujahidin attacked a bus carrying members of the Khalq faction party and killed many communists. According to news arriving from Kabul, two high officials of the Communist Party were killed in Sarubi. There was bitter fighting between the Khalq and Parcham factions in Sarubi, resulting in the death of two Afghan officers and two Russian soldiers. The Mujahidin attacked and defeated an Afghan company of soldiers in Ruday District of Mangarhar Province. They also destroyed stores owned by Khalq faction members. The Mujahidin killed five members of Khalq in (Nadir Shah Kot). The Mujahidin killed seven Russians and captured six machineguns in (Khogiani) District. They also destroyed the residence of the deputy commissioner and other officers of the Khalq faction.

A former high official of the Afghanistan government has accused the present puppet government of abusing and brainwashing Afghan children. This officer said that children are tortured until they take the oath of allegiance to the present government.

According to Radio Kabul, at least 15 Mujahidin were killed in a bloody battle between the government army and the Mujahidin in Herat. Government forces claim that they have captured 35 soldiers along with their arms and ammunition. It should be remembered that a number of battles have been taking place in the Herat area.

According to the BBC, the Russian Army is worried about a rebellion by Karmal government troops. The Voice of Germany reports that according

to some diplomatic sources a great battle was fought between the Russian Army and the rebellious Karmal government army in Ghazni. A large number of soldiers were killed. According to Moscow Radio, the Mujahidin have captured Falzabad, the main city in Badakhshan. Moscow Radio further announced that Russian and Karmal troops have recaptured Dakhan District from the Mujahidin. The radio further said that the Mujahidin have devastated (Kandaz), Falzabad, and (Shahra Parelon).

7997
CSO: 4203

DELEGATE COMMENTS ON UNESCO SESSION IN BELGRADE

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 22 Sep 80 p 12

[Text] "The UNESCO general conference, "Mr Abdelatif Rahal stated, is always somewhat of a solemn occasion because, contrary to UN-level meetings, it is an intergovernmental conference which is held every other year and which, therefore, can maintain an historical perspective in assessing its past action and in planning it for the next two years. This year, however, the UNESCO general conference has some special characteristics: first, it is not held at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris, but in a special environment characterized by the nonalined policy of Yugoslavia and, probably, by intensified activity of nonalined countries within this conference. This conference is also special in that, for the first and probably the only time, it will plan UNESCO action for the next three years, not just for two. This, only because UNESCO is synchronizing its action with that of other UN agencies which have a two-year program starting on odd years."

"Another special characteristic of this conference," the ambassador added, is that it will elect the UNESCO general director. In this respect, I can tell you that it now seems assured that Mr Ahmadou Mahtar M'Bow will be reelected to his present position. Mr M'Bow, of course, can count on the support of all Third-World countries who see in him a son of the Third-World, a man sensitive to Third-World peoples' problems and who has been actively engaged in promoting Third-World development, both cultural and scientific."

The permanent delegate to the UNESCO then indicated the importance of this conference in view of the present international situation.

"It may not be necessary," he said, "to stress that this UNESCO conference occurs at a time when the international scene happens to be somewhat confused because of the tensions which have appeared almost everywhere in the world. These tensions, which it is not necessary to enumerate, affect developed countries as well as Third-World countries. They even affect the super-powers. These tensions shall not fail to cast a shadow on the proceedings of this conference and on the climate in which these proceedings

will take place. As far as we are concerned, that is as Algerians, we, of course, associate ourselves with the anxiety felt by all Third-World countries concerning the manifest failure of their attempts at getting themselves out of their present underdevelopment. The North-South dialogue, which had raised many hopes, has unfortunately not led to any results, and the last United Nations' session, which was devoted to this problem, has confirmed our worst fears."

Still speaking of the present international situation, the ambassador added:

"We are also directly concerned by the threats which are now hanging over the Middle-East situation. Israel's aggressive policy increases the threats which have never ceased to hang on this area, and it might lead to tragic developments. These elements, to mention only these, cannot fail to be reflected in the proceedings of the UNESCO conference, both with respect to aspects of development and with respect to the problems concerning El-Qods and the cultural situation in the occupied territories. These are very important questions which have been placed on the agenda of the general conference, and on which the delegations of Arab countries will have to agree on a joint action in the commissions which will have to deal with these problems. The Algerian delegation, chaired by Mr Bessaieh, member of the Central Committee and minister of Information and Culture, will, of course, add its contribution to this joint action, both within the Arab group and within the African group, to which it also belongs, and with nonalined countries and countries of the group of the 77.

"Within its own field of action," the Algerian ambassador went on, "the UNESCO, this year, will have to give special attention to the problems of science and technology. Former general conferences had already stressed the close connection which must exist between the development of Third-World countries and their access to science and technology under favorable conditions which should be strenghtened from year to year. The general conference which is about to open shall have to take into consideration the results of the conference organized by the United Nations in Vienna in September 1979, which had been devoted precisely to science and technology in the service of development. The general conference shall have to examine the results of this conference and to study the means which UNESCO has at its disposal to ensure that implementation of the resolutions adopted is started; in this connection, the draft UNESCO program provides for a number of large projects intended to cover the various aspects of the problem of science and technology and their utilization to promote development in the Third-World."

Concerning another major object of the conference--the problem of communication and information-- Mr Rahal recalled that "this is not the first time that UNESCO has dealt with this problem. Discussions on this subject have led to increasingly clear principles, increasingly precise definitions,

and lines of action which would create an international order for communications, with more justice, objectivity and permeability, as far as information is concerned, between all members of the international community. This year, the general conference will have at its disposal, for its deliberations, an important report prepared by a commission chaired by Mr Mac Bride, which had been appointed to study for UNESCO the various aspects of the wide-ranging problem of communication. In this domain, as in the domain of economic development, two points of view are opposing each other more or less virulently: that of Third World countries and that of developed countries. The opposition of these points of view should not result in a confrontation during the discussions. This is the wish of Third-World delegations who, during the general conference, shall strive to better define their own objectives and to formulate demands which may be acceptable to developed countries."

The Algerian ambassador felt that it was important to add that, beyond these major themes, "the general conference provides an occasion for multiple contacts between officials of various countries, in the fields of culture, science and education." "The possibility of such contacts and discussions between officials," he thought, "is not the least benefit to be derived from a meeting as important as this one."

In conclusions, the Algerian permanent delegate to the UNESCO indicated that, this year again, Algeria shall make its contribution to the cultural events by organizing an Algerian-culture day within the context of the Arab-culture days which will be organized in Belgrade.

9294
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IRAQ ALLEGEDLY WANTS TO BECOME 'GENDARME OF THE GULF'

Paris LE FIGARO in French 27 Sep 80 pp 62-64

[Article by Robert Lacontre: "Iran-Iraq: Sadam Hussein's Slap at Khomeyni"]

> [Text] Where will the surprise offensive mounted by the Iraqi army stop as it runs into the disorganized Iranian troops? This time, Sadam Hussein has decided to teach Khomeyni a lesson. Baghdad wants to become the "policeman in the Gulf" now in turn.

The children are no longer bathing in the Shatt el Arab, sitting on the backs of buffaloes. The tankers of all countries likewise have deserted this wide arm of the sea formed by the muddy waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. They now crowd off the ports of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. There are already more than 500 of them, waiting there. This is the biggest bottleneck in the Gulf where one tanker usually leaves every 6 minutes.

The battle has been raging for the past 10 days. The guns keep thundering endlessly. One can clearly hear the whistle of the shells and their dull explosions about 50 kilometers away, like a violent thunderstorm. This is particularly true at Kuwait which is very nearby and everybody is very worried because Baghdad has always had its eye on that part of the desert with the black gold in it. The artillery duel across the big river has replaced the chant of the women as they spread out the strands of lively-colored wool to dry on the flat roofs of the houses. The Iraqi fire is much stronger. They are using the Russian method. They put up an incessant carpet of artillery fire before sending the tanks and mounted infantry forward. Time and again, on both sides of this water frontier, a thatched cottage or a mosque will explode in a cloud of dust. The nomads have folded their tents and have taken their baggage to escape from the region on their camels.

The inferno is all around a little village by the name of Abul Khasil as it is burned by the sun. It is 33 degrees. It had been 51 degrees a week ago. There, the green-clad soldiers of Sadam Hussein concentrated more than 200 pieces of 155-mm artillery which without respite pound the town

opposite, Khorramshar, and Abadan (population 500,000), less than 20 kilometers from the eastern bank, the site of the world's biggest refinery. The Bassorah petrochemical center in turn is under fire from the Iranians. Bombs and rockets keep cutting down 20 million trees of this vast palm plantation. With a deafening roar, Soviet Migs and American Phantoms face each other in the sky. The Iraqi air force bombs Tehran. The Iranian air force bombs Baghdad. The characteristic neon signs of the Iraqi countryside no longer light up the night-time sky. The entire strip along the border is plunged in darkness, as are the big cities. Without light, Baghdad looks dark like a tunnel. Tehran is trembling with fear. The air is hot and humid and is full of petroleum, dust, and powder.

Suddenly the region has burst into flames. The first tanks filled to the top with precious liquid explode. Tracer bullets cut through the night with their high arcs of steel. Against the flashes from the explosions and the burning fires, the derricks and minarets rise with their phantom-like silhouettes like a scary color film.

In a downpour of war communiques, each of the two belligerents describes his victories without anybody being able exactly to verify what really goes on. The war of radio waves is in full swing. Yesterday, Radio Baghdad announced that Khomeyni was dead. Today, it says that the American hostages have been released. The Iranian radio declares that an incalculable number of enemy aircraft has been downed. In her exile, the Shabanu calls upon the people, who condemned her, to save her fatherland. According to certain rumors, the son of the Shah, Prince Reza Pahlevi is to be crowned emperor next month on the occasion of his 21st birthday.

The Iraqi Army--13 divisions strong, including half of them armored divisions, with 2,500 tanks and 300 combat aircraft--has seized the advantage over its adversary who has been totally disorganized for more than a year as a result of the Islamic revolution and the preachings of the fanatical ayatollah. It is known that more than half of the soldiers in the Iranian army, which until now was considered the strongest in this part of the world, simply vanished out in the field long before the lightning attack by its neighbor. The rest are today abandoning their divisions in full rout. The Iraqis have already broken through at three points. In the northeast, along the only road linking Iraq to Iran, at Qasr el Shirin, at Nafl i Shah, and Ilam. The attackers recovered 150 square kilometers of territory which they had been claiming and they are moving on toward Kermanshah. In the center, on the level of Susa, where Aeschylos had placed his tragedy "The Persians," heading toward Dizful. In the south, starting from the eastern part of the Shatt el Arab, which belongs to Iraq, the armored units are carrying out a pincer movement. One column is thrusting toward Susangere and Ahwaz. Another one, to all appearances, without encountering any resistance, has already encircled Abadan and is firing on Bandar Shahpur.

The lightning war mounted by Baghdad, which has surprised everybody, particularly the Russians and the Americans, has a quadruple objective:

(1) to administer to its centuries-old enemy a drubbing. We might say that this is a case of settling old accounts. And that also means its enemy of yesterday who supported the Kurdish revolt for 15 years. (2) To deliver a big slap to Khomeyni who has stirred up trouble among the Shiite population of Iraq, the majority in the country, whereas power is "in the hands of the Sunnites." (3) To wipe out the concessions made to the Shah, a few acres of land here and there and control over the east bank of the Shatt el Arab over its last 50 kilometers before it flows into the sea. (4) To assert its position henceforth as the guardian of the Gulf.

Revenge

The important thing for Sadam Hussein now is to move very fast, to take maximum advantage before the two super powers agree on forcing a ceasefire on him. In summary, history repeats itself. Iraq wanted to teach Iran a good lesson, just as China did recently with respect to Vietnam. It is no longer impossible that Baghdad might in this way seek to get rid of the "turban-wearing shah" who is running the risk of being overthrown by a military plot aimed at saving what can still be saved from the current religious chaos.

The "country between the two rivers," Mesopotamia, thus has taken its revenge upon the Persians, upon their constant raids, upon two centuries of occupation and oppression. Niniveh, today called Mossul, can now forget the affront inflicted by the Scythians who came down from the Turkish steppes and by the arrogant Medes of Iran. "Those from the west" finally have been able successfully to cross the border into the east, the same border of 1,200 kilometers which had been surveyed in 1639 by the ottoman Sultan Murad IV and his Turkish and Arab warriors after having disembowelled the Shah Abbas II in a fight to the finish. Closer to our time, the Algiers accord, 5 years ago, is now meaningless. Baghdad is taking back what it had yielded to the Shah-an-Shah so that he might stop supporting the "Peshmergas" of Kurdistan.

To top the whole thing off, it only remains for the Iraqis now to drive the Iranians out of the three islands which they occupied by force 8 years ago, in the Strait of Ormuz, called "Little Tomb" and "Big Tomb" islands which belong to the tiny Emirate of Ras el Kheimah and "Abu Mussa" which belongs to Sharjah. There are some reports about a column of tanks which is supposedly moving toward Bandar Abbas, right opposite Ras Mussandam, of the Sultanate of Oman. That might well be a useless and foolish run of 1,000 kilometers in a rocky desert where there is no road. These little islands are not even strategic. As a matter of fact, they are tiny and they are separated from each other by about 20 kilometers; besides, they are more than 100 kilometers from the strait. To that we might add on the other hand that, contrary to what is generally said, the Strait of Ormuz is not a choke point. It is wider than the Initial Channel, about 40 kilometers. It is essentially guarded by the American fleet and the French fleet.

The danger for the West is a double one: (1) the Iranian navy of Admiral Madani, governor of Khuzistan (Arabistan, according to Iraq where 3 million Sunnite Arabs live) is not in as much trouble as the army. It can still block the estuary of Shatt el Arab and prevent the exports of Iraqi black gold; (2) the complete breakdown of Iran would facilitate Soviet penetration toward the Persian Gulf, hence, the Arabian Gulf. Now, Sadam Hussein knows very well that it is not in his interest to have Iran break up into little pieces because the Russians would install themselves there in force and would then run the oil wells. Finally, this kind of neighborhood situation would be much more troublesome.

Who is that Iraqi who has set fire to the powder keg in an area that is sufficiently explosive anyway? Tall, strapping, with a Stalin-like mustache, cold, not to say glacial, often wearing a Kurdish turban, ostentatiously patting the cheeks of little girls before the cameras, a big Havana cigar constantly between his teeth, the Baghdad dictator distinguished himself in the struggle against the crazy Kassem who had overthrown the monarchy in a blood bath. Wounded, imprisoned, escaping, he then organized the party's secret service, and then the Ba'athist militia. In 1968, 1969, and 1970, already acting as the regime's "strongman," he triggered bloody purges. He discovered real or phony plots as a pretext for numerous executions. He gradually eliminated the rightists, the leftists, the communists, all of those who opposed his decisions. He expelled 25,000 Shiites from Iraq under shocking conditions. Repression was so bad that it is difficult today to figure out how the "partisans" of Khomeyni could rebel once again. "If that were the case," it is said in Baghdad, "there would be a third river in Iraq, a real river of blood." Everything is calm today at Nadjaf and Kerbala, the strongpoints of Iraqi Shiism where the remains of Hussein, brother of the martyred Imam Ali are kept and the son of Ali, who was treacherously slain by the Ommayad soldiers. Khomeyni lived in exile for 15 years at Nadjaf, before being expelled to please the Shah and before being received fondly by France.

Sadam Hussein, whose primary objective is his country's economic development, in recent times has moved closer to the West, not because of a sudden change in ideology, but because he has realized that he can no longer go to the USSR to get advanced technology. With the $18 billion per year which he gets from his oil wells, among other things at Zubair (France's second-ranking supplier after Saudi Arabia), he can really modernize his country and extricate his people from the Middle Ages. In reality he remains a Third-Worldist, a revolutionary and a progressive. Iraqi Ba'athism in the final analysis is very close to Marxism. Besides, Baghdad has the ambition of becoming a regional power.

However, his hands are tied by the USSR regarding his army and his air force. Only recently did he begin to try to diversify his armaments by going to France, Italy, and Spain. He signed a "friendship and cooperation treaty" with Moscow. He paid for the Russian tanks with gold ingots. He knows only too well that the Kremlin can put pressure upon him at any moment

by supplying him with spare parts in dribs and drabs or by utilizing the Iraqi Communist Party, the only really effective communist party in the Arab World, by assigning it some subversive missions, perhaps by stirring up the Kurds. He must therefore be very cautious with his "big protector." This is why he has sent his right-hand man, vice president Tarik Aziz, a Christian, to Moscow to test the reactions of the Russian oligarchs to his military adventures. We must not forget that Baghdad supported the Eritrean rebels against Sovietized Ethiopia but it withdrew its aid to Somalia after the latter let the Americans use the naval base at Berbera which had been built at the expense of the Soviet taxpayer. Today, Sadam Hussein very cautiously avoids taking sides with the Afghan Muslim patriots. His alliance with Moscow thus is not at all laid to rest.

And What About the Kurds?

There remains one vital problem for Iraq--the problem of the Kurds. The relative current tranquility of these mountain warriors certainly does not mean that they do not have to be watched very closely at all times. There are more than 10 million Kurds in three neighboring countries, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. There are 3 million Kurds in Iraq[1], including half in the autonomous zone. There are also 300,000 in Baghdad. For the past 15 years, these indomitable mountaineers have been fiercely fighting the government in Baghdad with the help of the shah. For the past 15 years, they formed a kind of "de facto" state along inaccessible slopes[2], under the direction of the big feudal leader Mustapha Barzani, the long-term leader of the national movement. The Iraqi armies have never been able to penetrate their strongholds. It took the shah to betray them and to turn off the flow of supplies before they would stop resisting. Barzani died last year in exile in the United States (he had lived in the USSR for 11 years). His remains were taken back to the country in a special aircraft. Thousands of warriors had come down from the heights to pay him their last homage. Today there is no indication whatsoever that the Kurds have definitely been subjugated.

Now the machine guns rake the mud huts in the villages, the fallow land, the artesian wells and the old bucket-chain operators who keep turning the wheel while grinning. The guns keep thundering constantly. The sand storm covers the irrigation canal, which it took many months to dig, in a matter of a few hours. The salt continues to rise up the underground water level, nibbling away at the few patches of green in the oases. The peasants are in hiding. Early in the morning, the village women, who do not wear any veils, the Iraqi women, go out looking for water which they carry very gracefully in huge jugs on their heads. An infernal uproar suddenly makes them dive into the basements of their huts. Hedge-hopping Migs race toward the sun in search of their targets. Higher up in the clouds, phantom aircraft, going in the opposite direction, are heading for the industrial cities. The guns are still roaring. This is war, real war.

FOOTNOTES

1. Iraq, 12 million inhabitants on an area almost equal to that of France; Iran, 34 million inhabitants, surface area three times greater than France.

2. The Iranian part of Kurdistan is more penetrable to regular armies.

5058
CSO: 4900

REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS TO GET ARMY TRAINING

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 31 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] The three-day seminar on coordination among the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran, held to discuss and survey the problems among the armed forces and other armed and unarmed revolutionary institutions, concluded its work by adopting a six-point resolution.

The resolution which has been made public in a statement release by the Political and Ideological Department of the Joint Staff of the Army makes the armed forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran duty-bound to undertake the military training required by the Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Revolutionary Committees and the 20-million strong army within the framework of its resources and to meet their needs for military hardware and ammunitions.

The text of the release by the Political and Ideological Department of the Joint Staff of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran reads as follows:

"In the name of God, the Clement and the Merciful:

"In compliance with the order of the Imam, a seminar was held at the Political and Ideological Department of the Joint Staff of the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran for ever more strengthening, harmonizing and solidifying the Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran and for bettering the relationships among the military-security organizations and the other revolutionary institutions and for guarding against irresponsible mutual interference of these organizations and institutions in one another's affairs. Presided over by Hojjatol-Eslam Eshraqi [Khomeyni's son-in-law], the special representative of the Imam, the seminar lasted three days and concluded its work at 2000 hours on Thursday, 6 Shahrivar [28 August] by issuing a resolution.

"Held in an atmosphere of complete sincerity and understanding, the seminar was attended by the Prime Minister, the Judge and Prosecutor of the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, the representative of the Vigilante Council of the Constitution, the representatives of the High Council of Judges, the General

appointed as Acting Chief of the Joint Staff of the Army, the commanders of three tripartite forces of the Army, the representatives of the Revolutionary Guards Corps and of the Central Revolutionary Committee, the chiefs of the security organizations, a number of the professors and the officials of the revolutionary institutions, and the representatives of the governmental organizations that were related to military and security issues. The participants discussed problems and solutions for various plans and arrived at a valuable conclusion which is summed up in a twelve-point resolution. The highlights and the most important points of the said resolution are as follows:

1. The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been charged with the duty to provide the military training required by the Revolutionary Guards Corps, the Revolutionary Committees and the 20-million [sic] strong army within the framework of its resources and in the event of war to provide these institutions with ammunition, food, lodging, transport, medical care and all the military requisites in their connection with the Ministry of Defense and the Army, such as weaponry, ammunitions, etc.;

2. The Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran is bound by the Constitution to participate in the reconstruction campaign as far as possible and insofar as its combat readiness is not impaired;

3. In order to prevent any manner of weakening of the armed forces, the mass media should observe the security interests of the Army and, when necessary, coordinate them with the Political and Ideological Department of the Army;

4. Consideration of cases of anti-revolution charges of the personnel of the armed forces shall be the jurisdiction of the Military Revolutionary Tribunals. Other institutions have absolutely no right to interfere in this matter. The summoning and detention of such personnel shall take place solely on a warrant by the Military Revolutionary Prosecutor issued in coordination with the commander of the unit concerned;

5. Purge is a natural process but it obviously should not do away with job security. The resolution stipulates that purge and its continuation is subject to the approval of the Islamic Consultative Assembly; and,

6. The military and security forces and the revolutionary institutions have been ordered to refrain from irresponsible interference in the affairs of one another.

At the conclusion of the resolution, Ayatollah Eshraqi was requested to supervise the follow-up of the enforcement of the provisions of the resolution.

9695
CSO: 4906

ISLAMIC CENTRAL BANKS PLAN COOPERATION

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 9 Sep 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] The third conference of the Chancellors of the Central Banks of the Islamic countries, held in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, concluded its work by issuing a resolution. The provisions of some of the articles of the said resolution shall be brought to the attention of our dear readers hereunder. These are: expansion of trade relations among the Islamic countries; making short-term and long-term economic facilities available for commercial activities; establishment of Islamic banks in conformity with the holy traditions of Islam; economic boycott of usurping Israel and supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization; and, donation of financial assistance to that Organization.

At the request of the Chancellor of the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the participants in the conference expressed their explicit opposition to the freeze of Iranian assets by the United States and demanded their immediate return to Iran.

The Resolution of the Third Meeting of the Chancellors of the Central Bank of the Islamic Countries

The resolution of the third meeting of the chancellors of the central banks of the Islamic countries, held in Riyadh, 1-2 September 1980 (equivalent to 21-22 Shavval of 1400 of the Lunar Hegira Calendar) was issued as follows:

1. With a view to the press report submitted by the Secretariat of the Islamic Conference regarding the enforcement of the decisions adopted in the second session of the said Conference held in Uganda last year, the participants assigned the Secretary of the Conference to follow up the matter and take action for the implementation of the adopted points through correspondence and contact with the officials of the member countries;

2. With a view to the contributions which may be made to the Islamic solidarity via transfer of private capital, it cannot be overemphasized that facilities must be provided for capital flow by means of bank guarantee and other incentives. On this score, the chancellors of the central banks of

the Islamic countries asked the Islamic Development Bank to extend an increasing amount of financial and technical assistance and credit facilities to the Islamic countries needing such help. Therefore, the secretariats of the Islamic Conference and of the Islamic Development Bank shall prepare a working paper on the measures to be taken for this purpose, which paper shall be submitted to the next conference of the chancellors of the central banks of the Islamic countries.

3. Two detailed reports were presented to the conference on the expansion of commercial relations among the Islamic countries. The two reports contained specific proposals on the expansion of trade cooperation and provision of short-term and long-term trade facilities. Subsequently it was decided that the secretariat of the Conference send the two reports to all the Islamic countries for their remarks and then to sum up the collected comments and suggestions with the help of experts in order to have a final set of suggestions sent for the consideration of the chancellors of the central banks of the Islamic countries in their fourth conference.

4. The chancellors of the central banks expressed their satisfaction at the willingness evidenced by the participants in the conference in observing the holy Islamic traditions in banking and in applying Islamic principles to their business. They further expressed their pleasure at the establishment of Islamic banks in member countries. The conference emphasized the need for supporting the organization of Islamic banks. With a view to the fact that these banks must conform stringently with the Islamic banking laws and take positive steps for protecting the deposits of the people and win the confidence of the investors, it was decided to make specific and clear-cut laws which completely corresponded with the holy traditions of Islam and were binding to the said banks. To realize this objective, adequate study must be made and a series of common laws and procedures must be devised. This important task was delegated to a special committee so that it might take steps for making and coordinating the said regulations with the cooperation and participation of the secretariat of the Islamic Conference and of the Islamic Development Bank.

5. The conference of the chancellors of the central banks of the Islamic countries agreed on the proposal of the representative of the PLO on generalizing the Arab economic ban on Israel and on stepping up Arab assistance to the PLO. Therefore, all the Islamic countries that have not yet put into effect the economic boycott of the racist and Zionist regime of Israel are expected to adopt such a policy. Also, projects should be implemented for equipping and marketing the agricultural and industrial products of Palestine in the Islamic countries. The chancellors of the central banks of the Islamic countries also decided to invite the financing and credit agencies of the Islamic countries to extend loans and financial credits to the PLO so that the said Organization may afford the high costs of the liberation struggle of the people of occupied Palestine.

6. The participants in the conference expressed their satisfaction at the decision of the chairman of the joint session of the delegations of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to invite the PLO to attend the sessions of these two agencies next year. However, they deplored and expressed their concern and resentment over the decision of the boards of directors of the said two organization change part of the rules and regulations governing these two organizations in order to prevent the admission of the Palistinians. The participants in the conference pointed out that the said two institutions had actually betrayed the confidence of the member countries in them by treading over their own principles and rules for serving the political ends of the superpowers. Therefore, the participants in the conference expressed their full confidence in Mr. Amir Jamal, the Finance Minister of Tanzania and Chairman of the Joint Session of the Delegations of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and endorsed his decision to invite the representatives of the PLO and at the same time called on the said two organizations to follow the existing rules and regulations as soon as possible and to listen to the chairman of the joint session and officially invite the Palestinians to participate in the meetings. With reference to the text of the proposed resolution which has now been sent by IMF and the World Bank for approval of their members--and which, once approved, would call for the modification of part of the internal regulations of the IMF as an effort to prevent the presence of the PLO--the participants in the conference suggested that all the member countries of the said two organizations--excluding the United States and South Africa--be asked not to respond to the proposed resolution at all, so that it would not gain quorum. Also those countries that have already voted for this resolution should be asked to withdraw their votes.

9695
CSO: 4906

ARAB LOBBY SEEKS KNESSET REPRESENTATION

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Aug 80 pp 19, 21

[Article by Ya'akov Havaquq: "A Voice Crying in the Jungle: Israel's Arabs Try for First Time in Years to Organize a True "Lobby" without Ties to Extremists or the Ruling Establishment; Opponents Regard It as Another Alignment Elections Maneuver"]

[Text] The ink has not yet dried on the document which records the six agreed on principles of the "Movement of Arab Citizens in Israel"--a new organization intended as a response group and better known as the "Arab Lobby"--and it has already been attacked from all sides. RAKAH (the communist party) regards the Arab-Israeli lobby as a new version of old bodies which belong to the Alignment, intended to gain power in the forthcoming elections, after all the old tradition ways have failed. Those close to the Likud see the lobby as an unnecessary body since Israel's Arabs have all the political and partisan structures for dealing with their needs. Like RAKAH, the Likud too sees the lobby as an arm of the Alignment for the elections. In the corridors of the Arab department in the Histadrut, where the idea of establishing an Arab lobby took shape, there is no meeting of the minds about it: when its activists were given the green light it was believed that the lobby will be linked to the Histadrut, yet the activists for their own reasons decided to promote it independently and at their own pace, which did not please the officialdom of the Histadrut. Nayif Musalha, secretary of the Workers Council-Integrating Generation, one of the most outspoken opponents of the lobby, sees it as a grave mistake and an act of self-justification on the part of the Arabs.

The Arab lobby, from its vantage point, follows closely the reactions to its initiative. The lobby activists know well the criticisms and the agruments which they consider a natural partisan reaction. "We are not worried about the criticism," one of the main activists says. "In the end, we believe, logic will prevail and the interests of Israel's Arabs will overcome the narrow political considerations of the various parties."

The birth of the Arab lobby, which is still in its infancy, as well as its goals and methods of operation are a subject of vocal controversy among Arab leaders.

Attorney Jamil Shalhuv, former member of Haifa's city council for the Alignment, considered the originator of the idea of an Arab Lobby, relates how the idea was born during the memorial service for Yigal Allon in Genosar. "I met Ibrahim Shvat of Nazareth and Muhammad Masarwa of Kara, and we discussed starting an Arab lobby like the Jewish lobby in the U.S. Muhammad Unis of the Histadrut who happened to hear us, raised the issue at the Arab department of the Histadrut, and when we got the green light, we started to work on it. We met in my office, we decided what the goals of the lobby will be, we set its principles, and we started a correspondence with various leaders in the Arab community, inviting them to join us."

Different political circles in the Arab community reject Shalhuv's claim that the initiative came from Arabs. Some say that Mr Binyamin Gur Aryeh, acting advisor for Arab affairs in the prime minister's office, decided to establish a moderate representative Arab body, which will speak for the silent majority of Israel's Arabs in light of the growing strength of RAKAH in the Arab community and its initiative in convening a "Congress of the Arab Masses and the Democratic Israeli Circles." RAKAH's show of strength, according to this view, caused the red light to go on in the advisor's office, which is why Gur Aryeh turned to the Arab department of the Histadrut (since Likud does not have influence among the Arabs), and asked for a response group to be organized and promised to finance it. Gur Aryeh categorically denies all this: "If I had wanted to form such a group I could have done without the help from the Histadrut. The initiative came from them, not from me. I don't tell the Arabs what to do, I am an advisor to the prime minister. All these arguments are unfounded."

Also Member of Knesset Nasr al-Din of the Herut party denies this view: "Anyone who says that the Likud has no influence among Arabs does not know what he is talking about. In a short time I plan to organize a convention of 200 Arab activists who support the Likud, which will be a conclusive answer to all the detractors."

Attorney Shalhuv, who was asked about the new initiative and its ties to the office of the prime minister's advisor for Arab affairs, said: "The initiative and the organizing was ours. We did not consult the advisor's office. We consulted the members, the Histadrut, the Arab section of the party we belong to (Labor and MAPAM)."

[Question] "Why was it necessary to establish an Arab lobby in Israel?"

[Answer] "There were several developments, especially the growing extremist tone on both Jewish and Arab sides, which were cause for concern for any Israeli citizen who cares," says Attorney Shalhuv. "Several demagogues on both sides have raised their voices, then raised their hands--which created a serious threat for Jewish-Arab coexistence. The Nazareth conference and its extremist proclamations; the friction in the universities in Jerusalem and Haifa among extremist students of both camps; the feeling of frustration and discrimination of Israel's Arabs; the reports of what was going on in the Arab community as was reported in the Israeli media--all of this created the impression of ferment and violence, an imminent blowup. The Jewish public

got the impression that the Arab citizen was not loyal to the state--which is untrue. I believe that Arab citizens have demonstrated their loyalty to the state, and if there were cases of betrayal, those were extreme, and there are some among Jews as well. We maintain that the silent majority of Israel's Arabs should be heard from, and, believe me, the overwhelming majority of the Arabs are loyal to the state of Israel and sees itself as an integral part of it."

[Question] "Who are the active leaders in the Arab lobby?"

[Answer] "At the moment the activists are Attorney Muhammad Masarwa of the village of Kara; Mahud Yunis of Arara; Ibrahim Shvat of Nazareth; Kassim Ziyad of Um al Fahm, and I. We maintain contact with 60-70 leaders who will participate in the activities of the lobby."

[Question] 'Are you in touch with Jewish leaders?"

[Answer] "Yes, the lobby is looking for ways to cooperate with Jews who wish to further coexistence and fraternity between the two nations. We intend to bring in Jewish representatives who are known for their modernate views like Yosi Sarid and Abba Eban of the Alignment and David Glass of MAFDAL."

[Question] "What are your principles?"

[Answer] "The principles of the Arab lobby focus now on six sections agreed by all members, which are: a) The Arab lobby is not a party or a list for the elections. Each member is free to run in any party or list of his choice. b) We wish to ally ourselves with the labor movement, with all it entails. We strive for the advancement of the Arab citizens and hope a dialogue with the labor movement will make it possible. c) The lobby will react to everything which happens in the state, especially in the area of Jewish-Arab relations and the problems of the Arab community. d) We will hold seminars, do research, discuss matters, and strive to persuade. We will not support demonstrations, strikes, or acts of violence. e) We will react against polarization on both sides; we will work toward normal relations, and toward fraternity and understanding between Jews and Arabs. f) Above all, we will contribute our share and struggle for a just peace based on mutual recognition between the two nations in Israel."

[Question] "What will be your method of operation?"

[Answer] "We will turn to the public in every way possible--through the media; we will hold seminars, inviting speakers from both camps to discuss and try to persuade. We will present not only the problems--which I believe are clear and well known--but will try to involve different bodies who will look for solutions to those problems. We will try to influence parties to change their platforms in regard to Israel's Arabs; we will work on educating the youth, in school and at home, in teaching civics, in promoting national pride for each nation, in uprooting hate, racism, and discrimination."

[Question] "Will you have a publication?"

[Answer] "We are not sure yet." "We may publish a weekly or a monthly, we haven't decided yet."

The Future Will Be Rosy

[Question] "People say that you are typical party hacks, that some of you ran for the Knesset and lost, and that all this lobby activity is meant to secure for yourselves a good place in the lists for the next Knesset."

[Answer] "We are indeed party members (Masarwa, Abasi and Shalhuv--members of Labor; Zayid, Yunis and Shvat--MAPAM members--Y.H.). True, some of us were on the Alignment list in past elections. But all this talk about the lobby being a jumping board for a seat in the Knesset is unfounded. I didn't tell anyone I want to be a member of Knesset. I am a party man, and if the party sees me as a candidate I will consider it and may even answer in the affirmative."

[Question] "Mr Shalhuv, if you want to solve the problems of the Arab citizens in Israel, why don't you establish a list for the Knesset and try to fight from within? Why insist on the nonpolitical nature of the lobby?"

[Answer] "I'll tell you why," Shalhuv says rocking in his easy chair. "If we go to the polls as an independent list we will get one, two, three mandates. No more. Another short-lived party. We strive for a non-politican lobby supported by many members of Knesset of all parties, something like the "Golan Heights Lobby" supported by more than 75 members of Knesset. Such a lobby is much more effective than a small faction in the Knesset."

[Question] "How will you finance your activities?"

[Answer] "Until now we have paid for everything ourselves. Truthfully, we did not have too many expenses. We met here, in my office, we sat and thought of our future moves. When we hold a convention the participants will contribute, according to their means. When the time comes we will hold a fundraising campaign, set up a budget committee and will have an ad hoc budget. We do not want the lobby to charge dues."

[Question] "The Arab lobby is meant to be a vehicle for the moderate Arabs. It is no secret you will have strong adversaries, like RAKAH, the Front, the Sons of the Village. How will you deal with them?"

[Answer] "No doubt RAKAH, the Front and the Sons of the Village consider us rivals. We know they will not welcome us. They will call us names and will try to thwart us. But we are sure that most of Israel's Arabs do not identify with those extremists. We can stop the deterioration of relations caused by the Sons of the Village and RAKAH."

[Question] "Still, RAKAH has a well oiled propaganda machine and a large budget. What will you have to offer?"

[Answer] "RAKAH's machine is good for RAKAH's purposes, but I believe that despite their machine and their money, they will not achieve their goals. Most of the voters do not support them. The majority supports the moderate positions, coexistence, fraternity, understanding." Shalhuv pauses, looking for the right words. "They bring up important issues, some of which are the same as the ones we bring up, but our solutions differ. They work through incitement and attack, we look for persuasion and dialogue."

Our short-statured interviewee sounds optimistic. As the conversation goes on he waxes more optimistic. He explains that the things he is talking about cannot happen overnight, but he believes that moderation and good sense will overcome extremism and violence. He envisions the two nations living together in harmony. "We have lived together for fifty years of wars and clashes in which tens of thousands of members of both nations lost their lives. War is not a solution; it will only aggravate the problem. Time has come to divert all the resources from war to construction and development, so that the land may finally yield milk and honey," he says in a whisper.

[Question] "What is your optimism due to?"

[Answer] "If anyone would have said three years ago that Sadat would come to Jerusalem or sign a peace treaty with Israel--he would have been considered crazy. I believe, that the future will be rosier. Jews and Arabs have things in common. We are of the same origin. We are both monotheistic. Once, the greatest Jewish philosophers, like Maimonides, wrote in Arabic. When you look for a basis for coexistence, you have to look to the past, to the time when Jews and Arabs lived together. We may disagree, but we must not let the disagreements create an abysmal gap of hate or violence." (After a moment of silence he continues) "I know that our road is not a bed of roses. We will have thorns and stumbling blocks, perhaps even a few fiascos. But we will pick ourselves up and go on, and hopefully achieve our goals. We have to do everything within our power so that what happened to us does not happen to our children. We have to insure a peaceful life, full of hope and happiness."

A Hidden Agenda

Shalhuv's optimism does not impress the opponents of the Arab lobby, who are strongly opposed to it. Member of Knesset Tufik Ziad of RAKAH, who is also mayor of Nazareth, sees the Arab lobby as an evasion of the problems which the Arabs suffer from. He considers the lobby the same dame with different makeup [as published]. "The lobbyists who are active in the new organization are the same people who have been through all the political motions in the past 30 years," he observes. "As for me, I see the lobby as a controlled, anti-communist body the purpose of which (as well as of the people behind it) is to work against the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality. They do not hide their purpose, which is nothing new. I believe the lobby is part of Labor and MAPAM, and all I can wish it is that it will not last long. Any new body which does not demand real and fundamental

change in the official Israeli policy toward the downtrodden and oppressed Palestinian people, is, in my opinion, short-lived," Tufik Ziad concludes.

A member of the Sons of the Village movement, whom we asked about the Arab lobby, said: "The activists who stand behind the lobby are traitors to the Arab-Palestinian cause. If they think that a fawning Arab lobby will solve our problems, they are wrong. They do not represent us, at most they represent themselves. Such a group will not make inroads in the Arab community, since the majority does not follow their principles. In reality, these people did not establish the lobby themselves, and they do not understand that they are being used as a fig leaf. We will wait and see what will happen to them after the festival of the media around them stops."

The question was asked: "Will your movement, the Sons of the Village, try to hamper them?"

To which he responded: "No comments. Time will tell."

Not only the radical camp in the form of RAKAH and the Sons of the Village opposes the Arab lobby. Also, the Arabists of the Zionist movements maintain that the Arab lobby is superfluous. Member of Knesset Nasr al-Din of Herut says: "The lobby in my opinion is a serious mistake. The Arabs should be integrated in the life of the state without ethnic or religious organizing. There is no need for organizing an Arab-Druse list, for example. We are all Israeli citizens. The whole lobby idea is political, backed by the Labor party, and the lobby activists are men with political ambitions." Member of Knesset Nasr al-Din does not think that the lobby threatens the Arab members of Knesset. "The lobby cannot hurt us. The members of Knesset are integrated in the Zionist movements because we were not elected by the Arab voters but by our parties." According to Nasr al-Din, the Arab lobby will eventually join the Labor party simply because it has no independent existence.

Nayif Masalha of Labor is strongly opposed to the move of his fellow Laborites. The idea of a lobby riles him because it presents a consensus on issues relative to official policy toward Israel's Arabs, which the Laborites cannot support. He thinks that the lobby activists present a self-justifying position, which he does not understand. "Whoever has something to say can say it through the existing political structure. There is no need for a new party to pre-party in the form of an Arab lobby." Masalha too does not consider the lobby long-lived, and he looks at it, in his words, realistically: "These activists do not hide their intention to be in the Knesset. They are members of Labor of MAPAM who look for a base when the time comes. This is legitimate, in itself, but I believe that they have to choose a framework, and they have already been pressured to do so. To me they are generals without a people, commanders without an army. They try to involve public figures and common folk, they are being pushed by heads of Arab departments and other bodies to serve as an alternative to people who are in office now. If you check the background of the lobby's activists you will see that there is food for thought. One of them, for example, was on the Alignment list in 69 and 73, but when he found out that he was not included in the 77 list he formed his own list with the Independent Liberal Party and the Citizens' Rights Movement (Mahmud Abasi--Y.H.). Listen, my

friend, these people have learned a good lesson in democracy from the Jews, and they know how to apply it." Nayif Masalha's conclusion is clear: "How can they get parties to change their platforms? How can they gain influence from the outside? Anyone who wants change can only do it from inside! These people try to walk among the raindrops without getting wet. They have personal weight, each one individually; they have good intentions, but their aim is transparent!"

The heads of the lobby, who follow the statements against them, are aware of questions which have not yet been answered. They recognize the fact that the massive attack against them has not yet started, and that there are difficult times ahead, a time of struggle with the most radical elements among Israel's Arabs. One of the lobby's supporters, who asked to remain anonymous, told us openly: "I think I made a mistake disclosing the idea to the media at such an early stage. The ground work should have been done quitely, secretly. We should have dealt with the more difficult questions and then gone public."

Jamil Shalhuv thinks that circumstances mandated the formation of the lobby at this time. He maintains that the Arab lobby is positive and vital, that its non-political and supra-political character will attract different people, Jews and Arabs, of different parties, with a common desire to work for the cause of Israel's Arabs. Shalhuv, looking to enumerate the serious problems of the Arab citizens, mentions the following: expropriation of lands, employment of graduates, education, jobs, social security law, citizenship law, absentees' property law, outline plans in villages and local councils, industrialization, image vis-a-vis the establishment, and more. He emphasizes that he is not concerned about the fate of the lobby, even in the face of radical political elements who wish to make political gains at the expense of hundreds of thousands frustrated Arab citizens.

At the end of the conversation, as I put down my pen, he starts a personal monologue: "I started my career in Israel, with Israel. I have a share in this state like anyone else. I consider the state a tree which I have helped to plant. I don't want anyone with fiendish intentions to harm this tree or let alone cut it down. The Bible says, "Love your neighbor as yourself." It does not say your Jewish neighbor or your Arab neighbor. This is my motto, love your neighbor as yourself, and anyone who does not threaten me, who wants to live with me in friendship and understanding and respect, is my good neighbor. I would like my Arab brothers in the state to feel as equals, have a feeling of constructive partnership and responsibility. The state of Israel today is built by Arabs, but, unfortunately, they do not feel they are building the state, they do not feel they are partners, part of the state. I would like to make a contribution to change the concept in both camps, in both nations who live side by side in one state. When I tell you such things each word is given differnt interpretations and I am accused of seeking power. In our present situation it is easy to be an extremist, to attack and defame. I know that if I defame I will attract the reporters. But if I work for understanding, friendship and safeguarding the rights of the Arab citizens, no one is impressed. Sensation seekers will only play up extremism, thus encouraging extremists and creating the impression that everyone is an extremist, which is untrue. Some day we will find out which is the right way, extremism, contempt, and violence, or moderation, mutual understanding, and coexistence."

9565
CSO: 4805

AGRICULTURAL EXPORT FALLING

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Aug 80 p 10

[Text] After several years of continuous growth, the agricultural export came to a halt and is now finding itself in a disquieting process of decline. During the export season of 1975-76 there still was an impressive growth of 45 percent; the year after the growth was only 29 percent. Another year passed and another drop to 22 percent, until we reached 1979-80 which just ended with a nominal growth of 6 to 7 percent only, which in real terms is even considered a decline. All this, inspite of the demand for our agricultural products and the good prices it obtains on markets.

In the summer meeting of the representatives of "Agresco" and the managers of its branches abroad, Reuben Iland, director general of the company, described this serious phenomenon, analyzed its reasons and determined that future plans must not be built on the "declining line" but rather on a new offensive. "If we withdraw from the market," he said, "our place will be filled by the competition;" a delegation of buyers from Europe who visited Israel towards the new export season also warned against such withdrawals. Moreover, the Israeli reality from the point of view of the considerable gap in the balance of payments of the country and the presence of many agricultural settlements in three regions of the country, whose main income stems from agricultural exports, reinforce the necessity to increase exports.

Where, then, is the delay coming from? Is it only the material hazards which we cannot control? The terrible blow which befell the avocado branch this year, in which according to the forecast 80 percent of the expected produce was lost, will in itself decrease the farmers' income in the coming export season by approximately $40 million. We still do not know whether or not the coming winter and spring will bring in hail, storms, heatwaves and, God forbid, cold and frosty days. The damages that those bring about cannot be avoided completely; it is only possible to minimize the possible effects.

Thus, says the director general of Agresco, only the strokes [as translated] of policy or the lack of right policy, will eventually determine the future of the export in general and of agricultural exports in particular.

Loss of Two and a Half Billion Lira

The big gap in the exchange rate of the export dollar since the economic upheaval of the Likud government, which is more detrimental to the agricultural export, represents, according to the director general of Agresco, one of the central factors in the decline of the agricultural export. To this, one has to add the scarcity of credit and the difficult conditions of the index-linked developmental loans in an annual inflation rate of 120 percent.

In the last export season alone, the exchange rate fell behind as against the level of inflation and the increase in the agricultural input by approximately 15 IL to the dollar, which means that the farmers lost $2 billion. In this situation, many farmers fear investments in the development and expansion of export growth. Moreover, due to lack of credit and cash, the farmers frequently prefer sending their produce from existing harvests to the local market, since they believe that this will pay a higher price.

Iland said that the grape growers in the Jordan Valley lost considerable amounts of money this summer because a great part of the grapes was directed to the local market, which paid a higher price at the beginning, but afterwards it became clear that the export fruit paid more. There is no certainty that this situation will not repeat itself in the marketing of mangos.

What Is Expected This Year?

What then can be expected during the coming export season, supposing that there will not be any considerable changes in the exchange rate policy?

In the fruit branch the sharp decline in earnings is already obvious because of the natural disasters which befell the avocado. In the flower branch it would have been possible to increase exports by 10-15 percent, but this was not done because of the government's lack of encouragement in investments. When a dunam carnations necessitates an investment of 600,000 IL and a dunam roses 1.5 million IL, and the loans are 100 percent index linked in a situation of an annual inflation rate of 120 percent, there is not much readiness to invest. In the vegetable branch Agresco took special steps to provide governmental help to vegetable growers (even if not a sufficient one), to encourage land expansion and export growth by a new method, and by securing the

farmers from risks. As it became clear from the signing of the agreements, this action was successful. Special care was taken, however, to insure the obligation of the growers to provide the export product and not to be tempted by the local market, even if it would promise better prices and immediate payments.

Thus, it seems, that in the export of vegetables, we shall witness a renewed offensive, if there are no unexpected natural disasters that cannot be controlled. Agresco will also try to increase the general export quota, especially of animals and dairy products, such as cows, sheep, poultry and turkey meat, honey, cheeses and butter, eggs, etc. Additional growth is expected in other products such as goose liver, meat, lard and feathers, since in this branch surprising progress has been achieved.

9467
CSO: 4805

JULY EXPORT DECLINES BY 23 PERCENT

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Aug 80 p 10

[Text] This July, the net export of goods totaled $408 million (calculated in dollars, current prices); of it $12 million was agricultural export and $396 million industrial export. Last July, the net export totaled $376 million. The export value exclusive of diamonds, ships, aircraft and exclusive of seasonal influences shows a decline of 23 percent this July as against June, after an increase of 23 percent in June as against May of this year. This was reported by the speakers of the Central Bureau of Statistics and the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism on the basis of temporary data which does not include the export from Israel to the administrated territories.

January-July 1980

The net export of goods during 7 months of this year reached $3,118 million as compared to $2,459 million during the same period of time last year--an increase of 27 percent. The industrial export (exclusive of diamonds) increased by 35 percent, the export of diamonds by 21 percent and the agricultural export by 12 percent.

The industrial export (exclusive of diamonds) from January to July 1980 totaled $1,819 million as opposed to $1,350 million during the same period of time last year. This increase of 35 percent reflects an increase in exports in numerous industrial branches, such as: mining, minerals, nonmetallics by 62 percent; textiles, wearing apparel and leather by 58 percent; chemicals, rubber and plastics by 53 percent; food, drinks and tobacco by 22 percent, wood, paper and printing by 20 percent; exports of metals, machinery and electronics which constitute approximately a third of the total industrial export (exclusive of diamonds) increased from January to July of this year by 19 percent.

Seasonally adjusted data shows that the industrial export (exclusive of diamonds) is in the last month at the level of an average of $260 to $270 million as against $230 to $240 million per month in the second half of 1979.

The export of polished diamonds (net) in the first 7 months of this year amounted to $861 million as opposed to $790 million during the same period of time last year. This increase of 21 percent contributed 23 percent to the growth in the value of all exports.

The agricultural export (including citrus) in the 7 months of this year amounted to $431 million as opposed to $386 million during the same period of time last year--an increase of 12 percent. The export of citrus totaled $208 million and was 6 percent higher than during the same period of time last year.

Another agricultural export rose from $188 million between January and July of last year to $222 million during the same months of this year--which amounts to an increase of 18 percent.

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CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

GOLAN HEIGHTS POLL--A public opinion poll conducted by Dr Minah Tsemah from the "Dahaf" Institution for the committee of the Golan Heights settlements, shows that 74.5 percent of the public supports, without any reservations, the implementation of the Israeli law in the Golan Heights; 11.1 percent opposes the implementation of the law and 12.7 percent has no opinion on the subject. In a poll conducted in the beginning of May, citizens were asked whether they were for or against the implementation of the Israeli law in the Golan Heights, now that a group of Knesset members are in the process of recommending the annexation of the Golan. The results of the poll show that the supporters of the implementation of the law come from all social classes, and there is no unusual division. The findings of the poll show that if the elections were held today, 81.3 percent of those voting for the Likud Party would presently vote for the law in the Golan, whereas 8.3 percent would be against the implementation of the law. Among those voting for the Labor Party, 74.5 percent supported the implementation of the Israeli law in the Golan, whereas 12.2 percent oppose it, and among those voting NRP, 83.3 percent supported the implementation of the law while 1.7 percent oppose it. Among those who are still undecided, 78 percent said that they support the implementation of the law in the Golan, while 7.2 percent oppose it. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 18 Aug 80 p 3] 9467

EXPORT PROFITS--Export profits increased by 3 percent in the first 7 months of this year. This was determined by a computation conducted by the Bank of Israel. This increase came after a rise of 4.2 percent in export profits in 1979. The calculations of the Bank of Israel are based on the real devaluation of the Israeli lira as opposed to the basket of currencies. They do not take into consideration the benefits of export by credit. The data of the Bank of Israel indicates a sharp increase in Israeli export inspite of a slowdown in the growth of import in the developed countries. According to the estimate of the Bank of Israel the export will increase (this year) by 13 percent (the nominal growth was valued at 30 percent). The Bank of Israel points to the fact that the Israeli export increased by 109 percent from 1976 to 1980, whereas

the rate of growth of imports in the developed countries was less than 38 percent over the same period of time. These findings relate to industrial exports exclusive of diamonds. According to the Bank of Israel, the growth in export expresses its profitability. Due to profitability, the export grew continuously. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 6 Aug 80 p 11] 9467

VIEWS OF YOUTH--The Israeli youth tends to be more hawkish than the adults. In an election poll conducted the day before yesterday, 15,000 youths participated and according to their preferences, "Thiya" has a good chance of winning more votes than the NRP. If the elections were held today, the Labor Party would win, according to their choice, by 50.6 percent, Likud by 26.8 percent, "Thiya" by 13.2 percent, NRP by 4.4 percent, Sheli by 2 percent and others by 3 percent. The question who would be most suitable to be prime minister was answered by the youths in the following way: Rabin, 42.5 percent; Begin, 21.5 percent; Peres, 18.5 percent; Weizman, 7.5 percent; Geulah Cohen, 4.5 percent; Sharon, 2.5 percent; others, 3 percent. The question of the youth's political involvement was answered by 65 percent of those asked. Some 55 percent of them are for a political involvement within the framework of political youth organizations. The poll was conducted by the coordinators of "Youth City." [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 6 Aug 80 p 3] 9467

CSO: 4805

DELAYS OF ARAB FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE DISCUSSED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 7 Sep 80 p 6

[Article by 'Isam al-Jaradi: "Delays in Making Arab Aid Payments Disrupt Construction Projects, Raise Questions About Existence of Political Reasons"]

[Text] The subject of Arab countries making their payments of Arab aid to Lebanon is monopolizing the interest of officials. This aid, which amounts to 1 billion dollars, was approved at the Tunisia Summit meeting. It is monopolizing the interest of officials, especially after the country's Development and Reconstruction Council prepared a program to implement construction and development projects in South Lebanon and in the remaining Lebanese areas in the context of what it was agreed would be called the 12-month program.

The Development and Reconstruction Council ties implementation of the projects that are mentioned in the aforementioned program with receipt of the first part of the aid that is to be paid during the present year. [This aid amounts to] 400 million dollars, and this is based on the fact that the total cost of implementing the program is 1 billion Lebanese pounds.

On the strength of official information, Lebanon has received only 153 million dollars of the Arab aid that The Tunisia Summit meeting committed to it. This is less than half the payment that is due in 1980 which is about to come to an end.

It has been learned that this matter was discussed at the meeting that took place two days ago between President Elias Sarkis and the president of the Development and Reconstruction Council Dr Muhammad 'Atallah. It was discussed from the angle of the effects of the delay in receiving the Arab aid according to the program that had been determined for that aid at the Tunisia Summit. It was determined that the sum of 400 million dollars would be paid over a 5-year period for the 12-month construction plan and for the general construction program that the state adopted. This program had constituted an official Lebanese item at the Tunisia and

Bagdad conferences in the course of investigating Arab commitments to help Lebanon financially.

A Decision of Kings and Heads of State

Official sources are asking about the reasons that have so far prevented the Arab countries from making the payments that their kings and heads of state had pledged to help Lebanon financially. These sources are wondering whether some of the countries had reverted to the old tune which they had used and hid behind as an excuse to justify their lack of aid to rebuild Lebanon in past years. That excuse involved domestic security and political reasons.

These circles are saying that Lebanon's [representatives] were candid when they met with the Arab kings and heads of state and proposed the subject of construction and that of alleviating the existing economic and social problems. They rejected [the notion] that Arab aid--in case intentions to offer such aid are actually serious--be subject to political conditions and security developments. "Economic and social problems have become part of the Lebanese crisis, and it is now doubtful that this aid will fulfill its full objectives if it comes late due to the fact that the social drain is continuing and the economic situation has been frozen especially in South Lebanon, that is, half the aid that was determined for Lebanon."

Lebanon is putting much stock on the Arab countries meeting their financial obligations towards the reconstruction and development of Lebanon. This is not only because Lebanon actually needs this aid, but also because this aid interprets practical Arab intentions towards Lebanon, the more so as the political field and the political scene are enveloped in much confusion and mystery which prevent the positive establishment of the accuracy and sometimes the truthfulness of the political support that is being given through this aid.

What Does the Delay Hide?

The same circles believe that the Arab procrastination in meeting the financial obligations that had been determined at the Tunisia Summit not only indicates a turning away from these pledges, but it also hides specific positions towards Lebanon that may be more political than they are financial or economic. They stem from expectations which this or the other Arab country may have about certain developments taking place on the Lebanese scene. In this too there is a source of concern for Lebanon, even though what is basically required from the aid is an increase, albeit limited, in the factors of stability and social security despite the existing circumstances.

What increases the sharpness of the questions that are being raised around this subject is the fact that even a relative reconstruction in Lebanon, in the context of the given circumstances, and restoring partial activity in some of the facilities whose operations or activities was expected by Arab aid in particular would not constitute any competition or any harm to any one of the Arab countries so as to prevent us from saying that the reconstruction of Lebanon, the stimulation of its trade and its trade and its facilities, the return of its tourist and hotel establishments to doing business, in addition to the improvement of its transportation and the retraining of its manpower do not constitute an Arab demand almost in and of itself.

Nevertheless, a decision that was made by Arab kings and heads of state and in their presence is still awaiting implementation in the desired manner.

In the view of observers, however, the developments in security and political conditions in South Lebanon are of special importance when compared with the Arab position on meeting Arab financial obligations towards Lebanon.

As we stated, 1 billion pounds of the total aid that was determined at the Tunisia Summit was designated specifically to South Lebanon due to the exceptional circumstances which that area is experiencing in confronting the Zionist enemy. There was an Arab determination to single out South Lebanon because it was a basic point in the conference's agenda. However, turning the Arab view of the special facts in South Lebanon into a decision to help the South was not completed by making the payments.

There is no doubt that the continued deterioration of conditions and the worsening living, economic and social conditions in South Lebanon constitute an incentive for implementing the aforementioned Arab decision. The security condition excuse here is the weapon to be used in the face of those who are procrastinating in making their payments and not the aforementioned circumstances and conditions whose particulars have not changed since the Tunisia Summit, except for the fact that they have deteriorated further.

The 12-month construction plan, which will be implemented with the first installment of Arab aid, includes building orphanages, improving the conditions of roads and building hospitals in South Lebanon.

What is astonishing is the fact that the Arab countries which have so far contributed the least to the aid payments they were supposed to make in 1980 are the oil countries in the Arabian Gulf. These are the countries that are "urging an Arab holy war these days."

It is the opinion of some that Lebanon embarrassed the Arabs in the oil countries five years ago when it presented a working paper to the kings

and heads of state that included a summary of the projects that were to be implemented to rebuild Lebanon. The paper included the financial obligations that were required and those that were available. Lebanon can embarrass the Arab oil countries again if it tells them, "Lebanon, and South Lebanon about which you are excited at the Tunisia Summit, is waiting for your 1980 aid payment to implement the projects for the orphanages, the waters of al-Shaffah and the roads and to shore up the resistance of South Lebanon's residents on their land."

All this of course does not relieve Lebanon of the responsibility of expediting the payment of this aid according to the program that was outlined for that aid, since it did ask for the aid at the Tunisia Summit. It could be that [by doing so] "we can catch the aid at the door of the house!"

Installments Until the End of August

The sum of 153,200,000 dollars which Lebanon did receive by the end of August was distributed. This sum is part of the 400 million dollars Lebanon was to have received in 1980. Saudi Arabia paid one installment; Kuwait paid one; the United Arab Emirates paid two; and Iraq paid three.

8592
CSO: 4802

PLANS TO DEVELOP AL-BIQA' REGION REVIEWED

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 7 Sep 80 pp 13-14

[Interview with the Minister of Agriculture Joseph Skaff, by Lur Ma'luf and 'Id al-Ashqar: "Minister Skaff Says, 'Al-Biqa' Constitutes Basic Foundation for Agricultural Economy; New Plan Made for Development and Mechanization"]

[Text] Minister of Agriculture Joseph Skaff said that al-Biqa' is considered the basic foundation of the agricultural economy, and that it represent the more abundant income in the agricultural field. He announced that the disturbances have left their mark on the agricultural sector and have created huge losses in it. He said the Ministry of Agriculture has prepared plans for development and mechanization.

The interview with Minister Skaff follows:

[Question] Is is possible to determine the position of agriculture in al-Biqa'?

[Answer] Al-Biqa' is considered the basic foundation for both branches of the agricultural economy: plants and animals. It represents the more abundant income in the agricultural field because it is in al-Biqa' that the production of field crops, grain, vegetables, sweet potatoes, sugar beets and fruitful trees, especially apples and grapes, is centered. In addition, there is a poultry industry that attracted huge capitals before the events and there are agricultural industries such as the production of alcohol and the processing of agricultural products produced in al-Biqa' Valley.

[Question] What are the difficulties that you are facing in agricultural activities [with regard to] labor and agricultural mechanization?

[Answer] The current situation which al-Biqa' is experiencing is summarized in the following:

--The scarcity, instability and high cost of labor.

--The high cost of production--rent for the land and the cost of materials, such as fertilizers and drugs for diseased plants--because agricultural mechanization is not developed and the greater portion of small farmers practice their profession manually.

--The security situation in some areas.

--The interference of natural factors (drought and frost) and their effect on production.

--Unsatisfactory maintenance of machines and use of appropriate equipment.

--The absence of specialized labor and the farmers' need for loans and training so they can obtain funding to acquire the agricultural machines which are often utilized without careful selection or evaluation.

--Not using modern automatic means in mechanizing basic crops such as sweet potatoes, sugar beets and others.

On this premise this ministry made a plan whose objective is:

A. To develop the agricultural effort, to encourage mechanization and to introduce modern methods in the utilization of agricultural land and farms for the purpose of attaining a lower cost of production.

B. To raise the farmers' level of skill. This would attract a large group of rural residents to work in the agricultural sector.

C. To guarantee loans to small farmers to enable them to acquire agricultural machines and equipment after giving them sound training at model centers that would be established for that purpose.

It is self-evident that this training will lead to the improved use of these machines and the sound operation of the tractors and their equipment. This would increase the worker's production six to ten times.

We have taken practical and energetic steps in this regard. The Agricultural Mechanization Committee, which was stipulated in the legislation that pertains to organizing agricultural mechanization, has been formed. The committee is chaired by one of the senior specialists, Dr Salim Maqsud, and its members are a group of specialists representing the public and the private sectors.

We have also placed about 3 million Lebanese pounds at the disposal of this committee so it can pursue its work. There are 2.5 million pounds from the proceeds of selling Italian rice and half a million from the budget of the Ministry of Agriculture.

To take precautions for the future and to establish a select group of specialists in that field a delegation of 10 technicians has been sent to Italy to receive training in the city of Turin for six months in the principles of agricultural mechanization. This is being done with the cooperation of the Italian government which has secured all their expenses for them.

[Question] Did the events have positive or negative effects for agriculture? What are your comments on this?

[Answer] The past events had negative effects on the entire agricultural sector. We had an 80 percent loss in dairy cows; a 90 percent loss in laying chickens; a 90 percent loss in young chickens; a 40 percent loss in sheep and goats, etc.

This is in addition to the losses that were suffered by agricultural production. Production of agricultural crops declined because of damages to irrigation motors and their furnishings. This is in addition to the security situation that was prevalent during the events, and this led a large portion of farmers to reject the pursuit of agricultural work.

Future Projects

[Question] What are the most important projects that you intend to undertake to improve and develop this sector which is one of the most important economic resources?

[Answer] I was dismayed when I assumed my duties in the Ministry of Agriculture by the marks that were left by events on the ministry's equipment and projects. I made an effort to standardize and to collect this equipment. Then I thought about the agricultural future of this country and about ensuring a minimum measure of food security. I made an agreement with Dr Edward Suma, the director general of the Food and Agriculture Organization, to draw up an agricultural plan for the next 20 years with the cooperation of the Development and Reconstruction Council and the UN program for development.

This work has been completed. We are in the process of putting the last touches on the final report.

Among the projects that we have implemented we mention [the following]:

--Forming the economic committee which worked to protect agricultural production, taking into consideration the interests of the consumer and the regulation of imports and exports.

--Submitting a study of the wheat and sugar beet policy that takes into consideration the cost of production and maintaining [a level of] production that would ensure minimum food security by making an effort to improve the conditions of the producing farmer.

--Reorganizing the Ministry of Agriculture and its public institutions in a manner that would ensure that technicians are transferred; that an effort is made in the village or in the agricultural region; that effective coordination between them is established; that a supreme advisory agricultural council that would give its opinion on agricultural plans is established; and that agricultural guidance is strengthened.

--Retraining and activating the technical staff by means of training them. We have designated 50 scholarships for this purpose in addition to preparing a project whose purpose is to prepare a senior staff for agricultural specialization. This project includes 12 grants and is still under study by the Development and Reconstruction Council.

--Taking measures that would provide 23 million dollars in loans to ensure a field fund to harvest apples; to import thoroughbred cows and goats; to pave agricultural roads; and to provide loans for the Cooperative Credit Association.

This will probably be completed at the latest by the end of December 1980 through the UN Fund for Agricultural Development where our request has already been favorably received by fund director Mr 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Sadiri.

--Establishing a center for applied research and guidance for greenhouse cultivation.

--Completing the project of surveying the animal sector (sheep, goats and others).

--Producing vaccines and strengthening veterinary health agencies.

--Raising every farmer's profit from the business of the Green Project from 10,000 to 20,000 Lebanese pounds.

--Producing 2,000 tons of pure wheat seeds for 1980 in the context of a project that would last four years.

--Producing and rooting citrus plants that are free from viral diseases.

--Establishing the firm foundations for organizing meat import operations.

We must say a word of thanks here to Dr Edward Suma for what he has offered directly or through his representative in the form of valuable assistance in preparing and implementing these projects.

[Question] What is your view of the future of the agricultural sector in al-Biqa'?

[Answer] Al-Biqa' will remain the principal support for both parts of our agricultural production: plants and animals. It will be the safety valve for providing the Lebanese people with a living because the factors of production are available in al-Biqa' and cannot be available in a better fashion in other areas. This availability, however, is tied to the implementation of a firm agricultural policy that takes into consideration the questions of development and the evolution of consumption and exports. [Such a policy also takes into consideration] encouraging modern methods of irrigation, establishing new sources of irrigation, increasing productivity in the agricultural sector and improving the work of official administrations and institutions so that they would work alongside the farmer in his field and be close to him to solve the problems that come his way. [Such a policy also] organizes relations between the School of Agriculture at the American University and the agencies for scientific agricultural research.

This policy must improve the use of the agricultural cycle for the purpose of improving soil fertility, increasing production and mechanizing all agricultural operations.

Comparative Table

	Before Disturbances 1973	What Is Left	The Loss	Value of Loss (Lebanese Pounds)
	The Available			
Dairy cows	25,000 cows	5,000	80 percent	60 million
Native cows	60,000 cows	30,000	50 percent	30 million
Laying chickens	3 million	300,000	90 percent	200 million
Young chickens	20 million	2 million	90 percent	100 million
Sheep and goats	500,000	300,000	40 percent	50 million
Hogs	15,000	5,000	65 percent	6 million
Horses	3,000	2,000	33 percent	12 million

8592
CSO: 4802

NATION PRESSING AHEAD WITH EXPLOITATION OF MINERAL RESERVES

London 8 DAYS in English 27 Sep 80 pp 42-43

[Text]

Peace with the Polisario guerrillas has enabled Mauritania to press ahead with the exploitation of its substantial mineral reserves. The country has high hopes of finding offshore oil and of increasing copper production but it is uranium that has the greatest potential.

MAURITANIA'S iron ore exports from the mines at Zouerate are the backbone of the country's economy. However, the government of President Mohammed Khouna Ould Haydalla has made considerable attempts over the past year to diversify Mauritania's exploitation of its resources. Efforts are being concentrated on prospecting for untapped mineral wealth and studying ways of renewing the copper mining activities suspended in 1978.

The Somima copper mine at the town of Akjoujt suffered considerable losses two years ago when the world price for copper slumped — mining operations were making a loss of about $1m a month. The mine, which had been nationalised in 1977, was closed down pending a more favourable outlook for copper on the world commodity markets.

The Akjoujt deposit, 160 kilometres northeast of Nouakchott, consists of two layers: oxidised copper, reserves of which are now practically exhausted, and a remaining 16.9m tonnes of sulphurised copper containing 2.25 per cent copper and 1.3 grams of gold a tonne.

Mauritania has been a small copper producer compared to Zambia, Zaire or Chile. Even in 1974, its top year, only 24,000 tonnes were exported. The copper was refined using the advanced Torco process which was both excessively capital intensive and required a high level of energy input. Because the mineral content in the sulphurised deposits is relatively low, Mauritania has commissioned the UK firm Seltrust to study the feasibility of refining it by means of a new treatment plant, which would be better adapted to local conditions.

'We estimate that the new investment outlay could be as high as $55m,' Mohammed Ould Zamel, minister of foreign affairs and cooperation, told *8 Days*. Discussions have been initiated with a number of potential financial sources and aid donors, such as the Amman-based Arab Mining Company, which is already engaged in the new Guelb iron ore scheme. Ultimately, the world copper outlook in coming years will be the decisive factor in determining the future of the Akjoujt mine.

Uranium undoubtedly has greater long term potential for Mauritania. Prospecting got under way before the outbreak of the Western Sahara conflict in 1975. Exploration efforts were concentrated in the northern part of the country, between Bir Moghreim and Ain Ben Tili, a region familiarly known as Dorsale Beguibat. The first results were considered positive, but the French prospecting firms had to abandon work due to the insecurity generated by Polisario raids.

Now that security can again be guaranteed in the region, after the August 1979 peace treaty between Mauritania and the Polisario, exploration has begun again. At the end of last year, a concession was awarded to a Franco-Japanese consortium consisting of the Commissariat a L'Energie Atomique Total-Nucleaire, Pechiney-Ugine-Kuhlman (PUK) and the Tokyo Uranium Development Corporation.

It takes about ten years to develop uranium mines. In the meantime, Mauritanian officials are planning to boost output at the gypsum deposits, which are situated about 55 kilometres north of the capital, at Sebkha N'Drahamcha. Reserves are estimated at several million tonnes, containing up to 96 per cent gypsum.

Though some is used in local construction, most of the production is exported to neighbouring Senegal for use in its cement works. Output has increased from 8,000 tonnes in 1974 to 16,000 last year. This figure is expected to top 20,000 tonnes for the first time this year. The government hopes to develop markets in western Europe and Latin America when the Chinese-funded Nouakchott deep water port is completed in 1982.

Exploration for oil in the 1960s and early 1970s did not fulfill expectations. The Atlantic basin zone, around Nouakchott, saw eleven wells drilled. Two revealed deposits of crude oil and natural gas, but not in commercially viable quantities. The Tindouf basin, near the Algerian frontier, proved to be another disappointment. Nor were explorations in the Taoudenni area — covering the central part of the country to the Malian border — any more successful.

Now hopes are centred on the coastal area around the port of Nouadhibou. The French firm Beicep recently prepared a seismic study of 40,000 sq kms of this region. Nine zones were delineated: three onshore, three on the continental plateau (less than 200 metres of water) and three in deep water.

Hopes are high for the offshore prospecting efforts currently being carried out by an international consortium consisting of Hispanoil of Spain which acts as operator, Italy's Agip, Phillips and Esso of the US. The first test well was bored last spring.

Even if results are positive, it will take some years to bring the deposits on stream. In the meantime, Mauritania is counting on Algeria to provide high quality crude oil for its refinery at Nouadhibou. Completed in 1978 at a cost of $80m, so far it has never been used. During the Western Sahara conflict, Algeria withdrew its offer to provide oil, and certain technical anomalies were discovered.

The refinery contractor, Voest-Alpine of Austria, has since agreed to provide financial compensation. Minister of Industry, Mine and Trade Mamadou Cissoko reckons that with an additional $2m investment outlay the refinery could rapidly be brought on stream. The Islamic development Bank has reportedly agreed to finance the purchase of the refinery's oil throughout the first year of production.

Phosphate reserves, in the southern part of the country near the Senegal river, do not seem large enough for export. However, they could be used for the small-scale production of fertilisers badly needed by local agriculture. Finally, known rare-earth deposits, (oxide of lanthanide element), increasingly important in the electronics industry, could give another fillip to Mauritania's economic development.

CSO: 4420

PETROCHEMICAL PROJECT GETS TOP PRIORITY

Manama GULF MIRROR in English 27 Sep-3 Oct 80 p 25

[Article by Peter Witton]

[Text]

THE giant petrochemical complex planned for Bahrain is to be built on land reclaimed from the sea, it was announced this week.

Gulf Petrochemical Industries Company, jointly owned by the Bahraini, Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian governments, also named the first contracts for the $400 million "top priority" project.

Wimpey Laboratories of Britain has been commissioned to survey the site off Sitra Island, and Dutch firm King-Wilkinson is to supply technical expertise.

Gulf Petrochemical Industries' chairman Dr Tawfiq Almoayyed said: "From now on all systems are go. We have completed two years' work in eight months."

Roadway

A decision is expected shortly on which system of production will be used for the plant's 700,000 tons-a-year output of ammonia and methanol.

The site, next to Bapco's loading jetty, will be connected to Sitra Island by a 1.25-kilometre roadway. Dredging and land reclamation should cost around $10 million but an exact figure will depend on tenders submitted.

Dr Almoayyed said local firms will be asked to submit tenders in the next few weeks, with the contract being awarded around December. The site should be ready for the main contractor in late spring.

Manpower

Tendering for the main contract should be underway in the first quarter of 1981 and "the winner should start work before next summer," said Dr Almoayyed.

The project is being given the highest priority by the three governments and should be onstream by 1983.

A board meeting this week selected King-Wilkinson to act as technical consultants, providing design and process engineers.

Manpower requirements were also finalised, and it was decided the finished complex will have a staff of about 350.

The contract with Wimpey International was signed earlier in the week and soil analysis began immediately, said Dr Almoayyed.

CSO: 4820

20,000 RUSH FOR SHARES IN NEW STEEL COMPANY

Manama GULF MIRROR in English 27 Sep-3 Oct 80 p 25

[Text]

THE expected last-minute rush for public shares in the Arab Iron and Steel Company led to an oversubscription of nearly 42 times, it was announced this week.

By Sunday's deadline for the $48 million float more than 20,000 applications had been received by the four Bahraini receiving banks

A few days before closure only 500 applications had arrived for the offshore company which plans to build a $300 million iron pelletisation plant near Asry drydock.

Investors borrowing money for shares normally wait until the last day or two to avoid paying interest on their loans. This happened with AIIC, though the response was modest compared with the 1,263 oversubscription for Gulf Investment Company's $25 million issue last October.

Mr Ghazi Al Musawi, deputy general manager of Bank of Bahrain and Kuwait — one the receiving banks — said he was "very pleased" with the outcome.

He thought it reflected a more "normal" response than previous oversubscriptions of many hundreds of times.

Only half of the $48 million is being called for and the issue was open only to Gulf nationals, excluding Bahrainis. Financial sources say 90 per cent of the applicants came from Kuwait.

The process of allocation and refunds is now underway. Investors are being allocated 2,405 shares for every 100,000 for which they applied and 241 for every 10,000.

The 50 cent shares are already trading for more than $1 each, but this is considered normal immediately after a share closure.

CSO: 4820

AL-RAQQAH, TARTUS PROVINCES WORK ON FIFTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 15 Jul 80 p 4

[Text] The office of planning in the province of al-Raqqah has recently prepared the basic phase of the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) in coordination with the executive office of the provincial administration and agencies concerned in the governorate.

The necessary appropriations to complete the projects already started under the Fourth Five-Year Plan have been set at 27.773 million Syrian pounds. A total of 52.19 million pounds has also been approved for the renovation and maintenance of existing productive capacity.

The province's projects include afforestation, education, schools, housing, utilities, municipal services, communication and water projects.

In Aleppo, the directorate of agriculture and agrarian reform has just completed preparation of the basic phase of its Fifth Five Year Plan.

A responsible source in the directorate announced yesterday that the plan for the agricultural sector was drawn up in accordance with the following considerations:

1. Increasing acreage irrigated by rivers by 1,000 hectares annually, taking into account the need to raise the capacity of pumps on the rivers.

2. Intensifying cultivation of river-irrigated lands by 173 percent.

3. Intensifying cultivation of unirrigated land, and increasing their area by 700 hectares annually.

4. Increasing fruit tree yield by 6 percent.

This study was submitted to the ministry of agriculture and agrarian reform in order to examine, discuss and adopt it in its final form.

On the other hand, Mr Danhu Da'ud, the governor of Tartus province discussed with members of the executive office of the provincial administration

and the mayor [of Tartus], in the presence of the secretary of the local branch of the [Ba'th] party, the progress of work on services and utilities projects which are underway, and projects set to be implemented this year. A total of 79.62 million pounds is appropriated for the latter.

The governor of Tartus also discussed the subject of the industrial zone and the need to award a contract for its construction to a public sector company. Expenditures on the industrial zone will reach 25 million pounds.

The governor also discussed with the director of housing and public works progress on improving the mechanical and electrical equipment and the two pumps of the Shamasis water projects, and the need to put the project into operation as quickly as possible in order to supply the villages which will benefit from it.

9614
CSO: 4802

ALEPPO MAYOR OUTLINES HOUSING CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 13 Jul 80 p 4

[Article: "A Review of Construction Projects in Aleppo"]

[Text] The mayor of Aleppo announced yesterday that during his recent visit to Damascus, he reviewed with the minister of local administration the new construction projects for which preparation and planning are underway. Foremost among them is the large Bab al-Faraj project, the sport city and the park construction projects. The latter include the public park which will be built in the Bab Allah quarter, and aim at [beautifying?] the city, particularly in residential districts.

The mayor explained that he brought up with the minister the matter of setting up a services company in Aleppo for road and highway construction, maintenance and (roadside tree planting). It would be like the [Qasium?] Company in Damascus. The minister promised that he would support all municipal projects and set aside the necessary credits for them in order to promote the development of the city.

The mayor added that he discussed with the minister of housing and utilities public housing projects in Aleppo. As a result of this meeting, it was decided to increase the number of housing units designated for the city of Aleppo from 5,000 to 10,000 units. It was also agreed to conclude a contract with the Military Housing Agency to build 1,000 units over a period of 2.5 years. Another 2,000 units are to be completed during the same period. Another 5,000 housing units are reserved for fellow citizens who will be displaced by the new principal street projects. A contract to build these 5,000 units all at once will be concluded this year. As for the remaining 3,000 [should be 2,000] units, they will be completed as part of the Fifth Five Year Plan.

The mayor declared that the new housing units will be distributed among fellow countrymen affected by the municipal redevelopment projects, especially in the downtown area. There, the municipality will build the first opera house in Aleppo and an Arab cultural center.

Housing units will also be distributed to residents of al-Maghayir and al-Tallah al-Sawda', who will be evacuated from their homes.

The mayor concluded: "The municipality of Aleppo is making serious efforts with the Military Housing Agency to buy 2,000 prefabricated housing units for the Hamdaniyah district of Aleppo, these being out of the 10,000 units set aside for Aleppo."

9614
CSO: 4802

NEED FOR ALTERNATE SOURCES OF ENERGY STRESSED

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 20 Jul 80 p 1

[Article: "Our Consumption of Energy Is Rising 10 Percent Annually: When Will We Be Forced To Import Oil?"]

[Text] According to a study by Dr Ahmad 'Umar Yusuf, minister of electricity, on energy in the nation, Syria produces 10 million tons of crude oil annually and imports another 3 million tons of light oil needed to balance the heavy Syrian oil. Accordingly, the Hims refinery is producing 5.2 million tons of petroleum products, and it is expected that the Banyas refinery output will reach 6 million tons.

Petroleum is the greatest source for the production of electric power. Waterfalls account for only 8 percent in this domain. A forecast of petroleum consumption in the country indicates that it will reach 5.35 million tons in the current year. In 1985, it will amount to around 9.33 million tons; in 1995 it will reach 19.24 million tons; and in the year 2000, it will reach 26.93 million tons.

In his study, the minister of electricity sees that alternate forms of energy must be found by 1985, if we are to remain self-sufficient in securing energy, until we begin setting up and exploiting nuclear power stations to generate electricity. This is especially important, because consumption of energy in Syria is increasing at a steady rate of 10 percent annually, as a result of the horizontal increase in consumers, who comprise 60 percent of the population; the vertical increase in individual consumption; and industrial and agricultural development.

The minister of electricity estimates that we will be forced to import crude oil after 1985, if new oil fields are not discovered.

9614
CSO: 4802

PRODUCTION, USE OF CHEMICAL FERTILIZERS IN SYRIA DISCUSSED

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 13 Jul 80 p 4

[Report on Interview with Ahmad al-Turk, Director General of the General Fertilizers Company, by Ghassan Al-Balu', in Damascus; date not given]

[Text] The first consultative meeting on developing markets for fertilizers in the Arab states was held in Damascus from 6 to 10 July. The meeting was called for by the Arab League's Industrial Development Center, in cooperation with the [Syrian] General Chemical Industries Agency. The purpose was to study the long-term program to develop the chemical fertilizer industry and the use of chemical fertilizers in the Arab states.

Representatives from the following Arab states attended the meeting: Jordan, the U.A.E., Tunisia, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya and Somalia, in addition to Syria.

During the meetings, AL-BA'TH met with several of the chiefs of delegations participating in the meeting. It was our reporter's first encounter with Engineer Ahmad al-Turk, the Director General of the Syrian General Fertilizers Company.

[Question] Will Syria export chemical fertilizers to the Arab markets? What are the agencies that would export them?

[Answer] Syria has not yet begun to export fertilizers at all, due to the fact that current production is being set aside for domestic use, in accordance with the agricultural intensification plan. When a surplus does show up, Syria will turn to Arab markets first, in view of our pan-Arab orientations.

[Question] What are our proposals in the area of marketing coordination with the Arab countries?

[Answer] Syria presented at the meeting a working paper which covered two basic points:

1. Taking care of the need of Arab markets for fertilizers produced exclusively in Arab factories; and

2. Coordinating the activities of Arab producers in world markets, so that they will be competitors, not rivals.

[Question] What is the expected production of Triple Super Phosphate and Ammonia Boria fertilizers? When will their production commence, and how much will the country use these two types.

[Answer] Production will begin at the Triple Super Phosphate and Ammonia Boria plants at the end of 1980 at 70 percent of actual capacities, that is, at around 315 thousand tons of Triple Super Phosphate and 230 thousand tons of Ammonia Boria fertilizers. The nation will consume 40 percent of the volume of actual production. The remainder will be surplus for export.

[Question] Will our local consumption of chemical fertilizers grow, and what is the current average level of consumption by Syrian farmers?

[Answer] The country's use of chemical fertilizers will grow by increasing annual amounts following the agricultural intensification plan laid down by the Higher Agricultural Council. However, farmers are still using fertilizers in smaller amounts than ought to be used.

[Question] What are our plans in the areas of packaging, transport and distribution? Do we have the necessary machinery and personnel for such enterprises?

[Answer] The General Fertilizers Company has ample resources for packaging and storing. As for transport and distribution of the fertilizers, they are the responsibility of other agencies--the Cooperative Agricultural Bank domestically, and the General Fertilizers Company abroad. The company is now planning to build an installation to store and ship the fertilizers by way of Tartus harbor.

[Question] Have detailed studies of fertilizer costs and appropriate export prices been drawn up?

[Answer] A special committee has been formed to study Arab and world markets in terms of appropriate export prices. We should bear in mind that the country's entry into discussions on the export of fertilizers would have no connection with our study of costs, since export prices are determined by world markets.

9614
CSO: 4802

STATUS OF COOPERATION WITH ALGERIA VIEWED

Trying for Possibilities

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 pp 1, 7

[Article by Abdelwaheb Abdallah]

[Text] Tunis-Rabat, Tunis-Algiers: the two official visits made lately by Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, to Morocco and to Algeria, clearly go beyond the context of bilateral relations. In their immediate consequences, but above all in their potential extensions, they fit into a clearly Maghreb-wide perspective.

This movement to go beyond is natural. It flows from a geopolitical law which says that every benefic action taken between two states of the Maghreb inevitably has repercussions on the whole region, directly or indirectly, in the short or the long term.

Much has been written about these visits and their possible consequences. It is fitting to emphasize, however, that in bilateral terms, as much in the first visit as in the second, Tunisia and Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, give the clear impression that both their similarities and their differences they are resolved to make a sincere move toward rapprochement and toward a kind of cooperation that is more in keeping with what reality is imposing on them, with their mutual interests, and with their destiny.

The impression is that we are in the process of going beyond romanticism to grasp instead for what is palpable, for what is achievable and thus credible. We are passing from dreams and pious hopes to a more realistic vision, which consists in trying for the possible and making progress starting from the possible.

This new dynamic takes account of a double demand, politican and human. Beyond the classical notion of cooperation imposed by proximity and the nature of things, the countries of the Maghreb owe it to themselves to establish relations on the scale of the regional whole which they make up.

Bearing their differences courageously, they recognize the truth that no country--and especially not in the countries of the Third World--can at this' point play the lone cowboy in the face of the blocs and various ambitions. "The daily exercise of power should have strengthened us in our conviction that joint action is the best was to achieve the prosperity of our peoples," said President Bourguiba in 1965.

That is the political demand. The human demand is no less evident. The greater ease of circulation of people in the last few months between Algeria and Tunisia is moreover bound to improve the image that each has of the other and to conquer prejudices.

The two official visits with which Mr Mohamed Mzali inaugurates his new assumption of the duties of prime minister are without a doubt successful.

Both in Morocco and in Algeria, Mr Mzali both said and heard new things; new in bilateral terms, but new also in terms of the Maghreb. What has happened is that there is less emotion with respect to certain problems that still exist, and a manifest determination to see things progressing. This is the indisputable sign of "ripening."

The favorable changes, at the bilateral level in any case, did not happen by chance. They result assuredly from political transformations in which the human factor played a role of the first magnitude in the event. There are certainly interests, the balance of power, etc...but there is sometimes also a human parameter. It can be enough...When "the current is moving," many things become simpler.

The quality of the reception and the first results achieved leave no doubt about the sincerity of the proposals. They demonstrate the existence of a new climate of confidence and the political will to change.

New men and new words: both legitimate reasons for believing in the future; both legitimate reasons for believing that "the current that passed" between two partners can pass between three. More than a wish, it is an imperative. The region thirsts for peace. The people of the Maghreb, firmly tied to their national realities and jealous of their independence, aspire to understand each other better, to help each other better to conceive and to build, together, their future.

Identity of Views

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 7

[Text] The visit of Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali to Algeria 7-9 September and the contacts he had with several Algerian leaders have shed new light on positions common to both Tunisia and Algeria on the big Arab and international problems.

Greater Maghreb

It is necessary to recall that the idea of creating a Maghreb is not in its infancy.

Certainly, the common determination to carry out this imperial action continually faces multiple challenges. The greatest obstacle to its creation remains, to be sure, "the Western Sahara affair."

Everything leads us to believe that this obstacle will someday be smoothed out.

Palestinian Problem

The same common determination inspires the two peace-loving peoples who unceasingly express to whoever wants to listen their absolute support for the Palestinian cause and for the untiring struggle of the Palestinian people to reconquer their freedom which is socked by the Zionist state of Israel.

Aware of the necessity for complete cohesion in the Palestinian ranks, the two countries justly consider that the PLO is the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in their struggle to win back their despoiled homeland.

The two countries have expressed their unshakeable conviction at the summits in Bagdad and Tunis. Similarly, they have deplored and still deplore any separate accord which can only create disunity in the Arab ranks.

In this connection, the two delegations judged that the travesty of peace established between Egypt and Israel constitutes less a durable solution than a dangerous breach in Arab ranks. To remedy this state of affairs, the two delegations reiterated their determination to strengthen Palestinian forces and to prevent the Zionist enemy from making El Qods its capital.

To this end, they issued a very strong appeal to all peace-loving powers to turn back the pernicious Zionists from their aims.

The Mediterranean

Also, the two countries accord particular importance to peace in the Mediterranean--against any attempt [to disrupt it]; the Mediterranean has become, in recent years, a zone subject to the most opposed influences.

Aware that peace depends in the first place on the countries of the region, the two delegations expressed interest in maintaining peace in the Mediterranean. This aim can only be attained by putting an end to all the sources of tension which exist there.

Nonalinement

As "pioneers" of nonalinement, Tunisia and Algeria have always been in the vanguard of the movement.

Mr Mzali's visit was the occasion, both for the Tunisians and for the Algerians, to reaffirm their attachment to nonalinement and their unwearying determination to take whatever actions are necessary to keep alive the movement, its principles, and above all its unity.

Africa

In the course of their talks, the two delegations paid considerable attention to African causes. The peoples of both Tunisia and Algeria cannot fail to defend just causes aiming at the banishing of the colonial legacy.

9516
CSO: 4400

ENERGY COMMITTEE PREPARES SIXTH PLAN

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 7 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of the National Economy, presided over a meeting in his department of the National Commission on Regional Energy.

The meeting was devoted to the preparation of the Sixth Energy Development Plan.

In a talk delivered on this occasion the minister first analyzed the previous decade, 1972-1981, and summarized Tunisia's energy situation. He then suggested that the National Commission direct its efforts in the following directions:

1. Maximum and purposeful use of the country's resources themselves in order to improve the energy balance.

2. The establishment of a schedule of energy consumption by categories through a national survey.

3. An inventory of all financial and technical resources to control the consumption of energy and to avoid waste.

4. A diversification of supply sources and of types of products.

5. The development of research into basic energy resources (lignite, coal, oil, etc.) and acceleration of studies on the use of new forms of energy (solar).

At the end of the meeting and after a work timetable for the National Commission was set up, it was decided to create seven sub-committees:

--Sub-committee on electricity

--Sub-committee on gas

--Sub-committee on oil research and production

--Sub-committee on refining

--Sub-committee on new forms of energy

--Sub-committee on distribution and transportation

--Sub-committee on consumption and prices.

8693
CSO: 4400

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FOR NEXT DECADE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 7 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] On Friday evening Driss Guiga, member of the Political Office and Minister of the Interior, presided at the meeting of the Sidi Bouzid Coordinating Committee, a meeting of Party and regional administrators.

On this occasion and in the name of the chief of state, the minister decorated a certain number of Destourian militants with the insignia of Chevalier of the Order of Independence.

In his speech Driss Guiga spoke of the up-coming meeting of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] scheduled for spring 1981, emphasizing that the base representatives to this meeting would be asked to formulate the broad outlines of development policy for the coming decade.

Guiga pointed out that this meeting will examine methods of establishing a proper balance between economic growth and social evolution paying particular attention to certain aspects of development which had been neglected until now. It will at the same time look into ways of achieving the desired balance in economic growth among regions as well as increases in the number of jobs by strengthening economic growth in the regions where an effort at industrialization proves to be necessary.

Driss Guiga stressed that the establishment of the desired balance does not at all mean recourse to easy solutions, much less to preventing anyone from reaping the rewards of his efforts in order to satisfy someone else, but rather implies serious consideration of the methods likely to promote greater contributions on the part of citizens to the state's effort to improve conditions of life for the economically weak.

As far as the launching of industrial projects in underdeveloped areas is concerned, the minister of the Interior pointed out that it is up to industrial promoters from the areas which need substantial increases in the number of available jobs to plan for construction of industrial units in these regions.

Guiga emphasized that launching a project in one region or another must not in any way reflect a tendency toward tribalism or regionalism, noting that national unity and the links forged among militants by the struggle for a common cause ought to be the guarantee of the success of the project undertaken to achieve prosperity for all Tunisians.

8693
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

BOURGUIBA SIGNS DECREES--President Bourguiba conferred in Essaada Palace in La Marsa at noon yesterday with Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, who presented the following decrees to the chief of state for his signature: --a decree regarding a movement among law officials; --a decree naming Mohamed Abdessalem, a university professor, dean of the College of Liberal Arts and Sciences in Tunis. The president of the Republic ratified an agreement between the Republic of Tunisia and the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg on social security. He also ratified an agreement between Tunisia and the Belgian-Tunisian Economic Union on international road transportation and freight signed in Tunis on 7 July 1980, the ratification of the 1978 formal agreement from the 1973 international convention on the prevention of marine pollution, and the approval of the agreement regarding technical obstacles to business. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 7 Sep 80 p 4] 8693

CSO: 4400

BEHIND SCENES ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN TALKS UNCONFIRMED

Paris LE MONDE in French 14-15 Sep 80 p 4

[Article by Roland Delcour: "The Saharan Conflict"]

[Text] At the end of the fifth session in Freetown of the "ad hoc" committee of the OAU [Organization of African Unity], which had been charged with resolving the Western Sahara problem, the six "wise men" of the committee (Nigeria, Tanzania, Mali, Guinea, Sudan and Sierra Leone), recommended the implementation of the resolutions adopted by the 16th summit meeting in Monrovia in 1979--after having heard the opinions of all concerned--to wit: a cease-fire followed by an "appropriate and general" referendum. In addition, they set a date--no later than December 1980--for setting up the cease-fire under the supervision of the UN "blue helmets." The referendum would be organized by the OAU with the assistance of the United Nations.

No official communique has been published by the OAU and the committee's six recommendations will not be published officially before the OAU secretary general, Mr Edem Kodjo, has brought them to the attention of the parties concerned and the African heads of state.

Rabat Stands by Its Positions.

The first comments made by the Moroccan Government on the resolution adopted on Thursday, 11 September by the "Committee of the African Wise Men" in Freetown, are harsh judging by the press conference held immediately after the end of the meeting by Mr Boucetta, minister of foreign affairs, and broadcast on Friday evening over the Moroccan radio.

After having noted that the "recommendations" of the wise men must be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote by the OAU summit conference, the minister made reference to Morocco's positions which are complete opposition to the two main points of the Freetown resolution.

With reference to the cease-fire, he declared that Morocco "had never opened fire" except when Morocco was under attack. He is not the person one must ask to stop firing; it is the "aggressor," i.e., the POLISARIO.

There is the same total opposition to the second main problem, i.e., the referendum. Morocco, Mr Boucetta declared in substance, has demonstrated its willingness to cooperate, within the African framework, by sending to Freetown delegates of the Western Sahara people, authentic representatives of the Saharan population who, in the past, fought against the Spanish occupation.

On the whole, according to Mr Boucetta, the committee of the wise men has only taken up again "what had already been done before without adding anything dynamic or without searching for a peaceful solution."

The only new element, according to the Moroccan minister, is a certain hesitation in considering the POLISARIO as being representative; a hesitation which was revealed by the appeal to the UN armed forces charged with overseeing the cease-fire. This recourse to the United Nations appeared to be, according to the Moroccan minister, only a way of "shrugging off its responsibilities" on the part of the OAU.

Outside of these statements, comments on Algeria's attitude are more subtle. Noting the presence in Freetown of President Chadli, some observers draw the conclusion that Algeria played a decisiver role, as usual, in the drawing up of the Freetown resolution and in its adoption by majority vote. According to these observers, Algeria would have realized these objectives only by renouncing to carry out its efforts, as one might have expected, after the OAU session of last July in Freetown, on the admission of the "Saharan Republic" in the United Nations. This time Algeria appeared to prefer presenting requirements which were easier to get accepted, such as a referendum, and more popular, such as a proclamation of a cease-fire. Likewise, the appeal to the United Nations was reportedly an attempt to go beyond the limits of the OAU where, last July, Algeria reportedly loaded the vote in favor of recognition and admission of the SADR [Saharan Arab Democratic Republic] into the African organization. From that possibility to believing that Algeria, in Freetown, might have adopted a relatively moderate attitude, there is only one step that some observers happily take by alluding again to the possibility of direct negotiations between Algeria and Morocco. Nevertheless, the rumors were wide-spread last July and August regarding Algerian and Moroccan negotiations behind the scenes have received no confirmation from any quarter.

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END

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No. 2208

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JORDANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER URGES SUPPORT OF IRAQ

LD101046 Kuwait KUNA in English 1001 GMT 10 Oct 80

[Text] Kuwait, 10 Oct (KUNA)--Jordan's Foreign Minister Marwan al-Qasim said that preparations were afoot to hold an Arab summit conference in Amman on November 25.

The minister told AL-ANBA' newspaper in an interview published here Friday that the Arab foreign ministers, attending the U.N. General Assembly session in New York, agreed to send a seven-member ministerial committee to Amman on October 22 to prepare a united Arab strategy to be presented to the forthcoming 11th summit conference.

Defending his country's support to Iraq in its war with Iran, the minister said that such support was not motivated by a spirit of aggression but it was to help [words indistinct] its (?historic) rights.

Minister al-Qasim urged other Arab countries to take a clear stand on this war saying that such stand would help pressure Iran to come to terms with Iraq and to keep the Gulf region free from foreign intervention.

Answering a question on the big powers' reactions to the war, the minister said that these powers, which have vested interests, wanted to impose their dominance over the whole region. Thus, he added, prolonging the war and the draining of the military force of the two combatant countries would help these powers achieve their goals.

He said that only serious action through Arab solidarity could block any attempt by these powers for polarising the Arab world. He asserted that such Arab solidarity would be viewed by the U.S. as a direct and real threat to Israel--its agent in the Middle East.

CSO: 4820

TWO FATAH LEADERS ATTACK JORDAN

Interview With Abu Iyyad

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 17 Sep 80 p 11

[Text] Abu Iyyad Says, "Campaign of Slander Against Palestinians To Evacuate Them From Gulf; We Try To Talk to Jordan, and Jordan Arrests Our People; Phalangists Failed To Assassinate Sarkis; Oil Weapon Not Used Out of Fear of United States."

A prominent Palestinian official has charged Jordanian intelligence with detaining Palestinians and Jordanians and has warned against a disaster in relations between the Resistance and Jordan.

He expressed his astonishment with the campaigns of slander being launched in the Gulf region against the Palestinians to justify their deportation.

The Palestinian official, who is Salah Khalaf [alias] Abu Iyyad, revealed that the Phalangists had failed twice in attempts to assassinate Lebanon's president, Elias Sarkis. Abu Iyyad called for Palestinian solidarity with Syria to confront the challenges.

Abu Iyyad, the second man in the Fatah Movement, which is the largest Palestinian organization, was speaking in an interview with AL-SAFIR which was printed yesterday.

He acknowledged that "The present state of relations between the Palestinian Resistance and the Jordanian regime is creating numerous difficulties for us."

He added, "While Palestinian officials were going to Jordan to sit around the negotiating table with Jordanian officials, Jordanian intelligence was launching campaigns of raids and arrests against our Palestinian and Jordanian peoples."

Review

In his interview with AL-SAFIR Abu Iyyad hinted that the Resistance may "reconsider" its present relations with Jordan. He said: "That the Jordanian regime should continue to be the sole beneficiary of its relations with the [Palestine] Liberation Organization either through obtaining Arab funds or through political action to achieve a United Arab kingdom, is a matter that requires an urgent review, because continuation of such relationship without controls will lead to disaster."

The Oil Weapon

Abu Iyyad added, "One begins to get the feeling that the Arabs do not want to introduce the oil [weapon] into the battle for numerous reasons, chief among which are fear of the United States, fear of U.S. occupation and fear of confronting the United States." But he said, "This fear is unjustified, because if we were to place barrels of gunpowder under the oil wells, and threaten to blow up the oil wells in case there is any threat to the sovereignty of this or that [Arab] state, no power in the world--not the United States or anybody else--would dare to even think of occupying or invading any Arab country."

He said, "I believe that some Arabs do not want to use oil in the battle by threatening to cut it off, by controlling its prices or by selling it to friendly countries at lower prices. Therefore, they resorted to endorsing the European initiative, so as to cover up their positions and claim that through their efforts Europe has begun to lean in favor of our cause."

Abu Iyyad called upon Syria and the Palestinian Resistance to rise and confront the challenges. He said, "If we and Syria do not rise and confront the challenges with a united effort, the Arab situation will deteriorate further."

Abu Iyyad also called on the Palestinian Resistance to take up its position in the Syrian-Libyan union "in whose vital center it must be."

Abu Iyyad accused the command of the Phalangist party's militia of working to implement an Israeli decision to settle the Palestinians in Lebanon.

He said that the Phalangists' insistence that the battle against the Palestinians should continue in effect sets the stage for their resettlement [in Lebanon].

Abu Iyyad accused the Phalangist party of trying twice and failing to assassinate the president of the Republic of Lebanon, Elias Sarkis.

The Denunciation Campaign

Regarding what is being said about expecting the Palestinians to have a role in future disturbances in the Gulf states, Abu Iyyad said, "The purpose of these rumors is to drive a wedge between the Palestinians on one hand, and area residents and incoming Arabs on the other, so as to justify deporting the Palestinians from the area and strengthening U.S. presence in it."

In this regard, Abu Iyyad denounced the explosion at AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM newspaper, and said that the Resistance condemns such action and would not allow any person who is related to the Palestinian Revolution to undertake it.

Abu Iyyad expressed his surprise with the campaigns of slander that the Palestinians are being subjected to in some Arab countries. He said that the Resistance would not refuse to bring any guilty Palestinian to trial, but that it is opposed to contrived campaigns against the Palestinians.

On the other hand, Abu Iyyad emphasized that the Palestinian Resistance had documents to prove that the Lebanese Phalangist party had participated in the explosion that took place in the Italian city of Bologna last month. Many people lost their lives in that explosion.

He said, "Terrorists from a number of Fascist West European parties are being trained in training camps run by the Phalangist party." He added that Fascist elements of these parties were being trained to carry out sabotage activities in Western Europe.

Interview With Abu Sharar

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 17 Sep 80 p 11

[Text] Abu Sharar Tells AL-WATAN: "Jordanian Move Under Way To Abolish Role of PLO."

Rome--Majid Abu Sharar, member of the Central Committee of the Fatah Movement, has accused Jordan of making considerable material gains since the Baghdad Summit which allocated 1.25 billion dollars for Jordanian steadfastness. In a statement made to AL-WATAN, Abu Sharar said, "Jordan did nothing all through these years to confront Israel." He went on to add that "through the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee To Support Steadfastness in the Occupied Territories, Jordan was able to gain much and not lose anything. Jordan took part in managing the affairs of our people in the occupied territories and expanded the front loyal to it."

The Palestinian official indicated that "Jordan has recently begun to present itself as a representative of the Palestinian people along with the PLO."

He said, "We can now say that we hold an opposite position."

Abu Sharar expects an eruption resulting from this incompatibility between the Resistance and Jordan to take place in the coming months.

He said: "We are now gathering available information about Jordanian diplomatic moves in Europe, the United States and the Arab region. We have evidence to prove that these communications are all based on abolishing the role of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people."

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FUROR OVER JERUSALEM STATUS SHAKES ISRAELI GOVERNMENT

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 4 Sep 80 p 9

/Article: "War of Words Settles Over the City of Jerusalem"/

/Text/ Meron Benvenisti, former mayor of Jerusalem, has said, "If the Arabs say that they feel intense affiliation with Jerusalem, we must believe them. We are not the ones to judge the extent to which that sentiment is real." He does not expect that the Arabs will accept occupation under any circumstances and considers that the solution to the problem of Jerusalem will be the final step along the road to a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Benvenisti says, "On our part we must pursue every necessary policy, if only unilaterally, to improve the living conditions of the Arabs of Jerusalem, and not take any political steps which will have the effect of shutting out the options of the future and making the Arabs feel that their existence is endangered."

The fact is that the unification of the city of Jerusalem, in the eyes of the Jews, means the incorporation of all areas lying within the limits drawn up directly after the 6-day war. These do not just include sacred and historical sites but apply also to geographic features like the strategic hills and the airports lying close to the Jewish settlements. We even find the leader of the "Peace Now" movement, in a private discussion he had recently with his friends, defending the restoration of occupied territories, "except for Jerusalem." He said, "I admit that I am not correct on this matter, but I insist on the need that Jerusalem remain united." He failed to reply to a question on whether unity could be imposed by one population group on another.

Jerusalem remains the city of peace, but, in spite of that appelation, this city has witnessed wars no other city on the face of the earth has witnessed. We can describe the current war looming in the skies over Jerusalem as one of words, comprising political decisions, parliamentary statements and improper allegations on the part of various parties.

The negotiators who are trying to create a permanent peace in the Middle East continue to admit that Jerusalem will prove to be the most difficult problem of all to resolve. For this reason they incline to put it to the side, preferring not to think about it until everything else is settled.

However, Menachem Begin, by putting his weight behind the memorandum from an Israeli parliament member who appealed to turn Jerusalem into the eternal, indivisible capital of Israel, has put the future of the city in the center of the picture. In reality, through this decision of his, Menachem Begin has given the Arabs anxiety over the destiny of the city and created willing ears for Arab protests on the status of Jerusalem which many people had ignored in the past.

Thirteen countries whose embassies are situated in the city have declared their determination to move their embassies to Tel Aviv, including most of the embassies which moved recently, especially that of The Netherlands, which is considered one of the most intensely supportive of Israel.

In the same city, the "laws of the city" are rarely subject to amendment. These laws emphasize the mere followup of the changes which began 13 years ago when Israel occupied the Arab half and quickly incorporated it into itself. Since then, Israel has tried, through tremendous construction plans, to expand and deepen its grip.

Jerusalem is considered a holy city to all three religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. As far as the Jews go, it is the old city of David and the site of the first and second temples. For Christians, it expresses the greatest moments in the life of the Messiah. As regards Moslems, it is the place from which the prophet Muhammad (on whom be God's blessings and peace) ascended to heaven.

However, the number of adherents to these religions who have any understanding of the reality of this city, which is distinguished by the great use of car horns, traffic congestion in its small modest commercial establishments, and its narrow buildings and alleys, in addition to some modern outskirts, is limited.

For 19 years of its long bloody history, the city was divided by barbed wire and stones. Jordan administered a part and Israel administered the other part. Nonetheless, the reality created during the period between 1948 and 1967 left permanent traces on Jerusalem. When the Israelis invaded Jordan and occupied the Jordanian Arab part of the city in 1967, they found the city totally different from the one they had known.

Because they occupy direct common borders close to their commercial centers, the governments of Israel and Jordan neglected the two parts of the city. In Israel, Tel Aviv and the other coastal cities experienced most of the development programs, while in Jordan the city of Amman and the other East Bank towns enjoyed most of them.

One of the things which inspired laughter among Jews in Israeli Jerusalem in the period before the 1967 war was riding the bus to Tel Aviv. As regards Jordan, Jerusalem was the city of merchants who provided services for thousands of tourists and pilgrims coming from various parts of the world to visit the holy sites.

In June 1967 the two parties were compelled to resume contact in a sudden, savage manner, and here the shock was mutual. The Arabs looked with perplexity at the Israeli traffic lights and the girls in their Hot Pants. The Jews were likewise surprised by a series of shops selling Western goods at low prices.

The life which has gone on for 13 years had done nothing to bring the views of the Arabs and the Jews closer and improve relations between them. Rather, it has worked to deepen the cleavage, because Israel's determination to intensify its grip over the city has led to the alienation of the Arab inhabitants.

Thus the Jewish section of the old city was regained and rebuilt with the utmost care. In addition, residential buildings closer to fortresses were built in a manner surrounding eastern Jerusalem with the objective of defending it from attacks from the east, and the Arab section was surrounded by a wall of Israeli presence.

The result is that Jewish sections are spread about inside present-day Jerusalem now while some of the Arab inhabitants live inside them. West of the city lies Israel and to the east lies the West Bank with its Palestinian inhabitants, who feel increasing anger over the spread of Israeli buildings. Although Israel incorporated east Jerusalem in 1967, Israeli legal experts doubt the legality of this action. In spite of their awareness of the non-legitimacy of their demand for the Arab city, they have permitted Arabs in east Jerusalem to continue studies according to the curriculum in Jordan. They have also permitted Arabs to acquire citizenship, but, if they fail to take advantage of this initiative, Israel does not do anything to compel them to do so.

Thus Jerusalem remains two cities--a quarter of a million Jews living in west Jerusalem where the Jewish sections are, while there are more than 100,000 Arabs living in the old city and the eastern sections, which remain wholly Arab. Perhaps the construction of Jewish buildings has led to the elimination of the material boundaries, but every Arab and every Jew knows the map through which the partition line that is not now evident passes.

If we view matters from the logic of force, we can state that Israel committed a great mistake in 1967 by failing to expel the Arab inhabitants and then claim that that occurred under the impulse of voluntary group emigration. However, the Israelis were bewildered when they found themselves occupying the Arab section of the city; they had not thought about the future problems the invasion of the city and the inhabitants would entail. It is not now in Israel's power to attempt to create such a

solution to the problem of Jerusalem, without creating a wave of doubts even among such allies as America.

Even the claim that the city is the capital of Israel raises a storm of protest. It does not appear that Menachem Begin wants to change this variable reality; if he did, he would not have exhibited all this interest in it. Because he is still living through his struggle of the forties, he is continuing to achieve his goal by returning all "the land of Israel" to Jewish dominance, out of his belief that the mistaken Western sympathy toward the Jews is evaporating somewhat in a world thirsting for oil. Through his support for the memorandum of one member of the Israeli Knesset on Jerusalem, Menachem Begin has drawn the attention of the whole world to Jerusalem and consequently to Israel's conduct and has succeeded in provoking the collective departure of embassies from this city which Israel wants all countries of the world to consider the eternal capital of Israel.

Thus the struggle which has gone on for a number of years to stress that Jerusalem is the capital of Israel has come to face an embarrassing destiny. In view of the fact that the objective revolved about the internationalization of the city, in accordance with the partition plan drawn up in 1947, no state has officially declared its recognition that Jerusalem is its capital. The Netherlands, which for a long period continued to display great sympathy toward Israel, raised the level of its diplomatic representation in Jerusalem from that of a consulate general to an embassy. However, no other European country tried to emulate it. In the sixties, Israel persuaded a number of Latin American countries to open their embassies in Jerusalem, but the number of embassies did not exceed 13.

The fact that the major Israeli officials actually prefer to be in Tel Aviv provokes ridicule. Menachem Begin lived there in a small apartment for 30 years and moved to Jerusalem only in 1977 when the victory in the elections gave him a residence in the "capital."

The members of the ruling Likud coalition, who bore journalists, commercial organizations, and businessmen with their frequent appeals to move to Jerusalem, tend to become tongue-tied when faced with a question on why the coalition's political headquarters are still in Tel Aviv. In spite of the intellectual stumbling and bumbling on Jerusalem, Tel Aviv remains the commercial and cultural center of the state, containing the companies, banks, theaters, symphony halls and museums of art.

In spite of all that, Menachem Begin claims that there is broad intellectual consensus among Israelis on the need to keep Jerusalem Israel's undivided capital. The fact that the opposition Labor Party voted in favor of the Jerusalem memorandum emphasizes that the former ruling party shares the Likud bloc's view. Even Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat, the only Arab leader who has striven toward peace with Israel, admits that the issue of Jerusalem is very complicated, finding it preferable not to raise it until all the other issues are discussed.

However, his reasons, which are well known and deep rooted within himself, are that he has chosen to adopt measures which have made Jerusalem the issue of the hour at a time when the autonomy talks have become stalled and only a few months remain until the American presidential elections.

By passing the Jerusalem Law, Menachem Begin has made the future of negotiations on the destiny of the Arab section of the city more complicated and consequently has forced the United States, which is Israel's main supporter, to be concerned with the developments occurring in the city. This renewed concern has also stirred up a number of expectations among Arab inhabitants. They have made protest demonstrations in past years and now hope that the world will wake up to their catastrophe.

In spite of the thousands of jobs available to them in Israeli companies and the Israeli social benefits they enjoy, the Arabs of Jerusalem still feel that they are not part of Israel. They still hope that the city on whose territory they live will become the capital of palestine someday.

After 13 years of Israeli occupation and ineffective international protests and condemnation resolutions, the Arabs have no faith in any international solution to their problems in Jerusalem. They know that Israel occupied Jerusalem through the use of force. Most of them consider that the proper way to create a change in this situation will also occur only through the use of force. However, peaceful coexistence among Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem can only really be achieved when both parties enjoy equal political rights and neither party is subject to the other.

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LATEST INFORMATION ON ISRAELI OCCUPATION BROADCAST TO WORLD

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 4 Sep 80 p 18

/Article: "Letter from Amman: Declarations from the Occupied Territories: a Call To Confront the Zionist Plan To Judaize Jerusalem"/

/Text/ Following the confiscation of land, the spread of settler communities throughout the West Bank and the total judaization of Jerusalem, the Israeli occupation authorities are trying to judaize the education law in the occupied West Bank. Israeli Military Order No 854, issued at the beginning of August, amending the Arabic education law, is nothing but a new attempt to strip the domestic Arab universities of their freedom and independence, impose the Israeli education officer on them, and place them under the dominance of military rule, because the universities are waging a vicious struggle in the occupied territories to confront the judaization process, the confiscation of land and the evacuation of legitimate inhabitants from the towns and villages.

The masses in the occupied territories are now embarked on a heated struggle to thwart the effect of the military defense order, which submits the universities and institutes to dominance by the occupation. In occupied Jerusalem, the executive committee of the Council on Higher Education of the Union Federation met and issued a statement condemning the Zionist step. Herewith is the text of the statement:

"The executive committee of the Council on Higher Education declares and states the following:

"1. Order 854 issued by the occupying Israeli forces on 6 July 1980, which is an aggression against the Education Law (No 16 for the Year 1964), is a clear violation of international agreements and the Fourth Geneva Convention, which explicitly stipulate that the laws prevailing prior to the occupation are to remain and be adhered to.

"2. The amendment of Subsection Two and Subsection Eight of the Education Law contained in Order 854, making no distinction between elementary and

university education arising therefrom, is a violation of the sanctity of education and a belittlement of its status and level.

"3. The amendment of Subsection 26 of that law, placing university teaching staffs and professors under the jurisdiction of what is called security legislation and administrative orders, is aimed at suppressing the freedom of university professors and putting them under constant intellectual terror and has the goal of forcing experts and competent persons to evacuate the occupied territories and emigrate from them.

"4. Subsection 59, Paragraphs A, B and C, is amended in a manner whereby a military official will govern higher education affairs who may consult with the regional commander and the police commander and give them the right to adopt measures fettering the institutions of higher education and universities with military personnel who can appreciate the responsibility of these institutions only through a viewpoint obscured by military verdicts and security illusions.

"5. Considering educational institutions, including universities, existing on the West Bank, to have received temporary permits as of 8 July 1980 according to the contents of Order No 854 is a diminution of these universities and is contradictory to their firm presence and their effective activities, which have enabled them to acquire international recognition. It threatens the progress of these universities in the qualitative and quantitative senses and exposes them to grave dangers, including shutdown. Order 854 is no less grave than previous acts which have been condemned by Palestinian and international citizens and institutions inside and outside the occupied territories. Among the actions the military authorities and personnel of the Israeli army have taken in the past year we mention breaking into universities and institutes, aggressions against students by beating and firing on students, inflicting various wounds on many of them, the arrest of a large number, their imprisonment and the sentencing of a number of students to pay exorbitant financial penalties. We do not believe, after all this, that the goal of Israeli military occupation is the interest of higher education.

"Therefore the Council on Higher Education and its executive committee condemn this order, demand that it be abrogated and that everything derived from it be abrogated, and request all universities and higher institutes, from boards of trustees to departments, faculties and students, to be cognizant of the gravity of this matter and to take appropriate positions to guarantee freedom of education and expression.

"We also request the Unesco organization, the United Nations and all people working in the sphere of higher education in its various organizations in all areas of the world to strive to stop orders of this kind and to guarantee freedom of education for the people of the occupied nation at a time when many of their rights and freedoms have been taken away."

Statement by Bir Zayt University

A statement of condemnation has also been issued by all departments in Bir Zayt University. The statement declares that the university refuses to deal with the Israeli decree or respond to it because it is in contradiction with the essence and independence of the university and its academic freedom and is in contradiction with educational concepts followed in all areas of the world.

Here is the text of the statement:

Statement of Condemnation Issued by All Departments of Bir Zayt University

"In accordance with the conviction of the trustees, administrators, professors, employees and students of Bir Zayt University, the danger latent in Order No 854 issued by the military governor of the West Bank on 6 July 1980, which was conveyed with three other orders bearing on education to the vice president of the university on 30 July 1980, is embodied in the following points:

"First, amendment of Education Law No 16 for the Year 1964 is in contradiction with international laws, especially the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which stipulates that occupation authorities do not have the right to change the systems the occupied country had been following.

"Second, stipulating that one must obtain written permission from the military governor to work as a professor or join as a student in the university is unacceptable because it violates the powers of the university and totally ignores the sound academic principles followed to appoint professors and accept students. Conversely, the powers which have been granted to the military governor in this regard in accordance with this order absolutely do not specify the bases on which he can rely.

"Third, this order is contradictory with recognized educational legislation through its application to universities of the provisions of the education law, which was basically codified for institutions below the university level, whereas this latter law basically and clearly excepts university institutions from its provisions.

"Fourth, this order conflicts with general legal principles in considering military provisions and administrative detention a basis for preventing professors from engaging in the academic tasks they are qualified to perform, and putting this law into effect is basically illegitimate.

"Fifth, placing the university under the authority of an education officer in a manner turning the university into an organization which has implicitly received a temporary permit is in contradiction with the powers and responsibilities of the board of trustees of the university and its administration and negates the legitimate status which the university has

acquired by virtue of its membership in international university federations and its scientific links with distinguished universities in various countries.

"In accordance with all this, all departments of Bir Zayt University declare their decision not to deal with these orders and stress their refusal to respond to any orders which will have the effect of conflicting with the identity, independence, continued performance of duties and academic freedom of the university and will also have the effect of contradicting the educational concepts followed in all areas of the world. They also urge all local authorities concerned and international educational authorities to strive to preserve the academic freedom which all international custom acknowledges."

Statement by Dr Nasir

In Amman, Dr Hanna Nasir, the director of Bir Zayt University, whom the occupation authorities banished years ago, stated that the Israeli defense order is to be considered one of the most dangerous schemes aimed at thwarting the role of the universities and preventing them from performing their pioneering role as educational institutions aimed at supporting and implanting our people and enabling them to persevere in the occupied territories.

In a press statement, Dr Nasir said that the Israeli law violates international agreements and the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibit amending or changing what had prevailed prior to the occupation. Dr Nasir said that the Federation of Arab Universities and universities and higher educational institutions in the Arab countries must take charge of the task of defending the academic freedoms in the universities and institutes of the occupied territories and present their cause at all levels.

Herewith is the text of the statement which Dr Hanna Nasir issued:

"The universities in the occupied territories are facing a vicious campaign by military occupation authorities. While these universities are constantly struggling for their freedom and independence, the Israeli occupation authorities on 6 July 1980 issued Military Defense Order No 854 amending Education Law No 16 for the Year 1964.

"According to this law, the universities and higher institutes in the territories occupied in 1967 are connected to an Israeli education officer--that is, are placed under the dominance of military rule.

"This law is to be considered one of the most dangerous schemes aimed at thwarting the role of the universities and preventing them from performing their pioneering role as higher educational institutions, whose existence is aimed at support and implanting our Palestinian people and enabling them to persevere in the occupied territories.

"The gravity of this amendment comes from the fact that it:

"A. Has violated international agreements and the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibit the amendment or changing of laws which prevailed on the eve of the occupation. This amendment is another step by the occupation authorities to incorporate the occupied territories and impose their dominance over them.

"B. Linking the universities and higher institutes to the Israeli education officer is to be considered a blatant transgression against the academic freedoms and sanctity of the universities. It is well known in all countries of the world that universities arise and grow independent of any intervention from any party, that these universities generally exercise their academic freedoms without supervision or intervention by anyone, and that the only bodies which supervise them are their academic senates, which the board of trustees cooperates with in a consultative, guidance capacity.

"C. This amendment gives the Israeli education officer the right to isolate or prevent the appointment of university professors and employees. This in turn is another uncouth intervention in the academic freedom of the universities and is not permitted by any legislation.

"It is widely known that university professors must enjoy absolute academic freedom and it is forbidden to impose any body upon them. Removal and appointment decisions are conferred only on the academic senates of universities; for an education officer to resort to this system means hiding behind the broad shield of Israeli security to practice intellectual terror against the professors in the university and deprive it of experts and competent persons. The occupation will resort to this weapon to punish the universities for positions that do not please it. That will consequently lead to forcing these competent persons to emigrate and applying the policy of evacuation.

"D. Linking the universities to the education officer will give him the right, as it did in the schools, to interfere in the instruction of curricula and the promulgation of teaching plans, which will by necessity remove these universities from the Arab educational goals which adhere to the great Arab heritage and civilization and from goals set out through the study of other human civlizations to transfer knowledge and progress to the scions of the Palestinian people. The education officer will resort, as he did in the schools, to proscribing hundreds of books and preventing them from being used in the universities, and that will deprive these universities of their most sacred possessions, books of various intellectual sources and origins.

"E. The military governor has notified university presidents on the West Bank that he would prohibit them from accepting students from the Gaza Strip or areas occupied since 1948 or from making contracts with professors from these two areas except by special permission of the military governor.

This is an obvious repressive policy to prevent contact among the people of a single nation and gross interference in the internal affairs of the universities.

"F. The same governor notified university presidents that the acceptance of students who had been convicted for security or administrative reasons would be subject to the agreement of the education officer alone. This would mean depriving the cream of the scions of our people, who voluntarily gave years of their lives as a sacrifice to the nation in the terrible prisons of the Zionist occupation, of their natural right to receive an education in their national institutions, which were established to serve all the members of the people. This will also give the education officer himself the right to demand that the universities terminate anyone engaging in activities against the occupation. That is another devious aim which has the goal of evacuating the universities of fighting men and limiting their activities of fighting against the occupation.

"G. The amended law considers that the existing universities have acquired a new permit. That will expose these universities to the penalty of closure--now in the name of the law. This is in contradiction to the existence of these universities, which, over the past years, have proved their permanence and their effectiveness, enabling them to obtain international recognition.

"H. Application of the amended law means abrogating the role of the universities in one form or another and turning them into educational institutions subject to the direct dominance of Israeli military rule. This is another application of autonomy. The occupation, without incurring any material cost, will directly supervise these universities.

"What is the occupation's objective in this amendment, and why has it started applying it now?

"It is well known that the universities and higher institutes in the West Bank have in recent years been turned into advanced points of collision against the Israeli occupation and they have played an effective role in challenging the autonomy schemes, the Camp David conspiracy, settlement, and brutal Zionist terror.

"During the years of occupation, these universities have been exposed to intrusions by the Israeli army, the detention of professors and students, their beating and shooting, and the killing of some of them. The occupation authorities have also imposed, and are imposing, obstacles in the way of the acquisition of new professors, provision of the necessary laboratories and equipment, and so forth.

"In addition, as a result of the failure of their plans to impose autonomy on the inhabitants of the occupied territories, the occupation authorities in the past months have, thanks to the firm, heroic resistance of the scions

of our Palestinian people in the occupied areas, escalated their techniques of repression against our people. They have banished mayors, committed aggressions against Bassam Shak'ah, Karim Khalaf, and Ibrahim Tawil, prevented the mayors from performing any activity, and prevented and prohibited any activity by national institutions in the occupied territories. Now the universities' turn has come to be thwarted and prevented from continuing to perform their pioneering role. They have amended this law and imposed what we have already referred to. Through this, they intend to pull the thorns of this role and make it yield."

What Is Needed To Stand up to the Scheme

There is no doubt that the basic role in standing up to this terrible scheme lies on the shoulder of our universities and institutes in the occupied areas and the national institutions there. The Executive Committee of the Council of Higher Education on the occupied territories has issued a statement rejecting the amendment to the law and demanding that it be abrogated. The universities and unions of employees and instructors in the universities and higher institutions (al-Najah and Bir Zayt branches) have issued statements condemning the illegal amendments issued by the military governor.

However, we cannot leave the task of standing up to these schemes on the shoulders of the universities and institutions of the occupied areas alone; the Federation of Arab Universities and universities and institutions of higher learning in the Arab countries are requested to assume the task of defending academic freedoms in the universities and institutes in the occupied areas and to present their just cause in all international contexts, including the Unesco organization, the United Nations, and the International Federation of Universities, in order to stop the intellectual terrorism which the military authorities are pursuing against educational institutions in the occupied areas.

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PALESTINIAN CALLS FOR RADICALIZATION OF POLITICAL CLIMATE

Damascus SAWT FALASTIN in Arabic Aug 80 pp 20-22

[Article by Ibrahim al-Rahib: "Lest We Put Our Heads in the Sand, Like Ostriches--The Palestinian Revolution and the National Revolution"]

[Text] The Palestine National Congress will meet at the end of August, in order to bring about national unity of the various elements of the resistance within the framework of the Liberation Organization, to discuss and hold to account the Executive Committee for all it has accomplished in the framework of political action and organizational and military plans in accordance with the recommendations and resolutions of the last National Congress, and to evaluate new developments on the international, Arab and Palestinian stage. Proceeding from this complex of issues, it has been necessary to set forth all views related to these basic matters with the aim of helping develop our struggles and criticizing some negative aspects which have accompanied the national action during the current phase.

On the Issue of National Unity

Since the Palestine Liberation Organization emerged, in spite of the transformation which has occurred in its situation, its base and command, the group of leaders who have held responsibility have not been able to crystallize and lead the national unity plan, although the nature of the struggle we are engaged in does not pose an obstacle to the achievement of this plan. It is a national liberation struggle in which all classes of the Palestinian Arab people are in agreement except for a minority which has tied itself to the adversary's camp--a minority which our people have been able to expose and lay bare, to the point where Israel has declared that it has not been able to come up with even a small number of people to deal with concerning the autonomy plan. The reason national unity has not been attained may be ascribed to the absence of a real major organization leading the people of Palestine, which alone will be able to lead this kind of historic achievement, and to attempts at organizational self-advancement at the expense of the national cause.

The lack of objective democratic dialogue and evaluation of every stage of political action has been another cause obstructing the national unity plan. The Palestinian arena has witnessed an intense struggle in this context since the glorious October 1973 war.

The Palestinian national unity which must be achieved is not a formal unity but a unity founded on clear military, organizational and political foundations. Its final goal is the liberation of Palestine, and any unity outside this context will remain illusory and tentative. At the same time, national unity demands the formation of real collective leadership bringing all detachments together, provided that this command commit itself to the essence of the National Congress resolutions.

National unity requires that all organizations be granted the same material and moral opportunities to develop their action. This does not mean absolute equality among various detachments, but it does mean mobilizing all powers and giving them real resources to serve our people's struggle. It is not permissible for ideological differences to constitute an obstacle to granting just equitable support to all organizations. In this stage the central enemy is imperialism, zionism and reaction. This powerful enemy, with its resources, demands that we open the gates wide to all fighting men without exception.

The Palestine Liberation Army and some Palestinian organizations must not remain outside the scope of national unity. Reality and the nature of the stage we are passing through make this mandatory.

National unity means that all Palestinian organizations will participate in fair proportions in all base and command institutions of the Liberation Organization; it is not permissible that the organization's institutions be left to one detachment to the exclusion of another.

National unity means the mobilization of all the masses' powers in the struggle and the placing of a limit on all errors and privileges which constitute a barrier between the masses and the organization.

National unity means "let a hundred flowers bloom."

A Stock-Taking Position

Revolution means, specifically, commitment and practice, the combination of theory and application; resolutions which contain revolutionary sentences without applying some, or just capriciously applying them, are the same as no resolutions. In this context we do not want to repeat former criticisms and stories; we only want to mention, and perhaps the mention will be of benefit. What is needed is the following specifically:

Holding to account everyone who has made certain statements which infringe on the essence of our national struggle under the pretext of the need to

win world public opinion over through moderate positions. We are not beggars; rather, we are people with rights and a homeland which are not in any way subject to argument and controversy.

Taking to account every body which has constituted an obstacle to support for the Palestine National Front within the occupied territories and has refused to participate in it, because this has been one of the resolutions of the Palestine National Congress. On this occasion it is necessary that we point out that parties inside the occupied territories which have committed themselves to the National Front sent more than one memorandum to the Liberation Organization command asking it for more support, and the response was negative.

Taking to account the manner in which a basic portion of support and perseverance funds for the struggle of the Arabs in the occupied territories has been spent. This portion has been disbursed to some proteges, cronies and persons who are the enemies of the Liberation Organization and the Palestinian people's revolution. These sums were disbursed at a time when the national commanders of municipalities were complaining of the scarcity of resources at their disposal. We state bluntly that there are now people in the occupied territories who are rich as a result of the material resources which have reached them, but they have had no contact with true revolutionary action.

What we are presenting in this list is partial but not complete.

The Palestine National Congress is requested to make an absolute decision in the international context on three major issues:

1. That the United States of America is the basic, central enemy of the Arab liberation movement. All the experiences of peoples have proved that American imperialism will fight with all its resources and those of its agents for its privileges in the Arab area, and Israel is one American military base which performs a basic feature of this task. In brief, what is required is that we liberate ourselves from the mentality of illusions, superstitions and middle-of-the-road thinking in our view of the nature and the role of the United States in the region. The issue is as clear as the sun.

2. The struggle between the European countries and the United States, whose severity rises at times and falls at other times, is aimed only at putting pressure on the United States for the sake of better distributing the pillage in the area among all parties of the imperialist camp during this stage, now that the European countries have grown politically, economically and militarily in the stage following the Second World War and the United States, as a result of confronting the revolutions of peoples in various areas of the world, has become weak. At the same time, if we assume for the sake of argument that Europe is able to adopt an independent initiative (which is far removed from the current situation),

this initiative in essence is an imperialist one because they are capitalist monopolistic regimes and politics is a true reflection of the economic system of every country in the world.

3. The Soviet Union, the entire Socialist system and the truly liberated nonaligned countries are the natural firm ally of the Palestine national liberation movement.

4. Our relations in the imperialist countries must be concentrated on the real popular organizations and forces existing there, because these forces are our true allies and because they are part of the process of revolutionary change which will take place in these countries.

On the Arab Situation

The perseverance and steadfastness states have faced further domestic and foreign conspiracies to shift their positions of principle toward the Israeli entity, in order to weaken them and push the Camp David conspiracy through. Syria has witnessed a series of reactionary factional movements, supported by Arab reaction and imperialism, and Algeria has also witnessed tribal movements, under the guise of Berber culture, aimed at moving its national entity and thwarting its role of supporting Arab and international liberation movements. In addition, South Yemen has also witnessed the formation of a reactionary front hostile to the revolution under the leadership of al-Sadat and his regime through apostate groups which have lapsed from the path of true revolution, and this has been the situation as regards Libya.

Some Arab countries standing between the perseverance and steadfastness front and its clear positions, and al-Sadat's capitulationist camp, have started an attempt aimed at promoting the European initiative, in order to justify some of their steps along the road to surrender. The response of the perseverance and steadfastness camp and the resistance movement, with most of its detachments, to this initiative, and their rejection of it, have played a prominent part in stopping the process of sliding toward capitulation; the lack of clarity of the European initiative itself has played a role in this context. Those who applauded the European initiative found themselves applauding Camp David. The coming days will be replete with surprises and shifts, negative and positive, which is what we must be on our guard against as regards the countries standing between the perseverance camp and al-Sadat's camp.

Arab attempts have been made, under brilliant national slogans, to split up the perseverance and steadfastness front; these attempts have failed, but at the same time the role of some Arab bodies in assaulting the Iranian revolution from within and without has grown.

The United States has consolidated Egypt's military role in an obvious fashion in order to repress the Arab liberation movement. The Egyptian

concentrations along Libya's borders and the takeoff of American planes bringing the American raiders to Iran are only some items of material proof of that.

Some Arab bodies have supported the process of conspiring against Syria through training, arms and financing, because Syria constitutes a basic citadel in the current stage in the face of the plot which is aimed at consecrating Israeli occupation of the land and of man.

To achieve a strategic balance with the enemy, Syria has propounded the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union.

In the Palestinian Situation.

The Palestinian situation has experienced a continued Israeli policy of repression domestically and abroad, the confiscation of more land and water, the construction of settlements, and the intensified expansion of the number of settlements on the bank, the strip and Golan. This stage has also witnessed a serious escalation of armed action against the occupation, rejection of the autonomy plot, and rejection of the European initiative because it does not achieve some of our people's aspirations and because it is part of the ludicrous political melodrama which is aimed at deceiving our people.

What Is Our Conclusion?

The Palestine National Congress must realize a single fact, which is development and maturation of a military, economic and political strategy founded on one basis--"either us or them". Every vision outside this framework is a childish one aimed at making justifications in the best of cases. Victories will be achieved by the forearms of our people and our Arab nation, through its true revolutionary vanguards, and we must not put our heads in the sand.

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CSO: 4802

BRIGADIER GENERAL SA'D SAYIL INTERVIEWED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 1 Aug 80 p 11

[Interview With Brig Gen Sa'd Sayil; "Brig Gen Sa'd Sayil on Palestinian Revolution's Military Action and Its Spheres of Development; Palestinian National Council Focuses on Merger Military Unity; We Are Doing What We Can to Avoid Striking Innocent, if There Are Any; Iranian Revolution Has Brought About Strategic Change in Favor of Arabs and I Am Surprised That Some Arab Forces Face It With Such Hostility"]

[Text] Since joining the Palestinian revolution's military forces in September 1970, Brig Gen Sa'd Sayil, alias Abu-al-Walid, has assumed prominent positions of military responsibility. He commanded al-Yarmuk Brigade and was then appointed chief of the central joint military operations chamber in Lebanon. He has also held the position of secretary of the revolution forces general command. In June 1980, Brigadier General Sayil was elected by Fatah's fourth general congress to the membership of Fatah's Central Committee and the membership of al-'Asifah forces general command.

Before joining the Palestinian revolution forces, Brigadier General Sayil was an officer in the Jordanian army which he joined in 1951 after completing his high school studies in Nabulus. He has studied in Jordanian military institutes and in a number of other Arab countries. He then attended specialization courses in Britain and in the United States. In the latter, he completed his studies in the Military Staff College. In the Jordanian army, he assumed several military positions, including the position of commander of the engineering unit of an infantry division and commander of an infantry brigade--the position he left when he joined the revolution forces.

The magazine SHU'UN FILASTINIYAH [Palestinian Affairs] conducted an interview with him last June and will publish this interview in its edition today. In coordination with SHU'UN FILASTINIYAH, AL-SAFIR publishes here excerpts of the interview.

[Question] Critics of the Palestinian revolution censure it for the fact that its operations at home [in occupied Palestinian territories] are aimed

against civilians. Despite the varying motives behind the criticism, it remains true that a number of operations have been aimed against civilians. It also remains true that this creates political problems for the revolution in its international relations and provides substance for hostile propaganda. What is your opinion on this issue?

[Answer] Any fair military or political observer cannot, in many cases, distinguish between what is military and what is civilian in Israel. The difference between the two is very weak, especially when we learn that in this regard Israel has an almost unique situation in the world. This fact must be present and clear to the mind when our operations are assessed.

Second, contrary to the exaggerated hostile propaganda that seeks to undermine the revolution's reputation, we are eager not to harm innocent civilians. I have the honor to say that the instructions given for any of the Palestinian revolution's operations contain frank provisions on avoiding any harm to old men, women and children. It has become known now that the old men, women and children killed in some of the operations were killed by the bullets of the Israeli army itself in its confrontation against the Palestinian revolutionaries.

Third, we face a situation in which the enemy, with its equipment and its official agencies, strikes our civilians openly, in broad daylight and with premeditation and planning. The enemy is doing this within the framework of a large-scale annihilation campaign for which enormous resources are available. So can we stand idle in the face of such criminality? This question is important, isn't it?

[Question] In Israel, a distinction can be made between two types of civilians: A type that is not different from the army and that includes the civilians who perform semi-military operations and the settlers who usurp the land and build their settlements on it and another type that does not interfere directly in such actions. Nobody disputes the legality of the actions aimed at warning the usurpers. However, the others can be avoided.

[Answer] We do our best to avoid the innocent, if they are found. Our fighters are fully aware of this. However, in the turmoil of war and because of the nature of war, civilians cannot be completely avoided, even when they are innocent. There has been no war from whose consequences civilians have not suffered. I am talking about that which we cannot prevent in our operations against the enemy. As for taking aim at the civilians as such, I believe that this is something wrong that we try hard to avoid. I expect the matter to become more clearly tangible to the entire world in the future.

[Question] Do you think that the results achieved by the armed resistance in the occupied territories are compatible with the available resources and with the enormous readiness of the Palestinian fighters to sacrifice?

[Answer] I have already said that many will be surprised by the qualitative step that we will realize in our military operations. I expect this step to materialize in the near future, without underestimating the difficulties that we face. It is a step that will include a change in the kind of targets and in the method of the operations. With this, we will crown the experiences and the sacrifices that have accumulated throughout the past years. Meanwhile, I will admit that our operations have developed slowly in these years. Matters had to proceed gradually and normally from one phase to a more advanced phase.

[Question] This leads us to a more general question. The popular atmosphere in the occupied homeland shows maximum readiness for sacrifice and a high national spirit. The people have confronted the occupation troops with stones. This means that if more effective weapons were available to them, the local atmosphere would be ready for a comprehensive armed uprising. Do you think that the silence of some Arab sides and the negative attitudes of others are obstructing a comprehensive armed uprising in the occupied territories?

[Answer] This constitutes the main reason or the strategic factor, and not just one of the reasons. The closure and silence of the Arab borders are the fundamental factor. If these borders were opened and if the fronts were stirred up, we would achieve what every Arab citizen aspires for and the revolution's military operations would move to advanced stages rapidly. When I speak of the difficulties facing us, I do not confine them to the difficulties created by the Israeli enemy. What I want to make clear is: We are facing non-Israeli difficulties, including closure of the Arab borders in the face of our fighters. If this issue is solved and if integration is realized among all the Arab countries, we will provide a strategic factor for the triumph of the revolution, especially since the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front in which we participate is open to all the willing Arab countries. In its present condition, and even if it attains an ideal position, the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front controls no more than 10 percent of the borders. This is in addition to the fact that the borders it controls are not connected with the densely populated Arab areas in our occupied homeland. This requires other Arab countries to join this front, particularly Jordan because its accession will open big spheres.

[Question] Is there grounds for the hope that Jordan will join the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and will adopt its goals?

[Answer] Insofar as Jordan is concerned, matters are proceeding very slowly. I hope Jordan will join the front because its accession will strengthen the Arab confrontation. But I cannot say that this will be accomplished or realized imminently, especially since there are fears that Jordan will join the Camp David line. These fears are justified, even though the Jordanian officials continue to make successive assurances and declarations. Perhaps it is useful to note that Israel's intransigence and actions provide automatic and convincing proofs of Israel's goals and the nature of the Zionist

movement and what this movement harbors for the entire Arab nation. All this can only be faced with confrontation. The Palestinian revolution has chosen the instrument of armed struggle. The others can be convinced that this instrument is the most successful and is the only instrument capable of confronting the Israeli intransigence.

[Question] Don't you think that what has happened in Egypt on the hands of al-Sadat regime constitutes a warning of what may happen in other Arab countries?

[Answer] We should not allow caution to prevent us from struggling. There is no doubt that what has happened in Egypt constitutes an enormous loss, not just a warning. However, we do not ignore the resources and capabilities of the Egyptian people who, I think, are not pleased with what has happened. Consequently, the Egyptian people are not pleased with the alienation imposed on them by the regime toward their Arab brethren. There are numerous good omens in the Egyptian opposition that has emerged recently. I believe that the Egyptian people will sooner or later restore their natural position in the Arab nation. Under all circumstances, we must work ceaselessly to create a state of Arab detente and integration in order to confront the Zionist enemy.

[Question] Do you think that the actual course of the Palestinian relations with Jordan serves this goal?

[Answer] Our talks with Jordan are proceeding slowly. It is noticed that Jordan wants to coordinate with us at the international level but that it refrains from such coordination at the level of the domestic Jordanian arena. There are things which we hope will be carried out, especially those on which agreement had already been reached and which have not been carried out yet--including, for example, increasing the size of the Palestinian Liberation Army in Jordan. Matters are proceeding hopefully but slowly, as I have already pointed out.

[Question] How does the issue of the Palestinian national unity and its developments reflect on the revolution's military action?

[Answer] It is my belief that the work of the forthcoming session of the Palestinian National Council will focus on this issue, especially since the council's previous sessions have stressed its essentiality. I also believe that we will realize in the next session a more advanced position in the direction of national unity. Military unity is what crystallizes the results of strengthened national unity. It has been possible so far to realize a number of unifying frameworks on the Palestinian arena, especially in the military sphere. These frameworks tend toward unification. We have, for example, the Supreme Military Council which forms the framework for a supreme military command and in which all the Palestinian organizations are represented. There is also the joint command which directs the joint daily military action. Our brothers in the Lebanese National

Movement and Pan-Arab [al-qawmiyah] Front participate in this command. There are other frameworks that form a nucleus for completing the military unity. Many of the agencies, especially the administrative agencies, are ready for unification. I believe firmly that the forthcoming National Council session will crystallize this issue and will open the way for a merger military unity. I hope this will happen because the lack of national unity causes the loss of many scattered efforts, especially in the military sphere. If the efforts are united, we will attain a much better standard.

[Question] Do you think that the conviction as to the error of the presence of many decision-making and executive circles exists by the same degree among all?

[Answer] I believe that the conviction exists among all. I hope that we have reached the phase of complete maturity. I stress that there is a feeling among all the factions that national unity must be attained.

[Question] How can the political, financial and organizational problems be solved, how can talk of the fear of domination by the major organization [Fatah] be eliminated and how can the influences of the foreign circles on the Palestinian arena be removed?

[Answer] Regarding the political position, the PLO political program presented to the latest session of the National Council represents a base for the unity of this position. I do not imagine that there is disagreement on this program. This is comforting. Concerning the financial matters, the latest Arab summit held in Baghdad has offered very big facilities that enable all the factions to be financed by the Palestinian National Fund--the PLO Fund. There may be fears regarding the issue of domination and perhaps some factions fear domination by Fatah. However, I imagine that the factions are convinced that Fatah represents not only the vanguard but also the major sector of the Palestinian people. Fatah includes Palestinians with different political backgrounds, both partisan and nonpartisan. There isn't in Fatah or in its leadership anybody who thinks of the question of domination on the Palestinian arena. The experiences that we have gone through side by side with the other factions have proven that Fatah is not seeking domination. Fatah, because of its size, may want the major share and the other factions approve this. Fatah shoulders very heavy responsibilities. It is the one that shoulders the major burden of the big responsibilities, whether in combat, in spending or in the political efforts. This is felt and is well known. We in Fatah are eager to spread reassurance throughout the Palestinian arena. The question of domination is out of the picture.

[Question] We notice that in addition to the U.S. political and economic influence, the U.S. military presence in the Middle East is also escalating. What is your visualization of the impact of this presence on the Palestinian revolution's action?

[Answer] The U.S. position is becoming clearer and more evident to us, especially with the escalating military presence in the Gulf area. It is my belief that several Gulf countries are committing a big mistake in the issue of giving facilities to the U.S. forces. How can somebody be concerned with the Gulf security and then invite the U.S. forces to enter and be present in the area?

The presence of the U.S. forces will tempt the forces of other major powers to enter. The chances of conflict will intensify and the area may reach the stage of open military conflict and may become open to all. It is well known that there are relations of friendship binding certain states in the Middle East with a state such as the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union cannot permit the United States to have a free hand [istibahah] in the area and this will, consequently, open the door for major military conflicts. I do not think that reaching this state would be in the interest of any of the area's countries and it is not in the interest of the Palestinian cause.

[Question] How does the triumph of the Iranian revolution affect the military aspect of the conflict map?

[Answer] The United States used to rely on two powers in the area: Israel and Iran. The two were entrusted with protecting the vital U.S. interests in the area. Whoever familiarizes himself with the armament and the military resources that existed in Iran in the shah's era becomes aware of this fact. This is why the Iranian revolution's triumph has introduced a strategic change. The balances of power in the area have changed insofar as the United States is concerned. This is why the struggle is intensifying to drag Iran backward. The problems sweeping Iran are being fanned within this framework. I believe that a better atmosphere must be created between Iran and the Arab area and that stability must be achieved inside Iran itself so that it may become strong because its strength is in the interest of the area's liberation movements, especially the Arab movements. I am surprised by some Arab forces which confront the Iranian revolution with such hostility. I believe that there is a struggle over the question of where Iran stands. We want a strong Iran that supports the Arab liberation movements. We are playing a role to create a state of good neighborliness between Iran and the Arab states. The Arab response is still slow and there are pending issues. But we are proceeding in this direction.

As for our military relations with Iran, they are, like the relations in all the other spheres, growing and they will witness many developments in the near future.

[Question] Briefly, what are the foundations of the combat doctrine of the Palestinian revolution forces?

[Answer] Our creed is clear and is based on liberation. The foundations of this creed are liberation of the Palestinian soil. Our theory is based on the need to liberate the land.

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SYRIA SEEKS INCREASED TRADE WITH KUWAIT

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 28 Jun 80 p 51

[Article: "Syrians Are Trying to Regain What They Have Lost in Gulf Market; Syrian Products Fair in Kuwait in Preparation for Setting Up Permanent Trade Center"]

[Text] Can the Syrian industrial and handicraft products apportion themselves a bigger share of the Kuwaiti market than they now have?

Both Kuwaiti and Syrian sources answer this question affirmatively. The answer to the question came on the peripheries of the talks held by a Syrian delegation in Kuwait last May. The delegation concluded its talks with the Kuwaiti minister of industry and trade and with the director of the Kuwaiti Fairs Company with an agreement to set up a special 15-day Syrian products fair in Kuwait, beginning on first of next December.

This conviction which has developed in the mind of the Syrian delegation and of its two Kuwaiti hosts is based on several facts. The first of these facts, according to Husayn al-Zu'bi, the head of the Syrian delegation to the talks on the agreement to set up the fair, is that Syrian products used to hold a prominent position in the Kuwaiti commercial market. This position has declined in recent years but there is nothing to prevent its renewed expansion.

The decline of the Syrian products in the Kuwaiti market is due fundamentally to the free economy system adopted in Kuwait--a system which subjects Kuwait's trade to the law of supply and demand and attracts goods from all parts of the world to compete on the strength of their specifications and their prices. This decline is not due to a deterioration in the qualities of the Syrian production but due to a lack of efforts to introduce and market this production. "The Syrian business men working in Kuwait, says al-Zu'bi, assert that there is a lack of knowledge in Kuwait regarding the industrial developments in Syria and regarding the Syrian goods that may be in demand in Kuwait and that familiarization with these developments can lead to marketing these goods." No single side is responsible for this situation.

Kuwait and Syria have a specific trade agreement that stipulates that a joint committee of the two countries meet once a year to discuss the progress in implementing the agreement and the problems facing it. Even though 5 years have passed since the conclusion of the agreement, the committee has not met yet. Perhaps this reality explains the complaint of some Syrian exporters, as the exporters say, regarding the customs fees to which some Syrian products exported to Kuwait are subjected and regarding the lack of the facilities necessary for the Syrian products to enter Kuwaiti market and be sold there.

From this angle, if the Syrian products fair in Kuwait is a lively and appropriate means to begin wide-scale familiarization with these products in the Kuwaiti market, then the talks held by the Syrian delegation for the aim of setting up the fair have alerted both sides to the error of not convening the joint committee called for by the trade agreement between the two countries. The talks have also put both sides on the way to deal with this error through their agreement to summon this committee to hold a special meeting in the near future to discuss all the issues concerning the provisions and implementation of the trade agreement and leading to facilitating entry of the Syrian products to Kuwait.

The results of the talks did not stop at this limit but went beyond to an agreement to have the Kuwaiti minister of commerce and industry head his country's delegation to the seventh International Damascus Fair which will be held from 20 August to 8 September 1980. Dr Husayn al-Qadi, the Syrian minister of industry, will then visit Kuwait in November 1980 to hold various negotiations on the possibilities of investing Kuwaiti capital in Syrian projects, especially in the tourism sector, and to spur Kuwaiti tourism to Syria.

But what will Syria exhibit in Kuwait?

Generally, the Syrian fair will include products by the public and private sector firms and craftsmen's products. If the information made available to the Syrian delegation by the Kuwaiti sources and by the Syrian business men working in Kuwait indicates that textiles, underwear, shoes, glass products and some food products top the kinds of products that are likely to find demand in the Kuwaiti market, then this same information has urged Husayn al-Zu'bi, the head of the Syrian delegation, to draw the attention of all those wishing to participate in the fair to take into consideration high quality, flawlessness and good packaging of the units selected for display as necessary conditions for the success of the fair and for attracting the Kuwaiti merchants toward Syrian goods, considering that the Kuwaiti market abounds with high-quality goods from various sources. Moreover, the information has urged al-Zu'bi to warn as of this moment that success in exporting to Kuwait requires abidance by the delivery dates and, consequently, by shipment conditions and schedules.

Another time: Can the Syrian industrial and handicraft products enlarge their share of the Kuwaiti market?

The answer this time depends on what the Syrian exporters from both the public and private sectors will do in the forthcoming fair. There is no doubt that these exporters will exert adequate efforts for success, not only to win a bigger share of the Kuwaiti market but also to win a bigger share of the Gulf market because the Kuwaiti importers import not for Kuwait only but also through Kuwait for the entire Gulf area, considering that Kuwait is a regional commercial station in the area. Success in the expected fair may constitute a good start to take up a suggestion which the Syrian delegation heard from the Syrians working in Kuwait who have drawn the attention of this delegation to the need to set up a permanent trade center for Syrian products in Kuwait similar to the trade centers set up by other countries in Kuwait--centers which constitute a permanent point of communication between the export possibilities of each state and the Kuwaiti market needs.

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PLO SPOKESMAN DISCUSSES ISLAMIC MINISTERS' CONFERENCE IN AMMAN

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 12 Jul 80 p 19

[Text] Amman--Mr 'Abd-al-Muhsin Abu-Mayzar, official spokesman for the Palestine Liberation Organization, said that the convening of the Islamic States' Foreign Ministers' Conference in Amman has taken on a special importance.

Abu-Mayzar told AL-DUSTUR that the PLO has prepared a draft resolution which is under consultation by the members of the Islamic Conference, and that it will be crystallized in its final form after these deliberations.

He said: "The Palestinian delegation will present a working paper and a number of documents and studies which deal with the general situation in the occupied Palestinian territories, and the difficult and grim circumstances facing our people."

He said: "The conference convened at the request of brother Yassir 'Arafat, chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, in order to discuss and confront the dangerous developments being witnessed by occupied Palestine. It will seek to confirm Arab Islamic solidarity and its absolute adherence to the heroic struggle of our people in the occupied nation."

Appraising the activities of the Arab Foreign Ministers' Conference, he said: "The political document issued by the Amman conference constitutes one of the most important Arab documents issued in recent years. Furthermore, the conference's rejection of security council resolution 242, calling it a resolution which does not come to terms with the rights of the Arab nation, especially with regard to the Palestinian problem. This is considered one of the most important achievements of the conference. It is a unanimous Arab blow to the principles of the Camp David accords, and is considered a response to the United States and some European states who still cling to that resolution."

Abu-Mayzar said that the Amman paper encompassed important political issues and that the unified Arab stand recorded in this document concerning these important issues will produce great positive effect that will go beyond the Arab region and will be felt on an international level.

Mr Faruq Qaddumi, chairman of the PLO's Political Office, said that the Palestinian delegation, in a statement, detailed the oppressive measures taken by the Israeli occupation forces and the terrorist acts it has perpetrated against our struggling Palestinian people.

He said: "We want this conference to produce permanent and well-defined resolutions and measures in order to confront the terrorist, oppressive campaign which is being launched by the Zionist energy within our occupied land, to extend support and aid to our people."

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JOURNALIST DESCRIBES SOVIET IMPASSE IN AFGHAN WAR

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 26 Aug-5 Sep 80

[Article by correspondent Olaf Ihlau]

[26 Aug 80, p 3]

[Text] The Stillbirth of the Codless Devils

Kabul, in August--"You had better not drive up there any further; up above are the Russians with their cursed tanks," a fantastically decked out fruit dealer shouts at us in warning as he comes down the mountain trail on the double, dragging after him a donkey laden with two sacks of Paradise apples. The red-brown sandy path is torn up by tank-track marks, which lead the shady avenue uphill past abandoned summer villas. Through the treetops, the karstic massif of the Paghman mountain range shimmers grey-blue.

It is a splendid summer day. Normally, it ought to be just swarming with visitors to the groves and parks of the Paghman Health Resort, which had been built in the 1920's by the reformer king Amanullah as an excursion resort and refuge for the well-heeled residents of the hot valley basin of Kabul. But nothing has been normal any more in the heartland of Asia for a long time now. Even last summer, when the Russians in Afghanistan were not yet presenting themselves as occupiers, but only as "advisers," the gardens and palaces of Paghman had lain there deserted and barricaded. Because this mountain hideaway just under 20 kilometers outside the capital had been occupied several times by Moslem insurgents and subsequently recaptured by government soldiers.

A magnificent summer day--and a Sunday, a week after which certain Western news agencies out of Delhi will announce, with reference to "reports of travelers," that the Soviets had killed more than 300 people with retaliatory bombings in Paghman and had forced thousands more to flee in the direction of Kabul. A piece of scare news, at all events with respect to such embellishing and proportioning, as is most of what has been coming out of this mountainous region in the Hindu Kush in the way of front-line reports for months now. We encounter no refugees either on the trip out to Paghman via the southern route or on the way

back past Kharga Lake. In the village itself we see no bodies, no traces of fighting, not one destroyed house. The only things of note are that three Soviet armored personnel carriers are drawn up in front of the town hall, and below the "Red Mosque" at the side of the street a taxi lies riddled by bullets. In this black Mercedes had sat three local functionaries of the Babrak Karmal regime who had been shot in an ambush of the Moslem rebels 2 days before. Later, a news agency converts this incident into 30 dead Afghan soldiers.

This assault had called the Soviets to the scene. They had moved up with three dozen tanks and armored personnel carriers, had posted themselves in a semicircle above the health resort, and had fired into the mountains. Apparently rather indiscriminately. Then their initial deployment had been supported further by a flight of helicopters of the type MI-24 D--those missile helicopters with a moose-like nose which so far are still the most effective weapon of the Russians against the Afghan fighters of their religious war. These death-dealing dragonflies had "dropped something small," reported an eyewitness, "and then there was a wall of flame 20 to 30 meters wide." On the basis of such observations, Western diplomats in Kabul conjecture that bombs containing a phosphoric incendiary substance were probably employed there. These suppositions conform to the impression that the Soviets are now responding to every pinprick of the guerrillas with counterstrikes in overkill proportions, in their present effort to surround the capital with a cordon sanitaire for the protection of their protege's regime.

One might interpret such overreactions as a consequence of the failure of Moscow's former military tactics, which were if anything bent on restraint. Because at the beginning of the ninth month of their Afghanistan occupation, the "Godless devils"--as the warriors of Allah call the invaders from the north--quite obviously are facing a military as well as a political stillbirth. Neither has the Kremlin managed to install a stable government with Babrak Karmal and at least to win over an appreciable portion of the population, nor has the morale of the mujahidin been broken. With its own increasing losses of men and materiel, for the eastern superpower the Afghanistan military venture has become a commitment full of setbacks. The military resistance of the guerrillas is proving to be more durable than was expected by the Russians; it has not slackened despite considerable losses among the civilian population. In meetings with Western and non-aligned diplomats, members of Eastern embassies have conveyed the impression recently that "Misha" no longer exactly knows in what direction he should turn: The Soviets, it is said, have reached an impasse militarily, and politically they are at a dead end. An early stability can scarcely be expected in Afghanistan; on the contrary--the war of attrition could last another 1 or 2 years "before gradually a new structure grows out of the ashes of the present period."

There is booming, buzzing, and rumbling without letup over Kabul. The explosions on the mountain ridge near the civilian airport ostensibly serve the purpose of laying out underground ammunition depots and rocket

emplacements. Within 6 weeks, since the beginning of July, a new, enormous military camp has arisen beside the runway of the airfield--a camp which contains around 5,000 soldiers and which now forms the operational base for all the flight operations of the Soviets within the greater Kabul area. It takes our DC-10 of the Afghan airline company Ariana 22 minutes following its landing, before like a timid foreigner it has wheeled past large Antonov transport aircraft, MIG jets, and incoming helicopter squadrons with emptied rocket launchers to the parking position in front of the main building. The Russians are making no secret of the fact that Kabul's airport is under their control alone.

In the Stays of the Watchdogs

And moreover, this is also true of everything that in any way has importance in Afghanistan's capital. The key ministries have been laced tight in a corset of Soviet watchdogs, and in the most important agencies and at Radio Afghanistan, Soviet security people are keeping vigil. The demoralized remnants of the Afghan army enjoy a special franternal guardianship, and Babrak Karmal, the new leader of the revolution imported 9 months ago with Moscow's military intervention, is practically a prisoner of his patrons. "He is not allowed to go alone even to the bathroom without his Russian guards," says a disillusioned Afghan party politician who occasionally obtains access to the strictly guarded complex around the "House of the People," the former king's palace, in whose granite halls the present viceroy of the Kremlin lives entrenched as if in a bunker.

A good 12,000 Soviet soldiers have drawn a ring around Kabul made up of dug-in tanks, antitank howitzers, and rocket emplacements. Under their guardianship, people's militiamen of the party--in fact, of the "Parcham" wing of Babrak Karmal--make a weapons search of every car and bus which wants to come into or go out of the city. "Chucha-e-Russ"--Russian sonnies--the Afghans hiss contemptuously when the inspectors with their heavy machineguns are out of hearing. The often very young party cadres are virtually "corpses on call," in more danger even than any Soviet soldier. Because they are always being preyed upon not only by snipers of the mujahidin, but also by the inner-party rivals belonging to the nationalist-oriented "Khalq" faction, according to the motto: "The Russians will be weak only when we in Afghanistan have exterminated the domestic Russians."

In organizing murder attempts against party functionaries, the anti-communist guerrillas seem to be able to chalk up one success after another to their credit. In the provinces, this selective extermination strategy has already crippled the administration and the educational system to a large extent. All of Karmal's avowed party-liners who can manage to do so remain in Kabul, that citadel which for the time being is still half-way safe. How hopeless for the regime the situation has grown outside in the countryside was hinted at a short time ago by Kabul's party secretary, Abdul Razmdscho, in a talk with Radio Moscow.

Razmdscho complained of the difficulties in the fighting against the "counterrevolution" and alleged: "The bandits are robbing the transport vehicles which bring in foodstuffs. They are burning down grain crops. At present, this is making it impossible to lower food prices. The enemies are murdering our party's activists, teachers, doctors, and farmers." And although Razmdscho then added very heroically that "we will not let ourselves be intimidated," nevertheless this assertion has little to do with a description of how things really are.

Wherever the Soviets cannot or do not want to be--and such areas amount to the more than 80 percent of impassable territory of this central-Asian mountainous country--either the mujadihin, apathy, or chaos holds sway. Of the about 30,000 soldiers of the Afghan army who remain in the barracks, at most only half are still considered to be combat-ready, and even here only to a limited extent. In combined operations the Soviets drive their Afghan comrades-in-arms ahead of themselves, to be on the safe side. If their columns fall into an ambush, the Russians remain near their tanks and vehicles, shoot into the mountains, and wait for air support, but seldom do they give chase to the attackers. Also, so far the Soviets have flown in no special troops of any kind, such as mountain infantrymen, for systematically combing out rebel hideouts. "Obviously, this conscript army which has been trained for battles over large land masses in the West and East is not geared to guerrilla fighting in a country of high mountains," say Western military experts when they make an initial summing up of Moscow's military entanglement in Afghanistan.

It has been calculated--by the Americans, naturally--that it is costing "Misha" about $5 million dollars daily for his stay in the Hindu Kush. Supposing the rebels have been coming into possession of surface-to-air missiles, which for some weeks now has surely been happening more and more frequently, and if now and then they are shooting down one of the dreaded MI-24 helicopters, then if anything this sum would even be understated. Because a single one of these craft--at present they are probably the best equipped combat helicopters in the world--represents alone a value equivalent to about $3 million.

It is as difficult as ever to estimate how great the losses in human lives are. The losses of the Soviets, who now have 110,000 men in the Hindu Kush, are likely to run into the thousands by this time. To be sure, the rumor that every night a plane leaves Kabul Airport with 25 Russian caskets aboard certainly springs from an Afghan pipe dream, but it is definitely true that here and there symptoms of demoralization are appearing and that the Soviet supreme command feels compelled to rapidly and regularly replace its troops in certain precarious localities. Western diplomats with experience from World War II are by no means surprised at this: "After all, it has been drummed into their heads that they are welcome as friends, and then they have to look into hate-filled faces everywhere, they have no time off, no diversions, not even a brothel. After all, they are only human."

The Soviet soldiers--they are just kids for the most part, many of them straw-blond, with likable faces. One sees them looking searchingly out of the windows of the trucks and armored trains which roll with supplies in endless convoys from the north toward Kabul. Many of the vehicles are carrying prefabricated parts for barracks. The bear is already preparing himself for the winter. Every 8 kilometers, alongside this most important connecting road of the Russians over the Salang Pass to Kabul, there is an entrenched sentry post with three or four tanks. Along the Paghman mountain range helicopters are patrolling.

I travel through the fertile Koh-i-Daman Valley up to Istalif, a village some 50 kilometers from Kabul which clings picturesquely to the mountain foothills and has a park in which the great Babur, the founder of the Indian Mogul dynasty, is said to have felt quite at home once. The diplomats in Kabul are not allowed to come here any more: Occasionally, the government and Russians risk inspection visits. Apart from that, Istalif is possibly visited at various times by this or that mujahidin. At the bazaar, I am treated to grapes and peaches when it gets about where I hail from. The shopkeepers are all worked up about the leaflets dropped from helicopters the previous day, in which the help of the Soviet Union is extolled as an "act of God" and support for Babrak Karmal is called for. At the bazaar in Istalif, the answer to this is: "Allah will exterminate the Russians and the Russian sonnies."

[29 Aug 80, p 3]

[Text] A Ruler Without Subjects

Kabul, in August--To be sure, he still exists in radio addresses in newspaper photos, and in messages of greeting. Now and then he receives an Eastern bloc diplomat, a hand-picked group of tribal elders, or a taciturn mullah. But for the people, whom he purports to represent, he has never yet been seen in the flesh in the 9 months of his regency. He cannot allow himself to make public appearances in Kabul, let alone a tour through the troubled country whose chief of state he claims to be: Babrak Karmal, Afghanistan's revolutionary ruler by the grace of Moscow, is protected and hidden away by his Russian patrons like an irreplaceable treasure.

The personal safety of the 51-year-old man is considered to be so endangered--especially after the recrudescence of inner-party score-settling--that at present the Soviet bodyguard does not let its ward out of the citadel-like complex around the "People's House" in central Kabul. In this former king's palace, at one time called the "Argh," the despot Mohammed Daoud was killed by the revolutionary putschists in April 1978. Here, in late summer of the previous year the "great and wise leader" Taraki saw himself ousted by his "heroic pupil" Hafizullah Amin, who in turn lost his life 3 months later as a victim of the Soviet military intervention, although on the outside, in the chateau of Darulaman.

Prayers From the Bunker

At one time, Daoud used to drive around Kabul all alone and at breakneck speed in a middle-class car. Occasionally Taraki could be seen, only moderately guarded, going for a walk. Even the hated Amin was in the habit of scurrying about with only a relatively small escort, and if need be he was even his own, pistol-happy bodyguard. Such an unbridled freedom of movement is barred to Babrak Karmal. In order to protect him from being shot, the Russians have restricted his official activity to the "Argh" grounds, which they have closed off. Here, the sessions of the Revolutionary Council, cabinet meetings, and receptions take place, here there is a mobile clinic, a radio and television studio, as well as two escape helicopters in case of an emergency. Not only the guard detail but also the domestic and kitchen personnel are provided by the Russians. Karmal cannot even cough without their surveillance.

Nor pray, either. In any case, not where the devout Moslem people bow towards Mecca in one of the great Kabul mosques. At the close of the fasting month of Ramadan the leader of the revolution, accompanied by top military men, had to say his prayers in the mosque of his "Argh" stronghold. Babrak Karmal, who had had it proclaimed about himself that he wants "like the holy prophet Mohammed, to serve the welfare of the people as a humble believer," beseeched Allah for support "in the extermination of the enemies of the fatherland and the revolution," as well as for help "in bettering the condition of the working Moslems of Afghanistan." Thus it was reported the following day by the KABUL NEW TIMES and the evening color television broadcast, which showed a party leader who had become stout giving an awkward greeting, and praising the volunteers--who without exception are young and who are being sent into fire practically without any basic military training.

The creation of such "combat groups," which are to "tear apart the illegal network of the counter-revolution," had been decided on at the end of July by the party, which is giving highest priority to the fight against the rebels. With a detailed list of measures, all the party organizations and provincial administrations were instructed to recruit volunteers and "to complete the organizing of the forces fighting for the regime." This sounds like a calling out of the last reserves, and probably this is also what it is. Students, pupils, and teachers--the latter not being needed outside of Kabul in any case, because the village schools have been closed or burned down by the mujahidin--are being thrown into the battle carrying "banners of honor," in order to "open up the radiant path into the future for our country, against the savage force of imperialism and of reaction" (RADIO KABUL). However, the bunker regime has not been able to mobilize very many of these "fighting party heroes" so far. If one adds up all the figures which the KABUL NEW TIMES has given, there were no more than 340 of such people in 4 weeks. And this figure already includes the 100 mercenaries of Schinwari and Djadji

whom the regime--by exploiting the traditional rivalries between certain Pashtun tribes--had supplied with new guns and ammunition and had hired for an advance of 27,000 afghanis (about 1,200 marks) per participant for a mission in the Logar Valley. Babrak's predecessor in office, Amin, had already sought to pursue a "pacification policy" by similar means.

"We want their heads, you can have their money and their women"--with such catchphrases one tribe was stirred up against the other. In the Logar Valley, things went awry. At the beginning of August, when two buses were moving up with the Pashtun mercenaries, these buses fell into a booby trap of the mujahidin near the site of Sorch-ab ("Red Water"), and 42 people failed to survive this initial engagement. Meanwhile, the main burden in the fight against the Moslem guerrillas lies as much as ever with the Soviet military machinery, without whose assistance the Karmal regime--which if worst comes to worst can rely on only 2,500 loyal fighters--could not survive for 24 hours. Although many atrocity reports publicized in the West about massacres and extermination bombings are likely to be irresponsibly exaggerated--during a round trip 250 kilometers long around Kabul I see only three destroyed houses--yet surely these impressions are valid: That the Russians are striking increasingly harder, more indiscriminately, and more ruthlessly; that in this connection it is not so much the mobile mujahidin who suffer--rather, to an increasing degree the civilians who remain in their villages are the victims of such retaliatory attacks; that although the "Shuravi" (Russians) apparently have not repeated the use of poison gas, whose employment was once observed in the Kunar Valley, instead of this they are employing scarcely less perfidious means, namely blasting charges and plastic mines thrown out of helicopters, which look like colored sheets of paper, rocks, cigarette packs, ball-point pens, or watches. Thus, the hands and feet are ripped off not only of Allah's fighters, but also of women and children who cannot know what they are picking up. The eye clinic in Herat, a project which was headed by Canadian doctors with German support but which is now closed because of incessant battles, in the end had to treat 30 to 50 cases every day of serious facial injuries suffered by farmers from the surrounding area of this center of unrest in western Afghanistan. Here it is not difficult to imagine what the situation might look like in other regions which likewise belong to the "grey zones."

In mid-August in Herat, when the marauding rebel troops of a formerly notorious thief by the name of Nessar Schaliptre held the old bazaar occupied for 2 days, units of the 17th Afghan Infantry Division went over to the guerrillas. From their citadel, they fired at the attacking missile helicopters of the Soviets with heavy machineguns. In southern Ghazni at the end of July, the 14th Division mutinied when a new commander was about to be forced upon them from Kabul who belonged to the "Parcham" party wing of Karmal. A revolt developed, which could be quelled only by a major operation involving Russian helicopters and jet planes. Several hundred soldiers disappeared with the mujahidin into the mountains--in full gear and taking along with them Soviet surface-to-air missiles.

These examples make it clear why Babrak Karmal's bunker government has now given the catchword: "The party to the front"--whereas there is no more talk at all about the Afghan army. Because the troops, or whatever is left of them, are considered to be contaminated with "nationalism." It is said that over 80 percent of their officers is made up of followers of the "Parchami"-rivaling "Khalq" faction, which finds the transformation of Afghanistan into a better Soviet colony to be a "national disgrace."

It would be a gross simplification to attribute the dispute between the two party wings--which meanwhile has degenerated into a bloody vendetta--solely to differences of opinion about the Soviet presence. Personal, political, and ethnic antagonisms, which date back to the time of joint opposition to King Sahir Shah, are just as resonant here as the classical factor of Afghan clan conflicts. The "Khalqis" around Taraki and Amin ousted and liquidated the "Parchamis" of Babrak Karmal following the victorious coup against Daoud. And although at that time the Russians were backing the "Khalqis," on the other hand they kept in reserve in Eastern Europe the emigrant "Parchamis." Thus when Taraki failed and Amin developed into an unreliable fellow in the eyes of Moscow, the hour struck for the return of Babrak Karmal.

Mortal Enmities

The revolutionary leader presently in charge in Kabul would be a fool if he did not know that his role could be limited as well, that the Moscow stage-managers are likely to concoct a new scenario with other actors if the drama of Afghanistan gets out of their control. And it now looks like this may happen, because in an atmosphere of continuing uncertainty and fear, of mortal enmity within the party and growing pressure from outside, it is simply impossible for the Babrak regime to display normal governmental activities.

Marked out as a "Russian serf," which as a matter of fact he probably is not, Babrak Karmal accordingly seems doomed to ruin. It is said that he is plagued by depressions, is a heavy drinker, and often shuts himself up for hours at a time. He supposedly had his father, a retired royalist general, taken to the Soviet Union not long ago since the murder attempts against his family members and closest friends are increasing. When in his stronghold he decorates young party veterans with aged faces for their combat duty against the "terrorist gangs," these television images are ominously reminiscent of similar film themes from the last days of Hitler. "Your heroism will unforgettably remain in the history of our proud party and will enter for all time into its annals," Karmal addresses his faithful comrades. And the impression is almost as if he foresees or fears that the very next stage of this revolution will begin without him when he makes "the last request" to his young visitors "that you may also continue to maintain the utmost firmly-principled unity, perseverance, and endurance in the face of difficulties."

[1 Sep 80, p 3]

[Text] The Soviets Are Settling In.

Kabul, end of August--An important event for the diminished Western foreigner colony in Kabul is the soccer game "Germany against the rest of the 'world'" every Friday afternoon. The kicking takes place on the grounds of the "deutscher Verein," which lies at the edge of the new-town quarter of Shar-i-Nau beside an old fortress whose casemates are still being used nowadays as an ammunition depot. This is not a very cosy neighborhood, especially in a city which in the last 2 1/2 years has seen about a dozen coups, coup attempts, revolts, mutinies, a foreign military intervention, and demonstrations accompanied by street battles. Therefore it is understandable that this club remained empty for safety's sake when things heated up in Kabul.

To be sure, there is frequent rumbling and booming even in these August days, in which a deep-blue summer sky shines above the bare mountain ranges which surround the 1,800-meter-high valley basin containing the capital of Afghanistan. But these explosions come from the distance, somewhere in the Logar Valley or the canyons of the Paghman Massif, 20 kilometers away from the city. The kickers, tennis players, and bathers at the "deutscher Verein" seldom look up into the sky any more when a fresh squadron of Soviet missile helicopters whirs past above them. People have gotten used to seeing the Russians incessantly flying sorties against the rebel troops operating in the vicinity. "I do not feel endangered, I find the entire matter to be more like an absurd farce," says sarcastically a teacher who comes from Bavaria. He is one of that 10-membered contingent of teachers sent out from the FRG who are still doing service at the Amani Oberrealschule, the educational showpiece of German presence in the Hindu Kush established 50 years ago.

Relations Frozen

Besides the Federal border policemen of the Bonn embassy and three Swiss fitter mechanics, these teachers are the backbone of the "greater German" ball-kicker team. In former times, they used to play frequently against the Russians, but since the Soviet invasion that is not considered expedient any longer. With the collapse of the empty Interconti-Hotel, the "deutscher Verein" has become the last oasis for the diplomats, businessmen, and U.N. experts still remaining in Kabul. It is practically an international club, where also Hungarians, Czechoslovaks, and Poles like to show up. In any case, aside from the pro-Soviet bloc there are no longer many here in the way of foreign representatives. The countries of the West and most of the non-aligned states have recalled their ambassadors as a protest against the installation of the "Karmal puppet regime" and at most have left behind only charges d'affaires. Relations with the present regents in Kabul are frozen, and contacts still exist only on a "consular and technical level."

Occasionally there is something to put in order here, for example when adventurous tourists get into a fix, as happened to that 17-year-old junior high school graduate from Lower Bavaria not long ago, who thought it would be really neat to interest himself in Soviet radar installations. This curiosity cost him a few days spent in jail and in interrogations before the embassy could extricate him and put him on the next plane for Frankfurt. Others--the most recent example was the death of an Erlangen student--return home in a zinc coffin. As for daredevil undertakings such as were ventured by the publicity-seeking CDU politician Todenhoefer recently with his trek through the rebel area, one hears in the "deutscher Verein" only a unanimous commentary: "idiocy."

Meanwhile, the West's intention to "punish" the Kremlin through withdrawing from Kabul is proving to be an impulsive political act. Because with the giving up of Western positions, the Sovietization of Afghanistan is being made all the easier for Moscow. Soviet, East German, or Bulgarian scientists and technicians are moving in where instructors from the West have cleared out, and this situation is least of all to the liking of the Afghans, as one hears even from party-liners of Babrak Karmal. Significantly enough, so far no arrangements of any kind have been made on the part of the regime to impede the activity of the three remaining cultural institutions from the West still half-way functioning, or even to abandon them to the Eastern clutches. We are referring to the French-speaking Istiqlal Gymnasium, the German Amani Oberrealschule, and the Goethe Institute.

In the propagandistically simplified treatment of the Afghanistan topic in the West, the fact is frequently ignored that Moscow has had a preeminent position in the Hindu Kush for a long time. It had been Lenin's state which was the first to establish diplomatic relations with Kabul, when in 1919 King Amanullah proclaimed Afghanistan's independence from British colonial rule. By the way, Lenin's congratulatory letter contained a significant passage which was to turn up in similar formulations several times more in Soviet-Afghan documents: Namely, that the establishment of diplomatic relations opens up great possibilities for "bilateral aid in case of an attack from outside on the freedom or the property of Afghanistan."

The Americans have never committed themselves very much to the Hindu Kush. They recognized too late the geostrategic significance of this central-Asian mountainous country. Only two states have really been able to build up political, economic, and cultural influence in Kabul counter to that of the Kremlin, even though to a considerably more modest extent: France and the FRG, with the Bonn emissaries being lent a hand by a traditional pro-German attitude on the part of the Afghans, which probably also stemmed from a reflex to the previous British colonial times.

Generations of Afghan technicians, scientists, administrative officials, and politicians have gone through the Amani school, in the upper grades of which the natural-science subjects are taught in the German language.

Its most prominent graduate at the moment is Babrak Karmal. The leader of the revolution spent 13 years at this school under German direction, and he is indebted to it, as he once acknowledged, for "an educational experience which left a deep impression." Bonn spends about 1 1/2 million marks on this project yearly, with the sending out of 10 teachers even at this stage. Both the Germans and the French halved their teaching staff following the Soviet coup, but they have not dropped their cooperation with the Afghans. Meanwhile the French, in this respect always a half step ahead of the Germans, have even let the family members of the teachers return to Kabul. Because as paradoxical as it sounds, the situation with respect to safety has become more auspicious, at least for foreigners in Kabul, because of the "regulative factor of Soviet power." If a sort of Stalingrad psychosis prevailed among them earlier because in emergencies the first step was always the closing of the airport, now--after the Russians have settled in everywhere in this country--it is doubtless a certainty that the airport will be open and usable for any possible evacuations to the very end.

Like the Amani school, the Goethe Institute also cannot complain about any lack of interest on the part of young Afghans. The week before last, the 140 openings for the seven new language courses in German had already been booked up by the second day of registration. But like Bonn, Goethe also has applied brakes on its educational policy in Kabul. Aside from the language courses, occasional evenings of films, and perhaps a small exhibition of Afghan painters, nothing is permitted to function. To the annoyance of the institute's head, Hans Peter Apelt, who regrets "that the obviously existing possibilities of cooperation with Afghan agencies, for example with the educational ministry, cannot be utilized at present."

In contrast, the Soviets are seeking to establish their influence in Kabul with almost unrestrained ruthlessness in all areas. Despite vehement protests from viewers, the television program abounds with Eastern films, and the newspapers could have been edited in East Berlin or Sofia. Scarcely a day passes without some kind of aid and cooperation agreement being announced, signed, or renewed. An endless stream of "advisers" flows into the ministries, and 84 new lecturers from Moscow have entered service at the university. Afghan teachers are being sent to Eastern-Bloc countries for "advanced training," and young party cadres and soldiers are being flown to the fatherland of the working people for "crash courses." From that country, Lenin's heirs are helping out with gasoline deliveries, and they are sending their hard-pressed Afghan comrades donations of food and clothing which nevertheless are often accepted only with reluctance by even the most faithful of Karmal's fellow party members. That is, much of what is inundating the Afghan dwarf from the cornucopia of goods of the eastern superpower is not of choice quality. A Zurich printing expert, who was in a position to observe the working life of the Kabul government printing office throughout August, frequently heard bitter complaints there "about the most recent junk which our--friends--are sending us."

Since apparently from Moscow's point of view Afghanistan's ties to the Soviet Union ought to be of relatively long duration, at present new prefabricated apartment buildings are arising along the airport road, which will be occupied exclusively by Russian advisers and their families. There are plans to restructure the entire administrative system in accordance with the Soviet model. The proportion of agricultural cooperatives and that sector of industry under State control are to be enlarged. Afghanistan has joined the East's "Council for Economic Mutual Assistance" as an "observer."

Karmal: 'An Act of God'

Babrak Karmal does not tire of extolling the aid of big brother as selfless and as an "act of God." The matter is really quite simple, remonstrated the revolutionary ruler to a delegation of provincial elders from Bamian: "If you divide the world into six parts, one part is the Soviet Union. This is enough even for its great-grandchildren. Whatever you can name, they have it there. They have petroleum, natural gas, many mines, and sufficient farmland. They do not need to occupy any foreign country."

Need not, perhaps, but they are doing it here, then decking out such operations as relief measures. And in this matter Afghanistan has its historical experiences. In one of the broadsheets now circulating in Kabul as "night letters" which are being distributed by a resistance group of liberal intellectuals, there is a reminder of the case of the old Central-Asian trading city of Bukhara. In 1920, the Red Army marched into that city and eliminated the emir and the khanate. Kabul's King Amanullah protested against this occupation and reminded the Russians of the commitment agreed upon with Afghanistan "to honor the independence and freedom of Bukhara and Khiva, whatsoever their form of government, in accordance with the will of their peoples." Through the envoy Raskolnikov, the Russian government affirmed that it also was constantly endeavoring to maintain the freedom of Bukhara: "The entry and sojourning of a limited contingent of our troops in Bukhara was desired by the government of Bukhara." By no means, it said, can this "friendly support" be viewed as an interference in its freedom. "As soon as the government of Bukhara no longer deems this sojourn necessary, the troops will be pulled back."

Sixty years later, the Soviets actually had to change only the name of the city from this text in their defense of their Kabul intervention.

[5 Sep 80, p 3]

[Text] The Ritual of the Forced Confessions.

Kabul, end of August--In the presence of two soldiers armed with submachine guns in the rear--as if an enormous danger still threatened from this "lackey of imperialism"--21-year-old Mohsen Rezai reels off his carefully worded confession. At the Kabul foreign ministry, before

a hand-picked press and party audience, the Iranian citizen Rezai relates how he became a "counter-revolutionary soldier." Actually, being the offspring of a "religiously fanatic family" he wanted to support the anti-Zionist struggle of the Palestinians, he says with a thick voice. But then he claims to have fallen into circles which persuaded him that the anti-Soviet struggle for Islam in Afghanistan was not less important. Today, 6 months after his capture while engaging in "counter-revolutionary activities" in Kabul, the young Iranian knows that in doing this he let himself "get caught in the net of U.S. imperialism."

At all events, that is the way he proclaimed it. He has been booked for one of those coarse propaganda appearances which the revolutionary regime in Kabul arranges from time to time. Declarations of guilt such as that of Mohsen Rezai are supposed to corroborate "with irrefutable evidence" that an armed conspiracy "by the counter-revolutionary forces under the leadership of U.S. imperialism and of Chinese chauvinism, as well as by circles of the regional and international reactionary element" has been organized from outside the country against revolutionary progress in Afghanistan--something which supposedly confirms anew the rightness of the Soviet support.

Therefore, in the confession of the young Iranian all the propagandistic buzz words, terms, and threads of reference must also appear which are capable of supporting this all-inclusive charge, no matter how flimsy it may be: The weapons from American, British, and Pakistani stocks, for example, the Chinese copies of Soviet Kalashnikov submachine guns, radio sets of German manufacture, flow of funds from Saudi Arabia or Egypt, and, of course, the controlling hand of the CIA in the background. Thus, part of the ritual of such exhibitions is the definitive question, as if coming from the Grand Inquisitor, asked by the PRAVDA reporter about the military "training camps" for the counter-revolutionaries in the Pakistani border city of Peshawar. The "revelations" which Mohsen Rezai has to offer on this score certainly do not sound especially sensational: There he had "received instructions for acts of sabotage in Kabul" from Burhan-uddin Rabbani--a theology professor who heads the resistance group "Jamiat Islami"--and then had left Peshawar together with an Afghan.

Meanwhile, the claim that Western and Chinese weapons as well as Arab monies are finding their way to various Afghan resistance groups via Iran and Pakistan can no longer be seriously disputed. "The rebels are receiving weapons from outside, not to a great extent, but adequate to keep their actions going," the representative in Kabul of an Asian country believes he can say with certainty. It is no longer the case, he said, that the mujahidin are dependent on Soviet captured materiel alone. For example, the mines with which the guerrillas have now learned how to obstruct quite successfully the roads and trails in the interior of the country against Russian tanks and personnel carriers come from American producers. However, even this sceptical diplomat must admit that so far the insurgents do not have that weapon which alone could threaten the feared missile helicopters: Surface-to-air missiles. But

this, he said, will perhaps change yet in case of a possible further freezing of East-West relations and following the election of a new American president.

Similar apprehensions can also be heard from other Western-oriented circles in Kabul. Now and then such impressions harden into the charge leveled against the Americans that they are carrying on a "strategy of pure idealism." The representative of a West European embassy says in consternation: "The Americans rejoice like children over the fact that Misha like the United States itself in Vietnam, is in a fix here. But they do not seem to be worried much about what will happen to the people in Afghanistan. What they would probably like best is for all of us to strike our tents as well." Moreover, many Western and neutral diplomats are annoyed at the fact that much of what is communicated to the Americans in the exchange of information among colleagues gets into the Western news agencies shortly thereafter via Delhi and from time to time re-echos back again to Kabul over Western broadcasting stations so distorted and dramatically decked that even the U.S. military attache Jim Kelly has to admit: "Then I just have to run to the window to see whether I am even in the same city."

What will and what can happen in Afghanistan? At the moment, the Babrak regime has no other ambition than that of bare survival. When Moscow's protege announces ambitious economic and social programs, when he dreams of trade-union reforms, when IZVESTIA or L'HUMANITE reports that the people in Kabul understand the government "better and better," this is pure hocus-pocus. At present, the government cannot do much more than hope for Soviet successes in wearing down the Moslem rebels and apart from that for a political miracle which might happen perhaps in a neighboring country. "The GDR as well was ostracized and isolated for years," a functionary of the "Parcham" party wing tries to make light of the allusion to the ghetto existence of his government. Certainly, but there the Red Army had every point in the territory under its control, whereas in the mountainous country of the Hindu Kush not even 20 percent is under such control. To be sure, such arguments do not spoil the revolutionary optimism of Babrak Karmal's young follower: "We only have to stick it out. When the Tudeh party in Iran and the leftist forces in Pakistan have finally prevailed, then we will have succeeded also."

Against Pakistan, the "refuge of the regional reactionary element," the political pressure of the Kremlin has drastically intensified. The Moscow media and their Kabul offshoots openly threaten the military regime of General Zia ul-Haq, who is little loved in his own country, with "destabilization measures." It is said in warning that Pakistan will have to answer for the fact that it is letting its territory be made into "the marshaling area for an undeclared war of aggression against democratic Afghanistan." The key words are Baluchistan, the Durand-line, and Pashtunistan. In these areas, a fire can be kindled easily by the stirring up of latent separatist movements and the infiltration of guerrilla troops--which, rumor has it, have already been trained in Afghan

camps--and this could put the military junta in Islamabad in a predicament. That Zia is very much aware of this Achilles heel and does not dare to quarrel with the eastern superpower without American-Chinese backing can be concluded from the fact, among other things, that he is sheepishly silent about the Soviet violations of Pakistani air space. For weeks now, Russian helicopters and MiG jet fighters have been openly flying several times a day over the North-West Frontier Province.

In Kabul, where all the diplomatic means of extinguishing crises have evidently gotten stuck in deadlocks, they are waiting for the next military blows of the Soviets. About 200,000 to 300,000 soldiers more would have to be put into this central-Asian mountainous state by the Russians in order to close off to some degree the borders with Iran and next to Pakistan and to suppress the rebellion in the interior, it is the unanimous opinion of military experts, regardless of their nationality. But such a decision, which would be extremely momentous not only militarily but also politically, is not likely to be taken before the winter, before the result of the American elections. Until then, the newly-created "combat sections" of the party and the mercenaries hired by the Pashtun tribes are supposed to harass the "terrorists" more vigorously. Surely there are "no more than 30,000 bandits, who operate only in small units," says the political commissar of the Afghan army, Major General Gul Aqa, in an attempt to reassure the "revolutionary volunteers" before their engagement.

Hopes Placed in the King

The conflicts possibly will last for years yet, and thus Afghanistan will continue to bleed. Some day, then, the moment may come when the Soviets realize that they cannot impose any communist system on this Islamic country and also it becomes clear to the West that no solution can be achieved against the will of the Soviets. If one asks members of the urban middle class in Kabul what way out they see in this muddled situation, astonishingly enough he often hears an answer often given also by Abdullah, a social scientist trained in the FRG: "The return of King Zahir Shah from his Roman exile as a purely transitional solution; the king would be the saving shield under which we could come together again." Abdullah--of course, this is not his right name--heads a liberal resistance group and is one of the authors of the much-esteemed "night letters." Under the governments of Taraki and Amin, he lost half of the members of his family. To be sure, a victory by the radical-orthodox mujahidin, such as for example by the "Hezbe Islami" group around the fundamentalist Asketen Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, now residing in Peshawar, would be just as unsuitable to Abdullah: "If they march into Kabul, there will be chaos like in Iran."

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MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD VIEWS, ATTITUDES DISCUSSED

Interview With Al-Talmasani

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 7 Jul 80 pp 10-11

[Interview With 'Umar al-Talmasani, Muslim Brotherhood Leader, by Muhammad 'Uthman; "Debate on Religious Thought Persists; 'Umar al-Talmasani Takes Part in Dialogue and Says: No Right, no Left, no Nationalization and no Ownership Limitation in Islam; Following Example of Prophet in Dealings and in Character, not in Wearing Flowing Robes and Growing Beard"]

[Text] No discussion on the crisis of religious thought in Egypt can be started without participation in the discussion by 'Umar al-Talmasani.

'Umar al-Talmasani needs no introduction. He is one of the pillars of the Muslim Brotherhood and the man in charge of AL-DA'WAH magazine. Following is the text of the interview with al-Talmasani:

He starts by talking about the issue of the crisis in the religious thought and says:

The failure of the scholars and of the speakers to familiarize themselves with the truth of their religion, their interest in the western theories, their fascination with the western civilization and the poor state of the Muslims have made these scholars and speakers ask extremely surprising questions. If there is a crisis, then it is in the western thought whose philosophers and writers since Socrates, Plato and others and until the present have not succeeded in attaining a state of stability, security and peace. What is viewed as right by this one is viewed as wrong by that one and what is approved by this one is refuted by that one, even when it comes to fundamentals.

The Islamic thought has been spared this astonishing contradiction. It is true that there are in Islam imams and jurisprudents who have disagreed but their disagreement has been on subsidiary matters only. As for the principles, rules and fundamentals, there is absolutely no disagreement

between any of the ancient or modern ulema. If some Muslim thinkers believe that there is a crisis in the Islamic thought, then this is only because they have strained and exhausted themselves with social, philosophical and moral studies without giving their religion the same attention. The crisis is not in the Islamic thought but in the minds of some Muslim thinkers. Let them pay attention to studying all aspects of their religion, especially in the books which they call unjustly the yellow books, and it will then become evident to all where the crisis lies and whether it is in the Islamic thought or in the minds of those who carry the name of this thought.

Left and Sayyid Qutub

[Question] How does the Muslim Brotherhood visualize the solution to the social problem in Egypt? Do you have a program to solve the economic and other problems?

[Answer] The Muslim Brotherhood has no special visualization regarding the social problem. The Brotherhood's visualization is the visualization of every Muslim who abides by the teachings of his religion. Imam Hasan al-Banna--the first grand master of the Muslim Brotherhood and the movement's founder--has written extremely precise and comprehensive treatise which are in circulation. When the officials pay attention to them, they will find out how all crises with their various names are overcome.

[Question] Is there a visualization insofar as the issue of nationalization and of the limitation of agricultural ownership is concerned?

[Answer] Islam knows no maximum and no minimum insofar as private ownership--money, business, real estate, agricultural land and so forth--is concerned, provided that the profit made from this ownership is legal, the spending from it is for what is permissible and provided that the alms tax and charities are paid for this ownership "and those who when they spend are not extravagant and not stingy and who (follow) the right path in between." [Loose translation of Koran phrase]

[Question] Is there within the Islamic current what we may call a leftist Islam?

[Answer] A Muslim, if he is a true Muslim, should not think of such issues which have been created by the enemies of Islam with the aim of casting doubt on Islam itself, and these enemies will not realize their goal because God preserves His religion.

[Question] Some Islamic thinkers believe that the current which used to be represented by Sayyid Qutub tended toward what may be called the Islamic left. What is your opinion?

[Answer] This name has no base in Islam, as I have already said. Such names and the assumption of such qualities is something that Islam does not at all know. The late Sayyid Qutub was one of the advocates of the Muslim Brotherhood. One of the woes and catastrophes which 'Abd-al-Nasir's regime inflicted upon the Muslim Brotherhood was to ascribe such descriptions to the Muslim Brothers to distort their image and to sow division among them. Sayyid Qutub and his opinions know nothing of the so-called Islamic left.

Between Following Prophet's Example and Growing Beards

[Question] What, in your view, is the Islamic society that must be established? Are there any differences between this society and the Islamic society in the time of the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, and of al-Rashidun caliphs as a result of the passage of 14 centuries?

[Answer] The modern Islamic society, in my view, is a society which has the values that were present in the society of God's prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, such as pure faith, complete manliness, full commitment, ample decency and widespread selflessness. These are some of the values of the Islamic society in the prophet's time and the values of this society till kingdom come, without any difference or any disagreement. The biography books about the prophet portray clearly the Islamic society in the time of the prophet and of al-Rashidun caliphs.

[Question] There has been a lot of talk recently about the Islamic strictures. In your view, can the Islamic Shari'a be applied before establishment of the complete Islamic society and is Islam nothing but strictures?

[Answer] This question deserves gentle censure, but with praiseworthy consequences. Islam establishes virtuous societies. The opposite is not correct and not true. So how can people ask if Islam is nothing but strictures? They are thus unaware that Islam includes strictures, a civil, criminal, commercial and international law, litigation, trials and crime investigation, commercial and economic transactions, science, sociology, ethics and politics and all the other things in this life. Islam guarantees man reassurance and security for his life, his property and his inviolability. These and similar questions are definitely harmful to the Muslim before being harmful to Islam because the loftiness of a towering mountain cannot be undermined by insects climbing its sides and its prestige cannot be enhanced by hawks and eagles nesting on its top. Islam is Islam regardless of how hard the tendentious try.

[Question] There are those who believe that following the example of the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, should be in matters more important than donning flowing robes and growing beards. What is your opinion?

[Answer] I believe that following the example of the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, should be in dealings, morals, social interaction and in every external and internal aspect. The prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, had a fine tent made of al-Ta'if camel wool which he bought for 27 she-camels. He also owned a red outer garment made in Azerbaidhzan which he used to wear when meeting delegations. God, may He be praised, has ordered us to follow the example of the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, in everything. Every Muslim should strive to follow the prophet's example in all external and internal aspects of his life.

'Abd-al-Nasir and Brotherhood

[Question] It is noticed that the Muslim Brothers view 'Abd-al-Nasir's era only through the torture they encountered during that era. They have not lauded a single one of that era's accomplishments. Do you think that the revolution years have not realized any accomplishments at the various political, social and economic levels?

[Answer] The nature of 'Abd-al-Nasir's era was evil and harmful. The harm caused by the nationalization and the custodianship is still crushing the Egyptian nation. The communist economy has led us to these fatal crises from which everybody is trying to rescue the homeland. The religious side suffered tyranny and oppression whose effects we see in many of our youths today. As for the High Dam, may God save us from its dangers. Even if 'Abd-al-Nasir's era was nothing but accomplishments and achievements, it is enough that it flouted man's dignity. So what good did Egypt get in that era?

Moreover, all the information media and all the officials ignored intentionally the role of the Muslim Brothers in Palestine and in the canal and their positive role in familiarizing the people with the teachings of Islam. At the same time, the information media were eager to spread the abominable, to undermine praiseworthy values and to destroy morals. Perhaps the reason for this observation is that the Brothers weigh every deed with the yardstick of Islam. They praise what Islam praises and villify what Islam villifies.

[Question] The Islamic groups are a new manifestation within the Islamic current. What is your position toward them?

[Answer] I believe that the Islamic groups that have been formed in the universities must continue. Some individuals may be blamed for going beyond the customary. But I can affirm that these youths have not understood the truth of Islam. This is in addition to the presence of some tendentious people and some communists who always provoke the students by disparaging the religious aspects. I don't think that you condone any Muslim who remains silent in the face of anybody who flouts his religion.

Moreover, some people are eager to organize shameless, dissolute and licentious entertainment parties with the aim of provoking the students who abide by their religion so that it may be said that they are fanatic and that they restrict the freedom of others. If the government had dealt with these Islamic groups sympathetically and with true understanding, the present state of conflict between the Islamic groups, the universities and the government would not have been reached. I do not approve of any student, even if he is a communist, who insults his professor and I do not approve of any student who expresses his political opinion through insults and villification. I consider any student who does not abide by the rules of his religion in dealing with all people a student who hasn't understood his religion.

Woman's Freedom Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow

[Question] You have certain positions toward women's freedom. Aren't there any changes in these positions as a result of the modern development and civilization?

[Answer] My view of women's freedom yesterday is still my view today and will be my view tomorrow. We are the ones who are surprised. I am not asking the Muslim woman to do more than abide by the rules of her religion. If some women do not follow the opinion of the advocates of Islam, then they can resort to his eminence the shaykh of al-Azhar, to the mufti, to the minister of awqaf and to the Council of Prominent Ulema to find out their opinion of Islam's view of the freedom of the Muslim woman, provided that the answer to the women's query be broadcast by the information media and that the answer of the gentlemen ulema be also published by the media. All the people will thus know whether these women are following the teachings of their religion or whether they are deviating completely from these teachings. Even though these women squeeze Koran phrases and venerable Hadiths of the prophet in their statements at times, they better have fear of God in their hearts because the pain God inflicts is terrible.

[Question] AL-DA'WAH magazine which you supervise talks a lot about the past. What about our society's present and future issues?

[Answer] Brother, AL-DA'WAH publishes only a few pages about the Brothers in the past. I think that you cannot but agree with me that the Brothers have the right to respond to what was attributed to them falsely and deceptively in the past. The rest of the magazine deals with the present issues. If you examine the magazine's pages you will find out that it talks a lot more about the present and the future than about the past. May God guide you and me to the right path.

'Abdallah Imam's Response

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 7 Jul 80 pp 12-13

[Article: "'Abdallah Imam Responds to al-Talmasani; Fair Look, O Shaykh"]

[Text] A man hesitates a lot when the duty of honesty requires him to debate the Muslim Brotherhood, because the general impression is that the Muslim Brotherhood does not advocate God's path with words of wisdom and kindness alone, but uses all means, beginning with distasteful words and ending with the dagger.

Whether this is true or not and whether it is some kind of tendentious propaganda by the Brotherhood's enemies, I find it necessary to discuss some of what 'Umar al-Talmasani has said in his interview so as to present the counter view. Perhaps the Brotherhood will be persuaded by the logic of serious and objective dialogue.

Al-Talmasani sees nothing in the July revolution and in 'Abd-al-Nasir's rule other than an era with an evil and harmful nature. 'Abd-al-Nasir nationalized, imposed custodianship, set up a communist economy that has ruined the country, inflicted tyranny and injustice on religion, built the High Dam--from whose dangers al-Talmasani implores God to save us, flouted man's dignity, and intentionally ignored the Brotherhood's role in Palestine and in the canal. The information media in his era resorted to spreading the abominable and destroying morals!

This is the July revolution's statement of account from the Brotherhood's angle.

We accept this assessment from anybody who has been wronged, but not from the Muslim Brotherhood, because the values the Brothers advocate commit them to honesty, truthfulness and impartiality.

When Mr al-Talmasani sits under the light of the electricity supplied by the High Dam to implore God to save him from the dangers of this dam, ignoring the opinions of hundreds of experts, dozens of discussions in the People's Assembly and in specialized councils on the importance of the High Dam, on the role that it has performed for the national economy and on the negative aspects that had been studied before construction of the dam--when al-Talmasani ignores all these opinions and with them the opinions of the U.S. mission which came to study the problem and effects of the High Dam, which lauded the greatness of the dam and which refuted all opinions criticizing it; when al-Talmasani does this, we try to find an excuse for him. Perhaps he is not familiar with this issue and perhaps the burdens of the call whose message he carries have not given him enough time to follow up on this issue.

But we can find no excuse for the prominent teacher when he talks about the religious aspect which was afflicted with tyranny and oppression. The religious aspect does not consist of the Muslim Brotherhood--moreover, we are not discussing what befell them. The religious aspect is more general and comprehensive and is deeper and greater.

It is surprising that the religious aspect was afflicted with oppression in an era in which al-Azhar was developed and into which women entered for the first time, an era in which a special radio station was set up to broadcast the Koran, in which an Islamic Affairs Council was formed, in which Islamic centers were set up abroad, in which bridges were extended between the revolutionary Egypt and many of the Islamic world's countries, in which the revolution helped many enslaved peoples achieve their independence and in which this revolution built thousands of mosques. It is surprising that al-Talmasani cannot see all, or part, of this, even if he has a different view on some of these accomplishments. It is still more surprising that he accuses the information media of having spread the abominable. Was the July revolution press profligate, licentious and naked? Was the revolution television lewd and did the state set up the Cinema Organization to spread obscenity? The film industry was present in Egypt before the revolution and the revolution came to refine it. The Cinema Organization produced hundreds of serious and purposeful films, some of them historical and some religious.

Al-Talmasani may reject all of this and he has the right to. We agree with him on some matters. But it is unfair to have testimony from a pious Muslim describing an era which tried to spread the values of justice and honesty as an era that sought to destroy morals and to spread obscenity. The issue of the communist economy set up by the revolution also requires a pause.

It is the right of al-Talmasani to call for a capitalist economy and to reject the limitation of ownership but he has no right to accuse the revolution economy of having been a communist economy just because al-Talmasani rejects nationalization. The distribution of land to farmers is not communism. King Hassan II, the Hashimite [sic, and wrong] king of Morocco, has done this. The construction of hundreds of light and heavy industry plants is not communism. Prevention of exploitation is not communism and the establishment of justice is not communism. Perhaps all of these actions are of the essence of Islam.

When evaluating the July revolution and 'Abd-al-Nasir's era, we must be fair and must point out the negative and the positive aspects.

The July revolution has many positive aspects, none of which al-Talmasani has acknowledged. Perhaps he was in jail or in detention camp--justly or unjustly--and did not hear about these positive aspects. But there is no doubt that after his release, he has come to know of and has heard about the industries that were set up, the farmer who was done justice, the

worker who has regained his humanity, the merchant who has been forced not to exploit, the student who has been educated free of charge, the village that has come to know the light of education, the electricity of the dam and the medical treatment unit.

It was al-Talmasani's duty to study and evaluate all these accomplishments. He has among his friends and Brothers farmers and workers who have entered the People's Assembly and he could have asked them so that his judgement could be more objective and more compatible with the fairness of Islam.

The July revolution has many negative aspects on which al-Talmasani always focuses. Some of these aspects are real and we acknowledge and denounce them, even though al-Talmasani attributes to them bigger dimensions than their real ones. As for the other aspects, al-Talmasani views them only through what he and his group have suffered, completely denying the other side of the picture.

The Brothers did struggle in the Palestine war before the revolution and nobody has denied this. What is more, there were among the revolution men and the army officers those who trained the Brothers and supplied them with weapons, and this is something that history notes. As for the canal battle, the views are different. Perhaps al-Talmasani does not remember the statement of the grand master [of Muslim Brotherhood] after abrogation of the [canal] treaty and declaration of the armed struggle when a journalist asked him about the duty of the Brotherhood youth under those circumstances. The late counselor Hasan al-Hudaybi answered the journalist: "Do you think that violence will evict the British from the country? It is the government's duty to do what the Brothers are doing, namely enlighten and prepare the people. This is the way to evict the British." (AL-JUMHUR AL-MISRI, 15 October 1951)

The grand master then addressed the Brotherhood youth, saying: "Go and concentrate on reading the venerable Koran." Khalid Muhammad Khalid responded to the grand master in an article published in ROSE AL-YUSUF under the title of: "Rejoice With Long and Safe Life, George." At the outset of his article, Khalid said: The Muslim Brotherhood, which has been one of our hopes, has not moved and has not hurled a stone or a brick for the sake of the homeland. When the Brotherhood's grand master stood to address 10,000 youths a few days ago, he told them: Go and concentrate on reading the venerable Koran. The poor Egypt heard this instruction and beat her chest, crying: O my heart.

Concluding his response, Khalid said: There are in Egypt popular forces that can, despite their circumstances, fill up the canal with the corpses of the British. But these forces are monopolized. In whose interest and till when will the organizations and councils monopolize these forces?

Al-Talmasani can check the article in ROSE AL-YUSUF's edition of 30 October 1951.

The debate is long and it requires calm, objective and honest discussions. We will not be able to advance and to make accomplishments if we deny and distort our history, if we cover it with all this blackness and if we view it through hatred. May God protect us and protect His worshippers from the evils of this hatred.

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DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER DISCUSSES ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 30 Jun 80 pp 8-10

[Interview With Deputy Prime Minister Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd al-Majid by Mahmud al-Maraghi; "Egyptian Economy Between Morphine and Acupuncture; We Accept Challenge and We Raise Wages Without Increasing Prices; New Policy Is Not Short-Term Policy But Policy That Extends into Future"]

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid has responded to what ROSE AL-YUSUF published in its previous edition. He has explained what the magazine has termed the dilemma of raising wages and incomes without increasing prices, of increasing spending without increasing--even while eliminating--the deficit and of increasing imports while establishing a balance in the transactions with the outside world. Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq has said that all this is possible because our policy is integrated [mutarabitah].

Borrowing and Development

Scrutinizing the pages of ROSE AL-YUSUF, Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid smiled and said: "If I had written this article, I would have chosen a different title saying: 'We Are Not Experiencing a Deficit But Are Borrowing to Enhance Development Rates.'"

The question is one of choosing between a low investment rate and a high investment rate which depends on our savings and the savings of others in the outside world. Yes we are borrowing but this borrowing is necessary for the development.

[Question] Let us begin the story from the start. The declared objectives--namely, to increase the incomes and stabilize the prices and, consequently, to effect a real rise in the standard of living--are something for which every citizen aspires. But can this be really done or are the means that we are employing having an effect in the short run while the long range remains a different story? The matter requires clarification. What is your visualization while drawing up this policy? In other words, what is your visualization while you accept the challenge and tackle what seems to be contradictory?

[Answer] There are no contradictions. Let us analyze together what is happening. They say that spending or the budget is the main instrument for correcting the course of the Egyptian economy. This is not true. The budget is only one of the instruments. It is an effective instrument that can escalate or reduce inflation and prices. What has happened this year?

The budget consists of two parts: A part channelled toward managing society and the other part toward developing this society. In the first part which provides security, justice and various services--the part which we call current spending--there has been a surplus this year, meaning that we have resources that exceed our needs to manage the society. This surplus reduces the inflationary pressure. This is the first trend.

[Question] Before we go on, has the surplus been the result of an increase in the resources or of a squeeze in spending?

[Answer] Spending in the second section (public expenditures) has been streamlined and there has been an increase in wages. I have insisted on this increase in wages in realization of what I have called "the humaneness of government." This humaneness is also reflected in the increase in subsidies. But on the other hand, there has been an increase in some fundamental resources, such as oil and the canal which together have yielded nearly 700 million pounds. There are other increases in resources which occur essentially without the adoption of any measures, such as the customs revenues which are tied to the increased volume of imports or of exports. This is where the balance has been realized. The new spending has been countered by new resources. Consequently, there is no fear of inflation.

We must point out here that a certain approach has been changed. For example, we used to give the cost of living allowance to everybody and this payment was like, permit me to use the expression, a morphine injection which kills pain for a time after which the patient awakens to find that prices have risen and that the disease has worsened. We are now following a different approach. Let me liken this approach to acupuncture. We choose certain positions which represent points of weakness in society and we inject a needle here and a needle there. Together, they complement one another and provide some cure. An example is what we are doing with pensioners or with people having small incomes. Let us speak frankly. How can we condone an income of 12 or 16 pounds monthly for some citizens, such as sentries, for example? How can such people live? This is impossble. We have raised their income to 20 pounds. This increase affects other aspects. This is understandable. But we deal with the effects through another measure and so forth.

The other issue is the state's role in developing society. This is done through the investment budget. The effects of this investment are reflected in the price and inflation situation.

In the new year, it has been decided to appropriate (3.2) billion pounds for government and public sector investments. Some may say: So what have you done? Wasn't the 1980 appropriation 3.1 billion pounds? So where is the increase?

Talking about things in this manner is inaccurate. An examination of the investment spending in the first half of the year shows that the allocated sums have not been spent and that the actual spending has not amounted to 1 billion pounds, i.e., one-third the year's appropriations. Therefore, when we say that we will invest (3.2) billion pounds, then this is a high rate.

Insofar as inflation is concerned, there are two possibilities: The first is that some units will be unable, as has already happened, to absorb the investments set aside for them. This will help to balance and stabilize the prices.

The second possibility is that the investments will take place. I will be happier with this, of course. The effects of these projects [for which the investments are allocated] are immediate effects. Sixty percent of the investments are for projects that are already under implementation and 10 percent of the investments are for replacement and renewal purposes. Both types of investments give us immediate results in term of commodity and service production. Consequently, spending on these projects will not escalate the inflation that is well-known in the case of development.

In both cases and regardless of whether the spending is done or not, we want to eliminate the excuse of financing. The financing is available from local and foreign resources. The agencies concerned have to do their work. In this regard, we must point out that it is necessary to raise the efficiency of the local circles in implementing the development projects. This can be done.

I will also point out here that the allocated rate of investment, amounting to 25 percent of the national income, will continue. This will add another dimension to what is being done. What is being done is not a short-term policy but a policy that deals with medium- and long-range problems. It is also hoped that this rate of investment will increase.

Third Weapon

Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq pauses for a moment, telephone calls interrupt the interview and then we continue the dialogue.

"There is a third weapon, namely the banking apparatus. We have formulated an interest rate structure. We have raised the interest and this is likely to attract savings and to reduce the purchase and spending pressure. This means that we are reducing the chances of inflation. Isn't it so?"

[Question] But there is another question. This is true for the small saver whose savings don't help him engage in another activity. Meanwhile, the situation is very different insofar as the big saver, or investor, is concerned. This segment, which is the main segment [of savers], prefers to operate in the market and to earn a bigger profit. When this segment [of big investors] deals with the banks and pays high interest rates, it will reflect these rates in the prices of its products. It may even reflect these high rates in reduced activities because when the interest rate exceeds a certain limit, the economic activity is forced to recede.

[Answer] This is true. The rule, however, is that if a project doesn't yield a profit parallel to the interest rate, then there is no need for such a project. We have raised the interest rate but the truth of the matter is that many of the projects are purely commercial projects and it is better for us to curtail them. But if the consequences affect factories, for example, then the matter is different. When we formulated our visualization regarding the National Investment Bank which will deal with the public sector, we took this fact into consideration. The interest rates will vary according to the type of economic activity. For example, we will loan the sewerage projects at an interest rate of 0.25 percent, al-Nuzhah airport at a rate of 0.50 percent and school projects at no interest at all and with a period of grace of 50 [sic] years. Meanwhile, interest rates will be higher for industrial projects and still higher for those who intend to export their products. This means that there are rules in accordance with which the interest rates charged the public sector, which is the main sector, will vary from zero percent to 12 percent.

[Question] Do we understand from this that the services will be financed through government loans and that the service facility will have to repay its loan?

[Answer] The 50-year period of grace is coupled with the idea that an asset owned by a school or a hospital, for example, will be consumed during this period and the value of the asset will decrease to zero. Consequently, such a project will repay nothing. This is merely an accounting procedure.

[Question] This concerns the financing necessary for investment. But what about the current financing for the public sector. This sector is borrowing from the commercial banks at high interest rates that affect this sector's [product] prices.

[Answer] We have foreign commodity loans that cover most of the public sector's production requirements. The benefits and facilities that the government gets from these loans are transferred to the public sector. These loans amount to 1 billion pounds annually.

[Question] There remains the question of the private sector. Will this sector raise its prices because of the hike in the interest rates?

[Answer] The government has intervened here also. It has allocated 75 million pounds for land reclamation at an interest rate of just 3 percent whereas the cost is 11 percent. The government pays the difference. The same thing has been done insofar as housing, the small industries and food security are concerned. Therefore, we are loaning the productivie private sector at low interest rates. So how can this sector be affected by the commercial interest rates? We have insulated a broad sector against being affected by the new interest rates charged by banks. Through the policy of inexpensive loans, we have even guaranteed the spurring of large investments in the private sector.

Thus, the hike in the interest rates will withdraw some money [from the market] and will lead to a degree of recession that will have a positive effect on prices. At the same time, these rates will not affect the costs of projects because the projects will be treated in a special manner according to their importance--an importance that will be given strong consideration.

We must also point out that other measures have accompanied this [increase in interest rates]--measures that are likely to withdraw some money from the markets.

An example of this is the agreement we have concluded with foreign banks to have them keep 15 percent of their deposits in the Central Bank. I am withdrawing this money from circulation and putting it at the disposal of the Central Bank according to its needs. This money will take the form of bank deposits and will collect from the Central Bank the interest rate customary among banks. This is better than when the Central Bank had to borrow from abroad and pay higher interest.

[Question] Can we have an initial evaluation of this action?

[Answer] Initially, I would say that this measure and other accompanying measures are likely to absorb a degree of purchase capacity from the market. It is also capable of bolstering the Egyptian pound and of increasing the import capability.

The value of the pound has risen against the dollar. When some importers complain that forcing them to pay 100 percent of the value of the luxury commodities, for example, which they import and when they say that the government thus denies them the advantage that they enjoyed when they had to make delayed rather than advance payment, we answer immediately: The opposite is true because the importers will lose the interest that the bank will pay them if they postpone the use of their dollars. [If they pay in advance] they benefit from the price difference between an expensive dollar and a less expensive dollar. The final outcome is a benefit of more than 10 percent in the import price, both for the merchant and the consumer.

The other aspect is the greater foreign currency monetary capability that the Central Bank has acquired. This capability enhances the import capability and reduces the import price because we pay "in cash." We have no shortage of monies at present and the essential and food supplies are fully available.

I do not think that we disagree that the availability of goods is the decisive factor in reducing prices.

Thus, the measures that have been taken integrate each other and each of them constitutes a weapon. We have used some weapons and we will use others.

What Then?

[Question] (The interview then turned to the other side of the coin). Yes, the new policy is trying to absorb the damaging effect of the surplus monies in the market and is trying to establish a "rapid balance through heavy

importation" relying on the resources of the Central Bank or of borrowing. But what then? How can a real balance be established without loans and without special measures?

[Answer] This cannot be realized without an increase in production. The question is how and, also, what kind of production do we mean? Colored televisions, eggs or sugar? It is important to determine the kind of production.

I also say that the production cycle can be made shorter. I can cultivate sugarcane and build a sugar plant [at the same time], thus supplying commodity production in the shortest time possible.

Moreover, if we streamline some types of consumption and if, for example, we think of stopping production by the big plants producing preserves and if we produce beverages with glucose, which is cheaper, wouldn't this save us money?

[Question] We agree on this. Development is the only means for a real balance in the Egyptian economy. But don't you think that the appropriations made for development this year seem to be unbalanced, at least for the industry sector which yields a huge and essential commodity production and which has not gotten big investments?

[Answer] We have allocated 413 million pounds for industry. But this is added to 6 or 7 billion pounds already spent [on this sector]. The problem we are facing at present is that there are numerous projects "under implementation" and I say that these projects can produce a quick yield with limited investments.

[Question] But some people in public sector believe that there is no solution and no chance without a foreign partner. Have you formed an opinion on this issue?

[Answer] My opinion has always been clear. The open-door policy has been intended to strengthen the public sector. The present problem is not a financial problem. Money is available. What we need is technology and good management. Partnership is not a goal but it is also not rejected altogether. Each case should be studied separately. What is important is the goal.

In the sphere of technology, we can acquire it by importing an expert or by importing the "right to know" [presumably meaning the knowhow]. Partnership is not the only means. It is true that the matter varies from project to project. What applies to light [industry] projects is not what applies to al-Nasr Car Company.

In any case, anyone who thinks that he needs a foreign partner because of "money" is wrong. We have loans of 7 billion dollars at out disposal. There is no place for the financing excuse. If, for example, the problem of Ideal is "1 million pounds," then let it take 1 million pounds.

Return to Prices

[Question] The discussion is not complete. The issue of prices requires further clarification. Can we actually control prices when 40 percent of the food commodities are imported? Can we control them when the volume of imports generally is rising and when the number of the open-door economy projects which operate outside any pricing system is also increasing? Can prices be controlled when the private sector supplies nearly all of the agricultural production and a large part of the industrial production?

[Answer] The prices of imports are affected by two factors. The first is the drop in international prices. The world is currently experiencing a period of recession that is expected to last until 1985. Moreover, there are subsidy increases in order to control prices.

As for the open-door economy projects, they are not bound to be included in the pricing because they get their requirements at unsubsidized international prices. But what do these projects produce? Non-essential goods. The price of carbonated beverages has risen. So why doesn't the consumer buy the product offered by the public sector which is cheaper?

I would like to say here that what the production [sic] projects offer does not necessarily surpass in quality what the public sector offers. The opposite is true in many cases.

[Question] Let us turn to the private sector that controls entire segments, such as agriculture. Can the prices of this sector, which rejects the official pricing and control, be controlled?

[Answer] I believe that the prices of many of the products of this sector have been brought under control. The prices of vegetables, for example, have dropped. Isn't it so?

There is also the tendency to reduce the number of middlemen.

Generally, let me say that this aspect requires deeper solutions.

[Question] There remains another issue that needs clarification....

[Answer] Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq 'Abd-al-Majid said: "We borrow to invest. The option before us is clear: The borrowing rate or the development rate. If we want to enhance development, then we have to borrow. When Britian wanted to double its growth rate after World War II, it did so [meaning resorted to borrowing]. The entire world, especially the poor world, is doing the same."

[Question] But how much do these loans amount to? ROSE AL-YUSUF brought up this issue in its previous edition and asked: "How can the declared figure be 2.069 billion pounds by the end of 1979 whereas the government had previsouly declared that Egypt's indebtedness amounts to 12 billion dollars?" I addressed this question to Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq.

[Answer] Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq smiled and clarified the matter in one line: This [2.069 billions] is the indebtedness for 1 year. So, both figures are correct. We are concealing nothing.

The interview ends, the matter becomes clearer and the challenge becomes one of turning the wheels to enhance the development rate and to increase reliance on the domestic resources. This is the "super challenge."

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SEMINAR DISCUSSES HEALTH PROBLEMS

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 14 Jul 80 pp 11-14, 55

[Article: "ROSE AL-YUSUF Seminar: Roundtable Discussion on Your Health; Minister of Health: Private Treatment Consumes One Half Health Spending; All Those Who Died of Valley Fever Were People With Small Incomes; Dr Ramsis 'Abd-al-'Aziz: We Now Have Health Map for 22 Governorates; Dr Ahmad Safwat: Some Hospitals Treat Patients According to Nationality; Dr 'Ali Hijazi: Drug Sector Supports Budget, not Vice Versa; Dr Hasan Tawfiq: State Has Taken Health Insurance Surplus and They Have Accused Us of Failure"]

[Text] ROSE AL-YUSUF has put society's health and the Egyptian citizen's health on the dissection table. The magazine formed a team of its writers and editors and asked the minister of health to do the same thing so that a frank and constructive discussion may be held.

Representatives of the physicians had to join the discussion and so the Doctors General Union [came into the picture].

The discussion lasted throughout 4 complete hours, beginning with the citizen's nutrition and hospitals and ending with his medicine. The minister announced important news. The editors brought up a number of charges, the specialists discussed the future plans and we had this dialogue.

The seminar was opened by 'Abd-al-'Aziz Khamis who welcomed the minister and the participants and said: The seminar is not based on a working paper to that we may impose no restriction on the discussion. However, let us agree that the issue projected is the curative policy and the appropriate solutions. I beg the colleagues present to speak frankly so that we may reach an understanding that serves the public interest.

Mamduh Jabr: I will, in fact, start with headlines. If we review the problems in Egypt we find that they are numerous. We try, within the limits of our resources, to organize the work so as to reach solutions. Prevention generally, and I do not mean individual prevention, is linked to environmental problems which are largely connected with responsibilities that are outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Health.

It is true that these problems require the intervention of the central authority. But the cry from the local authorities is always louder. The problems also require coordination in the sphere of implementation, especially in regard to the population growth which represents the number one problem and in regard to the standard of nutrition which represents the second problem. As a result of the first problem, the rate of what is available to the individual decreases whereas as a result of the second problem, the individual's immunity against disease is weakened.

If there is place for talking about nutrition, then there is the sphere of streamlining the expenditure on food because the Egyptian citizen takes in no less calories than the individual in the advanced countries. What is important is that there is a very strong link between the individual's nutritional condition and resistance to disease. We all know that bilharziasis and (englostoma) in a healthy [sic] person can be brought under control with a couple shots whereas in a person suffering from malnutrition, these diseases lead to an enlarged spleen and to death.

When the valley fever epidemic hit Egypt 2 years ago, all those who died as a result were people with middle and limited incomes whose nutritional condition weakens their resistance to disease.

This is insofar as the general problem of prevention and its various dimensions are concerned.

The sector second in importance is the basic healthcare sector. This is what the United Nations wants to achieve in all countries of the developing world by the year 2000. I say with utter pride that basic healthcare was started in the days of Dr 'Abd-al-Wahid al-Wakil who initiated this kind of healthcare in the countryside and wanted to have a basic healthcare unit in every village. Nowadays, any Egyptian village with a population of more than 9,000 people has a treatment unit. Very often, such units are found in villages and hamlets with a population of less than 5,000 people. The point in basic healthcare is to have the government provide the individual adequate prevention, adequate vaccination, adequate care during pregnancy and childbirth, adequate care against endemic diseases, health education and then an opportunity for the treatment of life-threatening emergency cases.

Our network [of basic healthcare units] has been very well-organized since the days of Dr al-Wakil, may God have mercy upon his soul, and was strengthened further in the days of Dr al-Nabawi, may God have mercy upon his soul. As minister of health, I have no opportunity to establish any more health units in the countryside because the units are there. The problem we have is a problem of the standard of performance. We must admit that this performance is not up to par. There are human problems and economic problems. Physicians consider them [basic units] a stepping stone over which they pass quickly or to which they go (unwillingly). The nurses, clerks and orderlies consider themselves the absolute rulers. A physician's

training is important. The youth have greater enthusiasm than we had in our day and the situation is improving. The problem is that their enthusiasm is faced with the bitter reality. The youth [young physician] finds that his training as a medical student was not geared toward dealing with the fundamental problems. This is why it has been important for us to train this youth before he enters this phase in the Ministry of Health and in its units. This is what we have tried this year and it has been successful at the central level.

The solution lies in the hands of the local governments and in establishing control over the physician and the unit to improve the standard of performance.

Then comes the emergencies sector. This is the responsibility of the state. This is why attention has been devoted to completing the first-aid radio communication networks throughout the republic. We have actually completed this work in a number of hospitals.

Free Treatment Is Problem

Explaining the dimensions of the medical treatment problem, the minister goes on to say:

As for treatment, it has become free of charge in name only. Consequently, most of those who can afford it seek private treatment for which some colleagues charge tens of pounds. Then there is the health insurance which was set up 20 years ago. Regrettably, this insurance has been able to provide services to only 1.5 million citizens throughout this period. There are new alternatives through which we are trying to revive health insurance by way of small participation by individuals in the costs of treatment.

In any case, one of the most prominent problems of the treatment sector is the economic problem. The appropriations are not sufficient under the shadow of this exorbitant inflation.

As for the drug sector, it is a feat for Egypt. The Egyptian citizen gets 81 percent of his medicines from the Egyptian drug industry. All kinds of vitamins and sulfa are produced in Egypt and drug prices have risen only by a few mils in the past 2 years. As for imported drugs, we benefit from them in treatment and the importers benefit by making their profits.

There is also the private treatment [medical care]. Regrettably, our planning in Egypt does not take into final account the role of private treatment. Private treatment, even in the countryside, represents in some statistics one half the spending. I will leave the issue of health spending to Dr Ramsis because he has conducted a pioneer experiment in this sphere on how much the individual spends and how much he pays for private treatment, including medicines.

Mahmud al-Maraghi: The seminar can deal with the problems of prevention, cure and medical education. I suggest that we, like his excellency the minister, start with the problem of nutrition and of the environment. There are observations made by the physicians, and these observations are probably supported by scientific facts, to the effect that diseases resulting from malnutrition are on the rise. Moreover, this issue is connected to the fact that 40 percent of the food in Egypt is imported and that some of the imported food poses a danger to the health of the citizen because of its unfitness for consumption or because it contains preservatives harmful to health. There is also the issue of environmental pollution resulting from certain industries, such as the fertilizer industry. We have heard about new methods to reduce this pollution but nothing has happened yet. There is no healthcare so far even for mine workers, including uranium mine workers and workers involved in nuclear activity.

'Abd-al-'Aziz Khamis: A People's Assembly factfinding mission has begun to investigate the situation.

Mahmud al-Maraghi: The question raised is: Where does the Ministry of Health stand vis-a-vis the problem of nutrition and of the environment? Does the ministry keep track of health development in Egypt, are we observing what is happening and does the health map have anything to do with this?

Fathi Ghanim: There is another start. We have heard a diagnosis from a skillful physician who, I believe, is fully trusted by many Egyptian mothers. The Egyptian family has been accustomed to going to him with its children to get the right diagnosis and the right treatment.

What has drawn my attention in the diagnosis are numerous words, such as "resources, the need for a loud voice and effective local governments." These words need to be discussed. The discussion itself supports these words and helps bring them to public attention because we are dealing with a very sensitive point, namely people's life and death. Our interest in this point is greater than our interest in what engineers, intellectuals and lawyers offer.

Let us make the discussion on this issue. The ministry is in a meeting with the press. Let the plan for the discussion seek to bring up the point of the local governments and of working with them, the point of resources and the point of the required picture of health education. When we bring up these points for general consultation we allow the public opinion to participate indirectly. As a result, constant ideas and inclinations may arise to strengthen the financial resources, for example. Thus, the matter stops being one of a minister succeeding with his influence to get the appropriations.

As for the local governments, the mere statement that powers have been transferred to the local governments because they are more capable to intervene directly is very great. But we would like this to be implanted in the minds of the executive officials and of those receiving the services. This should be done through discussing what seems to be axiomatic. From experience, the most difficult thing for man to accept is the axiomatic. We accept the axiomatic and think it is easy because it is axiomatic. But the matter is not so.

Dr Mamduh Jabr: I agree with the point of bringing up the axiomatic aspects of the problem. We can then deal with the solutions. It is possible to translate the goals into plans. The ministry's efforts in calculating rates and in taking stock of the resources will help enhance the resources. Insofar as the local governments are concerned, the issue is new. It is assumed that a physician is the closest person to a family. In this capacity, he is supposed to lead the village society. There is an improvement in the situation. At present, 50 percent of the young doctors do not wish to leave the villages in which they work.

Another issue: If we give power to the local governments, this will lead to serious control over performance. It is possible to solve the problems that arise between the local governments and the other leaderships. Therefore, the local governments will solve a large part of the problem if we put all matters in their hands.

A third point is that the credit of health education here is zero and its budget is very meager. The role of the scientific societies and of the inhabitants emerges in this sphere. When I speak about cries, I mean the cries of the Ministry of Health for a sound health education. The press can contribute, provided that it observe the scientific standard.

As for malnutrition in Egypt, a point which al-Maraghi has brought up, the social standard, the state of nutrition and the health standard are all improving tangibly. The death rate has dropped and the average lifespan has risen. The current average lifespan for men is 56.5 years and for women 58 years. Moreover, if there is malnutrition, then it shows first in children. My observation is that the situation is improving a lot. There are several factors that have had an effect on raising the average lifespan from 46 to 56 years in the past 10 years. The most important of these factors are the medical advance, the cultural progress and the social reform. The rate of malnutrition has also dropped from what it was in the past. This means that the situation has improved and this improvement is due to the state subsidy.

As for the environment and industrial pollution, a higher committee has been formed under the chairmanship of the minister of health. The costs of preventing pollution are not as enormous as some people imagine. As for the plants causing the pollution, we are trying to find the means to get rid of the harm caused by these plants in the next 6 years. This requires state planning to determine the priorities.

Mahmud al-Maraghi: Let us return to the issue of nutrition. Is your excellency confident that all the imported foodstuffs are fit for human consumption? Tons of meats and fishes have been destroyed and there are lawsuits against the Ministry of Supply and Foreign Trade. Even if we act tolerantly toward everything, there can be no tolerance toward any danger posed to the citizen's health.

'Abd-al-'Aziz Khamis: By the way, your excellency is a member of the Food Security Committee. What is the task of the minister of health in this particular committee?

Mamduh Jabr: Some people imagine that food security means supplying more meats, improving bread or supplying cheese. We say that the purpose of the food security is for the consumer to obtain foodstuffs that make him healthy. The requirements of each group and age group are different from the requirements of other groups. Food exports and the available alternatives make the responsibility of the Ministry of Health evident. There is planning but the difficulty lies in the fact that we are not yet used to the scientific approach.

Mahmud 'Abd-al-Wahhab: We agree that man is the target of healthcare. In the Egyptian village, the role of the physician and of the specialist is completely absent. The teacher, the agricultural engineer and everybody else works without communication with the others. This is why we feel no benefit. There isn't a complete plan involving the ministries of health, agriculture, education, social affairs and the local governments.

A patient may search for a physician and die before he can find one.

There is the general observation that control and followup by the local governments are not strong and strict.

Insofar as the environment is concerned, there are two projects: A sea water desalination project in Sidi Karir and a fertilizer project in Abu Qir. Both projects are in residential areas and cause pollution.

Dr Mamduh Jabr: The rural development plan is the fundamental goal of the local governments. Coordination in this regard is necessary and control is indispensable. However, I do not think that a physician can be so late in visiting a patient to the point where the patient dies. This happens in one case only, namely the case of acute hemorrhage. In any case, the issue has its humanitarian aspect and the patient must feel that the physician cares and responds quickly.

As for projects polluting the environment, such as the nuclear energy project in Sidi Karir, the Ministry of Health has its view. It does not oppose the construction of such projects but it does place restrictions.

Ministry of Health Is Not Sole Responsible Authority

Dr 'Izz-al-Din Hashish: Insofar as protection is concerned, if we consider it as physical, psychological and social safety, then the major burden would fall on the shoulders of the Ministry of Health. As long as social safety is concerned, then the social and psychological specialist must have a role. If the role of the Ministry of Health is to provide social care, does the minister of health have the resources to do so? We must know that the responsibility of the Ministry of Health is confined to the physical aspect alone.

Mahmud 'Abd-al-Wahhab: Then why shouldn't there be coordination between the ministries of health, social affairs and education?

Dr Mamduh Jabr: This is the role of the local governments and I cannot award or penalize. In the new law, we will place under the disposal of a unit chief enough cadres to help him coordinate the various threads.

Dr 'Izz-al-Din Hashish: Our hope is that the government will pay attention to the element of protection and that it will increase the number of people working in the protection agency because protection is better than cure. We don't get aware of the ministry's efforts except in cases of big emergencies, such as cholera outbreaks. The truth is that we should underline the ministry's success. Even though there have been cholera outbreaks around us, especially during the pilgrimage season, cholera has not entered Egypt.

As for protection against environmental pollutants, I speak as a specialist in this sphere for more than 20 years. A simple filter can prevent the pollution caused by many plants in Hulwan, such as the cement plant. But these plants refuse to install such filters because of their high costs. There is an important point concerning protection, namely periodic checkups on vocational diseases for all workers. This is what the social insurance does. As a result, the rate of such diseases has dropped to less than 1 percent throughout the republic.

Regarding what the minister has said about the wish to expand the health insurance, I can say that Alexandria is a special case. Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir Hospital is a big hospital with a well-known reputation. If we went to expand in Cairo, we must have a big hospital so that we may have an attractive facade. It is to be noted that whenever we talk about getting one of the hospitals for health insurance, they say no for fear that this or that side may be upset.

Regarding the training of physicians, especially young physicians, the minister has said that the physician serves in the countryside for 2 or 3 years until he finds a better place. So why doesn't the ministry set up a training program using video and cassette equipment and movie projectors and send them to the physicians so that they may keep up [with developments] wherever they are.

Regarding the doctor's right to open a [private] clinic, I say that this is the responsibility of the local governments, each according to its circumstances. We know that 70 percent of medical treatment in Egypt is private

treatment. For your information, the health insurance does not hurt private clinics. The clinics are doing good business. Let me make it clear that health insurance the way I understand it does not mean giving a little medicine to somebody with a cough or with a slight case of influenza. Health insurance the way I understand it means helping somebody who needs an operation that costs 2,000 pounds which he cannot afford or somebody who needs treatment abroad. It is here that the role of health insurance emerges.

Finally, I stress our gratitude and our thanks to the Egyptian drug sector because it is truly illustrious. I also underline our thanks to the pharmacists.

Intensive Care

Dr Ahmad Safwat: There are four kinds of medical care in Egypt--free care provided by the government and embodied in all the services supplied by the Ministry of Health. I must praise here the ministry's efforts in recent years, especially in regard to the emergencies sector, the first-aid and communication networks, physician and medics training and the establishment of new sections for intensive care. I hope that intensive care will be provided free of charge. This is in addition to the preventive services in the health offices, rural units and the new health centers. All these sites supply free services to the citizens. Regarding free medical care in the hospitals of the Ministry of Health, the service in these hospitals is somewhat inadequate due to the lack of resources. The second kind is insurance medical care which has been provided by the Health Insurance Public Authority since 1964. There is also the curative establishment and the private medical care. There have been no actual additions to the health service, whether supplied by the health insurance or by the curative establishment. This means that the health insurance has added no units other than the 6 October Hospital. The curative establishment has taken control of the hospitals of the Charitable Association: Al-Shifa' Hospital, al-Ma'adi Hospital, Heliopolis Hospital and the Old Egypt Hospital.

I think that the hope attached to the health insurance is that it will cover the masses within 10 years.

As for the private clinics and hospitals, I find a big difference between the prices of the curative establishment and the private clinics. Insofar as health insurance is concerned, the person insured pays a part and the business owner pays a party. In the curative establishment, the patient pays everything, but in a (streamlined) manner. The four kinds of medical care are different. Even the health insurance takes ones form in Alexandria, another in al-Minufiyah and a third form in al-Sharqiyah. Why shouldn't it be unified and made to follow one pattern?

As for the private hospitals, their prices are very surprising. There are some hospitals that charge their patients different rates according to nationality because they have become like tourist hotels at times. Why don't we form a committee from the ministry and the union [of doctors] to calculate the costs of opeation and draw up a list of rates for surgeries and for room charges so as to serve both the hospital owner and the patient.

As for free medical care in government hospitals, this care remains inadequate, regardless of what the government does, because of the lack of resources. I cannot imagine that the food that a patient needs costs only 20 piasters a day and that the medicine that he needs throughout the year is within the same limits.

The available resources are supposed to be channelled in the right direction. Insofar as free medical care is concerned, I find no objection to the government saying, for example: I have 500 beds in Banha Hospital. Of these, 250 beds are to be set aside for paying patients and from the income of these beds I will spend on the other 250 beds which will be free of charge.

Why shouldn't a committee be formed from the Ministry of Health and the union to calculate the operation costs and then formulate a convenient list of charge rates. Regardless of how hard the ministry concentrates its efforts, the care will remain inadequate due to the inadequacy of the resources. If the revenues from hospital tickets [sic] were spent on free medical care and as (bonuses) for the workers, the standard of service given the patient would improve.

Dr Mamduh Jabr: I hope that the press will not interpret the health problem in Egypt as the interest of the union youth in treatment [sic].

Dr Hasan Tawfiq: Insofar as the insurance is concerned, there has been, according to the statistics, an increase in the number of [hospital] beds, in the budget and in the number of floors. Moreover, there are comprehensive clinics in Alexandria and Cairo. We have developed these clinics which used to be small.

We supply 320 beds in Alexandria [Hospital], 187 beds in Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir Hospital and 180 beds in Karmuz Hospital. The Workers Health Establishment had nearly 130 beds and we spent 300,000 pounds on it in the 1960's and increased the number of beds to 240. This is in addition to 240 beds in the 6 October Hospital in Cairo.

We shouldn't forget that there were no comprehensive clinics--i.e., clinics with the philosophy of having all kinds of specialization in one place. We now have 17 such clinics in Alexandria, not to mention an optometric center in Cairo.

The social insurance system will be applied to the farmers in the rural units. The local government law will give the governorates the responsibility of setting the rates for medical service in the private hospitals.

Zaynab Hamdi: Is it more beneficial to build a hospital costing 20 million pounds or to spend the sum for prevention?

Dr Mamduh Jabr: I cannot answer the question. The state has to participate with the private sector in providing some kinds of medical service.

Zaynab Hamdi: Why aren't there in the countryside means of education that are more effective than the present means?

Dr Mamduh Jabr: The problem in the countryside is that clean water has been supplied to the villages but sewerage has not. To provide protection, latrines have to be built and these cost the state millions of pounds.

Zaynab Hamdi: But in return for these millions, we will save other millions in treatment costs, human loss and protection.

Dr Mamduh Jabr: There is a study that shows that the enormous cost. Why shouldn't lavatories, schools and clinics be built with the intrinsic efforts of the villages, especially since the farmer's income is bigger than that of an employee? We must use this high income to make it contribute to improving the village conditions.

Dr Mamduh Jabr [sic]: For the health insurance system to survive, it must be made compulsory for large numbers so that we may benefit from the insurance revenues. I cannot set up a unified health insurance system as long as individual incomes are not unified.

Map for Youth Health

The discussion had to move to another area, meaning a look at the future--beginning with the organization of data.

Dr Ramasis 'Abd-al-'Azim: Regarding the health map, its role and the philosophy on which it is based, this is summed up in that the map realizes the scientific approach toward planning in Egypt. Health planning is a part of the economic and social develoment planning. But in my view, health planning did not start correctly until we thought of drawing up a health map for Egypt. For the first time, we survey the health and disease condition of the population, the conditions of the environment surrounding them, their tendencies, their attitude toward the health service and so forth.

We have surveyed 12 governorates so far to familiarize ourselves with the actual health situation in Egypt. This will help us to plan and to formulate priorities for spending on protection and treatment.

Mahmud al-Maraghi: We have discussed the issue of nutrition. Daily evidence shows that the standard and components of nutrition in any Egyptian home are declining. Is there an answer from the samples collected from the 12 governorates?

Dr Ramsis: It is true that we have surveyed 12 governorates but emptying and analyzing the data is done by computer and this has not been completed yet.

Fathi Ghanim: I imagine that need is what pushed us toward planning. There were urgent problems and difficulties that we wanted to face and so we resorted to planning. The problem is that planning is more comprehensive

than this. Health is linked to economy, education, the military aspect and so forth. There is also the problem of the changing reality. A health map is prepared and results are reached and after the data is emptied and analyzed, it is found that values have changed and that unexpected changes have taken place.

There is a big possibility that the picture will change. When I asked the Americans who are providing the financing and who are preparing a map which they started in 1965 about the overrun in time, they said that it is 2.5 years. Therefore, I am better off than they are because I have my calculations on this and they are less than (their estimate). The issue of time and the suitability of the data for use is also taken into consideration.

Dr 'Izz-al-Din Hashish: I hope that we will define whether there is a lack of nutrition or malnutrition because healthy food consists of basic elements. Various age groups require different nutrition. Lack of nutrition is different from malnutrition.

I have a question on the importance of coordination between the Ministry of Health and the other state agencies because the Ministry of Health cannot do all this by itself.

Drugs and Their Prices

Mahmud 'Abdal-Wahhab: I have a short observation. On 1 May [1980], the Higher Council of the Drug Sector held a meeting and emerged with a recommendation that drug prices not be touched. At the same time, new drug prices were being posted and causing costs of medicines to rise exorbitantly.

Dr 'Ali Hijazi: I will answer you with a very simple and convincing reason. There is no doubt that the drug companies face a very difficult equation. The price is of a unit (D.S) exceeds its [sic] price by 30 percent at least because 90 percent of the chemical substances from which we manufacture the drugs are imported and their prices are rising constantly. Take the production requirement. We used to purchase the empty tube for eye ointment for 17 mils in the past and now we buy it for 9 piasters and the tube of ointment is now sold for 12 piasters. Another example is the empty glucose (unit which used to be sold for 18 piasters). Locally, they have raised the price of glycerin and of cotton, even for the drug companies.

Despite this, they ask the drug companies to make profits. Some prices have been raised but we have not touched the prices of any heart, diabetes or asthma medicines.

His excellency the minister has said that the state has advanced a subsidy of 6 million pounds. No, the state has not given me a single mil. The state has taken from me 12 million pounds in profits and has given me 6 million pounds, keeping in mind that the state also collects from the drug sector 12.5 million pounds in treasury fees. Remove this treasury fee from my back

[I tell the state but it says] no. The state collects from me a thousand other things as if I were an investment company. The important thing is that I say that we must all act in solidarity and support the public sector to enable it to stand on its own feet.

Dr Ahmad Safwat: I thank Dr 'Ali Hijazi for the point that he has brought up, namely that the prices of the drugs that concern a large part of the people should not be moved [upward]. It is not necessary that the drug companies make profits on their medicines insofar as the health insurance [patients] are concerned. I wonder why hasn't the health insurance built a hospital in the past 10 years at a time when the state treasury gets so many millions from the insurance sector annually? It is better to build a hospital than to have the money in the form of state revenues. The construction of a hospital constitutes a good and distinguishing facade for the health insurance and is better than seizing already existing hospitals.

Dr 'Izz-al-Din Hashish: I have a question for Dr Hasan Tawfiq: Has the health insurance incurred any losses since 1964 and up to the present. In other words, has it saddled the state with any burdens?

Dr Hasan Tawfiq: No, it has been supplying the state with a surplus. We used to fight in the Ministry of Finance until the 1975 law was issued and the health insurance was turned into an independent fund. Three months ago, there was a surplus of 5 million pounds in the [fund's] budget!

The hour neared midnight and the problems were still being discussed by those present. But can we discuss all the health problems in one session?

This is impossible and this is why the discussion was mere headlines and an inlet to ideas.

[Box on Page 13] Participants in Seminar:

Dr Mamduh Jabr, the minister of health.

Dr 'Ali Hijazi, chairman of the Pharmacists Union.

Dr Hasan Tawfiq 'Awad, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Health Insurance Authority.

Dr Ramsis 'Abd-al'Alim, undersecretary of Ministry of Health and official in charge of the health map.

Dr 'Izz-al-Din Hashish, member of the Doctors Union Council.

Dr Ahmad Safwat, secretary of Doctors Unions.

From ROSE AL-YUSUF:

'Abd-al-'Aziz Khamis.

Fathi Ghanim.

Mahmud al-Maraghi.

Zaynab Hamdi.

Majdi Muhanna.

Mahmud 'Abd-al-Wahhab.

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DATA GIVEN ON PENSIONS PAID IN FIRST HALF OF 1980

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 25 Jul 80 p 4

[Excerpts] During the first half of this year, 203.8 million pounds were paid in the form of pensions and retirement compensation. This is compared to 140.2 million pounds paid during the same period of 1979, an increase of 45.3 percent. These payments were made to approximately 1.7 million Egyptian citizens.

This is revealed in a report discussed by Dr Amal 'Uthman, the minister of social insurance and social affairs, with senior officials of the insurance sector, in the course of a review of results achieved during the first half of this year.

Samir Mitawalli, first undersecretary of social insurance, said that according to the report, 267.3 million pounds were collected in social insurance dues during the first 6 months of this year, as compared to 250.4 million pounds for the same period last year. This represents a 6.5 percent increase.

During the first 6 months of this years, 259.7 million pounds were loaned to the Social Insurance Investment Fund, which was replaced by the National Investment Bank as of 1 July 1980. In comparison, 232.7 million pounds were loaned during the same period of 1979, and 11.6 percent increase. This money has been channeled into financing development plan projects incorporated into the national budget.

The Nasir Community Bank achieved a record in terms of transfers of ownership of various means of production and different types of tractors and vehicles to Egyptian citizens including craftsmen and farmers. Total transfers of this type for the first half of this year amounted to 39.6 million pounds, compared to 17.7 million pounds for the same period of last year. This represents a 123 percent increase. The volume of community loans made to citizens was 8.8 million pounds. The recipients were 35,000 government and public sector employees, pensioners, and students in universities and institutions of higher learning.

Religious alms collection committees organized by the Nasir Community Bank, which number 12,000 committees throughout the country, collected a total of 500,000 pounds in voluntary donations.

The undersecretary of social insurance added: "Follow-up reports clearly indicate the availability of effective insurance coverage for all citizens covered by the social insurance laws currently in effect. Insurance coverage is being extended to all as planned. The number of individuals directly or indirectly covered by this insurance will total 40 million citizens by the end of this year."

The minister of social insurance has directed that all social insurance offices strive to immediately pay Sadat pensions in all cases in which it is ascertained that individuals are entitled to them. The minister ordered enlisting the help of branches and mobile units of the Nasir Community Bank, and of banks in the villages where the pensioners live, so as to eliminate the problem of crowding in commercial banks and post offices. This is to be done to make things easy for the pensioners, in consideration of their advanced age.

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MINISTER OF AWQAF INTERVIEWED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 28 Jun 80 p 3

[Interview With Dr Zakariya al-Barri, Minister of Awqaf, by 'Abd-al-'Ati Hamid; "Era of Tampering With Monies of Muslims Has Ended; Communists, and Russia Behind Them, Are Cause of Deviation; New Rules for Distribution of Awqaf Apartments; Firm Measures Against Delinquents; Putting an End to Chaos in Mosque Podiums"]

[Text] The talk about deviation in the Awqaf Authority is extensive and includes such things as the presence of thefts, embezzlement, deviation in the distribution of apartments, deviation in the Higher Islamic Affairs Council and deviation in the distribution of Awqaf lands.

The man in charge of awqaf in Egypt answers: The era of tampering has ended. There will be new rules. Firm measures will be taken. An end will be put to chaos. Our youth are well. Ninety nine percent of our Muslim youth believe in the principles of Islam and are of good character and morals. We have drawn up plans to protect the youth against destructive ideas. We will not permit Egypt to be turned into another Lebanon.

[Question] What is the task of the minister of awqaf and is the position necessary?

[Answer] If the Ministry of Awqaf is abolished, who will take charge of investing the awqaf [trusts] of the Muslims? Moreover, who will take care of the mosques and support the Islamic call? There has to be somebody in charge of this, regardless of the title he takes. According to tradition and to the Shari'a rules, this supreme head of the state is the man in charge of the Islamic awqaf and he is the one who selects a minister to assist him, to shoulder the ministerial responsibility and to follow up on planning and implementation. This is why the Ministry of Awqaf was established and why the Awqaf Authority was formed under its control.

[Question] But don't you agree with me that there has recently been increasing talk about the presence of thefts and embezzlement in the Awqaf Authority and that this has hurt the reputation of the Ministry of Awqaf which has thus violated the purpose for which it was set up, namely to preserve the monies of the Muslims?

[Answer] No system whatsoever can be free of those who exploit and spoil it.

Insofar as the usurped awqaf lands are concerned, my position is that I will get back what can be regained legally. As for what cannot be regained legally, I will declare the name of whoever has caused the loss so that he may be subjected to a moral trial. The same thing will apply to the Higher Islamic Affairs Council and to the distribution of apartments. There are flagrant examples of exploitation of the state. The rights of the state must be regained and we cannot permit exploitation of the monies of the Muslims.

Regrettably, some groups and individuals have begun to seize the capital of the awqaf, at times in the name of Islam and at others through influence. If this situation continues, the awqaf monies in Egypt will be thus completely lost.

[Question] What have you done regarding the delinquency cases already seized?

[Answer] I believe that the cases of delinquency [phrase indistinct] that have taken place and that will take place will drop sharply. There will then remain a few with whom the lenient approach will be of no use and who have to be dealt with differently, namely be branded with fire, meaning that there have to be a deterrent and effective cure so that delinquents may then provide an example for others.

I Deliberated in Selection

[Question] What about the future of the Higher Islamic Affairs Council and about the awqaf apartments and lands?

[Answer] Insofar as the Higher Islamic Affairs Council is concerned, its membership will be announced shortly and it will constitute the biggest grouping of Egyptian Islamic thinkers. I hope to succeed in absorbing them. This council will have an executive committee and scientific and administrative agencies. As for the members from outside Egypt, I have proceeded deliberately in selecting them even though I know many of them welcome joining Egypt's Islamic leadership.

As for the awqaf apartments, I have reached the maximum in Islamic application, religious control, secular control and popular control in the distribution of apartments by forming a committee in which all kinds of expertise and all levels are represented so that it may conduct deliberations that realize justice. The decisions will be then made by majority and will be declared to the public. The vacant apartments will also be made known to the public. It is the right of any citizen to apply for occupying one of these apartments. The committee will also make known the reasons why it has given an apartment to this and not that person. The Islamic Research Council, the People's Assembly, the Ministry of Housing, the press, radio and television, the Union of Imams and the Union of the Ministry of Awqaf

Workers are represented in the committee. The committee will have rules for the distribution of apartments and these rules will be announced to the people. Frankly, the era of chaos in the distribution of awqaf apartments has gone forever and everything will be according to rules and regulations from now on.

Religious Vacuum

[Question] The delinquency by a small number of youth, be it religious, political or moral, is due, according to the experts, to the presence of a religious vacuum. What is your opinion in this regard and what has the ministry done to protect the youth against this vacuum?

[Answer] The ministry has begun to take positive steps in the sphere of youth guidance. The overwhelming majority of the youth believe, God be thanked, in the principles of Islam and are of good character and morals. I feel confident about our youths. Before becoming minister of awqaf, I was a professor at the Cairo al-Zaqaziq and al-Mansurah law colleges. It is my opinion that the youth abiding by the Islamic principles represent 99.9 percent of all youth. The heart of the matter is that there are some who have gone to excess in their abidance and have understood Islam to mean sternness, fanaticism, grimness and the imposition of views on others and so forth. Dialogue, such as the dialogue between a teacher and his students, will succeed with some of these people. Many of them have actually come to understand the right path. There will only remain a few who are ignorant, who disregard the facts or who are communist agents hiding behind the mask of religion--a mask which has been revealed and exposed. The state knows enough of the past secrets and news of this mask to be able to uncover and expose it. Communism has despaired of the possibility of getting the Egyptian people to follow it because this people has refused communism by virtue of its atheism and of its denial of God and because communism is oppressive, demonic and malicious toward mankind. Communism has sought to burn our backs, to sow hostility and hatred among us and to instigate a civil war between those called the toilers and those called the capitalists, not knowing that Islam has called for a social justice based on love, fraternity, tolerance and compassion and not for the accursed and hateful Marxism which advocates malice, hatred, rancor and sabotate. We have drawn up a plan to wipe it [communism] out and we have planned many programs to protect our youth from it.

Mosque in Every Quarter

[Question] What are these programs?

[Answer] President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat has instructed that a mosque be opened in every quarter for material [sic] culture and spiritual culture and to embody the greatness of Islam--a mosque to which the young go to memorize the Koran and the old go to study it. The mosque is also to contain a university for religious and secular sciences and is to be the place in which a quarter population meets in love and cooperation.

[Question] You have said on this occasion [sic] that you will ban any preacher or imam who does not follow the charted path and who tries to exploit the masses' hardship to realize personal leadership or use it to serve differences between himself and others and that you will stand firmly in the face of such a preacher or imam. How will you do this?

[Answer] When the seeds of such cases appeared in past centuries, the Hanafi rite ruled that only the supreme ruler or his representative can deliver the Friday sermon and lead the people because it is unimaginable in any creed or any religion to have mosque podiums exploited for personal opinions or to have one preacher attack another and then have a third and a fourth preacher get involved in the fight. Under such conditions, the group of Muslim preachers is divided and the Muslim is subjected to opposed and conflicting views contradicting one another. This is the goal of communism.

Mosques, Not Parties

This is prohibited and keeping silent over such a situation means keeping silent over a religious duty. We cannot permit differences and villification among mosque imams. We also cannot permit the mosques to be turned into parties, we cannot permit each imam to turn into a party representative and we cannot permit anybody to exploit the mosques to realize personal gains. This is forbidden and both religion and the state are against it. I say forbidden and we will confront such behavior with utter firmness and strictness.

[Question] This is possible for the mosques that are under the control of the Ministry of Awqaf. But what will you do regarding the private and small mosques which are widespread?

[Answer] The plan we are preparing for the future and which has not been made public yet--AKHBAR AL-YAWM will be the first to reveal this plan--is to have a board of directors to take care of and tend to every mosque, regardless of how big or small. The Ministry of Awqaf will help this board as much as possible and will supply it with people capable of preaching and guidance. The role of this board will be to preserve a mosque's podium and not to allow every ignoramus to climb it, regardless of whether such a person's ignorance is simple ignorance, in the sense that the person is ignorant and knows that he is ignorant, or compounded ignorance, meaning that the person is ignorant and doesn't know that he is ignorant--and God protect us.

[Question] Mr Minister, what have you done or will do in this regard to protect the imams from intruders? In other words, what is the ministry's plan to improve the standard of the preachers and of the imams?

With Wisdom and Benevolent Exhortation

[Answer] I have instructed the Directorates of the Call in the governorates to ask every imam who finds in himself the ability to deliver the unified Friday sermon from the radio and television station to take his chance so that the Muslim nation may hear him. I have also instructed the Directorates of the Call to ask every imam to present the sermons he has for dealing with the masses' problems with wisdom and benevolent exhortation and then to send copies of these sermons to the ministry so that it may deliver them to the Higher Islamic Affairs Council in order to publish them in books. We will thus realize both material and moral benefits for the preacher and the imam.

[Question] Frankly, what is the ministry's position toward the Islamic groups?

[Answer] We can reach an understanding with the Islamic groups that understand the Islamic Shari'a and the goals of Islam and that work for the interest of Islam. We can reach an understanding with these groups through wisdom, benevolent exhortation and kind words and we will agree as long as our goal is what is right. As for the few that want to impose themselves and their opinion on society and on the law, I hope none of them will remain because if these groups permit themselves to impose their opinion by force, other groups will rise to oppose them and to also impose their opinion by force. Then a third group may rise to impose its opinion on the preceding ones. This is a situation that no man can imagine and that no creed can condone. It is the kind of chaos that must be fought immediately.

Another Lebanon...No

[Question] By the way, what is your opinion of those who try to agitate sectarian sedition and what is the ministry's role in this regard?

[Answer] We will not permit Egypt to be turned into another Lebanon. We will confront sectarian sedition with utter firmness and severity. Some of them have depended on the loving mother that has given them weapons with which to strike their brothers and kinsmen. This loving mother is Russia which has sought to stir a war of annihilation among the area's peoples. Frankly, sectarian sedition is a communist means that must be cut off. Anybody who tries to ignite sectarian sedition must be brought to account. The state must not at all permit this.

[Question] Ramadan is around the corner. What is the ministry's plan in this regard?

[Answer] I have held a seminar at the Higher Islamic Affairs Council and invited to it the ministers of supply and of health to provide guidance in the month of Ramadan which was turned by some of the previous governments into a month of consumption in which only certain kinds of foods are eaten. This is happening at a time when Islam wants Ramadan to be a month that

elevates people above their cravings. Those [governments] wanted to distort the month of Ramadan and to contradict the purpose of Islam. They turned it into a month of cravings and food. This is incompatible with the majesty and greatness of the month of Ramadan, considering that it is the eye of the Islamic constitution.

In Ramadan, the president will hold several meetings with the Muslim youth in the Islamic associations, led by the Muslim Youth Association with its branches in the various provincial capitals. I will attend these meetings. Similar meetings will also be held in the centers of the Democratic National Party. I will have with me officials from the ministry and from the party to discuss with the youth all their religious and secular affairs.

Youth, Not Brotherhood

[Question] Frankly, I have heard that the purpose of your meetings in the Muslim youth associations is to turn these associations against the Muslim Brotherhood and that you want to rely in the future on the Muslim youth associations and not on the Muslim Brotherhood.

[Answer] All the Muslim associations agree with the Muslim Youth Association and there is no disagreement over it. We find no differences in these associations. I had an experience a year ago. I met with the youth of the Muslim Youth Association in Alexandria and then with the chairmen of all the religious and social associations in Alexandria. They all attended the meeting without any exception. We had a discussion on how to improve the religious call, how to unite its word and how to prevent the exploitation of subsidiary issues and differences because such exploitation divides the word of Islam.

No Surprise

[Question] You have declared that there will be an imminent surprise. What is this surprise? Any hints about it?

[Answer] It is not a surprise in the ordinary sense. All the decisions that lead to strictness and to firmness are a surprise for those who try to provoke seditions in society. The decisions that will enhance the religious call are a surprise to the doubters who try to spread the rumors that the government is not concerned with religion or with the implementation of the Islamic Shari'a.

Any excellent, serious and purposeful action seeking to serve Egypt is a surprise to those who work against Egypt. In any case, if I tell you what the surprise is, will it be a surprise any longer? But I believe that you have understood what I mean by the surprise. It is a number of regulations and decisions aimed at strengthening and enhancing the religious call so that Egypt may flourish and become the Islamic world's capital yesterday, today and tomorrow.

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RADIO AND TELEVISION UNION CHAIRMAN INTERVIEWED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 8 Jul 80 p 3

[Interview With Safwat al-Sharif, Radio and Television Union Chairman, by 'Isam Hashish; "First Interview With Radio and Television Union Chairman; First Organizational Structure for Radio and Television Union; Next February, Egypt's Voice Will Be Heard Strongly Throughout World; Phenomenon of Imported Series Will Disappear and Television Theater Will Reappear"]

[Text] From a room in the eighth floor in the radio and television building, Safwat al-Sharif, the new chairman of the Radio and Television Union, has issued a number of important decisions. All the decisions seek to change the form and philosophy of information work in this important agency.

The first of these decisions provides for creating the first Radio and Television Union structure having the fundamental task of serving the information work. The decisions also provide for the separation and independence of the two television channels, for the construction of the biggest radio broadcasting station in the Middle East and for plans to have both the camera and the microphone work together to transmit the pulse of the Egyptian man-in-the-street honestly and objectively.

Safwat al-Sharif also announces a number of other decisions in an exclusive interview with AL-AKHBAR.

The spectator or listener may feel that the standard of the radio and television programs offered weakens at times. He may blame this on the failure of the officials in charge of these agencies to understand him and to respond to his needs.

But this time the change starts at the roots and rises to build a technical and administrative entity that guarantees the public good-quality programs, that uses all the resources to enhance the public's taste and thinking and that seeks to meet this public's needs.

Information Work First

[Question] I asked the Radio and Television Union chairman about his philosophy on running the most important information agency in the state.

[Answer] My philosophy is based on an important need, namely to subjugate all the agencies and sectors in the radio and television premises to serve the information work in the manner that realizes our goals. In the light of this principle, an organizational structure will be formed for the Radio and Television Union for the first time on the basis of information mentality and thinking so that the information work map may form the basis of the information work and so that the organizational structure may be made to serve this basis.

(Al-Sharif added): A comparative study has already been conducted on our system and the systems of the London B.B.C. and of the French television. Before the middle of August, the union will have an organizational structure consisting of new and distinctive forms and sectors and including the various agencies of the general secretariat. The union chairman who controls this secretariat does not need 1,500 employees to work in it. The general secretariat should serve both the radio and the television branches of the information work.

Biggest Station in Middle East

[Question] In the light of this philosophy, what is your visualization of the form of the service [that should be performed] in this important agency?

[Answer] To start with, the broadcasting service should reach the targeted public. This will be our second task after forming the organizational structure. Regrettably, our voice is not heard in the remote parts of the republic and is not clear in the Arab and European countries. The problems experienced by radio broadcasting are also experienced by television broadcasting. Therefore, the projects to strengthen the transmission and booster stations must be reconsidered with the aim of greater strength and range. This is why I issued a few days ago a decision to change the wavelengths of four stations, namely Voice of the Arabs, the general program station, the Hebrew program station and the Koran broadcasting station. This decision will go into effect as of the middle of August. The wavelengths [mawjat] of these stations will be raised from 450 kilowatts to 2,000 kilowatts [sic], i.e. by more than fourfold. We will thus have the biggest radio broadcasting station in the Middle East. Construction of this station with its new power will take nearly 6 months. It is likely that the transmission will weaken during these months but we can then proceed to address the fraternal Arab peoples.

(Al-Sharfit further adds): The Arab Action Paper presented by President al-Sadat stresses the need to address the Arab peoples over the head of their rulers who have not understood the Egyptian peace initiative. This is a 100 percent information task and this goal cannot be realized without new stations that make it easy for the Arab citizen to hear Egypt's voice clearly and strongly.

Camera and Microphone in Heart of Egyptian Street

The information service is also based on a philosophy that seeks to transmit the pulse of the masses through the radio and television and through presenting the problems faced by the Egyptian man-in-the-street. This requires the base to be in contact with the top through the camera and the microphone so that the dialogue may not be one-sided. We will see shortly more programs that convey what is on the mind of the man-in-the-street with real democracy. This will be controlled by a code of honor among the reporters in this regard. A committee comprised of experts, specialists and public figures will be formed to draw up a code of honor which every radio and television worker will take the oath to respect. There will be a new penalty for whoever violates this code. If the information worker is not honest with the masses, he will be penalized by being denied appearance on the television screen or standing behind the microphone for a period of 6 months. I mean by dishonesty the failure to observe the genuine Egyptian values or the transmission of a false picture of the events. Dishonesty also covers the information man who obviously seeks to undermine social peace and national unity. We shoulder the responsibility of preserving this peace and unity through our contact with the masses. Any information person who fails to shoulder this responsibility will face the union's special committee for the protection of values which will decide what to do regarding the violations committed by an information worker.

News Cast

[Question] On more than one occasion, the president of the republic has stressed the need to devote attention to the news casts and to develop the live programs dealing with the problems of the Egyptian man-in-the-street. What are your plans for developing these programs?

[Answer] The news cast is the window through which the citizen looks at the most important local, national and international events by way of either the radio or the television. I am making preparations at present for the organization of a new central office into which all the news reports flow and from which these reports will be distributed to the service stations. Each station will then select the reports that suit its activities and inclination so that the news cast in one station may not be a replica of the cast in another station. Voice of the Arabs, for example, devotes special attention to the Arab news, the general program devotes such attention to the national news and the Voice of the People [idha'at al-sha'b] devotes a large segment for local news. Each station will write its news cast and there will be in each station a political officer in charge of this work. We will very shortly hear the news transmitted live from the site of the event and the reporters will be supplied with equipment that enables them to transmit the events live on location and to interview the decision-makers in a democratic manner which the listener will hear and which will enable this listener to comprehend the dimensions of the events.

Separation of Two Channels Cancelled Idea of Commercial Station

[Question] It has been announced that there is an idea to establish a commercial television station through subscriptions. Do you think that there is any need for this idea in view of the separation of channels one and two?

[Answer] I do not think that there is need for this station. If we find that the Egyptian viewer needs it, then we will set it up without subscriptions. The separation of channels one and two will produce a variety in the information material [television programs] which, I think, will satisfy all viewers. Channel one will have its distinctive political and official quality, in addition to certain doses of cultural and recreational programs which it will present and which will be different from what channel two presents. Each channel will have its own theater, choral and musical groups and studio. We will restore to the television theater the show and operetta programs. To put it briefly, each of the two channels will be youthful [shabbah] and will have a fast tempo and taste that will attract large numbers of viewers. There will also be honorable competition for subject matter, performance and stars. Moreover, the television chairman and the union chairman will take part with the heads of the various sectors in drawing up plans and in coordinating the programs of each channel.

Phenomenon of Imported Series About to End

[Question] In the recent period, a new phenomenon has spread, namely that of showing large numbers of imported series and works whereas most of those in charge of (the programs) are Egyptian artists. How can the Egyptian television regain its glorious past in this sphere of production?

[Answer] This phenomenon will disappear completely with the disappearance of the big gap between the wages paid by the television and the rival companies. We will raise the wages we pay and from now on, the cost and performance level of every television production will not be below that of any company's production. An economic study has actually been conducted on the cost of producing series and programs and of distributing them to stations that broadcast in Arabic. On the basis of this study, I can say confidently that this phenomenon will disappear and we will have a sufficient asset with which to invade the Arab stations. I have recently issued a decision modifying the stocks [usul] of the Audio-Visual Company and redistributing these stocks between the company and the television. As of the beginning of September, the company will operate through Studio 10 and the Pocket Theater Studio and control over Studio I and Studio 5 will be transferred to the television sector. The decision also provides for the first time for setting production rates for both the television and the company. It has been decided to raise television productions from 100 to 450 hours. Even though this is costly, we have taken the marketing of this production into strong consideration. The Audio-[al-sawtiyat] Company will produce 300 hours as a minimum of which 240 hours will be designed to meet the needs of the Egyptian and the Arab screen and 60 hours will consist of distinctive joint artistic productions designed to revive the vast Egyptian heritage.

One-Million Pound Loan

(Al-Sharif added): The financing of the Audio Company has, regrettably, faced obstacles that almost brought the company to a halt. This is why it has been decided to finance the company with one million pounds every 3 months as a production loan from the television's financial sector to provide it with liquidity, provided that the company submit a report on what is produced during this period and that it settle at the end of the fiscal year all the financial relations between itself and the union's various sectors.

Another decision which I have issued provides for the economic sector to market the production of all the sectors under the union's control. I have also issued a decision providing for Studio 5 to produce plays, shows, spectator programs and operettas. The television theater, which used to accommodate 2,000 spectators, will be thus revived. The television theater will also have seasons which will be announced in advance and the door will be thus opened for young talents to rise to stardom.

Chief Announcer Instead of Undersecretary

A special committee has also been formed to draw up new bylaws for the workers, to draw up new promotion regulations and to reclassify the grades, giving them professional names. Thus, the rank of general director, undersecretary, general supervisor and others will be discarded and replaced by announcer, first announcer, chief announcer and so forth. The bylaws will also set the right work allowances for each of the union's workers. There will also be a central procurement committee to determine the priorities of what has to be purchased so that each sector may not purchase what it wants independently. The sight of the male or female announcer carrying a recording set on his shoulder, for example, must disappear. We must understand the obstacles facing the work and must overcome them in order to realize the best performance.

[Question] In the month of Ramadan, the public's interest in radio and television intensifies. What new things will you offer this year?

[Answer] I have left it to the radio and television chiefs to determine the programs and to coordinate what each agency offers. In fact, they are exerting super efforts to please the public in this month. This is why I say that our programs this year are unique, harmonious and different from past years. However, I would rather leave it to the heads of each agency to talk about the programs. But I will say, for example, that religious programs this year will amount to 37.5 percent and will be presented in a very interesting way. The viewers will see shaykhs al-Sha'rawi, al-Baquri and other prominent Koran readers. They will also see new films and plays shown on the screen for the first time. The television chief has exerted noteworthy and commendable efforts in this regard.

Nelly's Puzzles Only

[Question] What about the puzzles?

[Answer] Mrs Safiyah al-Muhandis has decided to cancel the puzzles program this year. I have discussed the matter with her and I have agreed with her decision because the purpose of these programs is to enhance the general taste of the public. The radio has prepared a number of excellent programs which the listener will hear and enjoy. As for the television, it has been decided to keep the program of "Nelly's Puzzles" only and I will leave it to the viewer to pass his judgment on these puzzles. The television and radio will also broadcast live four night variety shows in Ramadan, one each Thursday from a public club or from Abu-al-Hawl [Sphinx] Theater. For the first time also, television transmission will be delayed to start at 1930 so that we may give the radio the opportunity to present its vital programs during the fast-breaking period. The morning transmission will continue now that the experiment has proven to be successful. This period will be injected with programs that suit all tastes.

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NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SITE SHIFTED AWAY FROM URBAN AREAS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 24 Jul 80 p 11

[Text] On 1 August, a final decision will be made concerning the site of the nuclear power plant which will be built in al-Dab'ah district [in the province of Matruh]. This is in compliance with directives given by President Sadat in response to a request by political and executive leaders of the province of Alexandria last year not to locate the plant in the Sidi Karir district. The request was made following the nuclear reactor accident in the state of Pennsylvania, in the U.S. The accident raised the issue of the potential threat posed by such nuclear plants to the lives of citizens, when such plants are built in densely populated areas.

At the end of this month, the province of Matruh will be hosting a delegation of French and Egyptian atomic energy experts who will undertake the task of determining the site of the nuclear power plant.

In determining the site of the plant, consideration will be given to building it far from densely populated areas and close to sites of industrial and agricultural projects which will be supplied with electric power from the nuclear plant.

An authoritative source has stated that the most important mission of the nuclear plant will be to help provide irrigation water and electricity. Experimental farms will be set up over an area of 10,000 feddans in the fertile area of Wadi Fukah in al-Dab'ah district, which is located halfway between Matruh and Alexandria. This will be in preparation for expanded use of sea water, after it is desalinized by the nuclear plant, in irrigation and cultivation along the northwestern coast.

Professors of botany from the colleges of agriculture in Egyptian universities will conduct a number of experiments at these experimental farms to prepare a plan for crop cultivation for subsequent adoption.

The nuclear plant will be linked to the country's national electric power network to help the country deal with its increasing need for electricity and to supply the new, growing cities, as well as the cities of the province of Alexandria with electricity.

The cost of building the nuclear plant will be $360 million. Its total capacity will be 600 megawatts. It will be second, in terms of capacity, to the High Dam power plant, the capacity of which is 2,100 megawatts.

9468
CSO: 4802

RAILROAD AGENCY RENAMED, NEW BOARD OF DIRECTORS APPOINTED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 25 Jul 80 p 4

[Text] Engineer Sulayman Mitawalli, the minister of transport, communication, and maritime transport, has issued a decision forming a new board of directors for the railroads agency. This follows promulgation of the new law establishing the National Egyptian Railroads Agency, to replace the current Public Railroads Agency.

The decision appoints the current board chairman, Engineer 'Abd al-Mun'im Hishmat as chairman of the new board, and appoints Engineer Dhu al-Himmah al-Sharqawi, Engineer Mustafa Hisan and Engineer Hanafi 'Abd al-Sami', as vice-chairmen.

The new board of directors will include as member, Mahmud 'Atitu Ahmad, head of the National Union of Railroad Workers. The board will also include the following members, for their expertise, for a period of 2 years: Engineer Sulayman 'Abd al-Hayy, former minister of transport; Muhammad Rashwan, member of the People's Assembly; Maj Gen Muhammad Fu'ad Mujahid, Quartermaster of the Armed Forces; Engineer Muhammad al-Sayyid Isma'il, undersecretary of economy; Muhammad 'Abduh, undersecretary of finance; Fu'ad Abu Za'lah, president of the Iron and Steel Co; Engineer Kamal Hishmat, first undersecretary of the ministry of transport; Dr Muhammad al-Huwari, professor at the Cairo School of Engineering; and Engineer Fa'iq Farid, commissioner of the Electric Distribution Co.

The new board will hold its first meeting on Sunday, 27 July.

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NEW LAWS EXPECTED TO EASE CEMENT, HOUSING CRISIS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 28 Jun 80 p 3

[Article by Mahmud Murad: "First Step To Solve Crisis in Construction Materials and Housing Will Begin Today, How? To Eliminate Black Market, Unified Cement Price That Doesn't Apply to Luxury Housing; Raising Pre-1952 Rents and Eliminating Reductions Taking Place Afterwards; Apartment Belongs to Tenant Who Has Right to Give It Up; Owner Responsible for Maintenance"]

[Text] Beginning today and throughout the month of July, a number of new decrees and laws representing the start of a revolution in the world of construction and housing with the basic changes that they will introduce in the prices of construction materials and with the subsequent boosting of the construction movement, as well as the changes they will introduce in housing rents, in the landlord's relationship with the tenant--changes that will lead to stability and to ending the disputes in this sphere. All of this will result in elimination of the black market, and of the phenomenon of key money and of advance rent.

It has been decided to set a uniform price for cement at the rate of 31 pounds per ton, to eliminate the subsidized price and to fix the price of iron. As for housing rents, the veiws are inclined toward raising them by a rate reaching 100 percent and by two to three percent for modern housing. New housing rents will, according to the studies, be subject to the decisions of rent setting committees. Moreover, a financial subsidy will be given to every landlord for every housing unit he builds in order to encourage him to contribute toward solving the housing problem on the basis of the principle that "neither the tenant nor the landlord should be done an injustice. Society in its entirety, represented by the state, should shoulder the responsibility."

These decrees will be issued in succession. The first to be issued will be a decree setting a uniform price for cement at the rate of 31 pounds per ton. This decree means the start of a revolution in the world of construction that is liable to boost the construction and reconstruction operations, to eliminate the black market and to affect in a fundamental manner the pheno menon of key money and of advance rent to which landlords resort on the pretext of making up for the prices charged by the black market.

Until now, there have been three prices for cement: The first is a subsidized price of 28 pounds per ton for cement sold for the construction of worship houses and government hospitals. The second price is 48 pounds per ton for cement sold to people with licenses for other kinds of construction and the third is the black market price which has now reached 66 pounds per ton and which has risen in some cases to 80 pounds or more. The new uniform price of 31 pounds will not apply to three types of construction: Luxury housing, villas--hotels--and investment projects. These three kinds of construction will be supplied with cement at a price of 48 pounds per ton and the quantities supplied will be according to what is set in the building licenses. This means that these types of construction will benefit from the available quantities and will not have to be at the mercy of the black market.

According to the memorandum submitted to the Ministerial Services Committee by Dr Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, the minister of state for housing, reconstruction and land reclamation, calculation of the new uniform price has been reached on the basis that the production cost per ton of cement, in addition to the fees charged, amounts to 12 pounds. The government sells this kind of cement for 28 pounds per ton for certain kinds of buildings. As for imported cement, the cost per ton amounts to 48 pounds and this kind is sold for all other kinds of installations. The government and public sector are considered the prime buyer and consumer of cement because of the size of the construction projects which they carry out. This is why the studies have seen it fit to combine both prices--12 pounds for the local production + 48 pounds for imported cement--and to take the average cost, namely 30 pounds, and add to it one more pound to come up with the new uniform price. But because the production of the Egyptian cement plants amounts to nearly 3 million tons only whereas the consumption amounts to 6.5 million tons--which means that we import nearly 3.5 million tons annually--and because this may give rise to a black market, the ministry has already concluded contracts to import these quantities in order to meet the local consumption needs.

This is for this year. As for next year, the number of projects will increase and so the consumption volume will subsequently rise. Research shows that we will need 11 million tons of cement [annually] by 1985.

Production of 5 Million Tons

Here emerges the need to develop local production either by increasing the number of production lines in the existing plants or by increasing the number of the plants themselves. In this regard, contracts have already been concluded to increase the production lines to yield nearly 5 million tons by the year 1985. It has also become evident that the capacity of the pulverizers [al-tawahin] is bigger than the capacity of the furnaces. To take advantage of this, 700,000 tons of crude cement have been imported to be processed into [refined] cement in our plants. We will thus benefit from the difference in the price of crude and processed cement and will also

benefit by putting the Egyptian plants into operation. To provide incentives for the workers in these plants and to prevent the emigration of these workers in search of higher wages abroad, the government will, at the same time, purchase every ton of cement beyond the [set] production rate at double its price, thus raising the revenues of the plant which will then distribute these revenues to the workers in incentives and rewards amounting to 100 percent [of the workers' wages].

On the other hand, there are plans to build new plants. Invitations have been issued for international bids for the construction of the first plant which will have a capacity of one million tons annually. A decision will be made on the bids at the beginning of next September so that construction may start in order that production may begin in 1985. The plant costs will range between 120 and 160 million dollars, most of which will be in loans. After a decision is made on this plant, invitations will be issued for bids for another plant that will, most likely, be built in Qina or Sawhaj and a third plant in Asyut or al-Minya to serve the neighboring governorates. Production will thus rise gradually with the rise in consumption. It is important to build numerous plants because the hypothetical lifespan of the existing plants is about to end and these plants require complete renewal.

New Housing Law

This revolution in construction which will be created by the decree to unify the price of cement will have its far-reaching effects on the volume of the housing construction operations and on the relationship between the landlord and the tenant in a manner that underline a change in the present conduct and method. There are views and opinions projected at present in preparation for issuance of the new housing law over which there will definitely be sharp arguments. The most prominent and most likely of these opinions so far are the following:

Regarding apartments built before 1952 and not subjected to any of the laws reducing rents, the rent of such apartments will be raised to reach 100 percent [sic].

Regarding apartments built before or after 1952 and subjected to any of the laws reducing rents, their rents will be raised to reach 100 percent. This means that the rent of such apartments will be restored to what it was before implementation of the law--be it one or two laws.

Regarding apartments built between 1952 and the end of 1973 and not subjected to any of the laws reducing rents, their rent will be raised by two to three percent.

Regarding apartments built from the beginning of 1974 and until now, their rent will remain the same.

Landlord's Responsibilities and Commitments

In return for this increase which the tenant will pay the landlord, the landlord will be fully responsible for the maintenance and repair work, for the regular functioning of the lifts and for similar work required by a building, regardless of its size. If the landlord procrastinates or fails to carry out such work, the tenants can take legal measures against him, repair what has to be repaired and deduct the costs from the rent.

For the first time ever, the law will contain a completely new provision on which all opinions and studies are unanimous, namely the right to benefit from an apartment after the death or emigration of its owner. The current law states that ownership of the apartment shall revert to the resident wife and children, to one of the two parents or to the brothers if it is proven that they have lived in the apartment for no less than one year. The new law will consider a rented apartment a part of the inheritance, meaning that its ownership will revert legally to one of the children, even if he is married and non-resident, or to one of the two parents or to a brother whether the tenant [sic] leaves a will to the effect or not. Should a dispute develop among the heirs, then it shall be settled in favor of those who deserve the inheritance.

The opinions are also inclined toward having the new law stipulate for the first time ever the right of an apartment tenant to exchange apartments with any other person, regardless of whether in the same governorate or in a different governorate, by virtue of the fact that the tenant has the right (to dispose of the apartment) without violating the law. This will solve numerous problems, including the problem of a citizen having to live far from his place of work and the subsequent problem of the pressure exerted on the transportation services and others. It may even be that the tenant's health condition makes it inconvenient for him to live in the apartment or the apartment may be bigger or smaller than the tenant wants. The law thus guarantees the tenant's right to swap apartments or give up his apartment.

These are some features of the new law. Numerous circles, including housing and civil law experts, are now holding meetings to draw up the provisions of the law on the basis of the principle that "neither the tenant nor the landlord should be done an injustice and if anybody has to shoulder 'something' then let it be the responsibility of society in its entirety."

The significance of this is embodied clearly in new buildings and this law answers the question raised years ago, namely: Should the rent committees continue to exist, on what basis should they operate and what will the situation be if the "reasonable" rent pleases the landlord but overtaxes the tenant?

Here the research resorts to the experiences of other countries. The rule says that the rent that a tenant pays should not exceed 25-30 percent of his income. How can this be done when this rent, according to construction costs, is higher?

So far, the opinion agreed upon is that the state should, on behalf of society, make up for the landlord so as to encourage construction. This means that the landlord builds and then the rent committee comes and sets a reasonable rent. Meanwhile, the state pays the landlord a certain sum for every housing unit he builds. How much is this sum? It amounts to the difference between the individual's income and the value of the essentials that he must have. This is exactly what is still being studied, not only at the level of housing but also economically and socially so that the features of the revolution of construction, housing and stability may be made complete.

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BRIEFS

LOW-ECONOMY HOUSING--Before issuance of the new legislations, i.e. under the legislations currently in force, the low-economy housing budget consisted of the local cement revenues. Production costs per ton, plus the fees, amount to 12 pounds whereas a ton of cement is sold at a subsidized price of 28 pounds, i.e. each ton yields a profit of 16 pounds. The yield from the sale of local production, amounting to 3 million tons, is 48 million pounds which have formed the low-economy housing budget. After the new legislations and under the uniform price, the low-economy housing budget will no longer consist of these revenues but will become a part of the ministry's budget. This means that the state will not abandon this type of housing but will, on the contrary, expand it. [Text] [Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 28 Jun 80 p 3] 8494

CSO: 4802

MAJLES MEMBERS GIVE VIEWS ON NEW GOVERNMENT

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 6 Sep 80 p 6

[Article: "Majles Members Express Views Regarding the First Most Important Tasks of the New Government"]

[Text] In a letter to the Islamic Consultative Assembly last week, Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Raja'i presented his new cabinet. Raja'i's cabinet is, in fact, the first government that is formed after the setting up of the country's fundamental institutions, that of judicial and legislative powers. With the formation of Raja'i's government and following its confirmation, the country's third basic institution, the executive, will officially begin operation.

Expectations from the new government, called "the government of revolution" by so many, are, undoubtedly, very high. In that connection, the public is impatiently awaiting necessary action from the new cabinet. Expectations are various and many, and despite the fact that the new government should be given enough time for implementing its plans, public expectations from the government could not be ignored, especially now that formation of the new government has raised the hopes and aspirations of the people. The most important thing is to recognize the problems first and then try to do something about them.

In that connection, the Political Service of KEYHAN contacted a number of Majles representatives to learn about their views about "the most important responsibilities of the new government." It hopes that by doing so, the new cabinet, guided by the nation's representatives in the Majles, will be able to give priority to popular demands and take constructive steps towards the fulfillment of what are expected from a "revolutionary government."

The views expressed by various representatives could prove to be of great help to cabinet members in the preparation and execution of their future plans.

In its first report regarding views of the Majles representatives, we bring you views expressed by six Majles members. Views expressed by other representatives will be included in our future reports.

Golzadeh Ghafuri, Tehran Representative

Answering our question, he talked about the philosophy of governments, saying that history had shown that governments had most of the time, been the source of oppression, but always tried to justify their actions as being legitimate and legal. In such cases, the minority which comes to power by force, imposes itself on the people and thus widening the gap that exists between the ruled and the rulers. At the same time, there is another form of government which is aware of its humanitarian responsibilities. The Islamic government falls within the latter category because it has a devine mission, is honest and is responsible. It is also prepared to relinquish power whenever a more competent and responsible government steps in. In an Islamic government, authority and power is not an end but a mean. Tehran representative Golzadeh Ghafuri further added that he hoped that the government would grasp its big responsibility and be able to "crystalize" Islam with its actions. We earnestly hope that the new organization that is taking shape under the new government will represent such order. If the new government expects to have a place among the existing world governments it must pay attention to human freedom--both for Moslems and non-Moslems, who should be made familiar with our system through our actions. We must prove to the world that Islam values human beings and humanity. He said: "The government should strictly observe the constitution, especially its third article, which is composed of 16 different sections and was proposed by myself. The important issue is that of individual liberties and judicial security. Public welfare issues are something all talk about and it is hoped that they too will be taken care of. I hope that the government will give the issue of justice first priority so that people could go to proper authorities whenever they feel they have been wronged. This, of course, is possible only if people have confidence in our high judicial council. The most important issue, in my view, is that of human liberties in the light of the Islamic belief in one God." Ghafuri added that he supports the establishment of social justice and hoped that existing differences would be resolved so that the country could move towards higher goals and the bringing about of fundamental changes in the world such as abolishing the veto right of the superpowers. He said that childish issues must be set aside, and help free people from the present state of suspension. He said that in the end it is the people, the history and the future generation that are going to pass judgment on us.

Esma'il Fada'i, Majles Representative From Shazand, Arak

Fada'i said that even not considering the oppression of the past 2,500 years, oppression and crimes committed during the 57 years of cruel and suppressive rule of the Pahlavi regime has wiped out every human quality. It is the responsibility of the new government to bring the nation's sacred ideals into reality, which means acting in true Islamic way. He said that he was talking in general terms with regard to acting in an Islamic method for the fulfillment of the various demands of the people.

It must be born in mind, of course, that popular demands should be pursued in line with the Islamic laws.

The representative from Shazand further added that the country had many cultural shortcomings which had to be remedied by the new government through the raising of the people's level of education. Material needs of the people should also be taken into account. The government should also think of the nation's full and complete independence which could only be achieved through self-sufficiency and noncommitment. Everything must be done to make the country free from dependency on colonialist powers. Why should we sell our honor to the superpowers and purchase their "consumer goods." This way, he said, we give our pride away as well as our money. He further added that the government should do everything to raise the cultural level in the country, because with the raising of cultural level the economy will improve also. He said that he hoped that after cultural independence is achieved, Islam and the Islamic revolution could be exported and the oppressed and the needy masses throughout the world will be able to become familiar and to know the real Islam. By the will of God, we can then present Islam to all nations and all classes and truly establish it.

Hadi Ghaffari, Tehran Representative

Answering our question, Hadi Ghaffari said:

The most important duty of the new government is, first to determine its domestic policies. It should then turn its attention to the nation's economic problems. In the past 50 years of the Imperial government, Iran faced a bankrupt economy. On the one hand, the entire economy was overshadowed by oil. This must be immediately remedied. On the other hand, under difficult conditions when the country was confronting the superpowers of the East and the West, there were hidden elements that tried to create political instability in Iran. These events, whether from the right or the left, in unity but each in its own method, aim for political instability in the country. The reason for that is that with political and economic stability many of the nation's ills could be cured. If this is prevented, in a condition of public dissatisfaction, many things could be done. This is what we call the proper ground for a coup d'etat. Ghaffari continued by saying that coup d'etats would not be possible without a proper groundwork and, therefore, the first task of the government was to prepare plans for bringing political and economic stability back to the country. He also said it must be remembered that in the domestic front nothing could be accomplished if principles set by the Imam were ignored. He said that everybody knows what the line of the Imam was and that it should be followed meticulously. In connection with the status of various political groups, Hadi Ghaffari said that the issue should be separated from the imperialistic and the world-devouring events. As I have pointed out in the Majles, he said, in the history of the struggle of the Iranian nation, everytime people had become united and wanted to have an ideology, by

creating a particular issue, the superpowers had fomented unrest and chaos in the country and had neutralized the efforts of the nation. He believed that the superpowers were doing the same thing now. He said that political organizations with huge budgets were being set up here and there and efforts were being made to hinder our revolutionary endeavors by raising preordered and standardized issues [sic]. To achieve their goals, he said, they are even prepared to create their own martyrs in order to cry over their corpses, and thus deceive and mislead the public. He said that the government was dutybound to act decisively in this respect and prevent the tragedy that occurred during the provisional government from being repeated. If political groups are given the opportunity, he said, they can simply sell the country to either the East or the West. He ended by saying that the nation considers the government as its legal representative and expects that it will prevent such a happening by legal and revolutionary methods.

Morteza Fazl'ali, Garmsar Representative

He believed that the establishment of security was the first duty of the government. He said: Internal security and the paying of attention to border areas, especially in the west, was the most important task of the government. He also called for a strict control by security forces of traffic in western parts of Iran so that peace and security could be established, especially in the Kordestan Province. He also said that the question of land, both agricultural and commercial, was very important, urging immediate government supervision. He said that in a number of areas people had taken over land that did not belong to them. This, he said, had created a rather chaotic situation noting that it could prove disasterous for the Islamic Republic if it was not stopped. Another important issue, he said, was coordination between revolutionary organs and government agencies which, he believed, did not exist in many places. He called for an end to overlapping authorities. On foreign policy, Fazl'ali said that it must be based on Islamic principles which, he believed, was the policy of "neither Eastern nor Western." He also said that it must be based on reciprocity in accordance with the ideology and interest of the Islamic revolution.

Musavi Kho'yniha, Tehran Representative

He said that the government had many immediate tasks and duties to perform but he believed that priority went to the purging of the executive organs. He was of the opinion that it was necessary because it would prepare them for the implementation of projects and legislations that were going to be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. He warned that as long as the executive was not purged nothing could be accomplished. With reference to economic problems, he said: "The most important duty of the government was to prepare the groundwork for the renewal of economic activities and the revival of agriculture. The great injustices and wrong done to our farmers should be corrected, in the sense that the government must provide them the same services that in the past had been reserved for the big urban areas."

Regarding foreign policy, he said that it was only natural that it should be based on revolutionary principles and standards. He also said that all countries should be put on the same footing and should be divided into two groups of Islamic and non Islamic. At the same time, he noted that in some Islamic countries relations with people was on a limited basis. He also said that liberation movements should be given all possible material and moral support with the Islamic liberation movements given priority.

Seyyed Mohammad Taqi Hosseyni, Zabol Representative

In answer to the question put to him by the Political Service of KEYHAN, Zabol representative Hosseyni said: "The government has two most important tasks to perform. First, it must turn its attention to internal situation and move towards repairing the damages done to the country. These are topped by the condition of the poor and the creating of jobs for the unemployed. Second, it must put the country's foreign policy in order so that our Islamic revolution could better be reflected abroad and the Islamic Republic be able to fulfill its mission." Regarding the role played by the government in the economy, he said that the stagnant economy must be revived on an Islamic basis, free from exploitation, until the country becomes self-sufficient. With sufficient effort we even can export our products on an international level. Regarding agriculture, he said that because of the geographical conditions Iran had great potential for agricultural development. What is needed, he said, was a thorough study of various aspects and a proper use of the needed manpower. He said the country was ready for this and all that was now needed was organization and proper planning. In conclusion, he referred to problems in the border areas, saying that the government bore a heavy responsibility with regards to fortifications in these areas. He said that because of the strategic importance of the nation's frontiers the problem of border security was of utmost importance which deserved priority over some domestic issues.

Fortunately, he said, the Majles is considering this problem and has drafted and submitted a bill for immediate debate calling for construction of roads in border areas which will be sent to officials for action following its approval.

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BRIEFS

FUNDAMENTALISTS UNABLE TO VISIT MECCA--Tehran, 11 Oct (KUNA)--Iranian Moslem Fundamentalists who are still fully determined to export their Islamic revolution to neighbouring Moslem countries would not be able to 'exhibit' their revolution at the annual pilgrimage in Mecca this year. The export plans were foiled due to the Iran-Iraq conflict and after Tehran expressed its inability to send Iranians for Haj by the land route. About one thousand Iranian pilgrims who left for Mecca before the war are being called back by the Iranian Government to take part in the 'holy war,' Iranian officials said today. Iranian Moslem Fundamentalists were making brisk preparations for the effective propagation of Islamic revolution among the Moslem pilgrims gathering from all over the world in Saudi Arabia. Influential religious leader Ayatollah Hosein Ali Montazeri in a statement issued only two days before the war had called on all Iranian pilgrims to make themselves ready for exporting Islamic revolution at the international gathering in the 'House of God' in the holy city of Mecca. [Text] [LD111236 Kuwait KUNA in English 1100 GMT 11 Oct 80]

CSO: 4920

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS, FOREIGN POLICY DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 4 Jul 80 pp 24-25

[Article: "What Are Resolutions Which Will Be Given Quality of 'Popular Legitimacy' by National Council; Iraqi-Syrian Political, Financial, Oil and Commercial Relations Are Normal; Baghdad Considers Its National Security to Include Gulf and Opposes 'Written' Agreements With United States"]

[Text] Two prominent and serious events coincided with the elections for the Iraqi National Council which took place in the middle of last month: The first was the attempt to storm the British Embassy in Baghdad and the second has been the military clashes on the Iraqi-Iranian borders which escalated before, during and after the elections. Iraq has accused the "Persian regime" of spurring these clashes.

Though the Iraqis no longer classify the clashes on their borders with Iran as surprises because such clashes have become a daily occurrence, they have dealt with the embassy incident which took place on the eve of the elections (the first incident of its kind since the monarchy was overthrown in 1958) as a serious matter aimed at diverting the media attention from the elections, not to say aimed at foiling and derailing the elections, as an Iraqi official source has stated. This is why quick and decisive action was taken to put an immediate end to the operation.

The National Council elections have given Iraq the first representative legislative parliament which includes 250 members representing Iraq's various governorates and citizens who amount to nearly 13.5 million people and of whom more than 6 million were called to take part in the elections. The voters did come to the polls in large numbers which were noticed by the hundreds of journalists from various countries who had responded to the invitation of the Iraqi Ministry of Information to cover the news of the elections which took place in one day from the northernmost to the southernmost part of the country, including the Kurdish self-rule areas which consist of the three governorates of Irbil, al-Sulaymaniyah and al-Huk [presumably meaning Dahuk].

The outcome of the elections has not been surprising, whether in terms of voters or of winning candidates, most of whom are members of the ruling

party. The Iraqi official departments have asserted that "only a very small number out of the 6 million Iraqis of age 18 and above who are entitled to vote in accordance with the National Council law issued by the Revolution Command Council more than 3 months ago have failed to vote."

The fundamental observation concerns the qualitative "victory" scored by the Iraqi women whose right to vote and to be elected has been guaranteed for the first time by the law. Women have exercised this right strongly and have elected to the parliament 17 out of a total of 19 women who have run for election in the various governorates. Manal Yunis, the chairman of the Iraqi Women's Federation, is one of the most prominent women elected.

Election winners include four Revolution Command Council members, led by Na'im Haddad who may be elected council speaker. In the self-rule area, where elections will be held shortly to elect members of the area's special legislative council, 'Ubaydallah Barzani, the son of the late Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani, and Bakr Rasul, a Kurdish notable, have won the elections. These two have run for election against 'Aziz and Hashim 'Aqrawi (the latter a minister of state) who are also Kurdish. The elections have also brought to the new council Sa'd Qasim Hammudi, the former minister of information and the current chief editor of AL-THAWRAH. Prominent media people elected to the new council also include Taha Yasin, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Information and Culture.

Even though the officials are eager not to differentiate and make distinctions between Ba'thist and independent and even though they have been asserting that the candidates came from the various political inclinations, excluding "the revolution's enemies," the certain fact is that the overwhelming majority of the 250-member council belongs to the ruling Ba'th Party and represents at the same time the various popular groups, such as the Peasants Federation. Five of the members of this federation's leadership have won seats in the new parliament, exactly as representatives of the workers, some retired military men and other personalities representing various sectors organized in labor unions have won.

In terms of organization and of the goals for which it has been established, the Iraqi National Council is not different from any other parliament in the world. Its basic task is that of legislation, but in participation with the Revolution Command Council, and of watchdog over the state establishments. This council is founded on a number of fundamental and general principles that are similar to those of most [parliamentary] councils in other countries.

Article 53 of the law in accordance with which the National Council has been founded states that "the National Council shall be summoned to convene by a republican decree within a period of no more than 15 days after announcement of the election results." This announcement was actually made on the day following the elections, i.e. on the 21st of last June.

However, the general impression among the Iraqi officials is that the preparations for the revolution celebrations which begin on the 17th of this month will delay convocation of the council's session for a few days to make it coincide with the start of the celebrations.

It is certain that Iraqi President Saddam Husayn will take the opportunity of the opening session, which will be headed by the most senior member, to deliver a speech in which he will focus on the importance of this "phased step" that has been made at the level of "building the Iraqi-style democracy." The general impression is that the Iraqi president will outline in his speech the major tasks of the council during its term which has been set by the law at 4 years.

Observers in the Iraqi capital say that the significance of the council's task in the coming phase should not be underestimated at the Iraqi and Arab levels. These observers point out in this regard a number of important factors that have urged the Iraqi authority to speed up the formation of this council. One of these factors is the desire to give the quality of "popular legitimacy" to some of the domestic and external political resolutions expected to be made through having the council take part in preparing and announcing these resolutions.

AL-HAWADITH has learned from some well-informed circles in the Iraqi capital that the Revolution Council's permission to a number of its prominent members to run for election and the subsequent victory of these members has been meant to introduce strong elements to the centers of guidance and influence in the assembly's work and to give moral significance to any resolution this assembly adopts, especially since it has become almost certain that the assembly speakership, deputy speakership and secretariat will belong to these strong elements. It is true that there will be no "opposition" or "support" in the western (and Lebanese) sense insofar as the council's internal structure is concerned. However, the eagerness to secure consensus for the required resolutions, be they of a domestic or external nature, is a big concern.

At the foreign policy level, the positions which the assembly can help to crystallize are numerous, especially in regard to the relations with Syria, the Arab Gulf states, the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as Iraq's Lebanese, Palestinian and other policies.

Jasim 'Ulwan, the minister of state for foreign affairs, describes the Baghdad-Damascus pan-Arab relations as normal. Despite the tension arising as a result of incidents of infiltration on the borders between the two countries and despite the lukewarm bilateral political relations, the economic relations and Iraq's financial commitments toward Syria emanating from the Baghdad summit have not been at all affected because Iraq is paying its share of these commitments on schedule. Moreover, oil is still flowing to Baniyas. The commercial relations have suffered no ill effects whatsoever by evidence of the fact that Syrian goods were present in the Baghdad fair which was held a few months ago.

Insofar as Lebanon is concerned, the Iraqi policy is summed up in supporting any step decided upon by the legitimate authority and the government to end the Lebanese problem. It seems that the Iraqi officials are enthusiastic for the detente efforts being exerted by President Sarkis and the government. However, they consider the Lebanese issue a part of the game of the major powers "and the Lebanese must make the first step to pave the way for a solution because it is difficult to impose any solution to the Lebanese problem from abroad." Even though these officials acknowledge that the Lebanese issue is tied to the Middle East issue, they do not encourage putting a stress on this point because such stress is not in Lebanon's interest.

During his meeting with the Lebanese journalists, the Iraqi minister of state for foreign affairs gave the impression that there is a kind of frost in the relations between Beirut and Baghdad when he said that direct contacts with Fu'ad Butrus, the Lebanese minister of foreign affairs, are almost nonexistent and that the only remaining channel of communication is the Lebanese Embassy in Baghdad. However, most of the Iraqi officials deny that there is a problem behind the delay in appointing a new Iraqi ambassador to Lebanon to replace the former ambassador who was wounded in an assassination attempt, returned to Baghdad for treatment and stayed in Baghdad after being appointed head of the Tourism Organization. The officials attribute this delay to a major factor, namely "the qualifications that any Iraqi ambassador to Lebanon must have," according to the words of an official Iraqi source.

The Iraqis are fighting the Iranian tide on two fronts: A military front all along their borders with Iran and a political front whose arena is the Arab Gulf states, especially Bahrain. The Iraqi officials do not conceal their support for Bahrain in the face of the Iranian threats on the basis of a principle which they stress, namely that any threat to the security of any Gulf state constitutes a direct threat to Iraq's national security.

The coordination attempts made with the Sultanate of Oman and embodied in the visit paid to Baghdad by the Omani minister of state for foreign affairs in the wake of the reports about Omani military "facilities" for the Americans can be viewed within this framework. The Iraqis say that they have expressed to Qasim al-Zawawi [Omani minister of state for foreign affairs] their strong opposition to any agreement between Oman and Washington in this regard and have said that if what is meant by the word "facilities" is "friendly visits" by some units of the U.S. navy to the Omani ports, then that is normal. But to have written and binding agreements concluded would constitute something that Baghdad rejects absolutely, especially since Baghdad is the advocate of the call for keeping the Arab world, particularly the Gulf, neutral in the struggle between the two superpowers.

In the Iraqi-Palestinian relations, Baghdad is inclined to disengage itself from some factions and organizations and to strengthen its ties with the PLO in its capacity as the vessel that contains the various currents.

It is within this perspective that closure of the offices of the Popular Front and of the Democratic Front in Baghdad can be interpreted. An Iraqi official has said that the disagreement with the Popular Front came to the forefront after the emergence of "special assessments in the front insofar as the situation in Iraq is concerned."

As for the United States, the Iraqi officials deny that any efforts are being exerted on their part to resume the two countries' diplomatic relations that were severed in 1967. However, these officials admit that the U.S. efforts in this regard are continuing, either directly through the U.S. Relations Branch in Baghdad or indirectly through some delegations friendly to the United States that have visited Iraq in recent times.

Minister 'Ulwan has said: Resumption of the relations with the United States can constitute a means to serve our national interest. However, our position in this regard is a principled pan-Arab [qawmi] position that has existed since the 1967 war and caused by the U.S. position of support for Israel. Our position cannot change unless the U.S. position changes.

On the Soviet side, the officials describe the relations as having returned to normal after being lukewarm because of the Iraqi position toward the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. The tepidity was eliminated as a result of the Kremlin leaders' understanding of the explanations on the Iraqi position regarding Afghanistan. The visit made by the Iraqi minister of industry to the Soviet capital (at the head of the committee overseeing the good progress of the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty) has contributed to this understanding.

But what about the impact of the presence of the new assembly on the country's ministerial and administrative structures?

It is evident that the success of a number of ministers, Revolution Command Council members, ministers of state, directors and others in the elections will bring about an inevitable change at these levels. It is expected that the assembly's opening session and the conclusion of the 17-30 July anniversary celebrations will be followed by important ministerial and administrative changes affecting a number of the main ministerial portfolios and major administrative posts.

However, the presidential system will remain the same and there will be no prime minister. This can be concluded not only from the officials themselves but also from the National Assembly law which puts the power of determining the fate of ministers in the hands of the president of the republic and of the Revolution Command Council solely. The assembly can withdraw its confidence in one minister only but necessarily in the ministers and the cabinet.

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CSO: 4802

LARGE HOUSING PROJECTS PLANNED

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 11 Jun 80 p 7

[Article by Ra'd 'Abd-al-Jabbar: "Start of Seminar on Public Housing in Iraq; Construction of 1.38 Million Housing Units by Year 2000"]

[Text] Muhammad Fadl Husayn, the minister of housing and reconstruction, opened yesterday morning at al-Mansur Hotel hall the study seminar for familiarization with the Iraqi public housing plan. The seminar is organized by the Public Housing Organization.

At the outset of the seminar, the minister delivered an address in which he welcomed participants in the study seminar on the Iraqi housing plan. The housing sector gains its importance from the fact that it is connected with and affects the daily life of the citizens and that it influences society's movement and development.

The minister underlined the special attention given to the housing sector by the party and revolution leadership, headed by leader and President Saddam Husayn, through the leadership's adoption of and reliance on programmed scientific planning that seeks to secure proper housing for every citizen so that he may take part in strengthening society. This planning also seeks to secure happiness and reassurance for every citizen and his family. This goal is the cornerstone in the housing policy which the party and revolution leadership has decided to adopt.

The minister also underlined the inclination of the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction, represented by the Public Housing Organization, toward conducting complete studies to determine the country's housing needs until the year 2000.

He said that the volume of work awaiting us is embodied in the construction of 1.38 million new housing units of various kinds, in addition to improving and carrying out maintenance work for nearly 355,000 already existing housing units, in the next 20 years, and preserving the existing housing asset which represents a national wealth that must be preserved and developed.

He said that the support and care which the leader president gives this issue through his daily instructions and through his awareness of the problem and of the hardship that the masses suffer from it--an awareness developed as a result of his on-the-spot visits--give us absolute confidence that we will solve this problem ahead of schedule.

Engineer 'Abd-al-Muttalib al-'Uraybi, the chairman of the Public Housing Organization, then delivered an address in which he underlined the importance of this seminar for familiarization with the contents of the studies and programs included in the plan--a seminar aimed at deeper understanding of the contents of the plan and a deeper discussion of its various aspects, especially since the talk about housing has become an issue that concerns all the citizens of all walks of life because of the impact of housing on their daily lifestyle, on the future of their life and on the citizen's role in society's general development movement.

The participants were then familiarized with a model of the general housing plan which the Public Organization has set up in the meetings hall of al-Mansur Hotel.

The three-day seminar will discuss the research and studies presented by the participants and will also discuss the general housing plan in the country until the year 2000.

Representatives of Morocco, Tunisia and Jordan and of a number of international firms specialized in housing affairs are taking part in the seminar, in addition to a number of the officials concerned in the country's various ministries.

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BRIEFS

FRENCH RAILROAD EQUIPMENT--The French railroad industry has recently won two big overseas contracts in Iraq and Brazil after a very active year in 1979 when the [French] export sales realized an increase of 40 percent to reach 2.2 billion French francs (330 million dollars). The two contracts have been concluded with the French consortium of (Francorail) which includes five French industrial firms. These two contracts have come shortly after this French industry won a deal to supply 340 railroad cars to East Germany and 60 cars to the Netherlands and Costa Rica. The Iraqi agreement provides for supplying 72 electrical diesel locomotives with a total value of 556 million francs for the five partners in the Francorail group. This is considered the biggest contract for French diesel locomotives even though 23 percent of the contract's value will go to the U.S. (Elco) Company which will supply the engines. The Brazilian contract, valued at 300 million dollars, has been awarded to a group of European firms led by Francorail. The contract provides for supplying 600 kilometers of railroad lines to the Brazilian railroad network, as well as supplying this network with 60 electrical trains. [Text] [Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 29 Jun 80 p 9] 8494

CSO: 4802

EDITORIAL DENOUNCING QADHDHAFI QUOTED

LD111202 Kuwait KUNA in English 1038 GMT 11 Oct 80

[Excerpt] Kuwait, 11 Oct (KUNA)--ARAB TIMES on al-Qadhdhafi and the Iranian-Iraqi war:

"The Arab world, and the Gulf states in particular, have found memories of al-Qadhdhafi's lead in denouncing the shah's seizure of the three Gulf islands. He had then not only broken off relations with Iran, but also sequestrated the assets of the British Petroleum in Libya, because he genuinely believed that there was British complicity behind the shah's action.

"When the Islamic revolution came to power, the Libyan-Iranian relations did not improve as hoped for by both sides because of the Musa as-Sadr affair, and also the declaration by the revolutionary regime that it will not return the islands to the Arab fold as one of the measures of undoing the wrongs committed by the shah. Only after forceful PLO intervention, Tehran and Tripoli had established diplomatic relations early this year.

"Therefore, if Iraq is now fighting a war for the defence of Arab rights, including the recovery of the Gulf islands, then Libya (?should) be among the first and the most vociferous and active supporters of the Iraqi campaign.

"Libya has broken the age-old and time-tested--but unwritten--convention that the Arab world is one when any of its members is locked in an armed battle against a non-Arab country. No independent Arab nation has ever actively supported a non-Arab country in its armed war against an Arab country. Col al-Qadhdhafi thus takes the dubious credit for making a deplorable beginning in this direction."

CSO: 4820

PHALANGISTS REPORTEDLY USE GAS WARFARE, PALESTINIAN FORCES TO UNITE

LD071515 Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 3 Oct 80 p 16

[Untitled report on London MIDDLE EAST magazine article]

[Excerpt] The PLO permanent observer at the United Nations Zuhdi Tarazi said that he was reprimanded by PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir 'Arafat for his failure to coordinate with his colleagues, the Arab ambassadors to the world organization, during the recent General Assembly meeting on the Palestine problem.

Tarazi's behavior has angered the Arab ambassadors because he submitted a draft resolution to the General Assembly in cooperation with Third World ambassadors without consulting the Arab delegates and one of the Arab ambassadors personally complained to 'Arafat.

Regarding the question of chemical warfare which is currently being raised in the Western capitals, reports from Beirut said that the Phalangist party militia used a chemical gas that causes total paralysis for several minutes, during its clashes 2 months ago with Camille Shamun's National Liberal Party militia.

Palestinian sources said that the PLO feels concerned over these reports because of the military buildup by the Phalangist militia against the Palestinians in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, reports spoke about talks currently taking place in order to merge the al-'Asifah forces, the military wing of the Fatah movement, and the Palestine Liberatory Army under one single command within a single structure. This question as well as the question of uniting all the Palestinian resistance forces will be discussed at the coming Palestine National Council meeting.

CSO: 4802

ISRAELI ARMY MAGAZINE ON PLO MANPOWER PROBLEMS IN LEBANON

TA090903 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Oct 80 p 4

[Unattributed report: "PLO Facing Manpower Shortage in Lebanon"]

[Text] "The PLO is in distress in the area of manpower recruitment for its forces, which are dwindling as a result of battles with rival forces in Lebanon and in the wake of the constant military pressure the IDF is exerting in that country." This is reported in this week's edition of BAMAHANE, in the framework of a series of articles, by Hayim Raviv, on the Palestinians' institutionalization in Lebanon.

The PLO's manpower problem in Lebanon has become so acute that the organization's leader, Yasir 'Arafat, found it necessary to intervene personally to solve it. In his recent trip to several Arab countries, 'Arafat tried to get their leaders to help him to introduce compulsory mobilization among the Palestinians residing in their countries; however, the heads of these countries showed no tendency to accede to his request.

The PLO's manpower shortage was also recently reflected in 'Arafat's call to the Palestinian students in Europe to enlist for a half-year in the ranks of the terrorist organizations. In Lebanon itself the PLO has set up a bureau for the registration of student recruitees, but the response appears to be miniscule, with the young persons who do enlist in the PLO doing so in order to finance their studies in the Arab University of Beirut.

CSO: 4805

OFFICIAL DISCUSSES ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 20 Jul 80 p 19

[Interview with 'Ali Fadil, Deputy Minister of Justice, by Kamil Hazir; "Judiciary System in Aden Not Marxist; Islamic Shari'a One of Sources of Legislation; There Are Now in Aden 90 Courts, 10 Lawyers and 3 Female Judges"]

[Text] Aden--Before independence, the judiciary system in Aden was foreign or, to put it more accurately, British and Indian. Litigations, sentences and everything in the judiciary system from A to Z was in English. Appeals, if ever anybody thought of appealing a sentence issued against him, had to be made in India and then in Kenya. The Democratic Yemen was subject to laws which Britain called the "Aden laws" and which the British drew up for [sic] themselves and then abolished them after applying them for 100 years.

'Ali Fadil, the deputy minister of justice and of Islamic awqaf, has talked to us about the post-independence period and the laws issued during this period and about the difficult confrontation Aden faced in the wake of its independence in its search for a purely South Yemeni judiciary system.

The first law issued--the public prosecution law--came in 1973 and was followed by the family law in 1974 and the penal code in 1976. Lower courts have spread throughout the districts and the governorates and have reached nearly 90 courts in number, in addition to the governorate courts and the republic's Supreme Court which is considered the highest step in the judiciary system.

What is the role of the Islamic Shari'a in this regard? Fadil says it is one of the sources used, especially in matters concerning personal status and the family. The deputy minister, who spent years studying the Islamic Shari'a in Medina and in al-Azhar, has also said that the Islamic Shari'a is a complete system that prevents monopoly, tyranny and oppression. Following is the text of the interview:

[Question] Let us first talk about the path that the judiciary system in the Democratic Yemen has followed to reach its present legal form?

[Answer] Before independence, we did not have judiciary in the conventional sense. In the days of the British colonialism, Yemen was divided into 24 emirates or shaykhdoms in which the free system prevailed. Meanwhile, the Shafi'i rite dealt with cases concerning personal status or what is called the family. There was no complete judiciary system and the matter was confined to a number of courts present in the emirate of Aden, in addition to the Aden Higher Court. Appeals litigation took place in India when Aden was attached to the colonialist administration present in India. After India's independence, appeals on major cases were conducted in Kenya.

After independence, we faced extreme difficulties in setting up a complete judiciary structure. The number of then existing laws, enforced in Aden only, had been in force in Britain 100 years earlier. The judiciary cadres were comprised of members of the British and Indian foreign communities. Adenis were not permitted to perform such a task, not even study law abroad. English was used for all case trials, litigations and sentences. In 1968, we encountered difficulty in setting up a complete judiciary system when we were still in the first days of independence.

[Question] How were you able to overcome this situation?

[Answer] In the first months of 1968, we started setting up district courts throughout the entire republic while maintaining the Aden Higher Court to perform its role within the jurisdiction of the Aden Governorate. The major lawsuits filed in the other governorates were presented to a judiciary authority formed by the Ministry of Justice to examine such cases which were not within the jurisdiction of the district courts.

[Question] This is insofar as the judiciary apparatus is concerned. How did you face the issue of legal legislations?

[Answer] The legal and law legislations posed a more complicated problem. In Aden, the legislations in force had been enacted in Britain more than 100 years earlier and had then been abolished in Britain itself. It was difficult to get a law permitting those legislations and laws to be enacted in the republic's governorates. This is why we started issuing partial laws dealing with problems of an arbitrative nature. With the onset of 1970, the year in which the constitution was promulgated, we started to establish legal approaches through bills drafted by specialized legal committees. The general prosecution law issued at the beginning of 1973 is considered the first law connected with the judiciary. The family was then promulgated in 1974. Through these two laws, the unified judiciary situation began to take form throughout the republic in terms of application. Then a number of other laws were issued in succession, including the penal code which was issued, along with its executive bill, in 1976.

At present, there are governorate courts, in addition to lower courts in the districts. In large districts, more than one court exists. This is in addition to the republic's Supreme Court which is the highest step in the judiciary system.

[Question] Is there a state security court?

[Answer] We have abolished this type of courts with the promulgation of the amended constitution at the beginning of 1979 when all the special courts, called the People's Courts, were abolished.

[Question] Why were they abolished?

[Answer] With the promulgation of numerous laws and with the full completion of the judiciary apparatus throughout the republic and to give the judiciary greater guarantees, we found that there was no longer any need for the presence of People's Courts. The cases of a special nature, most often political cases, are examined by the court governorates and by the republic's Supreme Court in accordance with the penal code. This means that we do not have a special law. We have one law (general law), namely law No 3 of 1976.

[Question] What is the number of judges at present?

[Answer] The entire judiciary body in the republic is Yemeni. The number of judges at present is (equal) to the number of courts which amount to 15 courts per governorate at the average. It can be said that there are 90 judges distributed over Yemen's courts in the six governorates. In 1973, we established an institute to prepare and qualify judges. The graduates of this institute are not university graduates. Most of them work in public prosecution. In the governorate courts and the Aden Court, all the workers are university graduates. There are three female judges in the republic, one of whom has been working in the judiciary corps since 1970. The other two were nominated this year and they are currently undergoing a period of preparation and training.

[Question] Is there a sufficient number of lawyers?

[Answer] I said at the outset of the interview that the pre-independence judiciary corps in the republic consisted of foreigners. This is one of the problems that faced us. In 1976, we had only five lawyers. Now we have 10 lawyers who have broad experience with the law and with public prosecution.

[Question] What is the role of the Islamic Shari'a in the laws promulgated so far?

[Answer] The Islamic Shari'a is one of the sources from which we have clearly taken. There are strictures in the Shari'a and they are clear strictures.

We have taken from the Islamic Shari'a whatever concerns personal status affairs, such as inheritance and family affairs. In this regard, we are like any other [Islamic] country.

[Question] In the family law, you have restricted marriage to only one woman. Isn't this in conflict with the Shari'a?

[Answer] In fact people try to raise this issue and to depict it as if it were in conflict with the Shari'a. But if we think calmly, we find that the venerable Koran itself asks us to think. The Koranic text does not set the limit of four [wives] as an absolute limit but as a permissible limit that allows marriage to four wives. But the text sets a condition by stating: "And if you are afraid not to be just, then marry only one." Insofar as we are concerned, we have not restricted marriage to just one woman. We have permitted marriage to two, but only under certain conditions. If we weigh these conditions in the light of the Shari'a, we can say that we have taken regulatory measures to realize broader justice. The public interest in the Shari'a is the same and is based on the principles of analogy followed in all the jurisprudence rites of the Islamic Shari'a.

[Question] What is the situation insofar as divorce is concerned?

[Answer] In addition to regulating the issue of marriage, we have also regulated the issue of divorce so that a person's charge [wife] may no longer be subject to his disposition and psychological whims. If a person feels that his life within his family has become impossible, he must submit a request to the court explaining the reasons justifying a sentence in favor of a divorce. This is an organizational matter that was discussed in more than one meeting attended by a number of jurisprudents, clergymen and judiciary men. Regarding divorce, women also have the right to demand it the same as men. The person demanding a divorce will have to pay compensation [alimony] to the other party.

[Question] From what perspective can the Islamic tide that has begun to invade the world as a contemporary phenomenon demanding a return to the roots and fundaments of religion--from what perspective can this tide be viewed and what is your opinion of what has been said about the current confrontation between Islam and Marxism?

[Answer] We believe that the message of the venerable prophet is a social message against monopoly, slavery and tyranny and for justice and equal opportunities. When we examine Islam, we find it to be a message carried by the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, and in which he was supported by the poor, the slaves and a few rich people, led by Abu-Bakr al-Siddiq who sacrificed his money to buy and liberate slaves.

The issue, in our view, is not an issue of an Islamic tide. I say this as a man who has studied the Islamic Shari'a. This Shari'a is a complete system that prohibits monopoly, tyranny and the exploitation of man. We find that the thing with which the Shari'a is in strongest conflict is capitalism.

[Question] What kind of attention does the ministry pay to mosques and to clergymen?

[Answer] There is a large number of mosques in Yemen. In the town of Tarim (Hadramaut Governorate), there nearly 360 mosques for every day of the year [sic]. The state takes full care of whatever concerns repair and maintenance for the mosques and whatever concerns all the mu'adhdhins and guards.

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COMMENTS ON CREATION OF CENTRAL BANK REVIEWED

Abu Dhabi AL-BAYAN in Arabic 4, 5 Aug 80

[Article by Ali Lashin: "The Central Bank is a Major Pillar of the National Economy"]

[4 Aug 80, p 3]

> [Text] Fifty Percent of the UAE's Estimated Oil Revenues of More Than $60 Billion Are to Be Deposited in Central Bank. Its Most Important Function Is Control of Banking. Its Range of Objectives Includes Securing Monetary Stability and Guiding the Investment of State Funds.

The Central Bank is considered to be one of the major pillars of the national economy. This fact will become obvious to the people of the United Arab Emirates [UAE] within the next few weeks, when they will become aware of the many advantages of this bank. The law creating the bank was promulgated last Friday.

All economic circles in the state have welcomed this law, because they realize that the central bank will play a great role in stabilizing economic conditions and protecting the state and the citizens.

We present this two-part article in recognition of the importance of the bank's mission.

Today we will present the views of government officials. Tomorrow, we will present the views of a group of officials in the banking sector in the UAE.

The need for a Central Bank

The bill creating the central bank of the UAE has been under study since late 1977. Many amendments have been made in it to accommodate the developments that have taken place on the international and local scenes, especially in the field of the national economy.

Commenting on this, 'Abd al-Malik al-Hamr, Chairman of the Monetary Council of Abu Dhabi, said: "The development of the State, the growth of its agencies and activities, the increase in the number of banks and financial institutions, the economic and financial development of the country in the past ten years, and the inevitable interaction between local and international economic conditions have all led to the need for the creation of a well developed central monetary system to organize the economic activities of the nation at home and abroad, so as to keep pace with the most modern monetary systems of the advanced countries. This is particularly important, in view of the pace of progress of the world around us."

A Federal Step

'Abd al-Malik added: "The decision of the president and vice-president of the state to deposti 50% of the oil revenues in the Central Bank to support the budget of the state is a very progressive federal step."

He added: "The decision to create a central bank is in itself a federal step forward. Armed with financial and legislative support, the Central Bank will have a great opportunity to act freely in the planning and execution of monetary policy, and its coordination with fiscal policy. These policies may be compared to the two wings of a bird. Together, they serve the national economy and protect the interests of the citizens and of future generations."

A Transitional Period

'Abd al-Malik continued: "Following the promulgation of the Central Bank law, there will be a transitional period of four months to permit the transformation of the Monetary Council into a central bank. This transitional period is needed to take inventory of assets and liabilities, and determine the general financial position of the council. This will be followed by the issuance of decrees appointing members of the board of directors of the Central Bank, establishing tables of organization and internal by-laws, defining the functions of various divisions of the bank and their interrelationships, and, finally, formulating high policy which will be applied in daily operations."

'Abd al-Malik concluded: "Our acquisition of financial support coupled with the necessary comprehensive legislation provide us with the necessary tools to exercise close control over both internal and external economic transactions in which the state is involved."

Key Positions

Muhammad al-Hadi, chairman of the monetary council in Dubai, commented as follows: "As we have repeatedly said, the central bank is the bank of banks. It is the state bank, and the economic and financial advisor of the state. Its most important functions are: issuing paper currency and coins; issuing permits to banks and financial institutions; supervising banking operations; and regulating money exchange and brokerage businesses.

"The Central Bank will represent the state at international monetary organizations, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Settlements Bank, and all similar Arab and Islamic organizations.

"The Central Bank is considered to be a public agency having an independent legal entity. Its headquarters will be in Abu Dhabi and it will have branches in most of the Emirates. It also possesses authority to appoint agents and correspondents overseas."

Al-Hady emphasized the central bank's role in supporting the local currency, maintaining its stability at home and abroad, and supervising the exchange of foreign currencies.

Al-Hady mentioned that the central bank will prepare the national balance of payments in cooperation with the appropriate authorities at home and abroad.

Al-Hady indicated that the central bank is authorized to invest the state budget surpluses in cooperation with the ministry of finance.

Banking Supervision

Al-Hady added: "The most important function of the bank we are presently interested in, and which we wish to develop, is its banking supervision department. The mission of this department is to guide and direct the banks and cooperate with them in the interest of both the banking community and the state.

"This control does not mean restricting bankings activities. It constitutes mutual consultation and the giving of advice which should be respected. A bank violating guidelines attracts attention. If it repeats the violation, its license will be revoked. This is expected to be an infrequent occurrence, because all banks cooperate with us and understand our mission. For our part, our doors are open to anyone having a question or inquiry. Our main goal is to maintain the monetary liquidity of the state, prevent fraud, and reduce risks to depositors. Deposits are equivalent to an act of trust in the bank. The trust has to be protected and invested faithfully for the benefit of both depositor and the investors.

"We are also concerned with maintaining the confidentiality of banking transactions of individuals and the secrecy of the profession."

Al-Hady said,: "The Central Bank will review the policy of granting credits presently followed by commercial banks, because it has caused some imbalance in the liquidity of the country. The central bank will attempt to correct the course of all of these matters in keeping with national policy."

Al-Hady concluded: "The Central Bank law will necessarily be supplemented by other laws at a later date. These will include: the depositors' protection law, the law governing checks and commercial paper, and the transfers law."

Credit Control

Since credit has an important effect on the economics and level of welfare of any country, governments entrust public organizations known as central banks with the mission of supervising and controlling credit. The laws authorize central banks to supervise the operations of commercial banks.

In this regard, Khalaf Sa'id al-Ghayth, director general of the finance ministry in Dubai told us: "Credits mean that the banks are granting loans. The Central Bank can influence the volume of credit in many ways. The most important ways are:

1. The rediscount rate. This represents the interest rate charged by the Central Bank when it rediscounts commercial paper accepted by commercial banks from their customers at a discount. If the Central Bank wants to increase the volume of credit in the community at large, it lowers the rediscount rate. This encourages commercial banks to rediscount notes in their possession, so as to increase the liquid funds which they can lend to their customers. When the Central Bank wants to reduce the volume of credit, it raises the rediscount rate. This forces the commercial banks to raise their discount rates, thus discouraging customers from asking for loans.

2. The legal reserve requirement. This involves changing the percentage of individual deposits which commercial banks are required by law or custom to maintain with the Central Bank. This percentage is raised when the Central Bank wants to restrict the volume of credit granted by commercial banks. When the Central Bank wishes to induce the commercial banks to expand the volume of credits, it lowers the percentage.

3. Moral suasion. The central bank has moral suasion powers over the commercial banks. It can induce these banks to follow a certain credit policy in keeping with definite political goals. Commercial banks have to heed the directions of the central bank, in view of the legal means it has to impose its credit policy.

4. Open market operations. These presuppose the existence of a highly organized financial bonds market. By this method, the central bank is able to control the volume of credit by buying and selling bonds on the open market. When the central bank buys these bonds, it gives the seller a check drawn on the Central Bank. The seller submits this check to his bank for collection from the Central Bank. The commercial bank credits the customer's account, and submits the check to the Central Bank. The latter credits the account of the commercial bank, and thereby increases the commercial bank's ability to expand its volume of credits. The opposite is true if the Central Bank sells bonds. When the Central Bank sells these

bonds for checks drawn on commercial banks, it reduces the reserves of the commercial banks with the Central Bank, and, consequently, restricts their ability to extend credits."

Control of Credit Objectives

Al-Ghayth added: "Control of the volume of credit is not an end in itself in central banking operations. The basic purpose of these activities is to direct credit in a way which is beneficial to the national economy in general.

"The commercial banks may grant credits for projects which are not essential to the welfare of society. At this point, the Central Bank intervenes to induce the distribution of credits to projects according to their importance.

"The Central Bank can also be an instrument in the hands of the authorities to harness all available resources in society. In the developing countries, the Central Bank takes upon itself the responsibility of enforcing a particular credit policy and requiring the commercial banks to follow it. For example, each economic sector receives a share of the financial resources of the commercial banks. This share can be determined on the basis of the sector's importance and its contribution to the economic development of society. Thus, if government policy is intended to encourage the agricultural sector and the industrial sector, credits to these two sectors can be facilitated, and credits to other sectors can be restricted.

5 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] The Central Bank's Control Covers 53 Banks and 340 Branches in the Emirates. The Bank's Responsibility Extends Beyond the Limits of the State to Reach the World and its Financial Organizations.

Yesterday, we presented the views of government officials regarding the promulgation of the Central Bank law, the importance of that step, and the effect it will have on the national economy in the Emirates.

Today, we present the views of bankers and financiers regarding this important event, what it means to them and what they expect to result from it.

Banking Supervision

"The existence of a Central Bank is undoubtedly very important. It is in the best interests of the national economy in general and the banking system in particular," stated Salah Al-Basus, director of marketing, planning and follow-up at the central Office of the Abu Dhabi National Bank.

He added: "At the present time, the Monetary Council plays a commendable major role. We wish its authority had enabled it to exercise complete supervision of all banking operations in the country. This will be one of the Central Bank's functions, which will be more comprehensive and highly specialized than those of the Monetary Council.

"Accordingly, the Central Bank will have a more effective role, especially with regard to controlling the activities of the nation's banks. This is particularly important, in view of the large number of national and foreign banks, which has reached 53 banks with more than 340 branches in the country.

"This large number of banks undertakes various and diversified activities which have a great impact on the national economy. The Central Bank must control the activities of all banks in order to be in a position to rectify any aberrations of the national economy as they occur.

"The Monetary Council law was enacted in 1973. Since then, successive important events have occurred at home and abroad. The establishment of the Central Bank is an effort to reconcile the Monetary Council law with the chain of modern developments in the domain of monetary systems and policies at home and abroad, and to benefit from the experience of others in serving the national economy of the UAE."

Protecting the Banks

"The creation of the Central Bank will no doubt be in the interest of all banks. It has greater authority [than the Monetary Council] to balance the money supply, and steer economic activity in cooperation with other agencies in keeping with the dictates of the present state of economic development." So commented Ahmad Sadiq Muhammad Sami', vice-president of the Commercial Bank of the Gulf, Limited.

He added: "The Central Bank will have the ability to intervene in any ordinary banking practices, so as to direct them in the interest of the national economy. It will intervene in the money market; so as to maintain the value of the dirham versus foreign currencies at home and abroad. More important, it will support the national banks and stand by them in difficult times, since the bankruptcy of any one bank would be a serious setback to the national economy."

Interest Rate

David Alexander, President of the Gulf Bank said: "The enactment of the Central Bank law is a very important step. It will create beneficial cooperation within the banking family. It will also help strengthen the banking system in the UAE through effective control. It may try to merge or reduce the number of banks in the country in proportion to the population and the volume of local economic activity."

David Alexander added: "We hope that the Central Bank will intervene to maintain a low rate of interest, so as to help keep the cost of living down at home. This could be realized through the creation of numerous local investment opportunities, which would enable the banks to invest their funds at home, instead of looking for hugh rates of interest abroad.

Courageous Board of Directors

"The establishment of the Central Bank was an important economic necessity." said Abdullah Salih, president of Dubai National Bank, Limited. He added, "For the Central Bank to enjoy the trust of local and international financial institutions, its board of directors should consist of persons possessing national and international banking experience. These individuals should be courageous enough to exercise comprehensive control over the movement of capital at home and abroad. They must enjoy sufficient independence to resist any pressures which may be exerted upon them contrary to the goals of the establishment of the bank. There is no objection to the utilization of some foreign experts, provided their role is strictly consultative and that they do not interfere with the decision-making process."

Coordination of Banking Activity

Abdu Mahmud, assistant manager of the branch of the Abu Dhabi National Bank in Dubai commented on the importance of the enactment of the Central Bank law as follows: "In the absence of a Central Bank in the past, many commercial banks engaged in some erroneous practices. They can be excused for doing so, because they were not aware of each others' activities. When businessmen sensed demand for a commodity or type of merchandise, they rushed to the banks to obtain loans to make that commodity available on the market through manufacture or import. Thus, more than one businessman submitted loan requests to more than one bank for the same purpose. This resulted in flooding the market with a particular commodity. The commodity would not sell, and the businessmen would be unable to repay their loans to the banks.

"The Central Bank will be in a position to detect a situation like this, and advise the banks that a particular project has already been financed by one bank. Therefore, the banks will refrain from financing identical projects. Thus the Central Bank can play the role of coordinator of banking activity and can act in the best interests of the banking system. As an extension of this role, the Central Bank can be a clearing house for the various banks. However, for this role to be effective, a stable account must be kept by each bank with the Central Bank. This account would be adjusted after each clearing operation."

The Banking Credit Book

"The establishment of a Central Bank in the Emirates is an important step to strengthen the economic structure of the state," commented Ahmad 'Abd al-Hamid, the General Manager of the Bank of Cairo branches in the UAE. He

said: "We have been hoping for the creation of this bank for a long time, because of the significant effect it will have on the organization of the commercial and financial sector, as well as on the planning and execution of monetary policy, which steers the country along the road of development and economic progress.

"The new element which the Central Bank can introduce for us who work in the banking sector is accurate and advanced control of banking operations. This can be accomplished in two ways:

1. Creation of a credit record for every customer who is granted a loan from any bank operating in the country. The Central Bank would be the only one in a position to initiate and maintain such a record, since it receives credit information from every bank for each customer. The Central Bank would maintain a record for each customer indicating the capital of the customer and the loans he has received. If the same customer applies for new credit from a different bank, the latter could contact the Central Bank to obtain a true picture of the customer's status and determine whether or not he is already burdened by loans. In other words, the Central Bank would be in a position to advise each bank if it is in its best interest to grant new credit to a customer. This is important, because it was possible in the past for a merchant with a capital of 1 million dirhams to obtain loans of up to 56 million dirhams from the 56 banks operating in the country. Each bank granted credit without full knowledge of the customer's total financial position.

2. A uniform tariff for banking services. The imposition of a uniform tariff for banking services on all banks would have a stabilizing effect. The setting of a maximum interest rate on deposits stabilizes deposits in the banks. And the setting of a maximum interest rate on loans would protect borrowers from exploitation by some banks."

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CSO: 4802

ABU DHABI PETROLEUM EXPORT STATISTICS FOR 1978, 1979 GIVEN

Abu Dhabi AL-BAYAN in Arabic 8 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] Abu Dhabi crude oil exports to the U.S., Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Sweden decreased in 1979. At the same time, exports to Holland, West Germany, Pakistan, India, Brazil and Madagascar increased in comparison to 1978. A statistical report of the Abu Dhabi Planning Department indicates that the export of crude oil decreased from 172,743,000 barrels in 1978 to 163,561,000 in 1979. Exports to other countries were as follows:

-The U.S.: 69,358,000 barrels in 1978; 64,908,000 barrels in 1979.

-France: 61,193,000 barrels in 1978; 55,677,000 barrels in 1979.

-Holland: 30,844,000 barrels in 1978; 38,404,000 barrels in 1979.

-West Germany: 11,665,000 barrels in 1978; 28,320,000 barrels in 1979.

-The United Kingdom: 16,682,000 barrels in 1978; 8,082,000 barrels in 1979.

-Italy: 13,387,000 barrels in 1978; 7,605,000 barrels in 1979.

-Switzerland: 6,356,000 barrels in 1978, 8,928,000 barrels in 1979.

-Sweden: 9,474,000 barrels in 1978; 8,772,000 barrels in 1979.

-Pakistan: 7,397,000 barrels in 1978; 9,060,000 barrels in 1979.

-India: 7,380,000 barrels in 1978; 12,503,000 barrels in 1979.

-Poland: 3,283,000 barrels in 1978; 1,316,000 barrels in 1979.

-Bangladesh: 4,460,000 barrels in 1978; 4,504,000 barrels in 1979.

-Thailand: 4,441,000 barrels in 1978; 4,826,000 barrels in 1979.

-Brazil: 6,283,000 barrels in 1978; 9,201,000 barrels in 1979.

Last year Abu Dhabi exported crude oil to 4 new countries: Portugal, Ethiopia, Morrocco and the Democratic Republic of Yemen, while it stopped exports to Egypt.

Although total exports decreased, development and public projects were not affected, due to the fact that oil revenues still yield a surplus amounting to millions of dirhams.

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ABU DHABI GAS INDUSTRY TRAINING PROGRAMS DISCUSSED

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 2 Aug 80 p 3

[Interview with unnamed vice-president of Abu Dhabi Liquefied Gas Company, by Khalid 'Aylbuni; date and place not given]

[Text] The gas industry in Abu Dhabi is a new industry in the full sense of the word. Until 1977, the gas associated with the oil extracted from sea and land oilfields was separated and burned. This wasteful situation continued until a project was initiated to liquefy both types of gas: natural gas and gas separated from petroleum in the offshore oilfields in Das Island.

With the rise of this new industry, the authorities began thinking of training citizens or Arab residents into personnel capable of running it.

Training is Investment

In an interview with the vice-president of the Abu Dhabi [Liquefied Gas] Company, our first question was about the progression of steps taken by the company in the field of training, and how the company views this subject.

He replied: "We view training as an investment. Our company is new, and our plant in Das Island is new. It uses the latest developments in Western technology. Our people who work in this industry must be trained and qualified. Otherwise we will remain at the mercy of foreigners, and will continue to pay them high wages. When we train our young men, we save a great deal, benefit our young men and avoid being at the mercy of foreign expertise. Since we opened the plant in October 1977, we have been training cadres from the ranks of our own citizens and those of other Arab nations. We sent trainees to the U.S. and Britain even before we officially inaugurated the plant."

[Question] Let us pause briefly to consider the subject of training overseas. How many trainees were sent to the U.S. and Britain?

[Answer] Twenty trainees. Sixteen were nationals and 4 were Arab brethren.

[Question] What kind of training do they receive?

[Answer] Actually, all of them are enrolled in scientific universities and institutions. In Britain, they study for a bachelor's degree in science or engineering, in various fields relating to the gas industry. They also study for British graduate degrees, in order to become engineers and technicians, and return to their homeland to assume their proper roles in this industry. In the U.S., the trainees also seek college degrees in various fields of the gas industry.

Local Training

[Question] Granted the importance of these study missions, training cannot be limited to sending personnel abroad. The company cannot be expected to send all trainees abroad on study missions which may last several years, and which may not be in fields essential to the gas industry. What is the status of local training within the company's training programs?

[Answer] Be assured that we have not overlooked this matter. We realized from the beginning that we had to establish a training center in Abu Dhabi, and provide it with the necessary technical facilities and expertise to train the number of people needed in all specializations of the gas industry. We started this program under the supervision of the mother company, the Abu Dhabi National Petroleum Company (ANDOC). We selected thirty citizens and Arab nationals, and enrolled them in the center. We hope to begin to reap the benefits of this domestic training program within the next few years through the graduation of qualified technicians who are able to work in this modern industry.

Trainee Selection

[Question] On what basis are the trainees selected?

[Answer] At the beginning, we required that trainees should have a high school diploma, but we found that this condition was difficult to meet. There were not enough applicants, especially among the citizens. Therefore, we relaxed this condition, and accepted students who had finished the first year of high school. This enabled us to screen many applicants and select the best qualified for training.

[Question] What benefits does the trainee receive at the center?

[Answer] The trainee at the Abu Dhabi training center receives 2000 dirhams, if he lives outside the housing facilities of the company. If the trainee lives in the company housing facilities, he receives 1600 Dirhams, in addition to food and transportation. Those who study outside the country, receive 4500 Dirhams monthly, besides tuition fees and travel expenses. This amount is enough to cover the various expenses needed by the student.

Study Subjects

[Question] We need to pause and take a look at the training center in Abu Dhabi. How long does the program of study take? What are the subjects studied by the trainees in the course of two years?

[Answer] The length of study in the institute is two years. The emphasis in the first year is on learning the English language, since it is the language of the industry. Without it, it would be impossible to handle the equipment and technology at the plant.

In the second year, emphasis is on scientific subjects and on work in the laboratories to conduct experiments and acquire specialized technical knowledge.

The Language

[Question] We cannot deny the importance of the language. However, we should mention that the Arab Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (AOPEC), realizing the importance of Arabizing the oil industry, agreed to establish an oil industry training institute in Baghdad.

[Answer] We wish to achieve Arabization of technology, but we cannot stay behind and wait for that to happen. As long as our oil industry depends on Western technology, we must teach our trainees the English language, which is the only available key to the specialized knowledge of this industry. This is not a difficult problem, since our youth have proved capable of mastering the language during their first year of training.

Graduates' Salary is 8,000 Dirhams

[Question] Does the training end after the completion of the two years at the training institute?

[Answer] The graduates need some on-the-job training after they complete the two years at the center. During this period, the trainees are not all on the same level or competence. Some forge ahead, while others slip behind slightly. We send those who show potential for advancement on study or training missions abroad, or we give them more advanced positions at the gas liquefying plant in Das.

[Question] If the trainee receives 2,000 dirhams during the two years of training he spends at the center, what is his salary after graduation?

[Answer] Upon graduation, the trainee is given a salary of not less than 7,000 dirhams. He may even be paid up to 8000 dirhams a month.

Arabization [of Personnel] of the Petroleum Industry

[Question] The training of citizens and Arab nationals by the Abu Dhabi Liquefied Gas Company does in effect constitute serious steps toward

Arabization of the petroleum industry in general, and the gas industry in particular. This leads us to ask about Arabization in the Abu Dhabi Liquefied Gas Company.

[Answer] The company follows the general policy of the state Execution of this policy is supervised by the petroleum department under the leadership of Dr Mani' ibn Said al-'Utayba, minister of petroleum and mineral resources. This is a policy of naturalization and Arabization. We train our Arab brethren in order to achieve this national goal. We have made good progress in the direction of Arabization. A good percentage of the technicians working for the company in Das Island is now Arab. The percentage of these Arab technicians has reached 35%.

I should mention that our attention to Arabization begins with the higher technical positions. If we consider these higher technical positions separately from other simple positions that require simple skills, the percentage of Arab personnel would be higher than 35%.

As I mentioned before, investment considerations are involved in this matter: we train our Arab brethren in order to benefit from them, and to gradually substitute them for foreign expertise.

Training Coordination:

[Question] What about coordination of training among the national companies?

[Answer] Actually, there is real coordination in the field of training between the mother company (ADNOC) and its affiliates. If you visit the training center, you will see that the students who study in joint groups are from various projects, especially in the first year. The curriculum and the programs are centrally prepared in a way that fits the practical needs of the various fields of the petroleum industry. For example, our first year students study with students of the chlorine factory, and students of the technology programs. Specialization begins during the second year. [End of interview]

Conclusion

There is an open invitation to all young citizens and Arab nationals to apply for any of the training programs of the Abu Dhabi Liquefied Gas Co or of ADNOC. Undoubtedly, the participation of youth in these programs will secure their future on one hand, and serve the future of the petroleum industry on the other.

An application is not a mere investment, but also a strategic move to secure the future of a young industry, which is still at the beginning of the road. Before we demand naturalizing this industry, we must make serious efforts to train the necessary Arab human resources capable of undertaking the responsibilities entailed by such naturalization.

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CSO: 4802

UK DAILY CITES EMIRATE CLAIM OF HORMUZ ISLANDS

LD031447 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 3 Oct 80 p 4

[Dispatch by Guy Rais: "'Return Hormuz Isles' Says Emirate Shaykh"]

[Text] A "request" for the return of two strategic islands in the Strait of Hormuz was made yesterday by Shaykh Saqr Ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi, ruler of the northern-most state in the United Arab Emirates.

The islands were taken over by the shah of Iran from the emirate, Ras al-Khaimah, nine years ago.

The 64-year-old bearded shaykh who has ruled for 32 years told me: "Our request is simple. The emirates want to see the islands restored to their rightful owners--in this case the emirates--as soon as possible.

"The islands belong to my emirate but now we are in a federation the issue should be dealt with on that basis. [as published] We want to continue friendly relations with Iran."

Naval Activity

The shaykh was speaking amid reports emanating in the Gulf that Iran had stepped up naval activity around the two islands.

Unconfirmed reports said that an Iranian warship was standing off the two islands, the Greater and Lesser Tunbs, and the Abu Musa which is shared jointly by the emirate of Sharjah and Iran.

The islands, about 80 miles from the strait at the mouth of the Gulf, are strongly fortified by the Iranian Navy. So far they have not been blocked and Iran has given a pledge that the Gulf would remain open to shipping.

Tankers have continued to pass through the strait since the war began 12 days ago.

Shaykh al-Qasimi, who took over control after an inter-family dispute and who, in 30 years has brought the backward emirate into a state of prosperity, received me in his palace, a modest white-washed single-storey building.

The only open display of opulance was a blue "Rolls-Royce" standing in the sweltering heat of the courtyard.

Answering questions in Arabic which were translated by one of his eight sons, the shaykh would not be drawn into specific replies on the Iraqi-Iranian war.

But he categorically rejected suggestions that facilities had been offered to both Iraq and Iran by the emirates. "The emirates have adopted a policy of neutrality and our ports and airports are not being used by either side. We are not at war."

Asked about reports that anti-aircraft guns had been positioned at his little-used international airport which has two or three scheduled commercial flights a day, he said: "What you have seen is the emirates' forces and they can go wherever they want."

Shaykh al-Qasimi agreed that he had visited Baghdad three weeks ago. "I went at the invitation of the Iraqi Government," he said. "It is a Moslem country and we discussed economic matters."

Asked what he felt about the super-powers' presence through their fleets in the Indian Ocean not far from the Gulf, he said: "This war has so far been confined to a limited military engagement. We are concerned with the possibility that it could escalate into a more dangerous stage. That is something we wish to avoid."

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END

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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PLO LEADER COMMENTS ON UN SESSION

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 16 Aug 80 p 13

[Interview with PLO executive committee member Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh, by Manar Baras, in Beirut; date not given]

[Text] Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh, member of the Executive Committee of the PLO in charge of the information department, declared that implementation of the recent UN resolution calling on Israel to withdraw from the Arab lands occupied after 1967 requires a modification in the balance of power in the region, which would force the Zionist enemy and American imperialism to yield to the demands of our people and their just rights. He disclosed messages sent by the United States to the leaders of the European states calling on them to vote against the resolution.

Commenting on the position of the states which voted against this resolution or abstained from voting, 'Abd-Rabbuh said that the PLO is conducting a widespread diplomatic campaign to deal with the positions of states hostile to the Palestinian cause and Arab questions.

He said that the PLO will present a complete plan to the first Arab meeting for the purpose of taking tangible steps toward an economic and oil boycott and withdrawal of Arab capital from American banks. He said that these sanctions would cover other nations with positions hostile to the Arab cause.

'Abd Rabbuh called on all Arab states to take a stand opposing by action, not by word, the step to annex Jerusalem to Israel, which supplements the "conspiratorial Camp David plan."

The following is the text of the interview conducted with 'Abd Rabbuh immediately after he returned from New York after he participated in the Palestinian delegation to the UN General Assembly session which discussed the Palestinian question.

[Question] What is your evaluation of the resolutions which were issued by the UN General Assembly about Palestine, and what can result from these resolutions, from your point of view?

[Answer] The recent resolution by the emergency session of the United Nations is considered more advanced than the previous resolutions, since it calls unequivocably for Israel's withdrawal from occupied Arab and Palestinian territory, without conditions or restrictions, sets a deadline for this withdrawal, calls for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, and guarantees the right of the refugees to return to their nation.

The resolution considers that the United Nations should demand follow-up of implementation, and, for the first time, deems it necessary to apply the sanctions included in the United Nations Charter against Israel, if it does not comply with this resolution. Also, this emergency session remains open and can be convened in the future if the need arises.

We have absolutely no illusions that Israel and its American protectors will comply with this resolution, but the resolution does indicate the isolation in which Israel and the parties to Camp David have been placed, since 112 states voted for the resolution, the highest percentage of votes cast for any Palestinian resolution.

The resolution proves that in spite of the strong pressure which the United States has applied to other international blocs, especially Latin America, Africa and Asia, could not achieve any success in forcing these blocs to vote against the resolution or even abstain from voting.

Only a handful of client states on these three continents, such as Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, Liberia and Burma, support the American position. The rest of the states belonging to the OAU and the nonalined states voted in support of this resolution. Although the United States sent personal messages to the leaders of the West European states calling on them to vote against the resolution, it did not achieve complete success with the exception of Norway, which bowed in abject fashion to American pressure and was among the seven states which voted against the resolution. However, the West European position of abstaining from voting reveals the truth about claims that there would be a positive new European initiative before the United Nations session is convened, and proves that the nations of Western Europe continue to be subject to the blackmail of America and to provide a cover for Zionist expansion against our Palestinian people and our Arab nation. The states of Western Europe justified their position at the United Nations by claiming that the resolution is imbalanced, because it does not provide for the right of all states of the region to live within secure and recognized borders. This alleged imbalance is an obvious excuse, since Western Europe has thus far refused to accept, in return [for balance], recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and the right of our people to establish their independent state on their land. They are content to use obscure phrases such as "right to self-determination."

Put in another way, Western Europe grants all of the clearly defined and detailed demands presented by Israel and America, while refusing to accede to the demands of the Palestinian people and the Arabs in general.

The session was an effective test of this European position, and it dispelled Arab illusions about it. The session and the final resolution confirmed that the vast majority of the states of the world refuse to consider Camp David as a sound basis for a just solution, especially with respect to the question of Palestine.

In light of this resolution, the PLO senses the complete and worldwide support of the socialist states, the nonalined states, the Islamic states and some other friendly nations. The PLO leadership is now studying the necessity of pursuing the political campaign to develop the historic results of this resolution. From another angle, we will carry out a widespread diplomatic campaign to deal with the hostile positions taken by some states, such as Norway, and with the negative positions of the states of Western Europe and Japan, which abstained from the voting.

Sanctions

'Abd Rabbuh added: "As for the mastermind of this conspiracy, the United States, we will submit to an 'Arab meeting' a complete plan to take tangible steps toward an economic and oil boycott, withdrawal of capital from American banks, and action to further isolate and unmask U.S. policy.

These sanctions must cover nations which have hostile positions, be they those which voted against the resolution or those which maintained their embassies in occupied Jerusalem, such as Norway and Holland.

As we know full well, implementation of this resolution depends upon achievement of a balance of power in the area which would force the Zionist enemy and American imperialism to submit to Palestinian and Arab demands. However, in spite of bad Arab conditions, which hinder the adoption of a resolute policy against the United States, Israel and the Sadat regime, we will pursue our work on the international level, especially to demand implementation of the resolution concerning sanctions and economic and political boycott of Israel because of its refusal to implement this resolution.

We emphasize here the responsibility of the Arab states to do everything in their power to enforce these sanctions and obtain wider international support for this position.

Annexing Jerusalem to Israel

[Question] What do you think of the Zionist Knesset stating that the Arab city of Jerusalem is considered the capital of the state of occupation?

[Answer] This step comes under the umbrella and protection of the Camp David agreements and within the policy of imposing the fait accompli which Israel, with U.S. support, is trying to implement. This dangerous step makes it incumbent upon all Arab states to take a position opposing this American-Israeli conspiracy in action, not just words.

Without a policy opposing American interests and influence in the area, there is no value in any declarations of disapproval issued by this or that nation.

Following the Zionist resolution in the Knesset, we decided to call immediately for a meeting of the Security Council and of the Committee to Save Jerusalem. We are also thinking of inviting the Arab foreign ministers to an emergency meeting to discuss methods of confronting the steps of the Zionists and their American protectors.

7587
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

INFORMATION MINISTRIES MEETINGS--Three days meetings are planned for next Sunday in Doha for the Liaison officers and representatives of the Information Ministries of the Arab Gulf States. These meetings will prepare the agenda for the Sixth Conference of the Information Ministers which will be held in Muscat in January 1981, and will insure the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the Fifth Conference which was held in Doha from 9-14 February 1980. Abd-al-Wahab al-Radwan, Director of the Cultural Department of the Ministry of Information and Culture will represent the United Arab Emirates in these meetings. [Text] [Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 3 Oct 80 p 2]

INCREASE IN SHIPPING INSURANCE--Sources of the national Insurance Companies reported that Lloyd's Insurance Co. has increased its premiums by 1% on ships heading towards the Gulf area. The sources further asserted that the increase in insurance premiums covers the ships' structures and engines. However, products destined to ports in the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, were exempted from this increase except that insurance on products destined to Iraq and Iran ports increased by one half percent. Moreover, these sources added that this increase will be reflected, one way or another, on prices and Lloyd's has decided to review these percentages weekly based on the size and direction of the war operations between Iraq and Iran and this will in turn affect whether percentages will be increased, decreased or stabilized. AL-KHALIJ also learned that the ship "Al-Riyad," which is owned by the Arab Maritime Transport Co. was seriously damaged while docked in al-Basrah port in Iraq, and was towed to the dry dock in Bahrain for repairs. [Text] [Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 5 Oct 80 p 1]

SHIPBUILDING COMPANY'S PROGRESS--The Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Yard Company met on 23 September 1980, the third anniversary of the beginning of its operations, and invited the press and other information media representatives to tour its facilities and acquaint themselves with its operations. A. J. Machado Luis, director general of the company, said that the company had performed maintenance and advanced repair operations on 327 tankers of various sizes, mainly supertankers, under various flags in the dry dock, at its piers, and in place at anchor. He said that the paid capital of the company is 340 million U.S. dollars. At the end of August 1980, 54 percent of the company's 1,285 minor officials and 50 percent of its administrators were Arabs. Up till the present time, the company has trained 710 of its minor officials and sent 140 of them abroad for operational experience, and is now instructing 51 persons in various vocations in its training center. [Excerpts] [Manama AL-MAWAQIF in Arabic 29 Sep 80 pp 6, 7]

CSO: 4802

KARMAL REPORTEDLY LOSES REVOLUTION COUNCIL CHAIRMANSHIP

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 19 Aug 80 p 3

[News report: "Babrak Karmal Removed from Chairmanship of Revolution Council; He Is also Prevented from Attending Council Meetings; Two Opponents Promoted to Important Posts in his Absence"]

[Text] New Delhi, 18 August (Reuter)--The meeting of the Revolution Council and the Politbureau, in which decisions were made to promote two members of the faction opposed to Babrak Karmal, was not attended by Karmal himself. Although Karmal is head of not only the government, but also of the party and the Revolution Council, no mention was made of his participation in the meeting in announcements broadcast over Radio Kabul and heard in New Delhi.

Among the new appointments made, Mr Abdorrashid Arian, who was minister of justice and attorney general, and belongs to the rival group, has been appointed deputy prime minister, and Saleh Mohammed, former minister of agriculture and health, and a member of the Politbureau, has been appointed chairman of the Revolution Council, a post which was formerly held by Babrak Karmal himself.

According to reliable sources, both appointments have been made with the purpose of ending differences between the opposing factions, Khalq and Parcham. Since 80% of the army officers belong to the Khalq faction, there is deep resentment and rebellion in the army over the anti-Khalq actions of the ruling party. This has gotten Russia worried.

Therefore, it is speculated that these two leaders of the Khalq faction have been promoted at the suggestion of the Russian advisors.

According to analysts and commentators, the fact that President Karmal did not attend the meeting has deeper significance. Some commentators have said that Karmal was not allowed to attend the meeting, and that these decisions were made in his absence.

Meanwhile, Radio Kabul broadcast an official announcement last night, in which it said that Deputy Prime Minister Asadullah Sarwari has been

appointed Afghanistan's ambassador to Mongolia. At the beginning of this year Mr Sarwari had gone abroad for medical treatment. According to the announcement, he is already in the capital of Mongolia. Mr Sarwari is between 30 and 40 years of age. He is the leader of the Khalq faction, rival of Babrak Karmal's Parcham faction. Mr Sarwari had become notorious for his cruel, atrocious acts during the administration of the former President, Mr Taraki. People used to call him "King Kong" and "butcher."

9612
CSO: 4203

POSSIBLE MUJAHID-KHALQ ALLIANCE SUGGESTED

Lahore MASHRIQ in Urdu 8 Aug 80 p 9

[News report: "Babrak Karmal Has Exiled Several Ministers and Generals of the Opposite Parcham Party; Those Sent to Moscow Include Watan Yar, Gen Dagarwal and Gulab Zai"]

[Text] Islamabad, 7 Aug--According to Radio Kabul and the NEW TIMES, the official newspaper of the Afghan government, fighting between the ruling Parcham Khalq faction of Babrak Karmal and the faction in opposition, Kha Khalq, has reached its climax. The Karmal regime has exiled to Moscow several ministers, generals and other high officials belonging to the opposition Khalq Party. These include Aslam Watan Yar, Abdurrashid Arian, Asadullah Sarwari, Dr Shah Wali, Dr Saleh Mohammed Zairi, Gen Abdul Qadir Dagarwal and Gulab Zai. Positions vacated by these persons have been given to members of the Parcham faction, which is now in total control of the government.

After eliminating the Khalq faction, seven leaders of Babrak Karmal's ruling Parcham faction have assumed control of administrative affairs. These seven are: Nun Ahmad Nur, Nur Wakil, Dr Inayat Ratibzad, Mahmud Barali, Sultan Ali Khishtmand, Bij Habib and Bij Rafi. All these had been accused of being traitors by former President Hafizullah Amin, and had been made targets of severe reprisals. After Babrak Karmal came to power, Khalq leaders supported his regime. But they later opposed the government of the question of Russian intervention in Afghanistan. Now, the Khalq faction has gained influence in the rural areas. This has led to speculation that the Khalq faction and the mujahidin will cooperate with each other to bring about the downfall of the Karmal regime and to oust the Russian army. Such a speculation has been confirmed by one mujahid leader, Prof Sayaf Gul.

9612
CSO: 4203

WRITERS' UNION TO PROPAGATE SAUR REVOLUTION

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 6 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] One of the long cherished aspirations of the writers and poets was finally fulfilled with the convening of the Founding Congress of Union of Workers and poets of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Held in a very grand ceremony the meeting of Founding Congress of the Union of Writers and poets was unprecedented in the history of Afghanistan. It was in fact another step taken forward to organise the different sections of the people of Afghanistan under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the vanguard of the working class in the country.

The establishment of the Union of Writers and Poets which took place with all enthusiasm and interest showed the full preparedness of the writers and poets to form a strong and fiercing force and to stand behind the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to defend its progressive ideas and programmes and safeguard the gains of Saur Revolution at a time when the entire nation has risen up to fight the sinister vistages of the past feudal order and the remains of the corruption which was prevailing during the reign of oppressive rulers.

In the message of greeting which was sent to the Founding Congress of the Union of Writers and Poets of Afghanistan by the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the Revolutionary Council of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan it is said: "At this sensitive stage of the second phase of Saur Revolution when the party has directed all forces towards the full annihilation of counter-revolution and the aggressive armed bands--these hirelings of imperialism and hegemonism the homeland expects its writers and poets to create such works which would arouse the sense of hatred of the people against the enemies and strengthen their belief in the performance of this sacred task and praise the heroism and gallantry of the prideful defenders of the people."

In this way we may say that the writers and poets roles have become more important and assumed a new colour and turn.

Like other revolutionary elements the writers and poets have to arouse the sense of hatred and hostility against the enemies of the revolution and the people of Afghanistan.

They have to defend and revive the heroism displayed by the defenders of the interests of the working class, the workers, peasants and toilers.

At this time when the party and DRA government with the support of the people have sent out their forces to wipe out the counter-revolutionaries despatched to Afghanistan by the US imperialism in collusion with the Chinese hegemonists the writers and poets have to wage a fierce battle against the enemies of the progressive regime in Afghanistan through their progressive ideas which have to be expressed by their strong pens and sharp minds.

The contributions of writers and poets are very important because they mobilize the minds and hearts of the nation towards the building of the new society, a society free of exploitation of man by man, and a society where everyone will receive his own share according to his work and expected to produce according to his ability.

The establishment of the Union of Writers and Poets gave legal recognition to the status and stand of writers and poets in the Afghan society. With this move the ground is prepared for our writers and poets to come into contact with their colleagues in other countries of the world.

It is now the duty of the Union of Writers and Poets of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan to seek means and ways to consolidate its relations and friendly ties with the Unions of writers and poets and other progressive organisations in the world and exchange views and experiences with the object to expedite the pace of movement towards the building of the new society.

No doubt the Union of Writers and Poets has made our progressive elements, writers, poets and intelligentsia take their pens and serve the interests of the working people and enrich the progressive cultural wealths of different nationalities living in Afghanistan.

Now that our writers have been provided with ample opportunity it is hoped that they produce valuable works in every area of social political, economic and cultural fields and help the vast masses of our land take active part in the development efforts and progressive plans undertaken by the party and government and feed our newspapers, periodicals, radio and television with their highly needed articles and progressive materials. We are sure that with the great sense of service that our writers are endowed with they will prove very fruitful in nation buildup and defence of the gains of revolution.

CSO: 4920

GOVERNMENT INVESTS IN SHOE FACTORY

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 6 Oct 80 p 3

[Excerpt] "The Afs. 60,000,000 Government assistance extended to the Watan Plastic Shoe Factory through banking credits is one of the most significant, useful and timely measures taken by our revolutionary government towards protecting, promoting and guiding the private industrial sector. This timely aid of the revolutionary government has been widely welcomed by the national traders, patriotic workers and toilers of our beloved country."

In an interview with the reporter of Kabul New Times while elaborating on the government aid, the President of Watan Plastic Shoe Factory said: The government has undertaken long-term effective plans for protection, promotion, and guidance of private industries, aiming at further expansion and improving the quality of goods and finding market for consumer commodities produced by this sector of national economy as well as removing their financial difficulties through the related banks. The extension of the sixty-million afghanis assistance through opening of letter of credit in the name of the Watan Plastic Shoe Factory is indicative of the government's earnest desire for the expansion of industrial sector and promotion of private investment.

He added that the objective behind granting afs. sixty-million credit to this factory was to facilitate the import of raw materials from abroad and to meet the requirements of the factory. As usual the factory pays in advance 25 percent of the total cost of material imported and the remaining 75 percent is paid when the raw materials reach Kabul. Sometimes it happens that though the imported materials reaches Kabul, the factory due to financial difficulties cannot pay the cost. Of course, the services and assistance rendered by the Pashtany Tejaraty Bank and the Export Promotion Bank in solving our financial and banking problems are worth of every appreciation.

The assistance, he added, rendered by these banks is not in cash. The banks extend loan to the factory and the loans are payable after the materials or goods arrive in Kabul Custom House. So far the services of the said banks have been very useful in smooth flow of materials needed by the factory.

As to the production capacity and the present capital of the factory, the President of the Watan Plastic Factory said: The Watan Plastic Shoe Factory which came into existence under DRA Private Investment Promotion Law and was registered by the Planning Affairs Ministry as a joint-stock company with an initial capital of twenty-million afghanis has played a significant role in the further growth of national economy and has been of valuable service to the compatriots. The factory at present functions with a capital of thirty-five million afghanis.

He further added: The maximum production capacity of the factory in one shift daily is 12,000 pairs of footwears, but unfortunately, during the despotic and oppressive reign of hangman Amin, the factory stopped production for one year and fortunately with the victorious uprising of the evolutionary phase of the glorious Saur Revolution which prepared the ground for reactivation and normalisation of national trade our factory resumed operation.

At present as a result of the government's assistance the factory produces 7,000 pairs of different kinds of men's, women's and children footwears.

As far as the equipment, machinery, and personnel employed at the factory, he said: The factory employs over 120 persons including technical and administrative personnel in its various sections and the work performed by them is appreciated by the management. The factory operates more than 20 different kinds of machines.

The president of the factory further added: The production of this factory can compete well with similar local and foreign products and that our products are greatly demanded by the compatriots in the capital as well as in the provinces. The setting up of branches sales stores of our factory in centre and provinces is indicative of great demand for our products throughout the country.

Regarding the timely assistance of the revolutionary government toward the further growth and development of national industry particularly the facility provided to the Watan Plastic Shoe Factory, he said: In the first step the Industrial Development Bank functioning in the framework of Finance Ministry is duty-bound to render any assistance to the private investors to help them in solving their financial problems. We haven't yet presented any official request to the said bank pertaining the bank's financial assistance to the factory, but if we feel any need to do so, we are sure the bank will promptly come to our aid.

CSO: 4920

YOUTH FESTIVAL HELD TO HONOR REVOLUTION

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 30 Sep 80 p 2

[Text]

Jashn-i-Jawanan or Youth Festival which was helde here was another event in the history of Afghanistan. Featured by artistic, sport and cultural programmes the Youth Festival was highly celebrated in grand ceremonies. These ceremonies were attended by party members, representatives of national and international youth organisations who had attended the all-conference of the Democratic Organisation for Afghan Youth, and large crowds of the noble and heroic people of Afghanistan.

Never before there has happened any such event in the history of Afghanistan. It is an indicative of the great importance which the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan attaches to the role and the activities of youth in taking part in development efforts of the country.

In the happy and delightful and grand solidarity meeting which was held on the occasion of Youth Festival the heads of the national and international youth organisations delegation once again expressed their militant support for the Saur Revolution and the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the patriotic and progressive youth of Afghanistan organised under the banner of the Democratic Organisation for Afghan Youth.

On behalf of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and DRA Government Sultan Ali Keshtmand Vice—President of RC and Deputy Prime Minister described the occasion as a new age, an age of youth, for revolution of Afghanistan and called the all—conference of the Democratic Organisation for Afghan Youth as an important ev-

ent in the social and political life of Afghanistan and wished the solidarity grand meeting of the world democratic youth with the Afghan Youth every success in maintaining peace, ensuring democracy and Social Justice.

It is a matter of great delight to note that the Youth Festival was also marked by solidarity meetings held in various organisations in the Kabul city. In these meetings the youth and noble people of Afghanistan expressed their full support for the Saur Revolution and appreciated the solidarity expressed by the national and internation democratic youth organisation delegations with the Afghan youth. The participants of these grand solidarity meetings and functions declared their readiness to fight the enemies of Saur Revolution and safegard its gains in the interest of the working people.

These functions and meetings are indicative of the fact that the Saur Revolution is a turning point in the life of the suffering and oppressed large masses of the people of Afghanistan. The revolution, no doubt, consolidated the rule of the toilers and labourers who produce all the moral and material wealth of this land.

The young men and women of revolutionary Afghanistan have without any doubt great role in translating into action the lofty aspirations of the Saur Revolution and the useful and fruitful social, economic, cultural and political programmes undertaken by the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the DRA Government during the second phase of glorious Saur Revolution.

With the high value and significance attached by the PDPA, DRA government and the entire people of the country and the full solidarity expressed by the representatives of the democratic youth organisations of the world the position of our progressive and patriotic youth has been further strengthened and consolidated. The people of Afghanistan are very much appreciative of the activities of the young men and women carried in toppling the tower of oppressive ruling classes and of the great support they have been giving to the progressive moves made by their revolutionary regime in Afghanistan.

During the last two and half years since the victory of the great Saur Revolution and especi-

ally its second phase the progressive and heroic youth of Afghanistan have fought gallantly the internal and external reactionaries and counter—revolutionaries who are trained, armed and backed by the US imperialism, Pakistan militarists and Arab reaction. Our youth have voluntarily been taking part in the construction and development work in Afghanistan.

The revolution certainly makes headway towards the building of the new society of Afghanistan. The youth have therefore greater tasks ahead and the people of Afghanistan are looking forward to the patriotic and progressive youth to bring the Saur Revolution to final victory and thus realise the objectives of the revolutionary Afghanistan.

We hope the festival of youth and the massive solidarity meetings held will provide further incentive to the youth of Afghanistan to organise their forces in a better manner so that they could play more constructive role and help better the party and government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in carrying out their activities and discharging the responsibilities they are shouldering for ensuring progress and social justice.

CSO: 4920

CRAFT UNIONS ESTABLISHED FOR WORKERS

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 5 Oct 80 p 2

[Text]

The consolidation and strengthening of the craft unions have led thousands of thousands of our workers to stand firm behind the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. It is an important step taken forward especially after the emergence of the second phase of the glorious Saur Revolution. Politically speaking, the craft unions of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan constitute a strong arm to help the PDPA and DRA government realise the lofty aspirations of Saur Revolution and put into effect the social, economic and cultural programmes undertaken in the interest of the masses of workers and peasants in the country.

The Central Council of the Craft Unions which has been established after the second phase of the revolution have launched an intensive and extensive efforts to get the workers organised in the capital and the provinces as well.

Admittedly, the members of the Craft Unions have carefully followed the instructions and orders of the Central Council as the highest authoritative body of the Craft Unions of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Eye catching achievements have been made by the Craft Unions and its central council. We have witnessed that the workers with the help of their unions under the instruction of their central council have cooperated in establishing resistence groups, in propagation of the lofty objectives of the Saur Revolution and the importance of getting united in the craft unions, expanding the artistic and cultural activities, forming sport teams and taking part in the activities carried out by the illiteracy courses.

In line with other useful and fruitful measures adopted by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan and the DRA Government the first Plenum of the central council of the Craft Unions was held in the headquarters of the Unions of Workers of Afghanistan sometimes ago. It was indeed an important event in the life of the workers. The first plenum of the unions of workers instructed the presidium to take effective steps towards establishment of city and provincial councils of unions of workers. With the establishment of these councils of workers' unions the activities of the workers will be organised in an effective manner in the interest of the working class led by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to help realise the lofty objectives of Saur Revolution.

As repeatedly said by the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan now the rule of workers and peasants has been consolidated in our country There will be no room for the past feudal lords, big land owners and exploiters to serve their interests in the revolutionary Afghanistan at the expense of the lot of millions of workers and peasants.

The city councils of the Unions of Workers are supposed to work as middle bodies between the workers and the Central Council of the Unions of Workers. The establishment and convening of the Kabul City Council of craft union took place as a result of the second Plenum of the Central Council of the Unions of Workers.

Convened to put into effect the resolutions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan about the roles and duties of the unions in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan the second Plenum of the Central Council of the Craft Unions passed a number of important resolutions which have significant role in the life of the workers in Afghanistan.

The city councils of Unions of workers will pass down the directions and instructions of the Central Council of the Unions of Workers of Afghanistan to the workers and toilers through the primary organisations and transmit the demands and needs of the millions of toilers to the upper echelon of the Unions of Workers.

The city councils of the Unions of Workers are expected to do every thing in their power to raise the level of production and to enhance the standard of knowledge and culture of workers and toilers of Afghanistan.

It is hoped that the City Councils of the Unions of Workers will try their best to establish primary organisations within different public and private organisations including factories and industrial establishments to implement the decisons made on the top level of the workers unions and thus serve the interest of the working class.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

GOVERNMENT ACKNOWLEDGES MUJAHIDIN SUCCESS--Kabul, 7 August (Radio Report)--Radio Kabul today indirectly acknowledged the success of the mujahidin in the province of Kunduz. In its news broadcast, Radio Kabul said that the activities of the mujahidin had increased a great deal in Kunduz, and adversely affected daily life in the area. The broadcast stated that the supporters of former President Hafizullah Amin were cooperating with the mujahidin, and that the mujahidin were doing much damage to government buildings and schools, etc. [Text] [Lahore MASHRIQ in Urdu 8 Aug 80 p 3] 9612

KARMAL EXECUTES 200 MUJAHIDIN--Moscow, 15 Aug (AFP)--The Karmal administration in Afghanistan has executed about 200 mujahidin. This was revealed in the official newspaper of the Russian ministry of defense. The newspaper said that these people were among troublemakers arrested in July. Their arms were confiscated and most of them were executed. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 16 Aug 80 p 10] 9612

CLERGYMEN EXPRESS SOLIDARITY--Kabul, Oct. 6 (Bakhtiar)--The monthly meeting of the clergymen and Emaman of more than 100 mosques of the city and villages of Jauzjan province was held in Shiberghan hotel last Thursday. Following recitation of a few verses from the Holy Koran, one of the party and government cadres in his speech disclosed the conspiracies of the enemies. He called on Islamic scholars to explain to the people what holy Islam says. Similarly, the preacher of Shiberghan congregational mosque and a number of scholars disclosed the conspiracies of the enemies of the holy religion of Islam, expressing complete solidarity with the government and the party. At the end the treatises of the Publicity, Extension and Education Department of the PDPA CC were distributed to the participants. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 6 Oct 80 p 1]

DEPUTY MINISTER TO MONGOLIA--Kabul, Oct. 6 (Bakhtiar)--On the invitation of the Mongolian Public Health Ministry Second Deputy Public Health Minister Dr. Nabi Kamyar left for Ulan Bator yesterday to visit some health institutions there. He was seen off at the Kabul International Airport by First Deputy Public Health Minister Dr. Zarah and some members of Mongolian embassy in Kabul. During his visit, Dr. Kamyar will hold talks with concerned authorities of that country on possibilities of cooperations of the two countries in the field of medicine. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 6 Oct 80 p 4]

CSO: 4920

1980-1984 FIVE-YEAR PLAN STUDIED

Committees To Begin Work

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 25 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] Algiers (APS)--The standing committees of the Peoples National Assembly will begin, starting Monday 25 August 1980, to examine bills related to the 1980-1984 five-year plan and to the Appropriation Bill for 1981.

Wilaya Studies Development Plans

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 26 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] Tlemcen (APS)--The five-year plan was, on Sunday, the central piece of work taken up by a meeting held at the offices of the Peoples Wilaya Assembly [PWA] of Tlemcen, which brought together members of the PWA Economic and Administrative Committee with those in charge of the Wilaya Department of Planning.

During this meeting, proposals from the APC's [People's Communal Assembly] on the development projects of their communes were examined. From these proposals it emerges that a considerable effort will be undertaken as part of the plan to finish the entire range of projects approved for this region.

Indeed, this work represents close to 54 percent of all the programmed projects since 1970.

Other important considerations have moreover motivated the basic proposals made as part of this plan, namely the investment efforts of all sectors, economic, social, and cultural, including agricultural, which is to receive important credits principally for small and medium-sized hydraulics.

Furthermore, particular attention will be paid to the modernization and maintenance of the road network, to problems of supplying drinking water to cities, to electrification and public health.

The specialized PWA committees in this regard devoted several days to the study of these proposals.

The housing sector was, equally in this respect, the subject of proposals aimed at overcoming the delays in Wilaya projects in this field, delays which are linked to the problem of means of carrying out the projects, to supply difficulties and to the lack of semi-skilled labor.

These proposals will also be the central piece of work of the inter-ministerial committee of planning which will meet on 30 August in Tlemcen.

9330
CSO: 4400

COUNTRY-WIDE JOINT MEETINGS OF KASMAS-APC

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 17 Aug 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by A. Belkhodja: "A Spirit of Responsibility and Commitment"]

[Text] In compliance with the recommendations of the extraordinary Congress of the FLN party, joint kasmas-APC meetings are succeeding one another throughout the entire country. The purpose of these meetings is to review the socio-economic problems which local communities are facing, problems inherent in the numerous changes they are undergoing.

The debate between militants and elected officials is always open and frank, prompted by a solicitude to bring about urgent solutions to the constraints and difficulties which crop us during the carrying out of programs decided upon. The forward march of the revolution and the confidence placed in elected officials by citizens call forth a spirit of responsibility and an absolute commitment, both of which find their full expression in the effort of edification and social progress.

Strengthening of Tiaret Distribution

The communal executive and the office of the FLN kasma of Tiaret have recently examined the entire range of points concerning the marketing sector during a coordination meeting held at kasma headquarters.

Housing and the distribution of building lots also figured on the agenda.

With regards to the latter, the committee charged with studying the dossiers devoted several night sessions at APC headquarters. A first allocation of 354 lots is about to be made available to citizens in the Sidi Khaled development.

In connection with this, the local responsibles have deplored the silence of certain national firms to whom the commune has assigned lots and who have not showed up to erect on them the projects and planned installations.

The kasma and communal executive members jointly agreed to undertake final steps to contact the companies involved in order to urge diligent utilization of the lots thus far assigned and abandoned. It must be concluded that such negligence scarcely favors the extension and consolidation of the public sector which deserves efforts as well as serious attention. In this context, it was decided to program a meeting with CASORAN responsibles for a definitive and precise assignment of lots and to thereby accelerate the start of the public health projects CASORAN has agreed to carry out.

The discussion about housing was restricted and concise, namely the application of texts in force which provide for the continuous functioning of the allocation commission with competency to investigate all dossiers.

The executives of the APC and the kasma held a second meeting to which the directors of public enterprises and offices were invited, such as SONACAT, ENC, ONALAIT, SN Sempac, SONIPEC, Souk El-Fellah, COFEL. Of the aforementioned companies, only ONALAIT and Souk El-Fellah answered the appeal of the local authorities... This intentional absence at the working sessions goes against presidential directives which insist strongly on the concentration of all responsibles for the purpose of arriving together at solutions which focus on the improvement of distribution not only during the month of Ramadhan but on a permanent basis.

The meeting which proposed to examine the situation of all the sectors then limited itself to only those present: ONALAIT and Souk El-Fellah which, it must be admitted, are regular when these current initiatives are involved. The situation of the ONALAIT distribution unit is sufficiently well known. The unit has available only rudimentary means which prevent it from supplying the totality of the seven dairas of the wilaya... An insignificant rolling fleet has gone beyong the threshold of reform. It continues nonetheless to 'roll' as best it can to satisfy distribution needs among several communes. Only in recent times has it proved to be inadequate for the needs expressed by the population... Of the 16,000 l, earmarked for the wilaya, delivery of only 6,000 l, was signed for. While waiting for the fleet to be increased, the Tiaret APC has promised to make available to the office a vehicle to supply the localities which are closest to the chief town of the wilaya. With the exception of milk, secondary products are not to be found on the market. Only very infrequently does the Tiaret unit receive secondary products from the regional unit which for its part depends on Sidi Bel Abbes and Tlemcen. It is thus on only rare occasions that Soul El-Fellah obtains supplies which the aforementioned units agree to deliver to it.

In closing it was agreed that urgent steps would have to be taken to meet the project goals of the ONALAIT production unit which was programmed several years ago but which has yet to come into existence.

This unit is obviously justified by a favorable geographic implantation since it will not be limited to supply a wilaya of 37 communes but will also provide for the needs of wilayas bordering on the South. In any case, what must not be forgotten is the feverish activity which predominates throughout the whole year in the small ONALAIT unit which with very meager resources struggles to meet the needs of a very large, spread out wilaya.

Souk El-Fellah, for its part, thanks to the premises which were handed over to it by the PAC, has managed to compensate for the empty space left unfinished for nearly five years by the SNNGA unit. The commune has just made available to the OFLA [Fruit and Vegetable Office] a piece of land which will accommodate appropriate installations from Souk El-Fellah. For presently the narrowness of the premises is such that the crowd daily runs the risk of suffocating. This crowd is justified by the very reasonable prices charged by Souk El-Fellah.

The retail market has decided for its part to no longer observe the fixed prices in force. An easy profit which is made at the expense of workers' pocketbooks has become the general rule. Only the state stores bring about a true price stabilization because supervision is ineffective. Sanctions are not proportionate to fraud, which is spreading. All one has to do is glance at ENC or SONACAT to become aware of this. These two agencies have practically become genuine beehives to which converge a colony of speculators, made up of merchants holding trade registers and phantom merchants who possess trade registers but no business, or even those uncovered by any criterion listed in regulations in force. It is to be hoped that the application of the new legislation will purge from this sector the parasites who indulge in a thousand and one practices which trouble the marketing circuit whose negation is felt directly by the consumer.

Price Rises and Speculation

The several formulae that have been applied have not really borne fruit; or at least they have perhaps partially reduced speculation. Indeed, one cannot deny the advantages of the "consumer producer" formula, which was adopted recently for refrigerators, stoves, and television sets. Another phenomenon has unfortunately burst upon the scene. This is the birth of a consumer corporation whose only consumption is the purchase, after which the product passes from hand to hand at prices which double.

There are also consumers who acquire a batch of products which they turn over to a merchant in exchange for a substantial commission for having agreed to put up their national identity card and for having undergone the fastidious chain effects. This phenomenon which does not contribute greatly to the harmony of the marketing sector deserves closer analysis. For when all is said and done, in such a confused state of affairs, how can the real consumer who uses the product for his own needs be distin-

can the real consumer who uses the product for his own needs be distinguished from the one who speculates--his end concern--in order to feed the parallel market.

Concerning the SN SEMPAC [National Semolina Industry, Milling, Pasta, and Couscous Company], the local responsibles are to urge this company to build the industrial bakery whose need is making itself strongly felt. SNIC continues peddling goods with the same consignment vehicle in the absence of storage premises. SOGEDIA still relies on the Relizane unit, SONACAT pays out considerable amounts for premises it has been renting for several years. This is likewise the case with CASORAN.

The matter of investments seems to be neglected by several agencies while the municipality of Tiaret is urging them to build their exploration installations on available land. A high level approach must be made; this has been the conclusion of local responsibles who are determined to contribute effectively to the consolidation of the public sector, which constitutes and will constitute the people's gain.

9330
CSO: 4400

WILAYA TRANSPORTATION ENTERPRISE SET UP

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 12 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] Mascara (APS)--The transportation sector plays a primordial role in the economic development of every region of the country. In the wilaya of Mascara, an agricultural region which numbers 450,000 inhabitants, this sector faces serious problems.

With respect to passenger transportation, the SNTV of Mascara has only 16 buses available for local transportation, of which several no longer meet current needs due to their antique vintage. To that must be added the failure to operate public passenger transportation lines assigned the moudjahidines [veteraus] and the weakness of private carriers who have available public transportation lines, but who do not satisfactorily discharge the mission which has devolved on them for lack of appropriate material means. There is also the crucial problem of school bus service which shows up the weakness of passenger transportation. In order to find a remedy to this situation, several proposals have been submitted by the wilaya services involved to competent central authorities. These suggestions relate to increasing the fleet and creating new lines within the wilaya and others which link the wilaya with certain other regions, as well as creating a wilaya-wide transportation enterprise.

In the field of private carriers, the wilaya numbers nine carriers who have available equipment which presents very real dnager to passengers.

The number of passenger transportation lines assigned to the moudjahidines totals 13. However, the different assignees, who are undergoing financial difficulties due to the lack of vehicle availability, have not been able to serve the assigned lines. Only one turn around, Oued Taria-Mascara, is presently in service.

With respect to taxi transportation, 248 vehicles are in service in the wilaya. Concerning driver training and driver licensing, the wilaya has 18 establishments. On the other hand, only one examiner presently administers tests for obtaining driver's licenses.

As for public cargo transportation, the number of vehicles under 5 1/2 tons engaged in it wilaya-wide comes to 70. These vehicles total about 136 tons overall tonnage.

Ghriss Airfield Remains Shut

The SNTR, which has available in the wilaya only one office used as a branch line, has no fleet at Mascara, which obliges the different operators to find an alternative solution.

The transport of perishable goods, especially fruit and vegetables, poses enormous problems, as does supplying other wilayas from Mascara, during peak production seasons, for potatoes and onions, for example. To that must be added the transport of merchandise of existing commercial and industrial units which number about 15 wilaya-wide. Taking into account the present situation and the importance of transporting merchandise, an SNTR presence is indispensable. A study has been undertaken of the possibility of creating an SNTR merchandise transport center in the chief town of the wilaya.

With respect to merchandise carriers working for their own account, their number has shown a decline for many reasons. Thus, out of 128 carriers who had 149 vehicles, there remain only 83 carriers who have 100 vehicles. On the other hand, public merchandise carriers with the help of vehicles of over 5 1/2 tons prossessing special temporary authorizations (STA) saw their number increase to reach six carriers who have eight (with a capacity of 8 to 12 tons) with new vehicle attributions by virtue of moudjahidine reclassification.

With respect to the wilaya's railway infrastructure, it consists of two main lines, namely Oran-Algiers, with service to Sig and Mohammadia on normal track, and Mohammadia-Bechar, with service to Hacine-Tizi-Ghriss on narrow track (120 km of track within the wilaya). The shortcomings of the rail network, the time required for car availability, accentuated by their transfer to narrow track, result in almost the total volume of merchandise in transit being shipped by truck, especially when perishable goods are involved, and this even though the wilaya has a large train station available for use at Mohammadia.

Three yards are planned in order to increase the number of cars, and a mini-train or "omnibus" will have to be placed in service between Mohammadia-Oued Taria, which will grant relief to the population centered around this axis. The link-up of Mascara's industrial zone with the Tizi station also proves to be necessary.

In short, the economic development of the Mascara wilaya requires, as far as transportation is concerned, the creation of a public passenger transportation enterprise, the setting up of an SNTR transportation center, the strengthening of the SNTV fleet and the aerial accommodation of the Ghriss airport. The fulfillment of these projects will make it possible for this wilaya to overcome the difficulties thus far encountered in the overall transportation picture.

9330
CSO: 4400

EASING OF PROPERTY ACQUISITION REGULATIONS

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 17 Aug 80 p 1

[Article: "Laud Reserves: Easing of Property Acquisition Regulation"]

[Text] Algiers (APS)--Within the framework of the joint Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Housing and Urban Development action program, and with an eye to giving decisive impetus to the concretization of the priorities drawn up by the Political Directorate in the vital field of housing, an important working session brought together, yesterday afternoon in the Government Palace, Boualem Benhamouda, member of the Politburo, minister of the interior and Ahmed Ali Ghazali, member of the Central Committee, minister of housing and urban development, in addition to representatives of the central administrations of the two ministries.

During this meeting, the following three large dockets were examined: land reserves, resorption of precarious housing, and rural housing. Important decisions were also drawn up.

With respect to land reserves and in order to encourage individual or collective housing, the streamlining of procedures heretofore employed was the first point tackled. Thus with an eye to speeding up the process of transferring lots to private individuals, the two ministers agreed on a certain number of provisions intended to improve on the procedures recently employed.

In addition to the easing of lot transfers, the government has released more than 30 million dinars which it has set apart for allotment studies which will be carried out by national (ECOTEC, CADAT...) and local planning departments.

The planning departments will be in charge, within the framework of special conventions with the wilayas, of carrying out studies of allotments intended for individual or collective housing, of furnishing, at the same time, and free of charge to buyers, housing plans which thus exempt the latter from the long and slow procedure of obtaining a building permit.

It is to be recalled that this operation involves close to 1,200 localities situated throughout the national territory and especially in the interior of the country where space and town planning constraints are less acute.

The planned streamlining is certain to beget progress in this action which has already, to date, chalked up valuable results.

The second point examined at this meeting concerned the resorption of shantytowns and the fight against illegal building.

It must be mentioned in this regards, that under the combined pressure od demographic growth and the housing crisis, regulation in respect to supervision of town planning has shown itself, put to the test of actual fact, to be inadequate and ineffectual and has been unable to avert the proliferation, in certain zones, of shantytowns and the multiplication of illegal and unauthorized uncivilized spontaneous, precarious housing.

In order to correct this situation, which seriously compromises the physiognomy of our cities, the two ministers examined the following possibilities:

--considerably streamlining the procedure for granting building permits in agglomerations of more than 2,000 inhabitants;

--submitting, on the other hand, to a meticulous procedure construction in zones of prime agricultural value whose preservation and valorization the Central Committee has, it is known, requested;

--increasing the civil and penal sanctions against infringers of town planning rules.

Concerning existing shantytowns, a joint program between the two ministries was decided upon. This program involves:

--an inventory of all insanitary and precarious housing through the registration of the identity of the occupants, the make-up of the families concerned, and the consistency of this housing;

--the obligation for local authorities to set aside a housing quota, in programs presently on-going or those to be carried out in the future, in order to progressively relodge shantytown occupants.

These measures remain nevertheless simple palliatives to the problem of insanitary housing, the real solution of which is to be found in the promotion of rural housing.

In the spirit of promoting rural housing, the two ministries decided, in agreement with the ministries of agriculture and agrarian revolution,

and of planning and national development, a program of encouragement of rural housing.

This program, which fits into the policy of integrating work and housing, consists of equipping, free of charge, the fellaheen with developed lots, construction materials with a view to making it possible for them to build by themselves, with the aid of the People's Communal Assemblies and the technical branches of agriculture and town planning, individual lodgings adapted to rural environment and located close to their work.

The concretization of this program will make it possible to stop rural exodus in its tracks, and, thereby, to settle workers of the land.

In the last analysis, the range of measures adopted in this coordination meeting fits into an overall strategy which aims at rendering effective the complementarity between rural milieu and urban milieu, a preoccupation whose ultimate goal is the equitable and harmonious raising of living standards of city and country dwellers.

9330
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

SONATRACH PARTY CELL INSTALLED--The ceremony for setting up the first party cell in Sonatrach-Production was held yesterday afternoon in the office of Sonatrach Production Management in Hydra (Algiers). This ceremony was attended by representatives of the FLN kasma [National Liberation Front - Division] of Birmandreis and Mass Organizations. During this event the representative of the Birmandreis kasma spoke to Sonatrach workers, stating that Production Management plays an important role in the economic development of the country. He pointed out that the workers should be vigilant to actuate this cell which will represent the party in the firm. He added that the cell will have to reinforce the ideological training of the workers, to contribute to the firm's orientation as part of the national charter and to broaden the FLN base. He also insisted on the necessity of the control and rational utilization of the means of production as well as the defense of the revolution's gains. [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 11 Aug 80 p 1]

CSO: 4400

PLOT TO SEIZE SOVIET EMBASSY FOILED; ARMY, INTERNAL OPPOSITION DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 25 Jul 80 pp 33, 35

[Article by David Bishay: "In Preparation for Second Operation to Rescue Hostages, CIA Foiled Coup Attempt in Iran; Moscow Sent Commandos Disguised as Painters to Protect Its Embassy in Iran"]

[Text] On the morning of Monday, the 23rd of last June, the Soviet Embassy in Tehran contacted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and notified the ministry's Protocol Section of the imminent arrival of 35 Soviet painters on a special Illyushin plane because the embassy building needed to be painted from the inside and the outside. The embassy asked for the necessary facilities for those painters upon their arrival in the international airport of the Iranian capital. The Protocol Section asked the embassy why it didn't use Iranian "painters" when Tehran is full of them and when they are known capable and skillful. The embassy said that for security reasons, it dediced to use Soviet workers and that it was necessary to permit them to enter the country.

The special Illyushin plane arrived on the following day. The Soviet "painters" disembarked, each carrying a big and heavy suitcase, and headed immediately for a column of black Zim cars belonging to the Soviet Embassy which took the painters to the embassy building in the center of the Iranian capital.

The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials were not unaware that these painters had nothing to do with painting the embassy or with anything of the sort. More than a week did actually pass but the embassy made no efforts to do any painting and none of the 35 workers appeared outside its premises. The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs contacted the Ministry of Defense to notify it of the matter and to inform it of its suspicions regarding the mission of these Soviet workers. Mostafa Shamran, the minister of defense and the chief official in charge of the state internal and external security, instructed his aides to watch the Soviet Embassy and the moves of the Soviet diplomats closely.

After 2 days of intensive watch, Shamran's aides informed their command that there was abnormal activity inside the embassy indicating the presence of a state of semi-emergency in it. The aides said that a large number of the

Soviet guards were carrying varied weapons, including antitank weapons and gas bombs used for dispersing demonstrations. The aides also informed the command that the embassy employees were seen moving radio communication equipment to the embassy building vaults and that the residential wing of the embassy, used for the diplomats and their families, seemed to be completely empty which indicated the presence of the occupants in underground shelters.

On 28 June, Mostafa Shamran decided to make his move and his men staged a surprise raid on a special meeting of the leadership bureau of the Communist Tudeh Party and arrested most of those present, including--in addition to the party men--a number of the Iranian armed forces officers and Vladimir Golovanov, the first secretary of the Soviet Embassy.

Mostafa Shamran believed firmly that the meeting was held to stage an operation of sorts inside the Iranian capital. But interrogation of the arrested Iranians produced no material evidence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to content itself with issuing an order for the deportation of Golovanov and all 35 members of the "painting" team, who had done absolutely no painting work even though more than a week passed since their arrival, within 24 hours. What is surprising is that Soviet Ambassador Aleksander Vinogradov raised no objection to the expulsion of the first secretary but objected strongly to the deportation of the housepainters. Vinogradov notified the Iranian officials that if the Iranian government insisted on deporting the Soviet workers, then all the Soviet Embassy staff, including Vinogradov himself, would leave on the same plane. When asked if this meant severance of the diplomatic relations between the two countries, the Soviet ambassador answered curtly: "Yes." The Iranian authorities then backed down on their demand for deportation of the Soviet workers and only diplomat Golovanov and his family were deported.

On the evening of Sunday, 6 July, Vinogradov contacted Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Gotbzadeh by telephone and requested an urgent meeting with him. The meeting took place only half an hour after the telephone call. During the meeting, Vinogradov delivered to Gotbzadeh the details of a scheme to seize the Soviet Embassy in an operation similar to that in which the U.S. Embassy was occupied. Vinogradov said that the plan was scheduled for implementation by midnight and that it was to be carried out by a number of armed persons led by Hojjatoleslam Mohammad Montazeri, the son of Ayatollah Montazeri. Vinogradov presented to Gotbzadeh a report on the gathering places of those armed men and a precise timetable of their movement and of their plan to attack the embassy and seize its main building. The timetable also included the names of the members involved in the scheme. The Soviet ambassador demanded that the Iranian Revolution Council adopt immediate measures to stop the operation. The minister of foreign affairs was warned that the Soviet Union is prepared to take all measures, including military force, to protect the embassy.

Less than half an hour after Vinogradov's departure from Gotbzadeh's office, the Revolution Council was holding an emergency meeting to discuss the Soviet ultimatum. The council then issued its instructions to the revolutionary

guard to surround all the gathering places of Montazeri's militias and to prevent them from making any move even if the situation called for opening fire on them. After discussions lasting more than one hour with the leaders of these militias, Montazeri's forces abandoned the Soviet Embassy operation and dispersed quietly without firing a single bullet. The Iranians thought that the matter had ended at that but were then surprised by an official statement from the Soviet Government in the form of a warning against any move against the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. The official TASS news agency kept on repeating the statement for reason and for no reason despite the Iranian assurances to the Soviets that the planned move was destroyed in the cradle and that the embassy was completely safe.

However, the Iranians came to believe firmly that something was being plotted against them. An important meeting was held at the home of Ayatollah Khomeini and was attended by Ayatollah Beheshti, the leader of the Islamic Republican Party, by Ayatollah Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, Khomeini's personal representative in the armed forces, and by Minister of Defense Mostafa Shamran. Neither President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr nor Foreign Minister Gotbzadeh attended the meeting. They didn't even know a thing about its convocation, about what was discussed in it or about its resolutions.

Several reports gathered by Mostafa Shamran from his various intelligence sources were presented to Ayatollah Khomeini. The first report was on the increased Soviet activity inside the Iranian armed forces and on the suspicious activities of members of the Communist Tudeh Party among the army forces. The report said that there also was increased military activity in the Soviet army bases near the Caspian Sea which is adjacent to Iran's northern borders.

One of those attending the meeting asked Shamran about the source of his information on the Soviet moves north of the Iranian borders and Shamran said: "The source of the information is the U.S. intelligence and we have received the information through a third party."

Mostafa Shamran's second report was on the situation in the huge air base of (Nowcheh Howr), located near Hamadan in western Iran. This report said that a large number of the base officers and pilots were in contact with anti-revolution elements living outside the country, particularly with former Prime Minister Shahpor Bakhtiar.

In the third report, Mostafa Shamran presented his visualization of the situation in the Iranian oil area of Khuzestan and talked about the increasing popularity of Ahmad Madani, the area's former commander, among the population. Ahmad Madani lost the presidential battle to Bani-Sadr when Khomeini declared his support for the present president a few days before the elections. Madani did not forget this "intrigue" and started to agitate his supporters and followers against Khomeini's and to extend bridges of communication with the naval base in Abadan and with the army forces in the area. The report said that Madani was planning for a coup against the central government in Iran and for the secession of Khuzestan and its vast oil wealth.

Mostafa Shamran's fourth and final report was on the force opposing Ayatollah Khomeini "which has no contacts with foreign circles or with the Iranian opposition abroad." The report warned that this internal opposition is increasing, is beginning to take the form of organizations and that its popularity is rising because it is clear of any suspicious regarding its national intentions or its acting as an agent of the former regime or of any foreign countries.

The meeting lasted for hours and it was decided to carry out a quick purging operation to wipe out plots before they spread. Khomeini asked Mostafa Shamran and Ayatollah Khamene'i to prepare a list of those plotting against the regime and to present it to him.

Two days later, Shamran and Khamene'i arrived at Khomeini's residence with a list of 1,110 names including all or the overwhelming majority of the plotters in the armed forces. Shamran also brought with him a plan to destroy and liquidate the plotters by using the revolutionary guard forces that support the regime. Again, President Bani-Sadr was informed of neither the plan nor the time of its implementation.

On 9 July, Shamran started to move the forces supporting him to the army bases where opponents of the regime are concentrated. On the night of 10 July, the rapid offensive, arrests and liquidation operation started. Most of the action centered in the area around the capital, in the (Nowcheh Howr) air base and in some of the bases around the Caspian Sea. There was some resistance, especially in the Ahvaz and Mosaddaq air bases. The clashes continued until 12 July. A large number of those accused of plotting were killed, others fled and nearly 600 persons were arrested. Some of the escapees flew a helicopter and landed it in the Turkish province of (Aghri) and asked the Ankara government for political asylum.

The number of those arrested by 14 July amounted to 632 members of the armed forces, 27 of whom have already been executed. Most of those executed were high-ranking officers, including former Chief of Staff Gen Hushang Hatem and the commander of the armored corps in Khuzestan province. But it then became evident to Mostafa Shamran and his aides that a large number of the plotters were still at large and so he closed Iran's borders and its airports for 48 hours. Tehran airport was opened last Friday but the other exits have remained closed in an attempt to prevent the escapees from sneaking outside the country.

President Bani-Sadr was not informed of the move against the plotters, or of those accused of plotting, until a full day after the operation was carried out. He was then entrusted with the task of announcing the operation to the people.

By last weekend, Tehran's local radio was still urging the masses to be alert to plots and sedition, talking about the plotters' attempt to avoid arrest and to flee the country by various means and calling for cooperation with the revolution forces to make sure that they are found [arrested].

But what is more important was the repeated warnings that the authorities were broadcasting about sabotage acts against public installations and vital utilities and about the presence of a large number of agents in the country to stage operations against the Islamic revolution and Ayatollah Khomeini, its great leader.

The radio said that the agents are working for Israel, Egypt, Iraq and traitor Shahpor Bakhtiar. The radio also said that the agents are led by a group of "treasonous generals" who support the shah, live in Europe and receive their orders from the United States. The Islamic guard have intensified the guard around the U.S. Embassy where the hostages are held because of the suspicion of the presence of "cooperation" of the U.S. intelligence with the Iranian authorities in exposing the Soviet moves--suspicion that this cooperation is a mere screen for secret moves to make another attempt to rescue the hostages through exploiting the state of confusion that usually accompanies the uncovering of plots, the efforts to destroy them and the efforts to pursue and arrest escapees. All this is based on the view that the staging of a successful U.S. operation to release the hostages at this particular time would be the biggest coup that President Jimmy Carter could stage to guarantee his success in the elections which will take place in a few months.

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INTERNAL STRUGGLE FOR POWER, BAKHTIAR'S CHANCES TO RETURN DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 1 Aug 80 pp 26-27

[Article: "Khomeyni Declares Revolution to Save Revolution; When Bakhtiar Presented His Program for Ruling Iran, Beheshti Decided to Try Him in Absentia"]

[Text] Tehran--While the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua is celebrating the first anniversary of crushing Somoza's dictatorship and releasing the democratic liberties, the Iranian revolution, described as having come to change the face of the world, is still floundering in fearful and bloody chaos. The struggle for secular power between the civilians and the clergy has made the Iranian leaders forget thinking of the future of Iran, the homeland.

For 2 weeks now, reports of the executions carried out in Iran in the middle of the night have been increasing--the execution of army elements and of those who spread corruption on earth, who cross the borders between Iran and Iraq and who are relatives of Shahpor Bakhtiar, a former prime minister in the shah's era. Amidst the executions and the explosions, it seems that each leader is living in a state of contradiction and that each of them pretends to be indifferent, as if matters were proceeding normally, in order to bolster his leadership. Meanwhile, each of these leaders lives in a state of fear of the other leaders.

Amidst this sea of uncertainty, Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr stood before the Islamic Consultative Assembly the Tuesday before last to take the oath, under the supervision of Supreme Judiciary Council Chairman Ayatollah Beheshti, to become the first president of the Islamic Iranian Republic officially and legally. It was said that he would appoint a prime minister immediately for the awaited government. But, regrettably, Bani-Sadr has not known how to exploit his election popularity which amounted last January to 75 percent of the Iranian people, has turned a blind eye to many issues and has gone along with others at the expense of issues that he should have defended and not permitted to be destroyed. Perhaps Bani-Sadr has committed a mistake by relying too heavily on his conviction which he has declared repeatedly, namely "I am the spiritual son of Imam Khomeini," whereas it seems that the final positions taken by Khomeini is a course favoring President Bani-Sadr's main rival, namely Ayatollah Beheshti, the chairman of the Islamic Republican Party.

On Sunday, 20 July, and amidst the clamor created over foiling the coup attempt [presumably by army officers], Khomeini attacked in a statement (one that was more violent than his statement of 27 June 1980) the government, the army and the Iranian embassies abroad and urged the Islamic Consultative Assembly to reject any government formed by Bani-Sadr if its members are not 100 percent Islamic and revolutionary. This time, Bani-Sadr did not respond to Khomeini as he had done the previous time even though Khomeini dealt him a new harsh blow when Bani-Sadr announced the nomination of his son, Sayyed Ahmad Khomeini, to form the government. This rejection has been considered a blow because of its timing. A month ago, Bani-Sadr sent Khomeini a message including this suggestion [to nominate Khomeini's son for prime minister] and received the answer only after the attacks against him began to escalate. In any case, Ahmad Khomeini does not represent the personality that his father wants and does not have revolutionary political aspirations. Moreover, he is a pacifist who supports Bani-Sadr's refusal to execute "everybody." He has intervened repeatedly for the release of some of the American hostages. Moreover, he does not have the intimidating and awe-inspiring personality of his father. Observers say that he is not qualified to play any role in case of his father's death and that he will continue to be one of the thousands of clergymen in Iran, but a clergyman with a big name. In any case, Bani-Sadr failed to form a government before the parliamentary elections. After the elections, he has failed to reach a compromise on forming the government with the Islamic Republican Party. This is why many find it unlikely that he will now succeed in forming a government in which he believes, especially in the wake of Khomeini's announcement which has caused the names of technocrats and of civilians to be dropped all at once.

On the other hand, Ayatollah Beheshti, the Islamic Republican Party chairman, has nominated Jalaleddin Farsi, one of the party founders whose nomination for the presidency had been withdrawn because his mother is an Afghan. Farsi's religious fanaticism did him no good in eliminating this obstacle.

Farsi (who is very close to the Palestinians) continued to play strong roles, but behind the scenes, while waiting for another opportunity to appear. He knows that he and Beheshti represent the same line, especially since he is a clergyman in civilian clothes.

The opportunity came in the wake of the abortive attempt at Shahpor Bakhtiar's life in Paris when he "slapped" Sadeq Gotbzadeh, the Iranian minister of foreign affairs, who denounced the attempt on French television and said it was not the work of the [Iranian] government. Farsi responded to Gotbzadeh by saying that the attempt was real [sic], that it was the work of the "guards of Islam," that he --Farsi-- knows their leader personally and that he had encouraged this leader to send his men to kill the opponents of the Islamic revolution wherever they may exist in France, Germany, Britain or the United States. Farsi added: "The Guards of Islam Organization does not need offices abroad because the bullet declares this organization's presence."

Farsi's statement did not come as a result of his personal power, and this is what everybody has been aware of. It is said that he was given the green light by the imam [Khomeini] and by the Islamic Republican Party. This

confused and perplexed Gotbzadeh. However, he did not issue any denial on his statement that the government had no knowledge of the issue [attempt at Bakhtiar's life] even though the imam declared that the government is useless, that things take place without its knowledge and that each of its members acts the way he likes. What worried Gotbzadeh is that the attack against him came in the wake of the attack which Khomeini had unleashed at the Iranian embassies abroad, accusing them of being "dens of licentiousness." Gotbzadeh's closeness to the imam does not mean that he is safe and this is why he did not appear in the session in which Bani-Sadr took the constitutional oath and why he declared that he will not take part in the next government. It is said that he has begun to feel that he will be the next victim, especially since the Muslim students have demanded that he be sued legally. Some people close to Gotbzadeh say that he is preparing to leave Iran to save his life, especially since the Guards of Islam have joined the Muslim students in the demand that he be brought to trial.

On the other hand, some observers have interpreted the current emergence of Jalaleddin Farsi by saying that Beheshti has made the first move in his plan for the fatal blow that he wants to deal Bani-Sadr. If Farsi were the president of the republic, Beheshti would not have created all these obstacles in his face. Moreover, Beheshti has known how to exploit Khomeini's statement on a "government whose members are 100 percent Muslim"--a statement which means a diminishing role for the people's civilian representatives in the Consultative Assembly and means the right of the assembly, which is dominated by the overwhelming majority of the Republican Party, to reject any candidate nominated by Bani-Sadr. In any case, some well-informed people say that if Beheshti succeeds in imposing Farsi as prime minister, Bani-Sadr will have no recourse but to resign. Despite his current isolation, Bani-Sadr refuses to be like the president of West Germany who stays in his residence and enjoys the title of "his excellency the president"--a situation which Beheshti wants.

Farsi's instatement can only take place with the approval of Khomeini, of course. If this should happen, Khomeini will have behaved with Bani-Sadr as he did with Mehdi Bazargan, the former prime minister. In August 1979, Khomeini stood in Qom to launch his attack on the government which lacked revolutionary faith and he accused at the time Bazargan, his government members, the army and the police of being unrevolutionary. Has Bani-Sadr now reached Bazargan's position and is Khomeini ready to declare his acceptance of the resignation which Bani-Sadr presented to him last month, especially since the price of the executions and of the arrests taking place in Iran at present is being paid by members of the National Front Party, the followers of Iranian leader Mosaddaq, who have fought the shah's regime for 25 years and most of whom are friends of Bani-Sadr who was a member of the front before joining Khomeini?

This small following of Bani-Sadr's says "the struggle between us and the clergy is already decided in their favor." However, they add: "Khomeini has not provided a definition of the Islam he wants. He also wants to be the Middle East's Mao Tse-tong and to maintain a constant revolution. Whenever we try to seek tranquillity, he rises to bring us back to a revolution that is anarchic in most of its aspects."

Bani-Sadr's group adds: "Khomeini's Islamic revolution is threatened by the Communist Tudeh Party--the only party that has exploited the chaos of the Iranian revolution to reorganize its cadres strongly and to assert that the first Mideastern communist party (Tudeh founded in 1919) has not ended and that its role in power is coming and imminent."

Some sources assert that the Muslim students who are holding the hostages in the American Embassy act on the instructions of Tudeh Party. These sources add that Beheshti is in ceaseless contact with Tudeh Party leaders. He has coordinated with these leaders from the time he was present in Germany and has continued to do so after the revolution's success. Beheshti, who is now stronger and cleverer, knows the strength of his influence on Khomeini and is preparing for the role which he will play in the post-Khomeini era.

The Iranian opposition says: Khomeini's Islam is not defined and clearcut and does not cover Iran alone. We no longer know if he wants to annihilate the traces of the Pahlavi era or the Persian heritage. He has issued his orders for the destruction of all the historical sites and for burning the books. The lion and the sun were not brought by the Pahlavi dynasty. They have been the sumbol of the Persian Iran for thousands of years. Firdaws, whose books Khomeini has ordered burnt, lived in Iran 2,000 years ago and not in Pahlavi's era." [sic]

The Iranian opposition circles add: "What is happening in Iran asserts that Khomeini and his group are on the path of decline and there is no means to stop this decline. Even if the Soviets and the Americans try the impossible, they will be able to save nothing."

The current question is: Are the tense internal struggle and the opposition abroad the only two dangers to the revolution? It seems from the course of the events that Khomeini himself is aware of the danger engulfing the revolution. He has personally issued execution orders for the first time whereas in the past he used to be notified and his approval taken [for such executions]. His successive statements diffuse the smell of his feeling that time is running short. The revolution has exhausted the people's enthusiasm while failing to realize their aspirations. Moreover, it has devoted its efforts to small issues and (has blown them up beyond all dimensions). It also seems that Khomeini has reached the stage of doubting everybody. He knows that the struggle among the Iranian leaderships is not for pleasing him but for realizing personal aspirations and this is why he has said: "If the next government looks like the present one, then we should mourn the Islamic Republic because we will have been defeated."

On top of all these revolutionary difficulties, there are the economic hardships. Inflation has reached 100 percent, in addition to 4 million unemployed workers and strikes in all areas.

Moreover, the demand [iqbal] for and the production of oil are so low that the Iranian minister of oil was compelled 2 weeks ago to reduce the price of

Iranian oil by 2 dollars per barrel. Because of its problems, Iran is currently producing 800,000 barrels daily, half of which is for exportation and the other half for domestic needs. This is in addition to the shortages in all economic commodities and everyday needs.

Moreover, the minorities have started stirring again and the Baluchis, Arabs and Turkomans have joined the Kurds.

Can what Khomeini is doing at present be called an internal revolution to save the revolution? Can the execution of officers of the air force (which, along with the naval forces, Khomeini has not been able to control completely), the arrest of civilians, the accusation of Bakhtiar and others of daily coup attempts and the antagonization of Europe and of the world save the deteriorating domestic situation.

It seems that the revolution is in need of subjecting itself to self-criticism and that it has had enough domestic struggles in its name, especially since the approach of striking whoever thinks of opposition instead of devoting attention to the national interest and to building the state has enhanced the opportunities that help to destroy the revolution. This approach has also come to pose the threat of a terrible civil war.

It seems that the offhanded blows dealt by the Iranian leaders in the name of the revolution and the accusations that the world is behind the [Iranian] political and economic crises have raised Shahpor Bakhtiar's name in Iran for numerous reasons, the most important being the fact that Bakhtiar was the first to oppose Khomeini. Others, such as Hasan Nazih and other figures, joined Bakhtiar afterwards.

Second [sic], Bakhtiar predicted what would happen to Iran and to the Iranian people if the clergy assumed power.

Third, Bakhtiar was one of the few third world prime ministers who gave the press its freedom and preserved this freedom, despite the martial law existing at the time and despite the press and caricature campaigns launched against him (at present, the Iranian press, like the rest of the third world press, is being exposed to fatal blows).

AL-HAWADITH has learned from a well-informed source that contacts between Bakhtiar and the Iranian parties, such as Mojahedin-e Khalq, Cherikha-ye Feda'i-ye Khalq and the Democratic Front, have begun secretly.

Bakhtiar's circles say that Bakhtiar's program has been distributed in Iran and that this has helped to enhance his popularity. The program calls for abolishing the Revolutionary Council and forming a provisional government supported by a council in which all the workers, farmers, university professors, political and economic figures and the technocrats are represented.

Second [sic], restoring confiscated property to its owners.

Third, reinstating the retired officers in their positions.

Fourth, pardoning all political prisoners.

Fifth, resumption of the activities of the political parties.

Those close to Bakhtiar say that he accepts all the parties, with the exception of Tudeh, and add that he does not have normal relations with Moscow. So far, the Russians are not enthusiastic for him.

On the other hand, Bakhtiar's sources assert that "his relations with the United States are not good. The United States still supports Khomeini because of the hostages and is still wagering on Bani-Sadr. These sources add that Bakhtiar may not return to Iran before the U.S. presidential elections."

Regarding the coordination between Bakhtiar and the Iranian General (Ofisi), the sources close to Bakhtiar say that "Bakhtiar has his strong group in the army and this group is awaiting the 'real' opportunity to move. Moreover, Bakhtiar believes that the Pahlavi era has ended and that Khomeini's era is about to end."

In any case, it seems the Iranians have become obsessed with trials. Last Thursday, Beheshti stated that after completion of the trial of the officers and detainees (300 detainees), Bakhtiar will be tried in absentia and Iran will request his extradition by France.

If Bakhtiar returns, his program guarantees amnesty for whoever has applauded Khomeini but "Khomeini and his group will be turned over to the judiciary and will be given the right to defend themselves and to bring whomever they want from abroad to defend them. Their trial will be conducted openly."

8494
CSO: 4902

DOWNFALL OF KHOMEYNI'S REGIME SAID TO BE IMMINENT, ALTERNATIVES DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 8 Aug 80 p 27

[Article: "Three Forces Lurking for Khomeyni's Regime: Army, Left and Bakhtiar: Two Traps into Which Iran Has Fallen: Hostages and Agreement on Prime Minister"]

[Text] Tehran--Last week, former Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan was asked about the fate of the American hostages and he answered: "I don't know my own fate. So how can I predict the fate of the hostages?"

In a [telephone] contact with a friend in Tehran I asked him about his father and he said: "Thank God he is in jail. This is safer than being outside it."

A TRIBUNE DE GENEVE correspondent has said in a report from Iran: I was listening to the radio with an Iranian friend when I noticed the bitterness that painted his face. I understood the reason when he translated to me the appeal that was being broadcast from the radio by one of Ayatollah Khomeini's aides. The appeal said:

"Destroy, destroy more becuase you will [not] destroy much [presumably meaning enough] whatever you do."

The correspondent has added: Outside, the Iranian cities were drowning in dirt, chaos and the last moan.

Last Wednesday and while a 12-year old girl was being given 25 lashes because she had swum in an area of the Caspian Sea set aside for men, Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Iranian Consultative Assembly chairman, was speaking in the parliament about the hostages issue, promising that it would be discussed shortly. He then read a message sent by 180 members of the U.S. Congress calling for the release of their compatriots. Rafsanjani silenced the deputies who tried to make objections and comments.

When the shah died, nobody asked about the fate of the hostages because all know that their issue is not linked to the shah's life or death, especially since the United States has repeatedly declared that the seizure of the hostages has led to an international crisis.

Now that the Iranian parliament has agreed to read a message concerning the hostages, no new hope has emerged, especially since Rafsanjani himself has said to Marcus Kaiser, the Swiss charge d'affaires who delivered the message to Rafsanjani: "Tell the Americans that this issue will not be settled peacefully."

Tehran has been passing the time with rumors circulating among the people regarding the fate of the hostages. One of the rumors is to the effect that a decision has been actually taken to execute the hostages but that it has not been agreed on the timing yet. The rumor adds that Bani-Sadr is now fighting for the cancellation of this decision.

Another rumor says that in return for releasing the hostages, the Iranian leaders will demand restoration of the shah family's wealth without forgetting the more important part, namely release of the [frozen] billions of dollars.

On the other hand, Queen, the American hostage who was released due to illness, has said that the hostages themselves believe that they are closer to death than they are to life.

The trap of the hostages in which the Iranian leadership is thrashing about is countered [presumably meaning compounded] by another trap, namely agreement over the prime minister. So far, Iran is still facing a constitutional crisis which underlines the inability of all the parties concerned to agree on an "acceptable" candidate who can "shake the world," to put it in the words of one of the Iranian clergymen.

Nobody can yet imagine the uproar which will be created over whomever is chosen to become the prime minister. Iranian President Abolhasan Bani-Sadr experienced new failure last week when he succumbed to the radical Islamic group and withdrew his nomination of Mustafa Mir Salim to the post of prime minister. Bani-Sadr has thus confirmed that the Islamic Republican Party will continue to maneuver until it imposes Jalaleddin Farsi without any consideration for the impact of such a step on Bani-Sadr.

It seems that the end which Bani-Sadr and his group have reached has wiped out the charges directed against his enemies or against those who tried to plot a coup against him including, for example, Hasan Ayah, the Islamic Republican Party theoretician, who was behind the attempted coup against Bani-Sadr--an attempt called Ayah's Recordings [tasjilat ayah] (Ayah explained to students the plan to attack and oust Bani-Sadr). Ayah came out this week to say that the Iranian constitution contains numerous means to relieve the president of the republic and to elect another president.

The struggle among individuals is escalating while Iran is heading for the unknown. The seven-man committee that was scheduled to be formed and to which the Iranian people have attached big hopes has not been formed because of Ayatollah Khomeini's refusal to participate in it or to send his representative to it. So far, Khomeini is still squatting high above, watching

the struggles taking place in the civil and religious institutions and being confident that this situation will tire the parties involved in the struggle and that he will remain the strongest. At the same time, Khomeini knows that release of the hostages would mean reducing the sphere of his strength and that the formation of an executive apparatus consisting of a government and legal members [sic] would also diminish his reputation though not his role.

But clinging to the principle of individual power does not eliminate Iran's domestic tragedy and does not eliminate what is being hatched around it. Internally, it is well known, all matters have come to a halt. Administrative departments are nonexistent and the decision makers are nonexistent. Even though the internal tragedy is big, it is not as important as what is happening abroad.

A well-informed source has assured AL-HAWADITH that on 2 July 1980, the western countries started to implement the resolutions they took in the Venice conference. In that conference, the west realized that it is impossible to reach an understanding with Khomeini's regime and that this regime had to be eliminated. On that day, the west agreed to go back to the Guadeloupe conference resolutions taken at the end of 1978--resolutions which adopted George Ball's theory that the solution to the Iranian problem can be based only on supporting Shahpor Bakhtiar who was the prime minister of Iran at the time.

The well-informed source added that this resolution became known to Iran and thus it decided to liquidate Bakhtiar in his capacity as the "ready alternative."

On the other hand, some western countries doubt Bakhtiar's leadership ability. However, the insistence of French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing on supporting Bakhtiar made these countries accept him. Moreover, Bakhtiar constitutes a compromise solution for all the Iranian opposition parties and for the Iranian people who do not at all welcome the return of the Pahlavi family, especially Princess Ashraf, or the return of Crown Prince Reza who is still too young to rule and who will continue to carry his father's curse with him.

This is why after the shah's death, the political observers started to project expectations indicating their certainty of the end of Khomeini's regime.

The political observers say that the opportunity is open for three forces to succeed Khomeini's regime:

1. The organized military units that are still loyal to the monarchy and that are small in number.

2. A consolidated left forming a ruling power [sic].

3. A new democratic state as projected by Shahpor Bakhtiar who has domestic and external civilian and military influence.

From these expectations, it has become certain to the observers that the accusation that Bakhtiar has tried to stage a coup attempt is nothing more than an excuse to weaken the Iranian armed forces. The Iranian leadership now has to find another charge to stick it to Bakhtiar in an attempt to liquidate him, especially since the shah's death will make the revolution unable to accuse him of being "an agent of the shah."

In any case, Bakhtiar's issue is not the only problem facing the Iranian clergymen. There is a more serious problem. The destruction of the forces that pose no real danger to Iran's future has opened the opportunity for communism to infiltrate, organize and train, especially since the resolution of the western countries to get rid of Khomeini's regime has motivated the Soviet Union to act quickly through Tudeh Party, claiming that it supports Khomeini despite the fact that everybody knows that the Soviets--though they don't want Khomeini--are against any attempt that could be staged by Bakhtiar or by General (Ofisi) who is now making the rounds in the U.S. State Department offices in Washington.

This is why there are "moderate pessimists" insofar as Iran's fate is concerned. These people expect a U.S. military move to be made shortly and say that even though the Americans did not succeed in their first attempt, their failure does not prevent them from repeating the attempt. There are also "radical pessimists" who say that those in power in Iran have not understood that fragmenting the state element will motivate those demanding self-rule to go further and demand secession. These pessimists add that the mere hint of a demand for the secession or actual independence of Azerbaidhzan or Kurdestan will make Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev enthusiastic for such a temptation, support his communist friends and instate them as rulers of Iranian provinces which were under Russia's control until 1946.

To put it briefly, the devil is gripping Iran's neck and the revolution in Tehran is still discussing the sex of the angels.

8494
CSO: 4902

KDP CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER ON FIGHTING IN KORDESTAN

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 1 Sep 80 pp 8-10

[Interview with unidentified KDP Central Committee Member]

[Text] The fighting in Kordestan has again intensified since last Wednesday. According to reports reaching Tehran, these battles have been in the vicinity of Tokab, Mehabad and Merivan, for the most part, with Kurdish rebel casualties amounting to 106 persons, while government forces lost only 39 persons. These figures ought to be taken with caution in the absence of an announcement from the rebel staff.

Owing to the ban on travel by foreign correspondents to Kordestan, actual reports concerning the forces in these areas are having a hard time reaching the outside world. LIBERATION held an interview with a member of the Central Committee of Kordestan Democratic Party of Iran who came to Europe last week.

Question: In April, President Bani-Sadr drafted a new plan of attack against Kordestan and announced at the time that Kurdish resistance would be broken. After the fall of the cities of Sanandaj, Saqqez and Baneh it has finally come out that military operations had decreased. What has happened in Kordestan over the last 2 months?

Answer: Large operations have not been undertaken but military actions have not decreased. Revolutionary guards and soldiers have launched attacks against the provinces of Kordestan, supported by helicopters. The hamlet of Ahmad Ava, for example, was completely wiped out. The greater part of the population has been successfully put to flight, but many (tens) were killed and were left behind.

There are other small villages in the Baneh region, many of whose inhabitants were immigrants, who had been brought there by the army, after the

destruction of their cities to seek refuge. They have experienced severe hardships.

[Question] A year ago, no great excitement was visible in the Iranian Army about fighting the Kurds.

[Answer] This army has become more efficient and more deadly. Just as we saw in Sanandaj, Saqqez and Baneh, the army no longer hesitates to bomb the cities. Of course, the army has a big problem from the standpoint of equipment, especially spare-parts; to repair one helicopter, for example, it's necessary to take apart two others. The Shah's Army had such a wealth of reserve equipment that there are still large supplies in many areas. In recent weeks, we have seen toys in the mountains which detonated upon use. In this fashion, many children have been mutilated.

[Question] What is the role of the Revolutionary Guards?

[Answer] The disarming of "counterrevolutionaries." Since every armed Kurd, particularly a commando, is fundamentally counterrevolutionary. On this pretext, they go into the hamlets and make a general slaughter of ally and enemy alike. They even pillage. We resist whenever we can, or we strike with a direct attack. In Saqqez and Sanandaj, commandos attack guards daily and even in Kermanshah, our forces attack Revolutionary Guard headquarters, in order to wipe out any security remaining for them in a single area and to prove that there is virtually no control over occupied city centers.

We have undertaken more important actions in recent weeks. We have brought down two government helicopters at a bridgehead connecting Sardasht with the outside. Secondly, rebel artillery fire destroyed a government Army motorized headquarters at Urmia. Third, actions were accomplished at a hamlet between Naqadeh and Ashnevieh 15 days earlier. We took prisoner 70 of 300 revolutionary guards, destroyed two government tanks and took a third as spoil.

[Question] These reports were not in the Tehran announcements.

[Answer] Iran Radio-Television has practically never reported government losses, but has consistently reported innumerable deaths that are, for the most part, imaginary. Radio Iran recently announced that in an engagement we had killed 175. The engagement concerned was in fact so small that no one was wounded.

LIBERATION Comment: We have been able to confirm the reports of the Democratic Party of Kordestan on the spot--we have monitored Iran on the subject of their own losses and on that of their opponents. Last year, for example, a printed Iranian source mentioned that between 300 and 600 persons were killed in a battle prior to the fall of Mehabad; Kurdish sources counted 13 dead (6 from one side, 7 from the other). This close sort of

figuring, give or take a few, more or less, is rare, a circumstance we should point out. Our radio tries daily to correct the lies broadcast by the government, but unfortunately its voice does not reach abroad.

[Question] Do you have radio equipment?

[Answer] The Voice of Kordestan in Iran broadcasts daily every hour and a half from Kuhestan, in Kurdish and in Persian.

[Question] A Paris correspondent has recently reported the assassination of "an important military figure" in Kordestan.

[Answer] An assassination attempt is always possible. To date, groups connected to General Oveysi, with the help of a few tribal chiefs from Iraqi territory, have tried on two occasions to engineer the death of Doctor Qasemlu (Secretary General of the Kordestan Democratic Party in Iran).

(LIBERATION: General Oveysi, Chief of Staff under the former Shah and known as the "Butcher of Tehran," directs irregular operations against Khomeyni from abroad, with the help of Iraq; the objectives of those operations have no connection with the objectives of the Kordestan Democratic Party of Iran. Nothing prevents General Oveysi from exploiting the leadership of the Kurdish resistance for the advancement of his own objectives, by calling for revolution in Kordestan.)

[Question] To what extent has the invasion of the major city of Mehabad, announced by Iran's leaders, been completed?

[Answer] All the cities are in the hands of the army. Between 1,000-15,000 soldiers were settled in the Mehabad garrison a year ago. The army had occupied the hills around the city with tanks and artillery. When this attack was announced for the first time, representatives of the people and political organizations held a conference with Army officials to tell them that this attack would cause harm without remedy. And to offer a proposal that the armed rebels evacuate the city on condition that the Revolutionary Guards take the same steps. For a year, soldiers had been drifting in and out of Mehabad, without arms and without business there. The Army accepted these proposals but did not keep its own promise. It seems as though the Army wants to occupy the city with tanks and turn the city into a power-base. From a military point of view, this would be useless. However, psychologically it would be a step towards intimidating people by saying "we took over Mehabad."

[Question] What do you see in the future?

[Answer] Without being optimistic we can say that in a short period of time our military organization is better than it was last year, even in the occupied cities. The morale of the people is also better. People have

experienced the fire of war and have understood that by fighting together something can be accomplished. As to the future, I must say that in months of parleys nothing has made me think that the enemy have any desire to negotiate. We know from reliable sources that the Ayatollah Khomeyni had ordered government representatives to put all our cities under siege before the parleys were held. And afterwards we prepared ourselves for a long war. We know no other choice."

[Question] Soon, 6 months will have elapsed since the date when Bani-Sadr said that you could not continue to resist another 72 hours....

[Answer] You, yourself see the result. The Army will take Mehabad. And what afterwards? Another month and the season will change. Then it will be our turn to launch an attack.

Battles At Mehabad

Yesterday Iranian authorities denied REUTER's report regarding severe fighting between soldiers and Kurdish irregulars in and around the city of Mehabad. Iranian authorities are saying that positions in and around Mehabad were quiet last night, but that scattered encounters have taken place in Kurdish-settled areas of west Azerbaijan.

9553
CSO: 4906

RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT SEEN GAINING IN NEXT ELECTION

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 7 Sep 80 p 1

[Article: "R. Ben Natan, General Secretary of Hapo'el Hamizrahi: Religious Judaism Will Come out of the Coming Elections Stronger"]

[Text] Refa'el Ben Natan, secretary general of Hapo'el Hamizrahi, in conversation with "Weekly Diary," said that as it turned out, not only would NRP not be weakened by the affair of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, but that it would come out of the coming elections strengthened.

He explained that many religious Jews had been hurt by the recent affair, and that they would at last understand that their natural place was in NRP. The speaker compared this phenomenon to persecutions of Jews in the Diaspora, which strengthened and united Jews, so that the more they were persecuted, the more they reacted with loyalty to Judaism.

Professor Yitzhaq Shamir, Judicial Advisor to the Government, told "Weekly Diary" that the reports that are being published about this affair in the news media are unnecessarily and unjustifiably harming persons whose names are involved in the affair. These reports also harm police work and impair the investigation, Professor Shamir added.

[Comment of Minister of Interior]

"At my age and as an experienced public servant I am not frightened by the arrows that are aimed at me; some arrows are weak and some are poisoned," said Dr Yosef Burg, minister of Interior, when he was asked to comment on the investigation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. "I think these arrows are made of paper, spittle, and baseless defamation." When asked whether he wanted to continue to be considered Number One in NRP, Mr Burg said: "It is desirable that they should all continue to consider me Number One, and that's how it will be with the help of God and the voters." "Someone is stirring things up on the inside, and even so, there has never been such a period of internal peace in NRP as there is today."

"They simply picked a young Sephardic minister, and decided to gain control of him, as though saying, 'Let's get them,' in order to get rid of him," said Asher Lazimi, deputy secretary of NRP, to "Weekly Diary." The speaker defined the investigation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minister Abu Hatzeirah as "a war of Ashkenazim against Sephardim."

"What answer could I give in this matter other than an ethnic one?" said Mr Lazimi, emphasizing that never before had there been an attack on a government ministry such as the present one on the Ministry of Religious Affairs. "We are suffering because the minister is Sephardic and has brought in many Sephardi assistants. So what could I say when they asked me if this is an ethnic matter? Let us hope that it may be proved false," he added.

9045
CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

POLL ON BEGIN--The public opinion poll quoted last night by Prime Minister Begin proudly at the "Moqed" program, where he said that the poll put him in second place in performance in the state of Israel, actually gives one of the lowest marks in the list of personalities. In the poll, which was conducted by Dr Mina Tzemah on behalf of the Van Leer Foundation, respondents were asked to grade various persons on the quality of their performance. Begin got seventh place, behind Shlomoh Lahat, mayor of Tel Aviv, and Minister Sharon. The poll was taken in March 1979. Top grade went to President Navon (92.8%), next to Weizman (81.6%) who was still serving as Minister of Defense; Teddy Kollek (80.2%), Chief of Staff Eytan (75.4%), Shlomoh Lahat (65.9%), Ariq Sharon (60.2%), and Begin (57.8%). Another question dealt with rating different persons according to their faithfulness to "Love thy neighbor as thyself." Here Begin got third place (62.9%), after Navon (84.4%), Kollek (63.5%), and ahead of Raful (62.4%). It should be noted that Rabin and Peres got lower marks than Begin in the two polls; Rabin was ahead of Peres. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Sep 80 p 1] 9045

KIBBUTZ OPINION ON GOLAN--At yesterday's executive committee session of Kibbutz Artzi at Kibbutz Artzi House in Tel Aviv, Dov Peleg, secretary of Kibbutz Artzi (KA), read the KA resolutions on the proposal to impose Israeli law in Ramat Hagolan: "The Executive Committee of KA supports the MAPAM position that the final boundary of the Golan Heights shall be a vital component of any peace agreement with Syria. Nevertheless, KA opposes the creation of conditions that will prevent any negotiations. Therefore, we oppose the initiative that has just been taken, which is harmful and unnecessary, to impose Israeli law in the Golan Heights. There is danger that additional political legislation like the "Jerusalem law," which the MAPAM Knesset members voted against, will cause Israel additional political damage that will be hard to repair. KA reaffirms its stand behind the "Kibbutz Geshur" policy, which calls on all the settlers in the Golan Heights to declare that no settlements there will become an obstacle to peace. KA sees it as its duty to influence all elements that undertake peace negotiations on behalf of Israel with Syria, to achieve vital boundary adjustments for the sake of the security of the State of Israel. [Text] ['AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 1 Sep 80 p 1] 9045

NATURAL GAS--Tests carried out yesterday at Drilling Site Notarah One, in the Huleh valley, indicate good prospects for finding natural gas in commercial quantities. Gas is flowing from the bore without difficulty. The opening was shut yesterday, until a decision is taken whether or not to continue drilling in this field. According to the program already announced, additional drilling was to be carried out in the 'Emeq Huleh district in October, but after yesterday's results, it is possible that the additional drilling may be started sooner. The drilling equipment that dug Notarah One was supposed to move on to another site, but in view of the finds the drilling programs may be changed. Only in the near future will details be available on the quantities of gas in 'Emeq Huleh. A person involved in the drilling said yesterday to a HA'ARETZ reporter that if the results at the other drilling sites will be like those already obtained, then there are good prospects for a substantial gas field in the 'Emeq Huleh district. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Aug 80 p 1] 9045

1979 PRODUCTIVITY RISE--At the session of the supreme commission on strengthening the productivity of labor and manufacturing, headed by the Minister of Labor and Social Betterment, Dr Israel Katz, with the participation of representatives of government, employers, and the Histadrut, Israel Medan, general manager of the institute of labor and manufacturing productivity, reported yesterday that in 1979 there was almost no increase in productivity, and that the increase in the business sector was only 1 percent. He pointed especially to the 2 percent increase in the industrial branch, which contrasts with decreases of 1 percent in agriculture and 8 percent in construction. He said that some of the moderate increase could be attributed to lack of exploitation of production resources and manpower, due to the economic slowdown at the end of 1979. Another reason is the unfulfilled expansion of manufacturing after many workers had been hired by industry and construction in hopes of such expansion. Dan Prufer, the employers' representative, reported that the public now recognizes the importance of the effort to raise labor productivity, and with properly integrated publicity it should be possible to promote this subject. He mentioned, among other things, an experiment at his firm in which the installation of air conditioning increased labor productivity substantially. Sha'ul Ben Simhon, Histadrut representative, emphasized the need to examine the recommendations of previous commissions, to learn which ones had been recommended for immediate implementation, and why they had not been implemented. Attorney Nahman 'Uri, of the Ministry of Labor, emphasized that there are legal arrangements in existing collective agreements that make increases in productivity possible, and the reasons why these have not been implemented should be investigated. In its coming sessions the commission will concentrate on prevention of absenteeism, problems of shift labor, work load and productivity, climate and productivity, and motivation of industrial workers. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Aug 80 p 3] 9045

CSO: 4805

ISLAMIC COUNCIL CHAIRMAN INTERVIEWED ON VARIOUS ISSUES

Kuwait AL-HADAF in Arabic 10 Jul 80 p 15

[Interview With Shafiq al-Wazzan, Islamic Council Chairman and Islamic Grouping Member; "Islamic Council Chairman to AL-HADAF: Dialogue With Lebanese Front Has Its Conditions; South Is Wailing Wall and Extortion Card and Solution Is in Striking Zionism and U.S. Presence"]

[Text] Beirut--AL-QUDS PRESS-- AL-HADAF correspondent has carried the issues of detente, formation of the new government, the army, the situation in the Lebanese National Movement, the Islamic visualization of the solution for the security problems on the Lebanese arena, the south in the wake of the repeated Zionist attacks and of the occupation of part of its territories, the dialogue with the isolationist forces, the ceaseless contacts between the National Movement and the Islamic Grouping and other issues to Lawyer Shafiq al-Wazzan, the Islamic Council chairman and the Islamic Grouping member, for a comprehensive interview. Following is the text of the interview:

Talk of Detente

[Question] There has been increased talk about detente recently even though nothing new has developed in this regard. Does this mean an attempt on the part of the authority [government] to drug the citizens or are there practical steps heading toward implementation.

[Answer] This question, especially the second part, would be better answered by the government officials because they are the ones in possession of the facts and the plans that enable them to say whether there are such steps or not. As for the increased talk about detente, this is natural because what do we expect of a patient other than the talk about health, recovery and the means of treatment to attain such recovery. Perhaps it was the epitome in which the will of the Lebanese was reaffirmed when this will agreed to support the principles of detente declared by the president of the republic on 5 March 1980. These principles were supported again in the recent consultations urged by President Sarkis and Prime Minister al-Huss. As a result of these consultations, the two have gained new approval coupled, insofar as some people are concerned, with signing the exact minutes of the consultations.

Those Obstructing Legitimacy

[Question] In your view, which are the forces obstructing detente?

[Answer] I prefer to have the question ask: Which are the influential forces obstructing detente? This phrasing would include the political forces and the military forces. Essentially, detente means a return to legitimacy and acknowledgement of all the authorities of this legitimacy. If these forces declare their support for the principles of detente, then we expect them to be true to their word and to abstain, even abandon, any actions that oppose the legitimacy [legitimate government] or that are in conflict with it. Any side that fails to do so would be the side obstructing the legitimacy. I have previously said that we, the Muslims are used to taking off our shoes before we enter any holy place. Therefore, whoever wants to enter the "sanctity" of the legitimacy must shun whatever is not compatible with it. The obstructionists, in my view, are those who do not abide by this rule.

Continuous Plot

[Question] What is the Islamic Grouping's evaluation of the current situation on the Lebanese arena in the wake of the intensifying security incidents in the nationalist areas and what are the means to contain such incidents?

[Answer] First, I would like to make it clear that I am not talking in the name of the Islamic Grouping but that I am expressing my view as a member of this grouping. Our evaluation of what is happening in our area is derived from our unchanging view, namely that we are living under a continuous plot that serves neither the Lebanese interest nor the Arab interest, including the Palestinian interest.

(Al-Wazzan added) An image occurs to my mind here. It is as if the plotters have succeeded in taking Lebanon's page and tearing it into two parts and then tearing each part into two more parts and so on. They will continue in this course until the page is torn into shreds, until Lebanon disappears and until all the goals of the plot aimed against the Lebanese people and the Palestinian people are realized. Many may have been dragged into this game unwittingly and as a result of real patriotic enthusiasm. Others may be hirelings or agents who perform their role to serve the plot and the enemies. A flagarantly obvious example is Sa'd Haddad and the border militias.

Dialogue That Brings Us Closer

[Question] It is rumored that the bridges of dialogue have been extended between western and eastern Beirut but that the isolationist forces constantly claim that there isn't a legitimate Muslim side to hold the dialogue with. What is your opinion of this?

[Answer] When the turn of dialogue comes and when the Islamic Grouping becomes convinced of the inevitability of the dialogue, then this grouping will not hesitate and will not engage in the dialogue secretly. In fact, there is no contact between the grouping and the Lebanese Front. It is true that

some members of the Lebanese Front declared at the outset of the events that the Muslims do not have those who speak in their name. This was during the period of feverish arrogance. But after the tempers cooled, we have heard more than one appeal inviting the "Islamic Grouping" as the side to hold the dialogue on the part of the Muslims to reach agreement. The Islamic Grouping has even been censured for allowing itself to sit with the Palestinian resistance leaders and not with the Lebanese Front members. The truth is that there are several reasons that have obstructed and that continue to obstruct such a dialogue whose time has not come yet because the Lebanese Front still has weapons in its hand whereas the Islamic Grouping has never resorted to arms. In the supreme interest and in the interest of those for whom the grouping speaks, the grouping doesn't find it appropriate that one of the two sides engaged in the dialogue be armed while the other is not, not to mention other matters that are very important to us and that require a frank position--meaning the dealings with the Zionist entity and the position that should be taken in this regard in the wake of Sa'd Haddad's and others' involvement in such dealings in an obvious manner with any condemnation or objection [by the Lebanese Front]. Add to this that at the present time, we all follow the path of agreeing on the legitimacy, represented in the government which has laid down certain rules for this agreement which we have all accepted. Beginning the implementation of this agreement will place us naturally on a path, which we hope will be long, serving Lebanon and its national causes. We believe that after all the events and lessons we have gone through we must turn a new leaf on the basis of the same principles on which Lebanon the homeland was established in 1943--meaning a homeland that is not the base nor the path for imperialism and a homeland in which all coexist in love and with constant aspiration for marching toward equality, fusion and faith in this affiliation with the Arab homeland surrounding us. These rules will lead us all toward a dialogue for which, we hope, the time will come through the way each of us conducts himself to bring that day closer.

Principles and Ideas

[Question] The governmental [cabinet] situation is attracting at present all the official and partisan attention. Is there a certain candidate for the Islamic Grouping or do you support Prime Minister al'Huss? What, in your opinion, is the solution: A national unity government or a government of political leaderships [fa'aliyat]?

Focusing on Principles and Ideas

[Answer] First, the governmental [cabinet] situation is undoubtedly the focus of everybody's attention. Insofar as the Islamic Grouping is concerned, what is of sole concern to me in the candidate for the premiership is that he possess the qualities that enable him--through ability, experience, integrity and moderation--to shoulder the responsibilities existing under the present conditions. The candidate should also be able to attract as many forces as possible in order to bolster legitimacy's march toward restoring all its powers and toward establishing these powers in all parts of the country. By virtue of the nature of its structure, it is natural for the Islamic Grouping

not to follow the course of nominating a certain candidate and to focus its attention on the principles and ideas by which a candidate abides and through which he expresses the will of those he represents and through which he aspires to serve Lebanon sincerely and serve the issues that concern Lebanon at a level that preserves the good relationship with the Arab brothers and preserves the role that the Arab brothers expect Lebanon to play--a role which we have always described as a vanguard role and which we hope Lebanon will regain when it regains its health.

Army for All

[Question] The army crisis continues to be a basic obstacle in which there has been no change. The political Marunism is still sitting atop the army's throne and engaging in sectarian and factional practices in the army. What is your opinion regarding the army issue and how do you view the army's future?

[Answer] The way the question is phrased gives the impression that nothing at all has changed insofar as the issue of this establishment is concerned--an establishment to which we give the major importance in any new upsurge in Lebanon's life. The truth is that the new defense law has made an important stride in laying the basis for building the army on sound and safe foundations. We expected organizational decrees to be issued in a quick succession that provides the opportunity for building this establishment in a manner that pleases us all--a manner that pleases us not as Muslims nor as Christians but pleases us nationally because we aspire for the army to be the living model for how all the legitimate establishments should be. The soldier who pawns his blood does so for the sake of Lebanon and not for the sake of a certain sect. This is why our hopes have been attached to the structure of this army. We do not want any step in this structure to shock us. On the contrary, we want every step to bolster confidence in this army so that all may rally behind it and so that it may be acceptable to all as the state's military arm which protects the borders against the Zionist enemy and preserves the [state's] sovereignty.

South Is Extortion Card

[Question] How do you view the developments in the situation in the south after the intensified Zionist shelling and "nibbling" operations against the southern territories--operations whose effects have reached Sidon--at a time when Arab, international and official Lebanese silence prevails insofar as this situation is concerned?

[Answer] This poor south has turned into a wailing and moaning wall, as if dignity and sovereignty are realized only through wailing and moaning, even at the walls of the United Nations and of its poor Security Council. I do not at all agree with the word 'silence' contained in the question. It is unfair to forget the Lebanese, Islamic and friendly statements and moves made regarding whatever concerns us, whether in the south or elsewhere. As for the Palestinian issue which has collided with [irtatamat] with the issue

of the south in one way or another, the word silence must be replaced by the word strangulation [khanq]. All the resolutions issued in the interest of the south or in the interest of the Palestinian brothers have been strangulated by a giant who turns dwarf in the face of Zionism and becomes an instrument in its hand, never hesitating to use the "veto" to strangle all resolutions--a giant that then turns again mighty in every form of aid it advances to the Zionist entity.

The south is an extortion card to which the Zionist enemy wants to cling through coordination and agreement with the United States. If we want to save the south, then we should stop weeping and wailing and should look for the means with which to strike the hand of the Zionist enemy and of the United States so that we may loosen its grip, make it abandon the card of the south and give the opportunity to right to prevail.

Grouping and National Movement

[Question] What is your view of the changes that have taken place in the Lebanese National Movement and do these changes mean the presence of differences inside the Central Political Council of the national and progressive parties and forces?

[Answer] These changes are an organizational matter that concerns the parties operating within this framework--matters in which we do not interfere and on which we express no opinion. All that we hope for is that we all agree on serving Lebanon and the other issues that concern us sincerely and selflessly.

[Question] Is there coordination between the Islamic Grouping and the Lebanese National Movement?

[Answer] Coordination in its organized sense does not exist at present even though I tried at the time of the late Kamal Junblatt to perform a role of the kind in my capacity as chairman of the Islamic Council. Were it not for some simple differences, we would find that we are essentially proceeding along the same national and pan-Arab line despite some actions that took place outside this framework [at times]. We used to draw attention to such actions in order to serve the supreme interest which we aspire for. Now we find that the conditions through which we have passed have narrowed the gap of difference in ideas and means [between us] and some prominent leaders of the National Movement, especially in the wake of the meetings that have taken place between Walid Junblatt, the Socialist Progressive Party chairman, the Islamic Grouping and the Front for Preservation of the South--meetings that have brought many of the views, visualizations and aspirations closer to each other.

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LEBANESE FRONT'S TELEVISION DISCUSSED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 4-10 Aug 80 p 13

[Article: "'Free Lebanon Television' Awaiting Right Circumstances"]

[Text] The Lebanese Front's television has started its tests on channel 12 which the authority has tried to use.

After Charles Rizq, the chairman of the board of directors of the Lebanese Television, submitted his resignation in the wake of the kidnapping to which he had been subjected 2 weeks ago and during which, it is said, he was told by the Lebanese Forces to stop operating channel 12 and to leave it free for the experimental transmission of the Free Lebanon Television, another issue emerged--an issue which all have thought to be a mere maneuver or a mere experiment which the Lebanese Front has wanted to carry out after the success of the Voice of Lebanon Radio and the subsequent emergence of the "Voice of the Free Lebanon" a few years later.

It is evident in this case that the front, in the wake of its success in the sphere of radio information, has sought to expand the sphere of its work by setting up a television company with a board of directors consisting of the front's partisans--a television company that propagates the front's policy and supports its positions. Numerous journalists have noticed that the important events and occasions have been recorded on videotapes by cameras bearing the symbol [words dropped], i.e. the symbol of the Free Lebanon Television and that most of these films and tapes have been recorded for storage and for the archives.

What is the truth of the preparations for this television?

It is certain that the Lebanese Forces have purchased 80 percent of the equipment from France, the FRG, Britain, the United States and Italy. The help of German experts has been employed to select the transmission site. The cost has reached nearly 2 million [Lebanese] pounds so far. It is said that three centers are already prepared: The Teachers Institute in Junyah where the Educational Television Center has been set aside for film making, a center in Adunis for management, editorial and production and one of Kasrawan's mountaintops for transmission.

But contrary to what has been said, the board of directors has not been formed yet because several proposals are still under discussion. The responsibilities have not been distributed either. As for the experimental transmission, it has been shifting from channel to channel for more than a year with the aim of selecting the most suitable wavelength. But on the other hand, the state has resorted to jamming this transmission, especially on the channels used for experimental transmission, with the aim of preventing the danger of the seizure of these channels. It is said that the technicians have been inclined toward channel 12 because it has remained unused for a long time and because the technical resources are suitable for it. This is why the disagreement took place with Rizq who, on the instructions of the higher authorities, had put into operation every channel likely to be selected by the Lebanese Forces.

The starting date for transmission has not been set yet because the start is awaiting three things: The decision to start operation which can be taken only with the unanimous approval of all the Lebanese Front's leaders, the opportune political circumstance and, especially, completion of the equipment. It must be pointed out that a number of technicians have been sent to attend training courses abroad and that it is not unlikely that technicians who had worked previously in the Lebanese Television and left it during the events because of their partisan affiliation will be used.

It seems that few people have viewed the experimental transmission which has never been announced. Few people have picked up the transmission accidentally and have found that it focuses at times on the slogan of the Lebanese Forces or shows one of the tapes recorded during an important occasion.

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ECONOMIC CONDITIONS SAID TO BE DETERIORATING

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 11-17 Aug 80 p 36

[Article: "Economy: Maelstrom of Starting Anew"]

[Text] The security setbacks are almost timed to sabotage whatever remains of the seasons of the Lebanese economy which has been dragging its tragedies for 5 years.

Between the end of 1977 and the end of 1979, missed profits in the Lebanese exports sector as a result of security setbacks have been estimated at 2.5 billion pounds. The figure rises to nearly 5 billion Lebanese pounds for the entire Lebanese production, of which the exports constitute one half. The figure may even double if the other economic sectors, such as tourism, trade and public utilities, as well as the drop in the productivity of the fundamentally limited public sector, are taken into consideration.

This year's events have had no less effect than the events of the past 2 years. Perhaps this year's events have been even more serious and severe. Enduring these events--not to mention the anticipation of more such events and the accompanying fear and refrainment from the implementation of any long-range projects--is almost a miracle.

These events have caused the Lebanese economy to lose its components and have deprived it of the element of growth because they have covered the entire homeland and because they have (erupted simultaneously throughout the country at times and erupted in different parts at other times).

Perhaps the first negative aspect resulting from these setbacks is the undermining of any long-range plan. Economic planning is based on clear vision in the medium and long range to realize balance in production, to study costs and to assess transmitted profits. But the continued lack of security has turned the Lebanese economy into the pawn of circumstances, or rather this economy has become an impulsive economy. This pattern under which the Lebanese economy lives spurs the investor to produce by any means and at any cost to secure a quick profit capable of yielding the capital before the anticipated destruction hits his establishment.

Tourism is Victim

This pattern of pressure planning is evident in the industrial sector which is one of the most heavily damaged sectors and which faces difficulties in growth, in production, in marketing and in labor as a result of the weakened production structures causing productivity to drop to a level below that of 1977. These difficulties have caused the Lebanese commodity to be unable to compete with similar commodities in the Arab markets.

Perhaps the connection of the industrial sector with the facts of the security conditions and the ability of this sector to overcome to a degree the negative effects of these conditions and to adapt to the pattern imposed on it have made it possible for this sector to continue producing until now. But what is true to the industrial sector can [not] be true to the tourism sector, for example.

The tourism sector is the sector most heavily damaged so far, not as a result of the tourist installations that have been destroyed or damaged but primarily as a result of the change in the tourism conditions provided under a state of security. This is why the type of the clientele of hotels and tourist establishments has changed and has turned from foreign clientele, especially Arab clientele, into a local clientele, with the exception of foreign business men who stop over in Beirut and spend a few days in it. The Beirut hotels occupancy rate has dropped from 65 percent before 1975 to nearly 20 percent at present whereas the Mount Lebanon hotels, especially in the areas experiencing security setbacks [sic], have continued to operate beyond capacity as a result of those fleeing the events. What is said about these hotels can also be said about the summer resort towns which have been emptied by the war from their multinational tourists with their various fashions, dialects, customs and traditions and have been turned into a void aspiring for vitality and into resorts where terror, fear and escape take refuge. These are elements that have changed the features of the tourism map.

With the extension of the security setbacks to new areas, the modern tourist facilities on the coast and in the mountains have also been exposed to damage. What draws attention about these setbacks is that they assume at the outset of every summer a more violent character than in the winter, thus certain areas benefit from the monies of those who can even hardly secure their sustenance.

Loans to Outside World

One of the negative aspects of the security setbacks is that they have delayed the phase of reconstruction which requires nearly 20 billion pounds to restore all the sectors to their conditions before the events. Since the creation of the Development Board in March 1977, this board has not been able to carry out a single project to rebuild what has been destroyed, except for restoring the official administrations and independent establishments, enlarging the airport, restoring the port and controlling the loans concluded to implement projects on the Lebanese soil.

The halt of projects in Lebanon narrows, in addition to the employment market, the opportunity for the Lebanese banks to invest their assets. This has motivated these banks to invest these assets abroad instead of investing them in the national economy. This inclination became evident in 1979. In 1978, loans to the outside world rose by 282 million pounds compared to loans of 1,873,000,000 pounds advanced to the national economy whereas the increase in foreign loans amounted in 1979 to 3,327,000,000 pounds compared to 1,102,000,000 pounds in loans to the national economy. In January and February 1980, the foreign loans rose by 721 million pounds compared to a rise of 394 million pounds for the national economy. This explains the rise in the price of foreign currencies and the drop in the value of the Lebanese pound in the exchange market. All of this has intensified inflation and has created in the banks a surplus that has not flowed into the investment channel.

The public utilities have also suffered heavy damage, beginning with the ports--especially Beirut port which has suffered and continues to suffer heavily from any security setback in either of Beirut's two areas. There has been an obvious drop in the number of ships and in their load capacity since last May whereas ships had to wait for their turn at the piers in March and April. Moreover, work has been paralyzed in Sidon port and affected in Tripoli port. Even though work at Beirut airport stopped only during the recent strike, the events have had an effect on both aircraft and passenger traffic --and ending with the private sectors and the public utilities. There is also the effect of the events on the public sector and on paralyzing its administrative work as a result of the negligence and chaos caused by the events, especially in the ministries and departments performing public services.

Corrupt Administration

There remains the Lebanese administration which has become more paralyzed and corrupt under the impact of the events. The departments performing public services have reached the point where they no longer deal with the problems of the infrastructures with the same determination they used to display before the events. The only concern of all civil servants, both high-ranking and minor and officials and of officials in charge and subordinates, has become that of accumulating money either by demanding increased wages and allowances for extra responsibilities or through illicit means.

No department or agency is free of the greed for money--a greed that has turned into a common factor among all the administrations. In the real estate offices, no transaction is concluded before the "fees" for it are paid. In the financial departments, no fee or tax can be paid easily and no formality can be performed without waiting in desk drawers for days, if not lost. In the electricity and water agencies, the departments of the Ministry of Public Works, the State Employees Cooperative, the Ministry of Social Affairs and in all the other departments, there are middlemen and specialists who perform the formalities in return for extra wages, especially in the Vehicle Registration Agency. Matters have reached the point where the civil servants have

turned into "honorary employees" attracted to their jobs by nothing other than their monthly wages and by their influence that has turned into a pipeline through which money flows into their pockets, as is the case in the Customs Department, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Economy and Commerce.

As for the Lebanese citizen, he has turned into the sole victim that endures the consequences of all of this. This citizen perhaps pays the highest tip, not to say bribe, in the world in order to be able to pay his due taxes and fees. Meanwhile, the public services are in a constant state of chaos. Roads have turned into furrows. Electricity, despite the new equipment and the increase in its prices, is still subject to outages. Often, the capacity drops below 90 volts and paralyzes industrial production. Fuel crises are successive and only death is less difficult than getting medical care. Price control, drugs, [social] insurance formalities performed and other services have become impossible.

Whenever a complaint is voiced, the official in charge has one of two answers: It is either that "the number of employees is inadequate: or "what do you want us to do?" And each official has a partisan group backing him. We should keep in mind, though, that the number of civil servants in the Lebanese administration exceeds the required number by nearly 13,000 civil servants.

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NEW HEAD OF MARONITE ORDER ELECTED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 4-10 Aug 80 p 13

[Article: "Maronite Order Has Won 'Holy Spirit'"]

[Text] Politics Stayed out of the Maronite Order retreat during which the order's new head was elected. Will the new head do the same [stay out of politics]?

On 30 August, the Maronite Order concluded a retreat which it had convened on 28 August [date as given, see publication's date] to elect Father Bulus Nu'man as its general head for 6 years to replace Abbot Sharbil Qassis. The synod also elected the following four new directors: Ilyas Khalifah, director and general deputy; Athanasyus Jalakh, Antunyus al-Sayfi and Tuma Muhanna as general directors.

The election session was headed by Bishop George Abu-Sabir, the Bishop of Latakia, on assignment from the (eastern synod) in Rome. In a speech preceding the vote, the bishop stressed the church's spiritual and social responsibilities in compliance with the instructions of Pope Paul II.

But the preparations for the elections had actually started 15 days before convocation of the synod and numerous names were presented. However, serious competition was confined to Abbot Qassis and Father Nu'man. Eforts were exerted with Oassis to persuade him to withdraw and support a third name but those efforts failed, keeping in mind that Qassis needed two thirds the votes for his renewal to be legal whereas a new head requires only one half the votes plus one vote to be elected.

When Qassis stressed that he would continue the campaign, which remained calm and which was described as having been characterized by an "athletic and priestly spirit," all exerted efforts to keep the elections within the synod and to keep them remote from the charged atmosphere between the Marunites. There was also agreement between the candidates to reject any intervention by Marunite politicians to tip the balances in favor of a certain candidate so that such a candidate's loss may not be considered an act aimed against those supporting him and so that the Marunite divisions may not get deeper.

Positive Points for Qassis

Those supporting Qassis's return consider the positions he has taken during the Lebanese war, especially the two-year war, positions dictated by the circumstances. In Qassis's opinion, the Marunite sect has been in danger and the Marunite Order can do nothing but take a clear position and cannot claim to be neutral. In this particular sphere, Qassis has disagreed with the Marunite Patriarch more than once and their positions have been contrasting. Qassis's supporters also underline the flexibility and wisdom with which he has dealt with the inter-Marunite conflict that has caused the north to break away from the Lebanese Front. Qassis has maintained normal relations with all. It is also the opinion of Qassis's supporters that the country is undergoing at present conditions similar to those prevailing during the two-year war. Consequently, he must continue to be present.

But another current has risen to demand reconsideration of the order's role and to stress the need for focusing on its spiritual and social message and for continuing its equal relationship with all and without any discrimination. Abbot Butrus al-Qazzi, president of the Holy Spirit University, had visited the north a week earlier and had explored ex-President Sulayman Franjiyah's opinion on the election of Nu'man. The ex-president assured Abbot al-Qazzi his respect for the rule of nonintervention and the need for the new order head to serve all the Marunites and not to succumb to the logic of one of their factions.

The elections did take place and Nu'man won by a vote of 47 compared to 40 votes for Abbot Qassis. Two votes were cast for Father Basil Hashim who had withdrawn in favor of Nu'man. During the synod retreat, Qassis was careful to display his continuing good relations with Nu'man and to congratualte him immediately upon his success.

In the address he made following his election, Nu'man stressed: "We are not for one faction or area but for all factions and areas." It has been noticed that the competition between the areas was not sharp during the elections even though the monks of Byblos supported Qassis and those of al-Shuf supported Nu'man. However, the political inclinations were not evident.

It is known that Nu'man is a specialist in Marunite history and that he is preparing a plan for the order's future work. Politically, the question still raised is: Will he take part in the Lebanese Front meetings even though some know that he has no admiration for some of the traditional leaders?

It seems that the Holy Spirit University has emerged triumphant in these elections. Father Tuma Muhanna is dean of the university's School of Philosophy, father Iiyas Khalifah is the dean of its School of Theology and Abbot Nu-man is the dean of the university's History School.

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THEORY BEHIND REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES EXPLAINED

Tripoli AL-ZAHAF AL-AKHDAR in Arabic 21 Jul 80 pp 8-9, 2

[Article by Ahmad Ibrahim: "Why the Revolutionary Committees?"]

[Text] The revolutionary man will not be able to bring about revolutionary change, exercise force, or deal with the circumstances of society in general unless there is a definite program to which this revolutionary and other revolutionaries are committed so that their action will be productive.

So that the revolutionary's action will not be suicidal and hopeless, he resorts to establishing a program of action which unites him with his fellow revolutionaries. By so doing, they define their methods of action and the goals they are endeavoring to achieve, and they establish a precise timetable for these tasks based on exhaustive study conducted by the revolutionaries in the light of their understanding of revolutionary theory.

The uniting of a group of revolutionaries around a daily and weekly program of action which they derive from revolutionary theory is manifested in the emergence of the revolutionary group or the formation of the revolutionary committee.

The formation of the revolutionary committee is not prompted by a feeling of danger or threat which intimidates the adherent of the mass revolutionary ideology, nor is it motivated by a feeling of isolation. Its goal is not to create a degree of isolation from society by creating a conditional and inverted social entity with the aim of producing a human type who will not hesitate to carry out the tasks assigned to him because of the subconscious sway which the idea of membership in this new group and the principles of the group have gained over his thinking. Such is the case in the various party organizations and in all political and social groups and organizations that evolve with the goal of creating a substitute for the social entity of the people.

Such groups and organizatons carry out their tasks and win their honors on the pretext of the inability of the people as a whole to carry out

tasks, which are thus entrusted to party or other organizations. This is used to provide a justification for requiring the people to respect the traditions of such organizations and to believe blindly in their laws and ceremonies. (For they are, in any case, the people's means of obtaining their rights and the people's avenue to freedom!)

Therefore, the political organizations exploit the traditional loyalty of the people and the society for their benefit, designating the right to act on this loyalty as their own. Until these political organizations come to power, it is wrong to confer respect and loyalty on other groups, including even the society itself. Each organization claims to have emerged for the benefit of society, maintaining that the society is caught in a bad and unsuitable stage from which the organization wishes to save it. Thus, it is right and necessary that this political organization should take the place of the society, and consequently, that its laws and ceremonies should take the place of those of society.

This is nothing other than a type of heresy, the results of which can be seen in all parties: the creation of an impotent and fanatical human type who does not believe in the people and strives to seize power on the strength of his suppressed feeling. This feeling makes him believe that he is a member of the vanguard and the elite, and that he is not like the masses and the simple-minded rabble who do not understand anything. However, duty calls him to think for the masses and lead them where he wishes.

His people, brothers and friends are not the members of his nation but rather the members of his party--those who are like him and agree with him! Stated very briefly, this organization is a new tribe, preparing its members to seize power and feeding them with ideas which enjoin them to isolate themselves from society by creating a new group that is different from it and a substitute for it.

This dilemma is rejected by the revolutionary committees.

The member of the revolutionary committee is nothing more than a herald or a teacher. He uncovers the unjust principles and rouses the people to destroy them. Moreover, he takes part in the destruction of these principles as a member of the masses.

He urges the masses to establish the revolutionary laws, which are the principles of justice, and he performs his part in establishing them as a member of the masses. For all of these reasons, he does not feel that he is isolated or separated from society. Rather, the welfare of this people--members of his nation--motivates him to arouse them and encourage them and lead them to remedy their problems. He does not think for them or belong to a group which is a substitute for society.

On the contrary, the revolutionary committees are themselves established because of a belief in the people and their ability to liberate themselves and out of a sense of belonging to the people.

The basic motive for the emergence of the revolutionary committees is a desire to attain the lofty goals of society in order to achieve happiness for man. What is it that motivates the sacrifice made by the members of the revolutionary committees if not a belief in the legitimate rights of the masses, including the personal rights of each of these members as an individual member of the masses?

When revolutionaries form a revolutionary committee, it is their means of teaching the best way for the masses to overcome oppression so that others will not be prompted to form a group to take the place of the people.

They provide their countrymen with the model and the example of the sound way to bring about the revolution, namely, by creating people's conferences, which are an objective that the revolutionary committees strive to achieve.

How the Revolutionary Committees Work

There are no differences among the members of the revolutionary committees, and there is no pyramidal or other type of organizational arrangement in these committees.

The revolutionary committee meets as a whole whenever possible, or some members are commissioned to carry out an action when it is impossible for the committee to undertake it as a group. The revolutionary committees have no form of official leadership, that is, a leadership which requires order, obedience and subordination. This is the customary type of leadership in the traditional political organizations, whose purposes have now become obsolete.

The leadership which the revolutionary committees are working to develop is the revolutionary leadership alluded to earlier. This leadership does not arise out of a need for order or obedience, or from a desire for subordination, or in order to garner individual or group benefits and gains of whatever sort. It develops out of a desire to arrive at the truth, and it develops naturally without any decision to establish it from any source.

Thus, the work of the revolutionary committees is organized in accordance with the comprehensive and scientific revolutionary theory embodied in the Green Book. Their first duty is to establish the power of the people by creating a system of government by the people through the popular conferences which make decisions, and the popular committees which carry out these decisions. A second duty of the revolutionary committees is to defend the potentials of the people by inciting them to perfect the wealth and weapons which are the means by which they wield power, and by fighting and destroying any deviation which hinders or blocks the complete realization of the power of the people. The latter will be accomplished through the revolutionary committees' fulfillment of the duty of

revolutionary supervision. This duty is performed by the revolutionary committees because of the consciousness and knowledge they have gained through the study of revolutionary theory and through their continuous work among the masses to incite them to revolution and the use of force against the symbols of backwardness and the manifestations of oppression that distort the life of the masses and undermine their future.

Do the Committees Exercise Revolutionary Force?

The revolutionary committees are the revolutionary leadership of the popular masses and they lead the masses in the phase of revolution. This includes guiding the exercise of force through the popular masses so that the force will be productive, humane and effective on the psychological and cultural level.

As was explained earlier, no one--whoever he may be--has the right to act in the place of the people. This is a sound principle which will prevent the revolutionary committees from ever becoming capable of acting on their own apart from the ocean of the masses surging through the new life which the revolutionary committees are struggling to create in this new age--the age of the masses. From this role entrusted to the revolutionary committees, we realize that they must employ force. However, this will not be the traditional kind of force, such as that which political groups have used in the past, first against others who used it and then against the people themselves. Such groups are captivated by the love of power and sense their separation from the masses. This is a calamitous phenomenon from which the majority of political organizations still suffer. I would like to call this the "antithesis," by which I mean the political organization's carrying out of the function and role of the political forces which it was fighting.

Thus, a political organization criticizes despotic forces, saying that they oppress and subjugate the people, and find justification to use force against these forces until they overturn them in some way. Then it becomes apparent that the demands of the masses have not been met. An inconsistency develops, and the political organization which has gained control can find no other way--according to its arguments--to defend the revolution and the revolutionary accomplishments, than to use force against the masses to prevent them from destroying the marvelous accomplishments achieved by the political organization!

There is no way to escape from this maelstrom of political action except by eliminating the mission of the violent political organizations, which is to attain power, and by obliterating the old mobilizational and ideological methods which set the political activists and revolutionaries apart from the masses by separating their group from that of the society.

This means that the function of political action is to bring the popular masses to power by organizing them into people's conferences. This is

the only democratic and progressive method that a revolutionary can possibly employ, respect and strive to put into effect.

Past and contemporary experiences have taught us the reasons for the failure of political activity and the collapse of the great ideas in the life of our oppressed mankind. With this, all theories have become mere clichés without any spirit and without anything to attract us, like paper dolls or pretty articifical flowers.

We no longer wish to experience additional failures, and we do not have time to waste on futile struggles.

Organization of the Revolutionary Committees

The revolutionary committee begins as a political and practical framework, sometimes with only one individual who then calls on others with similar characteristics to join him. As mentioned earlier, these are individuals who have attained [word illegible] of the political, economic a[illegible] social systems prevailing in their communities through study of the Gr[illegible] Book. This study of the Green Book has also provided them with an alt[illegible]ative to these corrupt systems. Their presence together constituted [illegible]ompact guaranteeing the destruction of the society of exploitation, op[illegible]ssion and backwardness and the building of the new socialist society [illegible]elded by the Green Book.

The appeal--whether by an individual or by a group--was made to [illegible]ll others about the values of the era of the masses. And whether the appe[illegible] was open or secret, by direct personal contact or through indirect means, it was the method by which the revolutionary committees organized themselves.

The model and example of skill and method is one means of heralding the new thinking.

This review of the characteristics of the revolutionary committee member demonstrates the characteristics which we consider a model of skill and method. The revolutionary group's organization of itself into a revolutionary committee means in principle its willingness to carry out the duties arising from its existence as a revolutionary group. The first of these duties is the organization of the popular masses into secret people's conferences.

The revolutionary committee organizes the masses surrounding it into a secret people's conference. This conference may begin with one individual, but it grows steadily to contain all the popular masses in its environment at the earliest opportunity.

Another function of the revolutionary committee is to form additional revolutionary committees in other areas to fulfill the same role in the

organization of the masses, so that within a certain period, all or most of the people will become affiliated with the people's conferences and will be ready to exercise power by means of them--or actually, they will be ready to seize power through them by the appropriate means prior to exercising power.

The revolutionary committee in any given place begins by formulating a concept of this place from the standpoint of the importance and consciousness of the people and their willingness to bear their responsibility in seizing their right to power. Next it formulates a specific conception of the people's conference, whose establishment it insures by secretly calling on the masses to join it. The committee envisions the conference structurally in terms of its number of participants and the existence of its administrative secretariat. Thus, we find that no people are incorporated into the structure up until the hour it is conceived. The means which are employed are to attract the people into the structure individually and in groups from the outside environment. In this way, the new structure is filled with people and the old structure they occupied previously is emptied completely--or nearly so.

The revolutionary committees thus create holes in this structure through which people leak into a new and sound structure free from oppression and the principles of exploitation.

These holes are simply the methods of appeal and attraction which the revolutionary committee employs in order to bring consciousness to an advanced stage of action and to channel this consciousness toward the popular revolution in order to achieve the society of the Jamahiriyah.

The individuals who formed the old structure are the very ones whom the revolutionary committees attract in order to form a new structure of life.

We can describe these channels of nourishment opened in the body of society as roots which draw in the necessary nutrients for plants in the growth stage from a suitable environment.

The methods of appeal in the revolutionary committees are like tiny capillaries whose function is to enable the popular conferences to grow and continue to survive until they reach maturity with the seizure of the power, wealth and weapons by the masses.

How Do the Masses Seize Power?

I touched on this matter earlier during our discussion of the function of the revolutionary committees and the question of the revolution and violence. However, what I am trying to explain here is the purely practical side of this complex process, which begins with an ideological change and matures with a complete and radical transformation of the elements of life in human society.

The conditions for the seizure of power by the masses can be summarized as follows:

1. The formation of people's conferences in which the masses organize themselves and which they prepare as an instrument of government to take the place of all the traditional instruments of government.

2. The fall of the traditional machinery of government through its elimination or destruction.

These are the two necessary conditions for the seizure of power by the masses. Unless they are met, this will not be attainable under any circumstances. For this reason, it is understood that the people's conferences are to carry out the destruction and elimination of the traditional government and establish the rule of the masses in the people's conferences in its place.

This is the fact on the basis of which the revolutionary committees call the people to the people's conferences. It is on this basis, as well, that the revolutionary committees mobilize the revolutionary committees to enable them to carry out this function in the best manner.

Many of the popular uprisings which have occurred in many different parts of the world would have succeeded if they had been led by people's conferences. In Egypt, for example, the popular masses revolted, rejected obedience and recognition of the official authorities as illegitimate, and poured forth toward the capital and the major cities from everywhere. But then the dictatorial government was able to smash these masses, wound them and drive them back into their holes like rats, as if nothing had happened. But if this has been done a different way, with well-defined and radical tactics, the people's conferences would have come into the open and proclaimed the overthrow of the dictatorial government. Each people's conference would have been responsible for its geographical area and would have defended it and eliminated the power of the dictatorial government within it. In this way, the organization of the [word illegible] masses takes place, and they are incited to carry out the same task throughout the region. They easily gain control over the country without encountering any [word illegible] actions from the dictatorial authorities. They finally tighten their grip on these illegal powers, which are left without any presence except in the capital, which is itself [in rebellion?]. The government is then eliminated in the capital by an advance from the outside and by internal disruption. But this is done without abandoning the basic principles followed by all the people's conferences which march on the capital from the different areas.

This is the method of popular revolution, and it is a method which cannot be resisted for several reasons:

1. It makes the masses organized and gives them definite goals which are unfailing and cannot be haggled over under any circumstances.

2. It permits the dissolution of the power of the dictatorial government without allowing it to settle the matter anywhere at a time when it needs to concentrate its power. This also affords time for the conferences to make themselves public and organize themselves thoroughly--even in the capital--so that the people's blow against the dictatorial regime will be fatal and decisive.

3. There is no chance for the struggle of the masses to be coopted, led astray or outsmarted. It is the masses which carry out the revolution directly, lead it in the field and know where to stop it.

4. The fact that the people carry out the revolution and organize themselves thoroughly in the popular committees attracts the forces which the dictatorial government is able to exploit into the ranks of the people, because these forces are from the people and because those carrying out the revolution have a direct relationship with these forces and have the power to influence them. This puts the dictatorial regime at a loss and denies it the prerogative of using these forces, which it considers a club that is always at the ready. Thus, it is not able to prolong its time in power.

5. By organizing themselves in the people's conferences, the popular masses will be an instrument of government which will not permit the chaos and social and political breakdown that usually accompany revolutions and acts of violence and destruction. In fact, acts of economic or social sabotage may not occur at all, because the masses will find themselves in control of their land, owning the spots where they plant their feet. The reactionary government, on the other hand, will find that it has no power and does not possess anything which merits destruction. Thus, the traditional regime will fall naturally without any complications in the areas of security or order.

After this, the masses will have only to establish the general conferences in which the leaders of the people's conferences, the people's committees, the trade unions, the leagues and the federations will come together to put the people's decisions into final form and establish the system of people's government forever, thus achieving their final victory.

8591
CSO: 4802

VIOLATION OF HARATINE'S CIVIL RIGHTS ALLEGED

Paris LE MONDE in French 7-8 Sep 80 p 4

> [Text] Some Haratine having been arrested recently in Mauritania (LE MONDE, 4 April), a reader, Mrs Claude Cenison, writes to us to clarify the living conditions of this social category.

Any man in the servile category in a Moorish milieu is called Hartani (pl.: Haratine). The distinction between the slaves and the emancipated is very difficult to make, most of those called "emancipated" being so "de facto" (escape, independent activity) but not "de jure" (legal act). Of the black race, descendants of the prisoners taken during the rezzous carried out in black territory, they have lived for several generations in the Moorish milieu, that is, nomadic and desert-dwelling. They have adopted certain of its practices, language and clothing among others.

The linguistic question takes on a special importance insofar as it has constituted and continues to constitute an essential claim of the Negro-African populations. Hassanophones like the Moors, the Haratine are often assimilated with the Arabo-Berber population whose life and culture they have shared for years.

But can one speak of an identical culture for all that? Can one compare the "master" who, in the tent, ceremonially serves the traditional mint tea, and the "captive" who hauled the water and wood necessary for its preparation? If the abductions appear to have ceased since the country's independence (1960), it seems that some selling of slaves has still taken place since that date.

At present the Haratine make up the majority of the unskilled laborers and the unemployed who have flocked to the cities after the drought of the seventies. As tent slaves, they attend to domestic duties; as bush slaves, they watch the master's flocks or insure the grain supply of the encampments during the winter. The conflicts which take place regularly in the country's interior seem to show, despite a poor circulation of information, that certain Haratine want to put an end to their status, which does not violate

the most elementary human rights any less because it is traditional... Demonstrating recently at Nouakchott, some Haratine demanded improvement of their condition and distributed tracts to sensitize national public opinion.

It seems that these latter events were the determining factor in the Mauritanian authorities' decision to proceed, at the beginning of March, with arrests among those Haratine who, thanks to unusual educational opportunities, have been able to rise to positions of responsibility. We should be alarmed by the repression which is being launched against these men who are only asking for a little dignity and their place at the heart of Mauritanian society.

9508
CSO: 4400

THREAT TO USFP SEEN AS EXEMPLIFYING OFFICIAL ATTITUDE

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 4 Jul 80 p 16

[Editorial: "How Far Will Exclusion Extend?"]

[Text] During the last parliamentary session of the year, the minister of the interior threatened the USFP point-blank with reprisals if it did not keep quiet. It might be thought that such an attitude is part of the administration's daily routine, and that after all there is nothing particularly scandalous about it. It is a fact that, Morocco being what it is, one can see no reason why the USFP would be excluded from the general coercive measures suffered daily by every citizen. Especially since there exist, between the USFP and the overwhelming majority of the Moroccan population, over and above mere affinity, a shared situation and a shared destiny. This explanation will do for understanding the event that has scandalized the whole of Morocco. Have we not seen the dignity of a whole nation derided by having its will set at naught through ballot-box manipulation? Have we not heard officials asserting that there is no economic crisis in Morocco, while the people are martyrized more every day? Have we not seen disgraceful school and university results wrecking the hopes of thousands of families, while officials hold forth about the generalization of education? So it is one system that prevails, one practice. Cynicism is pressed to the extreme. So it is not a matter of concern if the accused changes into the prosecutor.

The administrative machinery that gave free rein to its excesses at the time of the May election, that falsified the returns and tailored them to its own needs no longer brothers about any moral considerations. It is in the heart of an institution intended to embody the end of the era of exceptions that the minister of the interior expresses his animosity toward the USPF. That is the height of scorn for democracy. And that is how they expect to convince us of the credibility of the present assembly.

Threats are used to explain that the elections were free and have always been free. Pressure is expected to create consensus around an experience distorted and caricaturized on 30 May 1980. It might be said that a new Morocco has been born. It is the Morocco of the consecration of high-handedness. For it is with the blessing of the "majority" that the new face of

Morocco is discovered day by day: one of exaction, impoverishment, and obscurantism. All that was missing from "democracy" Moroccan-style was direct threat, as policy, from the government. We have gotten it! And we are proud of being its victims, because it proves once again our good faith and the bad faith of those who contradict us. It adds a new item to the heavy file on the lack of any political will among officials to get Morocco on the road to democracy and respect for human rights.

But let the minister of the interior be assured that his threat will merely give the USPF greater strength for fighting the choices and methods of government that have no consideration for the Moroccan. The USFP has its carapace. Its faith in and dedication to the ideal of democracy have been strengthened by precisely what it has endured for over 20 years. You are not dealing with an inexperienced political organization. It is a political organization rooted in the historical traditions of struggle and hope that you, and that others, have just threatened with reprisals. The hisotry of this organization is the story of the struggle for democracy in our country. It is a story punctuated by sacrifices, which, contrary to the hopes of our oppressors, have only rooted the USFP more deeply in the daily life and consciousness of the masses. The USFP has accumulated capital in militants over 21 years, counted in terms of death sentences and hundreds of years of imprisonment in secret places, and thousands of acts of physical cruelty, countless measures of extortion and pressure. So this threat is not one that will stop us in our struggle for a political system in which, among other things, all governmental or administrative authority would have limits to its power. Limits set first and foremost by respect for the will of the people.

"Troublemakers, you will be punished," they hurl at us. But then, you are likely to take a whole people for disruptive elements! A worker on strike is an agitator, a peasant protesting the devastation of his land is attacking the security of the state, a student who disagrees is a dangerous element, a protesting shopkeeper is dabbling in politics (and so is liable to sanctions)...how far will exclusion go? Do you want the new Morocco to be only for the boss who fires workers, the feudalist who steals land, the speculators who harry little middlemen, for an arbitrary policy?

There is every reason to believe that the minister of the interior was not particularly taking aim at the USFP. This threat is one intended for any protest movement, whether it is political, social, or cultural. It is proof that the policy followed recently has been carefully thought out. Arbitrary measures and falsification of votes are not in fact mere over-zealousness. Because the administrative system has been adopted, in the name of the government, and its arbitrariness has even had repercussions within the assembly. The few impressions of democracy are thus purely and simply wiped out.

But let those pressing for a return to the era of exceptions be reassured. Times have changed. They have brought greater strength to our combativity

and armed the masses better against coercion. Democracy is no longer just a claim. It is a necessity now. Tomorrow it will be an imperative. The people around us have realized that. Democracy is spreading on an international scale. Morocco will never be able to backtrack again. It could not possibly live in isolation. Even if it wanted to, it could not do it. No black spots are wanted in international society any more. So, really, minister of the interior, you seem very behind the times.

12,149
CSO: 4400

AUTO, NAVAL SHIPYARD STRIKES CONTINUE

Auto Workers

Casablanca AL-BAYANE in French 9 Jul 80 pp 1, 3

[Text] One thousand workers are continuing the strike movement they started on 2 June 1980. We remind readers that metal workers in Casablanca held a sympathy strike on behalf of their SOMACA [Moroccan Automobile Construction Company] brothers on 18 June.

The present movement was started, as is common knowledge, in support of the claims presented to management by the workers. Management rejected all the claims wholesale, and chose to have recourse to unspeakable behavior to break the strike, sow discord among the workers, and in the end make no concessions at all. Even elementary rights. Management obstinacy is more or less implicitly encouraged by the indifference of local authorities to the paralyzing of so important a sector as that of SOMACA automobiles.

We recall that the causes of the worsening situation of SOMACA workers are of long standing. So the present strike is the second of its kind during 1980. Last 6 May, management provoked workers' displeasure by firing some of their number. Hence a strike, which led to negotiations. Last year, too, workers held a general strike that lasted a month (21 February to 22 March 1979).

The strike is continuing at present despite all management's reprehensible maneuvers.

Management sent workers notices that they had abandoned their work stations and that punitive action would be taken against them. It decided to fire the nine trades union bureau members. It withheld May wages even though the workers were not on strike then.

Some "strikers" were arrested, then released. After undergoing interrogations, and establishing that there was nothing in their records, of course. They were innocent, as were in fact all their comrades, who were only claiming elementary rights, flouted by a very harsh administration. In fact,

the ineptitude and ill-will of the SOMACA administration are not just an example of poor management in an establishment of industrial and commercial nature, but also, and especially, an illustration of employer arrogance and its anti-worker choices.

In the face of this revival of employer "strike-breaking" policy, the SOMACA workers have at their disposal one big trump for taking possession of their rights: namely, unity in their ranks.

For our part, we unconditionally support their legitimate struggle until their definitive victory.

Naval Shipyard Workers

Casablanca L'AVANT-GARDE in French 5 Jul 80 p 6

[Excerpt] From the Moroccan Naval Shipyards: strike since 6 June 1980. The workers of the New Moroccan Naval Shipyards are still determined to continue the strike.

The arguments put forward by the employer, and fully agreed with by the authorities, are far from convincing enough to repress the wage-earning workforce.

The latter again denounces the prefecture's taking sides with the employer. If the employer alleges "economic reasons" for proceeding with the firing of the 59 workers, the same reasons must be used by the authorities to prevent this arbitrary act. And with good reason! In an almost new branch of economic activity in which a lot of effort needs to be made, management prefers to turn to an easy solution, namely, dismissals and keeping administration static.

These very economic reasons explain employee motives for continuing the strike until all their dismissed comrades are rehired.

12,149
CSO: 4400

FUEL PRICE INCREASES CONDEMNED BY UMT

Casablanca L'AVANT-GARDE in French 5 Jul 80 pp 1, 3

[Statement by UMT National Secretariat]

[Text] The measures the government has just taken concerning the increase in fuel prices are another blow to working class purchasing power.

This increase, which will inevitably have major repercussions on all staple products, is sure, coming just before Ramadan, to encourage speculators, lead to price flare-ups, and adversely affect the already shaky living conditions of the masses.

The measures demonstrate once again that the policy in force, trapped in its own unpopular initial choices and in its day to day inconsistencies, cannot help but force the poor to pay more.

They are occurring at a time when the inclination for a campaign against fiscal fraud has been forgotten. They prove that except for sedatives, expedients, and soothing speeches, no consistent social policy is to be expected within the current framework of choices.

Deep legitimate social discontentment is constantly increasing, totally at odds with the ostentatious agitation of the protagonists of democracy of pure form.

The discontentment reaches beyond workers and the underprivileged to affect broad strata of society.

In parallel with the discontentment we are witnessing a systematic offensive by the employer class against worker achievements, trades union rights and freedoms, in total violation of the laws.

Employer arbitrariness is exercised with complete impunity, having the advantage of the cooperation or abdication of the officials.

In the face of this situation, the National Secretariat of the UMT [Moroccan Labor Federation]:

Protests against renewed escalation of the policy of impoverishment of the working classes;

Energetically denounces the actions of the employer class which is trying to take advantage of the situation to strike at the achievements and rights of workers;

Declares infamous employer provocation, the more or less generalized rule of refusal to accede to workers' requests, and quibbling by officials and their refusal to honor their commitments toward workers in several sectors;

Denounces the policy of domestication and division using the vilest means to damage the trades union unity of workers;

Condemns violations of trades union freedoms, unfair dismissals and persecution of union officials;

Salutes struggling workers and the daily sacrifices they accept for the defense of their rights and achievement of their goals;

Calls upon all militants and workers as a whole to strengthen their unity, redouble their vigilance, and check any attempts to subjugate workers or make use of them to achieve dishonorable aims.

The UMT national secretariat reaffirms the deep conviction of workers that there is no solution except through radical change, which implies abandoning the unpopular choices now in force and the adoption of an orientation guided by well-defined, consistent, liberating choices.

12,149
CSO: 4400

EXPORT FIGURES SHOW SATISFYING INCREASE

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 4 Jul 80 pp 1, 2

[Text] It is with obvious satisfaction that the minister of commerce has just announced the initial figures reported by the foreign trade of Morocco this year.

Statistics established last 30 April show that very substantial progress in exports was reported, on the order of 52 percent over the figures reached in 1979. This is a really exceptional rate of progress that had not been seen since 1974-1975.

The increase is essentially due to exportation of phosphates of which we recently pointed out the development in terms of quantity as well as price. If lead export development is included, ore exports in the first 4 months are up by 63 percent over the results achieved during the same period in 1979.

Phosphoric acid exports continue to increase at a lively pace; they have more than doubled since last year (+ 135 percent).

These are some of the principal results achieved:

1. Agricultural products: citrus fruits: up 26 percent in value; young vegetables: up 58 percent in value; olive oil: vigorous resumption of exports, of which there were none in 1979; paper pulp: sales development is continuing at a spectacular rate.

2. Mining products: Overall increase of 63 percent.

3. Partly processed products: fertilizers: + 89 percent; phosphoric acid: + 135 percent.

4. Finished products: overall increase of 37 percent: ready-to-wear clothing: increase of 69 percent; footwear: + 144 percent.

Imports also showed an increase, but not so broad in scope: the rise is only 32 percent. Consequently the balance of trade deficit is declining and the import-export covering rate which was only 49.8 percent in Aoril 1979 has increased this year to 57.3 percent.

12,149
CSO: 4400

KING VISITS SAFI PHOSPHATES, URANIUM EXTRACTION PLANTS

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 1 Jul 80 pp 1, 2

[Excerpt] Safi, 1 July (MAP)--Beginning his official visit to the Safi provinces, Essaouira and el-Jadida, his majesty King Hassan II arrived in Safi at 1350 hours from Marrakesh via Tleta Bouguedra.

Tens of thousands of citizens received his majesty the king and his highness Crown Prince Sidi Mohammed who accompanied him with a welcome indicative of the bonds of affection linking the people to the unifier of the kingdom.

During the afternoon, his majesty the king visited the chemical complex of "Morrocco Phosphate 2." This complex, built to put the Benguerir phosphate into production, was inaugurated by his majesty the king on 15 November 1975.

The phosphate is processed then converted into phosphoric acid from which sulphuric acid is then extracted by combustion of the sulphur, thus producing SO2 gas and finally SO3.

Sulphuric acid then gives off heat, which is converted into electrical energy in quantities sufficient for the running of the complex. The surplus energy is intended for the National Electricity Office (ONE). Mixing sulphuric acid with phosphate produces phosphoric acid in a 54 percent concentration from which P 205 (phosphoric oxide) is extracted.

The P 205 is intended for export. The capacity of each of the three units at "Morocco Phosphates 2" is 1,750 tons of sulphuric acid a day. They also produce a total of 1,500 tons of phosphoric acid a day. The complex thus consumes 5,500 tons of phosphate a day.

His majesty the king was then to proceed to the laying of the foundation stone of the uranium extraction unit. The sovereign was first given an explanation of this unit by the director of chemical industries, Mr M'hamdi. [No further details given]

12,149
CSO: 4400

GOVERNMENT WELCOMES ALMOST HALF MILLION REFUGEES

Paris LE MONDE in French 11 Jul 80 p 4

[Article by special correspondent Jean-Pierre Langellier]

[Text] Towawa--"The idea of going home never leaves us. But when? We fled Ethiopia because we were being oppressed. We shall not go back again until the regime in office has been overturned. Meanwhile, we lead a passive existence, uprooted." Johannes Desta does not conceal the unhappiness of his existence, like the majority of the 500 occupants of the Towawa camp. He is from the Tigre Province in the north of Ethiopia. He was a primary school teacher until the military in power threw him into prison. Relatively privileged, he was there only 2 months. Afterwards he took the long road into exile. He is barely 25 years old, and frankly admits that he belongs to the Tigre Liberation Front, an armed combat movement against the "military dictatorship."

The "semi-urban community" of Towawa came into existence only a month ago. An hour's drive by Land Rover from Khartoum, and 2 hours from Kassala--on the Ethiopian border--it shelters "old refugees" settled until recently in the nearby town of Gedaref. Rising abruptly out of the bush, Towawa came into existence through one of the refugee resettlement pilot projects implemented by the Sudanese government with the support of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). Each of the 1,300 families in Towawa has received the materials necessary for building its own "oukal," the traditional round thatch-roofed hut.

For 6 months, the world food program will supply the occupants of Towawa, free of charge, with the powdered milk and sorghum with which the women will make "Joura," a cooked flat cake which is the basic food of northern Ethiopians. After that, they will have to be self-sufficient. A primary school and a little clinic will open soon.

Among the host countries harboring the 5 million African refugees--one out of every two in the world--the Sudan is somewhat of a model. Having faced the drama of exile itself in the past--half a million of its nationals having found asylum until 1972 in neighboring countries, as a result of the

civil war--the Sudan has managed to pursue a generous policy in the matter. For the past 15 years waves of refugees have continuously flooded across its borders: Zairians in 1965 and 1968, Ethiopians from Eritrea and elsewhere in 1967, 1974, and since 1979, Chadians from 1970 to 1974 and in 1979, Ugandans in 1972 and 1979. Not one of the refugees has ever been turned away. On 1 January 1980--the latest known statistic--there was 441,000 of them, made up of the following groups: 390,000 Ethiopians (including 360,000 Eriteans), 39,000 Ugandans, 7,000 Chadians, and 5,000 Zairians.

Here refugees have been considered second class people to a lesser extent than elsewhere. A government department was set up to take care of them. From 1967 to 1979, the UNHCR devoted $17 million to refugees in the Sudan. However, for this country which is one of the poorest in the world, the refugee burden has become intolerable with the passing of years. A partisan of voluntary repatriation of exiles, the Sudan has continued to be a reception country in accordance with humanitarian conventions. But it has decided to make the public aware of its efforts and to start a fundraising campaign on behalf of the exiles who have wound up on its soil.

The Sudanese Government has set itself the task of putting an end to the spontaneous settling of refugees by grouping them in permanent resettlement areas equipped with infrastructures enabling them to become self-supporting quickly. The UNHCR, which considers the Sudanese policy realistic and courageous, increased its financial contribution to this project sixfold in 1980. Several European and Scandinavian countries, the EEC itself, United Nations agencies and the Islamic Development Bank have announced or given hopes of aid programs. But it is far less than is needed. "There is a limit to what our government can manage," we were told by Sayed Abel Alier, vice president of the Sudanese Republic, "We do not want to find ourselves in the same situation as some south east Asian countries.

Avoiding Friction

To prevent the development of ghettos, the Sudanese Government is planning to integrate refugee communities into the development programs of neighboring districts. The emergence of areas of friction between refugees and the local population must be avoided, thus the inhabitants of Towawa were still living in an area of Gedaref a short time ago [as published]. It was partly burned down last October after a quarrel broke out between Ethiopians and Sudanese. So the authorities decided to move the refugees out of the town. Whether in connection with job-hunting, admission to hospital, or admission to education, refugees are perceived as intruders, usurpers even, and sometimes privileged as well when they receive free food for several months. At Gedaref, Port-Sudan, or Khartoum, the influx of refugees has caused an increase in rents and made the shortage of transportation worse.

Most of the refugees were peasants in their native countries. Many hope to return to agriculture. As a result of international aid, the government has provided for allocation of land to them. Ten kilometers outside Gedaref,

the village of Um Gargur shelters 6,000 refugees. This year each family will receive one hectare, and a second one in 1981. These lands were bought from neighboring farmers. The HCR hopes that the refugees will soon become self-supporting as far as food is concerned. In the meantime, the adults are to a large extent inactive. According to a survey, admittedly conducted in the off-season, over 6 out of 10 were unemployed. The others work an average of 7 months a year. Only a real program of rural development will enable the refugees to restore the economic and social balance of the village community that they lost when they set out on the road to exile.

12,149
CSO: 4800

PRESIDENT OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY GIVES DINNER IN HONOR OF SIMONE VEIL

Remarks by Mokaddem

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 7 Sep 80 p 4

[Article: "The President of the National Assembly Gives a Dinner In Honor of Mme Simone Veil"]

> [Text] Dr Mokaddem: We attach great importance to the implementation of the cooperation agreement with EEC.
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> Dr Sadok Mokaddem, president of the National Assembly, gave a dinner on Friday night, at the "Baie des Singes" hotel in Gammarth, in honor of Madame Simone Veil, president of the European Parliament and of the members of the delegation who accompanied her in her official visit in Tunisia.
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> Among the persons of distinction invited to this dinner, the presence of the following was noted: Mme Fethia Mzali, member of the Political Bureau, and president of UNFT [National Union of Tunisian Women], Larbi Abderrazak, member of the Political Bureau, Abdelmajid Karoui, director of protocol, Taleb Sahbani, secretary general, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Ben Arta, ambassador director general of international cooperation, Noureddine Mejdoub, chief of the European division of the same ministry, Abdelaziz Hamzaoui, tunisian ambassador to the EEC, and Pierre Hunt, French ambassador in Tunis, as well as some members of the National Assembly.

First to speak during the exchange of toasts, Dr Sadok Mokaddem welcomed Simone Veil, whose visit in Tunisia, he underlined, constitutes the development of the cooperative relations between the institutions of the European Economic Community and the Tunisian Republic.

"Your auspicious visit, he added, addressing the president of the European Parliament will serve to implement the provisions of Article 47 of the EEC--

Tunisian convention of cooperation dated 25 April 1976. These provisions foresee the establishment of a joint parliamentary commission, a European Parliamentary Assembly-Tunisian National Assembly, in charge of insuring the uninterrupted proper execution of the stipulations of the EEC Tunisia agreement of cooperation.

Mokaddem continued "the discussions we had this afternoon soon after your arrival and the work session which took place in the office of the National Assembly marked the beginning of this projection. We can say that they were useful and constructive. I do not feel that it is necessary to re-examine the particulars of our exchange of viewpoints.

I would like to stress again the particular interest that we attach to the proper implementation of the provisions of the cooperation agreement and to state again the hope that the deepening and broadening of the scope of the application of this agreement can become a reality.

We ardently wish to see that the differences which are in conflict with this prolongation could be solved by a show of willingness and understanding on the part of all the parties concerned.

The president of the National Assembly then recalled that Tunisia was one of the first mediterranean countries to proclaim officially and solemnly, through the voice of its president, Habib Bourgiba, its wish to join and cooperate with the European Economic Community as soon as the first agents of its Community were established during the fifties. This political desire proclaimed by the most authoritative voice in the country must be taken into consideration during discussions, exchange of viewpoints or negotiations between the Community and Tunisia.

I hope and trust, he said, to see our eminent colleagues in the European Parliamentary Assembly, share our concerns and preoccupations, and combine their efforts with ours with the view to fully insure cooperation between the Community and Tunisia.

"In this uncertain and menacing world in which we live, real cooperation between the European Community and Tunisia can create a zone of stability and safety and contribute to the cooperation, understanding and the reinforcement of peace in our regions", concluded the President of the National Assembly.

Remarks by Veil

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 7 Sep 80 p 4

[Article: "Madame Simone Veil: We are paying careful attention to the questions which are the focal point of your preoccupations--European Parliament keenly desirous of establishing without delay a permanent structural dialog with the National Assembly"]

[Text] Following Mokaddem, Simone Veil underlined that her visit in Tunisia marks the starting-point of cooperative relations between the National Assembly of the Republic of Tunisia and the European Parliament, whose establishment was foreseen in the agreement dated 25 April 1976.

Soon after the signatute of the agreement, she stated, our assembly had made an appeal for the implementation of this cooperation and this appeal had been heard, since the following year the modalities of a collaboration between our two institutions had been defined by common accord and approved by the expanded bureau of the European Parliament, but unfortunately circumstances made it impossible for this cooperation to take effect before the installation of the first European Parliament elected by direct universal suffrage. But today nothing prohibits us from attempting together to make up for lost time. My visit in Tunis, at the time when our Parliament is entering into its second year of existence, bears witness, at any rate as regards the Assembly, of its intention to go forward without delay.

Veil underlined that the European Parliament had welcomed with satisfaction the signing of the cooperation agreement between the Tunisian Republic and the European Community. Qualifying this agreement as "global and exemplary."

Global, she said, as it is underlined in the first article of the agreement which assigns to itself as an objective "to promote global cooperation between the contracting parties with the view to contributing to the economic and social development of Tunisia and to assist in the strengthening of their relations." Exemplary, because as is indicated in the preamble of the agreement, it is propounded as a "model for relations between developed states and developing states, compatible with the provisions of the international community for a fairer and better balanced economic order."

Tunisia's Adherence To the Dialog Under All its Forms Has Never Been Refuted

The president of the European Parliament continues: "Also remarkable, as regards the members of the European Parliament, was the fact that these cooperation agreements, and not simply of associations, involved the European Community in certain directions and policies while they were still being outlined: Mediterranean policy as a whole; opening policy in the direction of the Arab world, global policy of aid to development, definition of a new worldwide economic order, characterized by new relations between developed countries and countries under development, between producers of raw materials and industrial nations, between exporters and importers of energy.

More than anyone else, Tunisia had found itself over a period of 25 years at the cross-road of these policies for achievement, under the enlightened guidance of the valorous founder of the Tunisian Republic, President Habib Bourguiba, whose clearsightedness and resoluteness had made it possible for Tunisians to become, in a quarter of a century, a strong country, respected by all.

Tunisia-EEC: the Dialog Was Never Broken Off

Speaking of Tunisian-EEC relations, Veil considers that the dialog between the Tunisian Government and the European Community was never broken off and that an equal realization of the difficulties by each has always ended in arriving at an understanding on both sides, and the most serious obstacles in the application of the agreement are in the process of being settled.

As to your country's fears in regard to the future expansion of the European Community, she added, they are being studied attentively by the authorities in Brussels and the governments of the member states. The members of the commission and the representatives of the governments of the Nine who have succeeded one another in Tunis since the beginning of this year have proved it to you. The solutions are not really easy to define but it is of fundamental importance for the balance of the Mediterranean space and the protection of the legitimate interests of all the parties in the debate, that the dialog between them should be fruitful.

Your country has pursued this dialog very closely for many years with the commission of the Communities and the governments of the member states."

Moreover, Veil emphasized the wish of the European Parliament to come into contact with the representatives of the Tunisian people in order to have a better understanding of its problems and to help in their solution. My presence among you, she stated, should shortly precede the first meeting with the delegations of our two assemblies."

The president of the European Parliament continued in this connection:

"The subjects which are likely to be entered in the agenda of this meeting and of those which will follow, are not lacking. As, beyond the contents of the agreement which binds your country with the European Economic Community, and the present and future problems which its application engenders, the European Parliament is paying careful attention to the questions which we know are also the focal point of the Tunisian Republic's preoccupations.

In addition, Veil made it clear that the European Parliament is following attentively the evolution of the Euro-Arab dialog, of which Tunisia, she underlines, is cut out to be one of its most ardent defenders and which the member states of the Community who had formulated its pattern in Venice last June, particularly wish to develop in its political dimension.

After recalling that in its October session the European assembly still plans to debate the problems of the impending conference on security and cooperation in Europe, which Tunisia is following closely in its Mediterranean viewpoint, Simone Veil stressed the strong desire of the European Parliament to establish a permanent dialog structure with the National Assembly as soon as possible.

Because, she said, it seems to me essential that in the uncertain and difficult times in which we are living, where the peace of the world finds itself every day at the mercy of a brutal aggravation of the tensions which affect too many areas of the globe, and, alas, which do not spare the periphery of the mediterranean, and our solidarities assert themselves much more than our differences, far be it from me to invoke the ascending perils in order to brush aside the necessary and frank explanations called for by the difficulties encountered in establishing our cooperation."

The Community, she declared in concluding, has not evaded and will not evade this degate, and the Parliament plans to take part in it. But, at the same time, it wishes that a dialog be established which would emphasize the unity of our views on the problems whose solution conditions our survival and our common future."

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CSO: 4400

COMMITTEES MEET TO FORMULATE SIXTH PLAN

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 4

[Report of the meeting of the planning committee: "Sixth Plan Preparation Meeting of Committees for Small and Heavy Industry and for National Education"]

[Text] The national committee for the small and heavy industry sector held its first plenary session, as part of the Sixth Plan preparation activities, at the National Economy Ministry, under the chairmanship of Mr Abdelaziz Lasram, minister for national economy.

Industrialists and representatives of various ministries, from industrial enterprises and national organizations participated.

The minister indicated that in order to maximally increase employment, to promote export, to improve industrial integration and to satisfy consumers needs, industry will be a priority in the next plan.

Accordingly, the committee must seek fast and concrete solutions which will eliminate any bottleneck which may develop; it must particularly resolve the structural problems (tax and banking systems, administrative requirements, price fixing mechanisms, state support). This will make it possible to back-up industrialists, to promote their responsibilities and to motivate them, as they are the backbone of the country economic development.

In addition, careful consideration is warranted by the following areas:

a) Promotion of industrial cooperation between Tunisia and Arab world

b) Improvement of working conditions and workers' training to match job requirements

c) Identification of projects which could be carried out during the Sixth Plan.

The minister reminded the committee that the government has decided the creation of three new banks to finance large projects.

d) Maximum utilization of production capacity

e) Technology and engineering

To achieve these objectives, eleven subcommittees have been created, divided into task forces. It should be noted that the minister has made sure that each subcommittee does represent a specific industrial sector:

1) metallurgy, mechanical and electrical industries

2) heavy chemical industry

3) chemical specialties industry

4) building materials

5) agriculture and food industries

6) textiles

7) miscellaneous industries

8) small enterprises

9) leather

10) general problems (industrial environment)

11) industrial cooperation.

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REMARKS BY MOKADDEM IN EAST BERLIN

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 18 Sep 80 p 4

[Report on speech by Dr Sadok Mokaddem: "Dr Mokkadem at the 67th Inter-Parliamentary Union Assembly: "Let Us Combine Our Energies To Save Humanity From Disaster"]

[Text] In an address, given yesterday in East Berlin, Dr Sadok Mokaddem, president of the Tunisian National Assembly, heading a delegation of deputies representing Tunisia at the 67th Inter-Parliamentary Union assembly, evoked the major problems of our time and gave a broad picture of situation currently existing in certain world regions.

In opening his statement, Dr Mokkadem reviewed the major questions which are on everyone's mind and which, by their intensity, do endanger the international peace and security. They consist notably of the progressive deterioration of international situation, of the accelerating course toward armaments, of the reactivated tension focal points in various parts of the world, of subversive activities, of destabilization efforts and international terrorism, and of the increase in the disparity, the socioeconomic distortions, between North and South.

Speaking of the situation in Africa, first Dr Mokaddem expressed his satisfaction at Zimbabwe accession to full sovereignty, before stigmatizing the "shameful" and degrading practices of apartheid and racial discrimination toward native populations in South Africa. On this point, he called upon the international community to take energetic measures and "if need be, effective sanctions" with the objective of bringing this country to its senses, as its current behavior "constitute an unacceptable insult to the whole of mankind."

In the same order of ideas, the president of the National Assembly noted that only Israel continues to maintain close relations and an intense cooperation with South Africa.

Again in connection with Africa, Dr Mokaddem has evoked the drama which is engulfing the Eritrean people, victim of a "veritable genocide."

As far as the Western Sahara conflict is concerned, "which constitutes a major obstacle to cooperation between countries of the Maghreb region," the speaker did express a wish that OAU "could find a pacific and permanent solution for this painful affair."

Dr Mokaddem was lead to speak of Middle East situation where the Palestinian problem has reached "a paroxysm of tension, as a result of systematic expansionism by Israel, in the West Bank, in the holy city of El Qods, and in South Lebanon and Golan Heights."

In this context, he recalled President Bourguiba's position "who has never ceased for the last 30 years to proclaim that the solution of the Middle East conflict resides in the application of international legality, as spelled out in the successive relevant resolutions passed in the United Nations."

"Again in the Middle East, added Dr Mokaddem, Afghanistan is still under the yoke of Soviet army occupation.

The Afghan people are putting up an heroic resistance to this occupation and proclaims, arms in hand, its will to conduct its own affairs without any outside intervention. Pressing appeals from the international community, directed to the Soviet Union, have remained without effect."

"True, he added, any settlement of these conflicts would reduce international tensions and they would strengthen international peace and security; but there will be real protection for peace only when more justice, and fair and effective solidarity is introduced in economic relations between peoples. This underlines the vital importance of elaborating a radically and deeply reorganized economic order. It is our duty, as partners, to combine our energies and to bring out our influence on our governments to save mankind from this menacing disaster" said Dr Mokaddem in his conclusion.

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BOURGUIBA'S SERVICE TO ISLAM PRAISED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 5 Aug 80 p 5

[Article: "Closing of the Seminar on Bourguibian Conceptions; Kooli: No Regime Has Served Islam As Well As the Bourguibian Regime"]

[Text] Mongi Kooli, delegate minister to the office of the prime minister, and director of the party, presided on Saturday, at the closing of the seminar on Bourguibian conceptions which had been meeting since 27 July at Dar Ayad in Ksar Hellal.

In the first place, in his address, the director of the party affirmed that "sincerely and without chauvinism the only person of mark and the only leader who has rendered such service to this country, is Bourguiba. Without his willpower, sincerety, patience and resistance, none of the concrete results which at the present time have been so advantageous to the Tunisian people, would have been realized."

In this context Mongi Kooli recalled the conditions under which President Bourguiba had been excluded from the old-Destour, underlining in this connection young Bourguiba's determination in having all the people participate in the battle for liberation, contrary to what the Archeans thought.

Basing himself on this principle, Bourguiba engaged in a sincere and loyal dialog and a direct contact policy with the people, said Kooli. After recalling the various episodes in the national struggle and the feats accomplished by Bourguiba, even when he was in exile, Mongi Kooli analyzed the qualities a Destourian militant must exhibit. He should arm himself, as Bourguiba did, with a will of iron which engenders the faith from which confidence in himself is born. The militant must give an example of honesty, competence and dissemination.

Doubly so, he said, since responsibility also implies enthusiasm, and the spirit of sacrifice in the service of the best interest of the nation.

Kooli added: the true Destourian is the one who, through his adherence to the party, does not run after titles and positions, and underlined that the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] is not founded on the criterion of quantity.

On the contrary it values the quality of its adherents as it considers that good quality would create the necessary quantity.

He continued that the party did not accede to power because of a parliamentary majority, a military coup d'etat, or through heredity, but rather through a legitimacy born from the long struggle conducted for the progress of the citizen after having achieved the independence of the country.

Speaking of the role of the party, Kooli said that the PSD is racing against time in order to realize the objectives of the nation, to consolidate the structures of the state in order to facilitate the fulfillment of the work started, insure the training of the masses and realize their aspirations.

Alluding to the youth sector, Kooli remarked that it is necessary to be aware of the sollicitude with which the Bourguibian regime supports youth. In fact, this regime considers man as most essential, especially young students.

The director of the party added: Assuming responsibilities represents a duty for the young which must be repaid vis-a-vis the country and the Supreme Combatant, whose 77th birthday is being celebrated today and for whom I pray God to grant him long life in order that he may carry out Tunisian's aspirations for progress."

Replying to a question relating to the conception of the party in connection with religion, Mongi Kooli recalled the fight led by Bourguiba against the naturalization campaign and his opposition to the Eucharistic Congress being held in Tunisia.

He added that there never was a regime which had served Islam as much as the Bourguibian regime which belongs to the true religion which is the Islam action, proposals and struggle.

The director of the party and the officials present then proceeded with the distribution of encouragement diplomas to the participants in the seminar.

A message of loyalty and best wishes was addressed to President Bourguiba on the occasion of his 77th birthday.

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TUNISIAN YOUTH URGED TO ACQUIRE RESPONSIBILITIES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 5 Aug 80 p 5

[Article: "Responsibilities Are Not Granted, But They Are Deserved"]

[Text] The elite of the final class representing the various governorates of the republic gathered in a frank and constructive debate on Friday night in Monastir with Mezri Chekir, directeur de cabinet in the office of the prime minister, in the presence of Abdessalem Dimassi, secretary general for youth organizations and Mohamed Ben Nasr, secretary general for the coordination committee.

Mezri Chekir immediately fell in the mood of his young audience who were particularly appreciative of the moderate and concise style of the lecturer, the clarity of his ideas, his constant reference to distinct examples and his willingness not to side-step any question and to reply frankly to all questioning.

Moreover the participants were anxious to warmly applaud the prime minister's closest collaborator and requested that he take a message of affection and support to President Bourguiba and Mohamed Mzali.

Opening the meeting with a brief preliminary expose, Mezri Chekir congratulated himself for the occasion offered to him to meet the young and and to discuss the problems of the present with them.

"The Bourguibian regime," he said, "is counting on youth. The interest which we bear for the young is not all on the surface with 'demagogic' and propangandist ends in view. We have the firm intention to see to it that they will be fully associated in the political, social and economic life of the nation.

"We are firmly convinced that this objective implies that the young should be informed of the options in our policy and events in public life. In fact, the duty of guiding Tunisia's future destiny will be incumbent on the young. It is therefore evident that the more the young are informed of the ins and outs of the management of national affairs, the more they

will be able to bring by their enthusiasm, spontaneity and impetuous potentials, their invaluable contribution to the collective action for progress."

Then Mezri Chekir invited the participants to express their views and suggestions, and the directeur de cabinet in the office of the prime minister conducted the following dialog with the future students:

[Question] Mohamed Mzali, director of the "AL FIKR" publication published an editorial on the interference between education and development, how do you explain this interference?

[Answer] When we affirm that a Tunisian is the first priority in any development plan we think that by the same token helps to realize that development. Therefore, let us consider ourselves indispensable in guaranteeing a moral, intellectual and civic training to all citizens which could make them become productive, fully participating in the effort for development, that is to say the osmosis which must be achieved in the action for education on the one hand and the labor for development on the other.

To summarize let us say that development can only succeed on condition that it is based on citizens who are sound in mind and in body animated by a patriotic faith and imbued with a responsible behavior.

[Question] Don't you feel that changing the people in charge is a factor in administrative instability?

[Answer] Assigning responsibilities in Tunisia covers objective and serious criterions. The chief of state chooses the first responsible people who in turn appoint their collaborators to the national, regional and local level. It is logical and natural that in this framework the responsibilities and the responsible officials could be changed in the evolution of the conjuncture and the new data of national life. The conception that is made of the profile of the people in charge is dependent on the facts and the needs of the hour. The essential point is that the change of responsible officials should not entail in any manner a modification of development plans or call in again the question of options in the national effort for progress.

Furthermore, the exercise of the same responsibilities over a long period can affect rentability and it is always advantageous to bring in new blood capable of imprinting greater impulsion and dynamism.

[Question] Don't you think that the young should be more involved in the exercise of responsibilities?

[Answer] I want to answer you in one sentence. Responsibilities are not granted, they are deserved and conquered. The young must not wait for someone to come knocking at the door. They must be able to prove their maturity and competence, and through this proof they can accede through the big door to responsibilities, however important they might be.

I would like to recall to the young, in this connection, to ponder over Mohamed Mzali's example. I remember when we were children in Monastir, the young pupil, Mzali, distinguished himself by his vitality and his faith which stimulated from the very first our enthusiasm and our adherence. He never ceased originating cultural manifestations and round tables. In this context, he founded, by facing up to the colonial authorities, the Monastirian Student Association, where he displayed his full capacity in a militant action. At that time Mohamed Mzali was far from fancying that he would one day become the prime minister and secretary general of the party, he simply answered the call to duty and to his conscience. Once vested by Bourguiba in this high executive position he remained faithful to the principles which guided his life and his career. Working on an average of 12 hours per day, he has sacrificed his time and health in order to be equal to the confidence placed in him. He is, in my opinion, an example and a symbol for the youth of Tunisia.

How can democracy and the single party be reconciled?

Contrary to other countries who advocate a plurality of parties, in Tunisia we consider that the party cannot reflect the preoccupations of only a part of a class to the detriment of another, but it must embody the aspirations of all the people, and as such it is open to all social categories, all tendencies, and all potentialities. It progresses and renews itself in the conjunctural evolution in order to remain on the level of the preoccupations of the citizenry and the hopes of the young.

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BRIEFS

CHICKEN FARM CONTRACT--A contract for a chicken farm was awarded to a Dutch company. The chicken farm, a joint Arab venture, will be built in al-Qasim region in Saudi Arabia under the supervision of the Arab Company for cattle development (with headquarters in Damascus), and part of the Council for Arab Economic Unity. The farm will cost 30 million dollars, or 10% of the capital of the Arab Company. Twenty international companies submitted bids for this farm. The first phase of this project will include building a slaughterhouse, a hatchery, a chicken feed factory, and a factory to produce 6 million eggs annually for the Arab markets. The first phase will be completed in two years. However, it is expected that other contracts will be required to build housing for the workers and an electric power station before the completion of phase one. The work on this project began later than anticipated by the Arab Company. The farm was to be built in 'Inshas' in Egypt, but it was later decided to move it to Saudi Arabia following the Camp David accords. Another delay occured when the Arab Company discovered that the tenders for the project were much higher than anticipated which led to a reviewal of the project's plans. Another animal feed factory presently exists in al-Qasim region in Saudi Arabia. The other projects of the Arab Company include raising sheep and chicken in Syria, and an animal feed factory which is presently being built in Sudan. The aforesaid Dutch company also manages vegetable farms in Oman. [Text] [Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 5 Oct 80 p 10]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

PRINTING HOUSE PROJECT--Colonel 'Ali Abdallah Salih, President of the Republic and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, dedicated yesterday in San'a', the Northern part of the Nation, the printing house project of the Public Organization for Journalism and News. The cost of this project, which includes modern printing methods, reached ten million riyals, and is one of the projects of the first five years plan in the Northern part of the Nation. Brother Yahya al-'Arashi, Minister of Information and Culture in the Northern part of the Nation, stated that this project is one of the most important achievements in the field of journalism and printing because it will change printing from a mechanical assembly system to a computer system in assembly and photography. [Text] [Aden OCTOBER 14 in Arabic 29 Sep 80 p 1]

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ARABS HAVE OFFERED AFRICA TWICE WHAT WEST HAS OFFERED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 25-31 Aug 80 p 34

[Text] Arab aid to Africa is rarely mentioned, while the Arab political role in that continent is described most of the time as being religiously oriented. It has also been described as a financing of imaginary, unofficial authorities for the purpose of supporting one country or another. All numbers related to Arab aid to Africa have been ignored as they rank second after Arab aid to [other] Arab countries. On the other hand, [Arab] trade relations [with Africa] are only 2.3 percent of foreign Arab trade.

Unfortunately, trade exchange [between Arab and African countries] has not developed. But, despite the unstable Arab-African relations, Arab aid to Africa has continued and increased. It has several forms, among which are special organizational aid to Africa, bilateral aid through development funds in all Arab petroleum-producing nations and aid that has a bilateral political character, the latter representing a small percentage of the overall Arab loans and grants.

Contrary to the prevailing views, politics have not played a major role in defining loan specifications and conditions and choosing the borrowers. African countries were chosen according to the specifications which the United Nations has for the poor or developing African nations. As a result, most of these loans were given to the poorest 20 African countries. But the loans were not limited to those countries; 36 out of 40 African countries recevied various types of loans from Arab countries. Between the years 1973 and 1979, 86 such loans were offered, with 70 percent allotted to the poorest African countries.

During that same period, Arab loans amounted to $6 billion of which $4 billion financed major projects such as roads, dams, ports and housing. The joint Arab monetary funds gave $1.16 billion to Africa, which is equivalent to 82 percent of their aid to Arab countries.

The increase in Arab aid to Africa occurred during a period of international Palestinian movements. This inevitably resulted in African support of all the U.N. resolutions in favor of the Palestinian cause. Arab-African relations also resulted in African opposition to Israeli presence in their continent.

It was also necessary to protect Arab relations with Muslim African nations due to their historical ties. However, this aid was not characterized as control-oriented, because it was not accompanied by direct exploitation of the African economy. Arab countries could have participated in the establishment of joint venture companies in Africa to exploit mineral and agricultural resources there; but this did not take place.

Positivisms

One of the most important positivisms of the Arabs' opening up to Africa is going beyond bilateral aid and its complications. This helped them establish the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, which had a registered capital of $738 million in 1979. This bank is specialized in financing developmental projects. The volume of aid this bank has offered since it was established in 1975 has reached $331.68 million, financing 50 projects in 32 African nations. Its loans amounted to 12.5 percent of total project costs. A special Arab fund for aid to Africa was also established. During the past 5 years, this fund offered loans in the amount of $221.74 million, distributed to 36 African nations.

Those two organizations abided by the loan conditions set by the United Nation's fifth trade conference, where loans were offered at an interest rate of less than 4.6 percent, paid within 20 years beginning with the 5th year after the loan is offered.

Arab loans to Africa are not limited to those kinds of aid. Arab petroleum-producing nations paid 50 percent of the costs to establish the U.N. Development Fund. Arab nations also participated, together with international organizations, Arab banks, and other financial institutions, in the financing of developmental projects such as the $3 billion Senegal River dam project.

Within 5 years, Arab countries have practically offered twice what the West has offered to Africa in the name of the "continent's stability."

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JERUSALEM COMMITTEE REACTS TO ISRAELI DECISION ON JERUSALEM AS CAPITAL

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 23 Aug 80 pp 28-29

[Interview with Secretary General of the Islamic Conference Organization al-Habib al-Shatti, by Faris Bazzi, in Casablanca; date not given]

[Text] "If we look at what Israel has done with the calm eye of the historian and the objective analyst, we see that the Israeli government's decision is the first shovel in digging the grave of the state of Israel. Israel may not have heard me make a statement like this before, but it should not forget that it has injured our hearts and our guts."

Observers did not view this statement by the Moroccan monarch, which was part of a speech winding up the activities of the emergency session of the Jerusalem Committee, as a mere political response to the Israeli decision pertaining to Jerusalem and its future. They also saw it as a change in Hasan II's position regarding the Camp David agreements, and an indirect reply to the Egyptian president's stand and his insistence on continuing his initiative and not backing out of it.

Informed circles in Casablanca also considered the Moroccan king's statement as an indication that he is now far from confident about his bet that al-Sadat will rejoin Arab and Islamic ranks. According to these circles, the king made this statement after receiving from al-Sadat, the same day the Jerusalem Committee sessions opened, a reply to the letter which the king had sent al-Sadat early this month. In this letter, the king had called for a firm stand towards the Israeli decision to make Jerusalem the permanent capital of the Zionist entity.

Even though the meetings of this emergency session of the Jerusalem Committee were accompanied by confusion, rumors and strict secrecy over the agenda, there is near-consensus among diplomatic circles that the content of the Moroccan king's speech, in addition to the committee's resolutions, constituted an obvious indication that the Arab and Islamic states were on their way to adopting a new, more radical line in confronting Israel and Camp David. The recent statements of Prince Fahd bin 'Abd-al-'Aziz about a holy war are seen as evidence of this development.

What gave exceptional weight to the meetings of the Jerusalem Committee and their results was the fact that PLO Chief Yasir 'Arafat headed the Palestinian delegation, and that the session did not start with an open meeting as usual. In this case, there was only an open final session held at the Casablanca Municipal Building on Tuesday. It was on the third day of the conference which had been scheduled to meet for only 2 days. Thirteen nations attended, including the Iranian Islamic Republic, represented by its charge d'affaires in Rabat. Libya was absent. Three working papers were presented to the meeting, one by Morocco, one by the PLO and one by Jordan, in addition to specific proposals submitted by the Syrian delegation not having the nature of a working paper. Reliable sources revealed to AL-MUSTAQBAL that the extension of the committee's meetings [from 2 to 3 days], was primarily due to disagreements aroused by the Syrian proposals and by a clause in the Palestinian working paper pertaining to the PLO's appeal to the Jerusalem Committee to adopt a resolution calling for Arab and Islamic volunteers to join the ranks of the Palestinian revolution.

Here are the Syrian proposals which stirred up the main debate in the committee's meetings. Some of them were passed, and others were not.

"There should be a political and economic boycott of:

"1. States which have embassies or representatives in Jerusalem.

"2. States which transfer or announce the transfer of their embassies or representatives to Jerusalem.

"3. States which recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel.

"4. States whose officials visit Israeli officials in Jerusalem.

"5. Inasmuch as the United States of America's participation in and adoption of the Camp David agreements and the Egyptian-Israeli pact is tantamount to a conspiracy against the Palestinian cause and the Arab nature of Jerusalem and the occupied Arab and Palestinian lands, the Jerusalem Committee calls on the Islamic states to boycott the United States economically, commercially and financially, according to a definite time table, and that they not provide any military facilities or bases to the United States in the land, air and territorial waters of the Islamic states."

The committee approved the first three proposals, and amended the fourth clause to read as follows: "Contact the states of the world to warn them that any visits by their officials to occupied Jerusalem would be considered encouragement and support for Israel's decision to annex Jerusalem, and to urge them not to make such visits."

The fifth clause of the Syrian proposal was also amended as follows: "Since it has become obvious that the Zionist entity's purpose is to

consolidate its occupation and to continue its expansionist plots, as evidenced by its recent decision to incorporate Jerusalem and make it its permanent capital, and in response to the religious and racist act of war which Israel has launched against the Arab and Islamic states by annexing Jerusalem the committee advises the next Islamic summit conference to draw up effective economic, political, cultural and information plans to induce the states which support Israel to stop this support and work to end Israeli occupation of Arab and Palestinian territory, bearing in mind that their continued support for the Zionist entity in light of these facts would have a negative effect on their interests in the Islamic world."

As for the clause in the Palestinian working paper calling for an extraordinary summit meeting, it was agreed that instead of a summit conference, a conference of Islamic foreign ministers would be held on 18 September in Morocco, and that the Islamic summit conference to be held in Tayif would be adequate for the present time.

It has been observed that no resolution was adopted with respect to a holy war, except for the content of the final statement, prefacing the resolutions, which used the following formula, and did not add anything new regarding the earlier positions of the Islamic states on the Israeli Jerusalem decision: "The Arab and Islamic states, reviewing their response to the religious, racist war which Zionism is waging, confirm their determination to continue the holy war to liberate Jerusalem from Zionist occupation, because the holy war, in its sense of human liberation, is the right of everyone whose country has been occupied and whose holy places have been usurped, and is an inescapable obligation."

Right after the end of the activities of the Jerusalem Committee's emergency session, AL-MUSTAQBAL met with Secretary General of the Islamic Conference Organization al-Habib al-Shatti, and had the following interview with him.

[Question] Even though the present session was convened as an extraordinary session because of the Israeli decision about Jerusalem, Egypt is still considered the party directly concerned with this decision. Nevertheless, none of the session's resolutions dealt with Egypt at all, as if Egypt had no connection with the matter. Does that mean that you still hope that Egypt will return to the Islamic Conference Organization? And under what circumstances would that occur?

[Answer] No one disputes the fact that Egypt is a basic factor in the Middle East issue and especially the Palestinian and Jerusalem cause. This requires no explanation, since the history of the cause has shown that Egypt took part in three wars and in all the developments, as is recognized by the organization. But President al-Sadat chose a path which the other parties in the Arab and even the Islamic world cannot agree to, and therefore the Arabs and Moslems were forced, however unwillingly,

to freeze Egypt's membership. From that time on, Egypt has followed a path different from that followed by the Arabs and Moslems together. This is the reason we did not refer to Egypt during this session.

As for Egypt's return to the organization, this depends on the desire of Egypt and its rulers first of all, for if Egypt abandoned the Camp David policy which no one doubts has been foiled, and if it returned to the Arab and Islamic ranks, there is no one there who would not welcome the return of a sister dear to everyone's heart. With the Israeli stand over the annexation of Jerusalem, Egypt had a unique opportunity to abandon the Camp David policy, for this stand confirmed Israel's true intentions. But Egypt issued nothing which would indicate that it intended to do so. The strange thing is that Begin's letter to President al-Sadat clearly indicated that Israel was imposing preconditions on Egypt for the resumption of negotiations: keeping Jerusalem as the permanent capital of Israel, and keeping the settlements and even continuing to build more settlements. Begin was unequivocal in his adoption of this stand. So how could it make any sense for negotiations with Israel to continue when its stand was so clear, as I have mentioned, without that constituting a tacit reversal of its stand?

[Question] In your last press conference you denied rumors that the Jerusalem Committee received a letter from President al-Sadat. You said that this was not true, because there was no contact between the committee and the Egyptian regime because Egypt's membership was suspended by ministerial decree and Egypt could not return to the organization without a ministerial decree. Therefore, how do you explain the letter which the Moroccan king recently sent to President al-Sadat in his capacity as president of the Jerusalem Committee?

[Answer] I don't think that in his letter to President al-Sadat King Hasan II mentioned that he was addressing him in his capacity as president of the Jerusalem Committee. As I see it, all there is to the matter is that the Moroccan king, because of his responsibility as an Arab and a Moslem leader, desires the unity of the Arab-Islamic ranks and the continuation of the struggles to liberate Jerusalem and Palestine through beneficial means. He feels that it is his duty to try to bring Egypt back into the Arab-Islamic fold. He believes that the conditions are right for convincing President al-Sadat to abandon the Camp David policy and come back. This explains his initiative in sending a letter to President al-Sadat.

As for the Jerusalem Committee, it knows nothing of this matter, and His Majesty King Hasan II did not inform it of his initiative, which proves that His Majesty did this spontaneously in his capacity as an Arab and Moslem official.

[Question] It is obvious that the committee did not pass any resolution about the holy war. You have defined the holy war as a serious, devoted act for the sake of a noble goal: defending the faith and the holy places.

You have said that war is the basic idea behind a holy war, and that the Islamic Conference Organization is operating according to circumstantial requirements. Does all this mean that Israel has not defiled the faith and the holy places, and that therefore the conditions are not right for calling a holy war, or is the talk about a holy war just for public consumption while waiting for a new strike against Israel?

[Answer] Israel has defiled the sacred places and has violated the honor of the Arabs and the Moslems. There has been a holy war against Israel ever since the 1930's, inasmuch as the Palestinian people's struggle against Israel, with the support of the Arabs and Moslems, has not stopped from then until now. Holy war in the sense I have mentioned is a continuation of the struggle in all fields and by all means, and is something which exists and is ongoing. Holy war has a number of manifestations, including war and economic, cultural and political boycott. All these means are being used as far as possible and under the appropriate circumstances so that the efforts can be crowned with success. If we have not declared a holy war, that is because we believe that a holy war is going on. If some of the aspects to which I have referred have not yet emerged, it is because they are impossible because of conditional or material reasons. To put it more clearly, the holy war's requirements must be met when the conditions are right for attaining the goal for the sake of which the holy war was declared. Holy war is not an end in itself, but is a means of attaining a specific purpose.

[Question] There have been reports that some of the states belonging to the Jerusalem Committee proposed the adoption of a decisive stand vis-a-vis the United States and an economic boycott of it, inasmuch as it is conspiring against the Arabs and Moslems through the Camp David agreements, but that the committee refused. Why was this stand taken?

[Answer] The committee felt that problems and difficulties of no benefit to our cause might arise from boycotting the states which support Israel. Boycott measures must be directed against all the states which support Israel, and if we do so we find ourselves all at once in disputes with a large number of states. For this reason we stated in Clause No 20 of the resolutions that we would try to get these states to give up their support for Israel, and that if they continued to do so, their relations with the Islamic states would meet with difficulties. This means that we will take measures such as boycotts in two stages, the first being an attempt to convince and the second being implementation of the measures.

[Question] It has been observed that the Arab and Islamic states always act defensively to Israel's actions. How can this be? Could these states possibly shift over to a position of practical initiative to confront the recent Israeli decision?

[Answer] At the press conference yesterday I mentioned that Israel, ever since its founding and even before, benefited from conditional

circumstances which were right for it and which unfortunately were not right for the Arabs. If the initiative always came from Israel, that was because the conditions were always right for it. We might mention the establishment of Israel right after the hardships which devastated the world after the Second World War. Another circumstance we might mention is the Jewish lobby's control over American information media, which made America an ally of Israel supporting it automatically and unconditionally. In our time, the Arab and Islamic states have begun to acquire the right conditions, making them capable of reacting positively. In the near future, the Arabs and Moslems will become internationally more powerful, which will enable them to take the initiative themselves. What we are doing today is aimed at changing the conditions and making them suitable. This effort will continue in all fields and in all directions until we achieve victory and regain Palestine. Our dispute with Israel was not generated today, and our drubbings over these past few years, such as the annexation of Jerusalem and the population of Arab territory with Zionist settlements, were not the first blows. Our dispute with Israel is a significant, long-range one, because our road to victory is not scattered with flowers. As Churchill said in 1940, when Britain was alone in the field of battle with Germany, "All of it is blood, pain, sweat and tragedy." Will this dissuade us from continuing the struggle? The facts prove that the answer is in the negative. We have lost battles, but we have not lost the war. We shall continue the holy war in its true sense, i.e. using all methods, until we gain victory.

[Question] The Iranian-Arab dispute is no doubt weakening the front of those forces opposed to Israel and its protectors. Is the organization inclined to do something to freeze the Arab-Iranian disputes?

[Answer] Neither side will accept mediation.

[Question] Is it true that the last Security Council session, which would have discussed the Israeli decision, was postponed until the Jerusalem Committee finished its meetings?

[Answer] Yes, the Security Council sessions were suspended for this reason, and they will resume shortly.

Syria Supports a Full Boycott of Israel

Syrian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Faruq al-Shar', who heads the Syrian delegation to the Jerusalem Committee meetings, was the focus of attention of those in the know about what went on in the debates during the closed meetings, inasmuch as the proposals presented by the Syrian delegation were resolute to the point of calling for a boycott of the United States.

AL-MUSTAQBAL met with the Syrian minister of state, who explained that Syria attached a great deal of importance to any organization whose goal

was resisting Zionist occupation or mobilizing public opinion against this occupation. Syrian concern for the Jerusalem Committee, and Syria's attempt to play a positive and effective role in it, arises from this consideration.

In response to a question about the general Arab situation, the Syrian minister said that the Arabs had not completely determined the correct way to regain their rights and Jerusalem, because they are at a loss. "What we have tried to do and are trying to do through the Jerusalem Committee meetings is to shed light on this aspect."

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ARAB REPLY TO JERUSALEM RESOLUTION TERMED UNSATISFACTORY

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 29 Aug 80 p 17

[Text] Dr Muhammad al-Farra, personal representative of the secretary general of the Arab League, said that the Arab reaction to the Israeli resolution to take Jerusalem in was undesirable.

In a special discussion with AL-QABAS, Dr al-Farra said that Arab weakness tempts Israel to be more arrogant and antagonistic and to adhere to its settlement policy. He added: "The Arabs' continual falling back on the Security Council is no longer helpful since Israel is adopting the matter-of-fact policy without paying attention to international decisions."

Dr al-Farra also said: "The [Arab] reaction to the ominous resolution has not been desirable; it was just more speeches and emotionally-charged statements calling for the crushing of the Zionist racial measure."

Dr al-Farra expressed fear that the Arabs' falling back on international organizations may transform from means to realize peace into a basic goal through which the ideal method to realize just and total peace is forgotten.

He added that the plan to expel Israel from the United Nations is not the first of its kind; the late Palestinian leader, Ahmad al-Shuqayri, had presented such a request to the Security Council and General Assembly more than once when he was the Saudi Arabia representative at the Security Council. The result was always the same: Refusal as a result of a veto. Other attempts took place, where the plan was presented by friendly nations. But the U.S. veto canceled such plans. This leads us to conclude that the timing of the plan during this period of U.S. pre-election campaigns means that the result is as clear as daylight due to the U.S. veto.

Dr al-Farra said that the Security Council's call for the invalidity and illegality of the Israeli action is considered necessary. However, going to the Security Council is not enough in itself.

He added: "Our resorting to the Security Council has become a routine action and is not taken seriously. This has encouraged Israel to continue its expansion and aggression, since it firmly believes that the Security Council will not act as long as those who have the legal right [to complain] limit their reactions to the Zionist action, rejecting, crushing and objecting through antagonistic statements and speeches."

Annexation of the Golan to Israel

On the subject of the Israeli Knesset's intention to issue a decision to annex the occupied Syrian Golan Heights [to Israel] in the same manner like the annexation and Judaization of Jerusalem, Dr al-Farra said: "There is nothing to prevent Israel from taking any decisions related to the occupied lands because the balance of powers is an advantageous factor to the enemy. Moreover, the lack of Arab unity and solidarity, the existing conditions in the Arab area and the Arab weaknesses encourage Israel to be more adventurous within a clear strategy that is being implemented at stages dictated by international circumstances and meticulously chosen by Israel."

Dr al-Farra added that, after their June' July defeat, the Arabs filed a complaint with the Security Council against Israel's plans to change the features of the Arab Jerusalem. However, Israel then declared that it did not take in Jerusalem or take any action toward that, and that they were only providing it with electricity, water and administrative services. But here they are today announcing the taking and the Judaisation of the Holy City and considering it the permanent capital of Israel.

The Arab League's Effectiveness

Dr al-Farra pointed out that the league's effectiveness depends on the Arab nations' desire to support and strengthen it and amend its charter in accordance with the [current] circumstances. He said that he has great hopes that the next summit conference which will be held in Amman will result in action that is competitive with the challenges.

Dr al-Farra concluded his talks by calling for the awakening of the Arab will and the creation of a spirit of struggle that does not enjoy hearing resouding speeches but listens to logic and reasoning.

He also demanded serious action and quick movement within a common strategy to serve the Arab cause as well as freeze the Arab conflicts in the name of Jerusalem.

9455
CSO: 4802

ISRAELI OFFICIAL CRITICAL OF OCCUPATION POLICY

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 24 Aug 80 p 17

[Article by Ghazi al-Sa'adi: "All Palestinians in Occupied Territory Want Israel Out"]

[Text] "The military administration of the occupied Arab territory lacks cabinet-level direction." This statement is attributed to Moshe Ma'uz, who has just completed 1 year of service as an adviser to the military administration. Joseph Gho'il, a political correspondent for the JERUSALEM POST, interviewed Ma'uz on this topic. The interview gives a picture of how the Palestinians are treated under the Zionist occupation.

According to the JERUSALEM POST, the former adviser to the Coordinator of the Occupied Territory, an officer attached to the military administration, chose his words extremely carefully, true to his rank as a colonel.

According to Ma'uz, the government simply does not give sufficient attention to finding alternate approaches to a settlement that could help to reduce tension in the occupied territory or to outside pressure for concessions that are unacceptable to Israel. When Ezer Weizman was in office, he knew at least how to tackle problems in a realistic manner. Since his resignation, realistic solutions have disappeared.

As colonel, and as professor of Middle Eastern studies at Hebrew University, Moshe Ma'uz cannot be shrugged off as a leftist academic dove; neither could his appointment to the military administration's office be viewed as an oversight by the rightist Likud Government of Menachem Begin.

Ma'uz, who headed the Truman Institute for Eastern Studies in Jerusalem before assuming his political-military office a little over a year ago, is strongly convinced that under no circumstances will Israel agree to a new arrangement in the occupied territory that could lead to the establishment of a PLO dominated Palestinian state. He is equally convinced

that any future Palestinian state will be dominated by the PLO either immediately or soon after its establishment.

Ma'uz disclosed that he had labored hard on a study exploring circumstances under which the Israeli Government could conceivably agree to negotiate with the PLO. His conclusion: "Israel will never be able to find anything to negotiate about with the PLO."

According to him, the PLO, headquartered in Beirut, partly for ideological reasons, but also for self-serving ones, is dedicated to the elimination of the Zionist state. The leadership of the PLO, according to Ma'uz, consists of Palestinians who left the occupied territory in 1948. When these leaders speak about returning to Palestine, he continues, they do not mean the West Bank, but Haifa, Jaffa, Ramleh and Lydda.

Ma'uz adds that his contacts with West Bank and Gaza Strip Arabs have convinced him that the predominant majority of Palestinians are sympathetic to the PLO, and that this sympathy is not about to fade anytime soon, despite what some people believe. He blames the situation on the young, educated Palestinians who, according to him, not only keep this sympathy alive, but who themselves are totally in tune with the PLO and with its ultimate goal of eliminating Israel.

Ma'uz claims that there are some indications that the facade of unanimity put up by the Palestinians has some cracks, a development, according to him, worthy of Israel's attention. He urges Israel to exploit this opening by seeking alternate solutions. While he admits that this is not a top priority of Israel, he is of the view that efforts in this direction could lead to a reduction of tensions.

[Question] Are you referring to the reports which assert that there is a group of relatively moderate Palestinians?

[Answer] Yes, but of course, only to a limited extent. First, there are in the West Bank and Gaza Strip elements which either fear or oppose the PLO. This, of course, is not based on some report by an Israeli committee. Personally, I believe that all Palestinians in the occupied territory want Israel out of their land and their life. I might even add that they prefer a bad Arab government over a good Israeli one. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the effects of the good environment created by the military administration in the occupied territory. Those who oppose the PLO do so for a variety of reasons: personal interests, competition over leadership, commercial interests, or fear that continued terrorism [by the PLO] could invite violent retaliation by anti-Palestinian Israelis. Another factor to be considered is the dispute between the PLO leadership [in Beirut] and local supporters in the occupied territory. Palestinians in the occupied territory are convinced that any attempt to impose a PLO-dominated Palestinian state on Israel could lead to war, one whose victims would be largely Palestinians.

Ma'uz believes that extremism on the part of certain Arab governments is another complicating factor. In Western diplomacy, according to him, there is always room for intermediate solutions. By contrast, he asserts, Arab diplomacy tends to be extremist, more often demanding victory and the silencing of the moderate voice. Based on this premise, Ma'uz believes that ordinary Arab citizens who would normally settle for what is possible and best for them in a given situation are deprived of the freedom to make their views known. As an example, he cites the PLO's determination to impose its way of thinking on its local leaders [in the occupied territory].

Ma'uz believes that there is an alternative to this trend, which, according to him, surfaced after the 1973 war, and became most acute during the 1976 municipal council elections in the occupied territory. At that time, he says, most mayoral offices went to a young generation of PLO supporters. These mayors, he adds, elected under Israeli supervision, make up the majority of the National Guidance Committee, which is the executive arm of the PLO in the occupied territory. This committee, in PLO plans, is to supply a good portion of the leadership of any future Palestinian state. Ma'uz thinks it is necessary to make contacts with other Arab parties--not Egypt--as a way out of this situation. The problem, according to Ma'uz, is that Weisman, who was receptive to the idea, made it clear to Ma'uz that Begin was absolutely opposed to this approach. Begin, Ma'uz continues, insists on his version of autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza, a version unacceptable to all Palestinians. On the other hand, according to Ma'uz, the autonomy blueprint proposed by the United States and Egypt would ultimately lead to the creation of a Palestinian state, something which Israel rejects categorically.

Ma'uz insists that Israel is the state most deeply concerned about finding a solution. Failure to find a solution, Ma'uz says, is bound to subject Israel to increasing international pressure. Based on this prediction, Ma'uz believes that Israel must explore every alternative to the present situation. Adherence to its version of autonomy, Ma'uz insists, will lead nowhere.

Ma'uz, who will soon return to his teaching position at Hebrew University after 1 year of service with the military administration, says he is concerned about this lack of initiative on the part of the Israeli government, and blames the "closed minds" within the military administration. "I do not know who will succeed me in this position, but it will not be easy to find one," Ma'uz concludes.

Before departing for Washington for a 2-month study tour, Ma'uz, still wearing his colonel's uniform, appeared perplexed about the government "which had begun to neglect its duties." By contrast, the former defense minister, Moshe Dayan, dedicated a good portion of his time to the administration of the occupied territory. According to some observers, that was the reason he neglected his other duties within the Israeli military establishment. By comparison, Peres paid less attention that Dayan to the occupied territory. The flamboyant Weisman, on

the other hand, while paying the least amount of attention to the occupied territory, nevertheless possessed the ability to find correct solutions to complex problems.

"Now that Weisman is gone," according to Ma'uz, "the situation is becoming worse." To fill the vacuum, the chief of staff, General Rafa'el Eitan, and the coordinator of the occupied territory, Danny Matt [or Mott], are assuming the role of policy makers, an essentially political role. While these two may be excellent military men, they have no training in dealing with complex nonmilitary matters, especially at a time when the occupied territory is seething with tension.

Ma'uz believes that the administration of the occupied territory and the search for alternate solutions ought to be a ministerial level responsibility. Furthermore, anyone entrusted with this responsibility, according to him, must answer directly to the prime minister.

Ma'uz concludes: "I feel confident that such a person or group of persons can find a way to create disaffection between the Palestinians of the occupied territory and the PLO, and to convince the Palestinians to settle for autonomy as a prelude to the creation of a federal union" [with Jordan].

9063
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PLO OFFICIAL CLAIMS PALESTINIAN MEDIA SUCCESS IN JAPAN

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 24 Aug 80 p 17

[Report on interview with Fathi 'Abd al-Hamid, PLO Representative in Tokyo, by FALASTIN BILADI Magazine and Japanese journalists, in Tokyo; date not given]

[Text] When Mr Fathi 'Abd al-Hamid arrived in Tokyo to open the first PLO office in Japan he held a news conference at the Arab League's Tokyo office attended by 20 editors and political commentators representing Japan's major news-media. The question on the minds of those present then was: Where are the machineguns, the time bombs, the mines, the checkered Palestinian headgear? Today, 3 years later, press conferences given by Mr 'Abd al-Hamid have become an important means for dialogue with Japanese journalists. Mr 'Abd al-Hamid has demonstrated that he is a seasoned journalist, a media expert held in esteem by his Japanese colleagues. According to him: "Information, like water, falls in drops at first, before becoming a torrent." We asked him candid questions, and he responded candidly.

[Question] This is the third meeting organized by FALSTIN BILADI between you and Japanese journalists. How do you assess this experiment and what does the future hold?

[Answer] First, I want to make clear that meeting with Japanese journalists is not something new. We have been doing that since the [PLO] office opened. Our friends in the Japanese media have played a prominent role in explaining our struggle to the friendly Japanese people. I am proud to say that without their help we would not have been able to carry out our projects, beginning with 'Palestine Week,' which was held in Yokohama in June 1977, and terminating with the [publication] of FALASTIN BILADI. What is new is the manner in which we meet. Formerly, we met with them as committees. During those meetings we prepared our plans, and they helped us to assess the public mood in Japan. The present meeting includes all of our friends. As a first step, we now meet with anyone who wishes to engage with us in dialogue, to exchange views, to present a position, or to inquire about a topic of interest. Our meetings now are expanded, as you see, and include journalists from a variety of news establishments.

The positive response of Japanese journalists has encouraged us to hold monthly meetings and to add new topics to our discussions. Last month, for example, we used the monthly meeting to introduce our brother, the well-known storyteller al-Tayyib Salih. Today, our meeting is attended by the famed actress Haroko Mabutchi, who will tell us about her experience with Palestinians. Also, the author-journalist Mizukazu Shibo will show us some photographs taken during a visit to the West Bank and share with us his impressions. All these things enrich our meetings and bring us new friends.

You can get an idea of how successful future meetings will be by considering the fact that only 20 journalists were present when we first opened this office. All of them had been correspondents for news agencies operating in the Arab world. Today, more than 120 journalists are taking part in our activities, and new ones are being added at every meeting.

We look forward to adding new friends, not only from the community of political journalists, but from the ranks of economic, cultural, and social journalists. Our aim, as we emphasize at each meeting, is not to make propaganda and issue statements, but to exchange views candidly on matters of concern to both sides.

[Question] There has been a passing reference to this meeting in the Japanese press, but no mention of the last "Fath" conference or any of the discussions following that conference regarding the prominent role assumed by the PLO. These are important developments. Do you not think that ignoring them in the Japanese press is a discouraging sign?

[Answer] We do not presume that this meeting, which is not a press conference, to be featured in the newspapers our friends here work for. We have said that this meeting is for the purpose of exchanging views candidly on matters of vital concern to both sides. Our goal is to deepen our knowledge, with the hope that what we learn will be reflected in the press at large. The Japanese press has been both understanding and supportive. This is a gain for us. A journalist does not report what we say. He analyzes events logically and objectively and expresses his views in his own way. When he writes he makes his own judgments. In order to see how the press responds to what we say, you must see what the press reports on our press meetings. As an illustration, take the two press conferences held in July in connection with the visit of the Palestinian delegation to Japan. These conferences were featured on pages 1 and 2. Reports on our press conferences in Japanese newspapers is a better criterion for judging whether the Japanese press is responsive to us. Reports that our press conferences have been ignored or inadequately covered represent the opinions of some journalists.

[Question] Why have you selected member of parliament Tokoma Otsonomia to be the guest of honor for your monthly meeting?

[Answer] You must know, of course, that Mr Otsonomia is an independent member of parliament. He has his own views and is supported by a large constituency. He is also well respected in many political circles. In addition, he is the adviser of the Japanese-Palestinian Friendship Association of the Japanese parliament, which has more than 100 members belonging to a variety of political persuasions. His selection to be our guest of honor stems from our desire to remain independent and to avoid entanglement in Japanese political disputes. His selection confirms our neutrality and assures us of support from all political quarters.

[Question] Any reason for selecting the actress Mabutchi?

[Answer] Yes. Our efforts are not directed at one sector of Japanese society to the exclusion of others. In addition to politicians, members of parliament, jouralists, academicians, researchers and economists, we are trying to reach the entire educated class. We are trying to influence public opinion through leaders in every walk of life. In the past, we have not been able to influence public opinion because we did not know how to go about it. Wait for the response of the educated class to our November 29 program, now being prepared. We expect it to go very well with the Japanese people.

[Question] What do you mean by that?

[Answer] The famous singer Tokiko Kato has agreed to sing a number of songs as a salute to our people on World Solidarity day. Our planning committee for the November 29 program boasts a number of prominent people: authors, artists, literary leaders, and professors. We are in the midst of a campaign to gather the views of some of Japan's most famous people. These views will be published and distributed during the coming celebration.

[Question] You spoke earlier of al-Tayyib Salih's visit to Japan. Are there any indications that the visit had any positive effects?

[Answer] His primary mission was to learn and discover. He met with Japanese authors and men of letters. They exchanged views, and both sides expressed a desire to learn more about each other's culture. Unfortunately, such exchanges in the past were carried out with the aid of third parties. The two sides recognized a need for direct discussions between the educated Japanese people and their Arab counterparts. Al-Tayyib Salih discovered that some Japanese people have read his recent publications. He was well received as an author. If anything, the meetings showed a need for beginning a dialogue between the Japanese and Arab people. That, in my view, was a positive accomplishment.

9063
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

ARAB DEFENSE INDUSTRY ORGANIZATION--Preliminary discussions took place between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates to establish a specialized Arab defense industry organization with a capital of $3 billion, similar to the previous defense industry organization headed by Ashraf Marwan, which the Gulf nations and Egypt established and later froze. This subject is said to have been the topic of discussion during Saddam Hussein's visit to al-Tayif last Ramadan. The concerned countries contacted Kuwait to include it in the project. However, the Kuwaitis had their reservations on the project, as they previously felt about the project with Egypt. They said that Arab countries will not be able to produce weapons at the desired level, in addition to buying weapons from other countries at a lesser price. But Iraq disagrees with Kuwait on this point and says that the time is right to cooperate with some European and Third World countries that are advanced in the defense industry, such as France, Italy, Yugoslavia, India and Sweden, to establish an advanced defense industry that makes the Arabs less dependent on foreign countries. [Text] [London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 5 Sep 8 p 7] 9455

CSO: 4802

KARMAL MEETS WITH 'FRONTIER GHANDI'

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 17 Aug 80 pp 1, 6

[News report: "Babrak Karmal Meets With Ghaffar Khan, the Frontier Gandhi; Ghaffar Khan To Launch Movement in Support of Karmal; Ajmal Khatak Appointed Leader of the Movement; Government Allots Big Sum to It"]

[Text] Kabul, August 16 (Radio Report)--Babrak Karmal head of the puppet government of Afghanistan, met in Kabul with Ghaffar Khan, the Frontier Gandhi, on the occasin of 'Id al-Fitr [post-Ramadan holiday]. A report of the meeting was broadcast over Radio Kabul.

The BBC correspondent in Delhi says that the report confirmed the news that Babrak Karmal wanted to use the influence of Ghaffar Khan to gain the support of Pathan tribes. The freedom-loving tribal bands settled on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border are at their strongest at this time.

The BBC, citing diplomatic sources, reports that Babrak Karmal has earmarked a large sum of money to gain the support of tribal leaders in these areas. The leader of this movement is Ajmal Khatak. It is said that he is trying to organize a guerrilla army in support of the present Afghan regime. According to plans drawn up, Frontier Gandhi will tour the frontier provinces [in behalf of the movement].

Diplomatic circles in Kabul are not very hopeful about the outcome of this movement. They are of the opinion that the frontier regions are not likely to accept the complete domination of the Karmal administration, and that Karmal supporters cannot effectively tour these areas.

9612
CSO: 4203

RUSSIANS USE INCENDIARY BOMBS TO CRUSH AFGHAN REGIMENT'S REVOLT

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 17 Aug 80 pp 1, 6

[News report: "Russians Use Incendiary Weapons and Balls of Fire Against Revolting Afghan Army; Several Towns and Villages Reduced to Ashes; Many Army Men Burned Alive"]

[Text] Kabul, August 16 (JASARAT Report)--To crush rebellion within the 14th Division of the Afghan Army in Ghazni, the Russians mercilessly used fireballs on the Afghans and burned many soldiers alive. Two infantry regiments of the 14th Division were protesting the appointment of a junior officer, a member of the Parcham Party, as their commander. The Russian forces took stern measures against the protest, which caused a rebellion in the whole division. The Afghan soldiers began to fight the Russians. In spite of their latest weapons, helicopters and tanks, it took the Russians 10 days to crush the rebellion.

The Kabul correspondent of the London DAILY TELEGRAPH has given details of this rebellion. According to his report, the Russian Army used incendiary devices and fireballs to chase Afghan soldiers out of hiding places in army shelters and on the front. Many Afghan soldiers fled to hide in ditches in the countryside. They too became targets of incendiary weapons. Many Afghans were burned alive in their places of refuge. Those who came out to the open were bombed by Russian helicopters.

The correspondent's report also said that in the area of (Bala Hissar), the towns of (Shevai) and (Charkogar) have been burned to ashes. Many villages are simply no longer there. It would seem as if a big earthquake or inferno had swept through them and wiped them off the face of this earth. Most of the population of the area has been decimated. Survivors are in a state of shock. Those who managed to escape from this area and reached Kabul were arrested by workers of the Parcham Party and the police, and were taken away to various unknown destinations.

9612
CSO: 4203

OIL DEPOT DESTROYED, RUSSIAN COMMANDER SUFFERS HEART ATTACK

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 16 Aug 80 pp 3, 6

[News report: "Mujahidin Destroy Largest Russian Oil Depot in Pul Khumri; 200 Afghans Shot Dead by the Russians; Taxi Drivers Arrested; Russian Commander Has Heart Attack"]

[Excerpts] London, 15 August (APP/AFP/Radio Report)--The Mujahidin have blown up the largest Russian oil depot in Afghanistan. The depot in Pul Khumri, in the northern part of the country, kept ablaze for 3 days and 3 nights. Its flames lit up the high ranges of the Hindu Kush mountains.

A DAILY TELEGRAPH report, based on local sources, said that when the storage facility was destroyed, there was rejoicing among the Muslim population of the region. Immediately after the depot was blown up, oil rationing began in Afghanistan, and a black market in oil sprang up. In Kabul, taxi drivers increased their fares 100 percent.

TIME magazine carried reports of fighting in the streets of Afghan cities. It said that in the last 3 weeks, the resistance movement of the Mujahidin has become stronger, and that Afghan troops are having a hard time crushing it. In Herat, the resistance is particularly strong, and it has become impossible for the Russian Army to enter the city. In fact, Afghan Army vanguards have advised the Russians to stay outside the limits of Herat. The Russians have, therefore, put a siege around the city. The purpose of the siege is to keep their supply lines intact.

Citing Radio Kabul, INA reports from Baghdad that Mujahidin resistance has intensified in the northern part of Afghanistan, and that the Mujahidin have destroyed many government buildings.

In the province of Kunduz the Mujahidin have carried out several big raids this month. This was revealed by Radio Kabul in its news commentaries. The commentaries also said that the Afghan Army has killed many insurgents and wounded many others, but the exact number of dead or wounded was not given.

AFP reports from Delhi that orders have been issued to crush resistance among Kabul taxi drivers, who are accused of cooperating with the Mujahidin. Each day, a number of taxi drivers are taken to the Ministry of the Interior, where their papers are examined.

Orders have been issued that tourists and visitors who want to go to Kabul should first get visas from the Afghan embassy in their country. Indian Airlines has announced that only passengers who have proper visas to travel to Afghanistan will be sold tickets.

The Ministry of Defense has told the paper KARVAN-I-AZADI that the government has confiscated the arms of over 200 Mujahidin captured on 1 1 July, and that most of them have been sentenced to death.

According to the DAILY TELEGRAPH, 120 T-72 tanks, 250 other vehicles and 9 helicopters have so far been destroyed in Afghanistan. The DAILY TELEGRAPH also reports that because of the destruction of the Pul Khumri oil depot and insurgence in two Arghan regiments, General (Mikhaelov?) commander-in-chief of the Russian forces in Afghanistan, had a heart attack.

AFP reports from Delhi that a high level military delegation from Russia has arrived in Kabul. The delegation has been accommodated in a guest house, and a powerful, sensitive antenna has been placed over it. Two incidents, the arrival of the delegation and the assassination of members of the ruling party, have taken place at the same time. A similar high level military delegation had visited Kabul in November 1979.

According to reports received in New Delhi from the Afghan capital, soldiers of the Pul Charkhi garrison who belong to the Khalq Party have been stripped of their weapons. The soldiers are anti-Karmal. The Pul Charkhi garrison has become a center of the Khalq Party. Supporters of the Khalq Party are said to comprise 80 to 90 percent of the total garrison.

AFP reports that three French convoys have arrived in Afghanistan with food and medicines; these supplies are contributed by the French people to the people of Afghanistan.

9612
CSO: 4203

COOPERATIVE MEASURES CONCLUDED WITH THE SOVIET UNION

Two Antonov Airplanes Purchased

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 6 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] KABUL, Oct. 6, (Bakhtar).— The agreement pertaining to purchase of two Antonov planes, Type—24, costing 2.8 million rubles was concluded between the Ministry of Transport and Tourism and Ova—Export Company of the USSR in the above ministry yesterday afternoon.

The agreement was signed and the documents were exchanged in presence of Sher Jan Mazdooryar, minister of transport and tourism and some departmental heads of that ministry, Political Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy to Kabul and the Soviet Trade Representative, by Col. Abdul Latif, president of Bakhtar Afghan Airlines and Vallery Choikov, Soviet trade representative in the DRA.

Under the agreement two Antonov planes, type—24, each seating 52 passengers, will be delivered to Afghan side in three months. The planes will be used for domestic flights, said a source of Bakhtar Afghan Airlines.

Exhibition of Soviet Tractors

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 30 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Kabul, Sept. 30 (Bakhtar).--The Soviet Tractor-Export exhibition was inaugurated in Kabul yesterday afternoon.

The inaugural ceremony was attended by some officials of the ministries of Agriculture and Land Reforms and Water and Power and some employees of the Soviet Tractor-Export Company in Kabul.

Prior to the opening of exhibition representative of the Company while providing information on the company's activities in producing and exporting various industrial and agricultural machinery, said that the Soviet-Tractor Export Company exports machinery to 67 European, American, Asian and African countries. Similarly, "our cooperation with the DRA grows successfully", he added.

Opening of Friendship Chamber

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 6 Oct 80 p 4

[Text] Kabul, Oct. 6, (Bakhtar).--The Afghan-Soviet Friendship Society chamber was inaugurated in a ceremony in the PD-PA CC Social Sciences Institute yesterday, afternoon. Najiba Hotaki, executive member and secretary to the Afghan-Soviet Friendship Society, speaking on amicable and fraternal relations between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union described the opening of the chamber as important in further strengthening of friendship between the two countries.

Similarly, the President of the PDPA CC Social Sciences Institute delivered his speech in connection to the lasting friendship between the two countries.

Protocol on Information Experts

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 6 Oct 80 p 4

[Text] Kabul, Oct. 6 (Bakhtar).--A protocol of cooperation on sending Soviet experts to the DRA Ministry of Information and Culture was concluded in the above Ministry yesterday morning.

The protocol was signed and the documents were exchanged by Deputy Minister for Publications, Ministry of Information and Culture, Dr. Haider Masoud and head of the USSR Promash Import-Export Company, Afanasiv.

During the ceremony present were also the President of Publications Department and some employees of the Government Printing Press.

According to the protocol, a number of Soviet experts are to be despached to Afghanistan to improve printed products and train the cadres of the Government Printing Press.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

NEW TERMINOLOGY BOOK--A book on new social, economic, political, philosophy artistic, literary, legal historical, geology and space terminology has been newly compiled by Noorullah Taluqani. The one--volume dictionary has been published in 4,000 copies by the National Defense Ministry printing press. In compilation of the dictionary use has been made of 105 scientific books. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 1 Oct 80 p 4]

OPENING OF FIRST CO-OP BANK--The consumer cooperative of bank was opened at Salang Wat yesterday by the Minister of Commerce Mohammad Khan Jalalar. At the function held on the occasion of the opening of the first consumer cooperative of bank, the Minister of Commerce delivered a decisive speech in which he described the role of cooperatives in the socioeconomic life of the country as highly important. He added the main objective behind creation of cooperatives is to meet the requirements of the toiling people in various fields of economy. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 21 Sep 80 p 3]

POLICE RETURN FROM USSR--200 police officers of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan returned to Kabul from the Soviet Union at the end of studies there. At the Kabul International Airport they were welcomed by the head of operation Department, Ministry of Internal Affairs. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 21 Sep 80 p 4]

RURAL SCIENCE WORKSHOPS-- The workshops on teaching science and technology in rural areas was opened by the first Deputy Minister of Education, Dr Faqir Mohammad Yaqoubi at the Technical School hall yesterday. The Bakhtar reporter adds the workshop which is attended by 36 teachers of primary schools of Kabul and provinces has been held with financial help of UNESCO and would continue for two weeks. The workshop would use the theoretical as well as practical methods and science and mathematic teachers can utilize their knowledge in teaching students in the remote parts of the country with the help of teaching materials prepared on low price by the personnel of the Science Centre. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 21 Sep 80 p 4]

KARMAL PROMOTES KHALQ MEMBERS--Kabul, 17 August (Radio Report)--Babrak Karmal, head of the puppet government of Afghanistan, has promoted two senior members of the rival Khalq faction to very high posts. When he made changes in his administration not too long ago, Karmal had totally ignored the rival Khalq faction. Last night, Radio Kabul announced that Mr Abdurrashid Arian, minister of justice and attorney general, had been appointed as one of the three deputy prime ministers. Mr Saleh Mohammed, who was already a member of the politbureau, has been promoted to membership of the Presidium. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 18 Aug 80 p 1] 9612

CSO: 4203

PORT SA'ID SUFFERS FROM RECESSION

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 25 Aug 80 pp 28-29

[Article by Gamal Zayda: "Recession Invades Port Sa'id"]

[Text] Recession has begun to contract Port Said's economy, and visitors from Cairo and other cities have decreased. People bought more in Port Said following school examinations and at the beginning of summer but that was only a slight increase in economic activity and not comparable with the commercial revial of 1976-77.

Several recently decreed economic guidelines have had an effect on the level of economic activity, e.g., government regulation of importing into Port Said, implemented last March, new customs duties, and a new customs law, implemented the first of July.

Government Guidelines and Smuggling

Al-Sayid al-Kilani, president of the Port Said Chamber of Commerce, says, "The recession's orgins go back to new customs duties, which have decreased the price differential between Port Said and the rest of the country. The differential has become minimal, and in addition Port Said visitors endure discomfort owing to the nature of the customs system. However responsible officials say that treatment of these visitors has recently changed. New customs duties have also decreased taxes on many goods, which should lead to an increase in the numbers of persons visiting the city."

Guidelines

Government guidelines have been set up in order to counteract smuggling. Al-Kilani says that Port Said has changed from a consuming to a productive industrial town. The Port Said Free Zone's Board of Directors has issued an order limiting the importation of easily smuggled goods to a total of LE 70 million, affecting some 11 commodities as follows: watches--LE 2 million; cigarette lighers--LE 250,000; tires--LE 1 million; eyeglasses and medical lenses--LE 400,000; soda pop--LE 200,000; ready-to-wear clothing--LE 23 million; fabrics--LE 26 million; batteries--LE 350,000; cassette players--LE 4 million; cosmetics--LE 1.3 million; china and crystal--LE 1.5 million; new importers--LE 10 million.

Each importer's quantities, based on previous import volume, have also been limited by the chamber. As a result importers think twice before importing an item. This has led to the importation of better quality merchandise, mostly from Europe, since importers cannot exceed limited monetary sums.

Guidelines Loopholes

Although the Chamber of Commerce's president says that no problems have resulted from guideline implementation, a regional association of Port Said importers has another opinion. Mustafa Marwan, president of the association, says, "Implementation of the guidelines, which were issued by a committee of the Port Said Free Zone authority, has demonstrated that they have had many bad side effects. For example some importers have contracts for ready-to-wear clothes and fabrics, two commodities that have special marketing systems. Such contracts are made with factories 3 to 6 months before production, each summer and winter, and an importer who does not get a contract during that time loses his chance to import these goods. Also previous contracts and agreements concerning other commodities bind both parties to the contract."

Marwan says that problems will arise from prior 1979 contracts and agreements, which create obligations for both importers and exporters. There could be financial and commercial effects in cases of non-compliance. Hence the necessity to solve these problems in a manner agreeable to all parties; the authority that issued the guidelines should take part in settlements to protect the reputation of Egyptian merchants. Some merchants have contracts requiring that they pay for goods within 60 to 90 days from date of arrival.

Decision Benefits a Few

Some small importers say that they have been harmed by the guidelines, since they must limit imports according to their previous year's volume, i.e., if they imported a small amount last year they will be limited to that amount this year. As a result the import business is increasingly limited to a small number of persons, and small importers have to buy from big importers dominating the market. Egyptian importers with limited resources have turned to foreign importers, such as the Lebanese and Armenians who import and warehouse within the port so that their commodities do not enter Port Said itself as stipulated by the guidelines. Some Egyptian importers thus import from these foreign warehouses.

The guidelines also stipulate that used clothing worth LE 500,000 should be imported, which raises a question. For whose benefit was this tacked on? It is well-known that used clothing is not subject to customs duties and could cause skin diseases.

Customs Duties

Ramadan Mustafa, general director of Port Said customs, says that the new customs duties have had major benefits for Port Said visitors. The normal customs exemption for travelers arriving at Egyptian airports and ports is

40 percent, with 100 percent exemption for the first LE 100 worth of merchandise brought in. All other imported goods are subject to a uniform duty of 100 percent, irrespective of normal duties. However in Port Said normal duties are assessed regardless of a commodity's value. If a visitor to Port Said takes out a sewing machine he pays a 35 percent duty, or 50 percent duty if he selects a 12-inch black and white television. He would have paid 100 percent duty if these items were imported through an Egyptian airport.

A knitting machine costing LE 80 would be assessed 100 percent at Cairo airport, but only 2 percent coming through Port Said. In addition duties on clothing and fabrics have been reduced from 250 to 125 percent excepting silk, gablan, aubusson, and needlework, which each receives 150 percent duty. Mustafa adds, "The new duties encourage purchasing china at Port Said, because its duty has been reduced from 200 to 100 percent."

He says, "New customs legislation implemented the first of July will have a great effect in limiting smuggling, because it will punish persons selling goods who are unable to prove that they paid duties on those goods. The fine for this violation has been increased from LE 1,000 to LE 50,000, with a 5 year prison sentence; both penalities are applied simultaneously with no choice of one or the other as formerly. The old law allowed conciliation between merchants and customs officials, even after sentencing. The new law forbids conciliation after sentencing."

In spite of the new duties smuggling has not stopped. Port Said customs chiefs have uncovered many smuggling attempts. Some smugglers have stuffed car tires and concocted tanks within fuel tanks so as to have space in which to hide goods.

9669
CSO: 4802

EGYPT FACES PROBLEM OF LABOR FLOW ABROAD

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 31 Aug 80 p 9

[Article: "Egyptian Workers Abroad Receive Lower Salaries than Foreign Workers; Labor Market Study Inside and Outside Egypt Needed to Establish a Balance"]

[Text] How can the flow of Egyptian workers abroad be controlled while, at the same time, the public, private and agricultural sectors are suffering a severe shortage of labor which leads to lower performance levels in these sectors? What is the best solution to this problem where several controversial opinions and policies exist among the concerned parties, especially since the constitution guarantees every citizen the right to travel, reside and move without restrictions whatsoever?

How can the labor problem be economically discussed as if labor was a commodity subject to supply and demand? What are the practical solutions to this problem which affects our economic, social and production progress?

A suggestion presented to the People's Assembly by its member 'Ali Hilali the beginning. Hilali demanded the reorganization and reconsideration of the policy of exporting Egyptian workers. Then the special parliamentary committee realized that no decisions could be issued on that subject because of the various aspects and responsibilities related to it, which require several hearings by the concerned ministers and representatives of workers syndicates.

'Ali Hilali said that it is necessary to temporarily stop issuing visas to agricultural, technical and general workers until the overall labor policy is reviewed and rules and regulations related to leave without pay are reconsidered.

'Sabri al-Qadi, chairman of the special parliamentary committee, said that Egypt enjoys a large population increase which is a national resource in itself. But, unfortunately, due to illiteracy, the lack of training and organized labor, this resource has become a burden on the government.

Sabri al-Qadi said: "I wonder how we could benefit from this resource and how we could achieve liaison between the state and the citizens who are abroad?

I see the need to establish a special government agency to carry out this task and research the method through which the increase in labor could be useful inside and outside Egypt, especially since the Egyptian workers' salaries are much lower than their coworkers of other nationalities, particularly in Arab countries."

Jamal 'Askar, head of the central organzation for mobilization and statistics, said that this temporary [worker] emigration is a big problem and, until now, they have been unable to determine how many Egyptians are working abroad although this task was assigned to our embassies. It became evident that Egyptians do not contact their consulates abroad and that the purpose of travel could not be determined. For example, those who travel for the purpose of pilgrimage to Mecca use this pilgrimage as a step to look for work. They have also tried to get officials in Arab countries to help them get reports on the number of Egyptian workers [in their countries], but they refused. Moreover, in preparing their statistics, these countries do not differentiate between Egyptians and [other] foreigners; they describe all non-national workers as expatriates, whether they were Egyptian or other.

Jamal 'Askar also said that the labor law has gaps which led to the flow of technical workers abroad. The law requires employers to agree that the wife must accompany her husband, or vice versa, when either has a job abroad. In addition to this, financial incentives [abroad] naturally attract qualified Egyptian workers.

The head of the central organization for mobilization and statistics added that the escape of qualified workers from government and the public sector affected performance levels. Even those sent on scholarships abroad do not return to Egypt, but prefer to remain in foreign countries after they acquire the certificates and degrees the government sent them for at its own expense, and after the government had given them experience and training.

He also said that the central bureau of organization and management must have an effective role in facing this crisis because employees who leave their jobs are those with experience and training.

The question here was: What are the proposed solutions to control this phenomenon?

Jamal 'Askar said that there must be law provisions preventing workers or those with government grants from leaving their jobs without [the government's] approval, and increasing penalties on violators.

He also suggested that one of the penalities should be to deny the [violating] employee his salary, bonus and workers' compensation. The law amendment must also control the flow of qualified people abroad before this flow causes work

stoppage in government, the public and private sectors. He also finds it necessary to conclude international agreements specifying the type and number of labor each country needs. The ministries of foreign affairs and manpower and training are responsible for this task. The type and number of workers sent to Arab and African countries must also be restricted.

Dr Husayn Kazim, manager of the central bureau of organization and management, said that it is easy to prevent labor export. Some people call for this while others call for the freedom of travel. But what is the solution?

In fact, the labor market must be studied because labor, like any other commodity, is subject to the law of supply and demand. Thus, labor demand must be defined, at all levels, inside and outside Egypt. On the other hand, the [increasing] number of graduates presents an oversupply problem to the government. The problem is a matter of supply and demand and a balance must be established; this is the core of the problem.

Dr Kazim also said that a field study has been conducted which confirmed the existence of a shortage in certain specialties and a surplus in others. The study was presented by the ministry of manpower and training to the ministerial committee for public services. The minister of state for education and scientific research based his coordination efforts of various educational levels on the results of this study. We would like to provide workers from this great number of graduates. For example, members of the army could be sufficiently trained before their release. We have examples of such successful attempts in some countries, such as Korea and the United States. A census was made by government of job seekers and the ministerial committee approved our proposal to train 25 percent of them at the ministry of housing and land reclamation in metallurgy and other trades. We wrote to all the ministries seeking their opinion in utilizing these workers.

Member of the People's Assembly and committee member Sa'd Bashir wonders whether the government is aware of such a flow of specialities abroad. The passports administration must have a major role in solving this problem. Necessary controls and procedures to restrict workers' travel destinations could be included in the passport. Mr Bashir suggested that a file containing all the necessary documents be kept on every Egyptian citizen who leaves his country.

Relative to construction workers, Muhammad Fahmi Badr, president of the construction workers syndicate, said that this type of worker is available and that he was prepared to immediately provide any number required in this field. He also said that it would be difficult to control travel for the purpose of pilgrimage or tourism, which are the two major outlets used by a great number of those seeking work abroad.

9455
CSO: 4802

NEW REGULATIONS NEEDED TO PREVENT CATASTROPHE IN HOUSING INDUSTRY

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 26 Jul 80, pp 5, 15

[Article: "After Al-Sharrabiya Incident New Houses on Their Way Toward Collapsing."

[Text] The problem has become dangerous. The incidents of the collapse of houses has become a dangerous phenomena. Houses are collapsing without determining the responsibility--even if the responsibility is determined, the maximum punishment is 7 years' imprisonment. The victims get buried and the complaints cease. Another house collapses and a new incident occurs followed by complaints and stories; then suddenly everything quiets down. The officials begin relaesing meager compensation and not one resolution is made to put an end to the phenomena of houses' collapsing.

Planning engineers in Cairo and al-Jiza confirm that we are going to hear more about houses collapsing in the near future. This, they say, will be caused by the housing shortage which forces people to add vertically to their buildings disregarding the planning laws and regulations. The greediness of landlords forces them to build.... They also elude the law in order to acquire a building permit or they build without a permit. Even if the court rules to demolish the new addition, this order cannot be carried out since the tenants would have occupied the unit.

Housing experts feel that the problem is primarily the responsibility of the landlord and then the tenant.

The last incident occurred in al-Sharrabiya....

The tenants had their early morning meal and then went back to sleep.... No one realized that the breakfast they had was the last one for many of the tenants of a building located in al-Sharrabiya area. After everyone went to sleep, the whole building collapsed and became a heap of rubble and under this rubble there were 24 innocent people dead in addition to a number of injured tenants.

No One Does Anything About This Problem

Everyone forgets about the incident until another one occurs and tenants end up dead under the rubble of their apartments.

All that the officials do after every incident is to form committees and then dispense meager compensation for the victims. Not one decision is made to put an end to these reoccurring dangerous phenomena.

If we go back to the past 10 years, we find that the incidents reoccurred and not one decision was made.

Nothing Happened

After the reoccurance of this phenomena, without narrowing down the responsibility, the Ministry of Housing and Construction decided in June 1975 to form a committee of nine experts from the ministry, the universities and the Union of Engineers to amend building laws to end the discrepencies of the building laws and to implement strict punishment against the violators.... This committee presented several suggestions which included facilitations in acquiring permits, from the administrative point of view, restriction from the engineering point of view in addition to stricter punishment for those who violate the laws and regulations.

The committee was then dissolved without the execution of any of its suggestions and the phenomena of houses collapsing continued.

Non-preventive Laws

If a person is caught adding new floors to his building, the fine does not exceed 20 Egyptian pounds and the demolition of the new addition although it is impossible at times to execute the demolition of the new addition due to the fact that the tenants who have already occupied the unit refuse to be evicted.

If the building collapses and the person responsible is the owner, the punishment is 6 months' imprisonment and a fine of 200 Egyptian pounds according to engineer Sa'd Zaghlul 'Allam, general director of the engineering administration in the area North of al-Jiza. If the punishment is stiffer, the sentence will not be less than 1 year nor more than 7 years' imprisonment. When the responsibility is that of the Union Engineers who approved the construction, then the punishment is either 5 years' imprisonment and a fine of 500 Egyptian pounds or one of the two.

If the collapse of the building did not cause human loss, then the fine imposed on the landlord is minimum since he is the one that suffered the loss of a building and the engineer is brought before the civil court.

In spite of the fact that this punishment forces the landlord to check the condition of his building before any new addition is constructed, the 20 Egyptian pound fine for not acquiring a permit and the demolition order which does not take place, allow the landlord to take the laws and regulations very lightly and to start adding to his building without any permits for the purpose of additional income.

Planning Engineers Defend Themselves

Planning engineers in Cairo and al-Jiza defend themselves by denying their failure to inspect the cases of violations which occur in their areas and in other governorates on daily bases.

Engineer Sa'd Zaghlul said:

"The number of housing units has increased tremendously in Cairo and al-Jiza and the shortage of engineers make it impossible to cover all these areas. This in addition to the fact that the housing crisis forces many citizens to make vertical additions to their buildings with the acquisition of a permit in spite of their awareness that this will endanger their lives.

"The responsibility of a planning engineer is restricted to inspection after a complaint has been received. As for the permit, any landlord can acquire it by presenting a report from a consultative engineer stating that the foundations can bear the required addition."

Engineer Sami 'Imam, director of planning in the north area said: "The operation of inspection continues but our authority as planning engineers is restricted to issuing a report concerning any violation related to the lack of acquiring a permit and then to issue an order to stop the construction work according to Article 17 of the Law 106. If the violation continues then we issue an order for the elimination of all the work related to the construction operation. However, the landlord ignores the reports and the orders and continues the work after working hours or even in the evening."

The Tenants Are Responsible

Engineer Lutfi Muhammad Hasan in the southern section said: "The only guarantee against the occurance of such catastrophes are the tenants' reported complaints. The tenants can inform the officials about any violation committed by the landlord or about any attempt to add new floors without a permit.

"The responsibility of a planning engineer is to stop the construction work ever works nor does the landlord abide by it."

The Acquisition of a Permit Is Easy

The danger is not anymore the only result of the addition of new floors without a permit. To acquire a permit, from the engineering point of view,

has become an easy task. As soon as the landlord acquires a report from a union engineer, that the foundation of the building can support the addition of new floors, the permit is granted.

Warning against this dangerous phenomena, Maj Gen 'Ali Yusri, head of the area north of al-Jiza said: "These reports have become a profitable operation for many engineers. The report is a piece of paper signed by an engineer and is used by the landlord to acquire a permit. With a permit, the landlord can do whatever he wishes since the housing administration does not run an inspection on the foundation which is in itself a dangerous issue.

"In fact the large sum of money, up to 3,000 Egyptian pounds for 2 new floors, forces the landlord to build without that permit. The permit, in this case, is a two-edged sword. On one hand it igves the government a good return and it emphasizes the seriousness of the landlord's intentim to build. On the other hand it forces people to avoid it due to the high cost.

"When the engineer discovers that there is a violation, he issues an order to stop the construction work and he notifies the police. In a very simple way, the landlord will resume the construction work in the evening.

"When an official report is concluded and is turned over to the courts, it will take 6 years before an order for demolishing the illegal addition is issued. Such a court order cannot be executed since the additional units would have been occupied and it becomes impossible to evict the tenants."

The head of the north area demands the facilitation of acquiring a permit from the financial point of view. He added that, after that, the punishment can be made stricter on those who build without a permit.

Maj Gen Sayid 'Othman, deputy minister of the Ministry of Housing and Construction, denies the responsibility of his ministry for what is happening by saying: "Although it is true that the cause of houses collapsing is the addition of new floors without permits, yet if we issue an official report on the violation, the court will find legal, national (due to the housing crisis) and emotional justifications which will prohibit the court from ruling not in favor of the landlord.

"The responsibility is primarily that of the landlord and secondly that of the tenant who should report immediately any attempt by the landlord to add new floors to the building without a permit.

"There is a shortage of engineers since many of them prefer to work abroad. Even if we have the engineer, we find it difficult to supply the adequate means of transportation."

Dr Yahya Qabil, dean of the Cairo School of Engineering said: "It is true that some union engineers sign reports about the strength of the foundations to support the building without inspecting. However it is impossible to meet the demand of some people to allow only the consultative engineering firms to do so mainly because these are small jobs and the consultative firms are not going to occupy themselves with that.

"For this reason, it is important that the responsible parties, at the Ministry of Housing and the governorates bear their responsibility by inspecting the building location before issuing the permit. If it is proven that the engineering report is false, the engineer will be severely punished. This alone does not solve the problem. An engineer should be appointed to supervise the construction work.

"Due to the current housing crisis many things are overlooked and no violations are dealt with and the fines are very insignificant. This encourages landlords to build. Because of this reason, punishments should be stricter."

Dr 'Abd al-Mun'im Ahmad Musa, professor of earth mechanics and foundations at the 'Ain Shams School of Engineering demands that the Union of Engineers formulates the basis and regulations which would control to work of those engineers who sign the reports. This will put an end to the violations which are being committed.

Consultative engineer, Dr Kamal 'Ism'il said: "The problem is basically the lack of nationalism and the desire for materialistic gains. Many engineers have ignored their honorable duty, have lost their devotion to their work and have given little consideration to human lives. Many of those engineers have graduated from engineering school but they did not contribute to their profession. They are people suffering from the lack of knowledge in their own field.

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BUILDING ADDITIONS DISCUSSED AS PART OF HOUSING CRISIS

Cairo AKHBAR AL-YAWM in Arabic 26 Jul 80 p 5

[Article: "The Experts Disagreed...The Landlords Fought and the Tenants Lost"]

[Text] The condition of the building allows the addition of new floors. The condition of the building does not allow the addition. These are the opinions of two consultants. The first opinion is that of the landlord and the second opinion is that of the tenants; the housing administration is lost between the two. The parties go to court, which in its turn calls upon a judicial expert. The court's decision takes years and years during which the price of construction materials rise and people lose the opportunity to rent a house. This often occurs when the landlords and the tenants disagree about increasing the height of buildings.

Building 32 on Abu al-Mahasin Street: The owner of this building requested a license to raise his building by two floors. He attached to his application a report from a consultant stating that the condition of the building allows the additional floors. The Ministry of Housing granted him a license for the new addition. One of the building's tenants presented a report from another expert emphasizing the fact that the building's condition does not allow the addition of the two new floors. The license was suspended and the whole case turned over to the courts.

Building 21 on University Street has eight floors. Its owner was granted a license allowing him to add two new floors then the tenants presented a report from another expert objecting to the addition of the two new floors. The mayor suspended the license and everyone wondered while waiting.

Mr 'Ali Yusri, president of the northern neighborhood of al-Jizah said: "We have requested from the housing legal advisor that he advise us on this subject.... Some people feel that licensing additional floors should be postponed and that it should be suspended if the license were already issued until the differences, arising from contradictory engineering reports, are solved. This should be accomplished by a ruling based upon a final report by a judiciary expert. The housing administration would then execute the ruling of the court."

Who Is Right?

This issue raises many questions such as, why would two reports given by consultants be contradictory?

The Union of Engineers has its opinion concerning this issue.

The secretary general of the Union of Engineers, Mr 'Ahmad Mazin said:

"When there are two contradictory opinions, the matter should be presented to the union for a professional ruling. If the union discovers a misrepresentation in one of the reports, then strict professional measures ranging from a warning to expulsion or even a suspension, will be taken against the expert who issued that false report."

Engineer 'Ahmad Mazin presented a logical solution by saying: "In the construction of new buildings, the engineer who designed the building should write on the license blueprints the specific number of floors the foundation and the pillars were made to support. The housing administration, which issues the licenses will then acquire from the contractor a similar report stating that the construction was executed according to the blueprints. This way, there will be no need for the report required for adding new floors.

"As for old buildings, there is a great difficulty in deciding whether to add new floors since checking the foundation, reviewing the blueprints and matching them with the actual execution would be either impossible or would require great expense on the part of the landlord.

"The engineer of the Ministry of Housing should also bear the responsibility of allowing the addition of new floors to existing buildings and should not rely on consultative engineers or others."

Fees Are Like Fire

Consultative engineers are being criticized for their very high fees.

Some reports could cost from 3,000 to 20,000 Egyptian pounds. These high fees force landlords to seek the assistance of any engineer for low fees ranging between 300 and 500 Egyptian pounds. What is the response to this situation.?

Dr 'Ali Ra'fat, an engineer and a professor at the school of Engineering in Cairo University, said: "Addition of new floors to existing buildings is a complicated operation which is based on scientific bases. There are certain required specifications and safety regulations for any building. This includes research to test the ground to see if it can bear 10 floors. According to Egyptian specifications and safety regulations, more than half of the allowable number of floors are not allowed. There are those

who permit the addition of floors without a scientific study which leads to ignoring the legally required safety regulations. Such people are not concerned and they would accept any fee. They also do not scientifically study the soil and the nature of the building. It is only natural that they would offer the kind of consultation which pleases those who pay their fees."

Dr 'Abd al-Fattah Abu-al-'Id, a professor at the School of Engineering in Cairo said: "The consultative offices are approved by the union of engineers and that a report will not be issued unless it meets special conditions which will make it of equal importance with the consultative office. Many engineers give themselves the right that they are consultants and for this reason, their reports are usually unsatisfactory from the technical point of view. But, in most cases these reports satisfy the customer and secure gain for the engineer."

The minister of housing and construction, Mr Hasaballa al-Kufrawi, had a different opinion. He said: "I am against the addition of new floors to old buildings especially when these buildings are in old, highly-populated neighborhoods. "Under other circumstances the addition of new floors is certainly cheaper if compared to a regular housing unit.

"Adding new floors to an existing building requires many conditions most important of which would be water, sewer and electricity. For this reason it is important that all the factors are agreed upon. It is also necessary to acquire the permission of the People's Council as well as that of the Committee of High Buildings at the Ministry of Housing.

"The Ministry of Housing can solve this problem by forming a committee of engineers."

Mr Kamal Ibrahim, the under secretary of the Ministry of Housing said: "It is necessary for the ministry to make a special arrangement with the Union of Engineers concerning the issue of adding new floors to existing buildings. In this manner, those who are interested in adding new floors to their buildings will find it easier to deal with the consultative engineers according to a list of requirements prepared by the Ministry of Housing in collaboration with the union.

"The rights of the landlord and the tenant were dealt with in Article 32 of Bill 49 of 1977. The article said: 'The landlord has the right to increase the number of housing units in the rented building by a horizontal or vertical addition even if the lease does not allow that. This does not wave the right of the tenant in decreasing the rent if the lease stated that. A court ruling could also permit the eviction of tenants and the demolition of non-residential sections which could prevent either the horizontal or the vertical addition on condition that a compensation would be paid for anyone involved."

Engineer Hasan Hassuni said: "The solution is in forming a consultative office, in association with the governorate, which would include the most qualified professors of civil engineering at the universities of that particular governorate and even if fees would be required to cover the expenses of such an office. The opinions given by this office should be accepted by both the landlord and the tenant. Any application for additional housing units to existing buildings will have to obtain the approval of the governorate's consultative office instead of having the landlord and the tenant present two separate reports.

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BRIEFS

DATA ON TOURISM--The Ministry of Tourism and Civil Aviation announced that the overall number of tourists for the first part of the current year was 571,815, compared to 492,890 tourists during the same period of last year (a 16 percent increase). The total number of Arab tourists during the abovementioned period was 206,264, compared to last year's 174,292 (an 18 percent increase). The number of Saudi tourists was the highest (61,338), followed by the Sudanese (53,697). At the bottom of the list of Arab tourists were Libya (3,716) and Iraq (2,463). During the first half of the current year, there were 324,739 tourists in the Arab world, compared to 77,352 during the same period last year (a 17.1 percent increase). The U.S. (39,360) and Italy (32,808) were at the top of the list while Turkey (966) and Portugal (710) were at the bottom. During the same period, the number of tourists to the Eastern camp was 10,930 compared to last year's 16,354 (a 33.2 percent decrease). At the top of the list were Yugoslavia (2,494) and Poland (2,143), with China (282) and Japan (11) at the bottom. Tourist nights, which are considered as the most important measure of tourist activity, did not increase in proportion to the increase in the number of tourists. During the first part of the current year, tourist nights were 3,406,951, an average of 6 nights per tourist, compared to 3,272,885 tourist nights during the same period of last year (6.6 nights per tourist); i.e., an increase of 4.1 percent only. The average number of tourist nights for Arab tourists during the abovementioned period was 6.4 nights, compared to 8.3 nights during last year. That average for Western tourists was 5.9 tourist nights during the period January to June of 1980, compared to 6.1 tourist nights during last year. The Eastern camp's tourist nights during the same period averaged 3.9 nights [this year], compared to 2.7 nights during last year. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 8 Sep 80 p 6] 9455

PHOSPHATE EXPLOITATION IN ASWAN--Geologic studies and research of the al-Siba'iyyah area east of Adfu in the governorate of Aswan resulted in the discovery of a hugh reserve of the best quality of raw phosphates, especially in al-Qurayyat area. The reserve is estimated at over 25 million tons of pure raw material. This was announced by Engineer Ibrahim Kamil, president of al-Nasr Phosphate Company in al-Siba'iyyah. He also said that the recently discovered raw material covers an area of 250 square kilometers. He added that work has begun to construct the first [phosphate] plant in the area to exploit the raw phosphates. This plant will be

constructed in cooperation with a Swedish firm and will cost 18 million pounds. It will be operational within the next 2 years. Studies show that the raw materials available in the area are enough to operate the plant for 20 years, at an annual production rate of 1.1 million tons. Dr Muhammad Sabri Zaki, governor of Aswan, had visited the phosphate mines in Adfu and met with their 1,500 workers. He requested that an incentive bonus equivalent to 1 week's salary be given to each worker in return for their efforts to increase production and material extraction from this remote area. The governor also decided to offer 500 pounds to the only youth center in the area. [Text] [Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 30 Aug 80 p 9] 9455

CSO: 4802

'U. S.', IRAQI WAR AIMS EXPOSED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 27 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] Tehran (Paris)--The morning daily Jomhouri-e Eslami (The Islamic Republic) devoted its recent front page to the recent Irano-Iraqi broder clashes in the west of the country. The article entitled "Wide Repercussions of Irano-U. S. War' said:

"In the name of God, the Beneficient, tho Merciful,

"The war between Iran and the United States in the western borders of the country is becoming more serious. The wrong impression should not seize our mind that this is simply a war, an event or a spark which has suddenly appeared and which we must in some way put out.

The fact is completely different. Aerial, naval and ground invasions of Iraq against Iran are launched according to a subtle political and propaganda plan drawn up against the Islamic Revolution of Iran. It is quite obvious that Iraq, or in other words the United States, by waging war against Iran does not have certain military objectives. Rather, they are precisely after achieving certain psychological objectives.

Having learned the fact that the Army officers leading the Iraqi forces stationed in the border areas are Americans and that even one of the pilots of Iraq killed in the crash of his aircraft in Ilam (west of Iran) was an Israeli, reveals how filthy this satanic plan is! Here we disclose in short some parts of the plots engineered by the United States:

1) The purpose of Iraq from its recent attacks against Iran is to damage the morale of our revolutionary people and to expand the psychological war against the Islamic Revolution of Iran.

2) Their objective is to concentrate our Armed Forces, particularly the Revolutionary Guards in the Border region so that they could carry out their plans inside the country more easily.

3) The counter-revolutionaries, SAVAK agents and mercenaries of the past regime will create artifical kerosene, gasoline and primary materials shortages to intensify the psychological war.

4) Armed mercenary groups who are allied with the blasphemous forces may stage military operations. These operations will possibly be carried out a few days after the Iraqi attacks on Iran are aggravated.

5) Rumor-monging networks will increase their activities most of which will be aimed at the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), the revolutionary institutions and the clergy. These people might even strongly support some certain individuals or groups in order to exonerate themselves.

6) Two different courses will be established in the Army, namely a short-term and a long-term. The short-term will be in the form of slogans against Army commanders accusing them of being traitors and that they should be arrested. This is to destroy the morale of the Army personnel in a bid to hinder their serving their country and Islam.

The long-term course will appear following infiltrations into the Army and utilizing it to bring to power a self-rule martial law government.

7) Other parts of the U. S. plot will be revealed in details in future. However, the following points should be considered:

A) Keep clam.

B) Identify and expose all rumor-spreading networks.

C) Be aware of any plots. The counter-revolution is more active nowadays.

D) The United States is trying to weaken the role of our great leader, Imam Khomeini and move him away from the political scene of the country and the region. The final victory will be achieved only by obeying the Imam.

E) The United States is launching a covert plot against Iran.

F) Do your best to fortify the spirit of Islamic fraternity.

G) If you have got extra medicine in your homes put them at the disposal of the Revolutionary Guards and National Mobilization Organization for the treatment of the injured.

H) Await the order of the Imam.

I) Be sure that the dawn of the victory of the oppressed has appeared.

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DOWNED IRAQI PILOT PRAISES IRANIAN PILOTS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 1 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] TEHRAN - The Iraqi pilot, Ha'an Sabri Hussein who has been captured by the Iranian militants after his MiG was shot over Dezful said Monday that he had been instructed by the Ba'athist regime of Iraq to bomb the Shahrokhi Air Base in Dezful in Khuzistan Province, "in order to prevent the reaction of the Iranian Air Force."

"If I did not undertake the mission, I would have been tried by a military tribunal."

Asked why Saddam Hussein did not send his forces to fight the usurper regime of Qadhafi, the captive pilot said, "All the military personnel of Iraq are ready to sacrifice their lives for the sake of Palestine."

He added, Saddam seems to have made a mistake in this respect."

"I was told that the objective of this war is to take back some Iraqi territory," said the Pilot.

He was also kept away from his family for psychological training before invading Iran.

When he was asked if he thought Saddam is being used by the U.S. he replied, "It is a possibility."

The Iraqi pilot also expressed surprise over the good performance of Iranian pilots and said Iraq has suffered unrepairable damages on its Iranian pilots and said Iraq has suffered unrepairable damages on its oil installations and military equipments which will take years to be replaced.

The interviews with two other Iraqi pilots identified as Abbas Khalil and Hashim, Pass[illegible] were telecast on TV.

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CLERGYMAN CALLS FOR BICYCLES TO REPLACE CARS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 30 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] TEHRAN – A call to use other means of transportation than private cars has been issued by the city's Mobilization Organization for the Deprived, which has been put in charge of traffic plans.

In an interview with the TEHRAN TIMES Hojjatoleslam Majd said that cars were a luxury and not a necessity and recommended the use of bicycles as a means to solve the transportation problems of the country.

The head of the Moutazafin Organization said other countries in the world were using bicycles as a means to solve their essential transportation problems and "we should do the same." He said transportation problems were especially acute in the capital and bicycles would be an ideal solution.

He said that the Mobilization Organization under a traffic mobilization wing had been given the responsibility for solving the present traffic problems. "Formal steps in terms of certain recommendations have been taken to make provision for alternative means of transport," Majd said.

In more detail Majd said that the Ministry of Commerce had been asked to purchase the "maximum number of bicycles possible to meet local needs."

He admitted there was a considerable shortage of public transportation but added that a proposal was under active consideration for buses and minibuses owned by the ministries and government organizations to be utilized for the use of the general public. This, he said, would be done when the vehicles were not being used by these departments.

Traffic mobilization plans will be further explored but he did not exactly specify what the proposed plans would be like.

CSO: 4920

CENTRAL BANK DISCOURAGES WITHDRAWALS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 30 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] TEHRAN – Bank Markazi (Central Bank of Iran-CBI) called on the people not to withdraw their deposits from the bank branches.

In an announcement the bank said, "Due to the recent war imposed upon Iran by Iraq, disturbances have been observed in internal flights and the distribution of gasoline which in turn have affected the banking procedures in the country.

Limitations on the distribution of gasoline has made the distribution of money difficult in the city. Some branches of bank have been faced with a shortage of cash-on-hand even for regular use. This matter has made a number of clients anxious, and they have rushed to the banks to withdraw their money, in excess of what they really need.

Unfortunately such problems have forced a number of bank branches to deliver less money than requested by clients.

The CBI apologized for the difficulties confronting clients and emphasized that although "these shortcomings are temporary, their resolution needs the comprehensive cooperation of the people."

"People should not withdraw their deposits unless they really are needed and should recommend others also to refrain from this.

They should also advise others to deposit their savings in banks here to help the economy of the country, to strengthen the Islamic Republic in Iran and to guarantee the security of their savings in the best possible way, the announcement added.

It also recommended that people should not change their 200 rial bank-notes at present since the deadline has been extended with the end of the current Iranian month, October 22.

CSO: 4920

NEWSPAPER EXPOSES IRAQI SECURITY APPARATUS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 30 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] TEHRAN (PARS) - The morning daily Sobhe Azadegan in an interview recently gave an outline of the resistance movement against the tyrannical rule of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and his numerous security organizations used to combat the freedom fighters in Iraq. The article said:

Saddam' Takriti has set up six different intelligence and security organizations like the Iranian SAVAK in order to suppress all the freedom lovers and revolutionaries. These organizations which are run like the disbanded Iranian security police, SAVAK, have already killed many Iraqi militant youth. They are as follows:

1. Al Amen which is suppressing the revolutionaries, under the pretext of preserving the country.

2. Al Mokhabarat (similar to SAVAK's Second Bureau) which operates for the so-called revolutionary Parliament of Iraq, escorting the servile Iraqi deputies to and from the Parliament.

3. Al Istekhbar which operates inside the Iraqi Army institutions to control any anti-Ba'athist movement. This organization has already killed or imprisoned many revolutionary officers and men. It has the authority to arrest or execute anybody any time.

4. A party-organ called "Tanzimi" which has branch offices in all the cities and villages of the country, its main function is to identify all ordinary citizens who may be against the regime.

5. The so-called "national army" consisting of a number of government agents, their job is to supervise and train some individuals for other security organizations.

6. Al Manzumat-al-Shomali, the security complex of north Iraq to suppress and control the Iraqi Kurds. Presently, a great number of the Kurdish clergy and militants who have discovered the true nature of the ba'ath, and under torture.

The above-mentioned groups have branches throughout Iraq and have been instructed by foreign experts. Under the supervision of Europeans, they are torturing revolutionaries by electric current, chemical agents and brainwashing.

The Ba'athist regime is so afraid of the revelation of its savage acts that burned with acid some 300 of its Army officers whom it had used to massacre the Kurds in war time.

Of course, the so-called revolutionary parliament of Iraq announced that the officers had disappeared. Due to the blows that the Ba'athist regime had received from the Kurds, it set up certain regulations for the Kurdish

people. For instance, it announced that if an Arab took a Kurdish girl by force or in some way, he would be given 500 dinars as a reward. This measure by the Ba'athist government was taken to destroy the generation of the Kurdish nation.

In Iraq's Kurdistan also the people were under several pressures. For example, 5,800 Kurdish villages were demolished by the Ba'athists and their inhabitants became homeless. After that many Kurdish militants took refuge in mountain areas and started their fight against the Ba'athist regime in a different way.

Nonetheless, some of them were arrested again and the Kurdish women were raped in the prisons of the bloodthirsty regime of Iraq.

The documents of these crimes are all available but international organizations do not pay the least attention to these documents.

Statistics show that every day in Iraq 4 to 5 Kurds are martyred. The origin of the hostility that the Ba'athist regime has with the Kurds is that the latter have always tried to fight against British imperialism and the Ba'athists. The Kurdish people of Iran also should understand that the nature of the mercenaries and must thwart their plots.

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STUDENTS ABROAD MUST BE CERTIFIED TWICE A YEAR

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 17 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN – The Central Bank of Iran (CBI) once again announced the absolute requirement of certifications from Iranian Embassies abroad, or their accredited representatives, of the student's academic credentials.

The certifications should be submitted twice yearly every six months the CBI announcement said.

Only students following courses in technical, agricultural, medical and basic sciences will be permitted to receive exchange at the official bank rates of exchange, it said. Courses which do not lead to qualifications in graduate records and are vaguely designated fine arts, secretarial courses and such like are not recognized by Educational Boards abroad and in this country, will not be entitled to exchange remittances for those following them, it added.

Any increase in fees for courses such as have occurred in the United Kingdom recently will have to be proved and certified by college authorities to bank sources Iran, it was said. All remittances to universities and colleges in London will have to be made directly to the credit of institutions there. The maximum allowance for those studying in London would be 250 pounds, and 200 pounds for other cities in England.

Students following recognized language courses and those in the final 2 years of courses which they have already enrolled for, will be entitled to 25 per cent at the official rate and the balance 75 per cent at the higher market rate, the CBI said.

All certifications received in Iran for submission to the CBI, or other banks for exchange remittance applications must be first endorsed by the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education whose offices for the purpose are on Grand Nejatollah Ferest (former Villa Avenue), the announcement said.

CSO: 4920

PROPOSED AGENDA FOR LABOR PARTY--MAPAM NEGOTIATIONS

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 11 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Naftali Ben-Moshe: "Negotiating Points With The Labor Party"]

[Text] The negotiations with the Labor Party must be focused on the most essential points in which there is a gap in the viewpoints between the two parties and must not attempt to cover a broad area so that the essence not be lost.

The purpose of the negotiations is not exactly the formulation of the joint program for the election. The election platform will naturally have to use a simpler and less direct and detailed language so that we can go with it to the public and win a decisive majority. This decisive majority is the best platform in that it will give MAPAM the power to tip the scale in the next government and not the NRP, for example.

We are speaking, then, of a penetrating and friendly discussion of the controversial issues which are the most critical issues between the two parties with the objective of influencing, advancing, and creating points of contact which will permit us to live and stand together without having to violate our conscience and our basic viewpoint. This was the case in the previous election when MAPAM succeeded, among other things, in obtaining the Labor Party's agreement on the political formulation "territorial compromise," a formulation which in the course of time became the political banner of the Alignment.

Such was not the case in 1973, on the eve of the Yom Kippur War, when MAPAM was dragged (albeit moaning and groaning) after the dictate of the famous fence-sitter Moshe Dayan and surrendered (together with the entire Labor Party with its doves and moderates) to a policy which was completely contrary to its world viewpoint. Whoever wants to locate the place of the earthquake which led to the collapse of 1977 can look for it here on this issue.

Maximum Effort For Agreement

The objective of the negotiations must be a maximum effort in order to reach an agreement--and not the opposite. In accordance with this, the

minimum condition must be set, and for this purpose help must come from allies in the Labor Party in every area--and there are such people--while allies in one area are not obligated to identify with allies in another area.

There is clearly a red line, and a period of time must be left between the summation of the negotiations and the date of the election which would give the MAPAM an option of an independent appearance. Even if this option, in my opinion, is only theoretical and for an emergency situation only, it must be in the atmosphere of the negotiations. Otherwise, the substance of the negotiations will be limited to the infiniterimal.

The authorized institutions of the party must decide in the summation of the negotiations the results of the negotiations and the progress achieved. To this accounting must be added the importance of the freedoms which we will obtain regarding those issues on which no agreement was reached. In contrast to the impression created at the convention, the purpose is to reach an agreement and not attain freedoms.

Those in MAPAM who grasp at every issue and every reason to push MAPAM outside toward SHELI are unaware of the primary aims of this period and MAPAM's mission. These are emotional reactions which should not cause excitement. It would be a tragedy of the movement to split apart just now on the objective and at the most crucial time facing the Labor Movement. At times there is no escape from tragedy. But to aspire to it?

In my opinion, the political subjects on which we should concentrate are:

(1) The Palestinian problem. The Labor Party proposes as a political alternative the Jordanian option. Without going into the seriousness of this option at this time, it is clear that without a readiness for far-reaching territorial concessions and without integrating an acceptable solution to the Palestinian problem in this framework, the orientation on Jordan is neither an option nor an alternative but a castle in the air, the contribution of which to the advancement of peace will be equivalent to that of the autonomy. There will be no one to talk to and nothing to talk about.

MAPAM talks about a Jordanian-Palestinian state which would include most of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, however it ultimately leaves the democratic decision on sovereignty of the territories in the hands of the Jordanians and the Palestinians. The Jordanians do not need Israeli recognition of their right of self-determination. The new feature then is that which involves the Palestinians and the territories administered by Israel.

The Shem Tov-Yariv version, concerning which even Dr Burg has already made a slip of the tongue, can open an option to the Palestinians--a version (incomplete) which together with the "territorial compromise" (also incomplete) is likely to provide a compromise between the Labor Party and us on the Palestinian issue.

2) We are divided on the subject of the settlements on the other side of the green line. The Labor Party advocates settlements in a defined area (unofficially) such as the Allon Plan and in the Golan Heights. MAPAM is against settlements on the other side of the green line including the Golan Heights despite the permit which Hakibbutz Ha'artzi [National Kibbutz, the kibbutz movement of the MAPAM] has given itself there. How does the Golan Heights differ from the Jordan Valley? What is the sense of interfering in a place the future sovereignty of which is unclear? Does Hakibbutz Ha'artzi have such an abundance of pioneering reserves that it is lacking challenges within the green line?

Peace talks accompanied by these settlements are two contradictory things which do not go together. Whoever dreams about settlements must not talk about peace. Israel, which argues for the principle of negotiations without preconditions, cannot at the same time create facts in a territory without convicting itself of a double standard and an injustice. The period of the British Mandate has ended. We are a sovereign state, and we must decide what determines what: the settlements, the boundaries or the boundaries, the settlements.

In planning its actions and policies, the Alignment government will have to take into serious consideration the heartbreak and the enormous waste of resources involved in the dismantling of settlements.

The compromise which we must strive for in this critical and controversial subject is the suspension of all additional settlements in the sector which is the subject of the peace negotiations and during the period of the negotiations.

3) The readiness for territorial concession has been the concession version for which MAPAM has struggled as the version of the Alignment, and it is not the MAPAM version. MAPAM advocates "border changes necessary for the security of Israel," and there is a difference between the two versions.

I do not believe that the Labor Party can be coerced into accepting MAPAM's version which expresses the need for far-reaching territorial concessions. However, it is possible to prevent a commitment to the Allon Plan and other "immutable" versions acceptable to the leaders of the Labor Party in everything related to Israel's future borders. If we use "territorial concession," it should remain open and flexible without closing options and without blocking territorial concessions as the situation requires.

4) The time has come for the Alignment to make a clear statement regarding the autonomy plan and not be satisfied with ridicule or criticism on the side. No good will come from the adventurous autonomy plan, and I will not add much to all that I have written and spoke about on this subject. The Alignment's attitude on the subject of autonomy is fatalistic. Let's let matters run their course or become complicated, and we will see how they develop or fail--all of this concerning the key issue of the Arab-Jewish conflict on which peace will rise or fall even with Egypt.

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FORMER MINISTER OF JUSTICE FAVORS CHANGE IN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Aug 80 p 20

[Interview with Former Minister of Justice MK Shmuel Tamir by Dov Goldstein]

[Text] Where is Shmuel Tamir going? After his resignation from the cabinet, what are the "plots" being woven in this fertile mind? What kinds of political tricks will he now be engaging in?

Even his political rivals praise his wisdom. However, even one who regards the old claims with restraint, that he is divisive, a schemer, and a conniver, will find it difficult to believe that Shmuel Tamir left the cabinet only because his pangs of conscience would not allow him to be one of three ministers representing a movement with three members of Knesset. Even less understandable is the fact that his excellent abilities and enormous pretensions will find a subsistence area and prospects for realization in the constricted, shaky, and hopeless framework of the Democratic Movement.

The departed minister has two good reasons to shroud his future intentions in secrecy--one being tactics and the other being personal image. As long as he has not spelled out his political path, he holds all the cards and several roads are open to him. In the matter of image, since his name has been previously connected with several movements and his antagonists are waiting for an opportunity to ridicule his shifting from one political structure to another, it is now convenient for him to stick to the statement that he will continue to work within the Democratic Movement.

"The Lost Son" Will Return To The Mother Party

I assume that when the time comes he will not be particular about the name of the movement or the party in whose name he will seek the public trust provided that it is a broad-based entity, one with future prospects, and not a splinter party. Another assumption is that under certain conditions, hinted at by Tamir in this interview, it is possible that "the lost son" will return to his mother party, Herut, to compete for the most senior positions.

However, until the trends become clear, Tamir derived considerable satisfaction this week. Not only was he in the center of the news--a phenomenon which no politician detests--but many greeted him, praised him, and complimented him to his face. He served in Menahem Begin's cabinet for almost

3 years. If he was bothered by the doubt that perhaps the prime minister was holding a grudge for past struggles, he felt this week that the "historical tear" has been mended. For 3 years Tamir demonstrated loyalty and statesmanship in the positive sense. He did not publicly utter even one word of criticism of the government. He was scrupulous in showing respect for the prime minister and the ministers. He developed a broad network of amicable relations with all the elements in the judicial system and served as the minister of justice with outstanding success.

[Question] Last week you asked angrily: "Is someone prohibited from resigning from the cabinet?" It is permitted, of course, however, since no one appoints himself as a minister and instead serves as his movement's or party's representative after being selected in its institutions, why is it less reasonable to insist that even if he wants to resign he should notify the institutions of his movement beforehand and give it reasonable opportunity to persuade him to change his mind?

[Answer] Even the selection of a candidate to serve as minister is not made only by a decision of the institutions. It is preceded by the man's personal decision to be the nominee of his movement and to want to be selected for the position. At times there is also his readiness to fight for his selection. Public service is based on free will. When it became absolutely clear to me that my decision to resign was final, any previous discussion in the movement's institutions would have been damaging. When the number of members of the Democratic faction was reduced to four, I said to Yigael Yadin: "Yigael, I am under no circumstances prepared to reconcile myself to this reality, that we will have three ministers in the cabinet. Although the prime minister and even the other factions are not exerting pressure on us to reduce the number of ministers, I feel strongly that with all the compromises that a political figure is forced to make in political life, this is one which I cannot accept."

"I Will Be Against That," I Said To Yadin

Yadin answered me that the labor and social betterment portfolio was just as important to him as that of justice and that if there would be a reduction in the number of our ministers, he, Yadin, would himself resign from the cabinet. I answered "It is not reasonable for you to resign. You must remain in the cabinet." I added that it was clear to all of us that if the question was which minister should resign and it came to a discussion and competition within the institutions of the movement, the overwhelming majority of the members would vote that the two of us, Yadin and I, should remain in the cabinet whereas Minister Katz would be forced to resign. I said: "I will be against that!"

I could not accept that we would have three ministers in the cabinet. Moreover, what is involved is representation in the cabinet, several positions of which I have had reservations about. However, to cause the forced removal

of a member of the cabinet in accordance with a proposal within the institutions of the movement--that I did not want. In order to prevent undesirable processes in the movement and since what is ultimately involved is a clearly personal step, I decided to carry out my decision without leaving a long period of time for anyone to dissuade me from my intention or try to delay its realization.

[Question] Did the prime minister urge you not to resign?

[Answer] The prime minister asked me three times not to resign or at least to defer my resignation. The first time was when I informed him of my intention Thursday night of last week in a telephone conversation. The second time was when we met before the cabinet meeting this Sunday in his office. The last time was also at a cabinet meeting. The three conversations were friendly, marked by unusual expressions of respect and mutual understanding. Unfortunately, I was not ready to change my mind and my conclusion which I had reached after extensive and thorough soul searching.

[Question] Do you believe that you acted properly when you announced your resignation on a television broadcast before you met with the prime minister? He may have had cogent reasons for you not to resign and you had created a fait accompli which you could not undo.

[Answer] I have already said that I was sorry about the short time available to me and I expressed my regret also to the prime minister. I did not submit my resignation before meeting with the prime minister. I submitted it without harshness, protest, or demands. I was happy to hear from the other party that the entire process of my resignation was respectful, regular, and smooth.

[Question] After almost 3 years of serving in Menahem Begin's cabinet, what has changed in your opinion and estimate of him? For example, did he surprise you with his moderation, tendency to compromise, perhaps also his forgivingness?

[Answer] I have known the prime minister since he came to Israel. We first met in the house of Abba Ahime'ir, of blessed memory. Begin was still wearing the Polish Army uniform. We have come a long way since then, almost 40 years, with each other and against each other. At cabinet meetings, my neighbor to the left of me, Dr Burg, would occasionally ask me: "You know Begin better than all of us. What is his intention at this moment?"

So, essentially I was not surprised. I knew that Menahem Begin was a very strong man with a special leadership quality and rare charisma. His ability to navigate through the internal political processes was somewhat surprising to some people who have not worked with him and did not know him from close up. I was not surprised. The only area in which I encountered something new and surprising was the ability of a statesman, who was no longer a young

man, at this stage of his life to make his foreign policy positions flexible even when it did not agree with the platform but was required by the changing reality and the opportunism of the time--I am referring to the peace process which the prime minister initiated and in which he played the key role. I saw something very positive in this and if you will permit me, also a certain satisfaction. At the time, when I was still in the Likud, I maintained ever since the Yom Kippur War that there was no alternative to flexibility. I encountered a profound lack of understanding on the part of various members and we finally parted company. The prime minister's readiness for political flexibility greatly facilitated our joint work in the cabinet.

[Question] Strange...a government headed by a man of such excellent qualities, why has it reached such a low state that everyone is predicting a decisive defeat?

[Answer] I have pointed out the prime minister's qualities which no fair person could deny. This does not mean that I am very unaware of the deficiencies of the government of which I was a member and which I continue to support. I have criticized the deficiencies even in public when my position required it, such as my view regarding the leaks from the cabinet meetings which are a severe blow to the functioning of the State.

However, you are certainly aware that in the difficult atmosphere in which the Israeli public finds itself, especially since the Yom Kippur War, I am among those who prefer to criticize their collaborators directly in personal conversations with those involved. This is how I conducted myself for the 3 years when I was a member of the cabinet. In our friendly conversation in his office this Sunday, I heard the prime minister say the same things that I have recently told others from time to time. Their essence: we are a small people (numerically), surrounded by great dangers, subject to threats, from various sides, and with so few friends. This obligates us not only to overcome past deep-seated feelings, even if they are hard, but also to seek the common denominator and that which unites us.

I have not hesitated in the past and I will not hesitate in the future to hold discussions and even a penetrating and thorough debate on the main issues: foreign affairs, structure of the administration, and the functioning of the government. However, we must conduct this debate as free as possible from personal tensions.

[Question] In a response to my question you once said that you have the requisite qualifications to fill senior positions in the political life of Israel. Many will support this assumption, however do you sincerely believe that the broken reed called the Democratic Movement is the political structure which will lead you to key positions in the State?

[Answer] For better or for worse, I have never sought the easy...

[Question] But also not the impossible task...

[Answer] I will be completely frank with you. I do not know if in the continuation of my political career I will have the opportunity to give myself maximum public expression. However, with full awareness and with open eyes, I prefer even today to take far-reaching risks than to follow a path with which I disagree. Despite the sophistication which some people attribute to my resignation, I have no doubt that it entails political risks. Nevertheless, I took this action.

As to the concrete course I will follow, I will add one sentence: What appears at times to be a short way is likely to turn out to be a long one just as what appears to be a long way, at times proves to be exactly the correct and purposeful one.

[Question] Have you planned additional actions?

[Answer] I have thought about the future, however this was not the determining factor in the decision to resign.

[Question] Simply stated, in the next election will you be a candidate for the Knesset from the Democratic Movement?

[Answer] I will do everything in order to continue to go with my friends, the Democratic Movement people, in the next elections, however this does not mean that I will go with them alone. I have always believed in the formation of major political alignments to the extent possible, provided that they have an agreed upon platform. I am also not now against efforts to form such a power.

[Question] What did you answer Yigael Yadin when he asked you if he should leave the cabinet or remain there?

[Answer] I told him: "Yigael, you must remain in the cabinet!"

In Theory, There is No Need For A Centrist Entity

[Question] Why? You can leave and he must remain?

[Answer] Because we continue to be partners in the coalition and it is only right that we have a voice in the government. Even the harshest critics of Yadin acknowledge that, for example, in the month when he served as a substitute prime minister and minister of defense, he conducted the affairs with excellence, responsibility, considerable ability, and exemplary friendliness to all the ministers. We must be represented in the government, of course in a more or less appropriate ratio to our strength in the Knesset.

[Question] Like, for example, two ministers for three members of Knesset?

[Answer] Good, I get your point...

[Question] Must another one of your people resign?

[Answer] Yadin must not resign...

[Question] You describe the possibility of the Alignment's return to power as a danger to Israel. You have already publicly expressed your opinion about Herut ("May God have mercy on the State of Israel if Herut comes to power"). What then is the solution? Should there be another attempt to establish a party of the center in spite of the complete failure of the DMC?

[Answer] The quote which you attribute to me regarding Herut is not precise. I will not go into details. I was an active partner in the establishment of GAHAL [acronym for the Herut-Liberal Bloc] in which Herut was the senior partner. We intended to establish a liberal centrist bloc. This was the objective also in the establishment of the Likud. It became clear in time that there was a need for establishing an entity between the Alignment and the Likud. If the statistics were different, it is possible that there would have been no need to establish the DMS. Theoretically, these two entities, the Alignment and the Likud, in addition to a religious bloc, are sufficient for the political arena. If the Alignment and the Likud would be sufficiently flexible, multi-faceted to the extent necessary, broad, and open, there would be no need for a centrist political entity besides them. If they will not be so, the need to establish a political force to fill the vacuum in the center of the political picture will be recreated. The Democratic Movement will consider its course in accordance with these circumstances.

[Question] If the need arises for another political force, will you be among its founders and leaders?

[Answer] It is too early to answer that question. Everything depends upon the circumstances. However, if you are talking about a new political alignment, I hope and I will work to the best of my ability that we will change our system of government from the present one to a presidential system. The history of 30 years of governments in Israel, including the lessons derived from a study of the present government, shows that a change in the electoral system is not enough. On the basis of my experience in the opposition and in the government, I have become convinced beyond any doubt that it is necessary to strengthen the executive arm and provide it with a more solid decision-making power while maintaining the balances by a strong Knesset.

The current situation is fraught with danger and it must not continue. We have a coalition of parties in the government and coalitions within the parties which paralyze the alignments, hinder action, and encumber the decision-making process. Another result is that the most qualified, the most suitable, and the best cannot always attain executive positions and express their abilities in the most important positions. The presidential

system, be it the American or the French type, has proven itself to be much more effective. France, during the Fourth Republic before World War II, was in a process of fragmentation and disintegration. Since the days of de Gaulle, France has recovered and has achieved economic prosperity and political power under the presidential system.

[Question] Do you believe that you will find support for your far-reaching proposal in the Israeli parties? Isn't one of the outstanding characteristics of the presidential system the reduction of the power of the parties and the status of their various types of activists?

[Answer] It is very doubtful if it will be possible to bring about the change in the next election. However, I have been greatly encouraged from conversations with key people in various parties who have shown much sympathy and at times even enthusiasm for the idea.

The presidential system is not a technical reform, but rather a political necessity for the people who are plagued with numerous troubles. The more concerned we are about democracy the more we are obliged to prevent its degeneration, lest, God forbid, there be stirred among us desires for an autocratic system as a result of the failure and disappointments of the cabinet system.

The Danger: Rise of Extremist-Fringe Elements

I will not relax my efforts in this matter and I will work incessantly to persuade the parties to choose the presidential system.

[Question] Will perhaps work for the change in the system within the framework of the Likud to which you will now return?

[Answer] I will work for the idea regardless of the party reality. This is a subject which goes beyond party affiliation. There is no alternative to this profound reform. The coalition system of government, which also has advantages, entails too many blind alley situations. We must prevent negative upheavals which are likely to be lurking in the coming years along the difficult road expected for the State.

[Question] What kind of negative upheaval, for example, are you afraid of?

[Answer] A democratic society which shows signs of the disintegration of alignments, which is suffering from economic inflation, and which finds it difficult to reach decisions and solutions is likely to be dragged into the situations in which extremist fringe elements can be pushed to the center of events and bring dangers upon us which I prefer not to describe. There is no such immediate danger at the moment. The rule of law is an established principle among us, however we must not ignore what has happened to other peoples and it is better to take preventive action. However, even without these serious dangers, we must cure the severe ailments of Israeli society completely and at a much faster rate. We can only do this under a democratic presidential system of government.

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PROSPECTING FOR MINERAL RESOURCES YIELDING SOME PROMISING RESULTS

Amman AL-DUSTER in Arabic 26 Jul 80 p 7

[Article: "Engineer Ahmad Tuqan Speaks About the Accomplishments of the Authority of Natural Resources During a Period of 6 Months: Studies on Oil, Brass, Oil Shale Rock, Radioactive Substances and Minerals"]

[Text] The planning committee at the Authority of Natural Resources held a meeting, at the authority's headquarters headed by engineer Ahmad Dukhqan, deputy chairman of the authority, for the purpose of evaluating the authority's accomplishments, during the past 6 months, according to its program and within the framework of the 5-year plan.

Engineer Dukhqan said: "The authority has realized several accomplishments within the framework of the work of different departments and sections and mainly in that which is realted to studies, research prospecting work, irrigation projects, artesian wells, building dams, fixing springs and protecting them from polution, prospecting for additional natural resources, executing the projects of geophysical aerial surveying, magnetic surveying, siesmic surveying, geochemical surveying, geoelectrical surveying and additional studies by the geological laboratory and other studies which we will discuss briefly.

The Department of Minerals and Geological Research

Talking about the accomplishments of the Department of Minerals and Geological Research, engineer Dukhqan said: "The department was able to accomplish several projects most important of which were:

--"The project of aerial geophysical surveying which includes the electromagnetic and the dry gravitational magnetic surveying.

--"The Authority of Natural Resources signed an agreement with the Geotrax Company for Aerial Geophysical Surveying. According to this agreement, 19,000 linear kilometers of the western heights area of the kingdom, which is located between Suwayma in the north and the Jordanian--Saudi borders in the south, were surveyed by means of two airplanes."

Radiomagnetic Surveying

--"According to an agreement signed between the authority and the Phoenix Company, the kingdom was radiomagnetically surveyed.

--"The two companies, Geotrax and Phoenix, along with the U.S. Government engineers and experts will collect, prepare and analyze all the information related to the survey and will also prepare the necessary maps. The final reports will be submitted to the authority next October."

Gravitational and Magnetic Surveying In Al-Khalidiqa and Al-Mafraq

"The field work of gravitational and magnetic surveying of the areas of al-Khalidiqa and al-Mafraq has been concluded. This means that the northern part of the kingdom has been gravitationally and magnetically surveyed. All the major highways in the kingdom have been surveyed as well."

Thermal En[illegible]

"This project included geoelectric and thermal energy studies and the study of land upon which the University of Jordan's School of Engineering building will be constructed. The authority also conducted a study to fix the land resistance for the project of constructing the fertiliser plant in al-'Aqaba."

The School of Engineering Building

"A study was conducted to define the locations for the foundations of the new building which will house the School of Engineering and the University of Jordan. A study was also conducted on subterranean water in the areas of al-Manzil and al-Sultani dam.

The Project of Seismic Studies

"A special team conducted a study on the thickness of the oil shale rock in the area of al-Lujun.

Industrial Rocks

"Several wells were drilled at the request of the company requesting the National Council for Planning. This project was conducted for the purpose of locating the portland cement ore and the dry clay needed for the cement factory which is to be constructed.

The Project of Brass

"Work has been concluded in the area of Khurbat al-Jariyat and the neighboring areas and has now moved to other areas. The project aims at increasing the copper ore reserves. Several samples were collected and sent to the laboratory for chemical analysis.

Oil Shale Rock

"The authority continued collecting samples of the entire layer of the oil shale rock which is 35 meters thick in the areas of the project. The samples are forwarded to the companies which are going to study the economic value of these rocks.

Radioactive Substances and Energy

"The radioactive substances of all 104 springs in al-Zarat and Ma'in were measured and calculations were tabulated for the uranium, potasium and thorium found in these springs. According to these measurements the areas which registered high readings were defined.

"Water samples from the springs where waterfalls have been built were collected for the purpose of chemical analysis to discover the barium, rubidium and scandium elements.

"The work was completed on preparing geological maps with a scale of 10,000 for al-Zarat and Ma'in (al-Hammamat). The maps cover an area 20 square kilometers. Another geological contour map with a scale of 50,000 was also prepared.

"The geological report for the studied area was also completed."

Prospecting for Dolomite

"Several samples from different areas were analyzed. The area of Ma'in was chosen to conduct a detailed study which will also include Ra's al-Naqab, Wadi al-Sulayji and al-Sukhna."

Prospecting for Limestone

"Several samples are being collected from different areas for the purpose of prospecting for the pure limestone and for finding enough quantities of this ore to be used in local industries such as potasium. The geological department is still waiting for the results of the chemical analysis so that the proper locations will be defined.

"A study is being conducted for the purpose of prospecting analyzing and defining the layer of dry clay in Batn al-Ghul.

"The geochemical project in the area of Abu-Khushaiba showed, as a result of a study, that the fire stone in Wadi 'Araba contain a high concentration of mineral ore, mainly copper, in the Rayolite rocks. The study concentrated on these rocks in a very detailed fashion in order to explain this phenomena. Samples were taken to the mineral laboratory for analysis."

A Study of Geological Engineering

"The geological engineering laboratory at the Authority of Natural Resources conducted studies and field and laboratory analysis for the collapsing area of al-Jufa and al-Luwaybid mountain and made the necessary recommendations.

"The laboratory will also analyze the soil in different areas and laboratory and field studies were made in al-Amana area in Saqfal-Sayl. Studies were also made al-Tahtur mountain in Amman. Laboratory tests were made for the project of connecting amman to the water of the eastern al-Ghawr canal. Sand samples from the Jordan Valley Authority were analysed also."

Supervising Quarries

"The department of supervision and licensing continued to perform its duty by inspecting quarries and collecting samples for the purpose of finding out the quality of the rock. This work which was performed in cooperation with the Royal Scientific Society also included the supervision of sand, marble and building rock quarries in Jordan."

Irrigation, Lakes and Dams

"In Irbid, al-Karak and al-Balqa' several projects of irrigation were executed. In al-Mafraq, Ma'daba and the outskirts of the capital studies were made on the desert lakes. Several desert dams and springs were repaired and protected from pollution in Irbid, al-Balqa', the capital, al-Karak and Ma'an."

The Department Drilling

"Several wells were dug by the Department of Drilling, at the Authority of Natural Resources, in Khunayzira, al-Munishir, Wadi Musa, Fidan No 2 and Fidan No 4, Ri'r Wadi Musa No 6 and Wadi 'Areba. A well was dug in al-Wala for the company of drinking water and another was dug in al-Baq'a to supervise the water level. A well was dug in Katm and another in 'Asal as an experiment to discover if there is water in the north. Another well was dug in Ghawr al-Safi (No 3) for the purpose of finding water for the Authority of Wadi al-'Urdun. Other wells were also dug in al-Mugarin, 'Arida Bani 'Ibad and Wadi al-'Abyad.

"Four old wells were repaired along with five industrial wells and three pumping stations in al-Karama, al-Tawani and al-Jafr.

"Several wells are currently being dug in al-Ajfur, al-Azraq, Sahm al-Kafarat, Kafar Yuba, al-Mawqir, Hasban, al-Baq'a, 'Anba, Irbid, Kafarnajat and Kafahuda for the purpose of studies and prospecting for subterranean water.

Surveying Wells

"Maps, tables and lists of available wells for the areas included in the surveying project have been prepared.

"Ninety-three wells have been surveyed so far in the areas of the northern part of al-Badiya, al-Ajfur, al-Risha, al-Qastal, al-Jiza, al-Zarqa', al-Bug'a and al-'Azraq.

Water Studies

"The Department of Water Studies conducted, through the Division of Subterranean Water, a study which included a schedule of drilling for 1980. The schedule includes prospecting for subterranean water in the sandy layers in the basin of al-Zarqa', searching for deep subterranean water in the basin of al-Azraq, searching and studying subterranean water in the basin of al-Hamad, studying the relationship among the water of al-Azraq, al-Dalil and northern desert and supervising the drilling of water wells in al-Azraq for the purpose of bringing it to Amman.

"Studies and consultations were conducted for the following ministries and institutions:

--"To locate the wells and to study the area of al-Ghuwayra for the purpose of using subterranean water for irrigation. This work was performed for the Ministry of Agriculture.

--"To supply the Division of Drinking Water with the required information on water resources in the northern desert, Qa'Ram, al-Humayma, al-Muthallath al-Sahrawi and Sumaya.

--"To study the availability of subterranean water in al-'Abdi for the armed forces.

--"To study the availability of subterranean water in al-Batrawi for the Department of Land Surveyance.

--"To conduct a study on the availability of water in al-Rusayfa for the Phosphate Mine Company.

--"To define the wells for the application of pumping water by solar power and wind for the Royal Scientific Society.

"The division of Subterranean Water supervised the following projects:

--"An experiment was made on a well in al-Baq'a in order to evaluate the hydrolic qualities of the sand layer lying under the water.

--"An experiment was made on the Ketm well for a period of 18 days for the purpose of evaluating the fixed amount of water produced.

--"Experiments were made on wells in al-Qastel for the Division of Drinking Water.

--"An experiment was made on the Well of Wadi al-Dalil, No 6, in order to diagnose the problems.

--"The work of drilling the well of the southern municipality of al-Zaraqa' and the well of the Authority of Water and Sewer in the area of Wadi al-Sibaq was supervised.

--"Reports were also prepared about the northern desert area and al-Dalil and about the water situation for the area of the Jordanian University.

--"Preparations are being made in order to benefit from the use of the comparative electric computer in the operations of the Division of Subterranean Water.

80 Percent of the Kingdom's Share

"The importance of the projects of the Division of Surface Water is due to the fact that this division deals with 880 million cubic meters annually of surface water which amounts to 80 percent of the kingdom's share of water. The division keeps track of rainfall, of draining the water of the valley and its floods and of the continually flowing springs. The division also measures the quantity and level of evaporation in the kingdom by means of 180 rainfall stations out of which 68 stations are mechanically operated, 16 are equipped to measure the weather factors for the purpose of defining the evaporating amounts of water and for the purpose of measuring 1,000 annual or seasonal springs in the kingdom.

"A register has been installed to measure the water levels in Judaida near the Red Sea area in al-'Aqaba. The division also administered and maintained all existing stations, published the technical rain report in Jordan, controlled water stations and analyzed field work."

Licensing Drilling for Water

"The Division of Licensing Drilling will supervise all drilling operations of the private sector by means of issuing well drilling licenses, collecting drilling samples of soil and water for analysis, monitoring water basins and applying the rules of monitoring subterranean water.

"The division responded to the requests of the private sector by issuing drilling licenses based on report preparations and defining the location. The division supervised the pumping operations of private wells where 27 pumping experiments were conducted issued reports on the drilling machines,

prepared the bases upon which it relies in issuing drilling licenses to control water balance and the amounts of water pumped from each basin, obligating well owners to install water meters and defining the amount of land irrigated with subterranean water.

"The division prepared reports on all the licensed wells in the kingdom, their locations, productivity and the areas of land licensed for the drilled wells. The division prepared contour maps for the surface of water in some areas in the light of the most recent information on drilling especially in the areas that have not been completely studied. Other maps of water analysis were also prepared."

The Accomplishments of the Department of Mechanics and Transportation

"The department is supervizing the execution of constructing shops for the maintenance and repair of drilling machines, pumps, machinery and cars. An agreement was signed with a British consulting company for the purpose of constructing and equiping the workshops with the tools and the necessary machinery.

Seventeen donums of land have been purchased for the project a road has been built, a fence has been erected around the property and water has been brought to it. The electric company will install a transformer in order to bring electricity to the project. The authority will train technicians in the needed areas in order to improve their performance.

"The authority will also hire qualified technicians from the technical institutes and it will train them inside and outside the country."

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ENI REPORTED IMPROVING RELATIONSHIP WITH KOC

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 19 Aug 80 p 11

[Report by Samir al-Ahmad: "ENI's Case Against Saudi Petromin Submitted to Higher Italian Judiciary"]

[Text] The special parliamentary committee for investigating "commissions" paid by the Italian company ENI, to close the well-known petroleum deal with Petromin of Saudi Arabia, announced that this matter was no longer under its jurisdiction and that it turned the whole subject to the higher Italian courts.

Relations With Kuwait

The exact amounts and recipients of those commissions were exposed. This case had turned into a great political scandal in Italy and led to the cancellation of the contract between the Italian petroleum company ENI and the Saudi company Petromin. It also led to the removal from office of ENI's existing management and the appointment of Mr Grande as the new president of the organization, in addition to a number of specialists who assist him in running and managing the country's most important economic organization. Since the new administration took over, its goal has been to improve relations, at all levels, with Arab oil-producing countries, mainly Kuwait and Iraq. However, petroleum relations between Italy and Kuwait have, in the past years, encountered some difficulties and obstacles which resulted in a noticeably lower rate of interaction between the two sides. This caused some concern among Italian petroleum policy makers, especially in the government-owned ENI. The reasons for these obstacles go back primarily to the fact that ENI chose to deal with other countries before going to Kuwait, and also to the [large] volume of connections between KOC and private Italian oil companies.

Monti's Empire

Relations totally deteriorated after the tanker "Salim's" incident and after its tonnage was purchased by an Italian company in Genoa. However, the best known Italian private company that dealt with KOC was "Petroliera Italiana," known as "Monti's Oil Company" after its owner Ezilio Monti, who also owns several financial institutions oil refineries and distribution stations known as MAC [expansion unknown].

About 1 year ago, "Monti's Empire" began to gradually collapse, forcing him to sell most of his distribution stations due to his huge debts and because of his direct clash with the United Workers' syndicates which wanted to administer the Italian oil sector through ENI in order to save this vital sector from private companies.

Attempts To Improve Conditions

A long time ago, the fact that Mr Monti owed KOC 25 million dollars became known. The story of these debts began when the customs authorities at the Milatzo refinery confiscated 185,000 tons of oil fuel which were imported from Kuwait by Monti, because he was unable to pay the import tax due on the fuel. This led to Monti's evasion from paying KOC for the imported fuel. Due to the continuing monetary inflation, the sum has increased to $30 million.

A few days ago, ENI, under its new management, intervened to solve the problem by purchasing more than one refinery owned by Mr Monti and also undertook to pay debts owed to KOC by Monti, provided Monti began immediately paying back this sum and its interest to ENI through his several companies, as agreed between the two sides.

This step by ENI is not aimed at saving Monti; it is an attempt at improving relations with KOC and having better relations with Kuwait in general. This would be achieved through a long-term project aimed at reexamining the nature and volume of ENI's work in all Arab oil-producing nations.

Kuwaiti Observations

ENI's president, Mr Grande, recently visited Kuwait and personally examined the nature of relations between the two countries in this field. He noticed discontent among official circles in Kuwait with the method of dealings of Italian companies in the oilfield. Grande relayed the Kuwaiti comments to ENI's board of directors in the hope of setting bases for proper and long-term cooperation between the two sides. It is worth noting that Mr Monti, or "king of the oil industry" as he is called here, was forced to sell "two newspapers" which he owned to pay the tens of millions of dollars of debts he owned some Italian organizations. ENI's step is considered a prelude to seizing the most important Italian refineries for the purpose of managing this vital sector throughout the country, because Italy, which needs to import oil more than any other European nation, cannot afford to leave the fate of their petroleum sector in the hands of private companies alone.

9455
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BRIEFS

OSLO BOND ISSUE--A special economic report, published yesterday, said that the most important incident last week was the announcement that the city of Oslo was the first borrower in the Kuwaiti bond market, after 1 year of restriction of issuing new bonds. The volume of bonds issued was limited to 7 million dinars, which is the maximum amount permitted by the central bank. Oslo, the capital of Norway, is considered one of the highest rated borrowers. The international bonds report, issued by the Arab monetary exchange company, said that the bonds' maturity date is 1990, at a 9 and 1/4 percent interest. The median long term will be 7 years due to the loan payment fund. The initial market reaction was good, due to the excellent characteristics of the borrower, in addition to the good interest rate and maturity date especially compared with the old dinar [interest] rate issued by Oslo at 7 and 5/8 percent, with a maturity date of 1990. The weekly report also mentioned that the prices of other international bonds remained the same. This reflects caution by the investors against the gradually rising interest rates on the dinar due to increasing local market demand. In other international markets, the volume of exchange was low in general for seasonal reasons, in addition to the rise in interest rates in foreign markets. This was especially true in the U.S., where the stock market is suffering from a relapse due to the Federal Reserve Bank's policy in the money market and the presidential candidates' election campaign declarations. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 30 Aug 80 p 14] 9455

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE--Prime Minister al-Shaykh Saad Al-Abdullah [al-Sabah] announced that certain amendments will be made to the election law, and that the minister of interior was assigned the task of presenting suggestions in this regard. In a press conference held yesterday morning, he assured that all the decisions, decrees and laws issued during the past 4 years will be presented to the new National Assembly for review. He said that the return of the assembly was in fulfillment of his promise and commitment. He also said that being part of the assembly is not an honor, but a duty and responsibility. He expressed his hope that everybody has learned their lessons and to stay away from old assembly practices. He reconfirmed the right of women's suffrage in assembly elections, but he said that this matter was in the hands of the cabinet. He said that the new assembly will have 50 members and a recommendation will be presented to the new assembly to increase its membership to 60. He said that the circumstances of this area and the Arab world necessitate the existence of a National Assembly in order to establish group responsibility and public participation in decisions that are important to Kuwait's present and future. [Excerpts] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Aug 80 p 3] 9455

CSO: 4802

PHALANGIST INITIATIVES ASSESSED; FRANJIYAH OBTAINS MODERN ARMS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 9 Aug 80 pp 23-23

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Latest Race between Security Breakdowns and Partition! Phalange Told Damascus, 'We Will not Declare a Christian State in our Sector!'"]

[Text] When the Syrian leaders decided to redeploy the Syrian Deterrent Forces in Lebanon, their decision was not tactical, as some believed and tried to explain. Rather, it was a strategic decision, through which the Syrians intended to regroup their forces to meet the great dangers that had begun to threaten their national security, and counter the pressure applied to insure the progress of the Camp David plans in the region.

At that time, Damascus communicated these reasons to all Lebanese and Arab officials concerned. Syria said that Israel, with the consent of the United States, was preparing to gradually drag the Syrian army in Lebanon into clashes which would lead to Syria's isolation. A decisive military blow would be directed against Syria, putting an end to its political and military role with regard to thwarting the Camp David accords.

The Syrian leadership implemented the first and second stages of withdrawal and regrouping, but it was not long before it stopped implementing the remaining stages. It informed those concerned with the reason for this.

These reasons gradually became apparent recently, with the revival of security breakdowns and military confrontations on the Lebanese scene. These began to escalate in such a way as to raise fears that the internal security situation in Lebanon is in danger of blowing up, and that confrontations might resume at times between yesterday's adversaries, and at other times between yesterday's allies.

In due course, senior Syrian officials became convinced that Arab and non-Arab forces had begun to return to the Lebanese scene, exploiting Syria's withdrawal, and the security and political vacuums left behind.

As a result, Lebanon was once again becoming an open area for the outbreak of repressed Arab struggles, as well as regional struggles which had been revived following the events of Iran and Afghanistan.

It became evident to Syria that this development threatened its own security, more than anybody else. Syria sensed that the appearance on the Lebanese scene of all the familiar forces as well as new elements concerned with the Middle East conflict, meant grave dangers, including the outbreak of a new war in Lebanon, which might be more savage than the 2-year war. These dangers also include the partition of Lebanon and a strike against the Palestinian Resistance. The purpose would be to attain the fundamental goal of fragmenting whatever Arab capabilities remain in opposition to the Camp David solutions, and, consequently, to impose a comprehensive solution at the expense of Lebanon, the Palestinians and the Arab territory occupied in 1967.

It also became quite evident that Israel would be the one in the best position to use the revived regional and Arab disputes on the Lebanese scene to its best advantage, by directing a military strike at the appropriate time. And why not, as long as the American administration, as a result of the presidential elections, has become powerless to deter or even to reproach Israel.

Faced with these new developments and factors, the Syrian leadership suspended its decision to pull out its forces from Lebanon. The first signs of the new perils appeared in the security violations and political assassinations which have so far occurred. They are all part of a scheme with which the Lebanese state has become thoroughly familiar. It is aimed at fabricating serious security incidents in Lebanon, in order to once again disrupt the situation in a way that makes the results difficult to foresee at the present time, unless the purpose is what Egyptian President Anwar Sadat stated in his recent speech to the effect that Lebanon was approaching a catastrophe and that its partition was forthcoming.

After the 7 July operation of the Phalange Party, in which it was able to eliminate the military wing of former President Camille Sham'un's party, the Phalange Party's military commander, Bashir al-Jumayyil, was quoted as saying that the 7 July operation was not for fun, because the military operation, and the stern security measures taken to control the situation, "have immunized our areas and will make them secure in the face of the serious security disruptions expected to take place in the western sector of Beirut and other areas subject to the authority of the Palestinians and their allies."

Bashir al-Jumayyil is also quoted as saying: "We have been aware that serious incidents would occur in the western sector of Beirut, as a result of the outbreak of Arab, regional and local conflicts there. We were afraid that these flare-ups would spread to our sector, as a

result of the lax security situation in our areas and of our certainty that more than one hostile element would be capable of penetrating some of the Christian lines, including those of the military organization of the National Liberal Party. This would make it easy for these hostile forces to turn both east and west areas into a theater for the eruptions that would start in the western areas. Now, however, we can be confident that eruptions in the western sector of Beirut would not spread into our sector."

This, as well as prior Phalange Party justifications of the operation to eliminate President Sham'un's military arm, were the subject of interest and study, not only by senior Lebanese officials, but also by party and government leaders in Syria as well. The latter saw the Phalange Party's action as adding a new element to their apprehensions regarding Lebanon. This is the fear that this Phalangist initiative was in fact meant to pave the way for the proclamation of a Christian state under Phalangist leadership, making the partition of Lebanon a fait accompli.

On this basis, the matter remained the object of study and concern by the Syrians, pending adoption of a final decision to take political and military action to confront this dangerous development.

Damascus has to reach a decision in this regard before the meeting of the Ba'th Party Congress, so that government and party leaders could respond to all anticipated questions at the party congress. It was said in this regard that the topic of the Phalangist military and political initiatives, and the resultant danger of Lebanon's partition, were some of the basic matters to be brought up for discussion.

As part of the rapid action initiated in the Syrian capital, contacts took place between Damascus and officials of the Phalange Party to obtain clarification of the party's intentions and designs regarding the Christian areas now subject to its exclusive authority, and, consequently, to discuss accusations that the Phalange Party was preparing to proclaim its own state.

The Phalangist leadership appeared to be extremely eager, during these contacts, to convey the following to the Syrian capital:

First, the Phalangist forces' actions on 7 July were aimed at rectifying abnormal security conditions.

Second, the Phalange Party's security measures in its sector are not meant to be a prelude to proclaiming a state in this sector, because the party is for continuation of Lebanon's territorial and popular unity. The party has repeatedly proved that, particularly when it recently declared its support for the principles of a accord announced by President Ilyas Sarkis, and, consequently, its readiness to participate in a government of national accord on the basis of these premises.

Third, the Phalange Party wishes, or rather is anxious, to resume the dialog that was underway between itself and Syrian officials on various levels, in order to achieve mutual understanding and consultation and to arrive at solutions for all pending matters.

In light of the results of these contacts, the Phalange Party decided to form a broad-based delegation to go to Damascus to conduct a comprehensive review and evaluation of the Lebanese situation following the new developments, particularly the Phalange's elimination of President Sham'un's militia, and, consequently, the complication of the problem of forming a new government of reconciliation in Lebanon.

Additional reasons led the Phalange Party to speed up the visit to Damascus and the resumption of the dialog with Syrian officials. It has been decided to hold up renewal of this dialog until after a new Lebanese government was formed. What were these additional reasons?

A few days ago, firm information was received that former President Sulayman Franjiyah had received a large shipment of modern arms from a distant Arab state, which would enable him to open a powerful, military front against the Phalangists.

This caused Phalangist confusion, to the extent that Phalangist leaders thought that Franjiyah's new weapons were sent to him by Syria. However, this suspicion was quickly dispelled, when the Phalangist leadership discovered that the arms came from another Arab country.

In spite of that, the Phalangist leadership remained convinced that the Syrian capital would have a certain responsibility for any military initiative by former President Franjiyah, following his receipt of these modern weapons. This is because of two basic considerations:

First, President Franjiyah was Damascus' first political ally. Second, the Syrian forces operating in the north are capable of stopping any major military action by former President Franjiyah against Phalangist areas.

Therefore, the Phalangist leadership made two decisions. The first, a military one, was to concentrate military forces on the northern front of President Franjiyah, and to issue orders to destroy Zagharta at the first sign of military action by him. The second decision, a political one, was to accelerate the opening of a dialog with Damascus, in order to look into this matter and ascertain Syria's views on it.

In this climate, a large explosion occurred in the al-Ashrafiyah area, when an explosive charge of 40 kgs of TNT was detonated and resulted in heavy material damages and a number of dead and wounded.

The state of alarm caused by this explosion, apart from the fear of repetition of the incident, induced observers to believe that the myth

of self-administered security, which the Phalange Party had tried or is trying to impose in the Christian sector, is subject to collapse any minute, and that the events confirm every day that the security situation remains unchanged. Any Lebanese sector, be it western or eastern, has been and continues to be exposed to bloody, painful incidents, because the reasons for this explosive situation are still present in every spot in Lebanon, from south to north, including Beirut and its suburbs.

Lebanese authorities know that there is a link between the clashes which are breaking out in the western sector of Beirut and the fighting which broke out in Ba'labakk during the funeral procession of the dean of the journalists' union, Riyadh Taha. These bloody military clashes are probably intensifying and escalating as a result of the regional and Arab conflicts which have reappeared on the Lebanese scene.

Had the situation been limited to these kinds of outbursts, the anxiety and fears of Lebanese officials would be quite restrained. However, the thing that increases the enormity of their fears is that the government does not know how far the Phalange Party will go in paving the way for a separatist state in the eastern sectors. The government also does not know whether what is happening in the eastern sector is a result of what is occurring in the western sector, or vice versa, with regard to the dangerous game that President Sarkis calls the game of partition.

7005
CSO: 4802

LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CRISIS DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 9 Aug 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Ghassan Bayram: "Outwardly, A Crisis of Government; Inwardly, a Crisis of Power; Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh Will Withdraw if Sarkis Wishes; al-Sulh's Withdrawal Means Abandonment of Last Constitutional Prerogative of President"]

[Text] The speech given by President Ilyas Sarkis on Army Day, 1 August, was not the speech he wanted to deliver on this national occasion. He wanted, by means of this speech, to dominate the next phase. He thought it would be one of relaxation for Lebanon, and the beginning of the reconciliation that would give the country a way out of its ordeal.

President Sarkis had prepared his basic Army Day speech amid preparations to charge Premier Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh with forming the government of reconciliation activists. Everything on the surface of the Lebanese crisis appeared relaxed and promising.

On this basis, President Sarkis prepared a speech tantamount to a program of action to initiate a solution of the crisis, under the aegis of national reconciliation beginning with the formation of a government of political activists.

However, winds always blow in the wrong direction. As soon as the Lebanese president had taken the first step of asking Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh to form the new government of political activists, and was about to take the second step of announcing the formation of the new government, matters became complicated, difficulties emerged and the rosy dream which President Sarkis had entertained for some time receded.

When Army Day approached, he found himself forced to cancel his prepared speech and write another one, concise and traditional in both form and content, in which he was content to affirm the importance of the army and its unity and of national reconciliation, and to express good wishes.

The past 4 years of President Sarkis' term have been filled with frustrated hopes of one kind or another. These frustrations have always

left the Lebanese locomotive of peace and security motionless. The same motionless condition applies to Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh, who is waiting now, not knowing whether or not he will be able to form a new government or bow out.

The premier-designate has for some time entertained the idea of stepping down, due to growing complications, in spite of intense consultations and contacts between Damascus and Beirut to solve the problem of the choice of al-Sulh as premier and to reach mutual understanding on a formula which would allow Sarkis and al-Sulh to announce the formation of a government.

After a meeting held by the Nationalist Movement's Political Council, at the beginning of last week, a comprehensive evaluation of the situation was made in light of the results of contacts with Damascus by members of the movement. The Nationalist Movement's staff emerged from the meeting semi-convinced that the possibility of Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh's remaining as premier-designate had become almost impossible, and that President Ilyas Sarkis was at an impasse with respect to al-Sulh. Accordingly, Sarkis had to decide whether to remain committed to al-Sulh and stay at a dead end, or abandon al-Sulh and open the way for the formation of a new government, headed by a person acceptable to all and satisfactory to Damascus.

Several Nationalist Movement leaders expressed their belief that Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh was about to bow out. Dr Samir Sabbagh, deputy chief of the Murabitun Movement, said that according to information available to him, a reasonable way out was being arranged to induce al-Sulh to step aside. He said forming a government of second-line political leaders headed by Dr Salim al-Huss or Mr Malik Salam was under consideration.

Dr Sabbagh expressed his belief that the difficulty of taking this way out might keep the problem of forming a government hanging indefinitely. Apparently, there are those who feel that they benefit from the lack of formation of a new government, and are currently active to keep the situation as is.

Dr Sabbagh added that there is now fear of dangers which might arise from keeping the government situation in suspense. It is even feared that in the next phase, these dangers will develop in a way which will not serve the security situation, or the progress of reconciliation.

In view of these dangers, the Nationalist Movement leaders agreed at their recent meeting to draw up a contingency plan in the event matters deteriorated as a result of inability to form a government and of the Phalange Party's exploitation of this situation.

Some of the fundamentals of this plan, which calls for quick action, have been disclosed as follows:

--Action to consolidate the Islamic and Nationalist positions, and develop their effectiveness.

--Intensification of contacts and coordination with former presidents Sulayman Franjiyah and Rashid Karami, and forming a high-level delegation of the Nationalist Movement to visit northern Lebanon and hold meetings with Presidents Franjiyah and Karami. The purpose is to draw up a plan of national opposition to counter Phalangist schemes and positions of the regime which are not in keeping with this plan of action. It is a plan which might be outwardly political and secretly military or vice versa.

This move by the Nationalist Movement is matched by similar moves on the part of other forces operating in Lebanon to meet all eventualities, including the possibility of al-Sulh being induced to step aside or the possibility of President Sarkis sticking with al-Sulh as premier-designate.

The important question now is, which is the stronger possibility?

A lengthy conversation by Premier-designate Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh with AL-MUSTAQBAL, not originally meant for publication, reveals certain facets of the government crisis.

According to the premier-designate, "All contacts concerning formation of the new government have not been completed, and it is not true that we are at an impasse, merely because some say that Damascus opposes my forming the new government.

"We want to take our time in our efforts to overcome the difficulties which obstruct our mission of forming the government. This stems from our belief that it does not matter if the job takes a little longer, as long as we believe that this will later shorten the suffering of Lebanon and the Lebanese."

Premier al-Sulh holds that his decision to step aside would depend on the position of President Ilyas Sarkis. This means that he will continue to refuse to step aside and will continue his efforts to form a government, until he sees that the president of the republic has given up on these efforts and has decided to settle the problem by dropping al-Sulh. At such a time, al-Sulh would announce that he is stepping aside to make room for the president to select another person to form the government.

Al-Sulh's attitude has turned the spotlight on the president's position and on what he proposes to do.

Up to the end of last week, the president had no clear and final position. Rather, it seemed that he was inclined to intensify contacts with

Damascus through the foreign minister, Fu'ad Butrus, whom he chose as a liaison between himself and Damascus, to solve the problem of who is to form the government and what type of government it will be.

The president's position has divided those close to him into two groups, each with its own view regarding what the president proposes to do.

The first view is that while President Sarkis now appears to stick with al-Sulh, he is not inflexible in this attitude. The proof of that is that he has left the door open for continued discussion with Damascus on a suitable government formula. While he would like to have al-Sulh as premier, he would prefer, if he has to choose, to maintain good relations with Damascus.

The second view is that it is no longer easy or possible for President Sarkis to induce Premier al-Sulh to step aside and replace him with another nominee like Salim al-Huss or Malik Salam. They go on to say that as far as President Sarkis is concerned, the issue is not a matter of being attached to or convinced of the competence of al-Sulh, but a matter of principle rooted in the system of government in Lebanon.

The president could not stomach two or more reversals at the same time.

The first reversal would be his being compelled to abandon al-Sulh. This would mean taking away the only remaining constitutional prerogative he can exercise,namely the right to select a prime minister.

The second reversal would consist not only of the forcing on him of a premier, such as Dr al-Huss or Malik Salam, but also of the imposition on him of a specific, political course of action. This would rob him of the freedom of action required to maintain the proper balance within the Lebanese political structure. What is more serious is that imposing a prime minister and a specific political course on the president would deprive him of the element of initiative in more than one domain and on more than one level, and would transform him into a figurehead president of the republic counting whatever days are left of his term.

If this latter view is correct, there is reason to believe that President Sarkis' firmness in sticking with al-Sulh, countered by the firmness of those who reject this choice, mean that the situation in Lebanon is heading toward a crisis in the government regime, whose results would be difficult to foresee.

What is certain is that no one, especially not President Sarkis, wants such a crisis to develop, because it would mean a new political confrontation between the government leaders of Syria and Lebanon. Past experience has proved that this type of confrontation frequently has repercussions on the security situation, in terms of tensions and explosiveness, and shuts the door on any possible solution.

Thus, the Lebanese situation reverts to spinning around in a vicious circle, awaiting either surprise developments or miracles.

7005
CSO: 4802

AMIN AL-JUMAYYIL DISCUSSES NATIONAL SITUATION

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 25 Jul 80 pp 12-14

[Interview with Amin al-Jumayyil, Phalange Party Leader in Northern al-Matn, by Huda al-Hussayni; date and place not given]

[Text] Since 7 July, the date of the military "coup" which occurred within the ranks of the Lebanese Front, the responsibility of Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil within the Phalangist Party has grown. Amin al-Jumayyil is the party official responsible for the northern area of al-Matn.

The political positions which al-Jumayyil formerly held have been toned down considerably since the tragedy that occurred during the military coup, and this has helped the Lebanese Phalangist Party avoid many negative reactions.

Amin al-Jumayyil played a conspicuous role during this phase. He is in continuous contact with Danny Sham'un, the military commander of the Liberal Nationalists Party, and his daily meetings with President Kamil Sham'un have continued without interruption.

In this interview with AL-HAWADITH, Amin al-Jumayyil insisted that the "Lebanese Army" is the one and only savior of Lebanon, provided that it is given complete powers. He revealed that the Phalangists' relations with the Palestinian resistance have not been cut off, and he said that a meeting recently took place between a Phalangist Party information official and Abu Iyad.

In this extended interview, Amin al-Jumayyil discussed many matters, both local and international. All these matters relate to Lebanon, however. He said that he would like to see normal relations between the Phalangists and Moscow, but stressed that such relations would not weaken their relations with the free world. In addition, he called for the Lebanese state to be courageous in confronting all its problems.

The text of the interview follows:

AL-HAWADITH: During a number of meetings between you and President Sham'un, it has been noted that Sham'un has acted with a certain amount of weakness, hesitancy, and confusion. What is your view on this?

Al-Jumayyil: To be truthful, I have never in my life seen President Sham'un stronger than he is today. If there is any weakness in his character, it was his natural reaction of wanting to withdraw from the field. If this had occurred, the biggest civil war in the history of the Christian area would have taken place.

Sham'un's coolness and his ability to overcome his natural feelings toward his associates and the organization he built a long time ago were put to the test, as were his thinking and his popularity. If President Sham'un had acted as any ordinary man, with a natural reaction to the enormity of this death, it is certain that everything would have been blown apart and Lebanon would have become embroiled in a more enormous and more perilous tragedy. And the matter would not have stopped with a few dozen deaths.

AL-HAWADITH: Don't you feel remorse for the tragedy that occurred? And was it possible to avoid it?

Al-Jumayyil: It is premature to talk about remorse, and it is premature to take a position. I believe that President Sham'un was clear when he told you that the present time is not a time for disapproval, or even a time for remorse. Now is a time for bold, objective and conscientious action to deal with the course of the tragedy. Because it really is a tragedy. And we have now reached this point. There are continuous meetings between President Sham'un and Shaykh Pierre [Jamayyil], and more than one side is trying to improve the climate. There are also efforts with Danny, and there are continuous contacts between me and him, so that we can at least save what we can. And this provides a basis for rectification.

There was an unreasonable lack of discipline, which was not accepted by anyone, and there were excesses. I am not saying that we have a duty to eliminate the excesses among others. Perhaps we have more idiosyncracies than some of the others, and I am not aiming an accusation at anyone. What I want to say is that this jolt to the conscience which took place could possibly generate some new feelings among the citizens. As a consequence, it could put new dynamism into organized, earnest and infallible action to save the situation, which has nearly gotten stuck in quagmires of corruption, irresponsibility, attrition, entanglement and conflicting wagering. In any case, the correct characterization of the events which have occurred is that the Lebanese crisis went on until it finally landed in a quagmire, where diseases are usually generated.

AL-HAWADITH: Who is responsible for the continuation of this maelstrom?

Al-Jumayyil: Perhaps we lay the responsibility on President Sarkis, and he blames the situation in the Middle East, and everyone blames someone-else. In my opinion, the main responsibility lies with President Sarkis, because he is supposed to search for solutions and move quickly--especially since the events which have taken place today have turned everyone against him. Those who want partition no longer have an interest in the presence of President Ilyas Sarkis, and those who want a unified Lebanon find that their interest does not lie with President Sarkis, who is incapable of insuring the unity of Lebanon.

Herein lies the gravity of the situation. All the sides, with all their conflicts, now feel a tendency to bypass President Sarkis or view him as not serving their interests.

AL-HAWADITH: Who wants partition?

Al-Jumayyil: Lord, you at AL-HAWADITH certainly have a broader field of vision that we do, especially since your move to London.

AL-HAWADITH: In any case, they write in the foreign press that you want partition, and especially Shaykh Bashir.

Al-Jumayyil: Why don't they put us to the test? In any case, partition will end when a single army comes in and puts all this area that we live in in order.

AL-HAWADITH: What is the crisis of the Lebanese Army?

Al-Jumayyil: Shaykh Pierre made a statement and said that we call for the army to be deployed in the two areas--or at least along the lines of engagement, or in the main centers of the state, such as the airport and the ports. Then communication should be opened between these areas. After that we will discuss (perfection?). As for the statement that the army must be put in order first, and country saved later, this is an unreasonable statement. I consider it treason. I believe that it is treasonous that, while the country is burning, we should discuss (perfection?), or discuss whether or not the powers of the Deuxieme Bureau [intelligence service] of the army should be expanded. The army should be deployed with a specific mission whose aim is to get things under control. As for the reforms and the other problems, they can be dealt with afterward.

AL-HAWADITH: How is it possible for the army to be deployed when it is in a state of moral and material collapse, and when you have a situation in which if a member of the army apprehends a fighter, a group from the fighter's party comes the next day to get revenge?

Al-Jumayyil: The reason for this is that the army is being deployed gradually, in small groups, and this has destroyed the army. No state in the world requires the army to deploy gradually in small groups. The Lebanese Army must be deployed in one group, and it must be deployed honorably. Along with the deployment of the army, civilian and secular courts must be established under these circumstances. Also, definite arrangements must be made to stand up for the cause of the army. If the army is deployed in small groups and is isolated from the other areas, then any band can cut it off and remain safe from any punishment. Therefore, we say that the army ought to be deployed immediately--at least in Beirut--and in integrated areas. That is, its lines of supply should be secure--it should be an integrated army unit. In addition, a state of emergency should be declared in the areas occupied by the army. But above all, the Lebanese Army must be deployed and it must assume its responsibilities. Then we can unify Lebanon--especially since our army is still the most untarnished army in the area. For in spite of all that has happened, the army has not been known to engage in any sectarian fighting. The members of the army have not opened fire on one another in the barracks. In the Sidon barracks they haven't opened fire on the Christian, and in the Juniyah barracks they haven't opened fire on the Moslem.

No officer has been killed for sectarian reasons in any of the barracks. And in spite of what has happened, nothing has taken place to affect the honor and integrity of the Lebanese Army. Thus, our army is still much more cohesive than people believe, and it is still more effective than people believe. It is still untarnished, and it still possesses the capability to act, provided that it is given the powers and the political, official and popular backing to do so.

AL-HAWADITH: But there is no equivalence between the weapons available to the parties and those possessed by the army.

Al-Jumayyil: The army possesses two kinds of weapons: material weapons and moral weapons. All its material weapons are of no benefit if they are not supported by the moral weapons. Today, all the Lebanese people are on the side of the army. When the army wishes to serve its country and carry out its duties conscientiously, then all the people will spit in the face of any individual who fires on the army, whether his weapon is a pistol or a cannon. Women and children will go and stand in front of the cannons that are aimed against the Lebanese Army. This would apply to both eastern and western Beirut alike, and to Moslems and Christians alike.

AL-HAWADITH: Are you speaking now on behalf of al-Jumayyil or on behalf of the Phalangist Party, which includes Shaykh Bashir?

Al-Jumayyil: I am speaking on behalf of the spirit of the Lebanese Phalangist Party, and the overwhelming majority, and the logic which forms the basis for the thinking of the president of the Phalangist Party himself. I speak from this position.

AL-HAWADITH: But doesn't Shaykh Bashir object to the deployment of the army?

Al-Jumayyil: Because Shaykh Bashir--and he is right to a great extent--has lost confidence in the ability of the army to carry out any rescue mission on the level of Lebanon. And perhaps Shaykh Bashir is not the only one who shares these feelings. The state takes pleasure in everything that happens and is waiting for the people to beg and plead with it. I don't believe that anyone will beg the authorities, and authority must be imposed or it will not have any existence.

These are the feelings of a large segment of the Lebanese. But in spite of these feelings, no one will stand in the way of the state if it takes matters firmly in hand. On the contrary, they will feel at ease, because the people really accept the tyranny of the state.

AL-HAWADITH: We have learned that you reject President Sarkis' position against deploying the army, but why won't you discuss the reasons for this rejection?

Al-Jumayyil: I am against President Ilyas Sarkis' logic, which says, as the English, "wait and see." And I am against the logic which says, "We can't do anything." This, unfortunately, was the logic of former minister Fu'ad Butrus, who is our dear friend. This logic has not contributed to saving the ship. Under previous circumstances, the state has been able to impose itself. We have not forgotten that you of AL-HAWADITH have paid the price. Your magazine was confiscated in east and west [Beirut]. Thus, the state could have confiscated the magazine and newspaper REVEIL which supported AL-HAWADITH and shared in some of measures taken by the state.

Therefore, the state had the capabilities to close the newspapers and apply the law in every sense of the word. So why did it give up all these capabilities? How could it have failed to settle the matter when it was able to? How did it permit all the initiatives to fall through its hands? This is the logic of Fu'ad Butrus, which did not lead to any progress in the Lebanese problem or any improvement of the situation in the Lebanese sphere.

Now, who is responsible? It is certain that these words will make former minister Fu'ad Butrus angry, and he will try to find an excuse for himself. In any case, it is incumbent on the government to succeed, and the people always hold the government accountable for success or failure and do not find any excuses for it. The people are not required to find excuses to absolve the ruler. When an architect

is asked to design a house, the house is expected to be sound. It is the responsibility of the architect to build a sound house. In the case of the doctor, you don't force him to cure you, because there are some diseases which fall outside his specialty. He is required to perform all his duties in a completely conscientious manner. But there is no excuse for the architect if the building falls down.

Thus, the responsibility of the government is similar to that of the architect. It must succeed because the people will not excuse it--particularly when it comes to action. This is especially true because our problem is linked to a considerable extent to the Mideast situation and foreign issues. Many aspects of this problem have been brought before international conferences and gatherings and have been taken up in diplomatic and political activity in an effort to arrive at a solution. But Lebanese diplomacy has not moved effectively in a way that would bring about an improvement in circumstances and lead to progress in the Lebanese situation.

AL-HAWADITH: Do you believe that foreign pressure is keeping this from being achieved and preventing the state from taking action?

Al-Jumayyil: When you want the state to take matters in hand, there is no room to say that there is foreign pressure, because the world around us is not united against us. If we are subjected to pressures from one direction, we contain them with pressures in our favor from another direction. The state must look for the course which best serves our interests and follow it.

Now, everyone is maneuvering against us: the states, the forces in the Lebanese sphere--all are maneuvering except the state, which is submitting to all the maneuvers and is not daring to counter them or resist them. On the contrary, the state accepts and yields to the maneuvers and the pressures in spite of the fact that it is still the state, the ambassador is still the ambassador of the state, the minister is still the minister of the state, and the civil servant is still the employee of the state. In other words, the state is disdaining all the givens and all the resources in its possession.

AL-HAWADITH: You seem to be treating the state unfairly, as if it decides the fate of the Middle East problem. According to what is published in the major capitals, Lebanon is under sentence of colonization. Menachem Begin refuses to withdraw from one inch of the West Bank to allow the establishment of a Palestinian state. Consequently, the only final solution that remains is Lebanon.

Al-Jumayyil: If what they say in the Western capitals is correct--and I don't want to go into the details of it--and as long as we are talking about the role of the state, then it is incumbent on the state to deal

with these suggestions. It should send for the Palestinians and come to terms with them on a sound basis, with courage and sincerity. Then it should reveal everything before public opinion and reach agreement with the Palestinians, as we did in 1969 after the encounters between us and them, as well as after the clashes between the state and the Palestinians in 1973. The state should come to terms with the Palestinians and say: We are now helpless, and there is a phase that we must get through. As long as neither one of us can do away with the other--if you please, Palestinians--it is in our interest for you to find a solution to your problem and for us to cooperate with one another. Otherwise, the Palestinian, the state, the Lebanese Front, and the National Movement, as well, will all be bled. The Amal movement will open fire on Fatah, Fatah will open fire on the Popular Front, and the Phalangists will open fire on the Liberals.

And these will open fire on the Guardians of the Cedars. In other words, this tragic situation that Lebanon is undergoing demands an individual who will come and speak the truth.

AL-HAWADITH: What is your view on the position of President Sham'un in which he refused to concede the defeat of the Liberal Party but suggested the idea of transforming his party from a military party into a political party?

Al-Jumayyil: It is premature to talk about and comment on these matters. At the same time, it is true that President Sham'un wants to change his party into a political party, because there is also discussion of turning the Phalangist Party into a political party, with the proviso that a national council of the Lebanese resistance would be established to control military matters. Therefore, it is premature for us to analyze President Sham'un's remark before things take shape.

AL-HAWADITH: Would the Phalangist Party really dissolve the war council?

Al-Jumayyil: Anything is possible and open. But for your information, there is nothing called the war council in the Phalangist Party. Certain names impose themselves in the field, but the real name is the Security Council. The designation "war council" got started during the war in order to gather all the leaders into a coordinating council, and it has continued in use because the war has not ended.

AL-HAWADITH: Where do your contacts with the Palestinians and the Soviet Union stand?

Al-Jumayyil: The contacts with Moscow are still in existence through a principle party in Lebanon and a state which we must respect. However, there are basic complications between us and Moscow, the main one being Moscow's solidarity with the Communist Party, which is our political adversary in the Lebanese arena.

Secondly, there are the joint statements between Moscow and the Palestinian resistance. These conflict with diplomatic principles since some of them involve interference in internal affairs, as when Moscow acknowledges the Palestinian resistance's right to act in Lebanon as an existing power. Moreover the Soviet information media express many positions hostile to a segment of the Lebanese people, in spite of all our wishes that our relations be normal and that Moscow respect the sovereignty of Lebanon in every sense of the word and act on this basis. At the same time, we do not renounce our basic friendships: the friendship of the free world, and our friendship with the United States.

AL-HAWADITH: What about the contacts with the Palestinians?

Al-Jumayyil: Our contacts with them have not been broken. Relations between us began in 1973. Joseph Shadir, Abu Iyad, and Abu Hasan were on the coordinating committee, which was under the supervision of Yasir 'Arafat. When we came to the Tall al-Za'tar events, it made a considerable effort to avert them and prevent a military settlement. Our relations with the Palestinians have not been broken since that time. We would always put the Syrians in the picture, and some meetings took place--with Sami al-Khatib present--for the sake of integration of action. The meetings were friendly. In order to be realistic, we say that the Palestinians are now present in Lebanon, and if we come to terms with one another, it will be possible for them to take part in easing the tragedy of Lebanon. On this basis, we began the earnest dialog with them. Today the dialog continues. Even at the level of the party, one of the information officials in the Phalangist Party met with Abu Iyad a short time ago, and the two talked about specific coordination and the intensification of meetings concerning various matters.

We are trying to put our relations with the Palestinians within an objective framework rather than an emotional framework or one of reactions and residual feelings. This is in the interest of Lebanon, because as we all know, before the Palestinian problem is solved, the Palestinian people will remain here. So we can either be content with this situation and work on this basis, or we can reject the accomplished fact. If we do the latter, Lebanon will continue to experience upheavals and conflicts.

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CSO: 4802

PHALANGE CHIEF DEFENDS POLICIES, POSITIONS

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 15 Sep 80 p 5

/Article: "Bashir al-Jumayyil: Our Problems Are Not with the Members of the Army But with the Mentality Driving the State Institutions"/

/Text/ Shaykh Bashir al-Jumayyil, leader of the Lebanese Forces, has accused the Lebanese army of not honoring the Phalange's houses in al-Hadath or the banners displayed in them. He said that the problem "is not with the soldiers and officers in the army, and not with the institution as an institution, so much as it is with the mentality which drives all the institutions of the state, from the army to the judiciary, education and foreign policy."

He stressed that there will be no infighting among members of the united ranks from today on and warned that if circumstances continue as they have in al-Hadath "They will be dealt with by the dynamic of 7 July, and it is enough for them to understand."

He declared that after today there will be no party cells in the schools and universities.

Shaykh Bashir was talking at a celebration held in the town of al-Chinah, in the entry to Kasrawan, on the occasion of the laying of a cornerstone for a new Phalange Party house. Attending the meeting were a member of the Phalange Political Bureau and head of the Kasrawan Region, Mr Michel Sufayr, the head of the Department of Regions, Mr Salim Ru'aydi, member of the Executive Committee of the region, Mr Joseph Tutunji, and a gathering of people from the area.

The celebration was launched with a statement by the head of the al-Chinah Phalange Section, Mr Nazih Shalala, who talked about the "7 July Movement" and its role in "uniting the Lebanese rifle," concentrating on the need to "implant the spirit which this movement has given prominence to on the field level in order to liberate Lebanon."

Mr Antoine 'Assaf spoke in the name of the Kasrawan Region Council Executive Committee, dealing with the occasion and the positions of Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil.

Statement by Pierre al-Jumayyil

al-Jumayyil laid the cornerstone in participation with the head of the region, head of the section and town priest. He then made a statement in which he said "We are inaugurating a house for the Phalange and hope that after today our heroic army will not think of entering the houses of the Phalange or that anyone will enter these houses except those we want to enter them. Lebanon needs centers which are redolent with faith and love, and, because this love and spirit of sacrifice are lacking among others besides us, we have been compelled to make up for what others have lost in what we are doing now."

He added, "One need not pause at length before what happened in al-Hadath Some conclusions are adequate to draw lessons on what can happen or what we can do in the future. What happened in al-Hadath made us show to what extent we ourselves have become the army and to what extent others have become militias and bands. It has become clear to what extent we ourselves have become disciplined, a national patriotic organization responsible for the areas we are in, and how others have come to act the way we did 3, 4, 5 years ago, or even 2 months ago. What happened in al-Hadath proves that the more organized, developed and strong we are the more others regress. The first conclusion we can observe, without malicious joy or scorn, is that we acted like an army and a responsible authority in the 4 days these events occurred, alleviating the barriers and easing the passage of our brethren in the army, without restrictions, while our houses were entirely exposed and our comrades were entirely exposed to what they faced at the hands of the Syrians in the occupied areas. They were not able to enter the houses of the Phalange in al-Hadath because this army "went away." Perhaps the Syrians were slightly nobler, respecting the banners in the houses of the Phalange. On some occasions the army behaved with the Phalange and Phalange houses the way the Syrian army behaves in the area it is occupying. The newspaper AL-'AMAL has been prohibited from coming into al-Hadath as it was in the past and today from coming into Zahlah. The political effects of the insane 4 days which passed in al-Hadath are taking place and being studied, and their messages are being drawn. Our position will be based in accordance with deductions in the future. To this day we have not learned and have not understood why what happened happened. After today we have started to be afraid of the introduction of the Trojan horse into our region; even when we did not take from within or from outside they have tried to take us through institutions. Four thousand young prople died so that our freedom and our areas would remain inviolate."

After he repeated that the Phalange Party had preserved the security of the troops in its movements and its houses in the eastern sections of Beirut, he said, "The problem is not with the soldiers and officers of the army, or with the inatitution as an institution, so much as it is with the mentality which drives all the organizations of the state, from the army to the judiciary, education and foreign policy. We should point out to

those in charge of affairs there that when we are more vexed than necessary we will say that we are not among those who will be vexed, will be hard pressed, or will be jammed into tin cans. We will bear it, swallow it and be patient, but there are limits to that, and we hope people will understand that we are not ready to endure what is going on today in 'Ayn al Rummanah, al-Hadath, Wadi Shahrur, and Kafr Shima These areas were a citadel of perseverance and they protected Ba'abda--it was not Ba'abda which protected them. To them go the thanks for protecting al Yarzah, it is not al Yarzah that protected their existence."

Then he said, "I would like to shed light on social conditions and living conditions, and leave the political conditions, which we are in agreement over, to the side. After what we have gone through the past 2 months, we find ourselves in the face of challenges and difficulties of a new kind. The dynamic of 7 July exists in al-Hadath. If the conditions in this region continue to deteriorate, they will be dealt with by the dynamic of 7 July. It is enough that they understand.

"We must deal with social conditions by the dynamic and mentality of 7 July. This is requested and demanded of our society, and our brothers who make up this society, on the territory of free Lebanon, from now until the war of liberation whose timing we have not declared, because the popular background to the war of liberation must be organized so that we may be able to bear the difficulties imposed upon us. We must become organized like a society and prepare ourselves socially and economically to transcend the state of chaos, fraudulence and perversity we are now experiencing as a result of the ferocious war. It seems that instead of the government saving us in any way, we consider that it is pouring oil on the fire; when dissension breaks out it stands by, neutrally watching, on the excuse that accredited ambassadors have not given it the green light to solve the crisis in Lebanon....We must go back to the organization we had at the beginning of this war and go back to the kind of discipline and conduct we respect and live in the light of....After 7 July, we created security and ended the fragmentation. Security without justice, a judiciary and order will not be proper and justice will turn into tyranny if we do not remedy our internal situation and propound solutions. We want to see how justice and the judiciary will be established. The Lebanese forces announced, at a press conference they held recently, that the government must proceed like traffic police and the judiciary and revive the public utilities. If it cannot, we will help it perform those tasks or else we will find ourselves compelled to do what will serve the vital social needs of the people. The government is not the guarantor of anything; its employees are employees on pension, and the same with its institutions. Why should a judge be active as long as he is able to receive a salary without exerting any effort? The same with traffic policemen. For 40 years of independence, the government has brought up its employees not to be men bearing responsibilities. We did not carry out the 7 July movement to take the place of the government, but, if the government is unable to rise up, we cannot wait until it does; we must guarantee a proper life for our society and end the

law of the jungle. We hope that popular committees will be found on the stage between now and 1 October to remedy the various conditions of the citizens. We, as Lebanese forces, are not traffic policemen or people brought in to plant trees. Our task is defensive and security-based, to protect our area, we have liberationist responsibilities, and we are acting in this direction like a society.

"We are on the threshhold of a new season following the radical changes which occurred this summer, which led to the unification of the Lebanese rifle, after everyone had been hiding behind a tank and behind a party. Protection has been lifted from all violations and the government must bear the responsibility or else we will arrange our affairs and create a legitimate force which will always be responsible, in depth, ending all threats to our security and freedom in this area of the world and freeing us of the fear that someone will throw us into the ocean. We are organizing our society in a strong fashion, our ranks packed tight together, combining love, cooperation, mutual assistance and feelings of united destiny. No government will uproot a Palestinian refugee on our territory--nothing will uproot him except our struggle and our adherence to our land to regain sovereignty over all of it."

He moved on to the subject of schools and students, and said, "Today we must create new organizations and our brothers the students must realize that students are there to study and that it is the professor who teaches and not the student, that it is he who corrects and not the student, and that it is the administration which organizes and not us. There are no party cells. If it is necessary that there be party cells, let them be outside the sanctuary of the school. There are no Liberal and Phalange cells in the schools. Schools are for studying and for the acquisition of knowledge and science, and our students today are in the most pressing need to return to their genuine nature and perform well in civilization, knowledge and science. Let them leave politics outside the sanctuary of the school and the university. Workers have totally succeeded in being trade union members on their jobs and playing their unionist role, and they are supposed to continue in this direction. The atmosphere between worker and employer is supposed to be a normal one, because the two are in the same trench and bombs do not distinguish between them. We must view these matters with utmost interest....We are all prepared politically to make decisions together when they must be made, but the conspicuous difficulties now are in vital daily matters. In this little society, we want to live honorably and securely and emerge from the law of the jungle."

He expressed his hope that the "Lebanese forces" would be able to play their military and security part "in the battle of liberation, because when all this is achieved the Palestinian refugee will see how we defend ourselves and how we organize Lebanon."

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CSO:4802

STEPS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT ECONOMIC AGREEMENT WITH EUROPE

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 31 Jul 80 pp 8, 12

[Article: "Lebanese-European Cooperation Agreement: The Foreign Ministry Requests Suggestions From the Economic Organization"]

[Text] The Ministry of Foreign and Expatriates' Affairs issued a memorandum to the economic organizations in Lebanon concerning the first session of the Lebanese-European Cooperation Council which was held in Brussels recently.

The memorandum called upon the economic organization and bodies in the country to study, within their own specialties, what would relate to the fourth article of the cooperation agreement concluded between Lebanon and the European economic community and to make suggestions concerning this issue along with appointing representatives to the Lebanese committee which is expected to be formed for this purpose.

The memorandum of the department of economic affairs defined the end of the current month as the deadline for receiving the responses of the concerned economic parties to the contents of the memorandum.

Following is the text of the memorandum:

First: The convening of the council:

In execution of the agreement signed between Lebanon and the European economic community on 3 May 1977 and in execution of the cabinet's decision number 11 dated 16 April 1980, the Lebanese-European Cooperation Council held its first session in Brussels on 6 June 1980. Lebanon was represented by a delegation headed by Kisirwan Labaky and comprised of Ambassador Joseph Dunato, Mr 'Adnan Qassar and Dr Antoine Basil who is a member of the Council of Development and Construction.

Second: The demands of the Lebanese delegation during the meeting:

The Lebanese delegation summarized its point of view of the meeting of the Cooperation Council in the following points:

--To develop trade exchange and to work on keeping the commercial balance between the two sides from shifting.

--To explain the great Lebanese need for reconstruction as a preparatory step towards reaching a new financial protocol for the purpose of receiving larger assistance from the European Economic Community.

--To continue to receive nutrition assistance from the community vis-a-vis the current social conditions in the country.

--To establish the technical and the economic cooperation between the two sides in order to benefit from the European advancement in these fields.

--To discuss with the European side new issues related to the fact that new countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal haved joined the European Economic Community.

--To work toward establishing communications between the European parliament and the Lebanese parliament.

Third: The results of the meeting:

Three resolutions were made as a result of the meeting:

The First Resolution: The rules of procedures of the Cooperation Council:

--The chairmanship of the council will be on rotating basis whereby the Lebanese will assume the chairmanship from 1 April until 30 September and the Europeans will assume the chairmanship from 1 October until 31 March.

--Three Bodies:

The Cooperation Council which will meet at ambassadorial level.

The Cooperation Committee which will be comprised of experts and whose job is to assist the Cooperation Council.

The Custom Cooperation Committee which will be in charge of customs affairs and to facilitate the trade exchange from the customs-technical point of view. This committee will present its reports to the Cooperation Committee.

The Second Resolution: To define the aspects of cooperation between the European Community and Lebanon.

--The framework of the basic structure.

--Development of industrial and agricultural production.

--Vocational training, research and technical assistance.

The Third Resolution: This resolution deals with the origin of commodities.

--To review lists A and B which are part of the second protocol for the purpose of adjusting custom duties upon the new basis and rules of the Council of Custom Cooperation.

The conferees issued a note concerning the items on the agenda which pertains to the following:

--The three previously mentioned resolutions.

--The results of executing the rules of the commercial agreement:

--The imbalance in the commercial balance.

--The execution of the technical assistance to Lebanon will help in increasing productivity and will decrease the imbalance.

--The possibility of reviewing the agreement in 1985 (article 44).

--The results of the financial and technical cooperation:

--Lebanon benefited from an exceptional assistance in 1977 (20 million European units).

--The necessity to utilize the current financial protocol (30 million units).

--The desire of the Lebanese side for a new financial protocol as of 1 November 1981.

--To work toward the execution of the cooperation plan in all areas as mentioned in Article 4 of the agreement.

--To establish communications between the European Parliament and the Lebanese Parliament as per Article 39.

--Lebanon should be consulted by the European Economic Council concerning the joining of new countries.

--The Cooperation Council has been made aware of the Lebanese desire to obtain nutrition assistance for the year 1981 similar to the assistance for the current year.

Fourth: Practical steps for the purpose of cooperating with the European side.

1. The Financial Protocol:

To request from the Council of Development and Construction the following:

--To allocate the balance of the financial protocol allocations, to inform the European and to use this money in executing the planned projects.

--To prepare a list of projects for the purpose of reaching a new financial protocol as of 1 November 1981 taking into consideration that The European Economic Community representative in Lebanon, Mr Yansnes, had said that it is preferable that an agreement, on what has preceded, should be reached before the end of next July since the European side will be reviewing this matter at the end of July.

--The Nutrition Assistance

To request from the High Commission for Relief to prepare a study on the Lebanese needs for nutrition assistance for the year 1981 and to present a detailed suggestion, concerning this issue, to the European Community by means of the Ministry of Foreign and Expatriate Affairs in order for the Lebanese delegation to the European Economic Council to be able to present this request to the community.

3. In the commercial field.

--To request from the Higher Council of Customs to appoint one or two experts for the purpose of executing the third resolution (origen of the commodities, labeling the commodities as per lists A and B).

--To request from the Chanber of Commerce and Industry to prepare defined suggestions for the purpose of developing Lebanese exports to the European community (expositions, assistance, less customs restrictions, etc.).

--To request from the Ministry of Economy and Commerce to cooperate with the customs authorities and the Chamber of Commerce in this respect.

4. In the field of cooperation (article four of the agreement).

To form a Lebanese committee for the purpose of executing article four of the agreement. The committee will include the following organizations:

--The Ministry of Foreign and Expatriate Affairs.

--The General Administration of Industry.

--The Council of Development and Construction.

--The Ministry of Economy and Commerce.

--The National Council for Scientific Research.

--The Higher Council of Customs.

--The Ministry of Agriculture.

--The General Administration of Vocational Training.

--The Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

--The Association of Lebanese Industrialists.

To request from all these organizations to prepare a study as to the possibilities of cooperation with the European side in that which concerns each of these organizations. These organizations have to appoint representatives who will be members of the committee. When the Lebanese side concludes this study, a request will be made in order for the European side to hold a meeting within the framework of the Cooperation Committee and at the level of experts for the purpose of reviewing the ways to execute article four.

5. Concerning the expansion of the community:

It would be beneficial to present preliminary suggestions to the European side as to the new membership of Spain and Portugal in the community. This matter mainly centers on Spain's membership since it will create an agricultural competition to Lebanon in the European market. It will also compete with the Lebanese industrial products due to the low cost of production in Spain.

6. To establish communications between the European Parliament and the Lebanese Parliament.

--To send a message to the speaker of the parliament informing that the European Parliament has appointed the committee which will establish the communication with the parliaments of the eastern countries. The message also states that it is to the advantage of Lebanon that the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs would form a committee to communicate with the European Parliament and to express the feeling of friendship which ties the two sides together and to encourage the execution of the agreement reached between them on 3 May 1977.

7. A note.

The agreement is being executed from the commercial point of view which is a matter controlled by businessmen on both sides. Steps are being taken to execute this agreement from the point of view of the financial protocol.

It would be to the benefit of Lebanon to try to execute the agreement in its totality in order to benefit from the technical cooperation, the financial protocol and the commercial facilitations.

It would also be better not to bring up article 44 which is related to reviewing the agreement as of 1 January 1981 because this agreement, in its entirety, is beneficial to Lebanon and it is our duty to try to execute it before any new reconsiderations.

8988
CSO: 4802

SYRIAN ECONOMIC DECISION HARMFUL TO LEBANESE BANKS

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 24 Jul 80 p 5

[Article: "Lebanese Banks Might Be Affected Negatively as a Result of a Decision, by the Syrian Ministry of Economy, To Offer Facilitation for Foreign Imports"]

[Text] Banking circles mentioned that the Lebanese banking sector might be affected negatively as a result of a decision issued in mid-June by the Syrian minister of economy and foreign trade, Dr Muhammad al-Atrash. The decision offered new facilitations in repaying the value of the private sector imports with foreign currencies.

The decision contained conditions allowing licensed private sector importers to repay the value of their imports by means of local licensed banks either by establishing credit or by placing the value of the documents up for collection.

The expected cause for negative effects on Lebanese banks is that most of the foreign imports operations used to occur through these banks or through Jordanian or common interest banks operating in Paris.

Although the decision did not forbid the use of foreign banks yet it included incentives if the operations are concluded by means of Syrian banks.

Following is the text of the decision, "Instructions No 81:"

"In order to encourage importers from the private sector, in order for them to confine their banking transactions to local banks in Syria so that they can save commissions and banking expenses which are paid in foreign currencies when using foreign banks, to give the opportunity to those importers who have money abroad to bring their money back to the country so that it can be used in repaying the value of their imports by means of using local banks, in an effort to develop our decision No 173 dated 7 March 1974 and in clarifying decision No 211 dated 7 April 1980 which permits the issuance of import licence of import licenses to the private sector without the need to transfer the value of imports in foreign currencies.

"In fulfillment of the above we issue the following:

"First: It is permitted for importers from the private sector, who were granted or will be granted licenses and permits stamped by the phrase 'no need to transfer the money value abroad', to pay for their imports by means of licensed local banks either by establishing a credit account or by the value of their documents up for collection. This can be done on condition that the importers should either deposit at that bank a down-payment of at least 15 percent of the total value of their credit in foreign currency or they should give the bank the right to collect the value of the documents in foreign currency. The importer will not be questioned about the origin of these foreign currencies which are used in these operations.

"Second: In order to benefit from the provisions of the previous article (No 1) the following conditions are required:

"1. The importer should present to the local bank a valid import license or permit.

"2. The importer should either give the bank the foreign currency which is needed to establish the credit account or the value of the documents for collection according to the rules and regulations of that bank.

"3. The importer should give the bank not more than 1.5 percent of the total value of the credit of the documents for collection, in foreign currency in exchange for banking commission and expenses.

"4. The importer should give the bank the balance of the value of the documents of the imported shipment in execution of the established credit in foreign currency and on the designated dates in accordance with the conventional rules of the bank for such operations.

"Third: The importer can repay by using the foreign currency he has in his open accounts at the Syrian Commercial Bank. This is done according to the decision No 191 issued by the minister of economic and foreign trade on 23 April 1970 concerning the use of foreign currency which was earned abroad.

"Fourth: The amounts deposited in foreign currencies in local banks should be strictly used in repaying the value of imports ordered by the importer himself. In case the foreign currency is not used in import operations within a 3-month period from the time the last import license has been presented to the local bank, then the local bank will purchase these amounts at the current rate of exchange issued daily by the Syrian Commercial Bank and the exchange value is then deposited in Syrian currency in the importer's account.

"Fifth: The local bank will be permitted to exchange the incoming foreign currencies for import purposes to any other foreign currency desired by the importers according to the conventional regulations of the bank in exchange operations.

"Sixth: The repayment of foreign currencies by the important can be made with all forms of payment (checks, money orders and banknotes) and with different accepted foreign currencies without asking questions about the source of these monies.

"Seventh: The foreign currencies paid by the importer to the bank for the previously defined purposes does not exempt the owner from paying the dues resulting from the value of his imports or any other commitments which are subject to the regulations of bankrates.

"Eighth: The provisions of these instructions do not apply on imports from countries with which Syria has established payment agreements.

"Ninth: These instructions will go into effect upon issuance and their provisions will apply to licenses and permits issued to the private sector prior to the issuance of these instructions."

Damascus 9 June 1980
Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade
Dr Muhammad al-Atrash

8988
CSO: 4802

INDUSTRIALISTS PRESENT REQUESTS FOR COMMON MARKET ECONOMIC AID

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 15 Sep 80 p 7

/Article: "Industrialists' Recommendations on Benefiting from Agreement with European Market"/

/Text/ In accordance with a request from the Economic Affairs Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, the Society of Lebanese Industrialists has drawn up a memorandum containing recommendations on different aspects of possible benefits from the economic, technical and financial cooperation agreement signed with the European Economic Group, in light of the principles included in Article Four of the agreement, which in particular stipulates the following:

"Cooperation between the group and Lebanon, aimed at particular in strengthening the following matters:

"The group's participation in the efforts Lebanon is exerting to develop its output and the infrastructure of its economy in order to diversify its economic structure. This participation must be linked with the industrialization of Lebanon and the modernization of its agricultural sector.

"Strengthening of trade and promoting the sale of products which Lebanon exports.

"Group cooperation aimed at developing Lebanese industrial output."

The society set forth a number of recommendations, expressing its readiness to prepare integrated projects for all of them, stressing the need to restudy the schedule appended to the agreement on commodities which benefit from customs exemptions and discounts, especially in order to review the conditions imposed for these commodities to acquire the character of "originating in Lebanon."

Here is the text of the memorandum:

Honored Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Economic Affairs Department:

Subject: The society's observations and recommendations on the implementation of Article Four of the Lebanese-European agreement.

Source: Your letter No 1683/9 dated 3 July 1980.

Greetings and respect, following which: we received your letter mentioned above, with attachments, last 29 July. The society is honored to submit to you as follows its observations and recommendations, whose adoption it considers will help the industrial sector achieve practical benefit from the Lebanese-European agreement:

First, as regards the principles contained in Article Four of the agreement under discussion:

A. The group's participation in efforts Lebanon is making to develop its production and the infrastructure of its economy:

Because of the events which have passed over the country, Lebanese industry lost some of the basic ingredients to support and develop growth, especially /through/:

A deficiency in spheres of development credit.

A difficulty in obtaining credit facilities from abroad to import machinery, equipment and primary materials.

Emigration of skilled Lebanese manpower.

Direct and indirect damage to some mutual development institutions, such as the Industrial Research Institute and the Vocational Training Center.

The fact that some industrial organizations have been compelled to review factory sites.

The Lebanese government has made many attempts to confront these obstacles. However, Lebanese industry is still in need of more effective measures to repair what the events have wrought on the industrial development infrastructure. The society, relying on the first principle contained in Article Four of the Lebanese-European agreement, which stipulates "the group's participation in the efforts being made by Lebanon to develop its production and the infrastructure of its economy," considers that:

There are numerous areas in which to put this principle into practical application.

Specifically, the society recommends that the Lebanese government strive to obtain aid from the European group in the following areas:

1. Obtain a $200-million long term loan from the group at low interest to be dedicated to industrial development purposes.

The society would like to point out in this regard that the foundation exists for guaranteeing the soundness of this loan, in the event it is obtained, both in terms of managing the loan channels and distributing them among industrial organizations and in terms of guaranteeing new investments.

The Lebanese government previously guaranteed a long-term credit loan to damaged industrial organizations and took suitable administrative measures to oversee the management of this loan and its distribution through the Development and Reconstruction Council in cooperation with some medium- and long-term lending banks. It is in these banks' capability, in cooperation with other specialized financing banks to provide the objective conditions to guarantee the soundness of the desired loan.

In another area, the Lebanese government has established the National New Investment Insurance Organization, which constitutes an element of security as regards loans granted to industrial organizations to finance their development investments.

2. In the same framework, the society recommends that an effort be made by countries in the group to induce export insurance organizations, especially COFAS /sic/ in France and HERMES in West Germany, to resume insuring these countries' exports of industrial machinery and equipment to Lebanon. In this field we have had successful experience, since the HERMES organization has recently agreed to resume insuring German organizations' exports to Lebanon, although within specific limits which will not satisfy the requisite goals of industrial development. The society considers that contacts in this regard must be centered on the guarantees Lebanese laws provide, as we pointed out above. In general, if it seems that countries in the group want additional official guarantees, such as special agreements to guarantee investments, we consider that the matter merits positive study.

3. As regards meeting the skilled manpower deficiency the events have brought about, we recommend that the group be requested to provide material support to support the establishment of vocational training centers in Lebanon and develop them in a manner which will help provide manpower trained in the necessary skills in the necessary numbers.

4. In the basic areas to which the group can contribute, in order to support attempts to develop Lebanese production, there is help to re-equip the Industrial Research Institute, which is considered the technical cornerstone for getting industry in Lebanon to grow and develop.

5. In another area, the events, and the economic and security developments which arose from them, have made a review of the status of some industrial organizations mandatory. Therefore, and in view of the fact that most countries in the group be requested to take charge of conducting a study

which will deal with the definition of the following points:

The industrial organizations' need to move from one place to another.

The expenses of moving industrial organizations.

Moving expenses for industrial organizations.

Financing industrial organizations' moves to new areas.

6. In another context, the Council of Ministers previously approved the framework for guiding the policy of encouraging industry and industrial development in Lebanon. However, it is not possible to set out any objective development plans for industry without relying on clear data and figures on the true current state of industry.

Therefore we consider that among the urgent matters which the group can contribute to realizing as regards the sector is the provision of financial and technical aid to complete the conduct of a comprehensive survey of industry in Lebanon. The committee derived from the General Department of Industry, in which this group is represented, has completed a full draft of the industrial survey, specifying among other things the material and technical requirements of the project. We consider that it might be useful to request the European group's help in implementing this project.

B. As regards the consolidation of trade and the sale of products Lebanon exports, as well as industrial cooperation aimed at developing Lebanese industrial output:

For years, in order to facilitate the export of Lebanese industrial goods to European group markets, this group devoted special attention to economic and political considerations, most important of which are:

The need to parcel out shares for the disposition of Lebanese production among various markets.

Concentration on stable markets in terms of the factor of demand.

Through the experiences we have acquired in this field, major obstacles have appeared which have obstructed efforts to open group markets up to Lebanese production. The most conspicuous of these obstacles are the following:

The high costs of marketing in the group countries and the inability of most Lebanese industrial organizations to defray these costs.

The industrial organizations' lack of an adequate grasp of the principles of marketing in the group countries.

The industrial organizations' readiness to confront marketing demands in the group markets is insufficient and will not fulfil the requirements of these markets, especially in terms of packaging and processing conditions and specifications, distribution channels, and means for communicating with them, as well as means for making use of the privileges and preferences the market countries give Lebanese production.

The society previously made numerous contacts with international organizations, especially the Unido organization and some institutes of cooperation in some market countries, of which we can mention the German Technical Cooperation Organization and the German Institute of Developing Countries in West Germany and the Federation of Industries in The Netherlands. However, the attempts faltered because of the security conditions the country has gone through since 1975. The society recommends that the projects listed below be included in the bill of priorities regarding the group countries' contribution to backing Lebanese products up and promoting them in their markets.

The holding of a specialized symposium or symposia in Beirut whose main topic will be "Marketing techniques in the group countries."

A study of the possibility of developing some Lebanese industrial products to conform to the requirements and demands of group markets. The society, in cooperation with the Unido organization and the Federation of Industries in The Netherlands, had already ventured on a corresponding project, whose implementation was halted by the events.

Participation in establishment of an industrial data center, bearing in mind that an integrated project is ready in this regard, between the General Department of Industry and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization.

Offering financial aid or aid in kind through this society to enable industrial organizations to take part in the specialized displays which are set up in market countries. It should be pointed out that the society has many encouraging experiences in this regard, of which we might mention in particular the aid the Exhibition Department in the city of West Berlin presented to take part in the "Partners in Progress" exhibit, devoted to the development of exports from developing countries to West Germany, as well as the aid presented to the society by the German Technical Assistance Organization to take part in the International Office Furniture and Supplies Exhibit set up in the city of Cologne in West Germany.

In addition one should point out that in the event you agree in principle to adopt these recommendations, the society is prepared to provide integrated projects for each of them and the means it considers available for putting them into execution.

In another context, we consider that it is necessary and appropriate to review Protocol No Two attached to the agreement regarding the definition

of the concept "products of local origin." This is because the stipulated definition of local origin prevents many Lebanese industrial products from benefiting from this agreement. We consider that in this regard steps should be taken to form a technical committee in which the General Department and this society will take part to study Table A attached to the agreement, commodity by commodity, preparatory to entering into negotiations with market management to make the necessary modifications.

As regards your request that the society name a delegate to the Lebanese committee to the agreement, the society delegates the secretary, Mr Nabil al-Ladhiqi, to represent it in this committee.

Hoping that you will find that the abovementioned observations and recommendations merit attention, and stressing the society's permanent readiness to cooperate with you in view of the benefit this entails to the economy and its prosperity:

Please accept our highest regards,

/Signed/ President Fu'ad Abu Salih.

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CSO: 4802

KORAN INSPIRES SAUDI RULERSHIP

Seoul THE KOREAN HERALD in English 23 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] Saudi Arabia is an Islamic monarchy which has been developing from monarchical to ministerial rule. The duties of the King-Imam are defined in the Shari'ah law (religious Islamic law as recorded in the Qur'an and interpreted in the Hadith, the Prophet's sayings) which recognizes the Imam not as an absolute hereditary monarch but as one who reigns in order to rule for the public goods.

The modern history of Saudi Arabia begins with the recapture of Riyadh by King Abdul Aziz ibn Abd ar-Rahman Al Faisal Al Saud in 1901. Other conquests followed and the Kingdom's international position was confirmed by a series of treaties, the most important of which was the Treaty of Jiddah signed in 1927, when Britain recognized the complete independence of the Kingdom in return for a pledge by King Abdul Aziz to abstain from attacking the Gulf Sheikhdoms which were under British protection. In 1932 the name Saudi Arabia was adopted.

The Royal Decrees, proclaimed in 1953 and 1958, which provided for a Council of Ministers and laid down its functions, may be regarded as the beginning of the "constitutional regime."

At the present time King Khalid heads the Government as Prime Minister; the First Deputy Prime Minister is Crown Prince Fahd, and Second Deputy Prime Minister is Prince Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz, who also has charge of the National Guard. The other members of the Council of Ministers — some of whom belong to the Royal Family — include the Ministers of Finance and National Economy, Justice, Defense and Aviation, Transport, Communications, Commerce, Industry and Electricity, Agriculture and Water, the Interior, Higher Education, Education, Information, Petroleum and Mineral Resources, Health, Labor and Social Affairs, Pilgrimage and Waqfs, Planning, Public Works and Housing, Municipal and Rural Affairs, and Foreign Affairs.

Ministers are responsible to the King. Almost all the apparatus of modern government--ministries, civil service, budgeting systems and so on--have been set up since 1955; in the early 1950s the Ministry of Finance was the only executive department of government. An independent judiciary and a modern judicial system were part of a reform program begun in 1962, but the first Minister of Justice was not appointed until 1970.

Although there are no elections and no political parties, Saudi Arabia has its own form of Islamic democracy. All men are regarded as equal, and differences are minimized between the rich and the poor, the governors and the governed. Ministers and officials keep their doors open so that anyone with any business can call in, without prior appointment, and be offered refreshment in accordance with Arab customs. A morning visitor to a senior official may find himself waiting with a large number of other callers; and since most of the official's morning may be spent receiving visitors in this way, he often needs to return to his office in the evening to do uninterrupted work when the office is closed.

An element of decentralization was introduced in 1963 when the country was divided into four provinces: Western (Jijaz), Central (Najd), South Western (Asir) and Eastern Province (Hasa), each with an appointed governor, or Emir, who is charged with local administration, maintenance of order and implementation of Shari'ah judgments. Various ministries have field offices, and the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for appointing the Emirs, but Saudi Arabia has no effective local government as the term is understood in Western democracies. The municipalities are completely dependent on central Government for funds. The people expect the Government to provide whatever utilities and services are necessary, and the Government accepts an obligation to do so. The only form of local election is for council members, called al-Majlis al-Batadi, who have a purely advisory function, their advice being directed to the chief municipal executive. A new "district system" of local administration was approved in principle by Royal Decree in 1963.

Oil provides nearly all the Government's revenue. There is no income tax. This dependence on oil is too great, and many of the Government's plans are aimed at diversification: by increasing the area of land under cultivation, settling the nomads, and stimulating industrialization.

The Ministry of Education with its sister Ministry of Higher Education together comprise the largest area of Government with over 50,000 administrators and teachers throughout the country, of whom 2,800 are employed centrally in the ministries' headquarters in Riyadh. Saudi students do not have to pay fees, and are given generous allowances to cover their expenses. In 1967 the Kingdom's third university, King Abdul Aziz University, was founded in Jiddah (the others are Riyadh University, founded in 1957, and the Islamic University, Medina, founded in 1961). The University of Petroleum and Minerals produced its first graduates in 1970. In 1975 King Faisal University was established in the Eastern Province. Riyadh's University of Imam Muhammad ibn Saud was preparing to include colleges of Arabic languages. Social Studies, and Shabic languages. Social Studies, and Shari'ah (Islamic law) and the High Institute of Judiciary.

The Civil Service Commission is responsible for staffing policies throughout the public service. Considerable efforts are being made in the direction of administrative innovation and reform, and impressive training schemes are being introduced to improve the structure and processes of public administration. The Institute of Public Administration, which was established in Riyadh by Royal Decree in 1961 as a semi-independent public agency, provides training and further education for civil servants, undertakes research, and assists government departments in reorganization and reform. It is probably the biggest and best equipped institute of its kind in the Middle East.

The Government's general objectives are to provide for national security and economic and social stability, and to raise the living standards of the people, while maintaining the religious and moral values for which the Kingdom, as the original homeland of Islam, is so well known.

The most difficult administrative problem is the shortage of skilled manpower. Although increased efforts are being made to remedy this it is unlikely that the Government will achieve its social and economic objectives with considerable help from non-Saudis, and such achievement may be at the expense of some of the religious and moral values which are an essential and distinctive element of Saudi society. It will be a matter of great interest to see how Saudi Arabia continues to develop towards objectives which anywhere else would be considered virtually irreconcilable.

CSO: 4820

EFFECT OF URBAN CULTURE ON ARABIAN SOCIETY STUDIED

Seoul THE KOREAN HERALD in English 23 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] In is the town culture--markedly Islamic--which brings together the various strands in Arabia society. to form a complex but harmonious whole, combining the virtues of Beduin life with merchanting acumen and a high standard of literacy and education.

The ancient records of Arabia show a society simultaneously at many distinct but interdependent stages of development. Beside the high civilization of the ancient South there is mention of Beduin, who do not, however, seem to play a role of any great importance. In early Islamic times, the interrelationship between nomads and townsmen is closer, each depending on the other for essential goods and services.

Although the early towns were organised in quarters corresponding to the tribal origins of their inhabitants, the conditions of settled life produced a culture superior to that of the tribes in the desert. One aspect of the rise of Islam can be seen as a clash between the aspirations of the town and the customs of the desert, where animism had been the principal religion. Many of the most important historical events during the first centuries of Islam must be interpreted to some extent in tribal terms, but there was a strong reaction by those who thought of the Islamic community as a whole.

The old poetry gives a good account of Arab life in pre-islamic times. It describes a heroic society demanding heroic virtues. The heroes are the symbol, the poets the voice, of their tribes.

It was the task of the poet, and of the invisible being who whispered inspiration into his ear, to act for the tribe in diplomatic negotiations, and to vanquish the opposing poet's familiar spirit. Before a battle he had to create martial ardor in his own people and weakness in the enemy. These incantatory poets verged on sorcery, which is doubtless why they are condemned in the Qur'an.

Some of the customs of early tribal society — such as the habit of exposing unwanted female children — were banned by Islam. Gambling and the drinking of wine were also forbidden, warfare between Muslims was condemned and revenge discouraged.

The old way of life still persisted to some extent, however. The Qur'an complains that the Beduin sometimes put tribal obligations above their duty to Islam. Over the centuries, urban society continued to develop while Beduin society altered very little. The economic changes of the twentieth

century have now intervened. The motor car spelt the end of Beduin wealth based on camel and horse breeding, and the rise of the oil industry has forced them into new occupations.

There have always been differences between the southern and northern Beduin. Those of the south dress differently, and in their migrations do not live in tents, but merely hang a sunshade from a tree, or go between mountain caves and camps.

The Beduin of the north ride their camels on saddles, while the southerners ride without saddles and much further back. The northern Arabs are believed to have adopted the saddle for use in war against their powerful neighbors, because it allows another warrior to be mounted behind the rider.

The aristocracy of the desert are the camel-rearing tribes. The sheep-rearing tribes were thought to be of lower social standing but, as the nomadic way of life has been eroded, any social disadvantage has now virtually disappeared.

Individuals or groups have always attached themselves to powerful persons or groups to obtain protection and the sheep-rearing tribes may have been clients who were not granted full right of membership in the more powerful tribes with which they had associated themselves for protection.

The economic basis of nomadic life lay in the utilization of resources difficult to exploit. Many scholars believe that it was not the weaker members of the tribe who were forced out of the oases and fertile areas, but rather the strongest who launched themselves into the hostile desert.

It is clear that there are not and never were, nomads in Arabia who have had complete economic independence. They have always relied on the settled areas for an important proportion of their food.

H. St. John Philby has written of the unifying achievement of King Ibn Saud by the mid-1920s: "The Arabia over which he was to rule for nearly three more decades was united as never before: ...and the realm which he had carved out with his sword and his faith would descend intact to his successor. The vital factor... was his reputation for justice and resolution, which was seldom put to the test, and always vindicated when the rare need arose. For the first time in human memory Arabia had a single ruler whom all could, and did, respect." "The Arabia over which King Abdul Aziz ruled was united as never before... The vital factor was his reputation for justice and resolution, always vindicated when the need arose."

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IRRIGATION PROMISES AGRICULTURAL BOOM

Seoul THE KOREAN HERALD in English 23 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] Saudi Arabia is characterized by the vastness of its land area, which is more than 900,000 square miles, over 1.5 per cent of the world land mass. Under 0.2 per cent is cultivated and the total area utilized for agriculture and forests is less than three per cent. Huge oil revenues give the country a high income per capita rate, but the traditional agricultural sector is still dominant in terms of the numbers employed within it.

The tenure of agricultural land in the Kingdom is unlike that of other Middle Eastern countries. There is no concentration of ownership by a few rich individuals and the cultivated land is remarkably evenly distributed. Owner occupied agricultural holdings make up ninety-six per cent of the cultivated areas. The total area planted with field crops is over one million acres.

Vegetable crops are becoming very popular in villages close to urban markets where transportation is available for marketing. In tonnage, the biggest crop today is still dates. Saudi Arabia has between seven and nine million mature date palms--ten per cent of the world's palms. But the tomato crop and the water melon crop are already producing almost as large a tonnage. Onions are a significant crop, and other vegetables and citrus fruits are of increasing importance.

The smallness of the average holdings--2.5 acres in the mid-1970's--

naturally presented problems for agricultural development; but with widening horizons, more ambitious farming has led to the production of substantial crops of alfalfa (by far the largest annual tonnage), wheat and sorghum. The government-funded Agricultural Bank has played a major role in producing credit for the energetic farmer, while the Ministry of Agriculture has established country-wide training programs for farmers.

One of the earliest success stories was in the field of chicken and egg production, where — in a period of high growth in food consumption — national self-sufficiency was achieved by 1979, and prices had remained steady in a period of inflation. Milk production had been successfully pioneered (e.g. at al-Kharj) for public sale, and prospects for a national dairy industry looked decidedly promising. H. M. King Khalid

himself was encouraging the development of modern methods for the production of camel's milk which, with a low fat content, is especially health giving. The Royal herd at Riyadh, for example, is being milked by specially developed milking machines. One characteristic of the she-camel in lactation is that it will not give milk unless it is living with its calf. The lactation period is shorter than that of the cow. But camels enjoy the inestimable advantage of maintaining good health in the extremes of temperature that prevail in Central Arabia.

About half, in value, of total food consumed is imported, and imports have grown more rapidly than domestic production. An opportunity to reverse the trend lies in the field of marine food, for which a growing demand offers and opportunity to increase food production with a minimum input of labor.

The most binding constraint on Saudi agriculture is imposed by water. The general availability of water in areas of cultivable soil is insufficient almost everywhere in the Kingdom: but studies conducted by the Ministry of

Scarce Resource Of Fresh Water Wisely Protected

Agriculture and Water have revealed that underground water resources are much greater than was believed ten years ago. Comparative studies of known water sources with recent national water consumption rates demonstrate that they should be sufficient for tens or even hundreds of years. Surface water is intermittent and primarily available in the southwestern highlands and coastal areas, brackish water is abundant and seawater is available for desalination in unlimited quantities.

It has been found that the eastern, northern and central areas of the Kingdom are compiled of sedimentary rocks containing water-bearing formations which vary in quality and quantity. Such sedimentary deposits cover two-thirds of the country. Most of these deposits are represented by sandstone or limestone, which hold a considerable amount of ground water.

These aquifers contain water more than thirty thousand years old. Some formations are near the surface but some are very deep, so diving and pumping equipment are necessary to extract the water. Some of these formations are not rechargeable, so water resources, like oil resources, are diminishing. According to studies made by consultants, twenty-eight important sedimentary aquifers have been discovered. Artesian water, once tapped, reaches the surface under its own pressure, often at a high temperature, from the heat of the earth's core.

As for surface water, Saudi Arabia is the largest country in the world without rivers. The annual rainfall does not exceed 100 mm, although the southwestern parts of the country are affected by monsoons and the annual rainfall average in these areas might reach 500 mm. In general, rainfall is sporadic and variable. There can be periods of drought of up to seven years, great humidity, high evaporation, strong wind effects and rapid run-off floods.

The accumulation of salts in the soil is one of the permanent problems facing irrigated agriculture. All surface water contains some soluble salts in negligible amounts, but after several years of irrigation a harmful accumulation appears. Salts found in irrigation water remain in the soil, while water itself is lost by evaporation and drainage. Irrigation water is used in Saudi Arabia with a salt content ranging from one thousand to more than four thousand parts per million (ppm). Generally 3,150 ppm is considered the maximum for the safe watering of any plant; so salinity is a severe problem.

Irrigation agriculture has been and will continue to be by far the largest user of eater. The demands made by agriculture on water supplies reflect crop needs and also determine minimum production and maximum cost levels. The depth of ground water in the Kingdom varies from a few feet to three thousand feet. It is estimated, however, that there is enough water, in rainfall and below ground, for the area of cultivated land to double in the short run.

The main means of combating the constraint imposed by scarcity of water are by dams, wells, water-towers, draining and long-distance piping. Fifteen dams are already built, of which the largest, across the Waid Jizan in the South-Western Tihama region, provides irrigation for 70,000 hectares. The greatest of the irrigation and drainage schemes — to rid the soil of its salinity — is at Hasa. The reclamation of land has led to a marked rise in the number of sheep raised, to,

which the Faisal Model Scheme bears striking witness. Here, a total of 3,600 hectares have been reclaimed, and the sheep population reached 33,000. In due course, the Faisal Model Scheme was to be converted into a private commercial enterprise which a group of Saudi and foreign firms were to operate.

The final protection against lack of water is the sea. With the increasing refinement of methods of distillation, a pipeline system is to link the capital with Jubayl on the Gulf. Meanwhile, a National Water Policy has been established, providing for the enforcement of a National Water Code, to sharpen public awareness.

The three main objectives for agricultural development are to raise the per capita income and improve the welfare of rural people, minimize the Kingdom's dependence on imported food and release surplus labor for employment in other sectors.

Fifteen research stations and demonstration farms have already been established and there are sixty-two extension units throughout the country. A government subsidy on fertilizers has encouraged their use, and insecticides and pesticides are being distributed. An Agricultural Bank has been set up, and has continuously expanded interest-free credit to farmers. To encourage the adoption of modern technology and to increase farm production, the government pays subsidies on selected imports and products.

The leaders of the country are committed to the processes of agricultural development. They recognize its connection with the maintenance of political stability.

CSO: 4820

AL-ASAD'S OFFICER CHOICES VIEWED

Tel Aviv BAMAHANEH in Hebrew 20 Aug 80 pp 30-31

[Article edited by Hayim Raviv: "The Officers of the Syrian Army"]

[Text] Syria's President Hafez al-Asad is now facing a new problem in addition to all his other internal problems, which is likely to give him many headaches, namely, the appointment of the next chief of staff of the Syrian Army. The question is whether a professional soldier is preferable to a political one, or whether a representative one should be picked. The new chief of staff will greatly influence the molding of the image of the army's officers in the future.

We do not have the space to discuss all the characteristics of the Syrian officer. We will only mention some typical landmarks in the course of the average regular army's officer's term of duty, and we will dwell on the role of the ruling Ba'ath party and the Alawite minority in shaping the present image of this officer.

The present chief of staff, Lieutenant General (Ahmad) Hikmat Shihabi, who has served for 6 years, is a prototype of the representative officers in the Syrian Army. Shihabi, a Sunnite, was picked for his post, as was Talas, minister of defense, in order to compensate the Sunnite majority and blunt the edge of possible feelings of discrimination. In effect, this chief of staff does not have real authority. He is mainly a representative and ceremonial figurehead. Thanks to his past as an intelligence officer, Shihabi is helpful in fighting the violent opposition of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Chief of Staff Shihabi is one of the three top officers in the Syrian Army who symbolize, especially for the Syrian officer, the encounter between professional quality and political power. The other two senior officers are the assistant chief of staff, Maj Gen Col (Liwa) Ali Aslan and the commander of the "Defense Units," Col Rifat Asad.

The assistant chief of staff represents the professional officer. He is a skillful officer who advanced persistently and systematically

through the ranks on his own merit, doing a variety of assignments in the field and at general staff. Rifat Asad, on the other hand, represents the political officer. Rifat, who is the president's brother, heads the unit which is responsible for protecting the regime. This officer, who has decorated himself with a doctorate from Moscow, has served in the same capacity all along and has advanced rapidly through the ranks.

The common denominator for both officers is their Alawite origin, which is also the origin of most of the leaders of the regime and the president. Beyond that they are quite different. Ali Aslan who served in 1976-78 as commander of the Syrian forces in Lebanon, is considered a professional in today's Syrian Army, and the political leadership recognizes his achievements. Despite his membership in the Alawite minority and the fact that he is a loyal party member, Ali Aslan has not been close to the political arena, and his promotion is due mainly to his performance. This respectable professional image has not gone unnoticed by the majority of Syrian officers.

Rifat Asad, the president's brother, on the other hand, is hardly ever photographed in uniform, and insists on being referred to as "Doctor-Member of the National Leadership of the Ba'ath party," without any mention of his military rank. From the beginning Rifat served as commander of his brother's bodyguard (even before he took power). Under his command this unit grew to gigantic proportions (it became recently a regular armored division and was given the best means of combat). The task of this unit which has a great many Alawites and members of Asad's family, is to defend the regime from a coup. It is well known that during Rifat Asad's term of duty his authority has been used to obtain political objectives and favors for those close to him. His military rank is also unusual--he is now commanding a division-size unit which according to regulations calls for a brigadier general (Ahmad).

Strangely, he and his officers make sure they maintain ranks lower than the usual--lieutenant colonels and majors serve as brigade commanders, while majors and captains serve as battalion commanders, despite the size of the forces under their command. This may be due to their desire to maintain a separate position within the army. Because of their political image and their many privileges, Rifat and his men have become the most hated unit in the army, feared by all.

An Open File--And a Secret One

The Syrian Army, which was established in 1946 when Syria became an independent country, has undergone many radical changes over the years. The frequent coups and political upheavals which took place during the 50's and 60's, did not leave the army untouched, certainly not the officers. Only during the past decade has the Syrian Army enjoyed a measure of stability, under Hafez al-Asad's regime. This too has changed somewhat in the past year.

Unlike the 50's and 60's, when most army officers were engaged in intensive political activity, their involvement today has been reduced significantly. Moreover, the political activity within the army has been channelled through established political structures which are separate from the civilian structures. This development undoubtedly has had a growing salutory effect on the professional level of Syrian Army officers. But it seems that even today the Syrian officer is preoccupied with the question of the importance of the political factor in his professional career in the army, especially in light of the struggle of the regime with the violent Sunnite opposition emanating from the Muslim Brotherhood.

Any highschool graduate in Syria who wants to serve as an army officer has to volunteer beforehand for several years of service in the army. After a series of tests the candidate enters the military academy in Homs (central Syria). The cadets take a 3-year course which includes general military training as well as professional training in the various training centers. An officer's course diploma is legally considered the equivalent of a bachelor's degree. Upon graduation the cadets become first lieutenants (Malasm Ul) and are placed in different units, according to the professional training. (Only academic officers who do 2 and 1/2-years of compulsory service become second lieutenants.)

In principle, the advancement process of Syrian officers through the military ranks consists of constant and changing elements: A period of 4 years between ranks; field assignments for certain periods of time; professional courses like company and battalion commander course; followed by command and staff course. The body which controls appointments, transfers, advancement, and demotions is called the "Officers' Committee." This committee includes most of the administrative heads of the general staff, but their decision must always be approved by President Hafez al-Asad.

The career of a Syrian Army officer, from the moment he arrives in his unit and gets his first assignment, is documented in two parallel files--an open one and a secret one. This is the symbolic start of a military career in the Syrian Army, since from here on out the officer will be tested on two levels:

The professional level--his skills, his performance, and his ability to carry out professional assignments.

The political level--his loyalty to the heads of the regime and the principles of the ruling Ba'ath party.

In every case the political consideration is decisive in the appointment of officers and their advancement (intermediate ranks and up), in accordance with the "scale of loyalties" of the following order of preference:

Preference A--Family ties (the families of Asad and those close to him).

Preference B--Sect membership (the Alawites, who are today the ruling sect in Syria, and are only 12-13 percent of the total population).

Preference C--Party affiliation (the Ba'ath party).

It follows that the Sunnites, who are the majority sect, are discriminated against, although quite a few Sunnite senior officers stand out in representative posts, such as the minister of defense, the chief of staff, the commander of the Syrian Air Force, and several unit commanders.

A Professional or a Political Chief of Staff?

Aside from the issue of advancement, it appears that the working conditions of Syrian officers today are relatively easy: a work day of only 7 hours, except for field units which are busy operationally, namely, in taking positions in the Golan Heights front, or in the "Arab Deterrent Forces" in Lebanon. In such units too, officers get many leaves during calm periods. The salary of officers, who are considered state workers, is above average, and they enjoy tax exemptions and aid with housing and the education of their children. No wonder that after their first term of service most officers extend their commitment for many additional years.

The average Syrian officer is undoubtedly impressed by the professional success of Assistant Chief of Staff Ali Aslan. But he is also aware of the power which political officers like Rifat Asad enjoy. This symbolic encounter between the two foci of power--the political and the professional--has great influence over the considerations of the army officer as to his future career. The answer to this question may be reflected in the person of the next chief of staff (the present one has served 6 years, and it is time for his replacement).

The question which arises is: will the Syrian Army be headed by a professional officer, like Ali Aslan, who seems the likely candidate for thi this post, or will it be a political officer like Rifat Asad?

There is only a possibility of compromise, by appointing a senior "representative officer" like the present chief of staff, in order to prevent further complaining by the Sunnite officers and the Sunnite population. In such case Rifat Asad will continue to head his private army and his sect's forces which will defend the regime within the official military system, while Ali Aslan will continue to serve as the highest professional officer in the army.

As in the past, this time too everyone is looking to "Comrade Commander," President Hafez al-Asad, since he alone can decide, as he continues to create the delicate balance between the various centers of power which surround the leader of the Syrian regime.

This delicate balance is bound to break down as soon as Hafez al-Asad leaves power, which he has held since 1970. This eventuality is more likely today than in the past, since his regime is in constant decline.

When will this regime come to an end and who will follow it--the answer to these questions also holds the key to the image of the Syrian officer in the future.

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CENTRAL BANK LAW PUBLISHED

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[Central Bank Law]

[7 Aug 80, p 2]

[Text] The Central Bank law ratified by His Highness Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, the president of the state, provides for the Central Bank's capital to amount to 300 million dirhams which will be fully paid by the government and for increasing this capital from time to time by a UAE [ittihadi] decree.

The most important provisions of the law call for the formation of a board of directors comprised of seven members, including the governor and his deputy with the rank of minister. The board of directors will be appointed by a UAE [ittihadi] decree for a term of 4 years subject to renewal, provided that the bank governor and his deputy devote full time to their work.

The most important provisions of the law also provide for the government to deposit in the bank an interest-free sum of 2 billion dollars within a maximum period of 2 years after the law goes into effect and that this deposit shall be increased 10 percent annually until it amounts to $4 billion.

The bank will issue currency, strengthen the dirham and work for its stability at home and abroad, regulate the credit policy, organize and control banking operations, act as a government bank in providing advice to the government and keep the state's gold and foreign currency reserves.

The bank will not be subject to the rules of advance control by the Accounting Bureau. The provisions of the laws concerning tenders and bids will also not apply to it. The paper currency issued by the bank shall also be considered valid. As of today, AL-BAYAN publishes the full text of the law in segments, due to its extreme importance to the country's economy.

[Definitions]

The bank: The UAE Central Bank.

Board of directors: The UAE Central Bank Board of Directors.

Chairman of board of directors: The chairman of the UAE Central Bank Board of Directors.

Board of directors member: A member of the UAE Central Bank Board of Directors.

Governor: The governor of the UAE Central Bank.

Currency: Includes paper currency and coins.

Paper money and coins: The paper currency and coins issued by the bank in accordance with the provisions of this law or paper currency and coins already issued in accordance with law No 2 of 1973 setting up the UAE Currency Council.

Previously existing currency: The paper money and coins issued by the Bahrain Currency Council and by Qatar and Dubai currency authorities.

Convertible foreign currency: Any currency, excluding the dirham, considered by the bank convertible currency for the purposes of this law.

Special drawing rights: The special drawing rights issued by the International Monetary Fund.

Year: Year of the Christian era.

Chapter One
UAE Central Bank
Section One
Establishment of UAE Central Bank
Article 2 [sic]

A central bank shall be established in the UAE and shall be called the UAE Central Bank. This bank shall be considered a public establishment with a legal status person and shall enjoy the legal competence necessary for it to carry out all the activities and operations to realize the goals for which it is established.

Article 3

1. The bank's operations shall be conducted and its budget and accounts shall be organized in accordance with the commercial banking rules and its transactions with others shall be considered commercial transactions.

2. The provisions of the laws concerning tenders, bids, public accounting and public jobs shall not apply to the bank. The bank's special regulations shall be applied in these matters.

3. The bank's operations shall not be subject to the advance control provisions stipulated in law No 7 of 1976 setting up the Accounting Bureau. The bureau's task shall be confined to subsequent control and the bureau may not interfere in running the bank's operations or in its policy.

Article 4

The bank's main headquarters shall be located in the capital of the state. With the approval of the board of directors, the bank may open branches, offices and agencies in the UAE member emirates and may appoint agents and representatives inside and outside the state.

Section Two
Bank's Goals

The bank shall regulate and supervise implementation of the currency, credit and banking policy in accordance with the state's general plan and in a manner that helps to bolster the national economy and to stabilize the currency.

To realize its goals, the bank shall have the following powers:

1. Use the concession of issuing currency in accordance with the provisions stipulated by this law.

2. Work to bolster the currency and to stabilize it at home and abroad and guarantee the freedom of converting this currency into foreign currencies.

3. Work to channel the credit policy toward realizing a balanced growth in the national economy.

4. Regulate and develop the banking profession and exercise control over the operations of the banking apparatus in accordance with the provisions of this law.

5. Perform the task of the government bank within the limits stipulated by this law.

6. Offer the government advice on currency and financial affairs.

7. Maintain the government's gold and foreign currency reserves.

8. Operate as a bank for [sic] the banks operating in the state.

9. Perform the task of the government's financial representative in the International Monetary Fund, in the International Reconstruction and Development Bank and in other Arab and international monetary funds and take charge of all of the state's transactions with these circles.

Section Three
Bank's Capital and Reserves
Article 6

1. The bank's capital shall consist of 300 million dirhams paid fully by the government.

2. The capital may be increased from time to time by a UAE decree issued on the suggestion on the board of directors, the recommendation of the minister [concerned] and the approval of the Council of Ministers. In such a case, the government shall pay the determined increase.

3. The bank's capital may not be reduced except by a law.

Article 7

The bank shall keep an account of the general reserve in the following manner:

A. At the end of each year, the board of directors shall determine the net annual profits after deduction of the administrative costs and allocating the sums necessary for the consumption in assets and reserves to make up for dead or doubtful debts, to contribute to the retirement and end-of-service compensation funds and, generally, to meet the financial costs ordinarily deducted by banks from their net profits.

B. The net profits shall be transferred to the general reserve account until this reserve amounts to fourfold the capital.

Article 8

If the general reserve reaches the limit referred to in paragraph B of the preceding article, then the net profits in their entirety shall be remitted to the government.

Article 9

If the general reserve account in any year is insufficient to cover the bank losses, the government shall make up for the existing deficit.

Article 10

Within the framework of the provisions stipulated by this law, the board of directors shall determine how it will invest the bank's funds, including the capital, reserves and other funds at its disposal.

Section Four: Management
Part One
Members of Board of Directors
Article 11

1. A board of directors comprised of seven members, including the board chairman, his deputy and the governor, shall be in charge of managing the bank.

2. Each of the chairman, his deputy and the governor shall have the rank of minister. The deputy chairman shall replace the chairman in case of the latter's absence or in case his position is vacated. The governor shall replace both in case of their absence or their positions are vacated.

Article 12

1. The members of the board of directors shall be appointed by a UAE decree with the approval of the Council of ministers for a four-year term renewable for a similar period.

2. The members of the board of directors shall be people with experience in banking and financial affairs.

Article 13

Should a member of the board of directors resign or should his position become vacant for any reason, a successor shall be appointed for the remaining period of the board's term in accordance with the provisions stipulated in the preceding article.

Article 14

The members of the board of directors may not be members of the board of directors of any commercial bank operating in the UAE unless they are holding such a position in their capacity as representatives of the public sector. Moreover, none of the board members shall be an active member of the cabinet or of the UAE National Assembly.

Article 15

1. The governor and deputy governor shall devote full time to their work in the bank and neither may hold another paid or unpaid position or job, be a member of the board of directors of any bank or company or participate directly or indirectly in any commitments undertaken by the public sector.

2. The ban set by the preceding paragraph shall not apply to tasks entrusted by the government to either the governor or the deputy governor or to representing the government in international conferences, in committees formed by the government or by the public organizations and authorities.

Article 16

The following may not be or continue to be members of the board of directors:

1. A person who has declared his bankruptcy or has stopped paying [his debts].

2. A person sentenced to a jail term for crime of violation of honor or of trust, unless rehabilitated.

Article 17

With a UAE decree approved by the Council of Ministers, membership in the board of directors may be terminated in either of the two following cases;

A. If a member of the board of directors commits grave mistakes in managing the bank or fails gravely in performing his duties.

B. If a member fails to attend three successive meetings without the permission of the board, unless the absence is due to an official task, to annual or sick leave or due to an acceptable excuse.

Part Two
Jurisdiction and Meetings of Board of Directors
Article 18

The board of directors shall enjoy the full powers needed to realize the goals for which the bank is established within the bounds of the provisions of the law.

The board of directors shall exercise the following in particular:

1. Determine the bank's currency and credit policy and its policy to invest the foreign assets and exercise supervision to insure the proper progress of its work.

2. Decide on matters pertaining to the issuance of currency and its withdrawal from circulation.

3. Draw up the bank's bylaws and determine powers and responsibilities within the bounds of the provisions of the law.

4. Determine the system of discounting [khasm] commercial bills.

5. Determine the commission and discount rates charged by the bank.

6. Decide on matters pertaining to the regulation of the banking profession and the rules for control over the profession within the bounds of the provisions of this law.

7. Determine the method of granting loans to the banks operating in the state, setting the maximum limit for such loans and determine the collateral required for them.

8. Determine the loans to be advanced to the government in accordance with the provisions of this law.

9. Set up accounting chambers and establish the Banking Risks Center.

10. Approve the bank's annual draft budget and introduce the necessary amendments to it during the year.

11. Approve the bank's general budget and the statement of profit and loss.

12. Approve the bank's annual report.

13. Draw up the regulations concerning the bank's personnel affairs, define the personnel rights and duties, set up a retirement fund for them and determine the degree of the bank's contribution to this fund.

14. Appoint the bank's high-ranking officials, promote them and terminate their services in accordance with the bylaws concerning the bank personnel.

15. Look into all other matters within its jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this law.

Article 19

The board of directors may delegate some of its powers to the chairman, the governor or the executive committee referred to in article 26 of this law.

Article 20

The board of directors shall draw the regulations concerning the salary, allowances and rights of the governor and deputy governor and the rewards and allowances for the chairman and members of the board of directors. A UAE decree shall be issued to establish these regulations with the approval of the Council of Ministers.

Article 21

1. The board of directors shall hold an ordinary meeting once every 45 days at least.

2. The board of directors chairman may summon the board to meet whenever the need arises.

3. The board of directors chairman shall summon the board to meet if requested by the minister or by three board members at least.

Article 22

1. A board of directors meeting shall not be valid unless attended by at least five members, including the chairman, his deputy or the governor.

2. While taking into cognizance the provisions of articles 62 and 75 of this law, the decisions of the board of directors shall be issued by a majority vote. In case of a tie, the side including the session chairman shall prevail.

3. If a board of directors member has any personal interest in any transaction or deal to which the bank is a party, then the member shall declare this interest, shall withdraw from the meeting when the deal or transaction is discussed and shall not take part in the vote concerning it.

Article 23

The board of directors may seek the help of experts and technicians, may determine their recompense and allowances and may summon to its meetings for advice any person whose opinion on a certain matter the board deems fit to hear, provided that persons thus summoned take no active part in voting.

Part Three
Powers of Board of Directors Chairman
Article 24

The board of directors chairman is the bank's legal representative and shall sign his name to all legal instruments, contracts and documents. He may delegate some of his powers to the governor.

Article 25

The governor shall be in charge of implementing this law, the bank's regulations and the decisions of the board of directors. He may delegate some of his powers to the deputy governor or to high-ranking bank officials.

Article 26

An executive committee shall be formed under the chairmanship of the governor in the following manner:

The deputy governor as deputy chairman and three directors chosen by the board of directors from among the bank's departmental heads. The board of directors shall also select their replacements in case of their absence or in case any of their positions is vacated.

Article 27

The aforementioned executive committee shall have the power to examine all matters within its purview in accordance with the bank's law and regulations. It shall also examine all matters with which the board of directors entrusts it or which the governor presents to it. In particular, the executive committee shall, within the limits of the general policy determined by the board of directors, perform the following:

1. Set the daily exchange rate in accordance with the provisions of this law.

2. Study the [bill] discount and loan requests submitted to the bank by the local banks and decide whether to approve or reject such requests.

2. Purchase and sell checks [sukuk], bonds, permits and foreign certificates stipulated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 74 of this law.

4. Invest the bank's private monies representing the bank's capital, reserves and other assets at its disposal in accordance with the provisions of this law.

5. Supervise the proper implementation of the regulations and bylaws concerning the bank's personnel.

6. Make decisions on matters pertaining to the bank's real estate [holdings] and real estate rights.

7. Decide [when] to resort to arbitration and approve the settlements and compromises pertaining to the bank's interests.

8. Propose the bank's annual draft budget and the bank's final accounts and prepare the bank's annual report which is presented to the board of directors, along with the report of account auditors.

Article 28

The executive committee may delegate some of its powers to the heads of the bank's departments in accordance with the conditions and terms which it lays down.

Part Four: Restrictions
Article 29

1. All members of the board of directors, all of the departmental heads and all of the bank personnel shall be prohibited from revealing to others any information acquired as a result of working in the bank and concerning the bank's affairs, the affairs of his clients or the affairs of the banks and establishments subject to the bank's control, unless the revelation of such information is in implementation of the provisions of the law.

2. Any person violating the stipulations of the preceding paragraph shall be punished with a prison term of no more than 3 months and a fine of no more than 5,000 dirhams or by one of the two penalties and shall be dismissed from his job under all circumstances.

Article 30

The bank may not pay its employees any rewards or bonuses on the basis of the profits that it makes.

Section Five
Bank's Operations
Part One
Relationship With Public Sector
Article 31

The bank shall express its opinion to the public sector on matters within its jurisdiction. It shall also express its opinion on the investments requested of it by the public sector (for) currency and financial affairs.

Article 32

The bank shall take part in the negotiations concerning the UAE government's financial and currency agreements and it may be entrusted to implement the provisions of such agreements.

Article 33

The bank shall perform free of charge banking services and operations for the government, both inside and outside the country. The bank may also perform free of charge the aforementioned operations and services for the governments of the UAE member emirates.

Article 34

Government funds shall be deposited with the banks, to the exclusion of all others, in dirhams and no interest shall be charged for these funds. The governments of the UAE member emirates may also deposit their monies in dirhams with the bank without requiring the bank to pay any interest.

On a decision by the minister, all or some of the other public sectors may be required to deposit their monies in light of the requirements of the currency and credit policy.

Article 35

1. The following sums shall be deposited with the bank in foreign currency under the government's name and the bank shall not be required to pay any interest for them:

A. The sum of the contributions of the UAE member emirates to the state's annual budget.

B. The government's other foreign currency revenues.

2. The government shall deposit with the bank within a maximum period of 2 years of the enactment of this law a permanent trust of one billion U.S. dollars or their equivalent in other foreign currencies without charging any interest. This trust shall be increased annually by 10 percent over the preceding year until it amounts to $4 billion or their equivalent in other foreign currencies.

3. The other public sector circles may deposit their foreign currency funds with the bank which shall pay for these funds the interest rate agreed upon with these circles.

Article 36

The bank shall purchase foreign currencies from the public sector and sell them to it according to the exchange rates posted by the bank.

Article 37

The government shall sell the bank the foreign currencies it needs to enable it to realize the goal for which it is established and to meet the public and private sectors' needs of foreign currencies.

Article 38

With the exception of the funds deposited with the bank in accordance with the provisions of articles 34 and 35 of this law, the bank may not interfere in the investment or employment of the government monies or the monies of the UAE member emirates unless entrusted to do so in accordance with an agreement concluded between the bank and the government concerned.

Article 39

The bank shall, directly or through the commercial banks, take charge of selling and managing the government permits or the loan bonds issued or guaranteed by the government or those issued by any public authority company of the governments of the UAE member emirates.

The bank may also sell or purchase such permits or bonds for its own interest in accordance with the provisions of article 48 of this law.

Article 40

The bank may advance to the government interest-free loans to supply cash money for the public treasury.

At no time may the loans advanced exceed 10 percent of the total government revenues realized in the government budget of the preceding year.

The government shall repay such loans on a date not exceeding the end of the fiscal year following the year in which the loan is advanced.

Article 41

The bank shall submit to the minister the information he requests on the country's currency and banking position.

The bank shall also submit to the minister every 3 months a report covering all aspects pertaining to this position.

Article 42

The public sector and the organizations and companies in which the state participates shall present to the bank all the data and statistics that it requires.

Part Two
Relationship With Local Banks and Financial Establishments
Article 43

The bank may open accounts in dirhams or in foreign currencies for the banks and financial establishments operating in the UAE and may accept their deposits without paying any interest for such deposits, except in cases where the board of directors decides to pay an interest.

Article 44

The bank may perform for the banks operating in the UAE, to the exclusion of all others, the following operations:

1. Issue certificates of deposit in dirhams for the banks and buy and sell such certificates within the limits and conditions set by the board of directors.

2. Sell, buy, discount and rediscount commercial papers arising from real debts, provided that such papers are due for payment in a period of no more than 6 months and provided that they meet the conditions required in accordance with the provisions of this law.

3. Advance loans or current account credit for a period of 7 days without any collateral or for a maximum period of 6 months in return for a collateral which the bank considers adequate.

Article 45

The bank may set for each of the banks operating in the UAE the maximum credit facilities that the bank advances in accordance with the provisions of the preceding article.

Article 46

The bank may not agree to the renewal of bills due for payment that it has discounted and may not agree to discounting or accepting as collateral commercial papers signed by a member of the board of directors or by one of the bank's employees.

Part Three
Gold and Foreign Currency Transactions
Article 47

In accordance with instructions set by the board of directors, the bank may engage in the following operations:

1. Purchase, sell and deal in gold ingots and coins.

2. Engage in all foreign currency transactions and conversions. Such transactions may be concluded only with governments, their public authorities, local, foreign and central banks, financial establishments and Arab and international funds.

3. Have accounts with central banks, foreign banks, Arab or international financial establishments and Arab or international monetary funds.

4. Open accounts for central banks, foreign banks and Arab or international financial or monetary establishments and be the representative or accredited agent of such banks, establishments or funds.

5. Advance loans or credit facilities to central banks, foreign banks, Arab or international financial and monetary establishments and acquire from them credit facilities or loans, provided that such transactions are compatible with its tasks as a central bank.

6. Purchase, sell, discount and rediscount through banks and financial establishments the bonds, permits and documents stipulated in paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 74 of this law.

Part Four
Other Transactions
Article 48

The bank may employ its private monies from its capital and reserves in the following:

1. Own real estate and movable property set aside for managing the bank's operations and for the residence or recreation of its employees.

2. Purchase and sell permits and subscriptions to loans issued by the government or by the public authorities, provided that they are guaranteed by these authorities.

3. Purchase and sell the shares of any company in which the government participates or of any company holding a concession in the UAE.

Article 49

The bank may purchase or expropriate through mutual agreement or through compulsory sale [auction] real estate and movable property in repayment for loans it has advanced and the property shall be sold as soon as possible, unless the bank uses it for running its operations in accordance with the provisions of this law.

Part Five
Prohibited Transactions
Article 50

The bank may engage in no commercial activity and may own no property in violation of the provisions of this law and may have no direct interest in commercial, industrial or agricultural operations or in any project unless it is in accordance with the provisions of this law.

[9 Aug 80 p 3]

[Text] The Central Bank law stipulates that the currency in circulation and the on-demand deposits kept with the bank must always be covered by gold ingots and coins, by easily convertible foreign currency assets and by any internationally acknowledged reserves, such as checks, bonds and permits issued by foreign governments or organizations and exchangable for convertible currency.

In accordance with the provisions of the law, it has been decided to exempt the bank's capital, reserves and revenues from taxes, fees and costs.

AL-BAYAN publishes today the third part of the text of the Central Bank law, covering the bank accounts, currency issuance, exchange rates and official cover.

Section Six
Account and Statements
Article 51

The bank's fiscal year shall start on the first day of the month of January and on the 31st day of the month of December of each year

Article 52

1. The bank shall open a special account in the name of the government and shall record the following on the credit side of the account:

A. The profits which the bank realizes at the end of the fiscal year as a result of the reassessment of the bank's assets and debts in gold, foreign currencies and special drawing rights and as a result of the change in the value of these assets in comparison to the value of the dirham.

B. The profits resulting from withdrawal of the paper currency and coins referred to in articles 70 and 73 of this law.

2. The bank shall record on the debit side of the special account the losses it incurs at the end of the fiscal year as a result of the reassessment of the bank's assets and debts in gold, foreign currencies and special drawing rights because of the change of the value in these assets and debts in comparison to the value of the dirham.

3. The net credit accounts at the end of the fiscal year shall not be included with the bank's profits. As for the debit accounts, the government shall repay them in public treasury bonds saleable at no interest. These bonds shall be consumed in succession from the net profits realized by this account in subsequent years.

Article 53

The bank's accounts shall be supervised by one or more auditors or by an auditing firm selected annually by the board of directors. The board of directors shall determine the recompense to be paid to the auditors.

Article 54

1. The bank shall submit to the minister a monthly statement of the bank's assets and debts and this statement shall be published in the Official Gazette.

2. The bank shall also present to the president of the state and to the minister within a period of 3 months of the end of the year:

A. A copy of the bank's final accounts certified by the auditor. These accounts shall be published in the official gazette.

B. A report on the bank's operations during the year and a brief glimpse [report] of the currency, banking, financial and economic affairs.

Article 55

The bank may publish the annual report and may issue the reports and pamphlets that the board of directors deems to be in the public interest.

Section Seven
Miscellaneous Provisions
Article 56

1. The bank may accept properties or movable asset as collateral or security to guarantee the repayment of its rights.

2. Should the bank fail to recover the guaranteed rights on the date due, then it may resort to selling the mortgaged property 15 days after it notifies the debtor legally. This action shall not affect the bank's right to adopt other legal measures against the debtor until the guaranteed rights are repaid.

Article 57

1. The mortgaged property shall be sold [auctioned] in accordance with the provision of the preceding article through the special court and at the request of the bank.

2. The bank shall collect its dues from the outcome of the sale which shall be conducted in accordance with the provision of the preceding paragraph. Should the outcome exceed the bank's dues, then the surplus shall be put at the disposal of the debtor.

Article 58

The bank shall be exempted of all taxes, fees and costs of all kinds, regardless of whether pertaining to its capital, its reserves, its revenues, the property it owns or the contracts and documents it draws up.

The bank shall also be exempted of all legal guarantees and fees required by the law.

Article 59

The government shall provide free of charge guard for the bank's premises and shall protect them. The government shall also provide the guard necessary for the safe transportation of funds and valuables.

Article 60

The bank may not be dissolved except by a law setting the rules and dates for such liquidation.

Chapter Two
Currency
Section One
Currency Unit and Exchange Rate
Article 61

The UAE currency unit is the dirham to which it shall be referred by the letters (D.H.) and which shall be divided into 100 equal subunits, each called a fils.

Article 62

A UAE decree shall be issued setting the official exchange rate for the dirham on the recommendation of the majority of the board of directors and with the approval of the Council of Ministers.

Article 63

When necessary, the bank shall post the exchange rate for the most important foreign currencies for the purposes that it defines.

Article 64

1. Without violating the provisions of paragraph 2 of this article:

A. Any contract, sale, bill, bond, check or guarantee payment or any money transaction whatsoever connected with money and requiring the repayment of money and already scheduled to be agreed upon, concluded and implemented on the basis of the currencies existing before the presence of this article shall be considered as if agreed upon, concluded and implemented in dirhams, provided that such consideration does not affect any commitment requiring this payment of any sum of money in any other country, excluding the UAE, where the previously existing currencies are still legal currencies.

B. Any reference to previously existing currencies in any law, any other legislative instruments or any regulation valid in the UAE on the date on which the aforementioned UAE law No 2 of 1973 went into effect be considered as if it were a reference to the dirham. Any reference to any sum in currencies existing previously shall also be considered as if it were a reference to the dirham.

2. On application of provisions A and B of the preceding paragraph of this article, the sums recorded in previously existing currencies on the date on which article 13 of UAE law No 2 of 1973 went into effect shall be calculated on the basis of the following exchange rate:

One Bahraini dinar: Equals 10 dirhams.

One Qatari-Dubai riyal: Equals one dirham.

Section Two
Currency Issuance
Article 65

1. Currency issuance is a concession restricted to the state and exercised by the Central Bank to the exclusion of all others.

2. Taking into consideration the provision of the preceding paragraph, all establishments and individuals are banned from issuing or putting into circulation paper money, coins, bonds or checks payable to the bearer on demand and having the appearance of currency, liable to be mistaken for currency or likely to be circulated as currency in the UAE or in any other country.

3. Any party violating the provisions of this article shall be punished by a prison term of no more than 10 years and a fine of no more than 100,000 dirhams or by one of the two penalties.

Article 66

1. The bank shall issue paper currency in the denominations, shapes, specifications and other distinguishing features decided upon by the minister on the recommendation of the board of directors. The minister and the board of directors chairman shall sign the paper currency.

2. On a recommendation by the board of directors, the minister shall set the weights, component elements and mixture rating, the permissible percentage differentials, the other characteristics and the quantities of each of the denominations of the non-gold coins needed to be minted.

3. On a recommendation from the board of directors, the minister shall determine the type, karat-composition, weight, measurements, the permissible percentage differentials, the other distinguishing features and the quantities of each of the denominations of the gold coins needed to be minted.

4. The bank shall take the measures necessary to print the paper currency referred to in paragraph 1 of this article and the coins referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article. It shall also take all the measures necessary to print, mint and safeguard this paper currency and these coins and the plates and molds used for producing them.

Article 67

1. The paper currency issued by the bank or that has been issued in accordance with UAE law No 2 of 1973 shall be considered legal currency with an absolute power of release for the repayment of any sum at its full face value.

2. The non-gold coins issued by the bank or such currency issued in accordance with UAE law No 2 of 1973 shall be considered legal currency in the UAE and shall have an absolute power of release for the repayment of any sum inside the state for their full face value, provided that such a sum does not exceed 50 dirhams. However, if such coins are presented to the bank, it must accept them without any limitation on the quantity.

3. The board of directors shall set the terms for the sale and purchase of gold coins in the bank vaults--both the coins issued in accordance with the provisions of this law and those issued before this law goes into force.

Section Three
Circulation and Withdrawal of Money
Part One: Paper Currency
Article 68

The new paper currency denominations shall be put into circulation on a decision by the board of directors setting these denominations and their quantities.

The decision shall be published in the Official Gazette and announced to the public through the proper information media.

Article 69

1. The board of directors, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, may withdraw from circulation any paper currency denomination in return for paying its face value.

Such a decision shall be published in the Official Gazette and announced to the public through the proper information media.

2. The withdrawal decision shall set the period for exchanging this denomination, provided that it is no less than 3 months from the date of publication of the decision in the Official Gazette. If necessary, this period may be reduced to 15 days.

Article 70

1. Paper currency not presented for exchange before the end of the period set in accordance with the preceding article shall lose its release power as a legal currency and its circulation shall be banned. However, the owner of such paper currency shall have the right to collect its face value from the bank within a period of 5 years after the withdrawal decision goes into effect. Should the five-year period pass without such currency being presented for exchange, then it shall be taken out of circulation and its value shall be added to the special account stipulated in article 52 of this law.

3. The bank shall take charge of destroying the paper currency withdrawn from circulation in implementation of the provision of the preceding paragraph. The currency shall be destroyed in accordance with the instructions issued by the bank in this regard.

Article 71

The bank shall not be required to pay the value of lost or stolen papers or to accept forged papers or pay their value.

Article 72

The bank shall pay the value of disfigured or (tattered) paper currency meeting the conditions included in the instructions issued by the bank in this regard. The paper currency failing to meet these conditions shall be withdrawn from circulation without the repayment of any sum to its owner in return.

Part Two: Non-Gold Currency
Article 73

1. Various denominations of non-gold coins shall be put into circulation on a decision by the board of directors determining the volume of these coins.

The decision shall be published in the Official Gazette and announced to the public through the proper information media.

2. On a decision by the board of directors, any denomination of the coins mentioned in the preceding paragraph may be withdrawn from circulation in return for the payment of their face value.

Such a decision shall be published in the Official Gazette and announced to the public through the proper information media.

3. The withdrawal decision shall set the period of exchange which may not be less than 6 months of the date of publication of the decision in the Official Gazette.

4. The coins not exchanged during the period referred to in the preceding paragraph shall lose their release power as a legal currency, its circulation shall be banned and it shall be taken out of circulation. Its value shall revert to the special account stipulated in article 52 of this law.

5. If non-gold coins get defaced or disfigured, lose weight or undergo change in shape for any reason other than ordinary use, the bank must withdraw them from circulation without compensating their owners.

Section Four
Currency Cover
Article 74

The currency in circulation and the on-demand deposits placed with the bank shall be countered by a cover permanently comprised of all or some of the following elements:

1. Gold ingots and coins.

2. Easily and freely convertible deposits in foreign currency placed with foreign banking establishments as on-demand deposits or set-term deposits for a period of no more than 12 months.

3. Any international reserves acknowledged as assets, including the state's assets in the International Monetary Fund, the sums loaned to this fund and the special drawing rights.

4. Checks [sukuk], bonds, permits or foreign certificates issued by foreign governments or guaranteed by them or issued or guaranteed by international financial or monetary organizations, provided that all such papers be first-class papers recorded in freely convertible currencies, easy to dispose of in the financial market and payable within a period of no more than 5 years after the date of purchase.

5. First-class foreign bonds or checks other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraph recorded in freely convertible foreign currencies, provided that they are easy to dispose of in the financial markets and payable within a period of no more than one year after the date of purchase.

6. Loans advanced to the government in accordance with the provisions of article 40 of this law.

7. Domestic commercial papers recorded in the dirham or the loans and credits advanced to the banks operating in the UAE, provided that they are payable within a period of no more than 6 months after the date of registration or conclusion [ibram] and provided that they meet the conditions set by the board of directors in the regulations it issues in this regard in accordance with the provisions of article 18 of this law.

Article 75

1. The rate of gold ingots and coins and of the net assets outlined in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article may not drop below 70 percent of the currency in circulation and of the on-demand deposits placed with the bank.

2. However, the board of directors may, be a majority of its members and with the approval of the Council of Ministers, reduce this percentage for a period of no more than 6 months. No further reduction in this percentage may be made before the 70 percent referred to in the first paragraph of this article is reached.

3. The rate of the net foreign assets outlined in paragraph 5 of the preceding article may not exceed 20 percent of the bank's net foreign assets referred to in the first paragraph of this article.

Article 76

The bank shall work gradually to harmonize the position of the foreign assets and the assets in dirhams included in the cover account and transferred to the bank from the present Currency Council with the provisions of the two preceding articles.

[10 Aug 80, p 3]

[Text] Abu Dhabi--The Central Bank law has given the bank broad powers in regulating and controlling banking operations in the country. The law has also included new and important conditions for the operation of banks and financial establishments.

AL-BAYAN publishes today the fourth and last part of the text of the law--a part which covers the relationship of the Central Bank with the banks and the banking operations in the country.

Chapter Three
Regulation of Banking and Financial Profession
Section One
Sphere of Application of Provisions of This Chapter
Article 77

1. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to:

A. Commercial banks.

B. Investment banks.

C. Financial establishments.

D. Financial and currency middlemen.

E. Representation agencies.

2. The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to:

A. The public credit establishments, excluding the commercial banks, established by a law.

B. The government investment establishments and agencies.

C. The government development funds.

D. The savings and special pension funds.

F. The insurance and underwriting companies and organizations.

Section Two
Commercial Banks
Part One: Definition
Article 78

1. Commercial banks include any establishment that ordinarily receives on-demand or set-term deposits from the public or that uses completely or partially loan bonds or deposit certificates in advancing loans and credit

for its own interest and at its own risk. Commercial banks also issue and collect checks, offer public and private loans, trade in foreign currencies and precious metals and engage in the other banking operations stipulated by the trade law and operations considered by convention as commercial banking operations.

2. The branch offices of any bank operating in the UAE shall be considered one bank and the provisions of this law shall be applied to them, unless stated otherwise by the law.

Part Two: Capital and Reserve Funds of Commercial Banks

Article 79

1. The establishments engaging in the operations of commercial banks shall take the form of public joint-stock companies permitted by the law or the decree setting them up to engage in such operations.

2. The commercial banks operating in the UAE at the time this law goes into force shall harmonize their positions with the provisions of the preceding paragraph within a maximum period of 3 years after this law goes into force.

Article 80

1. The capital of any commercial bank may not be less than 40 million dirhams paid in full.

2. The branch offices of any foreign bank must prove that they have allocated such a sum for their operations in the UAE.

3. The commercial banks operating in the UAE at the time this law goes into force shall harmonize their positions with the provisions of the two preceding paragraphs within a period determined by the board of directors, provided that this period not exceed 2 years after the date on which this law goes into force.

4. By a UAE decree issued on the recommendation of the board of directors and with the approval of the Council of Ministers, the minimum capital of a commercial bank may be adjusted. Such a decree shall be published in the Official Gazette.

Article 81

If the capital of a commercial bank drops below the minimum limit referred to in the preceding article, the bank shall obviate the deficit within a period determined by the executive committee, provided that it does not exceed one year after the date of notification.

The executive committee alone has the right to assess the deficit occurring in the commercial bank's capital.

Article 82

In addition to the obligations imposed by any commercial law on the joint-stock companies or on their constituent contacts, the commercial banks and the branch offices of foreign banks must set aside annually no less than 10 percent of their net profits to form a special reserve until such a reserve amounts to 50 percent of the commercial bank's capital or of the sums allocated as capital for the branch offices of foreign banks.

Part Three: Registration, Merger and Operation of Commercial Banks

Article 83

1. While taking cognizance of the provisions in force concerning the establishment of joint-stock companies and not in violation with the provisions of this law, the commercial banks may not initiate their operations until licensed to do so on a decision by the board chairman or by whoever he deputizes with the approval of the board of directors.

Licensed commercial banks shall be registered in the register prepared for this purpose at the bank. The decision licensing such banks to operate shall be published in the Official Gazette.

2. The board of directors shall determine the conditions and procedures to be followed in submitting the requests for licenses and the documents and data required. The board shall also determine the regulations concerning the establishment of branch offices and whatever pertains to them.

3. In case a request for licensing is rejected, the bank shall notify the establishment concerned within a period of no more than 15 days as of the date of rejection of the request.

Article 84

No commercial bank may open a new branch inside or outside, the UAE, change the location of a branch or close a branch without the prior approval of the board of directors.

Article 85

1. None other than the commercial and investment banks registered in accordance with the provisions of this law may use in their commercial address or in their advertisements the words bank, banking or any other similar expression in a manner that may mislead the public as to the nature of their operations.

2. Any party violating the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall be punished to a prison term of no more than 3 months and a fine of no more than 2,000 dirhams or to one of the two penalties.

Article 86

1. The registered commercial banks shall request approval for the changes that they want to introduce to their constituent contracts or their bylaws or the changes that have developed in the statements submitted to the central bank at the time the request for licensing was.

Such changes shall not go into force until recorded on the margin of the register.

2. The governor shall decide on the request for recording the change. If he decides to reject to record the change, the matter shall be referred to the board of directors which shall make a final decision on it.

Article 87

No registered commercial bank may stop its operations or margin with any other bank before acquiring a permit to do so from the chairman of the board of directors or from whoever he deputizes with the approval of the board of directors.

The permit referred to in the preceding paragraph may not be given unless the central bank makes certain that the commercial bank has repaid all its commitments to its clients and creditors or has settled these commitments in a manner acceptable to the central bank.

Article 88

1. A commercial bank may be struck out of the register in any of the following cases:

A. At the request of the bank concerned.

B. If it fails to initiate its operations within one year after being notified of the decision to register it.

C. If it suspends its operations for a period of more than one year.

D. If it declares its bankruptcy.

E. If it merges with another bank.

F. If its liquidity or its solvency is in danger.

G. If it violates in a fundamental manner the laws, rules, regulations, decisions and instructions regulating its operations in accordance with the provisions of this law.

2. The cancellation shall take place in all cases on a decision by the chairman of the board of directors or whoever he deputizes with the approval of the board of directors. However, insofar as cases F and G of the preceding paragraph are concerned, the board of directors may not approve the cancellation before asking the bank concerned to submit its observations regarding the facts necessitating the cancellation decision within a period determined by the board.

3. The decision to cancel a commercial bank shall result automatically in withdrawing the license given to it.

4. The cancellation decision shall be considered valid as of the date of its publication in the Official Gazette, unless the decision sets a different date for its going into effect.

5. Except for the case stipulated in item G of the first paragraph of this article, the cancellation of the commercial bank from the banks register shall result in its inevitable liquidation in accordance with the laws in force and with the instructions included in the cancellation decision.

Article 89

The Central Bank shall prepare at the beginning of every year a statement [list] of the banks registered with it and shall publish this statement in the Official Gazette.

Part Four: Strictures

Article 90

Commercial banks shall be banned from engaging in non-banking activities, especially the following activities:

A. Engaging in trade or commerce or possessing and trading in goods for their own interest, unless the goods are owned in repayment of debts that others owe them. The banks shall dispose of such goods within a period set for them by the governor.

B. Purchasing real estate for their own interest, except in the following cases:

Real estate necessary for them to carry out their operations or for the residence and recreation of their employees.

Real estate that they come to own in repayment of debts owed to them. In such a case, the commercial banks shall sell such real estate within a period of 3 years which may be extended on a decision by the governor.

C. Owning or dealing in the bank's [sic] shares unless they revert to it [sic] in repayment of a debt. In this case, the bank shall sell these shares within a period of 2 years of the time it comes to possess them.

D. Purchasing the shares of commercial companies or loans bonds belonging to them beyond the limit of 25 percent of the bank's private monies, unless such shares and bonds revert to these banks in repayment for a due debt. In such a case, the bank concerned shall sell the excess within a period of 2 years as of the time it comes to possess the shares and the bonds.

This ban shall not apply to the loan bonds issued or guaranteed by the government or the public establishments.

Article 91

1. The commercial banks shall be banned from advancing current account loans or credit to the members of their boards of directors, managers or individuals in a similar capacity without the prior permit from the board of directors. This permit shall be renewed annually. The ban does not include discounting commercial bills, providing guarantees or opening documental credit.

2. No commercial bank may advance to its clients credit facilities by using their shares in the bank as collateral.

3. No commercial bank may advance loans or credit for the purpose of constructing residential or commercial buildings exceeding in total value 20 percent of the bank's deposits unless the bank is specialized in advancing real estate loans and has acquired the [central] bank's approval to exceed this percentage.

Article 92

No commercial bank may issue in its own name travelers checks without the prior permit of the [central] bank.

Article 93

1. No person convicted of a crime of theft, of betraying a trust, of fraud, of embezzlement or of issuing intentionally a bounding check may be or continue to be a member of the board of directors of a commercial bank or the manager of such a bank.

2. No member of the board of directors or manager of a commercial bank may be, without permission from the board of directors of this bank, a manager or member of the board of directors of another commercial bank.

Part Five: Provisions Concerning Control

Article 94

The bank may supply the banks with the instructions or recommendations that it believes will realize its credit or currency policy. The bank may also adopt the measures and use the means that are capable of insuring the sound operation of the banking work.

These instructions, recommendations, measures or means may be general or singular.

Article 95

1. The board of directors may draw up regulations setting the ratios by which all the banks, without exception, abide to guarantee their liquidity and solvency, especially the ratios that must be present between the following elements:

A. The commercial bank's private funds on the one hand and the total sum of the on-demand and set-term deposits on the other hand.

B. Its liquid assets on the one hand and its total on-demand and set-term commitments on the other hand.

C. Its private monies on the one hand and the sum of its total commitments by way of agreement and guarantees on the other hand.

2. In the regulations and instructions that it issues, the [central] bank shall define what is meant by the phrases: The bank's private funds, the luqid assets, the commitments and other elements.

Article 96

1. The board of directors may set the following insofar as the commercial banks are concerned:

A. The maximum total of the discounts, loans and credits that a bank may conduct as of a certain date.

B. The maximum sum that may be loaned to one person, be he a natural person or a legal person, from the bank's private monies.

C. The part of the commercial bank's deposits that must be deposited in cash with the [central] bank as reserve.

D. The minimum sum that clients have to pay in cash to cover the transaction of opening documental credit facilities.

E. The interest rate paid by banks for deposits and the interest rates and commission fees charged by the banks from their clients.

2. The [central] bank may impose on any commercial bank violating the provisions of item C of the preceding paragraph a monetary fine not exceeding two per thousand daily of the deficit in the reserve required of it. This fine shall continue to be effective until the deficit is covered.

Article 97

The regulations, decisions or instructions issued by the bank for the implementation of the provisions of the two preceding articles shall have no retroactive effect. Moreover, they shall not obstruct implementation of the agreements concluded between the banks and their clients prior to the issuance of these regulations, decisions and instructions. The [central] bank shall set the periods of grace necessary for the commercial banks to bring their operations in line with the imposed regulations and must spell out the rules in accordance with which the compulsory percentages are calculated.

Article 98

The commercial banks must take into consideration in their investment of the monies that they receive from the public the investment duration and the duration of the deposits.

Article 99

A department attached to the [central] bank shall be set up for control over the commercial and investment banks and the financial establishments.

This department shall be set up and the tasks and conditions in accordance with which the control team is to operate shall be defined by a decision issued by the board of directors.

Article 100

1. The bank may dispatch at any time one or more of its controllers to the commercial banks if it deems it necessary to make sure of the soundness of their financial position and to find out the degree of their abidance by the laws, rules and regulations in managing their operations.

2. The commercial banks must present to the controller referred to in the preceding paragraph all the books, accounts and documents pertaining to their operations and must supply him with the data he requests on the dates set.

3. The controller shall submit to the bank a report on the outcome of the examination and must supply a copy of this report to the bank concerned.

4. If, after the aforementioned examination is made, it becomes evident to the bank that the operations of the financial bank are conducted in an unsound or illegal manner, the central bank may ask the bank concerned to adopt the measures that enable it to rectify its position. With the approval of the board of directors, a qualified employee may be appointed to provide guidance and to exercise control in the bank concerned, provided that the wages of this employee be shouldered by the bank concerned.

Part Six: Accounts and Statements

Article 101

The fiscal year for commercial banks shall start at the beginning of January and end on 31 December of each year.

Article 102

1. The branch offices of foreign banks shall keep separate accounts for all their operations in the UAE, including the budget and the statement of profit and loss.

2. The branches and branch offices existing in the UAE and belonging to one bank, be it local or foreign, shall form one bank insofar as account keeping is concerned.

Article 103

1. Each commercial bank operating in the UAE shall appoint each year one or more qualified and experienced auditor or an auditing company accredited by the [central] bank to examine its accounts. If the commercial bank fails to appoint the auditor, then the [central] bank shall appoint an auditor for the commercial bank and shall determine his recompense which shall be shouldered by the bank concerned.

2. The auditing task shall include the preparation of a report to be presented to the shareholders on the general budget and the statement of profit and loss. The auditor shall outline in his report whether the annual budget and the statement of profit and loss are correct and in line with the facts and whether the [commercial] bank has supplied him with the date and explanations he has requested to perform his task.

3. The auditor's report, along with the report of the commercial bank's board of directors, shall be read to the annual meeting of the shareholders if the bank is a local bank. Three copies of the two reports shall be presented to the [central] bank within a period of 15 days after convocation of the general assembly. If the bank is a foreign bank, a copy of the account auditor's report shall be sent to the bank's headquarters abroad and three copies of this report shall be presented to the [central] bank within 15 days after issuances of the report.

4. No account auditor may be a member of the board of directors of the commercial bank whose accounts he has been assigned to examine. He may also not be an employee of the bank or an individual who performs permanent consulting work in the interest of the commercial bank.

Article 104

1. The [central] bank may set up at its headquarters an independent department called the Banking Risks Center within the limits of the controls and conditions determined by the board of directors.

2. For the smooth progress of the work of this department, the commercial banks shall supply it with periodic data and statements on the credit facilities they have granted in accordance with the forms and instructions drawn up by the [central] bank and within the periods it sets.

3. The commercial banks shall cover the costs of this department. These costs shall be divided among these banks and collected from them in accordance with the rules and regulations determined by the [central] bank.

Article 105

1. The commercial banks shall supply the bank with the statistical data, statements and information and other documents that the bank deems necessary for the performance of its task.

2. The bank may set up a system to gather statistics on banking credit facilities on a periodic basis.

3. The bank shall determine the nature of these statements, data and information, the forms for them and the periods set for the presentation of such information. The banks shall supply such information to the bank in accordance with the instructions that it issues.

Article 106

All the information supplied to the bank in accordance with the provisions of this law shall be considered confidential information, except for the part pertaining to the publication of collective statistical information.

Article 107

The bank may levy a delay penalty not exceeding 200 dirhams per day on the commercial banks that fail to supply the statements, information or data referred to in articles 104 and 105 within the set periods.

Part Seven: Liquidation of Banks
Article 108

1. In case a commercial bank is liquidated, an announcement of the liquidation must be published in the Official Gazette and in at least two other newspapers issued locally.

2. The liquidation announcement must include:

A. A period of grace of no less than 3 months so that the bank customers may have the chance to take the measures necessary to protect their rights.

B. The name of the liquidator assigned to repay the remaining deposits and the current (accounts?) after the final closure of the bank's offices on which the customers have been given no notice.

Article 109

If the liquidation comes as a result of cancellation of the commercial bank from the banks register, the chairman of the board of directors or whoever he deputizes may set in the cancellation decision the commercial bank's closure data and name the establishment assigned to liquidate the pending operations by this date.

Article 110

The [central] bank shall continue to watch the operations of the commercial bank under liquidation until this bank's offices are closed finally.

Article 111

The provisions of articles 108, 109 and 110 shall not obstruct the implementation of any other legal provisions in force concerning the liquidation.

Part Eight: Administrative Penalties
Article 112

1. If a commercial bank violates its bylaws, the provisions of this law or any measures imposed by the central bank, if it fails to submit the statements and information it is supposed to submit or if it submits incomplete information incompatible with the facts, the central bank may, in addition to the delay fines stipulated in article 107 of this law, levy on the contravening commercial bank one of the following penalties:

A. Warning.

B. Reducing or suspending the loan facilities advanced to the commercial bank.

C. Banning the commercial bank from performing certain operations or imposing any other restrictions on its operations.

D. Striking the commercial bank out of the banks register.

2. Levying the penalties stipulated in items A and B of the preceding paragraph shall be done on a decision by the executive committee. As for the other penalties, they can only be levied by the central bank's board of directors.

3. In all cases, no penalty may be imposed on a commercial bank before its explanations are heard.

Section Three
Investment Banks
Article 113

1. In the application of the provisions of this law, what is meant by investment banks are those banks usually called business, development or medium or long-range investment banks, that are given similar or equivalent names and that are distinguished mainly from the commercial banks defined in article 78 by being banned from accepting deposits for a period of less than 2 years.

2. These banks may borrow from their main headquarters, from the local or foreign banks or from the financial market.

3. The board of directors [of the central bank] shall determine the extent of the activity of these banks and the conditions for their operation. The provisions of the law shall be applied to these banks, unless exempted by the board of directors from some provisions or other adopted measures.

Section Four: Financial Establishments
Article 114

In applying the provisions of this law, what is meant by the financial establishments are those establishments whose main work is the performance of credit or loan operations, financial operations, participation in existing projects or projects under implementation, investment of their monies in movable or immovable assets and other operations defined by the [central] bank.

The operations of the financial establishments shall not include the receiving of monies in the form of deposits. However, these establishments may borrow from their main offices, from the local or foreign banks or from the financial market.

Article 115

The financial establishments may not initiate their operations in the UAE or open branches abroad before acquiring a license for the purpose from the [central] bank.

Article 116

The board of directors [of the central bank] shall set the conditions and measures governing the issuance of licenses and the documents and statements that must be attached to the request for licensing.

The request for licensing shall be accepted or turned down on a decision by the chairman of the board of director or whoever he deputies with the approval of the board of directors. The decision approving the request shall be published in the Official Gazette.

The decision turning down a licensing request shall be conveyed to the establishment requesting the license within 15 days after issuance of the rejection decision.

Article 117

1. The financial establishments shall abide by the instructions issued to them by the central bank regarding loans or other matters which the bank deems necessary for implementing the credit policy or for insuring the proper progress of work in the establishments.

2. The bank may send its representatives to audit the accounts of a financial establishment if it deems it necessary to do so.

Article 118

The withdrawal of the license of an investment bank or a financial establishment shall be done in accordance with the provisions, conditions and procedures stipulated in article 88.

Article 119

The financial establishments shall submit the following to the central bank within the periods this bank sets:

1. Three copies of the general budget and of the profit and loss statement.

2. The data, statements and statistical information upon which the bank decides and of which the financial establishment is notified.

Section Five
Financial and Monetary Middlemen and Representation Agencies
Article 120

In applying the provisions of this law, what is meant by financial and monetary middlemen are any natural or legal status persons, excluding the financial establishments, engaging in the following works or operations:

A. The profession of money exchanging based on the purchase and sale of currencies, paper money, coins of various kinds and travelers checks.

B. Stock market agents and middlemen purchasing and selling local and foreign stocks and bonds, be they locals or the representatives of foreign establishments.

Article 121

The board of directors may subject those engaging in the works referred to in the preceding article to the condition of prior licensing in order to be able to initiate their operations in the UAE. The board of directors

may also determine the conditions for licensing and the commitments resulting from such licensing, may exercise control over the operations of such persons and determine the cases in which their licenses shall be withdrawn in accordance with the regulations set by this board of directors.

Article 122

In applying the provisions of this law, the representation agencies are meant to designate the agencies that represent foreign banks or financial establishments in the UAE.

Article 123

1. The representation agencies may not initiate their operations in the UAE before acquiring a license from the bank.

2. The board of directors shall issue special regulations concerning the following:

A. The procedures to be followed in submitting the licensing requests and the required documents and information.

B. The extent of the activities and operations of these agencies, the subsequent responsibilities they shoulder and the regulations for withdrawing their licenses.

3. A licensing request shall be approved or turned down on a decision by the board of directors. The decision shall be conveyed to the party concerned.

Chapter Four
Transitional and Final Provisions
Article 124

1. On the date this law goes into force, the Currency Council shall liquidate its works and accounts and prepare the council's final accounts for the final accounting period. These accounts shall be approved by accounting auditors. The council shall also prepare a detailed report on the position of its assets and debts and other aspects clarifying its financial position.

2. On the date this law goes into force, the Currency Council shall separate in the final account referred to in the preceding paragraph the assets whose repayment is doubtful from the healthy assets expected to be repaid and shall list each of these assets under a separate item.

3. The bank shall collect the doubtful assets within a period of 5 years as of the time it initiates its operations.

By the end of the aforementioned 5 years, the remaining unpaid assets shall be transferred from the doubtful assets [column] to the administrative authority designated by the government, provided that the government pay the value of these assets to the bank in cash.

Article 125

On the date this law goes into force:

1. All the assets and debts of the Currency Council shall be transferred to the bank.

2. The bank shall take over from the Currency Council all the paper currency and coins not put into circulation and all the instruments and molds pertaining to the printing of paper currency and to the minting of coins.

3. All the workers of the Currency Council shall be transferred to the bank with all the rights accruing to them in the council.

Article 126

The bank may put into circulation all the paper currency and coins issued by the Currency Council as if they were the bank's paper currency and coins.

Article 127

The Currency Council's capital and reserves shall be counted as part of the bank's capital. The government shall add up to the assets until they reach the limit set by article 6 of this law.

Article 128

The constituent works and costs pertaining to the establishment of the central bank and approved by the Currency Council shall be valid and shall be considered as if approved by the board of directors.

Article 129

In exception to the provisions of article 51 of this law, the bank's first fiscal year shall begin as of the date in which this law goes into force and end with the end of the [regular] fiscal year.

Article 130

As of the date on which this law goes into force, the provisions of UAE law No 2 setting up the UAE Currency Council and any other provisions violating this law shall be abolished.

Article 131

The bank, to the exclusion of all others, shall issue the instructions, decisions and measures it is empowered to issue in accordance with the provisions of this law.

Article 132

This law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall go into force 4 months after its publication.

[Signed by] Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan
President of the UAE

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CSO: 4802

END

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30 October 1980

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FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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30 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2211

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UAE PAPER CALLS FOR GULF SUMMIT CONFERENCE

GF151842 Al-Shariqah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 13 Oct 80 p 1

[Editorial: "An Immediate Gulf Summit Is a National Historic Task"]

[Excerpts] Now that the Iraqi-Iranian war has lasted so long, the situation in the Gulf and the Arab region is leading politically, economically, militarily and psychologically toward a real calamity. It will reach one if immediate and effective action is not taken to stop this situation in preparation for reasonable and wise arbitration for the sake of the primary interest and through guidance by principles and national traditions which have been enriched by Islam and which accelerated the spread of Islam.

During these days of the bitter Iraqi-Iranian war, the observer of the Arab situation in general and the Gulf situation in particular sees clearly that the savagery and squalor of war machinery, the psychological and media warfare couldn't defeat the wisdom and reason that are characteristic of the Arab nation and were achieved admirably through practices associated with Arabism and Islam on the way to the establishment of states, respect for man and contribution to the civilization of man.

When peace, goodness and understanding are called for to rule Gulf relations these days, it is not a mere political exercise or simply a call that can have no part in the Arabs' battle against their imperialist and Zionist enemies. It is rather a call based on close knowledge of the true nature of this nation, which has witnessed conflicts and crises and learned, from this knowledge, that dialog leads to consensus on the common goal. It was the departure from peace and guiding dialog which led to the situation from which the Arabs and Muslims are now suffering and of which the Iraqi-Iranian war is an example. When dialog and the inclination to peace were lacking, the law of war ruled the two neighbors: Iraq and Iran. And when the rift dividing Iraq and Iran began to widen, it engulfed all the Arabs. The picture is very clear: It is between pro-Iran Arabs and anti-Iran Arabs, Arabs against non-Arabs, anti-Muslim Arabs and anti-Muslim Muslims.

It is a pitiable situation indeed. The losers are the Gulf countries, Arabs and non-Arabs, and the sole winner is the enemy of the region, world imperialism and its world Zionist ally. The conflict is giving the enemies of the Arab nation, of Arab-Islamic consolidation and of anti-imperialist and Zionist struggle a splendid, attainable opportunity.

A Gulf summit conference is urgently needed. We firmly believe that the leaders of the region's countries, if they don't take such a step, will miss a historic opportunity granted by destiny to achieve an exceptional national feat. We call for such a Gulf summit soon with the sole objective of stopping the disaster and keeping it from turning into a river of blood which will never dry. Such action is within the framework of true, constructive and comprehensive understanding in the interest of the nations and peoples of the region and their historic relations.

CSO: 4802

TOP PALESTINIAN LEADER ANALYZES STRUGGLE WITH ISRAEL

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 16 Sep 80 pp 8, 9

[Report on interview with Abu Iyad by Salih Qallab: "A Talk With Abu Iyad on Concerns About the Palestinian and Lebanese Situation"]

/Text/ Talking with Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) on the concerns and worries of the Palestinian revolution is always significant, by virtue of his status in the FATH command, his longstanding roles in dealing with the most delicate, sensitive issues, and his position in the Palestinian revolution as a whole.

People who know Abu Iyad, and people who have followed the political tasks he has assumed close at hand, will always remember a string of difficult missions. In Amman Abu Iyad was always the figure of national unity. At the fourth FATH conference he played a prominent role in unifying the ranks of the conference and enabling it to rise above the numerous difficulties facing it. In Lebanon he was the person assigned by the FATH command to hold the dialogue with the authorities and try to find ways out of crises, starting with the famous Shatura agreement and proceeding up to the latest meetings with chiefs Sarkis and al-Huss.

In this dialogue AL-SAFIR held with him after his return from a long trip, in which colleagues Balal al-Hasan, Sa'd Mahyu and Salih Qallab took part, Abu Iyad was as usual clear in answering all questions.

In talking about the Lebanese arena, Abu Iyad did not belittle the responsibility for security transgressions, but called for bridges of trust to be extended among the resistance, the Lebanese authorities and the deterrence forces, and for the transgressions to be remedied by mutual coordination, considering that the security issue is an indivisible one.

In talking about Arab circumstances, he was also explicit in calling for the establishment of solid, strategic relations with Syria, eliminating all the possibilities for doubt which arise from time to time.

In talking about Palestinian conditions, he stressed the need to hasten to convene the Palestinian National Congress lest its constant postponement affect the solidity of internal relations.

In talking about international Palestinian activity, he was very precise in defining the need to continue political action toward Europe and similarly to put a ceiling on this movement and to remove illusions on any anticipated European position independent of American policy.

What imparts greater importance to conversation with Abu Iyad is the fact that in his positions he expresses not just his personal convictions but also the directives of the Palestinian command, from the viewpoint of one who is knowledgeable about the various, indeed sometimes contradictory, information, decisions and viewpoints. Herewith is the text of the conversation.

Holding the National Congress

/Question/ The National Congress was to have been held at the start of September 1980. We know that there are some organizational issues which require previous discussion, but to what extent is it correct to state that the postponement of the council was made in anticipation of the American elections and the European initiative?

/Answer/ With regard to this matter, I must point out that the National Congress, at its meeting in June, formed a committee of secretaries general under the chairmanship of our brother Abu 'Ammar to agree to all details bearing on the Executive Committee and some issues which are hanging, on grounds that the political program is approved by the National Congress.

This committee was to have met last 18 August but it appears that the Palestinian command's preoccupation with holding the Jerusalem committee in Morocco prevented this meeting. I believe that there is no political reason in the background for postponement of the National Congress as far as either the American elections or the European initiative go.

Probably it is the failure to state the reasons for the postponement of the National Congress meeting that has led to these ambiguities and stirred up these rumors. The failure to state them has also led some detachments to raise an outcry, and I say they have the right to do so, because postponements without explanations certainly lead to stirring up doubts.

I stress here that we now need a congress meeting more than in any past period, and I also stress that if there is no longer any justification to postpone it, I believe it should be convened at the start of next month.

Before that, however, it is necessary to reach agreement over the following basic issues. First, the detachments must meet and agree on the form of the Executive Committee, because without agreement on this issue we

will go through the same painful experience we went through at the previous National Congress meeting.

Second, it is necessary to reach agreement on a minimum national unity, militarily and financially, especially since the Palestine Liberation Organization's national fund is now able to cover all the detachments' requirements and it is not compelled to go to one Arab country or another and hold out its hand for money.

I believe that it is now time for the budgets of all detachments of the resistance to be under the Liberation Organization--strengthening national unity and making us discuss other subjects besides money with the Arab countries.

Third, it is necessary to observe sudden political changes, and we should promulgate a plan for dealing with them in the light of the political program which has been approved, although in circumstances which differ from the current one in some particulars.

In other words, before the National Congress meeting we must agree on the style of confrontation and on what our role is and what the role of others in it is. We must set out a plan and mobilize the Arabs around it, because the Arabs, as has been clear so far, do not have any confrontation plan. Therefore we must explain the role of oil in the sturggle and the role of military power in the struggle. I state that before convening the National Congress we must agree on political movement, if we are not able to agree on the abovementioned points.

Some of us are now opppsed to political movement on the European level, and some are unreservedly for this movement. Therefore, before the National Congress convenes, it is necessary for us to agree on this point at least, because once agreement is reached on these issues the time for convening the congress will not be important, whereas if we do not agree on a political position and the state of the council remains hanging, Palestinian national unity itself will be affected.

I now recommend that the committee assigned by the Central Council meet to discuss matters most frankly in order to take a stand on the abovementioned issues and determine a firm date for the congress meeting.

Finally, I believe that linking postponement of the congress to the American elections or the European initiative is not right. Proof of that is that as long as it is not possible to bind the Palestinian leaders to it outside the congress it will not be possible to bind them to it within it.

The Limits of the European Initiative

/Question/ Is the goal of European activity the belief that the existing balance of forces in the region will permit successful official diplomatic

activity, or is it just an issue of political activity to gain support from public opinion?

/Answer/ The issue about which most uproar has revolved is that of the European initiative, although the matter is very plain and simple.

Before talking about the initiative, we must ask the following:

Must we become immersed in what is going on in Lebanon and content ourselves with talking about political victories?

Will we just be content with military action and not turn it into political positions?

We must view political activity in this framework, whether it is toward Europe or in another direction.

I believe that through this movement we will have to achieve gains for our people's cause, however they differ, however small they might be.

Here, however, one must distinguish between moving politically for the sake of new gains for our people and betting that a movement toward Europe may produce an acceptable solution for our cause.

This type of bet will certainly lead to illusions and mistakes, because the Palestinian, Arab and international balances of forces will not allow for thought of a reasonable solution through the current European movements.

Therefore one must just view political movement from the standpoint of attaining media and political gains in the European camp.

As the regards the European initiative, on which talk is taking place and toward which we observe some movement, I can state in advance that that initiative is an extension of American diplomacy and an extension of Washington's movements.

Europe is not able, and does not dare, to move alone without a signal from the American White House.

Even as far as the two major countries in Western Europe go, that is, West Germany and France, Germany is to be considered a political and economic colony, even a military colony, of the United States.

As for France, in spite of the fact that it is trying to adopt an independent position, this position has not yet reached the point of liberation from the zone of American influence, especially since the American administration, headed by Carter, has laid out a red line on the Middle East, and that is Camp David. Carter considers that any diminution of Camp David is

tantamount to a challenge to his foreign policy and the successes it has realized during his term.

Neutralization of Oil

I believe that some Arabs do not want to use oil in the struggle, either by threatening to cut it off, by controlling its prices or selling it to friendly countries at reduced prices. Therefore they have resorted to backing the European initiative in order to cover their positions and say "We are in the struggle, and Europe, through our efforts, has started to tilt toward the Arabs."

I can give an example of that in D'Estaing's visit to the region, in which as the price for his statements on the Liberation Organization and the Palestine cause he reaped great gains for his country and the European states, although in fact he brought nothing new in spite of all that was said about his progressive stand in this sphere.

I state that we must not fall prey to the illusion that there is a European initiative. It is true that we hear some promises from one European official or another, but these will all remain just promises, and all European initiatives will remain mere movement within the American orbit.

/Question/ What about the relationship between the European initiative and the American elections?

/Answer/ I believe that Washington's view on the European Middle East iniative will crystallize after the American elections, on grounds that the Europeans will then demand that the American administration show what limited formal concessions it will accept regarding Camp David.

As for the European initiative assuming a form independent of the American contest, I state that that is impossible, and, even if we concede that it is possible that a third force could appear in Western Europe, alongside the American imperialist camp and the system of Socialist states, this would be considered a revolution in international politics which is not likely to happen now.

Europe--and the Arabs

/Question/ But in the light of all this, isn't it necessary that the resistance distance itself from the Arab countries accepting the European initiative.

/Answer/ To clarify what you say, one must recognize that there is a crisis of confidence in our relations with the Arab bodies involved whereby our movements and positions are interpreted in an incorrect fashion.

Therefore I say that we must describe to certain Arab countries, and our partners in the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front, the true nature of our movement toward Europe, which does not go beyond a specific political framework and does not reach the point of an illusion that this movement will yield a solution.

Moreover there is another matter which must be noted and that is that some statements issued by some Palestinian officials are sometimes not marked by precision and therefore some Arab brothers, in light of the crisis of confidence, give these statements interpretations which are remote from the true nature of the real Palestinian positions.

Our brothers must understand the importance of our political movement; if we abrogate it it will be as if we have abrogated our existence, but we must clarify the dimensions and limits of this movement and the extent to which we are betting on it. At that point I foresee that the lack of confidence will disappear and will be replaced by a common coordination aimed at deepening the contradictions between Israel and some European forces, inside or outside power, and expanding the scope for recognition of the Liberation Organization.

/Question/ However, the issue of the European initiative is not confined just to the Liberation Organization. There are other Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Iraq, which are enthusiastic about this initiative.

/Answer/ I mentioned earlier that some Arab countries, not necessarily the ones I mentioned, believe that euphoria over the European initiative might exempt them from their responsibilities for setting forth oil as a weapon in the struggle.

New statements are being made about the failure to use oil in the struggle, on the excuse that this method is repugnant to civilized human taste and so forth. People make these statements in order to remove oil from the struggle and separate economics from politics, although, if we recall the history of the Arab struggle with Zionism we will find that Israel launched its wars against us at times when it was being stifled by economic crises and the crisis of unemployment.

Ceausescu's Activity

/Question/ Ceausescu, we have learned, advised some Palestinian officials to exploit the present situation and get what can be gotten, on the pretext that the coming years will witness a new international detente and will witness a decline in the degree of the world's need for oil as a source of energy.

/Answer/ What can be gotten? At a time when Israel is even bargaining over autonomy, which does not go beyond a mission to implant the occupation

on our territory and does not respond to the slightest national demand of our people, and has adopted a decision to incorporate Jerusalem with the objective of further diligent activity to lay its hands on our territory and our people?

I differ with Ceausescu in his viewpoint. He thinks that it is possible to divert the Palestinian people at this stage through some placebos.

This reminds me of the attack launched against us to make us tentatively accept autonomy. Some of our friends advised us after Camp David tentatively to accept this until we strengthened ourselves, and then demand new gains.

This type of step could be acceptable in the case of another pattern of imperialism, but, as regards the Israeli presence on our territory, that is a colonialist imperialist presence and I stress that acceptance of autonomy will be tantamount to a step toward strengthening and implanting this presence at the expense of the rights and the existence of our people.

Sliding into this kind of step will result in joining al-Sadat, who is no longer able even to extricate himself even partially from being bogged down on the road to final treason.

/Question/ In the light of your talk about the oil issue, do you not believe that it is the resistance's duty to set out a plan to tell the Arab masses ways and means for using oil, such as reducing production, raising prices, linking political negotiations to oil issues, and commercial and economic matters related to them?

/Answer/ I believe that Arabs, even those who have not yet reached adulthood, have started to realize the value of oil in the struggle. We realize that some Western European countries are resorting to a rapprochement with us because they are eager to exploit our influence on the Arab situation to obtain specific gains in oil.

Therefore I consider that the Arab oil states must follow a plan to explain the value of oil in the political struggle.

Here I can give an example. Before the Suez war, which 'Abd-al-Nasir waged, the Arabs did not exactly realize the value of the Suez Canal; they just knew that it was a simple waterway.

However, following 'Abd-al-Nasir's nationalization of the canal and the 1956 war, the strategic importance of this important waterway was driven home to the Arabs.

Now the Arab nationalist oil countries must take a stand like 'Abd-al-Nasir's so that the importance of this vital element in the struggle the Arab nation is embarked on will be clear to the Arab masses.

However, I would like to state bluntly that people have started to feel that the Arabs do not want to bring oil into the struggle, for numerous reasons, foremost fear of America, American occupation and confrontation with America.

I say that this fear is unjustified, because, if we put barrels of gunpowder under the oil wells and threaten to set them off in the event of any threat to infringe on the sovereignty of a given Arab country, no country in the world, America of any other, will dare even think of occupying or invading an Arab country.

Threats to the Gulf States

/Question/ As long as you are talking about oil and threats of occupying oil fields, this reminds us of what is currently being said to the effect that the gulf is on the verge of tensions and rifts, and what is said about the role of Palestinians in these tensions.

/Answer/ We have been hearing these rumors for a long time, and I believe that their purpose is to get people to take the issue of American bases in the gulf area for granted, especially since some emirs and sheiks reject the presence of such bases and the Arab masses there are fighting against American hegemony in the region. There is also an Arab rejection by some countries of these bases.

This is one reason, and a main one, but a second reason is to put some wedge between the Palestinians and expatriate Arabs in the gulf area on the one hand and the original inhabitants of the region. Therefore some people are fabricating individual problems and security problems and labelling Palestinians with them to justify banishing and deporting them, in order to make it easy to implant an American military presence in the region.

In this regard, concentration is now being made on Kuwait.

I might mention that I met the Emir of Kuwait 6 months ago and a conversation took place on the Ka'bah incident. We said that some people from a number of Arab countries were among the people who caused that incident but there were no Palestinians among them, and we stressed that that was proof that it is not necessarily true that Palestinians participate in every problem occurring in a given area.

After that meeting, in which the Emir of Kuwait was won over to our viewpoint, two incidents took place:

First, the hijacking of an airplane by a Palestinian who was working in Kuwait. In spite of our condemnation of this act, which is not justified by the oppression and bias this Palestinian faced, we are amazed at the media attack which was launched against the Palestinians in Kuwait, which

ignored all their contributions to the development of this fraternal country and service to its people.

Second, the explosion in the AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM newspaper. I can assert to you that when I heard this news, I was outside the Arab area, and it only occurred to me that it was Israeli intelligence, or that of some other hostile body, that carried out this operation.

However, when I returned I was surprised to hear that some Palestinians had been arrested on the charge of involvement in this operation, which we condemn and deplore, as we do not permit anyone connected with the Palestinian revolution, closely or remotely connected with the Palestinian revolution, to venture on such operation.

In this sphere, I am amazed, in spite of the competent bodies' knowledge of the nature of our positions on such matters, that defamation campaigns are being carried out and that talk is being made of an open trial. I have even started to feel as if the objective is to fabricate problems between the Kuwaiti government and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

We are not against having any Palestinian who has done wrong brought to trial, but we are against defamation and against the fabrication of campaigns against Palestinians which we fear will move into offices, schools and factories and could lead to unpleasant things.

Any Palestinian might err. We are not angels. However, for this noise to be stirred up on this matter at a time involving issues which bigger, more serious Arab bodies stand behind, at a time when we have refrained from embarrassing the government of Kuwait on the issue of the assassination of 'Ali Yasin, this means that the intention is to deport Palestinians from Kuwait so that it may fall prey to American bases. I am not saying that we are the ones protecting Kuwait, but I say that the goal in expelling our people from Kuwait is for Kuwait to create a justification for American intervention.

We Are Not a Party to an Axis

/Question/ There are people who say that FATH is working out of an alliance with Iraq, that this alliance has opened the way for the European initiative, and that it has opened the way to the special relationship with Jordan and led to touchiness between you and Syria.

/Answer/ The subject of an alliance is not at issue, because alliances have meanings which are different from the existing situation. What I would like to say is that our relations with Iraq improved recently, having been almost cut off before Camp David.

I stress that our real alliances are expressed through the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front, because as far as we are concerned that represents

a position which is more advanced than other Arab positions. It was our hope that Iraq would join this front, in view of the weight it accounts for on the Arab stage.

However, for reasons which concern it, it has not joined this front. Therefore, because we are pursuing a platform which holds that it is necessary to deepen bonds with any country standing against Camp David, we are concerned about good relations with Iraq.

We have heard of these rumors, which might perhaps have been repeated by some Arab officials. I have not met with Syrian officials for a while but some of them might be repeating talk of this sort.

Therefore, from a position of responsibility, I deny that the Palestinian revolution is a party to an Arab axis working against any given Arab body. As I said, our basic position is in the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front, but that does not prevent us from having good relations with other Arab parties working against Camp David.

Ultimately I must state that Syria always represents along, and, as far as the current period goes, all fighting forces must stand alongside the current Syrian regime to confront the assault which is being made on it because of its positions against Camp David.

Then one must point out that some forces, in order to drive wedges between us and Syria, are anxious to spread rumors about a Palestinian-Jordanian-Iraqi-Saudi security alliance and talk about a Saudi-Jordanian-Iraqi-Palestinian axis.

Once again I say that the goal of these rumors is to crush the prime element of perseverance; their goal is to crush the firm relations between Syria and the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement.

Our Relations with Jordan Embarrass Us

/Question/ It is clear that relations with Jordan constitute a basic matter of dispute among the detachments of the resistance. The prevailing view is that Jordan is exploiting this dialogue with you for its benefit, is moving toward Europe, and is establishing a Ministry of Occupied Territory Affairs in order to attain the demand for a united kingdom.

/Answer/ To be fair I must say that the dialogue with Jordan was approved by the Palestine National Congress, under the pressing need to expand the scope of contacts with our people in the occupied territories and to create political and military positions for ourselves in Jordan.

Our aspirations were to create a firm base in Jordan to confront the enemy, but the Jordanian regime limited the scope for cooperation to the occupied territories and did not allow any cooperation outside this framework.

Most bluntly, I say that the fact that our relations with the Jordanian regime take this form is causing us much embarrassment. At a time when Palestinian officials are going to Jordan and sitting down at the negotiating table with Jordanian officials, Jordanian intelligence is carrying out broad house searches and arrests against our Palestinian and Jordanian people.

It is necessary to point out that arrests of our people in Jordan are continuing in spite of all that is said about the releases which have taken place.

It is true that some arrested persons have been released, but in exchange for these releases intelligence has arrested many many times more people than were released.

In the last 2 years Jordanian intelligence has broadened the scope of its activities against our people. The file on this is in front of me. They have not stopped infiltration campaigns against us and have not stopped cursing us while Palestinian leaders are holding dialogues with their officials in Amman.

I believe that if the Jordanian regime's intention is sincere, it will permit broader relations than cooperation on certain matters concerning the occupied territories.

If the Jordanian regime's intentions are sincere, it will allow the Palestine revolution to mobilize the masses in Jordan and agree to a form of cooperation, even partial, regarding military activity in the occupied territories.

To confine relations just to methods of distributing aid in the occupied territories, I believe that a committee much lower than the command level is able to carry out that task and as a consequence I say that the Jordanian regime is the only one benefiting from the relationship with us. It is moving in the political and foreign contexts under the cover of mutual understanding with the Liberation Organization although it is not even giving the resistance the slightest rights from these relations.

I further stress that it is necessary to specify a position and review relations with the Jordanian regime in the light of the National Congress resolutions.

If the Jordanian regime is to remain the sole beneficiary of the relationship with the Liberation Organization by obtaining Arab funds or by moving politically to attain a united kingdom, I say the matter requires urgent review, because for relations to continue without rules will result in a disaster.

/Question/ We have heard that there has been a freeze on your part on joint committees with Jordan.

/Answer/ Matters have not reached that point. However, there is a stand on our part in the light of the experience of the past 2 years, because we do not agree that a Palestinian leader should go Amman and not be allowed to visit the al-Wahdat camp. Nor do we agree that Jordanian intelligence should continue its campaigns against our people and the staffs of our revolution.

The Camp David Predicament?

/Question/ Much talk is going on about the Camp David predicament, and, through that, the predicament of the Egyptian regime. First, do you really believe that Camp David is in a predicament or is what is called the predicament just the implementation of a separate peace between Egypt and Israel, which is the essence of Camp David?

Second, what is the meaning of bringing down Camp David? Does that mean making al-Sadat retrench or bringing down his regime?

/Answer/ Let me go back a little, that is, back to 1970, and point out that a Palestinian resistance delegation met with the late leader Jamal 'Abd-al-Nasir. At that time he showed us documents on international offers to return all of Sinai to Egypt in exchange for an end to the state of war with Egypt.

At that time, 'Abd-al-Nasir told us, "They want to swallow the Egyptian fish, so that it will be easy for them to swallow the other Arab fish." Therefore, in view of the occurrence, I state that al-Sadat realized and declared before embarking on Camp David that that solution would be an Egyptian-Israeli one and could be nothing but that.

However, in alienating Egypt, al-Sadat has had to tell the Arabs that what he was reaching was not a separate Egyptian Israeli solution. Therefore I am sure that all the talk that went on, before and after Camp David, on a so-called Egyptian-Israeli dispute over the Palestinian issue, is only part of the same process of alienation.

I stress that if Israeli had not paid part of Sinai as a price for the Palestinian cause, the Arab cause and Egypt's relations with the Arab nation, it would never have withdrawn from a square inch of Egyptian territory.

Proof of the validity of what I am saying is that these complications that talk has been going on about, before and after Camp David, reached a climax, then disappeared all at once, and the separate solution has continued on its way unobstructed.

This applies to some matters related to autonomy, the settlements and even the issue of incorporating the city of Jerusalem which al-Sadat tried to exploit in order to portray himself as concerned for the Palestinian cause and the sacred shrines of Moslems, which he is still relinquishing and considering not to be a basic problem obstructing the resumption of negotiations.

This is as far as the first issue goes. As regards the second issue, bringing about the collapse of Camp David, I say that persons who view this issue in terms of betting on the chance that al-Sadat will draw back are far removed from reality, consciously or unconsciously.

al-Sadat went on to Camp David determined not to draw back from any step he took. Anyone following al-Sadat's statements since the signing of the Camp David agreements must notice that this man considers that he has entered history through them.

Therefore the simplest obvious facts stress that bringing Camp David down means bringing al-Sadat down, that there will be no bringing down Camp David without bringing down al-Sadat. In this sphere one must remind people that the Egyptian people, who have fought tyrannical rulers with caustic jokes, always reached the peak of tension and rose up against these rulers with blood and iron. This is what happened in the era of 'Urabi and what happened in the July revolution under the command of 'Abd-al-Nasir, and this is what will happen against al-Sadat, in spite of the gloom surrounding Cairo now.

The Resistance's Predicament

/Question/ A final question on this subject: it sometimes seems to the observer that the Palestine cause is realizing great successes on the international level, while it faces further frustrations on the Arab level, and in this sense faces a strategic predicament. Do you agree with this view of things?

/Answer/ The cause of the predicament is not the fact that we are living in a small area which is Lebanon; rather, it may be ascribed to a general Arab deficiency and to general frustration, which makes it mandatory that we set forth a broad scale plan of action which in the first place will observe Palestinian-Syrian relations and consolidate them on a firm basis transcending minor points of touchiness.

I say that it is necessary that there will be a lack of complete congruence between our positions and those of our Syrian brothers, for a simple reason, which is that they are an existing state with all its assets and we are a revolution with its special, objective circumstances. However, this must not result in a lack of trust or a lack of coordination in everything.

I say most bluntly that if we do not arise, we and Syria, and hold hands to face all the challenges that come up, the Arab situation will proceed toward further deterioration and regression.

Therefore we must build firm, solid, clear relations which are not influenced by reports, whispers, plots or attempts at distortion and confusion.

Again I stress that we, along with Syria, will be able to dispell Arab deficiencies, will be able to disrupt the balance of forces, and will be able to extend into a heartland which reaches Iran and the Arab west.

In this regard, I also say that it is necessary to strengthen the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front and strengthen the trust of the Arab masses, lest they continue to view its action as just that of a body issuing statements with no scope for carrying them out in actuality.

/Question/ Some days ago Yasir 'Arafat called for an Arab Defense Council meeting to discuss the dangers of the Israeli aggressions against southern Lebanon. So far we have not noticed any Arab response. Frankly, we say that if he had gone to any international body it would not have delayed in responding to the call. This is the predicament.

/Answer/ Our brother Abu 'Ammar called for an Arab summit before that and the Arabs did not respond. He called us to a meeting of foreign ministers of Arab countries before the convening of the United Nations session, and the Arabs still did not respond and the issue was confined to a meeting at the delegate level in the international organization.

This issue does not concern Abu 'Ammar as a person; rather, it concerns the Palestinian revolution, because Abu 'Ammar is the commander and spokesman of this revolution. However, this state of affairs leads us to an important matter, which is that some Arab countries are no longer afraid of the Palestinian revolution.

Therefore I say that these Arabs must know that the Palestine cause has become an international one, as well as being the everyday cause of every Arab, and that the voice of the Palestine revolution, as a consequence, cannot be bought by money. We need money, this is true, but I say in a loud voice that we need political positions.

Let me be more explicit. This indifferent position toward the Palestine revolution is caused by the alienation which sometimes seeps into Palestinian-Syrian relations, because Syrian-Palestinian relations are firm and clear and will impose on every Arab a blood tax and will bind them to positions on the Palestine cause.

The Unity of Syria and Libya

/Question/ The latest important Arab event is the declaration of a merger union between Syria and the Libyan jamahiriyah. It is true that the ordinary citizen wonders about the Palestine revolution's position on this union.

/Answer/ The climate of the Syrian-Libyan union brings us back to the climate of the fifties. However, as much as we are happy and support, back and bless this union, to that extent also do we fear for it, from a position of solicitude.

Fear for the union arises from a glance at its importance. The linkup between Damascus in the Arab east and Libya in the Arab west is not a simple matter which hostile forces are standing and watching.

Then I say that our Arab masses are not able to endure a new setback in the context of this nation's historic goal. Therefore, just as we say that it is not permissible for the Palestinian resistance to be defeated, so do we say that it is not permissible for this union to fail, whatever the reasons might be.

I say also that it is necessary for the Palestinian resistance to take its stand on this union and it is necessary that at its core it not take the form of statements and "dazzling displays" but take a true combative form and serious revolutionary solidarity.

This solidarity will make all the Arab nation and the Arab masses join this union, which is to be considered a ray of hope for them and is to be considered a great historic achievement.

Israel's Threats

/Question/ Fear for the union, in the light of Israeli statements and movements, causes us to wonder about the possibility that an Israeli military blow might be directed against Syria and the Palestinian resistance.

/Answer/ If what is meant is an Israeli aggression against Syria, or a Sadatist aggression against Libya, I can say that these aggressions will strengthen the union and will move the two countries toward further solidarity.

However, the source of fear for the union is domestic enemies, not foreign ones. An attack by the foreign enemies will give the union its value and will give it its strength.

The Lebanese Explosions

/Question/ There is talk about domestic explosions in Lebanon, in addition to anticipated aggressions against the south. To what extent can one consider this talk valid?

/Answer/ The talk about explosions is not new. We spent the last year in an atmosphere of explosions, and talk about explosions; in reality the gravity of the anticipated explosions started to assume real dimensions after the 7 July operation in the eastern section.

This operation united Israel's agents and consequently united Israel's schemes. In my opinion, this operation constituted the start of the rallying of forces under the command of a single decisionmaker linked with Israel.

There are people who say that this operation was linked with a more distant framework, that is, the United States, but in this regard I believe that the Phalange Party and Israel are playing their own game this time, in the sense that there was no current American agreement, although the scheme basically was drawn up by the American administration in 1975 at the time of Kissinger and that administration is still carrying it out in stages.

Therefore Bashir al-Jumayyil resorted to this operation to gather power in his hands. The recent clashes in al-Hadath between the Phalange militia and the army, in addition to two previous attempts to assassinate Sarkis, even managed to prove his intentions to the legitimate authorities.

Anyone reading Bashir al-Jumayyil's statements in the wake of the Ba'abda clashes will fully confirm his intentions and his party's intentions toward the legitimate authorities in whose name they have immersed Lebanon in a cauldron of death and destruction over the past 5 years. If Rashid Karami or other Islamic leaders had made these statements, the world would have risen up in arms and stayed up.

What gives Bashir al-Jumayyil's statements regarding the army a dangerous dimension is the fact that because of specific circumstances he is able to penetrate the army and is able to do what he wants in its ranks.

In the light of what the Phalange Party has done and has been doing since the 13 April events, proceeding from the Ihdin massacre, to the 7 July operation and the latest skirmishes with the army, I believe that the Phalange is carrying out a plan which aims not just at dominating the area but also encompasses all of Lebanon.

The talk about liberating Lebanon from what is called the Palestinian and Syrian occupation is the index of the coming drift toward an explosion.

Here we must observe that when it talks about settlement, adopts a viewpoint based on the lack of a likelihood that the Phalange Party solution will be created to the Middle East crisis. Therefore it says "We will accept the Palestinians in Lebanon, but without arms."

Thus it is clear that the Phalange Party is carrying out an Israeli scheme aimed at stripping the Palestinian people of their arms and consequently at imposing settlement on them by force.

Therefore we appeal to those who are talking about settlement to cast a real glance at the scheme the Phalange Party is carrying out in coordination with Israel, aimed at settling the Palestinians in Lebanon after the liquidation of their revolution (which is their instrument for returning to their homeland) and after their arms have been snatched from their hands.

One must observe that the Israelis, and the Americans also, are now talking about the need to settle the Palestinians in Jordan. In reality they mean Lebanon, because the Palestinians in Jordan have been considered Jordanian citizens, especially since they were stripped of their weapons following the September events.

Therefore the conspiracy the Phalange Party is now carrying out is to continue fighting the resistance under the slogan of stripping it of weapons, in preparation for applying the settlement in practice.

The Palestinian resistance has declared, and I declare now, that implementation of settlement will in practice begin the moment the rifles fall from the hands of the Palestinian fighting men, because these rifles are what are fighting settlement.

It appears in the light of all that is going on that the scheme requires the fabrication of clashes with the resistance in Beirut while Israel moves from the south, so that together they may comprise a pincers,strangling the Palestinian resistance and stripping it of its arms, after which the settlement will occur.

On this occasion I would like to say a word, which is that the Phalange Party, which has committed massacres to impose its dominance over the area, consists of the sons of the cream of the Maronite families and will never hesitate at any moment when anyone who just thinks of standing up to its hegemony extends his hands to other areas.

At some stages it has deluded some Islamic leaders into thinking that the Palestinians constitute a burden to them, thereby exploiting some of our excesses to win these people over by the slogans of liberation they raise.

I stress that those who have dared to strike against Sulayman Franjiyah and Camille Chamoun will never hesitate to belittle any Lebanese personality, whatever his religious position, and his social leadership.

The Phalange Party is the party of a person with a fascist platform who inherited it when it was an athletic team and continued to strengthen it until it became an armed force aspiring to dominate all of Lebanon and to see no one on this land but itself.

Again, I give as testimony to what I say what happened to Camille Chamoun at the hands of the Phalange, although he is trying to rid himself of

Bashir al-Jumayyil's grip by attacking the Palestinians and the Palestine revolution.

Bashir al-Jumayyil "shone" at the game of chess, and it appears that Israeli intelligence found in him the person who could be driven by his ambitions to implement all its plans.

Concerns about the Transgressions

/Question/ There is an issue which has kept coming up over the past years: the security issue. The Lebanese citizen is suffering from these conditions and sometimes expresses his concern through stands against the resistance. The question is, why isn't a solution found to this issue, which is considered the basic concern that deprives citizens of their sleep?

/Answer/ If we start with the security issue when the Arab deterrent forces came into Lebanon, we will find that the agreement called on these forces to assume the responsibility for security in all areas, or at least in our areas.

What happened was that after the Bayt-al-Din conference--and all of us know the nature of its resolutions and the positions of the parties to these resolutions--the deterrent forces started to relinquish security responsibilities on behalf of the Lebanese authorities, in accordance with their desires.

The deterrent forces' patrols at the beginning acted in participation with the Lebanese security forces, backing them up and enabling them to impose their dominance. Here I must point out that we in the national movement and the resistance refused to take part in controlling security outside our areas, on grounds that this was the task of the deterrent forces which are the legitimate Lebanese forces.

The fact is that one cannot parcel out security responsibilities, because this kind of parcelling out will lead to instability as a result, since each party will throw the responsibility on the other party.

Once again I point out that security responsibility lies on the shoulders of the deterrent forces and the shoulders of the Lebanese security forces. This is our opinion in the resistance and the national movement.

I wonder why the Lebanese security forces do not exercise their responsibilities, although we in the resistance and the national movement would welcome this sort of conduct.

This year we have held a series of meetings devoted to security matters, in the light of a broadening scope of complaints about thefts, aggressions and the imposition of detention. We agreed to the formation of a security committee, and this committee managed to get in movement, if only in a limited manner, at the beginning, but its activity soon was paralyzed after

it had come to a standstill, impotently, in the face of the question of what entities ought to have been arrested, especially as far as the Lebanese are concerned.

The national movement has insisted on the fact that the deterrent forces and the Lebanese security forces are the body in charge of this matter. Therefore, contact was made with the Lebanese authorities and the deterrent forces to discuss the matter, but, in spite of that, things remain as they are.

Here I would like to mention that the felons and crooks in the western section number no more than 140. We can arrest them in 48 hours and rid the people of their evil. However, the problem is that these people are mixed--some are Lebanese, some are Palestinian, and the majority of them do not live in the Palestinian camps, which prevents us from taking a decision to arrest and impose the punishments on them they deserve.

We got in touch with the deterrent forces and agreement was reached with them on arresting them, but this agreement has not been carried out yet, and the situation remains as it is.

Therefore I repeat what I said before, which is that the deterrent forces and the Lebanese security forces are the ones that bear the responsibility and therefore we must cooperate with them and offer them information on people who seek defense and protection from given organizations for bodies.

For the sake of the citizens, we must also hide displays of weapons and close down some offices. However, these issues will remain partial and limited in their results unless a radical treatment is made in cooperation among the three parties--the resistance and national movement, the Lebanese authorities, and the Arab deterrent forces.

We recognize the gravity of the responsibility for security conditions and we are therefore continuing the effort to deal with this problem. Here I should not miss the chance to mention that we reached agreement with Dr al-Huss to set aside a prison in Beirut so that these criminals and felons may be rounded up and put in it, to be released only after their punishment period has ended. This is the opposite of what happened in the past, when we would imprison someone committing a violation and hand him over to the Lebanese authorities, then be surprised the next day to see that he was free and out on his own.

Support for the South

/Question/ The security issue in the south goes beyond the issue of violations and brings up the matter of support and confrontation. Here also Lebanese citizens complain bitterly. How do you envision dealing with this issue?

/Answer/ As far as the south goes, and the fact that Lebanese citizens are continuing to endure suffering by being alone in confronting the enemy, without any support or backing, I hold the Arab countries without exception responsible for this.

The Arab countries are withholding support and backing from the people in the south, on the pretext that there are no authorities to receive support money. We say that this pretext is unacceptable and unjustified, because the Lebanese authorities are present. Let these monies flow to them if the Arab countries concerned do not trust other bodies.

Lebanese citizens in the south are supposed to feel that a hand is extending them support, so that their perseverance may be strengthened and their will to confront the enemy may be strengthened.

This is as far as support goes, but as regards the security situation in the south, we in the resistance consider that the solution to this matter must come about through coordination and cooperation with the Lebanese authorities. The Lebanese authorities must open their hearts to us and we must open our hearts to them so that a solution may be found for all the problems facing them and the citizens.

On this occasion I must give thanks to Dr Salim al-Huss, who, through his sincere Lebanese nationalism and his clear national commitment, has managed to create bridges of trust between the resistance and the Lebanese authorities and has managed to implant the beginning of a cooperation based on equality and mutual understanding which we hope will continue and develop.

Here I state that the time has come to carry out a peaceful dialogue in which all forces will participate to create a formula for coexistence which will enable the citizen to be free of the things he faces every day in his life and aggressions against his property.

/Question/ By this approach do you mean the Lebanese authorities?

/Answer/ Yes, the Lebanese authorities. Lebanese authorities which forswear the influence of gangs connected with Israel. These gangs on whom the authorities' decisions sometimes appear to depend.

/Question/ A few days ago a conflict arose between you and the Lebanese authorities, since the Foreign Ministry considered the invitation 'Arafat sent to the Joint Arab Defense Council to be tantamount to a violation of their powers, and they issued a statement in this regard.

/Answer/ The reason for this, as I said, was the lack of dialogue and coordination. If there had been coordination and dialogue, these types of problems would not have occurred.

Regarding the episode you mentioned, what I would like to point out is that our brother Abu 'Ammar's invitation absolutely does not conflict with the powers of the authorities. The Palestinian forces in the south are exposed to the process of being ground down and are exposed to extermination attempts. Therefore 'Arafat has the right to invite the Arabs to bear their responsibility toward what is going on in the south.

More than that, doesn't any Arab country that belongs to the Arab League have the right to call the Arab Defense Council to meet over southern Lebanon?

What is going on in the south is a responsibility borne by all the Arabs, and when Abu 'Ammar calls on the Arabs to bear their responsibility, he is not detracting from the powers or the sovereignty of the Lebanese authorities.

Then why doesn't Fu'ad Butrus take the initiative to call for such a meeting, so that 'Arafat can come and the Liberation Organization can come and strengthen and back up the Lebanese invitation?

/Question/ Is there any specific initiative regarding the subject of coordination with the Lebanese authorities?

/Answer/ There is no specific initiative. However, I call for coordination because of its importance and necessity.

The Tripoli Events

/Question/ There are ambiguous circumstances surrounding the recent events in Tripoli. Would it be possible to shed some light on these events, in view of the measures which have been taken?

/Answer/ When I spoke of the need for security coordination between us, the authorities and the deterrent forces, I meant that if this kind of coordination had occurred we would not have suffered from what happened in Tripoli and elsewhere.

As regards what happened in Tripoli, it appeared that people outside the law gathered to commit a political act of a security nature in order to strike out at Syrian-Palestinian relations and stir up factional grudges.

I should not miss the opportunity to mention that some Lebanese official agencies played a bad role in this type of atmosphere.

The Tripoli events began with the imposition of forcible detention, the robbery of citizens and aggressions against their property; then they escalated, assuming a political character which assumed the nature of factional grudges, leading to acts of capricious slaughter and aggressions against innocent people, without justification.

Col Muhammad Ghanim and our brother Abu al-Hawl were able, in their missions, to eliminate the consequences of this fabricated discord but they were not able to eliminate the causes of it; this may result in a resumption of these incidents at any moment.

Therefore we must continue to coordinate and deal with this discord in order to pull it out by its roots and put an end to it.

I believe that as far as the resistance, the national movement and the deterrent forces go, the fact that the higher command was absent from Tripoli is one of the reasons why it was possible for the discord to develop on its own and enabled the gangs to give their conduct a political character.

I believe that if the higher command were present in the north, alongside Rashid Karami and other national leaders, these security shocks would not have occurred.

/Question/ Through the latest skirmishes in al-Ghaziyah, the nightmare of the southern suburbs has returned again, again stirring up talk about relations between the Palestine resistance and the Amal movement.

/Answer/ When Imam al-Sadr raised the slogan "arms are the clothing of man," his goal was to fight the Zionist enemy, defend the south, stand alongside the resistance and support and back it.

Anyone reviewing Amal's premises will find no narrow factional Shiite demands among them. Amal's premises have all been national and domestic demands concerning all the Lebanese people and all the Arab people.

However, what truly cuts one's spirit is that after the disappearance of Imam al-Sadr, some leaders started trying to divert Amal from its national course and its patriotic platform. Some people tried to fabricate contradictions between it and the Palestine resistance. However, for the sake of the truth and fairness, one must point out that the higher command has made maximum efforts to prevent these attempts from succeeding.

I can point out that I met with some medium-level leaders in the Amal movement about 4 months ago and some of them asked me questions which were far removed from the nature of interaction between friendly forces, such as "Do you pray or not?" "Why isn't the Palestinian revolution an Islamic revolution?" and "What are your relations with Libya? with Iraq?"

I believe that people who know the true nature of the Palestinian revolution must not ask it this kind of question, because they at least know that one-quarter of our Palestinian people are Christians.

Once again, I say that this kind of question is a departure from the field of well known fraternal interaction between the Palestinian revolution and the Amal movement.

In any case, new commanders were recently elected to the Amal movement and although I have not met my brother Nabil Barri for a number of years I know him from before as a patriotic person who holds progressive national positions.

What bodes well, now that the new commanders have assumed the keys of matters in Amal, is that the skirmishes have stopped and the situation has started to return to the way it was before, as far as relations with the Palestine resistance go.

However, we must be sure that not everyone who is hostile to the national movement and the Palestine resistance must of necessity be a member of the Amal movement and that the motive for entering Amal must not be enmity toward the Palestinians and the national movement.

I believe that personnel of this sort are deliberately infiltrated into the Amal movement; the higher command in the Amal movement must be aware of them and rid the movement of their problems and evils.

I can bluntly state that some Lebanese official security agencies and some Arab intelligence bureaus are trying to pervert the Amal movement and create misunderstandings between it and the Palestine resistance and the Lebanese national movement.

However, this must not mean that everyone in the Amal movement is suspect.

Amal is full of chaste, sincere, fighting staffs. The small number of people with tendentious ends makes the possibility of getting rid of them easy--very easy for sincere fighting leaders.

The Phalange and the Bologna Explosion

Abu Iyad mentioned that the Palestinian resistance has evidence and documents confirming that the Phalange was involved in the explosion which took place on trains in the Bologna station in Italy, resulting in the death of about 80 people, in addition to the wounded and serious material losses.

The Palestinian leader stressed that the resistance's information confirms the existence of camps in the eastern district training fascist party groups from Western Europe and some other countries, in addition to sections for training groups of forces committing sabotage against some Arab countries.

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KUWAIT, TUNISIA SET UP JOINT DEVELOPMENT BANK

Paris AL MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 6 Sep 80 pp 54, 55

/Article: "Plan To Establish a Tunisian Kuwaiti Bank To Develop the Tunisian Economy"/

/Text/ On the sidelines of the meetings of the Arab Economic Ministerial Committee held in Tunisia to follow up on preparations for the anticipated Arab economic summit in Jordan, the Kuwaiti minister of finance, 'Abd-al-Rahman Salim al-'Atiqi, made a statement after he came out of a special meeting with the Tunisian president, Habib Bourguiba, in which he pointed out that the focus of the meeting with the Tunisian was "a review of the existing good relations between the two countries, especially in the sphere of economic cooperation, which we hope will develop and flourish to the benefit of Tunisia, Kuwait and the Arab countries."

It was possible to consider this statement a kind of acceptable flattery by the minister on his emergence from the meeting with the president of a country which has no dispute with his country. However, people observing the development of Kuwaiti investment policy in general, and those who have been following its investment policy programs carried out in Arab countries in general and Tunisia in particular, consider that these flattering statements reflect the vivid reality of investment relations between Kuwaiti and Tunisia, and prove the positive developments with which these relations are proceeding--relations which might in the foreseeable future witness growth and expansion either as part of previous trends in investment relations between the two countries or as part of new trends which will be crystallized in new projects and institutions in the process of preparation or study.

The fact is that al-'Atiqi has expressed all this in other statements which he made prior to his departure from Tunis in the wake of the conclusion of the Arab ministerial committee meetings.

On the one hand, al-'Atiqi expressed "great satisfaction over the course of bilateral economic and investment cooperation between Tunisia and Kuwait," pointing out that "the success of this cooperation may be

attributed to a number of factors, among them the good results that have been attained so far and the success of the projects that have been carried out in its context."

On the other hand, al-'Atiqi expressed his hopes for broad horizons for this cooperation, referring to a new step which will follow the ones that have taken place so far, by broadening the scope of cooperation between the two countries, especially by establishing a Tunisian-Kuwaiti development bank.

Nothing in this statement goes beyond the facts. It is supported by the actual steps which have been taken in the sphere of investment cooperation between Kuwait and Tunisia, and its expansion in the future is in accord with one of the basic rules of Kuwaiti investment policy in the Arab countries. These are the details:

So far one can state that investment cooperation between Kuwait and Tunisia, within the context of the Tunisian economy, has taken place within four frameworks, which are independent and integrated, each involving a number of various projects, although their common denominator is the fact that they are a troup of tourist projects, including real estate projects with a tourist character and tourist objectives.

Relying on the official data available on these projects, one can present them as follows:

The first framework, within the Tunisian-Kuwaiti Development Group. This group was established with a capital of 20 million Tunisian dinars (about US$55 million), 60 percent belonging to Kuwait, whose share is broken down among the Ministry of Finance (49 percent), the Kuwaiti Real Estate Investment Group (6 percent), and the Social Insurance Fund (5 percent), while the remaining 40 percent is distributed among the Tunisian government and other Tunisian banking and financial institutions.

Although the bylaws of the group stipulate that in the first stage just half the value of the shares each side owns be drawn up, Tunisia so far has paid only 1,419.75 Tunisian dinars of what it owes for its shares (that is, less than 40 percent, for which the sum due totals 4 million dinars). Kuwait has paid everything it owes, 6 million Tunisian dinars. This Kuwaiti position has been one of the causes contributing to stimulating the activities of the group, which was stipulated to have an investment budget of 46.5 million Tunisian dinars (more than $127 million), including loans of about 27 million dinars and capital of about 18.5 million dinars, provided that the investment budget be managed in a manner which will give implementation priority to the six following projects:

1. The Andalus homes project, consisting (in the first phase) of hotel apartments with a capacity of 140 beds, to rise in the second stage to

240 beds, in addition to 32 villas, five of which are to be built to test the market.

Costs of this project, which covers a territory of 19 hectares, are estimated at 8.25 million Tunisian dinars. Construction of it started in July 1978 and it is expected that it will be delivered in full in the last month of this year, 1980, that is, without a delay beyond the specified date.

2. The al-Najmah Tourist Complex project, established on territory estimated at 2 hectares in area in a spot of the town of Sousse looking out over the sea, which also consists of tourist apartments with a capacity of 213 beds and a commercial and recreation center containing all the facilities and services a tourist project requires. The costs of the project have been estimated at 4.5 million dinars; it is expected that this will rise following the issuance of agreement by Tunisian authorities to the addition of new apartments with a capacity of 100 beds. So far work on the first part of the project has been finished, and it is expected that it will be wholly completed at the end of the current year. One should realize that construction started in July 1978 also. Construction of some new apartments might be delayed until the second month of 1981.

3. The Abu Nuwas project, consisting of a scheme to improve and develop the hotel known by that name, which is located in the suburb of Qamart.

The improvement is aimed at raising the level of the hotel to four-star status while it is expanded to accommodate 200 beds with hotel apartments accommodating 254 beds over an area of 40,000 square meters at a total cost of 5 million Tunisian dinars (about $14 million). Work on construction of the project started in the first month of 1980 and it is expected that it will be completed before the start of summer 1981.

4. The al-Mashtal Complex project, which might be considered the most important tourist investment project in which Kuwaiti capital is participating in Tunisia.

This project, situated in an area overlooking the Belvedere Gardens in the Tunisian capital, consists of a three-star hotel with a lodging capacity of 800 rooms with hotel apartments accommodating 246 beds, in addition to 1,000 square meters for a company office building, a commercial and sports complex, and halls for movies, meetings and receptions.

The importance of this project also lies in its large costs; its total budget has been estimated at about 11 million Tunisian dinars (more than $30 million). Work is now underway to assign an architectural consulting firm to perform design work, supervision and engineering studies on the project and set out a detailed specific implementation schedule.

5. The Tunis Palace Hotel project, lying in the heart of the capital, Tunis, covering an area of 2,000 square meters. The project consists of renovation and repair on the existing hotel by that name so that it will accommodate 380 beds while retaining its rating at the three-star level. A technical and financial study at estimated costs of 3.34 million dinars has been prepared for it. It is expected that the development plan will be received from the consulting firm assigned to do it at the latter part of this year, provided that construction on it start in the first half of 1981.

6. The Qamart Hotel project, whose goal is to develop this hotel and raise its level to a four-star class with a lodging capacity of 300 beds, with bungalows with a capacity of 100 beds, gaming halls, a marine club, a recreation and sports center, and the services and facilities necessary for a first class hotel. The bodies concerned with the project have made big strides in studying the bids they have received from consulting firms to study the project and to program construction of it, as well as the bids they have received from hotel management companies to run and manage the hotel.

The second framework in which investment cooperation between Tunisia and Kuwait takes place is the Real Estate and Tourist Financial Company, known in short by the name KUNAT.

The company's capital has been fixed at 7 million Tunisian dinars (a little less than $20 million). It specializes in financing commercial real estate tourist projects in Tunisia. The company has actually taken part in financing a number of projects which enter into the context of its concern and area of specialization.

The third framework does not differ from the previous two but is confined to the el-Mahdia Tourist Development Company, which is now active in the first stage of a project calling for construction of a three-star hotel with a lodging capacity of 500 beds and hotel apartments accommodating 200 beds and supplementary recreational and sporting facilities, in addition to a commercial center for the project annexed to it. A start has been made on setting out an economic feasibility study for the project and the financial study bearing on it.

There remains the fourth framework, which consists of the el-Tewfiq Sanatorium being constructed over an area of 24,000 square meters. This consists of 20,586 square meters of seven-storey buildings containing 116 beds set aside to provide advanced, progressive medical treatment in the Tunisian capital, thus saving a large portion of the numerous funds Tunisians spend for treatment outside the country.

The sanatorium has actually entered the practical operating stage following the celebration of its inauguration in December 1979, after it had

been provided with modern management and advanced treatment facilities, including radiation treatment.

The capital of the company which owns and operates the project has been set at 2.5 million Tunisian dinars, of which Kuwait has contributed 20 percent (500,000 Tunisian dinars) through the Kuwait Unified Real Estate Investment Group, in exchange for a further 20 percent from Shaykh Salih Kamil (a Saudi businessman), 30 percent from the Islamic Development Bank in Jiddah, and 30 percent distributed among Tunisian banks, insurance companies, and private and government firms and Tunisian individuals as well.

It is clear from the preceding review that some of these projects have actually entered the stage of commercial operation and that some of them are on the verge of being completed, preparatory to operation, while others are still in the process of being outfitted, prepared or even subjected to preliminary study. Therefore it might be difficult now to judge the degree of productivity of these projects in full although that has not prevented Min al-'Atiqi from ruling that they are successful from a number of angles coinciding with the announced and implicit rules of Kuwaiti investment policy:

The first angle: this is the general legal and legislative framework in which these projects lie. It is a framework of joint cooperation, joint participation and joint ownership of investment projects. While Tunisia needs financing for its investment projects and economic sectors, Kuwait needs to invest its money in projects with a reasonable advanced yield which will reduce its reliance on oil resources and help it to endure depletion of oil in the future. There is a great deal of equitability and justice in commitment to this rule to the point where it makes these projects mutually beneficial, now and in the future, to both parties, who cooperate and participate in carrying them out on behalf of economic and social development in the Arab world.

The second angle: this is the relative speed with which these projects are carried out. This may be ascribed to the general legislative framework of the Tunisian economy, which is founded on the liberal system, which attracts capital and offers it a suitable legal, human and executive context, especially in terms of transcending a large degree of the red tape and bureaucracy rampant in other economic systems which require Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti money but do not open suitable systemic or executive averages through which it can flow into their sectors.

The third angle: this is that all these projects are involved in the tourist sector or in the real estate sector supplementary to it; this sector is continuously prospering in Tunisia. Since these projects have the effect of increasing the degree and scope of Tunisia's capacity for increasing tourist activity in its territory, this state of affairs has the effect of assuring Kuwaiti investors that their money is being put into projects which can grow and develop with a good yield which may rise.

From this angle, Kuwaiti finance minister 'Abd-al-Rahman Salim al 'Atiqi's talk about the project to establish a Tunisian-Kuwaiti development bank becomes more than just an idea or a hope--it is a step capable of rapid implementation which will allow investment cooperation between Tunisia and Kuwait to make a quantum leap, moving it from the framework of the tourist sector to a broader one which might include the productive agricultural and industrial sectors which have already attracted various European organizations (refer to AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-IQTISADI, No 16, 14 August 1980, pages 6, 7). If Kuwaiti capital enters these fields, that will have the effect of realizing mutual benefits for Tunisia and Kuwait, by accelerating the growth rates of the productive sectors in the Tunisian economy and enlarging the fields for feasible permanent investment for Kuwaiti money.

11887
CSO: 4802

COMMITTEE FOR DEFENSE OF SYRIAN POLITICAL DETAINEES CABLES IRAQ

JN101456 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1200 GMT 10 Oct 80

[Text of cable sent to Iraqi President Saddam Husayn by the Committee for the Defense of the Political Detainees in Syria--date not given]

[Text] We, the Committee for the Defense of the Political Detainees in Syria, greet you and welcome your great move to regain and liberate our Arab nation's territories which have been usurped by the ancient and modern racist Persians, who have been blinded by rancor against our nation. We strongly condemn the stand taken by the regime of sectarian repression in Syria toward this move. The sectarian Syrian regime's cowardly stand has affirmed its connection with and allegiance to the racists, the imperialists and the Zionists.

Oh struggling President, this stand by the Syrian regime is hardly surprising, since it was this regime which sold the Golan Heights, approved the shedding of the blood of the freedom fighters in Tal al-Za'tar and spilled the blood of our strugglers in Syrian prisons. In the latest massacre in the history of Syria, the regime executed more than 1,000 political prisoners in Palmyra Prison. The regime shelled the great towns of Aleppo, Hamah and Dayr al-Zawr. The regime is currently launching a war of extermination against our young men in Syria. However, our great people will not condone these actions and will struggle until they have carried out their honorable duty of overthrowing the sanguinary regime and bringing Syria back to its pan-Arab line.

We send greetings and admiration from our strugglers and youth to you and to Iraq's Arab army, which is waging its battle of honor. May you remain, Mr President, the knight to lead our nation. We congratulate you on raising high the banner of liberation.

[Signed] Chairman of the Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners in Syria

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

IRAQI ORGANIZATION AT JORDAN-PLO TALKS--Persons returning from Jordan said yesterday that a representative of the "Iraqi Liberation Front," 'Abd al-Rahim Ahmad, is participating for the first time in the talks of the Joint Jordanian-PLO Committee, which are currently taking place in Amman. To date, only FATAH representatives have participated in this committee's discussions. The talks were boycotted by representatives of the PLO's Rejection Front, of which the Iraqi Liberation Front is a member. It now appears that with the tightening of relations between Iraq and Jordan, and the latter's participation in the war against Iran, Iraq has decided to dispatch a representative of this organization to the committee's discussions. [Unattributed report] [Text] [TA090726 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Oct 80 p 2]

IRAQI MOVEMENT TELEGRAM TO AL-QADHDHAFI--Tripoli, 5 Oct (JANA)--Colonel al-Qadhdhafi received the following telegram from the Movement of the Iraqi People: Brother, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, leader of the great Al Fateh revolution: Finally Saddam Husayn regime revealed through its conduct the contradictory nature of its slogans. At the time when he is raising the banner of liberating Palestine, he keeps his troops busy with a side fight, and mobilizes them for invading Iran, the enemy of imperialism and Zionism. As far as the Iraqi armed forces are concerned, they have no interest in fighting against Iran, but they have an interest in fighting against the Zionist enemy. The repressive Iraqi Government forces the army to wage its war through threats of death and imprisonment. It is your nationalist and humanitarian responsibility to take a firm stand in urging Iraq not to distract the Iraqi forces from the fight against their primary enemy which is (Israel), and to form a joint front with Iran against the front being forged by the Iraqi regime in the area. [Text] [LD060001 Tripoli JANA in English 1644 GMT 5 Oct 80]

PALESTINIAN LEADER ON AMMAN TALKS--Amman--Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) has told AL-QABAS that his talks in Amman were successful and fruitful and that they gave new impetus to Jordanian-Palestinian relations. He said he and the Jordanian prime minister discussed measures that have been completed so far in supporting the steadfastness of the occupied territories and also Israeli threats to prevent the entry of steadfastness funds to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Abu Jihad said that he discussed with the commander of the Jordanian armed forces, Sharif Zayd ibn Shakir, plans to develop the Palestine Liberation Army [PLA] in Jordan and turn it into a brigade. He said that the Jordanian Government has accepted the transfer of 200 Palestinian soldiers who are Jordanian citizens to the PLA, as well as the transfer of 1,000 Jordanian Palestinians on the completion of their military service. [Text] [GF071410 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 6 Oct 80 p 1]

BRIEFS

MAURITANIA DEPENDING ON ALGERIA--Lt Col Ould Haidallah, Mauritanian chief of state, ended his 4-day visit to Algeria last Wednesday, 1 October. If they have disengaged themselves from their alliance with Morocco, into which President Ould Daddah had led them, the Nouakchott leaders state nevertheless that they do not want to fall under Algerian control. They maintain a prudent attitude and will refuse to recognize the SADR despite pressures exerted on them, especially by the POLISARIO who still have not freed all the Mauritanian prisoners they are holding. However, Mauritania is counting on Algerian cooperation to overcome its economic difficulties. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 3 Oct 80 p 8] 9341

CSO: 4400

LAWFUL WAYS FOR ISLAMIC BANKS TO MAKE PROFIT EXPLORED

Sharjah AL-KHALIJ (BANKS, INSURANCE, INVESTMENT SUPPLEMENT) in Arabic
22 Jul 80 p 13

[Article by Muhammad Badawi: "Means of Capital Investment by Islamic Banks"]

[Text] "Islamic" banks in the modern age got their start in the United Arab Emirates. The Dubai Islamic Bank was the pioneer among Islamic banks. Within a few years, this type of bank spread throughout the Arab world--to places such as Sudan, Jordan, Kuwait and Bahrain. In Egypt right now there are three Islamic banks. Also, one of the large banks in Egypt has set up a special branch for Islamic business transactions. It has also set up a special section in each of its branches for Islamic business transactions.

These moves by the banks are an implicit acknowledgement that they had been conducting their business in a way which is not in conformity with Islam.

In Europe, there is actually such a thing as an Islamic bank in Luxembourg. And in Pakistan, Iran and the Moslem countries of Asia, there is a continual effort to establish Islamic banks and to conduct banking transactions on a basis which is in conformity with the principles of Islamic law.

Every day, Islamic banks receive numerous letters from all parts of the world asking questions and requesting explanations about how Islamic banks operate. Islamic banks now are also continually invited to participate in the founding of new Islamic establishments.

Whoever has been following the growth of Islamic banks, can have no doubt that within a few years the entire world will be blanketed by an integral network of such banks.

For this reason, it is important that many studies be made. The experience of those who work in Islamic banks and the results of their unique and fortunate experiment should be published. Thus, all

Moslems would become familiar with how Islamic banks work, and would be convinced of the soundness of this method of doing business.

In this regard, I wish to share with the readers what I know, from my actual experience as comptroller in the Dubai Islamic Bank, concerning some of the investment methods utilized by Islamic banks.

Usurious banks [that is, banks that charge and pay interest] utilize methods of investment and ways of collecting revenues which are different from methods that are followed by Islamic banks. The reason for this is that Islam forbids usury.

Interest-Paying Loans

The great majority of investments made by usurious banks are in the form of loans where money is loaned in return for interest payments.

Since the loan consists of a fixed sum of money and obligates the borrower to return it on the date agreed upon, in addition to obligating him to pay the interest agreed upon, it provides the bank with an easy way to invest money.

The reason it is easy is that the bank can simply calculate the profits it will get from the loan, at any time. All the bank has to be concerned about is the reputation of the client and his ability to pay back the loan. The bank is not concerned about whether or not the client has or has not gained any benefit from the loan.

In most cases, the loans are of the following types:

1. A fixed sum of money which is paid to the client or put at his disposal in return for his commitment to pay the loan back on a certain date. The client commits himself to pay back the full amount, together with interest, on a particular date.

2. Loan credit--an arrangement under which the bank agrees to put at the disposal of the client a sum of money which is agreed upon, and which the client can use whenever he needs it. In such a case, the loan usually takes the form of a current account.

The client commits himself to pay back the amount of money which he has taken out on credit. On top of this, he must pay interest on the sums of money he has used at a rate agreed upon for the period of the loan.

3. Discounting a commercial paper which matures after a certain time period. The person submitting the commercial paper transfers to the bank all rights related thereto, with a guarantee that it will be paid

at maturity. The bank pays the client the value of the commercial paper, with an amount discounted from it equal to the interest payment it would normally receive for the time period beginning with the date of the discount and ending with the maturity date of the commercial paper.

In the three types of loans shown above, it is easy, as we have pointed out, for the bank to calculate the interest due on loans at the end of every month. Consequently, the bank can know what profits it will be getting. The profits basically consist of the difference in the interest which the bank pays or will pay, and the interest which the bank collects or will collect. Thus a usurious bank can secure its financial position over short periods of time, and can always be aware of the extent of the profits it is making.

Partners in Profits

As for Islamic banks, numerous thinkers and authorities on religion have consulted Islamic legal books and traditional sources in search of a basis which Islamic banks can use to conduct their investment of capital operations. Some of this research has resulted in the appearance of a new word in the investment terminology of our modern age. The word is "mudarabah" [silent partnership].

Silent partnership is defined as follows: An owner of capital gives it to someone who uses it. In return, the lender receives a portion of the profits at a rate established on the basis of an estimated part of the profits.

One of the conditions of silent partnership is that it is not proper to distribute profits before the capital is returned. Thus, if profit is distributed, and the borrower dies, the lender is regarded as having received part of the capital. The lender would then have a claim equal to the outstanding balance of the loan.

Silent partnership can be either unrestricted or restricted, as determined by the owner of the capital in terms of where the business activity is to take place, the nature of the activity, etc.

According to this definition, a silent partnership contract is a known type of partnership contract and is governed and regulated by law. The sharing of partners in both profits and losses is considered to be one of the basic principles of a partnership contract. The law prohibits any form of the so-called lion's share. It may be stipulated that one partner should not share in the profits, that one partner should not share in the losses, that one partner should receive profits to the exclusion of others, or that a partner should receive a certain amount as profit whether the entity has profits or losses. All these are known as lion's share conditions, and are considered invalid. In addition, they invalidate the partnership contract itself.

There are two major categories of association:

1. Associations of capital, and

2. Associations of persons.

The most widespread types of associations of capital are joint-stock companies, limited partnerships and limited liability companies. The most widespread types of associations of persons are commercial companies of joint liability and simple partnerships.

In associations of persons (as well as in limited partnerships), it is permitted to have partners who only participate in the work of the company and do not own any part of its capital.

My opinion is that some of these types of associations represent favorable areas for capital investment by Islamic banks. Some of the most important types of associations which serve this purpose are:

1. Joint-stock companies.

A joint-stock company is defined as being a company which divides its capital into shares of equal value which can be bought and sold in the market. The company's shareholders are responsible for company obligations up to their share of the company's capital.

The existence of this type of company has led to the undertaking of numerous projects which individuals were not able to undertake in the past.

It is characteristic of the joint-stock company that its shares have an organized market-place in which stock prices are publicized and in which it is easy to buy and sell the stocks.

Stocks characteristically have a value which is not stable. Their value goes up or down according to the degree of progress or failure manifested by the company. Also, the price of the stock goes up when the buying power of the currency goes down (assuming that the conditions which affect the price of the stock are unchanged). This feature is not true of loans, but the real value of a loan would go down if the buying power of the currency goes down.

2. Limited partnerships.

A simple limited partnership is composed of one or more partners who are collectively responsible for all of the company's obligations, and they run the company. It includes one or more limited partners who are responsible for partnership obligations to the extent of the share they contribute to the partnership.

In view of the fact that a limited partner is responsible for the company's debts only to the extent of his share in the entity, and that he does not work for the partnership, this type of association is considered to be suitable for owners of capital who do not want to assume commercial risks. They give their money to whomever they consider to be worthy of their trust, and share in his commercial activities.

This type of partnership developed in Europe in the 12th century. The reason for its emergence was the fact that it does not involve usury, which was prohibited by the church.

Simple limited partnerships are considered to be a practical application of the idea of silent partnership. Its principles can be applied to financing operations which are undertaken by non-usurious banks. Tradesmen and small merchants, who want to expand their business activities, can participate in such partnerships.

It is possible to modify the simple limited partnership, so that a working partner commits himself in the contract to utilize part of his share of the profits to purchase a portion of the capital of the financing partner (the bank), until such time as the bank disassociates itself from the enterprises. Thus, the bank will have sufficient liquidity and potential to finance other enterprises.

There is no doubt that when Islamic banks choose to invest part of their available capital in the purchase of stocks of successful stock companies, and thus earn profits from them (by selling the stocks or cashing in their coupons), they engage in one form of successful investment. Usurious banks quite often engage in this type of profit-making activity.

Likewise, when Islamic banks share in financing projects undertaken by merchants or tradesmen associated in simple limited partnerships, they engage in a type of investment which will benefit not only the banks, but society as a whole.

However, these types of investment should not absorb all of the capital of a bank or of its depositors. If they do, Islamic banks would not retain sufficient liquidity to repay short-term deposits, or finance many needs of the bank's clients.

There is no doubt that there are several ways through which Islamic banks can engage in financing the needs of their clients. Here are some of these ways:

1. Selling on credit or through installment plans.

One means of investment which Islamic banks have resorted to is financing the purchase of durable goods, be it for production purposes or for

consumption. The bank purchases the goods in cash, and then sells these same goods to the client for deferred payments. Usury is totally absent from this type of transaction, since the bank has exchanged cash for goods, and then sold the goods for cash. The difference in the amount of money which the bank pays for the goods, and the amount of money it receives when it sells the goods to the client, represents the bank's profit.

Nevertheless, it is my opinion that when a bank itself undertakes to purchase and sell goods, it departs from its normal realm of activity. Islamic banks can share in the formation and financing of specialized companies which undertake transactions such as these. A bank can undertake to collect installment payments due to be paid in connection with a purchase, and can do so in behalf of a commercial company in return for a commission.

If a bank is compelled to undertake purchase and resale transactions, it would be appropriate for the bank to set up a special independent department for them, and to totally separate this activity from other normal accounts.

2. Participation in limited operations.

An existing enterprise might need a certain amount of cash which it is unable to provide from its own resources. It might need this to carry out one or more operations that have been entrusted to it. It would not be a matter of increasing the enterprise's basic capital, because there is no guarantee that the enterprise, in the future, will continue to be entrusted with such operations.

It is possible for Islamic banks to finance activities such as these. The bank could provide money to the enterprise on condition that the bank would share in the profits resulting from the operation. The enterprise would pledge to deposit the revenues resulting from its activities in its account in the bank. When the operation is completed, the client could present to the bank his accounting statement concerning the operation. In accordance with this accounting statement, the profits or losses of the operation would be divided up.

One of the most important things which should be taken into consideration in determining the bank's percentage of the profits, is that this percentage should not be excessively high. Although the bank does contribute its capital, it is the enterprise which has to carry out the operation and which must put into the operation what it possesses in terms of effort, know-how and material resources. One thing that could be done is to be guided by the accounting statements of previous operations, carried out by this same client, which were financed by usurious banks.

3. Participation in financing.

Perhaps a particular enterprise does not have sufficient cash liquidity. This might be the result of having too much inventory on hand, or because some of the clients of the enterprise have not met their payment obligations on time. Or it might be because the enterprise needs to finance maintenance work or has to renovate its machinery. Or it could be for any number of other reasons which crop up and which cause the enterprise to need money to meet its payment obligations. The enterprise might feel that its needs for money will not be a continuous thing, and that it does not require an increase in basic capital.

Islamic banks could offer money to an enterprise such as this by means of sharing in profits and losses. This could take place on the basis of following principles:

a. An agreement is concluded between the bank and the client to distribute profits and losses according to the ratio of contributed capital (company's capital + capital reserves + retained earnings of prior years) over capital furnished by the bank. The company could be given a greater share of the profits. This is because the enterprise achieves its profits not only as a result of capital used, but also as a result of factors such as its know-how and other material factors which are difficult to evaluate. Furthermore, the enterprise is obligated to return the bank's money when it has sufficient cash to do so.

The enterprise could receive money from the bank in installments. In such a case, it is possible to evaluate both the capital contributions of the company and of the bank on the basis of the number of days during which their capital was invested. The financing could be provided through a current credit account. In this case, the capital furnished by the bank could be calculated by means of the well-known (digits) method. The entitlements of the two parties could be computed by multiplying the value of their capital contributions by the number of days in the time period involved.

The above has been a quick sketch of the most important ways Islamic banks have of making investments. It would be useful if various Islamic banks would publish information about their experience, hold symposiums, and present lectures at close time intervals so as to promote an exchange of practical experience which would be of benefit to everyone.

9468
CSO: 4802

OPERATIONS OF ISLAMIC INVESTMENT COMPANY DISCUSSED

Sharjah AL-KHALIJ (BANKS, INSURANCE, INVESTMENT SUPPLEMENT) in Arabic
22 Jul 80 pp 9, 25

[Article: "How Are Islamic Investments Different From Other Investments?"]

[Text] Commerce and Partnership Instead of Fixed Interest.

Ten Percent Profit the First Year After Deducting the Zakat [religious tax].

Islamic Insurance Has Become a Reality.

Prohibition of Deduction of Zakat From Profits To Put an End to Attacks by Skeptics.

Since people have for so long been used to the Western concept of banking transactions and investments, they might think that there is no alternative to this system of conducting business. But statistics show that only 4 percent of the world's Arab Moslems conduct transactions with banks. This is in contrast to, for example, 80 percent of the people in the United States. The reason for this is obvious. It is the fact that the banks use the system of paying and charging interest.

In the past, there were several attempts to devise practical means of applying the spirit of Islamic law in economics. Some of these attempts failed, and others simply camouflaged themselves by calling interest payments a "commission" or "service fee."

In 1978 a group of Arab businessmen in the Gulf area set up an investment firm which, they believe, overcame all of the obstacles which frustrated previous such attempts. They set up the Gulf Islamic Investment Company. Its headquarters is in Sharjah, and its honorary president is Shaykh Sultan Ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi, the ruler of Sharjah. Quite a few of the heads of state of the region's countries have contributed toward the establishment of this company.

Profits Permissible for Moslems

Dr Hasan 'Abd al-Qadir, the director general of the company, says: "Our firm was set up to serve the average Moslem investor who does not want to do transactions which involve interest payments (something forbidden by God), and who has a surplus of capital and has neither the time nor the expertise to engage in investing it himself.

"The idea for such a firm arose from the necessity to provide Moslems with a permissible means by which they could earn profits in Saudi Arabia--a country which forbids interest payment transactions in its banks. The result was the formation of the Islamic Legal Supervisory Commission, whose members are some of the best economists from the entire Moslem world. During the last 5 years, they engaged in devising ideas and means which have guaranteed the realization of this goal. With the help of Dr Ibrahim Kamil's consultant firm in Egypt, they have developed all of the necessary regulations which are in conformity with the spirit of Islamic law."

Dr 'Abd al-Qadir went on to say: "At first the parent company, called the Islamic Investment Company, was set up in the Bahama Islands in the Caribbean Sea, in view of the tax exemptions provided by that country. This company utilized the efforts of scholars and researchers, and undertook pioneering experiments in all fields, to the point where statistics demonstrated that they had achieved complete success.

"Then the company established an 'operating company' called the Gulf Islamic Investment Company. Its headquarters is in Sharjah, and its initial capital was 3 million dirhams. After its establishment a year and a half ago, I can safely say that the company has been a 100-percent success.

"The company has withstood large-scale hostile attacks on the part of skeptics from all directions. It has continued to do its job quietly and with a determination which is indomitable. Figures show that the results of the first year of the company's operation were a success. The company was able to distribute net profits of 10 percent to its shareholders after the zakat was deducted. The company sold "silent partnership" shares amounting to $7.5 million when subscriptions were first advertised in Qatar. In fact, the National Bank of Qatar was forced to call the police to disperse people who insisted on buying subscriptions in the company."

Commerce Permissable for Moslems

In an interview with Mr Ibrahim Mustafa, the company's sales manager, we asked him about how the company operates and about the types of investments which the company is now advertising in the market. He said:

"The principle of investment in the company is based on two types of legal agreements. The first type is a loan contract. The investor loans to the company a sum of money which he can spare. He loans the money free of charge, and for the service of his fellow-Moslems. The company commits itself to return this sum of money to him, with nothing added to, or subtracted from, the original amount. That is to say, the investor earns no profit when the loan is repaid at maturity.

"The second type of arrangement is that of 'silent partnership' contracts. Their basis is that of a partnership contract between the company (in its capacity as a body which possesses expertise and the necessary potential to engage in investing capital) and the investor (who is the silent partner). The company conducts transactions with the capital under conditions which are fixed in the silent partnership contract, depending on which particular type it is. The silent partner and the company have to accept whatever profits or losses God sees fit to bestow upon them.

"There are different types of silent partnership contracts. For this reason, for each type of silent partnership contract, a particular silent partnership company is formed. It is made known through a public ordinance which advertises subscription contracts. The company can then begin operating.

"The company engages in all types of commerce which are permissible according to Islamic law, and does so under the supervision of the Islamic Legal Commission and the auditors. It is aided by the most prominent Arab and international experts in the field of investment. In addition, the company utilizes the most modern methods and tools of operation which are used by the most prominent international investment companies.

"The company invests its capital in various commercial transactions. It buys and sells different types of minerals and crops, and sells them at a profit. It also deals in the acquisition of foreign currency to provide for its needs of hard currency when financing commercial operations. It does this so as not to be at the mercy of fluctuations in the currency market. Likewise, the company leases various types of heavy equipment and means of transportation to contracting companies and other companies. In fact, the company has already established a special branch which deals with such operations."

Types of Silent Partnerships

Mr Mustafa explained to us the different types of silent partnership which the company so far has advertised in the market. He said: "The first and second types of silent partnership were silent partnership

contracts, each of which involved the amount of $100 for periods of 1, 3 or 5 years. Sales connected with the first issue amounted to $7.5 million. Sales connected with the second issue totaled about $5 million. Profits are paid out annually.

"The third type of silent partnership was connected with life insurance. It involved the amount of $20,000, to be paid during the course of 20 years, at a rate of $1,000 per year. At the present time, this type of life insurance can only be taken out by married couples. But we are in the process of issuing special contracts for other categories of individuals. Later on this will even include children. Subscriptions became available starting in October 1979, and will be available until October 1981.

"The fourth type of silent partnership deals with current investments. Subscriptions to this type of partnership have been available since 1 January 1980. The minimum subscription is $500. It is possible to add any additional amounts by means of contracts, each of which involve $250. A partner may withdraw either all or part of his money whenever he wants to, on condition that he inform the company of his intention by the 20th of the month (Christian calendar). He will then be paid whatever he is entitled to in terms of profits which God has seen fit to bestow upon him. This payment will occur on the 5th of the following month. Subscriptions to this type of partnership totaled $15 million by May of this year.

"The fifth type of silent partnership has to do with financial establishments, banks and companies, including personal companies. The minimum subscription is $100,000, for a period of either 2 or 5 years. In the first instance, profits are distributed every month. In the second instance, they are distributed every 3 months. This type of investment provides tremendous advantages for investors. They have the right to withdraw their money within 72 hours. Also, they are able to obtain letters of credit for up to 4 times the value of their subscription, provided they report the type of goods they are purchasing and their financial situation. Likewise, it is also possible for the company to join the silent partner in commercial transactions which he is not able to finance by himself. All of this can be done because the company, in advance, has a complete and clear idea about the financial dealings of its subscriber. In addition, while the subscribed capital is invested, the subscriber can receive nine-tenths of its estimated profit.

"There are special silent partnerships available to governments. The company is thinking about entering, into average-term investments in guaranteed projects after the necessary studies have been prepared. God willing, this will take place in the near future."

An Islamic Securities Market

We asked the director general about developments in the company's activities, about its impact on the financial markets, and about how the company publishes the results of its activities. He said: "An indication of our success is the fact that 90 percent of the subscribers in our first type of silent partnership have decided to participate in subsequent partnership arrangements. Also, the company has become a member of the Federation of Islamic Banks. Pakistan, Malaysia and Nigeria have extended permission to the company to open branches in those countries without their being subject to laws which are designed to regulate usurious interest.

"Furthermore, an Islamic securities market has arisen. The company used to issue its financial statements every 3 months but now it issues them every month. Soon it will issue them every week. Later on, God willing, it will issue them daily. When the company's financial situation is known every day like this, the financial papers can be reliably bought and sold.

"The Islamic Legal Supervisory Commission has recently decided not to deduct zakat from the profits. This decision was made to put an end to attacks by skeptics, and to apply the principle that Moslems may spend their profits as they see fit.

"As far as supervision goes, there is the Islamic Legal Supervisory Commission, the annual general assembly, the board of directors meeting twice every year, the investment commission created by the board of directors, and the financial supervisor who is commissioned by the general assembly, in addition to auditors from the best-known company in this field, namely, the (Price Waterhouse) Company.

"We are looking forward to the future with confidence with optimism and indomitable determination. Our guiding principle is our belief in God. This belief is bolstered by the success which we have achieved and continue to achieve every day.

"In conclusion, I would like to say that our experiment is a pioneering type of experiment. It is successfully moving forward, and has proven that there is, in fact, an alternative to engaging in Western-type banking and investment transactions. This alternative emanates from the true faith of Islam. However, non-Moslems are also permitted to participate in our partnership subscriptions, with the exception of those having to do with insurance."

9468
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

ISLAMIC SEMINAR RECOMMENDATIONS--Mecca, 14 Oct (SPA)--The Ninth Islamic International Seminar has recommended that the Islamic Shari'ah must be applied and that it must be the basic source of all laws and regulations on which Muslim society is based. It has also recommended cooperation so as to liberate the Aqa Mosque (in Jerusalem), as well as all countries which suffer from the afflictions of communism and the enemies of Islam. The recommendations of the seminar, which ended this evening, called on the league's general secretariat to address an appeal to all Muslim countries to settle their differences through fraternal negotiations, away from war, and to mobilize all energies and resources so as to confront all heretic Christianization trends which seek to make the Muslims have doubts regarding their religion. The seminar welcomed the call for Holy Jihad by Deputy Prime Minister and Crown Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, it being the Muslims' dear aspiration. It called on the Muslim countries to translate this call into actual measures for the liberation of Palestine and the Muslim peoples. The seminar recommended the liquidation of all clubs, establishments and societies [words indistinct] charity and others so as to conceal its goals in fighting Islam and the Muslims. [Text] [LD142216 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 2115 GMT 14 Oct 80]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

CSSR NATIONAL FRONT GIFT--Ten tons of dried milk and 4 tons of butter arrived aboard a special airplane of the Czechoslovak Airlines in Kabul yesterday. The Czechoslovak gift will make possible initiation of test operations of a new dairy establishment. [Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech 2 Oct 80 p 2]

CSO: 2400

IRAN-IRAQ CRISIS IMPACT ON MIDDLE EAST, U.S. EXAMINED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 20 Sep 80 p 5

/Article by Ali Sirmen: "Iran-Iraq-Middle East"/

/Text/ The dimensions of the border clash between Iran and Iraq is growing steadily. Within the week, Bani-Sadr's helicopters were attacked by Iraqi aircraft, then two days ago one Iranian plane was downed in a clash between the two nations' airforces.

In addition to these developments, Iraqi President Saddam Husayn announced that they had unilaterally abrogated the border agreement between the two nations. The 1975 agreement to resolve the festering Shatt al-Arab and Kurdish problems had been signed between Baghdad and the shah. The agreement regulated passage through the Shatt al-Arab and introduced measures to prevent infiltration of Iraq via Iranian borders of armed Kurdish forces.

Iraq's abrogation of the 1975 agreement and the clashes' having gained obvious intensity in recent days strengthen the liklihood of all-out war. More than anything else, such a development clearly would bring with it dangers difficult to predict for Iran.

In fact, it may be thought, at first glance, that a war would be effective for the administration in Iran to overcome, or at least freeze for a while, its own internal difficulties. Yet such a thought fails to take into account the liklihood that the shah's left-over army, which is still a very great danger to the Iranian administration, would move to the foreground in the event of total war and form a powerful force against the administration.

Intensification of the conflict between Iran and Iraq, in addition to the problems it would create in the two nations, would clearly cause significant developments in the Middle East also.

There is no doubt that going to war with Iran would completely destroy Iraq's status as a force, albeit small, against Israel in the future and would, perhaps push Baghdad rapidly to the side of the United States. Washington is looking for nations to take on the police role vacated by Iran in the area and clearly would benefit tremendously from this situation and would do anything and promise everything in order to bring about such a development.

When the shah left the country at the beginning of 1979 and Shapur Bakhtiyar's post-shah, soft-landing formula quickly lost its validity in Tehran, the United States suffered three, actually four, interrelated losses in the Middle East.

The first of these losses was that a large source of oil was no longer under the West's control. This loss was made up by Saudi Arabia which stepped in and raised its production. The fact that the conjuncture on the world oil market at the moment is not conducive to new price hikes and that, for the first time in a long time, the supply-demand balance in this area has tipped in favor of demand has put Iran in the position where it cannot be too fussy about oil sales, and the problem which the new administration in Tehran created as a source of oil has been automatically resolved to an extent, albeit temporarily.

The second great U.S. loss was the loss of an arms buyer which provided very handsome profits to its own arms industry. If fact, Iran, which paid more than $20 billion in 4 years to American arms manufacturers at the time of the shah, is no longer a profitable customer for the arms industry.

The third and fourth U.S. losses are the loss of a policeman to keep the Persian Gulf oil nations under control and the fact that its foundation stone in the Middle East, Israel, lost a major supporter in the north.

The Pentagon cannot sit on its hands, watching these two developments. The United States' greatest concern in the post-shah period is, on one hand, to pursue efforts to enable Iran to resume its former duties while, on the other, to prevent the bridges which Israel has already built from being blown up anywhere in the region, to render ineffective one by one the dangers confronting Israel and to find new forces to take on part of Iran's police dutues.

So intensification of the Iran-Iraq conflict comes at a time when the United States is increasing the efforts we have considered above. If developments proceed in this direction, a wider war between the two nations will bring with it brand new changes in the balance in the region.

8349
CSO: 4907

MAJLIS DEPUTY WEIGHS FATE OF HOSTAGES

Tehran ECHO OF IRAN in English 29 Sep 80 pp 12-14

[Interview with Ali Akbar Parvaresh, deputy speaker of Majlis, date and place not given]

[Text] In an interview with the daily JOMHOURI ISLAMI, Ali Akbar Parvaresh, Deputy Speaker of the Majlis, spoke on the issue of the U.S. hostages in Iran and the views held by the Majlis deputies on it. Here are the salient features of the interview:

Q. What is the Majlis deputies' approach to the U.S. hostages issue?

A. There are presently two types of attitude in the Islamic Parliament on this issue. There is a group of parliamentarians who seek the release of the hostages, while another group wants them to be put on trial.

The group, seeking the U.S. hostages' release, bring in the following arguments:

1. Since Iran is presently facing economic sanctions, and because of its dire need for machinery spare parts for the industries imported from the West, we are very much dependent upon America. Hence, these hostages should be freed.

2. The hostage-taking has lost its initial excitement and fervour among the Iranian masses, which necessitates the hostages' release.

3. There are vast energies being used in protecting and maintaining these hostages. By releasing them, such energies can be utilised to the advantage of the Islamic Revolution.

4. The court trial of the hostages is very problematic. If we try them in Iran, then certainly, there is a prejudgment of their being sentenced. If we try them in some Western country, then we ourselves would rather be sentenced. However, verdicts issued at these trials would not be acceptable to the parties involved. Since there is likely to be no agreement on any one of the counrt verdicts, it is desirable to release the hostages.

5. American is constantly taking measures to draw us into political isolation. The U.S.-planned coup in Turkey is one such effort to check the revolutionary movement of the oppressed nations in this region and to consequently neutralise theexport of the Iranian revolution. Similarly, the U.S.-initiated Iraqi war is another factor leading to our political isolation. Hence, it is essential to free the hostages so that we could continue our propaganda aimed at exporting the revolution.

6. The domestic anti-revolutionary forces are collectively trying to wear down the energies of our forces and nation. There is currently a plan before the Majlis to reactivate these revolutionary energies.

7. The United States has resorted to sending emissaries to start parleys with the Iranian Majlis such as PLO representative Hani al-Hasan and Papal Envoy Archbishop Cappucci. In his mediatory letter, Pope John Paul II has even referred to a six-point agreement which America is willing to sign with the Iranian nation. These include: (a) all the assets of the Shah would be returned to Iran (b) all the frozen assets of Iran standing at 12 billion dollars would be released. There are also another 21 billion dollars which were invested by the Shah in Pentagon's various Ordnance factories (c) America would denounce its past policies (d) America would withdraw all of its claims against Iran. There are already about 200 suits filed by America against Iran including the one at the International Court of Justice (e) America is willing to sign a non-aggression treaty with Iran under which it would not interfere in its political and military affairs (f) This article would be left open to be filled up by the Iranian nation as deemed fit by it.

In case of article (f) it can be observed that America has greatly degraded itself. While analysing the causes for it, we come to note that by such willingness, America wants to show to the world its desire to resolve the hostages issue through negotiations by and by granting privileges to Iran through its own nation in order to isolate the Majlis, and to show it to be compromising with imperialism. This group argues since America is willing to surrender itself to us, we should grab such an opportunity.

8. Since the hostage-taking has only been approved by the Iranian nation, and many countries of the world have already condemned it, with even some of the liberation movements remaining neutral in the matter, as such we should release these hostages.

9. What are the conditions on which parleys should be started with America? Recently Imam Khomeyni referred to five such preconditions in one of his messages. This was taken as a green signal by the Swiss Embassy which is the protector of U.S. rights in Iran. However, if America promises to part with its imperialist tendencies in case of Iran, and we consequently start negotiations with it, what is the executive guarantee for such promises? Such a guarantee would be otained by the Special Majlis Commission on U.S. Hostages if it decides on holding such talks. We don't possess documents in respect of all these U.S. spies as most of them have been destroyed by the Embassy staff during its seizure. Out of these spies, we have only got documents against 22 of them.

The other group in Majlis, which favours the court trial of the U.S. hostages, offers the following reasons in support of its viewpoint:

1. Islamic revolution is an ideological one, and hence seeks to put an end to material domination. If we agree to hold parleys with America, then it would mean our submission to materialism and consequent degradation. Since we are not going to submit to it, hence the hostages should be set on trial.

2. If we agree to set the hostages free, this would be contrary to our Islamic spirit outlined in our constitution (Principles 2 and 3) which says that "Our constitution and Islamic Republic would keep away from domination and also from being

dominated." Hence our revolution should act in favour of the interests of the oppressed world to attain full unity of the Muslim nations.

3. To conclude non-aggression treaty with America is, in fact, to accept U.S. hegemony over us. We should not avoid such an act.

4. The U.S. crimes should be brought to the notice of the whole world. We have not been isolated in the world since we enjoy the support of the oppressed nations. So we should go on with the trial of these hostages.

5. America is observing that anti-U.S. feelings are increasing in the region, with Iran playing an active role in instigating such sentiments. It is trying to do away with such feelings through isolating Iran. Thus there should be no release of the U.S. hostages.

6. If these hostages are freed, then it would dampen the revolutionary energies at national level. Therefore, these spies shouldn't be released.

7. America has committed many crimes in Iran during the past 27 years and has done so to keep in place the decadent monarchial system. Would a mere denunciation of its crimes by the United States compensate all these tyrannies against the Iranian nation? Is Washington going to pay for all the damages caused to the Iranian nation during all these years? U.S. imperialism is certainly not going to give up its tactics for the sake of Iran. Hence, there should be no relaxation in case of the U.S. hostages.

These were the arguments of the two groups on the release or court trial of the U.S. hostages. I must here say that Islam only considers the good deeds of individuals. If we contend that Islam negates such parleys with the United States, then this argument is rejected by certain events which took place in the early days of Islam. In those days, even Prophet Mohammad concluded pacts with the non-Muslims (such as the Hodeibiyeh Agreement), and Imam Hasan's truce with Moa'aviyeh clearly indicates that the interests of Islam have to be kept in mind in such parleys. All these aspects are to be discussed by the Majlis in its debate on the U.S. hostages issue within the framework of the special commission.

CSO: 4920

MINISTER OF STATE'S DEFECTION ANALYZED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 5 Sep 80 p 22

[Article: "Al-'Aqrawi Aligns Himself With al-Talibani; the Minister Was Called a 'Mule', and He Defected"]

[Text] There is nothing new in a minister or other official defecting from his country to another. This is what 'Aziz al-'Aqrawi, the Iraqi minister of state, did when he asked for asylum in Damascus last week. But al-'Aqrawi's defection is different. Al-'Aqrawi is a Kurd from the north, and was primarily associated with the non-separatist Kurdish nationalist movement. Thus, he was not in agreement with the movement of the late Kurdish leader Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani. Before becoming involved in politics, he was a member of the traditional Iraqi military establishment, in which he reached a high rank before his retirement. Therefore, he is said to have been more in agreement with Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr than with Saddam Husayn, who was not a member of the military establishment until quite recently, and then only in an honorary capacity.

As a Kurd opposed to the movement of al-Barzani, who led the Kurdish rebellion against the central government in Baghdad from the time of his return from exile in the Soviet Union in 1959 until his death in the United States in 1979, al-'Aqrawi found a key place for himself in the autonomy administration established by the Iraqi Government, after the end of al-Barzani's rebellion following the agreement between Saddam Husayn and the late shah of Iran in Algiers in 1974. Since that time, al-'Aqrawi has occupied ministerial posts in the Iraqi Government and has been a member of the Nationalist and Progressive Front.

As a member of the Progressive Front at home, and as a member of the International Peace Movement abroad, he was to a certain degree attached to the Iraqi Communist Party. The expulsion of the communists from the Front seems to have annoyed him. That, however, was not the reason for his defection, because he remained in his official position following the expulsion. He even took on new duties, including membership of the higher committee overseeing the legislative council for Kurdistan and membership of the higher commission which recently supervised the first elections to take place in Iraq since the fall of the monarchy 22 years ago. One outcome of these elections was the election of the current national assembly (parliament) in which Ba'thists won by an overwhelming majority.

If 'Aziz al-'Aqrawi had assumed all of these sensitive roles during the past 6 years, why did he choose this time to defect? In fact, why did he defect at all? Why did he pick Syria in which to seek asylum?

According to communist sources, al-'Aqrawi's defection is a protest against the presidency of Saddam Husayn himself, "because he brought Iraq into the U.S. sphere of influence." The communists seem to be basing this on al-'Aqrawi's own words at a press conference he held in the Syrian capital upon his arrival. At the press conference, he accused Saddam Husayn of trying "to destroy the Ba'th Party by liquidating its most fundamentalist and patriotic militants and leaders." He was referring to the executions in July of last year of persons accused of complicity in a Syrian-backed conspiracy to overthrow the government. Al-'Aqrawi also claimed that there is a tacit alliance between Saddam Husayn and Anwar al-Sadat against Syria, the Islamic revolution in Iran and the PLO.

But Kurdish sources in Iraq are saying that what al-'Aqrawi said was a political pretext for his defection, not the real reason. According to these sources, the reason was that al-'Aqrawi felt that his role had come to an end, and that after getting all the use it could out of him, the Iraqi Government was going to discard him. He chose to beat them to the punch as a "hero" by taking advantage of the current state of tension between Damascus and Baghdad.

The Syrians consider al-'Aqrawi's defection a propaganda gain in their tense relations with Baghdad. If time for a reconciliation came, they would have (somebody they could exploit?). In this context, al-'Aqrawi's defection to Syria balances Mahmud al-Shufi's defection to Iraq. A similar thing happened during the Iraqi-Palestinian dispute, which spread to Europe, when certain dissident groups of the two sides were used as scapeboats in the settlement which is still in effect. One of the prominent Iraqis who have sunk into oblivion is Hasan Mustafa al-Naqib who was commander of the Iraqi forces in Jordan before the events of September 1970. He enjoyed close relations with the Palestinians, and had a good reputation in Ba'th circles. Prof Michel 'Aflaq, the secretary general of the Ba'th Party, even said that he was worthy of being the commander of a united Arab army. But Hasan al-Naqib was soon dismissed from his position and appointed to an ambassadorial post. He served for 3 years as his country's ambassador to Madrid, and held that post when Saddam Husayn visited Gen Franco in 1974. He then defected, went to Beirut, and sought asylum with the PLO. He is now said to be living in Damascus.

There is, however, another aspect to al-'Aqrawi's defection to Damascus: the Kurdish aspect. The Kurdish movement is currently made up of several different factions. A major one is that of Jalal al-Talibani who now leads his movement from Syria. During the heyday of Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani's movement, al-Talibani split away, and cooperated with the Iraqi authorities on occasion. The followers of al-Barzani called any Kurd who cooperated with the Iraqi authorities at that time as one of the "government mules." That is what al-Barzani's followers used to call al-Talibani and his followers. The followers of al-Talibani in turn applied the epithet to al-'Aqrawi before his defection. There are those who believe that al-'Aqrawi will join the al-Talibani faction to intensify the Kurdish rebellion against the Iraqi Government in the north, even if the remaining followers of al-Barzani still maintain their opinion of al-Talibani and al-'Aqrawi.

The al-Talibani faction of the Kurdish movement maintains that the Kurdish people must resume their revolution in Iraq on a new footing, avoiding the pitfalls which Mulla Mustafa's movement fell into. They must, therefore, make peace with the Islamic revolution in Iran, where a fierce war is now raging between the Kurds and Iranian Government forces in Mahabad, which was the capital of the first Kurdish republic established by al-Barzani right after the Second World War. The republic fell as soon as the Soviet forces withdrew from Iranian territory. In recent years, while there has been peace in northern Iraq, the al-Talibani faction has carried out several limited military operations in the area near the Syrian-Turkish borders. But the Turkish Government has kept this region under control through harsh measures, instituting martial law. This has had a dampening effect on these operations. Two years ago, when these operations were at their peak, Saddam Husayn was asked about them. He said that they posed no danger of erupting into a wide-scale rebellion, and that Iraq was able to endure them and contain them for many years.

The faction which opposes al-Talibani's faction, including the remnants of al-Barzani's faction, says that the Kurdish revolution cannot achieve victory through certain leaders changing from "mules of one government" to "mules of another government." They say that al-Barzani's experience proves that such a situation is doomed to failure, if an agreement such as the one signed in Algiers by the shah and Saddam Husayn takes places. This faction calls for an all-out revolution in all of Kurdistan, including Iran, Iraq and Turkey. When that comes about, Syria can be used as a rear base, because of the large number of Kurds in its northern districts.

There is also a third faction which believes that the Kurdish revolution has a chance to remain active in Iran. There is even an opportunity for the Iranian Kurds to achieve a good position from which to improve the Kurdish situation in the neighboring countries. Logistically, this requires taking advantage of the Iranian-Iraqi conflict so that Iraqi Kurdistan would become a rear base for the Kurdish revolution in Iran.

There is also a fourth faction, though not very numerous, which consists of Kurdish intellectuals and students in Europe. This group calls for a new Kurdish movement. As they put it, this movement would shake off the "traditional conservative leadership which has been burned up by its ties with various governmental agencies in the nations which have divided up Kurdistan and the Kurdish people." This faction says that although the traditional leaders differ with each other, they form, as a group, "a party of mules."

According to observers, 'Aziz al-'Aqrawi's services to the Ba'th regime in Iraq, while he was part of the government and an official in the autonomy administration, far outweight any harm that could be caused to Iraq by his defection and association with the followers of al-Talibani. According to these observers, al-'Aqrawi has only propaganda value now.

9123
CSO: 4802

PURCHASE OF FRENCH COMBAT PLANES UNDER NEGOTIATION

Paris LE MONDE in French 24 Sep 80 p 4

[Article by Jacques Isnard]

[Text] Discussions in progress between Paris and Baghdad have to do with the purchase by Iraq of 150 Alpha-jet combat planes which will be partially produced locally. While these negotiations are taking place, in November Iraq is to receive the first of the 60 Mirage F-1 air defense interceptors ordered from France.

Relations between France and Iraq in the field of aviation go back over 3 years. In July 1977 Baghdad ordered 36 Mirage F-1 interceptors from France. At the time, it was understood that Iraq would later announce an order for 36 more Mirage F-1's. In December 1979, however, an agreement was concluded for 24 more of the same interceptor.

Apparently, after acquiring the 60 Mirage F-1's, Iraq chose to set its sights on the creation of a local aviation industry with the aid of French companies. Long dependent on an exclusive supplier, the Soviet Union, the Iraqis wanted to set up their own sources of supply to cut down the risks of foreign dependence.

This is why, in its own interest, Iraq has resumed work on the main lines of a still-born project. Actually, several years ago Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait had drawn up a plan to create an Arab Organization for Military Industrialization--known under the acronym OAI--with the aim of setting up the basis for an aviation industry in Egypt which was to have been financed by the three other Arab partners to the agreement and was to appeal to France for the mass production of a combat plane, the Alpha-jet, designed as a trainer for local personnel and to beef up several Near Eastern air forces.

The OAI disappeared following many a mishap, in particular due to pressure from the United States at the time of the Camp David agreements, which normalized Israeli-Egyptian relations.

Since then, Iraq has for its own reasons reexamined with France the possibility of setting up aviation plants near Baghdad and Mossoul where the Alpha-jet would be assembled. This twin-jet aircraft,* was designed by French and German companies but the two manufacturers have agreed that, in the event the plane is exported, each of them would be free to sell it by buying back that portion that has been coproduced from the other manufacturer.

All in all, 150 Alpha-jets are involved, in the advanced training models for the training of other than beginner pilots and for the tactical support of ground troops.

The first machines will come from the French plants. During a second phase, Iraq will, with French assistance on the basis of already-approved plans, proceed to the assembly of the most important Alpha-jet components. Later, production will be farmed out to local plants for most of the plane's components, including the jet engines.

Not counting France, which plans to buy a total of 200 planes, the Alpha-jet has to date been ordered by the FRG (200), Belgium (33), Morocco (24), Nigeria (12), Ivory Coast (6), Qatar (6) and Togo (3). The Emirate of Abu Dhabi is also negotiating with France for the purchase of Alpha-jets.

In the present case, the conclusion of a contract with Baghdad would have the effect of breaking the Soviet monopoly in the Iraqi Air Force, chiefly equipped with Mig-21's, Mig-23's, Sukkoi-7's or 20's, Tupolev-22's, Ilyushin-28's and a few rare British planes, already obsolete. Iraq has promised France 23.3 percent of its oil supply.

11,466
CSO: 4800

*With a top speed of 850 km an hour, the Alpha-jet is capable of carrying up to 2.2 tons of armaments a distance of about 900 km.

BRIEFS

FRENCH TANKS--France is getting ready to deliver a new contingent of AMX-30 medium tanks, 100 of which have already been supplied. A big consignment of missiles will be added to this shipment. [Text] [Paris LE POINT in French 18 Aug 80 p 28] 11466

CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS--Iraq has recently been devoting attention to construction activity, following its belated opening up to western contractors, whose revenues from Iraqi construction projects have reached a billion dollars. Iraq has signed several contracts amounting to 1.1 billion dollars with one company for the construction of a government center in Baghdad. Another contract with the company has been signed for 700 million dollars for improvements to the Basra airport. A 500 million dollar contract with a Japanese firm has been signed for building renovations. Iraq has also signed a 340 million dollar contract with Korea for the construction of a medical center in Baghdad. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 13 Aug 80 p 13] 9123

LOAN TO INDIA--It was announced in Baghdad yesterday that Iraq and India have signed a long-term loan agreement under which the Iraqi Fund for Foreign Development will provide the government of India with a 104 million dollar interest-free cash loan. The Iraqi News Agency quoted an offical of the Fund, who said that the loan was equivalent to the increases in the price of Iraqi oil supplied to India during the second half of last year. The official noted that this was the 10th loan provided by Iraq to several developing countries. The loan was signed for Iraq by Dr 'Abd al-Amir al-Anbari, chairman of the board of the Fund, and for India by its ambassador to Baghdad. The official said that the loan would be paid back over a 20-year period. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 29 Aug 80 p 15] 9123

IRAQI LITERARY FIGURES KILLED--Beirut--The Association of Democratic Iraqi Writers, Journalists and Artists issued a statement today on the martyrdom of Jihad Majid, an Iraqi storyteller. The statement said that some time ago, 84 Arab intellectuals signed a memo calling on the rulers of Baghdad to release Jihad Majid and to account for the destiny of Dr Safa' al-Hafiz, Dr Sabah al-Durrah and Jihad Majid following reports on their grave condition due to torture. The statement added that on 30 September, Lebanese newspapers published the statement issued by Amnesty International which called on Iraq to open an investigation into the killing of political detainees by poison. The statement mentioned Jihad Majid. The statement referred to the execution of journalist Isma'il Khalil in Baghdad. It denounced these actions and called for sending cables of condemnation, revealing the facts to world opinion and having the masses of the people sign memos of objection against the Iraqi regime. [Text] [JN071836 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1615 GMT 7 Oct 80]

PERES DISCUSSES MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

TA050917 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 5 Oct 80 p 8

[Article by Shim'on Peres, Labor Party chairman: "War or Peace?"--translation of an article appearing in OCTOBER magazine]

[Text] The choice before all of us, Arab and Jewish residents of the Middle East, is sharp and clear: Will we let the Palestinian problem blast the entire region into another war? Or will we strive towards a new regional alignment through which a solution can be found for the Palestinian problem as well as others?

The first option calls for another war; the second opens the gate to peace. I believe that President as-Sadat accurately perceived this choice. And, as the president of the largest nation in the area, he took the historic initiative towards a peaceful solution.

Egypt has always been regarded as the "big brother" in the family of Middle Eastern nations. Its achievements and its shortcomings have always been extremely significant for other states in the area. I believe the past--and the future as well--justify this assessment. There were four wars between us. Each had a clear military outcome, but none solved the problem that brought the armies out.

The wars of 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973 only increased the number of human casualties, the property damage and the number of refugees, and deepened the feelings of hostility and bitterness. But no permanent solution followed. On the contrary, the wars opened the region to Soviet infiltration, aroused fanatical elements, retarded social development and halted economic growth. It would be naive to address ourselves only to the causes of the wars and to ignore their results. Any future belligerency would only benefit foreign powers--weapons-suppliers or status-seekers. And the human and economic development of the region's inhabitants would suffer.

The Palestinization of the conflict was thus a basic error. On the other hand, a comprehensive regional view brings with it a chance for a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem. The regional approach takes into account that lack of progress in the Middle East derives in part from geographical and historical factors. These international "givens" are the deserts, mountains, seas and climate. All these have kept the peoples apart and inhibited development. Isolation, competition, hostility, and the domination of narrow interests intensified the effects of a harsh environment.

As far as I have understood from my conversations with President as-Sadat, he, like us, is interested in an honest and historic pooling of forces to overcome those obstacles--turning deserts into fields, linking mountains in ways that will allow for initiatives in industry, research and tourism; cleaning the seacoasts and opening the seas themselves to free passage; conquering the climate; cooperating to keep out foreign forces and transform blind fanaticism into cultured, intelligent, tolerant exchange.

If nature in the Middle East is harsh, the people of the region are blessed with imagination and ability which, from time to time in their long history, took them to the zenith of scientific and spiritual achievement. The goal of regional alignment must be to bring back the rule of wisdom despite the many difficulties arising from habit and terrain.

I believe in such a possibility. I also believe we can find a just solution to the painful problem of the Palestinian people. Within such a context of renewed trust and far-reaching cooperation, the problem can be viewed without the added burden of suspicion and hostility.

I know this "burden" cannot be eliminated in a single day. The split in the Middle East between the "rejectionist front" and those who favour dialogue necessitates a great deal of patience in striving for a solution in stages. How, therefore, do we Israelis describe to ourselves the solution of the Palestinian problem?

To solve the problem, we believe, we have to ask where the Palestinians are. This is only a matter of statistics, but it's sometimes surprising to see to what extent people tend to ignore them. Nearly half of the Palestinian people live in Jordan, and they comprise a majority of the Jordanian population. (We must remember that Jordan itself was in the not-too-distant past a part of Palestine.) About 700,000 other Palestinians live in Judaea and Samaria. About 100,000 live in Jerusalem, about 450,000 in the Gaza Strip, about 600,000 are Israeli citizens, and about 200-300,000 are refugees in Lebanon.

We must see the problem and the solution in a unified, complete context. All of the interim solutions must derive from a view of the comprehensive solution at the end of the road. We must decide, then, first of all, what the comprehensive solution is. Will it be a single solution, or two or three?

A single solution means one political framework, one army, one flag. Two solutions means two stages, two armies, two flags. We contend that more than one solution is not in fact any solution, merely a change of venue, date and reason for further conflict.

If, for example, a Palestinian state based on the Palestine Liberation Organization is established, alongside Jordan, Yasir 'Arafat's unceasing attempts to take over Jordan as well (as called for in the Palestinian covenant) will give rise to constant terror and tension. King Husayn would respond accordingly. And Israel would find itself involved, willingly or unwillingly, in this perpetual tension.

A Palestinian state with an army equipped for offence would pose a threat to its neighbors on both the east and west. But it isn't even clear if such a state

would be stable enough to withstand the competition which already exists among the various PLO factions. Katyushas would fly in all directions and the response to them would be continuous escalation of the confrontation in the entire area.

Anyone prepared to see the region in its full context and reach a logical solution to the Palestinian situation must seek a complete, single solution, despite the difficulties. There is no divided solution to a problem which isn't divided. For these reasons, Israel favours the establishment of a Jordanian-Palestinian framework which would include all of the more than three million Palestinians living today in Jordan, Judaea, Samaria and Gaza.

If we agree to this view, we can begin fashioning bricks for the political structure under the existing conditions and agreements in the Middle East. The first brick can be the Gaza Strip, which can be given autonomy without delay, for the period defined in the Camp David accords. At the end of that period, we can examine, along with the Gaza residents, ways to link the Gaza Strip to the Jordanian-Palestinian framework.

The second brick can be an Israeli invitation to the Jordanian Government to conduct negotiations for a solution to the Palestinian problem on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 242, which was formally adopted by Egypt, Jordan and Israel.

We may not be able to reach a full and permanent agreement on Judaea, Samaria and Gaza in one leap. In that case we would have to seek interim agreements, such as those reached with Egypt, before arriving at a permanent peace.

The difficulty of the single leap to peace is described convincingly enough in one of the formulas the Egyptian delegation brought to Camp David: "...In determining the future boundaries of the West Bank, the two main considerations will be the aspirations of the Palestinians and the security call of Israel."

And in fact, we must not only face the problems of Egyptian expectations, but also those of Israel's security. Israel believes it was unjustly attacked twice by the Jordanian Army--in 1948 and in 1967--and is convinced it must not be vulnerable to more errors of the same sort. There is a contradiction formulated in the Egyptian statement, but I believe it can be bridged in serious negotiations.

It is not inconceivable that such negotiations may lead to solutions no one can imagine today.

A third brick in the political structure can be the establishment of a suitable Israeli policy in the territories. As the development of local leadership is encouraged through free elections, even on the municipal level, the military government will withdraw from the territories, clearing the way for an independent authority, as described in the Camp David accords.

The fourth brick in the structure must be a solution of the problem of refugees in Lebanon. That would relieve Lebanon's agony and permit those refugees who wish to return to the Palestinian-Jordanian framework to build their permanent home.

In my opinion, this brick can be made, again, only in the context of a Jordanian-Palestinian solution. If there are two states, the larger of them, Jordan, will not necessarily want to absorb the refugees and the smaller of them is likely to want to absorb them but not have the room. Israel, like the rest of the nations in the region, can extend various kinds of help to carry out this programme.

The fifth brick in the solution would be Jerusalem. In this area there is some agreement and there are some differences between Israel and Egypt. Egypt agrees with us that Jerusalem must remain a united city and that religious rites must be performed there in dignity by all of the sects for whom it is a holy city (and we must not forget that the Christians, not only Jews and Muslims, consider Jerusalem a holy city). But Egypt argues for division of sovereignty in the city, which Israel cannot accept.

I believe we must take the two points of agreement--unity of the city and free approach to the holy places, through administration by the relevant religious authority--and develop them, with the symbols necessary to increase the degree of agreement concerning the status of Jerusalem.

When we have finished baking those five bricks, we can get on with building the entire structure. That might take a long time, but isn't it preferable to build peace slowly rather than slip into war for lack of patience?

If we solve the Palestinian problem, we can all commit ourselves to the central goal of the policy President as-Sadat has embarked upon, and in which we are full partners. That goal is to turn the Middle East into a region whose economic, scientific and social development is as advanced as that of Europe, or even America; a region in which there will be cooperation, despite the differences of religion and language, such as that found in the European community--with its open borders and its flourishing culture.

The fact that we are ancient peoples should not prevent such a regional renaissance. A Middle East without conflicts will no longer be a grazing ground for foreign flocks. We can all devote our human energy, based on an ancient culture, to the service of the coming generation--of the Arab nation, the Jewish nation, and the other peoples who live here.

The key to that is an intellectual, not only political, cooperation between Egypt and Israel. Politicians, writers, artists, farmers, and workers already have the green light. Let us not be daunted by the difficulties that face us and let us not fall prey to excessive suspicion, to the rumours that bloom, to the hatreds of the past. We met as human beings, and we were surprised to each find a desire in the other to have today's civilization succeed yesterday's strategy. These are the days for great decisions and wide-ranging vision. We are not nations of peddlars. We were brought up on the laps of prophets. That was our strength yesterday; that will be our strength tomorrow.

CSO: 4820

BEGIN INTERVIEWED ON IMPLICATIONS OF MIDDLE EAST WAR

LD121320 London SUNDAY TELEGRAPH in English 12 Oct 80 p 19

["Exclusive" interview with Prime Minister Menahem Begin by Gordon Brook-Shepherd in Jerusalem; date not given]

[Excerpts] Three points stood out in talks lasting in all two and a quarter hours which I have had here with Israel's controversial and beleaguered prime minister, Mr Menahem Begin. These are: 1) Grave concern that the Gulf war may spread, coupled with a pledge that Israel will not meddle in it; 2) withering criticism of Western Europe in general and of Tory Britain in particular, for kowtowing to Arab oil power; 3) uncompromising rejection of any form of Palestinian state under any leadership and of any attempt to tamper with the status claimed for Jerusalem as Israel's undivided capital.

His sombre words about the Iran-Iraqi conflict came when I suggested that his generals must surely be delighted that two of Israel's bitterest enemies were now draining each other's strength. He shook his head briskly and said: "My friend, there is an ancient precept in the Bible, 'Don't rejoice in the downfall of your enemies.' It is true that both Iran and Iraq are our implacable foes, yet we do not rejoice that they are fighting each other. When a war starts, you never know how it will end. It is like a conflagration. The flames can reach far away from the battlefield. Therefore we are very perturbed, and the situation in the Persian Gulf is very dangerous also for the Western powers."

The week I was in Jerusalem had seen both the visit of King Husayn of Jordan to Baghdad to discuss Jordanian aid to Iraq in the battle, and the visit of the Syrian President al-Asad to Moscow to sign a so-called "friendship" treaty with the Soviet Union. It was difficult to know which event troubled Mr Begin more. On Jordan he said:

"We want peace with her as a neighbour. But now she allies herself with Iraq--the most radical of all our enemies, who has always fought us and never signed a ceasefire, although we have no common border. Jordan puts the Port of Aqaba at Iraq's disposal and we know that more Soviet ships with arms and military supplies for Iraq are now on their way there." (I later learned that Israel has pinpointed 12 more Soviet vessels bound for Aqaba.) This co-operation is very serious for us. Look, Iraq has more than 3,000 tanks. Let us say that, in gratitude, they give Jordan 500 of them. That would mean Jordan would have, counting your British Centurions and her other armour, something like 1,500 tanks to mass against us."

As for Syria, he could find little comfort in the fact that she was at loggerheads with Iraq in view of the treaty just signed in Moscow. This seemed to him to presage the re-entry of the Soviet Union in force into the Middle East arena from which she was excluded eight years ago after the breach with Egypt.

"The important thing will be the secret clauses in such a pact, and those will not be published. There are even reports that Soviet military units may be stationed in Syria--right on our door-step. We are not frightened but this whole development is serious. Syria has 3,000 tanks, too; and I can tell you that the number of Soviet advisers in that country has already recently doubled--from 2,500 to 5,000. Nonetheless, Israel cannot intervene, and allegations of our intervention in the Gulf war are baseless. We just don't want to interfere but we have to watch very carefully."

If there was one positive aspect of the Gulf war for Mr Begin, it was the end of what, in his view, was a Western illusion about the Arab world. He obviously relished ramming this particular point home.

"For years there was a myth in the West that if only the Arab-Israeli conflict could be solved, more or less in the Arab sense, if Israel could be so persuaded, then there would be peace and quiet in the whole region. No more war or strife, and supplies of oil assured to every-one. Now this myth is exploded completely. Two Arab oil states are fighting each other and the Arab world is divided. What has the Arab-Israeli conflict to do with all this?"

We now got on to Britain and, more particularly, Tory Britain, which came in for some fierce broadsides. In the morning, when we had touched on the outbreaks of anti-Semitism in France, he had spoken sadly of "the two Frances--the France of liberty, equality and fraternity and the France of the Dreyfus case and the horrible face of racial hatred." Were there, I asked, two Britains as well?

Well, he replied, of course. There was on the one hand the Britain of Balfour and Lord Passfield--great friends of Zionism--and he himself had been brought up by his father (who was a great devotee of Disraeli) to admire Britain.

Though he did not exactly specify that Britain's other face reposed in the patrician features of Lord Carrington, it was our foreign secretary who got most of the stick that now followed. Mr Begin had already accused the whole of Western Europe, including Britain, of "vying for the favour of the Arab world, trying to sell arms to them at the highest price and buy oil from them at the cheapest price." But it was our behaviour over the "Death of a Princess" TV film which aroused his particular wrath.

"Suddenly, Saudi Arabia became very angry with you and threatened to take her money away from the city and her oil, which is still important to you; and first your Foreign Office minister, Mr Hurd, and then Lord Carrington went to Riyadh and humiliated themselves--I don't hesitate to say so--with abject apologies, bowing deeply to a corrupt ruling clique simply because in your free country there are free media."

I pointed out that it was regrets and not apologies which had been tendered, and it was precisely the freedom of the British media which had been stressed and upheld throughout the incident. As far more distinguished interlocutors of Mr Begin's have discovered, however, he is harder to deflect than a charging bull. I had no better luck later on when trying to persuade him that, important though Arab oil and trade were to the Western world, we also had a genuine political motive in trying to help along a Palestinian settlement.

The so-called "justice of the Palestinian cause," he retorted, amounted simply to the blunt fact that there were now 21 sovereign Arab states in the world determined to create a 22nd, "on the neck of the Jewish state."

Lord Carrington "was no friend of Israel's at all, as long as he repeats that we should negotiate with the PLO." (Sir Ian Gilmour--whom Mr Begin also met on his visit to London last year--got even lower marks: He was described as "absolutely hostile.")

I picked Mr Begin up on a point he had made earlier that the Middle East was unpredictable and full of paradoxes. Just supposing that a reasonable and peaceful Palestinian leadership were to emerge one day, would he still oppose a Palestinian state? He brushed aside even possibility of such moderate leadership.

"A Palestinian state is out of the question. In any case it would be a mortal danger to Israel."

It was, he went on, "sacrilege" to compare the dispersal of the Palestinians to the Jewish Diaspora. The Palestinians were living among their own Arab peoples with the same language and culture. The solution for these dispersed Palestinians was "resettlement in the countries where they live." After all, nobody had tried to send back all the Moslem and Hindu refugees created by the partition of India. As for those Palestinians living in Judaea and Samaria, the solution proposed by Israel herself was the best--to give them complete administrative autonomy to run their lives. "But security we must reserve for ourselves."

Ideas such as those floated by his Labour opposition opponent, Mr Peres, that Jordan might be associated in a political solution, he dismissed as an attack of the illness he called "Husaynitis."

"How can you have a territorial compromise with Jordan when Husayn said 'I want Jerusalem'?"

It was the status of Jerusalem which produced his final blast at Lord Carrington. He told me: "I said to Lord Carrington in London when he gave me some unsolicited advice on East Jerusalem, 'When King David transferred his capital from Hebron to Jerusalem, nobody at that time had ever heard of London but would any Englishman have asked anyone about making London his capital? Don't give me unsolicited advice! There is no Arab Jerusalem. There is only Jerusalem!'"

CSO: 4820

ISRAELI ANALYSTS COMMENT ON SOVIET-SYRIAN FRIENDSHIP PACT

TA101235 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 10 Oct 80 pp 1, 2

[Report by David Landau, diplomatic correspondent: "Pact Seen as Threat to Israel and West"]

[Excerpt] Top analysts in Jerusalem said yesterday the Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad had agreed to sign the treaty with Moscow as a direct consequence of the Iran-Iraq war.

These analysts noted that al-Asad had hesitated for a very long time over repeated Soviet urgings to enter this type of close relationship with the Kremlin. It was the war, these analysts believe, that persuaded him to take the plunge.

Al-Asad apparently perceived the war as increasing Syria's isolation in the Arab world. Most of the Arab states are backing Iraq--a few, like Jordan, overtly, and the majority less openly. Only Syria and its new partner-in-union Libya have come out in favor of Iran. Syria also has longstanding grievances against Iraq.

Al-Asad may also have feared that the war would inevitably strengthen the bonds between the Soviet Union and Iraq--and therefore he decided to respond to the Soviet proposals to strengthen Syria's own client-patron relationship.

The Israeli analysts say active Syrian involvement in the war on the side of Iran seems highly unlikely at this stage. They point out that Iraq has succeeded to a large extent in portraying the war as an "Arab" struggle against a non-Arab enemy. With his minority Alawite regime under pressure from Moslem fundamentalists within his country, al-Asad could hardly afford to be viewed as taking an anti-Arab side in the conflict.

Nevertheless, Syria has sought to aid the Iranians in behind-the-scenes diplomacy.

Pondering Jordan's open logistic support for Iraq, the Israeli analysts said Jordan plainly hopes to be rewarded by Iraq and by other Arab hardliners once the war is over. In part, King Husayn is apparently moved by sentiments of Arab solidarity. But he is also seeking to better his own standing in the Arab world at the expense of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The PLO has been ambivalent on the Gulf war.

This purpose would accord with Jordan's steady attempts during recent months to regain preeminence on the Palestinian issue. A special ministry dealing with West Bank affairs has been set up in Amman recently, and more money has been made available to the West Bank.

Jordan seems to be shaking off the constraints imposed on it by the Rabat resolutions of 1974 in matters pertaining to the Palestinians. Israeli analysts feel that Husayn sees himself resuming a central role as spokesman for the Palestinians. His support for Iraq in its war is one way, he seems to feel, in which he can advance this aim.

Husayn's warlike rhetoric against Israel this week coincides with this assessment. Husayn has been moving steadily away from his traditional "moderation" ever since Camp David. But his bald threats this week of war against Israel to "purify Jerusalem" registered a new note of stridency with analysts here.

When the rhetoric is set in the context of the burgeoning strategic relationship between Jordan and Iraq, as well as with Husayn's immiment visit to Moscow, Israeli policymakers understandably view developments on the eastern front with disquiet.

Deputy Prime Minister Yiga'el Yadin warned Husayn publicly yesterday that it would be a "grave error" to "jump on the Iraqi bandwagon." Yadin said Husayn had gravely erred at least twice before: when he entered the war alongside Egypt in 1967, and when he failed to enter the peace process with Egypt in 1978.

CSO: 4820

'JERUSALEM POST' COMMENTS ON RABIN'S CANDIDACY FOR PREMIERSHIP

TA121018 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 12 Oct 80 p 8

[Editorial: "The Rabin Challenge"]

[Text] It would be a vast exaggeration to assert that the country has been awaiting Yitzhaq Rabin's formal decision to throw his hat in the ring for the Labour Party leadership and his candidacy for the premiership with bated breath.

Now that Rabin has taken the plunge it should, however, be clearly stated that the mounting of such a challenge to Shim'on Peres, is entirely legitimate. For what more appropriate time is there for such a race than in conjunction with the convening of the party's quadrennial national convention?

This is all the more true in view of the fact that the convention will represent many new members who have joined Labour since its 1977 defeat at the hands of the Likud in the expectation of taking part in fielding a new Labour in the next elections.

The less than mass enthusiasm accompanying the announcement of the Rabin candidacy is a reminder of the fact that when those supporting him today decided to mount their challenge to the Peres leadership at the beginning of the year they passed over the former prime minister and chose instead the late Yig'al Allon.

That choice, with which Rabin concurred at the time, was to a large extent a comment on the lacklustre nature of the three-year Rabin premiership and on his disastrous inability to assume the mantle of party leader.

Be that as it may, the choice between Peres and Rabin is a matter for the Labour Party to make. But the country has a right to expect some clear talk from both men on two matters.

The most disastrous aspect of the last Labour government was the poisonous relationship between Prime Minister Rabin and Defence Minister Peres. It is essential that the Labour Party guarantee that it will not propose a government that will again include both men, which can only lead to paralysis at a time of growing troubles for Israel, both on the international and the domestic fronts.

Since neither of the two candidates has proven himself to be an electrifying leader the electorate has a right to know what leadership team Labour will propose to challenge the Likud. Internal party and personal considerations may temporarily militate against the naming of such a shadow cabinet at the present time. But it is the least that the electorate has a right to demand immediately upon the resolution of the race for the party's leadership.

CSO: 4820

GULF WAR MAY CAUSE U.S. REAPPRAISAL OF ISRAEL'S VALUE

TA101914 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Oct 80 p 14

[Commentary by Yosef Harif: "Strategic Clarifications on the Lessons on the Iraq-Iran War To Be Conducted During Begin, al-Sadat Washington Visits"]

[Excerpts] On Prime Minister Begin's instructions Israel's ambassador to Washington warned the U.S. administration of the dangers inherent in Jordanian involvement on the Iraqi front, even if for the moment this involvement is a passive one. This time the United States was not, as it usually is, indifferent to Israel's warning, and assured it that it was aware of the dangerous situation evolving in the region.

What is it that worries the prime minister?

No great imagination is needed to guess what is worrying Begin: He is afraid that Jordan will, despite itself, find that it is rolling downhill, into Iraq's arms, even though its initial intention was to stay on this side of the line and not step over it and be dragged into the depths of the growing conflagration whose end no one can foretell. But regardless of what the outcome may be, from Israel's aspect the danger of an arranged match between Jordan and Iraq is extremely grave: Obviously--Begin thinks--Iraq will have to requite Jordan's good deed with a favor of its own, meaning that Iraq will form a united front against Israel with Jordan.

As is its custom, Washington might perhaps have taken the Israeli evaluations lightly, but this time it is starting to sense the danger; it is beginning to feel it where its interests are concerned and this is a very tangible danger indeed: If the Iraqis win, Baghdad will become the greatest oil power in the world, with all that this implies to Western economy and security. If Iraq does not win and Iran succeeds in dealing Iraq a decisive blow, then the Soviet Union could step in. Either way, the damage to U.S. interests could be considerable.

For weeks the United States has been acting as though struck by lightning and has not even begun to know what to do. Its warnings to Jordan, rather than being an expression of power, only underline the weakness of the U.S. administration, and most, if not all, of its political truths are collapsing day by day on the Iranian battlefield.

The question of whether the United States, which in this case is availing itself of Britain's assistance, will be able to extricate Jordan from the trap threatening it is a highly important one from the U.S. aspect; since Jordan, because of the move it chose to take, could reluctantly fall into Soviet hands. This is a U.S. question, yet it is far more serious from the Israeli aspect.

The fact that this development makes the idea of a "Jordanian option"--the Alignment's idea for an arrangement with Jordan, based on territorial compromise, even in the form of a continuing interim agreement--unrealistic is of secondary importance. The government autonomy idea cannot be fulfilled now either; even those who believed that it was fundamentally viable are agreed on that score. After all, according to the Camp David accords, Jordan has a role to play in the future arrangement once a permanent settlement is up for discussion; and according to Camp David, Jordan--together with Egypt and the representatives of the Palestinians residing in Judaea and Samaria--is supposed to be a partner in the autonomy negotiations. Its merger in the Iraqi Alignment excludes Jordan from any possible negotiations with Israel on a peace treaty on conditions that any Israeli government, even under the Alignment, could accept. If Husayn refused to talk to Israel before, and Jordan was not prepared to cooperate with either Israel or Egypt in the peace process previously, then now that Jordan has crossed the lines, counter to pronounced U.S. interests, can it be expected to change its mind and sit down at the negotiating table? If Iraq emerges the strong power from this war, will Husayn be in a position to defy it?

At first glance, the idea of a "Jordanian option" as the basis for a settlement appears to be an "Iraqi option," and no one here would venture to even entertain it. (Saddam Husayn, Iraq's bloodthirsty ruler, said that not only must an Israeli Jerusalem be opposed, but Tel Aviv, too, should be razed to the ground with bombs.) The emerging reality also makes al-Sadat's idea of a summit and the actual autonomy talks seem somehow other-wordly. The United States appears to recognize this fact as well, even though its entire policy in the region was based on the recognition that without a solution to the Palestinian problem there can be no peace and the United States will not be able to realize its hope of curbing Soviet expansionism in the Arab-Islamic world.

So far the United States has not brought Israel into its thinking; either because it is pretty confused these days and incapable of influencing to any real extent events that could well prove decisive for the future, or because its president is fighting for his political life in an election campaign in which, at this point, he has nothing to draw on that could give him courage. But from the little that reaches us from various sources it can be assumed that immediately after the presidential election, a reassessment of U.S. Middle East policy will be conducted, and in all likelihood those who already believe that it is not the Arab-Israeli conflict that should be at the center of things will predominate. With all its importance, it has been demonstrably proven that this complex conflict was not to blame for the lack of stability in the region.

If that is the approach taken, Israel's importance could rise side by side with that of Egypt, which has become an important part of U.S. strategy in the Middle East.

We do need a "summit" attended by the president of the United States, the president of Egypt and the prime minister of Israel. Such a planned summit can serve the interests of all three sides if it facilitates a more factual assessment of the situation and helps to establish a more realistic scale of priorities. Obviously such a summit cannot become a forum for strategic discussions without appearing to be an American-hatched "imperialistic plot," arranged with the connivance of Egypt and Israel. That is of course inconceivable, but there can be no doubt that when they visit Washington in the near future, Begin and al-Sadat respectively will attend bilateral talks (between the United States and Israel and the United States and Egypt) on developments in the region and on the real lessons that must be learned from them. Perhaps that is what Begin meant when he said that there would soon be a strategic dialog between Israel and the United States and that it would be conducted at the most senior level.

The U.S. inclination to ignore Israel, as displayed by the policy-shapers in Washington, naturally derived from the concept that since Israel--for lack of an alternative and due to its near total dependence on the United States--is in the Western camp anyway, the ones to be courted are the Arabs, even if that means hurting Israel.

This tendency might now become weaker. The fact is that when times were bad Washington wanted a dialog with Israel. There were two conspicuous such cases: After the Iraq revolution in 1958 it was the United States that held strategic consultations with Israel on how to act. Moreover, it asked Israel for its encouragement in Congress, to enable it to land Marines in Lebanon that year. And in 1970, when the United States accepted Israel's assistance to combat Syrian and Soviet intentions in Jordan. (In effect, it was proven in 1970 just how badly the United States needed Israel. Moshe Dayan, who was then defense minister, once recounted how U.S. generals came to Tel Aviv from Europe with old and obsolete maps, and showed themselves less than familiar with the terrain....)

At the start of the Iran-Iraq conflict many voices predicted a gloomy future: Whatever happened, it would be bad for Israel. Now second thoughts are being expressed. Perhaps, after all, things are not totally doomed for Israel. Perhaps the opposite is true. Perhaps at long last the United States will open its eyes and leave the world of illusion behind it.

Jordan did not follow Iraq into the latter's Iranian adventure because of Israel. The same holds true for Saudi Arabia, which is not treading the U.S. path. Senator Jackson once developed the theory that thanks to Israel both Jordan and Saudi Arabia continued to survive. This recognition, which could lead to a change of attitude toward Israel among Washington's policy-makers--no matter who they are--after the election, may not for the moment be forthcoming from the administration, but at least it cannot be passed over. From this aspect Israel is not all that pressed. The United States is more pressed, and that is why it immediately agreed with Israel and hastened to warn Jordan.

CSO: 4803

COMMENTATOR ON U.S. WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ISRAELI INITIATIVES

TA071700 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 7 Oct 80 p 5

[Commentary by Yehoshu'a Tadmor: "Washington Is Updating Its Stances: It Will Not Abandon Israel But Will Expect Israeli Initiatives"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir could not have gone to Washington at a worse time. The U.S. elections are due in some 4 weeks and until 4 November there is simply nobody to talk to. The senior officials are also keeping silent because they know they might lose their jobs, even without saying anything out of the ordinary. This is known to anybody who has recently visited the United States and to anybody maintaining contact with the U.S. Embassy in Israel.

The feeling is that after the elections, if Israel comes up with a properly formulated plan on security issues in the West Bank, the U.S. administration officials will be prepared to listen and discuss it. Naturally, this would have to be a plan guaranteeing security for Israel but which would not deprive the autonomy plan, as formulated by the Israeli Government itself, of its key content. Yet even if such a plan were not acceptable to the Americans, Israel could still try to fight for it with Washington, for the sake of Israel's security. This, at least, is what senior level U.S. officials between one administration and another tell Israeli visitors.

On the autonomy issue, too, the Americans are not making any a priori repudiation of Israeli ideas. They have objected to most of the draft proposals submitted by Israel's autonomy delegation, but not every idea was turned down outright. For instance, over the weekend, an unofficial U.S. reaction was heard that the alternative suggested by Yitzhaq Rabin in his newspaper interview to the effect that Israel would be willing to examine the possibility of Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank if Husayn rejects all the initiatives, was "an interesting idea, worthy of examination" (it must not be ruled out that this reaction came from Washington). Even if this plan meets with Palestinian opposition, the very fact that the Americans have favored it is of significance, although it is noteworthy that the Americans are only referring to a temporary solution, until the final negotiations are conducted.

The United States expressly wants Jordan as a partner in the negotiations. In Washington they say that they will accept any settlement by Israel that will be also acceptable to Husayn, and the United States obviously prefers Husayn to al-Sadat in resolving the West Bank problem and they consider Jordan a senior

partner in any Palestinian settlement. They will recommend a settlement with the Palestinians only if there is no other choice and when Israel reaches the conclusion that this is the best solution. As previously mentioned, this pertains only to an interim agreement within the timetable determined in the Camp David accords.

If no settlement is achieved, it is doubtful whether Washington will try to force a settlement on us. This is so utterly foreign to American tradition that it is difficult to imagine that Carter would risk such a move even if he were reelected. It is even more unlikely in view of the fact that any forced solution would entail U.S. responsibility for the agreement and for Israel's security. On the other hand, one must not delude oneself into believing that Washington would consent to bear for long the damage resulting from the conflict, of which both public opinion and both houses of Congress have grown tired.

The outgoing [as published] administration officials are surprised that Israel has not as yet come up with an initiative for making Washington side with Israel. Foreign Minister Shamir made a sort of last-minute effort to bring about a dialog between the United States and Israel, but his intentions, though good, came too late. No U.S. leader will start any kind of negotiations or real commitment 4 weeks before the election. Begin's government has forfeited in an unpardonable manner its chance for an early rapprochement with Washington and no matter what Shamir might do he will be unable to change this.

The Americans were also surprised at the fact that the Israeli Government has not attempted to come up with a serious plan for a settlement with Jordan. After all, it is a well established fact that the autonomy plan has been aground for a long time and there are some Israelis, including several cabinet ministers, who would have been willing to explore the Jordanian option. No such plan has reached the Americans, not even a nonbinding draft. The Americans claim that Israel preferred to first "finish business" with the Egyptians, and only then to concentrate on Jordan, but even in the negotiations with Egypt there was a lot of stalling which enraged the Egyptians. These Americans argue that Israel had two options at the time: to implement what was agreed upon with Egypt based on the Camp David accords or to immediately make alternative proposals that can advance the talks. Israel has done nothing to realize either of these two alternatives, nor has it shown any real initiative on the Jordanian issue. It did not submit any plan to the United States for discussion to advance the Washington-Amman talks and prevent the strengthening of the PLO.

Even now, the Americans do not reject the concept of "security borders" in the Jordan Rift Valley. What they are saying is that such a border, and any settlement with Jordan, cannot be considered as an ultimate solution. They see no harm in Israel and Jordan reaching an interim solution that will last several years, so that the bitterness can be mitigated in the meantime and the severity of the conflict reduced--all this provided that no attempt is made to devoid the Camp David accords of their original content, the Americans argue.

These comments indicate the Americans' adherence to the framework of the agreement, while showing readiness to be flexible toward different initiatives and their implementation, and indicates their determination to bring Jordan into the agreement almost by force. The United States shows some willingness to accept

Israeli plans for a unilateral evacuation of certain sections if only in order to force Husayn to join the agreement. This means that the Americans are putting the onus back on Israel, saying: We are ready to accept any arrangement that the Israelis and the Arabs agree upon and that will dissipate the hostility. We are not interested, nor can we be dragged again and again into delicate tests, which will oblige us to take a unilateral stance, sometimes in Israel's favor, other times with the Arabs. If you assist us in ridding ourselves of this burden, we will even help Israel become an integral component of the strategic fabric of the region. In the meantime you had better know your place, and we shall talk in more concrete terms after 4 November.

CSO: 4805

PERES VIEWS IRAN-IRAQ WAR, KING HUSAYN

TA081215 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1105 GMT 8 Oct 80

[Text] Labor Party Chairman Shim'on Peres [words indistinct] at a meeting with correspondents on party affairs today, about the war between Iran and Iraq.

[Begin Peres recording] The picture of the eastern front, which is becoming clearer, looks like this: Because of the relations between, let us say, Syria and Iraq, al-Asad is going to Moscow in November [as heard] and they themselves, the Syrians, have already leaked that they are going to sign an unusual treaty with the Russians--one that contains an element of much deeper Soviet involvement than we have ever known anywhere else. Now a set of relations, which it is still hard to define, is about to be established between Iraq and Jordan. Jordan says Iraq is its strategic rear. What interests us is not whether Iraq is Jordan's strategic rear, but whether Jordan is Iraq's strategic rear. We have always said we would not be able to simply accept it if, for example, Iraqi forces enter Jordan. Incidentally, from our point of view there is a difference between Jordan sending forces to Iraq and Iraq sending forces to Jordan and this must be clarified. Now, in my view, King Husayn must be asked what he wants. If he wants war, then, first of all, this must be brought to the knowledge of the public and all the required conclusions must be drawn. [Words indistinct] we have to know if he is preparing for a war with Israel. If this is so then do not let him appear in the United States or Austria or Europe as a peace-lover. If this is true then he is a man who is preparing for war and then, in my opinion, we must also appeal to all the countries of the world and say, here, once more this man is preparing for war. This must not be simply accepted. Of course the following should also concern the United States: that al-Asad is going to Moscow, King Husayn is going to Moscow, King Husayn is making an agreement with the other Husayn, Saddam Husayn, and all of a sudden a Soviet zone of influence will be created here which will include Iraq, Syria and Jordan; if this is the case. [end recording]

CSO: 4805

'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTS ON ISRAEL'S ATTITUDE TOWARD JORDAN TODAY

TA131320 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 13 Oct 80 p 5

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "The Red Line in Jordan"]

[Text] A Middle Eastern absurd play is being performed in al-'Aqabah at the moment. The actors are Iraq and Jordan and the silent, indifferent spectator is Israel. Right under our noses, within the range of artillery fire, military equipment and ammunition are streaming in for the Iraqi Army and its war in the Persian Gulf, a war defined by both Jordan and Iraq as the first stage in a war against Israel, to liberate Palestine.

Israel does not generally need to intervene in wars between Arab countries and there is nothing bad in the fact that they are spilling each other's blood. However, it should be recalled that this rule does not always apply; as witnessed by the military aid Israel gave both to the Kurds against Iraq and to the Christians and others in Lebanon, against the PLO. There have been other instances in which we did not keep our fingers out of the dish, beginning with the Yemen war in the 1960's and going on to our intervention (by concentrating forces) when Syria invaded Jordan. The trend has always been to defend Israeli interests by weakening and distracting the militant Arab factor, by supporting minorities and moderate factors in the region.

The Iran-Iraq war and the Jordanian involvement in it are different from the cases previously mentioned. However, it is important to stress that had this war developed in 1975, when the shah imposed the partition of Shatt-al-Arab on Iraq, Israel would have taken an active stance at Iran's side. Conditions today have changed not only in Iran, but also in Jordan (which at one time enjoyed Iranian military aid in the form of F-5 planes and engines for them). The change has been expressed not only in King Husayn's statement that when the war in the Persian Gulf ends, it will be Israel's turn, but, first of all, in the latest remarks by the head of the intelligence branch of the General Staff, Maj Gen Yehoshu'a Sagi, to the effect that "it is clear that Jordan is making thorough preparations for the next war with Israel," this is a most grave statement to which, for some reason, no attention was paid.

Now, after the absurd play in which Iraqi ships have been unloading weapons under our very eyes, we ask the question: What country that respects itself and looks after its long-term security as it should would accept such challenges? I am trying to imagine how Ben-Gurion would have reacted if Israel had confronted such

a situation when he was alive. From his vigorous reaction to the possibility of Iraqi forces being stationed in Jordan (during the period of retaliation actions on the eve of the Sinai campaign), it may be assumed that Israel, which was then very much weaker, would have flexed its muscles and shown its teeth. Israel's reaction to the development of the Jordanian-Iraqi axis and the other events in the area teaches us that we have become the good child of the Middle East. We are the too sane party, all of whose moves may be evaluated with absolute precision. We are a something over which there is no need to take any trouble.

It is right now, when the Arab world has experienced a grave polarization, when several of its flanks have been over-exposed, that it is obvious just to what extent we do not know how to take advantage of an opportunity. If Israel had aggressive aims, it would have taken advantage of al-Asad's regime's weakness a long time ago and struck it. Nor does it take the advantage it should of the PLO's weakness in Lebanon. And when Jordan is dragged into militantism defined by the head of the intelligence branch as a preparation for war, we are as surprised by this development as though it was a question of a war against someone else, not us. I am not trying to claim that taking advantage of opportunities always takes the form of using force. There are also other channels, primarily political ones. For example, this is the right time to speed up the atuonomy negotiations with Egypt, by making mutual concessions. With a more credible show of muscles in certain sections of the eastern front, we could achieve rapid compromises in the autonomy negotiations with Egypt.

The Iraq-Iran war could also lead to Iraq finding it difficult to send forces and resources westward, to the front with Israel, for a long time. But even such a possibility, which is positive from our viewpoint, should not release us from setting ourselves a red line in Jordan. When the Syrian Army penetrated Lebanon, Yitzhaq Rabin, who was prime minister at the time, claimed that this would weaken Damascus and make things more complicated for it. Nevertheless, this evaluation did not prevent a fairly clear red line, from our viewpoint, from being laid down. This red line was that Israel would not suffer Syrian units to be stationed in southern Lebanon.

This should also be the case in Jordan. As long as the Jordanian-Iraq effort is aimed eastward, at the Persian Gulf, fine. Nor will the rift between Jordan and Syria be harmful. But we must not agree to Iraq, under the guise of a war in the Persian Gulf, beginning to build up a new military infrastructure in Jordan. This, in my view, is Israel's red line in Jordan. This is very much more grave because Iraq is aiming at a military nuclear option. It would be an error on our part to make short-term judgments and evaluations of the situation, based on only the low efficiency of the Iraqi Air Force today.

The development of the Iraqi infrastructure in Jordan began a long time ago, but now is the time to stop or delay it, while Iraq is busy with its war in the Persian Gulf. The military and other aid Jordan is receiving from the Baghdad Pact countries, and primarily from Iraq, is quadruple what it is receiving from the United States. There are reports that Iraq is even paying for weapons Jordan is purchasing from the United States and France. Visits to Jordan by Iraqi Army leaders, defense ministers, intelligence leaders and air force commanders have been known for some time. All the signs indicate that, parallel

with developing the al-'Aqabah port and the network of highways leading to Jordan, both countries are trying to achieve intelligence and air coordination (directed, first of all, against Israel).

The cat was let out of the bag when the war in the Persian Gulf broke out. The danger, as stated, is that under this guise, Iraqi emergency reserves will be set up in Jordan. It is reasonable to assume that Husayn will opt for the maintenance of equipment for Iraqi armored divisions instead of having the entire division stationed there. Such an infrastructure could disrupt Israel's early warning system and make it easier to move Iraqi forces to our border. In other words, Israel must oppose not only Iraqi forces being stationed in Jordan, but also the establishment of Iraqi military equipment and ammunition stores in that country.

For this reason, it was an error on our part to have accepted the stationing of Iraqi aircraft in Jordan with understanding and unspoken agreement. As soon as we discovered this, we should have signaled Husayn that this was a precedent likely to jeopardize Israel's security. What disrupted and misled both Israel and Jordan was the U.S. intervention in this matter. As soon as Washington took the trouble to let us know about the appearance of the Iraqi aircraft in Jordan, it could be understood that Washington had authorized this. But even if this is Washington's position, it does not fit in with Israel's interests. We should have reacted more sharply and clearly. It would then have been apparent to Husayn what Israel's red line was on the Iraqi issue.

Because we did not make our position clear, matters developed rapidly. Husayn declared that this was the first stage in the expected war against Israel, and ships carrying Iraqi weapons began to arrive at al-'Aqabah. Nor can we dismiss the possibility that at the same time Iraqi troops came to Jordan in the framework of the transfer of the military equipment from al-'Aqabah to their country. Husayn is too exposed to provoke Israel on this issue. In this Iraq cannot come to his aid, nor, certainly, can Syria. It is clear that imposing an Israeli blockade on al-'Aqabah would have aroused the Security Council, which is helpless as concerns the Persian Gulf war. Imposing an Israeli blockade on a country's only port is not something simple, although almost the same thing is happening in the Persian Gulf. But Israel could make it plain to Husayn, who regards the current war as a stage in the war against us, that we will not suffer the entry and anchoring of Iraqi ships laden with weapons in the Gulf of Elat. This signal would be understood and would prevent other precedents.

CSO: 4805

COMMENTATOR ANALYZES JORDANIAN SUPPORT FOR IRAQ

TA101223 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 10 Oct 80 Sabbath Supplement p 4

[Commentary by Arye Avneri: "Israel Warned--But the United States Belittled Husayn's Coming Out for Iraq"]

[Excerpts] The leaders of Jordan and Iraq view the war against Iran as a kind of commencement of a political and military struggle against Israel and against American imperialism, in an effort to liberate Palestine. King Husayn, for example, constantly reiterates that the Iran-Iraq war is aimed at redeeming all Arab land--and he makes no distinction between Iranian-held Arab land and Israeli-held Arab land. Husayn even takes the trouble to say, albeit in the form of not very subtle hints, that whereas the PLO is hesitating and is avoiding the adoption of a clear stance on the Iraq-Iran war, Jordan has decided to mobilize all its resources in Iraq's aid.

The PLO is in fact politically embarrassed. Its leaders have declared neutrality on the Iran-Iraq conflict, and this finds expression in the PLO press. A recent editorial in AL-FAJR was entitled "Neutrality--Our Concern." But this fence-sitting by the PLO is not strengthening its standing in the Arab world. The PLO has been weakened, at least politically, in the war's wake.

The PLO leaders are aware of the fact that the Iran-Iraq war has done away with one of their most effective advertising slogans, which they have succeeded in inculcating into many heads worldwide. This war has demonstrated clearly that it is nonsense to say that the Palestinian issue constitutes the main and central cause of the instability in our region. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, after the struggle between Syria and Iraq and after several other similar developments, the war between the two Muslim states has shown that the Palestinian issue is on the fringes of the region's problems, not at their center.

Moreover, precisely the Iran-Iraq war has demonstrated clearly, in contrast to assertions by the PLO and its supporters, that in the wake of the Camp David accords Egypt is today the most stable country in the Arab world, both politically and militarily. It has also shown that, above and beyond all the talk and showiness of the Saudis and Kuwaitis, the United States is the only country capable of guaranteeing their well-being and their future.

The question that is preoccupying the Israeli defense establishment's heads who are following the partnership being forged between Jordan and Iraq, is whether

that partnership will lead to the establishment of an actual alliance between the two countries. Jordan, at least, believes that its backing of Iraq imposes on Baghdad a large degree of commitment vis-a-vis Amman when it will require Iraqi assistance. Nor does the problem end here. The United States, for example, could support such an alliance on the assumption or hope that they would have influence over it. A parallel calculation could be made from the other side, by the USSR.

Israel cannot acquiesce in the current U.S. approach to the Iran-Iraq war, and certainly not in Jordan's involvement in that war. It has warned Washington that it will not be able to accept the arming of Jordan, which declares publicly that its policy, including its rapprochement with Iraq, is aimed at liberating Jerusalem "from the Zionist contamination" and the soil of occupied Palestine from the Zionists.

One of the molders of Israel's security policy, Deputy Prime Minister Prof Yiga'el Yadin, said within the past few days: "It must not be forgotten that the declared policy of the Alignment government stated that an Iraqi presence in Jordan constitutes a security threat to Israel. If this was true in the past, this truth is all the more valid today, for what is involved is an emerging alliance between Jordan and a different and new Iraq which is developing, among other things, also nuclear arms." Yadin added that Iraq's ruler had even stated in these days that this nuclear weaponry is directed against Israel. "A situation in which Jordan, which receives U.S. arms, officially supports Iraq, is a new reality in the region which must be of concern to Israel."

The fear is that Husayn's joining the Iraqi camp--which ultimately may prove to be a fatal mistake on his part--changes Israel's situation. Husayn is liable to bring disaster on his own nation--before that, however, he will seriously embroil the regional state of affairs.

At the same time, no far-reaching conclusions should be drawn too quickly, and the present situation, which is still not the final picture, requires a thorough and close examination by Israel and by the entire Western world.

CSO: 4805

WEST BANK, GAZA ARABS SAID TO SUPPORT KING HUSAYN'S GULF POLICY

TA101747 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 10 Oct 80 p 15

[Commentary by Dani Rubinstein: "'Knight of Arab Nationalism'"]

[Excerpt] The Amman monarch has now forged friendship and all alliance with one of the most radical and revolutionary regimes in the Arab world. For him this is unparalleled patriotic legitimation. The Jordanian regime is now presenting itself as one of the knights of fighting Arab nationalism. To anyone who accuses him of sidestepping the campaign for Palestine, Husayn replies: The war for the Arab territories on the Iranian border is a stage in the struggle to purge the contamination from holy Jerusalem and to liberate the road to Jaffa (quotations from two of his speeches). True, Husayn has reined his relations with Syria, but against the shaky regime in Damascus he now has the backing of Iraq, which can also offer him massive monetary aid.

King Husayn's maneuvers over the past year have strengthened him considerably. Ever since the start of the Arab summit conferences, no one imagined that Amman would host any summit meeting. This is a contribution to the prestige of the host ruler which no one ever thought to accord to Husayn. Just 2 years ago or less people would have laughed if anyone had raised the idea of a summit meeting in Amman. But now for the first time Amman has been selected for a summit meeting—though it is doubtful whether it will be held because of the war on the Iranian border. One way or the other, the selection of Jordan for the summit is a milestone on King Husayn's path, and in the intra-Arab labyrinth of rifts and chaos he finds himself stronger than ever before. This strengthening enables him to gamble on the alliance he has entered into with Iraq.

Against this background it is interesting that Jordan's aid to Iraq is enjoying quite a bit of sympathy in the West Bank and Gaza. In the past it could be asserted with certainty that any action by the Jordanian regime would encounter criticism and abuse among the radical Palestinians residing west of the Jordan. This time, too, a little criticism was leveled at Husayn's involvement in the Iran-Iraq war, but it was minor and quiet. It is quite difficult to come out against the Jordanian monarch, who is about to visit Moscow and who i aiding Iraqi revolutionism. Are these not manifestations of loyal Arab nationalism? Most of those who are termed "national circles" in the West Bank and Gaza are maintaining a quiet neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war, and an Arab journalist from East Jerusalem told me: "In such a case, neutrality or standing aside means support for the side that attacked and conquered." The lawyer Zuhayr al-Ra'is,

who is considered a PLO supporter, published in his paper THE NEW WEEK (AL-USBU'A AL-JADID) an editorial entitled "Arabism Comes First" (that is, not Islam). In this article he asserts that Iran should have recognized the rights of the Arab minority in its territory and given up its expansionist ambitions in the Gulf. It was in the same spirit that Ziyad Abu-Ziyad, an editor of AL-FAJR, wrote a few months ago when he expressed his appreciation for the goals of the Khomeyni revolution.

Obviously, the traditional West Bank leadership immediately expressed its support for Husayn and his aid to Iraq, as did the Muslim religious establishment, one of whose spokesmen a week ago preached a sermon in al-Aqsa expressing support for Iraq and sharply condemning Iranian Islam which, he said, is built "on an American model." The youth and students in Nabulus, Ramallah and Gaza find it difficult to say even one word in favor of Husayn, and during the sermon at al-Aqsa there were even outbreaks of anger at the shaykh who condemned Iran. However, when I asked acquaintances to evaluate the attitude toward Husayn today in the territories, I was told that this is perhaps the first time in a long time that fairly broad support exists for Amman's policy, support based also on the enhancement and strengthening of Jordan's standing in the Arab world.

In the near future we shall be able to judge whether King Husayn has succeeded in directing his steps well. In the meantime, he is benefiting from the distress of the PLO, which has been paralyzed in Lebanon, from al-Asad's troubles, from al-Sadat's isolation, from the fears about internal stability in Saudi Arabia; and he is positing himself as a solid strategic rear for the war which Iraq is presenting as the war of the Arab nation and Arab nationalism against the aliens who harm it.

CSO: 4805

ADDITIONAL 10 MILLION SHEKELS ALLOTTED FOR GOVERNMENT OFFICES

TA190926 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Oct 80 pp 1, 2

[Report by El'azar Levin, economic affairs correspondent: "In the Midst of the Deliberations on Government Budget Cuts, the Treasury Decided To Allocate an Additional 10 Million Shekels To Build Offices for Government Officials in the Capital"]

[Text] The treasury has recently decided to spend 10 million shekels beyond the budget allocation to build offices for government officials in Jerusalem. This was approved by the Knesset Finance Committee in the midst of the deliberations on cuts in the government's budget.

Among other things, this involves an expenditure in excess of the estimated 2.8 million shekels for the office building in al-Shaykh Jarrah designated for the prime minister's office. It now appears that the construction of this building will cost 16.8 million shekels and not 14 million shekels, as called for by the original plan. Also, further expenditure involving several million shekels will be necessary in order to rent an office building on Mamila Road from the "Karta" company and renovate it for the office units to be transferred to Jerusalem. It is not known which units are in question.

The following are the special extra expenses recently approved by the Knesset Finance Committee at the request of the treasury:

--A dormitory in Bet Al: Private individuals have been building a 20-room dormitory in Bet Al near the Hesder Yeshiva there. The dormitory will cost 2 million shekels, or 100,000 shekels per room. This is heavy expenditure given current market prices. Treasury Director General Ya'aqov Ne'eman personally approved a government allotment of 500,000 shekels to finance part of the construction work. (This he did jointly with the Construction Ministry's director of the rural building and new settlements department.) The rest of the money will be raised by donors in Israel and abroad. The Finance Committee was not told why the construction work is so expensive.

--Commemorating [Irgun leader turned communist] Moshe Sne: On 4 November 1979, a few days before he resigned from the treasury, Simha Ehrlich approved a government allocation of 5 million shekels for the establishment of a fund to commemorate Moshe Sne. Contrary to this pledge, the funds for this were not included in the state budget as presented to the Knesset. Now the treasury is

asking the Knesset committee to approve the transfer of half the sum, or 250,000 shekels. The nature of the commemoration fund, the name of its director or that of the person who would be responsible for the money were not provided.

--The Sede Boqer College: The college encountered a deficit because the Ben-Gurion University at Beersheba did not fulfill its promise to transfer 660,000 shekels to finance the college's Negev Studies Institution. The college approached the treasury with a request for aid and the Finance Ministry agreed to provide it with all the necessary funds.

--Fencing at Qalandiyah: Stones have been thrown at cars driving along the road near the Qalandiyah School. It was therefore decided to build a fence to prevent disturbances. How much erection of the fence will cost is not known, but the coordinator of activities in the territories is known to have allocated 25,000 shekels toward it.

--Patrols in the territories: It was decided to set up a patrol comprising three supervising teams--six people altogether--to guard state land in Judaea, Samaria and Gaza since there was constant penetration into those plots for the purpose of cultivation and residence [by Arabs and Bedouin]. The establishment of the patrol will cost 400,000 shekels annually, but this includes its communication equipment costs.

--Savings in the police force: Now that al-'Arish has been returned to Egypt, police activity in northern Sinai has been limited. It was subsequently decided to freeze 15 Israeli positions and 62 local positions. The 1.3 million shekels that have been saved will be kept in reserve. This sum may, in the future, be returned to the police budget.

CSO: 4805

CABINET DECLARES 14 PALESTINIAN ORGANIZATIONS TERRORIST

TA131033 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 13 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] The cabinet decided yesterday to declare that 14 Palestinian organizations are terrorist organizations, as required in accordance with the amendment to the Order for the Prevention of Terror. The declaration is intended to determine which are the organizations in which membership is a crime.

Justice Minister Moshe Nisim, who brought the list of the organizations to the cabinet for approval, said that the cabinet declaration applied to these organizations, their branches and their affiliations, even if they are known by other names. The list of organizations was prepared by the government's legal adviser, Prof Yitzhaq Zamir.

The organizations declared to be terrorist organizations yesterday are as follows:

The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian Rejectionist Front, the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA), the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (FATAH), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (the Front, Chabash), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (Hawatimah), the Pioneers of the Popular Liberation War (As-Sa'iqah), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (the General Headquarters), the Arab Liberation Front, the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, the Palestinian Liberation Front, the Abu Nidal branch, known as the "Liberation Doves," the (Wadi') Haddad branch, known as the "Arab Organization of 15 May" and the branch of Naji (La'alush) known as the "Arab Popular Liberation Movement."

CSO: 4805

DISPUTE OVER DEFENSE BUDGET UPDATED

TA071441 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 7 Oct 80 p 1

[Report by military correspondent Ze'ev Schiff: "New Dispute Over Updating of the Defense Budget: Defense Ministry Demands 5 Billion Shekels, the Treasury Is Willing To Allocate Only 3 Billion"]

[Text] A new dispute over the defense budget occurred recently after the Defense Ministry demanded an additional 5 billion shekels from the treasury to compensate for this year's price hikes. The treasury recognizes in principle the demand for covering the price hikes but argues that the Defense Ministry is demanding some 10 billion Israeli pounds [as published] beyond the estimate, and this may cause the economy to once again enter an inflationary spiral.

When the 1980 defense budget was determined, the Defense Ministry and the Finance Ministry agreed on an arrangement according to which the IDF and the defense system would be compensated for the rising prices in the economy. According to the agreement, the defense establishment will be compensated during the first 6 months of the year for all the price hikes. It was also decided that compensation for the last 6 months will be for 80 percent of the price hikes. According to Defense Ministry calculations estimating that this year's inflation will reach 137 percent, the ministry demands an additional 5 billion shekels. In addition, the defense establishment is requesting 220 million shekels--which it claims it is entitled to--for the project of IDF deployment in the Negev.

Contrary to this demand, the treasury is offering the defense establishment a sum of 4 billion shekels for the price hikes. The treasury intends to subtract 900 million shekels from this amount that have been cut from the defense budget by a cabinet decision, so that the amount the treasury is willing to allocate to the defense establishment is 3 billion shekels.

As regards the demand to pay 220 million shekels for the Negev deployment project, the treasury officials replied that the project in question has not yet been realized, and they will be willing to discuss this topic only after the IDF starts implementing the project.

CSO: 4805

RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS MINISTER ISSUES STATEMENT

TA082013 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 8 Oct 80

[Excerpts] Religious Affairs Minister Aharon Abu-Hatzera was interrogated today at National Police headquarters for 5 hours. It is not yet clear whether the minister will be summoned for another interrogation. On this, our police reporter Dan Semama:

[Semama] For 5 hours Religious Affairs Minister Aharon Abu-Hatzera was interrogated today in an office at National Police headquarters in Jerusalem. The religious affairs minister arrived in his office about 2 hours ago, and, following a consultation with several of his advisers and with his lawyers, he issued the following statement for publication. I shall now read the statement.

For some months now a campaign has been conducted against me in the media, entirely based on gossip and slanders. This campaign, which is totally unprecedented in the annals of the country, and for which there is no place in enlightened states, included character assassination, deliberate leaks and a witch hunt, nor did any of this fail to omit my friends and the members of my family.

I saw no point in reacting to all the reports in order not to adversely affect the investigation, despite the suffering which was my lot. I have much to say on the manner and content of the investigation and on its character, on being judged before being tried and on the search for libelling state's witnesses at any price. But even now, this is not the time to say everything I have to say on this subject.

After my legal advisers were told that the police wanted to question me as a suspect. [as received] Like any other citizen, the law accords me the right to refuse to reply or respond to the suspicions. But I chose to appear, nonetheless, before the police and to respond to all the accusations. I appeared before a team of police investigators, which included Deputy Commander Binyamin Ziegel, in two meetings which together lasted for 9 hours. I requested and was given details concerning the accusations, and in these meetings I reacted to all the accusations.

During these many hours I gave my version and my explanations for all the accusations raised against me. I also replied to many questions on various and diverse subjects. Following these many hours of interrogation, I informed the interrogators that since we were dealing with questions that contain only gossip, I see no point in the continuation of these talks.

That is all from the Religious Affairs Ministry.

CSO: 4805

COMMENTATOR DISCUSSES GOLAN HEIGHTS ANNEXATION

TA051041 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 Oct 80 p 9

[Article by Dan Margalit: "The Golan Heights Syndrome"]

[Excerpts] Today a new round--perhaps the final, decisive round--opens in the struggle for the application of Israeli law to the Golan Heights. The timing of the meeting in Upper Galilee is not accidental. A week before the opening of the new Knesset session the [Golan Heights] lobby wishes to remind most of the MK's that they signed a petition calling for the annexation of the Golan. They are now being called upon to support by legislation the circulars they signed.

There is a difference between the parliamentary struggle that preceded passage of the Jerusalem Law about 2 months ago and the campaign over the future of the Golan. Jerusalem is focused at the heart of the national consensus. The Golan Heights is a borderline, perhaps even a fringe issue, within the framework of the general agreement. The Jerusalem Law showed that the debate among the Zionist parties was not substantive but centered on matters of formulation and timing. With respect to the Golan Heights, a substantive dispute is possible. No less important is the fact that the struggle over annexation of the heights is getting underway after Israel's experience with the Jerusalem Law. True, if annexation is decided on there will not be 12 embassies pulling out of Majdal Shams; but international activity at the United Nations and in other institutions will be similar to that which accompanied the passage of the Jerusalem Law.

Even the lineup of legal-historical arguments is not identical. Prime Minister Menahem Begin reminded the State Department that it was the United States alone that determined the location of its capital, and the same goes for Israel in Jerusalem. He cannot base himself on this kind of reasoning when what is involved is the unilateral application of Israeli law to a territory like the Golan Heights. The Americans, who unwillingly confirmed Begin's legal argument on Jerusalem, disagree with him when it comes to unilateral annexation.

In certain ways the Golan issue is more interesting than the Jerusalem Law. Internally, it will focus attention on the Alignment faction, because the political forces and the economic interests participating in the current struggle derive their inspiration from political events in the Labor Party and from various sections in the Moshav and Kibbutz movements. The Tehiya movement's Ge'ula Kohen is no longer the "national leader" on the Golan issue, as she was on the Jerusalem Law issue, but only a detonating fuse.

The majority of the Labor Party establishment committed itself to supporting the annexation of the Golan, and all its leaders are bound (imprisoned) to documents confirming this. Now a Labor Party group has arisen that believes there is no need to annex the Golan, but because of previous commitments finds itself unable to contest the issue employing arguments of principle. It must justify its retreat from its original position with the awkward claim that the timing for the Golan's annexation is inconvenient. As party political debates in Israel have demonstrated, the timing argument constitutes a narrow base, which is not always sufficient to curb political initiatives based on popular demands.

The difficulty is that the internal relations in the Labor Party do not allow its MK's to reformulate their stand and to object to the annexation in unison. Shim'on Peres may oppose the Golan's annexation, but will Yitzhaq Rabin, who depends on the support of the Kibbutz Hame'uhad movement? It is precisely the Kibbutz Hame'uhad movement that is conspicuously represented in the agricultural settlement on the Golan. It is clear that if the Golan annexation issue slides into the vale of tears of the Labor Party's internal debate the Alignment faction will not be able to come out against the proposed move, and this may even lead to the opposite result: that both camps will be quick to support the annexation on the assumption that it is popular, and they cannot "allow themselves" to be on the other side.

Clearly, considerable opposition to the annexation is to be expected. The doves will call for the settlement of the Golan, not its annexation. The position of the Druze there is not uniform. It is probable that the Foreign Ministry and other institutions dealing with the problems of the Middle East will seek to take into account Syria's delicate position in its hostility to Iraq and Damascus' indirect influence on the Baghdad-Tehran conflict. The discussions on the Golan's annexation will take place not only in the Knesset's Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, but also in the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, which will gauge the effect of the annexation on the relations developing in the Middle East subsystem in the context of the conflict between Iran and Iraq.

When all is said and done, even those favoring the annexation realize that its implementation at this time is liable to create a new anti-Israel focus of tension, precisely in the midst of the conflict in the Persian Gulf in which Israel has no part.

At this stage the prospects of the opposition to the annexation are unclear. They will apparently depend on the energy and effectiveness involved and on the ability to constantly bring up the results of the Jerusalem Law.

CSO: 4805

'MA'ARIV' ON WEST BANK'S ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

TA051328 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Oct 80 p 15

[Article by 'Amos Levav: "The West Bank: a Taxless Land Bursting With Money"]

[Text] "It is good to be an Arab resident of the West Bank today. They pay (virtually) no taxes and pay no municipal taxes (at all). Every order or law relating to taxes is accompanied here by political calculations," explained military government personnel who are in charge of tax collection in the territories. "The law prevailing in Judaea and Samaria is the Jordanian law, and where taxation is concerned, it is easier."

In the West Bank you will find goods at half price. People will tell you that they pay no taxes, that their businesses are flourishing and they have food in abundance. If you win their confidence they will reveal to you that many stolen goods find their way from inside the green line to the territories, that black capital can easily be exchanged with Nabulus money-changers (who do not balk at trading in stolen gold, either) and that a house can be built on any hill overnight.

About 4 years ago, when VAT was introduced inside the green line, an added customs tax was introduced in the West Bank. More precisely, an attempt was made to introduce it. "International law bans the imposition of taxes in administered territory, but allows the expansion of existing taxes," the military government personnel explained. Therefore, an added customs tax was decided on, but the attempt to impose it on the residents of the territories was accompanied by violent disturbances. The result, the military government personnel admitted, was "minimal application."

The law was applied gradually. First of all its existence was made public. Slowly, the businesses were registered--14,000 all told. Then taxes began to be collected from them according to declarations and calculations. And then came the Camp David peace talks, and the application process was frozen. Today, too, full tax is not collected. "We also have manpower problems," the military government personnel explained and refused to state the number of tax collectors in the territories.

The other two taxes that are "collected" in the territories are income tax and municipal property tax. Income tax is, by Jordanian law, very low. But even this little bit goes virtually uncollected in the territories. The entire income

tax is supposed to be transferred to the military government. Property tax is "collected" by the military government, 90 percent of it going to the municipalities and 10 percent to the military government as administrative fees.

"This system is problematic," the military government personnel reiterated frankly. "The tax rates have hardly been raised, but the main problem is the low motivation of the local clerks to collect taxes for the military government. The local clerks are afraid and are considered by their brethren to be collaborators with the authorities." The tax collectors in the territories are local Arabs. The result: negligible collection. "We are going to have Jews do work in the field also, and not just in administration," the military government personnel promised.

In the past 6 months the tax collectors in the territories have succeeded in collecting 60 percent of the estimate. How much money is involved? What was the estimate? Silence. "Delicate political considerations accompany tax collection in the territories," the military government personnel explained. "It is difficult to check the tax evaders. Declarations of capital may not be demanded in the West Bank, and the vast sums of money flowing in to the West Bank from the United States, South Africa and the Persian Gulf states make any examination of the 'assessees' difficult. Therefore, there are no examinations. The West Bank is bursting with money," the military government officials stressed.

The key question is: What happens to a relatively small place that is "bursting with money"? Does the money flow into Jordan? Into Israel? Or does it perhaps remain in the West Bank?

"We have full control today over the money that comes in via the bridges. There is no emergent tendency of the money being drained from the West Bank into Jordan," the military government personnel asserted.

Nor does the money enter Israel in any significant amount. Thus it remains in the West Bank, awaiting an opportunity to burst out. In the meantime it is waiting, mainly in dollars, gold and Jordanian dinars (the Jordanian dinar, a relatively hard currency, is legal tender in the West Bank). Israeli security men carrying out a search in a poor-looking house in some remote village are often surprised to find tens of thousands of Jordanian dinars inside a door serving its owner as a bedboard. "Hiding dinars in doors is a usual method," said security men.

Once a month the official rate of the dinar in the territories is published (not every day, as is the case inside the green line). The residents of the areas have come to know that their shekels buy fewer dinars at the end of the month. Therefore, when they receive their wages, they rush to the money-changers to exchange their shekels for dinars. "Money-changing is legal in the territories. Therefore, it is flourishing. The money-changers deal also in stolen gold. This is a dark business," said the military government personnel.

The banks in the territories have been closed since the Six-Day War. Although Bank Le'umi and the Israel Discount Bank have opened a few branches, the residents of the territories are afraid to deposit their money in a Jewish bank.

There has recently been an increase in the number of residents of the territories who deposit money in Jewish banks but the number is still negligible.

Finance Ministry officials heard about the "Vaduz Paradise" in the West Bank and held their breath. They knew about the existence of a legal loophole which enabled an Israeli firm to shift its location from Tel Aviv to Nabulus and enjoy extensive tax benefits which are enjoyed by firms in the territories. "Surprisingly, the West Bank did not become Vaduz. Apparently, the place is not safe enough. After all, it is not a country," say the military government officials. In 1978 the loophole was sealed: A law was instituted saying that what applies to an Israeli firm within the bounds of the green line applies also to an Israeli firm in the territories.

But the possibility exists--and there is proof of its application in practice--of "silent partnerships." A wealthy Jewish contractor, investing a vast sum, places it in the hands of an Arab in the territories, who sets up a plant in his name alone. The risk is that the Arab will disappear after the plant's establishment; but a Jew entering into such a deal does not exactly solve his problems in a court of law, as the Arab well knows.

Only 25 percent of the tax potential is collected in the territories, and the military government personnel admit frankly: "There is no strict application of the tax laws in the territories. It is easier to arrest the treasurer of the Tel Aviv municipality than the treasurer of the Nabulus municipality."

The treasury understands the problem and forgoes much money. Experts have calculated that if the treasury were to apply Israeli tax laws in the territories, the collection would decline even more, and possibly nothing at all would be collected. "The collection would cost several times as much as the amount that would be collected," the military government officials say. "This is a storm, but this storm does not affect the country as a whole. If an aquarium in an apartment has storms and waves does that affect the entire apartment?" they ask, and themselves reply with a resounding no.

Nonetheless, the storm in the aquarium is liable to cause damage to the apartment. Water could spill on the carpet and splash on the walls. It is possible that the storm in the "Vaduz of Israel" is not yet being felt but its effect is great and penetrating and the Israeli underworld has discovered the treasure hidden 20 km from Netanya.

CSO: 4805

PUBLIC UNDECIDED ABOUT BEGIN'S STRENGTH

TA060947 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Oct 80 p 3

[Pori public opinion poll: "Forty Percent: Begin Is a Strong Man; 40 Percent: He Is Weak, Gives Way to Pressure"]

[Text] The Israeli public has divided opinions about the personality of Prime Minister Menahem Begin. About 40 percent think that Mr Begin is a strong man who knows how to insist on what he wants and about 40 percent hold views to the contrary, that he is a weak man who gives way easily to pressure. This emerges from a Pori Institute nationwide public opinion poll conducted at the request of HA'ARETZ.

When asked: "What do you think about Prime Minister Menahem Begin: Is he a man who knows how to insist on what he wants when this is necessary, or does he give way easily to pressure?" 41.8 percent said he is a man who knows how to insist on what he wants when this is needed and 40.7 percent replied that he is a man who gives way easily to pressure.

Another 6 percent said this depended on the "situation," the "circumstances" and the "strength of the pressure."

The remaining 11.5 percent said they "did not know" what sort of a man the prime minister is.

An analysis of the findings according to the class of people interviewed proves that it is the younger generation born in Israel or originating in the Asian and African countries who are more prominent among those who think that Mr Begin is a strong man, while it is the older people, those who have lived in Israel since before the state was established and those originating in the countries of Europe and America, who think that Menahem Begin is a weak man who gives way easily to pressure.

The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women interviewed personally throughout the country.

CSO: 4805

POLLS SHOW MORE CITIZENS BELIEVE GOVERNMENT SHOULD RESIGN

TA031731 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Oct 80 p 18

[Fifth in a series of pollster Hanokh Smith's "Election Forecasts": "The Number of Persons Who Believe the Government Should Resign Has Increased"]

[Text] As the public opinion polls of the Smith Research Center published in the four preceding articles indicate, the public has expressed increasing dissatisfaction with the functioning of the government.

In the period between May 1979 and September 1980 the Alignment's support has increased considerably compared with the Likud. Among Jewish voters the Alignment leads with 40 percent, compared with 18 percent given to the Likud, while among the public at large 37 percent prefer the Alignment, compared with 15 percent for the Likud. Throughout this time the number of voters who have not decided, however, is still 15 to 20 percent of the total and this remains the decisive vote. The percentage of persons who believe Prime Minister Begin fulfills his duties well has also dropped over this period, from 59 percent in May 1979 to 40 percent in February-March 1980. In our latest poll in August-September Begin's popularity slightly rose to 41 percent.

Still, the dissatisfaction is more profound than that reflected in these public opinion polls. While in our latest poll 30 percent said they would vote for a coalition party (the Likud or the National Religious Party), only 17 percent maintained that the government was functioning well at all or rather well. This means that the voters who will vote for a coalition party will do so notwithstanding the fact that they believe the government is not successful. This fact, combined with the high percentage of voters who remain undecided, obliges us to examine further questions.

In view of the relative dissatisfaction with the government's functioning, a question is asked: How is this fact reflected in terms of the voters' will to replace the government?

The data providing an adequate answer to this question are those referring to the public's willingness to continue with this government or wishing for its resignation. In the past three polls a question was asked: "Do you believe that in view of the recent developments the government should resign or continue in its office?" Three alternatives were suggested: The government should continue until the next elections: the government should continue but more ministers

should be replaced; or the government should continue but more ministers should be replaced; or the government should resign. Here are the results of these polls:

Should the government continue or resign? [figures in percentages]

Date of poll	Government should continue as it is	Government should continue but some ministers be replaced	Government should resign	No opinion
September 1979	28	31	34	7
February-March 1980	28	31	34	7
August-September 1980	30	17	48	5

In the light of the other findings, these results seem somewhat surprising. This is not a typing error. The polls of September 1979 and of February-March 1980 show identical results and they show clearly that to a certain extent the public is not inclined to replace his current government. In spite of the fact that only one voter out of four in the September 1979 poll and only one voter out of five in the February-March 1980 poll thought that the government was successful or rather successful, only just over one-third of all the voters in the polls thought that the government should resign. Almost as many among the voters thought the best solution would be replacing several ministers in the existing government.

What is the cause of this trend among the voters? If the government is functioning so badly why, at least, do people not want to replace it?

A partial answer to this seeming contradiction in the national Israeli political character could be accounted for by the voters' conservatism. We have a long tradition of stable governments. We may like it. Though the political structure resembles that of Italy, where cabinets fall at the rate of one a year, we may actually prefer the U.S. system in which administrations are replaced at predetermined dates.

The data may also point to another eventuality. The Likud has in fact more support than meets the eye, and many of its supporters in 1977, though disappointed with its functioning so far, still hope things may improve. However, this explanation may account for just a small fraction of the vast discrepancy between the public's dissatisfaction and the wish for the government to resign.

The explanation is largely due--and we have no means of weighing the alternative causes--to the unwillingness of the voters to support existing alternative parties. Regarding the small existing parties there is a clear evidence of that: In spite of the present degree of dissatisfaction with the cabinet, none of the small parties attracts more than 2 to 3 percent at the most and some do not even attract the minimum of 1 percent required for the representation in the Knesset. A good case in point is Professor Yadin's party, the Democratic Movement for Change: At this point in time the voters opted not to see it as an alternative.

There is an obvious trend to see the Alignment as the only feasible alternative. It appears, however, that the main reason for this moving toward the Alignment, is the opposition to the existing government, not the attractiveness of the alternative. As pointed out in the second article in this series, this is normal reaction in years in which elections are not held. The opposition enjoys the mistakes made by existing government without having to be very active in enlisting support.

Yet the polls in September 1979 and February-March 1980 showed that a considerable number of the new supporters of the Alignment at that time did not then want to bring down the existing Likud government.

In the recent poll however, a sharp change on this issue is seen. All of a sudden there has been a tilt when 14 percent of the voters who considered the change of ministers as a solution, moved over to the camp of those who think the government should resign. At present, about half of the total number of voters want the government to resign. The alternative that the Alignment is representing has not only more votes but has more persuasiveness as well.

It is obvious that something has changed and it is worthwhile to examine, according to the data emerging from the Smith Research Center, what could have produced such a change now that we are entering an election year. Many variables that have not been examined in public opinion polls may account for the change in attitudes. One thing is clear and simple: We all know that we are entering an election year and it is too late now to solve fundamental problems by replacing more ministers. It may be better to replace the entire government.

Yet the data indicate that there may be some other explanations. The most important data refer to the assessment of the government success in foreign affairs. From the February-March poll to the August-September poll of the current year, there has been a decline in the percentage of those who thought that the government was successful or largely successful in foreign affairs from 31 percent to 20 percent (compared to 59 percent in May 1979). Although Prime Minister Begin has not sustained a loss in his personal popularity as prime minister other data have indicated that only 16 percent of the total number of voters agreed with the prime minister on foreign affairs; there were more voters who agreed with Dayan, and almost an identical number agreed with Weizman, Eban and Rabin. Only 20 percent thought that the new foreign minister, Yitzhaq Shamir, was doing a good job. Another major event that occurred in the period under review was the approval of the Jerusalem Law. Some of the reactions to this law, including the transfer of embassies to Tel Aviv, occurred during the period when that poll was conducted. The reaction of the respondents to these events was twofold. On the one hand there was an angry reaction of the public, and as a result a toughening of the positions regarding a settlement in the territories and a closing of ranks of the prime minister's faithful supporters. On the other hand there was a reaction against the government that was considered to be responsible for what appeared to be a worsening of Israel's international position. The result was that many of those who formerly considered the replacement of ministers as a possible solution, went over to the camp of those who wished the government to resign.

But there is another aspect to the situation, namely, the socioeconomic aspect. The percentage of those who thought that Yiga'el Hurvitz will succeed or partly succeed in his plan for curbing inflation and for the recovery of the economy, has dropped by 15 percent in the period between the two polls from 50 to 35 percent. The personal popularity of Hurvitz and of Minister David Levi, who is active in the same fields, has also dropped considerably. Part of this public may have reached the conclusion that Hurvitz' chances of success were nil.

Two major changes in public opinion regarding the evaluation of the government's success, as measured in these two polls, the decline in the percentage of people who think that Israel's foreign affairs policy is successful and that Hurvitz' economic policy is effective, should be seen as compatible with the increase in the number of persons who want the government to resign.

Whatever the complete explanation, there is still a discrepancy between those who believe the government's work has been unsatisfactory and those who want the government to resign, a feeling prevalent among many voters who are undecided, and among other voters.

How does the picture appear as presented in this series of articles, as we enter an election year? Do these polls indicate what could happen during the election year?

The polls show us what the opening positions would be, and a little more than that. The Likud popularity has declined as well as the popularity of its ministers. But this party is still holding power and Prime Minister Begin is still enjoying considerable personal support. This fact gives the government a chance to try and reverse the trend. It may be a very difficult task but it is not impossible.

Notwithstanding its large lead the Alignment is encountering difficulties as well: 1) Because it is in the opposition it is unable to control events, and 2) it has to begin attracting new supporters by positive actions, plans and personalities. Many persons among these new supporters have given the Alignment their provisional support mainly as a reaction to their disappointment with the existing government. Unless it significantly increases its attractiveness, the Alignment will find it difficult to continue enjoying its present rate of support or attract voters from the large group of voters who are undecided.

The religious parties have the most constant success. The voting for these parties seems to remain stable, irrespective of the political climate.

Little change is expected in the voting for the religious parties, which was an average 14 percent in the nine Knesset elections. These parties encounter new difficulties as well, particularly those stemming from the Abu-Hatzera affair. It seems however, that their position was less undermined by the recent events.

The small parties are facing a difficult situation. Those represented in the Knesset will continue to exist but the obtaining of more extensive support will not occur. The promise of "the new look" in Israeli politics that the Democratic Movement for Change held up proved to be nothing but sand in the wind. The

scattered remnants of Yadin's movement do not have even one seat in the Knesset, according to public opinion polls. The "inheritance" of the Democratic Movement for Change was that the voters are very careful now in supporting new parties. A new party, if it wishes to be successful, will have to work much harder than just to present new faces, or old faces in different locations.

Finally, there are the undecided voters, whose proportion of the total remained throughout the year at almost one out of four. In the recent elections many voted for the Likud; others, who represent a factor that does not wish to vote for the Alignment now, voted for the Democratic Movement for Change. A smaller number of undecided voters came from among religious parties, the small parties or are new voters. There are even people who voted for the Alignment in 1977 who have not decided how to vote as yet because of the internal conflicts in the party.

This group will determine more than any other the final results. It may turn the 1981 election into a close run or give the Alignment a smashing victory. It may also develop new parties, which will serve to tip the scales one way or another. Persons who believe the 1981 election has already been decided are deluding themselves.

CSO: 4805

'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTS ON ATTEMPT TO MUZZLE IDF GENERALS

TA061101 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 6 Oct 80 p 9

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "Who's Afraid of an Argument About the IDF"]

[Text] Anyone juxtaposing the verbal barrage from some of our ministers and leaders with the criticism by one of the IDF's most important generals, Dan Shomron, of the size of the standing army and the inflated dimensions of the general staff and how the defense budget is being used is making his work easier if he does not understand the substance of what is going on. Although these may appear to be similar, this is not the case. The leadership's verbosity is not new. It typifies the current administration. But its predecessor was also not notable for reticence. It is sufficient to remember the wave of criticism leveled at former Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin, following an interview in HA'ARETZ about the interim agreement he signed with Egypt, as being intended to lead to a split between Syria and Egypt; incidentally, a move proved to be correct. Begin loves telling about Israel's aid to minorities and the underground links we have maintained with these bodies. He also made public details of the dimensions of the aid we are giving the Lebanese Christians. He is not the only one doing this. Was it not former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan who disclosed--without having coordinated this with the prime minister--that we were supplying the Ethiopian Army with bombs? (And it was immediately after this that the Israeli delegation was expelled from that country.) In the same way, Begin has now revealed the matter of the aid given at one time to the Kurds. I do not think Begin said this on the spur of the moment. A proof of this is the fact that foreign correspondents and television crews were also invited to the tour of the educational institution [where the remark was made]. This was intentional; it is only a pity that practically nothing was said about the educational activities in the IDF.

If the disclosure of the aid to the Kurds and the Christians can be explained as being a single trend, it is hard to understand the contradiction between the various statements about Iraq's nuclear reactor. At one time Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori came out with an inflated declaration that Israel would do all it could to stop Iraq from implementing its intentions in this field and, if political moves would not help, we would consider other ones. Begin did not like this statement and even commented on this to Tzipori. There was silence for several months until the Iran-Iraq war broke out. In the course of the fighting there was an attempt to hit the reactor from the air and it was only natural that after such statements there would be those who would try to hint that Israel had had a hand in the affair.

The fact that the chief of the intelligence branch, Maj Gen Yehoshu'a Sagi, invited the Iranians three times to hit the Iraqi reactor did not detract from the suspicion and perhaps even reinforced it. But a completely contradictory Israeli statement followed the accusation against us. That is a libel!--official spokesmen said, including Deputy Minister Tzipori. They almost added, a blood libel. It may be that Israel's spokesmen do not understand what they say--even in Hebrew!--but, in any event, the meaning is that a strike at Iraq's nuclear reactor is inconceivable, it is not nice.... It will be interesting to see what they are going to say now, after Iraq's official paper has written that the reactor is in fact aimed against Israel, not Iran.

To combine these statements with the important argument over the future of the IDF and what our army will look like in the 1980's is an insult to logic. Unfounded things have been said about the circumstances of the interview with Maj Gen Dan Shomron, but before we deal with them, I would like to recall a period when the IDF was considered to be a "sacred cow" and it was forbidden to even argue about what was going on in it.

After the Yom Kippur War, Israel was washed by a wave of criticism of the various blunders and the way in which various negative phenomena developed. Criticism was leveled at the military censorship which had not permitted things to be published; at the press for not having been courageous enough to violate the censor's orders and let things out; at former, regular and reserve army personnel for not having told, not having raised doubts and not having argued about why we did not know in advance. Why was there no argument about vital security issues, as there is about political and economic ones? (By the way, in these fields, where there is not censorship, I did not, for example, read anything about the expected oil embargo or Israel's expected political downfall in Africa and elsewhere.) It was claimed that the public needed to know about the argument over the Bar-Lev line and the defense of Sinai. The public certainly needed to know more about the state of the emergency depots, for example, or the level of supervision and strategic-political issues. The opinion was that in the future the IDF was not to be allowed to be treated as a sacred cow and there were even proposals to cancel military censorship altogether. These voices were raised again after the Litani campaign.

However, it transpires that many people prefer to deal in slander and gossip about the IDF, to quote something they heard from a son in the army or a friend on reserve duty, but not to check the sources. Many people do not want an argument about the IDF and prefer not to deal with substantive security issues. They feel these things should be dealt with in inner sanctums. The Yom Kippur War and its circumstances have been forgotten. The military censorship is generally more liberal and open than it was in the past, but there is almost no argument. We are standing at the beginning of a nuclear era in the Middle East, but even on this fateful topic, argument is marginal and restricted.

There is no better example of this than how the defense budget was dealt with. Despite Israel's sorry economic situation and the fact that the defense budget is Israel's heaviest burden, the sides did not succeed in conducting an efficient argument about the IDF's structure and the security views dictating our large outlays. Even a provocative comment by Minister Sharon that the defense budget

could be cut by 20 billion Israeli pounds was left without a genuine answer. To this day the treasury claims that it does not know from where the IDF intends to cut the 9 billion decided upon and that it is not true that the standing army will be cut, it will be increased by thousands of men. Instead of an argument, we have heard from the chief of staff and other generals that before arguing about the defense budget it would be preferable for the country's captains to tidy up their own homes as to the way they conduct the economy.

It is clear that the longer the argument is postponed, the more pointed and painful it will be. Because of this I found it very important that an IDF general was prepared to speak about the process of making decisions connected with enormous expenditures (the Lavi plan), the size of the standing army and the number of officers in the IDF. It is not the professional details of the ground forces headquarters that are important, but comments about the danger to our will to fight and the fact that we should know details about what use is being made of the enormous funds the state is putting at the disposal of the defense budget. This is also important because the remarks represent a sort of platform of a general who is one of the candidates for the post of chief of staff and it is good to know that there are different approaches and proposals in these vital fields. From this viewpoint, the interview with Major General Shomron was a welcome precedent and the same thing applies even if another paper, not HA'ARETZ, had aired his remarks. Dan Shomron did not speak about political issues, nor was he interviewed without permission. In the interview with him, he dealt with professional, security issues.

For reasons best known to themselves an IDF decision was made to permit several army generals to be interviewed before the holiday. This is not a new phenomenon. Generals have also been interviewed in the past, although this was generally done in groups and all at one time. It seems to me that proposals to interview seven or eight generals were submitted to the defense minister's office, but the minister only approved four of them (the interview with the chief of intelligence is an affair on its own). My request to meet with Major General Shomron for a short background talk was coincidentally incorporated into this program, without my knowing about the other interviews. Anyong who thought he would hold a discussion about marches and acts of valor, or the Entebbe campaign, was either naive or lacking in professional knowledge.

It was not an underground interview. It was not to be compared with interviews granted by generals after the Yom Kippur War to foreign and Israeli correspondents without permission (some of whom were later rebuked). The interview with Major General Shomron was approved by the IDF spokesman, the chief of staff and the prime minister and defense minister. Furthermore, a representative of the IDF spokesman was present at the interview. It was recorded and the transcript was given to the IDF; and I happen to know that it found its way to either the chief of staff or his deputy.

The article was passed on to the military censor, as the law requires. The censor made five or six corrections to it. Other than one erasure about which I have doubts, the censor was correct in all the other security erasures; and the censor does not normally have scruples about erasing. In other words, those at the top echelons of the security establishment who are involved in this were

not surprised by Shomron's remarks as published in HA'ARETZ; therefore the prime minister's and defense minister's surprise at statements made by IDF generals is amazing. This surprise, if it really is his and not that of his aides, only proves either a blockage in the establishment or a lack of control. Basically, Major General Shomron's remarks are a contribution to and a positive precedent for a genuine argument about issues essential to our very being. They represent an opening for the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee to hold a more thorough debate on vital issues in its field.

CSO: 4805

PLAN SUBMITTED TO STRENGTHEN GREEN LINE SETTLEMENTS

TA090853 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Oct 80 p 4

[Unattributed report: "New Plan Submitted for Beefing Up Settlements Along Green Line"]

[Text] A new settlement plan, designed mainly to strengthen and beef up the green line, was submitted by the director of the Jewish Agency's Land Settlement Department, Prof Ra'anan Weitz, in a discussion held yesterday by the department's directorate.

According to Professor Weitz, the new plan is designed to posit a new challenge to the Jewish Agency, as he did when he put forward the plan for the Galilee lookouts about 3 years ago. In line with its experience, the Jewish Agency will be able to meet the new challenge if it mobilizes for it--as it did in the establishment of stage 1 of the lookouts.

Drawn up by the department's deputy director, Mr Me'ir Shamir, and by the Land Settlement Department's regional directors, the new plan deals with filling in the settlement gaps along the entire length of the green line, from Galilee in the north to the slopes of the Hebron hills and the Negev in the south.

According to the plan, 21 new lookouts will be set up in Galilee and along the northern part of the green line. Two lookouts will go up in the central region, and 10 additional settlements on the slopes of the Hebron hills and in the Negev.

At the meeting it was decided to commence the planning stages in line with the principles of regional planning. Also at the meeting, Professor Weitz announced the crystallization of another plan for the continued development and strengthening of the lookouts which the Jewish Agency has already set up in Galilee.

CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS PUBLIC DISSATISFIED WITH HURVITZ

TA081133 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Oct 80 p 3

[Pori public opinion poll: "There Are 28.4 Percent Who Are Satisfied With Hurvitz and 44.8 Percent Who Are Dissatisfied"]

[Text] Finance Minister Yiga'el Hurvitz' popularity remained stable in September. At present 28.4 percent are satisfied with him as minister of finance, compared with 44.8 percent who are dissatisfied. This emerges from the Pori Institute nationwide public opinion poll conducted at the request of HA'ARETZ.

It is true that the percentage of those satisfied with Mr Hurvitz did drop by 2.4 percent (from 30.8 percent in August to a current 28.4 percent) but the percentage of those who are dissatisfied with Mr Hurvitz also dropped by 2.5 percent (from 47.3 percent in August to a current 44.8 percent).

In contrast to this, the percentage of those who are not sure what they think about the finance minister have increased (from 15.9 percent in August to a current 19.1 percent).

It should be noted that the figures for those who are satisfied with Mr Hurvitz are almost as high among people with higher education, people with academic and administrative professions and the higher income brackets as they are for those who are dissatisfied with him.

The finance minister's highest popularity is among people in the high-income brackets (37.2 percent) and highly educated people (37 percent).

The finance minister's lowest popularity is among people with low educational standards (50.6 percent) and the low-income brackets (49.7 percent).

The poll covered a representative section of 1,200 men and women who were given private interviews in their homes throughout the country.

CSO: 4805

BEGIN CONSIDERS FIGHT AGAINST ARAB TAKEOVERS OF WESTERN FIRMS

TA051202 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5 Oct 80 p 1

[Economic correspondent report: "Begin To Initiate Political Activity Against Arab Takeover of Western Financial Firms"]

[Text] Prime Minister Menahem Begin will hold consultations with Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir to decide on possible political activity in view of the danger of the Arabs taking over financial firms in the West. Israeli ambassadors in various capitals may be employed to acquaint governments and public opinion with the danger expected to the free world. This was stated by Prime Minister Begin in a letter he sent to Knesset Economic Committee Chairman Gad Ya'aqobi.

MK Ya'aqobi recently sent a message to the prime minister in which he warned against the gradual takeover by Arab governments and companies of well-known firms in Western countries. Among other steps, the Arabs have acquired 10 percent of the stock of Volkswagen's daughter-company in Brazil; the Kuwaiti Government has acquired from a Swiss metals firm in Zurich 10 percent of the stock in the well-known German firm (Metallschaft); Kuwait is now completing the purchase of the fifth largest bank in Arizona for $40 million.

MK Ya'aqobi noted that through these takeovers, the Arab states' influence would grow over the West's foreign policy and its economic calculations. Grave security dangers are also involved, since some of these firms and plants are engaged in manufacturing for the Western countries' defense systems. He suggested that Israel expose this process in the international arena and augment Western awareness of its ramifications and perils.

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

WEST BANK EXPORT LICENSES--Jordan has made another move to strengthen its status in Judaea and Samaria, obliging all farmers and agriculturalists in the region to obtain export licenses only from its agricultural associations. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari said this will strengthen these associations in contrast with the pro-PLO municipalities since they will thus gain control over agricultural produce marketing in the Arab countries. Our correspondent said this move has also directly affected the chambers of commerce, which used to approve the export licenses. The heads of the chambers of commerce are supposed to meet in East Jerusalem today to discuss the matter. [Text] [TA021139 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 2 Oct 80]

COAL SUPPLY AGREEMENT--The managing director of the Israeli Electricity Company, Yosef Tulipman, has signed an agreement in the United States for the supply of 1 million tons of coal a year for 30 years to the Israeli Electricity Company. This agreement supplements earlier accords, signed with firms in Australia and South Africa for the supply of 2.3 million tons of coal a year for 30 years. All the contracts contain options for increasing the amount of coal, should the Israeli Electricity Company so desire. [TA082120 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 8 Oct 80 p 5 TA]

TOURISM INCREASE--In September 1980, 99,000 tourists entered Israel, an increase of 9 percent over the same period last year. These statistics, which were released by the Central Bureau of Statistics, do not include visitors from Lebanon. In the first 9 months of 1980, about 919,000 tourists entered Israel, an increase of 6 percent over the same period last year. [TA082120 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 8 Oct 80 p 3 TA]

DEAD SEA SOLAR POOLS--The Energy Ministry has signed an agreement with the (Solmat) Company, a subsidiary of the (Ormat Turbines) Company on building solar pools for producing electricity along the Dead Sea coast. The project involves some $20 million and will be implemented between 1980 and 1983. The government decided to sign that agreement today rather than wait for reports on foreign investment in the project because of its significance. In the first stage, the pools will operate a 5-megawatt turbine and the idea is to later produce 20 megawatts of electricity. The plant will be incorporated in the sea-to-sea project, which is in the planning stages. The spokesman for the Energy Ministry reported that many investors, including the U.S. Energy Administration, have expressed interest in financing the project. This is currently the Energy Ministry's largest development project. [TA112045 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 10 Oct 80 TA]

REAL WAGES DOWN--In the first half of the year there was a significant decline in real wages. This emerges from a survey conducted by the Manpower Planning Authority in the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. According to this data, the average monthly salary for wage-earners was 2,030 shekels for the January-May period, a rise of 102 percent over the same period last year. However, the consumer price index rose during that same period by 112 percent, so that real wages in fact decreased. [TA112045 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 10 Oct 80 p 2 TA]

ARAB UNEMPLOYMENT--No change has been marked in the September employment statistics for employees from the territories working in Israel through the employment service offices. They numbered 43,957 as against 44,255 in August--a decline of 298--even though September was the month of the Jewish holidays and as a result the demand for labor decreased by 2,107. Of all the employees, 14,578 worked in the construction field, 17,286 in the industry, 7,769 in services and 4,324 in agriculture. Of them, 2,089 were women. [TA112045 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1745 GMT 11 Oct 80 TA]

FOOD PRICE INCREASE DECISION--The economic minicabinet decided to raise the prices of several foodstuffs whose prices are government-controlled, such as frozen beef, milk and dairy products and eggs. On the other hand, it was decided today not to raise the prices of subsidized foodstuffs such as bread, flour, cooking oil, frozen poultry as well as public transportation fares. The decision not to raise these commodities' prices was made because of a confrontation between Finance Minister Yiga'el Hurvitz and Housing and Construction Minister David Levi. At the prime minister's suggestion, the decision on these goods was transferred to the entire cabinet plenum for decision. At the end of the session, the finance minister said he would continue to fight for the principle of not subsidizing goods. He said that anyone who believes that inflation can be controlled by subsidizing commodities is wrong because ultimately the results are the same. He added that he is determined to operate within the confines of the state budget. Minister David Levi said that the treasury's policy of initiating price hikes has been proven sterile and added he would request a thorough cabinet debate on this policy. He welcomed the decision to postpone the decision to raise the prices of subsidized foodstuffs. [Text] [TA131031 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 13 Oct 80]

NO W. BANK LAND SHORTAGE--There is no shortage of land for the expansion of most settlements in Judaea and Samaria. This emerges from a comprehensive land survey recently compiled by the Defense Ministry. There is a particularly difficult land problem in the 'Ofra and Qedummim settlements. Our correspondent Yig'al Goren has learned that the government has purchased vast tracts of land in Judaea and Samaria in the last few weeks. These lands will be put at the disposal of the settlements. Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori toured the settlements today. He told our correspondent that no Israeli government would in the future be able to ignore the significant fait accomplis established by this government throughout Judaea and Samaria. [Text] [TA132112 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 13 Oct 80]

RIFT VALLEY SETTLEMENT LAND--For the first time since the beginning of Israeli settlement in the Jordan Rift Valley, the military government is now permitting the Rift Valley settlers to cultivate land on the bank of the Jordan River, on the eastern side of what is called the system fence [Gader Hama'arekhet]. This new development now gives the Jordan Rift Valley settlers a chance to expand their land reserves. Our settlement affairs correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh says that up to now the IDF has banned visitors from entering territory beyond the system fence. [Ben-Melekh] Now, too, the IDF is restricting entry to this closed area in several security zones; however, for the first time since the Six-Day War, it has placed a large tract of land between 1,000 and 2,000 dunams at the settlers' disposal. This is a tract close to the Jordan River, in the eastern sector of the Jordan Rift Valley facing the Moshavim (Fatza'el) and Tomer. Teams from the military government and the Ministry of Justice have been examining the question of the ownership of the lands over the last year and they have decided that the entire 1,200 dunams belong to the state. [Excerpt] [TA140649 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 14 Oct 80]

NO CUTS IN IDF TRAINING--The chief of staff has issued orders not to cut the IDF training program under any circumstances, even with defense budget cuts. He has only allowed cuts in the equipment acquisition and research budgets. This was reported today by the chief of staff's financial adviser to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. The adviser has turned down the Bank of Israel governor's arguments that there was no real cut in the defense budget. According to the adviser there has been a 5 percent cut. The chief of the planning branch in the general staff reported to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee about details of how the IDF would be deployed in the framework of autonomy. [Text] [TA141856 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 14 Oct 80]

COST OF LIVING UP--The consumer price index rose last month by 7.3 percent. The increase in the index reflects price rises in all the consumer groups, especially food, education, transportation and postal services. In the first 9 months of the year the index has risen by 81 percent. The Finance Ministry explains that the source of the high increase in the index lies in a strengthening of demand pressures in the economy. These pressures were generated because of surplus money held by the public. The treasury spokesman holds that the cuts made in the state budget are insufficient. In another 5 days the finance minister is to submit to the Knesset the budget proposal for the second half of the fiscal year. [Text] [TA151525 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 15 Oct 80]

130 PERCENT INFLATION RATE--The consumer price index published yesterday was 7.3 percent, and Finance Minister Yiga'el Hurvitz believes that only with the help of next year's budget can any change be effected in the economy's negative trend, as reflected in the index. The Finance Ministry has accepted the fact that the price rises this year will total 125 to 130 percent. One day after publication of the index: A report by Gid'on Zelinger. [Begin recording] Yiga'el Hurvitz admitted that the inflation rate this year would be 125 to 130 percent. This fact cannot be changed in the remaining half of the fiscal year. The treasury believes that an atmosphere of collapse must be prevented now and that preparations must be made for the next fiscal year, which begins in April. This year was a particularly unsuccessful year of containment, but the treasury hopes to change this trend next year. Such a change is liable to cost the public dearly, but the

treasury believes, as does the finance minister, that it is preferable to make things difficult than to bribe the electorate, especially since the treasury is empty. Yesterday Finance Minister Hurvitz warned Shim'on Peres and David Levi in the same breath against election bribery. This is also the reason that the finance minister will insist on implementation of the approved budget and will oppose a general sale of reduced goods. He and his staff believe that the existing compensation apparatus is sufficiently sophisticated to answer to the genuine needs of the underprivileged. The finance minister's wars have not ended. [end recording] [Excerpts] [TA160755 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 16 Oct 80]

COPPER MINING RESUMPTION--Mining has been resumed at the Timna' Copper Mines north of Elat after an interval of several years. The concession has been given to a British firm which is employing 300 Israeli workers, mostly former employees of the Timna' mines. The British company intends to take advantage of the rise of copper prices in the world and is hoping next year for exports of $15 million. [TA172110 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 17 Oct 80 TA]

GAZA MAYOR TO PUBLISH PAPER--Gaza Mayor Rashad al-Shawwa intends to publish a daily paper with the approval of the military government. This will be the first daily paper published in the Gaza Strip. The name approved for the paper is (AL-HODA) which means the guidance in Hebrew. Al-Shawwa has already purchased modern, improved printing equipment for the establishment of an independent printing house--an investment of about $3 million. This includes the latest photo and offset printing machines. This will be one of the largest and most modern types of printing press in the Middle East. The military government has not yet given its approval for the printing press to be set to work. Al-Shawwa submitted his request to publish a paper to the previous defense minister, 'Ezer Weizman, when the latter was visiting the Gaza Strip. His request was discussed and approved by all those involved in the matter. The assessment by military government elements is that although al-Shawwa superficially shows relatively moderate positions in comparison with other Palestinian leaders, he is close to the PLO "and no less dangerous than others." [Eli Tabor] [Text] [TA171417 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 17 Oct 80 p 1]

FACILITY FOR AIRCRAFT ENGINES--A new production line for the overhaul of F-15 and F-16 engine blades will be inaugurated at the Turbochrome plant near Lod on 19 October. Thus the plant will be able to service the blades of all the Israeli air force and civil aviation craft. The plant is owned by a U.S. businessman. Turbochrome is a subsidiary of the U.S. company called (Chromalloy) which recently purchased the Israeli Government's shares in the plant and funneled another $1 million for advanced technology. [TA190549 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1830 GMT 18 Oct 80 TA]

JORDAN PLANNING NEW TOWN IN SAMARIA--Jordan is planning the establishment of a new town near 'Anabta in Samaria which will include 365 housing units, a mosque and public buildings. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari points out that this will be the first Arab settlement to be established in the West Bank since the Six-Day War. The town will supposedly be erected by the Construction Association of Tulkarm Civil Servants. The association has already discussed the issue with the military government. However, no specific plan has yet been devised. Our

correspondent points out that another construction association in the West Bank wants to build a new community on land belonging to the village of Rujayb near Nabulus. The community would be located on the former site of the settlement of Elon More which was evacuated in the wake of the ruling by the High Court of Justice. [Text] [TA180825 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 18 Oct 80]

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL FAVORED--Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori said that he supports the establishment of a national security council which would hold deliberations on matters pertaining to the IDF--its organization and ways of operation. Mordekhay Tzipori reiterated his belief in the necessity of establishing the ground forces command within the framework of the reorganization of the IDF. As for the IDF operation in Lebanon, he said there is no chance that quiet would prevail in that region in the near future. Some 15,000 terrorists can be found there whose aim is to kill Jews. There is no government in Lebanon that can enforce order and therefore Israel has to do it. Regarding the possibility that 'Ezer Weizman would return to the Likud leadership, Tzipori said that it has already happened that disputes were settled in political life and subsequently Weizman's return is possible. [Text] [TA181726 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 18 Oct 80]

PRIVATE CONSUMPTION--The private consumption per capita in fixed prices has gone up by 2 percent in the second quarter of 1980. Private consumption in the first half of 1980 was lower by 9 percent per capita than the rate for the second half of 1979, when the annual rate of the decline reached 17 percent. The private consumption per capita declined in a year--from the first half of 1979 to the first half of 1980--by 8 percent. This was reported by the spokesman for the Central Bureau of Statistics in Jerusalem. There were marked decreases in per capita consumption of foodstuffs, drinks and tobacco, amounting to 9 percent, in the first half of 1980 as compared with the second half of 1979. Especially conspicuous was the fall in fruit and vegetable consumption--12 percent; in dairy and meat products--12 to 14 percent; fish--19 percent and soft and hard drinks--20 percent. The per capita purchases of nonperishable goods such as furniture, household wares and cars--items marked by great fluctuations--diminished by 29 percent with the fall being especially sharp in car purchases: 60 percent. The per capita consumption for clothing, footwear and personal goods also went down by 15 percent during that period. [TA190958 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Oct 80 p 8 TA]

SEPTEMBER MONEY INJECTION--Last month the government printed 8.2 billion Israeli pounds. The treasury accounts for this large injection by the drop in tax collection and sale of government bonds. Since August 1979 the consumer price index rose 130 percent while tax collection rose only 112 percent. There was also large government expenditure as well as deviations from the state budget framework last month. [TA050819 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 2 Oct 80 TA]

POLL SHOWS CONFIDENCE IN DEFENSE--An overwhelming majority of the country's residents are certain that Israel can defend itself should the need arise. Only an insignificant minority fears that Israel is today incapable of defending itself. This emerges from a countrywide Pori Institute public opinion survey,

commissioned by HA'ARETZ. Asked, "To what extent do you believe at this time that Israel can defend itself should the need arise," 64.3 percent replied that they are "to a large extent" certain that Israel could defend itself, while another 21.1 percent believe "to a certain extent" that Israel can defend itself. All told, then, 85.4 percent believe that Israel can defend itself. Another 5.8 percent said that they "do not believe so much" in Israel's independent defense ability, and a minority of 1.4 percent said they "do not believe at all" that Israel can defend itself. The remaining 7.4 percent said they "do not know" whether or not Israel can defend itself should the need arise. An analysis of the results shows that the most optimistic are those with a high level of education, persons in the academic or administrative professions and those with high incomes. The most pessimistic are persons aged 60 or more and those with low educational and income levels. The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women who were personally interviewed throughout the country. [Text] [TA051027 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 5 Oct 80 p 3]

JUDAEA, SAMARIA SUPREME COUNCIL--Our correspondent reported that Jordan has again set up the Supreme Council on Judaea and Samaria Affairs, thus taking the wind out of the sails of the Joint Jordanian-PLO Committee. All the issues that were the responsibility of the joint committee have already been transferred to the Jordanian council. [Text] [TA050743 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 5 Oct 80]

BEGIN CALL TO WORLD'S JEWS--Prime Minister Menahem Begin has called upon the Jews in the Diaspora to defend their lives, their honor and their property against terror attacks. He said that an evil wind of antisemitism, recalling the Nazi period, is now blowing in France. This is not the same France that gave us the encyclopedists and emancipation, the prime minister said: This is the other France. [Begin Begin recording] There is the France of the revolution and progress and liberty, equality and fraternity and there is a France where antisemitism is rampant; that is the second France. After what happened to our people, after 1.5 million small children were slaughtered there is an explosion at a synagogue, murder and bloodshed. Now we see the evil wind blowing in the second France. As long as the Jew is in the Diaspora, he must not cede his right and his duty to defend himself and his children and his national and human honor. The 1930's and 1940's have passed; they must not return. If anyone attacks Jews, the Jews are not only entitled to but must defend themselves and anyone who wants to react to this can react however he wants. This is our position and we will tell it to all our people until, with the Lord's aid, as many of them as possible, as we hope, return to their historic homeland of their own free will and live here as free men. [end recording] The prime minister was speaking at the annual rally of IDF disabled persons and our military correspondent brought us his remarks. [TA070726 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 7 Oct 80]

BEGIN REJECTS GOLAN WITHDRAWAL--The prime minister said that under no circumstances will we withdraw from the Golan Heights and as far as the proposal to assume sovereignty over it, this is currently under discussion in the cabinet and will later be dealt with by the Knesset. He refused to give any more details. Touring the Bet Shemesh engine plant, Mr Begin expressed his hope that an agreement will be reached with the U.S. companies to manufacture the engines for the Lavi fighter aircraft in this plant. [Text] [TA072023 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 7 Oct 80]

DEFENSE MINISTRY BUDGET INCREASE DENIED--The Finance Ministry does not intend to grant the Defense Ministry's demand to increase its budget by an additional 1 billion shekels as compensation for price hikes during the first half of the year. The head of the budgetary department of the Ministry of Finance, Yisra'el Arqin, reported that according to an agreement between the minister of finance, the prime minister and defense minister, it had been decided to compensate the defense establishment for 80 percent of the 1980 price hikes, as was being done for the other ministries. The gap between the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Defense springs from differences in assessments of the price hikes expected in the second half of the budgetary year. But the Ministry of Finance does not intend to compensate the defense establishment with a higher sum than that set in the proposal to update the state budget. The DAVAR correspondent comments that the defense establishment's budget was increased from 21.09 billion shekels to 27.3 billion shekels and the Finance Ministry fears that an even greater increase would broaden the economic activity and cause a further acceleration of the inflation rates. They estimate that a decision will be made when Finance Minister Yiga'el Hurvitz returns from the United States. [Excerpt] [TA081227 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 8 Oct 80 p 3]

W. BANK CHARITY CONTROL--Jordan is now trying to take control over the charity organizations and the public clubs in the West Bank by means of financial pressure. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari noted that at present elections are underway in these organizations and clubs and Jordan has pledged huge allocations only to those bodies that vote for the people it backs. In some institutions communist representatives had been elected but were later forced to resign because of the Jordanian financial pressure. [Text] [TA091113 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 9 Oct 80]

POLL SHOWS AUTONOMY TALKS SKEPTICISM--A clear majority of Israel's population does not believe that the autonomy talks will be successfully concluded according to a poll conducted for the JERUSALEM POST by the Modi'in Ezrahi Applied Research Centre. Of those polled, 73.6 percent said they had no faith in the talks. Only 20.1 percent said they believed in the negotiations and 6.3 percent had no opinion. [Sarah Honig] [Excerpt] [TA141138 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 14 Oct 80 p 3]

RISE IN EXPORTS--Exports in the first nine months of the current year were 24 percent higher than in the same period last year. In September, however, the level of exports was only 3.8 percent higher than in September 1979, according to data released yesterday by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The data are all in current values, which means that after taking account of the fall in the value of the U.S. dollar, in which exports are recorded, there has been a fall in real terms. Total net exports in January-September 1980 amounted to $3,781 million, compared with $3,054 million in the same period last year. While total exports thus rose by a nominal 24 percent, industrial exports increased by 26 percent, diamond exports by 18 percent, and agricultural exports by 7 percent. (Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 14 Oct 80 p 8 TA]

DECLINE IN INVESTMENTS--Investment was down some 9 percent in the first half of 1980, compared with the second half of 1979 and 11 percent lower than in the last quarter of 1979, according to estimates released by the Central Bureau of Statistics. The 11 percent fall in investments in the first 3 months of 1980--with no change in the second quarter of the year--is equivalent to an annual contraction of 36 percent, the bureau says. All the data are seasonally adjusted and in constant value terms. [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 14 Oct 80 p 8 TA]

ARAB UNEMPLOYMENT—The number of unemployed Arabs in Israel rose to 2,700 last August, the highest level since the recession of 1965. According to Labor Ministry figures the unemployment situation is particularly difficult in Nazareth and in Umm al-Famm. [Excerpt] [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 1 Oct 80 p 3 TA]

PERES REFUSES TO RUN AGAINST RABIN--Labour Party chairman Shimon Peres last night declared that he would not "run" against former Premier Yitzhaq Rabin for the party leadership if the party convention scheduled for mid-December insists on a showdown. Peres explained that for a showdown to take place an earlier decision by the Labour Central Committee naming him as the party's number one man would have to be overturned. If this is done he would refuse to take part in a leadership race, he said. Peres was speaking at a closed party meeting. His aides explained that trying to avoid an actual showdown with Rabin, Peres wants to force the convention into a vote of confidence by asking it either to support him or overturn the previous Central Committee decision and open the convention. Spokesmen for the Rabin camp last night accused Peres of trying to "blackmail" the party. Peres also said that he would never serve in a Rabin government and added that should a showdown for the leadership actually take place, Labour unity would be irrevocably shattered. [Sarah Honig] [Text] [TA071307 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 7 Oct 80 p 1]

CSO: 4820

'JORDAN TIMES' ON RATIONALE FOR BACKING IRAQ

JN300726 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 30 Sep 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Setting the Pace"]

[Text] In its statement Monday on the Iraq-Iran dispute, the National Consultative Council covered all the subjects of concern to the Arab nation in general and to the Jordanian people in particular, with regard to the fighting in the Gulf.

Jordan has set the pace with its forthright national stand in support of brotherly Iraq's campaign to restore Arab rights and dignity in the territories, waters and islands usurped by Iran.

From the beginning, Jordan has voiced this stand not out of any antagonism to the Islamic people of Iran, but out of this country's firm and longstanding conviction that the usurpation and occupation of Arab land in any part of the Arab nation must be resisted and opposed to whatever extent is necessary.

The NCC has reiterated this point by stressing that aggression against any part of the Arab nation must be treated as aggression against the whole of that nation. Considering Jordan's position on the front line against Zionist aggression, no other national stand is either desirable, logical or possible--quite apart from the paramount commitment of this country to both the principle and the practice of Arab unity and its steadfastness in the defence and pursuit of Arab interests.

These are all the elements which go into the Jordanian stand at the side of fraternal Iraq at this moment. The National Consultative Council has articulated the people's strong support of this stand.

Quite correctly as well, the NCC statement stressed the element of brotherhood in appealing to the Islamic people of Iran to recognise Arab rights and open themselves to the establishment of good-neighbourly relations. Such a realistic and correct move on the part of the Iranians would do so much towards restoring the region's precarious balance of forces, and towards keeping the region free of outside interference or intervention.

We would add, in the same spirit, that it is time for the rulers of Iran to set aside their narrow chauvinist pursuits and throw their full weight, as they had been expected to do, behind the just Arab and Islamic struggles; only this course

will allow the Iranian people to accept the out-stretched hand of friendship extended to them by all Arab and Muslim peoples.

The council was likewise quite correct in putting out an appeal to all Islamic states in the present instance to pledge themselves to the cause of averting internecine disputes and quarrels, keeping in mind the constant aims before us.

These aims extend from the mobilisation of Arab and Islamic resources in the battle for Palestine, to which the NCC statement specifically referred, to the continuing struggle for social and economic self-fulfillment. With the present diversion of resources, that ultimate battle is being forced to take a back seat, and no one really stands to gain from that.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

ANTI-KHOMEYNI SERMONS IN WEST BANK--As of yesterday, sermons against Khomeyni are being preached in Judaea and Samaria and East Jerusalem mosques. Our reporter says that it is very probable that the orders in this matter came from Jordan. Our reporter notes also that the new line in the sermons is arousing displeasure in the mosques because Khomeyni's Islamic revolution has so far gained sympathy there. In the al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem and in a Nabulus mosque there were even fistfights among the worshippers as a result of these sermons. [Text] [TA042110 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 2100 GMT 4 Oct 80]

'GREATER AMMAN' RADIO--Jordanian broadcasting station sources have said that preparations are underway to transform the current Amman station into a popular local radio that will deal with all levels of the Jordanian society's activities. It will use direct contact with the people and will openly discuss social and development issues. This step is being taken because radio is the primary disseminator of development information and is easily accessible to all strata of society. A special board is expected to be created to direct the station, with the participation of responsible authorities from the departments of development, planning, national guidance, labor and education. The Greater Amman station will begin transmission within the next 4 weeks and will work to project Jordan's activities and development plans abroad. [The Greater Amman station was previously observed testing on 594 kHz between July and August 1979] [Text] [JN242150 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 23 Sep 80 p 24]

CSO: 4802

INVESTMENT BUREAU BUYS INTO SHAKY BRITISH FIRMS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 17 Sep 80 p 16

/Article: "The Kuwait Investment Office in London Is Buying Shares in Failing British Companies"/

/Text/ "Investment has become a science and an art. It is a science with general rules and an art with special touches."

These words are repeated when one asks, "Why does the Kuwait Investment Office in London sometimes buy the shares of failing companies?" Kuwait has a big share in the Shop and Son Company, which announced an unenviable financial status this year; nonetheless Kuwait recently added thousands of shares to its holdings.

The Mortal Blow

In the report, it was stated that the company's profits were dealt a mortal blow in the first half of this year. These came to 2.2 million pounds sterling, as compared with 8.3 million pounds sterling in the same period last year. Last year's profits also dropped 50 percent, totalling 7.22 million pounds sterling as compared with 15.26 million pounds sterling in 1978.

Most of the losses arose from the flow of capital in the commercial sector and the production sector of the computerized cash register known as Gross.

Computer Losses

The cost of this equipment is extremely large, whereas sales of it are dropping in significant fashion; the company, which had 20 percent of the distribution market in Britain in 1976, has started facing serious competition from Japanese companies, which offer cheap, attractive products.

In spite of that, the Kuwait Investment Office bought several thousand shares in the company recently.

The Successful Model

The observer stated, "Thus some people deliberately prefer failing investments. However, do not forget that those people, including the Kuwait Investment Office, possess and also buy shares in successful companies.

The closest example of this is the General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Company, whose profits in the first half of this year increased to 40 million pounds, as compared with 30.5 million pounds in the same period last year.

The company report stated that profits on insurance policies increased in Britain at a lower rate than in Canada and Brazil and faced losses in the United States and European countries.

The Power of Sterling

The report said that the power of sterling helped increase the company's profits. Investments in Canada also increased from 21.7 million to 47.6 million pounds sterling. This led to an increase in revenues.

Profits also rose to that point because of an increase in the value and prices of insurance on cars.

The question now is, why doesn't the Investment Office concentrate on this type of company?

The observer stated, "Certainly there are reasons for choices of this sort. They are all subject to the laws of the science of investment, and its arts."

Why Weak Companies?

The basic rule is, choose a strong company and strong stocks. The art is sometimes enticed into choosing weak stocks, because demand is low and stirring up interest may lead to a rise in their prices. However, it is not an ordinary investor but rather a strong investor who can play this role, possessing big resources which clearly tell the market "I can save this company from bankruptcy and destruction. My choice of these stocks is not just caprice--it is the choice of a professional who knows what he wants."

This psychological suggestion certainly plays an important role in the company's status in the market. It also helps attain profits at various rates through the process of purchasing shares and reselling them at higher prices.

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CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

DAIMLER-BENZ BUYOUT--Will the Daimler-Benz automobile empire be saved from the tribulations the world automobile industry is passing through? No one can offer a sure answer. All answers depend on the word "perhaps," or consideration of probabilities mixed with optimism, for two reasons: First, Kuwait's 14 percent contribution can help the company market its products. Second, the company has rid itself of the complex of being located in Germany and has brought factories out into the third world. The company's 1979 report states that sales increased by 12.8 percent and their value came to 30.4 billion marks, or $17.4 billion. Sales of cars alone increased to 10 percent, and transport and truck production increased 7 percent, totalling 256,467 units. Production of passenger cars increased 7.4 percent, totalling 422,159 units; 67,695 units were assembled in Brazil and Argentina. Exports increased to 234,000 units. Their profits increased last year to 592.8 million marks, as compared with 445 million marks in 1977 and about 392 million marks in 1976. The report said that the company has many export contracts for 1980. Another report published last July stated that the company's output has increased, in contrast to all /other/ German companies, by 2 percent in the first half of 1980, and that the capital passed on from the previous fiscal year rose by 8 percent, totalling 14.8 billion marks. The report stated that the company is committed to exporting 430,000 units, as compared with 422,000 last year. The company therefore relies on a store of success to cope with the three-dimensional crisis grinding down other companies. namely drops in profits, increases in costs, and competition. Observers say that Kuwait can play a role in increasing distribution and has plans to back up its public transport fleet with $400 million. It also has companies and investments in various parts of the world, all of which can be converted into clients of the German company, if the Kuwaiti government so agrees. However, these available resources are suspect because Daimler-Benz hastened to sign a contract last year to export buses to Israel. [Excerpt] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 16 Sep 80 p 14]

INTEREST RATE RISE--The weekly financial bulletin issued by the National Bank of Kuwait described the Kuwaiti dinar market as contracting in terms of the liquidity level. The bulletin said, "The state of contraction lasted through the past week and reached the point where interest rates

on short-term deposits in the local market exceeded similar rates in the United States." The bulletin said, "The prevailing state of contraction in the market in past weeks may be explained by the presence of a general tendency to limit the rate of economic growth which according to preliminary data have realized great leaps since the end of Ramadan." It added, "In spite of the enormous balance of payments surplus, the process of transferring dinars to high-yield foreign assets in addition to covering import activities exceeds the pressure on reserves within the banking system. This disturbance generally arises as a consequence of concentrating import activity basically in the hands of the private sector, while receipts from oil exports, which account for 85 percent of total exports, are concentrated in the hands of the government. The rise in local interest rates has arisen from this, as well as from the contraction in economic activity through the flow of capital abroad for investment purposes." The bulletin anticipated that the short-term interest rate would remain at its current levels in coming weeks. On deposits committed for a 1-month period, it is expected that the increase will recur this week along with a stabilization in interest rates for other periods at their current levels. In the local market, gold prices have surged to 5,850 dinars per kilogram. The bond market valued in dinars is still suffering from fluctuations in American interest rates. Bonds have become extremely sensitive to interest rate movements since investors remain in a state of cautious expectation, waiting for specific new trends in the interest rate. Bond prices valued in dinars have retrenched in the past week. /Excerpts/ /Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 15 Sep 80 p 14/ 11887

CSO: 4802

ISRAEL'S PREPARATION OF NUCLEAR BOMB AS BLACKMAIL DESCRIBED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 17 Sep 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by J.K.: "Nuclear Blackmail"]

[Text] The Israeli leaders no longer have any illusions! They are now conscious of the fact that time is working against them. The Arab-Muslim world, whose foreign affairs ministers are meeting tomorrow in Fez, has become a power that is being listened to more and more: because of its human potential, its oil and financial power, and despite the differences. The power struggle is now different on the international scene. The Western world is no longer a bloc, and European and American interests, if not in contradiction, are at least increasingly divergent.

The United States itself is no longer in a position to impose its point of view as it did in the past. That is to say that Tel Aviv, which has survived heretofore because it was a politico-military instrument in the hands of the West, will not fail to become awkward for the economic and strategic interests of that same world. What is to be done, then? What blackmail is to be used? The Israeli leaders have opted for nuclear blackmail.

They have also launched a program to manufacture an atomic bomb jointly with South Africa. And taking advantage of the privileged ally situation they procured the technology and uranium they needed, from Europe as well as from the US.

Israel has known since 1973 that it has become very difficult, if not impossible, for it to repeat its 1967 victory. And the fact of the change occurring in international relations, Sino-American rapprochement, Euro-Arab rapprochement and the fact that the Arabs have much better mastery of armament technology. Also, the atomic weapon is the only possibility for the Zionist state to practice blackmail on the US as well as on the Arab world.

It is this blackmail we are confronting today and which we must react to, at the risk of seeing Zionism maintain its occupation.

8946
CSO: 4400

FRENCH DELEGATION'S SUPPORT FOR MOROCCO ON SAHARA REPORTED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 20 Sep 80 pp 1, 3

[Text] The delegation from the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee of the French Senate, which has been visiting Morocco since Tuesday evening, is "convinced" that the Moroccan thesis on the Western Sahara is well-founded.

"I believe," Roger Poudonson (UCDP) [expansion unknown], the head of the delegation, stated Thursday evening at a press conference in Rabat, "that Morocco's argument is solid, and solidly rooted in history."

Mr Poudonson, who is vice chairman of the Senatorial Committee, affirmed, "We are pleased to find that the situation is better now than it was a year or two ago." He told of his "admiration for the moderation of the policy conducted by King Hassan II, who is trying very hard not to insult the future," notably by not exercising the right of succession.

"I believe," Mr Poudonson added, for the benefit of the Moroccans, "that you have the right for yourselves...that the populations are broadly self-determined, that you are not holding them in Laayoune forcibly, that one may come and go in that region. I am not at all convinced that there is an entity (Saharan)."

The vice chairman of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee "does not rule out the possibility that the Algerians have other motives (than the creation of an independent state)," but he thinks they "may change. One already notes," he said, "that the blows with the fist have become blows with a pin."

The members of the senatorial delegation, who were received on Wednesday by the president of the Moroccan Chamber of Representatives, Dey Ould Sidi Baba, surrounded by the leaders of all the political parties--majority as well as opposition--, declared themselves struck in particular "by their faultless unity on the problem of the recovered provinces."

According to Mr Poudonson they regretted "that French public opinion is perhaps not as well informed as would be desirable on this unanimity on the part of the Moroccan people behind their king." The head of the delegation stated

in that connection that he would inform the president of the Republic and the minister of Foreign Affairs next Monday of the reality of the situation.

For his part, Louis Longequeue (Socialist) indicated that the delegation had received an answer to the question "Who is arming the Polisario?", that answer being "Algeria and nations east of Algeria." He also said he was satisfied with the limits of the military cooperation between France and Morocco. "There are no French soldiers in the combat zones and contested territories," he said.

"Personally," he wonders if self-determination is possible in the Sahara and if the Moroccan people are not already self-determined. "It seems that they are," he replies, even while recalling that the Socialist Party has come out in favor of self-determination.

The delegation, which also includes Louis Martin (RI)[Independent Republican] and Alfred Gerin (independent), was to leave Rabat on Friday for Meknes and Marrakech, where it is to visit the Flying School, the Royal Academy and the Gendarmerie School.

8946
CSO: 4400

UGTM CHARGES ARBITRARY OFFICIAL ACTION AGAINST MEMBERS

Statement of Bureau Members

Rabat L'OPINION in French 16 Sep 80 p 5

[Statement by seven members of suspended bureau]

[Text] On 30 April 1980, the personnel of the OFPPT [Office of Professional Training and Labor Promotion], meeting at the UGTM [General Union of Moroccan Workers] headquarters in Rabat, decided to create a national bureau made up of nine brothers well known for their union activity and their devotion to the task assigned to them.

Intense activity of two months' duration, during which this young bureau earned the sympathy of several partisans, shook up the OFPPT leaders, most of all the phantom bureau of the UMT [Moroccan Labor Federation].

In accordance with the directives from the leaders of the UGTM group, the federal bureau ceased its activities for a period of one month, to grant the wish of the OFPPT board of directors.

During that month of calm the board caught its breath, enabling the pawns of the union center to juggle with the decisions for change.

We deplore this abuse of trust; if we have kept silent it was in order to allow the office's board plenty of time to think it over. Since this is the way it is, we remind the OFPPT leaders that these sanction measures taken counter to these agents, to have to belong to a legal union recognized by the authorities can only double our forces, for our struggle will last as long as we are in this organization.

UGTM Executive Bureau Communique

Rabat L'OPINION in French 17 Sep p 2

[Text of communique from UGTM executive bureau]

[Text] The UGTM, after studying the situation of the union activity of the Professional Training Bureau, after contacting the Labor and Professional

Training Ministry as well as the leadership of the Professional Training Bureau in Casablanca, has become aware of the fact that the situation that institution is experiencing is due to a group that is engaged in serving its own interests to the detriment of the genuine objectives for which that institution was founded.

For this reason, and following the events of 1973, 1976, 1977 and 1978, which culminated in the expulsion or suspension of a large number of persons, this group undertook a series of arbitrary changes coupled with more ignoble measures against the UGTM militants. Among these militants are brothers Namrouch Khlafa, Haj Bedouz, Hallab Mohamed, Mimoun Abdessalam, Najm Mohamed and Rguig Ahmed.

It is strange to hear the leaders of this institution say--to defend themselves--that they are not hostile to "the union is a legal activity," but that they are undertaking these measures for the good of and in the interest of the institution.

Even as we denounce these acts we wonder if one can expect anything good from an institution that is afraid of the union and does not respect the legitimate rights of union activity.

The UGTM insists that the leaders intervene immediately to render justice to the union activity in the Bureau of Professional Training and asks all those concerned to return to their place of work.

The UGTM affirms that the staff of this institution have, for the fifth time in ten years, expressed their devotion to the UGTM and emphasized that persecution and constraint will in no way affect these employees' determination not to deny their membership in the UGTM. This also constitutes a condemnation of the administrative degeneracy and the labor union treason within the institutions of the OFPPT.

8946
CSO: 4400

SIGNING OF HEALTH AGREEMENTS WITH FRANCE REPORTED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 19 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] Rabat (MAP)--The minister of Public Health, Dr Rahal Rahhali, and the French secretary of State for Health and Social Security, Jean Farge, signed, on Wednesday in Rabat, the ceremonial act providing for eight cooperation projects, after three days of discussion in the second session of the joint Moroccan-French Health Sciences Committee, under the joint chairmanship of Dr Rahhali and Jean Farge.

The first project concerns "postgraduate training" and provides for bringing to Morocco French physicians whose "duties will be to provide health care and supervise interns and doctors in specialized training." These physicians, whose mission will be for a minimum of four years which can be extended for one or two two-year periods, will be integrated into the Public Health system.

The general text also provides for organization of an emergency service consisting of a study and coordination mission of long duration (four years) and the cooperation of French specialists in the development of the emergency toxicology service recently created in Rabat.

The third project provides for bringing to Morocco French specialists who will be in charge (for a maximum of four years) of training personnel for upkeep and maintenance of bio-medical equipment, general equipment and buildings.

Both parties accepted the plan for creating two medical schools in Morocco; French teachers and specialists will collaborate in realizing and operating the schools.

Training of social welfare personnel constitutes the fifth project, the French part being to take charge of training future Moroccan staff members in this field and putting at Morocco's disposal the French teachers necessary to put in place and operate the project.

Lastly, the last three projects concern radio protection service, assistance in matters of management and the exchange of documentation.

The signing ceremony took place in the presence of the secretary general of the Public Health Ministry, the principal private secretary, the French ambassador to Rabat and the members of the delegations from both countries.

8946
CSO: 4400

'ALI NASIR MUHAMMAD SPEAKS ON REVOLUTION DAY

LD132200 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1730 GMT 13 Oct 80

[Speech by PDR Supreme People's Council chairman 'Ali Nasir Muhammad to commemorate 17th anniversary of the 14 October revolution--live or recorded]

[Excerpts] Brother citizens:

At its extraordinary general congress our party considered and defined its principled attitudes toward the situation in the neighboring region in particular and the Arab and international situation in general. While emphasizing the importance of establishing equal and constructive relations with our neighbors on the basis of peaceful coexistence and respect for national sovereignty, we are anxious about American military moves which have exposed the U.S. military administration's tendency to reinforce its hostile military presence through its bases and spy aircraft. We appeal to the states in the region to halt the deterioration affecting security and stability in the region due to (?the dangers) threatening the future of the region's peoples and world peace. For our part we stress that we will never remain silent in the face of any hostile presence in the region (?harmful) to the security and stability of our Yemeni people and of our Arab peoples.

Our country, relying on its known principled attitudes, will continue to support all militants struggling for the liberation and progress of their peoples and the world's peace and security. In this respect, we will continue our solidarity with the Oman revolution, the Palestinian revolution and the Lebanese national movement and we will support heroic Syria, Libya, Algeria and revolutionary Palestine and stand with them in the same trenches.

(?We will support) the establishment by (?the Arabs) of the foundations of the National Steadfastness and Confrontation Front to enable it to do its duty of resisting the designs and conspiracies of imperialism and Zionism. We will also work to expand the scope of comprehensive cooperation with the countries of the socialist community, headed by the USSR, for whose support and backing of the struggle of our Yemeni people and the Arab peoples for national liberation and social progress words of appreciation and deep respect cannot suffice.

Once again, brother citizens, let me congratulate you heartily in the hope that the 18th anniversary of the revolution will witness further victories and successes in bringing the hopes and aspirations of our great people and our glorious party to realization. Peace be upon you all.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

RA'S AL-KHAYMAH PHARMACEUTICALS--Shaykh Sa'ud ibn Saqr al-Qasimi, chairman of the ruling court of Ra's al-Khaymah, as president of the Gulf Pharmaceutical Industries Company, signed an agreement on Thursday 28 August with the West German firm Hoechst by virtue of which the German company will provide technical expertise to develop the existing company factory into a pharmaceutical industries complex. The Hoechst company holds top position in the world in pharmaceutical manufacturing areas in terms of sales and quality. The board of directors of the Gulf Pharmaceutical Industries Company and Medical Accessories (Agadima) of the Arab League, the General Pharmaceutical Organization in Iraq, and a number of businessmen in Arab Gulf states have recently held meetings in Ra's al-Khaymah, designating the board chairman, Shaykh Sa'ud ibn Saqr al-Qasimi, to sign the contract on behalf of the board. /Text/ /Kuwait/ AL-QABAS in Arabic 11 Sep 80 p 17/ 11887

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' DECISIONS--His excellency Shaykh Husayn Mansuri, deputy minister of communications and information, declared that the Council of Ministers has approved yesterday in its session the request of the minister of information to disburse the annual aid installment to all the newspaper and magazine houses for 1980-1981 on the basis of the decisions made by the previous Council of Ministers. His excellency added that the council has also reviewed the request of His Royal Highness Prince Saud al-Faysal and approved Saudi Arabia joining the Convention on Diplomatic Protocol and Immunities signed in Vienna in April 1961. The council further approved the request of Dr Abd-al-'Aziz al-Khowaytar, minister of education, to extend the project concerning the overall archeological survey of the kingdom five more years from 1981-1985, according to the decree of the Council of Ministers No 621 of 21 May 1975. Moreover, the council decided after reviewing the request of Dr Solayman al-Salim, the minister of commerce, concerning the increase in the prices of food and drinks in some hotels to approve the ministry's intervention to determine the prices of food and drinks in hotels whenever necessary. Furthermore, the council approved the request by Shaykh Ibrahim al-'Anqari, minister of labor and social affairs, to increase the monthly remuneration of the trainees in the vocational training centers and giving them a bonus upon their graduation, and increasing the monthly remuneration of all trainees in vocational rehabilitation centers and in night programs. These increases are pursuant to the expansion of the vocational training programs as a part of the Second Development Plan. [Text] [Jiddah 'OKAZ in Arabic 23 Sep 80 p 6]

CSO: 4802

PAPER SAYS U.S. SENT TROOPS TO GULF SOON AFTER WAR BEGAN

NC051421 Paris AFP in English 1405 GMT 5 Oct 80

[Text] Damascus, 5 Oct (AFP)--The United States sent troops to Oman, Bahrain, Dubayy and Saudi Arabia soon after the Iranian-Iraqi war broke out two weeks ago, the ruling Syrian Ba'th Party newspaper AL-BA'TH said today.

Quoting "reliable sources in the Gulf," AL-BA'TH added that Egyptian President Anwar as-Sadat had "contacted several powers in the region in view of cooperating in the American military set-up."

The newspaper said that the armed forces of Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia were on full alert and that guard of oil wells had been stepped up. AL-BA'TH also said "Iraqi planes and warships are in Bahrain and in the emirate of Ra's al-Khaymah."

Again quoting "informed sources," the newspaper said "U.S. Phantoms, at first mistaken for Iranian aircraft, have been carrying out regular high-altitude patrols over the region."

AL-BA'TH warned that "several Arab and foreign companies" were seriously considering winding up their interests in the Gulf after fears increased that the war could drag on even if the United States "intervened officially."

In another, more conciliatory article, the party newspaper called on both Iraq, an "Arab country," and Iran, as a "strategic ally of the Arab nation," to accept their responsibilities and end the war.

AL-BA'TH wrote that Iraq should save its strength to fight "imperialism, Zionism and the Camp David agreements (between Israel and Egypt)" while Iran should "stand by the Arab side."

The party daily called for an urgent reconciliation, noting that the Arab world needed "Iraqi strength and Iranian support."

The Syrian newspaper said that the war could end up pushing Iran into American arms by putting too heavy a strain on it, concluding that this would be "neither in Iran's nor the Arab nation's interest."

CSO: 4820

DAMASCUS RADIO COMMENTS ON SYRIAN-SOVIET TREATY

JN101440 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 10 Oct 80

[Station commentary]

[Text] The friendship and cooperation treaty signed between Syria and the Soviet Union within the framework of the historic visit leader President Hafiz al-Asad is paying to Moscow is a large victory for the forces of liberation and progress in the region. It is also a new consolidation of the Arab revolution movement's capabilities in the confrontation of the Camp David schemes and the Zionist and imperialist forces' plots, which are aimed at liquidating the Palestinian issue and imposing the conditions of capitulation and defeatism on the entire Arab nation.

The extraordinary Arab and international interest in this treaty reflects to a large extent its strategic value concerning the Arab liberation struggle at this stage. Balance in the region will shortly be achieved, and this will inevitably lead to the deterrence of the Zionist aggression, the encirclement of the Camp David accords from all sides and the creation of new and practical realities for the Arab masses so that they can exercise an advanced role on the level of deepening their pan-Arab steps and mobilizing their self-potentials on the liberation battle arena.

All this embodies the historic meaning of President al-Asad's visit to the Soviet Union. For Syria, which has always cared to consolidate the friendship and cooperation with the forces of liberation and socialism in the world, is now behaving on the basis that it now high time to step up these relations by the qualitative factor, which is embodied in the friendship and cooperation treaty with the Soviet Union.

The hostile forces' reaction to this treaty stresses this treaty's importance and seriousness as regards the whole prevailing situation in the Middle East. Terrorist Menahem Begin, prime minister of the Zionist enemy, has expressed his deep concern over the conclusion of a friendship and cooperation treaty between Syria and the Soviet Union. He expects that large repercussions will occur on the world level. As for Egypt's ruler Anwar al-Sadat, he described the treaty as very serious because, in his opinion, it will lead to a new defect in the balance of powers in the region.

It is understood from these comments that the Zionist and imperialist forces will as of now try to undertake some aggressive moves in the Middle East with the aim of placing the region before a grave state of aggravation and deterioration. These forces will then proceed to direct attacks against the positions of the Arab liberation movement.

This indicator can be detected in more than one place in the Middle East.

The United States is reinforcing its military presence in the Gulf region under the pretext of protecting the oil supplies against havoc and sabotage attempts. The colonialist forces in general are, in turn, trying to employ the circumstances and interactions of the Iraqi-Iranian war to rebuild their fallen positions in the region and to further loot the Arab nation's material and human wealth. However, these imperialist calculations will not, from now on, go according to plan because the qualitative leap of the Syrian-Soviet relations will completely foil such calculations and will basically reformulate the general situation in the region in the interest of Arab rights.

The welcome with which the friendship and cooperation treaty between Syria and the Soviet Union has been received by the forces of liberation and progress in the Middle East and the world simply means that the forces of colonialism and imperialism have been stricken by a new defeat in the Arab region, something which constitutes in itself the other face of the justice of the pan-Arab struggle being waged by the Arab nation to liberate its occupied territories and restore its usurped rights.

The next few days will witness further positive changes on this level. From now on, the Middle East will not remain the captive of imperialist and Zionist control. It will find itself all at once in a position of complete freedom from this grave control. Thus, Syria has returned the crisis of the Arab-Zionist struggle to its correct historical framework and has reorganized the pan-Arab home in a manner that will enable the entire Arab nation to overcome all the obstacles impeding its required liberation and to directly enter the comprehensive confrontation of the enemies.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD DEN 'STORMED'--Aleppo--Syrian security forces stormed a Muslim Brotherhood den in the Mambijj area today, killing two men and confiscating four revolvers, three bombs, a large amount of ammunition, false identity cards and documents revealing the gang's contacts with the enemies of the nation and homeland. The citizens of Mambijj expressed their satisfaction at the discovery of this den and affirmed their cohesion with their revolution in putting an end to tyrants and plotters. [Text] [JN242006 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 1915 GMT 24 Sep 80]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

TELEPHONE NETWORK--"Cit-Alcatel," a French company, has been awarded the contract to provide the towns of Gabes, Sousse and Sfax with telephone exchanges because of its E-10 electronic system. "Ericsson," a Swedish company, on the other hand, will modernize and extend the telephone network from Tunis and Bizerte. The two firms will install a total of 120,000 new automatic lines. The contract is put at 150 million francs, divided almost equally between the two companies. There is also a projected telephone link via underwater cable between Tunisia and France valued at 200 million francs. [Text] [Tunis DIALOGUE in French 29 Sep 80 p 48]

CSO: 4400

RESPONSE TO LIBERIAN FOREIGN MINISTER STATEMENT

LD031055 Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 30 Sep 80 p 6

[Editor's column: "With the Events"]

[Text] The recent developments in the area in relation to the settlement between Egypt and the Israeli enemy have enabled Israel to reap the fruits of its diplomatic victories at every level. The Liberian foreign minister's recent statement calling for a rapprochement between the African states and Israel is a very serious statement and implies many things. If we go back to the not too distant past, we discover that the African states, after the 1973 war, severed their diplomatic relations with the Israeli enemy in solidarity with the Arab nation. The African states adopted that firm stand when Arab solidarity was almost complete.

But now that the Arabs are split and lack leadership, Israel has begun to take advantage of this situation in order to implement its hostile policy. The Israeli information media have been distorting the Arab image in the African states. We are aware that Israel needs markets to sell its goods and products and that the African states are the only market for Israel. We are also aware that the Israeli goods were reaching Uganda after the 70's and that the Ugandan Government later became aware of this matter and, under concerted Arab pressure, banned Israeli goods from its territory. Now, however, the situation is completely different. Israel is now safe and unaffected by Arab surveillance, especially in the wake of the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement engineered by the imperialist states, which has led to the detachment of Egypt from the Arab ranks and from the Arab confrontation of Israel and in view of the serious developments that are taking place in the area.

The Liberian foreign minister justifies his call by the fact that Egypt has established diplomatic relations with Israel and that Egypt is an Arab state and therefore, why should the African states, which have nothing to do with Arabism, not do the same. Israel seized this opportunity and welcomed this "blessed" African initiative, thanking the Arab states for being the cause for such an initiative to be made.

In view of all this, what will the Arab states do to counter this African step? Will they issue strong resolutions like the ones they issued at the time when Jerusalem was annexed and the sanctions they imposed on the states which recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital? We seek stronger resolutions than those in order to counter this step and to check Israel and prevent it from taking advantage of any opportunity that might present itself in the absence of Arab solidarity.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

OIL EXPLORATION AGREEMENT--The heir apparent and chairman of the Executive Council, Shaykh Khalifah ibn Zayid, signed today two franchise agreements on oil exploration with U.S. and Canadian companies. The area covered by the agreements is 10,000 square km in Abu Dhabi and al-'Ayn. The two companies will spend $125.5 million during the first 10 years of the franchise. Petroleum and Natural Resources Minister Dr Mani' ibn Sa'id al-'Utaybah, who attended the signing ceremony, said the contracts for the first time stipulate new terms at the instructions of the heir apparent. The companies are to explore for potable water. Gas explored in the franchise area will be the property of the government. The companies must pay any taxes levied by the government. He said that these new terms are among the best reached by any OPEC country or other organization. They are an example to be followed by other countries intending to grant franchises for oil exploration in their territories. The minister added that the Abu Dhabi Oil Department stressed the importance of using the most advanced world technology for research and exploration. [Excerpts] [GF131359 Abu Dhabi Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 13 Oct 80]

CSO: 4802

ALPS CLAIMS WIPING OUT OF ELITE FAR UNIT IN SAHARA

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 19-20 Sep 80 p 5

[Article: "An Elite FAR Unit Wiped Out in South Morocco by the ALPS"]

[Text] Two hundred ninety-seven monarchist soldiers killed and 24 others taken prisoner; 4 armored tanks destroyed.

SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] (Liberated territories) (APS)--A communique of the Saharan Ministry of Information announced: "After the annihilation of the Moroccan elite troops, pompously named by the Hassan II government "Ouhoud," "Zellagha," "Badr," "Imann," our brave ALPS [Saharan People's Liberation Army] again realized a great war exploit within the framework of the "Houari Boumediene" offensive against aggressive Moroccan troops in the region between Seken and Abatih (South Morocco)."

"Thus fighting units of our heroic ALPS on 17 September 1980 engaged in battle against the "famous" Moroccan elite "Larak," supported by the 10th regiment. During violent conflicts that lasted 16 hours, our brave fighters disabled several hundreds of monarchist soldiers, wounded another several hundred, destroyed or recovered an impressive amount of military equipment, including armored tanks, various types of vehicles, as well as heavy and light weapons," added the communique.

"Several tens of monarchist soldiers were captured by our illustrious fighters during this battle," continued the document.

A second communique specified that "aggressive Moroccan forces experienced significant losses in human lives and materiel, estimated at:

- 297 dead, of all ranks, and as many wounded, and the destruction of the following materiel:

- 4 armored tanks, 23 Land Rovers, 11 "GMC" trucks, 4 "Unimog" trucks, 5 105-mm cannons, 3 120-mm mortars, 4 81-mm mortars, 5 12.7 mm machine guns,

2 14.5--mm machine guns, 3 23-mm bi-tube batteries.

At the end of this battle, the Saharan fighters captured 54 enemy soldiers, including 2 adjutants, and recovered the following materiel:

- 14 Land Rover vehicles, 4 GMC trucks, 1 crane, 1 tank truck, 2 VLRA trucks, 5 12.7-mm machine guns, 7 American-30 machine guns, 10 Mag machine guns, 3 anti-tank rocket launchers, 130 Fal guns, 11 Kalashnikov's, 1 mine detector, 7 transmitter-receiver sets, including 2 long-range ones, 83 tons of ammunition.

Thus this new defeat of the Moroccan elite "Larak," cream of the general staff of the annexationist troops of Rabat, which follows the preceding ones of the "Ouhoud," Zellagha," "Badr" groups, in more ways than one reveals the determination of our people to pursue and to generalize armed struggle everywhere on Moroccan territory as long as the Hassan II government confines itself to blind intransigence and continues to reverse the decisions and resolutions of the international organizations that acknowledge our people's legitimate right to national independence and sovereignty.

This very day, our brave fighters intensively rammed the Moroccan "Gour-Lehcheicha" garrison (on the SDAR-Moroccan border), causing very great losses in human lives and materiel to the monarchist occupation and invasion forces," the Saharan communique also indicated.

8255
CSO: 4400

POLISARIO ESCALATING MARITIME OPERATIONS AGAINST SPAIN

Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Oct 80 p 11

[Article by Daniel Junqua: "Fifteen Portuguese Fishermen Captured by the POLISARIO"]

[Text] Algiers--On Thursday, 2 October, the POLISARIO announced that the "Saharan navy" had visited and inspected a Portuguese boat while it was fishing along the Western Saharan coast. Fifteen fishermen were captured and "will be freed at the right moment." The announcement was in contrast to the Saharan silence toward the 29 September attack at Dakhla of two Spanish trawlers, the "Sarita" and the "Costa Terranova," whose crews were arrested (LE MONDE, 1 October).

The difference in treatment is completely intentional. To obtain the release of 14 of its subjects seized under similar conditions in June, the Lisbon government recognized the POLISARIO as the "unique and legitimate representative of the Saharan people," and, in a communique published on that occasion referred to the SADR twice. Madrid's officials on the contrary have refused to take such a step to recover the 15 crewmembers of the "Gormonar," seized on 22 May. These last few weeks, they have carried out an active international campaign to denounce the "dealings of the POLISARIO.." At their institgation, the foreign ministers of the member countries of the Andean Pact have sent a telegram to the UN Commission of Human Rights protesting against the arrest of the Spanish fishermen.

The Saharan leaders have disliked this initiative. They counterattacked by sending one of their officials, Mr Mahfoud Laroussi, to Panama and publishing a message violently denouncing "Spain's hostile policy toward the Saharan people." The seizure of 25 new sailors, which brings to 40 the number of Spaniards arrested by POLISARIO, constitutes a new escalade and places the Spanish authorities in a difficult situation.

The increase of maritime operations against Spain also makes it possible for the POLISARIO to be talked about at the international level at a time when a UN session that will deal again with the Saharan problem is opening and it seems that the Saharan resistance fighters are clasing on the ground with a more effective resistance from the Moroccan army, at least in Southern Morocco.

9341
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NEW LAW CREATES AVIATION, AIR DEFENSE FACULTY

San'a' AL THAWRAH in Arabic 9 Sep 80 pp 7, 2

/Article: "Republican Decree Establishes Faculty of Aviation and Air Defense"/

/Text/ Republican Decree on Law No 17 for the Year 1980 establishing a faculty for aviation and air defense.

The president of the republic, having studied the permanent constitution; the constitutional proclamation issued 6 February 1978 forming the Constitutional People's Assembly, amended by constitutional proclamation issued 17 April 1978;

The constitutional proclamation issued 22 April 1978 implementing the decree of the Constitutional People's Assembly defining the form of the office of the prime minister, its areas of specialization and its term; the constitutional proclamation issued on 8 May 1979 amending some provisions of the previous constitutional proclamations bearing on the People's Assembly and broadening its powers; and Law No 16 for the Year 1975 regarding the service of officers in the armed forces:

Has decreed the following law:

Article One. A faculty is to be established, called the Faculty of Aviation and Air Defense, which will be subordinate to the armed forces general command.

Article Two. The faculty will prepare its students to be officers competent from the educational and technical standpoints to serve in air force and air defense units.

Article Three. Administration of the faculty will be assumed by a director with the rank of a senior officer and he will be assisted by the senior instructor.

Article Four. The faculty will have a higher council to consist of:

A. The chief of war staff of the armed forces as chairman, or one of his deputies in his absence.

B. The director of the faculty.

C. The director of the War College.

D. The senior instructor of the faculty, who will be the council secretary.

Article Five. The higher faculty council will be competent to review the following matters:

A. The goals of study in the faculty, and approval of them.

B. Educational organization of the faculty, and approval of that.

C. The requisite number of students in each new class.

D. Faculty requirements for new facilities.

E. Presentations made in accordance with a request by the chief of war staff of the armed forces or a written request presented by the faculty director.

F. Approval of the nomination of reaching faculty members from among military and civilian personnel and their appointment to work in the faculty.

G. Distribution of educational materials among the departments of the faculties.

Article Six. The higher faculty council will meet by invitation of the chairman or in accordance with a written request presented by the director of the faculty to the chairman of the council, on condition that the council meet at least twice an academic year.

Article Seven. The holding of sessions of higher faculty council will be valid only if an absolute majority of its members is present. Council decrees will be issued by a majority of votes. In case of a tie, preference will go to the side the chairman is on. The council's proceedings will be secret and its decrees will be with cause. If one of the issues presented is related to a member of the council, he must refrain from attending.

Article Eight. The decrees of the higher faculty council will be considered in effect as soon as they are issued.

Article Nine. The faculty will have an education council consisting of:

A. The deputy chief of staff for training affairs, whose place will be taken in the event of his absence by the director of military training, as chairman.

/B./ The senior instructor of the faculty.

/C./ The teacher of military subjects with greatest seniority. He will be secretary of the council.

/D./ The teachers of civilian subjects with greatest seniority, as members.

Article 10. The faculty educational council will be competent to review the following matters:

A. Putting the goals of study in the faculty into implementation.

B. Preparing organizational instructions for study in all educational departments of the faculty.

C. Apportioning educational courses throughout the years of study, preparing their curricula, and setting up classes of study for each subject.

D. Nominating civilian and military faculty members who work in the faculty and recommending their appointment to work in the faculty.

E. Examining the faculty's annual budget draft.

F. Recommending the amendments it considers appropriate in the faculty's bylaws.

G. Whatever is presented to it by written request of the deputy chief of staff for training affairs, the director of the faculty or the senior instructor, at least 1 week before the convening of the council.

Article 11. The faculty educational council will meet by invitation of its chairman in accordance with a request by the faculty director, or by written request presented by at least three members to the chairman of the council; it is stipulated that the faculty educational council must meet at least four times during the academic year.

Article 12. The decrees of the faculty educational council will be valid only if it is attended by an absolute majority of the members, and it will issue its decrees by a majority vote. In the case of a tie, preference will go to the side the chairman is on; the proceedings of the council will be secret and its decrees with cause. If one of the issues presented is related to a member of the council, he must refrain from attending.

Article 13. The council's decrees will be in effect only after approval by the chief of war staff of the armed forces. If he does not approve

them within 15 days of the date he is notified of them, they will be considered to be in effect. If he objects to them within that period, the protested decree will be returned to the council, which will review it again in the light of the protest within a week of the date of the return. If the council insists on its view, the chief of the staff authority will issue his decree in the manner he deems fit, and this decree will be considered final.

Article 14. The faculty council may seek the aid of people with expertise whose views it considers appropriate at council sessions and they will not have a valid vote in the council's transactions.

Article 15. Persons applying for enrollment in the faculty must meet the following conditions:

1. They must enjoy citizenship in the Yemen Arab Republic and be of two Yemeni parents.

2. They must have obtained a general secondary certificate, scientific or literary.

No more than one academic year may have elapsed since their acquisition of this certificate.

3. Their age must not be less than 16 (sixteen) or exceed 23 (twenty-three).

4. Those who are 16 must be not less than 155 centimeters tall, those who are between 16 and 18 must not be less than 158 centimeters tall, and those from 18 to 20 must not be less than 159 centimeters tall.

5. They must be of good conduct and behavior and no sentences may have been issued against them.

Article 16. The tests the applicant wishing to be enrolled in the faculty will pass through are:

First, a medical fitness test. The applicant must pass these tests in accordance with the level the military medical council sets out.

Second, physical fitness tests. The applicant must pass the tests in accordance with the level the educational council in the faculty sets out.

Third, general information tests. The applicant must pass those tests set out by the faculty educational council.

Fourth, test of personal bearing and character. The applicant must pass this before the committee which holds it, which will consist of:

Chairman of the higher faculty council, as chairman.
Director of the faculty, as member.
Senior instructor, as member.
Commander of the faculty company, as member.

Anyone the general armed forces command sees fit, as member.

The faculty bylaws will also specify the different aspects of other regulations for accepting persons presenting themselves for enrollment in the faculty.

The results of the above tests and the names of accepted applicants will be published in writing at the faculty headquarters following their approval by the commander general of the armed forces.

The nomination of students accepted in the faculty will be abrogated if they do not present themselves to the faculty in 15 days of the date of the announcement of the results of the tests referred to in the preceding paragraph.

Article 17. The probation of students accepted at the faculty at the start of the first academic year will depend on the condition of their fitness for military life during the period defined by the faculty council at the beginning of the academic year. At the end of the probation period, the faculty council will issue a decree on the students' fitness for military life; at this point the students will be considered to be in the preparatory section. If they are unfit, the decree must contain a statement on whether the students are only to be removed from the faculty or are to be prevented from enrolling in any other military faculty, and the decree of unfitness must be issued by unanimous vote.

Article 18. The commander general of the armed forces will have the right to terminate any student for serious cause related to the public interest in accordance with a report by the faculty council.

Article 19. The period of study at the faculty is 3 years. This may be lowered to less than that in the case of the air defense department only, in the event the armed forces have need for officers, by decree issued by the commander general of the armed forces.

Article 20. The living requirements of the student during the period of study and military and athletic training uniforms will be at the expense of the state, and the student will be given a monthly stipend specified by the commander general of the armed forces.

Article 21. Studies at the faculty will be organized on the basis of three educational sections: the preparatory, intermediate and women's sections.

Article 22. Instruction in the faculty will be in Arabic and the higher faculty council may decide to teach one or more subjects in a foreign language.

Article 23. Students in the faculty will receive the following instruction:

1. The technique of combat. 2. Preliminary instruction in arms and fire-fighting. 3. Physical fitness. 4. Mapreading. 5. Specialized courses which the faculty educational council determines for every field of specialization.

B. /sic/ Technical courses comprising the following subjects:

1. Signals. 2. Field engineering. 3. Command and aeronautical engineering, for the aviation department.

4. Driver education, for civil defense.

5. Specialized courses which the faculty education council determines in accordance with each specialization.

C. The signal courses will comprise the following subjects:

1. Order and management. 2. Administrative affairs in peace and war. 3. Military traditions.

D. Social courses will include the following subjects:

1. Military history. 2. Military geography. 3. Morale guidance. 4. National history.

E. Science and mathematics, namely chemistry, physics, nature and mathematics.

F. Languages, including English language study.

The general commander may, by request from the higher faculty council, decide to remove some courses or add other courses connected to the goals of the faculty.

Article 24. The faculty bylaws will regulate the hours of instruction, distribution of grades for various courses and passing grades. It will also specify major courses where the student will be considered to have failed for the year no matter what requisite passing grades he receives, if he fails them.

Article 25. Any student failing a year more than once in any study department will be terminated from the faculty. If the student acquires less than 50 percent in conduct and diligence grades, his case will be

presented to the higher faculty council to determine whether he should be kept or terminated.

Article 26. The rank of passing students in the final section will be in accordance with the grades the students receive in the final section.

Article 27. The president of the republic will grant bachelor's degrees in military science to students who have successfully passed the examination for the final section in the faculty.

Article 28. The disciplinary penalties which may be imposed on students are:

1. Prison for a period not to exceed 168 hours (7 days).

2. Detention in the faculty for a period not to exceed 38 days.

3. Withholding of leave for a period of 3 weeks.

4. Minor penalties, types of instruction, inspection by the travel board, withholding of weekly leave.

5. Removal of noncommissioned officers from the faculty and their demotion to a lower rank.

6. Abrogation of examinations in one or more courses.

Article 29. The following crimes will be considered serious ones, and those students committing them will face permanent dismissal from the faculty:

1. Theft or acceptance of stolen articles.

2. Murder or attempted murder.

3. Waste or embezzlement.

4. Violent conduct indicating danger or prejudicial to public morality or military traditions.

5. Intentional forgery such as the presentation of forged papers or evidence, data or false statements.

6. Cheating in examinations, attempted cheating, or aid to others in cheating.

7. Absence for a period of more than 10 days without permission or an excuse accepted by the faculty.

8. Offering or acceptance of or acting as an intermediary in a bribe.

9. Dealing in or owning narcotics, kat or alcoholic beverages of any kind.

10. Striking, or attempted striking.

11. Disobedience or use of words implying threats.

12. Deliberate falsified certification.

13. Failure to obey an order issued by a higher officer in a manner displaying deliberate rejection of authority.

14. Escape or attempted escape in case of presence under military restraint.

15. Pretending illness or deliberately creating illness in oneself.

16. Shameful conduct unfit for a student in the faculty.

Article 30. The following authorities will be concerned with the imposition of disciplinary penalties:

1. The higher faculty council.

2. The director of the faculty.

3. The senior instructor.

4. The faculty company commander.

5. The faculty war staff.

6. The battalion commander.

7. The platoon commander.

The bylaws will specify the disciplinary penalties which each of the foregoing disciplinary authorities will be competent to impose.

Article 31. Anyone resigning from the faculty without its agreement, or contriving to leave it to join another institute or faculty, as well as all students leaving the faculty without spending at least 5 years in armed forces service from the time of their graduation, will be bound, by bond, with their guardian, to pay double the amount the state treasury has spent on his studies.

Article 32. The commander general will issue the bylaws of the faculty after receiving the views of the higher faculty council, and may issue the decrees necessary to implement this law.

Article 33. This decree on the law will be in effect as of the date it is issued and it will be published in AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH and military publications.

Issued at the Republican Palace in San'a', 8 September 1980.

Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president and commander general of the armed forces.

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END

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No. 2212

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30 October 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2212

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ARAB ECONOMIC SOCIAL COUNCIL AGREES ON ECONOMIC ACCORDS

Joint Arab Economic Charter

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 12 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Accord reached on inter-Arab investment agreement.

Steps for admission of PLO as observer with IMF being taken.

Tunis--The 29th regular session of the Council of Arab Ministers of Economy, which concluded its deliberations on Wednesday, has adopted a plan for a joint Arab economic action charter designed to promote cooperation and economic reciprocity among the Arab nations.

This plan will be submitted at the First Arab Economic Summit Meeting, which is to be held next November in Amman (Jordan).

The council has also adopted an inter-Arab agreement on investments presented by Tunisia. It has retained the principle of Arab Economic and Social Development Fund (FADES) and Arab Monetary Fund (FMA) capital growth.

These two institutions, which have been meeting since yesterday in Tunis, are to particularly discuss the ways and means of producing this capital growth.

And lastly, the council has appointed a committee to study the draft of an agreement designed to facilitate trade among the Arab countries. This draft will be submitted at the council's next meeting, scheduled for 25 February in Tunis.

The Economic and Social Council has, furthermore, decided to take steps to admit the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as an observer at International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank meetings.

Assistant Secretary General of the League of Arab States for Economic Affairs Abdelhassen Zelzela said that the council has reaffirmed its earlier resolutions on the need for granting the PLO observer status at IMF and World Bank meetings. The council, which consists of the ministers of economy of those Arab nations that are members of the League of Arab States, has decided to step up its efforts to achieve this objective.

Sources close to the council stress the fact that the Arab nations' request on behalf of the PLO is in accordance with IMF and World Bank statutes which provide for the admission of observers.

The same sources feel that, since most of the member-nations favor PLO admission, it should in principle be accepted.

Inter-Arab Investment Agreement

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 11 Sep 80 p 4

[Article by M.M.]

[Text] Last night, the Arab Economic and Social Council concluded the proceedings of its 29th regular session, which took place from 8 to 10 September at the Hotel Africa in Tunis and were presided over by Palestinian delegation head Walid Kamhawi.

At a press conference he held immediately after the conlcusion of the council's deliberations, Assistant Secretary General of the League of Arab States for Economic Affairs Dr Zelzela described this session as "the most positive and most effective of all the sessions in view of the importance of the issues that were dealt with and the interest it represented as a preliminary session for the coming Arab economic summit meeting."

Among the chief positive points of this session, Dr Zelzela emphasized the agreement of all council members on the pan-Arab economic action charter, whose most important principles are the neutralization of economic action, Arab economic citizenship, preferential treatment, economic solidarity and the freedom of workers to move about freely within the Arab world.

The league's assistant secretary general said that another important point adopted by the council was the inter-Arab investment agreement, which he felt constitutes "a big step" toward the strengthening of inter-Arab cooperation since it grants Arab investors legal and financial guarantees and treatment which, while not privileged, is at least equal to that reserved for local nationals in order to encourage these investors to let their capital grow inside the Arab world and benefit their sister nations.

The council also demonstrated its desire to favor the growth of FADES and FMA capital and to open special accounts in these two funds to come to the aid of the less advanced Arab countries.

Dr Zelzela, furthermore, admitted that the council had to postpone discussion of several items on this session's agenda until the next session, which will be held next 25 February. Among the chief items that were postponed was the draft of an agreement on inter-Arab trade.

Prime Minister's Address

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 11 Sep 80 p 4

[Speech by Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali in Tunis on the occasion of the 24th session of the Arab Economic and Social Council; date not given]

[Text] Tunisia is fc the drafting of a uniform treaty for the protection of investments.

Let us make this a decade of overall Arab development.

Mr President, Your Highnesses, Your Excellencies, Dear Friends:

First of all, I would like to warmly greet you, to welcome you in the name of the president, the government and the people of Tunisia and extend to you greetings from his excellency President Habib Bourguiba and his wishes for a pleasant stay among us here and complete success in your deliberations.

I would also like to congratulate you on the efforts you have made these past 2 days to evaluate the Arab and international economic situations, to seek ways to consolidate cooperation among the Arab countries and to establish the sound basis for economic relations among our countries first and then between the Arab community and foreign economic and political cartels with the aim of preserving the interests of the Arab Nation and of strengthening its position in international forums.

Honorable Delegates,

We believe that the chief objective of any Arab action should be the mobilization of our energies and our potential to liberate occupied Arab territories and to achieve the desire of the Palestinian people, that is, the creation of their own state.

This oblige us to further affirm the might and invulnerability of the Arab Nation such that it will be able to deal with Zionist attempts to dominate us and to carry out plans for colonization aimed at Judaizing occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including the holy city of Al Quds [Jerusalem] which the enemy is trying to empty of its Arab citizens and where it is applying a policy of fait accompli.

It is also indispensable for us to operate through the media to further enlarge the audience for the legitimate struggle the Arab Nation is engaged in, at the top of the list the heroic people of Palestine, the objective being to gain the support necessary for the triumph of our just causes.

Moreover, it is to our advantage to reactivate the north-south dialogue and the Arab-African and Arab-Arab dialogues through which the Arab community will work for the recognition of our inalienable national rights and of the PLO as a unique and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and for Israel's withdrawal from occupied Palestinian and Arab territories.

Firm Arab determination as regards the Knesseth's vote on Al Quds has produced a profound repercussion in international forums. All those countries that had diplomatic representatives in Al Quds have hastened to transfer their embassies to Tel Aviv, convinced as they are of the legitimacy of the Arab position following the Security Council's adoption of a resolution opposing recognition of Al Quds as capital of Israel.

Reduce Gaps Between Arab Countries

Honorable Delegates,

The realization of this strategy for joint Arab economic action, which your honorable council has approved at this special session in Amman will require of us a long-term effort for the construction of an Arab economy based on reciprocity, which will tighten our ranks and eliminate disparities.

Collectively and individually, the Arab nations are faced with serious challenges that threaten their existence and prevent them from following the path of economic reciprocity and political solidarity.

While Zionist aggression represents the chief challenge to our existence, our civilization and our future, economic, social and technological underdevelopment constitutes a threat to the Arab Nation's aspriations for prosperity and union.

Disparities of income and wealth in the Arab countries constitute a problem that has shaped and will continue to shape economic and political relations among the Arab nations.

To be sure, these nations have individually worked out plans aimed at limiting the gaps between the social classes and at achieving overall development within their respective countries. But the time has come today to work with determination on the basis of a sincere political desire to reduce the gaps between Arab countries by at least enabling certain favored ones among them to catch up with the main body of developed countries. This task is not difficult for a nation united by bonds of language, religion, civilization and common destiny.

Establishment of Joint Arab Projects

During the past decade, Arab countries with financial surpluses have made considerable efforts to speed up the process of growth in the developing countries, particularly in Arab countries. This aid has contributed to the realization of the development programs and plans of the countries involved and to the launching of reciprocal Arab economic action, put into practice by the establishment of joint Arab projects.

However, these efforts have not yet come up to the level of the hopes and aspirations of the Arab Nation, which has forced the deficit Arab states to borrow on international financial markets to finance their development plans and to bear the heavy burden of the terms they thus have to accept.

It in only natural for Arab states with limited resources to expect a regular and well-organized contribution from their sister nations with financial surpluses. Thus, through these investments, Arab capital will serve to strengthen the forward motion of our development.

Honorable Delegates,

Tunisia supports your efforts toward the drafting of a uniform treaty for the protection of investments. The object of this treaty is the judicious utilization of surpluses for profitable Arab projects that will benefit the entire Arab Nation and consolidate its joint economic interests, inasmuch as Arab capital invested in Arab countries poses less problems than foreign capital.

First of All Liberate Arab Spirit and Determination

In order to encourage investors of Arab capital, Tunisia has constantly granted them guarantees, privileges and even concessions. This is why we take the liberty of insisting on this point which, to our way of thinking, will represent the cornerstone of joint Arab action in the 1980's. So we join you in your praiseworthy efforts to make of this decade one of overall Arab development.

I also take my hat off to your agreement on the increase in funds to be allotted to national development funds and on the strengthening of the FADES and FMA through increases in their capital and improvement of their methods of operation in order to permit them to speed up the process of economic and social development in the Arab countries, to facilitate trade among them and to intensify them.

Honorable Delegates,

Future generations would judge us harshly if we failed to assure the development of the Arab citizen since he is both the craftsman of development and its ultimate objective.

This is why it is appropriate for us to first of all liberate Arab spirit and determination, which could not be achieved without the development of human resources and without improving the level of our technological acquisitions, which must be diffused on a large scale throughout the Arab world. This will be the price we have to pay to reduce our dependence on the industrial world in the different domains of development.

Pursue Action to Link and Associate Our Economic Interests

I have with great satisfaction noted that heading your list of objectives of the strategy for a joint Arab economic action program is the necessity of liberating the Arab and freeing his creative energies to get him to participate in the development program and to profit from its benefits.

We are convinced that the overall development that has motivated the efforts of generations of Arabs and which has pressed them to make sacrifices is based essentially on the necessity of satisfying the basic needs of our citizens, of assuring them dignity by affording all of them opportunities for learning and by creating productive and profitable jobs that benefit the whole community, which will make possible greater participation of the people in the effort toward development.

Honorable Delegates,

Overall Arab development will certainly profit from the development in progress in each Arab country and will also be strengthened by the joint Arab action plan.

This is why we must make an effort to gradually reduce the gap between the Arab countries and pursue our action to link and associate Arab economic interests. To our way of thinking, this is the best path to follow to realize the aspirations of the Arab Nation and the generations of Arabs who have been striving for well-being and union.

Aside from conducting joint Arab projects and promoting trade and capital investment among the Arab countries, we must grant the support necessary for the realization of each country's development plans, all the while working toward their integration into the framework of a pan-Arab plan for joint economic action. This support must above all be realized through participation in the financing of projects for the construction of economic and social facilities designed to create new opportunities for investment and profit.

In connection with this, permit me to remind you that the dean of Arab and African national struggles, that supreme fighter, Habib Bourguiba, has made all the problems we are discussing here together and all Arab concerns the focal point of his fight against colonialism and imperialism. It is he who has sung the praises of the promotion of people. He emancipated women and generalized education, making technological expertise one of the major objectives of education. He has made equitable distribution of wealth the foundation of our economy and he has never ceased to believe and to affirm that the union the Arab countries aspire to must first go through a phase of joint reciprocal economy.

Honorable Delegates,

Both political and economic joint Arab action has without any doubt benefited from the contribution of this meeting of your council. In fact, as have the earlier ones, this session of the Arab Economic and Social Council has contributed to the establishment of constructive and effective resolutions.

No doubt the agreement that prevails among Arab leaders will work in favor of Arab solidarity and spur our nation on to work quickly and resolutely to realize its aspirations for dignity and prosperity.

There can be no doubt that the president of this session has spared no effort to see to it that the results anticipated at this meeting were obtained within the deadlines set for them.

In conclusion, let me take advantage of this opportunity to express, before you assembled here, to the secretary general of the League of Arab States and his collaborator in the field of economic development, Dr Abdelhassen Zelzela, and to all the staff of the league our esteem and respect and our encouragement for the ongoing efforts they are expending to facilitate the task assigned to these institutions and organizations so that they can be assured of the success of the projects we plan to carry out.

Permit me, Excellencies, to thank you for your praiseworthy efforts these past 2 days and to greet our other brother delegates who are to join you in participating in the proceedings of the two special sessions to be held by the governors of the FADES and FMA.

On this occasion, I wish you complete success in your work and a pleasant stay in Tunis.

The president said to me that perhaps I was tired because of the job I just finished during the 2 days I spent in our sister republic of Algeria. I feel that the positive results we have achieved in our work constitute a reason for rejoicing and I hope that your work will achieve the same results.

May God help us in what we are doing for the well-being, dignity and invulnerability of our glorious Arab Nation.

Resuming the floor, Dr Walid Kamhawi thanked the prime minister and asked him to transmit a message expressing his esteem to the supreme fighter for the interest Tunisia has shown with regard to the different Arab issues.

Officials Speak at Governors' Meeting

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 12 Sep 80 p 6

[Text] A joint meeting of the FMA and FADES Councils of Governors was held yesterday morning in Tunis with Messrs Hanna Ouda, president of the Jordanian National Plan Council, Mansour Moalla, minister of finance and plan, Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States, Mohamed Imadi, director general of the FADES, and Jaouad Hachem, president of the FMA, attending.

At the start of the proceedings, Mr Hanna Ouda delivered an address in which he thanked Tunisia for its hospitality, then turned the presidency of the meeting over to Mr Mansour Moalla.

The minister of finance and plan delivered a speech on this occasion in which he said: "We are starting in on a new decade of development during which the Arab countries intend to achieve the launching of the Arab economy through mobilization of all Arab resources and in conformity with the overall socioeconomic development strategy outlined by the secretary general of the league at the recommendation of the 10th Arab Summit Meeting and approved by the Arab Economic and Social Council.

"The economic development of the Arab world," Mr Moalla added, "constitutes the essential basis of Arab solidarity and of the reinforcement of Arab positions in international forums. The Arab world is today in a state of economic dependence for its food and the satisfaction of its daily needs as well as for its equipment and defense."

After reminding us that this meeting was devoted to an examination of the resources, ways and means of financing Arab economic development, Mr Mansour Moalla noted that the Arab Nation has wealth which will enable it to realize its aspirations if the Arab countries know how to exploit it for the benefit of their development. In connection with this he called for the development of financial aid from those

Arab countries possessing capital for the other Arab countries to help the latter to finance their national development programs. "It would be desirable for the Arab countries to give up non-Arab financial aid and become autonomous in terms of financing."

The minister further emphasized the need for increasing FMA and FADES capital so that these two institutions would be in a position to satisfy the development needs of the Arab countries.

He also advocated expansion of the staffs of these two Arab institutions.

Mr Moalla called on these two institutions to act to get competent Arabs practicing their specialties abroad to return to the Arab countries and place their abilities at the service of the Arab Nation, which has great need of these abilities.

The minister of finance and plan recommended increased cooperation and exchanges of experience and information between these two institutions and Arab financial organizations.

He also advocated reform and revision of the methods of operation of the two funds to adapt them to the needs and realities of the Arab countries.

Noting that our problem most often lies in the choice of projects and their execution, Mr Moalla called on the FADES to aid the Arab countries in the domain of identification and conception of economic projects.

"The Arab countries," Mr Moalla added in conclusion, "are now being called on to rely on their own resources and to give serious thought to the realization of their objectives, which are the protection of their territories, property and independence under one and the same banner and within the framework of a reciprocal economy."

The Arab countries are also being called on to consolidate the various Arab funds so that they will be able to respond to the needs and economic and social aspirations of the Arab peoples.

In his speech at the joint meeting of the FMA and FADES Councils of Governors, Mr Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab States, said: "We need solidarity and effective cohesion in the face of the challenges we are confronted with, the maneuvers of those who are actively engaged in imposing their domination on the peoples of the Third World, in exhausting their resources, in weakening their solidarity, in dividing their ranks, today when the community of this Third World has demonstrated its ability to change the balance of power and international relations.

But to gain for ourselves, for us Arabs, the freedom to choose and to set out options in motion to serve the interests of our nation, we must strengthen our unity and improve our relations on the basis of reciprocity among our countries."

He, furthermore, stressed the fact that each Arab country has, of course, been separately engaged in increasing its own resources and in improving the social and economic conditions of its population inside its borders independently of any pan-Arab vision, which has involved differences in growth rates and reduced the

ability to mobilize Arab energies to strengthen pan-Arab security and social stability and to speed up the process of development.

After analyzing the Arab economic situation and stressing the importance of the role played by the FADES and the FMA, Mr Klibi said:

"We consider what your two institutions have accomplished or are getting ready to do to be a contribution to the edification of Arab power, enabling us to assume the responsibilities involved in overall development and to deal with Israeli acts of aggression, whatever form they may take, especially at this time when we are receiving information that gives us cause for concern.

"The Israeli prime minister, who constantly resorts to a fait accompli policy as far as the international community is concerned, whether it be in the form of the settlement of colonies, exactions from Palestinian resistance fighters in the occupied territories or the Judaization of Al Quds and proclamation of that city as the capital of the Zionist state.

"The day before yesterday, the Zionist leader announced that he had reliable information establishing the fact that Syria was getting ready to launch an attack on Israel in a few days."

Appeal for Vigilance

"This technique is classic," Mr Klibi added. "We have been stuck with the bill over and over again. Each time Israel decides to engage in an act of aggression against the Arab countries, it sets false alarms and blusteringly announces that it is certain that the Arabs are preparing to attack.

"From this rostrum," the secretary general of the League of Arab States said, "We declare that the responsibility for any act of aggression in the region must be assumed by the Zionist state. The latter would, in fact, like to take advantage of what it considers to be a vacancy in the government in the United States to engage in aggression in order to extend its territory, establish its domination, lay hands on Arab lands and violate holy sites revered by both Moslems and Christians."

He concluded:

"In the face of these designs, we can only direct to the United Nations, to all nations that love peace and justice, an appeal for vigilance and ask them to warn the Zionist government of the consequences of what it may be tempted to undertake against UN forces, against Lebanese territory, directly or through agents who have linked their fate with Israeli interests, or after all against any country whatsoever in the region.

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KLIBI ADDRESSES LEBANON PROBLEMS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 20 Sep 80 pp 1, 5

[Text] It is up to Arabs to support Lebanon and it is up to Lebanon to work towards an Arab solution to the problem.

Chedli Klibi, secretary general of the League of Arab Nations left Beirut yesterday for Baghdad.

The secretary general of the league, who was seen off in particular by Fuad Butros, Lebanese minister of foreign affairs, said the following:

"The discussions I have had have helped me to get a better grasp of all the elements of the Lebanese problem. I can assure you that this problem is uppermost in the minds of the members of the Arab community and of the secretary general of the league.

"I have informed their excellencies, president Sarkis, Prime Minister El Hoss, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Butros of recent Arab decisions regarding Lebanon and aimed at strengthening the Lebanese state in all areas and in all ways to resist the Israeli enemy and to use the influence which Arab states have achieved to end the aggression against Southern Lebanon.

"We have explored what we ought to do to help Lebanon free itself from the painful situation it has been in for 5 years now and what we might attempt in order to begin a movement towards peace, to spread law throughout Lebanese territory, and to try to reestablish security in the country.

"I have also spoken with Ministers Jdeph Skaff and Ali Khalil and Brig Gen Sami El Khatib, commander of deterrent forces, particularly about reestablishing Lebanese rule and about Arab assistant in the reconstruction of Lebanon.

"I reassured them that the league would adhere to the unanimous decisions made by the Arabs, taking into account the changes which have come about in the geopolitical situation of the area in general.

"At the Chamber of Deputies meeting, I saw President Mounir Abou Fahdi and Deputies Abdellatif Bayahoun and Sheykh Amine Gemayel. They explained their opinions on the situation in Lebanon and particularly in Southern Lebanon.

"I assured them of natural Arab support of Lebanon and of the conviction among all Arabs that there is a permanent bond between the future of Lebanon and that of the Arab community.

"It is precisely from this Arab point of view," Klibi concluded, "that the recent decision by the league must be viewed which requests the secretary general to make whatever contacts might be necessary to put the question of Southern Lebanon on the agenda for the next Arab meetings."

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CSO: 4400

ARAB JOURNALISTS ASSESS ARAB PRESS

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 20 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by Muhammad Rashid al-'Awwid: "What Arab Journalists Have To Say About the Arab Press"]

[Text] AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM was blown up, Riyadh Taha was assassinated, and prior to all this, Salim al-Lawzi was murdered.

The word of the press has become a source of concern, resentment and indignation. But the persons concerned--the persons with this power to provoke concern, resentment and indignation, prefer not to discuss their own affairs, though they discuss all other matters

We asked them to address this matter and talk about their Arab press. We were like someone scraping the scab off their wound, for they talked like wounded people.

I have met with Arab jounalists at various conferences and political gatherings which we attended jointly and then wrote about; I took the opportunity to invite them to discuss the Arab press.

They asked me how reserved they should be in writing about this subject. My answer: "Write freely. Your work will be published in Kuwait, where the press is free from the coercion felt by the press in most other Arab countries.

Awaiting a Political Initiative

Yusuf al-Rafhi, chief of the foreign section of newspaper AL-KHALIJ: "The progress of journalism is related first to the theory of government and then to the consciousness of the masses. The theory of government reflects on the press. If the society lives in a democratic state, it means that the press is free.

"If the theory of government is one of controls, and the press is part of the overall entity, then it is also controlled.

"Arab sensitivities play a very large role in the political topics treated by the press. If the relations are good between two countries, it is difficult for one to write criticism of the other country's regime. When relations between two countries deteriorate, each government inspires the press to criticize, expose and provoke the other regime.

"In technology and artistry, the Arab press has made great strides. It has become nearly the most modern in the world of journalism. At times, this creates a contradiction between form and content. While form is advancing, content is lagging behind to a great extent.

"In any case, journalistic work is making progress. The future of the Arab press is favorable. Officials acknowledge that the press has a role to play, and they sense its influence. One can now see that the Arab press has begun to handle subjects which it was previously forbidden to discuss.

"Finally, the Arab news media constantly seek political initiatives with clear guidelines serving the Arabs. Whenever there is such an initiative, the Arab journalist promptly undertakes to perform his task as best he can. The Arab journalist is an Arab citizen who assumes his responsibility and works very hard at it."

Army of Mercenaries and the Prostitution of the Profession

Ghassan Sharbil of AL-NAHAR in Beirut: "Discussion of journalism requires a discussion of freedom. It is a discussion talking place throughout the Arab nation. Where there is no freedom, there is no journalism, because the press which echoes just one voice cannot respect truth and enrich the reader.

"Thus, a discussion of the Arab press leads us to certain situations where there are independent newspapers not forced to advocate this or that party, or to applaud one regime or another.

"Such cases are so few, they are rare in our Arab world. A journalist rarely has the opportunity to make effective criticism. He is usually given a conditional right to criticize, so that the right to criticize is transformed into an obligation to express approval and support.

"The problem does not just involve the press. It is a problem of the way the various regimes regard the Arab individual, who is still viewed as a quantity.

"In the short run, I do not expect the independent press to grow. On the contrary, I expect an increased campaign against the independent press, using 'smarter' methods.

"While I criticize regimes, I do not overlook directing criticism at institutions of the press and newsmen themselves, because an army of

mercenaries has shared in prostituting this profession. The ordinary citizen has come to see the press as a mere mouthpiece, so often have certain journalists acted as servants.

"Finally, the development of a genuine, fress press which respects the individual depends on an increase in the progress or growth of democratic and secular movements in various Arab societies."

Press is the Captive of all Regimes

Muhammad al-Ashhab, former editor of the daily AL-MITHAQ AL-WATANI, which expresses the opinion of the parliamentary majority in Morocco: "The situation of the Moroccan press is something that affects me personally at present. It is a situation where it is difficult to find journalistic work free of the tyranny of the party press.

"It is true that the existence of pulpits of information through which the political institutions express their positions and proclaim their principles is a positive sign. However, the tyranny of party opinion over journalism clearly contributes toward not publishing the simple objective truth.

"Every morning these various political pulpits publish various opinions in line with their basic postulates. The reader does not try to seek the truth elsewhere.

"In other words, I'm saying that journalism in Morocco is the same as the profession of a politician. Thus, changing jobs from one newspaper to another is considered a switch from one line to another. Consequently, professional journalism is nonexistent.

"As for the emigre press, I think it has fallen into the same trap as the one into which the press in the Arab world has fallen.

"The basic problem of the Arab press in general is one of freedom.

"Allegiance to one regime or another confines the practice of journalism, whether publication is in Europe or the Arab world. For this reason, emigration is useless.

"In essence, journalism has remained the captive of all regimes, of anyone who pays the most. It has become like a commodity sold here and there."

Michel al-Nimri of the Lebanese AL-SAFIR: "Democracy is the necessary motive force for the development of journalism.

"With the utmost objectivity, we can say that Arab journalism has registered gains, both quantitative and qualitative, in recent years. The leap forward might have been greater and more significant, were it

not for the barriers which have prevented and continue to prevent this. The most prominent of these factors are:

"1. The absence of democratic freedoms. Various forms of deep-rooted Eastern despotism and the lack of disposition to inform still prevail in the region.

"Democracy is the motive force for the development of journalism. Without democracy, we will continue to remain in place. It is democracy which allows all factions to surface, and members of the Left to express their opinions without members of the Right or Center being deprived of this right.

"The absence of democracy deforms not only the press, but also the individual Arab from within. Under programmed suppression, the individual becomes a freak who is completely powerless.

"I do not want to talk too much about this factor, which is well known to everyone. I will say only that those who think they can protect their political or economic positions by prohibiting freedoms make a great mistake.

"The absence of democracy creates its own antithesis. It creates a tendency toward conspiracy and terrorism. It generates violence. It causes a resort to arms. The mistakes of democracy may be corrected only through more democracy.

"2. The second factor is the obstacles and barriers raised against the press at the borders between Arab countries, making it a regional press with limited concerns. The destruction of these obstacles and barriers fabricated by imperialism is imperative for the development of the press, for the Arab nation to regain its unity, for the individual Arab to achieve prosperity, and for our nation to take its place in building a happier and more humane society.

"In this connection, I think the initial step lies in permitting the free transmission of ideas of all shades, so that every Arab field is transformed into a rich garden by the great diversity of the colors of its flowers.

"3. The third factor in the decline of journalism is the fact that certain wealthy persons have entered the world of newspaper publishing because of their tremendous funds in banks, not because of any particular interest they have in the press.

"The investment of funds in newspaper projects is not in itself objectionable, but what is objectionable is the capitalists who set themselves up as masters of a profession in which they have no previous experience or knowledge.

"The capitalists' invasion of the domain of the press, even if it has contributed toward the technological development of this press, has unfortunately transformed it into a consumer commodity not subject to the standards applicable to this commodity.

"As I mentioned, these are some of the basic factors. One can include scores of other reasons and secondary factors, but I preferred to stick to the basic ones.

"The greatest lie which has deceived some people for a long time is the claim of certain newspapers and magazines that they were forced to emigrate and publish in certain Western capitals for reasons connected with democracy.

"Despite all its tragedy and despite the war which has continued without a halt during the last 5 years, Lebanon is still the oasis of democracy compared to the Eastern despotism prevailing in most of the other Arab countries.

"The magazine AL-SAYYAD, for example, is primarily social in nature and does not suffer from political problems. Nonetheless, it is published where it has emigrated, even though its sister AL-ANWAR is still published in Beirut.

"AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWWALI is published in Paris, and its sister AL-NAHAR is published in Beirut. Why is the former published in Paris for reasons of democracy, while the latter is published in Beirut?

There are numerous other examples. The magazines involved are very well known to the reader. I do not want to disparage them, but let them permit me to ask them to stop claiming that the absence of democracy is a reason for their publication abroad.

"We do not reveal any secret when we say that their situation has not changed. Whether they are in Beirut, Paris or Sierra Leone, they are the captives of the governments which finance them."

[Unidentified opinion from] 'UKAZ, Saudi Arabia: "The Arab press today is in its most critical stage. Faced with a reader who no longer accepts everything written at face value, it is trying to improve its image, and to gain the confidence of the Arab reader who has become conscious, mature, and in a position to bring any newspaper either success or failure. The degree of awareness acquired by the Arab reader makes it impossible for any writer or newspaper to ignore his thinking. There are no longer any fallacies which find a place among his thoughts. The reader seeks nothing but the truth. He wants the opportunity to make up his own mind, and not have an opinion imposed on him.

"Also the Arab press today faces an apprehensive reader who is subjected to psychological pressure, and who feels that his nation is a center of attention, with the entire world staring at it. Perhaps his importance

to the world has made him search himself for his proper place in the world, and has sharpened his thinking.

"These things taken together require the Arab press today to be a press of ideas, rather than a commercial publication adapting itself to the 'commercial' or 'political' market!

"An authentic, distinguished press reflects our culture and values, without narrow-mindedness, but with a bold intellectual receptivity and confidence in the strengths of a nation with a noble history.

"Our Arab press today must suggest guidelines to deal with our 'chronic' social problems.

"Our Arab press must play a role in molding a new responsible generation.

"Our Arab press must be honest with itself above all, and then honest with others!"

He Seldom Sees the Arab Press

Hisham Mansur of Tunis, correspondent of the Swiss News Agency and Swiss Radio:

"I do not have complete knowledge of the Tunisian press, because I have not lived in Tunisia for a long time. However, I can say that the problems of the Tunisian press are the same as those of the Arab press. There are certain differences reflected by the difference in regimes. The Maghrib [Moroccan] press is a partisan press where each newspaper is the spokesman for one party or another. However, in Tunisia there is one ruling political party; consequently the press there is a one-party press.

"[In Tunisia,] there are three newspapers published in Arabic and three in French. These newspapers are almost all the same, because Tunisian newspapers are more concerned with news than analysis. They reflect events on the surface without examining their background or dimensions.

"As for the freedom granted the Tunisian press, it is relative. We can criticize social and economic domains, but the Tunisian press is not allowed to approach or discuss the domain of politics.

"The opposition press in Tunisia includes the monthly AL-DIMUQRATIYAH and the weekly AL-RA'Y. Since they are not dailies, their influence on Tunisian society is negligible. Their readership is limited, and does not include the entire Tunisian society. I may add that Tunisian borders are open to Arab newspapers, except for the extremist newspapers which are not allowed to enter Tunisia.

"One last thing I would like to mention is that as an Arab journalist working in Switzerland, I seldom see the Arab press, so as to review and quote it. When I visit Arab embassies in Geneva, [and ask for Arab newspapers], I receive apologies, because the newspapers of their respective countries do not reach them!"

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FRESH RUSSIAN TROOPS REPORTEDLY LAND NEAR IRANIAN BORDER

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 26 Aug 80 pp 3, 6

[Article: "Mujahidin Attack Babrak Karmal's Residence in Kabul; An Undersecretary Wounded; 10,000 Fresh Russian Troops Equipped With Modern Weapons Arrive in Afghanistan"]

[Text] Tokyo, 25 Aug (APP/APA)--The Afghan Mujahidin claim that they have destroyed Karmal's residence. The Chinese News Agency, XINHUA, reports that the Mujahidin carried out this attack last week. According to this report, the residence was built for Karmal's father. An undersecretary, (Mahmud?) Gulam was seriously wounded as a result of the attack.

The Mujahidin have increased their activities in Kannar, Paktia, Nangarhar, Kunduz and Parwan. According to another report, the Russians last week attacked Wardak Province using planes, tanks, helicopters and armored cars. The activities of the Mujahidin are limited [there], because of the army stationed on roads joining Kabul with Ghazni. On the second day of the attack, the Russian army used more destructive weapons. Russian planes heavily bombed (Ankhi Shansh) Valley and Carot hills and used poison gas, tear gas and sleep-inducing gas. Inspite of all of this, it was the Russians who suffered more loss of life.

According to one report, the chief commander of Hazb-e-Islami [forces] was recently killed in Piktia. The Mujahid, Qadeer Mohammed, had joined Mohammed Yunus Khaalis' Hazb-e-Islami 2 years ago.

Meanwhile, 10,000 Russian troops equipped with the latest weapons have arrived in a central province of Afghanistan near the Iranian border. According to the reports reaching Kabul, these soldiers landed at the airport of (Sheen Dand) from Russia. This airport is 90 kilometers east of the Afghan-Iran border, and 50 kilometers east of the center of Afghanistan. The Russian army now numbers 80,000. According to Afghan tourists, the military airbase of Sheen Dar [previously spelled Dand] has been transformed into a civilian airport, because war is continuously raging in that part of the city.

7997
CSO: 4203

RUSSIANS PLAN TO MOVE PEOPLE FROM AROUND CONTROLLED CITIES

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 29 Aug 80 pp 3, 10

[News report: "The Mujahidin Surround Jalalabad, Engage in Fierce Fighting With Russian Army; All Roads to Jalalabad Are Cut Off; Russian Army Moves by Means of Helicopters; Part of Control Tower at Airport Destroyed"]

[Text] London, 28 Aug (Radio Report)--The Afghan Mujahidin have besieged the city and military cantonment of Jalalabad situated on the highway connecting the Khyber Pass and Kabul. The Russian army can reach the cantonment by air only. The Russian army is trying to break the siege, and has asked for reinforcements. Heavy fighting resulting in great loss of life on both sides is reported.

According to reports reaching New Delhi, this is the biggest battle since Russia entered Afghanistan. The Mujahidin downed two helicopters and one MIG fighter. In addition, they destroyed several armored cars and tanks. They closed all roads leading to the city, and are attacking the enemy from hillocks around the city. The freedom fighters also attacked the airport of Jalalabad and destroyed a part of the control tower. To deal with the deteriorating situation, Russian army reinforcements have been flown in. Battles in other parts of the country are also reported.

According to the BBC, Jalalabad is very important because of its geographical proximity to Pakistan. Therefore, Russia will leave no stone unturned to free it from the Mujahidin. A large counterattack by the Russians is expected soon. The loss of Jalalabad would endanger control over the puppet government in Kabul. Meanwhile, trucks carrying fruit were struck on the Jalalabad-Kabul highway, and were forced to return to Kabul.

According to the Voice of America, Russian artillery stationed 20 miles north of Kabul is shelling the area heavily and forcing the local population to move to Kabul. Fighting has also started in (Pighman) and (Shakar Durra). In the south, around the (Kandoz) area, Russian planes bombed a small town. According to some diplomatic sources, the recently arrived delegation of senior military officers from Russia has suggested using guerrilla tactics against the Mujahidin. The Karmal government is going to follow that advice.

Removal of People Around Cities

According to APA, the Russian army in Afghanistan is working on a plan according to which people in areas surrounding cities under Russian control will be asked to move, in order to protect the cities from the influence of the Mujahidin, who have a strong hold on rural areas. According to this plan, the Russians have begun to attack the hideouts of freedom fighters. Camps of freedom fighters at (Pighman), (Charikar) Road, (Shiwaai) and Jalalabad Road have been attacked. The Russian army has established check points on bridges and road crossings. The Russian army is bombing the outlying areas of Kabul and other cities, and forcing the freedom fighters to flee to the mountains.

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CSO: 4203

RUSSIANS REPORTEDLY STALLED IN MILITARY DEADLOCK

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 25 Aug 80 p 6

[Article: "Kabul in State of Siege; Russian Officers Cannot Leave City; Russians Have No Control Over Rural Areas, Military Rebellion Feared; Former U.S. Ambassador Robert Newman's Impressions; Russian Declared Compulsory Language; Kabul University Under Russian Teachers' Control"]

[Text] Karachi, 24 Aug--After 8 months, the Russians have still not succeeded in controlling the rural areas of Afghanistan. Inspite of their 80,000 troops in Afghanistan, the Russians have not achieved anything more than an embarrassing military deadlock. This impression was given by the former U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert Newman. Mr Newman told the weekly TIMES that while the Russians can afford to stay in Afghanistan for an infinite period of time, they cannot win the war. The people of Afghanistan will not let them win the war.

Last week a high level Russian delegation arrived in Afghanistan. According to some diplomatic sources, this delegation is going to examine the reasons for the slow progress of the war. The TIMES reported that people visiting Kabul get the feeling that Kabul is in a state of siege. After many weeks of efforts, Russian armored cars are still stationed on corners of roads and in front of government buildings. Russian officers are afraid to leave Kabul. Kabul police search taxis at night for weapons and identification of riders, because the Russians are concerned about the rebellion of Afghan soldiers and attacks by the Mujahidin.

The Russians have suffered heavy losses in Herat, a commerce center with a population of 160,000, situated in the western part of the country. Herat is totally out of Karmal's control, and is in great turmoil. Freedom fighters and Afghan soldiers are engaged in fighting round the clock. The famous eye hospital of the city, named after Noor Mohammed Taraki has been closed. The Afghan army, which once boasted a number of 100,000 troops in its ranks, is almost scattered now. The Russians, inspite of their repeated claims that they are only temporarily in the country, clearly plan to make this a satellite state. They exercise full control over all ministries through their advisers known as undersecretaries.

According to a government order, Russian has been declared as second language in schools and has been made compulsory. The New Delhi correspondent of London's DAILY TELEGRAPH reports that the Russians have started a regular program to influence the minds of young Afghans and Russian teachers have recently taken control of Kabul University and other educational institutions. Hundreds of Afghan young men are sent to Moscow on scholarships, and Afghan educational institutions are being supplied with Russian textbooks.

7997
CSO: 4203

FOUR ANTI-KARMAL FORMER MINISTERS EXECUTED IN KABUL

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 27 Aug 80 pp 1, 6

[Article: "Four Anti-Karmal (Former) Ministers Executed in Kabul; Russian Commander's Jeep Destroyed in a Mine Explosion in Sarobi"]

[Text] New Delhi, 26 Aug (APP/REUTER/Radio Report)--Four [former] ministers of the anti-Karmal Khalq faction have been hanged. Among the executed are: minister of higher education, Mohammed Sooma; [former] minister of education, Halbeli; [former] minister of power, Mansoor Hashmi; and [former] minister of culture, Khial Mohammed Kitwazi. All of them were in jail in Pul Charkhi.

According to reports reaching Delhi, the activities of the Mujahidin are increasing by leaps and bounds. At Sarobi, on the Kabul-Jalalabad road, the freedom fighters blew up the jeep of a Russian commander with a mine. The commander, his daughter and two officers in the jeep were killed.

The restlessness of the Afghan soldiers stationed in Sarobi is very important, because they are charged with keeping the Khyber Pass open. Conditions in Sarobi have worsened following the inner strife of the Khalq and Parcham factions of the ruling party. Reports of skirmishes between commandoes and officers of the government army have been received.

Meanwhile, travel between Kabul and Jalalabad has been suspended, because the road between the two cities is closed. Hundreds of trucks carrying fruit are stranded on the highway. If this road is closed for a long period of time, it will adversely affect the already suffering Afghan economy. It will also cause scarcity of food in the country.

According to the BBC, the Kabul-(Torkhum) road has been destroyed by the Mujahidin. Hundreds of trucks are stranded outside the capital on this road leading to the Khyber Pass. The Afghan Mujahidin have increased their activities against the Afghan Marxist Party. Their activities are more pronounced in three provinces. About 30 or 35 members of this party are killed daily in Kunduz, Takhar and Baghlan. The Mujahidin claim in one pamphlet that they have killed 1,800 supporters of the government during the last 2 months.

Meanwhile, Kabul Radio reports clashes between the government forces and the Mujahidin in several parts of Afghanistan. The radio claims that a group of Mujahidin was annihilated and 10 Mujahidin were captured in Helmand. However, this report was not verified.

The mayor of Chasikar is among those killed recently. According to a report, the mayor was working at his home, when two gunmen jumped the fence around his house and began to fire, killing the mayor, his wife, two children and a servant. A son, who was not at home, escaped this fate.

7997
CSO: 4203

MUJAHIDIN SAID TO HAVE BESIEGED JALALABAD

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 30 Aug 80 pp 3, 6

[News report: "Soldiers (340) of Sarobi Garrison Join Mujahidin; Mujahidin Mine All Roads Leading to Jalalabad; Governor of Nangarhar Takes Refuge in Army Garrison"]

[Text] London, 29 Aug--The governor of Nangarhar Province has fled from his official residence. Jalalabad is Nangarhar's capital, and is being besieged by the Mujahidin. According to the DAILY TELEGRAPH, after fleeing his residence, the governor took refuge in the garrison of the 19th Afghan brigade. According to information received, the siege of Jalalabad is considered to be the biggest challenge to the Russians so far. It is said that the Mujahidin have mined all roads leading to Jalalabad.

According to the DAILY TELEGRAPH tourists arriving in New Delhi report that Russian bombers are bombing towns north of Kabul. The Russians are using napalm bombs, which is causing heavy destruction in these towns. Numerous innocent citizens have died; very few are safe.

The Afghan Mujahidin and rebel government soldiers have captured a power station in Sarobi, plunging many parts of Kabul in darkness. According to a source in Kabul, 340 soldiers belonging to the military garrison in Sarobi have joined the Mujahidin along with their weapons. According to an earlier report, the army was called to suppress some disturbances caused by commandoes in Sarobi.

According to western diplomatic sources, the Kabul-Jalalabad road was opened to traffic on Thursday night [28 August]. This road was closed on 20 August because of Russian and Afghan army movements. According to some reports, the Mujahidin had mined this road between (Surakhpur) and (Mahipur). According to a reliable source in Kabul, the Russians bombed the old city of Jalalabad. The Mujahidin have now taken over this area, and forced the governor and other officials to take refuge in a military garrison. This source added that there was heavy loss of life on both sides. More than 300 soldiers of the Russian and government armies were killed. Also, seven helicopters and two MIG planes were downed.

7997
CSO: 4203

BRIEFS

ZAHIR SHAH'S RETURN REJECTED--London, 6 Aug--The Afghan Mujahidin have rejected the proposal to reinstate former king Zahir Shah, and said that if Zahir Shah returns to Afghanistan he would be put in chains like a criminal to answer charges of crimes against Islam and the people. News had circulated a few days ago that attempts were being made to bring Zahir Shah, who is now living in exile in Italy, back home to Afghanistan. However, Mujahidin leaders told newsmen in Peshawar that no Mujahid would invite Zahir Shah to return, because he was active against Islam and the Afghan people during his rule, and was responsible for the poverty of the people in the country. The Mujahidin leaders said that some people did try to bring Zahir Shah back, but were not successful. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 7 Aug 80 p 10] 7997

CUBAN MILITARY ADVISERS REPORTED--London, 28 Aug (APP/AFP)--The conservative DAILY TELEGRAPH reports that according to diplomatic sources in New Delhi, Cuban military advisers considered to be experts in guerrilla warfare are fighting in Afghanistan. However, it is not known how many of them there are in Afghanistan. The New Delhi correspondent of the DAILY TELEGRAPH reports that the number of Cubans being admitted to Kabul University has increased rapidly. The newspaper adds that it is firmly established now that the USSR has failed to suppress the Muslim freedom fighters in Afghanistan, and that admission of Cuban students to Kabul University is being stepped up on Russian orders. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 29 Aug 80 p 3] 7997

IMPORTATION OF GOODS--Peshawar, 28 Aug--Aside from military control, the Russians want to take over the economic affairs of Afghanistan. To this end, the Karmal government has instructed all business firms involved in international trade to decrease their business with Japan and [West] European countries, and to import goods from communist countries. Meanwhile, Russia has started exporting goods such as radios, television sets, refrigerators and cars to Kabul on a large scale. It should be pointed out that Afghanistan used to import all its necessities from Japan and [West] European countries. It is noted that British cigarettes are not imported anymore. Instead, cigarettes from communist countries, such as Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary are being sold in Afghanistan. The Afghan Government has restricted travel too. It has instructed its embassies not to issue visas to anyone, except people from India and communist countries. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 29 Aug 80 p 10] 7997

FIGHTING IN SAROBI--Kabul, 29 Aug (APP/REUTER/Radio Report)--Afghan Mujahidin and soldiers who have defected from the Afghan army have captured an electric power station in Sarobi, 30 miles east of Kabul. The Afghan capital and its surrounding areas were plunged into darkness on Monday and Tuesday. According to news reaching New Delhi, most (340) of the soldiers in the Sarobi garrison have joined the Afghan Mujahidin along with their weapons and ammunition. It was learned that the Russian army was sent last week to Sarobi to suppress an uprising in commando barracks there. According to the same source, the Mujahidin have mined the highway between Kabul and Jalalabad. This highway is apparently still closed. According to a reliable source in Kabul, the Russian army has bombed Jalalabad, killing many people of both sides. A total of 300 Russian and Afghan soldiers have been killed and 7 helicopters and 2 MIG fighter planes destroyed. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 30 Aug 80 pp 1, 6] 7997

CSO: 4203

CRUDE PRODUCTION CUTBACK STATISTICS REPORTED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 22 Sep 80 p 1

[Article signed E.M.: "A Positive Contribution to the Stabilization of the Market"]

[Text] Like other OPEC members, Algeria has just announced a cutback in its oil exports.

The cutback, amounting to 100,000 barrels a day, will become effective within a few days, and it of course contributes to the trend taking shape among OPEC members aiming to reabsorb the current surplus, which exerts intolerable pressure on the crude oil prices of OPEC countries.

If one takes into account the statements made by certain OPEC countries since the Vienna conference, one can estimate as of today that the voluntary cutbacks decided upon amount to a million barrels a day.

It is very probable that this trend will increase and could affect all OPEC countries. Cutbacks could thus amount to nearly 2.7 million barrels a day. This indicates the importance of the measures that each OPEC country has decided to take on its own in order to modify the current situation of the market, which is unfavorable to OPEC countries and is at present characterized by a record stock estimated at 6.7 billion among OECD nations.

These decisions prepare a climate more favorable to the examination of different dossiers to be submitted to the sovereigns and chiefs of state who will be meeting in Baghdad at the beginning of November.

It is undeniable that the decrease in exports from OPEC countries, if it should become general as seems to be the case among the whole membership, constitutes a positive factor improving the chances first that an OPEC summit will be held, and second that it will succeed.

This should be considered a contribution to the stabiliziation of the market, which is characterized at present by excessive overstocking, because, while in the short run this overstocking constitutes a means of

exerting pressure on oil prices, it can only result, in the long run, in situations similar to those we experienced during the year '79, leadin consequently to a disorganization of the totality of rules governing the international oil market.

The readjustment of the price of a barrel between 1979 and 1980 was certainly a factor which encouraged hopes for a great mobilization of other energy sources. It simulates consuming countries to save energy, and, as a last resort, it draws the attention of the international community to the pending or ultimate risks of an oil shortage, and consequently to the prospect of a serious economic recession.

Developing nations have nothing to gain from such a prospect, and their supplies are in danger of being seriously compromised, eventhough some of these countries may have the means of paying the price required to replenish their stocks. It is well known that in situations of shortage the problem of prices becomes secondary for buyers, while that of availability becomes the major one. Such being the case, it is evident that OPEC owes it to itself to make a positive and notable contribution so that developing countries can enjoy a priority in supplies, and so that deprived nations can be helped to develop their domestic energy resources, to modernize their means of production and their infrastructures, so as to improve the efficiency of the utilization of a barrel of oil imported.

The sense of responsibility shown by members of OPEC, and particularly by those who have individually and voluntarily decided to reduce their exports, thus constitutes an eminently positive political act. Short-sighted objectives have been set aside to plan for the future and to improve the opportunities for agreement on a long-term OPEC oil policy. This cannot fail to diminish the threat of an impending energy crisis.

9347
CSO: 4400

CAMPAIGN SEEN AGAINST SONATRACH'S CLAIMS ON LNG PRICING

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 23 Sep 80 p 1

[Article: "On the Subject of a Press Campaign on the Price of Liquified Natural Gas (LNG)]

[Text] An orchestrated press campaign aiming to misrepresent SONATRACH's legitimate claims for a revision of the conditions of the export of natural gas--notably its price--in the light of new data on the international energy market seems to have been in progress for some time.

SONATRACH, anxious to safeguard its advantages in a difficult negotiation, did not deem it necessary to deny certain allegations, one as fantastic as the other, and seems instead to concentrate its efforts on articulating concrete positive proposals which will promote the progress of current negotiations.

The responsible attitude which the national corporation SONATRACH has maintained with regard to these slanted news reports--emitted by certain Western business interests--seems to have been misrepresented, so that the statements of principle expressed by the highest authorities in the country with regard to Algerian natural gas export policy are forgotten.

The press campaign which developed, particularly before and during the Vienna triministerial OPEC conference, sheds new light on the real intentions of its prime movers, who are bent upon distorting the meaning of the responsible, constructive positions of the Algerian partners.

Rear-guard action or mere search for short-term benefits, it remains true that no other exporter of natural gas has officially announced that it has abandoned the objective of lining up the price of gas to that of crude oil, when such has not already been achieved as in the case of the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, and Mexico.

On the other hand, one can legitimately wonder about the very slight publicity given to the price increase of, reputedly, over 60 percent

for Dutch natural gas, while SONATRACH's request is being represented as "unrealistic."

Futhermore, it should not be forgotten on this subject:

--That the agreements between the Netherlands and its partners in the European Community are secret, and that the real price increase is probably much higher.

--That extraordinary pressures exerted on those in key responsible positions in European oil and natural gas enterprises led them to recognize that it was necessary to aline the price of gas on that of crude oil and that it was in the interests of consumer nations to accept this.

--That in countries which are great importers of natural gas the tendency is for the price of the gas produced to line up with the price of crude oil.

It would seem that there is, indeed, the intention of discriminating against SONATRACH after having encouraged it to become very deeply involved in investments specifically intended to supply consumer nations.

While SONATRACH has remained firm in its objectives of parity of the LNG price with that of crude oil, it has always specified to its partners that it was open to considering a progressive evolution of the price toward that objective with a reasonable delay acceptable to both parties.

The potential increase in the price of gas cannot alone explain the magnitude of these pressures and campaigns, for its impact on the bills of importing nations is, after all, not comparable to, for instance, the moderate increase in the price of "marker crude" on which OPEC has just decided.

This means in other words that the stakes are elsewhere and that it would be fairer to inform public opinion more objectively.

These real stakes reside in the approach to the problems of international trade in natural gas, which, whether we like it or not, is the primary alternative to oil--the availability of which is becoming more and more restricted. Everyone predicts a decrease in the proportion that oil will represent in the fuel supplies of industrial nations with a parallel increase in that of natural gas.

When one knows that the reserves of natural gas are of the same proportions as those of oil and that the other energy sources will contribute marginally to meeting growing energy needs, one can henceforth assess more correctly the part played by Algeria.

Another aspect of the problem, and not among the least important, is the role it plays in the new international economic order, and particularly

in north-south relations. For natural gas is generally an export from developing countries to industrialized ones. It is an energy source and a strategic raw material that the south can export in more or less sizable quantities to the north. To accept equitable terms of exchange in matters of natural gas is to acknowledge that the success of OPEC in the matter of crude oil can gain ground in another basic product and open the way to a trend with regard to other raw materials.

That is the reason why the extraordinary congress of the National Liberation Front has affirmed in the clearest possible way our objectives in matters of hydrocarbon gas, and has in so doing directed the attention of our partners to the grave consequences of an error in assessing Algeria's determination with regard to the settlement of the problem.

9347
CSO: 4400

APN PURSUES FINANCE LAW ACTIVITIES

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24 Sep 80 p 1

[Article by APS: "Finance Law of 1981: The Permanent Committees of the APN Continue Their Efforts"]

[Text] The permanent committees of the APN [National People's Assembly] continued their work on the 1981 budget on Tuesday, 23 September 1980, in the presence of members of the government.

The legal and administrative committee met in the presence of Boualem Baki, member of the [FLN's] central committee, minister of justice, in order to examine the draft operating budget of that department for fiscal 1981.

The committee for territorial development and the infrastructure examined in the presence of Mohamed Kortebi, minister of public works, questions connected with the draft operating budget for fiscal 1981 as well as some matters falling under the jurisdiction of that department.

The agriculture and agrarian reform committee met in the presence of Brahim Brahimi, member of the central committee, minister of hydraulics, to examine the 1981 draft operating budget of that sector and discussed matters relating to hydraulic policy, namely, problems of drinking water supply for inhabitants.

The meeting of the committee of education and culture, in the presence of Mohamed Cherif Kharroubi, member of the central committee, minister of primary and secondary education, was devoted to an examination of the 5-year plan and the proposed operating budget of the primary and secondary education sector.

Issues relating to human and material potentials slated for the implementation of primary education and their rational use on all Algerian territory as well as those relating to the opening of the academic year and the improvement of the material and mental frame of mind of teachers were discussed.

2662
CSO: 4400

INTERIOR MINISTER CHAIRS COORDINATION MEETING

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24 Sep 80 pp 1, 3

[Article by R. Semmad: "Coordination Meeting Chaired by the Minister of Interior Yesterday"]

[Text] A coordination meeting involving problems of public works, housing, and land reserves in the capital was held yesterday morning at the seat of the governorate under the chairmanship of Boualem Benhamouda, member of the [FLN's] politburo, minister of interior, in the presence of Ahmad Ali Ghazali and Mohamed Kortebi, members of the central committee, minister of housing and minister of public works, respectively. This working session was also attended by the members of the governorate's coordination council, officials from the foreign departments, and representatives of the ministries of planning and finance.

Important on more than one score, this meeting was the occasion for members of the government to review the complex problems hindering the capital city's development. Indeed, at a time when other governorates have moved to faster development, Algiers continues to lag behind weighed down by administrative delays.

The agenda touching on the major problems of the capital bore on three items.

Minister Benhamouda recalled the interest evidenced by the Algerian President in solving the problems faced by Algiers. He then invited the various personalities to take all the measures necessary to make up for all the time lost to achieve the goals contained in the resolutions of the 4th [FLN] Congress and the third session of its central committee.

Broaching the first point on the agenda, the director of basic infrastructures of the governorate drew the major lines of the public works sector. It is recognized that the country's political, economic, and cultural capital has reached a state of strangulation for which a solution has to be found at any cost. In the first instance the traffic thoroughfares are saturated and cause gigantic bottlenecks daily at the access points to iers at Birkhadem and Thenia.

SONATRACH at Caroubier: Building Problem

Highway projects were launched toward the end of 1979. They involve the construction of the Boudouaou-Lakhdaria expressway (over 40 km), the Algiers expressway between Birmandreis and Dar el-Beida (20 km), the East Algiers expressway (15 km), the

reconditioning of Highway 41 from Birkhadem, and the construction of an automobile bridge at Cinq Maisons. This ambitious program costing a total of 188 billion Algerian centimes has witnessed inherent difficulties as the director of the governorate explained, numerous constraints concerning expropriations of land for public use, and the existence on the route of industrial plants such as the domestic head office of SONATRACH at Caroubier.

Making a second state, the minister of interior gave details, asking interested parties to proceed with the evacuation of sites upon presentation of documents conferring title. On this score and in order to relieve the governor, it was suggested that a project chief be designated to follow the evolution of the operation from close by.

The minister cited the example of the Birkhadem crossroads which constitutes a scourge on traffic obliging motorists to wait for hours to reach the capital. Too, the realization of the reconditioning project involving National Highway 1 has become a matter of top priority to insure the smoother flow of traffic on this important road, Minister Benhamouda added.

On his part Ali Ghazali pointed to delays at all levels, delays reflected by a lag in the execution of projects. A committee was created to study the causes and find remedies for the bottleneck. Regarding the SONATRACH unit at Caroubier the minister said: "An opportunity has been given to the officials of this very old facility to review their entire strategy for putting up industrial complexes."

The second aspect of the meeting pertained to housing, veritable Achilles heel of Algiers. Thus, 200 operations relating to the highway, posts and telecommunications, and education sectors have not yet been finalized. The communal committees and district committees charged with the selection of sites have not been effective, the minister of urban development noted.

To remedy this situation he decided to centralize the job by involving elected local officials.

Decentralized Housing Operations

As regards operations under way, the delay in the realization of projects stems from payment credits which were not honored at maturity. Thus, the housing zones at Bab Ezzouar, Bordj al-Kiffan and the Anasser regions are suffering from the failure to settle the problem.

Another factor prejudicing the execution of the projects involves strategic materials: Tiles, brass founding, ironware, plate glass, and insulation items. By way of example it should be noted that under the 3-year plan Algiers Governorate had received an allocation for the construction of 55,000 housing units. By May 1980, 20,000 units were still at the discussion stage, the operations for same not having been sited.

The minister of housing did not fail to note that what is involved here before everything is a problem of authority.

In future, he said, housing operations will truly be decentralized at the governorate level. Projects will be entrusted to state or private enterprises and for all delays it will be appropriate to apply penalties to national companies, the minister added.

Broaching the issue of real estate reserves, the director of CADAT [Territorial Development Fund] cited the figure of 7,000 land lots for which surveys have been completed and 4,827 lots ready for distribution.

This operation, which caused a lot of ink to flow in Algiers, Ali Ghazali noted, must shortly be implemented by giving more time to the APC's to draw up and publicize lists of beneficiaries. As far as the minister of interior is concerned what should be done first of all is to encourage housing cooperatives, with individual housing units representing an exception. Talking of the environment, Minister Benhanouda stressed the need for laying out green spaces, recalling that the urban development code calls for a percentage of same at housing sites.

At the conclusion of this meeting the minister of interior expressed gratification at the democratic and constructive discussion that had taken place, stressing the spirit of give-and-take which must underlie relations among officials for a better reactivation of the projects under way.

2662
CSO: 4400

CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER STRESSES 5-YEAR TRANSPORT PLAN

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 22 Sep 80 p 3

[Interview with Saleh Goudjil, member of the [FLN's] central committee, minister of transportation, by Cherif Haddad: Constantine; date not given]

> [Text] Saleh Goudjil, member of the central committee, minister of transportation, who has just made a working and inspection visit in eastern Algeria, indicated to our Constantine correspondent who interviewed him the major outlines of our national transportation policy.

Question: In your previous tour you detailed a transportation policy based on a decentralization of facilities and means. Is this policy adequate to face the needs of the people during the period covered by the 5-year plan?

Answer: The entire transportation policy included in the 5-year plan strives to solve all the problems raised directly or indirectly by economic life and the needs of citizens. Knowing that these needs and the requirements of this sector are growing annually and are assuming an increasingly larger role in our concerns, we owe it to ourselves to reflect on the ways and means that will enable us to reduce this constantly growing demand in order to achieve at the conclusion of the 5-year plan a result which will not meet all our needs but at least the essential items to insure harmonious development of the regions. This planning policy is necessary for our working method with constant and up-to-date follow-up of the various levels of the country's development in order to place this important sector of the country's economy in the vanguard of national development.

Question: Your ministry seems to grant a choice place to the infrastructure of railroad transportation. Does the implementation of this goal not carry the risk of being effected at the expense of the inhabitants' immediate needs?

Answer: The concern expressed in your question is linked to what I have just noted in the preceding question. However, we know that what should enable us to face the considerable evolution of needs and accumulated demand over the years obliges us to anticipate the future, stressing the realization of the basic transportation infrastructure across Algerian territory. It is only in this fashion that we shall manage to make up for delays and envision definitive solutions.

Indeed, if there is one sector which has suffered delays--and this is a general observation made by all economic operators--it is that of the transportation infrastructure in Algeria. Too, the 5-year plan has been premised in the field of transportation on the undertaking of large-scale operations, very important to preserve the harmonious development of our economy by taking long-term prospects into account. This policy will insure the country's development without major constraint, which does not mean that our immediate concerns will be neglected.

An adequate solution of our transportation problems passes through a balancing of needs without falling for all that into the easy way out which consists in importing and acquiring costly equipment only to allow it to deteriorate or to underutilize it for lack of sufficient backup infrastructure.

Question: The reconditioning and extension of the national railroad network enjoy a priority in your ministry. A start has been made in its implementation with the project of Ramdane Djamel-Annaba. What will become of the other projects?

Answer: Taking into account regional balance and the method of complementary action, a port governorate with a very highly developed infrastructure must meet not only its own needs but also those of the bordering governorates. Talking of Ramdane Djamel, that is one of the most important projects which the railroad sector is initiating. It will be in a position to insure the relief of the two major ports of eastern Algeria (Annaba and Skikda) through transportation to the Constantine region and the rest of the country. Furthermore, this important project will provide the railroad experience necessary for the realization of the other projects included in the 5-year plan such as the regional reconditioning of Annaba, on which a promising start has been made.

Such planning of the railroad transportation infrastructure will enable us to block out a railroad master plan staggered over 20 years. The organization of this important sector will assume the place that behooves it, taking into account our national policy in the field of territorial development.

Question: Our ports continue to raise serious problems of land space. Has the time not come to reorganize the infrastructures by restoring the initial orientation of the fishing ports?

Answer: While we have so far found solutions for the relief of bottlenecks in our ports thanks to improvements and the realization of some basic infrastructural projects, our primary goal in this respect is to take advantage of the real possibilities of our ports within the framework of short-, medium-, and long-term development. I would strive thereby to make an evaluation of the existing possibilities of our ports, one by one.

I would then examine the possibilities of enlarging them by increasing their accommodation capacities for freight and determine on the basis of the results actions to be taken and included in the 5-year plan. A master plan for each port will be drawn up in light of its orientation together with the laying out of new ports.

As for the functional aspect of our multiple-purpose ports, as regards maritime control but also fishing whose socioeconomic repercussion is obvious, this has not been overlooked for the political directorate has placed fishing among our priority sectors by endowing it with a secretariat of state for fishing.

In conclusion we can say that we have been able to go beyond the initial stage which consists in seeking solutions, in planning, in becoming organized, and in getting ready for the realization stage.

With the approval of the 5-year plan we move entirely into the most decisive stage--that of the realization and implementation of these goals.

2662
CSO. 4400

PUBLIC OFFERED SHARES IN INSURANCE COMPANY

Manama GULF MIRROR in English 4-10 Oct 80 p 35

[Text]

THE Kuwaiti-dominated Arab International Insurance Company this week opened a public float for $2.5 million of shares and financial sources expect the two-week issue to be oversubscribed up to 100 times.

AIIC, a Bahrain-registered exempt company which will act as a general insurance and re-insurance group dealing with fire, accident, motor, marine, air and industrial cover, is the second public firm to float shares in a month.

Two weeks ago Arab Iron and Steel Company's $48 million float was oversubscribed almost 42 times. But this week a source for one of the four Bahrain commercial banks

Founders

which accepted share applications said: "Despite the Iran-Iraq war we expect this issue to be oversubscribed between 50 and 100 times."

AIIC is issuing $6 million of its authorised $10 million capital. Bahrain's Ministry of Commerce recently allowed the founders to upgrade the issue by $1 million.

The founders, including Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi, Bahraini and Qatari companies and businessmen, are taking $3.5 million, leaving $2.5 million — fully paid up — for the public.

Fifty Bahraini founders are each putting in $10,000 worth of shares.

CSO: 4820

DAMAGE TO IRAN, IRAQ'S OIL INDUSTRIES NOTED; RESERVES REPORTED HIGH

Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 6 Oct 80 pp 11-12

[Text] During an exclusive interview, an official of the Oil Ministry explained the effects of the Iran-Iraq war on the two countries' oil industries, as under:--

As President Bani Sadr said in his press conference, Iraq had for some time been making preparations for a long war. These preparations become specially clear when we regard Iraq's oil activities immediately prior to the start of the war. Apart from exporting its oil by sea, Iraq also exported oil via pipelines running through Turkey, Syria and Jordan. The pipeline through Turkey ended at the Turkish port of Iskenderun and had a capacity of 700,000 barrels per day. This pipeline, completed in 1977, had never been utilised in full, partly due to differences on the payment of transit fees to Turkey.

The pipeline running from Kirkuk to the Syrian port of Banias on the Mediterranean has had its capacity raised to 1.7 million barrels per day.

Sometime ago the foreign press reported that Saudi Arabia had agreed to make a 15-year loan of 250 million dollars to Turkey. In this way the Saudis were acting as intermediary in settling the dispute between Iraq and Turkey over the pipeline transit fees, and clearing the way for the export of Iraqi oil via Turkey.

On 25 September REUTERS reported that Iraq had informed Lebanon that it wished to utilise the pipelines from Kirku to Tripoli and Banias. All these steps show the close ties between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and if we bear in mind the dependence of the Saudis on the United States, and the support given to Saddam Hussein by Jordan and Saudi Arabia, both undisputed servants of Western imperialism, then the real character of the Baath regime in Iraq becomes clear.

With due regard to the above, it becomes clear that Iraq would not have started the war without prior permission from its masters and close friends. In this way Iraq would export its oil to the West by pipeline should the war disrupt its exports by sea via the Persian Gulf.

The following statements published in the oil journal PLATTS of 25 September are also revealing:

Carter says that oil exports from the Persian Gulf must not be disrupted. The United Arab Emirates' Oil Minister says we will not permit our Western friends to be short of oil. The European Economic Community has 120 days reserves of oil so

it is unlikely to suffer any shortages due to a crisis in the Middle East. An official of the Japanese Government said that Japan had oil reserves enough for 110 days.

Thus while Iraq got the green light to start the war, it had been warned not to attack crude oil loading terminals since this would endanger oil exports to the West. For this reason we see that Iraq attacked the Abadan refinery which supplied 60 percent of domestic needs, but refrained from any serious attack on the Kharg Island crude oil loading terminal.

The Oil Ministry official said that damage caused to Abadan refinery was much less than at first thought, and a team had been despatched to ascertain the exact amount of the damage.

In answer to a question as to whether Iran would face an oil shortage this winter, the official said that before the attack on Abadan refinery and the storage tanks we had no shortage and our reserves were higher than at this time last year. Even now, our stocks of kerosene are very satisfactory, but we are in a state of war, and the Army must have first priority in fuel supplies. We must also note that Abadan refinery supplied 60 percent of domestic consumption, and accordingly the moves taken, such as the banning of private cars during the week, is a precautionary measure and does not mean rationing, since our storage tanks are not empty.

The official added that a number of oil producers had proposed selling oil products to Iran, and while thanking these states, Iran had informed them that for the time being it did not require such imports.

Of course, if the war continues for some time, we can count on Iran's allies such as Libya and Algeria to supply us with some oil products, but the important thing is that should the war continue, the Iranian people must be prepared to bear some hardships.

The official said that prior to starting the war with Iran, Iraq had been endeavouring to win friends and influence public opinion by granting a total of 209.7 million dollars in loans to various countries, including India, Morocco, Pakistan, Mozambique, Madagascar, Tanzania, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh.

CSO: 4920

SANCTIONS SEEN CONTRIBUTING TO INFLATION

Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 pp 2-3

[Text] Since the imposition of economic sanctions on Iran by European countries and Japan, there has been a marked aggravation in Iranian inflation, and prices of imported products have risen. The sanctions have had two major effects on our economy:

Firstly, the announcement of the sanctions resulted in some local merchants hoarding their imported products in the hope of selling at much higher prices later on. This resulted in marked shortages in many products and raw materials, and the price of some products even doubled.

Soon Iranian importers started importing their requirements from European countries through the intermediary of middlemen in Switzerland, Austria and Spain [nations not participating in the sanctions against Iran). And similarly Japanese goods were imported via the Persian Gulf states. But this round-about procedure, requiring transshipment of the goods, and commission for the middlemen resulted in a sudden rise of about 20 per cent on the cost of Iranian imports. The procedure also involved a further delay of between one to two months before the ordered goods finally reached Iran.

It appears that America and the other nations participating in the sanctions were well aware that their action would not prevent raw materials and manufactured goods from reaching Iran, but that the difficulties and problems created for Iranian importers by the sanctions would lead to Iranian inflation rising to unbearable levels. And thus Iran, dependent on its basic industrial needs on the West, would have to submit to imported inflation.

Today, not only in the private sector, but also in the public sector such as the National Iranian Oil Company, we witness the purchase of spare parts and machinery via the intermediary of third countries at higher costs, and all this has led to a kind of psychological warfare and domestic dissatisfaction.

Since rising inflation entails political agitation and general lack of confidence, the United States and its allies are using every means, including economic sanctions to prevent economic stability in Iran, and show that Iranian officials are unable to control inflation and rising prices.

Accordingly, and under present circumstances, any irresponsible slogan and baseless talk can have an adverse effect on the country's economic stability. In this respect we may recall the remarks of our President who said that each new lashe of the whip is a new factor in increasing prices and worsening inflation, and a step nearer to economic instability.

Today we must earnestly request all our politicians and economists to counter our economic difficulties with economic remedies. All the various factors inherent in our economic problems, the most important of which are inflation and rising prices, must be fully analysed and appropriate remedies be imposed to solve them. Such remedies must of course be compatible with our new social order. Only in this way can we combat American efforts to show that our system and regime is incapable of solving our economic and technological difficulties.

Today there is talk of a drop in our domestic production, (It should be noted, however, that our political leaders in all their speeches, talk about an increase in production and encourage the people to economise and consume less, all of which is important in controlling inflation and bringing about economic stability to the country), but have we asked ourselves the reasons for our drop in production?

During the past 18 months every one has been saying that our production must increase, but despite all these sayings, we have been witnessing constantly rising prices and spiralling inflation. This may be due perhaps to our concerning ourselves so far to the symptoms of the disease and not giving enough attention to the real reasons for the sickness.

It is now time for us to investigate the reasons for the drop in investments in Iran, and make an all-out endeavour to remove the obstacles to increased investments. Only in this way can we increase our domestic production and lessen our dependence on foreign nations. The reasons for the drop in investments will be discussed at length in a separate article.

CSO: 4920

NIOC EVALUATES LAST YEAR'S PERFORMANCE

Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 pp 7-10

[Text] The spokesman of the Oil Ministry announced a summary of the operations of the National Iranian Oil Company for the period after the Revolution, as follows:

Production and Exports

Production of crude oil and gas during 1358 (year ending on 20th March 1980) was as under:

Crude oil production for year totalled 1,259 million barrels i.e. an average of 3.45 million barrels per day. Oil exports during the year averaged 2.65 million barrels per day.

Gas and Liquefied Gas

Liquefied gas from the Mahshahr refinery for year averaged 22,110 barrels per day, and of this amount 15,096 barrels per day was exported.

Total gas produced during the year came to 888,635 million cubic feet, equal to about 2,429 barrels per day (or about 2,429 million cubic feet per day). Total gas delivered to the trans-Iranian trunk gas pipeline was 732 million cubic feet per day.

Production of crude oil and gas during the first quarter of 1359 (three months ending on 21st June 1980) was as under:

Crude oil production for the quarter averaged 1.848 million barrels per day, and of this about 571,000 barrels per day was exported.

Liquid gas production by the Mahshahr Refinery averaged 10,900 barrels per day.

Gas production for the quarter averaged 1,233 million cubic feet per day, and gas delivered into the trans-Iranian gas pipeline averaged 373 million cubic feet per day.

Discovery of new oilfield in Khuzistan

The new oilfield of Pelangan, 35 kilometres north-east of Dezful was discovered when the first exploration well struck oil on 9th March 1980. This well was drilled to a depth of 4,597 metres and is currently producing at the rate of 4,500 barrels of light crude of 32.5 API.

Tests of the strata so far drilled indicate probable oil reserves of the field to be some 40 million barrels, but a more accurate estimate will become possible when drilling is completed to the bottom of the oil-bearing strata.

Drilling in the South

During 1358, twelve drilling rigs drilled a total of 44,215 metres. Five of the rigs were engaged in exploration drilling, another five on development of existing wells, and two rigs operated in offshore waters.

During the year the Roudak oilfield, south-east of Gach-Saran was discovered. The new field is producing at the rate of about 6,000 b/d.

The 12 oil rigs have also been operating since the start of 1359 and during this time the two new oilfields of Pelangan and Papileh were discovered.

Gas Injection

Gas injection into old wells at Gach-Saran and Haft-Kel continued during the period under review to increase oil recovery from them. About 288,6400 [as published] million cubic feet of gas from the Pazenan field was injected into wells of Gach-Saran, and another 125,760 million cubic feet of gas from the Naft-Sefid field was injected into wells at Haft-Kel. These operations prevented this considerable amount of gas from having to be flared.

Seismic Survey

Seismic survey in the Turkoman Sahra and north-east of Gorgan (in the North) regions led to the discovery of three geological structures which probably contain oil or gas.

Well drilling in the north included three wells in the gas field of Khangiran, and five development wells in the Naft-Shahr (ex Naft Shah) region.

Some 18,511 million cubic feet of gas was produced from the Khangiran field in northern Khorrasan and delivered to the National Iranian Gas Company of Mashad.

During the period under review, some 5,908,950 barrels of oil was produced from the joint Iran-Iraq oilfield in the Haft-Shahr region, and fed into Kermanshah Refinery.

From July 1980 some 305 million cubic feet of gas was produced from the Qeshm Island field and fed into the Gourzin gas refinery.

During the year 1358 crude oil fed into the country's oil refineries reached an all-time high, and production of middle distillates (kerosene and diesel oil) was some 23,800 barrels per day more than for the previous year of 1357. By the end of the year under review, crude oil fed into Iranian oil refineries exceeded the one million barrels per day mark.

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LAST YEAR'S NON-OIL EXPORTS TABULATED

Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 pp 9-10

[Text] The report of the Export Promotion Centre of Iran for the first quarter of the current Iranian year (21 March to 21 June 1980) shows that the country's non-oil exports for the period amounted to some 152,000 tons valued at Rials 19,332 million (U.S. $276 million). Compared with the same quarter of a year ago, the figures show a drop of 22 per cent in weight, but a rise of 40 per cent in value.

Exports of hand-woven carpets and handicrafts accounted for 77 per cent of the total non-oil exports. The share of such exports in previous years (with the exception of last year when it was 46%) had been between 14 to 18 per cent. Exports of carpets for the quarter under review came to 2,087 tons valued at 14,230 million Rials. This is a drop of 14% in weight, but a rise of 133% in value over the same period of last year.

The following table shows the percentage value of non-oil exports during the quarter under review:

Group of Exports	1st quarter 1359	1st quarter 1358
Industrial products	4.5	3.5
Agricultural products	15.0	44.5
Carpets & handicrafts	77.0	46.0
Mining products	3.0	5.0
Other products	0.5	1.0
	100.0	100.0

During the three months under review some 854 million Rials of textiles, shoes, vehicles, chemical products, household products and biscuits were exported. This is an increase of 80% over the same period of last year.

The report indicated that with the shortage of raw materials, spare parts, specialist workers and expert management, there does not seem any special effort by industrial units to boost their exports.

In the agricultural sector, with the exception of liquorice roots, wool, guts and caviar, there was a big drop in exports, and this was due to very low stocks.

The drop in exports of cotton, due to the decrease in the area of cultivation of this product, and inability to meet domestic requirements, was one of the main reasons for the drop in the value of agricultural exports.

Exports of dried fruit and nuts during the period amounted to 4,363 tons valued at 774 million Rials ($11 million) showing a drop of 87% in weight and 77% in value over the same quarter of a year ago.

The value of exports of nuts and dried fruit during the first three months of this year and their comparison with the same period of a year ago are shown in the following table:

Product	1st quarter 1359	1st quarter 1358
	(in millions of Rials)	
Pistachio nuts	476	2,003
Raisins & sultanas	183	969
Dates	15	89
Almonds	7	65
Dried apricots	93	207

Exports of mining products and building materials during the period under review showed a drop of 22 per cent in weight and 17 per cent in value over the same period of a year ago. The drop was mainly due to the decrease in exports of metal mining ores, and exports of these came to 16,110 tons valued at some 342 million Rials, against 32,643 tons valued at 515 million Rials in the same period of last year.

It appears that the uncertainty over the manner of administration of the country's mines by the Government following the announcement that all mines are nationalised, has resulted in a drop in mining operations and lack of interest by the private sector to pursue such operations.

CSO: 4920

PLAN DIRECTOR TAKES STOCK OF ECONOMY

Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 6 Oct 80 pp 7-10

[Interview with Ezzatollah Sahabi, director of Plan and Budget Organisation, date and place not given]

[Text] Mr. Ezzatollah Sahabi, director, Plan and Budget Organisation (P&BO) expressed his views on the effect of the hostage-taking of U.S. Embassy personnel on the Iranian economy, and various problems confronted by P&BO. Here is a summarised version of this interview:

Q. Could you tell us what positive and negative effects this hostage-taking has had on the Iranian economy?

A. This hostage-taking has, so far, had a negative effect, but it could also have positive effects. From my viewpoint, this action has, as a matter of principle, been a correct and revolutionary one, as it reflected the crimes committed by the United States in Iran during the past 25 years, and which brought the Iranian nation to the point of explosion. This act of hostage-taking was undertaken by a small number of students, but they did it in their capacity as a conscientious and politically aware section of this nation. As a matter of principle, the student class has been in the forefront of the Iranian revolution. At a time when the Iranian masses were inactive and ignorant of the Pahlavi regime's stance, the students were engaged in their anti-Shah struggle. This hostage-taking has violated all international laws and conventions. But there has always been a question mark on the validity of these regulations as we argued that these laws were to be respected only when a country has its normal law and order situation. When people of a society reach an explosion point and actually stage an uprising, then these international laws can't be enacted there. So this uprising has been both against the Pahlavi regime and its supporters. It should also be kept in mind that this action was taken only when the Shah was taken to the United States which was tantamount to granting refuge to a criminal and plunderer who was responsible for massacring tens of thousands of the Iranian people.

This hostage-taking could have a far-reaching positive effect on the economic and social aspects of the Iranian life. While preparing the emergency budget during the current year, I have, at times, said that it is true we are now facing economic sanctions and our oil revenues have sharply declined from its 23 billion dollars. This brings a great pressure upon our country whose 80 to 85 percent budgetary resources are obtained from oil. I have, when preparing such emergency budgets,

expressed my opinion that these economic sanctions have come to us as a boon since these can account for the start of a big socioeconomic jump for the Iranian nation because we would be forced to utilise our domestic talents when all of our foreign resources are cut off. Such a national mobilisation was begun during the days of the late Dr. Mosadeq when oil revenues were cut off. It was in those days that oil stoves and samovars as well as industrial spare parts were started to be manufactured domestically, with our raw materials etc., being exported for the first time ever. If that Government had lasted for just another decade, we had certainly possessed an independent economy. Until we become independent and self-sufficient economically, all slogans on independence would be hollow and empty-worded in essence. In order to become economically independent, our economy should not rely on oil. Our oil-based economy is the result of a colonialist plan, with the result that our oil exports went on increasing every year. When Mosadeq concluded an agreement with the Oil Consortium, it was decided that the Government budget should be met through domestic resources, and the oil revenues specified to only national development plans. But later, there was increasing budgetary deficit every year, until in the Fourth Development Plan, oil revenues became a part of the budget. From that time onwards, the shortfall in current expenditures was met from oil income. Presently the Government revenues from taxation etc, is only up to 550 billion rials whereas it has to spend 1,800 billion rials on current expenditures. I must say that despite a lack of oil income, Pakistan enjoys a better position. Similar is the case of India. We are poorer than both India and Pakistan. If we intend to become independent of oil, we should gradually reduce our annual current expenses. These economic sanctions can prove to have a positive effect if we act vigilantly in implementing a "war economy" which can be the starting point for our economic independence. The hostage-taking, however, has not been advantageous to us since a large number of our assets abroad were frozen, the firms with which we had concluded agreements and which were later cancelled by us filed suits in courts which acceded to their demands. Such issues are still continuing.

These economic sanctions have brought great pressure upon Japan, European states, and even on some neighbouring Muslim countries. Despite the fact that, as a matter of principle, OPEC member-states were required to come to the rescue of one of the members faced with economic sanctions, Saudi Arabia and Iraq betrayed it by boosting their oil exports by three million barrels per day. This has adversely affected us as our oil revenues have sharply declined. If the present situation continues, our present oil revenues of 13 billion dollars would be reduced to 10 billion dollars next year. When we have less foreign exchange earnings, it has two effects: The financial budgetary resources decline, and since we are deeply dependent upon foreign countries, we need to export more commodities which needs larger amount of foreign exchange. Another loss incurred by us due to economic sanctions is that we are unable to import industrial raw materials and spare parts from European countries, and have to meet such demands from international markets on higher prices. This year, we have to pay between 20 and 30 percent increased prices on such commodities. For instance, one item, very urgently needed by us, constitutes spare parts of road-building machinery, such as those of Caterpillar which is a famous American firm. Despite our contacts with many of its branches in different countries, we have received negative responses. As a result, Iran had to procure its needs at inflated prices elsewhere. A number of new firms have lately been set up in the Persian Gulf emirates which are earning huge profits through acting as intermediaries in exporting goods to Iran. In any case, there were great short-term losses economically and materially due to the hostage-taking. If it leads to a general awareness to do away with our foreign dependence and compels us to utilise our talents and indigenous

Products, then I am in favour of these economic sanctions. However, if the trend of the past one year continues, then these sanctions would be detrimental to us.

Q. What effect has this hostage-taking put upon the rate of employment in Iran?

A. It is natural that a decline in foreign exchange earnings has adversely affected Government's development programs. Resultantly, we have been forced to reduce our development expenditures up to 50 percent in the current year, and consequently, a number of road-building, construction, agriculture, power and telephone projects have been shelved. This has caused unemployment, and has checked any new employment at a time when our population is constantly on the increase, and nearly half a million people are annually increased to the country's potential work-force. Hence, the hostage-taking has directly affected employment positions. As the effects of reduced oil sales have now started appearing, and because the Government has been compelled to discontinue a number of its development projects, these would lead to some more unemployment. Hence, hereinafter, unemployment would be one of the major and complicated issues to be confronted by our Government since with the stoppage of development projects, their personnel cannot afford to get jobless. Last year, a number of our workshops faced the same problem, as their workers continued to get their wages without there being any output. Moreover, many of the private sector jobs are likely to be eliminated because of a decline of our imports of resultant closure of commercial firms. Similar situation exists in big transportation firms which have been nationalised lately. According to reports, we possess a fleet of about half a million trucks whereas we need only a maximum of 150,00 trucks for our economic needs. If our imports are further diminished, then more than two-thirds of these truckers would get unemployed. In this way, it can be observed that there would be greater unemployment at both public and private sector levels. Also with a decline in Government revenues, there would be no investments, and consequently no new jobs created.

Q. Why was the Economic Mobilisation Committee set up, and what has been its performance so far?

A. In March last, the P&BO sent a proposal to the Revolutionary Council that, with the economic sanctions taking a serious turn, we should mobilise all of our efforts to confront them. Earlier, there has already come into existence a National Mobilisation Command which dealt with military affairs. By such a proposal, we wanted to mobilise ourselves economically, culturally, politically and from the publicity point of view. Later, five members of the Revolutionary Council were asked to set up such a Mobilisation Committee which was to confront the economic sanctions on a war footing, economic responsibilities of this committee. Subsequently, I set up a five-member Mobilisation Unit attached to the Revolutionary Council, and invited top officials of a number of ministries such as Agriculture, Commerce and Finance to join it, apart from a number of experts and specialists from P&BO, thus comprising a 15-member team. We first began our task through procuring foodstuffs and basic goods until the end of the current Iranian year (March 20, 1981). We improved customs functioning at Julfa Post where a maximum of 15,000 railway wagons were awaiting their turn for clearance. Then we provided handling facilities to some of the inactive seaports on the Caspian to enable some of the imported goods to be brought there. This committee did a tremendous job by holding its bi-weekly meetings and we were very much satisfied with its functioning. Later, we dealt with the

industrial matters to resolve the issue on the shortage of their raw materials and spare parts. A subcommittee was set up to arrange manufacture of certain agricultural implements domestically. Then another subcommittee was formed to benefit from the state-owned factories and private workshops to manufacture industrial spare parts, etc. This subcommittee is still functioning. We also chalked out a distribution plan of essential goods in various provinces of the country through a network of cooperative societies. We sought help of local councils in big cities, like Tehran and Isfahan, for distribution of essential commodities through Government stores and shops to ensure provision of nine basic goods in sufficient quantity to every family. With the change in Government and my election as Majlis deputy led to a discontinuation in the work of this committee. However, we did a lot of work during a space of four months.

Q. Would you elucidate on the "emergency budget"? Does it pave the way for our gradual independence from an oil-based economy?

A. Yes, it does, since we have been able to cut down our current expenditures appreciably. In the 1359 approved budget, current expenditures amount up to 1900 billion rials whereas the development spendings stand at 1100 billion rials which is a unhealthy budget. We should increase our development funds and make still greater cuts in current expenditures. Another point is that our total oil revenues are 920 billion rials of our budget. We raised income tax on a slab system, and thus expect to have an added tax revenues to the extent of 200 billion rials by the end of the current year. We would have to reduce staff in those state-owned firms now running at a loss. In 1359 budget, there was a deficit of 4640 billion rials. However, if all the anticipated plans are approved, there would only be a deficit of 3600 to 3700 billion rials in the "emergency budget" which seems quite logical.

Q. How do you view the rumours on the dissolution of P&BO?

A. Such rumours have mostly been spread by certain individuals on political grounds about whose political affiliations I don't want to comment. There also exist some individuals, with specific political affiliations, who contend that P&BO is a redundant organisation. If we want to speedily gain economic independence and our revolutionary aspirations, such as social justice and equitable distribution of wealth, then we need to have a system of centralised planning. Anyone, with even a little knowledge of economy, understands this. I don't approve of P&BO in its present form and personnel. It can be reduced, but it is vital for the country in terms of its valuable functions, since its dissolution would lead to lack of harmony in national affairs. Such individuals, calling for a dissolution of P&BO have not so far come forward to discuss the issue in the Islamic Majlis, and hence it appears to be just a political stunt.

CSO: 4920

BANKER ASSESSES OPERATIONS OF AGRICULTURE BANK

Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 pp 4-6

[Interview with Abolfazl Shaheedi, member of Agriculture Bank Managing Committee; date and place not given]

[Text] Following the end of the general assembly meeting of the representatives of Islamic Councils of various branches of the Agriculture Bank from all over the country, Abolfazl Shaheedi, a member of the elected Managing Committee of the Agriculture Bank expressed his views in an interview on the performance of the Bank in the pre-revolutionary period, the existing bottlenecks and its future program. Here is a summarised version of the interview.

[Question] What is the reason for slow processing of credit extension by the Agriculture Bank to farmers? According to reports, these loans are much delayed before they finally reach the applicants.

[Answer] This is one of the fundamental problems faced by the Bank. The loans, if not extended on the proper time when they are required for farmers to procure seed, fertilisers and water pumps, etc., they actually lose their value, and are subsequently used up by the farmers in meeting their basic needs of living. However, the reason for these loans, which sometimes take up to four months to be processed, is the shortage of bank staff and availability of funds. We have, in a resolution passed at the recent general assembly meeting, called upon the Government to notify the total amount of funds to the Agriculture Bank at the beginning of every financial year. Naturally, once the available funds with the Bank are exhausted, we have to approach the Central Bank of Iran (CBI) and the Plan and Budget Organisation for further grant of funds which are usually not extended to us due to the present critical conditions.

[Question] What was the total amount of funds granted to the Agriculture Bank this year?

[Answer] CBI has approved about 110 billion rials for us during the current year. Because of some new plans, we are hoping to get CBI approval for boosting these funds to 200 billion rials which, if granted, would more than double the funds given to us last year, and these would go a long way to meet the present needs of the farmers.

[Question] How much of these funds have been spent so far?

[Answer] Of these funds, which are being gradually put at our disposal, about 30 billion rials have been spent so far. According to statistics, a total of about 38.5 billion rials have been extended in loans to 231,000 rural families during the first four months of the Iranian year (ending July 20, 1980). This shows a 93% rise in terms of number of loans and 109% boost in terms of the amount of credits as compared to the corresponding period of the last year. This rate would further go up during the autumn season when great number of farmers apply for loans.

[Question] What is the maximum amount of loan paid by the former Agriculture Cooperative Bank and the former Agriculture Extension Bank in the post-revolutionary period?

[Answer] The former Agriculture Extension Bank had certain on-going projects which couldn't be discontinued due to existing commitments. However, we limited the scope of these projects without affecting their economic feasibility. Now the Agriculture Bank is acting in accordance with the new set of regulations on loan extension under which a maximum of 10 million rials are granted to individuals and a maximum of 50 million rials for collective activities. This limit has been put in order to allow larger number of farmers to benefit from such loans. The average amount of farm credits extended until last year stood at 82,000 rials, but during the current year, this has gone up to 120,000 rials, which shows that due attention is being paid to the needs of the masses in rural areas.

[Question] Since the Islamic land reforms are being implemented in the country, are there any plans to probe into the specified limits of land ownership and loans paid by the former Agriculture Extension Bank to big land owners?

[Answer] Unfortunately, no such probe has been made so far. However, the loans, being extended now, are paid after due consultations with the seven-member team in each region on the land ownership position of the applicant and the performance of his agricultural activities.

[Question] Most of the individuals who acquired big loans from the former Agriculture Extension Bank were those who come under Principle 49 of the constitution, and as such their wealth and assets are to be probed into. Do you have any program to probe into such persons' file?

[Answer] A number of individuals were singled out for such a probe. But since the merger of the former Agriculture Extension Bank and former Agriculture Cooperative Bank has not been completed so far, therefore there exist certain problems in this task because of our lack of thorough and direct supervision over the new Bank.

[Question] Should the Bank legally function under your supervision?

[Answer] Yes, we should have such a supervision. But this supervision is practically possible only when systems of these two banks are completely merged and their employees brought under the framework of the new bank.

[Question] What is the mode of functioning of this Bank? Whether it is acting in an independent manner?

[Answer] It is practically governed by its Managing Director and the Managing Committee. However, due to the different nature of the two systems, it cannot be said to have basic and accurate supervision over the Bank affairs. Presently, the preliminary merger plan has been prepared, and necessary staff needs of its four units appropriated.

[Question] What are the conditions governing the advancement of loans to farmers?

[Answer] Under the new set of regulations, many of the former security bonds have been eliminated, and we extend up to a maximum of one million rials in loans on guarantees and promissory notes. Since the issue of probing into individual land ownership is also there, we grant loans upon the recommendation of the seven-member committee in rural areas, as also some other loans on the basis of documentary evidence given by local witnesses about applicants. But such evidence has posed us with a number of problems because of incorrect evidence.

[Question] What are your future plans to make the Bank still more people-oriented and to remove its existing bottlenecks?

[Answer] Among our problems in this connection are the scarcity of funds and resultant lack of job security. In some branches of the Bank, employees attend to their official duties due to their concern regarding the scarcity of funds that might lead to their tussle with dissatisfied loan applicants. Another problem relates to a shortage in staffing position which can be met if we are allowed to hire the presently jobless highschool diploma-holders and graduates on daily wage basis. This would boost the activities of this Bank and consequently resolve many problems. At present, we have no Bank branches in about 1,500 small towns, and hence can't meet their demands for farm loans. We are also lacking in transport facilities to cater to the needs of the rural population. After much difficulty, we were able to purchase 50 new automobiles this year, but this would be neutralised with the planned inaugural of 50 more branches of the Bank in the near future.

[Question] Don't you think there is a need to bring about a change in credit extension policy?

[Answer] Yes, there is. The problems I have referred are those confronted by the Bank at present. If the Agriculture Bank is to carry out its basic functions in a normal way, then cash loans are to be extended to farmers, under the overall supervision of the rural services centers with which they are to be attached. All the servicing units, including those of the Agriculture Bank, are to be located in rural areas, with the credits being extended to such units in cash by the Bank for offering their services to farmers.

CSO: 4920

TENDERS ISSUED FOR VARIOUS NEEDS

Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 pp 13-14

[Text] The Sugar and Lump Sugar Organisation intends to invite public tenders for the transport of seven hundred and fifty thousand tons of sugar from the three following ports of Bandar Khomeini, Bandar Abbas and Bandar Bushehr (each with a total tonnage of two hundred and fifty thousand tons).

All interested parties with a similar experience in the transportation of sugar to various parts of the country and equipped with the required transportation system are required to approach the offices of the above Organisation situated on Davar street, opposite the eastern door of the Ministry of Justice in order to receive details and description of the project including the various points of destination in the country and to receive a tender participation form and the terms and conditions acceptable to the Sugar and Lump Sugar Organisation and applicable to the transporting contractor.

Last date for the submission of the tender proposals is October 14th. The Sugar and Lump Sugar Organisation of the country will not entertain any proposals it receives after the expiry of the above date and also reserves the right to accept or reject one or all of the proposals received.

The proposals must be submitted in such a manner that by the 18th of October it must reach the Organisation. The proposals would be opened for reading on the next day.

The Ordinance Department of the Islamic Republic Police intends to invite public tenders for the transportation of their goods from one central point to another point in the country.

All interested parties with similar experience in the transportation may approach the offices of the above Organisation situated on Dr Ali Shariati street, adjacent to the driving licence issuing department in order to

receive details and description of the project and the points of transportation of goods in the country, and to receive the tender participation forms and the terms and conditions applicable to the Ordinance Department of the Islamic Republic Police.

Last date for the submission of tender proposals is October 12th. The Ordinance Department of the Islamic Republic Police will not entertain any proposals received after the expiry of the above date and also reserves the right to accept or reject one or all of the proposals received.

The tender participants must not have been prohibited from participating in government tender notices.-- Ordinance Department of the Islamic Republic Police

The Pharmaceutical Company of Iran intends to purchase the required medical goods for its various units in the country through the invitation of international tenders.

All interested parties who have had similar experience in the field of supply and delivery of medical goods and apparatus may contact the above Organisation situated in Tehran at, Towhid Avenue, adjacent to Yazdgerd street, Number 32, fourth floor in order to receive details and description of the above goods required and their quantities, including the receival of the tender participation forms and the terms and conditions applicable to the tender participating firms and acceptable to the Phamaceutical Company of Iran.

Last date for the submission of the proposals is October 22, 1980. The Pharmaceutical Company of Iran will not entertain any proposal it receives after the expiry of the above date and also reserves the right to accept or reject one or all of the proposals received.

The First Naval Fleet of the Islamic Navy situated at Bandar Abbas intends to purchase eighty one (81) various items of stationery materials through the invitation of tenders.

All interested parties who have similar experience in the field of supply and delivery of writing and stationery materials may approach the offices of the above Organisation situated at Bandar Abbas, Skele street in order to receive details and description of the goods required including the terms and conditions for delivery applicable to the tender contracting party and acceptable to the First Naval Fleet Organisation of the Islamic Navy.

Last date for the submission of proposals is October 23, 1980.

The First Naval Fleet will not entertain any proposal it receives after the expiry of the above date and also reserves the right to accept or reject one or all of the proposals received.

The Islamic Republic Police intends to purchase through the invitation of public tenders 150 P.A. systems consisting of Sirens, loud speakers and rotating lights.

All interested parties who have had similar experience in the field of supply and delivery of the above items may approach the Purchase section of the above Organisation situated on Forughi street in order to receive details and description of the goods and also to receive the tender participation forms and the terms and conditions for delivery applicable to the tender contractor and acceptable to the Islamic Republic Police.

Last date for the submission of the proposals is October 16, 1980.

The Islamic Republic Police reserves the right to accept or reject one or all of the proposals received.

CSO: 4920

GOVERNMENT ISSUES TENDERS FOR GOODS, SERVICES

Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 6 Oct 80 pp 14-15

[Text] The Ordnance Department of the Islamic Republic Police intends to invite public tenders for the transportation of goods and equipment from the various cities of the country to other points in the country. All interested parties who have similar experience in the transportation of goods may approach the offices of the above Organisation situated on Dr. Shariati Avenue, adjacent to the driving licence issuing center in order to receive details and complete report of the project as well as the tender participation forms and the terms and conditions applicable to the tender contractor and acceptable to the Ordnance Department of the Islamic Republic Police.

Last date for the submission of proposals is October 12, 1980.

The Ordnance Department of the Islamic Republic Police will not entertain any proposals it receives after the expiry of the above date and also reserves the right to accept or reject one or all of the proposals received.

The Tobacco Monopoly of Iran intends to purchase through the invitation of public tender a total of one million meters of jute (Chatai). All interested parties who have similar experience in the supply of the above item may approach the offices of the above Organisation situated on North Iranshahr Avenue in order to obtain the tender participation forms and the terms and conditions applicable to the contractor and to receive detailed information and description of the goods required including the time period for its delivery, to the Tobacco Monopoly of Iran.

Last date for the submission of proposals is October 10, 1980.

The Tobacco Monopoly of Iran will not entertain any proposal it received after the expiry of the above date and also reserves the right to accept or reject one or all of the proposals received.

The ETKA Company intends to purchase through the invitation of public tenders a total of 6,000 tons of sunflower seeds, for the Ganjeh Plant at Roudbar.

All interested parties who have similar experience in the supply and delivery of the above item may approach the offices of the above Organisation at Imam Khomeyni street, Bastion, Etka building, in order to receive detailed information of the goods required and to obtain the terms and conditions applicable to the tender contractor and acceptable to ETKA and the tender participation forms.

Last date for the submission of proposals is October 11, 1980.

The ETKA Company will not entertain any proposals received after expiry of the above date and also reserves the right to accept or reject one or all of the proposals received.

The Islamic Republic Police intends to purchase a number of radio receivers and broadcasting sets through the invitation of public tenders and through the opening of letters of credit.

All interested parties who have similar experience in the supply and delivery of the above items may approach the offices of the above Organisation situated at the Purchase Section of the Organisation on Forughi street, Tehran, in order to receive details and description of the items required and the terms and conditions applicable to the tender contracting party which include the time period for the delivery of the items and the tender participation forms. The terms and conditions must be acceptable to the above Organisation.

Last date for the submission of the proposals is October 23, 1980.

The Islamic Republic Police will not entertain any proposals its receives after the expiry of the above date and also reserves the right to accept or reject one or all of the proposals received. The bids would be opened for reading on October 25, 1980.

The Mazandaran Regional Power Department intends to invite public tenders for the purchase of 2,500 concrete pipes for power lines. The poles built of concrete must be 8 and 9 meters in length respectively. All interested parties who have similar experience in the supply and delivery of concrete poles and of designs stated above may approach the offices of the above Organisation situated on Boulevard Keshavarz, 2, in order to receive all the information and details and description of the goods required, including the terms and conditions applicable to the contracting supplier and acceptable to the Mazandaran Regional Power Department.

Last date for the submission of proposals in October 24, 1980. The proposals are to be submitted at Sari, Secretariat of the Organisation before 9.00 am.

The Mazandaran Regional Power Department will not entertain any parties for obtaining the proposal forms and tender documents after the expiry of the above date and will also not entertain any proposals received after the said date. It also reserves the right to accept or reject one or all of the proposals.

The Bank Mellat intends to invite tenders for the repairs, servicing and maintenance of the lifts of its buildings in Tehran.

All interested parties who have similar experience in the repair and servicing of lifts may approach the offices of the above Organisation situated on Sepahbod Qarani Avenue, in order to receive details and description of the work required including the terms and conditions applicable to the contracting party and acceptable to Bank Mellat, including the obtaining of tender participation forms.

Last date for the submission of proposals is October 9, 1980. The Bank Mellat will not entertain any proposals received after expiry of the above date and also reserves the right to accept or reject one or all of the proposals received.
CSO: 4920

HIGH COST, CONSUMPTION OF DURABLE GOODS SCORED

Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 6 Oct 80 p 13

[Text] More than two million tons of household appliances have been imported by Iran during the last few months, and with stocks full, consumption of such durable goods has this year increased by more than 70 per cent over last year. Ahmad Qassemi in the Tehran Bazaar said that demand for household appliances rose at a high pace during the summer, and this appeared to be somewhat unusual. He said that during a two week period 3,000 electric suction sweepers were sold, and that some 500,000 sewing machines imported during the year had all been sold.

Last summer there was a shortage of fans and space coolers. A fan selling for 4,500 rials last year was priced at 7,500 rials this year. And coolers costing 25,000 rials last year were now priced at 33,000, and even then the local manufacturers only supplied the frame of the coolers and the customer had to buy the electric motor on the black market.

Other items which have gone up in price include water heaters (from 23,000 to 29,000), wall clocks (from 3,500 to 4,500), Pars colour television sets (from 90,000 to 93,700), and 9-foot Philco refrigerators (from 20,000 to 23,800).

One Bazaari merchant said that the higher prices were all due to profiteering. Before the Revolution the merchants in the Bazaar played a major role in the downfall of the old regime, but now after the Revolution they are turning to profiteering again. He added that most items are imported at reasonable cost, but by the time the article has passed through various middlemen the cost for the consumer has increased fourfold.

In this way sewing machines are imported at a cost of 4,000 rials each and sold to the consumer at 12,000 rials. Similarly ceiling fans imported at 1,700 rials each are sold to householders in Khuzistan at 12,000 rials.

The merchant warned his colleagues in the Bazaar and the various middlemen involved to abstain from profiteering and hoarding of products, and to be content with a reasonable profit, or else they would soon face the wrath and anger of the public.

Another Bazaari said that it was wrong for the people to buy such large amounts of foreign imported "luxury" goods, but should utilise traditional Iranian products instead, and wait until the country was in a position itself to manufacture such household appliances.

CSO: 4920

BACKGROUNDS OF CABINET MINISTERS GIVEN

Tehran JAVANAN-E EMRUZ in Persian 8 Sep 80 pp 6, 7, 54

[Article: "Following Is a Report on the Educational Backgrounds and Revolutionary Records of Members of Mr Raja'i's Cabinet"]

[Text] The names of the ministers and their positions are as follows:

Mohammad Nurbakhsh, Ministry [sic] of Economic Affairs and Finance.

Seyyed Esma'il Davari, Planing and Budget Organization.

Dr Manafi, Ministry of Health.

Mohammad 'Ali Fayyazbakhsh, Ministry of State for Welfare.

Mahmud Qandi, Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone.

Musa Kalantari, Ministry of Roads and Transport.

Hosseyn Musavi, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Dr Hosseyn 'Arefi, Ministry of Culture and Higher Education.

Seyyed Assadolah Lajevardi or Reza Sadr, Ministry of Commerce.

Engineer Ne'matzadeh, Ministry of Industries and Mines.

Mohammad Salamati, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development.

Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i, Ministry of Education and Training.

Ahmad Tavakoli, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs.

Behzad Nabavi, Ministry of State for Executive Affairs.

Mohammad Shohab-e Gonabadi, supervisor of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.

Hasan 'Abbaspur, Ministry of Energy.

'Abbas Duzduzani, Ministry of National Guidance.

Mahdavi-Kani, Ministry of Interior.

Asghar Ebrahimi, Ministry of Petroleum.

Old Ministers

Among Mr Raja'i's cabinet members, Qandi, Kalantari, Sadr, Ne'matzadeh Raja'i, Abbaspur, and Mahdavi-Kani are left over from the previous government. The rest are newly appointed.

Getting Acquainted with the Ministers

To become acquainted with Mr Raja'i's cabinet members, following is a short biography of them:

Musa Kalantari, Minister of Roads and Transport

Born in 1327 [21 Mar 48 - 20 Mar 49], he holds an MA in civil engineering from the polytechnical faculty. He is married and has been socially and politically active in Islamic associations during all his student years. He cooperated with the militant clergy during the armed struggles. He was appointed director general of the department of roads and transportation of western Azarbaijan following the victory of the revolution and was later appointed as the minister. Before the revolution he was active in construction work.

Engineer Hosseyn Musavi, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mir Hosseyn Musavi Khameneh'i was born in 1329 [21 Mar 41 - 20 Mar 42] in Khameneh of Tabriz District. He is a graduate in architecture and city planning from the National University. During his studies he and his friends formed the first Islamic association of their Samarqand Company which was a cover for the continuation of their struggle [against the regime) but were all arrested at the beginning of 1352 [1973] by the now defunct SAVAK. With the exception of martyr Hassan Aladpush and 'Abdol 'Ali Bazargan they were released in a short time. In 53 (21 Mar 74 - 20 Mar 75) he became a lecturer at National University, and in 1355 [21 Mar 76 - 20 Mar 77) he and a number of friends founded the "Movement of Iranian Moslems." After the victory of the revolution he was made a member of the Central Council of the Islamic Republic Party and helped set up the party's organ and was appointed its manager and editor.

Mohammad Shohab Gonabadi, Minister of State in Charge of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development

Born in Tehran in 1321 [21 Mar 42 - 20 Mar 43], he got his diploma from Tehran Industrial School in 1340 [21 Mar 61 - 20 Mar 62] and was employed the same year by the Ministry of Education. In 1349 [21 Mar 70 - 20 Mar 71] he received his degree in civil engineering from the faculty of Science and Industry. From 1350 [22 Mar 71 - 20 Mar 72] to 1354 [21 Mar 75 - 20 Mar 76] he served as the head of Tehran Vocational School and was later dismissed from service temporarily for 2 years. He was a member of the Islamic Association of Engineers from 1349 [21 Mar 70 - 20 Mar 71] and is one of the founders of the Islamic Association of Iranian Moslems and is now a member of its Central Council. In Esfand of 57 [20 Feb-20 Mar 78] he was first appointed as technical deputy minister of the Ministry of Education. His last position before being appointed to the present position was that of head of the public relations office of Prime Minister Raja'i.

Dr Hassan Abbaspur, Minister of Energy

He is an electrical engineer with an MA from the Technical Faculty and a doctorate degree in planning and management of energy systems from London University. During the black period of oppression, he was active in the underground movement and the political activities of the academicians and the founding of the academicians' Islamic association. He also actively participated in the Central Council and management group for political and economic studies of the Islamic Republic Party. He held the post of associate professor and taught and did research work in various universities inside and outside the country. From 1351 [21 Mar 72 - 20 Mar 73] to 1354 [20 Mar 75 - 20 Mar 76] he studied abroad. He is married with two children. He was born in 1323 [21 Mar 44 - 20 Mar 45] in Tehran.

Dr 'Arefi, Minister of Science and Higher Education

He was born in Tehran in 1315 [21 Mar 36 - 20 Mar 37] and graduated from Tehran Medical Faculty in 1345 [21 Mar 66 - 20 Mar 67]. He went to the United States the next year and following a specialization course in pediatrics he completed a course in internal medicine and cardiology and returned to Iran in 1354 [21 Mar 75 - 20 Mar 76] after which he was appointed as a professor at Tehran University. After the victory of revolution he was appointed head of the Razi Medical College and later as the head of the medical faculty of Tehran University. He had recently been appointed as the chancellor of Tehran University. He is married and has two children.

Asghar Ebrahimi, Petroleum Minister

Engineer Ebrahimi was born in Esfahan in 1332 [21 Mar 53 - 20 Mar 54] and holds a diploma in mathematics and a BA in chemical and gas and oil engineering as well as an MA in oil engineering from the University of Southern California. He left his doctorate degree studies incomplete to return to Iran. During his student years, both in the Oil College in Abadan and at the University of California, he was a member of the Islamic Association. He had been arrested 4 times by the SAVAK in Esfahan and Abadan, once spending 17 days in prison in Abadan. During the old regime, he had held several revealing news conferences in the United States. After the victory of the revolution, Ebrahimi played important and effective roles in calming down the situation in Khorramshahr, in confrontation with Iraq and in leading of military operations against the enemy. He also took a leading part in the strengthening of the border garrisons and the purging of government agencies in the Province of Ilam. His last position was that of governor-general of Ilam.

Mohammad Reza Ne'matzadeh, Minister of Industries and Mines

Born in 1324 [21 Mar 45 - 20 Mar 46] in Tabriz, he finished his elementary and highschool studies in Tehran. He later went to the United States where he studied mechanical engineering at the University of California. He was the head of Persian speaking group of the Islamic Association [at the university], and before returning to Iran worked for 6 months at various industries in the United States. He cooperated with various political groups at different times, and before the victory of revolution he worked with Engineer Bazargan in getting the oil industry started. After the revolution, he worked with the Ministry of Labor for 4 months to get various plants restarted. He also cooperated with the Islamic Housing Foundation as an inspector. He was, for 4 to 5 months, a member of government mission at the Iran National Plants until last Aban [23 Oct-21 Nov 79] when he was appointed the minister of labor. He does not belong to any political party but has had close ties with the Islamic Republic Party. He is married and has 3 children

Duzduzani, Minister of National Guidance

He was born in 1321 [21 Mar 42 - 20 Mar 43] and was employed by the Ministry of Education in 1340 [21 Mar 61 - 20 Mar 62]. He later attended special classes for teachers of theological subjects run by such professors as Yadollah Sahabi, Bazargan and Golzadeh Ghafuri. Because of the old regime's sensitivity to that matter, he was exiled to such places as Damavand and Larijan. Later, he entered the university and, inspired by the uprising of 15 Khordad 1342 [5 June 1963], he joined the Islamic Nations Party which was the first organized Islamic group that believed in armed struggle. Following the uncovering of the party in 1344 [21 Mar 65 - 20 Mar 66] he and 55 other members were arrested. He was

sentenced to 6 months in prison and was discharged from the Ministry of Education. In 1346 [21 Mar 67 - 20 Mar 68], during the coronation celebrations, he and 5 other people were arrested and were charged with the plot to kill the deposed shah and members of his family. He did not confess and was able to go free after 44 days in prison. In 1348 [21 Mar 69 - 20 Mar 70], he joined the "Allah" Party, and later, the Mojahedin. In 1351 [21 Mar 72 - 20 Mar 73], he and a number of Mojahedins were arrested and were sentenced to 7 years in jail. He continued his struggle after he was released in 1356 [21 Mar 77 - 20 Mar 78] until after the victory of revolution after which he played an important role in organizing the Guardians Corp which he commanded for some time. He still teaches the corps members theoretical subjects.

Mahdavi-Kani, Minister of Interior

Hojjatoleslam Haj Sheykh Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani was born in the village of Kan in 1310 [21 Mar 31 - 20 Mar 32]. After completing his elementary education he went to Tehran where he studied theology in the years 1325 [21 Mar 46 - 20 Mar 47] to 1327 [21 Mar 48 - 20 Mar 49]. Later on, he went to Qom where he studied for 14 years under such teachers as Tabataba'i-e Tabrizi, Borujerdi and Imam Khomeyni. Following the death of Ayatollah Borujerdi, he returned to Tehran where he taught at the Marvi Theological School and served as the Imam of the Jalili Mosque. He began fighting the regime at 18 in Qom the same period that martyr Navab-e Safavi and Haj Hosseyn Vahedi had begun. The same year he was sent to exile after he was arrested in Ardestan of Esfahan. In the years that followed he was arrested several times by the SAVAK and experienced torture while in jail. He was arrested in 1354 [21 Mar 75 - 20 Mar 76] in connection with his activities with Taleqani and Hojjatoleslams Rafsanjani and Lahuti and was sentenced to 4 years in prison. He was released a few months before the victory of revolution and became a member of the Revolutionary Council. Later, he was made the head of the Imam's committees and in Esfand of 58 [20 Feb-20 Mar 79] was appointed minister of interior. Recently, he was also appointed by the Imam as a theologian member of the Council of the Guardian of constitution.

Hadi Manafi, Minister of Health

Born in 1320 [21 Mar 41 - 20 Mar 42] in Tabriz, he completed his elementary and highschool education in Tehran and went to Turkey in 1340 [21 Mar 61 - 20 Mar 62] where he completed his medical education in 1347 [21 Mar 68 - 20 Mar 69]. He then continued his studies in surgery. On his return to Iran, he joined the Health Corps and was sent to Bushehr. Returning to Tehran in Aban of 50 [23 Oct-20 Nov 71], he started working as a resident-doctor in various infirmaries run by the Ministry of Health. Later he was employed by the Social Security Services but quit after 3 years and joined the Mehr Hospital. After the victory of the revolution he was appointed as the head of Tehran emergency services.

Ahmad Tavakoli, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs

Tavakoli was born in 1330 [21 Mar 51 - 20 Mar 52] in Behshahr. In 1347 [21 Mar 68 - 20 Mar 69], in his fifth year of high school, he was arrested for making inflammatory speeches. He received his diploma in Tehran after having been released. He then went to Shiraz where he studied electronics. During 1349 [21 Mar 70 - 20 Mar 71] and 1350 [21 Mar 71 - 20 Mar 72], he was arrested several times until he finally joined the armed forces as a conscript. He was arrested once again in 1352 [21 Mar 73 - 20 Mar 74]. While in jail he drifted gradually from the Mojahedins until he completely broke away in 1354 [21 Mar 75 - 20 Mar 76]. He was finally released in 1355 [21 Mar 76 - 20 Mar 77] and after the victory of the revolution he became the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Committee in Behshahr. Assisted by his revolutionary friends, he formed the town's revolutionary court and became its assistant prosecutor. He also played an important role in organizing the town's Guardian Corps.

Nurbakhsh, Minister of Economy and Finance

Born in Esfahan in 1327 [21 Mar 48 - 20 Mar 49], Nurbakhsh graduated from Tehran University's faculty of economy. He continued his post-graduate studies in the United States and Canada where he was active in the students' Islamic Association in both countries. He returned to Iran after receiving his doctorate degree in economics. After the victory of the revolution he formed the office for the International Communications Studies to serve as a means of communication with Moslem sisters and brothers living abroad. While teaching at the computer school and the economy faculty of the National University in Tehran, he cooperated with the Research Center for Development. In addition to his research work on Islamic economic system, unemployment and inflation, he also cooperated with the Ministry of Interior in preparing its plan for solving the unemployment problem. Nurbakhsh is married and has two children.

Fayyazbakhsh, Minister of State for Welfare

He was born in Tehran in 1316 [21 Mar 37 - 20 Mar 38]. After receiving his diploma in classical studies he entered Tehran University's medical school. He specialized in general surgery at the Sina Hospital and opened his own clinic in the southern part of Tehran where he attended the poor. Following the victory of the revolution, he cooperated with the Relief Committee of the Imam and later was made the head of the rehabilitation service department. His last position was that of the head of the Welfare and Health Organization. Fayyazbakhsh is married and has 4 children.

Reza Sadr, Minister of Commerce

Born in Kashan in 1311 [21 Mar 32 - 20 Mar 33], he received his doctorate degree in philosophy from the school of theology in Tehran. He then went to the United States where he studied chemistry at Miami University. Later on, he continued his studies for an MS in management at New York University. During the period of oil industry nationalization, when he was at Qom Theological Center, he was very active in Islamic affairs and was able to play an effective role in the establishment of the Islamic Center in New York. He was also active, along with Dr Yazdi, in the students' Islamic associations in the United States. Following the uprising of 15 Khordad 1342 [5 June 1963], he was in touch with Imam Khomeyni by mail. After the revolution he was a member of the 5-man group charged with the takeover of (Iranian) embassies and consulates abroad. He was later appointed minister of commerce. He is married and has two children.

Seyyed Assadolah Lajevardi, Minister of Commerce (If Sadr is not appointed)

Lajevardi was born in Tehran in 1314 [21 Mar 1935 - 20 Mar 36]. He became a member of the Central Council of the Islamic Coalition Association in 1342 [21 Mar 63 - 20 Mar 64]. The next year he was arrested in connection with the revolutionary execution of Hassan Ali Mansur (former prime minister) and was sentenced to 3 years in jail. He was one of the leaders of the demonstrations against the football match between Iran and Israel and was responsible for the bombing of the Israeli El Al branch office. He was arrested and sentenced to 4 years in prison. Savagely tortured, he suffered eyesight loss and was injured in waist. He was sent to the Qezel Qal'a Prison and was later transferred to Mashhad. Having been released, he was arrested once more in 1353 [21 Mar 74 - 20 Mar 75], and after undergoing tortures, was sentenced to 18 years in prison. He and martyr Sadeq Amani were among the students of Hojjatoleslam Shahcheraghi, one of the first teachers at Hosseyniyeh-e Ershad Islamic Center.

Seyyed Esma'il Davudi, Director of Planning Organization and Budgetary Affairs

Born in Yazd in 1325 [21 Mar 46 - 20 Mar 47], he received his diploma in his hometown and continued his college education in Esfahan and Tehran, receiving an MS degree in mechanical engineering. He worked for 12 years in administrative training, services, management and social research. His last job was that of governor-generalship of the province of Esfahan.

Behzad Nabavi, Minister of State in Charge of Executive Affairs

Engineer Nabavi was born in 1321 [21 Mar 42 - 20 Mar 43] and is a graduate of Tehran Polytechnics in electronics. He started his political activities in 1338 [21 Mar 59 - 20 Mar 60] and joined the Second National Front the next year. In 1341 [21 Mar 62 - 20 Mar 63], he represented polytechnics in the National Front and a year later played a role in the fight against the front leadership and helped form the Third National Front. In 1349 [21 Mar 70 - 20 Mar 71] along with a number of former members of the front formed an armed group but were uncovered in 1351 [21 Mar 72 - 20 Mar 73] and he went underground. Three months later he was captured in the house where he had been hiding and received a life sentnece. He was set free in 1357 [21 Mar 78 - 20 Mar 79] after the mobs broke open prison gates. While in prison, he cooperated closely with the Mojahedins until 1354 [21 Mar 75 - 20 Mar 76]. At this time, he and another young man (of the Mojahedins) formed a secret Islamic organization in prison. After the revolution he became active in the Central Committee and became a member of the Council of the Central Committee. In Azar of 1358 [22 Nov - 21 Dec 79] he was appointed by the Revolutionary Council as a member of the group supervising the radio and TV organizations. From Farvardin [21 Mar-20 Apr 80] on he had been engaged in ideological activities. Nabavi is married and has one child.

Mahmud Qandi, Minister of Post, Telephone and Telegraph

He holds an MS degree in electronic engineering from Tehran University and a doctorate degree in the same field from the University of California. From 1350 [21 Mar 71 - 20 Mar 72], to 1357 [21 Mar 78 - 20 Mar 79], he taught at the technical college and the school of communications. After the revolution, he was appointed as the head of the faculty of communications and a little later was appointed as the minister of post, telegraph and telephone. His political activities were confined in the framework of Islamic associations both in the country and abroad. He is married and has two children.

Mohammad Salamati, Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development

Born in Kashmar in 1325 [21 Mar 46 - 20 Mar 47], he holds a BA in economics from Tehran University. In Aban 1353 [23 Oct-21 Nov 74], he was arrested by the SAVAK because of his political activities. He was tried in 1354 [21 Mar 76 - 20 Mar 77] and was first sentenced to 3 years in jail. His sentence was extended to 38 months by the appeal court. He was released in Ordibehesht 1357 [21 Apr-21 May 78] and following the revolution was appointed as the superintendent of the officers school which had been taken over by the people.

9561
CSO: 4906

BACKGROUNDS OF TWO NEW CABINET MINISTERS REVIEWED

Tehran IRAN POLITICAL DIGEST in English 29 Sep 80 p 18

[Text]

[Minister of Oil]

Name and family name	:	Tondguyan, Mohammad Javad
Present profession	:	Minister of Oil
Educational background	:	Completed primary and secondary education at Javad and Jafari Islamic schools in mathematics and entered the university in 1972 in Abadan graduating in oil engineering. He was the best student in Abadan. He also obtained a masters' degree from the Institute of Management in Iran.
Former professions	:	After the completion of his studies he was employed at the National Iranian Oil Company in 1972 working at the Tehran Oil Refinery. After 1 year, he was imprisoned for being a political activist and was later expelled from the Oil Company. After being expelled from oil company he was drafted as ordinary soldier and was employed at Pars Toshiba Company in 1975 and remained here until 1979. After the victory of revolution he was employed by the oil company again.

[Minister of State]

Name and family name	:	Khaier, Mosa, Engineer
Date of birth	:	Born in 1941 in Ardebil in a religious family
Present profession	:	Minister of State
Education	:	Primary through higher education in Tehran the Military Academy. He later joined the Tehran Technical College to continue his studies in

electro-mechanics and obtained his engineering certificate with honours in 1964. He obtained a M.SC. in management in 1974.

Former occupations	:	He began his teaching at the Abadan Oil Institute in 1968 to 1970 when he joined to teach in the Tehran politechnic and in 1973 joined Tehran Refinery. After the victory of the revolution he was appointed advisor to the Steel Plant, Advisor to the Oil Minister and Advisor to the Khuzestan Governor-General.
Political activities	:	He did not have political activities since he was studying in Military Academy but in 1973 after leaving the army he joined the opposition groups to the shah and was arrested in 1974 for a year. Before the victory of the revolution he was active in politics and was invited to work after the victory of the revolution.
Foreign trips	:	European countries.
Foreign languages	:	English

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

VEGETABLE OIL PRODUCTION--A well-informed source in the vegetable shortening distribution center told reporters that the production of vegetable shortening in the country exceeded twenty-nine thousand tons during the Iranian calendar month of Sharivar, ending September 22. The source said that the production figure was nearly four thousand tons more than that of the previous month. He also said that had there not been official holidays during that month the production figure would have exceeded thirty thousand tons. [Text] [Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 p 11]

NEW DETERGENT PLANT--Reports indicated that by the end of the fiscal Iranian calendar year of 1359, the giant Toli Press detergent and soap manufacturing plant with an annual output of sixty thousand tons which would ultimately reach one hundred and twenty thousand tons would go on-stream. Reports said that during the fiscal calendar month of Mehr, ending October 22, the total production of soap and detergent would exceed 17,000 tons. [Text] [Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 p 11]

RAILWAYS NOTICE--The State Railways in a notice to all importers who have imported their goods by train asked them to clear their goods as soon as possible from the wagons to assist the railways in reaching vital supplies to other parts of the country during the present situation. The Railways also warned that delay in clearing the wagons must not be permitted. [Text] [Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 p 11]

SARCHESMEH COPPER SMELTING--Reports indicated that discussions are continuing with several eastern bloc countries for the completion of the giant Sarchesmeh copper smelting works in cooperation with their experts and knowhow. It is widely believed that East German expertise would be invited for the completion of this project that has been lying incomplete since the Islamic revolution. Their cooperation would be sought for the completion and putting on-stream of the plant and for manpower training and after the completion of these projects their contracts would be annulled. [Text] [Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 p 11]

CUSTOMS STATEMENT--Officials of the Khorramshahr customs told reporters that the clearance of all articles at the customs warehouses is unrestricted and called on all importers and those whose goods have been lying uncleared to clear thier goods as soon as possible. The officials said it also included luxury items which are restricted. The officials also said that the Khorramshahr customs would not shoulder any responsibility for damages incurred to their goods by fire or other sources. [Text] [Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 p 11]

REFINERIES AT FULL CAPACITY--Officials of the National Iranian Oil Company told reporters that contrary to rumours that the Abadan refinery had been damaged, the production of the refinery at Abadan stands at 380,000 barrels a day, reflecting half the original production figure. The production has been de-reased for security and safety reasons. The officials also said that the refineries elsewhere, like Tabriz, Isfahan and Tehran were working at full capacity and added that there are adequate reserves of various types of oil, including gasoline and kerosene for the country and also sufficient stocks for export purposes. The officials further said that at present there is no shortage of oil in the country, but for winter concrete steps will have to be taken. [Text] [Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 p 12]

GASOLINE DISTRIBUTION--The Revolutionary Prosecutor General of the country issued warnings to all the gas station managers and owners to refrain from providing gasoline to those customers without cars and that too they have to only fill in their gas tanks. [as published] In a clear warning, the statement said that those with petrol cans or other utensils should not be sold gasoline and those operators of gas stations who fail to heed this warning should be severely dealt with. [Text] [Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 p 12]

BREAD, FLOUR COUNCIL--The Bread and Flour Council in a statement informed the public that there is no shortage of any stocks and as such asked the public not to rush to the shops purchasing large quantities of bread and flour. The Council asked all the bakeries to start a bit earlier their third round of bread baking so as not to clash with the hours when the lights are put off and power cut in the city. [Text] [Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 p 12]

BUS SPARE PARTS--The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran hereby informs the public that the company operated by Mohammad Kamal Alaribi navigation experts in a letter addressed to the Iranian Embassy in Tunis said that they are in a position to supply a large percentage of spare parts for bus, for the bus manufacturing industry of Iran. Traders interested in making any purchase may approach the Islamic Republic Embassy in Tunis for details and other information. [Text] [Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 p 12]

EGG DISTRIBUTION--A survey recently showed that eggs have again made a comeback at the groceries. However, the officials have warned the public to refrain from paying more than the fixed amount of one hundred and thirty five rials (135) per kilogramme of eggs. [Text] [Tehran IRAN ECONOMIC SERVICE in English 29 Sep 80 p 12]

CSO: 4920

DEFENSE BUDGET SEEN HAMPERING ECONOMY

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 27 Aug 80 p 10

[Article: "Gafni: Defense--The Heavy Burden on the Israeli Economy"]

[Text] The State of Israel's defense burden is three to four times heavier than that of every member country in NATO--said the Governor of the Bank of Israel Arnon Gafni in his talk on Tuesday on Israel's economic situation and policy.

The governor appeared at the 38th International Conference on Public Funding and Employment, held at Hebrew University on Mount Scopus in Jerusalem. More than 200 senior economists from various countries, including the Eastern Bloc, are participating in the conference. The Egyptian representative, who was to participate in the discussions and speak on the funding and effectiveness of public initiatives in Egypt, did not attend.

The governor of the Bank of Israel dwelt in his survey on the difficulties which are afflicting Israel as part of the sad situation in which most of the industrialized countries of the world find themselves. This is primarily because of the continuous increases in the cost of petroleum.

Israel has an additional problem which weighs heavily on its economy--the defense burden which constitutes a serious factor in the growth of the country's national debt. Mr Gafni pointed out that in contrast to an increase of 3 billion dollars in the national debt during Israel's first 25 years, this debt has increased by 15 billion dollars during the last 7 years alone. "This is an unbearable burden, and it is three or four times greater than each of the NATO countries," he said.

In regard to inflation, the governor of the Bank of Israel opined that "there is perhaps a tendency to partially blame also the liberalization in the foreign currency policy which the Likud administration has conducted," however this is not the crucial and most important factor in the acceleration of inflation. Other important factors are public expenditures, increased monetary expansion and wage increases.

The economic policy conducted during the last year has been trying to control these factors, and not without success, said Mr Gafni, in citing the positive results which led to the decrease of private consumption, the decrease in imports and the increase in exports.

In concluding his remarks, the governor of the Bank of Israel mentioned his program for economic policy and the battle against inflation, which is based on a joint arrangement for a temporary freeze of wages, prices and taxes.

5830
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DROP SEEN IN DEFENSE FORCE READINESS

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by the Military Correspondent of DAVAR: "The Training Level in the IDF Has Reached the Brink of the Red Line"]

[Text] In the Central Training Installation of the IDF for field units, training is conducted for units from detachment up to regiment for all military reserve units of the IDF, and the installation is provided with a good deal of up-to-date equipment. In the course of a year, tens of units pass through the installation and the training exercises conducted there encompass units from a detachment to a regiment on a very broad scale.

In these exercises the integrated battle theory of the IDF is implemented in practice. Due to budgetary limitations, this training is conducted with a minimal utilization of battle armaments and equipment, but in part various training aids are substituted for the use of equipment, some of which are modern and quite expensive electronic components that afford the soldier-trainees a refresher in battle theory and practice in battle methods.

On a tour of this place yesterday by military correspondents, the advantages of the systems and the manner in which they are utilized for the purpose of training tens of thousands of servicemen annually, were explained. Among other things, structures have been erected at the installation for battle in urban areas, a large range, facilities for teaching tank gunnery occupations, use of communications equipment for training, and the like.

Major General Amnon Reshef, commander of the Armored Corps, Major General Amir Drury, head of the Training Department in the General Staff, and Brigadier General A., commander of the installation, explained, on a tour, the effectiveness of the installation, its advantages and the solutions it affords the military during a time of economizing. In a "warfare city" in a built-up area there are structures and streets within which infantrymen are trained in warfare in built-up areas under almost

actual area conditions. Among other things, training is conducted in the installation for detachment commands in order to prepare them for maneuvers in which all units of the detachment participate. During the past 2 years many innovations have been introduced to the central installation, and the construction of facilities, and the setting up of additional bases are continuing.

With all of this, the remarks Major Generals Levy, Reshef and Drury seemed to leave the impression that the economizing and the budgetary restraints are bringing the training level of the IDF formations to the brink of the red line. As an example, it was reported that the training of one detachment for the duration of the maneuver that extends over a number of days in all of its aspects, costs tens of millions of Israel pounds. Acquisition of a single simulator installation for teaching tank occupations will cost something like one billion pounds. Because of budgetary restraints, the acquisition of such simulation systems has been deferred at this stage.

8090
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ANNEXATION OF GOLAN HEIGHTS OPPOSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 Aug 80 p 9

[Article by Dan Margalit: "Golan Arises on Annexation Map"]

[Text] The parade of embassies leaving the capital has increased, as could be expected, the sense of regret on the part of some cabinet ministers and members of Knesset, who were pressured into voting for the annexation of Jerusalem, but this has not weakened the call for the annexation of the Golan Heights. An analysis of the political circumstances and pressures leads to the conclusion that the parliamentary trap is unavoidable and the opposition ability is practically nil. One of the Likud MK's who had signed the petition on the Golan Heights said to me in a bitterly joking manner: "There is nothing to fear. The Columbian consulate will not leave Katsrin in protest."

But in time, some voices expressing reservation have been heard. Menahem Begin was cool in his reaction to the petition calling for annexation. When he received the signed demand that "we not lose the North," the prime minister responded with almost complete silence, and Likud members added that "we do not have to lose our heads." But just as the prime minister changed his reasoning in the Jerusalem affair, and made it the opening gambit of the election campaign, so he may act regarding the new demand.

The chairman of the Labor party, Shimon Peres, was not far behind Begin, and sought to assure himself some room to withdraw. He declared this week that a territorial compromise is possible on the Golan Heights. As the defense minister in the last Alignment government, Peres knew that at that time Henry Kissinger had probed the possibility of reaching an interim agreement with President Assad at the price of a withdrawal of 2-3 kilometers. These voices cannot buck the general trend. Since 1967, the settlement of the Golan Heights has been part of the Israeli mythology. When Alignment governments wanted to evade demands to expand settlements in Judea and Samaria, they added preliminary housing facing Damascus. Except for Jerusalem, singers have honored this region more than any other in the country. The words by Rachel: "There are the Golan mountains, reach out and touch them: have for many years been heard in parade choruses.

Even archeology has been enlisted to uncover the heavy Jewish settlement of Golan during the Second Temple period (a fact).

The political reasons which have encouraged this trend are still in place. Syria has refused to join any peace process. Fear of such a possibility has recently been expressed by settlers. Syria controls the course of the PLO. The last Damascus Congress proved that the terrorists are not satisfied with a partition of the country and the establishment of a state alongside of Israel; they want a state to replace Israel. Under these circumstances there is no one with whom to talk. Even according to Anwar al-Sadat's last letter to Begin, no country has to negotiate its extermination. These are the conditions which prevail in the Syrian-PLO sector.

From such roots has grown rapidly a unity which is a national consensus. This unity opened on the left. MAPAM included Golan in its original plans. It was only in this area that the Hashomer Hatsair kibbutzim breached the Green Line, with their fields spreading out on the Golan Heights. Their settlements in the eastern Upper Galilee are trying to soothe the party institutions so as to avoid creating any more disturbance than necessary. MAPAM is well aware of the inferiority of its position.

Likewise, the doves of Hakibbutz Hameukhad do not want to provoke a debate of principle over the Golan Heights. Their great historical debate with Moshe Dayan is based on their claim that when he was the defense minister, he was not enthusiastic about occupying the heights. They also like to quote him, that the present ceasefire line cannot be described as a defensible border in Syrian terms. The settlements of Hakibbutz Hamsukhad in the area are more prominent than those of any other movement.

Under these conditions, the Alighment will not permit Geulah Kohen to seize the initiative again. Opposition politicians do not want to get caught once again in being dragged after the "renaissance." Alignment members of Knesset will oversee the annexation of the Golan Heights by means of a multi-party coalition created for that purpose. In a certain sense, Likud and the NRP will be less demanding on the issue of the Golan Heights. The historical link to that region is not so strong, and in orthodox circles this is even considered to be "the conquest of Syria" which is a right but not a particularly obligatory commandment. Yet even Likud and the NRP do not want to play into the hands of Ge'ula Kohen.

The principal oil for lubricating the machine is supplied by public opinion surveys. Seventy-five percent of the Jewish community supports the annexation of the Golan Heights, and that is an irresistable incentive in an election year. To this must be added the Druse Arabs in the Golan Heights themselves, who have apparently accepted certain assurances not all of which are known. A member of the Israeli administration does not dare to warn them as to what will happen to them if in the future they return to a Syrian administration, for no Israeli administration is now able to admit that such considerations guide it.

In the Druse pressure to become citizens, as much as it flatters Israel, is also a troubling element similar to the lack of gratification which sometimes accompanies relations with Major Haddad. But in the face of the active role played by the Israeli Druse Arabs in pressing for annexation, the government will not want to reject them.

In practical terms, this annexation is without value. Just as the Jerusalem legislation did not add one Jewish neighborhood to the capital, so the annexation of the Golan Heights will not solve the problem of the settlements in the region. In Katsrin and Marom-Hagolan there has recently been heard complaint about the slowdown in construction activity. The settlers have complained to visitors that the frames of houses have remained uncovered. Hundreds of families who signed up for housing have not been able to move into their homes.

The situation is even worse in the area of employment. People travel from Katsrin to work throughout the Galilee. If, until now, settlements have not developed because of budgetary difficulties and considerations of official priorities (e.g. pouring more resources into Samaria), now a political difficulty may be anticipated. Annexation of the Golan Heights will arouse international pressure to stop all Jewish construction. To the economic pressures will be added political pressures which until now were dormant. But, in the election atmosphere which is already guiding the party centers and Knesset factions, no practical value is assigned to arguments such as these. Only earlier elections, or sophisticated delaying tactics will be able to stop the annexation.

7075
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EAST JERUSALEM ARAB CALLS FOR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 20 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Gideon Vigart: "Prophet From East Jerusalem"]

[Text] In the east part of Jerusalem lives a man who is considered a prophet--a man before his time and era. In the present atmosphere of great tension in the territories, when people live in constant fear of retaliation and revenge if they dare to "betray the Palestinian cause", and contradict the self-proclaimed leaders in Beirut and Damascus, it is unusual to find such an "exception."

So, if in this atmosphere we meet in the Arab part of Jerusalem a Palestinian nationalist, who proclaims on street corners that he rejects the "secular democratic state in all of Palestine," in the style of the PLO, and instead demands the existence of the State of Israel within secure and recognized borders--he is indeed "exceptional."

And if in addition, this same Jerusalem Palestinian demands that the PLO erase from its charter all reference to armed struggle "for the secular entity," and says to the Palestinian organizations in Lebanon: if you ever want to return to the Bank and the Gaza Strip, you will have to change into declared political parties to struggle for your goals by peaceful legal means--this indeed is a rare phenomenon.

Such a man is Muhammad Abu Shilbayah, "the stubborn," who calls upon his people to stop always demanding "all or nothing." His motto is "take what is given--and later ask for more!" Who is this man, and what is his background?

Muhammad Abu Shilbayah was born in Kfar Yahudish (today Yahud), in the last decade of the British mandate, and he fled with his family because of the War of Independence. After wandering, he settled in Jerusalem, studied at the University of Cairo, and became a young teacher. As a nationalist, and an activist in the Syrian socialist Al-Ba'ath party, he sought the removal of the regime of the Hashemite kingdom. Thus he spent years in Jordanian concentration camps in the desert on the Iraq border.

His name became known in broader circles when in 1971 there appeared on the shelves of bookstores in East Jerusalem his first book (in Arabic) "There Is No Peace Without a Free Palestine State" and a year later "The Way To Salvation, Freedom, and Peace," two books which could never have been published in Arab countries because of the sharp criticism of their regimes. Even then the Jerusalem writer came out against the use of violence as a solution to the Israeli-Arab dispute (in his first book a special chapter is devoted to "the mistakes of the Palestinian organizations who have learned nothing from the lessons of the past!").

He writes as follows: "The Palestinian state which I propose does not need weapons and does not need an army. Absolutely not; we do not want to destroy anyone or throw anyone into the sea; we do not want to build our state on the ruins of the state of Israel..." (p 14, "The Way to Salvation, Freedom, and Peace").

Abu Shilbaya was the first man, until today the only one, not only from among his own people but among all Arabs, who demanded not only the payment of reparations by Israel to Palestinian refugees, but also the payment of reparations by Arab countries to Jewish refugees who were forced to leave their countries following the War of Independence and the establishment of the state.

In 1973 Abu Shilbaya made an attempt to publish his own newspaper, the weekly SAWT-AL-JAMAHIR (The Voice of the Masses). In its pages, which appeared for 3 months, the editor called for a solution based on mutual understanding and concessions, called upon Israeli writers to work with him, and called for the establishment of an Israeli-Palestinian peace party. Today, Abu Shilbaya is one of the editors of the Jerusalem Arab daily paper AL-ANBA.

It is a rare experience to listen to a man like Abu Shilbaya in these times. Today, as in the past, he is not afraid of expressing his opinions, even though they arouse the leaders of his people beyond the borders. He is not afraid to say openly that "deep and far-reaching changes have occurred among the Palestinians in the territories thanks to the daily contacts between them and Israelis over the last 13 years." He thinks that the effects of this fruitful encounter are especially felt in the creation of totally new classes within the population of the territories and East Jerusalem--workers and women. They are no longer satisfied with an antiquated social structure and are now demanding true democracy "as it exists in Europe, the United States, and Israel!"

His plan: federation between Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan--as a nucleus for a general Middle Eastern federation in which Egypt would be the main factor. In his opinion, the "secular democratic state" on the PLO model would lead to the establishment of a bi-national state, a second Cyprus, and unceasing war.

With great courage, he proclaims to all willing to listen: "I am for a Palestinian state in the territories--a transition period of 5 years under American supervision, elections in 2 years in which the voters will elect a government which will enter into negotiations with Israel on all of the problems in the dispute."

As for Jerusalem? A united city, indivisible, having two separate city halls, with an overall single city hall--the capital of the tripartite federation. But above all, this man repeatedly emphasizes: I demand an absolute end to acts of hostility, a change in the Palestinian covenant so that it will recognize Israel's right to exist within sure and recognized borders forever--in exchange for Israel's recognition of a Palestinian state which is peaceful and non-aggressive.

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POLITICAL PARTIES WOO ARAB VOTE

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Aug 80 p 19

[Article by Meir Hareuveni: "Parties Open Race For Arab Votes"]

[Text] The people involved in the electoral system in the Arab sector estimate today that the principal struggle prior to the elections for the Knesset are in two camps: the front which is crystalizing around RAKAH, and the Alignment. The other parties, including Likud and the NRP, which had significant influence on the Arab village in the last 20 years, will pay the price of having ignored the problems of the Arab sector and of their absence from the Arab village during the period of Likud's power. In the chase for Arab votes in the Arab sector, the party workers are encountering a chilly attitude. When the secretary general of MAPAM, Viktor Shem-Tov, was invited to lecture to a group of Alignment workers at the Arab village of Dir-al-Asad near Karmiel, only 20 persons from the village and from those invited from other Arab villages in the Galilee attended. Workers from RAKAH, the strongest party in the village, did not hide their pleasure at the embarrassment of their principal antagonist.

In another instance, the honor given by Alignment leaders to the past MK Shaykh Jabar Mu'adi whenever they visit the area, was challenged by young activists in the Druse villages. The young people claim that the aging leader who tends to envelope himself in gilded robes while his feet are stuck in the soil of reality of the Druse village, is in fact a "worn out horse" and that the Labor Party would do well to understand that the Druse population has become estranged from the aging and conservative leadership. More than anything else, the young activists were angered by the fact that Shaykh Jabar Mu'adi was invited to sit at the presidential table, when Shimon Peres appeared at the Histadrut Hall in Acco before a sympathetic Jewish public.

Another phenomenon which is accompanying the race of the large parties for the votes of the Arab electorate is the organizing of mixed Jewish-Arab pressure groups which seek to develop brotherly relations of cooperation between the Jewish and Arab sectors in the Galilee. Everyone knows of the efforts of the head of the local council of Kfar Tavor, Micha

Goldman (who is one of the election managers for Yitshaq Rabin). Recently there was founded, at the initiative of Micha Goldman, the "Committee of Jewish-Arab Councils in the Galilee."

A similar activity in the Arab sector, in cooperation with groups of Jewish activists, is being conducted in the Galilee by MK Amnon Lin, of the Knesset faction of La'am.

Another group which was created this month at the initiative of the Regional Workers Council in the Western Galilee and the Union for Development of the Western Galilee is the group for nurturing good neighborly relations, with the participation of Jews and Arabs from both sectors of the region. One of the signatories of an invitation to the first convention of this group is a resident of Kfar Dir-el-Asad, Husayn Asadi, coordinator of activities of the Labor Party in the Arab sector of the Western Galilee.

Another group, totally Arab, which was recently created, is the "Arab Group". This group is led by people of high position in both Arab and Jewish circles, most of them academics. Among them are the attorney Jamil Shalhuv of Haifa, attorney Muhammad Masrawa of Kfar Qera, Ibrahim Shabat who is a journalist from Nazareth, and Dr Sami Mar'i of Haifa University. Because of their position in both the Jewish and Arab communities, the people of this group carry far more weight than their numbers would suggest. Although for the moment this group is not identified as an offshoot of any of the political parties, its primary mission is to moderate extremism in the Arab sector and to increase cooperation with Israel, and this will lead to such identification, at least according to the propaganda of the RAKAH people, who view this group with much seriousness, and characterize it as "yet another group under Alignment protection."

In contrast to the formation of a strong front led by RAKAH in all villages and population concentrations of Arabs in the Galilee and the Triangle, the deployment of the Alignment in the Arab sector is marked by splinter groups. This splintering of forces and group organization based on local and sectarian interests marks the split between Rabin and Peres in the struggle for the Druse Arab vote.

Presently, sympathy in the Arab sector is supporting Peres. In the Arab sector, the Alighment paints itself as a party which rejects settlements in the territories and which is ready to negotiate significant withdrawals. Of the two principal opponents in the struggle for the prime ministry in an Alignment government, Rabin has the image of the hawk, which explains the support expected by Peres.

The Arab electorate blames the Likud government for difficult economic conditions as well as the extremism in political expressions on the issues of settlements in Judea and Samaria, as well as recent developments in negotiations with Egypt.

The Arab electorate will also settle accounts with the NRP because of the influence of the Ministry of Interior on budgets for local authorities

as well as permits for building. They remember clashes with the police against the background of implementation of decrees for the destruction of houses built without permits, the repeated protests over the non-approval of building plans in the Arab village, and the difficult financial situation of local authorities currently.

Political developments in the region since 1967 and especially in recent years, surrounding the peace agreement with Egypt and the strengthening of pro-PLO elements not only within the region, but on international fronts such as the UN Assembly and the European Common Market, have contributed to the strengthening of RAKAH and its establishment as the central party in the Israeli Arab sector.

RAKAH, together with other local factors which are uniting around it in a front, is trying to create for itself the image of a responsible party. Its leaders emphasize that they agree with and recognize Israel's right to exist within the 1967 borders, and they demand the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside of Israel. They affirm the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, and they accept the coexistence of Jews and Arabs in the region on condition that the Arab community enjoy full equality of rights.

Extremist minority groups among the Arabs of Israel view even RAKAH as a disappointment that has to be removed. The RAKAH platform has no answer for the longing of many Arabs for the creation of a Palestinian state which would include the territories where large communities of Arabs are concentrated within the state of Israel. Such extremist factors, including the S'nei Hakfar; TALAM (the Progressive National Movement) which is the movement represented by university students, as well as MATSPEN which is made up of both Jews and Arabs, all reject RAKAH.

Opposing RAKAH there are relatively large Arab groups which identify with the State of Israel. These communities are controlled by people of [illegible] years of age, most of them well established economically. These groups fear that the strengthening of the extremists and the weakening of the deterrent strength of Israel will lead to a deterioration which will cause them to lose their material achievements and turn back the standard of living to which they have become accustomed. Within these groups are those who seek to find a common denominator and a basis for cooperation with the Jewish political parties.

The Likud has not been wise in using its position of control. In the three years in which it has been in the driver's seat, neither the Liberals nor the Herut movement has established one club or branch in any Arab village. The recent attempts of the Deputy Prime Minister Simha Ehrlich on behalf of the Liberals, to develop a network of communication and influence within the Arab sector, using his position as the government appointee over the Arab sector, have not succeeded in arousing more than a smile among the activist leaders within the Arab sector. The other Zionist parties have done nothing in this area. All of them have left the arena open for a struggle between RAKAH and the Alignment.

The Alignment has already made its first move in the Arab sector. The census of the Labor Party counted about 10,000 Arabs. About 100 Arab delegates are supposed to participate at the convention, and they will carry decisive weight in the selection of the candidate for prime minister. The Arab representatives are also demanding a place in the candidate lists for the Knesset and central public institutions in the government. The principal demand is that the Labor Party leave the Arabs and the Druse to decide who will be their candidates for the Knesset, and not perpetuate the selection of candidates through the party machinery.

The Labor Party is also preparing a platform in which special sections will be devoted to positions on issues important to the Arab sector. Central activists within the party are frequently visiting the Arab sector. Rabin and Peres made courtesy visits to greet Druse and Muslim leaders on the festival of Id-al-Fitr at the end of Ramadan, and they even participated in family events.

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VARIOUS PEACE OPTIONS WITH ARABS ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 22 Aug 80 p 6

[Article by Eliahu Khen-Tzion: "The Dangerous Character of the Jordanian Option"]

[Text] Before we deal with the subject itself, we must pose a series of fundamental questions.

Does King Husayn represent the Palestinians? Would an agreement with him mean an agreement with the Palestinians? Are the days of the Hashemite regime in Jordan numbered? Is a treaty between Jordan and Israel so essential that it would be worth the price of accepting Jordanian-Palestinian sovereignty in Hebron, Ramallah, Nablus, and Gaza?

The questions are many, and any ill considered step could lead to destructive results for the future of the country, for generations. Let us face these problems and answer them. Before doing so, it is worth clarifying who are "our basic enemies." With whom are we constantly and fundamentally in frontal collision? On the other hand, which are the Arab countries where the "areas of friction" with them are small, relatively, and where conflicts can be bridged?

We can see that basically, the problems between us and Egypt are not abysmal and can be bridged. Ultimately, there is no territorial dispute between Israel and Egypt. There is an international border recognized by all nations of the world. Israel has no territorial demands in Sinai, and Egypt has no territorial demands in Israel. Israeli conquest of Sinai, three times, was an Israeli response to Egyptian challenges, and for security considerations to prevent it from becoming a "military spring board" against israel. The many attempts of Egypt to attack Israel led us to hold a permanent road in the Sinai desert, all or in part, and to create works on the ground which would prevent Egypt from turning the Sinai into a permanent base for attacking Israel.

At the same time, there is no dispute between the people of Egypt and the people of Israel. There is no collision of interests of a proportion which would upset a stable peace treaty between us and Egypt.

The difficulty for Egypt in coming to peace terms stemmed essentially from reasons which were required by "the brotherhood of Islamic nations" as well as the desire to maintain Egypt's hegemony in the Arab world. Egypt wanted to enjoy the economic support of the oil exporting nations, and to avoid political isolation.

On the other hand, Egypt had many reasons for wanting peace with Israel. The principal one was to stop the "vicious circle of war," which had sapped its strength and prevented it from devoting its resources to the reconstruction of the Egyptian people.

The points of dispute between us and Syria are much greater than with Egypt, but still it is possible to bridge them. There is an international border between Israel and Syria. We were forced to occupy and hold the Golan Heights because of wars forced upon us by the Syrians.

There are political circles within Syria which have not forgotten the distant history of "Greater Syria" which stretched to the borders of Egypt, and included western and eastern Israel, but these memories have not been formulated into actual territorial demands.

Syria was and still is one of the states taking a most extreme stance with respect to Israel, and more than once it was the "motivator" which caused bloody wars and dragged the rest of the Arab countries into a general war with Israel. Nevertheless, the gaps are not abysmal, and a peace treaty could be reached without too much "pain" for Syria and Israel.

For purposes of discussion, it should be noted that in both Egypt and Syria there are dominant populations and presidential regimes, and while taking into account the non-democratic character of regimes in Arab countries, these do represent their countries, in spite of the strong opposition in each of the countries. So, signed treaties could be made with these countries under their present regimes. It is not impossible that such treaties would be breached by new regimes that might come to power, or even by the existing regimes, but nevertheless there is a degree of reasonableness that political agreements could be reached. So, the achievement of a peace treaty with Egypt is a positive step, and the desire to reach such a treaty with Syria should be one of the early goals of Israeli policy.

This is not the case with Jordan, where King Husayn of the Hashemite dynasty rules, supported by the beduin population which is a minority in the total Jordanian population. Most of the population is composed of Palestinian refugees who have "acquired" for themselves a "national entity" differing in character and substance from that of the Jordanian beduins.

Today we live in a period of the destruction of the last remnants of kings and kingdoms in the Asian and African continents, and this "wave: is rising. The stability of Husayn's monarchy in Jordan is doubtful. It might even be said that its days are numbered.

Still one must marvel at Husayn's staying power and ability to maneuver. Yet the facts do not offer a promising picture for him.

The Palestinian population of Jordan is gaining increasing influence politically, economically, and culturally, and there is no doubt that in the not distant future, they will gain control of the country.

The Palestinians are now riding the crest of a wave of proud and militant nationalism, supported by other Arab countries and the Third World. Now they have succeeded in hitching their wagon to the countries of Western Europe. It is true that these waves are temporary and irrational, based on changing political reasons, filled with contradictions.

The differences between the political "national entity" between the two populations both in the country of Jordan and in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza with their "added Palestinian power", are deep and very basic. Any treaty between us and Jordan will be deeply influenced by these basic facts. It is beyond doubt clear that a treaty with King Husayn will not solve in any way the Palestinian problem. On the contrary, a treaty with Husayn would cause a Palestinian reaction and could aggravate the problem and make its solution more difficult.

There is a great difference between the geographical-military problems between Israel, Egypt, and Syria, and between Israel and Jordan. The former are on the southern and northern borders, and in military and geographical terms would not, in the first stages of a war, press the heartland of Israel.

On the other hand, Jordan is on Israel's long eastern border, at the narrow neck of the country. Jordan could launch an attack on Israel from bases close to the population centers of Israel, and the sensitive and critical military points of Israel. Any treaty with King Husayn, according to Shimon Peres, would include territorial concessions in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. The border between Jordan and Israel would "move" westward and be fixed near Jenin in the north, Tul-Karm in the center, and in the region of Yatur which is south of Mt Hebron. Indeed, MK Peres supports the Allon plan, which calls for Israeli settlements and sovereignty in the Jordan Valley, and the stationing of the IDF on the Jordan River, but we must also keep in mind the Jericho plan which permits a Jordanian corridor to Judea and Samaria, as well as access roads for Jordan to Gaza, which would become a Jordanian port on the Mediterranean. The limitation which would prevent the Jordanian army from crossing the Jordan River would be no guarantee to prevent the possible creation of secret bases on the crest of the mountains of Judea and Samaria which could be occupied by the Jordanian army--in the event of a war--by means of surprise landings by land and air.

It can be assumed that any attack on Israel would be in cooperation with "brotherly" Arab countries--Syria, Iraq, Lybian support, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the Arab countries.

Jordanian sovereignty over Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, which would prevent free military movement by Israel in those territories, would enable the Jordanians to concentrate military means, secretly, which could be hidden in the mountains and towns, and with which Arab civilian militias could be equipped, to provide massive military support to the Jordanian-Syrian-Iraqi army to the rear of the IDF.

King Husayn would solve his "Palestinian problem" within his country by transplanting the Palestinian leadership and the other volatile factors within the Palestinian population in Jordan to Judea and Samaria! The Palestinian entity in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza would be more radical and more militant, and would sooner or later lead to another Palestinian state under the Jordanian crown of King Husayn.

The "Jordanian option" will not solve the Palestinian problem; it will perpetuate it. As stated before, some of the Palestinian refugees in Jordan would be directed to Judea and Samaria by economic inducements as well as threats. Such a movement would be accompanied by a new national and religious arising under the motto "return to home" of the Palestinians.

The Jordanian option necessarily carries with it danger to the very existence of Israel. It carries no solution to any of the problems of Israel.

The Jordanian option will only sharpen the Palestinian problem, and encourage and push the Arab countries to open a general attack on Israel--on the northeastern front from aggressive military bases having clear advantages for the Arab armies! They would attack in the belief that this time they would be able to defeat the IDF on the battlefield. Already on the first day of such a war, Israel would be forced into a defensive posture, to protect its population and industrial centers, as well as sensitive military points. This would give a very important opening advantage to the Arabs.

The Jordanian option--in my opinion--would constitute a death trap for Israel, both politically and militarily, and the Israeli government should do everything possible to put distance between itself and such a solution.

In looking back, it is clear that Israel never had any interest in saving the monarchy of Husayn in 1970. We responded to a secret request, perhaps silently, by the U.S. to support the hand of Husayn by turning back the Syrian armored columns which were disguised as "Palestinian forces." The IDF did this by moving up armored units on the Golan Heights opposite the mountains of Gilead--the road on which the Syrian tanks were advancing. Their armored column was forced to turn back, to avoid an Israeli attack on its flank, or being cut off from the Syrian rear.

We have no interest in the continuation of Husayn's monarchy in Jordan. It holds no advantage for Israel, in spite of the quiet on the Jordanian border and the open bridges, which are to his credit.

In the long run it would be better if the Palestinians would take the reins of power in Jordan and realize there their "national political" desires. The "Palestinian entity" would find its expression there. In terms of explaining our position to the world, this would be more convenient for Israel. The autonomy plan, in spite of all of its drawbacks, limitations, and dangers, is a possible solution, as the lesser of evils. But in order to reach this solution, we must create far reaching facts in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, by means of which we will be able to neutralize the dangers of autonomy, and prevent any territorial contiguity of the areas of autonomy. Only after basic preparations by Israel "in the field" can we begin serious negotiations on autonomy.

It would be appropriate for the government to come out of the next elections to be a national unity government, which would have the power to face the challenges and great difficulties which await us, on all fronts and in all sectors, in both political and security terms.

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OUTSIDE MEDDLING CALLED CAUSE OF NAFHA PRISONER STRIKE

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 2 Sep 80 p 4

[Article: "The Source of the Hunger Strike by the Security Prisoners in the Nafha Jail Lies in Unmistakable Political Causes"]

[Text] "The reasons for the hunger strike declared by the security prisoners in the Nafha Jail on 11 July were clear political reasons, provocative elements from the outside meddled in this issue and their contribution to the spread of the hunger strike was quite significant," was determined by special investigation commission headed by Commander Shmuel Eytan, which was appointed by the Interior Minister Yosef Burg to investigate the causes of the strike.

The report of the commission, which includes conclusions and recommendations stemming from what had been learned from the strike, was made public at a news conference which took place yesterday in Jerusalem.

The interior minister reported that the commission examined about 40 people, among them Squadron Leader Haim Levy, commander of the Prison Service, personally, who was present at the press conference.

The interior minister noted that in Israel there are seventeen jails, including seven in the areas of Judea and Samaria. These fails hold some 600 [sic] prisoners, among whom are 2700 security risks "in the broadest sense," since among those security detainees there are those even at Nafha who have been sentenced because of notorious acts of terror to life imprisonment more than once.

Outside Elements

"The hunger strike by these security prisoners was political, led, incited and inflamed by specific external elements, by the influence of the PLO, and in accordance with general political acts associated with the general atmosphere," said Mr Burg, who noted that the recommendations of the commission will be taken under advisement and implemented to the extent possible.

Squadron Leader Haim Levy, Commander of the Prison Service, and Commander Shmuel Eytan, chairman of the commission, also said that from conversations with the prisoners as well as from intelligence information, it was clear beyond doubt that "the strike was organized within the context of the struggle against the State of Israel, indeed from within the walls of the jail, and the principal goal was to exhaust us to the greatest degree possible."

Forced Feeding

The commission report confirmed that two of the hunger-striking prisoners who died during the strike, as a result of the penetration of acidified juices from the stomach to the lung after they had been fed in an exhausted and frail condition. One of the deceased, Muhammad 'Ali J'abri, ate willingly after the deterioration in his condition and for reasons that were not made clear died subsequently as a result of "respiratory pneumonia."

Hunger striker Ghassam Muhammad Halawa died after being forcefed by means of a tube (zunda) and expired by reason of the penetration of acidified gastric juices to the lungs, which could have been in any case "the result of the resistance by the prisoner and his general condition, when a quantity of food entered the trachea by error instead of the esophagus."

But in the two cases, the commission found no deviation from the procedural instructions and there was no negligent conduct requiring legal action.

By Order

The commission determines in general that "the activities in their entirety, including the medical activities which were carried out by the prison authorities, from the beginning of the hunger strike were carried out in accordance with orders and existing procedures." Only with regard to three prisoners was there the need to use force to persuade them to accept nourishment, according to regulations existing only in the State of Israel, which require that a hunger striker must be forced to take nourishment of a sufficient caloric quantity in order to prevent endangerment to his life.

Lack of Concern

Mr Burg noted that in countries throughout the world it is customary to permit hunger strikers to strike until there is an actual danger to life before the prisoner is forced to take nourishment, however in Israel there exists the principle of "sanctity of life" and a hunger striker is not permitted to approach a danger point at all.

The commission recommends response to a number of demands of the prisoners related to the conditions of their imprisonment, emphasizing that these demands could have been met even without the strike, the principal motivations of which were, as has been stated, political, and especially out of a desire to prevent the separation of the leadership of the prisoners from the other prisoners and their transfer to other jails.

Expanded Exercise Compound

Among the recommended reforms: Expansion of the exercise compound, instituting improvements in the conditions of the prisoners' meeting with their family members, installation of wash basins in all cells, increasing the lighting and ventilation conditions in the cells.

The commission also recommends introducing more variety in food served the prisoners by seasoning it and cooking it in accordance with their taste.

In a special recommendation, the commission notes that government authorities should give attention to the problem of indoctrination of the security prisoners, with the aim of utilizing the length of their stay in prison, in view of the fact that "the terrorist prisoners refuse to work at any kind of task with the exception of self-serving tasks entailing their own needs. The refusal to work is explained as a non-contribution to the Israeli war effort."

Intellectual Theory

The intellectuals among the prisoners disseminate a theory of hate toward everything associated with the State of Israel and Zionism, and that is operated at times also by the use of force and threats.

The commission notes further that "with the outbreak of the hunger strike at Nafha Jail, the incident received a great deal of publicity in the media in Israel and abroad to a degree exceeding all proportion. For example, it was reported that 26 hunger-strike prisoners had died.

Distorted Picture

The timing of the strike to correspond with the deliberations at the UN and in Copenhagen and the meddling by interested parties created a distorted picture of Nafha Jail."

The commission determined that it was proper to emphasize that the medical service and the other prison conditions at this facility are superior to the conditions at other jails, and the only problem is the distance of the site from the center of the country, which is a problem that is of no especial consequence in the opinion of the commission.

8090
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PALESTINIAN STATE SEEN AS ANATHEMA TO ARABS

Tel Aviv HATZOFEH in Hebrew 29 Aug 80 p 6

[Article by Dr Yitzhaq ben-Gad (Makhloff): "The Arabs Do Not Want a Palestinian State"]

[Text] In the previous article in this series, we discussed the dilemma facing the PLO after the Yom Kippur War: to join, or refrain from joining, the Geneva Conference. We shall discuss the intervention of the Arab states in the dispute, and the idea of the establishment of a Palestinian state. We shall answer the question: Do the Arab countries neighboring "Palestine" want a Palestinian state?

The resolutions of the Palestinian National Council at its meeting of June 1974--which have been called the Ten Section Plan--were extremist and uncompromising. They appear less extremist by reason of the strengthening of the foundations of the PLO which advocate a relatively moderate position, on the tactical question calling for the participation of the PLO in Geneva. This is as opposed to the position of the extremists, who reject out-of-hand any compromise or political negotiation and are of the opinion that the only way to achieve the goals of the Palestinians is through armed conflict. However, in effect, the resolutions of the Palestinian Council were meant to serve two important aims: A) To deny Jordan the legal authority to return to itself the areas from which Israel is to withdraw. B) At the same time to maintain a state of war with Israel and to prevent, at any cost, a connection between return of territory by Israel and the Palestinian recognition of Israel's right to exist.

Anyone examining the way of the Palestinian national reaction, cannot but be impressed by the fact that the Arab leaders who wished to exploit the Palestinian problem for their own interests have, with the passing of time, been turned into the exploited. The Palestinians who had been destined to be the weak and exploited body have become an exploiting factor, vexing and even dangerous, to these leaders and to others who have succeeded them. This is analogous to the axe turning upon its hewer.

The prime argument of the Palestinian movement that the land belongs to its Arab inhabitants and that no man has a right to deed it to the Zionists. The Balfour Declaration, the Mandate and the Partition of 1947 are all null and void, inasmuch as they stand in opposition to the natural and legitimate rights of the inhabitants of the land whose decisive majority are Arabs. The appointment of Haj Muhammad Amin al-Husseini to the exalted position of president of the Supreme Muslim Council was the beginning stage in the relations of "Palestine" with the Arab countries and

Islam. Amin al-Husseini was an ambitious leader who wanted "Palestine" to capture a position in the Arab and Muslim arena above and beyond its size and its political weight. In a Muslim congress which he convened in Jerusalem in December 1931, there are to be seen for the first time hundreds of representatives from Arab and Muslim states who came to deliberate over what the Mufti called: "The terrifying Zionist threat to the Holy Places." In the riots of 1936, some of the Arab states attempted to intervene with the Palestinians to cease their strike. In the London meeting of 1939, representatives from the Arab countries participated in order to help in solving the problem.

The interest of the Arab states in the controversy increased when they achieved independence in the mid-forties, and a sharp rivalry then began among them on the conquest of "Palestine" and tying it in to their sphere of influence. The Arab leaders were not blind to the fact that "Palestine" constituted a geopolitical focus by virtue of its location between the Mediterranean and Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Egypt. The one dominating this land region could influence—if even indirectly—events in neighboring countries. The War of 1948 presented an appropriate opportunity for the leaders of the Arab countries to concern themselves with their interests in "Palestine" or at least to prevent others from achieving exclusive gains. When that war broke out, Egypt even hesitated about becoming involved in it. The decision of Egypt to intervene in "Palestine" came when it became known that Abdallah, king of Jordan, was preparing to wage war in order to annex parts of it to his kingdom. Egypt decided to intervene in order to prevent Abdallah from donning the crown of "the courageous fighter for Palestine" in the Arab world, and to prevent him from annexing territories, or at least to provide that Egypt, too, gain a substantial slice. In the war, as is known, Abdallah dominated western Transjordan, which had been intended as a Palestinian nation, and Egyptians conquered the Gaza Strip. At the start of the fifties Nasser, the ruler of Egypt displayed ambitions to annex the Negev, in order to create a corridor to the northern Arab countries. Even in 1948, Egypt planned its aggression to accommodate this theory.

The war also served the interests of King Abdallah, who wished to enrich his desert kingdom with manpower from Judea and Samaria, and he also aspired to attain the title "Defender of the Holy Places" of Islam in Jerusalem.

The Syrians' claim to "Palestine" is known. The leaders of the Palestinian movement after World War I considered themselves Syrians, and "Palestine" was called Southern Syria (Syria Al-Janubiyyah). The first Arab executive committee assembled and was formed in Damascus. The Palestinian leaders considered themselves Syrians in the peace conference following the first World War. One of the reasons the Syrians are more extremist than others is their perception that "Palestine" is a part of their land. On 8 March 1974, Syrian President Assad said that: "Palestine is an integral part of southern Syria and we are of the opinion that our privilege and obligation are to insist that Palestine be a liberated portion of our Arab homeland and of our Syrian land." It is no wonder that in the deliberation of the representatives of the Palestinian organizations, the representative of the pro-Syrian Al Sa'iqah Organization said in 1970: "Neither the Palestinians themselves nor one of the organizations, have the authority to decide unilaterally the solution of the fate of Palestine."

In contrast to this Syrian position, the representative of the Arab Liberation Front who leans toward Iraq, said that: The liberation of "Palestine" will serve as a means of achieving overall Arab unity, and not toward the establishment of the 15th Arab state, which will only deepen the division.

At a press conference held about a year ago with President Carter, he said that as far as is known to him all of the Arab leaders with whom he met did not desire the establishment of a Palestinian state and they did not discuss it with him. Why?

Saudi Arabia--this nation is one of the most reactionary and conservative globally and in the Arab world in particular. On more than one occasion this nation has been the target of a verbal attack by the leaders of the PLO. This nation is also busy even today with an economic development plan of stupendous sums. Clearly, a situation such as this requires peace and serenity. A revolutionary Palestinian state at the head of which stand subversive leaders and experienced terrorists, who have never covered their Communist leanings, would endanger the existence of the Saudi royal regime. Recently, Crown Prince Fahd spoke of the need for a Palestinian state. But in the Arab East we must differentiate between words and deeds and the beliefs which are in the heart.

Syria--for the reasons we have outlined in the article and for the age-old desire to see the unification of the Fertile Crescent--is not interested in such a state. It wants a Palestine as an indivisible part of Syria.

Jordan--Hussein knows well, and rightly, that the cruelest enemy of him and his kingdom is the PLO. He still has not forgotten the pronouncement of George Habash: "The road to Tel Aviv leads through Amman."

Egypt--This country is prepared for any solution which will preserve its interests in the region. Arafat, the revolutionary and the pro-Russian, is not to its liking. A state in Judea and Samaria which will be under Communist and pro-Russian influence, will clash also with the national interests of Egypt.

How does it happen that everyone is talking about a Palestinian state and no one wants it, including the PLO? That is related to the character of the East in which we live.

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ANALYST REAPPRAISES PLO POWER

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 29 Aug 80 p 17

[Article by Mordekhai Bar-On: "The PLO and the Strategic Balance"]

[Text] The expanded preemptive activity of the IDF in the areas seized by the terrorists north of the Litani [River] was undoubtedly necessary, justified, and singularly successful. Anyone conversant with the history of the mini-war of the IDF can hardly remain unimpressed by the level of implementation, by the scope of the strike at the enemy, and even—with all the grief--by the minimal number of casualties among our fighters. The problem posed to the IDF in its war against the terrorists is not how to liquidate once-and-for-all their capability of striking at us, but rather how to reduce this capability to a tolerable minimum.

Strategic Balance

The success and the timing of the operation requires that we examine the strategic balance of our struggle against the PLO.

From the time of its founding in 1964, the PLO has absorbed far more defeats than successes on the battlefield and in its various operations. The level of the military operations of the PLO fighters was shown, in almost all cases, to be very low. On the tactical and operational level, the IDF succeeded to a great degree in neutralizing the efforts of the terrorists. If this problem were only one of military struggle, we would be witness now to a total degeneration of the terrorist organizations and would have gained, after 16 years of struggle, a strategic victory which also would have included a political advantage.

If the goal of the terrorists is to convert life in Israel to hell and to undermine the will-power of the Israelis, there is no doubt that the IDF has chalked up a victory for itself in the strategic military balance.

Political Advantage for PLO

Although life in Israel has not become hell at all and the strikes of the terrorists have not become a decisive factor in the shaping of its domestic morale, the PLO has made spectacular gains on the political level and has become a first-rate factor, both in the Arab world and in global politics: the PLO has acquired for itself increasing sympathy in world public opinion and has strengthened its base as the recognized and undisputed spokesman for the Palestinians.

How can the gap between the military failure of the PLO and its political and psychological success be explained?

It would appear that the difficulty is pegged in our grasp of the historic quality of the PLO and of its strategic goal. We must make the analysis according to the results and not according to the proclamations, according to the actual development and not as a result of images which flow from formal definitions, from exhibitionist declarations or from literal declarations of aims.

The PLO declares about itself, and thus it is perceived worldwide, that it is an organization of guerrilla fighters. The fact that we in Israel persist in labeling the PLO as a terrorist organization, has not succeeded in changing by much its world image; very few outside of Israel label the PLO fighters with the name "terrorist" or with other pejorative labels. The expressions prevalent in the world media are "guerrilla fighters," "commando" and the like. Even within Israel, we use the label terrorist more by way of a moral judgment than by way of strategic-historic consideration. The strategy of Israel vis-a-vis the PLO really demonstrates that we see in it first and foremost an organization which poses before us a military problem.

Through all too pathetic but completely fruitless informational efforts, we persist in convincing the world that there is no Palestinian problem, or at least that the PLO does not represent this problem honestly; in effect, Israel does not have a PLO policy. All of our efforts are concentrated in defensive methods similar to the IDF operation on the Arnon Heights.

What Is Guerrilla War?

Were the PLO a guerrilla organization within the classical meaning of the word, its struggle could be summarized as total failure. Those conducting a mini-war are aware that their enemies possess a decisive advantage which is in itself military; thus they are incapable of defeating them in a direct campaign on an area or on other military objectives. They direct their efforts toward striking a single objective--the will of their enemies to continue the struggle. A guerrilla war is typical of struggles within the frame of reference of a civil war--where the will of the ruling circles can be broken, or at least the basis of their hold upon the nation can be pulled out from under them (and this, of course, is a situation irrelevant to the Israel case)--or to struggles against a foreign ruler. In this case, a vital condition for success of the struggle of guerrilla fighters is that the enemy have a realistic option to abandon continuation of the struggle. Inasmuch as a foreign conqueror always has a capital city, such a war ends in the victory of the guerrilla fighters when the foreign conqueror decides to give up his conquests and to retreat to his capital city. Converting the life of the foreign conqueror to a hell in the conquered areas, persisting in the mini-war until the community and the policymakers in the capital city are convinced that there is no prospect of ending the war in victory, and the unrelenting pounding on the morale of the conqueror, are therefore the principal objectives of guerrilla fighters. Influence upon international factors or upon the policies of other nations which are not directly involved in the dispute, are secondary objectives and their influence on results of the struggle are for the most part secondary; the essence of the struggle is joined between the conqueror and the conquered and its results are directly determined between the disputants.

An additional objective facing guerrilla fighters is the effort to recruit the support of their people and to take a position on national leadership acceptable to all, or at least to a decisive majority of their nation. The essence of the struggle against the foreign conqueror helps them to attain this objective relatively easily; however, when there are competing forces within the guerrilla movement, the problem of rivalry with the national leadership arises, as we have seen in several places in Africa in recent years (in Angola and in Mozambique, for example), but this issue mainly influences the situation which is created after the conqueror has left and not the essential results of the guerrilla war.

If we examine the struggle between Israel and the PLO in light of these classical terms, we can say with confidence that the IDF has indeed succeeded in preventing the PLO from approaching its proclaimed goal (to weaken the Israeli position, or even its will to retain the areas which it conquered in 1967). Furthermore, we may even say that the PLO has no prospect of attaining these goals, inasmuch as the fundamental factor is lacking in this struggle--Israel has no concrete option of abandoning the struggle, and even abandonment of the areas which were conquered during the Six-Day War, entails at the very worst a negotiated arrangement and not military surrender.

PLO Strategy

However, this analysis deals only with the only superficial layer of our historic struggle against the Palestinians, and though it takes into account the uniqueness of Israel's situation, it fails to account for the uniqueness of the PLO situation. The PLO, despite its proclamations, is not an ordinary case of an organization of guerrilla fighters, since the military aspect of its war is nothing but a marginal aspect.

The strategy of the PLO is not to overcome Israel's capability to maintain its position by a direct struggle. Its accomplishments are in the very area of three collateral objectives: conquest of the leadership of the Palestinian nation, recruitment and activation of the Arab world (and even the Islamic one) for an all out war against Israel, and a strike at the international position and the economic and political survival capability of Israel. The military capacity of the PLO is merely a visual accompaniment to its political and psychological capacity. This is the reason why, paradoxically, military defeats do not weaken the PLO, but rather even reinforce it. Its very position on the front of the struggle against Israel and its continued appearance in the headlines of the media in the Arab world and over the globe generally, is what affords to its advantages in the area of the three goals toward which it aspires.

This article deals with the military-political balance and not the moral-ideological balance of our struggle with the PLO, but it is appropriate, though only by indirection, to add this as well: The atrocity missions of the PLO (its actions in Bet She'an, in Ma'alot, and on the Coastal Road, and others), despite the anguish they arouse among us and among many others, are not weighed against the strategic balance of the PLO, but rather to its advantage especially. Paradoxically, such acts build the image of the PLO in the Arab world in particular, but also globally and even in the enlightened Western countries as a representative of the despairing struggle of the Palestinian nation for its liberation.

Slaughterers of children in Nahariya and Ma'alot do not appear in the consciousness of the world as criminals who pull out from under themselves every moral hold upon the justice of their struggle. They are described as "desperados" whose terrible distress pushes them even to the commission of such acts of atrocity. These atrocities are described, even more regretfully, as evidence of the strength of the political demands of the Palestinians.

Let us return to the cumulative effect of the military failure of the PLO. Were the PLO an ordinary case of a guerrilla war, their ongoing and repeated military failures would have to expose the shame of this organization before the world in general and the Palestinians in particular. 14 years of military failures would have had to convince the Palestinians and their supporters in the Arab world that the road of the PLO is a dead-end. Yet, with every additional failure the stock of the PLO rises both in the eyes of Arab public opinion as well as in the eyes of the Palestinians. 14 years after the founding of the PLO, there is not today an Arab or a Palestinian who would undermine the leadership of Yassir Arafat among the Palestinians. Further, it would appear that Arafat and his cohorts have succeeded in consolidating a broad and powerful front of Arab nations and armies who are preparing themselves and looking forward to the moment when they, and not the PLO will be able to attain the ultimate goal--the liquidation of Israel.

I have not yet had the opportunity to analyze closely the reactions worldwide to the IDF's most recent attack, yet from previous instances it can be concluded that the victory of the IDF on the Arnon Heights, with all its essentiality and importance on the level of the military struggle of Israel against the terrorist organizations, will contribute not at all to and perhaps will even take away from, our political and psychological balance of our war against the PLO. When the films of the successful strikes against the bases of the terrorists go out worldwide--even if there are statesmen and media personnel who justify the operation--the image of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian struggle and as the power to be reckoned with in any solution that can be attained in the Middle East, will be reinforced, since even the IDF is obliged to take it into account and to mobilize against it by such a broad and daring operation.

We must therefore remember, even when the defense requirement obligates us to conduct operations such as this, that their influence ranges merely over the most superficial level of our struggle against the PLO, and that they do not solve by any means or manner, the deeper problems of this struggle. If we fail to search for new ways to measure up against the cumulative effect of the PLO position in the Arab world and globally, we are destined to be likened to one who treats pneumonia with cough tablets.

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CSO; 4805

INTERNAL STRUGGLE WRACKS HERUT

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Aug 80 p 7

[Article by 'Adit Zartal: "Herut Returns to Its Natural Place"]

[Text] If there are special suits for those who sit on the benches of the opposition, they are already being made or pulled out of mothballs in Herut. One of the key activists of the movement told me this week that Herut is returning to its natural place after a period of glory. For the purposes of public relations and election propaganda, there are those who are flexing their muscles and guaranteeing that in the time remaining until the elections, the situation will be reversed and the public will come to know what a wonderful government it has had in recent years. Some, primarily those whose seats in the coming Knesset are assured, are already regarding the political arena with a bit of despair and self-irony as if there is no force in the world able to save this government and this coalition from themselves. There are others, however, who are endeavoring to guarantee themselves and their movement a soft landing on the day after the elections and are speaking about a government of national unity. Moshe Arens, a certified major hawk (he voted against the Camp David agreements) recently stated in an interview to Galei Tzahal [the IDF radio station] that it is a national obligation to establish a government of national unity and that in sum the political differences between the Likud and the Alignment are not as great as they seem. If the Alignment is ready to return 80 percent of the West Bank, so he said, the Likud is prepared to return 50 percent. He said this, and the ground under him did not open up and swallow him. MK Hayim Kaufman, the chairman of the Herut faction in the Knesset, also favors the establishment of a government of national unity. "The next government," he says, "whatever government it is, will fall in 2 years when it will be necessary to give up territories and to withstand unprecedented pressures. Only a government of national unity will be able to endure this."

The awareness or the feeling that the days of the administration are ending and that the opposition always remains has changed Herut into an arena of clashes in the style of "grab what you can." There are two main struggles in the movement--the old struggle for seats, that is to say for a seat in the Knesset, which has now taken on dimensions of urgency and near-violence, and the struggle over the inheritance from Begin, that is to say over the leadership. These two struggles are intertwined and feed each other.

Three years of government have done something to Herut and its people. It has given them, for the first time in their political lives, the taste of power,

influence and action. It has elevated many people, some of whom were virtual unknowns, to the governmental level and has made them personalities, as it were, and has raised the level of their political aspirations. Since the return to the benches of the opposition will again reduce the system of political reciprocity to the seats in the Knesset, the atmosphere around the list for the coming Knesset is oppressive and full of suspicions. There are new candidates, whom the administration has elevated and made national personalities, such as the Israeli ambassador to Egypt, Eliyahu Ben-Elissar; Cabinet Secretary Arye Na'or; or the Director-general of the Office of the Prime Minister Matti Shmuelevitz. There is also pressure from below, that of the young activists or the middle-aged generation in the leadership and in the secretariat of the movement, and from the local leadership which has arisen and built up strength in small towns and development towns. While the list of candidates has greatly increased, the list will be reduced according to all the forecasts. Someone told me that there is no one in the Herut who is ready to sign the 16th place (in the event that Herut joins with the Liberals). There are also those who fear that the prime minister, in order to preserve the all-Likud course, will impose concessions on Herut for the sake of the other partners in the Likud. The struggle for these few places promises to be so intensive that only a few really consider themselves safe in the coming list. A key member of Knesset, who has important positions both in the movement and in the Knesset faction, told me that after the first six positions, everything will be open. He, himself, is not at all certain of his reelection.

I requested those with whom I talked, all of whom have key positions in the movement, to draw up their list for me. All agreed on the top five of Menahem Begin, Yitzhaq Shamir, David Levi, Arik Sharon and Yoram Aridor. Several added Moshe Arens as safe in the sixth position. After these, in varying sequences, came the almost-certain including Hayim Corfu, Dov Shilanski, Roni Milo, Moshe Katzav, Hayim Kaufman and Yigal Cohen-Orgad. Even Mordekhai Zippori, Deputy Minister of Defense, did not manage to assure himself a safe seat in the next Knesset. Although in recent weeks, he managed to collect the signatures of 150 members of the central committee (the central committee of the Herut has more than 1000 members) who called for his appointment as minister of defense, they say that in the struggle for seats, he is likely to be rejected because he does not have a clear and definitive group of supporters and because his main support, Ezer Weizman, has proven to be a broken reed, at least in the current situation. The places of members of Knesset such as Mikhael Deqel, Yosef Rom, Eitan Livni, David Stern or Nasser al-Din are even less safe. In contrast to those who will be rejected there are those who are seeking to be drawn inside. At the head of this list are those with government positions whom I have already mentioned and also the chief of the Information Branch of Herut, Gideon Gadot, who apparently holds many promises from those who are considered in Herut as the recipients of large votes; David Magen, the head of the Qiryat Gat Council, who has gained a reputation as a rising local leader; Me'ir Shitrit, the head of the Yavneh local council; Tzvi Tzilqer from Ashdod; Hananya Gibstein from Rishon Leziyyon; Ovadya Ali from Afula; and Mikha Reiser, chief of the Organization Branch, a branch which is traditionally an almost-certain springboard to the Knesset (Yitzhaq Shamir and Mikhael Deqel previously served in this position).

Weizman--A Soccer Player in Quarantine

Ezer Weizman's name was missing in all the lists of candidates which I received and in every case was placed on the side. No one believes that with Begin at the head of the list Ezer Weizman will return "home." There are those who are not sorry about this, primarily those who are among the supporters of Yitzhaq Shamir as a possible heir of the prime minister and are also doing everything they can to increase the obstacles confronting Weizman. There are those who are trying secretly and without leaving a trace to preserve as best they can the very thin and fragile ties which nonetheless exist between Weizman and Herut. The more prominent in this area are Weizman's opponents, not his supporters, who have "entered the shelters" according to their man in Caesarea. Moreover, whoever has identified with the Weizman option has recently found himself a target for attack and even purge attempts. This is how many understand the attempt to purge the chairman of the Herut faction in the Knesset, Hayim Kaufman, and to replace him with Dov Shilanski, as part of a greater power struggle between the Shamir people and the Weizman people. In this pattern, claim those who are identified with Weizman, can be included also the recurrent talk about David Levi's loss of strength in the movement, the notices in the press, after the elections in the Metalworkers Union, which blame Yoram Aridor for the defeat, the attempt to involve Mikha Reiser, the chief of the Organization Branch, in the incident involving forgeries in the party's card file, and the struggle between Mikhael Deqel (the Shamir camp) and Me'ir Cohen (a supporter of David Levi) for the vacancy in the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee with the departure of Akiva Nof. Deqel defeated Cohen in the vote, and the Shamir camp (in the activities of which, incidentally, Shamir does not participate at all, at least overtly) vociferously claimed that the hawkish line in the Herut movement has defeated the dovish line, which is now used to signify anyone who seeks to leave the doors open for Weizman.

The irony is that the key person in several of the recent power struggles, some say conspiracies, which the Shamir people have conducted with the other camp is Eitan Livni, who was the operations officer of Irgun Tzvai Le'umi and who does not exactly squander love for Yitzhaq Shamir (the operations officer of the Lohamei Herut Yisrael). They say in Herut that Livni aspires to Aridor's position as chairman of the secretariat, for which he struggled unsuccessfully during the past year, and to again be one of the strong men in the movement. He is credited with erasing the enormous debts of the Tel Hai Fund and, of course, its underground past. However, for the sake of his "grand plan," the seizure of the secretariat and the domination of the extreme hawkish line, he was prepared to enter into alliances which until a short while ago seemed unacceptable. He supported Mikhael Deqel (a Shamir man) against Me'ir Cohen in exchange for his friend Dov Shilanski's taking the place of Hayim Kaufman, known as an adversary of Livni, as chairman of the Herut faction. The next stage in the plot was said to be the removal of Mikha Reiser from his position as chief of the Organization Branch in anticipation of the removal of Aridor as head of the secretariat. This plan has so far not been very successful, and there are those who maintain that it has even damaged his prospects for holding what he already has.

Beyond these unaesthetic personality conflicts emerges the larger struggle over the future image of the Herut movement, both in terms of the composition of the leadership and its ideology. This struggle over the inheritance is between two camps. One camp supports Yitzhaq Shamir as the heir of Begin and is more solid and active at this time while the other camp, the centrist one, claims that now is not the time to be involved in naming an heir (with the intention of leaving the door open for Weizman), a camp which is not actually active and even whose lines of demarcation are not sufficiently clear.

It is not easy today to be an open supporter of Weizman, the man who insulted the leader and who came out against his leadership and even to a certain extent against the ideology he personifies. In a movement which is very closely supervised by the leader, despite the democratic "moves" which he makes, it is better not to stand openly alongside one who has removed himself from the at times imposed consensus around the leader. Individuals, not from the first ranks, have openly declared their support for Weizman. Others are saying behind closed doors that Ezer Weizman is Herut's electoral life-saving board and that under no circumstances should he be permitted to leave the movement. Someone compared Weizman to a soccer star who has submitted a quarantine form. Should he be ejected and pushed to the arms of another competitor team or should an attempt be made to talk things over with him and reach a common understanding, his silent supporters ask.

This indeterminate camp of phantoms of those who want to see Weizman return includes David Levi (who recently had a telephone conversation with Weizman), Hayim Corfu, Hayim Kaufman ("It is unheard of that Rabin and Peres can appear on one list and not Begin and Weizman"), Mordekhai Zippori, Moshe Katzav, Me'ir Cohen, and also, it is said, Yoram Aridor, even though he himself denies any affiliation with any camp. There people are very cautious in their comments and their actions. They are not among those who are making pilgrimages to Weizman's new home in Caesarea. They try not to initiate conversations with him and not to be seen in his company or in the company of his friends and emissaries. The movement for Weizman in Herut has gone underground. Nevertheless, five members of the secretariat maintain rather frequent contact with Weizman. The same applies to heads of branches. This will continue until the screening out of those who are described as Weizman people begins. Not much is needed, someone told me. All it takes is for Kadishai to say one word of criticism and opposition, either in or not in Begin's name, in order for the target of the criticism to be frozen out.

Weizman also does not make it easy for his supporters. He does not make his intentions clear, does not consolidate an open force for war within or outside of Herut, and is very cautious about promising anything to anyone. It now seems that among all the options open to him he will choose the easier one in waiting for another factor which will tip the scales in his favor, be it those pressures on Begin within the Likud to work for his return or be it the state of Begin's health which would open the way for his return. In any event, waiting outside in Caesarea is much easier than waiting inside, within the movement.

Weizman's opponents do not consider him to have much influence, and they do not consider him a danger. One member of the secretariat told me that the furor around Weizman's electoral abilities was exaggerated and that the Likud's great victory in the last election did not result in more than two seats. In the previous election, the Likud's component elements received 39 seats whereas in the

1977 election, "with Weizman as the chief of staff, with Zhorbin on the right and Leah Rabin (and her bank account) and Asher Yadlin on the left, the Likud received no more than 41 seats. It was only afterward with all the joinings that we increased to 45, so where is the landslide victory?" Someone told me that there are three people who can win an election in Israel, and they are Menahem Begin, Zubin Mehta and Isaac Stern.

Also, no one believes that when Ezer Weizman decides to leave Herut, he will take a healthy bite out of it for the entity which he will head. "Ezer," they say, "hoped to bring down the government with his departure from the Ministry of Defense and he did not succeed. He hoped to shake the movement and it remained whole."

In contrast, the camp which supports Yitzhaq Shamir as Begin's heir is clearer and more unequivocal. His supporters--Roni Milo, Mikhael Deqel, David Stern, Dov Shilanski and to a certain extent also Moshe Arens (although, it is said, that he reserves the right to compete for the leadership after Begin), Yosef Rom and Eitan Livni, despite his long-term rivalry--are speaking and working openly. Mikhael Deqel even attempted to arrange open conferences in the branches for Shamir under the banner of "ideological conferences," however, he was censured for this in the secretariat.

Songs Behind the Scenes

Yitzhaq Shamir's strong status in the movement and the unanimous recognition of his personal qualities and ability make it very easy for his supporters. Begin also considers him, as it were, his heir, however, the Shamir people claim that it is precisely Begin's position and lack of action in this matter that are playing into the hands of Ezer Weizman. They recognize that Shamir is not an outstanding vote getter, but they claim that if he were given the opportunity to serve now as prime minister and mature in the position for the remaining year to build himself as a national leader in the public consciousness, he could head the Likud's list in the next elections and even win. Such a process is possible, of course, only if Begin were to announce today his early departure for health reasons (and for no other reason) and gracefully vacate the top position to his natural heir. Those who maintain this point primarily to the state of the prime minister's health. They are concerned that in anticipation of the elections it will become evident that the prime minister is unable to endure the burden of an arduous election campaign and will be forced to drop out. Only then it will be too late to run Yitzhaq Shamir for prime minister, and the top position will fall uncontested into the hands of the big vote getter, Ezer Weizman.

These comments, made repeatedly without attribution in the corridors of Herut, attest to the very sensitive status of the prime minister in his movement. Although he is the leader and no one dares to stand up and advise him out of friendship to depart honorably, and whoever would criticize him openly would be ejected immediately from the tribe, the songs are different behind the scenes. More and more people in Herut believe that Begin is a failure as prime minister and that there is no longer any prospect for saving this government in its current composition. "He is a great leader," someone told me, "but of the opposition. As a prime minister and team chief he has failed all along the way." Other vibrations on frequencies which are still not being received well also attest to an erosion of his strength. Although members of the Likud leadership were encouraged and jubilant when they left the last meeting during which Begin declared that he would visit every settlement in Israel during the election campaign and that he would be chief of staff for the elections, it is mentioned with bitter humor in internal conversations that the

victory in the last election was achieved while Begin was lying in a private room in the intensive care ward in Ikholov [Hospital]. Someone told me that in anticipation of Begin's birthday which was intended to be, as it were, an intimate event for family only, members of Knesset and key people in the movement received telephone calls to be present. I have also heard denials of this, but the story itself attests to the major fading process.

However, the real battle which Herut is conducting today, say those who are trying to eliminate the internal disputes and rivalries, is the one for the masses of its members and sympathizers, those who have been disappointed by the policies of the government and the conduct of its ministers and who are not sufficiently aware of the government's achievements. "If members of the movement become active again, we will stay in power," says Gideon Gadot, the chief of the Information Branch. "Herut members have expressed their dissatisfaction," he maintains, "in the municipal elections and in the trade union elections. They simply did not vote. We know this because we followed the vote closely. If we can reactivate them and gain their support, we have nothing to worry about," he states. It is difficult to know if he believes what he says or if this is part of his job as the one who is in charge of information and the one who will apparently lead the information staff of the entire Likud for the elections.

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POLL SHOWS NO DROP IN PERES LABOR LEAD

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Amnon Denkner: "Nothing New in Labor: 65:35 in Favor of Peres Camp"]

[Text] There is nothing new at all in Labor. It is becoming gradually clear that both camps comprising it, with the accompanying incessant friction, are within clear numerical frames. Every controversial question requiring the decision of the Party Central, is being and will be decided, apparently, in favor of the camp of the supporters of the chairman of the party, Mr Shimon Peres, who dominates about 65 percent of the members of the Central, as opposed to a minority of 35 percent who make up what used to be the "Allon Camp" and now is the "Rabin Camp."

This is the outcome of considerably stormy afternoons at Arlozorov House in Tel Aviv, and was expressed with a good deal of bitterness by the one who had apparently won the victory, but in effect was not able to brag about it to the professional oddsmakers of the Party: Yeruham Meshel, the veteran secretary-general of the Histadrut, while selected as the Party's candidate to continue to serve in the position which he holds in the second session, yet his great personal expectations were smashed against the immovable wall which separates the camps.

Evidently Mr Meshel had good reason to believe that he would score a conspicuous personal gain: while the Rabin Camp took a position against his selection, it nevertheless stressed that it was taking that position not because of personal opposition to Meshel, but rather on an issue of principle: the existing Party Central which, in a couple of months, will end its term, is not the one that should be choosing candidates for the next session, but rather the Party Central that will be chosen subsequent to the December convention. The Meshel people were aware that even within the hard core of the Rabin Camp--the Kibbutz Ham'e'uhad--there were those who expressed a desire to vote in favor of Meshel. Even the fact that he had not a single opponent appeared to support his efforts to garner a sizable majority. Add to that the political wisdom which said that against a hostile Likud government the secretary-general would need an overwhelming

expression of confidence, to strengthen his hand in his economic battles, and you can see the rosy hopes of the Meshel faithful, who looked forward during the secret ballot process to a majority of about 75 percent.

What was left for the secretary-general after the vote was to choose between two alternative explanations: was it his unstimulating image that became a stumbling block for him, or was it, perhaps, the Histadrut steam-roller which was activated at week's end on the members of the Central, that failed to break the rigidity of the camp division.

Adari Versus Nehemias

The second vote, which delineated the boundaries, was on the function of the chairman of the elections committee of the party. The choice of the Peres camp was Mr Rafi Adari, the general manager of Workers' Housing, and the Rabin Camp offered Mr Aharon Nehemias, mayor of the municipality of Safed. The sponsor of Nehemias before members of the Central was a man who in the past has been among the leading behind-the-scenes operators of the party, Mr David Calderon. He proved once again that people who have blossomed behind the scenes are better remaining there and not exposing themselves to a microphone, a camera and an audience. In a long and tiresome discourse which detailed insignificant milestones in the life of his candidate, Calderon succeeded in arousing impatience and derision among members of the Central Committee. Even his remark that the fact that Mr Nehemias is of Moroccan origin should not be used against him, did not sit well particularly. The crowd whistled and roared in rage and Mr Abba Eban pondered aloud whether it would not be worthwhile for the Peres people to arrange, at the next Central Committee meeting, for Mr Rabin to be introduced to the members by that very Mr Calderon.

Mr Adari was presented by the General Manager of Koor, Mr Nafhthali Blumenthal, who did a far better and shorter job, but even that had no great influence on the results of the vote, which again stood at around the fixed percentages.

Rabin-Peres Clash

As always, it was interesting to note how Mr Rabin and Mr Peres once again clashed on the podium of the Central Committee. Mr Rabin called upon Mr Meshel to waive the vote, and postpone it for the Central Committee following the convention. As soon as he left the podium, Mr Peres sharply attacked his remarks, the substance of Peres' remarks being that the decision should be taken immediately and decisions should be honored. This was more than a simple hint of the previous decision of that very Central Committee, on the matter of the candidacy of Mr Peres himself for the position of prime minister. However, Mr Peres added, that if the Central Committee were to vote for Yitzhak Rabin as its candidate for the prime ministry, he, Peres, would avoid challenging that. People of the Rabin camp, who well remember that Mr Peres did that very thing in the past, began screaming foul, and even the Peres people did not understand

precisely what their leader was saying. "He certainly meant something," one of them said to me. "Tomorrow morning he'll explain it to me. Maybe then I'll understand it."

Stammering Speech

Against the background of a ceremonious but stammering acceptance speech by Mr Meshel, the camps made their calculations. Everyone attempted to appear satisfied with the results, it was pleasant for the Peres people to stress the large majority, the Rabin people to stress the firm base for continuing the struggle, but both camps today are cocking hopeful eyes toward the large camp of almost 100,000 new registrants in Labor, who are the ones who will determine a good deal in the true and perhaps final battle: the battle over the composition of the Labor Party convention, next December.

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HISTADRUT SCORES GOVERNMENT ON HOUSING

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 7 Sep 80 p 14

[Article by Yosef Golan, DAVAR Correspondent: "Histadrut Alleges: Severe Housing Shortage Threatens Social Stability"]

[Text] The severe and continuing shortage of housing and its high price, which is beyond the reach of those eligible for it, constitute a threat to social stability in the country and are a cause of resentment which has already brought about a number of undesirable outcomes--it was stated in the sharp proposals for a resolution which were formulated to wrap up today's deliberation in the executive committee of the Histadrut on the issue of the housing crisis.

Shmuel Bahat, a member of the coordinating committee who will initiate the debate today, will accuse the Housing Ministry of extreme negligence in this area.

The Likud people may raise a storm because of the failure to invite Housing Minister David Levi to initiate the debate on the housing issue. Members of the Likud faction allege that by failing to invite David Levi, the majority is revealing that its intention is actually "for a political and not a substantive discussion."

Last night the Likud people were in contact with the Housing minister and proposed that he appear at the meeting in his capacity of associate member of the executive committee, to hear the opening remarks of the chairman of the housing committee, the member of the coordinating committee, Shmuel Bahat, and subsequently to be the first speaker on behalf of the Likud. According to sources in the Likud, David Levi "has not yet made a final decision on how to go about this." A precedent had been set for this tactic already when David Levi and Yoram Aridor appeared together as associate members of the executive committee, and David Levi even brought with him a group of protestors who were residents of his municipality Bet-She'an.

In the proposed resolution which will be offered today to the executive committee, it is further stated that the continuing housing shortage has a negative and dangerous influence on the integration to society of those demobilized from the IDF as well as upon the immigration to Israel and the absorption of immigrants. "The executive committee cautions," it is stated in the proposals for the resolution, "that instead of coming to grips with the problem itself, the Housing Ministry has misled the public through dissemination of misleading data both with regard to the extent of housing starts in actuality as well as with regard to the number of eligibles who have been unable to exercise their eligibility." In order to close the gap that has been created by the scope of residential construction, the executive committee demands that the government initiate building starts within the range of 45,000 to 50,000 dwellings annually," the proposals for the resolution state.

Coordinating Committee Demands Creation of Employment Sources

The coordination committee of the Histradut at the end of the week accepted at its meeting the proposal of the secretary-general of the Histadrut, Yeruham Meshel, to demand that the government forthwith create employment sources for workers who have been laid off. Likewise, the Treasury has been called upon to permit the National Insurance Institute limited use of funds which have been collected by it, and which belong to it, including monies of the Unemployment Insurance Fund, which are monies that are transferred to the National Insurance from wage withholdings of workers and employers.

Meshel stressed that emphasis should be placed upon creation of sources of employment, either through transfer of production lines in depressed enterprises, or through the establishment of new enterprises. Meshel noted that payment of unemployment benefits is merely a partial stopgap, as insurance during a time of crisis, but that it will not solve the problem of the worker who has been laid off and who is interested in continuing to work. Likewise, the secretary-general warned against withholding unemployment payments from workers who complete courses in occupational training, but for whom work has not been found.

SHELI: Weak Classes Hit Again

The chairman of the SHELI faction in the Histadrut, Ron Cohen, reported on Friday that he has received information which is still being held secret, according to which the training grants for students in the lowest tenth percentile in the population have been cancelled.

In consequence of this information, Ron Cohen on Friday applied to the minister of labor and welfare and to the minister of education to act to restore the grant. According to his argument, "cancellation of this grant is an additional link in the chain of assaults upon the weak classes, and it is up to me to demand that the assaulter not economize on the backs of these classes." Ron Cohen asserts that training of a student for the

current school year costs about 6,500 Israel pounds. The chairman of the SHELI faction proposes that monies from the tuition fee which are presently frozen in the National Insurance Institute, be allocated for this purpose, and in that way will be returned to their original purpose.

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MAJOR INCREASE IN UNEMPLOYMENT NOTED

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 20 Aug 80 p 8

[Article: "Unemployment Increases From 1200 to 12,000"]

[Text] "The increase in the number of unemployed from 1200 prior to November 1979--the date of the change of government policy on subsidies, employment and credit--to 12,500 in July provides clear evidence of the worsening of the employment situation," said the chairman of the Trade Union Branch in the Histadrut, Yisrael Kaysar, at the plenary session of the branch which was convened yesterday with the participation of the director-general of the Employment Service, Barukh Haqla'i.

Kaysar demanded that the unemployed be given suitable work in accordance with the law and not be required to take any work offered. According to him, the Employment Service must solve the unemployment problem by means of the vocational rotation and movement of workers. He demanded that the government enact a minimum wage law.

The chariman of the Employment Staff of the Histadrut, Aharon Harel, demanded that the government and the Employment Service create commutative employment for the unemployed. He called for the cancellation of an order for 200 ambulances in the United States and their production in automotive enterprises in Nazerat 'Illit which will prevent the laying off of workers and the payment of foreign currency.

Haqla'i: 3500 Laid Off

The director-general of the Employment Service, B. Haqla'i, said that since 19 November businesses have announced their intention to lay off 8200 workers, however, by the end of June 1980, 3500 had been laid off. In addition, many workers have been given early retirement, and the scope of employment in a series of businesses has been reduced. This process resulted in the fact that while in July 1979 there were 22,720 people seeking work, in July 1980 the number rose to 36,750.

Barukh Haqla'i also pointed out that public administration has also been recently closed to workers, a fact which primarily has an adverse effect on academics.

Nevertheless, he said, there are today about 17,000 vacancies in textile and food enterprises. These involve shift work and beginning wage levels; therefore, not many people are interested in them.

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NEW DIRECTIVE WITHHOLDS UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 8 Sep 80 p 8

[Article: "12 Thousand Job Seekers in the Development Towns]

[Text] 12,045 job seekers registered in the development towns among which are 7,338 men and 4,707 women. Among the job seekers there were 99 skilled building trade workers, 887 in manufacturing, 701 from transportation, 784 in clerical, 340 in the liberal professions, and 9,075 unskilled job seekers as has been made public in a recently completed report on the employment situation in the 29 development towns.

During the same time period the employment offices in the development towns received 5,598 requests for workers, which included 1,475 requests for skilled workers, and 4,123 requests for unskilled workers. 615 of the requests were not filled for lack of appropriate workers and this included 332 requests for unskilled workers. 5,224 of the job seekers were directed to jobs. 4,750 job seekers were unemployed 6 days or more during that month.

Large Development Towns

7,096 of the 12,045 job seekers and 3,164 of the 4,750 unemployed for 6 days or more, are counted within the 7 large development towns, which include Tiberias, with 710 job seekers and 499 unemployed; Nazareth-Alit 602 job seekers and 358 unemployed, Afula 815 and 465; Acre 717 and 237, Nahariya 577 job seekers and 195 unemployed, Ashdod 1,073 and 278; and Ashkelon 946 and 392.

Job Refusal Notation

Directives to note "Refusal to Work" which makes unskilled job seekers who refuse to report to available jobs, ineligible to be certified for unemployment benefits, were sent to the employment offices throughout the country--as was reported by the director-general of the Employment Service at a meeting of the placement subcommittee of the Employment Service Council which took place last week in Jerusalem.

Haklay reported, that despite the increase in the number of job seekers and in the number of unemployed, the Employment Service encountered difficulties in directing skilled and unskilled workers to manufacturing, to hotel services, to construction and to agriculture. There are difficulties in directing workers to the grape harvest in Samaria. The employment offices are compelled to transmit new applications for workers from the Territories. The number of recipients of certificates for unemployment benefits increased also among the unskilled who refuse to report to available jobs.

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RESEARCH EMPLOYMENT PROPOSED FOR ACADEMICS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 25 Aug 80 p 3

[Article: "IL690 Million Will Permit the Employment of 500 Additional Academics in Research and Development for Export"]

[Text] An allocation of IL690 million will permit the employment of an additional 500 academics in about 100 research and development programs for export commodities. This was announced by Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism Gideon Patt upon completion of the first part of a program for encouraging exports and changing the employment structure in the economy.

The program, which was prepared by Mr Avraham Ashri, the deputy director general of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, and approved by the minister, notes that the ministry now has proven research and development programs, the implementation of which has been delayed because of the lack of funds. Moreover, all the requisite administrative instruments for the immediate implementation of the aforementioned programs also exist.

The ministry states that even with the authorization of the programs, there will be a need to establish a condition that the academics who will be employed will be supplementary employees and not permanent employees in the projects.

Emphasis on Research and Development

In a discussion of the essential elements of the program held in the ministry, Minister Patt pointed out that special emphasis must now be placed on industrial research and development since Israel can now compete in the world market only if the original know-how component in the commodity will be relatively higher than the cost of its production.

Those who submitted the program point out that in 1979 about 2,850 academics were employed in industrial research and development, including about 80 research and development programs at an overall cost of IL1.860 billion, of which about IL970 million was funded with the help of grants.

The average overall cost of an academic researcher, including use of equipment, materials and employment of assistants in an industrial project in 1979 was about IL1.4 million while in 1980 it was estimated at IL2.8 million.

One Hundred Programs

On the basis of the requests already in the ministry, it is clear that for about 100 justified and proven research projects there will be no solution and it will not be possible to authorize them under current budget limitations. For these 100 programs to be authorized an additional allocation of IL550 million is required for the fund for industrial research which will provide an impetus for the employment of 400 academics and about 325 other workers. A supplementary allocation of IL140 million for preindustrial research, which would employ about 100 additional academics, would be a solution for the employment of 500 academics and would likely provide impetus for development and the promotion of exports resulting from Israeli research and development.

The entire program will be submitted today to an interministry team for the encouragement of exports and the change of the employment structure in the economy.

Minister Patt also pointed out that Israeli exports resulting from original research and development, which amounted to 150 million dollars in 1979 is steadily increasing, and the application of this program will bring us at the end of the decade to the export of 3 billion dollars of research and development commodities.

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MINISTER DEPLORES DEFICIT IN RAINFALL, EFFECT ON CROPS

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 6-7 Sep 80 p 3

[Interview with Mohamed Ould Amar, Mauritanian minister of rural development, by Radio Mauritania; Nouakchott; date not given]

> [Text] Mohamed Ould Amar, minister of rural development, recently granted an interview to our colleagues from Radio Mauritania in which he deplored the delay in the rainy season this year and its dangerous consequences on the life of the rural sector.
>
> By way of example, the minister said that the towns of Nema and Kiffa witnessed in the entire month of July 1980 only 33 and 21 percent, respectively, of their normal rainfall for that month.
>
> Asked to survey the situation of the livestock-raising projects in the country's southern and southwestern zones, the minister said that they are either on the point of or at an advanced stage of execution.
>
> Mohamed Ould Amar also mentioned among other questions the constraint which the landholding system exerts on the development of agriculture in Mauritania and asserted the government's determination to find a just and equitable solution to this thorny question.

Question: The rainy season was late this year. Can its scope be determined already at this stage and what are the consequences of this delay on the rural sector?

Answer: The rainy season was indeed late this year, which has had among other negative consequences the extension of a particularly difficult preharvest food shortage for the herd. By way of example, the towns of Nema and Kiffa, to mention only these, witnessed in the entire month of July 1980 only 33 and 21 percent, respectively, of their normal rainfall for that month. Even though it is still premature to evaluate the results of this rainy season, it is already possible to draw the following conclusions:

1. The rainy season will be relatively short and some types of vegetables, especially the fodder crops, will not have time to complete their growing cycles before the October hot weather (harmattan wind).

2. The rainfall is unevenly distributed and some very important regions from the agricultural-pastoral viewpoint have so far seen a dangerous deficit. Involved are the two Hodhs and Assaba and Trarza.

It is however appropriate to note that the river's flood waters had risen fairly early, which enables us to hope for good crops in the Oualo region.

Question: Mauritanian agriculture has witnessed difficulties owing to a shortage of rainfall. Mr minister, are you optimistic for the year under way?

Answer: The shortage of rainfall is indeed one of the major constraints of our country's agriculture and particularly of traditional agriculture. It is still too early, as I said before, to make projections regarding the results of this year's agricultural season. In general, such a projection can be made only in October or November, that is, when the maximum amount of information is available on the rainfall, its volume, and its distribution in time and space. Too, as you certainly know already, it is not only rainfall which determines the results of such an agricultural season. There are also the behavior of the crop pests and our capability to contain their attacks. Wait, then, for a month longer, perhaps even for 1-1/2 months, so that I may be able to tell you with less risk of error what this agricultural season will be like.

Already now and as I mentioned earlier, the Oualo region and the low-lying areas can represent sources of hope for us for the 1980-81 agricultural season.

Question: What is the situation regarding the laying out of livestock-raising projects in the southern and southwestern zones?

Answer: Three livestock-raising projects are in the process of initiation or at an advanced stage of execution.

Involved are the pastureland improvement project (with Dutch funding) whose operation zone is in Assaba, the Tagant region, and southeastern Brakna; projects in the southeast and southwest (financed respectively by the EDF [European Development Fund] and the World Bank which will be involved in the two Hodhs and Assaba for the former, and in the regions of Trarza, Brakna, and Gorgol for the latter). The sum total of these projects strives to improve the pastoral hydraulic infrastructure (to increase the use of some pastureland through the creation of water points to enhance sanitary facilities and to teach the livestock-raisers improved techniques of herd and pasture management. The latter is all the more fundamental as it is necessary to observe a balance among our pastureland resources. We have so far resorted to temporary makeshifts which have limits since they are not completely dependent on us. What is involved is movement of herds outside our borders and the distribution of concentrated fodder.

Question: Land ownership represents a handicap for the state's facilities, notably in the Gorgol region. Has a solution been found to this thorny problem?

Answer: The system of land ownership is a handicap to a large extent and, as I explained at the latest seminar for cadres, the development of agriculture as well. I nevertheless wish to clarify an ambiguity. This constraint is exerted principally on the major public hydroagricultural projects. It can still be overcome in the area of traditional agriculture. Consequently, in my opinion there are no farmers who, as some pointed out at the seminar, have the resolve to produce and enjoy rainfall, climatic, and ecological conditions favorable for production but are prevented from doing so by the nature of land ownership. Furthermore, when they exist, the contradictions are less among social classes--as is the case elsewhere--than among tribes or groups of tribes.

What I have just said in no way strives to minimize the problems which arise but rather to specify their nature. The search for a solution to this problem of land ownership will have to strive to preserve the fundamental rights of individuals as well as groups of individuals concerned and to liberate the modernizing effort of the state.

While striving to solve the immediate problems arising in the Gorgol region or elsewhere, this solution will have to broach the problem overall, that is, in all its relative aspects both regarding cultivated or cultivable land and concerning pastureland and pasture rights. Efforts are under way. But the problems being as complex as you know, the endeavor could only be prudent and extended.

It is necessary to find just solutions which are equitable to everyone. The government will not allow itself to be diverted from this approach because of pressure.

Question: Mr minister, what is the state of the national agricultural development fund?

Answer: There is nothing called an agricultural development fund but there is a national development fund, period. The decree creating and regulating this fund is in the process of being promulgated. This institution whose takeoff capacity will be 400 million ouguiya anticipates three specialized funds (for agriculture, fishing, and industry), which funds could in the more or less long term split off as autonomous entities. For the time being the national directorate is striving to build up the necessary funds for the institution and to define its operating rules.

Question: The head of state launched an appeal this year that everyone contribute to the success of the 1980 agricultural season. What are the measures taken by your department to achieve that goal?

Answer: I specify that the appeal of the head of state does not relate exclusively to the government services but also to all the active forces of the country.

As regards measures taken by the department in this context, they involve the acquisition and distribution of market garden equipment, the initiation of a vegetable and especially crop protection campaign, and the strengthening of the means of assistance of the livestock-raising department to insure appropriate sanitary services for the herd.

Too, my department continues to be at the disposal of collectivities that may express their intention to lay out new land or boost water storage possibilities in the villages and the fields.

Question: Mr minister, is there a message that you wish us to convey to our farmers?

Answer: My appeal will limit itself to reminding you of what the chairman of the CMSN [Military Committee for National Safety], the head of state and of the government, said when he urged our people to win the battle of agricultural production and particularly of food crops to protect what is our natural patrimony and to help our natural resources regenerate themselves.

2662
CSO: 4400

SENTENCES ISSUED IN BENJELLOUN ASSASSINATION

Details of Sentences

Rabat L'OPINION in French 21 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] The Casablanca Court of Appeals issued its verdict in the case of the assassination on 18 December 1975 of Omar Benjelloun, editor of the Casablanca newspaper, AL MOUHARRIR.

The court imposed the death penalty on defendants Saad Ahmed Ben Driss and Khazzar Mustapha Ben Mohamed.

In addition, the following defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment: Mouti Abdelkrim, a fugitive from justice; Nousmani Abdelaziz, a fugitive from justice; Khachane Abdelmajid Ben Omar; Salih Omar Ben Mohamed; Kindi Hassan Ben Mohamed; Omar Azgoula; and Amri Ahmed Ben Nouchalb.

What is more the court acquitted Kamal Ibrahim Ben Abbes, Achalb Ahmed Ben Lahbib and Chawki Mohamed Ben Abdellah.

Protest Demonstration

Rabat L'OPINION in French 21 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] In a related connection, the Ministry of Interior issued a communique in which it announced that on "Friday, 19 September 1980, a group of individuals proclaiming itself to be an association with the name of "Achabab Al Mouslim," had organized an unauthorized demonstration in the public streets and that this had taken place at the end of the prayer on Friday which was celebrated in the Al Mouhammadi Mosque in Casablanca.

"The demonstrators shouted slogans in opposition to the trial relating to the assassination of Omar Benjelloun and to the political group with which the latter was associated.

"The quick intervention of the forces of order resulted in the dispersion of this demonstration. There were no casualties. Thirty persons were arrested.

"A judicial investigation has been initiated."

Witness for Prosecution's Statement

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 19 Sep 80 p 9

[Text] Text of statement made by a witness for the prosecution [partie civile] in the case heard on 15 September 1980:

The political assassination of which the late Aomar Bendjelloun [as published] was the victim and whose particular seriousness cannot escape anyone was committed with the specific purpsoe of silencing one of the eminent defenders of the democratic and socialist causes in the Third World.

Executed in Morocco by paid killers, he was liquidated by those who have an interest in keeping our country from ever inaugurating the democratic process for which the deceased Aomar Bendjelloun had always fought and for which he suffered so much. On several occasions he had escaped death, in particular at the beginning of 1973 when an effort was made to assassinate him by means of a booby-trapped package.

The truth about the assassination on 18 December 1975 which we are called upon to judge could have been brought to light if those charged by their duties and responsibilities--political and judicial authorities--with revealing this truth had operated to this end. But these authorities have constantly acted just the opposite.

On the one hand, in fact, the responsible government authorities did not make known to the judicial apparatus the information they possessed; worse yet, they did nothing to ensure the court appearance of two essential defendants, although one of them, Abdelaziz Naamani, was arrested 3 years ago, and the other, Abdelkrim Moutii has taken refuge in a "brother country" (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) and the Moroccan Government has refrained from requesting his extradition. Similarly, these authorities have not taken the action necessary to assure that papers which have disappeared from the dossier and which--according to police conclusions--contain serious charges against high personalities and foreign organizations are replaced in the file or that at least copies of these papers are introduced into the court proceedings.

As for the judicial hearings, they have in turn prevented the truth from coming out, either passively or actively.

Passively: when the judicial police stopped their investigations of those responsible for the crime at a lower level and when the various examining magistrates who succeeded one another in this case limited themselves to the admission of the defendants' denials as if the judges were dealing with mere witnesses.

Actively: when the judicial apparatus refused to have an inquiry made into the disappearance of essential papers from the dossier; when it refused to order that defendants Naamani and Moutii be referred to the judical apparatus; when it refused to order the judicial police to present to it at least copies

of the papers which had disappeared from the file; when the judicial apparatus refused to hear as witnesses persons whom the witness for the prosecution had requested be heard, either within the framework of supplementary information or at the bench of the criminal court, such hearing being of a nature to bring to light at a minimum certain truths about this case.

Under these circumstances, the trial which we have been requested to attend can be nothing more than a judicial masquerade, an insult to authentic justice and to the memory of the late Aomar Bendjelloun.

The witness for the prosecution, being unable by his presence to support such a mockery of justice has decided to leave it to your court the historical responsibility of hearing the case without his participation.

By means of the decision you will render, you will have perhaps judged the assassins; however, you surely will not have judged those really responsible for this odious crime which did not only make a victim of Aomar Bendjelloun but also of those close to him, his friends, indeed all of Morocco.

The real trial of this crime will take place on another day, when we will find those truly responsible.

For now, the witness for the prosecution feels that the true dossier of this case has not yet been opened...

8143
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

COOPERATION WITH PLO--The Protocol of Party and Cultural Cooperation between the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, was signed yesterday morning at the Secretariat of the Executive Committee. Brother 'Ali abd-al-Razzaq Ba Dhib, member of the political bureau and secretary of the Central Committee, signed the protocol for the Yemen side, and brother Taysir Khalid, of member of the political bureau and head of the Committee on International Relations of the Democratic Front, signed the protocol for the Palestine side. Brother Khalid is presently in Aden as a member of the Democratic Front's delegation visiting the Republic under the leadership of brother Nayif Hawatmah, the secretary general of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. [Text] [Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 5 Oct 80 p 1]

CSO: 4802

TEN NATIONAL GUARD MOBILE BRIGADES FORMED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 26 Sep 80 p 10

[Text] Important measures to tighten security in Tunis.

In accord with government instructions and in consultation with regional authorities from the District of Tunis, the minister of the Interior has taken a series of measures designed to tighten public security in Tunis and in the suburbs to maintain an atmosphere of calm and to prevent acts of delinquency.

In this context, a work session was held Wednesday in the governor's offices under the direction of Mhadheb Rouissi, president governor of the District of Tunis. This session was devoted to putting these measures into effect and particularly to the creation of ten mobile National Guard brigades whose job it will be to back up the activities of the police stations in the areas and neighborhoods which have experienced a renewed outbreak of acts of violence and delinquency.

The mobile brigades will begin their activity shortly and will be provided with necessary manpower and material. They will make continuous rounds and, to back up the actions of the municipal police, will make checks aimed at fighting rural depopulation and anarchistic groups.

The president governor of the District of Tunis noted in this regard that elected officials and Destourien groups are being asked to prepare the public so that these brigades will be able to accomplish their clean-up mission under the best conditions and to guarantee security within the capital and in its suburbs.

He also announced that permanent National Guard posts will be established at Gammarth, Harrouch, B'har Lazreg, Kabaria, El-Ouardia, Borj Touil, Mnihla, Douar Hicheur, western Kram, Sidi Hassine, Attar, Boum'hel and Borj Cedria.

8693
CSO: 4400

SENTENCED STUDENTS TO ENJOY FULL RIGHTS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 24 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] As the universities get back in session for 1980-81, the prime minister has announced:

In accord with the recommendations of Supreme Combatant President Habib Bourguiba, to permit all sentenced students to continue their studies and to take advantage of social benefits normally available to students and to guarantee psychological conditions conducive to a normal university life, Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali, presided over a work session yesterday at the government palace in Kasbah with Abdelaziz Ben Dhia, minister of higher education and scientific research, and Ahmed Bennour, general director of National Security, along with Mezri Chekir, director of the prime minister's cabinet.

During this meeting the following was decided:
--Sentenced students have full rights to registration in the fields in which they are studying, to boarding school scholarships, to housing, and to the university restaurant.
--Students in fields which have been abolished in the meantime will be reoriented into different areas within the university.

8693
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END

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No. 2213

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ARAB TRADE WITH MAJOR WESTERN COUNTRIES DETAILED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 29 Aug 80 pp 36-37

[Article by 'Adnan Karimah: "Saudi Arabia Is Tops on All Fronts in Arab Trade With West"]

[Text] There are Arab officials who, publicly at least, separate politics from economics. They defend their point of view in support of their country's economic relations, including imports and exports and various investments in certain foreign countries. Then they make political attacks against these countries for their positions which conflict with Arab interests, without translating this into both economic and non-economic measures to put pressure on these countries to support Arab rights. It seems that the statement made by Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz last week is the beginning of a new thrust in a different direction.

No matter what the secret or public positions of certain Arab countries doing business with the United States and West Europe may be, financiers, businessmen and economists understand those positions only in terms of figures. These reflect the true state of existing relations, the development of trade, and the activity of the Arab-American and Arab-European partnership in securing the supply of oil needed by the Western countries and selling industrial goods in the Arab markets.

Figures show the trade relations of the four major foreign industrial nations with the Arab world. The countries are as follows:

1. The United States of America.

The volume of trade between the U.S. and the Arab world jumped from $25 billion in 1978 to $33 billion in 1979, an increase of 32.5 percent. American imports, most of which are oil, rose from $15.6 billion to $22 billion, an increase of 40 percent. With the price of oil, the Arabs paid for goods imported from the U.S. These rose from $9.4 billion to $11 billion, an increase of more than 17 percent. As a result of an increase in American imports over exports, the American balance of trade registered a deficit of more than $11 billion last year, compared to $6.2 billion in 1978, an increase of more than 77 percent.

Five of the 21 Arab countries monopolize 85 percent of Arab-American trade.

Saudi Arabia is in first place. Naturally, it is the best Arab customer of the U.S. Its volume of trade with the U.S. is approximately 39 percent of the total Arab-American volume of trade. It rose last year by 33 percent, growing from $9.6 billion to $12.8 billion. Most of this increase came from the increase in American imports of Saudi oil, taking into account the rise in prices. Oil imports amounted to $7.9 billion compared to $5.3 billion in 1978, an increase of approximately 50 percent. American exports to Saudi Arabia represent manufactured goods for consumption and production. They rose 11.5 percent, from $4.3 billion to $4.8 billion. As a natural result of the increased dependence of the U.S. mainly on Saudi oil, the deficit in the American balance of trade with Saudi Arabia grew from $936 million in 1978 to $3.108 billion in 1979, an increase of 232 percent.

Libya is in second place in Arab-American trade relations. Its share is approximately 17 percent. The volume of its trade with the U.S. rose last year by 35 percent, from $4.2 billion to $5.7 billion. Inasmuch as American exports registered an increase of only 10 percent from $425 million to $468 million, the big increase came from the 30 percent rise in Libyan exports to the U.S., from $3.7 billion to $5.2 billion. This caused the deficit in the U.S. balance of trade with Libya to grow from $3.3 billion to $4.7 billion, an increase of more than 45 percent.

Algeria is in third place. Its share of Arab-American trade is approximately 16 percent. Its position is no different than that of Saudi Arabia and Libya with respect to supplying the U.S. with oil and gas. Its volume of trade jumped from $3.8 billion to $5.3 billion, an increase of approximately 40 percent. While its sales to America rose 44 percent, from $3.4 billion to $4.9 billion, American exports to Algeria registered an increase of only 8 percent, rising from $374 billion to $404 million. This caused the deficit in the American balance of trade with Algeria to grow from $3.1 billion to $4.5 billion, an increase of 45 percent.

The United Arab Emirates is in fourth place. Its share is approximately 8 percent. The volume of its trade with the U.S. rose from $2.3 billion to $2.6 billion, registering an increase of only 13 percent. However, purchases by the Emirates of American goods improved. They rose from $493 million to $666 million (35 percent). This led to a relative reduction of 4 percent in the American balance of trade deficit with the Emirates, despite increased American purchases of oil from the Emirates. These purchases rose from $1.8 billion to $1.9 billion.

Egypt is in fifth place. Its share is 5.4 percent. Its volume of trade with America jumped from $1.2 billion to $1.8 billion, a 50 percent increase. American imports from Egypt, including oil, rose from $105 million to $381 million. Exports to Egypt also rose from $1.1 billion to $1.4 billion. Thus the surplus in favor of the U.S. rose by 2.2 percent, registering $1.52 billion.

Iraq has taken the place of Iran in supplying the U.S. with oil. Iraq's exports to the U.S. rose from $243 million to $618 million, or by 154 percent. Its purchases from the U.S. also rose from $316 million to $441 million (by 39.5 percent). Thus Iraq's volume of trade with America jumped from $559 million to $1.059 billion. The American balance of trade with Iraq moved from a surplus of $73 million in 1978 to a deficit of $177 million last year.

2. France.

Figures show the degree to which the French economy is dependent on the Arab world, be it for its supply of oil or for the sale of its production of consumer and intermediate goods in Arab markets. The volume of trade between the two rose from 77 billion francs to 102 billion francs (by more than 32 percent). The rise in the price of both oil and industrial goods contributed to inflating this increase. French imports (mostly oil) rose from 45.8 billion francs in 1978 to 61.9 billion francs in 1979, an increase of 35 percent. At the same time, French exports to the Arab world rose from 31 billion francs to 40 billion francs, an increase of 29 percent. As a result, the deficit in the French balance of trade with the Arabs rose from 14.6 billion francs to 21.7 billion francs, or 48.6 percent.

Saudi Arabia is also in first place as the best customer of the French economy. In the context of its securing France's requirements of oil, its sales to France rose from 18 billion francs to 24 billion francs, (33 percent). Saudi imports rose accordingly from 3.9 billion francs to 4.6 billion francs, an increase of approximately 18 percent. This caused the deficit in the French balance of trade with Saudi Arabia to rise from 14.4 billion francs to 19.6 billion francs, bearing in mind that the volume of trade between the two countries rose from 22 billion francs to 29 billion francs, or 31.8 percent. The Saudi share was 28 percent of the total Arab-French trade.

Iraq ranks second in trade with France. Iraq's share is 17.3 percent. Its volume of trade with France rose from 11.7 billion francs to 17.6 billion francs, an increase of more than 50 percent. This increase came from the rise in French imports from Iraq, mostly oil, from 9.4 billion francs to 14.2 billion francs, and from the rise in Iraq's imports of French industrial goods and technological equipment from 2.2 billion francs to 3.3 billion francs. Inasmuch as the increase was nearly proportional, the deficit in the French balance of trade with Iraq rose at the same rate from 7.2 billion francs to 10.8 billion francs.

Algeria is in third place, with a share of 12.6 percent. It registered a 27.7 percent increase in its volume of trade with France. This volume rose from 10.1 billion francs to 12.9 billion francs, although it differs from the other Arab oil countries in that it is close to and does business with the various sectors of the French market. Therefore, despite Algeria's sales of oil and gas to France, France's exports to Algeria increased from 3.2 billion francs to 4.7 billion francs (by 46.8 percent), providing a surplus in the French balance of trade amounting to 3.5 billion francs last year. This was the natural result of the growth of Algeria's imports of French industrial and consumer goods from 6.9 billion francs to 8.2 billion francs.

The same holds true for Morocco which is in fourth place. However, the lack of Moroccan oil for export has caused a 63 percent increase in the French balance of trade surplus, from 1.9 billion francs to 3.1 billion francs. French imports from Morocco rose from 2.3 billion francs to 2.8 billion francs, while its exports to Morocco rose from 4.3 billion francs to 5.9 billion francs.

The United Arab Emirates is in fifth place in Arab-French trade, with a share of approximately 7 percent. French imports from the Emirates rose by 10 percent.

French imports rose from 4.6 billion francs to 5.1 billion francs, as compared to an increase of 32 percent in French exports to the Emirates, which rose from 1 billion francs to 1.4 billion francs.

3. West Germany

West Germany's economy became more dependent on Arab oil which amounted to 59.9 million tons out of a total 107.4 million tons of oil imported by Germany last year, an increase of approximately 55.8 percent. Arab oil imported in 1978 amounted to 52.9 million tons. Oil constitutes 90 percent of German imports from the Arab world. German imports rose from 12.9 billion marks to 18.5 billion marks, a 43.6 percent increase. Despite this, the German economy enjoys a top spot in Arab consumer markets. Sales of German production in Arab markets rose from 15.8 billion marks to 17.3 billion marks, (a 9.4 percent increase). The German balance of trade moved from a surplus of 2.9 billion marks in 1978 to a deficit of 1.2 billion marks in 1979, bearing in mind that the volume of trade as a whole rose from 28.8 billion marks to 35.9 billion marks, an increase of 24.6 percent.

Although 98 percent of West Germany's imports from Saudi Arabia is oil, West Germany succeeded in registering a surplus in its balance of trade with the kingdom, amounting to 1.126 billion marks in 1978. Imports amounted to 3.33 billion marks compared to 4.416 billion marks for exports. However, the surplus diminished in 1979 to 108 million marks, the difference between 308 billion marks for imports and 4.416 billion marks for exports.

The situation is different with regard to Libya, which is in second place in Arab-German trade relations. Inasmuch as oil constitutes 94.4 percent of West Germany's imports from Libya, these imports rose from 3.4 billion marks to 5.5 billion marks, an increase of 61.7 percent. West Germany's exports to Libya rose accordingly from 1.6 billion marks to 2.1 billion marks (more than 31 percent). This resulted in a rise in the German balance of trade deficit from 1.7 billion marks to 3.3 billion marks, a 94 percent increase.

While West German imports from Algeria rose from 2.3 billion marks to 3.1 billion marks (98 percent of which was oil), West German exports to Algeria declined from 2.5 billion marks to 2.2 billion marks. This caused Germany's balance of trade to move from a surplus of 200 million marks to a deficit of approximately 900 million marks.

The deficit in the German balance of trade with the Emirates, which is fourth in rank in Arab-German trade, rose from 538 million marks to 1.244 billion marks. This was the result of an increase in German oil imports from 6.5 million tons to 7.6 million tons, thereby causing a rise in imports from 1.4 billion marks to 2.1 billion marks, or by 50 percent. German exports to the Emirates rose by only .8 percent, from 857 billion marks to 864 billion marks.

For its part, Iraq supplies West Germany with oil, which amounts to 95.6 percent of Iraq's total exports to West Germany. Last year, West Germany bought 2.2 million tons, compared to 1.9 million tons in 1979 [sic]. This led to an increase in its imports from 411 million marks to 610 million marks. However, German goods succeeded in invading the Iraqi market and registered a gain of approximately 31 percent, rising from 1.6 billion marks to 2.1 billion marks. This provided a surplus which grew from 1.2 billion marks to 1.4 billion marks.

4. Great Britain

Great Britain depends mainly on oil from the North Sea to fill its requirements. It imports small amounts of Arab oil, but it is the European country which enjoys a trade surplus with the Arab countries. Its imports rose from 2.714 billion pounds to 3.097 billion pounds, an increase of 14 percent, compared to an increase of only 5.3 percent for exports which rose from 3.152 billion pounds to 3.32 billion pounds. As a result, the surplus dropped from 438 million pounds to 223 million pounds.

Saudi Arabia is in first place in trade even with Great Britain. Great Britain's volume of business with Saudi Arabia rose from 1.656 billion pounds to 2.001 billion pounds. However, in its balance of trade with Saudi Arabia, it suffers from a slight deficit which rose from 84 million pounds to 215 million pounds. This was the result of an increase in British imports from 870 million pounds to 1.108 billion pounds, compared to a rise in exports from 786 million pounds sterling to 893 million pounds sterling.

Kuwait is in second place. The deficit in the British balance of trade with Kuwait rose from 289 million pounds to 510 million pounds, due to an increase in British imports, including oil, which grew from 621 million pounds to 743 million pounds. At the same time, British exports dropped from 332 million pounds to 233 million pounds.

The Emirates provided a surplus in the British balance of trade which rose from 166 million pounds to 251 million pounds, due to a drop in British imports from 270 million pounds to 237 million pounds, and a rise in exports from 435 million pounds to 488 million pounds.

With Iraq, which ranks fourth in Arab-British trade relations, the deficit in the British balance of trade dropped from 282 million pounds to 192 million pounds, due to the drop in Britain's imports from 497 million pounds to 393 million pounds. There was also a drop in British exports to Iraq, from 215 million pounds to 201 million pounds.

Egypt is in fifth place. Its volume of trade with Great Britain rose from 306 million pounds to 516 million pounds, an increase of 68.6 percent. However, British imports rose from 101 million pounds to 252 million pounds (150 percent).

Britain's exports to Egypt rose only 28.7 percent, from 205 million pounds to 264 million pounds. This led to a drop in the British balance of trade surplus from 104 million pounds to 12 million pounds sterling.

One may conclude from all of these figures that the four great industrial countries are the ones benefiting from their trade relations with the Arab countries, especially the oil countries, in the following manner:

First, they benefit from Arab oil which provides them with their industrial and consumer requirements.

Second, they benefit from oil money which is recovered from the oil-producing countries to pay for consumer goods, services and interest on investment in

development projects, not to mention the cost of weapons which they sell to the Arab countries, thereby covering the deficit in their balance of trade with them and even achieving a surplus. It is understood that trade indices do not include arms sales.

Third, they benefit from the oil money surplus. This money is deposited by its owners in foreign banks, outside the Arab nation. In addition, these banks use it for their various investments.

The least one can say after examining these figures and learning the real status of the Arab economy is that it is an economy which suffers from the illness of "subservience," since it is integrated in an unfavorable manner with the world capitalist economy. It is in the interest of the capitalist nations to try to prolong this illness, in order to benefit from draining Arab resources.

7811
CSO: 4802

SWEDISH YOUTH HAIL GAINS OF APRIL REVOLUTION

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 9 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] Kabul, Oct. 9 (Bakhtar).--The characteristic features of present day Afghan reality is the growth in the participation of the people in the political and social life. Despite the continued intrigues of the counterrevolutionary gangs in some areas of the country, the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is normalising. Chairman of the Young Communist League of Sweden Olof Brengstroem said this in an interview to a newspaper in Stockholm upon his return from Kabul where he attended the conference of the Democratic Organisation of Youth of Afghanistan.

He said that guests from abroad at the conference visited different provinces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and could get convinced of the people's trust for the revolutionary government of Afghanistan led by Babrak Karmal, of the striving of the working masses to defend the gains of the April Revolution.

He said that the creation of the organisation of Afghan youth is part of the process of the construction of new society. The Democratic Organisation of Women of Afghanistan, associations of creative intelligentsia have already been formed in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The activity of these mass organisations is aimed at the consolidation of the gains of the April Revolution.

The conference of the Democratic Organisation of Youth of Afghanistan whose delegates were representatives of all Afghanistan provinces set out the tasks of the Afghan youth in the construction of new society, Olof Brendstroem said.

The chairman of the young Communist League of Sweden also noted that representatives of youth of many countries who participated in the work of the conference unanimously adopted a resolution in which they approved the Soviet Union's fraternal assistance to the people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and proclaimed their solidarity with the Afghan revolution.

CSO: 4920

DETAILS OF ANTONOV DEAL AIRED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 9 Oct 80 p 3

[Text] By putting into service the two Antonov--24 planes on the air routes served by the Bakhtar Afghan Airlines, the difficulties of our compatriots in many provinces will be solved as far as air transportation is concerned.

Stating the above in an interview with the reporter of the KABUL NEW TIMES, the President of Bakhtar Afghan Airlines, Col. Abdul Latif Lakanwal added: Afghanistan is mainly a mountainous country, and due to lack of motorable and paved roads in some parts of the country, our compatriots are faced with tremendous difficulties as far as transportation is concerned. To remove these difficulties and for the well-being of the people, which is the main objectives of our revolutionary government, the DRA government decided to further develop the air transportation within the country. Thus, the Bakhtar Afghan Airlines, a domestic airlines with a fleet of six planes which are of smaller tonnage and limited seating capacity, was instructed to purchase bigger aircrafts with larger tonnage and seating capacity.

Following this instruction the Bakhtar Airlines contacted the friendly country of Soviet Union and inquired about the kinds of plans that could be used in small airports and could accommodate large number of passengers. The friendly country of Soviet Union recommended the Antonov-24 (AH. 24-PB) type plane.

The two Antonov-24 planes, the purchase agreement of which was signed recently in Kabul, will be used for domestic flights, both for passengers and cargo. The Antonov-24 main seating configuration provides for 50 passengers seats and two cushioned baby cradles which can be substituted by two passengers seats. If the plane flown without additional fuel tanks it can carry upto 75 passengers.

The Antonov-24 engine is overhauled after 3,000 hours flight and that its body after 45,000 hours flight. Its overall tonnage is four and half tons. The cruising speed of the plane is 450 km per hour and its recommended flying altitude 6,000 metres. It can land and take off on airports with 600 metres runway.

The Antonov-24 plane consumes 760 kgr fuel in one hour which is economical. Similarly, with four and half and six tone fuel it can fly non-stop for four and a half to five hours.

As was mentioned earlier the Antonov-24 planes will be operating on domestic air routes, however due to its technical facility it can also be used for both passengers and cargo on the air routes serving the neighbouring countries, said Col. Lakanwal.

The two Antonov-24 aircrafts, priced at 2,800,000 rubles (some Afs. 100 million) is financed from the credit of the government. Twenty per cent of total price is paid after the signing of purchase agreement, 30 per cent on delivery and the remaining 50 per cent is paid on various installments in the form of letter of credit, noted Col. Lankanwal.

In addition to four spare engines, the friendly Soviet country has also provided a number of spare parts to the Bakhtar Airlines as grant-in-aid. The training of personnel to operate the planes is also included in the purchase price.

The planes could be delivered in fifteen days after the purchase agreement was signed, however training of personnel will take three months, thus the two aircrafts can go into operation, within Bakhtar Airlines, in Qaus, 1359, said Col. Lankanwal.

The Antonov-24 aircraft is equipped with air-conditioning systems and with a system controlling the air pressure in the pressurized cabin.

CSO: 4920

DEVELOPMENTS OF KHUZESTAN WAR ASSESSED

Paris LE MONDE in French 12-13 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Paul Balta]

[Text] El Amara, at one and the same time an industrial and an agricultural town situated 50 kilometers from the Iranian border and the same distance from Desfoul and Ahwaz, has been a strategic center of paramount importance: it is there that the military from the southern sector are assembled before being distributed along the fronts of Khorramshahr by way of Bassora, and of Ahwaz and Desfoul.

On Friday, 10 October, we stopped off there to see some of the materiel taken from the enemy in these regions: some 15 Chieftain tanks, 4 Scorpion, 3 BTR 50 and 1 M113 tanks, several other armored vehicles, some jeeps, guns of various caliber and a significant amount of ammunition. The day before, other reporters had visited Baakouka, near Khanakin, to see the weapons seized at Qasr-e-Chirin and in other towns of the sector: the materiel was lighter but in a much larger quantity.

The officers whom we met strongly asserted that the industrial town of Ahwaz and in particular the Desfoul air base, Khorramshahr's strong defense, were subjected to heavy bombing. Is that the offensive warning sign pointed to a few days ago? In any case, whereas earlier in the week, mostly ammunition supply trains were seen headed toward the South, now there are truck loads of soldiers heading in that direction. And a part of the materiel accumulated around El Amara is on its way to the front.

Of considerable significance on the military level, this town is also important on the sociological plane: it is at the very heart of a region where very old highly structured Arab tribes, who carefully adhere to their ancestral customs, ride on horseback along both borders. Iraqi authorities, therefore, can expect that those who are in Iran in the Ahwaz and Desfoul regions, will be better disposed toward them--or at least will prove to be more faithful to Arab tradition--than the more mixed and more proletariat-oriented people of Abadan and Khorramshahr. Despite its Shi'ite ascendancy as in Iran, this region, like the entire South, where the holy cities of Nadjaf and Kabala are situated, is intensely Arab. It was at Nadjaf that in 1920 the revolt against British occupation broke out. The disagreements which arose with Baghdad during the past few years resulted from the Shi'ites' demand for a greater share in the ruling power. The disappointments they met with did not for all that prevent them from remaining very optimistic.

The Rift With Damas and Tripoli

El Amara, like the other towns we passed through, is covered with posters and notices. Alongside the Baas main slogan--"Unity, liberty, socialism"--the watchwords proclaim: "All the people are with you, O Saddam," "With you, O Saddam, we shall free Palestine," or again: "With our soul, our blood, we shall free the Arab lands," or lastly: "The Chatt-el-Arab is an Arab." Over the waters the Qaddissieh song endlessly floats on.

In the provinces as in Baghdad, everything has been done to activate the people and bolster the troops' morale. The weapons seized are going to be conveyed to Baghdad and there assembled in a museum. Poems commemorating the "Khanakin battle" and President Saddam Hussein, the new hero of the Arab cause, are being read over the radio. A celebration dedicated to this feat of arms is planned for 20 October, with, no doubt, the projection as a world premiere of a film by the famous Egyptian film director, Abou Seif, in which he reconstructs the bravery with which Iraq defied Persia about 13 centuries ago.

In this context, it is made clear that Baghdad had severed relations with Damascus and Tripoli. Following the attacks launched against Damascene policy for several days, the rift with Syria was inevitable. A new commentator for AL SAOUARA, a Baas newspaper, leveled a charge against President Assad, "who had sent troops to Lebanon 4 years ago to break down Palestine resistance and the Lebanese national movement with U.S. protection and Zionist endorsement." In view of the fact that the Syrian leaders took Iraq to task for having diverted Arab involvement in the "major battle"--the struggle against Israel--the paper points out that, at the time of the 1973 war, that it was "Halez El Assad who asked for a cease-fire and surrendered Golan to the enemy before it had actually fallen." And it added, "Where are the Syrian forces now?"

"The answer is to be found in Alep, Homs, Hama and Deir-Ezzor, towns which have nothing to do with the (Israeli) front. These forces are destroying Syrian towns and killing Syrian citizens. How then can a cruel man such as he teach others how to muster all their hidden powers for a major battle?" Libya--which, like Syria, was to send arms to Iran--is also severely criticized particularly for its inconsistent position. "Colonel Qadhdhafi's Libya," an officer said, "had harshly criticized the 1975 Algiers agreement, calling us to task for having ceded Arab territories to Iran. At that time we had so many problems, in particular with the Kurds, that we had no choice. Now that we are fighting to restore our supreme power over our lands and to make it possible for the Arabs to recoup the small islands in the Strait of Hormuz, we had every reason to believe that Tripoli would be on our side. Now we discover, strange to say, that Qadhdhafi is supporting Iran."

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CSO: 4900

IRAQI POW SIDES WITH IRAN

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 5 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] TEHRAN (PARS) – A Second Lt. of the Iraqi Artillery who was dispatched to Susangerd, took refuge at Ahvaz was interviewed by Pars correspondent, which is as follows:

Q: Have you freely volunteered yourself to fight against Iran?

A: No, I am a soldier and bound by the orders of the Army.

Q: Have you taken part in action?

A: No, today was the first day of my mission and I have directly come to the Iranian Forces and surrendered myself.

Q: Despite your claim that you are a devoted Moslem, how did it happen that you accepted to fight against the Islamic Revolution of Iran?

A: I was ordered, and being a soldier I was bound to obey, but I have not done anything. I was just sent to the front.

Q: How is the morale of the Iraqi people?

A: They are Moslems and they dislike this war but we (soldiers) are duty-bound to obey.

Q: What percentage of Iraqi Army comprises Shi'ite Moslems?

A: 75 per cent.

Q: How unstable is the Army?

A: As I told you previously, most of the Army personnel are Shi'ite Moslem and they believe this war is nothing but useless and unwanted fratricide, and nobody except the United States and Israel can benefit from such war.

Q: What percentage of the Army personnel are waiting to flee?

A: I don't exactly know, as actually, we are afraid to discuss the subject with each other.

Q: That means, you could not even inquire about the view-points of your friends?

A: There is total strangulation, and we can not even discuss such matters with our friends.

Q: Is freedom of speech prevailing in Iraq, and are the people happy?

A: No, wherever you go, there are possibilities that you are being followed.

Q: Except for the ruling Party, are the other people happy to fight against Iran?

A: Partly yes, but most of the people are against this war – Albeit, in the beginning the Iraqi government announced that Iran had attacked Iraq and therefore, a majority of people deemed it their duty to defend their country, but when we came to know that the matter is just the opposite and that Iraq has invaded Iran and our Moslem brothers, the number of supporters of the war against Iran has diminished to a great extent.

Q: How were your conditions after arrest?

A: I am truely satisfied. I was previously under the illusion that Iranians are brutal, they were Americans – but now that I see myself, here I feel as if I am within my own family. Since I have been taken captive they have maintained a brotherly relation with me.

Q: What is your opinion with respect to the Iraqi government's claims that Iran is intending to destroy Arabs and that this is a Fars-Arab war?

A: Iraqi mass-media are propagating such claims but we see that there is no such thing and actually Iraq has invaded Iran, but the Iraqi people are Moslem and we know that Iranians are also Moslem and there is no reason for war.

Q: How did you run away?

A: I was sent on a reconnaissance mission to the region, and I ran away with the same car.

Q: Do you consider Ba'athist government as being Moslem?

A: No, they are not Moslems.

Q: Did you hear Imam's message instructing Army personnel to flee -- What was the effect of Imam's message on the Iraqi Army?

A: Yes, I heard Imam's message through the Ahvaz Radio. I myself was highly impressed. It was a message from a Moslem to another Moslem, and surely it has effected others too. But most of them are afraid to speak of their opinion.

Q: Has the non-military sector being affected by air bombardments?

A: Mostly industrial and military sites are damaged but sometimes dwelling houses nearby the sites are also effected.

Q: Have you heard that the Iraqi government puts pressure upon and hurts the families of defecting Army personnels?

A: Yes, I have also heard about it, but it is not important for me.

CSO: 4920

CAPITALISTS DENOUNCED FOR FLEEING WAR ZONE

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 9 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] Tehran (Pars)--The evening daily ETTELA'AT in a recent page article lashed out at those "Moslem capitalists" who were cowardly fleeing the war-stricken areas of the country.

The article started with statements by Imam Khomeini that "America has been slapped in the face, not by me or you, but by Islam and these slum-dwellers" and "the main defenders of the Revolution are these same masses who hold demonstrations by day and shout Allah-o-Akbar (God is Great) at night."

When the Imam made these statements, said the article, many people did not believe him, particularly when he emphasized: "The Revolution has been achieved by these deprived people residing in the slums. We need these people--not those living in palaces or the supper-class ones," and "Among the martyrs of the Revolution you cannot find anyone belonging to the well-off and upper-class people," and "the Revolution should proceed the way these slum-dwellers wish it to, not in the way the well-to-do classes desire."

At the time when the Leader of the Islamic Revolution of Iran specified that "they (the wealthy class) have from the very beginning kept themselves aloof," some could hardly believe it.

The article went on to say: "But now we can easily see that what the Imam said was true. War is, indeed, a good test. Improving godly characteristics, virtue and sacrifice, it scandalizes the well-off class and brings those who are looking after a comfortable life to disgrace themselves.

Here, war differentiates between the revolutionary, the non-revolutionary and the counter-revolutionary. In these days when our youths, the brave Revolutionary Guards, the Army, the mobilized oppressed masses and the national revolutionary forces are warmly welcoming martydrom, the upper classes, who are in fact the most wretched ones in the society, are packing up and fleeing from the war-torn cities.

This is a most shameful and vile act under the present circumstances. Shall we still rely upon traitor capitalists who complain more than anyone else and who surrender to the enemy before anyone else? Reports from the western cities of the country indicate that the well-to-do classes are fleeing these areas and rushing to the central districts. They have abandoned the Revolutionary Guards, the Army and the deprived and faithful masses to defend their empty villas and apartments!

The article concluded, "The funny thing is that most of these timid counter-revolutionaries are taking advantage of Islam and, by forming a so-called Islamic Associations, are trying to escape confiscations and the implementation of the law. By so doing they have made the people and the truly faithful people embittered and cynical towards the Revolution and have laid the ground for the enemy to misuse this disaffection against the real Moslems."

CSO: 4920

COMMENTARY ON STANDS TOWARD IRAQ-IRAN CONFLICT

JN111835 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 11 Oct 80

[Text] The war for sovereignty and the regaining of rights waged by fraternal Iraq and Jordan's clear and pan-Arab position vis-a-vis this war have revealed that both the East and the West, to the same extent, do not want to see even once an Arab state that decides on its own the fate of its rights and its sovereignty. This is largely due to the oil consideration, which prompts both the West and the East to divide and weaken this region of the world.

This war has been the first waged by an Arab state to regain its rights after the opposite party became intransigent and attempted to consolidate its moral and material gains through armed force. Despite this, both the East and the West attempted to prevent this Arab state, which is Iraq, from correcting the abnormal conditions and regaining Iraq's sovereignty over its national soil and territorial waters in Shatt al-'Arab. They have also attempted to prevent Iraq from demanding the return of the three Arab islands in the Arab Gulf.

There is a clear similarity between the Iranian and Israeli intransigence in refusing to concede Arab rights. This explains Israel's clear attitude toward fraternal Iraq and Jordan. Israel declared that any positive Arab inter-reaction with Iraq is eventually a threat to Israel. Menahim Begin declared that the situation is very dangerous for Israel. This explains the hostile designs and the methods followed by the aggressors to preserve the gains acquired through wars of aggression at the expense of the Arab nation. Israel is trying to prove its regional hegemony in the Arab world and Iran attempts to preserve its regional hegemony in the Arab Gulf. The superpowers, prompted by shear oil considerations, attempt to impose international hegemony and spread their influence in order to preserve their vested interests in the Arab region.

Where do the Arab states stand vis-a-vis the attempts to impose regional and international hegemony over the Arab region? What have they prepared or are preparing to face the consequences of the battle raging on the eastern flank of the Arab homeland, the clear Israeli threats or the attempts of the superpowers to share the areas of influence in the Arab homeland?

Amid this medley of regional and international struggles to impose hegemony over the Arab world, the Jordanian pan-Arab stand emerges in support of fraternal Iraq to reiterate the importance of Arab solidarity in facing regional hegemonism. The stand taken by fraternal Kuwait in support of Jordan, which stands facing the Zionist enemy along the longest confrontation line, also reiterates the importance of Arab solidarity, particularly in this serious stage in confronting both the Iranian and Israeli threats, the Arab east is exposed to great dangers, which are revealed by the current war on the eastern flank of the Arab homeland. These dangers are also exposed by the declared Israeli aggressive intentions and the maneuvers of the two superpowers to impose regional and international hegemony over this region. The states of our Arab nation must declare their position before it is too late.

CSO: 4802

ISRAEL CONDUCTING CAMPAIGN OF LIES AGAINST JORDAN

JN110803 Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 11 Oct 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Troublemakers"]

[Text] Not unexpectedly, Israel is doing its utmost to stir the already troubled waters of the gulf by attempting to keep the present conflict between Iran and Iraq going, and at the same time, to see to it that the Arab posture of preparedness for confrontation is irreversibly weakened.

Reports in diplomatic circles in London indicate that there have been contacts between the Israeli and Iranian embassies there over an Iranian request for supplies of spare parts and military hardware for Iran's mostly American-supplied armed forces.

At the same time, Israel is acting as a dispenser of the most far-fetched rumours and alarmist propaganda, fed bit by bit to gullible Western journalists. The brunt of this insidious propaganda attack has been directed at Jordan because of its bold and forthright national stand at the side of Iraq. The picture of the impending or actual collapse of both our economy and our morale, and of allegedly prevailing siege conditions here, contrasts sharply with the true picture which we see around us.

Much more serious is the campaign of slurs and lies about Jordan which the Israeli leadership, from Begin on down, is directing, with the help of pliant pressmen, at its patron, the United States. This hysterical campaign is based, first of all, on outright factions--the presence of "Soviet ships unloading arms" at Aqaba, the movement of Jordanian troops to Iraq--masquerading as fact and given undue prominence by such normally reputable international news media as the BBC.

Moreover, Begin maintains that Jordan's stand presents a "threat" to Israel and demands that the U.S. take measures to "protect" him, lest it wake up tomorrow to find "Iraq troops massed along the Jordan River." Specifically, Begin wants the U.S. to abrogate military supply agreements with Jordan.

The aim of this Israeli campaign is clearly to weaken the Arab position when it appears opportune to do so. That in itself is a measure of Israeli self-delusion: Arab strength is at this moment manifesting itself in a

vigorous and victorious effort to repel aggression and liberate occupied territory on the eastern flank of the Arab nation. Begin obviously does not wish to see such Arab strength manifested on his own front.

His Majesty King Husayn has stated that "victory there in Iraq is the beginning of victory here in Palestine." That should indeed give the Israelis something to think about. However, Jordan has made it clear from the beginning that, in supporting fraternal Iraq, we seek an early rationalisation of threats and contradictions in the gulf region, with an end to belligerency and intimidation and occupation so that peace can be restored quickly. This is the same stand which Jordan always maintains with regard to all the threats to peace in our region.

Jordan's position is absolutely clear and open for all to see. As His Majesty the King told a group of Western television interviewers on Wednesday, we are committed to support Iraq because Iraq's cause is our cause and it is right. This support extends to all fields, material, military and moral. We have as yet not been asked to provide actual forces to Iraq, and don't expect to be asked [to] do so, but we are ready if asked.

Iraq has for some time been importing between ten and fifteen percent of its normal needs through Aqaba; this traffic has quite naturally picked up as a result of the present inaccessibility to Basra. Aqaba is a free port and Iraq is a part of us and is, therefore, free to bring in whatever it needs through there. These are the facts of Jordan's position and commitment.

When Begin talks about "threats" to Israel's "security," we wonder how even the most naive of recipients of his twisted view of the world could ignore the very real and constant military threat which Israel not only poses but imposes on the civilian inhabitants of southern Lebanon as well as the occupied territories in Palestine. This Israeli capacity for aggressiveness against the Arabs now extends to apparently giving aid to our aggressors on the eastern wing of the Arab nation. Who, we ask, poses a threat to whom? As for the correspondents who have arrived here seeking the conditions of war and panic which Mr. Begin describes, do they feel their job extends to creating such conditions where they do not exist? If so, who benefits?

CSO: 4802

CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR REVIEWS MONETARY, BANKING SITUATION

Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 7 Jul 80 p 5

[Article: "Monetary, Banking Situation in Country Reviewed; Central Bank Governor Explains Dimensions of Jordan's Financial Policy; Banks Urged to Exercise Self-Control in Sphere of Credit Facilities"]

[Text] Amman--Dr Muhammad Sa'id al'Nabulsi, the Central Bank governor, has spoken at the first annual gathering of the Jordanian Banks Association on the banking development, the Jordanian currency policy and the general features of the policy which the bank will follow in the future.

Latest Developments in Monetary and Banking Situation in 1979

In the sphere of deposits, Dr al-Nabulsi has pointed out that the total deposits placed with licensed banks rose in 1979 by 32 percent to reach 593 million dinars. This rise resulted from the growth in the various types of deposits. The growth in the set-term deposits has been the largest, amounting to 42 percent. The second largest growth has been in the savings deposits, amounting to 28 percent, followed by the on-demand deposits, amounting to 24 percent.

In Sphere of Credit Facilities:

The growth in the credit facilities in 1979 amounted to 40 percent and these credits reached 365 million pounds by the end of the year. Thus, the growth in the credit facilities advanced by the licensed banks has exceeded the deposits placed with them by eight percentage points.

The money supply in its narrow sense amounted at the end of 1979 to 446 million pounds, meaning that this supply grew by 26 percent during the year. In the broad sense of money supply, the supply amounted to 764 million pounds (28 percent).

The loans advanced by the specialized loan apparatus in 1979 also grew by 26 percent to amount to 131 million dinars by the end of the year.

Developments in 5 Months

Dr al-Nabulsi has also pointed out that the average monthly increase in the credit facilities during the first 5 months of the current year has almost been equal to the average increase in the deposits, (11.2) million dinars, and that these credit facilities amounted to 521 million dinars by the end of May 1980.

As for money supply, its growth rate, both in the narrow and broad sense, has amounted to 11.6 millions in the first 5 months of the current year. Money supply in the narrow sense amounted to 520 million dinars and in the broad sense to 853 million dinars by the end of May 1980. If we compare this growth rate with the corresponsing period of last year, we will find that the growth rate in the money supply in its narrow sense is three percentage points less and in its broad sense four percentage points less [than last year].

The loans advanced by the specialized loan establishments in the first quarter of this year have risen by 5.6 million dinars compared to 7.8 million dinars in the corresponding period of last year.

Public Bonds:

The standing value of government bonds rose by 7 million pounds in 1979 to reach 56 million pounds. The bonds issued by public establishments on a government quarantee remained unchanged in 1979, with a value of 11 million dinars.

The volume of the total loans advanced in Jordanian dinars by the licensed banks, the specialized loan establishments, the financial companies and a number of insurance companies amounted to 28 million dinars by the end of 1979. These loans represent an important development in the credits advanced by the commercial banks. The Central Bank has encouraged the advancing of this type of loans by excluding them from the credit-deposit ratio.

End of May 1980:

The total deposits have risen in the first 5 months of this year by an average of 11.1 million dinars monthly compared to 13.5 million dinars monthly in the corresponding period of last year. The total deposits amounted to 649 million dinars by the end of May 1980. In contrast to last year, the growth in on-demand deposits has amounted to 12 percent, followed by set-terms deposits which have risen by eight percent and then the savings deposits which have risen by seven percent.

Dr al-Nabulsi has pointed out that in the past 6 months government bonds valued at 6 million dinars and public establishment bonds valued at 9 million dinars have been issued, thus bringing up the value of government bonds to 62 million dinars and of public establishment bonds to 20 million dinars.

A contract has also been concluded this year for a collective loan of 9 million dinars advanced to 'Aliyah Establishment [Jordanian Airlines] in which the licensed banks, the specialized loan establishments and a number of insurance companies have participated.

Monetary Policy

Dr al-Nabulsi has further pointed out that the Central Bank has continued to draw up its policies that seek to control the volume of banking credit facilities and to encourage the granting of such credit to the production and development sectors. The Central Bank's most important measures in 1979 have included the measure setting a 70-percent ratio of credits to deposits and then reducing this ratio to 67.5 percent, excluding the credit advanced to the production sectors. The currency reserve has also been raised to 16 percent for on-demand deposits and to 13 percent for savings and set-term deposits. It is evident that the bank has sought through this latter measure to introduce a change in the structure of the deposits placed with the commercial banks favoring set-term and savings deposits.

The bank has also used the instrument of the interest rate to influence the cost of banking credit on the one hand and the volume and structure of the deposits on the other. It has raised the minimum interest rate on credit facilities to eight percent for residents and to nine percent for nonresidents. As for deposits, the interest rate for deposits subject to a two-day or a seven-day notice has been reduced to two percent whereas the minimum interest rate paid for deposits subject to a notice of one month or more has been raised to 5.75 percent and for deposits subject to a notice of 6 or more months to six percent.

In the preceding months of this year, the Central Bank's attention has been focused on the need for the commercial banks to take into consideration the rules of sound banking practices in advancing credits, both in terms of the volume and purpose of these credits and of the soundness of the borrower's financial position. The Central Bank has asked the licensed banks not to advance credit facilities exceeding 400,000 dinars to any resident without the prior approval of the Central Bank. This condition also applies to credits advanced to nonresidents, regardless of their value. Agreement has also been reached with the Banks Association not to advance to any customer direct credit facilities exceeding in total value 150,000 dinars except on the basis of a budget approved by a legal auditor.

The Central Bank has also required an additional compulsory reserve for the total sum by which the credit-deposit ratio set for all licensed banks is exceeded

Regarding interest rates, the Central Bank has raised the minimum interest rates to 5.5 percent for savings deposits, 6.25 percent for deposits subject to a notice of one month or more and to 6.50 percent for deposits subject to a notice of 6 months or more. The bank has also raised the minimum commissions collected by licensed banks for some types of their credit facilities by 0.25 percentage points.

To encourage the licensed banks to advance collective loans, the Central Bank has approved the principle of deducting the value of such loans used for the financing purposes approved in advance by the Central Bank in calculating the credit-deposit ratio, provided that such loans are for a term of no less than 5 years.

Main Step in Central Bank's Banking Policy

Development of Capital Market:

The Central Bank has attached and continues to attach major importance to developing the financial market in Jordan because of the positive impact of such development on mobilizing local savings and channelling them toward investment on the one hand and to attract foreign capital (especially from Jordanians working abroad) on the other hand. The Central Bank has made long strides in this regard, including issuance of the public debt law in accordance with which the 1969 treasury permits were issued and which formed the nucleus for the monetary market and the government bonds in 1971, as well as the nucleus for the organized capital market. Moreover, the liberalization of restrictions on foreign currency has undoubtedly contributed toward attracting the monies of Jordanians and of other Arabs toward investment in Jordanian stocks and bonds. One of the major steps in this regard was the creation of the Amman financial market at the outset of 1978.

To encourage the establishments necessary for developing the financial market, permits have been issued in the past few years for the establishment of two investment banks and two financial investment companies. As for the financial instruments, commercial bonds and deposit certificates have been issued for the first time in Jordan's history. The Central Bank has also strived to have the commercial bonds given the same tax advantages given to government bonds so that their use may spread. The Central Bank is currently studying the best means through which the issuance of deposit certificates, especially long-term deposit certificates, can be encouraged.

Licensing

In his lecture [sic], Dr al-Nabulsi announced that the Central Bank believes that the number of banks operating in Jordan is sufficient and that there is no need for any more banks at present. Therefore, the Central Bank policy is not to issue licenses for new banks in the kingdom, whether they are branch banks of foreign banks or banks founded locally. Moreover, the Central Bank's present policy calls for not permitting licensed non-Jordanian banks to open more branches in Amman or outside it and for confining the opening of new branches, especially outside the capital, to Jordanian banks.

As for licensing investment companies, the Central Bank encourages the foundation of specialized financial companies that do not accept deposits. The bank also encourages the foundation of companies leasing equipment and machinery and similar companies to operate in the sphere of special investment financing. As for the financial companies that accept deposits [presumably meaning savings and loan firms], the Central Bank has recently drawn up special regulations including the conditions that must be present for the foundation of such companies and defining the sphere of their operations.

Dr al-Nabulsi has also said that the Central Bank has encouraged the foundation of representative agencies in Jordan for foreign banks and financial companies because of the important role that such agencies perform in familiarizing with

the spheres of investment in Jordan and, consequently, in attracting foreign capital to contribute to financing the various development projects. A number of such agencies have already been licensed and two of them have started their operations.

Since its foundation, the Central Bank has regulated and controlled the operations of money changers in the interest of the national economy. The amendments introduced to the law on money changing have sought to raise the capital of firms dealing with this work and to define the types of their activities and the spheres of their operations. The Central Bank has also made it conditional that a security of 50,000 dinars be presented to it by money changers to guarantee their meeting their commitments toward others. To raise the standard of the money-changing profession, the bank has acted strictly and has imposed the following conditions for granting new licenses:

1. Licensing only companies with a large capital.

2. Confining transactions in foreign currencies to public joint-stock companies.

3. Imposing licensing fees and annual fees.

Financing Exportation

Dr al-Nabulsi has also asserted that the Jordanian balance of trade is experiencing a big deficit as a result of the fact that our imports exceed our exports by several times. The Central Bank has been and continues to be interested in encouraging exports with all the means so as to get rid of this deficit and, consequently, to correct the structure of the Jordanian balance of payments. For example, the Central Bank has exempted for a number of years the revenues of exports by giving exporters priority in the various credit facilities. To encourage the banks to give such priority, the Central Bank advances to them short-term loans up to a period of 263 days at the discount rate in operation in return for shipping policies, export credits, deposition certificates and national goods in storage. The value of the loan advanced by the Central Bank in return for these documents ranges from 60-80 percent of the value of the goods. In the case of bills and accepted [money] withdrawals signed in accordance with the abovementioned credit terms and shipping policies, the loan is given for a period of 6 months and to the sum of the full value of these bills and withdrawals.

Guaranteeing Deposits and Loans

The Central Bank law contains a provision stipulating that the Central Bank, in participation with the licensed banks and specialized loan establishments, establish a public authority to guarantee deposits and loans in accordance with a special statute issued for this purpose.

Currently, the Central Bank, in cooperation with the Banks Association, is drafting a statute to bring this authority into existence. When founded, this authority will work to bolster confidence in the Jordanian banking and monetary system because it will protect savers (by guaranteeing their savings and the interest accruing to them) and protecting the licensed banks and financial companies (by guaranteeing their loans). The authority's activities may be expanded to include the operations to secure financing for exportation.

Amending Banking Legislation

Dr al-Nabulsi also said that he believes that the presence of the proper banking legislations is one of the fundamental elements in the development and prosperity of the banking apparatus and in safeguarding the strength and soundness of the monetary establishments. Consequently, the bank has amended the banking law more than once with the aim of developing this law so that it may not stand a stumbling block in the face of the development of the banking work based on sound foundations.

The Central Bank is currently in the process of introducing a comprehensive change into the banking law to make it compatible with the requirements of developing the banking and monetary apparatus. The new amendments will include the capital of the banking establishments and will define the conditions and spheres of the operations of the specialized financial companies and the possibility of allowing these companies to benefit from the credit facilities advanced by the Central Bank to the banking apparatus. This is in addition to adjusting the ceiling for credit subject to the approval of the Central Bank.

Observations on Operations of Banks

In his lecture, Dr al-Nabulsi mentioned several observations concerning the operations of the banks. In his observations, Dr al-Nabulsi dealt with:

A. Inspecting Banks:

The Central Bank has worked to strengthen quantitatively and qualitatively the inspection teams that it dispatches to the banks periodically by increasing the number of inspectors and sending them abroad for training courses. It is hoped that the licensed banks will strengthen their cooperation with these teams, considering that their work is in the interest of the licensed bank particularly and the interest of the banking apparatus and the monetary policy generally. It is also hoped that the managements of the licensed banks will respond to the inspection letters in time and will take the proper measures to deal with the observations and issues raised by the inspection reports.

B. Bank Branches:

The Central Bank wishes to see more branches outside Amman and the other major cities so that the benefit may spread throughout all parts of the kingdom and so that the banking habit may spread among all. As we have already mentioned, the Central Bank's present policy in this sphere is not to issue permits for opening new branches, unless they are Jordanian banks, especially outside the capital.

C. Banking Facilities:

The Central Bank wishes to see more banking facilities channelled toward the production sectors, such as industry and agriculture. But perhaps what is more important than this is that the licensed banks observe the rules and regulations of the sound banking operations and keep clear off any activity incompatible with the banking tradition, such as financing speculation in gold, foreign currencies and real estate. In this regard, a word must be said about some credit facilities

advanced by a number of banks to their clients without inquiring adequately and carefully and making certain of the soundness of the financial positions of these clients. We all know that some of these clients are experiencing financial troubles that may embarrass the licensed banks themselves. It is noticed that some contractors use a very small part of their financial resources to carry out their undertakings and depend largely on the credit facilities given them by the banks. It is also noticed that on giving credit facilities to a contractor, the interest of the licensed bank is focused on the condition of the adequacy of the securities. However, the bank neglects to follow up and keep an eye on the monies [given in loans], is lenient in demanding the financial accounts and fails to study these accounts adequately.

Therefore, it has become necessary to have in the information and followup departments of the licensed banks technical cadres experienced with the work of contractors and with bids and capable of studying their conditions and of keeping an eye on the credit facilities given to these contractors to make sure that they are connected with the projects that they implement. It is also beneficial to set up an information center at the Jordanian Banks Association similar to the Risks Center of the Central Bank--an information center which gathers all kinds of information on the contractors to supply it to the banks. The Central Bank hopes that the licensed banks will refuse to offer credit facilities to any contractor unless he submits correct and certified financial accounts [qawa'im] and statements of cash flow.

D. Self-Control by Banks (Information-Inspection-Technical Setups-Bouncing Checks):

It is obvious from the aforementioned that there is an urgent need for the licensed banks to introduce information and followup sections or to inject the currently existing sections with the necessary technical cadres capable of studying and following up on all matters pertaining to the credit facilities given to the main clients and capable of verifying the degree by which the credit facilities advanced are used in the projects for which they are advanced. The banks also need to keep the necessary files and documents regulating such work.

There is also the problem of bouncing checks. We hope that the licensed banks will cooperate with us to get rid of this problem by preparing lists of the names of those who (issue) such checks to find out if some clients have the intention to misuse banking checks. Therefore, it is necessary that high-ranking officers of the deposit sections examine bouncing checks carefully. In this respect, we should also point out the need to curtail the use of printed checks through agreement between a licensed bank and its clients because the widespread use of such checks may weaken the public's trust in those who deal with checks. The Central Bank also hopes that the licensed banks will select employees with sufficient banking experience to represent them in the clearing offices so as to facilitate the clearing operation.

Concerning the role of the Bank Association in this regard, Dr al-Nabulsi has said: The creation of your association and comparing the methods of operation provide an excellent opportunity for the exchange of views and experiences among the banking apparatus officials and are the best proof of the degree of your interest in developing and improving the standard of the banking work. It is needless to say that the development and progress of the banking apparatus constitute one of the fundamental requirements of economic development under the system that we follow. It is also my opinion that the Banks Association can perform an important role as an instrument of communication and dialogue between the monetary and financial authorities on the one hand and the licensed banks on the other.

8494
CSO: 4802

MUNICIPALITY OF IRBID COMPLETES ITS WATER SYSTEM

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 7 Jul 80 p 2

[Article: "In Interview on Projects of Municipality of Irbid, Dr Tubayshat Declares That Ample Supply of Water Reaches Every Home in City and Asserts Sewerage Project Will Be Carried Out as Soon as Its Plans Are Approved"]

[Text] Irbid--Dr 'Abd-al-Razzaq Tubayshat, the mayor of Irbid, has declared that the water crisis in the city has ended and that the drop in the quantity of water pumped ordinarily from al-Azraq to the Governorate of Irbid has been the result of a failure in the water pumps in al-Azraq which are under the supervision of the Water Authority.

In his interview with AL-DUSTUR reporter, Dr Tubayshat has said that as a result of the contacts made with the officials, it has been agreed to pump 6,500-7,000 cubic meters of water [daily] to the city of Irbid. According to the estimates, this quantity is sufficient to meet the needs of all of the city's residents, if properly distributed and used. To make sure of this, the city of Irbid has been divided into two sections so that water supply may reach the citizen regularly for a period of 3 days a week. The flow of water to high buildings may be late at times and this is normal. But there is no doubt that such buildings get their water needs.

The mayor of Irbid has assured the citizens that he supervises personally the distribution of water to make sure that it reaches every home. He has said: I am ready to examine any complaint reaching me in this respect.

Subdivision Law

As for the subdivision of Irbid lands in accordance with subdivision law No 11 of 1968, the mayor has said: From the outset, we have undertaken and pledged to serve the citizens and to adopt their causes. What has been raised regarding implementation of the [land] subdivision law is unjustifiable because implementation of the law is undoubtedly beneficial to the prosperity of both the city and the inhabitants.

The mayor has also said: I have met with the land owners to whom this law will apply. After a long discussion and after the matter became clear to them, we have agreed to go ahead with implementing the law. The citizen will certainly feel the results of the implementation of this law as soon as it is ready.

City Streets

On paving and asphalting the city streets, the mayor of Irbid has said that the municipality has invited bids for asphalting 400,000 square meters and paving 150,000 square meters. Work is going ahead day and night to complete this bid invitation [al-'ata'] in 2 months.

The mayor of Irbid has also appealed to the citizens to keep the streets clean and to remove dirt and debris from them.

Sewerage Project

Regarding the sewerage project, Dr Tubayshat has pointed out that serious studies are underway to go ahead with implementing the project so as to serve the citizens and to solve a difficult problem. As for the cost of the projects, they will become known after preparation of the studies and of the specifications.

Dr Tubayshat has added that the municipality is conducting studies on building public parks in the city to beautify it and that work will begin shortly to build a public park near The King Husayn Charitable Institution, in addition to a number of small parks for children in all parts of the city.

Industrial Town

Dr Tubayshat has also said that the municipality has carried out all the commitments it has undertaken to improve the conditions of the industrial town and to provide it with services. Streets have been opened, health units have been established and a medical clinic has been founded, in addition to a small (government) complex to serve the industrial activity in the town. Studies are currently underway to build a trucking complex in the town.

Car Parks

Dr Tubayshat has also asserted that the municipality is exerting efforts at present to secure new car parks after issuance of the decree banning the parking of cars in the streets.

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SKEPTICISM EXPRESSED ABOUT UNITY PLANS BETWEEN ARAB COUNTRIES

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 4 Sep 80 p 1

[Editorial by Ahmad al-Jarallah: "Dangers of Escapist Slogans of Unity"]

[Text] Ever since unity between Egypt and Syria failed, projects of unity between one Arab country and another have lost their glitter. To the Arab citizen now unity of material interests takes precedence over unity of religion, language, poetry, music, hopes and dreams.

Unity between Egypt and Syria could have succeeded had it been preceded by successful preparation. The case is the same with regard to unity between Iraq and Syria which was subject to inaccurate considerations.

By the same token, the Jordanian-Syrian cooperation, which came close to unity, could have been firmer and could have lasted longer, had it not been for the feelings of caution, suspicion which plagued it as of its early days.

Likewise, talk about unity between Libya and Tunisia, or even Libya and Algeria could have served practical purposes had not the calculations made in each instance been inaccurate. The long historical dialogue about unity between the two parts of Yemen is not too different. This dialogue remained so confined to the leaders that it could make no progress.

Thus, talk about unity occasionally provokes laughter, because it is not based on serious thought and precise calculation. All successful experiments of unity on the European and American continents have shown that talk of unity will not be effective unless it is based from the very beginning on practical considerations of common economic interests. The daily life routines of candidates for unity have to be similar and based on identical theories, legislation and practices.

Without such a foundation, Arab unity proposals will remain tantamount to conversations between two deaf people, or to speeches made by leaders on ceremonial occasions, when they try to escape from the problems of the present by talking about the future. People are no longer interested in chasing a mirage or a beautiful dream. A mirage does not quench thirst; it makes it worse.

Unity means a network of interests that ultimately leads to joint political action. Unity does not mean putting on an act in the media. No one believes

that a leader in power finds his seat so uncomfortable as to pursue a distant mirage which will provide neither water nor vegetation.

Real unity among the countries of the Arab world calls for economic integration without reservation or equivocation. Whimsical talk or escapist slogans can only lead to further failures.

8592
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THREE KUWAITI FOREIGN INVESTMENTS OUTLINED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 18 Sep 80 p 16

[Text] Cairo--In August 1980, Kuwaiti investors concluded three transactions in three geographic locations: Frankfurt, London and Cairo. They relate to hotels, contracting and manufacturing. The first transaction was made in the Egyptian capital. Through it, the Kuwaiti (ARTOK) Company purchased the 10 percent interest of the British (Bryant Walker) Company in the al-Shams Hotel and Tourist Corporation. Al-Shams Corporation owns al-Salam [Peace] Hotel. Under the agreement, the British Company lost its contract to manage the hotel and its management revenues which amount to 20 percent of profits. The second transaction, signed in London, provides for purchase by al-Jazirah Construction Contracts Company of 10 percent of the stock of the French (French Care) Construction Contracts Company for the sum of 1.9 million pounds sterling. It is known that the al-Jazirah Company is an Arab multi-national corporation headquartered in Bahrain. Kuwaiti companies have invested in it. It was established to undertake major operations and construction in the area. Its capital is 53 million dollars (25 percent of it has been paid in). The (French Care) Company has been doing business in the Middle East for 6 years. It had obtained contracts in Iraq, the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia. The British Company announced that it welcomed Arab investment, because such investment would open the market in the Middle East for it, extending thereby its operations to North Africa. The al-Jazirah Company has obtained a major construction contract in Bahrain for 350 million dollars. It is also implementing another 130 million dollar project in Iraq. The (French Care) Corporation is considered a successful corporation whose profits in 1979 amounted to 8.2 million pounds sterling. The third transaction was made in Frankfurt. Through it, Kuwait purchased a 10 percent interest in the (Metalgesic Aft) Corporation which works in the areas of manufacturing, mining and production of chemical products. The company owns private transportation companies, a bank and an insurance company.

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BRIEFS

JAPANESE PETRODOLLAR DEAL--Bank sources in Tokyo said yesterday that a number of principal Japanese banks began selling shares to the oil countries in the Middle East last June. The sources indicated that the Bank of Tokyo, the Sumitomo Bank and the Sanwa Bank were among these banks. The sources added that these banks' sales of shares to the central banks in Iraq, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and in Kuwait amounted so far to about 100 billion yen, or approximately 460 million dollars. Although Japan's Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank of Japan have not commented on this news, the sources stated that these sales were important because they encouraged the flow and the circulation of these countries' petrodollars into Japan. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 4 Sep 80 p 15] 8592

SPANISH AUTOMOBILE COMPANY LOAN--British financial sources said yesterday that the Kuwaiti National Bank was one of the principal banks that had participated in organizing an intermediate term loan of 40 million Deutschmarks for a Spanish automobile company. The sources added that that company was (Aurufias) Concesionaria Española de Autopistas. No other information was available about the other banks that took part in financing the loan. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 6 Sep 80 p 17] 8592

CSO: 4802

DANY SHAM'UN COMMENTS ON SITUATION FOLLOWING JULY EVENTS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 11 Aug 80 p 4

[Interview with Dany Sham'un, of the National Party (NLP); date and place not given]

[Text] Yesterday, Dany Sham'un made a violent verbal attack against those who perpetrated the 7 July massacre. He said that it will not change the situation at all, "since the ports are back in operation, the tributes imposed by warring factions have increased, and the confiscated hashish has been returned to its owners." He announced his support for keeping the outgoing government afloat, saying that there is nothing wrong with it. He expressed his belief that the government will not yield to the Phalangists on the matter of their taking over Channel 12. And he stressed the fact that no meeting has taken place between him and Bashir al-Jumayyil. "Such a meeting is not under consideration, and my opinion about the events at al-Safra will not change."

Dany Sham'un was asked about his assessment of the statement made by his father the day before yesterday. He answered: "Former President Sham'un has made plans for the Party, and everybody has expressed his relief upon hearing the statement. This is what was expected." Dany Sham'un talked about his view of the situation now that about a month has passed since the 7 July events. He said: "The events of 7 July will not change anything. The ports are back in operation, the tributes imposed have increased, and the hashish which had been confiscated has now been returned to its owners, with a promise that they will be able to export it."

Dany Sham'un then wondered: "What did they accomplish through the events of 7 July? The only thing they did was to weaken the ranks of existing fighting forces, because the fighters of the NLP have left the forces of the Lebanese Front."

Dany Sham'un said that the increase in migration from the eastern areas [of Beirut] is due to the fact that members of the NLP are subjected to harassment. Anyone who wants to think for himself has got to either go along with the one-party system, or face an unknown fate. This was discussed by former President Sham'un in his statement."

Concerning the disturbances which have been going on in al-Ashrafiyah, Dany Sham'un said: "They--that is, the Phalangists--are conducting inquiries, and have accused the Palestinians. In any case, they have announced through the 7 July massacre that they want to live under this type of climate of terror, and they want to impose it on the people in general."

He went on to say: "We have nothing to do with these disturbances. These actions are against the principles of the NLP. We have never engaged in such activities, and we have never believed in such a thing at all."

[Question] After the events of 7 July, some government officials demanded that the Lebanese Army take over the responsibility for security in some of the more sensitive areas. What has become of these plans?

[Answer] I do not know. These plans were mentioned as being among the actions to be undertaken by the "government of political activists." But this government has not been born yet.

(Concerning the Phalangist television station which, it is rumored, will soon start its transmissions, he said:) As far as I know, it is the government which is utilizing Channel 12. I do not believe that the government will yield to such violations of the law. This is the only information that I have.

[Question] If Mr al-Sulh withdraws as premier-designate, would you be in favor of keeping the outgoing government afloat?

[Answer] This decision depends on former President Sham'un. However, there is nothing wrong with the outgoing government, and there is no reason not to keep it afloat.

[Question] The ministry of defense has announced that the army now numbers 23,000 people. Do you believe that it is now capable of assuming broader security functions?

[Answer] This figure includes both soldiers and administrative personnel. The army reorganization project provides that, with compulsory military service, the number of personnel in the army could reach 40,000. A large number of officers and administrative personnel are needed to handle 40,000 people. And this is what is happening. The number of soldiers in the army now is only 12,000. According to my information, two-thirds of the army right now is already being used in security functions. The remaining third is a sort of reserve.

[Question] People are fearful of a new eruption in the country, particularly in the north. What do you anticipate with regard to this?

[Answer] There is a massing of Phalangist units in the north, and there are delusions about what has been called "the battle of liberation." If there is such a "liberation" move, it will begin in the north, and will kill more Christians in the north than were killed in the events of 7 July. If the situation does explode in the north, the result will be new crimes committed by Bashir al-Jumayyil's forces.

[Question] Different interpretations have been given to your visit to Jordan. What is the truth about this visit?

[Answer] There exists a deep friendship between King Hussein and me. That is why I visit Jordan, and that is why I will continue to do so.

During my whole life, I have never exploited this friendship for any personal or political reason. I went to Jordan to rest, to familiarize myself with the situation in the Middle East as a whole, and to explain what has been happening in Lebanon. This is all there was to it.

[Question] There are reports that the reason for your visit to Jordan was to try to acquire 80 tanks. Are these reports true?

[Answer] There is a matter of purchasing weapons for the Lebanese Army from the Jordanian Army. This is on the state level; it is the state which deals with these matters. I am always ready to offer any service to the state that would help strengthen the army.

[Question] Efforts are being made to redeploy the forces of the Lebanese Front. In particular, there are efforts to arrange a meeting between you and Bashir al-Jumayyil. Has anything come of these efforts?

[Answer] There have been no contacts, and no contacts are under consideration. I expressed my opinion on this matter in the first statement I made after the events of al-Safra. I am not in the habit of changing my mind every 5 minutes.

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NATIONAL LIBERAL PARTY PLANS RETALIATION AGAINST PHALANGE

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 3 Sep 80 p 4

[Article: "Information About a Phalange Decision to Liquidate Al-Hanash (the Snake), Al-Zaghlul (the Squab) and Al-Wahsh (the Brute) Units of the NLP; Reorganization of Cells and a Secret Plan of Action for 'The Tigers' of NLP"]

[Text] Information received from the eastern area [of Beirut] yesterday confirmed that the dispute between the Phalange and National Liberal Party [NLP] has begun to widen within party cadres and to threaten to develop into a new phase of bloody conflict.

Contacts which took place over the past 48 hours between President Camille Sham'un and Pierre al-Jumayyil, and the meeting between President of the Republic Ilyas Sarkis and the secretary of defense or the NLP, Dany Sham'un, resulted in removal of Phalangist barricades from the streets of the eastern area, and the pullback from the approaches of al-Ashrafiyah area. Nevertheless, reports confirm that the military leaders of "the Tigers of the Liberals" are examining a secret plan of operations focussing on retaliation for the 7 July events. A statement distributed yesterday in the name of "the Tigers of the Liberals--Leadership of the Retaliators Movement--Carlos" threatened to kill 17 leading Phalangist leaders, including Bashir al-Jumayyil, whom the statement viewed as responsible for the 7 July events.

News reports state that a meeting was held the day before yesterday at the headquarters of "the Tigers of the Liberals--al-Hanash" at "the Embassy Palace" in 'Ayn al-Rummanah. It was decided to prepare a secret plan of operations, and to create three cells which would handle the task of retaliation for the events of 7 July. It was followed by an evening meeting between al-Zaghlul, al-Hanash and al-Wahsh during which the issue of the cells in al-Ashrafiyah was discussed.

Sources in the NLP indicate that the party had received information about a Phalangist plan to liquidate al-Hanash, al-Zaghlul and al-Wahsh, noting that the NLP had asked these to maintain maximum vigilance.

The same sources concluded that the party has laid down a plan to change the headquarters of "the Tigers of the Liberals."

A group of Tigers, calling themselves "the Movement for Retaliators," announced in a statement distributed yesterday, and signed by "Carlos," that the dispute of the Liberals with the Phalange is not recent.

The statement said: "The first contrived incident between the Phalange and the Liberals occurred in a bar in Juniyah near the municipal playground. The incident was over a bar girl when Joseph al-Bustani killed Muhammad al-Qadi, who became a martyr of the Lebanese cause. After this incident, the Phalangist party council despatched forces from Qism al-Rumayl, 'Ayn al-Rummanah and Furn al-Shubbak, which surrounded and blew up the headquarters of the Liberals, killing five people inside. They also occupied other NLP quarters in Sarba, burning the vehicle of President Sham'un and beating up his aides."

The statement added: "President Sham'un had always intervened to block retaliation to dozens of similar incidents, until the incident when the Phalange shelled the holy places in 'Anaya. When Liberal personnel sought asylum at the building of the Society of Saint Sharbal, following an attack on their headquarters and the shooting of a group of Liberals in spite of a ceasefire agreement, Phalangist elements shelled the building with field artillery and tanks."

The statement continued: "These incidents led to the intervention of NLP personnel from al-Safra and their monitoring of the movements of the Phalangist personnel. Therefore, the Phalangists decided to wipe them out even if it cost them, as the head of the Phalangist military council put it, 150 dead and the destruction of half the area."

The statement said that the phalangists began to create problems in the Liberals' areas, which led to the incident of the killing of Joseph Ghawi (liberal) and the wounding of his companion in Wadi Shahrur. This was followed by a retaliatory NLP decision which the Phalange Party viewed as "an effort to wipe it out of southern al-Matn." Thereupon, a meeting of the Phalangist Politburo was held on Saturday, 5 July, and "approval was given for the treacherous operation."

The statement went on to mention the deceit which the Phalange fighters used in attacking al-Safra and wiping out everyone there on 7 July. The statement concluded that the Tigers of the Liberals will not forgive the Phalangists for what they have done, and that the "command of the Movement for Retaliators" had reached the following decision, irrespective of what decision the leadership of the Tigers of the Liberals or the NLP may take:

"To warn every Phalangist official who did not have a hand in the 7 July incidents to leave the Phalange Party, announce this in the press, and leave the country." Otherwise, he would meet an inevitable fate far worse than that of the citizens of the town of al-Safra, and would be on the same black list as the leaders of the operation. These include the following: Bashir al-Jumayyil, Dib Anastas, George Sha'nin, Ili Habiqah, Marun Mash'alani, Ili Sa'adah, Ilyan al-Zayik, Khawayri, Joseph Na'im, Sasin and George Abu Shadid, Antoine Qardahi, Antoine 'Atallah, Mas'un Murad, and Qazhiya al-'Utayq. They also include the well known hero, Samir Ja'ja', and his aide, Sulayman al-Huwayk, as well as others. The decision states that the "retaliators movement" would pass sentences against all these persons, which would be implemented one after the other. This would be to pay back the culprits for what they did on 7 July, particularly to the personnel of "The Tigers of the Liberals--al-Wahsh Battalion," who would not collapse under a treacherous operation such as this.

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PHALANGE MILITARY STRENGTH ASSESSED

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 10 Sep 80 pp 40-45

[Interview with Lt Col al-Haytham al-Ayyubi, Chief Editor and Publisher of AL-MAWSU'AH AL-'ASKARIYAH (Military Encyclopedia), and Prof Rubay' al-Asir, an editor of AL-MAWSU'AH AL-'ASKARIYAH; date and place not given]

[Text] On 7 July 1980, the Lebanese awoke to startling news: the Lebanese Phalange Party and its militia had wiped out once and for all the party of Camille Sham'un and his militia. The Phalange and Sham'un were old allies who had fought side by side against the Palestinian resistance and other nationalist forces in the Lebanese war, and both sides had good relations with the Zionist enemy.

However, over and above the political questions raised by this surprise liquidation, there are still some military questions one might ask. For example: What is the Phalange's military strength on the ground? What is the nature of its weapons and military organization? Is the Phalange, having finished off its number one ally in this savage manner, also trying to set off new battles with the Resistance and the Nationalist Forces? If that occurs, what is the balance of power between the parties concerned? We took these questions to AL-MAWSU'AH AL-'ASKARIYAH in Beirut, whose chief editor is Lt Col al-Haytham al-Ayyubi, one of the few people with extensive advanced expertise in military and strategic affairs. There, we had an interview with Lt Col al-Ayyubi; and with Prof Rubay' al-Asir, an expert in strategic military affairs and an editor of AL-MAWSU'AH AL-'ASKARIYAH.

Following are the details of this interview:

[Question] I would like to ask first about the size of the Phalange's military strength and the nature of its arms and structure.

[Al-Ayyubi] With regard to the Phalange, there is a certain amount of illusion about its military strength, arising from confusion between the number of "combatants" and a number of "armed individuals." The fact is that given the deteriorating economic circumstances, particularly in some areas such as industry and tourism, a Phalangist military-economic establishment has begun to take form. This establishment comprises those persons who are out of work, those who are living in a sort of disguised unemployment, and all those persons who joined armed organizations, their new mission becoming in reality the bearing of arms. In such circumstances, the number of those armed men rises or falls depending on the economic situation, job opportunities or working conditions. Therefore, we find that

there is a relatively small number of intellectuals, technicians, craftsmen and skilled laborers in the Phalange armed organization or other similar organizations.

In fact, unskilled labor constitutes the bulk of the armed men. Their numbers are large. While some of them, probably the bulk of them, see weapons as a way to make a living, there are some who accept them merely to overcome feelings of inferiority, or because of emotional zeal honed by the glitter of a weapon, or for self-protection, etc. They all carry arms and there are a lot of them. However, they cannot perform complex military functions, for example, engaging in secret or regular military movements, for example. They are not qualified for such types of combat.

[Al-Asir] The truth is Lt Col al-Ayyubi's insight is very important and critical, as this is the substance of the real Phalangist military strength. However, we must point out that the Phalange Party has a relatively qualified military force numbering between 4,000 to 6,000 combatants. The Phalange is intent on developing a true diversified and combat-ready regular military force.

[Al-Ayyubi] I would like to make a distinction among various terms and concepts involving military affairs. There is a difference, an essential difference between the word killer [qatil] and the word combatant [muqatil], between fighting [qital] and combat [iqtital], between an army [jaysh] and a band ['isabah], and so on. These are expressions that must be used very carefully because mixing up such things can obscure the facts.

[Question] It would appear that al-Asir was not finished talking.

[Al-Asir] I wanted to say that the Phalange is in earnest about developing a regular military force. The original infrastructure of this force is a number of regular military men who served in the Lebanese army and who joined the Phalange in one way or another. The Phalange is working to make the transition from the militia stage, which Lt Col al-Ayyubi talked about accurately, to the stage of a regular military force able to engage in more complex field operations.

What al-Ayyubi said is important, because it shed light on forces in motion, and on whether the Phalange, in its present form, can operate with regular military methods. It is very difficult for the armed individual to move from one quarter to another to fight there. The militias are made up of armed men of specific locales, and they are not good at launching an offensive outside their locale. This is not the case, naturally, with regular trained and qualified military forces.

[Question] Could you acquaint us a little bit with the sources of the Phalange's regular military strength?

[Al-Ayyubi] The main sources are the unemployed and those persons who benefit from carrying arms. Secondly, there is the Lebanese army which constitutes a source of Phalangist military strength. Thirdly, there is personnel which has been trained within the Zionist entity. Lastly, there are the militia who were put in special training camps for limited periods, and whose training was supervised by Lebanese officers and possibly by Zionist officers as well.

[Question] And the sources of the arms?

[Al-Ayyubi] The Phalange has a mixed bag of arms. There are Eastern bloc arms purchased from the arms merchants who, in turn, bought them from the Zionist entity and other markets. I say from the Zionist entity, because in the 1967 war, the enemy seized large quantities of these weapons. The Phalange also buys Western arms from open markets and from arms merchants who buy arms that have gone out of service or are surplus to army requirements in this or that country. There is no moral or political impediment to the arms trade.

[Al-Asir] Weapons have no homeland or identity.

[Question] So much for the sources of weapons. I would like to get some enlightenment about the technological aspect of the Phalange's arms. Does the Phalange have modern weapons, for example?

[Al-Ayyubi] Most are light and medium weapons, from rifles to machineguns. The Phalange has infantry type weapons, light arms. The Phalange has certainly seized weapons from the Lebanese army, but we must not exaggerate the weapons of the Lebanese army itself. The weapons of the Lebanese army are no more than the weapons of an artillery brigade. In any case, the weapons of the Lebanese army have been divided up by a number of factions. However, regardless of the nature of the Phalange's weaponry, it has its very own perspective of such issues. This perspective has created a feeling on the part of the Phalange that they are strong. Are they really strong, given the balance of power?

[Al-Asir] The Phalange has MX-13 tanks. These were weapons of the Lebanese army and are light compared with modern tanks.

[Al-Ayyubi] These are tanks of the 50's. When the Lebanese army used them, they mounted heavy guns on them, but their accuracy became poor. Then came the Sherman tanks, which the enemy modified into Super-Shermans. The Phalange got them in their modified form. These were tanks of the 40's generation. Today they belong to the 50's generation of tanks. So they are not tanks but mobile gun platforms. These tanks may be very useful for the Phalange in military reviews and shows. They might attract the notice of the average onlooker at the reviews, but reviews are one thing and fighting is something else. Naturally this tank gives the owner the feeling that he has a tank. This, in reality, is a lethal feeling, because it could motivate the Phalange to move on the basis that it has a military force, when it really does not have such a force as measured by the balance of real military strength.

[Question] It appears that al-Asir wants to say something.

[Al-Asir] The colonel has defined the general outlines of the response. I would add only one observation, that is, that the Phalange's armaments do not constitute a major threat if taken in isolation from other outside forces, such as the enemy, for example. The Palestinian Resistance has military capabilities and weaponry far superior to that held by the Phalange.

[Al-Ayyubi] Arms, equipment, training, etc.

[Al-Asir] Yes, this is true, but were the Nationalist Forces forced to fight on two fronts, one against the Zionist enemy and the other against the Phalange, the

Phalange's weaponry would have a significant effect. Naturally, this is a possibility.

[Al-Ayyubi] Draw a comparison between the T-34 tank and the Super Sherman.

[Al-Asir] Naturally, it has become known that the Palestinian Resistance has T-34 tanks. My observation about the point under discussion is that the Phalange is moving to improve its military capabilities. Of course, this is governed by a number of considerations and constraints, for example, the existence of sufficient manpower, the capability to absorb the weapons, and the extent of Phalange capability to secure sources of advanced support. There are also the local political constraints.

[Al-Ayyubi] There are some constraints by Arab elements which are the chief financiers of the Phalange in countering the Nationalist Forces. The fear of these forces by these elements has prompted them to slip blindly into bolstering the Phalange. However, will this support continue, if the battles resume, bearing the scenario laid out by al-Asir in mind?

I would like to say in brief that, given the existence of the Nationalist and Resistance forces and the deterrent forces, the Phalangist strength has no significant effectiveness. Its relative effectiveness will begin when Syria and the Resistance are preoccupied with the Zionist threat. In such a circumstance, any weapon becomes useable.

[Question] What is the Phalange's fundamental dilemma?

[Al-Ayyubi] It is the shrinking of the Christian territory. At the start of the Lebanese war, this territory was relatively extensive. Then the north, that is, the north of former President Sulayman Franjiyah, split away. Prior to this there was the dispute between the Phalange and Raymond Iddih, leader of the Christian Jubayl area; the repeated attempts to assassinate him; and his departure for Paris. Finally, the Phalange directed its military strike at Camille Sham'un himself. This is an aspect of the basic dilemma of the Phalange. It means that the Maronite Christian leadership is fragmenting away from the Phalange. The other aspect is the psychological state of mind of the Christian man in the street. At the beginning of the war, the Phalangist armed individual was told that he was fighting against the Syrian and Palestinian "strangers." Then it became evident that the Palestinian Resistance is not properly categorized militarily, and he was told: "You are fighting for one, democratic Lebanon." The Phalange armed individual then saw Lebanon split within itself with the Phalange liquidating its allies around it. He was told: "You are fighting for civilization and culture." Then the combatant observed that school certificates are obtained at the point of a gun now, and that murder and excesses, have become a daily policy of the Phalange. He was told: "You are fighting against the Islamic danger or an Arab threat with an Islamic stamp." Then it became evident that Maronite Christians are more zealous defenders of Arabism than the Muslims. All this has fragmented the articles and central points of faith of the Phalangist psychological mobilization.

The average Christian citizen has found that with the Phalangist authorities he is more oppressed, worried, and unemployed, and that elimination of government security has not made local security any better of a situation. All this has made

the average citizen lose any tendency to be swayed by the correctness of the Phalangist plan and the credibility of the Phalangist allegations and slogans. This is a terrible crisis for the Phalange. It is covered up today only by the lack of any battles with other factions. This dilemma means that the Phalangist military strength in fact lacks underpinnings.

[Question] I do not know how accurate the postulates presented by al-Ayyubi are. I think that, after the 7 July strike by the Phalange against the militia of its ally, Camille Sham'un (which made the other militias lay down their arms), the picture has begun to change over the last few days. At 'Id Mar Ilyas [Saint Elias Holiday], the Phalange ordered that there be no firing in the air, and, in fact, this stopped. The people have begun to sense a new sort of security imposed by the Phalange.

[Al-Asir] I would like to comment on this. One must make a distinction between two levels with regard to 7 July. First, prior to 7 July, the Phalange had achieved a high military technology compared with the other militias and the militia of Camille Sham'un. This emerged clearly in the operation to wipe out the supporters of Camille Sham'un. Naturally this elimination left negative reactions at first but, with regard to the Phalange, it demonstrated that it was capable of building its own military force and sending it into battle, even against Camille Sham'un. The elimination of Sham'un's group and the perpetration of crimes does not compare with the crimes perpetrated at Tall al-Za'atar. Second, there is a stage that will follow 7 July. I think that the Phalange can gradually blunt unfavorable reactions to it. Fear on the part of the average Christian citizen of the Phalange and its violence will make it very difficult to put up any form of opposition against it.

With that, I would like to go back to another part of the interview. We talked about the Phalange's military strength within the context of the balance of power in general. The truth, as I see it, is that the Military struggle in the area has a variety of degrees. The Phalange can serve the Zionists, not only in open and extensive conflict. There are things it can come up with, such as preoccupying the Palestine Resistance and distracting its operations, for example. Even with regard to the Arab Deterrent Forces, the Phalange has been able to exercise a sort of attrition against it. We recall the battles of the Deterrent Forces against the Phalange, and we remember that the political circumstances at the time prevented decisive action against the Phalange. This could recur.

[Al-Ayyubi] True, this is true. The Phalange is required during this phase to distract, to attempt to distract the Nationalist Forces to keep Camp David going.

[Question] Let's move on to another point. Are there aspects of similarity between the Phalange's military organizations and those of the Zionist army for example?

[Al-Ayyubi] There is one and only one aspect of similarity, that is, the psychological aspect. There is no material or organizational similarity.

[Question] Then I will ask about aspects of similarity with the Zionist army, not in its present state but at the early stages of its formation, for example.

[Al-Ayyubi] Early stages are always similar and all have one and same appearance. First, militias are created. Then, they evolve into companies and battalions and armies. The fact is, however, that we have not yet found signs of military similarity, that is, after the first stage, except for the psychological aspect, as I said.

The Phalange was originally a Fascist organization which believes in the superiority of the Lebanese individual and his separateness from the Arabs. It believes in violence, and this, in fact, is not just an accusation. Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, the leader of the Phalange Party, says that his highest idol is Mussolini, and he never tires of advocating "a just tyrant." We can get a feeling of the Fascist stamp of the Phalange Party by taking a look at the history of its establishment, its symbols, the uniform of its personnel and its political behavior. This party was established in the early 30's, following the Fascist development in Germany and Italy. It then borrowed the Nazi and Fascist forms of organization and relations and adapted them to its personnel. It is also a racist party. Its only concern is to control Lebanon and to dominate it by force.

The fact is that the Zionists, just like the Phalange, have a sense of being wronged. These psychological similarities between the two sides on the level of the subconscious, the individual and the organization have produced forces similar psychologically, forces that rely on widespread terrorism.

[Question] I would like to confine the interview to the Phalange. The Zionist problem is very complex. The fact is that the Maronites believe that they are a minority in a sea of an Islamic majority. What can a minority do if the majority is unjust and wants to impose upon it something contrary to its interests? This is the belief of political Maronite-ism in Lebanon and Maronites are very sensitive about this complex.

[Al-Asir] Before answering this point directly, I would like to add something about the facts of Bashir al-Jumayyil's plan. He is, in fact, trying to emulate the experience of Ben Gurion in building a unified military force. We know that even in the second half of the 40's, the Zionist parties in Palestine were suffering from a proliferation of military forces. There were the Irgun, the Stern Gang, the Palmach and others. Ben Gurion, who established the Zionist state, unified these forces; he could not, in fact, have established the Zionist state without doing so.

Bashir al-Jumayyil is pursuing this course of action. He wants to consolidate Maronite military strength. The difference, however, is that Ben Gurion did not unify them by force. Bashir al-Jumayyil appears to be in a real hurry, even if it causes the death of hundreds of persons in just a few hours, as happened to Camille Sham'un's militia. There is another point that I think is an appropriate way to approach the full question, namely, the fact that despite attempts to emulate the Fascist parties, the Phalangist plan remains a caricature of them. We understand the reasons for the rise of Nazism in Germany, for example. There were powerful economic factors behind it. The Phalangist plan runs smack into an important obstacle: the Christian brothers, even the Phalange, rely economically on the surrounding Arab sea. The second point is that Nazism and Fascism are both based on the existence of the fatherlands of Germany and Italy. The Phalangist

plan is pursued, not readily or through consent, by a mere religious sect, the Phalange, just like Zionism. From this standpoint, it is trying to give religion and a sect the character of a fatherland. However, if we look around us, we see that mankind is trying to get beyond these narrow differences. Europe, for example, is trying to consolidate its strength in one bloc. This represents quite the opposite of the Phalangist plan, which has an extremely narrow sectarian range. Finally, we should point out that the Maronite Christian sect is bound by common destiny with the Arab world. These bonds cannot be eliminated.

[Al-Ayyubi] Economic bonds too.

[Al-Asir] This is very true. The number of Maronites in the Gulf area is very great, and the Maronite Christian sect is very dependent on the funds of its sons there.

[Al-Ayyubi] The fact is that the apprehensions which the Maronites raise find their justification in conditions in the Arab countries. You cannot ignore the fact that the Phalange would not be what it is today, if the surrounding Arab environment were different. The Maronites raise the issue of their fear of the tie between Arabism and Islam. Had they faced a secular Arab society that had a contemporary concept of pan-Arabism and religion as a relationship between a worshipper and his God, their fear would have no basis. However, the general thrust is to confuse Arabism with Islam, and this gives the Maronite fear some credibility in the mind of the average Maronite.

Maronite isolation from the Arab arena is basically a mistaken view. However, were the Arabs to seriously raise the banner of war against Zionism, this Maronite isolation would have no justification. But when the president of a leading Arab country makes a visit to occupied Jerusalem, he lends credence to the Maronite isolation.

In general, we note that all the Maronite arguments for isolation are mistaken. However, the Arab reality does suffice to give these arguments some passing credibility and justification. We must say here that given a strong and combative democratic, sectarian Arab society, the credibility of the arguments for Maronite isolationism would be almost spontaneously repudiated. If an Arab Hanoi or Prussia (a united militant society) were in existence, Maronite-ism would lose the focal points of its psychological strength, and the Maronites' fear would gradually disappear. The Maronites would then experience a rapprochement with the Arabs as an originally inseparable part of the Arab world.

I still should say one more thing about 7 July, when Bashir al-Jumayyil dealt a death blow to Camille Sham'un's militia. The fact is that the achievement of the "7 July Movement," as Bashir al-Jumayyil calls it, has been exaggerated. Why? It is true that the Phalange was able to wipe out Sham'un militarily in a few hours. However, from a military standpoint, if you want to occupy a position or raid a target, the first problem you face is that of information about the position or target. Most battles fail, because information was lacking or was wrong. If the information is available and is clear, as was the case with the Zionist entity in June 1967, when it was able to get extremely accurate information on the Arab armies, particularly the Egyptian army, success in battle is completely assured.

The fact is that the Phalange had detailed and very accurate information about the status of the forces of Camille Sham'un's militia. The Phalange and Sham'un's militia were allies who had fought together for years in the same trench. Everything was known: arms, disposition of forces, movements, etc. For Bashir al-Jumayyil to have had all this clear from the start gave the Phalange's battle against Sham'un a 90 percent chance of success before it ever started. Bashir al-Jumayyil only took care of the remaining 10 percent. This is in no way outstanding. The seventh of July is a big figment of the imagination; there are many similar examples. General Bashir al-Jumayyil, like General Moshe Dayan in 1967, won a victory he did not deserve. Camille Sham'un could say to Bashir al-Jumayyil after this blow, "Et tu Brute?"

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LEBANESE-EEC PROTOCOL PROVIDES ASSISTANCE TO LEBANON

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 11 Aug 80 p 6

[Article: "Text of the Financial Protocol With the EEC; Departments Concerned Are Preparing Their Observations and Getting Ready To Appoint Their Members of the Joint Council"]

[Text] The ministries of economy and trade, agriculture, and industry and oil, as well as the Customs Bureau, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and the Association of Lebanese Industrialists, are preparing their observations concerning the trade agreement concluded with European Economic Community. They are also preparing to appoint their members in the Council of Joint Cooperation provided for in the agreement, especially in view of the fact that the council's decisions will be binding on both parties entering into the agreement.

This council will consist of representatives of Lebanon and of the member nations of the EEC.

Yesterday, the president of the Association of Lebanese Industrialists, Dr Fu'ad Abi Salih, assured AL-SAFIR that the association has already completed its observations concerning the agreement with the EEC, and that it would seek meetings with officials in the EEC to acquaint Europeans with Lebanese products and commodities. This is to be done by means of meetings and symposiums in an effort to promote Lebanese goods in European markets.

Abi Salih went on to say: "Our observations include a basic demand to ease the conditions imposed in the paragraph on certificates of origin, especially in view of the fact that our industry is mainly a processing industry. What I mean is that parts of the products manufactured in Lebanon are imported, in finished form, and cannot be considered to be of Lebanese origin."

He concluded: "Concerning the appointment of a representative of Lebanese industrialists to the Council of Cooperation, we are presently discussing the choice of the appropriate person for this position."

On the other hand, a source in the department of economy [of the ministry of economy and trade] yesterday assured AL-SAFIR that the ministry has already chosen its representative to the Council for Cooperation, based on a request from the ministry of foreign and expatriates affairs. The source added that the department is presently preparing its observations on the means of implementing the agreement with the EEC.

It is learned that the observations of the ministry of economy will be based on its suggestions concerning the financial and technical protocol of the agreement. Here is the text of the protocol.

Article 1. Within the framework of technical and financial cooperation, the EEC shall participate in financing activities which will help Lebanon's economic and social development.

Article 2.1. To achieve the goals defined in Article 1, and for a period of time ending on 31 October 1981, it will be possible to conclude contracts totalling up to 30 million European monetary units, to be distributed as follows:

a. 20 million European monetary units in the form of loans from the European Investment Bank--hereafter referred to as "the Bank." These loans will be granted from the Bank's own resources, in accordance with its by-laws.

b. 2 million European monetary units in the form of loans in accordance with special conditions.

c. 8 million European monetary units in the form of aid not to be repaid.

It is possible to utilize shares for the formation of risk capital charged to the account of the amounts indicated in (b) above.

Article 2.2. To the loans referred to in paragraph 2.1.a., an interest grant, not to exceed 2 percent, shall be added, as a general rule. This grant shall be financed by means of the capital indicated in paragraph 2.1.c.

Article 3.1. The funds defined in Article 2 shall be used for financing or for participation in financing:

--Projects in which capital is invested in the field of production and of building the economic infrastructure, particularly projects which aim at diversifying Lebanon's economic foundation, strengthening its industry, and modernizing its agricultural sector.

--Preliminary or complementary technical cooperation on capital investment projects of Lebanon.

--Technical cooperation in the realm of training.

Article 3.2. EEC aid shall be set aside to cover the expenditures necessary to carry out the projects and activities agreed upon. It shall not be used to cover normal administrative expenses, maintenance expenses, or normal operational expenses.

Article 4. Conditions for financing or participation in the financing of projects and activities referred to in Article 3, in keeping with the provisions of Articles 2 and 6, shall be determined in accordance with the nature and particular characteristics of each project or activity.

Article 5.1. The funds, which must be procured each year, for each form of aid involved, shall be acquired as (evenly?) as possible over the duration of this protocol. However, amounts procured in the first phase of application may, within reasonable limits, be somewhat higher.

Article 5.2. Any balance of amounts not procured by 31 October 1981, may be used until it runs out. This shall be in accordance with the conditions laid down in this protocol.

Article 6.1. Loans granted by the Bank from its own resources shall have conditions relating to a period of time established on the basis of the economic and financial features of the projects for which these loans are granted. The interest rate shall be the rate used by the Bank on the date that each loan contract is signed, bearing in mind the interest grant previously referred to in Article 2.2.

Article 6.2. Loans having special conditions shall be granted for a period of 40 years, and have to be used within a period of 10 years. The interest rate for these loans shall be set at 1 percent.

Article 6.3. The loans may be granted through nations or appropriate Lebanese government agencies, provided that the money be loaned to the users according to conditions established with the approval of the EEC, on the basis of the economic and financial features of the projects.

Article 7. If Lebanon agrees to it, the aid offered by the EEC for carrying out specific projects may assume the form of joint financing involving the participation of international financial agencies, or credit and development institutions in Lebanon, in member states of the EEC, or in third-party nations.

Article 8. Those entitled to benefit from this financial and technical cooperation are:

a. In general, the state of Lebanon.

b. The following organizations, with the approval of the state of Lebanon, for projects or activities approved by it:

--Lebanese public agencies.

--Private enterprises in Lebanon which are active in the field of economic and social development.

--Enterprises which pursue their activities in accordance with [modern] industrial and commercial methods and which are organized as corporations in accordance with Lebanese legislation.

--Groups of Lebanese producers. In exceptional cases, where such groups are nonexistent, the individual producers themselves.

--Holders of study grants and trainees who are sent abroad by Lebanon within the framework of training projects referred to in Article 3 above.

Article 9.1. As soon as the agreement is implemented, both Lebanon and the EEC, by mutual agreement, shall establish definite goals for their financial and technical cooperation in accordance with priorities determined in the Lebanese development plan.

By mutual agreement, these goals may be revised so that they take into consideration changes which take place in the Lebanese economic situation and in the goals and priorities determined in the development plan.

Article 9.2. Financial and technical cooperation, within the framework established under Article 9.1 above, shall apply to projects and activities established by Lebanon or by other users judged acceptable by Lebanon.

Article 10.1. Users referred to in Article 8.a., or, in agreement with Lebanon, users referred to in Article 8.b., shall submit to the EEC a file concerning each request for financial aid under this protocol.

Article 10.2. The EEC shall study each request for financing, jointly with the Lebanese state and the users, in accordance with the goals defined in Article 9.1, and shall inform them of the results of its study of these requests.

Article 11. The implementation, administration, and performance of operations and activities to be financed in accordance with this protocol are the responsibility of Lebanon or of the other users referred to in Article 8 of this protocol.

The EEC shall ascertain that the use of this aid is carried out in accordance with allotments made and is carried out under the best possible economic conditions.

Article 12.1. Concerning the projects and activities which the EEC agrees to finance, participation in invitations to bid on contracts and subcontracts shall be open on equal terms to all natural and legal persons in the member states of the EEC and Lebanon.

Article 12.2. In order to promote the participation of Lebanese enterprises in the implementation of business transactions, it shall be permitted to lay down expeditious guidelines regarding invitations to bid which call for short time periods of time for the submission of bids. This will be based on proposals by the relevant agency of the EEC in situations which, by virtue of the size and scope of the project, are particularly suited to Lebanese enterprises.

It shall be permitted to set up these expeditious guidelines in situations where the amount involved is less than 1 million European monetary units.

Article 12.3. In exceptional cases, and by mutual agreement, it shall be possible to allow the participation of other countries in the transactions financed by the EEC. In addition to this, it shall be possible, under the same conditions, to allow the participation of third-party countries when the EEC participates in the financing of the operations together with other financiers.

Article 13. Within the framework of its national laws in effect, Lebanon shall apply, to the transactions and contracts concluded for the purpose of carrying out the projects and activities financed by the EEC, a suitable customs and taxation system, such as the system applied to other international organizations.

Article 14. When a loan is granted to a user other than the Lebanese state, the EEC shall have the right to attach to this loan a condition requiring the Lebanese state to submit collateral or other adequate guarantees.

Article 15. Lebanon shall commit itself, for the duration of the period of the loans granted in accordance with the provisions of this protocol, to put at the disposal of the borrowers using these loans sufficient foreign currency to make interest payments and repayments of principal.

Article 16. The Council of Cooperation shall annually study the results of the technical and financial cooperation. This council shall, when necessary, revise the guidelines of this cooperation.

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SPECIAL BUREAU IN THE SOUTH TO LICENSE INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 10 Aug 80 p 6

[Article by Muhammad Salih: "The Head of the Regional Bureau of Industry in the South Grants Licenses to Aluminum, Oxygen, and Furniture Plants"]

[Text] Saida--The Regional Bureau of Industry in the South has begun its work. The first thing it did was to receive applications from southern Lebanese industrialists concerning the inauguration of industrial plants and establishments, the granting of licenses for plants which are under construction, and the exempting from customs duties of factory equipment being imported for the plants of southern Lebanon.

The head of the Regional Bureau of Industry in the South Hilal Zantut, told AL-SAFIR that right after it was opened, the bureau has been flooded with industry-related applications which used to be submitted to the ministry of industry and oil in Beirut before the establishment of the regional bureau. The applications are for such things as certificates of origin from local industries (in Saida and southern Lebanon), in accordance with which goods are exported abroad, especially to the Gulf countries. Applications are also for industrial certificates about the current status of some of the plants and factories in the South, for submission to customs bureau and border posts in connection with the import of basic materials needed for industries in the south. The bureau also receives applications for certificates regarding processed and dehydrated products. The bureau is also engaged in issuing industrial certificates to existing enterprises which have large installations, equipment, and machinery, for submission to departments concerned.

With regard to new industrial enterprises, Zantut said that the bureau has conducted field inspections of six new plants in Saida and vicinity. These industries include iron and aluminum plants, a machinery plant, a furniture factory and a lumber mill. All of these plants were given licenses. The bureau also officially registered various plants in the environs of Saida--in Kafr Hunah, Jizzin, Mashmushah, and al-Ghassaniyah.

Zantut went on to say that the bureau has received an application to establish a fully equipped plant for producing oxygen. This would be the first plant of its type in southern Lebanon. Such a plant would supply oxygen to all hospitals and industrial establishments. The cost of this project would be more than 20 million Lebanese pounds. The bureau has given legal approval to the entrepreneurs so that they may proceed with bringing in the necessary machinery, equipment, and raw materials.

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MONETARY LIQUIDITY IN GULF REGION DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 10 Sep 80 p 16

[Article: "Liquidity in Gulf States Is Subject to Interest Rates and Freedom To Transfer Funds Abroad"]

[Text] The economic bulletin of the central banks and monetary establishments of the Arabian Gulf countries states that local liquidity in the Arabian Gulf nations, except for Iraq, was affected by various factors. The most important of these are:

1. In the economics of a free market, short term interest rates play a major role in the movement of capital from abroad into the country. Therefore, the interest rate has a direct effect on the condition of the balance of payments, and, consequently, on fluctuations in the rate of growth of local liquidity (the money supply).

2. The nature of the makeup of the money supply in the six states differs from that in Iraq. One notices that the volume of deposits is predominant among the elements of local liquidity, be it with regard to the money supply in the strict sense of the term [M1], or with regard to the money supply in the broad sense of the term [M2]. The table below indicates the ratio of currency in circulation to the money supply for the period between 1974 and 1978.

The volume of the money supply is affected by the conduct of three sectors of the economy: the monetary authorities, the commercial banks and the public. Since it is the public which keeps the currency in circulation, the ratio of the currency to the total money supply is an indication of the public's conduct and reflects the public's desire to hold on to the currency, as opposed to depositing it in banks. In other words, the decline in the ratio of currency to total liquidity in the six Gulf states means that monetary policy can utilize quantitative and qualitative currency measures available to it in a better and a more effective fashion than it otherwise would, had the ratio of currency to the money supply been high.

3. The financial and money markets in some Gulf states are growing, and foreign exchange operations are conducted freely in these markets. This means that the incentive behind demand for currency may not be confined to business purposes, but extends to investments and speculation in the local financial and money markets or in the international markets.

4. The nature of the banking system's business and the private sector's interest in it require that the monetary authorities use their quantitative and qualitative measures with flexibility and in a progressive manner for the purpose of influencing the performance of these banks, and, consequently, influencing local liquidity. For all these reasons, the monetary authorities in the six Gulf states (except for Iraq) have to resort to several measures to achieve the required state of equilibrium and influence excess local liquidity. The following are some of these measures:

First, influencing the ability of commercial banks to grant credit through measures based on the ratio of reserves to deposits, the rediscount rate, and open market operations. The first and second measures may be the most suitable for the monetary authorities in the Arab Gulf states.

Second, adopting a flexible interest rate policy consistent with prevailing international interest rates, to influence the stable movement of capital from and into these countries.

Third, working to pay for construction contracts in foreign currencies rather than in the local currency.

Fourth, resorting to issuing bonds in local currency for either the local family sector or for foreign lenders. In addition to absorbing [excess] liquid funds available to the public, this measure would develop the financial market, and, accordingly, increase the effectiveness of open market operations to influence local liquidity.

The State	The Ratio of Currency to the Money Supply in the Narrow Sense [M1]	The Ratio of Currency to the Money Supply in the Broad Sense [M2]
Iraq	76.5 percent	54.2 percent
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	45.3	41.2
Kuwait	33.8	10.4
United Arab Emirates	26.2	10.2
Qatar	24.8	14.0
Bahrain	27.5	11.6
Oman	52.6	30.8

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MZALI ADDRESSES UTICA CONGRESS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 26 Sep 80 pp 4-5

[Speech by Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and secretary general of the Destourien Socialist Party, at the opening of the Ninth UTICA [Tunisian Union for Industry, Trade, and Crafts]: "National Unity Can Last Only If It Is Based On Social Justice"]

[Text] Dear brother Ferjani Belhaj Ammar, congress chairman;

My dear colleagues;

Honorable guests;

Dear brothers and sisters:

I am proud to declare this congress open on behalf of the Supreme Fighter President Habib Bourguiba. I thank your organization for having invited us and given us a fraternal welcome. I wish your congress success. I wish that it be not only the occasion for drawing a balance and evaluating the results of 5 years of activity but that it also include the drafting of a plan for the years to come and be a substantial contribution to the next Sixth National Plan which, as you know, for the past several months has been the target of our preparations and concertations, and for which we are providing all the necessary prerequisites for success.

I would like most particularly to join my brother Ferjani Belhaj Ammar in greeting our brothers once again, the Arab businessmen who are honoring us with their presence and who have honored us in the past by holding their congress in the capital of the Republic of Tunisia. The holding of their congress in Tunis and their presence among us today mark a new constructive and generous start in the field of horizontal and fraternal cooperation among the economic activists of the Arab fatherland. That is what I told them yesterday. I believe that by developing such cooperation and rediscovering ourselves after centuries of intellectual and political isolation from the Arab countries we are multiplying our strength and insuring more firmly the invulnerability and independence

of the Arab nation, for the Arab fatherland has all the necessary prerequisites for success: human potential, a steadily growing and enthusiastic youth, natural resources, particularly rich agricultural potential, and cadres of all kinds. However, this great Arab fatherland has been unable to coordinate its possibilities or formulate plans which could promote the renaissance of the Arab peoples because of colonization which not only sucked our blood and took away our wealth but developed in us a number of complexes and mental deformations. Some people among us could see things only in a vertical way, if I may say so, and were afflicted by a kind of blindness whenever they tried to see things horizontally. This was the result of colonization, cultural colonization in particular. In order to heal ourselves from the ill of colonization and get rid of the shame of its consequences we must carry out a cultural revolution in our minds. We must undertake an examination of our consciences and adopt a new view of realities. We must open our arms to one another, shake hands, help one another and jointly struggle for life. In your name, therefore, I greet them.

I hope--this being a hope rather than a simple wish--that this meeting will become the starting point of a very important stage in the area of cooperation. I ask the Tunisian businessmen and merchants to make an effort in this direction. Tunisia is a country known for its open nature and Arab-Muslim authenticity, the patriotism of its children and the ability of its people to win over difficulties and even achieve the impossible despite modest resources. Today we must gradually triumph over the consequences of colonialism in order to become truly free in the same way that yesterday we defeated colonialism.

I also greet the small merchants, the Tunisian merchants and businessmen you represent. I take this opportunity to recall with pride the participation of the UTICA in our victory in our struggle for national liberation. I do not believe it would be historically wrong to claim that the UTICA is the first national organization founded by the party immediately after World War II, in 1945. Our elders recall the contribution of the marchants, the petit merchants in particular, to the national movement.

The great majority of merchants, the petit merchants in particular, actively participated in the national struggle. Small or big, they supported the national movement by supplying the necessary funds or joining the resistance. A large number of them died for the fatherland. Those who are still alive recall the concentration camps and the jails. One of them is Serjani Belhaj Ammar. He effectively participated in the struggle and is familiar with jails and concentration camps. The comrades who are here today and many others have struggled, suffered, and lost their possessions. Our elders know that it was the petit merchants and craftsmen who went on strike and faced colonialism.

When the Supreme Fighter was arrested on 18 January 1952 all shops in the country remained closed for weeks on end. Again, when the great

leader Farhat Hached was assassinated, it was the merchants who struck for days on end. This is a historical reality which we shall never forget.

We believe that the various social categories of the Tunisian people--merchants, craftsmen, workers, farmers, officials, teachers, and others--belong to a single family. There are no big gaps between these categories, there are merely a few small differences. It is this united family that rallied around the party and closed ranks under the banner of the great leader, the Supreme Fighter Habib Bourguiba.

Ever since we regained our freedom and our dignity, ever since the independence of our country, we have worked to strengthen the attributes of our sovereignty. We declared a merciless war to underdevelopment and poverty. All Tunisian population strata are continuing to contribute to this struggle.

This is the reason for the firmness of the ties uniting the PSD [Destourien Socialist Party], the UTICA, the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor], the UNA [National Farmers Union], the UNFT [National Union of Tunisian Women] and the youth organizations. This is not the result of an accident or of official considerations. Our answer to some of our brothers or friends who, unaware of our realities, are surprised by this, is that this is a historical reality; this is what we call national unity.

This national unity which is considered by some observers or some young people an empty slogan is flowing in our veins. It is a part of our being and it is vibrating in our hearts and our minds. It was born in the jails and it developed and strengthened at a time when our members were being killed by bullets. We believe that this national unity, which we built with our tears, hopes and sufferings at times of trial, must be considered essential, even vital if we want to remain united, challenge poverty and underdevelopment, build up our economy and build a strong, firm, dignified and prosperous state.

The struggle goes on. In the past its target was to free the country politically. Now its purpose is to eliminate the consequences of the colonial age and, specifically, poverty and underdevelopment inherited from centuries of decadence and aggravated by foreign domination.

Consequently, we cannot abandon our national unity. We must protect it from all ills. Our social strata must remain healthy. We must immunize our society against the viruses of imported ideologies which claim with Marx and his supporters that there are no classless societies.

For this reason, the state and the individuals must avoid in their economic activities anything which, in the long run, could trigger hatred

and class conflicts. This would be detrimental to the country and provide with arguments the supports of foreign ideologies.

That is why we remain attached to our national unity. We not only consider it a historical reality and an essential factor, but we also think that it has its own values, its special framework, its own conditions and characteristics, the most important of which is our determination to eliminate the causes of oppression and tyranny.

We must, at all costs, eliminate any kind of exploitation of one Tunisian by another. In popular language this is known as "drawing benefits from someone else's sweat." This is nothing but exploitation, in the full meaning of the term. Let us not kid ourselves, this could not last indefinitely. An employee may be exploited for one, two or even three years. However, he would not endlessly tolerate an intolerable situation. Someday his resentment would necessarily turn into rancor and be followed by an explosion. The hatred triggered by the exploitation of man by man engenders violvence, the class struggle and, in the final account, civil war. The national unity which should protect us from all such risks is not a static feature. It is a principle and a reality. It is also a dynamic principle which must continuingly be adapted to the political, economic and social imperatives, to the development of the young people and of the minds. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that a national union is a reality with which we have lived since our youth, a reality we believe in and which has been very useful to us in the course of the liberation struggle. Let us make an effort, therefore, to preserve this important gain and let us make an effort to protect it from any deviation which, God forbid, could trigger a class struggle, resentments and upheavals. I honestly believe, and this is not merely view but a view shared, I am convinced of this, by my companions within the party, since it expresses a truly Destourien principle which has always been supported by the party since its establishment, that national unity can last only if it is based on social justice. Social justice requires more than statistical data and averages. It consists of a sustained effort to create and increase the wealth--which is our role--and to distribute the results of this growth as stipulated by the party resolutions after the Sfax Congress, as even-handedly as possible. Total justice will remain an ideal which we may not be able to achieve but for which we shall continue to struggle.

Let me now discuss the type of human relations which must prevail between employers and employees. I expressed my viewpoint on this subject, as you may recall, on 1 May last, at the meeting organized on the occasion of the Labor Holiday. I repeated it that same month, at the meeting of the chairmen and directors general of public enterprises. I am convinced that the ideas I expressed represented your belief. Yet, as our religion encourages us to repeat endlessly the good word, allow me to use this occasion to mention it yet once again. One of the conditions for safeguarding national unity and preventing the development of hatred and of

a class-mindedness is, in fact, the need to work for peace in the hearts and for developing between employees and employers harmonious and fraternal relations. The worker must have the feeling that the head of the enterprise is sympathetic with his fate and is working for the improvement of his situation as though he were a member of his family, not to mention the fact that the manner in which something is given is worth more than what one gives. This applies to the importance of human relations. In this respect let me cite the old Tunisian adage, "Keep for yourself this bread you are giving me with a frowning expression." In other words, something which is a right should not be presented as a favor or as charity. Concern for human relations is strongly rooted in our Arab-Muslim traditions. This same spirit must prevail in human relations in such a way that the worker will not be led to believe that the chairman-director general or head of an enterprise, the engineer, or the official are made of a different substance. Along this line, the employer must not deem it useful to establish relations with his employees only under the pressure of a crisis, a strike, or any type of agitation within the enterprise.

An intelligent head of an enterprise should be like a doctor who is convinced of the great importance of preventive therapy. He must react to any change in the atmosphere among his personnel, a change which may show up as an increase in absenteeism or in any other type of malaise. He should use this to start a dialogue with his employees. Obviously, there are others who, thank God, are few and, I hope, rarely found in the public and private sectors, prefer the use of coercive means to a dialogue. Such people, even though very rarely encountered, are paradoxically convinced that social peace can be achieved through force only. They are greatly mistaken.

In fact, it is an error to believe that the structures of dialogue and enterprise committee are useless. Some owners are wrong in their belief that by mixing with the workers, listening to their concerns, and discussing with them expansion and improvement prospects, their dignity would be lowered and affected and, therefore, the dignity of the system. It is inconceivable, today or in the future, that social peace in the enterprises could be achieved through the force of bayonets or police clubs. Such protection would be illusory and ineffective.

As you unquestionably know from what you have read or your contacts with foreign countries, today a new "race" of businessmen has been born in the developed countries, believing that managing the human potential is more important than the proper management of facilities, possibilities, or existing structures. They are convinced that without people programs and plans remain unattainable utopias. Conversely, everything is possible with available human potential.

From specialized journals and other publications I have learned a number of facts on what is taking place in the United States, Europe or Japan

on the level of human relations within enterprises. I learned, among others, that in Japan it is not infrequent to see the boss and the engineer wear the same type of clothing as the workers and frequently eat in the plant's cafeteria among their employees. Such contacts eliminate mistrust and misunderstandings. In other words, the articles and studies I have read have proved to me that trade union activities, and I wish that my brothers in the trade unions would not misinterpret my statement, become meaningless when the worker, the boss and the engineer live in good harmony, work hand in hand, share the same concerns, experience the same constraints, and strive to achieve the same objectives. In such cases what would be the purpose of trade unions? Evil be to him who thinks it! I myself am a former trade unionist and the reason for which I have cited these examples is to show you the point we have reached, for in such a situation the role of the trade union movement would be changed. The trade union would no longer have as its purpose to rally the workers to defend themselves against the owners and for the recognition of their violated rights. In such cases, naturally, the trade union has the right to formulate claims. Nevertheless, in the future this role could change into a positive role of promoting awareness, education, training, and information. In that case social peace and trust would prevail. Actually, our future will be what is today the tangible reality of the big enterprises in Europe and America. This has made some leftist parties in Western Europe panicky at the thought that if the owners would act intelligently and win over the trust of the people these parties would remain purposeless. This is because the reason for their existence is found in crises, malaises, and the discontent of the workers. They enter the struggle presenting themselves as the defenders of the rights of the weak and the oppressed. I have not invented this but have found it in serious works on some extremist parties and trade unions in Europe. Actually, I have recopied some excerpts which I have sent to the heads of public enterprises and which should be sent to the heads of private enterprises as well.

As I said, these left-wing parties and trade unions obviously fear that an improvement in the social climate would deprive them forever of their battle horse and their reason for being.

This is because in their subversive activities such foreign extremist organizations exploit the cause of the workers for the sake of promoting disorder in the means of production, disturb social peace, and cause trouble to the existing system. They are not pleased with a calm behavior and a serene social climate.

They are afraid of the owners who display a new spirit and are more understanding. They prefer the somewhat arrogant behavior of some heads of enterprises. This gives them grounds for engaging in venomous propaganda. They would very much like the dissemination of the arrogance of

some bosses and of their tendency to consider the worker as a negligible quantity. These are attitudes which unquestionably create resentment and which these fishermen in troubled waters do not fail to exploit. Actually, they are to society what microbes are to the human body. As long as the body of an individual is healthy it can defend itself against such microbes which pollute the atmosphere.

When microbes attack a healthy organism they are immediately hunted by leucocytes. This is known as phagocytosis. The same applies to society: As long as the social body is healthy and is developing in conditions of stability and social peace, it has no reason to fear the nefarious activities of pathogenic agents. That is why we must act like vigilant physicians and forewarn Tunisian and Arab society against any microbial aggression. We must launch preventive measures and not wait for the fire or the disease to break out. In the latter case only major means could help, as is the case with antibiotics when the body has been severely infected. We have seen the major means in action, in our country on 26 January, or on the occasion of other events which shook up the Arab world and even Europe half a century ago. However, the major means, like antibiotics, could provide salvation once or twice....without guaranteeing success a third time. That is what leads me, as an activist like you, to draw your attention to this question. Here I address myself to all those in charge of managing personnel and enterprises: businessmen, chairmen and directors general of public or private enterprises, engineers, administrators, or managers. All of them must promote the preservation of social peace and avoid reactions of despair triggered by resentment and hatred. I believe it to be my duty to speak out frankly, for I find it unpleasant to be agreeable whatever the circumstances.

I believe it to be my duty to express my views even should this be hurtful to some people. Actually, it is only those whose conscience is not clear who would be disturbed. Even though our country is healthy, there are some elements in whom selfishness prevails and who are ruled by the lure of profits. Seeking profit is a legitimate ambition which, however, should take place within the framework of respect for the laws and fiscal stipulations. No one intends to nurture feelings of envy toward the "haves." However, it is indecent to try to become rich by all means, even though illicit. The accumulation of insolent fortunes which are as huge as they are illicit, within a short period of time, cannot remain unnoticed. The young, the university students above all, are watching. People of modest means are watching as well. In such cases, resentment and hatred could take over the hearts and the minds. This, God forbid, could lead to convulsions and rebellions.

In the second place, I turn to you in the name of Islam and morality. I do not wish to address you as a specialist but I firmly believe in the goodness of man. I am addressing myself to those Muslims who believe in God, who obey his laws, and who seek his mercy. It is possible that in

the six million believers there may be some who engage in speculations or fraudulant activities leading to considerable profits. To them I would say that such practices are condemned by religion and moralicy. Recently, as a result of the raise in taxes on some kinds of fruits, their prices have doubled. Overnight the price of peaches thus rose from 480 to 840 millimes. It was this that led the weekly BILADI to state that, "Freedom is expensive....for the consumer."

It is not my intention to examine the political or administrative aspects of this problem. However, I would like to consider the moral aspect of this question. Whereas it is legitimate to seek as reasonable profit, exorbitant profit is illegal in terms of morality and religion. Such individuals should consider what their situation could become when, as a result of their behavior, difficulties or general strikes would affect the country's progress. Their urge to earn excessively would cost them everything. Even if they personally would be spared, it is not certain in the least that 20 years later the new generation would let their young benefit from the wealth they had amassed. Justice will thus be done, for God may postpone but never abandon his retribution. Therefore, we could only wonder about those who are draining the blood of the people remorselessly. Are they unaware of the existence of an immanent justice or that they would pay through their flesh the price of their unscrupulous greed? I would like to whisper in the ear of such irresponsible people to get hold of themselves, to come back to God, and to understand that ill-gotten gains benefit no one. Big fortunes only exacerbate quarrels among the heirs. On another level, whatever they may do to remain unnoticed, their behavior triggers anger toward and criticism of those in charge. I say this without trying to moralize, for I envy no one. Personally, I have chosen to live modestly for the rest of my days. My happiness is serving the country. That is why I think of you, I think about the future of your children and the future of our country. Disorder must not prevail and resentments must not lead to a class struggle. There must not be a privileged minority whose position would trigger envy and hatred.

I hope and am even convinced that the government will not be forced to resort to repressive laws to protect by force the interests of the economically weak and the consumers in general. May you be able to protect one another and wish the others what you would like to have yourselves. Why should the government be forced to set the price of fruits by decree whereas the middlemen should protect on their own goodwill the intersts of the poor and the weakest. I would be willing and disposed to discuss the matter all day long with four or five such insubordinate people among the middlemen. I have nothing against them and I do not like to govern by force. I merely wish for a change in their mentality. For it is inadmissible for some still to be trying to exploit others, trick customs agents or engage in big deals.

Naturally, we are in favor of the normal development of economic activities, of the creation of fortunes and, consequently, the emergence of a growing number of businessmen. However, such fortunes must be created in a healthy manner which would guarantee to those who acquire them and to their children security and peace and would be redistributed in a spirit of justice, far from any extremism. This may lead some to say that those are very nice words for, in their view, there is no third way other than the classical alternative offered by the two big economic concepts. Personally, I do not believe this and I do not believe that I am wrong.

Within our party we do not agree with the concept of liberalism which turns economic options loose. Nor do we support the socialist ideology which boasts of being scientific.

Our party is a socialist party. However, our socialism is not nurtured by class hatred. I disagree with the proponents of the omnipresence of the state which should direct and control everything. I prefer to this the Bourguibian way, the way which does not consider the Tunisian people lost, which trusts them, which supports them in the field of political activities, i.e., which resorts to training and education. This was the way chosen by Bourguiba during the struggle for liberation and after it, the way which made it possible to change the Tunisian people. I am convinced that it is not too late and that we retain the possibility to avoid the dilemma of a blind socialist dictatorship or excessive and unfair liberalism. Therefore, we have chosen the middle way, as our society is a society of a just environment which believes that all Tunisians are brothers and for which national unity, far from being an empty slogan or a myth, becomes a concrete reality. Whether they are workers, merchants, businessmen, physicians or unemployed, all the Tunisians are sincere patriots. If the leadership can pursue the difficult path of a just environment, and if it is direct and permanent contact with the masses, with a view to changing their mentality, we are certain to succeed as we succeeded in our liberation struggle. For example, Hedi Ben Jaballah was a 19- or 20-year-old man at the time when, in accordance with the President's directives, he had volunteered to execute a traitor. He said, "I am not married and I have neither father nor mother." Subjected to torture, he tirelessly shouted, "Long Live Bourguiba," and "Long Live Tunisia."

Sentenced to death, Hedi Ben Jaballah died as a martyr, leaving to future generations the example of extraordinary courage. Ben Jaballah had never gone to school. He was a young Tunisian like many others at that time. It was Bourguiba's school which took him over and changed him, turning him into a true activist. This was the case of a large number of activists such as Ferjani Belhaj Ammar who, as he himself recalls, without his apprenticeship in Bourguiba's and the people's school would have remained a modest craftsman. Jail turned him into an activist, for even in jail the Destourien activists learn and train one another. Without

all this they would have remained simple merchants exclusively concerned with making a living, supporting French colonization with fatalism and resignation. However, thanks to the extraordinary efforts to educate and make the people aware, undertaken tirelessly by Bourguiba, joining the party in large numbers, the Tunisians defied the occupation authorities and faced death with courage and dignity.

Therefore, if during the struggle for national liberation it had become possible to trigger among the activists through the promotion of their awareness a spirit of sacrifice which let them stand up to bullets and jails, today, thanks to direct contacts and education, it should be easier to convince some profit-thirsty individuals of the need to temper their appetites. I am convinced that this is possible. Therefore, I believe that in addition to the party's activities and the efforts of our press, radio and television, and the lessons which President Bourguiba continues to teach, both the UTICA and the UGTT should spare no effort to enhance the level of awareness of the working people so that they may produce more. Unquestionably, this activity is being pursued by the enterprise owners. It is a question of pursuing it, of consolidating educational work and of determining the range of the general interest and the limits of private interests. It is in the very interest of these same individuals to treat the people with consideration, to fear God and to restrain their grubbing. I am deliberating using such words to emphasize the severity of the problem, for what we should fear is to suddenly discover, 10 or 20 years later, too late, that the class struggle has become established in our society and that our children are paying its price.

This is a vital question and I hope that my statements will be interpreted accurately. This is because some people could question whether I am a socialist or not and, proceeding from the viewpoint of a simplistic Manichaeism, reach the conclusion that he who is not with them is necessarily against them. I am convinced that by promoting awareness it is possible to establish a climate of harmony and solidarity which would augur better days, providing that the national organizations persevere along this way in cooperation with the party which, in this respect, faces the important task of guiding and rallying. It is thus that, hand in hand, we shall secure for ourselves a better future. Conversely, should everyone persist in pulling the blanket on his side of the bed and exclusively look after his own interests or the interests of a small plan or else plunges into politicking and partisan deals, the results would be null. We must understand that this is a problem which concerns the future of the country.

I wish to address all working people, whether owners, engineers, or workers in the language of faith, reason and patriotism and tell them that national unity, based on tolerance, harmony, justice and rejection of exploitation, should be maintained and consolidated in order to protect our country from any threat of difficulties and destabilization.

I owe it to the truth to say that since independence and, above all, in recent years our country has witnessed the appearance of a large number of specialists in the field of economics and trade, with acknowledged level of competence and enterprise and who have developed viable projects. We are proud of them and wish to encourage them further and to protect their interests so that they continue to be the dynamic element of our economic development. This, however, should be with the stipulation that it would not lead to an exaggerated increase in prices but would allow our enterprises to remain competitive abroad.

Currently these initiative-minded people are studying, together with the services of the Ministry of the Economy, and with the owners' organization, the modalities of price setting. This would result in a certain number of specific measures which would turn our words into actions. On 1 May I stated that the petit merchants and craftsmen needed the special attention of the government. I discussed this with Ferjani Belhaj Ammar who informed me that he had kept a file on this project since 1973, i.e., roughly for the past 7 years. I answered him that this file should be reviewed as soon as possible. In the course of a meeting of the Political Bureau, chaired by the Supreme Fighter, I asked Ferjani Belhaj Ammar to present the question to the party's chairman and the members of the Political Bureau. The Supreme Fighter then recommended to us to help the small merchants. The reason I mention their case is that we wish to encourage them, for it is possible that their voice is not always heard even though they are the keystone of the national economy. It is they who are struggling at the base to insure its upsurge. Therefore, price restraints should not be to their detriment and they should not be the only ones to bear their burden. Actually, they are workers even though in some cases they may employ a few people who, occasionally may be making more than they do. They are Tunisians who have played a role in both the struggle for liberation and for development, who support families and whose situation, therefore, should be of proper concern to us. I have the pleasure to inform you that the file is ready. In a week or two Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of the national economy, will announce decisions which have been made and to which I had hinted in my 1 May speech. Thus, only a few months after the speech we have results. This will be the answer to some people who are operating behind the stage saying that not only words but actions are needed. These people are trying to raise doubts.

We are like the ant in the story, which is building and producing while others play the role of the grasshopper, liking their leisure. We shall let them fiddle away. As far as we are concerned, we shall continue to roll up our sleeves to serve our fellow citizens, willingly letting others engage in discourses, intrigues, and shady deals.

We are relying on those who work, who produce and expend their forces to be useful to others. As to the others, the "debaters," Let them pursue

their intrigues and confused theories. They could not go very far. As I emphasized only yesterday, addressing the personnel of the Tax Court, God has wished our country well and, with his help, you will see only good from the Supreme Commander and his government. Actually, you will have a new proof of this expressed in the decisions which will be imparted to you by Ferjani Belhaj Ammar, the minister of the economy.

Another remark I would like to make has to do with the purpose of your organization, the UTICA. Its role is to contribute to economic development, the creation of wealth, and the motivation and utilization of youth energy. I say this in all sincerity without back thoughts. Actually, in this very hall, invited by the Junior Chamber of Commerce, I met with young Tunisians who are admiral from all points of view. The members of the Junior Chamber of Commerce Bureau then visited me in my office. On that occasion I was able to appreciate the reasonable terms, in literary Arabic rather than in "Franco-Arabic" and the clarity of views and constructive approach of the young and the promising nature of their ability which blossomed after independence was gained, thanks to the policy of the Supreme Fighter in the fields of education and training. Meeting with them gave me great satisfaction and deep faith in the future, for one day these young people will take up the torch from the hands of their elders. As in a relay race the young will take over the "witness" from the hands of the less young and go on with the struggle. I am convinced that they will be closer to the people even though they did not participate in the struggle for independence. Yet, they are no less imbued with the patriotic spirit which Bourguiba inspired in them. Personally, I trust them totally.

Naturally, Ferjani Belhaj Ammar is very encouraging toward them. Nevertheless, I would like to urge you to open for them further the road leading to Jendouba, Kairouan, Bizerte, and elsewhere, not to mention Tunis, Sousse and Sfax. Each of these areas is rich is competent young people who must make their contribution in accordance with our policy based on maintaining the balance among these areas.

The point is that Tunisia could not develop or achieve progress by being satisfied with the development of nothing but the coastal cities. Quite to the contrary, the development effort must spread to the other areas as well, such as Jendouba, Kef, Siliana, Kasserine, Sidi Bouzid, Gafsa and Medenine. Furthermore, as I have already announced, the next plan will be focused on these areas in order to avoid or reduce any imbalance.

However, in order to achieve this we must rely on this youthful energy found throughout our country. Was I not invited by young people to chair the conclusion of a seminar in Kairouan? In both the public and private sectors such competent young people are becoming energized and meeting difficult assignments. I am firmly convinced that such people do not scorn the workers and know that equal attention should be paid to everything.

May your organization always welcome more young people who will bring it fresh healthy blood.

On the other hand, I must emphasize the need for a dialogue between the various organizations. This, in my view, is an essential matter. In this connection I am pleased to congratulate the UTICA and its president who, last year, despite difficulties, constraints and legitimate economic considerations, supported us in our social policy, in our policy of collective bargaining and in the dialogue with the working people. I am convinced that they will continue to give us their full support, for we are firmly resolved to go forth in the way to social justice. We are firmly resolved to reexamine in the months and years to come collective agreements and enterprise committees. Yet, this can be accomplished only to the extent to which industrialists, merchants and workers will contribute as well. The same applies to the National Farmers' Union. We must consider the problems of prices, wages, economic growth and psychological climate. The dialogue among the different partners should not astound us, for we are all patriots trained in Bourguiba's school. However, we would like in the months and years to come to see this dialogue broaden, strengthen, and become crystalized to prevent malaise and sporadic difficulties.

Without intending in the least to exaggerate, I would like to emphasize in this context that some foreign parties are bothered by Tunisia's success. The point is that despite the modest nature of our resources we are steadily blossoming and increasing our strength despite very limited means. Our success sticks in the throat of those who have chosen a different way. Those people are not helping us. Worse, occasionally they try to disturb us and to hit us by encouraging strikes and troubles with a view to worsening our situation and blocking the access to our development. I am convinced that the leadership in the trade unions, the economy and agriculture are aware of this. Naturally, they occasionally have diverting views and create tempests in teapots. Nevertheless, all they have to do in order to come to their senses, is to remind themselves of the existence of enemies and of latent dangers which threaten us and to remember that our economy remains fragile, developing within the context of an international economy ruled by the law of force. In this context disinterested help could come from friends alone and even they have a tendency to make more promises than to act upon them. Consequently, we must rely on ourselves. Merchants, farmers, industrialists, workers, engineers and employees must tighten their ranks to save the fatherland which is not the sole ownership of anyone. Do not forget that there are dangers threatening us! Do not forget that our children have the legitimate ambition to live a life better than ours! Let us be on the level of the hopes of the young generations in order to avoid convulsions, plots and traps laid by some! Let us be united in protecting our country from anarchic strikes.

We have no objection to legitimate strikes triggered by injustice or abusive exploitation. No one should consider this detrimental.

Conversely, if the enterprises, the public enterprises in particular, are used for the purpose of bringing the government or the system down on its knees or to promote someone, we would find this totally intolerable. The opening which we favor is not synonymous with laxity, not to say slackness. We cannot allow disturbing elements to harm the enterprises or promote anarchy within them. Just as we are asking of the industrialists to help us to eliminate any type of abusive exploitation, we are calling on the workers, on the other hand, to help us by enhancing their awareness and education. In turn, the government guarantees the economic and social security of all citizens, whether producers, merchants or consumers. In other words, the government plays the role of the umpire and the guarantor and is not a party to the game. As the Supreme Fighter has emphasized it so many times, the state must act toward the citizen like an attentive father, correcting all the faults that are noticed and eliminating all exploitation with the help of words and laws but not coercion. Actually, we have never supported the strong method, being entirely convinced that moral force is far more persuasive than physical force.

Nevertheless, when thoughtlessness becomes anarchy, hegemony or striking omnipotence, we call upon the verdict of the people, denouncing those who attempt to harm the enterprise and, through it, the fatherland.

In this connection, it is important to have on our side a strong owners' organization and a powerful workers organization which would be truly and democratically representative of the workers. Democracy is expressed through elections and not through the predominance of a category of people. All trade union federations and primary trade unions must hold their congresses and nominate the delegates to represent them at the UGTT congress. Being the supreme power, the congress will make the decisions. We shall thus have accomplished something useful and taken into consideration the general interest.

This is the policy of adventurers, of those who preach the policy of doom! On our part, we shall not turn them loose, for the government and the state have both human and other means with which to neutralize agitators and fishermen in troubled waters.

I am saying this for I clearly perceive what will take place in the next few months. As long as we keep our ranks tight and maintain a firm national unity, bearing in mind the interests of the fatherland and fight exploitation, we have nothing to fear concerning the fate of our nation. Even if a crisis were to break out we would be able to face it like an airplane which resists an atmospheric turbulence and eventually lands safely. Like passengers in an airplane hitting an air hole we shall buckle up our safety belts and resist the crisis until it is past, for

it always eventually disappears thanks to the skill of the captain who, in this case, is Bourguiba. As long as the Supreme Fighter will be holding the rudder and guiding this state, as long as he will be assisted by a coherent and united government, as long as harmony prevails between the party and the national organizations and, above all, as long as the government will have the trust of the people we have nothing to fear.... Our government is not a government locked in an ivory tower. Stemming from the people, it has made the people the sole judge for it has nothing to hide from the people. This must be known and understood by everyone.

May Tunisia go forth always! May your great organization, which was the first to be created by the party, remain always in the vanguard! May we, with its help and with the help of all other national organizations, tirelessly strengthen the party in order to consolidate the trust of the people, its serenity and its ability to take up the challenges of poverty, underdevelopment, envy and laziness!

May you continue to act with the same zeal for the good of Tunisia and all Tunisians!

May God crown with success the work of your congress!

5157
CSO: 4400

POLISARIO SAID TO BE READY FOR DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS WITH MOROCCO

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 5 Sep 80 p 3

[Report on Interview with Nur al-Din Ahmad 'Ali, Member of the National Political Office of the Polisario Liberation Front; date and place not given]

[Text] Nur al-Din Ahmad 'Ali, Member of National Political Office of Polisario Liberation Front Says, "We Accept Any Mediation with Morocco, and We Accept Unity With It."

Nur al-Din Ahmad 'Ali, member of the National Political Office of the Polisario Liberation Front said that his visit to Kuwait is in the context of a tour that includes Arab capitals to explain the front's point of view in the struggle with Morocco.

In an interview with AL-QABAS, Nur al-Din Ahmad 'Ali added that the front is fully prepared to accept any Arab mediation whatsoever, provided that the nature of the struggle between the front and Morocco and not the struggle between Morocco and Algeria be investigated.

He said that the OAU had agreed to hold negotiations through the Committee of African Arbitrators this month, but it seems that Morocco changed its mind.

Ahmad 'Ali said that the front is prepared to unite with any Arab country whatsoever. He emphasized that "Unity must take place between us as two states. It must not be imposed on us. We are prepared to unite with Morocco through a democratic, constructive dialogue, not through an accomplished fact imposed on us."

Ahmad 'Ali said that the purpose of the aid offered by colonialist countries is to preoccupy the Arab Maghrib [Morocco] with secondary questions at the expense of the real Arab problems.

He affirmed that the front had advocated unity between Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritainia, and said: "This is because we are advocates of unity. We believe that the Arabs will not have any strength, unless they unite. This is the basis of our outlook. The Sahara was divided in 1884, and remained occupied until Spain left it. We wanted independence, but Morocco and Mauritania wanted to annex the people of the Sahara, and we did not want that. We are fighting now so that we can assert our will." He added: "Mauritania has become convinced that the people of the Sahara have rights, and it has withdrawn from its agreement with Morocco."

He said: "We want to put an end to Arab bloodshed. We want to have direct negotiations with Morocco so that we can establish a just and permanent solution similar to that which happened with Mauritania."

8592
CSO: 4802

'LE MONDE' DESCRIBES CLAIMED POLISARIO SUCCESSES AGAINST MOROCCANS

LD240859 Paris LE MONDE in French 22 Oct 80 p 7

[Dispatch by Daniel Jungua: "A 1,000-km Foray With the Polisario Fighters"]

[Excerpts] Hassi Hafed Boudjemaa--In taking some 10 journalists, mainly French and Spanish, on a 3-day tour of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR] "liberated territories," the Polisario had two objectives: to prove that it effectively controls virtually all this region abandoned for almost 2 years now by the Moroccan army, and to establish on the other hand that the current fighting is taking place on Moroccan territory in the Oued Dra region. The demonstration struck us as convincing.

Our escort only began to take precautions when we approached the border with Morocco in order to reach the Ras-el-Khanfra zone where violent clashes have been taking place for the past month. Ras-el-Khanfra, a small hill in the foothills of the Zini Mountains, looks out over a valley which gives access to Tan-Tan through Abatteh, 17 km further on. That is one of the routes taken by the Polisario battalions to reach northern Morocco. This enables them to attack the coast road from Tan-Tan to Tarfaya which is the supply route for conveying men and military equipment to the Hagunia-Semara-Bojador fortified triangle in the West Sahara. This fortified triangle encompasses El-Aiun--the territory's capital--and especially the Bou-Craa phosphate deposits. Together with the city of Dakhla (formerly Vialla-Cisneros) further to the south, these are now the only points at which Moroccan troops are still deployed in the former Spanish colony.

"For this operation intended to protect its communication routes, the Moroccan army," Polisario command council member Omar Hadrani told us, "has deployed some 20,000 men at Abatteh, commanded by Colonel Ben Othman. Last August 12,000 of those soldiers were installed at three positions spread over some 30 km, one in Saharan territory at Khreibichat, the second at L'Bouba on the border and the third at Ras-el-Khanfra, a few kilometers inside Morocco. As a result of our attacks the first two garrisons were forced to withdraw between 16 and 18 September. They went as reinforcements to Ras-el-Khanfra. We are continuing our attacks and have already penetrated their command post once, destroying heavy artillery batteries and Stalin organs [presumably a multiround tube-type rocket launcher]."

Protected by a providential fog which prevented aircraft reconnaissance, our group reached a point only 5 km from Ras-el-Khanfra whence the sound of explosions could be heard at intervals. The terrain, which was slightly uneven, was covered with traces of violent fighting over the previous days. We saw the wreckage of a Mirage F-1 aircraft shot down on 21 September scattered over several hundred square meters; further on we saw the blackened and twisted shell of two South African-made armored troop transport vehicles. Our guides then showed us a gigantic caterpillar bulldozer which looked out of place in that desert-like scene. "Our fighters siezed it at Ras-el-Khanfra," Omar Hadrani explained to us, "and they succeeded in bringing it here. However, the engine is burned out. We have already destroyed four of these vehicles. The Moroccans use them to dig ditches and build protective dikes."

We then visited the positions abandoned by the [Moroccan] Royal Armed Forces at Kreibichat and L'Bouba. Signs of the Moroccan withdrawal could be seen everywhere. There were individual dugouts and trenches, littered with empty tins, there were artillery and mortar positions littered with munitions cases and boxes, overturned land rovers and a burned-out tanker truck. Here and there we could see a few mounds of fresh soil: "graves which we dug for Moroccan soldiers," one of the members of our escort told us.

"Who Is Rounding Up Whom?"

According to Omar Hadrani, some 600 Moroccans have been killed since the beginning of this series of operations. "This is a good opportunity for us to attack the best enemy units--the few thousand men who constitute the spearhead of the royal armed forces. We are engaging them before they have time to entrench themselves."

A reference to the "rounding-up operations" which, according to Rabat, have eliminated the Polisario in the southern part of Morocco, made Mr Hadrani smile. "Who is rounding up whom?" he asked pointing to the royal army's successive retreats. "Southern Morocco," he added, "is facing a growing threat as shown by our attack on M'Hamed-Les Gazelles near Ouarzazate which is level with Agadir." A little later, on the return journey, after the traditional meal: roast goat meat, rice and green tea, Mr Hadrani, sitting under an improvised tent made from blankets, drew conclusions from the last OAU meeting in Freetown. "We agree to a referendum on self-determination," he said, "and a cease-fire provided the Moroccan army withdraws completely from our country. There can be no referendum under the threat of Moroccan weapons. The OAU has tried to throw the king a last lifebelt. He has not even taken hold of it. We are now giving priority to the struggle to secure the departure of the Rabat troops."

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4 November 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2214

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LONDON PLO AIDE CONDEMNS, DENIES INVOLVEMENT IN ANTI-JEWISH VIOLENCE

LD150801 London ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 14 Oct 80 p 2

[ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT report: "PLO Denies Link With Attacks on Jews in Europe, Denounces Exploitation of Attacks"]

[Text] London--The PLO office in London has denounced the recent acts of violence against the Jewish communities in Europe and totally rejected the Israeli foreign minister's 8 October statement to the effect that the PLO is involved in backing fascist organizations in Europe.

PLO representative in London Nabil Ar-Ramlawi said: "We regret that the Zionist leaders are now trying to intimidate the governments of the EEC through the cheap exploitation of acts of violence being committed against the Jewish communities in Europe."

Ar-Ramlawi added: "Zionism--the political dogma of the state of Israel--is the direct result of hostility toward the Jews and their persecution in Europe in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Any reemergence of organizations hostile to the Jews in Europe would only strengthen the Zionist movement and encourage Jewish emigration from Europe to Palestine, which in turn would strengthen the movement that imposed dispersion and banishment on millions of Palestinians, both Muslims and Christians, from their home in Palestine."

Ar-Ramlawi said: "The Palestinians, therefore, share the concern of Jews in Europe for the need for the relevant authorities to take drastic action against those who use or incite violence against the Jewish communities."

The PLO representative said in his statement: "Any solution to the Palestinian problem that the EEC is now trying to reach rests not only on respect for the Palestinian people's legitimate right to return to their home and establish an independent Palestinian state, since the basis of any solution requires that Jewish communities wherever they may be must be able to live free from discrimination and violence against them."

Concluding his statement, Ar-Ramlawi denied that the PLO had anything to do with anti-Semitic organizations whether in Europe or anywhere else.

CSO: 4802

PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVE IN AMMAN LAUDS JORDAN, CONDEMNS ISRAEL

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 19 Sep 80 p 17

[Interview with Najib al-Ahmad by AL-QABAS, in Amman; date not given]

/Text/ Mr Najib al-Ahmad, director of Mr Yasir 'Arafat's office in the Jordanian capital, said that Zionist designs are not just restricted to Palestine but go beyond it, to what is called the land of Israel, from the Euphrates to the Nile--as was openly resolved at the first Zionist conference held in Switzerland in 1897. He said that the occupation, incorporation and judaization that are taking place now are only the exact implementation of what was resolved at that conference.

Mr al-Ahmad asserted, in a conversation with AL-QABAS, that Israel is now launching an aggressive attack which is aimed at eliminating the Palestinian revolution and paralyzing the movement of Syria and Jordan in order to subject and force them to proceed along the capitulationist Camp David road. In this, it is relying on unlimited American support and the connivance of the Egyptian regime.

The director of Abu 'Ammar's office in Amman stated that Jordanian-Palestinian relations are fraternal and excellent and that the two parties are standing together in the face of the Zionist attack and the Zionist schemes against our people in the occupied nation.

Mr Najib Ahmad, who was born in the village of Rumanah in the District of Janin, participated in successive Palestinian revolutions in 1936, 1938 and 1939. The British imprisoned him for a year during their mandate. He participated in the 1948 war as a commander of combatants in cooperation with the Palestinian Holy War Forces, the Arab Salvation Army and the Iraqi Army, which gave him the rank of honorary officer.

He worked with the International Red Cross as an overseer for refugee affairs in 1949-50 and was elected member of the Jordanian Parliament as a delegate from the Janin area for four successive terms, from 1951 to 1963. He was a founder of the National Socialist Party and a member of its Central Committee. He was chosen a member to the first Palestine National Congress in 1964 and took part with the Jordanian Arab Army in the 1967 war as a commander of the popular forces in Janin. He resisted the occupation, was arrested by Israeli enemy authorities and was sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment, of which he served 13 months. The occupation authorities then banished him with his family to Jordan in early September 1969.

After that he worked with the Palestine Liberation Organization as a commander of the Western Sector in 1970 and was given the rank of honorary officer in the honor ary officer in the Palestine Liberation Army until 1973. After the October War he was appointed representative to the Political Department of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Jordan until 1975, then worked in the Political Department in Damascus, and recently as member of the Palestine National Congress, which he still is. Finally, he was appointed director of the office of Mr Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Herewith is the te of the meeting between Mr Najib Ahmad and AL-QABAS:

Activities and Powers of Abu 'Ammar's Office

/Question/ What are the activities and powers of Mr 'Arafat's office in Amman?

/Answer/ The activities of the office of the Liberation Organization Executive Committee chairman are defined by the chairman himself. They are not specific but are diverse. Abu 'Ammar's office has been assigned to follow up on matters of supporting our brothers' perseverance in occupied Palestine in implementation of the recommendations issued by the Islamic Conference Organization in Jiddah and numerous other matters related to our people living in occupied Palestine.

The Decree Incorporating and Uniting Jerusalem

/Question/ How do you view the latest Israeli decree unifying Jerusalem and considering it an eternal capital of the Jewish state?

/Answer/ The Zionists' designs on Jerusalem and all Palestinian territories, and all Arab territories from the Nile to the Euphrates are not far from our minds and our eyes. They were declared in accordance with the resolutions of the first Zionist conference held in Switzerland in 1897. May I remind one of the Zionists' attempt in 1929 to take over the noble Alborak, also known as the Wailing Wall, and the bloody revolution that caused in Palestine.

After the Zionists' occupation of the city of Jerusalem and all Palestine in 1967, the enemy government, on 27 June 1967 specifically, issued a law titled "Amended Judiciary and Administration Law for the Year 1967," by virtue of which the Arab sector of Jerusalem which was occupied in 1967 was incorporated into Israel. It then issued a decree according to this law by virtue of which it incorporated the Arab areas surrounding Jerusalem into the state of Israel. These areas comprised the areas of the villages of Bayt Safafa, Sur Bahir, Salwan, al-Tur, 'Anata, al-'Isawiyah, al Ram, Sha'fat, up to Bayt Hanina. These areas were included in the boundaries of the municipality of Jerusalem, so that the united holy city of Jerusalem became the capital of the Jewish state. Residing in these Arab areas, which were affixed to Jerusalem, which had been occupied since 1948, are 100,000 Arabs.

On 29 June 1969, the enemy government issued a decree calling for the dissolution of the board of trustees of Arab Jerusalem and took over all its records, combining them with the records of the unified municipality of Jerusalem. It then banished the mayor, Mr Ruhi al-Khatib, to Jordan.

On 28 October 1969 elections were held for the unified municipality of Jerusalem, including the Jewish and Arab inhabitants. One should bear in mind that the Arab residents boycotted it.

Abrogation of Jordanian Laws

The occupation authorities abrogated all the Jordanian laws which had been in effect at that time, including the Education Law. They appended educational affairs to the Israeli Ministry of Education and even linked the Islamic law courts to the Jaffa Islamic law judge, on grounds that he was an Israeli judge. Israeli identity documents were issued to the Arab inhabitants of Jerusalem, and all government offices supervising West Bank affairs were moved from the courts to the al-Tabu Office in Ramallah.

On 21 August 1969, the occupation authorities burned the blessed al Aqsa mosque then established residential buildings in Jerusalem to which they moved tens of thousands of Zionist emigres. They established a wall of residential buildings like citadels around the city of Jerusalem and changed the archaeological features of the city. Isn't that enough to demonstrate the incorporation of Arab Jerusalem into the Zionist entity?

Mr Najib Ahmad went on to say, "I assert that the issuance of the incorporation law is only a sort of Israeli arrogance and presumptiousness. It occurred as a blatant challenge to the United Nations, the Security Council and the nations of the world, headed by the Arab and Islamic countries, and showed disdain for the person of the Egyptian president, the patron of the Camp David agreement.

The Canal Linking the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea

/Question/ Israel intends to dig a canal linking the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea. What is your view?

/Answer/ Israel is striving to take over all sources of water in the area. It had previously used the waters of Lake Tiberias when it transmitted its water in big pipes to the Negev, the south of Palestine. It also destroyed Arab installations when the Arabs decided to make use of the Waters of the al-Yarmuk, Baniyas and al-Hasibani rivers and threatened war, and is now striving to take over the waters of the al-Litani River in southern Lebanon.

Mr al-Ahmad declared: "Israel has been intending to dig a canal from Haifa via the Marj ibn 'Amir Plain to the town of Baysan and the River Jordan and south along the Graben of the Jordan to the Dead Sea. Since this project can be carried out only with the agreement and participation of Jordan, which forcefully refuses, Israel has adopted the notion of establishing this canal from Gaza via the south of Beersheba to the Dead Sea. The project aims at completing the circle of dominance over all Palestinian and Arab territories."

He said, "Israel is the only state in the world whose borders are not determined, on the basis of the Zionist rule: 'Your borders, Israel, are where you set your feet.' If that Zionist foot is not severed it will be set on more Arab and Palestinian territory."

Incorporation of Golan

/Question/ The terrorist Knesset member Ge'ula Cohen, patroness of the plan to incorporate Jerusalem, intends to present the draft of a plan to incorporate the Golan Heights into the Zionist entity. What is your comment?

/Answer/ The Zionists view Syrian Arab Golan as part of what is called the territory of greater Israel. Since 1967, 27 settlements have been established there. This year they issued a law according to which the Ministry of the Interior tried to issue an Israeli identity to every Arab residing in Golan 'who wanted it!' It is not strange that Cohen should want to incorporate Golan into the racist entity.

Southern Lebanon

/Question/ Israel claims that its military escalation in southern Lebanon against the joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces and the refugee camps is part of an attempt to respond to the activities of the resistance and a preventive strategy aimed at preventing the implementation of guerrilla activities against its vital targets.

/Answer/ The purpose behind the escalation is completely clear. Israel is working to evacuate the Lebanese inhabitants from southern Lebanon up to the al-Litani River with the goal of taking over a south without inhabitants, and the river and its waters as well.

Israel and its Camp David allies also know that this agreement will never last as long as the Palestinian resistance exists and speaks firmly in rejecting the agreement and its conclusions, supported by the Lebanese national forces and the Syrian army.

He went on to say, "From this state of affairs, bitter as far as the Camp David partners go, Israel, with American support, exploiting sorrowful disputes among Arab countries and the American elections, is trying to strike out at the Palestinian resistance, crush warm relations with the Lebanese national forces, and threaten Syria with a lightning war to push the Camp David agreement through, subject Syria and consequently to weaken the firm Jordanian position and try to make it take part in the Camp David negotiations it intensely rejects."

Mr Najib al-Ahmad said, "The firm Palestinian position, derived from the rigidity and obstinacy of the fighting man and his command, represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, fully cognizant of his cause and the Zionists' goals, stands as a deterrent barrier to the enemy's vicious attacks."

The European Position

/Question/ What is your opinion about the European Common Market countries' recent position on the Palestine cause?

/Answer/ It is great that the countries of Western Europe recognize the failure of the Camp David agreement but solutions to the Palestine cause can progress only through the people whose cause it is, namely the Palestinian Arab people, represented by their legitimate authority, the guarantee of their legitimate national rights to

their nation Palestine, and their right to return to it, determine their destiny, and establish their independent national state on their national soil.

He said, "In spite of all this sympathetic European behavior, the recent position by the Western European countries has not been wholly supportive of Arab rights and we therefore are requesting the countries of the European group to be more practical in supporting the just cause of the Palestinian people free from American influence."

Egypt and the Arabs

/Question/ Do you expect Egypt to return to Arab ranks?

/Answer/ Egypt is genuinely Arab and its people were in the vanguard of those fighting for Arab causes. The history of Egypt and its people is full of heroic acts and it is not strange that Egypt should return to Arab ranks--what is strange is that it has not returned yet.

The Jordanian-Palestinian Dialogue

/Question/ Where has the course of the Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue reached?

/Answer/ Since the Egyptian president's lowly visit to occupied Jerusalem, the agreements that followed it and resulted from it, the vicious campaign by the Zionist state, and its unlimited support from the United States of America in judaizing Palestine, alienating the Palestine Liberation Organization, failing to recognize its leadership and the right of the Palestinian people to their nation, and removing Jordan and all the Arabs from their sacred cause, Jordan and the Palestine Liberation Organization have therefore set out to implement the resolutions of the Baghdad and Tunis summits, in their awareness of the gravity of the situation and the need to work together against the liquidationist schemes, foremost of which are the Camp David agreements.

He went on to say, "Relations are fraternal and excellent and we are working in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity to stand up to the Zionist attack and the enemy's liquidationist schemes against our people in the Arab nation."

Mr Najib Ahmad expressed his hope that the meetings would continue and deepen in order to create further fraternal solidarity in order to struggle with the enemy and liberate the nation.

Mr al-Ahmad concluded his conversation by saying, "The liberation of Palestine will not occur with a proliferation of hollow statements and threats, or festivals, parades and epic speeches, but through the unification of ranks and Arab efforts in heart and soul to prepare for the coming stage, taking into consideration the need to benefit from the aid and support of friends in the Islamic world, the nonaligned countries, and the Socialist countries, headed by the Soviet Union, and through conviction in the statement that what has been taken by force will be regained only by force."

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CSO: 4802

PALESTINIAN LEADER VOICES SUPPORT FOR IRANIAN REVOLUTION

NC141224 Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 13 Oct 80 p 11

[Text] Nayif Hawatimah, secretary general of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, has said that "the war on Iran represents the third phase of the imperialist, reactionary and Arab rightist plan to destroy the Iranian revolution now that the political war and the starvation and economic blockade campaign have failed."

Hawatimah outlined "the basic motives behind the enthusiasm by King Husayn and other Arab reactionaries for this war against Iran" and said: "Destroying the revolution, which placed Iran in the front lines against Camp David and alarmed the reactionary thrones, will clear the way for striking against the Palestinian revolution and its Lebanese national ally by putting them between the pincers of the Zionist enemy and the Phalangist statelet."

Addressing groups of trainees of the democratic front organization, Hawatimah added: "Destroying the Iranian revolution will also lead to encircling Syria by the Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian axis, injecting internal terrorist, reactionary and class sabotage operations and disrupting the establishment of the unitary state."

He noted that all of this was "connected with the imperialist plan to dictate a capitalist solution of the Palestinian question under a western European initiative that complements the Camp David accords concerning the Palestinians."

Hawatimah declared that "the Palestinian people and revolution support the right of the Iranian revolution to exist and develop, as this is a Palestinian national and pan-Arab necessity against U.S. imperialism, Zionism and reaction."

CSO: 4802

HAMMADI URGES INTEGRATED ARAB DEVELOPMENT FINANCING

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 8 Jul 80 p 18

[Article: "Iraqi Working Paper Calls for Allocation of $10-15 Billion To Finance Arab Development"]

[Text] Amman--Dr Sa'dun Hammadi, the Iraqi minister of foreign affairs, said that the most important feature of the Iraqi working paper is its seriousness, for it means to realize what it calls for. Its intention is to move Arab economic relations to a serious stage which will witness development in the direction of Arab economic unity.

With regard to what the conference aims for in Arab political and economic cooperation and Iraq's commitment to that end, Dr Hammadi said: "We will strive for this because the general Arab political and economic situation is not positive at this time. We, however, cannot give up but will work toward moving the Arab political and economic situation in a positive direction." He expressed his belief that Arab economic relations would finally shift from a negative to a positive financial situation.

Concerning the Iraqi suggestion to draft a joint pan-Arab economic plan, Dr Hammadi said that Iraq is suggesting a pan-Arab project, not an Iraqi one. He said there is a need for such economic cooperation in which all Arab states, not just the rich ones, would share in this Arab economic effort for development: "We think that this effort is possible, even if difficult.

In an interview with a reporter for the radio station, the Iraqi minister spoke highly of Jordanian-Iraqi relations describing them as good, brotherly and founded on cooperation and solidarity in various fields. He said: "We are very pleased with these fraternal relations."

The working paper stresses the concept of the eighties as the first decade of Arab economic development. The paper aims to prove effective tools for establishment of a common ground for joint Arab economic strategy. The proposal embodies Iraq's commitment to the principles of the Nahm'al charter which Mr Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi president, announced. Also, the proposal will contribute to the development of the resolutions made at Baghdad and Tunis summits.

The working paper pointed out the need to allocate $10-15 billion for development financing in Arab countries for the next 10 years.

It points out that the decade of development is only one part of a more comprehensive issue related to the economic and political independence of the Arab countries which will take place with a minimum of pan-Arab involvement in international polarization. Charting an independent course for development will increase opportunities for Arab economic integration and will direct the human and natural resources of the state to the cause of the liberation of Palestine and other Arab soil, aiming never to allow a foreign presence for any reason.

This working paper included comprehensive joint Arab economic action by all Arab countries, unification of a central authority which will be in charge of Arab development planning, relating this central authority to the Arab League; while it is economically, administratively, financially and technically independent from the League, and a clear definition of the goals and programs of the central authority.

The Iraqi working paper suggests an agreement on joint Arab economic strategy which is sanctioned by the economic council of the Arab League and is distinguished by clarity of goals and requirements. Iraq proposed the working paper be approved by the Arab summit which will recommend a commitment to its implementation in order to achieve more serious, better planned and better organized Arab economic action.

Likewise, the paper noted that, in its annual meeting or a special session, the summit should set standards for each Arab country's utilization of development assistance; this assistance should be given for integrated Arab economic projects in which participation and management is limited strictly to Arabs.

The Iraqi paper included a statement about the necessity for Arab countries of limited means to pay a part of the cost of a project erected on their soil in local currency; it would be up to the Arab countries participating in the joint project to set the respective shares of the public and private sectors according to the economic system.

The paper stipulated the preservation of the right of any Arab country to participate in a project, along with the countries originating the project, even after activity is underway, giving the project sufficient tax, financial and legal privileges, linking the input and output of joint Arab projects to an Arab common market including all Arab states, providing collective Arab protection for Arab investments, and conducting joint Arab development on a basis of real investments according to integrated and interrelated programs.

The paper stated that the first decade of Arab development must work to give an economic content to Arab coordination on various current international economic problems and strive to establish a new order. In addition the paper referred to prospects for the first decade of Arab development

including the boycott of the Zionist entity and the strengthening of the blockade around it in addition to the development of a joint Arab economic apparatus.

The paper advances a number of proposals in the area of developing the joint Arab economic apparatus. As a first stage, the paper proposes some legal changes in the mutual defense and economic cooperation among the countries of the Arab League.

9392
CSO: 4802

ALGERIAN-MAURITANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT

President Ould Haidallah's Visit

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 2 Oct 80 p 1

[Article: "Following Four Days' Official Visit in Algeria: 'Rapprochement Between the Algerian and Mauritanian People, Unity of the Maghreb, Arab-African Cooperation' Are Stressed by President Ould Haidallah As He Leaves Algiers"]

[Excerpt] Algiers (APS)--Following a four days' official visit in Algeria, the Mauritanian president, Mr Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah, left Algiers at 1300 hours for Nouakchott; as he left, he was greeted by the president of the republic and general secretary of the party, Mr Chadli Bendjedid, who was accompanied by Mr Rabah Bitat, member of the political bureau, president of the National People's Assembly, and Mr Abdelghani, member of the central committee and prime minister.

Before taking his seat in the plane, the head of the Mauritanian state greeted members of the central committee and of the government, party and government officials and members of the diplomatic corps in Algiers.

A salute of 21 gun-shots was fired to honor the illustrious guest of Algeria who, next to President Chadli Bendjedid, had listened to the national anthems of the two countries before "reviewing a detachment from El-Haras El-Djoumhouri" who were presenting arms.

In the official reception hall of the airport, President Ould Haidallah, speaking to the press, drew the conclusions of his official visit; among other things, he stated that his conversations with President Chadli Bendjedid "dealt with regional, Arab, African and international questions."

"Of course," he added, "bilateral cooperation and the means to revive it have received particular attention. I am leaving with the conviction that this visit will contribute to a rapprochement between our two brother nations and to the unity of our beloved Maghreb, to Arab-African cooperation and to the unity of the Arab world."

In concluding, the head of the Mauritanian state thanked President Chadli Bendjedid and the Algerian people and government for the warm welcome and hospitality extended to him and his delegation during his official visit to Algeria.

After leaving Algiers, the president of the Mauritanian Islamic Republic made a technical stop at the Bechar airport, in southwestern Algeria, at 1500 hours.

As he left the plane, the Mauritanian president was greeted by civil and military officials in Bechar, including the governor and the head of the third military region, before reviewing a detachment of the People's National Army who were presenting arms.

After resting a while at the official reception hall of the airport, the presidential delegation flew back to Nouakchott.

Official Communique

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 2 Oct 80 p 3

[Article: "'Considerable Agreement' Underlined in Algerian-Mauritanian Joint Communique"]

> [Text] Algiers (APS)--Following the official visit of the Mauritanian president, Mr Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah, an Algerian-Mauritanian joint communique has been published; we are reproducing it in its entirety:

At the invitation of Mr Chadli Bendjedid, president of the Algerian Democratic People's Republic and general secretary of the FLN Party, His Excellency Lieutenant-Colonel [Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah], president of the Military Committee of National Safety, head of the state and of the government of the Mauritanian Islamic Republic, made an official visit to Algeria from 28 September to 1 October 1980.

During their stay, President Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah and the delegation accompanying him visited various agricultural and industrial projects and had the opportunity to appreciate the efforts made by Algeria to strengthen its independence in all fields.

The two presidents had conversations to which the following also took part:

For Algeria: Messrs Ahmed Taleb Ibrahimi, member of the central committee, minister to the Presidency of the Republic, Abdelhamid Brahimi, member of the central committee, minister of Planning and National Development, Djelloul Bakhti Nemmiche, member of the central committee, minister of

Veterans' Affairs, Abdelaziz Khellef, member of the central committee, minister of Commerce, Smail Hamdani, member of the central committee, Mohieddine Amimour, member of the central committee, adviser to the Presidency of the Republic, Mohamed Salah Dembri, general secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abdelouahab Abada, director of the African department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ahmed Dekhili, assistant director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

For Mauritania: Major Gabriel Simper, member of the Military Committee of National Safety, assistant chief of staff, Messrs Mohamed El Mokhtar Ould Zamel, minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Mamadou Cissoko, minister of Industry, Mines and Commerce, Abderrahmane Ould Saibott, head of the presidential staff, Mohamed Ould Mohamed Mahmoud, ambassador, Kamara Ali, director of administrative affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Mohamed Ould Hamadi, press adviser to the presidency.

During these conversations, which took place in an atmosphere of fraternity, harmony and mutual understanding, the two parties reviewed their bilateral relations and matters of common interest, and exchanged opinions concerning the development of the regional, African, Arab and international situation. These discussions showed that considerable agreement exists between the two countries, which reflects the nature and strength of the many ties between the Algerian and Mauritanian people.

Reviewing their bilateral relations, the two parties were pleased at their present development. They reaffirmed their conviction that a fruitful and mutually advantageous cooperation, based on mutual respect, fully answers the legitimate aspirations of the two people for development and well-being, just as it reflects their century-old relations of friendship and neighborliness. In this respect, both parties are of the opinion that the positive results achieved by the recent meeting of the mixed Algerian-Mauritanian committee for economic, scientific and technical cooperation are a concrete confirmation of their mutual desire to develop exchanges between the two countries in all domains. They also consider that the decisions arrived at on this occasion represent a significant milestone in the development of Algerian-Mauritanian relations based on fraternity, solidarity, neighborliness and the respect of each other's national sovereignty.

Reviewing the situation in their region, the two parties reaffirmed the attachment of their countries to the principles and ideals of the Charter of African Unity. In this respect, they reaffirmed the commitment of the two countries to promote relations of friendship, fraternity, neighborliness and close cooperation between themselves, and to continue to work toward the creation of a climate of mutual trust and understanding which could promote the realization of the aspirations of the people in the region as a whole for peace, liberty, security and material progress. In this spirit, they renewed their full adhesion to the principles set forth in the political declaration of the Fifth Summit of Saharian States, which in both parties' opinion represents an adequate basis and frame of reference for the development of regional cooperation.

After carefully reviewing the question of Western Sahara, the two parties expressed their great concern with respect to the threat which this question represents to peace and security in this region of the continent.

The two parties were pleased at the efforts made by the international community, especially the United Nations Organization and the OAU [Organization of African Unity] to help the people of Western Sahara exercise its imprescriptible right to self-determination.

They made a point of giving credit to the ad-hoc committee of the OAU, and more particularly to the heads of state which comprise it, for their efforts to arrive at a just and final political solution of the question of Western Sahara.

The two parties renewed their determination to work toward a strengthening of the OAU which they consider to be a privileged instrument in achieving complete liberation of the African continent, and in struggling for the economic and cultural development of the African people and for the creation of a climate of peace, security and concord.

In this respect, the two parties profoundly regret the tragic situation now prevailing in Chad. They expressed their appreciation for the continued efforts of the African community, and especially of the OAU, to preserve the territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Chad. In this spirit, they reaffirmed their support to the Lagos agreements which should enable the provisional national union government to accomplish its mission of restoring peace and establishing concord.

Concerning the situation in South Africa, the two parties stressed their adhesion to the modalities providing for Namibia's accession to independence, and their desire to see these modalities applied strictly and immediately, according to the decisions and resolutions of the United Nations; and the two parties reaffirmed their indefectible solidarity with the Namibian people in its legitimate struggle, under the leadership of its one and only representative, the SWAPO.

The two parties repeated their strong condemnation of the inhuman policy of apartheid and they expressed their indefectible solidarity with the people of South Africa in their struggle to achieve freedom and the recognition of their fundamental national rights.

The two parties reaffirmed their belief in a common destiny for the Arab and African people. They consider that, just as many century-long traditions have created ties between the two regions, new and intensified relations of solidarity and cooperation must develop between Africa and the Arab World to achieve the development of their people and to preserve their independence.

Analyzing the situation prevailing in the Middle East, the two parties stated again their firm condemnation of the Camp Davis agreements and

stressed the dangerous implications that these agreements contain for the liberty of the people in this area and for international peace and security.

The two parties consider that any settlement of the Middle-East problem should provide for the restitution of all occupied Arab territories, including El-Qods, and the return of the Palestinian people to their usurped homeland.

They reaffirm their continued and indefectible support to the Palestinian people in their struggle under the leadership of their one and only representative, the Palestine Liberation Organization.

The two parties have considered with great concern the armed struggle opposing Iraq and Iran. After informing each other of their respective stand on this question, they expressed their deep concern in view of this fratricidal war which could have the most nefarious consequences in a region where the natural solidarity between all Arab and Islamic countries should be affirmed against their common imperialist and Zionist enemy. Attached to the higher interests of the Arab nation and of the Islamic community, and to the cohesion of nonalined countries, they express the hope that a rapid settlement of the dispute will restore peace and concord among Muslim countries and strengthen their front against imperialism, Zionism and underdevelopment.

The two parties also reaffirmed their complete adhesion to the principles and objectives of nonalinement, and stressed the fact that the policy of the nonalined movement remains, now more than ever, an irreplaceable factor in the struggle for the liberation and emancipation of the people, the settlement of international problems, the promotion of international cooperation and the safeguard of peace and security in the world.

They also consider that the withdrawal of foreign forces and the dismantling of all foreign bases now existing on the territory of Third-World countries will represent a decisive contribution in ensuring peace in the world.

The two parties have given particular attention to the question of development and the restructuration of international economic relations and they have also underlined the fundamental part which all developing countries must play in establishing relations of a new type between developing and developed countries.

They have reaffirmed their determination to increase the coordination of their efforts to strengthen solidarity between developing countries, especially through actions undertaken within international organizations, to obtain satisfaction for their legitimate demands concerning a new international economic order.

The two parties expressed their pleasure at the atmosphere of brotherliness which characterized their conversations, and at the results which have been achieved. They decided to intensify the exchange of visits at all levels so as to ensure an increased development of the cooperation between Algeria and Mauritania, in line with the new prospects outlined during these conversations.

President Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah warmly thanked President Chadli Bendjedid for his invitation and expressed to him and to the Algerian people and government his sincere gratitude for the brotherly and warm welcome which was extended to his delegation and to himself during their stay in Algeria.

President Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidallah invited President Chadli Bendjedid for an official visit in the Mauritanian Islamic Republic. The invitation was accepted with pleasure. Its date will be determined later on.

9294
CSO:4400

CAMP DAVID ACCORDS CRITICIZED, ARAB REACTION DESCRIBED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 18 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Two years ago, on 18 September 1978, Anwar Sadat, along with Begin and Carter, signed the first pact of high treason that an Arab head of state ever set his name to in the history of our nation. For Sadat, Camp David was the crowning glory of his "political escapade" at occupied El-Qods (Jerusalem), on 19 November of last year. The "Pax Americana," long seen by the Arabs as a serious danger, found a much-heralded beginning in Sadat's Egypt. From east to west, the Arab nation has reacted against the crime of the "cursed son of Mit Aboul Koum." The Arab nation is even ready to take the offensive.

The Arab rejection front, which includes Algeria, Syria, Libya, Democratic Yemen and the PLO, has formulated a platform of action to oppose the danger of Sadat. The Arab masses, very sensitive to the reaction of these progressive nations, enthusiastically show their support and their satisfaction. Denunciations of Camp David are heard from Kuwait to Algiers.

Two months after the Camp David accords were concluded, the Arab kings and heads of state unanimously decided at the Baghdad summit to join in retaliatory measures advocated several months earlier by the Arab rejection front.

The political, diplomatic, economic and cultural boycott against Egypt today ensures her isolation.

Meanwhile, Tel Aviv and Washington are seeking to exploit this breach in the Arab world. How?

1) With Egypt: the establishment of diplomatic relations and exchange of ambassadors in Tel Aviv and Cairo.

The reopening of borders between the two countries was followed by commercial exchanges and official visits to the two capitals.

2) Militarily: despite all the assurances given by Washington, the intransigent Begin refuses to accept total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. Unfortunately for Sadat, the withdrawal will be gradual and spread out over several years in order "not to endanger Israel's security."

Egyptian-Israeli military cooperation, one of the secret clauses of the Camp David accords, will assuredly make rapid progress. The agents of Sin-Beth and Mossad now have tea in the velvet-walled rooms of Qasr En-Nil along with their Egyptian colleagues of the "moukhatarate" and the CIA.

The presence of Israeli and American secret agents is eagerly requested by Sadat in an effort to protect himself against any danger of a coup d'etat by free officers.

3) Egypt has also taken on a new role: that of the new policeman in the region, after the fall of the Shah of Iran. In April 1980, Sadat's Egypt was transformed into a base for aggression. The military planes that attacked Tabas in Iran took off from a newly established U.S. airbase a few dozen kilometers from Cairo. Two other bases, meant for the stationing of B 52's and having a special mission, have now opened, encouraging Sadat to propose the intervention of the Egyptian army into any Arab country...

4) The Egyptians, Israelis and Americans were not able to provide for an important clause in their accord. The plans for the "autonomy" of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were denounced and rejected by the Palestinian people. Washington, Tel Aviv and Cairo then tried to push for the emergence of a "third force," capable, in their opinion, to evict the tenants of the PLO. There too, they are failing miserably.

5) This summer, the annexation of El-Qods (Jerusalem) replaced the spectre of Camp David at the forefront of international events. The next Arab summit, to be held next November in Amman, promises to be a decisive stage in the Arab reaction to Zionist expansion. In reporting to President Chadli on the evolution of the Near East situation, Mr Abdelhalim Khaddam, Syrian foreign affairs minister, restated the fact that "the Camp David conspiracy is aimed at isolating the Arab nation."

The danger has not yet been averted.

9671
CSO: 4400

INSIDER'S BOOK ON FLN REVIEWED

Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Aug 80 p 14

[Book Review by Paul Balta]

[Text] Here is one book[1] that cannot fail to set people's teeth on edge and create controversy: without qualms, the author publicly washes the dirty laundry of the various clans in the Algerian family. In fact, he announces in his opening lines that he wants [the book] to be "an analysis of the controversies and conflicts that tore apart the people's nationalism in Algeria between 1946 and 1962." There is more, however. Going back to the origins of the national movement that asserted itself in 1926 with "L'Etoile nord-africaine" [North African Star], although it had deeper historical roots, this work "represents the first part of a broader project involving Algerian society."[2] In its present form, it unfolds on several levels.

In the first place it is a historical compilation. This is a book to be reckoned with, even by its critics--and it already has some. Until now, the main authority on the Algerian War had been the "foursome" by Yves Courriere[3]. Everyone used it as a reference, even the Algerian cadres.[4] Nothing more exhaustive was available. This is no longer the case. Mohammed Harbi read everything written concerning his country, he had access to many unpublished documents, he questioned many witnesses and then he dissected, analyzed and examined it all critically.

In addition, this is a researcher's work: Although one may not share many of his conclusions, his book is filled with facts that cannot be ignored. Thus, with regard to the assault on the Oran post office on 5 April 1949, he reveals that, contrary to the usually accepted version, Ben Bella was not responsible for that attack: the former president only gave some assistance to Ait Ahmed, who had prepared the operation based on information provided by Nemiche Djelloul, while a commando group which included Mohammed Khider took responsibility for the execution.

The book abounds with unpublished details, supported by documents or by first-hand testimony, regarding the ulterior motives of neighbors on the Maghreb side or those of Near-Eastern rulers, about personal rivalries, ideological differences, the attitude of a particular leader or the part played by a particular event. Also worthy of mention are the biographical footnotes and the index--all too often lacking in French publications--that make it possible to easily pinpoint and find confederates.

Next, [this book is] a sociological study. Taking the opposite tack to contemporary historians who have been stressing the urban nature of Algerian nationalism, Harbi, for his part, is placing the emphasis on the importance from the very beginning, of Algerian emigration, which has an essentially rural origin. He subtly shows the "plebeian" nature of that revolution and how the village often took precedence over the city. Also notable are his analysis of the "populistic ideology" of Messali Hadj and other leaders, as well as his analysis of the Berber phenomenon in its natural manifestations, the Berbers being one of the nation's [ethnic] components, as well as in its excesses and deviations.

The book also contains ideological thoughts. The author has "attempted to show that, during this entire period (1946-1962), crises and frequent turnovers in political personnel were but moments in the formation of a new social force: bureaucracy." Even though, in this respect, "Algeria represents a borderline case in the history of decolonization" as the author points out to justify his argumentation, his too-thorough analysis regrettably gives the impression that Algeria has a monopoly on bureaucracy, ignoring the fact that this phenomenon has developed in many other nations, where it has reached hypertrophia.

A Pamphlet

By placing in context, as he does, Messali Hadj's personality and his work, and without hiding any part of his shortcomings or errors, he greatly contributes to restoring the good name of the founder of the nationalist movement, whose evolution he analyzes in detail: from the "Etoile nord-africaine" (March 1926 to 1 November 1954) via the Algerian People's Party (March 1937-September 1939) to the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (November 1946-November 1954) and its offshoots including the OS [Special Organization], which originated in February 1947. He also shows with relevant examples how the FLN is the final link in that line of descent, even though the FLN, having become the one and only party, is reluctant to admit it.

Finally the book is also a political tool, as the polemicist shows through under the veil of ideology--although this aspect of the book is not its best. Before 1 November 1954, for instance, Harbi takes praiseworthy care to examine the motivations of the various political tendencies and of the men representing them, while, as we near the year 1962, the account of personal rivalries competes with ideological content. There is such overemphasis that we end up wondering how Algeria was able to achieve its independence and through what miracle the FLN managed to create a doctrine--which appears in the various charters, including the charter of 1964, in which Harbi participated--and how it was able to define a remarkably consistent foreign policy which finally, in 1974, sparked the idea of a new international system.

The author points out a consistent aspect of modern Algeria which he apparently deplores: every time the nationalist movement is shattered, he writes, it "regroups around its most centralizing and authoritarian core, the OS in 1954, the ALN [National Liberation Army] on the borders in 1962." Similarly, he points out that many of its leaders, including Messali Hadj and Boumediene, are "radicals and centralizers." One may wonder--he hardly does--whether the Algerian nation has not put up with that centralistic tendency because of its centuries-long troubles due to the lack of a strong and structured government. The question would have been worthy of further investigation.

In conclusion, while long chapters are devoted to one or two-year periods, eight pages are considered sufficient to take care of the 18 years following independence, which are judged, on the whole, to have a negative balance. This is only an epilog, to be sure, but the author could have saved himself the trouble, as it closely resembles the clumsy gesture of a cook who at the last minute ruins the sauce he had carefully concocted. Harbi, who had his share of the power structure until 1965, with a group that shared his ideas, describes at length the rivalries of the Algerian political class and deplores them, which does not prevent him from settling his accounts, too, and enjoying it. In spite of the above reservations, "FLN, Mirage and Reality" remains a major book.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Le FLN, Mirage et Realite, des Origines a la Prise du Pouvoir (1945-1962)" [The FLN, Mirage and Reality, from the Origins to the Assumption of Power (1945-1962)] by Mohammed Harbi, published by J.A., series "Le Sens de l'Histoire" [A Sense of History] Paris 1980, 450 pages. Around 69 francs.

2. Among others, the author has announced the November publication of two volumes titled "Les Archives de la Revolution Algerienne" [Archives of the Algerian Revolution].

3. "Les Fils de la Toussaint" [Sons of Nov. 1], "Le Temps des leopards" [Days of the Leopards], "L'Heure des colonels" [Time for the Colonels] and "Les Feux du desespoir" [Fires of Despair] (Fayard).

4. Those books have been criticized by the Boumediene ruling team and are not sold in Algeria.

11936
CSO: 4400

SOVIET-ALGERIAN AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION TALKS BEGIN

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 12-13 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] Algiers (APS)--The Algerian-Soviet agricultural talks began Thursday morning at the Ministry of Agriculture and the Agrarian Revolution.

The Algerians were represented by Mr Bouzid Hammiche, secretary general of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Agrarian Revolution. The Soviet delegation was led by the Soviet Vice Minister of Agriculture, Mr B. A. Rounov.

After welcoming the Soviet delegation, Mr Hammiche stated that the main object of the official opening of the working sessions between the two parties was the development of conditions for the carrying out of a number of projects relating to Algerian agricultural development.

The agricultural subcommittee, organized as part of the joint Algerian-Soviet committee, has provided for a geobotanical study for the plains area, another for increased cereal cultivation and a third aimed at the strengthening of scientific and technical cooperation, especially in the fields of research and training. A fourth project deals with the Green Dam of the Aflou region. As for Mr Rounov, he stated that he was pleased to collaborate with those responsible for agriculture in Algeria, specifying that the first working session would determine the means for carrying out the proposals already made. He emphasized that the price of food has continued to rise and that some countries are making a political demand of it. He stressed that "being self sufficient in food has become a necessity." In this context, he stated that 27 percent of the USSR budget is devoted to agriculture.

It is to be noted that the working sessions to follow will be approved by an official report which will be signed Wednesday, 16 September.

9671
CSO: 4400

STRENGTHENING OF CONGO-ALGERIA COOPERATION

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Sep 80 p 2

[Article: "Algeria-Congo: To Develop Further the Friendly Ties Which Exist Between the Two Countries"]

[Text] Algiers (ASP)--At the invitation of Mr Rabah Bitat, member of the political bureau, president of the National People's Assembly, a large Congolese parliamentary delegation headed by Mr Jean Ganga Zandzou, member of the political bureau of the central committee of the Congolese Labor Party, invested with the people's powers and president of the National People's Assembly of the People's Republic of Congo, has been staying in Algeria for an official visit since 25 September 1980.

During its stay in Algeria, the Congolese parliamentary delegation is escorted by an honorary committee chaired by Mr Djelloul Melaika, member of the central committee and vice-president of the National People's Assembly, and by several deputies.

On Friday 26 September 1980, the Congolese parliamentary delegation went sightseeing to Tipaza, and they visited the tourist complex of Sidi Fredj and the Palace of Nations.

On Saturday morning, 27 September 1980, the Congolese parliamentary delegation, accompanied by Mr Djelloul Melaika, went to the El Alia cemetery to meditate and deposit a wreath at the Martyrs' Square, on the tomb of President Boumediene.

That same morning, the first conversations between members of the Congolese and Algerian parliamentary delegations, headed respectively by Mr Jean Ganga Zandzou, member of the political bureau, invested with the people's powers and president of the National People's Assembly, and Mr Rabah Bitat, member of the political bureau and president of the National People's Assembly, took place.

During these conversations, the respective socialist development policies of the Congolese and Algerian republics were examined, as well as questions pertaining to present international problems.

The Algerian and Congolese parties were pleased to note the similarity between the options on which their development strategies are based, their common will for political and economic independence, their active solidarity in the struggle against imperialism and colonialism.

The Algerian and Congolese parliamentary delegations agreed that this visit will contribute to further develop the friendly ties which exist between the two countries.

During the afternoon, the Congolese parliamentary delegation will visit projects of an economic character, among which the Meftah cement plant in the Blida governorate.

Finally, Saturday evening, 27 September 1980, the Congolese parliamentary delegation were guests at an official dinner given by Mr Rabah Bitat, member of the political bureau, president of the National People's Assembly, to which members of the FLN Party and of the government were also present.

9294
CSO:4400

STABILIZED CONCRETE SEEN AS SUBSTITUTE FOR CEMENT IN CONSTRUCTION

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 17 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Oran--The National Center for Business Initiatives and Information in the Construction Sector (CNAT) has developed an indepth study on "stabilized concrete," a substitute material which can replace, to a great extent, the exclusive use of cement. In 1971, the problems of the supply of construction materials, acutely felt in the remote southern regions, prompted researchers from the Ministry of Housing to begin studies aimed at "using local soils in order to obtain a material with technically acceptable characteristics for the construction of durable housing." In Algeria, the use of untreated earth is very widespread and the constructions have always met with the satisfaction of the local population.

Two villages of the Agrarian Revolution, one part of 100 houses in Haich, in the Biskra region and the second made up of 200 houses in Maâder, in the district of Bou-Saâda, are presently being used as a testing ground for housing technicians. These socialist villages now being built are constructed of stabilized earth, a kind of mortar called "stabilized concrete" (BTS).

The technicians believe the BTS can be used as a replacement for concrete cement in the form of bond-stone. These bond-stones are made at the building site using earth from the excavations. For constructions of a lesser size, they are made manually. Mechanization is necessary for the building of large sections of housing. The studies carried out have also helped the technicians discover that BTS is an excellent thermal insulator. The bulletin of the CNAT explains to this effect that "the variations of temperature of the Saharan climate are adjusted by the fact that the energy stored during the day by the BTS is released outside during the night. What is more, the CNAT bulletin concludes by stating that a type of architecture based upon the arrangement of doors and windows creates an indoor atmosphere that is quite pleasant.

9671
CSO: 4400

ANALYSIS OF SNS ACTIVITIES GIVEN

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 9 Sep 80 p 2

[Article by A. Boutrahi]

> [Text] As a company with a strategic role in the general development of the country, the SNS [National Iron and Steel Company] was the subject of a recent article which appeared in these same columns. As one article cannot give a complete picture of an expanding company which, because of its growth, encompasses several areas, Mr Hamoutene, company director, was willing to supply us with further information that is often unknown to the general public.

With regards to the production objectives of the SNS for several commercial products indispensable in many areas, 820,000 tons of cast iron were produced in 1980 with an objective of 1,236,000 tons in 1981. For liquid steel, 463,000 tons in 1980 and 994,000 tons for 1981.

Welded pipes: 180,000 tons in 1980 and 200,000 tons for 1981.

Seamless pipes: 41,000 tons in 1980 compared with 51,000 tons in 1981.

Gas and iron pipes: 30,000 tons in 1980 and 31,000 tons in 1981. With regard to steel for construction, 270,000 tons of ferroconcrete were produced in 1980 with a view to 300,000 tons in 1981; 50,000 tons of machine wire in 1980 and 85,000 tons planned for 1981. The production of welded gratings was 26,000 tons in 1980, which will be maintained in 1981. For light metal girders: 6,000 tons in 1980 and 7,000 tons in 1981. For the first two items, one must be aware that the amounts produced represented 50 percent of market needs.

In the area of cold-casted extrusions used in metal casings, automobile bodies, metal joinery and furniture making, 55,000 tons were produced in 1980 with an objective of 60,000 tons in 1981. Thirty-two thousand tons of metal wrappings, casings and frames were produced in 1980 and 35,000 tons are planned for 1981. One million, two hundred thousand units of gas cylinders were made in 1980 and 1,300,000 will be produced in 1981.

Zinc electrolytes: 30,000 tons in 1980 and 1981; welding electodes: 6,000 tons in 1980 compared with 7,000 tons in 1981. For welding flux, the total demand was covered.

Industrial gas is a very important area of the SNS. The installed capacities for oxygen, nitrogen, protoxide and acetylene exceeded demand. Since 1972, when the SNS took over this area, the initial capacities have been increased 100-fold. Work has begun on a new facility in Arzew for carbon dioxide.

To return for a moment to steel for construction, we have learned that 50 percent of market needs for ferroconcrete have been met, exports accounting for the remainder.

In the area of manpower, the SNS has 41,000 workers, while in 1970, it had 7,700.

A very large distribution network has been realized in order to bring the product closer to the user, while permitting the establishment of stocks which protect the commercial sectors.

In the area of SNS and production: the company has two engineering firms: URPTD and SERSID and four construction firms: REALSIDER, TRAVOSIDER, GENISIDER AND COSIDER. They are chiefly used for company needs, but also lend their services to other companies, taking into account their actual needs, especially in the area of housing. There are also subsidiaries such as SIDAL [Algerian Iron and Steel Company], which deals with production studies, maintenance, medical or cryogenic facilities, technology used in the areas of stocking and distribution of gas in liquid and gaseous forms, deep-freezing, freezing, transport under controlled temperature and the safety of transporters of methane.

This subsidiary also deals with technical diffusion in the area of welding, while ensuring the training or recycling of welders.

In the area of professional undersea diving, it trains specialists who deal with the safety and development of underwater techniques not previously mastered in our country.

Furthermore, in the development of iron and steel products, the PROSIDER company has the role of developing the uses of SNS products, especially those of portable arched panels, which permit the rapid construction of stocking areas and small workshops. Using these materials, the firm has produced in response to the social needs of its workers, a multisports stadium in Kouba in record time. In this regard, it is interesting to note that this light structure, whose recovered costs challenge any competition, is attracting the attention of many companies, especially local authorities and regions with small means of production.

Nonferrous metallurgy, especially the first and second conversions of aluminum, is an area which the SNS hopes to develop very rapidly, taking into account the imperatives of national development and the increasingly large place of aluminum in many areas, from tools to aspirin containers to packaging and metal joinery, to name only a few examples.

Aluminum is indeed becoming an ideal product for substitution and it is time to provide for the development of this sector.

Before concluding, we must mention that the SNS, like many companies, is confronted with problems which it must resolve at any price.

It remains that the impression the company gives is that of wanting to face up to its problems, further mastering other technologies and continuing to evolve and progress. As in the example of SIDAL, one realizes that the SNS has far-reaching goals, which must be considered encouraging in many respects.

9671
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

SIGNALS OFFICERS GRADUATE--Algiers (APS)--Col Ali Bouhadja, member of the central committee and commander of the Seventh Military Region, yesterday presided over graduation ceremonies for a new class of active officers at the Ecole superieure des transmissions [Higher Institute of Communications] in Bouzareah. Attending the ceremony were Col Mohamed Alleg, central committee member, central director of the political bureau, and several high ranking officers of the ANP [People's National Army]. In a brief address, the head of the Higher Institute admonished the new officers to honor the new responsibilities they will face as they carry out their mission. Scheduled after the ceremony were the assignment of ranks and diplomas and a parade by the students. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 31 Jul 80 p 1] 11936

MARA-TRACTOR CONSTRUCTORS MEETING--Algiers (APS)--Mr Bouzid Hammiche, secretary general of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Agrarian Revolution, met Mr D. Dreyfus, president of the French General Union of Constructors of Tractors and Agricultural Machinery Thursday morning at the offices of the MARA. The meeting was on the possibility of exchange between the MARA and the French Union of Tractor Constructors. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 12-13 Sep 80 p 3] 9671

CSO: 4400

MINISTER OF EDUCATION MEETS WITH DISSIDENT STUDENTS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 22 Sep 80 p 17

[Article by Sami 'Imarah: "Message from al-Manamah: Bahrain Minister of Education in Lengthy Interview with Students Studying Abroad; 'National Union of Bahrain Students Is Non-Existent; We Will Not Recognize It Because It Is Not in Bahrain;' Comprehensive Dialogue Around Decisions To Organize Students' Missions and Restrictions That Have Been Imposed"]

[Text] There was a candid dialogue between Bahrain's minister of education and Bahrain's students abroad during the meeting that they had. The dialogue was about the recent decisions that had been made by the Ministry of Education regarding student missions abroad. The students regarded those decisions as restrictions on their freedom.

The minister candidly explained the objectives that led to these decisions being issued. He said that the purpose of every text mentioned in these decisions was to protect the future of the students who are needed by the state because they are its real wealth. The state also wants to protect them from involvement in problems that may hurt them and hurt their future.

The meeting took place at the Summer Activities Center for Students of Higher Institutes of Learning and Universities at the old Eagles Club. The meeting was attended by al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Muhammad al-Khalifa, the minister of education; Dr Jalil al-'Arid, undersecretary of the Ministry of Education; and Mrs Safiyyah Dawighar, the director of the Students' Mission Office at the Ministry of Education.

Al-Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz ibn Muhammad al-Khalifa said at the beginning of the meeting, "I would like to express many thanks to our sons the students who provided us with this opportunity to meet and to speak about matters that are of interest to the students. I would like to be clear from the beginning. We welcome any meeting with our sons the students. We welcome everything that would close the gap between us and unite us because we have one objective and because we consider ourselves responsible for the interests of our male and female students. It is the interests of the male and female students that lie behind all the measures that are taken. We are prepared to take students' opinions and observations into consideration, and our readiness to do so is based on the certainty that when our actions are predicated upon our duties, they are dictated by the public good and what we see as our duty to serve the public interest. I do not want to be long-winded. I want you to have the full opportunity to ask all the questions that you have."

The dialogue began with a question about the reasons that led the Ministry of Education to issue the recent decisions regarding the student's missions. The person who posed the question said that he considered his question to be an introduction to the dialogue process.

The minister said, "I will try to answer this question as comprehensively as I can. I said from the outset that the purpose of everything we do is to serve the students--male and female. There have been new circumstances and surrounding conditions that have required the introduction of amendments to the regulations for students' missions which were drawn up in 1960. A few fraternal countries nearby have operated on these regulations. What these countries have indicates the extent of the developments that have been introduced into the students' mission regulations. We are trying to have Bahrain students studying abroad devote themselves to learning and to acquiring the necessary qualifications so that they would return to their country and serve it in the area that it needs. We must keep male and female students from becoming involved in conduct that would not be beneficial to them at present or in the future. Therefore, it was our opinion that the students' mission regulations include conditions that would make the male or female student devote himself or herself to learning.

"We found that the student whose father has vouched for him and signed a pledge on his behalf may be in a position to think before he becomes involved in conduct that would not benefit his present or his future. The amendment we introduced to the students' mission regulations is not a novelty in those regulations. It has its analogues in regulations governing students' missions in nearby fraternal countries and in other fraternal countries. As we know constitutions copy each other, and the regulations governing students' missions which we heeded and referred to are those of Jordan and Qatar, for example. We find that in those regulations, whether the parent makes a pledge for his son, secures a financial bond for him or pays back the money that was spent for the student if he exhausts the number of times he can fail and is expelled from the university, the parent has to pay back the money that was spent for him. This is enforced in Qatar even though the financial capability is available there. Nevertheless, this condition is mentioned and can be found in the regulations that are applied in Qatar."

Regarding a question around the reason behind the decision to ban coeducation in Al Khalij [Gulf] University despite the fact that education in Al Khalij Industrial College and in Bahrain University College is coeducational, the minister of education replied, "I do not know to what extent my colleagues [on this panel] are willing to entertain this question, because it would sidetrack us from the subject of this meeting, which is being held to discuss decisions that were made recently. Nevertheless, the answer is that this was a decision made by the congress which approved the establishment of Al Khalij University. [This] congress represents a number of ministers of education in the area, and it is their opinion that education at Al Khalij University should not be coeducational. This was the decision of the congress. It would be difficult for us to change it or to have the freedom to change it. Bahrain is host to the university, and since there are seven countries [sponsoring the university] with every country having its opinion, a decision is made on the basis of what the majority decides, and it was the opinion of the majority that education should not be coeducational.

Governmental Decisions

One of the students asked about the agency that made the recent decisions. Was it the Ministry of Education or another agency? The student said, "If it was the Ministry of Education that issued the decisions, would it not have been more useful for the ministry to discuss them with the students just as it is doing so now?" The student said, "The decisions have been put into practice and have been implemented, and I do not know what possible use our meeting now could have! Will we be able to change some of these decisions at this meeting?"

The minister of education replied, "I would like to mention here that I had the honor of meeting the prince and the prime minister with the representatives of Bahrain students' clubs abroad. [Our] colleague Hasan al-'Abasi here was listening. Colleague al-'Abasi began by saying that he thanked the Ministry of Education for the decisions it issued. When it was the prime minister's turn to speak, he was careful to say that the decisions that were made were government decisions even though they were issued by the Ministry of Education. The decisions were issued, and it was natural that they be issued by the Ministry of Education because this is its area of jurisdiction."

The minister said, "I do not think that these decisions infringe upon a student's freedom. What was intended was to designate and to determine the area of specialization. The country needs specializations, and the material capabilities are limited. Therefore, it was important to confine the scholarships and the grants to the areas that are needed by the country. In this, there is no infringement whatsoever on the student, or on his freedom to choose, as some are saying.

"We did stipulate that the student not be involved in any political activity because we know from experience that a number of male and female students ruined their futures because they were interested in politics. We know that there are political organizations that try to take advantage of students, and it is our duty to keep our children the students away from this exploitation so that they would have the time to study because the country needs scientific cadres."

One of the students asked about the reasons that led to issuing a decision to prevent students from traveling to other countries, other than the one country where each has his scholarship. He also asked about the need for a student to return to Bahrain during the vacation. The student who raised that question said that with this decision the Ministry of Education was preventing the student from practicing one of his rights as a citizen, which is the right to travel, a right provided for him by the constitution.

The minister of education replied, "The assumption behind issuing any one of these decisions is to protect the student and safeguard him from everything that might hurt him." He said that the passport determined the countries where the student may travel; however, students did travel to other countries and got into trouble.

"The student says that such conduct is freedom, but it may be explained as involvement in problems that the student does not need. A student who is studying in Kuwait is asked to go to the place of his student mission in Kuwait, to study and return to Bahrain. In 4 years he graduates; and after he graduates, he can go anywhere he wants to go. But while he is a student, he is not to travel to any country that is not mentioned on his passport."

Mrs Safiyyah Dawighar director of student missions said, "With regard to the condition to return to Bahrain, the minstry thinks that this condition represents the tie that exists between it and its students abroad. Summer is a period during which the student can consult with the Ministry of Education, and the ministry can consult with the student. Likewise, the student has a ticket for 1 year only, and it would not permit him to travel to any other places. Some students get themselves into trouble by traveling to places other than those provided to them by their tickets."

Abiding by Regulations

One of the students said, "I consider this a curtailment of freedom. A student is not a child. The law gave him rights, and when he reaches the age of 18, he becomes an independent person and he does not even need the approval of his parent to travel abroad." The minister of education replied, "If I am permitted, I would like to add that obeying regulations does not mean curtailment of freedom. A passport is a document issued by the state to determine the countries to which the passport bearer can travel. Abiding by this means abiding by regulations. Abiding by regulations does not mean renouncing personal freedom. There are instances in which some students departed from the mandate provided for them in the passport, and they traveled to countries that were not mentioned in the passport. We are being asked by the state to ensure that the students conduct themselves well and that they follow the instructions determined in the travel document carefully."

Dr Jalil al-'Arid said, "Stipulating that the student not leave the country where he is studying during the period of his study came about because there were instances when a male or female student left the country of the student mission. This resulted in several problems. Let me give you an example. The father of one of the female students came to us and told us that his daughter had left the country where she had been studying with a non-Bahraini citizen. They had gone to a neighboring country, and they did get married without the knowledge or approval of the father or of the embassy of Bahrain in that country.

"There is the case of a student who left the United States with handbills, and when he arrived to another country, he was arrested. The handbills were taken away from him, and his passport was stamped so that he would not be permitted to enter that country. When he returned to the United States, they stamped his passport, 'Not to be admitted to the United States.' When he arrived at the airport of one of the European countries, his passport was stamped, 'Not to be admitted to that country.' They asked him, 'How much money do you have?' When they found out that he had enough money for a ticket to Bahrain, they reserved a ticket for him, and they returned him to Bahrain. Hence came the special decision not to allow a student to travel to any other place from the country where his student mission is located."

The Question of Traveling

One of the students said, "The undersecretary brought up the question of traveling, and he brought up a subject that touches me personally. I am the student who was denied admission to Canada, to the United States and to Britain. I am that student. But why was I denied admission? Why did that happen? This happened for political reasons that pertain to the Palestinian question. I came here, and the Ministry

of Education was supposed to have defended me as a student who had reached his fourth year. But the ministry did not defend me. It did not even agree that I should continue my studies at my own expense in the area where I was studying. I met with a number of officials in the Ministry of Education, and they said that the subject was outside the scope of the Ministry of Education and that I would have to deal with the Ministry of Interior on that matter even though it is purely an educational matter."

The minister of education commented on the student's comment and said, "I would like to thank my friend for two reasons. First, [because] he is practically the only one who is raising questions, and this is making the debate lively. The second reason is that he did in fact give us the example, and he proved that we are truthful when we say that we are trying to spare the students involvement in problems not even the Ministry of Education can solve."

The Union Is Non-Existent

One of the students asked about the paragraph which pertained to the political organization and which was mentioned in the decisions. The student said, "Does belonging to a political organization mean the National Union of Bahrain Students?" The minister replied, "The National Union for Bahrain Students is not implied in the special paragraph pertaining to belonging to a political party for the simple reason that officially and legally the union does not exist. I remember that this union was trying to obtain official recognition from the government 6 years ago. The response of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs--and it is this ministry which is authorized to give official permits to clubs and associations--was that it would be difficult for us to recognize this union because it does not operate in Bahrain and we would not be able to become acquainted with its activities. The problem continues to exist because the union is outside Bahrain."

The same student commented again on the right to travel and the question of marriage. He said, "The student is a citizen, and the constitution and the law have guaranteed him the freedom to travel. Likewise, the subject of marriage is a personal subject that pertains to the student's rights. It is governed only by the general laws which govern the country."

There was a discussion between the minister and the students about the possibility of presenting these decisions to the students for their opinion before they are issued. The minister said, "From a practical point of view this is not possible. If we had a parliament, we would have presented these decisions or any other decisions before issuing them."

The Gap and Sensitivities

One of the students touched upon the gap and the sensitivities that exist between the students and the government, represented by the Ministry of Education and the embassies abroad. The student proposed the idea of establishing a dialogue between officials and students. He said, "As a national union for Bahrain students we ask why don't we have this dialogue?" Then he said, "Do the clubs for Bahrain students represent the students of Bahrain? There are organizations that represent the vast majority of Bahrain students in the country and abroad, but they have not been recognized. If it has been said that there was a union for Bahrain students abroad, then there are also clubs for Bahrain students abroad."

The minister said, "The National Union of Bahrain Students is an organization that officially does not exist. Today, a number of students came to my office asking to meet with me. I asked the secretary to notify them that I would welcome meeting with them at any time as students who are citizens of Bahrain [and studying] abroad, but that I could not meet with them as representatives of any union because the student's union is a non-existent organization."

One of the students said, "The minister mentioned that there was a group of male and female students who had ruined their futures. But what we see, however, is a group of male and female students who were confronted with a set of difficulties after they arrived in Bahrain, and specifically those who are members of the National Union for Bahrain Students. Is the fact that those students are members in the union the reason for their being subjected to these difficulties?"

Limited Capabilities

The minister replied, "All that I want to say is that Bahrain is a country of limited capabilities. Bahrain's real wealth lies in its students. We acknowledge that there is a number of male and female students who become involved in political matters and who antagonize the government. This makes the specialized authorities in the country take measures against them that are necessary. It is within the jurisdiction of security agencies and security authorities to establish security in the country. If they find elements that are dangerous to the security [of the country], they have to take all the measures to limit the effectiveness of those who work against security and its establishment in the country."

One of the students raised the question of not recognizing the National Union for Bahrain Students a third time. He said, "The union applied for recognition 8 years ago. Why didn't the ministry approve this request despite the fact that the authorities have recognized Bahrain clubs and union members are many times more than Bahrain club members?"

The minister replied, "It would be best to be extremely candid here. With regard to recognizing the National Union for Bahrain Students I have already mentioned that the agency which has the authority to grant such recognition in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs which did say that the reason for not recognizing the union was the fact that it practices its activities outside Bahrain.

"Second, it is not unknown to anyone that the union has adopted a political line that is almost antithetical to that of the government. Examples of this are numerous. There are handbills, pamphlets and numerous other positions that the union took.

"The state began to wonder why the students of Bahrain were conducting themselves in this manner? Why did they oppose the government? Was it because the government had failed to look after the students? The state has always been asking why some students were against the government and against the state? Then the state perceived some reason, moderation and realism in some students. Those students are the students [who are members] of Bahrain clubs abroad. They are student who have not engaged in excesses. They are students who criticize but who do not exaggerate. Therefore, the state recognized the request of the clubs abroad and created for them this summer location because they represent the kind of students who must be helped."

One of the students spoke about the gap that exists between the students and the government. He said, "The minister has asked why there was a gap between students and the government, and I am responding to this question. The National Union of Bahrain Students submitted a request to the Ministry of Education after the conference that established it which was held abroad. The union requested that it be granted legitimacy so it can work in Bahrain and so it can convene its first conference in Bahrain. The response from the ministry was clear: it was rejection. The natural situation is for the union to have its organization inside the country just as it is in Kuwait. In Kuwait the National Union for Kuwait Students exists in Kuwait. We, however, for circumstances that were forced on us pursue our activities abroad.

"After 1975 all the conveniences that used to be offered to the National Union of Bahrain Students were cut off. I would like to ask the minister why the conveniences were cut off when the clubs for Bahrain students were established in 1976. There may be a gap, but why does this gap exist? The Ministry of Education should have listened to students' opinions. The National Union for Bahrain Students is prepared to engage in a wide-ranging dialogue with the ministry regarding students' opinions and regarding establishing a student organization for us just like those that exist in all the countries of the world."

Why Did Students Occupy Bahrain Embassy in Kuwait?

One of the students asked about the secret behind preventing some students from continuing their studies this year, and he asked why the passports of some students were taken away. He asked about the role of the Ministry of Education in treating this subject.

The minister replied, "It is unfortunate that a limited number of male and female students subject themselves to strict measures. The strictest measure that may be taken against a student is to prevent him from continuing his studies. There are hundreds and thousands of students. Why were they not subjected to such decisions? If a student is engaged in activities considered by the security authorities to be infringing upon the security situation in the country, he has to bear the responsibility of his action."

One of the students suggested that a student who is deemed to have engaged in measures that threaten [the country's] security should be taken to court. The minister said, "There is no need for the courts if the measure of taking away the passport or that of preventing the student from continuing his studies is adequate. All these measures are practiced in other countries. A student is taken to court if he does something that requires taking him to court. Only those who engage in poor conduct, and they are few, have measures taken against them."

The minister said, "A very small number of male and female students behave very poorly, such as the attempt to occupy the embassy of Bahrain in Kuwait and the offices of the Arab League in New York."

One of the students commented on the subject and said, "The minister spoke about students occupying the embassy of Bahrain in Kuwait and the Bahrain consulate in Texas. I believe that Bahrain's problems are neither easy, nor are they few; they are growing every day, I believe that the embassies neglect the rights of students

abroad." The student said, "When students resort to occupying an embassy, they are using the wrong approach, especially if [their action] is accompanied by sabotage. But for students to go to an embassy and to have a sit-in in that embassy is only a way of protesting."

The student said, "Regarding the fact that Bahrain students occupied the embassy of Bahrain in Kuwait, what happened is that students entered the building in a peaceful manner and sat in the building. This was a proper method for expressing their views. This would not have happened had there been communications between the ministry and its students or between the embassy and the students.

"But why did the students occupy the embassy? It is because the Muslim ambassador refused to meet with the students. It is because the Muslim ambassador refused to solve the students' problems. It is because the Muslim ambassador decided to take possession of the student's passports. It is because the Muslim ambassador adopted a method of exerting pressure on the students when he suspended the grants which are designated for their living expenses. But is suspending students' grants to exert pressure on them an educational method?"

Leftist Exremism Is Rejected

The minister said, "I disagree with the colleague about the matter of not meeting with the students. I was in Kuwait to attend the Fifth Conference for Ministers of Education, and I met with you for 4 hours, and the Muslim ambassador was with me. Everything that could have been said was said during the 4 hours. The students insisted nevertheless on their position. If there was any intransigence or stubborness it was unfortunately on the side of the students.

"However, I would like to say that we consider all students our children: we consider students who are union members to be our children. We are prepared to sit with them, to talk with them and to do everything that is in their interests. But leftist political extremism must be confronted by the authorities of the state. This is indisputable and incontrovertible. We are not prepared to acquiesce in extremist political activities that are carried out by some people."

One of the students asked about why there were no scholarships in Cairo and Kuwait. Mrs Safiyyah Dawighar replied, "Regarding scholarships in Cairo and Kuwait, Bahrain needed specializations in medicine, engineering and physical therapy. Our cultural attache in Cairo submitted these applications, but we did not get anything in these specializations. Regarding the other specializations, they are available at University College in Bahrain. With regard to Kuwait, Kuwait suggested that these scholarships be granted to Bahraini citizens who have the Kuwaiti secondary school certificate. With regard to studying at the College of Medicine, there are five scholarships and all Gulf citizens are competing for them. The rate of acceptance comes to 96 percent."

16 Students Were Politically Involved

The meeting was concluded with a question from one of the students. He said, "If a student is prevented from studying abroad because he was accused of participating in a party or in a political organization, for example, does he not have the right to know what he is being accused of, and does he not have the right to defend

himself? This charge may be based on erroneous foundations and information and mere doubts and suspicions. Does he not have the right to defend himself?

The minister replied: "What I know is that the number [of students who became politically involved] did not exceed 6 students who had scholarships and a limited number of grant recipients that may amount to 10. If the matter pertains to 16 students who became involved politically and gave security authorities enough evidence so they can make a decision to prevent them from traveling, the objective is to prevent them from futher political involvement. If this is the case, the situation is not dangerous; but if the case pertains to forming a political party or otherwise, I do not have jurisdiction to take action in this area."

8592
CSO: 4802

PROBLEM OF DETERIORATING BUILDINGS IN CAIRO

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 25 Aug 80 pp 14-17

[Article by Dr Milad Hanna: "The Tragedy of Collapsing Buildings Is Not Over Yet!"]

[Text] On one of the days of the month of Ramadan, at dawn, there was once again the tragedy of a building collapsing, this time in al-Sharabiyah. It resulted in the death of a large number of our citizens. This tragedy, which is becoming an occurrence which happens almost every year, has brought up the question of building maintenance, prolonging the life of the buildings and examining the dossier of the "hypothetical life-span" of the buildings. This is a term which has been used a great deal by engineers without this term having any realistic meaning or scientific basis; as far as I know, this subject has not even been brought up yet.

The Economic Life-Span of Buildings

I can perhaps understand why economists discuss the life-span of a building from the investment point of view. This question is worthy of being studied, especially since there has been a change in the type of ownership of real estate, which used to be that the individual owned "all of the land and the buildings on it." In that case, at least the individual owned the land even after the buildings collapsed, that is, when the life-span of the building itself was over. Right now there is a noticeably strong trend toward having the ownership of apartments and residential units. In most cases, the sales contracts between the original owner, who owns all of the real estate, and the owner of the single apartment stipulates that the latter not share in the ownership of the land. That is, the owner of the apartment owns the walls, floor and roof of the location where he lives. That is, he has the space, the air and the use of the area, but he does not have the land. For this reason, if the building collapses for any reason, then the investor who bought this residential unit ends up with practically nothing when the life-span of this residential unit is over, in spite of the fact that the "ownership" of the unit has been "transferred" to him. This is especially true in the case of concrete structures in tall buildings, because it becomes extremely expensive when you want to tear them down and get rid of them.

For this reason I believe that, at the beginning of the next century, the subject of a building's economic life-span will have to be presented in light of these new facts. Up till the beginning of the seventies the prevailing trend of thinking was that the building yields profit which is equal to the amount paid into it--during the course of about 20 years at the most. That is to say, it would yield an

average net return estimated at about 5 percent of the value of the real estate. There were additional expenses for maintenance, real estate taxes, water supply, use of electricity for the stairway, the doorman and so on. These expenses were estimated at about 3 percent of the annual rent payments.

A lot of people engaged in this type of investment from 1952 to about 1974. They did so on the basis that it was a semi-permanent and stable means of earning profit. In addition to this, it was known that the prices of real estate and land were steadily going up, year after year. That is, the rise in prices of land and real estate was more or less keeping pace with the rate of inflation. But the current situation is such that the matter of investment in buildings and constructing residential units for the purpose of renting them out requires that the investors make an economic study in light of the high rate of inflation as well as in light of the rise in interest rates for bank deposits.

At the outset we must concede that the language of Law No 49 of 1977, which makes stipulations concerning rental property, is already economically dead, and it is in nobody's interest to print its obituary.

This law allows for a profit of 7 percent of the value of the land and 10 percnet of the value of the buildings on it, without allowing for any expenses or consumption of water and electricity. What investor is going to choose to construct an apartment building to rent out units in it at these rates of profit when he can deposit his money in Type B investment certificates which yield a constant profit of 11 percent, without him having to expend any effort or undertake any risk, as is the case in business dealings involving different kinds of foreign currency which yield even greater profit?

Let us suppose that an average investor wants to invest his money in a condominium apartment, and that the value of the apartment, for some reason, is as low as 10,000 Egyptian pounds. Let us also suppose that he is able to rent it to an average family at a rate which gives him 12 percent of his capital (in order for him to recieve a rate of profit which is at least a little bit higher than in the case of Type B investment certificates). This means that the basic monthly rent will be 100 pounds, and does not include any of the services or taxes which must be paid extra by the tenant. All this presumes that he has been successful in finding a tenant who is able to pay this amount of money and that the apartment will never be unoccupied during the course of 10 years. The apartment owner will have made a profit equal to or being slightly more than his capital. Most likely his profit will be a result of the fact that the value of the apartment will have gone up in order to match the rate of inflation which has taken place during the course of these 10 years. Otherwise, he will have suffered a loss because if there has been inflation of 200 percent, that is, an inflation rate of 20 percent per year, then the market price of the apartment would have to be 30,000 pounds. And it is doubtful that this would happen.

This being true, the apartment must have a long life-span--at least 30 or 40 years--and its value must constantly increase at a rate which is higher then the rate of inflation. Otherwise, people would not venture to buy apartments for the purpose of renting them out.

It is clear from all of this that investing capital in the construction of apartment buildings for the purpose of renting out the apartments is not the most appropriate way of investing large amounts of capital for people who build large multi-unit buildings. Likewise, it is clear that the purchase of one or several apartments for the purpose of renting them out unfurnished is not the kind of project which average investors feel encouraged to engage in. Thus, it is certain that the private sector will not enter into the problem of housing for the purpose of solving it. Instead, the private sector will invest its money in the construction of buildings and the sale of apartments in these buildings. This is because this is an operation of limited duration, involving a fixed number of years, in which the investment of the capital is carried out, the profits are earned, and then the investors switch over to some other business operation.

Another thing for certain is that a single apartment is not purchased for the purposes of investment. It is purchased for the purpose of use, in the sense that whoever buys the apartment is basically doing so because he wants to use it and live in it. Thus, it is the housing problem which is the motive for those with small amounts of savings, especially in the case of workers who work abroad, to purchase the commodity which is known as an "apartment." There is a demand among such people for apartments and they are forced to buy them in spite of the fact that they are expensive because it represents the only means of obtaining housing.

If concern about economic problems were left to those who specialize in that field, then the readers would perhaps expect me to write in more detail about the construction life-span of buildings. In this regard, it would be best at the outset to differentiate between what is called a building's utilization life-span, from the point of view of design, and the building's construction life-span, which has to do with its capability of standing up before it is finally torn down.

A Building's Architectural Life-Span

The utilization life-span of a building represents the period of time in which a building performs its function, from the point of view of utilization and benefit, in the time and age in which it exists. Let me illustrate what is meant by this by giving some simple examples which are widespread and well-known in the realm of housing.

Numerous palaces were built during the last century on the basis that their inhabitants were wealthy people. It was understood that families living in them consisted of numerous children, that the heads of the households had perhaps more than one wife in the same residence, and that the families had either a small or large number of servants who took care of them.

Because of this, there was the "haramlik" [women's quarters] where the female members of the family lived, there was the "salamlik" [reception room] where receptions and parties were held, and other areas of the palace which served the life-style which prevailed during those times.

As the years passed, the generation of people inheriting all of this disappeared. They were replaced by a new generation of people who were not content with the life-style which was lived by their fathers and grandfathers. They preferred to live in a simple apartment in which every square meter of floor space was utilized,

in contrast to the empty, sprawling spaces, which were not utilized, in a structure which at one time was considered to be very valuable, but is no longer considered appropriate in this modern age.

This phenomenon is not something which is restricted to Egypt or to the countries of the developing world. It is a change in life-style which is occurring in all parts of the world. This has also actually taken place in England and in a number of European countries. For example, a number of sons of lords and other such people have abandoned their castles in the countryside and preferred living in regular apartments in large cities. They have announced the sale of these castles to wealthy Arabs, for whom this life-style is more appropriate in our modern times.

On the other side of the coin, peasants on large feudal estates lived--and in some cases continue to live--in places which more nearly resemble lairs or shelters consisting of walls which protect a person while he is sleeping. They are not residences in the modern sense of the word, made for self-respecting human beings to live in. But then the new generation refused to live in these shelters and dens and started demanding modern residences having bath and heating facilities and other such facilities corresponding to modern man's growing needs.

For this reason, it is a difficult job to determine in advance, and for certain, the utilization life-span of a building. This is because whoever undertakes to construct the building usually constructs and designs it according to what he visualizes as being his own needs and the needs of his children. He sees these needs as being constant and eternal. But soon his generation goes, and it is replaced by another generation whose needs have changed and whose aspirations are different.

In Egypt, for example, since the end of World War II we have witnessed many social changes which have had a direct effect on people's needs in terms of housing. In addition to this, there has been the appearance of new appliances which have had their effect on life inside the household--such as television sets, refrigerators and electric irons. They have become normal everyday things in most city households. Also, aspirations have quickly developed for appliances such as heaters, air conditioners and things of this sort. All of these things have a definite effect on the utilization life-span of residences. The amount of floor space covered by the residence is constantly changing and the relation between the rooms and different parts of the residence is constantly undergoing development and modification. For this reason, the building which was suitable for living in around the end of the 19th century may not be suitable at all for the life of, and utilization by, a family in the 20th century. And no doubt the generations of the next century will reject the thought of living in residential buildings such as we have now. Thus, it will be decided to tear down many of these buildings. This is not because they have reached the point of collapsing or because they do not provide appropriate economic profit. We make the decision to tear down such buildings because the formation, "arrangement," amount of surface area and perhaps even the height and facade of the buildings--and in some cases even the materials that they are made of--are no longer considered to be appropriate for the times. In such cases we say that the utilization life-span of the building is over.

Stopping Deterioration In the Buildings Or the Construction Life-Span

Perhaps the most important thing, when discussing the life-span of buildings, is the matter of sudden collapse of residential buildings. This is something which is extremely important because it usually concerns an even greater tragedy, that is, the end of the lives of some of the people who live in these buildings.

Up till now no one has been able to come up with a clear scientific approach or accurate method to determine the life of a building in terms of days or hours or to predict that this or that building will collapse in a month, a year or several years, as they are able to make predictions concerning some malignant diseases which attack man.

The Great Pyramid is still standing and challenging the passage of time, and it is expected that its life will continue for thousands of years more. At the same time, engineers are doing their utmost to save the Leaning Tower of Pisa in Italy.

It is true that there are complicated and ever-changing engineering theories involving the design of buildings, bridges, transmission towers and so on. These theories have been reduced to the status of laws in the forms of exact specifications which must be heeded when working out the blueprint of anything to be constructed. These extraordinary studies determine what engineers generally refer to as the "safety factor." This means that a structure will not collapse when it bears the limit of what the structure was designed to bear according to the specifications. The building or structure is able to stand up to a load twice as much as this, or even more, before it collapses. In such a case it is said that the structure's safety factor is "2." Perhaps the clearest example of this is the fact that a bridge is usually designed to withstand the weight of a 70-ton tank. But in fact the bridge is capable of withstanding twice as much weight as this before it will start to crack.

Thus, the majority of modern structures have actually been designed according to specifications and load limits which are known and have been determined. Then the construction of them is supervised in order to make sure the construction materials are used in conformity with the technical provisions which are fixed in the specifications. Then the result will necessarily be a structure which is safe and will not collapse. This is, of course, unless the structure is subjected to forms of stress which are basically unexpected, for example, fires, explosions and bombs.

In spite of all of this architectural knowledge, none of the specifications in Egypt or any other place in the world are capable of determining the number of years after which a given structure will collapse. From the purely theoretical point of view, the life-span of structures such as this which are well-designed and which have been constructed with care, with safety in mind, and without cutting corners, will extend for hundreds of years. Thus, they would not reach the point of collapsing. But they will be torn down due to other factors, previously referred to, which involve the economic or utilization life-span of the strucutre.

But there are older buildings which have been constructed "with God's blessings," and without any designing. There are others which are constructed according to well thought-out and exact design, but the construction is carried out with inferior materials and according to non-technical principles--or there is stealing and

pilfering of the construction materials. Or else additional stories are put on buildings without exact technical studies being made beforehand. All structures constructed in this manner are dangerous and their life-span cannot be determined because no detailed study has been made to find out the actual status of all of these structures.

This is why, my dear readers, you see that we stand before a real and serious catastrophe concerning everything that has to do with this endless number of buildings about which nothing is known. The majority of residential buildings in our country have no blueprint and were not constructed according to any specifications. The construction of all of them has been a matter of expertise of the owner and the builder who was either skilled or unskilled and was called the "banna" ["builder" in the colloquial Egyptian dialect].

This being true, I can expect--as I have expected in the past and as many others also expected--that the collapse of the building in al-Sharabiyah will be followed by the collapse of other buildings in al-Sharabiyah and in other places. Unless people stop adding additional stories to older buildings about which nothing is known, then there will be many more such collapses of buildings and all of the human tragedy which they entail.

I do not have any complete and comprehensive solution regarding existing buildings. But one very good solution would be to take all possible precautions concerning construction in the future. Licensing for building construction should not be granted except on the basis of technical principles and specifications which are sound and which must be followed in practice.

I sympathize with those who, because of the building and houseing crisis, are forced to violate the law. Investigations have shown that owners of buildings have not violated the law because they wanted to cause a catastrophe to themselves, their families and their neighbors. What they have wanted primarily is to solve the housing problem for their children, neighbors or relatives. Experience has taught us that as long as we do not put thought into solving human problems and try to provide human beings with the possibility to lead a decent life, the logical result of this negligence and negative attitude, on the part of the government agencies concerned, will be to push people into following a path and engaging in practices which are crooked. The result of this will be the backwardness and destruction of the social, human and economic structure of our country; this is why mention must be made of this.

9468
CSO: 4802

MINISTER ANNOUNCES EXPANSION OF TELEPHONE SERVICE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 20 Sep 80 p 2

[Text] In an exclusive interview with the PARS NEWS AGENCY, the minister of Post, Telegraph and Telephone, Dr Mahmud Qandi, spoke about the new programs of his ministry and about the plan for the development of telephone and post facilities and services in the country.

Regarding the plan for the development of the telephone services in the provinces Dr Qandi said that priority in the plan would be given to the deprived provinces and to those cities and districts that had been neglected under the previous regime. "Our present potential," he said, "would provide about 100,000 telephone installations for applicants." If the economic and technical conditions permitted, the project would be expanded in the coming years, he pointed out. The minister of PTT then spoke about the part-time telephone project which called for the sharing of telephones by the people and the government departments. About the possibility of the expansion of this project he said that the project had been started for some time and that it could be continued. A number of telephone lines had been allocated under the new arrangement. As regards the manner of using such telephone numbers, he said that his ministry had written letters to various government agencies and asked them to put at the disposal of the communications company the telephones that were not in use during the whole 24 hours of the day so that these telephones could be used for allocation on a part-time basis.

Dr Qandi underscored the shortage of postal services in rural areas and in distant towns. The entire postal manpower of the nation was 10,000 persons, he said. With a view to the speed in postal services, this force must be augmented, he added.

The minister also said that it was part of the policy of the postal administration to fight against corruption in and abuse of postal services in connection with the contraband of illicit goods and with the illicit movement of goods. It was a general policy of the government to extend postal services to the faraway and underprivileged parts of the country, he said. However, he added, the expansion of roads was a prerequisite of postal services expansion because, he reasoned, the development of postal services would not be possible without first securing road communication. The minister of PTT then spoke about the

expansion of telecommunications and the contracts signed with foreign countries. Many of the contracts had been abrogated and those which were worth implementing had been modified so that they would become reasonable, he said. Another issue under consideration was the appropriate cooperation that the minister of PTT could mutually establish with technical companies. Some companies, however, had previously installed certain equipments in Iran and had subsequently failed to fulfill their financial and technical obligations during the revolution on various excuses. Such companies, he accused, would not extend the necessary cooperation for the improvement and advancement of the contracts. They were thinking of economic ban on Iran, he said. "We watch the behavior of these companies closely and intend to prepare a long-term schedule to phase these companies out," he warned.

In conclusion, the minister of PTT spoke about relations with the populace. He said that there was a stream of requests from various provinces and city regions for converting the magnetic system telephone to an automatic central switchboard system. "We know that the nation suffers from many deprivations in the area of telecommunications," he admitted. But, he explained, the people should realize that the nation's economic and technical resources were limited. The government, he assured, is doing its best, though. The people should be realistic and note that the government needed time to materialize all the needs of the people, particularly in this case which involved technicality. "We have many deficiencies in technology and industry," he argued. "God willing (Ensha'allah)," he promised, "all these deficiencies must be made good in the future." At any rate, the progress made after the revolution has been more positive and all operations have been more effective than in the past despite the economic ban and severance of relations by foreign countries. Consequently the expansion of telephone services during this period was more than 10 percent of the entire work done in the last 10 years. Operations of the telecommunications and postal services were on a much faster pace than before. Moreover, these operations were of a basic and fundamental character and were free from the window dressing aspects of the content-poor projects of the past, he said.

9695
CSO: 4906

STEEL MILL TRYING TO SOLVE COAL PROBLEMS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 17 Sep 80 p 14

[Article by Dr Mohammad Reza Hasanzadeh]

[Text] Supply of Coke to Esfahan Iron Smelting Plant and Its Present Bottlenecks

The Esfahan Iron Smelting Plant which had been originally planned to achieve an ultimate production capacity of 8 million tons of steel a year after implementing several projects (1 - 4) is still in its first phase of productivity, viz. 600,000 tons of steel per annum, 15 years after the contract of the industry was signed.

The second project of this institution--which is nearing completion--would boost production to 1.9 million tons of steel per year. However, the additional production capacity has remained idle and stagnant because of lack of coal or because there are no mines ready for exploitation. That this plant has not been developed over a long time is, of course, a big issue open to debate. It calls for a separate analysis. However, it can briefly be said that if any industry was to be established in Iran the West wanted it to be dictated according to a precise scheme so that the imposition of the imperialist technology would follow and so that Iran would become even more dependent on the West. On the other hand, the introduction of the direct reduction method--a new and as yet untested method in many ways, posing many problems for its developers--in the development of Iran's steel mill was in itself a dangerous pitfall and a snare in the mesh of dependency of the recipient on the donor country. The development of the Esfahan steel mill along this line made for further sinking of Iran in the quagmire of foreign dependency--one from which it would virtually be impossible for Iran to disentangle herself. As we see today, after the victory of our magnificent revolution, under the unrelenting leadership of the "chain-busting" Imam Khomeyni, these wicked contractors have left the projects half-finished and thus inflicted billions of tumans of additional economic damage on Iran.

Iran's Coal Mines and Their Coking Capacity

Geological surveys indicate that Iran has coal deposits totaling 6 billion tons of exploitable coal, more than 4 billion tons of which can be turned into coke.

It is notable that 1.5 billion tons of coal is concentrated in the Kerman region while the other 4.5 billion tons is scattered in the region of the Alborz Range. A further deposit of 500 million tons of high-grade cokable coal has been discovered in Tabas region in Khorasan Province. About half a billion tons of coal of KJA and KJB grades is available in the Kerman coal mines which can achieve the desired coking quality once mixed with other types of coal at varying ratios. As can be noted, a considerable quantity of this coal is cokable and can meet the metallurgical needs of our iron-smelting industry.

The Present Deficiencies of Iranian Coal

At the beginning of the revolutionary era we took note of the deficiencies and problems of Iran's iron smelting industry, especially in the area of coal supply. We dispatched a team of students to Esfahan to study the case so that the physical quality of the coke, including its increased erosion-resistance can be enhanced by the research section of the plant. Unfortunately, the traditional bureaucratic problems of underemployment and lack of interest in research were encountered from the very outset. Basically, the engineering group did not believe in tackling the task. Consequently, we failed to carry out the intended experiments. However, in the process of our studies we came across the records of years of research and survey that had been consigned to oblivion. Obviously, the old criteria could not easily be removed from the iron smelting plant which was chiefly a window-dressing proposition, and the problems that we wanted out of the way could not exactly be solved radically. At any rate we believe that the problems of the Iranian coal that have been studied by us can be summed up as follows: More than 20 coal mines in Kerman and Alborz regions which are exploited mostly have varying degrees of ash and a low rate of erosion resistance. Since they were not bent on the development of the coal mines in the past, they purchased some quantity of coal from West Germany and mixed it with the Iranian coal to offset this deficiency.

The documents which have been examined and researched indicate that if appropriate quantitative and qualitative use is made of the coal presently extracted from each mine, and if they are mixed correctly, this problem can be obviated to an acceptable extent.

Solution of the Problem

In order to expand the Esfahan Iron Smelting Plant to a production capacity of 8 billion tons of steel per annum, the coal mines of Kerman and the Northern region must be developed. This development must begin as soon as possible. As for making Furnace No 2 operational, since the second phase of the project which raised the production level to 1.9 million tons a year would be very lucrative, this development should be attempted as soon as possible.

1. There are many small coal mines around Esfahan which are superficial and can be strip-mined. In order to be able to put both furnaces of the plant on stream, the local people should be encouraged to exploit and sell the coal to the plant.

2. The mine should be inspected as soon as possible and in case its coal is found to be of high quality, it should be used. Therefore, efforts should be made for obviating this problem.

9695
CSO: 4006

JAPAN REPORTEDLY TO CEASE BUYING IRANIAN OIL

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 22 Sep 80 p 11

[Text] The FINANCIAL TIMES reported that four Japanese companies which have imported heavy crude oil from Iran during the past year based on concluded contracts have announced that at the end of their contracts' period in the coming week they will no longer import oil from Iran. REUTER said that a Japanese commission is now spending time in Iraq in order to increase Japanese oil imports from that country from 8 million to 11 million tons annually.

According to the report by the FINANCIAL TIMES heavy petroleum imports from Iran are the remainders of the year's trade of crude oil imports which have continued since last April, when Iran raised the price of a barrel of its light crude to $35 and Japan refused to purchase it.

After Japan's abstention, Iran refused to load Japanese tankers but continued its heavy oil exports according to contract. This contract expires at the end of September. The four companies, "Mitsui," "Marubeni," "Mitsubishi" and "Siaytuh" have expressed no interest in extending the contract.

One of these four companies announced yesterday that for political and economic reasons it does not desire to renew its contract with the National Iranian Oil Company. The oil company, independent of its light crude exports, is very interested in exporting its heavy oil to Japan.

According to the former contract, 2.8 million tons of heavy oil have been delivered to Japan in nine months. Japanese purchasers had accepted the relatively expensive price of heavy oil on the condition that light oil also be exported. Even if Japan agrees to again purchase heavy oil, doubtless the amount of purchase will be much less than the amount in the former contract.

The Japanese companies which have oil deals with Iran say that the National Iranian Oil Company has the right to claim damages from the Japanese companies because of their refusal to accept light crude at the April price. But up till now the Iranian oil company has not announced that such damages are demanded. Any type of legal action by Iran against Japanese companies will certainly close possibilities of new negotiations concerning oil purchases from Iran. The four contracts which elapse next week make up the remainder of Japan's main petroleum imports from Iran. However, several small contracts will continue to hold for several more months. If the Japanese companies are so inclined, light Iranian oil is available to them at the price of $35 a barrel. But the Japanese companies are no longer inclined to purchase Iranian oil because of political and economic reasons. The selling price of Iranian oil is expensive in comparison with similar oil arriving for sale on the spot market at $32 a barrel (from the Middle East and other oil-producing regions).

9597
CSO: 4906

MULLAHS SEEK AID FOR SISTAN, BALUCHISTAN

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 20 Sep 80 p 10

[Text] A number of the Ulema (religious authorities) of the Sunni Sect met and discussed with Dr Ebrahim Yazdi, the supervisor of KEYHAN newspaper and the people's deputy at the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Jales), yesterday afternoon at the premises of KEYHAN newspaper. The Sunni religious leaders talked with Dr Yazdi about economics, culture, religious security and the wishes of the people of Sistan and Baluchistan. Dr Yazdi promised that they would receive all kinds of assistance and that their problems would be solved. These people then sat down to chat with KEYHAN's reporter and answered his questions.

[Question] Would you explain why you came to KEYHAN?

Molavi Shahdad: We came here to attend the "unity camp" organized for wider relationship with our brethren, as well as to discuss our problems and difficulties.

[Question] What issues are at stake in Sistan and Baluchistan these days?

[Answer] There are many bottlenecks. Economically, culturally and agriculturally Baluchistan is crippled. Of course, there is expansive land but there is need for deep wells and motor pumps. Many roads have not been asphalted. Job opportunities must be generated in Sistan and Baluchistan. I mean that by building factories, jobs are created, too. Schools and university should be established here so that our youths do not go abroad.

Wishes of Sunni Religious Leaders

[Question] As religious authorities of the Sunnis what do you want from the government?

[Answer] Firstly, the Radio and Television should not blaspheme the sanctities of the Sunnis. They should watch their words.

Such profanities against the Sunni brothers would provide pretext to the counterrevolutionaries to sow the seeds of division and hatred. The press should refrain from printing material against the Sunni religious leaders and their sacred things. In courts of law and offices of the government the Sunni religious authorities should be given a role just as the Shiite religious leaders are given roles in other cities.

One of the wishes of the Sunni religious leaders is to have the educational records of those Sunni Ulema who have studied in foreign countries, such as Pakistan, and have toiled for a lifetime to obtain their academic degrees, evaluated and to give these Ulema jobs in educational and theological centers. The Ulema should be active in education so that the youth do not deviate. At present, the agnostics have penetrated the educational system and incite the people. If the Ulema are employed in education, such deviations would be precluded.

[Question] How true is the statement, as it were, that there is a schism between Shiism and Sunnism? If it is not true, which group brings it up most?

Minor Differences

[Answer] The difference between Sunnism and Shiism, like those among the religions based on the prophet's traditions, are minor, but the previous regime blew these differences up to promote its own interests. But these differences were not extensive and they are now being gradually removed. After the victory of the revolution we did not have the kind of differences that could lead to mutual hatred.

[Question] Have the revolutionary organs been active and effective in Sistan and Baluchistan?

[Answer] The reconstruction campaign people have, to be fair, worked and are still working very hard. But these revolutionary organs lack adequate resources. The Reconstruction Campaign and the Corps have rendered effective service. The government should supply more resources to them and support them.

The Molavi Ulema said that so long as no purging took place in other departments, no revolutionary work could be performed. They endorsed the governor of Saravan and cited him as a sympathetic and revolutionary man.

[Question] Are there any other issues being discussed in Sistan and Baluchistan in connection with the people?

[Answer] The important issue is the poverty of the people. There is no trade in Sistan and Baluchistan. There are only two ways to make a living: to migrate abroad in order to pursue a livelihood or to engage in contraband. This is because employment is not correct in this region. To put an end to such problems, factories and productive centers should be set up and mines should be exploited.

Dr Yazdi's Suggestions

At this point Dr Yazdi suggested that an "Office of Sistan and Baluchistan" be created for coordinating the efforts for the solution of the problems and difficulties of Sistan and Baluchistan. He further suggested that some of the visiting Sunni Ulema remain in Tehran so that their problems would be followed up. Dr Yazdi said, "We are anxious to have your problems solved as soon as possible. Any problem is referred to us, we are for you and ready to serve."

Dr Yazdi also touched on the long-term mission of the Sunni religious leaders and said, "You should tend to the minds of the young people. If, God forbid, they deviate, you are to blame. Just as the Shiite Ulema have moved the young people, you, too, can change the minds of the youth." Dr Yazdi added, "Unfortunately, there has not yet been any strong Islamic movement of a progressive nature in areas inhabited by Sunnis. In Baluchistan, it is you who should guide the youth. You should guide the youth and the people in the direction of Islam. Our revolution is an Islamic one and it has strengthened your position among the Baluchis and has attracted the attention and favorable attitude of the people to you."

At a later point, Dr Yazdi said, "In the beginning the Khans (chieftains) would obstruct any constructive work. They incited the people against the government and the Reconstruction Campaign. Now they have realized that the campaign is here to work for them--to sink wells and to install electricity. They asked themselves that if the campaign people wanted to do something positive why should they stop them?"

[Question] If you have any statement in the way of a message, please make it.

Attention to Theological Centers

[Answer] We want the theological centers of Sistan and Baluchistan to be given fundamental attention. We want the Sunni religious authorities to be used in the educational departments and judicial courts. We also want the theological degrees that you have earned abroad, such as in Pakistan, after 15 to 20 years of hard work for learning theology to be evaluated and put to use. We want the residents of the border strip to be given jobs so that they may stay put and defend their fatherland instead of going to other places."
Dr Yazdi also had a message addressed to the Majles asking the Majles to keep the Sunni religion, too, in mind while making laws.

Statement of the Representative of the Imam's Publicity Office

At the end of this visit, the representative of the Imam's Publicity Office who had accompanied the Sunni religious authorities to KEYHAN from the Theological Center of Qom told the KEYHAN reporter: "In order to further strengthen the unity of the Shiite and Sunni religious leaders, such organs as the Reconstruction Campaign and the Corps had requested that a representative from the theological center visit Sistan and Baluchistan. I went there on my own accord.

In order to promote the unity, we began the preliminary stages. For instance, we organized the Holy Koran Camp which was attended by the pupils of Sistan and Baluchistan city regions. We also staged various cultural and military mobilization programs there.

"When I went there I witnessed that the deprivation there was really stupendous. The officials who were mostly the agents of the previous Khans and did not want to imperil their interests refrained from doing anything for the people. As even the name of Baluchistan was distant from the minds of the authorities we decided to have Baluchistan's cry heard. I had two interviews in that province in which I warned the officials of the office of the governor-general, the revolutionary prosecutor and the security centers. Later they began their attacks on me.

"The problems are numerous. The most important issue is the governor-general. He should be a decisive, efficient and sympathetic person, not connected with any interest group, but must be supported by the central government as well."

9695
CSO: 4906

ECONOMIC TRANSACTIONS WITH FRANCE ON INCREASE

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 20 Jul 80 p 33

[Article by Ghassan Ma'luf: "In Addition to Providing Iraq With Promised Nuclear Station, French-Iraqi Economic Relations Open the Door for Iraq To Become an Industrialized Nation"]

[Text] The advanced state of French-Iraqi relations attracts attention. Iraq considers France as the only Western country characterized by independence in foreign policy and a clear position with regard to the Arab cause. France considers Iraq as the most stable Arab country, an oil supplier second only to Saudi Arabia and a potentially very large market for French products and equipment, both civilian and military.

Since 1975 Iraq has established unique relations with France resulting from the personal ties between Mr Saddam Hussein, vice president of the Iraqi Revolution Council at the time, and the French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. France has become the third-ranking economic partner of Iraq after Japan and West Germany. In addition, Iraq, which is a member of the nonalinement movement, has something in common with France, which, relatively speaking, has maintained some sort of independence from the two superpowers. Iraqi-French relations have been strengthened by the visit of Mr Raymond Barre, the French prime minister, in July 1979, and the return visit of Mr Sa'dun Hammadi, the Iraqi minister of foreign affairs, to Paris in June 1980, when he confirmed that President Giscard d'Estaing will visit Iraq next fall.

Unbalanced Trade Exchange

Transactions between France and Iraq are numerous and cover various economic sectors. Trade between the two countries has increased rapidly during the past years, rising from a total of 2.5 billion francs in 1973 to 6.6 billion in 1975, 11.7 billion in 1978, and 17.6 billion francs in 1979. However, the growth of trade between the two countries was not balanced, for it resulted in a French balance of trade deficit of 1.8 billion francs in 1973, 3.1 billion in 1975, 7.2 billion in 1978 and 10.9 billion in 1979. This deficit was basically due to the increase in Iraqi oil prices and oil exports to France, which amounted to 20.3 million tons at a cost of 9.5 billion francs in 1978, a 13-percent increase over 1977. These exports reached 24.9 million tons in the first months of 1980 [sic. should read: in 1979] representing 20.2 percent of total French oil imports.

Thus, Iraq has become an oil supplier of France second only to Saudi Arabia, whose oil exports to France have reached 34.5 percent of total French oil imports. In comparison, Iraqi imports of French civilian goods were estimated at $540 million in 1978, putting France third in exports to Iraq after West Germany (approximately $800 million) and Japan (approximately $1 billion).

In 1979 French exports of civilian goods to Iraq increased by 50 percent over their 1978 level, and were estimated at 3.38 billion francs [1978 data are in dollars]. The same year, French industrial firms concluded with Iraq contracts valued at 8 billion francs. This is in addition to a contract to build the new airport in Baghdad at an estimated cost of 3.7 billion francs.

Contracts in 1980

At the beginning of 1980 several contracts were signed between Iraq and France. The most important of these contracts was that signed with the (Jashnib?) French company to build a plant for the production of gas separated from oil in Zubayr in southeastern Iraq. Moreover, contracts still under consideration include one being negotiated by the Thompson Company for the construction of a plant for electronic equipment at an estimated cost of 6 billion francs. According to French sources, there are about 200 French companies operating in the Iraqi market.

Yet, this increase in French exports of civilian goods to Iraq did not close the gap in its balance of trade, especially as France needed to buy an additional 5 million tons of oil at higher prices to overcome the shortage resulting from the decrease in production of Iranian oil. This additional need in 1979 resulted in an increase of 50 percent in the cost of oil imported from Iraq, which jumped from 9.47 to 14.27 billion francs.

In its efforts to modernize and reinforce the equipment of its armed forces, Iraq, which depended essentially on Soviet military equipment in the past, placed orders for French military equipment valued at 8 billion francs in 1977-78. In 1977, Iraq ordered 36 Mirage F-1 planes, which began to be delivered at the beginning of this year. At the end of 1979 Iraq signed a contract for the purchase of an additional 34 planes of the same type, in addition to rockets, large helicopters and various naval equipment. Negotiations are currently taking place for the purchase of Mirage 2000 planes and warships of various sizes.

Nuclear Plant Controversy

A new dimension was added to Iraqi-French cooperation when Iraq signed an agreement for nuclear cooperation with France in 1975. According to this agreement, France would provide Iraq with a 70-megawatt plant for nuclear research. Along with the plant, France agreed to provide Iraq with 12 kgs of 93-percent enriched uranium. According to atomic experts, this means that Iraq's nuclear plant could lead to the manufacture of a type "1" atomic bomb having the same power as the Hiroshima bomb. The plant would cost 200 million francs.

We should point out the controversy which surrounded this issue as of the beginning of talks between France and Iraq to develop relations of cooperation in the nuclear field. Some French circles strongly opposed supplying Iraq with a nuclear plant of this kind, considering this transaction as inconsistent with the policy of French President Giscard d'Estaing, which calls for the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It should be mentioned here that a plant of the same type was going to be built at that time in Isfahan, Iran. Other circles felt that the Iraqi demand did not present any problem as long as the plant would be under the supervision of the International Atomic Agency in Vienna.

Israel and the United States strongly objected to this project. Yet, in spite of their objections, work continued on building the plant, which was ready to be shipped to Iraq in April 1979. But on the night of the sixth of the (?previous) month, components of the plant were destroyed with explosives. It is not known yet who was behind this operation, as no information has leaked about it since then. There are two hypotheses. The first implicates Israeli and U.S. intelligence, and the second implicates some French circles.

This incident did not shake diplomatic and economic relations between France and Iraq. On the contrary, it seems to have strengthened these relations. France has decided to rebuild the damaged components of the station and export them to Iraq, most likely at the end of this year.

At the beginning of June, Iraq sent Egyptian atomic scientist Yahya al-Mashad, a member of the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission, to France on a mission related to supervision of the atomic equipment which France was exporting to Iraq. On 16 June, Mr al-Mashad was found murdered in his room at the Meridian Hotel in Paris. There is a lot of speculation, but the identity of the killer is still unknown.

It should be mentioned that the transaction is important not only because it provides Iraq with a research nuclear plant, but also because Iraqi nuclear research will in the future produce trained Iraqi experts in this field. This new Iraqi know-how will inevitably extend into other scientific fields through French-Iraqi economic cooperation. It could lead to the admission of Iraq into the industrialized world which has so far been closed to Third World countries.

9392
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NEW DISTRIBUTIONS OF POWER ENVISIONED TO END WAR

Beirut AL-MARUNI in Arabic 8 Sep 80 p 1

/Article: "The War Ends--On the Basis of a Plan Agreed to by Lebanon, the Arabs and /Foreign/ Countries"/

/Text/ News has leaked out to some Lebanese sources, official and unofficial, from international and world diplomatic circles that the resolution of the Lebanese war, that is, the war of rifles and trenches, is close at hand, according to a group of indications and data. From this it is assumed that this solution will occur in accordance with the following stage-by-stage sequence:

First, the armed forces in the Western section--that is, primarily the forces of the al-Murabitun--will take over the sites and centers the Palestinians are now occupying. Implementation of this step in a number of points of contact on the western front of Beirut has actually started.

Second, the forces of the Amal organization will assume charge of adopting similar measures in the district situated south of Beirut and extending to the town of al-Zahra'.

Third, the Lebanese army, according to a comprehensive security plan, will take charge of deploying itself over an area including Beirut the city, especially the commercial areas and the international roads, and greater Beirut, within an area whose boundaries extend to al-Rumaylah, al Shuf, 'Aliyah, Zahlah, Tarshish, al-Matnayn, Jubayl and al-Batrun; in a second stage, this be followed by the deployment of the Lebanese army to the other areas of Lebanon, in particular the entire north and al-Biqa'.

Fourth, the confinement of the detachments of the Palestinian resistance to the south, in particular to a section of the region known as the region between the two rivers, to consolidate their centers and strangthen their defense agencies there against Israel. The area of this section will range from 250 to 350 square kilometers, as is shown in the map printed above.

Sixth /sic/, Sa'd Haddad's forces will advance toward the al-Litani on a long line extending from the coast to the interior averaging 22 kilometers in width and 70 kilometers in length, that is, along an area of 1,500 square kilometers.

Fears and Obstacles

Observers anticipate that the process of deploying the Lebanese army, as well as operations of the new concentrations of armed groups in west Beirut, will take place without obstacles or obstructions. However, the difficulties will begin in terms of the distribution of the Amal organization's forces and the retrenchment of the Palestinian forces, as a result of which it is feared that severe fighting will take place between Amal and the Palestinian resistance along the area extending from South Beirut to the boundaries of the region between the two rivers, especially al-Biqa'.

Observers also anticipate that the Palestinian presence will be confined to the civilian refugee camps, stripped of light and heavy weapons, provided that the Lebanese Domestic Security Forces take charge of guard and security activities inside the camps in cooperation with some Palestinian detachments following its orders, as stipulated by the Cairo Agreement, the Melkart Agreement and their attachments and subsequent additions.

The main point of concentration of the Lebanese army will be in al-Damur, where barracks the size of the barracks existing will be built in Sarba to guarantee the safety of the international highway and the return of the people of al-Damur to their areas, livelihood and homes.

The international and world diplomatic sources' information adds that these points have been agreed to in principle and almost in actuality at the highest levels, Lebanese, Arab and international, so that it is possible to realize the following gains, with the guarantee of the /foreign/ countries and the United Nations:

1. The permanent termination of Israeli aggressions against the south.

2. The return of the refugees from al-Damur in particular and other Lebanese regugees in general to their regions and houses.

3. Guaranteeing the deployment of the Lebanese army to all areas of Lebanon.

4. Opening international Lebanese roads from north to south and from east to west in a complete, secure fashion.

5. Reopening the commercial areas in Beirut, that is, returning life to the heart of the Lebanese capital.

6. Enabling international emergency forces to perform their duties and implement the international Security Council resolutions as fully as possible.

7. Expanding the scope for the termination of the Syrian deterrent forces task?

8. Achieving national reconciliation among Lebanese.

9. Making the course of peace a success and starting the course of reconstruction in a decisive manner.

Diplomatic Advice?

Toward the end of last week other information was received to the effect that diplomatic circles in Lebanon recommended to Lebanese politicians and leaders that they arrange their affairs and persevere awhile until that plan is definitively approved and the final touches are put on means for carrying it out. This will take a few months, especially since during that time the form of the European initiative will have become crystallized, along with the resumption of negotiations among the Camp David parties, and the results of the American elections will have become known.

These circles also advised the Lebanese to exercise wisdom, skill, self-control and strong nerves so that the solution to their problem may be easy and rapid. Otherwise, if they are hasty and venture on some hasty actions, the state of fragmentation now distinguishing the Lebanese crisis will proceed to escalate until it reaches the stage of schism and disintegration.

One System for the Palestinians in Lebanon and the Arab Countries

These circles state that the abovementioned plan will have the effect of reducing the tension in relations between the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese regime, since gathering the Palestinians in the area between the two rivers will result in the formation of a sort of state for them. This will be accompanied by distribution of the Palestinian refugees, who number 700,000 in Lebanon, to all Arab countries in accordance with agreed upon criteria and formulas and application of a single system to them in Lebanon and all Arab countries which will spell out the conditions for their residence and movements and will prevent approval of actual ultimate settlement in Lebanon.

11887
CSO: 4802

PHALANGE ORGAN RIDICULES ARAB NATIONALIST MOVES IN NATION

Beirut AL-'AMAL in Arabic 13 Sep 80 p 2

/Article: "The Comedy of Perseverance and Steadfastness on Lebanese Soil--They Recommend That Libya Take Part in the Deterrent Forces"/

/Text/ Does the Libyan government have the right to send its military forces to Lebanon, following the announcement of the merger union between it and Syria?

About a month ago the Syrian government determined on the party and official levels to "stand fast against Israeli aggressions launched against Lebanon, against the south and against the Palestinian resistance."

Syria carried this resolution out when it moved its air force to counterattack against Israeli warplanes over Lebanon. One Syrian air force plane was downed, and those calling for steadfastness applauded because a Syrian pilot managed to break the terrible wall of silence which the whole Arab world has wrapped and is wrapping around what happened and is happening in and through Lebanon concerning Palestinian and Israeli operations. After this resolution it was observed that the Syrian government demanded, and still is demanding, that all Arab governments and armies take part in deterring Israeli aggressions and defending Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance. It was also observed that the Palestinians applauded and welcomed this step, considering any Arab hesitation in coordinating with the Syrian movement and strategy to be neglect and conspiracy.

Following the Syrian resolution and the Israeli reaction, the Libyan government proclaimed its position, in Tripoli specifically, claiming that it was necessary to open the borders of the front-line states to Palestinian guerrilla activity on the one hand and have Syria participate militarily, materially and morally in defending Lebanon, the south and the Palestinian resistance against the Israeli aggressions.

The Syrian army is present in Lebanon, in implementation of the resolutions of the Riyadh and Cairo summits to preserve security and stability, prevent fighting and thus defend Lebanese territory; this army is totally subject to the personal command of the Lebanese president and its continued presence on Lebanese territory in turn is subject to a request presented by the Lebanese president to the Arab League council through his ambassador, accompanied by causative reasons, because the Arab countries which are participating materially or morally in the Arab deterrent forces must be convinced in advance of the justifications the Lebanese president presents

in his request in order to continue to participate in balancing these forces and agree to continue their operational tasks.

In the information received from Tripoli, some Palestinian and Lebanese organizations recommended to Libyan officials that the file be opened on "sending Libyan army units (aviation, infantry, armor, and naval and land artillery) to Lebanon so that it could use Lebanese territory within the perseverance and steadfastness plan as bases against Israel and its expansionist schemes and constant aggressions against Lebanon and the Palestinian resistance."

Those who raised this issue before the Libyan authorities and asked them to open this file actually meant to encourage the movement of perseverance and steadfastness against Israel among Arab countries, but they discussed providing a legal and strategic framework for the desired Libyan military presence on Lebanese territory on grounds that Israel would oppose this presence by launching immediate military operations.

The Libyan military presence in Lebanon must be in accordance with a request from the legitimate Lebanese authorities, and these authorities, which appreciate the position and gravity of adopting a decision like that, certainly will hesitate to adopt it, whatever the pressures.

However, advocates and enthusiasts of the proposal found the legal formula, or what they consider the requisite legal formula, for the Libyan military presence on Lebanese territory. They recommended to Libyan officials that their presence in Lebanon lie within the context of the Arab deterrent forces. Since the Libyan and Syrian states will become a single state after the unity merger, their armies will become a single army, their political and military decisions will become united, and the presence of the Libyan army on Lebanese territory will in turn become legitimate and acquire a legal covering through the resolutions of the Council of the League of Arab States.

Information reaching certain Lebanese circles from Tripoli states that the Libyan officials who heard this recommendation and its causative reasons were enthusiastic about it at the outset but requested more time to conduct an expanded study and obtain the agreement of Syria and the Palestinians, then Lebanon.

These plans in turn raised the future of relations between Lebanon and the unified country and in the past 2 days have been the subject of an evaluation in official and political circles, lest Lebanon awake to new steps which will not be in its interests at all.

11887
CSO: 4802

'QNA' REPORTS ON PHALANGIST PLAN TO PARTITION COUNTRY

NC231200 Doha QNA in Arabic 1034 GMT 23 Oct 80

[Text] Jidda, 23 Oct (QNA)--Press reports published here today indicate that some influential Palestinian personalities have warned U.S. officials of the likelihood that the Lebanese Phalangist Party, which is effectively supported by Israel, will partition Lebanon and declare the formation of an independent Maronite state.

In a report from Washington, the ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT newspaper says that these personalities have told officials in President Carter's administration that this expected step by the Phalangists will be timed in such a manner so as to benefit from the U.S. presidential elections and the Iraqi-Iranian war.

The paper adds that the Phalangists are preoccupied with an unprecedented operation of increasing their military strength and supplies, preparatory to implementing this step.

Quoting informed sources, the paper says that the Phalangist Party has militia force of about 40,000 fighters--which is double the strength of last year. The sources add that the Phalangists are receiving large quantities of arms and military equipment, including tanks, from Israel and the western states. The sources further say that the Phalangist Party is moving rapidly now to build the economic foundation of its proposed state: the party has enlarged its airport so as to be able to accommodate the Israeli transport planes which will bring the requested equipment for the new state. Moreover, the port of Juniyah is being extended as well, and the Phalangists are currently setting up a television station so as to complement their radio station's transmissions. The same sources add that the Phalangist Party has been collecting taxes assessed at about $300 million a year in order to strengthen their new state.

The sources add that there are increasing signs that the Phalangists will move soon, in coordination with Israel, to implement the partition plan. According to this plan, the Phalangists will move militarily from North Lebanon, while the Israeli forces will pour into Lebanon from the south. During this operation, the Phalangists will seize a part of Beirut and declare it the capital for their state. At least the eastern sector of the capital will be dominated by them so as to become a political symbol of the new state. The Israel forces will help the Phalangists to protect the borders of their state and will then withdraw, according to the plan that has been drawn up.

CSO: 4802

FRANJIYAH EXPLAINS HIS STAND ON RECONCILIATION GOVERNMENT, OTHER ISSUES

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 23 Aug 80 pp 20-23

[Interview with former President Sulayman Franjiyah, by Ghassan Bayram, in Ihdin; date not given]

[Text] A few hours after Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh declined the task of forming a national government of reconciliation out of Lebanese political activists, I contacted former Lebanese President Sulayman Franjiyah and asked him for an appointment for this interview.

There was more than one reason for requesting this appointment, just as there was a pressing journalistic need to conduct this interview.

Franjiyah has been in the spotlight and the focus of all contacts from the moment Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh was entrusted with forming a national reconciliation government, which is the last hope of President Sarkis in one more attempt to get out of the distressing crisis which has been shaking Lebanon for more than 5 years.

Apart from any unknown differences, Franjiyah appeared to be the only obstacle in the way of forming this government, and the foremost reason for al-Sulh's excusing himself from forming it.

Are there other hidden obstacles which have all entered into the making of Franjiyah's mind?

Are there other factors and reasons which have combined to make Franjiyah adopt this stand--including, for example, the war which he has launched against President Ilyas Sarkis, accusing him of cooperating with the Phalangists?

There are other questions for which answers must be sought in this discussion with Sulayman Franjiyah at his summer home in Ihdin, during which he said things he never said before, either about a president of the republic or anyone else.

[Question] Several days ago, Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh excused himself from forming a national reconciliation government. To what do you attribute this failure to form this government, and where should President Sarkis have begun so as to not end up with this unfortunate result?

[Answer] Al-Sulh's begging off was expected and anticipated ever since the day he was commissioned to form this government.

Before his assignment, they submitted a list of ministers' names [for a new government] which was categorically rejected. After that, they asked al-Sulh to form a government similar to the rejected one. How could someone who rejected the first accept the second? I also question the reasons which impelled al-Sulh to agree to form this government, since I know that he is a sensible man who looks at things from all angles. As to how he got involved in this imbroglio, I do not know!

I fear that the imbroglio into which al-Sulh plunged himself will cost the country dearly. All the dreams which the Lebanese people had expected to be achieved following the proclamation of the principles of national accord may have become very difficult to achieve today.

[Question] In other words, can we say that these accord principles have fallen by the wayside?

[Answer] I wouldn't say "fallen"; I would say that they have become very difficult to achieve, because it was up to the president, who announced these principles in complete freedom, to carry them out. Their implementation does not need activists or nonactivists. The president is the one who makes decisions or does not, in agreement with the prime minister. It was up to the president to implement the principles of accord, and, after implementing them, to tell the Lebanese people: "I have done my duty towards you, and now I want to choose those whom I wish to work with in the government." But to proclaim the principles, then forget them, delay their implementation, and place the responsibility for their nonimplementation on certain groups--these are cheap actions done only by petty men.

[Question] In your opinion, what should the president of the republic have done to make things proceed naturally, especially since from the start he conducted accord consultations ending in the proclamation of the principles and their premises. He then conducted other accord consultations about the need to form a government of activists to carry out these principles, and, finally, conducted traditional consultations to form this government? In your opinion, what are the other means and methods which he should have resorted to under these extraordinary, critical circumstances of the country?

[Answer] Before doing all of this, he should have begun by implementing the 14 principles. Al-Huss was right when he said: "We should have started to implement the easier and simpler principles so as to gain the people's confidence." But unfortunately, even the easiest ones were not implemented.

[Question] There is something almost universally accepted. This is that this country has from the start been exposed to a conspiracy. President Sarkis is quoted as saying that when he tried to form the accord government, he was not gambling as much as he was conducting a natural experiment to find out whether this conspiracy was continuing as intensively as ever, or whether an opportunity had developed to implement a certain solution. It is said that he ascertained that the conspiracy was still going on. What is your opinion?

[Answer] The conspiracy is still going on; there is no doubt about that. But, and this is a reiteration of what I have said before, President Sarkis announced the principles on the assumption that a voice would speak up in opposition to these principles, so that he could throw the responsibility for nonimplementation of the accord on the opposition, and tell the Lebanese people: "I have tried to carry out the accord, but the opposition rejected it." Unfortunately for him, not a single Lebanese voice spoke out in opposition to these principles, so, he had to contrive something in order to create an opposition. Therefore, he concocted the myth of a government of activists. This created opposition, not to the principles of the accord, but to the formation of the government. Some newspapers, including AL-NAHAR and AL-ANWAR, depicted this opposition to the Lebanese people as opposition to the Lebanese accord. This is a lie and a concoction by organs which support the president, so as to place the responsibility for nonimplementation of the accord on this opposition. When the only one in fact responsible for nonimplementation is the president.

[Question] Statements are circulating to the effect that one of the reasons which hampered formation of the government of activists and implementation of the accord was opposition to the person of Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh. How true is this?

[Answer] I have not heard of any opposition to the person of Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh. On the contrary, al-Sulh has a distinguished political record, and we all know that he is a sensible, mature man. But the opposition was to what was imposed on al-Sulh. Opposition was to the advance circulation of the rejected government composition.

[Question] You have had a long political history. You were active in politics, and then practiced government at its highest level, as president of the republic. Now you are in the thick of the battle. Assuming that the president of the republic had succeeded in forming his government, what do you think would have been the result?

[Answer] If the proposed government had come to pass?

[Question] Yes.

[Answer] It would have been a very serious experiment. Its results would have been even more serious, because they would have led to the adoption of policies which might have led to very grave dangers.

[Question] For example?

[Answer] For example, if the Lebanese citizenry outside the control of the single party [the Plalange] were told, "If this regime can restore normality to Lebanon, so be it. But if it cannot, you have to act." Their action could take a variety of forms. If we told the citizenry: "The regime has entered into a conspiracy against you with those who are sabotaging this country, with those who want to partition it and sell it to your enemy. We want you not to recognize its existence and behave as if it did not exist," I believe that the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese people would accede to the request.

[Question] In this connection, could you possibly shed some light on your position with regard to thwarting the formation of the proposed government, and the nature of the contacts which took place between you and a number of Lebanese parties on one hand, and between you and Syrian officials on the other hand. In particular, we have in mind Deputy Prime Minister 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, who visited you twice for this purpose?

[Answer] Let us begin with the Syrian officials. The Syrian official function with respect to forming the new government, was that of a "postman." A Syrian official was requested to communicate a certain list of names of who would be members of the future government. He performed his function very reliably. He visited us here, submitted these names, and asked, "What do you think--acceptable or unacceptable?" Our opinion was that they were unacceptable. He visited [former premier Rashid] Karami and got the same answer. Bearing in mind that Karami was the candidate commissioned with forming this government, how could he accept such an initiative? They form a government and present it to the premier-designate, saying: "Here is a government in which you will be premier." What about the opinion of the premier-designate? Certainly, no premier-designate would agree to such an arrangement.

We were honored by a second visit by Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam. He also called on the Lebanese state. To absolve itself of responsibility for what was happening in Lebanon, the Lebanese state sought the help of the Syrian state, so as to cover up its failure. But until this very moment, the Syrian position with respect to the formation of the new government is, I repeat, only that of a postman.

[Question] The journalist is forced to echo what the people say. At certain times, he is even prepared to play the role of the devil's advocate, if necessary. Therefore, I want to say that the present state of affairs with all its ramifications has begun to make some ordinary and not-so-ordinary people say that you have become an obstacle to the formation of a government of reconciliation, or even the achievement of reconciliation. What is your reply to such impressions?

[Answer] You are saying that some people sometimes imagine real or imaginary things. The first person to put all his resources at the disposal of the president in order to achieve these principles [of reconciliation] was Sulayman Franjiyah. I still do. But is the president the tangible or intangible property of a certain group? Does he conduct himself at any time only according to the will of this group? Naturally, this group, if it were as devoted to Lebanon as it claims to be, would not have sold itself to Lebanon's enemy. If it were defending the Christians of Lebanon, as it claims to be, it would not have killed 530 Lebanese Christians in one day. If a person places himself at the service of this group, can the Lebanese citizen, who desires only Lebanon's welfare, approve of him? It is very difficult.

[Question] Can we name the group to which you are referring?

[Answer] We can call them the Lebanese Phalangists.

[Question] You have a specific position, as do the Phalangists and the president. It has been observed that at the present time and under the present circumstances, it seems to be impossible for these positions to come together or reach mutual understanding. Where are we headed?

[Answer] Towards a resolute stand which has to be taken by the president. If the president believed in his position, he would have adhered to it and said, "This is my position and I will operate accordingly."

[Question] Not to wrong President Sarkis too much, what should he have done, and how should he have conducted himself as a president of the republic in the midst of this Lebanese and Arab turmoil? Let us determine what he should have done in the midst of this complicated crisis with its Lebanese, Arab, Palestinian and international ramifications.

[Answer] The day President Sarkis took office, the greatest resources which any president could control were placed at his disposal--i.e. military resources, which Lebanon had lacked: 30,000 soldiers at his personal command. The Arab states gave him carte blanche, and said to him, "Anything you want, we are prepared to give." At the beginning of his administration, Riyadh promised him whatever he wanted. What did he do with 30,000 soldiers at his personal command, interested in nothing but carrying out this person's orders? Was he able to collect illegal arms from the people? Was he able to insure security for Lebanese territory?

[Question] Moving along, I would like to ask the following question, in response to what you said in your answer. President Sarkis has said, or is quoted as saying, that whatever was said about the resources placed at his disposal, they were just verbal resources. So far, nobody has helped him and nobody wants to help him, be it on the Lebanese, Arab, or international level. He always finds himself moving by himself in the direction of a solution, but finds all doors shut in his face.

[Answer] Let us take his words as essentially true. Why does he remain in his position? He ought to pack his suitcases and say, "Have it your way."

[Question] It is said that President Sarkis has asked himself, "Why do I stay here?" It is said that whenever he tries to answer his own question by comparing the negative points of remaining with those of departing, it becomes clear to him that his leaving the government under these circumstances would be comparable to someone administering the coup de grace to the country. The entire country is deteriorating, the legitimate authorities are all deteriorating, and the country is being partitioned or colonized or so forth. Will the future be extremely overcast?

[Answer] That the situation should deteriorate more than it already has? I do not think so. How far has the deterioration gone? Just a few kilometers from the Republican Palace. Look at the Biqa', look at the north. Praise God, they are not deteriorating; the reverse is true. There is a boom today, be it in the Biqa' or in the north, the likes of which no one has ever seen in his whole life.

Why? Because there is no state presence in the Biqa' or in the north. They would like to imagine that the Biqa' and the north are pools of fire. I wish that every Lebanese who wants to spend a weekend would come to the north, to see for himself the situation there. Likewise, a glass of 'araq [Lebanese alcoholic drink] at al-Barduni, in Zahlah, would hurt no one. Let them look over Zahlah and the Biqa'. They would find that life there has a thousand blessings, praise be to God. Why? Because there is no state presence. The citizen's vigilance makes him concerned for his region and his security, without the need to shoot anyone. Today the incidents in the north and the Biqa' are one-tenth of what they were before 1975, all because of this vigilance, which originates in the deep-rooted Lebanese conscience and fear of God.

[Question] Therefore, do you feel that the president's stepping aside would insure an outlet to a solution?

[Answer] If this is his thinking, then I suppose that there is no other way out. When a man feels that he has become isolated and bears all the responsibility, there is no call for him to remain, for remaining would be a harm from which no benefit could result.

[Question] This precedent is perhaps not permitted because of the Maronism of the republican president.

[Answer] My dear man, Ilyas Sarkis is not the keeper of the "Maronism" of the republican presidency. This was dictated by the Moslem leaders, so that there would remain in this region some place which would show the world a picture of sectarian coexistence, not just in Lebanon but throughout the region.

[Question] Today, whether we like it or not, it has come to appear that your differences with the Phalangists are the main difficulty in the way to a solution. Even the Vatican delegates who visited Lebanon went home with the impression that there was no hope of achieving a Maronite-Maronite accord as long as this dispute existed. This in turn makes it impossible to solve the Lebanese crisis. Here it seems that the entire Lebanese problem hinges on the continuation of this dispute and this conflict between you and the Phalangists. How can we convince the people otherwise?

[Answer] Unfortunately, I must say that the papal delegate's visit to Lebanon gave the impression that the Vatican was insufficiently informed as to the actual situation in Lebanon. For this reason, after honoring me, the papal delegate went away regretting his visit.

The Vatican's delegate came in order to bring points of view closer together, but he operated on untrue, unrealistic grounds. The Vatican delegate assumed that the dispute between Sulayman Franjiyah and the Phalangists came about because of a number of osbstructionists on Franjiyah's side and a number of obstructionists on the Phalangist side, because the Beirut-Tripoli road was off-limits for some Lebanese, and because there was an exchange of fire from time to time. I informed him of the issue from A to Z, and told him that the

that the dispute developed before the treacherous massacre which the Phalangists perpetrated in Ihdin. It developed for a national reason, not a personal one. It so happened that one day it was proven to me that the Phalangists were dealing with Israel. I was still a member of the Lebanese front. I gathered up my papers and withdrew. I told the Vatican delegate that my dispute with the Phalangists began before the massacre, for they carried out the massacre to bring Sulayman Franjiyah to his knees. They did hurt me emotionally, but in practice and in principle Sulayman Franjiyah kneels only to God. I told the Vatican delegate: "Your Eminence, if this group stopped dealing with Israel today, and stopped fighting among themselves (as proved by the 7 July massacre), I would do whatever you wish. But to establish an accord today between me and the group which is preparing to partition Lebanon and which deals with the enemy, a group trying to forcibly impose its domination over this country and practice single-party rule, is not possible. Sulayman Franjiyah could not accept such an accord, not because of his own personal interests, but because of the interest of his country."

I also told the Vatican delegate, "If they partitioned Lebanon today and established a racist Christian state, what would our Arab brothers' attitude be towards this new racist state? In the past, a racist Jewish state was founded, and the Arab brothers did their duty, totally severed relations, and fought. They are still fighting this racist state. Furthermore, today this racist Jewish state is getting untold, unlimited aid from the United States. As for ourselves, would we get this kind of aid so as to continue living? From the United States? We have seen America plotting to force us to leave Lebanon. West Europe? It has never given us any thought. In fact, it asked that we Lebanese come to an agreement, as a first step, so that it could offer us aid later on."

I also told the Vatican delegate that the mere idea of creating a racist state obligates the Vatican to frustrate its sponsors. The Vatican has to declare its pleasure or displeasure with this idea. I don't suppose that there is anyone at the Vatican who is happy with this idea. I told the papal delegate, "You have to be the first one to combat this notion, because you are responsible for the 12 million Christians living in this region. If a racist Christian state were created, the future of these Christians in the region would be just like that of the Jews when the state of Israel was founded--all the Jews migrated from the Arab states.

[Question] You referred to the 7 July operation, during which the Phalangist Party undertook to wipe out Sham'un's militia, as being due to the Phalangist desire to set up a one-party system. Were there any other reasons? What is your opinion of Sham'un's conduct?

[Answer] Here I cannot answer for Sham'un. Yesterday he held a press conference, and I assume that they asked him this question. As for other reasons, I cannot think of any except that the Phalangists wanted to forcibly subjugate whomever they could not subjugate peacefully. For this reason, they perpetrated the 7 July massacre. On the night of 7 July, the Liberals and the Phalangists were meeting, and there was total accord between them. If you go back to the newspapers which were published on the morning of 7 July, and the statements

issued by the Phalangists and the Liberals, you see the extent of their mutual understanding. But whoever gets used to doing something has to continue doing it. If he gets used to perfidy, he persists in it.

[Question] Recently, the scope of consultation between you and the national movement and other political leaderships in western Beirut has widened. It is said that the purpose of this is to create a broad national front. What point have you reached in these consultations?

[Answer] We have reached total understanding. Before, we had a mutual understanding without understanding each other. There was a goal we were striving for. Luckily or unluckily for one group of Lebanese, during these contacts we all had one goal, but the ways of attaining it varied. Some members of the national movement honored us and met with us in this room. Our viewpoints were in complete accord on the basis of our desire to return Lebanon to what it was before 1975--a strong state, with all of us subject to the laws without any exceptions. A statement was issued which I suppose you have seen. So far, reactions to it from all parties, except for one [the Phalangists], of course, have been positive. This encourages me to continue along the line we have charted for ourselves.

[Question] In your cooperation and alliances, how can you overlook the question of the Palestinian presence in Lebanon?

[Answer] The Palestinian presence is not a Lebanese issue but an Arab one. The day the Arab brothers decide on any stand, Lebanon will be obliged to adopt this stand. Today there are 22 Arab states. As I always say, Lebanon will always be the 14th state. Any time 13 states adopt a position, Lebanon has to adopt it also, because it represents the Arab majority. With respect to our position, we cannot take sides with any Arab state; we have to take sides with the Arab majority. The issue has been with us for a long time, and I have always wished and repeat my wish today that some sort of regime could be drawn up for the Palestinian people. It would be applicable to all the Arab states, until the issue is solved. Any rights given to this regime by any Arab state would also be given by Lebanon. But if the situation in Lebanon remains as it is now, this would not be in Lebanon's interest. So far, this situation has been proven not to be in the interest of the Palestinian cause itself.

[Question] For a long time you have espoused Arab positions and national positions. The day the PLO was accepted as an observer member at the United Nations, all the Arab presidents and kings commissioned you to speak in their behalf about the Palestinian cause. In our present situation, are you thinking of touring the Arab world in this connection?

[Answer] An Arab tour to convince whom? We are all convinced of the sanctity of the Palestinian cause. I have only two solutions for the Palestinian issue. Either the Arab brothers stand together militarily, if only for 1 month, in order to seize the land which was militarily occupied, or they should pressure America to stop its aid to Israel. Unfortunately, Arab solidarity may not be available these days, and we thank God that Syria took up positions on the Israeli borders

in order to resist Israeli expansion. If we look at the Begin Program, the plans since 1952 have not changed. He is still dreaming of expanding Israel and annexing for Israel the territory stretching from Jordan to the Red Sea.

This is his dream, as can be seen in Palestinian studies. Praise God that this dear fraternal state, Syria, has taken a steadfast position. Otherwise, there would be nothing to prevent or deter Begin from reaching the Red Sea. The Arab brothers, and I am addressing my remarks to the oil producers in particular, have to take a stand today.

Yesterday they took a stand against the recognition of Jerusalem as the permanent capital of Israel. They are to be thanked for this stand of theirs, but if they took the same stand against all dealings with Israel, I believe that the result would be for the good of us all.

[Question] When you suggested your Arab tour, you did so for a reason--that for 5-1/2 years Lebanon has not only paid the price for the lack of solution of the Palestinian problem, but also the price for Arab conflicts. Your friend Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh said that we have to make up with the Arabs, so that the Arabs can make up among themselves and solve our problem for us. Therefore, why has there not been any political Lebanese approach to the Arab countries for this purpose?

[Answer] Regarding this notion, can any person intervene in matters which these states do not acknowledge as existing? If we went and told these states, for example, "You are fighting on Lebanese territory against another Arab state," what Arab state would acknowledge such a thing? No one, because this activity is illegal. Whoever does something illegal cannot acknowledge it.

[Question] How do you view the future of the region's crisis? Is it near solution or what?

[Answer] The solution is within our reach, provided that our solidarity be not propagandistic but functional. If we could take a first step which does not involve any (risk?). The first step is for the oil producers to say, "We are prepared to sell petroleum for a number of foreign currencies: the Japanese yen, the franc, the pound sterling, and some others." Let them say, "We want to sell our product for these currencies." You would see Carter coming from America to Riyadh on his knees. If they say, "The friend of Israel is our enemy," as in the proverb "the friend of my enemy is my enemy," what states would risk being friends with Israel? None. There are 120 million Arabs, 120 million consumers and 120 million owners of a fantastic resource the likes of which is unknown in history. If these 120 million said, "We want to boycott the friends of Israel," who would be ready to sacrifice 120 million consumers economically, not to mention politically, in order to stick with Israel? No one. But we lack the person who could say this. The one who could have made this statement and carried it out was assassinated by America. He was, God's mercy be upon him, the late King Faysal ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz.

[Question] What do you expect will be the future of Lebanon? Are we going to better, or to worse, or to pieces, especially since Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat recently announced that Lebanon is headed for more massacres, that the Pierre Jumayyil state will be founded, and that Lebanon will be partitioned?

[Answer] My only thought is that a president knows that he has to take stands. Today, in spite of everything which has been said, the fact remains that no man can claim that he has the resources available to the president. The president is the only one who has all the resources, and he has to take his stands on the basis of these available resources. As long as the president does not take stands, he is like a homeowner who leaves his house open to everyone. This house will never be safe.

True, people may applaud him. If he finds himself in error, he can back up. Rectifying an error is a virtue. But unfortunately, he has never at any time tried to take a stand.

[Question] If President Sarkis came tomorrow and said, "I am no longer able to do anything, and I want to resign," do you think that the election of a new president to maintain the continuity of the legitimate authority would be possible in the midst of our present circumstances?

[Answer] With 80 deputies, we could surely elect a new president. It is possible that 10 or 15 deputies who live in areas controlled by the Phalangists would boycott the elections, but who else would refuse to elect a new president? No one. This would not be the first time in the world that a presidency became vacant. Many presidents have died or resigned without anything coming to a standstill.

[Question] Suppose a new president was elected without the Phalangists' approval. What if the Phalangists came, knowing that he was their enemy and opponent, and said, "We refuse to go along, and we are declaring our own state?"

[Answer] This president would have the resources enabling him to bash them in the head.

[Question] As long as we are saying that they are allied with Israel, what if Israel came to protect them?

[Answer] The world would stop Israel at its borders.

[Question] But this world we are talking about is even now unable to stop Israel at any border!

[Answer] No, my dear man, the world can stop it. And if the world does not stop it, allied as it is with the enemy, Lebanon can ally itself with friendly states. There are many friendly states, and Israel is not such a big bogeyman.

[Question] In this case, there is no friendly state for us except the Soviet Union, because the other states, from the United States to the European states, are the ones which helped establish Israel.

[Answer] And why not the Soviet Union? Any man who helps me, I call him a good man. Whoever is good to me is, in my opinion, a benevolent and good man.

8559
CSO: 4802

ECONOMIC SECTORS REMAIN ACTIVE DESPITE POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 23 Aug 80 pp 41-42

[Article by 'Abd-al-Karim al-Khalil: "From Banking to Industry to Real Estate; The Secrets Behind Deals and Investments"]

[Excerpts] Political and security factors in Lebanon frustrate economic activity which might create outlets for energies and capabilities, and cause people to believe that right now the freezer is the natural place for any creative economic enterprise or any project which might generate activity.

There has been a climate of surprise political events, beginning with the resignation of the Salim al-Huss government on 7 June, followed by the acceptance of this resignation on 20 July, followed by a series of surprises relating to the proposed formation of a miraculous government of political activists headed by Taqi-al-Din al-Sulh, the failure to form this government, and the idea of forming a government of 2nd, 3rd or bottom line of political activists. This climate gave rise to a pretty gloomy outlook for businessmen.

The successive security breakdowns which coincided with the political crisis, beginning with the assassination of a number of press, political and religious personalities in various parts of the country, followed by the detonation of cars filled with explosives, underscored the basic difficulties of a system of localized security which had appeared to some businessmen to be a hopeful development in some regions.

However, inspite of this atmosphere which gave rise to uneasy questions about the country's fate, most sectors of the Lebanese economy are witnessing a varied succession of business transactions and buying and selling activity. At times, these transactions attracted attention with regard to their nature, size or implication.

In the banking sector in particular, there was more than one new transaction, or old one begun before the crisis became serious, which took its course in spite of the gloomy atmosphere. Transactions to increase the capital of banks operating in Lebanon by amounts consistent with the guidelines of the Bank of Lebanon, in order to improve the ratio between capital and deposits or credits, are not easy under current circumstances, especially where capital is to be raised to 50 million Lebanese pounds (as in the case of the Mediterranean Bank and the Bank of Lebanon and al-Mahjar).

The "Francebank" transaction ended with the firm of 'Adnan and 'Adil al-Qassar purchasing 70 percent of the bank's shares, which had been owned by the French "Indosuisse" group. This was a relatively old transaction begun before the new deterioration in the situation. However, the participation of a group of Lebanese and Arab businessmen (in anticipation of some foreign individuals or banks) in forming the new group which acquired the above-mentioned shares indicates that there are many men looking for investment opportunities in the darkest of hours. Why would they do it, when they already enjoy various good positions in contracting, trade, industry and real estate?

While transactions and efforts to establish banking firms and branches abroad continue, the admission of new shareholders into existing banks in Lebanon, in these dark hours, is somewhat unusual. This development is exemplified by the accession to ownership and board membership of Universal Bank by Messrs Raja Najjar, Niqula Alban, Farid Shqqayr, and Salim 'Abd al-Rahim Diyab, and by the accession to ownership and board membership of the Byblos Bank by the industrialist Rafiq Ghandur and Muhammad al-Za'tari, president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Saida.

In the industrial sector, the most outstanding transaction taking place may be the one referred to by AL-MUSTAQBAL AL-IQTISADI 5 weeks ago. This is the offer by a group of Lebanese and Saudi businessmen to buy 90 percent of the shares of the al-Mashriq Glass Company, for the sum of 48 million pounds (more than $14 million). But the establishment of the Interback Cardboard Carton Plant in Saida, with an initial capital of 5 million pounds, in addition to more than 20 million pounds required to start it up, is no less important in a region constantly threatened by Israeli attacks.

As for the real estate sector, the major transactions in progress, involving vast, diversified capital, are those being financed by Kuwaiti capital in particular and Gulf capital in general, in more than one region, under outright Kuwaiti names or under Lebanese names covering Kuwaiti interests. Some of them consist of construction of residential complexes (such as the Dawud al-'Ali Company complex in Saida and the complex which Rafiq al-Hariri intends to build in Saida). There are also many transactions by expatriates or semi-expatriates, individuals or groups, the most recent being the Fardan land transaction in Beirut, by Rubay' 'Ammash and Ahmad Kabbarah, and the Mushrif land transaction and project near Damar, by Rafiq Sharaf-al-Din.

Naturally, we cannot enumerate everything or list all transactions in all sectors.

It is possible to explain this continued and renewed interest in investment in all sectors in terms of what we (and foreigners) refer to as the adaptability and vitality of the Lebanese people in general, and the Lebanese businessmen in particular. Still, one has to view all these investments, which are attracting millions of pounds, as evidence of potential profitability in the various sectors of the Lebanese economy.

However, recognizing the investment potential in the various sectors of the Lebanese economy does not keep one from wondering about the secrets or

common secrets, behind these transactions. Is it confidence in Lebanon's future, even in the darkest hours of the crisis which created uneasiness about the fate of the country and the future of everything in it? Or is the secret the ease of quickly raising money, which might drive its owners into assuming risky ventures.

Such questions might seem strange to businessmen who are unconcerned about economics except from the standpoint of what the transaction might bring. However, what gives rise to further questions are a number of phenomena which accompanied some of these transactions.

The first phenomenon is that some transactions revealed a sort of withdrawal on the part of French capital operating in Lebanon. This withdrawal began in part with the reduction of Credit Commercial de France's (the mother company) share in Credit Commercial De France-Middle East at the end of 1977, on the grounds of increasing the number of shareholders. This was followed by the sale of one-third of the New Syria-Lebanon Bank Company, owned by French interests, to Mrs Nadiya al-Khuri at the end of 1979. Now we see the Indosuisse group relinquishing 70 percent of its ownership in Francebank. In the industrial sector, we see the "Saint (Goyen)" industrial group giving up 40 percent of the shares it owned in the al-Mushriq Glass Company, and maintaining a symbolic share not exceeding 10 percent.

The second phenomenon is that the same names were involved in more than one transaction, especially in the industrial, banking, and real estate transactions.

The third phenomenon is the volume of money involved. Aside from the ease of quickly raising money, this phenomenon has to be explained in terms of the vital fact of firm relations which continue to link Lebanese businessmen with Arab businessmen, financiers and rulers, who have vast amounts of money and are looking for investment opportunities, which, they feel, are limited in their own countries. They are stepping up their search now, because of increasing uneasiness about stability in their own countries, where they have heard more than one threat, and have seen more than one serious incident, against this stability.

Is all this discussion sufficient to give a reasonable idea about the secrets behind the investments in various sectors of the Lebanese economy during hours and days of anxiety about the fate of Lebanon?

Does this discussion answer the question as to whether these investments are an indication of continued confidence in Lebanon's future, or does it merely underscore the puzzle of these investments?

The discussion may or may not be adequate. But with all available facts and questions raised so far, we will know the answer to our questions sooner or later.

8559
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

TWO LEBANESE MURDERED--A state of tension and expectation is prevailing in the southern area after Al-Qulay'ah, Marj 'Uyun, An-Nabatiyah and (?Arnun), had come under heavy artillery fire. Heavy artillery fire has fallen in western Al-Biqa', particularly in Al-'Aliyah and Ra's Al-'Ayn. In the capital, the situation remains relatively calm in the traditional axes. However, intermittent sniper fire is being heard between armed positions. Meanwhile, in [words indistinct], Al-Biqa', a dispute broke out in the office of Abu Ahmad Isma'il, who belongs to FATAH. The dispute resulted in the murder of Antoine al-Hashim and a member of the Zaytun family--both of whom belonged to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party. [Text] [NC202059 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 2015 GMT 20 Oct 80]

CSO: 4802

SAHARA 'RECOVERY' ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATED AT DAKHLA

Rabat L'OPINION in French 18 Aug 80 pp 1, 3

[Article by Hubert Laverne, AFP special correspondent]

[Text] Thursday the Moroccan Government once again indicated its determination to keep the Western Sahara by giving special pomp to the celebration of the first anniversary of the "recovery" of the Province of "Wadi Ed-Dahab."

On 14 August 1979, 9 days after the Algiers agreement by which Mauritania resolved to withdraw from the southern part of the Western Sahara, the region's tribal chiefs and leading citizens swore allegiance to His Majesty, King Hassan II, in Rabat. In the eyes of the Moroccan authorities, this ceremony was supposed to take the place of self-determination.

A year later, a ministerial delegation led by Prime Minister Maati Bouabid, and including representatives of the various parties represented in the government, went on locating, at Dakhla (formerly Villa Cisneros), while all over Morocco a holiday was observed to mark the event.

A Moroccan Air Force "C-130" plane landed on the airfield that no longer has anything in common with the stopover runway of "Aeropostale's" pioneers: a theatrical company, the Moroccan Radio-Television Orchestre, and approximately 30 members of Mohammedia's Yacht Club who had come to participate in a surfboat regata and a fishing competition were present.

Before the parade that opened the ceremonies, General Dlimi, the head of the king's Aides de Camp, in command of the southern zone, and the leading official responsible for the "recovery" of Morocco's military position, decorated the commanding officer of the Dakhla zone and eight soldiers distinguished for their heroic conduct during the battle of Bir Anzarane (in the south of the Western Sahara) which, a year ago, stopped the POLISARIO in its attempt to seize Dakhla and all of the province.

The parade of the troops of the three branches of the armed forces was preceded, amidst the people's applause, by the passing of the province's leading citizens wearing traditional costume. Some carried U.S. rifles distributed to them last year by His Majesty King Hassan II at the conclusion of the allegiance ceremony.

The prime minister then inaugurated two facilities that symbolize the city's future expansion: a secondary school and a water treatment plant, the volume of which should be sufficient until the year 2000.

He also presided over a mechoui (banquet-size roasting of lamb) given for everyone under tens of camel skin tents set up in rows at the edge of the city.

But without a doubt the most extraordinary event of the day was the distribution of prizes--a camel for first prize--to the winners of the regata and the fishing competition. The ceremony took place at the end of the pier under the eyes of the crews of four Spanish and two South Korean trawlers stopped and boarded in the last few days.

The waters of the Western Sahara are so well stocked with fish that master coxswain do not resist the temptation to throw their nets in without permission in Morocco's economic zone or right in territorial waters, they pointed out in Dakhla.

General Dlimi voiced his satisfaction to the AFP concerning the situation in the region: "As you see " he said, "there is no problem. The situation is very calm and very sound on the military level. The Malians, Mauritanians, and the other African nationals (who make up the POLISARIO) no longer want to fight for others."

As far as the prime minister is concerned, he feels that the situation has also improved at the diplomatic level: "Some African countries," he said, "have understood the situation. For example, Nigeria has remembered that it was supported when Biafra wanted to secede. Others have ethnic problems...So, what we need to do is continue to explain Morocco's point of view in Africa and Latin America." Regarding an eventual direct settlement of the conflict between Morocco and Algeria, that Rabat has always wanted, the honorable Maati Bouabid appears skeptical: The internal changes that have taken place in Algeria, he feels, have not changed the positions on the Sahara.

"This matter doesn't concern us," they continue to say in Algiers, according to the prime minister.

9064
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NEW ROYAL PARDONS ISSUED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 22 Aug 80 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Acts of Royal Pardon"]

[Text] As is known, an act of pardon was granted sentenced prisoners or prisoners being prosecuted in cases of committing an offense against the public order or the state's security.

Those who benefited from this act of pardon were freed on the occasion of the last Young People's Celebration, which coincided with His Majesty, King Hassan II's 51st birthday.

From an authorized source, we have learned that, on the occasion of 20 August, the royal pardon was extended to the sovereign's subjects living outside the kingdom and also sentenced, charged, or wanted by the nation's judicial system. In this respect, it is explained by the same source that the royal act of pardon effectively applies to people under charges, as explained in the preceding paragraph, in particular those whose names follow:

--Abderraham Yousfi,
--Bensaid Mohamed, called "Chtouki,"
--Iraki Abdelmajid,
--Sebata Abdelfattah,
--Mohamed Lakhsassi,
--Benyahia Mohamed,
--Skirej Rachid,
--Kheir Ahmed, called "Mid,"
--Sahir Larbi El Figuigui,
--Nasser Omar, called "Ferchi,"
--Midaoui Ahmed,
--Bouderqa M'Barek,
--M'Hammedi Houssein, called "Khaddar,"
--Ramdani Abderrahman El Figuigui,
--Bouras Mohamed Belarbie El Figuigui,
--Amara Mohamed, called "Saa,"
--Zahir Omar,
--Jahouani Mohamed,
--Kamil Brahim,
--Manouzi Brahim,
--Fatni Ahmed,
--Ameziane Mohamed Ould Sellam El Ouaryaghli,
--Laouzi Haddou, and
--Hilali Mohamed.

9064
CSO: 4400

ISTIQLAL PARTY SUPPORTS AL QODS COMMITTEE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS

Rabat L'OPINION in French 25 Aug 80 p 1

[Article: "Al-Tayif [Conference] Appeal Supported to Firmly Oppose Countries that Sustain the Zionist Enemy"]

[Text] The executive committee of the Istiqlal Party met Thursday, 10 Chaoual 1400 (21 August 1980) to discuss the results of the Al Qods committee meetings at Casablanca from 16 to 18 August under the chairmanship of his majesty the king.

The Istiqlal Party feels that the committee achieved positive results with the aid of the sustained work and basic energy his majesty the king instilled in the committee's working staff. The executive committee voices its total support of the decisions made at the conclusion of the Al Qods committee meeting. The Istiqlal Party supports the basic principles that assert the desire of Arab and Islamic states to respond to the Israeli challenge and that are committed to liberating the Arab city of Al Qods in order to make it the capital of an autonomous Palestinian state. The Istiqlal Party feels that this commitment is a national, Arab, Islamic, and human obligation demanded of all Arab and Islamic countries and allies to support the Palestinian people in their struggle for the exercise of their rights to return to their homeland, to achieve self-determination, and to establish an independent state in their homeland.

The Istiqlal Party expresses its support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's appeal for a religious war to liberate Al Qods as resolved and stated by the Al Qods committeee.

The Istiqlal Party also supports Al-Tayif's appeal to firmly oppose countries that support the Zionist enemy.

The Istiqlal Party regards it as essential to carry out the resolution to open volunteer offices in Islamic countries in order to mobilize citizens.

The Istiqlal Party is happy to record the appeal for the creation of public support associations like the "Moroccan Association to Support the Palestinian Struggle."

It voices its support of all the resolutions taken at the conclusion of the Al Qods committee meeting and, in the first place, the one recommending the increase of equipment and moral support for the Palestinian Liberation Organization to enable it to step up its armed struggle as well as the one calling on Arab and Islamic countries to use their strength and potentialities against all countries that support the Israeli resolution to annex Al Qods.

The Istiqlal Party expresses its support of the resolutions taken by the committee on the level of foreign contacts regarding the withdrawal of embassies from occupied Al Qods as well as the expulsion of the Workers' Party of the Socialist International, the stopping of Jewish immigration to Palestine, the recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, or the breaking of diplomatic relations with Israel by nonalined countries.

The Istiqlal Party expresses its support of the committee's resolution inviting all countries to carry out their responsibilities vis-a-vis the challenge made by Israel.

It expresses the trust extended to the committee and its chairman, His Majesty Hassan II and feels that the effort exerted by His Majesty during the last session and at the level of the contacts that it is initiating confirm the committee's commitment to liberate Al Qods and it expresses its total confidence that the committee will undertake to set these resolutions down in the practical areas forming the best counterattack on Israel's challenge to annex Al Qods and make it its "eternal" capital.

9064
CSO: 4400

FIRST QUARTER ECONOMIC STATISTICS REPORTED

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 12 Aug 80 pp 1, 2

[Article: "A Satisfactory Balance Sheet for the First Quarter of 1980"]

[Text] A 19-percent increase in the production of phosphates and a 68-percent increase in exported tons; a 52-percent increase in exports and a 30-percent increase in imports.

The quarterly survey of the economic situation carried out by the Office of Statistics during the second quarter of 1980 permits us to make some interesting observations on economic growth during the first quarter.

The balance sheet we can draw up is very positive and remarkable results have been obtained in some sectors. Here are the most noteworthy points:

Coal production	:	+46%
Production of electricity	:	+11%
Phosphate production	:	+19%
Zinc production	:	+42%
Lead production	:	+16%
Exports	:	+52%
Imports	:	+29.8%
Price of a ton of exported phosphate	:	+68%
Price of a ton of exported P2 05	:	+63.3%

Here are the results recorded in various sectors of the economy as they were recorded by the Office of Statistics.

Energy

The energy sector experienced a favorable growth during the first quarter of 1980. Coal and electricity production were better than in the first quarter of the preceding year, with 46 percent and 11 percent more respectively. As for crude oil, it recorded an almost 2 percent decrease, in comparison to the same period. However, this decrease is not surprising since the rate of increase was very extraordinarily vigorous in the year elapsed, largely because of the imports of this product resulting from the expansion of the SAMIR [Moroccan-Italian Refining Corporation] and the installation of the SCP [Moroccan Petroleum Company].

The consumption of petroleum products like gas, gas oil, and fuel oil, experienced a clear improvement compared to what it was during the first 3 months of 1979, except for gas where a decrease was noted during the same period.

Mines

The rise in the prices of raw materials on the world market stimulated our mineral production at the beginning of the year 1980.

As a result, at the end of March 1980, phosphates had advanced in volume by close to 19 percent, lead 16 percent, and zinc 42 percent compared to the same period last year.

On the other hand, the production of iron does not seem to have recovered yet. The latter was only 450 tons at the end of the first 3 months of this year, compared to 2,600 tons during the first quarter last year. Consequently, the overall index of the mining sector is reported at 167 points, compared to 128 last year.

Industry

According to the industrialists affected by the economic survey, the trend observed for the whole processing industry during the first quarter is rather favorable. As a result, when seen through its production index, the activity of this sector continued to experience a recovery during this period.

The branches that seem to be experiencing sound growth are paper and cardboard, leather and leather shoes, chemistry and metals. These results have been occasioned by rising demand on the one hand and by the restocking of inventories on the other hand. Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the production of paper and cardboard has completely run out and that inventories are depleted. In the case of personal prospects for the second quarter, half of the industrialists were expecting an increase in production volume. Food products, for which 56 percent of the industrialists had observed a stabilization during the first quarter compared to the fourth quarter last year, would experience an economic upturn since 63 percent of them anticipate an increase. Perhaps it is the upcoming month of Ramadan that is responsible for this phenomenon, particularly when we know that this month has very significant effects on consumption. Because of these statistical data and also the evolution of the industrial production index over time, the latter would stabilize at 197 points compared to 194 a year ago or an increase of 1.5 percent.

Foreign Trade

In the first quarter of 1980, our trade with foreign countries produced a trade deficit of 1,691 million dirhams or thereabouts, compared to 1,563 million DH at the conclusion of the same period the preceding year. Such a change is the result of a very marked increase in our purchases of 29.8 percent and from the 52 percent increase in value of our sales that we have already reported. Therefore the reserve ratio settled at 59.5 percent, compared to 50.8 percent.

The weighing down of the expenditures incurred by imports results in particular from the rapid increase in the average prices of an imported ton of refined crude oil (95.5 percent), sugar (34.5 percent), and wheat (30.4 percent).

In the case of exports, for their part they have recovered 52 percent, as a result principally in value of raw materials (86.7 percent), semi-manufactured products (107.7 percent), food products (6.3 percent), and fuel products (225.9 percent).

Indeed, certain outstanding products like the phosphates, citrus fruits, and phosphoric acid and that represent 50.9 percent of all exports have seen their average price per ton rise 68 percent, 1.6 percent, and 63.3 percent, compared to the same period last year.

Concerning the second quarter of 1980, imports and exports would continue their rising trend, the fluctuations expected at the end of June 1980 are respectively 24.9 percent and 52.5 percent, in comparison to the same period a year ago.

Tourism

At the conclusion of the first 4 months of 1980, the number of arrivals of short-term tourists came to 400,000 tourists, compared to 391,000 for the same period last year. This outcome could be better without the continued rise in prices that is rampant in the world, particularly in the cost of transportation and petroleum products.

The growth by the various means of transportation lets it become apparent that only air travel progressed. This remaining, in addition, the principal means used was in fact used by 219,000 tourists (an 11.7 percent increase in growth). However, the entries of tourists by land and sea registered a loss, 8.8 percent and 3.4 percent respectively, compared to the same period last year.

Public Finance

Compared to the first 4 months of last year, recurring revenue rose 17 percent to reach 4,679 million DH. As for fiscal revenue, representing 95 percent of all revenue, it alone registered a fluctuation upwards of 27 percent compared to the same period of 1979. Customs duty and excise taxes are at the bottom of this growth.

As for recurring expenditures, they registered a 29 percent rise to reach 5,066 million DH, during the same period. We find the operating and public debt expenses intervene in this substantial increase 23.4 percent and 47.9 percent respectively.

As a result, fiscal savings produced a deficit of 387 million DH at the end of April of this year, instead of a surplus of 83 million DH achieved during the same period of 1979. However, beside this seemingly difficult situation, capital expenditure declined 22 percent to settle at 1,263 million DH. With regard to forecasts, because of the statistics for the month of April, the operating and public debt expenses should, at the end of June, register increases of 27 percent and 67.6 percent respectively compared to the same period last year. Reciprocally capital expenditure declined 28 percent.

Money and Credit

The money supply hit 28,264 million DH at the end of March of this year, compared to 24,605 million DH a year earlier, producing as a result a 14.9 percent increase. This rise involved paper currency and quasi-money particularly--16.1 percent and

30.3 percent respectively. As for financial credit, because of the marked improvement in demand deposits in depository banks, it rose 9.7 percent, thus representing 51 percent of the total money and quasi-money supply. Furthermore, while claims against the Treasury and economic appropriations increased 11.9 percent and 17.1 percent respectively, as for foreign assets, they declined 6.1 percent compared to the same period last year, because of the heaviness in value shown for our purchases overseas that experienced a dizzy increase of 29.8 percent during the first quarter of this year.

At the end of the second quarter, the aggregate total of money and quasi-money supplies was to stabilize at 29,729 million DH, thus recording a 13.4 percent rise, compared to 24.5 percent already noted last year. As far as economic appropriations and claims against the Treasury are concerned, they were reported by 17.5 percent and 16.8 percent respectively with an eye on responding to the needs of the economy through the restrictive policy on the inflationary creation of money.

Prices

Consumer prices slipped in virtually all industrialized countries this year. Japan, considered the toughest in the struggle to counter price increases, is currently experiencing a 10-percent rate of inflation. In France and the United States, the shift in these prices from January to the end of March stabilized at a rate of 4.2 percent.

At the national level, the cost of living index, while continuing to show an upward trend, is varying in the direction of our forecasts. It reached 204.1 points at the conclusion of the first 5 months of this year, compared to 188.4 one year before, thus recording an 8.3 percent increase.

It is pointed out, furthermore, that if the lowest rates are blamed on the "clothing" and "food"groups, with respectively 5.6 percent and 6 percent, the "housing" group has seen its index increase 11.3 percent. In addition, while it has the highest rate, the index of the "transportation, leisure, miscellaneous" group has experienced a substantial slowdown, moving from 16.1 percent at the end of January to 14.7 percent at the end of May 1980.

At the conclusion of the first 6 months of this year, we should expect an 8.3 percent increase in the overall index, compared to the same period last year.

9064
CSO: 4400

MOTIVES BEHIND TIMING, LOCALE OF MILITARY REVIEW STUDIED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 6 Sep 80 p 18

[Article by Sulayman Nimr: "Saudi Arms: Diversified Sources and Modern Sites"]

[Text] AMX-30 tanks were passing in front of the area of the military review which was held in Tabuk in northern Saudi Arabia last Monday and F-5 aircraft were flying overhead when one of the foreign military attaches whispered in the ear of a colleague: "Do you think there are political and military ramifications behind holding this military review no more than 200 kilometers from the Jordanian front with Israel, particularly after the call by Saudi Crown Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sa'ud for a holy war?"

The other military attache replied to his colleague: "I don't think so because it is not Saudi Arabia's habit to flex its muscles and make shows of strength. The military display now in progress and the review presented by the paratroops and the personnel of the special units yesterday were held only because the Saudi monarch was inaugurating the military city, King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Military City in Tabuk. This military city is one of those that Saudi Arabia has taken pains to establish in various parts of its territory. There is another military city in the southern area of the kingdom and construction of a military city is currently underway in the eastern area.

"However, I believe that there are ramifications to picking the time to hold this display, not to mention the number of personnel and equipment which we are now seeing, much greater than we have seen in earlier reviews by the Saudi army. This leaves me with an impression that the Saudi leadership wants to show the world, and Israel in particular, that it has a military strike force, particularly after the call for a holy war by the Saudi crown prince."

These questions raised by the foreign military attache did not appear odd to the military observers who had followed with great interest the two military displays in which various military units had participated, in addition to a display of equipment and machinery involving troop transports, armored vehicles, M-6 tanks, AMX-30 tanks, vehicles carrying TOW and HOT anti-tank missiles, 155 mm artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, HAWK missiles and various formations of aircraft including Lightening and F-5 fighter and interceptor aircraft and air-refueling aircraft.

The size of the military display prompted observers to point out in their reports that the Saudi leadership is working to station and reinforce Saudi army forces in

the northern part of the kingdom. However, Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd-al'Aziz al-Sa'ud, Saudi minister of defense and aviation, when asked about that, denied it, saying: "The kingdom's defense policy is not centered on concentrating its defense and forces in a specific part of the kingdom but rather on defending all territory of the kingdom. One requirement of the Saudi defense plan is to create military cities in various areas of the kingdom because the tremendous expanse of the kingdom requires the establishment of military cities in specific strategic areas." Prince Sultan reaffirmed the arms policy of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia based on the principle of multiple sources of arms for its army, saying in this regard, "The principle of multiple sources of arms is a policy which the kingdom has pursued for a long time resulting in the conclusion of bilateral agreements with a number of arms-producing western countries. The kingdom is anxious to acquire technology to the extent it can absorb it."

The Saudi minister of defense and aviation disclosed that Britain had agreed to sell arms to the kingdom and that the British foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, had, during his recent visit to Saudi Arabia, expressed his country's willingness to cooperate with Saudi Arabia in this area and others.

AL-MUSTAQBAL asked an official Saudi source about the political and military goals of the military reviews which the city of Tabuk on the northern border of Saudi Arabia with Jordan had witnessed and he said, "As Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sa'ud, minister of defense and avaiation, explained, all the military accomplishments which the kingdom is pursuing fall within the framework of Saudi Arabia's defense plan."

8389
CSO: 4802

FRENCH NAVAL WEAPONS PACKAGE DETAILED

Beirut AL-'AMAL in Arabic 12 Sep 80 p 1

[Article: "French Naval Weapons Worth 14 Billion Francs for Saudi Arabia"]

[Text] It was learned yesterday in Riyadh that a contract worth 14 billion French francs to supply French naval weapons to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was initialed.

The signing of this contract between the French and Saudi governments comes in the wake of the preliminary decision to entrust the supplying of a large part of the ordnance needed to defend its coasts to France. It should be mentioned that this decision was reached during the visit of French Defense Minister Yvon Bourges to Saudi Arabia last May.

These sources say that the contract calls for providing naval defense equipment, equipment for special forces and electronic equipment through a consortium comprising state-owned naval arsenals and private companies: Matra, (sinas), and Thomson-CSF. The same sources also say that the French group, Thomson-CSF, will play the role of executive overseer of the delivery of the arms and equipment. A spokesman for this company refused, however, to confirm or deny this information.

In a related concern, Saudi Arabia has agreed to provide the necessary funds to the Dassault group to manufacture the twin-jet Mirage 4000.

It should be noted that a few months ago Saudi Arabia paid the same company 4 billion francs to finance the final plans and manufacture of the aircraft. It has not been determined how many Mirage 4000 aircraft Saudi Arabia will need and it is thought that there will be negotiations about this.

It appears that the important thing at the present time is the production of large numbers of this very advanced aircraft which the French government and the Dassault group did not have the necessary financial capabilities to manufacture.

8389
CSO: 4802

POLICE CHIEF DISCUSSES ORGANIZATION, PENAL AFFAIRS

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 15 Sep 80 p 3

[Interview with General 'Abd al-Muhsin ibn al-'A'id al-Harithi, Director of Police of the Al-Qasim Area, by 'Abdullah al-'Ayarah, date and place of interview not given]

[Text] The security aspect of things receives great attention from the government of the kingdom and it always takes pains to provide security and protection for citizens and others. Public security is handled through directorates of police in all areas of the kingdom which achieve and maintain this security and pursue crime wherever it occurs. The directorate of police in al-Qasim is one of these directorates which has witnessed a great improvement in the number of personnel and equipment and to which the police departments of al-Ras, 'Anizah and Baridah have been joined to fall under a single command. During the years 1397, 1398, 1399 and 1400, the police force has developed and has received modern equipment.

During a meeting with General 'Abd-al-Muhsin ibn 'A'id al-Harithi, director of police of the al-Qasim area, he talked with AL-RIYAD about the police departments and how to enlist in military service.

[Question] What about the most important police stations?

[Answer] The fact is there is a large number of police divisions at the present time. The most important are the Baridah division, and the 'Anizah/al-Ras/al-Bukayriyah/al-Mudhnib division. Also, there is a criminal operations division and a telecommunications division. The most important section of the latter is the operations section, because it has prime responsibility for crime prevention and for catching criminals once crimes are committed. It is also responsible for the security situation in the area in general. We should not forget that every division, branch or department of the police has a considerable role and importance.

[Question] Given the vast size of the al-Qasim area, is thought being given to opening sub-stations in a number of cities of the area?

[Answer] The fact is that the idea of opening sub-stations in the area has come up and is being studied and, God willing, will be made public at the right time. Also, when there are sufficient capabilities, a number of branches will be opened in the city of Baridah.

[Question] When we hear the word prison, we at once think that this is a place where you put everyone who violates the law of all classes and ages as well as women. There are a number of questions about this. If a person who is not yet 18 is arrested for violating the law, where is he put? If a non-Saudi who is not yet 18 is arrested for violating the law, where is he put? What about girls who are under 18?

[Answer] Prison is the administration of punishment, correction and reform and is not what some people think. Most people put there are on equal footing with no difference between them, citizen of foreigner. However, the punishments vary to fit the offense. Anyone arrested who is not yet 18--whether foreign or Saudi--is placed in an observation house. They are interrogated in a calm and psychologically relaxing atmosphere as juveniles; they are treated equally because our wise government pursues the path of the Islamic Shari'a the basis of which is justice and equality.

Women have a special, independent prison in wings of public prisons and have matrons to take care of their affairs within the prison.

There are various activities in which some prisoners engage in prison, such as carpentry, electrician, foundry work and some other manual work for women and these activities are certainly sufficient to rehabilitate a prisoner to follow the straight and narrow.

[Question] When a prisoner gets out after serving his time, is there a followup by the security directorate and attempts to help him from reverting to the crooked path?

[Answer] There is certainly a followup on prisoners when they leave prison after serving their sentences to find out if they are going straight and to keep them away from crime. There is indeed a helping hand given to them to enable them to continue honest work and to direct them away from the path of crime and, with God's help, to guide them to happiness and wellbeing.

[Question] Is there cooperation between the al-Qasim area police and some departments that take an interest in the individual, such as the vocational training center, vocational preparation and the social care house, that is, after the prisoner gets out of prison?

[Answer] There is excellent cooperation between the al-Qasim police and those departments with a common relationship.

[Question] Recently a social observation house was opened. What is the connection between public security and this house?

[Answer] There is one connection between the observation house and the security machinery, that is, dealing with problems of juveniles who are under 18 years of age who turn to committing some misdemeanors and infractions and turning them toward the right path and keeping them from the paths of evil and perversion.

[Question] It is known, God be praised, that the kingdom has one of the lowest crime rates in the world. Do you know the crime rate in the al-Qasim area (we

don't mean the crime of murder but anything violating the law) and what is the rate for Saudis compared with foreigners? Are you satisfied with the security situation?

[Answer] I would say that the crime rate in the al-Qasim area is low, God be praised, although there are some incidents but not worrisome and most of the crimes are by foreigners.

In fact, I am satisfied with the security situation in the area because all personnel do their duty as well as can be expected within their specialities in accordance with the security plans. We are working to improve security conditions. Rather than my satisfaction as an official, I want the public to be satisfied in this regard because the satisfaction of the citizen is more important and my satisfaction is based on their satisfaction. We pray to God for success.

[Question] There are some young people who shy away from military service because of what they see as its tough rules. What would you say to them?

[Answer] I would tell them that the military is not like that; it is easy, education and honorable service which is the duty of everyone. Like some other activities, when a young person wants to get involved in it, it appears difficult to him but when he joins it, he finds that things are easy. The military, as is known, is a transformation in an individual's life from civilian life to the military life and this has an impact on his behavior and his treatment while performing his duty with any citizen. After an individual experiences it, he will prefer it over any other government jobs. I urge our young people to be eager to follow the military path in all its various jobs and they will see the great difference between the civilian and military lives and the psychological satisfaction.

[Question] Any last word?

[Answer] My final word is a request for cooperation between the citizen and the security man because cooperation is needed. Both are human beings and both are citizens as well.

8389
CSO: 4802

COMMUNIST PARTY ISSUES ANNIVERSARY STATEMENT

Beirut AL-NIDA' in Arabic 17 Sep 80 p 9

[Article: "The Events of November Are an Essential Turn in the Struggle of our People; the Call for a Holy War Is a Lie; the Authorities Suppressed the Demonstrations on Jerusalem Day"]

[Text] The Communist Party in Saudi Arabia released a statement on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the announcement of its founding about conditions in Saudi Arabia, the Arab world and the world. Here is an extract of the bulk of the statement which was dated last August:

Workers and peasants, youths, intellectuals, women, men of the tribes, our masses:

This is the fifth anniversary of the announcement of the founding of the Communist Party in Saudi Arabia, the seasoned vanguard of the working class and the rest of the downtrodden people in our country. On 31 August 1975, the first constituent assembly of the party was held where it drew up the political and organizational fixed in its nationalist program, its internal structure, and elected the leading bodies.

Five years have passed filled with important and grave events from the domestic, Arab and international standpoint. They have certainly left their effect and had their impact on the activity and struggle of the party and the rest of the patriotic and democratic forces in our country. The validity of the party's course and political and combative options and directions have been tested with regard to many positions and the party has reaffirmed its sincerity and fundamental commitment to its class, nationalist, pan-Arab and international tasks and duties. One the nationalist level, the communists have fought relentlessly and selflessly at the side of all patriotic and democratic forces in exceptionally harsh circumstances against the absolute monarchial regime supported by international imperialism and its monopolistic companies. In defense of the vital interests of the working class and the other patriotic segments of the populace, this struggle has made the utmost sacrifices of its finest members and supporters.

The noble events of November, which were the product of a set of objective and autonomous factors in the economic, social and political reality, represented a major event and essential turn in the struggle of the masses and their patriotic forces in our country. The superior bravery and heroism demonstrated by the

people in confronting the forces of the suppressive authorities, armed to the teeth with weapons and supported by American imperialism, reflected the extent of the anger harbored as the result of the injustice and persecution the people had received from the ruling establishment. The regime's only concern is to fulfill its narrow, egoistic interests, even if this required frittering away the values of independence and effective sovereignty over the basic destinies and wealth; in effect, pawning itself to imperialism and its oil companies.

The November convulsion underscored the fact that given the depth and evolution of the confrontation between the masses on one hand and the ruling regime and its imperialist masters on the other, the authorities will have to continuously forego their positions which are invariably hostile to the interests, aspirations and ambitions of the homeland and the people. What is needed now is the intensification of the struggle and moving it forward on all levels to tighten the noose around the absolutist regime whose crisis has worsened, whose isolation has increased, whose social base has narrowed and whose foundations have been undermined.

In order to accomplish the patriotic and democratic tasks in our country, it will be necessary to unify the efforts of all patriotic and sincere forces. This must be achieved regardless of [their] political, intellectual and ideological orientations, on the common patriotic battleground against the domination of imperialism and the absolutist regime for the sake of freedom, democracy and honor. The objective being to regain nationalist control and sovereignty over the potential and wealth of the country and to place it at the service of the development, progress and prosperity of the country.

Camp David

On the Arab level, American imperialism is working hard to extricate Camp David from the impasse it has reached because of the stumbling and failure of the autonomy negotations thanks to the stanch resistance of the Palestinian people under the leadership of the PLO. This struggle remains both within the occupied territory and on the Lebanese scene where the men of the resistance and the Lebanese nationalist movement have recorded bloody battles of herosim and sacrifice in defense of the Lebanese national destiny and the right of the Palestinian resistance to exist, and in defense of the pan-Arab destiny as a whole. In addition, the steadfastness of Syria and the confrontation front, bolstered by loyal friends in the socialist camp, with the Soviet Union in the forefront, have played a prominent role in standing firm to frustrate the conspiracy. The imperialist-Zionist-reactionary attack against all locales of the national liberation movement in the Arab area is aimed at liquidating its accomplishments in order to regain and sanctify total domination over the potential and wealth of the Arab peoples. This policy emerges in various forms and methods, the most important of which are the daily Israeli attacks against the south of Lebanon, sometimes openly and sometimes under the cover of the fascist mini-state of Sa'd Haddad, as well as through the European initiative which was raised as a complement to Camp David, not as an alternative to it. Arab reaction in general found in this initiative a liferaft in a clear attempt to deflate and water down Arab steadfastness by creating illusions about Europe's capability to formulate a resolution independent of America which would bring the possibility of a comprehensive and just solution of the Middle East issue, with the Palestinian issue at its core.

The world has witnessed important developments embodied in the successive victories and successes of the peoples and the forces of liberation, progress, peace and socialism. As the result of this, young countries have appeared on the international stage, liberated from the system of colonial domination, such as Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, and a number of reactionary, dictatorial regimes have collapsed, as in Afghanistan, Iran and Nicaragua, and the positions of revolutionary regimes, such as the PDRY and Ethiopia, have been strengthened. All this was preceded by the great victory won by the peoples of Indo-China when the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia ground American arrogance into the dust. On the African continent, the policy of discrimination and apartheid is witnessing violent resistance from the black majority, crowned by Zimbabwe's achievement of independence. Many reactionary and dictatorial regimes are candidates for a downfall at the hands of their peoples in Latin America, Asia and Africa. The existence of the socialist ranks, led by the Soviet Union, play an important and decisive role on the international level for strengthening peace and relaxation and warding off the threat of war and aggression, for helping peoples in their just struggle against imperialism and reaction and for their future development and social progress. The ideal example of international support which the Soviet Union provided to the people and revolution of Afghanistan constitutes a manifestation of this resolute basic policy.

In complete contrast to this, the world imperialist system, whose problems and conditions are worsening, is striving to escape its crises by intensifying its aggressive military propensity and beating the drums of war, the most prominent signs of which are the implementation of the program to produce the neutron bomb, locating medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the call to rearm West Germany and Japan, the improvement of NATO's military fleets, intensification of the policy of regional alliances and the construction and improvement of American military bases in several areas of the world. Following the same course is the freeze in signing the SALT II agreement and the Pentagon's announcement of a new nuclear strategy. Naturally the NATO allies find Peking to be a guaranteed ally based on the tendency toward hegemony and domination, linked with super-power chauvinism, inherent in the Chinese leadership. This policy which is a threat to the peace of the whole world is spurring all forces of peace throughout the world to intensify the struggle against imperialism and its aggressive nature. In this regard, the communist and labor movement emerges as the prime defender of the future and security of peoples.

Under this framework, the last meeting of the European communist and labor parties was held in Paris. It is regarded as an event of major importance for Europe which has experienced two destructive world wars, since American imperialism is striving to spread the climate of the cold war and sabotage the positive principles of the Helsinki security and cooperation conference. The unity of all forces which oppose international imperialism, reaction and war, and which are struggling for liberation, progress and peace occupies a preeminent place in our contemporary era because it is linked to the future of all of mankind.

Our party, which is entering its fifth year, is completely confident of the inevitable victory of the cause of the people and the homeland despite all severe difficulties because it is a just cause which is in line with the requirements of inevitable historic development.

In order to contain and humble the forces of Arab steadfastness, local reaction was set in motion to engage in acts of conspiracy and sabotage. This was demonstrated clearly in Syria as the direct confrontation line against Camp David. All this was accompanied by strange and extensive American and European political and military movements in the Gulf and the Peninsula. The American military presence is being strengthened in the Indian Ocean, the Arab Sea, the Red Sea and the Gulf to be a permanent presence through naval and air military bases and facilities in Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrein on the Gulf and its approaches and in Egypt and Somalia on the Red Sea. All these aggressive activities are underway with the goal of insuring the complete domination of imperialism and the continued devouring of the best parts of the area and in order to confront the popular movements there and also in order to contain the revolutionary regimes in the PDRY and Ethiopia and to implement threats and conspiracies against the Iranian revolution. In order to continue these aggressive conspiracies and movements, imperialism and its local reactionary allies in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia resorted to raising the slogans of the security of the Gulf and the security of the Red Sea which were threatened by "the Soviet communist threat emanating from Afghanistan."

Call for a Holy War

It has become clear that the trickery and demagoguery which marked the statements of Saudi officials about a holy war to liberate Jerusalem did not fool the Arab peoples and were met with scorn and derision. This self-same regime which arrested citizens who volunteered to fight beside their Arab and Palestinian brothers in the 1967 war and whose national guard opened fire on the peaceful marches which took place in a number of cities of the eastern area on Jerusalem day should be the last to talk about a holy war. The road to a holy war will not come through statements to show off but by using every means available which are numerous. The measure of earnestness in the appeal for a holy war is the use of the oil weapon, the weapon of financial balances and the mobilization of the potential of the people, demonstrating its moral intiatives by releasing public, democratic freedoms. The call for a holy war requires making a clear distinction between the friends' camp and the enemies' camp. Facts confirm that American imperialism is at the head of the enemies of the Arab nation and its just issues and that the Soviet Union is at the forefront of its natural allies and friends. Any call for a holy war that befriends and allies itself with the worst of enemies and displays enmity toward the best of friends is a specious and dubious appeal.

Given the intensification of the savage imperialist-Zionist-reactionary attack against the centers of the Arab national liberation movement and the deepening of the distinction within the framework of this movement between the levels of regimes, political forces and organizations, the al-Sadat regime is no longer just outside the centers of this movement but is savagely hostile to it. The policy of the enemies of communism and the Soviets and all forces of progress in the area and throughout the world is no longer confined to traditional local reaction.

Our party is confident that despite the difficulties and conspiracies which face the national liberation movement, it will be able to continue its progress, and to achieve victory when it unifies its forces, capabilities and energies. This progress will be achieved when it allies itself with the forces of international revolution, led by the Soviet Union and the rest of the socialist ranks.

Long live the fifth anniversary of the announcement of the founding of our communist party.

May all forces opposed to American imperialism and the abolutist regime in our country be strengthened and coalesce.

Let us intensify the struggle to release political detainees and prisoners from the jails of the Saudi establishment.

Let us intensify the struggle against American military alliances and bases in the Gulf and the Red Sea.

Long live the struggle of the Arab national liberation movement against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

Glory and immortality for the martyrs of the intrepid November upheaval.

8389
CSO: 4802

PSD DISSOLVES SOME COORDINATING COMMITTEES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 1 Aug 80 p 1

[Text] The Political Bureau of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] held its regular meeting Wednesday night under the chairmanship of Mr Mohamed Mzali, secretary general of the party and prime minister.

In the course of that meeting the Political Bureau examined the social situation across the country in its various manifestations. It also reviewed the situation prevailing within some of the party's coordinating committees.

In preparation for the forthcoming convention of these committees, keeping in mind the atmosphere prevailing in those organizations, and concerned with insuring that these meetings proceed smoothly, the Political Bureau decided to dissolve coordinating committees in the City of Tunis, Bizerte, Gafsa and Gabes, and to replace them with provisional committees, whose functions will be limited to preparing for the elections. For that purpose, these provisional committees will have to organize these elections so that they may take place freely, in a democratic and serene atmosphere. Provisional committee members will not be allowed to become candidates in the forthcoming elections.

The provisional committees will be made up as follows:

--City of Tunis:

Belhassen Cherif, coordinator;
Youssef Ayari, member;
Mosbah Belarbi, member
Mohamed Guiza, member, and
Salah Berzouga, member.

--Bizerte:

Ammar Ben Aouicha, coordinator;
Habib Tliba, member;
Larbi Mallakh, member, and
Amor Bejaoui, member.

--Gafsa:

Houcine Bouyahi, coordinator;
Ferid Dhaoui, member;
Mohamed Ben Amor, member, and
Najet Ktari, member.

--Gabes:

Mohamed Kerrou, coordinator;
Houcine Azaiez, member;
Houcine Touhami, member;
Bechir Ben Mahmoud Blidaoui, member, and
Mohamed Nafti Balmi, member.

The Political Bureau also decided to dissolve the Ez-Zahra Destourian cell, to suspend Habib Fathallah, Abdelhamid Touati and Chedli Quetat from any party activity and to have them appear before the PSD's disciplinary commission.

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END

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JOURNALISTS' CONFERENCE IS STAGE FOR IRAQI AID TO EGYPTIAN JOURNALISTS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 30 Aug 80 p 29

[Article by Yusuf Ibrahim Yazbak: "Protecting the Arab Journalist From Camp David and Its Parties"]

[Text] Last week Paris witnessed the "Conference for Solidarity with Egyptian Journalists," which was organized by the Society of Arab Journalists in France, the president of which is Wafiq al-Taybi, with the guidance and support of the "General Federation of Arab Journalists. It was convened, with Sa'd Qasim Hammudi, president of the above-mentioned federation, as its chairman, on Wednesday and Thursday, 20 and 21 August, at the Hilton Hotel. The elite from the world of journalism, law and letters from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Sudan, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya participated in its activities and debates, along with more than 20 Egyptian journalists, some of the most illustrious and active journalists from the Nile Valley, whom persecution had forced to emigrate from their homeland because of their opposition to the policies of the ruling regime there--the policy of submission to the enemies of the entire Arab nation. This is the characteristic fate of all those who have successively said that this policy is traitorous.

The conference's opening session was attended by representatives from some Arab embassies, the World Organization of Journalism, the International Federation of Journalism, the French national journalists' union, and many other unions.

The high point of the conference was an announcement by its chairman, Sa'd Qasim Hammudi, president of the federation, that the Iraqi government had once again reaffirmed its promise of practical support for the circumstances and guaranties whereby the Egyptian colleagues could continue their struggle against the capitulatory conspiracy. These requirements may be summarized as follows:

1. All those Egyptian journalists whose passports have been withdrawn, not extended or not renewed, or from whom citizenship has been dropped, are granted Iraqi citizenship and passports, to ensure their right to a decent life for themselves and their families, in any place of struggle they choose.

2. The Egyptian journalists will be guaranteed the right to work in Iraqi organizations, and those journalists who are overseas will be protected from all the forms of persecution and pursuit to which they have been subjected by al-Sadat's authorities.

3. A fund will be established to support all manners of struggle by Egyptian journalists, and will be placed at the disposal of the federation, to help all those who are suffering because of their patriotic political stands.

4. The necessary means of protection will be provided for those Egyptian journalists who prefer to remain in Egypt without collaborating with the al-Sadat regime, and who are exposed to various kinds of persecution.

The conferees advised the General Federation of Arab Journalists to make efforts to get Arab capitals to adopt effective measures similar to the positive initiative taken by Iraq, to support the Egyptian journalists' struggle at home and abroad.

The conferees also requested the general federation to form an international-Arab committee to defend their Egyptian colleagues in case they are brought to trial because of their views and writings, and that the friendly journalist unions defend those colleagues who are working in their countries.

The most important reports discussed at the conference were "Egyptian Journalism In Its Struggle Against Terrorism and Imperialism," by Sa'd al-Ta'ah; "Al-Sadat, the Journalists and the Conflict of Wills," by Fathi Khalil; "Syncophantic Groups and the Egyptian Press," by Sa'd Zaghlul Fu'ad; "The Camp David Journalism Law," by 'Abd-al-Mum'im al-Ghazzali; "The Subjugation of Education and Information In Light of International Law and Human Rights," by Samir Nada; and "The Democracy of the Meatgrinder," a collection of extraordinary laws passed by al-Sadat.

It was evident that most of these reports were written with total objectivity and seriousness, and that the discussions were also conducted with total objectivity and seriousness, which proved that the conference had made progress towards its goal, on the liberal nationalist level on which the General Federation of Arab Journalists operates.

Here it should be pointed out that three main positions were observed during the discussions at the conference:

1. There was extremely violent, concentrated attack on the regime of Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat and those behind him;

2. There was a violent attack on American imperialism and the presence of the state of Israel;

3. The Egyptian colleagues associated among themselves in a brotherly manner, proving their good-naturedness, in spite of the differences in their ideologies and socio-political aims.

At the end of the conference, Chairman Sa'd Qasim Hammudi replied to a question as follows: "The Arab journalists' federation is adopting this stand in order to protect and aid every journalist persecuted by his government because of his struggle against Zionism and imperialism. We at the federation are on the side of all our Arab colleagues."

8559
CSO: 4802

REASONS FOR POSTPONEMENT OF PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL DISCUSSED

Paris AL-'NAHAR AL'-ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 14 Sep 80 p 19

[Article by N.M.: "Palestine National Council Is Postponed until 1981; Postponement of Arab Summit Is Possible"]

[Text] Some changes have been made in the calendar of Arab Political activity to adapt it to international schedules. The Palestine National Council [PNC] session has been postponed and the Amman Arab Summit is a cadidate for postponement.

A brief news item appearing in the bottom corner of the international news section in last week's press will determine, by itself, the direction of both the Arab and Israeli courses of action in the Middle East conflict.

The news item states that the Council of Ministers of the European Common Market nations will meet on 1 and 2 December to discuss the results of the trip of Gaston Thorn, foreign minister of Luxembourg and current president of the Council of Ministers of the Common Market to Middle East capitals. During this trip, he attempted to feel the pulse of the region's leaders concerning a European initiative taking shape through the UN.

No European meeting will be held before this date to discuss the final form of the European initiative.

This means that the Arab side will decide to wait and see. On one hand, the initiative could possibly clear the way to rescinding the Camp David Accords, which are now suspended at Egypt's request. On the other hand, even if some Arab nations reject the initiative, its final contents, not the Camp David Accords, could become a point of departure for the next Arab political move.

From the Israeli viewpoint, the period before December will be an opportunity for Israel to settle the PLO problem from the political and military standpoints in Lebanon, including the south, naturally. In all probability such a decisive result would be difficult to achieve, and Western Europe will have no alternative but to recognize the PLO in one form or another. Naturally, such recognition would not result in a positive reaction on the part of the new or re-elected American administration with regard to the Palestine question, but this administration would have to use the European initiative, not the Camp David Accords, as a point of departure for its next move.

In the Arab world, the first reaction to the date of the meeting of the Common Market Council of Ministers came from the PLO, which announced postponement of the PNC session,

previously set for 4 September in Damascus, until further notice. AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI had anticipated this in a previous issue under the headline: "Ceausescu Adivses Postponement of PNC and Arab Summit Meetings."

This does not mean that awaiting the European initiative is the only reason for postponing the PNC meeting. However, it is one of the reasons, according to a statement from a source in the Palestinian leadership.

This source defines the reasons for the postponement as follows:

First: Convening the PNC requires more than two weeks of preparation, working sessions and administrative actions. The PLO leadership does not believe that it is possible to waste this much time while Israel is undertaking daily aggression against the south [of Lebanon], not to mention the internal clashes [between Lebanese factions].

However, the Democratic Front [for the Liberation of Palestine - DFLP] and the Popular Front [for the Liberation of Palestine - PFLP] do not see a positive development in postponing the PNC session. Rather, they believe that it is an attempt to finesse certain policies within the PLO without obtaining unanimous approval. Parties close to Hayef Hawatmah, Secretary-General of the DFLP, believe that holding the PNC meeting would solidify the Palestinian situation in south Lebanon, not the reverse.

Second: The Arab situation and the disputes which erupt every day do not permit convening the PNC without transposing these disputes into the PNC. This would not serve unity of the Palestinian position. Another reason for postponement is perhaps to wait for an Arab situation dominated by less tension and a minimal measure of solidarity. Besides, relations of the Palestinian leadership, or most of it, with certain Arab regimes, including Syria, are tense. This tension would inevitably spread into the PNC.

Third: In any event, convening the PNC would not facilitate the job of the Western European nations in trying to come up with a political settlement for the Middle East question. Rather, it might once again result in advance rejection of the European effort. If it is undersirable to announce PLO approval of this European effort, it is also undesirable to announce an advance rejection of it. Otherwise, the situation of the Palestinian leadership would become like the situation of "the young girl who rejects a man who has not asked to marry her."

Furthermore, the thrust of the European initiative may not produce support for the PLO. However, it would break the international political deadlock in the matter of settling the Middle East crisis outside the framework of Camp David.

Some Palestinian leaders see the European move as a supplement to the Camp David Accords. But others, who hold decision-making positions, believe that the European initiative may provide opportunity for Palestinian action, whereas no such opportunity exists under current conditions.

With regard to the Arab world in general, the situation is no better than it is with the Palestinians. Therefore, postponement of the Arab Summit conference, which had been scheduled for 4 November, is quite possible."

9605
CSO: 4802

'ARAFAT EXPRESSES OPTIMISM IN PLO STRUGGLE

Santiago HOY in Spanish 24-30 Sep 80 pp 57-60

[Report on interview with PLO leader Yasir 'Arafat by HOY correspondent Maria Paz del Rio, in Beirut, date not indicated]

[Text] Beirut--At 0115 hours, the streets are deserted, and only a few night owls are still out in a Beirut which is still startled and shaken every so often by gunshots. The guards are alert at their posts, and the tense commotion of day has been replaced by the tense calm of night.

In the offices of Yasir Arafat, leader of the PLO, the stir has not ceased--according to one of the aides, "It is very early"--nor has the vigilance relaxed. Armed guards watch the building's entrance and do a friendly but nonetheless careful search of persons, briefcases, tape recorders, and cameras. The Palestinian leader is in a military meeting "because of recent events," and the interview with HOY, set for midnight, has been delayed.

Israeli attacks on Palestinian bases in southern Lebanon had increased in recent days, and for the first time Syrian Air Force planes had pursued the Jewish teams into Lebanese territory. According to PLO spokesmen, Israel is trying to destroy the bases before the American presidential elections, using Jewish votes as a brake against any pressure Jimmy Carter might want to exert.

Therefore, the Palestinians expect a new attack "at any moment" and are ready. In Arafat's office, everyone has gun in hand, and the quiet jokes and laughter do not diminish the sense of alertness.

Mythical Image

Finally Arafat receives HOY in his large and orderly office, which has a big meeting table, air conditioning, walls covered with books and photographs--including that of the Ayatollah Khomeyni--and flags.

Impeccably dressed in khaki, with his characteristic black and white keffiyan and a pistol in his belt, he walks with quick steps, shakes hands warmly, and apologizes for the delay. Fifty-one years old, not very tall, and rather plump, with a grizzled beard and hoarse voice, Arafat perfectly fits the almost mythical image that has developed during the years of struggle.

He is--and he stresses it--president of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization, commander in chief of the joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces (basically, the National Lebanese Movement, a leftist coalition that is fighting the Christian-rightists). To Palestinians he is "the president" of whom they speak with almost reverential respect. But he is also "Abu 'Ammar", whom everyone loves and is willing to follow unhesitatingly.

With this background and his reputation as a fighter, it is surprising to see him take pains with operating a small tape recorder. He too wants to record the interview and has his own recorder, but he does not use it much, so he and an aide spend long minutes pushing buttons until they are finally sure the machine is working. And he explains with a smile, "I don't use it much here in my office." He speaks a very clear English but sometimes turns to his aides in Arabic to find just the right expression.

Annoyance With the West

He is warm and smiling in the talk about himself, but when he is speaking about his cause, his tone hardens, and his fist hits the table to underscore his arguments. What bothers him the most is what he calls "the surrender of the western press to Zionist blackmail." According to him, the western media only expresses the Israeli point of view, "the aggression angle, in spite of the fact that we are the victims" and that "the correspondents are witnesses to what is happening."

By way of example, he asked HOY, "Why don't you in Chile open a PLO office? Why do only the socialist countries give their people all the information about our rights?" To illustrate his position, he rises and goes to find a copy of TIME that is on his desk. He turns the pages and shows the article--with paragraphs underlined in red pencil--about the confrontations in the southern part of Lebanon and complains, "This is the whole report; in spite of the fact that there was a big important battle, they do not even give the name of the place, and that Begin was on one side, and I was on the other." (As acting minister of defense, Israeli Prime Minister Menahem Begin was at the front supervising operations.)

In his opinion, the present situation in the Middle East is an Israeli escalation in all aspects:

"It is what is going on in southern Lebanon, the air raids, the massive concentrations of troops in northern Palestine and in one of the occupied Lebanese areas between Marj 'Uyun and Matullah (he is speaking of Mayor Haddad's 'enclave,' HOY 165). We must remember the last big operation, in Beaufort's castle. The Israelis sent two hand-picked brigades, including paratroopers, to occupy the area of Nabatiyah, 'Arnun, and Beaufort. And despite all their deployment, the support of helicopters, planes, heavy artillery, and rockets, they failed, thanks to the courage and decision of our fighters, who are fighting alone, with their flesh and determination, and they taught them a good lesson.

"Despite statements by Israeli military men and political leaders, they are threatening the Palestinians; they are threatening the Lebanese; they are threatening the Syrians.

"In addition, our people, within our occupied territories, are facing an escalation of repression and terrorism. We remember the expulsion of three of our leaders and the assassination attempt on three of our mayors by those terrorists, who are supported and protected by Begin himself. We must remember the fantastic laws, the inhuman laws against Palestinians living in the occupied territories. For example, they are imposing punishment for ideas and opinions. All a Palestinian child has to do is say he is with the PLO, sing a Palestinian song, or have a Palestinian flag, and he is arrested and punished. This did not happen even under the Nazis, this is the first time it has ever happened in the world.

"Another law concerns universities. All the universities must be under Israeli military administration and leadership. They are against human beings, against science, against beliefs. This is the escalation we are facing."

[Question] And where does this escalation lead?

[Answer] To war.

[Question] Another war in the Middle East:

[Answer] Yes, indeed. We must recall what happened a few days ago between the Syrian Air Force and the Israeli Air Force.

[Question] Do you believe that the Arab countries will go to war without Egypt?

[Answer] Why not? We have what we need. We Palestinians are fighting alone now. And we will fight with other Arab countries, because we have no other choice. What are they offering? Genocide, oppression, terrorism. Accepting those choices means living like slaves. We absolutely will not accept living like slaves. We will resist and the Palestinian people living under occupation will resist oppression.

Two Revolutions

According to Arafat, resistance means using all means: political, diplomatic, propaganda, information, and education. To him, the war "is a part of the political struggle; it is a political measure, but more forceful."

And he explains: "We Palestinians have to build major revolutions within the spirit of our tragedy. After 1947, when our tragedy began, we started our first revolution: the educational revolution. And through it we now have the highest literacy rate in the region, including the Israelis, a fact of which we are proud. Because we consider our struggle, our confrontation, a war against our civilization, education is very important.

"The second revolution is resistance, armed struggle. Diplomacy is part of the struggle."

Nevertheless, there are factors in diplomacy that do not interest the PLO--the talks on Palestinian autonomy between the United States, Egypt, and Israel, for example. Although many sectors, from the UN secretary general to the European Community, have stated the necessity of PLO participation in the talks, Arafat rejects the idea.

He says: "Autonomy? No! We definitely do not intend to participate in those talks. What is this autonomy? It is a new kind of slavery for my people, and we reject this new slavery. We reject the whole Camp David conspiracy, including this autonomy. It isn't even autonomy. They are only offering self-administration, and within that self-administration, they (the Israelis) must control even the water sources, even the water sources! Give me one example in the whole world where the inhabitants of a city cannot control the water they drink. Who can accept this?

"They view us as Indians. The Yankees pushed the Indians away from the rivers, away from the water sources, into the desert. This is what they envision doing to us. But we are not the Indians. We are here; this land is our land; it is our fathers' land, our grandfathers', and it will go on being, not just our children's, but our grandchildren's land. This is the Palestinian people's determination. We will not be the Indians."

Neither Carter Nor Reagan

In other respects, his feeling toward "Yankees" has not improved much. Basically, this is because "what we are suffering is part of the Camp David agreement, which was planned by the American government and has been implemented by Israel and Sadat. And they persist in not recognizing any Palestinian rights, including the right to return to our land, the right to self-determination, and the right to establish our independent state on our own land."

According to the Palestinian leader, what is happening in southern Lebanon results from the United States' "green light" [to the Israelis], including the use of American weapons, which is expressly forbidden in the sales contract. The Israelis explain that it is "self-defense."

Arafat feels "the genocide our people are suffering is taking place because of U.S. policy." Therefore, in his opinion, it will make no difference, if Ronald Reagan becomes the U.S. president.

"In superpowers like the United States, the presidency and the president's decisions are very important, but they are no more than 25 percent of the whole decision. The ones who make policy are not only the president and his advisors, but also the entire establishment; it is a continuing policy."

Arafat recognizes a slight change in the attitude of the press and the American public. "The contributor begins to ask himself, 'Why are we killing Palestinians, Lebanese, and Arabs with American weapons used by Israelis?'" However, he is not concerned about the reaction of that public in the case of another war.

"You know, I am not seeking war. The Israelis are preparing for war, not me. It is not my choice. We are resisting occupation, because we have no other choice. If you were in my place, you would do the same. We are human beings, and we want to live like human beings on our own free land."

A Time Bomb

An important part of that resistance is the attitude of Palestinians living in territories occupied by Israel. Arafat calls them "our time bomb," because "after the Camp David conspiracy, they believed our people would accept that conspiracy.

But our people were a time bomb that blew up in the face of that conspiracy. We put our confidence in those people, because we know beside whom we are fighting. We are fighting beside our people; we have the will and determination, and with that will and determination, we shall win the victory sooner or later."

The victory is the creation of an independent, secular, and democratic state that--according to the latest resolution by the Palestinian National Council [CNP], the parliament, the supreme body of the PLO--it will be declared in every part of Palestine that Israel must withdraw, or it will be liberated. Whether that is enough, or whether it will be the basis for continuing the struggle until all Palestine is "liberated", will depend, says Arafat, on the CNP, "because we respect our democracy, and what the CNP decides is what we shall do."

Democracy is very important to the Palestinian leader. If he is asked about the political structure of that independent state, he stresses that, "We shall respect our democracy; we shall give all Palestinians complete freedom to choose the kind of government they want. We are proud of our democracy, and what the majority decides will be what we will do. I shall not be the one who decides."

And he stresses, "You have to think what a democracy means in the revolution. A democracy is not easy in a jungle of weapons, but it is a new experiment."

There are those who have expressed doubt that a Palestinian state would be able--physically and economically--to receive all the refugees.

Arafat is precise: "Definitely, every Palestinian will have the opportunity to return to his country, his state. We cannot prevent anyone from coming. That Polish terrorist named Begin has the right to return to Jerusalem, and I, who am from Jerusalem, cannot return to Jerusalem?"

The voice rises, and the hand again pounds the table. But the smile appears again when one tries to find out something about Arafat the man. "No personal questions," he says, tearing himself away to go, at 0200 hours, to another military meeting (apparently 3 or 4 hours of sleep are enough for him). And he turns back to add somewhat sarcastically, "I am not a monster; I am a human being, as you can see." What does he like; what is important to him? "Only fighting for my people's salvation."

8587
CSO: 3010

AFGHAN GOVERNMENT RESTRICTS PASSPORTS, SALE OF HOMES

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 4 Sep 80 pp 1, 6

[Article: "Fierce Bombing by Russians in Herat; Widespread Fighting; Restrictions on Passports, Sale of Property"]

[Text] New Delhi, 3 Sep (PPI/Reuter APA)--There is widespread fighting between the Mujahidin and the Russian army. According to some Western diplomatic sources, Russian planes fiercely bombed the city of Herat, and there is heavy fighting in Kandahar, a southern province. Since mid-August, the Kabul-Jalalabad road was opened only a few times. It was partially destroyed by the Mujahidin toward the end of August.

It is calm in Kabul, but reports of officers of the ruling People's Democratic Party being killed have been received. In Wardak, a province west of Kabul, the Mujahidin planted mines on a road just before a Russian army convoy was to pass over it.

According to some diplomatic sources, there was heavy traffic of Russian planes at Kabul airport on 29 and 30 August. The planes were transporting army units. The activities of Helicopter Gunships are increasing around Kabul. Reports of battle in (Panjsheer) valley, north-east of Kabul, have been received.

It is learned that many officials in Kabul's foreign ministry have either been fired or transferred to other countries. Once again, the government is denying passports to citizens who want to leave the country. Many Afghans who wanted to leave the country were detained at Kabul Airport. According to another report, no sale or purchase of property is allowed without the advance approval of the secret police. This is to prevent the sale of homes by homeowners before leaving the country.

Meanwhile, a message of President Karmal was published today. According to it, Afghanistan expects to get unprecedented cooperation from Russia after peace has been restored. This message has been sent to Brezhnev and Kosygin, president and prime minister of Russia respectively.

7997
CSO: 4203

AFGHANISTAN REPORTEDLY REORGANIZED INTO SEVEN MILITARY DISTRICTS

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 3 Sep 80 pp 1, 12

[Article: "Russian Generals Plan to Crush Afghan Mujahidin; Government Army Divided Among Seven Districts; Administrator of Each to Be a Member of Party Presidium; 1,000 Commandos and Russian General to Assist Each District; 10-fold Increase in Salaries of Soldiers"]

[Text] New Delhi, 2 Sep (APP/Reuter)--Russian advisers and consultants are launching a large scale plan to crush the desire for freedom of the Mujahidin. The basic strategy of this plan is to get one tribe to fight another. A delegation of high ranking officers of the Russian army arrived in Kabul last month to put this plan into operation.

After consultation with the Karmal government, it was decided to divide the country into seven military districts. According to some informed sources, a volunteer army was started. A soldier of this army is paid 7,000 Afghan rupees ($175). This sum is 10 times more than the amount paid to a regular soldier. The administrator of each district will be a member of the central committee or presidium of the People's Democratic Party. Each of these administrators will be assisted by one Russian general and 1,000 commandos, in addition to his regular forces. Resources are being used on a large scale to implement this new plan.

According to some informed sources, the Russians and their puppet Karmal government are using tribes against each other. According to this plan, a unit composed of Paktra tribesmen was sent to Parwan and Badkhshan provinces to infiltrate and destroy the Mujahidin of north and northeast Afghanistan.

As a result of the new military reorganization, the Kabul area has come under the control of Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, the minister of communications. The new volunteer militia uses regular uniforms and is equipped with modern weapons. This militia has been in operation for over a month. Its major duty is to scare the people. It is reported that its mercenaries are charged with killing the Mujahidin, but they also kill innocent citizens.

An Afghan politician who is presently in India said that spies of the Karmal government are trying to get the Mujahidin to fight among themselves. The spies spread rumors about some Mujahidin groups being communists rather than Muslims. Thus, the people in power are using the traditional method of divide and rule.

7997
CSO: 4203

BRIEFS

RUSSIA TRIES ENLISTING TRIBESMEN--Russia is offering large bribes to Afghan tribesmen to join a volunteer army. This volunteer army is being recruited to fight the Mujahidin, using Mujahidin tactics, and divide the Afghan people into two camps fighting each other. Afghan tribesmen, especially young men, are being offered top salaries for joining this army. According to the Mujahidin, Russia has spent over $200,000 so far. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 6 Sep 80 p 6] 7997

KABUL SEEMINGLY NORMAL--New Delhi, 4 Sep--Incidents involving gunfire or bombings happen almost every other night in Kabul. Visitors to this city are amazed that the 300,000 inhabitants of this city, many of them Europeans, do not seem to pay attention to them. From the hills surrounding Kabul, one can hear the echo of fighting in the city, but one cannot guess the actual place of the fighting. Because of strict government censorship, the newspapers do not publish anything on gunfire, bombings, explosions, their causes or who died in them. Because of the strict curfew at night, no one except the Russians and their collaborators know what exactly is happening. Travelers arriving from Kabul report that the seemingly normal situation in Kabul is a strange phenomenon. There are 48 West German citizens in the city. Among them are officials of the embassy, the staff of a German-Afghan School, representatives of several companies, and directors of the (Goethe) Institute. The West German colony includes 10 women and 6 children. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 5 Sep 80 pp 3, 10] 7997

CSO: 4203

MAJOR CONTRACTOR GIVES VIEWS ON MARKET CONTROL, FOOD SUPPLY

Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic 22 Sep 80 pp 24-28

[Interview with 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, major contractor and close associate of President Sadat, by Mamdule Mihran]

/Text/ The beginning was a telephone call, in which I told Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman "You have talked a lot to me about providing the people with food, especially meat, whose shortage you promised to end through the party's Popular Development Committee. The result was that slaughter was prohibited for a month and people raced all over one another for the modest quantities of fish and poultry which began to be offered to them."

He said, "This is not a fit subject for a passing phone conversation. What you are saying needs an explanation, so that we can put the facts in their place. I will be waiting for you after midnight when I will be fully at your disposal after completing my work program of the day."

I said, "Agreed." I went at the specified time and a heated discussion took place, in some of which Eng Mahmud 'Uthman and his wife Jihan al-Sadat took part. The conversation extended late into the night. In the course of it Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman declared a group of important items of news.

The Question: Where to?

I began the conversation by saying "Where is the meat shortage going, after all the efforts that have been made?"

He said, laughing, "Meat is not a problem in Egypt. The matter requires more production and patience for a while, nothing more. Our people can produce and bear up. In general, whatever the sufferings of our people, they cannot have reached, and will never be able to reach, what I saw with my own eyes in Germany, after its defeat, when you would go down the street smoking a cigarette and two people would go behind you, each of them waiting to get a piece of it to satisfy his smoking habit. That was the point the situation in Germany reached. You certainly do not need me to explain to you what the situation there is now and the extent of prosperity it has reached. They got there only through production and patience."

I said, "We have heard a great deal about your projects, which you are embracing within the National Party's Popular Development Committee, which has given the

people broad hope of a relaxation in the food shortage, especially the meat shortage. Nonetheless the problem seems to be without a solution!"

He said, "If we want to debate let objectivity be our guide. Yes, there are many projects for self-sufficiency in food, especially meat of various kinds. Numerous companies are now being established and formed in this realm. There are many projects which we are on the road to taking steps to implement. However, let me ask you if these projects can be established overnight. Are these projects, as soon as they are announced, strong enough so their production is able to start? A single company when formed requires not less than 2 years' time to produce, under a skilled businessman. However, I previously succeeded in al-Isma'iliyah, then in the Engineers' Union, prior to the National Party's Popular Development Committee, in forming dozens of companies involved in self-sufficiency in food. It takes no more than 3 months to form one, when we start to establish a company, but for us to put it on the production lines we need at least 3 more months, as far as companies with rapid production go; with some companies it takes a year."

He filled that out by saying, "Mamdouh, I don't possess Solomon's ring. I am just a person who gives what he can and travels on the road to carry out his projects, which will yield up production sooner or later, and neither you nor anyone else should imagine that it is wise for any project to begin overnight. What is important, rather, is that we make the right beginning, and continue, and that is what I and the sincere men who are with me are doing. However, in 1981 dozens of these projects will yield production and after that I am prepared to be held to account not by you but by the people, who will know the value of these projects when their production reaches them."

I said, "We must wait."

He said, "No, we must work and join forces. The party Committee on Popular Development is bearing the responsibility for self-sufficiency in food on its shoulders and God willing will succeed in its task. The committee is working with a spirit which I wish every Egyptian citizen could closely observe in order to realize what we are doing; if he did he would be confident that the current shortage is transitory and that production will really inundate the market soon, and not with words, God willing."

I said, "Do you understand where the problem lies? And where the solution to it will start?"

He said, "The problem in Egypt is not one of meat, it is one of organization. As an example, do you know that every year Egypt slaughters 900,000 calves and that the weight of each does not exceed 70 kilograms? Do you know that half of this number is females which we must not slaughter but must raise so that they may become fertile and we can increase the resource? What is happening with female calves is a national crime against animal resources in Egypt and will lead not just to high prices but also to a decline in the sources of meat.

"If there is some organization and we exempt half this figure from slaughter for example as a beginning for a period of 1 year that will mean that I will increase the meat supply by 50,000 tons. If we exempt that for 2 years the increase will be 100,000 tons--that is, 1 billion kilograms of meat /sic/, which will be provided

by one method, by not slaughtering half the calves we slaughter every year. If we gradually succeed in not slaughtering them all, the quantity will reach 200,000 tons, or 2 billion kilograms of meat /sic/, which by itself will be able to create tremendous sales in the meat market. But unfortunately we have not done that, animal resources are lost, and then we scream about the meat shortage.

"The shortage we have realized in livestock resources was not created overnight; it escalated for the reason I gave you and therefore solving it will require solutions which will subject livestock resources to sound use."

And Fodder?

I said, "But the problem is in providing the necessary fodder for raising these calves, as you say."

He said, "There are two kinds of fodder. There is green fodder, which is an easy matter since we grow it, especially in the new lands, and concentrated fodder, for which we must construct factories. We have actually started to build two big fodder plants to produce millions of tons; for production to start in either will require no less than 2 years from the date on which construction of the project starts. However, does that mean that I should wait until these factories start producing? Not at all. The alternative exists, and that is imports. We must import large amounts. I do not want to provide fodder alone, I will strive to provide it at the docks for those who want it and enable them to obtain it easily and at appropriate prices."

I said, "Is that possible?"

He said, "Very much so, and why not? I had previous experience when I was appointed minister of housing and reconstruction, a shortage of building materials was sweeping the country, there was a black market everywhere, and exploitation of the public was at its most intense. What did I do? I did not do more than import tremendous quantities of all the necessary raw materials and succeed in supplying them to everyone who asked for them in any quantity at any time. The black market was suppressed at once, spontaneously. In fact, what happened was more than that. Merchants, owing to the pileup of goods in their possession, because of their large quantities, demanded that the amounts allotted to them be reduced. I challenge anyone to say that the market experienced any shortage of any kind in the period when I was in charge of the Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction."

I said, "Will that experience apply in the area of food?"

He said, "Yes, we will do that at the start and all foodstuffs, foremost among them meat, will be supplied to any citizen in any volume at any time. However, here the situation is different: in providing food, I do not want to rely primarily on imports but on production, so that I can realize self-sufficiency in my requirements. My concentration in imports will be on fodder, which the fattening process requires, and also on imports of factory equipment, materials I will process and mechanical slaughterhouses."

I said, "But foodstuff, especially meat, need preservation. Do you have storehouses suitable for them when they are imported?"

He said, "That is a very vital point and therefore in order to be able to store large quantities of meat that I can supply for consumption at the appropriate time in the appropriate quantities I will need a cooling capacity of not less than 400,000 tons in the form of refrigerators, in the form of one refrigerator per governorate. Do you know that the storage capacity of our refrigerators now does not exceed 70,000 tons!"

And Poultry?

I asked, "Does poultry enjoy a share in this concern?"

He said, "Naturally poultry resources represent a basic important source of protein and therefore in just 1 year I will double the quantities the Ministry of Agriculture farms produce to 150 million hens, in place of 75 million. Fish will enjoy a similar concern. While we are trying to provide animal meat in the necessary amounts, we are also striving to increase poultry and fish output so they may occupy a large portion of the consumption map, reducing the pressure on meat. This will be reflected in the setting of their prices."

I said, "On whom will you depend in implementing your new projects to provide food, principally meat? The subject requires awareness."

He said, "I will rely on my children the graduates of all the university faculties and technical schools."

I said, "Who will assume the chairmanship of the Popular Development Committees in the governorates, which will be in charge of implementing this idea in each governorate?"

He said, "The governors. Each governor is the head of the Popular Development Committee in his governorate."

I said, "And where do you get the necessary financing?"

He said, "From the banks. President al-Sadat has met with bank men for this purpose specifically, I mean, for the purpose of having the banks finance projects for self-sufficiency in food. Here all the problems are solved and financing will no longer be an obstacle in the way of projects for self-sufficiency in food which will be determined by the Popular Development Committee centrally or in the governorates. We will then assume charge of the process of studying and preparing the steps to carry them out, and really carry them out, through financing by the banks, which they will obtain. Then I will hand them over to the graduates, where they are, to take possession of them in stages and start managing them. I, as a committee of popular development, will take charge of supervision, problem-solving, and overcoming the obstacles in the way, so that the process may proceed on its proper path."

I said, "How will activity within the committee be organized so that these specialized people will be able to make their contribution?"

He said, "A council of experts will immediately be formed in the Popular Development Committee, under my chairmanship at the outset; then, after that we will look

for someone to chair it who will possess the specifications the process requires. This council will supervise a number of branches, for instance a branch for livestock, a branch for poultry, a branch for fish, a branch for eggs, a branch for fodder, and others. Through these branches the council will take charge of studying the entire food situation in the context of the republic, area by area, from Alexandria to Aswan, having real figures at its disposal on strong points and weak points in every spot so that we will strive to remedy them as soon as they appear. This council's ties with all growers in every area will be strong and it will take charge of collecting their problems from every standpoint then solving them without obliging the growers to be concerned about losing time in this regard, so that they can save their time for the productive process. It will provide relevant production accessories in a manner whereby they will reach them as cheaply, easily and quickly as possible. Then, in another area, it will purchase the grower's output from the grower without exploiting the circumstances of the market he is involved with, at a feasible price which will encourage the grower to continue, instead of stopping."

"Here I will pause briefly."

I said, "What about?"

He said, "One of the causes of the meat shortage is speculation by merchants against producers. They plotted against them, buying their output at less than its real cost, and this frustrated these growers from continuing in this field and was reflected in the volumes supplied and their prices."

I said, "Have we forgotten the problem of the contracts?"

He said, "This in its turn is a big problem, but it has ended.

"Do you know what happened?"

"This governor would contract with a grower to give him the fodder necessary to fatten four calves, for example, provided that he buy two from him at a price of 80 piasters per kilogram live, then leave him the other two calves to sell at the price he saw fit. Here we find that the grower lost 40 piasters per kilogram at least for the calves he sold to the governorate. Therefore he would try to make up for that by raising the price of the calves he sold on the free market, which resulted in a rise in the price per kilogram of meat. This was on the one hand. On the other, do you know why 60,000 tons of fodder remain in the warehouses in the Ministry of Agriculture? The issue turned from one of raising and fattening livestock to trafficking in fodder. When a person obtained 4 qantars of fodder at 30 pounds per qantar per head, he preferred not to raise the animal but would sell the amount on the black market at 100 pounds per kantar--that is, he would pay 120 pounds and sell at 400, earning 280. Trafficking in fodder became more lucrative than raising livestock. Gradually the number of growers dropped when the fodder moved into the hands of weak-spirited persons who used it for trafficking rather than for growing. For that reason the president's decree cancelling the contracts at once was wise."

Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman said, "There must not be two prices for fodder, an official price and a black market price. Rather, we must provide the necessary

quantities and unify the price so that fodder can emerge from the dominance of the black market."

I said, "How can that happen when our output does not exceed 1.25 million qantars and we need 4 million qantars?"

He said, "Our factories, which we are building, will produce that, but until this happens I must import and provide fodder in tremendous volumes satisfying fattening consumption requirements."

Pricing--Now

I said, "But the meat shortage will not ease overnight. Until these solutions produce results, what will the consumer do in the face of the tyranny of the butchers' empire?"

He said, "Tentative compulsory pricing of meat is necessary now even if the pricing is mobile and can be amended every 3 months, for example, by increases or decreases according to the condition of the market--provided that this pricing take into consideration that the grower or merchant is not defrauded and the consumer is not exploited."

I said, "And if the merchants hide the meat?"

He said, "We have our arrangements. There are tremendous amounts of meat, both that available from the prohibition on slaughtering this month, the amount in storage to cover the 'Id al-Adha requirements, the amounts to be supplied next month and the other additional amounts which have been provided as a reserve for this matter. Then meat is not a commodity which can be locked up and stored and even if it is for a month, it cannot be for 2 months." He then laughed, saying, "Then if the merchants retrench, the retrenchment will result in savings in the livestock resources we want to develop, and that will help increase their quantities in the future in a manner which will make their prices appropriate. As far as the government goes, it is fully prepared to face the situation with all the means it has to prevent the exploitation of the people and provide the citizens' needs."

I said, "But is the subject of preventing the slaughter of veal calves just a view presented to growers, or are there measures to carry this out?"

He said, "Of course there are measures. They will be among the tasks of the council which will be formed within the Popular Development Committee to follow up on this matter in all governorates. For example, in a governorate like al-Qalyubiyah, the popular development committee will be established under the auspices of a number of villages and peasants who have buffaloes or pregnant cows. It will then get in contact with these peasants to determine if a calf is to be raised and it will help them in raising it. If it is to be sold we will buy it from him for more than the merchant's price and will keep it to raise it.

"It is not just this that is important. This council is appointed to be the thermometer of the supply situation, especially the meat supply situation, in terms of capacity of refrigerators, the number of calves, the poultry pens or whatnot, so that the matter can proceed through a proper fixed system which ultimately will be

able to achieve balance in the equation, that is, preserving and developing livestock resources, encouraging growers, providing their requirements, storing meat, supplying it to the public in the necessary amounts, covering the weak points and increasing the distribution outlets."

I said, "On the subject of increasing distribution outlets, how far have the efforts of the National Company for Self-Sufficiency in Food gone?"

He said, "They are moving full speed ahead. We are now intending to carry out a project to provide 50 sales outlets for the company every month, and we will proceed at these rates, which we will try to increase, until the company is able to perform the role expected of it. This is in addition to popular meal counters which we will expand and deed over to our sons the graduates. I will develop the experiment so that our children can take over such food projects as Wimpey's, instead of foreigners."

I said, "Do you believe there is a meat shortage in your home, as there is in the homes of people generally?"

Here Mrs Jihna al-Sadat Jr took charge of responding, looking at Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman and saying, "Blessings to 'Chief Engineer Ahmad,' who provides us with all our requirements so we don't buy from the market." Eng Mahmoud 'Uthman broke in jokingly, stating "Come on, he exploits us." We all laughed, and at this point Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman broke in saying, "Really we don't buy chickens or eggs or meat--my son Ahmad raises about 75 egg-laying hens and cooking chicken, he raises livestock especially sheep, and his output covers all the requirements of his brothers, his cousins and the family. In fact he also raises pigeons and goes to al-Isma'iliyah, where he fishes, and his catch is enough for all of us. He likes this activity, which he pursues at home."

I said, "Why don't you allow him to establish a big project?"

He said, "He still is a student in the Faculty of Engineering. Here I am not just relating the story of my son Ahmad, I am asking every family in Egypt, especially in the rural areas, to carry out this type of small project, which will suffice for a family's consumption requirements. Providing food is easy but we must not hand our affairs over to the government. We must begin with ourselves lest we create problems then revolve around them even if there basically is no problem."

I said, "There isn't time, we have approached the dawn prayer, people are all going off," and I went home to transcribe the conversation which took place at the meeting.

11887
CSO: 4802

ARMY OF OPPRESSED GETS MOBILIZATION TRAINING

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 20 Sep 80 p 11

[Article: "Special to SOBH-E AZADEGAN: Illustrated Report on the National Mobilization Camp for the Oppressed"]

[Text] Mashhad--Sabri Tabatab'i, SOBH-E AZADEGAN reporter. During the week of establishment of the big national mobilization camp for the oppressed in Baghrud of Neyshabur, we had an opportunity to discuss various questions concerning the camp with its overseer, Colonel Kuchekzadeh, acting commander of the 77th Army of Khorasan and supervisor of the mobilization camp for the oppressed of Baghrud of Neyshabur.

The photos accompanying the interview on this page of the mobilization staff's various military training exercises were especially prepared for SOBH-E AZADEGAN. [photos not reproduced]

Colonel Kuchekzadeh began by saying: I want to tell you that the mobilization camp for the oppressed that has been established in Baghrud for the sake of strengthening and unity, in view of the current circumstances in which every brother and sister is involved, meaning the imperialist plots of the West and the East and their handpicked agents in our midst, can be a gathering that shows cohesiveness, a fist in the mouth of imperialism, whether Eastern or Western.

Question: Can you explain a little about how revolutionary and government groups are working with camp officials?

Answer: You are certainly aware that this camp was erected with great haste. It must be sincerely stated, however, that all groups helped us with the erection of this camp as much as they could and their help was truly valuable. Everyone joined hands to construct a camp to accomodate around 10 thousand people (considering the allotted time, which was one week) and, praise God, we completed this important task.

Question: Could you tell us the criteria for the selection of camp members and who the people were who were chosen from the municipalities and provinces and came here?

Answer: Selection is mostly subject to the approval of the mobilization brothers. Their first priority is piety, the second priority is order and discipline and

and they make their selections based on the same criteria as that used for the brothers. Of course it is hoped that the problems and difficulties which will naturally arise in this camp, which is experimental, can be put aside in future camps, with the help of God, and that we will choose forces who will have greater resistance to worldly forces. We have thus limited some of them to a certain extent, especially since we now have brothers who are 50 years old and older, but these are a minority. We have set the age at between 20 and 30 except for a limited group that has come between the ages of 40 and 50.

Question: Could you please explain about camp expenses, when they are paid, from what sources, and whether brothers who are now camp members pay their own expenses or whether the camp assumes this responsibility?

Answer: You are certainly aware that the mobilization has no budget. This is why it was said that the camp was formed with the help of groups, organizations, companies, and other brothers. This assistance, praise God, has been given, and it is through that assistance that the mobilization was organized and secured. The brothers who have come have received absolutely nothing in this connection from them.

Question: Will there be some sequel to the camp after its completion, since these people have directly received training which gives them an advantage over other mobilization brothers?

Answer: One of the areas I discussed was exactly this that this gathering is a fist in the mouth to both East and West. If you are aware, we announced yesterday in the dining hall that our brothers should help other brothers in the West of the country. They should give their names to province supervisors so that later we can pass their style of leadership on to the Western areas.

Question: What kind of weapons training are the brothers who are here now receiving, and what kind of martial arts are they learning?

Answer: Weapons are limited here. The heavy weapons we have are mortars. The small arms are the usual ones with which mobilization brothers are equipped. At the same time, however, we are teaching them destruction techniques and how to go up and down moutains and cross valleys. We also have a program for teaching marching techniques and how to carry out warfare while enroute. We were able to carry out these programs as training exercises with military brothers. At the same time we have been able to secure indoctrination training for camp participants through speeches and calls from our committed and crusading brothers.

Question: What are the daily training hours, and what is the duration of the camp?

Answer: The daily training schedule was set and announced at the first meeting of the camp's opening. According to this program, daily activities begin around 5 am, continuing with specialized training programs until 12:30. This training begins with the fulfillment of religious obligations, until after early morning, then there is military training until 12:30, when the brothers come and pray together. Then they eat lunch together and rest from 1530 to 1800 hours. At 1800 hours there is a meal and a religious talk. A program is also planned for after dinner. These programs are related to ideological questions and revolutionary films such as "Algeria" are shown to the brothers.

Question: What was the reason for establishing the camp in Baghrud of Neyshabur?

Answer: The original plan was to set it up in the north in Ramsar, but afterwards when the matter had been studied we learned that the Ministry of Education and Training had previously designated this spot and the camp was established here.

Question: Could you describe the camp's meal planning, and tell us whether or not you test camp members after the necessary training, or give them cards that show they have had this course?

Answer: Concerning the camp's food, as I have said, the mobilization must be so organized that it can feed itself, like a guerrilla, meaning it cannot rely on prepared, provided food. You can say that we have been able, so far as possible, to prepare some food for our brothers, but the basis of guerrilla activity is that he can manage himself and be self sufficient. He must be able to satisfy his needs if he goes into the mountains and he must have this preparedness. This concept of his criteria for activity is his provender.

Question: What organization helped you obtain the camp site? Do only brothers receive training here, or do sisters also receive the required training in another location in collaboration with you?

Answer: These grounds are managed by the Boy Scouts organization. Those brothers were contacted, and they truly helped us, while they turned this site over to us and helped us with other work related to the camp. Sisters do not take part in this camp. Since this was an experimental camp we did not allow sisters to participate, because it was a trial run. If possible we must get a consensus on them. Naturally sisters must be prepared for mobilization, prepared for jihad, both ideologically and militarily.

Question: Could you talk about the number of instructors, the method of their selection or the obstacles that prevent your rapid advancement?

Answer: We have around 190 military training instructors. Of course there are always shortages. It would be erroneous to state otherwise, and these shortages must be laid aside. We must identify the problems in our work so that we can truly train our brothers better in future camps, and eliminate the shortages and problems of this camp once we have become aware of them.

Question: In the course of setting up the camp, wasn't there obstructionism from beginning to end on the part of certain groups and organizations who placed obstacles in your path? If they did this, do not hesitate to identify them for the sake of the responsibility of the newspaper SOBH-E AZADEGAN so that the people can also know who they are.

Answer: No, praise God, I must say that all groups are truly brothers who have sincerely helped the mobilization. As I said at the beginning of my talk, the mobilization of the oppressed is thankful to all organizations for their help. I should also say that the mobilization is not really a group. The mobilization is like an ocean, the ocean of unity. Groups are like rivers that flow into the ocean, all becoming one. They naturally help us, and, praise God, we truly saw this. All the brothers heartily thank all groups for their help.

Question: Could you tell us whether there was ideological and religious training in this camp or not, along with the military training? If there was not, why?

Answer: As I said, the working principle is indoctrination and religious training, because we must establish that principle. When we make ideas the foundation, when a brother is armed he knows this, and how to use his weapons. He will destroy the enemy with the weapon of belief as well as with military weapons. The efforts of our brothers, and the desire of all our brothers is to strengthen the sessions on ideology. We have received help with this from all our brothers, and so far as possible we have been able to take care of this important matter.

9310
CSO: 4906

BRIEFS

EMBASSY IN ROME PROTECTION REQUEST--Rome--The Iranian Embassy in Rome has accused the Iraqi Embassy, in a communique, of "planning terrorist attacks on the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its diplomatic staff" and has announced that it has "asked the Italian foreign minister in a verbal note to provide greater protection for the embassy headquarters and its other offices in Italy as well as for their staff." The Foreign Ministry has confirmed its receipt of "a number of requests concerning protection and security from the Iranian Embassy and the Iraqi Embassy." The Iranian Embassy communique attributes to the Iraqis several terrorist acts, including the occupation of the Iranian Embassy in London and armed attacks on the Iranian embassies in Vienna, Beirut and Kuwait, as well as the assassination bid on then Foreign Minister Qotzbadeh in Kuwait. [Text] [LD281455 Milan L'UNITA in Italian 25 Oct 80 p 18]

CSO: 4404

COMMENTATOR CALLS FOR BURG'S REPLACEMENT AS AUTONOMY CHIEF

TA211406 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Oct 80 p 11

[Commentary by Mati Golan: "Why the Interior Minister?"]

[Excerpts] It is certainly understandable that during 1978 it was difficult to deal with anything that deviated from the sphere of the peace treaty with Egypt. However, 2 years have gone by since then. The original enthusiasm over the peace wore off, and in general the ministers have returned to engage in their own affairs. The exception to the rule is Minister Burg, whose degree of attachment to political affairs has actually intensified since then, by virtue of his post as chairman of the autonomy negotiating team.

The Interior Ministry is a vast empire, even if one devotes one's full attention to it, it is difficult to control. And when dealing with it becomes a secondary matter, as has happened, the prospect for the efficient functioning of this ramified system is negligible.

In parallel, hidden unemployment is being generated in the Foreign Ministry. What is left for this ministry to do when it is freed of the necessity of dealing with autonomy? Persons seeking to enhance the interior minister's prestige point out that there are plenty of occupations besides autonomy: the United Nations, the United States, Europe, normalization with Egypt.

This argument has no real foundation. Every political sphere today is connected in one way or another with the autonomy issue. This is the central issue of Israeli foreign policy and all the rest will be determined according to its lights. Every Foreign Ministry staffer, from the minister to the last of the officials, reveals this truth in his meetings with foreign diplomats and statesmen.

Unquestionably, the cooperation between the foreign and interior ministries is proceeding more smoothly than was the cast during the Moshe Dayan period. Minister Shamir is free of his predecessor's personal residues and ideas. He generally finds the government's political line on autonomy acceptable. Personally, he has no reason to feel offended, since he served as Knesset speaker when Burg was made head of the negotiating team.

This fact facilitates things, but does nothing for the hitches that sometimes cause not a little damage. A foreign minister who serves as an aural witness

only in the central political issue cannot represent this issue in the most effective manner. If it is accepted that one of the Foreign Ministry's main functions is information [hasbara] to diplomats and for public opinion, a situation has now been created in which the ministry must explain what others have determined.

It is worth bearing in mind that the idea of establishing a separate ministry of information has come up in several governments. The chief argument against taking the information powers from the Foreign Ministry was that those who implement can explain themselves best. This argument still holds, but things have now changed unrecognizably. It is precisely the main political powers that have been taken from the Foreign Ministry; what remains is information.

One sphere in which this anomaly is acutely conspicuous is that of the normalization of relations with Egypt. It is in Israel's interest to separate this process from the autonomy negotiations. There are those who maintain that the separation between these matters--even though this was not the original aim--serves the goal well.

On the surface, this is a reasonable contention. But in fact the present situation does not meet the [country's] needs and is actually in conflict with them. Whether or not we like it, the normalization process is indissolubly linked with the contacts on autonomy. The fact that the addresses are different makes progress very difficult to attain in both areas alike.

There will be those who say that this description is inexact since the Foreign Ministry staffers are taking part in the talks through Ms Ruth Lapidot. They are preparing background papers, legal opinions, and they are consulted. All this is of course so, but all the consultations, opinions and reports cannot serve as a proper substitute for the direct conduct and guidance of the negotiations.

A final instance of this occurred about a week ago in Washington. The media there reported on a certain [Israeli] concession in the talks. The Foreign Ministry was interested in cultivating this belief, in order to blunt the sharp criticism about Jerusalem's intransigence. Then along came Minister Burg and declared that Israel had made no concession, and the few information points Israel had managed to gain melted away as if they had never been. This kind of thing could never happen if both the right hand and the left hand were attached to the same body.

I asked senior Foreign Ministry officials why Minister Shamir puts up with this state of affairs. That is how he is built, came the reply. Even though he is not satisfied, either personally or substantively, he will not publicize his viewpoint. He is an easygoing person, quiet and serious, and not looking for battle.

It is very nice to hear that. This kind of personality in the governmental jungle is a real treat. The problem is precisely that Shamir's attitude on this issue must not be a personal one. This is not a private matter between Burg and him. The autonomy matter is a crucial one and will largely determine our future. There must be no compromises in the way it is dealt with.

There were reasons that brought Burg to the autonomy issue. Those reasons are no longer valid. Burg should be thanked for his work and asked to return to his very busy ministry. In this way the position will be restored to its natural place. If Shamir does not insist on this, he may do well by Burg, but not with the nation.

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

JORDAN FUNDS FORBIDDEN--The military government has forbidden the Hebron Charity Association from using 40,000 dinars received from Jordan. For a long time the military administration has not imposed restrictions on bringing funds from Jordan, on the contrary, they were received willingly. Sources in the military government explained to our correspondent, Pinhas 'Inbari, that on this occasion the funds were received without having been previously approved by the military government. [Text] [TA200914 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 20 Oct 80]

PAPER SEEKS EXPLANATION--The AL-MITHAQ newspaper published in East Jerusalem obtained an order nisi from the High Court of Justice today instructing the defense minister and the military commander of Judaea and Samaria to explain why they should not allow the distribution of the newspaper in the West Bank region. Judge Shlomo Levin who issued the order nisi gave the respondents 30 days to give their reasons. The suit, filed by AL-MITHAQ, which called itself "a political daily," and its owner and chief editor (Mahmud 'Ali al-Khatib), said that on 27 September 1979 they asked the military government headquarters in the West Bank for a permit to distribute and sell the newspaper in the West Bank zone. The appellants complain that until the present day they have not received a reply to their request, which is contrary to the rules of good administration and indicates a lack of good faith. They point out that the newspaper does not serve as a mouthpiece for any party or organization and that all the articles and reports published in it undergo censorship. The suit adds that the authorities discriminate against AL-MITHAQ in contrast to other newspapers, such as AL-QUDS, AL-FAJR and ASH-SHA'B, that were permitted to be distributed in the West Bank. The newspaper and its editor compalin that the fact they did not receive the permit stems from arbitrary decisions guided by irrelevant reasons which are detrimental to the appellants and to the freedom of expression. [Text] [TA201308 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1000 GMT 20 Oct 80]

LAND PURCHASED IN SAMARIA--Recently Jews have purchased tracts of land from Arabs in Samaria and they are using them to construct the industrial zone of the Samaria regional council as well as private homes. Our correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh has learned that the Israel Land Authority has purchased an area of about 70 dunams opposite Qarne Shomron to establish the industrial zone. A group of settlers from Qarne Shomron has also purchased, privately, land on two hills in that area. They have already constructed a road to the hills and will begin to build houses soon. [Text] [TA210623 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 21 Oct 80]

CSO: 4805

GULF WAR PROMPTS ARAB ALLIANCE IN AREA

GF081140 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 7 Oct 80 p 1

[Editorial]

[Text] Arabs unite during wartime and disunite during peacetime. There are many examples in ancient and contemporary Arab history confirming this fact. The Iraqi-Iranian war presents new proof for this fact that at least applies to the Gulf region.

For years, Gulf Arabs have been unsuccessfully discussing the question of Gulf security, although they all agree that Gulf security is the sole responsibility of the region's states and not the Western powers.

All Western plans on Gulf security--beginning with the 1955-1958 Baghdad Alliance until the last British soldier was withdrawn from the region in 1977, when the British bases in Oman were evacuated--have always failed.

During the time of the shah, Iran claimed it was the backbone of Gulf security. In view of this Iranian stand, the question of the aims of Gulf security remained suspended. Thus, who threatened the security of the Gulf? Was it Israel? Was it the United States? Or was it the Soviets? Who was it?

However, during the time of Khomeyni, Iran has presented the answer to Gulf Arabs on a silver platter. Iran has unwittingly convinced the Gulf Arabs that the real threat to Gulf security is the Persian threat itself with all the popularity it has and its exciting impact.

The primary outcome of the Iraqi-Iranian war will be the beginning of the formation of an Arab Gulf security alliance without discussions or abuses and without indulging in legal or juridical details.

Thus, Iraq has found that its strategic support in this war, which has been prolonged, has suddenly stretched from Amman to San'a' and from Jiddah to Ra's al-Khaymah, which is near the Strait of Hormuz.

The continuation of this war means that the issue of Gulf security is being implemented and transformed into a status quo, not only during this war but forever.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

JAPANESE MODERNIZATION OF REFINERY--Kuwait, 5 Oct (KUNA)--Kuwait today signed a contract with a major Japanese company for the implementation of a project for the modernization of the largest oil refinery in Kuwait, the Al-Ahmadi Port Refinery, south of the city of Kuwait. No information is yet available about the value of the contract which was signed between the Kuwait National Petroleum Company--a state-owned company--and the Japanese company J.J.C. A spokesman of the Kuwaiti company said the plan to modernize the refinery at Al-Ahmadi Port "Is in line with the policy of industrializing oil to meet local needs of energy" in Kuwait. The aim of the project is to provide liquid fuel to electric power stations and the petroleum industries. The spokesman said that Kuwait decided to modernize the refinery "after extensive studies of Kuwait's needs of energy until 1990." The project is expected to be completed during the first quarter of 1984. [Text] [LD051532 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1230 GMT 5 Oct 80]

CSO: 4802

MINISTER DISCUSSES FOOD, HEALTH ISSUES

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 7 Aug 80 p 6

[Text] The minister of economy and trade, Talal al-Mar'abi, said yesterday that he gave instructions to the Grain and Sugarbeets Bureau to resume the distribution of sugar to the cooperatives that have committed themselves to the distribution guidelines set by the bureau. Al-Mar'abi confirmed that the ministry has no intention of raising the prices of subsidized sugar at all.

Al-Mar'abi added in a statement yesterday: "I have requested the Consumer Protection Agency to prepare schedules of distribution operations undertaken by the cooperatives in coordination with the Cooperative Union, which assumed responsibility for supervision of the delivery of sugar to the cooperatives. Quantities will be increased to the cooperatives that demonstrate abidance by the guidelines set by the ministry.

"With regard to the municipalities, quantities will be distributed to them according to the schedules prepared by the governorates in conformity with the guidelines to be observed in the provinces."

Yesterday, in his office, the minister of economy and trade dealt with supply, health and insurance issues. He had a number of appointments with senior officials of the ministry, and examined with the director general of the Grain Bureau supply policy and measures for the proper distribution of sugar.

In response to a question about the supply policy the government will follow, al-Mar'abi told AL-SAFIR that the policy of subsidy currently followed costs the state nearly 250 million pounds, which will gradually increase with the increase of the volume of consumption of both sugar and wheat.

He added: "In spite of that, the policy is not achieving its intended result, because of violations occurring at the mills and elsewhere, resulting in the smuggling and sale of wheat in the black market for fodder.

"In the face of this situation, we decided, shortly before the acceptance of the government's resignation, to hold a working session with President Sarkis to study supply policy proposals and approve a plan of action. However, the meeting did not take place."

Al-Mar'abi mentioned that "there are three choices with regard to supply policy, ranging from full subsidy as at present, to 50 percent subsidy, to abolition of subsidy.

"I am for the policy of decreasing the subsidy, taking measures that would force the mills and bakeries to abide by prices set for bread, and checking the black market operations of a number of merchants and mills."

In response to a question about adjusting the milling fee allowed to the flour mills, al-Mar'abi said: "The mill owners have already asked for a raise in their fee from 76 to 125 pounds per ton. Technicians of the Grain Bureau were charged with preparing a study of this matter. In light of it, we decided to raise the fee to 104 pounds for 1 ton.

"On this basis, we renewed the contract with the mills to resume milling at the set fee pending approval of the new supply policy."

In reply to a question about health matters, al-Mar'abi [who is also minister of public health] said: "We had been scheduled to meet this afternoon with American University officials to sign an agreement with the university hospital regarding the open-heart surgery] center, following the decision of the cabinet to allot 6 million pounds for the said center. However, the meeting was postponed until next week."

About the new pricing policy for medicines, al-Mar'abi said: "The pricing of medicines will be announced very shortly. The delay in completing the price list can be traced to the failure of the importing companies to submit the lists requested of them. I made a decision to prohibit these companies from importing medications, because of their failure to submit the information requested of them.

9587
CSO: 4802

ISLAMIC COUNCIL REACTS TO JUMAYYIL'S CALL TO LIBERATE LEBANON

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 5 Aug 80 p 4

[Text] The Islamic Council announced that the recent speech of Bashir al-Jumayyil has great significance, and will prompt Islamic forces to reconsider their positions. It affirmed that the situation calls on the officials concerned to strictly adhere to their legitimate authority and to defend it in a determined way in keeping with the principles of national reconciliation.

This came in a statement issued by the council, in which it said: "The administrative board of the council has taken note of news media accounts of al-Jumayyil's speech, in which he announces the formation of an 'Army of Free Lebanon,' in place of the 'Militias for the Liberation of Lebanon'; the existence of a plan about to be implemented; and the rejection of any talk of dialogue or reconciliation before the liberation of all of Lebanon."

The statement added: "This speech was preceded by an attempt to make an illegal broadcast on Channel 12 and by action to assert militarily the authority of one party [the Phalange] through what was called the 7th of July movement. All this took place at a time when the regime was trying to form a government of activists, to undertake implementation of the announced principles of reconciliation.

"The Islamic Council considers that this speech has great and serious significance. It will drive the Islamic forces not only to be cautious, but also to re-examine all their positions and their methods of reacting to what is going on in Lebanon and the region. Consequently, the council will seek alliances with other forces faithful to the unity of Lebanon in order to confront plans hatched agaisnt this country and readied for implementation.

"The government crisis appears today more serious than in the past. It calls on those concerned to make serious and determined efforts to abide by the legitimate system, defend it and assert its existence. The positions and processes of the legitimate authority must be made completely clear, and government officials must abide by them.

"The sound national principles we have repeatedly advocated to complete rebuilding the army and promulgate the decree on army reorganization;

to build a just and strong state; and to achieve national reconciliation through the announced principles of accord, constitute a framework we will not give up or be complacent about."

The statement continued: "While the Israeli army defies the United Nations and its resolutions, decides to move his capital to Jerusalem, and, at the time deceitfully talks about peace in the region, we, in Lebanon face a similar deceptive situation which we must not succumb to. The legitimate authority is called upon to recognize the facts and to be aware of both its supporters and enemies.

"The citizens and their national leaderships must also recognize both the supporters and enemies of the legitimate regime. The citizens must base their attitudes on such recognition and on support for the legitimate authority, provided this authority helps its own self, not through silence as we have regretfully observed, but by rejecting and challenging what has taken place [in Phalangist areas].

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CSO: 4802

GEORGE HAWI INTERVIEWED ON CIVIL WAR, CP CONGRESS

Havana TRICONTINENTAL No 67-68,1980 pp 59-67

[Interview with George Hawi, secretary general of the Lebanese Communist Party, by Moises Sa'b; date and place not given]

> [Text] In the last few years, Lebanon has become the area in which the Palestinian Revolution, the National Lebanese Movement, and the progressive forces of the Arab world are launching their bloodiest battle against imperialism, Zionism, and reaction.
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> The struggle in southern Lebanon is so intimately related to the Arab people's cause, and especially to the Palestinian question, that it can be said that the fate of the entire Arab world will be decided there.
>
> For that reason, TRICONTINENTAL has been following developments in Lebanon with interest and has offered its readers the opinions of outstanding Arab personalities in this respect.
>
> Today we bring to our pages--in an interview by newsman, Moises Sa'b especially for TRICONTINENTAL--George Hawi, secretary general of the Lebanese Communist Party, who analyzes the historical and ideological roots of the crisis in Lebanon and speaks to us about the ramifications of the struggle taking place in his country.

[Question] We would like to know your opinion about the present situation in Lebanon.

[Answer] There is still a very complex and difficult situation in Lebanon. For 5 years now we have been carrying on a difficult struggle against the imperialists and Zionists and against reactionary plans related to the Middle East crisis and the situation in Lebanon.

The Lebanese crisis is intimately related to the crisis in the Middle East. During the 10 years from 1970 to the present, immediately after the liquidation of the Palestinian presence in Jordan and after the death of President 'Abd-al-Nasir, Lebanon became the most important area of the confrontation with the imperialist-Zionist front, which tried to solve the Middle East question on the basis of the interests of imperialism, Zionism, and the reactionary Arab classes. Because

there is in Lebanon an essential presence of the Palestinian Revolution and a national progressive movement which forms a united front, all the conditions are present there for trying to influence Syria's position.

For this reason, in 1975, during the preparation of the Sinai accords, the reactionary Lebanese forces--in complete cooperation with Israel, the United States, and Sadat--began to carry out their plot against the Palestinian Revolution and the Lebanese progressive movement.

During the first years of the civil war, the situation was very difficult and, after a brief period of calm, of stability--no more than 4 or 5 months--another military provocation took place against the Palestinian Revolution, the Lebanese National Movement and, at the same time, against the Syrian Army. This new confrontation was also related to preparations for further escalation of the plot in that region: the visit of Anwar al-Sadat to Israel. During these preparations and immediately after that visit, Israel began its great offensive against southern Lebanon--at present it occupies a large part of this area--and at the same time, it continued its attacks and provocations.

At present we are facing a permanent Zionist aggression. In addition, we must also confront what they call the Lebanese Front--in other words, a reactionary and fascist front which is continuing its political pressures and its military agression in order to control Lebanon and divide up its territory, creating a fascist state in complete collaboration with the Zionist regime of Israel. Their position is against neither Israeli aggression nor the plot of the internal reactionary forces, but against the Palestinian Revolution and its presence in Lebanon.

Israeli aggression in the south is becoming increasingly strong. Every day hundreds of people in the Lebanese quarter and in the Palestinian camps are forced to abandon their lands and their homes. There is a steady wave of new victims of the attacks, and there is great pressure from the government, from UN forces, and from all the country's reactionary forces against the Palestinian Revolution so that they can obtain concessions from the Palestinians and force them to get out of southern Lebanon.

There is great danger and our Lebanese National Movement, along with the Palestinian Revolution, will have no other choice but to fight, politically and militarily, against that aggression, to defend the southern region, and to continue our military action to free the area occupied by Israel today either directly or through the traitor Sa'd Haddad.

Last August our comrades in the south launced a big and very important battle against th Zionist aggressors. Five of our comrades died after an hour of fighting against 250 Israeli soldiers who landed and attacked one of our bases. Israeli propaganda tried to ignore the presence of progressive Lebanese forces among the people of the south, tried to underestimate the position of the Lebanese people, and also tried to make it seem that this attack, this battle, had only been between Israel and the Palestinian fighters. However, after this heroic action and that of the following night, Israel was forced to admit openly that its troops had had to fight a big, bloody battle, and then it could no longer hide the presence of the Lebanese progressive forces. On that occasion, five of our comrades died because of the Israeli attack; and before that, in July, other comrades in another part of

southern Lebanon also fought off attacks. Our party, along with the National Lebanese Movement, is with that essential force in the south which is fighting for the unity of Lebanon, for the liberation of that area, and against the Israeli occupation.

[Question] What effect have the Camp David accords and conversations had on the Lebanese crisis?

[Answer] The Camp David accords are now behind all this escalation, behind this whole situation. Lebanon is the "arena," the second objective, if your will, of these accords. Camp David may or may not be successful in the measure that its agreements may or may not be successful in Lebanon. Why? Because, unless the Palestinian Revolution is liquidated, there will be no one, not a single Palestinian, capable of joining the talks between Israel and Egypt on self-determination as a solution to the Palestinian problem. If they succeed in liquidating the Palestinian Revolution, it will be easy for them then to find some traitors to present as deserters from the Palestinian people.

This is the first aspect. The second is that the united position of the Arabs against the Camp David accords and the Baghdad summit will not remain the same if the Palestinian Revolution is liquidated, because the reactionary Arab regimes, forced to take this position against Camp David, now fear for their own interests. We can say that they are under pressure from their own peoples, who really are in sympathy with the Palestinian Revolution. Therefore, if they succeed in betraying it, they would have to fear both the Palestinian Revolution and their respective peoples. If the Palestinian Revolution was destroyed, reactionary Arab regimes like Saudi Arabia, those of the Gulf and others would be more free to participate, along with President Sadat, in the Camp David accords.

If the Palestinian Revolution in Lebanon is destroyed, Syria's position would be weakened. Therefore, pressure against the Lebanese situation is also directed at crushing the Palestinian Revolution and influencing Syria's position.

The American maneuvers to have King Husayn, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab countries support the Camp David accords have not been successful because of the presence of the Palestinian Revolution, but if that revolution should disappear, then King Husayn, as well as other reactionary forces in the Arab countries, would not continue to maintain his position against that treaty.

This means that the key to the question at this time is Lebanon. It is because of this that the escalation of Israeli aggression has begun, along with President Sadat's initiative. The interests behind the Camp David accords are trying to see that these attacks are not stopped, but rather that they continue and gain new territories, new positions, every day. We are now on the defensive, and the fact that we are able to maintain our positions is a positive factor.

After the Camp David accords, all the pressure of the United States, Israel, and Sadat is concentrated on Lebanon to break up the Steadfastness Front, which opposed the Camp David treaty. Begin said categorically in the Israeli parliament that he will continue his aggression against Palestine and Lebanon, and he invited President Sarkis to visit Israel, or failing that, to sign in Lebanon itself another treaty similar to that of Camp Cavid. This statement shows very clearly what

Begin's intentions are: he would like a new treaty with Lebanon, similar to that of Camp David, and the price of this agreement would be, first, the Palestinian Revolution and, second, the independence of Lebanon, the unity of the Lebanese nation, and support of the Lebanese profascist movements. This means imposing on the country reactionary fascist regime having good relations with Zionism and under its domination, against the will of the Lebanese people and that of the other Arab peoples of the region.

We are sure now that Lebanon is the second phase of Camp David; in Lebanon, Camp David can continue or stop, and our decision is to stop it and to maintain our position, to fight the Israeli aggression and not to allow the Lebanese Government to surrender to Israel's demands, its desires, its conditions. And this is, at the same time, the decision of the Palestinian Revolution.

[Question] Does the Lebanese problem have any religious roots?

[Answer] There are some religious facets to the problem, but this is not its base, its content. Essentially it is a problem of classes and of national tendencies.

The Lebanese bourgeoisie, especially the financial oligarchy, has tried in the last 10 years to solve its crisis in the economic, social, and political spheres against the interests of the working class and the peasants and of the middle and lower bourgeoisie. The Lebanese political system is a clerical regime whose basis is religious discrimination. For example, not everybody can be elected president of the republic: for this one must be a Christian, and preferably a Maronite Christian. In general, all the leaders of the political regime are elected according to religions. In this distribution, the Maronites obtain the key positions, such as the presidency of the republic, leadership of the army, and the majority in parliament. It is apparently a clerical combination, but in reality this distribution came about in 1943, and since then there has been a great change in the population; there is a great transformation in social and economic levels, as well as in religious and political levels. This Maronite domination is one of class content, because the Maronites are dominant within the bourgeoisie. This does not mean that there is no Moslem bourgeoisie, but the latter in not the dominant force.

Lebanese industry has developed in the last 10 years, so that many factories, shops, and industries have been built along the coast. This region, in the last century, was also inhabited traditionally by Christians. Because of those factories, workers from other regions of the country, especially from the south and east--Moslems in general--came, not only to work in these centers, but also to remain in the region, to inhabit this part of the country. Others--Christians in general and from Mount Lebanon--also worked in those factories, and this brought about a new unity in Lebanon, a unity of the working class on the basis of its own interests rather than on the basis of any faith or religion. The political regime and the dominant religious forces became fearful on seeing this unity among the working class in the struggle for its interests.

This is one aspect. The other is that the economic crisis in Lebanon reached into all the important levels of the middle and lower bourgeoisie of the country, and these people also began to fight against the authority and domination of the financial oligarchy. Its struggle was also that of the working class.

Since the working class is most organized on the union level and in the leadership of our party and other forces, the struggle of the lower and middle bourgeoisie was related to the cause of the working class. The regime began to lose the historical stability which had come from domination by the lower and middle bourgeoisie. In view of the development of these events, the only path for the upper bourgeoisie to follow was fascism, through which it tried to reestablish its economic, political, and religious domination. In Lebanon this fascist solution has taken a religious form because of the historical contradiction and the interrelation between the monopoly of class and the monopoly of religion and faith. On one side is the Maronite bourgeois domination over the entire bourgeois class; on the other, the workers and peasants--the majority of them Moslems--along with most of the Christians. Finally, the clerical forces have not been able to conceal the class content, the social content, of this struggle.

On this subject, we must mention also that because there are thousands of Palestinian workers in Lebanon, as well as hundreds of thousands of Syrians who are working in these factories and businesses along with the Lebanese working class, there is another interrelation between the class struggle and the national question, concerning the history of Lebanon.

We must also say that most of the working class which comes from the south and the east has continued the fight against Israeli aggression, counter to the policy of the state and the Lebanese authorities toward those attacks. At the same time, the struggle continues on the economic, political and social level, achieving an identity between the national question and the principal objectives of the working class struggle.

There is, consequently, a certain appearance, certain phases, a certain facade of clerical and religious aspects, but the true content of the Lebanese crisis of 1974-75 is a class content, a social content.

[Question] How will the balance of forces develop in the future?

[Answer] I can say frankly and with certainty that everything depends on two principal factors. First, it depends on whether or not we are able to stop the progress of the Camp David treaty. If we succeed in stopping it, the balance of forces will incline completely in our favor, first throughout the region and then in Lebanon, as a result.

The second factor is closely related to the first and is the unity within the progressive and anti-imperialist rank and file of the Arab world. This unity is the most important condition in creating a new correlation of forces in favor of the Arab national liberation movement. We say this because we are sure that international opinion is on the side of the interests of those who are fighting for their independence, for social progress, and for peace. For that reason, creating this new situation depends solely on our position, on the position of the progressive elements in the Arab countries. We have an experience and a very clear example in Ethiopia. The balance of forces around the Ethiopian question and its revolution was once against it, but when that country's revolutionaries decided to keep up their fight against imperialism and reaction, they were successful, and then they saw the socialist countries alongside them--the Soviet Union, Cuba and other who helped them and offered them all the assistance they needed to win.

This means that the progressive Arab forces must make a decision. The international situation is on our side; we have only to unite and advance in our struggle against imperialism, against Israel, against the Camp David treaty.

[Question] Can you tell us briefly about the chief results of the Fourth Congress of the Lebanese Communist Party?

[Answer] For us this congress was the most important event in the life and history of our party, and we closed it in a situation which was very difficult for the security and political life of the country. We discussed in depth and at length all the questions concerning the Lebanese crisis and the future of our country and, at the same time, the future prospects of the Arab national liberation movement. We also discussed the international situation and the liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The three or four most important subjects discussed were those concerning Lebanon. We analyzed the internal crisis of the capitalist regime which gave way to fascism. To do this we presented all the documents and facts which prove the economic roots of the fascist trends. Our congress called for unity among the forces which advocate peace in Lebanon, its national independence, its democratic progress, and its good relations with the Arab world to unify the entire struggle against the aggressive plans of the imperialists, or Israel, and of the reactionary forces of the country. Our call is for the broadest cooperation among the forces to save the unity of the country, its national independence, its Arab character, and its democratic development. Our decision is to continue our struggle alongside the Pales Palestinian Revolution for the purpose of defending its existence and to mobilize the masses for the political and military struggle against Zionist aggression, with the mission of liberating the south from occupation by Israel and its lackey, Sa'd Haddad.

At the same time, we called attention to the new tendencies of the government and of the president of the republic, to prepare the country for military dictatorship if the fascist plan of isolation does not succeed. In this other plan for military dictatorship, we see that the Lebanese bourgeoisie will play the same role it played in the fascist plan. And this will not, of course, be in the interests of the majority of the people, or even in the interest of many levels of the bourgeoisie itself. The example of Greece is very clear in this respect; Karamanlis himself, 10 or 12 years ago, brought the colonels to power to put an end to the democratic process of the country; however, he was one of the victims of the colonels' regime and was forced to fight later on to get rid of that government, but Greece had already fallen many years behind. We are speaking now very openly with the Lebanese masses and especially with the bourgeoisie, telling them that they must not repeat that example.

As for the Arab world, I want to say in a few words that we support its positions and decisions against Camp David, and I see that the most important question is to stop the development of that treaty. But at the same time, we are studying the crisis in the Arab national liberation movement, and we see that it is a crisis of leadership, related to the class nature of its leaders. The lower and middle bourgeoisie, under the leadership of this national liberation movement, are trying to keep it in a centrist position: with one face toward imperialism and the other toward the masses, development and communism, against the interests of the revolution

itself. This tendency, in some Arab countries, is trying to eliminate democracy, keep the masses out of the struggle, and continue this vacillating position, never firm, incapable of fighting against and winning victory over an attack such as that directed by the United States, Israel, and Sadat.

In addition, we see that this crisis is continuing because the truly revolutionary forces, the communists and others, are not completely playing their role, the historical role of the working class, and for that reason they are also responsible for this leadership crisis in the Arab national liberation movement. The participation of the working class in the leadership of the national liberation movement is not something which we should hope for, which we should beg for, saying, "Give us our role," but a right which we must take into our own hands and which depends in the first place, on the truly revolutionary program of the most advanced forces, among them the communists, to solve the national question truly and satisfactorily. If the communists do not take the national question, the question of the liberation of Palestine, of Arab unity, and social progress, into their own hands, they will leave it in the hands of the lower and middle bourgeoisie, and the latter will take it from one defeat to another.

We can say very frankly, from the revolutionary point of view, that our responsibility is very great, because the bourgeoisie is not capable of solving the national problem; on the contrary, they have led it down the path of treason. Nor is the lower bourgeoisie capable of solving this problem; only the working class can play that role, since we can see that the Camp David treaty has a social content, which is a coalition of classes against the national liberation movement among Arabs in general. In Africa, Asia, and other parts of the world, the truly revolutionary role of the working class is recognized as the force which is replacing the lower bourgeoisie.

The most important question we discussed in our congress was this leadership crisis in the national liberation movement in its two aspects: on the one hand, the lower bourgeoisie as a class and as a political organization, and on the other the truly revolutionary forces and, at their head, the Arab communist forces.

[Question] Can you tell us what is the role of the territorial division made by Sa'd Haddad?

[Answer] Sa'd Haddad is a tool in the hands of Israel to conceal the Zionist occupation, expand it, and annex that territory which he and Israel occupied in the middle of the country--occupied now by the isolationist fascist forces--so that they can in the future dominate all the national territory. For this reason, we believe that this "state" is very dangerous now and will continue to be so in the future. Therefore, we are calling on all the Lebanese people to fight against this maneuver, this separatist, divisionist, and fascist "state," and we urge all the Arab countries to face this danger and be on guard against it. Unfortunately, there is no truly patriotic and national position in the Arab countries against this danger, not only within the reactionary forces, but also within the patriotic and progressive forces. To underestimate this "mini-state," this puppet state, is, in our point of view, very dangerous, because it concerns a phase, an aspect of Israeli occupation in an Arab country. This is the first time Israel has shown this tendency in its occupation.

8735
CSO: 3010

MERGER OF THREE NASIRITE ORGANIZATIONS ANNOUNCED

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 2 Aug 80 p 3

[Text] It was announced yesterday that a new Nasirite organization has been formed under the name of al-Tanzim al-Tali'i [Vanguard Organization] through the merger of three Nasirite organizations in Lebanon. The three were: al-Harakat al-'Arabiyah al-Tha'irah--Fasa'il al-Fida' al-'Arabi [The Arab Revolutionary Movement--Arab Fedayeen Cells], the Arab Socialist Union Party and the Socialist Union--Forces of the Revolution.

This was announced at a press conference held at Hotel Beau Rivage yesterday afternoon. In attendance were 'Ali al-Hajj of the Arab Revolutionary Movement, Samir Kabrit and Husayn al-Ahmar of the Socialist Union Party; and Ahmad Hammud of the Socialist-Union. A number of the other leaders of the new organization were also present.

At the beginning of the conference, the secretary general of the new organization, Mr Al-Hajj, welcomed the newsmen, praised the role of the press and the role of its martyred dean Riyadh Taha, and asked for the observance of a moment of silence in his memory.

Mr Kibrit then read a statement which affirmed that "The advance of the forces of the revolution will not be stopped," and announced the formation of the Vanguard Organization. He said: "This organization is progressive and forward-looking throughout Lebanon. It constitutes a call for the unification of forces under circumstances that cannot bear any delay. We must today adopt our unification slogan of 'Unity of doctrine and strength of unity above anything else.'"

At the end of the conference, Mr Hammud answered questions. Referring to the organization's joining the Central Political Council, he said: "Our documentary statement calls for the Nasirites to play a role both within and outside the council. However, we demand the formation of a central council, representing all nationalist parties operating in Lebanon."

9587
CSO: 4802

PHALANGIST PLANS, INTERNAL CONFLICTS ANALYZED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 15 Sep 80 p 15

[Report from Beirut by AL-QUDS (Jerusalem) PRESS: "The Phalangist State Appointed Its Ambassador al-Ma'iki in Washington; Three-Story Presidential Palace Near Juniyah"]

[Text] AL-QUDS PRESS has learned from sources close to the Phalangist Political Bureau that the basic steps have been taken under the tentative plan to proclaim a Phalangist state under the name of the Free State of Lebanon, and that the timing of the announcement depends on the completion of the final plan. This involves settling disputes among rival centers within the party, and consulting personnel at the front facing National Front areas.

The Centers of Amin and Bashir

Regarding the existing disputes within the party and the political bureau sources paint the picture as follows:

There are two basic centers within the political bureau.

The first center is represented by Amin al-Jumayyil who is concerned about maintaining the existing balance, in a manner that would permit him to retain his political and military influence within the party and qualify him to carry on a dialogue with the other parties. This is manifested in his concern to maintaining a good relationship with the National Liberal party [NLP], led by Camille Sham'un, chairman of the Lebanese Front. Amin al-Jumayyil's sphere of influence is tied to that of a group within the party, which includes moderate Phalangist figures like Deputy George S'adah and Attorney Karim Baqraduni. Both are members of the Political Bureau and are playing a role in mending relations between the Phalangists and Damascus and between the Phalangists and other Maronite and Moslem political forces. Among these forces are Franjiyyah's bloc and the Islamic Grouping [coalition of Moslem political leaders].

The second center is represented by Bashir al-Jumayyil who is trying hard to settle the situation to his advantage, using his full authority over the effective militias of the party. The 7 July military movement sought to bridle the NLP, and is linked to plans to subdue all political and armed minorities in the areas where the separatists are in control. This center is always trying to maintain the initiative and to place Phalangist political leaders before accomplished facts.

Bashir's Steps

Sources mention in this regard that new steps Bashir al-Jumayyil is preparing to implement include the following:

*Building a presidential palace for the new mini-state in the area of al-Rabiyah near Juniyah. It is to consist of three floors: two will be underground and the third will be above ground. The palace will be equipped with rapid warning electronic devices.

*Printing new identity cards; building centers for real property and vital statistics agencies; and issuing tax collection procedures.

*Establishing the practice of raising the flag of any country whose ambassador visits the Free State of Lebanon. An orchestra is to be organized to play the national anthems of the Free State of Lebanon and of the foreign country.

Ambassador in Washington

*The Phalangist party established an office abroad following the events of 7 July. This office is tantamount to an embassy. A person called Antoine Ma'iki has been appointed ambassador of the Phalangist mini-state in Washington. He has good relations with Harold Saunders, the Undersecretary of State for Near East Affairs.

*Dictating compulsory military service, and prohibiting travel abroad, unless the militias permit it. Landed property is to be sold only to Maronites, and an 80 percent tax on sales contracts is to be imposed.

Mobilization and Explosion

On the other hand, eyewitnesses report that Sherman and Centurion tanks were advancing towards al-Jabal to take up positions on the borders of Karawan and Upper al-Matn. Heavy movements of Phalangist militia in the capital and the suburbs have also been noted. A battery of heavy artillery directed towards West Beirut and the al-Shuf area has been set up.

Arab security forces are expecting the Phalangist forces to begin a concentrated attack in some areas, especially in al-Shuf and Upper al-Matn, while the Zionist enemy carries out an all-out attack in the south.

Inducing the Syriacs To Leave

Informed sources state that about 60 percent of the members of the Syriac Church have left the eastern area of Beirut and are headed abroad. Thirty percent of these arrived in the western part of Beirut and a similar percentage emigrated to European countries.

The Position of al-Jumayyil, Sr

At present, the position of Party leader Pierre al-Jumayyil, the father of the two feuding brothers, is like that of one who is trying to swallow a bitter pill. On one hand, he is concerned about preserving the unity of the family, and, accordingly, that of the party under the leadership of the family. On the other hand, he is

interested in achieving party control over the Christian areas in their entirety under a cohesive command. Pierre al-Jumayyil appears to be concerned about maintaining good relations with the Lebanese Front and with its chairman, Camille Sham'un. He expresses his fears that the front may collapse as a political organization following continued Phalangist steps to control Maronite decisions. This would bring about the isolation of the Phalangist party from its allies, to say nothing of the party's existing isolation from other political parties.

Therefore, Pierre al-Jumayyil is trying to prepare suitable conditions for proclamation of a Phalangist mini-state. He considers such a proclamation as a weapon of last resort in the hands of the Phalangists. It is to be used only in the final stages, after complete political preparations for it have been made on the local and international scenes.

Continued Developments

Political observers in the eastern areas are not betting on a continued state of relative balance within the Phalangist party. They expect feverish developments to continue inside and outside the party to carry out the militias' plan to assume control over political and military decisions. They believe that Bashir al-Jumayyil's faction did strengthen its influence considerably after the 7 July massacre, in which the militias of the NLP which oppose Bashir al-Jumayyil's course were liquidated. This means that full control by Bashir al-Jumayyil is approaching, and that this would inevitabily expedite the proclamation of a Phalangist mini-state and the announcement that it will be tied to the border strip area. This would also lead to preparations for an extensive eruption whose purpose is to tie this mini-state with the area of Jazin and al-Jabal through al-Shuf.

8592
CSO: 4802

PHALANGISTS ARRESTED, WEAPONS CONFISCATED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 22 Aug 80 p 11

[Article: "Resistance Discovers Phalangist Network Involved in North Lebanon Assassinations and Plundering; Hablas and Mahbash Confess to Several Actions"]

[Text] The Palestinian resistance has announced the discovery of a Phalangist network operating in nationalist areas of North Lebanon. The general leadership of the popular front held a news conference and presented two members of the gang, Ahmad Hablas and Walid Mahbash. The front said that various weapons were found in their possession.

Confession

Following their arrest they confessed to membership in the Phalange party and revealed plans to assassinate several Zgharta personalities, the most outstanding being deputy 'Abdallah al-Rasi and his wife, Sonia Franjiyah, Philip Habib, commander of Zgharta's militia, and Abu Robert, a senior militia officer.

They also admitted to participating in a number of murders, armed robberies, thefts, and bombings, including the following:

1. Robbing and murdering the bank teller, Munir 'Oda, in his house in the Bab-al-Hadid area

2. Blowing up Shawki al-Rasi's printing shop on Centralle Street (al-Tall area)

3. Stealing 30,000 Lebanese lire from a teller near the French bank

4. Breaking into Dr Lahud's clinic and stealing 5,000 lire

5. Breaking into a store near the statue of Abd al-Hamid Karrami in Tripoli and stealing 7,000 lire

6. Bombing a cafe where Zartawis gather

7. Stealing an automobile belonging to "'Azzar' Azzar, a 1979 Fiat 132

8. Stealing 3,000 lire from Dr Rafik al-Mara'bi

9. Breaking into Dr Kasdi Al-Shahal's clinic and stealing 1,500 lire

10. Blowing up a number of Zgharta stores in the al-Zahraya area.

Financial Inducements

In answer to the journalists' question, "How did you first become linked with the Phalange?," Ahmad Hablas, 28, replied, "I was visiting a number of people, Sa'id 'Allam al-Din, Mustafa Hablas, Ma'n Barbich, and someone called Adib, and they were getting in touch with Akram in al-Ashrafiya. They offered me financial inducements to work with them; they also got in touch with Walid and Khalid Kotrayib and two Syrians called 'Abd-al-Ra'uf and 'Ali. They suggested that we get in touch with the Phalange so as to participate in destructive activities in exchange for money. So the agreement was made. They tempted us with money, and I am very sorry for these deeds. We distributed the money we stole among us." Concerning assassinations he said, "We were supposed to be only the lookout in exchange for 5,000 lire, but we refused because the amount was insufficient."

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CSO: 4802

PHALANGISTS ELIMINATE THEIR COMPETITION

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 17 Aug 80 p 18

[Article: "Phalangists Destroy Last Rivals; Sharbal removed as Head of Maronite Monks; AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM Reveals Details of Party and Personality Conflicts Within Lebanese Front Leadership; Are al-Ashrafiya Explosions a Response to Phalangist Domination?"]

[Text] Father Bulus has replaced Father Sharbal as head of the order of Maronite monks, which are a large and important Lebanese Christian religious institution. This followed closed elections lasting several days, interspersed by prayers and religious rites.

This would be a normal event if not for the situation surrounding the elections and the special role that Sharbal played in both religion and politics. This outstanding priest participated in all stages of the Lebanese civil war. In cooperation with his allies in the Phalangist and Free parties he converted Maronite monasteries, religious centers, and places of worship into militay centers and well-defended forts filled with weapons. Arrests followed by torture within these religious shrines--against Palestinians, Moslems, Syrians, and Christians supporting the Palestinian cause--have occurred and are still occurring. Leftist and progressive forces seized by the Christian militia are treated likewise.

Many questions have arisen concerning the reasons which caused the forces dominating the Christian side, presently gathered entirely within the Phalangist party, to get rid of Sharbal. The latter was a main leader of the Lebanese Front, which from the beginning included al-Jumayyil, Camille Sham'un, President Franjiyah, the poet Sa'id 'Akl, the historian Jawad Bulus, and a number of right wing intellectuals, e.g. Dr Fu'ad Bustani and Dr Charles Malik. The answer can be found in developments within the front following battles in Beirut and other sectors, the movement of the war to South Lebanon, and military movements in the interior.

Disagreement within the front began when Sulayman Franjiyah walked out following fierce disagreements between himself and his former allies, particularly the Phalangist Party. Franjiyah and northern leaders charged the latter with attempting to dominate the situation and to impose one party rule. Franjiyah and the northern leadership, young and old, repudiated the front's dealings with Israel and refused to allow the Phalangists to participate in the government, particularly after they concentrated their energies on separatist steps designed to partition Lebanon. This overriding development still influences the Lebanese political situation.

Second was the secession of a number of independent, right wing personalities from the front's leadership for several reasons. Those quitting felt that they had no "say," given Phalangist ambitions to dominate their allies and consequent suppression of free speech even within front meetings.

Some supporters of the poet Sa'id 'Akl, who has close ties with the monks and the "Hurras al-Arz" organization, disagreed with the Phalangist call for the destruction of Arabs and Arabism while at the same time seeking to build bridges to some Arab countries. Dr Fu'ad al-Shamali, who led a military organization called "'Al-Tanzim," no longer has a role within the front and is encircled by his former allies.

Third was the Phalangist ground war against Christian minorities, which has lasted throughout the past 2 years in numerous forms. It has had severe repercussions within the ranks of some in the front. The Christian minority, according to a level-headed observer, felt subject to extermination or complete one party rule. Fourth, there is present

Fourth, there is present Phalangist militia attack upon its only remaining ally within the front, former President Camille Sham'un. Throughout his political life Sham'un has labored for the same cause that the Christian right wing has fought for during the past 2 years. This cause is supported by the Israeli army's move into South Lebanon, Jerusalem, and the West Bank.

In spite of deep ties of friendship between the Phalangist Party and Camille Sham'un, the former decided to wage war against the latter with a fierceness hitherto unknown in Lebanon, including the widespread butchery of 1975-76. The leaders of Sham'un's party publicized the Phalangist butcheries of 7 July, which the Phalangists term the "noble movement of the 7th." During that time 550 people were killed, with hundreds left wounded, maimed, and homeless, and tremendous property losses.

Democratic procedures aimed at Father Sharbal, who was attending the meetings of the Lebanese front, represents a fifth Phalangist dictatorial scheme. It appears that the Phalangists were upset by the major role played by the priest and the monks within the front. In spite of close military, political, and propagandistic ties between Sharbal and the Phalangist military council, Sharbal was accused of harboring a relationship with former President Franjiyah who was carrying on a bloody conflict with the Phalangists. The Phalangist militia under the leadership of Bashir al-Jumayyil decided to get the priest replaced as head of the Maronite order at the end of his 6-year term. Although the dominant mood among those with a right to vote was to renew Sharbal's presidency, outside pressures were stronger and the congregation decided to elect Father Bulus Na'man. The latter has no problems with the Phalangists; his relationship with them and their leaders is very good.

The question is whether Bashir al-Jumayyil can totally liquidate all rivals, enemies, and friends. It is too early to give an answer to this. However, massive and repetitive explosions, occurring in east Beirut and al-Ashrafiya in particular, have caused people to live in constant terror despite the activities of Phalangist authorities. These explosions may constitute more than an "answer" to conflicts and breakdowns that are occurring on the internal front, which the Phalangists thought they could totally control.

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SECRET RESOLUTIONS OF PHALANGE PARTY REVEALED

Kuwait AL-HADAF in Arabic 21 Aug 80 p 5

[Article: Phalangist Council Secret Resolutions; Sham'un Says Zero Hour Will Come 20 or 21 August 1980"]

[Text] Observers link delays in forming a new Lebanese Government to fear of another blowup that could return the country to its previous state of violent and bloody conflict. Preparations for violence are most prounounced in the two most inflammatory areas of the country, South Lebanon and North Lebanon. In South Lebanon Israel launched a lightning attack to take advantage of the U.S. presidential election and to draw attention from her announcement making Jerusalem the permanent capital of the Zionist entity.

What is going on in North Lebanon? The price of linking events in South Lebanon to those occurring on the border between Mount Lebanon and North Lebanon? During a small family celebration which took place in the presidential palace, 17 August 1980, Sulayman Franjiyah, on the anniversary of his election as Lebanese president, spoke with close associates about specific information which he continuously receives concerning Phalangist movements toward North Lebanon. He revealed that the Phalange is gathering its forces near Jurud Jubayl and al-Batrun and preparing to move on North Lebanon. Zgharta sources have indicated that a Phalangist buildup composed of three divisions is preparing to end the forced isolation of the east by attacking North Lebanon. Therefore it would appear that a Phalangist division is trying secretly to reach the town of Bsharri, under the leadership of Samir Ja'ja', while another division is preparing to leave the towns of Mayfuk and Dir al-Kattara for North Lebanon. A third division would go from the coast via al-Barbara highway, which intersects the main Beirut-Tripoli road. It appears that the Phalangist hordes moving into North Lebanon include 2,000 armed fighters, including elements from the former Lebanese army and volunteers from various eastern sections. A number of tanks and heavy artillery have been moved to Phalangist borders with North Lebanon, and reinforcements are continuing daily. All these movements are being watched by division stations in border areas from al-Batrun to Qanak, near Bashirri, and Jabal'Ayut, Darb 'Ashtar, etc. Terrorist activities have started within the Jubayl area, and a wide northern movement is occurring in Beirut in anticipation of every possibility.

The Military Council

During secret meetings held by Bashir al-Jumayyil, of the Phalangist military council, it was decided to launch an attack on North Lebanon, following the attainment of specific conditions in that sphere. AL-HADAF has obtained a copy of these resolutions, which were unanimously agreed upon by the council. They are divided into two parts. The first deals with Beirut; it calls for watching Dany Sham'un and not permitting him to move toward North Lebanon and upset the planned attack there. The second is intended to prevent Arab resistance forces from interfering in any possible battle between the Phalange and the Maradah in North Lebanon and thereby to neutralize the Tripoli front. Karm Bakraduni was given that assignment. The council received information specifically accusing Dany Sham'un of blowing up two cars in the al-Ashrafiya area. Dany was placed on a list for liquidation, whatever the cost. He refuses to go to North Lebanon because he knows what awaits him there.

Zero Hour

The information that Camille Sham'un is spreading among close associates and visitors indicates an anticipated blowup in two stages soon. He speaks thus with the help of Jordanian authorities and says, "A new wave of assassinations will begin between the 20th and 25th of this month. Following these liquidations there will be consecutive security blowups in South and North Lebanon." Camille says that the Jordanian authorities have warned him of all this and have asked that he do whatever he can to limit these activities which threaten the country. Camille and Dany have doubled security about their houses as well as military activity in the areas where they live and move about.

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SEQUEL OF ARMY TEST OF STRENGTH IN AL-HADATH DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 14 Sep 80 p 13

[Report from Beirut by AL-QUDS (Jerusalem) PRESS: "Army Succeeds in First Practical Test Against Phalangists"]

[Text] The armed clashes between the Lebanese army and the Phalangist militia in the area of al-Hadath ended early Thursday morning after the armed Phalangists in the area surrendered. Firing ceased, and guards at Phalangist posts were taken to prisons at army barracks in al-Fayyadiyah, al-Yarazah and B'abda. However, no sooner had the fighting ceased at 5 a.m. than two heavy artillery shells exploded, one near the presidential palace in B'abda, and the other near al-Yarazah army headquarters. It was determined that the Phalangists had fired the two bombs from one of their posts near Brummana.

The First Test for the Army

These battles are considered the first practical test of the army's ability to confront [militias], specifically the Phalangists, who have imposed their control over the entire eastern area [of Beirut], with the exception of some sections in the southern suburb. The clashes began when the National Liberal party [NLP] invited army troops to occupy their offices. This invitation followed Camille Sham'un's decision to dissolve the military arm of his party and maintain its political activity.

Army troops did in fact enter the NLP positions more than a week ago. As soon as they arrived into the area, they issued a local order that no weapons be carried in the area or transported into it. The army asked the Phalangists to stay in their positions and not to appear with their weapons in the streets. After a week of provocations and Phalangist disregard for the decision of the army, the armed Phalangists tried to provoke NLP elements in the area. The army interfered to stop that, but the Phalangists responded with violence. Two Phalangists were killed, and two officers who were trying to solve the dispute peacefully were wounded. Thereupon, the army command issued orders to its troops to return any fire, to arrest anyone who fires guns and to establish the army's full control over al-Hadath.

A number of clashes followed between special and regular army troops and the Phalangist militias. These battles led to the surrender of a large number of armed Phalangists and the destruction of their headquarters in al-Hadath. Despite political interventions by Phalangist leader Pierre al-Jumayyil with President Elias Sarkis, the president notified al-Jumayyil that the army would not stop its intervention until it had established full control over the area whose security it was charged to protect

as part of its new mission. The fighting had stopped at noon, but it was resumed in the afternoon after Bashir al-Jumayyil threatened the army. Bashir warned, "Today we note with sorrow and with pain what the army did in Shahrur Valley before 7 July. We note that it was these actions that brought us where we are today. On 13 April this army was not able to protect us; we protected ourselves. If this army is politically incapable, and if it cannot maintain peace, it should at least be careful so that it does not become a tool for civil strife and for strengthening one party against the other."

He also said, "We do not want to enter areas which are occupied by the Lebanese army. We do not have a right to do so. But the army also does not have the right to do what it is doing today. These areas used [Christian] steadfastness areas. These are the areas that have protected B'abda [seat of presidency] recently and 4 years ago. These are the areas that will protect B'abda in the future."

Bashir al-Jumayyil referred openly to the army's failure to assume its responsibilities in some areas. "If the army is unable to maintain the peace, we may be forced to play its role this time also," he said.

Raiding the Dens

In the course of all this, army troops continued to raid the Phalangists with the covert assistance of some NLP groups. Army troops were able to silence Phalangist gunfire and to arrest the well-known leaders of the party in the area. The army's telecommunications devices intercepted new orders from Bashir al-Jumayyil [to his partisans] urging resistance and non-submission. The orders affirmed that aid was on the way to al-Hadath. However, al-Jumayyil's orders were not carried out this time, because the army thwarted that.

It may said that the army did settle the situation in al-Hadath, and it seems that it was able to establish full control over the area. Bashir al-Jumayyil issued a new warning to the army command and to the president. He threatened to expand the area of confrontation and to attack and occupy areas where the army is posted. Al-Jumayyil also threatened to shell the army and to divide it most deeply. However, this information remained confidential and was not ciruclated in political and media circles.

Everybody is speculating about the position of Camille Sham'un and the NLP in the area. The Phalangists are circulating information that Sham'un had denounced the disturbances and had instructed the NLP in al-Hadath not to take part in them, and to contribute to the effort to pacify the situation. But Sham'un's wishes were not carried out in the area. In fact, the members of the NLP proclaimed their absolute support for the army's action. Bashir al-Jumayyil tried to straighten things out by publicly commending Camille Sham'un. This, however, did not have any impact on the centers of power in the party. These take their orders form Dany Sham'un who takes a negative and extremist position against any position taken by the Phalangists and Bashir al-Jumayyil.

[Camille] Sham'un had held an extended meeting with Pierre al-Jumayyil and had spoken many times with Bashir. It is expected that he will convene an important meeting to determine the situation in the context of the army's new action in the eastern areas.

Position of the National Movement

But what about the position of the National Movement?

Information received at B'abda Palace from various parties on the other side [of the conflict] confirms the existence of a large group which supports the army's action and calls on it to continue imposing its control on the separatist areas which are working for partition, so that, if the army is successful, it could then pursue its basic mission. Numerous national figures in the western region [of Beirut] as well as public opinion leaders and key figures in the Chamber of Deputies have informed the president of this view. They emphasized that this course of action constitutes the only available opening to solve the problem of the continued existence of mini-states in the eastern areas. The president was also told that the army's success there would be a prelude to its move into the remaining areas, including the western [areas of Beirut] and the south [of Lebanon].

B'abda palace circles are saying that President Sarkis is considering all these possibilities with senior security commanders. He is facing the difficult choice of shifting the power of the state from the realm of radio statements to that of enforcement [of state policy]. Such a choice would make it easier for the state to implement the well-known principles of accord which the president proposed several months ago.

In general, reaction in other non-eastern areas to the army's success in al-Hadath have been positive. According to private information form the eastern area itself, public opinion was satisfied with what has happened in al-Hadath, and was hopeful that this would be a prelude to [the army's] reaching into all areas controlled by the Phalangists.

Phalangist Pressures

President Sarkis is being subjected to heavy Phalangist pressure to disregard the advice of some of those who are close to him to continue widening the army's sphere of influence into the heart of the eastern region. This, according to Phalangist threats, would have harmful consequences for Lebanon as a whole and for the army and the government in particular. The Phalangists have begun carrying out their threats. They have resumed shelling the area of al-Hadath where the army is stationed, while they negotiate secretly to stop the army's campaign.

The latest information about the clashes in the area indicates that fighting resumed after the Phalangists issued a new warning in which they asked that all detained Phalangists be released. AL-QUDS PRESS has learned that the army may release the armed Phalangists who are being detained, provided that they promise not to carry arms again or appear with their weapons in the area of al-Hadath. It was also mentioned that the army has permitted the appearance of any party faction, provided it does not make any use of weapons. Negotiations on this matter are under way between the army and the Phalangists.

Some circles of the National Movement believe that President Sarkis will pursue his course to impose the army's control, and that he will apply himself to achieve the plan proposed by former President Sulayman Franjiyyah to start deployment of the army from B'abda, until the army carries out its objective of controlling all partitionist-areas. But according to presidential circles, the president is saying that he needs political cover to enforce army control. Contacts are under way in this area, and it is not unlikely that all these demands may be met in the course of the next few days.

In any case, all indications are that the administration is at a difficult and important crossroads. The destiny and the identity of the administration in the remaining 2 years of its life depend on the decision it will take in this regard. It is also been learned that the presidential palace has initiated broad and secret contacts with all groups so that they may help this round before matters get worse and before any action is undertaken that may hurt the course of peace and reconciliation in the country.

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CENTRAL BANK RAISES CEILING ON BANK CREDIT

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 6 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] The Bank of Lebanon raised the ceiling on bank credits to the private sector by 2 percent until the end of the current year. Likewise, it increased the additional allowable credit to finance the industrial and tourist sectors from 5 to 8 percent.

This appeared in circular No 268 of 5 August 1980 issued by the governor of the Bank of Lebanon, Shaykh Michel al-Khuri yesterday. It amends circular No 251 of 29 December 1979.

This measure of the central bank relaxing credit ceiling is in response to the desire of the banking system after it became clear that there was presently increased and unexpected demand for the Lebanese pound, free of risk, on both local and international money markets. The volume of bank credits given in the first quarter of the year revealed an increase in line with the limits set by the Bank of Lebanon.

The text of circular No 268 follows:

"In reference to circular No 251 of 29 December 1979, the governor of the Bank of Lebanon announces that in the session held on 4 August 1980, the board of directors of the central bank approved the following amendments:

"First, to raise the credit ceiling as set in the second article of the said circular for the period between 1 January and 31 December 1980 from 20 to 22 percent of the lower of all bank credits as of 30 November 1979 or 31 December 1979 (as determined under prior guidelines). Any bank can utilize this new 2-percent increase up to the end of 1980.

"Second, to increase the additional allowable credit defined in the third article of circular No 251 regarding the financing of the industrial and tourist sectors from 5 to 8 percent of the volume of a bank's credits as of 30 November 1979. This will be effective until the end of 1980.

"Third, every bank that exceeds the maximum limits set forth in the two previous paragraphs and in Paragraph 4 of circular No 251 will be required to place with the Bank of Lebanon 75, instead of 50 percent of the amount in excess of the maximum credit limit, as a necessary reserve. This paragraph takes effect on 1 September 1980.

"Fourth, banks may concede to other banks the right to use any unutilized part of the increased credits authorized above. This may be done after obtaining the prior consent of the Banks Control Commission.

"Fifth, this circular takes effect on 5 August 1980.

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PROMINENT INDUSTRIAL REPRESENTATIVE DEPLORES FINANCIAL STATE

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 13 Sep 80 p 7

/Article by George Bashir: "The Subject of the Instalment Payment of Debts Is Closed; Restriction of Banking Credit Has Created Economic Stagnation"/

/Text/ The current chief of the Society of Lebanese Industrialists, Dr Fu'ad Abu Salih, resembles the current chief of the Society of Banks of Lebanon, Dr As'ad Sawaya.

Dr Abu Salih is the first chairman of the Industrialists' Society to come from the ranks of technicians and managers, not the ranks of the big industrialists, after the biggest of the big factory owners--Albert 'Usayli, Butrus al-Khuri and 'Abdallah Khuri- followed one another as chairman of the Industrialists' Society since its establishment.

Dr Sawaya is the first chairman of the Society of Banks to come from the ranks of the technicians and managers, not from the ranks of bank board chairmen like Messrs Pierre Iddah and Joseph Ja'ja'.

Some people say that developments of the age and the expansion of the economic societies' tasks have brought about the presence of experts, not princes, at the top of these societies.

Some people say that technicians like Fu'ad Abu Salih and As'ad Sawaya constitute a compromise solution to the struggle among princes for the chairs of sensitive economic societies like the Societies of Industrialists and Banks.

That is, Fu'ad Abu Salih may provide more stability for industrialists in the light of the competition between the two chieftains of industry Shaykh Butrus al-Khuri and Mr Ghazi Jabr, and As'ad Sawaya may provide better stability for the banks in the light of the competition between the two bank chieftains Shaykh Joseph Ja'ja' and Mr Jean Abu Jawdah.

The problems and concerns of the industrialists, during and after the events, have increased greatly since the days of peace, and the problems and concerns of the banks increased during and after the events, because, in matters of finance, labor and workers, the trials of war always start after the war ends--they do not end as soon as there is a fragile cease fire.

On the affairs and concerns of the industrialists, AL-ANWAR held this conversation with the chairman of the Society of Lebanese Industrialists, Dr Fu'ad Abu Salih:

Instalment Payment of Debts

Question: Following continuous negotiations on the subject for more than 2 years, this draft is still the subject of negotiation, from committee to committee and from meeting to meeting. Where has the draft got now?

Answer: The draft law on the instalment payment of debts is a special exceptional solution to a special exceptional situation which the country has been going through as a result of the events and their aftereffects. Had security been established after the conclusion of the events in 1976, there would never have been need for this draft.

This kind of exceptional settlement must be negotiated amicably by those interested in the settlement to arrive at the formula for the settlement, a settlement where the woif will not die and the sheep will not disappear.

Especially since the Lebanese government in its current political economic and security state cannot impose a solution on everyone.

At least the mentality prevailing in Lebanon now does not want to impose this solution. Rather, it wants mutual understanding among groups in the Lebanese economy on solutions to the economic problems, in a manner whereby this dominant mentality will try to make the Lebanese political groups understand the solutions to their security and political problems.

The draft on instalment payment of debts, which is of interest to industrialists, merchants, hotel owners and other debtors, will naturally harm the banks. The banks are asking the government to compensate them for the losses they will suffer from the instalment payment of debts. In its current state, the government needs someone to help it. The claim is naturally not against the Italians but against "General Security."

Therefore the negotiations have gone on long, and have become ramified longer, to the point where we have lost and have made the people lose in negotiating to agree over the final formula for the draft on the instalment payment of debts.

Now, however, the joint parliamentary committees in the Chamber of Deputies--that is, the Committees on Administration, Finance and the Economy--have approved a final formula for the draft of the law on the instalment payment of debts, a formula which enjoys the agreement of the industrialists and merchants' societies and the hotel and restaurant unions, and enjoys the agreement of all banks and the Central Bank as well.

We had hoped that the Chamber of Deputies would be summoned to an exceptional session this September, to approve the draft of the law, but the cabinet crisis prevented that. We began to hope that the draft would be approved in parliament at the beginning of the ordinary session which will begin the middle of October.

Question: How long is the period for the instalment payment of debts, and what is the annual interest on the debts broken down into instalments, according to the formula of the draft law agreed to by all those concerned?

Answer: I may not be boasting if I say that the final formula of the draft law which was presented by the Society of Industrialists has been approved because it is the most comprehensive and the fairest.

This final draft will allow factories and hotels indebted to banks to request that their debts be broken down into instalments and paid back over 10 years at an annual simple interest rate of 5 percent.

The draft will allow other persons in debt to banks to request the breakdown of their debts into instalments to be paid back over 7 years at an annual simple interest rate also of 5 percent.

The simple interest rate for all debtors has been consolidated in order to prevent problems and disputes on the status of each creditor bank and each debtor client.

The repayment period for industrialists and hotels has been made longer than that for the other debtors because factories and hotels were more damaged than others by the events and because the debts which the hotels and factories have incurred are greater than the debts of others.

The draft stipulates that banks which break their clients' debts down into instalments have the right to request compensation for them from the Central Bank of Lebanon. This compensation will take place by having the Central Bank discount the paper of the debts broken down into instalments.

That is, banks which break down clients' debts valued at 10 million pounds at a low interest rate of 5 percent per year will have the right to borrow 10 million pounds from the Central Bank at very low interest--much less, naturally, than that the banks pay depositors.

In other words, the Central Bank will compensate the banks which break their clients' debts down into instalments in a manner guaranteeing them financial liquidity and compensating them for the difference between the free interest rate prevailing in the Lebanese market and the interest rate set at 5 percent for debts broken down into instalments, because the banks cannot pay 9 percent interest to depositors and just realize an interest of 5 percent from borrowers.

The interest the Central Bank will receive on the banks' "paper discount" will be variable and will differ according to fluctuations in the bank interest rate on deposits in the Lebanese market.

The Price of the Pound

Question: Are you in favor of having the price of the American dollar stabilize at its price, which now totals 342 Lebanese piasters, or do you envision broader Central Bank intervention to lower or raise the price of the dollar, on grounds that all changes in the price of the dollar in the Lebanese market are automatically reflected on the prices of all Arab and foreign currencies?

Answer: At every time in history and in every country in the world, a drop in the price of domestic currency benefits domestic industries, since domestic interests can increase their exports.

In Lebanon now, Lebanese industries are naturally benefiting from the low price of the Lebanese pound, since greater scope is being made available to factories to export their output from Lebanon.

However, the drop in the price of the Lebanese pound measured against the prices of foreign currencies is a double-edged sword. Because of it the prices of raw materials imported to Lebanese industries from abroad soon rise and because of it the wages of workers and employees in Lebanon soon rise. The prices of the other requirements and services industry consumes, such as electricity, fuel and transport also rise.

In the face of benefits from the drop of the Lebanese pound on the one hand and its deleterious features on the other, we demand stability in the prices of Arab and foreign currencies on the Lebanese market, by keeping the price of the dollar where it now is or by modifying it to rise or fall.

This is so that the employer can be confident about his near future and build his works domestically and his relations with the outer world on the basis of an approximately known currency price, because rapid severe fluctuations in the price of currency are a kind of gamble and adventure which could make some rich and bankrupt others.

One should realize that there are very rich advanced countries which deliberately lower the price of their domestic currency to encourage the exports of their national output abroad.

The issue of the currency price is an instrument in the hand of the government to be used in accordance with the domestic economic interest. Drops in the price of hard currency do not always mean that the country's economic state is collapsing. This is an old fanciful view which the era has transcended and which reality and practice have dispensed with.

90 Percent for the Arab East

Question: What are the total exports of Lebanese industries, as a share of total production, and how are Lebanese exports broken down among the nations of the world?

Answer: I imagine that about 30 percent of the total production of Lebanese factories is exported outside the country and 70 percent of it is consumed within the country.

I estimate that about 90 percent of total Lebanese industrial exports are exported to countries in the eastern Arab world and only about 10 percent are exported to other Arab and foreign countries!

The Arab countries which import 90 percent of all /exported/ Lebanese manufactured goods are the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the state of the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Jordan and Syria.

That is, Lebanese industry, especially since the events of 1976, have come to rely on the markets of the countries of the Arab east, first because of the great wealth which has been obtained by these countries through the rise in oil prices and the increase in construction and consumption in the countries of the Arab east and second because of the difficulty of sea transport when Lebanese products are exported to African Arab countries and foreign countries (the security situation about the port of Beirut and security conditions between Lebanese areas).

Restriction of Credit

Question: The Central Bank of Lebanon imposes restrictions on the lending of funds from banks to clients in order to improve the exchange rate of the Lebanese pound. Are these restrictions, which are being imposed for the first time in Lebanon, suitable for industrialists?

Answer: The goal of the Lebanese Central Bank in restricting the banks' freedom to lend to clients is to achieve two purposes:

The first purpose is to limit commerce in land and buildings, a commerce which has been transformed into speculation and a black market where a land or building is bought today at a price of 2 million pounds then sold in a week at a price of 4 million pounds!

The second goal is to limit the transfer of funds from Lebanon abroad with the purpose of depositing them in western banks at very high interest, especially after the interest on bank deposits in America jumped to 18 and 19 percent toward the end of last year.

By virtue of Central Bank Directive No 251 dated 29 December 1979, banks operating in Lebanon were prohibited from giving new credit to clients in excess of 20 percent of their total credits on 31 December 1979 in 1980.

The banks have been permitted to give new credits to owners of industrial and tourist organizations equivalent to just 25 percent of their total credits on 31 December 1979 in 1980.

However, in accordance with Central Bank Directive No 268 dated 5 August 1980, these restrictions have been lessened slightly. Banks are permitted to give new credits to their clients in 1980 equivalent to 22 percent of their total credits on the last day of 1979, or 28 percent of their total credits at the end of 1979 if they were credits given to industrial and tourist organizations.

The restrictions the Central Bank has imposed to limit bank credit have not just led to a reduction in loans to land and building speculators; they have also led to a reduction in bank loans to other employers and productive projects, including industry, agriculture and trade, and these restrictions as a consequence have a created perceptible paralysis in the course of work in the country.

While it is difficult in this pressing period to discuss the policy of tightening bank credit, I consider in brief that specialized banks should be obliging in granting medium-term and long-term credit to clients.

That is, I recommend that the Industrial, Agricultural and Real Estate Credit Bank, the Financing Bank and the Housing Bank open their treasuries and lend to every reliable person who is in need.

The government owns half the shares in these three banks. The purpose of these three banks is to lend to productive projects. This specifically is a time for these banks to perform their functions.

In activity there is a blessing, much more explicitly, in these difficult circumstances when banks are deliberately and intentionally being kept from their rights and freedom to lend to the clients they consider appropriate.

National duty dictates an exceptional government policy to urge these government-national banks and other specialized national banks to lend over the medium term, so that their credit may be expanded.

In paralysis there is restraint, despair and discouragement. Let the government move to get the frozen funds in these banks moving. Money should not be frozen in treasuries. Shaykh Shakhbut's point of view has vanished.

For example, but not exclusively, the national government Financing Bank (headed by Mr 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Tayyarah) allotted the sum of 400 million pounds to lend to industrialists over long terms at low interest. We have promised to allocate another 800 million pounds for the same purpose after lending out the initial 400 million pounds.

However, 3 years after allocating the 400-million loan, it has been feasible for the industrialists to borrow only 100 million pounds out of the original 400 million; 300 million are still frozen in the bank.

The reason for that is not the industrialists' lack of need to borrow but rather the debilitating conditions which the Financing Bank imposes on the borrowing industrialists; we do not exaggerate in saying that those conditions nearly bankrupt the borrower.

A Federation of Employers' Committees

Question: It has been proved through practice that the General Federation of Labor in Lebanon has been more able to exert influence, act and obtain gains for the workers than the Lebanese societies of employers, which have seemed fragmented in the face of the Labor Federation's demands. Why isn't an office of "economic committees" established, which would be tantamount to a general federation of employers in Lebanon, as recommended by the president of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mr 'Adnan Qassar, so that a balance of forces can be established between the two parties to labor?

Answer: I do not consider that the General Federation of Labor has achieved anything but negative gains. That is, it has achieved continuous large wage increases for workers, and these increases in turn have led to a great rise in living expenses where the workers have lost with their left hand what they gained by increasing with their right hand.

Then employers' societies, by the nature of their structure, in every country of the world, are more concerned with economic stability than workers' unions. Therefore the employers' societies remain constantly compelled to offer concessions toward demands for increased wages in order to avoid strikes and eliminate political auctioneering.

I personally do not oppose the establishment of a kind of general federation of employers' societies to limit the oppression of the General Federation of Labor, in its capacity as the only representative of the workers.

However, we must realize that the interests of employers are sometimes in contradiction. An example of that is the contradiction in positions on import policy between merchants and industrialists. Meanwhile the interests of the workers, which are always to demand increased wages and compensations and reduced work times, are homogeneous.

In spite of this bitter fact, I consider that the coordination which exists between the chambers of commerce and industry and the societies of industrialists, merchants and banks is reasonable and acceptable.

Dominance by the Beirut Chamber

Question: What is your position on some people's statement that the chairman of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mr 'Adnan Qassar, dominates the activities of the other chairmen of chambers of commerce and industry and creates reluctance on the part of some of these chamber chairmen to cooperate firmly with the other economic committees?

Answer: I see no dominance and I see no reluctance. There is a difference in views between Chairman 'Adnan Qassar and one of the three other chamber chairmen. This is logical, because the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry is the biggest Lebanese chamber and by virtue of the importance of the Beirut chamber and by virtue of its situation in the center of Lebanon its activity seems bigger and its role greater. Opponents and critics must emerge before every power in the world.

Smuggling

Question: The problem of the smuggling of goods to Lebanon which became blatant in 1975 is still broad in scope. What are the late developments in this?

Answer: Smuggling is smuggling; there are no statistics on the quantities of goods smuggled. However, in the past 4 years it has certainly become a dangerous operation, threatening national trade and industry, because at least about 20 percent of total imports into Lebanon enter the country through smuggling without payment of any customs duties to the government.

Smuggling is a basic security problem more than an economic one. Therefore we are now making an attempt to remedy it with those who are active politically and in security terms.

Question: Are your efforts for example concentrated on forming a national unity government or are they more urgent than the formation of a government?

Answer: We hope that a government of national unity will be formed, because such a government might solve most of the smuggling problem, if not all of it. However, there is no good our making efforts in this field because the problem of formation of a government is bigger than we are.

Our efforts which we are making quietly, are concentrated, through effective politically active persons, on attempting to create a radical peaceful solution to limit smuggling.

I do not want to expand on a description of these efforts, lest I stir up sensitivities here or there.

It should be stressed that all labor unions and all economic bodies are against smuggling and that all political and party activities share our view that smuggling is harmful to national industry and trade.

However, there are circumstances and conditions which are causing some politically active persons temporarily to hesitate to adopt decisive positions to prevent smuggling. We hope to arrive at solutions in a manner where the fox will not die and the sheep will not disappear.

Question: It is said that some politically active persons are in favor of preventing smuggling if it is easy to create "Lebanese financial resources" for political parties which will enable them to do without the "duties" they collect from the "private ports," on grounds that these parties do not get foreign oil assistance or international aid. Is your effort being made in this framework?

Answer: That question revolves about details. I have no answer to it. Let us try, because our goal is to solve a problem, not create problems.

11887
CSO: 4802

BANKER DISCUSSES POSITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN BUSINESS

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 13 Sep 80 p 7

/Article by Habib al-Bustani: "Lebanese Banks abroad Have Been Active in order To Survive: 'Ashi: I Have Participated in Holding onto Clients"/

/Excerpt from Text/ During the Lebanese war, around 1975, work stopped on the street of banks in Beirut, prompting the bank owners to think of moving their banking activity in the desire to guarantee the course of activity and work outside the borders of the nation. Activity in branches of Lebanese banks in some Arab countries was stimulated.

However, this was not enough to respond to the needs of clients, especially well-heeled ones, outside the Arab countries, most of whom sought refuge in Europe in general and France in particular. Lebanese banks opened in France.

On this subject, and other banking matters, we had a meeting with Dr George 'Ashi, manager of a bank operating in Lebanon and member of the Society of Bank Owners.

Questions and Answers

/Question/ What is the reason for establishing Lebanese banks abroad and how large is their number?

/Answer/ The basic motive for establishing Lebanese banks abroad, especially in Paris, is, on the one hand, to create a center outside Lebanon containing all the services needed to pursue the bank's activity in a country where all the services the bank requires are available, and, on the other, in a country where the biggest number of bank customers reside who emigrated from the nation temporarily or for good as a result of the events which occurred during the years of the trials. Therefore Paris was chosen. What made matters easy was French legislation, which encouraged the opening of banks, not in the form of branches of Lebanese banks but in the form of French joint-stock companies subject to French law. On this basis, as of the latter part of 1975, Lebanese banks or joint banks existing in Lebanon started to establish subsidiary companies for themselves in Paris subject to French law. As regards the number of these banks, they total about 10.

Conditions for Establishing Banks in Paris

/Question/ What conditions do the French authorities set forth for establishing such banks, and are there difficulties?

/Answer/ The conditions applied to these banks are general ones adopted from the French law and statutes in force. The minimum capital must be 7.5 million French francs and the agreement of the National Monetary Council and the Bank of France to the measures to be taken to establish the bank, including the bank management, must be obtained.

The Bank of France has now started tightening up. If the bank it is intended to establish is a Lebanese one, it must have the participation of a large acceptable French bank in France. Such conditions did not exist before. The banks established recently have been companies belonging to big bank organizations and companies. For example, when the Credit Suisse pour le Moyen Orient bank, 96 percent owned by Credit Suisse, was opened there was no need for any conditions because the bank had international support and sufficient expertise, and the same was true in the case of Credit Commerciale de France. However, there are Lebanese banks which have been requested to provide French participation through a French bank.

/Question/ Is there fear on the part of the French of the danger of an invasion by Lebanese banks?

/Answer/ The Lebanese banks which open in Paris are not aimed at speculating against the French banks there. They open for Lebanese and Arab clients, to finance the operations of Lebanese who are residents and expatriates in France, Africa or America, and to finance operations Arabs perform. Therefore the fact is that the Lebanese banks do not take away any of the business of the major French banks.

Advantages of Banks abroad

/Question/ It is said that Lebanese banks abroad give more facilities than other banks.

/Answer/ Lebanese banks open for specific clients, which helps them to know the clients more exactly. Their knowledge of the condition of clients, through lengthy dealings with them,especially their knowledge of the clients' properties in Lebanon and other Arab countries, by the nature of the case makes them better able to give appropriate facilities suitable to their conditions, which are not available in big French banks which rely only on the individual's assets and possessions in France.

/Question/ What is the effect of opening the banks on the Lebanese economy?

/Answer/ The opening of Lebanese banks abroad has helped develop the economy, since that has helped retain the clients of the Lebanese banking system abroad and keep them within its area of influence. At the same time, the profits which these banks realize are profits which return to Lebanon through the Lebanese participants, although these banks have performed services, elevated Lebanon's name, shown the world the Lebanese ability to adjust to various circumstances and conditions, and have shown the degree of solidity of the Lebanese banking system.

/Question/ What is the number of Lebanese employees in banks abroad?

/Answer/ Essentially, when the opening of Lebanese banks in Paris started, between 1975 and 1979, recourse was made to a large number of Lebanese employees because bank street closed during this period; there were no banks except on that street, and their closing resulted in a large number of unemployed workers, until these banks opened branches in a number of areas to adjust to the new condition in the capital and enable the largest possible number of clients to benefit from banking services. At this time, the number of employees was abundant, permitting the banks that opened abroad to seek recourse in its employees in Lebanon. Likewise, the presence of a large number of employees who were receiving money but not working made it necessary for the banks abroad to seek recourse in these people. In exchange, the French authorities let this pass at first.

In 1975-76 France was extremely tolerant with Lebanese regarding their residence, facilitating their affairs and providing for their children in schools. Among those who were blessed with the facilities were the Lebanese banks and their employees. Now, however, there is a quota; the ratio of non-French employees may not exceed 35 percent of the total bank employees.

Without a doubt, the banks which have opened outside Lebanon need to have a Lebanese management system to deal with Lebanese and Arab clients. Fluency in Arabic is essential, as are the banking techniques in use in Lebanon. These techniques are very flexible; the bank can tailor banking services to the requirements of the patron. Therefore there is no way to avoid employing Lebanese workers.

/Question/ Do you believe that opening these banks will be for a specific period?

/Answer/ Banks do not open in a temporary fashion. Banks are not like shops; if they open, they stay open. Among the things which are not at all liked in the banking world is closing a branch or banking company belonging to a bank. Thus these banks opened in accordance with newly arising circumstances under the pressure of need but did not open to close down, even after the disappearance of the need and the pressure. Banks open with flexibility, in view of the circumstances Lebanon is passing through. When banking activity inside Lebanon is paralyzed the ability of Lebanese banks abroad reaches its maximum. This ability declines when matters return to their normal state inside Lebanon.

An Unsound Situation

/Question/ What is your opinion regarding the banking situation in Lebanon from the standpoint of work?

/Answer/ The banks' work in Lebanon is active. During periods of inflation, banks function, profit and expand the their deposits expand also. However, all the banks' work is now based on financing: financing old projects, financing emergency activities, providing the routine requirements of citizens. In other words, there is no new investment creating production and increasing the surplus national product which is to be considered an element in developing the Lebanese economy. There is a turnover in the economy despite the existence of inflation. Lebanon imports 3 billion and has now started importing 6 billion; tomorrow it will be 8 billion. Thus the

value of imports is increasing, prices are rising, inflation is occurring and profits are rising. In my view this economic situation is unsound. A country which wants to prosper must rely on production in its various sectors, industrial, agricultural, service and so on. This is not happening now in Lebanon. What we are seeing is the continued use of what had existed and the assets remaining, and this constitutes a very grave phenomenon.

/Question/ So there has been a transformation as regards the investment of bank funds since the time prior to the events. What is the banks' reaction? Have they resorted to foreign or perhaps Arab investments?

/Answer/ The fact is that participation of the Lebanese banks in existence here in international foreign financing activities is not great but without a doubt it exists. The law and the statutes allow that and the banks opening to the outer world conduct operations like that.

/Question/ What about the banks which have opened branches for themselves abroad?

/Answer/ Alongside the banks which have opened subsidiary banking companies in Europe, especially in Paris, there are banks which have opened branches and subsidiary companies in Arab countries, especially in areas which permitted the opening of branches even before 2 years ago, such as Dubai, Sharjah, and Abu Dhabi. But the banks which have opened branches in Arab countries have managed to provide the main centers in Lebanon with foreign financing.

Lebanese Law Is More Flexible Than French Law

/Question/ Is there a difference between French law and Lebanese law as regards Banks?

/Answer/ Lebanese law was taken basically from French and Belgian legislation, but in France there is something which does not exist here. There is oversight on currency, meaning that there is a corpus of legislation necessary for oversight regarding currency and regarding lending. Thus currency oversight exists and Lebanon does not need it. In other words, the banking system in Lebanon is more flexible and less subject to severe stipulations.

Deposit Activity Is 20 Billion

/Question/ So Lebanon will regain capital soon in view of its flexible banking system?

/Answer/ Lebanon has not lost any capital. If we calculate the deposits in Lebanon before 1975 in comparison with today we will see that they are three times what existed in 1975. Some capital has left and other capital has come in. The capital which has come into Lebanon and is helping to stimulate deposit activity now exceeds 20 billion pounds, which is a fantastic figure in terms of the conceptions which had been set forth for a country like Lebanon. Unfortunately, most of the capital belongs to resident or expatriate Lebanese /abroad/. Without a doubt Arab and foreign deposits are few, but their share never was high. Talk about Arab capital in Lebanon was an illusion; at its maximum it did not exceed 10 percent. Thus one must not

depend on Arab deposits in Lebanon. We have the deposits of Lebanese working in Arab countries, Africa and so forth, which constitute the major portion. The major blessing which always must be emphasized and which makes the Lebanese banking system an interesting one is currency freedom. Lebanon is distinguished by a currency freedom which does not exist in any other country of the world; this is the secret of the survival of the banking system in Lebanon, the secret of the prosperity of the bank market and the secret of the increase in the Lebanese people's deposits.

/Question/ Recently the funds of the Iranians in the United States were frozen; perhaps that will have an effect on Arab funds in the future. Is there a Lebanese or Arab banking initiative and policy to correct such a situation and attract this capital?

/Answer/ Without a doubt the danger exists. The danger of freezing foreign funds as regards the subjects of a number of countries is relevant. This occurs in wars between the subjects of enemy countries. Ordinarily the depositor rectifies this situation by transferring his funds to another country but I do not believe that Lebanon in its current circumstances can play a role in this field. For example Iranian funds did not seek refuge in Lebanon. The Iranians' funds sought refuge in France, Switzerland and other countries.

11887
CSO: 4802

STATE INDEBTEDNESS TO NATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY FUND GIVEN

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 8 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] Total state indebtedless to the National Social Security Fund through the end of 1979 reached nearly 39 million pounds. This amount should have been paid in the first part of the current year at the latest.

The director general of the fund informed the [fund's] Finance Commission of this during one of its hearings. He explained the accrued debts of the state as the largest employer in the country. It pays dues for both full-time and part-time employees, whose number is about 18,000 and are not members of the civil service. The state also contributes 35 percent of the cost of health services.

It is estimated that dues owed by the state will rise to 75 million pounds by the end of 1980, and to 116 million pounds by the end of 1981, due to the rise in wages and costs of health insurance.

The director of the fund proposed that a sum of not less than 70 million pounds be set aside in next year's state budget to cover the balance owed for 1979 and 1980.

It is understood that the chairman of the Finance Commission of the fund, Dr Khattar Shibli (who is at the same time director general of the Finance Ministry) promised to form a committee representing the Finance Ministry, the National Social Security Fund and the Audit Office to propose firm guidelines regulating relations between the fund and the treasury.

It should be noted that in contrast to past years, the 1980 budget did not include any provision related to the payment of state obligations to the fund.

9587
CSO: 4802

ROLE OF MERCHANT MARINE IN BOLSTERING ECONOMY PRAISED

Khartoum AL-AYYAM in Arabic 29 Aug 80 p 4

/Article by Muhammad Ushik Hashal: "Sudanese Shipping Lines Are One of the Pillars of the National Economy"/

/Text/ Although the Sudanese Shipping Lines Company management prefers to work in silence, on grounds that that is better, in its view, since the nature of its activity requires that, one must pause before the main aspects of this economic edifice which has started to be influential, with an effectiveness which has developed clear features, in a stretch of the course of our national economy which has not been easy. We must pause briefly to review the growth of the Sudanese Shipping Lines Company, which we all know is the sole government company operating in the sphere of marine transport and the biggest marine transport operation in the Sudan now, and the stages which it has passed through and the successes it has achieved. To that end I sat down with Mr Salah-al-Din 'Umar 'Abd-al 'Aziz, director general of the company, in his office in Port Sudan, after the cluster of eight new ships had been rounded out by the arrival of the vessel al-Nil al Azraq the last week of June.

The Beginning of the Meeting

The beginning of the meeting there occurred when Mr Salah met me with his familiar simplicity and permanent smile. He set aside part of his time, in spite of the pressure of work and the continuous meetings he holds every day with officials in various sections of the company to learn about the course of work and follow it up in order to reduce all difficulties which might obstruct the smooth flow of performance in the company. I started my conversation with him by venturing to ask the man a question on the history and the manner of growth of the Sudanese Shipping Lines Company and the foundations on which it was based.

Mr Salah arranged himself in his seat and pondered awhile, as he searched his memory, and said, "This company was established for the first time in 1962 with a capital of about half a million pounds, divided equally between the Sudanese government and the Yugoslav government." Mr Salah says that the first ship to enter service was the vessel Sinnar, which reached Port Sudan for the first time on 23 April 1962. Its capacity was 4,950 deadweight tons. It was then followed by the vessels Kordofan, 4,980 deadweight tons in capacity, al-Jazirah, also 4,980 tons, Shindi, 7,601 deadweight tons, Maridi, 7,648 deadweight tons, Niyala, 8,563 deadweight tons, and Omdurman, 13,716 deadweight tons.

Development and Termination of the Partnership

The general manager continued his discussion, stating "The development the Sudanese Shipping Lines Company witnessed during the period between 1967 and this year, 1980, after the arrival of the eight multi-purpose new vessels was complete, also witnessed the termination of the partnership with the Yugoslav government in 1967 after all the demands of the Yugoslav party had been met by the company. At that time the capacity of the fleet did not exceed 20,000 tons and the ships were four in number, the Sinnar, Kordofan, al Jazirah, and Arkawit, which subsequently sank." He declared that the capacity of the fleet has now risen, with the arrival of the new ships in service, to 153,000 tons and the number of ships has risen to 15. He mentioned that the new ships are the al-Abyad, the Dongola, the al-Qadarif, the Marwi, and the Darfur. The capacity of each comes to 12,200 deadweight tons. There is the vessel Khartoum, whose capacity comes to 14,400 tons and there are the two ships al-Nil al-Abyad and al-Nil al-Azraq, which are roll on roll off ships with a capacity of 12,600 deadweight tons each. Mr.Salah stated that the rate of increase in the capacity of the merchant marine fleet rose above its level at the dissolution of the partnership in 1967 by 600 percent.

The Successes

We asked Mr Salah 'Umar about the successes the company realized in the field of sea transport and he said, "The company as a Sudanese marine transport firm now enjoys a very good international reputation and a high degree of confidence from companies operating in the field of marine transport, since we, for our part have been able to cover some of our country's requirements in this sphere, transporting a large volume of our exports and imports, of which about 50 percent are transported, thus saving our country more than $100 million a year in hard currency which had been paid to other bodies for ocean freight, in addition to the revenues arising from chartering, concentrating our services on all shipping routes, and competing in them as a competent carrier enjoying international confidence and observable capability in spite of the intensity of competition from foreign companies." He stressed "In spite of that also the company offers Sudanese citizens, especially those who are active in the export area, the best bids available in the marine transport market. One believes that it has been important that there should be a minimum national commitment toward the Sudanese Shipping Lines Company in the Sudanese private sector, on grounds that it is the sole national marine carrier in the Sudan, so that it can achieve its national goals of saving the hard currency that is paid to non-Sudanese carriers for ocean freight and can also take part in greater and greater fashion in developing the national economy." Mr Salah declared that "the two vessels Khartoum and Omdurman have been put up for international charter, and stressed that the vessel Khartoum was chartered in the past 2 months by the state of Kuwait and People's Republic of China to bring it cargoes from the United States of America.

Other Results

The director general of the Sudanese Shipping Lines Company, Mr Salah-al-Din 'Umar 'Abd-al 'Aziz, continued by stating "The positive results are also considered among the successes which inspire pride and respect. The first is that the proportion of Sudanese workers in this company on sea and on land now totals 95 percent as compared

with 5 percent when the company was first established and this has occurred as a result of a firm training plan the company has followed, observing commitment to the competence incentives in use internationally, especially in the marine field." He stressed the continuity of this training plan and declared "The coming 3 years will mark the end of the journey in Sudanizing all the positions in the company 100 percent." He stated "The company, since its establishment, has created labor which had not been taken into account, helping provide stability for hundreds of families and also creating qualified Sudanese staffs in the marine transport field."

The director general of the Sudanese Shipping Lines Company talked about the shipping routes, pointing out, "The company runs a basic shipping route, the Red Sea-United Kingdom-northerwestern Europe route," pointing out "This area accounts for the greatest percentage of the Sudan's import and export trade, totalling 40 percent of it, and all of that is transported on the Sudanese /Lines/. The company also operates a shipment every 10 days in each direction." He said, "The operating capacity of Sudanese Shipping Lines vessels exceeds the requirement of the route it operates on, giving the services of the commercial fleet of the Islamic port of Jiddah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the ports of North Yemen the same number of shipments as the Port Sudan harbor." He states, "The Sudanese Shipping Lines' activity is not just restricted to operating ships. It goes beyond that to functioning as an agent for about 30 major international shipping companies." He mentioned, "They received in 1978 190 ships in addition to those of the company, or one ship every other day." The man said, "Receiving the ship means answering its captain's request for fuel, supplies, unloading its cargo, creating cargo for it, representing it in collecting freight charges, and other various activities of performing as agent." He stresses, "The persons delegating the agency functions always record a high degree of satisfaction for the excellent services they receive."

Transudan

We turned the conversation to the Transudan Company, and Mr Salah said "It is a new company with a legal personality, one of the establishments of the Sudanese Shipping Lines Company." The man stated, "The development of means of transport is no longer restricted to transportation from port to port but also operates from factory to warehouse to specific sites in the receiving country, which has made companies supply new ships with a thousand containers." He considered that there will be no benefit in these containers if their use ended at Port Sudan. To that end, he said "They have established the Transudan Company and supplied it with a fleet of trucks by which transport operations may be continued." He pointed out "These trucks make four monthly trips between Port Sudan and Khartoum-Madani, shipping 500 tons per trip." He stressed, "This company also will undergo development and modernization in order to keep abreast of the country's requirements after the preparation of container storehouses is completed in Port Sudan and Khartoum and they are outfitted with the equipment they need."

An Aside

It remains for us to point out that the Sudanese Shipping Lines Company, between its establishment in 1962 and the end of last year, realized revenues totalling 81 million pounds. Revenues last year alone totalled 17 603,844 pounds; the company's net profits in the same period came to 19 million pounds, of which 5,724,891 were

last year alone. The total foreign currency the company saved between its establishment and the end of last year came to 51 million pounds, all of which would have gone to foreign companies were it not for the Sudanese Shipping Lines Company fleet. We must point out, as we conclude the discussion on the Sudanese Shipping Line facility, that the company faces severe competition and that, in spite of the faith and solidity of the men managing it as their national duty, it is mandatory that the efforts of all sincere Sudanese businessmen, especially those working in the export-import field, act in solidarity with more abundant national commitment, which will motivate them to allocate all their exports to this company so it will be their carrier, in order to save every millieme which goes to foreign bodies. Let us not forget, either, to urge officials at the summit of power to think clearly about the matter so that they will be able to give incentives for further cooperation with this company, if only by using such encouragement incentives given to every exporter to transport all his exports via this company as reduction of all types of the tax he pays, for example, so that he will be able to break the thorn of intense competition this company faces, preserving the hard currency which goes out of the Sudan in the form of ocean freight charges, in order to maintain our abilities and provide another incentive for our domestic economy of which none of us denies the Sudanese Shipping Lines Company has become a strong pillar. At the end, it is necessary to say a final word which we direct to Mr Salah-al-Din 'Umar 'Abd-al-'Aziz, apologizing to him for delaying in publishing this meeting because of special circumstances which accompanies us as we were in the process of preparing it for publication, and thanking him for the generosity with which he received us, giving us an opportunity to learn much that the reader did not know about this company.

11387
CSO: 4302

MZALI ADDRESSES POPULACE OF SILIANA

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 28 Sep 80 p 1,5

[Excerpts] --Make the young aware of the advantage in choosing manual work.

--The administration must be in the service of the people and not the contrary.

--The people know how to distinguish between the sincere official and the charlatan.

Mr Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister and secretary general of the Party spoke yesterday to the citizens of the Governorate of Siliana during a people's meeting which was held in the Siliana House of Culture, where there were also present: Mr M'hamed Chaker, minister of Justice, Lasaad Ben Osman, minister of Agriculture, Abdelaziz Ben Dhia, minister of Higher Education and Scientific Research and a number of national and regional officials.

Mr Mohamed Mzali began by transmitting to the audience the greetings of the Supreme Combattant.

"The inspection trip which I am undertaking in the Governorate of Siliana, accompanied by a certain number of colleagues and officials on the regional level is only one proof of the interest which the government has in the region and its interest in bringing together to a greater extent conditions favoring its development and placing it definitively on the path of progress and prosperity," declared Mr Mzali, who then continued:

"Because of a lack of time, my visit was limited to a few delegations. I promise you that I will visit the rest of the delegations later."

"This visit and the popular character which we tried to give it constitute a reaffirmation of the Bourguibian and Destourian influence which was based from the beginning of our struggle for liberation and development on direct contact."

Mr Mzali continued: "Such visits aim first of all at increasing the number of contacts with the population in order for us to gain first hand knowledge of the situation. We are not content during these visits to look at a few graphs and figures and charts.

"We believe that the popular masses must be kept informed of the reality of the situation and that they can contribute to changing it.

"The state can, relying on experts and technicians, build roads, dams and factories, but such accomplishments can only be valuable and beneficial if the popular masses feel that they are involved, that they have a role to play, that they have their say.

"Without participation, the popular masses are in danger of going off in one direction, while the technicians and experts go off in another.

"That is what has happened in certain countries such as Iran.

"The Shah had tried to make of Iran the strongest country in the Third World. He was presumptuous and vain, up to the point of saying that Iran would be the fifth most important country in the world.

"But the Shah had not tried to understand the real desires and aspirations of the Iranian people.

"The government," added Mr Mzali, "is anxious to follow the Bourguibian approach. It considers, therefore, the solution to the psychological problems as being of prime importance, which must be acted upon now and feels it must speak frankly with the people about the numerous obstacles which are holding back the concretization of integral development.

"It is also essential that the popular masses know that the officials are determined to reduce these obstacles as soon as possible and with a sincere will.

"We know that there exist problems and we recognize their existance. Because all it takes is to have a leader visit a region for letters from the citizens to rain down on him. This shows that the situation is not as good as we have a tendency to believe and that some leaders abstain from meeting with citizens and from speaking with them frankly and listening to their grievances.

"These numerous letters prove without any doubt the existence of certain problems of a psychological nature. I do not reproach the citizens for sending me their written grievances. My reproach is directed toward those officials who avoid direct contact with the citizens in order to know their situation better.

"That explains, moreover, the interest which we attach to the realization of decentralization, to the Adminstrative Reform, and to the services which the public officials and the administration are called upon to render the citizens so that the administrative apparatus may be placed in the service of the people and not the other way around.

"Our administration has become bogged down in structures and paperwork, which has tended to worsen the situation. Because of this, the government has taken a series of measures aimed at reducing the delays and simplifying procedures. But the slowness of the administration is reducing the effectiveness of the political desire for various reasons, the most important of which is psychological, that is on the level of prejudices, traditions and errors in value judgments which our minds are affected by."

Mr Mohamed Mzali asked, in this context, the civil servants to treat the citizens with respect and to serve them quickly. He added: "We must restore magnanimity in our hearts and a deepened feeling of solidarity and affection between citizens. That is a psychological task which requires the combined efforts of all our citizens.

"A minister cannot accomplish this task alone, all officials at whatever level they function are called upon to intensify the efforts in education and orientation in order to make our reform of administrative structures succeed and to make of them instruments in the service of the citizens. We must also reinforce our contact with the popular masses and be sensitive to their problems and to the most appropriate means to find adequate solutions to them. The letters which are given me here and there show that some citizens have problems which remain unresolved and that it is because some officials have not done their job and have not taken the trouble to meet the citizens so as to get to know their concerns and be able to help them solve their problems.

The prime minister added: "The problems become less acute when each official accepts his true role and tries to get in contact with the citizens whenever it is necessary. Actually, every official must have a true understanding of his responsibilities and must be present wherever duty requires him to be, that is, close to those for whom he is responsible. To keep in permanent contact with them, and to keep abreast of their problems and their concerns. It was Bourguiba who taught us that principle and who continues to teach it to us.

"We must be in contact with the people, because that contributes to strengthening the Party, to assuring its influence and its duration. The Party can be strong and overcome underdevelopment only if it has the confidence and the support of the population and that is possible only to the extent that the Party is in the service of the people, and its officials and staff members feel mobilized to serve the higher interest of the nation. Any person who wants to

take on a responsibility must prove himself worthy of it through hard work and by furnishing the required effort. But for any person who tries to reach other ends, he should look for another activity more in keeping with his ambitions.

"That is why I reaffirm the necessity of choosing the officials in a democratic way and taking advantage of congresses and general assemblies, of party organizations to ask for an accounting from the officials, frankly and courageously.

"I would like," added Mr Mzali, "to mention with satisfaction the new positive climate which I have noted in Siliana. That is the reason the new governor visited the different regions and suspended a policeman for having violated the rights of the citizens.

"I have been very happy to learn that the governor urged the officials in all sectors to carry out their mission correctly and that he criticized any official who neglects his duty, blaming him at that time.

"Our relationships," he added, "must come out of our work and not from personal affinities. The person who is one of us is the person who demonstrates his seriousness and devotion in his work. Our sympathy must go out only to those who work for the good of the country.

"That is why I take satisfaction in the fact that the new governor and the officials of the Coordinating Committee have become aware, through direct contact, of the problems of our citizens.

"My wish is to see the regional staff bring their support to the governor, in order to win the psychological battle because we can only succeed in our development efforts if we create a favorable psychological climate, suited to the reinforcement of confidence, to reawakening the enthusiasm of the citizens and strengthening in them the will to accomplish and to succeed, while realizing that the political action of the Party is based on direct contact with the people, aimed at raising their level.

Mr Mohamed Mzali emphasized in addition the government's desire to promote the agricultural sector in the governorate of Siliana by strengthening regional development. "To do this, we have taken several steps. Other steps will also be taken in the near future. We are going to direct our efforts essentially toward the promotion of the farmer and the improvement of his standard of living. We are also going to encourage the establishment of industries involved in processing agricultural products and to work for the creation of middle sized industries in the governorate while at the same time giving serious attention to the housing sector."

"President Bourguiba, moreover, gave instructions for revising government policy in the area of low income housing. It is possible to take steps to reduce the delay required by CNEL [expansion unknown]

for the granting of loans to savers. These delays could be reduced from 4 to only 2 years.

"In addition, we are going to continue our efforts to promote the education sector. It is in that way that each delegation of the governorate of Siliana now has a secondary school, with the exception of the delegation of Kisra, which will have its secondary school in the next few years. We also plan to establish a technical high school in Siliana."

"The prime minister emphasized on this subject the concern of the government to encourage vocational training and employment so that each young person may find a job once his training is completed."

and Mr Mohamed Mzali added: "We must revise our methods of action. The Destourian cells and all the organizations are called upon by us to help so that the education dispensed by the Ministry of National Education, by the Department of Social Affairs or of Agriculture is adapted to our needs and that it encourages a spirit of initiative.

"The objective which is being pursued," continued the prime minister, "is that of convincing the students graduating from the schools to remain in their area and to orient themselves toward productive industrial branches with all the difficulties and all the constraints which that implies.

"Asking for help from management and from the heads of businesses in the creation of jobs for young people, we are working so as to make young people become aware of the benefits in choosing manual work, struggling against an old-fashioned attitude which gives more prestige to administrative jobs," the prime minister added.

"It is in the advanced countries that one finds the best examples of caring for those who take up trades such as electrician and plumber whose earnings are far higher than the salaries of teachers and certain categories of civil servants.

"Change, moreover, has become possible thanks to the transformation in thinking, the change in the idea held about certain jobs.

"What we are suffering from in Tunisia," added Mr Mzali, "is rather slow change in the thinking of certain Tunisians who do not place themselves in harmony with the needs of modern life.

"Today, we need more than ever before manual workers, particularly in the agricultural sector, where the average age of the workers is on the order of 55 years. Who will replace them in a few years?" asked the prime minister, who pointed out that we are seeing a change in thinking. "Actually," he said, "this morning, I met in Oued Lakhmes, a farmer who, with the help of his son, is working, with remarkable enthusiasm, the land of his ancestors. That forces us, as leaders, to create a revolution on the psychological level, to

analyze the situation and to understand the true problems which bear on social action, such as the role of the woman in the home and in family planning and the status of handicapped and disabled people.

"These are the kinds of problems which the Party and the militants must be concerned with--that is our conception of political action," he said.

The prime minister also added: "I am happy to find this positive atmosphere and to see that we are going in the right direction. I reaffirm what I have already said, that is, the government is counting on the governors, the delegates, the secretaries general of the Coordinating Committees and all the other officials, to be, each of them an example to be followed concerning their attachment to the Bourguibian method of direct contact with the masses. They must find solutions to the psychological problems, must listen to the citizens, speak with them frankly and act so as to make them aware of the real problems which we are facing. As for the problems of development, be reassured, because Bourguiba is there, thinking of you and your problems.

"I am anxious," added Mr Mzali, "to put my finger on the origin of the problem because I am one of you and we must help each other in order to combat underdevelopment in us and around us, calling for the good and getting rid of the bad, by adopting as our motto, sincerity in words and loyalty in deeds, spreading high moral values and by caring about the higher interest of the nation, of the invulnerability of Tunisia and the future of the rising generation.

"That is what gives meaning to our struggle and what can satisfy our conscience and our people, who appreciate fully our efforts because they know how to distinguish the sincere official from the charlatan.

"If the people trusted Bourguiba during their national struggle, it was because they were convinced that Bourguiba was sincere and he spoke the language of sincerity. They felt that that sort of language which came from the heart was not the language of a hypocrite. On the contrary, Bourguiba was the first to make use of this language because he had had to endure the rigors of colonial cells and jails.

"He had made use of it because the destiny of his people concerned him. That is the reason the people granted him unlimited affection and embarked upon the path that he had chosen.

"We would like each one of us to take Bourguiba as an example and take the route he showed us, always remaining loyal to the people, sincere in his relations with them and devoted to their service. The future can then only offer hope.

"Iam relying on you," he said, "and I am sure that all the officials in the governorate, with governor at their head, are prepared to serve you. I remind you, moreover, that the governor represents the chief

of state in the region and that he is the man in whom the government has placed its confidence."

Speaking of decentralization, the prime minister said that it did not mean the creation of a state in each region. It was instituted for the purpose of bringing together the administration of the citizen and the management structures of the governor so that the governor can make use on the spot of all the possibilities which are offered him without having to go to Tunis and so that he can assure the coordination between all these potentialities in order to obtain the best results.

"In our opinion, decentralization means then bringing together the services of the administration and the citizens and simplifying administrative procedures.

"Therefore, I must rely, for this, on the governor and the delegates in the matter of political and administrative action as well as the Destourian cells and the national organizations and the Union of Youth Organizations, which are being called upon to be the "motor," the conscience of the people and the "transmission belt" to take the aspirations of the citizens to the officials and the directives of the officials to the citizens, explaining to them the content of the programs of the government and informing them of the obstacles with which we are confronted."

The prime minister added: "As I said yesterday, the mission of the Party does not consist in directing.

"On the other hand, it must lead a effort toward reflection, creation and verification. Moreover, President Bourguiba in person reaffirmed it on many occasions and I am merely reminding those who may have forgotten."

"The prime minister, in addition, wished the governorate of Siliana a happy future and expressed the conviction that by joining efforts, by winning the psychological battle and by making a healthy climate reign, the impossible will be realized.

"I hope to be with you again in a few months as I promised the citizens of other delegations," he concluded.

Mr Mohamed Mzali then decorated certain militants with the order of Chevalier of the Order of Independence.

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END

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7 November 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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EUROPEAN LOANS FOR POWER PROJECTS GRANTED

London 8 DAYS in English 4 Oct 80 p 23

[Text] THE EUROPEAN Investment Bank (EIB), the European Community's financing institution, has granted a loan worth 4 million European units of account (1 EUA - $1.3) to help build an electricity network in the Zerga region, to the north east of Amman.

The loan is for 15 years, with interest at 9.15 per cent, after deduction of a two per cent interest subsidy drawn from Community budgetary resources. It has been given to the Jordanian government under the terms of the EEC-Jordan Cooperation Agreement, which also includes financial and technical assistance. The EEC loan will be channelled to the Jordanian Electricity Power Company which holds the domestic and industrial electricity supply concession for Amman.

The project, which will cost about EUA 8.6m, covers the construction of two 33kV sub-stations, some 30km of underground cable and 80km of low-voltage power lines. The project will start in late 1982, and should accelerate industrial development in the Amman-Zerga corridor, Jordan's largest industrial belt.

EIB has also granted a loan to Lebanon, worth 3 million EUA. The loan will provide part-finance for two new 125 MW generators for the thermal power station at Zouk, near Beirut. The project is estimated to cost approximately EUA 140m. The two new generators are scheduled to come onstream at the end of 1983.

The loan has been made available for 14 years, at an interest rate of nine per cent. The European community has agreed to bear a two per cent interest subsidy. The loan, made under the terms of the EEC-Lebanon cooperation agreement, will be given directly to the Lebanese Council for on-lending to Electricite du Liban. The credit is part of an EIB deal which could amount to as much as EUA 15m.

The Zouk power project is a key feature of the Lebanese government's efforts to pump new life into the economy. It will be the second Lebanese power station to be built with EEC bank aid. A total of EUA 20m was given to the Jieh power station, also built by Electricite du Liban.

CSO: 4820

ISLAMIC INVESTMENT COMPANY'S VENTURES ON RISE

London 8 DAYS in English 27 Sep 80 pp 34-35

[Article by Phil Finnegan]

[Text]

PROSPECTS are looking bright for the world's first large investment company run strictly according to Islamic tenets. After pioneering the development of Islamic bonds and insurance, the company is planning to embark upon the first major Islamic industrial and commercial ventures.

The Islamic Investment Company (IIC) was set up in 1978, in the Bahamas so it could receive the tax benefits of Bahamian incorporation. Its avowed goal was to establish subsidiary companies throughout the Islamic world, the first of which was the Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf. IIC's board of directors is headed by Prince Mohammed al Faisal, son of the late King Faisal, and chairman of the International Association of Islamic Banks.

Since its formation, the IIC has offered a number of Islamic bonds or investment trusts, in which the giving or taking of interest is strictly avoided in accordance with the teachings of the Quran.

The first offering, in early 1979, was for one and three year bonds while the second was for five year bonds. Each bond is divided into 'loan' and 'participation'. The loan is repaid without interest when the bond reaches maturity and the portion of the bond devoted to participation will share in any profits or losses accruing from investments made by the company.

The investor can choose options of 75 per cent participation and 25 per cent loan, 50 per cent participation and 50 per cent loan, 25 per cent participation and 75 per cent loan or a 100 per cent loan.

The company also offered the first Islamic life insurance in October 1979. The trust opens and closes quarterly, allowing new participants to enter throughout its 20-year life.

Participants contribute $1,000 each year for 20 years. This sum is returned to the participant at the end of the period, plus any profits made from its investment. If a person dies before the period is up, the full $20,000 is paid to the participant's heirs.

This scheme is financed by a special 'solidarity fund' to which all participants contribute five per cent of their annual $1,000. The trust is limited to applicants aged 20 to 45, but a later offering is planned to cover those from 20 to 55 years in two separate pools, the first covering applicants aged from 20 to 45 and the second those

from 45 to 55. In this way the younger applicants will not suffer from the participation of older individuals.

The IIC also plans to offer car insurance and, like the life insurance, it will be cooperative. Participants will make yearly payments for the first five years. If they make no accident claim during that time they will begin receiving free insurance coverage and eventually receive profits from invested funds.

If the insured party has an accident, then the trust will cover his claim and he will begin contributing to the trust again for five years. If the insured party withdraws at any time he will receive his funds and any profits.

There have been two offerings of a trust designed especially for Islamic banks. The bankers' financial certificate is issued in denominations of $100,000. Banks are allowed to withdraw their money from this trust on a monthly basis. The primary aim of this issue is to help Islamic banks solve one of their most pressing problems — liquidity.

The Bank of America and Bank Suisse Italiano are participating in this offer by guaranteeing the Islamic banks purchasing the financial certificate access to withdrawal rights of up to four times their bond's face value. The two western banks have discovered that encouraging Islamic banking can be profitable because it gives them a chance to meet wealthy clients from the Middle East and at the same time gives them a great deal of prestige in the area.

Proceeds from the sale of bonds go only into very safe investments such as the leasing of computers, railway cars and heavy construction machinery. However, according to Ibrahim Kamel, executive vice president of the IIC, once the company is firmly established investments will be made in other ventures, even in such speculative areas as oil and mineral prospecting. Kamel estimates that the IIC is currently getting a 15 to 17 per cent return on investments.

Bond offerings planned to finance large scale industrial ventures, run according to Islamic principles, have encountered serious difficulties. Negotiations with Volkswagen to set up a joint car assemoly plant to produce VW Beetles in Egypt broke down last year. Volkswagen would have provided the machinery while the IIC was to provide the land and some liquid funds for construction. When these funds were exhausted, IIC was to have made another bond issue for the project instead of resorting to an interest-bearing loan.

'Volkswagen was keen on working with us, but they could not understand how we could avoid resorting to commercial bank loans,' said one employee of IIC. 'They were afraid that the time lapse between bond issues might jeopardise the project.' Consequently Volkswagen withdrew and found a new partner.

The company then began lengthy negotiations with a European pharmaceutical producer to take over one of its European plants, which is on the verge of closure, as a possible alternative for their industrial bond issue.

Kamel says that the company wants to become involved to a greater extent in providing for the basic needs of the Islamic world, particularly in such areas as food supplies. The first project, planned for November, will finance the reconstruction of a large, Arab food supply firm. The IIC is to purchase cargo ships — perhaps as many as eight — at a cost of $8m to $12m each, and will allow the food supply company to use Islamic leasing in order to purchase the ships.

A second issue, which has been planned for some time, is to expand the cultivated area in Prince Mohammed al Faisal's 243,000 hectare agricultural development project at Damazin in Sudan. The issue has been slowed down by complex negotiations with the Sudanese government over allowing the new area the benefits which the original project enjoys.

In accordance with the company's wish to help meet the basic needs of the area, an offering is planned to help an unnamed Gulf country finance the construction of two

power stations at a cost of $30m. 'They were ready to sign with a consortium of European banks but when we showed them our terms they realised they were much better so they decided to finance the construction through us.' The offering should further contribute to the IIC's growing prestige.

Kamel is optimistic about the IIC's future. Revenues of oil rich states are increasing each year. According to the Bank of England, Opec's foreign assets, most of which belong to Islamic countries, totalled about $115bn at the end of 1979. 'Our target is to have about $6bn of that surplus under management by 1985.' (Total funds now under the IIC's management are a closely guarded secret because oil states investing with the IIC do not want their total investments known.)

The company is expanding its operations to include new countries. Currently, bonds are sold through offices in Cairo, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, Damman and Geneva. A new subsidiary is being created in Pakistan with a capital of $3m, 51 per cent owned by the IIC. Other new branches are being considered in Nigeria and Turkey.

Particularly crucial to the company is the official approval of Saudi Arabia. Already some 60 per cent of all bonds are sold to Saudi investors, but official sanction would greatly facilitate increased sales. Crown Prince Fahd wrote to the company in December 1978 saying that approval would be given, but the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency has waited to see how the company does before giving its approval.

There is a long term goal involved in the sale of Islamic bonds — the creation of an Islamic financial market. Abdul Aziz Hegazi, Egypt's former prime minister who initiated Egypt's open door policy and who is now a convert to Islamic banking, told *8 Days* that Islamic bonds are one of the major factors which, he hopes, will lead to the creation of an international Islamic stock market.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

ISLAMIC BOOK EXHIBITION--Abu Dhabi, Oct. 12 (Ittihad)--The biggest Islamic book exhibition will be organised during the next two months in Abu Dhabi, Sharjah and Al Ain. The national committee entrusted with the organisation of the celebrations on the advent of the 15th Hijri century headed by Justice, Islamic Affairs and Endowments Minister Mohamed Abdul Rahman Al Bakr will approve, at its next meeting, to be held after the Eid holidays, the plans for holding the exhibition. A number of libraries and publishing houses from the Arab world will participate in the exhibition to be held over ten days in each of the three cities. /Text/ /Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 13 Oct 80 p 3/

CSO: 4820

USSR OPENS POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE IN KABUL

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Oct 80 p 3

[Text] The friendly country of Soviet Union has taken a major part in the efforts of Afghanistan towards development. The remarkable economic and technical cooperation of USSR has been instrumental in the achievements made by people of Afghanistan in all socio-economic fields. One of the remarkable assistance of Soviet Union to this country is the gigantic educational establishment of Polytechnic Institute, a most modern educational institute in the country, where 2,000 students are enrolled, studying various fields such as industrial and civil engineering, hydrotechnic engineering, road construction, geology, development of useful mines, development of gas and petroleum, extraction of mines, electronic, etc.

In an interview the Chancellor of Polytechnic said that after the victory of Saur Revolution the Kabul Polytechnic Institute has been recognised as an independent institute, functioning within the framework of the Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education. The Institute has three colleges such as college of architecture, college of geology and college of technology. The duration of study in the institute is five and half years at the end of which the students are given masters degree.

The Institute, built through grant-in-aid of our great neighbourly country of Soviet Union, was officially opened in 1969. Some six million roubles is spent by Soviet Union in construction of the Institute.

At the beginning 185 Soviet lecturers and personnel helped the Afghan personnel in carrying out the teaching programmes of the Institute. And, now some 100 Soviet lecturers and laboratory technicians and some 135 Afghan teachers are teaching at the Institute.

In the course of eleven years since the opening of the Institute, 1100 engineers in various fields and at high level of education have been graduated from the Institute.

In reply to another question the Chancellor of Kabul Polytechnic Institute said that when the Institute was separated from the Kabul University, the ground was prepared for establishing three colleges within the Institute and in the future other fields such as repair of vehicles, and tractors and electrifications of urban areas and industrial plants will also be included in the programme of the Institute.

The Institute was able to revise its teaching programmes and implement the post graduate programme with the commencement of the first year of the five year development plan of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. To further enrich the educational level of its local lecturers the Institute plans to introduce the doctorate programme too.

To carry out scientific researchers a scientific research department was established within the Institute. A computer centre is also functioning within the Institute.

The abovementioned measure will prove very useful in raising the academic standard of students and

scientific competition with other universities in the country.

Expounding on the construction and educational aspects of the Polytechnic Institute, the Chancellor of the Institute recalled that the cornerstone of the Institute was laid on 14 October 1963 by Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of Communist Party and President of Presidium of Supreme Soviet. The construction work of the Institute began on April 1965 and on 14 April 1967 the first group of students, numbering 250, were enrolled in the Institute. On 29 May, 1969 the Institute was officially inaugurated.

In the first years only general subjects were taught at the Institute and later the Institute was gradually developed and specialised departments were established and as is now seven specialised departments are functioning within the Institute.

The first group of studdents, numbering 109, were graduated from the Institute in 1973.

CSO: 4920

SOVIET TRACTOR EXHIBITION HELD IN KABUL

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 11 Oct 80 p 4

[Text] KABUL, Oct. 9, (Bakhtar).— The Traktorexport exhibition of USSR, displaying the production of that company, was opened in Kabul on 29 September. It will remain open until 18 October.

The exhibition displays variety of industrial, agricultural and road construction equipment. It is being visited, with interest, by great number of people, interested organisations and individual traders.

The representative of USSR Traktorexport company to Afghanistan, Titov, talking to a Bakhtar reporter said that the Traktorexport is the sole exporter of tractors of various powers and purposes, as well as variety of road construction and construction equipment and agriculture tools from Soviet Union to other countries.

The company was established in 1961 and since then it has exported more than 400,000 tractors, agricultural tools, 30,000 road construction machine and other machinery to various countries of the world.

At present 640,0000 tractors, produced by Soviet tractor producing companies, are functioning on agricultural farms in that country.

Likewise, more than 2,000 Soviet manufactured tractors are functioning in agriculture sector in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Another 350 tractors with ploughs and trailors, ordered by Afghan Agricultural Development Bank is being supplied, which will be delivered in the course of next year.

The technical service and repair of equipment is carried out in two stages, one included a year guarantee given by company for 1,000 hours operation or one year after the delivery of the equipment. The service and repair is done by technical personnel and at the expense of the company. The second stage includes service and repair after the elapse of period for guarantee. This services are rendered by the company but at the expense of the buyer.

As most of the tractors in Afghanistan are operating in northern provinces, well-equipped repair plants are established in Mazare Sharif, centre of Balkh province.

Prior to the Saur Revolution the volume of sale of machinery by Traktorexport reached to one and a half million dollars, however the figure is reached during the current year to six million dollars due to greater attention being paid by the DRA government in development of agriculture in Afghanistan.

The representative of Soviet Traktorexport company said that agreements have been concluded as regards purchase of tractors and agricultural equipment, road construction with concerned Afghan authorities, with some three per cent reduction in the prices.

The products of Soviet Traktorexport company has the satisfaction of customers in view of technical dependability, and it has won more than 100 golden medals in world affairs. As is now the products of the company is exported to 67 European, American, Asian and African countries.

During the 1971 to 1979 the Company's output was increased by 60 per cent and it is envisaged to produce 1.92 million tractors and 538,000 agricultural tools in the years of 1979 and 1980.

The Company is carrying intensive publicity programme through issuing pamphlets, posters and other means to introduce the Company's products.

The Soviet Traktorexport Company has prepared a training programme for the Afghan personnel. Some Afghans are undergoing training at the Rastkov factory and three other groups are to be sent to the Soviet Union for the same purpose, noted the Soviet Traktorexport company representative.

CSO: 4920

STUDENT UNION DECLARES OPPOSITION TO EDUCATION MINISTRY MEASURES

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 24 Sep 80 p 11

[Article: "Press Statement of National Union of Bahrain Students"]

[Text] Members of the Kuwait chapter of the National Union of Bahrain Students were taken by surprise when two of their members who were studying at Kuwait University were dismissed without having any specific charge leveled against them. They had been in the final stages of their education.

While we denounce the dismissal which has befallen our students, it is of concern to us to emphasize certain facts that are considered to be the background behind the step to dismiss [those students]. These facts are:

First, the dismissal of the two students was carried out under direct instructions from the educational authorities in Bahrain. The two students did not engage in any activities that would disrupt the security of Kuwait. This was evident in the response which the security official made to the students [who are members] of the union when a union delegation proceeded to follow up on the matter with the security agencies. In addition, there have been numerous precedents in this regard: these occurred from December 1974 to 1978 to our students who were studying at the university. The request for dismissal came through Bahrain authorities or through the cultural office of the Embassy of the State of Bahrain in Kuwait.

Second, the educational authorities in Bahrain did issue a decision early last August demanding that 17 students studying at Kuwait University and a similar number of students studying at other Arab and European countries be denied admission [at their respective institutions].

The National Union of Bahrain Students had adopted a position on the decisions that were issued by the Ministry of Education to regulate students' missions abroad. The union was able to create among students in Bahrain a general state of non-acceptance of these resolutions. The government then resorted to preventing this number [of students from completing their education] in an effort to arouse fear among the students and compel them to endorse these decisions. We believe that the recent step to have those students dismissed [from their institutions] comes under this series of steps that are being engineered by Bahrain's Ministry of Education.

Third, we are rejecting the aforementioned decisions not only because we disagree with them, but also because those decisions are based on an infringement upon a student's freedom and constitutional rights. Suffice it [to say] that one of those decisions stipulates that the student's parent sign a pledge that his son who is studying abroad will not engage in any activities that go against the state's supreme policy. Not only is such an expression adaptable to various interpretations, we refuse to have our parents become hostages in a situation where they could be taken to court by the authorities for actions they did not commit.

Fourth, this point pertains directly to us, the students in Kuwait. We had continuing disputes last year with the cultural office regarding receipt of our passports. As a result, the grants offered to us by the Ministry of Education were suspended. The step to have students dismissed is considered to be a form of moral pressure exerted on students who are union members to make them accept the embassy's point of view in this matter.

The Kuwait chapter of the National Union of Bahrain Students values the efforts that are being made by the Dean of Students Dr Musa'id al-Harun to safeguard the educational future of our students who are studying in the university. At the same time we are calling upon university officials to take action to stop any steps for dismissal that may be likely in the future. The union is calling upon all student organizations and popular Kuwaiti authorities to establish solidarity with its positions and to obstruct the plan of Bahrain's Ministry of Education to paralyze our students' wills and to force upon us positions and policies that we do not accept.

The Administrative Agency

8592
CSO: 4802

HENDERSON'S DEPARTURE UNANIMOUSLY REQUESTED

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 24 Sep 80 p 16

[Article: "The Arabian Peninsula; Readings in Forbidden Papers; Bahrain: Request for Henderson's Deportation Is Unanimous"]

[Text] A person who has been following the activities of Bahrain's National Opposition will note that part of its general activities is centered around the demand to "deport Henderson" who has been responsible for the agency of political investigations for the past 10 years. The 5 March editorial in the bulletin that is published by the Popular Front in Bahrain stated that "The earnestness of any real openness in Bahrain, or rather the first prelude to such openness, would be manifested in the final deportation of Henderson and his gang from the country."

The editorial added, "People have numerous demands, and we want those demands to be achieved. Despite the points that separate and bring people together, the Popular Front thinks that it is necessary to achieve a basic central demand that would be an introduction as well as a pre-condition to the achievement of the remaining demands. This central demand is exemplified in the deportation of Henderson." The editorial concluded by saying, "To avoid the repetition of this evil tune which more than anything else is an indication of bankruptcy--associating communism and sabotage with this demand--we are saying that this is a regular measure in any country whose people enjoy a minimum of freedoms."

An article in the same issue discussed the six decisions that were issued by Bahrain's Ministry of Education to impose stricter control than had been the case in the past on the activities of students abroad. The article stated, "When the Ministry of Education stands in the way of any student who wants to study abroad, this means that a vast majority of secondary school students will be denied a university education and large numbers will be added to the armies of unemployed in this country."

The article added, "With regard to the decision to prosecute students abroad [because of] their political ideas and beliefs, we are saying that the ministry has no right to interfere in students' political convictions because any citizen has the right to discuss the questions of his country. The constitution which was promulgated by the same authorities gives [citizens] that right."

The article concluded by saying, "We find indications in the ministry's decision of the extreme confusion that is prevalent in the government. We find evidence that the government does not want to have stability and security in the country,

but that it rather wants chaos and disturbances so as to give Henderson further justifications to stay longer in this country."

It is noteworthy here that the aforementioned decisions include the ministry's right to bring back a student who is studying abroad if that student engaged in activities that were contrary to "the supreme interests of the state." The student's parent is to pay the Ministry of Education a sum of money, and the parent is subject to trial during the period of the student's study if the student does not abide by the instructions of the state.

The cover story of that issue included a quick review of the events of the past 5 years which followed the dissolution of parliament on 23 August 1975. We quote the following from this review: "During these 5 years Henderson executed four citizens while they were being brutally tortured. He did so without presenting a single piece of evidence that any one of them had committed a murder or any other crime that would justify comparable treatment or putting him on trial, not to mention killing them."

In another section, "It was sufficient for a member of the National Assembly to talk about the illegality of dissolving the assembly to be taken to prison. This is what happened to Attorney Muhsin Marhun. It was enough for a former assembly member to ask for a return to parliamentary life in 1976 in order to be deprived of [participating in] all the biddings of the Ministry of Public Health. This is what happened to Representative Rasul al-Habashi."

The cover story touched upon the economic, social and political conditions that prevailed during the absence of the National Assembly. These conditions were tantamount to the material evidence that the government's program had failed to solve the general crises from which most of the citizens were suffering. The ouster of the government had become necessary so as to make room for a givernment elected by the people. However, the price that is being asked for that is calling the former officials to account for their actions during the foregoing period.

The leading article on the Labor Affairs page referred to the sweeping arrests to which the members and leaders of the organizational committee of the Union of Bahrain Labor were being subjected. [The government] thus wishes to divest the masses of the Bahraini people and their national movement of their action arm which can lay down the actual foundation of the question of openness and can in fact bring this matter to a head if the government does not comply with the demands of the people of Bahrain and ignores their struggles for the past years.

The August issue [of the bulletin] included news and numerous political commentaries that dealt with the affairs of the Gulf area and the Arabian Peninsula.

8592
CSO: 4802

TESTS PREPARING FOR 1981 GENERAL CENSUS DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 10 Sep 80 p 21

[Article by Sami 'Amarah: "Three Successful Experimental Census Operations; Population More Than Doubles in Past 10 Years; Women Lower Their Ages; Men Give Approximate Age"]

[Excerpts] The three experimental census operations conducted in Bahrain during the past few months and concluded a few days ago, in preparation for the 1981 census, confirm that Bahrain's population has more than doubled during the past 10 years.

The tests confirm that the number of Bahraini citizens exceeds that of non-Bahraini residents. The June census operation confirms that there are 250,000 Bahraini citizens and 150,000 non-Bahraini residents. In light of the three experimental census operations, census department officials expect Bahrain to have a population of 400,000 by 1981, compared to 216,000 according to the 1971 census. [This does not substantiate claim in preceding paragraph, and in subslug, that population has more than doubled.]

The census operations confirm the ancient theory that women always tend to claim to be younger than they really are. Men who do not know their exact age, give the closest rounded figure, that is, 30, 35, 40, 45, or 50. The average marriage age of Bahrain citizens is 24 for men and 19 for women; for non-Bahrainis, it is 25 to 28 years for men and 25 to 27 years for women.

According to the director of the census department Shaykh Muhammad ibn 'Atiyyat-Allah Al Khalifa, the first general population census in Bahrain was conducted in 1941, the second in 1950, the third in 1956, the fourth in 1965 and the fifth and last in 1971, when the population of Bahrain reached 216,000 residents. The sixth census will be conducted on 6 to 15 April 1981. The population of Bahrain is expected to be 400,000 in this coming census.

A Mini-Census

Relative to the recent experimental census concluded a few days ago, Shaykh Muhammad said: "The cabinet gave the census department the privilege of planning and implementing the 6th population census, which pleases us. The work we are currently doing is all being performed by Bahrainis, including preparation of the census form, home calls, the sorting out of forms, and the extraction and analysis of data by computer.

"The third experimental census was a mini-census of residents and dwellings. For this census, we chose a random sample of around 400 Bahraini families from various areas of Bahrain, for the purpose of studying two basic factors:

1. To test the suitability of the census form specifically designed for special locations with constant population increases or decreases, such as hotels, old people's homes, workers' homes, etc.

2. To test the possibility of using the system of census blocs, based on the current address numbering system.

"We began the third experimental census on Monday, 18 August and completed it in a few days.

"The purpose of using random samples is to test specific things. The intent is to learn something specific, not carry out a complete census. For example, in relation to the questions in the forms, are the questions clear or vague? And how many cases could the census worker complete per day?

"On the first day of work, for example, we faced the problem of the very long form with room for 15 family members. It took the census worker 45 minutes to complete one form the first day. On the second day, he was able to complete the form in 25 minutes.

"We are taking into consideration all the above matters in preparing for the general census of 1981. This will be useful in determining how many census workers are needed and how long it will take each worker to do his job.

"In the first and second experimental operations, it took the workers a long time to complete forms for seven families. In the third operation, the forms for seven families took only 3 hours to complete. Therefore, the census committee chairman recommended that each worker complete forms for seven families per day."

Difficulties and Problems

Mr Yasir al-Nasir, director of the third experimental census, discussed the difficulties and problems encountered by census workers on their first day of work. He summarized these problems as follows:

"The training period was short. It consisted of 2 days, 1 theoretical and 1 practical. This caused very minor errors to occur. Of course, these errors appeared on the form, but we corrected them.

"Some people may ask: Why didn't we increase the training period? In reply, I say that this could not be done, because there were many other important things to take care of. The accuracy rate on the first day of the census was 70 percent, increasing to 85 percent on the second day, and to 100 percent on the third day. We have to bear in mind that the young Bahraini census takers are bright and that the citizens spared no effort to provide all that was required of them. Their cooperation undoubtedly encourages us to feel certain that the sixth population census will be the most accurate census taken in Bahrain.

"Another problem may have been communications difficulties, but we tried to overcome these by using radio. The census worker was required to go from his place of residence to the census center (operations room) and then to his work area. Anyone facing problems could contact us at the operations room by radio. By radio, we in turn could give him instructions to help him solve the problem he was facing, such as needing a car because his car had broken down."

Recognizing Mistakes

Shaykh Muhammad, the director of the census department said: "We are trying, through this census, to know our potential, or the potential available to us. We are trying to recognize mistakes, so as to avoid them in the coming general census, God willing.

"For example, in the first and second experimental operations, we noticed that the population pyramid was irregular. An analysis of available information revealed the cause of this, and we are currently trying to rectify it.

"For example, we found that men who do not know their real ages try to give approximate ages, to the nearest round numbers, such as 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65. We also found that women, like everywhere else in the world, try to say that they are younger than they really are. We found these discrepancies after we asked some families for their birth certificates and passports.

"We have asked for birth certificates and passports only to get accurate figures. We only ask for these documents to achieve accuracy."

9455
CSO: 4802

EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURAL REFORM PROGRAM DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 8 Sep 80 pp 16-19

[Article by Mu'tasim Rashid: "Engineer Sayyid Mar'i Makes Accusations Concerning Bureaucracy and the Problems of Agriculture, and Absolves the Egyptian Model of Agricultural Reform of Any Blame"]

[Text] The Egyptian experiment in agricultural reform is related 100 percent to the level of agricultural production in Egypt or, in other words, to increasing this production, whether the increase is vertical or horizontal. Therefore, in order for us to evaluate this experiment as we view it on 9 September 1980, we must attempt to review the results which it has succeeded in achieving since 9 September 1952. It was in this light we began our interview with Engineer Sayyid Mar'i.

General Principles

What we had to do was to review the features of the application of agricultural reform in Egypt in order to clearly perceive the basic general principles upon which the implementation of agricultural reform was based. We are not setting new principles here. Nor are we inferring matters which did not concern Egyptian legislators when faced with the issuance of the law or did not concern government executive agencies when faced with actually putting the law into practice.

As Mr Mar'i said: "The fact is that we set up for ourselves a system or model of agricultural reform which has its own direction and goals which derive from the very core of the Egyptian countryside, its needs, and its nature. As I have stated in my first book about 'Agricultural Reform and the Population Problem in Egypt,' the basic foundations of this system are as follows:

1. Determining the maximum amount of property to be owned by an individual and distributing property in excess of this maximum to the peasants. This distribution is supposed to be in the form of property owned by individuals, and rejects the idea of collective farms which threatens individual private ownership.

2. Adopting the cooperative system as a means of guaranteeing the best utilization of the land distributed and the earning of the highest possible income from it.

3. Expansion in the utilization of uncultivated lands. At the time, we made it clear that methods of agricultural reform should be based on private ownership of land, and that it is necessary for the individual peasant to have his plot of land which is distributed to him and for him and his family to be within the framework of a cooperative system which provided a link between him and his fellow-peasants. Since a peasant's feeling of freedom is considered one of the most important pillars of his progress and eagerness to make the best use of his land and increase his production, then there is no doubt that the system of private ownership, supported by the cooperative system, becomes a means of rendering service simultaneously to the peasant and to the national interest."

The Philosophy of the System

Mr Mar'i went on to say: "There was a social, political, and economic philosophy behind this system. Agricultural reform legislation was based on this philosophy, and the application of this legislation was also based on this philosophy. Perhaps this is what induced international organizations, in particular the food and agricultural organizations of the UN, to call the Egyptian system 'the Egyptian model of agricultural reform.'

The reason is that this 'model,' with the philosophy behind it in terms of legislation and application, was based on technical and economic principles. Perhaps the most important of them were the principles of combining the individually-owned farmlands into organized crop rotation cycles and the creation of production, credit, and marketing cooperative bodies in all realms of agriculture at a time when this philosophy achieved the realization of the final objectives of maintaining Egypt's agricultural production."

The Level of Production

Mr Mar'i said: "For any country, being able to maintain or increase its level of agricultural production while at the same time introducing agricultural reform is the real criterion for the success of a given system or 'model.' It is the only sure means of guaranteeing further progress in the carrying out of agricultural reform laws without suffering setbacks. When agricultural productivity decreases in a given country, this is a sign that it has deviated from putting the law into effect. There are many examples of this among the countries of Latin America and in some of the countries of Asia."

Mr Mar'i explained: "If we recall the year 1953, when the 'irrigation districts of the property-owning elite' were seized and distributed to the small peasant farmers and when the critical agricultural systems and necessary cooperative bodies were set up, we find that the results of the philosophy upon which the 'Egyptian model' of agricultural reform is based have clearly become visible in the increase in production of, for example, sugar cane. Other evidence of this is the statistics of the Sugar Co. which we have seen year after year."

The Law Has Its Enemies

"At this point I do not want to digress and talk about the history of agricultural reform in Egypt. But I do want to make it clear that agricultural reform in Egypt did have its enemies when the law was issued. It also had its enemies when lands

were confiscated, and up till the present day it still has its enemies!! Their opinions crop up from time to time. For them, agricultural reform is a type of scapegoat which they use to blame for some of our economic or agricultural problems when in fact these problems originate in other economic sectors.

"Without wishing to digress, I would like only to point out that some people oppose agricultural reform in Egypt not because it is a social project which has the goal of protecting small peasant farmers and, at the same time, fully maintaining agricultural productivity, but rather because they consider it to be a socialist decision which enables the weak to assert their rights in the face of the strong. They oppose it because it provides these peasants, as best as it can, with the means to live a decent life instead of allowing a minority of people to monopolize Egypt's agricultural crops in order to exploit them for the purposes of enjoying their wealth outside of Egypt and spending their excess capital as consumers outside of Egypt--instead of saving it to invest in projects inside the country. I do not say that all of the people in the wealthy Egyptian landowning class did this, but a large number of them did. In fact these people used to wait until they had gathered in and sold the crops before determining the exact amount of money which they collected from the small peasant farmers as rent to be paid for the land which the peasants planted!!

"The purpose of agricultural reform in Egypt was to deal with these abnormal phenomena and to determine the characteristics of the relationship between the landowner and tenant farmer after determining a suitable maximum of how much farmland it was allowed to own. The result was that the agricultural reform law gave rise to a new class in the Egyptian countryside. The people of this class had been virtually salves of the land and constituted the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of the rural areas."

The Problem of Production

Mr Mar'i added: "Perhaps these circumstances created a suitable climate for increasing agricultural production in Egypt in comparison to what it was before 1952. But whether or not his production today is sufficient or insufficient is quite another problem, and it is unjust to hold either the system or agricultural reform or its Egyptian experiment responsible for this problem. We all know that our population has doubled and that our limited increase in agricultural land areas has not at all kept pace with the population increase. This is especially true if we take into account what has been subtracted from this slight increase because of the building and construction which has taken place on some of the best agricultural lands in the countryside and on the outskirts of the cities. There is this on the one hand."

The World Economic System

"And on the other hand, we all know that the present world economic system is moving in a direction which is completely opposed to the welfare of the developing countries. We see that the industrial products which are produced by the wealthy countries and the petroleum products which are extracted by the OPEC countries are imported by the developing and agricultural countries--are continually showing a rise in prices. We also see that the world level of production of agricultural products is more or less stable or, at best, increases at a rate which does not keep pace with the size of the increases in the prices of oil and industrial goods."

A New Economic System

"For this reason, we have appealed both inside Egypt and, in particular, outside Egypt, at international gatherings and in UN organizations, for what is called a 'new economic system.' This is a system which has the goal of achieving some degree of balance between world prices of agricultural goods and world prices of the oil and industrial goods which the developing countries depend on both for their agricultural production and for their other economic sectors.

"In order to present a clear picture of the extent of the harshness and fraud which is being suffered by the developing countries because of the present world economic system, let me quote only one example: In 1950 or 1951 an Egyptian peasant could buy a farm tractor for 10 gantars of cotton which he produced. But today, in order to get this farm tractor or perhaps even something which is inferior, he has to pay 140 gantars of the cotton which he produces. There is no doubt that our cotton production today, from the point of view of quality, is better than our cotton production of 1951.

The Fault

"Agricultural reform," according to Mr Mar'i, "is not responsible for all aspects of the agricultural problem since agricultural reform has performed its function for society without giving rise to the slightest harm to the level of agricultural productivity.

"As I have pointed out, the fault lies with the population explosion problem, the problem of the present world economic system, the problem of the scarcity of agricultural lands, and the problem of insufficient horizontal expansion which matches the increase in population.

"It may be said today that our cotton production is not sufficient in order to cover our requirements of imported sugar--and this is something that we say with great reservation--but this is not the fault of agricultural reform. It is the fault of the world economic system, on the one hand, and is the fault of our lack of expansion in land cultivation, on the other."

Agricultural Reform Legislation

"As for agricultural reform legislation," Mr Mar'i said, "there is a current trend toward modifying some of this agricultural reform legislation and transferring the ownership of desert and uncultivated lands, on a large-scale basis, to individuals, cooperative associations, and corporations on the condition that they cultivate these lands within 5 years of the date when they take possession of them. But this trend, although it does not conflict with the philosophy of agricultural reform, probably does not represent a basic solution for the problem of expanding our area of agricultural lands. I believe that the government's basic duty in this regard should be to extend the basic facilities and conveniences or the necessary economic infrastructure in order to have these lands cultivated and planted, in order to encourage mechanized agriculture, etc."

The Basic Solution

In the words of Mr Mar'i: "In our opinion, this is the basic solution to the problem of maximum expansion for our agriculture. This is a problem which does not affect the essence of the philosophy on which the Egyptian model of agricultural reform has been based. On the contrary, I emphasize that this model of agricultural reform has fulfilled its role as well as possible and has achieved its mission. If it has achieved its mission, then today we are faced with a problem which is a ramification of it. This problem is that of the bureaucracy within the agricultural reform program. We have established the relationship between the merchants and the tenant farmers, and we have established the maximum limits of ownership of farmlands. The farmlands belonging to the large landowners have been confiscated, and we have completed the distribution of these lands to the small peasant farmers. All of this has been accomplished. Then why is it that today we find that we have a large government bureau which is called the Public Bureau of Confiscation and Distribution!? We find that the committees and some of the courts are drowned in a vast ocean of legal and legislative inquiries. I have already appealed, and I am taking this opportunity to repeat my appeal, for doing away with these bureaus and doing away with these legal ramifications and court cases so that those occupied with them will be free to engage in other more productive activities and promote land cultivation projects. Right now it would be sufficient for us to have a technical agricultural bureau which would undertake to provide guidance for those who are benefiting from the agricultural reform and show them the way toward a continuation of the increase in agricultural production and a continuation of vertical expansion."

9468
CSO: 4802

VIOLENT ATTACK UNLEASHED AGAINST QOTBZADEH, BAZARGAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 16 Oct 80 p 12

[Article by A. Agah: "That Government's and 'That Minister's' Mistakes"]

[Text] Radio Monte Carlo quoted a former cabinet minister [preceding Raja'i's cabinet), as having said that he considers the Iraqi attack on Iran as the outcome of numerous "mistakes" committed by the present Iranian Government. The aforementioned minister, who has held lengthy interviews with foreign press and television, and whose hostility towards the student followers of the imam became evident, more than any other minister, by the statements he made during the program [Voice] and Profile of the Islamic Republic, has also added that: "The present government is not in a position to efficiently run the country."

This former minister, whose premature and untimely judgments regarding the news about the arrest of the shah in Panama, and the hue and cry which followed it, helped more than anything else to provide foreign media with ammunition needed to "discredit" and point out the "mistakes" of the previous government. Even though, he was and is well known as a liar, part of his statement quoted by Radio Monte Carlo is not far from the truth. He has called the Iraqi attack on Iran as being the result of "numerous mistakes" committed by the Iranian Government. Among one of these mistakes committed by the Iranian Government was the appointment of "that minister" to one of the country's most sensitive positions at a time when the nation was engaged in its most crucial struggle against one of the most bloodsucking international colonial powers. People and many newspapers, at the very outset had protested and were quite aware that the "line" followed by the minister was very much different from that of the imam. In his speeches, in his meetings with foreign guests, and in his contacts with domestic and international media, whenever the opportunity presented itself, he attacked and scorned the courageous action of the students who follow the imam's line and continued to cleverly negate the nation's anticolonial struggle.

At that time, many followers of the imam and those who believed in the revolution, warned against the existence of such ministers in the government, insisting that such individuals were doing more harm, than good to the revolution. Unfortunately, no one paid attention to these warnings until Raja'i

formed his government. The reason for the protests of the adherents to the revolution and the press was that they believed that considering the importance of the ministry he was in charge, the minister was acting, intentionally or not, in a manner that could be effectively reflected outside the country as that of the government. This was certainly true. During the entire period he was in charge of that ministry, no policy was formulated to distinctly represent the policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. No basic and fundamental actions were ever taken by the minister and organizational appointments were made based mainly on the minister's personal attitude and assumptions and, therefore, hopes and expectations from the ministry were not fulfilled. Thus, it was clear from the very beginning that inclusion of that minister in the government had been a "mistake." He has now proven this in his Radio Monte Carlo interview. If the previous government (prior to Raja'i) had committed "numerous mistakes," one of those "mistakes" was the appointment of this man to a sensitive ministry. The other "mistake" was the dismissal of protests and warnings issued by the people and the press regarding the keeping of the minister in such a position which later became the source of further "numerous mistakes" by the government.

Judgments of a Morning Newspaper Writer

When tens of thousands of Moslem fighters, city folks as well as people from rural areas, are risking their lives to defend the honor of their country, one of the "morning" newspapers, a latecomer who wants to get ahead early, has published, on page six, the views expressed by a leading clergy. With all due respect to religious leaders, their views and recommendations, publishing the views expressed on 20 Shawal 1400 [31 Aug 80], "a month and a half later" and during the war with Iraq, could not be dismissed as a purely innocent act by the "morning paper," especially when it discusses such issues as guardianship of the jurisprudent [rule of the grand ayatollah], distribution of wealth, property seizure, decrees of the revolutionary courts and judgeship. These are complex issues, which, ever since the formation of the Islamic Republic and the Assembly of Experts, have been subjects of discussions and were used as a means of creating division and dissension among people.

At a time when enemies have surrounded us, on the ground and in the air and the Iraqi, American and Israeli mass media and their supporters are busy doing everything to unsettle our nation, it is unfair for a newspaper, which has blossomed under the shadow of the Islamic Republic, to be managed by people so "unbalanced",* who stand ready to ignore conditions created by war and try to sow dissension on the one hand, and swim against the current and turn back the clock, on the other.

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*[The word "unbalanced", or "namizan" in Persian, is a transparent remark to identify former prime minister Bazargan, who is publishing a newspaper called MIZAN, which means "balance," whereas the word "namizan" means "lack of balance." I.E. Bazargan is indirectly being presented as an unbalanced person.]

In the Persian language, such actions are called "a stab in the back." The attention of the entire nation has now turned west, to the criminal Saddam, to the consequences of his action and to his disgraceful fate. Our people are observing the blackout and are passing a portion of their existence in darkness. Most business activities are either stopped or are slowed down because of the war-imposed restrictions. Unpredictable shortages and inadequacies lie ahead. Yet people endure all these hardships in order to be able to settle their accounts with the blood-thirsty enemies, namely America and its protege Saddam. Why are you trying to undermine this unity of mind and national solidarity?

When thousands of farmers and their sons are risking their lives thousands of kilometers away in the west defending their country, not only you are not with them in the trenches but are also busy using a 2-month old letter written by a religious leader to complain about the taking of land away from some fugitive landlord, which perhaps has not been given yet to that fighting farmer's son.

Whether it is true or not, but the BBC reported several nights ago that invading Iraqi soldiers are busy stealing sewing machines and bicycles stored in warehouses of Khorramshahr's customs. Barely have they arrived and already they are taking away war "booty."

The action taken by that morning newspaper is not only similar but much worse than those taken by the Iraqi soldiers. It is not yet quite clear what is to be done in our war with Iraq just as the Islamic Republic is not quite sure how to deal with the opponents and dissension makers. These gentlemen are already trying to divide the "booties" of the war.

It is no surprise that the people end their slogans, saying: "Death to dissension causers." Truly, death to dissension causers.

9561
CSO: 4906

AYATOLLAH SHIRAZI CRITICIZES RECORD OF REPUBLIC

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 13 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] TEHRAN – The Islamic Republic of Iran has not turned out to fulfill the aspirations of the Islamic Revolution in all respects, charged Ayatollah Shirazi, a prominent religious leader, in a letter addressed to President Abolhassan Banisadr, Prime Minister Mohammadah Rajaie and deputies of the Iranian Parliament.

He said in the letter which was published in the Persian daily "Mezan" that the Islamic Revolution had been achieved with sacrifice of tens of thousands of lives of young martyrs, and its primary objective was to effect a transformation of society on Islamic lines.

It was the hope and wish of one and all who cherished the revolution that there would have been greater unity and a sense of fulfillment in the Islamic Revolution, he continued. However, such hopes had been less than met the expectations of these people because of the ever increasing friction within government circles, between those in authority on the one hand and between groups of people who held divergent opinions on the other, Ayatollah Shirazi argued.

The prominent religious dignitary alleged that false accusations, unislamic judgements and punishments, executions and unjust confiscations of property seemed to have been the order of the times.

He said that he had earlier referred such misdeeds to the president, to the interior minister and to the Revolutionary Council but was surprised by the indifferent response to his appeals and to their refusal to publicise his allegations.

He added that if his arguments had been given a hearing and investigated it would have resulted in advantage to the Islamic Revolution.

Ayatollah Shirazi said that a complete review should be made of all earlier bills passed in Parliament, of all regulations and promulgations, and all those which did not conform to Islam should be annulled.

As regards the Constitution itself and certain laws contained in it, the religious leader said, they were mostly in conformity to Islam but a few articles needed amending. He did not say what the articles were. But he suggested that the members of the Guardian Council in Parliament should meet with representatives of the Maraje-Taqlid (Supreme religious leaders) in order to effect one hundred per cent Islamic changes in the parliament.

He stressed the importance of upholding Vilayat Faqih – the supreme authority of the religious head of the state – saying that this was a cornerstone in an Islamic administrative system and no article in defining this should be left in doubt, or contain flaws in interpretation. In order to effect truly Islamic changes the clauses in respect of the Vilayat Faqih should be looked into with care, the Ayatollah said.

In the same way the question of the judiciary and the appointment of all judges should be exercised with the greatest of care. The status of the judiciary stood only next to that of Imamat (the supreme religious authority which devolves from the special religious eminence of the 12 Shi'ite Imams, Ayatollah Shirazi said. All judicial positions from that of Supreme Judge to lesser positions, carried important political as well as religious responsibilities, he added. Care should, therefore, be the rule in appointment to such sensitive posts, he concluded.

CSO: 4920

REPRESSION MOUNTS AGAINST BAHAI COMMUNITY

Blantyre DAILY TIMES in English 26 Sep 80 p 6

[Article by Anthony Hyman]

[Text]

WITH the news that seven leaders of the Bahai faith in Iran have been shot by order of the Revolutionary Tribunal, the Bahai community in Britain has voiced its fears for the 300,000-strong minority in Iran. The Bahai faith is looked on by most Iranians as a deadly heresy or perversion of Shia Islam,

There are renewed fears in the 300,000 strong Bahai community — the largest religious minority in Iran — of a campaign of repression organised by militant Muslim leaders.

The Bahais are one of five main religious minorities in Iran, together with Christians, Jews, Ismailis and Zoroastrians, but they are the most exposed to waves of popular fanaticism, which have led to serious incidents of killings and damage to Bahai property, ever since the middle of the last century, when the religion was founded in Iran.

In recent incidents in towns all over Iran, local Bahai leaders have been arrested merely because they were members of this faith. Some have been executed. In Yazd, central Iran, seven Bahais were killed recently.

There are well-grounded fears that in the present state of politics in Iran, popular prejudices may be whipped up against Bahais by interested circles, and that they may be made scapegoats for Iran's problems.

Some observers have seen a parallel with Bahais in the Jews in Europe, where anti-semitism has flourished in the past and been exploited for political purposes. Like Jews in many European countries, Bahais in Iran tend to be better educated, more prosperous than average, and provide obvious targets for envy.

It is also the fact that the Bahai faith is looked on by most Iranians as a deadly heresy or pervesion of Shi'a Islam that makes members of this numerous and influential community fear that intolerance and prejudice could be converted into a nationwide persecution.

Already this year, numerous confiscations have been made of Bahai holy places, hospitals and other properties owned by the community, while mullahs (Muslim leaders) have repeatedly called for Bahais to be dismissed from state service and to be handed over to the revolutionary courts.

Bahai leaders maintain that the sole crime of which they are guilty is belonging to this controversial community — all too often branded by Shi'a leaders as a harmful political faction and an agent of Imperialism or Zionism.

Accusations of being part of an international conspiracy against the Iranian revolution are commonly made against Bahais. They arise from the international nature of the religion, with converts scattered around the world. The historical accident that the chief shrine of the Bahais lies in Israel is a serious complication for them, with present-day tensions and strong sympathies with the Palestinian cause in Iran.

Some Bahai spokesmen assert that another motive for attacks on their community inside Iran is the wealth available for redistribution after confiscation of property — and there is no doubt that the notoriety of certain Bahai businessmen who became very rich under the Shah's rule (along with many Shia's too) have added to public prejudices against them.

The other religious minorities in Iran are certainly less exposed, enjoying a more honourable status as 'People of the Book' (i.e. a revealed scripture which Muslims too recognise) like Christians and Jews or like Zoroastrians and Ismailis, having lived side by side with Muslims for so many centuries that they have become accepted to a large extent.

Yet even among the Armenian and Assyrian Christians, who account for most of the 200,000 Christians in Iran, signs of stress and strain have appeared; only this summer Armenian Church leaders advised Armenian women to "pay special attention to the issue of their dress in offices and work places," by wearing headscarves and long-sleeved dresses.

In effect, this means that Christians are being asked to adopt 'Islamic dress,' as ordered by Ayatollah Khomeini for all Muslim women, although theoretically, the new Iranian Constitution imposes no such duty on protected religious minorities.

Although Armenian Church leaders have co-operated so far in trying to lessen potential causes of friction, the atmosphere of religious bigotry and fanaticism

in Iran is likely to bring further disputes both within the Christian community and between their local leaders and Shia-dominated komitehs, which have become a law to themselves.

There are, of course, limits beyond which many Armenian Christians will not wish to go, however great the spirit of compromise or acceptance of the inevitable shown by Church leaders. An end to co-education of the sexes, as well as the ending of separate Armenian schools themselves, are aims of Shia bigots which will certainly be hotly contested.

The future does not look too bright for religious minorities with foreign connections, a feature not only of the Bahais, but also of the Jews and various small Christian denominations with close links to Churches based in Europe.

In spite of repeated assurances from Ayatollah Khomeini and his entourage in the early months of the Iranian revolution, the place of these communities is still unsettled, with the Anglican Church facing persecution of a very ugly nature.

While many of the richer Jews left Iran, along with the rest of the Iranian middle classes, in the last half year of the Shah's rule, perhaps 40,000 out of the 60,000 strong Jewish community remains in Iran.

Judaism has been established there for some two and a half thousand years — since the time of Cyrus the Great (6th Century BC) — and it is difficult to imagine the sudden extinction of such a well-established community, whatever the current difficulties.

Moreover, the remaining Jewish population is for the most part poor, living in Teheran in a well-defined ghetto, with their own trades and good relations in the past with Shia neighbours. —GEMINI

CSO: 4920

KHO'I ALLEGEDLY SUPPORTED BY IRAQ VERSUS KHOMEYNI

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 17 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] A religious element has now been introduced into the Iran-Iraq struggle. Foreign correspondents in Baghdad report that the Iraqi Government considers Ayatollah Abolqasem Kho'i as the leader of the Shiites of the world in exclusion of Ayatollah Khomeyni.

According to the report published in LE MATIN, Ayatollah Khomeyni has on several occasions told those close to him that he intends to transfer the Shiite religious center from Najaf in Iraq to Qom in Iran. After the success of the Iranian revolution, Khomeyni feels that the location of the center of Shiism in Iran will provide it with greater security than in Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Khomeyni has accused Saddam of being a "small satan", one who is not Shiite but an ardent advocate of secularism in his capacity as the leader of Iraq's Ba'th Party.

Khomeyni's decision has been defied vehemently by Iraq and particularly by Ayatollah Abolqasem Kho'i who resides in Najaf and is the highest religious authority in Iraq and a rival of Ayatollah Khomeyni. He has said, "I shall stay here and keep Najaf as the religious center of Shiism." With this statement made to an Iraqi journalist, Ayatollah Kho'i has purported to underscore that he is the leader of the Shiites of the world, not Ayatollah Khomeyni.

The Iraqi regime that has embroiled Iran in a war of attrition obviously backs Ayatollah Kho'i in this contention. The location of the Shiite theological schools in Iraq makes it possible for Iraq to control the more committed wing of the religious movement. Besides, Baghdad derives satisfaction from pitting an opponent against Ayatollah Khomeyni who has called for the overthrow of "traitorous Saddam Hussein."

The report adds that in fact the Shiites in the world of Islam, particularly in Lebanon, Iraq and even Turkey, are divided. Those who are against administration of politics by the clergy outnumber the others and support the leadership of Ayatollah Kho'i who is based in Najaf.

9695
CSO: 4906

OPPOSITION LEADERS LABELLED 'QUISLINGS', 'LAVALS'

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 20 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] By unilaterally declaring the Iran-Iraq Treaty of 1975 null and void, Baghdad has virtually declared war on Iran. In addition to claiming sovereignty over the entire Shatt al-Arab, Iraq also claims about 400 square km of Iran's territory, including Qasr-e Shirin. According to recent reports, Iraq ultimately plans to sever Khuzestan from Iran.

Despite the victory-claiming communiques and press releases of the Iranian Army, the reports received here all speak of the fact that the Iraqi forces are advancing in Iran and have captured several areas. In addition, since yesterday all the foreign ships going through Shatt al-Arab have been flying the Iraqi flag.

What all the mass media agree on and the Iraqi Government has also confirmed is that the Iraqi forces have 'invaded' Iran and are publicly trying to cut off part of its territory. Consequently there is now a state of war between Iran and Iraq. ...However, despite this state of war, a number of Iranians who had made deals with Iraq in order to enrich themselves are still continuing their treachery.

In the pre-war Europe many people used to advocate the Nazi philosophy. But as soon as the war broke out they, too, like the rest of their compatriots, took up struggle against the invading Germans. ...And those who did not fight against the Germans were later executed as traitors. In Norway, an officer called Quisling, and in France a politician called Laval, named themselves patriots and collaborated with the Nazis. However, the courts found them to be traitors to their countries and condemned them to death.

Iran, too, is now facing an invasion. Regardless of whether they favor or oppose the Islamic Republic regime, it is the duty of each honorable and patriotic Iranian to defend his national borders and refrain from cooperating with the enemy under any condition. Those who act otherwise have betrayed their country and they shall be remembered as "Quislings" and "Lavals" of Iran.

9695
CSO: 4906

PRESS POLL QUERIES QUALITIES NEEDED FOR PRIME MINISTER

TA241008 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 24 Oct 80 p 1

[YEDI'OT AHARONOT poll: "What Are the Character Traits That the Public Would Like To Find in the Prime Minister?"]

[Text] Why do you want Begin, Peres or Rabin for the next prime minister? This question was posed to respondents during the current poll of the Israel Institute for Applied Social Research and the Hebrew University Communications Institute, conducted this month. This question was presented at the request of YEDI'OT AHARONOT. The following are the results in percentages:

Characteristics	Begin	Peres	Rabin
The best suitable man	21	22	17
Authority and leadership	19	17	11
Credibility, morality	14	1	29
Good judgment, intelligence	4	7	3
Experience, good functioning	17	16	13
Other qualities	13	11	14
Other reasons	12	26	13

It should be pointed out that the respondents were those who have already made a decision for their preferred candidate among Begin, Peres and Rabin. Those who had not expressed an opinion were not taken into account.

The poll also showed that without any connection to the preference for one candidate or another, the public thinks that authority and ability to perform are the major qualities a prime minister needs (46 percent). From among the respondents, 27 percent pointed to morality and integrity as major qualities, while 18 percent attached more importance to intelligence and wisdom.

As regards the percentage of preference for the different candidates, in October there has been no substantial deviation from the findings of the previous month.

CSO: 4805

BURG DISCUSSES AUTONOMY TALKS

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5 Sep 80 p 13

[Interview with Interior Minister Dr Yosef Burg: "After The Elections, A National Unity Government"]

[Text] It is difficult to interview Interior Minister Dr Yosef Burg. The most veteran of cabinet ministers in Israel, a statesman and politician of rich and varied experience, he knows how to answer. It is impossible to trap him or to get him to say something which he does not intend to say. He carefully chooses his words, he walks between the drops without getting wet. One can see that he is the man for his job. Burg is loyal to the government and the prime minister. If he has a criticism, one must read it between the lines. He says: "For years they did not recognize my character. They thought that I was drawn by MAPAI. But I was not drawn. I am Burg. and in every government in which I serve, I conduct myself in the same manner." Burg does not hide his desire to continue to be active in political life, to lead the NRP in the coming elections, and to serve on its behalf as a minister in the next government. Under present circumstances, there is no doubt that his desire will be realized.

[Question] Does the affair of the investigation of minister Aharom Abu-Khatsira affect the position of the NRP and internal relations within it?

[Answer] The matter of procedures of investigations within a governmental ministry is for the NRP. It has demanded an acceleration of the investigation so that there should not be a perversion of the law. It has spoken out against a smear campaign against religious judaism and parts of it, and it has expressed confidence that the correctness of the people involved in the investigation will come to light. Since we are united in our assessment of the situation, there are no differences of opinion which could disturb the internal peace of the NRP.

[Question] As the minister in charge of the police, have you already drawn some conclusions regarding the form of the investigation?

[Answer] The matter of procedures of investigations within a governmental ministry will be clarified in an appropriate forum. In the meantime we have issued strict orders against leaks. It is unthinkable that the media could make a decision without a trial.

[Question] How do you evaluate the results of Ambassador Linowitz's discussions in Israel?

[Answer] I can say that on our part, a real intellectual effort has been made so that the discussions can continue. On the day that this interview is published. Mr Linowitz will already have finished his discussions with the Egyptians, and everyone will know what the situation is.

[Question] At this point, do you see a serious prospect for progress in the talks, if the Egyptians agree to renew them?

[Answer] If I may distinguish between administrative and political questions, I can say that this year we have progressed on administrative questions in negotiations, but differences remain on the political questions. We must remember that this year was a "leap" year, and that since 8 May 1980, the talks were stopped four times by the Egyptians. There were also many personnel changes in the negotiating teams; in the U.S. Ambassador Strauss was replaced by Ambassador Linowitz. In Egypt, Prime Minister Khalil was released from his post. General Ali was appointed to take his place in the talks, and for our part, our foreign minister, defense minister, and minister of justice were replaced. But essentially, the difficult political questions have remained.

Personally, from the exchange of letters between Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat, as well as the exchange of letters between myself and General Ali, I felt that the Egyptians are raising three principal things, and they are: Jerusalem, settlements, and the general situation in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. These issues appear and reappear from time to time, with different emphasis, and they are the true problem.

The U.S. is concerned that the momentum of the talks not be left to die, and Israel, in all honesty, has expressed its desire to continue the talks. Apparently, the Egyptians have preferred not to hold substantive talks until after the presidential elections in the U.S., and at the same time to demand concessions from Israel, in order to renew the talks that were halted by Egypt. At this time, it is difficult for me to decide what the guiding line of Egyptian policy is on this issue. It is possible that Khomeinism is influencing Egypt from the east, just as propoganda from Lybia came from the west. In any event, the theoretical gates have not been locked.

[Question] What has been the true effect of the Jerusalem legislation on the Egyptian position?

[Answer] It is possible that the Jerusalem legislation passed by the Knesset acted as a kind of catalyst. However, the positions were clear before, and the Egyptians have attempted to raise them from time to time during the autonomy talks.

[Question] And yet, wouldn't it have been worth delaying the Jerusalem legislation so as to prevent a slowdown in the process?

[Answer] The debates in the General Assembly and the Security Council justify the expression of unified national opinion in the matter of Jerusalem. On 6 June I wrote to Ambassador Sol Linowitz and suggested to him that the government would not intervene in the process of the Jerusalem legislation, either to accelerate or decelerate it. In addition, I reminded him of the resolution of the Egyptian National Assembly on 1 April, which spoke of "Arab Jerusalem." I also reminded him

of that resolution on 2 July, and in another form I spoke of it to high ranking officials in the U.S. and said that they had no right to condemn Knesset for passing the Jerusalem law when for years, and especially in recent months, an organized campaign has been conducted against Jerusalem, together with verbal pogroms against the state of Israel.

[Question] In view of the harsh reaction to the Jerusalem law, isn't there room for halting the shift of the prime minister's office to East Jerusalem?

[Answer] Since Jerusalem is united, the office can be located anywhere....

[Question] When you accepted your position as negotiator on autonomy, did you ever imagine that our political position would reach such a low point?

[Answer] Our life is composed of processes which are both for the good as well as the bad, in various spheres. The autonomy talks did not cause the low point. But it may be that what you call the low point has affected the talks. The oil weapon and the money from oil were known from before. France has not changed its position for the better within the year. There was from before an European initiative, which crystallized further after the Venetian resolutions, and did nothing to calm the oil consuming nations--all of this has created a very difficult package. Our propoganda activity has to be reinforced in light of the many trips by people from the Egyptian government to African and European capitals. We should renew our struggle for understanding in all countries of the free world. This includes, especially, those countries whose ambassadors left Jerusalem, against the profound recognition of their peoples and the uniqueness of Jerusalem in the history of the world and the Jewish people.

[Question] With your permission, let us move to the area of domestic politics. After Prof Aron's refusal to serve as minister of defense, would you have any preference for filling the position?

[Answer] There are only two possibilities: either a quick solution or a slow one. Only time will tell how the prime minister deals with the problem.

[Question] Will the NRP pressure him?

[Answer] The NRP wants the maximum security for the country. This maximum requires a maximum of good administration of the defense ministry. More I cannot say for the present.

[Question] Minister Moda'i accused you of foiling his appointment as foreign minister for fear that the conduct of the autonomy talks would be taken from you?

[Answer] I am surprised at such talk. Several months ago Minister Moda'i, at his initiative, met with me and said to me that if I had any fears that his appointment as foreign minister would hurt my position as chairman of the Ministerial Committee on Autonomy, he wanted me to know that there was no basis for such a fear. I told him that I had no such fear, and that I was not born to be the minister of autonomy. Since then we have not discussed the issue.

[Question] If so, why then did you oppose his appointment?

[Answer] I, and most of the members of the party were of the opinion that government is not a matter of musical chairs, and that Mr Yitshaq Shamir was well suited to the foreign ministry and that it would be a shame to remove him.

[Question] The NRP supported the proposal to appoint Prof Arens as defense minister. Wasn't there a fear of a government in which the foreign minister, the finance minister, and the (intended) defense minister had opposed the peace treaty? Wouldn't this have seriously damaged the foreign image of the government?

[Answer] I do not like to publicly debate the opinions of colleagues. Your question is perhaps important, though not in the direction which you pointed, by the expressions and actions of Minister Yitshaq Shamir. To be a member of a government it is incumbent upon the minister not to betray his views, but also to take into account reality--be it political, economic, social, national, or international reality. It may be said that in general, a cabinet is united around an average line.

[Question] You have been quoted as one who predicts elections in the spring. Is that prophecy still in effect?

[Answer] In the first weeks of the winter session of the Knesset, the parliamentary picture will become clear. I assume that immediately after the by individuals whose party addresses for the tenth Knesset are not, for the moment known. The disintegration of several factions in the Knesset will no doubt leave its mark on this matter. It may be assumed that immediately after the beginning of the winter session, discussion will begin of several laws which belong to the election, such as increasing the cutoff percentage or a renewed determination of the various times in connection with the "decisive" day of the elections. In debates of this sort, two interesting things will be clarified: first, if there are common interests among the large factions (such as the Badar-Ofer Law), and secondly, at what pace the election will legislation be approached.

[Question] Is the interior ministry ready for the elections at any time?

[Answer] As minister of the interior, I can say that the central election committee exists and is operating. The voter rolls are maintained, polling stations are determined, and the technical aspect is all ready.

[Question] Why is it impossible to hold elections within a month of the dissolving of the Knesset, as is done in Britain and Western Europe?

[Answer] Technically, it is possible. But there are some factors which make such a procedure difficult: there is a law that a senior official or an army man who wants to be a candidate for the Knesset must resign his position 100 days in advance. Some Knesset members also want to update the voter rolls beyond the decisive day, which is the 15th of Av, and to include all those who will be 18 years old as of election day.

[Question] Do you see a renewal of the historic alliance between the NRP and the Labor party after the next elections?

[Answer] Together we wrote many pages of Zionism, realization, defense. We did not reject Jews, Zionists, when they were in the Herut movement, and there is certainly no basis for rejecting cooperation with the workers' camp. I was very sorry about the separation in December 1976, and the manner in which it occurred. The Israeli voter will determine the possibility of various coalition combinations. The NRP, which is a constructive party, sees no reason for rejecting what has been called a historic partnership. However, it may be that after the elections, the parliamentary picture will not be clear, or it may be that the political situation will be such that the establishment of a national unity government will be necessary.

7075
CSO: 4805

WEIZMAN REJECTS CRITICISM OF HIS SUPPORT FOR CARTER

TA282115 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 28 Oct 80

[Interview with 'Ezer Weizman, former defense minister, by Dan Shilon, Israeli television correspondent in New York--videotaped--date not given]

[Excerpt] [Question] Mr Weizman, these days Air Force 1 is not only the plane of a president but that of a presidential candidate. Your joining that plane has been interpreted as interfering in the internal affairs of the United States and in the election campaign here. How do you explain this?

[Answer] It is true that Air Force 1 is the plane of a presidential candidate--incidentally, it is the plane of a president--Air Force 1 is also the plane of a friend, a friend of the State of Israel and a personal friend. Second, there is quite a bit of hypocrisy when people say that what I did was to interfere in the internal affairs of the State of Israel. [sentence as heard] A large part of our foreign and defense policies rely to a large extent on interference in the internal affairs of the United States.

[Question] Would you elaborate on your remarks?

[Answer] It seems to me that from time to time we--past, present and future foreign ministers and prime ministers--are trying to influence--pressure is a bad word--and also to pressure certain parts of the United States to attain, and justifiably so, achievements for the State of Israel.

[Question] However, they do this with republicans and democrats at the same time. They do not say--just as you said yesterday that were I to make my recommendations as an Israeli....

[Answer] That is true, and I reiterate what I said yesterday. I regard the peace process between Israel and Egypt as one of the most important, basic, historic and largest processes for the State of Israel. I know that there are those who do not think so, several of my friends in the party. Whoever contributed to this process--the prime minister, the Egyptian president and the U.S. President--is, as far as I am concerned, a person who contributed a great deal. It seems to me that the U.S. President's contribution to this process has been made light of to such an extent that, lately, when you ask people both in Israel and in the United States what wrong did Carter do to Israel, they--not everybody

but some of them--will tell you: He imposed peace with Egypt on us. This is one of the most inaccurate things I have ever heard in my life.

When I came here I saw that Carter was being pushed on the issue of the Middle East as if he had done us some wrong. I spent time with him at Camp David with the prime minister and the former foreign minister and during the entire lengthy process of the last 2-1/2 years, I cannot pinpoint any wrong that he has done to us. I know there was a vote at the United Nations, a serious and difficult vote, and Carter admitted his fault.

Therefore, when a friend who has made such a fundamental contribution to an exceptional process--and in view of our relations with the United States, which are not regular relations--when such a friend asks me to fly with him aboard Air Force 1, I fly with him. Whenever any questions were posed to me I only replied on matters concerning the State of Israel and not about the unemployment situation in the United States or about the economic situation there or about the U.S. attitude toward SALT and so on.

[Question] Yet, you still aroused--or may have aroused--many of Reagan's supporters against you, and Reagan still stands a chance of being elected.

[Answer] Whatever I did was not intended to arouse Reagan's supporters against me. I did what I did out of appreciation for President Carter's actions and deeds and out of the feeling that, to a certain extent, people were incited against him, and his actions in this process, which I regard as a fundamental, important and historic process for the people of Israel, were made light of.

[Question] Would it not have been better to thank President Carter by means other than interfering in the election campaign in the United States?

[Answer] First, I do not think that I interfered. I admit, it is true, that my presence on the scene had some influence. The fact is that you are interviewing me, otherwise you would not have interviewed me. Had I come as a regular guest, as a Knesset member, to the United States, I think that you would not have interviewed me perhaps.

I still think that President Carter is a friend of the State of Israel. I think that he has made a vast contribution to the peace process. I think that Carter's value has been made light of. Incidentally, I am not the only one to have said so; the prime minister always lauds him. I do not know if it makes much difference whether this is done 6 months or 1 week before the election. I believe that if Reagan is elected president there will be several good Jews close to him and we will continue to interfere in the internal affairs of the United States in order to have a favorable influence upon the State of Israel.

CSO: 4805

COMMENTATOR FAVORABLY APPRAISES NAVON VISIT TO EGYPT

TA291634 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Oct 80 p 9

[Commentary by Yo'el Marcus: "Another Bit of History"]

[Text] As the years go by (yes, it has already been years) the Israeli pubic's heart has become somewhat hardened to the flood of enthusiastic descriptions of trips along the Cairo-Tel Aviv-Cairo axis. There is not a single superlative that has not been used to describe the "depth of emotion" at the sight of the Israeli flag flying in Cairo or the meeting with Egyptians in Israel and so on. It even seems that we can no longer be surprised by remarks expressing reservations that al-Sadat in fact "does not mean it" and everything he does--the official receptions, the mutual visits, playing "Hatiqwah" [Israeli national anthem] on Egyptian soil--all of this is nothing but scheming to cheat naive Israel, as in the well-known joke, in which the Israeli journalist reports to his reading public by referring to a list of standardized reports, since everything is known.

And yet....

When you see the honor official Egypt is giving President Navon, even the most "blase" Israeli can only pinch himself. It is true that we will not go as far as 'AL HAMISHMAR, which gave its editorial about the president's visit the title: "And Tears Come Again To Our Eyes." But we must admit that we are seeing history in the making. It cannot be disputed that Navon is receiving in Egypt everything that Begin dreamed of getting there and did not achieve on any of his five visits. Perhaps for this reason--spiteful people will say--television coverage of Navon's visit to Egypt was given less time than the report on the completion of the Hebrew encyclopedia. It makes no difference that the masses were not organized to come out along the trip's routes. It is impossible to complain if he is not being given the same honor given to Carter, for example. Organized transport of the masses from their places of employment and villages costs a great deal of money, and this is reserved for only President al-Sadat's special domestic needs.

I do not know if, with Navon's visit, we have broken the "human isolation" from which Israel has been suffering in addition to its political isolation, as it was put by one of the papers, but it is a fact that there is no country in the world that has ever given such honor to a president of Israel or any other Israeli leader as that being given to Navon by Arab Egypt. This is true despite the fact that, from al-Sadat's viewpoint, every single month there have been fewer and

fewer reasons to give an Israeli the "red carpet" treatment, nor did anybody force him to invite Navon for such a provocative visit. Certain Arab leaders were obviously close to having a heart attack at what they saw on television precisely at this time.

Obviously al-Sadat had a whole series of political motives justifying the visit for him. After all, al-Sadat is a professional, it not an artist, in politics. He is very well aware of the political limitations of an Israeli president, and so he did not invite him for the purpose of political talks. It may be that the article in the weekly AL-SIYASAH about Navon's chances of being prime minister and his influence over the Israelis of eastern origin, who make up 60 percent of the Israeli population, exposes one of al-Sadat's motives. Throughout the years, especially during the war waged by the media, the Egyptians believed that it would be easier for them to find a common language with the Israelis of eastern origin, more than with the ruling Ashkenazi class. And I am convinced that Navon won over his listeners' with his colorful speech and his images that appeal to any oriental soul, more than the dozens of clever moralizing speeches Begin made on his official visits to Egypt. There is a double long-term political investment here by al-Sadat, not only against the ethnic background and a gamble on Navon's personal future, but also on the assumption that Navon--whose views are well known to him--will have a substantial personal influence on the alinement government.

[TA291707] All the signs indicate that al-Sadat has decided to take a deep breath and wait, not only until after the U.S. election, or until the new president gets into the swing of things during the first quarter of 1981, but also until the Israeli regime is changed. That is why his latest interlocutors have formed the impression that he is in no hurry at the moment. During this time-out period of almost a year, he is committed to take action in three fields:

--To show his aides and the Egyptian intellectuals, who have reservations about his moves, that he has not dropped the Palestinian issue;

--To show the United States that he has not retreated from the peace initiative, in order to deepen the relations that are being formed with it and upon which not only al-Sadat, but also the Egyptian people, are pinning many (economic) hopes; and

--To eliminate Israeli public suspicions and to prepare the ground for flexibility on the part of the next government. Through his invitation to Navon and the enthusiastic reception--and it certainly is an enthusiastic official reception--he wants to make the Israeli public understand that he has accepted the State of Israel and that his quarrel and criticism involve the militant Begin government alone. He is aware of the fact that only 4 months after a new government is established in Israel, it will be time for the second stage of the evacuation of the Sinai (March 1982), and of course he wants the public to be convinced that his peace is sincere and stands firm even under the stress of the misunderstandings.

It is clear that al-Sadat had, and still has, political intentions behind all his moves, but these are legitimate and do not detract from the value of facts and events being interwoven into a "bit of history." From visit to visit, from event to event, whether a trick or not, al-Sadat's deep involvement in the peace processes is more firmly entrenched and, in my opinion, there is no going back as long as he is alive and well. But while al-Sadat is thinking of the future, about "after Begin," pinning his hopes on Israel's next government, one can hardly say that Israel, for its part, is giving any thought at all to the period after al-Sadat. Israel could have secured Egypt's involvement in peace even more firmly, even after the al-Sadat era, by advancing the autonomy and striving for an agreement. Those people in Egypt today who are influential skeptics may be its leaders tomorrow.

But who in Israel lifts his eyes higher than the turgid swamp of mutual slander and the rest of the nonsense in which the heads of state are currently occupied?

CSO: 4805

'HA'ARETZ' COMMENTATOR ON KING HUSAYN'S ROLE, ACTIONS

TA141657 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Oct 80 p 11

[Commentary by Yo'el Marcus: "The Professional 'Survivor'"]

[Text] The Israeli Government has been performing a strange trick: First it blows the alarm and only later asks itself why it did so. As if Israelis' nerves were not sufficiently strained, the government's official spokesmen time and again speak about "the gravity of the situation" in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war and King Husayn's involvement in the war alongside Iraq. The prime minister has declared that King Husayn has not acted wisely. The transportation minister--who in his times of leisure, after dealing with roads and airports, serves as an amateur defense minister--has cautioned that Husayn is "playing with fire." Minister Sharon has already reached the conclusion that the "Jordanian option" is dead. The general scenario portrayed by the government is that Iraq will win an all-out victory over Iran and this newly-born giant together with Jordan will create an unprecedented danger on the eastern front.

In my opinion, such a scenario is exaggerated and unfounded. An "all-out" Iraqi victory is altogether impossible. At best, Iraq will hold onto the disputed strip of land until the Iranians redeploy their forces and launch a counterattack. Even if a cease-fire is achieved the border dispute will require both sides to maintain forces on their joint border, far from Israel--thank God.

Our experience in upheavals in this region should have made us realize that no conflict or alliance lasts in the Arab world. Not long ago we were concerned about the creation of a Syrian-Jordanian front. Israeli officials said Syrian-Jordanian preparations were under way to launch a joint military action. This view also did not prevail for long. In fact, the danger of the eastern front faded away dramatically in spite of the macabre prophesies. Therefore, we should not be overly excited now because of the new "romance" between Jordan and Iraq. Husayn is much wiser than what we think.

Intrigue and warmongering have never been King Husayn's most outstanding qualities. His outstanding feature is his ability to survive. Husayn has turned his personal survival into his exclusive profession and occupation. People analyzing his moves, decisions, alliances and seasonal disputes will find out that they all stem from this quality. It may be said that his successful survival is impressive--he has been sitting on the royal throne for 28 years. He has

certainly not broken Dr Yosef Burg's record for state service. However, he has certainly broken the record of leaders in the Middle East and the entire world. There have been 11 unsuccessful attempts to assassinate him and cemeteries in the Middle East are full of people who said Husayn did not stand a chance of holding out.

In a kingdom lacking oil and natural resources, where a large section of the population is of Palestinian extraction and aspires to national independence, where 60 percent of the state budget comes from external sources, the king has successfully managed to keep his head above water. He has never been exceedingly involved in disputes or friendships. Because of our arrogance we tend to ridicule him for joining the wrong war in 1967 and staying out of the war where he could have won in 1973 and maneuvering himself out of the Camp David accord. All these descriptions are not accurate and it is a shame that we do believe them and make light of a possible future ally.

Husayn got carried into the Six-Day War by the Egyptian Army commander in the West Bank who ordered the opening of fire without consulting the Jordanian monarch. In 1973 the Egyptians and the Syrians did not tell him about the secret war plans and it was already too late to join the war when it emerged that Israel was in distress. He was not invited to Camp David not because he did not want to attend but because al-Sadat did not want him there. However, except for these "accidents"--which were not exactly slips on the part of Husayn--the king acts as a professional "juggler" simultaneously keeping several balls in the air.

He made exaggerated statements against Israel but was not [as published] the first Arab leader to hold direct talks with it. During his period of great tension with Syria in 1960 (the Syrians planted a time bomb that exploded during the cabinet session) he had a direct meeting with Israel and begged Israel not to use his distress in order to attack him. During his conflict with the Palestinians in 1970 he again asked Israel to consider his situation. Long before al-Sadat arrived in Jerusalem (Husayn initially welcomed this move and later withdrew his support when it emerged that al-Sadat did not intend to let him join it) he maintained a de facto and peaceful modus vivendi with Israel: cooperation by means of the open bridges, preventing terrorist actions from Jordanian territory and funneling many millions of dollars to the West Bank to pay salaries and provide budgets.

[TA141725] As a professional "survivor" Husayn changes alliances and loyalties in the Arab world at the same rate he changes his shirts, according to his needs. His changes are dictated, as already said, by his chances for surviving. When the Syrians sent two MIG's to attack his private plane and threatened to invade his country he did not hestiate to ask for U.S. aid and Israeli support. However, when he saw that Israel was also sharing its cake with Egypt he turned to Syria. When the United States did not give him "Hawk" missiles, Husayn did not hesitate in going to Moscow and creating the impression that he was on the brink of changing allegiances. Yet, he did not purchase a SAM missile system as he had pledged to do. He is a very capable acrobat but he is not a clown. He is for the PLO but on the condition that they do not live within his boundaries. He is for a

Palestinian State as long as such a state does not exist. As long as he keeps out of practical negotiations he does not lower what he demands from the PLO and al-Sadat. He speaks about peace but flirts with the rejectionist states, maybe because he has not yet made up his mind about what will better serve his survival--either retrieving the West Bank or leaving the situation unchanged.

Husayn is referred to as a man playing with fire. The U.S. State Department is of the opinion that he is undergoing a difficult psychological problem stemming from his involvement in a maze with no logical way out. Respected journalists who met him are surprised to learn that Husayn aspires to become the leader of the Arab world. The truth is that Husayn takes an interest only in himself. Therefore, he is very cautious. He never goes to the very end and he is very good on turning his back on alliances. However, there is a certain method in his actions: He wants to keep his pro-Western link without severing his ties with the Arab "mainstream" which is currently led by the rejectionist states. He has held close relations with Saudi Arabia, then with Egypt, later with Syria and Iraq. The latter relationship was initiated by Iraq, both against Syria and in order to guarantee a "land lift" (in the wake of the possible blockade of Basra) in the wake of the military operation it recently planned. In exchange, Jordan enjoys Iraqi financial aid. In his own way, Husayn believes that he is not entirely acting against U.S. interests by maintaining his relations with Iraq, and it is not at all certain that he is mistaken.

The assumption that these relations will develop into a new front against Israel is not likely. Trust Husayn, it will not even occur to him to open the gates of his country to Iraqi Army troops. By the same token, I would not rush to dismiss the "Jordanian option." A leader whose main occupation is to survive has all the alternatives open before him. This is the secret of Husayn's strength.

CSO: 4805

OPPOSITION TO ANNEXATION OF GOLAN HEIGHTS SCORED

Yadin Calls for Governmental Stand

TA230630 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 23 Oct 80

[Text] Deputy Prime Minister Yiga'el Yadin wants the government to take a stand against a parliamentary bill to annex the Golan Heights. Yadin told ISRAEL RADIO that the executive of his Democratic Party will meet today and is expected to adopt its own decision opposing such a bill. Yadin says it is inconceivable that the Knesset would pass a bill which would close the option of negotiation with Syria and make it impossible, should the time come, for a withdrawal of even 200 metres on the Golan Heights.

The American ambassador in Israel, Samuel Lewis, has expressed to Prime Minister Begin his government's concern over the intention of passing a law to annex the Golan Heights. The American concern was expressed at a meeting between the prime minister and the ambassador. Lewis was told by Washington to clarify to Israel that the U.S. views the proposed Golan law with grave concern. The American Government believes the proposed law is far more serious than the Jerusalem law; this because Jerusalem was in actual fact united in 1967, while in the case of the Golan its sovereignty is clearly recognized and therefore such a law would be in direct conflict with UN Resolution 242.

Our reporter has learned that the prime minister clarified to the ambassador that the Israeli Government has not intervened in parliamentary process in the Knesset. Official circles told our reporter that they did not believe the proposed law would be brought before the Knesset. They said the prime minister and the cabinet would find a way to convince the Knesset members to express their position and their support for the Golan in a way other than a law.

Mapam Party Voices Disapproval

TA291307 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 29 Oct 80 p 1

[Report: "Mapam Will Regard Support for the Annexation of the Golan as a Violation of the Alinement Platform"]

[Text] During clarifications made yesterday by the Mapam Knesset faction, with the participation of the three party secretaries, it was decided to demand that

the Labor Party adhere to the alinement platform which supports territorial compromise with each of the neighboring countries. Any legislative initiative--to which members of the Labor Party are partners--changing the political situation in the Golan Heights will be regarded as a breach of the alinement platform.

Mapam demands that urgent clarifications be made on this issue in the supreme institutions common to the two alinement parties.

In order to avoid a situation in which we would be faced with parliamentary faits accompli in the Knesset, the Mapam faction decided to demand that the clarifications be made within the next few days.

The announcement issued yesterday by Mapam regarding the opposition to the annexation of the Golan Heights says that "in order to contain any legislative initiative for the annexation of the Golan Heights--something that contradicts the political interests of the State of Israel and of the Golan Heights settlements--Mapam put forward an urgent motion for the Knesset agenda. The Knesset executive did not approve that motion.

"During the alinement Knesset faction executive's clarifications, the Labor Party demanded that no normal motion for the agenda be submitted on this issue until the end of the clarifications in the Labor Party's institutions. A normal motion, as is well known, requires the approval of all the alinement factions."

CSO: 4805

IMPROVEMENT OF ARAB-JEWISH RELATIONS SOUGHT

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Sep 80 p 5

[Article by Aluf Hareven: "Israeli Arabs as a Jewish Problem"]

[Text] One in every six Israeli citizens is an Arab; that means he belongs to a non-Jewish minority in a Jewish state, which in its declaration of independence declared the principle of equality of rights for every citizen. By the year 2000, there will be more than one million Arab citizens of Israel. Even today, with their number at 600,000 about 70 percent have been born after the establishment of the state, meaning that those Arabs are Israeli citizens by birth. The question regarding the mutual relations between Jews and Arabs should thus be one of the critical questions for the second generation of the country.

In relations between the majority and the minority, who is it that determines the forms of relations? Certainly these relations are determined in the manner of reciprocal relations, of interaction; but we can assume that the majority, since it is the decisive factor in the country, has more power than the minority to shape the forms of this relationship, since the minority does not have the power to determine. Therefore, it is important that the Jewish majority try to focus on the components of its attitude toward the non-Jewish minority; only when we are informed of these factors will we be able to be clear regarding ourselves, as to whether we are satisfied with the situation or whether there is room for change.

In a survey commissioned by the Van Leer Institute on the attitude of the Jewish majority towards the non-Jewish minority, and which was directed by Mina Tsemakh, the following discoveries are prominent:

The Jewish majority in Israel is not unambiguous in its attitude toward Israeli Arabs. There are three principal groups: a minority of Jews whose attitude toward Israeli Arabs is essentially negative; a minority of Jews whose attitude is essentially positive; and between them a group comprising the majority of Jews in Israel, whose attitude toward Israeli Arabs is not clear cut (not stereotypical, but a mixture of both positive and negative positions.)

The group which attributes only negative qualities to the Arabs comprises about 14 percent of the respondents. Most prominent in this group are those Jews who come from Arab countries, age 18 to 22 years, who vote for Likud and the NRP (although of course not all belonging to these categories are so negative in their attitudes toward Israeli Arabs). This group is a minority; in contrast, 84 percent of the Jewish community hold positive or mixed attitudes toward Israeli Arabs.

The group which attributes only positive qualities to the Arabs comprises 13 percent of the respondents. This group, too, is a minority, and prominent in it are those people who come from western countries, or the children of westerners, having a high level of education, and living in cities where there is an Arab population.

The largest group, which comprises 70 percent of Israeli Jews, is that which has mixed attitudes, i.e. they attribute to Israeli Arabs positive qualities (e.g. industry, devotion to family) and negative qualities (e.g. violence).

The compositness of positions of the Jewish public is testified to by several divisions, such as:

The "dirty"Arab--36 percent; "clean" or "neither clean nor dirty"--64 percent. The Arab is "devoted to his family"--69 percent; "not devoted"--8 percent (the remainder is between the poles). Human life is important to them--42 percent; is not important--33 percent. Most Israeli Arabs engage in espionage--15 percent; only an isolated few engage in espionage--60 percent. Most Israeli Arabs are happy when the country suffers harm--53 percent; other opinions--47 percent. Most Israeli Arabs are torn between loyalty to the country and loyalty to their people--45 percent; other opinions--55 percent.

The whole survey exposes internal tensions in the positions of the Jewish public. So for example the tension between the principled position of 90 percent of those interviewed regarding the necessity of displaying tolerance to minority groups, whichever they are, and the readiness of only 40 percent to apply full equality of rights to the Israeli Arab minority, while the principal claim of those opposed to the application of full equality of rights is based on considerations of security.

In contrast to these tensions, one of the most encouraging discoveries was the readiness for social contacts with Israeli Arabs. About 40 percent are ready to live in the same building with Arabs; more than half of the respondents are ready for social contacts with Arabs in the cities in which they live; about 60 percent are ready to work on the same job. This date testifies to the fact that a substantial segment of the Jewish public is not racist in its attitude toward Israeli Arabs; it does not reserve itself from such contacts with them, in that manner that whites relate to blacks in South Africa. On the contrary, the high degree of readiness for close social contact shows the potential for excellent relations which has not been realized. This rate is important because of studies made of Israeli Arabs which also show a high rate of interest in social contacts with Jews, although the rate of credibility regarding Jewish readiness for such relations is low among Arabs.

The practical conclusions which stem from this study are in three areas; first and foremost, the impression that most Israeli Jews have a negative attitude toward Israeli Arabs is false. The rate of Jews in Israel whose attitude toward Arab citizens of the country is purely racist is only 15 percent, which is about 3 out of every 20 Jews. All those to whom Israel is dear as both a Jewish state which is concerned for the rights of its minorities, as well as a democratic country whose citizens enjoy equal rights will be concerned to define himself outside of that group, as well as to isolate it.

Secondly, there are in the positions of the Jewish majority of Israel bases which are positive, and upon which can be built with the goal of limiting negative attitudes, and of improving the general attitude toward Arab citizens of Israel. This activity is especially important in the area of education. As of today, there is no component in the education of Jewish students which teaches them how to relate to one sixth of the citizens of Israel who are not Jewish. It is possible that the absence of such a program is one of the factors in the fact that particularly among Jewish youth there is a high rate of negative attitude toward Israeli Arabs, as compared to many adult groups.

Thirdly, there is enough data in this survey to strengthen the hope of developing in Israel relations between the majority and minority based on the mutual respect of civil rights, even when there is a difference of opinion as to the way to solve political problems. But such a development will not occur by itself, and the resolution to move to it must first be a resolution of the Jewish majority, for the image of the Arab minority which we see is to a great extent a reflection of the image which we project of ourselves to them. To the extent, that we hold a negative view of them (as "dirty" or "spies") so we will strengthen their negative view of us; and to the extent that we strengthen positive bases which already exist among part of the Jewish majority, we will be able to strengthen the Israeli Arabs' view of themselves as citizens of the country.

This is certainly no easy task, and the difficulties in settling the Israeli-Arab dispute will not make it any easier. But if we do not, as soon as possible, turn to the task of clarifying our attitudes toward the non-Jewish minority, then even if we do settle the external Arab-Israeli dispute, we will still have an internal dispute which will be both painful and debilitating. There is within the Jewish majority a sufficient basis for the growth of positive attitudes between us and the Arab minority. What is lacking in the meantime is a policy which is ready to face up to the problem. It is lacking in the present government and was lacking in its predecessors, and is still lacking in the opposition which will someday replace the present government.

7075
CSO: 4805

'HIGH-RANKING' OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON FRG MIDEAST POLICY

LD282158 Hamburg DPA in German 1749 GMT 28 Oct 80

[Report on interview with unidentified Israeli official by DPA on 28 Oct 80, place not given]

[Text] Jerusalem, 28 Oct (DPA)--It is the official view in Jerusalem that the Federal Government, like other West European countries, allows itself to be "blackmailed" by the Arab oil states and disregards the sympathies felt by Germans for Israel. This view was expressed in a DPA conversation today by a high-ranking Israel Government official who did not want his name published.

He criticized the Mideast policy of the European community, and specifically the Federal Republic. He said: "Even leaving aside motives and only looking at results, I am bound to say that Germany has so far not achieved anything positive in this respect. The West Europeans as a whole have failed to make the Arabs understand that they must sit round the table with Israel if they really want peace."

The Federal Government, he added, "understandably" will not admit that, for the sake of its energy supplies, it is looking to the Arabs and is therefore open to blackmail. With this policy Bonn disregards the fact that the Germans sympathize with Israel for three reasons: "First, the Germans know that Israel is a democratic state. Second, they feel that Israel is having to pay for the mistakes of western politicians and is being thrown to the dogs for the sake of good relations with the Arabs. Third, the Germans well remember that the Jews had to pay the highest price in World War II."

Bonn, 28 Oct (DPA)--In Bonn's view, the Israel statement ignores the facts. A Bonn foreign office spokesman said today that the federal government is not taking sides and is not pursuing a policy at the expense of Israel. Nor are its efforts to secure peace in the Middle East motivated by its energy supply interests.

The spokesman said that the federal government supported the decisions taken by the EC summit meeting in Venice for the very reason that it wants to support the peace process.

Bonn is making every effort in bilateral contacts to get the major groups, that in Israel, Egypt and the Arab League, to move closer. The federal government's efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace in the Middle East are in the interests of Israel. The spokesman referred in this connection to the visit which Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir is due to pay to Bonn this year.

CSO: 4403

'DIVERGENCES' BETWEEN DANISH-ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS REVEALED

LD290929 Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 23 Oct 80 part 1 p 5

[Dispatch by Mogens Kofod-Hansen: "Kjeld Olesen Did Not Convince Begin"]

[Text] Jerusalem--Israel's concern over the EEC's position on the Middle East, especially on the Palestine problem, was a major topic at the meeting yesterday between Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Foreign Minister Kjeld Olesen. Begin found that the nine are motivated by oil and other short-term economic interests in the Arab countries to adopt a position which hurts Israel and favors Yasir 'Arafat's PLO.

Kjeld Olesen replied that the so-called Middle East initiative from the EEC Venice summit in June is not directed against Israel, is not intended to be an alternative to the Camp David peace process between Israel, Egypt and the United States and does not go further in support of the PLO than earlier EEC statements. He said that in his opinion it is only a catalyst, a sounding and an analysis, which is intended to make a contribution to the continuation of the peace process.

Begin did not let himself be convinced. On the contrary he stressed that the EEC by accepting the PLO as the negotiator for the Palestinians and by talking of Palestinian self-determination has gone further than before and much further than the Camp David agreements, which do not mention the PLO and only speak of self-government, which is less than self-determination. The Prime Minister has said several times in recent weeks that this European position has contributed to anti-Israeli feeling which could have been a factor in the creation of new anti-Semitic trends in Europe.

The question has occupied Israelis a lot in recent weeks. Both official circles and the general public have listened with great attention to what Kjeld Olesen has had to say, for he is the first EEC foreign minister to visit the country since the controversial statement from the Venice summit. There is great satisfaction that several times during the visit, among other things in connection with the resumption of the Euro-Arab dialogue, he has said, "Our feelings toward Israel are unchanged."

But the majority of Israelis are afraid that the moderate Danish interpretation of the EEC initiative is not representative of what all the nine and especially the larger and stronger members of the community really intend. Many Israelis are also afraid of the contents of the new Middle East declaration that will come from the next EEC summit in December, when the results of Council of Ministers Chairman Gaston Thorn's soundings in the Middle East have been analyzed.

After the meeting with Begin and after talks later in the day with the Israeli Labor Party leader, Kjeld Olesen has now wound up 2 days of intensive political discussions on the situation in the Middle East and relations between Israel and the Arabs. Without this in any way affecting the close friendship between Denmark and the Jewish state, the conclusion is that as expected there are certain divergences between the parties' views, not only between the governments but also over a smaller statement [as published] between Kjeld Olesen and his friends from the Israeli Labor Party.

Apart from the disagreement on the Jerusalem law and the heralded law on the Golan Heights it has been said that there are differing views on the PLO. It has given rise to Israeli satisfaction that Kjeld Olesen has said that Denmark cannot recognize the PLO, partly because only states are recognized, partly because of the PLO's insistence that Israel must be destroyed. But none of the Israeli parties think that the PLO should be included in the negotiations as the representatives of the Palestinians. Neither of them has answered Kjeld Olesen's question: "Who is then going to represent the Palestinians?"

Labor Party Chairman Shimon Peres told his Danish guest yesterday that when his party forms a government again--this is expected to be next year--it would go in for a territorial compromiser, that is to say the clearing of a large part of the West Bank and Gaza with a drawing of borders only dependent on security considerations. It would not agree to the surrendering of East Jerusalem, the return of the Golan Heights to the Syrian military, or the establishment of a Palestinian state there, which would inevitably fall under the control of the PLO.

"There is already one Palestinian state in Jordan. This must be enough. The solution will therefore have to be found with Jordan, when negotiations take place," Peres said. These ideas will be included in a newly formulated party program to be approved in December as the foundation for the Labor Party campaign for the next election in Israel in 1981. An important point in this program is that the Labor Party does not want a Jewish state with a large number of Arabs as its citizens, who may form a majority at some point in the future. For this reason the Labor Party is ready to surrender a large part of the occupied areas.

After the political problems the official visit's brighter sides follow today: A striking public manifestation of Danish-Israeli friendship. This will take place after a visit to the Denmark school in Jerusalem with the dedication of a new forest, planted in Queen Margrethe's name with funds collected by Danes and Israelis and this evening with a large thanksgiving party in memory of the saving of Danish Jews in October 1943. It will take place symbolically in the Beth Ha'am House (the house of the people) in Jerusalem. Anti-Semitism's German overseer Adolf Eichmann received his death sentence there in 1961. Those who cheated the Hitler reich of a few thousand of its intended victims will be celebrated there tonight.

CSO: 3106

BRIEFS

CEMENT DISPUTE--The construction of the airbases in the Negev will not be adversely affected by the sanctions in the cement industry now that the Nesher Company has worked out a special arrangement on this matter. Our military correspondent Shmu'el Tal learned this from the cement factory management. A U.S. engineer corps source said that thus there would be no need to import cement to Israel. A few days ago it was feared that the sanctions would adversely affect the construction of the airbases and even bring it to a halt. [Text] [TA260714 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 26 Oct 80]

NEW SETTLEMENT PROBLEMS--The Gush Enunim Settlement Movement is not succeeding in enlisting a nucleus of settlers for the new settlement of Mikhmash, near Ma'ale Adummim, the establishment of which has been recently authorized. This was learned by our correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh. Our correspondent notes that several new settlements in Judaea are now encountering manpower shortage problems. New settlers prefer to join the established settlements. Nevertheless, a nucleus of the Ihud Haqla'i Movement will be set up next week in Vered Yeriho, south of Jericho. [Text] [TA 290638 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 29 Oct 80]

KNESSET 'CONCERN' OVER AUTONOMY DOCUMENT--Today Prime Minister Begin presented the latest Israeli document submitted to the United States on the autonomy issue to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee. Our Knesset correspondent Arye Golan reports that Moshe Arens, Yosef Rom, Mikha'el Deqel and Hayim Druckman expressed concern at the clause in the Israeli document pledging that the Autonomy Administrative Council will participate in decision-making on matters of land and water in the territories. According to these Knesset members this clause jeopardizes the Israeli settlement in Judaea and Samaria. The prime minister said that the Israeli document does not contain any concessions. On a different issue Prime Minister Begin said that President Navon's visit to Egypt is a success story and makes a great contribution to the strengthening of relations between the two states. [Text] [TA291151 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 29 Oct 80]

IMMIGRATION DATA--A drastic decline in the number of immigrants arriving in Israel in 1980 compared with their number in 1979 emerges from the latest immigration report compiled by the Jewish agency Aliyah and Absorption Department. A rise of 17 percent was only registered in the number of immigrants arriving from Romania. From January to September 1980 there was a decline of 48 percent

in the number of immigrants from the Soviet Union, 64 percent in the number of immigrants from South Africa and 26 percent in the number of immigrants from Argentina. Immigration from France declined by 16 percent and from the United States by 25 percent compared to 1979. [TA250643 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 25 Oct 80 p 3 TA]

LIBERAL FACTION CHAIRMAN--MK Menahem Savidor was elected this afternoon as chairman of the Liberal Faction in the Likud. [TA301051 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 28 Oct 80 TA]

MECCA PILGRIMAGE--This year 4,700 Muslims from Israel made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Our correspondent Arye Gus comments that 10 of the pilgrims from Israel and the territories died while on their way and several of them were buried in the holy city. [Text] [TA301051 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 30 Oct 80 TA]

EXTERNAL DEBTS--In the first half of 1980, a $1.76 billion deficit was recorded in Israel's goods and services account, similar to the deficit in the parallel period last year, though 16 percent less than in the second half of 1979. In the first half of 1980, Israel imported goods and services worth $6.6 billion, an increase of 2 percent over the second half of 1979. Direct defense imports in the first half of the year totalled $632 million, or 7 percent more than the parallel period last year. In the first 6 months of 1980, exports of goods and services totalled $2.86 billion, an increase of 29 percent as compared with the parallel period last year. The country's external debts (not including stocks and debentures held by foreigners) stood at $20.1 billion at the end of June 1980. [TA270945 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 27 Oct 80 p 3 TA]

NEW SETTLEMENT IN GOLAN--The World Zionist Organization has begun building a new settlement on the Central Golan Heights near the village Juwayzah. Several bulldozers are about to complete clearing the ground, eyewitnesses said. Four other settlements will be established along the border between the West Bank and pre-1967 Israel, but a Jewish agency source said they will be located on the western side of the green line. The settlement near Juwayzah is one of three new settlements the government decided a year ago to establish on the Golan Heights. Work on the second, near (Yaqusa), in the southern sector of the Golan is still under way. However, construction of the third, near Qawlah has been postponed until the government decides on the kind of settlement it will be. [Text] [TA300938 Jerusalem POST in English 30 Oct 80 p 2]

CSO: 4820

PLO INVITES POPE TO VISIT COUNTRY

London 8 DAYS in English 4 Oct 80 p 28

[Text] POPE John Paul II has been invited to visit Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and to 'take the lead in a worldwide movement to help the Palestinians return to their homeland'. The invitation, from PLO leader Yasser Arafat, was contained in a confidential message delivered to the Vatican on 17 September by Hafif Safyeh, Arafat's personal envoy.

The message, which was revealed exclusively to *8 Days* by diplomatic sources in Rome, was reportedly given considerable consideration by the Pope, who is said to have told Safyeh that 'Palestine, the Palestinians and Jerusalem are at the centre of all our preoccupations'.

Safyeh's Rome visit highlights the increasing interest being taken by the Vatican in the Middle East conflict. King Hussein of Jordan visited the Pope in early September and he was followed by Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptian secured from the Pope a clear commitment to the defence of Jerusalem's 'multinational status' and of the Palestinians' 'legitimate national rights'. Mubarak is thought to have sought the Vatican's backing for Camp David.

When Pope John Paul II came to office, there were Israeli hopes of a change in the Vatican's 'understanding' of the Arab and Palestinian situation, which was first declared by Pope Paul VI. Such hopes increased with the initial acceptance by the Vatican of Menachem Begin's invitation to the Pope to visit Israel. On 30 June however, the Vatican issued a statement to all UN members, strongly warning against any unilateral change in the status of Jerusalem. The subsequent 'annexation' of the city angered the Vatican — and nothing more has been heard of the proposed trip to Israel.

CSO: 4820

BEIRUT'S HOTEL SITUATION EXAMINED

London 8 DAYS in English 4 Oct 80 pp 19-20

[Article by Earleen Tatro]

[Text]

THE MANAGER of Beirut's Cadmos Hotel was exuberant as he bounded across the deserted rooftop solarium. 'Look, look — what a nice view,' he cried, pointing to the sparkling blue waters of the Mediterranean. 'In the old days we used to have 50 tourists up here sunning themselves.'

He marched to the other side of the roof, and his mood changed as he pointed to the smoke-blackened skeletons of the luxury hotels which formed the heart of Beirut's Gold Coast in pre-war days. Of the dozen or more big hotels which did a thriving business in the area, only the Cadmos is still open. Structurally intact, with only a few bullet holes here and there, it stands near the western edge of the no-man's land which divides predominantly Christian East Beirut from predominantly Muslim West Beirut.

In the old days, before the 1975-76 civil war, the 120-room Cadmos was booked all year round by sun-seeking Europeans and wealthy Arabs. Today it rents rooms for $6.50 a day to the girls who work in the all-night bars on nearby Phoenicia Street.

Despite the civil war, despite the continuing violence which can still erupt in street battles anywhere, any time, despite the low volume of business, many Beirut hotels stay open. Hotel operators say they have little choice. If they close their doors, squatters will move in or mortgages will be foreclosed or leases terminated and million-dollar investments lost. Some say, with stubborn pride, that it's a point of honour to keep their premises open, and, besides, they have money-making hotels in other countries or real estate in Lebanon or some other form of income.

The National Tourism council says that of the 100 three-and four-star hotels in Beirut before the war, 62 are still open.

The average occupancy rate for the first five months of 1980 was 25.3 per cent, according to the council. Hotel executives say an occupancy rate of 55 per cent is needed to break even in the Middle East. In 1974 the average occupancy rate for Beirut hotels was 69.3 per cent. The January to May period this year showed an increase of 4.2 per cent over the same period last year, and 2.5 per cent above the monthly average for all of 1979.

With fewer clients, now mostly businessmen making short trips to the country, the hotels are trying other ways of making money. 'We push our beach operation,' said Nizr Alouf, manager of the Riviera Hotel, which sells six-month memberships for its private beach at $220. This season the operation has grossed about $110,000. The occupancy rate at the Riviera, where a double room costs $59, is about 15-18 per cent. 'It's lousy — that's the least I can say,' said Alouf, whose family owns the Riviera, a small hotel in Baalbeck which catered to tourists in the days when Lebanon had them, and the New Omayyad Hotel in Damascus.

The 125-room Riviera, located in a relatively calm section of West Beirut, is now 'on the edge of breaking even, for the first time since the war' Alouf said.

The Hotel St Georges the most opulent hotel in pre-war days, sits next to the so-called green line which divides East and West Beirut. Today the St Georges is a study in surrealism: waiters in red jackets carry icy drinks to deeply tanned, bikinied Lebanese ladies lounging around a swimming pool overlooking a yacht basin full of pleasure boats. Looming above this idyllic scene is the hotel itself — a charred hulk of stone with boarded-up windows and no prospects of reopening.

The 140-room Beirut Commodore, in West Beirut's Hamra business district, is one of the success stories by current standards. It has an occupancy rate of 60-65 per cent, mostly businessmen who stay two or three nights. Before the war the Commodore boasted an occupancy rate of 100 per cent.

The Summerland Hotel promotes its restaurants and occasional outdoor musical extravaganzas featuring such entertainers as the American singer Gloria Gaynor. And the Bristol hosts a big reception or wedding party nearly every week. Although Beirut residents tend to stay home more at night than they did before the war, some hotels are luring them to cocktail lounges with nightly entertainment.

'I hired a very loud musician for very loud people — because the people in this town like loud things,' one hotel owner said. The Cadmos started offering monthly rates this year and instituted a variety of bargain prices. 'Our normal price is £150 ($360) but very seldom is there anyone in the hotel paying that,' manager Adel Rubeiz said.

For less than $9 a night, Middle East Airlines can rent a room at the Cadmos for transit passengers. Most transit passengers stay at the Beau Rivage and International hotels in the less desolate section further west, but those who come in on flights from poorer nations such as Sudan may end up at the Cadmos.

CSO: 4820

COUNTRY'S PORT ACTIVITIES REVIEWED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 4 Oct 80 pp 14-16

[Text] During the seventies, port activities on the Mediterranean and Gulf shores increased substantially as ports and ship fleets expanded to serve the growing demands of the import-export trade between the Middle East and the rest of the world.

During the first half of the decade, Lebanon, thanks to its port of Beirut, became the leading center of port activities in the area. Its geographical location, its facilities and numerous technical advantages attracted an important part of the export-import trade.

The Beirut Port

The port of Beirut is comprised of 3 fully operational berths, one still under construction, 11 piers, 53 open air storage surface of 192,800 square meters, and 30 covered warehouses of 170,000 sq.m., in addition to a number of administrative and maintenance buildings. Its history as a naval trade center is more than a century old and has always derived its importance from its location between the ports of southeast Europe and the Arab countries.

The port is 110 kms away from Damascus, 300kms from Amman, 1,000 kms from Baghdad, 1,800 kms from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and 2,000 kms from Tehran. Moreover, it is linked to Syria, Turkey and Iraq by more than 7,900 kms of railroads.

Between 1970 and 1975, the number of international ports which dealt with the Port of Beirut increased from 145 to 293. In 1970, 3,128 ships unloaded 2,290,000 tons of merchandise in 1970 and this figure rose to 3,612 ships and 3,412,000 tons of merchandise in 1974. An average of 28 per cent of the total merchandise passed in transit towards Iraq (56% of the transit merchandise in 1975), Saudi Arabia (22%), Jordan (6%), Iran (5%), Kuwait (5%) and Syria (4%).

The Lebanese civil war of 1975-1976 slashed down its fast growing activities. In 1975, only 2,859 ships came to Beirut to unload 2,434,000 tons of merchandise, 753 ships and 978,000 tons less than in 1974.

In 1976, the port was completely paralyzed and this shifted the activities to the Syrian and Gulf ports. The average 28 per cent of merchandise which transited through Lebanon in 1974 dropped to a mere 11 per cent after the war.

The port of Beirut became operational again at the end of the 1975-1976 war. However, its role as the major port of the region was affected by recurrent incidents in the country and the expansion of the Syrian and Gulf ports. Its best year since the war has been 1977, when the country enjoyed relative security; 2,782 ships unloaded 2,047,000 tons of merchandise. But in the following year when new troubles erupted, these figures decreased to 1,786 ships and 1,664,000 tons of goods. The figures climbed back again in 1979 to 2,253 ships and 2,374,000 tons.

Figures and statistics concerning transit trade show that a substantial part of activities has moved to other ports. At present, the port of Beirut mainly serves the needs of Lebanon.

(These figures do not take into account the activities of the fifth berth of the port which is completely under the control of the Phalangist Party. More and more merchandise is being unloaded at this berth because of lower duties and no customs. Ed)

The Port of Tripoli

The port of the second main city of the country is comprised of a 20,000 sq.m.-large and 8 meter-deep basin, 6 piers, 65,000 sq.m. of warehouses and 78,000 sq.m. of open air storage surface. It was established in 1958 and during the 1975-76 events tried to replace, within its capacities, the port of Beirut.

In 1975, 849,000 tons were loaded and unloaded at this port, compared to 95,000 tons in 1959. But in 1976, operations dropped to 50,000 tons.

A plan was drawn up in 1974 by a British firm, for the expansion of the port of Tripoli. The plan provided for building a new basin 11m.-deep and 9,000 sq.m.-large, deepening the first basin by 3 meters and building new piers and storage surfaces (about 350,000 sq.m). The implementation of this project still awaits the settlement of the Lebanese crisis.

The Ports of Jounieh and Saida

The ports of Jounieh and Saida were considered as secondary compared to those of Tripoli and Beirut. Before the war, their activities were limited to tourist and fishing purposes. The war boosted their activities and small and middle-size ships were able to load and unload merchandise there.

In 1976, 1,622 ships anchored at the port of Jounieh and 170 in Saida. In 1977, these figures dropped respectively to 450 and 80. They increased again in 1978 to 500 and 252 and dropped again in 1979 to 480 and 105. No expansion projects are planned for these ports yet.

Illegal Port Activities

The war and its consequences in Lebanon have led to the establishment of more than 18 illegal "ports" in Lebanon, all along the coast from Tripoli to Tyre.

In addition to their activities, frauds were also committed in a number of institutions dealing with the ports, resulting in a sharp decrease in the State's income from port activities.

In a report on the situation, the Paris-based weekly magazine AL NAHAR ARAB & INTERNATIONAL said that illegal activities and frauds were carried out in three different manners:

1) Bribery of officials to avoid paying customs on imported goods. The magazine quoted the director general of the Customs Department as saying that the situation was "scandalous" and could, if it continued, lead to "the bankruptcy of the Treasury."

2) Importing merchandise into the port as if it were in transit and then smuggle it into Lebanon by transporting it aboard another ship to a neighbouring illegal harbour.

3) The small illegal ports which charge no customs and reduced service duties.

The Lebanese Commercial Fleet

The magazine went on to say that the Lebanese commercial fleet is comprised of 5,430 ships which carry 12.1 per cent of the merchandise that reaches Beirut or transits by Beirut. The report did not say, however, whether all these ships are Lebanese or registered in Lebanon.

The report said that the commercial fleet was organized in the years 1968 and 1969 when a group of 7 shipowners formed an association the goal of which was to improve and develop the Lebanese commercial fleet. It was an independent, private initiative which sought to compensate for the absence of any state policy. The association kept growing and includes 95 shipowners with a total of 219 ships.

In conclusion, the report said that the State should speed up the development and expansion of its ports, especially the 4th and 5th berths of the Beirut port. It is also suggested that in order to avoid the congestion from which the Beirut port suffered in the years preceding the war, the other ports of the country be developed and the illegal ports placed under the control of the state with the purpose of having each harbour specialize in handling specific types of cargos. It also called for establishing a department to supervise activities besides the semi-private Port Authority.

CSO: 4820

MUSLIM RELIGION MISUSED TO MANIPULATE PEOPLE

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 19 Sep 80 p 3

[Editorial: "Religiosity and Imposture"]

[Text] Religious consciences in the Moslem world have been subjected to a terrible ordeal. Of course, such a thing is not a recent phenomenon. Every Moslem wishing to live in conformity with the Islamic ideal of justice, fraternity and tolerance has been confronted by the harsh realities of the evolution of Moslem society in which the monopolizing of wealth and the concentrating of privileges are all the more visible because the people have not ceased living with injustice and poverty. The demands of a spiritual life (in the Islamic meaning of the word which is not total renunciation of the world) are, therefore, giving way to the accumulation of material goods whose perpetuation is protected by the blindest of violence.

This dichotomy between ideal and fact is a reality. To divert the people's attention, the wealthy attempt to make us believe that the problems of Moslem society do not come from the arbitrariness and exploitation of a dominant class but from I know not what renunciation of faith on the part of the humble and disinherited. Under the circumstances, it is necessary to find the guilty party and to thrash if not annihilate him. They then allege the exclusivity of belief and orthodoxy when even daily behavior conspicuously gives the lie to the attachment placed on principles. The flag of Islam is raised whenever the expression of the popular will becomes stronger and better organized. The pretext is the "threat" to ideology, while the only ideology defended is that of the dominant classes, behind the discreet veil of the defense of beliefs and values.

The partisans of defense of acquired situations and institutionalized privileges were soon unmasked, however:

--At the international level, the war in Lebanon has clearly shown that the "defenders" of the faith have not rejected any compromise with the reactionary Christian minorities whose avowed purpose is to carve up a country, annihilate its national and progressive forces and to frustrate

struggle for national liberation undertaken by a martyred people, the Palestinians. How then do we explain the fact that a Moslem army flew to the rescue of reactionary minorities, attached to exhorbitant and anarchronistic privileges, if there were not a consensus of a political kind between Zionism, imperialism and the forces of conservation and reaction against the establishment in Lebanon of institutions based on the democratic principle?

How do we explain the culpable silence of regimes no matter what their ideology in the face of the Tell Azzatar massacre, which involved children, women and old people who were subjected to systematic bombardment to the great satisfaction of Israel? At a time when certain individuals could have lifted their little finger to halt the invasion and massacres, they preferred the tragic denouement and the fall of the Palestinian camp.

What explanations can the so-called defenders of Islam give for this betrayal?

--At the domestic level, from the Gulf to the ocean, there are groups and individuals contriving to divert the popular struggles from their objectives by pretending to save the souls of the masses, while the latter are living in a state of deprivation because of the privileges of the former; when their lack of savoir faire and the emptiness of their doctrine find nothing more than the past to offer as hope for the future, they affect a religiosity which is nothing more than a substitute for imposture; when certain persons see an augmented conscience and determination in the masses' emancipation effort, they then unveil their true nature and do not hesitate to resort to violence and assassination to stem the mounting flood of popular aspirations to dignity, the basis of all spiritual life.

At these two levels, the defense of the Palestinian revolution and the struggle for popular emancipation, Aomar Bendjelloun will have been our messenger. His message was heard and nothing can stop its spread. His memory, therefore, can only remain alive in the hearts of true Moslems.

8143
CSO: 4400

DETAILS OF SAFI CHEMICAL COMPLEX REPORTED

Chemical, Textile, Energy Industries

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 19 Sep 80 p 8

[Text] The Safi chemical complex is to process up to 3.2 million tons per year of dry phosphate from Youssoufia and 3.3 million tons per year of wet phosphate from Ben Guerir in the form of P_2O_5 phosphoric acid concentrated and clarified to 54 percent TSP [treble superphosphate]; MAP [monoammonium sulfophosphate]; NPK [nitrogen-phosphorous-potassium] compound fertilizers; and DAP [diammonium phosphate], as a by-product.

The complex will be made up of three large industrial facilities: Maroc-Chimie [Morocco-Chemistry]; Maroc-Phosphore I [Morocco-Phosphorous I]; and Maroc-Phosphore II located about 10 km from Safi and of a group of installations for handling and storing sulfur, ammonia, phosphoric acid, TSP and and MAP at the port of Safi.

With an overall potential for phosphoric acid production of 1.35 million tons of P_2O_5 per year, the Safi phosphorus complex will be the largest in the world.

It will be basically oriented toward the export of phosphoric acid, TSP, MAP and DAP, as a by-product, and toward the satisfaction of Morocco's needs for phosphated mixed fertilizers.

The Chemical Industry

The year 1965 marked an important stage in the establishment of the bases of a chemical industry in the province. The construction of Maroc-Chimie I was only the first phase in the regional industrialization effort which was pursued by doubling the productive capacity of Maroc-Chimie I and the placing in service in 1976 of another integrated chemical facility: Maroc-Phosphore I.

The Maroc-Chimie chemical complex is a development of world scope; it provides for the production of a whole gamut of products such as:

--phosphoric sulfuric acids,

--treble superphosphate,

--ammonium phosphate,

--diammonium phosphate,

--tripolyphosphate,

--trisodium phosphate and

--phosphoric acid.

The chemical industries which use the phosphate and pyrrhotite of Kettara as their principal raw materials have largely contributed to the utilization of important amounts of manpower and the improvement of the city's infrastructure and its economic development.

The Safi chemical-industrial complex is made up of Maroc-Chimie I, Maroc-Chimie II and Maroc-Phosphore I. Once Maroc-Phosphore II has been completed, the total investments in all these facilities (except Maroc-Chimie I) will be 2.7 billion dirhams, not including the cost of the infrastructures which were taken care of directly by the state.

In the final stage, about 4,000 direct jobs of a highly technical nature will be established. These jobs will generate several others, up and down the line: transport, port, local industry.

Subsequent to the start up of the Maroc-Chimie installations in June 1965, studies targeting the development of local processing of the phosphate were resumed in 1968 and resulted in the placing in service at the end of 1976 of an NPK fertilizer manufacturing unit, the tripling of the initial capacity of Maroc-Chimie, construction of the Maroc-Phosphore II plant and the plant for the recovery of the uranium contained in the phosphoric acid manufactured (still in the planning stage).

With completion of Maroc-Phosphore II, the Safi complex will process 6.5 million tons per year of pyrrhotite coming in equal parts from Youssoufia and Ben Guerir. In the process, it will annually consume: 1.25 million tons of sulfur, 320,000 tons of chloride and potassium sulfate.

The Safi complex will produce 1.83 billion tons of 54 percent phosphoric acid of which 400,000 tons can be transformed into PMA (monoammonium phosphate), 79,000 tons into treble superphosphate and 145,000 into NPK 14-28-14 mixed fertilizer.

The two units, Maroc-Phosphore I and II will bolster the region's industrial progress and contribute to the processing of the nation's natural resources which were exported raw for a long time.

The Textile Industry

The textile industry has experienced relative development in Safi; the Moroccan Textile Company [CCT], which was established in 1946, specializes in other plastic departments, particularly in the following sectors: polypropylene and polyethylene.

The city of Safi over the last several years has benefited from the installation of a very large spinning plant. The ASAFIL [expansion unknown] spinning plant, whose completion recently required an investment of nearly 1 billion entimes, is entirely financed by the private sector which has benefited from the advantages granted by the Investment Code.

This plant has two departments: spinning with 9,000 spindles and a shop for the dyeing of wool and synthetic fibers, which in large measure meets the needs of the domestic (national) market for spun goods.

For its part, the Moroccan Textile Company since 1969 has opted for modernization of its installations in response to developing requirements for product processing. Thus the traditional jute sack which was used for all kinds of packaging finds itself in competition with the plastic bag which is lighter, easier to handle and whose production is less subject to dependency on supplies from distant countries and variations in the prices of natural fibers.

The CCT is using the latest technique in this sector and has a battery of circular looms adapted for the weaving of polypropylene sheeting for the manufacture of over 10 million sacks annually.

The most important domestic clients are the OCE [Marketing and Export Office] for the export of potatoes and Maroc-Chimie for the export of fertilizer. The polyethylene department has an annual production of about 20 million bags of different capacities and colors. Its latest investments, its streamlined and ultra-modern installations, its articles of international quality place the CCT in the forefront of bag producers in Morocco.

Mines and Energy

The Youssoufia Phosphate Center is the most important mining operation in the province. The Moroccan Phosphates Office [OCP] employs about 4,200 workers and employees in Youssoufia who annually produce about 3.5 million tons of phosphates from three underground mines and one strip mine. The

development of the phosphate centers is being carried out within the framework of an overall OCP expansion plan which affects Youssoufia in three sectors:

--Continuation of the mechanization process to improve productivity and reduce the cost price per ton to meet increasingly aggressive competition on world markets.

--Increasing the value of most of Morocco's production by transforming it into semi-finished products through the establishment of chemical industry plants (Maroc-Chimie, Maroc-Phosphore).

--Since black phospherous is the future of this center because of the importance of its reserves, the OCP has now prepared a vast development program for this mineral (opening of an underground mining facility, construction and outfitting of a calcination plant).

Ighoud is another mining center in the province. The extraction of barite by the COMABAR [?Moroccan Barite Company] provides employment for about 400 workers and employees for an annual production of 70,000 tons which are exported through the port of Safi.

In another connection, the Moroccan Salt Company in Chemaia produces 20,000 tons per year from salt marshes (water drainage and evaporation basin). The activity of this company could be adversely affected by the start up of the large salt plant at Mohammedia.

Gypsum is a new mining resource for Safi province.

More on Phosphorous Products

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 19 Sep 80 p 9

[Text] Phosphoric acid results from a chemical reaction between sulfuric acid and natural phosphate. The resulting mixture, composed of phosphoric acid and gypsum, is vaccum filtrated. The resulting phosphoric acid has a concentration of 30 percent P_2O_5.

The phosphate which is supplied to Maroc-Chimie and Maroc-Phosphore I comes from Youssoufia. The phosphate which will supply Maroc-Phosphore II will come from Ben Guerir. The Youssafia phosphate is crushed in a dry state; that of Ben Guerir will be crushed immediately after washing on site and, therefore, will be wet.

Sulfuric acid is produced either from pyrrhotite (an ore which comes from Kettara) that has an average sulfur content of 30 percent; i.e., imported

sulphur. The principal operations consist in burning the pyrrhotite or the sulfur to obtain SO_2 (sulfur dioxide) gas which is transformed by means of catalytic oxidation into SO_3 gas which will produce sulfuric acid.

The combustion of pyrrhotite and sulfur is done exothermically. The heat is recovered to produce steam which is used to produce electric energy in particular.

Each complex has its own thermal power plant which provides the energy needed to operate the complex. The sulphus power is fed into the ONE [National Electricity Office] power grid.

Part of the steam is used to raise the concentration of the phosphoric acid from 20 to 54 percent P_2O_5.

Treble Superphosphate or TSP

TSP is obtained by a chemical reaction between crushed phosphate and phosphoric acid of 40 percent P_2O_5. The resulting mixture passes through a cycle of granulation, drying and grading.

The end product is in the form of granules whose granularity ranges from 0 to 4 mm. The TSP has a titer of 43 percent water-soluble P_2O_5.

Ammonium Sulfophosphate or ASP

This fertilizer is produced from phosphoric acid and imported ammonia. A small amount of sulfuric acid is necessary to obtain a titer of 19 percent nitrogen and 38 percent P_2O_5. The manufacturing cycle is the same as that of TSP.

NPK Mixed (Compound) Fertilizers

The process is the same as for the manufacture of ASP with the additional introduction of potassium chloride at the granulation stage.

These three kinds of fertilizers are produced at Maroc-Chimie.

Monoammonium Phosphate

This product is the result of a reaction between phosphoric acid with a concentration of 54 percent P_2O_5 and ammonia. After the reaction, the product moves into a prilling tower which yields a granularity of 0 to 2 mm. The MAP titrates 11 percent nitrogen and 55 percent P_2O_5. This product is manufactured at Maroc-Phosphore I.

Maroc-Phosphore II will not produce solid fertilizers.

SPAIN COMPETING FOR AFRICAN SARDINE MARKET

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 19 Sep 80 p 9

[Text] There is new cause for concern among fish canners: Spain has just launched an aggressive campaign to compete with Morocco on the African markets.

Thanks to its production in the Canary Islands where manpower is relatively cheap, the supply of plentiful fish and the transport of finished products enjoys considerable advantages, Spain is in a position to impact heavily upon our sales.

Everything seems to have started with the announcement of the contract for 600,000 boxes of canned sardines between the OCE [Marketing and Export Office] and Nigeria. Spanish industrialists took offense at this and decided to make an all out effort on the African markets by offering veritable dumping prices. Moroccan producers are all the more bitter about this action because Moroccan-Spanish accords, particularly in the fishing sector, seemed to have brought about a rapprochement between the industries of the two countries. What is more, the announced contract for 600,000 cartons is still far from being filled. So much so that even Moroccan canning sectors fear that it never will be.

A total of 90,000 boxes has been delivered; and it was agreed that the cans of that 60 percent of the order; i.e., 360,000 boxes, were to bear the brand name of the buyer, that is a Nigerian brand name.

In such commercial practices, the buyer is supposed to supply the can manufacturer with a design; however, weeks and months have gone by but this design still has not been supplied. The manufacture of cans requires a minimum of 2 months; and it is feared that as the fishing season moves forward, Morocco will find itself in a position of being unable to fill its contract, if decisions are not made immediately.

Moroccan industrialists are, therefore, wondering whether foreign interventions or excessively competitive offers are not being made so that Morocco will lose this market. The canners on the one hand want the talks with Nigeria to be resumed to finalize this important market and on the other hand a meeting with the Spanish interested parties to permit reestablishment of the excellent relations which we had with this country and which we will continue to have in other sectors.

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CSO: 4400

FRANCE FAVORED AS SUBSTITUTE FOR U.S. IN MIDEAST

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 19 Jul 80 p 12

[Article by Fu'ad Matar: "France, the Substitute"]

[Text] More than at any other time in the past, it seems that France, unlike other European countries, is being called upon to develop its military industry and its industrial technology so as to be able to respond to Arab requests which may register record levels in the 1980's.

Every time the United States comes out in favor of Israeli interests, France's importance increases in the view of the Arabs. Up to now, France has appeared to be the advanced country that generates the most confidence among Arab countries. The common denominator of this trust is that France wants to play a role without trying to establish hegemony, and that most Arab countries are not prepared to try again the games of the 1950's and 1960's, which were based on trying to benefit from the rivalry of the two superpowers to obtain weapons from them.

To the extent that France develops its military industries and industrial technology, it relieves some Arab countries of the burden of having to make major decisions [sic].

We are currently witnessing a developing situation which provides an opening to France, if it should decide to develop its resources as we mentioned above. The new situation is reflected in the words expressed last week by Prince Sultan, the Saudi minister of defense and aviation, in response to the maneuvers and pressures of the Zionist lobby in the American Congress. Some 70 congressmen signed a letter urging President Jimmy Carter to block an arms package requested by Saudi Arabia. Prince Sultan said: "We say to the Zionist lobby which is exerting pressures during the elections campaign: 'You are losers wherever you are.' The kingdom will not submit an order, only to be turned down, so long as it possesses a prominent moral, economic, geographic and social position with the help of God."

Such sharp words constitute something relatively new in the domain of Saudi-American relations. Although these words are addressed to a number of American congressmen who support Israel, they are also intended to be heard by President Carter. These words mean very clearly that should Saudi Arabia not get the arms it requested from the United States, it would get them from another source.

Since, for objective reasons, that other source cannot be the Soviet Union, France is ready to do the job.

Even if the Saudi threat is effective and gives rise to some change in the position of those members of Congress who support Israel, so that Saudi Arabia will get its arms package, France will still be called upon to develop its military industry and its industrial technology. This is because new circumstances may create a crisis in Saudi-American relations at any moment. Such circumstances are always possible so long as the United States continues to side with Israel, and so long as Saudi Arabia will not back out of its position on the Camp David agreement, no matter how hard the United States tries to change this position.

For its part, Saudi Arabia is actively seeking to make France a possible substitute for the United States. Before the Venice summit, a Saudi-French consultation of the utmost importance took place so that President Giscard d'Estaing may be able to resist the nations toeing the American line. French resistance was only partial. But once France's steadfastness grows, defiance of the United States by the Arabs in general, and the Saudis in particular, will increase.

The Arab foreign and finance ministers agreed at their last conference in Amman on a strategy of joint economic effort through the year 2000, based on integrated Arab development. They approved the principle of joint Arab development in response to Iraq's proposal to set aside a billion to a billion and a half dollars annually for purposes of Arab growth. However, the next Arab summit conference will have to set the standards whereby each Arab country could benefit from this action.

France is an advanced country capable of serving this development. The Arab resolution taken regarding development ties it to abidance by the resolutions of the Tunis and Baghdad summit conferences. France, following President d'Estaing's initiative, which was exposed to some attacks at the Venice summit, is the country that is closest to the aims of these two Arab summits, and the country which demonstrates the greatest degree of understanding of the Arab position.

The developments arising from the American way of doing business with the Arabs, as illustrated by what is now occurring in its dealings with Saudi Arabia, represent a unique opportunity for France. Although there are some risks in this opportunity, it is still a historic chance. Out of it, President d'Estaing might realize what General De Gaulle hoped to achieve when he adopted the historic position in favor of the Arabs during the 1967 war. President d'Estaing must have sensed French opportunity during his past trips to the Arab world. He will become even more aware of it when he visits Iraq this autumn. President Saddam Husayn may help induce him to take the role that France is called upon to play.

In any event, it is a role favorable to France's interests and prestige.

9587
CSO: 4802

REACTION TO U.S. CONGRESSMEN ON F-15 ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 19 Jul 80 pp 10-11

[Article by Sulayman Nimr: "The Battle for the F-15; the Jewish Lobby Opposing the Saudi Lobby"]

> [Text] Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz: "Washington did not place any conditions on us on the planes deal. America is not the only source of our weapons. We do not bargain over our national principles. We will continue to reject the Camp David accords and any foreign military presence in our region. Saudi Arabia is the top oil supplier in the world. It is necessary that nations share in strengthening the kingdom's defense of its own interests as well as of the interests of the world."

Riyadh--On his way on Wednesday morning to the graduation ceremonies of a new class of officers from the Saudi Staff and Command College in Riyadh, Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, minister of defense and aviation, read news reports about the letter which 70 American congressmen wrote to President Carter requesting him not to approve the sale of the additional equipment for the F-15's, to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

After Prince Sultan distributed the diplomas and certificates to the officers, he surprised the audience, which included the ambassadors of several Arab countries, as well as some foreign military attaches, with an improvised speech in which he replied to the American congressmen's letter to Carter. He said: "It is reported that 70 members of the American Congress sent a letter to President Carter demanding that the kingdom not be given advanced weapons. Our answer is that the kingdom will not order arms only to be rejected. The kingdom possesses sufficient strength through the help of God, and its spiritual, social and economic leadership, not to be in a position to make a request only to be turned down."

Prince Sultan added: "When the kingdom places orders for arms, its requests are met in America as well as in other Western countries. The kingdom is not aware of weapons withheld or new advances denied to it."

In his closing remarks on this subject, the Prince said: "We say to the Zionist lobby which is applying pressure during the American elections campaign: 'You are losers wherever you are and wherever you go.'"

After the ceremonies, AL-MUSTAQBAL interviewed Prince Sultan to obtain further clarification of his words and of the congressmen's letter.

[Question] Do you believe that the letter of the congressmen to President Carter will obstruct the sale of additional equipment to the kingdom?

[Answer] Up to now, there has been no change or development that would prevent filling the order we have placed for the kingdom. We have never made requests for arms to the United States or other countries, and been turned down.

[Question] In the event the Congress succeeds in obstructing the sale of this additional equipment to the kingdom, are there other sources from which this equipment can be obtained?

[Answer] Everyone knows that the kingdom has a number of arms sources in friendly Western countries. The United States is not the only source for provisioning the Saudi Arabian army. But we hope to obtain the additional equipment for the F-15's, because the kingdom has the right to enhance its defense capabilities, especially in view of current events occurring in this region.

[Question] Don't you believe that it is possible that Washington may resort to placing conditions on the kingdom before Washington would agree to the additional equipment sales deal? For example, it could ask for Saudi approval of the Camp David accords, or of military facilitations for America in the area.

[Answer] I would like to clarify here that the United States has not presented to the kingdom any special conditions for approval of the sale of this equipment or of any other arms requests. This has not happened. Nor will we permit anyone to place on the kingdom any conditions for our obtaining arms, be it from the United States or anyone else. Our positions are clear and independent regarding the Camp David accords or the granting of military facilitations in the region to any foreign power, We will not bargain over these two issues to obtain arms or for anything else.

[Question] And if Washington places such conditions?

[Answer] We would not permit it. It would be completely unacceptable. It is not customary for the kingdom to entertain any conditions or stipulations from any source whatsoever. [end of answer]

Before Prince Sultan made these statements, Shaykh Faysal al-Hajilan, the Saudi ambassador to Washington, had sharply attacked the message sent by the congressmen to President Carter. He said: "The United States would be placing the interests of Israel before American interests in the Middle East." The Saudi ambassador emphasized in the statement he made in Washington that Saudi Arabia, which possesses a quarter of the world reserves of oil, and which exports a third of

the oil traded in the world market, has the right to enhance the effectiveness of its defense capabilities, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan."

Shaykh al-Hajilan alluded to an important point when he said: "The matter is much more important than the mere additional equipment, which is opposed in the congressmen's letter, and which is available from other sources without conditions or restrictions."

Before all of this, but after the meeting held on 26 June in Geneva between Prince Sultan and Harold Brown, the U.S. secretary of defense, there were several reports that the Carter administration had decided to delay the sale of the additional equipment for the F-15's to Riyadh until after the American presidential elections in November. According to the WASHINGTON STAR, quoting informed American sources, "this was to avoid a direct clash between President Carter and Israeli pressure groups during the election campaign."

Despite the concern caused by these reports among Saudi officials, it was noted that no comment was made regarding them by Saudi Arabia. Even in the first week of July, when the Saudi cabinet met, and Prince Sultan presented a report about his discussions with Harold Brown (which dealt at length with the subject of the additional equipment), no Saudi statement was issued about this subject. Prince Sultan himself did not comment on the reports in question, even though Menachem Begin, the Israeli prime minister, had let it be known in early July that Israel would exert pressure on Washington not to sell the additional equipment to Saudi Arabia, because, as he claimed, "If the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia were given this offensive equipment, its F-15 fighter planes would have the capability to strike Tel Aviv and return to their bases in 20 minutes."

Why then did Prince Sultan make the above statement less than 12 hours after the American congressmen directed their letter to President Carter? Why was the Saudi press so concerned as to prominently publish the statement of the Saudi ambassador to Washington, in which he attacked the congressmen, and in which he charged that the United States would favor Israel's interests over its own interests in the Middle East?

The popular newspaper, AL-JAZIRAH, published the Saudi ambassador's words under banner headline on the front page on 10 June 1980. This was accompanied by a sharply worded editorial which said: "We state frankly and with a loud voice that the United States is trying to lose all its friendships and all its relations and vital interests with the countries of the Middle East, by allowing this kind of tampering with the destinies of the American people by the Zionist lobby in the Congress, the White House, or the Pentagon

As a matter of fact, the congressmen's letter to President Carter gave rise to extreme Saudi indignation. Informed sources in Riyadh told AL-MUSTAQBAL that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not view this matter as a mere question of additional equipment for the F-15's, because Riyadh is capable of obtaining similar equipment from other Western nations, thanks to its strong relations with them. This is particularly true of France, which is bound by such strong ties with Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab countries that it would not fail to satisfy any arms requests by Riyadh. As Saudi officials see it, at issue is the

Zionist influence within the American administration. It is this influence which prevents Washington from realizing that its genuine interests in the Middle East are more important than the interests of Israel.

Informed sources expect a confrontation in Washington in the next few weeks between the "Zionist lobby," which pressures the American administration to favor the interests of Israel over any other U.S. interests, particularly during the present election campaign, and the "Saudi lobby" which views U.S. economic and oil interests in the Middle East as far more important than the interests of Israel. If Riyadh is successful in this confrontation, the event would have great significance for Arab-American relations. Its greatest significance is that it would mark the beginning of a change in American policy toward the Middle East crisis, which would make Washington view the situation with less bias for Israel. Such a change has been sought by Saudi Arabia for a long time, as evidenced by the Saudi ambassador's words that the matter is far more important than a mere issue of additional equipment.

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CSO: 4802

SAUDI TRADE CONFERENCE PLANNED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 14 Oct 80 p 3

[Text] JEDDAH, Oct 13 — A conference is to be held November 13-14 in Houston, Texas for American companies intending to do business in Saudi Arabia.

The conference, organized by the London *Middle East Economic Digest* and Advanced Market Research International, aims to help American busineses take advantage of the continuing boom in the Kingdom's economy. Imports, the conference prospectus points out, soared by 28.6 per cent to $26.3 billion in 1979, and the 80 per cent rise in oil prices in the last 18 months is creating even more acute expansionary pressures. These are reflected in the $73.7 billion state budget for 1980-81 a 27 per cent rise on the estimate in the last budget. The high growth strategy is confirmed by the third five-year development plan (1980-85), which calls for an increase of 57 per cent to $222 billion in the level of development expenditure compared to the previous five-year plan.

With the emphasis on education, training, maintenance, telecommunications, electricity and other high-technology services, the new plan promises a market that is not only larger but also of a higher quality.

But the collapse of the Iranian market and the political and economic uncertainties in other Middle Eastern states have brought increased competition for the still stable Saudi Arabian market from European and Far Eastern businesses, says the prospectus. The conference is designed to help American companies take on these competitors.

The conference will be addressed by a senior official of the Kingdom's ministry of commerce, as well as trade experts from the United States.

CSO: 4820

SAUDI GOVERNMENT CONFIRMS ITS CONTROL OF AWACS

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 14 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] JEDDAH, Oct. 13 (SPA) — Defense and Aviation Minister Prince Sultan reiterated the Kingdom's refusal to allow any type of foreign presence in the region.

In an interview with *Al -Jazirah* Monday Prince Sultan confirmed that the presence of the AWACS planes in Saudi Arabia was controlled by the Kingdom's Government. "We have freedom of decision and policy," he said.

Saudi-U.S. relations were based on respect and equality, the prince said, and not on alliance and commitments. "We don't work behind screens. The Kingdom's policy is clear and not on alliance and commitments. "We don't work behind screens. The Kingdom's policy is clear and known to all," he said.

Commenting on hostile media report on the issue of the AWACS planes, Prince Sultan said, "These people know we are not against criticism. But we are against distorting facts and lying." The reports claimed the AWACS planes" mission was something more than strengthening the Saudi Arabian air force radar system.

The visit of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Gen. David Jones, to the Kingdom took place in response to a previous invitation and did not have any link with the present situation in the region, the prince said.

Asked about the truth of Arab press reports that the U.S. turned down a Saudi request for Hawk missiles, Prince Sultan said that the Kingdom has these missiles now. "If we find the necessity to increase the number of Hawk missiles, we know when to request it and the quantity we need," he added.

Regretably, some of the Arab press chase such malicious news.

Sunday, Prince Sultan laid the cornerstone of a SR1.6 billion armed forces medical center for the Eastern Province on a 470,000 square meter site.

The center will include a 300-bed hospital with a specialist intensive care ward and special facilities for treating burns, as well as a ward for artificial kidneys, a department of nuclear medicine, X-ray and chemical laboratories and a physiotherapy section.

According to Dr. Reza Khalifa, director of medical services for the armed forces who delivered a speech on the occasion, the center will include a technical institute for medical services that will accommodate 300 trainees. The institute will have enough classrooms and modern laboratories for all branches of medicine and all technical hospital specialities.

There will also be a housing complex for 325 students, 1,298 apartments and sports grounds. A mosque for the compound will accommodate 800 persons. In addition, the project will have its own industrial zone with maintenance facilities, a water purification and treatment plant, a power station and warehouses for medicine. Work on the project is expected to be completed in May, 1985.

CSO: 4820

MODERNIZED JIDDAH STEEL CASTING PLANT STARTING OPERATIONS

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 29 Jul 80 p 3

[Interview with 'Abd al-Muhsin al-'Utaybi, deputy general manager of Jiddah Steel Casting Company, by Husayn al-Zahrani]

[Excerpts] The Steel Casting Company of Jiddah is one of the subsidiaries of the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries Company (SABIC). It is the first of SABIC's projects to start operations. The plant, which includes some of the most modern machinery and equipment is almost ready to put its commercial products on the local market, and to satisfy an essential portion of its needs. Saudi workers are 85 percent the total work force at the plant. They operate all sections of the plant efficiently, having been sent abroad and trained according to the most modern methods of instruction. AL-MADINAH interviewed 'Abd al-Muhsin al-'Utaybi, deputy general manager of the Steel Casting Company of Jiddah. Here is an account of the conversation.

[Question] Please give us a detailed idea of the plant and some of its operations.

[Answer] This plant was started in 1965. The late King Faysal laid its cornerstone in that year. Petromin undertook its construction to mark the beginning of the age of industrial awakening in the kingdom, especially in the area of iron and steel production. This was to satisfy some of the kingdom's needs for iron rods for reinforced concrete at that time. The plant satisfied a large part of the needs of the western region for iron reinforcement rods under the management of Petromin, and had a planned production capacity of about 45,000 tons yearly.

This plant was one of the first established in the kingdom. Saudi young men sought work at the plant as ordinary and skilled workers, technicians and engineers, and had an opportunity to receive on the job technical training. In this connection, I would like to point out that most of the workers of the plant are Saudis, since they now comprise more than 85 percent of the total work force.

When the Ministry of Industry and Electricity was formed, and all metal production activities became under the control of the ministry, the plant's ownership was transferred to the ministry, which formed a committee to manage it. When SABIC was established as the state-owned company for the implementation of basic industrial projects (such as the production of iron, steel, petrochemicals, etc), ownership of the plant was transferred to SABIC. SABIC entrusted several specialized

companies to prepare an extensive study of the existing condition of the plant and its requirements to keep pace with the comprehensive industrial awakening of the kingdom. It was decided as a result of this study to modernize the plant, raise its production capacity to 140,000 tons annually, and staff it with qualified nations. In addition, it was decided to invite a foreign iron and steel company to become a partner in the plant, so as to gain technical know-how from it and train Saudi workers. In fact, an agreement was concluded with one of the foremost German iron and steel companies to this end.

Accordingly, a new company was formed under the name of the Steel Casting Company of Jiddah on 1 July 1979. The new company embarked on modernization of the plant.

Production Capacity

[Question] What is the yearly production capacity, and can it be expanded in the future?

[Answer] The plant is divided into two production units. The first unit produces 50,000 tons annually of small size iron rods for reinforced concrete. Trial production has actually begun in this unit.

The second division, the casting unit, is now being built. Upon completion, it will produce about 90,000 tons of large size iron rods for reinforced concrete in conformance with the most modern worldwide specifications. Thus, total production capacity of the plant will be 140,000 tons a year.

As for future expansion of this capacity, it would depend among other things on the volume of local market demand, especially when the al-Jubayl project begins to produce reinforcing iron. Al-Jubayl's capacity, as you know, will exceed 800,000 tons annually.

We Will Not Satisfy All Needs

[Question] What kind of equipment and machines are in use at the plant? And will it satisfy the needs of the kingdom?

[Answer] The machines and equipment used at the plant are the most modern in the world for the production of reinforcing iron rods, and most operations are automated. In this respect, I would like to make clear that this plant is for casting steel, not producing it. Imported steel ingots are heated in a special oven to a temperature in excess of 1000 degrees centigrade, whereupon the steel is mechanically conveyed through various casting operations.

The kingdom's consumption of iron reinforcement rods in the past year reached nearly 2 million tons. This consumption exceeded all expectations, as a result of the building boom that has swept over the kingdom. This plant will not be able to satisfy all the kingdom's needs. However, when the al-Jubayl project begins production, most of the needs of the kingdom for this product will be met, God permitting.

[Question] What about training and how much will the total cost of the plant reach?

[Answer] There is no doubt that the human factor is one of the most important elements of the industrial boom, if not the most important. Based on this, SABIC has from its inception persisted in its emphasis on training in all its projects. It has given training the highest priority. This has occurred at the Steel Casting Company of Jiddah. As soon as the new company was formed, it began to prepare a training program for technical employees with the cooperation of the German firm. Already 40 individuals have been sent to the firm's plant in Germany, where they have spent some time training on steel casting machinery, especially those like the ones in use here. These trainees, all Saudi, have returned and are doing an excellent job.

[Question] What final words would you like to say?

[Answer] I would like to praise first of all the wise policy of industrialization pursued by the government of His Majesty the King, which augurs a prosperous future for the citizens of this country. I would also like to commend the efforts of the officials of SABIC.

I would also like to urge Saudi iron merchants, contractors and ordinary consumers to acquire their needs of reinforcing iron from this plant in response to the appeal of Gazi al-Gosaibi, the minister of industry and electricity: "Be Saudi, and buy Saudi products."

The plant will produce the best grades of iron at competitive prices and with prompt delivery dates. This will relieve the merchant and contractor of many problems related to importing, storing and price fluctuations.

We are prepared to discuss the needs of any dealer or contractor, and to fill their orders to their satisfaction.

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ENORMOUS NEW PETROCHEMICAL PLANT CONTRACT SIGNED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 29 Sep 80 p 3

/Article by Sultan al-Bazi'i: "Signing of a Contract To Construct the Biggest Petrochemical Project in the Kingdom"/

/Text/ An announcement was made concerning the establishment of the Saudi Petrochemical Company yesterday in Riyadh following signature of the final participation agreement between the Saudi Basic Industries Company, Sabic, and the United States Shell Oil Company. The new company will construct a petrochemical complex in al-Jubyal to produce a number of petrochemical products derived from natural gas. Project costs will come to 11 billion riyals, and it is expected that its production will start 5 years from now.

Signing the participation agreement were His Excellency Ghazi al-Qusaybi, minister of industry and electricity and chairman of the board of Sabic, Mr John Bookhout, president of the Shell Company, and Mr S. Styles, chairman of the board of the Arabian Bechtel Company Ltd, wholly owned by the Shell Company /sic/.

His Excellency Dr al-Qusaybi, in the statement he made on the occasion, pointed out that the long period the negotiations lasted was used to carry out all the necessary economic and technical studies and fully prepare for the basic preparatory materials the project will require, enabling the fledgling company directly to start carrying out the project.

His excellency said,

"The Saudi Petrochemical Company, which will be established as a joint project between the Saudi Basic Industries Company and the Bechtel Company owned by Shell Oil /sic/, clearly reflects the method the kingdom encourages in establishing such technically complicated projects, which is the method of international cooperation represented in joint projects in order to make maximum benefit of the expertise of the foreign partner in the production and marketing fields.

"There is no doubt that the entry by the Shell Company, which is one of the biggest companies in the world, into the project as a partner, clearly shows the extent of the confidence the Saudi economy enjoys and the soundness of the approach we have called for, which is for the petrochemical industry to be established in the area where relative advantages, especially raw materials, are present.

"We thank the Shell Oil Company for the confidence it has shown toward the kingdom, and I especially thank its president, Mr Bookhout, who has always been one of the biggest supporters of this project."

His Excellency Dr al-Qusaybi said,

"This great complex will without a doubt constitute the cornerstone for future chemical industries in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the kingdom will be able to enter into world markets as a partner competing in the sales of these products. The kingdom will also be able to establish integrated industries which the domestic economy requires.

"There is no doubt that the new company will provide the kingdom with high international technology and consequently young Saudis will acquire high skills in a field which is considered one of the advanced industries of the world.

"This project, in producing these useful materials, will use a material which in the past had been burned as waste, namely natural gas. The exploitation of this resource, which had been wasted, is really to be considered a turning point in the orientation of Saudi industry."

Mr. Bookhout, president of the Shell Company, described this firm by stating "This is only a reflection of the good repute the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoys in terms of security, stability and fair dealings with others. We are very happy to be guests in the kingdom but at the same time we will struggle hard to be a suitable partner in the development efforts now underway in this kingdom. We thank you for this trust. We also thank you for the good hospitality which we will never abuse."

Mr Bookhout continued,

"In view of the strength of your will and your farsightedness, and also because great financial resources are present, plants have been provided to gather and separate gas for the sake of the full use of the natural gas associated with the other oil products. It is possible to reinject this gas and use it in feeding the petrochemical complex and supplying fuel for the plants.

"Thus one of the resources abundant in the kingdom, which we have not used and the kingdom has not benefited from, has been converted to a productive goal. A world thirsty for petroleum energy will only be thankful and indebted for such a measure. This is proof of the extent of feeling for international responsibility to the economic system of the free world which is clearly manifest in the wise leadersship of His Majesty King Khalid and his crown prince Fahd."

Eng 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Zamil, deputy board chairman of Sabic, said that this massive petrochemical complex would be composed of six large-sized plants and would produce five basic petrochemical products--ethylene, ethylene dichloride, ethanol, caustic soda and styrene.

He said, "The costs of constructing this complex, totalling 11 billion riyals, reflect the nature of capital intensity in this type of industry, reducing the number

of foreign laborers because of its complex machinery, since the complex does not need more than 1,300 workers for its operation.

"We have chosen the system of building the complex by means of prefabricated units shipped to the site in order to reduce the volume of foreign labor, and this will result in giving Saudi citizens an opportunity to hold major administrative and operating positions in the project."

Eng al-Zamil, in response to AL-RIYAD's question on the response the training program Sabic organized has received young Saudis and its effect in reducing the percentage of foreign workers in basic industry projects, said, "There is no doubt that the response Sabic has met is to be considered a turning point in the training programs; the programs were designed to accommodate 240 trainees; because of this reception the number was raised to 400. We aim to reach greater than this rate in a longer period, so that we may realize a 100 percent proportion of Saudis in administration of the industrialization program."

"The complex will produce 650,000 metric tons of ethylene, 295,000 metric tons of styrene, 281,000 tons of raw industrial ethanol, 454,000 metric tons of ethylene dichloride and 377,000 metric tons of caustic soda annually."

This is to be considered the biggest of the Saudi Basic Petrochemical Industries Company projects and is the seventh project whose final participation agreement has been signed.

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BRIEFS

BANK AID TO FARMERS--As a responsible official in the bank stated to AL-RIYAD, Saudi Arabian Agricultural Bank reports, in statistics prepared by the bank for its activities in the months of May, June and July of this year, 1980-81, that the volume of loans came to about 426,443,099 riyals, accounting for about 6,476 loans offered to people working in the agricultural sector, in the form of farmers and investors in the field of agricultural projects contributing to the attainment of the self-sufficiency in food needed for the consumers by helping to provide such basic food elements as meat, dairy products, eggs, vegetables and fruit. The services of the bank during this period extended to include fishermen and beekeepers as well as bedouins and renters of agricultural equipment. It is worth pointing out that the loans the bank has offered, are aimed at supplying the farmers with the money they need to meet the expenses of farming, the accessories it requires and agricultural project insurance. By the grace of God, it has been possible to provide about 4,773 machines and 4,131 pumps during this period of the year, in addition to more than 5,307 items of agricultural equipment and the tractors, plows, harvesters, trucks, excavators, threshers, pipelayers and so forth attached to them. In addition, about 25 percent of specialized agricultural projects have been financed by the bank in this period. The source adds that the value of the aid in the first quarter came to about 117,140,926 riyals; this was provided for agricultural production factors in the form of machines, pumps, agricultural machinery, fodder, poultry raising equipment and dairy producing equipment, as well as fishing gear. The source concluded his statement by saying that the high official orders which were recently issued giving agreement to extension of the period for payment of Agricultural Bank loans from 5 to 10 years will encourage many investors to explore the agricultural field in order to move the wheel of agricultural development, achieving prosperity and welfare in this sphere. /Text/ /Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 15 Sep 80 p 2/

VILLAGE IMPROVEMENTS--In the projects drawn up by the Municipality of al-'Umran in the town of al-'Umran and the villages surrounding it, the municipality has awarded bids for the paving and lighting project to a domestic organization. This will cover all the area of al-'Umran and outlying districts with its 21 villages. This was stated to AL-RIYAD by Mr 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Furayh, mayor of al-'Umran, who added that the first stage of the appropriation project for the ring road about the town of al-'Umran has been completed; its costs will total 5 million riyals, and the money due the people owning the appropriated real estate will be paid out. On the environmental health projects in the Eastern Province, he declared that drilling has been completed on three wells for potable water in the villages of

al-Rumaylah, al-Chasi and al-Sivayirah, and construction has been completed on water tanks in the town of al-'Umran and the village of al-Rumaylah. Also, a water line has been laid in the al-Khudayri and al-Duwaykiyah sections. He also added that the network budgets concerning the swamps and depressed areas in the villages of al-Kilabiyah, al-Miqdam and al-Hulaylah have been presented to the Environmental Health Committee in the Eastern Province preparatory to filling them in under the committee project. Regarding the scheme for lands for people with limited incomes, he stated that work is still underway on the scheme for people with limited incomes in al-Kilabiyah, which comprises about 300 housing lots with utilities, and it will be completed shortly, God willing. It will also be paved and connected to a divided highway 60 meters wide containing sidewalks and lighting also. /Text/ /Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 27 Sep 80 p 3/ 11887

NEW GAS PLANTS--Riyadh, Oct. 6 (SPA)--The National Gas Company Monday awarded a SR 220 million contract for three automatic gas storing and filling plants in Taif, Qassim and Abha. The company's Director General Dr. Ibrahim Al-Khudair stated that the aim of constructing these plants, each with an initial 70,000-ton annual capacity, is to expand the facility and to increase the plant's productive capacity. The step has been taken in light of rising demand and the state directives to facilitate the supply of gas for the citizens, he said. Khudair added that the company is operating similar plants in Riyadh, Jeddah, Dammam and Medina, and is in the process of taking over some other new plants. /Text/ /Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 7 Oct 80 p 1/

CSO: 4820

SYRIAN GRAND MUFTI GIVES PERSONAL INTERVIEW IN EAST BERLIN

East Berlin HORIZONT in German Vol 13 No 21, 1980 signed to press 19 May 80 pp 14-15

[Interview with Shaykh Ahmad Kaftaru, Grand Mufti of the Syrian Arab Republic, in East Berlin (date not given), by Carl-Friedrich Reinhardt: "HORIZONT Portrait: Shaykh Ahmad Kaftaru--A Meeting With the Grand Mufti of the Syrian Arab Republic"]

[Excerpt] From the Barada to the Spree

Shaykh Ahmad Kaftaru--the title "shaykh" is somewhat of an equivalent here of priest or scholar--and other Islamic dignitaries are for studies in the GDR at this point. Knowing he will have a very busy program today, I ask his indulgence for disturbing him so early--while he is having breakfast. With kind consideration he says: "How so? Is it not pleasant to take in some spiritual food along with one's breakfast?"

And promptly, in answer to my question, Shaykh Kaftaru starts telling me how he came to assume the office of the highest Islamic dignitary in Syria--having been born, in 1915, as the son of a ulema, scholar Shaykh Mohamad Amin, in Damascus.

"First I studied with theologians Islamic and Arab sciences in the traditional individual manner. Thereafter one gets licensed by one's teacher to give Islamic religious lessons oneself. This I did for 40 years. I would lecture about Islam everywhere, many times also in Damascus, mainly in the largest mosque of Damascus, the Beni-Omaijad, but also in others--such as the mosque of Abu Nur. That is located in an Islamic center of scholarship in Damascus. That center has two institutes and an Islamic theological faculty. I founded that institute in 1972, and there is where I work at present. But even before that, in 1956, I had founded two institutes, secondary schools, as it were, with a religious orientation, one for girls and one for boys."

He chooses and accentuates his words well and, using gestures sparingly, describes his teaching activities which evidently give him much satisfaction. At times he rearranges a sleeve of his grey garment, the djilbab, something like a caftan. His white headgear, the aimama, makes his face shine a bit more. Altogether this is the picture of a successful teacher.

Tasks of the Grand Mufti

Because of his many distinctions, Shaykh Kaftaru was appointed mufti of the city of Damascus. "That was in 1952, and that was my function until 1964. Then the General Mufti, the Grand Mufti of Syria was chosen." Shaykh Kaftaru emphasizes: "The law in our country is that this office calls for a vote by higher religious scholars. Thus in 1964 I was chosen the Grand Mufti and I am simultaneously the chairman of the Supreme Islamic Council (the Mufti Council) in Syria."

That office took him, as Syria's representative, to many parts of the Islamic world and made him take part in many conferences and scholarly congresses. Due to that, he earned an honorary doctorate from the Sherif Hadayatollah Islamic State University in Djakarta, Indonesia. In the same year he was awarded the highest medal of the Islamic Republic, in Pakistan, the "Star of Pakistan." He also traveled to Western countries, however, and, among other things, on the invitation from the Great Lakes Universities in the United States, gave lectures there on Islamic and Arab affairs and--he makes a special point of this--on the problems of the Palestinians.

Had he visited socialist countries at this time too? "I was several times in the Soviet Union, on four visits in 1969, 1973, 1974 and 1979. I visited mosques in the Soviet Union, gave lectures and met in Moscow with high representatives of the Soviet government. We had very interesting talks. Though our philosophical points of view differed, one of the persons I talked with said to me at the end: 'If Islam is as you have presented it to us, it really is a good thing.' I have another invitation from the Soviet Union this year, for next fall."

Christians and Moslems

One matter Shaykh Kaftaru evidently is most concerned with is the relationship between Christians and Moslems, more exactly the cooperation of all people for the safeguarding of peace. "For more than 30 years I have advocated that Christians and Moslems move closer toward each other and live in peace together. It altogether is my view--which I also have been stressing in many meetings and talks during my current visit in the GDR--that much still remains to be done to deepen the cooperation and good relations among the nations, precisely for reasons of making a good contribution to the preservation of peace."

And Shaykh Kaftaru continues: "I always proceeded from my Islamic faith, for Prophet Mohammed has said--and I paraphrase slightly: 'A Moslem is, willy-nilly, the brother of others.' The term 'atheists,' it seems to me, should be replaced by a better term: people who think scientifically. For there are many different possibilities that can be used--faith, reason and science--for the benefit of cooperation and peace and, above and beyond that, international fraternity and love among the people."

Islam and the State

Those probably also are the terms in which one must understand the clear reply Shaykh Kaftaru made to the question of how he perceived of his task as the highest Islamic dignitary in Syria in relation to the Syrian state, especially since many Western mass media are rousing incitement in this regard particularly. "The attitude and words of our President Hafiz al-Assad make an unequivocal reply easy. This president is a believer, a Moslem president, and I think the relations between state and religion are very very good, and there are no disadvantages.

I have been friendly with the president for more than 15 years. We are good friends. I know his faith, his conduct, his ethics. We trust him completely. Not only we, the religious leaders, the whole nation trusts him. It is the natural thing that there always are some wicked people who want to sow discord. But those aspects of the imperialist mass media are, after all, known well enough."

He himself, Shaykh Kaftaru emphasizes, had been a delegate of the People's Council to the Syrian parliament for one election period. "My work was like that of any deputy who serves his people. Islam, after all, is not a 'religion of prayers' but one of life that enters the various domains of life and does everything for people. And while our President Hafiz al-Assad is now considering how to expand the National Progressive Front, we, being responsible for religion in Syria, will do likewise. That is our duty and task."

In view of the current imperialist threat against the countries in the Near and Middle East, the threat with the "big stick," and after the hypocritical words of the U.S. President himself about his "deep respect and veneration for Islam" have been led ad absurdum by his deeds, Shayky Kaftaru says, very calmly, and judiciously and prudently, I think: "In our time, the existence of man, the survival of mankind, is most closely associated with the problem of preserving the peace. We work for peace and, even more still, for the higher goal of establishing brotherhood among the people. War and aggression find their pathogenic agent in egoism and the greed for conquest. This is a psychological illness, and illness of the soul, and these pathological ideas must be treated so that no evil consequences will result from them. It is not that I look at the problem of preventing wars from my emotions only. I look at it from the standpoint of science, conviction, religion and practical realization."

All Help for the Palestinians

Our talk logically leads us to the Steadfastness Front which, in its conferences--in January this year in Damascus and in April in Tripoli, Libya--adopted clear resolutions on supporting the Palestinians. Says Shaykh Kaftaru: "I believe all Arabs are ready to help the Palestinians, especially the countries of the Steadfastness Front. It reflects our patriotism, our

allegiance to the Arab Nation, and our Islamic faith. No Arab can afford not to help the Palestinians, as it were. Every Arab knows this is his first and foremost task. Moreover, the Palestinian problem has become an international problem as, altogether, the peace in the world is threatened by this problem.

On the other side: those who do not help and who try to derive their own benefits from this difficult situation, are people we cannot love, with whom one cannot be friendly. We must grant the Palestinian people all help possible so they will recover their legitimate claims to forming their own state. These rights belong among the human rights, as ratified by the international organizations, including the United Nations."

'Israel Committing Two Errors'

Shaykh Kaftaru most emphatically advocates that Israel should at last be forced internationally to recognize the Palestinians' legitimate rights to forming their own state. It would be in the vital interest of Israel itself. To bolster this argument, Shaykh Kaftaru adduces historic evidence that would be hard to refute: "In refusing to recognize the legitimate claims of the Palestinians, Israel is committing two crucial errors, one religious, the other historic.

First, Israel says it has a religious and a historical claim to the land of Palestine. It claims: 'God promised the land of Palestine to his son Abraham.' Which is in no way correct. God promised the land of Palestine to all his sons--to Isaac and to Ismail. And those are the Arabs and Jews together, not merely the Jews by themselves.

But furthermore: we can today no longer constantly refer to a judge of thousands of years ago. We have our judges and our laws in our times, and human rights have to be looked at in terms of our own times.

Secondly, it is regrettable to see how Israel is trying to bring Jews from foreign countries to Israel. Israel wants them to leave their homecountries and come to an alien land which, futhermore, is a conquered land. Why should they actually seek to find a new 'homeland' there?

There is absolutely no justification for inducing Jews in Europe or Asia to leave their homeland and settle in a country from which Palestinians were expelled. There is no reasonable ground for that, but that is what Israel is doing.

Israel is also committing a historic error in failing to learn any lessons from history. The crusades, after starting in the 11th century, lasted circa 200 years, as one knows. Some also got to Palestine, causing horrible bloodbaths. But the crusaders, beaten, had to withdraw from Palestine, and the people of Palestine regained their rights. Later then, imperialists and colonialists conquered our countries, but the peoples fought and regained their independence. And as the colonialists and imperialists suffer

defeats everywhere, the same will be Israel's fate. The Palestinian people will win and regain their legitimate rights."

When our conversation is nearing its end, words of friendly and solidary closeness, and of thanks, reverberate again for having become acquainted through many conversations and meetings during this visit in the GDR with a people "working with great diligence and scientific progress, and loving life." Great cordiality had welcomed him everywhere. "We have sensed with great joy the sincere friendship your country has for the Syrian people. And we are gratified in having observed that the GDR is making every effort for stabilizing world peace."

5885
CSO: 8120/0096

UGTT COMMUNIQUE ON NATIONAL UNION COMMISSION

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 3 Oct 80 p 5

[Article: "Formation of the National Union Commission"]

[Text] With the decision made by the union leadership before 26 January 1978 to be represented by a national union commission, followed by a decision in the same direction by the present administrative commission of the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] (see the communique, which follows), the solution of the union crisis now seems possible.

The proposal of the Political Bureau of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] to constitute a commission representing all union tendencies in order to prepare for a democratic congress has thus been understood and appreciated for its true worth.

This proposal and the positive reactions it has received are a response to President Bourguiba's recommendations and proceed from the solicitude he feels for all national organizations and his concern to consolidate the country's progress.

The compromise finally adopted by the union members is also a part of the Mzali government's new policy and responds to the government's efforts to give national politics a solid democratic base.

It also echoes the decisive role the party has assumed instituting a general environment suitable for work and the establishment of a solid platform for dialogue.

This important step towards a new congress is also a response to the expectation of the working masses, whose profound desire is to have a representative, responsible, and dynamic union organization, especially since great tasks, among which is the forthcoming review of collective conventions, are awaiting the social partners.

By going beyond details and other secondary matters, unionists have shown a sense of responsibility, which requires individuals to "yield to the national imperative," as Mr Mzali recently put it in his interview in LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE.

The administrative commission of the UGTT has sent TAP the following communique:

"The administrative commission of the Tunisian General Federation of Labor, meeting on the afternoon of Tuesday 2 October 1980,

"After citing the recommendation of the Political Bureau, dated 5 August 1980, calling for the constitution of a commission charged with preparing for the next UGTT congress in the framework of liberty and democracy;

"After reviewing the decisions of the administrative commission at the successive meetings it has held, especially those of Friday and Saturday 12-13 September 1980;

"After examining the evolution of the union situation that has followed them and that foreshadows a positive and effective outcome and approach to the union crisis;

"Reaffirming its support for the far-seeing political orientation dictated by President Bourguiba and followed by Mr Mohamed Mzali, general secretary of the party and prime minister;

"Considering the decisive, historic turning point that our country has reached and that requires everyone to close ranks in order to preserve union unity and thereby consolidate national unity for the purpose of preserving our accomplishments and insuring our country's invulnerability;

"Faithful to the noble ideals of unionism and the eminently patriotic positions taken by the UGTT throughout its glorious history thanks to the labor of its members and martyrs, headed by the late Farhat Hached;

"Aware of the heavy responsibility devolving upon unionists and requiring them all to show abnegation and devotion in the service of the workers and our country and to respond to the general will of the workers to try to find a satisfactory solution to the union problem on the basis of liberty and democracy;

"(1) Decides to support the proposal of the Executive Bureau appointing to the national union commission Messrs:

Noureddine Hached	Lakhdar Jeziri
Ahmed Amara	Mohamed Ali Sfaxi
Habib Chabbouh	Tojhani Acheur
Taieb Mansour	Mahmoud Ben Tahar
Abdallah Ben Said	Habib Tlili

"(2) And to ratify the decision of the Executive Bureau to divest itself of its responsibilities and yield them to the national union commission for the purpose of facilitating its mission and insuring its independence and coming guarantees.

"(Signed) Hedi Abid"

8782
CSO: 4000

REGIONAL EQUILIBRIUM: KEYSTONE OF NEW DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 6 Oct 80 p 55

[Article by Khaled Tebourbi: "Regional Equilibrium: Keystone of a New Development Strategy"]

[Text] The idea now seems to be accepted that regional development should be an entirely separate component part of the country's economic and social policy.

Government officials have already made that clear, and everything in recent economic, administrative, and political decisions indicates that the proper conditions for implementing this new orientation are being met.

This being the case, it seems useful to us first to examine the reasons that have led up to this new choice (for it is indeed a new choice); next, in the light of the changes developing now, to try to state the objectives of the "regional" strategy.

By critically examining the last two decades of development and, more concretely, by learning the lessons of 1975 general census, Tunisian officials have concluded that a well-defined regional development policy is necessary.

Examining the last two decades has revealed that despite changing options, the development model adopted by Tunisia since it gained independence has always followed a macroeconomic growth dynamic; it has turned in a good performance, but it has not been well-adapted to evaluating properly the imbalances affecting various socio-economic components, nor has it made it possible to alleviate them.

In the period of recovery and general development that followed independence, and, all the more so in the sectorial growth phase that has characterized the country's economy since 1970, choices and achievements could be indexed only by overall development indicators and coefficients. Obviously this was likely to make it easy to overlook missing "details" and to relegate to the secondary status of ad hoc solutions the measures that, in the best cases, could be taken to correct these oversights.

For example, things like the rural exodus or the shift of resources from one region to another were concerns at the time, but the complexity and extent they have gained with the passing of time were never expected, because general evaluation indices such as the overall growth rate, the gross national product, per capita income, etc. gave no indication of them.

But these conclusions of principle were not by themselves determining ones; the 1975 census was needed to bring the matter to full light. The results of the census, while not exhaustive, were enough to show that the model adopted by Tunisia had led people to underestimate seriously the resulting imbalance of overall growth and the absence of a real policy of regional development.

The interpretation was enlightening:
--An imbalance in population followed an imbalance in setting up activites for "overall development";
--The production per region is out of balance;
--There is imbalance between the regions themselves;
--There is imbalance between sectors.
The question arises whether imbalance is not itself the actual rule of development, whether it is not a dialectic element of development, and whether it would not be better, all things considered, to accept it philosophically as the bitter fruit of development.

Fortunately the leaders did not stop at these questions. The prevailing idea among them today is that the imbalances noted should be considered toxins, or mistakes, and that it is possible to conceive of another model of growth that will perform well and yet make it possible to do away with them or at least alleviate them. Hence the determination they have shown to find clear solutions to the "problem" by implementing a real strategy of territorial and regional development.

This strategy may be expected to have three major objectives:

An economic objective for regional development. This will consist in developing all the potential resources of the country that are still underutilized or not utilized in the regions.

A social objective. This objective will coordinate with the first and will aim at improving the income and standard of living of households presently below the poverty level and unable to meet essential needs. These households will be aided by participating in the country's development effort.

A political objective, last but not least. The fact of regional development will create an exemplary median society, one in which the reduction of imbalances between individuals and groups of individuals will make it possible to reduce social tensions between Tunisian citizens and will make national unity an unalterable reality.

8782
CSO: 4400

STATE EXPRESSES IMPORTANCE OF FISHING INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT

Tunis LA PRESSE in French 7 Oct 80 p 4

[Article: "Mr Ben Osman: The State Is Determined To Promote the Basic Infrastructure and Aid Producers by All Means Available"]

[Text] Mr Lassad Ben Osman, the minister of agriculture, presided over the opening of a seminar yesterday morning on the "fishing wealth in the Gulf of Gabes." It was held by the National Institute of Oceanography with the cooperation of the General Commissariat of Fisheries.

Noted participants in the seminar were Messrs Mohamed Belhaj Ali, director of the Institute; Mohamed Hamza, acting general commissioner of Fisheries; Mohamed Zouali, general director of the National Office of Fisheries (ONP), and a great number of researchers and professional fishermen.

Mr Ben Osman opened the seminar, saying that it would have to examine questions of great importance for fishing and for the development of fisheries on the most densely marine-populated areas of the Tunisian coast.

"This seminar," he said, "is part of a series of conferences that will be held to increase direct and constructive contact with all who are concerned with Tunisian fisheries, their rational exploitation, development, and conservation."

After emphasizing the importance that the government attaches to this important sector, the minister mentioned that Tunisia has, in addition to its 1,300 km of coastline, a large continental shelf off of Gabes. Mr Lassad Ben Osman explained, "These fisheries are for Tunisia and all Tunisians an advantage that must in no way be neglected. That is why it is important to regulate their use and protect them against any anarchic and unplanned use."

On this subject, the minster emphasized the need to inform fishers of the various studies made by the National Institute of Oceanography, which, he noted, not only does purely scientific work but also, with the cooperation of fishers, performs practical experiments likely to favor both a complementarity of efforts undertaken in this sector by all parties concerned and to give this department access to the outside area that is the object of its study.

The minister hoped that the Institute would be able to consolidate cooperation among the various fishermen and undertake research that would meet this sector's needs. He mentioned that his department has decided to establish similar institutes in the coastal areas.

He also expressed the hope of seeing closer ties between producers and the ONP and said that the Office's mission is not to compete with producers but to help them in prospecting on the fishing banks through its financial resources, staff, and technical potential.

The minister was also gratified by the efforts made by the National Federation of Fisheries, which has established regional fishing banks, which, he said, are actually mutual assistance societies that assist producers in marketing their catch.

In conclusion, the minister stressed that the complementarity of efforts by the parties concerned naturally tends to develop the fisheries sector, especially since the government has made enormous efforts to build new fishing ports and is determined to promote the basic infrastructure and to help producers by all possible means.

8782
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

TWO ISLANDS LINKED--The Executive Council discussed in its meeting yesterday, under the chairmanship of His Excellency Lieutenant General Shaykh Khalifah ibn Zayid, the crown prince and president of the council, the project concerning reclaiming the lands of the islands of Hudayriyat and Bu al-Sayayif, and forming one island to be later linked to Abu Dhabi, the mother island, through one bridge to meet the population growth. This project was initiated by His Highness Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan al-Nihyan, the chief of state, during his latest visit to these islands. The implementation of this project will require transferring 35 million cubic meters of sand so that the new island reaches 9 kilometers with the possibility for further expansion. The two islands are located southwest of Abu Dhabi. The islands of Hudayriyat and Bu al-Sayayif are located 5 and 7 kilometers respectively from Abu Dhabi. The distance between the two islands is 2 kilometers. The council also discussed the project of developing the south channel in Abu Dhabi. Moreover, the council discussed the electric power station project in Umm al-Nar, west 7 and 8, which will include the installation of two steam turbines each of 160 megawatts. Furthermore, this project will include the installation of four desalination units with a daily capacity of 20 million gallons of water. The council reviewed a number of matters related to providing citizens with services and the appropriation of additional funds for the projects of Bint Sa'ud and al-Za'lah in al-'Ayn, and the approval of new funds for the aforestation projects in the municipality of Abu Dhabi. [Text] [Abu Dhabi AL-WAHDAH in Arabic 22 Sep 80 p 4]

EMIRATES OIL CORPORATION--Abu Dhabi, Oct. 11 (Ittihad)--Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources Dr. Mana Saeed Al Oteiba today received a representative of Caltex company as part of the consultations being conducted by the Ministry for establishment of the Emirates Oil Corporation (EOC). The consultations are part of a study being conducted on the offers made by oil companies for managing the proposed corporation. The meeting was attended by the Ministry Under-Secretary Al Shiba Al Hamily who is conducting the discussions with the concerned companies. Later, the Minister also received a delegation from Carmaji oil company. /Text/ /Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 12 Oct 80 p 3/

LEGAL DEPARTMENT ESTABLISHED--Sharjah, Oct. 13 (Ittihad)--The Sharjah Chamber of Trade and Industry has decided to set up a legal department to handle all legal problems between local and foreign merchants, director general of the chamber Abdul Razaq Harji said. He added that the rising membership of the chamber which has now reached nearly 5,000, including merchants and businessmen, requires the establishment of a legal department to study and receive complaints and find suitable solutions to them. Hajri said that a decision has also been taken to expand the existing departments of the chamber to deal with the increasing activities to trade and industry. /Text/ /Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 14 Oct 80 p 3/

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END

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No. 2217

EGYPT: HOUSING SITUATION AND CONFRONTING ITS PROBLEMS

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12 November 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2217

EGYPT: HOUSING SITUATION AND CONFRONTING ITS PROBLEMS

[Excerpt of report published as a supplement to 1 Feb 80 edition of AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI]

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Introduction

The challenges that have faced Egypt in its performance of its leadership role in the Arab causes in particular and the African and international causes in general have had a big impact on Egypt's low economic growth rates and on its inability to maintain a proper standard of services.

This is why housing has not received its due share of attention--a lack of attention that has ultimately led to the deterioration of the housing problem to the degree which makes this problem hold at present the second highest priority in the state's national interests after securing food.

Out of our faith in man and of his being the goal of every growth and the means for realizing this growth, the government believes that housing constitutes an economic and social necessity and an important element for creating a consolidated society and a healthy social atmosphere characterized by stability and providing the suitable circumstances for production and for development activity.

Now that God has given our inspired President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat success in establishing peace that heralds a new era in our nation's life--an era over which prosperity prevails and in which each citizen aspires rightfully to realize his long-sought wishes, including the wish of having proper and healthy housing--there is no doubt that the task of providing such housing is not confined to one agency and not another. All of society's efforts, including the efforts of this society's various public and private sectors, must act in solidarity to realize this goal.

In implementation of the instructions of his excellency the president of the republic in this regard, Prime Minister Dr Mustafa Khalil has issued a decision forming a national committee to study the roots of the problem and to propose the national policy capable of confronting it according to sound scientific approaches.

To realize this, the committee held successive meetings throughout a period of 4 months during which it studied the national housing strategy on whose basis the special policies for every aspect of the problem are founded.

In view of the fact that the problem under study is a national problem that is closely linked to all the political, economic and social spheres, it was deemed fit to form eight working teams, each entrusted with one aspect of the problem. These teams carried out detailed studies which were presented to the national committee. After studying all the reports, the committee ended up with the conclusions contained in the proposed national housing plan.

It pleases me on this occasion to laud the great efforts exerted by the chairman and members of the main committee and of the subsidiary working teams who were comprised of a select group of specialized public figures with broad experience and high qualifications. Were it not for the vast efforts they have exerted, it would not have been possible to draw up the draft plan in this manner and in such a short time.

In conclusion, I hope that the proposed plan will receive the approval of all the state's executive and popular agencies and that it will be put into implementation as soon as possible so as to realize our people's aspirations for a better life.

God is the giver of all success.

Engineer Mustafa al-Hifnawi
Minister of Housing

Chapter One: Familiarization With Problem

1-1 Introduction

1-1-1: The houses and residential centers existing in Egypt, both those in the urban and rural areas, are the product of successive generations that have been influenced by the contemporary social, economic and political conditions under which they lived.

1-1-2: Until the end of the 19th century, these residences were either luxurious palaces built by the wealthy, who were a few, or big rambling houses in which the head of a family, his sons and their families lived or low houses built of bricks or stone with wooden roofing.

1-1-3: Most of the buildings were owned by people who were careful to live in them because tradition called for every family to live in its own house. Egypt did not know the policy of leasing in a clear form until the first half of the 20th century when many investors employed their money in housing by virtue of its being an investment with guaranteed profit.

1-1-4: In this part of the 20th century and with the development of the social, under the economic and political conditions in the country and with the emigration of numerous families from the countryside to the cities, especially to Cairo where all the means of attraction are present, the housing design developed into investment apartment buildings and many investors proceeded to construct such buildings by virtue of their being a better investment than other types of investment.

1-1-5: Because of the increased emigration from the countryside to the urban areas and the excess in population compared to housing units and, consequently, because of the widening gap between supply and demand, the state started to intervene as of 1954 by building houses for people with limited incomes. However, the state has not been able to meet the housing requirements needed to deal with the increase in the number of families, to absorb the emigrating families, to face the renewal and replacement needs or to deal with the economic development needs, all of which are increasing year after year.

1-1-6: The successive laws issued to fix the rent values, then to reduce them and then to define the relationship between the landlord and the tenant have had their grave impact by causing many investors to refrain from investing their savings in construction, in addition to causing landlords to stop carrying out maintenance work for their houses. All of this is the cause for the presence of many old buildings that get damaged and collapse easily. Our future housing strategy and national policy need to deal with this issue in a fundamental manner so as to preserve and prolong the life of the existing buildings and to maintain the ties of love and peace among all citizens, be they landlords or tenants.

1-1-7: This is why the housing problem in Egypt has become one of the major issues we are facing at present and why the population explosion has turned into a fundamental stumbling block and a major obstacle in the face of the economic and social development efforts. Moreover, the rapid population growth year after year has come to represent the alarm signal for the danger threatening to consume the main part of the national production of the development programs. This growth also

represents an ever-present pressure on the public services and utilities. It is worth noting that the rate of housing unit construction dropped from seven units per 1,000 persons in 1960 to about two housing units per 1,000 persons in 1975.

1-1-8: The matter requires the reappropriation of an ever-increasing part of the national income to just maintain the present standard of services. This reappropriation affects the part that can be channelled toward direct investment in the production projects that led to enhancing the economic growth rates. The big population growth results in an increase in the consumption rate and, consequently, in a drop in the rate of the savings that can be directed toward direct investment in housing.

1-1-9: The Arab Republic of Egypt is devoting special attention and exerting vast efforts in an attempt to formulate fundamental solutions for the housing problem. But despite all these efforts, the problem has grown to such an extent that most families suffer from it in one way or another. This is what motivated the creation of this committee so that it may draw up a national policy that seeks to solve the problem at present and in the future.

1-2 Causes of Problem

The housing problem emerges at both the national and local levels as a direct result of the following fundamental factors:

The high population growth rates.

The population's qualitative distribution and its impact on the housing problem.

The high rates of emigration from the countryside to the urban areas.

The population's social and economic dimensions [characteristics] and their impact on the housing problem.

The failure to establish a balanced relationship between the landlord and the tenant--a failure which has caused investors to refrain from employing their monies in housing.

1-2-1: Population Growth and Its Impact on Housing Problem

The constant population growth in Egypt, especially in the cities, has a big impact on the housing problem as a result of the subsequent effect of this growth in creating new families in need of new housing. This is in addition to the fact that internal migration has contributed to intensifying the housing crisis in the republic's cities.

By studying the population situation in the republic, it has become evident to us that the republic's population amounted to 38.2 million people in 1976, of whom 37.7 millions live inside the republic, i.e. with an increase of 8.2 million people over 1966. The annual population growth rate in the period from 1966 to 1976 amounted to 2.31 percent compared to an annual growth rate of 2.54 percent in the period from 1960 to 1966--the period experiencing a rapid growth in Egypt's population. However, the current annual growth rate of 2.31 percent is still high and if

the current situation persists, the republic's population will amount to nearly 66.2 million people in the year 2000. This figure will result in the further deterioration of the housing problem in Egypt. However, if it becomes possible to reduce the annual birth rate by one per thousand through the adoption of an effective family-planning policy, the population will amount to about 56 million people only in the year 2000. The population may also amount to 59.6 million people in the year 2000 if the Egyptian woman's childbirth habits are changed to make this woman give birth to two children only.

1-2-2: Qualitative Distribution of Population and Its Impact on Housing Problem

From the distribution of this population over the planning [presumably meaning administrative] provinces, we find that the greater Cairo province contains the largest percentage of the population and that this province's population amounted in 1976 to 9.2 million people representing 25.1 of the republic's total population. This means that one quarter the republic's population exists in the greater Cairo province. This indication has its significance in the planning to solve this problem because greater efforts must be channelled toward solving this problem in the province, especially when we learn that the province population will amount to nearly 17.6 million people in the year 2000. Second in population density is the delta province which includes the governorates of al-Minufiyah, al-Gharbiyah, Kafr al-Shaykh, Damietta and al-Daqahliyah. The population of this province has amounted to 8.6 million people representing 23.4 percent of the republic's total population. The figure is expected to reach 14 millions by the year 2000. Alexandria province is also a province with high population density that needs to have its present and future housing needs dealt with. The 1976 census shows that this province's population amounted to 4.8 million people representing 13.1 percent of the republic's total population. This figure is expected to reach 8.7 million people in the year 2000.

By studying the population distribution in the rural and urban areas, we find that the 1976 census shows that the urban population amounted to 16.1 million people representing 43.9 percent of the total population whereas the rural population was estimated at 20.6 million people representing 56.1 percent of the total population. The housing problem emerges more clearly in the urban areas than in the rural areas. Therefore, most of the concerted efforts must be channelled toward the problem in the urban areas where the problem will intensify year after year as a result of the aforementioned factors.

It is worth noting that this enormous population which is increasing by more than one million people annually lives on an area not exceeding four percent of the republic's total area and that this inhabited area extends along the banks of the Nile River. This makes it necessary to move to new centers outside the [Nile] valley, such as the northwestern coast, the new valley, the Red Sea coast, the Sinai and the High Dam Lake area. This movement must be made on the basis of a profound and deliberate study of the components of life in these areas and on the basis of exerting efforts to develop these components.

The matter also requires the initiation of efforts to draw up comprehensive national planning for the entire republic and regional planning for the various provinces. This work should proceed side by side with implementation of the proposed plan so that the development may take place on sound scientific foundations.

1-2-3: Emigration From Countryside to Urban Areas

The statistical data shows that emigration from the countryside to the urban areas is occurring at high rates and that the urban population is rising steadily as a result of natural increase on the one hand and internal migration on the other. This trend is causing further deterioration in the housing problem, especially in the urban areas. Consequently, it is necessary to establish new centers of attraction, to develop the countryside and to raise its living standard so as to make it desirable to live in the countryside and to curtail emigration from it. As a result of the population growth, the area of cultivable land has diminished due to the encroachment of construction on this land at a rate of nearly 60,000 feddans annually. Should this situation continue, the expansion of construction in the next 20 years will swallow more than one million feddans [of cultivable land]. This calls for diverting construction toward the desert.

1-2-4: Social and Economic Conditions and Their Impact on Housing Problem

A house in the modern sense is the material framework for human interaction. The nature of this interaction depends to a large degree on the structures of this framework with the buildings, open spaces, utilities, services, streets, public parks, recreation spots and markets it contains.

Providing the proper sanitary housing and the well-studied residential environment that takes into consideration the deep-rooted social criteria and cultural customs in both the rural and urban local societies has constituted one of the means [sic] preoccupying the social and economic policy of the developing world generally, and especially a broad segment of this world's societies that cannot find the proper housing and that cannot, with their limited resources, act as a party in the local construction market. These are societies that are experiencing at present fundamental tranformations in all the social, economic and cultural spheres. Following is an explanation of these dimensions:

A. Income Levels:

The prevalent income levels in the Egyptian society represent a social and economic dimension in the housing problem because families with low income represent more than 50 percent of the families in the Egyptian society. This is due to the low wages and the lack of work opportunities which are reflected in the standard of housing which a family budget can withstand on the one hand and in the widening gap between what the family can shoulder in return for housing on the one hand and the ownership installment or the economic rent value of the house it wants on the other hand.

B. Increased Marriage Rate:

Each marriage contract represents an urgent demand for an independent dwelling unit. Statistics indicate that the number of marriage contracts concluded in the republic in 1975 reached 384,000, compared to 339,000 in 1973. The number of these marriages in urban areas in 1975 was 155,000, or 40.3 percent. In rural areas, the number was 229,000, or 59.7 percent. The number of marriages was 10.3 per thousand of the total population in 1975, compared to 9.9 per thousand in 1974, and 9.4 per thousand in 1973. In 1975, marriages were 9.3 per thousand in urban areas, and 13.8 per thousand in rural areas.

1-3: Dimensions of Housing Problem

Statistical figures have shown that there are nearly seven million families in the republic, of which 3.2 million families or 46 percent live in urban areas, according to the 1976 census. By comparing the number of families with the number of apartments in the 1976 census, it became evident that there was a shortage of 555,000 apartments. If the required number of apartments needed to meet the population growth by 1980 is added to the aforementioned figure of 555,000 apartments, the present accumulation [shortage] would amount to 831,000 apartments. At the same time, the total number of apartments needed to replace old apartments by 1979 amounted to 393,000 units. The number of units needed to replace old ones by the year 2000 is estimated at 589,000 apartments.

On the basis of the current average family size, amounting to 5.2 members per family, and of an estimate of the number of families in the future and by assuming that an apartment will be made available to every family, then the number of apartments needed to face the population growth from 1976 to the year 2000 is 2.43 million apartments whereas the number needed to face these factors in the period from 1981 to the year 2000 is 2.18 million apartments approximately.

Thus, the volume of the problem is estimated at 3.6 million housing units needed to face the three factors of:

Making up for the current shortage of 831,000 units.

Replacing old units by the year 2000, a figure of 589,000 units.

Facing the population growth from 1981 to the year 2000, a figure of 2.18 million units.

Chapter Two: Proposed Housing Plan

Proposed Housing Plan

To meet the required housing volume, estimated at 3.6 million units by the year 2000, it is required that five-year programs be drawn up and put into implementation in the 1981-2000 period. Consideration has been given to starting these programs and plans in 1981 so as to provide the chance for the preparations necessary to undertake the tasks required by the first plan covering the 1981-85 period and to get the lands, utilities and other aspects connected with the housing issue ready. However, the situation also requires that urgent solutions be also drawn up without waiting for cooperation [sic] in order to confront the urgent problem in the 1979-80 period.

2-1: Urgent 1979-1980 Plan:

To make it possible to realize the goals of the urgent 1979-1980 plan, it is proposed that the plan include the following:

2-1-1: Start immediate adoption of all the practical means to prepare an urgent housing program to be implemented during the remaining part of 1979 and during 1980.

This is in addition to exerting efforts to complete all the operations already started, provided that consideration be given in designing the housing units included in the urgent plan to developed housing patterns that are low in costs and efficient to use and provided that the ideal economic method be followed in construction and building so as to make sure that the construction materials required are secured from the sources of wholesale production without the intervention of middlemen. Efforts should also be exerted to reduce costs as much as possible and, consequently, to supply the largest number of housing units possible in an urgent program to meet the requirements of those who are in the direst need of housing.

2-1-2: Give priority to encouraging the construction of more floors atop already existing low buildings with the capacity to support more floors, provided that the additional floors are built properly and according to designs compatible with the capability of the existing building to support these additions.

2-1-3: Prepare a quick executive program to start immediately the construction of housing complexes in the areas close to the population centers and already served by or close to the necessary utilities. This should be done for the low-economy and middle-income housing of both types A and B, provided that preparation of the blueprints for the new housing patterns be started immediately and provided that standard units and patterned models producing a cut in costs be taken into consideration.

2-1-4: Exert immediate efforts to prepare the lands for construction in new and complete population centers in close desert areas that are easy to supply with utilities, especially water and electricity, at the lowest costs possible. These new centers must also be supplied with partially paved roads to make them easily accessible for construction and building activities and to also make it easy to plant trees on the sides of these roads in the future.

Such areas, when trees are planted in them and when attention is paid to the distinctive architectural style that they can be given, can encourage many families with limited income, especially the families looking for a better life or newly formed families, to show big demand for them.

For the beneficiary masses to feel the efficiency of these small-size housing models for their ideal use, it is proposed that models of these houses be furnished according to an economic design providing for beautiful, simple and solid furniture so that it may provide an example for other beneficiaries to follow. It is proposed that these housing units be furnished according to a set pattern and by a furniture cooperative that undertakes this task so that the furniture styles may be compatible with the housing styles and with their efficiency for all purposes.

2-1-5: Start immediate preparation of the lands for the projects of the first phase of the plan contained in the national housing policy until the year 2000 and supply these lands with their utility requirements so that the first part of the lands may be ready with their complete blueprints as of the beginning of January 1981. However, consideration should be given to the importance of the lands' suitability for economic foundation so as to reduce the costs. Tree planting should also be started in the empty spaces so that the trees may grow with the rising buildings.

2-1-6: Continue the programs to bolster and set up plants producing construction materials so that their production may reach the limit compatible with the

construction material needs in the housing construction plans, in addition to the needs of the other construction plans.

2-2: National Housing Plan

2-2-1: The proposed plan has been drawn up on the basis of meeting the housing needs in accordance with five-year programs implemented in the period from 1981 to the year 2000. Consideration has been given to a gradual annual increase [in housing construction] compatible with the targeted capacity of the construction sector, with the financial resources, with the construction materials and with the availability of labor. Consideration has also been given in this distribution [sic] to meeting the requirements needed to counter the population growth, in addition to the gradual elimination of the already existing shortages so that the public may feel a tangible improvement from year to year. Consideration has further been given to starting implementation of the proposed plan as of the beginning of 1981, provided that the state efforts be focused in the remaining part of 1970 and in 1980 on meeting the more urgent needs, namely the housing needs of those whose houses have collapsed and those with newly formed families.

This is in addition to gaining the confidence of the private sector and encouraging it to participate in solving the problem by eliminating all the work obstacles facing this sector, making land available, supplying it with the utilities and making construction and labor available, as will be noted later.

2-3: Cost of Proposed Housing and Services Plan for 1981-85

This plan provides for the construction of 675,000 housing units, along with the necessary service buildings linked with housing--especially in the new areas not supplied with such services:

Year	Number of Housing Units (in 1,000)	Average Unit Cost (in pounds)	Total in Million Pounds Including Housing and Services
1981	110	4,130	530
1982	125	4,269	602
1983	135	4,387	650
1984	145	4,468	690
1985	160	4,528	770
Total	675		3,243

Important Observations: High Estimates of Plan Drawn Up on Following Basis:

Adoption of the system of standard units in design and the use of uniform units that bring about a drop in costs, along with innovating the means that realize streamlining the use of the available local resources.

The official prices of the basic materials have been calculated on the basis of the prevalent 1979 prices, especially insofar as the prices of cement, reinforcement iron and wood are concerned.

Taking into consideration development of the building and construction methods to face the ever-increasing needs to implement the plan and strengthening the construction companies by providing them with technical and administrative outfits they need and supplying them with equipment and machinery to speed up the construction process and to reduce the costs.

Securing all the construction materials needed in quantities that meet the plan's demands, in addition to the demands of the other building and construction plans.

2-4: Estimated Costs of Buildings for 1981 Housing and Services Plan:

To construct 110,000 housing units with the necessary service buildings connected with them:

Type of Unit	% of Unit	No. of units	Average Area of Unit (in sq. m.)	Average Cost Per Square meter (in pounds)	Total Costs (in 1,000 pounds)	Average Cost of Unit (in pounds)
Low-Income A	20%	22,000	45	45.8	45,342	2,061
Low-Income B	25	28,500	50	53.0	102,025	2,650
Middle-Income A	25	27,500	70	59.0	113,575	4,130
Middle-Income B	12	13,200	80	64.5	68,112	5,160
Above Middle-Income A	6	6,600	100	70.0	46,200	7,000
Above Middle-Income B	2	2,200	120	75.0	19,800	9,000
Total	100%	110,000			395,054	3,591.4
Total Calculated After Addition of 15 Percent in Costs to Meet Difference in Costs of Construction in Remote Locations					454,312	4,130.0

Service Buildings Connected With New Housing Centers and Required Per 1,000 Units:

Joint elementary school consisting of 20 classrooms and with an area of 1,500 square meters: 1,500x80=120,000 pounds

Mosque 650 square meters X120 [pounds]=72,000 pounds.[sic]

Social service buildings and business and craft shops 1,400 sq.m. X80=112,000 pounds.

Main Central Buildings 304,000 pounds.

Grand Total 608,000

Considering that these services will be set up only in new areas, it is estimated that only 60 percent of the housing units will require these services.

110,000 units X608,000 pounds X0,60=40,128,000 pounds. With the addition of a differential to meet the costs of construction in remote areas, the total sum required for implementing the 1981 housing and service plan amounts to nearly 530 million pounds.

2-5: Estimated Costs of Buildings for Years 1982-85 of Housing Plan:

Calculated in the same manner outlined in item 2-4, the costs of the buildings in the following years can be estimated at the following:

1982	nearly 603 million pounds
1983	nearly 650 million pounds
1984	nearly 690 million pounds
1985	nearly 770 million pounds

Total costs for all 5 years is nearly 3.25 billion pounds.

Consideration has been given to raising the estimates for each subsequent year in order to improve the possibility of completion and of carrying out some extra work to improve the housing conditions. Consideration has also been given in these estimates to raising the percentage of the necessary service buildings in the last year of the plan because such buildings are scheduled to be constructed in areas remote from the new population centers and in new cities.

Chapter Three: Requirements For Implementing Proposed Housing Plan

3. Requirements of Implementing Proposed Housing Plan (1981-2000)

To implement the proposed plan, it is necessary that the following requirements be estimated and supplied:

The lands needed to accommodate the housing volume proposed in the plan and the services necessary for it.

The public utilities necessary for the housing plan and their costs.

Development of the construction sector to enable it to undertake the tasks of the proposed housing plan and the other relevant activities.

The construction materials necessary for the housing plan and the means to secure them.

The sources for financing the first 1981-85 five-year plan.

This has been done in the following manner:

3-1: Land Requirements of Proposed National Housing Plan

3-1-1. To determine the land requirements for the 1981-2000 urban national housing plan on the premise of a population density of 25 units per feddan, or 125 persons per feddan, and assuming that the housing requirements by the year 2000 amount to 3.6 million units, then the land requirements amount to 144,000 feddans.

It is required that these needed lands be secured in the following spheres:

1. Lands within the populated areas in the governorates.

2. The proposed construction expansion around the major cities.

3. New cities.

3-1-2: The lands suitable for development in the planned cities, namely the greater Cairo province, the Alexandria province and the cities of Suez, Ismailia, Port Said, Bani Suwayf, Samnud and Asyut, have been estimated at nearly 38,190 feddans.

As for the new cities which it has been decided to build and which total nine cities, namely the cities of 10 Ramadan, 15 May, al-Sadat, al-'Amiriyah, four cities in the greater Cairo province and the city of New al-Fayyum, the areas of their lands amount 27,650 feddans.

Thus, the total area of the lands calculated so far amounts to 65,840 feddans capable of accommodating 1.6 million housing units. The remaining area needed to implement the 1981-2000 plan is 78,160 feddans. This area can be made available in the locations which will be developed outside the valley.

3-1-3: According to the studies conducted, the number of units called for in the first plan amount to 675,000 units which require 27,000 feddans.

It is proposed that these lands and units be distributed as follows in the future plan:

Year	Number of Housing Units (in 1,000)	Lands Required (in 1,000 feddans)
1981	110	4.5
1982	125	5.0
1983	135	5.4
1984	145	5.8
1985	160	6.5
Total	675	27.0

By surveying the areas scheduled to be developed in the existing and planned cities during the first five-year plan, it has become obvious that it is possible to secure 11,010 feddans (as part of the 38,190 feddans already referred to).

As for the new cities, it is possible to secure 7,200 feddans during the first five-year plan (as part of the 27,650 feddans already referred to). This means a total of 18,260 feddans.

To make all the lands needed for the first plan available, it is thus required that nearly 8,740 more feddans be secured. These lands can be secured in the other governorates of the valley and in the new areas.

3-1-4: The basis and principles for selecting the lands and the elements that must be available:

First, the open spaces within the populated areas in the governorates:

These must be selected on the following basis:

A. Their proximity to the utility networks

B. Taking into consideration the population density averages in the areas surrounding them.

C. Preserving the cultivable area whenever possible.

Second, construction expansion around cities:

The following must be taken into consideration in selecting these lands:

Turning fundamentally toward the desert lands or the agriculturally unproductive lands.

B. Conducting studies for integration with a city's populated area.

C. Studying the road networks.

D. The capacity of the utility networks.

E. Conducting studies on the qualities of the soil.

Third, new cities:

The following must be taken into consideration in determining their locations:

A. The possibility of providing them with utilities economically.

B. Conducting studies on the qualities of the soil and the topography of the locations.

C. Their proximity to quarries.

D. Determining the area of each city in the light of a complete study of its economic components.

3-2: Estimates of Utilities Required by Proposed National Housing Plan

The comprehensive housing plan is based on constructing 3.6 million housing units by the year 2000. It is proposed that 675,000 units be built during the first five-year plan.

3-2-1: To estimate the utility requirements, the following principles and assumptions have been formulated:

A. The costs of the public utilities and their requirements will be estimated on the basis of the areas of land needed for the plan, their locations and their population density.

B. A total of 75 percent (20,250 feddans) of the lands required are located within existing developed areas and their expansion and having a population density of 140 persons per feddan, i.e. with a total population of 2,835,000 people.

C. A total of 25 percent of the required lands (6,750 feddans) are located within the new cities and with a population density of 80 persons per feddan, i.e. with a total population of 540,000 people.

This produces a general population density average of 125 persons per feddan.

3-2-2: Immediate Costs of First (1981-85) Plan:

By examining the data and studies received from the state sectors concerned and in light of the estimates on population density and land acreage, it has been possible to conclude the cost per person per utility on the basis of the 1979 prices and the total costs per person in terms of all the utilities (water, sewerage, electricity, roads, transportation and telephones) as follows:

A. A total of 360 pounds per person in the construction expansions within the populated areas.

B. A total of 720 pounds per person in the cities.

Thus, the total costs of the utilities amounts to:

A sum of 1,021,000,000 pounds in the populated areas and their expansions.

A sum of 388 million pounds in the new cities.

This produces total costs of 1,409,000,000 pounds, or nearly 1.41 billion pounds, distributed as follows over the various utilities:

	Costs (in one million pounds)
Roads	324
Drinking Water	238
Sewerage and Drainage	277
Electricity and Lighting	151
Telephones	307
Means of Transportation	112
Grand Total	1,409

3-2-3: Costs of Meeting Existing Shortage:

As a result of the comprehensive studies on the plans and of the data supplied to the committee, it has been possible to estimate the costs of the works needed to

meet the existing shortage in the water, sewerage and electricity utilities--utilities which must be secured to make it possible to provide services to the housing proposed in the 1981-85 five-year plan, in addition to the costs of the immediate plan. These costs have been estimated as follows:

Utility	Costs of Meeting Shortage (in Million Pounds)
Water Utility	400
Sewerage and Drainage Utility	534
Electricity Utility	100
Total Costs of Meeting Shortage	1,034

This figure does not include any sums for the shortages existing in the telephone, transportation and road utilities.

3-2-4: Total Costs of Utilities for 1981-85 Five-Year Plan:

	In Million Pounds
A. Immediate Costs of Various Utilities (Roads, Drinking Water, Sewerage, Electricity, Telephones and Transportation	1,410
B. Costs of Meeting Existing Shortages in Water, Sewerage and Electricity Utilities	1,034
Grand Total	2,444

In light of the studies on the possibilities of implementation, it is proposed that the grand total be reduced by 10 percent. Thus, the grand total costs of the utilities amounts to 2.2 billion pounds.

3-2-5: Immediate Costs of 1986-2000 Plan:

After addition of the telephone services required according to the authority's [presumably telephone authority] plan, the total costs of the utilities per person in the expansions rise to 460 pounds instead of 360 pounds. Thus, the cost of the utilities in the new expansions amounts to 87,750X140X460=5,651,000,000 pounds.

The cost of the utilities in the new cities amounts to 29,250X80X720=1,685,000,000 pounds.

The grand total is 7,336,000,000 pounds or nearly 7.34 billion pounds.

The grand total of the immediate costs of the utilities plan and of the costs to meet the shortage in the first (1981-85) plan thus amounts to: 2,444+7,340 = 9,784,000,000 pounds.

This figure does not include the appropriations necessary to meet the current shortage in the telephones, roads and means of transportation.

3-3: Estimate of Requirements of Proposed National Plan in Construction Sector

3-3-1: In view of the fact that the volume of construction, including housing, amounts to nearly 45 percent of the development plan's investments, this makes clear the extent of the impact of the construction sector's capability on the economic and social development plans.

Following is a chart of the construction volume and housing volume in 1979 and in the first and last year of the 1981-85 five-year plan:

Year	Construction Volume (in million pounds)	Part Allocated for Housing (in million pounds)
1979	1,000	255
1981	1,230	530
1985	2,220	770

To make it possible to meet the requirements of the ambitious housing plan seeking to build 675,000 housing units from 1981 to 1985, the housing volume in 1981, the first year of the plan, must amount to double the targeted volume this year (i.e. 530 millions to 255 millions).

This volume rises successively during the years of the plan which begins in 1981 with the construction of 110,000 units and ends in 1985 with the construction of 160,000 units.

This explains the importance of starting and speeding up the preparation bolstering and development of the construction sector in the remaining part of this year and in 1980 so that this sector may be able to meet the urgent housing requirements as of 1981 and so that it may, at the same time, be able to meet the construction requirements in spheres other than housing.

The housing policy seeks to develop the role of the private and joint sector in the contracts so that this role may amount to implementing 75 percent of the housing projects with the end of the 1981-85 five-year plan and so that the public sector companies may implement 25 percent of the housing projects, concentrated mainly in the low-economy housing.

3-3-2: Present Position of Construction Sector Companies:

The construction companies are divided into:

A. Contracting companies (public sector) controlled by the Ministries of Housing and Development, numbering 29 companies. These companies implement nearly 50 percent of the construction plan (these companies implemented in 1978 a work volume valued at 526 million pounds compared to a targeted volume of 462 million pounds, i.e. with an increase of 12 percent representing the rise in costs).

B. Contracting companies (public sector) controlled by the other ministries and agencies. These companies implement nearly 25 percent of the construction plan.

C. Contracting companies (private sector) and joint companies. These companies implement nearly 25 percent of the construction plan.

The current position of the public sector contracting companies can be summed up by stating that in their entirety, these companies carry out a work volume that exceeds the targeted volume. However, they face numerous obstacles that pose a threat to the existence of many of them, the most important being the obstacle of the severe shortage in monetary liquidity, the inability to collect the debts due them by others, amounting to 325 million pounds in 1978, and the shortages and bottlenecks in the main construction materials, such as cement and reinforcement iron. The deficit in the capital of these companies is estimated at 46 million pounds.

There also exists a vast disparity between the capabilities of these companies, considering that there are three major companies that carry out 50 percent of the total volume of work implemented by all the companies, numbering 29 companies. Moreover, the net assets of these three companies amount to 63 percent of the net assets of all the companies.

Moreover, the prefabricated housing plants, totaling 11 altogether, have not started practical production yet.

There is no doubt that these conditions must be remedied immediately so that production may be raised to realize the ambitious plans.

As for the private sector companies and contractors, it has become evident that their number amounts to 3,472 companies and contractors, most of them small contractors. A work volume amounting to 320 million pounds was entrusted to them in 1978, in addition to the joint companies. These companies undertake the construction of middle-income, above middle-income and luxury housing, as well as other projects. The volume of the work of the private and joint sector contractors amounts to nearly 25 percent of the total construction plan.

After examination of the method of assigning projects, it is proposed that the methods of bids and of assigning be combined when necessary.

3-3-3: Determination of Goals Required of Construction Sector:

The requirements of the construction plans until the year 1985 have been calculated generally, with stress on the requirements of housing in the same period. Following is a summary of these two plans:

Year	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Housing Plan	530	603	650	690	770
Construction Plan in Spheres Other Than Housing	700	800	940	1,070	1,770
Total Construction Volume (in million pounds)	1,230	1,403	1,590	1,760	2,220

A detailed study on labor, equipment and material requirements has also been conducted.

Concerning Skilled Labor:

The skilled labor currently available in the sphere of construction amounts to 250,000 workers. This figure must be raised to reach 660,000 workers in 1985, as will be pointed out later.

Concerning Equipment:

It is proposed that 600 million pounds be appropriated for developing and bolstering the equipment resources during the 1981-85 plan, provided that the appropriations start with 100 million pounds for 1981 and that they be raised gradually to 140 million pounds in 1985 to meet the requirements of the construction plans (estimated at 1979 prices).

In light of the proposed percentage of the housing levels (55 percent low-economy housing, 38 percent middle-income housing and eight percent above middle-income housing), on the basis of the average prices prevalent at the start of this year and in light of the architectural patterns proposed by the Committee for Housing Designs, the costs of the housing units in the 1981-85 plan have been estimated on the basis of certain percentile distribution between the public and private sector companies. The costs of public service buildings and the proper allowances for remote areas have also been added.

Following is a chart of the estimated costs of the 1981-85 housing plan, taking into consideration the gradual increase in the private sector's share in implementing the housing projects:

Year	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Number of Units (in 1,000)	110	125	135	145	160
Public Sector's Share of Housing Plan [presumably in million pounds]	150	160	170	180	190
Private Sector's Share of Housing Plan [presumably in million pounds]	380	443	480	510	580
Total Cost of Plan	530	603	650	690	770
Percentage of Public Sector's Share to Total	28%	27%	26%	26%	25%

3-3-4: Developing Construction Sector to Meet Plan Requirements

For the construction sector to be able to shoulder its part in implementing the plan, it is proposed that the following important measures be taken:

First, regulation of construction companies' activities:

For the construction sector to be able to perform its part in implementing the plan, it is required that:

A. Balance and equal opportunities be realized in assigning works to the companies so as to make it possible to exploit all the resources and to create competition in order to control the prices through limited bid invitations offered to each group of companies within their field of specialization and their capabilities and in light of the geographic location of these companies' operations.

B. Participation by the public sector companies in the low-economy housing projects when necessary through direct assignment, provided that the volume of work assigned is compatible with the capability of each company and is in accordance with prices studied in advance.

C. Bolster capabilities of infrastructure and sanitary works companies.

D. Encourage the private sector to take part in the finishing work necessary for the housing projects.

E. Organize the economic units technically, financially and administratively.

F. Correct the capital of the public sector companies and strengthen them financially.

G. Set up a stable central national construction agency and determine its powers to make them compatible with the requirements of implementing the construction plans scientifically.

Second, development of construction methods to raise productivity:

It is necessary to develop the performance regarding the quarrying, land survey, soil research, soil works, concrete and iron works, bindings, building works and finishing works.

Special stress must be laid on mechanization in construction work and coordination must be established among the research, designing, manufacturing and building agencies. The importance of mechanization as a basis for the development is underlined in view of the expected labor shortage compared to the volume of the plan.

Coordination among the research, designing, manufacturing and building agencies should be established through drawing up standard specifications for all construction and complementary work, through taking maximum advantage of the available local [construction] materials and raw materials and through developing the tile industry and the plastics industries for the production of electrical appliances, bathroom appliances and sanitary appliances in order to do away with importation gradually.

This is in addition to raising productivity through a scientific management of the work sites, through developing the wage system and through paying attention to the controls necessary to realize a balance in these wages. It is also necessary to set standard performance rates and to pay attention to the cost [accounting] systems and to the controls necessary to curtail the rise in prices.

Third: prefabricated buildings industry:

As for the 11 plants for the production of prefabricated houses that are owned by the companies of the Ministries of Housing and of Development and that have cost 60 million pounds, their entire work is based on producing large size and heavy supporting walls. The operation of these plants has been started and their production is still very limited in comparison to what was targeted for them.

From reviewing the system of producing supporting walls, it has become evident that this type of production is highly costly in comparison to other types, in addition to the presence of obstacles that face these plants.

Fourth, labor:

As for skilled labor and craftsmen in the construction sector, a complete plan has been proposed to meet the requirements of the current phase, to overcome the existing shortage in craftsmen, to provide specialized training to prepare supervisory and executive elements and to outline the forms of international cooperation in this sphere.

Following is a summary of this plan:

Year	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Skilled Workers Needed for Plan (in 1,000)	300	350	420	480	450	600	660
Number of Instructors Needed to Provide Training	700	1,000	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400	1,400
Total Financial Requirements of Plan (in million pounds)	10	16	16	13	8	8	8

It is proposed that the construction training setup controlled by the Ministry of Development be bolstered and developed or that it be turned into a public authority with full powers to supervise and develop the training activity so as to meet the plan's requirements, to study the labor market in the Arab and African states and to take part in linking technical and university education with the actual needs of the construction sector.

3-4: National Plan's Requirements of Construction Materials

3-4-1: The percentage of construction materials in construction components varies according to the type of project. At the general average, this percentage amounts to the equivalent of 30 percent of the construction investments in the plan and nearly 45 percent of the construction investments in housing. Perhaps this makes clear the special importance of the materials which affect directly implementation of the national plan generally and of the housing projects in particular. As a result of the presence of numerous bottlenecks in construction materials in recent years, there has been extreme instability in the programs for the implementation of projects and, consequently, schedule overruns. It can be said as an estimate that

the construction capacity could have been raised by no less than 15 percent if the construction materials had been available at the right time.

One of the main factors causing the emergence of those bottlenecks was the failure to provide the investments necessary to preserve the capacity of the plants producing the main and predominant materials, such as iron, cement and cinder blocks, not to mention the failure to secure the investments necessary for the expansions needed to increase production to meet the rising requirements of the development plans. As a result of this situation, the state has incurred big financial burdens in free currencies to import the needed materials. This trend will continue for a while and until the replacement and expansion projects for the production of various materials are carried out.

3-4-2: Estimate of Areas of Housing and Service Buildings in 1981-85 Plan:

On the basis of an average housing unit area of the various types of housing scheduled to be built according to the proposed plan, the total acreage for housing, in addition to the acreage needed for the services required by this housing, has been calculated and the figures have amounted to what is shown in the following chart:

Total Acreage for Housing and Services in 1981-85 Plan:

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Total Area in Square Meters, Including Area for Services	6,610,000	7,510,000	8,110,000	8,710,000	9,620,000

3-4-3: Estimate of Volume of Construction Materials Needed for 1981-85 Five-Year Housing:

To estimate the volume of the needed materials, the main construction materials needed for constructing 100 square meters of housing and service buildings have been calculated. By applying these calculated figures to the areas and buildings already defined, the quantities of the basic materials necessary for housing construction during the years of the plan have been estimated. The volume of these basic materials amounts to the following:

Volume in Millions

Material	Unit	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Gravel	Cubic meters	2,664	3,004	3,244	3,484	3,848
Sand	Cubic meters	2,975	3,280	3,650	3,920	4,330
Cement	Tons	1,322	1,502	1,622	1,743	1,924
Reinforcement Iron	Tons	0,152	0,173	0.186	0,200	0,221
Cinder Blocks	Units	594.0	676.0	730.0	784.0	866.0 [sic]

3-4-4: Study on Construction Materials Situation:

The construction materials situation has been studied in three groups as follows:

A. First group, namely the natural construction materials including sand, gravel, natural stones, basalt, granite and marble.

These materials are available in abundance in numerous parts of the country. However, the major part is still produced in primitive manual methods and it is necessary to begin the use of modern mechanized means of quarrying, whether in terms of breaking, cutting, shaking [sic] or transportation, so as to acquire products with qualities compatible with the standard specifications, that help to raise the standard of implementation and that improve the economics of operation, especially in regard to the use of reinforced cement which requires good gravel of various sizes.

B. Second group, including the main manufactured materials including reinforcement iron, cement, cinder blocks, wood, lime, gypsum, glass, clay piping, non-metal sanitary appliances, porcelain tiles, ceramics, cast iron piping and galvanized iron piping.

A survey has been conducted on the production volume and consumption volume of these materials. The current production, in addition to the [future] production of the projects under implementation and the projects on which agreement has been reached will be enough to meet the plan's requirements of all materials, except for reinforcement iron, cement, wood, cinder blocks and cast iron piping.

Following are the details concerning these materials:

3-4-5: Reinforcement Iron:

This material is not just one of the predominant materials in the construction industry but is also one of the general strategic materials. It has become evident from the statistics that there will be a constant shortage in the production of reinforcement iron throughout the years of the plan. The shortage will be as follows:

In 1,000 Tons

Index	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Total Local Production	280	325	325	385	528	965	1,155
Requirements	624	690	760	837	920	1,000	1,105
Shortage or Surplus	-344	-365	-365	-452	-392	- 35	+ 50

The currently available steel rolling [al-darfalah] capabilities will start production at full capacity as of 1982 and will realize maximum capacity in 1982 as a result of the start of production by the fourth furnace in the Steel and Iron Complex.

Another increase in production will appear in 1984 as a result of the new al-Dakhilah project and without the addition of any new production lines to the existing plants. It is worth noting that there was a plan for a new project in al-Sadat City--al-Khatatibah previously--with a production capacity of 400,000 tons. Work on this project was stopped due to the shortage of stocks ['uruq] in the production of the Hulwan plants.

In view of the fact that the costs of local production are still lower than the price of imported iron, it is required that the expansion projects be reconsidered and expedited, especially since the fourth furnace in the Iron and Steel Complex has been put into operation and has added 600,000 tons to the annual production capacity. It is required that the project for the production of rolled iron in al-Sadat City, with its annual production capacity of 400,000 tons annually, be expedited. This should be done in addition to implementing the steel and iron complex in al-Dakhilah (a project with a production capacity of 700,000 tons annually). Consideration should also be given to adding new iron rolling lines to the existing plants.

It is to be noted that an imported ton of reinforcement iron costs nearly 350 dollars at present whereas the investment required to produce a ton of this kind of iron is 1,000 [figure as published] dollars only.

3-4-6: Cement:

Cement is the overwhelmingly predominant material in the construction industry generally and in housing in particular. The cement industry in Egypt is one of the old industries in which we have formed numerous specializations and experts. However, in the past 10 years, the investments necessary to preserve or enhance the capacity of the existing plants to meet the needs of the development plans and to produce a surplus for exportation have not been available.

The following chart shows the production, requirements, shortage and surplus in the 1979-1985 period:

Volume in Million Tons

Index	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Total Production of Plants	3.600	4.500	5.950	9.010	11.650	15.150	15.600
Demand	6.432	7.072	7.432	8.064	8.760	9.488	10.312
Shortage or Surplus	-2.832	-2.572	-1.483	+0.946	+2.890	+5.662	+5.288

In view of the importance of planning for this vital commodity, it is proposed that stress be laid on the following elements influencing the cement industry:

A. A sound economic situation requires that a general plan be formulated for the locations of the new cement plants, taking into consideration the availability of raw materials, consumption areas, environmental protection and transportation potentials. The proximity of plants to populated areas affects not only man's health but

also affects crops. Moreover, such proximity adds a heavy burden which the road networks cannot handle.

B. It is necessary to continue implementation of the projects for which contracts have already been concluded and the new expansion projects according to the schedules agreed upon because it is noticed that there has been a delay in implementing the current projects. Such delay results in enormous financial burdens. In 1979, a million tons valued at 100 million dollars at the import price were calculated [sentence as published].

C. Postpone scrapping [takhrid] any of the furnaces currently in operation when production reaches the point of exceeding the local consumption needs because these furnaces, despite their low productivity, still produce cement at a much lower cost than that of imported cement.

The investment required to produce a ton of cement amounts to nearly 150 dollars at the current prices.

3-4-7: Cinder Blocks:

Cinder blocks are the basic material for the construction of walls. The main variety produced so far is still the red brick. Before construction of the high dam, the production of this variety of bricks depended mainly on the silt carried by the Nile River flooding. This source has been cut off now and, consequently, the brick plants have resorted to scraping off top soil from cultivable lands or to gathering this type of soil from the islands in the Nile River. Such practices pose a grave danger to the agricultural resources and to the fertility of the soil.

The tendency to produce alternatives to red bricks in the preceding period has been very slow and this has led to the serious present situation which must be tackled with all the means possible.

The construction of plants producing calcareous sand bricks and clay bricks as alternatives to red bricks has started recently. The following chart shows the production of the various types of bricks, the demand volume and the shortage in the 1979-1985 period:

Volume in One Million Bricks

Index	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Total Production of All Types	2,389	2,574	2,978	3,365	5,340	3,665	3,705
Demand	3,152	3,465	3,642	3,951	4,292	4,649	5,053
Deficit	763	891	664	586	752	984	1,348

It is evident from this chart that there will be a serious shortage in production throughout the years of the plan. Considering that it is unreasonable to import bricks from abroad and that the mere transportation of bricks for long distances internally is uneconomical, it is necessary to expand the production of brick alternatives, the most important being:

A. Clay bricks for which the raw materials are abundantly available in the various parts of the country.

B. Calcareous sand bricks for which the raw materials are also easily available in most of the governorates.

C. Gypsum blocks and slabs as a by-product of the gypsum plants.

Insofar as production is concerned, the production that will be turned out by the existing red brick plants after they are developed to use desert clay instead of clay from cultivable lands has also been taken into account. The inclination toward this development must be encouraged with all the means, including facilitating the financing necessary for the private sector plants to introduce this development. These plants produce 1.8 billion bricks annually. The investment necessary to produce 10 million bricks from desert clay amounts to one million pounds whereas investment necessary to develop the local red brick plants amounts to nearly 100,000 pounds for every 6 million bricks.

3-4-8: Wood

The country depends fundamentally on importing the wood necessary for various kinds of uses. The 1978 consumption amounted to 950,000 cubic meters of various kinds of wood which can be divided into three categories:

First category: This category concerns the types used in construction work and includes the wood used for bindings [al-shaddat] and scaffolding in which the (filirian, white, latzana and muski) veins are used.

Second category: This category concerns the types of wood used for the production of doors and windows and building requirements for which the (muski), Swedish, (ablacage) wood and bamboo are used.

Third category: It concerns the types of wood used for furniture, including bamboos, (kunter, ablacage) and various types of veneer. There are other types of wood such as the (aru), Turkish walnut wood, oal wood, mahogany, (al-tabk), (al-'azizi) and (al-binu) wood varieties. These are types of wood used for various special purposes.

As for granulated [al-habibi] and plywood, they are also used in wood bindings and in the production of some types of inexpensive windows and furniture. The local production capacity of these types of wood is as follows:

Plywood Plant in al-Mansurah	9,000 tons
Plywood Plant in (Farskur)	6,000 tons
Granulated Wood Plant in Kawm Ambu	13,000 tons
Granulated Wood Plant in Tanta	10,000 tons
Grand Total	38,000 tons

There are proposed plans to raise the capacity of these plants by 58,000 tons. But it is necessary to exert efforts to develop these plants and to treat (their products) with special chemicals to expand their uses and to enhance their durability.

It is expected that the total requirements of the 1981-85 plan of the various kinds of wood will amount to nearly 6.5 million cubic meters (i.e. an average of 1.3 million cubic meters annually).

It is necessary to exert efforts to produce local alternatives to the imported kinds of wood, such as metal bindings instead of the (filirian) veins, aluminum windows and partitions instead of wooden ones and alternatives for other uses.

3-4-9: Cast Iron Piping:

This type of piping is used for sanitary drainage works. Even though many countries have begun to produce plastic piping as an alternative, this kind of production has not been introduced in Egypt on a broad scale yet. Cast iron piping is produced fundamentally by the plants of the Cairo Metal Products Company, the Delta Steel Company and al-Nasr Cast-Iron Products Company, in addition to a number of small private sector companies. The following chart shows the production and the requirements throughout the years of the plan:

Volume in 1,000 Tons

Index	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Total Production (Public & Private Sector)	21	24	27	28	29
Requirements	30.9	35.1	37.95	40.8	45
Deficit	9.9	11.1	10.95	12.8	16

Enough cast iron piping is imported at present to make up for the annual deficit in production. It must be noted that the production of some companies in the private sector does not meet the specification, that it is produced in primitive ways and that the use of this production results in damage to buildings. Therefore, it is necessary to give consideration to raising the production of the existing plants whose products meet the standard specifications in order to make up for the apparent deficit.

The investments needed to produce a single ton of cast iron amount to 500 dollars.

3-4-10: Floors [al-ardiyat]:

It is proposed that the production of Canaltex Company and of the private and joint sectors be raised to reach one million square meters annually as of 1985. This requires an investment of 4.8 million pounds, of which 3.3 millions are in foreign currency.

3-4-11: Paints:

The country still imports the needed volume of paints exceeding the local production. The following chart shows the total local production, the requirements and the annual deficit during the years 1979-1985:

[No Unit Given]

Index	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Total Production	22,500	30,000	32,500	32,500	32,500	32,500	32,500
Requirements	29,250	33,640	38,700	44,490	51,170	58,840	67,670
Deficit	6,750	3,640	6,200	11,990	18,670	26,340	35,170

It is proposed that the deficit be made up for through encouraging the private and joint sectors to set up plants for the production of paints, varnish and (ratinjat), keeping in mind that the average investment needed for the production of a single ton [of paint] amounts to nearly 360 pounds.

3-4-12: Miscellaneous:

What is meant here are the various metal pieces necessary for the operation [sic] of windows and doors. (Sabi) Company turns out nearly 80 percent of local production and the rest is produced by small and scattered shops in the private sector.

It has been impossible to survey this miscellaneous production or the volume imported. However, the initial figures indicate that to meet the major part of the plan's requirements, it is necessary to double Sabi's production. It has actually become evident that this company has the potentials for such expansion. An investment of 3 million pounds, 20 percent of them in local currency, is needed for this expansion. This investment should start with an appropriation of one million pounds in 1980.

3-4-13: Requirements in Sanitary Appliances:

The country is experiencing big difficulties as a result of the failure of the locally produced sanitary appliances to meet the standard specifications, especially faucets and flush tanks that get damaged quickly, thus causing an excessive water consumption and the subsequent abnormal pressure on the sanitary sewerage networks and damage to installations.

Sabi Company is one of the few sources that produce these requirements according to the standard specifications. However, the company's production of these types of appliances, amounting in value to 200,000 pounds in 1978, represents only a very small part of the requirements. The rest is produced by small plants and foundries owned by the private sector. These plants and foundries often fail to observe the standard specifications.

Therefore, Sabi's production must be raised in accordance with the discussions held with the company's management. The production of certain essential kinds of appliances must be raised to meet all the local needs.

3-4-14: Glass:

The state is still importing to meet its annual needs of glass. The following chart shows the annual production and the country's needs during the years of the plan:

Volume in 1,000 Tons

Production	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Shubra al-Khaymah Plant		23	23	23	23	10	20
10 Ramadan Plant (New)	-	-	-	-	30	60	75
Total	23 [sic]	23	23	23	53	70	95
Country's Needs	51	54	57.5	61	65	69.5	85
Deficit or Surplus	-28	-31	-34.5	-38	-12	+0.5	+10

To produce the glass needed during the years of the plan, it is necessary to make the appropriations necessary to implement the new glass production project in the 10 Ramadan City--appropriations amounting to nearly 70 million pounds, of which 40 millions are in foreign currency--to make it possible to meet the country's needs and to stop importation.

3-4-15: The investments needed to produce the main construction materials have been increased. The increase has included the projects under construction, the projects under study and the projects needed to meet the plan's requirements.

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MUSLIM LEAGUE RAPS QADHDHAFI

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 22 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

MENA, Oct. 21 (SPA) — The Muslim World League issued a statement here Tuesday vigorously condemning President Muammar Qaddafi of Libya for attacking the Kingdom and belittling the value of the pilgrimage.

The constituent assembly of the league categorically rejected Qaddafi's claims made during a speech in his country recently, that the United States was occupying the holy places in the Kingdom and that its warplanes were overflying the holy places. "The only planes that were seen over the areas were helicopters flown by Saudi Arabian pilots," the statement said.

It condemned Qaddafi's sarcastic remarks about the pilgrimage and reiterated the significance of the ritual as one of the fundamental pillars of the faith.

"The members of the assembly strongly denounce the allegations made by Qaddafi which have nothing to do with the facts," the statement said. "His claims that the holy places of Mecca and Medina were occupied are totally unfounded as two million pilgrims, including those from Libya, have seen for themselves. Nor were there any American planes screaming over Mecca, Medina and Arafat as he claimed.

"The assembly denounces the use of Islamic sacred places in political controversies and slander matches because such use will hurt the feelings of Muslims and create doubts and dissension as well as offend the reputation of Islam. His attack on the pilgrimage and his ridiculing of the rites are a clear transgression of the holy rites of Islam as if Qaddafi denied the word of God who exhorted the people to uphold his rites and seek his forgiveness.

"Such pronouncements are unfit to be made by the head of a state whose people have been known for their religious zeal and heroic struggle for the sake of Islam over the ages.

"His appeal for jihad, holy struggle, to liberate the holy places from the Americans and Christians as he claimed, instead of peforming the pilgrimage, is a call to suspend the holy rite behind a false screen in the name of jihad.

"He also attempts to incite bloodshed of Muslims in the holy months in the holy places of this holy land. His call is also aimed at diverting the attention and efforts of Muslims from their main battlefield, to liberate Palestine and the holy city of Jerusalem from zionist occupation.

"Qaddafi should have appealed to the Islamic states of Iran and Iraq to stop fighting and unite their resources and those of other Muslims to liberate the occupied lands."

The assembly appealed to all Muslim leaders to strive for the unification of Muslims to help those Islamic nations which are subject to aggression everywhere.

The statement was signed by 31 members from Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Singapore, Cameroon, Egypt, Palestine, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Uganda, Afghanistan Kashmir, Mali, Niger Sudan Jordan, Upper Volta, Gambia, Nepal, Qatar, Kuwait, Tunis, Mauritania, Burma, Libya, Chad and Bahrain.

CSO: 4820

NATIONAL SYRIAN SOCIAL PARTY CHIEF INTERVIEWED ON LEBANON

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 26 Aug 80 pp 18-19

[Interview with Chief of National Syrian Social Party In'am R'ad by Salih Qallab; date and place not given]

[Text] "In'am R'ad in Lengthy Interview with AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM; Sarkis Followed Erroneous Course in Dealing with Crisis; He Tried To Throw Ball in Court of Syria and National Movement; Al-Huss, Karami, Malik Salam Are National Movement's Candidates for Prime Minister; We Reject the Accord That Constitutes Cover for Zionist Sympathizers; Sarkis Vetoed Most Successful Lebanese Prime Minister; We Are in Process of Formulating National Position Again; We Will Fight To Defend Every Inch of Lebanon."

The National Syrian Social Party elected In'am R'ad its new president early this August. He will succeed Dr 'Abdallah Sa'adah who is devoting himself to national missions outside organizational frameworks.

In'am R'ad is a well-known figure who needs no introduction. In addition to being one of the deputies of the chairman of the National Movement's Central Political Council, he has played a very prominent role throughout the last harsh years in Lebanon.

Before that In'am R'ad was known as a strong and an unyielding fighter. He moved from one location to another and from one sector to another in the battle for national and democratic struggle. Because of his clear positions he was harassed, and most Arab borders were closed to him.

In addition to this, In'am R'ad is known for meticulously keeping up with matters and for assuming positions. He is famous for not subjecting judgements to abstract logic despite the fact that he is a lawyer. R'ad subjects his judgements to the circumstances of concrete material facts which are consistent with the supreme national and pan-Arab interests.

If an interview with In'am R'ad always assumes the quality of universality and produces something new with every time, an interview with him at this stage assumes its importance from the fact that the man is in a position of responsbility. He is one of those who are privy to the secrets of affairs, and he is one of those who take

part in making decisions. In this interview which was conducted with him by AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM In'am Ra'd speaks with considerable candor and clarity. When he talks, he always tends to gather information. He is not satisfied with analysis. Therefore, what he said [in the interview] appears like a storehouse of information that allows the observer and the reader to draw [his own] conclusions and positions.

[Question] It is being said that the current crisis of government is the prelude to the coming presidential battle. What is your opinion of the National Movement?

[Answer] The [factor] which prescribes the organization of government or sets forth the crisis of government transcends this political emergency, if one may use that term. The [factor] which prescribes a governmental crisis lies in the continued absence of a solution to a set of questions and problems, and that leads to the destruction of the legitimate authority in Lebanon and to the fragmentation of the unity of its land, its people and its institutions.

These are the questions that were presented in the initiative of the Lebanese National Movement a few months ago. They were adopted by the president in the message in which he proclaimed what was described as indisputable principles concering the pan-Arab identity of Lebanon and its Arab commitment. [The president] rejected all forms of division and affirmed the unity of Lebanon and all the other principal questions as well.

The principles of national accord have suffered a major setback because it is not enough to proclaim those principles as theoretical indisputable principles and then to contradict them in practice, in fact, on the field. This is actually what happened with the establishment of the divided forms of the Phalangist state.

Defining one's position vis-a-vis this phenomenon has become the standard for gauging the credibility of the principles of accord on the one hand, as well as the credibility of the legitimate government's commitment to the principles it proclaimed. And yet, there is now a huge gap between the principles of accord and practices, as compared with those who voilated the principles of accord.

This is the actual crisis of the government; it goes beyond government organization.

Therefore, when the file of the recent government crisis was opened, our party had a specific position. We emphasized these questions, and we refused involvement in the ministerial fair beyond the questions and beyond how to solve and realize them.

We considered, or rather, we proclaimed the two slogans of accord, whatever the case may be, leading to a government of activitis to be leading not to a solution but rather to the continuation of the crisis. What is required is a solution to the crisis. Accordingly, it was our opinion to harden the national position, not for the purpose of escalating the crisis, but rather because the purpose of this hardening is to achieve correct solutions to the crisis instead of continuing to [come up with] stopgap solutions. The majority of the Lebanese people who reject partition and Zionism must resolve again their public will to prescribe to the government a formula of government that would oppose the distasteful divisive forms that appeared after the 7 July massacre in some areas that are under the control of the Phalangist militias. Otherwise, embracing these forms without impairing them and bringing their advocates to government would be a course in the same mode that is being proclaimed by some Arabs under the slogan of Arab solidarity. This is the course through which those Arabs are trying to restore al-Sadat to the Arab rank.

Embracing treason cannot be construed as solidarity just as embracing Zionism and partition cannot be construed as national accord. This is our view of the basic questions in the Lebanese crisis which, as I said, may be reflected on the next president. However, this is not the basis [for the crisis]; the basis is the objectivity of these questions which constitute the features of the Lebanese crisis and how it is to be confronted.

[Question] On this basis do you believe that the government crisis will be prolonged?

[Answer] The Lebanese crisis is lengthy, but the government's crisis may be shortened if we were to bring a government that would confront the Lebanese crisis. This is the sound premise: to select persons in relation to the questions. Our hope would then be great for solving the questions. If we were to bring [to government] a homogeneous working team on the basis of a program for solving these questions, these questions will be solved.

This is the formula as we see it from here. We insisted that we begin with the subject of the prime minister after we complete a redefinition of the questions because the prime minister symbolizes the government.

We may be asked, "Why do we want to redefine the questions since they have been defined in the president's message and in the principles of accord with which you began?"

We would say because new facts have emerged on the scene. The position vis-a-vis these facts must be redefined; a detailed program must be designed; and a prime minister must be brought who can confront these questions and adhere to this program.

In this context the names of three political figures emerge: Dr Salim al-Huss, Mr Malik Salam and Mr Rashid Karami. They can be listed in any order you wish to use, but these three names, in our opinion, are those which are suitable to [the task of] bearing the burdens of this stage.

[Question] It is believed that the purpose of the president's proposal of a government of political activists was to embarrass the National Movement and to embarrass Syria.

[Answer] President Sarkis is the president of the Republic of Lebanon. We are supposed to treat him with respect, but the political realities also require that we speak objectively in a manner that does not comply with anyone.

Our evaluation of President Sarkis's course is that it is erroneous. We told him so when we met him, and we also told the people throughout the year in the statements and announcements we made. First, President Sarkis used to start out by making a wager on the crisis in the entire area. Perhaps some of his advisers helped him in making such a wager.

It is our opinion that Lebanon has no choice in the matter of geography or in that of national destiny regarding the matter of determining its position vis-a-vis the crisis in the area. In his accord message President Sarkis ultimately came to proclaiming [Lebanon's] rejection of Camp David. This was a significant and a good state of affairs, but I believe that this rejection came very late, that is, approximately 1 year after the Camp David [accords] were announced. Lebanese policy, however,

remained as though it were fluctuating between two positions. We support a Lebanese policy that adheres to our pan-Arab surroundings and our pan-Arab depth. That is, we support a policy that is totally allied with Syria and with the Opposition and Resistance Front.

We are saying that Lebanon cannot possibly dissociate itself from this pan-Arab commitment.

It is true that in return Lebanon did sacrifice more for the cause of nationalism in opposing the Zionist enemy. But this is an honorable [course] for Lebanon and something to its credit even though it represents a material, moral and a historical burden to it.

We are proud of all those who become victims and all those who lost their lives in battle; and we are proud of all the land that has been scorched. This is a very small price to pay for forging national freedom. If it is the historical and geographic destiny of Lebanon to have the battles of the pan-Arab question fought on its territory, this would be a great honor for it.

Implied in this commitment is an idea [for solving the crisis] other than that which states, "Let us use the hardships that Syria is facing and the difficulties that the resistance is facing to impose the de facto government that we wish."

We oppose such an opportunist policy because it departs from the essential commitment to pan-Arab destiny. This is not a commitment to accommodate. Official Lebanon may not continue to be accomodating on the pan-Arab question.

This is a basic point. A second point is the fact that whenever the Lebanese Front breaks up, President Sarkis tries to restore respect to it and to its remains on the basis of his view that these remains represent the political Maronites.

In this area we disagree with President Sarkis in this line of thinking. When the events began, the Lebanese Front did in fact represent Christian and Maronite clout. In this regard, however, we want to emphasize that a Christian majority had rejected the Lebanese Front since 1975. At the forefront of that majority was our Syrian National Social party which extends across all sects; its Christian base fought with heroism and with courage in the heart of al-Jabal.

But now the objective reality has changed to the better. The Lebanese Front broke up, and President Franjiyyah, who was its president and the president of the republic, dissociated himself from it because he has always chosen his pan-Arab and national commitment over any suspect relationship with the enemy; and the general staff of the front had become involved in such a relationship.

President Franjiyyah paid a high price for this national and pan-Arab commitment: his son, his family and the victims who lost their lives with him in the massacre.

President Franjiyyah was a power base in the Lebanese Front. The fact that he left the Lebanese Front and presided over the National Christian Group was a major gain for Lebanon and for Arabism. President Sarkis should have embraced this gain in the interests of legitimacy and the unity of Lebanon. However, President Sarkis and the legitimate government developed a Sulayman Franjiyyah complex, and this is a matter that boggles the minds and the hearts.

And here we can see how the Phalangists are devouring their Sham'un ally!

Notwithstanding our opinion and our evaluation of Sham'un and of the extent of his ties and because of the position we have taken on him, he is still in his course and in his conduct a member of the Lebanese Front. However, a bloody conflict did occur between him and the Phalangists. Consequently, the Phalangists became isolated in the face of a vast Christian majority.

Therefore, when President Sarkis sets forth [the notion of] a government of activists, he should not afterwards hesitate to place the Phalangists on one scale of a balance and all of Lebanon with its various parties, sects, political forces and activists on the other scale.

The Phalangists have become a party that controls two and one half districts of Lebanon. This party is deferred to on this basis. But if armed people do have clout, this is another matter. We believe that the clout which armed people have is not always in the interests of the Phalangists. The legitimate government is not supposed to evaluate matters on the basis of the power wielded by armed people, but rather on the basis of popular effectiveness.

We are saying that the vast majority of citizens in the areas which are controlled by the Phalangists are suppressed and repressed. It is the duty of the legitimate government to liberate them from this repression and this suppression. It has to crystallize their free will to support the unity of Lebanon's territory, its people and its institutions.

The sum total of this analysis leads us to conclude that proposing a government of activists was tantamount to closing the file of the 7 July massacre. This accordingly means--whether it was deliberate or nondeliberate, we do not address ourselves to intentions--that the legitimate government threw the ball in the court of Syria and the Lebanese National Movement.

From the beginning President Sarkis wavered around the person of the prime minister. The veto came from him and not from us because he was the one who vetoed the most successful prime minister in Lebanon's political history at this stage: Dr Salim al-Huss. He was the one who removed Prime Minister al-Huss and rejected the national names that were proposed afterwards to organize the government. He is the one who is responsible for the crisis and not those who had reservations on the government organization as it was proposed.

[Question] You are saying that President Franjiyyah's position is a great national and pan-Arab resource. Why did you not form with him a national rescue front for all of Lebanon?

[Answer] I believe that the statement which was issued from Ihdin and Tripoli following the visit of the Lebanese National Movement delegation and the meeting it had with President Franjiyyah and Prime Minister Karami did place the foundations for such a notion. Although we did not call this [assocation] a front, we considered it a national gathering that included the National Movement, President Franjiyyah and Prime Minister Karami.

The meeting defined political principles and a practical course for realizing common objectives.

It is natural [to ask] why did we delay until this happened. We are saying that an attempt was begun 2 years ago when Mr Walid Jumblatt, President Franjiyyah and Prime Minister Karami announced the Ihdin communiqué.

Although the Ihdin communiqué was brief and shorter than the joint communiqué that has now been issued, it did formulate basic assumptions for national cooperation or for a national gathering of this kind.

Then there were circumstances that killed this communiqué. This was announced previously by Mr Walid Jumblatt to AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI because of a lack of follow-up.

but we have now reorganized everything on an objective basis in the light of a National Movement delegation such as the basic parties in the National Movement. Among them and at their forefront is the Socialist Progressive party.

I believe that in the next few days Mr Jumblatt, chairman of the Central Political Council of the National Movement and president of the Socialist Progressive party will visit Ihdin to meet with President Franjiyyah. Thus we see that steps are being taken towards the crystallization of this national gathering.

As the Social Syrian National party we have been establishing discretionary bilateral relations with President Franjiyyah for 2 years. As I said we consider him to be the head of this national Lebanese Christian gathering which is confronting the Phalangist, separatist, divisive project.

We are also in the same battle position with President Franjiyyah. His fighters and ours are standing [together] in al-Jabal, al-Matn, al-Kurah and as far away as Zgharta. This battle position is that of opposing the Zionist, divisive, separatist project.

[Question] Bashir al-Jumayyil is making daily threats that he will "liberate" all of Lebanon. Therefore, due to the gravity of this problem in the light of your understanding of it, will you oppose him with weapons?

[Answer] We responded to this question as a party in several basic and official statements that were issued in recent years. Among those statements was the speech I delivered at the graduation of the fighers of the Social National Syrian party in Upper al-Matn a few days ago. There was a clear definition of our course in that speech. As a Social National Syrian party and as a Lebanese National Movement we do not support an outbreak. We do support a political solution to the Lebanese crisis. We do support a return of normal life to Lebanon. As a party with an ideology, I believe that a political solution and a return to a democratic political struggle is in the interests of Lebanon because as I said in my speech at the graduation of a class of our fighters, we support a political because we want to return to those areas. We are confident that our people [who reside] in those areas which are controlled by Fascist terror and guerrilla terror are yearning for the return of this intellectual, ideological political struggle. Ultimately, our people will choose the idea that will unite them with the rest of their people; they will not choose the idea that would try to isolate them or divide them especially since that idea led to their destruction and led them to commit suicide in spite of themselves. We are confident that a good idea will win over an evil one. We are confident that good beliefs will win over evil beliefs. We are confident that the national question

with its secular and social progressive content will win over racist and sectarian questions, and we are confident that democracy will win over terrorism and people will win over guerrillas.

For us, an outbreak is not imminent, and we oppose an outbreak. However, we will naturally not resign ourselves to Bashir al-Jumayyil's state if that state wanted to expand itself.

We are in a position of defending ourselves, and we will defend ourselves with the ferocity for which we have been known.

But we will not advance towards any area unless the people in that area rise up against their executioners. We would then be the reserves for those people to support their free will.

[Question] Through the developments that surrounded the resignation of Prime Minister al-Huss and the authorization of Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh [with the task of forming a government] we have noticed that positions within the National Movement via-a-vis this problem were dissimilar.

[Answer] I believe that you read [this] in the newspapers and [noticed it] in some of the meetings that took place between the leaders of the National Movement. This is based on an executive committee decision that was made by all the parties regarding the necessity of reformulating a unified position for the National Movement. Naturally, we believe that what happened--and may Brother Abu Shakir, Ibrahim Qulaylat, permit us to use an expression he had used at this stage by way of expressing an opinion. But if opinions were to go beyond the acceptable and reasonable, they would become disputes.

We look upon what brings us together in the National Movement to be above every secondary dispute and every secondary opinion. For this reason we are in the process of reformulating a standard position for the National Movement.

There was an opinion which stated that the advent of a government of activists would bring about the end of the separatist state. This is an opinion that is based on a nationalist assumption. It may be an erroneous opinion, but it has a nationalist basis.

In our judgment we may know more than what is known by [people in] those areas, where the Phalangist state is being established, that the security solution which President Sarkis was hinting at as part of a government of activists--that is, the army's advancement into al-Matn so as to separate Kasrawan from al-Ashrafiyah--was merely an apparent trick because the army is located in those areas. The army saw the massacres [that took place there], but it did not take action. The army saw the smuggling [that was going on] from Beirut to Juniyah, and it did not take action. The army has been surrounding the borders of the Phalangist compound, and it has been protecting it. This is not a matter of the army entering into an area, but it is rather a matter of army organization which allows that army to carry out a decision. Then it is a matter of a political decision made by the presdient to confront this divisive state and not to appease its advocates by bringing them into the government.

Perhaps it is our knowledge of what is happening in those areas that has prescribed our rigid position on this matter. Our purpose, as we said, is not to create a crisis, but rather to reach a correct solution so that we do not get trapped into the pitfalls of mirages and imaginary solutions.

[Question] Bashir al-Jumayyil waged a battle to liquidate Sham'un under the cover of security. There are those who are saying that if he succeeds in establishing security, he will throw the ball in the court of the National Movement, especially since the security situation in the western region is shaky.

[Answer] The truth is that we did suffer a great deal in the past years because we have been shouldering the moral responsibility but not the practical responsibility for the security that has eluded us. The nightmare that prevailed over our thoughts in general and then prevailed over the thoughts of some of us in particular was that we did not want to establish our own security and find ourselves involved in the game of partition and counter partition.

It is on this basis that we have always supported the legal government with its internal security forces and the Arab deterrent forces. These are the forces that were able to establish peace when they came.

But you will recall that the role of these forces began to shrink after the Bayt-al-Din conference. Consequently, they no longer had a free hand to impose security. Therefore, after the legal government began to refrain from using them adequately, they began to avoid what is called the long, narrow security line.

This situation with its returns recalled that of the national forces because on the one hand they do not use their adequate security and, on the other hand, because security was no longer stable.

Therefore, we are in the course of formulating a new view of this matter, and we are coordinating [our efforts with those] of the Arab deterrent forces and the other legal forces such as the internal security forces.

I would like to affirm that we frown upon security irregularities but that they are organized and institutionalized there. Theft and extortion are driving people away from their homes and all these matters are organized to the point that His Eminence the Maronite Patriarch condemned what was happening in those areas in several appeals he made.

Excesses are reprehensible in our area, and it is possible to suppress them if there is coordination between our national security--and I am not saying our own security [forces]--and the legal security [forces] which we consider to be the basis.

[Question] Developments in South Lebanon indicate that there are possibilities for creating further tension in security. Do you expect the problem of South Lebanon to be tied to the question of the Middle East? What measures will you take [in this regard] as a national movement with a commitment to this part of the Lebanese homeland?

[Answer] There is a general view and there is information regarding an expected Israeli attack. Some are saying it will come before the U.S. elections, and some are saying that it will come after the U.S. elections but that its purpose will be to establish new facts on the land.

Because we are a national party that views the scene in its entirety in relation to the consequences of what is happening on the Lebanese scene and the intended results of the conspiracy on the Jordanian scene, we do look upon the matter from this

perspective: there is a relationship between an attack that is directed against Syria, the resistance and the Lebanese national forces here and proposing an addendum to Camp David on the Jordanian scene, not to mention the basic Israeli plan to impose an Israeli peace which is based on sectarian and racist outbreaks.

Two small states or military camps have so far been established. One is on the border strip, and the other is east of the capital and in part of al-Jabal. These two states are models of this mode whose prevalence in the area is being sought. In addition, there are the historical regional ambitions that the Zionist entity and the Zionist organization have entertained on our waters and especially the Litani River.

The National Movement and the Palestinian Resistance have the joint responsibility of defending every inch of South Lebanon. This is a matter that we are serious about. In 1978 we had the honor of fighting in the south in the heroic fierce battle which lasted for more than 1 week. It may have been on of the longest Arab wars.

We must mention in this regard the heroism of the Palestinian resistance which had the largest mobilization of forces that were engaged in combat. We cannot but mention with reverence also the steadfastness of the Lebanese national fighters in a number of advanced positions, and I mention on this occasion, Bint Jubayl and al-Khayyam where our party participated with its fighters.

Thus we are not incidental to the subject of the south, and our readiness for a confrontation is serious, but as I said the whole scene must be taken in its entirety.

[Question] Did you propose this matter to the Syrian brothers in the context of the confrontation front?

[Answer] We always have a strategic meeting with the brothers in Damascus, and we look into all the concerns and questions of the Lebanese scene either for national security against the Zionist enemy or for national security against divisive and destructive attempts.

[Question] You met with the Romanian ambassador some time ago, and there is talk about a Romanian initiative. Do you have knowledge of the substance of this initiative and what is your position on it as a party and as a national movement?

[Answer] I cannot speak for the National Movement on a foreign matter because this would require a decision from the National Movement as a whole. But I can speak for the party, and I do know that several parties in the National Movement have relations with the Romanian Communist party and also with the Palestinian Resistance.

His Excellency the Romanian ambassador did bring to me a handwritten message from President Ceaușescu congratulating me on his behalf and on behalf of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist party on my election as party chairman. It was natural for me to thank him for this generous impulse, but we were careful in the statement that was issued by the party to indicate that the investigation dealt with the Romanian initiative from a rejectionist position. We had clearly affirmed that no initiative could be proposed before the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty were scuttled. We also affirmed--and this is our position as a national party--that international pressure was to be exerted on the Zionist entity and not on the people of Palestine. We used the following expression: "It is the thief who must be put behind bars and not the one whose land has been stolen."

We said more than this in a statement to the press that was published in Lebanese newspapers. [We said that] ever since it was established in 1947, the Zionist entity has not been honoring international resolutions. These resolutions have therefore lost their value. Furthermore, this Zionist entity basically contradicts international, human and national rights. This is our position. We disagree with anyone who makes international initiatives, and we warn against them. But the fact that we disagree with foreign countries about their policies on the area does not mean that there be no dialogue with these countries, even if that dialogue were to begin with disagreement over these questions. It is known that we must refer to the fact that President Ceauşescu has amended his position in the last 2 years. This, however, does not mean that on our part we have accepted his position because we reject any initiative that stems from positions that [range from] supporting Camp David to saying that the Camp David accords are not adequate and to presenting alternatives to the accords. Naturally, we do not think that these alternatives meet [our] conditions, nor do we think them acceptable. But we must refer to the fact that this development has occurred, and we believe that it is occurring not only in Ceauşescu's position, but also in the European position. This development, however, was very insignificant, and this is because of the armed struggle that our people are engaged in in Palestine under the leadership of the PLO. This is the struggle that has gone beyond an armed struggle and has become the uprising of a people which scuttled the autonomy conspiracy and set forth new facts on the land.

We are saying that Bassam al-Shak'a's two legs and Karim Khalaf's leg have done much to alter some international balances and international convictions, even though these convictions have not yet reached the point of being acceptable to us.

But we must always affirm that it is national opposition and national warfare that changed these formulas. Therefore, this struggle must be escalated.

With regard to the reason why neither the European initiative nor the Romanian initiative reached an acceptable point, we believe that the Arabs did not use their real clout in the strategic balance. And here we hold the oil countries responsible in a major way for formulating an Arab strategy that would initiate attack and not retreat as is the case now.

[Question] In your discussion you talked about Jordan's role, and you referred to a solution on the Jordanian scene. Is there a specific idea for this solution which is being proposed on the Jordanian scene?

[Answer] This is a lengthy subject, but we can summarize it [by referring] to what we read about Shimon Perez's notion of such a solution. Perez's notion is not far removed from that of the United Kingdom or from Allon's project and other projects. In addition, most initiatives--European or Maronite--are directed towards Jordan. The case is the same with regard to the dialogue that took place between King Husayn and President Carter. Although that dialogue was based on disagreement over Camp David, it was conducted in the context of looking for another solution.

This other solution that they were looking for did not deal once with scuttling Camp David, but it was rather being discussed as though it were to complete Camp David. The completion of Camp David means falling into the conspiracy pothole.

It is because of our national responsibility that we are saying that it is very important to keep Jordan outside Camp David and its supplements. Despite the political differences between us and the Jordanian regime, we had no reservations whatsoever on having Jordan join the Baghdad summit to participate in the general Arab positions that condemned Camp David. There are, however, several questions that must be placed on record. These are:

First, why didn't Jordan go ahead with its unity with Syria? It is being said that the United States and Saudi Arabia exerted pressure on Jordan to pull Jordan out of these unity [schemes]. Had this unity been completed, Jordan would have been fortified in the positions of opposition.

Second, why is Jordan the existence of the Moslem Brothers and their setting out from Jordan to Syria?

Third, why is Jordan condoning the settlement?

Basically, Jordan has not said that it was rejecting Camp David in principle with regard to the normalization of relations with Israel; with regard to [the accords] being a peace treaty with the enemy; and with regard to the fact that [the accords] altogether scuttle the state of Palestinian affairs so as to propose inquiries around them.

To say that the Camp David [accords] are not enough, but that they may be completed by improving the conditions [of the accord] is a very serious statement. We appreciate the fact that Jordan has a long front with the enemy, and we appreciate the fact that Jordan needs support from its national heartland. However, instead of looking for international solutions to improve the conditions of the settlement, Jordan should have devoted its attention to how it could change the pan-Arab equation by uniting with Syria. This would have strengthened Jordan and made its long borders the same as those of the united Syrian army, of the Syrian air force and of the Syrian forces.

This qualitative move has not taken place. In its absence all the pitfalls exist; they are relevant, and they are moot as I have indicated.

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BRIEFS

ARAB LEAGUE-EEC MEETING—Yesterday at the league's office, League of Arab States Secretary General Chedli Klibi received Mr Michel Courtier, the European Communities Commission delegate in Tunis, who came to say goodbye on the occasion of the completion of his mission in Tunisia. "We spoke," he said, "of current relations and particularly of the development of relations in terms of the European-Arab dialogue, resumption of which is hoped for on both sides." He added that he had looked into cooperation between the two shores of the Mediterranean with the secretary general of the League of Arab States, this cooperation being "a challenge and a source of reflection with an eye to enabling that sea to deliver a new message to the world at this level of north-south relations in the Mediterranean." Then Mr Chedli Klibi received Mr Nelson Hernandez, the Venezuelan ambassador to Tunis, who indicated that this meeting, which he described as friendly, had permitted him to engage in an exchange of views on the world situation with the secretary general of the pan-Arab organization. After stating that the establishment of peace is the goal sought by the Venezuelan Government and the countries that constitute the League of Arab States, Mr Nelson Hernandez said: "We have agreed to go on to a broader exchange of views among our nations since, as an OPEC member, Venezuela has many contacts with the Arab world." [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 10 Oct 80 p 7] 11466

PRELIMINARY ALGERIAN-TUNISIAN MEETING—A delegation of highly-placed Tunisian business leaders headed by Mr Moncef Belaid, director general of industry attached to the Ministry of Economy, visited in Algiers from 6 to 9 October. During its stay in Algeria, this delegation was received by Messrs Mohamed Liassine and Said Ait Messaoudene, members of the FLN [National Liberation Front] Central Committee and Algerian ministers of heavy and light industries respectively. The Tunisian delegation also held discussions with the leaders of the different expanded industrial sectors of housing, public works and the postal and telecommunications service. On this occasion, they engaged in an in-depth examination of the experiences the two countries have had in the field of industrial development. An increase in exchanges of information in the different fields as well as industrial cooperation were the object of particular attention. This mission, which falls under the heading of the application of measures decided on at the time of Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali's recent official visit to Algeria, is also planning to prepare for the proceedings of the big Algerian-Tunisian Commission which is to meet shortly in Tunis. [Text] [Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 11 Oct 80 p 2] 11466

ARAB INVESTMENT IN FRG--A West German news report quotes the head of the Arab Monetary Fund, Mr Jawad Hashim, as saying that the Arab oil-producing countries now wish to invest more of their billions of dollars of oil revenues in the Federal Republic of Germany rather than, as they have done so far, primarily in the United States. It is felt that these funds would be safer in Germany than in other West European Nations. The Arab countries are not going to invest any new oil revenues in America, but the deposits which are already there, totalling between 30 and 40 billion dollars, will not be withdrawn. This decision was made primarily as a result of America's freezing of Iranian assets. This caused the Arab oil-producing countries to become apprehensive about the possibility that America might undertake to take similar measures with regard to Arab financial assets in the event of a crisis. [Excerpt] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 16 Jul 80 p 12]

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SOVIETS REPORTED TO KILL AFGHAN TROOPS

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 6 Oct 80 pp 1, 5

[Text] Peshawar, Oct. 5: According to latest reports, Soviet tanks and armoured cars opened fire and killed over 100 Afghan troops when they responded to Mujahideens' call and jumped out of a convoy sent to repair Asma-Birkot road in Kunar province. Ninety troops who succeeded in running away from the convoy surrendered before Mujahideen alongwith their arms and ammunition. The Mujahideen also destroyed two Soviet tanks.

It is also reported that most of troops are kept under constant watch of Afghan Government party workers as they are looking for an opportunity to defect to Mujahideen. Afghan Government which suspects the loyalty of troops has restricted their movement and forbidden them from writing letters even to their close relatives. Leave of all types has also been stopped. This has completely lowered the morale of Afghan troops and a state of uncertainty is prevailing all over the country.

It is further reported that the Soviets are going to remove anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons from Afghan army units because most of the Afghan-controlled weapons are finding their way to Mujahideen.

Meanwhile, there is acute shortage of consumer goods and the soaring prices are now beyond the reach of Afghan masses.

Another report adds:

According to a Press release of Hezbi Islami Afghanistan issued here today, reports from Kandhar province said that Mujahideen have fulfilled the following operations in Kandhar province during the last few days.

The Mujahideen entered the bazar and captured the son of the Director of the Prison, then a cassette was recorded by him and it was sent to his father to release the prisoners. Otherwise, he will be executed by the Mujahideen.

The Mujahideen captured alive a Communist by the name of Mangul on Sept. 27.

The Mujahideen killed two Khalqies, one on the road side while the other was killed in his house on Sept. 28. Next day the Mujahideen killed Zalmi, the representative of the Defence Committee.

On Sept. 29, Vice-Commander Dad Mahmad, a loyal sepoy to the Government, was captured and executed.

Reports from Ghazni province said that the Mujahideen killed two Khalqies in the Armak school, because this school was the centre of the Communist and militia.

On Sept. 28, guerilla group attacked Ashor village, with the result that one high-ranking Khalqi who was also the bodyguard of Hafizullah Amin was killed.

Mujahideen destroyed two tanks and killed six soldiers and two officers in an attack on a convoy near Barikot, according to a Press release of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan.

In another fighting incident on September 25, the Mujahideen killed 27 Babrak soldiers, wounded 18 and captured eight of them. In this encounter the Mujahideen also captured six machineguns, one mortar and ammunition. In another incident, the Mujahideen captured three heavy machineguns and one morter when 100 soldiers surrendered themselves to the Mujahideen.

On September 28 one tank was destroyed and three Russians killed when a mine, planted by Mujahideen, exploded.

According to another report from Kunar, Russian and Babrak troops attacked Smar on September 25. Fighting still continues. The invading troops have inflicted heavy casualties and four Mujahideen have been martyred.

A report from Badakhshan says that about three weeks ago Mujahideen destroyed seven Russian tanks and killed 36 Russians in fighting. The Mujahideen also captured some arms. Two of the Mujahideen were wounded.

According to another report from Badakhshan, heavy fighting took place between Mujahideen and Russian troops in Argo. The Mujahideen killed a large number of Russians--PPI.

CSO: 4920

SOVIETS BUILD UP TROOP STRENGTH

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 4 Oct 80 pp 1, 10

[Text] New Delhi, Oct. 3: Afthanistan Government announced yesterday that a trial court ordered jail for scores of school children after they pleaded guilty of staging a series of anti-Soviet demonstrations in Kabul last April and May.

The court decided that those who have not reached the legal age be put in reform jails, while it sentenced the others to imprisonment terms varying from five to 20 years, the Afghan Government Radio said in a broadcast monitored in New Delhi.

Thousands of school girls and boys chanted slogans criticising the Soviet Union and Afghan President Babrak Karmal, taunted Afghan Government soldiers and organised school strikes earlier this summer. Unofficial reports from Kabul said more than 350 were killed by gunshots and beatings.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union meeting still guerilla resistance, has rebuilt its troop strength in Afghanistan and is using 'scorched earth' tactics in an unsuccessful effort to subdue the country.

This is the assessment of U.S. officials who also told reporters on Wednesday that the Red Army has built permanent bridges across the Soviet border while slowly increasing troop strength to 85,000 men. Soviet forces were at that level in June, when President Leonid I. Brezhnev announced a partial withdrawal--a move that appeared to suggest a conciliatory attitude in the Kremlin and an opening for a negotiated settlement.

The U.S. official said, the Afghan Army has virtually collapsed forcing the Soviets to take on most of the fighting against guerillas. "The Soviets, in our view, are digging in for a long stay," said one official who asked not to be identified. "I don't think there is any doubt about this."

A Western diplomatic source said the thunderous explosion which roused Kabul residents from their sleep early on the morning of Sept. 24 was the detonation of a Public Works Ministry dynamite storage depot just sout of the capital.

One report said the cache was set off by anti-Marxist guerillas, said the source, who asked not be identified.

Six people reportedly were killed in the blast and the fighting that followed, he added.

The Muslim guerillas reportedly had removed one truckload of dynamite from the depot at Chakh-Ab, five kilometres from Kabul, before they were spotted at about 2:30 A.M. by security forces, the source said. They apparently decided to set off the rest of the explosives when it became clear they couldn't haul them away.

Ashes from the explosion drifted down on the capital for about two hours after the blast, and small arms fire was heard in the area until about 5:00 A.M., the source said.

An earlier report said 10 Soviet tanks were also seen moving through Kabul after the blast toward the site of the explosion.--APA.

CSO: 4920

SOVIET ARMY SAID LOSING GRIP ON KABUL

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Oct 80 p 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct. 10: The Soviet army grip on Kabul has seriously slipped, allowing Afghan urban guerillas to attack Soviet and government targets more often, a diplomat said today.

Small arms fire, that lasts through much of the night, has spread and occurs several times a week. Beside this, unexplained loud explosions and prolonged electricity cuts have become common in the last two weeks, the diplomat said.

"It is rarely clear who is shooting at whom" the diplomat said "but there is evidence that Mujahideen attacks are increasing in number and around Kabul".

LULL IN FIGHTING: Meanwhile a source in Kabul said yesterday that Soviet military operations had at least temporarily ground to a halt, with no major fighting involving Russian soldiers reported in recent days.

However, the source said that fighting continued against guerillas by Afghan soldiers, militiamen and tribesmen recruited by the Government. But there has been no significant activity by the Soviet war machine in Afghanistan—currently estimated at 85,000 troops, backed by MiG jet fighters and helicopter gunships—since the Russian defeat recently in the Panjshir Valley, north of Kabul, said the source.

In that campaign, the Soviets launched a major offensive in late August to secure the strategic gorge, held by Muslim insurgents since 1978. Soviet troops led by scores of tanks and supported by pocket-bristling fighter-bombers and helicopters pushed 40 kilometres into the valley against heavy guerilla resistance. The advance was stalled at Rokha, when the guerillas trapped Soviet tanks by blasting boulders down the hillsides, reports from Afghanistan said.

The guerillas claimed later to have killed more than 1,500 Soviet and pro-government troops and destroyed 35 tanks and a helicopter in the fighting.

MEMBERSHIP RULES: Western diplomatic sources said in the Indian capital today that the Ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), had made important changes in its membership rules, which would further weaken the influence and importance of the Khalq faction opposed to President Babrak Karmel's Parcham group.

The membership structure consist of a new three-tier system of full members, provincials and trainees.

Under the new rules, all those who have been 'inactive' for the past nine month's have been relegated into a lower tier, the sources said.

The new rules would primarily affect the Khalq member, who have kept at a generally low profile since the Parchamite leader Babrak Karmel was installed in power by the Soviet Union in December last year. The Parcham faction outnumbered the Khalqis in government and party posts and observers believe the latest changes in the membership rules will make it difficult for the Khalqis to make a preceptible influence.

The changes in the membership rules are also considered to be a sequel to the continuing purges of Khalq elements from both the government and the party. —APA/UPI/AFP

CSO: 4920

USSR REPORTED TO TAKE HEAVY LOSSES IN KUNNAR

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 Oct 80 p 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Oct. 9: The Russian forces attacked Mazar Valley, in Kunnar province recently.

According to a press release of Hezbi-Islami Afghanistan, issued here today, the Mujahideen defended themselves bravely agint the Russians. In this encounter 330 Russians were killed. One Russian plane was also shot down.

On the Mujahideen side eight persons killed.

Reports from Alishang in district Langhman said that in a fighting with the Soviet forces a few days back, the Mujahideen destroyed 18 enemy tanks and killed 235 Russian soldiers.

Due to heavy bombardments, 20 Mujahideen were killed. In another encounter in the same area, 14 Soviet soldiers were killed and two tanks were destroyed.

On the side of Mujahideen no casualties were reported.

Meanwhile, according to a report published today in the 'Indian Express', the Soviet soldiers, who lived in primitive self-built huts after their invasion last year, were getting ready for a comfortable second winter. Solid barracks, the paper said were being built in many important cities. Construction in the Afghan capital as well as in Jalalabad, Badakhshan, Mazar-i-Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Pul-i-Khumri is going on.

The highway from Kabul to the Soviet border, the paper said would be widened into four-lanes. Wooden bridges have been built over the frontier river Oxus and will be replaced in the near future by permanent structures.

Western diplomats in the Indian capital pointed out that such actions need not necessarily mean that the Soviets now feel secure.

In Kabul, members of the Democratic People's Party have told journalists of Soviet offers to withdraw from Afghanistan, if Kabul can rebuild its army to its original level of 100,000 troops—an increase of two-thirds.

But the offer, according to a member of the Khalq party's (people's) wing, is by no means a sign that the Soviets have any plan to withdraw. As long as the Russians are in the country, recruitment of so many native soldiers will remain impossible, he said. —PPI

CSO: 4920

MUJAHEDIN HALT RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN PANJSHIR VALLEY

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 2 Oct 80 p 3

[Article by Frederic Smelt: "In Afghanistan the Russians Have Not Yet Learned Mountain Guerrilla Warfare--Unsuccessful Fall Offensive in Panjshir Valley"]

[Text] One night about 30 Soviet armored cars and supply vehicles drove through some streets, lighted only by a few naked lightbulbs, of the Kart-e-Parwan District of Kabul to their barracks. Many Kabul residents went out in front of their premises surrounded by walls to take a look at the dirtied vehicles and exhausted soldiers, who everyone thought were coming from the Panjshir Valley. There were sporadic cries of the resistance slogan "Allah-u-akbar" (God is great), but the majority remained silent in the knowledge that the Soviets' unsuccessful advance into the Panjshir Valley is not bringing their country a single centimeter closer to peace, and that even the couple of burned jeeps which were being hauled by wreckers could not hide the fact that no end is in sight of Russian occupation of part of the country. The soldiers looked neither right nor left and appeared to have but one thing in mind--to reach their barracks as quickly as possible. For a few seconds it was impossible to escape the impression that the people in this dark street on both sides would have expressed the same wish if they had been asked: the Afghans were wishing they were on the other side of the Amu Daria, and the Russians looked as if they too would rather be there. Four days later the remaining armored forces presumably returned to Kabul at night, and thus it appears to have been established that the people in the Panjshir Valley again managed to throw the Soviets out of the valley, though afterward some houses in Gulbahar were destroyed by helicopters.

According to reports of others and one's own observations, only one conclusion is possible concerning this commando action: even after 9 months the Soviets have not learned how to conduct mountain guerrilla warfare, even assuming that they did not want to occupy the valley permanently but merely intended to reduce the power of the local muhajedin through a "punitive expedition." For since the Soviets do not control the country outside the towns anyway, and in fact cannot do so with the existing forces, one cannot really see why they should have been bent on taking the Panjshir Valley, which is made for partisan warfare, particularly as winter will start in a few weeks and Russian logistics will have its hands full to supply its troops on the Salang Road more or less satisfactorily.

If anything, protection of the Salang Road, the main route of supply for the army of occupation, may be seen as the reason for the advance into the valley, for in Dshabal-e-Serach this road passed very close to one of the accesses to the

Panjshir Valley. As far as is known, however--disregarding an attack against an Afghan money transport--the muhajedin did not attack the road there. Perhaps a more serious consideration for the Soviets is the fact that there are routes running all the way to Badakhshan and Pakistan from the Panjshir Valley.

In the clear autumn air not only the blue sky and the blue-green water but also the brown mountain boulders radiate in the Panjshir Valley. The valley is beautiful if one does not happen to have to earn his living here; to be sure, many a peasant looks at the panorama differently when he works for his daily living on the meager rocky soil, which needs to be irrigated artificially. The amount of land that can be cultivated being very small, many inhabitants of the valley migrated to Kabul to find some kind of work--without, however, losing their longing for the valley.

This close tie between Kabul and the Panjshir Valley explains among other things why the imminent Russian attack was known, the villages were vacated to some extent and peasants, shepherds and fishermen became guerrillas. In the mountain boulders, which in most locations rise right next to the river or the road, there are caves which normally serve as a place for the shepherds to stay during bad weather and are now serving as a refuge for the mujahedin.

If one sits with a group of Panjshir people in such a cave, one feels as if thousands of years of history had become a single day. Rifles and old Kalashnikovs, which were not purchased but captured, with whole stories connected with that, or the not very large supply of ammunition being kept in ammunition belts, small cases and sacks, or the three watches and one Japanese transistor radio make it clear that one is in the 20th century, as do sweaters and jackets manufactured in Europe or the United States. If, however, one goes through the rest of the cave inventory, time vanishes. Dried mulberries to sweeten tea, and dried peas, as well as grains of wheat and flour, are kept in stone or earthenware vessels. Piles of camel's-thorn are stacked in a corner for heating stones to bake flat bread with flour and water. There are no large supplies, for the Soviets are not expected to stay in the valley long, and at night one can reach the nearest village anyway. Cotton blankets rolled up to serve as cushions to sit on during the day complete the cave decor. In daytime the men need do only one thing: stay alive and not be discovered by helicopters. This is not particularly difficult as helicopters can be seen approaching a long time ahead.

According to the reports, the Soviets drove with armored cars and supply vehicles toward Rukha, the district capital, while helicopters circled above the convoys. As is often the case in Afghanistan, no exact figures about the number and type of the Soviet vehicles are available. The consensus is that there were a great many. In Kabul, the figures vacillate between 60 and 600, with the former figure probably closer to the truth. Parachute troops are said to have been used around Rukha, but otherwise the Soviets appear to have again proceeded according to the old scheme of "armored cars and helicopters," despite the fact these tactics as yet have not worked in any mountain valley where the partisans remained prepoderantly on the defensive, attacking the Soviets in brief raids.

The fighting method of the mujahedin is as simple as it is effective. At places that are particularly difficult to take in with one's eye, they take advantage of

the momentary confusion when a vehicle has hit a mine, firing at the tires and personnel of the convoys. Those raids are said to have been staged so quickly and with such clever use of the terrain that--according to the muhajedin--losses were not great despite the enemy armor and helicopters.

This particular morning, when the first helicopters were slowly but surely approaching our mountain, the entrance to the cave was shut quickly with a few rocks. The effort turned out to be unnecessary, for the helicopters flew up the valley. After an hour, the same thing happened, except that this time we heard some explosions in the distance. This prompted one of the cave warriors to state: "I guess they are once again bombing our rocks and lizards." When the helicopter noise had stopped, we established that evidently this was exactly what had happened. Along the road, clouds of dust testified to military activity despite the fact that at the time not even a sheep had been in the vicinity.

During those few hours in the Panjshir Valley I did not see any dead or wounded, and helicopters attacks with rockets are not particularly strenuous if one is staying in a solid cave. Reportedly Soviet pilots in other valleys drove the muhajedin with nonlethal gas from their hiding places, but this is not certain, for in Afghanistan, which is 15 times the size of Switzerland and hardly has any communications any longer, it is very difficult to gather accurate information. Details are invariably only known in Peshawar, Islamabad and especially New Delhi (apparently knowledge increases proportionately to the distance from the location of the occurrence), and from there the information then also reached the Afghan citizens.

In all likelihood the Soviets used no gas, lethal or other, or napalm or phosphorous bombs in the Panjshir Valley, and yet the presence of their troops, though there aren't any at all in many of the country's villages, lies on the country like a cover of lead. One of the shepherds in the Panjshir Valley expresses this more strikingly. He fought the Russians without any ideological tinge and without hatred; rather he was guided by the simple reason that the Russians did not belong in the valley (any more than the young people of the Partshani Party, who have no qualifications that are respected here and whose party phrases were listened to by him first without prejudice and then with irritation and finally were dismissed with the words, "The talk of an official has never made a single sheep well again". This is what the shepherd says: "Look, what can I do when I care for my sheep and they die nevertheless although I have used all the herbs and good words I know and have sought the mullahs' advice? And still there have always been sheep in this valley."

No one at this mountain post gave the impression of lacking hope, but all also realized that, while they could inflict losses on the Soviet soldiers, they could not defeat them and that they were faced with a guerrilla war that would last for years and in which not only some of them but also their wives and children would die.

8790
CSO: 4403

SOVIET PLANES AT KANDAHAR AIRPORT REPORTED DESTROYED

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 20 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] Beijing, Oct. 19--Amidst the roar of guns coming from the Iran-Iraq border, the Kremlin summoned the Babrak Karmal of the Kabul regime and accorded him a ceremonious reception in Moscow.

Mr. Brezhnev himself greeted Karmal as a "head of state" at the airport, where they gave each other a big hug and reviewed an honour guard.

The fact is that the Soviet Union was compelled to do so because of the stiff resistance by the Afghan people. The Afghan guerillas are hitting hard and their recent surprise attack on Kandahar airport in which many Soviet aircraft were destroyed added new proof to this fact.

Recently, the Soviet Army has taken the following steps to stiffen the suppression: (1)--Tighten the control of major cities, towns, and communication lines; the Soviet troops sent out in planes and tanks to bomb and shell villages along the main roads throughout the country to create desolate "no-man areas" to deter and isolate the guerillas.

(2)--The Soviet authorities have sent home that part of its personnel and equipment unsuited to fighting in Afghanistan and brought in a large batch of gunships and a great number of mobile shock troops trained for anti-guerilla warfare and suitable to fight in mountainous regions in order to launch surprise attacks on the guerillas.

(3)--Employing Afghans to fight against Afghans and to create discord among the Afghan tribes and undermining the morale of their forces.--Xinhua

CSO: 4920

MUJAHEDIN ATTACK KABUL OFFICIALS, RULING PARTY WORKERS

Karachi DAWN in English 6 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Oct 5: According to a Press release of Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan, issued here today reports from Kandhar province said that the Mujahideen have fulfilled the following operations in Kandhar province during the last few days.

The Mujahideen entered the Bazar and captured the son of the Director of the Prison, on Sept 6.

The Mujahideen captured alive a Communist by the name of Mangul on Sept 27.

The Mujahideen killed two Khalqies, one on the road side while the other was killed in his house on Sept 28. Next day the Mujahideen killed Zalmi, a representative of the Defence Committee.

On Sept 29, the Vice-Commander by name of Dad Mahmad, that being a loyal sepoy to the Government was captured alive and then was executed.

Reports from Ghazni province said the Mujahideen attacked the sub-government of Armak. As a result two Khalqies were killed and the Mujahideen put on fire the Armak school, because this school was the centre of Communists and militia.

On Sept 28 a group of Mujahideen attacked another village with the result one high-ranking Khalqi, who was also the body-guard of Hafizullah Amin was killed.

The report adds, that two Russian convoys — one force from Ghazni and the other from Kabul were determined to attack Wardak province. But the devoted Mujahideen of Hezb-i-Islami attacked both convoys on their way to Wardak province near Shindu Sayyer Pass. It was 7 p.m. at night and the fighting continued for four hours. As a result two tanks were destroyed by rocket launcher and the trucks carrying potatoes and one jeep were destroyed. Twenty-five Russian soldiers were killed and 12 were wounded seriously, including one high-ranking Russian adviser, who died after a while.

According to latest reports, Soviet tanks and armoured cars opened fire and killed over 150 Afghan Askars when they responded to Mujahideen's call and jumped out of the convoy sent to repair Asmar-Pirkot road in Kunar province. Ninety Askars who succeeded in running away from the convoy surrendered before the Mujahideen alongwith their arms and ammunition.

Mujahideen also destroyed two Soviet tanks.

It is also reported that most of Askars are kept under constant watch of the Afghan Government party workers as they are looking for an opportunity to defect to the Mujahideen.

Afghan Government which suspects the loyalty of troops has restricted their movement and forbidden them from writing letters even to their close relatives. Leave of all type has also been stopped. This has completely lowered the moral of Afghan troops and a state of uncertainty is prevailing all over the country. —PPI.

CSO: 4920

KABUL REPORTED TO BE HOSTILE TOWARD INDIANS

Karachi DAWN in English 9 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Yeha Syed]

[Text] London, Oct. 8--An Indian journalist who was in Afghanistan last Friday reported in "The Times" yesterday noticeable estrangement towards the Indians visiting Kabul, because "the Afghans believe that India failed to stand by them during their hour of crisis."

Kuldip Nayar said in his report filed from Delhi, "when I was in Kabul in 1974, I was welcomed wherever I went. Shopkeepers would go out of the way to say that the Indians were their best friends. This time many shopkeepers said "bayro" (go away) when I approached."

Nayar reports that "insurgents have surrounded Kabul," from where, he says, "I have just returned, and even Government officials warn you against going more than six miles outside the capital without armed escort."

An Indian residing in Kabul took Nayar in his Mercedes to Paghman, a scenic picnic spot nine miles from Kabul last Friday; this was a holiday, and found the place deserted. On his return at 4 his car was fired upon, although no one was hurt, but "the windscreen was shattered."

Since most Mercedes belonging to Afghan citizens had been requisitioned, Nayar explained, the general belief is that travelling in them are senior officials of the Soviet-backed regime in Kabul.

Two weeks ago, he said, 21 lorries carrying dry fruits and other goods were destroyed on the road between Kabul and Jalalabad, distance of 50 miles. Since then those who still use the road, Nayar said, "are forced to pay toll tax to the insurgents for safe conduct."

"This works out to be cheaper," an Afghan trader told Nayar, whose lorry was recently burnt.

The Soviet lorries leaving Kabul with supplies and mail are escorted by up to 15 tanks and even non-Russian convoys have between six and eight tanks to protect them, Nayar said.

This, he added, "indicates the extent of the insurgents' hold around Kabul." Nayar said, "In the suburbs of Shakedra, posters carrying the picture of Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, the chief of Hizbe Islami, 'the most influential guerilla group,' are pasted on many walls, with a warning that no one should pull them down."

When a Parcham member ignored the warning, he was killed on the spot, Nayar said.

Deserters have reduced the Afghan army to a shadow of what it was, reported Trevor Fishlock in "The Times" for Delhi.

Before the Soviet occupation last December, the strength of the army was 80,000; now it is estimated at 35,000 only, he said.

CSO: 4920

INSURGENTS IN KABUL ENJOY 'OFFICIAL COVER'

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 7 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct. 6: Anti-government insurgents number nearly 20,000 in Kabul and enjoy protection from sympathisers in the Afghan Police and Army, an Indian Journalist reported today.

Kuldip Nayar of the 'Indian Express' newspaper, who spent six days in the Afghan capital, quoted guerrillas as saying, "We can disrupt life in Kabul in no time, but it is no use doing so when we cannot hold the city."

According to the guerillas, there are about 20,000 Soviet troops in or near Kabul. The city's Population, Nayar said, has risen to one million because of an influx of refugees from the provinces.

Soviet troops in Afghanistan total about 85,000 according to Western estimates.

In a despatch from Kabul, published today, Nayar said: "The guerilla activity inside the city has increased since I was here eight months ago. It is still limited to a few exchanges here and there at night, but the guerillas are bolder and more determined than before."

"It appears they have their men in the Police and the Army who not only act as their informers but also give them shelter" he said.

BABRAK INVITED: Soviet-backed Afghan President Babrak Karmal will make an official friendship visit to the Soviet Union in mid-October, Tass reported last night.

Mr. Karmal accepted an invitation from the Communist Party's General Committee, The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and from the Soviet Government, Tass said.

Meanwhile, Afghanistan yesterday agreed to buy two Antonov commercial aircraft from the Soviet Union for its domestic carrier, Bakhtar al-Watana, Radio Afghanistan reported. —AFP/AFA

CSO: 4920

MINISTERS OF FRONTIERS, PUBLIC WORKS KILLED IN PAKTIA

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 14 Sep 80 pp 1, 6

[Article: "Afghan Mujahidin Kill Two Ministers and 90 Guards in Paktia; Fierce Battles in Konarha, Samangan, and Balkh; Karmal Government Drafting Young Children Into Army"]

[Text] Kabul, 13 September (PPI, JASARAT Correspondent Mukhtar Hussein)--The Afghan mujahidin have killed two ministers of the Karmal government and their 90 guards in Paktia. These ministers were sent to spread anti-mujahid propaganda in that area.

Meanwhile, in (Panjsher) Valley, the Russians have suffered heavy casualties in a battle lasting several days against the mujahidin.

The mujahidin defeated the Russian army in Chakwardak, 20 miles from Kabul. The Russian army could not enter Herat city. The mujahidin killed 300 soldiers, and destroyed 6 tanks and 12 trucks carrying ammunition in (Oruzgan) district. The mujahidin killed 27 Russian soldiers while they were getting out of their helicopters in (Sharan) district.

According to news reports, Faiz Mohammad, minister of frontiers and tribes, and Nazar Mohammad, minister of public works, were visiting (Sayyed Khel) and (Monari) in Paktia. Their purpose was to use money, military power and force to get the local tribes to rise against the mujahidin. However, the mujahidin attacked under the command of Jalal al-Din, leader of Hazb-I-Islami, and, after a bloody battle, killed the two ministers and their 90 guards. Congratulating the mujahidin on their success, Mohammed Yunus Khalis said that God was on their side, and that the Kabul government would face the same fate as its ministers. The minister of frontiers and tribal affairs, Faiz Mohammad, was originally from Paktia and belonged to the Mahmood tribe. He was also a minister under Taraki and Amin.

Reports of fighting starting Monday between Russian soldiers and the mujahidin have been received from Samangan and Balkh provinces. Heavy fighting is reported in (Bainwal), Jalalabad, and the neighboring provinces of Konarha and Laghman.

According to REUTER, the combined forces of the Karmal government and Russian armies tried unsuccessfully to enter the city of Herat. The mujahidin fiercely fought them back. Following its shattering defeat in (Panjsher) Valley, the Russian army is camping in Rakha, 20 miles away. Under the leadership of Engineer

Gulbadan Hikmatyar, the mujahidin attacked the Russian army in (Argoan) district, destroyed 6 tanks and 12 trucks loaded with weapons, and killed 300 Karmal government troops. The Russian army was headed from Ghazni to (Argoan) to recover this area from the mujahidin.

The Russians are fighting the mujahidin in (Khoust) and (Ghoulang) districts. The Russians dropped soldiers from helicopters in (Shawan) district of Paktia province, but the mujahidin attacked them as soon as they landed and killed 27 Russian soldiers. One mujahidin was killed and another was wounded. In fighting lasting several days between the mujahidin and the Russian soldiers, the mujahidin destroyed seven tanks and three armored vehicles in (Ghourband) district of Parwan province. The mujahidin attacked Russian reinforcements, blocked their way to Parvan, and killed 81 Russian soldiers.

According to a report by REUTER, the Afghan army is discouraged by the forced recruitment of children below age 15. Shopkeepers are on strike in Kandahar. Due to fighting in other areas, people are flocking to Kabul, resulting in an increase in Kabul's population. The Russian army is once more patrolling Kabul. They have set up check points on all roads entering Kabul. Murder and abduction are on the increase in Kabul. In the capital, pamphlets containing threats to murder Russian soldiers are being distributed. The Karmal government has passed a new law meant to stop soldiers from deserting the army.

7997
CSO: 4203

BRIEFS

GUERRILLA ACTIVITY STEPPED UP--New Delhi, Oct 6--Anti-Government insurgents number nearly 20,000 in Kabul and enjoy protection from sympathisers in the Afghan Police and Army. Kuldip Nayar of the "Indian Express," who spent six days in the Afghan capital, quoted guerillas as saying, we can disrupt life in Kabul in no time, but it is no use doing so when we cannot hold the city. According to the guerillas, there are about 20,000 Soviet troops in or near Kabul. The city's population, Nayar said, had risen to one million because of an influx of refugees from the provinces. Soviet troops in Afghanistan total about 85,000, according to Western estimates. In a despatch from Kabul published today, Nayar said: The guerilla activity inside the city has increased since I was here eight months ago. It is still limited to a few exchanges here and there at night but the guerillas are bolder and more determined than before. It appears they have their men in the Police and the Army who not only act as their informers but also give them shelter, he said.--APP/Reuter [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 7 Oct 80 p 1]

USSR BOMBING CLAIMS 200--New Delhi, Oct 21--About 200 Afghans were killed when Soviet MIG fighter jets and helicopter gunships blasted Farza, a town north of Kabul, earlier this month, according to a report in the "Indian Express" newspaper. The Express said yesterday the bombing was "to punish the people for sheltering Afghan guerillas." It quoted a witness to the attack as saying that half the dwellings in Farza, a town of about 25,000 people, were destroyed in the attack. Most of the residents fled to the safety of nearby mountains. The witness told the newspaper in New Delhi that he saw a Russia MIG-21 exploding in flames near Farza. Some helicopter gunships were also hit by gunfire, he added. He claimed that fruit orchards and standing crops in the area were destroyed by the raid.--APA [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 21 Oct 80 p 10]

RUSSIANS KILLED--Quetta, Oct. 19--Eight Russians have been killed and four others injured in two encounters with freedom fighters in Afghanistan. Freedom fighters have also seized 12 machineguns from the Russians. Two freedom fighters have, however, received injuries in their operations against Soviet-backed Karmal regime. According to a delayed information received in Quetta from Afghanistan today, freedom fighters had their first clash with a group of Russians on Oct 11 and a second on Oct 12. Russians were fishing in Dorri River, Khoshab village close to Kandahar airport when Mujahideen attacked the group, killing eight Russians and causing injuries to four others. Two Mujahideen also sustained injuries. They captured 12 Russian machineguns. Next day Mujahideen killed another Russian near Kandahar when he was sitting on an armoured vehicle guarding his Russian friends who were shopping in main bazar. [Text] [Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 20 Oct 80 p 1]

BABRAK KARMAL SPEECH QUOTED--New Delhi, 8 September (PPI, DPI)--The pro-Soviet government leader, Babrak Karmal, has claimed that his army is defeating its enemy, and forcing enemy remnants to flee the country. Addressing the citizens in Kabul yesterday, the Marxist leader said, however, that the government cannot deal with the mujahidin by itself. According to Radio Kabul, he called on the people to cooperate with the government to clean the country of its enemies. He said that the people should be able to distinguish between their enemies and their friends. He added that though the situation was bad, the course of events was in his favor. He repeatedly claimed that China, Iran, Pakistan, and America were introducing trouble-makers into the country. He said that as soon as all these foreign intrusions stop, the Russian army would leave Afghanistan. He asked for volunteers to help the ruling government and the country. According to him, those who died for the country were martyrs. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 9 Sep 80 pp 3, 6]
7997

AFGHAN GENERAL KILLED--New Delhi, Sept. 30: A Major-General of the Afghan Army was shot dead by Muslim guerillas in Kabul province on Friday, Afghan guerilla sources said yesterday. The sources said Maj.-Gen. Abdul Aziz was killed by anti-Soviet guerilla during a commando raid on the town of Murad Beg in Kabul province. Several other Afghan Army officers were killed in the attack, the sources said, adding that details of the ambush were scarce. Afghan security forces "eliminated hundreds of guerillas and seized large quantities of arms and ammunitions from their possession" in the Muqur district of Ghazni province, Kabul Radio claimed yesterday. "Our security forces, aided by party activists, eliminated hundreds guerillas and captured hundreds of weapons from their possession," the radio said in its Pushtu language news bulletin monitored here. Meanwhile, heavy fighting continued in Maidan, the centre of Wardak province, between Mujahideen and Soviet forces in which 370 Russians were killed and many injured, according to a Press release of Hezb-i-Islami, Afghanistan. Four Mujahideen were martyred and six wounded. Reports from Kandhar province say that the Russian forces attacked the centre of Mujahideen of Hezbi Islami in Murghan village of Cyar Bagh district. Heavy fighting took place between the two sides. Forty-five Russian soldiers, three officers and two Afghan officers were killed.--APP/PPI. [Text] [Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 1 Oct 80 p 1]

CSO: 4920

DISCUSSION OF GOALS OF 1980-1984 PRODUCTION PROGRAM

Algiers EL DJEICH in French Sep 80 pp 32-37

[Text] Sectional imbalances in investments have certainly been the cause of malfunctions in the organization of the national economy and have continued the harmful dispute about the "unsound environment" or "bottlenecks."

The sectional imbalances were not unrelated to the development and exacerbation of interregional and intraregional disparities.

During the 1967-1978 period, public investors spent, calculated at a constant price, an amount of about 300 billion dinars, of which more than 150 was in foreign exchange.

Gross domestic production, the annual result of the utilization of invested capital and labor, only increased in constant prices, at an average rate of growth of 7.2. It has risen thus from a little bit more than 40 billion dinars in 1967 to 86.8 billion dinars in 1978.

It is clear that such growth of gross domestic production is quite low compared with the efforts made and especially with the volume of investments involved.

Hydrocarbons: a necessary replacement for the future exhaustion of our reserves. Production of hydrocarbons remained high during the period and involved a significant drop in the level of our hydrocarbon reserves without a parallel long-term energy policy, to provide a substitute after the exhaustion of our reserves, being implemented. It is far from being decided either, whether the price for the exploitation of our hydrocarbons has reached its maximum level, whether it involves liquid or gas hydrocarbons.

Agriculture Has Stagnated

The depression which characterizes it is not explainable either by physical or climatic conditions or by any form of management which would be unsuitable for it.

Usually well administered self-management should have released the forces of production substantially in relation to the agricultural wage earners, accordingly for self-management; it is the application which is to be examined and not the theory.

In the second place, the public sector in agriculture (self-management and the agrarian revolution sector) only accounts for 27 percent of total added value, an evaluation made in current prices. Accordingly, blaming self-management for agricultural inertia is based both on a superficial analysis and a serious disregard of specific conditions in rural life.

Production of services: is increasing, but is inadequate:

Transport and commerce have expanded, according to themselves, but not enough to cope with the sometimes simultaneous appearance of surplus and shortage.

In a general way, production of services have reflected the relatively excessive share in our efforts of imports of goods and their distribution.

Industrial production: our hydrocarbons have been insignificant in the total picture during the period. The levels reached, very short of objectives and production capacities, have slowed down the industrial and economic integration envisaged and it is not inaccurate to claim that because of that they have hindered the growth of the economy.

In fact, the deficiencies and shortages mentioned are reflected in an increasingly high level of imports, goods and services, to the point of reaching a rate practically unequaled in the world, half or more of our gross domestic production.

Reviving our production and making it conform more with our objectives of integration and satisfying the social needs of the masses will require much effort and time.

The difficulties lie especially in Algeria's population problem, which has been very acute. We are not far in this respect from beating a "world record" with a rate of 3.2 percent.

Our resident population was 12.6 million in 1967. It reached 18 million in 1978.

On the closing of the sessions of the regional seminar on planning, Mr Chadli, secretary general of the party, made an important speech in which he mentioned the "need for a rational use of existing human and material potentialities." It is necessary to recognize today

that the level of production does not equal that of consumption; this is why we cannot properly meet needs without first increasing production.

Imports must be limited to materials which we cannot produce in Algeria.

Today we have petroleum and gas which allows us to import food products. But only depending on resources is a danger for the nation and the Revolution because of the disorganization which this situation could cause in the production system. We must act in such a way that work is a reward and a badge of respect for the citizen and the cadre. We must also increase our production in all fields to meet the needs of citizens and have a healthy economy. Moreover, this is a guarantee of national independence.

A. - For the Development of Production Sectors

The objectives and priorities of the 1980-84 Five-Year Plan are first to rapidly cover the most important shortages. Various measures are going to be implemented and that in the three main sectors: hydraulics, agriculture and industrial development.

Hydraulics

Delays in development in the hydraulic sector are expressed in huge shortages in supplying consumers. Water is actually the scarcest material resource; for the needs for drinking water and industrial irrigation water are increasing at a faster rate than our economic and social development. Failure to satisfy them could be a factor in hampering the development of our economy.

It actually involves starting in the decade extensive programs for collecting surface and underground water and combining them with programs to improve and maintain existing storage capacities, as well as distribution networks. In addition, and while expanding resources, including the desalinization of salt and brackish waters, it is desirable to introduce water conservation measures in requirements.

In order to give an idea of the size of the problem, it is useful to point out that irrigated land, now about 300,000 hectares must increase to 600,000 hectares between now and the year 2000. Meeting drinking water needs, now very low, will require 700 million cubic meters in 1990. The effort to be made in this field is tremendous, when we realize that the present drinking water supply is exactly abcut 525 million cubic meters.

During the coming decade, more than 30 billion dinars will have to be appropriated for hydraulics, to which we must add the 12 billion dinars planned for agricultural hydraulics.

B) Agricultural Development

It is necessary, and this is an essential imperative, to guarantee Algeria's food supply and protect it from threats of food blackmail, which the recent past has shown can be used by some capitalist countries.

To this fundamental aim of agricultural policy, must be added that of creating obviously improved living conditions for the peasants in the coming decade.

In conformity with the aims mentioned in the national constitution, agricultural lands must not only be protected against all encroachment from any sector whatever, but they must also be extended.

The growth of agriculture means that land resources and man who lives from them will again be fully developed.

The improvement of the status of agriculture in the Algerian economy will be done in such a way that society will learn to adapt to its demands and its rhythms and this involves both the educational system, as well as the supply, distribution and finance systems in general.

In the coming decade, progress in plant production will have to involve mainly, grains, potatoes, leguminous plants, fresh vegetables, fruits and fodders.

Meat products, severe shortages of which are felt, will have to involve the whole range of products, by developing mainly the production of red meat and vigorously speeding up poultry production.

During the coming decade, it is planned to spend some 50 billion dinars for agricultural development.

Agricultural Investment Program 1980-1984
(In million DA [Algerian Dinars])

Branches and/or sectors	Amount of RAR [Remains to be completed] at end of 79	New program (80-84)	Total of Five-year plan	Authorization of expenditures	RAR beyond 1980
Plant production and crop development	2,700	3,640	6,340	5,800	1,340
Livestock production and development	1,300	4,700	6,000	5,000	1,000
Agricultural material and equipment	1,600	7,544	9,144	8,944	200
Study, research, rural infrastructures and others	400	2,016	2,416	1,056	1,360
Subtotal agriculture	6,000	17,900	23,900	20,000	3,900
Forestry projects	470	2,330	2,800	2,395	405
Equipment and forestry planning	100	740	840	640	200
Study, research, production in kind	110	250	360	265	95
Subtotal forestry	680	3,320	4,000	3,300	700
Production, processing, distribution	116.5	100	216.5	216.5	-
Soil infrastructures	38	605	643	643	-
Study, research and training	15.5	155	170.5	170.5	-
Subtotal fishing	170	860	1,030	1,030	-
Overall total	6,850	22,080	28,930	24,330	4,600

Industrial Development

Characterized by concrete results of planned industrial development, the past decade has produced achievements, which, although being in themselves, a positive aspect of the period, cannot help but bring up seriously and confusingly the question of Algeria's economic future.

The imbalances and tensions which result from them, whose dislocating effect cannot be ignored, reveal a sector which, although concentrating in itself most of the country's financial, material and human resources:

Is not mastering its production apparatus;

Does not have the means for planning and implementing its investments;

Continues to appeal to a great extent for technical assistance;

Is highly concentrated in northern Algeria.

This is why, besides completing and putting into operation, under the best conditions, projects in the process of being carried out, efforts during the next plan will emphasize:

The utilization of new investments in basic support industries;

The rationalization of the use of the production machine, encouraging methods of accomplishment, development and handling of investments and training;

Strengthening the role of local organizations and the introduction and involvement of the private sector to guide it towards a meaningful contribution to the development effort.

Investment Operations

The total amount of investments devoted to industry in the 1980-84 plan is about 155 billion DA of which

Seventy-eight million DA remains to be used.

Seventy-seven DA belong to the new program.

Investment 1980-1984 (million DA)

Investment	Cost of Programs	Authorization Expenditures	Remains to be carried out beyond 1984
General studies and projects	900	650	250
Drilling	950	850	100
Dams	9,000	7,200	1,800
Transfers and bringing forward	3,000	2,500	500
Water supply and urban sanitation	5,150	4,300	850
Urban renewal plans (AEP [expansion unknown] plus urban sanitation)	4,700	2,900	1,800
Reclamation of irrigated areas and development, including small and average scale hydraulics	5,700	4,300	1,400
Other installations of regional infrastructures	600	300	300
Totals	30,000	23,000	7,000

Remains to be Carried Out

Year	Hydrocarbons	Industry outside of Hydrocarbons	Total
1980	11,000	17,000	28,000
1981	8,000	14,000	22,000
1982	5,000	10,000	15,000
1983	3,000	6,000	9,000
1984	1,000	3,000	4,000
Total	28,000	50,000	78,000

New Investments

The volume of new investments to be made during this middle term plan represents the effort to be authorized to develop the industrial sector and strengthen its support for priority sectors.

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	Total 1980-1984
Hydrocarbons	5,000	5,700	6,500	8,000	10,000	35,200
Industry outside of hydrocarbons	3,000	5,000	8,000	11,500	14,000	41,500
Total industry	8,000	10,500	14,500	19,500	24,000	76,700

Resolutions of the Fourth Congress Regarding Production Operations

In the light of and taking into account the reports at the plenary session and the reports in committees.

Considering the long term policies for economic development [as published].

12) To develop organizations to manage and exploit large areas and irrigated areas, so as to guarantee efficient utilization of water and to insure through suitably scaled rents the maintenance and renewal of installations.

Agriculture

The Congress calls for:

1) Undertaking positive action to develop material and technical bases for agriculture

2) Development of land, preservation of landed capital through drainage and combating the extension of forestry resources connected with large agricultural projects, protection of the reservoir slopes of dams, protection of agricultural land, by limiting urban and industrial expansion.

3) Efficient use of soils, the preservation and optimum use of agricultural areas in conformity with local ecological and soil science conditions, as well as priorities for the development of food and forage crops, fruit tree cultivation in foothill and mountain areas, as well as the crops-livestock raising-fruit tree growing combination in high plateau areas and Saharan regions.

4) The expansion of irrigated areas both through the creation of new large areas as well as through the development of small scale hydraulics.

5) Drawing up of agricultural production plans by the farmers on each commune level, in accordance with the short and medium term national plan priorities.

6) Short term improvement of yields in the plant production field by decentralization of the sector's operation and improving organizational, supply and marketing conditions.

7) Improved and increased livestock production to meet the needs for white meat and eggs, to cover the needs for milk and dairy products to maintain the present rate of supply of demand for red meat.

8) Forestry development to combat desertification, erosion of reservoir slopes and to increase the productivity of forested areas by a sizeable increase in Algeria's afforestation rate.

9) Increase of fish and seafood production, by expanded fishing facilities, training of oceangoing fishermen, their organization in cooperatives, making adjusted credits available to them, setting up suitable distribution organizations, elimination of bureaucratic red tape, as well as encouraging the nonoperative private sector in this field and developing all types of pisciculture.

10) Improving and encouraging scientific and technical research regarding agriculture, in conformity with its priority, with the

participation of research centers of national universities in theoretical fields and taking into account the knowledge and experience of producers.

11) Priority large scale assignment of engineers, cadres and Algerian technicians on the production and support structure level to the people, especially the CAPCS /Communal Multi-Service Agriculture Cooperative/ groups and their integration in producer collectives, the need to decree measures for the compulsory assignment of agricultural engineers and technicians in the agricultural, veterinary and paraveterinary sector.

12) Increasing the value of agricultural production, in particular tomatoes and dates, by increasing decentralized units for preparation, canning and processing, taking into account at the time of their establishment, regional pecularities.

Encourage and provide favorable conditions for the integration of emigrant brothers in agriculture.

Regarding the organization of the agricultural sector.

The Congress calls for:

13) Decentralization of research and development organizations for livestock and plant production.

14) Improving the capacities of the CAPCS to properly assure their support mission to all producers, including the small peasants.

15) Reorganization of self managed operations and cooperatives to provide them with effective management and full economic efficiency.

16) Guiding and encouraging the small peasants to organize in cooperative and precooperative production and marketing groups on the basis of voluntary membership.

17) Simplification of procedures for granting credit to all producers, effective decentralization of financial organizations, as well as organizations charged with the inspection and supervision of planned investments.

18) Reorganization of the present marketing system to assure improved movement of distribution and a better protection of the interests of producers and consumers.

Industry

The Congress calls for:

1) The implementation of an energy policy capable of harmonizing the actual and foreseeable needs of the national economy and those of future generations. In view of the limited and nonrenewable nature of the hydrocarbon resources, the development of a policy of use of substitute energy is essential, as well as an energy conservation policy.

2) The Congress declares the need for the progressively increasing participation of industry in national accumulation, calls for the mobilization of workers, elected officials and leading cadres to win the battle of production and management, to increase the effectiveness of the production apparatus and reduce the costs of production to lessen investment cost.

3) The development of a policy of national and regional industrial development capable of encouraging the participation of local collectives, meeting priority needs in industrial products and services and increasing their role in the integration of the economy.

The Congress calls for:

4) It emphasizes that the size of units and complexes must only be decided in the future on the basis of economic, technical and planning qualifications.

5) The complete development of projects and the progressive creation of specialized organizations being one of the means of providing cadres and acquiring technology, will necessarily create increasingly improved conditions for the national endowments, for study and achievement and their development.

6) The Congress urges regarding a medium and long-term industrial policy, assuring greater independence and greater economic integration, investigating the feasibility of the development of an assembly industry to satisfy the needs for consumer goods or equipment considered necessary to effectively save foreign exchange.

7) The Congress additionally advocates encouraging and developing especially on the local and private sector level, a tradesman class to service equipment and do traditional artistic handicraft.

8) To complete as soon as possible and under the best conditions projects now being carried out.

9) To undertake investments for the improvement of the existing potential to eliminate bottlenecks observed in production operations.

10) To direct new investments towards activities connected with priority sectors especially housing and city planning, agriculture and hydraulics, economic and social infrastructures, education and

training, the development of projects capable of being started in future plans, especially for the production of equipment and projects encouraging the export of goods and services.

11) The Congress recommends that the planned activities for the production of goods and services, as well as investments be carried out smoothly and that bureaucratic red tape in supplying units and carrying out projects be eliminated. For this reason, administrative procedures must develop and adjust to the requirements of effective planning at all levels.

12) The Congress demands the integration of the private sector in plans to allow it to make a positive contribution to the industrial sector's development effort. This additional investment must take place under conditions which guarantee that the private sector does not acquire an actual monopoly of operations in these situations.

8490
CSO: 4400

COMMENTS ON RESTORATION OF PARLIAMENTARY LIFE IN KUWAIT

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 17 Sep 80 p 13

[Article: "The Voice of Democracy Is Heard Again; The Parliamentary Ring in Kuwait Will Be Echoed in Bahrain"]

[Text] Bahrain--When Amir Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabah of Kuwait issued the royal decree for the return of parliamentary life to Kuwait, the Bahrain press reported it with great interest. Most of the editorials welcomed the decree, stressing the pioneering role of Kuwait in the realm of parliamentary government.

The [Bahrain] newspaper AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ pointed out in its editorial that "democracy means a sharing of responsibility by each individual citizen." AKHBAR AL-KHALIJ continued with the following word of caution: "Democracy does not mean anarchy, dancing in the streets, and giving the opportunity to intruders to harm the country and the citizens. It does not mean serving oneself before anyone else, and it does not mean that any individual may work in the dark in order to impose what he wants [on others]. Rather, democracy means that there is a sacred place called parliament, where the voice of the individual can be expressed and heard."

The Commentary of AL-ADWA'

The weekly [Bahrain] newspaper AL-ADWA' welcomed the royal decree issued in Kuwait, emphasizing the positive role which parliamentary life can play in serving society and its cultural development. It added: "Parliamentary life can never function on an even keel, unless every citizen and opinion leader can express his views without fear for his job or means of livelihood. Representative life means securing the rights of every citizen within the framework of the laws that govern his society. It means transforming the citizen into a constructive person in every sense of the word. And it means that the individual will not be forgotten, and that he will not be surprised by pre-dawn visitors to put him behind a tall fence [under arrest].

Democracy is Everybody's Aspiration

Political observers stress the fact that when the press here takes a position on any regional political question, it gives expression to local feelings. In the meantime, the weekly [Bahrain] newspaper AL-MASIRAH is continuing to publish an open readers' debate on parliamentary life in Bahrain. In its latest editorial, 'Ali Amin, chairman of the board of the General Trade and Food Processing Company, commented:

"I do not know when parliamentary life will return [to Bahrain]. The government intended to restore parliamentary life, but the chain of events in the region, especially the disruption of security, has prevented the return of parliamentary life to Bahrain and other countries of the region. I wish that democracy could be restored now, for this is everyone's desire. The government will inevitably follow through with the restoration of parliamentary government, especially as other countries in the region are serious about restoring representative life. One example is Kuwait. Also, Saudi Arabia is earnestly studying a new system of government. If Bahrain acts, it could still be among the first few countries to bring parliamentary life to the region."

Women and the Parliament

Lawyer Salman Sahwan said: "The Parliament is the natural legislative authority. In its absence, the cabinet, which is basically the executive authority, undertakes the functions of the legislature. This contradicts an important legal principle--the separation of powers." Regarding his proposals for the new experiment, he said: "It is important to give women the right of full participation in the democratic experiment, since Bahraini women have reached a high degree of maturity."

Commitment to the Democratic Concept

Former (candidate?) 'Isa Jawdar pointed out in a word addressed to government officials: "When a representative assembly is created through direct and free elections, the government should make a total commitment to the democratic concept of majority rule, and should not harass members in any way. The government should set the stage for a true democratic environment for all individuals and factions, and should release all political prisoners, so that they may do their share in serving their country, effectively and out of conviction."

What About Official Reaction?

On the government level, officials have not yet expressed their point of view on the ongoing debate regarding the return of parliamentary life to Bahrain. However, observers here stress that the government is cautiously following all developments touching on this subject. Political analysts here feel that the quick one-day visit of the Bahrain minister of information, Tariq al-Mu'ayyid, to the government of Kuwait, on the day following the announcement of the royal decree to restore parliamentary government to Kuwait, reflects the interest of Bahrain officials in any new development in the field of democratic government in the region.

However, this official attention does not mean, in the opinion of observers, a desire to hasten the return of parliamentary life to Bahrain, at least not in the near future. Bahrain officials had already announced, at the beginning of the year, their desire to review the [past] parliamentary experiment in Bahrain exhaustively, in the light of what Kuwait does in its new experiment. This means that Bahrain's steps in this connection will depend on the time span required to prepare for elections and parliamentary life in Kuwait. During this period, Bahrain will be preparing for the requirements of the new experiment.

Observers see in the faint voices given expression from time to time on the pages of the Bahrain newspaper, AL-MASIRAH, an official beginning for these needed preparations. Therefore, we might say that the ring of democracy in Kuwait will be echoed in Bahrain--but after some time.

9614
CSO: 4802

POLITICAL PARTIES LAW AMENDED

Cairo AL-JARIDAH AL-RASHMIYAH [THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic No 28 13 Jul 80 pp 24-26

[Article: "Law No 144 of 1980 Amending Number of Provisions of Law No 40 of 1977 Concerning Political Parties"]

[Text] In the name of the people,

The president of the Republic,

The People's Assembly has ratified the following law and we have promulgated it:

Article One

The text of clause No 1 of paragraph No 1 of article 4, article 7, the first and second paragraphs of article 8, the last paragraph of article 12, the last paragraphs of articles 14 and 16 and the first paragraph of article 21 of law No 40 of 1977 concerning the political parties shall be replaced by the following texts:

Clause No 1 of paragraph No 1 of article 4:

The principles of the Islamic Shari'a in their capacity as the main source of legislation.

Article 7:

A written notification must be presented to the chairman of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee provided for in the following article on the formation of a party. The notification shall be signed by 50 constituent members of the party and their signatures must be authenticated officially, provided that at least one half the members is comprised of workers and farmers. All the documents concerning such a party, especially its bylaws, the names of its constituent members, a statement of the party's monies, their source and the bank in which they are deposited and the name of the party representative in the measures for founding the party, must be appended to this notification.

The notification on the formation of the party shall be presented to the committee referred to in the preceding paragraph within 15 days as of the date of the submission of the notification.

Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 8:

The Political Parties Committee shall be formed in the following manner:

1. The Consulta ive Council chairman, chairman.

2. The minister of justice, member.

3. The minister of interior, member.

4. The minister of state for the People's Assembly affairs, member.

5. Three members not affiliated with any political party. These three members shall be former chairmen, deputy chairmen or acting chairmen of judiciary councils and a decree shall be issued by the president of the republic selecting them.

When the Consultative Council chairman is absent, chairmanship of the committee shall be assumed by one of his two deputies. In case they are all absent for personal reasons or for (reasons pertaining to the Consultative Council), the president of the Republic shall issue a decree appointing a replacement for the chairman of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee.

Last paragraph of article 12:

The said agency must prepare an annual report on all the affairs and financial conditions of the party and must present these reports to the chairman of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee.

Last paragraph of article 14:

The public prosecution must notify the chairman of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee of the measures taken at the party headquarters within 48 hours of the adoption of such measures.

Article 16:

The chairman of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee shall be notified by registered letter of any decision taken by a party to change its chairman, to dissolve the party or to merge with another party and of any change in the party's bylaws within a period of 10 days as of the date of issuance of the decision.

First paragraph of article 21:

The Political Parties' Affairs Committee shall lay down the rules regulating a party's contacts with any foreign political party or organization according to the proposals submitted by this committee's chairman.

Article Two

The president of the Republic shall issue a decree selecting the person to replace the chairman of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee stipulated in article 8 of law No 40 of 1977 concerning the political parties until the chairman and two deputy chairmen of the Consultative Council are elected during the first annual session of this council.

Article Three

The members of the Political Parties' Affairs Committee already selected in implementation of clause 5 of article 9 of law No 40 of 1977 concerning the political parties shall continue to be members of this committee until a decree is issued by the president of the republic re-forming this committee after convocation of the Consultative Council.

Article Four

Article 19 and 20 of the aforementioned law No 30 of 1977 shall be abolished. Every provision violating the provisions of this law shall also be abolished.

Article Five

This law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall go into effect on the day following its publication.

This law shall be stamped with the seal of the state and shall be implemented as one of its laws.

Issued at the presidential office on 13 July 1980.

Anwar al-Sadat

8494
CSO: 4802

LEGISLATION TO REVIVE EGYPTIAN RAILROADS OUTLINED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 1 Aug 80 p 5

[Article by Ahmad 'Ismat: "Legislative Solution to Railroad Problems"]

[Text] Experts have decided that the railroads will now move forward after years of stagnation. More cars will not be imported to solve problems; instead, new legislation has been enacted. Maintenance has been poor, arrivals and departures erratic, and rail travel a torture, because of the awful state of the coaches. Maintenance facilities are in terrible shape, and technical personnel have quit due to low pay.

Antiquated government regulations and bureaucracy are leading enemies of the railroads and originators of their decline. The new legislation approved by the People's Assembly was prepared for this reason. How will this legislation improve the railroads?

One Hundred Engineers Quit

The main problem facing the railroads, besides bureaucracy, is the difficulty of keeping engineers on low pay. For example, authorities say that the shortage in railway and signal engineers is about 60 percent of those needed to carry on basic operations. This shortage is reflected in the [poor] quality of operations, particularly in maintenance. Presently, the number of engineers refusing railroad employment is one hundred.

Railway authorities add that they advertise for engineers, but no one responds. In contrast, during the 1940's and '50's, high grades were required of those wishing to work for the railroads.

Capable people prefer to work in public and private companies offering higher salaries. Railroad wages stand in the way of employees' advancement.

Backlog in Renovation of Cars, Roadbeds, Signals

Revenues have decreased due to fixed fares and worldwide increases in the cost of railroad equipment. Freight rates have remained static, in spite of inflation. Thus, the railroads have run into deficit since 1975. Freight rates have remained the same for the past 21 years, while passenger rates have increased 60 percent during the past 75 years. In 1975, the railways lost 2.7

million pounds, 14 million in 1976, 15 million in 1977, and 33 million in 1978. Poor maintenance and renovation, brought on by niggardly government appropriations, contributed to these losses.

Authorities say that there are 1,700 kilometers of roadbed that should have been renovated by 1979. This is some 38 percent of total roadbed kilometers. One hundred fifty-six bridges have been in use in excess of their estimated useful lives, including two spanning the Nile, 15 crossing canals and ditches, 67 stationary steel ones, and 72 concrete ones.

Three hundred seventeen coaches are over 30 years of age, 17 percent of the total number. Three thousand eight hundred twenty-nine freight cars are more than 40 years old, 21 percent of total freight cars. One hundred ninety-six locomotives are 20 years of age or over, or out of operation because of their rundown condition. This adds up to 23 percent of total locomotives. Most maintenance shops are between 45 and 90 years old, have deteriorated, and are incapable of meeting maintenance requirements.

Lack of Safety Procedures Increases Accidents

The poor state of the railroads is not limited to a shortage of coaches and to slow replacement and renovation, but is also reflected in the absence of modern safety procedures and resultant train wrecks. The signal system suffers from severe limitations. This has reached the point of operating most main line signals with kerosene lamps. A system for monitoring train movements, one that would permit total control over railroad traffic, keep in touch with breakdowns, change routes, and give instructions, has not been implemented.

The Legislation--How Will It Work?

Experts agree that the railroads cannot make any headway unless guaranteed a financial return in line with continuously rising operating costs. The government must, therefore, give the railroad authority the monetary difference between the fare for the service provided and its real cost. The authority must also be able to perform necessary repairs and renovation, be unhampered by government regulations, and be given a free hand to attract needed technical expertise by improving salaries and incentives. The authority should be able to choose a suitable form of administration to achieve its ends, be it by creating corporations, partnerships, or dealing with the private sector, etc.

Railroad requirements have crystalized in recent legislation designed to achieve these aims. How will this legislation improve the roads?

No Local Interference With Railroad Operations

The new law prepared by Engineer Sulayman Mitwalli, Minister of Transport, Communication, and Maritime Transport, emphasizes the national characteristic of the railroad authority's activities. This necessitates administering things centrally, since the railroads are in the forefront of national services and operate in all governates nationwide. They are not a local service, and local laws and rules do not apply to them.

Among the most important provisions of the new legislation is the right of the authority to set fares relative to costs, so that it will have the financial ability to achieve its goals. If the government does fix fares, it must now pay the difference in terms of real costs. The authority will set charges and tariffs for its various services. Its board will suggest a fare schedule, which will be announced by the minister of transport following submission to the council of ministers. The treasury will provide for differences between revenues resulting from the approved tariff and actual costs in the railroad budget for the following year.

The new legislation provides that the authority should use its money and budget in ways suited to its activities, and should modify its work to achieve its aims. This will be accomplished by having the railroads prepare their own budget according to their by-laws, without reference to national legislation governing budgets. The railroads will have their own account, into which their revenue will be deposited, and surpluses will be carried over from year to year.

Tax Exemption Allows Problems To Be Tackled

Since the railroads face many financial burdens as a result of high operating costs, the law exempts them from duties on imports of equipment, machinery, and technical supplies necessary for their operations. This is on condition that these items be inspected. The railroads will be required to give an affidavit that their imports are for internal operations. Customs exempt items cannot be sold within 5 years of the date of exemption, or they will be taxable. Since government contracts are usually subject to many restrictions which actually prevent their implementation, the railroads have been freed from these restrictions by special exemption from legislation governing imports and foreign exchange. The railroads can import on their own or via other channels without a license to do so. Their production requirements, raw materials, machinery, equipment, spare parts, and means of transportation can be imported according to their by-laws.

Creation of Railroad Corporations

The most important aspect of the new legislation grants the railroads authority to administer themselves. The railroads are allowed, given the approval of the minister of transport, to establish corporations, on their own or in cooperation with others, and to sell stock in these corporations following their establishment.

Board of Directors Sets Salaries

Low salaries cause technical expertise to flee. Thus the new legislation gives the railroads' board of directors the authority to draw up regulations governing appointment of railway employees, their promotions, salaries, bonuses, and all other personnel matters. The minister of transport will issue the final regulations. A workers' health and social care system can be created by the board. It can also suggest internal and external loans and set procedures governing contracts with customers, technical and financial matters, purchasing and warehousing, etc.

Can the railroads progress under this legislated reform and regain their lost reputation?

9669
CSO: 4802

SOLUTIONS TO HOUSING CRISIS SOUGHT IN NEW HOUSING BILL

Cairo AL-HRAM in Arabic 17, 18 Sep 80

[Article in two installments: "Relations Between Landlord and Tenant Turn New Leaf"]

[17 Sep 80 p 3]

[First Installment by 'Abd-al-Wahab Hamid]

[Text] All Concerned Parties Engage in Lengthy Debate on New Housing Law Before It Goes into Effect.

New Law Realizes for Landlord:

1. A 150 Percent Rent Increase for Old Buildings After 10 Years;

2. The Right to Fix Rent After Rent Committees Are Turned into Grievance Committees;

3. Penalty for Key Money Is Civilian Not Criminal; 2 Years Advance Instead of 2 Months.

For the Tenant, the New Bill:

1. Reduces Returns on Buildings to 7 Percent;

2. Gives Right of Grievance Against Landlord's Evaluation;

3. Gives Tax Exemption for His Apartment.

What are the principal features of the proposed new housing bill before it is presented to the Council of Ministers and the People's Assembly for approval or modification?

What are the outstanding characteristics of the bill? Will it benefit landlords, tenants or both? Will it be a means for solving the housing crisis?

Many questions were being raised by average Egyptian citizens: some supported the bill and others opposed it.

Those who supported the bill said, "The new bill provides benefits to old and to future landlords. It does so by fixing rent and especially by changing the work of the rent committees and turning them into grievance committees to which the tenant would appeal. The new bill increases rent in old buildings so that the increase would amount to 150 percent after about 10 years; in new buildings it would amount to 50 percent."

The new bill also gives the tenant benefits. The most important of these is reducing returns on buildings from 10 to 7 percent. This reduces rent. The tenant is also exempted from all kinds of taxes which represent more than 50 percent.

The question now is this: What are the reasons that led officials to contemplate preparing a new housing bill at a time when the former law raised landlords' returns more than 200 percent over returns fixed by the law that was in effect before it?

What are officials saying about the features of the new law before it is approved?

Engineer Ahmad Fu'ad al-Juhari, assistant to the governor of Cairo for technical and engineering affairs says, "The outcome of our previous experiences indicates that it is necessary to have an agency that regulates the relationship between landlords and tenants instead of turning that task over to grievances committees. I believe that rent committees are more specialized in this regard than the courts. This makes the existence of rent committees as they are necessary since the courts basically depend on a report from an expert, whereas a committee's opinion is considered more comprehensive than that of one expert. Furthermore, there has been a backlog of court cases as a result of the fact that the committee's opinion was not considered final. This entailed a delay of over 5 years in settling rent cases."

Retention of Committees Essential for Relations Between Two Parties

Engineer Fu'ad al-Juhari is calling for "the retention of rent committees as a basis for relations between landlords and tenants. The feasibility of these committees has been established during the previous period, and their opinions have been accepted by landlords and tenants. The number of these committees must be increased, and they must be bolstered by providing them with the necessary means of transportation so that matters that are pending between landlords and tenants can be settled. Incentives for committee members must be reconsidered so that engineers who are capable of joining these committees can do so."

Regarding the proposed increase in rents [that were fixed in the past], Engineer Ahmad Fu'ad al-Juhari, assistant to the governor of Cairo for technical affairs said, "The thought of increasing rent is a constructive trend, especially since these are old buildings whose rents are low. Low rent makes a landlord refrain from carrying out the necessary refurbishing and maintenance operations for the building. I believe that the private sector can play a major role in contributing to a solution to the housing crisis. This increase [in rent] is considered one of the kinds of incentives for that. Tenants will not be hurt by paying the small proposed increase, especially since their incomes are increasing continuously.

The governor's assistant says, "Legalizing the payment of 2 years's rent in advance was also a positive trend. It will expedite the completion of buildings whose implementation is delayed at present because landlords do not have the necessary funds and because they will not go to the banks for funds because of the high interest rates."

The Advance Is a Contribution from the Tenant to the Landlord

Instead of having the landlord obtain the advance by illegitimate means that may endanger the relationship between him and the tenant, the legislator established a foundation that legitimized the payment of 2 years' rent in advance. The fact that this situation has been legalized protects tenants from having to pay sums of money without proof that they did so. Many tenants are now paying large sums of money as advances without any safeguards.

'Ali Hasan al-Imam, the authorized representative of the People's Council for the governorate of Cairo says that among the most important misgivings that he has about the new bill is the fact that the work of the rent committees, which is the basis for determining the relationship between the landlord and the tenant, has been changed and confined to the task of fixing rent in case a tenant has a grievance. He says that this means that thousands of cases will pile up in front of judges since it is not likely that the landlord will set the rent--and he is free to do so--that the tenant will approve of. Consequently, this will lead to many problems between landlords and tenants.

'Ali Hasan al-Imam is advocating that the rent committees be retained so that they would be the foundation between landlords and tenants for determining the rent. The committees had many advantages in the past since their appraisal was accepted by both parties. In fact, some landlords used to mention in the rent agreement the statement, "according to the committee's appraisal" without either party resorting to the courts. This strengthened relations between landlords and tenants.

Mr al-Imam says, "The subject of determining rents cannot be left to supply and demand since there is a big discrepancy in income, especially after the economic openness which led to the creation of a broad class [of people] who can purchase [goods and services] at the most expensive prices and who can afford to pay the most expensive rents because they can make up for the increase from the returns of projects. In such a case people whose incomes are limited will not be able to obtain housing at all. The matter of housing may be left to supply and demand under two conditions:

* When incomes are not so disparate; and

* When the supply of homes exceeds the demand.

Rents Were Very Low Before 1944

The authorized representative of the People's Council for Cairo adds, "The rents of homes that were built before the 1st of January 1944 were actually low. These rents must be increased, and the landlords must be obligated to conduct the necessary periodic repairs and maintenance."

Mahdi Judah says, "Undoutedly, there is a small group of landlords who will determine a reasonable amount of rent [for their property]. But what guarantees [for that] does the bill provide after the work of the rent committees has been changed? What is the difference between the greedy landlord and the temperate one? The abolishment of these committees will become a sword hanging over the heads of tenants." He says, "If the purpose of abolishing the rent committees is to encourage landlords, this menas that the landlord will be able to obtain more rent than the rental unit deserves. If the state does in fact want to encourage landlords, it has to offer them loans, and it has to go back to the old system of dispensing subsidized construction materials. Consequently, costs will be reduced, and this will lead to rent reduction."

Social Worker 'Abd-al-Ra'uf 'Aziz says, "If the purpose behind abolishing the rent committees or limiting their work is to curb the greed of landlords, I believe that this will never be achieved. The new housing law which has been in effect for less than 2 years had led to a rent increase in excess of 200 percent. A rental unit under the old law which was rented for 10 pounds is being rented now under Law No 49 for 1977 for more than 30 pounds. Landlords, nevertheless, are not satisfied, and they are still asking for better. This will be achieved if the committees are abolished."

He adds, "We were expecting the new bill to tighten controls on landlords who take advantage of people and who receive key money, but the bill made it clear that the penalty for accepting key money was civilian and not criminal. This would encourage landlords to continue accepting key money. I believe that this bill will not be approved by the Council of Ministers or by the People's Assembly especially since the state is now leaning towards reducing the burden that is borne by people whose incomes are limited."

Another tenant says, "The thought of limiting the work of the rent committees will backfire because we are in a society in which a greedy class has emerged. There is no better indication of that than the fact that President Anwar al-Sadat is standing firm these days against the class of merchants who are trading in the livelihoods of the people. The competition is clear: every class is trying to get more than the other. If [some people] are thinking of abolishing the committees, this can be done with regard to luxurious housing only; implementation of that is to be confined to the choice locations, which are the tourist areas."

A tenant says, "If rents for old homes were fixed on the basis of the prices that were in effect these buildings were built and in accordance to the actual cost of these buildings, how then can the rent be increased by a rate that varies from 5 to 15 percent over a period of 10 years? By the end of that period rent will have increased by approximately 50 or 150 percent. This is a major increase that could affect a large class of people [living on] limited incomes. Those people had established for themselves a lifestyle that is suitable to the rent [they have been paying]. In other words, the annual increase in rent will exceed the periodic increase in pay which an employee receives." This tenant is asking that this article of the new bill be reconsidered before it is approved since the bill does favor the landlord.

Landlords Calling for Retention of Rent Committees

Landlord Ahmad al-Disuqi is calling for the retention of the rent committees. He says, "If the relationship between landlords and tenants deteriorated under the rent committees even though the rent committees established what may be a fair foundation for a relationship between them, I cannot at all imagine that there will be a relationship between landlord and tenant if the committees are abolished. As is its custom the human spirit is not satisfied and asks for more. I believe that all tenants may file suits against landlords to determine [their] rents. This will lead to numerous problems as a result of the poor relationship between landlords and tenants and the lack of confidence with them. This will lead to a backlog of thousands of court cases waiting for their turn in a long line of thousands." Mr al-Disuqi supports the increases in old rents.

Ahmad Muhammad Khalaf, the director general of disbursements in the governorate of Cairo and a member of the rent committee says, "The proposed new housing bill is undoubtedly advantageous to both landlord and tenant. Some of its articles, however, must be reconsidered, especially regarding letting the landlord estimate the amount of the rent and confining the task of the committee to making an appraisal after the landlord [sic] files a grievance. I believe that the committees will be confronted with grievances from tenants because it is unlikely that the landlord and the tenant will agree on a reasonable rent."

On the proposed increase in the rent of old homes Ahmad Khalaf says that such an increase is necessary in homes built before 1944 since returns from those buildings are low. "Low returns may cause the landlord to neglect maintenance of the buildings, and that could [ultimately] cause the building to be torn down. But the proposed increase for the other groups [of buildings] must be reconsidered because these buildings were built at a time when prices had risen somewhat. The most important positive aspect of that increase is the reduction of the returns of buildings from 10 to 7 percent, and this will lead to a reduction in rents that will be in the interests of the tenant.

Attorney Kamal Ibrahim, undersecretary of the Ministry of Reconstruction and Housing says, "The new housing bill, which is still being considered, has tried to establish a balance between the landlord and the tenant. This is due to the legislator's conviction that the private sector plays a major role in contributing towards a solution to the housing crisis. Among the most important advantages to the tenant that the bill has determined are [the following]:

"* The bill limited returns from buildings to 7 percent instead of the 10 percent limitation in the current law. The 7 percent return is the basis for determining rents. This will help reduce rents by about 30 percent. In order to avoid damages to the landlord from this reduction, the state will bear some of the burdens: the revenues landlords receive from buildings will not be included in the public revenue coffers.

"* The new bill exempts the tenant from all taxes which represent over 51 percent [of his income] if the rent [he pays] for one room exceeds 10 pounds.

"* The unjustified delay in completing buildings: rent in this case will be determined in accordance with the prices that were in effect when the building should have been completed, so that the tenant would not be hurt by the price increases when the rent is set.

"* Ten percent of the profits earned by public sector companies are to be earmarked to finance housing units for their employees."

Attorney Kamal Ibrahim, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Reconstruction says, "The bill did not give a landlord [the prerogative to] set rent without [any] controls. The bill rather stipulated that the returns from a building were not to exceed seven percent of the cost of the land and the building. If returns [and accordingly rents] exceeded that percentage, the tenant may appeal to the rent committee so it can correct the situation."

He says, "The rent committees will stay as they are. No one is thinking of abolishing them. But there is an inclination to give landlords the freedom to come to an agreement with tenants over the amount of rent. If they do not agree, the landlord may file a grievance."

"Likewise, when the legislator proposed that the advance be 2 years' [rent], his intention was to have that advance secured instead of what is happening now, which is the payment of an advance that may not be acknowledged.

Balance Between Landlord and Tenant in Interests of Both Parties

Attorney Kamal Ibrahim says, "The purpose of the proposed increase, which is between 15 and 5 percent, over a 10-year period is to compensate the landlords whose rents are low, especially [for buildings that were built] before 1944. This increase will not be taken by the landlord only: one-third will be for the landlord; one-third will be for refurbishing and maintenance; and the last third will be for popular housing. This increase is still under consideration."

Engineer Taha 'Abd-al-Qadir, technical office manager for the governor's assistant for technical affairs says, "I believe that the thought of making the rent committees settle tenants' grievances against the appraisals of landlords will increase investments in the field of housing. This will encourage landlords to turn their savings into investments in this area. Returns from buildings will be proportionate to the prevailing interest rate in banks. Thus supply and demand will be balanced, and matters will return to normal after a period that may come to 3 years."

Engineer Taha 'Abd-al-Qadir adds, "Rent committees have not settled relations between landlords and tenants throughout the past period. The evidence of this lies in the thousands of court cases that are now pending in the courts awaiting settlement on matters pertaining to problems between landlords and tenants."

He says, "At present the work of the committees is advantageous to tenants at the expense of landlords. This is because the state is incapable of enabling the tenant to pay the landlord the real rent, and this is the result of the current wages policy and the discrepancy in incomes. If the state does in fact wish to help the tenant, it may build suitable housing for tenants instead of helping them at the cost of preventing landlords from obtaining suitable rents for their housing units."

[18 Sep 80 p 3]

[Second Installment by Muhammad Ahmad Hammam]

[Text] Why Are There 28,000 Vancant Apartments? 71 Percent of Urban Housing Lacks Sewage; 52 Percent Is Without Running Water; 38 Percent Without Electricity; We Need 1.8 Million Housing Units So We Can Look Forward to Future with Confidence and Reassurance.

If the proposed new housing bill which is now under consideration and under study is the beginning of a new chapter in relations between landlords and tenants and if we are really determined to overcome this crisis, what is called for is for us to reveal the magnitude of the crisis and its real features in figures to all the experts who are looking into that bill.

It has become evident that we have about 28,000 vacant homes whose owners for one reason or another do not want to have them occupied.

It has also become evident that 71 percent of the homes in the cities have no sewage; that 52 percent have no running water; and that 38 percent have no electricity.

It has also become evident that we need 1.8 million housing units so we can look forward to the future with confidence and reassurance.

At any rate the dialogue which was begun yesterday by "AL-AHRAM Investigations" to discuss the new housing bill continues.

The question with which officials are now preoccupied is that of the housing problem and finding radical solutions to it. Announcing the organization of a national housing agency was merely an announcement that the real battle for confronting that problem and for finding suitable solutions to it had begun. The recent ministerial decision to amend the ratio of the loans which are granted to cooperative housing and to individuals was part of the attempts [that are being made] to find a solution. The government is making an effort towards that end at this stage of [the effort to] build and to forge the foundations of the new society.

But the question is this: what is the magnitude [of the problem] that officials have to confront?

This question indicates that there is a need to explain and to present the real picture of the aspects of this crisis since it is not enough that citizens are complaining of the fact that houses are not available.

In fact, the real magnitude of the problem is much greater than that. The importance of this problem lies in the fact that it is forcing some people to look seriously into the aspects and the symptoms of the problem so as to come up with a diagnosis and a remedy that would be suitable to the disease. People should not be surprised by this expression because the housing crisis in Egypt is in reality a social disease and a defect in that social structure. How [can we make such a statement]?

[We can make such a statement because] official data that are available from the last census of the population and housing in Egypt, which was conducted in 1976, indicate that the number of existing buildings is 1,580,000 buildings and that these buildings contain 3,587,000 housing units. Dwellings that are used as private residences represent 94.5 percent of that total; units occupied by business represent 1.7 percent of that total. It is curious that we note a significant matter here: there are about 128,000 vacant dwellings. This [figure] represents 3.4 percent of total dwellings in urban areas. This phenomenon can only be explained by one self-evident fact: the landlords' desire to await suitable opportunities to realize the highest profit from these dwellings despite the devastating crisis that citizens are experiencing!

But it is certain that the recent bill which regulates the relationship between the landlord and the tenant and which will restrict ownership to one housing unit will increase the number of these vacant units, and the question then will become the need to regulate the distribution of these units to the citizens who need them.

Housing and the Crisis of Utilities

The fact is that the existing population figures have another meaning. This residential stock is divided into apartments and separate rooms.

These separate rooms which are mentioned in the census signify a shanty, a cabin, a garage and a hut.

This means that these separate rooms have been used as homes because the supply of housing cannot meet the needs of citizens within the limits of their economic standards. Consequently, these rooms are not suitable for housing nor even for human habitation. Without bathrooms, kitchens or running water they are merely shelters. The number of these rooms amounts to 677,000 units. That is 20 percent of the total housing units designated for private housing and business. Cairo's share of that ratio comes to 43 percent.

But are the basic utilities available to all these units?

Unfortunately, 52 percent of the buildings in cities have no water; 38 percent have no electricity; and 71 percent have no sewage. The real significance of this situation, according to Dr Mahya 'Ali Zaytun, assistant professort of economics at the College of Commerce of the Girls' Branch of al-Azhar University, is the fact that a non-negligible part of the buildings in cities are considered inaccessible to the principal utilities which are indispensable to a dwelling. What is even more serious than that--and of crucial importance--is the fact that 31 percent of the families that were available at the time of the census do not have running water in their buildings and that 23 percent do not have electricity. Similarly, the decline in the number of families that do not have utilities compared with the ratio of dwellings is due to the fact that the buildings which have utilities are designated for poor people. Consequently, they are made up of rooms or a limited number of housing units. This makes the number of families living in every building less than the number of families living in the buildings that have utilities. Most of these buildings consist of a number of floors that is not inconsiderable or a larger number of housing units.

In her study of housing in Egypt Dr Mahya Zaytun says, "There are no data about the ages of buildings even though a large ratio of these buildings are considered old. It has been estimated that the number of condemned buildings in Cairo and Alexandria in 1970 was about 140,000 buildings. In the other cities it was estimated at about 60,000 buildings or about 700,000 housing units."

If we were to turn to rural areas, we will discover the deterioration of the housing condition there. Available data indicate that 36 percent of rural families do not have any source of pure water and 81 percent do not have electricity as a source of light.

The sum total of this picture is that the condition of housing in the traditionally popular areas, which are usually old areas, is deteriorating. This is the case in Bulaq, Misr al-Qadimah and al-Sharabiyyah. As a result of residential encroachment, areas that were originally villages are now within city limits. These were usually centers where migrants from rural areas lived, as is the case in Shubra al-Khaymah and 'Ayn Shams in Cairo. In fact, the pictures include the distorted housing as is the case with those who live in cemeteries, huts and tin structures. It is estimated that the number of people who are living in cemeteries in Cairo alone is over 100,000 families. On the other hand research indicates that the decline in the income of families that are living in popular housing areas is due to the fact that a large percentage of them is trying to utilize their homes in some economic activities.

Towards a New Understanding of the Problem

If this is a diminutive picture of the aspects of the housing crisis in Egypt as it appears through the census information that is available and the social surveys [that may be found] at research centers, the question that is being raised now is not that of searching for a solution because the solution is known: it is meeting the needs of citizens. But the question is rather that of the magnitude or the extent of [meeting] those needs in an urgent fashion and that of their magnitude in the future.

Dr Mahya Zaytun points out the need for defining to officials some notions of the philosophy of housing in Egypt so we can determine the magnitude of the requirements.

Our interest must be focused on housing needs and not on the demand for housing. The demand for housing means the desire to acquire a residence, provided that this desire is accompanied by a purchasing power so that this demand can be realized in the marketplace. Housing needs, however, signify the necessity of providing housing to anyone who does not have shelter and to anyone whose dwelling does not meet a suitable standard of essential, sanitary and social conditions. It is this latter notion that the National Housing Authority must adopt because such a notion does imply the welfare of our society. Regarding current housing needs in urban areas, some people estimate those to be approximately 1.8 million units. These units will replace dwellings that are unsuitable and dwellings that have been condemned, and they will reduce the competition for existing dwellings.

Officials have to make their estimates of future housing needs until the year 2000 now. These estimates are to be based on the expected increase in the population until the year 2000 or on the increase in the rates of urbanization until the same year. In addition, officials are to consider the structural condition of the residential stock according to which will be determined the replacement housing that will be necessary for the future.

All this [must be done] so we can overcome the problem, avoid its future dangers and establish a sound society that would offer its citizens the best of good things as well as security.

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SYRIAN AMBASSADOR LAUDS REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 18 Sep 80 p 3

[Text] PARS NEWS AGENCY—The Syrian Ambassador to Tehran, Ibrahim al-Yunis, expressed in an interview his viewpoints about the Syria-Libya unification. Concerning the merger he said, "We consider it a fundamental factor because unity is the prerequisite of our political, economic and cultural life."

Regarding the Syrian-Libyan merger, Ibrahim al-Yunis said, "It aims at becoming self-sufficient symbiotically. Division is a heritage of colonialism still lingering on in our countries. Therefore, our struggle continues. As Hafez Assad has put it, Syria has not stipulated any condition for our union except that the union should be achieved for the sake of our deprived people. We consider unity a basic factor because it is a requisite of our political, economic and cultural life. We want to build a civilization of Arab unity."

The Ambassador was asked, "You said that this unity is a nationalistic one, whereas we see that the Algerian Minister of Religious Affairs says that Arab nationalism was tried to no avail. We should rely on Islam. If this is so, should the Syria-Libya unity not be an Islamic unity?"

Ibrahim al-Yunis replied, "The terms used in Iran differ from those used in other countries but the meanings are the same. Nationality does not conflict with Islam in any way. It is the usage of terms that differ in this area. As you see we attend most of the Islamic conferences."

The Ambassador was reminded that the call to unification was first made by Col Qadhdhafi and since it was promptly acceded to by Syria it seems that Syria had completely felt the necessity of this merger. The Syrian Ambassador to Tehran said, "A big conspiracy against the Palistinian nation has been hatched in the Camp David Accord. For this reason, any unity that takes shape against Imperialism which is actually antagonistic to nations, it will win our supports."

"The unity of Syria and Egypt against the regime occupying Jerusalem was a commendable unity but the Camp David Agreement gave birth to a second Israel and killed the previous unity."

The Syrian Ambassador was asked, "Considering the sterile unity attempted on numerous occasions previously, how much hope do you attach to this latest unity?"

The Ambassador replied, "This unity is imperative and it is our duty to attempt it tens of times until we arrive at a unity that serves our interests."

The Ambassador was reminded that the geographical distance between Syria and Libya would create problems. He was then asked whether this matter had been studied carefully.

The Syrian Ambassador answered, "As our leaders have said the very fact of our unity is a revolutionary concept. A revolutionary thing does not abort itself by the anticipated consequences. As the colonialism and imperialism of the regime occupying Jerusalem have not sprung from the love of Prophet Moses, but have been pursuing other goals, we should continue our struggle."

Asked what role Islam played in this unity, the Ambassador said, "We are Moslems and respect Islam. Islamic religious teachings even run through our state laws. If we run into any problems we revert to the Islamic theology and if the Islamic theology provides no precedent we deduct our solution by giving sway to justice and truth." Concerning the official view of Syria on the coup d'etat in Turkey, the Ambassador said, "Our government has not yet adopted an official position vis-a-vis this matter. We do not want to be dragged into secondary issues at the cost of losing sight of our principal objectives."

Asked about the impact of the role of Imam Khomeyni and the Islamic revolution of Iran on the people of the region, the Ambassador said, "We are of the same opinion as the Islamic revolution of Iran concerning the liberation of the occupied lands. Imam Khomeyni has such power that any time he wills he can put an end to unjust relationships in the world."

9695
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KERMANSHAH TRIBESMEN JOIN MILITARY MANEUVERS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 7 Sep 80 p 4

[Text] Kermanshah, KEYHAN's Despatched Reporter--Some 2,000 tribesmen of Kermanshah staged a military and guerrilla warfare maneuver with their own weapons and ammunitions and displayed their combativeness and individual dexterity in Mahidasht Plain.

Yesterday about 2,000 members of Kalhor, Kakavand, Jalalvand, Osmanvand, Balavand, Zardalan, Halilan, Sanjabi and a number of other tribes performed their intensive drills and staged a spectacular military maneuver in Mahidasht Plain before Pirhoseyni, the Presidential Aid, Ayatollah Kermani, the Imam's Representative in the Western region of the country and the deputy of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles), the Governor-General of Kermanshah, Hojjatoleslam Majd, the Supervisor of the Iranian Mass Mobilization Organization, and hundreds of eager compatriots onlooking. The exercise was carried out without the smallest financial assistance from the government agencies or revolutionary institutions.

Before the military maneuver started, Pirhoseyni, the Presidential Aide, spoke at length about the unity and solidarity of the tribes and the impressive results thereof in uplifting Islam and creating security in the country and in the region. After him, a representative of the tribes and also Hojjatoleslam Majd spoke about the tribal problems and the arming of the tribesmen who were decent and devoted to the Revolution, respectively.

At this point, a number of the members of the Kermanshah Mass Mobilization Organization marched past, followed by the tribesmen. In this process they performed two military operations. The armed horsemen, too, went into a series of offensive operations and started shooting. Started sharp at 12 noon with the reading of some verses from the Holy Koran, the exercise lasted until 5 p.m.

Major Mo'azzen, who had taught the tribesmen military art during the past 10 days reported: "These valiant and courageous tribesmen, with their faith and power, can progress to the heart of Iraq to make their prayer at the holy shrine of Imam'Ali, Peace Be Unto Him."

Before the maneuver, the Governor-General of Kermanshah talked to the tribesmen and said, "After purging the rural areas and identifying the devoted persons, we shall issue weapons licenses to the devouts who own weapons and give arms to those devouts who do not have them. This is so they can preserve the security of the

region effectively and to protect their homes and abodes against the possible dangers posed by the counterrevolutionaries. The tribesmen who took part in the maneuver used their own weapons and ammunitions and many of them were reluctant to leave the field even after the end of the maneuver and the beginning of the ceasefire.

The KEYHAN reporter adds in his report that despite the border skirmishes, Kermanshahan is in peace and the armed forces are completely in control of the situation.

Also with the unity of the tribes around Kermanshah and other parts of the province which was exemplified by their 5-hour military and guerrilla maneuvers, larger devoted and prepared forces shall be at the service of the people in the future in order to preserve the security of the region and to keep the aliens and the counterrevolutionaries at bay. Of course, despite the excellent morale and the extra-ordinary power of these zealous tribesmen who participated in the maneuvers with such a great enthusiasm, a great number of them must necessarily receive training because sometime later when some of the tribesmen have to take their animals migrating to the border areas or to the nearby regions they will face the enemies of Iran and will have to be equipped well in addition to their courage and zeal so that their significance to the preservation of the security of this land will be clear and so that they may be more successful against injustice and evil."

9695
CSO: 4906

DIRECTOR OUTLINES ACTIVITIES OF RED CRESCENT SOCIETY

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 7 Sep 80 p 15

[Text] The new Director of the Red Crescent Society of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Dr Ali Asghar Behzadnia, in a radio and television interview spoke about the plans and programs for reconstructing the Society and interfacing the operations of the Red Crescent Society with the goals of the revolution and of the Islamic Republic. He said that the Red Crescent Society would try to help the coreligionist, Third World and, generally speaking, the oppressed countries of the world--defined by the Koran--in the time of peace.

Concerning the creation of coordination between the Red Crescent Society and the Ministry of Health and Welfare in the field of medical treatment, the Director of the Red Crescent Society said that the former Red Lion and Sun Society and now the Red Crescent Society had medical treatment centers all over the country. As testified by all the persons who had benefited from their services, these centers rendered valuable services. He added, "In the rural areas, perhaps the most orderly buildings which are habitable and usable belong to the Red Crescent Society. But, unfortunately, all the hospitals and clinics of the Society were turned over to the Ministry of Health and Welfare in a hurry. Of course, the said Ministry also belongs to this nation, but this transfer caused their efficiency and managerial ability to suffer and their effectiveness to drop, whereas this Society reaches the rural heartland with its hospitals and clinics and has been rendering service as a medical treatment network. Where the hospitals and clinics could not reach, the relief workers of the Society reached with their service. It should now be rightly admitted that in this medicine shortage crisis the Red Crescent Society helps the entire country with its resources. Thanks to its relationships with the relief and medical treatment organizations of the world, the Red Crescent Society can easily get what cannot be obtained through the governmental commercial and other means."

Dr Behzadnia went on to say, "Fortunately, with the understanding that prevails and with the devout and committed officials that we personally know in the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the solution of this problem is very easy. Therefore, the aim is not to have this Organization under this roof or under this management. The aim is to cooperate and to help the Iranians and the human beings. We have actually one goal but are cooperating in two departments. However, it is unfortunate that in the atmosphere that was created after the revolution, each organization or group acted in its own name. This duplicity and multiplicity and flip-flop is not only impermissible when it comes to ensure the health and safety

of people, but is a great sin. We believe that medical treatment services should be handled by an organized management."

Regarding the manner of the operations and management of the Red Crescent Society, Dr Behzadnia said that the Red Crescent Society "is the only organization that can be managed under a five-member board." According to "our new plan, we replaced the management with five experienced managers who are devoted to the revolution and to the Islamic ideological principles. With the approval of these five persons who constitute an executive board, any decision can be implemented."

With respect to the task forces of the Red Crescent Society, the Director of the Society said, "Part of our reorganization plan in the Society is to strengthen and expand the task forces. We have discussed this with our colleagues, the doctors and relief workers, and we decided to strengthen these groups. Each group comprises a surgeon, a general doctor, an internal diseases physician, and even specializing surgeon and pharmaceutists and relief workers. They are volunteers. So far we have formed three to four task groups. We hope to send them to the war zones and to the non-war zones. We plan to have a "mother" hospital to serve as the hub of the task project where task groups will be prepared for being dispatched to designated places to give services." He added, "One unfortunate thing that I have to say is that unfortunately as a result of the medical treatment plans and thoughts put forth after the revolution which were products of haste or, God forbid, negligence, medical treatment in this country has been plagued with incoordination and stagnation so that many of the experts have left and many more do not set their hearts on the work. As envisioned in our plan, we hope to attract the specializing forces, whether in the country or from abroad, who are devoted to the revolution and who have managerial skill and experience, as the Imam put it. I am sure we shall succeed."

Behzadnia said, "If I solve the financial problems for the experts and if I am not attacked and villified for it from all sides, obviously any physician desires to take one week off in every six months or devote one month a year so that he may serve his fellow men in the various parts of the country."

Touching on the importance of restructuring the Youths and Volunteers Department of the Society, Dr Behzadnia said, "The Red Crescent Society was really people-oriented. Apart from the higher echelons of the Society who were affiliated with the previous regime, the workers of the Society in the provinces and in the Capital were mostly people-oriented and praiseworthy, so much so that when the principal managers of the Society were dismissed, there would not be so much need for further purging. As it was reported then, apparently there were no more than 12 to 14 persons who had been connected with the SAVAK and the former regime. But the bulk of the personnel of the Society or, so to speak, those who served, are people-oriented and their work is laudable. There is no doubt that this Society has been successful in its social and populistic activities, excepting one department of it, viz. its Youths Department. My study shows that its plannings did not have the contents which is useful to the Islamic Republic of today. In this particular department, the idea is to prepare the youths for the goals of the Islamic Republic so that they are trained to be workers, scouts and helpers of the community, specially in the Ideological Section." The Society Director then spoke about the unwarranted take-over of the Youths Houses of the Society by the revolutionary institutions and the need to reopen these houses. He said, "This

Society has 24 to 25 houses across the country. Each of these has branches which, put together, cover a great expanse of the country. Yesterday we appointed as the deputy chief of this Section Dr Ali Afrouz, a specialist, a Moslem, efficient and active brother, so that a new page is turned by his putting a person in charge of each of these houses in order that educational, ideological, relief worker training and local re-educational programs are implemented to benefit the youths.

In another part of his interview, Dr Behzadnia spoke about the necessity of preclusion of catastrophes. He said, "Instead of sitting idle and waiting for catastrophes to occur, we should try to preclude these. To achieve this with the knowledge that we have of the geographical and natural features of our country, we have set up a special section in the Society and it has been already manned, too. Its personnel are to forecast the services required in the form of the supply of tents, blankets, medicines and the basic needs. They are also supposed to study the local conditions. For instance, our farmers sow their fields for dry-farming and they build their houses next to their farms. The conditions the rural-folks opt for are vulnerable, because the same thawing snow that waters and ripens their farms can ruin their lives if unharnessed. Therefore, by proper planning we can build healthy and safe houses for these farmers farther from their farms with the help of the Ministry of Housing and other responsible organizations so that their houses are not in danger while their farms are prosperous. It is at this juncture that the issue of experts comes up again and a discussion with the Workers Program should be arranged. We hope that this atmosphere of chastising and slandering the experts and the devouts currently permeating the community may be dispelled and an atmosphere of understanding and inspiring devotion in the people may take its place.

9695
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CHRISTIANS CONTINUE TO LEAVE COUNTRY

PARIS LE MONDE in French 12 Aug 80 p 6

[Article by special correspondent J.P. Peroncel-Hugoz]

[Text] Baghdad--One of the tallest monuments in the Iraqi capital is an Armenian church. In Baghdad, some 50 Christian sanctuaries, including 40 Catholic churches, stand side by side with the green or blue domes of the Persian-style mosques. In Mossoul the church spires are inseparable from the scenery of the large northern city. One of the most prominent members of the government and of the Revolutionary Council is a Christian, Mr Tariq Aziz.

This, the least known among Christians communities in the Arab world, has lived through many tragedies* but has been more fortunate than the Iraqi Jews--practically all of whom have had to leave the country. Under the current Baasist regime, which chooses to remain secular, it [the Christian community] is becoming more and more involved in the life of the city. "Since the 1958 revolution, never have we breathed so freely," we were told by a priest, whose statement was echoed by a mother and by a Christian working in hotel management.

Still, in spite of administrative obstacles, the exodus of Mesopotamia's Christians, which began half a century ago in the village of Telkef, near Mossoul, is continuing, chiefly to the United States and Australia. After using the Lebanese and then the Greek exit routes--25,000 Iraqis, most of them Christians, are said to have traveled through Athens in 1979 in order to obtain U.S. visas--now a route through Eastern countries or through Egypt is chosen by the emigrants arriving from the country between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. They may be poor people from the Bataouiyine neighborhood in Baghdad just as likely as residents of modern villas bordering the river, or else northern villagers.

A Divided Christendom

Like Egypt with its Copts, Lebanon with its Maronites, or Syria with its Greek Orthodox, Iraq has its "national" church. That church, designated as "Assyrian" in reference to remote pagan ancestors, is not devoid of the divisions and subdivisions that plague Eastern Christendom.

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* We'll only mention the massacres of Assyrians by the Kurds in 1843 and 1845 and those committed in 1933 by some members of the Royal Iraqi Army, followed by the deportation of the Nestorian patriarch to Nicosia.

Thus the Assyrians are divided into the "Chaldean" Catholic Church (another remnant of ancient times), including some 70 percent of Iraqi Christians, and the Nestorian Assyrian Church. Although all other Christians living on Arab soil have long been Arabianized, linguistically speaking (except for the Armenians, who in fact are not indigenous to the country), their [the Assyrians'] liturgical language as well as their mother tongue* is Syriac, the latest stage in the evolution of Aramaic, the language spoken by Christ.** However, Arabic is of course the working language of Christians in Iraq.

From the time of the Ephesus Ecumenical Council in 431, which condemned Nestorius, patriarch of Constantinople, for distinguishing two separate persons in Jesus Christ, until 1552, when a large number of Assyrians (since then designated as Chaldeans) united with Rome, Iraqi Christians have formed a single community. Today Catholics are under the authority of the Patriarch of Babylon, residing in Baghdad, while the Nestorians' spiritual headquarters are in Chicago, in the United States.

In addition to these indigenous Christians, there are in Iraq followers of the Catholic Armenian or Gregorian (Orthodox Church, of the Latin Church*** and the Syrian Catholic or Orthodox Church--all Iraqi nationals. The "Syrian" Church, which also uses Aramaic (or Syriac) as its liturgical language, is intellectually very active, especially its Catholic section, which for the past 16 years in Mossoul, has been publishing AL-FIKR, AL-MASIHI [Christian Thought], one of the best Arabic-language Christian publications, with a monthly circulation of 3,500.

The number of Christian faithful is a state secret in Iraq, as it is everywhere in the Near East. Still, until recently, their total number was generally estimated at 600,000. However, according to foreign experts, the first reliable general census, conducted in the country 2 years ago, showed 1 million Christians faced with 12 million Moslems, the latter divided into Shi'ite Arabs, Sunnite Arabs, and Sunnite Kurds, not to mention some other small minorities, such as the 60,000 to 100,000 Yezidi peasants who profess some sort of restored worship of Ibbis (Satan)--and who are, therefore, with some exaggeration dubbed "devil worshippers"--or the 20 to 3,000 Shebans, a syncretistic sect from the Mesopotamian marshes.

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* Soureth, the contemporary Aramaic (or Syriac) spoken in Iraq, is almost as different from liturgical Aramaic (or Syriac) as French is from Latin.

** Aramaic is also spoken in a few Christian villages in Syria.

*** The Latin Church, which originated during the Crusades, has always been linked to Rome. In addition to Arabic speakers (some of whom come from India, as far as Iraq is concerned), in the East it serves the needs of Roman Catholics traveling through the country. In Iraq Latins have an archibishop (the current one is French born), whose fictitious seat is in Babylon, as is that of the Chaldean patriarch.

A Poem

Even though inequalities subsist, for instance the fact that a Christian has no right to marry a Moslem women, Baas, which has been in power in Iraq since 1968, follows a policy aiming to abolish religious discrimination. Baas has also taken a great many steps to calm the fears of a community that has traditionally been suspicious and withdrawn. The ambassador of the Holy See became dean of the diplomatic corps. Christian pupils were excused from studying an Islamic textbook containing some uncomplimentary references to their religion. With great ceremony, President Saddam Usayn received some of his Christian compatriots who had become Americans, and he had gifts of money delivered to them for the purpose of building churches in the United States. He sent several donations to the Iraqi clergy and in 1979 paid a surprise visit to a Baghdad church while mass was being celebrated.

"We are appreciative of all this, but we still intend to emigrate in order to raise our children as we please," we were told in confidence by the head of a family, referring to the nationalization of all religious schools in Iraq, which took place 5 years ago. That step was directed mostly at the Iranian Shi'ites, but the Christians were not spared. He was also referring to the "Baasization" of the minds that goes on from kindergarten to university. Many Christians, however, state that they have joined Baas, a pan-Arabic, non-sectarian nationalistic party founded in 1939 by Michel Afiak, a Syrian Christian. They join it "out of conviction" or "to strengthen a regime that has outgrown the literal interpretation of Islamic law."

The Chaldean Church, quietly ruled since 1958 by Patriarch Paul II Cheikho, around 75 years old at this time, has neither the political clout of the Lebanese churches, nor the spiritual renewal of the Egyptian Copts, which might perhaps enable it to slow down the exodus of one of the East's oldest Christian communities. On the other hand, through the friendships that it has cultivated within Moslem society, the Chaldean Church could serve as a model to many other Eastern communities. What an incredible sight, in that same Middle East where the fires of the Iranian revolution have, nearly everywhere, kindled the move to reintroduce religion as a factor in social relationships, what an incredible sight indeed to see Sheik Jalal Hanafi, renowned Baghdad preacher, honor the patriarch of Babylon on his 50 years of priesthood by reciting a poem on "the virtues shared by Christians and Moslems!"

11936
CSO: 4800

DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC ARCHITECTURE REVIEWED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 16 Sep 80 p 8

[Article by Yousef El-maleh: "The Foundation of Islamic Architecture in Medina"]

[Text]

Of all the arts, Arabic architecture has proved the most enduring, its trends having shaped the face of the Arab world. Patterns and edifices in the cities from which various schools emerged were all united by the distinctive characteristics of Arab Islam.

Islamic architecture was first modelled on the Prophet Muhammad's house in Medina, built by himself and his companions soon after the "hijra," his departure from Mecca to Medina.

The Prophet's house was used as the first "masjid" mosque for Muslims. It was a square enclosure surrounded by walls of brick and stone; part of it, probably the northern portion where the Prophet led the prayers, was roofed.

The congregation knelt facing north, the direction of the city of Jerusalem, and this direction or "qibla" was marked in some way. In 624, ("hijra 3") the objective for prayer was changed from Jerusalem to Mecca. "Al-Haram al-Nubawi al-Sharief" in Medina, as the first mosque is usually called, has been undergoing extension and renovation for fourteen centuries.

With the spread of Islam, mosques and Muslim houses were built in the new land.

With the shifting of the Islamic Caliphate from Medina to Damascus during the Ummayyads, Islamic architecture began to develop further, embracing palaces, forts, tombs and lavish mosques.

Perhaps the most noted of the early mosques is "Masjid al-Sakehrah," the "Dome of the Rock" Mosque. It was first begun in Jerusalem in 643 near the simple mosque which Caliph Umar Ibn al-Khatab had erected four years earlier. The mosque was built around the rock believed by Muslims to be the place from which the Prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven.

Reconditioned more than once, the mosque is a building of impressive size and monumental character, gorgeously decorated. A concentric annular structure, it consists of wooden dome with 16 windows. The lower-half was originally panelled with marble and the upper portion with glass mosaic on a beautiful golden background.

Internally all the arcades were likewise decorated with mosaic, and the walls with quartered marble panelling; each slab was cut in half and opened like a book, so that the veining ran towards the joint.

Al-Walid (705-715), the architect Caliph of Damascus, not only began the reconditioning of the silver-domed "al-Aqsa" mosque near the site of the Dome of the Rock, but also ordered the building of the Great Mosque in Damascus, this was considered one of the wonders of the world at that time, and the mosque was used as a model by many Muslim architects.

An outstanding example of architecture, the Umayyad Mosque is one of the most beautiful Islamic sites in the world. It is a masterpiece of art with its magnificent construction and gold engraved decorations.

The building, which was erected over the ruins of a temple of Jupiter and a Byzantine church, was completed in the early 8th century. The 145-yard long prayer-hall of the mosque is surrounded by beautiful arcades and walls decorated with finely-made mosaics. The shrine of St. John the Baptist, is found in the prayer hall of the mosque.

Gradually, as the people embraced Islam, isolated towns and small cities began to progress toward a framework of national unity. These three mosques were used by early Muslim architects as models for mosques which became landmarks of every Islamic center, houses of worship and notable monuments.

Style of mosques

Mosques gave Muslim cities their characteristic shape and personality. They still represent the Islamic style of architecture, and crystalize its features.

Mosques generally varied to some extent in plan and style but always retained the same basic features. One of the main reasons for this standarization of form is found in the annual pilgrimage to mecca.

The structural plan of a mosque took the shape of a rectangular open court enclosed on the four sides by vaulted halls or cloisters, surrounded by a wall with gates. The site is open to the courtyard or "sahn," usually covered with woven mats or rugs.

On the side of the main gate, which is arched and exquisitely decorated, there are plumbing systems sometimes in the form of beautiful fountains. These are mainly to provide water for performing the "wudu" (-ablution) which is a necessary preliminary to the prayers.

Mosques, as sacred houses, must be constructed in a way that enables the believers to face "Qiblah," the ordained direction for worshipping the Lord. The direction of Mecca or more precisely the Kaaba, symbol of spiritual power, is indicated by a niche ("mihrab") in the appropriate wall.

The wall is generally covered with mosaics, and the frame of the niche is almost invariably adorned with Quranic verses. Next to the niche in the wall stands a stepped pulpit or "mimbar" which takes the form of a throne. From here the Imam delivers his sermon.

The external characteristics of the mosque feature minarets ("mazzanah") and domes ("guba"). The minaret is a tall, pencil-shaped tower usually built over the doorway. The interior space is taken up by a spiral staircase leading up to a landing. Some minarets contain more than one landing. They are fine pieces of architecture believed to be pointing to heaven and God, and are used for giving out the call to prayer ("adhan").

Domes were adopted and became one of the most remarkable features of Islamic architecture. Usually there is a central dome with smaller domes tapering at the top in harmony with the minarets. Most domes are covered with dazzling glazed tiles and a substructure of glass mosaic, incorporating arched windows of coloured glass. The domes are awe-inspiring, designed to lift the Muslim's eyes to heaven, 'the seat of God.'

Arab domes, which gave Muslim cities a mood of poetic reverie, influenced the design of the City of the Sun, a Utopian city conceived by Tommaso Campanella (1568-1639) an Italian Renaissance philosopher and poet. Some Islamic cities are covered with massive domes and lofty minarets rising above the flat-roofed towns.

A few of the minor arts also contributed in one way or another to the architecture of the mosque: stucco, glazed tiles, metal and wood for instance were employed to create geometric and epigraphic designs of great intricacy, delicacy and charm.

Muslim interest in mathematics shows in the use of complicated geometrical patterns to cover walls that would otherwise remain bare. This style, termed "arabesque," influenced European designs from the end of the Middle Ages.

The Arabic language, the language of the revelation of the Quran, was also used in the form of calligraphy to decorate islamic architecture. Inscriptions were written at important places such as the entrance gates, around the 'mihrab' niche and below the dome.

Not only verses from the Quran were used: Arabic characters often also expressed the purposes of the building through prose or verse, sometimes adding the name of the ruler, the date and the architect.

The craftsmen of medieval Europe flatteringly imitated Arab calligraphy and so came unwittingly to adorn the coin of a European king and even the cross, undoubtedly not for its Islamic message but for the sake of decoration.

The building of mosques is credited to the divine guidance of Islamic architects and their skills. These architects worked as mathematicians, astronomers, craftsmen, calligraphers, illuminators and instructors, their genius always in harmony with the faith and needs of rich princes.

The mosque, spiritual center of early Muslim cities, crystalizes the Islamic style architecture, while its primary function remains that of a place where man prostrates himself before God.

CSO: 4820

IDF INTELLIGENCE CHIEF ANALYZES MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR (Weekly Supplement) in Hebrew 10 Sep 80 pp 8-9, 16

[Interview with Major General Yehoshua Sagi, chief of the IDF Intelligence Branch, by Alex Fishman]

[Text] The central tier of the State of Israel's intelligence community has been Military Intelligence. By virtue of his position, the chief of the Intelligence Branch of the General Staff is responsible for warnings and political estimates. The Yom Kippur War did not significantly change the military arm's status in the intelligence community. Its head holds a power which has few parallels in the western world. The opinion of the chief of the Intelligence Branch has at times a decisive influence on the determination of policy.

The current chief of the Intelligence Branch, Major General Yehoshua Sagi, 47, belongs to the generation of officers who began their military service in the IDF after the War of Liberation. He has spent most of his service, beginning from his induction in 1951, in the Intelligence Corps and primarily in field intelligence positions, as an officer in an armored brigade and from 1960 as a command intelligence officer. During the Six Day War he served as the intelligence officer of the Sharon Division. In 1974 he was transferred to the General Staff and served as assistant chief of the Intlligence Branch for Research. In February 1979 he was appointed chief of the Intelligence Branch.

[Question] The IDF has recently expanded its operations in southern Lebanon. It seems that we are at the height of an offensive. In this counter-terror campaign, men are being killed in action, and political problems are developing. What are the objectives and achievements of this war?

[Answer] I believe that the question stems from an erroneous point of view. There is no solution, at least I recognize none, to the problem of terror, especially in the unique conditions of our region. In actuality, we have no severe substantial problem of internal terror. The terror being conducted along our borders or our coast is the dominant one. The terrorist base along our borders, primarily in Lebanon, Syria, and even Jordan, is very firmly established. If we tried to bring matters to the absurd and assume that the terrorist base along the borders will disappear, I do not think that there will be internal terror in the Land of Israel. Therefore, in my opinion, there is no military solution to the problem. It can only be solved by political means. The light which you are seeking at the end of the tunnel, that is that one day after 1,001 operations there will no longer be any

terror, is not compatible with our situation. We are trying to reduce the attacks within the country and along its borders and coast to a minimum by strikes which are aimed directly at targets where actual terror is being prepared against us.

[Question] If I understand you correctly, the military activity is designed to give the political level a kind of breathing space.

[Answer] It is not a matter of breathing space. I maintain that we will be unable to solve the problem of terror by military action alone or that a very large military action will change the regional order. The objective is actually to prevent, albeit for a limited time, attacks against us.

How is this possible? The alternatives are very limited. Actually we have two possibilities: one defensive, that is defend your borders to the best of your ability; the second possibility is offensive. That is to say do not wait till they come to you and penetrate and then destroy the teams which are attacking you but rather try to strike them in their bases. The State of Israel does not have many alternatives. For a country of 3 million people, struggling with problems of reserves and economy, the significance of a defensive guarding of its borders is that half of the people will be mobilized all the time. In the light of constantly decreasing funds and constantly expanding terror, things are not working out using defensive means alone. The cheaper and more effective method is to attack the bases themselves.

For 2 or 3 months now we have undoubtedly had an increase in the wave of terror. The reasons are well known, they are not military but political. Al-Assad is occupied at home, and while the Syrian army and the Syrian regime are fighting for their lives, there has been a weakening of the restraint of the Palestinians who are completely supported by the Syrians. There are internal disputes within the Palestinian factions. We have stood up to the Palestinian Council where there has been a rise of the military faction and a decline of the political faction within the PLO. In regard to the problem of Jerusalem, the Palestinians feel now that their strength is increasing in the international community. The PLO is beginning to become an accepted institution in the European Community and in the institutions of the United Nations. You know what? I will also add the Egyptian issue. The suspension of the talks at the present time has raised the hope in the Palestinian sector that al-Sadat will change his policy, and perhaps it is only necessary to give him a little push so that he will return to what is called "the Arab road." All of these factors together require the Palestinians to emphasize their presence. It reduces to one rule: You act, that means you are alive. So we have an increase in the wave of terror...

In the fight against terror, there is no 80 percent success. There is either 100 percent or nothing. When 10 penetrations have failed and one operation on the coastal road has succeeded--a failure is 100 percent. In recent months we have prevented about 10 actions, each of which was designed to be an action of killing and bargaining.

[Question] Does "we prevent it" mean from the other side of the border?

[Answer] Both from the other side and along the border, however primarily from the other side. The course of action which we are taking is that the moment when

we have intelligence about teams on their way and the bases of departure, the cheapest and safest course of action is to try to prevent the departure and to cause the terrorists to reconsider or learn a lesson--and we gain time. Time provides room for flexibility for the political means. We are involved today in the midst of some very substantive discussions about our future: will there be or will there not be autonomy? What kind of autonomy? Ultimately, this is the solution to the terror. With military means you can destroy. How much can you destroy? You can not eliminate all the terrorists. That is absurd.

There is also the very serious problem of how we attack. We cannot permit ourselves a situation in which the innocent and the guilty die together. That is to say, our attacks are very precisely directed, almost surgical in nature.

[Question] This is not true for the air force bombings...

[Answer] This is not true for thebombings...in part. For the air force's bombings of known terrorist bases or a certain house where you can be sure that there will be no civilian casualties in the vicinity or an attack on a team under a tree, it is true. It is not true for massive bombings of an area. However I do not remember that we have ever launched massive bombings. It is not true for artillery shellings or almost not true because in those cases, the pinpoint striking of a target is very difficult.

We are up against a group which learned its lessons and tried to respond in the best form, in conditions available to it, to our sophistication. For example, they have learned that their entry into camps and their residing within a purely civilian environment prevents us from taking massive actions. We have not yet reached a situation where the terrorists would be evicted from the civilian settlements. This could have been a solution, however the terrorists are doing precisely the opposite. They take a house in a refugee camp or a house in Beirut, for example, and establish a base there. We do not attack Beirut in spite of the fact that it is an infested area. Most of the terrorist headquarters and most of the logistics are located there. We know where they are, the problem is how to attack so that the innocent do not die with the guilty. In the last operation, I can say conservatively that about 40 terrorists were killed. This was a large operation. Not one civilian was killed, not one! I think that this speaks for itself.

In your question you mentioned the word offensive. IDF action is an escalated response to an escalation which has already begun in the number of penetrations. Check the statistics. How many penetration attempts have there been in the last 2 months? You will see that the terror is increasing. A number of the teams do not succeed at all. UNIFIL stopped 20 or 30 teams in the last 2 or 3 months. But then, UNIFIL acts against the teams which have been caught in its own way even though we are not happy with it.

So we are not responsible for the escalation. There has also been an increase in internal terror. If in the past the terrorists have succeeded in striking once out of five times, today they are making 25 attempts in order to succeed once.

[Question] Are the recommendations of the Agranat Commission regarding pluralism in intelligence estimates being implemented? There was talk of two more centers, besides the Intelligence Branch, which would be involved in intelligence estimates.

How is this system functioning? Can it be correctly stated that the chief of the Intelligence Branch still is the intelligence officer of the people of Israel as was the case before 1973?

[Answer] You are simply not correct. There is an enormous difference between the situation then and today. The difference is not in the change of the status of the chief of the Intelligence Branch. The chief of the Intelligence Branch, in my opinion, is in charge of or responsible for warnings and political estimates (as derived from the delineation of the responsibility of his position). This responsibility of mine has not been divided between others and me. That is to say, with the establishment of research institutions both in the ministry of foreign affairs and in the intelligence institution, the responsibility of the chief of the Intelligence Branch has not been divided. In a word, a national security council has not been established. The chief of the Intelligence Branch is responsible for national estimates and warnings. This is actually the substance of the entire matter.

[Question] You would agree with me that the Agranat Commission wanted to divide the responsibility...

[Answer] Look, in de facto terms, we are still in a war. The response to the military issue, to warnings, is in the military area. One of the mistakes on Yom Kippur eve was that we attempted to analyze the political level and did not thoroughly examine the facts in the military area. If we had at that time separated the two subjects and asked ourselves the question: In the current situation as it now exists, in military terms, are there or are there not preparations for war here? The response should have been short and clear.

In the military area, the intelligence branch remains exclusive. Even after 1973, this area was not divided between others and ourselves. In the estimate of a military situation, you require the [military] arms. It is a joint product of Intelligence Branch research, air intelligence, and naval intelligence. In order to create duplicators for the Intelligence Branch, you must actually produce double studies in terms of the scope, both in the [specific military] arm and in the quantitative sense. For example, you receive intelligence from the analysis of radio signals. If you do not have an air arm (let's say in the air sector) which would interpret, study, and give you the final product of the estimate on this subject, it is as if you have done nothing. I can pass the information to the ministry of foreign affairs or to the Mossad, however there is no one there who will analyze it. Therefore, these institutions concentrate in the political-strategic area.

[Question] Political-strategic research which you also provide to it...

[Answer] I do not provide that to it. I am responsible for it.

[Question] That is to say nothing has changed since the Agranat Commission?

[Answer] That is precisely what I have not said. Before 1973 the chief of the Intelligence Branch was an institution who was obeyed implicity. He had no competitor in the arena. After 1973, the chief of the Intelligence Branch must answer questions, and difficult questions. The leader who must decide receives an estimate parallel to ours, from a sister institution which at times takes an opposite view. When such a situation is created, I, for example, do not permit my professional

people to read the situation estimates of the sister institution so that a condition of national consensus or national conception will not be created. I prefer to see two or three opinions, call together all the parties, and endeavor to formulate the balanced estimate.

[Question] Are you the one who decides if there is a confrontation?

[Answer] No. The same different estimate from a sister institution which I receive is also received by the prime minister and the minister of defense. When an estimate of the national situation is being considered, one must first collect the facts. Facts and statistics are not a mathematical thing but a process of reaction and briefing.

The chief of the Intelligence Branch reads an average of 6 hours worth of raw material. He asks questions about some of this information. The assistant chief of the Intelligence Branch for research does the same thing. The same applies to the chief of the areas of research, air, and sea. In this way, the questions become "notations of vital information," which are fed back into the collection system and subsequently receive reactions. This is a continuous and repetitive process of question, answer, and reaction. You cannot get up one morning and say: The time has come to prepare a national situation estimate, and you as chief of the National Security Council begin to consider the facts. You must live the facts, you must collect the instruments. Therefore, if you would establish a national security council, you would have to do one of two things: either give it the position of the chief of the Intelligence Branch and the sister research institutions and then matters would be summarized in a forum similar to that of the chief of the Intelligence Branch, or as happens in other countries which have a national security council, the council would receive three working papers, different situation estimates, and in order to check to see that they are not contradictory, it would be assisted by an apparatus which would provide the facts. This is the basis. The question is if in a country of 3 million people, when you are struggling over the quantity of research material for one institution and certainly for 2 or 3, you can permit yourself this luxury.

[Question] In regard to the autonomy, to what extent do you feel that the Intelligence Branch has contributed its part? Have you as chief of the Intelligence Branch had an influence on the processes which have occurred?

[Answer] I will describe it in a different way, I believe that I have had the full opportunity to express my opinion.

[Question] Are you satisfied with the extent of the influence which the chief of the Intelligence Branch has had on this issue?

[Answer] You will not find a chief of the Intelligence Branch who would be completely satisfied. When you are the prime minister or the foreign minister and you have another matter in which you are involved and on which all your thoughts are concentrated, you naturally drop or defer matters which appear to you to be secondary and marginal and which can be viewed by the chief of the Intelligence Branch as no less important. Then the chief of the Intelligence Branch will not be satisfied. This is a subjective matter. I am satisfied the moment that I can enter a forum, express, fight for, and explain my view. Whether my opinion is accepted

or not is irrelevant. For this there are parliamentary and political institutions which will choose from the alternatives which I present to them.

[Question] Didn't the National Planning Branch take over some of your functions in the autonomy issue?

[Answer] No. For both the National Planning Branch and the Planning Branch of the IDF, the basis for developing the strategic picture is the intelligence basis. This we provide. There is no substitute for this.

[Question] However the estimates and advice on the autonomy issue were accepted by the leaders from the National Planning Branch and not from the Intelligence Branch...

[Answer] This is legitimate. The leader listens to me and to him, and he eventually decides to accept his opinion. This is the leader's right. Period. It is my obligation and my right to express my opinion.

[Question] Do you believe this is the normal situation?

[Answer] You are continuing in the wrong direction. An organization works in accordance with the way its chief has built it. If the leader thinks that this is the way he wants it to work, then this is fine. It is his right, and you cannot prevent him from doing so. The chief of the Intelligence Branch does not dictate policy. Under no circumstances should this happen.

[Question] What are the positions of the chief of the Intelligence Branch regarding the normalization with Egypt and the autonomy?

[Answer] We expected difficulties. The difficulties are now occurring. It was the view of the chief of the Intelligence Branch that peace with Egypt must pass the test of time. Peace is not a condition where you can say: A peace agreement has been signed, and from that moment, hostility has ended, the danger that Egypt will take part in some Arab alignment in the future has been eliminated, and actually what happens is not important, we are advancing along the road of peace. We expected difficulties also in the autonomy issue because we saw that at the very beginning there were actually opposing views. The Egyptian view is not ours, the American view is not ours. Let's say that in the view of the autonomy, the Americans are closer to the Egyptians. It was difficult for us to see how things would eventually develop, and therefore, we expressed them in concrete terms.

[Question] After the Six Day War, the then Chief of Staff, Mordekhai Gur, said that we would no longer base our reaction on an estimate of intentions. When there were concentrations, unusual movements, or unusual phenomena, immediate action would have to be taken. Is this policy still in effect?

[Answer] Yes. It is different than the past. I will give you an example of a situation in which I differed with Chief of Staff Motta Gur. In 1975, a state of readiness was declared as a result of unusual movements in Syria. The chief of the Intelligence Branch did not detect the intentions, and his opinion was not to take action. The chief of staff decided otherwise. In this case, the chief of the Intelligence Branch was ultimately proven right. However, in my view, the general staff took the correct action in spite of the fact that my opinion was not accepted.

[Question] This is a revolutionary policy in that in the past there was concern about taking the initiative because of political considerations.... Can one say that today these inhibitions do not exist?

[Answer] It is impossible to be free of these obstacles. This is a human function. However, as long as I am chief of the Intelligence Branch I will adopt this policy. I will also explain the reason. Al-Sadat can talk about two democracies, Israel and Egypt. Anyone who has visited Egypt knows that when one speaks about Arab democracy, one is actually speaking about a totalitarian regime of one form or another. If you need proof, look at the isolation of Sadat in Santa Katherina or in Isma'iliyah before his trip to Jerusalem. In the Arab world matters are decided by one man or a very small group of men. We are living constantly in three circles of deception in the intelligence area. One circle of deception is that of the ruler and his subjects. That is to say that the ruler makes a decision and does not want his subjects to know about it. The second circle of deception is that of the ruler and his fellow rulers. Al-Assad tries to deceive Hussein, Sarkis, and Saddam Hussein. The third circle of deception involves us--it is very difficult to say that you know the intentions because you are speaking about one man who makes a decision and the intentions change. Today he can decide one way and tomorrow another, we have already witnessed this. Therefore, I say knowledge of the intentions will not dictate to me on a subject so vital to my security, that which is called warning, but rather the actions which would be taken. The facts in an area will dictate the picture to me. Had this been the policy before the Yom Kippur War, I think we would have not encountered what we did.

[Question] What is the significance of the tightening of the military ties between Egypt and the United States on two levels: the supply of sophisticated weapons systems and strategic cooperation?

[Answer] These things stem from the new regional arrangement which has been creates. Iran has fallen; there has been Afghanistan with or without the American reaction. I think that the Americans have finally accepted what we have maintained for a number of years. The Russians have made a change in their targets. Europe is no longer in first place. The Soviet spearhead is now aimed, in a long-range plan, at two points. The first is energy and the second is Africa. If you want raw material, take the map of Africa today and compare it to the map of Africa of 5 years ago. Take a look at the Soviet achievements. Take a map of the Middle East and look at the achievements... Actually they have suffered one failure--Egypt.

[Question] Perhaps Iraq in the future?

[Answer] No. Iraq represents a prospect for the United States. I believe there is a joint American-Iraqi interest. In spite of the fact that the Americans are trying to find the connection to Iraq, the Iraqis have not yet moved down this road toward the Americans. In such a strategic situation, the United States is seeking to create footholds in the region in order to block Soviet expansion, a process which represents a direct threat to the Gulf nations. The image which has been created for the United States after Iran has led to a situation in which the nations of the Gulf, who can protect their regimes with difficulty, are tying to seek immediately an alternative by a compromise with the hostile environment. This is also the case with Saudi Arabia's turning to Iraq in spite of the fact that they are at two opposite poles. The Iraqis are pushing for a defense pact among the

Gulf nations under Iraqi hegemony. They need the United States in order to achieve this. Here is where there is a joint American-Iraqi interest. Such a pact is aimed against Khomeinism and Soviet expansion. I do not assume that regimes such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq will be able to live side by side for a long time. In the American world view, Egypt is the first place on which it can depend. Egypt also has importance as Egypt--as one who has led the Arab world in the past. There is an American desire to restore it to a position of hegemony in the Arab world. The United States would emerge actually as a beneficiary.

[Question] However, Egypt has a tradition of expelling foreigners. That is to say that the Americans are taking a risk.

[Answer] Yes. It means that they are taking a risk. An American-Egyptian strategic pact has been created. Al-Sadat is developing these relations. Actually, he began to develop them even before he went to Camp David. In his world view, the United States is the main support. Therefore, in spite of the fact that perhaps the main and only ally of the United States in the region is Israel, a closer tie has paradoxically been created with Egypt. This pact between Egypt and the United States can have long-range implications and can also have very disappointing developments. American bases in Egypt is an idea which is compatible with the strategic view of the United States. There are two at this time: in Qina and Ra's Banat. These bases are on the periphery and they do not disturb the Egyptian administration. The dangers to us are those of preference and limitation.

[Question] Has this already been manifested?

[Answer] I do not think that we can feel this in the military area, however we already feel it in the political area, and in the future we will feel it much more. Egyptian willingness has an importance to the Americans beyond that which it actually has, whether it is or is not compatible with the American view.

The equipping of the Egyptians with modern weapons is secondary in importance at this time. On the other hand, I have already said that I cannot ignore Egypt as a potential confrontation state until proven otherwise through the years. There are several key dates which we must pass through in order to be shown that Egypt is indeed moving in consonance with the peace agreements. For example, the evacuation of the Sinai in 1982. What is beyond that? Why does the Egyptian Defense Minister Badawi maintain that the first target of the Egyptian forces is still Israel? Why have the Egyptians deployed five divisions along the Canal whereas on the Libyan border where the Egyptian problem is concentrated there is only a small segment? The questions are difficult ones. An Egyptian army equipped with American weapons will be a completely different army, a much better one. There is no need for there to be doubts on this issue. I do not say that Egypt does not have peaceful intentions. I think that al-Sadat's intention is for peace. The question is what will happen after al-Sadat. What will happen in the upheavals in the Arab world during the course of time, which for me are the years 1983, 1984, and 1985, 2 or 3 years after the withdrawal to the international border. Then we will be able to really determine the Egyptian intentions.

[Question] What is the extent of the effect on us of the diminishing image of the United States which is our major ally?

[Answer] In our microcosmos, it is not much different today. First of all, we are in a no-alternative situation. We cannot say: Let's leave this ally and go over to the Soviet Union. Secondly, things balance out because of the upheavals in the Arab world, and the targets of the Soviet Union are farther than our region. The Soviet Union is basing itself in Afghanistan, in my opinion, as a bridgehead to Iran. It is only a question of time. It will do this before it will apply pressure or aim for a flareup in our region. The United States is using the time to attempt to create an anti-Soviet front based on its spearhead--Egypt. If the United States becomes firmly established in Egypt and succeeds in creating the Egyptian bridge to the Gulf countries, a bridge which actually existed in the past, then in this circle it will succeed in creating an anti-Soviet bloc. As Israelis, we have a problem with this. We will pay part of the price of the American action.

[Question] You spoke about the internal situation in Syria. I have a specific question on this subject. If the internal situation deteriorates, to what extent will we find the Russians in Syria?

[Answer] This is a possible development. The Soviet Union has no alternative to al-Assad today. The processes today in Syria are moving in an anti-Soviet direction. In order for al-Assad to continue to stay in power, he is likely to come to a situation in which he will ask the Soviets to enter Syria. I think that the Soviets have found, for example, in Afghanistan, that their intervention in foreign countries has not encountered an appropriate American reaction.

[Question] Do you see Afghanistan as a precedent for many things which are likely to happen to us?

[Answer] Correct. The main precedent is that until the invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had not intervened directly in places other than its satellites. According to the reaction which this intervention encountered, the Soviet Union can permit itself to do the same thing a second and third time in other places.

In conclusion, I would like to add a few words about the people of the Intelligence Branch. I think that today, 7 years after the Yom Kippur War, one can praise the people of the Intelligence Branch. in all its sectors, both in the collection sector, about which there were no complaints in the war, and the evaluation sector, about which there were complaints. The praise is not only mine. Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin specifically cited the intelligence after the attack on Entebbe, and the chief of the general staff cited the intelligence after the last operation in the north. Those who are performing in intelligence work are being praised, and it is important that the people know that they are doing good and important work. The strength of the Intelligence Branch is in its reservoir of manpower. It has no other strength. If you take the people away from the Intelligence Branch and compensate it with equipment, you have not increased its strength. It has a tradition of sacrifice and dedication to profession, duty, responsibility, and mission assigned to the people. This dedication, which wears out the people, is one of the things which surprise me. When I try to compare the motivations even of a low-ranking officer in any Intelligence Branch occupation, they are completely different than those of an officer in other places. The weight of the responsibility here is emphasized much more, from the lowest ranks to the top.

5830
CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

MIRAGE MAINTENANCE IN COLOMBIA--Bogota (AFP)--Maintenance and repair of French Mirage fighter planes, sold to Colombia in 1970, will be entrusted to an Israeli company. The disclosure was made in Bogota on Wednesday, 6 August by General [words missing], the defense minister of Colombia. The Company, Israeli Air Industries, or IAI, was in competition with the French firm Dassaut-Breguet, builder of the aircraft, and with a Spanish firm for maintenance and repair of the 16 Mirages based in Central Colombia. IAI won the contract, having made the lowest bid and allowing Colombia an $8 million saving (around 32 million francs), as the minister also noted. In addition, IAI pledged to provide the Colombian Air Force with the necessary industrial and military substructures to effect partial repairs on the aircraft locally. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Aug 80 p 7] 11936

CSO: 4800

NEW RAPPORT WITH INDIA REPORTED

London 8 DAYS in English 27 Sep 80 p 25

[Text]

The visit by a Kuwaiti delegation to India in September opened a promising new chapter in industrial, economic and commercial cooperation between the two.

KUWAIT'S DECISION to make substantial investments in India and enable India to participate in its own industrial development has left Indian industrialists with much homework to do. Trade between the two countries has been stagnant in the last three years and Indian officials admit that no serious market surveys have been attempted in order to assess Kuwait's capacity to absorb Indian industrial products.

A promising new chapter in the countries' bilateral cooperation in the economic, industrial and commercial fields began following a visit to India from 9-11 September by a Kuwaiti delegation headed by the ruler, Sheikh Jaber al Ahmed al Sabah — his first official stay. After talks and an unprecedented lunch for the Emir and his ministers at Prime Minister Gandhi's house, it was announced that Kuwait will make sizeable investments in selected Indian projects and cooperate with India in sponsoring joint ventures in third countries.

The choice of projects to receive Kuwaiti petrodollar backing has yet to be made. It is likely that a Kuwaiti delegation under the auspices of the Gulf Corporation will visit India in the next month or so to discuss concrete proposals. In the matter of joint ventures, the two countries' industry ministers — Kuwait's Abdul Wahab al Nefisi and Dr Charanjit Chanana of India — agreed that no time should be lost.

From New Delhi's point of view one sombre fact which emerged was that the Indian government as well as private industrialists have done practically nothing to establish greater rapport with Kuwaiti officials and industrialists. The Kuwaiti industries minister stressed frankly the need for special Indian efforts to bridge the information gap by organising trade fairs and exhibitions.

The major items of Indian export to Kuwait include spices, iron and steel, machinery, meat, rice, vegetables, coffee and tea, wood manufactures, fruit and clothing. India's imports from Kuwait include petroleum products, urea, ammonia, copper waste and sulphur. Chanana was told by Nefisi that Indian assistance would be particularly welcome in setting up petrochemical and machine tool industries in Kuwait.

The talks covered a wide area. It is understood that the Emir agreed in principle to Prime Minister Gandhi's suggestion that there should be a world oil conference specifically to discuss the problems of the developing countries in the face of galloping oil prices. Mrs Gandhi made a forceful plea that the present categorisation of countries by the strategic committee of Opec is very unfavourable to India and that New Delhi is entitled to concessional treatment by virtue of her per capita income and oil consumption. According to an Indian official, this view, which has been accepted by both Indonesia (see page 48) and Iran, appeared to have made more than a marginal impact on the Emir and his advisers.

Without naming Afghanistan, the joint communique issued by the Emir and Mrs Gandhi at the end of the visit expressed strong opposition to the use of force in the

settlement of disputes, which it stated 'should only be resolved peacefully bilaterally and in accordance with the charter of the United Nations and within its framework'. The two leaders said that the presence of foreign troops contributed to instability and heightened tensions, and voiced their grave concern over the growing escalation of great power rivalries in the region. They called upon the concerned states to convert the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace and to keep the Gulf free from superpower military rivalry.

On the Middle East, the Emir and Mrs Gandhi were more specific and forthright. They emphasised the urgency of finding a just and durable solution based on the complete withdrawal of Israel from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, including Jerusalem, and endorsed the inalienable right of the Palestinian people under the auspices of the Palestine Liberation Organisation to return to their homeland and establish an independent state of Palestine.

It is understood that the visiting Kuwaiti ministers and officials extensively briefed the Indians on their country's problems with Iran. According to Arab sources in New Delhi, Indian leaders and officials agreed with the Kuwaiti stand strongly deploring Ayatollah Khomeini's repeated calls for Iran-type uprisings in Arab countries.

The visiting Kuwaiti officials also explained to the Indians why Arab countries had endorsed Saudi Arabia's proposals to set up a Pan-Arab institute for Arab studies in Riyadh which will, among other things, lead to the establishment of an 'Arab Interpol' to tackle insurgency problems.

CSO: 4820

CENTRAL BANK REPORTS ON YEAR'S DEVELOPMENTS, FUTURE PLANS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 21 Jul 80 p 12

[Article: "Annual Report of Central Bank of Kuwait"]

[Text] The annual economic report issued by the Central Bank of Kuwait yesterday says that the bank approved at the end of last year a new and important plan to streamline and regulate the banking credit system through gradual transformation from the system of open account credit facilities to the system of programmed and set-term loans.

In its report, the bank reviews the measures that it took to strengthen the liquidity of the banks last year, the oil developments that have led to raising oil prices and the international economic situation.

The report says that the total local production amounted to 6,430,500,000 dinars in 1979, of which 4,650,300,000 dinars came from the oil sector whose relative contribution to the total production rose from 60.7 percent in 1978 to 72.3 percent in 1979.

The report points out that Kuwait held fourth place [not further specified] among the OPEC and Middle East countries in 1979, third place in OPEC behind Saudi Arabia and Iraq and sixth, instead of seventh place in the world [presumably meaning in oil production].

The rise in crude oil production in 1979 was accompanied by a rise of nearly 20 percent in the volume of oil exports, by an increase of nearly 17 percent in natural gas production and by a growth of nearly 38 percent in the use of natural gas in comparison to 1978. One of the prominent features of the development of the oil sector in Kuwait in 1979 was the putting into operation of the new gas liquefication plant at the outset of that year. This plant has added nearly 3.3 million tons to Kuwait's total annual liquid gas production.

Regarding oil prices, prices rose by the end of 1979 to almost double their level at the end of 1978.

The report also points out that the year's general revenues in the 1979-80 budget have been estimated at 3,863,000,000 dinars, that the oil share of these revenues has been estimated at 3.12 billion dinars and that the government spending has been estimated at 2,453,000,000 dinars.

Currency Expansion

The economic report also says that the currency expansion--reflected in the percent increase in the local liquidity--continued to decline for the third consecutive year.

The report attributes the main reason for the decline in the currency expansion rate to the transfer of a large part of the local liquidity to the outside world, either in the form of current remittances to pay for imports or in the form of capital outflow seeking the investment opportunities available abroad, especially as a result of the high international interest rates.

The report adds that even though some of the factors which had contributed to the outflow of local liquidity to the outside world disappeared or lost their intensity at the end of 1979--such as the temporary halt in the trend toward sharply rising international interest rates, suspending the creation of new Gulf companies and suspending the issuance of new bonds recorded in dinars--the liquidity of the local banks in dinars continued to experience rising pressures which motivated the Central Bank to strengthen the liquidity of these banks by supplying them with money at a relatively low cost through the discount window whose operations amounted to a total of 195 million dinars by the end of the year and through the system of the exchange of currency for a set term. The total value of this type of operations amounted to 202 million dinars.

Strengthening Liquidity

The report also notes that in addition to the Central Bank's continued support for the liquidity of the commercial banks, it started for the first time in 1979 issuing its bonds which can be considered a nucleus for the operations of the future open market. The bank also approved at the end of 1979 a new and important plan seeking to streamline and regulate the banking credit facilities policy through gradual transformation from the system of open drawing credit facilities to the system of programmed loans for set terms and purposes.

The economic report also says that the Kuwaiti paper money market experienced in 1979 a number of developments including the issuance base and a number of regulatory measures in the Kuwaiti stocks and bonds market.

The issuance base has expanded by 15.7 percent as a result of the issuance of 58.5 million shares in the form of free grant shares and shares to increase capital offered to subscribers with an issuance allowance.

The stock market activity in 1979 resulted in an increase of nearly 20 percent in the prices [of shares] and with the appearance of long periods of recession.

The report notes that the record figure for wholesale prices rose from 164.5 percent in 1978 to 175.6 percent in 1979, with 1972 as the base year. The record cost of living figure rose from 166.4 percent in 1978 to 175 percent in 1979, with an increase rate of 5.2 percent.

Rise in Trade

The report also says that Kuwait's foreign trade in 1979 experienced a tangible increase in both exports and imports and in the balance of trade in comparison to the preceding year.

The total surplus in the 1979 Kuwaiti balance of payments amounted to nearly 3.1 billion dinars, i.e. it rose by nearly 364 percent over 1978, as a result of an increase in the current surplus amounting to nearly 115 percent on the one hand and the inward shift in the net movement of foreign capital belonging to the commercial banks on the other hand.

International Economy

The report also notes that there were successive developments in many countries of the world in the past year as a result of the high inflation rates and as a result of the turmoil in the oil market in the first half of the year and the tendency of the oil prices toward rising in the second half of the year. However, the major OPEC countries were able to realize a high surplus in their 1979 current account whereas in 1978 this surplus had reached its lowest point since 1974. By the end of 1978, a number of the major powers had taken joint measures to bolster the dollar exchange rate. Those measures did not prove effective beyond the first half of 1979 when the dollar began to face some pressures.

Gulf Currencies

The European currency system which was initiated in March 1979 reflects further interest in the exchange rate. This system has been established as an advanced phase of the serpentine system [nizam al-thu'ban] with the aim of stabilizing the exchange rate among the currencies of this system in order to reach the phase of currency unity. In fact, the first European Currency Unit (E.C.U.) has already been issued.

The developments have shown that the currencies of this system, led by the Deutschemark, have realized an improved position vis-a-vis the dollar, with the exception of the Danish crown which has deteriorated somewhat. As for the Gulf currencies, they have been characterized by stability in the face of the dollar, with the exception of some slight fluctuations.

One of the most prominent international economic events in 1979 was the evident rise in gold prices in the last part of 1980.

8494
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

MALAYSIAN INVESTMENT--South East Asia provides good investment opportunities for Kuwait, Kuwaiti Finance Minister Abdul Rahman Salem Al Ateeqi said last week. The Minister, who was a member in the delegation accompanying the Ruler of Kuwait to six nations in Asia said that region would also provide means for diversifying Kuwait's foreign investments. Kuwait's Asian investments will be based on a clear vision and previous experience, the Minister said, adding, "we simply cannot be absent on that platform." Commenting on the Emir's tour which ended last week, the Chief of Kuwait's Real Estate Consultative Group said South East Asia is a 300 million man market. Ahmad Al Duwaij, who supervised the formation of Kuwaiti-Malaysian Investment Company said that Kuwait was not seeking special concessions in moving towards the Asian market. Al Duwaij ruled out allegations that investments in Asia would involve risks. Industrialised countries who are focusing on the South East Asian market are not doing that for humanitarian purposes, he said. Developed countries are seeking to serve their own ends and to realise profits, Al Duwaij added. Investment in South East Asia, contrary to that in industrialised nations will be highly profiting, the chief of the consultative group said. Kuwait's investments in South East Asia will start with projects aiming towards constructional development, Al Duwaij said. This would be followed by industrial projects. We are at present studying the investment laws of those countries but we are confident the investment potential is big and wide, Al Duwaij added. Kuwait-Malaysia Investment Company is a Mal. Din. 250 million ($120 million) joint venture in which Kuwait holds 48 percent. The Kuwait stock in the venture is held by the Ministry of Finance, the Real Estate Consultative Group, and Kuwait's Social Security Organisation. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 27 Sep 80 pp 12, 13]

NEW POWER, WATER PLANT--The site for a new power station and water distillation plan was discussed last week at a meeting between officials of the Ministry of Electricity and Water and the Municipality. The new plant will be located at Julaa, on the Southern coast of Kuwait. Some chalets at the proposed site will be demolished. No decisions were reached at last week's meeting and another meeting will be held this week. An official said that the Ministry had succeeded in overcoming the consequences of the fire at south Shuaiba Power Station and that the supply position was now satisfactory. The fourth unit at South Shuaiba will start operating within a few days and this will increase the electricity supply load and provide a good margin against any sudden demand. He added that consumption is expected to fall as the weather becomes cooler. The remaining two units affected by the Shuaiba fire will become operational during the winter. The Electricity Ministry expects the maximum load to reach 2,725 megawatts in 1981, 3,150 megawatts in 1982, 3,600 megawatt in 1983 and 4,075 megawatts in 1984. The forecast for 1990 is the consumption of 7,450 megawatts. The Ministry is taking steps to meet the expected future demands. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 27 Sep 80 p 13]

CSO: 4820

FORMER PREMIER AL-SULH INTERVIEWED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 1-7 Sep 80 pp 10-12

[Interview with former Premier Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh by Talal Haydar, in Beirut; date not given]

[Text] He picked up the morning newspapers, leafed through them, expressed resentment over a weekly paper's report that he has proposed formation of an ordinary government headed by al-Huss. He read a telegram received from the Jordanian king. We reviewed the background of the Lebanese war, and he said: "The Lebanese war has ended, but it appears that other wars are still raging in Lebanon."

[Question] The story of your appointment as premier-designate and your subsequent stepping down is so far still more important than the formation of a new government. What provocative and surprising situations did you discover during the contacts you made with the various factions, in order to form the government of political activists? And what were the basic obstacles which impeded formation of this government?

[Answer] Some 19 days passed between commissioning and calling off the formation of the new government. There constituted an extraordinary transition period in the Lebanese situation, because many issues crystallized, even though they are not yet apparent to the public.

First, the contacts were tantamount to an initiative to stop the war. We did stop the war between the Lebanese. Discussions had been under way to transfer the Lebanese issue to Paris, as was done with the Vietnamese question, because of the difficulty of conducting [at home] a direct dialogue between the parties to the dispute. Then, all of a sudden, the Lebanese factions agreed to meet around the same table in the premier's office at the presidential palace.

I discovered that there was a group of positive factors. I sensed a sincere concern for Lebanon, for Lebanon's unity and for its moral values.

All the factions wanted to finally end the war and begin a stage of positive construction. They did not want "to call it quits" in just any old way. It was clear that they did not want a truce, after which the war would return, as some feared. On the contrary, I sensed that all parties loved Lebanon and were concerned about its unity. Each faction knew that it has a stake in Lebanon.

[Question] The discussion was not about the past or future of Lebanon?

[Answer] The discussion was about one Lebanon. We did not want Lebanon as it was. We wanted to introduce the necessary, contemporary developments, and to modernize all institutions. Past shortcomings were clear to the parties in conflict, but positive views were a common denominator.

Both the extreme right and the extreme left appreciated the values of Lebanon, such as its democracy, and all were anxious to maintain these values.

I felt that all parties had a strong desire to participate in achieving Lebanese unity, which has always been composed of various sects and religions working for the development of a united nation and state.

Lebanon appears to the world as a radiant democracy representing a higher culture and a civilized partnership, progressive and liberal, setting a high standard of coexistence to every society which suffers from sectarian, religious, or ideological incompatibilities.

The Lebanese formula must be maintained in the interest of the Palestinian cause and to confront Israeli racism through coexistence among the various religions.

When the delegation of American blacks (Jackson) arrived, we met with him at the "Islamic Coalition" center. I told him that, in my opinion, the war began when the Arabs in general, and the Palestinians in particular, offered the world a rational and advanced picture of the type of state contemplated [for Palestine]. The model was the Lebanese formula where everyone, Moslem and Christian, lived in a democratic climate. Lebanon was the model which stirred up Israeli racist fears and unmasked Israel before Western public opinion generally. This was the biggest political arrow to hit Israel in the heart. The Israeli response was war and the "destruction" of the Lebanese formula.

This was the cause of the Lebanese war. Today, the conflict in the Middle East, especially in Lebanon, can be summarized in two ways:

Either Palestine will be in Lebanon's image, or Lebanon will be in Israel's image.

We say that Palestine must be like Lebanon. All the factions that accepted the idea of a government of activists shared this view.

[Question] During your discussions with Christian and Moslem leaders, did you feel that the Christians were still afraid of the Moslems and uneasy about their loyalty to Lebanon, and that the Moslems lacked confidence in the Christians and did not truly desire national partnership and unity?

[Answer] The Christians' feelings of fear were matched by the Moslem's feelings of being wronged.

I felt, during my efforts to form a government, that the two factions understood that fighting would not solve the problem. On the contrary, war would aggravate the problem even more, and has aggravated it quite enough already.

I also sensed that the two sides believe in the need to resort to dialogue to solve this problem, that is, to abolish war.

In 1943, the year of true independence (not of the lip-service independence of 1922 and later years), the difficulty of Christian fears was present, but the solution was found in the national charter.

Lebanon has been trying to solve these two problems since it obtained its true independence, because the two sides were convinced of the presence of fear [by the Christians] and of a sense of being wronged [by the Moslems]. Each side began to try to solve the problem of the other side. The Moslem was trying to solve the problem of fear which the Christian had and the Christian, for his part, was trying to solve the sense of feeling cheated which the Moslem had. However, big mistakes were made during the more than 30 years that have passed, because Lebanon did not find a satisfactory remedy for these two difficulties.

These mistakes have helped to cause the war and to open the way for the plot hatched by Israel and those who back Israel.

The Moslem and Christian leaders now agree on the need to cure Lebanon of this chronic disease.

The Political Activists Would End the War

[Question] If the government of political activists had been formed, would reconciliation have been achieved, or would the war have been moved from the street to the palace, which would have been more serious?

[Answer] The possibility of mutual incompatibility and conflict are always present, but in the case of a government of activists, the conflict would have switched from a contest of weapons to a contest of dialogue and resolutions.

We are now in a phase of possibility of war. And I tell you, very simply, that we would have been moving toward the possibility of abolishing war. The activists were not responding to a call to war by agreeing to participate in the new government. On the contrary, the desire to end the war was inherent in everyone.

[Question] Why was it no longer possible for you to continue your commission and consultations? What was it that caused you, after 19 days of trying, to stop your efforts and submit a letter of resignation?

[Answer] The path we were following was very difficult. Moreover, we found obstacles we could not quickly overcome. Preparations could have taken longer than the citizens could endure. Mistakes were made by the government and by me personally. However, everything that happened must be reconsidered and reviewed.

Self-criticism is very necessary at this stage, not just to look at the past, but rather, at the future as well, because the initiative continues. The initiative to end the war has not ceased, even if the formation of a new cabinet has stopped.

It must be followed up by all parties. As for the mistakes, they can be remedied in due course. There is no substitute for the principle of a government of activists itself. There can be no backing away from it. The period of preparing for it might have been insufficient; therefore, we have not abandoned the idea. Rather, we have stopped naming the ministers. Whether it is myself or someone else [who would form the government], I reiterate the need to continue this effort, the effort of ending the war, because it affects national destiny.

On the day I was commissioned, and on the day I declined the commission, I sensed positive relations. I felt as if our hopes had landed on difficulties, not on despair.

A Way In For a Government of Activists

[Question] If the object of trying to save the country is noble and valuable to this degree, why did it not merit further patience and efforts on your part? Or, did you arrive at a point where patient efforts were no longer of any use, so that you stopped trying?

[Answer] Not exactly, I now feel a need to change the approach I followed in this round, as well as the way to prepare for the future. A transitional government, as the next government might very well be, could be a suitable prelude to the inevitable next phase, which is a government of political activists.

I wish we would have a government of activists right now. But I firmly believe that it would face the same difficulties and obstacles [I ran into]. Still, there is no substitute for a government of activists, since there is no way to end the war, except through a dialogue between the combatants and a resolution to abolish the method of arguing with weapons, especially among citizens of the same country.

In our efforts and discussions, we felt that the war between the Lebanese had ended, because there was a sincere desire to end it. However, it is obvious that there are several wars within Lebanon. During the visit I made to the Arab kings and presidents, I said to those in conflict with Syria: "We asked you to end our war, but we suddenly realized that we had to end a war between the Arabs."

We were waiting for an end to the Lebanese-Lebanese war, when we discovered that we were called upon to end an Arab-Arab war. This is an example of some of the obstacles that stood in my way. In any event, an end to the war between the Arabs is not just in Lebanon's interest. Rather, it is chiefly in the interest of the Arabs themselves, especially following the fierce Israeli onslought and the disgraceful American ineptitude.

What will history say about us? It will say that in the days of such and such [government leaders], Jerusalem was lost, and in the days of such and such leaders, the south [of Lebanon] was lost.

History has immortalized King Faisal's famous words, "I shall pray again in Jerusalem," even though he died as a martyr without doing that. History will not forget those who lose Jerusalem, so let them make a choice. The Arabs might have an excuse that Israeli know-how is superior, or that international support [for Israel] is stronger, or that Israel's weaponry is more advanced. However, they have no excuse for their disputes, because mutual agreement is within their own reach. It is their only weapon, so why don't they use it?

This weapon would solve the problem of Lebanon and Palestine as well. The picture of a fragmented, partitioned Lebanon is the picture of war. The importance of Lebanon is that it is a mirror, a pulpit and a voice. This is the source of the grandeur of this small country, and we expect it to rise again. If Lebanon were sound and healthy, there would be no Camp David accord. Lebanon's return to good health would be the greatest blow to that agreement.

From Jumblatt to al-Jumayyil

[Question] Let us return to the Lebanese scene. The failure to overcome the obstacles in the way of a government of activists makes a "transition" government necessary. Why didn't Premier Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh form a caretaker government?

[Answer] I believe that to give the greatest possible thrust and impetus to the idea of a government of activists, we should insist on it and abandon any other course. To emphasize the strength and importance of this idea, I tried to make it look as if it were the subject of a referendum.

It might be preferable for someone other than myself, to form a caretaker government, because he would not be tied to the issue as I am. If I agreed to form a caretaker government, I fear that it would put an end to the concept or objective [of a government of activists]. It is no longer my property; it has become the property of every Lebanese, including Walid Jumblatt, Amin al-Jumayyil, and the silent majority. It would not be proper to deal with this idea as if we were dealing with an ordinary matter.

Obstacles to the formation of government only increase the people's desire for it. These obstacles are the current fragmentation. Once that is gone, the formation of any government becomes easy, because this will open the way for a new, healthy Lebanon. The need is to form "the government," not "a government," because there is a government now, so why change?

Our generation has had its day, but the new Lebanon can only be rebuilt by the new generation of activist forces.

[Question] Walid Jumblatt, Ibrahim Qulaylat, and Amin al-Jumayyel all concurred about this government which....

[Here Premier al-Sulh interrupted, and said:] They concurred.

This is the important accomplishment. The government was not formed, but the activists concurred. There has been a meeting of minds. This accomplishment is very important. This is what the Lebanese people applauded when the formula was broached. It became a specific goal this is the road we shall take.

My Presence Is Evidence of Their Accord

[Question] Any government formed now, by any other method, would not be "the government," according to your view. When will the time come for "the government?"

[Answer] The time depends on the effort of those doing it, on their intelligence and devotion, and on the way they work to establish "the government," which is the government of activists.

I say that we have made mistakes. Certain parties have not yet been convinced, and not all difficulties have been overcome. But this does not prevent us from pursuing efforts and reconsidering the matter, in order to extricate the country from this worsening situation.

The difficulty of any head of a coalition government--such as a government of activists--is that his presence is evidence of disagreement of the various factions. I want my presence to be evidence of unity. [End of answer].

(It is well-known in Beirut streets that when al-Sulh was asked when the crisis would be over, he replied: "When you see that I have formed the cabinet.")

[Question] If a government were formed this week, but the situation worsened and became explosive, leading to the government's resignation, would it be possible to form a government of the same type, no matter what the obstacles or difficulties?

[Answer] This would not happen. From now on, we must not lose the slightest opportunity to form a government of activists. Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh will not fail to do everything possible to help any premier-designate implement this concept.

[Question] There are many voices calling on President Sarkis to assume responsibility for everything going on. Did you cooperate with him at the crucial stage, and what is your view regarding everything being said?

[Answer] President Sarkis believes in the need for a government of activists. He is sincere and earnest in his untiring, silent efforts to extricate the country from its ordeal.

Sarkis and I Believe

[Question] If the formation of any new government will not change the situation, did President Sarkis err in accepting Prime Minister al-Huss' resignation and appointing you as premier-designate?

[Answer] I think that if President Sarkis had not believed in the possibility of forming a government of activists, he would not have pursued this effort. And if it were not for my belief in the idea, I would not have accepted the commission. It is certain that it was and still is possible [to form such a government]. There was some gain in what has happened. Credit has to be given to all those who tried to help.

The crisis, in itself, transformed a potential idea into near reality. This was a big accomplishment for Lebanon, whether a new government was formed or not. President Sarkis adopted a clear position regarding the idea. This is a very important matter.

[Question] When you agreed to form a government of activists means, did you believe that they could also be political leaders? And was it this belief that led to your stepping down?

[Answer] There is no doubt that they possess the military power that no one else has. In addition to that, they have their major political role. The proof is that they were called upon to undertake a major political task. This does not prevent senior politicians from joining them in the mission. A government of activists would not be limited to them. (I myself am not a soldier). Influential personalities include military/political leaders as well as pure politicians.

Walid Jumblatt and Amin al-Jumayyil, for example, both have political influence, with or without weapons. Armed as well as unarmed political leaders are willing to talk to one another, and acknowledge the importance of each other.

Under war conditions, each side rejects the other. But today, all Lebanese accept one another. This gives a true picture of the unity of the country. All of them want to come together, from the pulpit and from behind the barricades.

[Question] Will the obstacles which blocked the way of a prime minister of activists, also block the way of a president of national reconciliation in 1982?

[Answer] People are afraid of that, but, God willing, the matter will not be like that. I believe that there are activists who believe in the preservation of the legitimate political machinery, and who would prevent a constitutional vacuum from developing. I am one of those who believe that a vacuum will absolutely not occur, and that the idea of a government of activists will materialize in due course and prevail until that time [when a new president is due to be elected].

Arab Disunion

[Question] What do you suggest the Arabs should do to confront two dangerous situations: the judaization of Jerusalem and the effort to judaize the south [of Lebanon]?

[Answer] Why do the Arabs find the judaization of Jerusalem strange? Israel was created to do that, and judaized Palestine before Jerusalem.

There is terrible Arab disunity. The proof is to be seen in the peripheral, regional conflicts. In the opinion of every Arab citizen, the issues involved in these conflicts are completely insignificant when compared to the idea of the establishment of Israel.

I have never seen such a shameful, disgraceful, most impotent resolution as the "Jerusalem Committee's" resolution to boycott the nations that move their embassies from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. This resolution will be cursed by future generations.

The Arabs have disregarded the reality of what is happening. Two years ago, I said in the Chamber of Deputies: "All Arab League nations have paid a price for independence. Some of them paid with 10,000 martyrs, and some with 100,000. Then came Algeria which paid the price of a million martyrs, not a million pounds, or a million protests, or a million statements."

Palestine has a price. When the Arabs decide to pay it Palestine will return to them.

As for judaization of the south [of Lebanon], it is a part of Palestine's judaization. A quick look at the history of Israel and the nature of Zionism shows us that they have expansionist ambitions. We should have prepared for that a long time ago. The Palestinian weapon is a legal weapon, because it is the way conducive to the payment of the price.

The Arabs did not only lose Palestine. They also lost Egypt, and are losing the south.

7005
CSO: 4802

CURRENT UNREST IN TRIPOLI ANALYZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 1-7 Sep 80 pp 13-14

[Article: "Fighting in Tripoli: Is It the Turn of the North After the South?"]

[Text] Fighting has broken out unexpectedly in the streets of Tripoli. It is true that the atmosphere of the northern capital was charged, but incidents occurred as if they were timed to match the general political climate.

Last week, President Sarkis met with one of his senior security officials, who is considered among the most prominent candidates to form a new government. They reviewed together the various phases of the effort to form a new government, and the difficulties still in the way of forming a government of minimal effectiveness. This follows the failure to form a government of maximum effectiveness, that is, a government of political activists, or a government of reconciliation and high aspirations.

The two men reviewed the political positions. Then, President Sarkis expressed his fears that security breakdowns might recur in certain sensitive areas, blocking all attempts to extricate the country from its present crisis.

The president's fears were justified. Last week was marked by security incidents extending from the south, where the matter has become the norm; to Jabal Lubnan, where explosive conditions have returned; to the north, where fighting has erupted in Tripoli this time, accompanied by direct clashes with "the deterrent forces." Perhaps the common denominator of the scattered disturbances throughout Lebanon, was the falling of many dead and wounded, the destruction of property, the escalation of the wave of terror, and the emergence of new obstacles in the path of [pacification] moves by several Lebanese who have become involved in current developments without their knowing it.

War of City Districts

Perhaps the thing that disturbed officials most last week was the bloody clashes in Tripoli. These took place between the districts of Ba'l Muhsn al-'Ali, al-Tabbanih, al-Qubbih, Ba'l al-Saraqbih and al-Mankubin. These clashes were almost sectarian in character, especially as migrations [separating the sects] have registered a noticeable increase.

The clashes shut down all parts of the city of Tripoli, which was already experiencing a severe food crisis. Bakeries were closed down, and vegetables and fruit were unsaleable, because the markets were closed. Electricity was cut off in the city, and terror stalked its streets, to the sound of bullets and explosions. The local heroes of "popular resistance" in the various districts regained the roles, for which they had been waiting for a long time. Many districts have been closed to strangers.

The dangerous direction in the course of events in Tripoli became more and more manifest when Syrian forces operating as deterrent forces, were exposed to sniper and militia fire resulting in a number of casualties. This was regarded as a serious development.

Severe fighting broke out continuously over a 3 day period, during which there were more than 25 killed and scores wounded. All attempts to stop the firing failed. The chief of intelligence of the Syrian forces operating in Lebanon, Col Muhammad Ghanim, and "Abu al-Hul," member of Fatah's central committee, went to Tripoli, and together attempted for 2 consecutive days to arrange a cease-fire, the withdrawal of militias, and the removal of barricades. Finally, they were able to achieve an uneasy calm in most of the city's districts--with the exception of al-Qubbih and al-Tabbanih and their environs--in exchange for a fresh deployment of deterrent troops, a better definition of their role, and certian "guarantees" requested by the militias in the districts.

A Power Struggle

In spite of the relative calm obtaining in the city in the days that followed this agreement, Lebanese security authorities still fear that it is the calm before the storm, because the causes of the recent fighting have not been dealt with in depth. The mistake, as security authorities themselves say, was to view the incidents as "individual disputes" or as the result of "behavior of undisciplined elements." These authorities believe that it is the behavior of certain leadership elements, created by the war, which caused the problems, created estrangement, and induced the Tripolitanians to demand that the army be deployed to separate the belligerents. A delegation was even sent to visit former Premier Rashid Karami, at his summer resort, to ask him to see to it that the army is deployed.

A report received by Lebanese security indicates that a struggle for power between two factions is behind the Tripoli incidents. Both of them want to monopolize the support of the Tripolitanians who, apparently, want their leadership to be in the hands of residents of the city and its leaders.

The report notes that the cease-fire was arranged only after an understanding was reached between the Syrian command and the Palestinian Resistance, which sent "Abu al-Hul" to settle the matter. The report acknowledges that the situation in Tripoli is very complicated. There are groups which support political parties. Others favor other types of organizations, which causes some difficulty in determining each faction's loyalty.

During the negotiations conducted to establish the cease-fire between the parties' militias, the Syrian side emphasized that "deterrence" applied to all, and that the Syrian force did not enter Tripoli years ago in order to side with one faction

against another. On the contrary, its mission is to maintain the city's security, and it will not allow anyone to try to use it, so as to undertake activities which do not serve security and stability.

Observers fear that the Tripoli incidents will be a fore-runner of continuous tension in the north. However, there are those who believe that the Tripolitanians' desire to overcome these incidents remains strong, and that contacts are under way to end the tension, eliminate the consequences of the disputes, do away with those who have caused the alienation and take another look at the activity of the security system in the city, so as to make it more effective.

It remains to be said that officials fear that security disruptions in the north may become chronic. If tension does not originate in Batrun and its environs, or in the heights of Jubayl, it is likely to develop in Tripoli and its suburbs. And if these two fronts simmer down, incidents are likely to break out in 'Akkar.

7005
CSO: 4802

ANTI-QADHDHAFI STUDENTS IN U.S. ISSUE STATEMENT

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic 10 Sep 80 p 6

[Article: "Important Statement by Libyan Students in United States; Leaflets Circulated Against al-Qadhdhafi, 'the New Mussolini of Libya'"]

[Text] The Federation of Libyan Students in the United States has circulated an important statement against Col al-Qadhdhafi, the dictator, or "the new Mussolini of Libya," as the students call him. The students reveal in the statement the policy of repression, terrorism and assassinations which he has been following against the forces of the national opposition. The statement says the following about the Libyan students' movement:

"The Libyan Students' Movement in the United States of America has decided through its organizational committee to carry out a protest demonstration against the nest of crime--which used to be called Libyan Embassy--in the United States. When the students carry out this demonstration and when they sit in front of the embassy building, they will be expressing their dissatisfaction with the conduct of al-Qadhdhafi's regime. The purpose of our demonstration is to reject the policy of 'Libya's new Mussolini.' This is the policy revealed by al-Qadhdhafi's recent conduct. It became evident in the bargains he tried to strike with the students and with the forces of the national opposition as well as in his promises, threats, intimidations and inducements.

"On the basis of our faith in God, in our homeland, in the fight and in the struggle of our people, and because of our awareness of our responsibility towards the questions that are of interest to our people, we proclaim the following:

"First, we strongly reject the chaotic, terrorist regime and its repressive measures, and we join those who struggle for and champion the cause of freedom everywhere in the world in asking that they boycott Libya's illegitimate regime. We call upon all nationalist forces to work for the overthrow of this regime.

"Second, we ask for the release of all political prisoners and detainees, who are currently being subjected to the worst forms of torture, subjugation and mistreatment in al-Qadhdhafi's prisons and detention camps.

"Third, we affirm our solidarity with our people in Libya and abroad, and we pledge to God and to the homeland that the day when we will be united is near.

"Fourth, the students, through their organizational committee, reject all the bargains which the Libyan regime is trying to offer. They see these bargains as nothing but attempts by the Libyan regime to gain time.

"We express in this statement our regrets, our sympathies and our condolences to the families of the fighters who have sacrificed their lives for God and for the homeland, and we remind them of what God Almighty said: 'You must not think that those who were slain in the cause of Allah are dead. They are alive, and well provided for by their Lord.'"

In a previous statement, the Federation of Libyan Students had warned the students against the assassination attempts and the liquidations being carried out by al-Qadhdhafi's teams. The security instructions were [as follows]:

1. Every student residing in the United States has the right to own a personal weapon to defend himself. He may keep that weapon in his home or in his private car, and he has the right to use it, provided he observes the laws of every state.

2. Packages or parcels containing explosives may be used against the students. Accordingly, it is advisable to take security measures with regard to the sender of these packages or parcels, and to check with the police department in the city or the state when there is doubt.

The union distributed leaflets and posters against al-Qadhdhafi in New York, Washington and other state capitals. The bulletins carried al-Qadhdhafi's picture, and stated that he was wanted for murder and for kidnapping.

8592
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TWO LIBYAN DISSIDENTS FLEE TO EGYPT, ASSAIL QADHDHAFI'S REGIME

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 16 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Ahmad al-Jundi: "Two Young Men from Libya Escape to Egypt"]

[Text] It is the hope of any person anywhere to live and to die in his homeland. When a person thinks of escaping from his country, this simply means that life in his country is tantamount to death. Free people at all times and in every place consider death a lesser evil than life in fear, terror and resentment.

Two young Libyan men escaped from al-Qadhdhafi's purgatory, and sought refuge in Egypt. They broke through the armed blockade on the Libyan borders. After a harrowing adventure with the colonel's reconnaissance troops, they disappeared in the desert for three nights. They traveled 1,950 kilometers without water and without food until they reached the Egyptian borders.

The two escapees, Hamad Salih Zayd, a university student, and Muhammad 'Ali Nasr, a driver, announced that they took these risks, because life in Libya was like death. They said that al-Qadhdhafi's opponents were everywhere in Libya, even in the revolutionary committees which are dear to the colonel. They said that there were 82 prisons in Libya, 14 underground detention camps, 10,000 prisoners and a day for revenge.

They said, "Don't believe Libya's broadcasts. The Libyans use devices to amplify the sounds of cheers." They said that al-Qadhdhafi claimed to be austere, but that he owned a yacht that cost 70 million dollars; that his airplane cost 150 million dollars; and that he had spent 2 million dollars for his son's circumcision. Members of al-Qadhdhafi's family are now among the wealthiest people in Libya; they had been among its poorest tribes.

They said that the Libyan citizen was living in a purgatory, and that he was being subjected to terrorism and tyranny everywhere and at all times.

They affirmed that the Libyan people had grievances against the regime of al-Qadhdhafi, and that they were getting ready to attack it sooner or later. No one [in Libya] has any sense of his human nature. Every citizen feels that his home, his children, his livelihood and his life are being threatened. The Libyan has lost his dignity, his sense of security and his honor, and his fate is now subject to the mood of the members of the popular committees which include the rabble, the unemployed, the illiterate and the ignorant.

Resentment Towards al-Sadat

They said that al-Qadhdhafi harbored [a feeling of] resentment against Egypt, and against al-Sadat in particular, becuase al-Sadat had broken al-Qadhdhafi's insane ambition to lead the Arab nation. Al-Qadhdhafi's insanity had led him to believe that he would have been capable of realizing this ambition with the funds of the Libyan people.

They said that al-Qadhdhafi was not a suitable ruler, because he was afflicted with schizophrenia, megalomania and hate. The Libyan people know that. Despite the violence and the terror they will not surrender; this regime will be overthrown, and al-Qadhdhafi will meet his inevitable destiny.

Details of the Adventure

Libyan student Hamad Salih Zayd narrated the details of the escape adventure.

He said, "We knew it would be risky. Al-Qadhdhafi knows that any Libyan citizen would like to escape from Libya to Egypt, because it is the only country where a foreigner can feel safe and immune from vengeance. We thought of escaping to Greece, Italy, London or Germany, but we changed our minds after al-Qadhdhafi's agents went to these countries and murdered those who opposed his regime. We decided to escape to Egypt.

The Risk or Death

"As I said, we knew it would be a risk that may end in death. Al-Qadhdhafi had placed an armed blockade along the desert and the Libyan-Egyptian borders to prevent any attempt by any Libyan citizen to escape. We also knew that reconnaissance patrols patrolled the area regularly around the clock. We had to observe their movements and their schedules, and we were helped in this by a member of the popular committee in Benghazi. They gave us accurate information about the areas where the patrols pass; they gave us their schedules and they also gave us a simple map which we committed to memory lest it fall into the hands of any patrol.

"It was risky even if we supposed that we would not be captured by the reconnaissance patrols. We had to travel in the desert, without a map, on a sandy road that had no signs to show direction for a distance of 1,950 kilometers. Every day many travelers who travel on a similar desert road that is only 250 kilometers long from Benghazi to al-Jalu lose their lives [during the journey]. We were facing the possibility of death, but we did not hesitate because the risk meant deliverance from humiliation, degradation and threats of death at every instant, but the risk meant the hope of escape, of arriving in Egypt and of being rid of the evil of this insane al-Qadhdhafi and his aides."

The Libyan student who escaped from al-Qadhdhafi went on relating the details of the adventure.

With the Assistance of the Revolutionary Committees

"We prepared everything 3 months before the zero hour which was 1 a.m. on 5 August 1980. We had concealed this matter even from our closest relatives; only two members of the popular committee in Benghazi knew of our plan. Muhammad and I had planned to drive the car he operates, which is a Toyota Landrover that can be driven in the desert and on sandy roads. The problem, however, was to provide the gas that was necessary for this long distance. Al-Qadhdhafi's orders were that no one was to be given a permit [to purchase] more than 60 liters of gas so that he could ensure the failure of any attempt to escape by car. The distance between the area of al-Kafrah in south Libya and the Egyptian borders requires at least 1,000 liters of gas. We contacted a friend who was a member of one of the revolutionary committees--we knew he was one of those who detested the regime despite the fact that he showed support for it. He promised that he would do what he could to give us a few permits. Muhammad contacted another member of the revolutionary committee in Benghazi whose acquaintance he had made previously during a trip in the car he was driving. He had discovered that that person hated al-Qadhdhafi but that he had felt compelled to join the people's committee so he can have the privileges that its members have. Muhammad succeeded in persuading that man to give him a few permits to purchase gas. We were thus able to provide the quantity that was necessary.

In the Direction of the Sun

"On the night of the escape each one of us told the members of his family that we were going to Benghazi to purchase clothing, and the adventure began. We turned towards the east. We had only one canteen of water and food for two meals only. We did not want anyone to suspect that we were going on a longer journey. After 3 hours we saw one of the reconnaissance patrols at some distance so we turned off our headlights and we waited until dawn. We began to move towards the sun just as the member of the revolutionary council had advised us. We traveled about 400 kilometers and suddenly we saw another patrol. We hid quickly beside one of the sand dunes and we were about half a kilometer from the patrol. We thought that we had been discovered, and there were moments of unlimited terror. Muhammad told me, 'If they come close to us, we will have to commit suicide. Death is a lesser evil than being arrested. Our fate will be the same if they capture us, except that if they do, we will die after being mercilessly tortured.'

"We recited the opening verses of the Koran and the Moslem creed and we waited. God preserved us; no one had seen us; and the patrol disappeared. We resumed the adventure until night fell and then we waited until dawn so we would not lose our way.

A Day Without Problems

"The following day went by without any problems. We had traveled a long distance in the desert. We began to feel exhausted after we ran out of food and water, but every kilometer that we traveled brought us closer to life. We continued our journey with the dawn of the third day, and we began to sense danger. We were approaching the borders which were regularly monitored by airplane reconnaissance patrols. But, fortunately, not a single airplane went by, and we approached the borders and gave ourselves up to the Egyptian police authorities. We thanked God that we had arrived in Egypt, the safe refuge for every Arab."

A Hypocrite and an Atheist

The Libyan student went on to say, "No one understands the conduct of this mad man al-Qadhdhafi. But he is a hypocrite, an atheist, a liar and a wicked, malicious swindler. All the people know this about him. He pretends in front of the people that he is indifferent to worldly goods and that he only wants to live in a tent, but the people know that he spent 2 million dollars to marry the Tunisian Jew Mishka Hasanayn. The people know that al-Qadhdhafi has two palaces on the island of Corfu in Italy and that he owns two yachts, one of them is the al-Mahrusah which cost 70 million dollars. Everything that the colonel touches in that yacht is made of gold.

"Al-Qadhdhafi's Boeing airplane cost more than 150 million dollars of the people's money. The people are now suffering from need. No one in Libya now owns more than 100 dinars."

Everything Is Out of Commission

"People in Libya now are suffering from the lack of production everywhere. The farms are managed by the state, and this has led to diminishing harvests. We are now importing everything from abroad. About 300,000 Libyans immigrated from Libya in 1977, and restrictions, therefore, were placed on immigration. But by then all the producers had actually immigrated, and there were no more new projects. Everything has come to a standstill.

"There are now 82 prisons in Libya; these were built by al-Qadhdhafi after the revolution. Before then there were only two prisons in Libya. Libya has 14 underground detention camps. There are more than 10,000 prisoners in the prisons and the detention camps. Every day hundreds of innocent people are arrested simply because they did not march in the support demonstrations or because they stayed away from the celebrations that al-Qadhdhafi holds so he can deliver his speeches and explain his theories which no one understands."

A Day for Revenge

The Libyan student asked, "Have you ever heard of a ruler, no matter how insane or unjust he was, who sets a day for revenge? Al-Qadhdhafi did that. He declared the 7th of April of every year to be liquidation day or revenge day, so he can get rid of his opponents, those whose loyalty is suspect, those who disobey his instructions and those who have renounced the Green Theory.

"All values and principles are being violated in al-Qadhdhafi's administration. These violations are almost sacrilegious. Homes and wedding parties are attacked, and women's jewelry confiscated. Girls' revolutionary committees have the right to enter any home or any public place and confiscate all the money and jewelry that women and girls have.

"One cannot find a gloomier picture of life anywhere in the world that is worse than the picture one finds in Libya now.

"The Libyan people feel they are oppressed. It is the sense of oppression that creates revolutions. Therefore, there is much hope that the people will rebel against this insane oppressor."

Strong Opposition

The second young Libyan man, Muhammad 'Ali Nasr, spoke and added the following to what his colleague had said:

"There is a strong opposition in Libya, but it is under the surface. Al-Qadhdhafi's opposition can be found even in the revolutionary committees in Benghazi, in Tripoli and everywhere.

"Libya's voices abroad are heard everywhere. There are those who hear those voices, sympathize with them and support them. The feeling that there is a strong opposition abroad strengthens the will of the opposition in Libya and encourages them to prepare themselves to get rid of al-Qadhdhafi.

"Do not believe what is broadcast by the Libyan media. Sound amplifiers are used in any broadcast of al-Qadhdhafi's conferences to amplify the limited cheers that are made by his followers who are members of the revolutionary committees and the workers who are rounded up from the factories so that the cheers would sound tremendous and resounding. Do not believe this: there is a resistance in Libya and an opposition; they are growing continuously, and they are making plans to confront al-Qadhdhafi."

Muhammad 'Ali Nasr went on to say: "Al-Qadhdhafi's tribe is now called in Libya the al-Damm tribe [the tribe of blood]. Sayyid, Hasan and Ahmad al-Qadhdhafi as well as Khalifah Hasanayn and other tribesmen will do anything to obtain a fortune.

"Al-Qadhdhafi's tribe was one of the poorest tribes in Libya, but it is now one of the wealthiest. Meanwhile, the ordinary Libyan citizen is denied the right to own his own home.

"On the day he left London Sayyid al-Qadhdhafi spent 2 million dollars for his farewell party."

Reasons for Unity

"Is there a rational ruler who would pay billions of dollars for a unity between two countries, one of them is in the east and the other is in the west of the Arab homeland? Is not this madness and stupidity? But al-Asad knows al-Qadhdhafi's nature, and he wants to take from him as many dinars as he can in return for a paper unity. However, al-Qadhdhafi, imagines that he can get rid of the officers and soliders who oppose him. He would send all those who oppose him into exile from Libya to Syria under the slogan of unity; the reverse of that is also true.

"Libya's funds are being spend on Uganda, Lebanon and Syria while the people have no money to pave the al-Kafrah Road in Benghazi where hundreds of travelers die every day.

"The fact that the people are aware of all this will ultimately lead to a revolution against oppression, terror and insanity."

Do You Have an Explanation?

I asked the two young escapees from Libya, "Do you have an explanation for a personality that combines all these characteristics: insanity, resentment, falsehood, hypocrisy, bloodthristiness, oppression, injustice and a notion that he is the first, the most rational and the most deserving of rulers to lead the Arab nation?

"Do you have an explanation for the conduct of a man who opened his country to the experts, weapons, agents and bases of communists even though his attack on communism was the most violent attack to which a theory was subjected?

"Do you have an explanation for the conduct of a man who claimed that the bases of his regime were the foundation of the Islamic religion, but who had the audacity to infringe upon the prophet who brought the message of this religion?

"Do you have an explanation for the conduct of a man who squanders the funds of his people in hunting down those who oppose him and appeasing those who praise him?

"We do not understand the conduct of a personality with these components, a personality in which all these defects, complexes and contradictions come together. Have you in Libya found a persuasive explanation for the conduct of this al-Qadhdhafi?"

The Libyan university student responded to my question: "No. We too in Libya have not yet found an explanation. Al-Qadhdhafi is a sick man, and he needs psychotherapy. It is certain that all psychologists would find it extremely difficult to remedy such a bestial disposition. The disease has taken so much hold of him, therapy may be very difficult."

Truthful Testimony

The conversation with the two young men who escaped al-Qadhdhafi's purgatory went on and on, but we eventually ran out of time.

There was one statement that the two young men wanted to make: "It is being rumored in Libya that all those who come to Egypt are persecuted and treated in the worst possible fashion. But the truth must be said, and we want everyone in Libya to hear it. We found nothing in Egypt but affection, security and peace. We found life without fear and without terror. We asked for political asylum in Egypt, and the authorities granted us our request. They offered us every possible assistance so we can live like any Egyptian citizen living in his homeland."

8592
CSO: 4802

MINISTER NOTES GOVERNMENT'S AGRICULTURAL PROGRAMS, POLICIES

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 26, 27-28 Sep 80

[Interview with Mohamed Ould Amar, minister of rural development; date and place not given]

[26 Sep 80, p 3]

[Text] At its October 1979 meeting, the Military Committee for National Salvation (CMSN) resolved, within the framework of the priority granted to the rural sector, to set up an agricultural loan fund and establish an organization in charge of putting the institution into operation.

The government, which was in charge of the study and resolution of these questions, has just examined and adopted a communication presented by the Ministry of Rural Development concerning a report on agricultural credit and the organization of the marketing of farm products.

We therefore met with Mohamed Ould Amar, minister of rural development, who defined the meaning and scope of that important decision for us.

[Question] At its latest meeting, the Council of Ministers approved a report on agricultural credit and the organization of the marketing of farm products. Can you tell us the main lines of that report?

[Answer] The Council of Ministers examined and adopted a communication presented by my ministry on 13 September 1980.

That communication dealt with the conclusions and recommendations of the report on agricultural credit drafted by a group of experts organized under the aegis of the Ministry of Rural Development in application of a decision made by the Military Committee for National Salvation at its October 1979 meeting.

Within the framework of the priority granted to the rural sector as proclaimed by the CMSN at that same session, the establishment of an agricultural credit fund and an organization in charge of putting that institution in operation was decided upon.

The government was in charge of the study and resolution of these questions, as elements in a national strategy to promote rural activities whose essential objectives had been defined. In the long run, those objectives are: self-sufficiency in food, the return to and settlement of the people in their native regions, and finally, the rehabilitation and protection of the natural environment.

These objectives are obviously important and ambitious.

It is in fact necessary for our country to be able to meet its needs for food as soon as possible. During the period of the drought and throughout the difficulties we have faced, friendly countries and organizations have lent us their aid in a generous and useful fashion.

But equally urgent needs exist elsewhere in the world and it could happen that in the eyes of the donors, food crises in Asia or other regions of Africa, for example, might be considered to have priority over the Sahel countries. One can easily imagine what the consequences would be under the present circumstances.

This is a possibility that the government wishes to bear in mind.

This gives their full meaning to the basic option (priority to the rural sector) and to accompanying measures taken or being drafted in order to translate this option into fact.

I would point here to an immediate measure being taken by the government: the establishment of a reserve or emergency supply of grain that would ward off the grave, widespread scarcities of food products. These stocks should be backed by others whose role would be to ensure regulation of the market in the case of limited regional scarcities.

Nevertheless, stimulation of national production remains the cornerstone of the government's action in this field.

Naturally, agricultural water projects that are to be launched before the end of the year (Gorgol Noi, Aftout, 30 small village perimeters) will help increase production, as will dams in the interior of the country (some 30 dams a year during the Fourth Plan) and the deep wells drilled (30 a year during the 5 years of the plan).

But it is the expected improvements in yield of the so-called traditional crops (rain crops and flood crops) that will make it possible to limit the grain deficit in the coming years.

One of the factors limiting the development of production has to date been precisely the absence of production inceitives because of the failure to provide access to farm loans for seasonal expenses or the purchase of production equipment, the lack of marketing structures for surpluses and the absence of guaranteed farm prices.

These are the elements that the experts took up. They recommended the following to the government: 1) the establishment of a farm loan institution; 2) the promotion of professional structures; 3) the adaptation of specialized organizations to the task of supplying consumable expenditures and the necessary production

factors for the development of rural production; 4) the reorganization of collection and the processing of farm products; and 5) the establishment of mechanisms for the setting and guaranteeing of farm prices and the marketing of production.

The resources of the farm credit fund have been defined, along with terms for their use. In this connection, particular emphasis has been placed on the solvency of loan applicants and on the security they offer, solvency linked to an appropriate environment that must be created and promoted through the reactivation of agricultural cooperation and the dissemination of improved farming techniques.

The farm credit fund must cover seasonal (short-term) credits and medium-term investment operations. Credit for development operations is not planned until a later phase.

The weakness of the current cooperative system requires that a specialized organization play the role of central purchaser in order to ensure supplies to farmers and livestock breeders. The nature and volume of such operations will be determined together with professional structures.

This organization, which could be the OMC [Mauritanian Grain Office] or a structure having the same vocation, must assume the task of collecting debts from recipient cooperatives and act as intermediary between the FND [National Development Fund] and the cooperatives.

Initially, two or three regions with high agricultural development potential will serve as test zones.

The recruiting of farmers and livestock breeders will be more dense there in order to take the projected operations into account. It will be done by a multidisciplinary team at the level of agricultural sectors and livestock inspectorates.

At the central level, it is recommended that a full extension service oriented toward production be set up.

The role of the services in the rural sector is defined in the phase of implementation of agricultural credit, along with accompanying measures such as the supplying of production elements and equipment, the collection and marketing of farm surpluses, control and technical support.

Finally, a schedule for the startup of operations is planned.

[Question] Mr Minister, can you tell us how the farmers will be able to take advantage of the farm credit? Will they do so through the National Development Fund?

[Answer] The farm credit fund's role is to aid farmers and livestock breeders in their production efforts. But their lack of organization, scattering and low technical level constitute a definite handicap that we are forced to take into consideration in the drafting of principles and terms for the farm credit fund. This fund, whose resources are limited, aims to help the largest possible number of our nationals.

For these reasons, the precooperative groupings and the cooperatives will be the privileged beneficiaries of the fund. The reorganized professional farm organizations which the government would like to encourage will be totally different from those that existed before and that mainly enabled their leaders to justify government demands.

From now on, the cooperatives must have statutes and conform to them. They must work with government officials in drafting activity programs whose execution will be supervised, at least with respect to those receiving financial aid from the government.

Private parties who have demonstrated that they are involved in continuing agricultural production activities and that they have made significant personal financial efforts will also be able to receive credit.

The agricultural credit fund is a branch of the National Development Fund which also includes a branch of activity for the development of small and medium-size enterprises and a third branch for exclusively social housing.

[Question] Among the problems facing those who would like to get involved in agriculture is the lack of means and absence of technical assistance. Mr Minister, do you believe that with the establishment of this agricultural credit fund, these problems will be solved?

[Answer] The agricultural credit fund will definitely make it possible to help nationals truly desirous of getting involved in agricultural production or livestock raising. The credit to which they will have access will enable them to meet expenses and purchase the machinery they need for their activities.

However, one must not expect that all Mauritanians will have their finance problems settled immediately.

As I said, the government intends to give certain privileges to cooperatives, along with serious, disciplined, motivated farmers who see government aid as an accompaniment to their personal efforts.

[27-28 Sep 80, p 3]

[Text] In the first part of the exclusive interview which he granted us, Minister of Rural Development Ahmed Ould Amar defined the context within which, at its most recent meeting, the Council of Ministers adopted the report on agricultural credit and the organization of the marketing of farm products.

After citing the main suggestions made by experts within the framework of that report, the minister described the major advantages which farmers may derive from agricultural credit.

The problem of financing projects, which constitutes a serious obstacle to rural development, the dispute involving SONADER [National Rural Development Company] and landowners over the question of land and the launching of projects in Aftout Es-Saheli: These are the main questions taken up by the minister in the last part of the interview.

Problem of Financing: Obstacle to Rural Development

[Question] One of the most serious obstacles facing major agricultural projects is the lack of financing. In your opinion, how is this problem going to be solved?

[Answer] The problem of financing the projects is definitely a major obstacle to rural development. Like many Third World countries, our nation is experiencing difficulties due to the absence or insufficiency of equipment and operating credits. But the financial factor is nevertheless not decisive in the development process.

We know of countries with considerable financial resources and which are not developed. The absorption of financing faces other countries in terms of their human, institutional and administrative deficiencies.

Mauritania is trying to make up for a lack of resources by the quality of its personnel, by its search for the most economical solutions and above all, by the mobilization of national production forces. Finally, it is seeking to improve the effectiveness of its administration.

We can count on the aid of our Arab brothers and friendly countries and organizations for the completion of major projects and for the acquisition of equipment and infrastructure necessary to the development of our economy.

But we can and must make internal efforts, using our own resources. The institution of a regional development fund starting this year and of an agricultural production campaign constitute important steps on this path.

Land Problems

[Question] For some time, SONADER has faced certain difficulties due to the demands of land owners. Mr Minister, have we succeeded in solving the land problem at that level?

[Answer] I would point out that SONADER is having no difficulties due to the situation in the pilot Gorgol perimiter. SONADER ensured recruiting at the request of the government. It is now up to the government to clarify things and to make farm owners and operators aware of its intentions.

It was the right of the people involved to spell out their real desires. Instead of that, both sides have continued to duck the essential problems, which are the appropriation of land, the method of developing the land and mutual obligations. They were trying to gain time. Politics became involved and the search for reasonable solutions was complicated.

The current situation helps no one. The landowners believe they have suffered injury and the government, which invested very large sums in the operation, received neither the anticipated political nor social advantages.

The experience of the Gorgol pilot area revealed the urgent need for a suitable legal framework for government intervention in development operations in which public development funds are to be invested.

A committee of experts is now working under the aegis of the ministry on an overall proposal for the settlement of land problems throughout the national territory.

[Question] What measures have been taken to guarantee the marketing of agricultural products? Will this task be entrusted to an establishment?

[Answer] The marketing of agricultural products will determine the success of the entire policy in the rural sector.

It is marketing that will provide the farmers and livestock breeders with profits, encouraging them to remain on their land and undertake production activities.

It constitutes the guaranteed reimbursement of loans granted by the agricultural credit fund.

In our plan, the OMC and the operator to be set up in the area of livestock raising must buy agricultural and livestock surpluses and ensure their marketing in regions where there are shortages.

Rice will be bought by SONIMEX [expansion unknown]. Purchase prices to the producer will be set by the government for every agricultural season.

Professional organizations of farmers and livestock breeders will also be able to sell their production freely, except for the portion reserved to cover the reimbursement of possible loans to the agricultural credit fund.

Aftout Es-Saheli

[Question] For some time, there has been talk of agricultural projects in the Aftout Es-Saheli region, at Tamourjt Naaj, R'Kiz, and so on. What has happened so far?

[Answer] The situation is as follows:

Aftout Es-Saheli

The plan for the first partion of the project, to wit, the intake, channels, the four closing dikes and the experimental farm, is now ready.

The prefeasibility study has been completed for the development of an area measuring 10,000 to 14,000 hectares and for the Nouakchott-Afout water supply.

Our Iraqi brothers did agree to finance the first portion of the project for an amount of 2 billion UM [Mauritanian ouguiya] at the time of the official visit of the president of the CMSN and chief of state to that country.

My departments are now working with Iraqi experts on terms for implementation of the project, which they hope will begin early in 1981.

Lake R'Kiz

The study for the development has been completed. It presents several options, including one providing for 5,200 hectares of crops irrigated by means of gravity

and grazing areas irrigated by floods ranging from 1,650 hectares (for Diama alone) to 2,950 hectares (if both Diama and Manantali are in service).

Financing of this project, whose cost is 1.2 billion UM, is being sought from Saudi Arabia and France.

Tamourt Enaj

This project includes two main phases: the development of 10 irrigated areas by drilling deep wells, totaling 80 hectares. Eight of the 10 wells have already been completed.

Financing for this portion is being obtained from France (CCCE [Central Fund for Economic Cooperation]).

The second phase includes the development of an irrigated area of 1,000 hectares. An additional 800 hectares will be prepared for flood crops. The schedule is ready.

Financing is being sought from the Federal Republic of Germany within the framework of the overall development project for Tagant.

[Question] Mr Minister, have you any appeal to make during this rainy season?

[Answer] Quite simply, I should like to tell my fellow countrymen who are farmers and livestock breeders that the CMSN and the government are making major efforts in their behalf in order to improve their living and working conditions. These efforts are certainly not enough, but they are truly meritorious given the current situation of our economy, our public finances and the other sectors of national activity.

Our livestock breeders and farmers must continue to deserve the attention of the government because of their serious efforts and work.

During the current rainy season, all fields must be cultivated. The pasture land we have this year must be protected from brush fires. Trees must be protected from abusive cutting which has disastrous consequences for our environment and that of our children.

11,464
CSO: 4400

EEC AID FOR DAM RESERVOIR AT FOUM GLEITA

London WEST AFRICA in English 20 Oct 80 pp 2092, 2093

[Text]

The EEC is to provide 9.5m. EUA to help to build and develop a dam reservoir at Foum Gleita in Mauritania. The total cost of the scheme which also includes developing a surrounding area of 3,600 ha, is estimated at 68m. EUA. Aid is also expected from the World Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Abu Dhabi Fund and the International Fund for Agricultural Development.

The Foum Gleita dam will be built in the Gorgol Noir Valley, a tributary of the Senegal river. Agriculture in the area suffers from infrequent and irregular rainfall, and the development of irrigation in the country is seen as the only means of reducing its substantial dependence on external aid for national food requirements.

Development of the area should allow for the production of 26,800 tonnes of cereals, and 2,400 tonnes of vegetables. Rice will be the main crop grown in the area, with an output of 21,900 tonnes of paddy, 10,200 tonnes of which will be processed and marketed. This is equal to one-third of the amount of imported rice at the moment. The project will also mean an output of 2,800 tonnes of maize and 2,100 tonnes of sorghum. This will mean that the region, with a population of 162,000, will be self-supporting as regards foodstuffs and any surplus can therefore be marketed in other regions of Mauritania.

Work on the dam is expected to be completed in about thirty months.

CSO: 4420

BRIEFS

DEFICIENT RAINFALL--Aioun (AMP)--The agricultural situation in Hodh El Gharbi is generally unsatisfactory because of the irregular rainfall and its poor distribution throughout the region. This announcement was made by the head of the agricultural sector in Aioun and picked up by the regional AMP correspondent. Two departments: Kobenni and Tintane, have had satisfactory rainfall, the official said, indicating that the amount received in the two areas is 135.5 and 208.5 millimeters respectively, compared with 300 last year. The Department of Aioun received only 70.07 compared with 250 in 1979 and in Tamchakett, the situation is even worse, as only 28.1 millimeters of rain have fallen. Although rain crops are developing normally in Kobenni and Tintane, the same is not true in the rest of the region, the agricultural official noted. [Text] [Nouakchott CHAAB in French 26 Sep 80 p 8] 11,464

CSO: 4400

VISIT OF SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSED

Anticipated Results of Visit

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 13 Oct 80 pp 1, 3

[Article by Mohamed Tamri: "To Strengthen the Cooperation Between Rabat and Madrid on Healthy and Solid Foundations"]

[Text] The arrival in Morocco of Perez Llorca, the Spanish Foreign Affairs minister, cannot fail to revive the Spanish-Moroccan cooperation. The visit comes at a time when our country, in the opinion of all neutral observers, is in control of the military situation in the Sahara, at a time when the Spanish government is showing that it is firmly opposed to all pressure and all blackmail aimed at forcing it to recognize the POLISARIO mercenaries or their ghostly republic. It also comes at a time when the growing interest aroused in both governments by the plan to build a permanent link through the Straits of Gibraltar leads us to expect greater rapprochement between Morocco and Spain. Finally, the visit of the head of Spanish diplomacy is directly connected to the prospects for improving bilateral cooperation, especially in the field of fishing.

Until recently there was talk of the psychological barrier that underlay the many misunderstandings between Morocco and Spain, and of the paucity of human contacts between the leaders of the two countries. In fact many mistakes were made on both sides. In our opinion the first mistake stems directly from the refusal of certain Spanish leaders to assume their responsibilities and fulfill their commitments. The first big mistake was recorded shortly after the signing of the tripartite Madrid accord, according to whose terms the Spanish government cedes the Sahara back to Morocco. When the accord was signed we heard three highly-placed Spanish leaders say that "they are washing their hands of us, we have transferred the administration but we have not transferred the sovereignty." A bad-faith, self-satisfied answer, for it is obvious that Spain has given that sovereignty to someone, and also, the tripartite Madrid accord makes no distinction between the two ideas.

Happily for both our countries, we are not guided by bad faith in taking our respective positions. Proof of this is the firm attitude of the Spanish government and its entire political class in the face of the Algerian mercenaries' blackmail. Madrid's reaction to the kidnapping and sequestration of Spanish citizens by the Algerian government's henchmen is exemplary and logical, far removed from any weakness and completely natural in the face of the extortions committed in the name of the people's pseudo-rights.

All of these elements may form the basic framework of a new Maghribian policy on the part of Spain, one more in conformity with its interests and taking into account the historic and legitimate rights of the Moroccan people and the dangers of general explosion brought upon North Africa by the policy of domination and expansion followed by Alteria and Libya.

New Orientation Foreseen

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 14 Oct 80 pp 1, 4

[Article by Abdelkrim El Andaloussi: "An 'Open Attitude' That Will Yield Neither to Pressure nor Blackmail"]

[Text] The first official visit of the Spanish Foreign Affairs minister, Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca, to a foreign country was made to Morocco. The head of Spanish diplomacy, since his appointment last 8 September has visited the United Nations headquarters in New York and the Council of Europe in Strasbourgh. His visit to Morocco illustrates the Spanish government's interest in improving Spanish-Moroccan relations and strengthening bilateral cooperation.

In Morocco we published his first official statement on 9 September, when he opened in Madrid the preparatory phase of the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, in which he stressed the necessity of seeking peace in freedom and cooperation. "We do not want," he said, "peace of any kind, peace at any price, we want only peace in freedom and freedom through cooperation."

His statement before the 35th General Assembly of the United Nations also revealed that he has a negotiator's mind with which to find--"with an open attitude"--solutions to the problems threatening peace in the world, and the desire to seek new formulas for cooperation with the Third World countries, the Mediterranean countries and especially the Maghrib countries.

"The Spanish government," Mr Perez-Llorca emphasized, "is attentively following the evolution of the situation in the Maghrib, with which it feels united by virtue of geographic proximity and profound historic, cultural and human ties, and we wish to preserve and develop close relations of friendship with all the Maghribian countries."

This desire, manifested by the new head of Spanish diplomacy does not surprise us, knowing that Mr Perez-Llorca is a career diplomat who is sincere and clever, and that for him only the facts count.

Who better than this young Andalusian diplomat--he was born in Cadiz in November 1940--who carries Spanish-Arab blood in his veins, can understand the justice of the cause defended by Morocco and act upon it?

"The Silver Fox," as his compatriots like to call him, who until now has avoided making statements to the press, has announced his desire to continue the policy followed by his predecessor, Marcelino Oreja, but with "an open attitude," and without yielding to external pressure or blackmail.

With regard to the Northwest African conflict that pits Algeria against Morocco and threatens Spanish interests in the region, Mr Perez-Llorca's position is clear:

"Spain has ended its presence in the territory (formerly the Spanish Sahara) and the minimal administration it exercised there until 26 February 1976.

"Spain," Mr Perez-Llorca continued, "seeks no advantages, either for itself or for anyone else," but it wants "to contribute to peace" on the basis of an "absolute impartiality" and "firm principles."

"Neither flattery nor pressure, whatever form they may take, are going to succeed in turning us away from the unaltered and consistent line we have followed," he said.

Speaking of pressure, the head of Spanish diplomacy added, "However, I must formulate my vigorous protest at the violence which, against every international standard, and regardless of human rights, is being perpetrated at this moment against innocent citizens of my country who are being used as hostages."

It is not difficult to interpret this as a clear condemnation of acts of piracy by the so-called "Polisario," which has abducted several Spanish fishermen and is holding them hostage.

According to several signs Mr Perez-Llorca seems to want to give a new orientation to Spanish policy in the Maghrib. The condemnation of the "barbarous acts" committed by the mercenaries against the Spanish fishermen, expressed by the president of the government, by the minister of Foreign Affairs and by national public opinion is very significant. Spain has suffered too much from its passivity, exploited excessively by mercenary bands armed by an Algeria that calls itself friendly. The time has come to put an end to the attacks against the prestige and interests of Spain. It can depend with every assurance on Morocco's support. We have always said that Spain must be firm in its Maghribian policy.

Commentary on Visit

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 16 Oct 80 p 1

[Editorial by "Al Bayane:" "Diplomatic Formalism?"]

[Text] "The mountain labored and brought forth a mouse."

This is pretty much what one would be tempted to think after the lightning 28-hour visit to our country by the Spanish minister of Foreign Affairs, Jose Pedro Perez-Llorca.

In fact, save for the signing of a cultural cooperation agreement, which is to replace the 1957 accord, we do not have the impression that the meeting of the Moroccan and Spanish diplomatic staffs produced any concrete progress in the settlement of the important points that arise in bilateral debates.

It will be noted, for example, that on the subject of fishing Mr Perez-Llorca was careful not to be precise, preferring to leave it to the opinions of the experts.

Better yet, everything leads one to believe that the status quo--which is profoundly prejudicial to Morocco's fishing interests--will be renewed as a result of the contracts between the two parties, which are to begin officially next 28 October.

As for the rest, these are just pious vows and vague declarations, as much where the plan for a permanent link between Morocco and Spain is concerned as for the potential axes for a marked strengthening of bilateral cooperation.

It is believable that the touchy pending dossiers were not mentioned, or that their resolution was not advanced an inch. We are thinking particularly of the shipping of citrus fruits for the EEC by way of Spanish territory, and the problem of what legal and social guarantees are to be granted our workers who have emigrated beyond the Straits.

Was this visit, then, simply to make contact? To get acquainted?

That being the case, that would confirm that what separates Spain from Morocco is not just an arm of the sea.

For we have to notice the discretion--more than diplomacy--with which the Spanish minister of Foreign Affairs brought up the burning--for Spain--question of the Polisario's fishermen-hostages, who are prisoners in Algeria.

The head of Madrid diplomacy--at least publicly and for the press--contented himself with a declaration of principle "condemning all violations of and attacks on human rights."

He absolutely did not connect that affair with the artificial tension that prevails in the Maghrib, any more than he seemed to react to the "discreet appeal" by our minister of Foreign Affairs, who said he was "persuaded that Madrid shares our concern for preserving our region from a conflict prejudicial to all."

So there is a Spanish reserve and sense of moderation that will not go unnoticed in East Oujda, where this visit has surely been followed with a great deal of attention.

Of course there is nothing to prevent us from believing that these muffled words and the fact that the visit is being "banalized"--a desire that seems clear on both sides--are being inserted into the framework of delicate diplomatic maneuvers aimed at contributing qualitative and positive changes to the Maghribian political climate.

Nevertheless, in policy one can only count on certainties.

And consequently it is not improper to show a certain disappointment when appraising the results of Mr Llorca's visit to our country. We are not likely to be contradicted by the announcement of the establishing of a precise schedule "for the most important questions."

The general situation of the relations between the two countries and the present political context called for results that would be otherwise more concrete, since it is true that formalism has never accomplished miracles.

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CSO: 4400

INSTALLATION CEREMONY FOR NEW SECURITY HEADS DESCRIBED

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 9 Oct 80 p 7

[Article by M. Benhida]

[Text] The general movement toward change that the National Security has been going through recently has affected several leaders and chief of services of the Regional Security in Marrakech. In that connection a glittering ceremony recently took place at the province seat to install Ali Benkacem, the controller general, who was appointed chief of the Marrakech Regional Security, replacing Mohamed Karim Sayagh, who was transferred to Tetuan.

On the same occasion the new chiefs of the regional services of the Regional Security were also installed, among them Yousfi Kaddour, chief of the Regional Service of the Criminal Investigation Department; Mohamed Chawad, the central commissioner; and Mohamed Sebti, chief of the Regional Service of General Information, who replaced, respectively, Abderrahman Tazi, transferred to Meknes; Maati Khattabi, appointed chief of the Regional Security in Ouarzazate; and Moulay Abdellah Alaoui, transferred to Agadir.

In the course of this glittering reception, Mustapha Tarik, His Majesty's governor in the province of Marrakech, gave a speech in which he eulogized Mohamed Karim Sayagh, the former chief of the Regional Security in Marrakech, emphasizing his success in his mission in the capital of the South.

"Although we are all sorry to see him go," said Mustapha Tarik, "we must wish him every success in his new residence where, I am persuaded, his actions will be crowned with success. On behalf of all of you," he added, "permit me to thank him for all he has accomplished in this province, as well as his close associates, Abderrahman Tazi, Moulay Abdellah Alaoui and Maati Khattabi; I wish all of them every success in their new offices."

The governor then welcomed Ali Benkacem, the new chief of the Regional Security in Marrakech, and congratulated him on the confidence placed in him by appointing him to this office. Ali Benkacem's appointment at the head of the Security in Marrakech is evidence of the board's continuing interest in providing peace and tranquillity for the citizens of this province, he said.

After bringing out Ali Benkacem's biography, the governor of the province stated, "I am convinced that the new chief of the Regional Security will have no trouble succeeding in his new mission. This is a delicate task that requires considerable effort and untiring work, which Mr Benkacem is used to; he has the experience to occupy this post and accomplish his administrative cuty under the best conditions, for the new chief of the Regional Security has always occupied very important positions since 1958."

The governor then said he hoped the new leaders of the Regional Security will continue the activities begun by their predecessors--activities whose goal is the peace and security of the inhabitants. Those two points form the basis of prosperity, progress and economic and social development.

Before concluding his speech the governor welcomed Mohamed Sebti, Kaddour Yousfi and Mohamed Chawad.

The glittering reception was attended by Mahjoub El Akkad, the governor's caliph in the city; Hassan Moulihi, acting secretary general; His Majesty Prince Sidi Mohamed El Hafidi; Haj Larbi Majboud, first presiding judge of the Court of Appeals; Haj Ahmed Lakhdar, King's prosecutor; Ahmed Chouhaidi, presiding judge of the District Court; Dr Naim Brini, vice chairman of the Provincial Assembly; M'hamed Khalifa,, chairman of the Municipal Council; Deputies Abdessamad Al Istiqsa; Lhousseine Boulasri; Haj Mohamed Boukdir and Abderrafi Basri; Col Hammou Hajoui, regional commander of the Royal Gendarmerie; Col El Mouch, second in command of the BEFRA [expansion unknown]; Col Cheloli, second in command of the FAR [Royal Armed Forces] Parade Ground the regional directors and provincial delegates and heads of technical and administrative services; the circle heads; the heads of the urban arrondissements; Regional Security staff members; as well as several important persons, notables and members of the elected body.

8946
CSO: 4400

SUGAR CANE PRODUCTION AT GHARB, SUCRAFOR DISCUSSED

Gharb Refinery

Rabat L'OPINION in French 9 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] Azeddine Guessous, the minister of Commerce, Industry, Merchant Marine and Maritime Fishing, presided in his department headquarters over the third session of the board of directors of the Gharb Cane Sugar Refinery.

This plant, whose anticipated processing capacity is 3,500 tons of cane per day, is the 11th sugar production unit and the second specializing in processing cane into sugar. Currently being assembled, its startup will occur on 1 May 1981 with the processing during the first season of 250,000 tons of cane and a production of 25,000 tons of refined sugar in 2-kilogram packages and 50-kilogram bags. By its third season, in 1983, it will reach its cruising capacity with the processing of 420,000 tons of cane and a production of 43,000 tons of sugar.

However, taking into account the development of sugar cane around Gharb, the production will exceed the capacity of installations in Mechra Bel Ksiri (SUNACAS [expansion unknown])and Dar Gueddari (SURAC [expansion unknown]) and will necessitate the starting up of a third sugar cane plant in Gharb in 1983. There is good reason to note that studies on the subject of launching the third sugar cane refinery in Gharb are at present in the process of being realized.

During the meeting a detailed examination of the company's activities was conducted, as well as of the various assembly projects currently in progress with a view to starting up the sugar refinery for the 1981 season.

SUCRAFOR's Production

Rabat L'OPINION in French 9 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] MAP--The minister of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, during a tour in Nador Province, last Friday visited the Oriental Sugar Refinery (SUCRAFOR), a unit that became operational in 1972.

This plant, which is located in Zaio in Nador Province, is--as its technical director, Saddiq Ahmed, indicated--unique of its kind in that it provides a dual function. It processes both beets and sugar cane.

After it was built in 1971 and became operational in 1972, SUCRAFOR undertook the processing of beets, before expanding its activities in 1974 to sugar cane.

Beets and sugar cane, cultivation of which is practised in the irrigated outskirts of Moulouya, cover respectively 5,150 and 750 hectares. SUCRAFOR processes 3,000 tons of beets per day and 1,000 tons of sugar cane per day.

However, the plant is only operational during the seasons, which begin in January and May and last about three months. Between seasons the permanent workers are responsible for maintaining and cleaning the machines.

It should be emphasized, on the other hand, that SUCRAFOR fills 60 percent of the sugar needs of the eastern region. Cultivation of beets is practised on both banks of the Moulouya, while cane is cultivated only on the left bank (Nador region). The annual production of granulated sugar, to which SUCRAFOR's mission is limited, is 25,000 tons. Its capacity, however, is 35,000 tons.

The crop program for the Garet outskirts, which is being equipped, anticipates reserving an area of 300 hectares for the cultivation of beets and sugar cane, which will alleviate the shortage of raw materials and will increase the plant's production capacity. The number of farmers who provide the plant with raw material is 3,340 for beets and 701 for cane.

8946
CSO: 4400

PROCEEDINGS OF COUNCIL OF MINISTERS' MEETING REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 17 Oct 80 pp 1, 4

> [Text] President Bourguiba's proposal for aid to El Asnam reconstruction; chief of state concerned with assuring the success of Administrative Reform; to enable the National Labor Union Commission to assume its mission under better conditions; a measure to reintegrate unemployed workers shortly after 26 January.

Yesterday morning, Thursday 16 October 1980, the Council of Ministers held its weekly meeting in the Government Palace in the Casbah, under the chairmanship of Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister.

In the beginning of the session the Council brought up the severe trial which the brother Algerian people have been subjected to following the earthquake that struck the El Asnam region.

The prime minister presented a report on the recent visit to Algeria of Mme Wassila Bourguiba, who was sent by the Supreme Combatant, President Habib Bourguiba, at the head of a Tunisian delegation, to express personally to the Algerian leaders and people the feelings of affliction and solidarity on the part of the president, the government and the people of Tunisia following the tragedy that has struck a portion of the territory of a brother country.

President Chadli Bendjedid hastened to emphasize to the wife of the Supreme Combatant how much he appreciated the prompt and spontaneous solidarity manifested by Tunisia toward Algeria and made concrete by the telephone message that President Habib Bourguiba was the first chief of state to put through.

For his part, the minister of Public Health reported on the visit he has just made to Algeria on this occasion. He recalled that less than 24 hours after the disaster Algeria showed its support for Algeria by putting at its disposal three medical teams, which went into action as soon as they arrived in the disaster-stricken areas. Tunisia also sent sanitary equipment and medications, to help our Algerian brothers cope with the situation.

The prime minister expressed the Council's satisfaction with the burst of solidarity shown by Tunisian organizations at the official and popular levels, thus conferring a national character on our fraternal support of Algeria. In particular he brought out the efforts of medical and paramedical personnel, both civilian and military, of officials of the Public Health Ministry and Civil Defense, the Organization of the National Social Solidarity Committee and the Tunisian Red Cross.

The prime minister announced that the Supreme Combatant has decided to submit to Algeria a proposal to make available to it Tunisian teams of engineers and architects to take part in studies on reconstructing the city of El Asnam.

The Council then examined what steps have been taken in preparation for the next UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor]. It expressed its pleasure at the recent creation of the National Commission in charge of preparing the sessions and expressed the hope that it would result in the congress of the Labor Union Group being held in a free, democratic and healthy climate, which would be likely to enable the UGTT to fully play its role as a social partner contributing to the strengthening of the country's social and economic development.

In that connection the prime minister stressed the need to give the commission all the help it needs, to enable it to assume its mission under better conditions, within the policy of dialog established between the government and the various social partners.

The Council also decided to form an interministerial committee, to be charged with studying the situation of the agents and workers from the public and private sectors, who lost their employment shortly after the events of January 1978, with a view to their re-entering the work force.

The ministerial delegate to the prime minister in charge of civil service and administrative reform presented a report in which he took stock of the actions conducted in the Administrative Reform, especially those having to do with defining assignments before they are permanently delegated to the regional administrations, with the goal of bringing the administration closer to the citizens, and enabling the regional services to accomplish their administrative, financial and technical tasks efficiently and easily. At the end of the report the ministers of Agriculture, Equipment and Housing, of Public Health and of National Education presented a group of regulatory texts on delegation of assignments in their departments, for the benefit of their regional boards.

The prime minister reaffirmed the chief of state's concern for assuring the success of Administrative Reform by decentralization, trimming formalities and simplifying the administrative channels. However, the decentralizing action is to be conducted in rationally studied stages so as not to engender new burdens to strain the state's budget.

The prime minister conveyed to the Council the instructions of the Supreme Combatant concerning the need to appoint competent and enthusiastic staff members, an indispensable condition for the success of the decentralization, and to create effective control structures at the regional level.

The realization of decentralization is to develop eventually from continuing negotiation with the [words ommitted] possible.

Before closing its sessions the Council approved a number of legislative bills to be submitted to the National Assembly. These texts concern:

Ratification of the financial cooperation agreement concluded between the Tunisian government and the FRG.

Ratification of the loan agreement concluded between the World Bank and the National Bank of Tunisia relative to financing agricultural credit.

Ratification of the bill authorizing the state to participate in the Arab Fund for the Activities and Institutions of Youth and Sports.

8946
CSO: 4400

UGTT'S SUBORDINATION TO NATION'S INTERESTS DISCUSSED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 13 Oct 80 p 31

[Article by Shlh Sghiri: "The Fatherland Above any Other Consideration"]

[Text] So in spite of everything, finally reason and the nation's higher interests prevail. Progressing in the direction of responsibility, the UGTT's [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] crisis seems today, after regrettable vicissitudes, to be experiencing a devotion which will not fail to strengthen the ranks and cement the general cohesiveness. Emanating from the National Labor Union Commission, which was created on 3 October 1980, the communique published last week set the tone for all the means currently in place for resolving--within the framework of the democratic institutions--the crisis of that organization created by the late Farhat Hached which, having arrived at its true purpose, "is the extension of the genuine union movement launched by Mohamed Ali El Hammi." A purpose that must above any other consideration call for "heroism, militantism and the spirit of sacrifice." A mission and values that today more than ever must prevail at all levels. The state having made all the adequate provisions likely to make confidence reign and do away with misunderstandings. Liberation of all union members and the decision to accept as valuable interlocutors genuine representatives, freely elected, of the laboring classes: two great gestures of appeasement from which every Tunisian now expects the best fallout. It is incumbent upon true militants to translate into deeds any bypassed personal problem, any vague impulse killed off--sectarian or refractory. For the good of a people to whom and for whose cause the best of its children, in the decisive hour, gave the best of themselves.

The makeup of the National Labor Union Commission augurs well. The very fact of its having been put in place is an important step taken, apart from any membership. Provided it serves and acts solely and exclusively in such a way as to "unify the ranks of the workers" and "eliminate all the after-effects of the crisis" and finally--and this is basic--"preserve and strengthen the assets of the laboring masses insofar as those assets constitute a motive of pride for the whole Tunisian people." The Tunisian people: a transcendental idea to be cultivated, protected and defended independently of anything else, of all the remainder, which arises out of economic conditions. Although the basic reason for forming the National Labor Union Commission is still the preparation for the extraordinary congress, it is also incumbent upon it, as the declaration says, "to restore confidence and peace of mind for all workers and take all legal measures to revive the union and social climate." An exhilarating historic role that could not be accommodated to any objectives other than those commanded by objectivity and attachment to collective aspirations. One could not emphasize enough the foundations of this heavy task except by recalling

the basic principles of unionism in Tunisia, as they were desired by Bourguiba and Hached.

In this decisive phase in the history of union organization, the principles must prevail today. To justify and inspire all acts, all decisions and choices. In other words, it is important above all to go beyond "marginal conflicts," for "time is precious and it is important to begin to heal the wounds, to envision the future and put the interest of the UGTT and the fatherland above every other consideration." A single interest that rules out any partial calculation or maneuver that might imperil the work of development on which Tunisia, everyone included, has decided to center all its potentialities. In this chorus of harmony the UGTT must, today and tomorrow, see to it that its primary objectives coincide in the best symbiosis, in the combination of efforts, well-considered and sincere timeliness, pragmatism. First and above all for the promotion of the Tunisian, the reign of social peace in equity and equilibrium, such as defined by our institutions. Correctly, Legally. Democratically. For the sole good of Tunisia.

8946
CSO: 4400

MEASURES TO INCREASE CROP PRODUCTION REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 15 Oct 80 p 5

[Article: "Easy Terms for Acquisition of Agricultural Equipment Directly From the Supplier"]

[Text] Mohamed Ghedira, a member of the Political Bureau and president of the National Farmers Union (UNA), yesterday chaired a meeting which included the members of the National Unskilled Workers Federations and the presidents of the regional factories.

During the meeting Mr Ghedira announced that the government has taken a series of measures to increase large crop production.

He stated that improvement of production depends on better development of the land, indicating that the many measures taken are aimed at helping the farmer observe the deadlines required for judicious exploitation of the land.

The UNA president urged regional and local leaders to explain the new measures to the farmers, to enable them to take advantage of the means available to them. All the measures have been included in a circular which has been sent to all of the regional structures. The measures are aimed at enabling the farmers to acquire their equipment directly by benefiting from easy terms in addition to the possibilities presently offered to them by the availability of banking credits.

They also offer farmers the opportunity to receive credits for maintenance of their equipment.

All of these new provisions are concerned with agricultural and fishing equipment.

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END

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BRIEFS

UAE-KUWAIT CUSTOMS AGREEMENT--The UAE-Kuwait joint committee has approved customs duty exemptions for indigenous agricultural livestock, natural resources and industrial products of both countries, at its meeting held here today. The two sides agreed that such products should be accompanied by a certificate of origin endorsed by the respective country's Ministry of Commerce. The certificate of origin endorsed by the respective country's Ministry of Commerce. The certificate of origin should testify to the effect that local raw materials constitute not less than 40 per cent of the manufactured products or components. The agreement will be effective on the date of its ratification by the concerned authorities in both countries. The Ministry of Economy and Commerce will report on the result of the joint committee's discussion to the Council of Minister for approval. The UAE-Kuwait joint committee holds half-yearly meetings in Abu Dhabi and Kuwait alternatively. Today's meeting was attended on the UAE side by Mohamed Jassim Al Muzki, director of foreign trade department in the Economy and Commerce Ministry and a number of officials from Foreign Ministry and the Abu Dhabi Customs Department. On the Kuwait side director of foreign trade department in the Commerce Ministry Badr Abdul Latif, Abdul Raheem and a number of Foreign and Communications Ministry officials participated. [Text] [Abu-Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in Eng 27 Oct 80 p 3]

CSO: 4820

SAUDI ARABIA MAKES CONTRIBUTION TO ISLAMIC BROADCASTING SYSTEM

Mecca MUSLIM WORLD NEWS in Arabic 6 Oct 80 p 6

/Article: "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Contributes $4 Million to Islamic Countries' Broadcasting Organization"/

/Text/ The Islamic Countries' Broadcasting Organization has expressed thanks and gratitude to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for the material and moral support it has presented and is presenting to the organization. Its contributions to the organization so far total $4 million; in addition, it has paid the rent on its headquarters for 5 years. This was stated in a resolution adopted by the organization's general assembly at the meeting held a week ago in Tripoli.

Urging Member Countries To Pay Their Shares

The assembly urged member states to take the initiative to pay the shares they owe the organization's budgets and fulfil their commitments in order to enable the organization to perform its mission. It also urged them to supply the secretariat general of the organization with Islamic radio and television programs in Arabic, English, French and some languages used in Islamic countries, as well as urging member countries to communicate the names of these countries' Program Committee representatives to the secretariat general so that it will be feasible periodically to organize these committees' meetings to set forth plans and make coordination in the realm of producing programs which will guarantee attainment of the organization's goals. The society also urged the member states and agencies concerned to buy this product at encouragement prices in order to support the resources and capabilities of the organization.

Zionism Is the Prime Enemy

The organization's general public assembly resolved to consider the racist imperialist Zionist attack the prime, most important danger to the Islamic nation and to give priority to confronting it through the media and exposing and condemning its practices. The society also agreed to give the Palestine cause maximum importance in program production in order to guarantee that the aggression of judaization to which Palestine, in particular the holy cities of Jerusalem and Hebron, are being exposed is confronted.

In addition, more importance will be given to confronting the danger of the Zionist invasion of Arab Moslem Egypt, and member countries will be requested to

strive to prepare programs directed to Egypt to repel this invasion and the practices of the ruling Egyptian regime.

Moslem Causes

The general public assembly of the Islamic Countries' Broadcast Organization also resolved that the organization's secretariat general should follow up on its activity of publicizing and presenting the causes of Moslems. It appealed to the ministries of information in Islamic countries to emulate their corresponding body in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in making use of the book al-Quds and the documentation of its broadcasting activities subsequently issued by the organization, and it appealed to the secretariat general to follow up on studying and investigating establishing a radio program in the organization's name in cooperation with the member states. It called upon the news agencies of the member countries, and Islamic international news agencies in particular, to offer news service which is consonant with the requirements of these programs when they appear.

Islamic Media Activity

In the realm of Islamic media activity strategy, the society resolved to agree to depict the secretariat general and present the subject after enriching the special committee formed to discuss and prepare the project in its final form with experts chosen for their personal character by the Islamic countries, in cooperation with the ministries and agencies concerned, turning the project in its final form over to the secretariat general of the Islamic Conference Organization so that it may determine its opinion, and the program may be ready for presentation to the council of information ministers in the Islamic countries when it meets. The society also resolved to present the code of media honor which the secretariat general has prepared to the exceptional general assembly session which will meet in Jiddah in the second half of March 1981.

Thanks to the Kingdom's Television

The assembly requested the member states to appreciate the organization's efforts in the field of production of such radio programs as Jerusalem and Muhammad the Prophet of God, and to praise its efforts in producing a series of television programs, especially the series on the Just Imam 'Umar ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz and the series "Martyrs' Mission." The society also resolved to send thanks to the kingdom's television network for its continuous cooperation with the organization and production of the program "'Id at-Fitr in the World." The organization also requested cooperation with the program production committee and the joint program production organization of the Gulf states and resolved to invite the secretariat general to participate in the second international competition for the memorization and recitation of the holy Koran and the first intellectual and scientific competition on issues of interest to Moslems, which will be organized on 17 January 1981.

An Exceptional Session

The general assembly also resolved to hold an exceptional general assembly session in 6 months to review the necessary modifications to the agreement on the organization's basic charter. It urged member countries to take care to participate in the exceptional session in order to guarantee that the necessary legal quorum will

be filled and the necessary modifications will be carried out. It also resolved to appoint to the executive council for the coming period, with a tenure of 3 years /representatives/ from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Libyan Arab Socialist People's Jamahiriyah, the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Iraq, the People's Revolutionary Republic of Guinea, the state of Kuwait, Palestine, the Republic of the Maldives, the Republic of Mali and his excellence the secretary general of the Islamic Conference Organization or his representative.

The Next Ordinary Session

In addition to approving the organization's budget and final accounts, the general assembly also agreed to respond to the invitation sent it by the chairman of the delegation of Kuwait, proposing that the next ordinary session of the general assembly be the guest of the state of Kuwait, in the second half of September 1981, provided that the general assembly meetings be preceded by an executive council meeting. The assembly expressed its thanks to the state of Kuwait and the chairman of its delegation to the committee for this invitation.

11887
CSO: 4802

ARIANA AIRLINES FLIES PILGRIMS TO JIDDAH

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Oct 80 p 4

[Text]

KABUL, Oct. 14. (Bakhtar).— The last flight of Ariana Afghan Airlines, carrying the Afghan pilgrims, left Kabul for Jedda yesterday. The airlifting of Afghan pilgrims to Jedda had begun on 23 September and in twenty three DC—10 and Boeing 707 flights a total of 4.123 pligrims have been transfered from Kabul to Jedda for Haj pilgrimage.

Some 8,000 pilgrims were scheduled to go from Afghanistan to Saudi Arabia this year, 6,000 by air and another 2,000 by surface transportation.

But, unfortunately due to unfavourable conditions this year the Afghans could not go to Saudi Arabia by over land transportation.

A source of Islamic Affairs Department of the Prime Ministry said as the DRA government has profound respect to the sacred religion of Islam, this year an allocation was set for 8,000 people to go to Holy Mecca, 6,000 by air and another 2,000 via surface transport.

Those who had applied to go to Holy Mecca by air transport, from Kabul and other provinces have all been tranported to Jedda by Ariana Afghan Airlines flights. Similarly, 750 Afghans who had applied originally to go to Holy Mecca through overland transportation were able to do so by travelling by air after paying the difference of the air and surface transportation rates. Thus, a total of 4,123 pilgrims have gone to Holy Mecca this year for Haj pilgrimige.

Some 200 people who could not go to Holy Mecca via overland transportation were reimbursed.

CSO: 4906

LARGE-SCALE COOPERATION PLANNED WITH BULGARIA

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 12 Oct 80 p 3

[Text]

Fazl Rahim Momand the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms has recently returned home after attending the session of the joint commission for economic, scientific and technical cooperation held in Sofia the capital of the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

The Anis daily reporter has made an interview with the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms on his visit to Sofia which is published below:

For the purpose of further encouragement and strengthening of economic, scientific and technical cooperations between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the People's Republic of Bulgaria an agreement was signed between the respective authorities of DRA and People's Republic of Bulgaria on August 12 this year.

Under this agreement the joint commission for economic, scientific and technical cooperation of the two countries is commissioned to meet every year in one of the capitals of the two countries. The joint commission is composed of representatives of the government of both countries. The head of each of the two sides is supposed to be a minister. Each of the two delegates is composed of a chairman, deputy chairman, secretary and few members.

Pointing out the above Fazl Rahim Momand the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms of the Democratic Republic of Afghaghanistan and head of the Afghan delegation to the above session while throwing light on the agenda of the sessions of the joint commission for economic, scientific and technical cooperation held in Sofia said:

The following agenda was approved by the two sides of the joint commission:

Assessment of the procedure to implement the credit agreement signed in Varna, Bulgaria, on August 12, 1980.

—Determining the list of the production units provided by the said credit agreement.

—Discerning and specifying the conditions for designing purposes and the collection of reports by each unit envisaged in the agreement.

—Focusing on subjects pertaining to handling of banking technical affairs of the above mentioned credit agreement.

—Method of control over implementation of the decisions taken about the common projects.

—Evaluation of the commercial relations between the two countries.

—Holding talks on the general terms of the agreement, and sending Bulgarian experts to Afghanistan.

—Other matters and questions which are related to the mutual cooperation between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

Elaborating on the credit provided to DRA government by the government

of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and supply of Bulgarian grants to Afghanistan the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms in answer to a question said:

The government of People's Republic of Bulgaria has provided a total sum of 30 million levs credit, equivalent to 35 million US dollars, to the government of DRA. Likewise it has given one million lives as grant-in-aid to Afghanistan. If the loans provided by the Bulgarian government are spent effective greater possibility would exist to provide further grant-in-aid to our country.

Asked what projects have been agreed upon by the joint commission for economic, scientific and technical cooperation to be financed under the Bulgarian credit the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms said that the following projects were going to be financed:

1—The construction project of Herat Tannery Plant.

2—The re-construction and expansion project of the fruit and vegetables processing plant of Kandahar.

3—Construction project of brick-making plant with a capacity of 50 million bricks per year in Kabul.

4—Juice making plant project.

5—Diary and poultry project.

6—Establishment of two fish production farms in Baghlan and Balkh provinces.

The following joint projects, he added, are also agreed upon to be financed by the Bulgarian credit:

1—Leather and posteen processing project.

2—A joint project for establishment of cotton and other plants production factories in Baghlan, Kunduz and Takhar.

Asked whether there were other projects under study the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms said:

In the meeting of the joint cooperation commission the establishment of international transport highways between the two countries was discussed. The question has referred to the Ministry of Transport and Tourism and it is up to it to make the final decision.

The establishment of animal food processing plant was also discussed and it is expected that after a feasibility study decision will be taken on it.

The reconstruction and expansion project of Bagrami poultry farm are under study by the experts, he added.

Pointing to the despatch of Bulgarian experts to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the decision taken by the joint cooperation commission the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms said: a draft agreement has been prepared in this connection and it is going to be studied by the respective authorities of the two countries.

Under this draft agreement it is envisaged that a good number of Bulgarian experts will come to Afghanistan and start working in different plants and technical establishments of Afghanistan under easy and favourable terms.

Regarding the trade relations between the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and the People's Republic of Bulgaria Fazl Rahim Momand said:

According to the information available the balance of trade between Afghanistan and Bulgaria is not favourable and there is a defecit on our side. In another words our imports from Bulgaria are much greater than our exports to that country. Therefore it was decided that the Bulgarian side should balance its volume of trade with us and Bulgaria should take action to import from Afghanistan the goods such as skin, carpet, precious stones, handicrafts and the like.

Likewise it was agreed that the two sides should cooperate in introducing the commercial goods of each other in the exhibitions, commercial fairs and other campaigns launched for promotion of trade. Similarly they will be going to hold exhibitions in one another's country and display their commercial goods.

At the end of the talks held between the two sides it was agreed that the two countries should make all efforts to encourage, expand and strengthen their cooperations and make

trade promotion between the two countries an inseparable part of their friendly relation and cooperation.

The Minister of Agriculture and Land Reforms of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan added: the talks were held in an atmosphere of friendship, sincerity and optimism and strong hope for fruitful cooperations in the future between the two friendly countries.

To facilitate the work of the Joint Commission for economic scientific and technical cooperation three working groups were set up by the joint cooperation commission. These groups reached all agreement in their talks on the matters concerned and thus prepared the first protocol of the session to be signed by both sides.

At the end of his interview the Minister of Agriculture and Land Reform while talking of the attitude of the people, party and government of Bulgaria towards the members of the delegation said:

The Afghan delegation during its stay in Bulgaria visited various industrial and agricultural institutions which were concerned with the projects envisaged in the Bulgarian credit agreement.

In its visits various cities and industrial and agricultural institutions the DRA delegation was met with sincerity, and friendship. The DRA delegation clearly felt the warmth and solidarity of the people, party and members of the government of Bulgaria with the new phase of the Saur Revolution and Babrak Karmal General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, President of the Revolutionary Council and DRA Prime Minister, party, government and people of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Everywhere the delegation, the people, party and government of Bulgaria expressed warm sincerity and profound solidarity with the revolutionary Afghanistan. Their hospitality and sincerity are highly appreciated, he said.

We have brought along sweet and unforgetable and unprecedented memories from our Bulgarian friends, he added.

CSO: 4906

BRIEFS

DELEGATION TO SOVIET UNION--Kabul, Oct 15 (Bakhtar)--On the invitation of the USSR, a 140-member Afghan delegation, including DRA creative intelligentsia, left for that country yesterday afternoon for a friendly visit. The delegation consists of clergymen, writers, men of letters, poets, journalists and artists who during their stay will visit the republics of Tajikistan, Turkomanistan and Kerkhezestan. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 15 Oct 80 p 4]

CSO: 4906

AMERICAN WOMAN STILL BEING HELD PRISONER

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 18 Oct 80 p 2

[Text]

SOMEWHERE behind the walls of Tehran's Evin Prison, a middle-aged American woman sits in a cell "hopeful, patient," a lonely figure forgotten by many during recent developments.

"I am well, clean and eat well," she wrote recently in the first letter to her family in two months. She assured them she remains in strong spirits despite her ordeal.

Cynthai Dwyer, 49, is in detention-and Friday was her 166th day in captivity.

Last April 10, five months after the other Americans were taken hostage in Tehran, the free-lance writer left her New York home to travel to the Iranian capital -- to write about the troubled country, her husband later explained.

On the night of May 5, Revolutionary Guardsmen took her from her Hilton Hotel room. Tehran newspapers said she was accused of being a Central Intelligence Agency agent. She dropped from sight.

In the months since,, the Swiss Embassy, representing U.S. interests in Iran, has appealed repeatedly for information about Mrs. Dwyer and for permission to visit her. The Iranians have confirmed she is being held, but otherwise have made no response and given no indication of any formal charges against her, says the U.S. State Department.

Her Husband, Dr. John Dwyer, chairman of the English Department at the State College in Buffalo, New York, met privately Tuesday with Secretary of State Edmund Muskie during Muskie's trip to Buffalo..

"I'd requested the visit with him," Dwyer told a reporter. But Muskie could report no progress. "He assured me they are doing everything they can. But I knew that."

The professor's voice was strained as he discussed his wife's plight.

Dwyer scoffs at the allegation his wife was a spy. Her sympathies for the Iranian revolutionary cause were well known within the academic community in Buffalo, he said, and she believed the U.S. news media presented a one-dimensional view of Iran -- that of the hostage crisis.

"She was more interested in the other story, away from the embassy, away from the angry crowds," Dwyer said.

Mrs. Dwyer, a former copy editor and occasional writer for the humanist magazine, planned to offer stories to Buffalo newspapers or other publications on her return. The Iranian National Guidance Ministry has acknowledged that she had proper press credentials.

Why then was this idealistic, graying mother of three arrested as a spy?

"Incredibly unfortunate timing," claims her husband. "She was there at the time of the rescue attempt. They wanted to get somebody and they got her."

After the failure of the U.S. commando attempt to rescue the hostages on April 24, Iran's revolutionaries went on a nationwide manhunt for what they believed were American agents linked to the operation. Many foreigners were apprehended, among them Cynthia Dwyer -- apparently the only American caught at that time.

Reports from Tehran said she was questioned for several days at an Army barracks before being moved to Evin.

Dwyer finally heard from her in late August. She said in a letter that she was "hopeful, patient" and in good condition. Swiss Embassy officials also received two letters from her, asking that they intervene on her behalf.

Her latest letter, received by her mother in early October again was just one page. "May be that's a requirement," Dwyer suggested.

He said she gave few specifics of her incarceration -- "a lot of it was personal" -- but did meticulously list her prison diet: "bread and butter, eggs, cheese, rice with chicken, lentils, yogurt, tea and fruit."

Dwyer said he detected no note of despondency, "and I don't think she's just putting on a brave front." But he said she plainly was writing the letters with the knowledge that they would be read by others before being mailed.

CSO: 4920

IRAQI POWS INTERVIEWED BY NEWSMAN

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 14 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN (Pars) – A group of Iraqi prisoners of war answered questions posed by a Pars reporter.

Even though hunted by fear of being betrayed by spies in the event of their eventual return to their homeland. Reports indicate that the Iraqi prisoners of war have been totally takea aback by the modesty and the humanitarian behavior shown to them by the Iranian authorities.

Pars reports commented Sunday that the agents of the Ba'athist regime of Iraq who had been constantly brainwashed by the Ba'athist regime never anticipated such behavior from the Iranians.

The Iraqi prisoners of war who are being kept in a camp in Tehran include soldiers, commissioned as well as non-commissioned officers, and a small number of civilians. The following is the text of the interview which was held with them Sunday.

Q. How were you sent on the war mission against Iran and how did the Ba'athist government justify this aggression for you?

A. (All) The present regime in Iraq had told us that Iran had intended to usurp parts of our lands, and since we are soldiers and employed by the Armed Forces we could not but obey the orders of our superiors. One of the captives: I am married and have four children. If I had not fulfilled their order for a mission here the Ba'athist regime would harass my family.

Q. What do you think about the involvement of the superpowers and the Imperialists in Iraq's war against Iran?

A. (Some captives): Certainly this war was started at the instigation of the Zionists and the Imperialists, for only those people can benefit from this war. They want to set neighbors against one another so that they may thereby reach their own objectives.

Q. Do you recognize the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran as being genuinely 'Islamic' and if you did so how could you bring yourselves to accept being involved in this fratricide?

A. (All): Yes, we consider the Islamic Republic of Iran as having a thoroughly Islamic government but they had told us that Iran intended to transgress our rights along the border lines. But we were Army Personnel and were forced to comply with their orders.

Q. Which do you think is in the right. Iran or the government in Iraq?

A. (Long pause) Then two of them answer: We are unable to say who is in the right in this concern. We do not have the necessary knowledge. The years of repression in Iraq has made it impossible for us to gain any insight into such things.

Q. Once you have gained the necessary insight into the issue and once it is proved to you that Iran is in the right would you then be willing to become active against Saddam Hussein and his agents?

A. (All): We are Moslems and as such once we have determined what is just, we will then support the ones who are just, and in so doing we will fulfill any task which we consider as being expedient.

Q. How have you found the morale of the Iranian soldiers as opposed to that of the forces of Ba'athist regime of Iraq?

A. (Some): What distinguishes your troops from us is that the Iranian Forces proceed to the battle fields with their trust in God and taking power from their off repeated slogan of "Allah-o-Akbar" (God is most Great), while the Iraqi troops have only been dragged to the battle-fields under compulsion.

Q. How much damage has been inflicted on the military installations of Iraq and how long do you think the Iraqi government could afford to continue with the war?

A. (One of the captive): Military and economic damages to the contesting parties are inevitable in war. I do not know exactly how much damages Iraq has incurred as a result of the war but I suspect it would take some five to six years before she can make good the damages.

Q. What do you know about liberation movement in Iraq?

A. The situation in Iraq is such that it makes it impossible for us to obtain any knowledge about existence of activities of such movements. We do not have any significant information about that.

Q. How have you found the behavior of the Iranian prison officials towards you?

A. We feel comfortable here. They give us anything we want. We have been outrightly surprised by such behavior on the part of our captors. For this reason we owe the Iranian Moslems, the Iranian Armed Forces and especially the person of Imam Khomeini our gratitude. . (One of the captives): When they captured us in the Western war fronts the personnel of the Armed Forces of Iran gave us their own food and lodging and received us as they would receive guests. Their behavior here is equally nice and humane.

Q. There are reports about the inhumane conduct of the agents of the Iraqi government towards the Iranian prisoners of war in that country. We also understand that many of the Iranian prisoners have been tortured in Iraq. What do you expect Iran should do to you in the event the agents of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq should continue racking the Iranian prisoners of war, or if they should martyr them?

A. (Some pause and then answered one of the captives): Since we recognize the Iranian regime as being Islamic in that case we will expect our captors to continue their present Islamic behavior towards us.

Q. It is surprising for the Iranian to hear from you in this side of the border that you recognize the Iranian government as being Islamic while as long as you were at the other side of the border you did not seem to be caring about Islam and "Islamic behavior." (No answer).

CSO: 4920

DEMOLITION OF HISTORIC MONUMENTS, BUILDINGS

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 15 Sep 80 pp 11, 12

[Text] In an article in LE MONDE about the demolition of historic monuments and buildings in Iran, Frederic Ullman writes, "The Iranian revolution is no exception from the general run of world revolutions in that it, too, indulges in extremisms to the point of stupidity. Executions take place as a daily routine, and like the French revolutionaries who wisely beheaded the statues, or like the Chinese extremists of the Chinese cultural revolution, in Iran historical monuments and buildings are facing a similar fate with the same degree of irrationality."

Beyond the reports heard and stories read in the Iranian press, a preliminary record and situation appraisals can be synthetized. While, reportedly, due to British mediation the tomb of Cyrus whose underground museum had been mistaken for SAVAK's torture chamber, was saved from destruction in February 1979, ironically the Mirza Ja'far and Kheyrat Khan theological schools in Mashhad, both of which are inviolable historic monuments dating back to the 17th century, were razed by bulldozers. The representative of Imam Khomeyni who called them "a heap of ruined plaster and bricks," talked of his plans to have a completely modern Islamic university in their place.

In an archeological seminar held in June the participants learned that over the past year more than 40 classified ancient monuments and relics had been demolished by bulldozers or dynamite. Such was the fate of Khosrow Agha Bathhouse (17th century), the Friday Mosque in the city of Malayer (16th century), Zavareh Mosque (12th century) and the Government Arch in Kashan where Shah Abbas II was crowned in 1642. The Neshat House in Esfahan, a distinctive specimen of the buildings belonging to the 19th century Iranian nobility, and other buildings and monuments have met a similar fate. Thus it seems that the buildings and monuments dating back to the era of the Safavids (1501-1736), who institutionalized Shiism as the official religion of Iran, including the mosques built during this epoch, are seriously threatened. Finally, according to unconfirmed reports, religion has found its way into the Forty-Column Palace again. In actuality, this palace has only 20 columns, while the other 20 are mere reflections in the water. The irreligious murals which had once been obscured and then restored after 10 years of hard work by a team of Italians, has again been obfuscated piously. Of course the destruction of the traces of the dethroned monarchy with all the destruction wrought in the process of the application of this ostensible method is a source of smaller wonder.

Along with such barbaric acts, we receive reports of clandestine excavations for archeological relics across the country and of an increased number of cases of theft. For instance, in October 1979 the illicit sale in the Majles [sic] of two objects d'arts, one of which had been taken from a museum, was prevented in the last minute. Briefly speaking, the gaucheness which is understandable at times of crisis may inexcusably destroy part of the artistic treasures of Iran. For instance, the Friday Mosque which is a monument well-known the world over is threatened with collapse because the grounds around it have been excavated and not filled again.

The deposed Shah, who earlier had not paid so much attention to Iran's artistic wealth (priority was given to the modernization of the country at the time), later on in his reign created certain administrative machinery for protecting and preserving Iran's cultural heritage. It was in this context that Iran signed the UNESCO's National Treasures Agreement. Apparently the new government in Iran has not rescinded this agreement because in 1979 three historical monuments in Iran (Persepolis, Shah Square, Chogha Zanbil) were listed among world treasures. Don't these actions [demolitions] in Iran denote the ineffectiveness of this agreement.

(NAME-YE RUZ: In addition to the reports about the demolition of the historical monuments of Iran, numerous other reports have also been making the rounds in recent months to the effect that Iranian objects d'arts have been sold at preposterously low prices at auctions and private sales. Of course these reports are about historical and artistic objects and relics, not simply about the cheap and gaudy antiques that the nouveaux-riche of the previous regime had bought in the Paris Flea Market and stacked their mansions with them as their idea of decoration and poshness. These items were bought by the upstarts of the new regime when the properties and belongings of their predecessors were confiscated. Among the items categorized as national wealth which were stolen and sold mention can be made of Qajar paintings, antique carpets, and unearthed relics lifted from museums. These have mostly been sold in England and Switzerland.)

9695
CSO: 4906

HAMMADI VIEWS SUPERPOWER ACTIONS IN GULF WAR

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 20-26 Oct 80 pp 44-49

[Interview with Saadoun Hammadi, foreign minister of Iraq by MONDAY MORNING, date and place not given]

[Excerpts]

The foreign minister of Iraq, Saadoun Hammadi, told *Monday Morning* last week that the possibility of a superpower confrontation developing out of the Iraqi-Iranian war still exists, but it has been reduced since the battles started.

"Theoretically," he said, "that possibility exists at all times, especially when there is conflict in a sensitive region," he said in a long-distance telephone interview. "But I do not believe there is a big possibility of such a confrontation developing in the present situation. International tension was high at the beginning of the war, but I notice that it has decreased since then. The international situation is less tense now than it was at the beginning of the war."

A translation of the full interview, which was conducted in Arabic, follows:

Does Iraq have any cease-fire conditions?

Iraq has made no conditions for a cease-fire. Iraq has demands. Those demands are the return of its full rights to its territory, full sovereignty over the Shatt el-Arab, and total noninterference in the internal affairs of Iraq and the affairs of the other Arab countries. These demands constitute recognition of Iraq's legitimate, internationally accepted rights. These are not conditions; they are rightful and just demands.

Iraq has expressed its readiness to cease fire and enter into negotiations toward a comprehensive solution of all the problems pending between Iran and Iraq and between Iran and the other Arab countries.

What is your reaction to Iran's demand that Iraqi forces withdraw from the undisputed Iranian territory?

Had Iran's intentions been good, we would not have reached this stage.

Iraq had warned Iran and demanded, in a formal memorandum, that it withdraw from the territories which it was illegally occupying. Iran did not respond to that memorandum, which forced Iraq to take back its territory by force, proclaim its total sovereignty over the Shatt el-Arab and unilaterally annul the 1975 treaty — the treaty which Iran had already annulled in word and deed.

After that, Iraq submitted an official memorandum to Iran requesting an understanding on the basis of current realities, to settle all problems by peaceful means. Iran did not respond to that memorandum. Instead, it escalated the war, closing the Shatt el-Arab, closing its air space and shelling the Iraqi borders with heavy artillery from all directions, thus widening the scope of the war.

This compelled the Iraqi forces to enter Iranian territory — to protect Iraqi territory and to gain Iranian recognition of Iraq's right to Iraqi land and waters.

Had Iran wanted to reach an understanding in all good faith, it would have done so before we reached this stage. Making that demand now that the war has reached this stage does not indicate good intentions. The demand is only an attempt on Iran's part to salvage the situation.

Can it be said that the Iranian-Iraqi war has become a war of attrition? How do you visualize this war developing?

Every war entails sacrifices. No war can be waged without sacrifice. Iraq is determined to regain its right to its land and waters, to preserve its independence and to prevent any form of interference in its internal affairs, regardless of the sacrifices that must be made. Defense of land and independence dwarfs any sacrifice.

But I do not share the view of those who believe that this is a war of months or years. I don't expect this war to last that long. We know what Iran has and we know the extent of its ability to resist. This war may take some time, but not as much time as some imagine.

The war appears to have resulted in increased American military presence in the Gulf. Do you think this is a prelude to direct American military intervention in the war? Or do you think it will establish U.S. military presence in the Gulf area, even after the war ends?

We said some time ago that Iran's behavior on the international level was bound to be used by the world's major forces as a pretext for interference in the region's affairs. We warned that the United States would use the affair of the American hostages in Iran as a screen to cover the return of its military and political influence to the region. We have been warning about this since the first Islamic Conference in Islamabad.

The behavior of Iran during this war is a further indication that Iran would not be averse to an increase in American influence in the region. Iran's irresponsible threats to close international waterways, its irresponsible threats to mine the Arabian Gulf and the straits, and the threats it is directing at the other Arab countries in the Arabian Gulf — all these are likely to encourage the U.S. to increase its presence in the region.

At any rate, our position on this matter is known, and it can be summarized as follows: The best thing that the superpowers can do for our region is to stay out of the Gulf war. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union have committed themselves to staying out of the conflict — on the official level, at least. We will continue

to observe the situation. We are against intervention by any superpower, and we are against any superpower increasing its influence or military presence in the region. If there is an increase in U.S. military presence in the region, no one will be to blame but Iran, its behavior and its threats, which are most likely calculated to invite U.S. military presence in the area.

How do you evaluate the Soviet attitude toward the Iraqi-Iranian war? Do you see any connection between this war and the signing of the Syrian-Soviet friendship treaty at this time?

The Soviet Union's position, as I told you, is one of neutrality, as the Soviet Union has repeatedly announced. As far as we know, and judging by the assurances we have received from them, the Soviets are remaining neutral. We have no strong or irrefutable evidence to the contrary.

Where the treaty with Syria is concerned, I see no connection between it and the war. This project was not born in this period; it is a project which has been under discussion by the two sides for a long time, apparently. I see no connection between the two subjects.

What are the implications of the treaty, in your view?

It is not the first treaty of its kind. Several other countries have treaties of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. India had one, Iraq has one and several other countries have such a treaty with the Soviet Union.

Do you expect the Iraqi-Iranian war to spread to other countries in the region — especially in view of the Saudis' public expression of support for Iraq and the reports about Jordanian military involvement in the war?

To begin with, Jordan has not entered the battle. That is absolutely untrue. Jordan supports Iraq's position, but it has not participated and it will not participate in the military operations undertaken by Iraq. This has been stated clearly in a communiqué by the Iraqi government.

As for the possibility of the war spreading, we have no desire to spread it and no intention of spreading it, as we have already announced. However, we cannot guarantee Iran's behavior on this matter. Everything depends on Iran's behavior. Iran may take action which would spread the war over a wider area. If it does so, it will naturally have to bear the consequences.

Do you think there is any possibility of the Gulf war leading to a superpower confrontation?

Theoretically, that possibility exists at all times, especially when there is conflict in a sensitive region. But I do not believe there is a big possibility of such a confrontation developing in the present situation. International tension was high at the beginning of the war, but I notice that it has decreased since then. The international situation is less tense now than it was at the beginning of the war.

There have been a number of attempts at mediation between Iraq and Iran, including the efforts of the Islamic Conference, the Security Council, the non-aligned nations and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Do you think any of those efforts can bear fruit in the future?

Those efforts failed because of Iran's intransigence, not because of Iraq's position.

However, I believe that, after some time, when the Iranian officials abandon their fantasies and realize that their military, economic and

political conditions are not at all good, the realities of the situation will impose new attitudes on them. The Iranian officials are bound to return to their senses, unless they want to destroy their country completely. When that happens (when they return to their senses), the (mediation) efforts will have a better chance of success.

Do you think the attacks on the oil installations of the two countries will lead to an international oil crisis? How would you assess Iraq's losses in terms of oil and oil installations so far?

The damage done to the Iraqi and Iranian oil installations is bound to have some effect on the international oil flow, of course. That cannot be avoided, since Iran and Iraq are among the biggest exporters of oil.

This does not mean, however, that the shortage will be enormous or that it cannot be compensated for. Iraq has announced its desire to cushion the impact of this crisis on the world's economy, and it has said that it will do everything in its power to that end, that it will consult with the other Arab countries toward exerting all possible efforts to minimize the shortage.

And in fact, there is no acute crisis in the international oil market now. Other Arab countries have been able to increase production, and we will take all the necessary measures to keep the reduction in our production down to the lowest possible level.

As for an assessment of the damage done to our oil installations, that would be difficult for me to make now. To begin with, I'm not in the country, and secondly, the war isn't over yet. The assessment of losses is a technical matter that I am in no position to go into.

However, the damage done to our installations is definitely less than the damage done to Iranian installations.

It is being said that neither Iraq nor Iran has enough arms and ammunition to keep this war going much longer. Do you agree?

No country in the world has an inexhaustible supply of arms and ammunition. Some countries are in a better position than others, but no country has the ability to keep a war going indefinitely. That goes without saying.

What I can tell you is that, in all respects, we are definitely in a better position than Iran.

If the war continues, do you think the Arab summit conference will be held in Amman on schedule next month?

So far, there has been no change in the date and venue of the conference. At any rate, everyone concerned, including ourselves, is now thinking about this matter. A final decision will be made in the light of developments. We don't know what will happen tomorrow. But until now, there has been no change in the time and the venue, and no one has suggested a postponement. The decision on this matter remains in effect: the conference will open on the previously determined date in the previously determined venue.

Do you consider that Iraq has received adequate support from the Arab world in this war?

On the popular level, I can state with total certainty that the Arab masses, wherever they are, support Iraq. On the official level, all Arab states, with the exception of Libya and Syria, support Iraq, although their expressions of support vary for various reasons.

Is this support adequate or inadequate? That is difficult to say. But Iraq, at any rate, has not asked anyone for material or military support, nor does it need such support. If anyone wishes to express his support in one way or another, he may do so — that depends on his feelings on the subject, his solidarity and his nationalist position. But Iraq has not requested and does not need military or material support.

Do you expect an increase in Arab support?

I believe that in time, the pressure of the Arab peoples will increase on those states whose expressions of support are still not loud enough. As for Arab states like Libya and Syria — I am certain that public opinion in Syria and Libya, which is a nationalist Arab public opinion, will eventually exert pressure on those countries' unnationalist positions...

What I would like to say is that we are all Arabs, and our sense of responsibility is not less than that of any other nation. When an Arab fights for Arab territory, in defense of the independence of Arab states, the issue is a nationalist one and not a political issue pitting one state against the other. These matters must be viewed from a nationalist angle. When an Arab fights a non-Arab in defense of Arab land, it is the duty of every Arab to stand by his brother, because this is a question of Arab territory and Arab sovereignty. That is all I would like to say.

How would you describe Iraq's current relations with the Iranian opposition, especially in the light of this week's reports about clashes between the Iranian forces and the Kurds?

We sympathize with the Iranian opposition and give it our moral support, but it is not true that Iraq's relations with the Iranian opposition go further than that.

As for what is happening in Iran as regards the Kurds or the other minorities, we view it as a natural development. The minorities in Iran had expected to be granted their nationalist rights after the fall of the Shah. But the new regime in Iran is a confessional one. By taking on a confessional nature, it has automatically gained the hostility of the religious minorities. It is also a bigoted racist regime which does not recognize the nationalist rights of the other minorities. These are the factors which have led to the escalation of conflict between the minorities and the new regime in Iran. The conflict was predictable.

We support autonomy for the minorities and have granted autonomy to the minorities in Iraq. Is it conceivable that we should grant autonomy in Iraq and stand against the principle of autonomy elsewhere? ●

CSO: 4820

VICTORY FOR BA'TH LOYALISTS IN KURDISH ELECTIONS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 29 Sep 80 pp 3, 4

[Text]

Last week's elections for the first Legislative Council of the autonomous region of Kurdistan returned a majority of officials considered close to the central government and leading local families. Some 701,000 voters chose 50 deputies out of a total of 194 candidates. The candidates, were not, however, opposing each other, according to the director of the information committee set up for the elections. The Iraqi authorities undertook all of the electoral expenses of the candidates and provided transport for voters.

Observers find it difficult to analyse the results of the election, as traditional yardsticks such as political platforms and ideological positions were completely absent from the candidates' campaigns. The newly-elected deputies are either officials of popular organisations affiliated to the Baath Party or members of prominent Kurdish families like the Barazanis. It was Mustafa Barazani who had led the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Kurds' political and military umbrella during the two decades that finally led to the granting of Kurdish autonomy by the Iraqi authorities in 1974.

Neither of two women nor the religious dignitaries, both Muslim and Christian, who contested seats were elected. Most of the winners came from well-to-do occupational backgrounds such as engineering, law, teaching and farming.

The newly elected Council which will sit in the regional Kurdish capital of Irbil, will hold its first session in November under the chairmanship of the oldest member-elect. The 50 deputies, representing some 1.8 million inhabitants of autonomous Kurdistan, will launch their official three-year term with an oath "before God to protect the Republican system, serve the interest of the people, safeguard the independence, security and unity of the Iraqi Republic and be loyal to the principles of the July 17 and 30 revolution of 1980."

The decision to endow Iraq with a national parliament, which was elected last June (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, June 30), and to grant Kurdistan its own local assembly was taken last March by the Baath Party leadership. It said the move was intended to "build up democratic institutions and develop democratic participation."

CSO: 4820

ANNUAL DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENTS AVERAGE $3.3 BILLION

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 26 Sep 80 p 15

[Text] Development plan investments in Kuwait reached $16.609 billion during the period 1976 thru 1980, an average annual rate of $3.322 billion.

This is brought out in a study by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development concerning the development of human resources and manpower in the Arab region. A table of total development plan investments in the Arab countries shows that Kuwait is in third place. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is in first place, with average annual development investments of $23.391 billion. Total development plan investments in Saudi Arabia from 1975 thru 1980 amounted to $140.346 billion [an average of 28.069, not 23.391]. In second place is Iraq, whose average annual investments is $9 billion. However, if the level of investments is related to the population, Kuwait takes first place among all Arab nations.

The study states that a number of Arab countries, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the two Yemens, Oman, Libya, Somalia, Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria, designated portions of their development budgets to the study of manpower problems, some of them anticipating a surplus, others a shortage in their labor force. However, there are signs that some of the basic decisions related to development plans are taken without regard to all objectives and programs of these plans.

The study states that all development plans of the Arab states give clear priority to technical and professional training. Many of them set aside large appropriations for this purpose.

All this points to the need to launch training operations. At present, interest centers on individual country programs. However, there are common regional problems which require regional solutions. It has become necessary to organize large-scale regional training programs, to supplement the training activities of the individual countries.

The study calls for giving priority to the sectors of manufacturing, construction, agriculture, communications and government administration.

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BRIEFS

FIVE MORE AIRBUSES PURCHASED--The director general of Kuwait Airlines, Mr Ahmad Hamad al-Mashari, announced that the airline has concluded contracts for the purchase of 5 Airbus planes, in addition to the six already ordered. The Kuwait News Agency reports that the new contract with the French manufacturer of this type of aircraft was concluded on 24 September. Mr al-Mashari added that the airline will receive the new planes in 1983 and 1984. He explained that this step is aimed at replacing the airline's fleet of Boeing 707's, which he described as having a high operating cost with respect to fuel. The Airbus has room for approximately 210 passengers, and is a medium range aircraft. Al-Mashari announced that Kuwait Airlines received its first Boeing 727 on 26 September. It is expected that another 727 will be received in October, and a third in February 1981. This plan has the advantage of low operating cost, and has room for approximately 140 passengers. It is a medium range aircraft. The public relations department of the airline invited the media to a Boeing 727 flight in the skies of Kuwait tomorrow morning [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 30 Sep 80 p 15] 9605

NEW PETROLEUM INVESTMENT COMPANY--The official gazette has published a decree by the Amir of Kuwait authorizing the Kuwait Petroleum Agency, represented by the oil minister, to form a Kuwaiti stock company called the International Kuwait Company for Petroleum Investments. The company will have a capital of 100 million Kuwaiti dinars. The new company must be formed in accordance with the provisions of the commercial companies law and other laws in effect. This authorization does not bestow any concessions or privileges upon the new company, and does not place any responsibility on the government with regard to it. Following issuance of this decree, steps to form the company will begin, and the citizens will be invited to subscribe to its shares. Thirty million shares with a nominal value of 1 dinar per share will be offered. [Excerpts] [Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic 10 Sep 80 p 8] 9605

PANAMA BOND ISSUE--The Kuwaiti International Investment Company announced yesterday that it will join the (Yamaishi) Securities Company (Japanese) and the First Chicago Asia Merchant Bank, Ltd, in floating a $25 million dollar bond issue, the equivalent of approximately 6,650,000 Kuwaiti dinars, in behalf of the Republic of Panama. The bonds mature in 1990. The bonds are offered at 99.75, and carry a floating interest rate. The issue will be registered on the Singapore stock exchange. It is the first issue of its type to be marketed in East Asia markets. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 21 Sep 80 p 15] 9605

STOCKHOLM CITY BOND ISSUE--The Kuwait Investment Company stated yesterday that it is floating a 7 million dinar bond issue (approximately $26.025 million) in behalf

of the city of Stockholm, Sweden. The company said that the bonds, which will mature in 1990, will carry an interest rate of 9.75%. The bonds are rated as "excellent." [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 29 Sep 80 p 17] 9605

ILLEGAL WEAPONS CASE--Yesterday, the criminal court sentenced Ahmad, Suri and Hashim Bahraini and Fawzi Muhammad, who is still at large and whose address is unknown, to three years in prison with hard labor, and subsequent deportation. They had been charged with possession of firearms without a license. These were nine automatic and semi-automatic rapid fire rifles, eighteen pistols, and 137 rounds of ammunition. The three accused also participated with a fourth unknown person in the forgery of a Kuwaiti Auto Club (identification and credit guarantee?) document. [Excerpt] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 1 Oct 80 p 5] 9605

CSO: 4802

VARIOUS LEBANESE FRONT MEMBERS TRY TO EFFECT RECONCILIATION

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 11 Sep 80 p 3

/Article: "The Lebanese Front Will Soon Sign a Historic Document on the Situation"/

/Text/ The Lebanese Front has decided to hold a meeting which will be attended by the deputies of the Phalange and Liberal Parties, to be preceded by meetings held by representatives of the front, in order to set forth a "historic document" on the situation in Lebanon and the Lebanese Front's notions on the dangers the current stage is passing through.

The Lebanese Front held its periodic weekly meeting at the Mar Jirjis 'Ukar Monastery at 9300 hours in the morning yesterday. In it, current political and security developments were discussed in the light of the new occurrences which have taken place on the Lebanese stage.

Attending the meeting, which continued right up to 1100 hours, were President Camille Chamoun, Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, Dr Fu'ad Afram al-Bustani, Deputy Edouard Hanin, and Rev Tuma Muhanna, representative of the Lebanese Maronite monastic order.

Chamoun's Statement

After the meeting President Chamoun said, "The fact is that there is nothing important we can convey to you except that it was resolved to prepare and arrange for a meeting to be attended firstly by representatives of the groups composing the Lebanese Front, with Mr Hanin and Mr Bustani, to study the local and international conditions which Lebanon is passing through, provided that this meeting be followed by an expanded meeting to be attended by the deputies of the two parties, the Lebanese Phalange Party and the Liberal Nationalists' Party."

Full Reconciliation Is the Offspring of Union

Chamoun added, "This is on the one hand. On the other, I say to those persons who want to cast doubt on the permanent lasting relations between the two parties that we are not just in a state of total reconciliation on all subjects which concern Lebanese politics, we are also working hand in hand on behalf of the national interest and will continue to work on behalf of this interest."

Unification of the Lebanese Forces

Chamoun said, "There is also a plan to unify the Lebanese Forces; this plan is under serious study in every sense of the word. We ask God for success in every field of our activity."

The Libyan-Syrian Union

Chamoun was asked "There is a difference of opinion on the merger union between Libya and Syria regarding its negative or positive effect on Lebanese conditions. What is your view?" He answered,

"My opinion is that I will not have faith in that union before I think of its positive and negative effect as regards Lebanon. I do not believe that it will occur; if it does, it will just be theoretical and logical but not a plan which is foreordained to have life. This plan has been preceded by four unity or union plans and in their time we did not arrive at mergers; all these plans just remained ink on paper or died as soon as they were put in practice."

Chamoun went on, "Therefore let us wait a little while to ascertain what the destiny of this plan is and what its terms are, at which point it will be possible for us to answer your question on its effect on the situation in Lebanon."

/Question/ There is news to the effect that efforts will be made after the attainment of the merger union to consolidate friendly relations between the perseverance and steadfastness states and the Soviet Union, which will influence the situation in the region and expanded Soviet influence there.

/Answer/ First, who are the perseverance and steadfastness states? Since they arose, that is, since this notion arose, no planning or constitution occurred to determine these countries' relations with one another and this group has been notorious on some occasions for bloody disputes or bad relations among one another. Iraq is a perseverance and steadfastness state, and relations between the two countries are not as they should be. They Iraq and Syria are also perseverance and steadfastness states and we all remember the conspiracy Iraq asserted took place, which had as its target Saddam Husayn's regime, and the number of people who were executed after being accused of performing this conspiracy. The question now is, where are the perseverance and steadfastness states?

/Question/ What is your opinion on the information which says that Imam al-Sadr is still alive?

/Answer/ God willing al-Sadr is alive and God willing he will appear and return to his country.

al-Jumayyil's Statement

As for Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, he began his statement by saying, "As you know, the circumstances the country is passing through and the situation the whole world is living through, including Lebanon, demand that efforts and forces be concentrated on really confronting the gravity of these circumstances."

The chief of the Phalange said, "The Lebanese Front, out of its awareness of this delicate stage, discussed the dimensions of these grave conditions today and decided to call upon its forces to cooperate with experts and specialists in various areas to set out a document specifying the front's view on this stage and the future of Lebanon."

al-Jumayyil added, "This front, represents most of the Lebanese who are concerned only to save Lebanon and restore its security, stability and unity, and what is needed is a realistic definition of the crisis and planning in order to set forth solutions. There are responsibilities which must be borne in the near and distant futures."

The head of the Phalange said, "After the document is set forth by the experts, it will be approved because it will be a document for history."

The Merger Union

al-Jumayyil was asked about his comments on the merger union and its effect on the situation in Lebanon. He said, "First no union can take place between one country and another by compulsion. During our good relations with Syria in 1976 this issue was already discussed with President Hafiz al-Asad, when we told him that the entry of 35,000 Syrian soldiers into Lebanon was supported by Lebanese, Arab and international approval, out of faith on the part of us Lebanese that these two moral and material forces would help restore security, stability and tranquility to Lebanon. After subsequent meetings we pointed out that the situation remained the same, if it was not getting worse."

He went on, "I remember that day, without broadcasting a secret, that the Syrian president told me, 'You are still afraid of union between Syria and Lebanon, and I tell you that unity is our goal and we will work to achieve it, but that this union will not be through compulsion. We believe in a union which the people demand; our problems are many, and we will not add to them. We believe in Lebanon as a sovereign free independent country in every meaning of the word, and when the last Lebanese is persuaded to unite with Syria then we will think of it. Nor will we forget the history of Lebanon's struggle against the Ottoman Empire for 400 years, until you were able to achieve your independence.'"

al-Jumayyil went on, "I am stating President al-Asad's words, from the standpoint of Syria's interests before those of Lebanon, which are that one must protect the independence, sovereignty and style of life of Lebanon."

al-Jumayyil said, "Most Arab countries are subject to individual rule; the ruler can make decisions without referring to the chamber of deputies or a popular referendum. However, Lebanon is a democratic country dependent on democracy, freedom and its formula, which combines 18 factions, and it cannot make decisions without setting forth from these principles, which it believes in. Union will not occur through compulsion or through slogans. That happened in the past but we have seen what the result was."

The Gravity of the Current Situation

Regarding the gravity of the current situation in Lebanon and the south, al-Jumayyil said, "Before all else, we must start from within. We, as Lebanese, must agree among ourselves to determine what we want. The armistice which exists between the Arabs and Israel after many wars is respected by all parties today because every party realizes his interests, while Lebanon, whose condition has been badly affected, its authority weakened and its people fragmented, is dominated by the chaotic armed Palestinian presence, and we ourselves bear the actions and reactions without having the power to put a stop to the dangers surrounding us. By the way, I say that if we are all Arabs and members of the Arab League, and there are Palestinians among us why isn't a united strategy put forth? Either a war strategy for which all Arabs will bear the responsibility or an armistice strategy which all Arabs will welcome?"

al-Jumayyil said, "For us alone to continue to bear the sufferings of war against the Arabs is not condoned by international law, custom, or relations of brotherhood and friendship. For what sake is the war in the south? Haven't its only results been the destruction of the south and the exiling of its people? What have the Arabs benefited from it?"

On the events which are taking place between the Palestinians and Amal in Ba'labakk and the southern suburbs, the chief of the Phalange said, "That is part of a war of destruction and terror which the major countries are directly or indirectly aiming at by means of the smaller countries."

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NATION SETS UP NEW BASES FOR TRADE WITH EASTERN BLOC

Nicosia AL-'ASR in Arabic 19 Sep 80 p 20

/Article: "After Eastern European Countries Requested Abrogation of the Clearing Agreement, Lebanon Set forth a Draft Concerning Commercial Agreements"/

/Text/ The trade and payments ("clearing") agreements concluded between Lebanon and five socialist countries are in the process of disappearing.

Of the five countries only two, Poland and Rumania, still adhere to the clearing agreements; after the Soviet Union and East Germany, Czechoslovakia recently "liberated itself" and a free trade exchange agreement was signed with it at the end of last August.

The turn of Poland and Rumania is coming soon.

The clearing agreements were the greatest commercial fraud with respect to Lebanon, which did not once benefit from the subsections of the agreements, that explicitly stipulate the principle of equality in trade.

The trade balance with the five European socialist countries did not register a surplus on Lebanon's behalf one year, because it was clear that dealing with countries with guided economies, such as the Eastern European ones, cannot guarantee even relative equality. While a Lebanese merchant is free to import what he wants from these countries, he is not free to export what he wants to them, since exports to these countries are subject to a general plan drawn up by their governments or specialized institutions operating under guidance from the governments.

Nonetheless, instead of Lebanon requesting the abrogation of these agreements, the five countries have determined to demand the conclusion of new agreements on the basis of free trade and abrogation of the clearing agreements.

Sources in the Ministry of Economy and Trade attribute the reasons for the Eastern European countries' disinclination to continue with these agreements to the following causes and considerations:

1. Lebanese customs tariffs are applied without condition or restriction to all countries in the world, including the Socialist countries.

2. The doors to importing into Lebanon are open to products of all countries without special restrictions regarding any of these countries.

3. Freedom of financial transaction is also guaranteed for all.

How can we, in this framework of freedoms, expect any foreign country to come to us and commit itself to buy specific amounts of our agricultural or industrial production?

The Eastern European countries did at a time when they needed to develop their relations with Lebanon, in view of what Lebanon's commerce represents in the Middle East.

Now, however, this goal has been realized and these countries are no longer in need of this kind of link.

Sources in the Ministry of Economy and Trade have wondered if it was in Lebanon's interests to keep its gates legally open to all without restriction or condition or to try to create new principles for commercial transactions with Lebanon.

Theoretically, there are a number of solutions to which one can resort to protect Lebanon's interests, including:

1. Imposing restrictions on imports.

The system of prior permission might allow the desired objective to be attained with relative ease. Import permission would be imposed on all cargoes imported into Lebanon; the countries with a free economy would be given this automatically but countries with a guided economy would be given it only on a basis of equality.

However, the system of permits which was applied in Lebanon is not devoid of complications and violations which we have previously tested out and therefore it is not possible to recommend that it be endorsed.

2. Modifying the customs tariff system.

Modification would occur by approving a new plan for a customs tariff system which would have the effect of making every country with economic interests with Lebanon enter into negotiations with it to obtain most favored nation treatment.

The customs law currently stipulates that there are three tariffs: a maximum tariff, an ordinary tariff and an agreed-upon tariff; this law requires that these tariffs be imposed in accordance with the following:

Maximum tariffs: these are applied to goods which originate in countries which do not benefit from ordinary tariffs.

Ordinary tariffs: these are applied to goods which originate from countries specified by Higher Customs Council decrees.

Agreed-upon tariffs: these are applied to goods which originate in countries with which special customs agreements have been concluded.

In this regard it is worth pointing out that ordinary tariffs, which are amended tariffs that are generally applied, are automatically given to all countries in the world; likewise, the most favored nation treatment which countries try to obtain in economic negotiations is a fact of life in Lebanon.

Therefore we consider that the customs tariff system should be amended in the following manner:

A. In the legal provisions:

The customs law should be modified in such a way that the tariff system stipulated in it should be replaced by a new system including:

A general tariff.

A preferential tariff.

A special tariff.

General tariffs will apply to all countries which do not benefit from either the preferential or the special tariffs.

Preferential tariffs are applied wholly or in part to countries which sign special customs or commercial agreements with Lebanon or to whom the authorities see fit to give this treatment, in view of the overall economic relations linking them to Lebanon. Here in particular financial, cultural, economic or technical aid presented to Lebanon is taken into consideration.

The special tariff is applied, as is the situation now, to the countries belonging to the League of Arab States which have signed an agreement to facilitate trade with the countries in this league or have concluded bilaterial agreements with Lebanon in accordance with the provisions of these agreements.

B. In determining the rates of the various tariffs:

The goal of the proposed method is to set forth a "preferential tariff" in a manner which will be as close as possible to the current "ordinary tariff," wherein:

The change will not influence the receipts of customs duties.

Nor will it affect the degree of customs protection given to local industries.

Nor will it affect the level of domestic prices, as far as possible.

In Setting forth General Tariffs

Use will be made of the occasion of creating this tariff to conduct a comprehensive review of the general duty levels which the ordinary tariff now stipulates; these levels will be coordinated where they need to be coordinated, will operate where they can operate, and so forth.

These levels will increase by varying percentages, in accordance with the types of goods, in a manner which does not affect the level of prices, at least as far as materials related to the daily lives of citizens are concerned.

In general the increase will not exceed a maximum of 25 percent, although it is possible to keep below that rate or exceed it in specific cases.

In Setting forth Preferential Tariffs

The levels of this tariff will be set with respect to the general tariff by an average percentage rate reduction to be endorsed when general tariff rates are set out--that is, 25 percent, if the limit recommended in the previous paragraph is endorsed.

In Setting forth Special Tariffs

Special tariffs are the result of the application to preferential tariff rates of the deductions stipulated in the agreement to facilitate trade reached in the context of the Arab League, or in bilateral agreements with Arab countries.

The Benefits of This Solution

Among the benefits of this solution are the fact that:

1. It opens room for fruitful economic negotiations not just with Eastern European countries but also with other countries which benefit from ordinary tariffs free of charge.

2. The principle of freedom of trade authorized in Lebanon will be preserved.

3. The level of customs protection granted to Lebanese industry will be protected.

4. In the customs context, we will be assured of a practical, flexible customs system; instead of the maximum tariff which cannot be applied and constitutes a punishment which is not inflicted on anyone, there is a just "general tariff" which can be applied to countries which do not want to establish trade or economic cooperation relations with Lebanon. It also creates a "preferential tariff" suitable for encouraging countries to desire to make contracts with Lebanon.

5. No financial sacrifice will result from its application; rather, to the contrary, it may provide the treasury with additional revenues.

6. It will not affect domestic prices:

By keeping essential materials from receiving substantial tariff increases.

By continuing the exemptions stipulated in the current ordinary tariffs and the agreements concluded with Arab countries.

By issuing special measures requiring that "preferential tariffs" be granted as an exemption to countries whose overall economic relations with Lebanon the authorities consider permit that.

By paving the way for rivalry between goods subject to general tariffs and goods benefiting from preferential tariffs.

While waiting for this modification to be realized, we consider that we should avoid granting most favored nation treatment in the transitional period except with the utmost caution in order to change our current tariff system.

Czechoslovakia Prepares To Buy Lebanese Products Worth $5 Million Annually

AL-'ASR has learned that the Lebanese delegation which traveled to Czechoslovakia toward the end of August to sign a new trade agreement between the two countries was surprised to receive a request from the Czech party for information on the reconstruction of Lebanon. Czechoslovakia's desire to participate in projects the Lebanese government will carry out in this field was expressed to the Lebanese delegation.

The Czech party wondered if Arab aid stipulated that bids for projects or the purchase of equipment not be awarded to socialist countries.

The Lebanese delegation refrained from getting into that issue on grounds that its task was basically restricted to discussing commercial aspects alone and consequently that it was not empowered to discuss the subject of reconstruction, the participation of Czech organizations in it, or the sale of equipment for its projects.

In addition, the Lebanese delegation, which traveled to Prague on 25 August 1980, signed a new commercial agreement which had previously been prepared for in Beirut with the Czech commercial mission.

The new agreement abrogated the previously concluded clearing agreement and its annexes and gave most favored nation treatment to the two contracting groups. Payments between the two countries have been freed and vessels of both countries are given equal opportunities to transport goods traded between themselves.

The most prominent point in the agreement is that Czechoslovakia has promised to buy Lebanese products valued at $5 million a year.

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FRANJIYYAH SETS CONDITIONS FOR SUPPORTING NEW GOVERNMENT

Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 9 Sep 80 p 3

[Report on press conference given by former President Sulayman Franjiyyah, in Ihdin; date not given]

[Text] President Sulayman Franjiyyah has affirmed that he "does not object to the participation of any faction in the new government, provided that the army, supported by the Arab deterrent force, moves into all Lebanese territory. The new government must commit itself in its inaugural statement to set a time and date for these forces to fan out towards the south, the north and the west, one kilometer per day from the presidential palace." He accused President Sarkis of failing to implement Arab summit conference resolutions "despite the fact that the Arabs gave him everything."

President Franjiyyah spoke yesterday at a press conference he held in Ihdin about various current issues.

Earnestness and Diversion

Correspondents began the press conference with a question about the seriousness of President Elias Sarkis's effort to get out of the crisis. Franjiyyah was asked if he believed that Sarkis's action was a mere diversionary tactic, as former Prime Minister Karami was saying.

Franjiyyah replied, "I agree with former Prime Minister Karami that everything being proposed on the Lebanese scene is diversionary. The most recent proposal was that of a government of activists to implement reconciliation. Fine. The government that they proposed was rejected by former Prime Minister Karami. I also rejected it completely. But for your information, I am announcing for the first time that this rejection was not to apply if a condition was met. This is that the proposed government pledge to the Chamber of Deputies in its inaugural statement that it would set a time and date for the Lebanese forces, supported by the deterrent forces, to fan out from the presidential palace towards the north, the south and the west, so as to extend the state's control. These forces would move one kilometer per day in all directions. We thank God who made our country large in significance and small in size. Thus, within 100 days, these forces will have spread across all Lebanese territory, and the situation will have returned to normal. But we have not heard anything about the state accepting this condition. We are repeating, and we are saying that the regime is trying to distract the Lebanese people until the 2 remaining years [of the term of Sarkis] go by without any action, resolution or implementation of a plan."

Franjiyyah was asked if he would ask President Sarkis to use the military solution in case one of the parties objected to implementation of the suggestion. He replied, "If he does not want to use the military solution, why have an army? Why is he spending 1 billion Lebanese pounds on the defense budget?"

Franjiyyah was asked about the two types of government presented to him. He said, "Only one type was presented to former Prime Minister Karami and to me. This was before Prime Minister Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh was appointed premier-designate. Other than this proposal, which Brig Gen al-Khuli was charged to relay to us, we did not receive any proposal."

Regarding the current Lebanese experience of a homeland that is united on paper, but whose land is divided, he said: "There is a state, but it does not really exist; [some act as if] the Arabs do not exist. Let me refer you to a statement made by Kuwait's minister of foreign affairs, in which he said, 'I do not know what they want!' If those who are the closest friends of the Lebanese people make such statements, what about those who are not their friends? This is not the Arabs' fault; this is our fault. The Arabs gave us everything we asked for at the summit conferences, but we did not carry out any resolutions, and wasted all the golden opportunities we had. It is the president of the republic who is responsible for this."

Who Is Working for Partition?

Franjiyyah was asked about his opinion of Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil's statement that we would have partition if the situation were to remain as it is.

He replied, "This person is himself working for partition. It is unfortunate that he calls for a legitimate government and for strengthening it, but does the opposite of what he calls for. Does this man refer to himself and to his party when he talks about the legitimate government? Does he believe that all the Lebanese people are stupid and he is intelligent? Maybe the opposite is the truth. A statement is made every day, but actions contradict the statements. Does he think that people are stupid? Anyone who thinks people are stupid is the biggest fool."

Crisis To Be Resolved with His Departure

Franjiyyah was asked about the means of getting out of the maelstrom. He replied, "There is no getting out of the maelstrom as long as President Elias Sarkis is president. We will get out of it when he departs."

About President Sarkis's objective of injecting the Syrians as mediators, Franjiyyah said, "His objective is to convey to the Lebanese people and to the world the impression that Syria is blocking agreement.

"Is this true? This is fiction. Lies! Lies! Lies! As far as I know--and I am not supposed to know everything--the Syrians did everything they could do that was asked of them."

Why aren't some leaders taking action to reveal the dimensions of the game and the regime's position, he was asked?

He replied, "The Lebanese question consists of two parts: a Lebanese-Lebanese part and an Arab-Lebanese part. Since the Palestinians are on our land, we cannot come up with a solution with our own capabilities by ourselves. We can only do so with our Arab brothers. But the Arabs have nothing to do with the existing internal condition on Lebanese territory. If we need help, we can ask them for it, but we are the ones who must solve this ourselves. No one but the state can solve this, and the state is, unfortunately, non-existent!"

About his opinion of the statement made by the Maronite Patriarch Antonios Butrus Kharish that "We, the Lebanese people cannot design a state; we do not have the ability to design a state," Franjiyyah said, "Most certainly we cannot design the state that His Eminence the Patriarch is hoping for, but we can design a state like any one of the existing states."

The Resistance and Implementation

About former Prime Minister Karami's statement that the security plan cannot be implemented unless the agreements with the resistance are carried out, Franjiyyah said, "The state has tried many times to work with the Palestinians to implement agreements, but, unfortunately, it did not achieve any results. I join former Prime Minister Karami in hoping that the agreements will be carried out, but not carrying them out does not prevent the state from establishing its control over the largest possible section of Lebanese territory, if not all of it."

Franjiyyah was asked about his position on the proposal made by Deputy Amin al-Jumayyil regarding political security as an alternative to the security plan. He replied, "Any person can propose what he wishes. Amin al-Jumayyil and other members of al-Jumayyil family make new proposals every day. Which one do they really believe in? I don't think they believe in any proposal. They believe in a state, an emirate, a kingdom or at the very least a republic whose president would be one of them."

Franjiyyah responded to a question by saying that he did not feel that the government had looked into the statement that was issued after the National Movement's visit to the north.

About what he and his allies would do if the government maintains its passive position, he said, "They will guarantee a comfortable life in their own environment. Sulayman Franjiyyah can do no more."

But how can this be done when security is being broken continuously? He replied, "These outbreaks have ended, thank God! If you were to look some day into investigations made, you would find that these outbreaks were concocted by the government so that this province would not remain as it is today. They went so far as to disrupt Tripoli with outbreaks which the authorized agencies paid for, according to the investigation."

The Possible and the Impossible

Regarding the possibility of implementing the security plan which the government is trying to work out with Syria, he said, "We want first to know the plan so that

we can say whether it can be implemented or not. It would not be enough to implement the plan in the marketplace or in some sensitive areas. The government must be in control of all the Lebanese territories it can control. The territories that it cannot control are the border areas which are controlled by the Israelis. The army can do what it wishes with the assistance of the deterrent forces in the other areas."

[He was asked if he thought the army could implement the security plan] even if that plan included the north. He replied, "I hope they would begin in the north. We have an army and a deterrent force. Let them coordinate their actions and set out for all the areas of the north."

Can the security plan be implemented before an agreement over the Army Law is reached? He said, "If we do not agree about a law, what could we agree about? What is hindering the implementation of the Army Law? The powers given to the Mr Johnny 'Abidu? They want to incorporate into the law all the irregular things that are being done by what is called the Deuxieme Bureau [Intelligence Agency]. They want to make the chief of the Deuxieme Bureau a dictator of the Lebanese republic in political, economic, social and even in educational matters."

Does he believe that the difference over reorganizing the army takes us back to square one and exposes the state to hazards, he was asked?

He replied, "Are you saying take us back to square one? Why? Where is the state now? It is in square one."

Is not the security plan the program of the next government, he was asked?

He replied, "Regardless of who is in the government, the purpose of the security plan is to spread the government's control over all Lebanese territory. We are with the government in this without reservations."

About his opinion of Lebanon's official rejection of the PLO's invitation to hold a meeting of the Arab Defense Council to discuss the situation in the south, Franjiyyah said, "The rejection was justified 100 percent. But if the Lebanese state knew its duties, it would have made the request itself. I wish the Palestinian brothers had not asked for the meeting directly, but had approached the state about it. If the state refused, the refusal would be known, and any Arab state would have the right to make the request."

The Experiment of Unity

About the anticipated union between Syria and Libya he said, "As far back as we can remember, we have always heard the leaders of Arab countries, especially the eastern ones, talk about unity of the Arab nation. Every Arab country has adopted the slogan of Arab unity from the Gulf to the [Atlantic] Ocean. Syria's slogan is unity, freedom, socialism. Thus, Arab unity according to Arab officials is the objective of every political action. Today unity may or may not be a fact, comprehensive or partial, but it is necessary for our happiness. The first step of what has been called for by the masses and in official circles is being implemented. We hope from the bottom of our hearts that this experiment will be successful, and that it will include all the Arabs."

Regarding how this step towards unity would affect the situation in Lebanon, he said, "It will most certainly be good, because we have sensed from our contact with fraternal Syria that Syria has no ambitions in Lebanon. How then could our distant sister have any ambitions in Lebanon? I doubt, [in fact] I swear that they have no designs on Lebanon. They are experimenting. If the experiment succeeds, we will grab it. If, God forbid, it should fail, it will be another one of the experiments."

Did he see the need for Lebanon's participation in any possible confrontation with Israel, he was asked?

He replied, "Would Lebanon be far away from a confrontation that may take place one day or the other under unity or without it? This is not possible. Although Lebanon did not bear arms in the 1948 war, it did carry out its duties towards the fighters. Lebanon would not remain a spectator in case of any confrontation that may occur even in Jordan, away from Lebanon. Lebanon has its duties within its capabilities."

President Franjiyyah was told, "You are an Arab nationalist in one sense of the word." He said, "It is not necessary to make that claim, but I do not allow anyone to claim that he is more of an Arab nationalist than I am."

Regarding the European initiative and what Franjiyyah had previously said about the fact that Europe was not speaking (its own mind), he said, "Europe is sacrificing everything it holds dear today to keep the jews in Israel. This is because if Israel were to cease to exist--and God willing it will cease to exist--the jews would return to Europe and would inflict upon Europe the same suffering it had experienced for centuries. It is in the interests of any European initiative to keep the jews in Israel."

Would he accept a part in a government which would adopt a clear action program to which Damascus would have contributed, and which would include third rank Phalangists who are not members of the al-Jumayyil family? He said, "Despite all efforts [claimed to have been] made by the state, can you mention to me one? There was one proposal which Brig Gen al-Khuli relayed to us. We turned it down, unless one condition was met. We turned it down, because the Phalangists would be part of it. But if the government carried out our condition, we do not care who would be part of it.

In response to a question, he explained: "We said that the army was to fan out one kilometer per day over all Lebanese territory. Are we to exclude Upper al-Matn or Lower al-Matn?"

Would he join the Phalangists if the army were to go into al-Ashrafiyah, he was asked? He replied, "Let whoever wants to go there do so, provided that the army, supported by the deterrent forces, go into all Lebanese territory. It is welcome to come to Zgharta."

Do you then support the inclusion of the Phalangists in the government, he was asked? He answered: "There is a condition. Politically speaking, one, two or three ministers in 20 would not make a difference, but there is one reservation.

We are forgetting that Israel's policy could become part of the government. We have reached the point of wanting to perish."

Regarding the Vatican's position vis a vis the Lebanese faction that opposes its position on the subject of Jerusalem as well as Israel's decisions in that regard, he said, "With regard to Jerusalem, the Vatican did not know the position of the Lebanese faction. But with regard to the al-Safra incidents the Vatican took the same position that was taken by the Maronite patriarch. It is quite unlikely for the Vatican to entertain the position of a Lebanese faction or to oppose it internationally."

Regarding a report about a role he played for unity he replied, "If I knew its source, I would answer, but it may be something that was made up by AL-NAHAR, for example."

He denied interfering in any way to bring Libya and Syria closer together for the purpose of uniting them. He said, "There was no need for mediation between Syria and Libya. It became evident that there was nothing to tarnish their relationship."

He said that his visit to Libya was "likely, but not under the present circumstances. It if had been very urgent, I would have gone. The visit will be made in response to Col al-Qadhdhafi's invitation. We will go after the crisis is over."

Responding to a question regarding Cpt Muhammad 'Uthman, a gendarme who was kidnapped some time ago, he said, "Two young men, one from the district of Zgharta and the other from the district of Jubayl drove in one car to Beirut. There was no news of them for over three and a half months. I would not wish for anyone to be in their parents' shoes. In the present situation, anyone who leaves his house is subject to being kidnapped. Then one of the two men, a gendarme, returned and reported what had happened. The father of the missing young man asked the Deuxieme Bureau to return his son or to turn him over to a military court if he were guilty. Then he went to Tripoli, and talked to the first officer he met from the Deuxieme Bureau. He then talked to the father of one of the officers of the Deuxieme Bureau. We are waiting for the son to be released, but the officials are not paying any attention to the matter."

Campaign Against Harb

Then Franjiyyah discussed the decision of the minister of public works, Mr Butrus Harb, regarding joining the district of al-Batrun with the province of Jabal Lubnan with regard to his ministry's activity. Franjiyyah said, "There are several explanations for this.

"This may be the beginning of implementing a decentralized administration. This is possible. However, a decentralized administration would not take from a small heap to give to a large heap. If Harb had tried to annex the district of Jubayl to North Lebanon, we would have said that he relieved Jabal Lubnan of a burden and turned it over to the north. We would have been grateful to him, if he had the right to do so. But there is no explanation for the administrative divisions of Lebanon being modified by a mere edict issued by a minister. The real reasons for the minister's action can be found in the fact that the official of the ministry

of public works in North Lebanon is from Zgharta, and does not yield to the minister on decisions that violate the law. He has rejected all the decisions, and has transferred everything that pertains to the ministry of public works in the district of al-Batrun to the province of Jabal Lubnan.

"The minister is now a member of a government whose resignation has been accepted. Does he have the right to make decisions of this kind? A self-respecting minister in such a situation would carry out routine business such as employees pensions. I am talking about a man who respects himself, not one who takes advantage of his position, as does the minister of public works. I would not be surprised by anything he would do. But let him know that his decision will not be implemented, nor will any action originating from his department in the province of Jabal Lubnan to the district of al-Batrun be implemented."

8592
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POLITICAL SITUATION FOLLOWING AL-HADATH CLASHES REVIEWED

Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 16 Sep 80 p 13

[Article: "Vast Majority Siding with Sarkis after al-Hadath Clashes and Army Intervention; Government of Activists Without Phalangists and Franjiyyah; Visits of Rizq Reveal Internal Phalangist Conflict"]

[Text] The recent clashes between the army and the Phalangist militia in the area of al-Hadath raised several questions about the future of relations between the legitimate government and the Phalangists, and between the government and the other Lebanese forces in the country. It soon became evident that a vast majority of Lebanese activists supported President Sarkis in his position on the intervention of the army. These activist forces can be said to represent a considerable majority on the scene. Its most important elements are the National Movement in Beirut; the Amal Movement; the parliamentary forces, excluding deputies of the separatist front; and other independent forces and political organizations. It is the judgment of persons close to President Sarkis that these elements are capable at any moment of supporting the formation of a new government capable of governing and assuming responsibility for preserving conditions in the country regardless of the difficulties and obstacles it may face.

The problem as the president sees it in the new situation is that the news from the north is not encouraging, especially following former Prime Minister Rashid Karami's intensification of his opposition and criticism. Karami has joined former President Sulayman Franjiyyah in calling upon the president to resign if he fails to consolidate the underpinnings of government in Lebanon.

A Government of the Majority of Activist

The administration is assuming a new position with regard to the government crisis. This position would call for the formation of a government that would represent a majority but not all of the activists. It seems that the regime will do so by keeping the Phalangists and the northern bloc out of the government. In case negotiations in this connection are successful, the government crisis will be solved without challenges, and a new government will be formed as soon as possible, if the parties concerned agree to take part in such a government with the approval and support of "the allies."

Based on these new considerations in the political situation in Lebanon, it is expected that the president of the republic will send Deputy Rene Mu'awwad to Biqa'

Safrin to meet with former Prime Minister Rashid Karami. Naturally, Mu'awwad would also communicate the position of the president of the republic to former President Sulayman Franjiyyah, especially since Mu'awwad was and still is an active liaison between President Sarkis and former President Franjiyyah. This is because he has strong relations with both. The new proposal which the president of the republic will announce amounts to the formation of a government which excludes any partisans of the Phalangists or of former President Franjiyyah. But will these two parties accept this?

Al-Jumayyil's Statements

The daily statements published in the name of Phalangist Chief Pierre al-Jumayyil indicate clearly that the Phalangists will not accept any government in which they do not participate. These statements also indicate that the party's old demand is still being made, that a member of the al-Jumayyil family represent the party. Al-Jumayyil had notified the president during the recent visit he made to B'abda that the party's candidate would be Amin al-Jumayyil and no one else. He also said that the party did not object to or have any preconditions regarding any candidates of the other factions.

The visits made to B'abda by Phalangist Deputy Edmond Rizq, who is considered an opponent of Bashir al-Jumayyil's course of action, had revealed a behind the scenes conflict within the party. However, these visits did not confirm the ability of Amin al-Jumayyil's faction to oppose Bashir's extremist faction. Therefore, Pierre al-Jumayyil's insistence that Amin be in the cabinet signifies the immediate agreement of Amin's faction to deploy the army from Upper al-Matn to Antilyas on the sea coast near Juniyah.

Al-Huss and the Secrets of the Game

The private meetings held by a group of deputies with candidates for the new government reveal that former Prime Minister Salim al-Huss is aware of most of what is going on behind the scenes, and is supporting the president. Al-Huss regards himself as out of contention for the premiership, but constantly emphasizes that President Sarkis has to form a government quickly, because the process of disposing of business without a government in office is not effective under present conditions in the country. But persons close to Prime Minister Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh, especially the deputies who visit him almost daily, emphasize that the current situation requires boldness in forming a government of activists that would include all factions without exception. Al-Sulh rejects the notion of a provisional government without Franjiyyah and the Phalangists. He considers that such a government would be incomplete and inadequate.

Karami's Demand

Former Prime Minister Rashid Karami is calling for the formation of a permanent government, but he is defining conditions for such a government that would keep obstacles out of its way. Such a government would be homogeneous and would try to implement the principles of reconciliation before proclaiming its agreement with its details. Karami still adheres to his refusal to form a government, because existing differences in points of view between him and President Sarkis and a large

group of Lebanese remain unresolved, and there are no indications that these differences will soon to be overcome. But Karami is objective on the subject of forming a government: he would not oppose any candidate who succeeds in resolving the problem of north Lebanon, and adopts a clear and candid position regarding those who deal with Israel.

Important Possibilities

According to information being discussed by some ministers of al-Huss's government, it seems that the administration is expecting significant developments to occur before it takes new steps to solve the government crisis, or while efforts that are being made to form a government. These developments may be summarized as follows:

1. Special information received by President Sarkis from some countries in Western Europe indicates that the crisis of south Lebanon is not over yet; that the Zionist state intends to launch a broad-based offensive against the south; and that it is awaiting a suitable opportunity to achieve this. The president feels that such a possibility calls for the formation of a government of activists, rather than a caretaker government. However, if every faction maintains its present position, despite its awareness of the current situation in the country, the formation of a provisional government becomes essential to confront all anticipated developments in the south and elsewhere. Sarkis insists on this, and wants the new government--in case a government of activists cannot be formed--to exclude the Phalangists and Franjiyyah and to be headed by Malik Salam.

Not Burning the Bridges

2. The Lebanese government believes that the widening of the opposition which calls for President Sarkis's resignation may lead to the renewal of the armed clashes, and may restore the climate of war in the country. According to the president, this encourages him to refrain from "burning his bridges" with the Phalangists and to maintain cooperation with them until further notice. Ongoing communications at the present stage are addressing the necessity of coming to an understanding with the president of the republic before matters get worse.

The Position of the National Movement

3. The National Movement is trying to contain every attempt to sow discord and generate clashes on the Lebanese scene, so as not to weaken the joint forces operating in the south, especially since a large number of the movement's fighters did move to the south to support and defend the area. In view of these considerations, the position of the National Movement regarding the formation of a new government is a very positive one. This is the crucial issue with regard to the policy and plans of the National Movement. The movement's basic demand at this stage is the formation of a new government that satisfies or achieves the greatest possible measure of progress.

8592
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CHAMBER OF COMMERCE BREAKS DOWN DATA ON NATION'S EXPORTS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 10 Sep 80 p 6

/Article: "Chamber of Commerce Report on Industrial Exports"/

/Text/ The Study and Documentation Center of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Beirut has set out a report on the development of Lebanese export activities during the first half of 1980.

The report stated that total exports came to 1,767,000,000 pounds as compared with 1,193,000,000 pounds in the same period of 1979, that is, an increase of 48 percent.

The report pointed out that the bulk of Lebanese exports still flows toward the markets of Arab oil states and that Saudi Arabia still occupies first place with respect to these exports, while Iraq has come to assume second place in terms of imports from Lebanon, having occupied fourth place last year.

Here are the most important contents of the report:

First, development of Lebanese exports in the first half of 1980:

Table One: Development of Monthly Exports in First Half of 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980 (in millions of pounds)

Month	Lebanese Exports Confirmed by Beirut Chamber				Total Lebanese Exports (estimated)			
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1977	1978	1979	1980
January	37	171	141	136	57	253	175	209
February	61	107	136	192	94	165	209	295
March	93	147	135	181	142	227	208	278
April	107	127	113	162	165	196	174	250
May	136	119	155	214	209	183	338	329
June	169	133	123	263	260	205	189	406
Total	598	800	776	1,148	927	1,229	1,193	1,767

Table Two: Comparison of Monthly Quarterly Export Values in Previous Years

	In Current Prices			In 1977 Prices	
	1977	1979	1980	1979	1980
First Quarter	98	197	260	156	180
Second Quarter	211	200	328	158	228
Third Quarter	201	221	nil	175	
Fourth Quarter	277	280	nil	221	

In spite of the high costs of production and continuing security crises, Lebanese exports continued to rise during the first 6 months of 1980, moving from 209 million pounds in January to 406 million in June, based on the values of exports whose origins were confirmed by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Beirut, which account for about 65 percent of total exports of Lebanese origin.

Total exports in the first half of this year came to 1,767,000,000 pounds, as compared with 1,193,000,000 pounds in the corresponding period of 1979, or an increase of 48 percent.

Table Three: Comparison between Goods Exported in First Half of 1980 and 1979 According to Chamber Certificates (in millions of Pounds)

Categories	First Half 1979		First Half 1980		1980 over 1979 (percent)
	Value of Exports	Per-cent	Value of Exports	Per-cent	
1. Livestock and animal resource products	3.679	0.4	5.169	0.4	+41
2. Plant resource products	48.270	6.2	47.221	4.1	-0.2
3. Fats, oils, animal and vegetable oils, animal candles	4.175	0.5	18.703	1.6	+356
4. Food industries, beverages	60.668	7.8	84.313	7.3	+39
5. Mineral products	81.872	10.5	35.503	11.71	+65.6
6. Chemical and related industry products	124.293	16.0	146.137	12.7	+17.7
7. Artificial resins, plastics, rubber	24.948	3.1	41.601	3.6	+67
8. Leather, furrier hides, manufactures from these materials, travel goods	9.610	1.2	7.432	0.6	-73
9. Wood, charcoal and wood manufactures	5.526	0.7	9.327	0.8	+67.2
10. Paper and paper products	47.968	6.1	58.777	5.1	+23.5
11. Textiles and textile goods products	83.792	10.8	154.419	13.4	+84.5
12. Shoes, headgear, umbrellas, human hair products	10.924	1.4	21.643	1.8	+98.0

Table Three (continued)

13. Goods manufactured from cement, stone, gypsum, asbestos, porcelain products, glass, glass products	45.016	5.8	52.202	4.5	+16
14. Pearls, precious and semi-precious stones, precious metals, jewelry stones (imitation)	16.401	2.1	37.995	3.2	+131
15. Ordinary metals and products	140.730	18.1	14.884	12.5	+2
16. Machinery and equipment, electrical equipment	5.351	6.4	129.915	11.3	+158
17. Transportation equipment	7.768	0.9	29.631	2.5	+284
18. Optical mat'l, equipment	0.304	--	9.347	0.8	--
19. Weapons and ammunition	--	--	0.045	--	--
20. Diverse manufactured equipment other than the above not mentioned above	9.042	1.1	15.791	1.3	+74
21. Art works, collection items, antiquities	0.131	--	---	--	--
Total	7,753.3	100	1,148.965	100	+48

However, in order to make a useful evaluation of the status of exports at present, one must include the rate of increase in prices in computing the value of these exports, that is estimated at about 15 percent in the period June 1979-June 1980. The increase comes to about 29 percent in comparison with the corresponding period of 1979 in June 1979 prices.

It is necessary to point out here that this improvement in the development of exports in the first half of the current year does not mean that Lebanese installations, especially industrial ones, have been able to make up the massive losses they suffered as a consequence of the destruction in the summer of 1978 or have been able to absorb the great increase in production costs. It had been expected that Lebanese exports, which account for about 40 percent of local output, would surge to much higher rates as a result of capital spending, which did not occur at the anticipated rates because of security setbacks of continuous escalating severity.

Table Four: Geographic Distribution of Imports of Lebanese Origin Confirmed by Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry in the First Half of 1978, 1979 and 1980 (thousands of Lebanese pounds)

	January-June 1978		January-June 1979		January-June 1980	
	Value	Percent	Value	Percent	Value	Percent
Arab countries	754,741	93.7	737,723	94.6	1,069,415	93.0
Syria	87,614	10.9	96,157	12.4	100,723	8.7
Jordan	119,552	14.8	58,463	7.5	53,943	4.7
Iraq	83,867	10.4	104,371	13.4	271,565	23.6
Kuwait	55,942	6.9	29,739	3.9	50,539	4.4
Saudi Arabia	308,692	38.4	323,193	41.7	485,763	42.3
The Emirates	32,531	4.1	25,893	3.4	46,139	4.0
Libya	24,072	3.0	14,132	1.8	10,184	--
Egypt	19,705	2.5	41,729	5.4	19,723	1.7
Europe	18,619	2.4	21,886	2.8	38,590	3.4
European Common Market	13,342	1.6	14,494	1.8	29,637	2.6
Free Zone	749	--	59	--	1,871	--
Asia	9,200	1.1	1,205	--	9,046	--
Africa	4,154	--	1,491	--	7,034	--
America	1,066	--	1,368	--	1,283	--
Australia	221	--	582	--	1,043	--
Total	805,409	100	775,303	100	1,148,965	

Second, Most important categories exported.

It is clear from the chamber's statistics on Beirut and Mount Lebanon (Table Three) that the most important exports are:

Manufactured items involved in building materials: 331.5 million pounds, accounting for 28.9 percent of total exports whose origin was confirmed by the Chamber of Commerce, as compared with 267.5 million pounds in the corresponding period of 1979.

Among the most important of these manufactured items are:

Ordinary metals, iron, aluminum, diverse ordinary metals, 143.8 million pounds.

Mining materials (cement), 135.5 million pounds.

Products of chemical manufactures: 146.1 million pounds, accounting for 12.7 percent of total exports, as compared with 124 million pounds in the corresponding period of 1979.

Textiles: 154.5 million pounds, as compared with 83.7 million pounds in the corresponding period of 1979.

Machinery, equipment and electrical equipment: 129.9 million pounds, accounting for 11.3 percent of total exports, as compared with 50.3 million pounds in the corresponding period of 1979.

Beverage and foodstuffs industry: 84.3 percent /sic/ as compared with 60.6 million pounds.

Paper and paper products: 58 million pounds as compared with 48 million pounds in the corresponding period of 1978 /sic/.

Third: Markets for Lebanese exports whose origin is confirmed by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Beirut.

From Table Four it is clear that the bulk of Lebanese exports flow toward the markets of Arab oil states.

In comparison with corresponding exports in previous years, we observe, on the one hand, that:

No structural change in the geographic concentration of Lebanese exports has occurred in 5 years. Arab markets still absorb 93 to 95 percent of total exports from the area of Beirut and Mount Lebanon, while they accounted for approximately two-thirds before the war.

Saudi Arabia still constitutes the basic market for Lebanese products, 38 percent in 1978 and 42 percent in 1980.

On the other hand, it also appears that there is a change in the standing of the markets of certain Arab countries as far as Lebanese exports go:

Lebanese exports to Iraq increased from 83 million pounds in the first half of 1978 to 271 million pounds in the corresponding period of 1980; Iraq has come to occupy second place with respect to Lebanese exports, whereas it had been in fourth place.

The value of exports to Jordan declined by half, from 119 million pounds in 1978 to 54 million pounds in 1980, placing Jordan's markets, with 4.7 percent, in fourth place in importance relative to Lebanese exports, instead of second place.

11887
CSO: 4802

RIGHT-WING NATIONALISTS DRAW UP COMMUNITY SUPPORT PLANS

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 12 Sep 80 p 4

/Article: "Lebanese Forces Establish Service Agency To Provide Requirements of Daily Life for Citizens"/

/Text/ The Lebanese forces declared at a press conference they held yesterday that they have established an agency for public services, one of whose tasks will be to provide the climate for a dignified life for citizens and provide various types of public services related to their daily life. They stated that they will pursue two avenues to provide these services: the first is based on stimulating the official agencies and the second is based on having the Lebanese Forces bear the responsibility for carrying these services out.

During the conference, Mr Nadim al-Shuwayri, head of the Public Services Agency of the Lebanese Forces, read out a statement in which he said,

"The Lebanese Forces know that the government's files are full of projects and studies which might be sound for the most part but that none of them have been carried out, because of the sick psychological state dominating government departments and the complicated administrative statutes in effect, which prevent the wheels of administration from moving naturally and soundly.

"Here today I am setting before you a list of the projects the Lebanese Forces have carried out so far, or intend to carry out:

Transportation

"After the Lebanese Forces had succeeded in the domestic transport project, which provided transport for citizens at low prices, and once these routes had been restricted to the coastal area from Beirut to Jubayl and some summer villages in al-Matn, we today intend to provide other routes to Kasrawan, as well as al-Ashrafiyah when work finishes on the two freeways which pass through this region.

"There now is a project under study related to operating small buses to provide transport among inner sections within the liberated sections of Beirut, on grounds that the narrow streets do not permit large buses to pass.

"Here one should bear in mind that we have ventured to establish stations to shield citizens from the sun and rain and also to contribute to easing traffic

since the buses will stop only in front of these stations.

Streets and Branches

"Now that the streets and sidewalks have become pits in which filth and refuse are gathered, we have decided to confront this situation in the following manner:

"1. Repave and resurface the roads and plant them with flowers and trees; work has been undertaken on the corniche of the river, starting at the Palace of Justice.

"2. Cleaning real property and neglected lands of filth and neglected cars and establishing small gardens alongside the roads in cooperation with the municipalities and owners of private organizations.

"3. Cleaning the water channels along roads to drain off rainwater before the winter season falls.

"4. Cleaning and sweeping the streets by the municipalities or with the assistance of shop owners.

"5. Lighting the streets after solving the issues unresolved by the Lebanon Electric Organization, the Major Projects Council and some municipalities.

"6. Regulating the establishment of shops in the form of sheds, especially along the international highways and in the outskirts of the capital, before they get out of hand, now that they have started constituting a danger to traffic safety.

"7. Reorganizing the condition of the signs, especially signs with street names and property numbers.

"8. Placing electric and neon signs at the intersections of roads to ensure traffic safety at night.

Traffic Problems

"As regards traffic problems, we have decided to confront the chaotic state with the aid of the traffic police in order to remedy the following matters:

"1. Honoring the signs placed on roads and one-way streets, bearing in mind that most of these signs do not exist or are broken; we are now working to restore and reinstall them.

"2. Overseeing forged license plates and detaining all stolen cars, although such incidents have rarely occurred in our areas.

"3. Demand that citizens not use horns and music, out of sensitivity to people's nerves.

"4. Regulating traffic in rush hours and on congested intersections.

"5. Prohibiting the driving of vehicles which do not adhere to safety features such as lights, covering of trucks whose loads come loose, and so forth.

"6. Imposing mandatory inspection on all vehicles upon payment of registration fees, to ascertain that they are fit for driving.

"7. Reviewing the flow of traffic in some streets now that some new streets have been opened.

"8. Confirming that drivers possess official drivers' licenses, now that we have observed a large number of drivers below legal age.

"In brief, compelling drivers to commit themselves to all traffic statutes in effect.

"It also appears to the Lebanese Forces that the performance of work on the freeways connecting the Palace of Justice to al-Hikmah and the Foreign Ministry on the river corniche will require a period of 2 months at most, in the event the government makes a serious decision on the matter. Therefore we are trying with all our effort, through the bodies concerned to carry out this vital project, which will guarantee that the traffic problem is solved in al-Ashrafiyah in particular as we are on the verge of the school year.

Consumer Protection"Now that there has been much talk about the emergence of a wave of fraud in some gas stations, regarding the quality or quantity provided, causing great damage to citizens, we have made a careful examination in a number of stations and have sent samples from them to the laboratory for analysis. The result appears in the published table /not translated/.

"To prevent tampering with station meters, we have called for the holding of a meeting with distribution company officials in order to inspect these meters, seal them, and confirm that they are working properly.

"Fuel oil and butane: We are now carrying out a similar campaign to ascertain the quality and quantity of materials delivered to the industrial sector, the transportation sector and also to homes. We will follow up on this campaign periodically and will adopt severe penalties for tamperers and violators.

Consumer Goods

"Treatment of the issue of consumer good prices requires deep study. Therefore we have considered that we have an obligation to the citizen, at least at this stage, to let him know the type and price of the goods he buys. Therefore, the merchants must declare the prices of the commodities they sell, especially foodstuffs.

"As regards the type of commodity, the Lebanese Forces have held preliminary investigations which reveal the conclusion that some merchants are adulterating specific foodstuffs in a regular fashion, and they are awaiting the conduct of further analyses to arrive at complete data. We will content ourselves with presenting the following examples:

"1. Some types of corned beef are now being imported from Rumania and Africa at low prices,forged labels are being fixed to them bearing the name of major well

known international trademarks, and they are sold at the same prices /as the latter/. This method is also followed as regards some brands of tuna and oil prepared for food.

"2. Citric acid is mixed with alum, which has the same flavor but is cheaper and unhealthy.

Movies

"We recognize that the official ticket price is no longer reasonable, but ask on this occasion whether the management of some movie houses provide their customers with comfort in exchange for special prices. We have noted that air conditioners do not function as desired, sanitary facilities are not always available, and some houses do not commit themselves to public health statutes in the event fire or disaster occurs.

"Therefore we request the owners of houses to commit themselves to the statutes, in order to preserve the health and comfort of movie-goers.

Bakeries

"It seems to us that many bakery owners lack proper vocational conscience and that many bakeries are suffering from two problems: cleanliness and the presence of raw materials.

"A group of specialists is now analyzing the materials which go into the manufacture of loaves to ascertain their quality.

"Patrols belonging to the Lebanese Forces will examine bakeries to confirm that the necessary sanitary conditions exist in them.

"The necessary penalties will be exacted against all violators and these penalties may reach the point of media publicity or final shutdowns.

Pharmacies

"During the years of the war, pharmacies spread out over numerous locations and districts, in violation of every law and all vocational conscience or technical consideration; this exposed, and still is exposing, citizens to the most calamitous dangers. We have made a list of the names of pharmacies operating in the free areas. We have decided to prohibit the opening of any new pharmacies which do not possess legal permits, review the conditions of the existing ones, and close all pharmacies which do not meet technical and moral conditions, in cooperation and coordination with the official bodies concerned and the Pharmacists' Union.

Electricity

"Electric plants in Lebanon are now yielding their full productive capacity, without any reserve, which means that in the case a machine breaks down or is shut down for maintenance the general balance will be disturbed, electricity will be cut off, current will be reduced and voltage will drop.

"While waiting for an improvement in output, as has been promised, we consider that it is our duty to adopt rapid measures before falling prey to a serious crisis.

"1. Stopping the theft of electricity by compelling citizens who use electricity in illegitimate ways to settle their circumstances with the Lebanon Electric Organization and requesting special meters for them, especially since this organization, in accordance with our demand, intends to streamline the red tape in transactions and not to insist strongly on requesting legal documents, in view of the exceptional conditions of persons who have fled. It has delegated a team of employees to settle these conditions and accelerate transactions.

"2. Improving distribution cables, especially in the 'Ayn al-Rummanah section, and replacing cables which are unfit or burned because of electricity thefts and reduced voltage.

"3. After taking into consideration the conditions of some sections which have been heavily hit, the technical committees of the Lebanon Electric Organization, with the aid of patrols of the Lebanese Forces, will proceed to record all electricity violations and thefts that occur, draw up ledgers of penalties on the violators and impose the appropriate penalties on them.

"4. Dealing strictly with contractors in order to keep the underground cables intact when excavations take place.

"5. Protecting the equipment of the Lebanon Electric Organization and all other official organizations and preventing their theft, expropriation, or damage by anyone, under threat of very strict penalties.

Water

"Work has taken place in organized fashion to confirm that the requisite water inspection analyses have been carried out and that sources of water pollution have been discovered and eliminated at the proper time in order to provide the citizens with suitable sanitary water.

"We are also helping the Lebanon Water Organization offer every assistance when major breakdowns occur, in order to guarantee repairs in the shortest possible time, while awaiting studies to provide additional amounts of water to areas where constant cutoffs occur.

Telephones

"The Lebanese Forces have established a special technical agency in the liberated areas to investigate the following matters:

"1. Reasons for delayed current signals in lines (dial tones).

"2. The conditions of cables linking centers, since some are used from center to center for the benefit of some customers at the expense of others. For example:

"Communications with Jubayl, Beirut, are provided by means of one line.

"3. Investigation into the presence of generators and batteries to provide continued connections in case any breakdowns or electric shutoffs occur.

"4. Confirmation of the proper operation of air conditioners, since breakdowns in the summer season lead to disruptions in equipment.

"5. Assertion of attention to continuous operation on the part of employees and their response to the complaints of customers.

Garbage

"The garbage which is thrown into the streets every day without any concern for principles of cleanliness, beauty and public health constitutes a public danger and a vehicle for the proliferation of bugs, rats and rodents. Barrels distributed here and there in turn constitute a large part of this danger, because when they are incompletely emptied the filth is left over which rots and poses an element in the spread of foul odors and insects which communicate diseases. In addition, one should mention the garbage which overflows from these barrels, falls on the ground and stays where it is, in addition to the refuse from restaurants, plants, offices and construction workshops.

"Moreover, one should bear in mind that citizens have also contributed to exacerbating these conditions by continuing to throw garbage about without using plastic bags or sealing them well. Therefore we have decided to confront this perverse situation and remedy it in stages, in view of its difficult nature, beginning with cooperation between citizens and sanitation workers and proceeding through the installation of new barrels and the spraying of barrels with insecticides to prevent the spread of diseases and proliferation of bugs, and ending with reliance on new methods used in advanced countries.

Sewers

"The method for disposing of sewage water in Lebanon relies on extremely poor, serious principles, considering that this water flows either into a sanitary pit and leaks out into wells or into the sea, which causes citizens to drink polluted water and swim in filthy water. All countries in the world, even backward ones, have found a solution to this grave problem, while to this day Lebanon remains deficient in solving it.

"Therefore one must create sound solutions beginning by excavating in accordance with technical principles, then proceeding with small purification plants in limited population accumulations, schools and hospitals, and ending with sewer systems which must flow into suitable purification plants.

Pollution

"A study is now underway, in cooperation with the competent agencies, on ways and means which must be followed to limit the spread of pollution, which is caused by factories, cars running on diesel and so forth.

"A periodic mechanical checkup of cars operating on diesel and the placement of filters on the smokestacks of factories, as is observed in advanced countries.

Posters

"Posters on walls have become filthy and ugly. Therefore we consider it necessary to regulate the attachment of posters, taking into consideration the maintenance of cleanliness and beauty of the streets, buildings and installations. Some specialists have determined to prepare a study putting a limit to the current chaos, designating special boards which will be hung in specific places, and prohibiting the affixing of announcements except on these boards.

"It is also necessary to regulate announcements on light poles and highways which can constitute a danger to traffic safety.

"What applies to posters applies also to signs and all similar forms.

Civil Defense

"In view of the weakness of the public sector in this field, because it is deficient in the necessary agencies and equipment, the Lebanese Forces have resolved to face this situation by establishing fixed emergency units in all areas and support units composed of:

1. Military first aid vehicles.

2. Fire trucks equipped with ladders.

"3. Tanks.

"4. Teams trained in lifesaving and first aid.

"In the event any fires occur or road or other accidents take place in the al-Ashrafiyah section, citizens may contact the following centers:

"Fire station, telephone 216216.

"Lebanese Forces police station /text ends at this point./ "

11887
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

PHALANGE PARAMILITARY FORCES--The Phalange Party's operational and media preparations reached their climax yesterday, beginning with a step to replace the official police by autonomous police in areas where the Phalange militia, or what are known as "the Lebanese Forces," dominate, in the context of a comprehensive plan to take over the Phalangist statelet and eliminate the government's role there. The Phalange Party prepared to deployment its "police" in its "areas" today with two statements issued by the "public service agency of the Lebanese Forces," in one of which concentration was placed on a meeting held by the general manager of the domestic security forces, Maj Gen Ahmad al-Hajj, and the chief of the "public service agency of the Lebanese Forces," Nadim Shuwayri. The first statement called upon truck and heavy equipment owners and drivers to paint the rears of their trucks and equipment with special phosphorescent paint to reflect light and guarantee traffic safety at night. It expressed the readiness of the day shift work teams of the public service agency to perform this work starting today. The second statement announced "a meeting held between Maj Gen al-Haff and Shuwayri, followed by an expanded meeting with the traffic group officers, during which methods which will help to control matters and violations were studied. It was decided to bring in concentrated traffic police patrols starting Tuesday the 16th (today)." The statement did not say whether the patrols which would be deployed in the streets belonged to the security forces or the Phalange police system. However, Phalange sources have mentioned that "One hundred Phalange motorcycles painted white and driven by 100 Phalange personnel dressed in uniforms similar to those of American police will take charge of regulating traffic and preserving security in the eastern districts." /Text/ /Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 16 Sep 80 p 4/ 11887

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

OFFICIALS OF FORMER REGIME DETAINED--Several Mauritanian personages of the former civilian regime and various opponents, including black activists who are fighting for the defense of the right to speak French, remain at present detained without trial in Mauritania. Among them are Hamdi Ould Mouknas, former minister of foreign affairs; Mohameden Ould Dabbah, Baro Abdoulaye, Abdallah Ould Ismail, former ministers under house arrest since last April. Also still incarcerated are: Tidjani Ould Kerim, professor; Mohameden Ould Icheddou, clerk of the court; Abderrahmane and Ahmed Ould Daddah, both economists; Abdallah Ould Bah, physician; Seydou Kane, research worker; Fadel Ba, educational inspector; Youssouf Ba, entrepreneur; Mbodj Samba Bedou, educational inspector; Sao, student. [Text] [Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Oct 80 p 5]

CSO: 4400

PARTY CONGRESS DISCUSSES NEW REVISED 5-YEAR PLAN

Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 14 Oct 80 p 2

/Article: "Main Directions and Indicators of the Second Amended 5-Year Economic and Social Development Plan for 1981-85"/

/Text/ The exceptional general conference of the Yemeni Socialist Party discussed the main directions and indicators of the second amended 5-year economic and social development plan for the years 1981-85.

The discussion included 14 interventions which comprised an analysis of the current situation, the overall development indicators of the national economy, industrial and agricultural development, fishing, productive capabilities, transport and communications, foreign and domestic trade, social development, investment allocations and financial resources, labor and staffs, and regional development.

The conference stressed that promulgation of the 5-year plan will take place as a reflection of the social and economic policy that was presented to the first conference of our party, which it ratified, and affirmed the directives of the Central Committee at its various sessions. The conference also emphasized that promulgation of the plan will take place in order to resolve the most important issues facing us in the current stage, which are:

1. Creating suitable conditions for establishing the material and technical base of the domestic economy, in particular completing construction of the basic structures and guaranteeing balanced development of the branches of the economy. 2. Raising the standard of living of the people as a major developmental goal.

3. Strengthening the state and cooperative sector effecting fundamental changes in the composition of the domestic economy and the social structure for the benefit of the productive sectors and the qualitative development of the workforce. 4. Raising the cultural level of the people, uplifting spiritual life and /illegible/ social consciousness.

5. Constantly building leadership and intermediate staffs for the sake of the sound operation and optimum use of the means of production.

What Did the First 5-Year Plan Achieve?

The conference paused before an analysis of the current state of the domestic economy, as expressed by the basic achievements of the years 1974-78 as well as the two years 1979-80 of the first economic and social development plan. The conference's analysis of the results of the implementation of the first 5-year plan pointed to noticeable successes, in spite of material and financial difficulties and some social problems. The volume of social output in 1978 increased by about 50 percent above the 1973 level; national income increased by 72.6 million dinars in the years 1974-78. Per capita income in fixed prices increased from 35.5 dinars in 1973 to 55 dinars in 1978, an increase of 25 percent, resulting in an increase in consumption and an improvement in the citizens' standard of living over the 1973 level.

The conference also observed successes in the first 5-year plan in the mission of radical changing the structure of the national economy. During the years 1974-78, social production in industry in current prices, rose 167 percent, fish production 137 percent, agricultural production 30 percent, building and construction 318 percent, transport and communications 234 percent, and commerce, restaurants and hotels 114 percent.

However, the conference noted that it was not possible to make radical changes in the structure of social production in the years of the first 5-year plan. Nonproductive branches continued to account for 39 percent of the value of gross social production. Conversely, the conference noted that great changes occurred in the contributions of various forms of ownership, giving proof of deep transformations in production relationships. An example of that is the increase in the relative weight of the state sector from 25 percent in 1973 to 52 percent in 1978.

The conference paused with great interest before an analysis of domestic economic development in 1979. It was observed that little use was made of productive capacity in a number of productive branches, production costs increased, and production accessories were misused. These and other causes affected the realization of the goals of the 1979 plan, and only a minor growth rate was achieved in comparison with the planned growth rates, especially in the material production sectors.

What Are the Overall Indicators of the Plan?

The conference discussions stated that preparation of the modified second 5-year plan constitutes a more advanced stage in planning activity, since it has given care to eliminating errors and negative elements which appeared in previous activity.

This was prepared in accordance with realistic reports, and the level of employment of capabilities poses obvious tasks for the future development of all branches of the domestic economy. In the light of the implementation of plan tasks, the conference considers that an increase of about 61 percent will be achieved in social output and about 62 percent in productive national output--percentage increases which are in agreement with the basic indicators of the plan, which the Central Committee of the Yemeni Socialist Party ratified at its session held in April 1980.

The conference's interventions showed that at the same time the next plan will be striving to increase gross social output, it will aim at increasing the activities of social and cultural services, improving the quality of these services, and developing the general forces. The conference considers that implementation of the plan will lead to an increase in the role of the state sector and the cooperative sector, so that it will be possible for them both to continue the leading role in implementing the plan.

Those attending the conference affirmed that implementation of the revised second 5-year plan will require:

Mobilization of all the material, financial and productive powers and resources available to the agencies of the party and the state.

Concentration on such basic essential methods as raising work productivity, creating sound relations between production and wages, creating staffs, and using the best means for holding people to account economically.

A positive, effective position on work, which is the cornerstone of the implementation of the plan and attainment of its goals.

Industry: Difficulties and Scope for Solving Them

In the light of the amended second 5-year plan, the value of industrial output will increase by 81 percent as compared with its expected 1980 level.

As regards electric power generating projects, the conference, in the light of its discussions of the plan, stressed the utmost importance of fulfilling the citizens' needs in order to develop all branches of the domestic economy. Technical conditions, alongside a delay in the establishment of new plants, has led to the creation of the difficult circumstances the country has gone through lately.

An increase in the volume of electric power production of about 90 percent in 1985 over 1980 will result from the implementation of the plan, and water supply projects will occupy an important place in the plan. The plan will give greater attention to industries which use local raw materials, such as textiles, clothes, cigarettes, and salt. During the plan a start will be made on construction of the cement plant, which will have a capacity of 250,000 to 300,000 tons per year.

In the field of oil refining, the plan aims at refining about 12 million tons during the years of the plan and at striving to reduce losses and cut unnecessary expenses in the Aden refineries. The plan will devote major importance to geological exploration activities. The conference observed that the results of these activities will have a basic role in defining the future development of the domestic economy.

Agriculture: Reality and Ambitions

In spite of the increase in state farms and cooperatives and improvement in their production, the conference considers that these results are different from the planned goals and are not in accordance with the volume of investments directed

toward this sector. Shortages are still prominent and are reflected in the drop of productivity per feddan, the failure economically to exploit new reclaimed lands, the confinement of a large area of reform lands, the survey of errors in pricing and marketing policy, and so forth.

In the context of the 1981-85 5-year plan, the basic mission of the agricultural sector will be the firm, constant increase in the volumes of agricultural output and the consolidation of the role of the state and cooperative sector in production. The agricultural plan indicators specify the attainment of a gross output valued at 47.2 million dinars in 1985 as compared with 31 million dinars in 1980, or a production increase ranging around 52.2 percent. This increase will result from the improved use of land and increased productivity of crops and livestock production. In addition, irrigation activities will be given an important status since the completion of irrigation activities over an area of 41,300 feddans is envisioned for the years 1981-85.

Fish and New Projects

During the first 5-year plan years, numerous projects were established in the realm of fishing. However, their productive capacities are being operated in an extremely low manner which leads to fluctuations in the volume of fish output and a deficiency in implementation of plan objectives. The reason for this may be attributed to negative features in the way of the organization of work in the fishing fleet, maintenance and operating problems, and so forth.

The 1981-85 plan aims at increasing fishing capacity to fulfil citizens' needs and increase the volume of fish exported. It will seek to develop the state sector in a greater form, so that its share may rise from 15 to 57 percent of total output, which is expected to reach more than 225,000 tons by the end of the plan. The conference considers that implementation of the goals in this field will basically depend on the adoption of a number of measures, such as the regulation of work, promulgation of schedules and monthly and daily plans, the granting of incentives for the activity of fishermen in the cooperatives, and other measures.

Housing and Construction

The conference noted a perceptible growth in the high volume of building and construction activities during the first 5-year plan, which in the last year of the first 5-year plan increased by 318 percent over its 1973 level.The state sector contributed the equivalent of 84 percent to total production, although the results attained in construction capacity, as the conference sees it, remained below the tasks set out, which are constantly increasing, and did not keep abreast of progress in the technical material base of the domestic economy, and the social and cultural construction of the society.

The reasons for this are many. Among them is the newness and backward state of the construction organizations, the low level of use of construction machinery and equipment, the low level of work organization, deficiencies in the activity of local construction organizations, and so forth.

In the light of these conclusions, in order to eliminate negative features, the coming plan aims at concentrating on the most important projects, adopting measures

to develop the construction management system, providing the necessary machinery and equipment, and introducing different forms into construction. The volume of construction and installations will total about 210 million dinars, or double their level in the first 5-year plan. An effort will also be made to develop the role of the state sector, and more than 8 million dinars will be allotted to developing the productive base of the public construction organizations, which will lead to a doubling of their productive capacity.

Transport and Communications: Great Development

The conference interventions in the discussion of the coming plan described the great development which occurred in all branches of land, sea and air transport, postal service and telecommunications during the years of the first 5-year plan and the first 2 years of the second 5-year plan, 1979 and 1980. The interventions also showed an increase of 300 percent in the length of paved roads and a rise in the number of passengers and cargoes shipped by land, sea and air, although steamship transport still is deficient; the same could be said of development in the realm of domestic and foreign communications.

The coming plan will witness rapid development in all branches of transport and communications. An increase of approximately 3.8 percent in the volume of transport and communications output will be created through implementation of the plan during the plan period, as compared with the level anticipated in 1980.

Domestic and Foreign Trade

The conference discussions on foreign trade development stated that there has been a development in trade with the outer world in past years, although this development, as people at the conference view it, increased the country's economic development's reliance on sources of foreign financing, and not the contrary, since the measures adopted to develop the volume of exports did not yield the expected results. The volume of imports continued to increase at high rates while exports accounted for just 9.8 percent of total trade in 1980, as compared with 10.9 percent in 1975. This resulted in bringing the volume of the balance of payments deficit to 134.7 million dinars in 1979.

The coming plan is aimed at meeting the greatest possible amount of the country's import requirements. It is expected that the volume of trade will increase 45 percent in 1985.

In the light of the plan, rapid measures will be taken to improve work in the port of Aden and increase the port's efficiency and activity in coming years so that it can keep abreast of increasing foreign trade activity.

In the context of domestic trade, in the context of the goal of meeting citizens' needs, the conference noted an increase of 90.5 percent in the volume of commodity dealings in retail trade in the 1975-80 period. This totalled 193.6 million dinars, for a per capita share of 101.17 dinars, in 1980.

The anticipated increase in the material production sectors during the plan will respond to an important part of the citizens' needs.

The future plan is aimed at increasing the volume of retail trade commodity transactions by 51 percent and it is anticipated that local goods' share /will increase/ by 38 percent. According to the plan, per capita consumption of fish, meat, dairy, poultry and other products will rise and the marketing of shirts, shoes, detergents and so forth will increase.

Social Development and Radical Transformations

The exceptional conference's discussions of the first 5-year plan underlined the occurrence of radical transformations and positive changes in the field of education, health, culture, radio, broadcasting and the press as well as in the fields of tourism, housing construction and municipalities. In the field of general education, the number of students totalled 250,000 in 1980 and they were enrolled in 929 unified schools.

The coming 5-year plan is aimed at expanding the base of democracy in education and at working to propagate education. The number of students in the schools will rise by 56 percent.

During the coming period the anti-illiteracy and adult education program will continue and attention will be given to raising the level of the productive forces.

In the field of public health, health institutions developed during the previous plan, since the number of beds in hospitals and health centers came to about 3,000 in 1980; the share of every 10,000 citizens totalled 15.5 beds as compared with 12.8 beds in 1975.

The coming plan will strive to continue developing health services and raising the health level in the country. Construction of new hospitals with a total capacity of 1,100 beds will take place, along with nine health centers whose total capacity will come to 320 beds and the construction of 51 primary health care centers and other services related to health guidance and indoctrination and so forth. The culture and tourism sector also experienced a perceptible development, in an increase in the number of cultural centers, exhibit halls, movie houses and hotels; in this sphere the 5-year plan will seek to develop and complete five centers in the various governorates of the republic. The plan also aims at building and constructing two hotels in Hadramawt, Aden, and so forth.

In the field of radio, television and publishing, the coming plan aims at building a new radio transmission station with a capacity of 750 kilowatts. In the field of television it also aims at starting color television transmission and boosting television transmission. In the area of publishing and printing, the central press project will be carried out. The coming plan will continue the efforts the first plan began in the construction of residential apartments for citizens. In accordance with this plan, 5,580 residential apartments will be built to respond to increasing housing requirements and special attention will be given to consolidating the role of the municipalities and public utilities in the main towns, striving to develop athletic fields, and making the necessary preparations for constructing a central sports stadium in the Governorate of Aden.

Have Investment Allocations Realized Their Goals?

The conference noted the faltering and fragmentary nature of investment allocations in the first 5-year plan. This resulted in an increase in plan costs, delayed implementation in the schedules of other projects, the appearance of concomitant negative features such as the lack or deficiency of detailed operating schedules, low competence in organizing work and administration, and so forth. Through a comprehensive evaluation of the previous plan and the plan of the past 2 years, indicators were set forth with respect to investment allocations for the modified second 5-year plan, proceeding from the performance of all necessary calculations to guarantee effective investment.

Total estimated volume of investment allocations in the plan years 1981-85 will come to about 425.6 million dinars, an increase of 118 percent in comparison with the previous 5-year plan.

The conference considers that implementation of the investment plan will require administrative development, improvement in the performance of units, an increase in the level of concern, implantation of health rules, pursuit of orderly methods in work organization, continuous provision of incentives for productive persons, and other means to guarantee development of production.

Investment allocations for the 1981-85 plan:

Industry, 32 percent.

Agriculture, 14 percent.

Fish, 8 percent.

Building and construction, 13 percent.

Transport and communications, 17 percent.

Services, 17 percent.

Financial Resource Development

In its discussion of the coming plan, the conference considers that the issue of expanding local financial resources occupies a high degree of importance in the current stage of development in responding to increasing investment allocation requirements, especially in the sphere of material production.

In the first plan years, 231 million dinars were allotted to the development budget. Of that, actual spending by the end of the plan came to 196 million dinars, and the bulk of this amount, or 78.4 percent, was from foreign sources. In 1979, 62.7 million dinars were allocated to the development budget, of which 47.3 million were from foreign sources.

The coming plan aims at bringing local financial resources up to 30 percent of the total, which will come to about 425.6 million dinars; local resources' share will

come to about 128 million dinars, and the remainder will be covered by foreign resources. Estimates of development resources are as follows:

Local resources	128 million dinars	30 percent
Bank loans	26	6
Foreign sources (labor and staffs)	297.6	70
Government sources	84	19.6
Self-financing	18	4.4
Total	425.6	100

During the first 5-year plan, as the conference vouched, important steps were taken to employ workers, who came to 79,000 persons. However, this figure is to be considered minor in comparison with the workforce which does not contribute to the productive process, since the volume of human resources came to about 856,000 people in 1980.

The conference also noted the obvious disruptions in the system of payment of wages, the lack of connection between production and wages and the failure to make optimum use of manpower. Therefore the coming 5-year plan is considered to possess a great degree of importance since its major task is considered to be the optimum employment of manpower and a constant rise in output. The plan aims at increasing the number of people employed in the domestic economy by about 88,000 persons, of whom 86,000 will be in productive fields; thus the ratio of employed people to the population will reach about 60 percent. In this context, the coming plan aims at raising the productive level of labor in industry by about 25 percent, in agriculture by 25 percent, in fishing by at least 47 percent, in building and construction by 43 percent, and in transport and communications by 33 percent. The ingredients for achieving these results, as the conference views them, are numerous, including:

Raising the efficiency and quality of work.

Strengthening a positive attitude toward work.

Developing training.

Regional Development

The main tendencies in the years 1981-85 embrace the development of organizations and facilities in accordance with the circumstances and particular conditions of each governorate, along with the effort to increase the integration among productive branches in the framework of the governorates and the domestic economy.

The indicators of regional economic development rely on the general bases and principles which guide the domestic economy. On this basis, it is necessary seriously to strive to strengthen economic relations among governorates in order to increase

the effectiveness of the regional division of labor and increase each governorate's share in resolving the important tasks of the state and assuming part of its duties.

Achieving these tasks will require increasing the role of party and economic agencies and local administration agencies and determining officials and tasks which will have productive activity and plan tasks carried out by productive organizations and facilities.

Our party's exceptional conference, which discusses the main tendencies and indicators of the amended second 5-year economic and social development plan for the years 1981-85, considers:

That the main task before it is represented by serious unremitting activity to turn this plan into an important progressive step in the economic and social development of the country.

That conscious discipline and a deep understanding of the importance of the plan and dealing with it as a fixed program of the party and a law which must be carried out and applied creatively by all ministries, authorities and organizations are important, and that holding people to account in implementing this noble goal to guarantee the necessary conditions for subsequent development is important.

That one should strive for an increased leadership role for the party in economic life on all levels.

That the growing role which the working class and its allies the peasants, fishermen and other working people play in our country is important in the course of the daily persistent struggle to build a national economy on firm foundations.

That improving material and spiritual life depends not only on resources which can be provided by the state but also on the level of people's performance of the jobs and duties assigned to them.

11887
CSO: 4802

'KYODO' FEATURE ON SOUTH YEMEN CITES SOVIET ENVOY ON USSR PRESENCE

OW010141 Tokyo KYODO in English 0030 GMT 1 Nov 80

["Akira Tani, KYODO correspondent based in Cairo, visited the Yemen People's Democratic Republic (South Yemen). It is extremely rare for journalists from free world nations to be allowed to enter the country, which has been in very friendly relations with the Soviet Union. Following is what he reported from Aden.--Ed."--KYODO introduction]

[Text] Aden Nov 1 KYODO--The Port of Aden is situated at the southern-most tip of the Arabian Peninsula, near the point where the Red Sea meets the Indian Ocean. It watches over a waterway which is used extensively for east-west trade, and is therefore a strategically important spot.

As the airplane from Kuwait decreased its speed in preparation for the landing, the Port of Aden was clearly visible before a backdrop of rocky mountains. A dozen cargo vessels were in the docks, as well as a grey Soviet warship, with a dark black submarine alongside.

There is just one political party in control of the country, the Yemen Socialist Party, which opened a major congress in mid-September. At this, the second five-year economic development plan was formulated, and the cabinet was reshuffled.

Also at this congress the government of President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad [al-Hasani], who replaced Abdul Fatah Ismail in April, was considerably strengthened.

A diplomat commented that in the past six months the people appear to have become happier, this would seem to be because they have been freed from the tight ideological constraints of the Ismail administration, and now are full of hope for the economic policies of the current rulers.

The Muhammad government is attaching great importance to restoration of friendly relations with neighboring Arab countries.

Also, as one of the poorer Arab countries, with no oil resources, it is promoting an economic development plan which pledges friendship with the Soviet Union and other socialist nations, but which also calls for economic cooperation from Western countries. South Yemen is now taking a modern, flexible approach.

In October last year South Yemen and the Soviet Union signed a 20-year friendship treaty, strengthening relations between the two countries. South Yemen has thus now become the most important strategic base in the Indian Ocean for the Soviets.

But if we look around Aden, the Soviet presence seems to be rather minor. It is rare to see uniformed Soviet military personnel in the city.

Apart from the Soviet warship--a maintenance vessel--and the submarine, there are no signs in the city of onshore or offshore military facilities.

At Aden airport only a dozen or so Soviet aeroflot and cargo airplanes were lined up.

Soviet military authorities emphasize that they do not have a military base in the country, and that they use only South Yemen's own facilities.

According to a Japanese man engaged in the fishing industry in South Yemen, Soviet nuclear-powered submarines can sometimes be seen in the harbor, while warships of the 6,000-ton class are also occasionally repaired at a floating dock outside the port.

In addition, around the island of Socotra, in the Gulf of Aden, Soviet warships issue strong warnings to Japanese squid fishermen not to approach the island. It seems that Socotra has become a Soviet base.

According to travelers in the country, Cuba and other eastern bloc countries have sent soldiers to South Yemen, and they have established camps around the mountains in the north. And an extensive air force base is said to exist in the desert in the west of the country. But it was impossible to confirm these reports.

Advisors from the USSR and from East Europe occupy important posts in various government ministries and agencies, and there is no doubt that South Yemen is a member of the Soviet bloc.

On the other hand, many ordinary citizens expressed strong anti-Soviet sentiments. A taxi-drive commented: "I hate the Soviets. Things were much better when we were a British colony."

The main problem facing the country now is how to escape from poverty.

South Yemen became independent in 1967. In the same year the Middle East war led to the closing of the Suez Canal, and a flight of foreign capital and technology from the region. This caused severe and unique economic problems to the country, from which she has still not fully recovered.

In the main streets of Aden, half the shops are closed, with their shutters down. There is no sign of the city's previous prosperity.

British petroleum used to operate oil refining facilities here capable of handling 8,600,000 tons of crude oil per year. But these were nationalized in 1977, and now only about one-quarter of that amount is refined here each year.

The average annual income is dollar 320. It is less than half that of Egypt, which is also a poor country. South Yemen is 100 times poorer than some of the rich oil-producing states.

The second five-year plan calls for total investments of dollar 1,270 million, but surely it is going to be a problem to find such an amount of money.

So far Japan has contributed economic aid worth yen 985 million (dollar 4.7 million), mainly for the fishing industry and for the purchase of foodstuffs. This is more than what has been offered by any other free world country.

About 75 percent of the country's exports are made up of fish, largely squid and shrimps, worth dollar 12 million per year. Most of it comes to Japan, which developed the seas around South Yemen. And for a number of years Japan has been the country's main trading partner.

At the end of an interview with this correspondent, President Muhammad emphasized that South Yemen attached great importance to its economic cooperation with Japan.

However, the Soviet ambassador in Aden expressed the view that the USSR was not capable of providing sufficient resources to ensure the economic expansion of the country, and thus the Soviet Union would not try to block Japan or Western countries which wished to become involved.

The ambassador also said that Western countries criticized the USSR for establishing a military base in South Yemen, but America has 400 bases around the world.

CSO: 4820

INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS TO RELY ON LOCAL RAW MATERIALS

Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 14 Sep 80 p 1

[Text] Comrade 'Abd al-Ghani 'Abd al-Qadir, member of the central committee and minister of industry, announced that the revised industrial 5-year plan, which will begin in 1981, will concentrate on new industrial projects which will depend on local raw materials. These projects include [new] plants for the production of building materials, such as cement and marble, and the modernization of the weaving and textile industries.

In a radio interview yesterday, 'Abd al-Qadir said that it is intended to develop consumer industries, such as mechanized bakeries and tricot mills, and produce new products at existing plants such as the al-Jundi Plastic Factory.

'Abd al-Qadir announced that projects provided for in the revised 5-year plan include: Expanding industry outside the governorate of Aden and establishing industries in rural governorates; and providing the essential requirements of industry, such as electricity, water, roads and other services. Regarding electricity projects included in the plan, 'Abd al-Qadir said that several of these projects will be implemented during the second 5-year plan, including: Completion of the Hadramaut Valley electric station; installation of an electric station in Abin, where work will begin within the next few weeks; implementation of the Mansurah station project; and construction of the thermo-electric station in al-Haswah. 'Abd al-Qadir pointed out that the plan includes conducting intensive surveys and preparing geological and hydrological maps of all regions of the republic to identify the possible availability of minerals.

In relation to petroleum, 'Abd al-Qadir said that a survey of two-thirds of the area covered by the plan will be (initiated soon?). This will be followed by the drilling stage.

As for the Aden petroleum refinery, 'Abd al-Qadir pointed out that the plan provides for its development to keep pace with modern refining operations.

9455
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

SOVIET-PDRY ECONOMIC COOPERATION--The joint permanent committee on economic cooperation between the USSR and the PDRY concluded its meetings in Moscow 2 days ago. In the course of the committee's 6-day meetings, the two sides gave a high rating to working relations between the two countries. They discussed effective measures to broaden and deepen these relations in the next few years. The two sides decided to continue, through active Soviet technical assistance, the development of industry, energy, agriculture, fish farming and the exploitation of natural resources in the PDRY. USSR-PDRY protocols were signed in this regard. In a statement to the Tass agency correspondent, brother Faraj Ghanim, minister of planning and chairman of the joint committee, said that "our people rate highly PDRY cooperation with the USSR, which is based on socialist economic guidelines directed in the first degree, at raising the workers' standard of living. Faraj Ghanim emphasized that the main emphasis in the working relations between the two countries is on agriculture and fish resources, on which Soviet and Yemeni experts are concentrating their efforts. He praised the tangible results of the mutual beneficial working relations with the Soviet Union. [Text] [Aden 14 October in Arabic 7 Sep 80 p 1]

CSO: 4802

ACHIEVEMENTS IN NATION'S INDEPENDENCE PERIOD CITED

Doha /sic/ AL-MAWAQIF in Arabic 1 Sep 80 pp 8-12

/Article: "On the Anniversary of Qatar's Independence: 9 Years of Achievements--Firm Bases for Cultural Takeoff"/

/Text/ A person visiting Doha now will feel that everything there has changed. Since 3 September 1971, Independence Day, Doha has been experiencing a comprehensive resurgence, proceeding firmly, forcefully and with determination toward vast horizons of progress and great hopes of building a modern state. Its struggle is not ceasing and its combat is not flagging, because its aspirations do not end and its dreams have no boundaries.

Therefore a person visiting Doha this year will find a different Doha from the one he saw last year or the year before. Life in Doha is changing rapidly. It is without a doubt changing for the better. These have not been my observations alone, after every visit to Doha, but it is the observation of everyone who visits Doha.

The Movement of Life Progresses forward

Over the period of 9 years which started on 3 September 1971--the life span of this young country--the movement of life has been progressing forward under the leadership of His Highness Shaykh Khalifah ibn Hamad al-Thani, the lofty emir of the state of Qatar, who has provided the state of Qatar with all the wherewithal for welfare and strength and has caused it, in a few years, to take its distinguished place as the beacon of comprehensive progress, development and resurgence in all political, economic, industrial, cultural and other vital spheres which have made the whole world look toward the country's steps and achievements with further appreciation and interest.

It was natural that the state of Qatar, following its independence, should set forth on a difficult road in a race with time, with a great goal and dreams that do not recognize the impossible, modernizing life in all sections of the country while preserving the values and legacy of its forefathers, which requires redoubled efforts and a firm conscious grounding.

Therefore, the flow of life has begun to surge on every spot of land in Qatar. The country has begun to make its way on carefully studied foundations in all spheres in order to prepare the Qatari people and give them every opportunity for knowledge, life and success. National industries have arisen, investment and

trade have been encouraged, and all powers have been exerted to expand its farmed area and develop its fish resources. It set its eyes on the need to place all the potential of its oil resources at the service of optimum development in the country, out of awareness that attainment of the higher goals and achievement of the requisite development must rely on an ambitious plan based on diversification of income sources and the best use of the materials in our good land, so that the great, genuine culture of these people may endure.

The Ambitious Plan and the Course of Development

The leader of the move forward has on more than one occasion expressed the state of Qatar's ambitious plan and the blessed course of development which hopes for the people's welfare, giving people everything that will cause their innovative and productive powers to grow, stating:

"We in Qatar are in a race with time, to develop the resurgence of the country on the various industrial, economic, developmental and cultural levels. We want to build a strong industrial base which will gradually reduce our dependence on oil revenues. Our ambition is to build an industrial society in Qatar so that alternative resources to income from oil may be realized. We also consider the coming generations to be our bond and we will spare no effort to achieve this, although we insist that our economy be firm, in order that we may develop our country on solid foundations. From this premise, in this context, we are moving and our confidence is great that almighty God will crown our efforts with success in the service of this Arab country. I consider that what is being achieved, although great, is the accomplishment of one stage in a country like Qatar which does not believe that reforms and accomplishments have an end."

While economic power is an important pillar of the strength of the state, human power is the basic support on whose shoulders all the development and progress we dream of rise up.

Therefore all the accomplishments and reforms we see today in Qatar are aimed first and last at creating Qatari man, who will participate in forging the civilization of a bright tomorrow with all the movement, consciousness, bounties and lofty principles he has achieved.

Firm Bases for a Cultural Takeoff

For the sake of cultural takeoff in various areas of life in the near and distant future, the state of Qatar has been anxious, in building its youth--the material of its future and its real resource--to realize firm bases, among the most important of which are:

Absolutely free education in all stages, domestically and abroad, up to the highest educational degrees, in accordance with the abilities and powers of each student.

Equal opportunities for all the people of Qatar.

Continuous expansion in education, horizontally and vertically, to embrace all stages of it.

Permanent and constant raising of teachers' levels in terms of accreditation and preparation, with the cooperation of the University of Qatar.

Qatarization of leadership positions in the field of education and preparation and accreditation of young people for this role.

Constant development of books, curricula, and educational materials.

Developing school buildings to meet educational demands.

Preparation of female Qatari teachers to teach small children because of their knowledge of the nature of the environment and traditions and ease in talking to children.

Constant development of anti-illiteracy and adult education programs.

Formation of committees to set forth the educational policy of the state of Qatar and promulgate an educational development strategy.

This year the state of Qatar has allocated a most massive budget to education, totalling 769,424,000 Qatari riyals. Therein lies the best proof of the real nature of the continuing support for education in this young state, which is concerned with educating its people and their dependents.

The number of students in the primary, preparatory and secondary stages in 1979-80 came to 38,010, an increase of 2,350 over the previous year. The number of persons enrolled in anti-illiteracy schools came to 6,055, including 1,580 females. Private schools have been regulated by law.

The number of people sent abroad for university studies came to 2,422 male and female students in the same academic year, and their financial allotments were increased by 20 percent. The increase came to the same percentage for students coming to study in Qatar. At the same time, an amendment was issued on allowances for books, schools, references, and holidays for higher studies in keeping with the requirements of the constant increase in the worldwide cost of living.

This year the University of Qatar accommodated 1,210 male and female students, while 1,212 male and female studies enrolled in Arab, European and American universities, studying the various fields of specialization the country needs.

The number of people sent on scholarship for higher studies to receive a master's or doctor's degree came to 102 male and female students.

Six hundred thirteen male and female students have graduated on foreign scholarship, including 112 Qatari girls, among whom 23 have received master's or doctor's degrees.

Since its birth in 1973, the University of Qatar has been performing its constructive role of achieving an advanced educational level.

In addition, the University of Qatar has graduated numerous classes of Qataris who have assumed responsibilities in the country of performing constructive roles in the service of their nation.

This year, specifically, it supplied the greatest number of graduates; the number of graduates in the fourth class came to 328 male and female students in various fields of specialization, an increase of 30 percent over the previous year.

In 1982 the university will move to its new location after completion of its buildings, which have been designed in accordance with the most modern systems and educational and social resources.

The Role of the Young and Youth Care in All Fields

Emphasizing the role of the young, and care for them in all fields, including the sporting field, His Highness the Emir of Qatar has issued a decree establishing the Higher Youth Care Council and has assigned the chairmanship of the council to his crown prince, His Highness Shaykh Hamad ibn Khalifah al-Thani. He has assumed the responsibilities of caring for the young, the hope of the present and the treasure of the future.

Before the council assumed its tasks, his highness the emir of the state ordered the construction of a sports city considered the first of its kind in the region; that is al-Khalifah Sports City, which contains a sporting stadium which can accommodate about 40,000 spectators. Its playing field witnessed the Fourth Gulf Soccer Championship Series in 1976. In addition, there is an enclosed auditorium and a model swimming pool and work is now underway to construct modern buildings for clubs which will be built in accordance with the most modern international specifications.

In order to organize and guide youth activities and aspirations, the olympic committee and sporting federations for various sports have been formed.

The Most Important Pillar for Diversifying Sources of Income

It was natural that the state should realize that industrialization is the most important pillar for diversifying sources of income. Therefore it was necessary to use oil revenues and natural gas resources to build light and heavy industries.

Since oil has constituted a basic buttress of this country's income, this vital sector has enjoyed the utmost attention. Among the most prominent features of this attention was the historic decree which His Highness the Emir of the State of Qatar announced, calling for total national dominance over the country's two natural resources, oil and gas. This attention also manifested itself in the establishment of the Qatar General Petroleum Organization and its subsidiary companies, which performs all activities related to the production, processing, marketing and storage of oil.

Now that the state of Qatar has attained complete dominance over its natural resources and complete ownership of revenues from these resources, it has begun earnestly to act to develop and expand industries based on oil and gas. At the present time oil policy in the country has been aimed at preserving its rate of production, which comes to about half a million barrels a day aside from gas production, out of concern to preserve the production level and guide consumption. The state of Qatar has also joined the vanguard of countries which are playing a prominent part in the area of oil industries within the Organization of Petroleum

Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), for the sake of a better life for their peoples and the peoples of the developing countries, and also in order to bear responsibility toward the stability of the economies of all the peoples of the world.

A glance at the industries now existing in the state of Qatar will cause us to realize the extent of the efforts which were made in past years.

Iron and Steel

The iron and steel factory which was opened in 1978 achieved record production figures last year. The plant's output, at startup, was 133,000 tons of iron rods; that rose to 379,780 tons in 1979, an increase of 42,780 tons /sic/.

Fertilizer Industry

The first fertilizer plant began production in 1974 and cost 360 million Qatari riyals. As a result of the increasing demand for its output in world markets, which totalled 900 tons of ammonia and 1,000 tons of urea per day, it was decided to construct a new plant of two units, and that was opened in June 1979, raising production to 497,158 tons of urea fertilizer and 371,000 tons of ammonia.

The Oil Refinery

In 1982 work will end on the project of the third oil refinery, whose productive capacity will come to 50,000 barrels per day, covering local consumption requirements up to 1995. Its costs total about 800 million Qatari riyals. Entering into the scope of these costs is the asphalt plant which will be attached to this refinery.

One should bear in mind that the second refinery, which was constructed in 1974, began with a productive capacity of 6,200 barrels per day and its production rose to about 10,000 barrels per day in 1977.

The first refinery, which was built in Umm Sa'id in 1953, operates at a capacity of 600 barrels of kerosene, gasoline and diesel fuel a day.

Cement Plant Production

Production increased noticeably in the three current furnaces of the cement plant, and the production of the Qatar National Cement Manufacturing Company last year totalled 237,000 tons of ordinary and reinforced cement, an increase of 20,000 tons over the preceding year.

Petrochemicals and World Markets

The petrochemical industry is considered one of the fruits of joint cooperation between the state of Qatar and France. Steps to carry out this cooperation began in the wake of the visit by His Highness Shaykh Khalifah ibn Hamad al-Thani, the Emir of Qatar, to France in 1975. This mutual cooperation resulted in the inauguration of the first stage of the petrochemical plant in the city of Dunkirk, France

in May 1979. Costs of the first stage of this plant came to 1.45 billion francs; the plant's output in this stage came to 225,000 tons of ethylene and 140,000 tons of polyethylene per year. In the second stage its production came to 450,000 tons of ethylene and 280,000 tons of polyethylene.

At the end of this year, the petrochemical complex will be inaugurated in the industrial zone of the town of Umm Sa'id, producing 280,000 metric tons of ethylene and 140,000 tons of polyethylene per year. The complex will also produce 50,000 metric tons of sulphur per year. Its costs came to 2.5 billion Qatari riyals and it lay within the scope of heavy industries.

Natural Gas Liquefaction

The liquefied natural gas project, considered the biggest industrial project in Qatar, will be inaugurated this year. It consists of two integrated units, one to liquefy gas from the onshore fields, the other to liquefy offshore gas, the Qatar General Petroleum Organization has supervised the construction of this project, work on which took 5 years at costs of 1.7 billion Qatari riyals.

Medium and Light Industries

Among the medium and light industries whose birth we have witnessed in the state of Qatar in recent years are the organic fertilizer plant, which began production in 1977 under the supervision of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, grain mills, the plastic sheet plant, and other industries which the government supports--indeed whose establishment it plans, so that the public sector may benefit from the economic studies carried out by the Technical Center for Industrial Development on the establishment of 18 medium and light industries in the country in addition to the major facilities it offers to anyone who assumes the onus of establishing any of these projects.

Stimulating Commercial Activity Domestically and Abroad

In the sphere of stimulating commercial activity domestically and abroad, the state of Qatar is preparing suitable conditions by establishing such vital facilities as the Qatar Monetary Authority, which carries out the monetary policy of the state and conducts oversight on banks, as well as devoting attention to the application of organized measures for the commercial activity of all commercial organizations and firms through the Commercial Registry Department of the Ministry of Economy and Trade, with the objective of bringing this economic activity to a level which is in keeping with the country's economic and social development.

Agriculture and the Hopes Founded on Its Development

While industry and trade are the nominal goal of development, agriculture, and the hopes founded on its development, have caused the state of Qatar to devote great attention to increasing the area farmed, especially since the area farmed in the country totals about 7,000 hectares, while the land suitable for farming totals 28,000 hectares.

Therefore, efforts are being directed to establishing experimental farms to study and improve agricultural production, increase sources of fresh water and lay

irrigation systems. More than 1,600 wells have been drilled in numerous areas of the country and water research has been carried out on more than 466 farms to estimate the volumes of water used by 700 wells each year.

In the fields of scientific research, we see substantial efforts; necessary experiments are going on under the supervision of specialized experts to confirm seed types before delivering them to farmers.

The state of Qatar is interested in productive farming in the two government test farms in the north, which produce vegetables. It is also interested in planting forest trees, adding new types of vegetables, employing modern mechanization to overcome the manpower problem and studying the best ways to establish agricultural projects in greenhouses which are resistant to circumstances of the environment and climatic factors.

In the area of livestock production, a start has been made through livestock growers by providing them with the necessary fodder and animals with abundant productive capacity. There are a number of projects, including the use of pastoral shrubs and little trees suitable to the environment and climate in Qatar and the establishment of a farm for milk cows accommodating 300 cows yielding production of about 1,000 tons of fresh milk per year, with a dairy plant attached to it.

Preliminary tests which were made in the test farm at Wadi al-'Arin in the southwest of the country confirm that this area is fit for the potential production of livestock fodder such as Berseem, fine corn, pastoral grasses, and so forth.

Qatar is developing and expanding the sheep farm in Abu Samra, increasing the number of the sheep by about 1,000 head, increasing the area planted with green fodder and drilling three new wells. The number of sheep provided for rearing in the farm has risen to 3,500 head; in the future this will come to 13,000 head, which is the farm's maximum output. The farm's output was offered for sale for the first time in 1979. This year lambs from the farm's production were offered for sale.

The Qatar General Poultry Organization is preparing a study to raise its productive capacity to 25 million eggs and 2.5 million chicks a year. It now produces 10 million eggs and 1 million chicks per year and will cover local market requirements for eggs and chicken in full in the future.

In the field of animal health, the plan of the Ministry of Industry and Agriculture of the state of Qatar is based on establishing three veterinary hospitals, in the north, center and south, each of which will be equipped with a treatment and surgery unit to provide all necessary services to protect livestock.

The state of Qatar devotes exceptional attention to the development of fish resources, providing them with all the means of modern science which will enable them to increase production and raise the capability of fishing equipment.

It has decided to establish a new joint-stock fishing company which will provide resources for fishing by the most modern methods. The Qatar National Fishing Company property will be included in this company.

The Fisheries and Fish Department is also carrying out some repairs on two fish and shrimp catching vessels in the framework of plans aimed at increasing production and providing local market requirements. These two vessels, in addition to the existing ones, will be the nucleus of the joint stock company we mentioned, which will operate in the fishing field to achieve the desired objective.

Construction Activity Accompanies the Economic Upsurge

This economic upsurge in the state of Qatar has been accompanied by a construction activity which has enveloped the entire country. All Qatar has been transformed into an arena of incessant activity, buildings have risen, and roads have been built inside and outside the town. It has been only a few years since areas in the state of Qatar were linked by a road system, tourist hotels in the most modern architectural style were erected, the town of Doha came to resemble a capital where major businessmen, economists and visitors meet, and the most important conferences and symposiums began to be held there.

Social Services and a Better Life for the Citizen

For the sake of a better life for the Qatari citizen, social services are playing a prominent role in realizing all guarantees for the citizen.

Social care, improvements in the standard of living, and providing security for the citizen--all these goals and others are being achieved in a clear fashion in the society today.

For example, the state of Qatar is very concerned with providing sanitary housing for people with limited incomes. As a result of that concern, the country has started to include a number of expansive sections of ordinary housing which has been distributed to citizens in accordance with a well-drawn plan. Work is now underway on completion of construction on 1,000 ordinary dwellings in the ordinary housing project in the al-Dafnah area, and this year work is to be completed on the housing complex project in Umm Sa'id which comprises 220 apartments. It is also expected that construction will soon be completed on 60 ordinary houses in al-Jumayliyah.

These and other ordinary construction works are being completed at the same time as the state is distributing land to its senior officials and offering them all construction facilities such as loans and other services.

For the sake of the comfort of citizens, to provide all foodstuffs and consumer goods and to reduce the intensity of inflation, the state has been concerned with and has encouraged the cooperative system.

Health Care for Every Citizen in Qatar

The state of Qatar strives to provide health care for every citizen and resident in the country free of charge.

The health services project will be carried out in three stages by 1985. Health centers are being established in Doha and other towns. As we are aware, the

Ministry of Health is now working to spread the health registration system among all citizens and is resolutely applying the law on pharmacy profession practices.

The Media in Qatar and Their Role in Keeping up with the Resurgence

The media in Qatar are playing their prominent part in keeping up with the comprehensive resurgence, proceeding from Islamic values and principles, by inspiration of the cultural mission which guides Qatar's future aspirations.

Radio Services

In the field of radio broadcasting, the new radio station's studio building will be furnished with the most modern equipment and accessories at a cost of 16,684,000 riyals. This project will be one of the most prominent landmarks of the plan to develop broadcasting services for listeners inside and outside Qatar.

The second stage of the al-Khisah transmission equipment will be inaugurated; this will cover the Gulf region, North Africa, the countries of the Levant and Europe.

Television Transmission

Qatar Television, which opened 6 years ago, managed to win the first prize for documentary films and the third prize for miscellaneous programs in the first festival of television programs in the Arab Gulf states held in Kuwait this year.

Qatar Television in the coming year will witness large expansions. Two new studios will be inaugurated, one for dramatic production, the other to serve programs on Channel Two, which will be devoted to educational, cultural and foreign programs.

Publications and Publishing

These play a vital role, with a responsibility for presenting the achievements of the state in all fields locally, internationally and in the Arab context. They are in charge of preparing studies and research, issuing books and publications, providing pictures and data, and strengthening relations with the press domestically and abroad.

A strong foundation has been laid for the press in the country through the issuance of the new publications and publishing law which, in its provisions, concentrates on giving a strong push in support of the local press, giving it every opportunity for freedom to perform its great responsibilities toward society, and regulating all subjects related to publications and publishing.

Qatar News Agency

This now has correspondents in most Arab countries and important European and Asian capitals and has centers in the major world capitals, and as a result of all this has become a reliable news source. Everyone who has dealt with the news in all media and press organizations in Arab and foreign countries has witnessed this.

Culture and the Arts

The Department of Culture and the Arts has contributed to developing cultural and artistic activity in the state of Qatar, encouraging Qatari talent and dramatic activity and inviting numerous men of ideas and letters during its cultural season. In addition it holds local popular festivals and prints books on cultural heritage and children's books on the occasion of the International Year of the Child.

Elevation of the Level of Tourism

In tourism and antiquities, the Department of Tourism and Antiquities of the state of Qatar is assuming the task of organizing and developing the cultural and historical heritage. It is making studies on tourism to raise the level of tourism and antiquities in the country and is exerting efforts to discover archaeological works which resulted recently in the discovery of works which go back to the fifth milennium BC and the discovery of the al-Huwaylah fortress.

The Department of Tourism and Antiquities has started implementing a project for a tourist club on the water, a project to erect sun shelters on the coast and a project to repair historic and archaeological buildings. It has published colored tourist brochure in the Arabic and English languages.

The Qatar National Museum has become a true picture of the deep-rooted past of Qatar and its prosperous present. It is the first center of its kind for the study of the history of Qatar and the Arab Gulf region.

Thus we see that the state of Qatar, as it celebrates its ninth year of independence, is celebrating great achievements in all fields and continuous aspirations toward a better future for the people of Qatar on their precious land.

11887
CSO: 4802

COUNTRY EXPECTED TO EXPORT CEMENT BY 1982

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 6 Oct 80 pp 8, 9

[Text]

A "cement crisis" in Syria lasting more than a decade will end next year and Syria will become an exporter of cement by the end of 1982, according to Aziz Khalifa, Director of the Syrian State Establishment for Cement Production. Mr Khalifa told the Damascus daily *Tishrin* recently that the turnaround from being a substantial importer of cement will take place when a new cement factory at Tartous comes on stream. The Tartous plant, with four production lines capable of producing more than 1 million tonnes a year, will be the largest cement factory in the Middle East, Mr Khalifa declared. "Despite unforeseen delays, the first and second production lines will become operative in the 6th and 10th months of 1981, while the other two lines will start production by the end of 1982 or the beginning of 1983," he told *Tishrin*.

In Aleppo, meanwhile, the new Sheikh Said cement plant is in the experimental run phase. It will start production this year with an annual capacity of about 1 million tonnes.

Thereafter, Mr Khalifa said, Syria's Five-Year Development Plan does not envisage building additional cement factories. When self-sufficiency in cement is reached, Mr Khalifa said, Syria will shift its emphasis to a complementary industry – brickmaking.

Syria's first cement plant was set up in 1930. The National Company for Cement Production in Dummar, Damascus started with a daily capacity of 880 tonnes and annual production level of 275,000 tonnes.

The National Company for Cement Production remained the only local supplier of cement until 1951 when the Old Sheikh Said cement plant in Aleppo started producing an annual average of 212,000 tonnes. In 1960 the old Muslmiya Plant started production of 117,000 tonnes per year, and in 1961 the Rustin Cement Plant in Homs became operative, supplying 115,000 tonnes annually.

In 1965-66 Syria's cement industry saw the coming on stream of two new plants: the Burg Islem plant in Latakiya with an annual capacity of 86,000 tonnes and the Hama Cement Plant with a capacity of 122,000 tonnes a year. Between 1966 and 1976 no

cement plants were set up in Syria. Existing plants had to meet local requirements until 1968 when imports became inevitable. In all, Syria's six cement plants produced between 925,000 and 1 million tonnes per year.

Until the end of 1968 Syria's cement plants covered all local demand and achieved a surplus of between 22,000 and 60,000 tonnes a year. But consumption rose sharply when the Euphrates Dam Project was launched early in 1969 and as a result of the ambitious projects under the Third and Fourth Syrian Development Plants and a boom in domestic construction. In 1969 Syria started importing cement at an average rate of roughly 200,000 tonnes a year. Imports of cement rose to 350,000 tonnes in 1972 and 1 million tonnes in 1975. In 1979 Syria imported 1.5 million tonnes of cement. The phenomenal growth in cement imports created bottlenecks in its distribution. Delays in delivery owing to the inadequacy of cement unloading facilities at Syrian ports gave rise to black marketeering and chronic shortages.

Between 1958 and 1968 consumption of cement in Syria more than doubled from 375,000 tonnes in 1958 to 500,000 tonnes in 1960, 630,000 tonnes in 1965 and 900,000 tonnes in 1968. But this rapid growth in consumption could still be met with the gradual increase in capacities. In fact, surplus output continued to be exported until 1968 as production rose from 400,000 tonnes in 1958 to 600,000 tonnes in 1960; output was 650,000 tonnes in 1965 and reached 930,000 tonnes in 1968.

But Syria's cement consumption has been rising steadily since 1969. Growing from 900,000 tonnes in 1968 to 1 million tonnes in 1969, Syria's cement requirements increased three-fold between 1969 and 1979. Local production meanwhile was almost stationery between 900,000 tonnes and 1 million tonnes, until 1976-77, when factories at Aleppo and Muslimiya went on stream. These plants added 600,000 tonnes to Syria's annual output of cement, which reached 1.5 million tonnes by 1978. Between 1979 and 1980 a second cement plant at Muslimiya started production and the Adra Plant in Damascus became operative, thus raising Syria's cement output to 2.350 million tonnes this year (production was at 1.850 million in 1979). During the Fourth Economic Development Plan covering the period 1976-1980 Syria saw an increase in the production of cement that exceeded 900,000 tonnes.

Prospects for renewed self-sufficiency in cement production in Syria are therefore promising. Capacities will be supplemented by new plants covered by the Fourth Development Plan, but which for unknown reasons were delayed and are expected to come on stream as of 1983.

The growth in consumption of cement, however, rose by a larger increment during the Plan period. The shortage in supply amounted to 50 percent of consumption in 1976, when 1.1 million tonnes were imported. The gap fell to 39 percent of local consumption in 1977, and to 38 percent in 1979. This year imports are expected to reach 17 percent of local consumption as only 500,000 tonnes will be needed, although consumption this year is three times what it was in the early 1970s.

CSO: 4820

MZALI ADDRESSES COORDINATION COMMITTEES CONGRESS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 20 Sep 80 pp 1, 4

[Address by Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and secretary general of the Destourien Socialist Party, and the Coordination Committees Congress: "We Must Consider Targets and Programs Rather Than Individuals"]

[Text] Yesterday Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and secretary general of the Destourien Socialist Party, closed the Coordination Committees Congress.

The meeting on this occasion was held at the Party House in the Kasbah. It was attended by the members of the government and the Political Bureau, by a large number of Destourien cadres, and by candidates for elections to the Coordination Committees bureaus.

In a speech delivered on this occasion, Mzali noted, first of all, that this meeting was within the framework of the renovation of the bureaus of the of the Coordination Committees. This meeting, held at the Party House itself, is the sendoff of these committees, the prime minister added, also noting that this was not the first time that this was being done, for renovation is a party tradition. Actually, it constitutes proof of its democracy.

Democracy is confirmed through such occasions which offer the Destouriens the possibility to engage in self-criticism, review their accomplishments and obstacles encountered, and communicate with one another frankly and, eventually, give their trust to a certain number of candidates.

Mohamed Mzali added the following: "Ever since it was founded in 1934, the party has supported the democracy which it has never considered exclusively as a target to be reached at the expense of the people. On the contrary, it has always been a method for action. That is why I am proud to be presiding over this meeting in the course of which I would like to share with you some remarks which, I hope, will benefit us in the project we will be undertaking in the immediate future.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that the Coordination Committees congresses are taking place at a time when a decision has been made to summon an extraordinary party congress. The purpose of the congress will be to examine the prospects for the next decade and the options, predictions, and orientations of the next plan. It will sum up past accomplishments and earmark the way for the next decade, the third decade since Tunisia gained its independence.

In order to accomplish this, we must bear this meeting in mind. In other words, we must be prepared for it since it will be very important in terms of the formulation of the next development plan.

In this context it would be preferable to think of targets and programs rather than of individuals, for the plans and programs determine the future of the people, whereas the individuals are in the service of the people.

Mohamed Mzali added the following:

We must formulate criteria governing the choice of the candidates. First of all, the candidate must be a true Destourien in the full authentic meaning of the term. By authenticity we mean loyalty to the party, its chairman, and its orientations. Starting with 1934 it is this authenticity that has made the Destourien a person dedicated to serving the general interest, placing the fatherland above all other considerations, inspired by the sacrifices of our martyrs and following the example of the many Tunisians who are continuing to make sacrifices for the sake of the freedom and invulnerability of Tunisia.

Therefore, the candidates to be chosen must be those who are the most willing to make greater sacrifices and display the greatest altruism and dedication, and look at questions and problems from the national rather than regional, local, sectarian, or individual viewpoint, or from the viewpoint of "simple allegiance." We must also choose those who are the closest to us, i.e., those whose hands and conscience are clean, for those who are candidates for leading others would lack the required competence and efficiency should their statement lack credibility and, therefore, would become the laughing stock of those around them.

Actually, individuals vary greatly. Some of them are selfish, concerned with their own interests only. They do not worry us excessively as long as they obey the law. There also are those who would like to serve others. We demand of them model behavior and to be more concerned with others than with themselves.

Furthermore, the party's secretary general went on to say, we must see to it that our choices meet two requirements: The first is to choose candidates who know how to exercise national responsibility and who are true Destouriens. The second is not to neglect the young people and the new energy. Every member and every participant in the Coordination Committees Congress must ask his conscience in making his choice between the old party members and the many new energetic people who aspire with a healthy spirit to the assumption of such responsibilities, the more so since 50 percent of the Tunisian population is under 20 years of age and that about 60 percent of all Tunisians were born after independence. Therefore, we must balance the generation of the fathers and mothers and that of the children.

Every congressman must decide according to his conscience. This is the only attitude which will enable him to make his choice without any pressure and to avoid any violation of his dignity.

In addition to such considerations, we must take into consideration national unity. President Bourguiba has always pointed out that the party is not a party of social category but the party of all Tunisians. It is thus that since 1934 the party has always been a front rallying within itself all social categories, all generations, and the representatives of all areas.

Mzali added: The voters must realize that the party belongs to all Tunisians, i.e., the intellectuals and the nonintellectuals, the workers, the unemployed, the industrialists, the people in the liberal professions, the men, and the women. That is why the bureau of the Coordination Committee had not included representatives of a single social category such as the employees, for example, while excluding all others.

It would be desirable that all socioprofessional categories be represented.

For many years we have asked the members to include all social categories and fight any monopoly. We should not fear in the least to open wide the party's doors so that every citizen may find his proper place, thus bringing fresh air into the party. As to those who fear the entry of new elements within the party, they are showing through such behavior a lack of trust and displaying their inability to project their beliefs, for the more they are trusted by the Destourien members the stronger and united the party becomes.

Therefore, we must involve the greatest possible number of citizens, and of people with competence and goodwill within the party.

The party's secretary general pointed out, within this context, that the list of candidates for bureaus of the Coordination Committees, numbering about 1,300, includes only a small percentage of those representing liberal professions, workers, small farmers, and women. The first duty of the Destourien is to draw the citizens toward the party which offers the ideal framework for action, dedication and sacrifice. Mzali invited the officials within the various party units to pay particular attention to workers employed in people's plants. They must volunteer to educate and guide them. They will thus block the path to anarchy so that it may not reach the people's enterprises and would protect the national economy from all obstructions. They must also dedicate their efforts and energy to draw such people into the party which offers broad areas of action in which the workers can apply their energy. The party also offers favorable grounds for the triumph of right, freedom and dignity and for concretizing the noble objectives which are the targets of all patriots who are sincere and loyal to the fatherland. Therefore, the young people could find within the party the ideal framework for achieving their ambitions and for contributing to the elimination of injustice and insuring greater justice, democracy and dignity.

In addition to the interest in the workers and their guidance and affiliation with the party, greater concern must be displayed for secondary and university students and for the development of an involved Tunisian student, i.e., open to the party, with faith in the greatness of the party's message, believing that the path he is following is the proper one for reaching the targets.

The party's secretary general went on to say the following: All of us must dedicate ourselves to these basic questions, ignoring rumors spread by troublemakers, rumors which could affect our wishes....

As Destouriens, we must also have faith in ourselves and be aware of the fact that the activities we are engaged in are political and that the political battle could be won or lost not through physical force but rather through moral strength and faith in ourselves....

The reason that Bourguiba was able to win the battle against the colonizer was that he believed in the legitimacy of his struggle. His victory was on the psychological rather than the material level....

Pursuing this train of ideas, Mzali added the following: We are aware of the challenges and difficulties we are facing. How to proceed in order to win the battle and strengthen the party so that it may be able to carry out its obligations? Through faith in ourselves and in the legitimacy of our fight, acquiring the capacity to convince our opponents, to resist and to work with dedication in our service to the fatherland and the people.

The prime minister then discussed the mission of the Coordination Committees. This mission rests on two basic functions. The first is the role which such committees must play in order to be the mirror reflecting the concerns and aspirations of the citizens. This requires that the Coordination Committees members be in permanent contact with the people in order to be better aware of their complaints, i.e., to be able to express most sincerely their concerns and ambitions.

Following this line of ideas, Mzali cautioned the leaders of the different party structures against the "bourgeoisification" which has affected a number of political parties throughout the world and whose repercussions create a distance between the party and the people and broaden the gap separating them.

On this subject, he called upon the Destourien leaders not to reject their popular roots but to maintain them, following the example of President Bourguiba, which is the best example of such an attachment.

The party's secretary general indicated that the dialogue we are demanding would be effective only if it is based on trust among partners, even though the latter might share different opinions. This should not prevent them from being loyal to the same fatherland and the same party through their membership.

Actually, the Supreme Fighter has always called upon the leaders to intensify their ties with the people and to be always in the service of the fatherland and of all citizens, whether Destouriens or not. The difference between these two categories of citizens is that the Destouriens have mobilized themselves to serve the fatherland and the people more than the others.

The purpose of the tie which must exist between the coordination committees and the people is to strengthen their links and to avoid anything which could alienate them and, on a collorary basis, weaken the party.

Therefore, what is essential is not the number of officials but their competence and their influence. This is the object of the controversy in the matter of quantity versus quality.

As far as we are concerned, we prefer a smaller number of members who would listen more to the people rather than a plethora of members cut off from the people. This means that, henceforth, we must focus our attention on this aspect of the problem.

The second function, therefore, is the fact that the party is responsible and that the Coordination Committees are, consequently, responsible and must work to

strengthen a development awareness. This is a contribution to the success of our overall development programs.

The party has renovated its mission. Having achieved independence and dignity on the political level, it joined the struggle against underdevelopment and poverty. In this respect the Coordination Committees must act as effective instruments for overall development in all its aspects--spiritual, cultural, educational, social and economic. We must equally depict the type of Tunisian society we would like to build.

Considered from this viewpoint, development does not mean only the building of roads, bridges or schools, or toiling the soil. It becomes an activity aimed at promoting man on the psychological, moral and spiritual levels, for the aspirations of the Tunisian individual go beyond concerns for food, clothing and housing, encompassing other ambitions which he may be tempted to find in imported motion pictures, periodicals, or ideologies, should he fail to find them within the party. The type of overall development we desire is one which covers all aspects of the daily life and future of the individual. Therefore, satisfying material needs is not enough. We must also meet moral requirements.

Freedom, dignity and democracy are ways of life rather than simple aspects of daily living. They mean that one must know how to live, why to live, and what are the objectives of life? Even though the adults may be concerned by the material aspects of life, our children and our young people always remind us of such principles which must be always renovated and become our main concern. The party must attract rather than be attracted. It must lead rather than be led. The party must be in the vanguard and able to master the situation thanks to its moral force, providing that the Destourien member, whatever his level, can project his ideas, analyses and creative imagination. The party must be able to attract the young people and the workers, and to animate national life. Thus, thanks to the way the members project their convictions, it will be possible to eliminate the party's enemies and detractors without resorting to force. Indeed, when the Destourien member has the ability to project and persuade he can impose and promote his ideas and viewpoints. Such was the case with the Supreme Fighter when he took the floor at the party's constituent congress which was attended by the supporters of the old Destour. At that time the Supreme Fighter was merely an attorney with a frail constitution and of very modest means. Yet, he had won over the participants through his eloquence, the strength of his convictions and the clarity and timeliness of his ideas, thus gaining their support.

Those in charge of Coordination Committees must be deeply imbued with the national options and their targets. They must be sufficiently aware of the country's policy and the governmental programs in order to be able to argue in their favor and win over the trust of the others. This is a difficult task which requires a great deal of work, for belief must be tirelessly renovated. Like a teacher who cannot teach the same curriculum for many years using the same methods, the member must recycle himself. He must readapt his training through seminars and courses. We must take this into consideration in our programs and actions.

The second role of the Coordination Committees is to create "a development awareness" and be a link between the summit and the base, expressing to the summit the

complaints of the base and informing the base of the facts, programs, and possibilities related to development, thus contributing to the political orientation of the base. The purpose of all this is for the committee to be trusted by all.

Mzali added that if the members of the Coordination Committee are chosen on the basis of such criteria and if the purpose of the committee, the essence of political action and the method used in the dialogue are taken into consideration, and if we work among all categories and all generations we will achieve democracy, i.e, the exercise of sovereignty by the people.

This means, on the level of the individuals, that they must have the feeling of being citizens exercising all their rights and implementing all their duties, choosing their own destinies and being fully aware of superior interests and existing possibilities. Should we reach this stage we would begin to exercise democracy without even being aware of it. Actually, this is democracy while anything else is merely a slogan. In the light of all this we have defined our attitudes toward university students, workers, and adverse foreign currents. Such currents existed long before independence and were represented by parties. Our party has always ignored them. It has not been subjected to their influence without, for this, losing the trust of the people's masses.

The prime minister added: I had told those who had asked my opinion on party pluralism that I must, first of all, focus my attention on my own party, strengthen its foundations and its credibility. Two conditions must be met for our party to remain strong, and to be renovated and regenerated. President Bourguiba himself defined them by stating that the party could be young and renovated only if it remains open to the growing generations and rallies within it the new energies, so that no one is left aside with a feeling of bitterness that the party is for the privileged only.

The second condition is that the party must be in the vanguard of ideas.

By this token the party will have combined the new ideas and new people dictated or even imposed by reality and by the specific circumstances of the end of the 20th century. In fact, the geographic environment, our choices, our plans, and the times in which we live, characterized by multiple contradictions, call for new ideas in politics as in economics, in the social and the cultural sector, and even in our ways of action.

Personally, I am convinced that our party is strong by virtue of its historical legitimacy and great popularity.

While addressing you today, I am thinking of the immediate and more disitant future since we must adopt an approach to it.

The reality of the youth, of the working people around us, the difficulties we are facing, the results obtained through the improvement of the cultural standard of our children and the thoughts coming from the outside lead me to state that, more than ever, we must adapt ourselves to our reality, examine our consciences, and formulate new consistent and flexible ideas. This does not mean ideas contrary to those we have had so far. We must also avoid hardening and rejection of everything new.

Those in charge must display sufficient flexibility in their thinking and openness of spirit to remain open to new ideas.

One day someone came to me to explain to me the reasons for which he had censored a play. He claimed that the text included a replica which stated, "Long live freedom." I was unable to conceal my astonishment to this reaction and I told my interlocutor: "Our entire lives have been an endless appeal for 'Long live freedom.' This applies to the party's life as well. Have you reached a point where you are fearing the slogan of 'Long live freedom' while our party is that of freedom? Let us all say, 'Long live freedom' without fearing anyone."

The statement of the Supreme Fighter, presented yesterday in the "presidential directives" broadcast on democracy should be engraved and displayed in the schools and Destourien cells. I am convinced that had such statements been made by anyone other than Bourguiba they would have been qualified as subversive. Such is Bourguiba's true democracy, for he states that democracy allows every individual to express his view without fanaticism or presumption and without refusing to hear the views of others.

Fanaticism and presumption trigger resentment and hatred. Therefore, we must remove the roots of this resentment and this hatred before irreparable consequences have taken place and before matters have worsened, establishing what President Bourguiba has described as serenity of heart and mind.

The prime minister went on to say the following:

Force must not be used in matters of persuasion. Arguments and ideas can be fought only with stronger and more profound ideas and arguments. Thus, Islam spread because it conquered the hearts. This was not achieved through the force of arms. In the same manner, the Bourguiba message was disseminated and conquered the hearts of the Tunisian people only through good words and persuasion. We must support the Bourguibian authenticity, aiming at convincing others through arguments. Actually, this is the essence of democracy. Politics is only a means for action and a set of methods for the implementation of ideas and the concretizing of objectives and lofty values. It is a means and not an end. We are not professional politicians. Bourguiba has taught us always to be in the service of the people, for in serving his country he was not seeking the power. Bearing in mind the logic according to which politics is a means for achieving objectives, we are using politics and the power to serve the people.

"We shall not sit on the shoulders of the people to assume a comfortable position in the seat of power," he has said.

The loyal and dedicated members must be in the service of the people. They must not use the people to earn their trust.

We remain firmly attached to an open policy. In our view, this implies a concensus concerning a method of action requiring that the interest of the nation prevail and a consideration of other opinions even though they may differ from ours. Furthermore, it implies respect for the law and morality.

We are giving our actions humanitarian dimensions. It is thus that we shall work to secure a job to all those who were laid off as a result of the 26 January events and, particularly, the young people in the interior of the country, particularly those with families to support. We are banishing hatred and resentment. Openness means tolerance and the softening of calloused hearts. Every individual must feel charitable toward his neighbor. Such is the ethic of our party.

I have great hopes that the proceedings of the congresses will develop normally and that this feverish rush to positions of responsibility will calm down. In our view, responsibility is an obligation rather than a distinction. I hope that the "spirit of sportsmanship" will prevail in the course of the elections and that even those who lose the elections will be good losers and not consider this failure a defeat. Therefore, there should be no envy toward those who will have been elected, for these elections are a competition in which there necessarily is a winner and a loser.

"This new mentality must prevail in the balloting," Mohamed Mzali concluded.

5157
CSO: 4400

NEW SYSTEM DEVISED FOR CLEARING PAYMENTS AMONG ARAB STATES

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 11 Oct 80 p 2

/Article: "A New System for Settling Payments among Arab States"/

/Text/ Dr Labib Shuqayr, counsellor to the Arab Monetary Fund, announced that during the coming period the fund will prepare a working paper, with proposals and alternatives, on promulgating a system for settling payments among Arab countries.

He said that the working paper would be presented to representatives of Arab central banks for study prior to preparation of a final formula for the payments settlement system, which would be presented to the board of governors of the Arab Monetary Fund for approval.

Dr Labib Shuqayr pointed out that four international experts would come to the emirates in this context to set forth the draft of the proposed system for settling payments among Arab countries, by invitation of the fund.

He said that proceeding from the agreement on its establishment, whose fourth article stipulates that one of its basic tasks will be to settle current payments among member states in a manner strengthening the movement of trade among them, the fund has sent an invitation to these experts.

International Experts

These experts are Mr Triffin, who is one of the greatest modern economics scholars, backed the notion of a European monetary system, and is one of the most important people to participate in creating the European Payments Union.

He is also member of the International Economic Commission, which contains 30 of the most famous economics scholars in the world, and is a non-resident counsellor to the Arab Monetary Fund, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority and the Monetary Council of the Emirates.

The second expert represents the Bank of International Settlements, the bank in charge of the European Payments Union, which is considered tantamount to a central bank for central banks in the Western industrial countries.

The third expert is Dr Mukerjee, one of the most senior technicians in the International Monetary Fund and one of the biggest experts on the international monetary system.

The fourth expert is Dr Khayr-al-Din Hasibi of the Center of Arab Unity Studies, the independent organization which is provided with the most precise and thorough expertise on economic and political circumstances in the Arab countries and the special circumstances in each Arab country in isolation.

Strengthening of Trade

On the importance of preparing a system to settle payments among Arab countries, Dr Labib Shuqayr stated that the agreement establishing the fund calls for the allocation of adequate fund resources, paid in the currencies of member states, to furnish the necessary credit facilities for settling current payments among states in accordance with rules and statutes which the board of governors will approve, within the framework of a special account opened by the fund to this end, with the goal of strengthening the movement of trade among the Arab countries.

Restrictions on Current Payments

He stated that in 1979 the fund devoted special attention to studying the possibility of establishing a system to settle current payments among Arab countries, evaluating its probable effects on trade among Arab countries and reducing restrictions on current payments among member states.

In this sphere, the fund has made a study of efforts made in the framework of the Council of Economic Unity in the early seventies to establish an Arab payments union and evaluate the causes which led to the failure of the efforts exerted in this regard.

Studies of International Experiences

Dr Shuqayr added that the fund has also made a study of the historic and modern experiences of payments settlement systems, especially the system of payments settlement among developing countries. It was also concerned with studying the European payments Union, which had a major effect in freeing trade and current payments among European countries in the wake of World War Two.

He said that it is recognized that the effect of payments settlement systems on freeing trade and reducing restrictions on current payments is basically linked to the extent of opportunities they offer to countries participating in them to guide the use of their international reserves and lower the cost of the necessary financial transfers for paying commitments resulting from transactions among them.

Reducing Commercial Restrictions

It is also probable that multilateral payment arrangements within a group of countries will constitute an incentive to participating countries to reduce commercial restrictions among themselves, in view of the credit facilities they may contain, giving those countries an opportunity to finance the resulting imbalance in their regional payments without resorting to the imposition of restrictions on their commercial transactions with participating countries.

Dr Shuqayr concluded his statement by saying that it was also agreed that the clearing arrangements and payment settlement systems would not in themselves suffice to develop trade and commercial transactions among the participating countries, but are considered an auxiliary element in this field, if other conditions are present, especially the productive base for the goods and services the countries involved need.

11887
CSO: 4802

MARITIME ACADEMY OPENS IN NOVEMBER

EMIRATES NEWS in English, 26 Oct 80 p 3

[Text]

Sharjah, Oct. 25 : The academic session of the Arab Maritime Transport Academy, now located in Sharjah will commence from November. Batches of students have started arriving in Sharjah. Of the 200 expected for the course 67 have arrived.

Issa Masoud El-Mukaddimy, acting Director General of the Academy, said that these students were those who were already with the academy when the decision to shift the institution from Alexandria was taken. The students who begin their shore studies from November were at sea during the period of closure of the Alexandria institute.

The Academy, which comes under the Arab League, was shifted to Sharjah after a decision was taken to shift from Alexandria following the Egyptian government's decision to make peace with Israel.

The new session of the academy which will take in new cadets, will begin sometime in February 1981. Mukaddimy, said arrangements had been made to house the students while they pursue their studies here. The academy is located in a spacious block of buildings of one the Al Khan in Sharjah which will serve as both the students residence, place of study and also the administrative section.

At a recent meeting of the the academy officials in Sharjah the board chose Mustafa Wajt Talyara, as the new Director-General of the academy. Talyara is from Syria. The academy now has a teaching staff of 100 and has well equipped laboratories, machine shops and other facilities.

Mukaddimy, disclosed that the UAE had gifted five million dirhams to the academy for equipment. He said the Arab OPEC countries had also promised another five million dirhams.

Students at the academy are prepared for the Certificate of Competency (Licence) examination which would qualify them to work on board merchant ships as deck, engineering, and radio/electronic officers. It also prepares them for the upgrading examinations leading to higher Certificates of Competency such as Master and Chief Engineer certificates. - Training for shore based manegerial and executive positions is also given. Apart from this the academy undertakes to train technicians, seamen mechanics and electricians.

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'LE MONDE' CITES ALGIERS' 'IRRITATION' AT RUMOR OF MOROCCAN OVERTURES

LD301635 Paris LE MONDE in French 30 Oct 80 p 42

[Dispatch by D.J.: "Algiers Surprised at Rumors of Political Contacts With Rabat"]

[Text] Algiers--The rumors from Rabat reporting political contacts between Algeria and Morocco are being received with surprise and also some annoyance here. A Moroccan officer did visit Algiers 19 October, a reliable source confirmed, but he did not bring any message from President Chadli Bendjedid. His only mission was to convey the consignment of blankets and provisions sent by aircraft from Rabat for the Al-Asnam victims. According to informed circles Algeria had no reasons to refuse such a gift since it could be considered to be a disinterested one.

The rather loud political exploitation of this solidarity by Rabat is causing some irritation here. The fuss being made about "Moroccan initiatives" comes, it is stressed at a time when the West Sahara debate is opening in the UN Decolonization Committee. However, this is no coincidence. It is thought that King Hassan II wishes to appear to be a man of conciliation and dialogue. He also wants to make another attempt to win support for the idea that the Saharan affair amounts to a bilateral conflict between Algiers and Rabat. This idea has always been denied here, and there is no indication that this position has changed.

Algeria is still supporting the Saharans' struggle for self-determination as strongly as ever. If it is doing so with more discretion it is only because of the international recognition obtained by the POLISARIO. The Saharan Republic is now recognized by several dozen states, it has an absolute majority in its favor at the OAU and Algeria, whose arguments have thus won the day, has less need to "be seen in the front line." Algeria is still prepared, as it has always said it is, to help establish direct contacts and negotiations between the POLISARIO and Morocco and does not intend to take the Saharans' place. Furthermore the Saharans would not allow them to do so and they enjoy powerful backing from other quarters, as shown by the visit which a Saharan Democratic Arab Republic delegation is now making to Tripoli.

CSO: 4400

200 AFGHANS KILLED IN SOVIET BOMBING

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 23 Oct 80 p 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct. 22: About 200 Afghans were killed when Soviet MIG fighter jets and helicopter gunships blasted Farza a town north of Kabul earlier this month, according to a report in the Indian Express' newspaper.

The Express said bombing was "to punish the people for sheltering Afghan guerillas".

It quoted a witness to the attack as saying that half the dwellings in Farza, a town of about 25,000 people, were destroyed in the attack. Most of the residents fled to the safety of nearby mountains.

The witness told the newspaper in New Delhi that he saw a Russian MIG-21 exploding in flames near Farza. Some helicopter gunships were also hit by gunfire, he added.

He said that fruit orchards and standing crops in the area were destroyed by the raid.

According to a report from Kunar province, Russians launched heavy attacks on Dara Noor and Dara Paich in the first week of October, says a Press release by Islamic Alliance for Liberation of Afghanistan.

In Dara Noor, the fighting lasted two days. Mujahideen forced the invaders back and killed more than 200 Russians and Karmal soldiers.

Twenty Mujahideen were martyred. Villages and forests were destroyed by the heavy bombardments by Russians and about 300 sheep were killed. Russian troops and their partners were defeated in Dara Paich and Chapa Dara also.

Mujahideen launched an attack on Khurd Kabul prison about 10 kilometres from Kabul city. They released 42 prisoners, including some women, who were put in jail because of their anti-Government activities.

According to another report, Russian troops and pro-Government militia launched a strong attack on Logas area. Details of the fighting were not known. In one incident in Azraw Musj, Mujahideen destroyed five tanks and killed 30 Russians and 35 Karmal soldiers. Three Russian military officers were also killed. One of Mujahideen was killed and two were wounded. — PPI | APA.

CSO: 4920

HEAVY TOLL IN BATTLE AT GHORBAND VALLEY: SCHOOL GIRLS STONE RUSSIANS

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 19 Oct 80 p 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct. 18: Kabul school girls this week stoned Russian doctors and nurses arriving to vaccinate them and forced the Russians to leave their school, according to a report from Afghanistan.

One doctor and one nurse were slightly injured and four teachers and several students were arrested during the flare-up on last Tuesday at the Zarghana High School, said the report from a Kabul source who in the last has been accurate.

Refusing to be vaccinated by the Russians because of Soviet military occupation of their country, the girls chanted 'Russians go home,' 'Death to Brezhnev' and 'Death to Babrak, servant of Moscow,' the report said.

Their school, Zarghana, was prominent in the 'children's revolt' last April and May when school girls marched into the streets of Kabul and taunted Afghan and Russian soldiers. More than 100 young people were unofficially reported shot dead and thousands arrested.

The Kabul source earlier reported Muslim rebels repelled an attempt by Soviet and Afghan Government troops to capture a strategic valley during a four-day battle with heavy casualties on both sides.

The insurgents killed or wounded 400 Russian soldiers and hundreds of Afghan Communist Party 'volunteers' and tribal mercenaries during the fight to stop the Government from opening the route to central Afghanistan through Ghorband Valley, 80 to 180 kilometres (5 to 62 miles) north-west of Kabul the report said.—APA.

CSO: 4920

MAJOR SOVIET OFFENSIVE IN PAKTIA PROVINCE

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 25 Oct 80 pp 1, 5

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct. 24: Hundreds of Soviet tanks and armoured vehicles have launched a major offensive near Afghanistan's eastern border in the Paktia province.

The Russians opened the attack last week from Gardez, 62 miles south-east of Kabul across rugged Paktia province with the help of hundreds of Communist Party, "volunteers" and tribal mercenaries, said the report from a Kabul source that in the past has been accurate.

The report also described stepped-up Soviet bombardment of insurgent-controlled Logar province, south of Kabul in recent days. Many Afghans gathered for prayers on the Eid festival last Sunday were killed or injured during Soviet shelling of a mosque at Nearkh, south of Kabul, the report said.

Rocket-firing guerilla squads in Kabul in the past week, meanwhile, have attacked several party offices and at least four jeeps carrying party volunteer patrols, with casualties on both sides, the report added.

Two Soviet military officers and a senior official of the Afghan Finance Ministry were killed by Mujahideen in Kabul last week, Western diplomatic sources said in Delhi today.

They said reports of attacks on Russian soldiers and Afghan officials in the Afghan capital continued to reach the diplomatic corps there daily, despite Government and Soviet contentions that the country was turning to normal.

In the latest attacks, on the night of October 15-16 two Soviet officers and the Afghan official were shot dead in separate incidents in a Kabul suburb.

The Soviets confirmed reports that on the same day the car of the Afghan Information Minister was fired on in the southern Afghan town of Kandahar. A bodyguard was killed but the Minister escaped unscathed.

Other reports add:

Insurgents in Afghanistan have destroyed more than half the Soviet-backed Government's medical and educational facilities, diplomatic sources said in New Delhi today.

The guerillas hardly allowed provincial governments to function. As such, Government officials rarely travelled to the provinces from Kabul, the sources said.

The sources said there was no evidence to support the contention of the Russians and the Afghan Government that the country was returning to normal.

The sources said the Governors of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan and Jalalabad in the east had recently been replaced. Guerilla activity has been intense in both towns and the surrounding areas, and the sources said that heavy firing continued at night in Jalalabad.

Shooting was also heard at night and sometimes in the day at Ghazni, south of Kabul. Soviet troops stayed in their camps several miles outside Ghazni and only went into the town for shopping.

Guerilla forces in the mountains around Ghazni appeared to have some anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons.

Soviet leaders might have told Mr. Karmal during his recent visit that political infighting in Kabul was causing damage, the sources said.

There had been a continuing power struggle in Afghanistan between Mr. Karmal's Parcham (flag) wing of the ruling People's, Democratic Party (DP) and the mainly-rural Khalq Faction.

Meanwhile, night letters have reappeared in Kabul after an interval of several weeks calling on Afghan army officers either to openly declare their loyalty to the

Soviet-backed regime or join the rebels, Western diplomatic sources said in Delhi today

Quoting reports from the Afghan capital, the sources said that last Wednesday several Afghan army officers received the night letters asking them to stay in their barracks or residences on Oct. 27 to signify that they do not support the Babrak Karmal regime.

Last Sunday, students and teachers of Kabul University issued night letters calling for a Friday strike beginning yesterday to protest forced conscription and to demand the release of arrested students and others who have completed their terms in the army, the sources said.

Forced conscription was continuing in down town Kabul and residential areas, according to the sources. Last Thursday, a team of Afghan army soldiers shot dead a young man at Artechar, when he refused to accompany them to the army office for possible conscription. The sources said there was widespread speculation in Kabul of an impending change in the Government.

CSO: 4920

HIZB AL-ISLAMI LEADER STRESSES UNITY/RUSSIAN LOSSES

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 28 Sep 80 p 1

[Article: "Hikmatyar Claims 20,000 Russians Killed in Afghanistan; Mujahidin Destroyed 800 Tanks and 100 Fighter Planes and Helicopters; Islam Can Become Third World Power by Uniting-Kazi Husayn Ahmed"]

[Text] Abbottabad, 27 September (JASARAT Correspondent)--Engineer Gulbadan Hikmatyar, leader of Afghanistan's Hizb al-Islami said today that the Mujahidin are very encouraged by their efforts and will be awarded with victory soon.

He was addressing a press conference here. He gave a detailed picture of the present Afghan situation. Such as: Afghan Mujahidin were fighting Russians very bravely at each front; The battles are being fought now in central Afghanistan and in the areas bordering with Russia; The Mujahidin with their zeal for freedom and bravery are making the Russians lose confidence. Furthermore, they get modern weapons from the Russians and use them against them. He also said that so far, 800 Russian tanks, 100 fighter planes and helicopters and innumberable armored vehicles have been totally destroyed. According to one estimate, about 20,000 Russians have been sent to hell.

Mr Hikmatyar attended a tea party given by businessmen of Abbottabad Cantonment. Kazi Husayn Ahmad, general secretary of Ahia Alum Mansura, was the chief guest there. Mr Hikmatyar explained the Afghan situation here also. He said that every child in Afghanistan was ready to die for the Holy War that was being fought. God will give us victory.

Malik Umran, member of the cantonment board, said that we feel it our religious and moral duty to help the members of Hizb-al-Islami who came here leaving everything in Afghanistan. Mullah Kazi Hussayn emphasized the unity of Islam in his speech. He said that if all Islamic countries united they can become the Third World Power. He detailed the schemes that were being used to divide the Muslims and thus weakening them.

Kazi Husayn warned that there will be amazing changes in the near future. This is an important era when balance of power will shift and Islam has to decide which way to turn. Mr Allah Rakh Pal, president of the host organization, expressed his thanks to Kazi Husayn Ahmad, Engineer Gulbadan Hikmatyar, and his followers. The leaders of Hizb-al-Islami and Tahrik-al-Islami were addressing a large gathering at the Shehzada Bukhara Mosque. The following people addressed the meeting there: Mollah Haqani, Mullah Kazi Hussien, Mullah Abdul Huq, Kazi Pir Mohammad, and Amraj-al-Din.

7997
CSO: 4203

MUJAHIDEEN INFLICTING HEAVY LOSSES ON KARMAL GOVERNMENT

Quetta BALUCHISTAN TIMES in English 25 Oct 80 p 4

[Text]

Mujahideen in Afghanistan have destroyed more than half the Soviet - backed Government's medical and educational facilities in the country, western diplomatic sources said in New Delhi today.

The guerrillas hardly allowed Provincial Government to function as such Government officials rarely travelled to the provinces from Kabul, the sources said.

The sources said there was no evidence to support the contention of the Russians and the Afghan Government that the country returning to normal.

The sources said the Governors of Kand har in southern Afghanistan and Jalalbad in the East had recently been replaced guerrilla activity has been intense in both towns and the surrounding areas. And the sources said that heavy firing continued at night in Jalalabad.

Shooting was also heard at night and sometimes in the day at Ghazni, South of Kabul, the sources said Soviet troops stayed in their camp several miles outside Ghazni and only went in to the town for shopping.

Guerrilla forces in the mountains around Ghazni appeared to have some anti aircraft and ant - tank weapons. Travel on the Ghazni - Kabul road is feares convoy only because of Guerrilla attacks.

Soviet leaders might have told Mr. Karmal during his recent visit that political in - fighting in Kabul was causing damage, the sources said.

There had been a continuing power struggle in Afghanistan between Mr. Karmal's Paracham (Flag) wing of the rulling people's democratic party and the mainly — rural Khalq faction

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

MUJAHIDIN ATTACK QANDAHAR AIRPORT--New Delhi, 25 September (Radio Report/AFP)--Several soldiers of Karmal government have joined the Mujahidin in Afghanistan and they jointly attacked the Qandhar airport. The eight soldiers joining the ranks of Mujahidins gutted an oil tank under the leadership of a major. Several people were killed in the ensuing skirmishes. According to diplomatic sources in New Delhi, loud reports of explosions were heard in Kabul on Wednesday. These were followed by rifle firing. The next day tanks were also seen on Kabul roads. According to another report, the Mujahidin blew an electric power house near the capital city. AFP reports of strict security measure at Kabul airport. The airport was kept under strict surveillance of the army for several hours. This resulted in delayed flights. One diplomatic source reports that this security precaution was taken for a visiting Russian minister. The BBC referring to some diplomatic sources in Islamabad reported that members of Khalq faction are still being expelled from the party. Mayor of Kabul, Sayyed Allah Quyam and deputy minister of industry, Gulam Mohammad Rahim, have been fired. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 26 Sep 80 p 1]

AFGHAN OFFICIAL TAKES REFUGE IN PAKISTAN--A high official of the Afghan Public Works Ministry (Rais Tameerat Wazarat Fawad-i-Aama) Dr. Abdul Ali has recently crossed over from Afghanistan and taken shelter in Pakistan Radio Pakistan reported today: Dr Ali who obtained doctorate in engineering in the Soviet Union has been serving under the present Babrak Karmal regime in Afghanistan said: The radio quoted the Afghan official as saying in an interview that the Soviet advisers were in virtual control of civil administration in Afghanistan: Under these circumstances he could not continue in service and hence decided to quit and take refuge in Pakistan he added. [Text] [Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 28 Oct 80 p 1]

AFGHANISTAN PRISONERS FREED--About 900 prisoners have been released from jail in various Afghan provinces during the past few days, Tass reported. It said the last batch of prisoners to gain their liberty consisted of more than 60 who had taken part in anti-Government activities. They had been taken in by "counter-revolutionary" propaganda "and had regretted their crimes," the agency said. [Text] [Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 25 Oct 80 p 8]

TRADERS OPEN SHOPS UNDER THREAT--Afghan authorities prevented an anti-Soviet shutdown of business in Kabul yesterday by threatening shop-owners with fines and loss of their licenses, a report from Afghanistan said today. The strike call was issued in "night letters (shabnama)," as the Afghans call pamphlets circulated around Kabul by the Muslim freedom fighters, the report said. It requested the people to stage a five day general strike to protest the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan and what was described as the sale of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union "by President Babrak Karmal, who has been visiting the USSR, for the past 10 days, it added." Meanwhile slackened fighting is reported from Afghanistan, amid feverish building activity to prepare winter quarters for thousands of Soviet troops. Several Russian convoys have been seen in Kabul hauling pre-fabricated sections of what looked like barracks buildings. [Text] [Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 26 Oct 80 p 5]

CSO: 4920

ARMED FORCES CHIEF OF STAFF RESPONDS TO CRUCIAL QUESTIONS

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 26 Sep 80 pp 25-28

[Interview with Lt Gen Abu Ghazalah by Hamdi Lutfi: "Chief of Staff of Our Armed Forces Gives Most Serious Interview to AL-MUSAWWAR; Lt Gen Abu Ghazalah Responds to These Questions: Have Our Armed Forces Strayed from Their Chief Responsibilities as Was the Case Before 1967? Can the United States Control the Weapons of Our Troops Just as the Soviet Union Did in the Sixties? Did We Give the United States a Naval Base and Then Call That Base Military Facilities? If We Were To Set Israel Aside, What Are the Dangers That Are Threatening Egypt at Present? How Did the Officer Who Refused To Carry Out Orders During the War Win the Order of the Military Star?"]

[Text] Men show their metal when homelands face crises and miscalculations.

Groups of people who have more faith, who are more steadfast, and who are more yielding [than others] confront adversity by elevating their homelands above catastrophes and miscalculations.

When the June 1967 setback occurred, many leaders broke down in dismay. At the same time the essential nature and the fine human metal of many men glowed: they worked silently and patiently, joining together the parts [of the army] that had become unreliable and building and constructing [other parts] anew. They worked night and day, making their utmost, tireless efforts. They were able to get rid of negative aspects; to remedy the climate; and to replace the environment; they even overcame the harshest obstacles and difficulties. Ultimately, they did achieve a healthy, radical military transformation, and their heroic feets shone in the eternally connected history of our people's struggle with the nobility of their character and with their effort to win and to take away victory in 1973.

Today, as we approach the seventh anniversary of the sixth of October which will be forever glorious in history, we are conducting an interview with one of those people: one of the leaders of the glorious Ramadan War. He is an important element of the stage of "patience and silence" whose slogan was proclaimed by President al-Sadat in 1972. That stage began the establishment of the glorious October victory. He is a master of the artillery--an Egyptian military intellectual whose name has always been linked to the military in the best military academies both in the east and in the west. Lt Gen Muhamman 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, a native of the village of Qubur al-Umara' which is located in al-Dilinjat

in the governorate of Buhayrah, and the chief of the general staff of our armed forces, is the man for whom the enemy has testified. At an official military meeting that was held last year in Washington, one of the Israeli military commanders said:

"General Abu Ghazalah was firing at us with a high degree of efficiency that was devastating."

Before I go on with my interview with Lt Gen Abu Ghazalah, I would like to narrate this provocative story which I had heard while I was with our armed forces in liberated Sinai during the October 1973 War. This story is a practical indication of the significance of one of the important arts in our life--the art of leading men--and of the skill and the knowledge [involved] in this art which plays a principal role in the progress of our country. Unfortuantely, not may people who have assumed positions of leadership in the various sectors are proficient in the art of leadership.

Before and during the October War Lt Gen Abu Ghazalah, whose title then was brigadier general, continued to move among the artillery formations of the second army which was under his command. The fighting had broken out on the sixth of October and had not stopped for one minute. On the third or the fourth day of the war the fighting had become more vicious, and the fire on both sides--our forces and the forces of Israel--had become more intense. On that day as he was passing, the commander of the artillery was surprised to notice a small unit of artillery fighters led by a young officer who had recently graduated from the military college. This unit had fought a major battle and had been subjected to the enemy's surface to surface missiles. The unit had also been subjected to successive Israeli air raids. Abu Ghazalah was surprised to find the unit's guns on the ground, without the trenches that were necessary at the site to ensure safety. The junior officer of the unit, meanwhile, was in a nervous, abnormal state, which usually happens to a few fighters after battles.

After the artillery commander spoke about the battles of that unit, he asked why the young officer had not dug a trench for his guns.

The second surprise came in the officer's reply. The officer had not yet reached the age of 20.

[He said], "I will not dig trenches for the guns, and I will not carry out orders!"

The situation became tense, but Abu Ghazalah, with his well-known self-control, told the junior officer, "Do you know that not digging trenches for the guns exposes them to destruction?"

"Yes, I know."

The situation became even more tense. The young officer's face twitched further, and he shuddered nervously. He seemed as one who had lost his senses.

Brig Gen Abu Ghazalah realized the situation immediately, recognizing what the officer was suffering from, he made a decision immediately and told the junior officer:

"My duty compels me to put you on trial now and to have you executed by a firing squad because you are destroying the morale of your soldiers with your disgraceful conduct and you are spreading a spirit of rebellion in the unit. However, I will not do that. I will be satisfied with discharging you from the service immediately. You are to return immediately to your home and you are to seek shelter there."

Abu Ghazalah concluded his firm statement. He took a shovel and began to dig trenches for the guns. He was accompanied by a brigadier general in the infantry who spontaneously did the same thing. Half a minute went by, and then the soldiers began to pick up shovels and to dig.

The last surprise came when the junior officer took a shovel and knelt beside the commander of the artillery of the second army. He started digging and apologizing for what had come over him. The tears were streaming down his face as he asked his commander to forgive him so he could resume his post.

The commander of the artillery spoke at length and harshly to this inexperienced officer in front of his soldiers [in a manner] that restored to the officer his self-confidence. Meanwhile the soldiers were pleading for forgiveness for their junior officer because he had shown courage, steadfastness and efficiency throughout the four days of combat. [Although] he had undergone a momentary lapse, he soon regained his senses.

Abu Gahzalah, the father, the human being and the commander who knows what happens in battles to the bravest of fighters, forgave this officer and allowed him to resume his duties.

During the interview which I had with the chief of staff of our armed forces in the last few days, I asked him if that story were true, and he confirmed it. He went on to add, "I followed the combat course of that officer day by day. At the end of the war, he received the order of the military star as a reward for the courage he showed in Sinai throughout the October War."

I am writing this story without comment as an indication of the fine results achieved by some leaders who have understood well the art of leading men.

Major Fallacy

[Question] As we prepare for the seventh anniversary of the October 1973 victory, the price that our people paid for the 1967 defeat is still urgently calling for revenge. The lesson itself needs further details in the conversation of everyone who lived through "the experience or the tragedy" so that we can have a store of conflicting or homogeneous information through which history can pass judgment on this period and on its leaders, the rulers of Egypt. What do you think of this?

(Note: During the June 1967 period Lt Gen Abu Ghazalah was heading the educational branch at the Artillery Academy. That branch was teaching officers in the artillery about the science and the development of their weapons.)

[Answer] The June defeat was not the product of a day or a week, but it was rather the outcome of a military and a political climate, and environment that

applied to our armed forces the principle of security before combat efficiency: security for protecting the regime that was in existence then and not real preparation for fighting and for achieving victory. This was the slogan to which Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal devoted a full article in which he discussed people of confidence and people of efficiency. Haykal emphasized the importance of relying on people of confidence, come what may to the people of efficiency. That article aroused considerable clamor because it represented an idea that was prevelent at the time. That idea also implied a major fallacy because the people of efficiency should be people of confidence because of their efficiency. That efficiency was a weapon that protected the efficient from corruption. These are the laws of life. They forgot that confidence strengthens the efficiency of the efficient in a positive way that ultimately serves the country.

It is no secret that the 1967 environment included military commanders whose military knowledge was zero. These commanders, however, were loyal to the regime and did make an effort to protect it. It was natural that we suffer a defeat with such commanders leading our armed forces in a serious war!

[Question] Allow me to ask you a question that is especially senstitive. This is because I am putting before you what has been repeatedly stated by spokesmen who oppose our policy in the Arab homeland. Some of our Egyptian citizens have repeated it with good intentions. In my opinion we must respond clearly and candidly to such opinions so we can get rid of the invisible poison in such talk as it is disseminated in whispers in our midst.

It has been said that by participating at this and the next stage in the construction of services projects that are needed by the people such as transportation, roads, agriculture and housing, the Egyptian armed forces are merely straying from their original duties which are to prepare constantly for combat and to devote themselves to improving combat efficiency so that, God forgid, what happened in 1967 would not happen again. What do you think about this?

[Answer] There is nothing to prevent us from responding to and refuting such statements that stem from total ignorance and ill will, of course.

Our armed forces take part in public activities that are related in a major and in a primary way to the "demands" of our armed forces. I will cite, for example, how this connection comes about.

Among the principal functions of the signal corps in our forces is to lay telecommunications lines to the branches of the armed forces and their fighting formations. When the signal corps lays communications lines for the masses of the people, in addition to the cast reduction and the time reduction that are realized, the corps provides practical, technical training for its officers and its soldiers while using new equipment and developing the equipment that is available to the corps.

To clarify the picture further, I will say that a corps such as the signal corps must spend limited hours every week in practical, military training. It will necessarily utilize its technical equipment; that is, it will wear out its equipment on a practical level. Why then shouldn't corps members train in fields that would ultimately achieve the required results of training and contribute at the same time to solving the public's telephone problems?!

There is a Provisions and Supply Authority in our armed forces. There are more than 13 major departments affiliated with that authority. Among them is an appropriations department one of whose functions is to provide food to the formations that fight on the battlefield. If this authority were to establish a cheese factory or even help the Ministry of Supply build a food plant, this would constitute the essence of its work and not a deviation from its functions.

Thus we find that we did not ask an armored division to make cheese, but we made that request of a military department whose principal function is to contribute with all its energies to providing food.

The same applies to the Department of War Supplies which is the department responsible for providing clothing to the armed forces. What if this department were to contribute towards relieving the public's suffering and were to offer its capabilities to provide civilian clothing also? The machines that produce the overalls for the field can also produce pajamas, shoes and other [items of clothing] for the public.

The corps of engineers includes construction battalions for buildings, for concrete work and for defence emplacement work for the armed forces. The corps also builds bridges and paves roads on the battlefield for the fighting formations. What if this corps were to build a road or a new bridge that would contribute to solving the problems of overcrowdedness and congestion which Cairo and other cities are suffering from? Is not this the essence of the functions of the corps of engineers? Did we bring an infantry brigade or an air defense [brigade] to build a bridge or to construct a new road?

We come to our air forces which have C-130 transport planes for carrying supplies, munitions and, of course, soldiers. Even if these airplanes did not fly and if they remained grounded for 2 years--and this would not be logical--they would have to undergo a "tune-up [operation]. Why then not benefit from the flight hours in the airplane's life by transporting foods from one country to another? We also transport from abroad to the homeland the purchases that are made by the state or by the armed forces. All these functions provide actual training programs for our pilots and for the crews that assist them. These functions also allow us to use the hours during which we are allowed to use the airplanes and operate the equipment without causing a shortage or a delay in the demands of our armed forces at all. Such cooperation with the state and with its civilian sectors takes place according to prearranged planning and scheduling that does not conflict with the principal programs and needs of our air forces.

Does the fact that the transport airplanes of our armed forces take part with the civilian transport sectors to provide food for the people in the various governorates signify that we used a squadron of Phantoms or Mirages to carry out the transport operations that we are talking about?

[Question] Do other armies in large or in small countries carry out such civilian functions in their homelands?

[Answer] Of course. I will tell you about the People's Republic of China which I visited. I found that the Chinese were putting into practice an ideal system in

the Chinese armed forces. For every infantry division, for example, they designated a certain area of land so that that division can cultivate the land with various crops to feed its own fighters. The division thus gets no food or grain from the state.

I recall my visit to the 196th infantry division when I visited the People's Republic of China in 1975. This division was stationed in an area that was about 150 kilometers from Peking. Do you know what I found there?

The military intellectual, the veteran master of artillery and the chief of staff of our armed forces answered his own question and said:

I found they had farms, not one farm, for cattle and poultry; I found a cheese plant, bakeries, a pharmaceutical laboratory and a clothing plant. I also found that the basic force of that division spent 6 hours every day in military training and 6 hours in agricultural and industrial production. The families of the officers and soldiers worked all day in production in the factories, the farms or in the fields.

I tested the level of their military training in a practical exercise they performed in front of me. They achieved during that exercise high levels of combat performance.

Let me leave the People's Republic of China and its armed forces and take you back to the technical capability of our armed forces. Our armed forces have an enormous capability which is more than excellent technically. There are maintenance workshops where equipment can be repaired in the factories. These workshops were designed to operate at average war rates, and these are high. This capability is not used in its entirety in times of peace. In fact, parts of this capability are almost idle. The equipment that manufactures gearboxes and spare parts for tanks can manufacture gearboxes for civilian vehicles to meet the needs of the public.

The Difference Between a Base and Facilities

[Question] Your excellency, Lt Gen, I have another question for you that I will present to you candidly.

It has been said that there was no difference between the facilities that Egypt was offering to the U.S. forces in the Red Sea and the acquisition by those forces of a base over which they would operate. Statements made by Egyptian officials on this subject are fallacious--even though as a correspondent who has been working with the armed forces for 28 years I am well aware that such an explanation is basically fallacious. These are not our statements. I would like you to elaborate, [or that matter] if only for the sake of truth. What do you think?

[Answer] Very clearly we must first establish the definition of a base? The chief of staff went on to say [the following]:

A base is an area of land which the state leases to a foreign country for a period of time. The country that leases the land has sovereignty over that area of land which it leased. This means that it can launch from that base attacks by air or by sea against any one of its enemies without notifying the country which owns the

land. The country that owns the base has no right also to enter into the area of the base itself without the permission of the country that is leasing it. The country that is leasing the base has the right to fly its flag over the base. This is what happened with regard to Britain, West Germany and South Korea and then the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. All these countries leased bases on their land to the U.S. armed forces.

Some of us are forgetting the al-Dhahrain base in Saudi Arabia or the Soviet navy base in Aden. In Libya there are Russisn bases that have not been announced even though they do in fact exist in the Gulf of al-Sallum, in Benghazi and in Tripoli. The rejectionist newspapers in the Arab area have stated that these were areas where the Russian fleet was stationed. They are in fact Soviet bases.

So much for military bases; but this is not what happened here.

The facilities that we are actually offering are being offered by the state--just like any state can offer another friendly state facilities so it can accomplish a specific task. These facilities remain under the control and the supervision of the host country; the other country does not fly its flag over the area where these facilities are granted. That area remains part of the land that is controlled by the country that owns the land. The officers and the soldiers of the guest country are subject to the laws of the country which owns the land. In this respect they are like any visiting, foreign tourist. In fact, officers and soldiers are not allowed to wear their military uniform outside the area that is determined for them by the host country.

The Americans who are working with our air forces are cooperating with us for a pre-determined period of time. They are working in a well-known Egyptian air force base: the West Cairo base. They work inside a brick fence; outside the fence they must wear civilian clothing. No U.S. officer, soldier, or person can depart or arrive without Egypt's permission and full supervision. Likewise, the state that has acquired facilities may not carry out any military action, nor may it use its forces against any other country without the official approval of the host countries.

You will also find that permission is requested from every country in the world when the military airplanes of another country pass through a country's air space. Those airplanes may also land to refuel. Such cooperation is one form or one way of providing facilities; all countries continue to cooperate in this fashion.

A short time ago a military airplane that belonged to the Saudi forces landed at Cairo International Airport, and it got what it needed. The same thing happened with regard to European airplanes and, in fact, Russian airplanes also recently received the facilities that they had requested. These facilities that we offer the United States; [the latter] are consistent with our political and our military strategy.

[Question] I told the Egyptian commander who had studied in the Soviet Union with an Egyptian military delegation between 1957 and 1961 and had then joined the American Carlyle College of War--one of the best military colleges in the United States from which famous U.S. generals like Patton, Marshall and Eisenhower had

graduated, a college which he had joined in the mid seventies and graduated from in 1979--I told Lt Gen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, the expert of military exercises, about which he has written several books and the expert on artillery and surface to surface missiles [the following]:

In your position of leadership now, can you speak to us frankly about the "dangers" that are presently threatening Egypt?

[Answer] The danger that surround Egypt now outnumber those that surrounded us at a time when our only enemy was Israel. If we were to talk about Libya, we would find that al-Qadhdhafi alone cannot launch an armed attack against Egypt because he lacks the military cadres and capabilities to launch such an attack. However, with help from mercenaries, al-Qadhdhafi does pose a threat to Egypt at some time.

Al-Qadhdhafi has turned Libya into a fertile ground for the mercenaries he recruited from amongst Russians, Cubans, East Germans and from other eastern countries. This is besides the Palestinians whom he uses for their destructive objectives only. If those mercenaries were to put together the weapons that al-Qadhdhafi has amassed, they would create another Afghanistan in the area. This situation in itself poses a major threat because the Soviet Union may in fact create a new Afghanistan out of the Arab area, taking advantage of the Arab leaders--and al-Qadhdhafi is among them--whom they control completely. The Soviet Union would do so by concluding a secret agreement with one of the Arab leaders. The Arab leader, who is a tool of the Russians, would then ask for Moscow's aid, and Moscow would interfere immediately or would carry out a coup in one of the rejectionist countries so as to place its obedient clients at the head of the government.

[Question] What about Ethiopia, Sudan and the waters of the Nile, Your Excellency, Lt Gen? It has been said that the estrangement that has occurred between us and Khartoum was due to the waters of the Nile and the fact that they were diverted to Sinai in order to overcome the obstacles that stood in the way of the comprehensive peace process: the rights of Palestine, the return of Jerusalem, the removal of the settlements and the remaining [considerations] that were covered by the Camp David Accords. What is the truth?

[Answer] There are no problems whatsoever with Sudan regarding the waters of the Nile. The government of Sudan, however, is suffering from political or economic conditions, and these have already been explained by President Anwar al-Sadat. It is important that I mention that we now have an Egyptian military delegation--air, naval and ground--serving to train the forces of the fraternal country of Sudan. There are many Sudanese students in our various military colleges and academies. Sudanese officers who graduated from Egypt and then also went to France and Britain for further study have acknowledged, and most of them have done so in front of us when we met with them, that they learned [in Europe] half of what they learned in Egypt. They said that these powerful countries conceal from them the most recent [information in] the military arts and sciences which the officers of these countries are studying.

Ethiopia's threats are directed basically against Sudan. For us, the waters of the Nile constitute a matter of life or death. The latest news indicates that a rapprochement between Addis Ababa and Khartoum has taken place. In the final

analysis we are not advocates of war, and it would be beneficial to all of us if peace were to prevail among the countries of the region.

This Will Not Happen Again

[Question] Allow me to bring to your attention the "point of view" which some people entertain on the matter of cooperation with the United States and on the weapons we get from the United [as a means of] putting into practice the strategy of having multiple sources of weapons.

This "point of view" states that we are pursuing a futile course and that the United States will ultimately become the sole supplier of weapons to our armed forces and [thus] gain the control that the Soviet Union had over us just as was the case in the sixties. How do you respond to these statements that are being made in secret, statements whose clandestine, malevolent objective is not unknown to us?

[Answer] You yourself have responded to your question with what you mentioned at the end of the question. But I will add the following:

Our supreme political command and our military command are quite vigilant regarding the consideration to which you referred. We are fully aware of how superpowers use the fact that they produce weapons and provide them to some government to exert political pressure that would serve their interests. This is what happened in our experience with the Soviet Union, and it will not happen again.

The United States sold 60 modern Phantoms to Saudi Arabia, but it removed some of the sophisticated electronic equipment in those airplanes!

The strategy of having multiple sources of weapons is based on a philosophy that stems from our view--which is clarified to us by this philosophy--that the countries which produce weapons are divided into three groups.

The first group is represented by the superpowers, the United States and Russia. They are capable of producing weapons of any kind and at any time. Accordingly, they are capable of filling orders in the shortest time possible and in large quantities.

The second group [consists of] the advanced industrial countries such as Britain, France, Germany and the People's Republic of China. These countries produce weapons, but they cannot fill orders in the time determined by the importing countries and in the quantities they require.

The third group is represented by the countries that produce specific kinds of weapons such as Italy, Spain, Korea and Brazil. At the same time these countries do not have the capabilities for development that exist in world industrialization. Italy, however, has achieved major progress in the manufacture of naval units. All these countries are experiencing special economic conditions that make them incapable of offering the importing countries any favorable terms for making payments.

We come after that to the developing countries which are trying to build such an industry in their homelands. Egypt and a few Latin American countries are among these countries.

It is through this philosophy and this political understanding that we make plans for what we can acquire through purchases not only from the United States, as your question stated, but also from France, Britain, West Germany, Italy and also a few countries of the eastern bloc. Let me not add anything further. But it has been through our special strategy that we did acquire a flexibility whose results have been good. For example, it is easy to obtain electronic equipment from Italy for a French airplane that we have; or we can make this equipment in our country. We have in fact succeeded in doing so, and a country like France has asked if it can purchase an Egyptian invention which we added to one of the modern French airplanes which are used by the artillery and by surface to surface missiles.

At any rate we will find that ultimately it is better to diversify the sources of weapons and to be quite vigilant regarding what happens around us so that we would not become prisoners or subject to the "world game."

It is important for me to explain that modern weapons represent a huge economic burden on all the countries in the various groups that I mentioned to you--even the United States. But as we say modern weapons are "a necessary evil."

[Question] I am asking you a question as a military intellectual and writer.

You have published 33 books. What is your favorite book?

[Answer] "The History of the Arts of War" which has five volumes. It discusses war from the Stone Age to the end of the Vietnam War.

[Question] Are you preparing a new book?

[Answer] Yes, I work on it occasionally, but I have recently stopped. It is entitled "Memoirs of an Egyptian General." In the chapters of that book I discuss the experiences I have had since I graduated from the Military College on the 2nd of February 1949. [It will cover my experiences] until such time when I should complete it, God willing, perhaps next year or the year after that.

[Question] A final question. Have you come close to death on the battlefield?

The father of Tariq, a student of medicine in the United States; the father of Ashraf, a secondary school student in Cast Cairo; and the father of three girls, one of whom has graduated and is practicing medicine--Abu Ghazalah, the fighter who is loved by his soldiers and his officers as a commander, a father and a human being who is rich in human emotions and fine conduct--replied:

[Answer] I came close to death in Sinai on the 23rd of October 1973. I was riding a military vehicle and I was on my way to investigate the bridgehead of the second infantry division. My colleague, Riyadh Jad, who is one of the commanders of the infantry, was with me. There was another artillery officer with us, the late Raja'i Fu'ad. A mine exploded in the car, and the car blew up and [its parts] scattered into small pieces. My friend Raja'i lost his life and so did the driver. Riyadh Jad was wounded in the chest. When I became conscious, I found myself reciting the Moslem creed, and I was not hurt. It was the will of God. I came close to death in that experience, and I came close to the Almighty Creator who gave me a new life.

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CSO: 4802

CIVIL WAR ANTICIPATED IF KHOMEYNI DIES SOON

Lahore CHATAN in Urdu 25 Aug 80 pp 14-17

[Article: "Who After Khomeyni?"]

[Text] Twenty months ago the Shah of Iran was deposed from his throne. Since then, Ayatollah Khomeyni, for better or worse, has been taking care of the country. The Ayatollah says himself that he will not live long. He is 80 years old now, and from heart ailments to worry about conditions in Iran, everything affects him. Since last winter, Khomeyni, on the advice of his doctors, has been living in the suburbs of Tehran. An ambulance with a red Islamic crescent flag always waits outside his residence. A number of Western diplomats who are still stationed in Tehran and some Iranian officials agree that if Imam Khomeyni dies within the next year, Iran will be engulfed in a civil war and all the efforts of the mullahs to establish a government in Iran will be of no use. Even so, it is definitely apparent that Iran will not join the communist bloc. One White House commentator, who has deep insight into Middle East affairs, said in London: "The supposition (that Iran would join the communist bloc) is irrational. The resurgence of Islam, which has taken place in Iran, will survive even after Khomeyni, because this resurgence has already spread to Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Gulf region. It is unthinkable that there will be anything but an Islamic government in Iran for the next 10 years."

The type of government which may be established in Iran after Khomeyni could be a hard line dictatorship, Islamic in name only. Or, it could be a hybrid type of government coming into existence as a result of cooperation between the mullahs and the secular technocrats. In view of the muddled situation in Iran today, the future is very hard to predict. Many political analysts doubt that the present circle of mullahs, which is composed of old disciples of Khomeyni, would survive his death.

Most of the present Iranian leaders have been Khomeyni's disciples. Among them is Ayatollah Beheshti, shrewd leader of the Islamic Republican Party and a staunch follower of Islamic fundamentalism. Beheshti has tried at every step to downgrade Iranian President Bani-Sadr, and is now in control of both, the supreme count and the parliament. Ayatollah Khalkhali, who is a notorious judge and known as 'butcher', is also one of Khomeyni's disciples. Some other disciples of Khomeyni are: Minister of Commerce Reza Sadr, Islamic Revolution Prosecutor Shaykh Ali Ghadausi, Minister of the Interior Shaykh Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani,

and at least six members of the dissolved Revolution Council. But the religious leader considered to be Khomeyni's most likely successor is Ayatollah Montazeri.

Khomeyni has had the foresight to prepare all these religious leaders for his theocracy, but the present state of affairs has led to deep frictions among the mullahs. The fact of the matter is that Islam does not recognize the existence of any group of mullahs who have authority to act as middlemen between man and God. But since most Iranians are Shia by faith, they look to the holy city of Qom for guidance. In Iran, it is commonly said that when one is in doubt about anything, he should always consult an Islamic scholar. That is the reason why every Iranian looks to one holy man or another for counsel and advice. Ayatollah Khomeyni has a uniquely respectable position among such holy men. Common people obey his orders with religious fervor and pascion, something which Westerners tend to equate with religious fanaticism. The behavior of the armed guards of the 52 American hostages, and of the members of Hezb-e Eqtedar [Eqedar Party], who attack their leftist opponents in the streets of Tehran, are manifestations of this very religious passion.

The influence of the Shia school of thought is not limited to Iran, but has spread to certain areas of Iraq and the Persian Gulf countries. Shia precepts provide for the constitution of a council of leading Islamic scholars. These scholars are called ayatollah's. Each ayatollah has hundreds of thousands of enthusiastic followers. These scholars are bearers of strange titles, and Khomeyni has been universally acknowledged as the "Grand Scholar," or the "Prince of the Ayatollahs." As far as religious titles are concerned, other members of the council of scholars rank below him in status. Khomeyni's popularity has unquestionably made him head of the council, while he wields political control over Iran. In the past, there was never a time when the scholars accepted a political personality as their leader. The present unique situation has scholars worried over the role of people like Ayatollah Beheshti and Ayatollah Montazeri, who are rising slowly to the top, not on the basis of their knowledge and scholarship, but because of their armed followers.

One Iranian expert said recently in America that in Iran today the only thing that matters is who was foremost in opposing the Shah. This state of affairs has led to the situation where lower level scholars, belonging to the Khomeyni school of thought, have organized councils of sorts which have challenged Iran's centuries-old institutions. It is just possible that such an organizational program was set up by Khomeyni himself. Khomeyni already had feuds with the five great scholars who are called 'ayatollah', and the problems gripping Iran today are an offshoot of that feud.

The crucial thing now, is how the scholars and mullahs, armed only with the Koran, will take charge of a nation in the 20th century. When Khomeyni started teaching in the Edare-ye Elmie of Qom in 1927, he got into trouble. His preaching about Islamic rule in Iran and his attacks on the Pahlavi kings made the leading scholars adopt such a cautious attitude toward him that until 1964 he was not allowed to join the council of scholars. When he was finally allowed to join the council, it was under pressure. Because of his attacks on the Shah's regime, Khomeyni was arrested four times after 1962. Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi then started thinking of putting him to death. At this point, Ayatollah Shari'at Madari, the

influential leader of 13 million Turks of Azerbaijan, intervened with the Shah's regime, and a solution was found. Khomeyni was made the "Grand Ayatollah" and exiled to Iraq. According to Pahlavi law, the Shah could execute an ordinary mullah, but he could not execute the Grand Ayatollah.

Shari'at Madari even now has a seat in the parliament. Differences between him and Khomeyni on the question of a new Islamic consitution caused severe riots in Azerbaijan last winter. Ayatollah Madari was strongly opposed to the idea that a religious scholar should hold all sorts of controls in the government, as Khomeyni now does. An expert on Eastern affairs commented on this in London, saying that not only Shari'at Madari, but a great majority of the scholars want to instill the teachings of Islam in the hearts of people, rather than use[Islam merely as an instrument of power. Shari'at Madari has kept silent on most issues, because he does not want to stir up a civil war between the people of Azerbaijan and the Khomeyni government by his remarks. Even when the revolutionary guards executed by firing the leaders of the Islamic Republican Party of Azerbaijan, on charges that they had connections with Savak, Shari'at Madari refused to denounce the revolutionary guards for this act. Those who have visited him at his residence in Qom say that he is living under (house arrest?). The atrocities that have been committed in the name of Khomeyni have (intimidated?) the great scholars.

Ayatollah Kho'i, keeper of the holy places of Najaf, Ayatollah Qomi, grand scholar of Mashhad, and Ayatollah Shirazi have already said in repressed voices that Iran is now slowly departing from the Islamic path. Last month, they expressed their views after a weekly Jom'eh [Friday] prayer gathering. Their followers even exchanged angry words with Khomeyni supporters. The demonstrations that took place in Azerbaijan last winter show how well the orders of these religious leaders are obeyed by their followers. Commenting on those demonstrations, an Iranian said that Shari'at Madari would have to say only one word, and 13 million Azerbaijanis, ready to martyr themselves, would break loose on Tehran. But Shari'at Madari does not want to do any such thing. He is a quiet person, and so are the other ayatollahs. They do not like a holy war against another ayatollah, but they say privately that Khomeyni should restrain his over zealous supporters and workers.

All those who are experts on or know anything about Islam are riding the wave of orthodoxy and fundamentalism that has spread in Iran today. Peasant mullahs lead revolution councils and pass sentences on anti-revolution elements. They have unprecendented authority. An American professor, who specializes in Iranian politics, says: "The rural mullahs are doing this reluctantly. Most of them want to follow the example of Ayatollah Taleqani, that is, they want to have nothing to do with politics, and want to return to the mosques." Ayatollah Taleqani was a social reformer and a staunch opponent of the Shah. After the revolution, he died of a heart attack.

A British expert on Eastern affairs has expressed the opinion that the armed mullahs roaming the streets of Iran will stay armed, and that those who argue that politics and the atrocities of the fundamentalists have no place in Islam (do not quite know what they are talking about). In the government, the fundamentalists have cornered all their opponents, including Bani-Sadr. Ayatollah Khomeyni recently warned Bani-Sadr that the new government was going to be one hundred percent Islamic. Now, Bani-Sadr has no choice. It is

Ayatollah Beheshti who can do what he wants. Beheshti controls the Majles, that is, the parliament, and for key ministries, including the premiership and the ministry of oil, he is selecting only those who toe the party line.

Inside the parliament, Beheshti's men have started an open fight with their secular opponents. This fighting has severe consequences, so much so that when the Islamic Republic Party accused Ahmad Madani of contact with the CIA, Ahmad Madani did not even talk back. It must be remembered that Madani was the second man in line for the presidency of the country. Even the supporters of Mehdi Bazargan and members of the National Front have become targets of the fundamentalists, and many Western sources say that this well-respected group will also go underground because of the threats against it.

It would not be out of place to mention here that even some close confidants of Bandi-Sadr have been caught in the cleanup movement of the Islamic Republican Party. Each government office has an Islamic society which aims at uprooting anti-revolution elements in that office. These societies are, in general, related to the Islamic Republican Party. During the last three weeks, they have made attacks on Ali Reza Nobari, governor of the Central Bank, and Foreign Minister Sadegh Qhotbzadeh, who want to lessen the influence of the mullahs in the government.

The armed forces have also become the targets of the fundamentalist mullahs. Officers trained in the U.S. have generally been labelled as being pro-Shah. The revolutionaries are worried that the foreign-trained officers may be unhappy with the political changes that are taking place, and that they might revolt. Nor are the doubts of the revolutionaries baseless. Recently, 300 army personnel, including air force generals and a former chief of police, were arrested on charges that they planned to blow up the residences of Khomeyni and Bani-Sadr with Phantom F-4 fighters. Air force pilots and other personnel often have to take orders from mullahs who know almost nothing about the latest weaponry. If the personnel disobey, they are sentenced to hard labor, The British press recently reported that one mullah ordered a pilot to shoot down a spy satellite flying 3,000 kilometers above the ground, way out of the range of aircraft. When such is the state of affairs the possibility of a revolt in the army cannot be ruled out. The mullahs' interference has alienated the army and a large segment of the technocrats, the intellectuals and the business community--groups which want to (calm?) Iran down. Political analysts say that if Beheshti compels Bani-Sadr to resign, whatever technocrats are left in industry and government would leave Iran and join with the other Iranian exiles.

The threats of the mullahs have had another bad consequence. Because of them, middle-of-the-road elements in Iran and Iranian minorities have been compelled to adopt extremist attitudes. When the revolutionary guards temporarily arrested the leader of the half million Kazaks, Kazak (representatives?) organized a protest and walked out of the majlis. The Kurds also are ready to fight the Tehran Government, because no attention has been paid to their demands for autonomy. The Kurds blame the Islamic Republican Party for creating the tension.

Terrorists activities against the mullahs are also on the increase. Recently, there were three bomb explosions in central Tehran, in which 6 people were killed and 100 wounded. An organization named Forqan was blamed for these

explosions. This organization undertakes political murders. Last year, it was accused of assassinating several mullahs. The Marxist-Leninist group Fedayin is pursuing underground activities in the provinces of Khuzestan and Kurdistan. Its aim is to turn these secret activities into open guerilla warfare against the mullahs. The Islamic Republican Party, by allowing only religious fundamentalists to take part in the 100 percent Islamic government of Khomeyni, has increased its own chances of a rapid downfall.

Bandi-Sadr, who looks meek because of his moustache and eyeglasses, has finally been driven to vent political anger. His supporters have made public cassette tapes which tell how certain officials of the Islamic Republican Party are busy downgrading his administration. Recently, Bani-Sadr's newspaper scored points over Beheshti's newspaper in the matter of granting the title of "Grand Ayatollah" to Ayatollah Montazeri. Ayatollah Montazeri leads the Friday prayer in Qom, and Bani-Sadr's paper prints his messages on the front page.

Many political analysts say that Montazeri's personality lacks the religious and political charisma which can have the same kind of hold on Iran that Khomeyni has. For this reason, both Beheshti and Bandi-Sadr think that the post of a religious chief of state should be made a merely ceremonial post. Anyway, should Montazeri succeed Khomeyni, Beheshti would still have the upper hand. Beheshti and Montazeri both studied under Khomeyni at the same time, and both of them took part in revolutionary activities. One Iranian observer remarked that these persons do not trust Western-educated people like Bani-Sadr and Mehdi Bazargan. Within the Islamic Republican Party, it often becomes hard to distinguish between opportunism and faithfulness to Khomeyni.

Since they follow Khomeyni's instructions only formally, and not in spirit, Beheshti and his group hold the view that religious zeal should be used or exploited for their own objectives. At one point, Ayatollah Beheshti organized demonstrations in front of the American embassy in Tehran solely to thwart the efforts of Bani-Sadr and Qotbzadeh in connection with the release of the hostages. Thus, release of the hostages could not be accomplished. Hojatolislam M (Khamene'i?) the spiritual leader of the armed guards, dealt a severe blow to Bani-Sadr's prestige by following the orders of the Islamic Republican Party. Hojatolislam A Rafsanjani is in close contact with Hezb-e Allahi [Divine Party]. Rafsanjani was recently elected speaker of the majlis. The Hezb-e Allahi people have compelled their secular opponents to go underground and have harassed newspapers not connected with the Islamic Republican Party to the extent that they have folded.

Beheshti has done careful planning to end up in the center of power. Reliable sources say that before the revolution, Beheshti was called "Mr Cassette," because he used to arrange the smuggling of Ayatollah Khomeyni's cassettes into Iran. In March 1979, Khomeyni ended his 15-year exile and made a triumphant return to Iran. By this time, Beheshti had already founded and become the leader of a well organized party, the Islamic Republican Party.

Western diplomats say that Beheshti had completed the organizational groundwork for the party in the autumn of 1978. At that time, Khomeyni was still in France, and used to say that once the Shah was ousted, he would consider his work done and retire peacefully to the quiet of the mosques of Qom. But Khomeyni's work

is not done. Acknowledging the shortcomings of the revolution, he said not long ago that the Islamic courts were in bad shape, and that the situation was not any different as far as the army and other institutions were concerned.

Lately, Washington and anti-revolution elements have been blamed for the ailments of Iran. It was recently revealed that Egyptian radio stations have been broadcasting anti-Khomeyni propaganda, and that high American officials have privately met with the former Iranian Prime Minister Shapur Bakhtiar and his former generals who are opponents of the present regime. But the fact of the matter is that many of the ills that have befallen the revolutionary government are of its own doing. Authority is still divided between two groups. The extremists, sabotaging Iran's rebirth in the wake of the revolution, have played lightly with the solidarity of the country.

Khomeyni himself is to blame to an extent. His anti-Western viewpoint spells political hazards for the Middle East. His vision lacks breadth. Now that the constitution of Iran decrees that the mullahs will run the country, it is no longer relevant to wonder how an Islamic government will be really run. The threats of the fundamentalists, and the killings and bloodshed, have created two extreme factions in the country. If Khomeyni dies soon, Iran will be caught in a war between these two extremist factions.

9612
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LEFTIST MAGAZINE INTERVIEWS PRESIDENT OF IRAN

Athens ANDI in Greek 10 Oct 80 pp 25-27

[Interview with Iranian President Bani-Sadr by Sofia Andonopoulou]

[Text] Question: What are the principles governing Iran's foreign policy? What type of relations are you seeking to have with other countries?

Answer: Speaking from a scientific viewpoint, relations are established in two ways. According to one way, the type of relations which are established between countries is imposed on both parties. The two sides have certain advantages, they make exchanges. They exchange in a way that ensures the two systems that they will remain as they were, will continue to survive according to the previously prevailing conditions. The other type of relations is that within which the two systems are destroyed completely in order to be replaced by a new situation. The first type of relations is that which sovereign countries impose on dominated countries, the strong countries on the weak. The second type of relations is that which weak countries must establish among themselves, the dominated countries who want to destroy the system in force.

The type of relations which we want to re-establish between Iran and other countries certainly does not belong to the first category. We will have to re-establish a type of relations within which we will destroy the system in force.

The strong countries, the imperialist countries, have imposed an order, as it is called, on our world. If we destroy this "order," if we change the present situation, it is natural for it to seem like some great event has happened, to seem to us that the change has occurred in a disorderly, irregular way because this imperialistic order has been imposed on us as the only model.

If I now wish to transform this answer of mine in a political way to a political language, I would have to say that the type of relations which we want to have with other countries is relations against the imperialist powers, against the sovereign countries. We must put an end to this epoch in which the imperialist powers told us and are telling us, made us believe, that if the weak countries re-establish independent relations among themselves, they cannot develop; that, at any rate, they will have to have relations with the imperialist countries. But what we want to show is that the weak countries can and must have independent relations among themselves, that they will not have to build relations with the imperialist countries.

Only in this way can they destroy the sovereignty and imperialism of the western and eastern bloc, particularly of America and the Soviet Union.

Question: What is the strategy of your foreign policy concerning the Third World, the non-alined countries and the European countries?

Answer: As I told you previously, our general policy is a policy which aims at the destruction of the imperialist countries' sovereignty. Our world is presently organized in a system with many contrasts between the superpowers of the west and east and the rest of the world. All the rest of the world is forced to follow this order of things. We must create an equilibrium within which we can isolate the two superpowers, America and the Soviet Union, so that the other coutries--the weak and those a bit stronger, the countries which are dominated--are liberated. In other words, the other countries, aside from the superpowers, must re-establish such relations among themselves that the oppressed peoples can be united, can build a strong unity, a strong totality. This strong totality is very different from that which Mao spoke of. This strong totality will allow the weak countries to make themselves independent of the imperialist countries. This is my political position.

Question: What is your evaluation of the international situation and what do you estimate as a possible revolutionary development in the future?

Answer: From what I told you before in answer to the other two questions, it is clear that in the world today there are two currents which are continually colliding. In Europe, the capitalistic current which follows that two superpowers, particularly America, prevails. European capitalism thinks that its attachment to America is the sole condition for its survival and that the moment which will mean its separation from American capitalism will also be the moment of its death. However, another current is also being developed in Europe which says, for example, that if the weak countries are able to build a front among themselves, if they succeed in being united, they will be able to defend themselves.

Which of these two currents will win depends on our role, the role which Iran will play. If we succeed in creating a strong current in countries like our own, we will be able to strengthen this second current in Europe and in this way we will be able to create a revolutionary current in other countries of the world. Thus, even in the superpowers, America and the Soviet Union, even within these countries themselves, some currents could be developed against the over-concentration of power.

Question: You have been elected president of this country by the great majority of the Iranian people. What are the guidelines of the program which you presented to the Iranian people?

Answer: My plan and program for Iran is written in my book "The Islamic Republic." Perhaps you can find it translated into English. There are four basic units there: independence, defense, economy, ideology. Why ideology? Because, in my opinion, we cannot and must not apply our principles, our policy, with coercion. If we do not use the ideologic factor, then the only route remaining is coercion. But, in my opinion, we cannot and must not use any coercion whatsoever. We cannot rebuild, for example, a devastated economy in a country like ours without a strong power. This strong power can be either coercion, which in this case will create a

Stalinistic regime, or, if it is not coercion, it is the ideologic factor, the ideologic factor which--this and only this--I consider the only solution to our problems.

If we wanted to organize coercion, if we wanted to develop it, to endow it with branches and offshoots, like a strong police force, strong army, etc., then the only thing we would have to do is follow western and eastern imperialism. If we wanted to use force, we would attach ourselves to one of the two imperialist powers.

This is my philosophy. Certainly, with this method, I face many problems because the tendency to use coercion is great. And Iran has survived four-hundred, five-hundred years of tyranny and oppression. And power entices many.

Question: Is there a strong conflict between you and those who follow you, on the one hand, and the Islamic Republican Party, on the other? What are the differences between your perceptions and program and those of the Islamic Republican Party?

Answer: Speaking from a scientific viewpoint, I would say that, in our country, that which we would call a party does not exist because we cannot ascribe the term party to any type of political group. A true party demands a political viewpoint, program, organization, ideology. Based on all these, one could speak about a party. But, in Iran, such a thing which we can call a party does not exist. Despite all these, there are limited political groups. These political groups, in my opinion, do not reflect more than two to four percent of the will of the population within Iranian society. And these political groups consider coercion the only solution to our problems, with the difference that they say the direction of the coercion has significance. In the previous regime, the direction of coercion was from the top to the bottom; now it will have to be from the bottom to the top, from the oppressed people to the oppressors.

But we do not believe this. We believe that the use of coercion splits up the society. The use of coercion would mean nothing other than that one group which was strong and governed and which now has shattered, gave up its place to another group. For example, in the Soviet Union, the Tsar gave up his place to Stalin. Our masses, the Iranian masses, have the culture, the ideology of the "divine unity," the non-use of coercion. Nevertheless, the masses are unorganized. If we want to organize them, this must happen on the basis of suppression of any coercion whatsoever. What we finally need is an absolute science, or something very close to an absolute science.

We must make the society absolutely conscious. This effort must create that knowledge in society which will allow it to build itself on the principle of man's relationship with God, or, in other words, on the principle of mobilizing ideology, not coercion.

Question: Your Islamic ideology, if I understand it correctly, has as a goal a society without rich or poor, a society without classes in which man will not be satisfied only in a material way, but all his spiritual powers will flourish also. But, even if the distinction between the rich and poor disappears, could another great distinction exist in the society, that between, on one hand, the minority of special and governmental officials who control the state and, through this, are guardians of the entire society and, on the other, the majority of people who carry

out commands from the other? (This, for example, is the case in the Soviet Union and other eastern societies.) What are, in your opinion, the changes which the Islamic Revolution must bring about so as to make this distinction disappear and arrive at a society in which man expands himself?

Answer: The worst class system is that which is based on inequality of knowledge, of information. Let us suppose that we create a society in which prevails equality only as concerns material goods, for example, food, housing, etc. However, can the ignorant ever be in a relation of equality with those who possess knowledge? We will have to destroy censorship in Iran. We will have to make knowledge, information, a prerequisite of equality in making political decisions.

The people will have to be absolutely aware of what is happening in our society. We must go to the people, not sit behind closed doors, to make decisions. The other method is the method of bureaucracy and technocracy. Our own method is the method, the principle, of mobilizing the ideologic factor and this must become a deep awareness in the people. If we sit within our offices and make decisions, the people do not know why we are doing this or that. But if we come to the people, if we speak to the people, if we present the problem to the people, then it is much, much better. This inequality (to which I referred) will be destroyed. For this, we must say to the people that we do not need coercion, we do not need to use coercion. The only thing which we have need of, which we require, is for us to acquire knowledge and, more, to acquire greater and greater information, so that everyone in the society has the information needed to know what is happening in the society. I reject the use of coercion because I know that this will lead us to failure, to destruction. I know that if we use coercion, we will return to the previous regime.

Question: In your book "The Economy of the Divine Unity" you wrote that everyone in the society must do three forms of work: manual labor, administrative work (directing, deciding, governing) and investigative or creative work (researching, innovating, inventing). Please analyze this principle.

Answer: In all the existing social systems, one of these three forms of work acquires a dominant role and prevails. In the system which we call "Tohindi," that is, "divine unity," the work of governing and investigation is the principal work of mankind. And this is the principal role of every man.

What are the characteristics of this system? This system is based on the abolishment of opposing forces. It is based on that which we call man's relationship with God, not with others. In order for one to achieve this, great investigation, great innovation, great creation is demanded. Consequently, ideology plays a very significant role for the creation of the new society.

In short, I would say that the answer you are seeking can also be found in another book of mine called "Governing and Implementation of Governing."

Question: Would you like to send any message to the Greek people?

Answer: The things I said are equivalent to a message. But tell them that this ideologic current which the west has imposed on societies today results in the destruction, the complete destruction, of all of mankind's values. The dimensions of this destruction increase more and more every day.

Mankind, slowly or swiftly, must forget the use of coercion for ever and mobilize ideology, spirituality, in its place.

In my opinion, we must not come to terms with the destructive forces, the imperialist forces of the west or east. But we will have to become aware that the use of coercion is not a solution for us.

In this way, only in this way, will we become aware that the planet Earth is sufficient for mankind, that mankind does not need anything else.

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FRANJIYAH DISCUSSES POLITICAL TRENDS, HIS, LEBANON'S FUTURE

Nicosia AL-'ASR in Arabic 3 Oct 80 pp 7, 12

[Interview with Former Lebanese President Sulayman Franjiyah, Conducted by GAMMA Correspondent Lilian Beret]

[Text] This interview with Former Lebanese President Sulayman Franjiyah was conducted by French journalist Lilian Beret for the GAMMA News Agency. Pictures were taken during the interview by the agency's French photographer, Jean Pierre DuVille. The French journalist prefaced her interview with the following remarks.

"Former President Sulayman Franjiyah, who held the post of Lebanese president from 1970 to 1976 and who is now 70 years old, has lived in his summer retreats at Ihdin and in a mountainous area of northern Lebanon controlled by his so-called "al-Mardah" militia ever since the assassination of his son Deputy Tony Franjiyah and more than 30 other supporters on 13 June 1978.

"From time to time there are armed scuffles and clashes between his supporters and the armed men of the Phalangist Party, which is led by Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil. Even though he moved from the capital, Beirut, Sulayman Franjiyah is still the leader of a cohesive group of supporters, and remains the weightiest leader with respect to the Lebanese political situation. He is the main ally of the Syrians, and no government can be formed in Lebanon without his approval. Last August, he used his veto power against the formation of the government of Lebanese technocrats, which would have included a representative of the Phalangist Party. Recently, he has reached a 'gentlemen's agreement' with the progressive forces of the 'National Movement' and with Former Prime Minister Rashid Karami, in order to combat Bashir al-Jumayyil and the forces of the 'Lebanese Front.'" Here are the questions and answers.

[Question] Ever since the end of your term, you have been continually receiving visitors--Lebanese leaders and foreigners--at your homes at Ihdin or Zgharta. Exactly why are they visiting you?

[Answer] According to Lebanese traditions, the home must remain open to everyone. This applies to the president of the republic as well as to any Lebanese citizen. Some of those whom I receive visit me in order to inquire after my health and to get my news, out of friendship. Others visit me to tell me of

their problems, in view of my experience. There are a few groups which visit me to seek information about national problems--as you know, there are many and varied problems in Lebanon--so that they can take some sort of general stand on them.

At the present time, Lebanese politics is divided into several trends having conflicting goals. I personally see three main political trends:

1. a policy which strives to restore our country to its pre-civil war situation; this is the policy which I follow;

2. a policy followed by others to create a religious, racist state; and

3. a group which wants to establish a canton system.

But I personally continue to promote the same slogan: a unified Lebanese state free to determine its own destiny.

Why Doesn't the Army Move In?

[Question] But doesn't the idea of forming a "national unity" government seem to you to be a kind of delusion?

[Answer] The phrase "national unity" certainly does not have the same connotation in Lebanon as it has in Europe. In Europe, there are political parties which want to be represented in the government. If one of these parties is not represented in the government, it moves over to the ranks of the opposition.

In Lebanon, the political parties coexist with groups belonging to several sects --Maronites, Shi'ites and Sunnis. If one wants to speak of a national unity government, these sects must be represented in it. All the governments formed in Lebanon included representatives in the ratio of 50 percent for the Christians and 50 percent for the Moslems. Therefore, instead of forming a government containing ministers representing the combatants, a government must be formed which includes representatives of the sects. The latest formula for forming a government, presented through mediators to those in the government, was as follows: If we take the Republican Palace as the center of gravity, why doesn't it order the Lebanese army, supported by the Arab deterrent forces, to advance one km every day in all directions? In less than 100 days the army would be able to extend the sovereignty and influence of the Lebanese government to all of Lebanon.

On this basis, and if a specific date is set for achieving this goal, I would grant the people in power full freedom to appoint whatever ministers they choose, without my being represented personally.

But if people insist on bringing "technocrats" into the government, these technocrats will continue to clash among themselves inside the palace. Any government which is concerned only with current affairs and red tape matters, without asserting its powers, will serve no purpose no matter what it is.

Relations With Syria

[Question] To be precise, don't the powers of the Lebanese government depend on Syria's good intentions? Didn't the Syrian forces enter Lebanon at your request? How do you justify that now?

[Answer] I would be ready to do it again, without any doubt. The best example that I was right is as follows: when the Arab summit conference met in Riyadh at the beginning of President Ilyas Sarkis' term, the Arab leaders adopted this solution during that conference, and resolved to send Arab forces to restore order and peace to all parts of Lebanon and to separate the combatants.

[Question] But that initiative was presumably temporary. How long will the Syrian forces stay in Lebanon?

[Answer] The Syrian forces today represent the orders of the Lebanese authorities. Every 6 months the Lebanese requests the renewal of these forces' presence. For this reason, anyone who feels that the presence of these forces constitutes a danger to Lebanon's future logically ought to attack the authorities who request the renewal of their term, because the Lebanese government is responsible for this and not the Syrians themselves.

[Question] Your friendship with Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad is well-known. How did it begin?

[Answer] My friendship began with the family and father of the present Syrian president, and then shifted to Hafiz al-Asad himself when he was a soldier and then president of the republic. This friendship has not changed; it consists of old family ties, not political ones.

[Question] But it is hard for you to not think of political matters. For example, what do you think of the recent Syrian alliance with the Soviet Union? Do you agree with it?

[Answer] To be able to make a correct judgment on the policy of the president of the republic, a person must be informed as to the situation in Syria before President al-Asad's time, especially the economic situation. The changes are obvious and great. As for al-Asad's policy towards foreign states, that is up to him, and it is up to him alone to decide the line he will follow in light of his country's interests. I would like to add that because of the Israeli alliance with the United States, any leader who wants to preserve his country's interests has to tend towards an alliance with the Soviet Union. We have to recognize that the United States considers only Israel in the Middle East.

[Question] Some people have expressed their fear of Syria's intentions towards Lebanon. What do you say?

[Answer] I feel that this is sheer extortion. If Syria really wanted to expand its territory or extend its sovereignty to Lebanon, what is preventing it from doing so now? Part of its army is already in Lebanon, and we have no government. The world has forgotten that our country exists. Syria is present in the heart

of Lebanon and in the midst of Lebanese politics, as proven by the fact that before the president of the republic appoints any ministers, he sends delegates to Damascus to find out the Syrian president's point of view. Under these circumstances, why doesn't our neighbor take advantage of this situation?

I repeat that as long as al-Asad is president of Syria, he will desire nothing but Lebanon's well-being. Anything else is sheer extortion and a threat to exploit it by some Lebanese groups outside of Lebanon.

The End of Israel!

[Question] There is another current issue that concerns Lebanon for better or worse, and that is the unification of Jerusalem, after the Knesset's July voting to resolve this issue. What is your opinion?

[Answer] The unification and Judaization of Jerusalem is the most serious issue with respect to the whole world, not just Lebanon or Moslems or Christians. If the Christian world does not act against this decision, I am convinced that this will mean the end of everything for the Christian religion. This is because after the unification of Jerusalem, how could those who do not believe in Christianity respect what it represents?

My first reaction upon hearing of the Knesset decision was, "This decision is the beginning of the end for Israel." Let us look at the past. What do we see? That 1,000 years ago all the European states united to launch a crusaders' war to conquer Jerusalem. Three hundred years later, they were expelled from it. History always repeats itself, but nowadays it won't take 300 years to do so--it will repeat itself as soon as the Arabs reach an understanding among themselves. If this policy continues, Israel will fall soon.

[Question] The Palestinian cause is only one step removed from Israel. Do you believe that the Palestinian cause will be settled some day?

[Answer] That will be no surprise to me. In any case, I feel that Israel cannot remain if it continues its present policy. I hope that the Palestinian issue will be solved according to Resolution 242, which calls for restoring the situation to its pre-June 1967 war situation.

[Question] What conditions are necessary for achieving that?

[Answer] The only thing which the solution requires is an American president with a humane conscience who can implement such a solution.

With Arafat? No!

[Question] We know that you are always receiving Palestinian delegations. Does this mean that you have secret relations with Yasir 'Arafat? If there are such relations, what is their purpose?

[Answer] There most certainly aren't any secret relations. In fact, Yasir 'Arafat has unfortunately never understood us, and is not interested in establishing relations with the Lebanese authorities in general. Everything which has been said is erroneous, and I am wondering when we can say "enough!"

But I certainly do receive Palestinians in northern Lebanon from the Tripoli region, whether at Ihdin or at Zgharta.

The purpose of such meetings is extremely clear--to establish peace and mutual understanding in the north. So far these visits have had positive results.

[Question] Are you optimistic about the next few months?

[Answer] Relatively speaking, especially after 2 years.

[Question] Why 2 years?

[Answer] Because President Sarkis' term will end after 2 years, unless he heeds the citizens' call and resigns before that time.

A State Without Movement

[Question] What is your basic opposition to President Sarkis?

[Answer] His inactivity. It is extremely serious, especially under our country's present circumstances, that matters are proceeding as they are without his reacting to them forcefully. We have a republican president who depends on the days. Many people, including ourselves, feel that we were mistaken about his abilities. Nevertheless, he has the means of doing something. The Arab and western worlds are prepared to back and support him. Let me give a single proof, one which can be revealed. Compare the situation and conduct of the Italian president with that of the Lebanese president. During a period of 2 days, there were disasters in both countries: an attack in Bologna (Italy) and the 7 July incidents in Lebanon. The attack in Bologna resulted in the deaths of more than 80 persons, and in Lebanon, if I can trust Danny Sham'un, who came here to meet me, the 7 July incidents resulted in the death of 350 persons. In Italy, the 85-year old president, who has no real powers in his country, felt it was his duty to attend the victims' funerals.

[Question] At that time, the internal divisions of every camp were aroused. Do you believe that what some people call the "mini-war" between the al-Jumayyil and the Franjiyah families will find a truce or solution some day?

[Answer] I don't see how. In any case, a complete solution to the Lebanese crisis could be achieved through a government which wanted to control every part of Lebanon, except for the Lebanese south, which is outside our control.

As for forgiving them for killing my son Tony, without a trial this will never be. But after the trial, why not?

[Question] Mr President, you have withdrawn to what many people describe as the "fortress," and you are tied down night and day by your armed forces, the Mardah. Don't you feel sometimes that you are a prisoner, albeit a voluntary one?

[Answer] On some days I can imagine myself a prisoner, although a voluntary one in any case. Besides that, one of my personality traits is that even when I was president of the republic, I saved time for myself to spend with my family and my private affairs. How can you think that I am a prisoner in what you describe as a "fortress?" Look around you. The people living in this area have maintained their traditions. During the summer they go to Zgharta or Ihdin where the weather is cooler. I don't believe that they are unhappy. Then too, you must not forget that I don't leave the region very much, for I am getting too old for that.

[Question] What constitutes the Franjiyah entourage now, on the military and popular levels?

[Answer] I cannot give exact figures, but in any case that is not up to me to comment on. On the personal level, the Franjiyah supporters are in the north, and go no farther than that. As for the political level, the Franjiyah supporters are something else. We have friends and persons supporting us throughout Lebanon, even in Beirut. But I will not say, as some people are saying, that 90 percent of the inhabitants of Lebanon are loyal to me.

I Could Succeed Sarkis

[Question] Do you believe that you still have a political future?

[Answer] If I have spoken freely and openly declared some facts perhaps more than others, that is precisely because I feel that I could succeed Sarkis.

[Question] Perhaps. In any case, no government can be formed without your approval. As we know, there has been much discussion of deputizing your son Robert. In your religion, is your son the one people listen to and interview? Is this the situation you want?

[Answer] My son Robert will have the same destiny as I have had. In 1957, I was concerned with local political matters in the village and the region, while my brother, Hamid Franjiyah, was concerned with general political matters. Unfortunately, my brother was stricken with an illness which prevented him from pursuing his activities and his way of life. It is a tradition in our family: the older one is concerned with politics and the younger one does what he wants.

After the disaster which happened to Tony, Robert was forced to assume responsibilities which he had not wanted in the first place. He is performing them well, and everyone trusts him totally.

[Question] Some people feel that this tradition and family or partisan spirit shows vestiges of feudalism.

[Answer] All I can say is that this region has managed to preserve the human element, which is scarce in other areas. We depend on it very much, and we know everyone by their first names only. For this reason, our home is open to everyone every day. Whenever anyone has a problem or has been treated unjustly, he comes to us so we can act as a judge. He is always satisfied with our decision and verdict. I feel that this is true socialism, and I am proud to say that it began here. Whenever any one of us is confronted with an obstacle, the whole village helps him, and the neighbors are ready to fix coffee and food.

France's Policy?

[Question] What do you think of France's foreign policy vis-a-vis the Middle East and Lebanon?

[Answer] I have nothing to say about French President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, but during the past few months I have come to feel that the French president was adopting a strong, extremely frank stand with respect to the Arab cause, even though it doesn't always have enough pressure, and that these stands reflect the president's innate concern for justice.

[Question] Nevertheless, many observers and Lebanese reproach France for being somewhat lacking in concern for the Lebanese crisis.

[Answer] I have often complained about France's unconcern for what is going on in Lebanon, at least the unconcern of the country's eladers. But we have always been able to say that we are not living in the eighteenth or nineteenth century, and that every state has to concern itself with its own problems. However, I believe that the French people's friendship for Lebanon will never dwindle, as proven by a simple but touching story. I have a Lebanese friend who hires a taxi when he arrives in Paris to go around the French capital. When the driver learned his nationality, he refused to charge him any fare, saying, "You live in a war-torn country, and you need sympathy more than I do."

The European Initiative

[Question] Does it seem to you that the Middle East visit by Common Market Representative Gaston Thorn was of any use?

[Answer] I doubt it. Many leaders and representatives from the United States and Europe have made similar fact-finding trips before Thorn, including the Vatican's foreign minister, but these officials don't know all of the many details of the Lebanese issue, and therefore their role is extremely limited.

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FOREIGN MINISTER DISCUSSES SAHARAN QUESTION IN FRANCE

LD301319 Rabat MAP in English 1219 GMT 30 Oct 80

[Text] Paris, 30 Oct (MAP)--Mr M'hamed Boucetta, Moroccan minister of state in charge of foreign affairs and cooperation, was received here Wednesday afternoon by President Valery Giscard d'Estaing of France to whom he conveyed a message from King Hassan II of Morocco.

At the end of this audience, Mr Boucetta told newsmen that the message was "a message of friendship." Then he gave explanations of his mission in France and made comments on the latest developments of the Moroccan cause.

The minister mainly said "I am here to lead the Moroccan delegations at the works of the great Moroccan-French joint commission devoted to the study of the whole relation between our two countries, and I have conveyed a royal message of friendship to the French president which expressed our will to maintain the excellence of these relations and develop them."

The Moroccan minister went on saying "Of course we spoke of problems of common interest and the evolution of the situation in North Africa."

Asked whether the Moroccan Sahara question was dealt with during the meeting, Mr Boucetta said "We always tackle the situation in North Africa, because we are all concerned. It concerns Morocco in particular and it concerns its friends who would like to see peace, and stability re-established in the area."

When asked about the evolution of the situation in the Moroccan Sahara he said that it was progressing on the military plan, because Morocco totally controls the territory, and on the diplomatic plan, because attempts are being carried on at the African level, by the recommendations of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and by the special committee which is entrusted with this affair.

The minister finally replied to a journalists' remark related to a better disposition of Algeria vis-a-vis Morocco since the coming to power of President Chadli Bendjedid saying "What we presently witness is that attacks are launched not against the Saharan provinces but against provinces to the north of the Sahara."

The minister further underlined, "We cannot say there is a radical charge at present."

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JOINT COMMUNIQUE ON BOUCETTA VISIT

LD032337 Rabat MAP in English 1216 GMT 3 Nov 80

[Text] Paris, 3 Nov (MAP)--The workers of the third Moroccan-French intergovernmental commission ended here Friday under the chairmanship of Mr M'hamed Boucetta, Moroccan minister of state in charge of foreign affairs and cooperation, and Mr Jean Francois Poncet, his French counterpart, in an atmosphere of confidence and serenity.

At the end of these works, a joint communique was published in which it is first recalled that the Moroccan-French permanent intergovernmental commission which met here on 30-31 October 1980, was created by an agreement concluded here on 2 July 1971 between Morocco and France.

During the two day meeting, Mr Boucetta was received by French President Mr Valery Giscard d'Estaing, as well as by French premier, Mr Raymond Barre.

Mr Boucetta and his French counterpart made a tour d'horizon of problems of international politics.

The two men confirmed the attachment of their countries to the cause of peace and security and to the respect of the independence and territorial integrity of states.

They expressed concern over the prolongation of the Iraqi-Iranian conflict and their support to attempts to put an end to it through peaceful means.

They exchanged viewpoints on the evolution of the Middle East conflict and reaffirmed that only a global settlement taking into account the Palestinians' rights is susceptible of securing a just and lasting peace in the region.

They also reaffirmed their governments' condemnation and the international condemnation of the Israeli measures aimed at modifying the statute [as received] of the city of Al-Quds, and the necessity for Europe to carry on its action in this line.

The ministers expressed their satisfaction at the next resuming of the Euro-Arab dialogue and emphasized the interest the two countries grant the tripartite dialogue aimed at a closer cooperation between Europe, the Arab world and Africa.

Mr Boucetta and Mr Francois Poncet discussed the situation in Africa and expressed concern over the tension currently prevailing in Africa. Then they examined with particular attention questions raised by the relations existing between Morocco and the European Economic Community.

The two ministers expressed satisfaction at the positive evolution of bilateral relations in various fields, first in technical and cultural cooperation where they decided to step up efforts in education and the training of cadres, then in the economic field where several questions were examined and means to encourage the current tendency aimed at reestablishing balance in trade exchanges were sought. Questions related to the Moroccan community in France were also examined and consultations in this regard will be carried on.

The two ministers finally expressed satisfaction at the positive results of the works of the commission and Mr Boucetta warmly thanked the French minister for the welcome the Moroccan delegation was met with and invited Mr Francois Poncet to visit Morocco. It is to be recalled that Mr Boucetta was received here Friday by the French president to whom he conveyed a message from King Hassan II of Morocco, and Friday with Mr Barre, French premier, who accepted an invitation from his Moroccan counterpart Mr Maata Bouabid to visit Morocco next January.

CSO: 4420

MAURITANIAN INTERVENTION IN WESTERN SAHARA EXAMINED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 27 Sep 80 p 1

[Editorial by Mohamed Tamri: "The Imponderables"]

[Text] Upon receiving Mauritania's new ambassador to Paris, the French president reaffirmed that his country "can only approve a policy of authentic neutrality with regard to the conflict now going on" in the Sahara.

Emphasizing that the neutrality proclaimed in Nouakchott must be authentic, President Giscard d'Estaing does not for a moment doubt the direct involvement of Mauritania in a conflict raging on its borders, within which the mercenaries find bases and seek refuge, mercenaries whose ranks are constantly supplied with Mauritanian citizens. As King Hassan II said at his latest press conference, the forces which Morocco finds in the field are 2 to 5 percent Saharan, about 25 percent Malian and Niger and the rest Mauritanians.

The Mauritanian coast is also placed at the disposal of these same mercenaries and they are the authors of all the attacks recently made on Spanish, South Korean and Portuguese fishing boats.

This demonstrates to what extent a country that was long Morocco's ally is now committed to its detractors. One can also see the great difference between the proclamations of faith of the Mauritanian leaders and their actions. That is what emerges from the statement of the French president when he emphasizes that the proclaimed neutrality must be authentic.

The French policy on Mauritania, taking its interests into account, has always been to use it as a buffer between Senegal in particular and the Arab-Muslim world. However, since the overthrow of President Ould Daddah, the Mauritanian governments that have come after him, especially that of Ould Haidallah, by virtue of their incoherence and the contradictions characterizing their positions and their overall concept of regional balance, distort the scenario and introduce so many imponderables that the balance is increasingly threatened.

In his statement before the Mauritanian ambassador, Giscard d'Estaing added that his wish was to "see an overall settlement to the painful problem that concerns a region in which France has only friends."

The wish of the French president joins the concerns of Morocco, whose most fervent desire is to see peace return to our region and which is doing its utmost to bring it about. But in order for this wish to come true, it must be shared by the other parties in the conflict, which does not appear to be the case at the present time for the Mauritanian leaders, whose policy can only add fuel to the fire in short-range terms.

As King Hassan II emphasizes: "If Mauritania is not careful, as a nation and as a government, it will have to pay the price for this inevitable peace. It will not be Morocco that will do so."

The warning is clear: "If Mauritania is not careful, if the Mauritanian authorities do not check the freedom they are giving their nationals to become involved in an adventure against a friendly, neighboring country, one day there will inevitably be peace" and Mauritania will suffer the consequences."

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CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

PROTEST OVER MOROCCO VISIT--The Queen's visit to Morocco has elicited a protest from the Sahara Action Committee based in London. At a news conference at the Africa Centre in London the Committee, a representative of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic republic, Kamal Lajer, and a Labor member of Parliament, Mr Christopher Price, all registered their disquiet at the implications of the Queen's visit to Morocco and the possibility that it might be used by Moroccan propaganda. The protest, which was signed by several British parliamentarians, noted that "in view of Britain's claim that it is neutral in the conflict, a royal visit to Morocco is surely inadvisable." The committee called on the British government to review its policy adding that "if it wishes to be even-handed it should maintain relations with both parties to the conflict--Morocco and the Polisario Front." Letters have already been written to the Foreign Office concerning the visit. The reply said, in effect, that the visit bore no relation to Morocco's activities in Western Sahara. Buckingham Palace simply referred the committee to its correspondence with the Foreign Office and added that the Queen's visits are arranged on the advice of her ministers. The one thing which saves the Moroccan visit from any embarrassing political consequences is the continuing ignorance of the British public of the conflict in Western Sahara. Mr Price, who made no pretense to being an expert on the Western Sahara, also voiced concern on the possibility of British arms sales to Morocco, now that the Iranian market, on which the British arms industry had come to depend, has closed. Kamal Lajar, the representative of the SADR, confined direct comment on the royal visit to Morocco by observing that the "United Kingdom gained an image de marque in Zimbabwe. If the Queen is to visit Morocco, you can easily see, it will be harmful to that image de marque." [Text] [London WEST AFRICA in English 27 Oct 80 pp 2110-2111]

FORCES FOIL MERCENARY ATTACK--Rabat, 25 Oct (MAP)--The Royal Moroccan Armed Forces on 22 October foiled a planned mercenary attack south of Ras El Khannfra. The Royal Moroccan Air Force on a reconnaissance flight spotted enemy grouping estimated at several battalions and they immediately intervened to pursue the mercenary bands. They inflicted on them heavy losses in men and equipment. The intervention of the Royal Moroccan Air Force continued from 1000 to 1400. At 1500 the remnants of the mercenaries tried to regroup to mount a suicide action but the planes of the Royal Moroccan Air Froce supported by the artillery engaged them, foiled their plan, and made them retreat in defeat. The battles have resulted in the martyrdom of 14 and wounding of 65 of our men. The losses among the mercenary ranks were 150 killed and 60 enemy vehicles destroyed. [Text] [LD252010 Rabat MAP in Arabic 1530 GMT 25 Oct 80]

FORCES CONTINUE MOPPING-UP--The Moroccan Royal Forces continue their mopping-up operations in the south. On Sunday 26 October 1980 they surprised a column of mercenaries west of (El-Haouza) consisting of several units carried by more than 300 vehicles. The gangs of mercenaries tried in vain to confront the advance of our royal forces, whose reply was quick and effective. The land forces, supported by the Royal Air Force, put a complete stop to the advance of the mercenaries, who were forced to flee to the east and southeast. The Royal Armed Force achieved their goals in full and carried out the plan which had been drawn up for them. The battle lasted from 1300 to 1700. The Moroccan side lost 5 martyrs and 30 wounded. The mercenaries left on the battlefield 250 dead and wounded, and 80 vehicles--7 useable and the rest completely destroyed. [Text] [LD272110 Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 27 Oct 80]

GEOLOGY, ENERGY AGREEMENTS--5 Oct (MAP)--Early Friday evening, Moussa Saadi, minister of energy and mining research, arrived at the Mohammed V Airport following a short visit to Guinea and Senegal, in the course of which he met with Guinean and Senegalese colleagues to discuss cooperation in the areas of energy and mining. Minister Saadi was also received by President Ahmed Sekou Toure during his visit to Conakry and President Leopold Sedar Senghor during his stay in Senegal. Reporting on his trip to the two countries, the minister of energy and mining said that he had made the visit at the head of a large delegation for the purpose of improving Morocco's cooperation with Guinea and Senegal in the field of mining and energy. Referring to his visit to Guinea, Saadi said that the talks with his Guinean colleague Ismael Toure dealt with the different aspects of cooperation in mining, geology and energy. Saadi stated that agreements will be signed in this field between Morocco and Guinea as soon as the Moroccan experts who remained there have drafted the accords, probably at the time of Guinean Minister of Mining Ismael Toure's next visit to Morocco. Saadi said he was grateful for having been received by Ahmed Sekou Toure, president of the Republic of Guinea, to whom he extended the best wishes of the king on the occasion of the 23d anniversary of Guinea's independence. Speaking of his visit to Senegal, Saadi announced that his talks with Senegalese authorities were aimed at expanding cooperation in energy and mining, particularly through the conclusion of agreements between Morocco and Senegal in these fields. The minister expressed his satisfaction with the meeting with President Senghor, to whom he transmitted the fraternal greetings of King Hassan II. The minister of energy and mining was greeted upon his arrival by Hadj Mohamed Okacha, representing the governor in the prefecture of Casablanca, and by several high officials from his ministry. [Text] [Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 6 Oct 80 p 2] 11,464

CSO: 4400

PROGRESS IN AGRICULTURE NOTED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 27 Oct 80 p 3

[Article by Bill Wang: "Farmers Succeed in Growing New Red Rice Variety"]

[Text]

HOFUF, Oct. 26 (CNA) — Saudi farmers in Al-Hasa, the Kingdom's biggest oasis near the Arabian Gulf, have been successful in growing a new red rice variety developed by a Chinese agricultural mission to improve rice productivity in the region.

About 30 local farmers have been harvesting the rice they planted in May with the assistance of the Chinese mission. At that time the mission began an extension program to introduce to farmers the new variety, a hybrid between the local red rice variety of Hassawi and a dwarf, high-yield white variety produced in the Republic of China, Ai Chiao Chein.

On the average, the farmers have produced seven tons of rice per hectare of land, nearly two-and-a-half times as much as the local variety can yield from a plot of the same size. But what is more significant is that the new variety takes only four months to mature while the local variety will not be ready for harvest until six months after the planting.

Prof. Lin Cheng-i, leader of the mission, points out that the new variety has a strong ratooning ability. Therefore, after the first cutting, shoots will come out of the stems, and a second harvest can be expected in about another 80 days without the need for a new planting.

Because of the significantly reduced growth duration, Lin says, even after the second harvest, there will still be time for another crop of wheat or vegetable, thus achieving a full utilization of the land. In addition, there are other superior characteristics about the new variety. For example, it is considerably more resistent to salt than the local variety and can thrive on drainage water, which generally has a salt content nearly 50 per cent more than ordinary irrigation water in the region.

This has been demonstrated by a local farmer, Khalifi bin Shaio Al-Nuwaiser. Under the cooperation of Chinese experts, Nuwaiser had grown the new variety on a plot irrigated by drainage water, and the result was highly satisfactory. Even though Al-Hasa boasts of the best and most extensive irrigation system in the Kingdom there is still a lot of land out of its reach, and with the introduction of the new variety, the acreage of rice fields can be expected to increase considerably.

Of course, the Chinese mission's success didn't come overnight. In fact, it has been operating in Al-Hassa for more than a decade, and the amount of effort the mission has put in can probably never be matched by any other Chinese agricultural mission abroad.

This is due to the fact that the people in Al-Hasa have a special preference for red rice. The Republic of China has over the years produced many high-yield rice varieties, but none of them are of red variety. As a result, the mission has had to work from scratch and to breed an entirely new variety to satisfy the local people. Before the successful breeding of the current new variety, a number of other varieties had been produced by the mission. But they were far from satisfactory, and much effort had been exerted to modify their undesirable characteristics.

In 1977, immediately after his appointment to the current post, Prof. Lin decided to give up all the previously produced varieties and to start the work all over again.

This time he chose Ai Chiao Chien for the breeding of a new variety because the dwarf variety is early to nature, easy to grow and has a high yielding ability. From the offsprings of hybridization between Ai Chiao Chein and Hassawi, Lin picked out the new variety, which retains almost all the desirable characteristics of both varieties.

Last year, the mission invited farmers to its experimental farms and formally announced

the successful development of the new rice. After enough seeds were produced, extension work was started earlier this year.

At first, most farmers were hesitant, and only some 30 of them would want to give the new variety a try. But after these farmers' resounding success, it has become the most sought-after rice variety in the region. Apart from its success in rice, the mission has also brought about a monumental change in the production of vegetables and melons in Al-Hassa.

The cantaloupe and watermelon introduced to the region by the Chinese mission have enriched King Khaled's table. In fact, the King likes the fruits so much that he has asked the mission to grow some of the melons in the garden of his summer palace in Taif.

In the past, farmers had never succeeded in growing watermelon in Al-Hassa because the time suitable for growing the melon here is too short. The only time suitable is the period between March and May. Before March it is too cold, and after May it is too hot.

To prolong the cultivable period, the mission introduced the use of PE covering to protect the plant from damage caused by low temperatures. As a result, the seeds can be planted in February, and the melon grows very well in the region.

The mission has applied the same method to the production of cucumbor. To everyone's surprise, the yield of one variety has doubled while that of another has quadrupled.

Some of the vegetables the mission has introduced to the region have brought fortune to local farmers. Among them is Chinese cabbage. When the vegetable was first introduced, the local people were not too crazy about it because they thought it was too coarse to be served as salad.

But Chinese cabbage is extremely popular with the Chinese and Koreans working in the area, and a scramble for the vegetable has steadily driven its price up. Currently, a Chinese cabbage is sold for SR15. The profit margin can be astronishing since farmers can produce 30,000 cabbages from a hectare of land within a period of two months.

After three years of working here, Prof. Lin has discovered that there are many favorable factors for agricultural development in the Kingdom. For example, crops generally grow better here because they get sufficient sunlight. In addition, crops here are rarely attacked by disease since germs are not so active in a place with such a long and hot summer.

He believes the Kingdom will be able to achieve some measure of self-sufficiency in agriculture as long as farmers are equipped with advanced farming techniques and motivated by enough incentives.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

OILFIELD DEVELOPMENTS--More than 70 technical papers covering the most important developments in Saudi and Gulf oilfields are to be presented in Bahrain at a major conference in March, according Richard Savage of Bahrain's Exhibition Center. The specialist gathering, which is aimed at the region's top oil technologists, is organized by the Society of Petroleum Engineers. It will be held from March 9 through 12, 1981, at the Exhibition Center Bahrain, alongside the second Middle East Oil Show. The program committee is chaired by Saudi Arabia's Deputy Minister of Petroleum Ahmed Zamel. He announced that more than 120 papers had been presented for consideration during two days of extensive discussions. After stressing the high technical quality of the papers presented, Zamel said, "I am working with a committee of high caliber expects in the oil industry to ensure good standards of technical presentations. "This important event will provide an opportunity for engineers, scientists, managers and technicians to exchange views and ideas on important issues that are encountered specifically in the Gulf area," he added. Before leaving Bahrain, the fifteen-man selection committee of international experts inspected the new conference facilities nearing completion at November's building, construction and solar technology show, Arab-build '80. [Text] [Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 25 Oct 80 p 2]

CSO: 4820

SYRIA LOOKS FOR NEW, CHEAPER WAYS TO GENERATE ELECTRICITY

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 25 Aug 80 pp 4, 11

[Article: "Observations on the Situation and Future of Electricity in Our Country: The 'Adhra Electric Generation Station Uses Solar Energy; The Local Beginnings of Use of an Inexhaustible Energy Source"]

[Text] It is anticipated that our country's consumption of electricity in the coming 5 years will double. This increase means that the rate of dependence on oil derivatives for electric generation will also increase. This year it is estimated that we consume 4 billion kilowatt hours. The hydroelectric power plant on the Euphrates River will ensure us of 2.8 billion kilowatt hours, i.e. roughly 70 percent of our consumption of electricity while the remaining water-power stations--Suq Wadi Barada in Damascus, al-Rustam, and Muhradah stations--will ensure us another 10 percent. Thus the total share of waterpower used in electricity generation in our country will be in the vicinity of 80 percent of the total electric power we produce.

However, electricity consumption is rapidly increasing in our country. It even surpasses the theme which the party has maintained: 'Electricity in the villages every day', since just in the first trimester of this year 152 villages had electricity installed. Add to this the additional housing units, factories, and new establishments all demanding increased electric consumption.

Engineer Muhammad al-Shaqfah, technical consultant to the minister of electricity informed us that our country's consumption in 1985 will be 8 billion kilowatt hours, and in his estimation the median amount that water-generated power can give will represent only about 30 percent of the total electric power generated in Syria in 1985. It is obvious that water-generated power contributes a fixed amount whereas consumption is a rising variable. According to his estimates, Syria will need 1.6 million tons of fuel oil in 1985 to ensure the total demand for electricity that year. It is axiomatic that these figures will increase exponentially in the years that follow 1985. Under the circumstances of rising oil prices, the search for a substitute for electric generation appears urgent. The attempt must be made to moderate our consumption of electricity.

In this context, Mr al-Shaqfah is pointing out our country's poverty in water power and that it is imperative for us to look for two sources for electric power generation: reliance on nuclear energy and second, solar energy.

We have observed or read of projects in the Ministry of Electricity in our country that there is a foreign company that has asked permission to conduct a study of the subject of utilizing water power along the coastal regions to generate electricity. There's another company that is studying the use of [oil] shale also which is plentiful in Syria. Proposals have been gradually completed in order to start economic and technical studies about the possibility of utilizing nuclear power for electric power generation in Syria. Likewise an experimental station for generating electricity from solar energy and from wind has been set up in 'Adhra.

In the opinion of the technical consultant of the minister the solar solution is the most preferable since all the other power sources will be exhausted in the world whereas solar power is inexhaustible. However, electric generation by means of the sun still remains extremely complicated. The initial costs of a kilowatt hour comes to 200,000 lira, relying on the costs of the experimental station at 'Adhra. Whereas the initial cost of a kilowatt hour in steam driven stations comes to 2,000 lira and using nuclear reactor generators, 10,000 lira. In his estimation the interval separating the serious decision to build a nuclear reactor to generate electricity and the time when this experimental station can profitably be used must be only 10 years, even though some studies indicate that this hiatus will be 20 years.

Perhaps the figures that we've been given present us with a clear picture of a country steadily advancing, for it is well known that electricity is civilization, and that the more consumption of electricity increases, the more work and comfort there is to raise people's hopes. However this is not inconsistent with runaway increases in the cost of obtaining electricity. Initially, we must look for additional water power which is considered one of the cheapest sources of electricity. The positive picture referred to above must become even more profound in the sense that we will surely consume more electricity. This will compel us to search for alternative sources to oil because of the crisis and the continuous rise in prices this commodity displays. Under the present circumstances there is no alternative to the nuclear solution for electricity except that this does not prevent us from utilitizing solar power for space and water heating. It is well known that the apparatus which can achieve this power transfer is cheap and abundant. It would increase electricity so that we can use it in place of oil derivatives. It is axiomatic that it will not be long before the world solves the present difficulties facing the transfer of solar energy into electricity at reasonable costs.

9587
CSO: 4802

TWO PROVINCES START ACTIVE ROAD BUILDING PROGRAMS

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 20 Aug 80 p 4

[Article from the SYRIAN ARAB NEWS AGENCY: "A Start in Work on the Ring-Road for Homs. Work on More than 100 Road Projects in the Two Provinces of Tartus and Suwayda"]

[Text]--General Fu'ad 'Absi, governor of Homs, asked the Syrian Road Company to begin maintenance and improvement work on the axis road of Homs which stretches from the oil refinery to the fork to the Palmyra road. The costs of this road will come to 8 million lira. In addition the Homs ring-road project planned to run from the end of the Damascus highway to the Tripoli road will be completed and will cost about 80 million lira.

In Tartus the director of communications confirmed that more than 100 principal and secondary road projects have been entrusted to the directorate of communications for their completion this year in order to improve and enhance the highway system and to facilitate the movement of public transport to and from the city centers, neighborhoods and outlying areas.

These projects will cost about 30 million lira.

The director of communications praised comrade Danhu Da'wud, governor of Tartus, for the support and measures that he took and which gave the directorate the opportunities to accomplish these projects on schedule.

He also pointed out in his statement to correspondents of the ARAB NEWS AGENCY that the completion of one of ten projects in the countryside had come to a cost of 3 million lira.

He said that the longest network of roads in the province was the mountain roads and that they required special work and bridges, since they are exposed to the destructive processes of heavy rains which don't allow the directorate's workshops with their meagre resources to undertake as promptly as possible the preventive maintenance and repairs measures that are needed in response to these processes of nature.

He added that the directorate needed to improve its important job with more modern equipment and by continously training the skilled workers needed to maintain the roads.

He pointed out that the Syrian Roads Company is now entrusted with the work of widening, expanding, and upgrading the Tartus-Safita and the Tartus-Duraykish roads.

During the next five-year plan work on the Tartus-Shaykh Badr, Baniyas-Qadmus, and Shaykh Badr-Duraykish roads will be finished.

He mentioned at the end of his announcement that the directorate in cooperation with the party branch office and the local branch of the Revolution Youth Union and the executive office of the local administration has taken possession of a number of secondary roads necessary for the peasant populace by means of using the youth production and training camps.

Likewise, the communications directorate in Suwayda has undertaken eleven road projects within the province.

The sum of 6 million lira has been appropriated for this work. These projects will be completed during the current year. They are included in the directorate plan of maintaining the road network in the province.

9587
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

ALEPPO'S NEW CEMENT FACTORY--The military housing authority has decided on setting up a cement factory in Aleppo with a daily production capacity of 1,200 tons of cement. This is in order to ensure enough cement for its development projects. An official in the authority indicated that the total cost of setting up this project shall reach 150 million lira and he expects it will be completed and begin production at the beginning of 1982. In other news the first experimental phase of the production program of the Arab Cement Company began recently with a capacity of 3,000 tons of cement daily. This is in preparation for shifting the plant to an actually profitable level at the beginning of next year. It should be mentioned that the total cost of the project could approach in the environs of 940 million lira considering the present completion costs of the plant. [Text] [Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 19 Aug 80 p 4] 9587

THE APPROPRIATIONS BUDGET'S PROJECTS--The level of expenditures of projects assigned in the separate budget for 1980 was exceptional and came to 25 million Syrian lira. A member of the executive committee of the provincial assembly announced this yesterday and added that five projects of the original 16 projects slated in the investment budget for 1980 had been completed. Their costs have reached 21.15 million lira. The necessary preliminary studies for the remaining projects are now being finished so that they can be contracted. This executive committee member explained that the completion rate of the maintenance plans was 60 percent since an appropriation of the sum of 6 million lira for these projects coming out of this year's budget was made. The military housing authority will shortly carry out the execution of the two projects in the administration building of the Water and Public Facilities authority at a total cost of 37 million lira. A responsible source in the provincial branch office of the housing authority announced this. He added that the authority expects to complete the two projects by the end of 1982. Recently an agreement was concluded between the Roadco Company and the city of Aleppo for the building and paving of various streets in the city's neighborhoods at a total cost of 4 million Syrian lira. The company has already begun work according to the contracted plan and it is expected that it will complete work on this at the end of the current year. [Text] [Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 17 Aug 80 p 4] 9587

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

REPORTED ATTACK AGAINST MOROCCO--The Saharan Democratic Arab Republic Information Ministry has published a military communique on a new attack waged on 26 October by fighters of the Saharan People's Liberation Army against the aggressive Royalist Forces at Ra's el Khannfra, southern Morocco. The Moroccan losses were 175 killed and a similar number wounded. In addition 51 diverse vehicles were destroyed, including South African armored vehicles. [Excerpt] [LD300057 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 29 Oct 80]

CSO: 4402

LEADER DISCUSSES POLITICAL, ECONOMIC POLICIES

San'a' AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 9 Oct 80 p 2

/Article: "Text of the President and Commander's Responses to Press Questions Presented by Qatar Paper AL-RAYAH AL-QATARIYAH"/

/Text/ Question: Mr president, what is the 19th year of the September revolution bringing to the people of Yemen? What about the Committees of National Dialogue and Correction? Was it necessary to transfer such important matters to the activities of committees, causing us to fear bureaucratic procrastination and the dominance of the official character over the popular one?

Answer: There is no doubt that the 19th year of the revolution will witness a great evolution in the new life of Yemen, because it represents a continuation of the serious national revolutionary course which we have striven to assert through deed and practice in all areas. There is no doubt that it will witness the establishment of a revolutionary council elected publicly, freely and directly by all members of the people through the system set forth by the General Election Law we recently issued, which will win a victory for the course of the revolution in the process of reaffirming democracy and the practice of democracy. It will also witness the completion of the implementation of all comprehensive 5-year economic and social development plan projects and serious preparations for the second 5-year plan. However, the most important thing we aspire to achieve and realize in the 19th year of the revolution is the National Charter, since that is one of the most important vital pressing demands which will guarantee that some of the political ailments created by the illusion of a political vacuum, illegitimate personal aspirations and the impetuous leap into reality and vital truths are remedied.

Naturally, in order to achieve an important objective, it is necessary that people be assigned to carry it out--be that one person or more. Several tasks and activities in particular can only be carried out by a chosen group, and here is where the designation of the committees comes. There is no harm in that, as long as the committee performs its work and is followed up on by the leadership and the entity responsible for performing the job, since, if it fails, it will be dissolved and another committee will be formed which will be able to perform the work and the tasks assigned to it. Therefore there will be no fear for the activity of the committees as long as there are people constantly to follow up on their activities, which is what we are doing.

Question: Have the discussions between the two halves of Yemen arrived at a crystallization of the notion of union? Union is a legitimate right, but has it acquired an identity? Does the president feel that there are some Arab or foreign forces which might oppose the establishment of a strong state in the south of the Arabian Peninsula, in a sensitive location?

Answer: Our discussions with our brothers in the southern half of the nation are in order to reattain the enduring unity of Yemen. We are acting to embody a clear, specific notion of the nature and character of the union state through the bases and principles contained in the two Cairo Agreements, the Tripoli, Kuwait and San'a' statements, and other subsequent statements. The tasks assigned to various unity committees have been aimed at discussing this issue and reaching final agreement on it. There is no doubt that the committees have covered great and significant strides in this regard. Thanks to that, we recently took a number of important executive steps which will have the effect of bringing the day of union close, among them establishment of joint tourist, cultural, and commercial companies and organizations, unification of postal and communications systems, and so forth.

This confirms that we are proceeding along the proper path to reattain unity, before which no obstacle or impediment of any kind can stand since it is the destiny of the Yemeni people and its inevitable, ineluctable future. We do not feel that there are Arab forces opposed to the establishment of Yemeni unity--rather, everyone is encouraging its consummation, and the same is the situation with respect to friendly countries. There is no doubt that there are enemies of Yemeni unity, but they are in reality the enemies of the Arab nation and the enemies of its solidarity and unity, primarily Israel and the forces of international Zionism.

Question: Once again, the winds of danger have started to blow from the African Horn, now that Somalia has offered military facilities to America. What about Yemen, on the shores facing Somalia? What is the effect of that on the unity talks between the two halves of Yemen?

Answer: Any foreign military presence in the region will constitute a blatant threat and extreme danger to the peace, security and stability of the region. Therefore we are acting against all foreign military presence in the region, because that will become a direct cause for drawing the region to the brink of international struggles and a race for foreign dominance and influence, bringing direct damage on all the countries in it. We are not satisfied with this and others are not either. We are appealing to everyone to coordinate and cooperate in repelling it and overcoming it.

There is no doubt that such things as this can have no effect on the course of the program of dialogue underway between the two halves of the nation for the sake of the reattainment of unity.

Question: News has proliferated about Yemen's readiness to join the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front. To what extent is that correct, and what strategic and political dimension will Yemen add by joining it?

Answer: We are in favor of every Arab position which will have the effect of strengthening Arab forces and combining them and their resources in one entity

which will be better able to confront the Israeli and Zionist enemy and enter into a decisive national struggle with him. This naturally does not mean, and does not commit us to join a specific bloc on the Arab stage, especially since Arab solidarity requires that we all go beyond blocs toward a single specific position uniting Arab statements, mobilizing all resources and powers, and employing them to one end, which is the attainment of victory in our inevitable battle of destiny.

Question: Have the Arab countries in general and the Gulf states in particular offered the requisite economic support to deal with some of the economic situations Yemen is suffering from? Has the necessary aid been presented or is their aid below the requisite level?

Answer: There is no doubt--and this we do not deny--that many Arab countries, Arab Gulf countries in particular, are playing their national part as far as we are concerned by embracing a number of important projects which will help us achieve economic and social development and progress; the space would be very long if we tried to get into details. However, we would like to stress here that our urgent developmental needs are receiving full understanding and care from our brothers who are able to provide it, and, were it not for the generous aid we are receiving from them, we would not have been able to make these great strides in the process of construction, development and gorwth.

Question: What are the features of the second 5-year plan? Is it accompanied by a cultural educational plan to move the productive capabilities of the Yemenis forward?

Answer: In preparing the second 5-year plan we will concentrate on building the domestic economy and translating the principle of self-reliance into reality by concentrating on productive projects, be they agricultural or industrial, especially since we have concentrated on the construction of the basic structures of development in our first 5-year plan. We have made substantial strides in this, as well as realizing basic essential services. This means that we will also concentrate on human development and preparation of the staffs and the technical and scientific capabilities production requires.

Question: Is Yemen suffering from a human drain through the emigration of many of its people to work in Arab and foreign countries?

Answer: Not to a large extent, because our country is rich in tremendous human resources and we have an abundant reserve of workers. However, we are deficient in technicians. Emigration helps us acquire this type of technical worker who returns to the homeland after acquiring skills which are not available here and technical expertise we really are deficient in.

Question: What is the extent of your relationship with the state of Qatar?

Answer: We are linked to the fraternal state of Qatar by warm fraternal relations which have deep historic roots. These are well developed relations which serve the interests of the two fraternal states and their common national aspirations.

I consider this a valuable opportunity to praise the role the fraternal state of Qatar is playing in supporting and backing the course of development of our country and helping us in many fields.

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CSO: 4802

END

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19 September 1980

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2221

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19 November 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2221

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FATAH MEMBER COMMENTS ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 20-26 Oct 80 pp 50-61

[Interview with Abu Iyad, Fatah Central Committee member, by Lydia Georgi]

[Excerpts] The Palestine Liberation Organization has proposed a "face-saving" plan to end the Iraqi-Iranian war and has high hopes that Baghdad and Tehran will accept it, according to Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), ranking member of Fateh's Central Committee.

In a private interview with MONDAY MORNING, Abu Iyad outlined the Palestinian plan as follows:

--A cease-fire will be declared;

--Iraq will announce its readiness to withdraw to the borders specified by the 1975 Algiers treaty or the 1913 treaty of Constantinople;

--Iran will immediately announce that it is ready to enter into direct negotiations with Iraq in any neutral country if Iraqi forces pull out of Iranian territory;

--Islamic or non-aligned states will supervise the withdrawal of Iraqi troops, after which negotiations will start.

A translation of the full interview, which was conducted in Arabic, follows:

You have said that the PLO will continue its mediation between Iraq and Iran and is planning to propose a solution for the problem between the two countries. Do you think you will be more successful than you were in the first mediation attempt?

When the matter involves an attempt to end a conflict between two countries which we believe are themselves being harmed by the war, the important thing is not whether we succeed or not; the important thing is that we have taken a stand in support of the principle of the cessation of hostilities between two countries which are among the major supporters of the Palestinian Revolution.

That is why, since the visit of Abu Ammar (to Baghdad and Tehran), we have taken every possible measure, we have thought out loud, and we have sometimes made contacts behind the scenes to put a stop to this war.

I believe the time will come when our call will be heeded, because the two sides will discover that our call is right, and that this war was planned to last until the capabilities of both sides are exhausted. They will also discover that it has been decided that no one is to be victorious in this war – neither Iraq nor Iran.

The United States, which I believe is indirectly encouraging the war, is keen on weakening the two countries and anxious to prevent either of them from emerging as the victor. It does not want Iran to emerge strong from this war because it does not want it to control the oil of Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and it does not want Iraq to emerge strong because it does not want it to have influence in oil affairs. The thrust of American thinking regarding this war is to have both Iraq and Iran emerge from it weak.

If the two countries discover this fact and drop their intransigence, I believe they will accept our idea to end the war and establish good neighborly relations through constant meetings and negotiations.

Do you think this is likely to happen in the current circumstances?

I think every day of war will convince the two parties of the sincerity and rightness of our call to end the hostilities.

There is now the idea of calling a meeting of the non-aligned nations' coordination office – an idea which the PLO proposed and is still backing. The PLO has contacted both countries on this matter, and there may be agreement in principle on the part of both countries to accept the mediation of the non-aligned nations.

There "may be" agreement?

I say "may" because I don't want to be overoptimistic, but I have great hope that we will be able to push this mediation in a direction that would create meeting points between the two parties and yield results.

I believe the two countries have begun to sense that the world is not really interested in arranging a cease-fire. On the contrary.

The greatest losses the two countries are incurring are not human losses; they are economic losses. Oil sources and refineries are being hit. The European countries are usually afraid to lose a handful of oil barrels; why are they so uninterested in this war? Why? I say they are not interested because they are being told by the U.S.: "Don't worry about oil. You will get all the oil you want. You will be the ones to rebuild the two countries after their destruction." In other words, "The oil of Iraq and Iran will be mortgaged to us until the two countries have rebuilt what the war has destroyed."

This means that the oil flow will be uninterrupted, unemployment in Europe will disappear, and we will be the losers – we the Palestinians and the Iraqi and Iranian peoples.

This is why we refuse to give up hope in stopping the war and why we will do everything in our power to stop it.

And this fact has begun to be recognized by our brothers the Iraqis and our brothers the Iranians.

Don't you think the relative lack of interest is at least partly due to the fact that other oil countries, especially the Gulf countries, have decided to increase production to compensate for the loss of Iraqi and Iranian exports?

Why are the Europeans not anxiously seeking an end to the war? Why aren't they pressuring the U.S. to stop the conflict? Everyone involved in the oil business knows that before this war broke out, the Europeans stored oil reserves that would meet their needs for four months. In other words, they have calculated that they will have enough oil for their needs even if the war lasts three months. In addition to this, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries and some other OPEC countries have increased their production covering part – not all – of the shortfall.

Given these facts, if the European countries know that after two or three months of war and destruction they are likely to be back in the region to rebuild and repair what has been destroyed, why should they be uneasy about the war – especially since there is a red line in this war, which means that neither country can emerge victorious?

There may be some European sentiments here or there, but in practice, the Europeans and the United States have taken a definite position: keep the war going but impose a ceiling on it, so that neither party wins.

Do you believe the Gulf states are encouraging this attitude by increasing their production?

This matter is connected with the Gulf states' relations with Europe and America. It has nothing to do with the encouragement of the war.

I don't believe that the continuation of the war would serve the interests of the Gulf states. My information is that those states are apprehensive about the war — they are afraid that the war will continue and spread to their territory, and they are afraid that the victor, gaining the upper hand, will deal with them from a position of strength. There are many reasons why they are afraid of this war, but they are now compelled to either support the Iraqi side or adopt a neutral position. My information is that they are all announcing their neutrality.

Saudi Arabia has not announced its neutrality.

Saudi Arabia may be a little more than neutral, but the general attitude among the Gulf states is that this war is against them as it is against Iraq and Iran.

Is there any coordination between the PLO's mediation effort and the mediation effort of the Islamic Conference, and will there be any coordination between it and the proposed non-aligned mediation effort?

The PLO is a member of both the Islamic Conference and the non-aligned nations organization, so any move made by those two bodies is made with our knowledge and encouragement.

The Islamic mediation effort has not succeeded, so we are now inclined to favor a mediation effort by the non-aligned nations, which include the Islamic states. This will give the effort a wider scope and avoid giving the war any (religious) color.

Perhaps even before this interview is published, the non-aligned nations' coordination office will have met and decided to send a team representing several countries to Baghdad and Tehran to detect the meeting points between the two countries and work out a timetable for a cease-fire, then for withdrawals, then for direct talks.

We encourage all these trends, which in no way run counter to the PLO's efforts to play a role.

You have said that Iraq should withdraw to its pre-war borders. Does this mean that you blame Iraq for the continuation of the war?

When a man tries to play a role — to exert "good-will efforts," in diplomatic language, because people don't like the word "mediation" — to end a war of this kind, he is bound to encounter difficulties.

Where do the difficulties lie?

Iraq says: "I have a right to lands which were given to me under the Algiers treaty. I have tried and failed to regain these lands by peaceful means, and I finally had to resort to force."

War is always started for a specific target, but wars may start as one thing and end up being something altogether different. Wars, by nature, develop by themselves, no matter how controlled they may be. This war started as a war over Iraqi land and became a thrust into Iranian territory. That has complicated the matter further. Now the Iranians say that acceptance of a cease-fire would imply acceptance of the occupation of their land, and it would mean that they would have to enter into negotiations as a country which has part of its territory occupied.

Negotiations will be difficult to start if Iranian lands remain in Iraqi hands.

So what is to be done? An unconditional Iraqi withdrawal? Iraq says that would mean a political defeat which would have negative internal repercussions.

That is why we have suggested that a cease-fire be declared first; that the Iraqis then announce their withdrawal to the borders specified in the Algiers treaty or the 1913 treaty of Constantinople; that the Iranians then announce their agreement to enter into negotiations with Iraq in any neutral country if the Iraqis withdraw from Iranian territory. In the meantime, friendly nations — Islamic states or non-aligned states — would supervise the Iraqi withdrawals to avert the possibility of another war breaking out in the process.

That is a general idea of our proposal, which would save the face of both countries.

Have the two countries responded favorably to this suggestion?

I don't think there is any other option. The only other way out is for one of the two countries to defeat the other and impose its conditions, and I don't see that happening – unless we want a very long war.

Does your suggestion of an Iraqi withdrawal mean that you are blaming Iraq?

It is not our job to decide who is wrong. Our job is to stop the war. When the war stops and peace returns, a man can freely state his views. But until our efforts to stop this war bear fruit, we must cast no blame unless casting blame can serve our purpose, which is the cessation of hostilities.

Everyone has his own views about the war. I have said, for instance, that the Arabs are either watching idly or gloating or inciting. None of these attitudes is a proper Arab attitude. The proper Arab position is one in favor of stopping the war by any means. Inciters, idle watchers and gloaters can do nothing but harm. That is not a time for idle watchers or gloaters or inciters. I don't need to name any names, because the position of everyone in the Arab world is known.

As for us, we are avoiding those three categories and trying not to call things by their names. However, we have evidence and documents to indicate who is at fault in this war.

Who is at fault?

We'll say it after the war ends.

You have been quoted as saying: "Arab land is precious but not precious enough to justify war." Would you explain that statement?

Sometimes, when we say we are against this war and we blame someone for continuing it, our statements are misunderstood and interpreted as biased statements against Iraq or against Iran.

We have taken a clear position against the continuation of this war, and one of the reactions we get is: "What do you mean? Our land is occupied and we want to regain it?" If we tell them, "Don't regain it," they say, "Don't you, the Palestinians, want to regain your occupied land?"

I say we have in this region one major conflict and several secondary conflicts which can be settled by negotiations and in time.

The major conflict, the basic conflict in this region is between us and Israel. That is why the Arabs have for over 30 years been convinced that all their capabilities should be funnelled into this conflict and that no war should break out in the region outside this basic conflict.

There are problems between all Arab countries – border problems between Iraq and Kuwait, border problems among the little Arab emirates, border problems between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, border problems between Libya and Algeria, border problems between Tunisia and Algeria, border problems between Tunisia and Libya... There are problems over an entire desert. We are against all these side wars. If we start settling our disputes over every kilometer by force, all our capabilities will be wasted in side wars – they will be poured into tributaries, and not in the river proper.

That is why I say we must push these disputes aside. Algeria can get along without a bit of land from Libya or Tunis, and the same applies to all the rest. Let us put off these matters and look to the land that has been occupied by external forces. Because those disputed lands, whether they are held by Libya or Algeria or Tunisia or Morocco, remain in Arab hands. And where Iraq and Iran are concerned, concessions are also possible on the part of both. We can go on demanding our rights and seeking them. But in the short run, we must not wage wars over those territories, because there is an external enemy occupying a large part of our land.

This is what I meant by that statement.

Do you agree with those who are saying that the Gulf war has brought U.S. military presence back to the region?

If we look at the military and political map of the Gulf region after the outbreak of the Iranian-Iraqi war, we will find the following:

There is American military presence in the heart of the Gulf – naval vessels and fleets. Even some French naval vessels have entered the Straits. Carter has also called for a meeting of the six countries that depend on the Hormuz Straits to prepare a plan for the creation of a naval force in the Gulf.

Iran, of course, has been intelligent enough to stay away from the Straits, but the military forces are there anyway.

No one can credibly state that he knows whether the consequences of the war will remain limited to this presence or will develop further. There may be surprises. An analysis of the repercussions of the war could be a hundred percent sound and still not take unpredictable surprises into account. This must be kept in mind.

I believe that the presence of those fleets in the Gulf has gained a certain legitimacy through the Iraqi-Iranian war. Before the war, if one vessel had made a move in that area, the entire world would have been up in arms. Four or five vessels would have set the world boiling. Now, it has become a natural thing: there they are, in the Straits, digging themelves in, strengthening themselves in the area.

Fear of the consequences of the Iraqi-Iranian war makes the Gulf states say, "We're ready to turn to the devil for help." I know one Gulf official – I will not name him – who told me, "If the devil himself came to help us and offer us protection from the dangers around us now, we would accept and you can't blame us." This is specially true of the states that have adopted a position of genuine neutrality and may consequently be threatened by both Iraq and Iran. Those people are thinking, "We will accept help from the devil himself."

Who is the devil in the world today? The United States is the devil of our age, and it is able and willing to intervene. Let's be realistic: who has strong military presence in Oman and Somalia?

The Iraqi-Iranian war has consecrated American presence in the region. How long the war will be, what its results will be, and how these will develop the American plan to strengthen U.S. presence in the area we do not know.

Do you think it is possible that the U.S. will intervene militarily in the war?

If Saudi Arabia or the Gulf is threatened, or if the Americans feel that the balance is tipping in favor of one of the two sides, they may intervene – because, as I told you, America does not want anyone to emerge victorious from this war. We call this war a war of rams. When rams fight, they go on fighting until their horns snap off and they both collapse. That is the kind of war they want the Iraqi-Iranian war to be. If they find that one of the two sides may win, they may intervene.

But it is your view, I gather, that whether they intervene or not, their presence has been consecrated by the war. Do you believe that this presence will remain consecrated after the war is over?

The longer the war lasts, the stronger the arguments of the Americans will be in their talks with the Gulf states and the more credible they will sound when they tell the Gulf states, "You have no one to depend on but us."

I have talked about possible surprises. When the Iraqi-Iranian war broke out, anyone reading the opinion columns in the Western press – specifically, in the American press – could catch a whiff of the internationalization of oil. The idea which came across was that since the Gulf states and Iran and Iraq were unable to protect the oil, why should the oil be kept under their protection? Iraq and Iran are big nations, and yet, for whatever reason, they started a war and stopped oil production. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are weak compared to Iraq and Iran. If Iraq and Iran can't protect their oil, how can Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states be expected to protect theirs? And that being so, why shouldn't America intervene and establish a supervisory presence in the area, thus internationalizing the oil of the Gulf so that it can no longer be at the mercy of anyone?

That is the trend of their thinking, and their thoughts apply to other countries – like Qadhafi's Libya, for instance.

They want to gain control of the oil sources, on the grounds that this valuable resource, which is so essential for Europe and the U.S., should not be at the mercy of people who – look at them! – don't think twice of destroying their own economies.

Don't ever imagine that this theme is not involved in the plan: "The Arabs and the Iranians are backward people whose control of the oil sources must not be allowed to continue. This resource must be in our hands."

It is my view that this will be one of the surprises of the war: the internationalization of Middle Eastern oil, so

that it falls under the full control of Europe and the U.S. – either directly or indirectly.

This means that Iraq and Iran are playing the American game by continuing the war, doesn't it?

We sometimes fall prey to a plot without realizing it. This was aptly demonstrated in Lebanon, where several parties thought they were working for the interests of Lebanon by declaring a holy war against the Palestinians. The consequences were not what they imagined they would be. They discovered that they and others, including ourselves, were playing the Kissinger game.

In other words, not everyone that plays a part in a plot is a plotter or an agent connected with the plot. Sometimes people slip into the plot without knowing it, drawn into it by those who have studied their mentalities and know how to influence them.

Where the Iraqi-Iranian war is concerned, they definitely intimated to the Iraqi leadership that the Iranian revolutionary regime would fall as soon as the Iraqi forces made their first move because the Iranians did not have an army, and if they did, they didn't have spare parts. That's the kind of misleading information they fed them.

And I have no doubt that spare parts have arrived in Iran – not directly from the U.S., of course, but via Japan and other countries – and the Iranian army is beginning to play its role again. Iran has in the meantime been told that if the Iraqis suffer one defeat, their leadership will definitely fall.

All the mistakes that have been made in history were made because of inaccurate or incomplete information.

In the light of what you have said so far, how do you evaluate the attitude of the Gulf states toward the Iraqi-Iranian war?

I believe they are among the victims of the war, but of course certain circumstances are dictating their positions. Perhaps they have disputes with Iran. What can we expect Sheikh Zayed to do when the Iraqi leadership tells him, "We will return the three islands to you"? Can he say, "No, don't return them to me"? The Gulf states are in a delicate position.

I'm not defending anyone, but I'm telling you that those who instigated this war made it a very complex one: they made it a war between the Arabs and the Iranians. Are you with the Arabs or with the Iranians: If you're with the Iranians, are you with Islam or against Arab nationalism? And the Iranians will tell you, "Are you with the right or the wrong? If you're with the right, then you're with us." And so on.

Those who planned this war chose the right time and place for it. Even the rumors and slogans that accompanied it were well-studied.

The fear of some Arab states, like Saudi Arabia, has prompted them to request advanced American arms. Does this...

This is fear of the results of the war – fear of what will happen if one of the two belligerents wins; in the case of Saudi Arabia, if Iran wins.

Furthermore, they may say that they have bought or asked for these arms, but we say that, in practice, all the Gulf area is sinking deeper into American influence, either willingly or unwillingly, as a result of this war. And the longer the war lasts, the more American reinforcements we will see in the area.

How do you evaluate the Soviet position, and how do you think this position may evolve in the event of direct U.S. intervention or permanent American military presence in the area?

The Soviets are now observing the situation, and I believe that their attitude is similar to ours. They, like us, regard this war as an advantage to the U.S.

As for what their position will be, this depends on a number of factors, foremost among which is the length of the war.

We must not forget that the Soviet Union has a friendship treaty with Iraq and has commitments under that treaty. At the same time, the Soviet Union, at least as far as it is concerned, has good relations with the new regime in Iran, despite the Iranian attacks on it and the way the Iranians are equating the Soviets and the Americans.

Given its relations with the two sides, the Soviet Union is likely to adopt a strong position if the war lasts much longer.

Also, the extent to which the U.S. interferes in this war, either directly or indirectly, will determine the Soviet attitude.

In short, I believe that the more the Soviets feel that this war is entailing more American military presence and influence in the area, the more quickly they are likely to adopt a position and make a move.

Isn't it strange that (U.S. Secretary of State Edmund) Muskie and (Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei) Gromyko should meet and come out with the sole decision that the two powers would remain neutral? What does this mean? It means that the Soviet Union has said that it will not interfere if the U.S. does not interfere. But the two countries' positions differ. The Russians are against this war from beginning to end. The Americans are not clearly against it. On the contrary, they are indirectly encouraging it — by having their agents incite Iraq to continue the war and by having their Asian allies send spare parts and war materiel to Iran. The U.S., in other words, is pouring oil on the fire and is by no means being neutral.

On the other hand, we know through our contacts with the Soviets that they really want this war to end, because they see no interest in having it continue. The longer the war lasts, the stronger American presence becomes in the area...

What do you think the Soviet reaction to this will be?

I can't make decisions for the Soviet Union, as you know, but I imagine that it will do *anything* if it feels that its interests are being threatened.

When the Soviet Union was asked to intervene in Afghanistan, it intervened without hesitation. The superpowers have taught us that if a certain red line is crossed they will make their move regardless. Of course, I'm not equating between the U.S. and the Soviets, because I consider the Soviet Union an anti-imperialist power that supports all popular liberation movements in the world.

However, the Soviets have no visible interest in the Iraqi-Iranian war, which is why they have not been quick to take a position. The U.S. has the means to intervene. It is present in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. But the Soviet Union is not present. It has friendly relations with Iraq, and it has a friendship with Iran which is subject to attack by the various statements. It is in a difficult position.

Do you think there is any possibility of a direct conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Gulf?

I say there is a red line for international action. I believe that if the war remains localized, if it remains limited to Iran and Iraq without any flagrant interference by the U.S., the Soviet position will remain unchanged. But if the Soviets feel that the U.S. has crossed the red line, I believe they are capable of doing anything.

What significance do you attach to the signing of the Syrian-Soviet friendship treaty at this time? Do you regard it as an attempt to establish a strategic balance between the superpowers in this area?

No. I view this treaty from a different angle. I consider that it establishes a certain balance between Syria and Israel. Egypt has withdrawn from the battle. Iran and Iraq are in effect out of the battle — not permanently, but for a period which I cannot determine. In Turkey, the U.S. is ruling through the generals. There are bad relations between Syria and Jordan. Syria is under siege, and it has an extension in Lebanon through the Arab Deterrent Forces.

What do you expect Syria to do in these circumstances? It can either withdraw into itself and announce its capitulation or break the siege through a treaty with the Soviet Union. I think Syria did the only thing it could do. It had no other option.

So this is not a matter of superpower balance; it's a matter of balance relating to the Arab-Israeli conflict. I don't share the view expressed in your question.

Which are the parties which are benefiting from the Gulf war, in your view, and which are the parties that are being harmed by it?

All the states in this region are being harmed by it. Outside this region, the U.S. and Europe are benefiting from the war, because this war will guarantee the oil of Iraq and Iran for them as they rebuild those two nations. The weakness of

the two belligerents after the war, the effects the war will have on the Gulf countries – all these things serve the interests of the U.S. and the European states.

In addition to all the states in this region, we, the Palestinians, are among the losers in this war.

We consider the Iraqi army a reserve army for us in any battle (with Israel). No matter how sharp the differences between Iraq and Syria, if a battle erupts between Syria and Israel, Iraq is bound to enter it. This was demonstrated in 1967: Iraq is bound to come in, even if it comes in late. It was demonstrated in 1973: Iraq is bound to come in.

And then there is the new factor – Iran. Iran cannot possibly adopt a neutral position in any future Arab-Israeli war.

So we, the Palestinians, are among the losers.

Do you think the damage done to the Palestinian cause will be temporary – in the sense that the war will divert attention from the Palestinian issue for the time being – or will the war have long-range adverse effects on the Palestinian cause?

The damage is temporary. It is limited to the present and the near future – not the distant future.

When two big nations like Iran and Iraq are neutralized, we are bound to be harmed. It is true that any people which believes in its cause and is willing to go on fighting for it as long as it takes will eventually win, but where our cause is concerned, time is also important.

Our assets used to be the presence of Egypt, Syria, Iraq – Arab presence in general – and the presence of Iran. We lost Egypt. Now we have lost Iran and Iraq, albeit temporarily. Our assets have been diminished. We had been depending on all those forces to strike a balance between Israel and its giant allies, specially the United States, and ourselves.

Why do we turn to the Soviet Union? To compensate for the imbalance thus created.

But the Soviets cannot fight our battles. They can help us, but they cannot carry our cause for us, and neither I nor any Arab would agree to have the Soviets liberate our land for us. The Soviets can help us to the extent of our presence. But if we are not present, who do they help? Ghosts? Hence the importance of our own power.

Judging by what you have said, the Palestinians are being harmed not only by the loss of Arab and Iranian power but also by the increase of American presence in the region. Am I right?

American presence in the region affects us, yes. For one thing, it can withdraw the political power of oil from our assets.

Consider how Israel is handling this war: It is telling the world that the only stable state in the Middle East is Israel, and that the presence of Israel is not the cause of Middle Eastern instability. It is saying: "This oil, which has been placed in the hands of juveniles, is the root of Middle Eastern instability. You Americans and Westerners who are trying to settle the Palestinian problem and give the Palestinians a state, look what the Arabs are doing to each other! Those people cannot be trusted with oil. We can."

All this is harmful to us, because the Europeans and the Americans are naive enough to believe that kind of argument.

What will the Palestinians' reaction be if the Americans succeed in gaining control of the oil sources?

Let's be clear about this: what I told you is that one of the surprises of this war may be the internationalization of Middle Eastern oil, in the sense that this oil will no longer be under Arab and Iranian control but will be under the control of the U.S., which will argue that the Arabs – their sheikhs and emirs and kings and presidents – are not fit to bear the responsibility for this oil.

Should this happen, what will the Palestinian reaction be? You have said more than once, for instance, that you will attack the oil wells or the oil routes...

Instead of saying that, I would prefer to say that the Arabs and the Iranians are capable of reacting more strongly. I say we stand with the Arab

nation in confrontation of the American peril. It is better to be modest and not carry the cross alone.

Do you think the recent developments in Turkey have anything to do with the current happenings in this region?

I say that the Iraqi-Iranian war was a very predictable one, and that the U.S. was indirectly directing it.

It is no coincidence that Europe built up so much oil reserves; it is no coincidence that the military coup in Turkey preceded the war; and it is no coincidence that some Arab countries adopted positions of encouragement, instigation and incitement toward this war. All these things were indications that a war was being expected and that misinformation was being fed to both sides to bring them to the point of collision and thereafter to escalate the conflict. These were not coincidence; they were predetermined.

A Turkey ruled by a strong military regime which can keep it stable is able to shoulder more responsibilities in the context of an Iranian-Iraqi war. It has borders with both countries and oil pipelines passing through its territory. It knows when to block Iranian air space and when to block Iraqi air space. A Turkey ruled by generals can help (the U.S.). After the war is over, I expect them to send the soldiers back to their homes and bring the civilians back to power.

Some observers believe that the U.S. will not adopt a decisive attitude toward the Iraqi-Iranian war before its presidential elections, and that the period after the elections will be of paramount importance for the Middle East. Do you agree?

I am against linking anything with the American elections. I believe that on all important issues, in the Middle East and elsewhere, the U.S. administration has a constant policy. A new President may introduce some changes in the details, but the core of that policy remains unchanged. Those who are pinning their hopes on the American elections are wrong, in my opinion. No matter who is elected, American policy will remain essentially unchanged. Nothing can change it short of a massive popular revolution or a total overhaul of the American system.

I believe that this war was planned during the term of President Carter, but if it is perceived to be in the interests of the U.S. after the elections, it will continue after the elections. In other words, the elections have nothing to do with it.

Of course, we hope we will not be tools in America's hands, and neither we nor anybody else are satisfied to wait for the U.S. to save us. That is why we are doing everything in our power to keep this war in our hands, because if this war is internationalized, it will destroy the entire region.

The war will be internationalized if one of the two countries, willingly or unwillingly, becomes dependent on the U.S. Dependence on either of the superpowers would mean being at the mercy of that superpower. And it is a well-known fact that in modern war, no Third World country can wage a long war alone. The longer the war lasts, the more the chance of dependence on either the U.S. or the Soviet Union.

I have said that there may be surprises. So far, there have been none. The war remains a local one between two states. The superpowers are involved only to the extent of their previous commitments toward those two states, but they have not intervened directly. The big danger to the entire region will come if the war is internationalized.

So you don't expect a change in the American attitude toward the Gulf war if the Republicans win in the elections?

I don't think so. Carter and Reagan share the same views about this war.

What is your reaction to Reagan's statement that he is ready to hold talks with Palestinians who are not members of the PLO?

The Palestinian people have not elected the PLO, of course, but they have accepted it as their sole legal representative. All the American and European delegates who have come here realize this. So far, our people are rally-

ing around us, and this is recognized by almost the entire world. At the U.N., in the last vote on a Palestinian resolution, 114 states voted for us. That means that, aside from the Big Five (of which the Soviet Union and China support us), close to three-quarters of the world stands by us. So I consider such statements to be designed for local consumption.

I challenge the United States and our Zionist enemy to accept the principle of an independent Palestinian state without the PLO. That doesn't mean I don't want the PLO, but I challenge them to give any Palestinian in the occupied territories an independent Palestinian state.

This is just another attempt to divide the Palestinian people, to create an alternative leadership for them. Carter tried it, and so did Nixon. Israel and Egypt are also trying to create an alternative leadership for the Palestinians. But I believe all those attempts have failed. How else did the autonomy project fail? It failed because our people were unanimous in declaring the PLO their only legal representative and in stating that they reject anything that the PLO rejects. That is what aborted the autonomy project, despite the fact that it was backed by the U.S. and Egypt. It is true that Israel also hampered the project, but the Israeli obstacles were not basic. What aborted the project was the fact that it meant nothing to our people, the fact that we reject it whether the Egyptian amendments are accepted or not.

What do you think the effect of the projected Syrian-Libyan union will be on the Palestinian issue?

In the Arabs' current state of division, dispersion and conflict, any meeting between two or three or four Arab states is a relief and can help narrow the gaps among the Arabs.

We always judge things through their effect on the Palestinian cause. We support anything that serves the cause. I believe that Syria, with its military and human capabilities, has economic needs that can be covered by Libya. If this complementary relationship develops as a result of the union, the union will be a positive factor which, added to the Soviet factor, will help redress the balance between the Arabs and the Israelis after the withdrawal of Egypt and the vaccum caused by the Iraqi-Iranian war. This union would benefit the Palestinian revolution and both Syria and Libya (for Libya is also exposed to dangers).

That is why we have announced our support of this union, and our only reservation is that this project must not be allowed to fail because the people can no longer endure experiments and failures. That is our only reservation.

How do you think Palestinian-Jordanian relations will develop, given Jordan's attitude toward the Gulf war and reports that five of the Palestinians in Jordanian jails have been executed?

Our relationship with Jordan was originally based on Jordan's rejection of the Camp David agreements, and later on Jordan's rejection of the autonomy project and all the results of Camp David. On that basis, we turned over a new leaf in our relations with Jordan.

At the beginning, we adopted the silent approach in our dealings with Jordan, but there have always been elements in the Jordanian regime trying to hamper the negotiations -- by making use of Jordan's intelligence service, by maltreating our people, by playing down the importance of Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In recent weeks, we have criticized this attitude repeatedly. The last time we protested, they told the Palestinian delegation that they would not execute the five Palestinians you referred to. They said that their case was non-political, relating to the murder of a policeman, and they promised to halt the executions. Regarding the other Palestinians in Jordan jails, they said they were in the process of releasing them.

I would rather wait for a while and see whether those promises are kept.

As for Jordan's attitude toward the Gulf war, I believe Jordan was wrong to adopt a position of incitement, because this position will in the final analysis reflect on it. We have said that in this war, it is predetermined that neither side

will win. What applies to the two sides applies to those who encourage them. The gains that Jordan may be seeking will not materialize.

However, our differences with Jordan at this stage are not over this, but over the matters you mentioned and a number of other issues – the failure of Jordan to push the dialogue in the direction of common political positions, the question of contacts with the people and popular mobilization, the matter of opening a PLO information office in Jordan... We are concerned with bilateral relations and have not tried to interfere in Jordanian policy – its relations with Iraq or Saudi Arabia or this or that country. Jordan is an independent nation and free to adopt whatever policy it wishes. What concerns us is our bilateral relations.

So there is no confirmation of the press reports that the five Palestinians have been executed?

According to the information we have received, they have been sentenced to death but have not been executed yet. Contacts are under way to halt the executions.

How do you think the Gulf war and the Syrian-Soviet treaty will affect the situation in Lebanon?

Lebanon is part of this region. If we, the Palestinians, are affected by the Gulf war, Lebanon as a state and a people is bound to be affected by it and by its repercussions.

If America decides to hit us because of the role we are playing in trying to stop the war, or because of the dictates of the settlement it has in mind, it can only hit us through South Lebanon, either by occupying new areas (expanding Saad Haddad's enclave) or by striking a blow that it believes can liquidate the Palestinian Revolution.

I believe that the Americans are too clever to do this while the Gulf war is raging. But if the war stops and they feel that it has not yielded all the desired results, or for some other reason desired results, or for some other reason (the Syrian-Soviet treaty, for instance, and the difficulty of attacking Syria directly), they may try to hit the Palestinians and the Syrians through Lebanon. In that event, they would launch a major war against the *fedayeen* in Lebanon and wait for Syria's reaction: will it intervene or not? If it intervenes, they will test its power; if it doesn't, that will be another test of its power.

So anything that happens in this region, especially the Iraqi-Iranian war, will, I believe, have an effect on Lebanon. We can reduce that effect by reaching an understanding that will prevent the conflict from becoming internal. Confronting an Israeli war against us and the National Movement would be much easier than confronting an internal threat – the return of the Lebanese war in its sectarian or regional form or in any other form. That is the big danger, and that is the danger we can avoid.

That, in short, is the possible effect of the Gulf war and the treaty on Lebanon.

Where the Syrians are concerned, I believe the treaty will make them more at ease in Lebanon and prompt them to deal more openly and positively with the Lebanese reality and the Lebanese authorities.

What role could the Syrian-Soviet treaty play in the event of an attempt to hit the Palestinians in Lebanon?

We must not forget that this is a treaty between Syria and the Soviet Union, not between Lebanon, Syria and the Soviet Union.

But Syria is present in Lebanon through the ADF.

It is difficult for anyone to make decisions for someone else. I personally am against Syria getting involved in any battle in support of us if it is not prepared for it.

I don't know the details of the Soviet-Syrian treaty. I believe the Syrians had decided that they would intervene when they had to – through their air force, for instance. What their behavior will be after the treaty I don't know.

I say, however, that the test of the Syrian-Soviet treaty is not in Lebanon but in Syria. The treaty cannot be said to have any effect on Lebanon except in a general way — morally, and the fact that Syria, having gained strength by this treaty, will become more at ease in Lebanon. Syria will decide whether and to what extent it should intervene in Lebanon or the South in the event of aggression, but whatever the decision is, it cannot be regarded as a measure of the strength of the Syrian-Soviet treaty. That treaty can be tested only by a direct attack on Syria.

In other words, there may be a text in the treaty which states that the Soviet Union will defend Syria by all means, including, perhaps, the dispatch of Soviet forces to Syria. But I don't think that text applies to Lebanon. ●

CSO: 4820

PUBLIC OPINION POLL TAKEN

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 20-26 Oct 80 pp 22-27

[Article by Claude Khoury]

[Text]

Around half of the Lebanese people want Raymond Edde to be the next President of Lebanon.

And over 60 percent of them want Caretaker Prime Minister Selim Hoss to be reappointed as prime minister of the next government, which 63 percent of the nation believes should be formed without further delay.

These are some of the findings of an opinion poll conducted by *Monday Morning* over the past two weeks — the first poll of its kind since the outbreak of the Lebanese war in 1975.

Questions about the performance of President Elias Sarkis and the government of Premier Hoss, the identity of the next President and prime minister, the form the next government should take and the possible effects of the Gulf war on Lebanon were put to 219 Lebanese men and women of all sects, ages and walks of life *(see description of sample in box)*.

Their answers:

LEBANON'S NEXT PRESIDENT

Raymond Edde was chosen as Lebanon's next President by 46.5 percent of the sample.

The next most popular choice, former President and National Liberal Party leader Camille Chamoun, lagged far behind with just over four percent, followed closely by President Sarkis (three percent) and Beshir Gemayel, commander of the rightist militias (also three percent).

The rest of the votes were scattered among over 20 candidates: MP Fuad Lahoud, Army Commander Victor Khoury, former President Charles Helou, Central Bank Governor Michel Khoury, Justice Minister Yousef Jebran, former MP Jean Aziz, former President Suleiman Franjieh, businessman Pierre Edde, Education Minister Butros Harb, George Deeb, NLP military commander Dany Chamoun, MP René Moawad, Gaby Lahoud, U.N. Ambassador Ghassan Tueni (who is a Greek Orthodox), Public Security Forces Director General Farouk Abillama', Yousef Ashkar and MP Fuad Naffah.

Those candidates received one to four votes each.

Six votes went to Premier Selim Hoss, with all six respondents stating that the man had proved that he was conscientious and that it was about time Lebanon got rid of its Maronite President tradition.

One vote went to businesswoman Myrna Bustani, the only woman ever to serve as a member of the Lebanese Parliament. The respondent justified his choice with the argument that "Lebanese men have failed."

It is noteworthy that the question about the next President did not include any suggested candidates; the respondents were left free to nominate their own President.

The unchallenged victor in this mini-election, Raymond Edde, was described by the respondents who chose him as "a man who knows what he wants," "a man of action," "a man who is not afraid of anyone," "a realist," and "a man who refused to get involved in the filth of the Lebanese war."

Edde ran against President Sarkis in 1976. After he lost the election, and after surviving two attempts on his life, he left Lebanon for Paris, where he has lived for the past four years.

Judging by the results of the poll, Edde is a favorite among all major Lebanese sects:

He was nominated by:

- 42.6 percent of the Maronites
- 62.7 percent of the Sunnites
- 43.7 percent of the Shiites
- 59.26 percent of the Druze
- 26 percent of the Greek Orthodox

Among the Maronites, the next most popular candidate was Camille Chamoun (11.1 percent), followed by Beshir Gemayel (7.4 percent).

It is noteworthy that around 11 percent of the sample refused to nominate anyone, explaining that they knew of no one worthy of the post.

THE PERFORMANCE OF PRESIDENT ELIAS SARKIS

In response to the question "Do you think President Sarkis has done all he can to end the Lebanese crisis," 60.7 percent said "No" and 38.3 percent said "Yes." The rest did not answer the question.

The Maronite respondents were kinder in their assessment of the President's performance, with 53.7 percent of them stating that he had done all he could in the circumstances. The same answer was given by 52.2 percent of the Greek Orthodox and 42.8 percent of the Protestants.

But only 23.5 percent of the Catholics, 22.2 percent of the Druze, 31.25 percent of the Shiites and 30.5 percent of the Sunnites agreed that the President could not have done more to end the crisis.

Those who disapproved of the President's performance (and paradoxically, some of those who approved) stated that:

- The President was wrong not to take clear positions against certain parties in Lebanon (38.8 percent);
- The President was wrong not to make more use of the Lebanese Army (24.2 percent);
- The President was wrong not to take some sort of initiative in the Arab world and the rest of the world to end the Lebanese crisis (18.7 percent).

Blame for the continuation of the Lebanese crisis was also cast at:

THE SAMPLE

The 15-question questionnaire prepared for this survey was filled out by 219 Lebanese citizens, either in writing or on the phone.

The random sample was distributed as follows:

SECTS:

Sunnite: 26.9 percent
Maronite: 24.6 percent
Shiite: 14.6 percent
Druze: 12.3 percent
Greek Orthodox: 10.5 percent
Catholic: 7.7 percent
Protestant: 3.1 percent

SEX:

Male: 62.5 percent
Female: 37.5 percent

AGE:

20-40: 75 percent
Over 40: 18 percent
Under 20: 7 percent

OCCUPATION:

Employee: 28 percent
Professional: 27.6 percent
Student: 13 percent
Self-employed: 11.5 percent
Unskilled worker: 5.5 percent
Executive: 4.6 percent
Housewife: 4 percent
Civil servant: 2.7 percent
Undetermined: 3 percent

PLACE OF RESIDENCE:

Areas controlled by the leftist National Movement alliance: 61.7 percent

Areas controlled by the rightist Lebanese Front alliance: 19 percent

Undetermined: 19.3 percent (these preferred not to state specifically where they lived and indicated general areas like "Beirut" or "Mount Lebanon").

Of the Maronite respondents, 54 percent live in Lebanese Front areas, 35 percent in National Movement areas, and 11 percent preferred not to say.

Of the Greek Orthodox, 30.5 percent live in Lebanese Front areas, 47.8 percent in National Movement areas and 21.7 percent undetermined.

Of the Catholics, 23 percent live in Lebanese Front areas, 64 percent in National Movement areas and 6 percent undetermined.

Of the rest of the sects, no respondent said he lived in Lebanese Front areas, but significant numbers did not indicate exactly where they lived. The place of residence of 33 percent of the Sunnites, 25 percent of the Shiites, 7.5 percent of the Druze and 16.6 percent of the Protestants was left vague. The rest said they lived in National Movement areas.

In seeking answers for the 15 questions in the questionnaire, we encountered two extreme reactions:

A significant proportion of the respondents were anxious to give their views and in fact gave more answers than were required, going into long explanations of their responses. Several insisted that their names be noted although no names were required. One felt that those people were totally dissatisfied with the current situation and pleased to be given an opportunity to say why.

Many, however, were very reluctant to talk, some responding with marked hostility and some indicating that they were afraid to speak up, even though they were assured that their names would not be noted. This was particularly true of the people who were questioned by phone, apparently because they were afraid the conversation was being taped. The typical reactions of this group were: "We don't want to get involved," or "Filling questionnaires won't settle the crisis."

The Maronite respondents were among the most reluctant to answer the questions, demonstrating extreme suspicion. "Why should I tell you my occupation or where I live?" one of them asked angrily. "Do I know you?"

•The Arabs (37 percent);
•The Palestinians (33.7 percent);
•The Lebanese militias (33.7 percent);
•The Lebanese Parliament (15 percent).

Insignificant numbers of respondents also blamed Israel, the United States, the West in general and the Lebanese people themselves.

DELAY IN THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT:

Of the full sample, 63.4 percent said President Sarkis was wrong to delay the formation of a new government so long. They generally argued that the absence of a government with full authority was contributing to the chaos in the country and leaving Lebanon without adequate leadership at a time when the country was in urgent need of leadership.

But 32.2 percent said President Sarkis was right to delay the formation of a new government. These explained that (1) the President was refusing to form a government because any government formed now would be under "external," mainly Arab, influence; (2) the President was delaying the formation of the government because any government he could form now would be ineffective; (3) the President was not deliberately delaying the formation of a government but was being prevented from doing so by the conflicting Lebanese parties and factions.

The Maronites were equally divided between approval of the delay (48.15 percent) and disapproval of it (48.15 percent).

Other sects were predominantly against the delay:

Sunnites: 71.19 percent against, 27.12 percent in favor

Shiites: 87.5 percent against, 12.5 percent in favor

Druze: 59.25 percent against, 40.75 percent in favor

Greek Orthodox: 60.86 percent against, 39.14 percent in favor

Catholics: 64.70 percent against, 21.73 percent in favor.

PERFORMANCE OF HOSS GOVERNMENT

The majority of the respondents said that the current Hoss government had not done all it could in the present circumstances to improve the security situation, bring down the cost of living or promote national accord.

•*Security:* 67.5 percent of the sample said the Hoss government had not done well in this field, and 32.5 percent said it had.

•*Cost of living:* 75 percent said the Hoss government had not done all it could in the circumstances to bring the cost of living down, and 25 percent said it had.

•*National accord:* 68.5 percent said the Hoss government had not done everything in its power to work for national accord, and 31.5 percent said it had.

Asked whom they blamed for the failure of the government to perform well, the respondents gave the following answers:

•The various armed parties in Lebanon (66.2 percent)
•The President of the Republic (25 percent)
•The individual ministers (20 percent)
•Premier Selim Hoss (10.5 percent)
•All of these combined (11.9 percent)

Insignificant percentages also blamed Foreign Minister Fuad Butros, the rightist Phalangist Party and the Lebanese people in general.

These percentages held more or less constant among the individual sects.

THE NEXT PRIME MINISTER

Premier Selim Hoss was the unchallenged favorite for the post of prime minister of the next Lebanese government, with 68 percent of the sample voting for him.

The next most popular candidate was former Premier Takieddin Solh, who, however, received the vote of only 6.4 percent of the sample.

Others nominated included former Premier Rashid Karami (4.1 percent), Islamic Council President Shafik Wazzan (3.6 percent), and former Minister Malek Salam (3.2 percent).

An insignificant number of respondents also nominated former Premier Saeb Salam, former Premier Amin Hafez, Internal Security Forces Director General Ahmad al-Hajj, Reconstruction Board Chairman Mohammed Atallah, and Interior Minister Nazem Kadri.

Around three percent said they wanted the next premier to be a "military man."

Premier Hoss' popularity was evident among all major sects:

- He was supported by 51.85 percent of the Maronites, whose next best choice for premier was Takieddin Solh (18.5 percent).
- He was supported by 81.35 percent of the Sunnites, whose next best choice was Rashid Karami (8.47 percent).
- He was supported by 84.38 percent of the Shiites, whose next best choices were Saeb Salam (3.12 percent), Rashid Karami (3.12 percent) and "a military man" (3.12 percent).
- He was supported by 77.8 percent of the Druze, whose next best choices were Takieddin Solh (3.7 percent), Saeb Salam (3.7 percent) and Amin Hafez (3.7 percent).
- He was supported by 65.12 percent of the Greek Orthodox, whose next best choice was Shafik Wazzan (13 percent).
- He was supported by 41.36 percent of the Catholics, whose next best choices were Shafik Wazzan (11.76 percent) and Malek Salam (11.76 percent).

THE NEXT GOVERNMENT

The majority of the respondents – 49.31 percent – voted for a coalition government grouping all parties in Lebanon.

Other choices that emerged were:

- A military government (15 percent)
- A parliamentary government (15 percent)
- A government of technocrats (13.69 percent)

Also mentioned by a few respondents were "any government," "any strong government," "any honest government," "a government not subject to Arab influence" and "no government."

With the exception of the Protestant minority, which was equally divided between a coalition government (28.57 percent) and a military government (28.57 percent), all sects showed a marked preference for a coalition government:

The first two choices of each sect were the following:

Maronites: Coalition (48.14 percent), military (18.51 percent)

Sunnites: Coalition (45.78 percent), technocrat (22 percent)

Shiites: Coalition (46.87 percent), parliamentary (21.87 percent)

Druze: Coalition (62.96 percent), military (14.82 percent)

Greek Orthodox: Coalition (56.53 percent), military (26 percent)

Catholics: Coalition (47 percent), parliamentary (17.64 percent).

It is noteworthy that whereas the coalition, parliamentary and technocrat formulas were mentioned as possible choices in the questionnaire, "military government" was not listed. Those who chose it added it unprompted to the multiple choice list provided.

THE EFFECTS OF THE GULF WAR ON LEBANON

There appeared to be general agreement among the respondents that the war between Iraq and Iran would do Lebanon more harm than good.

The respondents said the Gulf war would harm Lebanon by:

- Starting proxy battles in the country (49 percent);
- Diverting attention from the Lebanese problem and therefore delaying its solution (38.35 percent);
- Delaying the solution of the Palestinian problem, and therefore the solution of the Lebanese problem (29.22 percent).

The respondents said the war could benefit Lebanon by:

- Diverting the routes of Iraqi and Saudi oil back to Lebanon (19.17 percent);
- Forcing the superpowers to speed up efforts to find a solution for the Middle East problem (14.15 percent)
- Relieving the international pressure on Lebanon by creating another major trouble spot (6.39 percent);
- Increasing the flow of Gulf funds into Lebanese banks as Arab businessmen try to get their money out of the new trouble spot (2.73 percent).

CSO: 4820

EUROPEAN INITIATIVE TOWARD ARABS CRITICIZED, SCRUTINIZED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 18 Oct 80 pp 36-39

/Article by Samir 'Atallah: "The Arab Gamble on Europe: From Behind the Rifle to the Venice Summit"/

/Text/ In Paris in 1961, bombs were exploding before everyone who called for Algerian independence. The Boulevard of the Champs Elysees was full of troops and armored vehicles, as it was on the eve of the German invasion, in the fear that paratroops and generals who wanted to overthrow DeGaulle before he agreed to independence would strike; the newspapers--all the newspapers--were talking about the Arabs with resentment; and the Arabs coming to France could be numbered on the fingers of one's hand.

Paris was drenched in the blood of Algerians and it was bearing--and still does bear--the effects of the Suez war and Bizerte on its face. French relations with the eastern countries, eastern countries of all kinds, were tense or broken. There were almost daily demonstrations against the french on the streets of Damascus, Beirut and Cairo.

London's situation was not much better. There were the harbingers of revolution in Aden and there was the shadow of Suez and Eden's defeat in the canal. There was "abd-al-Nasir's daily war against "the English," In brief, all Europe was nonexistent in the Arab world. Conversely there was no Arab presence in Europe. There were no relations. West Germany was still giving Israel billions in aid in reparations for the war.

In brief, "greater" Europe, including Italy and the bitter memories it had left in Libya were still a symbol of a long stage of colonialism, the mandate, Sykes-Picot and the Balfour declaration.

The Americans, in their turn, tried to benefit from the new situation. The "vacuum" left by the departure of the British and the French, as far as America was concerned, was a golden opportunity to become "number one" in the region, after the Suez war had emphasized for the first time "on the ground" that oil was the steam of modern industry and that the major countries would turn into villages without it under martial law.

However, the egregious American error was to repeat the egregious European error. Washington tried to come in by the same door from which Europe had left, that is,

the door of treaties and alliances. John Foster Dulles was obsessed by the fear of Communism, and he saw an invisible red flag in the vanguard of every national movement. After the hot war in Suez the Arab world found itself getting into the cold war from all the outlets channels and seas surrounding it, after the Sixth Fleet had "mobilized itself" in the Mediterranean--while Peter the Great's dreams of "warm water" were inspiring Nikita Khrushchev.

Thus the Arabs turned in two directions. Europe was in no way in either. "abd-al-Nasir looked for weapons and found them only in the east. He looked for banners for the High Dam and found them only in the east. Before Algeria became independent in the Maghreb, the union between Syria and Egypt occurred. Then there occurred another national evolution, with the Ba'th Party's advent to power in Iraq and Syria. Then there occurred the major evolution, that is, the 1967 war.

From the 1967 war there arose a long-term invisible victory: after 5 June the Palestinian cause in practice stopped depending on Syria and Egypt. With the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights, The Palestinian cause, again, in reality, was no longer just a Palestinian cause, and the 1967 fiasco was not just a military fiasco.

Thus, in addition to the genesis of the Palestinian revolution--which, in a short time, would involve the whole world in its cause--the whole Arab world was looking for a role in repelling the defeat, and bitterness grew with each passing day. The Arabs found that Israel's victory ultimately was an American victory and that in Egypt's defeat lay a sort of Soviet deficiency.

In 1967, in terms of the Arabs, Europe was either isolated or neutral. Britain had left South Yemen but retained a somewhat diffident presence in the Gulf through old treaties. As for France, the Arab world was on the list of its commercial concerns but not on the political list.

The Boycott and the Mirage

As regards Europe, also, the June war was to change the political balance vis-a-vis the Arab world, or at least it was to be the beginning of a change. In Paris, DeGaulle imposed a military boycott on Israel, which had raided Egypt's defenses with Mirages. In London, for the first time since 1956, the British Foreign Office was searching for a political balance and was devising Resolution 242, calling for evacuation from "occupied Arab territories," without recognizing, or referring to, the Palestinian people. Directly after that, France and Britain called for the first time for a big powers' club for "quadrilateral talks," again in the United States; these talks gave birth to the mission of Gunnar Jarring, then expired before the mission expired.

Aside from the results, and even aside from the importance of the European role, this stage was in any event the start of the European return to the Arab world--first, by a route in opposition (though at the outset parallel) to the American path, and second through a door wholly different from that through which it had exited in the late fifties and early sixties.

Thus any evaluation of modern European-Arab relations will perforce start with 1967, whether on the official, commercial, or oil level, or on the media level,

in which the Palestinian revolution played the catalytic or transformational role when the European papers in countries whose media had been purely Israeli started to listen to, then write, then in large part turn in sympathy.

These relations gradually escalated until they reached their climax at the Venice Summit, that is, the summit the European leaders held expressly to issue their famous "declaration" on the Palestinian revolution, along with the separate declaration on...Lebanon.

With the Venice summit, numerous questions and queries arose openly, implicitly and secretly on the levels of leaders, revolutionaries and the people.

Is Europe really on our side?

Is the European initiative a backup for Camp David?

Are the Europeans really able to adjust the balance the Americans have disrupted?

Is the source of European support just fear over oil? Is it due to arms sales? Is it due to trade?

Is it strategic, that is, due to the mediation which is a European extension to the Arab east and the Maghreb together?

Is it sincere?

Is it capable of persevering in the face of detente or agreement between the Americans and the Soviets?

Finally, do we need it?

The answer to all these questions is yes.

However, there is need for detsils, many details: European-Arab relations are not as complex as they seem, but they are also not as simple as they sometimes seem. It is true that the spirit of colonialism disappeared of its own accord, it is true that contemporary Europe no longer admits a colonial psychology, even from within, and it is true that there is a strategic relationship and perhaps even geographically common interests (as contrasted with the United States and the Soviet Union), but it is also true that there is a difference, mentally, intellectually and socially, which will keep the West west and the East east, or two or three easts, in the essential view of things.

Whether European policy is organically linked to American policy, as Arab pessimists say in the face of despair and doubts, or is independent or wants independence, as the optimists say in the face of good tidings, one can deal with European policy toward the Arab world only in the context of the American position. If Europe really is independent, it can thus constitute an instrument of pressure on Washington while, if it is not, it can still constitute an instrument for making the Americans conscious of an area whose sweet and bitter side the Europeans know.

From 1967 to 1973

Some people consider that while the 1967 war constituted a shift in the European position toward the Arabs, the October war recorded a European shift vis-a-vis the American position toward the Arabs. The strangled victory in October put Europe before three new facts: first, that Israel was not a country which could not be defeated; second, that the Arabs were able to win; third, that oil was being transformed from a vital commodity to a weapon--and a remedy.

For the first time the strangled victory and the oil victory placed the Arabs in a position of strength. In addition, the new position led to the convening of the Geneva Conference, which still is in suspense. It also for the first time led to the issuance of an official declaration by Gerald Ford's administration announcing that there was a "reappraisal" of American policy toward Israel.

In brief, this "reappraisal" regressed and became step-by-step, then piece-by-piece, although in Sinai alone, in an obvious attempt to strip the Arab world away from Egypt. When Carter's administration came, there was at the beginning a tendency to get the big powers to take part in "peace talks on the Middle East"--indeed Alfred Atherton, Carter's special envoy to the region in 1978, stated that Resolution 242 constituted a comprehensive settlement, whether it was applied in toto or not applied at all. Washington's desire to get the participation of the Soviets and Europe led to the issuance of a statement in October 1977 by Andrei Gromyko, and the American secretary of state at that time, Cyris Vance, reiterating the acceptance of general principles for a settlement and an invitation for a followup on the Geneva Conference under the chairmanship of the two parties.

However, the Geneva Conference, which put Europe at rest and gave it a new breath, was soon replaced by Camp David, that is, first of all the departure of the Soviets and second of all the Europeans from all attempts at a settlement, not to speak, naturally, of the departure of the Palestinians and the Arabs.

Some Arabs consider that Europe was in agreement, if only implicitly, or at least at the beginning, with Camp David. However, the Europeans deny it. Some say that Europe opposed it from the beginning, not because of an impulsive rush toward the Arabs but because it knew that the new American policy would increase the alienation between Europe and America itself at a time when the Europeans were trying to reduce the number of problems at dispute between the old continent and the new one.

The Europeans are not calling for a position more supportive of the Arabs, but since 1967 they certainly have wanted a position more balanced than the American one. They felt that it was in their ability to adopt such a position, first, because of the historic and economic relations with the Arab world and secondly because the European elections are not decided by the Jewish voter or by Jewish influence like the American ones. Europe did not say that it would go to the point of demanding the disappearance of Israel in supporting the Arabs, but it was not prepared to support Israel in the occupation of Arab territories either. In the last volume of his memoirs, DeGaulle relates that he once told Ben Gurion, "France is ready to help you survive but it is not ready to supply you with the means which will enable you to invade new territories."

It is not known to what extent the French position reflects the positions of the other European countries. However, it is certain at least that the European group is now acting through one body, the "Council of European Political Cooperation," which was established in the early seventies. In May 1971 the foreign ministers of the European states (six at that time) "accepted" a report from the "political committee" spelling out a common position on the Arab-Israeli conflict. In general the report reiterated the elements which are included in Resolution 242, in-cluding withdrawal from the occupied territories (with minor adjustments), the call for "secure borders" (that is, borders supported by international guarantees and demilitarized zones subject to international supervision), and a solution to the problem of "the refugees" and the problem of shipping in the Gulf of al-'Aqabah and the Suez Canal.

Although there was no new element in the report, it seemed like a European attempt at an initiative to put pressure on Israel regarding the occupied territories. While the Arab states welcomed the initiative, Israel hastened to declare that the European family had no right to interfere in the Middle East question.

Then official Europe issued a statement on 6 November 1973 calling on Israel to "end the occupation it had been carrying out since the 1967 war" and said that "in the event of the attainment of a just permanent peace, the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people would have to be taken into consideration." Although the statement was very far from satisfying any Palestinian or Arab demand, some people interpreted it as a European turning point toward the Arabs as a result of the October war and the oil embargo. However, the fact is that it was a reaffirmation of previous statements and United Nations resolutions.

However, the October war, to repeat again, actually led to the establishment of an Arab-European dialogue for the first time, that is, for the first time in the context of the Arab world collectively and for the first time in the context of Europe collectively as well. One of the forms of this dialogue is what was officially called the "Arab-European dialogue" in 1974 between the Arab League and the European family. Although bilateral relations were and still are much stronger than what the dialogue between the two "families" has come up with, it did include a number of economic issues as well as trade, scientific and technological cooperation and cultural and social exchanges. Only the issue of energy was officially excluded from the agenda. It was agreed that each side would issue a statement on the subject of the Arab-Israeli struggle after returning home.

In the first official document in this regard, issued in May 1976 in Luxembourg, the two parties stressed that it was necessary that the legitimate rights of the Palestine people be recognized as a precondition for a just permanent peace. The Common Market issued a reminder of its statement issued in November 1973 while the Arab party called for the Liberation Organization to participate in all negotiations on a settlement. In similar corresponding statements, the Europeans condemned the settlement policy which Israel was pursuing and stressed their opposition to any changes in the status of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

However, in exchange, "official" Europe continued to refuse to acknowledge the Liberation Organization and rejected the Arab demand that the preferential trade

agreement they had concluded with Israel in 1975 be suspended until the latter withdrew from the occupied Arab territories.

From "Refugees" to "a People"

Although the European "shift" was important, it was also gradual, tentative and slow. In 1967, the Palestinians were referred to in the British-made Resolution 242 as "refugees." This position changed in 1973 with talk about the "legitimate rights" of the Palestinian people. Mention of a Palestinian "national home" did not appear until 29 June 1977 in a lengthy statement issued by the European Council which stressed that the national homeland was a precondition but also called for the acceptance of "secure recognized boundaries for Israel."

Satisfied as the Arabs were with the policy of balance chosen by the Europeans, they also felt that this balance was restricting European steps to a large extent and benefiting the Arab cause to a small extent. Although there is a serious conviction that the Europeans really are sincere as regards the rights of the Palestinian people, there is a corresponding conviction that Europe is unable to depart from general American policy. Otherwise, how can one interpret the stand in favor of Palestinian rights and at the same time the salutation to Carter for "great courage" in arranging the Camp David agreements?

The European "predicament" appeared clearly in the wake of Camp David, because, in spite of the "salutation," the market's foreign ministers seem to have exerted unremitting effort at the same time to point out that "the agreement must not constitute a separate peace" but should be a first step toward a comprehensive peace "to which the representatives of all, including the Palestinian people, will agree, and which the international family will approve."

About a year after that, the Europeans drew back again, although slightly, from American policy. In June 1979 the market foreign ministers issued a statement declaring that the Security Council resolutions must be the basis for any settlement, and they condemned "any step or statement which could obstruct peace," thus referring to the Israeli occupation and settlement policy.

Rather than content themselves with standing on the sidelines of American policy in the region, the Europeans saw in the results left by the Camp David treaty an opportunity to carry out a special European initiative, and many of them did not hide the fact that Europe was waiting for the failure of the autonomy talks, or, more correctly, the announcement of this failure, to carry out its initiative. There is a conviction on the part of a large number of Europeans that European diplomacy alone is qualified to perform such a role. It is said that the British told the Americans at one stage that they knew the affairs of the region better than Washington and that it was up to Washington to leave them to create the solutions and get out of the stagnation which had existed since the Geneva conference.

Although the French have overtly gone farther than the English have in leaning toward the Arab world, the British have in reality been insisting for some time on amending Resolution 242 to include the rights of the Palestinian people. Although they have not yet ventured to propose the amendment officially, the former British representative to the United Nations, Sir Ivor Richards, said in the Security

Council debate in 1976 that any settlement in the Middle East would have to be founded on three considerations, and that the third consideration, that is, Palestinian rights, was not included in Resolution 242. In his speech he called for reference to the Palestinian identity to be added to Resolutions 242 and 338 (which was issued after the October war), but Britain again abstained from voting on the drafts of resolutions affirming the rights of the Palestinian people (27 January and 29 June 1976) because these drafts did not refer to the other sections of Resolution 242, that is, the secure boundaries and so forth.

In spite of its insistence on stating that the definition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people is a matter subject to negotiation, the British government accepted the principle of "a Palestinian national homeland." Former foreign minister David Owen declared before the House of Commons in March 1979 that the "national homeland" must be part of the comprehensive settlement and said that "autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza" was the first step toward that.

It appears that Mrs Thatcher's position is not very different from the Labor position. Like the Laborites, she welcomed Camp David, but considered the treaty "just a partial step toward a comprehensive settlement and a solution of the Palestinian problem." This, as the foreign minister, Lord Carrington, said on 22 May 1979, is "the heart of the problem."

The British consider that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan has underlined the need to hasten to arrive at a solution to the Arab-Israeli struggle.

During the tour Lord Carrington made of the region this year, he discovered that Arab officials were prepared to cooperate with the West in the face of "the common challenge," but was also "surprised" that the Arabs made such cooperation conditional to the maximum degree on the progress which could be attained in the context of a solution. At that time it was stated that Lord Carrington returned from his Arab tour convinced that it was necessary to hasten to amend Resolution 242, while the secretary of state for foreign affairs, Lord Douglas Heard, declared "We are studying with our European partners whether there is a means by which it will be possible for European countries to improve opportunities for attaining a settlement." He pointed out that such a step might lie in filling the "void" in Resolution 242, which refers to the Palestinians as refugees, "because the Palestinians have rights far more advanced than that, and we consider that the Security Council must recognize those rights."

The Right of Self-Determination

If an initiative of that sort occurs, the French will certainly be Britain's major partners in it. There is no doubt that the French were ahead of the British, as they were ahead of other Europeans, in suppprting the Palestinian cause; in this sphere theirs has been the loudest market country voice in criticizing Camp David, once in an official statement issued by the council of ministers, another time in the words of Raymond Barre, and several times in the words of the foreign minister Jean Francois Poincet. During the Arab tour French President Giscard D'Estaing made this year, he emphasized that the Palestinian problem was not one of refugees but was one of a people who must enjoy the right of self determination within the context of a just comprehensive peace. In Giscard D'Estaing's position, which

first appeared in a joint declaration issued in Kuwait, then was repeated in the rest of the visit, Western newspapers saw a basic shift in the European position.

This is because at that time the phrase "self-determination" appeared for the first time in a diplomatic document signed by France. It implicitly transcended the issue of a "national homeland" and supported the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. One should bear in mind that France had previously voted for international resolutions containing the same principle, as Abu 'Ammar pointed out in his comment on the subject.

However, the right of self determination, in spite of its significance, is not everything. There is a conviction on the part of Arab officials that there is a conviction on the part of Europeans, from Paris to The Netherlands--naturally proceeding through Luxembourg, which has assumed charge of the latest European movements--that the right of self determination, national homeland and the Palestinian state are matters which have been settled.

The dispute is over who will exercise the self-determination and who this state will be. Here, precisely, European policy once again is the captive of American policy, or, more accurately, it falls prey to the schizophrenia it has not been able to rid itself of.

Last year for the first time the Europeans, in their "Arab position," went to the point of naming the Liberation Organization. That happened for the first time in the speech which the foreign minister of Ireland delivered before the United Nations in the name of the European family, then was repeated in the speeches given by other European ministers.

However, Europe named the organization diffidently considering it a "partner" in the settlement not a representative of the Palestinian people. Even in the "Venice declaration," the organization remained "a partner," as far as Europe was concerned. This made a number of Palestinian leaders reject the initiative, in spite of their conviction that it constituted a sincere step on Europe's part, whatever the motives and causes.

Between Diplomacy and the Combatants

While some Arab leaders "understand" the European "limit" or "restrictions," others simply state that while the politicians understand Europe's situation, how can it be explained to the combatants? Either Europe is with us to a specific point or it is not.

In other words, more simply, how can Willi Brandt meet with the head of the Liberation Organization in his capacity as "the head of international socialism," but not as a leader of the ruling Democratic Party in West Germany, or, more accurately, as a former German chancellor? How can France accept a Liberation Organization office in Paris and receive Abu al-Lutf, the foreign minister of the organization, then be afraid of receiving Abu 'Ammar?

Is European support just verbal, then?

Some Europeans admit this, but, as one of Giscard D'Estaing's companions on the French president's visit to Abu Dhabi said, "Talk about politics and international relations is also important."

That is to say, talk in some cases is a position. It seems that what Europe is afraid of, or so at least some of its politicians say, is that if they go far in supporting the Arab policy which rejects the Camp David policy, that will cause it to lose its influence in carrying out an initiative, and there is no doubt also that there is a split among the Europeans in viewing the matter, or more precisely in the treatment of it, although the market countries ultimately anticipate a united political statement.

The French position is different, without a doubt, from the British one, and the British position is different from the Dutch one. The position of the Europeans who belong to the market is different from the position of the Europe which is still outside it. Austria is an inseparable part of Europe, as is Spain. The two have gone to the point of officially recognizing the organization and receiving Abu 'Ammar as the chief of a state while Greece, for example, which has not recognized Israel, still is hesitant to take Arab steps because it is a candidate for entering into the market.

In fact, during his visit to Israel a few days ago, the foreign minister of Luxembourg, Gaston Thorn (chairman of the current session of the Common Market Council), met the mayors and Arab leaders in the occupied territories and heard them inform him that the Liberation Organization was the sole legitimate representative. However, Thorn's response during the meeting did not go beyond the stipulation contained in the Venice declaration--the declaration which was behind his visit--although he dwelt on the existence of disputes between Europe and Israel. At the end of Thorn's visit Menachem Begin issued a declaration in which he said that "since the Venice conference, Israel no longer considers Europe an objective, independent partner."

This is true.

Between 1967 and 1980 Europe no longer has been a partner of Israel's. Between the American position, which rejects the Liberation Organization, the national homeland and the right of self-determination, and the European position, which recognizes the three, there is a vast distance. There certainly also is a vast distance between the positions of Spain and Paris.

However, there is another fact, which is that the "difference" in European positions is still far better than the American position, bearing in mind that what is required by this party, the Arab party, is not just who is rotating around the threshing floor; what is required rather is the wheat.

11887
CSO: 4802

PROPOSAL FOR ARAB TRANSPORT, TOURISM

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 11 Oct 80 pp 16-19

[Text] During the last two decades, the Arab world has been experiencing a rapid transformation in its structure as a whole, be it on the political, economic, or social levels. The economic and social changes registered have led to the improvement of certain fields of activity in the region.

Thus, the means of transportation and communications have been developing alongside tourism, trade and other economic activities. For this reason, the potential importance of Arab tourist activities has attracted the attention of both the tourism and transport industry and proposals to plan and improve these activities have been coming from various sources.

Air Transport

Between 1966 and 1976, Arab air transport activities have increased at an annual rate of 16 percent, when the annual increase in the world in general was 11 percent.

In an interview with the AL NAHAR ARAB & INTERNATIONAL weekly edition, the general manager of the Lebanese airlines company Middle East Airlines (MEA) said he estimated that, during the next ten years, Arab air transport will still have an annual increase of 15 percent, compared to the projected 9 percent for the world at large.

The high rate of increase of the Arab air transport operations is supported by the equally growing tourist services. AL NAHAR reported that the percentages, as far as passenger movement is concerned, were the following: 44 percent between an Arab country and a European country; 34 percent between two Arab countries, and the remaining 22 percent between the Arab world and other parts of the world.

These figures demonstrate that most of the Arab airlines' activities are with the outside world (66 percent), while only 34 percent are inter-Arab activities. The report added that there had been some neglect as far as linking together the major Arab airports was concerned.

There are 29 major Arab airports, and air services between them average 9.45 lines, instead of the expected 28 routes each airport should have established with the remaining 28 airports.

Proposals

In order to promote the development and improvement of inter-Arab air services, the report suggested the following measures:

1. To encourage Arab nationals to visit various Arab countries by:

a. launching campaigns which would introduce the various countries to potential visitors

b. to facilitate travel arrangements by canceling entry fees or speeding up the entry process

c. to improve airport services, especially the baggage claim section

d. to improve car rental operations so that a tourist who lands in one country could easily move about and to neighbouring countries by car.

e. to construct highways linking Arab cities to the main historical and touristic sites

f. to improve industries that cater to tourists: hotels, furnished apartments, camping sites and youth centers and hostels.

g. to organize tourist attractions, musical, cultural, etc

h. to develop touristic, historical and sports centers

i. to encourage the holding of trade fairs by providing the necessary facilities.

2. To encourage airlines companies to open new flights between the various Arab cities

3. To help airlines companies expand their operations and offer better services to their passengers

4. To ask airlines companies to lower air fares, this would be compensated by the profits realized through the increase of air flights and passengers.

Moreover, the report underlines the importance of introducing charter flights for middle and short distances, because it would attract a new social stratum whose limited income make regular fares inaccessible to them.

Charter Flights

A study made by the secretariat general of the Arab Federation of Tourism has come up with the following conclusions as far as chartered air transport is concerned:

1. The reduced air fares currently applied by regular airlines are still too expensive for the average Arab citizen

2. The principle followed of pricing air tickets on the assumption that the plane will be half-full leads to high prices

3. Chartered air transport is an important means to develop Arab tourism and has a market which differs from that of the regular airlines. It would not compete with the latter, especially insofar as long-distance flights are concerned

4. Tourism and business in general would be promoted if certain necessary facilities were provided for on chartered air flights

5. Current regular air fares in the Arab world are relatively more expensive than those practiced in Europe and other parts of the world. Therefore, the introduction of charter air services would lower the rates.

Land Transport

Land transportation has remained the most popular form of travel in the Arab world, both inside a country and from one country to the other. One of the main reasons for this is the fact that airports are located only in major cities and this does not attract passengers from towns located far from the city.

More than 3 million Arabs travel each year from one Arab country to the other by car. This has prompted a project agreement for the creation of an Arab Association of international Auto Transport. The association is expected to offer highway facilities to travellers from one Arab state to the other.

Railroad transportation is limited because of the lack of up to date railways between major Arab cities. The secretary general of the Arab Federation of Tourism, Mr Abdel Rahman Abu Rbah was quoted by AL NAHAR as saying that Arab efforts to establish modern networks of railroads in the Arab countries would bring about economic and social developments to the areas. The railroads could be used for tourist and trade purposes.

Recommendations carried by the AL NAHAR report for improving land transport in general are the following:

1. To hold an international meeting between Arab and European experts representing the tourism industry, the car industry and clubs in order to promote and organize automobile tourism in the Arab countries

2. To call on the Arab League's Company of Arab Land Transport to implemented needed improvements in order to promote tourist and trade activities and exchanges between the various Arab countries. [as published]

Maritime Transport

Maritime transport does not play an effective role in the development of tourism in the Arab countries. Only recently has there been some efforts to promote

this means of transportation. AL NAHAR points out to a neglect on the part of the Arab official authorities in promoting and helping maritime companies.

The report says that the establishment of an Arab cruise ship company, with car transport services, would do much to help increase both maritime and land transport activities between the various Arab countries.

In conclusion, the report said that the social and economic changes that are taking place in the Arab world are leading to an increase in touristic activities which, in turn, require the development of means of transportation, on the inter-Arab scale.

CSO: 4820

STATUS OF MOSLEMS IN CHINESE TURKESTAN REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-RIYADH in Arabic 31 Aug 80 p 14

/Article by Iain MacKenzie: "The Moslems in Communist China Do Not Believe in God"/

/Text/ Islam is showing new vitality in China, but there are questions about its future in a Communist country where the older generation of believers is disappearing from life.

During the past 2 years, a number of mosques have been reopened, but government policy in this regard is linked to the need to improve the conditions of the domestic minorities in China and the country's reputation abroad. Chinese Moslems still lack any connection worth mentioning to the outer world, and the events in Iran and Afghanistan have not had any effect worth mentioning on them.

In the Zinqiang area situated in the far west of China, Su Mutung, the superintendent of minorities and the senior official in charge of religious affairs, said:

"During the Cultural revolution, Moslems were beaten for going to mosques, but now the government has resumed applying its former policy (on religious matters) and has prepared mosques. This however does not mean that there is an increase in the number of believers."

The areas which comprise the greatest accumulations of original Moslems are the Xinang Ughur region, which enjoys autonomy, in the far west of the country, the neighboring Jansu area, and the (Nankhiahiah) area adjacent to Jansu and Inner Mongolia.

These three areas contain about 9.4 million persons who are considered traditionally to be Moslems, out of a total population of 23.7 million, while about 3.6 "original Moslems" live in various areas of China, according to a document published by the Chinese Islamic Society for an international Islamic conference held in Pakistan early this year.

One can describe "original Moslems" as Moslem people who follow Islamic customs in such matters as eating, drinking and life styles and belong to groups which embraced Islam in the past but are not necessarily devout followers of the Islamic creed.

In the Xinqiang area, for example, the following minorities are considered to be traditional Moslem groups:

Bughur /sic; probably Uighur/: 5.7 million persons.

Kazakhs: 800,000.

(Hawis): 500,000.

Kirghiz: 100,000.

Tajiks: 23,000.

Uzbeks: 7,000.

Tatars: 3,000.

Su Mu-tung, member of the Committee of Minorities and Religious Affairs, said that it is difficult to estimate the number of devout followers in the region.

He stated, "It is truly difficult to determine the number of true believers because faith in religion is a private matter which does not concern the state."

'Abdallah al-Hajj, the imam of the (furin lin) mosque in Urumqi, estimated the number of true believers at roughly more than 700,000 Moslems out of an "original Moslem" population of 7 million. If this estimate is approximately correct, and reflects the situation in other areas of the country, the actual number of devout Moslems in China is close to 1.3 million. The overwhelming majority of the Chinese Moslems are Sunnites; in addition there is a small percentage of Shiites.

Su Mu-tung said that according to last year's statistics, the number of mosques in the Xinqiang region totalled 5,000 and the average number of people praying in each totalled 140.

"In its abovementioned document, the Islamic Society said that the number of mosques in Xinqiang totals 1,900, but there has been no explanation for this contradiction."

'Abdallah al-Hajj said that the number of people praying in the (furin lin) mosque more than doubled during the past 2 years, that is, reaching the figure of 300 people praying on Fridays. He said that the city of Urumqi itself contains 34 mosques while the town of Xinqiang, close to the Soviet borders, has more than 120 mosques.

The number of Moslems in the Jansu area adjacent to the northern Xinqiang area comes to about 1.14 million out of a total population of 18.94 million, according to statistics on the area and Islamic Society figures.

The original Moslems consist of (Hawis) and (Dunfis) along with several thousand (baos), Kazakhs and a few Uighurs.

The capital of the area has two mosques. People in charge of the larger of the two, which is built of red brick and was constructed at the site of a smaller mosque destroyed during the Cultural Revolution, said that work on the construction of this mosque began this year and it is to be completed next October.

The persons in charge of this mosque also added that 500 persons go to the mosque for the Friday prayer out of a total of about 2 million inhabitants in the city of Lanzu and its surrounding area.

The officials in the area said that there are other mosques in the villages and rural areas in regions inhabited by Moslems, but these officials have no idea of the number of these mosques.

The inhabitants of (Nantihia), situated to the East of the Jiansu area, number more than 3.6 million, one-third of whom are Moslems descended from the (Hawi) people.

The Nanxia region is still considered closed to foreign visitors, but there is no reason to believe that the position of the local authorities in this region concerning religion is very different from that of the authorities in the neighboring Jiansu.

Inner Mongolia, where the original inhabitants are considered traditionally Lamists, has 28,000 Moslems, most of whom are (Hawi), according to the imam of the two big mosques in the regional capital of Huhut.

The imam said that a number ranging from 700 to 800 persons comes to perform the Friday prayer in the mosque, which was reopened in July of last year, having been closed in 1966 during the Cultural Revolution. He said that more than 700 people frequent the other mosque in the town.

The Chinese Islamic Society says that there are also 50,000 Moslems and eight mosques in the old town of Zian located in the Shienjin region and 160,000 Moslems and two mosques in the capital, Beijing.

However, it seems that the figures for Zian and Beijing concern original Moslems rather than true believers. The Dong Si mosque in Peking, for example, has about 1,000 persons performing prayers during the most important religious occasions.

Article 46 of the current Chinese constitution says "Citizens have the freedom to believe in religion and the freedom not to believe in the call to atheism."

This provision compares with the provision of Article 88 of original 1954 constitution, which states "The citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religion."

However, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion were perverted during the Maoist Cultural Revolution in 1966, when mosques, shrines and churches were closed and desecrated on many occasions, religious personages were abused and devout followers of religions were persecuted.

Chinese Moslems admit that they were more mistaken than the followers of other religions during the 10 years of the Cultural Revolution, because of the deep-rooted nature of Islam in the region.

However, the mosques were closed, the devout were beaten, and members of Islamic sects were forced to abandoned their traditional customs. Su Mu-tung said that imams in the Xinqiang area were forced to raise pigs and eat pork during the Cultural Revolution, and they later lost their religious status as a result of that.

Stories are also told about imams who were forced to go about the streets with pig heads hanging from their necks. A Moslem from Kaxgar says that the mosques in that great Asiatic city were closed in 1966 and turned into shops, stores and warehouses during the Cultural Revolution.

The main mosque in the town of Hubut, whose history goes back 200 years and whose appearance from the outside is still in good shape, was saved from destruction during the Cultural Revolution because Red Guards used it to store the food they plundered from families in this area.

The fourth national conference of the Islamic Society was held in Beijing last April. It was the first national meeting of this type to be held since 1963. Politics immediately dominated the meeting and the conference chairman, al-Hajj Burhan, in his opening statement, declared his support for the Arabs in their struggle against Israel and for the Afghans in their battle against the Soviet Union.

The director of the government bureau of religious affairs in /word missing/Xioa Xiangu, said that believers and atheists are politically and socially equal in China and that freedom of religion is long-standing basic policy of the Chinese Communist Party.

Xiangu mentioned two other points directly related to the government's domestic and foreign policy: approval of religious freedom will help consolidate unity and rally all forces about the development program in the country.

Many people in other countries believe in the Islamic religion, and Islam in particular has great influence in countries of the third world, especially in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. However, Xiao went on to say, "Freedom of religion requires adherence to the socialist platform and preservation of the Communist Party leadership and the dictatorship of the proletariat."

Last June the newspaper PEOPLE'S DAILY, the official organ of the Communist Party, warned that religious freedom will be assured only through official supervision of religious authorities.

The newspaper said, "Citizens of the People's Republic of China must give priority to the unity of the country regardless of whether they believe in it, and personal religious activities and the interests of sects must be subjected to the general good of the country"

They stated that the government will establish schools for teaching the Koran and other subjects like religious policies. In a publication by Lanzwa radio toward

the end of last July, it was stated that the Islamic Society "agreed that young people below the age of 18 should not be permitted to participate in religious activities."

The government's goal in granting further religious freedom and giving great autonomy to minorities is to strengthen unity among the various nationalities in China, and this slogan finds an echo in the mosque.

'Abdallah al-Haff, in the (furin lin) mosque at Urumqi, said,

"The slogan now is love of the nation, love of learning, and love of religion. We must call all citizens toward unity and the effort to develop China."

11887
CSO: 4802

SOVIET MILITARY OFFICERS, AFGHAN OFFICIAL REPORTED KILLED IN KABUL

Quetta BALUCHISTAN TIMES in English 27 Oct 80 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, Oct 26--Reports from Afghanistan say two Soviet military officers and a senior Karmal regime official were killed by the Freedom Fighters near a Soviet military camp in a Kabul suburb last week.

According to diplomatic sources in New Delhi, reports of attacks have been coming in almost daily despite contentions by the Karmal regime about the country returning to normal.

These sources further said that the Afghan capital continues to remain tense. While the Kabul authorities control the capital and some other cities, much of the countryside is ruled by the Freedom Fighters who become active particularly during the night. AFP says commercial flights between Kabul and Jalalabad have been rerouted because of insecurity near Kabul.

Discontentment among the people is also reported persisting because of the conscription campaign to draft young men for compulsory military service. One Afghan youth was recently killed in the capital while resisting the conscription campaign. Night posters and secret letters are also said to have been distributed protesting against the conscription and urging those who had joined military service to give it up and support the Freedom Fighters.

Meanwhile, the leader of the Soviet-backed regime, Mr Babrak Karmal, has completed his official visit to the Soviet Union. The Soviet News Agency Tass however, said he will stay on for several days for rest and treatment. The officials accompanying Mr. Karmal during the visit have returned to Kabul.

In East Berlin, an International Communist Conference has ended with differences continuing among delegates over the Afghan crisis.

According to conference sources, the Spanish and Italian delegates sharply criticised the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

CSO: 4920

'NIGHT LETTERS' CIRCULATED IN KABUL BY REBELS

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 27 Oct 80 p 8

[Text] New Delhi, Oct. 26--Afghan authorities prevented an anti-Soviet shutdown of business in Kabul on Friday by threatening shop owners with fines and loss of their licences, a report frcm Afghanistan said yesterday.

Some shops in the centre of the capital opened late in apparent response to the call for a shutdown, but by 10 a.m. it was as usual, said the report from a Kabul source that in the past has been accurate.

The strike call was issued in "night letters (shabnama)," as the Afghans call pamphlets circulated around Kabul by the guerillas, the report said. It requested the people to stage a five-day general strike to protest the presence of Russian troops in Afghanistan and what was described as the sale of Afghanistan to the Soviet Union by President Babrak Karmal, who has been visiting the USSR for the past 10 days, it added.

The "night letter" warned that shops ignoring the call would be burned down, the source said. On Wednesday and Thursday, Communist Party members rode through the streets of Kabul in Soviet military jeeps, warning over loudspeakers about fines and loss of licences, the report said.

The call for a business strike was not confirmed independently.

Still another strike call has gone out in "night letters," a Western diplomatic source said. It asks Afghan military officers to demonstrate support for the guerillas by staying at home or in their barracks next Monday.

The guerillas killed at least 10 Russians and captured seven in a shootout with a Soviet military construction crew last Wednesday 15 kilometres outside of the capital, yesterday's report from Kabul said.

The guerillas attacked a group of Soviet trucks loading sand for a construction project at the dry bed of the Kabul River. Construction of barracks is underway at several military bases around Kabul, and Afghans take this to mean that the Russian troops plan an indefinite stay.

Varsity Strike

Students and professors at the Kabul University launched a strike this week to protest against the Afghan Army recruitment methods, university sources reported in Kabul.

The strike which started on Friday should run to Tuesday, the sources said. It is the first protest of its kind since April, when a series of strikes and demonstrations broke out in the Afghan capital's schools and universities to protest against the Soviet military presence in the country.--APA/AFP

CSO: 4920

CONVOYS AMBUSHED NEAR KANDAHAR

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 2 Nov 80 p 1

[Text] Peshawar, Nov. 2--According to the latest reports, Afghan Mujahideen attacked Khakrez in Kandahar province and ambushed a military convoy at Kandahar killing 20 Russian officers and 20 soldiers.

The Mujahideen also killed six officers and 20 Afghan sepoys in another ambush near Kandahar and carried away some persons.

In Uruzgan province, the Mujahideen attacked Afghan troops at Deh Rawat killing and wounding 30 sepoys and destroying five vehicles.

The Mujahideen also carried away 1,610 sheep from the Government farm.

In Paktya province, the Mujahideen ambushed a military convoy near Matun killing 30 sepoys and destroying five armoured cars and six army vehicles.

In Baghlan province, the Mujahideen raided Narin city killing its Deputy Commissioner and many other pro-Government persons.

The Soviet-Afghan troops retaliated by killing 80 innocent villagers of the area.

In Ghor province, the Mujahideen, who have already got control of Passaan, Surjangal and Saghar districts have been frequently damaging the gas pipeline between Shabarghaf and the Soviet border.

The Mujahideen are also exerting heavy pressure on Maimana in Faryab province.

Meanwhile, the Mujahideen have stepped up their activities in and around Kabul and their attacks are now targeted against the Soviet Army headquarters, Soviet Air Force garrison, Afghan Government facilities and supply convoys.

In response, the Afghan Government has extended curfew in Kabul by two hours and Security measures have been tightened further.--PPI

CSO: 4920

ZAHER SHAH MAY RESPOND TO AFGHAN MUJAHEDINS' CALL

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 28 Oct 80 p 3

[Text] Rome, Oct. 27--Afghanistan's deposed king is quietly tending his garden but some exiled Afghan leaders believe that he would answer a call to help unite resistance forces fighting to drive Soviet troops from their homeland.

King Mohammed Zaher Shah, toppled in 1973 after 40-year reign, has called for Afghan "patriots" to expel Soviet's forces and urged the squabbling opposition groups to cooperate.

Recently a wave of nostalgia for Zaher has swept the refugees' canvas tents and tea stalls in northwest Pakistan, Afghan sources say. They openly express hope that he could forge unity among the leaderless Mujahideen.

The bald, mustached 66-year-old Zaher was ousted in a July 1973 coup led by his cousin and former Prime Minister Mohammed Daud. The king was in Italy at the time, taking a rheumatism cure at the baths in Schia.

The king keeps out of the public eye. He will not talk to the press and spends most of his time cultivating flowers and reading history books at his four bedroom villa north of Rome, according to close friends.

Zaher has said repeatedly that he does not claim his former throne and would only support a restoration of the monarchy if Afghans rejected a republic in a nationwide referendum.

The King's son-in-law, first cousin and spokesman, Gen Abdul Wali, does not encourage speculation that the monarch is willing to take a new role, but he does not rule it out either. "The King is a patriot at the service of his people," Wali said in an interview. "Like anybody else, he shall serve according to his ability."

Wali said that the King enjoys prestige among many Afghans. "Some view him as a leader, some as a father figure," Wali said. "An entire generation of Afghans grew up under his rule." Some exile leaders think the King would agree to come out of retirement and this is a good time to do so.

"He does not seem ambitious to get back to his throne, but I think he would be available as a leader if the people wanted him," Jalil Shams, Secretary of the

Islamic Council for the Liberation of Afghanistan, a Europe-based exile group, said in an interview.

"We are coming to a point where we should find someone and rally around him," Shams added. "The parties have failed to establish a single figure (as leader)," he said.

Nearly 11 months after the Soviet army intervened in Afghanistan, political rivalries among the five parties which comprise the Islamic Alliance resistance movement are deeper than ever according to Afghan sources.

The King meets periodically with representatives of the opposition groups and encourages them to cooperate, Wali said.

Forty-eight hours after the Soviet intervention last December, the King issued a statement condemning what he called the violation of Afghan sovereignty. He has not made any further public appeals since he sent messages to the individual resistance leaders in January, however.

"The King is not really very active. He gives advice if people approach him," Shams said.

Leftists in the army supported the 1973 coup and anti-communist exiles believe it paved the way for an openly pro-Moscow coup in April 1978.

Zaher withdrew quietly to his villa with his wife Queen Homaira, 64, and decided to stay in Italy because he likes the climate and the people. The family has one full time servant at the villa.

Many Afghan exiles remember the King's reign as a time of peace.--APA

CSO: 4920

MUJAHEDIN ATTACK FAIZABAD AIRPORT; 5 RUSSIANS KILLED

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 28 Oct 80 p 3

[Text] Peshawar, Oct. 27--According to a press release of Islamic Alliance for Liberation of Afghanistan, reports from Badakhshan province say that Mujahideen had destroyed one tank and one military jeep in a guerilla attach on Faizabad Airport.

Five Russians, including one officer were killed and two of them were wounded.

According to another report from Badakhshan, two tanks were destroyed in Qara Kamar by mine explosion.

According to a report from Takhar province, Mujahideen attacked a militia centre in Rustaq district. In this attack Mujahideen killed 20 militia and Russian soldiers. They captured 100 pieces of weapons including 303 rifles and machineguns.

Russians had tried to strengthen their positions in Rustaq to protect their agents, but they could not resist Mujahideen attack and after giving some casualties had to run away.

According to a report from Logar, Mujahideen burned down Mohammad Agha school building which had been turned into Babrak troops headquarters in the area.

According to another report from Logar, Mujahideen had called a general strike for October 13, 14 and 15. On the second day of the strike Russian agent militia started a massive attack.

Scattered fighting took place in different areas along the way between Kabul Gardez. In an attack on a caravan of trucks near Surkhab, Mujahideen destroyed 140 trucks and armoured vehicles and killed about 80 Russians and militia troops and captured ammunition from them.--PPI

CSO: 4920

GUERRILLAS DESTROY AMMUNITION CONVOY

Karachi DAWN in English 2 Nov 80 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Nov. 1--Afghan guerillas destroyed a Soviet ammunition convoy, killed at least 45 Communist Party members and burned down a large primary school in raids north and south of Kabul the past week, a report from Afghanistan said today.

The guerilla raid last Monday night on the convoy near Sange-Niwishta pass, 37 kilometres southeast of Kabul, prompted Soviet punitive air attacks against "every moving thing" in the villages of Logar province, killing hundreds of civilians, said the report from a source that in the past has been reliable.

Several Russian soldiers were killed or injured in the raid in which guerillas, some firing rockets, destroyed 21 ammunition trucks, two armoured cars and one tank, the report added.

It said hulks of burned vehicles closed the road for two days through the narrow valley-terrain. The rebels have often turned to their advantage for attacks on government and Soviet units.

Guerilla losses were not given in the raid south of Kabul, but 15 to 17 freedom fighters were reported killed in strikes the past week against Police posts and a party office at Karte Parwan in the northern suburbs of Kabul. The report said the guerillas seized weapons and killed 30 members of the ruling People's Democratic (Communist) Party.

On Thursday night, the freedom fighters burned down the Wazir Akbar Khan Primary School in the same suburb, leaving 1,500 students without classrooms, the report continued.

Guerillas killed 15 party members attending a gathering in a private home at Charikar, the Parwan provincial capital 60 kilometres north of Kabul, during the week, the report said.

The specific raids were not independently confirmed but diplomatic reports reaching here have also mentioned fighting in the same areas.--APA

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

CUBANS, RUSSIANS REPORTED KILLED--Peshawar, Oct. 28--Two Cuban generals and 10 Russian soldiers are reported to have been killed in a mine explosion in village Ajighal of Imam Sahib district in Kunduz province. According to a Press release of Hizbe Islami, Afghanistan, heavy fighting took place between Mujahideen and Afghan forces in this village where one tank and one military truck were also destroyed. Mujahideen of the Hezbi Islami have also attacked on the Russian forces near Gum Kool village at Imam Sahib district located about 50 km to north of Kundu city. After few hour heavy fighting, two armoured cars and two troop carrier trucks were destroyed. Thirty-eight Russian troops were killed and 50 wounded. Mujahideen have not got casualties as reported. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 29 Oct 80 p 12]

CSO: 4920

NATO EXPERT PREDICTS IRAQI VICTORY, IRANIAN COUP

Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 25 Oct 80 p 11

[Interview with Gen John Hackett, former commander of British Forces in NATO by Mohammed Said Gunaidi]

[Text] [Question] Starting from the assumption that the superpowers will not intervene in the war, what are your views with regard to its results? Who will win?

[Answer] I believe Iraq will be able to attain its objectives, albeit not within the envisioned timeframe. I think Iraq will take Shatt el Arab and the islands, to the satisfaction of the Arabs. However, I would like to clarify two points: 1) The war will not last long 2) It would come as a surprise if it were to last through October with Ayatollah Khomeyni still in Qom as the leader of the Iranians.

[Question] Don't you believe that with Tehran isolated in the international scene, Iraq may be able to obtain the weaponry necessary for the continuation of the war?

[Answer] I don't believe, for example, that the United States is helping Iraq, though the Soviets would. I believe that both the Americans and the Soviets will let the two antagonists fight it out, so they can then intervene at the right moment and bring about a ceasefire.

[Question] You don't believe therefore that the war is being fought by the superpowers using surrogates?

[Answer] No. I stated that this war will not last long and I would like to predict something else: Soon we will hear more said about the Kurds. The situation at the present is very favorable for them on all fronts, in Turkey, in Iran, as in Iraq.

Who Supports the Kurds

[Question] For this to happen, it is necessary for someone from the outside to come to their aid: Among the reasons given for the signing of the 1975 Iranian-Iraqi accord was that of aid previously furnished by the shah and the Americans to Iraqi Kurds. Do you think it worthwhile for the Russians to incite the Kurds?

[Answer] The Kurds might find it to their advantage to come into the arena at a moment convenient for them and it might be known that it is the West that is encouraging them to do so.

[Question] In view of the fact that the West favors the fall of Khomeyni, why should it aid the Kurds? And why do you believe that the Kurds will go into action on all fronts?

[Answer] The Kurds have always relied on outside aid and the West will probably be interested in maintaining a means of pressure in the Gulf region. This is what the Americans, Kissinger in particular, have done in the past.

[Question] Reagan, the Republican candidate for the American presidency, in criticizing Carter's Iranian policy, sustained that the United States, in case the Straits of Hormuz were to be blocked, is not capable of intervening in a decisive manner because it does not possess sufficient forces.

[Answer] The Americans have the strength and the capacity to intervene. Actually, it is the Iranians who are not able to block the Straits of Hormuz. The only way to block the Straits is to mine them, but the Iranian Navy is not able to carry out this operation on its own and the United States has a naval force capable of making sure this does not take place. I believe what Reagan wanted to underline was the fact that the United States should not take unilateral military action, but rather cooperate with its allies.

Blocking the Straits of Hormuz Is Impossible

[Question] Isn't it possible to block the Straits by sinking some ships or some tankers as pointed out in some reports?

[Answer] No. These were not military reports. The width of the Straits does not permit this. The Straits of Hormuz are almost 60 miles wide and even at its narrowest points, it is wider than the English Channel. Thus it is impossible to block it, even by sinking 20 ships in the same spot.

[Question] You have mentioned serious gaps in the Iranian Army's weaponry, its training, spare parts and also with regard to its commanders. What is the situation with regard to the Iraqis?

[Answer] I believe that the Iraqis have better commanders. The Iranians now are fighting inspired by their fidelity to Iran and because they dislike Iraqis; however, they do not have military leadership. Khomeyni has destroyed the cadres which are indispensable to the armed forces. To that must be added the shortage of armaments, ammunition and spare parts. With his actions, however, Khomeyni has not destroyed the capability on the part of the military to grab power, and I believe this will happen. The Iranian Army will come to power. This will not be a surprise. Conversely, it would be a surprise if this did not happen.

[Question] Given the hypothesis of an Iranian Army coup, what effect would that have on the war?

[Answer] I think that if the army were to come to power, there would be peace. Iraq would annex Shatt el Arab and the other islands and thus the conflict would end. The war has been waged in order to obtain political objectives. The objectives of this war are clear to Iraq, which also has definite territorial aims. They are also clear to the West, which favors the elimination of the Khomeyni regime, with some options left open in the future for the winner.

9209
CSO: 4404

TRAINING OF THE 'DEPRIVED' AT MILITARY CAMP DESCRIBED

Tehran JAVANAN-E EMRUZ in Persian 12 Oct 80 pp 54-55

[Interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Amir Majd]

[Text] The natural, beautiful areas of the camp, the fields and the surroundings, were very lovely and attractive. As was mentioned earlier, the camp is built on a very large piece of land to the north of the city of Neyshabur on the slopes of the Khorasan Mountains. We should mention a beautiful, small dam built in the valley which is a place for raising trout.

The age difference between some of the participants was in itself interesting. When they walked together, one was reminded of a grandfather and his grandchildren. A common goal had gathered together 60 or 70 year old men with youths of 15 or 16.

The importance of the camp from the point of view of mercenary radio stations in the service of foreigners was quite noteworthy. During the camp activities, a false report was spread by one of these radio stations. In order to neutralize this action, the participants began a large, widespread march in the city of Neyshabur. This undertaking instigated excitement in the people who cheered the participants warmly with revolutionary slogans. Finally, together they stood at prayer in the congregational mosque of the city and neutralized any kind of rumor.

The closeness of Neyshabur to Mashhad made all the participants yearn for a pilgrimage to the tomb of his holiness Reza. After a suggestion by them to the supervisor of the camp, the camp was concluded one day early to enable them to go enthusiastically to Mashhad on a pilgrimage to the eighth imam of the Shi'ites and from there to depart for their own cities.

At the end of the camp, one M-1 rifle was given as a gift to each one of the participants by the Organization for the Mobilization of the Deprived to be taken with them to their own cities so that when needed they would not have to get weapons from military camps.

The opening day of the camp, Sep 7, coincided with the anniversary of Tehran's Black Friday. On Sep 9, ceremonies marking the anniversary of the death of the Abuzar of the time, his holiness Ayatollah Taleqani, were held simultaneously with those in other cities.

Final Section

You have read in the last two issues Parts 1 and 2 of the report of the correspondents of JAVANAN Magazine dispatched to the military camp of the Organization for the Mobilization of the Deprived in Baghrud, Neyshabur. Here you will read briefly about the events and how the camp was conducted:

The History of Mobilization

In Nov-Dec [Azar] of last year, the decree of Emam Khomeyni, the leader of the Islamic revolution of Iran, concerning the establishment of an army of 20 million was issued. This decree was based on a vital social, political, and military need. Following the imam's decree, the revolutionary people of our country went to work in various parts of the country on this important matter and began military and cultural training. But it was necessary for this training to come under an organized and controlled unit in order to yield better results. To this end, the Organization for National Mobilization was established, which overtook the management of military, political, and cultural traning of the resistance army assisted by the pasdaran and the military. Since then, because of the overwhelming welcome of the people throughout the country and present sensitive conditions, this organization reached extensive proportions. At the present time, more than hundreds of thousands of individuals throughout Iran have joined the resistance army. The activities of this organization are not limited to mere military training, but the duties of the organization extend to cultural training, reinforcement training, and medical emergency training as well.

Recently, in order not to limit the activities of this organization, the name was changed to The Organization for the Mobilization of the Deprived.

The Location of the Camp

The Baghrud camp is located 15 km north of the city of Neyshabur. Baghrud is a village in which more than 50 families live at present. The land for the camp covers more than 100 acres on which the Boy Scouts of Iran intended to build a scout camp.

Of course, what is interesting is the manner in which the camp was to be established. It was to be built not for the people, but for a small number of children, for example, the children of the royal family, in order to make Iran better known to the people of the world by inviting foreign guests and organizing scout meetings with the

participation of the Pahlavi family. Since the day the construction of this camp began, strict limitations were put on the villagers. Their agricultural land was regularly taken away from them in order to provide security for the camp and the people had to leave the region. After the victory of the revolution, the camp was given to the army and the Organization for Mobilization to be used as a military camp.

The Program of the Camp

As was mentioned earlier, this camp was the military camp for the 20-million army. But ideological issues and cultural activities were also taken into consideration along with military training.

Every day, after the evening prayers, various personalities were invited to the camp to give speeches to the participants. Among these guests was Dr Ghafurifard, the governor general of Khorasan, who spoke to the participants of the camp on two nights. In one part of his speech he said:

Why does the United States warship come into the Persian Gulf but does not dare to attack? Why do American helicopters land in Tabas but run away in humiliation? Because they well know that 35 million human beings are prepared for holy war and martyrdom and if Americans set foot here, all the people will take up arms and make Iran a graveyard of Americans. America knows through its spies and experience that if there remains only one person of the 35 million Iranians, half of his heart will be full of love for the Koran, Islam, and the imam of the people and the other half full of enmity and hatred for America.

In another section of his speech, he referred to good and bad deeds in our times saying:

During certain periods of time, good deeds mean merely the understanding of the Koran and ideological issues. But when a time comes that the Koran itself and the Islamic country is in danger, when the enemy attacks from within and without, at this time good deeds do not mean sitting at home worshipping and praying. We must take up arms and defend our borders. I do not mean only geographical borders, but also ideological borders. Here, good deeds mean holy war and martyrdom. Anything but this would be evil deeds and anti-revolutionary.

The camp programs began at 0500; from then until 0700, when morning ceremonies began, individuals carried on personal things such as eating breakfast, praying, and doing morning exercises. After the conclusion of morning ceremonies, people were divided into various pre-assigned groups and went to the fields for military training. The morning military training lasted until 1230, at which time the participants returned to their tents, ate lunch, did their prayers, and rested. Afternoon military activities began at 1530 and lasted

until 1830. The following are some of the areas of military training offered at the camp:

Self-defense, guerrilla and anti-guerrilla techniques, fighting with bayonets, night watching, compass, hiding, the recognition of military equipment, fighting disasters such as flood, fire, and earthquake, the treatment of prisoners of war, medical aid, ambush and anti-ambush techniques.

These are brief samples of the kinds of training which the people went through on various days at the camp.

Interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Majd

We held an interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Majd, the supervisor for the Mobilization of the Deprived, who was present at the gathering of brothers at the camp, which follows:

[Question] In conversations with different individuals from different cities, all spoke of the cultural poverty of the people. Would you please explain the cultural goals of the Organization for Mobilization and the steps you have taken?

[Answer] For us, Islamic culture is of primary concern in this organization. The reason is obvious. The weapon which brought victory to our revolution was the faith and the beliefs of the people and not modern weapons which had been built and given to the people. We are striving diligently to strengthen this weapon. You have noticed that military training is not our only goal. It is a means to enable us to extend cultural training. Cultural and military training are never separate. This is what the prophets did. The imam has also emphasized that we should take up arms in one hand and the Koran in the other. We emphasize both of these aspects. The creation of spiritual weapons is one of our principles. Therefore, attention is paid to cultural and ideological issues, to individuals and institutions. This training does not end with our organization. However, military training, because of present conditions and various threats, is of more immediate importance for our people and shortcomings are felt more in this area of training. But I should emphasize once more that military training is coupled with ideological training. At the present time, our ideological and cultural division is working on this problem. Since we are in a sensitive situation militarily, this division has been unable to attract the people as well as our military division has.

[Question] I would like you to speak about the sister members of the 20-million army and their programs and whether they also participate in similar camps.

[Answer] In certain areas, our sisters have been more enthusiastic than our brothers. Military, cultural, and reinforcement training,

which are among the duties of the Organization for Mobilization, are provided for everybody. And our wives and mothers are actively participating. For the future, we are prepared to organize camps with instructors in conformity with the status and the personality of our women. They could not participate in this camp due to the lack of means, especially the shortage of instructors. On the whole, however, the participation of women in the mobilization is in step with that of the brothers. And our aged mothers and wives are also actively involved. Most often they support us in jobs such as food preparation, behind the front jobs, and nursing. In the future, we will have important programs in this area which we will soon carry out.

[Question] Please give us some explanation of the change of the name of the Organization for National Mobilization to the Organization for the Mobilization of the Deprived.

[Answer] Our revolution has two dimensions. First, the dimension within the borders, concerning independence and our own internal problems. Second, beyond the borders, a universal dimension.

It is our duty to help others in the world who are deprived. This help would be mostly spiritual, such as exporting revolution, providing hope, and setting them in motion. Before this name was changed, the word was "national" mobilization. We explained many times that the word "national" does not indicate limited dependencies such as tribe, race, language, or material relationships. And then, too, we meant the mobilization of a nation which included the internal dimension of our revolution. But since it did not include the external and universal aspects of the revolution, it was felt that it was necessary to choose a term which would include the universal dimension of the revolution. Hence, this term was suggested. Other terms such as sacred [qots] were suggested. We brought them to the attention of the imam and the word "deprived" [mostaz'afin] was chosen, which is an ideological and all-inclusive term. And it includes all the movements in the world which demand their rights. After completely studying other true, liberating movements, we intend to establish an office here to maintain contact with them in order to benefit from each other's experiences and possibilities.

[Question] Is this the first military camp of the Organization for Mobilization and what is your opinion concerning military camps and specifically this camp?

[Answer] No, this is not our first camp. In the past we have had other camps which were smaller in size and number of participants. This camp is our first large camp of this size and quality, which has more than 10,000 participants. In spite of the imperfections and shortcomings of this camp, because of the lack of means, on the whole, it has been satisfactory, because it was organized on the basis of goals, like in organizing a seminar.

We have daily sessions and conversations with our brothers from various cities and provinces and we hear about their problems. We have discussions and exchanges of views concerning solutions. Other brothers from each one of the provinces hear about each other's problems. From a psychological point of view, these camps can be very beneficial and can neutralize the plans of the enemy, which are to try to create enmity and separation between the people of this country.

On the whole, in spite of all the problems we have had, the camp has been satisfactory and it corresponded with our general intentions. We hope to have better camps in the future by eliminating the problems.

What you have read above was a brief report about the large military camp of the Organization for the Mobilization of the Deprived which was held last month. What has since caused us astonishment are the present situation of our country and the words of those in charge in the past. We should pay attention to the words of Dr Qafuri and Hojjat ol-Eslam Majd once more, as if those words had been spoken today, at this very moment, and before them, our imam, this superhuman of the times who has warned us again and again of such days and who for the same reason decreed the organization of the 20-million army and the mobilization of the people.

The forced and stupid war which Sadom began with the help of Western politicians and Eastern weapons shows that although they have struggled to precisely understand the Islamic revolution of Iran, they have never succeeded in this affair, because the role of the Moslem masses in protecting the revolution never played a role in the political analyses of these idiots. In the first week of this forced war between Iran and Iraq, what we saw in their analyses was a war and war strategy without consideration of the people. As for Iraq, at any rate, this assessment holds, since it has had to continue and finish a war which it started with the help of its army. But in our case, this was not so. From the beginning of the war, we witnessed the role of the mobilized people, their battle alongside the armed forces and behind the front, their faith in the revolution, the pure love of the country, and their strong belief in the ideology which caused the people of the world to awaken as the war continued and to contemplate once more on Iran, the people of Iran and their steel will, to awaken once more from their daydreaming. On this path, we contemplate what God has promised: "We have willed to favor those who have suffered deprivation and to make them the inheritors and leaders of the time."

9593
CSO: 4906

LEFTIST, RIGHTIST FIGURES ACCUSE FOREIGN MINISTER OF FOLLOWING U.S.

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 18 Oct 80 pp 30-31

/Article by Ghassan Bayram: "A Question Lebanese Raise to the Cabinet: Why Do You Only Follow Washington's Line?"/

/Text/ The chairman of the Socialist Progressive Party and the Political Council of the Lebanese National Movement, Mr Walid Jumblatt, in his private gatherings, recounts impressions of some significance which he brought back from his recent visit to the Soviet Union in the company of Mr Samir Franjiyah, nephew of former Lebanese president Sulayman Franjiyah.

These impressions concern the Soviet position on the Lebanese crisis, the current Lebanese situation, the legitimate authorities, the nature of the struggle which is still taking place on the Lebanese stage and the need to attain a settlement to this struggle which will lead to support for the legitimate authorities under the leadership of President Ilyas Sarkis.

Among these impressions, for example, was the one which was derived from a meeting Mr Jumblatt and his companion Franjiyah held with one of the most prominent Soviet leaders, Mr Kirilenko, one of the candidates to succeed the Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev.

During this meeting Mr Kirilenko raised a question whose gist was, "Is it true that relations between Israel and the Lebanese Phalange Party are very weak these days?" Expressions of consternation immediately appeared on the faces of Messrs Jumblatt and Franjiyah, because the question itself surprised them; they had not expected that this issue would be the focus of the attention of the Soviet leadership and that a question would be raised on it by a major Soviet official.

Naturally Mr Kirilenko did not anticipate an answer from the Lebanese Socialist leader, and he did not want to obtain additional information on the new circumstances which Israeli-Phalange relations were going through.

When a Soviet official at that level asks a question of that kind, he wants in one way or another to give the leader of the Lebanese National Movement and his comrade an oral message, telling them that there is a weakness in relations between Israel and the Lebanese Phalange and that it would be best to use this weakness in the interests of the approach calling for an expansion of the gap between Israel and

the Phalange and a narrowing of the gap between the Phalange and the other Lebanese parties opposed to it on the other hand.

This is the interpretation given to the major Soviet official's question, especially since this statement was made about 2 months ago, that is, at a time when repeated meetings were taking place in Beirut between the Soviet ambassador in Lebanon, Mr Soldatov, and the leader of the military wing of the Phalange Party, Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, and between the latter and other officials in the Soviet Embassy.

It is stated that four meetings took place in the course of 2 months between Ambassador Soldatov and Shaykh Pierre al-Jumayyil, which were intermingled with an exchange of letters that consisted of specific written questions from the Phalange Party which the Soviet ambassador received, and to which he gave written answers in return after review by his government.

In this regard a prominent Phalange official says that "Whatever the results of this conversation with the Soviets have been, and whatever the Soviets' answers to our question have been, satisfactory or unsatisfactory, the party is not disturbed at all--to the contracy, there is satisfaction within the party and we sense a benefit, if not to the requisite degree."

The objective in reciting these facts is not just to give information, but more because these have become examples which are given, in some political symposia of different tendencies and inclinations, of the extent of the inability of Lebanese diplomacy and the failure of the foreign minister to move this diplomacy in all international directions for the sake of presenting the Lebanese problem and conscripting whatever international forces are possible in order to arrive at a solution to it.

The queries are no longer, as in the past, addressed to the reasons which cause the foreign minister to be in constant contact with the ambassador of the United States of America in Beirut; rather, they have all started to revolve about the reasons which cause the foreign minister of Lebanon, in the circumstances which his cabinet and his country are going through,to cut off all contact with the ambassador of a great power like the Soviet Union, except when the foreign minister decides to meet with the ambassadors of the major powers which have permanent membership in the international Security Council.

The complaints against Lebanese diplomacy are no longer restricted to a specific group of Lebanese politicians or people working in the general field; rather, the complaints have become general and comprehensive, now that people on the far right have started to raise the same questions as people on the far left and the center on the reasons why the foreign minister works only along the American line and keeps the road of movement in the opppsite direction, that is, the Soviet road, closed and almost unused to the point where a moderate politician, well known for his friendship with the president, has wondered on more than one occasion "What is the logical explanation why Bashir al-Jumayyil met four times with the Soviet ambassador in the course of 2 months while the foreign minister has not met with him once, realizing that Bashir al-Jumayyil is not George Hawi, chairman of the Lebanese Communist Party?"

What attracted people's attention was the fact that Minister Fu'ad Butrus tried to arrange a meeting with the American secretary of state and the French foreign minister more than a week before his trip to New York, but did not try to take advantage of his presence in the United Nations to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to review the Lebanese situation in its real state and thereby discuss developments in the Middle East crisis and ways of limiting its effects on the Lebanese situation.

After Minister Butrus' return to Beirut, more than one friendly politician criticized him for this "failure" to try to meet with the foreign minister of a great state like the Soviet Union which has a great role and influence in various international crises, especially in the Middle East crisis--a role and an influence which are expected to grow in the foreseeable future, especially following the Iraqi-Iranian war and the Soviet-Syrian treaty.

These friends wondered what harm there was in trying to get in touch with the Soviets or at least meet the Soviet foreign minister when an opportunity arose such as Minister Butrus' presence at the United Nations.

In spite of the fact that this style (according to these sources) has stamped official Lebanese policy with the character of "total alignment with the American camp, causing this policy to lack the minimum of balance which it must show," it is only fair to state that this is not wholly what is meant and is not the objective in the Lebanese foreign minister's thinking.

On more than one occasion, the Lebanese foreign minister has taken the initiative to condemn American policy regarding the Lebanese crisis. In more than one statement, he has attacked American failure to support the Lebanese position in word and deed, stating that American support has in practice not yet emerged from the verbal context.

This is a blatant fact which has been conspicuous on more than one occasion in which Washington has striven to implicate the legitimate Lebanese authorities in bothersome positions, in the south of Lebanon or outside it, and then at the last hour relinquished support for these positions. On more than one occasion the United States of America has given the legitimate Lebanese authorities evidence of matters which it soon abandoned at the last moment. And so on. However, the problem lies in Minister Fu'ad Butrus' vision. Since the beginning Minister Butrus has been gambling on the fact that if there is a solution to the Lebanese problem it will of necessity lie in the hands of the Americans. He gambled on the fact that if there is an international body which can provide Lebanon with the aid which will enable it to transcend its trials it is America. In the worst case, he gambled that if there was an international body capable of limiting the ramifications of the Lebanese crisis it was America. Indeed, Butrus lost hope of the possibility of obtaining a European position which would support or partially save the Lebanese entity. Since the beginning, Minister Butrus has constantly believed that there is no benefit in resorting to the Soviets because Moscow could not support Lebanon at the expense of the Palestinians.

When Minister Butrus recently became persuaded that there was no hope in the Arab situation, and that the solution, or the beginning of a solution, would either lie in the hands of the Syrians or would not exist, this gamble caused him finally to

determine to break off with the Arab states and gamble entirely on Syria in a manner which to some extent damaged Lebanon's relations with some Arabs who have specific touchy feelings toward Lebanon and the Arab role in Lebanon.

Perhaps there are few people who can argue with the foreign minister on principle over these gambles, but the overwhelming majority has started to hold the foreign minister to blame for his style and method in dealing with matters and handling international, regional and Arab events and variables.

There are people who state frankly, in front of the foreign minister, and perhaps the president, that to bet on the Americans, after all that Lebanon has suffered from America, does not mean and cannot mean a final break with the Soviets, considering Moscow to be in the enemy camp, and that gambling on one Arab body or another does not mean and cannot mean a final break with the other Arabs who possess Arab, international and regional weight.

In the opinion of many, the gravity of this style in the foreign minister's platform no longer lies in the fact that it has caused Lebanon's isolation on many occasions and made its issue a peripheral one in comparison with the other issues in the region. Rather, the gravity has come to lie in the fact that this style of thinking is in one way or another reflected in his platform of government and policy, and is therefore a source of permanent refusal to have President Ilyas Sarkis make permanent trips to Arab countries and major countries to present the Lebanese cause whenever ramifications appear or dangerous dimensions to it appear.

11887
CSO: 4802

BUDGET FOR 1981 ALREADY APPROVED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 6 Oct 80 pp 4-5

[Text] Lebanon's caretaker government has approved a budget of LL 5.2 billion (LL 1 = $0.290) for Fiscal year 1981, despite its constitutionally disputed right to do so. The budget which has now been sent to the Chamber of Deputies for approval includes a deficit of LL 1.48 billion which, according to one local press report, is to be financed by the issue of Treasury Bills, and local and foreign loans.

The new budget shows an increase of approximately LL 800 million over that of the current year. However, this year's figure is purely theoretical, as in accordance with usual practice, allocations for infrastructural projects will probably not be fully spent. Nevertheless, according to the Minister of Finance Ali el-Khalil, the proportion of expenditures going to reconstruction has gone up this year to 37 per cent of total expenditure, against 34 per cent last year. The minister has also pointed out that this year's deficit is 2 per cent lower than last year's, at 33 per cent of the total budget figure.

No final breakdown of the figures has been given, pending parliamentary ratification of the budget later this month. However, some local press reports have indicated that the Ministry of Defence's allocation has gone up by LL 242 million over this year's figure of LL 980.48 million; the Ministry of Education is reported to be receiving LL 662.8 million, a LL 152 million increase over the current year's allocation, while the Ministry of Public Works' share is to go up by LL 76 million to LL 662.8 million. An increase in budgetary reserves of LL 124 million is reported to have been earmarked for high cost of living and wage increases.

CSO: 4820

AIRPORT EXPANSION PLAN DESCRIBED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 6 Oct 80 p 5

[Text]

The expansion of Beirut's international airport will cost the Lebanese government a total of LL 1 billion (LL 1 = $0.29), according to press reports last week. The Director General of Urbanism, Mohamed Fawaz also indicated that the terminal expansion project alone would cost LL 304 million. A figure of around LL 250 million was given last December, at the time when the airport authority had shortlisted 17 companies for this project (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, December 10, 1979).

The airport expansion plan, designed to permit handling of 6 million passengers by 1990, is divided into three phases, according to a study by the French firm Aéroport de Paris. These are work which is currently being undertaken, work for which contracts have been awarded but where construction has not yet begun and finally, future extensions to the airport which have been given ministerial approval but have not yet been put out for tenders.

Underway already is the LL 3 million expansion of office space to be rented to the various airlines operating at the airport, and which will be operational some time in 1981. Also underway is the construction of a LL 15 million catering centre, which is to provide 10,000 meals a day by the end of next year. Furthermore, a LL 1 million building is being erected for warehouses and customs offices.

A project for which bidding has closed but for which ministerial approval for implementation is still pending, is the expansion of the airport terminal from its current area of 35,000 square metres to 135,000 square metres. The new terminal is to be equipped with two covered walkways which will enable passengers to embark directly from the terminal building, without having to be transported across the runway by bus, as is the case at present. This part of the airport expansion project was awarded last April to Caragulla-Vianini, and is estimated to cost LL 304 million. The first phase of the terminal expansion is to be completed in 26 months and the entire project to be finished by 1984.

Lastly, future plans which are yet to be offered for bidding, include a new 3,750 metre-long runway, to be built parallel to two existing runways of 3,200 metres each. A three-story parking lot at the same location as the present one, facing the entrance of the airport, is also one of the future projects, which is estimated to cost LL 75 million. Additional customs, cargo and security-related buildings to be built will cost LL 105 million.

According to Mr Fawaz, the overall cost of the expansion projects to be undertaken at the airport in the next few years, are now estimated at LL 1 billion and may rise further in case of delays in the execution of the projects. But he added: " Financing is no problem at all. That may be the most remarkable aspect of the situation in Lebanon."

CSO: 4820

NEW PASSPORTS IN WAKE OF FORGERIES

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 6 Oct 80 p 5

[Text]

New Lebanese passports will have a different design as of December 1, it was learned in Beirut. According to the Director General of the Lebanese *Sûreté Générale* Farouk Abillama, the decision to issue passports of different format was taken more than three months ago, before a recent discovery of a network of forgers, who have been supplying false passports and visas to Lebanese migrants.

The new passports are being made by the English company Thomas Delarue and Co, which already prints Lebanon's banknotes. Mr Abillama said that the new passports would have a number of characteristics which would make them virtually impossible to copy. Lebanese passports in circulation since 1975 have been printed in Lebanon, and according to Mr Abillama, were relatively easy to forge.

The announcement concerning the new passports comes on the heels of the latest and largest-yet round-up of forged documents, following the expulsion by Sweden of more than 200 Lebanese citizens in the last few months. Recently, people who were either working temporarily or applying for residence in Sweden were flown back to Beirut by the Swedish authorities, who had discovered they all held false passports and/or forged visas. A few days later another four Lebanese citizens were repatriated to Beirut under the same charges.

Since then, it has been revealed that the would-be migrants obtained their documents at considerable expense from a gang of forgers, who are apparently well-protected by one of the local militias in Beirut. At the time when the 69 Lebanese were repatriated, some local newspapers carried reports linking the forgery group to prominent members of the Phalange Party. The majority of the deported migrants were reportedly from Lebanon's Syriac Christian community, who are generally seen as staunch supporters of the National Liberal Pary, led by ex-President Camille Chamoun. The Lebanese daily *As-Safir* claims that following a Phalangist operation to crush the NLP on July 7 (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, July 14) Phalangist militia commander Bechir Gemayel threatened the Syriacs if they did not switch their support to him. *As-Safir* also said that Mr Gemayel summoned Syriac leaders and instructed them and their followers to leave the country, ensuring that facilities were provided for those who wished to do so.

According to the latest reports the Lebanese judicial authorities have identified the gang of forgers but cannot actually lay hands on them. It appears that the gang is being protected from police enquiries by "elements obstructing the course of justice." One Beirut daily has alleged that the authorities knew the names and addresses of the forgers, who are thought to have made some LL 14 million (about $4 million).

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

MINERAL SURVEY STARTED--Abu Dhabi, Nov. 2 (WAM)--The Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources has embarked on phase III of the mineral survey plan which includes conducting feasibility studies on the minerals found during phase II of the survey. A Ministry of Petroleum delegation led by the Director of Mineral Resources Department will leave for London tomorrow to hold talks with officials of the company which was in charge of the execution of the first and second phases of the plan. Priority will be given to feasibility studies on copper in Mudhab area in Fujeirah and chromite in Sharjah, Ajman, Ras Al Khalmah and Fujeirah. The delegation will then leave London for Morocco to attend the five-day meetings of the liaison officers of the Arab Mineral Resources Organisation to discuss the budget for 1981 and to close the accounts for the current year. Participants in these meetings will also review the program of work for next year, prepare the agenda for the fourth Arab conference on mineral resources to be held in Jordan next year, draw a geological map of the Arab world, set Arabic guidebooks on geological and minerological terms and write the draft Arabic legislation on mining. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 3 Nov 80 p 3]

NO OIL OUTPUT INCREASE--Abu Dhabi, Nov. 3 (Ittihad)--The UAE will make no further increase in oil production to compensate for the loss of exports from Iran and Iraq, Petroleum and Mineral Resources Minister Mana Saeed Al Oteiba has declared. The Minister said that the UAE had so far agreed to an increase of 50,000 barrels per day, "totally exported to France, in accordance with the directives of UAE President Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan." "There will be no (further) increase of oil production to compensate the needs of those countries affected by the Iraq-Iran war," Dr Oteiba said. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 4 Nov 80 p 1]

CSO: 4820 END

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No. 2222

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2222

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FLAREUP IN SYRIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS SEEN AS LIMITED IN SCOPE

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 29 Aug 80 p 24

[Article: "A 'Muddying Of the Waters Sketch' Between Damascus and Baghdad; a Limited Flareup In Syrian-Iraqi Relations"]

[Text] Ever since the French poet LaFontaine wrote the fable of "the wolf and the sheep" the story of "muddying the waters" has been used as an example of fabricated tension in bilateral relations between nations. Nowhere is this story more appropriate than as applied to the relations between Syria and Iraq. The story about muddying the waters between Damascus and Baghdad has reached the point that it has almost become a story of poisoning the waters. It is well known among agricultural societies that cutting off water or muddying the water, and particularly poisoning the water, is something that causes great anxiety and provokes retaliation, as is best portrayed in Lebanese musical sketches. People in power--mayors, village chiefs and governors--know just how sensitive this "water sketch" is to the people. It touches a sensitive spot in order to kindle feelings of revenge on those accused of muddying the water.

Thus, the Iraqis forgot the reason for their invasion of the Syrian embassy in Baghdad in full view of the Arab diplomats who had been summoned by the Iraqi foreign ministry for this purpose. All they could think of was the "jar of poison" which they had been told was inside the Syrian embassy to be used for poisoning the water.

The Iraqi authorities had previously accused Iran of a failed attempt to poison the water in al-Najaf and Karbala' for the purpose of arousing revenge against the government. So it happened that the Iraqi government had struck this chord to arouse the people of al-Najaf and Karbala' to vengeance against Iran.

But the "water sketch" between Syria and Iraq is not new. It has been played more than once with regard to the water of the Euphrates after Syria built a dam on the river with Soviet assistance. Al-Sadat threatened to go to war over this kind of water problem if the countries through which the Nile passes on its way to Egypt should block its waters or cut them off

from the Egyptians. The Kuwaitis, too, say that they prefer to desalinate sea water than to pipe water from the Shatt al-'Arab in Iraq for fear that the Iraqis might cut off the flow one day.

The Syrians say that the invasion of their embassy in Baghdad was fabricated, and that the Iraqi authorities planned it to publicly revile Syria in full view of Arab diplomats in the strangest display of its kind in diplomatic history. Although the Iraqi government announced the expulsion of the Syrian ambassador and the embassy staff from Baghdad within 48 hours, relations between the two countries were not severed. The Syrians responded in kind, expelling the Iraqi ambassador and the embassy staff, about 20 employees. But despite what has happened, the two sides seem to prefer to keep the flareup in their relations limited. Relations were severed in fact, but not officially.

In such circumstances it is difficult to know for certain whether the episode at the Syrian embassy was real or concocted. But the event itself is of no importance to the political atmosphere in which it took place.

This atmosphere has indicated a silent tension in Syrian-Iraqi relations since the breakdown of unification talks more than a year ago. This tension, however, has not come into the open until recently.

The Syrians have their suspicions that the Iraqi authorities brought the situation to public attention at this time to block the efforts being made towards a general Arab settlement, because such a settlement under present circumstances would be in Syria's interests. This is the view held by certain European observers inasmuch as economic factors are a principal cause of Syria's current troubles, and an Arab settlement would cause an economic explosion in Syria, which would lead to a political explosion. These observers say that the economic hopes that have been held out by the Syrian government to its citizens for more than 2 years have not been realized. This has had negative political repercussions. Although the Syrian government does not deny that its economic hopes have not achieved the desired level of success, it attributes that to the negligence of the wealthy Arab countries which have given Syria only a limited amount of money, not enough to meet its needs.

It is noteworthy that until very recently the Syrian government refrained from mentioning Iraq in connection with the acts of violence that have occurred in the country of late, having been content to accuse Jordan. But it has begun to alter this course. It indicated that according to several defendants who surrendered to the Syrian authorities they had received training in Iraq. Sources close to the Syrian government have pointed to Iraqi involvement in the disturbances in Syria. These disturbances had subsided completely during the unification honeymoon between the two countries. They had begun before that, and broke out again after it ended. Other indications that are cited are the fact that Prof Akram al-Hawrani, who is currently in exile in Baghdad, broke his silence for the first time since he left Syria 15 years ago, in a statement he gave to the

pro-Iraqi magazine AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI which is published in Paris. In the statement he described the Moslem Brotherhood as "fighters in a holy war." The same thing is true of Mr Hammud al-Shufi, who resigned his post as Syria's representative to the United Nations last year and sought asylum in Iraq.

The Iraqis on their part deny direct involvement in Syria's internal affairs. But they say that they cannot prevent Syrian opposition groups from carrying out their activities. They have tried in the past to check this activity with only limited success. The Iraqi authorities also cannot turn a deaf ear to the pressure exerted by these groups which are quite numerous in Iraq.

Thus, observers tend to consider the recent flareup in Syrian-Iraqi relations as a limited one. The Iraqi authorities have no desire to get deeply involved in Syrian affairs, particularly with the Moslem Brotherhood waiting in the wings. But at the same time they have succumbed to the influence of the Syrian opposition groups which have taken refuge in Iraq and which exert continual pressure for greater Iraqi involvement. Therefore, they see the recent "dose" which led to the withdrawal of ambassadors as a compromise between the two directions which affords the Iraqi government a measure of flexibility at the pan-Arab level, because it is not in its interests to be accused of breaking up the Arab ranks. It is the Iraqi government which considers one of its most important accomplishments in this area that it was able to unify these ranks at the Baghdad summit conference 2 years ago.

In the opinion of observers there are also ideological pitfalls which cannot be ignored by the Syrians or the Iraqis in the internal conflicts, not to mention party differences. These, too, are factors which encourage a limited flareup. Since it was founded, and before the differences among its members arose, the Ba'th Party has represented a third ideological line, between the communists and the Moslem Brotherhood. Those who have joined it are opponents of the communist parties and the movements of the Moslem Brotherhood. Therefore there is a fundamental obstacle to a radical alliance between any branch of the Ba'th party and the communists or Moslem Brethren. Thus, the Syrians cannot support the Iraqi communists to the point that the Iraqi government will fall to the Communist Party, and the Iraqis cannot support the Moslem Brotherhood in Syria to the point that the Syrian government will fall to the extremist religious faction. Thus, the amount of intervention of each side in the domestic affairs of the other is equal.

As far as the effect of the foreign relations of the two countries on the domestic conflicts are concerned, they are marginal. Although President Hafiz al-Asad had visited Iran during the shah's rule, that did not prevent his establishing good relations with Khomeini. Although President Saddam Husayn fought against the shah, then made peace with him in Algiers, that will probably be repeated when a clearly defined authority emerges in Iran. Before the establishment of good relations between Iraq and Jordan, Syria and Jordan were practically unified. This has also been true of the

two countries' relations with Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union and the United States.

It may be true that the waters between Baghdad and Damascus have been muddied to some extent, but the dose of poison has not reached the wells. The wolf has not died, and the sheep have not perished.

9123
CSO: 4802

SYRIAN DIPLOMATS RECOUNT EXPULSION FROM BAGHDAD

Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 22 Aug 80 pp 1,4

[Article: "Our Diplomatic Mission In Baghdad Reveal the Details about the Invasion of the Embassy; the Diplomatic Staff Were Detained; Weapons and Explosives Were Planted In the Offices; the Purpose of the Operation Was To Drag Syria Into a Marginal Conflict"]

[Text] Damascus--SANA--The Syrian Arab television system held an interview last night with our chargé d'affaires and other members of our embassy staff in Baghdad, following the invasion of the Syrian embassy there by the Iraqi authorities, in violation of all diplomatic customs and traditions observed throughout the world. A transcript of the interview follows.

[Question] We would like to ask a question of Mr Muwaffaq Junayd, the chargé d'affaires at our embassy in Baghdad, and chief of our diplomatic mission there. We would like to inform our viewers in Syria about the incident and the circumstances of the aggression you were subjected to as Syrian diplomats in Iraq.

[Answer] On Monday morning, 18 August 1980, we were summoned by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs to meet with the minister of state for foreign affairs, Mr Hamid 'Ulwan, at 9 o'clock. When I arrived at the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs I found the heads of the other Arab diplomatic missions there. We met with the minister at about 10 o'clock, and he spoke to us. It was the practice of the foreign ministry to summon the heads of diplomatic missions whenever there are matters at hand which pertain to inter-Arab affairs, so that they may consult with each other, exchange opinions and transmit the Iraqi point of view to their governments. However, this time the minister was sorry, as he put it, that despite events of importance to the Arabs, particularly the matter of Jerusalem, the subject at hand pertained to the conduct of the Syrian authorities. He said, "We have received information from foreign sources," and added, "--from an Arab source--relating completely reliable information--that there are weapons, explosives and toxic substances inside the embassy of the Syrian Arab Republic, and that there are enough explosives and toxins to kill thousands of people. This is especially true of the toxins should they be

introduced into the water supplies. Therefore, we have summoned the heads of the Arab diplomatic missions to be witnesses to this conduct which is contrary to the purposes for which embassies are established according to international customs and laws." I denied to the minister that there was anything of the sort he imagined. I asked him to please name his source. But he insisted that this information was reliable. I asked the minister whether diplomatic customs and international laws did not prohibit searching foreign embassies under any circumstances.

[Question] The intention of the Iraqi minister's preliminary remarks as well as everything else he said to you was to inform you that they wanted to search the embassy, correct?

[Answer] The minister said, "We have received reliable information. Therefore we will search the embassy. We will not accept any questions and we will not ask for anyone's permission or anything else. Everything is set and final." At this point several Arab ambassadors raised the question of whether there were any precedents for such an action. The Iraqi minister said, "I don't recall. There may be precedents, but I don't remember in detail whether or not there are."

The other Arab ambassadors asked me whether I would allow them to enter the embassy. I said, "Since it is quite clear from what the minister has said that the matter is final and everything is arranged, and that they will carry on without our permission, my opinion does not really matter." Several of the ambassadors were opposed to entering the embassy because that would be personally embarrassing for them as well as for their governments. The minister answered that it was the policy of his ministry to make tours to get generally acquainted with the Arab ambassadors and diplomatic mission chiefs in Iraq and to learn about their projects. They were now going to make their tour within Iraq, and he hoped that it would be done in a fraternal atmosphere, the way Arabs do business with each other, and that there would be witnesses to the proceedings.

The minister was quite insistent, inasmuch as one of the mission chiefs asked for a delay so that he and his colleagues could consult with their governments on the matter, but the minister refused. Then another one asked that they discuss among themselves whether or not to enter the embassy. The minister said, "We, too, are your Arab brethren, who must be present when you discuss the matter." It was evident that it had been predetermined that they would enter the embassy no matter what. They asked us to go with them, saying, "We have cars ready. The cars for the mission chiefs will follow later."

They asked me to accompany the chief of protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I actually rode in the chief of protocol's car along with a plainclothes officer in the embassy. The cars carrying the diplomatic mission chiefs preceded us. When we reached al-Hurriyah Square, which is 2 minutes by car from the embassy, I was taken out of the chief of protocol's car and put into a car equipped with a radio. I was seated between

two men as if under arrest. They used the radio and said that "we now have the target"--meaning me--"and we will arrive in 2 minutes." A voice answered that everything was ready. When we reached the embassy I got out and one man held me by the left arm and the other by the right arm. They took me through the embassy's outer and inner gates. Armed surveillance troops also entered. This took place in full view of the crowds in front of the embassy, but prior to the diplomatic mission chiefs' arrival. Armed troops entered the inner gate. One of them rang the bell once. When there was no response and the door did not open, They began to kick the door with their feet and used the butts of their rifles. An employee opened the door and was slapped by one of the armed soldiers. They then rushed inside the embassy. Certain doors were locked, such as the one to my office and those to the ambassador's and consul's offices. The consul at this time had not yet arrived at work, and the ambassador was on vacation. His door was locked. There were other offices on the upper floor that were locked because some employees were also on vacation. They kicked open the doors, and brought me into the consul's room in which there were two iron safes. All this was taking place with no one present but the armed Iraqi troops. They told me to turn my face to the wall, and they opened the safes that were in the consul's room. I turned around, but one of them put his hand on my shoulder so that I could not see what was happening.

After about 10 minutes two television cameramen walked in. Ten minutes later they let me turn around. They were inspecting some explosives, about four pistols, some bombs and several bags containing a white substance which they scattered over the floor of the room. They proceeded to take pictures of these things.

When we had entered the embassy there had been two plainclothesmen carrying Samsonite luggage, one piece red and the other black. They were opened inside the room and inside them were sticks of dynamite. Meanwhile the consul entered the outer building. When he entered the room he was seized by two men and was beaten. Then the chief of protocol came and said, "I hope you will permit the Arab ambassadors to enter the embassy." I told him, "You have conducted yourselves contrary to every customary law. The matter is no longer in my hands. I have no authority now. You are going to do whatever you want anyway, so why do you ask me to permit them to enter?"

Five minutes later he said, "the ambassadors would like you to come out and meet them." I went out. The ambassadors were standing in the street, refusing to enter the embassy building. I told them directly "The embassy has been invaded. I don't know whether or not you were present during the invasion. This invasion took place without our consent, in contravention of all generally accepted diplomatic customs and laws. As you have seen, it was at the insistence of the minister. They are conducting themselves as they see fit and have not paid any attention to what we think. I leave the matter to you." I then left and went back into the embassy. At that point an officer took me to my office and asked me, "Where is your office? We want to look for weapons and poisons right now. Please open the safes

in your office for us. If you don't, we will be forced to break them." I opened the strongboxes which they looked through, finding nothing, however. They then told me to remain in the office, and put two armed men at the door. I don't know what was going on in the other offices during this time. We remained for about an hour, during which time they came and negotiated with me about my making a statement to Iraqi television that the operation had been carried out with my consent and approval, and that there had not been any insults or beatings. I flatly refused to make any such statement. They wanted to take my picture, but I refused to be photographed. Then they began to make threats, saying that they would take my picture whether or not I allowed them to. I told them, "We are in Iraq. You are armed and we are unarmed. You can conduct yourselves as you wish, but without my consent."

They then consulted with one another and decided not to force me to be photographed. After a while they brought my colleagues on the embassy staff into my office and began to photograph. They tried to lure us into talking so that they could prove that the operation had been carried out with our knowledge, that they had, in fact, discovered poisons and explosives in the embassy, and that they were taking a statement to this effect, and so that during the talk we would admit that this was something natural. They spoke a great deal about Syria and the government in power there. They voiced their hostility toward the Syrian government. There were two strongboxes, one in the ambassador's office and the other in the consul's office. They asked me for the key. I told them that the ambassador had it--which was the truth--and that the ambassador was on vacation. They said, "Then we will have to break it open." I said, "Do whatever you want." They put us into another room. They brought experts to open the iron strongboxes. They opened the one in the consul's office. After they left, the door was broken. They opened the ambassador's room, then relocked it. We found it locked. Only two screws had been loosened. They then said, "You are free. We are sorry. Because we were forced to 'protect our people and our sovereignty' we did what we had to do. You can go freely. We went to our homes. In the afternoon I was summoned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The chief of protocol handed me a notice of expulsion of the entire embassy staff, including the ambassador, as personae non gratae. We were ordered to leave the country within 48 hours. He then said, "In view of the fact that this is a unique occurrence we will make an exception and allow two members of the embassy staff to remain for 15 days until they are replaced." I gave my name and that of a colleague. He said, "We will submit your names for approval and let you know."

The next day, on Tuesday at noon, they informed me that they had approved my colleague but not me. In the afternoon I got in touch with them. They said that my approval had still not come through. I had to leave within the specified period. When I left my house in the afternoon no one was keeping watch on me. When I returned home at about 9 o'clock I found a car with two intelligence agents in it parked in front of my house. The next morning my daughter tried to go out to get a document from the neighborhood school to transfer my children out of the schools. They prevented her from

leaving. I went out to talk to them. They said, "We have instructions not to let you or your family leave the house." I said to them, "Since we are being expelled and have to leave within 48 hours, I would think we would be given freedom of movement to settle our affairs and leave the country within the designated time. Please get in touch with the competent authorities." They did, and at about 9:30 they let us leave. I went about my errands without restrictions, but I was followed around by several cars. During the second night that I spent in Baghdad the police car kept my house and the embassy under surveillance.

On Wednesday at 11 o'clock I left Baghdad in my private car and was followed out of the city by the police car. At the border they took away my car's license plates and my diplomatic identification papers.

[Question] Before we investigate this precedent which poses a danger to international and inter-Arab relations, I would like to ask the consul to give us an idea of what it was like when he arrived at the embassy on Monday morning, and how the invasion was carried out. I see the effects of the treatment, particularly under your eye and on the other side.

[Answer] As the chargé d'affaires said, I was out of the embassy. When I arrived there at about 10 o'clock I was prevented from entering the building. I found special units men surrounding the building and a large number of police cars. The men were using walkie-talkies. I tried to go in but they would not let me. I told them, "I am a diplomat and this is my embassy. I have to go in." One of them said that I could not. I said, "It's nothing serious, I hope. What's going on?" He said, "You'll find out later." They did not let me leave or enter. There were also cars belonging to several Arab diplomatic missions in front of the embassy. They were witnessing the event. After about 20 minutes a policeman with a walkie-talkie came out of the embassy. He said, "Please come along." I went with him to the main door of the embassy. Someone else was there. One of them seized me by my right arm and another by the left. They harshly forced me to enter. This was witnessed by the Arab ambassadors and diplomatic personnel because they were at the gate. They searched me thoroughly but found nothing on me. When I entered the building I went directly to my office. The chargé d'affaires was in his office. They turned my face to the wall and said, "Raise your hands." I raised them. All the while the television camera was shooting.

The situation really took me by surprise. When I entered my office I found a large table which was not mine. Both Syrian and Iraqi visitors to the Syrian embassy in Baghdad would know that.

They had brought in another table and distributed pictures of it. This table was filled with things they had put on it, including explosives and weapons. I really couldn't make out how many pistols there were--5 or 10—because the punch in the face I received had impaired my vision.

Then they told the chargé d'affaires to see the Arab ambassadors. He went out to see them, while I stayed in the office alone with 12 special units agents and policemen. They began to punch me for no reason. I did not know why, or what they wanted from the beginning, so I asked them. They said, "You must open this strongbox" which was in my room. This strongbox contained the embassy's secret code, something all embassies have. I refused to open the strongbox. I remained about an hour or maybe more discussing with them the subject of opening the strongbox. They made threats and pointed a pistol at my head. One of them said, "Either you open the strongobox or we'll open up your head," and similar statements. They made obscene, unjustified attacks against Syria. They finally gave up and said that they would break the strongbox open. I said to them, "You're in charge here while I am an unarmed man in your midst. They did not allow me to see any of my diplomatic colleagues, except that when I first entered I had seen the chargé d'affaires whom they later removed from the room while I remained by myself. About an hour later someone who seemed to be an official came. He said, "I apologize to you in the name of the Iraqi intelligence service for the beating and verbal abuse you received." He asked me, "Did they beat you?", even though the marks could be clearly seen. He told me to accompany him to the office of the chargé d'affaires. A little while later the rest of the embassy staff were brought in. They ordered us to sit in the chairs and began to talk, as the chargé d'affaires has already recounted. Their remarks included attacks against Syria in general.

Their television camera was rolling and photographs of the people were taken. During this time the subject of opening the ambassador's strongbox came up. I had a strongbox and the ambassador had one. The chargé d'affaires was told, "We will break open the strongboxes if there are no keys to them." They actually proceeded to break it open, and finished after about an hour of work. At that point someone came and said, "You can leave now." Naturally, I went to my office with the chargé d'affaires and other members of the embassy staff. I found the strongbox open and the papers it had held scattered about. They had been violated and some had been stolen. Then we went home. At 5 o'clock in the evening the chargé d'affaires was summoned. At 5:30 the chargé d'affaires asked us to meet at the embassy. He told us about the expulsion order from the Iraqi government which called for the entire staff of the Syrian diplomatic mission to leave the country within 48 hours. We left, leaving behind our furniture and personal belongings in our houses. Because of the pressure and fear, our thoughts only concerned leaving by any means; the subject of furniture was not important.

[Question] Among the bruises on your face I see a very pronounced one in the corner of your eye. These are facts that no one can deny.

[Answer] I was also beaten on my torso.

[Question] (To the cultural attache): What would you like to say about the incident? What can you tell us about what happened to you?

[Answer] I was in my office with several female Iraqi visitors who were inquiring about study in Syria. All of a sudden I heard noises. I tried to listen from the door and was surprised to find people trying to force their way through the door, using the butts of their rifles. With threats, they angrily told me to raise my hands. They crowded a group of embassy staff members and visitors into a small room and told us to raise our hands and place them on the walls like prisoners. They hurled insults and abuse at us personally as well as at Syria. After a while they took us to another room with embassy personnel in it. Then they told me to go to my office for a search. They asked me for the keys and I opened the office for them. They searched it but did not find anything. Then they said, "We want to search another office." I told them that the occupant of the other office was on vacation and had the keys with him. They said, "That's impossible. The room must be opened." They proceeded to break open the door, and search the cabinets and tables. They invaded the cabinets, a violation of privacy and proceeded to break them apart. Some of them tried to lift the floor tiles, in an act of sheer vandalism. They were men, the least that can be said about whom is that they carried out their operation more effectively than would a barbarian. After they had searched everything, we went to the chargé d'affaires' room, where I was beaten in the abdomen and back, and received blows to several parts of my body.

The interesting thing is that after they had taken pictures of everything, they put back the chairs and tables and cabinets, and cleaned the rooms. It was as though nothing had ever happened. If someone were to have entered the embassy, nothing would appear to have been amiss. Even if the diplomats had been able to see for themselves, they would not have suspected anything. However, the fact remains that there is nothing left of the doors.

[Question] (To the vice consul): Tell us about the incident.

[Answer] On that day I went to my office at the consulate and the visitors, foreigners, began to enter to apply for visas. I was working when I heard a loud noise coming from the rear door. The consulate has a door separate from that of the embassy, I was alone and I had visitors waiting. Suddenly, I heard a noise. They entered the visitors' room opposite my room--there is a window between my room and the visitors' waiting room. I heard loud screaming.

I found armed men dressed in special units uniforms. They seized the visitors. At the same moment the door was pushed open and five armed men entered. They told me to raise my hands and they forcibly dragged me out, beating me, of course. They did not know where exactly to take me, so first they pushed me into a small corridor. There were others there who beat me and pushed me somewhere else, to a small room. At that moment they brought in several colleagues and visitors. At the same time they made us stand next to the wall and told us to raise our hands. If any of us moved he was kicked and verbally abused, as is the case when one is being beaten. We remained for about one half-hour or 45 minutes standing with our hands raised. Then they released the visitors.

This was done in the presence of the visitors up to this point. They received punches and were beaten a little. However, they called us "you so-and-so" while they beat us. Then they took us to the visitors' waiting room. There was no one there but us. They told us to sit on the chairs. After 45 minutes they began to take each one of us alone. This was after they had searched the offices. They beat us, verbally abused us, and broke a few doors. Then they began taking each employee to his office in order to search it in his presence. However, this operation took place after they had ended the search operation. This search was a sham. They had planted everything so that whenever they brought someone they would say to him, "We have found explosives."

All the employees knew instantly that there was nothing in their offices. The safes had been broken into, and they had planted the explosives. A television cameraman was present and they recreated these scenes and circumstances. At that moment the visitors left. Some women began to scream loudly. One of them had been seized by armed men, and as they brutally beat her she screamed. This is natural. We remained about an hour. After a while someone said, "Please go to the charge d'affaires' office. We want under heavy guard by the fully armed special units--not the police. They began to try to lure us [into talking]. Meanwhile an officer in a special units uniform with the rank of first lieutenant fired a shot with his pistol. I do not know whether he did it intentionally or unintentionally. We were there and they were there. They were policemen. No one was hit by the shot, and it did not cause any argument. I do not know whether they meant to frighten us with it. Then they left, but we remained. In the evening we were informed of the decision to expel us. We got right into our cars and left.

[Question] (To the chargé d'affaires): As one who works in the diplomatic corps, I have a question for you. Any viewer or any person who heard this strange story will know that for the most trivial matters there is diplomatic immunity, and that the diplomatic corps enjoys diplomatic immunity inasmuch as the Syrian embassy in Baghdad represents Syrian territory within Iraq, and the Iraqi embassy in Syria represents Iraqi territory. There is something called immunity. What you have reported is astonishing. The question comes to mind: What happened to this immunity? Does what happened to you, Syrian embassy personnel, have any precedent in international affairs, or has anything like it happened in the last hundred years?

[Answer] From what I have learned over a long period--20 years--in the Syrian foreign ministry,I have never heard or read about any similar incident. On the contrary, during wars embassies have been protected from invasion. I recall some incidents in modern and early history. For example, during the events in Hungary in 1956 a cardinal or an archbishop sought asylum in, I believe, the U.S. embassy. I think his name was (Krazuli). He remained there until 1973, when an agreement was reached and the government granted him amnesty and allowed him to go to Rome--to the Vatican. In 1963 the Syrian prime minister, Khalid al-'Azm, sought

asylum in the Turkish embassy, where he remained for a while. He was later allowed to leave the country and go to Beirut.

[Question] I would like to explain something to our viewers. When the March 1963 revolution against the separatist government took place, the separatist primeminister, Khalid al-'Azm, sought asylum inside Syria in the Turkish embassy in Damascus. He remained thereabout 2 months, wanted by the revolutionary government, but no one at all could get hold of him. He was then given permission to leave the country.

There is a more recent example. When the revolution broke out in Bolivia its president sought asylum in the embassy of the Vatican. Despite the fact that the revolution was against her, the embassy was not invaded, and she was not forcibly taken from it, because embassies are sacrosanct. I have really never heard of anything happening in any country that resembles what happened, or the violation of an embassy's sacrosanctity, however bad relations between the countries may have been.

[Question] To what do you attribute it? You say that this is a unique, unprecedented event that has not happened in the past and cannot happen in the future, as the examples you kindly gave clearly demonstrate. What purpose did the Iraqi authorities have in carrying out their invasion of the Syrian embassy in such a manner?

[Answer] In my opinion, in recent years, particularly since al-Sadat's visit to Jerusalem and the signing of the Camp David accords, Syria's position has been noted for its opposition to these agreements and its efforts to torpedo them and expunge all that they have accomplished. Syria's steadfastness is common knowledge, as is the fact that Syria is the only country that is in an active state of confrontation with the enemy. I think that the purpose of this operation was simply to create secondary factors to divert Syria's attention from resisting the Zionist schemes.

[Question] Can we say that the operation was prearranged?

[Answer] From the statements made by the Iraqi minister of state for foreign affairs it is obvious that everything had been decided and prearranged. The Arab ambassadors had been summoned to a manufactured expulsion operation. There is nothing more than that.

9123
CSO: 4802

PLO SPOKESMAN LAUDS SYRIAN-SOVIET TREATY

LD031555 Damascus AL-BA'TH in Arabic 26 Oct 80 p 3

[Report by AL-BA'TH correspondent Abu Munir: "DPFLP Deputy General Secretary Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh: Soviet Treaty Important Event and True Expression of Stand of all Nationalist and Progressive Forces in Area"]

[Excerpts] Beirut--Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh, deputy general secretary of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine [DPFLP], PLO Executive Committee member and head of the PLO Information Department, has said that the Syrian-Soviet treaty is an event of historic significance for all nationalist and progressive forces in the area. First because it is a true expression of the attitude of all progressive and nationalist forces in the area, which have always affirmed that the development of relations with the socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union, is a basic condition for successfully confronting Zionism and imperialism and their agents in the area. Second because it comes at a time when those hostile forces have been trying to isolate Syria and seeking to pick on it because it is the main bulwark of Arab steadfastness in the face of Camp David. The treaty has proved that the friendly Soviet Union will not hesitate for a moment to take a firm and decisive stand in favor of boosting Syria's capability to resist and defeat those conspiracies.

Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh added: The treaty comes during international conditions in which the supremacy of the forces of liberation and socialism is confirmed and the forces of imperialism and world capitalism are retreating in more than one area. Thus it becomes clearer that the characteristic of our era is that it is the era of the triumph of socialism and the defeat of imperialism. Events in our contemporary world have proved that it is impossible for any of the national liberation movements or the progressive developing countries to achieve a decisive victory against imperialism that secures their national independence and opens the road of progress for them unless they rely on the characteristic of the age: that is, ally themselves with the principal power--namely, the socialist camp--against the imperialist camp of darkness and all its networks of exploitation, its fleets, its aggressive bases and its social mainstays, particularly in the Third World countries.

Within this framework, the Syrian-Soviet treaty puts all the weight of the favorable world situation behind Arab Syria and all the forces of steadfastness in their current battle, which is becoming more ferocious with the expansion of the imperialist onslaught--which now includes Iran and the Gulf, in addition to the Arab East. Obviously, the achievement of the treaty's objectives of supporting Syria's steadfastness in all the areas and fields will ensure that the necessary conditions are

created for curbing this onslaught and the repeated Zionist aggression. Also it would be the necessary prelude to achieving in the area a new balance of power that would give the initiative to the forces of national steadfastness and pave the way for achieving the national objectives, particularly our Palestinian people's right to return, to self-determination, and to build their own independent state.

Our people have greeted with enthusiasm and satisfaction the Soviet-Syrian statement attached to the treaty which places in the forefront of both countries' objectives support for the Palestinian people's struggle and commitment to our people's rights as a principal condition for peace. All our people under the PLO's leadership, realize that the protection of Syria and strengthening of its steadfastness serve the struggle against imperialism throughout the area in general, and our people's struggle in particular. The Soviet-Syrian treaty is at the same time a treaty with all the Arab forces of liberation and progress and with our Palestinian people, who are fighting in forward positions extending from Arnun Castle to the borders of the Gaza Strip.

Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh added: This treaty comes at a time when the Arab reactionary forces, backed by U.S. imperialism, are attacking all the positions of revolution and liberation and one link in the imperialist plan is following another. The plan includes: Stepping up internal conspiracies in order to strike at the unity of several Arab countries; supporting the reactionary gangs such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria; blatant and open U.S. interference in order to create a colonialist military entity with the help of the bases which are now spreading in Egypt, Oman, Somalia, the Gulf and the Arabian peninsula; finally, it includes provoking wars such as the war of Saddam Husayn's regime against the Iranian revolution, which aims at exhausting Arab and Iranian resources, diverting the battle from its main course of struggle against Camp David and the imperialist presence and giving the necessary justification for the U.S. military presence--the excuse being that it is protecting oil resources and safeguarding the world economy.

Syria, all the steadfastness countries and progressive forces are basically responsible for resisting this plan since all the reactionary forces, particuarly the Jordanian regime, have begun facilitating the implementation of the U.S. objectives, are openly defiant and are conniving at the achievement of these objectives. Syria, before which the treaty opens new horizons, along with the declaration of unity with Libya and the solidarity of all progressive Arab forces, is now capable of becoming a major launchpad in deterring this imperialist and reactionary onslaught and protecting the front of steadfastness and confrontation in southern Lebanon and the occupied Palestinian territories.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD BRANCH--The first branch of the "Muslim brotherhood," considered the most fanatic movement in the Arab world, has recently been established in the Galilee town of Shefar'am. Residents of Shefar'am have told our correspondent that in the last few weeks Muslim citizens preaching a return to the faith and shunning of all foreign influence have appeared in town. One of the leaders of that movement is a religious figure from Shefar'am. The number of members in the new movement has been estimated to reach several dozen, but according to the local residents they are gaining power day by day. [Yo'el Dar] [Text] [TA240850 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 24 Oct 80 p 3]

CSO: 4805

COUNTRY SHOULD RETHINK ITS INDUSTRIALIZATION

London 8 DAYS in English 27 Sep 80 pp 43-45

[Text] IN ALGERIA's headlong rush during the past decade under the aegis of former minister of heavy industry, Belaid Abdessalam, to rapidly raise itself into the exclusive league of industrial powers, the guiding principles of its economic planners — self-reliant development and national economic independence — have seemed to have turned out to be more theoretical, than practical, goals.

The National Charter, Algeria's official blueprint for socialism adopted in 1976, spelt out this philosophy: 'Basic industries, such as metallurgical, mechanical, electric and electronic, petrochemical and chemical, as well as shipbuilding will play a decisive role since they assure the independence of national industry, and more directly, of the country itself.' These 'industrialising industries' would lead to the formation of an integrated industrial structure.

This development approach has been seriously called into question. In the latest government shake up announced in June by President Chadli Benjedid, the group of 'industrialists' around Abdessalam has seen its influence plummet. They were practically eliminated from key posts in the government and ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), as well as from the commanding heights of the public sector of the economy.

The new five year development plan, covering the 1980-84 period, places emphasis on light and consumer industries, housing and infrastructure and social services. The announcement in September of the abandonment of the LNG-3 complex at Arzew was only the latest indication of this switch.

Criticism was mounting, even before the death of President Houari Boumedienne, that Algeria's singleminded thrust towards an industrial society was engendering as many new problems as it was solving. The choice of ultra-modern technology for the Arzew or Skidda LNG plants may have been appealing on glossy Sonatrach brochures, critics said, but in the field it proved tricky to master, provoking costly delays and extensive cost overruns. In addition, the emphasis on capital intensive plant was viewed as an aberration for a country facing both massive unemployment and under-employment.

Algerian officials admit that most of the expensive new factories operate well under design capacity and continue to survive thanks to generous subsidies and a 'captive local market'. For example, the $25m American built electronic equipment plant at Sidi-bel-Abbes is known to produce at only a quarter of its capacity. Colour television sets produced at this plant cost more than a third more than, for example, Japanese imports.

The local press has begun to cast an inquisitive eye at the activities of western multinationals, blaming some of them for the poor performance of Algerian industry. The role of technical cooperation has been often criticised for its supposed reinforcing of Algeria's economic and technological dependence. According to the French-language daily *El Moudjadid*, some 5,000 contracts for technical assistance were initialled by state companies and the administration between 1973 and 1978: just under 80 per cent of these were with Western European states (with France in top position) and 9 per cent with the US.

The cost of expatriate personnel provided under these accords has grown from 27 per cent in 1973 to about 40 per cent in 1978. Does their presence aid the

transfer of technology? The French-language weekly, *Algerie Actualites*, thinks not. A recently published analysis of the experience at the 'model' industrial vehicle complex in Rouiba, 25km from Algiers, strikingly underscores the paper's conclusion.

Under the control of the state firm, Sonacome, the Rouiba plant has been able to surpass its initial production aims by increasing its output from 3,850 vehicles in 1977 to 6,000 in both 1978 and 1979. But this impressive showing was realised at the expense of increased dependence on foreign parts and labour.

The 'product in hand' contract signed in July 1970 with the French firm, Berliet (now part of the state-controlled Renault group), called for the production at Rouiba of ten different models including lorries, coaches and city buses, making a total projected output of 4,550 vehicles per year. The plant was to supply about 59 per cent of each vehicle's components, with the total Algerian-made content of between 75 and 80 per cent.

The French firm was to provide the management for start up and supervise operations while training Algerians. The handing over of the plant, originally set for 1976, has been constantly deferred. The Algerian factory director explained this by the lack of trained local executives, supervisory personnel and skilled workers.

Workers, for their part, question Berliet's in-plant training programme, claiming that it is not fully adapted to Algerian realities. They point out that the department in charge of recruiting and training Algerians was only created in June 1978, four years after the first vehicle rolled off the Rouiba assembly line.

The Rouiba complex began production in 1974 with 210 expatriate personnel. By 1978 this figure had risen to 232. In 1979 it reached 267. The need to expand output was the main reason for the increase in the number of highly paid foreign technicians. In order to take advantage of the plant's extra production capacity and notch up a greater share of the local market for heavy vehicles, estimated at around 20,000 a year, the Rouiba plant management decided to pull out all stops.

But of the 6,000 vehicles produced at Rouiba last year, only 3,850 were fitted with 75 per cent of locally manufactured parts. In the remaining 2,150 vehicles, the local content slid to a mere 33 per cent. Expanded production also was achieved by cutting corners and reducing the number of different models offered.

The jump in production markedly increased the amount of French-made parts imported from Berliet. From Ffr117m ($28.32m) in 1976, Sonacome spent Ffr231m ($56m) in 1978 and more in 1979. 'By letting themselves be blinded by short-term objectives,' wrote *Algerie Actualites*, 'plant management relegated to second place essential considerations: the gradual achievement of control over the technological process and the capacity to locally produce finished products.'

Another example put forward by the Algerian weekly is the case of the LNG-1 complex at Arzew. El Paso of the US has the management contract and is in charge of the 1,600 workers, 500 of whom are Europeans. Thus, the complex's two crucial sectors, production and maintenance, are in the hands of expatriates, while the supply and security departments are shared by Algerians and expatriates. Only the personnel and general affairs departments are totally controlled by Algerian nationals.

Algerie Actualites claims that the US firm has dragged its feet in pushing the 'Algerianisation' of senior and middle level management posts. Skilled Algerian executives are not lacking in this domain because Folpetrol, a subsidiary of the French multinational Schlumberger, has hired a number of them for its international operations from a Sonatrach affiliate, Altest. Strangely enough, Algerian executives must often go abroad to get top positions.

Does Algeria have the capacity to fulfil a greater share of its needs for modern technology? The weekly advances the case of two local companies: Altra, an affiliate of Sonatrach, and SN Metal, which were able to manufacture a torch burner for Arzew's LPG unit. Previously, a French firm had refused to honour its guarantee and replace a defective one which was playing havoc with plant operations. Likewise, when another French firm pulled out of the Annaba fertiliser plant the 1,470 Algerian employees not only maintained output, but also improved the quality.

EEC Boost for Worker Training

Algeria's efforts to upgrade and expand existing facilities for the training of skilled workers, essential for the country's booming industrial and construction sectors, are to receive a boost from the European Community which is to

grant 20m European Units of Account (1 EUA = $1.3) to the Algerian government for the development of the country's technical training facilities.

The EEC assistance will be given under the terms of the EEC-Algeria cooperation agreement which was signed in 1976 and which, in addition to giving Algeria certain concessions in the trade sector, provides for EEC financial assistance totalling 114m EUA to be given to the country for a five year period.

The Community will focus its aid on the setting up of six new technical training centres in Skikda, Batna, Bejaia, Djelfa, Tiaret and Sidi bel Abbes.

EEC officials estimate that the community's assistance would allow up to 3,200 workers to acquire professional skills required by the country's industries and the building sector. The lack of skilled technicians is a major obstacle in Algeria's plans to industrialise. While the EEC aid is hardly expected to meet all of the country's requirements for skilled workers, EEC officials hope that it will contribute to the successful implementation of the new five year development plan (1980/1984) launched recently by the Algerian government.

The new plan gives special attention to the development of technical training, both for economic reasons, and to solve social problems created by an increasing number of young people who are dropping out of the country's educational system yet could be integrated into the technical training network.

The community assistance will be used for the construction of new buildings, the supply of technical training equipment, and for the training of teachers.

[Chart follows on next page]


Opec aid to the Third World
(Millions of US Dollars)
Nigeria
14
28
Algeria
41
45
Venezuela
31
83
Iraq
218
861
Libya
261
148
Qatar
339
251
Iran
593
21
Kuwait
976
1,099
UAE
1,046
207
Saudi Arabia
1,997
1,970
TOTAL OPEC
5,516
4,711
1975
1979 (Provisional)
Source OECD

CSO: 4420

INTERIOR MINISTER DESCRIBES SECURITY PROBLEMS AT PARTY CONGRESS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 30 Sep 80 p 11

/Article: "Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il: The Continuous Successes Egypt Has Realized Have Unmasked the Agents and Parasites and the Vindictive"/

/Text/ Mr Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il, deputy prime minister and minister of the interior, made a statement at the conference yesterday in which he said:

"At a time when factors for disturbance and tension are multiplying in our modern world in general, when the features of dissension, violence, terror and instability are spreading out in most of the countries surrounding us, when bloody phenomena, assassinations, and civil war are manifesting themselves among the proponents of perseverance, struggle and progressivism, and when personal disputes, wars and destruction are breaking out, al-Sadat's Egypt, the greatly growing Egypt, is standing in the midst of this crashing sea with the utmost pride as a haven of peace, security and stability, with its values, its civilization, its leadership and its command, with the consciousness of its people and their genuine nature.

"It is obvious that the great and continuous successes which Egypt has achieved in every sphere since the Corrective Revolution have destroyed the strategies and the designs of international and Arab forces and leaders and have unmasked the agents and the parasites, the vindictive and those with designs, constituting an infringement on their entities and their personal interests. Therefore their schemes and their hostile movements have been directed against our domestic front, which the government is forming from within, with all the humanity it possesses, all the installations it has, the organizations it dominates, and the cultural legacy and spiritual values that lie in its conscience.

"Therefore the safety and security of our domestic front has become the issue of issues in national action and the first thing we must be confident about as we embark on the battle of life for the sake of construction. This is not a subject of dispute. The realization of great miracles is dependent on the establishment of a firm domestic front in the context of cohesive secure national unity and the content of social peace which is mutually agreed as to its national goals and national leaders."

The minister of the interior added, "It is recognized that the ingredients of the stability of the domestic front may basically be defined by three focal points:

"1. National leadership and command represented by the leader and commander Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, to whom the masses have pledged loyalty and whom they have rallied around with a solidarity whose likes are unprecedented, out of loyalty to the victories he has achieved and belief in his renewed ability to sacrifice.

"2. Unity of national thought and goals. The masses in Egypt have rallied behind their leadership in a categorical definition of our national goals and have embodied them in the construction of peace, democracy and welfare.

"3. A cultural and human legacy and spiritual values. That is the element whose roots within us extend 7,000 years back, when the first unified state known to human history was established."

He then said, "Thus we praise God for the existence of these ingredients in our country. Thus this stability which we are experiencing came not from a void but rather from the liberation of the citizen's will, the liberation of the will of the nation, the restoration of Egyptian and Arab dignity, and the civilized historic peace initiative."

He went on to say "The rejection front, and after that the perseverance front, have hatched plots in full coordination with the soviet Union; meetings, conferences and resolutions to isolate Egypt, besiege it politically and economically, and starve out the Egyptian people; accusations of treason, of acting as agents, of personal arrogation of power, liquidation, and alienation; trumpets of their propaganda; their press; secret broadcasts directed to the young; curses; the spreading of rumors; training camps to give mercenaries and agents skills in acts of sabotage within; and constant attempts to attract and mobilize, in exploitation of the circumstances of Egyptian workers in some of these countries--put simply, they have used all possible forms of material and moral sabotage against Egypt; their movements, their schemes, their camps and their agents are observed and unmasked, and we are always in watch for them. Their means of contact and financing are in our grasp, thanks to the alertness of the men and the integrity of the noble. Their infiltrated agents are falling like bats, one after the other, with their destructive equipment, and give detailed confessions of their conspiracy. Those noble citizens who are exposed to their mobilization pressures hasten to the security agencies to expose their schemes. They make cheap use of vindictive hired agent writers whom they cause to write in their papers to defame the dignity and reputation of Egypt, at the hands of those who claim that they belong to Egypt, though Egypt and its people are innocent of them.

"Unflagging efforts to embody illusory bodies with the brilliant names of fraudulent fronts, sometimes through some possessors of pens for hire in some European capitals, at other times in the embrace of the ludicrous leadership in Libya, and sometimes under the aegis of the bloody Takriti Ba'th in Iraq.

In the Domestic Context

"Elements of the opposition forces whose political and intellectual affiliations differ and whose designs and purposes are different still agree on a basic factor which moves them, and that is blind vengeance and mercenary thinking. If we

examine closely, we will find that they rely on the same propagandistic thinking as the foreign opposition forces under the leadership of Moscow and the Arab rejection front.

"They have thus determined their position, chosen to align themselves with the enemies, and have become tools in the service of the conspiratorial scheme against the homeland. Local communist agents are also a tool mobilized in the service of the international communist movement's scheme on behalf of the Soviet Union.

"The same propaganda, charges, rumors, publications, attempts at provocation and casting of doubts are quoted from Radio Moscow and the rejection radio and press.

"They concentrate on moving among groups of students and workers, and nationalist elements in both groups; those are the ones who represent the noble broad base which stands up to them spontaneously, makes them stop at their limits, brushes them aside and gives information about them and their methods. I salute them for this national spirit and positive attitude.

"These communist elements have totally dominated the Grouping Party and turned it into a tool to serve the local communist movement and a trumpet for Soviet and Arab rejectionist propaganda.

"The statement or publication the party issues is broadcast by Radio Moscow and the rejection stations and published by their newspapers on the same day. Conversely, the propaganda and analyses issued by them are expressed in the party's publications and propaganda and communist elements domestically."

Mr Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il went on to say, "Most loyally, with integration /sic/ and self-sacrifice, their thinking is wrong and twisted, and it has been exposed, but there is no shame for those who have no religion. Their communist elements, with their hired foreign pens, are strengthening the chain of conspiracy and vileness at the expense of Egypt's reputation with total coordination. Their failure has caused them to work tirelessly to raise slogans of prostration among their various organizational wings and the alliance against the national regime in Egypt with the far right and scattered reactionary party remnants.

"Through claims of Nasirism, they ignore their positions of hostility to 'Abd-al-Nasir and what they say against him and vie with one another today to celebrate the anniversary of his departure to the same end.

"Even the religious current has not been safe from their maneuvers to attract what they describe as the progressive religious current. Okay, how can that be? Through an attempt to infiltrate some of their elements into the circles of this current, 'some of whom grow beards and make a show of religiosity,' while practicing provocation and agitation at the appropriate time.

"The latest outcry in their dramatic productions has been the call for an alliance with those they call the oppressed, so that they can play on the chord of factional dissension."

He then said, "With respect to the movement of religious currents, I would like to stress at the outset that the broad base of student, youth and labor religiosity

is sound, their orientations are healthy, their nationalism, pride and commitment are remote from any sinister implications, and their firmness represents the rock against which attempts by suspect elements are dashed; however, that does not prevent there from being a few Moslems and Christians who depart from the true essence of religion to a fanaticism which is totally at variance with the tolerant principles of religion.

"Religiosity and lofty religious values are the foundation which we are striving to reaffirm in the spirits of our young people, but the use of religion as a ruse, for personal and political designs or on the part of certain fanatics is rejected and prohibited in accordance with the premises of the existing legitimate order and we will, in implementation of the sovereignty of the law repel all attempts to violate this legitimacy.

"Egypt, throughout its genuine civilized history, has not known positions of fanatacism or extremism. Unity between the two elements of the nation is a firm fact which has remained and will remain far removed from attempts to sow doubts with God's permission.

"There is another pattern of hostile movement which takes the ludicrous form of a alliance on the part of those whom the Communist alliances are appealing to. A strange mixture of the vengeful and the vindictive--a group of communists inside and outside the Grouping Party, some reactionary party elements, some people trying to form a party by name of the National Front, some people who pretend to revolutionary attitudes, people who revive appearances, and others of their ilk who have given themselves the names of a national coalition and have issued a statement which is suspect in its content and its objectives titled 'statement by the Egyptians' claiming that they have acted through inspiration from the call of national conscience.

"The statement contains a collection of falsehoods and erroneous thinking which reiterates the same hostile propaganda. They have not presented it to the masses--no, they have translated it into English and French and presented it to foreign news agencies, the press of Moscow and the rejection front, which have taken its contents as an instrument for defaming their country, and their conscience relaxed and their mission ended.

"Now if we try to deduce the bases of the thinking behind the hostile propaganda, domestically and abroad, in order to set it out for discussion, far removed from labyrinths of falsification, it will be possible to attribute it to the following main points:

"An attack on the peace initiative and affirmation of its failure--a way of thinking which feigns ignorance of all the objective, historical and political facts which surround the problem and the historic and civilized initiative which political observers in the whole world consider to be the greatest wisest and boldest event of our modern history.

"The initiative, which occurred as an expression of a conscious perception by some masses, an exploitation of the glorious October victory, and a sophisticated political development in its conclusions, which groups of people came out to support in

a historic reception before voting for it in a referendum with an overwhelming majority which exceeded all expectations.

"According to this suspect thinking, as they claimed, the initiative was an individual act--the opening of the Suez Canal, restoration of the beloved land of Sinai with its resources in the form of mines and oil, the reconstruction of Sinai, the construction of tunnels to link it up as a strategic national goal,are a total failure, as they claim.

"Snatching the problem of the Middle East from the labyrinths of struggles and gropings and causing it to burst forth on the international stage in accordance with specific realistic processes, making Israel face its responsibilities, crushing its propaganda, and internationally condemning its obstinacy are a total failure, in their view. Winning over world opinion and convincing it of the Palestinian presence and logitimacy and Egyptian firmness in the face of Israeli maneuvers during the autonomy negotiations has caused the loss of the Palestinian cause, as they vie with one another in saying.

"We have proved our ability to deal with reality in deed, not through slogans and statements. We have not closed doors but have left all roads open wide to every constructive effort which will realize a comprehensive, just, permanent peace.

"The issue of democracy: they claim that Egypt is suffering from a renunciation of democracy, the suppression of freedoms, laws restricting freedoms, and control by iron and fire.

"Concentration camps bursting with thousands of detainees and fighting men! I challenge them to declare the name of one concentration camp.

"Restrictions fettering the press and freedom of opinion, and the quarantining of freedom and opposition views.

"As for the democracy which deprives them of their sleep in Egypt, they criticise it on grounds that it has eliminated the concentration camps, liquidated the sequestrations and freed the citizen from various forms of torture and the destruction of dignity and humanity, and has restored the dignity of Egyptians and liberated their will.

"The assertion of freedom, formation of parties, elimination of press censorship, and elimination of arbitrary verdicts.

"Respect and solicitude for the opinions of others and their appearance in the light of day for the first time after a long period, and repression of the opposition press and publications, symposiums, speeches and statements by local, Arab and foreign agencies under a single party.

"National newspapers embracing campaigns and issues, discussing faults, exercising criticism, and presenting studies and recommendations.

"Independence of the judiciary, and reverence for its statements and just verdicts, which we are proud of.

"The opposition papers have not failed to express their opinion or present a criticism in regard to any issue, problem or decision related to domestic or foreign policy, however much the severity of tone or extent of commitment may differ.

Political, legal, trade union and vocational dialogues at all levels in which the leader participates with a generosity which gives a model and example.

"Referral to the people to seek their opinion on any issue related to their concerns or destiny.

"The claim that Egypt is aligned toward America:

"It is true that it is hard for agents and people of weak will to understand the meaning of independence of positions and will, or the concept that the loftiness of national and domestic interests is above all ideological or intellectual affiliation. The Soviet positions have been recorded by history and their bitterness has been recounted by the heroic leader Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat. Moscow's position on arming us, Moscow's position on preparing for the battle and the decision on it, calculations of dominance, influence, and schemes to exhaust the capabilities and powers of peoples in the name of friendship--that is what we have rejected. We reject their progressivism and revolutionariness in Afghanistan. The friendship of peoples does not justify the killing of children, women and old men in Afghanistan, and international legitimacy is not of no use. We have established free balanced relations for the sake of our national interests, and the leader has repeated them explicitly and in a loud voice. No to defeat, no to communism, no to hegemony, no to Soviet dominance, greetings to balanced relations.

"Speaking ill of economic conditions, policies which have been carried out and intrinsic efforts:

"It is this matter, specifically, that receives the major portion of their attention and propaganda. The reason is obvious. It is to attempt to exploit the sufferings of the masses and bid over them as a prelude to provocation and agitation, before welfare is achieved and they lose one of the props of their movement. Their way of thinking, by casting doubts has left no field in which they have not cast doubts. Hostile forces abroad, elements of the Grouping Party, statements by their leaders, and hireling writers abroad have participated in it. The policy of economic liberalization is apostasy and a sacrifice of socialist achievements, they assert. The government has illusory plans to liquidate the public sector and sell it to investors, they claim. Egypt is passing through the worst stage of deterioration and experiencing total economic collapse, they hope. Even expanding distribution outlets by establishing group consumer societites in workers' and white collar employees' sections is in their view a means for the government to control the sustenance of these groups."

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CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

FINNISH-IRAQI CULTURAL AGREEMENT--In Helsinki a cultural agreement was signed on Friday between Finland and Iraq. The agreement is intended to encourage widening of cooperation between the two countries in the fields of science, education, culture and sports. The agreement was signed for Finland by Minister of Education Paer Stenbaeck and for Iraq by Minister of Higher Education Jasim Muhammad al-Khalaf, who is on a visit to Finland. Negotiations on the agreement have been under way since March last year. Finland has also made framework agreements of this kind with other countries. [Text] [LD081312 Helsinki International Service in English 0930 GMT 8 Nov 80]

FOOD FROM LEBANON--Kuwait, 19 Oct (KUNA)--Iraq will turn to the Lebanese market for foodstuffs and other consumer goods, AL WATAN newspaper said Sunday. Recent Lebanese exports to Iraq included eggs, vegetables, soap and fresh milk, the paper said. [Text] LD191138 Kuwait KUNA in English 1036 GMT 19 Oct 80]

LOAN TO UGANDA--Iraq and Uganda today signed exchange instruments regarding the remaining portion of the $10-million loan extended by Iraq to Uganda that was signed in 1975. The remaining portion of the loan, amounting to more than $5 million, will be used for development projects in Uganda. The instruments were signed by the Iraqi charge d'affaires in Kampala and the Ugandan finance minister. [Text] [JN311954 Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 31 Oct 80 JN]

CSO: 4802

ISRAEL SEEN CHANGING VIEW ON AUTONOMY--PEACE TREATY LINKAGE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Sep 80 p 11

[Article by Uzi Benziman: "The Haman Syndrome"]

[Text] Without saying so, Israel is striving to create a linkage between the development of its relations with Egypt and the extent of progress in the autonomy negotiations, and it hopes to set a target date. In this way Israel is displaying the syndrome of Haman the Agagite about whom it was said in the Book of Esther that "his wicked device, which he had devised against the Jews, should return upon his own head."

The "linkage" and "target date" were common idioms at the height of the negotiations on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. During the 6 months in which the text of the peace treaty was being discussed (after the Camp David Agreements), Israel struggled against the creation of a linkage between the treaty's going into effect and the anticipated developments in the autonomy negotiations and against the setting of a target date for its conclusion.

It is perhaps worthwhile to mention that which has been forgotten. In September 1978 two agreements were signed at Camp David: One established the principal conditions for an Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement and the second laid the foundations for a new order in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. When the United States, Israel, and Egypt came to give these agreements real content, they encountered two key problems: a target date and linkage.

These two terms actually reflected two sides of the same coin: Egypt sought to link the development of future contacts between Israel and it on the establishment of the autonomy and the rate of implementation of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty whereas Israel strove to frustrate this Egyptian plan. Behind this struggle were two contradictory tensions: Egypt wanted the rate of the implementation of the peace with Israel to be influenced first and foremost by the extent of progress in the autonomy negotiations. Israel hoped to sever the process of applying the peace with Egypt from the extent of progress in the implementation of autonomy. The basic assumption of both countries was that there was not in actuality any great prospect for implementing the autonomy plan. Israel, which paid the price of peace in the Sinai, wanted the quid pro quo to be in the form of normal relations with Egypt while maintaining its hold in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Egypt which paid, according to its understanding, the price for receiving the Sinai by its very readiness to recognize Israel refused to pay an additional tariff in the form of a concession on the linkage between this development and future events in the West Bank and Gaza.

There were several stages in the Egyptian approach to linkage. The Egyptians first tried to give it a formal character. For this reason they argued for the inclusion of various Palestinian formulations in the documents which were being discussed between the two countries and on their inclusion in a condition for implementing the peace treaty. In a later stage the Egyptians moved to an effort designed to create a legal linkage between the two subjects by including sections from the introduction to the Camp David Agreements in the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty. They finally completed their approach and demanded the creation of an actual linkage between the two issues by limiting the autonomy negotiations to 5 months so that it would end before the Egyptians would be obligated, in accordance with the peace treaty, to exchange ambassadors with Israel.

Menahem Begin considered it a great accomplishment when he managed to convince President Carter to change the American compromise formulations on the linkage between the two issues and on the target date. The compromise which was acheived was the version that the autonomy negotiations would not be limited by a specific date but rather by establishing an objective of completing them within 1 year so that the elections to the autonomy council would be held "with all possible speed" after the agreement. Also agreed upon was the weakening of one of the articles of the peace treaty (Article VI, paragraph 2) which states that "the Parties undertake to fulfill in good faith their obligations under this Treaty, without regard to action or inaction of any other party and independently of any instrument external to this Treaty" (that is to say, an agreement on the structure for establishing the autonomy). This article was accompanied by a vague explanatory memorandum designed on the one hand to assure the effectiveness of the problem article (which is what Israel wanted) and at the same time the effectiveness of the Camp David Agreement for establishing the autonomy (which is what Egypt wanted).

Now the wheel has turned and Begin's success appears increasingly as a clear Pyrrhic victory. Israel finds itself in a situation in which it requires linkage and the target date. It will not be long before the representatives of the government will use the same arguments which the Egyptians used in the past in order to support their interpretation of the final versions of the linkage and the target date.

One and one-half years after the signing of the peace treaty, it seems that al-Sadat has accepted without any problems the opening of the autonomy negotiations beyond the 1-year target date. The vagueness of the linkage between the implementation of the peace treaty and the autonomy negotiations also does not bother the Egyptian president. On the other hand, it troubles the Israelis.

It seems to Israel that it is facing a concrete danger that the autonomy negotiations will slip not only past the target year but will extend for 2 or 3 years extending to beyond May 1982, the date set in the peace treaty for the IDF to complete its withdrawal from the Sinai. Jerusalem is concerned about the danger that the autonomy negotiations will drag on and on--even after the return of the entire Sinai to Egypt and that Cairo's desire to reach an agreement on the autonomy will weaken, and as a result of the failure of the effort to install a new order in the West Bank, Egypt is likely to attack the peace treaty with Israel. On the other hand, Israel is commited to reach an agreement on autonomy with Egypt in order to block the intervention of a hostile Arab entity or substitute international initiatives for solving the Palestinian problem.

Israel finds itself, therefore, in a situation in which it is interested in setting a specific target date for concluding the autonomy negotiations and creating a linkage between it and the implementation of the peace treaty with Egypt (read: completing the withdrawal from the Sinai). It is only because of this compelling factor that Israel has a chance of moving Cairo to compromise on the nature of the autonomy arrangement. Without the interdependence between the two issues and without setting a date for completing the negotiations, a reality is developing in which it is in Egypt's interest to extend them beyond May 1982, without being compelled to conclude them in a way which will be acceptable also to Israel.

We should not wonder if it appears then in the not too distant future, the jurists in the ministry of foreign affairs in Jerusalem will pull out the arguments of 'Ussama al-Baz and Butrus Ghali of Egypt on the validity of the target date and the linkage in the peace treaty and its annexes. Although with this they will be obscuring the bargaining success of Menahem Begin and his government between October 1978 and March 1979, they will succeed perhaps in securing the Israeli interests for the period between September 1980 and May 1982.

5830
CSO: 4805

SOVIET GROUP ON CONDITIONS FOR RESUMING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL

TA100934 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 10 Nov 80 p 3

[Report by Mary Hirschfeld: "Russian Delegation Here on 'Fact-Finding Mission'"]

[Text] Haifa--Moscow University Professor Oleg Roitov said yesterday that if Israel wishes to resume diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union it must first comply with two pre-conditions: to withdraw its army "from all occupied territories and to recognize the natural rights of the Palestinian Arabs, including that of self-determination."

Roitov, a prominent nuclear chemist and a veteran member of their National Academy of Science, heads a group of Russian scholars now on a "fact-finding mission" in Israel on behalf of the Soviet committee of peace.

Four of them were guests yesterday of the Haifa University's political sciences department: Roitov; sculptor Yuriy Chernov, secretary of the National Association of Soviet Artists; Professor Andrey Sakharov, a specialist in oriental studies (not to be confused with the Nobel Prize winner) and Robert Markarian, senior official of the peace committee.

"The Soviet Union is not prejudiced against any Middle East country," Sakharov said. "In fact, we enjoyed perfectly normal and friendly relations with Israel from 1948 until your 1967 war. If the ties were severed then, it was not because of us but because of you. If you desire to go back to the old status quo, the ball is in your court--if you move, we will follow suit."

Although refraining from commenting on Ronald Reagan's victory in the U.S. Presidential election because "It's still too soon," Sakharov had sharp words for America's present military policies. He said:

"Many positive steps towards peace and disarmament were achieved in the early 1970's but America's leaders managed to put them all in jeopardy. Then we had the Helsinki agreement, the first SALT agreement and many others and it seemed the winds of war had definitely stopped blowing. Now, we feel them again on the back of our neck. The United States has taken a number of very dangerous steps which cannot lead to peace and coexistence."

The Soviet visitors said their peace committee was the "biggest nongovernmental pressure group in Russia."

When asked about Sakharov, the Nobel Prize winner, Roitov was emphatic: "All he wants is to make money. He seeks publicity and to become famous at our country's expense."

CSO: 4820

INFORMATION FACILITY NEEDED TO BLOCK EXPULSION FROM UNITED NATIONS

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 24 Sep 80 p 21

[Article by Hayim Herzog: "Alone On The Fire"]

[Text] The annual news to the Israeli public that the next session of the UN General Assembly will be the most difficult one that Israel ever had to face has become a daily or annual event. These predictions are generally accurate, and there is no reason to doubt them about the current General Assembly.

This is not the first time that they have threatened us with expulsion from the United Nations and it certainly will not be the last. However, it seems that much of the talk and conjecture about this matter completely ignore certain basic facts. There is no reason to talk about the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations in that admission to the UN or expulsion from the UN is not possible without a vote of the Security Council, and the permanent western members of the Security Council have declared on more than one occasion that they will veto any action which has as its objective the expulsion of a member from the United Nations, and certainly Israel. They did not even succeed on South Africa. What is possible is that the General Assembly will refuse to accept the credentials of any state for its seat.

In order for this matter to be understood correctly, it is worthwhile to mention the procedure. Before the convening of the General Assembly, every nation which intends to participate presents credentials to the UN Secretary General, signed by the foreign minister of that nation and listing the names of the five members of the delegation, five alternates, five advisors, and attaches. Every year the outgoing president of the General Assembly (this year it is Salim Salim, the ambassador of Tanzania) appoints the members of the credentials committee. From Israel's point of view, the composition of this year's committee is one of the best ever. Besides the United States, the Soviet Union, and China, the members of the committee are Spain, Kenya, Costa Rica, Singapore, Angola, and Haiti. With this composition, it is reasonable to assume that Israel will not encounter any special problems in the deliberations of the committee. In addition is the fact that the permanent members, primarily the superpowers including the Soviet Union, are essentially opposed to suspension.

The committee will consider, among other things, complex problems such as determining the validity of the representation of the government of Kampuchea (Cambodia). It generally submits its report in the middle of the deliberations of the General Assembly. The custom until now has been that after the submission of the report to the General Assembly, which states that all the credentials have been approved, the Libyan and/or the Syrian representative expresses reservations in regard to Israel--and this completes the matter for another year. In practice, however, any nation can propose to the General Assembly that it not accept the recommendation of the credentials committee in regard to a certain nation.

The worrisome thing about Israel's approach this year is the tendency to passivity in light of possible developments. This does not mean that diplomatic measures have not been taken by Israel, and that the foreign minister has not raised the issue in his discussions in Washington and the United Nations. The opposite is true, however, it seems to me that in light of the serious deterioration which has taken place this year in Israel's international situation, customary diplomatic measures are insufficient.

I remember that in 1975 when I arrived at the United Nations to take up my position, the primary issue on the agenda was the decision to suspend Israel from the General Assembly. This action was the result of a decision of the president of the General Assembly, Bouteflika, the foreign minister of Algeria, on South Africa, which nullified a previous decision by the president of the General Assembly 4 years ago (Mr Hambro of Norway) on the same subject which was that the fact that the credentials committee does not approve the credentials of a nation does not prevent that nation from taking its seat in the General Assembly. After Bouteflika nullified Hambro's decision (which resulted in South Africa's taking its seat every year), the Arabs decided that the opportunity had come to expel Israel from the General Assembly.

Israel's reaction, however, at that time was not passive. Israel launched an offensive and even issued a threat. Two members of the delegation to the United Nations, who were responsible for South America, Africa, and Asia, left immediately for a conference of the foreign ministers of "the nonaligned" nations which was being held then in Lima. Their action was successful. Israel's diplomatic network in all the world capitals was also activated with an appeal to public opinion in those countries. It became a key issue in the communications media in the United States, and it triggered a series of attacks and criticism of the United Nations by American organizations. This and more. Foreign Minister Yigael Allon solemnly announced then that if Israel is suspended from the deliberations of the General Assembly, he would recommend to the Government of Israel the expulsion of all the UN elements in Israel and the territories, including the UNRWA (the agency for aid to refugees), and the UNEF forces in the Sinai and the UNDOF in the Golan, the UNTSO observers organization, and the UN headquarters in Jerusalem.

While it is true that in the final analysis, the United Nations is only a function of the member countries, the UN secretariat and the permanent administration have a self-interest, and they are capable of exerting considerable influence for the benefit of that interest. The UN secretariat faced the possibility of self-damage--and reacted accordingly.

It seems that this year there is reason for a supreme and appropriate effort. The conference of the foreign ministers of the "nonaligned nations" will take place this year in New York at the end of this month in the shadow of the decision of the conference of the Islamic foreign ministers in Morocco to recommend the suspension of Israel from the General Assembly. It is vital, therefore, that Israel declare at the outset the sanctions which threaten the United Nations in the event that it acts against her in accordance with the recommendations of the conference of the Islamic foreign ministers.

The meeting of the foreign ministers of the "nonaligned" countries in New York is at a time which requires a supreme and concentrated effort by Israel, the American Jewish community, and Israel's supporters in the American congress in which the United Nations must be told unequivocally of the damage it will cause itself in the wake of rash action against Israel.

There are no partisan differences on this issue, and there is a national consensus. It is desirable now to push aside all partisan considerations and to mobilize everyone who can help in this project. We must rise above and ignore considerations of party, status, and prestige. We must mobilize American Jewry for the purpose of influencing the American congress to declare that the suspension of Israel's delegation from the General Assembly will mean the withdrawal of the United States delegation from the General Assembly and also the suspension of American payments to the United Nations. The United States' resignation from the International Labor Organization for 2 years and the effect of this action on the organization's budget and deliberations were sufficient to return the deliberations of this organization to a basis of normalcy, and as such, it permitted the United States to resume its membership in the organization. The United States' share of the UN budget is 25 percent, and the democratic and free world's participation in the UN budget is about 60 percent. In contrast, the share of the Arab oil-producing countries in this budget is about 1 percent. Therefore, the United States has the right and the obligation to make its voice heard and to warn the United Nations unequivocally regarding the results of such an action against Israel.

For the purpose of such an Israeli effort, it is necessary to mobilize public opinion in the United States. If the State of Israel had an information organization worthy of its name, with the requisite means, then right from the opening of the General Assembly session a week ago, large advertisements explaining the issue to the American people should have appeared in the major newspapers of the United States so that psychologically and naturally the United Nations and its supporters in the United States would have been thrown on the defensive instead of the opposite situation which exists today. If the American taxpayer knew that about one-half million dollars (in 1977 the sum was 350 thousand dollars), is spent solely for the purpose of publishing in the protocols of the General Assembly anti-Israel slander which is repeated by the Arabs, the Third World nations, and the communist nations, it would arouse second thoughts about the American contribution to the UN budget.

Furthermore, the Government of Israel must inform at the outset all the UN organizations in Israel that if the State of Israel is suspended from the deliberations of the General Assembly, they must know while there is still time that they will be forced to leave Israel and the territories. This year the time has already passed for polite diplomatic talk; the time is for sharp talk.

[illegible] appear today, the Arabs will avoid launching a major offensive until [illegible] the elections in the United States. Afterwards, on 15 November, when the [illegible]ary-general is to report in accordance with the last resolution adopted as to whether or not Israel has withdrawn from the territories and East Jerusalem, [illegible] will launch a new attack which is likely to include a draft resolution to [illegible] Israel from the General Assembly. The extremist resolution will also [illegible] proposed sanctions against Israel. The Arabs drew encouragement for such [illegible] resolution from the weakening of the United States in the Security Council which was evident several months ago at the time when it abstained on the Jerusalem [illegible] The number of anti-Israel votes in the General Assembly will be impressive, [illegible] the issue will revert to the Security Council.

It is therefore vital that Israel today launch a major offensive on public opinion in the United States before the elections, in order to obtain a commitment by Congress in the form of "a sense-of-congress resolution" which would commit the administration even after the elections. Above all, it is vital that Israel state its position regarding the presence of the UN institutions in Israel so that at the outset there will be no misunderstandings or delusions.

If there ever was a time when it was vital for Israel to launch an international political offensive, it is now. However, such an offensive requires the establishment of an information organization worthy of its name and capable of fulfilling its mission. Unfortunately for us and for the entire Jewish people, such a possibility appears to be a castle in the air.

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CSO: 4805

'JERUSALEM POST' VIEWS COUNTRY'S RECESSION

TA240831 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 24 Oct 80 pp 1, 15

[Report by Economic Correspondent Shlomo Maoz: "Jobs, Exports, Wages Hit as Recession Deepens"]

[Text] Unemployment has reached its highest rate in years during the past few months, real wages have dropped, exports have declined, and fewer building starts are reported as the economy continues its downward trend, according to government economists.

The recession is continuing to deepen, despite a brief respite during the second quarter of the year. Industrial production is still much lower than in 1979 and inflation has stabilized at 132 percent. Economists believe that the recession might be eased in a few months' time when demand grows as a result of the massive printing of money by the government.

The unemployed registered in the labor exchanges reached 11,150 in September, compared with 3,958 in September 1979. There has also been a rise in the number of men registered as seeking work. There has been no comparable rise among women, probably because many more women don't bother to register when they lose or leave their jobs.

The number of those unemployed for more than two weeks is climbing steadily.

The number of building starts has continued its downward trend, after a brief rise in the second quarter of the year. The number of flats started by private enterprise fell to 660 a month in July-August, compared with 857 in the second quarter of the year and 1,143 in the third quarter of 1979. Government-sponsored building reached its lowest rate in September, with only 43 flats started.

The average number of government flats started during the third quarter is 414 a month, compared with 767 during the second quarter and 8,843 a month during the third a quarter of last year.[as published]

Industrial production improved during the second quarter but there are no figures yet for the third. It was still lower during the first six months of the year than it was during the first half of 1979, and there are no signs of more work vacancies which would indicate a possible growth.

Exports, which rose steadily during the beginning of the year, are showing signs of slowing down, dropping by 8-9 percent during July-September compared with the first half of the year.

Imports increased by 11 percent during the third quarter of the year compared with the second, but this may be because of depleted raw material supplies which are now being replenished.

The general recession has resulted in a 9 percent drop in real wages during the first half of the year compared with the first half of 1979. Although real wages have steadied during the past few months, the rise in inflation and growing unemployment have made it impossible for wage earners to improve their real wages. Private demand also dropped by 9 percent.

According to government statistics inflation has levelled during the past few months, but may rise shortly as a joint result of the massive printing of money by the government, on the one hand, and the rise in costs, on the other.

The rise in uncontrolled prices appears to follow the trend set by the price hikes initiated by the government.

CSO: 4820

OFFICIAL DATA SHOWS DROP IN WAGES, CONSUMPTION

TA051222 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 5 Nov 80 pp 1, 2

[Report by POST economic reporter Shlomo Ma'oz: "Net Wages Dropped by 14 Percent in 6 Months"]

[Excerpts] The real value of salaried workers' net wages dropped by 14 percent in the first half of this year, according to the Central Bureau of Statistics. During the same period, private consumption dropped by 8 percent--the largest drop in this economic indicator since 1950 when measurements began.

The 14 percent drop in the real value of wages is apparently the largest such drop since the creation of the state, although there are no authoritative figures until 1960.

According to the Central Bureau of Statistics figures first published yesterday, gross wages also dropped during the first half of 1980, but only by 8.8 percent in real money terms. The difference between the 8.8 percent drop in gross wages and the 14 percent drop in wages after income tax and payments to the National Insurance Institute was caused by three factors: only moderate rises in wages; the system whereby cost-of-living increments--which are supposed to compensate for higher prices--are paid with up to three-month delays; and the government's refusal to update both the income tax credit points and National Insurance Institute (NII) child allowances.

In the first half of 1980, gross wages in pounds or shekels rose by 106 percent and net wages rose by 94 percent measured in annual rates. At the same time prices rose at an annual rate of 125.8 percent.

The 8 percent drop in private consumption was accompanied by an 11 percent drop in investments in durable goods during the same period.

Other Central Bureau of Statistics figures show that the Gross National Product went down by 1 percent during the first half of the year, compared to the second half of 1979. But it is still 2 percent higher than the GNP for the first half of 1979.

Exports grew by 11 percent in the first half of the year and imports went down by 9 percent.

Israel's balance of trade deficit including import and export of services did not change in the first half of this year even though in terms of quantities of goods and services imported compared to those exported the deficit went down by 40 percent. The high prices of imported fuel stopped the deficit from contracting.

Expenditure on defence rose by 4 percent in the first half of last year mainly because of expenses involved in building the two new air force bases in the Negev.

CSO: 4820

PROPOSAL TO ANNEX GOLAN HEIGHTS DISCUSSED

TA261303 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 26 Oct 80 p 5

[Commentary by Moshe Zaq: "The Golan Heights--A Standing Proposal"]

[Excerpt] In the days when the Soviet Union maintained relations with Israel it used to write us official messages full of warnings "that we do not harm Syria which is located on the Soviet southern border."

One can, of course, question this "flexible" southern border of the Soviet Union but one cannot ignore the great interest the Soviet Union has revealed in Syrian-Israeli relations in the past and all the more so today, after the signing of the Soviet-Syrian friendship agreement.

In the current public debate about the Knesset draft resolution about applying Israeli law to the Golan Heights one should take into consideration the possible Soviet reaction to such an Israeli move although it is not absolutely necessary to make a decision only according to this consideration. When we climbed the Golan Heights, too, a Soviet threat existed and was sharply conveyed via President Johnson but Israel acted according to its own needs. Likewise, now it is not the Soviet ire that can guide Israel in its considerations about this fateful decision on the future of the Golan Heights.

Nevertheless, it is precisely the parliamentary initiative and the very existence of a Knesset draft resolution that opens the way for the beginning of a dialogue with the Soviet Union. As long as the Soviets and the Syrians were sure that nothing would happen regarding the Golan Heights there was no motive to urge them to open talks with Israel. The Israeli legislative initiative which followed the pioneering act of settling the Golan may prove to them there is a reason to rush and look for a way for negotiations.

Now, as far as the relations with the Americans are concerned, there are no grounds for the fear and tremor that has seized some of those concerned about relations with Washington in view of the draft resolution on extending Israeli law to the Golan Heights.

A political benefit is inherent in raising the proposal in the Knesset and, paradoxically, this benefit may be lost precisely the moment this proposal is endorsed by the Knesset.

One should certainly understand and sympathize with the Golan Heights settlers who fear that the model of the Rafah approaches settlements fated to be removed by the Camp David accords will be repeated in their case. Extending Israel's law to the Golan Heights serves for them as guarantees and collaterals that they will not be deserted during possible negotiations with Syria.

However, so long as the draft resolution exists as a proposal it serves as a means of pressure for the defense of both the Golan Heights and Jerusalem. As long as this proposal has not been struck off the agenda and has not been endorsed either, the United States knows it should prevent UN resolutions that enhance Israel's feelings of isolation and push it "to spiteful reactions."

The month of November, immediately after the U.S. election, will be a month of confrontation between Israel and its opponents in the United Nations. In this month we shall direly need U.S. help. The existence of a draft resolution may aid the United States in arguing with its allies that an abundance of UN anti-Israeli resolutions will lead to sharp Israeli reactions. The feeling of isolation will push Israel into defensive moves of its own and the United States is experienced on this matter. It was the U.S. UN Security Council vote on the Jerusalem issue that prompted the Israeli Knesset to pass the Jerusalem law.

The power of the standing draft resolution on extending the Israeli law to the Golan Heights much outweighs the power of the possible law to this effect.

The draft resolution prompts the United States and many other countries which maintain relations with us to persuade Israel not to lead itself to political isolation, while a law, if and when it is passed, will put Israel in a defensive position--why we did what we did and why we decided the way we decided. So long as the draft resolution is pending the United States is trying to persuade us [against converting it into a resolution] and to promise us support in a UN confrontation. When the law is passed in the Knesset it will be we who will have to coax the United States into rescuing us from a UN Security Council operational resolution.

If the law had been endorsed a week or 2 weeks ago and the UN Security Council debate had taken place prior to the U.S. election, there could have been some chance for a U.S. vote, but if the law is passed this week, the UN Security Council debate will be held after the election with all the attendant implications.

Therefore, one should not urge the government to lift the glove thrown to it by the Knesset coalition. The government had better not hurry to resolve how the coalition parties should vote on the Golan Heights issue.

The government must prevent the removal of the proposal from the Knesset's agenda. The proposal should continue to stand on the agenda of all of us, not only on the Golan Heights settlers' agenda. However, on behalf of both Jerusalem and the Golan, the power of the draft resolution as a proposal pending discussion, is far greater than the resolution or the law itself.

CSO: 4805

'SOURCE CLOSE TO BEGIN' PREDICTS DELAYS ON GOLAN HEIGHTS LAW

TA311849 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 31 Oct 80 p 3

[Commentary by Dalya Shehori: "The Golan Law, Early Elections, What Dayan Meant and All the Rest"]

[Excerpts] Even though most ministers and most Knesset members are very unenthusiastic about annexing the Golan Heights through legislation at this time, the danger still exists that they will find themselves raising their hands in favor of such legislation if they are cleverly maneuvered into doing so, as Ge'ula Kohen did with the Jerusalem law. The source of their weakness lies in their ideological or other commitment (the Likud--loyalty to every inch; the NRP--the same; the Labor Party--strategic-security reasons) which will force them to vote in favor, should matters reach the stage of an open vote.

The reasons for not annexing the Golan are more or less known. What is surprising is that I heard a considerable and significant part of these reasons this week from a source close to Begin. To my delight, this source said that such legislation would cause complications for Israel with world public opinion, without our gaining anything, and this we can do without. It was to my delight, because at last a refreshing breeze of responsible, realpolitik thinking blowing out of the corridors of power after 3 years of oppressive pathos lacking any links to reality.

This source also noted that Israeli law is being applied on the Golan Heights, so that any annexation legislation would be provocation per se. He noted also that if the Knesset explicitly annexes the Golan, in addition to the annexation of Jerusalem, this will be taken as readiness to make concessions in territories that were not being annexed: Judaea and Samaria, the dear sons of Herut. In a moment of frankness, the source even asked rhetorically why a law should be passed that the alignment will have abolished when it takes power.

In any event, the source continued, even if the subject comes before the cabinet--and it is far from certain, in his view, that Begin will not vote against it, if he is compelled to vote--it will not happen at this time, which

means that it will not be in the near future. On 8 November Begin leaves for a 10-day visit to the United States. Then, if Carter is re-elected, there will be a Carter-al-Sadat-Begin summit meeting in Washington some time in December, and obviously the cabinet will not initiate a discussion on such a sensitive matter before a summit meeting. When will the issue come before the cabinet? This week I asked a minister, known as a hawk among hawks. What is the hurry, he replied. The prime minister is not raising this yet....

According to the prediction of another confidant, one who is well-versed in the internal politics involved, Begin will raise the matter in the cabinet sometime--as far in the future as possible--but will see to it that the continuation and completion of the discussion are postponed until an even later session, on the grounds of a crowded cabinet agenda, in order to cool the issue. He will do this because if the subject comes up for a vote--according to this confidant--there will be a cabinet majority for annexation legislation. Noblesse oblige.

CSO: 4805

PROBLEMS OF ISRAELI ARMS MANUFACTURE DISCUSSED

TA021120 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 2 Nov 80 p 5

[Commentary by Yuval Elitzur: "The License for the Kfir Planes"]

[Text] The report published at the end of last week in the WALL STREET JOURNAL about the permission the U.S. administration gave the Israeli aircraft industry to offer Mexico Kfir planes did not please the staff of our defense industry.

First, any publicity about a deal of this sort, especially when it appears at a stage when the deal is far from being finalized, may cause it to fail.

Second, the report again exposes the great dependence of Israel's security exports on foreign elements.

On the surface, we should have known about this weakness a long time ago. Any export of weapons--from the 'Uzi submachine guns to the Gavri'el missile--is not a purely commercial deal, but also a political act. The political nature of the arms deal has recently assumed more complicated and dangerous forms. On the one hand, there is a threat to one of Israel's most flourishing export fields, but, on the other, this is an important, promising opening for the broadening of these exports, a hint at a "reversal" that will lead to a new vitality in the entire Israeli economy.

Hostile journals (such as LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE which published an expanded commentary on this issue about 2 months ago) have often, over recent years, "exposed" Israeli arms exports. These journals have presented Israel as a country lacking any other economic basis and without any moral inhibitions, as a country which has established an industry of destructive arms based on the theft of technology from others and which is trying, with the aid of this industry, to balance its budget. Israel, according to these descriptions, does not hesitate to sell weapons to anyone, including, in this context, tyrants and national oppressors.

The truth is different. Israel began to lay the foundations for its security industry even before the establishment of the state, because it was unable to buy the few defense weapons then needed from any other source.

The export of weapons has never been an objective per se. In nearly every case we chose production lines of the same type of weapons developed in Israel for the IDF. The sale of arms to foreign countries was always explained

as an unfortunate necessity, to compensate ourselves for the enormous investments in the development of these weapons systems and the establishment of production lines capable of producing, out of all the weapons, larger quantities than those required for Israel. Because of this, because the prime objective was a defensive one, it was also not hard to find moral justification for the sale of arms, even to countries unable to boast about their democratic regimes. We could with justification point to the great hypocrisy prevalent in the world in everything involving the sale of arms and to the unclean hands of those who have pointed accusing fingers to us in the United Nations, in leftist circles and sometimes even from among our friends.

However, we would do well not to delude ourselves and to recognize the political consequences of Israel's flourishing arms exports. This has affected Israel's image and also its political maneuvering ability. But this danger to Israel's image is only one side, and actually the less grave side of the influence of the defense industry and defense exports on Israel's political status. The other side has been revealed in the publication of the WALL STREET JOURNAL report. Israel is being forced to make decisions in this field, not only from security and economic considerations. It is now subservient to decisions made at times out of a surrender to certain U.S. slogans ("the desire to prevent the infiltration of modern weapons into Latin America"), either as a surrender to the pressure put by U.S. commercial companies that fear competition by the Israeli industry or from considerations of the eve of the U.S. presidential election. This is because the Israeli defense industry can no longer be entirely independent. Unlike the "Uzi, a jet plane cannot be produced as purely "made in Israel." We require the import of technology and systems and, first and foremost, a jet engine. We can only buy this under certain conditions and, in this context, the agreement of the U.S. Government is the prior condition for the plane to be marketed to a third country.

This dependence on foreign elements originates in technological limitations (our inability to develop certain systems) but mainly in economic limitations. The investment required today for the development of weapons systems is so large that, with all Israel's willingness to allocate quite a considerable portion of its resources to the defense budget, we cannot maintain this "war of independence." It is because the IDF cannot permit itself to use second-rate weapons systems, because we need the best and most modern weapons found in any army's possession for our existence, that the investment required of us for the development of these weapons is the largest.

Until recently Israel, for some reason, believed that it would be able to overcome the economic limitations of the development of sophisticated weapons. When the decision was made to develop the Merkava tank, it was made with the knowledge that we might be able to sell it to a foreign element and thus lessen the investment the Israeli economy would have to bear. This was also the case when the decision was made to develop the Kfir plane, with the knowledge that our need for the general dynamic engine could very much restrict our ability to offer this plane to others. This was also the approach last February when the decision was made to build the Lavi plane; but the last few months have brought about disillusion.

Repeatedly it emerged that we must rid ourselves of illusions concerning the security burden the Israeli economy is capable of bearing. For example, it emerged that Israel would not be able to withstand the investment of about $800 million or more required before we could see the new Lavi plane. It was not with a light heart that the aircraft industry staff began to propose the plane as a "joint production" project to four U.S. companies, and, according to the rumor, also to a Swedish company. It is now clear, beyond any doubt, that only a joint effort with foreign companies, a joint investment and the advance knowledge that it will also be possible to market this plane outside Israel, will permit the completion of the construction of the Lavi.

U.S. agreement on the sale of the Kfir to Mexico is a turning point. It transpires that if we know how to plan our moves wisely, we will thus develop an opening for joint production of weapons systems with the United States and, in the future, with other countries as well. This may be seen as a paring down of Israel's nondependence, but the weapons industry and exports have also restricted Israel's political freedom of maneuvering in the past. It is beneficial for us to know that in the future we will also have to incorporate the defense industry--almost like any enriched-technology industry--in the export establishments of other countries.

CSO: 4805

CRISIS IN LIKUD OVER RAFI THREATS VIEWED

TA021023 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 2 Nov 80 pp 1, 2

[Report by Arye Kinarti: "Crisis in the Likud Following Rafi's Resignation Threats"]

[Excerpts] A serious crisis erupted in relations between the Herut executive, the leaders of Rafi and Finance Minister Yiga'el Hurvitz when the Herut movement's secretariat met on 31 October for an urgent debate on the Rafi leaders' threats to resign from the Likud and run for the Knesset elections on a separate list. At the meeting, which had been convened in a panic with the agreement of Prime Minister Menahem Begin, a demand was made to present an ultimatum to Rafi and demand a reply: "Where is it going, to the Likud or outside it."

Grave attacks were made at the meeting against Hurvitz and MK Zalman Shoval. Hurvitz' personal attacks against Minister David Levi, for whom the Herut movement's support has recently been increasing, were recalled.

Although Hurvitz speaks about "his popularity among the public" because of his economic policy, severe criticism of this policy was expressed at the meeting, particularly by MK Moshe Qatzav, the spokesman of faction members from the Knesset and the councils of development towns.

It appears that chairman of the secretariat Deputy Minister Yoram Aridor, will meet tomorrow with the leaders of the Likud's liberal faction in order to coordinate positions in face of Rafi's threats. The meeting will be held in the Knesset building.

Yoram Aridor, who opened the discussion--as is known, after a talk with Begin--severely criticized the remarks by Hurvitz and the Rafi leaders, saying: "The Rafi leaders threaten to resign every other day." Without mentioning Moshe Dayan's name, Aridor spoke in condemnation of the Rafi method of "grabbing temporary rides on personalities and bodies"--this in reference to Zalman Shoval's "forum." "The Likud is not a hitchlike stop" Aridor warned the Rafi members.

Members of the secretariat said that the Rafi members' behavior in the Likud institutions was insufferable, both among friends and in public. "It is inconceivable that Rafi should behave in the Likud as though it was outside it."

The speakers spoke scornfully about the Rafi leaders' pretentious remarks to the media on the issue of the many seats they would collect "with or without Dayan" in their independent list. Moshe Qatzav said: "Rafi and its leaders have no weight among the public." Qatzav favors Rafi's resignation from the Likud. When Rafi stands up on its own before the voters, everyone will know what its weight is. Chairman of the Herut Knesset faction MK Hayim Kaufman also said: "Perhaps it would really be worthwhile for the Likud and Herut to go to the elections without Yiga'el Hurvitz as finance minister."

Because of the "gravity of the situation" in the developments in the Likud and the relations with Rafi, the Herut movement's secretariat is to meet this week for a continuation of the debate, after Aridor holds contacts with the liberal leaders.

CSO: 4805

LABOR PARTY CHANGES INTERNAL ELECTION SYSTEM

TA301700 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 30 Oct 80

[Text] By a large majority, the Labor Party Center has decided to change the system of elections for the party convention. According to the new system, party members will be able to elect 75 percent of the candidates, instead of the previous 60 percent. Members of the Rabin camp left the hall in protest and did not participate in the vote. Yitzhaq Rabin also did not vote and angrily left the hall.

Our correspondent Pe'erli Shahar interviewed Yitzhaq Rabin upon his departure:

[Begin recording] [Shahar] Mr Rabin, why did you decide not to vote and why did you leave the room?

[Rabin] Because, in my opinion, this entire vote is manipulative, contradicts the party spirit and is disgraceful to the Labor Party.

[Question] After you have said all this, now what?

[Answer I will remain in the Labor Party even in these difficult circumstances, and I will fight. I believe that the majority of the Labor Party members support me. Had the members of the Labor Party been allowed to take a personal vote and elect one of the two candidates directly on election day, there is no doubt in my mind as to whom they would have elected.

[Question] Do you plan to request that each member of the Labor Party be allowed to elect the party candidate for the premiership?

[Answer] I will consider it.

[Shahar] Thank you very much. [end recording]

CSO: 4805

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON NEGEV REDEPLOYMENT VIEWED

TA031510 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Nov 80 p 1

[Report by Aqiva Eldar: "The Executive Committee on Planning the Negev Redeployment Has Been Paralyzed for Four Months"]

[Text] The coordinator of the Director General's Committee on the Negev Redeployment in the framework of the Camp David agreements, Mr Efrayim Shilo, resigned from his office. According to Shilo it was impossible to bring about cooperation between the government offices dealing with this issue.

A few weeks ago Mr Shilo met Finance Minister Yiga'el Hurvitz and Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori--who chairs the committee--and gave his reasons for resigning. Shilo, who was appointed to this job by the director general of the Ministry of the Interior, will continue functioning as the coordinator of the ministerial committee on Jerusalem. Since Shilo's resignation no new coordinator has been appointed to replace him. All regular contacts have stopped between the ministries in charge of the civilian redeployment in the Negev planning, the Defense Ministry and the IDF which are responsible for the military redeployment.

Mr Shilo told the HA'ARETZ correspondent that the Executive Committee has not convened in over 4 months, adding: "It was impossible to make different views coincide for the advancement of the issue. I am used to being busy with matters of implementation, I am not used to wasting my time." Mr Shilo noted that he was unable to prove "that something is being done in the area and that there is an intention to carry out projects."

According to Shilo, the lack of cooperation between the various military and civilian factors caused unnecessary roads to be paved in the Negev and a waste of funds.

A senior source dealing with the Negev redeployment told the HA'ARETZ correspondent that the Defense Ministry is encountering many difficulties in coordinating the different issues with planning components and the IDF branches.

According to that source the Defense Ministry does not receive data from the IDF which would make it possible to plan the civilian services and their deployment in the Negev, rendered necessary by the transfer of thousands of military personnal to the region.

The HA'ARETZ correspondent notes that in the recent state comptroller report, issue of coordination between the different branches in charge of the planning of the Negev redeployment was criticized. The report said that the committee did not meet often enough and that too few director generals participated in the meetings.

CSO: 4805

JERUSALEM 'AL-SHA'B' CRITICIZES SAUDI 'SUBSERVIENCE' TO U.S.

JN031551 Jerusalem AL-SHA'B in Arabic 31 Oct 80 pp 1, 5

[Editorial: "The Saudi Wagon and the U.S. Station"]

[Text] It is nice to hear Saudi Arabia criticize a U.S. decision with the tone and expressions used in the statement issued by Riyadh yesterday criticizing Carter's decision to stop implementing some of the arms deals agreed on previously by the two states.

It is interesting to hear the Saudi rulers remind Washington that Saudi-U.S. friendship is not to be taken for granted, that this friendship can be reconsidered, and that Riyadh will not allow U.S. Presidential election considerations to be used to interfere in its relations with the United States.

All this is noteworthy and interesting but, unfortunately, incredible. The reason for this lies not only in the nature of the ruling family in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, the past few days have provided additional proof that the family of the sons of 'Abd al-'Aziz al Sa'ud are continuing to bolster their subservience to the United States.

Recently, four sophisticated U.S. radar planes were brought [to Saudi Arabia] to carry out acts of espionage against the region's states. Saudi Arabia also announced that it would increase oil production at U.S. behest and fought to prevent a big increase in oil prices. Furthermore, only 3 days ago Saudi Arabia severed its relations with Libya in protest against Tripoli's stand on Saudi-U.S. relations, which, according to current intimations by Riyadh, are supposedly being reconsidered.

We have had enough of the political lies and falsehoods which some Arab regimes are circulating. Indeed, we feel that mere discussion of this issue is a waste of time.

However, we would like to repeat that the arena is open for the Saudi rulers to prove their stand and wrath. On the other hand, we are sure that they will do nothing and will continue to give out signals that their wagon is not proceeding toward a U.S. station even though they will continue to direct this same wagon toward this same station.

CSO: 4802

BLACK HEBREW LEADER PROMISES RESISTANCE TO EXPULSION

TA051240 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1105 GMT 5 Nov 80

[Excerpt] We will oppose our expulsion even if the army is sent against us. We will not send our children back to captivity in America, said the leader of the Black Hebrew sect Ben-'Ami Carter, in reaction to the interior minister's decision to reject the Glass committee recommendations, our correspondent in the South Yaron Enosh reports.

[Begin recording] [Enosh] The decision by the interior minister to turn down the Glass committee recommendations aroused considerable bitterness among the Black Hebrew sect in Dimona. Although the sect members continued repairing the apartments that were given to them in the abandoned absorption center, their leader Ben-'Ami Carter made strong statements against the minister's words.

[Carter] I am really disappointed to hear this. I am disappointed for two reasons. One is that Knesset member [as heard] Yosef Burg can react like this and continue blaming us for crimes, as he did 10 years ago. The other is that he does everything except giving us a chance to prove ourselves, to show that we have really moderated our attitude.

[Enosh] Ben-'Ami Carter added that he does not believe that the Black Hebrews can do anything to convince the government that they are not a negative factor in Israel. However, the sect members will not consent to a decision to expel them and will even oppose it with all the means at their disposal.

[Carter] Certainly, we can agree to anything except to expulsion. We will not allow anybody to expel [words indistinct]. They can, they really can send the army against us, to murder us all. I do not doubt this. But to send our children back to the U.S. captivity, no we will not volunteer to do this. We will consent to anything else, but we will not accept this.

[Enosh] Ben-'Ami Carter added: We prefer to die in Israel than to return to the United States. As mentioned, these were the words of the leader of the Black Hebrews. [end recording]

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

LAND DIRECTOR RESIGNS--Ya'aqov Aknin, director general of the Israel Land Administration, has submitted his resignation to Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon, saying that Mr Sharon's concept of the meaning of the administration's work differs from the way the law sees it. In a talk with our correspondent 'Uzi Birman, Mr Aknin explained that an unbridgeable gap has been opened between himself and Mr Sharon in everything related to the administration of state land according to the law and subject to regular administration procedures. Mr Aknin had learned that the question of his continued employment was to be raised at the cabinet session tomorrow. He said that to prevent public storm, and because he was certain that, for obvious reasons, the prime minister would be unable to rule against the agriculture minister, he preferred to resign and not cause a further rift in the government. Mr Aknin told our correspondent that Minister Sharon has not yet reacted to the resignation. [Text] [TA272017 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 27 Oct 80]

E. JERUSALEM ELECTRIC TAKEOVER--The government will apparently rescind its plans not to renew the contract with the East Jerusalem Electric Company in view of what has been defined as "political compulsions" and "legal complications." People who demand that the government go ahead with its original intention of not renewing the contract have said that if the government does go back on its initial plan this would be Israel's first step in the process of getting "cold feet" on the issue of Jerusalem. According to these people, this process began when it was decided to freeze the transfer of the prime minister's office to East Jerusalem. "These withdrawals are ominous for the future status of Jerusalem as a unified city under fill Israeli sovereignty," these people emphasized. The issue is secret. However, reliable sources have confirmed that secret contacts are being held with the heads of the East Jerusalem Electric Company to reach a compromise, with the consent of Prime Minister Menahem Begin and Energy Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i. The main argument of those favoring calling off plans not to renew the contract is that this would be interpreted by other countries as the nationalization of the Arab electric company in Jerusalem and as an extension of the Jerusalem law. Therefore, this move would provoke another waver of anger against Israel. Another contention is that it is impossible to predict the ruling of the high court of justice on the appeal of the East Jerusalem Electric Company, scheduled to be held in December. [Yosef Waxman] [Text] [TA301521 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 30 Oct 80 p 1]

LIBERAL-LIKUD MERGER--Deputy Prime Minister Simha Ehrlich has promised the prime minister that he will act within the Liberal Party to bring about the merger with the Likud despite the Liberal Party's long-standing objection to this move. The prime minister revealed Ehrlich's promise in a recent meeting he held with Knesset member Moshe Qatzav of the Herut movement. Our correspondent, Amnon Nadav, has learned there have recently been increased demands in the Herut movement to merge the Likud and cancel the Gahal agreement that grants the Liberals a larger representation than their actual stand among the public. A similar opinion has been recently expressed among Rafi faction members who, together with Herut members, conveyed it to the prime minister. [Text] [TA311043 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 31 Oct 80]

FUTURE OF TERRITORIES, AUTONOMY--Knesset member Yitzhaq Rabin said today that the Jewish settlements in the territories, the southern part of the Gaza Strip, and the Jordan Rift Valley and the hill slopes near it and the Jerusalem area should remain under Israeli rule. He noted that although there is no country in the world that would support this plan, it would be easier to find a supporter for this plan than for the prime minister's plan for Israeli rule over the entire Eretz Yisra'el. Yitzhaq Rabin further said that the Arab residents of the territories should be granted administrative rather than legislative autonomy but this should be accorded to them only in areas populated by Arabs which will remain under Israel's rule in the future. Mr Rabin also said he was willing to accept a joint Israeli-Jordanian trusteeship but with Jerusalem excluded. Rabin today addressed the students at Bar-Ilan University and our correspondent notes that although Rabin's words were not received with great enthusiasm, the students prepared large posters with slogans denouncing Knesset member Peres and demanding that Rabin continue his struggle against Peres. [Text] [TA231803 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 23 Oct 80]

SOVIET IMMIGRATION--September was "noted" for the smallest number of immigrants and the greatest amount of dropouts. This transpires from an internal report by the Jewish Agency's Immigration and Absorption Executive. Last month 1,491 immigrants arrived compared with 1,731 in August, 1,922 in July and 2,858 in June. Some 267 immigrants came from the Soviet Union in September out of 1,307 Jews who left the Soviet Union. Thus the number of dropouts reached a record 75.7 percent. This drastic drop in immigration is explained by the fact that the Soviet authorities now appear to be granting exit visas only to those Jews whom they know will not emigrate to Israel. [Text] [TA231925 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Oct 80 p 3 TA]

FOREIGN WORKERS--The number of foreign workers employed in Israel dropped by about half last month compared with September of last year. The employment service granted 740 work permits to foreigners. The decline seems to result from the economic recession and from a tougher policy on granting work permits to foreigners. These figures do not include Negev air base construction workers. [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 22 Oct 80 TA]

WEST GERMAN AID--West Germany and Israel have signed their annual aid agreement under which Israel will be provided with 140 million German marks for promoting projects in industry, agriculture and communications. The distribution of the money will be carried out at a later stage. [Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 23 Oct 80 TA]

NEW SETTLEMENTS ALLOCATION--The Knesset Finance Committee has allocated 10 million shekels for the establishment of another two settlements in the Qatif Bloc in the Gaza Strip. This sum will be spent by the end of the current fiscal year. [Text] [TA220605 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 22 Oct 80]

QADI'S SON APPOINTED--Hebron, 22 Oct--Shaykh (Taysir) Bayyud at-Tamimi, the son of the deported Hebron Qadi Rajib Bayyud at-Tamiri, was this week appointed by the Waqf in East Jerusalem to take his father's place as Qadi, preacher and teacher in the Makhpela cave in Hebron. The ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria notes that the father was deported together with the Hebron and Halhul mayors, following the murder next to the Hadassah building in Hebron. However, while the two mayors were given the right to appeal before the Military Appeals Board, no such right was accorded Shaykh at-Tamimi, since the supreme court determined that he had in fact engaged in incitement. [Text] [TA221557 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1430 GMT 22 Oct 80]

W. BANK WATERPIPE SABOTAGED--The waterpipe of Bet-Horon [in the West Bank] has been sabotaged and the flow of water to the settlement has stopped. A police bomb expert who arrived on the scene discovered a shoe mine near the sabotaged pipe. The army is now carrying water to the settlement in water tanks. Members of the settlements noted that the waterpipe had also been sabotaged about 2 months ago. The pipe leads from Moza to Ramallah. [Text] [TA261055 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 26 Oct 80]

KOOR IN SRI LANKA--Koor Asia is to open an official office in Sri Lanka, as part of its effort to expand trade with countries which do not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. The Israeli office--the first of its kind--will engage in export-import deals between Israel and Sri Lanka, and also with India--this is with the Sri Lanka Government's full consent. The opening of the office is being termed as a significant political breakthrough for Israel with Asian countries that have no diplomatic ties with Israel. The development came in the wake of a meeting between the Histadrut secretary-general and the Sri Lanka president about 3 months ago. [TA010945 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 31 Oct 80 p 2 TA]

U.S. RESEARCH PROJECTS--Israel and the United States have approved 37 new joint research projects in agriculture. The funds will come from the joint development authority set up by the two countries in 1967. Part of the projects will use solar energy to detoxify organic pollution in water recycle for agricultural use. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 31 Oct 80]

NEW WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS--Now to settlement matters. In the Jericho Rift Valley and in Samarai two new settlements were populated; one is Vered Yiriho, the second is Homesh, between Nabulus and Janin. Here is Avraham Ben-Melekh: [Begin recording] Vered Yiriho is among the lowest of the Jordan Rift Valley settlements; Homesh is among the highest of the new settlements across the green line: on a clear day one can see Mount Hermon and Tel Aviv from it. Vered Yiriho is a moshav of the agricultural union at the entrance to Jericho, near the refugee camp. It is the closest Jewish settlement to the town of Jericho, and one of its aims is to prevent implementation of the Allon plan. Homesh is the new name of the Nahal outpost called Ma'ale Nahal. It is situated on one of the highest points on the Samarian Ridge. Only the vanguard of families came today to these two settlements. The remaining members of the settlement core will arrive during the coming days, at which time the festive inauguration ceremonies will also be held. [end recording] [Text] [TA021951 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 2 Nov 80]

GOLAN HEIGHTS ANNEXATION OPPOSED--Now to the Labor Party. In view of the debate in the party between hawks and doves, MAPAM this evening sharpened the formulation of its position in order to pressure the Labor Party, its partner in the alignment. The MAPAM executive [Rikuz] a short time ago passed a resolution asserting that MAPAM will insist on the alignment voting against the law for annexing the Golan Heights. Amnon Nadav reports: [Begin recording] While the Labor Party is now struggling with its stand in its settlement and political committees, MAPAM this evening stepped up the pressure on the Labor Party regarding the Golan Heights law almost to the point of an ultimatum. In the course of this evening's discussion MAPAM secretary-general Victor Shem-tov said that MAPAM will not be able to live with the Labor Party if the latter initiates a law for the application of Israeli law to the Golan Heights. MK Hayka Grossman corrects him: we will not be able to live together. At the conclusion of the discussion, the executive passed a resolution asserting that a situation must not be created in which a Labor Party abstention on a vote on a Golan Heights bill will lead to its being approved by the Knesset. MAPAM is now demanding that the Labor Party refrain from submitting its own bill for the application of Israeli law to the Golan Heights; it will view this as a step conflicting with the alignment's platform, with all that this entails. And on the other side, the Labor Party's settlement committee could yet in the near future pass a resolution which would counter the MAPAM resolution and put that party to the test. [end recording] [Text] [TA021949 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 2 Nov 80]

KFIR PLANES OFFERED--Israel is going to invite representatives of several Latin American countries to come to Israel in order to offer them the opportunity of examining the possibility of purchasing the Kfir plane. This development comes after Washington gave Israel permission to add these countries to the list of those with whom the aircraft industry may conduct negotiations for the sale of the Kfir (which is equipped with a U.S. engine). [Excerpt] [TA020955 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Nov 80 p 2]

FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES--Israel's foreign currency reserves dropped by $76 million in October, due to the weakening of the German mark vis-a-vis other foreign currencies. The drop stemmed from a decline in the value of the Bank of Israel's reserves, part of which are held in marks. Israel's reserves stood at $2.786 billion at the end of October, a drop of $161 million from this year's peak of $2.947 billion in July. At the end of 1979, the reserves were $2.57 billion. [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 9 Nov 80 p 2 TA]

KNESSET MAJORITY ALINEMENT--[Report on public opinion poll conducted by Dr Mina Tzemah published in the financial weekly KSAFIM] A public opinion poll held in mid-October gave the alignment an absolute majority of 61 seats in the Knesset, compared with 59 in an August poll. With Yitzhaq Rabin heading the list, however, it got 66 seats. The poll, which asked a sample of the public which party it would vote for it Knesset elections were held now, was conducted by Dr Mina Tzemah and published in the financial weekly KSAFIM. The Likud received 29 seats (28 in August), and the NRP eight, one less than in August. An "Independent Centre" Party headed by 'Ezer Weizman received 16 seats in the poll, four more than in August. Eight of the seats were at the expense of the Alignment and four from the Likud. An Independent Rafi list, however, drew only three seats, the number it has now. In answer to the question "Who is best suited to be prime minister?" 34.6 percent chose Rabin, 25.2 percent chose Prime Minister Menahem Begin, 20.6 percent voted for Shim'on Peres, and 15.2 percent chose Weizman. Peres' rating rose five percent since August, while the others received about the same. Over 60 percent of the public is dissatisfied with Begin serving both as prime minister and defence minister. Asked whom they preferred as defence minister, 34.4 percent chose Ari'el Sharon, while 27 percent chose 'Ezer Weizman. [Text] [TA319831 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 31 Oct 80 p 3]

TAX COLLECTION DOWN--A real drop of over 10 percent was registered in tax collection during the period between April and October, according to figures released by the State Revenue Commission. Indirect tax receipts were up slightly last month, but the overall picture still shows a drastic fall in tax revenues. Adjusted income tax revenue showed almost no change for the first seven months of the current fiscal year, but import duties fell by about 40 percent and tax on local products by 15 percent. Value added tax receitps were down by 14 percent net, and local purchase taxes were lower by more than 28 percent. [Text] [Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 7 Nov 80 p 15 TA]

CSO: 4820

PAPER CRITICIZES U.S. STAND ON IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR

JN031100 Amman AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 3 Nov 80 pp 1, 13

[Editorial: The Position of the Camp David Trinity on the Iraqi-Iranian War"]

[Text] As the theatrical game of the hostages enters its last stage, a theatrical being acted by Washington and Tehran before the Iranian and U.S. peoples, the nature of the close ties linking the two countries and their conspiratorial role in exacerbating the situation in the area in preparation for returning U.S. influence and U.S. control over its interests has been exposed.

The barter deal--hostages for space parts--in first and foremost meant to justify a U.S. intervention in the Iraqi-Iranian war. The U.S. intervention is aimed at prolonging the war and exploiting it and at regaining its status in the area by adopting a partial stand supporting Iran against the Arab position which supports Iraq in its pan-Arab battle against the Iranian aggression. The barter deal would be in implementation of the Camp David plot and would serve Israel's interests.

The three Camp David partners--Egypt, Israel and the United States--have adopted a joint stand on the Iraqi-Iranian war in declaring that Iraq is the aggressor. This confirms the close ties between Washington and Tehran, ties which are an extension of their relations under the former regime.

Iran's leaders are entrenching the bases of their alliance with the United States against Iraq; or more precisely, they are reviving their old alliance with Washington.

The U.S. partiality toward Iran against Iraq is an extension of Washington's biased attitude toward Israel. This is a well-known U.S. stand against the Arabs in every field, a stand appearing as if it is a part of the U.S. strategy.

It is incumbent upon the Arabs vis-a-vis this serious development, to adopt a stand to reply to the pro-Iranian U.S. intervention. The Arabs must marshal their potentials without bounds to support Iraq in orde to enable it to end the war in its favor and to settle the battle, which is basically one of the Arab nation.

There is no doubt that all these developments confirm Jordan's sound and healthy stand since the beginning in support of Iraq and its pan-Arab battle against the Iranian aggression. The battle will assume serious dimensions as a result of the U.S. intervention unless the Arabs hasten to unwaveringly support and back Iraq without reservations.

CSO: 4802

ISRAELI REPORTER DENIES SPLIT IN GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP

TA101900 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 10 Nov 80

[From the Evening Newsreel]

[Text] Dissatisfaction has been reported among certain levels of the Jordanian population due to Jordan's pro-Iraqi intervention in the Persian Gulf war. However, unlike yesterday's report there are no manifestations of opposition in the Jordanian leadership to the Jordanian-Iraqi rapprochement. Our correspondent for Arab affairs Aharon Barne'a reports:

[Begin recording] For 8 weeks, ever since the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war, an argument has been raging in Jordan about Jordan's part in this war. The regime's leadership, which fully supports King Husayn, is well aware of the Iraqi interest in Jordan and the benefit Jordan can gain from cooperation with its northern neighbor, which is now one of the richest Arab countries. Nevertheless, there are manifestations of opposition among the Muslim brotherhood and other religious elements due to their closeness to Khomeyni's Islamic revolution. It is reasonable to assume that remarks in this spirit have been recently made during sermons in mosques.

Until the outbreak of the Persian Gulf war Jordan has been enjoying an unprecedented economic boom, but over the last 8 weeks there have been increasing reports about shortage of basic commodities throughout the Hashemite kingdom. The port of al-'Aqabah, Jordan's only outlet to the rest of the world, is blocked by ships transferring equipment to Iraq. The port workers are very busy unloading equipment not designated for Jordan, and the truck drivers conveying food from al-'Aqabah to Amman and other cities are now making long trips conveying equipment that does not belong to them to another country.

All this causes internal ferment but the criticism leveled at King Husayn is over the scope of the aid, not over the principle of aid. Some question Jordan's involvement in the private war of Iraqi leader Saddam Husan, and some wonder why the Jordanian king is playing the role of an attorney of the Iraqi regime that has entered an endless war in the Arab world.

For the time being there is no confirmation of the report published in the name of Zayd al-Rifa'i, former Jordanian prime minister and King Husayn's personal friend, opposing the rapprochement with Iraq, nor is there any conformation of reports about arrests of opponents to the Jordanian involvement in the war. Informed sources say today that an argument in certain circles about the size of aid to Iraq exists, but there is no opposition to the Jordanian ruling class. [end recording]

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVIEWED--Foreign Minister Marwan al-Qasim has affirmed that the Jordanian stand on the Iraqi-Iranian war is very clear, adding that Jordan's support for Iraq derives from a pan-Arab premise. In an interview published by the Kuwaiti paper AL-QABAS today, Al-Qasim says that His Majesty King Husayn's visit to Iraq was successful. He added that during this visit, developments in the Iraqi-Iranian war, current circumstances of this war and various future possibilities were discussed. Al-Qasim said that the current Arab situation and the possibility of clearing the political atmosphere and of working to reunify the Arab ranks, prior to the convocation of the forthcoming Arab summit conference, were also discussed. Asked about the meetings of the seven-member committee, the foreign minister said these meetings were one of the best Arab conferences, pointing out that all of the delegations met their responsibility in facing the challenges to our Arab nation. Marwan al-Qasim added that the committee adopted several positive decisions and recommendations, including the decision to convene another meeting for the committee on 18 November, since by then the Arab League general secretariat and Jordan would have put all of the recommendations and decisions in their final form. Marwan al-Qasim added that if these recommendations are agreed upon, they will be referred to the Arab foreign ministers for adoption. These recommendations would then be referred to the Arab kings and leaders at their conference on 25 November. [Text] [JN311238 Amman Domestic Service in Arabic 1200 GMT 31 Oct 80]

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE--Jordan has set up another committee for Palestinian affairs; it will deal with Jerusalem-related matters. Our correspondent, Pinhas 'Inbari, reported that, among other aims, the committee will provide assistance to Jerusalem institutions and will seek to realize Jordanian policy stressing the city's Arabic nature. Called the Royal Committee for Jerusalem Affairs, it is headed by Qasim al-Ramawi, a former prime minister. This committee was established within the framework of the Jordanian Government's activities to reduce the importance of its joint committee with the PLO. [Text] [TA231123 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 23 Oct 80]

CSO: 4805

KUWAIT PAPER DISCLOSES FRENCH EFFORT TO RESOLVE LEBANESE CRISIS

LD281519 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 24 Oct 80 p 13

[Beirut dispatch: "AL-WATAN Unveils a Special Important Secret; a French Initiative in the name of Western Europe; Delamare Meets Sarkis and Leaves for Paris"]

[Excerpts] Beirut--AL-WATAN has learned from an informed diplomatic source in Beirut that behind-the-scenes contacts have been taking place between France and the Lebanese Government for some time now on a new initiative which the French Government intends to make to resolve the Lebanese crisis which has been going on since 1975.

According to information, these efforts are nearing completion. Last week, French Ambassador to Lebanon Louis Fernand Delamare left for Paris for consultations with the French foreign ministry on the outcome of the efforts that have been made in this connection.

After having met with President Ilyas Sarkis to say goodbye before leaving for France, Delamare declined to say anything to journalists other than that the talks he had with the Lebanese president were "extremely important", adding: I cannot at present reveal the nature of the subject on which the talks centered.

It appears that the French ambassador's eagerness not to say anything in this connection coincides with the information given by the diplomatic source on a new French initiative. It has been learned also that Catholic Church leader Pope Paul II has something to do with this subject because Papal Nuncio Monsignor Carlo Furno has participated in some aspects of the efforts and contacts that have taken place in this connection, particularly with the members of the isolationist leadership.

According to certain information, if all the parties concerned with the Lebanese crisis agree, France is prepared to play an important role by sending French forces to Lebanon to replace the Syrian forces which are operating as Arab deterrent forces in some areas in the capital and the suburbs, provided that the question of the Syrian forces' continued stay in the other areas is left for discussion at a later stage. The information says that France regards the restoration of normal life to the capital, Beirut, as a basic factor in resolving the crisis. It is worth noting that sniping operations take place and shelling is exchanged daily, particularly at night, in the commercial sector of the capital where the Palestine Liberation army forces are stationed as part of the Syrian forces.

The idea that is being discussed provides for the deployment of French forces in the commercial area and on the contact lines between the two sectors of the capital as well as in the southeastern suburb where the presidential palace and the Defense Ministry are situated.

On the other hand, during these efforts an idea was put forward providing for the deployment of international forces in the capital, Beirut, of which the French forces would constitute the basic force. It is worth noting that this idea agrees with the posture of the Phalangist Party leadership which has links with the Zionist enemy and which seeks the withdrawal of the Syrian forces from Lebanon, particularly from the area of Beirut and its suburbs.

According to other information, the Western European countries might adopt the French initiative--that is, the initiative will be announced in the name of the Western European countries following the American presidential elections which will take place next month.

In any case, the coming days will reveal more details and information about this matter.

CSO: 4802

DRAFT PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL MOVEMENT PUBLISHED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 25 Oct 80

[25 Oct 80 pp 12-16]

[Text] The following are excerpts from the draft plan for the reorganization of the Lebanese leftist National Movement which was carried on October 11 and 12 by the Beirut pro-Syrian daily AL SHARQ. The document was drawn up by Mr Mohsen Ibrahim, executive secretary general of the NM and presented to the Central Political Council and the Executive Committee of the movement.

The draft plan described itself as being "a political analysis of the Lebanese conflict in the present and future stages," and made recommendations concerning the broad lines of future action to pursue "the national Lebanese struggle during the critical situation."

The introduction gave a general picture of the Lebanese situation and stated the main purposes behind the draft plan. The Lebanese crisis was described as the result of local, Arab and international conflicts which prolong and complicate the Lebanese problem. It warned the National Movement against the risk of falling a victim of this situation as a result of inadequate policies. The document proposed to examine in an objective way the different aspects of the crisis in order to determine a practical line of action.

The report then proceeded to examine the various facts and conditions of the situation in the following manner:

"First. The Israeli Policy Vis-a-Vis Lebanon.

"I. The goals

"a) The "immediate and direct" goal is to strike a blow to the Palestinian revolution by destroying its military bases in Lebanon." The aim as it is seen, is to impose the Camp David agreements on the Palestinian cause, including the forced resettlement of Palestinians in the countries where they currently reside, including Lebanon. The document says that armed struggle remains the only hope for a Palestinian return to the occupied territories.

"b) The "immediate and direct" goal of using the Lebanese scene for more Israeli military and political activities to pressure the Arab steadfastness front, and especially Syria, into a defensive position.

"c) The "middle and long-range" Israeli goal of taking progressive control over Lebanon so as to realize "the Zionist ambitions in South Lebanon.

"2. The Means

In order to implement its goals, Israel would resort to the following means:

a) The consolidation of the occupation Israel has already achieved in the South with the creation of the mini-state of rebel Lebanese Major Saad Haddad, in addition to the annexation of parts of the borderline territories.

b) To provide political and material support to the "isolationist" project of the Lebanese Front in general and the "mini-state the Phalangist Party is establishing" in particular.

c) Frequent statements of Israeli political intentions on the Lebanese scene and which are broadly defined in the above point.

d) The use of military tactics to keep the Lebanese scene under constant pressure by the Israeli military machine (a policy which has been implemented ever since the March 1978 incursion).

e) To intensify military aggressions, especially air raids, every time the Middle East situation in general creates the right opportunity for it, with the purpose of frustrating Syria which had taken it "upon herself to ensure the security of Lebanon."

"Second: The U.S. Stand vis-a-vis the Lebanese situation

"1. The US position on the Lebanese crisis hinges on its overall Middle East policy, and is bent on attempting to spread the Camp David logic in the Arab world.

2. The US has given its approval to the Israeli plan to pressure Lebanon, the Palestinian resistance and Syria in Lebanon. The US is described as the main support of Israel and the main obstacle to the implementation of UN resolutions.

3. As far as the internal Lebanese situation is concerned, the US supports the legal authorities and acknowledges Lebanon's territorial sovereignty and independence. Yet, this does not preclude tacit support to the Lebanese Front "in order to maintain an essential balance of forces." This balance of forces is deemed necessary to maintain the chances of the Camp David peace process alive on the Lebanese scene.

"Third: The Lebanese Front's plans on the political and territorial levels:

1) The "isolationist" approach does not aim at the partition of Lebanon, but at the "occupation" of all of Lebanon with the purpose of imposing a one-party (phalangist) system.

2) The Phalangist policy of forced unity between the different forces in presence in the regions aims at forming a central base which would enable the party to carry out its ambition of monopolizing power in Lebanon as a whole. The plan said that unity as seen by the Phalangists would be a federation.

3) The Phalangists' position towards the Palestinian is in line with that of the Israelis; they aim at distributing the Palestinian population over the Arab countries, except Lebanon.

4) The fact that the Phalangists have monopolized power in regions under the control of the Lebanese Front confirms that they have plans for the establishment of a "one-party fascist system."

5) The Phalangists want to establish themselves as the legal authority in regions under their control.

6) The plan says that the reiterated warning against a power vacuum at the end of Mr. Sarkis' presidential mandate indicates that this is the time when the Phalangist Party will substitute itself for the legal authority in regions under its control. This is interpreted as likely to lead to a resumption of the war.

"Fourth: The stand and the responsibilities of the legal authorities

1) The plan blames the Lebanese legal authorities for having ignored reality and having encouraged the impression that the Lebanese Front was the victorious side.

2) The legal authorities lost time in their search for partial solutions as was the case with the reconstruction of the Army.

3) Following Syria's decision to withdraw part of its forces from Lebanon, and especially from Beirut, the National Movement proposed its plan for "a political solution to the Lebanese crisis" in order to avoid the power vacuum that would have resulted from the Syrian withdrawal. The plan was overlooked and still awaits the initiative of the President.

4) The 14-point proclamation made by President Sarkis received wide support. However, the text said, the State was unable to bring about a political solution to the conflict and this has let the crisis drag on.

Part Two

Part Two, which is divided into two sections, deals with the necessary means to put an end to internal dissensions, achieve the unity of military ranks and define the role of all forces in Lebanon: the Arab Deterrent Forces, the Internal Security Forces (gendarmes) and the Palestinian resistance. This part also looks into the necessary means to meet the needs of the population and to improve information and propaganda.

Section I

First and foremost, the National Movement reasserts its goal which is only "a means towards securing an overall solution to the Lebanese crisis."

It said that "despite the obstacles that stand in the way of a just peace, despite attempts by the isolationist faction to monopolize the situation, despite the Phalangist-Fascist continuous criticism of attempts to restore national unity, and despite continuous uprisings throughout the country, the National Movement maintains its belief that Lebanon's salvation can only come through political endeavours. Violence cannot solve the urgent problems and efforts deployed by some to extend a form of partisan hegemony over the country and can only be fatal to Lebanon's sovereignty.

"Democracy is, in our belief, the only possible solution capable of ensuring a healthy future to the country..."

"The National Movement is aware of the fact that the pro-Israeli isolationist faction in Lebanon is attempting to drown the country in a new wave of violence. The persisting escalation of Zionist moves in the South and in particular the increase in Zionist armed presence, is a proof of the isolationist influence.

"On the other hand, the National Movement understands very well that it must continue to fight and consequently to defend Lebanon against its aggressors. The struggle will always be undertaken in the name of a just and equitable political solution. The National Movement refuses to take up arms for the sake of extending its own hegemony over the country."

A. Main Conditions for National Unity

"1. The reconstruction of the Lebanese political and central authority.
2. To reassert Lebanon's Arab allegiance.
3. To establish a just and democratic rule.
4. To rebuilt the armed forces and the various national institutions.
5. To reactivate the economic and social sectors of the country.

B. Conditions for a Democratic Reform

The plan said that once national unity is re-established in the country on the basis of the principles defined above, "then we must carry on the democratic struggle in an effort to exploit the country's resources at all levels. When this becomes possible, the National Movement will extend its hand to all factions with the purpose of pursuing the goal to the end. The National Movement will then implement the working paper first proposed in August 1970, a plan which it considers as a national peace plan.

"The Zionist-Imperialist alliance has bestowed a special role upon Lebanon. It is well known that the Zionists have long coveted Lebanon's waters and lands, and in the past it (Lebanon) was chosen as an experimental site for the promotion of sectarian dualism, such as it exists in the Jewish state. The Camp David dilemma has added a new dimension to Lebanon's role, making it all the more linked to the Middle East crisis. Furthermore, the tripartite Camp David alliance has turned Lebanon into a battlefield to intimidate Arab states. By allying himself with Israel, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat has indirectly opened the way for the destruction of Lebanon..."

"To counteract Zionist plans, the National Movement has come forth with the following points:

"1. Formation of an Arab militarized Steadfastness and Confrontation Front whose responsibility will be to prevent violence and political deterioration in all Arab countries. It would have to undermine relations that foster defeatist plans; confront the US-Israeli alliance, demand the liberation of all occupied territories and the restoration of the Palestinian right to establish its state on its own land.

2. The task of the projected front has been adequately filled by Syria. Consequently it becomes imperative that we fully cooperate with Syria.

3. It is necessary to offer unlimited cooperation to the Palestinian cause. The PLO will be considered as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

[1 Nov 80 pp 11-13]

[Text] 4) To support the National Movement's goal of preserving the unity of Lebanon, its Arab character and its democratic evolution.

5) To work within a truly unified Arab context and along the lines drawn by the Arab summit.

6) To foster strategic relations with the Soviet Union and most socialist countries and liberation movements.

7) To preserve the national and social gains that have been secured by the National Movement.

8) To promote a popular majority which will assume its responsibilities in the struggle against the Zionist-imperialist alliance.

9) To keep up the influence of the national and progressive Arab front at a popular level and throughout the Arab world.

10) Arab unity remains the only weapon which the Arabs can use to secure their social and national independence.

Leadership

"In view of the chaotic situation which prevails across the country, it becomes imperative that the President of the Republic assumes his responsibilities vis-a-vis the nation. A continued lack of central authority can be fatal since it will promote the current trend calling for dividing the country into cantons or a federation.

"Our first demand will be the formation of a cabinet which is long overdue. We are not concerned with its external make-up but rather with the policy it will follow. Will the new cabinet put an end to the fascist faction and destroy the trends calling for partition, or will the cabinet continue, as in the past, to accept the present status quo.

"The answers to these questions lie in the stand that the President will choose to take. He must dictate the future political evolution of the country."

The document went on to list the bases on which national unity should be achieved by the new cabinet:

--a plan for the reconstruction of the Army
--a security plan for all the Lebanese territories
--a plan to preserve the South from Israeli aggressions
--a plan to implement agreements concluded between Lebanon and the PLO
--a plan to define Lebanese-Syrian relations
--a plan to secure democratic values
--a plan for the reconstruction of the economic and social sectors

The document said that "the security plan needs to be implemented quickly, and we are looking forward to a new formula which would promote the role of the Army. On the other hand, the plan must clearly explain the responsibilities of the Arab Deterrent Forces, their coordination with the Lebanese Army."

On Palestinian presence in Lebanon, the text said "we must...work towards implementing the agreements that were signed between the local authorities and the PLO."

It added that a political plan needs to be formulated to promote the national interests of the country.

Reorganization

The document then dwelt on the measures that are necessary to be taken in order to "counteract the direct confrontation led by the pro-Israeli isolationist faction."

--"The pro-Israeli isolationist scheme which the Phalangist Party is implementing shows distinct Zionist involvement. This indicates that this party cannot work for national unity nor would accept solutions likely to restore peace in the country.

--"The legitimate authorities represented by the President of the Repbulic have failed to take a strong position against the Phalangist fascist current and have failed to implement a political solution to end this chaotic situation. Meanwhile, isolationist influence is increasing. If the population of this country does not pressure the authorities, we cannot expect from the latter any immediate actions.

--"Nevertheless, the power of the authorities is limited. This is why Opposition (i.e. the force opposed to the isolationist's schemes) must pull its weight across the country and work in cooperation with all factions that seek to preserve Lebanon's Arab character and its democratic evolution.

"The legitimate authorities, alone, cannot overcome the isolationist plan. The National Movement proposes to work with the authorities... The plan called for by the National Movement is completely different from the isolationist plan. The isolationist plan proposes a temporary state of partition (i.e. a confederation) but its long-term goal is complete hegemony of a sectarian and fascist rule. On

the other hand, the National Movement's plan calls for the reorganization of the country at all levels and urges Lebanese nationals to exert pressures on the authorities.

The document said that in order to achieve its goals and implement its plan, the National Movement should adopt a series of reorganization measures, which are as follows:

1) On the political level the text called for giving priority to collective action by all the NM's members and to reduce the importance of individual action by the various forces. It stressed, however, that this should not interfere with the ideological and political independence of the various individual groups and that the individual groups should not obstruct collective action by the Movement.

The text added that communication should be improved at all levels of the National Movement.

It also called for reorganizing the joint political committee that binds together the National Movement and the Palestinian resistance.

2) As far as military and para-military activities are concerned, the text called for unifying the military branches of all National Movement parties into one single military organization. It also called for reorganizing the joint military committee established between the National Movement and the Palestinian resistance, and for defining the duties and role of this committee.

Furthermore, the document called for establishing a unified joint military command for the National Movement member-parties.

The document also called for defining the role and duties of the (Syrian) Arab Deterrent Forces, the Lebanese Internal Security Forces (gendarmes) as well as relations between the National Movement and the various other security agencies existing in the country.

The document also underlined the importance of social questions and the need for ensuring decent living conditions to the population by reviving or creating services and institutions necessary for its welfare and well-being.

It also announced that the National Movement's newspaper AL WATAN would soon be published again and called for establishing a NM-owned radio-station in an effort to promote information.

CSO: 4820

AL-WAZZAN INTERVIEWED ON NATIONAL EVENTS

NC042103 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 4 Nov 80

[Excerpts] About a week ago, Prime Minister Shafiq Al-Wazzan was interviewed by AL-JUMHUR magazine on affairs and events taking place on the Lebanese arena. The magazine will publish the interview tomorrow, Wednesday.

Prime Minister Al-Wazzan began the interview by saying: What has been happening in Lebanon since the start of the events is definitely a plot, many plots. I cannot say anything about the timing of the 'Ayn Ar-Rummanah incidents. I can only say that they were apparently studied and came to coincide with the period of transferring the government responsibilities. Despite this, I will not evade the responsibility and I am dealing with the matter according to the dictates of duty. I believe that we must consider Lebanon's interests first and last even if this places on our shoulders a responsibility which is not the responsibility of our government that has not yet assumed its duties.

Asked if the army commander has placed his resignation at the disposal of the president of the republic, Prime Minister Al-Wazzan answered in the negative.

Asked if the legality has fallen with the fall of 'Ayn Ar-Rummanah, Al-Wazzan answered: I can deny this conclusion. Certain facts make me believe that the authority is serious about raising the flag of legality and determined to emphasize the sovereignty of the state.

Regarding the problem of the south and Israel's slicing of parts of it, the prime minister said: this question appears embarrassing at first for the official who can see clearly his inability to confront the aggression with his own resources. I will not clarify this statement or elaborate on the inability of Lebanon to confront the Israeli attacks. I say in answer: if the state cannot confront the situation militarily, then its only option is to seek the aid of the brothers and of the United Nations. We have sought this aid and you are aware of the course of events and the results. Those sincerely wishing to resist these attacks have only to point the way to us. We believe in useful resistance and not the resistance which would generate more tragedies and further occupation.

Concerning the defense law, Al-Wazzan said: I have a specific point of view based on my commitment to certain principles and stands and on memorandums which we submitted to the officials concerned. The gist of these memorandums is that we want to build a national, balanced and sound army which could earn the confidence of

all through their feeling that the army belongs to all of them and not to a certain faction. Moreover, we have declared that it is necessary to adopt the organizational rules followed by the sound democratic states in all matters relating to the reorganization of the army, including the intelligence directorate.

Regarding the 14 principles of the national accord, the prime minister said: these principles constitute the suitable groundwork to deal with the question of accord.

Concerning the state's relationship with the Palestinian Resistance and the loose security in the western part of Beirut, Prime Minister Al-Wazzan said: we believe in the need to coordinate with the Palestinian Resistance. This coordination should take place on the spot in light of the contacts, which must take place in keeping with the practice of the government so far. I hope we will succeed in this to serve Lebanon and the Palestinian question.

CSO: 4802

NEW PRIME MINISTER OUTLINES PRIORITIES

Shafik Wazzan

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 27 Oct-2 Nov 80 pp 24-29

[Interview with Shafik Wazzan, prime minister designate, by Mona al-Said, date and place not given]

[Text]

In his first private interview with the press after his appointment last week, Prime Minister Designate Shafik Wazzan told *Monday Morning* on Friday that one of his first priorities as Lebanon's new premier will be the implementation of the controversial defense law.

Wazzan also said that he intended to take part in the preparation of a security plan which would be designed to bring the internal situation under control.

Disagreement over parts of the defense law was one of the major factors which clouded relations between President Elias Sarkis and Prime Minister Selim Hoss, Wazzan's predecessor.

Wazzan, as president of the Islamic Council and member of the Islamic Grouping, was known to be a supporter of Hoss' position, and he told *Monday Morning* last week that his views on this subject have not changed.

"President Sarkis knows all my thoughts and positions, and I have even submitted written memoranda to him on the subjects to which your question refers," he said. "Our commitment to the memoranda that we have submitted (on the subject of the Army) stands, and this matter will doubtless claim a major part of our attention until we arrive at a conclusion that serves the national interest."

He added: "We don't want something for any sect to the exclusion of any other sect in Lebanon... We want the Army to have a national structure."

Asked if the Lebanese could expect the implementation of the defense law in the near future, Wazzan said, "This must happen! It must happen! "

The disagreement over the defense law reportedly revolves around the prerogatives of the Maronite Army commander and the jurisdiction of the Army intelligence section, which is also headed by a Maronite. The dispute has held up the implementation of the new defense law, which was drafted and approved by Parliament to make the Army more "balanced" confessionally and eliminate Moslem and leftist objections to the use of the Army for security duties in West Beirut, South Lebanon and other leftist-dominated areas.

It is this dispute which is believed to have hampered the implementation of a number of nationwide "security plans" worked out by President Sarkis and involving the use of the Army.

On the subject of security plans, Wazzan said: "If there is to be a security plan, I want to be responsible for it; I want to participate in its preparation. Otherwise, I would not be willing to bear this responsibility... We must have a security plan in the preparation of which I participate."

Answering questions about his relations with the various armed parties in Lebanon, Wazzan said he had "many strong friendships" among the members of the National Movement, Lebanon's major leftist alliance.

He said he had not met with the rightist (Maronite) Lebanese Front alliance, but he pointed out that he had discussed matters with some Lebanese Front MPs during his parliamentary consultations last week.

These MPs, he said, "wanted to place a special responsibility in my hands in my capacity as president of the Islamic Council. I, in turn, gave them a special message: that they must understand the truth of the Islamic position, through which the Moslems have demonstrated allegiance to Lebanon which is above suspicion. I asked them to refer either to their official, recorded speeches or to statements that they had made, and I requested that they abide by what they had said, assuring them that this alone would facilitate efforts to settle the situation. This nation can rise only on foundations of justice and equality, and we will accept nothing short of justice and equality.

"I said to one of them: 'I refuse to allow anyone to monopolize the honor of allegiance to Lebanon or the honor of defending either the territory of Lebanon or any national Lebanese issue. Let no one posture on these matters.'"

Members of the Lebanese Front, especially the Phalangist Party, have often cast doubt on the Lebanese Moslem community's allegiance to Lebanon and declared that the Front had singlehandedly defended Lebanon while the rest of the population watched.

On his relations with Damascus, Wazzan said he had always called for "special" Lebanese-Syrian relations, and he emphasized that he was ready to contact or visit Syria "when I find that the national interest requires" it.

On Lebanese-Palestinian relations, Wazzan called for coordination with the Palestinians "in such a way as to maintain the effectiveness of the Palestinian struggle in all arenas and at the same time preserve the sovereignty of Lebanon and protect Lebanon from harm."

At this writing on Saturday afternoon, Wazzan is in Baabda for what is generally believed will be his final consultations with President Elias Sarkis, and his sources say the members of the new government will be named after the meeting.

On Friday, he told me that Lebanon's democratic system "dictates a government whose members are drawn from Parliament, and this is what the MPs want. They also want each minister to have only one portfolio."

He added: "But the Lebanese constitution is flexible on this matter, and it allows the President and the prime minister to form a government of non-parliamentarians or a mixed government of parliamentarians and non-parliamentarians when the need for such a government arises.

"We are now in conditions that free us of all formal considerations as we all strive for the major goal of saving Lebanon. The salvation of

Lebanon requires more than names. We hope that the men we choose will be as close as possible to perfection and to the ability to undertake the mission that will be entrusted to them in these difficult times."

I asked the premier designate exactly what that mission would be.

My question:

I know you don't like labels, but how would you describe your government? A "security government" that will concentrate on giving the Lebanese people security, as most MPs have demanded? A "national accord" government that will deal with all parties and try to bring them together? An "external affairs" government that will concentrate on improving Lebanese-Syrian and Lebanese-Palestinian relations? A "routine affairs" government that will focus on the day-to-day matters and avoid the basic issues?

That question gives the impression that we are after a specialized government, like a man who asks for a heart specialist or an internist or an eye specialist. The fact is that we are suffering from all diseases, and the government will govern with everything it has in terms of legal and constitutional power, using prerogatives which are limited by nothing but the constitution, the law and tradition.

A minister of health, for instance, must make use of all his prerogatives to improve the health situation and do his duty in that regard. The same applies to the other ministers.

Those labels were brought up by people who were thinking of certain conditions which dictate, for instance, special attention to the security that all the people need and demand; conditions which dictate the presence of certain people and forces that would be responsible for security. This, of course, will be taken into consideration, keeping in mind that the coming government will be a government which has full authority and is fully qualified to do its duty in all the fields that you have mentioned and in many other fields that you have not mentioned.

We are like doctors who must offer treatment for any ailment that they come across. Otherwise, we would be neglecting our duty to the nation and shirking the responsibility that we have agreed to bear in these difficult circumstances.

Are you and President Elias Sarkis in agreement on the basic issues that have clouded relations between the President and Premier Salim Hoss?

I am not new to the political arena. President Sarkis knows all my thoughts and positions, and I have even submitted written memoranda to him on the subjects to which your question implicitly refers.

I am not one of those who abandon their ideas, change their principles and shift their positions. But I am a positive man and I work to achieve everything that serves the interests of Lebanon.

Where the Army is concerned, our commitment to the memoranda that we have submitted stands, and this matter will doubtless claim a major part of our attention until we arrive at a conclusion that serves the national interest. We don't want something for any sect to the exclusion of any other sect in Lebanon. We want the welfare of all the Lebanese. We want national measures. We want the Army to have a national structure. We want the Army to be a model to be emulated by all State institutions, to take on the form that all of Lebanon wants it to take — democratic Lebanon, nationalist Lebanon, the Lebanon that wants to rid itself of the sectarianism that has so far hampered its growth and progress and is, indeed, responsible for the horrible situation in which we find ourselves today.

But are you in agreement with the President on the question of the Army law?

I believe the answer I have given you is enough. I could have given you more, but I would rather not go into the details at this stage — not because I don't want to commit myself or because I am afraid to express my views, but because protocol and political and national interest considerations dictate that I wait for the formation of the government before I speak, so that anything I have will be presented as part of the government's program and ideas.

Can we expect the full implementation of the defense law in the near future?

This must happen! It must happen!

Are you in agreement with the President on the question of the security plan?

To tell you the truth, we have read about so many security plans that we no longer know what security plan the newspapers are talking about.

If there is to be a security plan, I want to be responsible for it; I want to participate in its preparation. Otherwise, I would not be willing to bear this responsibility.

So you will prepare a new security plan?

I will definitely look into this matter. We must have a security plan in the preparation of which I participate.

Can we expect the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the commercial center of Beirut during your term?

I could have refused to answer many of your questions on the grounds that they are premature, but I'm afraid you would interpret this as my way of ducking the question, and I never duck questions.

But how can I answer a question about the deployment of the Army when I just told you that I want to take part in preparing the security plan? The plan I want has not been prepared yet, and I have not seen any of the previous plans, so I cannot adopt them.

But you must have an idea of the security plan you would like to have implemented. Could you give us an idea of the form this plan could take?

This is my first interview with your magazine, and I would like to tell you that I am straight in all my dealings.

I am not a technician, so I cannot prepare the plan myself. But when I ask technicians to prepare the plan, I have enough brains and reason and vision to determine the nature and the goals of the plan and to recognize its merits and limitations.

Are you in agreement with President Sarkis on the so-called "weapon of clear positions" — the weapon which Premier Hoss says has never been used by the executive authorities?

I know that the position is the position of the State, and anyone who feels he cannot go along with it must step down.

Do you expect this "weapon" to be used during your term?

If we consider positions to be weapons, then the mere announcement of a position dictates that the man who announced it either implement it or return to his home.

Are you in touch with Damascus?

I have not visited Damascus for some time. In the past, I have visited Damascus only when the national interest dictated a visit. When I find that the national interest requires direct contact with Damascus, or even a visit to Damascus, I will not hesitate one second.

How would you evaluate your relations with Syria?

I am among those who say that our relations with Damascus must always be strong. And this is not a new position on my part. I have stated it in Parliament, and you will find it in the records — especially the records of the period when the Permanent Lebanese-Syrian Commission was created. Anyone who reads the House's records of that session will find that I have always been a proponent of special relations between Damascus and Beirut.

Have you contacted the Palestine Liberation Organization?

I have not contacted them, but I have made contact with them, in principle, through my statements at the entrance of the presidential palace (after his appointment as premier designate). I believe that kind of contact is stronger than a direct telephone contact.

We support the PLO in its struggle to regain Arab rights in Palestine; we support it in its rejection of permanent resettlement and in every activity it undertakes in any arena toward the realization of these goals.

And if Palestinian activities have led Lebanon into embarrassing and confusing situations and sometimes into situations which have been unacceptable to some, it is our duty to coordinate with the Palestinians in such a way as to maintain the effectiveness of the Palestinian struggle in all arenas and at the same time preserve the sovereignty of Lebanon and protect Lebanon from harm.

What I'm saying now is nothing new. I have said it repeatedly in the past, and it is recorded in Parliament and in communiqués. As I said in answer to one of your questions, I will never change any of my positions.

Will there be any direct contact between you and the PLO soon?

I hope to contact all forces present in Lebanon.

What are your goals where the Palestinians are concerned?

Where the Palestinians are concerned, we have no goals other than the support of the Palestinian cause. Support of the Palestinian cause today carries a double benefit: a benefit for the Palestinian people, who have had enough suffering and dispersion, and a benefit for Lebanon, because there are some who want the Palestinians to remain in these conditions until they despair, abandon their cause and accept the idea of permanent resettlement (in Lebanon).

We must therefore help the Palestinians for nationalist considerations first, so that they will regain their country, and second to end their problems in Lebanon — problems which have spawned a Lebanese issue.

How would you evaluate your relations with the Lebanese Front?

The truth is that we have no relations with the Lebanese Front so far, although I did receive some MPs who belong to the Lebanese Front during my consultations with Parliament.

The Front has its own ideas, and the Front MPs with whom I met wanted to place a special responsibility in my hands in my capacity as president of the Islamic Council. I, in turn, gave them a special message: that they must understand the truth of the Islamic position, through which the Moslems have demonstrated allegiance to Lebanon which is above suspicion. I asked some of them to refer either to their official, recorded speeches or to statements that they had made, and I requested that they abide by what they had said, assuring them that this alone would facilitate efforts to settle the situation.

This nation can rise only on foundations of justice and equality, and we will accept nothing short of justice and equality.

I said to one of them: "I refuse to allow anyone to monopolize the honor of allegiance to Lebanon or the honor of defending either the territory of Lebanon or any national Lebanese issue. Let no one posture on these matters, especially after the lessons we have all learned and must benefit from in any future step to rebuild the new Lebanon."

Do you intend to meet with the Lebanese Front as a whole?

I have not thought of that so far, so I cannot answer you. But I believe that national interest will, at the appropriate time, dictate a meeting among all parties – not a meeting of meaningless sentiments but a meeting on the basis of unified principles on which we can build the Lebanon of the future, the Lebanon which the coming generations want.

How would you evaluate your relations with the National Movement?

As far as I am concerned, I consider myself a friend. I have strong friendships among the parties and people in the National Movement, and we hold many principles in common.

But I don't want to get carried away with this answer. I would rather have you hear it from them before you hear it from me.

Have you met with the National Movement?

I have not met with the National Movement, but I have been contacted by Mr. Walid Junblatt (elected president of the Movement, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party and leader of the parliamentary National Struggle Front). The members of the Struggle Front with whom I met during the consultations relayed to me Mr. Junblatt's greetings and informed me that the positions which they explained to me were adopted under Mr. Junblatt's guidance – which I consider very encouraging.

Once again, I don't want to get carried away. I would rather have the answer come from them, not from me.

You have not set a date for a meeting with the Movement?

No, but I believe in the need for direct contact, and this is what I said when I completed my consultations with Parliament. I said that I would now turn my attention to contacts with certain quarters with whom I believe it would be useful to confer.

What about your relations with former President Suleiman Franjieh?

We hold President Franjieh in great regard and esteem, especially in view of his bold nationalist positions.

And I would like to tell you – I have not revealed this before – that when I went to the North and visited (former) Premier (Rashid) Karami, I seized the opportunity of my presence there to contact President Franjieh by phone – first to ask about his health (for I had heard, with regret, that he was not feeling well), and second to request his support in the mission that I have been entrusted with. You are the first one to know this.

Do you intend to meet with him in the near future?

We did not discuss this. But I did meet with the parliamentary bloc led by Bakhos Hakim and the discussion we had was a clear expression of President Franjieh's views.

And as I told you, we will not hesitate to hold any meeting or make any contact which we believe can serve this nation. ●

Wazzan's Background

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 27 Oct-2 Nov 80 pp 13-17

[Excerpt]

Shafik Wazzan, 55, was born in Beirut, studied law at the St. Joseph University and has been a practising attorney since he received his degree in 1947. Married and the father of two children — Wassim and Susan — he was elected to Parliament in 1968 and served as minister of justice in the government of Rashid Karami in 1969. In 1973, he was elected president of the (Sunnite) Islamic Council, a post which he holds to this day. He is also a member of the Islamic Grouping, a loose alliance of right-wing Sunnite politicians which was formed during the Lebanese war, has remained out of the hostilities and has often been named by Phalangist Party President Pierre Gemayel as the group most qualified to enter into a dialogue with the Maronite Lebanese Front on the future of Lebanon.

CSO: 4820

BIOGRAPHIC DATA ON NEW MINISTERS GIVEN

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 3-9 Nov 80 pp 22-34

[Article by Lydia Georgi]

[Text]

Last week, this magazine introduced Prime Minister and Interior Minister Shafik Wazzan — lawyer, former MP, president of the (Sunnite) Islamic Council, member of the (Sunnite) Islamic Grouping and father of two children.

This week, the rest of the Wazzan government introduces itself.

Each of the 20 ministers of the Wazzan government was asked by *Monday Morning* to tell our readers who he is and where he stands politically.

Each was also asked to give a message to the Lebanese people about what he hoped to achieve in the government.

And each obliged.

This (in alphabetical order) is how Lebanon's new ministers — who may "help elect the next President of the Republic," as leftist leader Walid Junblatt told us last week — view themselves and what they hope to achieve:

Joseph Abu Khater

JOSEPH ABU KHATER, MINISTER OF STATE

His message to the Lebanese people: "I will devote myself to the tasks which are entrusted to me as minister of state. I assume that, for certain reasons, I will be asked to concentrate on the efforts which must be exerted in the direction of national entente. I will devote myself wholeheartedly to this mission, because I am convinced that entente is the *sine qua non* condition for Lebanon's return to a quiet life in an atmosphere of restored security. The very survival of Lebanon depends on it."

His place and date of birth: Zahle, 1909

His sect: Greek Catholic.

His political affiliation: As a political leader in Zahle, he says, "I was my own boss." In Beirut, he headed the "Chehabist" Nahj Bloc, the cluster of MPs supporting the late President Fuad Chehab. He refuses to say what party or political leader he represents in the new government.

His political career:

•In 1946, he served as Lebanese ambassador to Mexico (seven years), then Lebanese ambassador to Italy and Austria (seven years), then Lebanese ambassador to Egypt and the Arab League (seven years).

•In 1958, his diplomatic career was briefly interrupted when he was appointed secretary general of the foreign affairs ministry, after which he returned to his post as ambassador in Cairo.

•In 1950, he was a member of Lebanon's first delegation to the U.N., and in 1959, he headed a Lebanese delegation to the U.N. Earlier (1947), he had headed Lebanon's delegation to the UNESCO conference in Mexico.

•He served as minister of education in two governments headed by Premier Rashid Karami, from 1968 until 1970.

•He ran for Parliament in 1968, heading his own ticket, and was elected deputy for Zahle and Beqaa. He was not a candidate in the 1972 parliamentary elections.

His professional background:

•He received a law degree from Beirut's St. Joseph University in 1925.

•He had his own legal practice from 1925 until 1946, when he started his diplomatic career.

His marital status: He is married to Renée *née* Skaf (his cousin) and has one son, Ibrahim.

MAHMOUD AMMAR, MINISTER OF STATE

His message to the Lebanese people: "It is my hope that the Lebanese people will recognize the dangers besetting them, unify their ranks and rally around the legitimate authorities of the Lebanese State.

"As a minister of state, I will strive, first and foremost, to achieve a minimum level of security, to provide the day-to-day needs of the people, and to help implement the (announced) principles of national accord."

His place and date of birth: Bourj Brajneh, a suburb of Beirut, 1920.

His sect: Shiite.

His political affiliation: He is a member of the Independent Parliamentary Bloc and represents it in the government. He is also a member of the Higher Shiite Council which was founded by Imam Mousa Sadr, who disappeared mysteriously when he visited Libya in 1978, and is now headed by its vice president, Sheikh Mohammed Mehdi Shamseddin.

His political career:

•He served as head of the Bourj Brajneh municipal council from 1952 until 1961.

•In 1957, he ran for Parliament on the ticket of President Camille Chamoun, the Phalangist Party and Independents, and was elected deputy for the Baabda-Southern Metn region.

•He joined Chamoun's National Liberal Party when it was formed in 1958 and remained in it until 1976.

•He was reelected to Parliament in 1960, 1964, 1968 and 1972 and is still an MP.

•He has served as chairman of the parliamentary Post, Telegraph and Telephone Committee. Until his appointment as minister of state, he was chairman of the Administration and Justice Committee and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

•In 1975, he served as minister of information in the government of Premier Rashid Solh.

His professional background:

•He received a *licence* in law from the French Law Academy in Beirut in 1943.

•He has been a practising attorney since 1943.

His marital status: He is married to Iffat *née* Baajour and has six sons: Hussein (27), Ahmed (25), Mohammed (23), Hassan (22), Ali (16) and Imad (14).

KHATCHIK BABIKIAN, MINISTER OF JUSTICE

His message to the Lebanese people: "This is a message of hope. After five years of suffering, the Lebanese people must realize that all we have gone through is nothing but a fleeting moment in the history of this country. Lebanon will remain, or rather, it will become better than it ever was, because the events that have occurred since 1975 will help shape our national character and our sense of brotherhood.

"In the field of justice, Lebanon has very ancient traditions. I hope that, with the cooperation of everyone, I will be able to give more hope to all those who are suffering. I will make a special effort to give justice a new face, particularly in the provinces and the remote regions which have often been neglected by the central authority. That, after all, would only be an expression of the

deep feeling that every Lebanese should have in favor of the equality of all citizens — the more deprived being entitled to the solicitude of the State before the others."

His place and date of birth: Cyprus, 1924.

His sect: Armenian Orthodox.

His political affiliation: He is not a member of any party, although he is close to the Tashnag Party. In this government, he considers himself the representative of the Lebanese Armenian community as a whole.

His political career:

•He ran for Parliament in April, 1957 on the ticket of the late Premier Sami Solh and was elected member of Parliament for Beirut. He was reelected MP for Beirut in 1960, 1964, 1968 and 1972. He is still an MP.

•He has served as chairman of Parliament's Committee of Standing Orders (1959), member of Parliament's Justice Committee (1959), member of Parliament's Economic Committee, chairman of Parliament's Committee for Planning, Reconstruction, Petroleum and Industry since 1977, when the ministry of planning was dissolved.

•He has served as minister of state for reform in the government of Premier Saeb Salam (1960-61), minister of health in the government of Premier Rashid Karami (1969), minister of tourism in the government of Premier Rashid Karami (1970), minister of information in the government of Premier Saeb Salam (1972), and minister of planning (1973).

•He represented President Charles Helou at the International Labor Organization conference in Geneva in 1969 and at the non-aligned nations' summit in 1970.

His professional background:

•After getting a law degree from Beirut's St. Joseph University, he received a doctorate in political economics and public law from the same university (1944) and studied for six months at the London School of Economics (1947).

•He has been a registered attorney in Lebanon since 1944.

His marital status: He is married to Marguerite *née* Hajjar and has five daughters: Reine-Marie (22), Christine (21), Anita (20), Carole (17) and Nicole (16).

MOHAMMED YOUSSEF BAYDOUN, MINISTER OF OIL AND INDUSTRY

His message to the Lebanese people: "I will do everything in my power to have this ministry accomplish the mission with which it is entrusted. Where the Lebanese people are concerned, I appeal to them to realize that their salvation is in their own hands."

His place and date of birth: Beirut, 1931.

His sect: Shiite.

His political affiliation: He is a member of the Independent Parliamentary Bloc, which he represents in the new government, but he has steered clear of all political parties. "I have never joined a political party in my life, thank God," he told me, adding, "except the Party of God."

His political career:

•He has been a member of the Beirut Municipal Council since 1961.

•He ran for Parliament in 1972 on the same ticket with Adnan Hakim and Ibrahim Shammas. His partners were not elected, but he was, and he is still an MP for Beirut.

His social-cultural activities:

•He has been president of the Amiliyeh (Shiite) Islamic Welfare Association since 1973.

•He has been president of the Amiliyeh (Shiite) Scouts since 1972.

•He has been a member of the Social Action Association since he helped found it in 1963. The Amiliyeh (Shiite) Technical Institute is an affiliate of the Social Action Association.

•He has been a member of the executive committee of the Lebanese Red Cross since the mid-1960's.

His professional background:

•He received a law degree from Beirut's St. Joseph University (French and Lebanese law) in 1955.

•He was still studying when he became the director of a flour mill in Iraq, a post which he held until 1958.

•In 1958, he was appointed director of the STARCO company, and he supervised the construction of the STARCO center in downtown Beirut.

•In the early 1960's, he launched a private commercial enterprise with his brothers. The business is still going.

•He has been a member of the Beirut Merchants' Association since the late 1960's.

•He has been vice-president of the Beirut Chamber of Commerce and Industry since 1972.

Marital status: He is married to Najla *née* Baydoun and has five children: Nehmat (23), Youssef (20), Nayla (16), Nadine (11) and Hussein (10).

NAZIH BIZRI, MINISTER OF HEALTH

His message to the Lebanese people: "In keeping with the humanitarian principles in which I believe, I will do everything in my power to implement a hospitalization and medical policy which will guarantee a hospital bed for every patient and medicine for every ailing citizen. It is every citizen's right to have the State provide him with sound public health and, for those who are unable to pay, free hospitalization.

"This ministry is determined to exert serious efforts to improve the existing government hospitals so that they can play their role fully. In

addition, we will work toward the establishment of new government hospitals and the strengthening of government clinics, so that we can cover all Lebanese regions and provide all citizens with the required health care.

"In this context, we will pay special attention to the health conditions of South Lebanon, helping the Southerners, who are suffering from daily Israeli aggression, to cling to their land and resist all forms of displacement.

"We will also endeavor to impose a medicine price list which will reflect the actual prices of medicines, and we will exert serious efforts to implement the decree for the establishment of the National Medicines Office, which can represent a sound solution of the chronic medicine problem.

"Where efforts to save Lebanon are concerned, we hope to arrive at the desired goal in cooperation with all the Lebanese people, that goal being the rebuilding of a sound and healthy nation through smoothly functioning legal institutions."

His place and date of birth: Sidon, South Lebanon, 1915.

His sect: Sunni.

His political affiliation: He is not a member of any political party but belongs to the Independent Parliamentary Bloc and represents it in the new government.

His political career:

- He ran for Parliament as an independent in 1952 and was elected MP for Sidon. He was reelected in 1972, also as an independent, and is still an MP.
- He served as head of the Sidon Municipal Council until 1957.
- He served as minister of health and of economy in the government of Premier Rashid Karami in 1954-55.
- He served as minister of labor and social affairs and of health in the government of Premier Abdullah Yafi in 1955-56.
- He served as minister of health in 1972-73.
- He served as minister of economy in 1974-75.

His professional background:

- He received his M.D. (general medicine) from the American University of Beirut.
- He was director of the government hospital in Sidon until 1957.
- He has a private clinic in Sidon, where he has lived and worked since the beginning of the war. He has stayed there "as a point of principle," to encourage the Southerners to stay in the South, although he has a home in Beirut.

His marital status: He is married to Soraya *née* Jawhari and has four children: Roukiya, Randa, Abderrahman and Rula (ages not provided).

FUAD BUTROS, FOREIGN MINISTER AND DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER

His message to the Lebanese people: He would rather "leave this to the new ministers."

His place and date of birth: Beirut, 1918.

His sect: Greek Orthodox.

His political affiliation: He was a "Chehabist" — a supporter of the late President Fuad Chehab — during the Chehab regime (1958-1964) and the regime of President Charles Helou (1964-1970), as was President Elias Sarkis.

His political career:

•He served as minister of education and of planning in 1959-60.

•He was elected member of Parliament for Beirut in 1960 and served as deputy Speaker in 1960-61. He was reelected to Parliament in 1964 and cooperated with the regime of President Charles Helou, who was brought to power by the Chehabists. He was defeated in the parliamentary elections of 1968 and did not run again.

•In 1961, he was appointed minister of justice in the government of Premier Rashid Karami and held that post until 1964.

•He served as minister of defense and of education and as deputy prime minister in 1966.

•He served as minister of foreign affairs and of tourism and as deputy prime minister in 1968.

•He headed the Lebanese delegation to the U.N. General Assembly in 1968.

•In December, 1976, he was appointed minister of foreign affairs and of defense and deputy prime minister in the first government of Premier Selim Hoss. Since then, he has held the posts of minister of foreign affairs and deputy prime minister without interruption.

His professional background:

•He holds a law degree and a diploma of higher judicial and practical studies from Beirut's St. Joseph University.

•He served as clerk in the Mixed Court of Appeal from 1940 until 1942, when he was appointed judge at the Civil Court of Mount Lebanon.

•In 1944, he was appointed judge at the Mixed Civil and Commercial Court of Beirut.

•In 1946, he was appointed examining magistrate at the Military Court.

•In 1947, he left the judiciary and started his career as an attorney.

•In 1970, after several years of involvement in the country's political life, he returned to his legal practice and stayed with it until 1976.

His marital status: He is married to Tania *née* Shéhadé and has two daughters and one son.

MUSTAFA DERNAIKA, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE

His message to the Lebanese people: "I hope that our work, under the leadership of the prime minister and with the guidance of His Excellency the President, will give a better idea about us (than any message could give). It is too early to talk about details."

His place and date of birth: Tripoli, 1936.

His sect: Sunni.

His political affiliation: He would rather not go into that. "Ask the prime minister," he advised me, adding: "The less we talk the better we can work."

His political career: He has not been directly involved in politics so far.

His professional background:

•He received a civil engineering degree from the Technical University of (West) Berlin in 1963.

•After working as an engineer in West Germany for less than a year, he came to Lebanon and worked for four years at the engineering and contracting office of Rudolph Elias.

•He arranged a joint venture between Rudolph Elias and financier Talaat Krayem, and they founded ARCOPA (Arab Countries Development Co.), in which he worked until 1967.

•He left the company in 1967 and went to Dubai, where he worked at the Darwish Engineering Co.

•In mid-1971, he founded the SOGEX contracting company, which he owns with Samir Hamza, a mechanical engineer.

His marital status: He is married and has four children: Rashad (16), Karim (11), Hania (9) and Dania (7).

MICHEL EDDE, MINISTER OF INFORMATION

His message to the Lebanese people: "At this juncture, information must pave the way for national reconciliation, help bring viewpoints closer together, and contribute toward ending this crisis, which has lasted too long and become unbearable for all the Lebanese, particularly those of limited means.

"I promise the Lebanese people that I will revive the ministry of information, which now, for the first time in four years, has a full-time minister in charge of it. Information ministers have so far (since the war) held other portfolios and have therefore neglected the ministry of information. I intend to make this ministry a link between the Lebanese."

His place and date of birth: Beirut, 1928.

His sect: Maronite.

His political affiliation: He is not a member of any political party and represents no one in the new government. He is, however, "close" to Raymond Edde (self-exiled leader of the National Bloc and 1976 presidential contender), whom he holds in "great esteem."

His political career: He served as minister of post, telegraph and telephone and of information in the government of Rashid Karami in 1966-68.

His professional background:

- He received a law degree from Beirut's St. Joseph University in 1948.
- He practised law from 1948 until 1966, when he was appointed minister.
- In 1968, he returned to his legal practice and became involved in industrial enterprises abroad.

His marital status: He is married to Yola *née* Doumit and has five children: Selim (21), Jean-Gabriel (20), Maroun (19), Isabelle (16) and Elias (14).

MARWAN HAMADE, MINISTER OF TOURISM

His message to the Lebanese people: "The word 'tourism' may draw a smile in Lebanon these days, but tourism covers everything: security, the environment, economic activity, the cost of living; in short, all the problems that directly concern every citizen today.

"Moreover, a ministry, in addition to being a specific portfolio, is a political function. We will try to undertake this function, with national entente as our main goal. When the Lebanese people can once more enjoy 'tourism' between the various regions and areas without danger or discrimination, we will have attained our goal.

"I hope to be able to give the ministry of tourism a cultural dimension and make of it a moving force for a series of youth meetings — meetings among the Lebanese and between them and foreigners."

His place and date of birth: Beirut, 1939.

His sect: Druze.

His political affiliation: He is not a member of any party, but his candidacy to the government was proposed and supported by Walid Junblatt, leader of the Progressive Socialist Party.

His political career:

•He is a member of the Druze Council for Research and Development.

•He has been entrusted with several missions by the Arab League to defend the Palestinian cause on French and Swiss television and at a number of conferences in Europe.

His professional background:

•He holds a degree in law and a degree in political economics from Beirut's St. Joseph University (1963).

•He served as account executive at the Business Services and Research Corporation (BSR), a leading Beirut-based public relations firm, in 1964.

•He co-founded Lebanon's French-language newspaper "Le Jour," in 1965 and served as editor of Arab and foreign news in it until 1971 when he became assistant editor-in-chief of the newspaper after its merger with "L'Orient" to become the only French-language daily in Lebanon ("L'Orient-Le Jour") at that time. He remained in that post until 1975.

•He has been the foreign correspondent of RTL (Radio Luxembourg, Paris) in the Middle East since 1968.

•He has been the foreign correspondant of the French magazine *Le Point* in the Middle East since 1971.

•He served as assistant managing director of An-Nahar SCPA from 1975 until 1976.

•In 1977, he founded and became managing director of An-Nahar Publications Internationales S.A., a French-based subsidiary of An-Nahar which publishes an Arabic-language weekly in Paris: *An-Nahar al-Arabi wad-Doualy.*

•Also in 1977, he became chairman and managing director of An-Nahar Press Services S.A.R.L. and managing director of An-Nahar S.C.P.A., the company that publishes "An-Nahar," Lebanon's leading daily.

•He served as chairman of the board of TAMAM (Trans Arab Media) from October, 1978 until December, 1979. He is now a member of that board.

•Also in October, 1978, he became a member of the board of Ciment de Sibline S.A.

•He is also a member of the boards of Idara S.A.L. (a company which owns shares in several press enterprises), the Press Cooperative S.A.L., Coprinting S.A.L., and Société de Distribution S.A.L.

His marital status: He is married to Suhair *née* Houri and has two children: Karim (15) and Rania (11).

ELIAS HRAWI, MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORT

His message to the Lebanese people: "Our government's motto is 'A government for all Lebanon, working for all the Lebanese.' Our doors are open to everyone in need.

"My hope is that the civil servants will be ethical, that they will refuse to sign any illegal transaction, so that we can regain the confidence of the people in the State. I categorically refuse to sign any formality that is not strictly legal. I will not go beyond the law. There is no room in this ministry for those who are after commissions.

"We will adopt a policy of reward and punishment with the civil servants. I have asked them to work as a team with me, and not as employees with their superior, so that we can all render the services which public opinion demands. I have also asked them to seek, through the work of this ministry, to restore solidarity among all members of the Lebanese family, without discrimination between one region and another or between one sect and another."

His place and date of birth: Zahle, Beqaa, 1926.

His sect: Maronite.

His political affiliation: He is a member of Parliament's Independent Maronite Grouping, which he represents in the government.

His political career:

•He ran for Parliament in 1964 but, seeing that he did not have enough support, stepped down for his brother, Joseph Hrawi.

•He ran for Parliament a second time in 1968 and lost.

•He ran for Parliament for a third time on the ticket of Minister Joseph Skaff in 1972 and was elected member of Parliament for Zahle. He is still an MP.

•He has been chairman of Parliament's Agriculture Committee and member of its Finance Committee since 1972.

•He has been a member of the Zahle Municipal Council since 1961.

•He has been the leader of Lebanon's delegation to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) since 1974.

His professional background:

•He holds a commerce degree from Beirut's Hikma School.

•He owns 20 hectares of agricultural land (inherited from his father) which he cultivates, along with large areas of land which he rents from other landlords. He exports his crops (vegetables and fruits) to the Arab world.

•He is chairman of the board and 30 percent owner of a dried vegetable plant which used to export its products to canned-soup factories in Europe. The plant was destroyed during the Lebanese war and has not yet been rebuilt.

•He has been vice president of the Beqaa Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture since 1968.

•He founded the first cooperative of Beqaa sugar beet farmers in 1965 and has been its president since then. He is also president of the Union of Lebanese Agricultural Cooperatives.

His marital status: He is married to Mona *née* Jammal and has five children: Rina (32), George (29), Roy (25), Zelfa (18) and Roland (15).

SELIM JAHEL, MINISTER OF HOUSING AND COOPERATIVES

His message to the Lebanese people: "I will work. Since I have just started, I cannot give you any details. What will come out of my work I don't know yet."

His place and date of birth: Deir el-Kamar, Shouf, 1931.

His sect: Greek Catholic

His political affiliation: He says he does not represent anyone. I asked him to comment on reports that he is close to former President Camille Chamoun, leader of the National Liberal Party. His reply: "President Chamoun is a friend whom I respect and hold in great esteem, but I don't speak in his name. I don't belong to any party."

His political career: He has not been directly involved in politics so far.

His professional background:

- He holds a doctorate in law from Beirut's St. Joseph University.
- He has been a judge and a professor of law at the St. Joseph University since 1969. He will continue to teach despite his appointment as minister, and he plans to return to the judiciary when he is relieved of his post.

His marital status: He is married to Nelly *née* Boustany and has three-year-old twin boys — Michel and André.

KHALED JUNBLATT, MINISTER OF ECONOMY AND COMMERCE

His message to the Lebanese people: "I have just assumed my duties and I have only a vague idea about them. In two or three weeks, I will address myself to the people and let them know what we will be doing.

"But in terms of general policy, I am bound to the front which I represent in the government — a front which supports the unity of Lebanon, the legal authorities and the deployment of the Army. These are the principles which Walid Junblatt and the Party have adopted, and since I represent that front, I am compelled to follow that general policy."

His place and date of birth: Al-Bramiyeh, Sidon, 1934.

His sect: Druze.

His political affiliation: He is not a formal member of any party, but, as he indicated in his message, he represents the Progressive Socialist Party and the parliamentary National Struggle Front, both of which are headed by leftist Druze leader Walid Junblatt.

His political career:

•He served as minister of agriculture and health in the government of Premier Abdullah Yafi (1962).

•He served as minister of finance in the government of Premier Rashid Solh (1974).

His social-cultural activities:

•He has been director general of the Druze Community Council since 1969.

•He has been vice president of the Union of Islamic Educational Institutions in Lebanon, whose president is former Premier Saeb Salam, since 1979.

•He has been chairman of the board of trustees of the Druze Educational Institutions in Lebanon since 1979.

•He has been vice president of the Druze Community's Health Institution, whose president is Druze spiritual leader Sheikh Mohammed Abou Shakra, since 1978.

His professional background:

•He received a degree in agriculture from the Royal Agricultural College in England in 1954.

•He owns agricultural land in the Sidon area and in Beqaa.

His marital status: He is married to Dalal *née* (Najib) Junblatt and has two sons: Rabah (24) and Sabah (22).

ALI EL-KHALIL, MINISTER OF FINANCE

His message to the Lebanese people: "My goal is to rescue Lebanon from its crisis and establish the unity of its land, people and institutions through the implementation of the national entente principles which were approved in March, 1980."

His place and date of birth: Tyre, South Lebanon, 1934.

His sect: Shiite.

His political affiliation: He is a member of the Independent Parliamentary Bloc.

His political career:

•He ran for Parliament as an independent candidate in 1972 and was elected deputy for Tyre. He is still an MP.

•He served as minister of tourism in the government of Premier Amin Hafez in 1973.

•He served as minister of state for administrative reform in the government of Premier Takieddin Solh in 1973-74.

•He served as minister of finance and tourism in the government of Premier Selim Hoss from July, 1979 until October of this year.

His professional background:

•He holds a B.A. and an M.A. in political science and economics from the American University of Beirut, and a Ph.D. in political economics from Washington University.

•He started teaching political science and public administration at AUB in 1968 and is still giving one graduate course in that subject there.

•He started teaching international law and political theory at the Lebanese University's Faculty of Law in 1968 and is still teaching those subjects there. He has also taught "the development of thought" at the Lebanese University's Faculty of Letters.

His marital status: He is married to Nadia *née* Ayyad and has two sons: Iyad (10) and Ghiyath (8).

ABDERRAHMAN LABBAN, MINISTER OF LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS

His message to the Lebanese people: "I hope to be able to realize the mission of this ministry. In my view, Man is the most important element — more important than institutions. Institutions are made to serve him, and that will be my guideline. My goal will be to give Man his human dimension. The Lebanese people probably need this human element much more than anything else now."

His place and date of birth: Beirut, 1924.

His sect: Sunni.

His political affiliation: He says he does not represent any group in the new government but he thinks he has "a job to do." He adds: "Maybe I was brought in because of my technical qualifications."

His political career: He has never been a politician and he hopes he will never be one. He describes himself as "a technical man" specialized in social psychiatry.

His professional background:

•He received his M.D. in medicine and surgery from the American University of Beirut in 1948.

•From 1949 until 1952, he specialized in psychiatry at London University.

•From 1954 until 1959, he served as senior mental health advisor with the World Health Organization, based in Bethlehem, Jordan.

•He returned to Lebanon in 1959, practised medicine in his own private clinic and became chief medical officer at the Islamic Psychiatric Hospital in Beirut — a position which he still holds.

•When the National Council for Scientific Research (a government institution attached to the premiership) was established in 1962, he was appointed its vice president, and he still holds that post.

His marital status: He is married to Adila *née* Dajani and has three daughters: Muna (23), Samar (18) and Mona (13).

RENE MOAWWAD, MINISTER OF EDUCATION

His message to the Lebanese people: "All I can promise is that I will shoulder my responsibilities fully. The ministry I am entrusted with is a very important one; it is a springboard for the formation of the human element whose task it will be to develop Lebanon in the direction of culture, which is this country's biggest capital. I will devote all my capabilities and efforts to the improvement of the standard of education at all levels – primary, secondary, university and vocational."

His place and date of birth: Zghorta, North Lebanon, 1927.

His sect: Maronite.

His political affiliation: He is not a member of any political party and says he represents no one in the new government, despite the general impression that he is "close" to former President Suleiman Franjieh. He is a member of the Independent Parliamentary Bloc.

His political career:

•He was elected deputy for Zghorta-Zawiyeh in 1957, and was reelected in 1960, 1964, 1968 and 1972. He is still an MP.

•He served as chairman of the parliamentary Administration and Justice Committee in 1959.

•He has been chairman of Parliament's Finance and Budget Committee since 1960.

•He served as minister of post, telegraph and telephone from 1961 until 1964, in the government of Premier Rashid Karami.

•He served as public works minister in the government of Premier Rashid Karami in 1969.

His professional background:

•He received a law degree from Beirut's St. Joseph University in 1948.

•He has a private law office and has been a practising attorney in Beirut since 1948.

His marital status: He is married to Nayla *née* (Issa) el-Khoury and has two children: Michel (8) and Rima (14).

MICHEL MURR, MINISTER OF POST, WIRE AND WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS

His message to the Lebanese people: "As a minister, it is my hope that the Lebanese population and forces will all rally around the legitimate authorities, to enable the State to make Lebanon what it used to be.

"As a minister of post and telecommunications, it is my hope that God and the political and security conditions of the country will enable us to implement the program we prepared last year, to make the Lebanese people content with the telephone service and give Lebanon the position it must have in the field of wire and wireless communications."

His place and date of birth: Btighrin, Metn, 1932.

His sect: Greek Orthodox.

His political affiliation: He is not a member of any political party. Despite the general impression that he is "close" to the Lebanese Front, he says he is a member of "the Party of Lebanon" and represents "the Lebanese people" in the new government.

His political career:

•He ran for Parliament on the Phalangist Party ticket in 1968 and was elected deputy for Northern Metn. He ran again in 1972 but was not elected.

•He served as minister of post, telegraph and telephone in the government of Premier Rashid Karami in 1968.

•He has been a member of the governmental Reconstruction and Development Board since its creation in 1977.

• He served as minister of post, telegraph and telephone and of cooperatives and housing in the government of Premier Selim Hoss in 1979-80.

His professional background:

•He holds an engineering degree from Beirut's St. Joseph University and a doctorate in engineering from the Sorbonne, Paris (1956).

•In 1956, he established an engineering and contracting company which is still wholly owned by him and operates in the Arab countries and Africa.

•He served as chairman of the board of the Bank of Lebanon and Kuwait from 1970 until 1974.

•He is chairman of the boards of 12 companies, of each of which he owns 75-percent. Those include the Murr Tower Company, the Zaarour Water Company, the Zaarour Tourist Center, and nine engineering and contracting firms.

His marital status: He is married to Sylvie *née* Abou Jaoudé and has three children: Mirna (22), Léna (20) and Elias (18).

CESAR NASR, MINISTER OF STATE

His message to the Lebanese people: "I would like to thank the President of the Republic for his confidence in me.

"A minister is by definition a servant of the nation. The important thing for me is to help reinforce legitimacy and spread it to all parts of the nation's territory. Secondly, I will work for the reunification of Lebanon, its land and its people — not superficially by having everyone embrace everyone else, but by trying to find a rational entente formula which would make Lebanese unity immune to those seeking to destroy it."

His place and date of birth: He was born in Beirut in 1926, but his hometown is Bkeffin, South Lebanon.

His sect: Maronite.

His political affiliation: He is not and has never been a formal member of a political party, but he is "interested in politics and in the Lebanese question as such." He does not represent anyone in the government but is "close to the (rightist Maronite) Lebanese Front."

His political career: He has not been directly involved in politics so far.

His professional background:

•He received a doctorate in social sciences from France's Sorbonne University (1955) and was a student at the Ecole Normale Supérieure de Paris.

•In 1956-57, he served as director of primary and complementary education at the ministry of education, after which, 1958, he was appointed director of the ministry's Center for Psycho-Pedagogic Research (the center does not exist anymore).

•He served as dean of the Institute of Social Sciences at the Lebanese University from 1970 until 1976, when he took a one-year leave of absence.

•In 1978, he was elected member of UNESCO's International Council for Social Sciences, becoming the only Middle Eastern member of that Council.

His marital status: He is married to Leila *née* Abi-Saleh and has one son: Samer (10).

ANWAR SABBAH, MINISTER OF HYDROELECTRIC RESOURCES

His message to the Lebanese people: "My major mission now is to provide the people with two of their basic needs: water and electricity. I will do my best to solve the problems of water and electricity in all parts of Lebanon, so that every house in the country will get a continuous supply of water and electricity."

His place and date of birth: Nabatiyeh, South Lebanon, 1933.

His sect: Shiite.

His political affiliation: A member of the Democratic Socialist Party, which is headed by House Speaker Kamel Asaad, and a member of the Independent Parliamentary Bloc, which is also headed by Asaad.

His political career:

•He ran for Parliament in 1964 on a ticket which included Abdellatif Zein and the late Ghaleb Shaheen, backed by Kamel Asaad. He was elected member of Parliament for Nabatiyeh.

•He ran for Parliament on the same ticket in 1968 and lost.

•He was appointed vice president of the South Lebanon Council in 1970 but resigned 18 months later.

•He ran for Parliament on the same ticket for the third time in 1972 and was elected MP for Nabatiyeh for the second time. He is still an MP.

•He was appointed minister of economy in the government of Premier Saeb Salam in 1972 and held the post until 1973.

•He was appointed minister of hydroelectric resources and oil and industry in the government of Premier Selim Hoss in 1979.

His professional background:

•He received a degree in mechanical engineering from Oklahoma State University in 1956.

•He worked as an engineer for Tapline (Beirut) from 1956 until 1960.

•He started a private engineering and commerce business in 1960 and worked at it until 1964, when he was elected a member of Parliament.

His marital status: He is married to Asma *née* Nassar and has five children: Sadeq (19), Mirna (17), Rima (15), Shirine (12) and Ali (10).

JOSEPH SKAFF, MINISTER OF DEFENSE

His message to the Lebanese people: "My mission in the new government, and the important message which I call on the Lebanese people to respond to, is to work toward the rebuilding of the Army to serve the interests of the One Lebanon. Because the Army must be in the vanguard of this nation's united forces after the fragmentation that it has suffered. In the final analysis, it is legitimacy that the Lebanese people will rally around, and the Army is one of the biggest symbols of legitimacy. It must rise to the level of that role."

His place and date of birth: Zahle, Beqaa, 1922.

Sect: Greek Catholic.

Political affiliation: He is the leader of the Zahle Bloc in Parliament and represents it in the government.

Political career:

•He ran for Parliament, heading his own ticket, in 1947 and was elected MP for Zahle. He was reelected in 1957, 1960, 1964 and 1972. He is still an MP.

•Has served as minister of agriculture (1955-56), minister of labor and social affairs and minister of health (1956 and 1957-58), minister of labor and social affairs (1960-61), minister of agriculture (1961-64), minister of hydroelectric

resources (1972 and 1973), minister of defense (1974-75) and minister of agriculture and defense (1979-80).

His professional background:

•Holds a political science degree from Beirut's St. Joseph University and has also studied at the American University of Beirut.

•He is one of the big landowners of the Beqaa.

His marital status: He is married to Chantal *née* Bigaré de Gombert and has one son, Elias.

(Note: This information, including the message, was provided by Milad al-Karah, director of public relations and information at the ministry of defense, with the authorization of Minister Skaff, who was out of the country last week.)

SAMI YOUNES, MINISTER OF STATE

His message to the Lebanese people: "A minister of state, as you know, is usually given very important missions, and I am ready to carry out any mission entrusted to me. It was initially suggested that I take over administrative reform affairs, and this is a very important field which suits my specialization.

"It is my hope that this government will be a government of national entente and national unity. I hope it will succeed in making progress toward the restoration of the unity of the Lebanese people, who have long been yearning for unity and solidarity among the various communities of this beloved country.

"I also hope that this government, with the guidance of the President and the prime minister, will give the people what they have been asking for: security and an end to the rise in the cost of living."

His place and date of birth: Dair Koubel, Shouf, 1929.

His sect: Druze.

His political affiliation: He does not belong to any political party and would rather not say who he represents in the new government. (It is generally recognized that Minister Younes is close to MP Majid Arslan, who heads the Aley parliamentary bloc. Last week, Younes placed his resignation at the disposal of President Elias Sarkis, at the request of Arslan.)

His political career: He has not been directly involved in politics so far.

•He received a law degree from Beirut's St. Joseph University in 1954.

•After serving for two years as inspector at the ministry of labor and social affairs, he was appointed apprentice judge in 1956.

•He was appointed judge in 1959 and served as president of the Nabatiyeh Court until 1962.

•From 1962 until 1970, he served as advisor to the Military Court.

•From 1970 until 1980, he served as public prosecutor of the Beqaa Court of Appeal.

•Since the beginning of 1980, he has been public prosecutor of the Supreme Military Court.

His marital status: He is married to Mona *née* al-Gharib and has no children. •

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

SWEDEN TO INVESTIGATE TRAINING--Controversial military training of about 100 Libyans at the state-owned enterprise 'Telub' in Vaexjoe is to be investigated by a special investigator, says DAGENS NYHETER. According to the paper, the center and liberal parties have agreed on the investigation, and the moderates are also expected to join them. 'Telub' has concluded a contract with Libya on a 4-year training program. The curricula are secret, but the training has a military-technical basis and covers radar systems and electronics. [Text] [LD081036 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1000 GMT 8 Nov 80]

CSO: 3109

PARTY OF PROGRESS, SOCIALISM ANALYZES CURRENT CRISIS

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 7 Oct 80 pp 1, 3

[Text] [portion of sentence omitted] October in Casablanca in its eighth regular session. On the agenda was a single subject: an examination of the general situation in the country and immediate tasks resulting from it.

After stressing the importance of the item on the agenda, Comrade Chouaib Riffi, member of the Political Bureau of the party and first secretary of the region of Casablanca, who presided over the meeting, yielded the floor to Comrade Ali Yata, secretary general of the party, who presented an important and exhaustive report on behalf of the Political Bureau.

The translation of the complete text of that report will be published in our newspaper beginning tomorrow.

The report made by Comrade Ali Yata is divided into four parts: an analysis of the international situation in the light of recent developments on the international scene; the evolution of the question of our territorial unity; the country's economic situation; and social problems.

We are publishing here a report on the work of the Central Committee of the Party of Progress and Socialism.

I. International Situation

Analyzing the international situation, Comrade Ali Yata stated that on the world level, the ratio of forces is on the side of the nations of democracy and socialism.

Socialist countries may naturally encounter problems, but they overcome them successfully. This is the case of recent events in Poland. The enemies of socialism have tried to exploit the situation in order to condemn socialism. Actually, the Polish workers did not give their strike political dimensions. They were not questioning socialism in their country.

We can only rejoice over the fact that the Polish people emerged from the test victorious.

Concerning the Third World countries and national liberation movements, the liberation of Zimbabwe from the racist yoke, the Islamic revolution in Iran and the revolutionary changes in Nicaragua are all pluses on the balance sheet of peoples.

In the capitalist countries, the working class is mobilized and in struggle facing increasingly acute problems such as unemployment and inflation. This crisis of capitalism is a structural crisis. But although the capitalist and imperialists are suffering blows, they still do not disarm and create hotspots of aggression here and there.

The following is Comrade Ali Yata's analysis of two main events: the events in southern Lebanon and the Iraqi-Iranian war.

Israeli Aggression Against Southern Lebanon

Having lost strategic points such as Iran, the United States and its allies are seeking to increase their number of support bases in the region of the Arab Gulf, which is of particular interest to them because of its oil resources and strategic position.

Having succeeded in bringing Egypt into their fold through Sadat's betrayal, they also hope to win Lebanon by dismembering it, by striking at the progressive movement linked to the Palestinian revolution and by liquidating that same Palestinian revolution.

This analysis shows that Lebanon's defense is not only the task of the Palestinians and the Lebanese, but the duty of the entire Arab nation.

In this defense, it is essential to rely on the union of Arab forces, transcending the contradictions that pit Arabs against one another or against neighboring countries.

Speaking of the situation in the Arab and Muslim world, Yata cited the action waged to free the holy city of Al Qods, which Israel wants to make its "eternal capital."

If we can but come to agreement on the slogan "Jihad," we are convinced that that watchword would be empty of meaning if turned against Israel without attacking imperialist interests, using all political, economic and military means, Yata said.

As for unity between Libya and Syria, we must be clear:

If we are zealous supporters of unity, we believe that it can come about on sound bases because past experience has shown that any unity imposed without the real participation of the peoples involved and without preparing the conditions necessary for success is doomed to failure.

Concluding on the Arab question, Comrade Ali Yata said that the success of the fight against imperialism requires the union of Arab forces and a distinction between our friends (such as the Soviet Union) and our enemies.

Iraqi-Iranian War

Since 22 September, Iraq and Iran have been at war and while it is difficult to verify the veracity of the military statements on both sides, one thing is certain: Losses in materiel and men on the two sides are substantial at a time when that energy is so sorely needed to free El Qods, when Israel is stepping up its attacks on Lebanon and when Iran is threatened by imperialism.

This war serves only the interests of imperialism and Zionism, as demonstrated by the obvious satisfaction of the Zionists.

If this war continues, it may give the imperialists an opportunity to destroy the Iranian revolution and to restore the old regime, as was the case at the time of Mosaddeq. This would truly be a catastrophe for the entire Arab nation and for the Palestinians.

It is within this overall context that we must view the war, not as if wearing blinders!

That is why the party expresses its grief over this war between two Islamic nations, both members of the Movement of Nonalined Nations, both members of OPEC, both anti-imperialist.

The conflict must therefore be stopped and the problems solved by negotiation, rather than adding fuel to the fire.

II. National Question

The question of our territorial unity remains the prime question on the national scene.

In this recent period, we have noted that attacks by our enemies are increasingly infrequent and none have been launched from the regions of the Sahara recently recovered by Morocco.

These attacks are made on uncontested parts of Morocco. They are launched from Algeria, to which our enemies return when they succeed in their action.

The POLISARIO Front therefore has no foothold in the Western Sahara.

It is Algeria that plans and directly supports this aggression aimed at our country, which is contrary to the rules of international law and against good neighbor conduct.

Furthermore, the POLISARIO mercenaries are not Moroccans, but essentially Mauritanians, Malians and Nigerians, whom the POLISARIO was able to recruit because of the poverty and famine reigning in those countries where they are doomed to certain death.

Although the POLISARIO Front has been able to kill some civilians and soldiers in these attacks, it is incapable of lasting success on our soil, thanks to the FAR [Royal Armed Forces] which courageously defend our territory. We take this

opportunity to honor the memory of our martyrs and express our admiration for our courageous soldiers, noncommissioned officers and officers in the FAR.

Militarily speaking, the situation is therefore clearly in our favor.

But international opinion has its weight and a diplomatic effort must be made.

At Freetown, the POLISARIO Front was expecting recognition of the so-called SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] by the OAU, but despite all pressure and corruption, the recognition never came because the voice of wisdom spoke.

Let us particularly mention the historic speech of President Ahmed Sekou Toure on the Moroccan nature of the Sahara.

At Freetown II, there was important progress for Morocco.

The SDAR was not recognized. Morocco was not condemned. The Polisario was only the 11th Saharan organization heard by the Committee of Wise Men.

The recommendations of the Committee of Wise Men included: an immediate ceasefire; the presence of a UN force (the "Blue Helmets"); the organization of a referendum (with maintenance of the Moroccan forces in the barracks and of the Moroccan administration).

The Political Bureau unanimously supports the idea of the ceasefire because it essentially concerns the POLISARIO and therefore, Algeria because Morocco is only defending itself.

As far as the UN forces are concerned, we do not see the need for such a presence because the Moroccans in the Sahara have already expressed their self-determination on several occasions.

Nevertheless, Morocco does not fear the referendum because it is 100-percent certain of the opinion of our Saharan brothers.

Morocco and Algeria are two neighboring countries and they have numerous tasks in common, such as their economic takeoff and industrialization, which are hindered by the unrest in the region.

Morocco and Algeria have duties vis-a-vis the Palestinian question and cannot perform them as long as they have not settled their bilateral problem.

The interest of the two countries, the Arab nation, the Muslim world and the supporters of peace is therefore to put an end to this situation.

Comrade Ali Yata made an appeal to the Algerian people and the Algerian leaders, particularly President Chadli, for reconciliation and a return to normal of relations between our two countries.

He also appealed to the FLN for a meeting of our two parties.

The same appeal was made to the Libyan people and leaders.

III. Economic Situation

The economic situation presents all the characteristics of a crisis. There has been stagnation since 1978 (beginning of the 3-year plan).

Despite the priority given to the agricultural sector, grain imports increase every year. Our party has already evoked the danger that this represents for the country's food security.

Whence the need for true agricultural reform.

Industrial production is stagnant, with growth amounting to the ridiculous figure of 2 percent.

Some companies have gone bankrupt, which has resulted in the laying off of workers and an increase in the number of unemployed.

Our trade balance still shows a deficit despite the increase in phosphate and unprocessed timber exports, partly because the higher cost of oil.

We must therefore think rapidly about solving our energy problems by using other sources of energy such as solar power and coal. We must also speed up exploration for oil.

Finances

Morocco constantly goes deeper into debt to pay back its debts. The IMF grants loans to Morocco but it gives "poisoned advice" to our country, such as the devaluation of the dirham, which hurts Morocco's interests.

Social Situation

It is also the IMF and the World Bank that "advised" Morocco to question the aid given by the government to basic products through the Compensation Fund. This dramatically affects the buying power of the masses. The PPS has demanded abrogation of these measures.

Comrade Ali Yata particularly noted three social hotspots:

Education

He noted the failure of the policy followed to date in the field of education. The spirit of the Ifrane colloquium could lead to the resolution of these problems.

Yata recalled the principles that our party has always defended regarding education.

Housing

Yata showed how the recent decision to lower the rent of wage earners receiving less than 1,500 dirhams is not enough to solve the crisis.

This does not solve the problems of the evictions or the rent problem for those receiving under 1,500 dirhams. This law in no way affects the interests of the big property owners who rent housing to those earning under 1,500 dirhams at inaccessible prices.

Finally, Yati recalled the solutions recommended by the PPS to solve this housing crisis.

Cost of Living

The increase in wages announced for lower-level civil servants will not be applied until next year and these increases have already lost all significance because of the inflation affecting basic products such as flour, oil, butter and milk.

The government justifies these increases by those that have occurred on the world market.

But it does not say why the rich are not made to bear the cost through direct taxes instead of taxing the meager income of workers through indirect taxes.

Where are those who speak of authenticity? Why do they apply the "imported advice" of the IMF?

V. Conclusion

The enemies of our territorial unity are waiting for Morocco to crack under the weight of the economic problems.

Our country's situation is not desperate. An improvement is possible if we condemn the liberal orientation and adopt scientific planning in a spirit of responsibility.

We must replace the men in government. We need hard-working men devoted to the people.

We need a minimum program on the basis of which the government should be named.

We must trust the masses and their authentic representatives.

We must rehabilitate the political climate.

The release of political prisoners and the return of the exiles is a positive thing but we demand amnesty for the 90 remaining political prisoners.

It is necessary to strengthen the domestic front and bring about a radical and overall change in the country's orientation.

A homogeneous government basing its action on a minimum program can save the country from the crisis.

Our appeal to a national pact fits into this framework because national unanimity must not be limited to the national question, but extend to other fundamental problems for our country.

We can save the country from the crisis, but on the condition that a sincere political determination exists in everyone.

That determination exists in the PPS and we are convinced that it is found in others. We shall do whatever is necessary so that it is expressed.

Discussion of the Report

The report made by Comrade Ali Yata was greeted by warm applause. The discussion then began.

The speakers all expressed their total agreement with the report presented on behalf of the Political Bureau by Comrade Ali Yata. They then developed certain questions, particularly concerning current tasks.

With regard to higher education, two important meetings are ahead and we must prepare for them seriously. They are the 17th Congress of UNEM [National Union of Moroccan Students] and the SNESup [National Union of Advanced Education Teachers] congress.

The question of the situation of the working class and particularly unemployment problems were also raised, along with numerous points concerning the national and international situation.

Comrade Abdallah Layachi, member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee, then took the floor to emphasize the importance of the party's political and organizational tasks. In particular, he emphasized the importance of propaganda work concerning party positions and the partnership with the masses in order to study their daily problems.

Comrade Ali Yata concluded by emphasizing the importance of the tasks facing the party in the current phase.

Finally, the political report presented by Yata was approved and unanimously adopted.

Warm applause greeted the vote, applause that demonstrated the pride of the members of the Central Committee over the cohesion and spirit of responsibility characterizing the conduct of the session.

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BRIEFS

BAKERS' STRIKE IN MARRAKECH--Modern bakery workers in the city of Marrakech are continuing the strike they launched at the beginning of this week. The workers' struggle is motivated by the arbitrary actions of the owner of the Al Manara bakery, who laid off a number of workers 2 months ago without reason. The strike could last until those employees are reinstated. Mobilization of all modern bakery workers is extensive, which explains the total success of the last strike that the workers launched, respecting their slogans in spite of intimidations and arrests made in their ranks. AL BAYANE supports the struggle of the workers of the modern bakeries in Marrakech and demands immediate reinstatement of those laid off. [Text] [Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 4 Oct 80 p 1] 11,464

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KOOLI SEES NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN DESTOURIENISM, ISLAM

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 27 Sep 80 p 4

[Speech by Mongi Kooli: "There is No Distinction Between the Destourien Involvement and Religious Faith"]

> [Text] The party's leadership has set up a committee for Islamic thought and religious guidance. The committee, chaired by Dr Mohamed Habib Belkhoja, the republic's Mufti, which consists of an elite of clergymen, held its first meeting last Thursday at Party House in the Kasbah under the chairmanship of Mongi Kooli, party director and minister attached to the prime minister.
>
> In a speech delivered on this occasion Mongi Kooli pointed out that Tunisia, a Muslim country, as its constitution stipulates, is linked with Islam which, he emphasized, is one of the main characteristics of the Bourguibian system.

Bourguiba's Fight Is Based on Carrying High the Standard of Islam

The party director reminded of the achievements of the Tunisian state under the leadership of the Supreme Fighter in bearing the standard of Islam high and increasing its influence among the people's masses. This is a truth which should be clear to everyone, Kooli said. As a result of this the preservation of Islam and the constant and sincere concern for upholding the faith were, in fact, the very foundations of the struggle waged by Bourguiba against colonialism.

It is thus that ever since its creation the party has drawn its militant principles and moral values from the precepts of Islam to such an extent that it has made the protection and strengthening of Islam one of the basic objectives for whose implementation the party has never ceased to work both before and after independence.

It is in accordance with this approach that the committee for Islamic thought and religious orientation was created, Kooli added.

This will be a permanent structure whose role will be to work throughout the country for the implementation of a set of targets particularly related to the strengthening of Islamic authenticity and awareness among the popular masses, particularly among the third strata, and support of Islamic values.

Islamic Awareness Strengthens National Unity

Mongi Kooli equally pointed out that the party ascribes particularly great interest to this action, as it is convinced that the strengthening of Islamic awareness is the most effective support of national unity which we justifiably consider support of our overall development efforts, a development whose strengthening and preservation remain the party's main target. He furthermore noted that the society we are building should be linked with the Islamic religion and draw its spiritual values in the precepts of Islam, precepts which call for fraternity, harmony and goodness.

The party director emphasized the need to evaluate the religious situation in the country and establish a program of action essentially aimed at the young generations.

Winding up his speech, Mongi Kooli stated that the party will give the committee the moral and material support needed for the implementation of its mission. He specified that all suggestions concerning this structure will be considered particularly closely by the party.

"In our party," Kooli concluded, "we make no distinction whatever between the Destourien involvement and support of religion." He urged the members of the committee to focus their activities on establishing direct contacts with the people's masses throughout the country.

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MZALI SPEAKS BEFORE SILIANA CADRES

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 28 Sep 80 p 4

[Speech by Mohamed Mzali to local and regional Siliana governorates: "Our Common Responsibility Is To Tell the Truth and Display Competence, Loyalty and Courage"]

[Text] Friday evening, Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and party secretary general, chaired in Siliana a work meeting attended by local and regional cadres. Also attending were Mohamed Chaker, minister of justice, and Lassad Ben Osman, minister of agriculture.

The meeting opened with a report submitted by the regional governor on the economic and social situation, emphasizing the measures which were taken to the benefit of the citizens and the success achieved in the region.

Having emphasized the feelings of the citizens who are pleased with the government's policy, the governor discussed the obstacles which hinder development in some sectors such as agriculture and the social area.

The prime minister listened with great attention to the statements by some of the participants. These statements, actually, reflect the positive response of the Siliana citizens to the choices and principles which the prime minister is tirelessly reasserting. They express the citizens' concern with the dissemination of a truly Destourien morality and of sincerity in managing citizens' affairs.

The prime minister was asked to provide an explanation of the concept the government has of the middle social class. Some spokesmen emphasized the need to proceed with an administrative reform and provide the young people with healthy civic and moral education and solid training in the various scientific and professional areas.

The regional cadres showed their interest in relations between Tunisia and fraternal and friendly countries, neighboring

countries in particular, praising, on this occasion, the prime minister for his efforts aimed at strengthening such relations which would benefit the peoples of the Maghreb today and in the future.

They also expressed their loyalty to the Supreme Fighter and their support of his personality and principles. They requested the prime minister to deliver to President Bourguiba a message of affection and regards.

This was followed by a speech by the prime minister in which he stated the following: Allow me, first of all, to thank you for your fraternal welcome which proves, yet once again, the people's support for President Bourguiba. This is not my first visit to the Siliana area. My initial contacts with it date from before independence and, specifically, in the period of Franco-Tunisian negotiations for internal autonomy, i.e., before the triumphant return of the Supreme Fighter on 1 June 1955.

I recall making speeches in Siliana at that time on behalf of the party. I found here sincere supporters and was able to sense the authentic values of the region.

After the independence I have paid a number of visits to this area and have made a modest contribution to the development of a number of sectors.

Mzali added: Ever since the chief of state decided to set up the Siliana governorate, in 1974, the development of this area progressed on a new basis. Ever since then I have been aware in the course of my visits here of great achievements and steady improvements.

On this occasion I am visiting you as prime minister and secretary general of the party to study your concerns and aspirations. This visit, the first after my trip to Mahdia, proves the desire of the government, inspired by the will of the Supreme Fighter, to pay particular attention to this governorate and to similar governorates which have suffered so greatly during the colonial period and, consequently, were deprived of conditions for rapid development and prosperity.

The prime minister then emphasized the determination of the authorities to insure the overall development of this area despite our modest means. "In this we are relying on your enthusiasm, reciprocal help, the joining of your efforts, and your great loyalty to this area. I am firmly convinced that the essential prerequisite for success is found in the prevailing psychological climate and in the awareness of citizens and cadres. That is why I was pleased with the clear presentation made by the governor and, above all, by the climate of tranquility and serenity prevailing among the population in the area." I have the impression that your hope is being strengthened and that your enthusiasm is being revived. Everything becomes possible once despair and surrender are eliminated. Conversely, should the horizons narrow and prospects turn dark, nothing could lead the people out of their underdeveloped status.

The role of the party is, essentially, to engage in psychological work aimed at sharpening the will and enhance the feeling of responsibility of the citizens for the building of their future. That is what will be achieved in the future thanks

to the dialogue and understanding between leaders and popular masses. We are determined to be in permanent contact with the people's masses and we shall never accept any obstacle to separate us as we follow this truly Bourguibian way. Success will be easy as long as the political leaders and the administration and the party members believe in what they are doing and pay proper attention to the psychological aspect.

The governor reasserted the concern which the leaders of the Siliana area show for the human element by the fact that they are aware of the aspirations of the people.

Whereas it is necessary to keep statistics and make accurate computations in the various sectors it is even more necessary to think properly. This can be achieved only if we consider man as the final objective.

The prime minister went on to say the following:

In our view, the causes of underdevelopment should be found. If they are rooted in man we must focus our attention on the human element and its development. Actually, Bourguiba's fight provides us with the best possible example, for, from the very first days of the national struggle, he focused his attention on the human element and was not satisfied with encouraging the planting of olive or almond trees, something which the regressives considered the best way leading to the liberation of the country.

Before focusing on the material aspects, Bourguiba turned to the education of the citizens and to promoting their awareness of their duty, for success in any action is the result of the relations of trust which exist between the citizens and the leaders. Ever since the country gained its independence, the party has tried to have the same behavior. It has refused to increase the number of useless meetings. It concerned itself with the real problems concerning the citizens, looking for proper solutions.

On a number of occasions I have recommended, in meetings I have held here, in Siliana, to pay particular interest to students and to the subjects they are being taught in order to determine whether the latter were consistent with our realities and with what we would like them to learn, and if they were consistent with their way of thinking, their state of mind and their patriotism. In our view, this is more important than the building of high schools, classrooms, or boarding schools.

We always call for close relations between the leaders and the masses. We have felt that such relations have been broken and that there is no longer a communion between them.

How many meetings have been held in the course of which some speakers have expressed everything but the feelings of the citizens and their concerns. This has led to a lack of trust. I recall, Mzali said in this connection, that in the course of one such meeting a citizen asked why was it that his son had not been given a scholarship. Told that he could not meet the annual income stipulation, he answered that the son of the cell chairman had been given a scholarship even though his father's income was far superior to his. This is merely one example

among others. This is one of the factors which have led the citizens to feel that they alone are bearing the burden whereas the leaders and the cadres change the rules to the benefit of the leadership.

Once mistrust has developed between citizens and leaders, the latter would find themselves alone facing arising problems and would no longer be able to rely on the people's support.

I state this as a political leader who must play a role and whose responsibility as a politician is exactly the same as that of a physician, for the people, like the body of a person, could show certain symptoms, in which case the politician should provide a diagnosis and prescribe the best medicine even if its taste is unpleasant. As far as we are concerned, our only ambition is to see our people free from any disease, however minor it may be.

What I am telling you today must be said by any leader whatever the level of his responsibility may be, providing, however, that he is a competent and courageous physician capable of saying everything he thinks and prescribing the most effective medicine in order to cure the patient the moment the first symptoms have appeared and before the disease has worsened and triggered a catastrophe and upheavals.

Our joint responsibility is to tell the truth and to display competence, loyalty and courage. I can assert that the Tunisian body is healthy in its structures. However, for a variety of reasons, it could experience malaises. I state most frankly that, more than ever, we must be interested in the psychological aspect and improve the political climate so that every leader would enjoy the affection and respect of the people's masses.

I am pleased by what I have heard on the concern of the leaders to be in constant touch with the citizens in order to be aware of their problems and their concerns. I am equally pleased by the fact that the serenity of the citizens has been strengthened.

As I express my pleasure of meeting you, I would like to share with you my admiration for the inflexible will which inspires you to meet all the necessary conditions for resolving the problems facing the area. I can assert that the Siliana governorate and the neighboring areas will be the target of far greater interest in the years to come and, more precisely, in the course of the Sixth Plan.

However, human and material potential must be made avaialble to use the funds which will be allocated for the implementation of some projects. In accordance with the 1980 budget 600,000 dinars were spent exclusively to supply the Silinia governorate with drinkable water. This was caused by the lack of technicians and of the necessary material facilities. Therefore, it is imperative to eliminate obstacles, for good will and credits would not enable us to implement projects within reasonable periods of time in the absence of cadres or harmony within the administration.

Actually, I have spoken to you of the directives issued by the president of the republic in the course of the various meetings of the Council of Ministers he has

chaired, in the course of which he insisted on the need to pay greater interest to the deprived areas in order to give them a new impulse which would raise the level of development reached by the coastal regions. This policy will be one of the main guidelines of the Sixth Plan whose target is the establishment of a proper balance.

Mohamed Mzali also pointed out that the development of agriculture will be one of the main foundations for the development of the Siliana governorate.

Along this line, the prime minister mentioned some features of the government's policy in the field of agriculture, emphasizing the determination of the government to help the small farmers and provide the necessary encouraging means which would enable them to play a proper role in the development of the economy.

He pointed out that an appropriate committee had been set up following the instructions of the chief of state. The committee examined the matter in its different aspects and was able to find solutions to the problems existing in this area. It is thus that we are contemplating the establishment of a fund by the Central Bank. This would enable the farmers to obtain loans from the different banks throughout the country.

Mzali noted that self-sufficiency in food products and the settling of the young on the lands of their ancestors was the target for the development of agriculture. If this objective is to be reached the farmers must be guaranteed substantial income. The agricultural areas must be developed and provided with the necessary amenities for a decent life.

The prime minister approved the remarks stated by some cadres on educational and cultural achievements in the area, the need for a balance between administrative centralization and economic decentralization, the status of women and the acquisition of basic knowledge on the environment.

Speaking of industrialization, Mohamed Mzali pointed out that the government considers this question vital and is promoting the multiplication of factories and the diversification of output. The government is also concerned with setting up such units in the various parts of the country, particularly in those so far deprived of industry.

He told the Siliana citizens that a certain number of plants will be built in the area in the next few years, specifying that the nature of these units and their deployment will be announced in the course of the next 6 months.

On this occasion the prime minister emphasized that, without denying the importance of industrialization, he believes that agriculture should be ascribed the importance it deserves, for extensive industrialization at the expense of agriculture yields negative results.

Mohamed Mzali went on to discuss political matters. He stated that the party is the essential motor of the country's political, economical and social life, and that it is responsible for the success of our development.

The Destourien cadres are assuming in the country the responsibility to guide the citizens. The next party congress, he added, to be held next May, will discuss and formulate the development policy for the next decade along with the characteristics and targets of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. It will also deal with some political questions, primarily those of the youth, the revision of the party's internal rules, the qualities which must be enhanced in the Destouriens, and the question of professional and territorial cells.

The prime minister expressed the hope that the congress will reach decisions and recommendations such as to strengthen the party, make it a militant party and avoid the infiltration of the party by careerists.

On this subject, Mzali emphasized that we want sincere party members who find their happiness in serving others and the superior interests of the nation, as President Bourguiba has taught us.

The prime minister called upon the new Siliana Coordination Committee Bureau to consider the political problems and realities in the area and to seek the ways and means to strengthen the party and consolidate its influence among all categories of the people of Tunisia.

Our party is a pole whose basic mission is to attract to itself all national strata. This is possible only by developing democracy within the party and, above all, democracy in electing Destourien leaders.

"Actually, I have drawn your attention to this truth. I have urged you to turn the congresses and the general meetings of all Destourien organizations into encounters in which you would ask the leaders to account for their actions with sincerity and courage. Should a leader fail suitably to fulfill his role or should he abandon the right way in the course of exercising his responsibilities, it is your duty to blame and criticize him, and to point out his errors at the general meetings of party units." I also recommend to the citizens and the Destouriens, Mzali added, to be guided only by their conscience in the course of the elections and to vote only for candidates who have proved their competence, loyalty, honesty and desire to serve the superior interests of the nation.

They must elect candidates who will enhance the party's prestige and consolidate its position with the Tunisian society. Our party is no one's prerogative. It is everyone's party. That is why I said that it is you who determine its success, for it is you who will be electing the leaders.

In the same order of ideas Mzali pointed out that the next party congress will consider the question of party districts.

We are against barriers separating Destourien cells from the Political Bureau, for the cells are the base, the foundation of the party and if their leaders are democratically elected the entire organization will be healthy.

He added that the party must be and always remain the conscience of the nation. Its role is to conceive, formulate ideas, control, and promote enthusiasm. In fact, it is responsible for defining the policy of the government and its orientation in the various areas.

Discussing relations between Tunisia and fraternal countries, neighboring countries in particular, Mohamed Mzali recalled his recent talks in Rabat, with the Moroccan leadership and, particularly, with King Hassan II of Morocco or the Algerian leaders, headed by President Chedly Bendjedid, emphasizing the esteem in which President Bourguiba is held by the leaders of these two countries who consider him the doyen of the fighters and the president of the Arab Maghreb. They have always needed his directives and his long experience. Mzali added that these talks revealed the will of all the parties to broaden their economic and cultural exchanges.

He added the following:

We shall unquestionably be able to face exploitation together. The day will come, and it will not be long in coming, when we will give the example to be followed by the countries of the Arab Machrek in facing the Zionist challenge, the hegemonistic aspirations and the deep penetration within the Arab nation.

On this subject, Mohamed Mzali stated that attempts had been made to Balkanize Lebanon and to divide the Middle East into ministates, such as the territory of the traitor Saad Haddad, which is an example, Mzali added. He called upon the Arab countries to resolve their differences in order to insure their self-sufficiency in all areas.

Mohamed Mzali emphasized that our cooperation with our Arab brothers should not be based on interest but on principles, for we believe that our common destiny, common history, common objective and Arab-Muslim ties are more important and more sacred than considerations of interest.

We have stated all this to our brothers who have felt our sincerity and loyalty.

Having recalled, on this subject, the talks between Tunisia and Kuwait and Saudia Arabia, recently held in Tunis, Mohamed Mzali stated that the two fraternal countries were entirely disposed to cooperate with us, believing that we are a fraternal Arab country which is sincerely aspiring to promote the good and development around it.

The prime minister emphasized the need to adopt an ambitious development policy without fear or hesitation and to rely on our own means and our cooperation with fraternal countries which have steadily told us of their willingness to participate in the financing of industrial, agricultural or financial projects in Tunisia.

Mzali recalled the agreement concluded between Tunisia and Kuwait and between Tunisia and Saudia Arabia on the establishment of important development banks in Tunisia.

He noted that such banks would make the necessary studies of development projects and their financing and will supervise their implementation. Their attention will be focused on governorates with inadequate resources such as that of Siliana.

Mzali added that the next development plan will be very ambitious, for it will open 65,000 jobs per year. This will enable us to eliminate the deficit which

has developed in this area over the past few years, totaling an unemployment of 150,000.

Discussing Tunisia's foreign policy, Mzali pointed out that it is guided by the Bourguibian principles. On this subject the prime minister recalled the current war between Iran and Iraq and the efforts undertaken by Tunisia within the Security Council. He pointed out that that same day he had discussed the subject with the Iraqi ambassador in Tunis and reasserted Tunisia's concern for joining its efforts to those of the Islamic Conference, aimed at positive action.

He equally recalled the decisions of the conference of ministers of foreign affairs of Islamic countries, recently held in Fes, Morocco, and expressed the hope that the Arab and Islamic countries would succeed in focusing their efforts on the solution of the crises which weaken and disperse their energies.

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JOURNALISTS ACCOMPANY POLISARIO MEMBERS TO MOROCCAN TERRITORY

Paris LE MONDE in French 22 Oct 80 p 7

[Article by Daniel Junqua]

[Text] Hassi Hafed Boudjemaa. When the POLISARIO took a dozen journalists, most of whom were French or Spanish, on a 3-day trip into the "liberated territories" of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic, it had a dual purpose in mind: to prove that it effectively controls almost all this region which for almost 2 years now has been abandoned by the Moroccan Army and to demonstrate on the other hand that the present fighting is still taking place on the selfsame territory of the Kingdom in the oued of Draa. The demonstration seemed convincing to us.

We left Hafed Boudjemaa, 25 km south of Tindouf, on 9 October; and our convoy of five Land Rovers returned there on the 13th, after having covered 1,000 km. At no time did we have cause for concern, except perhaps during our bivouacs in Farsia and Haouza, in the heart of Saguia-El-Hamra, or as we traveled over the Hamada when immense clouds of dust were easily spotted from aircraft. On two occasions, at day and at night, the Land Rovers even traveled over the road laid down by the Spanish, a long, thin ribbon with a shattered embankment which snakes its way from Farsia to Smara over rocky plains strewn with rare tufts of esparto and thorns. Our drivers, with their heads wrapped in their turbans [cheches] and their eyes protected by huge motorcycle or ski goggles, in the absence of windshields, did not hesitate to use their parking lights and even their headlights. In passing, the combattants proudly showed us a plowed field which is to be sown with wheat and oats. For lack of tractors, the earth, which is plowed in long irregular furrows, was worked with the help of Land Rovers. Doubtless the Saharans have no illusions about the agricultural potential of their country; however, for these nomads the plowing of fields has a symbolic value. It bears witness to their desire to settle down.

The Ras-El-Khanfra Fighting

Our escort began to take precautions only when we approached the Moroccan border to enter the Ras-El-Khanfra region where violent confrontations have been taking place for a month (LE MONDE, 10 October). Ras-El-Khanfra, a small mountain in the first foothills of the Zini mountains, commands a valley which, through Abatteh, 17 km further along, gives access to Tan-Tan. That is one of the routes taken by the POLISARIO katibas to climb toward the northern part of Morocco. In this way

they are able to attack the route which, along the coast from Tan-Tan to Tarfaya, permits the channelling of supplies, men and war materiel to the fortified triangle of Hagounia-Samara-Boujdour in the Western Sahara. This stronghold encompasses the capital of the territory, El-Aioun, and in particular the Bou-Craa phosphate deposits. With the city of Dakhla (formerly Villa-Cisneros) further to the south, these are now the only points in which Moroccan troops are established in the former Spanish colony.

"For this operation, which is designed to protect its communications routes, the Moroccan Army," we are told by Omar Hadrani, a member of the POLISARIO command council, "has engaged some 20,000 men who are in Abatteh under the command of Col Ben Othman. In August 1980, 12,000 of these soldiers were stationed in three positions spaced over 30 km, one in Saharan territory in Kreibichat, the second in L'Bouba, on the border, and, finally, the last in Ras-El-Khanfra, several kilometers inside Morocco. Following our attacks, the first two garrisons had to disengage between 16 and 18 September. They proceeded to reinforce the Ras-El-Khanfra garrison. We will continue our attacks; and we have already surrounded their command post and have destroyed heavy artillery batteries and Stalin organs."

Protected by a providential layer of fog which prevented aerial reconnaissance, at dawn our group was only 5 km from Ras-El-Khanfra from which point sounds of explosions occasionally reached us. The terrain, which was slightly irregular, bore traces on all sides of the violent fighting of the preceding days. There, scattered over several hundred square meters, was the wreckage of a Mirage-F1 airplane which was shot down on 21 September; further out, there were the blackened and shattered hulls of two armored troop carriers of South African manufacture. Our guides next showed us a huge Caterpillar bulldozer which appeared out of place in this desert setting. "The combatants seized it from the Ras-El-Khanfra positions," we were told by Omar Hadrani, "and they managed to bring it here. However, the motor blew up. We have already destroyed four of these machines. The Moroccans use them to dig holes and erect protective barriers."

Next we visited the positions in Kheibichat and L'Bouba abandoned by the Royal Armed Forces. Signs of the Moroccan withdrawal were visible everywhere. Individual foxholes and trenches, littered with canned goods, artillery and mortar positions strewn with ammunition casings and crates, overturned Land Rovers, burned tank trucks. Here and there, several mounds of freshly turned earth: "They are graves which we dug for Moroccan soldiers," we are told by a member of our escort.

"Who is Mopping Up [Ratisse] Whom?"

According to Omar Hadrani, since the start of this series of operations the Moroccans have suffered 600 deaths. "We have a good opportunity there to attack the best enemy units, the several thousand men who make up the spearhead of the Royal Armed Forces. We engage them before they have the time to reinforce themselves."

The mention of "mopping up operations" which, according to Pabat, resulted in the elimination of the POLISARIO in the southern part of the kingdom made Hadrani smile. "Who is mopping up whom?" he asked as he mentioned the successive withdrawals of the Royal Army. "As for the southern part of Morocco," he added, "it is being increasingly threatened, as has just been demonstrated by our attack on M'Hamed-les-Gazelles, near Ouarzazate, at the Agadir level." Later, on the road back, after

the traditional meal: roast goat, rice and green tea, Hadrani, under the cover of a tent improvised from blankets, drew for us the lesson of the last meeting of the OAU in Freetown. "We agree to have a self-determination referendum," he said, "and a cease fire, on condition that the Moroccan army totally evacuate our territory. No consultation can take place under the threat of Moroccan arms. The OAU wanted to throw the King a last life preserver. He did not even grab it. From now on, our priority is combat to ensure the departure of Rabat's troops."

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ARAB LEAGUE OFFICIAL DISCUSSES PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO MIDDLE EAST CRISES

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 13-19 Oct 80 pp 18-20

[Interview with al-Shadhli al-Qalibi, Secretary General of the Arab League by Rashid Khashanah: "Al-Shadhli al-Qalibi Says Solution to Lebanon's Crisis Lies in Creation of Homeland for Palestinians; 'We Supported Iraq, but We Placed League at Disposal of Peace Efforts;' Coming Year Will Bring Beginning of a Solution to Sahara Dispute; We Do Not Wish To See a Setback to the Unity Between Syria and Libya; We Want It To Become an Example"]

[Excerpts] [Question] Did the aid formula which Arab countries can offer Lebanon through the league or unilaterally to confront the situation in south Lebanon begin to take shape after your negotiations with Lebanese officials and especially with President Sarkis?

[Answer] My recent visit to Beirut came in the context of the resolution that was adopted by the recent session of the league's council. This resolution charged the secretary general with making direct contact with top-level officials in the Lebanese government to study the situation, especially in the aftermath of the recent raids on the south, and to look into the possibility of helping the Lebanese state overcome the difficulties which it is facing.

And here I must say that the aid which the Lebanese government requests is what the Arab countries may offer collectively in the context of the Arab League. There can be no other aid. The Arab countries cannot nor do they have the right to propose formulas for this aid, be this aid moral, political, economic, material or financial.

We believe that despite the multiple difficulties that confront it due to various and interconnected factors, Lebanon can, to a certain extent, overcome these difficulties. These factors are basically foreign and are the result of the fact that the Palestinian people have been deprived of their homeland. They are also the result of Israel's various tyrannical acts in the area, both in the occupied territories and in the neighboring areas.

But there is no doubt that the final solution to what Lebanon is suffering from lies in allowing the Palestinians to settle in their homeland and to establish an independent state on their land.

However, we are not telling our Lebanese brothers that there is nothing we can do to alleviate the impact of the difficulties they are facing until a final solution is achieved. I believe that while we wait for this solution we can--in fact, it is our duty--help Lebanon check the grave consequences of the problems and obstacles that stand in the way of the state and its institutions.

This action depends to a large extent on the establishment of what President Sarkis calls the reconciliation. He had proposed a set of principles for this reconciliation in a famous speech which we regard as the foundation for everything that may be achieved in this regard and a point around which the Lebanese can rally. The starting point for any action which seeks to curb the problems that are becoming more critical inside the country must turn towards regulating the relationship between the state and its institutions, on the one hand, and the Liberation Organization, on the other. This means that any such step must take into consideration the requirements of the revolution, which we do not deny, do occasionally conflict with the requirements of the state. There is no doubt about that and there is no way we can avoid acknowledging it.

It is possible, nevertheless, to strive for what the Tunisia Summit had advocated and to organize or re-organize the relationship between the state and its institutions [on the one hand] and [between the state and] the PLO and the requirements of its revolutionary action on the other. But this in itself does depend to a large extent on the Lebanese reconciliation so that the people of Lebanon could speak with one voice.

It is, therefore, the duty of the Arabs to supply Lebanon with the assistance that Lebanon, as a state with united institutions and as a nation with united groups deems appropriate. It is thus that Lebanon can gradually regain its health and its strength, and it is thus that the state can regain its ability to assume its responsibilities in the various areas. Lebanon can thus adjust its relationship with the revolution both on the popular level and on the level of state institutions.

This was the subject of the discussion with all the officials I contacted, and especially President Sarkis.

Everything that we can do is being discussed within the league, all of whose members believe that all previous agreements must be enforced. The Lebanese state must gradually regain its ability to assume its responsibilities in all areas.

This, however, must not make us turn our attention from the real confrontation, nor must it make us forget that these are problems that the Zionist entity deliberately created and concocted here and there and wherever it can so that Arabs' efforts can be diverted towards them throughout the Arab homeland. For years we have been concerned with and we have been keeping up with the internal situation in Lebanon with growing anxiety while the real confrontation is between the Arabs and Israel.

We must all regain an awareness that must be aimed at three points:

* Regardless of its duration and its onerous consequences, the Palestinian presence in Lebanon is temporary. Palestinian presence will not turn into Palestinian settlement, not because the Lebanese people object to it, but because the Palestinians themselves refuse it. It is not in the interests of Palestinians even to think about settling in Lebanon.

* All leaders and commanders on the Lebanese scene must overcome the painful, daily problems. They must rise above these problems and look to the future. It is the future that will make it easy to overcome the difficulties of the present. In fact, we must endure the present while we forge the future.

* This is an extremely difficult period which Lebanon has been experiencing for 5 years. It is a period of various, onerous and painful ordeals for us. We call it a period of labor because Lebanon will emerge from it a united nation and an indivisible homeland. Peoples and nations are fused by the ordeals [they experience].

If all the leaders were to look at this future and if they were to look at the present ordeals with all the pain, hardships, and disasters they involve, they would realize that these ordeals are the melting pot in which all the groups would be fused. It is from this melting pot that a new Lebanese mentality will emerge and demonstrate the balance that we should have in the future. It is this that will enable the Lebanese people to forge their country anew and to make it stronger than the country which the treaties created 40 years ago. This is because the Lebanese people would have created a country with their own hands, with their own minds and with their own hearts. They would have contributed to the creation of a homogeneous entity that is headed for the future.

This is what I want to establish and to underscore in the minds of all our Lebanese brothers. There is no flattery involved here: what concerns the Lebanese people concerns the Arabs who are not indifferent to Lebanese problems. In fact, the Arabs are prepared to do as much as they can [for Lebanon]. Although it may be easy to determine what Arabs are to offer, it is not easy for them to interfere in the affairs of a sovereign state--a state that must remain a sovereign, independent and separate entity.

First and foremost, we must also all understand, whether we are Lebanese or not, that a solution to this crisis, like all [other] crises in the Arab world, has to be an Arab solution.

Iraq-Iran: an Islamic Solution

[Question] When the clashes between Iraq and Iran escalated, you did not waver in expressing your support for Iraq, "the Arab country," in [its efforts to] defend its sovereignty. Now that the situation has turned into a serious confrontation that threatens the area in its entirety, what is the position of the league [vis a vis the Iraq-Iran conflict]?

[Answer] Without any hesitation I would say that no one who is conscious of the dictates of his humanity can support war. It is to the Arab's credit that he can say--even though his interests and those of his homeland may be on the line because

what concerns Iraq does concern every Arab--that man can find no reassurance in war. Man is [usually] forced to go to war, and he goes to war with a sense of bitterness and joylessness. Inasmuch as we did express support for our Iraqi brothers' demand for their rights before the onset of military operations, we now feel that we are all being called upon to find a peaceful solution that would safeguard the area from imminent dangers.

This is what we must say very clearly. If I were to say the opposite of that--if I were to say that I supported the war--I would not be faithful in the fulfillment of my responsibilities. [Such a statement] would not conform to Arab and Islamic practice or values. We are both Arabs and Moslems. The values upon which our civilization has been built undoubtedly include protecting [our] dignity and championing what is right.

But those values also require that we lean towards what would save the peace and what would strengthen good relations that are based on neighborliness. We do not want the disputes to get worse so that there would be no feelings of hatred in people's hearts that generations would inherit. There are many areas in the world that have suffered for long periods of time from the fact that hatred had settled in the hearts of people who are neighbors. This is what happened in the distant past between Britain and France, and it happened not too long ago between France and Germany.

We would not like such hatred to become entrenched between Arabs and non-Arabs in the Middle East. Although in the present situation our feelings make us sympathize with a certain side and undoubtedly lean towards it, we do state, as the guns are being fired, that relations between nations must be saved [from such rancor].

We must also take into consideration what may be a mutual destiny but not a common one.

[Question] There was an agreement between you and Mr Habib Chatty that joint efforts would be made to settle the Iraqi-Iranian dispute and to coordinate the efforts of the two organizations [in that regard]. A week ago you expressed the hope that the clashes would not develop so that the two organizations would not have to undertake that effort. Now that the clashes have developed, do the two organizations intend to mediate or to take part in settling the dispute?

[Answer] I believe that cooperation between the two organizations is very important under all circumstances and especially in this situation in particular. I did try to contact Mr Habib Chatty by telephone, but I was not able to reach him because he was on his way to New York. I did, however, ask the league's representative in the United States, Dr Clovis Maqsud to get in touch with him. Dr Maqsud contacted Mr Chatty and told him on behalf of the secretary general that the league and its office in the United States were at the disposal of the Islamic Organization. He told him that he, that is, Dr Maqsud, was authorized to act in accordance with what the two parties perceive to be beneficial and in accordance with the proposals made by the Islamic Conference Organization. With regard to this I was able to contact a large number of ministers of foreign affairs--I was unable to reach some of them--to consult with them about what we can do. Our opinion was unanimous at this stage at least that the appropriate background for interfering and mediating was Islamic. This is what we are now pursuing along with the United

Nations which is working diligently [to settle this matter]. We are following the efforts of the United Nations with great interest and appreciation. These efforts are being carried out by the secretary general himself, Dr Waldheim and by the president of the Security Council who, fortunately, is a Tunisian Arab. He is a politician and an experienced diplomat, well-known for his know-how in national and international negotiations. We believe that the United Nations can do something now. In the final analysis it is the United Nations that will make a decision because a cease fire [that would be established] to pave the way for official negotiations must be made by the United Nations so it would acquire an official, decisive character.

We Do Not Want the Unity To Suffer a Setback

[Question] You talked with President al-Asad and with Mr 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam in Damascus about the plan for unity. Do you believe that this endeavor is sufficient for facing the situation in the area, especially since the response to it in the Arab countries was not as positive and as warm as those who forged the unity had expected?

[Answer] We discussed numerous matters with both President Hafiz al-Asad and with 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam. Chief among the subjects we discussed was the plan for unity between Libya and Syria. As an Arab League we cannot but give our blessings to every step that is taken to further the trust between two Arab countries or among a number of Arab countries. I know the comments that have been made internationally about this plan, and I am also familiar with the doubts that some observers are raising about the benefits of this step because of the numerous matters that separate the two countries. But I do believe that the reapprochement that will result from the plan will in itself be positive. It will be a political rapprochement--a rapprochement in the coordination of efforts--as well as a joining of forces and a solidarity in other economic and military fields. It is no secret that Syria is one of the most important countries facing the enemy and that it needs support because of its location. This support must go to Syria from all the Arabs; Syria is in fact receiving this aid regularly from numerous Arab parties, especially from the oil countries. The fact that Syria is receiving this support from Libya meets with the requirements of confronting the enemy. Consequently, we view this plan on two levels:

* An urgent level of supporting the opposition; and

* A deferred level. This [level] means that haste would not be necessary because haste will bring about disappointment, and we do not want this new experiment to suffer a setback and to be weakened by the same failure that weakened its predecessors.

Therefore, we believe that it is the duty of all of us and it is the duty of the Libyan and Syrian brothers to take their time and to proceed one step at a time so that they would establish those steps firmly and create this unity with the integration, the strength and the firm, solid foundation that it requires. It is on the basis of such a foundation that unity between the two countries can be achieved. If that unity becomes a good, radiant, credible model, it may become an example for others.

This is our view of the experiment in the immediate and in the distant future.

Weapons for the Arabs: Persuasion

[Question] According to statements you made, your negotiations with Yasir 'Arafat dealt with impending dangers to the Palestinian forces and with ensuring an immediate Arab reaction if Palestinian forces were to be subjected to any Israeli attack. What practical formula or formulas do you think can ensure a minimum of Arab confrontation that would be characterized by unity and immediacy.

[Answer] When we met with our fellow fighter Yasir 'Arafat, we talked about the efforts that all of us are making in the international area to persuade our friends that there is a question of a nation. What we always hear from our European friends is that the question is that of the people of Israel and the state of Israel. It is Israel whose security and whose survival must be guaranteed. Everything else is marginal and would only be viewed incidentally and occasionally. We are trying to convince our European friends that this view is lacking because there is another nation. We cannot tell them that the people of Israel do not exist, and since the existence of the people of Israel is their logic, we proceed from their point of view so we can gradually win them over and tell them, "You believe that there is a Jewish people who are the people of Israel. All right. But there is another nation in the same area--a more authentic nation--that was expelled from its land and condemned to homelessness for over 30 years. This nation's problem has existed since 1917, the day the Balfour Declaration was made and the Jewish throngs came from everywhere to buy land and to take it over by all means. Those homeless people do exist, and their existence cannot be denied. They will not accept fading away within the Arab community or blending with any other community. They have their own entity, their own identity and their own characteristics." There is no way for Israel or anybody else to hope that this question will be obliterated by settling the Palestinians in Lebanon, in Jordan or in any other country. This conviction has begun to take root in the minds of our friends, the Europeans.

We spoke about this effort which the organization and we in the league are carrying out; all the Arab countries are contributing to this effort. We looked into the dangers surrounding the area and especially south Lebanon-shelling the forces of the revolution and shelling Lebanese civilians so that they would emigrate to the north and create a vacuum in the south, thereby increasing complaints and unrest there. Israel is hoping that difficulties between the Palestinians and the Lebanese would get worse as a result of these hardships and disasters with which south Lebanon has been afflicted. This is what Israel is hoping for. Israel may be encouraging Sa'd Haddad to take over south Lebanon, making this a persuasive, indirect annexation. Israel may also be thinking about encouraging Bashir al-Jumayyil to announce the creation of a state independent of the original legitimate state. All these dangers are possible. We had to review them and to think about how we would react to them. I believe that the most important weapon the Arabs can use to confront these dangers is to remain united, not only because there is strength in unity, but also because the fragmentation of the Arabs would enable Israel to carry out maneuvers until problems one day become aggravated and avoiding them becomes impossible. The most dangerous threat to the area is for Israel to establish what Moshe Sharitt and Ben Gurion have been aspiring for: the creation of another state in the area on the same grounds upon which the state of Israel

was founded. That state would then become the justification for the existence of Israel because it would have been built on religious and racist grounds.

This cannot take place unless the Arabs become fragmented, but if they remain united, Israel cannot accomplish such an operation. Therefore, one of the most important things that we must do is to close the gaps that have appeared here and there so that the ranks of the front which emerged in Baghdad and then in Tunisia would remain together.

It is thus that we can confront the enemy and the opponents and establish the proof that bilateral agreements with Israel are of no use because the Arabs reject them all and because the basic question has not been solved.

The European Friend Is Prepared

[Question] What is your evaluation of Mr Thorn's tour in the Arab region? Do you expect the European Common Market countries to undertake an initiative in the Middle East?

[Answer] Our evaluation of this experiment must take into consideration above all else my verbal negotiations with a number of European leaders. I was convinced in the course of these negotiations that our European friends were prepared to make a special effort to facilitate opening the roads to a real and just peace in the Middle East. We must welcome any action taken by our friends that would make a peaceful solution easier even though their point of view is not identical to that of the Arabs. This is natural because if a French man or an Italian thought the same way an Arab did, problems would come to an end. But the Arabs themselves do not always think alike on many problems. How then can an Arab and a French man think alike? It is therefore natural that there be differences and that we work to minimize them. Even if we were to disagree with our European friend, we must encourage him to come closer to us gradually by persuading him and not be exerting pressure on him. Pressure may be useful, but it is not beneficial under critical circumstances. Support can only be based on faith and conviction.

Although we may not be able to win them over, we believe that we can even persuade the Europeans who are not our friends to [accept] positions that are close to ours. They would at least favor neutrality, or their enthusiastic support for Israel would diminish.

There are various steps, and just as is the case with a musical instrument, there are many scales we can play. There is total support, and there is total opposition, and between the two there is a vast difference. We can take advantage of all the capabilities so we can strangle the enemy and render him incapable. The war between us and [Israel] is not just a war with airplanes and tanks. The time for such a war may come: it did in the past and it may come in the future. But before we resort to such a war and instead of resorting to it, there are many things that we can do before that: there are media, political and economic disturbances. We can use all the power, the influence and the means at our disposal to isolate the enemy and to reduce the supplies he receives from abroad because Israel survives on foreign supplies. If we can organize the Arab forces and the Arab energies on the U.S. scene just as the Zionists organized their forces in the United States

scores of years ago, we will be able to confront the Zionist influence adequately. This is what we are thinking about now.

We must confront Israel with all the means that we have at our disposal. It was on this basis that His Royal Highness Prince Fahd called for a holy war. You will recall that I said [then] that a call for a holy war does not inevitably mean war. It would be naive to say that it meant war or no war at all. I said that war and nonwar were implied. Prince Fahd's call for a holy war has many other implications: the power of determination is among them. Prince Fahd's call was an invitation to the Arabs to resolve to enter into the battles and assume all the responsibilities. The second implication of the holy war is using all the means that we have and sacrificing ourselves and what is dear to us--and sacrificing what is dear to us before sacrificing ourselves.

We Count on Our Rights

[Question] Is it legitimate for the Arabs to count on the U.S. elections? What is the position of the league vis a vis the U.S. administration after that administration continued its absolute support for the Israeli position?

[Answer] We are counting on Arab rights and on the confirmation of those rights. We are counting on the fact that those rights can be understood in all the arenas. If we can influence European and U.S. public opinion, the U.S. government will follow the trend because political and social organizations in the United States make the government incapable of straying away from what is dictated by U.S. public opinion.

In this regard we cannot say that Carter or any one of the other candidates would be better.

The best thing for us is to continue the Arab effort on this basic arena, on all the arenas and in the face of all the powers that have influence and that can or must contribute towards the establishment of a just and peaceful settlement.

[Question] Military bases and facilities granted to the superpowers have become numerous in some areas of the Arab homeland. This implies a threat to sovereignty, a violation of the sanctity of Arab land and a violation of the charter of the Arab League. The recent session of the council of the league decided to charge you to make the necessary contacts to deal with this matter. How far have your efforts gone? Do you expect the matter to be raised at a summit conference or do you expect the achievement of uniform positions to be impeded?

[Answer] The answer is hinted at in your question. The council of the league did in fact charge me to contact the parties concerned, to conduct an investigation and to report about it. I have not been able to carry out this task yet because I have been busy with other matters. I believe I will have the opportunity as soon as possible to do what is necessary in this regard. This may take the form of consultations with all the Arab parties about what will weigh the scales in favor of fundamental Arab values upon which Arab consensus is based. It is these values that preserve the unity of joint action from disarray and fragmentation.

The Sahara. . .Next Year

[Question] The Arab Maghreb is still the scene of an armed struggle that lasted for more than 5 years. Recently, Arab circles have begun to sense a development in the Algerian and Moroccan positions that would permit the achievement of a negotiated settlement. Does the secretariat general intend to undertake an initiative in this direction?

[Answer] The work that is being done by the league along those lines is not always done publicly. We are not always concerned about the fact that the league's actions be reported in the media. This is because we believe that what is important is not to have people say that the secretariat general is doing what it is doing, but what is important is to try and to strive and to make an effort. For a year we have spared no efforts to move in this direction and to contact the two parties that you mentioned as well as other Arab parties that may influence this dispute. The information that I have now from various sources makes me believe that the coming year may bring us good news about settling this dispute in a manner that would be satisfactory to everybody.

What Egypt Is Doing Is Insulting

[Question] The council of the league decided to open four new offices at once for the first time in the history of the league. Your envoy also made intensive efforts in the countries of Latin America; these efforts yielded some positive results. Is the league about to undertake new diplomatic and media campaigns to explain the Arab cause to public opinion and to governments?

[Answer] This last session was an important one. I emphasized the positive features that characterized it in the closing speech. I want to emphasize this because usually the prevailing opinion is that a session of the league's council which is not attended by the ministers is not a very positive one. But this session established the evidence for the opposite [view] even though the ministers do give a session greater significance.

I would like to mention here that the council's business is carried out at the committee level. Among the traditions of the league is the fact that debates in the committees are always heated. Everyone who knows the league knows this propensity to a hot climate. This does not mean that there are special problems in that session, but it is usual for the debates in the league to be heated. This is an indication of enthusiasm and of the fact that matters are taken seriously. It is an indication of the fact that all are concerned about examining matters thoroughly and carefully.

The reports were positive with regard to financial aspects, indicating that the secretariat general had made efforts leaning towards austerity, tightening disbursements and avoiding what may not be exactly congruent with the law.

With regard to political action the political committee expressed its appreciation for all the efforts that were carried out by the secretariat general both on the Arab and international scenes, and especially with regard to the Arab-European dialogue and Afro-Arab cooperation.

The assembly has also made important decisions in political matters that are rather important. The question of Eritrea came to the league for the first time, and a decision is being made on this matter. This affirms the fact that the league always supports liberation questions. This is our duty, and it is one of the values we believe in.

With regard to Lebanon a decision was also made to send the secretary general to that Arab country and to entrust him with a political mission.

Also with regard to news that has been spreading about agreements on granting foreign bases in the Arab region, the council made a firm decision, and it also charged the secretary general with conducting the investigations that are necessary.

This session was characterized by firmness in all areas, and its actions were positive. The secretariat general, thank God, was appreciated for what it did accomplish in the various fields.

[Question] The Egyptian government has decided to resume the negotiations with Israel even though the decision to annex Jerusalem is still fresh on people's minds. A few hours after the Egyptian decision [was announced], Israel decided to establish four new settlements. What does the secretary general of the Arab League think of this direction which Egypt is taking?

[Answer] Notwithstanding my respect for the actions of every Arab or non-Arab government, I cannot say [that I respect] the actions of the Egyptian government. As an Arab citizen, however, I am deeply hurt, just as every Arab would be, by the fact that hardly did a few weeks go by after the Egyptian government proclaimed its determination to cut the negotiations unless Israel reversed its decision regarding Jerusalem; unless it changed its mind about settling Jews in various parts of the occupied territory; or unless it accepted fundamental matters regarding autonomy, but we were surprised by the fact that the negotiations were resumed. I do not allow myself [to express] an opinion on this subject. All that I will say is that it hurts me deeply, and that I feel somehow wronged as though we had all been insulted.

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KUWAIT DECLINES TO JOIN AIDO

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 25 Oct 80 pp 10, 11

[Text] Contacts are currently taking place between the Arab Industrial Development Organisation and Kuwait to persuade the latter to join the organisation following its change of name from "Center." The Chairman of the organisation's current session, Iraq's Minister of Industry and Minerals, Taher Tawfeeq, has been charged with persuading Kuwait to join the organization. Kuwait's attitude towards the change of name is that it neither retards nor advances the Centre and that what is required is a realisation of its aims and not a change of name. It should then be developed so as to become worthy of the name "organisation."

Kuwait was called upon to join the organisation at its first board meeting which was held in Baghdad from September 20 to 22 under the patronage of Iraq's President Saddam Hussein. Kuwait was absent from the meeting due to her reservations about the change of name. It was decided at the September session to form a five-man committee led by Iraq's Minister of Industry and Minerals and consisting of experts from the Arab League, the Arab Industrial Development Organization, OAPEC and the Gulf Industrial Investments Organisation. This committee was given the right to refer to any Arab exports in its assignment to draw up the internal structure of the organisation's various bodies.

The organisation's first board meeting also examined the cooperation existing between it and the Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development and called for close cooperation with all Arab organisations. The problems arising from the lack of expertise in the organisation were evaluated, and attributed to the moving of its headquarters from Cairo to Tunis and then to Baghdad.

The board saw the need to fortify the local expertise available with Arab expertise both within the Arab nation and abroad, so as to do away with the need to resort to foreign experts as far as possible. It stressed the need for the organisation to complete all the activities it has begun, giving priority to conducting regional survey which will serve the economic development strategy decided upon by the Arab Economic Council at its last meeting in Amman.

The board also expressed the belief that the transitional period that has been estimated at six months will be sufficient to prepare for the establishment of an Arab information bank. It also approved a budget for the organisation of US $3,053,559 for the coming year.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

TRADE WITH YUGOSLAVIA--Kuwait has agreed to lend Yugoslavia $250 million to help it boost its foreign currency reserves, it was announced in Belgrade; officials there said that the loan agreement was signed by the National Bank of Yugoslavia, but they did not identify the Kuwaiti state corporation which they said made the loan, nor did they disclose any other details. Economic relations between the two countries have until now been insignificant: the loan is worth more than 10 times the entire value of two-way trade in 1979. Yugoslavia's chief oil supplier is Iraq, which exported $514 million worth of crude and other goods and services in 1978 and $806 million worth last year; Iraq's trade surplus with Yugoslavia rose in the same period from $359 million to $586 million. Iraq accounted for more than 60 per cent of Yugoslavia's trade with OPEC countries last year. With the rest of the Arab world, Yugoslavia has enjoyed a small but healthy trade surplus: exports, worth $374 million in 1978, were up to $451 million last year, while imports jumped from $147 million to $249 million. Overall, however, Yugoslavia suffers from a serious balance of payments, deficit, which increased from $4.23 billion in 1978 to $6.12 billion last year, and it has been seeking loans from a number of Western countries, as well as oil-exporting nations and the USSR to make up some of this gap. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 6 Oct 80 p 12]

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

CHINESE ISLAMIC TEAM ARRIVES--An Islamic delegation from the Republic of China arrived here today. It is the first of its kind to visit the country from China. The team will meet, during its four-day visit, Minister of Justice, Islamic Affairs and Endowments and senior officials in the Ministry. The discussions will cover the situation of Muslims in China. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 8 Nov 80 p 3]

CSO: 4820

CONGRATULATORY TELEGRAM SENT TO WALDHEIM

Kabul NEW TIMES in English 23 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] Kabul, Oct. 23, (Bakhtar).--On behalf of Babrak Karmal, General Secretary of the PDPA CC, President of the RC and DRA Prime Minister, the following congratulatory telegram, addressed to His Excellency, Dr. Kurt Waldheim, General Secretary of the United Nations has been sent to New York, on the occasion of 35th UN day anniversary:

H.E. Dr. Kurt Waldhein,
Secretary General,
United Nations,
New York.
Excellency,

While expressing to you our most sincere felicitations on the occasions of the United Nations Day we reaffirm our full adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter. The Afghan people and government realize the importance of United Nations as a major instrument for promoting international peace and security, developing cooperation and establishing equitable economic relations between states.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is determined as before to continue to cooperate with the non-aligned and other progressive countries for the defence of peace, the lessening of international tension and in favour of the rights of all peoples to freedom and self-determination and their struggle against imperialism, hegemonism, zionism, apartheid, colonialism, neo-colonialism oppression, militarism and aggression.

We would like to convey to Your Excellency, our best wishes for further success in your valuable endeavours aimed at achieving the Charter's goals.

Babrak Karmal
General Secretary of Central Committee,
People's Democratic Party, President of Revolutionary Council and Prime Minister of DRA.

CSO: 4920

ZIA: 'SOVIET TROOPS LACK WILL TO FIGHT'

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 1 Nov 80 p 5

[Text]

LONDON, Oct. 31: A top leader of the Afghanistan resistance has said that 120,000 Soviet troops are fighting with the Mujahideen in that country.

Hamid Nasser Zia, Deputy Leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), told the General Affairs Committee of the Western European Union (WEU), which links Britain to the six founder members of the European Economic Community for defence purposes, that a Russian political opposition group, N.T.S., has jointly with the National Islamic Front signed leaflets in the Russian language which have been distributed in thousands in many of the major cities of Afghanistan. This has added "an ideological dimension" to NIFA's operations.

The General Affairs Committee of the WEU, which met in London was told by Zia that now there were 120,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, but they "lack the will to fight."

The first Soviet units, mainly from the central Asian republics, were withdrawn because the young central Asian conscripts "proved to be of poor resolve and stamina." But even the recent seasoned troops "are proving to be of poorer quality than expected."

He rediculed the belief in certain Western quarters that the combination of Western economic sanctions and political pressure is worrying the Russians. They worry "about the Mujahideen," not about who wont sell them wheat. They worry about how to keep their casualties hidden from the peoples.

To give an idea of the Soviet casualties in Afghanistan, Zia recalled a recent report by an Afghan nurse, who worked in an hospital in Kabul. She had reported that an average of 25 to 30 Soviet soldiers a week died there.

The Afghan people, too, were paying a high price for their resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, he went on. Six recognised groups are fighting the "enemy" and their "political differences" are not causing the resistance any problem "the Afghan people are 100 per cent united in the face of the enemy."

"The progress that NIFA can report at this time is that our forces are becoming ever more effective within the cities in their disruptive activities, especially in Kabul.

The outer sections and suburbs of Kabul were now controlled by the resistance, and the NIFA is running the judiciary and administration in many parts of the country.

He urged the WEU to ask their governments "to practically and constructively support the Afghan resistance." The destiny of the free world will be decided in Afghanistan. If the West does not take constructive action today, how will it be morally capable of resisting further Soviet expansionism?

The assembly of the WEU is meeting in Paris this December, when it will "examine the possibility of full financial and other assistance to the Afghan resistance movement until the USSR proves it is ready to negotiate withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan," according to a spokesman of the union.—IINA.

CSO: 4920

MANAGEMENT OF AFGHAN REFUGEES BEING REORGANISED

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 1 Nov 80 p 5

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Oct. 31: The Government has initiated a plan to reorganise the management of Afghan refugees in view of their continuing influx.

An official spokesman told Radio Pakistan, here today that the number of Afghan Refugees in Pakistan has now reached about 1.2 million of this over 9,50,000 are in NWFP, two lakh in Baluchistan, 22,000 in Punjab and 1000 in Sind and Azad Kashmir.

The spokesman said that the problem has assumed enormous proportions not only in unprecedented increase in refugee population, since the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan but the number of their camps itself had more than double.

He said in view of the large scale multi-dimensional problem the entire organisation for Afghan refugees especially at lower tiers has been revised and strengthened.

Under the new plan, every camp to be called a tentage... village, would contain only 5000 refugees or 1000 families. Thus the villages are now to be more than 200 in NWFP and 40 in Baluchistan. Five villages will form a district or an agency.

The spokesman said that the better qualified personnel will be detailed to make the plan here attuned to the new situation.

It will speed up the distribution of food supply, medical supplies and social services to the refugees in order to alleviate their plight.

CSO: 4920

AFGHANS MAY FACE HEALTH, FOOD PROBLEM IN COMING WINTER

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 4 Nov 80 p 6

[Text]

PARIS, Nov 3: Famine and disease thraten to follow in the wake of war this winter in the mountains of Afghanistan, according to two French doctors who have just spent two months in the north-eastern province of Nuristan.

Frederic Tissot and Daniel Parisot, of the Organisation International Medical Aid (AMI), said that the fighting between Soviet troops and Afghan guerrillas coupled with the still increasing exodus of refugees, has meant that almost no crops have been cultivatd.

Animal food is almost non-existent and a large proportion of the livestock has been killed by anti-personnel mines dropped by Soviet helicopters, the doctors said.

While the severe winter, which has already begun in Nuristan, poses severe food problems there for women and children in particular, in more central regions such as Hazaradjat which are not traditionally self-sufficient there is a real risk of famine, the doctors added.

The medical picture is no brighter, with no Afghan doctors left in a region where there was one for every 100,000 population in 1978. Nor can local people go to Kabul for treatment as the road is out and regularly bombed.

The only aid now comes from volunteer medical teams from French organisations such as AMI, Doctors Without Frontiers and Doctors of the World, but even they have only about 10 doctors to cover the whole frontier region.

The team of doctors Parisot and Tissot was led into Afghanistan by a local chieftain. It took with it some 600 kilos (1,320 pounds) of medical supplies and light surgical equipment.

In Nuristan the doctors trained local nurses and cared for the sick as well as those wounded in the war. They said the fighting was still fierce, with Afghan Government troops penetrating into the valleys with the support of armour and Soviet helicopters to carry out combing operations.—AFP.

CSO: 4920

MUJAHIDEEN KILL 200 SOVIET, AFGHAN TROOPS

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 4 Nov 80 pp 1, 8

[Text] London, Nov. 3--The Hizb-i-Islami Afghanistan reported from Alishang district of Laghman province that on October 29, heavy clashes took place between the devoted Mujahideen of the Hizb-i-Islami and the Russian forces.

In these conflicts, eight tanks and armoured cars were destroyed and 200 Russian and Afghan soldiers killed. On the side of Mujahideen six were killed.

The report added that the Russian invading forces attacked Alishang districts several times to get control on the liberated areas, but each time they were defeated.

Another Hizb-i-Islami report from Maqoor district of Ghazni province said that the Afghan Mujahideen attacked Russians in Maqoor. As a result, two tanks were destroyed and one armoured car burnt up. In this attack which lasted for four hours, one Mujahideen was martyred.

The report added that the Mujahideen attacked the Russians while they had gatherings in the centre of Maqoor. The ships were also burnt up because of heavy firings on the two sides.

Logar Province

Reports from Logar province said that the Mujahideen launched heavy guerilla operations in various parts of Logar province. The Mujahideen attacked a group of soldiers while they were taking meal. As a result, they were captured and their weapons taken by the Mujahideen.

In another attack two armoured cars were destroyed while they were coming from Kabul to Logar.

According to a report from Sang Charak of Jawzjan province, the Mujahideen captured sub-provincial headquarters. After this incident, Russian planes bombarded Sang Charak killing ten of innocent children and women and destroying many houses.

In another attack, Sayfuddin's Mujahideen group destroyed eight tanks and about 30 trucks and killed several hundreds Russian and Parachamis in Sar-e-Pul of Jawzjan province.

They captured about 300 rifles, six machineguns, and 200 horses. The sub-province headquarters fell under the control of Mujahideen.

Another fighting took place in Jawzjan in Khawal sub-province. More than 200 Russian and pro-Russian troops were killed and five tanks destroyed by the Mujahideen. They also captured about 100 pieces of weapon and two horses. The Mujahideen and villagers also suffered heavy casualties.

It should be added that in all the bombardment, Russian planes came directly from the Soviet soil and bombarded villages and Mujahideen's position--PPI.

CSO: 4920

FOUR AFGHAN TRIBES JOIN MUJAHIDEEN

Karachi DAWN in English 1 Nov 80 pp 1, 10

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct 31: Four Afghan tribes were reported to have joined forces to surround an Afghan Soviet column of tanks in the Logar valley south of Kabul, diplomatic sources said here yesterday.

They named the tribes as the Logaris, Mangals, Jajis and Zadrans. But no details of the combined operation were immediately available.

The sources said there had been some air activity over Kabul in the past week. But that combat helicopters were heading mainly towards the Logar valley and Ghazni city about 11 km. south of the Afghan capital.

Senior Afghan Government and party leaders visited Ghazni last Monday.

Clashes were also reported from Charikar, Pauli Khumri and Gurbahar, north of Kabul, according to the sources.

They said fighting in the provinces had resulted in a shortage of firewood in Kabul.

The price of firewood had increased since last winter and was now beyond the means of most Afghans who used it for cooking and heating, they said.

The sources said conscription was still being severely enforced "on the streets in shops, public bars and houses".

Kabul Radio monitored in New Delhi repeated an amnesty offer this week to young men who had failed to turn up for service, saying they would be exempt from punishment if they reported for duty before November 7.

Residents of Kabul, hit in the past by shortages of some food items and fuel, now face the rugged Afghan winter with a shortage of firewood, a diplomatic source said in New Delhi Thursday.

The price of firewood in the capital had more than tripled over what it was two years ago, rising from the equivalent of about 2.64 US dollars for a Kharwar (1.232 pounds) to about 8.50 dollars, said the source, who asked not to be identified.

Wood is used both for cooking and heating in Afghanistan, but the current price makes it far too expensive for the average Afghan, the source said.

Last winter the Government brought truckloads of wood from the forests to the capital in a large convoy protected against anti-Government guerilla attack, and that supply brought the price down to about 5.76 dollars per Kharwar, the source said. He added that there were fears that there could be trouble in Kabul this winter if the Government does not do the same again.

Winter already has begun in this rugged, landlocked Asian country with snowfalls on Tuesday and Wednesday blanketing the mountains.

A top leader of the Afghanistan resistance has said that 1,20,000 Soviet troops are fighting with the Mujahideen in that country, reports IINA correspondent.

Mr Hamid Nasser Zia, deputy leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), told the General Affairs Committee of the Western European Union (WEU), which links Britain to the six founder member of the European Economic Community for Defence purposes, that a Russian political opposition group, at N.T.S. has jointly with the National Islamic Front signed leaflets in the Russian language which have been distributed in thousands in many of the major cities of Afghanistan. This has added "an ideological dimension" to NIFAs operations.

To give an idea of the Soviet casualties in Afghanistan, Mr Zia recalled a recent report by an Afghan nurse, who worked in an hospital in Kabul. She had reported that an average of 25 to 50 Soviet soldiers a week died there and that only top Afghan officers were admitted to the hospital.

The progress that NIFA can report at this time is that our forces are becoming ever more effective within the cities in their disruptive activities, especially in Kabul, were the main fuel storage tanks were blown up, the general heading the KGB was assassinated, and key members of Afghan Communist Party were killed. The Soviet and Afghan troops are now only able to control the centre of the city."

The outer sections and suburbs of Kabul were now controlled by the resistance, and the NIFA is running the judiciary and administration in many parts of the country.

Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ito yesterday called for consultations by Japan the United States and the nine countries of the European Community on the future of their economic sanctions against the Soviet Union.

Mr Ito said there was a lack of unity in the stands taken by the US, Japan and the EEC countries on the sanctions, which were imposed following Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.—Reuter/IINA.

CSO: 4920

MUJAHIDEEN STEP UP GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 5 Nov 80 p 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Nov. 4: Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan, reports from Kabul guerilla operations in Kabul City and its surroundings.

A number of guerilla groups have entered the Kabul city while other groups are pouring into Kabul city from Wardak and the neighbouring provinces.

According to a Press release of Hizb-e-Islami, two tanks were destroyed in Barchak area of Kabul on Nov. 1 was destroyed in an attack on Soviet forces by Mujahideen.

In another guerilla operation under the command of Maulvi Rahman Gul, one armoured car was burnt up in Arghafdi area, 21-Km south-west of Kabul.

Since the guerilla operations have been stepped up, many Communist and pro-Russian elements have been killed or captured alive.

Communists and supporters of the Russian-backed regime, residing in the outskirts of Kabul, such as, Kottasano Shadah and Qala are leaving their residences and are shifting in the city while the most active and high-ranking officials of the Afghan Government are living in the military barracks.

Rear Admiral, Robert J. Hanks, who was Director of Strategic Plans and policy for the U.S. Navy Department when he retired in 1977, in his new study has revealed that while U.S. naval strength has undergone a rapid decline over the past two decades, Soviet sea power has steadily increased. In his opinion the U.S. Navy must be rebuilt and the political economic and military strength mobilised.--PPI/APA

CSO: 4920

RESISTANCE AGAINST KARMEL GAINS MOMENTUM

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Nov 80 p 6

[Article by Qaiser Butt]

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Nov. 7: Nationalist resistance against the Babrak Karmel's regime in Afghanistan is gaining momentum, according to information received here from reliable sources.

Joining this struggle are the leaders of "Shula-e-Javed" the ever-burning flame "Akhgar" (sickle), Afghan-e-Millat and the Millat (the two groups of one party), the "Gronph-e-Inqulabi Khalq" (the revolutionary people's group), the Social Democrat and the "3 Aqrab" (the Third September) and the organisation of Afghan youth.

The sources said the leaders of Shula-e-Javed, Dr. Ahmed Shah Zamani, and his wife Dr. Saleha, who is daughter of another prominent leader of Shula-e-Javed late Dr. Mehmood, Mr. Wakzam, the leader of Millat, and Syed Mohammad Sultan of "Third September" have joined hands with the nationalist forces in Afghanistan against Babrak Karmel. Most of the leaders of these progressive parties have been put behind bars by Babrak Karmel for their nationalistic activities.

Some of the leaders of the nationalist groups are reported to have gone underground to mobilise forces against the present government. It may be mentioned here that the nationalist forces of Afghanistan have also formed a Pakhtoonkhwa Revolutionary Front against the Babrak regime.

The Afghan youths, the sources said, have recently formed another resistance group called the Islamic Freedom Front in Gardez province. It consists of young men who have no political affiliation with any political party. Mr. Zabihullah Mujaddi, the chief of the front, recently contacted the other nationalist forces in Afghanistan to bring the youth on one platform.

CSO: 4920

MUJAHIDEEN GIVING TOUGH TIME TO SOVIETS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 8 Nov 80 p 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Nov. 7: Mujahideen attacked Russian troops going towards Taab and Nejrab at Pul-e-Abdullah in Parwan Province in mid-October, according to reports received here.

In the fighting, which lasted 15 hours, the Mujahideen destroyed one tank and killed 42 Russians. They also destroyed seven trucks.

In a separate incident, the Mujahideen of the Islamic Alliance for Liberation of Afghanistan destroyed two vehicles and killed 12 Russians in Pul-e-Abdullah. The Mujahideen also killed 15 Pachamis and another six in another place in the same area.

According to a report from Parwan Province heavy fighting took place between Mujahideen and Russian troops from Oct. 21 to Oct. 24. On the first day the Mujahideen suffered some casualties but on the second day they organised themselves and defeated the invading forces. They destroyed two tanks and killed four Russians.

On the third day the Russians landed troops at Adaizai.

In the fighting, 75 of the invaders were killed and some arms captured by the Mujahideen. The same day another group of Russian troops attached in a bid to bring Alasai under control. But they too were defeated. Four Russians were killed and their two tanks destroyed. Mujahideen' and villages' casualties numbered 35 killed mostly during the heavy bombardments of the villages by the Russian helicopters and jets. Many children and women were wounded.

HOPE PLACED IN REAGAN: In Madrid, an Afghan guerilla leader, Sayed Ahmed Gailani expressed the hope yesterday that U.S. President elect Ronald Reagan would show more understanding for Afghans' cause than his predecessor and provide Afghanistan's resistance with much needed help in its fight against Soviet forces.

Mr. Gailani, who heads the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, said his movement had an urgent need notably for food, medicine, anti-tank weapons and air defence system and would accept help "from any quarter, provided, there are no strings attached."

Mr. Gailani, who was speaking at a Press conference, charged the West with having turned its back on Afghan resistance which he described as "a rampart of the West and Islam".

He claimed there were currently 120,000 Soviet troops in his country and as many insurgents fighting under the black banner of only war.—PPI/AFP

CSO: 4920

KANDHAR, URUZGAN PROVINCES SITES OF MUJAHIDEEN ATTACKS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Nov 80 p 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Nov. 2: According to latest reports, Mujahideen attacked Khakrez in Kandhar province and ambushed a military convoy at Kandhar, killing 20 Russian officers and 20 soldiers. They also killed six officers and 20 Afghan sepoys in another ambush near Kandhar and carried away some persons.

In Uruzgan province, the freedom fighters attacked Afghan troops at Deh Rawat killing and wounding 30 sepoys and destroying 5 vehicles. They also carried away 1610 sheep from the government farm.

In Pakia province, Mujahideen ambushed a military convoy near Matun killing 30 armymen and destroying 5 armoured cars and 6 army vehicles.

In Baghlan province, they raided Narin city, killing its Deputy Commissioner and many other pro-government persons.

In Ghor province, the freedom-lovers, who are already in control of Pasa Surjangal and Saghar districts, have been frequently damaging the gas pipe line between Shibarghf and the Soviet border. Mujahideen are also exerting heavy pressure on Maimana in Faryab province.

Meanwhile, Mujahideen have stepped up their activities in and around Kabul and their attacks are now against Soviet Army Headquarters, Air Force Garrisons, and supply convoys. In response, the Afghan Government has extended curfew in Kabul by 2 hours and security measures have been tightened further.—PPI

CSO: 4920

HEAVY FIGHTING REPORTED IN LOGAR VALLEY

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 Nov 80 p 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Oct. 31: Four Afghan tribes were reported to have joined forces to surround an Afghan-Soviet column of tanks in the Logar valley south of Kabul, diplomatic sources said here yesterday.

They named the tribes as the Logaris, Mangals, Jajis and Zadrans. No details of the combined operation were immediately available.

The sources said there had been some air activity over Kabul in the past week, but they said the combat helicopters were heading mainly towards the Logar Valley and Ghazni city about, 11 Km south of the Afghan capital.

Senior Afghan government and party leaders visited Ghazni last on Monday.

Clashes were also reported from Charikar, Pull Khumri and Gurbahar north of Kabul, according to the sources. They said fighting in the provinces had resulted in a shortage of firewood in Kabul.

The price of firewood had increased since last winter and was now beyond the means of most Afghans, who used it for cooking and heating.

The sources said conscription was still being severely enforced. Kabul Radio monitored in New Delhi repeated an amnesty offer this week to youngmen who had failed to turn up for service, saying they would not be punished, if they reported for duty before Nov. 7.

In London, meanwhile a top leader of the Afghanistan Resistance said yesterday that 1,20,000 Soviet troops were fighting against the Mujahideen.

Hamid Nasser Zia, deputy leader of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), told the General Affairs Committee of the Western European Union (WEU), which links Britain to the six Founder members of the European Economic Community for defence purposes, that a Russian political opposition group, NTS had jointly with the National Islamic Front signed leaflets in the Russian language, which had been distributed in thousands, in many of the major cities of Afghanistan. This, he said had added 'an ideological dimension' to NIFA's operations.

The first Soviet units, mainly from the central Asian republics, were withdrawn because they did not demonstrate enough "resolve and stamina". But even the new and seasoned troops, Mr. Hamid said, were proving to be of poorer quality than expected.

The Soviet Union, he said had therefore, resorted to massive bombing, 'with the result that famine and disease are widespread.

The Afghan leader ridiculed the belief in certain Western quarters that the Western economic sanctions and political pressure was worrying the Russians. They only worry 'about the Mujahideen".

To give an idea of the Soviet casualties in Afghanistan, Mr. Hamid recalled a recent report by an Afghan nurse, who worked in a hospital in Kabul. She had reported that an average of 25 to 50 Soviet soldiers a week died there.

The Afghan leader said "political differences' were not causing the resistance any problem. The Afghan people were 100 per cent united in the face of the enemy", he said.

The Afghan leader said progress that NIFA could report at this stage was that resistance forces were becoming ever more effective within the cities in their disruptive activities, especially in Kabul.

The outer sections and suburbs of Kabul were now controlled by the resistance, and the NIFA is running the judiciary and administration in many parts of the country, he said. —Reuter/IINA

CSO: 4920

SOVIET AMMUNITION CONVOY REPORTED DESTROYED

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 2 Nov 80 pp 1, 5

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Nov 1. Afghan guerillas destroyed a Soviet ammunition convoy, killed at least 45 Communist Party members and burned down a large primary school in raids on north and south of Kabul in the past week, a report from Afghanistan said today.

The guerillas raid last Monday night on the convoy near Sange Niwishta Pass 37 kilometres south-east of Kabul, prompted Soviet punitive air attacks against "very moving thing" in the villages of Logar province, killing hundreds of civilians, said the report from a source that in the past has been reliable.

Several Russian soldiers were killed or injured in the raid in which guerillas, some firing rockets, destroyed 21 ammunition trucks, two armoured cars and one tank, the report added.

Guerillas losses were not given in the raid south of Kabul but 15 to 17 Mujahideen were reported killed in strikes in the past week against police posts and a party office at Karte Parwan in the northern suburbs of Kabul. The report said the guerillas seized weapons and killed 30 members of the Ruling Peoples Democratic (Communist) Party.

Guerillas also killed 15 party members attending a gathering in a private home at Charikar, the Parwan provincial capital, 60 kilometers north of Kabul during the week, the report said.

The specific raids were not independently confirmed, but diplomatic reports reaching here have also mentioned fighting in the same areas.—APA.

CSO: 4920

COFFIN FACTORY FOR RUSSIANS IN KABUL REPORTED

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 3 Nov 80 p 4

[Text]

KARACHI, Nov. 2: A new factory making 300 coffins a day for the dead Russians has been set up recently in Kabul, besides a special cemetery, 'Beijing Review' disclosed in a recent issue.

It said Russian casualties are mounting with the escalation in the fighting and shipping the coffins back to the Soviet Union is having a demoralising effect so the dead are now being buried in Afghanistan.

Beijing Review further disclosed that the Russians are trying to get out of the fix they have got themselves into when they rolled into Afghanistan, by stepping up operations against the resistance fighters and by trying to put their stooge in Kabul more firmly in the saddle.

Since early July, they have been pouring in more troops and equipment into Afghanistan. Reports now put Soviet troop strength at 1,20,000, a 30,000 increase over earlier estimates. The Russians are revising their battle tactics, too, after being frustrated by stubborn guerilla resistance. Divisions are being divided into four to five detachments of 2,500 to 3,000 men each to be more responsive to guerilla attacks.

The stepped-up Soviet military suppression is coupled with political moves to weaken Afghan resistance. But neither Soviet bullets nor Karmal's promises are producing the results the Soviet Union hopes for, the Paper said.—PPI.

CSO: 4920

REPORTER ANALYZES RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION

Kabul NEW TIMES in English 27 Oct 80 p 3

[Text] The reporter of the Kabul News Times has carried out the following interview with Eng. Shaheen, President of Afghan CART Company, in connection with Babrak Karmal's visit to the Soviet Union and the long-standing relations between Afghanistan and Soviet Union:

Recalling his observations, and his constructive memories during his recent visit to the Soviet Union, Eng. Shaheen said:

It was my second visit to the USSR. My first visit took place in the land of Great October Revolution when I went there to receive higher education.

In the course of several years of study in the Soviet Union, I found out that the Soviet people are prosperous, they work hard and are energetic. They are patriotic and they enjoy their life as they have everything. The Soviet people do not worry about the future of their children. All these happiness and prosperity are the results of the bloody and long struggles of the heroic Soviet people.

After the victory of the Great October Revolution, the Soviet people for the first time in the world raised the banner of working people, putting an end to the satanic rule of tsarism.

V. I. Lenin, sent a message to Ghazi Amanullah Khan, recognising the independence of Afghanistan. Since then the friendly relations between Afghanistan and Soviet Union are increasingly developing and getting further consolidated on the basis of peaceful co-existence.

In the past 62 years this friendship has stood the test of time.

The presence in Afghanistan of Soviet limited military contingent, at the request of DRA Government, to defend the gains of the Saur Revolution and especially its new evolutionary phase, and ward off the foreign aggression, and finally foil the plots and conspiracies of foreign enemies, led by US imperialism in collusion with regional reaction and Pakistani militaristic circles, Chinese hegemonists and Arab reaction, is a vivid example of Soviet profound friendship with Afghanistan.

With the victory of the Saur Revolution the people of Afghanistan were freed from the yoke of imperialism and now Afghanistan is placed along the front of peaceful

and progressive forces of the world. The nature of our national democratic revolution, brings us further closer with the progressive forces of the world. Now, Afghanistan is able to make use of the experiences of friendly Soviet Union for building blossoming Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, as real friend of Afghan people, has refrained from no disinterested assistance to Afghanistan. There are scores of examples of assistance of Soviet Union to Afghanistan and one can name the Naghlu hydro-electric power station. Ghaziabad and Hadda farms, Kabul Polytechnic Institute, Jangalak technicum and that of Mazare Sharif, Kabul Airport and etc. as example of economic and technical cooperations of the USSR to Afghanistan. Only, recently the Soviet Union gave Afghanistan a hundred million roubles grant-in-aid in forms of clothings and other essentials which are being still distributed to the deserving people.

The past treacherous regimes, especially Amin, the traitor, wanted to undermine the friendly and fraternal relations between the two countries, however, they failed to achieve their vile designs.

Despite the plots and conspiracies and even armed interventions of 14 imperialist countries as well as civil wars, incited by imperialism, the Soviet people, in the light of socialism, were able to build a strong Soviet Union from under the war debris. Now, the achievements made by the Soviet Union in all walks of life are eye-catching.

After the victory of the Great October Revolution, all Soviet people had the opportunity to take equal part, without any discrimination, in building their society. Due respect was paid to the desirable traditions of the people as well as to their culture. The Soviet Union is a vast and multinational country, yet it has preserved its national prides.

The relations between Afghanistan and Soviet Union are based on principle of peaceful coexistence, equality of rights, respect to each other's national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as mutual cooperation and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. It is in the framework of this policy that Afghanistan was and is able to make effective use of fraternal and all-sided cooperations of Soviet Union in political, economic, cultural and social spheres.

The Soviet people are staunchly loyal to this friendship. I was personally witness that Afghans in the Soviet Union were treated like brothers and they profoundly respect the Afghans tranditions, customs and religion. The common religion between our Moslem people and Moslems in the Soviet Union has further consolidated our relations.

I am confident that with the help of noble people of Afghanistan and leadership of PDPA and with the disinterested assistance of Soviet Union, we will overcome all our problems, concluded Eng. Shaheen.

CSO: 4920

KABUL MAY SEAL BORDERS WITH PAKISTAN, IRAN

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 1 Nov 80 p 1

[Article by Qaisar Butt]

[Text] Islamabad, Oct. 31--The foreign troops in Afghanistan have been seen moving towards borders with Pakistan and Iran, to launch pre-winter offensive against freedom fighters, an eye-witness told this correspondent who visited North Waziristan, the Pak-Afghan border area recently.

The witness who crossed over the border said the situation prevailing inside Afghanistan was likely to force the Kabul Government to seal its borders with neighbouring countries.

The Russians are conscious that during the winter season guerilla warfare becomes more effective. The cold weather, the source said, would create more difficulties for Afghan troops posted at various installations, like powerhouses and telecommunication poles, air bases and border check posts.

The source said that Kabul authorities would also attempt to prevent the Afghan refugees and other persons from crossing over to Pakistan and Iran.

This correspondent also visited the Tribal border of Waziristan, where six Afghan gunship helicopters had carried out an attack last week. The source said the Afghan government was very unhappy with the Zardan tribesmen of the Paktia province where the Afghan Minister of Tribal Affairs Faiz Mohammad and his two companions Bakhtiar and Mian Habib were assassinated by the Afghan fighters last month. The Afghan Minister had gone to the tribesmen to ask them to lay down their arms. The Afghan Minister also allegedly attempted to bribe the fighters with cash and other facilities.

The Afghan government is reported to have asked the Zardan tribe to hand over the murderers to the government. According to the source, the tribesmen are defying the orders and are continuing the struggle against the Afghan government.

The source said that most of the refugees, who were target of Afghan gunship helicopters attack, belonged to the Zardan tribe. The tribesmen of Zardan area are of the view that the attack was intended to harass the tribal belt people who have been supporting the cause of Afghan Mujahideen.

CSO: 4920

NATIONALIST FRONT AGAINST KARMEL

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 3 Nov 80 p 1

[Article by Qaiser Butt]

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Nov. 2: The nationalist forces in Afghanistan have joined the resistance and taken up arms against the Babrak Karmel's administration by forming the "Pashtoon Khawa Revolutionary Front", a usually reliable source disclosed to The Muslim here today.

The Pashtoon khawa is a Pushto word used for the nationalist. The source said the front of the Afghan nationalists comprises progressive students, teachers, armymen, labourers and the younger people of other progressive political groups.

He said these nationalists elements were supporting the Saur revolution till the end of Hafeezullah Amin's regime in Afghanistan but they took up arms in July this year against Babrak Karmel when he killed the "true revolutionaries", who opposed him for his anti-nationalist policies.

The Front claims to have wiped out a number of pro-Karmel elements and also some religious leaders, who had indulged in killing those Afghan people who were working in government services. These include teachers, students and other civilians officials, the source said and added that these people were killed because they were serving a Communist government.

The source said that the Front had promised to provide protection to innocent citizens against the Government's barbarous acts and also from other religious fighters who had assassinated many citizens charging them of "serving the Communist Government".

The recent defection of a high-ranking official of Babrak Karmel's administration, Akhtar Mohammad Paktiwal, brings into sharp focus the struggle of the nationalist forces in Afghanistan.

In his speech Mr. Paktiwal, Afghanistan's chief delegate to the UNESCO General Conference in Belgrade, had stated "that the Afghan people were not fighting against Socialism but they were fighting for freedom, for self-determination and for their own rights. He had stated that "the Afghans are killing other Afghans.

The Government is killing Afghans and Afghans are killing the Soviets and the Soviets are killing Afghans." The speech of Mr. Karmel's representative reflects his affiliation with the nationalist forces. It is also interesting to note that the defecting Afghan official did not lend his pleas with religious protestations. He only protested against the killing of Afghan people and their independence.

CSO: 4920

KABUL JAILS CRAMMED WITH DETAINEES

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 7 Nov 80 p 12

[Text] Paris, Nov. 6--Kabul jails are crammed with political prisoners, a French reporter recently freed from captivity in Afghanistan said here on Tuesday.

The journalist, Francois Missen of the News Agency La Compagnie Des Reporters, was arrested in Kandahar last Sept 7, together with his agency colleague, French photographer Antoine Darnaud, who was subsequently released with Mr Missen.

Mr Missen said that apart from Afghan guerillas there were political prisoners.

We were first kept in Pul-i-Charki prison at the entry to Kabul, he said. From our block, number one, we could tell that there were about 3,000 prisoners mostly political, in the prison.

Later we were transferred to Political Police Headquarters near the Kabul Radio building and each thrown into a hole 1.10 metres (about 40 inch) wide and two metres (yards) long, guarded by Soviet paratroops.

In neighbouring cells there were prisoners captured with guns in their hands or suspected of guerillas sympathies. Every day new prisoners arrived and others left.

Mr Missen said he and Mr Darnaud were endlessly interrogated by the Afghans and by an Uzbek interrogator who spoke excellent French.

The man was a professional and knew interrogation techniques through and through, Mr Missen said. He was surely a Russian of the KGB (secret police).--AFP

CSO: 4920

KHALQIS, MUJAHIDS COOPERATION INCREASES

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 7 Nov 80 p 1

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Nov 6: The Khalq (g[illegible]ie) faction of the ruling [illegible] Democratic Party of Afghanistan has formed armed underground self-defence units amid reports of increasing cooperation between the Khalqis and the Mujahids, Western diplomatic sources said here today.

Quoting reports from the Afghan capital, the sources said that leading Khalqi Ministers in Babrak Karmal's Government, Communications Minister Aslam Ali Watanjar and Interior Minister Syed Mohammad Gulabzoi, were preparing for a possible confrontation with Karmal's Parcham faction, the sources said.

The Khalqis, who are considered more nationalistic and independent, are opposed to the Parchamis who are considered closer to Moscow.

The sources have said not give the numerical strength of such underground defence units, but said that the Khalqis had secured arms from police stores in the Interior Ministry.

The units are led by Khalqi military officers and civilians, the sources said.—AFP.

CSO: 4920

GUNBATTLE REPORTED IN CENTRAL KABUL

Karachi DAWN in English 7 Nov 80 pp 1, 6

[Text] New Delhi, Nov. 6--A two-hour gun battle took place in central Kabul on Friday, apparently between Afghan Mujahids and Government troops, Western diplomatic sources said here today.

The attack, believed mounted by an estimated 75 Mujahideen, was eventually repulsed after Soviet armour intervened, the sources said.

This is the first Western evidence of a major Mujahideen attack on an important military centre inside the Afghan capital. The incident was said to have happened near Darul Aman Palace--an important military facility base in the city centre.

The sources could not give casualty figures, but said that the insurgents inflicted injuries to Government troops.

For three days from Friday, explosions and gunfire were heard by city residents from several directions.

Quoting reports from the Afghan capital, the sources said that three Soviets and two armed Parchamis (members of the Parcham faction of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan) were killed at Karte Omar, Central Kabul, on Oct. 29.

Gunfire was also heard on the same day from the direction of the Polish Embassy, the sources said.

Giving details of Mujahideen activities on the outskirts of Kabul and in Afghan provinces, the sources said three armoured trucks were seen burning on the southern outskirts of the city on Oct. 29.

Soviet aircraft reportedly bombed villages around Kariz-i-Amir in northern Afghanistan on Oct. 29 along the strategic Salanga Pass Road, which connects Soviet Union with Afghanistan.

Mujahid groups operating in the Hasseim Kot area in northern Afghanistan attacked Afghan Government troops on Sunday, the sources said.

Further north in Qarabagh, Mujahids were said to have attacked the Governor's office on Saturday and took hostage the Governor and an unspecified number of other officials.

On Sunday, Mujahids stopped public transport buses at Maidan on the southern outskirts of Kabul, and took away identity cards of new conscripts.

A long convoy of Soviet armoured vehicles, meanwhile, entered the Afghan capital from the north on Monday in an operation which could mean that the Soviets were bringing in new forces or that battle-worn troops were returning to barracks, the sources said.

Meanwhile, Western diplomatic sources in New Delhi said today the Khaliq (People) faction of the ruling party has formed armed underground self-defence units amid reports of increasing cooperation between the Khalqis and the Mujahids.

Quoting reports from the Afghan capital, the sources said that leading Khalqi Ministers in Babrak Karmal's Government, Communications Minister Aslam Ali Watanyar and Interior Minister Syed Mohammad Golabzoi, were preparing for a possible confrontation with Karmal's Parcham faction, the sources said.

The Khalqis, who are considered more nationalistic and independent, are opposed to the Parchamis who are considered closer to Moscow.

The sources here could not give the numerical strength of such underground defence units, but said that the Khalqis had secured arms from police stores in the Interior Ministry.

The units are led by Khalqi military officers and civilians, the sources said.

The sources also said a fourth plenum of the ruling party will be convened soon to discuss a Cabinet reshuffle.

The third plenum was held in the first week of July. The sources did not give other details.

Meanwhile, well-informed Afghan dissident sources here speculated that Mr Babrak Karmal might have come back from the Soviet Union with Moscow's endorsement to sack Ministers belonging to the Khalq (Peoples) faction on the PDPA who are opposed to Karmal's Parcham (Flag faction).

Mr Karmal returned to Kabul yesterday after a 21-day visit of the Soviet Union.--AFP

CSO: 4920

COMMUNICATIONS ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 1 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by Ljubinka Milosevic]

[Text] Communications can be a tool of power, a weapon of revolution, a trade product or a medium for education they can serve the aims of liberation or suppression, the development of the personality of the individual or the channelling of human beings towards uniformity—caution members of the Macbride commission for the study of communications problems in its report entitled "Many voices—one world".

The report saw the light of day this summer after two years' work and is stirring up fresh interest on the eve of the UNESCO session as to the nature of the new order in communications and information, a subject which has in fact been under discussion for a decade.

This report came after a storm of opposition from the privileged to the demands of the subjugated in this field—mainly the developing countries— for equitable participation in the flow of information.

The six big "world" agencies control 90 percent of agency information which is transmitted in the world. The creation of the Pool of nonaligned countries' news agencies was the response to this injustice. The state of affairs is identical as concerns the efforts of the Committee for cooperation amongst the radio broadcasting organisations of the nonaligned countries. for eight tenths of the available frequences belong to the developed world.

No longer does anyone dispute that "freedom of information" in the present system does in fact mean the freedom of the stronger to impose information (and opinions) technically and technologically on all developing countries. The debates on this subject led UNESCO to set up the Macbride commission.

The mind boggles at the fact that 3,500 languages are spoken in the world. This very number does, however, illuminate the difficulty of the tasks undertaken by Commission members, many individuals, countries and organisations—to assure communications and the transmission of information while preventing anyone from being neglected or privileged.

The situation is just so today—some are privileged while others are neglected. The Macbride report has confirmed that it is necessary to seek a new, more just and equitable order in the sphere of communications. No proof is needed to demonstrate the existing inequality and dependence. The members of the Macbride Commission are extremely clear—they consider that "the time has now come to pass from principles to reform and concrete action.

Pointing out the link between communications and overall social, cultural and economic development, they stress that each country should develop its communications

models in accordance with its own conditions, needs and traditions, strengthening in this way its integrity, independecne and self-reliance.

The nonaligned and other develping countries have long since pointed out that a close link exists between the establishment of a new international economic order and a new world information and communications order—a statement which the commission members put forward in one of the 82 recommendations. In accepting this position, Commission members recommend that the concrete plans which link these two processes should be implemented under the aegis of the UN. Furthermore they consider that the UN, when it accepts development strategy, should comprise the communications sector as an essential part of the UN and not only as an instrument of public information.

The Commission members support the steps taken by the nonaligned to fill in the gap which exists in information amongst the developing countries themselves—the nonaligned news agencies' Pool and the Conference of Radio Broadcasting Organisations. They devote a special section to this entitled "The strengthening of collective independence" in their recommendations. Collective independence is, they consider, the corner—stone of the new world information and communications order.

All the recommendations put forward in the lengthy report are the basis for extensive international debate and action. One of the fundamental objectives must here be kept in mind—that the news world information and communications order should and must become the instrument of peaceful cooperation amongst nations. The Director General of UNESCO therefore acted wisely when he decided not to involve the forum of the general assembly in theoretic studies and polemics.

The UNESCO delegates in Belgrade will have entire the Macbride report at their disposal, but they will vote on the Action Programme to be proposed by the Director General in connection with the Macbride Commission proposals. As UNESCO voted for the inclusion of the problems of communications in their activity as early as April of this year (with the proposal for the formation of the International organ for planning communications development), UNESCO is today faced with concrete and clear tasks. It is not to adopt or reject the 400 page Macbride report but rather to define the directions for further inevitable changes in order for the world to remain one and to make it possible for everyone to hear the wealth of voices from all over the world. In this respect the Macbride report has done much it has made possible a maturing of awareness throughout the world of the intenability of the current information and communications system and the necessity for the creation of a new one.

CSO: 4920

INTERNATIONAL DECADE FOR WATER SUPPLY TO BEGIN

Kabul NEW TIMES in English 29 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] Kabul, Oct. 29. (Bakhtar).--Based on the decision of the United Nations and in pursuance with the lofty objectives of the Saur Revolution, the International Decade for Water Supply and Sanitation is scheduled to begin as of 1 January 1981 and will continue until 1990.

In view of importance of the issue and the great need for supply of drinking water for vast masses of suffered Afghan people, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan has decided to form a national policy committee composed of ministers of planning affairs, education, finance, public health, agriculture and land reforms, public works, water and power, under the chairmanship of esteemed Vice President of the Revolutionary Council and Deputy Prime Minister.

The national policy committee will coordinate the related affairs at national level and will take necessary and timely decisions in establishing a set strategy as regards supply of drinking water throughout the country. The National Policy Committee will also issue necessary instructions to the Decade's working committee which will be composed of the representatives of the interested ministries.

The first meeting of the Decade's working committee, including the representatives of the ministries of planning affairs, finance, education, water and power, public health, agriculture and land reforms, Kabul Municipality, Rural Development Department and Water Supply and Sewage Authority, was held on October 6. The meeting, chaired by Assadullah Kawish, President of Social Services Department of the Ministry of Planning Affairs discussed the DRA policy on supply of drinking water and sanitation for people of Afghanistan. At the meeting the DRA government support for the valuable decisions of UN was expressed and efforts to draw the economic and technical cooperation of UN in achieving this goal was raised.

Furthermore, during the meeting the draft on duties of the Decade Committee was discussed and during the subsequent meeting the same draft was approved by the Working Committee, to be later submitted to National Policy Committee for final approval.

The objective of the International Decade for Water and Supply and Sanitation is to seek ways and possibilities so that all nations in the world would benefit from clean drinking water by 1990.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

MINISTER IN CUBA--Mohammad Aslam Watnajar, member of the PDPA CC, of RC Presidium and minister of communications, who is on a visit to Cuba, met with Carlos Rafel Rodrigos, member of Politburo of Central Committee of Communist Party and vice chairman of the State Council of Cuba, on 31 October, discussing with him related issues. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 2 Nov 80 p 1]

KORAN VERSES RECITED AT POLITICAL MEETING--The new term of political education for workers, officers, soldiers, cadets and other employees of publication department of Ministry of Defence commenced in a function yesterday. Following recitation of few verses from the Holy Koran, caretaker of printing press and deputy political head of Publication Department spoke on methods and programmes of political teachings. Similarly some participants expounded on the importance of political education, discipline and duties of soldiers under the present circumstances. At the end secretary to Publication Department delivered a speech, supporting the decision of party and government on education. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 29 Oct 80 p 1]

PASHTUN LEADER RETURNS FROM USSR--Khan Abdul Ghafar Khan, the great leader of Pashtoons, who had gone to the Soviet Union for medical checkups and treatment some times ago, returned to Kabul yesterday afternoon. He was welcomed at the Kabul International Airport by Dr. Saleh Mohammad Zeary and Noor Ahmad Noor, members of the Politburo, secretaries to the PDPA CC and members of the RC Presidium, Dr. Anahita Ratebzad, member of the PDPA CC Politburo, the RC and Minister of Education, some members of the Party Central Committee, the RC and Council of Ministers, some high powered state and party and government authorities and Soviet ambassador in Kabul. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 1 Nov 80 p 1]

TERRORIST BANDS CRUSHED--Baghlan, Oct. 30, (Bakhtar).--Large number of terroristic bands, rebels and functionaries of international imperialism were destroyed and arrested in Baghlan province by valorous security forces and party activists in collaboration with the local working people. Various types of US, Pakistan and Chinese made arms have been seized from the terrorists. Similarly, large quantities of bullets and properties stolen earlier by the robbers were discovered and seized from them by the security forces. A number of noble inhabitants of Baghlan, including clergy and patriotic government officials who were detained by the rebels were freed after clashes. Two rebel ring leaders, Sarwar and Jamil, were among those crushed by the security forces. Another terrorist Jora from the rebel bandits has also been crushed. [Text] [Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 30 Oct 80 p1]

POLITICAL PRISONERS RELEASED--Kabul, Oct. 23, (Bakhtar).--The specialised revolutionary attorney had earlier presented a report to the government authoritative authorities about 496 political prisoners who had been deceived by the enemies of Islam, people and the revolution and were repentant of their past actions. The DRA authoritative authority, while considering the specialised revolutionary attorney report endorsed the closure of their files and their release from detention in respect to the advent of the auspicious Eid-ul Adha and the holy Haj pilgrimage ceremonies. Stating the above, a source of the Specialized Revolutionary Attorney said: The above persons who had been deceived by the enemies of Islam, people and the revolution and resorted to acts against law and prosperity of the people, expressed repentance for their past deeds. They pledged not to be deceived by the lies and ominous inhuman conspiracies of the enemies of the homeland any longer and would serve their beloved homeland under the leadership of their national democratic government. The above accused were released and returned to their homes, the source added. [Text] [Kabul NEW TIMES in English 23 Oct 80 p 1]

TWO NEWSMEN RELEASED--Paris, Nov. 2--Two French journalists were released yesterday from an Afghan prison, a French Government source said. Francois Missen, 46, and Antoine Darnaud, 23, both of the Compagnie Des Reporters, a French news organisation, were arrested by the Soviet-Afghan forces last August--AFP [Text] [Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 3 Nov 80 p 4]

CSO: 4920

CONSTRUCTION OF STEEL PLANTS PLANNED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 1 Nov 80 p 21

[Text] The Arab Iron and Steel Company hopes to begin production of iron pellets by the spring of 1983. The company has opened offers from Kobe Steel Company of Japan and Lurgi of Germany to build its planned four million tonnes a year pelletising plant. The plant contract should be signed by the beginning of next year.

The company plans to build the iron pelletising plant in Bahrain, at an estimated cost of 300 million dollars, including site preparation and port facilities. Output from the plant will be used mostly in the Gulf area but the plant would be able to compete in the international market and will produce pellets suitable for direct reduction.

The company has negotiated in India, Brazil, Peru and Sweden for supplies of suitable ore and held premilinary talks in Australia. [as published]

The general manager of the company, Omar Grine, said that he expected 80 per cent of the plant cost to come from export credit financing. He added that the company would borrow commercially on the market and that he expected the company's authorized capital to be fully issued and paid up by the end of next year. He added that the pelletising plant and its associated power station and water desalination plant would use an estimated 25 million cubic feet of natural gas a day, supplied by pipeline from Bahrain's gas fields.

The Arab Iron and Steel Company has an authorised capital of 150 million dollars per value shares with 110 millions issued and 50 per cent paid up. Founders, who hold 62 millions of the shares include individuals and institutions from Bahrain, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan and Iraq. The chairman of the company is Hussein Al Jassem, vice chairman of Kuwait Petrochemicals Industries Company.

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BRIEFS

DESALINATION PLANTS--Bahrain's Ministry of Works, Power and Water is to appoint a team of consultants to begin work on three new desalination plants near Sitra. The plants, which will take two to three years to complete, will produce 15 million gallons of water a day. Consultants will be on the job by December and tenders will be called around the middle of next year. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 1 Nov 80 p 21]

INSURANCE INSTITUTE--An insurance training institute, using expertise from the European and US markets is planned for Bahrain. The initiative has come from the multi-million dollar Arab Insurance Group (ARIG). A spokesman for the company said the institute will serve insurance companies throughout the Middle East. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 1 Nov 80 p 21]

CSO: 4820

PRELATE WARNS AGAINST TIES WITH SECULARISTS

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 14 Oct 80 p 10

[Interview with Dr Bahonar]

[Text] The magazine 'ARUTOLWOTHQA [Strong Bond], a student publication of the Islamic Republican Party, printed an interview with Jojjatoleslam Dr Bahonar in a recent issue. Because of the importance of some of the questions raised, we undertake to publish a part of the aforementioned interview.

Dr Bahonar, answering a question concerning provision of the Islamic Republican Party's [IRP] budget, stated: The party has precisely continued the Islamic revolutionary movement of the Moslem masses. You recall that this movement's crusade had large expenses in the past. Our movement required a budget for all those trips, reproduction of tapes, distribution of announcements and books, organization of groups, preparations for marches and demonstrations, etc. As you know, in the past the budget for this movement and Islamic awakening came from the people's contributions and generosity; some of them even put aside their daily bread and their daily livelihood and joined the ranks of the crusade. In the same fashion, when the party was organized, the people who gathered together in the party and who proclaimed their cooperation, interpreted and now interpret the party's organization precisely as an Islamic movement and service in the path of God. Furthermore in different forms they make efforts helping administer the party.

In addition to that, as you know, expenditures of the imam's fund and portion are solely for Islam, the advance of Islamic propaganda, Islamic service, and the preservation of the Islamic nation's existence. Therefore they can be for activities that take place in the form of propaganda publications, organization of societies and ceremonies that are exactly in the Islamic revolutionary line.

And these are all matters that are in the path of the imamate, the Koran and the leadership, and therefore religiously sanctioned funds can be spent for them. Apart from this, an amount has also been received from interest-free loans. I think this question must be asked of many other organizations, societies and parties. We believe that the IRP possesses a popular base in the revolutionary line. We do not want to say that all the people who were in the revolutionary line exclusively gathered together in this party. However, we do claim that those persons who have joined and express their interest and cooperation are people in the Islamic revolutionary line. Since the party has a popular base,

made up of these very people that in the past, as I said before, administered the revolution, and performed positive work; for example, persons who created and built the Unification Societies and welfare and 'Alavi schools, or initiated interest-free loan chests or assistance centers, and accomplished all those things with such difficulty under those suffocating and oppressive conditions, the resistance, damages and blows of the regime; how were all these monies and funds provided? the nation is a nation that has an ideal, a goal, that wants and waits to be of service to the revolution, to help as much as it can.

Hojjatoleslam Bahonar was further asked: What is the party's position in relation to various other groups, whether or not they are non-Islamic, quasi-Islamic or Islamic?

In my opinion, the answer to this question requires a long time and extensive knowledge. To summarize, I must say that a party, if it is a pious party and has a clear ideological foundation (such as the IRP), and certainly thinks piously and Islamically, then it is clear that it cannot compromise in confrontation with any group or party that is atheistic or based on a faith other than Islam, or which is fundamentally faithless and contentless, or which is a blend of faith and atheistic ideology. It cannot compromise unless it loses its quality of piety. Of course there was a time of discussion concerning the type of encounter, confrontation, or opposition to each one of these parties and organizations. Sometimes it is in the revolution's interest not to have hot, face-to-face conflicts with some of these parties that I have named. But this does not mean that we can bring about disassociations or unions, or combine groups of the sorts I mentioned. How many times in instances of the plots, treachery and agression of these parties and fronts that I mentioned has the party been compelled to have hot, face-to-face conflicts, acting out of Islamic duty within the jurisdiction of the Islamic Republican government? How many times when they plotted, with poisonous lies, provocations and the sowing of discord, have we been obliged to disclose and speak the truth, and display documents and proofs against the treachery of some of these groups? But if we pass over these two issues, meaning the operation of some of these parties and fronts in the form of a plot and actions for an insurrection against the Islamic Republic, or in the form of provocations, distortion and dissemination of poisonous lies, still they want to continue their political and even their ideological activities, that is, to bring about sabotage and plots against the Islamic Republican order.

Since our party's ideology gets its inspiration from Islam, we respect the principle of freedom of throught, expression of opinion and social activity, if treachery, provocation and plots do not exist. If this is the case, we do not prevent political, social and intellectual activities, and we take no negative position. Concerning the Islamic parties that I mentioned, we ask if they are truly Islamic parties, purely, truly Islamic, and if their connection with Islam is not just to hide their expression of another ideology, or if their relation with the Islamic revolution is not merely a protective shield, and behind the curtain they have associations with foreigners, traitorous agents of the past regime, or others, and if fundamentally their operation and their position are against the Islamic revolution. Thus, in answer, this means that our position is to ask to what degree are these groups Islamic, truly Islamic, and to what degree are their political positions truly the imam's and the Islamic

revolution's positions. The closer they are to these positions, we consider them our brothers, helpers, and colleagues (in the field of the struggle).

Dr Bahonar, in response to this question: "In your analysis, why was most of the pressure from counterrevolutionaries (whether in the form of propaganda or assassination) turned towards the party and the central council?", said:

I imagine that this is a natural matter because groups and organizations in political confrontations with problems are deeply affected by rivalry, divisiveness and special interests, so that to whatever degree they feel that the party or individuals from the central council possibly will have a large field for development in the society and in the Islamic revolution, and might accept heavier positions and responsibilities in the future, they begin this poison-spreading in order to pound these individuals and shatter the party's power. This is an inhuman, unislamic, anti-political confrontation with the truths. Revolutions cannot expect much except from those organizations possessing this insight and character. We were and are hopeful that the Islamic revolution would be able to create a revolution in culture, morals and cirtue, to create pure, honest, intelligent, just, fair and self-sacrificing humans, so that instead of forces which can only sabotage and spread dissension, make accusations and suspicions, we would work towards constructiveness, movement and efficiency in the field of action. In summary, instead of negativism, we hope to be positive, active, useful and fruitful in society, of course in conjunction with revolutionary sincerity.

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CSO: 4906

PEOPLES' CONTRIBUTIONS TO WAR FRONT MOUNT

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 14 Oct 80 p 5

[Text] - JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI reporter: The Islamic Society of the Urban Land Development Organization of Esfahan province announced: This society, while reaffirming its complete allegience to the imam of the nation, the great Khomeyni, announces its readiness to go into the front line of the war front in order to extirpate Saddam Hussein's blasphemy which is guided by the eastern and western superpowers and commanded by the world-devouring United States. Furthermore the sum of 186,000 rials has been deposited in account number 7400 of Bank-e Melli to help the war-stricken regions.

Shiraz - The Reconstruction Crusade Staff of Shiraz province announced as collecting and dispatching aid to citizens in the war zones continues, aid has also been dispatched to the western and southern regions of the country.

Five medical groups, three groups of ten persons each, one group of 16 persons and one of 17 persons, including a surgeon, eye doctor, orthopedic doctor, anaesthesiologist, nurse, operating room technician and nurse's aide, and 700 cartons of medicine and 24 vehicles have been sent to be used in the border regions.

Kerman - In order to help the border-dwellers and afflicted of the west and south of the country, the Islamic Society Union of the Kerman Coal Company announced that the miners of the region of Bab-e Nizu, Riga Bad and surrounding areas delivered 21 cartons of medicine to the Reconstruction Crusade Staff. Furthermore the aforementioned miners delivered 47 cartons of dates, 19 kilograms of oil, three sacks of mixed nuts, 57 sacks of bread, rice, flour, wheat, sunflower seeds, tea, lump sugar, peas and a number of clothes and blankets to the staff collecting material aid from this region. Similarly the Islamic Society of the Bab-e Nizu region announced that the workers of this district deposited the amount of 3,177,000 rials cash in account number 777,707 in order to help the war zones.

Gratitude to Varamin Residents

Tehran - The Reconstruction Crusade of Varamin in an announcement expressed its gratitude to the residents of Varamin and the surrounding villages for their cooperation and monetary and material contributions to the War Zone Support Staff of the Varamin Crusade.

Esfahan - JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI correspondent: The Regional Municipal and Public Health Organization of Esfahan province announced: Pursuant to the plan of accepting wounded from warstruck homes, the Coordinating Staff for Aid and Treatment of Esfahan province brought 24 wounded persons to Esfahan by airplane. They are being treated in University Hospital and the Public Health Hospital.

Interview with Supervisor of Gilan Province Red Crescent Society

Rasht - The Rasht center supervisor of the Gilan Province Red Crescent Society spoke with a PARS correspondent about part of the society's activities in Gilan province. In this interview he stated: Up till now the amount of 9,950,000 rials has been deposited in the account of the Aid and Treatment Staff of the Red Crescent Society. Amounts have also been collected in other city-regions of the province: the people of Langrud have allocated more than 5.2 million rials cash to aid war-struck brothers and sisters in the south and west of the country. In addition, dozens of people have collected food and medicine; so far one truck carrying eight tons of food and 48 cartons of medicine and one potato truck have been sent to border points. Also two other trucks carrying material aid were dispatched to Ahvaz and Ilam on 21 Mehr [13 October 1980]. The supervisor of Gilan's Red Crescent Society added: The Moslem people of Langrud and Bandar Anzali also contributed nearly 18 bags of blood to this center. Right now, despite Gilan's citizens contacting us to give blood, we have no more refrigerating capacity for blood.

Another of this center's activities is the dispatch of a medical team, composed of one doctor, one nurse, two nurse's aides, one technician and three aides to the war zones.

The supervisor ofGilan's Red Crescent Society, while expressing his appreciation of those assisting the Red Crescent, stated that these brothers and sisters are busy day and night collecting and packaging goods, food and medicine.

Shiraz - As assistance from all the people of Fars to the brothers and sisters residing in the war zones continues, in addition to the setting aside of one or two days wages on the part of government workers in the region, Fars educational workers deposited 504,200 rials cash in a special account for war victims. Furthermore, reports arriving indicate that the residents of Fasa city-region have sent 200 tons of food and medicine, 140 head of sheep, and 435,000 rials cash to the war zones. One completely equipped medical team with surgical instruments was dispatched to Gilangharb forthe treatment of wounded.

Kazerun - The people of Kazerun sent 26 trucks of food, including fruit, bread, dates, lump sugar, tea, grains and clothing and 67 head of sheep. Sheep-raisers of Kazerun sent 300,000 rials cash as of 19 Mehr [12 October 1980] as assistance. The villages of Kamankesh and Korehi of the city-region have sent 100 sacks of wheat. The residents of the villages of Rafi'abad, Hoseyn-abad and Ersanjan have sent 72,557 rials in cash, more than 2000 kilograms of wheat, 14 head of sheep and a quantity of food.

According to the same report, the zealous tribes, other classes of the people of Sepidan, and the Mosta'zefin Mobilization of the region, while contributing money and other aid to citizens of the war zone, announced their readiness to be sent to the front to confront the Iraqi Ba'ath infidels.

Saqqez - The tobacco products workers of Saqqez have deposited the amount of 211,118 rials in account number 4101 to aid war victims in the west and south.

Rasht - Based on a report from the Joint Coordinating Staff of Aid and Treatment of Gilan Province Red Crescent Society, following a complete mobilization with the cooperation of revolutionary structures and government organs, material aid including food, utensils and clothing which arrived from the good and revolutionary people of the province: following packaging, eight tons of consumables such as bread, dates, cookies, sugar, beans, cloth, flour and medicine, packages of tea and soap were carried to Kermanshah on 12 Mehr [4 October 1980] by a potato-truck weighing about 8.5 tons. At the present moment about 15 tons of the same food is in the Red Crescent Society, awaiting request from the war-stricken zone. Similarly, the central branch of Bank-e Melli announced: As of yesterday 6,772,275 rials had been deposited in account No 7673 by the faithful people. Meanwhile one medical team composed of a doctor and aide was sent by Public Health to the front.

Continuation of People's Aid to the Border Regions

Tabriz - PARS NEWS AGENCY - As financial and material assistance to our army brothers continues from the people of East Azerbaijan Province, it was announced today that workers in Tabriz's Hekmat High School, Mihantur Garage, and residents of several villages have sent a total of 177,382 tumans in cash, and a large quantity of potatoes and onions to the border regions. The Water and Electric Organization of the province contributed 171,477 tumans; citizens of Bostanabad, 162 bags of flour and wheat; residents of Khaljan and Esfahlan villages, 27 cartons of medicine; residents of Sa'idabad Street, 9,315 tumans; residents of Charaveymaq, Hashtrud and Liqvan, 9,262,991 tumans, 1166 bales of wheat, 17 bags of flour, 40 bags of bread and a large quantity of lump sugar and tea.

Aid from Tribal Villagers to the War Zones

Kermanshah - According to a PARS NEWS AGENCY correspondent's report, the public relations officer of the Mobilization of the Oppressed Western Tribes said that 11 villages in the Dinvardinvar region had assisted the warstruck zones with a sum of 236,500 rials. Names of the aforementioned villages are as follows: Jihunabad, Maryamnegar, Kallehchubsofla, Bala-ye Chubsofla, Kong Mirtaher, Amirabad, and Qitasabad.

They donated seven trucks of wheat, flour, rice, oil, cheese, potatoes, one truck and five million rials in cash.

Workers of the Central Office of Public Roads of Kermanshah Province, while announcing their readiness, paid the equivalent of three days wages and benefits as assistance to victims in the west.

Similarly, the Abhar city-region sent a truck of flour, peas, potatoes, onions, and beans; Kazerun city-region sent one truck of food, bread, dates and figs; Tehran city-region sent one truckload of empty sacks, rice, lump sugar, clothes and oil; Sadeqabad of Takestan sent seven head of sheep and one truck of grapes, flour, apples raisins, wheat, bread and clothes to various regions.

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CSO: 4906

ROULEAU PROTEST AGAINST VOA AIRED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 30 Oct 80 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN – The famous and controvercial personality in the Western news media, Eric Rouleau, recently said to Pars in Tehran that the Washington-based radio of Voice of America had badly distorted one of his recent writings about the Islamic Republic of Iran and the person of Imam Khomeini and said that he would sue the Voice of America for distorting the original texts of his writings.

Referring to VOA's Persian translations of his analystical articles on Iran, the French writer Rouleau said that the Voice of America had recently broadcasted "shocking lies under my name which totally contradict with the original of my wirtings." He added, "The Voice of America (persian Language Service) has said unjust things about the person of the Imam under my name which are not true and which are in sharp contrast with the original version of my writings."

"Throughout my articiles which have been published in Le Monde said Rouleau," I have always said that the West has no insight about the facts of the clerical world of Islam, and that it does not know that the clergy in Iran have struggled against cruelty and injustice.

I have said that Imam Khomeini enjoys the support of the majority of the masses in Iran, and that the Iranians have not forgotten that over a period of 15 years he continued his resistance in exile and while he was in Najaf (in Iraq). "He quoted the original text of his article as saying "Imam Khomeini ensured the Iranian people of the triumph of the Revolution... He is not only a religious leader but also a political leader... He does not compromise with those whose views should be against known facts... The West as well as the United States are at a loss to understand the Islamic Revolution... They compare Imam Khomeini with De Gaulle but whereas during his office De Gaulle had compromised with the left and right wings. Imam Khomeini never did anything like that."

Eric Rouleau said that in his writings on Iran he had said that since the early years of his life, Imam Khomeini never found any possibility for compromise with the Marxists, and that the VOA's distortment of this statement in this respect was downright disrespect for the writer of article.

He added he had given a lengthy account of the historical role of Shi'ism in the national struggles in Iran from the start of the nineteenth century to the present day. He noted in his articles he had given his own analysis of what might happen in Iran without Imam Khomeini, but said that the Vocle of America had related his tentative analysis as though it were an absolute prediction of something already happening in Iran.

He requested Pars to reflect his comment on the VOA's treatment of his writings for the information of the world media.

Rouleau has made frequent visits to Iran ever since the culmination of the Islamic Revolution here and has written extensively about the Islamic Revolution.

CSO: 4920

MILITARY INNOVATIONS NOTED

Mortar Training Device

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 3 Nov 80 p 1

[Text]

SHIRAZ -- A mortar training device newly innovated here will train a maximum number of personnel under every conditions at the least cost, reported Pars yesterday.

The training set, named "Shabab", is intended for use at the battlefronts and can be mounted on an M-1 gun as well as various cannons and tanks.

A test of the training device proved satisfactory. Effat's plan constructed by Engineers Makki, Soltani Zakeri and Hojabri.

The industrial section of the Electronics Industries Installation of Shiraz worked in close cooperation on the construction.

The total cost of the set amounted to 50,000 Rials. The dedicated innovators claim they can produce 200 sets every month.

Call-up of Graduates

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 23 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN - The National Service Department of the Gendarmerie has announced that male university graduates born between March 21, 1955 and March 20, 1961 must report to the Vali Asr (Eshrat Abad) Army garrison to register for military training. They should report at 5 p.m. on the following days:

Graduates in medicine -- Saturday, November 1st.

Graduates in engineering and electricity: Sunday, November 2nd.

Graduates in agriculture, geology, husbandry, Arabic and Persian literature, social sciences and history: Monday, November 3rd.

Graduates in economics and political science, as well as those in other fields who are unable to report on their assigned days, are to report on Tuesday, November 4th.

Anti-tank Grenade Produced

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 29 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN -- Three ingenious and committed young men of Shiraz have successfully produced an anti-tank grenade and named it. "Azadi" (freedom) in anticipation of the total victory of the Iranian nation, reported Pars news agency.

This home-made weapon was demonstrated in Shiraz in the presence of Ayatollah Rabani Shirazi, the supervisor of the Mostazafin Foundation, and the Army officer leading the test of the grenade judged it as performing well.

The grenade took four days to manufacture and the three inventors claim they can produce 150 units a month, the report said.

This demonstration of an effective weapon produced by completely amateur Iranian youths offers further evidence of the capabilities at home for self-sufficiency in the near future.

CSO: 4920

ECONOMIC PLANS, MEASURES BEING REVIEWED

Fuel Quotas for Houses

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 2 Nov 80 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN - Limits for Kerosene and gas oil allowed to be sold to each house were set by the Oil Ministry, their spokesman announced yesterday.

Pars reported that a weekly amount of 20 liters of kerosene per residential unit may be sold until the onset of cold weather when the amount will be increased to 40 liters weekly.

The allotment of gas oil per residential unit has been set at 500 liters monthly. However the allotment for two or three months may be delivered at one time.

In a separate announcement of the Fuel and Power Committee of the Economic Mobilization Center, rationing system for kerosene was outlined as follows:

A weekly ration of 20 liters of kerosene will be delivered to each family obtaining a ration card from the Committee or Mosque in their neighborhood.

Approval for delivery will be made by the Committee or Mosque in each district after taking a census of family members.

Kerosene will not be delivered to houses consuming gas, gas oil or butane for heating purposes.

Kerosene for private consumption may be obtained only by the ration card/home delivery system.

Kerosene will be delivered in the same manner to commercial locations but the allotment will be smaller.

Large consumers of fuel, such as bakeries, dry cleaners, workshops, and public institutions including schools, mosques, and hospitals may meet their fuel consumption needs by purchasing their supplies at the petrol station.

Their ration will be determined by the relevant union, educational department or governate.

Each kerosene distribution center must provide the Committee or mosque in their district with information regarding their location and their normal distribution level.

Short-term Priorities

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 2 Nov 80 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN — Long-term economic plans for the nation have received a set-back in view of preoccupations with emergency short-term plans to meet immediate requirements of essential supplies, Deputy Minister of Economic and Financial Affairs Dr. Nurbaksh told Pars yesterday.

Nurbaksh said that plans undertaken by the government at present have been aligned to the need for meeting of shortages in essential consumer requirements, therefore, leaving no time for researching into long term economic plans, he said. It was essential to have the economy in place just now without throwing it off balance, he added.

However, he went on to say, cabinet ministers including the minister of industries and mines and the minister of agriculture and rural development, have recently taken part in discussions on programs of investment with foreign collaboration. The investments are to be made either in Iran, or in countries abroad, but would serve the purpose of bringing in returns for economic growth of the country. The plans are only tentative ' and no. conclusive agreements have been reached, the deputy minister added.

One of the priorities attached to all plans of the Ministry of Economic and Financial Affairs is the effort to see that industries now holding their own as going concerns do not suffer shutdowns, and that both the industrial and agricultural sectors are revivified, Nurbaksh emphasised.

A problem that afflicts both the industrial and agricultural sectors at the moment is a severe shortage of fuel, he complained.

Five-year Plan Dropped

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 22 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN — New considerations such as the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war and the resultant damage to the vital Abadan oil refinery means having to shelve the 5-year plan slated by the Oil Ministry, Aliakbar Moinfar said yesterday.

Moinfar the former oil minister and now the head of the Parliamentary commission on oil revealed this in an interview with the Engelabe-Islami, the Persian Daily.

He said in response to a question that Iran's oil resources were expected to last from anywhere between 75 to 100 years but added this would very much depend on overall oil policies.

"But before we make any prognostications on oil use we would have to consider the effects of oil policies consequent to the devastations that have resulted from this war," Moinfar said.

"How long we will be able to benefit from oil resources and what uses we are going to make of these precisely cannot be gauged without envisioning the present difficulties," he continued. "Neverthelem, logical planning will be of great help," the head of Iran's parliamentary Oil Commission added.

By planning, Moinfar explained, he meant that oil resources should be so used as to contribute towards the building up of an economic infrastructure particularly in industry and not squandered on consumption as it was under the regime of the late shah.

Moinfar also stressed oil pricing policies which, he said, was closely linked to the question of maximizing benefits from the use of oil as a productive resource and not as an expendable export commodity to be exchanged for import of goods.

The former oil minister was during his term of office very closely interested on the question of controlling and determining the Iranian oil prices and production, and generally on international pricing and production mechanisms which would ensure benefits to oil producers in the region and throughout the world.

Spending Curbs

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 30 Oct 80 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN - Minister of State and Head of the Plan and Budget Organization, Musa Khaier, yesterday called for drastic curbs in spending in the government and private sectors, slashing of consumption at all levels, and for severe austerities all round, in view of the monetary complications in the national exchequer resulting from the European economic embargoes and the current war with Iraq.

Minister Musa Khaier, made the appeal to the nation in an interview held yesterday, which was broadcast on the national television network.

He said that the nation was increasingly finding itself confronted by a situation in which national expenditures far exceeded incomes.

The minister said that this was a consequence of the earlier European economic embargoes on Iran, and now, by the war expenses resulting from the indiscriminate war damages.

Khaier said that government had enunciated certain proposals to meet the emergencies by governmental action taken hand in hand with the wholehearted cooperation of private business interests, and ordinary citizens of the country.

He said that businessmen and entrepreneurs should assist government by paying in all taxes and dues promptly to the state and punctually.

Along with this he said, there should be the most severe curbs on expenditure in the government as well as the private sector in all respects. He added that every Iranian family should share in this effort as a patriotic duty by minimising consumption.

The minister said he was confident that by such austerity measures the nation's economy was certain to make recovery and compensate the present difficulties in the national budget.

Government also plans to issue government bonds, Khaier said. He called on people in all strata of society to purchase these bonds in the same spirit of "Jihad" (Holy War) for the country, which they were bringing to the war. Khaier was hopeful that the issue of the government bonds would go a long way in meeting the nation's current budgetary deficits.

Asked whether government proposed further salary amendments, as was carried out earlier when salaries of government employees in the higher pay brackets were lowered, he said that adjustments would follow in respect of these same groups only. Salaries of middle and lower income groups would be left untouched the minister said.

The minister said that the government would soon be introducing a formula to rationalize payment of salaries in the government sector.

Development of Sistan-Baluchistan

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 3 Nov 80 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN – Urgent problems to be faced in the Sistan-Baluchestan Province were outlined by the provincial governor-general as lack of security on roads and within cities, dangers to villages and farmlands from shifting sand dunes, illiteracy, shortage of water and smuggling.

In an interview with Pars the governor-general focused on the shortcomings in the province but said that the development budget of Rials 3,000 million allocated for the region should be put to the right uses.

A Development Council has been formed for the region, he said, and stressed the need to educate people in the region on the benefits of cooperation and participation in the development projects planned by the Council.

He said that there was a need to investigate the possibilities of reviving the factories which could usefully supplement production in the province and be a source of employment to people in the areas in which they are located.

Agricultural facilities were also sorely in need of attention, he noted. He said that in a region lacking natural resources and for improved farm-

ing methods. However, the region produced 90,000 tons of wheat last year, an unprecedented yield, the governor-general observed.

Budget allocations have been made from time for provision of deep-well irrigation systems and dredging of rivers silted over with desert sands, the governor-general said, adding that these allocations were simple to meet these requirements.

He promised further government aid to fishermen who ply a trade in fishing off the Oman Sea.

The governor-general said that if the creation of jobs through the implementation of plans for a cold storage plant at Chahar-Bahar, a canning factory and the development of cooperative rural incentive schemes were realized, smuggling for a living could be minimized and eradicated.

As regards security problems in the area, he urged clergymen of the area and those in charge of the administration to guide the people and instill in them a sense of civic consciousness.

Oil Pollution Protest

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 26 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] Tehran (Pars)--The Environment Organization of Iran severely protested to the executive secretary of the U.N. Environment Organization for its silence towards the pollution of the Persian Gulf waters resulting from the explosion of the excavation platform of the U.S.-Saudi oil company ARAMCO and by the eruption of the oil in the shores of Kuwait.

The seriousness of such a pollution is to the extent that oil is covering a vast surface of the Persian Gulf and the pollution has reached the Iranian shores. No doubt such pollution would cause uncompensable damages for the sea animals and for the people of the region.

The plunderer international oil companies, affiliated with imperialist countries, are exploring and plundering the oil resources of the Persian Gulf region and such a plunder is taking place without providing any security means which would thus create such deplorable events.

Obviously such events would not happen in imperialistic countries of if any instances are seen it would be immediately controlled. The Environment Organization of Iran, while severely protesting against such incidents, asks for rapid compensation the damages and purify the region from oil. In a protest to the executive secretary of the U.N. Environment Organization who is the U.N. Secretary General, Kurt Waldheim's deputy in this respect, the Iranian Environment Organization condemned the negligence of the U.N. Environment Organization in the Kuwait regional convention to support and expand sea environment in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea and also the operation of the regional cooperation protocol to fight pollutions created by oil.

The convention and the protocol were signed two-and-half years ago and thus is deemed necessary to be implemented. Iran has always been a volunteer to hold the post of executive secretary of the convention but due to the opposition made by the violator criminal Ba'athist regime of Iraq and severe weakness of the U.N. Environment program, so far no positive response has been made to such a demand. To ask for compensation for such pollution is the obvious and legal right of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and all other countries of the region affected in this respect.

CSO: 4920

NORTH KOREA OFFERS INDUSTRIAL, AGRICULTURAL AID

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 30 Oct 80 p 13

[Text] Tehran--PARS NEWS AGENCY--Mr Cha Pyong-ok, ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea met with Mr Mohammad 'Ali Raja'i, prime minister, Wednesday night in Tehran. In this meeting, which lasted more than one hour, Mr Raja'i said: I am more or less informed about relations between Iran and North Korea, and understand them. But important above all things is the position you have taken confronting a nation from which we want to live independently, and which in a very large number of respects resembles the United States.

We have heard that you are self-reliant to a degree. If such a thing is true, we can hope in the future to step together in the interests of the peoples of our two countries. As you know, we have a pious revolution [enqelab-e maktabi] here, and as you have been informed, our beliefs are independent of the beliefs of the large country which is our neighbor. The expansion of our beliefs in society is important to us, compared to becoming dependent on a country in which another ideology rules. We see the essence of the matter to be the contents of the revolution because this revolution is our capital and our goal. We will go along with you as far as we are able while still preserving the revolution's authenticity, which depends on us alone. Mr Raja'i said: The remarks which I make speaking as the prime minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran are empty of all diplomatic ceremony, and the basis of relations between us are the very matters here being discussed.

Concerning our relations, we will accept that self-reliant production which you can offer to us. We can accept this proposal as a revolutionary proposal, and if considerable cooperation with a country can be proposed, it should be that fundamental cooperation which functions in the building of nations. In reality you make proposals which we can be assured will not cause dependency, but instead our country's people will become self-reliant as before. We will offer industry to you, and will equip you with industry so that your country's people can be self-reliant. Mr Raja'i then added: At the present time we are confronted specifically with three basic problems, each with their own specific time. The first problem is the war, the second problem is post-war reconstruction, and the third is the programs based on revolutionary values which we would implement in our country.

On the basis of what I have explained, we are very desirous of becoming informed of your country's experience with each of these three problems, and making use of it when necessary.

The North Korean ambassador said at the end: We are in complete agreement with your requests. We desired independence, and we will not permit a country to interfere in our domestic affairs. We are opposed to this, and we know that our nation's enemy is the United States, and that all our misfortunes began when the United States seized South Korea.

He said finally: We are very rich industrially and agriculturally, and we can have further cooperation with you.

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CSO: 4906

IRAQI DAMAGE TO OIL FIELDS CAUSES FUEL CRISIS

Bonn DIE ZEIT in German 17 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] Beirut. Peter M. Ranke. "The Persians cannot conduct the war much longer with the meager refinery capacity they have left," the Arab petroleum experts are saying. "They urgently need aviation gasoline and fuel for their tanks and trucks." All private operations of automobiles is actually already prohibited, and the ever-decreasing operations of the Persian air force may be proof that the Iraqi war offensive against all the Persian petroleum and refinery installations is gradually leading to success.

Artillery fire as well as bombs and fires have caused damage in the billions to the Abadan refinery and have put this gigantic plant out of operation for an indefinite period. Therefore, occupation of it by Iraqi troops would no longer be significant for actual production. The experts assure us that, after an armistice, repairs and replacements would take the Iranians longer than the Iraqis. Iran would need about 6 months to reach an export figure of 700,000 barrels of crude oil a day, as before the war, since the shipping facilities on Kharg Island have also been damaged.

It will be a long time for the refinery capacity to even be able to cover domestic needs since the damage was so great and the loss of Abadan is so serious.

Iraq is better off although it is now losing 4 million dollars a minute because its petroleum exports (about 3.1 million barrels a day) had to be stopped. However, the [Iraqi] Ministry of Petroleum is hoping that the shot-up oil docks and shipping installations on the Gulf at Mina al-Bakr and Khawr al-Amaya as well as the pumping facilities and computer center in Al-Faw can be repaired in 3 months. The oil fields in southern Iraq have hardly suffered at all so far. Likewise, the oil fields in northern Iraq have suffered only relatively slight war damage.

Iraqi oil experts assure us that: "If Iraq could gradually begin exporting crude oil in 3 months at the latest after an armistice, then in a good 6 months it could achieve an export output of about 2.1 million barrels a day on the Gulf and 700,000 barrels in the North." Also, [Iraq's] gold and currency reserves are sufficient to tide it over the slack period. Of course there will be great problems of when and how many of the foreign oil experts and workers return to Iraq--on which the repairs essentially depend. And, there should not be any more damage to the petroleum industry. (SAD)

CSO: 4403

MAYOR ANNOUNCES GAS RATIONING REGULATIONS

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 6 Oct 80 p 9

[Text] Engineer Mohammad Tavassoli, mayor of Tehran, in a conversation with a PARS NEWS AGENCY reporter, while thanking the people for their cooperation during Traffic Mobilization Week, particularly those whose profession and occupation depend on the use of automobiles, said: We hope that our country's people, particularly residents of large cities, will take into consideration, just as they did last week, the present war conditions and the fuel shortage. I hope that they will meet these difficulties and losses with sacrifice, generosity and willingness so that, God willing, after the victory of truth over evil and the normalization of our country's emergency condition, people can begin their normal, daily work again. The mayor of Tehran added: An arrangement will be made so that there will be no interruption in the work of productive units and municipal services as far as fuel supply is concerned. A staff will be organized to examine related measures, so that private automobiles will be able to acquire a sufficient amount of fuel for vital, urgent tasks. Probably the ration, which will be announced this week, will be about 30 liters of gasoline a month for each car. The Tehran mayor, concerning fuel conservation, said: Now that the Abadan refinery, which supplied 60 percent of our fuel production, is actually closed, it is now the religious duty of every pledged Iranian Moslem to conserve as much as possible in these critical and emergency conditions, and in case other refineries are closed, to be prepared to conserve even more with the same excellent morale visible in them.

The mayor of Tehran, concerning an increase in the number of buses of the Vehed Company [Tehran Bus Company], said: Figures of Vahed Company buses and minibuses operating today throughout the city show 2,269 buses and 613 minibuses belonging to the Vahed Company, and 150 rented buses and 200 rented minibuses which are at the company's disposal. Meanwhile, it has been decided to prevent the movement of all private buses and minibuses throughout the city in the next two or three days, so that their owners, given a fair rental fee, will cooperate with the Vahed Company. Furthermore, buses and minibuses of government organizations must be placed at the Vahed Company's disposal. Permits will be issued, upon the determination of the Vahed Company and the Traffic Organization, to those organizations whose type of work requires their activity throughout the city.

Army buses which are in Tehran and not involved in the war will be taken over by the Vahed Company. With the cooperation of the ministers of industries and mines, factory buses during idle hours will be used on the Vahed Company's bus lines according to conditions.

The mayor of Tehran added: Because of the increase of buses and the movement which has appeared in the Vahed Company's management, because the city's people have become acquainted with the routes and accustomed to the use of the Vahed Company's buses and minibuses during the past week, and furthermore due to the approval and execution of the proposal of Tehran's mayor based on the distribution of the starting and quitting hours of work in government organizations, there will no longer be such crowding in the morning and afternoon. This problem will be gradually eliminated with the people's cooperation.

Engineer Tavassoli emphasized that the Traffic Mobilization Week plan and its continuation is not a component of plans to improve Tehran's traffic, and that this decision was made only because of the exigencies of war conditions and the fuel shortage. However, he said, the results will be good experience for traffic improvement planners in the future. He also again asked those persons in good physical shape and whose path is short to walk and leave the buses for older persons and those who have far to go.

The Tehran mayor, concerning statistics of Vahed Company passengers, said: During Mehr, 1358 [23 Sep - 22 Oct 1979] there were one million passengers: in Shahrivar, 1359 [23 Aug - 22 Sep 1980] two million, and during mobilization week, 3.3 million passengers. The number of buses has also doubled and the average bus speed has increased from 11.5 to 20 kilometers per hour. The sale of tickets has risen 120 percent.

Concerning the installation of coin-taking boxes in the buses, he said: This work has begun and until its completion, in addition to the cards which government workers had and the cards which ordinary persons got from banks, ticket books will also be available to the passengers through the banks. This is so that there will be no annoyance in the provision of tickets and less time will be consumed. The mayor of Tehran, while thanking drivers and other workers of the Vahed Company who have recently offered the greatest service, asked the drivers of Vahed Company's buses and minibuses to refrain from needless stops so that passengers will not be kept wandering and waiting in the bus stops, and also to continue their work in the afternoon as long as there are passengers. He also requested them to stop at the side of the road in a red condition [alert]. He asked the people, brothers, guards and Komithehs to show necessary cooperation with these drivers. He also asked them to permit those buses whose lights have been covered with blue paint to use their low means at night and during white conditions, since if they extinguish their headlights, in actuality, they will not be able to move and carry passengers.

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CSO: 4906

REAGAN ELECTION IMPLICATIONS ON ISRAEL VOTE VIEWED

TA071545 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 7 Nov 80 p 3

[Commentary by political correspondent Dalya Shehori: "Reagan's Election--What Does It Mean?"]

[Text] The major loser in the U.S. presidential election is the U.S. polling institution--modern age's new oracle--which had predicted, at the most, a small Reagan lead. Anyone who wanted to smooth over their disgrace said that the electoral system is devastating to polls. This, however, does not provide an explanation for the arithmetical gap of about 8 million votes between the support for Reagan and the support for Carter. Professor Louis Guttman of the Jerusalem Applied Social Research Institution hurried to calm people and said: We have more advanced methods of assessing public opinion in cases of uncertainty. But the United States is still the cradle of public opinion polls, and yet this is what happened.

The U.S. election results bring us, in terms of the statistical forecast failure, back to that unclear but probably firmer area of "commonsense." Perhaps a sober look at U.S. social trends together with an awareness of the issues about which Americans felt "their shoes were too tight" could have resulted in a more accurate guess than the sterile Harris and Gallup polls. or, for that matter, the polls conducted by the television networks, the NEW YORK TIMES and NEWSWEEK.

It looks as though the U.S. lesson will make us view more skeptically the public opinion polls conducted here almost on a weekly basis, bringing good news to some and less good news to others. Based on an analysis of the factors that featured in the U.S. voter's choice, it could be said that by activating "commonsense" vis-a-vis the Israeli voter, if a 14-percent inflation (registered in October 1980 in the United States) led to a rush into Reagan's arms, then an inflation of 130 percent or more in Israel will push the public en masse into the arms of the alignment, and the Peres-Rabin contest and its results will merely play a marginal role.

It seems that the dissatisfaction with the Likud in Israel is greater than the dissatisfaction with the Carter administration in the United States. The awful rate of inflation, the mind-boggling price hikes, the cuts in services, the shame of the municipal network's impotence, increased

unemployment, the shutdown of businesses and, at the same time, in foreign affairs--the increased Israeli isolation and the question mark regarding the status of Jerusalem with the melting away of the autonomy talks and the peace with Egypt--all these must be harbingers of massive fleeing from the Likud, whatever the public opinion polls may say (and, so far, they have indicated such fleeing). The feeling is that the longer the current government continues to be in power--by virtue of its artificial and unrepresentative Knesset majority--the more its image will be eroded and the greater the degree by which it will determine the scope of its failure in the next election with its own two hands.

Oddly enough--and perhaps not so oddly--positive reaction to Reagan's election was heard from both Likud and Labor ranks. It happened that each party hoped to find in Reagan what suited it. The Likud, without saying it outright, pinned itself to the traditional Republican image of conservatism and Reagan's record as a rightist Republican with anticommunist views--one who would act strongly against the Soviet Union. The Likud found parallels between the Republican and its own characteristics. "There will be good ties with the current administration by virtue of the ideological and political affinity," hawkish Liberal minister Yitzhaq Moda'i exclaimed. "Now in the United States there is a president who thinks along the lines of Israel's concepts," a senior "Herut" personality remarked.

The Labor Party, too--even though most of its members are neither conservative nor rightist nor reactionary--expressed itself favorably toward the newly-elected president. "His election may advance the Jordanian option," said Labor Party chairman Shim'on Peres. "The past has shown that our experience with Republican presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford was very good and both demonstrated a fair attitude toward Israel and its problems," his adversary, Yitzhaq Rabin, said.

Moda'i went even further and said that Republican control of the United States, namely (and this he did not say) the U.S. retreat in the direction of greater isolationism, insulation and conservatism will help the Likud get reelected to form the next government. Peres and Rabin for their part became nostalgic--silently if not out loud--over the period of working with Henry Kissinger and they saw the opportunity that has opened to continue the course stopped short in May 1977.

Moda'i's conceptual error seems to be two-fold. First, he thinks that there can be any force in the world (except for the god of inflation) which could help the Likud get reelected, and this is an illusion. Secondly, he judges Israeli political and social trends along the same lines as those derived from the American scene, and this is a simplistic approach to reality. The conservative process was felt in Israel not in November 1980, but already in May 1977. This process began in June, 1967 after the great victory in the 6-Day War. It materialized in the Likud's rise to power in May 1977 and may have already overripened. Chances are, therefore, that we are currently facing the end of the reactionary and conservative age which we found

ourselves dragged into by "Gush Emunim" rather than at the brink of such an era. At any rate, chronologically we are ahead of the United States in this development and we are preceding it by 3 years--if indeed what happened in the United States demonstrates a shift in the direction of greater conservatism--and thus it is highly doubtful whether the fact that a Republican administration was elected in the United States can encourage us to continue to instate a conservative regime in Israel.

The Likud, so it seems, also takes Reagan's campaign declarations seriously. Its members quote all of Reagan's promises dealing with Israel--"there is nothing illegal about the settlements," "Jerusalem should remain united under Israel," "the state of Israel is the most credible ally the United States has in the Middle East," "in my administration there will be no communication foul-ups" like the one that happened during the Carter term, when the United States voted against Israel at the United Nations; and "I will make sure that the Security Council does not adopt such resolutions." Reagan's hazy statements on granting a Vatican-style status to the old city of Jerusalem are mentioned with somewhat less glee. People hang on to other unclear things he had once said regarding resolution 242 concluding that Reagan supposedly does not support that resolution and will not regard an Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 borders as a necessary basis for any regional arrangement that will be reached.

Furthermore, it is said that "the Brookings document" sponsored by National Security Adviser Brzezinski is dead and buried, but at the same time people seem to forget that the Republican counterpart is the "Rogers plan" which is also, as far as those people are concerned, a nothing to be overjoyed about.

The truth can be said that even people in the Likud realize there is no point in relying on election declarations. However, with the naivete of a "tyro" they think--well, maybe, after all he said.... This is characteristic of the Begin government which blindly follows the magic of the word. Israeli officials well versed in U.S. politics not only disregard Reagan's election pledges, but are even able to identify his speechwriter by the nature of the promises and the contradictions of the different speeches. These officials are not currently prepared to discuss trends that would typify the Reagan administration because they are convinced that there is still nothing to say. Much will depend on who will be appointed secretary of state. It is also too premature to guess about this because the process of making appointments in any new administration (involving some 6,000 positions) is complex and prolonged and has to consider all the pressure groups constituting the coalition in the Republican Party.

Against the background of the uncertainty that characterizes the inter regnum period between election night and the inauguration of the new president on 20 January 1981, the more cautious assessments voices by Peres and Rabin sound much more convincing. Rabin did not go beyond relying on past experience--the distant past as well as the recent past--and Peres also addressed himself to the period when Israel and the United States shared views on the Jordanian option. Neither one ventured beyond that.

Generally, one may speculate that the difference between the Republicans and the Democrats--with respect to U.S. domestic and foreign goals--is not great and stems primarily from a different outlook of how to go about reaching these goals as well as from differences of personalities between the presidents and their advisory staffs. The differences, which appear to be harmful to Israel, between the outgoing and the incoming administrations are in the decreased number of avowed Israeli friends in the Senate and the existence of the possibility that the influence of those in the Republican Party with oil interests might increase.

The developments that appear on the surface, to be favorable to Israel are the trends--so it is hoped--that the United States will demonstrate a greater determination vis-a-vis Soviet expansionism in the Middle East as well as the desire to solve the regional conflict while strengthening the moderate countries' bloc and introducing U.S. influence.

If Henry Kissinger was to be the next U.S. secretary of state--or at least special presidential envoy to the area--it would be possible to predict that the "step by step" policy would be rejuvenated, the next step possibly being preliminary contacts with Syria, of all parties, rather than an impotent continuation of the autonomy talks. Successful talks with Syria would open the road for renewed contacts with Jordan and then to the resumption of the autonomy talks with Jordan's participation, or to another formula aimed at effecting a "pax Americana."

But the secretary of state could also be George Schultze, who still has no fixed position toward the Israeli-Arab conflict; or any other person who has not yet read the Camp David agreements. Therefore, guesses at this point are nothing but wild speculations. One could only estimate that the new administration will declare its adherence to the Camp David process, even if this adherence could be given varying interpretations. It would be foolish to predict beyond this.

One can further predict that if the Reagan administration manages to conduct a strong foreign policy, it will not allow Israel to do as it pleases, like the Carter administration did. During the last 3 years, the Israeli Government got into the habit of establishing settlements in the territories without restriction and adopted such legislative initiatives as the annexation of Jerusalem despite the merely passive and verbal U.S. objection. The Reagan administration will not make do with passive objection. It may be worthwhile to mention at this point the Ford administration's reassessment of March 1975, when all aid to Israel was stopped. We do not like pressures, but, after all, maybe U.S. pressure--or the threat to apply it--will prove to be a rather effective way of making us act wisely for our own sake.

CSO: 4805

NEW POLL SHOWS ALIGNMENT STILL AHEAD

TA091014 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Nov 80 p 1

[Unattributed report: "'HA'ARETZ' Election Poll: Alignment Maintains Strength; Slight Rise for Likud; NRP on Decline"]

[Text] The alignment continues to receive about 50 percent of all votes (50.3 percent). The Likud has recovered somewhat, moving up in the past month by 2 percentage points, from 19.1 percent to 21.1 percent. Continuing to fall, the NRP lost another 0.7 percent, dropping from 6.4 percent to 5.7 percent. These are the main findings of the Pori election poll, commissioned by HA'ARETZ, and conducted in the second half of October.

Had elections been held at the end of October, the alignment would have won 50.3 percent of the total vote (50.4 percent in September) and the Likud 21.1 percent (19.1 percent in September). Losing another 0.7 percent of its strength, the NRP now stands at 5.7 percent, as against 6.4 percent in September.

The following are the results of the poll, as compared with the September poll and the results of the elections to the 9th Knesset:

Party	October Poll	September Poll	9th Knesset
Likud	21.1	19.1	35.3
Alignment	50.3	50.4	24.8
NRP	5.7	6.4	9.2
Orthodox	2.9	3.1	4.7
Democrats and Shinui	1.9	0.8	11.6
Others	3.9	6.8	8.2
Minorities		Not polled	4.6
Undecided	14.2	13.4	—
	100.0	100.0	100.0

[as published]

An analysis of the undecided shows that they come mainly from former Likud and DMC voters. In the 1977 elections, 39.9 percent of them voted Likud and 12.9 percent voted for the DMC; 13.6 percent of the undecideds did not vote in the previous election.

A socioeconomic breakdown of the undecideds shows that there are more women than men among them and more persons of European or American extraction than of Asian or African extraction. There are also more persons in academic and administrative professions among the undecideds and more native born persons.

The findings reveal that the main reason for the NRP's decline is that 22.6 percent of those who voted NRP in the 1977 election "do not know" who they would vote for today. In addition, 15.1 percent of NRP voters in 1977 declared that they would vote for the Likud today, and 11.3 percent said they would vote for the alignment today.

The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 eligible voters--men and women, aged 18 and over--who were interviewed in their homes in complete privacy.

CSO: 4805

RATIONALE FOR USE OF ISRAELI AIR POWER ANALYZED

TA041156 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Nov 80 p 9

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "Who Decides on the Bombings"]

[Text] The surprise fierce bombing raid by the Israeli Air Force near Beirut about 10 days ago raises a sensitive question about the process by which important decisions are made by Israel's political and defence hierarchy. Many asked wonderingly why Israel carried out this bombing, and former Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was actually critical of the operation. Suddenly, out of the blue, following a lengthy period in which the air force was not employed in an attack on terrorists, our planes delivered a fierce blow near Beirut. The last time the air force planes were sent up was immediately following the IDF's extensive infantry operation on the Arnun Plateau, in reaction to a terrorist shelling of settlements.

The immediate assumption was that there must be a special reason for the use of the planes near Beirut. For example, a new target of unusual importance in the war against the terrorists, or an available target which must not under any circumstances be missed. It has been 10 days then, and this was apparently not the case. The target that was bombed does indeed serve as a large terrorist base. It is not a new base. We have known about it for some time; Israeli intelligence has long known many details about the camp. We have had more than one opportunity to bomb it both recently and earlier.

Since the Israeli spokesman is limited to laconic announcements that resemble one another, it is difficult to know why the anti-terrorist offensive was expanded to the Beirut area. If a target 13 kms from that city is hit, why not strike at major terrorist targets which are, for the most part, located in Beirut itself? Has Israel decided to extend the bombings throughout Lebanon, or was this a chance operation that cannot attest to the opening of a new stage in the employment of the air force? It is doubtful whether there is a clear answer to this question within the hierarchy. At most there are diverse answers, sometimes contradictory and generally vague. It would appear that the subject was not properly elucidated to the political-defense hierarchy, despite the declaration by the prime minister and defense minister that this bombing is part of the tendency not to wait until the terrorists strike at Israel but to strike first.

So it is not surprising that this lack of clarity generated the question of whether the recent bombing near Beirut was not designed to test indirectly the meaning of the new friendship pact between Syria and the USSR with respect to territory (Lebanon) that Damascus considers a vital security area. It was Israeli experts who asked whether the new treaty refers only to an attack or a war between Syria and Israel on their border, or whether it also extends the mutual defense responsibility to Lebanon, where Syrian troops are stationed. On the other side of the fence there will undoubtedly be those who interpret the recent bombing near Beirut from this perspective.

The offensive against the terrorists in southern Lebanon, which began under former Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizman, has been successful and has yielded much military fruit. Its advantage lies in the fact that it is generally waged on a limited scale. With the exception of the extensive Arnun Plateau operation, it does not attract any special attention. Using effective commando operations, by the infantry and naval commandos, aided by limited artillery fire, the IDF strikes at the terrorists. The latter sustain losses and find it difficult to conduct offensive action. This applies to the large Fatah organization as well as to the smaller rejection front organizations, which are interested in offensive show-attacks. This success in using the commando method does not mean that the air force must never be employed, either in southern Lebanon or elsewhere.

Planes must be employed in extraordinary instances, when speed of reaction is of the essence, there is virtually no possibility of employing any other method and the target is an essential one or is dangerous in terms of potential losses of personnel. Certainly there can be no prior decision not to use the air force, thus according the terrorists a cheap insurance policy. However, if we judge the operation near Beirut by these criteria, it is doubtful whether it passes the test.

Why is there so much sensitivity about the ongoing and permanent use of the air force in the war against the terrorists throughout Lebanon? Evidently, one of the likely results--one we do not desire--of intensive Israeli air activity in central and northern Lebanon is that the Syrians will put surface-to-air missiles there. Such a situation would entangle Israel in more difficult combat and would make it harder for the air force to perform its missions. Moreover, using the air force, even with smart bombs, by its nature does not produce precise results. The almost inevitable result is that it injures innocent Christian civilians, we have no interest in injuring. Nor is this a Palestinian population that willingly receives the terrorists, supports them and serves as a manpower reservoir.

There is also a political reason having to do with the United States. Extensive, regular bombing of populated areas places us in a conflict with Washington. While we may claim that the air force does not use U.S. planes in its operations, this does not eliminate the conflict. There are certain things in the conduct of the war that are Israel's exclusive responsibility, matters on which Israel must not agree to outside intervention. However, if no essential need is involved--one in which the use of airpower is beyond any doubt--we should refrain from unnecessary clashes with the U.S. administration.

Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori is against the intensification of the war by using the air force. This unquestionably adds security considerations to the political considerations.

How, nonetheless, is a decision made to conduct a fairly heavy bombing raid near Beirut? In the past care was generally taken to bring such matters before the ministerial defense committee for its approval, in principle. In the war of attrition, for example, this committee gave overall approval, in principle, for certain types of action; such as penetration of the border and for the kind of bombing conducted deep inside Egypt. From time to time the committee would reexamine the issue, but approval for a separate, individual operation would come from a small team of defense personnel and ministers.

After the commander of the air force, or the director of military intelligence proposed a certain target, the chief of staff would approve it and pass it on for the defense minister's approval. In coordination with the prime minister, political approval for the operation was given. It is noteworthy that in the past the head of military intelligence was always involved in the process, and when the distribution of cabinet portfolios was different than it is today at least two ministers were involved in the decision.

Over the years there have been many changes in this process and its circumstances. Even though the war against the terrorists is permanent, it does not resemble the war of attrition, which was far more intensive. The ministerial defense committee has plenty of time on its hands today, and it need not make do only with granting broad approval in principle for operations across the border. In most cases it can take the time for a special discussion, for granting approval before each operation. This is certainly so in the case of a bombing raid near Beirut.

Another change concerns the defense hierarchy. Prime Minister Menahem Begin is doing all he can to fill the post of defense minister, which was imposed on him with Weizman's resignation. But Mr Begin is not in the best of health, and he can devote only limited time to military matters. The result is that the position of chief of staff has taken on more importance and weight than we have ever known, far more than was the case in the Eshkol and Rabin periods. Some say that Raful [the chief of staff's nickname] has virtually become defense minister. In several areas this has also been the result of his dispute with Deputy Minister Tzipori.

It bears noting that in the course of this development the military arm in the defense minister's bureau has disintegrated. Two officers who were active in the defense minister's bureau are effectively absent. The minister's adjutant, Lt Col Arye Shur, has left to attend a course. The military secretary, Col Ilan Tehila, is working part time, since he has received approval to study in a civil administration course at the same time, apparently before he leaves. The other officer in the prime minister's office, Brig Gen Efrayim Poran, who plays a central role, is busy with other matters. After he dealt with President Navon's Egyptian visit, spending much

time there, he left yesterday for the United States to prepare for the prime minister's visit. The person remaining, Poran's aide, holds the rank of major and is the liaison man with the IDF. And again, the result is that the liaison work is done almost exclusively by the chief of staff.

This situation makes the ministerial defense committee all the more important. Today the committee is effectively the only body that supervises the decisions made by the defense hierarchy and balances them. The Knesset's foreign affairs and security committee is doing more than it did in the past in various areas, but it is far from properly supervising all the subjects. By its very essence, it deals more with decisions that have already been made and with operations that have already taken place. It is almost absurd that Minister Sharon, a member of the ministerial defense committee, offsets chief of staff Raful, as we saw on the budget issue. Not all the members of this ministerial committee have military or security experience, but besides Sharon the committee has another army man, former chief of staff Professor Yadin. In the present situation it is very important that this commmttee get more involved in details and not remain content with broad approval in principle for operations. It is also important that it hear, on a regular basis, the views of other IDF leaders, at least those of the director of military intelligence or his senior aides.

CSO: 4805

'HA'ARETZ' VIEWS 'FIRM HAND' WEST BANK POLICY

TA041500 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Nov 80 p 1

[Report by Yehuda Litani: "33 Restraining Orders Issued So Far Against Mayors and Notables in the Territories"]

[Text] To date the West Bank military government has issued 33 restraining orders to mayors, members of municipal councils and notables, forbidding them to go beyond the perimeters of their residences without military government permission. By the end of the week the military government had issued three restricting orders, to A'dal Ghanim, a member of the Nabulus Municipal Council and a trade union activist Dr 'Azmi ('Shu'aybi), a member of the al-Birah Municipal Council; and Khalid al('Awwad), former mayor of Qabatiyah.

A few months ago the military government refused to allow 23 West Bank mayors to leave their towns without its permission. It also forbade seven members of the National Guidance Committee--most of them residents of Ramallah and al-Birah--to leave their towns. Three editors of East Jerusalem papers were among the seven.

The restraining orders are being issued within the framework of the "firm hand" policy which has been employed in the West Bank for the past 6 months. These orders are designed to prevent the 33 mayors and notables from conducting any organized political activity and to prevent these persons from meeting together.

Five female students from the Ramallah seminar who were apprehended on 2 November while setting up a barricade of stones were yesterday expelled from the seminar until further notice, by order of the military government. Yesterday morning youths threw a stone at a military vehicle in Ramallah; no damage was caused.

The students association, the board of trustees and the teachers union at Bethlehem University yesterday set up an actions committee after soldiers had, in the past few days, demanded that Bethlehem University students show them student cards--this in accordance with a new order relating to higher education which the military government recently issued. Students who did not present the proper cards were not allowed to enter the university. It has been learned that this action has generated considerable ferment within the university, and there are fears--so it is reported--of strikes, demonstrations and attempts to disrupt order in the coming days.

CSO: 4805

PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE DATA ON WEST BANK ARABS

TA101716 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1600 GMT 10 Nov 80

[Government press office communique]

[Excerpt] The director-general of the prime minister's office, Mr Matityahu Shmuelevitz, notes the considerable improvement in the living standard of the Arab population in Judaea and Samaria. The population today is 700,000, about half of which are under the age of 15. There are 40,000 Judaea and Samaria workers employed within the green line; 19,500 of them in construction; 9,500 in industry; about 4,000 in agriculture and the rest in the services.

Progress in education can be seen in the following data: the number of classrooms increased from 4,338 in 1967 to 7,457 in 1979; the number of pupils increased in this period from 141,735 to 253,826. In 1967 there were 37,995 persons in Judaea and Samaria with over 9 years of education; in 1979 their number stood at 120,500, the overwhelming majority of them being among the adult population.

There was also considerable progress in health services. In his memorandum the director-general of the prime minister's office notes that the number of births in hospitals increased 500 percent in recent years, today totaling 10,341, as against 2,100 in 1968. Infant mortality also decreased very significantly, with the infant mortality rate today only slightly higher than the rate within the green line.

In the final section of his memorandum to the prime minister, Mr Shmuelevitz noted data that points to the rapid rise in the living standard of the Arab population in Judaea and Samaria. In 1967 only 23.1 percent of the families there enjoyed electricity in their homes, while in 1979 this had risen to 79.2 percent. Among the Arab families 41.3 percent have an electric refrigerator, as against 4.8 percent in 1967. In 1967 there was one private car for every 300 families, while today that has risen to 13 cars for every 300 families. Half the Arab population in Judaea and Samaria today has a television set, and 20 percent have washing machines.

CSO: 4805

BEGIN RECEIVES DATA ON WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS

TA101728 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 10 Nov 80

[Text] Some 28,000 Jewish settlers in Judaea and Samaria--this should and could be the Likud government's goal before the end of its present term. This was stated by the director general of the prime minister's office, Matityahu Shmuelevitz, who submitted to the prime minister a detailed memorandum about the situation of the Jewish settlements in Judaea and Samaria. Since the Likud assumed power about 14,000 Jews were added to the 3,200 settlers living in Judaea and Samaria in 1977. Our political correspondent Gad Becker talks with the director general of the prime minister's office.

[Begin recording] [Question] Mr Shmuelevitz, 28,000 Jews in Judaea and Samaria--should this be the goal of the Likud government before the end of its term, in your opinion?

[Answer] In my opinion, this can be done. Today, 17,400 Jews are living in Judaea and Samaria. Over the last 3 years more than 14,000 settlers have moved there. If we take into consideration the fact that the government's first year in power was used for organizing and preparations, then an average of 7,000 Jews were added annually over the last 2 years. Now, considering the budget limitations, it is not an exaggeration to ask for 10,000 or 11,000 additional Jewish settlers in the last year of the government's term. This seems to me an attainable goal. I wanted to emphasize that behind these dry figures one finds a great national act and, thank God, we have many elon mores.

[Question] There are 68 elon mores now. Do these settlements have the basic data necessary for any existing settlement in the full sense of the word?

[Answer] When one talks of agricultural settlements, they share the same problems plaguing such settlements anywhere else in the country. When one talks of communal settlements, these also share the same advantages and disadvantages of settlements in other places, in fact. Some people who live in communal settlements work outside their settlements. This happens anywhere, especially when the settlements are young. My report also touches on an analysis of the statistical data of industry. Today you can find 120 plants that supply the settlers with work. [end recording]

CSO: 4805

MILITARY AFFAIRS ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR ANALYZED

TA091350 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 9 Nov 80 pp 9, 11

[Commentary by Ze'ev Schiff: "The Iran-Iraq War: Further Lessons"]

[Text] The war between Iraq and Iran today enters its 50th day. The fog of battle has not entirely lifted, but many details have in the meantime come to light. The war has revealed both of the fighting armies, particularly the Iraqi Armed Forces. Conclusions which had seemed unclear a few weeks ago have become clearer, and new facts have emerged. This matter is important to Israel, first of all, because of Iraq's place on the eastern front, but for other reasons as well.

It is worth bearing in mind that all we knew about Iraq before the war was that it had a large army which since the Yom Kippur War had doubled in size and had added immense quantities of arms. Its strength was doubled, and a large effort also made to develop a nuclear option. Furthermore, Iraq had vast resources for continuing the growth. We knew about the strength and the size, but very little about the level and the quality. One reason it was difficult to learn much about the army and its commanders' control was that this army carries out fewer maneuvers than do other Arab armies. Evidently, this difficulty existed not only for the Israelis but also, and apparently even more, for other Western states.

This question of what the Israeli intelligence community knew about the large Iraqi army and the anticipated war has become a sensitive issue. I referred to this matter in one of my articles, stressing that we had not known that we did not know. The Knesset's foreign affairs and security committee also discussed this subject, and following an examination the committee's chairman saw fit to emphasize the level of information Israel had. I have had an opportunity to examine this matter once again, and the conclusion is that we knew we did not know. This lack of knowledge bothered us in the past, and several steps were taken. And as for the eruption of the war, we were not in a bad situation at all, if one is to judge by the recent commentaries published in the United States and Europe.

With respect to the war itself, light has been shed on a few major conclusions. With all due caution not to exaggerate in coming up with a quick judgment, the most important lesson is that the Persian Gulf war has revealed today's Iraqi army to be a paper tiger. In order not to generalize, the strategic sphere must be distinguished from the operational sphere. On the

political-strategic level, Saddam Husayn's regime made all the required preparations from the moment it decided--apparently last April--that it had to use force against Iran. The political-strategic preparation was correct; in contrast, just as failure was marked in most other areas, the army, too, failed in the operative and tactical sphere.

The intelligence sphere experienced a particularly conspicuous failure, both in field intelligence and in the appraisal of the enemy. All the indications are that they did not correctly estimate the field and ground situation and did not properly assess the various obstacles, such as swamps, rivers and the complex oil pipe system. A no less serious mistake concerned the weakness of the Iranian regime, its staying power and the reaction of the Arab residents of Khuzestan, which is the main target of the Iraqi offensive.

Nor did the Iraqis correctly predict the combat strategy that Iran would adopt after it was attacked. They were apparently totally taken by surprise when Iran, instead of reacting with ground combat, chose to open with bombings of strategic and economic targets. This completely disrupted the rules of the game Baghdad had set for itself.

But the Iraqi strategy appears to have become ill defined and confused for another reason. In the face of the Iraqi armored power, of a regular army, a force of a different nature presented itself: quasi-regular, a factor that is not spelled out or specified in the books of the regular armies. The result is that the Iraqi army could not realize its armored strength. It did not succeed in adapting itself quickly to the changing battle conditions.

Operationally, something strange happened on the ground. The war began with an air attack on 22 September, and that very night the land breakthrough got underway. The thin Iranian line was broken, but 2 or 3 days later the Iraqi army bogged down and ground to a halt. The foreign correspondents who were invited to the battlefield when the war broke out were expelled from the area the moment the difficulties began. Since 25 September, the war has been largely static.

Since then the Iraqis began declaring they had captured Khorramshahr; actually, the city fell much later and after considerable difficulties. The armored fist that operated in the south began to bog down, with its strength being manifested in much fire but little movement. This tremendous fist's potential was not wholly realized, even though it was confronted by a disbanded army which operated in small units.

In Khorramshahr the Iraqis made the same mistake the IDF did in the town of Suez [in the 1973 war]. They entered the city with armor and began to sustain losses of men and materiel. They had to transfer their special forces there, yet about a month elapsed before the city was taken. They are trying to avoid this mistake in the attack on Abadan. Following the capture of Khorramshahr the Iraqis, in fact, managed to close off three of the four roads to Abadan, while covering the fourth road with heavy artillery fire.

Of all the operational spheres, only one has been conspicuously good: the Iraqi artillery. This branch is working more than any other corps, but overall, the inter-arm and inter-corps cooperation have been poor. In contrast to what we thought at first, the Iraqis' logistical alignment is not bad. It is difficult to know about the level of the crossing of water obstacles. The Iraqis must cross a river at each of the four cities they have decided to capture (Khorramshahr, Abadan, Dezful and Ahvaz). The Karun was crossed at night, in a surprise move, and apparently they faced no real resistance.

In the ground fighting the situation at the moment is that Abadan is effectively surrounded and will likely fall. Iraqi artillery is pounding it without any consideration for the masses of civilians, among whom there are a great many losses.

In various places the Iraqis have shown that they do not flinch from attacking towns with ground-to-ground missiles (the frog or the scud). They refrain from entering a town, but await its fall while employing psychological warfare. In the other two southern sectors, Dezful and Ahvaz, the fighting is more static and the cities have not been encircled. In the country's center and north another two or three divisions, mostly infantry, are engaged in the fighting. The clashes have been small.

It is noteworthy that Iranian armor, which includes advanced chieftain tanks, has taken virtually no part in the fighting. The tanks the Iraqis captured from them were in camps. Nor have the Iraqis, for some reason, put the advanced Russian T-72 tank into battle. On the other hand, both sides have begun employing helicopter gunships. In the Iraqi army we see a curious mixture, in which Russian equipment is employed in combat doctrine learned from the Soviets, while the units' structure is of the old Western type, similar to what we saw in the past in the Jordanian army (350 tanks in an armored division, with 48 tanks per battalion; as against 250 tanks in an organized division under the Soviet system, such as in the Syrian army).

An odd affair in itself is that of the Iraqi Air Force and air defense. Clearly, Iraq's control system has failed badly, but it would be a mistake to conclude that the Iranian Air Force has gained any major victories. On the contrary, reports filtering out of the battlefield show that the Iranians have suffered immense losses in planes. They have already lost nearly 100 planes. This is approximately the same number Israel lost in the Yom Kippur War. But if we take into account the number of sorties made by the Iranian Air Force, its failure assumes large proportions. All the planes have been downed by fire from the ground (Iraq has about 100 surface-to-air missile batteries).

At first the Iranians succeeded in making many dozens of sorties every day, but their method today is one blow followed by a break of several days. The Iranian Air Force has another advantage in the field: the flight from its bases to Baghdad is about 150 kms, while the distance from Iraq's air bases to Tehran is about 800 kms.

The Iraqi Air Force reacted with peculiar slowness, and it is far from clear why it did not employ TU-22 bombers (as Iran did not employ the F-14). The Iraqi Air Force's sorties have increased recently, but it too has already lost about 50 planes.

As to the damage, the published figures range from $5 billion to $20 billion. These figures appear to be greatly exaggerated.

Nor is it clear whether, for example, the pumps in the oil installations have been damaged. The reports about the damage to the Iraqi nuclear reactor are also highly exaggerated. And it appears that Paris will again bring into play its cynical approach to develop the reactor.

The experts are already leaning toward the conclusion that this war, too, has proved again that the Western means of warfare are generally superior to the Russian weapons. Saddam Husayn has already begun making excuses, saying that the Iranians' arms are better. In any case, this augurs that in the future Iraq will invest large sums in Western equipment, such as radar systems.

While Iraq has a good infrastructure of spare parts and ammunition, Iran does not. It is true that Iraq is closed off, with the only connection being by way of Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Since they prepared large stocks of ammunition, the only shortage appears to be in refined fuel for jets, and this is not a real hardship. Baghdad is pressing France and Russia to implement the earlier arms procurement agreements. All the signs are that the USSR is transferring equipment to Iraq through other Eastern elements.

In Iran the situation is worse, even though it has ports outside the Gulf that are open to navigation. It should be borne in mind that the Iranian Navy in superior. The main difficulty concerns spare parts for planes and tanks, and the situation is particularly difficult in regard to refined jet fuel. In the past the fuel was refined at Abadan, and now the Iranians are trying to find substitutes in the small Shiraz and Isfahan installations. Nonetheless, Iran will be able to continue the air fighting for some months, though at a slower pace than at the outset.

The Iraqis are confronted with a difficult military question. In order to maintain their control over the Shatt al-'Arab, they must push the Iranians back beyond artillery range. This is not a simple matter, and even if they complete the conquest of the cities it means the fighting going on longer and longer.

The Iranians are confronted with a different kind of question, which finds expression in an internal debate. On the one hand there is Khomeyni's approach, which favors a transition to a popular war against the Iraqis. This is both as ideology and a means by which to weaken the power which is once more being concentrated in the hands of the Iranian Army. On the other hand, there is the approach of President Bani-Sadr, who favors concentrating the strength around the army, with the guerrilla war being only a secondary

matter. Both approaches are marked by the feeling that there is no need to hurry into negotiations with Baghdad and with Saddam Husayn. Now a new factor has been added, which has to do with the Reagan administration's approach and with whether the Iranian militants will, in fact, release the hostages before the change of administrations in the White House. Questions exist on this matter, though these will be resolved in the not too distant future and will certainly affect the war.

CSO: 4805

EXPERT IN NORWAY TO PROMOTE BILATERAL INDUSTRIAL LINKS

LD071649 Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 5 Nov 80 p 20

[Report by Ole N. Hoemsnes: "Israel Wants Increased Industrial Cooperation"]

[Text] Israel is now making efforts to increase its industrial cooperation with Norway. Israel's European industry and investment office chief, Director Avraham Kiperman, has been in Norway for a few days to hold talks with Norwegian export and industrial managers. He told AFTENPOSTEN that conditions are now good for increased industrial cooperation in several fields between Israel and Norway.

In the first phase the Israelis are now disseminating general information on the benefits Norwegian companies would receive in Israel. It is intended to hold a seminar in Norway in the spring and at it industrial cooperation will be a major topic. The mixed economic commission will also hold a meeting in the spring. Later the campaign will be directed more at the companies that could be of interest as cooperation partners.

On Tuesday [4 November] Director Kiperman had talks in Oslo with the board of the Federation of Norwegian Industry and the Norwegian Export Council. Today he leaves for Sweden to hold similar meetings.

Among the advantages that Israel could offer, Director Kiperman mentioned duty-free access to the Common Market and the United States, a highly trained and productive labor force, a modern and "up-to-date" industrial infrastructure, financial support of up to 75 percent of investment costs, the financing of research and development projects, the leasing of industrial premises at low rent and reasonable and advantageous tax arrangements.

Director Kiperman stressed that Israel is not primarily interested in exchanging industrial projects through the purchase of oil, but is on the other hand interested in discussing such proposals.

CSO: 3108

BRIEFS

RISE IN WORK DEMANDS--For the first time in 1 year there has been a significant rise in the number of demands for workers in employment offices throughout the country. The number of demands totaled 20,000, a rise of 4,500 requests compared to the number of requests in September. At the same time, a rise was registered in the number of people seeking employment. Hence, the number of unemployed increased further in October reaching over 14,000 people. [Text] [TA051758 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 4 Nov 80 TA]

UPDATED BUDGET APPROVED--The Knesset Finance Committee has endorsed the updated state budget of 90.1 billion shekels. The Knesset committee has cut the budget of the Council of Culture and Art and increased the budget increment for Yeshivas [rabbinical schools]. [Excerpt] [TA051034 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 5 Nov 80]

GDR COMMUNIST DELEGATION--A delegation of the German Democratic Republic Communist Party, headed by a member of the Central Committee, Otto (Funke), arrived in Israel. The delegation is the guest of the Rakah Party Central Committee, and it will pay a visit to the party branches. [Text] [TA060917 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 6 Nov 80]

DEFENSE PRODUCTS EXPORT INCREASED--Israel's defense exports have recently increased considerably. In the current fiscal year they will total $1.25 billion. Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori said that the significant growth in defense exports stems from a series of new agreements, constituting a breakthrough and a "reaching of new horizons." Last year these exports totaled $600 million. A series of actions taken recently, and prime Israeli commercial successes have led to Israel's defense exports already totaling $1.25 billion in the current fiscal year which ends in April. These exports include products of Israel aircraft industries, the military industry, the weapons development authority, electronics firms throughout the country, as well as other plants connected with the defense industries. The new agreements (with countries which in the past did not purchase defense products on such a scale) will lead to the growth in defense production continuing next year as well. Mr Tzipori stated that another reason for the increase in defense exports has to do with initiatives of the Foreign Ministry under Yitzhaq Shamir. At the minister's instruction, Israeli ambassadors in various countries are helping defense establishment personnel reach new markets.

As a result of the increase in exports, thousands of workers have been taken on by the defense industries and the weapons development authority. [Text] [TA111236 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 11 Nov 80 p 1]

ISRAELI-VENEZUELAN AGREEMENT--An agreement on cooperation in rural planning was recently signed in Jerusalem between Israel and Venezuela--the first between Israel and a foreign country [to be signed in Jerusalem] since Switzerland refused to sign, in the capital, an agreement for settling the rights of Swiss citizens living in Israel. Following the adoption of the Jerusalem law and of the security council resolution against Israel on this matter, Switzerland about 3 months ago refused to sign, in the capital, an agreement settling the pension and national insurance rights of former Swiss citizens now residing in Israel. The details of the agreement were ratified by both governments, but the signing was postponed due to the Bern government's refusal to hold the ceremony in Jerusalem. Since then the question of the place for signing agreements between Israel and foreign countries had not come up until the signing of the agreement with Venezuela. The Caracas government did not object to the agreement being signed in Jerusalem. [Text] [TA111244 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Nov 80 p 2]

NATION'S LEGITIMACY QUESTIONED--A study carried out on "trends and politization among the Arab minority in Israel" shows that half of those questioned tend to reject or have reservations about Israel's right to exist. Most of those questioned identify Zionism with racism and nearly all of them would like to see the law of the [word indistinct] of the return abolished or amended. As a whole, the Arab population dissociates itself from the consensus that exists among the Jewish population in Israel on the issues of the Palestinians' right to self-determination, a withdrawal to the 1967 borders, the refugees' right to return to and settle in Israel, and the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The study was carried out by Dr Sami (Shmu'el) Smookha, of Haifa University's Institute for Middle East Studies. This is his second study of this subject, the first having been published in the summer of 1976. The present study covered 722 Arab and druse residents throughout the country. About 60 percent of them were aged below 25; about one-quarter of them had high-school or higher education. Dr Smookha cites facts that reinforce the survey's findings: since 1967, over 400 Israeli Arabs have been arrested and convicted of terrorist activity or of collusion with the enemy. Of the 54 Arab local authorities in Israel, 20 are headed by representatives of Rakah or of the Democratic Front. All the Arab student unions were controlled by Rakah or by even more extremist groups, which issued many declarations of support for the PLO. [Text] [TA111249 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 11 Nov 80 p 4]

TOUGHER LINES ON ARABS--The security authorities have decided on a new, tougher line, one which forbids mayors and delegations from the territories to visit Arab countries in order to meet there with heads of the PLO and its institutions. There has been more than one instance in the past in which mayors asked for and received approval to visit an Arab country for meetings with PLO leaders. In addition, delegations from the territories were in the past given approval to take part in conferences organized by the PLO. The

change came about in recent weeks, following 'Ezer Weizman's resignation as defense minister. The guiding line is not to permit official meetings with heads of an organization which Israel has declared a hostile organization whose aim is to destroy the state. In the wake of this guideline, a Gaza Strip delegation was not permitted to attend a conference which was due to be held in Algiers. The condition laid down by the military government was that the Gaza delegation go to the conference, but not meet there with PLO heads, as it had originally planned. In the wake of this ban, the trip was canceled. Instead of the delegation, other persons went to Amman, held meetings in the Algerian Embassy in Jordan, and then returned to Israel. As a result of the new directive, a trip by a West Bank personage who stated in his exit request that he intended to meet with PLO heads was canceled. [Text] [TA111304 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Nov 80 pp 1, 2]

NEW KNESSET FACTIONS--There are two new one-man factions in the Knesset: Yisra'el Ahat [one Israel], Mr Yitzhaq Yitzhaqi's faction, and MK Se'adya Marciano's faction which has no title. There are now 16 factions in the Knesset including 10 one-man factions. There are also two Knesset members who do not belong to any faction: Moshe Dayan and Modekhay Elgrably. [Text] [TA111445 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 11 Nov 80]

JORDANIANS PREVENT ROCKET FIRING--The Jordanian security forces recently prevented a terrorist from firing rockets at Jordan Rift Valley settlements. After a time the terrorist was arrested by the Israeli security forces, and yesterday he was indicted in the Nabulus Military Court. Military prosecutor Lt Yosef Hikri has accused Taysir Salah 'Assli, aged 21, from (Bayta) village, of having undergone training in the use of and the preparation of bombs and firing rockets at a Syrian camp for 17 days during October 1979. In early 1980, the charge sheet states, Abu-Ziyad, one of the Fatah leaders in Damascus, directed 'Assli to launch rockets from Jordanian territory into the Jordan Rift Valley, and to set an ambush for Israeli vehicles. In the indictment, Lt Hikri contends that the accused was apprehended by the Jordanian security forces en route to carrying out this mission. Taysir 'Assli is accused of having met with Yasir 'Arafat's deputy, Abu-Jihad in Lebanon and of planning attacks on Israel with him. He was ordered to go to a meeting place in Israel where he would find arms and to use them to perpetrate attacks. Two other charge sheets submitted yesterday to the military courts in Nabulus and Janin, reveal that the Israeli security forces prevented an attack on two IDF camps during the Jewish New Year [11-12 Sep 80], and the firing of an automatic weapon in a movie theater in the Caesarea area. [Excerpt] [TA111437 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 11 Nov 80 p 16]

UPDATED STATE BUDGET--Tonight the Knesset approved--by the coalition votes--the updated state budget at a sum exceeding 90 billion shekels. Of the Knesset members 50 supported the budget and 34 opposed it. Knesset member Se'adyah Marciano did not participate in the vote. Chairman of the Knesset finance committee Shlomo Lorincz--when bringing the budget for its final approval--said that prices must be frozen. If the way to attain this goal is through reaching a package deal than all those concerned should discuss it day and night until the deal is reached because the public can no longer tolerate the price hikes. [Text] [TA111803 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 11 Nov 80]

ISRAEL-SAMARIA ROAD--After a long break the construction of the Samaria crossing road [khvish hotze shomron] is now being resumed. Our correspondent says that the Jewish National Fund is now completing the paving of the last section of the road between Tapuah--on the Jerusalem-Nabulus road--and Ma'ale Efrayyim. This section is 13.5 km long. When it is completed the Samaria crossing road will extend over 62 km from the Kafr Gsim region to the mountain ridge of the Jordan Rift Valley. Our correspondent adds that the completion of the road in 6 months will bring the central part of Israel and the coastal road closer to the Jordan Rift Valley and will reinforce the Israeli hold of Samaria. The Jewish settlers in Samaria say that completion of the road will make it possible for them to absorb many new families in the settlements. [Text] [TA111909 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 11 Nov 80]

ISRAELI-GAZA OFFICIALS DISPUTE--In Gaza there is a dispute between Mayor Rashad al-Shawwa and the military government. Al-Shawwa hopes to receive permission to obtain $5 million through Amman for the establishment of a sophisticated printing house in the Gaza Strip and a cultural center to be named after the Gaza mayor. Our correspondent Rafiq Halabi has learned that the military government is concerned that al-Shawwa is raising the funds through the joint Jordan-PLO committee. The military government is investigating whether or not al-Shawwa is hoping to print stamps and banknotes which at a certain time could be clear emblems of an autonomous government. Al-Shawwa told our correspondent that these were false accusations because everything passes through the Israeli censorship anyway. The Gaza mayor also said that $1 million had been received from Saudi Arabia, another $1 million from Amman and the rest of the money had been raised from the Islamic conference. A senior officer in the military administration told our correspondent that al-Shawwa was permitted to operate a printing house and to publish a newspaper entitled (AL-HUDA). The dispute with Al-Shawwa is over the source of the funds, he said. [Text] [TA112013 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 11 Nov 80]

ARAB EMPLOYMENT STATISTICS--In October 42,363 inhabitants of the territories were employed in Israel compared with 43,257 in September. This represented a decrease of 1,697. Of these, 14,307 were employed in construction (a drop of 403), 16,760 in industry, 7,117 in services (a drop of 652) and 4,175 in agriculture (a drop of 146). This was reported by the employment service department of information and statistics. [TA081107 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1545 GMT 7 Nov 80 TA]

SOVIET JEWS--The number of Soviet Jews that have recently left the Soviet Union has dropped by two-thirds. The average number of Jews leaving the Soviet Union now is 1,600 per month. The number of dropouts that remained in Vienna was 76 percent in September. These are the findings of the London Institute on Jewish Affairs based on the data of the first 9 months of this year. [Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0700 GMT 6 Nov 80 TA]

TERRORIST ATTACKS--From June to August there were 74 terrorist attacks and attempted attacks both within the green line and in the territories. These involved 44 bombs, 8 in Jerusalem and 17 inside the green line. The terrorists also planted 19 bombs that failed to explode, 13 of them in Jerusalem. [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 6 Nov 80 p 5 TA]

U.S. AID--Because of the change of administrations in the United States, there is now apprehension that U.S. aid will not be increased by $400 million this year, as President Carter had promised. This is the fear of circles in the Israeli Embassy in Washington. In discussions held in recent months, an assurance was given that the aid would be upped by $400 million within the framework of the draft budget to be presented to congress. However, following the change in the U.S. administration, the change in the size of the budget will be postponed, the intention being to leave the handling of these matters to the incoming administration. Therefore, the outgoing president's message to congress in early January will not contain a proposal to increase aid to Israel by $400 million. Only the existing aid data will be noted. The coming days will see urgent consultations in Washington on how to prevent the loss of the $400 million promised us in economic aid for the coming year. [Text] [TA091000 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 9 Nov 80 p 2]

COMMITTEE ON EAST JERUSALEM--Jordan has appointed a committee in East Jerusalem composed of five high-ranking personalities in order to be able to directly supervise activities in the eastern part of the city. Our correspondent has learned that contacts are being made with people from Judaea and Samaria to incorporate them into the committee and transform it into a kind of Jordanian replacement for the National Guidance Committee which works on behalf of the PLO. Members of the Jordanian committee include former ministers Anwar al-Khatib, ('Abduh Rahim Sharif), (Musbah al-Qasbi), former Judge (Taysir Kan'an) and educator Husni al-Ashhab. Arab sources in East Jerusalem told our correspondent that the PLO is very much opposed to the unilateral steps Jordan is now taking in Judaea and Samaria. Yasir 'Arafat sent a letter on this issue to King Husayn via the PLO commander of the military forces, Abu Jihad. However, King Husayn refused to receive the PLO messenger. [Text] [TA071538 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 7 Nov 80]

EGYPTIAN DELEGATION ARRIVES--A high-level Egyptian agriculture delegation arrived in Israel last night to continue talks on increasing cooperation with Israel on this sphere. They will discuss with their Israeli hosts the development of farming in Egypt, the establishment of plants for the processing of agricultural produce, the purchase of irrigation equipment and cooperation between the two countries on the import and export of agricultural produce. The Egyptian delegation also includes a team of veterinarians who will discuss the possibility of vaccinating cattle herds in Egypt against African rift fever. [Text] [TA070701 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 7 Nov 80]

CSO: 4805

PLANS TO SUBSTITUTE FOREIGN LABOR WITH QUALIFIED ARABS

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 18 Oct 80 p 17

[Text] Kuwait is prepared to substitute its foreign labour by skilled Arabs at certain conditions, a Kuwaiti newspaper reported.

"We will dispose of skilled and unskilled foreigners as soon as adequate numbers of qualified Arabs are available," the paper quoted an informed source at the Ministry of Social Affairs as saying. "Kuwait will need sufficient numbers of trained workers for the implementation of the construction and economic projects," the source said.

Foreign employment in Kuwait and other Arab states was discussed at a conference of the Arab Labour Organisation in Baghdad last March. The Baghdad meeting agreed on the formation of an Arab Employment Agency to coordinate the inter-exchange of labour forces. The agency will be assigned to move surplus labour to where it will be needed. The meeting recommended the provision of training opportunities for Arab workers to lessen dependence on foreign hands.

Asked to comment on the likely dangers of foreign employment in the region, the Ministry's spokesman said the Gulf governments are aware of anything that might endanger security or stability.

Along with other Arabs, the Gulf states would unite in 24 hours in the face of any threat to their internal security, he added. At present, only three Arab states can export labor: Egypt, Sudan and Morocco, the paper said, adding most of them are not sufficiently qualified.

Because of labour problems Iraq had recently assigned a number of major projects to Korean and Japanese firms because their Arab counterparts will not be able to secure skilled Arab workers. This problem can only be solved through extensive training of Arab hands, the spokesman was quoted as saying.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

INCREASED VW-BRAZIL INVESTMENT--The West German car manufacturing giant Volkswagen is in principle willing to allow Kuwait to double its stake in VW's Brazilian subsidiary from 10 to 20 per cent, it was reported last week. Kuwait's original investment, acquired from the Brazilian company Monteiro Aranha, cost $115 billion, but the parent company, according to reports from Bonn, is not saying what price it wants for a new holding by Kuwait. This will have to be bought from Volkswagen itself, since Monteiro Aranha, the only other shareholder in the subsidiary, is unwilling to relinquish its remaining 10 per cent stake. The Brazilian firm lost about DM30 million ($19 million) in the first half, but expects to balance its account by the end of the year. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 20 Oct 80 p 12]

DENIAL OF VW INVESTMENT--Kuwait's Minister of Finance Abdel Rahman Al-Atiki has denied that his country would be increasing its stake in the Brazilian subsidiary of the German car manufacturer Volkswagen. At a press conference in Kuwait last week, Mr Atiki said that the question of Kuwait's stake in VW-Brazil had not been raised during his visit to Latin America. There had been reports of a German offer to Kuwait to double its 10 per cent holding in VW-Brazil at the time of Mr Atiki's visit last month (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, October 20). [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 3 Nov 80 p 1]

VISA, WORK PERMIT FREEZE--The Kuwait Ministry of the Interior has issued an order indefinitely suspending the extension of new visas to foreigners "who are not under absolute necessity to enter Kuwait or who do not present sufficient evidence for such a necessity." A report carried by the London-based ASH-SHARQ AL AWSAT added that no new work permits were to be delivered either, until the completion of a study on the foreign workforce. According to an aide of the Kuwaiti Vice-Minister of the Interior, the new decisions do not affect businessmen and workers under contract. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 13 Oct 80 pp 3, 4]

CSO: 4820

$1 BILLION PROJECTS FOR ALUMINUM INDUSTRY PLANNED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 3 Nov 80 p 11

[Text]

Gulf countries meeting in Doha, Qatar, last week have agreed on a long-term strategy for the region's aluminium industry which could cost nearly $1 billion. Under the auspices of the Gulf Organisation for Industrial Consultation (GOIC) government officials and aluminium company representatives have called for the construction of up to five aluminuin smelters and a bauxite refinery costing up to $800 million, as well as the establishment of a $100 million aluminium rolling mill.

The long-term aluminium smelter project is to increase Gulf smelter capacity to 750,000 tonnes a year by 1995, according to the head of Research and Project Studies at the Ministry of Industry in Bahrain. Present smelter capacity in Dubai and Bahrain is around 270,000 tonnes annually.

If past experience is anything to go by, however, the cost of the smelters may well have been underestimated by delegates at the GOIC meeting. Dubai's 135,000-tonne smelter, begun in 1976, was estimated at the time to cost its owners $300 million. By the time the plant was complete and came on stream last year, $1.3 billion had been spent. Moreover, it is doubtful whether there is sufficient demand in the Gulf region to absorb the capacity projected for the five smelters, and whether the aluminium projects would not suffer the same fate as the Gulf's ultra-modern but largely useless drydock facilities.

The bauxite refinery project, to be based either in or outside the Gulf area, is to refine between one and two million tonnes of bauxite annually into alumina, which is the raw material used in aluminium smelting. The GOIC-sponsored meeting last week ordered feasibility studies to be started on the refinery project.

It was also announced in Bahrain that the agreement to set up a $100 million aluminium rolling mill in the Gulf state was expected to be signed in December (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, December 31, 1979). The mill, which is to have a capacity of about 40,000 tonnes a year, will use material from Bahrain's ALBA smelter. The mill, being built in association with GOIC, will produce aluminium sheet and strip either by the conventional pot rolling process or by a casting method. Construction of the plant should begin next year, while the production date has been set at 1983. Output will be sold mainly to Gulf countries, most of which are joining in the project.

Recently, the UAE agreed to become a joint owner of the mill project along with Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar and Oman.

GOIC will provide 60 per cent of the mill's financing while the remaining 40 per cent will be obtained through soft loans from Gulf government development banks and funds, as well as from commercial banks.

GOIC is also carrying out a feasibility study for a petroleum coke plant, in Abu Dhabi, and a textiles fibreglass plant in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia is being considered. The output of the coke plant would be used in aluminium and steel producing factories, and that from the textiles fibreglass plant would provide rovings and chopped strands used in furniture-making and boat-building.

CSO: 4820

NAIF, BONNET SIGN SECURITY ACCORD

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 4 Nov 80 p 2

[Text] Interior Minister Prince Naif and his French counterpart Christian Bonnet signed a security cooperation agreement between Saudi Arabia and France here.

The agreement, for which no time limit has been fixed, will regulate cooperation between the two interior ministries, according to Prince Naif. It will lead, among other things, to the establishment of a French language institute for the staff of the interior ministry, who will be trained in France. Moreover, an office will be set up to ensure cooperation between the two countries through specialists.

Prince Naif said that visits also will be exchnaged for Saudi officials to acquaint themselves with advanced French equipment with which the various agencies of the Saudi interior ministry will be supplied. [as published] The agreement aims at preparing the men before they are handed the technical equipment, Prince Naif added. He expressed his appreciation for France's cooperation and for Bonnet's visit.

The coordination office will follow up training matters, especially training in France, and the seconding of French instructors in Saudi Arabia, the prince said.

For his part, Bonnet affirmed his country's desire and keeness on fostering bilateral cooperation to a maximum extent. [as published] He said "Saudi French friendship is strong and excellent." He also expressed his gratitude for the warm welcome and hospitality extended to him and the other members of his delegation in Saudi Arabia.

The signing of the agreement took place in presence of Deputy Minister of Interior Prince Ahmad, State Undersecretary for the interior Dr. Ibrahim Al-Owaji; Interior Undersecretary Hashem Maatouq, who is in charge of the passports and civil status affairs, Gen. Abdullah Al-Sheikh, public security chief; Gen. Muhammad ibn Hilal, director general of the Frontiers Guard; Muhammad Al-Shawi, director of the interior minister's office, and the officials accompanying Bonnet.

Meanwhile, Bonnet Sunday afternoon visited King Abdul Aziz Airport in Jeddah. He was accompanied by Deputy Minister of Interior Dr. Ibrahim Al-Owaji.

Bonnet, who was received by Muhammad Dahman, assistant director of international airport projects, was briefed on the project. He toured the computer center,

library, layout display hall, the southern passenger terminal and the pilgrims hall.

In the evening, Governor of Mecca Prince Majed gave a dinner at Jeddah water tower in honor of Bonnet and the accompaning delegation. [as published] The dinner was attended by Interior Minister Prince Naif, Deputy Interior Minister Prince Ahmad and other senior officials.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

RAILWAY COOPERATION AGREEMENT—The Kingdom and Pakistan have agreed to cooperate in technical aspects and the supply of experience and training in railways. During a meeting held in Lahore yesterday between the Kingdom's delegation headed by director of the General Railway Corporation Faysal al-Shayl and the Pakistani Railway delegation, it was agreed that Pakistan would supply railway engineering equipment and train railway employees. [Text] [GF081206 Riyadh Domestic Service in Arabic 1830 GMT 8 Nov 80]

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

TWO WIMPEY CONTRACTS--Wimpey Alawi LCC has won two contracts worth a total of more than $5 million from the Ministries of Communications and Defence in Oman. The larger, worth about $4.1 million, is for the construction of 9.8 kilometres of single-carriageway feeder roads including a seven span bridge on the Oman-Bausher road. Consultant engineers for the contract, awarded by the Communications Ministry, are Sauti Ici of Italy. The second contract, worth almost $1 million, is for the construction, completion and maintenance of training facilities at the Oman Naval Training Centre. Consultant Engineers are J and A Philippou of Cyprus. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 3 Nov 80 p 12]

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

INDIA OFFERS SYRIA COOPERATION--Brussels, 6 Nov--India has begun taking action toward setting up a plant to produce new spare parts for the Soviet "T-72" tanks. Reliable sources in the West have recently pointed out that the Indian Government has recruited Arab capital toward that end and has even offered the Arabs technical cooperation on assembling and operating these tanks, considered the best in the world. India has signed deals for the procurement of these tanks, but has made the extension of the deals conditional upon obtaining Soviet permission to assemble the tanks in an Indian plant. The Indian armament industry has manufactured combat tanks according to a British "Vickers" company design. They are called in India "(Vigiatna)," and they closely resemble the "Centurion." The project also involves Indian-Iraqi cooperation as well as Indian-Syrian cooperation. Military experts have noted that the "T-72" is considered a revolutionary tank primarily because of its armor, described as yan armor that can withstand most types of antitank arms currently in existence." The Soviet agreement to allow the Indians to produce this tank is probably dependent on consent that a large part of the work will be done by Russian technicians or that the armor cover will be produced in the Soviet Union and brought to India for mounting. The T-72 tanks were placed into operation by some Arab and Eastern bloc armies last year. [Yoram Hamizrachi] [Text] [TA071136 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 7 Nov 80 p 1]

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

GULF AIRCRAFT FIRM--President His Highness Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, in his capacity as the Ruler of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi has issued a law establishing the Gulf Company for Aircraft Maintenance. According to the law, the proposed company's capital is about Dh. 120 million. The paid up capital is Dh. 18 million. The Emirate of Abu Dhabi will hold 60 per cent of the company's capital, while the balance (40 per cent) will be subscribed by Gulf Air Company. The company, whose main office will be in Abu Dhabi will undertake maintenance works on aircraft, their engines and equipment for 25 years. The company's management will be run by a 5-member board of directors, three of whom, including the chairman, will be appointed by the Abu Dhabi Executive Council, while Gulf Air Company will appoint the remaining two. The board's term is three years, subject to renewal. Sheikh Zayed also issued a decree appointing an Assistant Under-Secretary for the Finance Department. He issued another decree amending the regulations of the fees for the services rendered by the Sea Ports Department at Port Zayed. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 5 Nov 80 p 3]

SHARJAH EXPO ANNOUNCED--Sharjah, Nov. 1: Expo Centre, Sharjah, management announced today a 'first ever Grand National Fair' to be held at the exhibition centre from March 1 to 13, 1981. The fair will be open to the public and will feature displays of UAE merchants. Expo Centre president Frederick Pittera said, "The Grand National Fair will be organised as a national festival of retail sellers and buyers. We will be taking the dust out of the past Expos and Spring Fairs which are now and in the future relegated to the status of strictly trade forums of international character and applying the drama, colour and excitement of these past shows to the national fair." Pittera explained that the objectives of the Expo Centre were being tailored to meet the changing Gulf market conditions brought about by the increasing incidence and presence of exporting nations in the Middle East. "Foir this reason," he disclosed, "the Grand National Fair will concentrate on bringing in retail buyers together with retail sellers, whereas all other Expo Centre exhibitions will link worldwide manufacturers with the Gulf and Middle East agents and distributers." [as published] "Both type of events," he said will provide entertainment on all level comensurate with Expo Centre philosophy to combine 'business with pleasure'. [as published] "The Grand National Fair will be the most economical fair to be ever offered to national merchants with an exhibition base including shelf scheme stands offered at the unprecedented price of Dh. 25 per square feet together with full services." Pittera said the exhibition will combine fair and demonstrations of consumer goods with rock concerts, cinema shows, Dh. 240,000 in cash prizes, stage show, fun fair and carnival, circus acts and snack stands. [Text] [Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 2 Nov 80 p 2]

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26 November 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2224

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INTER-ARAB COOPERATION, TUNISIAN-SAUDI BILATERAL CONTACTS DISCUSSED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 16 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] The Saudi sovereign emphasizes the necessity to strengthen relations between Tunis and Ryadh to the highest levels.

Jiddah--Saudi Arabia King Khaled received yesterday at the Royal Palace of Jiddah Mr Driss Guiga, minister of the Interior and head of the official delegation of Tunisian pilgrims, who was accompanied by members of the delegation. Present at the interview were Mr Kacem Bousnina, Tunisia's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Prince Abdallah ibn Abdelaziz, vice president of the Saudi Council of Ministers, and Messrs M'hamed Abalkheil, minister of Economy and Finances, and Hichem Nazer, minister of Planning in the government of Saudi Arabia.

At the close of the meeting Mr Driss Guiga declared: "The official delegation of Tunisian pilgrims had the honor of being received by His Majesty King Khaled to whom I transmitted a written message from the Supreme Combatant in which the Chief of State extends his respects, in his name and in the name of the Government and of the Tunisian people, to His Majesty King Khaled, to the Government and the Saudi people, as well as in the name of Tunisian Moslems to all Moslems gathered in the Holy City for the pilgrimage."

"We have made a complete review of our bilateral relations which are by the way excellent. His Majesty King Khaled emphasized on this occasion the necessity to further tighten contacts at the highest level and to consolidate them by an intensive exchange of visits between government officials of the two countries," he added.

Mr Driss Guiga went on to say that he and the Saudi sovereign talked about questions pertaining to the Arab World, particularly those relative to the internal and external security of the Arab Nation and the Palestinian cause. "His Majesty King Khaled emphasized that it is indispensable to promote the economic cooperation between the Arab countries."

The minister of the Interior concluded his statement by saying: "We have also talked on the subject of the war which at the present is opposing two countries and two Moslem people. We have expressed hope that the pilgrimage will be an occasion for the restoration of brotherhood and peace so that Moslems may reach a higher degree of cooperation and understanding, the objective being to make the cause of Islam and that of Moslems triumph."

9670
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

MAURITANIAN OFFICIAL IN TRIPOLI--Foreign Minister Mohamed El Mokhtar Ould Zamel returned home this afternoon from Tripoli. In a statement he made on arrival the minister said that he had delivered a letter from chief of state and government Ould Haydala to the Libyan leader Al-Qadhafi on bilateral relations and cooperation. He added that he had discussed with Jallud and other officials bilateral relations and Arab and international issues. He said that he was pleased with the outcome of the visit and grateful for the welcome and hospitality accorded. [Summary] [LD112248 Nouakchott Domestic Service in Arabic 2030 GMT 11 Nov 80]

CSO: 4402

INTERVIEW WITH DEFENSE MINISTER ON MILITARY, POLITICAL ISSUES

TA071744 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Nov 80 pp 21, 28

[Interview with Defense Minister Ahmad Badawi at his office in a military camp in a suburb of Cairo to Arab Affairs Correspondent 'Oded Granto; date not given]

[Text] Question: Next week Egypt will start another series of maneuvers with U.S. forces. What is the difference between these maneuvers and previous ones? What is their objective?

Answer: The objective is to acquire knowledge not only about the very use of arms but also about the techniques of the use. We are sending Egyptians to study in the United States for the same objective.

Question: Does the presence of U.S. land units in the expected maneuvers indicate increased cooperation between the two countries?

Answer: Naturally. Do you know why we are cooperating with the United States? Because the United States is driving toward the achievement of peace and stability and is considered among the friendly countries that are very important to Egypt. The U.S. attitude toward us has given rise to a new climate for the development of relations based on mutual trust and respect unlike those with the Soviet Union at the time.

When the peace agreement was signed different regional reactions were triggered particularly on the part of the countries under Moscow's influence. There were even neutral countries that claimed Israel should not be trusted before it consents to a comprehensive just solution.

The outcome--dangers which are threatening to Egypt have evolved. Do you know where the threat against Egypt originates? From which direction? It comes from the direction of Libya and Ethiopia. Libya is active in Chad and this creates a threat to Sudan and Sudan is our life's artery....

It is from this point that our cooperation with the United States as one of the sources for arms supply has started. We are still resolved to diversify armament sources so as not to repeat the first mistake we made with regard to arms import from the Soviet Union only. The objective is to defend the borders, to establish stability, to guarantee peace--a weak country tempts others to attack it.

Question: Have the maneuvers with the U.S. army contributed to improved ability of the U.S. army to operate in desert conditions?

Answer: Certainly, undoubtedly. Otherwise we would not have decided on the maneuvers. The 12-plane Phantom squadron only has value or weight in a joint maneuver. When a U.S. battalion comes to participate in a maneuver with similar elements of the Egyptian army--there is no value to it other than in cooperation in the field of training. The Americans, too, derive much knowledge from us just as we do from them. The cooperation is on an equal basis. They come here and operate under our command. The Phantoms squadron established itself in Cairo-west under the full command of the Egyptian base commander and all rules apply to them; there are no deviations. We are saying this publicly so the entire world can hear.

In contrast, the Soviet Union today has bases, emergency stockpiles, arms and experts in Arab countries. They dominate these countries and have bases where none of the country's people--including the country's president--is admitted. We have no such thing. We have begun marching toward democracy and there are no secret agreements in democracy. The cooperation with the Americans does not detract anything from our sovereignty. The U.S. forces come for 3 weeks and leave, for 3 months and leave.

Question: You mentioned the Libyan threat to Egypt. Does Cairo view the stationing of the ground-to-ground missiles on Libyan territory as a threat to its security?

Answer: This surely threatens Egypt's security for two reasons: the Libyan decisionmaker is an unbalanced person while the "original" decisionmaker (namely, the Soviet Union) may control him and direct him against Egypt when it pleases.

Question: Is Egypt making preparations to forestall such a threat?

Answer: All of our preparations on the western border region are defensive by nature. We have no ambitions regarding Libya, nor an intention to attack it. Everything we are doing is intended to safeguard the border.

Question: Is it possible that Al-Qadhdhafi will acquire nuclear arms?

Answer: Through whom? A third party?

Question: France... the Soviet Union....

Answer: I do not believe the French will give him nuclear arms. France is giving Iraq nuclear energy for peaceful needs. If Libya receives nuclear arms it will receive them directly from the Soviet Union since Libya lacks the scientific basis for the development of a nuclear arms potential.

However, if Libya receives nuclear arms from the Soviet Union we also will have to receive these arms from another source. Otherwise this will be suicide for us--destruction and ruin. I will give you an example: if we

receive this kind of arms the goal will not be to use it in an immoral manner but to prevent the other party from using it. In the 1967 war Israel extensively used napalm but in 1973 it did not use this since it knew we also had these arms.

Question: A policy of deterrence....

Answer: Exactly: When Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi attains nuclear arms so shall we, not in order to use them against Libya but in order to neutralize the Libyans and prevent them from using this kind of weapon against us. However, as far as this issue (of procuring the nuclear option) is concerned, there is no reason why we should scatter the resources and invest funds in it instead of investing in developing our country. If it is a question of life and death though, there will be no choice and no investments will be spared.

Question: Will Egypt consider extending aid to the Persian Gulf countries, for instance, in view of the war there?

Answer: Our commitment to help the Arab countries through training or with the supply of know-how and arms as defense against foreign attacks is valid and unchanged. The same applies to the common defense pacts. We are attaching great importance to the defense pact with Sudan because of the traditional ties between us and because of Egypt's interests in Sudan since the Nile is Egypt's life source.

We will also help the Arab Peninsula and Persian Gulf countries to repel an outside attack if we are asked. We shall not aid them if they are the aggressors. The purpose of the aid is to safeguard the region against Soviet control or influence.

This also applies to the installations we grant to the United States. These installations are aimed at helping countries that will ask for U.S. aid in repeling a threat by a big power, something that neither Egypt nor several Arab countries uniting together can face or cope with. We are giving facilities, not bases, to the Americans.

Question: What is your position regarding the Persian Gulf war? How will it end politically, militarily and economically? Has Saddam Husayn been mistaken in his war calculations?

Answer (categorically): I do not want to broach this subject being the defense minister of the Arab Republic of Egypt. It is clear, however, that both Iraq's and Iran's economy have been ruined as a result of the war. Even if one of the parties scores local, practical victories this will not measure up to the destruction and ruin caused to these two countries.

Our stance on this war is neutral. We do not support it since it is neither in the regional interest nor in the interest of either of the fighting parties. I am sorry the war broke out regardless of its motives and of who is right and who is wrong. This problem can be solved through peaceful

negotiations and we call on both sides to reach an agreement between them. If each was content with the rights he deserved and did not want to get more than his due, the problem would have been solved without bloodshed.

Who stands to benefit from the war today? The Soviet Union. I expect the internal struggles in Iran to increase as the Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh, is strengthening and awaiting the weakening of the fighting sides. Then it will proceed to do its bit....

Israel's intransigency regarding a just solution to the Palestinian problem contradicts the Western world's policy, contradicts the policy of peace and stability and enables the Soviet Union to penetrate the region as an "arms dealer."

Had the Palestinian problem been solved, the friendship agreement between Syria and the Soviet Union would not have been signed. Some say a solution to the Palestinian problem is in U.S. hands. Others claim this is not true and one should solve the problem through war. The source of weaponry for war is the Soviet Union and [in return] it should be given influence and bases--even up to the point of giving the Soviets the chance to change the social regime in an Arab country.

Today, after the Camp David agreement was signed and the problem will be solved by peaceful means it will become clear that the road followed by Egypt with the help of the United States is the one to success.

Question: I thought that Al-Asad signed the friendship pact with the Soviet Union not because of the still unsolved Palestinian problem but because of the internal threat to his regime....

Answer (firmly): When the Palestinian problem is solved regimes will change. Whoever "barters" with the Palestinian problem will be removed. Today Al-Asad is saying: The Golan issue can wait 2, 3 or 5 years and in the meantime he is taking advantage of this situation to use violence (terror) against the Persian Gulf countries to extort huge sums of money. In other words, he is bartering with this problem. When the Palestinian problem is solved, what will be "bartered" then? The Palestinian problem is the cornerstone and there is no doubt about this. We have to prove to all the countries claiming they need the Soviet Union since their existence is in danger that they are mistaken. A solution of the problem by peaceful means is the positive way.

Question: Can we say that when the Syrian regime is changed that it will be easier to solve the Palestinian problem?

Answer: The opposite is true. Al-Asad made an agreement with the Soviet Union and "is bartering" with the Palestinian problem. Al-Asad is doing everything to remain in power and rule. However, when the problem is solved, they will have nothing to chatter about. One will be able to greet them. Al-Asad represents an 'Alawite minority in Syria and he has signed a pact with the Soviet Union in order to keep his throne although he is not acceptable to the decisive majority of the Syrian people.

It is obviously not in the USSR's interest to have regional stability prevail since it is making use of the disorder and is complicating the peace process. (General Badaqi emphasizes that the Palestinian state will not be communist or given to Soviet influence and will never think in terms of posing a threat to Israel.)

Question: And the Palestinian National Charter?

Answer: Not everything the Palestinians say reflects their real policy. Today you are hitting and attacking them in Lebanon. I foresee an Israeli operation in southern Lebanon. Later the Lebanese are hitting them [the Palestinians] and the Syrians take over. Where will the Palestinians go? They have not received anything to date and when we achieve a just solution they will come to the negotiations in spite of the wish of any country.

Question: Is the autonomy agreement a reasonable solution?

Answer: A full autonomy is needed. Where in the world have you heard of autonomy for people and not for land? The Palestinians want full autonomy and you are establishing settlements. An occupation regime exists [in the territories] and the Palestinians are being driven out of every place.

Question: If Israel and Egypt achieve an agreement on the autonomy after a second Camp David conference, what will happen if the Palestinians reject this solution?

Answer: Who will reject? Every country has an extreme minority and a large majority that would accept the just solution. There are elements who do not want to solve the problem everywhere. (smilingly) Are there not Israeli elements who do not desire a solution to the problem?

How will the Palestinian state threaten Israel? The East and the West are Israel's guarantors and talk of liquidating Israel and throwing it into the sea is empty talk. The entire world, both East and West, will not agree to the destruction of Israel. We, too, will not agree and we have a word of honor that we adhere to. We signed on recognition of Israel and that is it. Israel is a state that exists and is legal. (Badawi is not overly impressed by the extreme minority, as he puts it, within the Palestinian camp. He rejects the assumption that the establishment of a Palestinian state will attract Palestinian immigrants.)

Question: As far as King Husayn is concerned, the impression is that he prefers to go in the direction of Iraq and Soviet influence rather than taking part in the peace talks.

Answer: It is naturally my hope that he will join the negotiations; however, Husayn is now going against the interest of the entire region. I am convinced that the king's steps of rapprochement toward the Soviet Union are a mere maneuver.

(Badawi entertains strong indignation against the Israeli accusations directed at Egypt and stresses the slowness of the normalization process. He is angry

about reports in the Israeli press according to which Egypt stopped tourism from Israel to the region of St Catherine's.)

Answer: We agreed on tourism to St Catherine's. As regards the Israeli tourists we said: Welcome. We said, however, that as far as foreigners are concerned they will come in through Egypt's official entrances, namely, like the citizens of any country we maintain contacts with.

This story has been misused by you in Israel. The press has said that Egypt stopped and prevented tourism and did not say that foreigners only will enter through Egypt while Israel will continue as usual. Why didn't Israeli official circles release a denial about this? There are dozens of tourist companies in Egypt and they are pressuring us--how will they work and what will they profit from?

Why should Israel not be like Greece, Italy or France, or like our relations with Libya? In this latter case we bring the tourists as far as the Al-Sallum border checkpoint and from there they travel by Libyan cars or buses. This whole arrangement with the foreign tourists Israel drove to St Catherine's was temporary. We have to make our living. We cannot allow foreign tourists to go through Israel. To give Israel a preferred status deals a blow to our honor.

Your adherence to temporary arrangements is turning into a permanent thing with you and this will oblige us in the future not to make such arrangements. All in all we have to progress gradually in the direction of normalization in relations. We did not, for example, prevent you from promoting tourism allowing swimming and diving, for instance, in the Ra's Muhammad area despite the fact that this is a buffer zone. All this profits the Israeli tourist companies while the Egyptian companies suffer from a lack of income and pressure us.

What is happening? Why all this commotion?

Look at the question of water supply to Sharm al-Shaykh. We are giving the Israeli settlement in Sharm al-Shaykh 1,700 cubes per day and take 500 cubes. You say: raise the quantity. How will we go about doing that? You should remember we have forces as well as citizens there. You still claim that we are withholding water from you. You later contended that 50 cubes of water of the allocation you receive leak on the way. I said: Well then, we will increase your quantity by 100 cubes so that you will have a surplus.

I do not understand what this spitefulness is for.

Normalization is proceeding well in general. Everything started early. We made nine agreements; after 3 months we began implementation. According to the agreement the negotiations should have begun 6 months from the day of withdrawal and could have lasted 1, 2 or 3 years.

We gave you a short aerial corridor over Port Sa'id during visits by important personages. (emphatically and raising his voice) There is no country and no country's president at whose disposal we put a short aerial corridor. Any president must go through the international corridor.

What does all this indicate? It indicates there are facilities, there is understanding, and what do we get in return?

Question: Is it possible that military-strategic cooperation will be established between Egypt, Israel and the United States in the future for the maintenance of regional stability?

Answer: Military cooperation is a big word with many aspects. Do you think to yourself that we will talk today of military cooperation when Israel is still controlling part of our land and has not yet led to a just and comprehensive solution to the Palestinian problem?

Question: Also regarding the exchange of know-how?

Answer: This relates to all spheres. There is the sphere of cooperation. We met and jointly implemented the military clauses of the Camp David agreement. This is a kind of cooperation but can one talk of cooperation when he is still under occupation? This is an issue that can be discussed only at a later stage. Today one should still create the climate, the appropriate circumstances and the mutual trust, on the one hand, and to remove the factors of struggle, on the other. First, the Palestinian problem should be solved. The main goal is the implementation of the peace agreement.

Now one need not talk of military cooperation. This is not an urgent goal. If I talk of military cooperation today, under the present circumstances when my land is occupied and the Palestinian problem is still unsolved, I will be accused of treachery.... When peace and security prevail in the region there will be various kinds of cooperation among the regional countries.

I hope that the friendship between us will last and that problems will be solved. This is the best guarantee. President Al-Sadat declared that the Yom Kippur War was the last one and that all problems can be solved by peaceful means.

Question: Are you considering a visit to Israel?

Answer: So far, as a result of circumstances I have not been fortunate to visit Israel. Former Defense Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali stayed in the United States for 70 days and continued to receive treatment later as well. All that time I substituted for him here and could not leave Egypt. I have no objection to visiting Israel. I only hope that at the same time good circumstances will also be created concerning a solution to the Palestinian problem.

CSO: 4805

KHOMEYNI'S POWER BASE SEEN DETERIORATING

Brussels SPECIAL L'EVENTAIL in French 31 Oct-6 Nov 80 pp 18, 20

[Text] Iran has been an unceasing cause for concern in the world for nearly 2 years. The Islamic revolution, the taking of the hostages, and now the war with Iraq have significantly contributed to destabilizing a vital region and to provoking disturbing tensions in the world.

The course of political change in Iran since the departure of the shah was at first surprising, then disturbing, to observers of the world scene. For many, the regime of the Ayatollah Khomeyni seemed destined to last but a very short time. Now, it has been just a bit less than 2 years that intransigence and fanaticism have held sway in Tehran.

Today, the problem of the American hostages returns to center stage. The question "Why?" must be asked. It will soon be a year since 50 of the personnel of the American embassy in Tehran were captured and held hostage. During that time the most elementary rules of international law have been scoffed at by the Iranian authorities with a nonchalance that leaves one gasping.

It may thus seem surprising that the fate of these hostages should be on the point of being resolved on the eve of the American elections and at a moment when Iran finds itself confronted with serious problems. So events are at a decisive turning point.

It appears more and more that Iran needs to shore up its prestige abroad, as the country is in bitter conflict with its Iraqi neighbor. The authorities in Tehran are looking for external support, for beyond the local defeats of the Iranian army, it is the prestige and authority of Khomeyni that could be hardest hit. Moreover, Iran needs money, as its principal source of revenue, oil, is almost completely dried up because of the conflict with Iraq.

The liberation of the hostages will undoubtedly entail the unblocking of Iran's assets in the United States. That would give the Iranians liquidity and therefore the army could be given resources to battle against the Iraqi enemy.

For in Tehran it is believed certain that an Iraqi victory would strike a fatal blow to the Islamic revolution. The heretics of Saddam Hussein would triumph over the followers of God! The Iranian people could be subjected to a painful

awakening, and might even open their eyes! It is therefore indispensable for the Iranian regime, in absence of victory, to be assured of the potential aid needed to forestall such a situation. Let us not forget that many of the Arab (and Muslim) countries have clearly sided with Iraq. This includes Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Gulf States.

The question of the hostages thus presents itself at an ideal time for enhancing Iran's image, if somehow a suitable solution can be adopted.

But, beyond this aspect, it also could have an effect on American political life. The freeing of the hostages might in part facilitate the reelection of President Carter. For this liberation would be considered by the public as a personal feat of Jimmy Carter. And he certainly understands this. For some days rumors have flown around Washington that negotiations were under way with Iran on liberating the hostages. Even though the Iranian prime minister denied it, the American public is whispering that "where there's smoke, there's fire," and that in fact some talks are being held right now. Such ideas, in case the hostages should be freed before the elections, would make it possible for the president to come out as the principal architect of their release. His chances of winning a second term would perhaps thus be enhanced. Not to mention that Washington could bring more specific support to Iran. Presently, the United States has contented itself with declaring its support for Iranian territorial integrity, without condemning "the Iraqi aggression." Moreover, and despite the absence of diplomatic relations with Iraq, there have been contacts between Iraqi and American diplomats.

Power Struggle

If the Iranians are tenaciously defending themselves against the Iraqi enemy, one should nevertheless not be fooled: their unity is only a facade. The internal political situation of Iran is far from being rosy, and it appears more and more [clearly] that a power struggle is in process among the principal Iranian leaders.

There is first of all the open struggle between President Bani Sadr and Prime Minister Ali Radjai. And behind the personal struggle is a struggle between lay and clerical factions. Let us not forget that it is the Parliament that has chosen the prime minister and imposed him on the president of the republic, even if the latter was ultimately chosen by the Iranian deputies. Nevertheless, it is clear for all to see that the two men have diametrically opposed ideas and that they are both jockeying for position as eventual successor to the imam Khomeyni. The latter, by contrast, is for the moment rather quiet and contents himself with watching the two protagonists while keeping his own power.

President Bani Sadr himself is quite aware of this situation, and thus he tries to maneuver skillfully, while at the same time avoiding antagonizing the religious hierarchy. It was however against the advice of this hierarchy that he ordered the release of a number of superior officers and advisers imprisoned for having served the shah, to help in the conflict with Iraq. In case of Iranian victory, the president would then look like the national savior. And, too, the army and its officers would be rehabilitated. This is precisely what Radjai and Khomeyni want to avoid. Their power would be greatly shaken, if this were to happen. And this is where the second conflict is taking place, between the Guardians of the Revolution and the regular army.

The Guardians of the Revolution are the personal troops of the imam Khomeyni. For the moment they are suffering the heaviest casualties in the Iran-Iraq conflict. They are, in fact, in the front line of the battle and to them have been entrusted the most dangerous missions.

They have been brought to such a pitch of fanaticism by the mullahs that they are going to their death with incredible nonchalance. Which enables them to put up ferocious resistance. By dying, these guardians are becoming martyrs who have given their lives for the victory of Good over Evil. By presenting "his" guardians as the martyrs, as the sole defenders of Islam, Khomeyni wins the recognition of the people and impedes any resurgence in the prestige of the regular army.

And, too, President Bani Sadr, commander in chief of the army, can no longer be considered the savior of the nation. The imam is killing two birds with one stone.

Nevertheless, it must be expected that this struggle will become still more pronounced, because of the disastrous economic position of the country, which will be burdened still further by the consequences of the war with Iraq.

Who Manipulates Khomeyni?

In analyzing Khomeyni's attitude, one asks oneself what he is after. What goal is he trying to reach?

At the start of his reign over the ancient Persian empire, some believed that he served Moscow's interests. It has since become apparent that this is not the case, since the USSR is, along with the United States, branded with infamy. So, what is the imam looking for?

Beyond personal vengeance, one might easily think that he aims at "exporting" his Islamic revolution at overthrowing the regimes he deems to be "corrupted by the West." The final victory of Islam over the heretics is certainly one of the deepest aspirations of Iran's ruler. Most of the other Muslim countries fear the Islamic revolution and its consequences. Few are tempted to court the economic chaos Iran has experienced. Why do the Muslims refuse to follow the old ayatollah? And what if Islam were but a pretext intended to mask another aim? Is the ayatollah acting on his own, or is he manipulated behind the scenes? These are questions which at present cannot be answered. Only the future will tell. Alas!

9516
CSO: 4900

CHARTER OF NEW ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM PROMULGATED

Aim of Proposed System

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 6 Sep 80 p 5

[Text] To promote the goals of the Islamic Revolution and to annihilate the traces of the former oppressive regime in the administrative system of the country, the Union of the Islamic Associations of Government Employees has, within the limits of its ability, formulated an organizational structure in order to change the government system in conformity with Islamic principles and the Constitution.

The Overall Aim of the Proposed System:

The realization of the rule of the oppressed on earth; decentralization of the economy and services; unity of leadership and command, insuring self-sufficiency in all spheres of activity and the severance of economic and political affiliation and dependence; complete ouster of colonialism; and, moving from the status of consumer to that of producer.

Another important point is that, by drawing on Principle 133 of the Constitution which provides that the number of ministries and the scope of their powers shall be determined by law to be ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles), and also by considering the other principles of the Constitution and the principal needs and logical links in the organizational network, we have changed the ministerial posts and ministries and have modified their functions. Cursory reference is made to these changes in the attached proposal on the organizational structure. The attached organizational chart does not reflect the details of the structures of the ministries and departments. We have limited ourselves to the overall organizational chart. The detailed charts of the ministries and departments shall be submitted after necessary amendments.

At this juncture we, the members of the Union of the Islamic Societies of Government Employees, declare that we shall be at the service of the esteemed deputies of the Majles with all our resources. We shall attend the meetings of the deputies at any time called by the Majles in order that we may give any necessary explanation regarding the proposed system and exchange views for its perfection.

We pray to God to grant us the opportunity to discharge our indebtedness to the Revolution and to make the contribution that we have pledged.

Union of the Islamic Societies of Government Employees

Planning Government Structure

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 6 Sep 80 pp 5, 6

[Text] As this structural design has been prepared on the basis of the needs of the society and of the people of the rural and urban areas—prepared in such a way as to touch and interface these needs in an Islamic context—the features of the overall design are described from bottom to top:

1. The furnishing of the various production, distribution and consumer services to villagers so that while the services are supplied the servicing energies are economized and the way is paved for the attainment of self-sufficiency and enhanced productivity. Therefore, about 20 executive units shall be created at the county level;

2. Required service units not mentioned at the county level for economizing on resources shall be created at the level of districts—located in one of the counties in the district. Such services include road building, construction and judicial court services;

3. The first phase of planning and designing takes place at the city region level (shahrestan) in the following manner: all statistics, proposals, operational reports and lists of the requirements of villages shall be prepared at the levels of county and district by village and district councils. Once these collected data are integrated they are sent to the city region's Designing and Planning Offices. The latter will review the data and prepare the necessary projects by taking into consideration all the timing and locating criteria and by considering the possibilities and priorities. The projects will then be sent to the provincial governments for final review. The city region offices shall independently approve and implement some of the projects. In addition, the governor shall put into effect through the lieutenant governors and operational groups the projects approved by the governor general's office. The councils shall play an effective part in the preparation and formulation of projects and in supervision over the projects at all governmental levels and at the county level, and even in the actual execution of the projects.

4. Specialized education complexes at the level of training technicians and more highly specializing experts as required in the region shall be set up at provincial and city region centers so that the material as well as employed specializing human resources available in cities may be used for training and securing the required human resources of the various parts of the city region (by training experts in educational complexes in the city region);

5. At the provincial level, the staff sections of each general department shall be set up to integrate the collected data, to design and plan, and to supervise and evaluate. The staff sections shall function under the supervision of the governor general and in cooperation with the relevant deputies of the governor

general. They shall not interfere in the operational activities except in cases necessarily instructed by the governor general and in such cases as the nature of the work involves them in the operational area as well;

6. At the national level, all the ministries shall be exclusively engaged in staff work. Each shall be in charge of the overall coordination, designing and planning, high supervision and evaluation, and in charge of the final phase of the implementation. They shall, while attending the regular ministerial council meetings, integrate and schedule the projects and estimate the necessary appropriations on the basis of the relevant criteria. Then they shall formulate the budget with the help of the Ministry of Finance and approve the projects and submit them to the Prime Minister for implementation. The Prime Minister shall put the projects into effect through governors general and governors;

7. At all governmental levels, measures have been taken to guard against overlapping of the functions of the executive departments and units and of technical sections. The principle of assigning the duties to the specialists has been kept in view. Also, in order to optimize the utilization of the expertise and the resources of some sections and ministries with near-similar duties and with the needs of the similar lines of expertise, we have merged these sections and ministries. On this very basis, the Ministry of Road and Transport has been merged into the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development so that by using the same experts, greater service may be rendered for road building and for observing the urban development criteria in rural renewal so that the standard designs and plans in public works may expedite rural development.

8. The Ministry of Commerce has been divided into the Ministry of Domestic Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Trade. Because of the crucial importance of creating an effective distribution network for consumer goods, of striking a balance between consumption and production, of maximal utilization of land and sea transportation and of public warehouses all over the country and of the cooperative societies for production, distribution and consumption tied in with a nationwide plan, a Ministry of Domestic Trade is to be established in order to put an end to the current chaos. All export and import operations shall be carried out on the basis of a scientifically correct program and with a perspective on the foreign policy of the country and on the basis of the ratifications of the Majles. These considerations call for the establishment of a Ministry of Foreign Trade to undertake foreign trade operations. Therefore, the sale of petroleum and petroleum products is also assigned to this ministry.

9. The Ministry of Industries and Mines: Because of urgent need for the integration of all industrial activities due to the interrelationship of various industries as far as primary and intermediate commodities and capital and consumer goods are concerned, all the industries and mines shall come under the supervision of the Ministry of Industries and Mines. The Minister of Industries and Mines shall appoint supervisors for various industries such as steel, petroleum and petrochemicals, and for other heavy and light industries.

10. The Ministry of Education: Due to the need for integrated planning of and for a linear coordination among the various levels of education from preschool to postgraduate, all these activities shall be planned under one minister. Sport training and matters related to physical education shall be handled by this ministry also;

11. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance: Part of the functions of the Planning and Budget Organization in the phase of budget formulation and allocation shall be incorporated into the staff functions of this ministry;

12. The Ministry of Labor: In the light of the fact that there are functional similarities and also with a view to the fact that all employment affairs should be coordinated, the Organization for Employment Affairs is disbanded and all its personnel and functions will be transferred to the Ministry of Labor. Thus any job candidate shall refer to the recruitment department of the Ministry of Labor and any governmental or nongovernmental organization shall use the Labor Ministry's Recruitment Department as a clearing house for their recruitment purpose. Each job candidate shall be issued a recruitment book with a serial number. The book shall show a work record and an employment status of the worker at any given time and at any place. The same book shall be used for entitlement to unemployment benefits and retirement pension under Principles 28 and 29 of the Constitution. Thus no element of the labor force will be found without a clear employment and living status, nor will it be found to be drawing more than one salary from more than one employer. The formulation of the laws and procedures of employment and the coordination of its various affairs shall be the responsibility of the Ministry of Labor and its various provincial labor departments while their enforcement shall be the charge of the city region labor departments. Generally speaking, the execution of affairs shall be delegated to the lower levels while a greater proportion of planning and decision making shall progressively be made at higher levels.

13. The Ministry of Interior: This ministry shall have the responsibility for coordinating the implementation phases of all national plans and for unity of command. Fortunately, the grounds have been prepared by some of the bills approved by the Islamic Revolutionary Council for the formation of the provincial technical councils and of the rural development coordination councils at the provincial and city region levels, and for the formation of recruitment centers in the provinces and for the formation of health planning task forces as well as those for activating the small industries in the provinces and city regions.

14. Water Resources and Distribution Facilities Ministry: One of the biggest problems of the country is to meet the water shortage and to maximize the utilization of the surface, river and underground water resources and to recover and filter urban sewerage water for use in agriculture; to supply water for drinking and farming; to create irrigation networks and to build dams and the relevant facilities. These problems justify the establishment of the said ministry.

15. With a view to Principles 152, 143, 110, 157, 158 and 8 of the Constitution, and with regard to the nature of the ministries in question, the proposed design is as follows: The Minister of Justice shall perform his duties under the supervision of the High Judicial Council and shall estimate and secure its finances through the Ministry of Finance.

The Ministry of Defense shall work under the High Council of Defense and obtain its finances from the Ministry of Finance. As regards foreign policies, a High Council of Foreign Policies shall be set up to oversee the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

16. Formation of the High Council of Foreign Policies: By virtue of Principles 152, 143, 110 and 113 and by considering the nature of the work of the said council, it is suggested that its membership comprise the President, the Prime Minister, a Mojtahed [religious jurisprudent] familiar with international affairs and representing the Velayat-e Faqih [Religious Guardian-Jurisprudent], an expert on international economics, an expert on international politics, and an expert on international defense--each delegated by their respective ministries.

17. The High Council of Religious Direction or the High Council of Islamic Guidance shall be established by inference from the provision of Principle 8 of the Constitution and on the orders of the Leader at the time of the Provisional Government and on the basis of the wish of the majority of the deputies of the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majles) and as required by the perceived nature of such a council. Its composition shall be as follows: 1. a Mojtahed, well informed on all guidance and educational matters, representing the Velayat-e Faqih; 2. a qualified person suggested by the High Judicial Council (Judiciary); 3. a qualified person introduced by the executive branch; 4. a qualified person proposed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Legislature); 5. a qualified person representing the Revolutionary Guards Corps. To implement the provisions of Principle 175 of the Constitution, the Radio and Television, publications and propaganda and the mass media shall be directly supervised by this council. The Ministry of Guidance Affairs and Islamic Propaganda shall be overseen by the High Council of Islamic Guidance, and the Endowment Organization, too, shall be part of the said ministry. It should be further noted that the latter four ministries shall coordinate their budget formulation with the Ministry of Finance and the other ministers while the final decision shall rest with the Islamic Consultative Assembly.

18. The High Economic Council: By virtue of Principles 43 and 44 and with a view to the need to formulate a coordinated general economic policy at the national level and to coordinate the economics of the country with the foreign policy formulations, a High Economic Council must, of necessity, be set up under the supervision of Velayat-e Faqih comprising of the following members: (1) the President of the country; (2) the Prime Minister; (3) the Minister of Commerce; (4) the Minister of Industries and Mines; (5) the Minister of Agriculture; (6) the Minister of Finance; and (7) a Mojtahed specializing in economic affairs and representing the Leader. Bureaus of Economic Experts shall work under the High Economic Council. These bureaus prepare the preliminary plans and the overall policy of the nation's economy on the basis of the data supplied by all the ministries. The bureaus shall also forward to the Prime Ministry and the relevant ministries the projects approved by the High Economic Council.

Regarding the Reconstruction Campaign

At the levels of the district and the country and where there is a shortage of manpower, the Bureaus of Planning and Evaluation at the city region and provincial levels and in the capital shall draw on the forces of the Reconstruction Campaign as far as possible. On the other hand, since the employment identification cards under this new system eliminate the permanent employment arrangements and give priority to temporary employment, and since wages would be rated according to expertise, experience, knowledge, need, merit and efficiency and would be payable on a purchase order basis, all forces shall have a campaign posture and,

God willing, all the employees in government organizations shall, under all circumstances work like campaigners.

National Mobilization

In order to implement the national mobilization project in as complete and expeditious a manner as possible, and in order to create a 20-million strong army, to prepare the basis for the equitable distribution of the public provisions, to establish a strong and integrated information network by the people themselves, and to enable the people to take meaningful and planned part in the supervision of network affairs and in occasional implementation thereof, a separate plan has been prepared. The latter makes for the creation of real People's Councils conforming to the Islamic principles. For its nature, the National Mobilization network shall be under the direct supervision of the executive ranks.

Islamic Guidance and Propaganda

At various administrative levels the elements of Islamic guidance shall be embodied in the planning and coordination offices, while at the lower levels these take executive form for guiding the people to grasp the Islamic culture and the political, social, economic and ideological issues prevalent in the world and in the community of nations. They shall have the responsibility of the mass communication at their own levels.

This plan provides for national inspection of satisfactory performance of affairs down to the district level.

Executive Deputy

It is the duty of this government authority to assist the Prime Minister in implementing the projects and programs approved by the Council of Ministers and transmitted to the ministries concerned. Other deputies shall assist the Prime Minister in handling and expediting the various projects and programs at a ministerial level. It is noted that the planning and controlling of the maritime communications (shipping, navigation, etc.) shall be the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The religious assertive and prohibitive guidance to be given the government by the people shall be channeled through the representatives of the councils at various levels. Administrative departments, too, shall guide their operational lines in keeping with their organizational ranks.

Organizational Chart

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 6 Sep 80 p 8

[Text] New Administrative System of the Islamic Republic of Iran



Key:

1. Velayat-e Faqih [Religious Guardian-Jurisprudent] (Principles 60, 110)
2. Presidency (Principle 113)
3. High Economic Council (Principles 13, 44)
4. High Council of Religious Exhortation and Admonition (Amr be Ma'roof va Nahy az Monkar)--Islamic Publications and Propaganda (Principle 8)
5. Islamic Consultative Assembly (Principles 62, 63, 91)
6. High Judicial Council of the State (Principles 157, 158)
7. High Council of State Defense (Principle 110)
8. High Council of Foreign Policy of the Country (Principles 152, 143)
9. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Principle 633)
10. Chief of the Joint Staff of Army (Principle 143)
11. Commander of the Guards Corps (Principle 150)
12. State General Inspectorate (Principle 174)
13. State Supreme Court—Judicial Courts (Principles 159, 161)
14. Ministry of Defense (Principle 110)
15. Ministry of Justice (Principle 160)
16. The Prime Minister's Office (Principles 133, 124)
17. State Accounts Department (Principle 55)
18. Council of Radio-TV (Principle 175)
19. Ministry of Islamic Guidance and Propaganda (Principle 133)
20. Affairs of Economic Experts
21. High Council of Provinces (Principles 101, 102)
22. Prime Minister's Bureau
23. Deputy Prime Minister for Development
24. Deputy Prime Minister for Production and Distribution
25. Deputy Prime Minister for Executive Affairs
26. Deputy Prime Minister for Health and Education
27. Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs
28. Ministry of Foreign Trade
29. Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance
30. Ministry of Health and Welfare
31. Ministry of Education

32A. Judicial Courts

32B. Branch of State General Inspectorate

33. Ministry of Interior
34. Governorate General
35. Ministry of Domestic Trade
36. Ministry of Industries and Mines
37. Ministry of Agriculture
38. Ministry of Labor and Employment Affairs
39. Ministry of Communications and Construction
40. Ministry of Water Resources and Water Distribution Facilities
41. Ministry of Energy
42. Ministry of Post, Telegraph and Telephone
43. Guidance Affairs and Islamic Propaganda
44. Provincial Accounts Department
45. Provincial Council (Principle 100)


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46. Governorate General Secretariat
47. Deputy Governor General for Planning and Programming of Development Affairs
48. Deputy Governor General for Planning and Programming of Production and Distribution Affairs
49. Deputy Governor General for Planning and Programming of Education and Health
50. Deputy Governor General for Political, Disciplinary and Mobilization Affairs
51. Deputy Governor General for Financial and Administrative Affairs
52. Planning and Programming Affairs Office for Communications
53. Planning and Programming Office for Urban Development, Roads and Construction
54. Planning and Programming Office for Water Resources, Sewerage and Water Facilities
55. Planning and Programming Office for Electricity Distribution
56. Planning and Programming Office for Agriculture, Irrigation and Pest Control
57. Planning and Programming Office for Industry and Mining
58. Planning and Programming Office for Livestock and Poultry Breeding
59. Planning and Programming Office for Production, Distribution and Consumption Cooperatives
60. Planning and Programming Office for Sanitation, Treatment and Preventive Medicine
61. Planning and Programming Office for Education and Physical Training
62. Police Department
63. Popular Cooperation and Mobilization of Political Affairs
64. Gendarmerie
65. Finances and Economic Affairs
66. Procurement and Supplies
67. Accounts
68. Administrative and Employment Affairs
69. Banking
70. Guidance Affairs and Islamic Propaganda
71. Regional Council (Principle 100)
72. Governor's Office
73. a) Judicial Courts; b) Branch of State Inspectorate-General
74. Secretariat of the Governor's Office
75. Deputy Governor for Development, Communication and Construction, Urban Development, Public Works and Electricity
76. Deputy Governor for Agricultural and Industrial Production and Cooperative Companies
77. Deputy Governor for Education, Health and Physical Training
78. Deputy Governor for Political, Social and Disciplinary Affairs
79. Deputy Governor for Financial and Administrative Affairs
80. Communications Planning
81. Road, Construction and Urban Development Planning
82. Water and Sewerage Facilities Planning
83. Electricity Distribution Planning
84. Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation Planning
85. Industry and Mining Planning
86. Production, Distribution and Consumption Cooperatives Planning
87. Education and Physical Training Planning
88. Manpower and Convened Higher Education Planning

89. Sanitation, Treatment and Preventive Medicine Planning
90. Political and Social Affairs, Popular Cooperation and Mobilization
91. Gendarmerie
92. Police
93. Administrative, Employment and Recruitment Affairs
94. Finances and Economic Affairs
95. Accounting and Banking
96. Coordination and Supplies
97. Guidance Affairs and Islamic Propaganda
98. District Council
99. District Governor Office
100. a) Judicial Court; b) Branch of the State Inspectorate-General



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موضوع	نمودار تشکیلاتی نظام حکومت جمهوری اسلامی ایران
کننده	اتحادیه انجمنهای اسلامی کارکنان دولت
تهیه کننده	دفتر فنی

101. Executive Deputy of District Governor
102. Popular Participation in Administrative, Financial, Disciplinary and Political Affairs
103. Communications and Construction
104. Services at District Level
105. Guidance Affairs and Islamic Propaganda
106. Rural Council (Principle 100)
107. Rural Administration
108. Rural Administration Council
109. Deputy, Executive and Reconstruction Campaign
110. Financial, Administrative and Mobilization Supervisor
111. Handicrafts and Agricultural Services: 1. Affairs of Handicrafts and Agriculture Promotion
112. Agricultural and Livestock Development Services: 1. Agricultural Extension, Irrigation and Pest Control Promotion; 2. Livestock Development and Veterinary Medicine Promotion
113. Trade and Insurance Services: 1. Banking and Insurance Affairs of Production and Distribution Cooperatives, Warehouses, Cold Storages, Heating Fuel Distribution and Tax Collection
114. Security Services: 1. Head of the Gendarmerie Post; 2. Personnel of the Gendarmerie Post
115. Educational Services: 1. Head of Education Department; 2. Responsible Officials of Educational Institutions; 3. Educational Cadre; 4. Support Personnel
116. Sanitation, Treatment and Preventive Medicine Services: 1. General Practitioner; 2. Dental Technician; 3. Medic and Injection Service; 4. Rural midwife; 5. Pharmacies; 6. Office Attendant
117. Reparation and Technical Services: 1. Repair Workshop Attendant; 2. Technical Workers
118. Water, Power and Water Facilities Services: 1. Power Transmission Grid and Rural Meter-reading and Registration; 2. Water Distribution Facilities
119. Telecommunications Services: Post and Telecommunications Affairs
120. Subject: Organizational Chart of the Administrative System of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Prepared by: Union of the Islamic Societies of Government Employees.
Drawn by: The Technical Office
Member of Central Council of Union of the Societies of Government Employees

Signed = NAJAFI

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CSO: 4906

FATE OF NAPOLEON'S, HITLER'S ARMIES PREDICTED FOR IRAQIS

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 26 Oct 80 pp 1,2

[Text] Modern history records that invading armies, without exception, have been defeated or destroyed. Examples are Napoleon's and Hitler's armies, both of which were annihilated on Russian soil.

"Khuninshahr" ["The City of Blood," formerly Khorramshahr] still continues to put up resistance. All newspaper headlines read: "Khuninshahr Puts Up Heroic Resistance In The Face Of An All-Out Attack By Infidels" and "Despite Complete Occupation, Khuninshahr Continues To Put Up Fierce Resistance." Many people wonder: Will that city which has put up such a heroic and historic resistance in every of its corners fall to the Iraqis ? Will other border cities fall in the hands of the enemy ? Will the plan for the so-called 'Free Khuzestan and Arabestan' be announced ?! And finally, in view of all these losses, will Iranians be defeated? The answer to all these questions is a categoric "no!" Because of history's record: Islam has always triumphed over satanic forces. There is plenty of talk purporting that border towns may fall in Iraqi hands. In this article we can comment only succinctly on a few aspects of that eventuality.

1. Iran's border towns now exhibit Karbala-like characteristics and recall the wars waged by Imams. That is why it is not the sheer numbers of the combatants involved, but their moral values which is the determining factor in the Iran-Iraq conflict: despite the masses of Iraqi troops, with all their materiel, who have been dragged to the battlefield forcibly, through intimidation, or in a state of intoxication, Iranian war-torn towns have been putting up a fierce resistance and are still entrenched in strongholds ~~under~~ the heaviest blows from gunfire and bomb explosions. This fact confirms the Koranic verse: "With God's intervention, small groups can triumph over huge armies."

This triumph is not due to Iran's material facilities and military forces, although, in terms of magnitude, they are superior to their Iraqi counterparts. Rather it is due to the impact of values created in the hearts and minds of Iranian troops and masses. As during the wars waged by Imams "the Imams, accompanied with armies, have risen to attack the infidels and have never shown any weakness, apathy, or wavering despite considerable losses and suffering which was their lot in their divine mission. And God likes those who gallantly and stolidly wage war against the forces of evil."

2. Furthermore, we must generally bear in mind that the current war is not a very classic one: the coexistence of revolutionary, guerrilla, and partisan tactics has prevented the Iraqi troops from unhindered movements and a classic military operation. Indeed, the current war consists of various fronts, each of which is governed by particular conditions. When we hear news about the border areas, we must make it a point to find out to what specific front and particular locality that news pertain.

Consequently we can rely completely and definitively neither on Iraqi attacks nor on their "positional advances:" for various reasons, Iraqi troops have often been able to initially invade a town or an area, only to fall on their knees and flee in the face of heroic assaults by the soldiers of Islam. Under such circumstances, how can one talk of the "fall" of Khuninshahr and of the adjoining area ? In general how can one consider Iraqi troops as victorious simply because they have reached and invaded a locale ?

3. Let us suppose that Iraq's scattered forces have finally managed to invade a town or an area. There can be only three possibilities:
(a) The Iraqis will continue to attack;
(b) the Iraqis will remain in their positions;
(c) the Iraqis will retreat.

Possibility (a).- This is not feasible:first of all Iraq wishes only to occupy certain strategic border points so that it can rely on them to establish a base allegedly aimed at weakening, dismembering, and toppling Iran's central government, thus ridding America of its big "pain in the neck." But apart from that, Iraq is simply incapable of continuing the war. Iraq has not yet occupied even the few points that are closest to its borders. Moreover, it has lost thousands of lives and billions of dinars in damages. Its military forces, economic facilities, and vital supply routes have been destroyed. If Iraq continues the war, it will destroy its own army and bring about the downfall of the Baath government. By now the Iraqi army if fully aware that a virtual hell awaits it in every inch of the Iranian soil; the Iraqi army is equally well aware that its "overlord," the U.S. army, is quite mistaken in indulging in fancies such as visions of Iraqis advancing towards Tehran and other cities !

Obviously, with the continuation of the war, the fatigue, pressures, and losses of the Iraqi army (which is not enthralled with war) are bound to mount and, as a result, the Iraqi army will become war-weary and "war-wise." It is well known that two of history's most powerful armies, those of Napoleon and Hitler, have been decimated and annihilated in a like fashion on Russian soil. Furthermore, there is a considerable amount of awareness and awakening among Iraqi masses, which is snow-balling and spreading. And, as Imam Khomeini has said: "Most likely, a revolution similar to that of Iran will soon sweep Iraq."

Possibility (b).- One must bear in mind the fact that to hold on to an invaded area is considerably more difficult than to attack and simply invade it. History recounts that conditions prevailing at the time when an army attacks and invades an area are never the same as those when that army decides to stay on and keeps occupying it. Examples are: the British army during the colonial era; America's

imperialist army in Vietnam; and the Soviet army in Afghanistan (subsequently the official Afghan representative at the United Nations denounced the Soviet invasion).

If the Iraqis are able to temporarily hold on to a locale, they shall see -- as they have no doubt already seen -- that its continued occupation entails considerably greater losses than those they have so far sacrificed for imperialism's sake ! The Iraqis may invade cities all right, but then the Iranians will surround those cities and clobber the Iraqis on land and by air, making it impossible for the Iraqis to defend themselves. Thus, Iranians will transform every war-torn city into a graveyard of thousands of American mercenaries, and will annihilate the enemy. Such a sucess will certainly rank as the most novel and extraordinary military operation in recent modern history.

Possibility (c).- If the Iraqis are defeated, there will be no more raison d'etre for Iraq's Baath government. Unfortunately Saddam's insane regime continues to be an American lackey and is bent on fighting on until the whole Iraqi army is decimated. We say "unfortunately" because we do not wish to see the Iraqi soldiers killed. However, under the circumstances, we shall be forced to crush the Iraqi troops and their leaders.

In any event, Iranians shall be victorious: in addition to achieving martyrdom, we shall triumph because our ideals and principles are noble, lofty, and durable. In other words, "all our actions are motivated by our creed." As for the Iraqis, whether they invade an area or not, they are doomed to defeat because either Islam's heroes will liberate that area through repeated attacks or, like Napoleon's or Hitler's troops, the Iraqis will be buried in the snows of Western Iran, will suffer considerable losses and an ignominious defeat, and will be forced to retreat. And the Iraqi people will topple the Baath clique and stop the war.

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CSO: 4906

BRIEFS

BLACKOUT REPORTED--All esteemed shopkeepers and tradesmen are hereby informed that effective today the blackout regulations will be enforced from 1800. Those wishing to continue work in their shops and stores must completely block any light emanating from their places of work and business. Violators will be dealt with according to legal provisions. [Signed] Tabriz Security Headquarters] [Text] [GF011613 Tabriz Domestic Service in Azeri 1527 GMT 1 Nov 80]

CSO: 4901

LISBON PAPER REPRINTS QADHDHAFI 2 OCTOBER INTERVIEW

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 5 Nov 80 (International Supplement) pp 1-5

[Apparent text of interview with Libyan Chief of State Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi by EPOCA journalists Francesco Frigieri and Mauro Galligani on 2 October 1980 in Tripoli: "World War III Is Imminent"]

[Excerpt] Question: Never, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, have the Jamahiriyah and its leader been so much at the center of international life as now. Politically, the plan for a merger with Syria is at an advanced stage; economically, there is the often threatened and always unilateral forecast of an increase in the price of oil; in military activity, there is the idea, as reported by much of the Western press, of an attack against U.S. military bases, wherever they are in the world.

Do you not believe, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi, that your importance is getting out of proportion to your country's real prospects and influence?

Al-Qadhdhafi: My role is closely in keeping with my country's needs and the contribution which it wishes to make to the plan for unity of the Arab nation. The fact is that outside Arab unity the Jamahiriyah is like a fish out of water--that is, outside its natural element.

Question: Let us discuss the merger with Syria, Colonel al-Qadhdhafi. How do you believe that the plan can succeed, since it is a matter of two countries which are over 1,000 km apart and which have been living for many years with two different economies, since Syria in an almost constant state of war, and since the Jamahiriyah is perhaps in the year 2000 of its pastoral civilization but is in year dot of the technological era?

Al-Qadhdhafi: These arguments seem to be idle and unconstructive, typical of the doctrine and interests of colonialism and traditional weapons against the plan for Arab unity. You are Italian, aren't you? Well then, if Italy had flinched at such obstacles during all the wars of independence of the last century, you would not have achieved unity today. And if it is true that history repeats itself, why should we act differently?

Israel Thinks Only of Attacking

Question: You have said, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi, that if the struggle against Israel is not resumed as quickly as possible by the entire Arab nation, you would be prepared to join the Fedayeen.

Is that so? And do you believe, bearing in mind the policy of blocs, with the United States and Russia dividing up the world between them, that a widespread resumption of the war in the Middle East could be possible without interference?

Al-Qadhdhafi: As far as the first part of the question is concerned, I did not say that: I said, translating literally, that if the Libyan people did not accept unity with Syria, I would be determined to join the Fedayeen personally, to make my personal contribution to the struggle for the liberation of Palestine.

As far as the second part of the question is concerned I believe that, when a new war between Arabs and Israelis breaks out, if the superpowers' policy decides to interfere, this war will be transformed into a world conflict, and the blame will rest entirely with the superpowers. Take note: Palestine's protracted occupation by the Israelis is the outcome of the interference of the two blocs--of the United States and the USSR, together with France and Britain--which in order to maintain a hybrid status quo throughout the Middle East region guarantee the State of Israel objective protection and encourage its aggressive and colonialist policy: it will therefore be with them that the responsibility for a third world conflict will rest.

U.S. and USSR Squadrons Out of the Mediterranean

Question: I do not believe at all that the USSR is currently protecting Israel but, since you have always maintained that the Mediterranean is a lake of peace, I will ask you: In your opinion, the U.S. squadrons should be expelled from our seas, but should those of the USSR also be expelled?

Al-Qadhdhafi: Out with both of them. However, I would like to emphasize that, if World War III breaks out, we Arabs will not be responsible.

Question: I hope that no war will break out, but especially that no world war will break out, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi.

Al-Qadhdhafi: Yet, in my opinion, it is inevitable.

Question: Inevitable, Colonel?

Al-Qadhdhafi: If Palestine continues to be occupied by the Israelis, if the Arabs act to liberate it and if the United States intervenes to prevent this, how can a war fail to occur?

Question: The liberation of Palestine does not necessarily imply the kindling of a world conflagration, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi. That could only happen if the USSR intervenes militarily against the United States--something which in principle seems highly unlikely.

Al-Qadhdhafi: If the United States intervenes, Russia must necessarily intervene.

Question: Western thinking in this respect is rather more elastic, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi....

Al-Qadhdhafi: Western thinking is seeking to drown its own fears in indifference. But I say: Pay attention, since the occupation of Palestine and consequent U.S. behavior constitute the backcloth for the outbreak of a colonial war....

Question: For the probable, hypothetical outbreak of World War III....

Al-Qadhdhafi: No. World War III will certainly break out.

Question: And when do you forecast that this war will happen, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi?

Al-Qadhdhafi: When the Arab peoples are militarily ready.

Question: Theoretically, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi, they are ready now, because the Arabs' superiority in numbers and arms over Israel is an obvious fact.

Al-Qadhdhafi: This means that the tragedy is near....

Question: Is the war near, Colonel?

Al-Qadhdhafi: Of course, or do you believe that the Arabs do not have the right to liberate Palestine?

Question: That is not the point, Colonel: what I wish to point out carefully is that at this moment you, in your capacity as Libyan head of state, are maintaining to a Western journalist the inevitability of a very imminent world conflict resulting from a Middle East crisis which is already virtually under way in many respects. Since this statement by you will resound in the four corners of the world, I would like to repeat to you once more, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi: Are there not various nuances in your way of expressing yourself which I am perhaps unable to perceive and which make your reasoning less dramatic and more feasible?

Al-Qadhdhafi: The meaning which you have perceived is the correct one: the Arabs must liberate their land and war is inevitable. Only if the United States changed its policy and if the Palestinian people saw their demands satisfied could the conflict not break out. But that is impossible....

Question: Why impossible?

Do you not foresee a peaceful solution to the Palestinian problem, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi?

Al-Qadhdhafi: Yes, but only if the Palestinians could return to their homeland....

Question: I desire this, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi, just as I desire that World War III should never happen.

Al-Qadhdhafi: All of us desire these things, dear friend. But desiring is one thing and reality is another. I repeat to you, once more, that the responsibility for the conflict will rest entirely with the Americans and Israelis.

Malta? Italy Does Not Guarantee Its Neutrality

Question: Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi, you are head of state and leader of a people, you have a family and you have affections: so you know that this dramatic analysis of yours which forecasts times of war will provoke anxiety and fear throughout the world. Are you certain, I repeat to you once more, that you do not wish to alter anything of what you have maintained so far?

Al-Qadhdhafi: The essence of what I said is correct. Certainly our concern for international peace is great, and our readiness to do everything possible to preserve it is also great. But we are unable to change U.S. policy and to end Israeli occupation of Palestine peacefully. Therefore....

Question: Relations between the Jamahiriyah and Italy, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi, are not at present the happiest. The Italian press and the Western and European press in general frequently accuse your country, and you personally, of decisions connected with their respective national sovereignties. In order to finally end all doubts, I ask you to answer three questions: Is it true that Italian and European terrorists of rightwing or leftwing ideological inclinations have stayed in Libyan training camps? Is it true that you personally intervened in the revolutionary committees to make them stop executing Libyan citizens who had taken refuge abroad and had not obeyed your orders to return to their country? Is it true, with respect to the Saipem II [Italian oil platform] incident, that your latest decision is to seek in the first place to drill on the Medina banks, even despite the danger of a direct military confrontation between Libya and Malta and Italy, which is a guarantor of the latter's neutrality.

Al-Qadhdhafi: This matter of terrorism and of the training camps for terrorists on Libyan territory has now become an obsessive refrain, unsupported by a single shred of evidence. I will put a proposal to you: If there is anybody in your country who has information that these camps exist in our country, I authorize him to come here, show us where they are and I myself will accompany him there. And if it is true that there are terrorists where he says, I authorize him to call me a liar and [words illegible], you will have the biggest scoop of the year. However, I must tell you that those who at home maintain that there are [words illegible] Libya [words illegible], especially when they assert that I personally have been to visit them. It is a matter, in fact, of the camp in the forest of [words illegible]. I attended an international meeting of boy scouts, whom I greeted. [words illegible] seriously, I do not mind telling you that it is our forces which need military training and that we sent our young men to the countries which supply us with arms--France, Britain, Russia and also Italy--to learn how to handle them, and then they teach others.

If this is our objective situation, how do you suppose that we can find the time, the means and the desire to train rightwing and leftwing terrorists? If we had these means, do you not believe that logically our foremost

concern would be to train our own people? Moreover, by the same token, we cannot train your red and black-and-red terrorists because their ideology is diametrically opposed to ours. With respect to this matter, I wish to assure you once and for all, we are extremely strict. As far the revolutionary committees are concerned, the problem of the executions of the refugees abroad is true: I personally intervened with the committees to make them stop these actions.

As far as the Saipem II issue is concerned, I wish it to be known, firmly and officially, that we do not in fact wish to be the first to drill at Medina--on the contrary. We wish to wait until the international courts' verdict is known. However, allow me to make a polemical observation: It is not true that Italy is a guarantor of Malta's neutrality. In fact it is we who are among the countries which have objectively guaranteed that neutrality....

Question: But were you not recently on the brink of a rift between the Jamahiriyah and the Malta government?

Al-Qadhdhafi: It is you who are saying that... and then allow me to tell you that those who do not possess something cannot promise it to anybody....

Question: What do you mean, Colonel?

Al-Qadhdhafi: That Italy, which is a NATO member and in fact almost a U.S. colony, cannot bestow neutrality on itself and subsequently guarantee Malta's neutrality....

Question: It is clear that you do not have a very favorable opinion of my country, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi....

Al-Qadhdhafi: It is the pure truth; why are you offended? Libya, which is a real member of the nonalined countries and which is truly neutral and nonalined, can speak of neutrality and give Malta real guarantees. Italy, on the other hand, belongs to a military pact and therefore does not have an independent policy. How can it speak of guarantees for another country's neutrality?

Question: The demand for guaranteeing this neutrality stems from Maltese Prime Minister Dom Mintoff's invitation and not Italy's request, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi....

Al-Qadhdhafi: This is political chicanery which enjoys, let me tell you, very little credibility....

Question: Let us turn now to your thinking, Colonel: In the green book, in the Third World theory, you assert that you have identified the Bible of the new era. But the state toward which you are aiming does not spring crystal-clear from your philosophy. What state is the state of utopia, in fact?

Al-Qadhdhafi: What state of utopia? In Libya, the state which springs from the teachings of the green book is currently being practiced....

Question: It is being practiced, yes, but not achieved. The Jamahiriyah, Colonel, is making gigantic strides in its process of transformation, but the goal is still very far away. Do you believe that it is possible to reach it within a reasonable space of time?

Al-Qadhdhafi: It must be clearly understood that in Libya, as the green book advocates, power is in the hands of the people through the congresses and the people's committees; I believe that this is an objective reality. It does not seem to me a distant goal that the regular army, in accordance with the Third World theory, is destined to disappear in order to be replaced by the people themselves. And that homes should belong to those who live in them and that in industries the workers should become bosses and partners and not employees, as state of the masses envisages; it seems to me that this has already been abundantly achieved here in the Jamahiriyah....

Question: It is true, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi; posters with the slogan "partners and no longer employees" appear on all the walls in the country. But who pays for losses when they occur under this partnership system?

Al-Qadhdhafi: The whole of society. Or do you believe that losses must be borne only by the weakest?

Question: In an economy which is undergoing transformation, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi, society cannot pay for the losses if there is no natural endowment....

Al-Qadhdhafi: So you mean that only the poorest should pay for them....

The Entire World Will Soon Be Like the Jamahiriyah

Question: Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi: Let us set aside populism: you can afford the luxury of not being pragmatic, because the oil allows you to undertake plans for various reforms....

Al-Qadhdhafi: On the contrary, the poorer the country, the greater its need to implement this theory....

Question: But it would be unable to pay for the losses and would rapidly go bankrupt....

Al-Qadhdhafi: What I am saying is that in your present society, it is the weakest--the workers and the consumers--who pay for the losses, while capitalist industry always increases its incentives. All this should be eliminated and the losses, if they occur, should be paid for by the entire community. For instance, the Jamahiriyah we have extipated the trickery represented by the fragmentary distribution network: we have eliminated the small, medium and large businesses of every kind and set up large community supermarkets, where the goods pass directly from the producer to the consumer. This eliminates the middleman and hence exploitation. Thus the Third World theory is already being implemented in one of its aspects.

Question: That is possible in the Jamahiriyah, Colonel, but it is more difficult in other countries....

Al-Qadhdhafi: The entire world will soon be a Jamahiriyah

Question: The entire world, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi?

Al-Qadhdhafi: Yes, the entire world.

Question: In your address at the symposium on philosophical thought, organized at the teaching faculty of the Al-Fatih University in Tripoli (13-20 September—ed), you harshly criticized positivism, linking pragmatism, existentialism and Marxism together. Identifying pragmatism as the philosophy of U.S. capitalism, existentialism as the Western doctrine and Marxism as the dogma of the East-bloc countries, you resolved the problem "tout court," by attributing the same trends in contemporary thought to currents which in fact have very few points of contact. Do you not believe that your address reveals, above all, an intensification of your personal stance of a religious nature?

Al-Qadhdhafi: In speaking at the Al-Fatih symposium, I did not proceed or act in accordance with religious inclinations but in a strictly scientific manner. I did not speak as an Arab and Muslim but objectively, dispensing with pragmatism, existentialism and Marxism. Moreover, it is clear that the traditional doctrines have never resolved mankind's problem: thus we find ourselves today at the beginning of the work confronting us to perform this task, since pragmatism, Marxism and existentialism have failed resoundingly as philosophical currents. It is, therefore, necessary to seek a new doctrine, and this doctrine can only be that stemming from the green book....

Question: Let us now talk about Islam: Are you convinced that Christians and Jews are an integral part of Islam? Does not all this seem to you a little too much? You have encouraged the translation of the Koran into many languages, but you have not been spared criticisms in this respect. Do you deem them justified?

Al-Qadhdhafi: From the philosophical viewpoint, all believers are Muslims, even the Christians and also the Jews since, from the viewpoint of God, they could all be Muslims since they believe in God. But if they can all be regarded as Muslims, each is free to follow his prophet, and so there are those who follow Moses, there are those who follow Jesus, and so forth....

Question: There is only one God?

Al-Qadhdhafi: Exactly, and the Koran does not oppose this interpretation but generously accommodates the deeds of these prophets in its pages. In fact Muhammad's followers recognize Jesus and Moses, just as they recognize Muhammad. If they did not recognize them, their religion would be impoverished. For its part, Christianity, with very little charity, consigns Muhammad to the depths of hell.

As far as the translation of the Koran is concerned, this has proved to be a very important factor, because Christians and Jews have had the opportunity to become acquainted with it, and through it to understand their religions

better. Why? Because in the Bible, which is a popular romance more than a book of God, in addition to true stories there are also incredible lies: thus I personally learned about Moses, Jesus and Mary through the Koran and thus, like myself, Christians and Jews have had the opportunity to learn the real truth through the Koran, translated into various languages. The Koran is the word of God, whereas the other holy books are words of men and not of God; therefore, here lies the deepest difference, here lies the importance of having translated the Koran.

Women Are Not Regarded as Human Beings

Question: Let us return to the green book, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi: You maintain that democracy is joint government by all equal men and that only when the masses attain power will they become strong and really govern. But are you convinced that it is, in fact, the people who govern in the Jamahiriyah? Or rather, are you not, Colonal Al-Qadhdhafi, the only man who can give orders in the entire country?

Al-Qadhdhafi: May I laugh? Do you permit me to laugh without offending you? In fact it is true that I manipulate the facts to lead the people: my presence in the Jamahiriyah is not detrimental but beneficial. I am seeking to increase the people's power and am striving to this end and not the reverse.

Question: The green book speaks of feminism and related problems: can you explain them to Western women?

Al-Qadhdhafi: I believe that half the world, which is represented by women, is living in a state of complete subjection: I assert that women are slaves throughout the world. The East, where women are most misused, has its counterpart in the West where domestic practices stifle women's innermost nature: in practice, the state of slavery is the same. I believe that in the West, women can gain no rights unless they become men and abandon their own selves entirely, and that is an injustice which demands revenge. In the East, moreover, women are often not even treated as human beings but like any other kind of chattel. This is not even an injustice but a crime which is made light of. Therefore, the world must experience a real feminist revolution which will have the success which it rightly deserves, so that women will be respected without being forced to beoome men or being treated like a chattel.

Question: I think that, as far as women are concerned, your charisma will henceforth be unassailable, that henceforth you will be the idol of women all over the world. But let us pass on to a problem of concern to all mankind: it is true, colonel, that the Jamahiriyah is preparing to have its own nuclear bomb?

Al-Qadhdhafi: I would like to reply officially to this report through your magazine: the Jamahiriyah has no nuclear bomb and is not about to have one. But I would like to enquire in this connection: why does the world not pay attention to all the nuclear devices that already exist instead of

bothering so much about the Jamahiriyah's hypothetical nuclear bomb? We are worried about all these nuclear devices and all those which the members of the so-called nuclear pool are constructing day after day: man's very existence is imperiled by the excessive presence of bombs under the control of a few arrogant countries. So why deceive world public opinion, why draw attention to an unlikely Libyan nuclear bomb instead of drawing attention to the American, Russian, French, British, Indian and Chinese nuclear bombs already snug in the arsenals; We want to destroy all these bombs which infest the planet and create no more. Having established this principle, what technical capability do we have for manufacturing this bomb?

Question: Well, it appears that you do not lack the capability, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi: a few months ago a specialist magazine published in the United States carried an advertisement in which the Jamahiriyah asked for nuclear technicians for a nuclear complex which was being constructed in the desert.

Al-Qadhdhafi: What complex in the desert? The advertisement probably refers to the engagement of science teachers for the Al-Fatih University in Tripoli. Perhaps the world wants to stop us using nuclear energy for teaching and peaceful purposes?

Question: No, Colonel, only for bellicose purposes....

Al-Qadhdhafi: I am telling you that we need teachers for university faculties and not technicians to stockpile nuclear bombs. As for the rest, it is reactionary propaganda aimed at stifling our technical progress.

Question: I know that you do not like talking about your private life, but to Western public opinion you are too public a man to have the right to a completely private life.

Is it true that you have married four times and have six children? Is it true that you often hop into an old Peugot and drive around Tripoli and Benghazi without an escort, in order to ascertain that everything is going well in the country?

And, if so, do you not get the feeling that in the Jamayiriyah the people are bored, that they pass their spare time just loafing around without the slightest incentive?

Al-Qadhdhafi: Believe me, I don't have four wives....

Question: I am happy for you, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi. You would have at least four problems piling up....

Al-Qadhdhafi: I have only one wife and the problem, as you call it, although only one, tends at times to mount up of its own accord. I have five children, not six. The first is named for my eldest uncle, who was the chief of my tribe, and is called Sa'd, which means fate. The second is Mu'tasim Billah, which means literally one who seeks the protection of God. The name of my little daughter, 'A'ishah, which means life, is the unforgettable name of

my late mother. I have another boy, Sayf al-Islam, whose name means sword of Islam, and the last is called Muhammad, like the prophet, also the name of my old father, whom I love and respect as one of my closest advisers. As for the other things you mentioned, it is true that I drive around Tripoli and Benghazi, as I do around all the other cities in the Jamahiriyah: I know that the security services tear their hair when I manage to elude them, but the outcome of the operation is satisfactory because I can see that all is well in Libya, that the people are truly free to do what they want to do and that they can spend their free time as they wish. My dear friend, there are no repressive laws in the Jamahiriyah....

Question: Perhaps, Colonel, there are no ways of spending free time....

Al-Qadhdhafi: Who put that idea into your head? Perhaps there is a difference between what you want in terms of recreation dynamics and what the Libyan people want. I do not believe that the people are bored, as you say. The Jamahiriyah does not have a government which imposes a certain kind of life: the people are autonomous, they are able to control their lives as suits them best.

Question: Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi, hitherto it has been difficult for the Arab nation to dispute your charismatic leadership: the star of the aged Khomeyni may, however, eclipse your role. Is that possible?

Al-Qadhdhafi: On the contrary, I am happy to find Khomeyni on the world scene. To me Khomeyni is a father, a kind of grandfather: after all, we are of the same origin....

Question: Origin in what sense?

Al-Qadhdhafi: From the same Qabilah, that is, from the same tribe. I repeat, I am very happy that Khomeyni exists: I hope that he can go on performing his valuable role for a long time to come.

I Like Garibaldi, the Force Behind the Revolution

Question: Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi, who is the person who has most influenced your political, military and religious life?

Al-Qadhdhafi: There have been many. Those whose historical role I have respected must include Sun Yat-sen, founder and first president of the Chinese Republic in 1911 and the man who forced Emperor Pu-yi to abdicate. I read his biography and was impressed by the clarity of his actions and his thinking and fascinated by the way he managed to destroy a corrupt and ineffectual monarchy through the foundation of the Tong Meng Hui, the United League, based on the three principles of the people.

As for Italy, I made a profound study of Mazzini, Garibaldi and Cavour. Garibaldi was the force behind your revolution, which you call the "Risorgimento" if I am not mistaken. Cavour was the brains, Mazzini the guiding light.

When I was young I learned a lot about Abraham Lincoln, a genius who was able to become a celebrated lawyer without attending a university. If I am not mistaken he found some legal texts in an abandoned attic and read them in the forest, sitting on a tree trunk. During the war of secession he used to send written orders to his commanders. On rereading these texts I confess to thinking many times that, if I had been in the recipients' shoes, I would not have had the courage to carry them out. Another great man in every way was Gandhi, a person whom I admire and appreciate for his calling, which he put into practice; a man who always lived for others. As you can see, I like humility and self-denial sublimited in work.

Question: A little while ago it was reported in the West that your army's 6th Brigade, stationed in Tobruk, had mutinied and violent action had to be taken to restore order. Is it true? If not, are you sure that the people of the Jamahiriyah are all behind their leader, as propaganda would have us believe?

Al-Qadhdhafi: It is not true. Nothing happened in Tobruk. I know that I run the risk of becoming tiresome, but I can see that I have to keep on repeating it. The army does not have a predominant role in the Jamahiriyah's political sphere: in fact it is the people's component which has a weightier role than the military. Having established that, I will say that in Tobruk an NCO and three soldiers were corrupted by the Egyptian secret services. The latter used two Italian economic agents who abused the trust and privileges they had been given by the people of the Jamahiriyah. They were discovered, they tried to escape but were caught. And that's it.

Question: Was it corruption or a plot?

Al-Qadhdhafi: I repeat, it was a provocative act organized by the Cairo secret services. Little was actually achieved, so much so that when we took those whom the West imagined to be conspirators we also captured the code they were using. Nothing unusual there.

Question: The war between Iran and Iraq modifies the plan for unifying the Arab people: who, in your view, is objectively responsible for the conflict? Khomeyni, with his anachronistic intolerance, or Saddam Husayn, with his desire to perform a police function in the Arab Gulf on orders, allegedly at least, from the USSR?

And what efforts have you made to get the warring sides to restore peace?

Al-Qadhdhafi: I think that this fratricidal war--fratricidal because it is being fought between brother Muslims--was stage-managed by the United States and Israel. I do not believe the USSR has interfered in it. On the contrary, I think that the Soviet leaders were taken by surprise when hostilities broke out.

Question: Is that your personal belief?

Al-Qadhdhafi: I think that it is, above all, a political reality rather than a personal belief.

Question: In the West one is led to believe the opposite: that it was the USSR which pushed Iraq into war.

Al-Qadhdhafi: But why should it do that? The Iranian stance is favorable to the USSR in that it is opposed to U.S. policy.

Question: You are forgetting the problems of the 30 million Muslims living in the USSR, who are urging Moscow to help topple the Khomeyni regime and calm the religious ferment in the country....

Al-Qadhdhafi: I do not see how Russia could oppose a revolution which is fighting against colonialism....

Question: Unfortunately, Russia opposes many other things, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi.

Al-Qadhdhafi: I am not Russia's defense lawyer. The information I have is political. Information I am inclined to trust.

As for efforts to resolve the conflict, at the very beginning I sent messages to the parties involved, and at the next Arab countries' foreign ministers conference we will try to resolve the conflict in a way that is most in keeping with the urgency of a solution.

I Have No Income, I Eat, Drink and Dress Myself

Question: Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi, I think you are au fait with the latest Italian political events, the Cossiga government resigned, a major factor in its resignation being its attitude toward the Fiat management which demanded the dismissal of 15,000 workers. Therefore, since the Jamahiriyah has 10 percent and even, some say, 13 percent of the shares in the Turin enterprise, since it is, at any rate, in relative, a major shareholder, what is your view, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi, of the Turin situation?

Al-Qadhdhafi: Certainly what is happening at Fiat is in clear contrast to the principles expressed in my green book: we are on the side of the workers under threat of dismissal; in no way do we agree with the action of the Turin enterprise management, despite being shareholders.

Question: If the Fiat workers decided to occupy the enterprise how would you react, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi?

Al-Qadhdhafi: But we are asking them to occupy the factory....

Question: Would you repeat that, please....

Al-Qadhdhafi: I will emphasize what I was about to say, and I want this message to reach the management: they should occupy the enterprise until what they deem a positive solution is found. The people of the Jamahiriyah give them their moral support and put the weight of their shareholder involvement behind them.

Question: Talking about workers, what do you earn a month?

Al-Qadhdhafi: I try not to have an income: all I need is to eat, drink and dress myself....

Question: But you have a family, and that requires you to have an income....

Al-Qadhdhafi: I will say that the Jamahiriyah permits me to provide for my family's needs.

Question: Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi: You are forever saying that you live for your people, that you belong to your people and that you act only for your people. So you must be well acquainted with the people of the Jamahiriyah and their fundamental needs, earnings and outgoings. Can you tell me, then, what a public bus ticket costs in Tripoli?

Al-Qadhdhafi: ...maybe one piaster..... No, two piasters.

Question: Yes, two piasters, Colonel. But this reply was prompted by one of the interpreters....

Al-Qadhdhafi: Yes it was, I can't deny it. When I said the price was one piaster I was thinking of specific classes, like students, soldiers and old people who can claim a 50-percent discount....

Question: Let us accept that, Colonel. But moving on to a more serious argument, do you not regard as excessive the 15 billion-lira war damage claim made against Germany and Italy? And don't you think that a claim going back 35 years is a bit late?

Al-Qadhdhafi: I don't think it is excessive. As regards its lateness, it is not a remedy with a fixed term or a food product which goes off after a certain time. Even today children in the Jamahiriyah are getting killed as a result of playing with objects abandoned or hidden during the war. Is there a time limit on this? No. Reparation is a right which does not lapse.

Question: Do you contemplate the possibility of making an official trip to Italy in the near future?

Al-Qadhdhafi: I want this trip to happen soon, as soon as we have agreed on the procedure for reparation in connection with war damage.

Question: I do not see how there can be an agreement on the basis of a 15-billion claim.

Al-Qadhdhafi: But the damage has to be compensated for....

Question: If you want recognition in principle I think it would be difficult to deny you. But if it is money, I seriously doubt, Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi, whether the question can be resolved quickly....

Al-Qadhdhafi: It is not, I repeat, so much a matter of money as of reaching an agreement.

Question: I cannot imagine what kind of agreement, Colonel. Maybe, instead of money we could give you, at most, Sicily or Sardinia, or Tuscany if you prefer....

Al-Qadhdhafi: You like to play games. But let's imagine that we went to Italy and did the same as you did here.

Question: Perhaps it would be best then to reach an agreement.

Al-Qadhdhafi: You see, you too think that an agreement is best....

Question: One final question, Colonel: Deep down, are you a happy man?

Al-Qadhdhafi: I am profoundly preoccupied with fate, with the future of the world which is currently full of problems and injustice; of political and economic problems; of violence by the strong against the weak, by the rich against the poor. The current situation is not a happy one, the future is full of unknown quantities, mankind is sitting on a keg of dynamite which could be detonated in an instant. What can you do to be happy? You can be happy at the level of your own family or people, but you cannot be happy in absolute terms. Therefore, I am not.

CSO: 4820

ALGERIA'S PLAN TO ENCIRCLE MOROCCO OUTLINED

Casablanca LIBERATION in French 10-16 Oct 80 p 5

[Text] Recently three Algerian airplanes landed in Mali. A large quantity of arms was off-loaded. These arms are not destined for Mali, but for a POLISARIO base situated about 150 km north of Bamaka. The transport of this war materiel was accomplished with the full knowledge of the Mali authorities. The Malian Government knows of this base. The Algerian Government supplies it with arms, munitions and men recruited in the region. It is very important.

There is an airport right on the Mauritanian-Malian border whose purpose is to receive the Libyan or Algerian planes that are resupplying the POLISARIO with arms. This airport has already been mentioned in the press. Its operations are no longer a secret.

In Mauritania, a natural port was used for launching attacks against fishing boats operating in Moroccan territorial waters, and to receive the kidnapped fishermen before they were sent on to Algeria. This port was bombarded and destroyed by Moroccan air power.

But other sites on the Mauritanian coast continue to be used for the same purpose.

Mauritania is a pool of manpower for the enemies of our territorial integrity. The recruitment campaign which has been held there for several months has significantly changed the physiognomy of the POLISARIO. Presently, at least 60 percent of its active troops come from Mauritania. The latter is crammed with attack bases. The activity of POLISARIO there is increasingly intense, to such a point that it is legitimate to pose the question: Who, really, is in charge in Mauritania? The CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] or POLISARIO?

At Las Palmas, on the Canary Islands, the Algerian camp has connections which enable it to carry out the inspection of trawlers.

On the high seas, there are floating bases that take an active role in these acts of piracy. The Affair of the Cuban boat is one example of this.

And, naturally, the heart of all this is located in southern Algeria. Right where Algeria has set up the bases from which military operations against Morocco are launched.

What can one deduce from all this?

Algeria is sealing Morocco off. After diplomatic isolation, it is trying to encircle Morocco and to weave about it a webbing of military attacks. This strategy is not new, but its continued escalation presents serious threats to the security of our country and the safeguarding of its territorial integrity.

It is true that Morocco's military position has much improved. Especially since the start of the large-scale sweeping operations undertaken by the FAR [Royal Armed Forces] starting in March 1980 in the Ouarkziz. For about 5 months, the enemy was unable to act on the ground. The fighting which resumed in early September shows that the FAR's initiative is thwarting our enemies and obliging them to acknowledge heavy losses. While the foreign forces of aggression are losing morale more and more, and their numbers are dwindling, the bravery and the good morale of the Moroccan forces have suffered no erosion.

On the contrary, the depth and firmness of their love and concern for their country gives them inexhaustible force when they go into battle: the pursuit of the sweeping operations in the northern region of the Saharan provinces has facilitated the destruction of several enemy bases, of stores of supplies, and the cutting of several roads used by armed bands coming from Algeria. The FAR's apparent objective in this region is to shut off the border definitively, and thus to deprive POLISARIO of any chance of infiltration.

However this may not be enough to lead automatically to the final defeat of our enemies. The face of the war will change, but the Algerian camp does not give the impression of wanting to put an end to the war it is making on us. The forces of aggression which it has set up all around Morocco prove it is going to continue a bellicose policy. It continues to field an army composed in large part of Mauritanians in order to make people believe in the Saharan origin of the mercenaries. It is equipping the army with increasingly sophisticated armaments.

One hundred twenty-eight [-mm] Stalin organs that fire 21 rockets simultaneously with a range of up to 28 km, 33-mm rapid fire artillery, "SAM-9" aerial missiles more powerful than the "SAM-7," etc. For the moment, the concentration of fighting in the Oued Draa region is the main act. Destroying the enemy in this region will greatly weaken the bases in Tindouf. But it is essential not to lose sight of the other aspects of the Algerian strategy that rest on the diplomatic and military encirclement of Morocco. It is this encirclement that must be broken.

9516
CSO: 4400

BOURGUIBA CALLS FOR PROMOTION OF AGRICULTURE STOCK-RAISING

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 31 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] The council of ministers held its weekly meeting at the palace of government at the Kasbah yesterday morning, Thursday, 30 October, under the chairmanship of the chief of state.

Following deliberations, Mr Fouad Mebazaa, minister of information and cultural affairs, made the following statement:

"At the request of the president of the republic, the minister of agriculture made a presentation on stock-raising.

"The minister made a special note of measures taken in accordance with the recommendations of the Supreme Champion with respect to the importation of sheep to be raised in the various regions of the country.

"The president of the republic put special emphasis on the importance of stock-raising for the economy of the country and recommended sustained effort toward development of this sector in order to meet our dairy product needs.

"The chief of state also underlined the necessity of promoting sheep-raising and importing new strains able to acclimatize themselves in both northern and southern Tunisia.

"He recalled in this connection the need to develop and improve pasturage in order to bring about both quantitative and qualitative increases in animal production.

"The minister of planning and finance delivered remarks about directions in the next decade of development and the objectives of the Fifth Plan.

"In his presentation, the minister noted especially the increases in the volume of investments and underlined the necessity to continue the effort in order to build savings and accelerate the pace of growth in industry.

"The chief of state highlighted the necessity of reducing consumption and in particular consumption of imported products and of promoting exports in order to free up additional resources for our development effort.

"He also recommended hastening the completion of major job-creating projects in the industrial and agricultural sectors."

We also note that the presidential entourage arrived, at about 1000, at Government Square at the Kasbah, where the chief of state was received by Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister, Habib Bourguiba Jr., special adviser to the president of the republic, and Mongi Kooli, deputy prime minister and director of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party].

In front of the palace of government President Bourguiba saluted the flag while a military band played the national anthem.

After having reviewed an army detachment present in his honor the chief of state shook hands with members of the government and then stopped to respond to the ovation of the citizens who were massed in Government Square to acclaim the Leader of the Nation.

President Bourguiba was accompanied from Carthage Palace to the Palace of Government by Allala Laouiti, head of the special secretariat for the chief of state and by M'heddeb Rouissi, governor-president of the council of the District of Tunis.

9516
CSO: 4400

INTERVIEW WITH ECONOMIC MINISTER

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 23 Oct 80 pp 4,5,7

[Interview with Mr Abdelaziz Lasram, Tunisian minister of national economy, date, place, and interviewer unspecified]

[Text] The next development plan is being prepared. It is hoped this one will see the definitive take-off of our national economy. What will be its main directions?

In an interview with LA PRESSE, Mr Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of the national economy, responds to this question as well as to others related to various aspects of Tunisian economic life.

Mr Lasram, in his answers, stresses the importance that will be given to the development of machine and electrical industries and underlines the need for Tunisia to strengthen cooperation with the countries that have reached a level of economic development comparable to our own, especially the countries of the Maghreb.

Employment, tourism, the API [expansion unknown], the Equalization Fund, decentralization, standaridization of industrial products, energy, and diversification of products and markets are also subjects of great importance which the minister of national economy was kind enough to discuss.

[Question] Tunisia is getting ready to launch itself into a turning point in its development which should lead it to the attainment of a new stage in the fields of industry and tourism. Can you, Mr Minister, at this point in the preparation of the Plan, clarify for us the broad directions and perspectives of industrial development?

[Answer] The new Plan will be oriented basically toward industries, but much more sophisticated industries than those realized during the preceding phases. If, in fact, the first Plan in some fashion served to put to use Tunisia's raw materials, to exploit them to the maximum, or at the very least to improve the exploitation, and the second served to create what could be called the substitution industries--that is, those that were appropriate to create in order to satisfy the needs of the domestic market--the third will rather be oriented toward machine, electrical, chemical, and even agricultural industries. Agriculture being, in our opinion, one of the factors for possible development.

The Plan being prepared will thus be centered on industrial development. We will continue to consolidate the sectors wherein we already have achieved good results: I am thinking in particular of heavy chemistry that we succeeded in developing, and whose technology we have mastered, such as phosphoric acid with all the products and the variations of production and the phosphate derivatives. In this connection, without false modesty we can state that in this field Tunisia is perhaps the only country in the developing world to set and reach the goal of transforming on site on the order of 75 percent of its phosphate. This is an absolutely astounding figure, which proves that our country has acquired the necessary technical mastery. At the beginning, phosphate was sold in its raw state. Then we went to super-simple then to super-triple, then to phosphoric acid all the way to DAP [expansion unknown]. Next we will go on to a certain number of products which will give us a very wide range of Tunisian products that will be flowing in good conditions into the international market. One must also not forget that in the field of fluorine Tunisia has also logged good results.

The tourist industry is also a successful sector which we intend to strengthen. Tourism in fact offers not insignificant development possibilities, which we should exploit, since Tunisia is in a stage which requires the exploitation of all available resources. Nevertheless, we have set ourselves limits, as this sector should not take up more than 4 percent of our PIB [expansion unknown].

But, beyond the consolidation of sectors where we have succeeded, such as tourism and chemical industry, we should also search out new paths, for, given Tunisia's need for jobs and income, we are obliged to produce more in order to be able to meet all our import needs. The production structure is such, in reality, in our country, that we remain dependent on foreign sources for supplies in several products such as milk, wood, coffee, and a certain number of equipment goods indispensable to the smooth progress of the economy.

What can we produce to meet our import requirements?

We think that the machine industry can be one of the fields where Tunisia could care out a development path, this industry being one of the basic, fundamental industries with vast potential for development.

We are thus in the process of examining the possibilities and seeing what there is in our country that could contribute to development of this sector.

We are aware of the fact that this enterprise necessitates technology transfer. Are we in a position to do this by ourselves? I think not. Events have unfortunately shown--as have the many negotiations in the framework of the North-South dialog--that things were not so simple, or so easy. So we think that we should join with countries that have reached a level of development comparable to ours, both in the economic sphere and on the social, with whom we have multiple and unique ties, whether geographic, linguistic, racial, or religious. We must strive for what we call development of relations with these countries, for horizontal inter-industrial exchanges that can be the basis of a start of technology transfer. If for example we put together the technologies of the Moroccans, the Algerians, and the Tunisians, we will not perhaps reach that of the Europeans, but all the same we will have climbed several steps nearer. Up to now each of these countries has followed a different path, but at the present

time there is an awakening going on, and this could be a new force throughout the Arab world. We sense the birth of a political will and of determination by the masses to push for more horizontal cooperation than before, which would first of all give us access to new technologies through inter-industrial exchanges among our countries, and on the other hand would constitute a more solid front when we show up for these or how difficult negotiations with the industrials, and by means of which we try to see that the industry created in Tunisia will not be a simple assembly industry or conditionnement [translation unknown] industry, but real industry.

So, to summarize the main directions we are following: maintenance of development in the fields which performed satisfactorily during the preceding phases, that is to say both the exploitation of necessary resources in all their forms and their maximized elaboration in our country, and the strengthening of the tourist sector by establishing for it rather ambitious targets which however are easily within our grasp, without for all that making it a critically large part of our PIB; and next the search for new industrial callings, particularly in the fields of machine-industry and electrical industry, which can be value-added [enterprises] that do not necessitate raw materials. I can say that, along with agriculture, industry is the master-key by which we will either succeed or fail in our development, and our pay-off will come at the end of the decade just now started.

What is also important, I would say in conclusion, since we are speaking of directions, is that we are counting on the private sector to come up with the largest share of the effort in this domain. We think that the Tunisian state has already made sufficiently great efforts, has done the basics, has invested much in the production sectors, and we think that presently the industrials can fulfill their role much better than they have up to now. They should not devote themselves solely to substitution industries, conditioning, and assembly. They should also try to orient themselves somewhat toward real industry. In order for them to do this, the government presently intends to put at their disposal sufficient means, through the famous development banks that are going to be created and which are certainly going to serve to support and enhance development activity in the field of industry.

Real Industry Is That Which Adds Real Industrial Value

[Question] You just made a distinction between what you called assembly industry and real industry. Could we know what you understand by real industry?

[Answer] Real industry is that which adds real industrial value and not just economic added-value. It is industry when an element properly its own is introduced. There is an example a professor gave me once and which illustrates maximum added-value. This watch weighs 50 or 100 grams and as pure steel is worth about 2 cents. After having been worked, this steel is resold at 300 dinars. This is perhaps the ultimate in technological elaboration. The worst example would be that of a man who gets a drumful of perfume concentrate and empties it into bottles, by mixing it with water. There you have two extremely contrasting images to compare the two kinds of industry. So a real industry should bring technology to bear. To make a piece of machinery is to introduce a whole new art, a whole technology which necessitates a whole structure which becomes definitively established. And

here, I think that what has been done by way of efforts allows us to hope this country will have access to this kind of industry. It is obvious, for example, that the chemical industry, which is not after all so elaborate, is a real industry because the initial product quite as much as the technology used is 100 percent Tunisian, and so is the value-added, almost entirely, with the exception of accessory materials. Textiles is also a not insignificant industrial field. I could cite you many other examples. Thank God Tunisia has them.

If, therefore, we have decided to opt for machine and electrical industries, it is exactly because they are sectors where the value added, the human value, and the part played by human hands and heads is important. Now like others Tunisians do not have many raw materials, so we are obliged to choose industries adapted to the situation of our country.

We consider presently that Tunisians are good workers and good technicians, and that education and vocational training in Tunisia have been well developed. We think, therefore, and I hope with good reason, that the machine and electrical industries are perhaps the only industrial fields where the value of the individual makes the difference, whereas in other fields to succeed one must have a big market, or capital, or cheap materials. These sectors are thus especially well adapted to the Tunisian man who remains our principal capital.

But as I already said, it would be difficult for us to guarantee substantial development in this sector without engaging in industrial exchanges with our neighboring countries. The reciprocal values-added that could be achieved would enable much progress to be made.

This is also the object of our continual negotiations with the European countries. When we receive the big leaders of the French, Italian, or German economy, it is these very problems that we discuss. We tell them that this is a part, a small facet, linked to Tunisia, of the North-South dialog, which we are trying to develop.

Our success or failure will depend therefore on the cooperation we will have been able to establish with our horizontal partners, and in particular with our Arab Brothers, on what we are going to accomplish with the Arab countries with which we have major economic ties, and above all on what the Tunisian as an industrial and as a worker can show by way of technological mastery and capacity to absorb, because in the last analysis, it is not solely the role of the administration to undertake these technological negotiations; it is rather the role of industrial leaders to make direct contacts either with their buyers, or their sellers, their partners or associates. I said elsewhere, in the last UTICA Congress [Tunisian Union for Industry, Trade, and Crafts], the same thing. We are banking a great deal on the activity of Tunisian chiefs of enterprises, small and medium-sized, to develop this aspect which could in the Tunisian context be one of the most visible battlements.

[Question] One doesn't hear much said these days about small and medium-sized enterprises? Is this just coincidence, or in reality have other paths been chosen?

[Answer] I have said a great deal about small and medium-sized enterprises during the last UTICA congress. We want these industries to continue to develop. We want a new wave of young Tunisian industrials not content to limit themselves to being traditional suppliers, not reluctant to go to Algeria or Morocco to go see on site the new possibilities their counterparts can offer in these countries. They should be organized by sector for greater efficiency.

By virtue of their size and because of the human relations that can be developed in them, we consider the small and medium-sized enterprises as very supple and flexible enterprises, and encouragement of them is a part of our design. It is also the goal of JOPRODI [expansion unknown]. We are also considering amending the '74 laws to adapt them better to the needs of our investors.

Jobs Remain a Priority: But Not at Any Price

[Question] Doesn't this option of calling for industries with much more technology risk limiting the possibilities for creation of jobs even while this remains our top priority, and even while the Fifth Plan, though based on job-creating industries to a greater extent, has not reached all its goals in this area?

[Answer] Yes. Jobs remain an undeniable and indisputable priority for us. Nevertheless it is obvious that without technology transfers, jobs will cost so dear that we will not be able to create more of them. If we create jobs in a field where there is practically no value added, the jobs will bring no real enrichment to the country. This is the case of the person who takes two sub-assemblies, assembles them, puts a screw in each side, and delivers the final product to the consumer, deducting his dime for the trouble. This is an economic, not industrial, added-value: he buys the product at reduced price and retails it on the Tunisian market at a better price. Such employment is in the last analysis very costly and it would perhaps be more rewarding to eliminate this job without a counterpart and buy a product of better quality at a better price abroad, taking a profit from the delays in the settlement of the transaction.

Employment, along with decentralization, remains our principal objective. But the transfers of technology and real industry are a necessity if the intention is to create a minimum of added-value in order to be able to engender income. The national income being a total of added-values that are created, we must have as much as possible to be able to continue to export certain products and have industrial exchanges with the outside world. Jobs remain our priority. But not at any price.

The Work of API has Been Beneficial Overall

[Question] While we are on the subject of industry, we would like to know what you think of the API. In the 7 years that the Agency for Investment Promotion [API] has existed, it has contributed to the creation of several industrial projects. Do you think it is time to take somewhat of a fresh look at its orientation, at its policy?

[Answer] The API has rarely been described properly. API is the Tunisian government, the Tunisian administration. Many people seem unaware that API grants no permits at all, that it is the minister of the national economy who does it.

It is an entity which was created for a specific purpose: that of investment promotion. That means that the agency is an entity which receives background information, which gives out guidance, which informs people, which makes certain studies to encourage people to locate in one region or another. Its administrative council, which is composed of representatives of various departments concerned, was conceived in this way out of concern to facilitate the activity of the agency so that the investor, from the moment he is going to invest, finds himself dealing with one sole interlocutor and is not obliged to pay 15, 20, 30 visits to customs, to the tax office, to the directorate of commerce, to the employment office, etc., as was the case in '62, '63, and '64 at the time when I was in the administration. To avoid all these steps and all these procedures, and in order to make investment attractive and not forbidding, the government created the agency, whose role basically is to make conditions adequate to facilitate investment. It is thus totally an amanation of the administration, and as I said it has no power to make decisions, since these decisions are inoperative until signed by the minister of the national economy.

One must say that up to now the agency has played its role well: the number of projects that have been launched during the previous plan is there for testimony. It enabled industrials and also several organizations to make contact much easier with Tunisia and to have a precise understanding of the requirements for locating there. Over the last 7 years it has made itself a valuable partner to Tunisian industrialists, and foreigners have found it a first-class partner. It is only justice to say this: it has often been said to me, and our partners have regularly confirmed this to me. So I can say that the work has been beneficial overall. Ultimately it serves simply to paint a picture of the government's decisions [on development and investment], of its policies and of the policy of the Tunisian legislature which put in place the laws that it applies. Its success or failure is the success or failure of the policy of the government, since it only implements the policy dictated to it. Is it not clear?

The API Is the Extension of the Administration Whose Policy It Implements

[Question] Yes. You probably think that in posing this question I was making an allusion to the fact that certain industrialists, certain investors, whether rightly or wrongly, say that this agency has become somewhat of an impediment, that it sometimes acts as a "brake" or merely an additional layer of red tape, etc. and that finally, the purpose for which it was created is not always attained. It is said that it is a little state within the state. What do you say?

[Answer] But this is not true, to the extent that as I told you permits can only be accorded by the minister. So all the agency can do is present the files to the government. On the other hand, the very composition of its administrative council is the best guarantee that it cannot become a state within the state, since it is itself the state, the administration, in concentrated form. So I would tell these people who say that it has become an additional intermediary that it is the only intermediary, in reality there are not two.

Before there was an infinity of entities that had to be dealt with. Today, when they go to the agency they meet at the same time the ministry of the economy, obviously, since it is its creature, the central bank, the ministries of planning and finance, interior, the sanitation office, the industrial loans agency, etc.

I think that it would not have been possible to obtain so many permits with the old system that I know so well.

The real problem is not the agency, it is the present regulations. Are they, or are they not, well adapted to Tunisia's needs? Have they fulfilled their purpose? The agency is only a tool, which one can modify at will. It is as if you were to say, in the same way, that the import licensing service, or the STEG [Tunisian Gas and Electric Company] are states within the state. It seems possible from the outside, but on thinking it out thoroughly it appears impossible. It is a very cutting judgment if I were to employ the term, for nothing in reality or in the regulations justifies such a statement, to the degree that those responsible each assume their own responsibilities. This is an important point. But it remains no less true that the agency is an extension of the administration, whose policy it implements. Its success is obvious, since it has channeled many investments. The judgments it is possible to make on investments are ultimately judgments which bear much more heavily on Tunisian laws, that is to say law 74 or law 72.

If Law 72 Is To Be Revised, It Will Be to Strengthen Assistance to Exports

[Question] Given recent tendencies, presently visible in the developed countries, toward more protectionism with regard to products, and especially manufactured products, coming from the developing countries, don't you think that the revision of laws such as law 72, basically intended to encourage exports, is a necessity in the present state of affairs, in order to adapt these laws to the new situation?

[Answer] I would tell you that if I were to revise them, it would be to strengthen assistance to exports. Law 72 was often presented not as it is but as a law which brought foreign investors to Tunisia. Now the very first function of this law was that of developing an export mentality in Tunisia. Because we cannot live solely in a market as thin as the Tunisian market. I would like to say that the Tunisian government wants to more exporters among Tunisian industrialists. We should therefore strengthen existing laws in order to encourage people to export.

One should really call Law 72 by its proper name: it is not a law to try to bring foreign investment into Tunisia; as it was conceived in the minds of the Tunisian legislators, it was destined to promote exports.

For the rest, if we analyze the enterprises that benefit from law 72, we will observe that more than 50 percent are solely Tunisian, 25 percent are Tunisian in partnership with foreigners, 25 percent are foreign. This is approximately the order of scale. These are the figures, therefore, they should be thrown into relief once and for all. Often, people do not know that enterprises such as ICM [Maghreb Chemical Industries], SEPA [expansion unknown], or SOGITEX [expansion unknown] of Ksar Helai were brought in within the framework of Law 72. This law is above all an export law.

There, I would say that we did not get results faster than anticipated, even though nonetheless we have arrived today, within the framework of law 72, at the exportation of electronic components to Germany. This is not an insignificant step. It is not exactly everything we could have hoped, but it is already a first step. What we should do through this law, what we can develop, is above all that which I already outlined. These famous horizontal inter-industrial exchanges with countries at the same insustrial level as ourselves, in this case certain countries such as Morocco, Algeria, and other countries in the Middle East, brother countries to whom we are attached by ties of friendship.

Now you can pose the question of whether we have succeeded with Law 72 and foreign investors, in realizing the technology transfers we were seeking.

If Export Markets Are Diversified, Product Diversification Is Automatic

[Question] In its annual report for 1979, the central bank draws attention to the low level of diversification which characterizes both our exportable products and our export markets. What actions is the ministry taking in this field?

[Answer] It is true that we do not have a diversification list identical to the European list, but our exported products are relatively diversified. I already cited the example of phosphates which, barely 10 years ago, were exported crude and which are now exported in 10 or 12 different forms. I can give the example of fluor-spar and textiles, which are exported in different forms. Textiles run the gamut from Indizo design to lingerie, including shirts, jackets, and hosiery. So one must not be too pessimistic and admit that we have a certain amount of diversification, of course nothing in the same league as the Europeans, but which is certainly among the best to be found in countries of the Third World. And it is just here that we arrive at the real problem; the diversification of our exports is in fact tied to the diversification of the countries with whom we work. So long as we continue to export to countries that are much more industrialized than us, and who have a standard of living and an industrial level much higher than ours, it is obvious that we will only be able to export a very few products in which we have an obvious specialty such as phosphates, textiles, oranges, olive oil, the sun (if one can count the sun as an exported product), etc. The day when we finally address ourselves to countries that have an industrial level similar to ours, we will very quickly see appearing an immense and very broad diversification, of products traded. And so, if we are talking about machine and electrical industries it is precisely because they make possible the achievement of total diversification, for it is not possible to find a field where there is more diversification than that. So the problem is basically one of no longer being tied to the markets of the developed countries and of moving out of the framework of a North-South trading relationship in order to try to have a horizontal relationship, with countries on the same level. By thus diversifying export markets, product diversification comes automatically. If in fact we come to make inter-industrial exchanges, if for example we and three or four other countries produce between us all the spare parts for an automobile, then we will have at least 120 to 150 products for trade. If we come to exchange the components manufactured in Tunisia, in Algeria, and in Morocco for the purpose of assembling an automobile, we will very quickly be trading several hundred products.

And this is precisely one of the objectives of this Plan, and a supplemental means of industrialization.

Standardization: A Complex But Necessary Problem

Along the same lines, Mr Minister, there is the question of standardization, which assumes great importance both for the protection of Tunisian consumers and for safeguarding the image of the trademark "Made in Tunisia." Where are we at this point in standardization of Tunisian industrial products?

[Answer] We are convinced of the importance of this question, and we are in process of examining it, and presently commissions are meeting under the aegis of the National Center for Industrial Research.

This is a very complex problem in two respects: that of exportation, and that of internal consumption. We have not even achieved the requisite standardization in wholesale marketing, to cite only one example. We are not even to the point of being able to exhibit our oranges in standardized crates, whereas in Europe, or elsewhere, the apples, fruits, or potatos are classified in three or four categories.

We are attempting to standardize at the level of industrial products, but this is not an easy task.

Standardization remains, in any case, a necessary step.

Decentralization Requires a Minimum of Resources Which We Lacked at Independence

[Question] After years of development, some regions of Tunisia have for all practical purposes remained on the fringes of this great effort at progress which has brought more benefits to the coastal regions. Is a new direction being considered to spread out development activity more generally and to make it profitable to all the regions, especially to the hinterland?

[Answer] It is obvious that during the preceding plans the objective was first of all to establish industrial projects and to create jobs. We must not throw stones at those who preceded us, because it must be recognized that Tunisia was obliged to begin its industrialization from the existing infrastructure. We were obliged, in fact, to construct industries where there were ports, electric current, telephones, roads, schools, etc.

People often have a tendency to believe that Tunisia at its independence found itself in a situation like the one we have today, which is, of course, absolutely wrong. Now thirty seconds' relfection suffices to make on realize that this is a basic notion. Tunisia has invested much time in becoming what it presently is, and much effort has been made to decentralize the universities, endow the country with a road network, make electricity and running water widely available, and build housing, and schools. All these projects throughout the republic are thus the building blocks for a restored equilibrium in the country.

At the start it was necessary to begin with what already existed, and this in a way aggravated the imbalances that existed. But it was inevitable, for one had to choose between remaining in absolute poverty while awaiting the inevitable end, or beginning by beginning.

Now if we had not begun, Tunisia today would be in bankruptcy and would not have the means to cope with anything at all.

Today, Tunisia has become a country which does have a minimum of resources that make possible remedial action. To redirect investment, industry, and the migratory flow of the people requires political determination and a great deal of money. The political will exists, and we have had it for a long time, but one must also have resources.

Nothing is more difficult in reality than to reverse the direction of the flow that has become established from the countryside to the city. It is a universal phenomenon and not one unique to Tunisia. And nothing is more difficult than to lead investment away from the centers of consumption instead of toward them. In some countries the governments grant subsidies that in some cases represent half the investment.

It is thus policy which requires great resources: the installation of industrialized zones which will not be sold for a long time (big investments risk) therefore, remaining unproductive. The introduction of electricity, for example, etc. And one must get everything prepared and then await the arrival of the investor.

As for us, we have chosen another path which, in my opinion, is the right one, up to a certain point, besides which the government and the president of the republic himself, on certain historic occasions at Gabes, Bizerte, etc. have made the decision to make an effort. And this effort has been supplied by the public enterprises which have implemented a policy of decentralization. If you look at Tunisia, you will see that enterprises such as SOTIMACO [expansion unknown] for example are located throughout the republic. This company is established at Jendouba, at Kasserine, at Gabes, and at Medenine right now. If you look at the industrial zone at Gabes or Bizerte, you will conclude that most of the enterprises installed are more or less big-money ventures.

The president even chose, right after independence, to locate the famour cellulose factory at Kasserine. Who, at that time, would have thought it possible to locate a factory at Kasserine?

So the government has made some efforts to promote decentralization. But it is obvious that if we want there to be real movement, we must introduce real incentive measures that will enable people to go to these regions and on this point the government is in the process of studying several general measures to make things go better. People should understand once and for all that the construction of a mega-city like Tunis, or like what Sousse or Sfax are in the process of becoming, can represent a factor for imbalance, even for danger, and that it is in their interest, perhaps not immediately but in the medium term, to leave for other regions.

The government is presently engaged in researching the entire question in the context of integrated development and of real decentralization for the benefit of the regions. It will do all it can to lead the way toward a real balance among the different areas and I think that results will start appearing in a year or two.

The Equalization Fund Is an Instrument of Transfer To Benefit the Economically Weak

[Question] In its annual report, the central bank criticizes the pricing policy followed by the government, especially with regard to equalization costs, and calls for its revision. What do you think about this, Mr Minister, as the number one man responsible for this sensitive sector of the economy?

[Answer] Yes, there again we have a big problem. The equalization fund has been and is still a big topic of discussion. What is it we should equalize? What should not be equalized? It is obvious that the government has a price policy which is the result of a whole series of factors: there is a link between prices and wages, and several particular products are considered to be sensitive elements that should not undergo the normal cost fluctuations. I am thinking especially of sugar, which is consumed in great quantity by the Tunisian populace, of bread and its derivatives, and of olive oil. These are basic elements in the diet of our compatriots. Considering how concerned the government is with the purchasing power of the people, it is led to get involved in prices in the country.

We would naturally prefer not to have to get involved, but as the law of supply and demand often does not get the job done, we cannot just let things happen as they will, like some people would wish. If the conditions of supply and demand, competition, and distribution chains were right, we would not have to intervene, either on the price of products I was just speaking about or on the price of other products that go into what could be called the pantry of the Tunisian housewife. If everyone played his part well: the producer, the intermediary, the transporter, the wholesaler, the retailer, and the consumer, it is obvious that we would not have any need to intervene to keep things from getting out of hand.

In general, we do not like to intervene in market mechanisms where it has been shown everywhere in the world that whenever such intervention is too sweeping, the products disappear. Examples in many countries testify to the truth of this.

We want personal initiative to continue to prevail, because it is the best guarantee of good quality, good service, and the honest play of the laws of supply and demand. But it is also essential that these laws be the same for all. When you go into the street and see two children or two people arguing, and one is very weak while the other is very strong, you arbitrate, you separate them to prevent the stronger from crushing the weaker. In the present case, this is our role.

We are obliged to stop the fighting when we see that, unfortunately, that it is often the weak who lose. These are the consumers, poor consumers, weak consumers because poorly informed: they buy any old thing, at any old price, and don't try to protect themselves. So we are obliged to defend them.

With respect to the equalization fund, we are keeping up our efforts, because we must, because there can be no question of allowing international prices that can affect olive oil, sugar, or cereals to interfere in our economy.

We are a serious country, with a planned economy, with a planned policy, and we cannot allow outside convulsions to whip around our economy with full force. It is a question of sovereignty. Perhaps at the end of a year or a year and a half we will modify the price of a product, because we know it has definitively stabilized. But presently, if the increase in sugar costs had been passed on, it is obvious that the price would have gone up by two or three times, which is unthinkable. And what will one do afterwards, when the price comes down again? It's a problem, isn't it?

Thus the equalization fund is an instrument of transfer, so to say, for the benefit of people with weak purchasing power. It is above all an instrument of control and regulation to maintain a general equilibrium in prices. We cannot allow certain imported products to come in freely without national control to act on our market and upset our overall policy.

This is the first element. The second: we would like to leave everything else in peace. Only when the rules of the game are broken--as was the case during the last Ramadan--do we intervene, and only in such cases will we intervene. That comes pretty close to how I should define our policy. This being so, what we would like to see in the industrial area when the conditions of competition are completely met, is that there should be a system of self-regulation and of relative freedom that allows people to try to do better on prices and quality.

The Problem of the Fund is One of Balance, Not Conception

[Question] The deficit of the Equalization Fund is growing each year, and arrears at the end of 1979 were estimated at 150 million dinars. Don't you think that, if the principle of the Fund is good, its operations should be reviewed?

[Answer] The fund is certainly in deficit, but it is a deficit that was accumulated over several years. This does not mean that the principle is bad. There may have been some decisions made over the years that were not good. Perhaps we should have increased prices by 20 or 15 percent to expunge the deficit. The problem of the fund is one of balance, not of conception. When we reach a certain point, and in the framework of the policy of the government, when the revision of the price of certain products becomes necessary, we will inform the public, we will say: here it is, these prices have changed in such-and-such a way; there is simply no way to keep them at this level any longer; we must raise them because the fund can no longer sustain them.

But the fund accumulated deficits because these revenues were not as large as its outlays, not because the decisions made were bad. It is an accounting problem. The fund is indispensable if we are to avoid finding ourselves starting off with a certain policy in a given year only to have the economy thrown completely up in the air because three months later some crisis over the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal results in the price of a product tripling.

The fund is an indispensable instrument of re-equilibration; in its absense we would have an economy like those of the 16th or 17th Centuries, completely free, where prices are subject to triple and then sink back down.

Equalization expenses exist; in the last analysis they are a reality. But the real equalization does not appear just in the fund; it is elsewhere. There are many hidden equalizations. The Tunisian state or the national community has other means in addition to the fund to promote equalization. It does it through energy, which it delivers cheaply to the country. And this is of a much greater order of magnitude.

Energy: Exploit All Our Potential and Keep an Eye on Consumption

[Question] Regarding energy, are we ready for the future? Isn't it time to arm ourselves to deal with the problems that could confront Tunisia if it were to become an importer of oil?

[Answer] It is obvious that if energy sources stay what they are now, and in general these sources do not change with great rapidity, Tunisia will in a fairly short span of years become an importing country and could find itself confronted with several problems, if the necessary measures were not taken to deal with the situation.

Presently, there are two lines of action: the first, which is the most important, consists in identifying all possibilities for substitutes for energy presently utilized, that is for fuel, all the petroleum derivatives. We are presently undertaking a very big research effort on minerals such as lignite that if proved to be in sufficient quantities could be used in power plants. As an example, East Germany uses lignite to run all its electric power plants, and uses it in chemistry and in all sorts of activities.

We are also contemplating as a possibility the utilization of the natural gas found in Tunisian water or in the earth and which, in light of the increase in oil price, is becoming a particularly promising product at present. Here, we must move forward and accelerate the research. We are really putting our shoulder to the wheel.

Certainly there are other sources, such as solar energy, wind, and uranium, which we have in not insignificant quantities in our phosphoric acid; and we can see the possibility of extracting close to the equivalent of 100 to 110 tons of uranium.

We have therefore a whole series of things to do, and the government has decided, in this field, to accelerate the pace so we can be prepared for the days ahead which, if we move too slowly, will be very difficult.

The second element is consumption. Tunisia's consumption is growing at an annual rate of 16 to 17 percent, which means that consumption is doubling almost every five years. So this is very simple to calculate: in 5 years we will consume twice as much; as presently we consume nearly half of what we produce, in 5 or 6 years, which is practically tomorrow, we will find ourselves importers; and

at that point we will find ourselves on the receiving end of all the crises we presently see due to the increase in oil prices: in other words, they will represent a debit on our trade balance, rather than a credit as at present.

So here we owe it to ourselves to keep an eye on our consumption, which is constantly rising, as even countries much richer than Tunisia, that have great supplies of energy, such as the United States to cite but one example, have succeeded in the last year in lowering their consumption by about 1 percent. How did they do it? By a policy of energy economy, certainly, but above all by a deterrent price policy. There is no deterrent but price.

Often, when one speaks of deterrence by price, people think of the automobile. Now in fact automobiles do not make up the biggest consumption. It is industry. How much fuel do we consume to produce a kilowatt, or a ton of cement, or a ton of steel? How much fuel is needed to go so many kilometers in our cars or trains? So there are ways to economize energy in these various fields. If we do not follow an ad hoc price policy, we will encourage people to waste energy [sic].

Consumption by private motorist is relatively marginal in Tunisia, by comparison with the rest of industrial consumption. So, through a price policy, through raising prices, we must aim first of all at reducing waste and second at making it profitable for investments to be made in the field of substitute energy sources of which I spoke before.

Presently, prices in Tunisia have no relation to world prices. If we were importers of fuel and gas oil, we would be paying three times the price at which we sell them to our compatriots at present. We should think about these problems.

Presently, America and Europe are shivering in winter because heating has been limited to 20 degrees [C.] because of the increase in the price of energy.

So sooner or later we must have a policy in this domain, and we have already begun to lay the foundations. It is obvious that we must not proceed in massive jumps: it could have traumatic or unhealthy effects on the Tunisian economy.

But we should nevertheless proceed, perhaps in homeopathic increments (you will excuse me for using medical terminology), until Tunisians are acclimatized to it. If we don't then on the day we go into deficit on energy products, our economy will be put in a catastrophic situation. One bright day we will find we have to pay 4 or 5 times dearer. Just imagine the indirect effects this could have on industry!

So we must invest very quickly in sectors where we can hope to find substitute sources, including petroleum research. This is also a reason for attracting foreign companies.

Many people ask why are we not doing the research ourselves. It is in our interest to attract the very highest technology, because our sub-stratum is very complex: it is volcanic, very fissured, and very divided-up. The foreign enterprises on whom we are calling to come work in Tunisia have very refined technology that would be very useful for us in trying to find the necessary quantities.

But it is obvious that we can do nothing if we don't have a policy of raising prices as close as possible to world prices. Gradually, to be sure, but ineluctably.

Tourism Is an Important, but not Fundamental, Element of our Economy

[Question] Regarding tourism, there is a controversy: some say it is a fragile sector, but its revenue in hard currency is on the order of 250 million dinars per year. What are the prospects for this sector?

[Answer] As I already said, we must first of all not allow this sector to reach proportions that would make it a fundamental element of the economy. The tourism sector is the second largest factor in our trade balance (if we put it in commercial terms), but it only represents 4.2 percent of Tunisia's PIB.

When you consider that agriculture is 18 percent, and that industry is 26 percent, you bring it back toward its real impact on the country. Tunisia, thank God, is not only a tourist country. Tourism is an important sector in our external resources-jobs balance, but it is not a fundamental element of our economy. Moreover, 1.4 million tourists at 8 or 9 nights per tourist is not all that much. I'll always remember the very good comparison given to me by a Tunisian at a meeting, when he said: there is 1 million of them and 6 million of us, and they consume 5 times as much as we do, so they are eating as much food as we do in the country; only he forgot that the Tunisians spend 360 nights a year in Tunisia, while the tourists spend only a week, and that, whatever the latter consume, one would have to multiply the figure for Tunisians by 365 and that for the foreigners by 8 to get an idea. So tourism is not as decisive a factor as some people think. And I think we have in the country sufficiently strong social structures and a sufficiently well-organized administration, and that Tunisians have attained a sufficiently high level of civilization to be able to sustain some tourist development.

After all we are not Zulus, that the shock of tourism should kill Tunisia. We are not people who have nothing: we have historical social structures, and I think that tourism has not completely denatured us, even if there are certain aspects that may seem negative to us. Tourism has not changed the Tunisian in a fundamental way, either in terms of consumption, or in social terms, or in any other terms. One would have to be looking for an argument to deny this, I think.

We are, however, convinced that this sector should remain at its present proportions, even if it constitutes for us a significant source of supplemental income that helps Tunisia continue to buy things such as equipment goods essential to its economic progress.

Another aspect which is perhaps a technical aspect is more dense development of what we have already acquired. We have made very large investments in infrastructure. What we are considering in terms of the number of beds during the next Plan is aiming more at utilizing money we have already spent rather than making new outlays. We have put in gas mains, electricity, we have built refining stations, roads, zones have been improved. Nevertheless, the network remains too thin at present, and we think it is possible to intensify it and to achieve at a marginal cost a much greater profitability of investment and more intense exploitation of the zones already created.

What then is the future of tourism in our country? People have been predicting catastrophes ever since I was involved in this sector (and I go back a long time in the ministries, as functionary and then as official). But time after time Tunisia has been saved by miracles: once it was the crisis in Spain, another time the crisis in Cyprus, and the sector continues to advance.

There is often a tendency to forget that tourism is the most heavily national sector. When you take a Tunisian hotel, and you see what is there, (apart perhaps from some vertical hotels that use several elevators) you will realize that in its totality it is more than 80 percent made up of Tunisian products.

The furnishings industry, for example, was developed in Tunisia thanks to tourism. The same for artisanry, plumbing, etc. The rebirth of agriculture in the tourist regions has also been achieved thanks to tourism. So many sectors have benefited from the development of tourism.

On the other hand, what other national investment can parlay 6 thousand dinars into nearly 2 thousand dinars per year in [hard] currency? Such is the case with tourism. Neither steelwork, nor agriculture can do as much, not to speak of the collateral effects on sectors such as trade, restaurants... which tourist consumption creates.

[Question] Isn't that precisely the fragility of this sector? Though it only represents a tiny portion of the PIB, it has spill-over effects that, in case of crises, could make themselves felt on all the other sectors?

[Answer] This is quite right. It is a sector that, when it weakens, creates a slump. But one must still take two other elements into account. First of all, there is internal tourism, which is beginning to take a significant place; it represents already more than 6 percent and will certainly grow over the next few years, especially since hoteliers have become aware of its importance. On the other hand, we have diversified our touristic sources. We are presently seeing arrive people from the Middle East, Algeria, etc. Our Arab brothers are beginning to represent a not insignificant potential. Then, we have tremendously diversified our European sources. At the beginning, we were dependent on two nationalities. Today, we have a very wide range.

I think that, in light of all these factors, the tourist sector, just as all the other sectors of the Tunisian economy, remains more or less dependent on external circumstances. Tunisia, as I said, needs money to import products. Now, by virtue of its size, and by virtue of its situation, external elements represent 24 to 25 percent of the total resources at its disposal, that is, Tunisia exports almost a quarter of what it produces. Thus, Tunisia in the last analysis is dependent on its trade with other countries. Touris is one of these elements of dependence, but it is not the only one. We do not consume all our oil, all our vegetable oils, all our phosphate, or all our phosphoric acids. Touris is thus not an isolated case, and its fragility is neither greater nor less than that of the other export sectors. If we were only to create development industries when there was no risk, nothing would have been built in Tunisia. We are thus obliged, we are condemed to take risks in order to develop.

The Maghreb Countries Should Coordinate Their Positions in Negotiating With the EEC

[Question] Relations between Tunisia and the EEC in recent years have been characterized by the train of protectionist measures taken by the countries of the Community. What are the prospects for these relations, especially in wake of the visit of Mr Francois Poncet, the French minister of foreign affairs, to Tunisia?

[Answer] It is really the visit of Mr Davignon, the EEC commissioner for industry, which is the most important factor. With France, we have special bilateral relations which Mr Poncet's visit has reconfirmed, and we are very satisfied. The French have been our mentors ever since we started negotiating with the Community, but it is with Mr Davignon that we have negotiated and exposed our problems.

I think that we have arrived at a profitable basis for compromise which takes account both of their concerns and our interests, that is to say, we have reached agreement to confront concretely our differences in perspective and to avoid to the greatest extent possible creating unexpected shocks in our relationship. This, I think is a very major breakthrough.

We do not intend to impose our policy on Europe, and I think that Europe in turn does not intend to impose its own on us, but we said to Europe: "If we are to continue to maintain the relations we wish to maintain, it is necessary that you take into account our point of view and our concerns. If you agree to this, I think that, being broadminded men, we will arrive at an understanding with out. Give us this much, and we will be on our way."

This is an important thing, but it should not make us rest all our hopes on Europe. As I already said, we should try to cooperate with countries at the same industrial plateau as ourselves, countries that have the same concerns as we. I will cite, as a very visible example, the fraternal countries of Algeria and Morocco. It is obvious that if we coordinate our positions, and this moreover has already been accepted both in Rabat and Algiers during the visits of Mr Mohamed Mzali, we will have improvement. If we ourselves make sufficient efforts to show that we are disposed to help each other, initially, (it is said that well-thought-out charity begins with oneself), I believe that the Europeans will be more broadminded toward us. But if we continue to walk each on his own path, to say: "You gave to them, why won't you give us as much?", and if each tries to pull all of the scant covers to his own side of the bed, since the biggest part of the covers has gone to Spain, or to a certain other country, it is obvious that all three of us will find ourselves naked.

Tunisian-Algerian Cooperation...Harmonizing Efforts and Benefiting From Each Other's Experiences

[Question] Bilateral cooperation between Tunisia and Algeria has just been launched: what, in your opinion, are the sectors where this cooperation could be most concretely strengthened?

[Answer] With Algeria, exactly as with Morocco one might add, we have just had negotiations which have brought to light the very preoccupations I just mentioned. We constate that we have made much progress and we are going to try experiments in cooperation, in coordinating our efforts and in exchanging our respective experiences.

The visit of the Prime Minister to Algeria resulted in important and immediately realizable decisions. Thus, we agreed to exchange visits of delegations at the level of sectoral leaders. Quite recently, a large Tunisian delegation went to Algeria to hold discussions with the sectoral chiefs in the machine and electrical fields, and the results obtained are especially significant and encouraging, and should enable our economic exchanges to reach a new dimension.

So serious things are moving forward. A large joint Tunisian-Algerian commission is also scheduled quite soon.

We are going in the same direction, and with respect to the Maghreb, there only remains to work out a few political problems.

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ECONOMIC MINISTER DISCUSSES ENERGY FUTURE OF COUNTRY

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 29 Oct 80 p 5

[Text] The work of the Franco-Arab colloquium on new energy sources began Sunday at Sousse under the chairmanship of Mr Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of the national economy, who on this occasion delivered a presentation on Tunisia's energy situation.

After having welcomed the participants to this colloquium organized by the Franco-Arab chamber of commerce, Mr Lasram described the concerns of Tunisia, which, according to current predictions, is going to see its external trade in the energy field undergo a reversal of sign toward the negative between the beginning and the end of the Eighties. Also, in the next 10 years energy could become the ocuntry's biggest import, if new resources are not discovered, thus explaining Tunisia's interest in the overall problem of energy and in this colloquium in particular, the minister said, describing in this connection the two sides of the energy balance: resources on the one hand and utilization on the other.

Resources, first of all: the ministers said that Tunisia's oil production (5.5 million tons in 1980) will experience a decline in the future, whereas availability of natural gas will increase starting next year thanks to the quantities of natural gas that is to be set aside for Tunisia from the Algerian gas that will transit through Tunisia on its way to Italy.

"However, we must start looking now at the exploitation of new energy sources in order to reduce the preponderance of hydrocarbons," Mr Lasram said, underlining the fact that Tunisia believes the next step is to use imported coal for production of electricity and to intensify prospecting for lignite. The minister noted that the demand for energy reached 2.5 million tons in 1979, for an increase of 11 percent per year during the course of the last decade.

The minister continued next to speak of actions undertaken by Tunisia in the context of energy economy.

These actions, he explained, are aimed at getting a better understanding of the ultimate destination of the energy consumed under different forms in order to

identify the sectors that consume the most energy, in order to establish an indispensable reference point for making coherent energy decisions.

Regarding new energy sources, the minister posed several questions which, he believes, the experts are needed to answer and which dealt with the necessity to move forward with the exploration and utilization of wind, solar, and other forms of energy.

For his part, Mr Jean Pierre Pruteau, French secretary of state with the minister of industry emphasized the special character of Tunisian-French relations in particular and of French-Arab relations in general, before giving to the audience a summary of the policy of his country on energy matters.

He said that France, which considers the development of new energy sources to be a necessity for the world and for peace, has developed a plan which would enable it by 1980 [sic] to reduce its invulnerability of energy, and to convert to new forms of energy.

France, he said, is trying to support international dialogue and concertation in order to free up prospects for adjusting supply and demand, to define a mechanism, of price adjustment, to develop research on new energy sources and to support coordinated action between the producers and consumers for the benefit of the most disadvantaged countries.

Before that, in opening the colloquium, Michel Habib-Deloncle, president of the Franco-Arab chamber of commerce, and Bourhan Dajani, secretary general of the federation of chambers of commerce, industry and agriculture of Arab countries, both highlighted the importance of the discussion which will be launched on new energy sources, both for the French side and the Arab side.

They also mentioned the emergent problems of the progressive exhaustion of sources of oil, the impact of this phenomenon on the future of humanity, and the necessity for both sides to establish dialogue and cooperation beneficial to both parties.

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KOOLI OPENS COORDINATION COMMITTEES CONFERENCE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 29 Oct 80 p 4

[Text] Mr Mongi Kooli, deputy prime minister and head of the party, who presided yesterday morning at the opening of the conference of the secretary-generals of the coordination committees, made a speech on this occasion in which he analyzed the important role incumbent on the coordination committees, especially at a time when the party is settling down to prepare for the congresses of Destourian cells. He emphasized that all efforts should be bent toward strengthening the activity of the party and intensifying efforts in order for the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] to remain the channel for mobilization of all energies into the battle for development which the party has undertaken to wage with unshakeable determination.

Determination To Surmount Problems and Obstacles

Mr Mongi Kooli stressed that the battle for development is a long-range effort. Achieving victory over under-development depends on the determination of Destourian militants and their resoluteness in surmounting problems and obstacles, because it is true that in order to achieve the objectives of our next development plan we must take into account a whole set of factors both internal and external.

General Mobilization and Constant Vigilance

The head of the party added:

"It is important for us, at the time when we are readying ourselves to launch ourselves into the third decade of development and to draft the broad lines of the Sixth Plan that will be at the heart of the next party congress, to take into consideration the external factors. We must also look far ahead into the future. By looking clearly at our resources and our potential. By doing this, the congress will be prepared to define our broad options in matters of development."

After reviewing the main chapters of the plan that will be clarified further in the course of the party congress next spring, Mr Mongi Kooli noted that the PSD is assuming a fundamental role in meeting the conditions for the success of the development plan, remarking that it is necessary to improve the social climate and to mobilize all useful energies through the Destourian cells.

Gamble on our Abilities

Analyzing the meaning of authentic democracy, the head of the PSD underlined that democracy does not mean weakness and toleration with respect to destructive political currents. By rejecting all election fraud, we offer the same opportunity to every citizen, in the framework of the law.

"Nevertheless, it is our right, or rather, it is our duty, to endorse only those in whom we have confidence, those who are faithful to the orientation of the party and its options.

We are only gambling on those who are intelligent, competent, imbued with shining and respected high moral values," the PSD leader said.

The Party's Interest Above All

Mr Mongi Kooli also exhorted the secretary-generals of the coordination committees to put the party's mission above all personal considerations and to take into account only the party's interests, reaffirming the need to examine all questions with due deliberation, wisdom, and far-seeing vision, and not to hesitate to use the tool of uncertation.

"Taking an oath is a practice to which we must return for joining the party and getting a membership card.

"The card should be issued individually, and we should hardly be fearful of limiting the number of members. The party can accept being a minority if this minority is sincere, faithful, and committed," he said, exhorting the secretary-generals to continue the work of administering the budgets of the cells and districts and to keep ever in mind that the party only asks for what the Supreme Champion and the sacred principles have inculcated in us.

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MZALI URGES DOMESTIC, FOREIGN POLICY IMPROVEMENTS

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 29 Oct 80 p 4

[Text] Mr Mohamed Mzali, secretary general of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party], brought to a close Monday evening at Party House at the Kasbah the conference of secretary-generals of the coordination committees whose deliberations lasted the entire day Monday.

At the start of the meeting, Mr Mongi Kooli, director of the party and deputy prime minister, welcomed the secretary general of the PSD and thanked him, on behalf of all the participants, for having brought together the secretary-generals of the coordination committees who thereby would have the opportunity to profit from his counsel at a time when the party is on the threshold of the third decade of development and while it is preparing to hold its congress which will have to lay out the broad lines of the Sixth Plan.

Mr Mongi Kooli next gave a comprehensive summary of the work of the conference and the conclusions and recommendations that resulted from it.

Mr Mohamed Mzali made a speech on this occasion at the beginning of which he reiterated his congratulations to the secretary-generals of the coordination committees and expressed to them his satisfaction with the results that crowned the latest meetings of the party coordination committees.

He next declared that he was confident about the future of the party: "I have absolutely no doubt," he said, "that the secretary-generals of these coordination committees will remain attached to the moral concepts and the ethos of the party and that they will not spare any efforts to see that the PSD remains the object of the respect and consideration of the popular masses by virtue of their exemplary conduct and the creative and intense activity they manifest."

The prime minister also mentioned the favorable climate which reigns today in the country, about which the secretary-generals of the coordination committees unanimously expressed themselves as being well-pleased. He exhorted the latter to continue with activities to preserve this climate and to consolidate this foundation by preaching the good word in accordance with the directives of the president of the republic.

"This peaceful climate," he said, "constitutes in our eyes the protective shield against anything that could threaten our sovereignty, and at the same time the best guarantee of the ultimate devotion with which we are proposing to pursue the prize of development in the course of the next decade.

"The government of Tunisia, under the aegis of the Supreme Champion, works unceasingly to improve the climate inside the country and to consolidate our network of friendships abroad, and it has made in this field some appreciable gains."

The prime minister reviewed achievements and projects contemplated for the future in this perspective. He was especially pleased at the understanding and cooperation that now characterize relations between Tunisia and its Maghreb neighbors. "Prospects for economic interaction between our countries are extremely encouraging, and the future of industrial complementarity is most promising. Besides, we are in the process of moving firmly toward economic integration on the scale of the Greater Arab Maghreb," he added.

Mr Mohamed Mzali also spoke of efforts that have been made recently toward consolidating Tunisia's position with respect to friendly countries, laying special emphasis on gains made in tightening the bonds of friendship and cooperation between the PSD and the European socialist parties.

The prime minister also reviewed the results of the visit just made to Tunisia by his French counterpart, Mr Raymond Barre. In this connection, he mentioned the profound impact that this visit had in reinforcing the bonds of friendship and cooperation between the two countries.

Mr Mzali also dealt with Destourian activities and with the necessity of redoubling efforts in order to consolidate the party's position and to increase its impact on all the populous [social] classes.

"Our work on development," he said, "is a labor of a socialist and popular character that implies that the Tunisian General Federation of Labor must be a strong and democratic organization to play its part fully, in the struggle for development alongside the party, which intends to remain ever faithful to the popular line established by the Supreme Champion, and faithful also to his message on mobilization of energies, safeguarding the regime, and bringing the people together by means of persuasion."

Mr Mohamed Mzali recommended to the secretary-generals of the coordination committees to devote themselves selflessly and enthusiastically to the elaboration of their programs of activity in all ways so that all sectors of the populace and all categories of the young can have the widest chances for fruitful work and effective participation in the nation's advance toward development, invulnerability, and prosperity.

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ARAB INSURANCE SYNDICATE FORCED TO SUSPEND OPERATIONS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 13 Oct 80 pp 7, 8

[Text]

An Arab maritime insurance group set up in opposition to Lloyd's of London has been forced to suspend its operations because of a refusal by Lloyd's to provide it with essential reinsurance cover. Insurance sources told this newsletter that Lloyd's had offered only a small fraction of the $1 billion which the Arab War Risks Syndicate would need as a minimum to start business next January.

To put this figure into perspective, the sources said that the Iraq-based syndicate could expect to earn between $10 and $12 million in its first year of operation; by comparison, annual premium income of Lloyd's is about $4.8 billion. These estimates were based on rates prevailing before the outbreak of the war between Iraq and Iran.

With supertankers insured for up to $100 million, and with anywhere between 15 and 20 vessels queueing up to load at large terminals like Saudi Arabia's Ras Tannura, insurers could face a bill of $2 billion as the result of a single air raid, the sources added.

The proposal to set up the Arab War Risks Syndicate (AWRS) was made after Lloyd's declared the Gulf a war zone last year and doubled premiums on tankers to 0.05 per cent of the hull value. It was estimated that this would cost Arab owners an extra $85 million. The London group subsequently rescinded its decision, which had followed a warning from the US State Department that an attempt might be made to hijack or sink an oil tanker. Charges were levelled, however that the West was waging "economic warfare" on the Gulf nations and insurers from Bahrain, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE went ahead with plans to create their own syndicate in opposition to Lloyd's (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, February 18). At least 31 companies have now joined AWRS, which is still in the process of being established, under the Chairmanship of Mustapha Rajab, recently retired Chairman of Iraq Reinsurance and current Chairman of Arab Reinsurance of Beirut.

Mr Rajab visited London last month for talks with local brokers on the reinsurance needs of AWRS. Sources here said that the Arab group hoped that Lloyd's would provide at least 50 per cent of the reinsurance, but Lloyd's was willing only to cover excess of loss reinsurance, a "tiny fixed proportion of risks," as one broker put it.

Without the backing of Lloyd's, AWRS "will be in no position to offer insurance on the scale originally offered," a source said, adding: " The Arab war risks pool has suspended operations."

There is still talk of an Arab boycott of Lloyd's, but sources in the insurance world believe that most shipowners will continue to do business with the London group, because its members have so far left no-one uncovered in the Gulf.

On October 6, Lloyd's announced a new increase in war risk rates, which now stand at about 1.5 per cent of the value of each vessel plying the waters of the Gulf. Before the outbreak of hostilities on September 23, rates averaged 0.0375 per cent of hull value. The rates are reviewed daily and will no doubt rise steeply if the war continues. It is recalled here that at one stage during the Vietnam war, Lloyd's quoted a premium of 10 per cent on a ship bound for Saigon.

A confidential Lloyd's survey revealed that, before hostilities broke out, there were 486 vessels either in or bound for the Gulf. Several are believed to be trapped in the Shatt-el-Arab waterway, in the heart of the war zone, but none has so far been reported sunk. The rates generally quoted by Lloyd's no longer apply to vessels bound for either of the belligerent states.

The general conclusion here is that only London has a sufficiently flexible and developed market to offer the necessary cover to shipowners.

A spokesman for Iraq Reinsurance here said that Mr Rajab's talks were only "provisional." The Chairman of Willis Faber, A R Taylor, who was involved in talks with Mr Rajab on another occasion about six months earlier,

said that his company refused to discuss "commercial transactions in which we may or may not have been involved."

Insurance specialists here said that Lloyd's might be trying to take advantage of the war in the Gulf to squeeze out its competitors, but they added that this was not necessarily the case. The group obviously had an interest in securing the best terms for itself in any reinsurance deal, they said.

Commenting on the efforts of AWES to establish itself, one expert said: " This proves that you cannot run a pool for one area, let alone the area most prone to have a war."

(SO: 4820

NOTION OF ESTABLISHING SCHOOL OF RELIGIOUS RENEWAL ADVANCED

Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 15 Aug 80 p 3

/Article by Dr Muhammad 'Imarah: "The Notion of a Modern Religious Renewal School Will Illuminate the Nation's Path"/

/Text/ With Muhammad (on whom be God's peace and blessings), God rounded out the sequence of his prophets before mankind.

Since Islamic law is the final religious legal system, it has been decided, in Islam, that "renewal" is an inevitable necessity, except in the case of Islamic law, which is unique to and distinguishes this religion and makes it superior to the religions which preceded it!

Before the completion of the prophetic call and the divine mission, when apostacy, superstition, sects, and additional beliefs were transgressing against divine law and obliterating its features, or societies were developing and going beyond their limits, the divine guardian of man dealt with these emergencies with a new religious law which a new prophet brought to mankind. However, after the completion of the process of the prophetic call and the divine mission through Muhammad's eternal law, and the grant of permission to man to make "intelligence" and "wisdom" (philosophy) proof, in the company of "transmission" and "divine law," of the discovery of the correct path, "renovation" of religion and religious law became an inevitability, since it alone would perpetuate the purity of religion and allow religious law's innocence of heresy, superstition, sects and additional beliefs to endure. In addition, it was the unique means to determine new provisions of religious law which new developments and changes in man's status required and demanded as a result of the constant development which the passage of time and changes in place created!

Because the prophetic call and divine mission were completed with Muhammad (on whom be God's peace and blessings) and with Islam, there arose the inevitability of "renewal" within Islam and the unique nature of Islamic law came into existence with the statement of the prophet (on whom be God's peace and blessings): "At the start of every hundred years, God will send to this nation someone who will renew its religion."

Indeed the prophet of God--on whom be God's peace and blessings"--stipulated that renewal is "relevant" and "possible," in fact a "requisite" for faith, which is an affirmation from the heart. He told his companions "renew your faith." When they

asked him "Prophet of God, how shall we renew our faith?" he said "constantly say 'There is no god but God!'" Then the majority of the thinkers of Islam came and stipulated that "faith" waxed and waned in accordance with the action of its practitioner and the purity of his conceptions, that is, that it was in a state of movement, renewal and renovation.

With the passage of the eras in Islam, "religious renewal" became a relevant matter, indeed a purpose and a desired objective--especially when apostasy, superstitions, sects and additional beliefs accumulated to the point where they almost obliterated the essence of religion and defrauded its essential beliefs, and when the developments of life postulated new phenomena which demanded that the provisions of religious law derived from the "advice and general issues" which Islam contented itself with determining, concerning the affairs of the world, be in harmony with them, lest religion seem deficient in keeping constantly abreast of advanced life!

This subject continued to be relevant, and a purpose and desired objective, until paralysis afflicted our Arab Islamic civilization when the effects of dominance by the army of Mamelukes, who were strangers to the spirit of Arabhood and the rational nature of Islam by virtue of race, capability and constitution, appeared in the state of our civilization, and renovation and individual judgment ceased.

We consider that those who acquiesced in the nation's progression down this path, after declaring the deficiencies and shortcomings and the closing of the gate to individual judgment, ceased mentioning new names in this series of the imams of renewal--those whom they mentioned like beacons whom God had provided for this nation, at the beginning of each Islamic century, so that this nation's religion might be renovated. In the sequence of men who renewed the religion, these historians have mentioned:

1. 'Umar ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, 681-720, at the start of the first 100 years of Islamic history.

2. Imam al-Shafi'i Muhammad ibn Idris, 767-819, at the start of the second century.

3. Ahmad ibn 'Umar ibn Suraij al-Baz al-Ashhab, 854-918, the judge of Shiraz, at the start of the third century.

4. The judge al-Bagillani Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn al-Tayyib, 950-1013, at the start of the fourth century.

5. Imam al-Ghazali Abu Hamed Muhammad ibn Ahmad, 1058-1111, at the start of the fifth century.

6. Imam al-Fakhr al-Razi, Abu 'Abdallah Muhammad ibn 'Umar, 1149-1210, at the start of the sixth century.

7. ibn Daqiq al-'Id Muhammad ibn 'Ali ibn Wahb, 1228-1302, at the start of the seventh century.

8. al-Siraj al-Balqini 'Umar ibn Ruslan ibn Nusayr, 1324-1403, at the start of the eight century.

9. Shaykh al-Islam Zakariya al-Ansari, 1423-1520, at the start of the ninth century.

10. Shams-al-Din al-Ramli, 1513-1596, at the start of the tenth century.

In spite of the observations we and others have on the fact that the names of these eminent authorities, and not others, were specified to be the most prominent renewers of Islam, they all, since al-Shafi'i, were Ash'aris, indeed Shafi'is! However, the purpose in making the citation here is to point out that historians of the Islamic renewal stopped at that date, that is, at the Mameluke era, when the negative elements of the latter, under the dominance of the Ottoman dynasty, were perpetuated. They did not give mention of knowledge of individual judgment and renovation and did not refer to effects of therenewal or individual judgment which was witnessed on the intellectual life of the nation, and thereby declared the paralysis and degeneracy which has afflicted our Arab civilization since that date!

This paralysis continued to be a curse hanging over the life of this nation and its civilization until the start of the modern era, until the school of religious renovation became crystallized: this was organized specifically about the philosopher of Islam, the awakener of the Orient and the inspirer of its modern resurgence, Jamal-al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897).

While al-Afghani lit the torch of religious renewal and opened the door to it, then became immersed in political action against colonialism and tyranny, Professor Imam Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh, 1849-1905, was the most prominent imam of this modern school of renewal of Islam. His emphasis on issues of liberation of the Moslem mind and renovation of the Islamic religion made it possible for him, along this road, to accomplish the greatest achievements which our nation has realized in its modern era, namely the achievements which caused this nation to live with a foot in the modern era!

The Notion of Renewal

It is worth pointing out that the expression "renewal" means more than the expression "change" or "development". "Change" and "development" do not require the connection of "the new" to "the old." If there is a link or connection, there is no rule specifying what aspects of "the old" must be preserved in "the new" and in what manner this "preservation" and "permanence" must occur. As for "renewal," that means "the elimination of anything which has affected principles, general issues and basic features and is in opposition to their spirit and their objectives, thereby revealing the purity of these principles and restoring them through rational individual thought so that they may do their work concerning matters which newly arise and matters which are new and are newly created in the real conditions of life." It comprises a return to the truth of the self, and a search for inspiration by factors and features of stability, with new added matters to deal with what is new, in the context of principles and fixed matters, so that its civilization may achieve a harmony which will turn its present state into a developed extention of the genuine features and the essential elements of permanence of its old structure. This is what the expression "renewal" means.

In the light of this truth, we can understand the position of the modern school of religious renewal, the giant contribution of Imam Muhammad 'Abduh, and the manner

in which this position and contribution stand apart from the positions and contributions of other intellectual currents. This school represents:

The middle position, that is, the truth which lies between the two forms of folly!

The third way, that is, the moderate way which lies between the two forms of extremism!

Harmony between the elements of permanence, principles and variables which life presents and transcends.

The genuine nature and the contemporary nature, in accordance with the expression which is in common use among us these days.

It happened that this school of renewal has said:

No to the current of "westernization" whose adherents have sought it--the colonialists, their partisans, and those who were "dazzled" and overwhelmed by the grandeur of European civilization when they compared it with the backwardness of the Mamelukes and the Ottomans. This school /of renewal/ saw in "westernization" a matter which transcended "renovation," saw the forcible uprooting of a venerable nation from its profound origins, and also saw in it a cultural co-optation which turned this nation into a "cultural sideline" of the colonial West which supported the oppressive state of affairs that colonialism created when it turned this nation, with its situation and its resources, into a "sideline" of the /world/ economy. It also saw in it a real oppressive danger to the spirit of Islamic Arab civilization--a spirit which struck a balance between "religion" and "the material world," "spirit" and "body," "Islamic law" and "wisdom," "transmitted truth" and "knowledge," and so on and so forth, and was threatened by the aggressive material character of the caravan of the movement of "westernization!"

No to the thinking of the dark ages which represented stagnation and decadence, as well as apostasy against the features of the civilization of the Moslem Arabs in the era of their renaissance, which gave the colonialist enemies of this nation broad scope to invade its homes, with an onslaught of the land and the mind together!

It was in the context of this confrontation with the thinking of the dark ages that the school of religious renewal's criticism against the superstition and charlatanism has taken place, Sufism has turned into at the hands of the "Sufic orders," and the paralysis, divorcement from reality of life, and distance from beneficial and necessary sciences which have befallen al-Azhar--whether these sciences were the sciences of the ancients or of the moderns!

Renewal, Westernization and Paralysis

Thus the school of religious renewal, and the great architect of its structure, Imam Muhammad 'Abduh, took this clear, decisive stand against the two currents which divided the nation's public at the start of the century of its awakening and resurgence, especially during the second half of the 19th century. They presented the distinctive new position and drew up the third platform for the nation and the reform movement. They wished this nation a modern cultural renaissance which was firmly linked to its cultural principles and features of permanence and was impregnated with the religious spirit which characterized the leaders of this nation throughout its long history, without letting this impregnation reach the point of

a "priesthood" or "religious power" in which religious leadership would tyrannize the powers of the people! They wanted this renaissance, in inspiration and revival, to depend on "transmitted truth" and "knowledge" alike, seeking the aid of the legacies of the forefathers, those who preceded the era of degeneration, and the discoveries and knowledge of those who came later, in crystallizing the new style of the Islamic Arab civilization which struck deep roots into history!

Concerning this distinctive cultural position, which is represented in the third way which this school of Islamic renewal drew up, the great architect of its giant structure Imam Muhammed 'Abduh says:

"I grew up, as every member of the great public of the middle class of Egypt's population grew up, became involved in what they were involved in, and soon became weary of continuing with what they had become habituated to. I rushed impulsively to seek something they did not know, and stumbled on what they had not stumbled upon, calling for the best of what I found, appealing for it, and crying on high to summon:

"Liberation of thought from the restrictions of tradition, understanding of religion in the manner of the nation's forefathers before the disputes arose and a return of the acquisition of learning to its initial sources, considering that to be part of the balance of the human intelligence which God has set forth to bring learning back from its excesses and alleviate confusion and disorder so that God's wisdom would be realized in the preservation of the order of the human realm, so that in this manner he would be considered a friend of knowledge, a seeker of the quest for the secrets of existence, calling for respect for the proved facts and demanding they be relied upon in the culture of the spirit and the reform of work--all this I considered to be one issue.

"Reform of the styles of the Arabic language in composition, be they in official correspondence or in the body of what the newspapers publish, essays or translations from other languages, or communications between people.

"Distinguishing between the right to the obedience of the people, which the government possesses, and the right to justice from the government and the ruler, which the people possess. If the ruler must be obeyed by the people who are in error and who are dominated by their appetites, only the advice of the nation in word and deed will bring it back from its error and put a stop to the oppressiveness of its appetites.

"In appealing for this, I differ with the opinion of the two great groups of which the body of the nation is composed--those who seek the sciences of religion and their ilk, and those who seek after the arts of the age and their ilk!"

It was through this distinctive stand and this special platform that the giant contribution of the school of religious renewal in this nation's "battleground of civilization," the battleground in which this essential, focal issue was raised, and remains raised, took place.

Who are we? Where will we start from? Where will we be going? Where do our roots and our cultural affiliations lie? In the liberal West? In the authoritarian

East? Or do our cultural roots and affiliations lie in the distinctive Arab Islamic civilization which our nation forged centuries ago?

Today, with the intensifying debate between the answers the various intellectual currents offer on this focal, essential issue, with the emergence of the call for "Westernization" in its liberal or its authoritarian form and with the intensifying oppression of those to whom Islam means only paralysis, ossification, and the appeal to cast the present and future in the mold of the past--and the past of the dark ages at that--the need to offer the notion of the new school of religious renewal to the masses of this nation so that it may illuminate its path is growing intense!

11887
CSO: 4802

INTERNATIONAL MOSLEM BROTHER ORGANIZATION CONDEMNS SYRIA

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Sep 80 p 52

/Article: "Statement by the International Organization of the Moslem Brothers"/

/Text/ Thanks be to God; peace and blessings be on the prophet of God, his family and companions, and those who have called out his message, have been led by his guidance and have progressed with his traditions to the day of judgment.

Following that: the Moslem Brothers' call arose more than half a century ago. Its primary goal was to establish God's religion on earth, strengthen his almighty Islamic law among mankind, liberate all the places where Islam dwells, unify the nation of Islam under the banner of the Koran, and uplift it materially and spiritually, in accordance with the book of God and the sayings and doings of his noble prophet, on whom be God's peace and blessings.

A great Islamic movement arose to achieve this objective, combining words of truth, directing efforts toward the good, raising generations in piety, mobilizing the nation for efforts on God's path, and embracing the defense of the causes of Moslems everywhere, foremost the cause of Palestine, warning the Islamic world of its gravity at a time when most people were ignorant of it and offering the best of its young men to liberate it when all were shrinking from sacrifice.

It is no wonder that the forces antagonistic to Islam, domestically and abroad, have gathered together to oppose the road to movement, trying to obstruct its progress, seeking the aid of their agents who revolve in their universe and follow their orders, and bringing on the objects of this call the worst type of torture, maltreatment, dispossession and killing. However, God prevents anything but his light from being realized: the movement emerged from its successive torments purer in essence, more intense in strength and firmer in resolve, its enemies met with failure and disgrace, and all who were sincerely genuine and all who were liars and agents became revealed to the people.

Today this movement, in beloved Syria, is facing a new trial at the hands of the Nusayri rulers who are apostates of Islam, as distinguished religious scholars headed by the Sheikh of Islam, ibn Taymiyah have decreed--rulers who are vindictive toward Moslems and agents of the enemies of Islam, who handed the Golan over to Israel, who broadcast the fall of al-Qunaytirah before it actually fell, who exterminated the inhabitants of Tall al-Za'tar, who cooperated with the separatists who have made common cause with Israel inside Lebanon, and other things which

history has recorded, in addition to the things they did during their tenure in rule in the country in the form of corrupting morals, wrecking the economy, destroying freedoms, twisting the people's will in order to create subordinates at the hands of the trade unions, and so on and on and on.

These rulers, who are still taking the money of Arabs and Moslems in order to seek their aid in fighting the usurper Zionism, but are actually taking it in order to fight Syrian citizens without firing a single shot at the chest of a usurping Zionist, have killed many of the best scions of the people, have expropriated freedoms, have turned the beloved nation into a great prison, have shown contempt for distinguished religious scholars, have taken mosques by storm, have killed those who have built them up, have observed no sanctity in them, have crushed the heroic army which was one of the strongest of Arab armies, have destroyed the Syrian domestic economy, have fought against the devout, have fuelled the fire of dissension among the classes of the people, and have killed even their old colleagues in the party. They even are wreaking vengeance against many intelligent people who are members of their faction, out of their overdone tyranny and shedding of blood.

The International Organization of the Moslem Brothers stands with all its power alongside the combative Syrian people who have risen up in rebellion in defense of their sacred possessions to protect their religion, values and freedoms against the dominant factional regime which wishes to eliminate the Syrian Islamic personality and impose its dominance upon it.

The International Organization of the Moslem Brothers also stringently condemns the brutal acts which this tyrannical regime is carrying out against the Syrian people in general and the Moslem Brothers in particular in the form of violating women's honor, killing old men, children and mothers, brutally torturing detainees, and conducting mass killing of prisoners, as happened in the prison of the Municipality of al-Raqqah, where Rif'at al-Asad killed more than 150 prisoners, and as also happened in the slaughter at the Palmyra Prison near the city of Hama, which has become a widespread scandal, in which machine guns opened fire and killed no less than 1,000 of the cream of the Syrian people, scholars, doctors, engineers, teachers, senior officers, professionals and university and secondary school students!

What is most amazing is that the Arab and international media do not refer to these vile events at which ears cringe on hearing of their terror, at a time when the International Commission on Human Rights has condemned them more than once, as have some trade unions in Syria itself and elsewhere and the Conference of Arab Lawyers which met in Morocco.

The most recent surprise this arbitrary regime offered to the world was the decree whose likes no one has heard of in ancient or modern times, which is the death penalty for anyone belonging to the Society of Moslem Brothers! They were not content with this--rather, they gave warning through threats, admonitions and killing to members of the Moslem Brothers wherever they were.

The International Organization of Moslem Brothers announces that these threats will never scare any Moslem Brothers because they have pledged their lives to Almighty God and believe that no one will die before his time "Say that nothing except what God has foreordained for us will afflict us."

Let these domineering rulers know that Moslem Brothers everywhere will never stand with their hands tied in the face of any aggression against any of them. They are able, with God's help, with God granting them success, to return blows with like blows, exercising his almighty words "To those who have triumphed after their oppression there will be a way, but the way for those who tyrannize people and covet land unjustly will be a painful torment." That is a saying of glorious God.

May God's prayers and God's peace be upon our lord Muhammad and his family and companions.

God is most great, and to God be thanks.

11887
CSO: 4802

SPECULATION ON DISAPPEARANCE OF AFGHAN DIPLOMAT

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 21 Sep 80 p 3

[Editorial: "Where Did the Afghan Diplomat Go?"]

[Text] According to a report, the first secretary of the Afghan Embassy, Mr Qayum Mansur, has been missing for the last 2 weeks. The Afghan Embassy claims not to know anything about him except that he was seen last at a reception given by the Russian Embassy on 8 September. He was to leave on a plane bound for Kabul on 9 September but he did not board the plane. His sucessor is already in Islamabad.

A news item in a local daily tells us that when Pakistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquired about Mr Mansur, they said that Mr Mansur had not requested political asylum from Pakistan and that they did not know of his whereabouts.

This news item is brief and arouses curiosity; it therefore requires some explanation due to its importance. The disappearance of a diplomat cannot remain unnoticed by the media, especially when that diplomat belongs to a nation at war. There can be several implications of this event.

The basic question is: What is the attitude of other diplomats at the embassy? Did they report his disappearance to the local police or the Foreign Office of the Pakistani Government? If not, then it is clear that this disappearance was prearranged with the approval of the Afghan Government and the embassy here is trying to downplay it.

The reasons for this disappearance need probing. It should be kept in mind that Mr Mansur was due to depart for Kabul on the 9th of this month, a seat was reserved for him on the plane and he attended a reception at the Russian Embassy on 8 September. His presence at the Russian reception indicates that he was not undisposed toward the Russians nor was he considered oppressed by the Russians, therefore he was not in need of political asylum. The statement issued by the Pakistani Foreign Office stating that he did not ask for political aslym supports this hypothesis.

However, the question of the officer's disappearance is still before us. If the Afghan Embassy does not want to look for him the Pakistani Government should.

It is appropriate for our government to issue a statement based on its information to alleviate concern among the people.

Our Foreign Office must be equipped with information to explain this incident satisfactorily. What are the reasons behind the mass transfer of diplomats in Afghan embassies? This side of the story requires special attention because only recently Nasir Hussayni, an Afghan diplomat stationed in Paris, requested political asylum from the United States.

7997
CSC: 4203

AFGHAN MINISTERS PUT TO DEATH FOR DECEPTION

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 18 Sep 80 pp 1, 6

[Article: "Afghan Ministers Sentenced to Death for Deception; Came for Negotiations, Requested Helicopter and Siege."]

[Text] Rawalpindi, 17 September (Reported by Mukhtar Husayn)--More details of the death of two Afghan ministers and 90 soldiers in Paktia have been uncovered. According to the information received, Mujahidin made two demands of the ministers, Fayiz Mohammad and Nazar Mohammad, when they negotiated at Sayyed Khel. According to the first condition, Afghanistan was to be declared an Islamic nation and Russians were to leave the country. The second condition demanded two military divisions stationed at Paktia be given to Mujahidin and Kabul's independence from Russian occupation. Fayiz Mohammad refused both conditions and tried to buy the Mujahidin with money. Since it was time for worship the meeting adjourned. While most people were busy praying, Fayiz Mohammad and his group went toward the river. They informed their bosses on a hidden wireless set that negotiations had failed, and advised besieging the place. They also asked for a helicopter for their escape. The Mujahidin heard this conversation and a bloody battle ensued in which 90 soldiers accompanying the ministers were killed. The remaining 100 surrendered. Fayiz Mohammad and his followers were taken before a panel of judges and were sentenced to death according to the Islamic law for treachery.

7997
CSO: 4203

DEATH OF AFGHAN MINISTERS CONFIRMED

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 22 Sep 80 pp 3, 10

[Article: "Relatives of Faiz Mohammad and Nazar Mohammad Confirm the Ministers' Death; Mujahidin Killed Other 13 High Officials With Them, Film Shot Before Death Shown in Kabul"]

[Text] Kabul, 21 September (Radio Report)--The latest report from Kabul has confirmed the death of two ministers and 13 high officials on 13 September in Paktia Province. Kabul Radio announced after this report that Nazar Mohammad, recently inaugurated a public health plan and a movie of this ceremony was shown at Kabul. Our sources met with the relatives of both deceased ministers and received confirmation of their deaths, and that the film showing Nazar Mohammad inaugurating the public health program was shot before his death. The Afghan Government has not confirmed the death of the second minister, Faiz Mohammad, as well. Informed sources, however, claim to know that his widow has confirmed his death. The grief stricken Mrs Faiz Mohammad said that her husband belonged to the Khalq faction and he was worried about threats on his life. Mrs Faiz said that her husband had remarked several times that Babrak Karmal was not trustworthy. In giving details of the 13 September events, these sources related that when government officials and tribal leaders were getting together for the meeting, a man embraced Faiz Mohammad and knifed him several times. This was the signal for starting the attack and bullets were fired from all sides killing the two ministers and 13 other high ranking government officials. Several people, including two officers of the Afghan Army, were wounded.

7997
CSO: 4203

WIDESPREAD MUJAHID ATTACKS ON RUSSIAN CONVOYS REPORTED

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 23 Sep 80 pp 3, 8

[Article: "Mujahidin Attack Russian Convoys at Smangani, Sawai, Jani Khel, and Dowangi; Hundreds of Soldiers Killed, Several Tanks and Armored Vehicles Demolished, 16 Communists Killed"]

[Text] Kabul, 22 September (PPI)--Afghan Mujahidin attacked Russian Army at Samangani in Paktia Province and killed 50 Russian soldiers. Only eight Mujahidin were killed in this battle and the Russians and government soldiers were routed. Russian airplanes bombed Samangani area and destroyed several houses and killed some villagers. Mujahidin killed 16 soldiers and destroyed a military truck at Durra Seen. In another battle the Mujahidin destroyed a truck and killed 11 soldiers. The Mujahidin attacked a Russian and Afghan convoy going to Badikot at Sawai Vehkle and fought for about 20 hours. The Mujahidin destroyed 25 tanks and trucks and killed 5 Russian and 60 government soldiers. Only seven Mujahidin were killed. The Mujahidin also captured 30 weapons and a wireless set. The Mujahidin killed 16 communists in an attack in Vardak Province. Among these were four very important officials: Lieutenant Jargal, Militia Commander Habib-al-Din, Public Relations Officer Abdul Qadir, and Chairman of Labor Union Abdul Halim.

The Mujahidin attacked a Russian convoy at Chai Khel in Paktia Province and killed 72 Russian soldiers, destroyed 2 armored vehicles and 3 tanks. The Mujahidin confiscated many weapons. Only two Mujahidin were killed and six were taken prisoners. Battles between the Russian Army and the Mujahidin are still raging in this area. The Mujahidin have destroyed two Russian tanks in Dowagni District of Kunarha Province. Thirteen armed Afghani soldiers in this area have joined the Mujahidin.

7997
CSO: 4203

RUSSIANS REPULSED AT SHIKAGI

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 16 Sep 80 pp 3, 6

[Article: "Russians Repulsed at Shikagi Valley, 80 Soldiers Killed; Mujahidin Down a Helicopter at Shahiban, 260 Russians Killed in Attack on Asmar"]

[Text] Kabul, 15 September (PPI)--In an attack at Shikagi Afghan Mujahidin have killed 80 Russian soldiers, five government soldiers, and have destroyed three tanks. The attacking Russian army was badly beaten in this battle. However, most of the homes in Ganjak were destroyed by heavy bombing by the Russians. According to another report, Mujahidin downed a Russian helicopter at Shahiban and killed eight Russian soldiers. According to reports received from Konarha, Mujahidin attacked a company of Russian soldiers going from Asmar to Barikot and after a fierce battle, Mujahidin destroyed ten out of the 15 tanks and six army trucks in addition to killing 260 Russian and government soldiers. Twelve Afghani soldiers have joined the Mujahidin. Only ten Mujahidin were killed in this battle. According to the reports received from Samangan province, members of Khalq and Parcham factions have escaped in planes and helicopters provided by their Russian masters after being threatened by the Mujahidin. They are seeking asylum in the capital of the province, Aibak, but the Mujahidin are chasing them there too.

7997
CSO: 4203

RUSSIANS BOMB HERAT MOSQUE

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 15 Sep 80 pp 1, 6

[Article: "Russians Bomb Herat Mosque, 120 Worshippers Killed; Mujahidin Repel Russian Attack on Pachar, 20 Tanks Destroyed and 85 Russians Killed."]

[Text] Kabul, 14 September (AFP/PPI/AFP/Radio report)--The freedom fighters have destroyed 100 Russian tanks and killed hundreds of Russian soldiers in a place 160 Kilometers south of Kabul. An officer of the Afghan army who has joined with the Mujahidin reported that the Mujahidin have surrounded 150 Russian tanks in "Durra Tung" [literally, "the narrow pass"]. The freedom fighters have closed the only route leading out of this narrow valley surrounded by high mountains. In the Chintal Varda area, where Mujahidin are holding strongly, seven tanks and five trucks belonging to the Russian army were destroyed. The Mujahidin attacked a Russian company in Hisarak and killed 50 Russian soldiers. An officer of the Afghan army and a Tadjik Russian have joined the Mujahidin. The Mujahidin destroyed an oil tanker and a truck in Paranda and Manjnar. The Mujahidin, under the command of Mirza Mohammad, killed 150 Russians on first day and 27 more during the attack on the second day. According to reports reaching from Takhar province, the Mujahidin have killed 30 Russians and 50 soldiers belonging to the Parcham faction in addition to totally destroying two tanks and wounding three Russian soldiers. The Mujahidin captured ten light machine guns and ammunition. According to reports reaching from Vardak province, the Mujahidin have killed 620 Russians and militia men this month, and have destroyed several tanks and armored cars. Four hundred Mujahidin have been killed in these attacks. According to reports from Herat, Mujahidin have killed 40 Russian soldiers and destroyed five tanks and nine armored vehicles. The Russian army captured an old town in Herat and bombed a mosque mercilessly killed 120 worshippers there.

We have received more details on the killing of two Afghan ministers, Fayiz Mohammad and Nazar Mohammad. The Mujahidin captured these ministers and some high military officers in Paktia. They were summarily tried in Mujahidin's court and were sentenced to death. The sentence was carried out on Thursday. Commander Jalalal-Din of the Mujahidin army shot them himself. According to Radio Kabul, a helicopter was destroyed in Chak area. Its pilot, Abdul Rauf, was killed. According to the radio report, the helicopter was on a practice flight. Meanwhile, the Russian and Afghan armies attacked Mujahidin with 300 tanks and 45 gunship helicopters in Pachar, Nangarhar province. The Mujahidin killed 85 soldiers and destroyed 20 tanks during the five-day long battle. The Afghan army was routed toward Jalalabad. In Taroki Bagh, Mujahidin killed 100 Afghan soldiers and destroyed four tanks. Six Mujahidin were killed in this attack.

7997
CSP: 4203

MUSLIMS MASSACRED IN INDIA TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM USSR INVASION

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 16 Sep 80 p 7

[Article: "Indian Muslims Massacre to Divert Attention From Russian Aggression on Afghanistan, United Effort Needed."]

[Text] Bahawal Nagar (JASARAT Correspondent/PPI/PR)--Chaudhery Abdul Gafur, chairman of district council, Bahawal Nagar, has condemned the communal riots in India. He said that Indian Muslims were being massacred under a calculated plan. He appealed to the Islamic countries to make concerted efforts to stop the genocide of Indian Muslims. Famed lawyer and scholar, Malik Wazir Ahmed Namazi said that Indian Muslims were being massacred to divert world attention from the Russian aggression. He asked the Islamic countries to help the Muslims in India. In a joint statement, Chaudhery Mohammad Salim, chairman of Sargodha's Hkidmat Khelq Islamic Society; its vice-chairman, Mullah Abdul Rahman Hashmi; Mohammad Javed, administrator of Sargodha city; Mohammad Zaffar Allah Khan, administrator; and Mullah Abid Allah of Itihad al-'Ulama have expressed apprehension over the communal fighting in Kashmir and other cities in India. They asked the government to suspend diplomatic relationship with India at once.

In a joint meeting of the Pakistan Writers Guild and Areas Babab Zauk of Sialkot, under the chairmanship of Mohammad Abbas Asar, anger and vexation were expressed. They requested the government to take action to stop genocide of Muslims in India. In a joint statement Sher Mohammad Hakru, president of Lahore student union, and Mohammad Aslam Sajid of Punjab condemned the atrocities committed on Indian Muslims. They said that the killing of Muslims in India and the arrest of Pakistanis there is very sad. Nur Mohammad Talib, president of Pakistan Khan Brotherhood, said that the anti-Muslim riots in India have brought the cat of seculiarism out of Indira Gandhi's bag. He appealed to the Muslims of the world to pressure India to stop these riots.

7997
CSO: 4203

BRIEFS

MUJAHIDIN REQUEST UN INVESTIGATION--Islamabad, 20 September (AFP)--Afghan Mujahid group, Hizb-al-Islami, has sent a telegram to Dr Kurt Waldheim, secretary general of the United Nations asking him to investigate the atrocities committed by the Russian Army against the Afghan people. It further stated that the Russians massacred Afghan people with the help of Czechoslovakian, Cuban and Bulgarian soldiers. Hizb-al-Islami urged the United Nations to send a delegation to investigate these actions and prove that the UN is not under the influence of Russia. The investigation would serve to let the world know of all the atrocities committed by the Russians. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 21 Sep 80 p 1] 7997

AFGHAN DIPLOMAT MISSING--Islamabad, 19 September (JASARAT Correspondent)--Qayum Mansur, First Secretary of the Afghan embassy at Islamabad has disappeared mysteriously. Since his disappearance on 8 September, it is not known whether he is in Pakistan or in Afghanistan. He was last seen on 8 September at a reception given by the Soviet embassy. His successor, Mohammad Rafiq Shamraz had arrived on 7 September to take over. The Afghan embassy has refused to comment on the issue. One officer at the embassy said that Qayum Mansu was either still in Pakistan or has returned to Afghanistan. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 20 Sep p 6] 7997

NEW COFFIN FACTORY IN KABUL--Kabul, 14 September (PPI)--A new coffin manufacturing factory had to be set up to meet the demand caused by the number of Russians killed by Afghan Mujahidin. Two hundred and fifty carpenters work in this factory round the clock and make 300 coffins daily. These coffins are used to ship the Russian soldiers' bodies to Russia. [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 15 Sep 80 p 1] 7997

CSO: 4203

OPPOSITION PARTIES TO FORM NATIONAL FRONT IN EGYPT

NC041248 Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 1 Nov 80 pp 1, 7

[Excerpt] Cairo (AL-SAFIR)--Political circles in Egypt expect that the establishment of the Democratic National Front of political parties and personalities which radically oppose President al-Sadat's regime will be announced in the coming few weeks.

Contacts among the parties (public and secret) and national figures have ended in agreement on the need for this front and the importance of announcing its establishment and exercising its activities. The founding members of the front, who will not exceed 15, are expected to issue a statement to the Egyptian people defining the basic aims of the front.

The founding members of the front will decide in the coming few days whether to declare themselves as a preparatory committee of the front and call on the national parties and personalities to join it on the basis of a 5-point program--which is toppling the existing regime and forming a national government to conduct free, democratic elections of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution--or announcing the establishment of the front and opening it to the national parties and personalities that accept the front's program.

The proposed program of the front consists of a preamble and a diagnosis of the comprehensive crisis gripping the Egyptian society. The program lists four manifestations of this crisis. These are the economic crisis, the political rights and freedoms crisis, the national independence crisis and the crisis of confidence between the people and the authority, dishonesty and corruption of the regime.

The program also indicates that the establishment of a constituent assembly and the accomplishment of a constituent assembly and the accomplishment of its tasks will open the door to the implementation of a six-point program:

1. Liberating the will of the Egyptian citizen through the establishment of a parliamentary regime.

2. Ending corruption and bribery.

3. Adopting a policy of economic and social development.

4. Liberating Egypt from all forms of foreign military, political and economic domination.

5. Liberating all the Egyptian and Arab territories as well as Arab Jerusalem.

6. Returning Egypt to its leading position in the Arab homeland, the Islamic world and the nonaligned movement.

The program includes elaboration on each of these six points.

The leadership of the front (or the preparatory committee) will include representatives of all the main opposition political parties (public and secret), apart from the Labor Party, and all the national political currents (the Nasirites, Marxists, Nationalists and Democratic Nationals), apart from the Islamic current, the majority of which still refuses any alliance with the Nasirites and Marxists.

The opposition political circles in Egypt expect the establishment of the front to lead to a new violent and suppressive police campaign against the national forces in Egypt.

CSO: 4802

TEHRAN ORGAN DERIDES REAGAN, BUSH, KISSINGER

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 6 Nov 80 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN — Reaction in Iran on the election success of Ronald Reagan as the new president of the United States of America indicated a stoical, unruffled response reinforcing the nation's steely stand against the forces of imperialism, and predicating that the movement of the Islamic Revolution will continue its sweep across the world.

A national radio commentary on Ronald Reagan's victory was preluded by statements that changes in theoretical standpoints in Western nations reflected in shifts at the hustings were only palliatives to the ever increasing economic, political and cultural malaise which Western nations were struggling to swim against.

The commentary broadcast Tuesday soon after the announcement of election results said that it will not be long before imperialism is shattered from the word. It said this was a natural corollary to the increasing knowledge of the oppressed of the world that the very essence of the system was flawed. Flawed because of its servitude to special class interests which sought economic and political domination through colonialist policies in the world. It said that this made for an escalation of conflicts and a deepening of the gap between classes in societies within their own countries and throughout the world where imperialist domination was strong.

Scoffing at the mechanics of Western political systems, the commentary said that it was basically a game that politicians and diplomats had created, adding that changes such as the one from Carter to Reagan was just so much play in this superficial game.

In more satirical vain the commentary said that Ronald Reagan suited the part in the play, being a former Hollywood movie actor rather than an experienced politician. Then it went on to debunk likely Reagan seconds in the white House, calling George Bush, the Vice-President a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) man and Henry Kissinger, a Republican who may very likely be an advisor to the president a master mind in the U.S. Zionist lobby.

Leading on to the crux of the issue the commentary said that the election victory spelt the death knell of even the semblance of liberalistic policies which the Carter administration appeared to follow and would now surely lead to a more militaristic trend in its approaches to the world political situation.

Reagan, the radio said, had in his campaign statements increasingly stressed militaristic policies which he vowed to follow if elected and had affirmed that he would be never a party to a recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), calling it a terrorist group. The Reagan victory will mean a swing towards a more assertive Zionist policy, the radio commentary said.

Whatever the changes predicted for the United States, the sweep of world revolutionary movements which had received an impetus from the Islamic Revolution in Iran will not be impeded, the radio said. Quoting Iran's Revolutionary Leader and the Founder of the Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini, it said, "America can do nothing." In these stubborn words there was a message for the oppressed of the entire world, the commentary said.

As a concession the commentary referred to shifts in the policy positions that Ronald Reagan had made during his campaign speeches and statements. It described these to tutoring of Ronald Reagan by more seasoned diplomats and political advisers in keeping with the realities of world trends today. The commentary said again that these trends were succinctly epitomised by Imam Khomeini who said that the "idols of the world were being broken" and that it will not be many more years before imperialism falls in ruin, a movement which neither Ronald Reagan or political theoreticians of any dye can hold back.

CSO: 4920

REAGAN'S POSSIBLE MOVES ANALYZED

LD100815 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 6 Nov 80 p 1

[Article by Ahmad al-Jarallah: "The Change That the Americans Wanted"]

[Text] According to statistics, one-third of those who voted for President-Elect Reagan voted for the new presidency out of a desire for change. It appears that the world has gotten tired of truce. What is desired is decisiveness by America and Russia.

Of course, not all that Reagan said during the election campaign can be taken as binding U.S. policies. When he enters the White House and says that he wants to reinstate Nationalist China (Taiwan) and withdraw U.S. recognition of the PRC he will be told that now is an unsuitable time to anger Beijing, which is no longer the town of Mao Tse-tung. Also Beijing is preparing to build factories costing billions and is in need of U.S. technology. Also China is still the strongest adversary of the Soviet Union.

With regard to the Middle East the new U.S. president will be told that the Arabs are now a real power and no longer tolerate U.S. arrogance. They have been patient and during the election campaign they tolerated all the nonsense and abuse of the U.S. electoral platforms but they are in control of the nerve of the U.S. stock exchange and own the oil which is important for the United States and its industry. They have proved that they are ready to die when it is a matter of their dignity, as is evident in what is happening now between Iran and Iraq.

Statistics experts said yesterday that one-third of those who voted for Reagan wanted change, but the change that Reagan declared might mean a new Hiroshima, which might not be important for Reagan whose age is verging on the eighties. [As published]. But there remains something more important called U.S. strategic interests.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONDITIONS 'UNFAVORABLE'--Kuwait, 12 Nov (KUNA)--Kuwaiti minister of state for cabinet affairs 'Abd al-Aziz Husayn said today that the circumstances currently experienced by the Islamic states are unfavorable for the convening of an Islamic summit, and that the intention is to convene it in more favorable conditions. Mr Husayn was speaking to journalists following the weekly meeting of the Kuwaiti cabinet. He said that Saudi Arabia, the host state for the forthcoming Islamic summit, still welcomes the convening of the conference in Holy Mecca. [Excerpt] [LD121342 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1303 GMT 12 Nov 80]

CSO: 4802

LEADER OF ISTIQLAL PARLIAMENTARY GROUP DISCUSSES ACHIEVEMENTS

Rabat AL-'ALAM in Arabic 23 Oct 80 pp 1, 5

/Article: "Our Brother Faysal al-Khatib, Deputy Chairman of Unity and Egalitarian Group, Reviews the Results of Istiqlal Group Activity after 3 Years of Practice"/

/Text/ On the occasion of the inauguration of the new Chamber of Deputies session, we asked our brother Faisal al-Khatib, deputy chairman of the unity and Egalitarian Group, to provide us with the results of the group's activities during 3 years. Herewith is the first part of this comprehensive review of the group's activity and the results of parliamentary practice in general:

Three full years of activity in the current chamber of deputies have elapsed. We believe that this period is sufficient for seeking to ascertain the results of the activityof the Chamber of Deputies and determine whether it has proceeded in a direction aimed at actually implanting democratic life in our country.

Before all else, one must mention some basic facts, not out of a desire to calumny, the love to criticize, or the ardor to stress and repeat previous positions, but out of the consideration that these facts should have an objective effect on the course of the Chamber of Deputies in its work:

1. The Istiqlal Party was unique in devoting itself legally to contesting the official results of the 3 June 1977 elections before the relevant political and judicial sources, on grounds that these results produced a numerical majority which did not truly express the premises of political thinking in Morocco.

2. The members of the "winning" numerical majority ran for office on personal bases, not as part of a specific political organization or electoral program which was capable of being debated before the electorate. Although this "majority" exercised its members' political rights to discipline within a specific political organization, following the official announcement of its "victory," the political program of this new organization has not yet received the confidence of the voting citizens.

3. All the rebukes and criticisms directed by the Istiqlal Party against the official results announced on 3 June 1977 constitute a political and legal position regarding these results, and consequently do not prevent /us/ from dealing with them while being present in the confines of the parliament, on grounds that the

existence of a "deficient" parliamentary institution exercising the rights of legislation and oversight over government activity is better that the lack of such an existence, in accordance with a viewpoint which concentrates on the need to develop political thinking and implant democratic habits in political behavior and on grounds that purifying the political and social climate of the country will be the fruit of a lengthy battle and struggle and that the Moroccan people, at their vanguard the cultural elite, must venture on its hazards to confront all the challenges which are in opposition to true democratic development.

From this, the difficulty of dealing with the current political balance is apparent. However, we prefer to face this difficulty with resolution, faith and forbearance, instead of declining to face it and leaving the country's powers and future exposed to various currents, tempests and dangers.

We, in the Istiqlal Party, do not consider that we are embarking on the hazards of "a democratic experiment." The country is not a laboratory for experiments, and must continue not to be one. Rather, we consider that the presence of the parliamentary institution is a political requirement for our country's growth, like the necessity for the presence of government or judiciary, administrative or security institutions, in spite of emphasis on our observation that the beginning was a "faltering step" which still needs to be rectified and that the coming legislative elections will be an opportunity to try to perform this "rectification."

After this prelude, which has been necessary in order to clarify the climate of political activity within the Chamber of Deputies, it is necessary to respond to the question some people are incessantly raising--either out of good will or a sort of request for knowledge of something, or out of ill will and the desire for revenge and exposure and to undermine domestic conditions. The two cases are a long-range political conception but are well known to everyone possessing a penetrating vision into the depth of things who perceives their background.

In either case, the question which is raised is, what has the Chamber of Deputies done to bring the country out of the economic and social crises it is suffering from?

The answer to this question does not require great scrutiny.

The crisis we are suffering from, from the economic and social standpoints, is in part a reflection of an international economic situation of growing severity, and in part the results of a policy and style of managing affairs which the country has followed since the early sixties; it is not one of the innovations of the Chamber of Deputies. Remedying its causes and results over the long range will be the joint responsibility of the government and parliament and also the responsibility of all political organizations present on the political stage, in view of the need to link the desirable to the possible and to spell out the tentative choices (I am not talking about ideological aspects) in the light of the available premises and resources and foreign and domestic circumstances which have a big effect on the type of decision which must be taken.

For example, there are two basic issues on which the future of development in our country depend.

The first is the war which was imposed upon us in the south of the country and the allocation of increasing credits which that requires for the sake of defending the country's identity and independence.

The second are the increasing costs of energy and oil resources as a result of the increase in domestic consumption on the one hand and the insane increase in prices of these materials, through the alliance of oil countries, in constantly continuing the increase in the prices of these materials on the international market, which has led to the constant impoverishment of the developing countries.

While the prices of oil materials in the international market are constantly increasing and in varying degrees influencing the economies of advanced and developing countries alike, the industrially advanced countries are less influenced by vicissitudes in the oil products market than the developing countries are, on the grounds that the countries producing oil and oil products reinvest the surplus of their financial revenues from the sale of oil materials in the industrial countries, and this inevitably leads to a stimulating of the labor market and an increase in the gross product of the industrially advanced countries, as contrasted with the situation regarding such developing countries as ours.

These premises, separately and in combination, perforce control the kind of policy which must be set forth in order to guarantee continued economic and social development, indeed, practical necessities sometimes make it mandatory, in such circumstances, that positions and measures be adopted which are not even in harmony with certain intellectual or ideological options--bearing in mind that political activity lies with the possible.

The Chamber of Deputies, with its well known present composition, is exercising its parliamentary tasks in the context of these circumstances, which are marked by the high costs and burdens of the war imposed upon us, the reflections of the international economic crisis, the problems which have been accumulated over many long years, and the financial costs their treatment, and the confrontation of their results, require--which are in excess of the limits of the resources currently available.

It must also not be absent from one's mind that the most numerous parliamentary group affects the trend of parliament's activities, either in view of the fact that guidance and operation of important economic sectors lies with the ministers who belong to this group, or in light of the internal contradictions which it suffers from, which causes an absence of decisive decisions on the guidance of economic policy in a manner which will respond intimately to the premises of the current crisis.

Now that we have finished giving a brief picture of the circumstances of the parliamentary activity of the current parliament, I consider it exceptionally necessary to furnish statistics to evaluate the results of the activity of the parliament and the efforts of the Istiqlal group within it to rectify the general conditions in the country.

It is clear that parliamentary activity is basically concentrated on the exercise of recommending laws, the exercise of oversight over government activity through

oral and written questions, and in addition the guidance of government policy through votes on the matter of confidence in the government.

From the purely legislative standpoint, up to the end of last August, the government presented to the Chamber of Deputies, in addition to financial laws and the draft of the three-year plan, 62 drafts of laws, of which the Chamber of Deputies ratified 50, after most of them were amended and improved. These are provisions of varying importance, including ones related to the ratification of international agreements, drafts of important laws such as the draft law on legal defense, the draft law on the leasing of sites prepared for housing, the draft law establishing a higher council for accounting and regulating its fields of specialization, the draft law on bylaws for judges in the higher council for accounting, the draft law rectifying services performed in liberal education, the draft law organizing trade union elections in the Rio de Oro region, the draft law changing the law on the Board of Judiciary Aides, the draft law changing the law on military justice, and so forth.

There are still two /sic/ draft laws under the scrutiny of the Chamber of Deputies committees, including legislation related to the application of the system of real estate registration in northern Morocco, legislation related to the organization of the justice plan and the receipt and composition of documents, the draft law establishing an economic free zone for 200 nautical miles along the Moroccan coasts, the draft of an appropriations law, and the draft law encouraging real estate investments.

From the standpoint of union initiatives in the legislative field, there is a group of proposed laws issued by the deputies of various groups, numbering 84 by the end of last August, of which the Istiqlal's share was 21 (or 25 percent. These dealt with various subjects of concern to the development of the political, social and economic life of the citizens and expressed the Istiqlal Party's genuine concerns for the attainment of such development.

Thus the Istiqlal group in the Chamber of Deputies has set forth proposals of laws related to the abrogation of the 1935 Decree bearing on "obligatory respect for authority," restricting publication of AL-JARIDAH AL-RASMIYAH to the Arabic language, abrogating the group and territory courts, workers' participation in the profits of organizations, amendment of the penal code, amendment of the law organizing finances, the conveyance of unused, neglected lands owned by foreigners to the state or to groups, protection of the blind, the resistence and liberarion army, and the amendment of Chapter 11 of the law organizing finances. This gives proof of the diversity of the concerns and preoccupations of the Istiqlal parliamentary group--concernes and preoccupations reflecting the breadth of the scope of political and social activity of the Istiqlal Party.

In spite of the slow progress of the discussion in the context of the competent committees or parliament which the recommendations of laws issued by the Istiqlal group have experienced, this does not detract from the importance of the activity of the Istiqlal parliamentary group so much as it proves certain aspects of disruption in the progress of the institutions of parliament, for reasons which in no case are attributed to the nature or level of our parliamentary presence in the current parliament.

The quality and level of participation in the discussions; the mode of exercising parliamentary oversight over government action; the presentation of final conclusions on the effectiveness of the activity of the Istiqlal parliamentary group in particular; and the benefit of the progress of the institutions of parliament in general will be the subject of the coming treatment, with God's help.

11887
CSO: 4402

PARDON FOR IMPRISONED TUNISIAN TRADE UNIONISTS DISCUSSED

LD121419 Paris LE MONDE in French 12 Nov 80 p 4

[Dispatch by Michel Deure: "President Bourguiba Pardons Most of the Trade Unionists Imprisoned After the January 1978 Riots"]

[Text] Tunis--On Monday 10 November President Bourguiba pardoned most of the trade unionists imprisoned after the violent riots which took place on 26 January 1978, who had already been granted conditional release.

This measure, taken on an individual basis, should in fact have the same effects as an amnesty but, when he announced it, Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali merely specified that "the effects of the verdicts passed fall within the pardon." In any case those who will enjoy this pardon should be able to recover their civil rights quickly. The presidential decision affects 10 members of the former Tunisian General Federation of Labor [UGTT] leadership, 6 of whom are at present members of the committee responsible for planning the forthcoming UGTT congress, and all the trade unionists who appeared before the regional courts, who number around 100 (note) (the exact number of trade unionists arrested, tried and sentenced after 26 January was never officially revealed).

"The head of state wanted to finally close the chapter of the painful events of 26 January 1978 and wanted all nationalist trade unionists to unite and serve the nation's higher interests," Mr Mzali said.

Mr Bourguiba is also meeting--but not fully--one of the main demands made by the former UGTT leadership who demanded that all trade unionists--"without exception"--be allowed to stand for office within the UGTT while the government's view is that, under the law, no condemned person can hold office unless he has benefitted from an amnesty. However, seven former leadership members, including former UGTT secretary general Habib Achour, still living under house arrest, have not received a pardon. Is that an obstacle? It is not generally thought to be and they will probably also be pardoned sooner or later, as Mr Mzali hinted when he said that the people pardoned on Monday only constitute "an initial group."

Whatever happens the gesture which Mr Bourguiba has just made and his avowed intention to finally close the "black Thursday" affair should help to ease social tension somewhat before the UGTT congress is held on 20 January. That congress should enable the trade union to regain an audience which it lost almost 3 years ago and to overcome reservations still shown in places despite the support given by a big majority of the former trade union leaders to the open policy which was introduced a few months ago.

CSO: 4400

PAPER CALLS FOR CONFRONTING REAGAN'S POLICY

CF101633 Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 7 Nov 80 p 1

[Editorial: "This Is How Reagan Spoke; How Should the Arabs Reply"?]

[Excerpts] This is Reagan, the new man of the United States. He is insulting us all, regardless of our political views and ideas. He went so far as to insult Arab honor and dignity when he stood in front of the cameras yesterday to say that he will continue to pursue his election campaign policy "that the PLO is a terrorist organization," thus repeating the words of Meir, Rabin and Begin and all the clique plotting against Palestine's Arabism and the Arab nation's future. Reagan's statement yesterday reveals the intentions of his administration. If he doesn't recognize the PLO because "it wasn't elected by anybody," he is impudently rejecting the Arab summit resolutions which recognize it as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. He is also rejecting the resolutions of the Islamic Conference Organization, the nonaligned group and the European countries which recognized its full rights diplomatically. Reagan also affirmed his disrespect for the United Nations, its affiliated organizations, and all humanitarian unofficial international organizations which recognized the PLO as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in their homeland and abroad. If there is any explanation for this stand, it is simply that Reagan is telling all Arabs that he is "with Israel all the way."

Therefore, there must be a wise and responsible Arab stand toward the United States and its allies after Reagan's victory. It is a stand required politically. It is required principally from the Arab conferees who met in Baghdad and Tunisia and agreed on the "minimum decisions" in order to arise against the open challenge which Reagan declared yesterday, not only to face decisively the U.S. hostility declared by Regan, but also to take the historic opportunity which the current situation offers them so as to take the offensive against all their enemies, whatever their nationalities and identities.

The Amman summit which will be held shortly will face a knotty problem. It must decide whether to accept Reagan's words on the "terrorism" of the PLO or respond to the historic challenge and begin the required national strategy on the road to the total liberation of Palestine.

CSO: 4802

CIRCUMSTANCES OF NEW GOVERNMENT DESCRIBED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 24 Oct 80 p 27

/Article by Sulayman al-Farzali: "The New Government in San'a': The People of the South Bet on Nasir While Those in the North Bet on the Sea!"/

/Text/ The people of Yemen have skills in the arts of politics, war, poetry and wit which are not to be ignored. Even the silence which Arabs have found fault among the Yemens for, comparing every silent person to "a delegate from the Yemen," conceals an ambivalence which is to be considered a skill in Yemen. It has been said that the most skilled of Yemenis in the modern era is al-Qadi 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Iryani, the former president, who entered into every conspiracy which royal Yemen, then republican Yemen, witnessed, reaching the execution square, indeed the execution mat, more than once only to come out safe and innocent. Perhaps the most skilful thing al-Iryani did in his long political life was to prefer safety, when he was sitting on the throne of the Hamid-al-Din family as president, and retire of his own accord. It was not odd that two of his successors, al-Hamdi and al-Ghashmi, in succession, met their death through a certain skill in conspiracy and killing.

No one knows exactly why governments in Yemen change. Governments generally change in order that conditions may change, except in Yemen, where conditions have no relationship to governments. Anyone reading Republican Decrees No 7 and No 8 issued this 15 October, appointing al-Qadi 'Abd-al-Rahman al-'Arashi and Mr 'Abd-al-Ghani Salih vice presidents and Dr 'Abd-al-Karim 'Ali al-Iryani the new prime minister, will realize how numerous and complex the laws and permanent and temporary constitutional proclamations issued in Yemen in the recent period are. The legal and constitutional preface to the decree is 10 lines and the decree itself is 10 words!

The Yemenis are wise to show disdain for the large number of laws in a country which has gone through many centuries in one. They say that the more the corruption of the government increases, the more the laws proliferate!

Some Yemenis attribute the latest change in government to the long life of the previous government which was headed by 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Ghani. They say that 'Abd-al-Ghani's government spent 6 whole years "in power," from 1974 to 1980, the longest period any government has lasted in any Arab country, or even in any foreign country, which is the biggest proof of the stability Yemen is experiencing. However, others see proof of the contrary in that and say that the killing of two presidents in that period proves, in addition to instability, that a proliferation

of years in power is the same as a paucity of them. Government in Yemen serves; it does not govern. Therefore also the proliferation of ministers is the same as a paucity of them. Although the new government contains more than 20 ministers in the form of respected professors and doctors, its strong man number three, and the three are military men. Heading the three strong men is Lt Col Mujahid Abu Shawarib, the deputy premier for internal affairs; then there are Lt Col 'Ali 'Atarab, the minister of the interior ('athrab in Yemen is a kind of herb), who has assumed this position in the place of Lt Col Muhammad Khamis--nicknamed in San'a' "the man who knows a lot," in view of the fact that he is in charge of national security, that is, intelligence--who has been given the Ministry of Local Administration. There is no doubt that this is the most important change in the Yemeni government. Some people consider it a demotion in rank for Muhammad Khamis; indeed, it is being whispered about in San'a' that this is preparation for isolating him and charging him with responsibility for previous events!

One joke the Yemenis tell of their new government is the statement--based on the names, not the personalities, of ministers--"the right name in the right place." Among the names bandied about in these jokes is that of 'Abdallah al-Kirshi, minister of public works, 'Ali al-Thaur, minister of foreign affairs, 'Ali al-Samman, minister of religious endowments, Muhammad al-Shalahti, minister of economy, Dr Muhammad Ahmad al-Kibab, minister of health, Fu'ad al-Aghbari, minister of development, and Ahmad al-Shajin, minister of state for People's Assembly affairs, whose name, among the Yemenis, has become "the al-Shajun /anxiety/ Assembly."

The al-Wazir family also has a finger in every pie in Yemen; Isma'il al-Wazir has become minister and has changed his portfolio. He was minister of justice in the preceding government and is now minister of civil service and administrative reform. The Ministry of Justice has fallen into the hands of a military man, Lt Col Muhsin al-'Alafi.

A Yemeni who was closely affiliated with the three professors at the beginning of the republican era (the three professors are al-Qadi al-Iryani, al-Nu'man Senior and al-Zubayri, who was killed in an ambush set for him as he was going about on a donkey proselytizing for the Party of God) states:

The conditions of Yemenis is better than the conditions of Yemen. While Yemenis complain of poverty, it is not because they are poor, but because "grousing is the key to a livelihood." They spend more storing up qat than the English spend drinking beer. Much aid is coming from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in direct form, and the Yemenis working in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf transfer hundreds of millions of dollars a month to Yemen. Even Saudi officials became fed up with the Yemeni demands one day and said "Our oil gushes forth in Saudi Arabia but flows into Yemen!"

The Yemenis also claim that their country is swimming on a sea of oil but that there is a conspiracy on the part of the companies, foreign countries and some Arab oil states deliberately to neglect exploration activities in Yemen for political purposes, in order to keep Yemen weak. When the Yemenis tell you about their alleged oil, they outwit the most proficient geologists. Therefore they are now optimistic over the appointment of Prof 'Ali al-Bahr as minister of state and

chairman of the Oil Organization, on grounds that the sea ("bahr") of oil will become an actual fact!

It is a strange coincidence that no change takes place in San'a' without a similar thing happening in Aden. As soon as a new government was formed in North Yemen, the president of South Yemen, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, announced a change in his government, as if there was a single motive force for events in the two countries, and this was proved categorically the day the two presidents of the two countries were killed on one day, perhaps in one conspiracy!

In North Yemen, al-Hamdi went, then al-Ghashmi went, before affairs were assigned to 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, and in South Yemen Salim Rubay' 'Ali then 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il went before affairs were assigned to 'Ali Nasir Muhammad. The two Yemens fight with one another and talk about unity with the same enthusiasm. No two Yemenis /meet/ without talking about unity. In our meeting with 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Ghani, the former prime minister of Yemen, at the same time last year, when he was on an official visit to Britain and the British authorities detained his private airplane, we asked him "Isn't there a middle solution in Yemen between war and unity, either war or unity?" In his opinion, that would not change the essence of the matter. Perhaps he meant that that would not change anything in the nature of the game.

The game in Yemen is complex. It has been said that al-Ghashmi was killed by the explosion of a bomb in a valise carried by an emissary of the Aden president. When unity talks were going on in San'a' last summer, it was said that members of the northern opposition in the southern delegation were killed under obscure circumstances. The opposition National Democratic Front, which is in exile in Aden, said that Dr 'Abd-al-Salam al-Damini and his two brothers were killed last 28 August under obscure circumstances. Thus union coexists with war and nothing is changed in the essence of things!

However, San'a', contrary to Aden, does not feel Arab isolation. In addition to the Saudi aid, North Yemen receives generous aid from Iraq, which has given favored status to the Yemeni Ba'th Party which the latter does not enjoy in the south, as it has become like a governing party in San'a', causing the left-wing opposition parties to take a negative stand toward it. Good relations between San'a' and Baghdad appeared at their most intense when the war broke out between Iraq and Iran. 'Ali Salih was one of Iraq's most intense enthusiasts, after King Husayn. It is said that Iraqi warplanes used Yemeni airfields after being moved from Saudi airfields.

The Yemenis, northern and southern, know that the game goes on and that change is not a means for stability but is the fuel for a new struggle. When Muhammad Salih Muti' was removed in Aden, the leader of the Aden opposition, "Abd-al-Qawwi Makkawi, who directs his attack against the South Yemeni regime from Cairo and Baghdad, said "The removal of Muhammad Salih Muti' can remain only an unanswered question. Every domestic political or party crisis has a repercussion. All wings will continue to fight among themselves as long as there is a struggle for power and partners continue to seek their share of the profits and spoils!"

al-Makkawi left the line open to 'Ali Nasir, on whom Arab countries like Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Egypt are also gambling. In this regard, "Abd-al-Qawwi Makkawi says, "However, what we are demanding is the boldness on "ali Nasir's part to declare the abandonment of Communism, declare the dissolution of the Communist Party, and abandon his connection to foreign subservience--on condition that all these policies be not tactical or temporary."

The North Yemenis do not rule out that this gamble on President 'Ali Nasir will bear fruit, but they prefer to bet on 'Ali al-Bahr!

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2 December 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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PLO 'GOVERNMENT' IN LEBANON DESCRIBED BY ISRAELI PAPER

Tel Aviv BAMAHANEH in Hebrew 3 Sep 80 pp 16, 17

[Article by Hayim Raviv: "Lebanon or Palestine?"]

[Text] It is unknown to the general public. No one declared its establishment, however in a part of Lebanese territory it takes on a form--"a state within a state" under PLO adiministration, which considers Lebanon its most important and perhaps its last stronghold.

There are many signs of its state-like nature. The PLO has the most powerful military force in Lebanon if one does not take the Syrian force into account. (The PLO military force today consists of about 15-20,000 men). This PLO power was one of the factors which led to the disintegration of the administration in this country. There are two background factors in the creation of this military enclave in Lebanon: the ejection of the terrorists from Jordan in 1970 and the military confronatation between the terrorists and the Syrians during the civil war in this country. The Palestinian military force in Lebanon, which is completely subordinate to the PLO (with the Fatah as the dominant factor), is designed to serve three basic purposes:

* To preserve the PLO's maneuverability within the framework of the struggle between the internal forces in Lebanon and to protect the Palestinian population there;

"To build and consolidate military structures which will constitute the nucleus of the national army of the expected Palestinian state;

*To serve the effort of attacking Israel.

Besides the army, the PLO also has its own territory in Lebanon, which extends southward from the outskirts of Beirut to the Litani. In this region, the terrorists are virtually the only military force, especially since the Syrians evacuated their forces early in the year from the Tyre-Sidon region. One of the characteristics of this "state" is its control of movement to and from it by means of the terrorist roadblocks on its borders.

"The Government"--The PLO Executive Committee

In Lebanon the PLO maintains a complete system of "governmental" institutions--political, military, economic, social, and propaganda. The Palestinian

government, in the form of the PLO Executive Committee, is located in Lebanon. As of now it consists of 14 members, and it meets about once a week, for the most part in Beirut, under the chairmanship of the PLO leader, Yasir Arafat. This forum generally discusses current, political, and security matters, and its decisions are dictated by the Fatah, the main group in the PLO.

Alongside the Executive Committee, which is a political forum, is a military body in the form of the Supreme Military Council. It is a kind of integration of the ministerial committee for security affairs and the general staff. This institution handles specific military matters, and it convenes especially against the background of events and internal tensions occurring in the Lebanese area. Its decisions are operative, and it is also headed by Yasir Arafat.

The legislative authority is the "National Council," which was to meet once a year but actually convenes once every 2 years. The last session of the Council, like the previous sessions, was to have been convened in Beirut, however for security reasons it was decided not to do so. The Council consists of 301 members dispersed throughout the Arab world, and its decisions are adopted by a majority, understandably held by the Fatah.

The PLO also has a "judicial authority" in Lebanon, which consists of a general prosecutor, military and civil revolutionary courts, and prisons. This authority's jurisdiction is limited to criminal and disciplinary matters. Its establishment in 1973 came about against the background of an increase in irregularities and crimes within the PLO establishment, and its function is based on laws established by its leadership and approved in 1979, such as the criminal jurisdiction law and the revolutionary penal law.

The revolutionary penal law encompasses all Palestinians whatever they are--activists and non-activists in the PLO structure--and also those who are non-Palestinians but who have committed by its definition a crime against the PLO. The law encompasses all crimes committed where there is a PLO presence and everyone who commits crimes outside the jurisdiction of the "Palestinian Movement." In such a case the guilty party is punished in accordance with the PLO jurisdiction law even though he is punished in accordance with the law of the country in which the crime took place.

The PLO bureaus and offices which support and operate the extensive diplomatic and propaganda apparatus of this organization throughout the world are located in Lebanon.

Alongside the political system, a system of PLO economic and welfare institutions is also being established in Lebanon. The most prominent enterprise in this area is "Samad," which is considered by some to be the nucleus of a future "Palestinian Federation of Labor," and some describe it as a concern. Samad provides employment for 3,000 Palestinians in Lebanon. As an economic enterprise, it represents a not insignificant source of income for the PLO.

According to a Palestinian source, the workers are represented at all echelons of the institution by means of revolutionary committees, and they also share in the management and profits and enjoy optimal social conditions. Samad combines within it 35 enterprises--for food and clothing commodities, textiles and plastics,

furniture, toys, handicraft workshops, and so forth. It also has a section for military production which is responsible for "defense" production enterprises which employ many Palestinian engineers. This refers to workshops for artificial limbs which provide limbs and aids for PLO wounded, workshops for the manufacture of communications equipment, workshops for vehicle maintenance, enterprises for the production of television stands and parts, a publishing house, and so forth. Samad also has a section for agricultural affairs, which operates agricultural projects in African countries--Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda. More than 160 Palestinian engineers and technicians supervise 1,800 African workers in this framework. At this stage, this refers to six joint agricultural projects for the raising of poultry and livestock and for agricultural produce.

Samad, which was established about 10 years ago, also has its own publication and a department for motion pictures and information which produces documentary and feature films. In recent years Samad has had financial difficulties, suspensions of production for security reasons, and professional manpower problems. Because of these difficulties, it was forced to close some of its enterprises. Samad, which was first established as a charity association for PLO wounded, is now endeavoring to develop extensive commercial relations with a number of countries, especially with Arab countries and those in the Eastern Bloc from which it imports equipment and raw materials. Its enterprises have succeeded in introducing products into the markets of the Arab countries where they are duty-free. Until now Samad has participated as the PLO representative in 36 international exhibitions where publications on the Palestinian people's dress customs, history, and attachment to Palestine have been distributed.

There is no doubt that social and economic considerations lie at the basis for the establishment of this institution, however one must not ignore the political implications: the desire to establish an economic system which will become a nucleus for a future Palestinian state or as described in a PLO publication, "to establish a Palestinian revolutionary nucleus which will implement the economic independence of the Palestinian revolution on the territory of the liberated Palestinian homeland."

In this connection, it is known that an economic delegation from India will come to Lebanon in order to assist the PLO in building a Palestinian industrial foundation in this country.

The PLO also has its own "Kupat Holim" [Workers Sick Fund] in Lebanon, although it is limited to the families of terrorists who are serving in the PLO ranks--combatants, wounded, and captured. The Fund, which is based on PLO membership dues and voluntary participation, provides complete health services to all the eligible families, from examinations to hospitalization and surgery.

The main hospitals of the Palestinian Kupat Helim [Workers Sick Fund] in Lebanon are under the management of the Palestinian Red Crescent Association, and they are concentrated primarily in Beirut. Other medical centers of the Fund are in Sidon, Tyre, Nabatiyah, Al Biqa', Tripoli, Baalbek, etc.

Information in the Spirit of the Palestinian Covenant

The Fund membership is 2o to 30,000, and there is now an internal dispute within the PLO over the expansion of the membership and adding all the PLO people, and not only the activists, to the Fund. The PLO health services include, of course, also the Palestinian Red Crescent Association, which was founded a short time after the Six-Day War. This association maintains branches in virtually all of the Arab countries, and it has extensive medical services and broad ties with various humanitarian organizations thorughout the world.

Another body which belongs to the Palestinian establishment in Lebanon is the Institution for Social Affairs, which works primarily in providing welfare services to the families of the terrorists in the various factions in the areas of finances, education, and health. Families who breadwinners have been killed or wounded as a result of terrorist actions receive a permanent monthly allocation. According to a Palestinian source, eligible families who live in Palestine, read: Israel, also receive their allocation in a special way.

The institution provides education to the children of terrorists who have been killed or captured, from kindergarten to higher education. In Lebanon the institution has established 11 kindergartens which contain about 1,200 children, On the primary and intermediate educational levels, the institution provides assistance to students in countries where there are no free schools for the families of the casualties. The institution also provides grants for higher education for the children of those killed and captured, and in certain instances, the institution also pays the tuition of ordinary Palestinian students. The institution also provides free vocational training for the Palestinian youth by giving preferential treatment to the children of casualties and the captured. It conducts courses designed to eliminate illiteracy in the camps, and it distributed propaganda materials in the various Palestinian population centers. Another group which benefits from the institution are the retirees, those with a terrorist past. The institution also established a special cemetery for Palestinians.

The PLO leadership devotes special attention to the youth. Eleven years ago branches for youth and sports affairs, with their center in Beirut, were established in several Arab countries. In 1974 the Youth and Sports Federation, the purpose of which was to prepare a generation of young leaders, to foster a spirit of loyalty and sacrifice for the Palestinian movement, and to implant among the youth the historical and geographical attachment to Palestine, was established in Lebanon. The association maintains close ties with similar bodies in the Arab world and is now working for acceptance as a member of the International Youth and Sports Federation. Full membership is granted to those who satisfy certain criteria, however even those who are not Palestinian are permitted to join the sports clubs.

The PLO in Lebanon also has institutions for research, the press, and the radio. The Institute for Palestinian Studies is involved in theoretical studies on Israel and Palestine and distributes various propaganda publications throughout the world. There is a flourishing Palestinian press in Lebanon. The PLO itself has two main publications: FALASTIN AL-THAWRA (Revolutionary Palestine)

and SHU'UN FALASTINIYA (Palestinian Affairs). The PLO's main radio station is in Lebanon and is called Voice of the Palestinian Revolution. It broadcasts 5 hours a day, and its broadcasts are directed at all the Palestinians in the region. Its "information" policies are based on the Palestinian Covenant, and its broadcasts include programs aimed at the youth who were born outside the Land of Israel: conversations with terrorists, lessons in the history of Palestine, acquaintanceship with the Arabs of the Land of Israel and the Palestinian homeland, and conversations with writers and poets on practical cultural subjects.

5830
CSO: 4805

PLO OFFICIAL CRITICIZES JORDANIAN ATTITUDE

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 17 Sep 80 p 15

[Article: "Abu-Iyad: 'Our Relations with Jordan Require Immediate Review'"]

[Text] Yesterday a prominent Palestinian official in Beirut warned that "continuation of the relation between the Palestinian resistance and the Jordanian regime without precepts will lead to a catastrophe."

In an interview with the newspaper AL-SAFIR published yesterday, member of the Central Committee of the Fatah fedayeen movement Salah Khilf, "Abu-Iyad," admitted that relations between the Palestinian resistance and "the Jordanian regime in the present form will cause us various difficulties."

He added, "At a time when Palestinian officials are going to Jordan and sitting down with Jordanian officials during negotiations, Jordanian Intelligence is launching campaigns of police raids and arrests against the sons of our Palestinian and Jordanian people." Abu-Iyad said that this matter requires immediate review.

In his interview, Abu-Iyad talked about the European initiative with regard to the Middle East. He said, "Some Arabs don't want to use oil. Therefore, they resort to confirming the soundness of the European initiative in order to cover up their own positions. The truth is that the European initiative is part of American policy."

On the other hand, the Palestinian official asserted that the Palestinian resistance had "documents" proving the participation of the Lebanese Phalangist Party in an explosion which occurred in Bologne, Italy last month killing many people.

He said, "Terrorists from a number of West European fascist parties are being trained in training camps run by the Phalangist Party." He added, "Elements of these fascist parties are training to undertake demolition operations in West Europe."

French authorities have arrested a member of an Italian right-wing party on the charge of being connected with the Bologne explosion.

Abu-Iyad warned against the growing deterioration of the Arab position. He said, "If we, the Palestinian resistance and Syria, don't stand up and join together to meet the challenges, the Arab position will further deteriorate and retreat."

As for the attitude of the Palestinian resistance toward the recently proclaimed union of Syria and Libya, he said, "The resistance must take its place in this union, and it will certainly be at its heart."

7811
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FORMATION OF MAGHREBIAN LEAGUE FOR PEACE, SOLIDARITY

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 25 Oct 80 p 6

[Article: "A League for Solidarity and Peace in the Maghreb"]

[Text] The League for Solidarity and Peace in the Maghreb will be created as soon as its founders have completed the legal formalities required.

The idea of such an association, in response to the necessity for a revival of a common action for cooperation and rapprochement of the Maghrebian people, sprung in the minds of a number of Tunisian intellectuals following the Ninth Maghrebian Medical Congress which, for the first time in several years, had gathered Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian physicians in Rabat.

Thus, at a meeting attended by Tunisian university professors and writers, journalists and lawyers, and officials of various social and economic organizations, last 28 May in Tunis, it had been decided to provide--not impromptu but as a carefully thought-out action--the conditions necessary to translate Maghrebian solidarity into concrete facts, every day, an idea which has long been dear to the Maghrebians but which changing circumstances have sometimes put sorely to the test.

Thus, and in memory of the relations which have been forged between so many Maghrebians for so long during the struggle for national independence, and as an homage to all the martyrs who have died for the cause of a unified and solidary Maghreb, the Tunisian founding members of the League for Solidarity and Peace in the Maghreb have felt it their duty to use all means available to revive and strengthen the spirit of inter-Maghrebian cooperation, regardless of all borders and ulterior motives, and on the basis of reciprocal equality and solidarity.

In addition, in the troubled times which the Arab nation is now experiencing, they consider that, now more than ever, there should be no question of insulting the future.

Thus the necessity for a permanent and ever renewed call to reason and to the union of minds and hearts, in a climate of peace and concord which is made imperative for more than one reason precisely by the sore test to which our Maghreb is put today.

On the basis of these principles, and in the light of experience, it thus became apparent that only a patient and unrelenting action, continued untiringly day after day, and going beyond the effects of prevailing circumstances, could bring us closer to these objectives which so imperatively condition our common fate.

It is, therefore, in this spirit that the by-laws of the League for Solidarity and Peace in the Maghreb have been prepared, and that its founding members have committed themselves to work. Their goal is to carry on any action which would promote peace and concord, and to encourage all good wills working in that direction, without any exclusion. At the same time, they intend to contribute to the preservation and strenghtening of inter-Maghrebian relations, by giving them the most privileged status, especially in the social, cultural and economic domains, so as to fulfill the deep-seated aspirations of our respective people.

In this case, the visits recently paid to Algeria and Morocco by high Tunisian officials with Mr Mohamed Mzali, prime minister, at their head, have probably warmed the heart of all Maghrebians. Through the concrete decisions which were made at the highest level, they have contributed to stress in the most outstanding manner the existing desire for understanding and rapprochement which each Maghrebian harbors at the bottom of his heart.

To help further concretize this desire, the call to mutual assistance and concord which we, in our turn, are now making must:

1) make use of all information and communication media, such as press articles, publications, periodicals, symposia and meetings;

2) further mutual relations, especially between the youth and cadres at all levels; this can be achieved by promoting the circulation of persons and the exchange of experiences, especially in the scientific, technical, economic, social and cultural fields;

3) finally, in our mutual interest, help promote cooperation between various agencies, organizations and institutions in the three countries.

With a view to helping in the progressive realization of these objectives, the founding members of the League for Solidarity and Peace in the Maghreb have also agreed to work toward the creation of similar associations in other Maghreb countries and, later on, to gather all these "regional" associations into a single Maghrebian federation; in the meanwhile, the Tunisian league would like to have correspondents in the three brother countries.

To this end, the founding members have formed a provisional enlarged board of directors with, as chairman, Mr Hamed Zeghal, former secretary of state to the minister of National Education and general manager of the Tunisian Agency for Technical Cooperation.

A wide range of people are represented on the board: it includes university professors, Drs Sleim Ammar, Abdelwahab Bouhdida and Mohamed Fantar, officials of large social impact organizations, Mrs Dordana Masmoudi and Mrs Souad Chater, Mr Ahmed Amara, a union official, member of the National Union Commission, Mrs Aziza Quahchi, president of the council of the order of pharmacists, writers representing the Tunisian writers' union, Messrs Mustapha Fersi, Abdelaziz Kacem, Ahmed Kedidi and Noureddine Samoud, heads of enterprises and representatives of economic and financial agencies, Messrs Habib Ghemim, Mokhtar Fakhfakh, Ali Boukkris and Mustapha Driss, lawyers, including Mr Rachid Sabagh, president at the Court of Appeals, and Lazhar El Karoui Chabbi, president of the order of barristers, physicians, including Dr Hamouda Ben Slama, assistant general secretary of the Union of Arab Physicians, Dr Hedi Mhenni, professor of pediatrics and medical journalist, Dr Rifaat Daly, demographer and an eager pioneer of family planning, and finally, representing the important press and information sector, Messrs Abdelwahab Abdallah, Abdeljelil Damak, Ridha Najar and Fethi Houidi.

The provisional board of directors of the League for Solidarity and Peace in the Maghreb, placing itself above all special interests, calls for all those who believe in the higher interest of an independent and solidary Maghreb to support the league in achieving its noble goals.

The league is expecting adhesions, letters of support and any other concrete forms of solidarity at its provisional headquarters in Tunis, at the House of Culture Ibn Khaldoun.

By that, it intends to underline how much the name of the great Maghrebian who Ibn Khaldoun was, engraved on the frontispiece of its headquarters, can symbolize the unity and perreniality of the Maghreb through the greatness and vicissitudes of its history.

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GUIGA'S TALKS WITH SAUDIS ON COOPERATION RELATED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 29 Oct 80 p 4

[Excerpts] President Habib Bourguiba, yesterday at 1810 at the Palace of Carthage, received Driss Guiga, a member of the Political Bureau and minister of the Interior. Mr Guiga stated after the interview that after his return from the Holy Places he had met with the Supreme Combatant, to whom he gave a report of the mission the chief of state had entrusted to him, as head of the delegation of Tunisian pilgrims.

Mr Guiga said, "I am eager to express my strong thanks to the Saudi authorities, who wrapped the pilgrims in great solicitude, despite the difficulties engendered by the gathering together of 2,000,000 Muslims during a very short period and in a place no larger than 20 km."

Concerning Saudi support for the development in Tunisia, the minister said:

"I had an opportunity to meet with King Khaled Ibn Abdelaziz of Saudi Arabia on two occasions: the first was when I presented to him wishes and greetings from the Tunisian president, government and people to the Saudi king, government and people.

"The second meeting with the Saudi sovereign concerned the relations between Tunisia and Saudi Arabia, especially in foreign policy following the statements made by an Arab chief of state, which troubled minds in Saudi Arabia, on the subject of the pilgrimage.

"In connection with bilateral relations, we mentioned section on cooperation for development, all the more so because the Saudi leaders have for a long time strongly supported Tunisia's development effort.

"That effort, thanks to Saudi aid, has been able to realize several projects. Saudi Arabia, with the agreement of the Tunisian Government and its concerned organs, especially the Planning and Finance Ministry, is currently engaged in drawing up other projects to be realized in the context of bilateral cooperation. I believe the symposium currently being held in Tunis under the chairmanship of Mansour Moalla, the minister of Planning and Finance, with the participation of business men, investors and representatives of Arab financial institutions--Saudi institutions in particular--will end with positive results for promoting Arab investment in the Arab world and and the future of relations between the Arab countries in general and between Tunisia and Saudi Arabia in particular.

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BOURGUIBA'S COMMENTS ON ARAB INVESTMENT SYMPOSIUM REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 30 Oct 80 pp 1, 5

[Text] Yesterday morning in the White Salon of the Palace of Carthage President Bourguiba received the participants in the symposium on Arab investment in the Arab world, which was organized in Tunis.

The audience was attended by Mansour Moalla, the minister of Planning and Finance, Abdelaziz Lasram, minister of the National Economy, and Lassaad Ben Osman, minister of Agriculture, as well as several ambassadors from Tunisia accredited in the Arab countries represented in the symposium.

At the beginning of the interview the chief of state shook his guests' hands one by one, wishing them every success in their work and a pleasant stay in Tunisia.

Addressing the participants next, the president of the Republic said, "I have followed with interest the work of the symposium on Arab investment, in which Mohamed Mzali in the opening session defined Tunisia's development needs."

The chief of state also expressed his pleasure at the seriousness that characterized the work of the symposium, and also the sincere desire to participate in the realization of development projects in Tunisia, pointing out that this margin of confidence is due to our country's stability, to its good intentions and also to its respect for pledges to pay its debts within the specified time. This has enhanced Tunisia's prestige and enabled it to enjoy a good image in the Arab world.

After emphasizing the disposition France has shown to form a Tunisian-Arab-French bank, the president of the Republic indicated that Tunisia desires to cooperate with the countries that are its brothers and friends in order to make its development objectives concrete, all the more so because it has no important oil wealth.

The chief of state indicated along that line that Tunisia is continuing to prospect its subsoil, emphasizing the promising horizons in gas production. He also brought up the good relations tying Tunisia to Algeria, recalling the common project to install the Algerian-Tunisian-Italian gas pipeline.

On the other hand, the Supreme Combatant underlined the measures taken by the government to rehabilitate the social climate by forming a national labor union commission chaired by the son of the martyred Leader Farhat Hached, and charged with preparing for the next congress of the Tunisian General Labor Union and the election of a directorate representing the workers.

"Tunisia, because of its characteristics, is the best guarantee of the success of the projects it envisages realizing in cooperation with you," added President Bourguiba. "My choice of Mohamed Mzali, that great man, for prime minister will contribute to strengthening that cooperation. I am optimistic about the success of the new plan, which I have entrusted to Mansour Moalla, one of the men best known because of their experience."

The chief of state also recommended activating the realization of the projects decided upon, especially those that concern the tourist sector. He also brought up the question of agricultural cooperation, particularly in the fishing and livestock raising sectors.

In conclusion President Bourguiba told of his conviction that Tunisia is still on the right path and that it will realize the objectives of dignity and progress to which it aspires.

During this interview Mansour Moalla informed the chief of state of the results of the symposium on Arab investment, and of the success that crowned the work, thanks to the participation of representatives of five funds and large investment companies in the Arab world.

Dr Abdellatif Al Hamed, general director of the Kuwaiti Development Fund, gave a speech before the chief of state in which he expressed on behalf of the participants in the symposium his thanks and gratitude to Tunisia for having hosted this Arab meeting and stimulated Arab cooperation, not only between the Arab chiefs of state and their governments, but also between the business men and the Arab peoples.

"Tunisia has particularities such as stability, wise leadership and good management, which can assure the inter-Arab cooperation the effectiveness expected of it," he concluded.

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FORMATION OF NEW TUNISIAN-KUWAITI BANK PREVIEWED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 30 Oct 80 p 6

[Article by Yahia Barouni: "The Forming of a Tunisian-Kuwaiti Bank With 100,000,000 Dinars in Capital"]

> [Text] The Symposium on Arab Investment in the Arab World ended yesterday morning after three days of candid and lively discussion. The closing session was marked by the signing of the agreement establishing the Tunisian-Kuwaiti Investment Bank, capital for which is 100,000,000 Tunisian dinars. The convention was signed on the Tunisian side by Mansour Moalla, the minister of Planning and Finance, and on the Kuwaiti side by Meiren Al Ahmad, ambassador from Kuwait in Tunis. Abdelaziz Lasram, the minister of the National Economy, and the participants in the symposium witnessed the signing ceremony.

In a speech for the occasion Mansour Moalla called this financial institution unique of its kind because of the volume of its capital and its future impact on Tunisia's socio-economic development.

Mansour Moalla pointed out next the speed with which Tunisia and Kuwait arrived at drawing up the convention, which, he announced, was decided upon by common agreement in the space of one hour.

In that same connection Mansour Moalla paid homage to his Kuwaiti counterpart, Abderrahman Al-Atiki, and to Badr Abdallah Rachid, the under secretary for investment and foreign economic affairs in the Kuwaiti Finance Ministry, for their meritorious efforts to translate the formation of this financial institution into a reality.

Mansour Moalla also paid ringing homage to Majren Ahmed Al-Hamad, who, he said, was the principal architect of the founding of the bank.

Mansour Moalla expressed the hope that the bank will be the link in a chain of jointly-owned Tunisian-Arab banks.

For his part, the ambassador from Kuwait, who signed the convention on behalf of the Kuwaiti Finance Ministry, wished the institution every success, expressing the hope that the Tunisian-Kuwaiti cooperation will constitute a model to be followed by the Arab countries.

Badr Abdallah Rachid expressed pleasure in his turn over the signing of the convention, which in itself, he noted, is "a beginning and not an end."

On the day before, a working session brought together the representatives of the Arab Development Fund and several Tunisian leaders. Abdelaziz Lasram, the minister of the National Economy, Lassaad Ben Osman, minister of Agriculture, and Brahim Khouja, secretary of state for the Transportation and Communications Ministry, in charge of PTT [Postal, Telephone and Telegraph], attended the session, in the course of which the participants listened to reports on the principal projects that Tunisia expects to realize under the sixth plan, in the financing of which Arab investors may participate.

Bureaucracy, a Curb on Investment

Arab deposits in Western countries could and should be partly oriented to the Arab world, but difficulties still exist, some participants stated. Bureaucracy and administrative sluggishness are problems afflicting a great many Arab countries. This symposium, therefore, should result in conclusions that would make it possible to surmount them. The speakers also emphasized the need to increase the contacts between Arab investors, so they can exchange experiences in this area. Tax legislation, import-export procedures, the capability of local contractors and other difficulties connected with simply tracing foreign legislation that is ill-adapted to the realities of the Arab world are so many problems to be solved.

To attract Arab capital deposited abroad, it is necessary above all to create a climate of confidence that can make investors feel secure and assure them a minimum of guarantee and gain, other participants in the conference said.

Speaking as part of the discussion, Mansour Moalla indicated that from 1974 to 1980 he has been in charge of financial institutions and for that reason has been able to see first-hand the negative repercussions of bureaucracy on development. "This is why," he said, "considering the importance of the planned projects, we will work together to relax the administrative formalities for the benefit of a better structuring of the Arab economies."

More Interest in Agriculture

This development action, which the mobilization of Arab investments is to be aimed at, other participants added, must be total and not limited to any particular sector. Agriculture deserves interest, because on it depends the solution to the rural exodus and the fulfillment of our nutritional needs. These investments, then, must have positive repercussions, on the economic as well as the social sector.

Investments Outside the Arab World: Similar Risks

With regard to Arab investment in the West, the participants who approached this theme stated that the risks are almost the same as those incurred in the Arab countries. In fact they include the same risks of losses (for example, the problem of

deteriorating terms of exchange). Also, in the same way, nationalization and taxation risks exist in Europe and America, and all of this means, therefore, that stability can only be relative.

Upon the conclusion of the work of the symposium Mansour Moalla took the floor to summarize this meeting's work in 10 points.

Tunisia's new policy in promoting Arab investment is founded on reciprocal interest and gain.

The revision of our policy has resulted in all fields being open to Arab investment and joint Tunisian-Arab investment.

The conclusion to be drawn from this symposium is that it is necessary to put place legislation appropriate to Arab investment. It is likewise necessary to stabilize the Arab manpower in the Arab world.

Tunisia's desire to give priority to Arab capital when resorting to outside financing, this to be done within the framework of a financing plan now under study.

To structure the Tunisian-Arab cooperation by putting in place means of communication and organisms adequate for the continuity of that cooperation.

To prove the effectiveness of the Arab cooperation by the realization of profitable projects.

We express the hope that Tunisia will become a meeting ground for cooperation and an economic base for creating joint projects serving and strengthening Arab cooperation.

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KUWAITI REPRESENTATIVE'S COMMENTS ON INVESTMENT SYMPOSIUM GIVEN

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 31 Oct 80 p 2

[Interview with Ahmed Douij, a representative of the Kuwaiti Real Estate Investment Consortium, in Tunis, by Yahia Barouni; date not given]

> [Text] As a spin-off of the symposium on Arab investment being held in Tunis, we met with Ahmed Douij, the representative of the Kuwaiti Real Estate Investment Consortium, who was kind enough to answer our questions on the Consortium's activities in Tunisia.

[Question] What are the Consortium's activities in Tunisia, particularly in the tourism area?

[Answer] The Consortium is currently in the process of developing five important tourism projects in Tunisia. The first is the "Nejma" hotel complex, which has already been built in Sousse. The other units being built are located in Tunis and Sousse. There is the Diar El Andalous, the Abou Nawas Hotel (which will be ready at the end of next July), the Tunisia-Palace (which is to be renovated) and the "Mechtel" Hotel in the Belvedere.

In the tourism field, the Consortium, through its branch, the CTKD [expansion unknown], is financing the various projects up to a limit of 30,000,000 dinars, for a total cost of 45,000,000 dinars.

Regarding the "Tunisia-Palace," the delay in the work is due to purely procedural questions.

[Question] During the symposium you stated that investing Arab capital in Arab countries is very difficult. What are the reasons for this?

[Answer] Actually, penetration of Arab investment into the Arab world is tough and very difficult. The investor has to have an unshakable will and unfailing patience, because he has to spend a very long time in discussions to convince the various parties. This does not mean he has to despair and abandon everything. On the contrary, he must confront these problems to smoothe them out, because there is no alternative solution.

[Question] What problems are hindering Arab investment in Tunisia, such as those you endured as a pioneer investor?

[Answer] Compared to other Arab countries, the difficulties in Tunisia are minimal. But this certainly doesn't mean that it isn't necessary to fight or close your eyes to them. They are almost all administrative because the desire to receive Arab investment really exists.

The difficulties are due in part to the administrative structures inherited from the colonial period.

The Consortium, through the experience it has acquired in Tunisia, has contributed to their solution and to establishing a certain climate of confidence.

[Question] Is the state of Kuwait a shareholder in the Consortium?

[Answer] Actually, the state of Kuwait participates in the Consortium's capital, encourages its activities and supports them. The Consortium is also active in Kuwait, where it has developed several corporations. It currently taps private Kuwaiti capital and others. As for our relations with the Arab Development Funds, they are not direct, but complementary.

[Question] After new fields have been opened up to Arab investment in Tunisia, does the Consortium envisage expanding its activities?

[Answer] We are very happy about that opening up, because we contributed to creating this new situation, which is favorable to encouraging Arab investment in Tunisia. The opening up of the agricultural sector is very important. On that subject it must be stated that investment does not mean appropriation of land, but the exploitation of land in the common interest, because the land has to remain Tunisian.

The Consortium does not plan to be occupied with this area because there are other Kuwaiti organizations that specialize in industry and agriculture. So our role will be one of making people aware, to induce those institutions to come to Tunisia.

The formation of the Tunisian-Kuwaiti Bank will also certainly contribute to the promotion of the industrial and agricultural sectors.

[Question] Doesn't the political climate in the Arab world discourage Arab investment from coming into the Arab countries?

[Answer] We, as a Consortium, are anxious to state that this climate has no effect on our determination to come and invest in the Arab countries. If we have to take this climate into consideration, we can't do anything but close up shop. It must also be stated that this climate isn't much different from that of other, non-Arab countries. The risk of nationalization, for example, is a danger that today has become minimal in the Arab world. In fact the problem is not one of the risks of nationalization, but rather one of administrative sluggishness. It is certain that change of regime does not appreciably change the investment situation, and that has already been true for several years.

Where Tunisia is concerned, we want to intensify the efforts to make this country an example to follow for Arab cooperation. An example of what can be accomplished by Arab capital if the right climate exists.

[Question] Does the Consortium propose to participate in financing Tunisia's next development plan?

[Answer] Actually, we intend to mobilize 10 percent of the capital intended for the tourism field, around 500,000,000 dinars. We hope the 10-percent figure will just be the minimum.

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RESULTS OF ARAB INVESTMENT SYMPOSIUM DISCUSSED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 28 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Yahia Barouni: "Economic Difficulties To Be Overcome in Strengthening Cooperation"]

[Text] From 27 to 29 October Tunis is hosting an international symposium on "Arab Investment in the Arab Countries."

Mr Mzali, the prime minister, presided yesterday over the opening of the work of this pan-Arab meeting.

There are five fundamental points on the agenda: Arab investment and economic cooperation; unified agreement on Arab investment and its taking place in Arab countries; the current situation and the future of joint Tunisian-Arab projects; and the Arab contribution to Tunisia's development.

During the morning session the participants approached subjects relative to the results of this cooperation in Tunisia, as well as the difficulties standing in the way of its development. In that connection Tunisia is a typical example of the materialization of inter-Arab cooperation; the constant increase in the number of Arab investments participating in development projects is tangible proof. The speakers also reported on their respective experiences and stressed the positive aspects of such cooperation.

Concerning Tunisia's determination to encourage Arab investment, Mr Moalla emphasized that all socio-economic fields are open to all Arab investors, pointing out that the Tunisian government has resolved to strengthen semi-private companies.

At present Arab cooperation in Tunisia is primarily concerned with the tourist sector, which has been the beneficiary of a significant financial contribution (Kuwaiti, Saudian, the Emirates) for building important complexes (El Kantaoui port, Tunis-Nord-Monastir).

In addition to the tourist sector, there is Arab investment in the industrial sector. There is Arab participation in the chemical industries of Gabes and the ICM [Maghreb Chemical Industries].

However, this cooperation is being called upon to be strengthened, despite the economic or structural difficulties hindering its development.

Today we are willing to admit that regional cooperation is a necessity that is beneficial to all parties concerned in it. It can only have positive repercussions on the Arab economy in general and the economy of each Arab country taken individually.

There remains the problem this investment might encounter in the Arab world. Even if all the difficulties cannot be ironed out, participation of Arab funds in the development projects of each country cannot help but be profitable over the short and long terms and cannot help but serve the complementarity and unity of those countries.

As for legislation problems concerned with guaranteeing investment, they do not appear to be insoluble. Legal agreement on Arab investment is already a step in the right direction.

Participation of Arab capital in the development work of each Arab country is of course dependent on the existence of certain conditions, such as basic infrastructure, the country's ability to receive and absorb the capital, the adaptation of financial and economic channels to the transfer of capital and the existence of legislation for regulating and protecting the investments.

The formation of an Arab financial market being the goal, the objective toward which all Arab cooperation is aimed, it goes without saying that the creation of joint inter-Arab companies will contribute and contribute a great deal to strengthening the cooperation, shielding it more from the hazards of politics.

The forming of joint investment companies, common industrial projects, etc., must be done in this context.

Investment does not have to wait, in order to develop, for the radical transformation of the receiving structures, which can only evolve slowly. Likewise, the scarcity of the host countries' markets can be surmounted by creating joint projects having access to the markets of the receiving countries and the investing countries, and by expanding to other Arab countries, and even a third country, with the idea of a triangular cooperation.

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MZALI'S SPEECH TO ARAB INVESTMENT SYMPOSIUM REPORTED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 28 Oct 80 p 5

[Speech by Mohamed Mzali, prime minister, to the Symposium on Arab Investment in the Arab World, at the Hilton Hotel in Tunis, 27 Oct 1980]

[Text] I should like first of all to greet you and welcome you to Tunisia, your second fatherland, which is advancing with steady steps on the path of progress, led by its president, Supreme Combatant Habib Bourguiba, the man who liberated the country from the yoke of colonialism, restored dignity to his fellow citizens and continues to fight with the same vigor, the same determination, against the causes of underdevelopment, such as ignorance and indigence, with a view to winning the wager of civilization and the battle for development.

I should also like to thank you for having been eager, despite your pressing occupations, to participate in this symposium in order to discuss "Arab Investments in the Arab Country," a subject to which we attach a great deal of importance, for we consider the circulation of capital in the Arab countries in the form of investments profitable to all parties as the foundation of any Arab economic action.

The common Arab economic strategy to be discussed at the next summit gives this subject a position of choice, since it recommends putting Arab savings at the service of development in the Arab fatherland.

Honorable guests,

Tunisia, which has with satisfaction welcomed Arab investment by granting it guarantees and privileges, would like on the occasion of this meeting to evaluate its experience in this area by confronting it with other experiences, and to know the opinions and impressions of our brothers on the subject, so we may if necessary reconsider our laws pertaining to investment.

During the last few months we have taken stock of the development we have realized during the decade just ended, which enabled our country to clear important stages in its march toward progress. Encouraging results were recorded, especially in the investment field, in creating jobs, which enabled us to attain an appreciable growth rate.

The organs of the Plan at all levels are at present working out the development strategy for the decade 1982-1991, and for the sixth five-year plan, 1981-1986.

During that period the Tunisian economy will have to face a new big gamble: doubling the investment volume and creating a maximum number of jobs, so we may gradually arrive at controlling the problem.

Our effort in investment matters will be especially oriented toward agriculture and the sector of the processing and tourism industries.

Moreover, during recent years Arab investment, in the tourist and industrial fields, has contributed to the realization of a number of important projects, such as the Sousse-Nord tourist complex, industrial phosphates and chemical products.

We have every reason to hope that Arab investors will support our development effort more effectively during the sixth plan and the next decade. Such an action cannot fail to serve the interest of the Arab nation, to strengthen its economic complementarity, and to promote harmonious development there, supported by the joint efforts of all of us.

To that effect, it is my pleasure to emphasize that Arab investments are timely in the tourist and industrial sectors, for the realization of projects with or without Tunisian participation.

Concerning the agricultural sector, the Tunisian government intends to associate Arab investment with it by means of agricultural contracts or by establishing corporations charged with modernizing and intensifying farming, to respond to the needs of the local market and increase our ability to export to the brother Arab countries. In this way Tunisia intends to contribute to assuring food security in Tunisia and the Arab fatherland.

I am seizing this opportunity to emphasize to you the strategic importance of the agricultural sector in Tunisia and in the Arab world. In Tunisia, a country with great potential in this area--in particular a number of highly-trained technicians and middle managers, agriculture receives various kinds of encouragement. It was in this context that the Supreme Combatant's decisions were taken on raising the prices of certain agricultural products (grains) at the production level--decisions likely to make the farmer feel secure and encourage him to settle on the land. This was obviously an action with very positive political and economic repercussions. For when the citizen is sedentarized on the land of his ancestors and encouraged to create wealth where he is, the charm of the city has no more effect on him, and the problem posed by the rural exodus can only be alleviated. Consequently, sedentarizing the citizen is incontestably a determining factor in safeguarding the country's stability. For in reality, what can threaten companies and overthrow political regimes is overpopulation of the cities and the various problems that demographic phenomenon engenders at all levels.

This is why it is important to work toward achieving demographic equilibrium between regions, by settling the people in their native villages, by providing them with the conditions for a dignified life, which strengthens the foundations of the political regime in place.

The expansion of agriculture is a factor that should not be neglected in any way, because it is an important element in stability; and the Arab world, more than at any other time, needs that stability in order to develop.

On the other hand, a large part of the Arab population lives off agriculture, which young people are loath to devote themselves to; because of this agriculture tends to become the economy's poor relation.

In Tunisia, as an example, the average age of the Tunisian farmers is 55. Thus, it is easy to see how the rural exodus is seriously threatening the future of the agricultural land. This is why it is important to take a firm position vis-a-vis this question. To do so, it is advisable to promote educational methods to make the young people aware of this sector and to develop the rural world, in order to settle the farmers and their sons on the agricultural land.

In addition to the various production sectors, the work of development requires significant investment to put the finishing touches on the economic and social infrastructure, for weakness or absence of infrastructure constitutes the most dangerous obstacle in the path of development, since it reduces the capacity to receive investment.

The brother Arab countries have helped us through the last decade to finance many economic and social infrastructure projects. We hope to continue to benefit from this support, because the Arab development funds are, for Tunisia, the most important contribution, on which it must be able to count in order to build dams, to carry out canalization projects and water supply and electrical energy projects, to construct high schools, colleges, hospitals and roads.

In hydraulics, for example, I inform you that the phreatic layer of the Tunisian south contains significant levels of drinking water which, if we have available the credits necessary for drilling and exploitation, are capable of satisfying the needs of the citizens for drinking water and improving the land of the Tunisian south.

Such a project is easy to accomplish in that it requires, not peak technology but merely investment, to put it into operation.

Possibilities for investment exist in Tunisia, but what is missing are resources for financing and we hope our Arab brothers will furnish us the necessary credits to transform the face of the land for the benefit of men.

There is reason to emphasize, in this connection, that the fact that we are appealing to Arab financial resources to realize our economic projects, including infrastructure, comes from a political option based on the necessity of strengthening the Arab complementarity.

This meeting was organized to proceed with an enriching exchange of ideas on a subject that is vital to the evolution of the Arab nation. I have no doubt whatsoever that this symposium will result in concrete proposals that will enable us to strengthen our ties and further strengthen the cooperation and solidarity between members of the great Arab family, thanks to the virtues that must continue to motivate us: the sincerity of our intentions and our determination to mobilize our material and human resources for the good of our peoples and our young generations who aspire to a better future, one of prosperity and invulnerability.

I should like to point out, in this context and in reply to a question some people might ask about the future for capital invested in Tunisia, that investment, by enabling projects to be launched and creating new jobs, undoubtedly contributes to strengthening the political and social stability of Tunisia.

Unless we work to develop the country's economy and realize projects that generate jobs, unemployment and the disillusionment of the young can be sources of anxiety and disorder. On the other hand, if we invest, if we act together and if we gamble on Tunisia's development, the development of this developing Arab country, we can surmount all of these obstacles, avoid anything likely to [word illegible] to destabilization and discourage all those who seek to bring prejudice to the sovereignty of Tunisia.

Naturally, we must remember, in Tunisia the regime is strong, the Tunisian people is devoted to President Bourguiba. However, it is necessary to work to develop the economy of the country and promote the corporation. To attain this objective we must act--and be--self-confident.

With every new job we create we will be giving birth to a new citizen, integrated into society.

Likewise, every agrocomplex set up can only strengthen our agriculture and our agricultural production, which will naturally reduce our dependence on foreigners and hence strengthen as well our independence, our freedom of decision.

Investment has an economic aspect, a political aspect and a civilizational aspect.

That is why it is incumbent upon us as militants and men of action to assimilate the close tie existing between the economy, policy and civilization, and to set in motion all available means to translate these principles and objectives into deeds.

Once more I welcome you to Tunis and wish you a pleasant stay among us.

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PLANS TO FORM TUNISIAN-ARAB BANKS OUTLINED

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 29 Oct 80 pp 1, 5

Article by Yahia Barouni: "Imminent Creation of Several Tunisian-Arab Banks"]

[Text] Certain Gulf countries are ready to welcome part of the Tunisian manpower.

Toward setting up legislation encouraging Arab investment.

The symposium on "Arab Investment in the Arab World" resumed its work yesterday morning at the Hilton Hotel in Tunis. The day before, representatives from Tunisia met in an afternoon working session with representatives of the Arab financial organizations attending the symposium, to acquaint them with the development plan and the Tunisian economic projects that may be financed by public and private Arab capital.

The morning session opened with a report by Mansour Moalla, the minister of Planning and Finance, who gave a brief survey of the next five-year plan and the prospects for financing that it offers Arab investors by virtue of the large number of projects written into it.

The ensuing discussion enabled the speakers to take up a great many themes concerned with investments, their security, the legislation regulating them in the receiving countries; the question of semi-private and multilateral corporations, etc.

The participants discussed the difficulties that get in the way of investment--difficulties connected with legislation and the actual capability of the host country to receive such capital.

During the same session the chairman of the symposium proposed that the discussion take up the following main themes: the financing of the next Tunisian plan; improvement of the climate (especially the economic climate) of the countries requesting capital; the risks attendant upon investing Arab capital outside of Arab countries; defining the time limit for Arab nationality for the investments; the role of the public and private sectors in financing the development of the Arab world.

Tunisia: a Solvent Country

On the subject of financing for the fifth plan, Mansour Moalla indicated that Tunisia, despite the mobilization of all the national energy and in order to best conduct its work of developing foreign aid in particular, still has need of the capital support that the brother Arab countries continues to furnish.

In this context he expressed the hope that the Arab cooperation which until now has represented 22 percent of the foreign aid will be raised to about 50 percent in the next plan.

Mansour Moalla added that Tunisia, a solvent country enjoying a certain credibility with the international financial authorities, envisages as part of the goal of making Arab investment in Tunisia more profitable, setting up joint investment banks, such as the Tunisian-Kuwaiti, Tunisian-Saudi and Tunisian-Emirates investment banks. to be started up in the next few weeks.

Discussing this section, the participants were led to debate the subject of Arab investment in Tunisia.

The representatives of the Tunisian and Arab financial institutions participating in the symposium were unanimous in noting that Tunisia, which so badly needs Arab investment to finance its socio-economic projects, has not in the past given enough encouragement to Arab investors to invest in our country.

On that subject they recalled certain difficulties that certain Arab financial institutions interested in the Tunisian market had previously been exposed to. They pointed out that the legislation drawn up for that purpose is general in nature and deals with foreign investments, with no distinction between them. Hence they recommended that an opportunity be provided to perfect legal texts appropriate to Arab investment in Tunisia and that substantial encouragement to that end be lavishly bestowed.

The participants emphasized the need to transcend the principle of political good will to establish Tunisian-Arab financial cooperation on legal and practical, clear foundations.

Imminent Creation of a Tunisian-Kuwaiti Bank

Speaking as part of the discussion, Mansour Moalla reassured Arab investors of the Tunisian government's determination to perfect, in the coming months, legislation that will take into account the requirements, needs and peculiarities of Arab investments. "Thus," he said, "in order to translate the Tunisian-Kuwaiti Investment Bank plan into actuality, we have arrived at defining a regulation appropriate to and specific for that Arab institution. There is no reason not to do as much with similar institutions."

Priority to Arab Manpower

On the subject of manpower, the speakers brought out the fact that priority will have to be given to Arab manpower in the requesting countries. In that connection the participants in the conference suggested creating, where Tunisia is concerned, a social attache post which would be concerned with this particular question and

could put the requesters and the offerers of jobs in contact with each other whenever necessary. In fact, some Gulf countries have proposed to Tunisia that they welcome part of the traditional Tunisian manpower.

On that question Mr Moalla stated that he met with the Social Affairs minister to strengthen the social activity of the Tunisian embassies in the Arab world, to see to what extent the market could resorb the surplus of the Tunisians seeking jobs.

The Coexistence of a National Private Sector is Necessary

Concerning the role of the two sectors, public and private, the speakers declared that the coexistence of the two sectors is necessary. The public sector has to be concerned more with donations and loans, while ease of payment is of interest to the basic infrastructure of the Arab countries (heavy industry, energy).

The national private sector of each receiving country is also a necessity and an encouragement giving a feeling of security to the sought-after private capital. This private sector is not to be motivated solely by gain, for it should also be oriented toward Arab national interest.

Awaiting the Arab Common Market

Realization of an Arab common market proving to be difficult, one of the participants stated, it is profitable and logical to begin with a bilateral or multilateral cooperation, or a sectorial cooperation (protection of a particular product on the scale of several Arab countries), in the interest of the participating parties from the Arab world.

These were the main themes approached yesterday morning. In the afternoon a second meeting was to bring together the representatives of the Arab Development Fund and their Tunisian colleagues.

8946
CSO: 4400

LIFT TOURISM BARRIERS, ARAB STATES URGED

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 12 Nov 80 p 3

[Article by Maruf Khwaja]

[Text] Dubai, Nov. 11: It's about time Arab tourists stopped spending billions of dollars on junkets to Europe and America and diverted some of the expenditure to parts of the Arab world where strenuous efforts are being made to develop tourism as a major industry.

But in order for this to come about, it is necessary for Arab governments, individually and collectively, to remove barriers to inter-Arab travel, make greater investments in tourism infrastructures and promote efforts by Arab travel agencies to develop cheaper all-inclusive tours within the Arab world for Arab tourists.

This was the substance of the debate in the morning session of the first day of Arab Travel '80 conference which opened here today under the chairmanship of Asad Naar, head of Middle East Airlines.

Leaders of the Arab travel industry as well as top executives in the business from Europe are included in the three panels which will examine the potential for Arab travel in the decade of the eighties in sessions spread over two days at the conference theatre of the Dubai International Trade and Exhibition Centre. The conference, sponsored by Middle East Magazine in association with the Government of Dubai and DNATA, is part of the first trade fair for the Arab travel and tourism industry organised by ICC Expo Ltd., an Arab media company operating out of London.

The conference was inaugurated this morning by Sheikh Hashr Al Maktoum, Director of Information, Dubai, who underlined the importance of delineating the course of development for an industry that was assuming over greater importance in Arab economies and was a medium of unity and cooperation in the Arab world.

The holding of the conference in Dubai, Sheikh Hashr said, also pointed to the pivotal position this Emirate occupied in the furtherance of Arab tourism objectives.

The tone of the conference was set this morning by Dr. Abdul Rahman Abu Rabah, secretary general of the Arab Tourism Union, who, emphasising the geographic immensity of the Arab world with all its natural and cultural riches, called for a unified approach to the development of the Arab tourist industry. This development could not be separated from aspirations by all Arab countries to raise their economic, social and cultural standards.

Rabah noted that in the wake of conferences by Arab tourism ministers and recommendations of the World Tourism Convention in Rome, most Arab countries were pursuing new policies of tourism action. While overall Arab tourism resource and potential could best be identified by a joint survey, four areas of development in the fields of marketing, training and planning were immediately apparent. These were: promotion of Arab regional tourism; encouragement of investment in joint Arab touristic projects; increasing tourism consciousness to raise the level of handling services and facilities and, lastly, intensifying the activities of the Arab Tourism Union as an Arab coordination and cooperation agency.

Rabah said in its process of evolution, Arab tourism had passed through three stages: creation of national tourist organisations as part of ministries or autonomous bodies; provision of infrastructures especially in remote parts and archaelogical sites and simultaneous adoption of foreign publicity programs and, lastly, implementation of planning and marketing programs. Aid was sought and obtained where necessary, from experienced countries or United Nations agencies. Supplementing government efforts was the private sector to invest in the field. But Rabah also noticed the difference in emphasis between Arab countries of the West and Eastern Arab states where tourism was not given a pre-eminent position. Even so, stage had been reached where most Arab governments recognised the importance of the tourism industry now or in the near future and its place in overall economic planning. The most obvious manifestation of this awareness was the provision in many countries of basic infrastructual improvements such as in the road networks and public accommodation.

Rabah nevertheless pointed the need for further attention to a variety of services and facilities. In this connection he reiterated the recommendations of the Arab Tourism Union which were of a political, social and economic nature. Among these were:

—Abolition of visas for all Arab nationals.

—Introduction of an Arab Tourist Card which could eventually substitute complex travel documents.

—Use of group passports for group travel.

— Less cumbersome customs inspection and documentation and oral instead of written currency declarations.

—Introduction of a unified Arab visa for travel by international Arab tourists to any Arab country.

—Abolition of exit visas and police registration to speed up the tourist's freedom of movement across national frontiers.

— Exemption of transit travellers from all frontier formalities.

— Reduction of taxes and fees levied from tourists and the abolition of requirements to spend a minimum sum of money.

Rabah also reiterated the Arab Tourism Union's call for the extension of health cover to Arab tourists and their protection and assistance during visits. The creation of complaints departments at national tourist organisations would provide the needed human touch to their functioning.

Rabah called for initiation of joint touristic programs for Arab tourists at special prices and the creation, where possible, of tourist camp sites, villages and centres with all recreational facilities.

CSO: 4820

NEW ATLAS OF ARAB WORLD IN PREPARATION

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 12 Nov 80 p 2

[Text] Al Ain, Nov. 11 (WAM): The committee set up by the Arab Universities Union today completed preparation of a working paper on the proposed publication of a new atlas of the Arab world.

The committee, which includes representatives of universities in UAE, Tunisia, Lebanon, Qatar, Kuwait, Syria, Jordan, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Libya and Morocco began its meetings last Saturday.

Head of the committee and secretary-general of the Arab Universities Union (AUU) Dr. Sultan Al Shawi said that the panel would submit the work plan to the meeting of AUU's council to be held in Tunis on November 24 for discussion and approval.

He added that the atlas of the Arab world would cover a unified group of physical, population, political, economic, cultural, historical and health maps and record the past and present and future of the Arab world.

Dr. Al Shawi said that the issuance of the atlas represents a response to scientific and cultural demand which can aid political leaders and economic, social and cultural planners throughout the Arab world.

He thanked the UAE for hosting the committee's meeting.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

IRAQI FIGHTING SUPPORTED--President Saddam Husayn has received more cables of support for the battle of honor and dignity fought by our struggler country against the racist Persians, as follows: We the masses of the struggler city of Aleppo congratulate you, Mr President, on the victories of our Iraqi army, the hero of Saddam's al-Qadisiyah battle. Go for more victories, O zealous army. Raise the Iraqi flag on the occupied Arab territory and fight bravely against the carlatan Khomeyni. Struggler president, it has become obvious to us that the regime of traitor Al-Asad is waging a campaign of suspicion against the heroic Araqi army. This traitor, who is the agent of Khomeyni and imperialism and its collaborators, had sent his army, tanks, armored cars and guns to Aleppo to kill innocent people and loot stores. Rif-at al-Asad had also sent his special forces with instruction to kill the people of Aleppo and destroy the city. These are the clear facts. Yet, they claim that they are the heroes of steadfastness and confrontation. Does the killing of innocent women, children and old people mean steadfastness and confrontation? You, the hero of al-Qadisiyah, are the true hero of steadfastness and the liberation of Arab territory. We sacrifice our souls and blood for you, O hero of al-Qadisiyah and liberation. The Iraqi military and political leadership is the devout leadership of the Arab nation. The Al-Asad regime is a traitorous regime. It is the enemy of the Arab nation and religion. March ahead, and may God grant you success. We are loyal soldiers under your wise leadership. [Signed] The Struggler Masses of Aleppo. [Excerpt] [JN081825 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1600 GMT 8 Nov 80]

GOLAN HEIGHTS-LEBANON BARTER--Kuwait, 13 Nov (KUNA)--A local newspaper Thursday reported that Syria had turned down an American-initiated Romanian offer for "bartering" the Golan Heights for North Lebanon. Quoting well-informed sources in Beirut and Damascus, AL-QABAS newspaper said that President Hafiz al-Asad had warned against partition of Lebanon which he feels has become more likely than ever now. The newspaper failed to mention as to when this Romanian offer was conveyed to Syria, but said that the proposal was initiated by the U.S. administration as one of the solutions for settlement of the Middle East conflict. AL-QABAS said that Syria had affirmed that it has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon or any other country and that it accepts no alternative for the Golan Heights which were occupied by Israel in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. [Text] [LD131236 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1122 GMT 13 Nov 80]

CSO: 4802

MAFIA ATTEMPT TO CIRCULATE COUNTERFEIT U.S. CURRENCY FOILED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 4 Oct 80 p 1

[Article by Nadiyah al-'Asqalani: "The Mafia Tried To Circulate 12 Million Counterfeit Dollars in Egypt"]

[Text] General Investigations Department men have arrested a Mafia leader who came to Cairo to flood the Egyptian market with US$12 million in counterfeit money. The purpose of the plot was to weaken the Egyptian economy and undermine confidence in it.

The Mafia leader succeeded in recruiting two senior Egyptian employees to circulate the counterfeit money. The Public Prosecutor ordered the imprisonment of the suspect and his two accomplices.

The General Department for Combating Monetary Crimes (the Economic Security Section) discovered that Dieter Pualap [transliterated], a German, was in Cairo, staying at a hotel.

Investigations revealed his contacts with the chief cashier of one of the major hotels, whom he recruited to circulate counterfeit $100 bills. Investigations also revealed his contacts with a senior employee at the student missions department.

When these investigations were compiled, Maj Gens Hasan al-Alfi, 'Ismat al-Rakhawi and Ahmad Rushdi, all assistant interior ministers for economic security, met and drew up a plan for surveillance of the contacts and telephone conversations made by the German, who was a prominent member of the German branch of the Mafia.

The General Investigations Department began forming investigation teams, headed by Col Fu'ad Jamal. Investigations revealed that the Mafia member had visited Egypt several times, had 24 previous convictions, and had previously been charged with forging documents, copying seals, theft, fraud, assault and armed assault, and was an international criminal.

Lt Cols Faruq 'Abbas and 'Ala' 'Abbas discovered his contacts with the two senior employees and recorded his telephone conversations with Germany and Italy, during which he asked his overseas agents to send the counterfeit dollars.

A plan was drawn up for arresting the Mafia leader. Lt Col Faruq 'Abbas went to him and pretended to be a member of the Cairo Mob who would circulate the counterfeit

money inside Egypt. The Mafia leader swallowed the bait! It was agreed that the price of the counterfeit dollars would be 60 percent of their face value, and that payment would be in real American dollars.

Assistance was sought from the modern technical equipment at the technical assistance section of the Interior Ministry, and Interpol sent information proving that the German in Cairo was a fugitive from justice, was wanted for arrest and was carrying a forged passport.

It was agreed that the payment and delivery would take place in Italy, out of fear that the suspect would be arrested in Cairo. The Mafia leader got ready for the trip, unaware that all eyes were upon him and that all the evidence against him had been collected. During the final moments of the trip he was arrested. Cols Faruq Hafiz and Faruq 'Abd-al-Rahim seized two maps in his possession, one of Africa and one of Europe, a typewriter, a can full of letters used in printing and some counterfeit 100 Spanish Peseta notes.

The suspect was referred to the prosecutor for financial and commercial matters, and Chief Prosecutor Muhammad Mani' took over the investigation under the supervision of District Attorney 'Adli Husayn.

The suspect made a detailed confession to the public prosecutor, saying that he had come to Cairo to flood the Egyptian market with counterfeit currency in order to shake confidence in the Egyptian economy. The prosecutor ordered his detention, and overruled all objections to the continued detention of the suspect and his Egyptian accomplices prior to their trial.

The Mafia leader had tested the accuracy with which the dollars had been counterfeited by taking a $100 bill to a Cairo bank, which changed it without being able to discover the forgery.

8559
CSO: 4802

PETROLEUM MINISTER OUTLINES SECTOR'S MAJOR INVESTMENT PROJECTS

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 1 Oct 80 p 7

[Article: "Deputy Prime Minister and Petroleum Minister Says that Oil Represents 60 Percent of Egyptian Exports"]

[Text] At a meeting of the Energy Commission, Deputy Prime Minister and Petroleum Minister Engr Ahmad 'Izz-al-Din Hilal announced that the petroleum sector realized a US$1.66 billion surplus in 1979, which will amount to about $2.15 billion this year. Petroleum sector exports account for about 60 percent of all Egyptian exports, and petroleum has become a principal source of foreign currency for the state.

The deputy prime minister said that the petroleum sector is helping reinforce the state's general treasury, for the Egyptian State Petroleum Authority and its companies contributed about 115 million Egyptian pounds to the general treasury in 1974, rising to 1.494 billion pounds in 1979. The figure is expected to rise to 2.021 billion pounds this fiscal year.

With reference to the most important petroleum projects now being carried out by the petroleum sector, Engr 'Izz-al-Din Hilal said that the petroleum sector is studying and implementing several major investment projects, the foremost being:

1. Construction of a new complex to produce lubricating oils at Alexandria, and increasing the current lubrication oil capacity at Suez and al-'Amiriyah to about 260,000 tons a year, thereby achieving self-sufficiency in such oils. At present we import about 45 percent of the local market's needs.

2. Studies for a proposed olefin complex to produce plastic from polyethylene. The local market's demand for this substance is increasing with the increase in development and industrialization activities in the country.

3. An almost-completed study on establishing a large refinery complete with the most modern technological methods of refining and processing.

4. Implementation of a project to build a 370-kilometer pipeline to carry crude oil from Shuqayrah on the Gulf of Suez to the refineries at Suez and Cairo, capable of carrying 8 million tons a year at the start, rising to 12 million tons during the 5-year plan.

5. Implementation of a project to collect petroleum gas from the Suez Gulf region for use in producing butagaz and manufacturing fertilizer.

6. A project for seeking natural gas in the Western Desert, the Delta and north Sinai, as well as looking into what must be done to encourage specialized international petroleum companies to prospect for natural gas in Egypt and to develop gas fields quickly.

7. Implementation of a natural gas grid for home consumption as an alternative to butagaz in the al-Ma'adi, Hulwan, Nasr City and New Cairo areas, whereby gas will be brought to about 160,000 residential units over a period of 4 years.

Under way now are the necessary studies for utilizing natural gas for home consumption in Alexandria and Gizah Governorates.

8559
CSO: 4802

SOUTH SINAI COUNTING ON LAND RECLAMATION, OIL, TOURISM

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 2 Oct 80 p 6

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Salam: "South Sinai Governor Tells AL-AKHBAR that New Oil Discoveries Will Be Announced During the October Holidays; 274,000 Feddans To Be Reclaimed and Handed over to Young People"]

[Text] Governor of South Sinai Maj Gen Fu'ad 'Aziz Ghali announced that new petroleum discoveries other than the Abu Rudays, Ra's Sudr and 'Alma Fields will be announced during the October holidays, and stressed that there are vast petroleum potentials in the South Sinai Governorate.

He stated that the way of life in the area began taking a new turn after President al-Sadat decided to change it into an independent governorate; that there are vast agricultural, mining and tourism possibilities, and that all resources are being concentrated on their exploitation. The governor invited the young people of Egypt to acquire at nominal prices the lands which are now being reclaimed in the governorate. The governor, in his statement to AL-AKHBAR, stressed the fact that planning in the governorate is aimed at increasing the population to 4 million by the end of the year 2000, as opposed to its current population of 40,000.

He added, "An agreement has been reached with an American company to reactivate the Abu Zunaymah manganese company, and 100 million Egyptian pounds have been allocated for this purpose. Production will begin in the second half of 1982."

Reclamation of 274,000 Feddans

The governor said, "There are tremendous agricultural possibilities in four regions of the governorate: the first located north and south of al-Tur, the so-called Sahl al-Qa' region, covering a total area of 120,000 square feddans; the second located in the Raqid and Wadi al-'Arish area, covering 60,000 square feddans; the third stretching from Ra's Sudr to Abu Rudays, covering 52,000 square feddans, and the fourth located in the Wadi Firan and St Catherine areas, covering 12,000 square feddans."

The governor of South Sinai added that these vast areas of land will be handed over to young Egyptian graduates of agricultural colleges and institutes at extremely nominal prices. These lands will contribute to the success of the food security plans now being drawn up to meet the future.

He said that in addition to these lands, the governorate has fish resources which have not been successfully exploited along 650 to 800 kilometers of the governorate's coasts. Some 120 fishing boats have been purchased to exploit these fish resources, of which 45 tons a month are now exploited.

Tourism Is the Hope

South Sinai Governor Fu'ad 'Aziz Ghali said, "There are several unique tourist regions in the governorate, and tourism is the hope for raising the social level of the governorate. During 1981, the governorate, in cooperation with the Reconstruction Ministry, will build a tourist village in the Moses' Bath area north of the town of al-Tur, with the assistance of foreign capital, as well as building another spa in the Pharaoh's Bath area, where the mineral waters reach a temperature of 72 degrees centigrade, even though it is located right on the Red Sea coastline."

He said, "An average of 9,000 tourists come to the Mediterranean each year. A contract has been signed with an Italian tourist company to bring several tour groups to the St Catherine area starting next month, each group averaging 900 tourists. The governorate's income from tourism amounts to about 40,000 pounds."

One Million Pounds for Health Care

Fu'ad 'Aziz Ghali said, "One million pounds have been allocated to build a general hospital, having 200 beds during its first stage of construction, in the town of al-Tur, to have all the medical specializations, as well as to increase the number of beds at the St Catherine and Abu Rudays Hospitals and to reinforce health care units at Abu Zunaymah and Wadi Firan."

The governor of Sinai ended his statement by saying that there are huge difficulties confronting the governorate, represented by a great shortage of employees in various specializations, especially in the upper management levels, and a lack of technical laborers."

The governor stressed the need to increase the incentives given to governorate employees, so as to encourage people to come to work in the governorate. Also, special facilities must be given to the public and private sectors to encourage employment in South Sinai. Early next year, al-Tur will become the governorate's capital.

8559
CSO: 4802

WAR CONSIDERED TO HAVE CREATED 'UNITY,' 'REALISM'

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 Nov 80 p 11

[Article by Naser Makaram-Shirazi]

[Text] This war has taught us to be more realistic and has taught the bloodthirsty, barbaric enemy that it is facing a revolution.

According to all estimations, the war started by Saddam in this sensitive region of the world is undoubtedly one of the maddest wars in history, even if we only bear in mind Iraq's own interests, since:

1. As for the Moslem nations who anxiously and with curiosity follow this destructive war (I am not talking about puppet governments, I am talking about the one billion Moslems of the world), they all ask each other whether these powerful and expensive weapons bought with the blood of the laboring Moslem people, these long-range airplanes being shot down and destroyed every day and all these fighters and pilots who roll in their own blood every day with their mangled, half-burned bodies strewn about, were they all for the purpose of fighting Moslems and a newly established, revolutionary Islamic regime, a regime whose enmity with the no one enemy of the Arabs (the United States and Israel) has been more open than others and has in practice proven that it will not compromise?

A regime, the Islamic Republic of Iran, whose constitution has greatly emphasized assistance to all the downtrodden of the world in general and the Moslems of the world in particular.

The Moslem nations of the world ask themselves: Does attacking such a country serve anything but the interests of the United States and the occupiers of Islamic lands, and will it have any results other than to escalate conflicts and disunite the Islamic countries?

Are a few patches of border lands, even if they are in dispute, worth giving Israel the opportunity to declare that it is happy about the

continuation of this war because this will afford it peace of mind for the next 10 years?

That is, even if the Ba'thists who have not fired one shot towards Israel are overthrown and a regime that would be a bitter enemy of Israel would come to power in Iraq, it would not have sufficient military resources at its disposal, because Saddam has madly destroyed them all by fighting an Islamic country.

2. As for the financial damages, they have been so heavy and horrible that according to conscientious observers, in the early days of this forced war, before it had expanded as it has now, the daily damages were equivalent to "the cost of building a large steel mill," a great part of the damages being Iraq's.

Even if we could imagine for one moment that the Ba'thists could finally dominate the border regions they claim, they would never be worth the great damages which have been inflicted.

Is it possible for anyone with a jot of wisdom and uderstanding to allow himself to cause a country such as Iraq, which is behind in many ways and every bit of whose income must be used for economic reconstruction, to regress for a period of 10 years and to rob its suppressed and deprived people of every bit of their resources in order to repair the ravages of war in areas such as the oil industry and refineries, atomic plants, industry, and roads?

3. And, as far as internal prestige and credibility are concerned, all those promises that Saddam has given his people concerning victory over Iran (a quick, crushing victory) have turned out to be empty. Even if (supposing for a moment) he had had any prestige or credibility in his country, it has been destroyed. By starting a senseless and extremely barbaric war, coupled with extensive false propaganda and baseless claims, he has made the neutral people of the world become so skeptical about him that even those reporters who were invited to his country with warmhearted greetings and gifts began to criticize him. But he could not bear this criticism, so he had to withdraw his invitation and drive them out of his country, or at least curtail their activities.

Naturally, this war has brought with it many damages for us and undoubtedly the nature of the war itself is damaging and calamitous; but this does not suggest that wars in the end are calculated by adding up the outcome and the calamities. So many wars have opened up new chapters in the history of nations. And as the imam of the people has said, they have created movement, struggle, and motion and have awakened the people from inertia and sleep. By the grace of God, this war has had such an effect and will have other significant effects, including the following:

1. We have not forgotten that recently political oppositions existed at high levels, even in the Parliament, which, were it not for the effective warnings of the imam, would have spread further. As if they imagined taht the activities of all our enemies had ended and no other danger threatened us! But this sudden attack by the merciless, brainless, heathen enemy has violently shaken every intellect. It has become obvious what a great mistake we have committed in widening our differences, a mistake which would undoubtedly cause us to lose everything should we not rise up to correct it. The still warm, burning, spilled blood of the martyrs has washed away our differences. (And hopefully, this is not temporary.)

The pelting sound of enemy bullets, rockets, shells, and bombs, which have always been answered by our brave fighters, has muffled the murmurs of division. Sincerity, love, and friendship have blossomed in our hearts and chains of unity have united our battlelines on all levels of the society, especially on the lower levels, which are always full of love and sincerity. (If we only realize the worth of this unity and try to preserve it!)

2. The end of the period of political isolation is another blessed result of this forced war. Undoubtedly, if the prime minister had wanted earlier to go to the United States, to New York, to participate in the meetings of the Security Council to explain Iran's decisive position, he might have immediately been accused by irresponsible individuals of compromise. But the war has shown that we should not lose these golden opportunities because of mere weak excuses. We must not remain silent in the face of so much propaganda from the enemy, because through such trips we can make ourselves heard through the mass media of the enemy and even the television networks of our prime enemy, the United States. And we can occupy the first page of every newspaper in the world in order to somehow show that we are right. This is something that we could not have obtained at any price before. (Even the presence of Mr Raja'i in that assembly and coming in contact with the opinions of friendly diplomats will open a new chapter for Mr Raja'i himself.)

We must realize full well that the outcomes of wars are not determined on the battlefields alone. World communication systems play an effective role in them. And although these systems are under the control of the superpowers, we can make use of them, to some degree, and make our just voices heard by those justice seeking nations of the world. Otherwise, they will make of us such a horrible monster with whom no one will sympathize.

Realism and attention to actual issues (beyond slogans) have been other blessings of this war. On the battlefields, we realize full well how unrealistic and destructive were the slogans of those groups who said that the army must be eliminated.

When we hear that the president has freed a number of army prisoners because of their expertise and has sent them to the battle fronts and they, too, sincerely sacrifice their lives, we realize that indescriminate violent action, anywhere, against anyone, for any conviction, does not benefit the country. Instead, we must distinguish between serious and minor crimes. Dispatching various committees to different countries in order to explain Iran's views on this forced war and other world issues was another realistic step. Hopefully, in the wake of the painful incident of this forced war, while remaining adamant about our revolutionary positions, we can increase our revolutionary awareness and alertness and become more realistic in order to bring our revolution to fruition with the least amount of damage and along the shortest path and to make the name of Islam known throughout the world as a progressive, liberating ideology. Also, through the decrease in senseless pressures on the people of our country by some inattentive individuals, we will be able to transform disappointments and lack of love into sincerity and love and to create a united, alert movement and, in the name of God, to put such mad enemies as Saddam and his masters in their place.

9593
CSO: 4906

SADDAM PRESENTED AS FOLLOWER OF 'WORLD IMPERIALISM'

Tehran ETTALA'AT in Persian 2 Nov 80 p 8

[Article by 'Abbas Tarrabyan]

> [Text] The coordinators of the movement of the Moslem people of Iraq are Islamic groups opposed to the Ba'th regime.
>
> Saddam's slightest suspicion is enough to destroy the most beloved of Iraq's Ba'th regime.
>
> Saddam knew well what a storm would rise if the martyred Ayatollah Sadr were alive.

The crimes of Saddam and the mad Ba'th party are broadening daily. These atrocities have reached such limits that they have surpassed even those of Genghis Khan and Hitler. Amidst all this, the suffering Iraqi people, who dare not even breathe under the American boots of Saddam, are confronting Saddam's regime with their blood boiling, following the rightful expectations of the Islamic people of Iran. But certain factors have overshadowed this uprising and defrayed somewhat the movement of the masses in Iraq.

There is no doubt concerning the alienation of the Ba'th regime from the Iraqi people. This alienation and the isolation of Saddam and his associates are the result of conflicts due to the Ba'th regime not having the support of the masses and, at the same time, the general discontent of the Iraqi people. There are absolutely clear signs of a general uprising but, because of certain factors, the main explosion has been postponed.

Suppression

Suppression is one of the most important of these factors. Suppression and terror are so evident in Iraq that the fighters against Saddam think of even breathing as a blessing. The slightest suspicion will even send the closest of Saddam's companions to death. This regime continues its infamous life through blood, fire, and

treachery. And every day Saddam expands its information and spy institutions to new dimensions.

Lack of an Alert Leadership of the People

The second problem concerns the lack of a leader. Following the Iranian revolution and its victory, the Arab rulers and dictators were thrown into a whirlpool of fear. They finally reached the conclusion that a widespread religious movement threatens them. Among them, Saddam Hoseyn, in particular, sensed this horror more than the rest. The ineffectiveness of the shah's power against Emam Khomeyni, the leader of the Islamic revolution of Iran, had a powerful influence on him. He realized how leadership, especially if it is religious, can give a boost to a revolution. And, through extensive studies, he realized that the martyred Seyyed Mohammad Baqer Sadr possessed such an ability which, were it to grow, would before long cause Mohammad Reza's fate to be repeated for him as well. Naturally, Saddam and the Ba'th party had no choice but to destroy Ayatollah Sadr. In this way, it would be a long time before a religious leadership would be created in Iraq with a leader such as Sadr.

Lack of Religious Awareness

Lack of religious awareness is another reason for the forced though temporary silence of the Moslem people of Iraq. Saddam and his associates would be happy if the rest of the Moslem people of Iraq, with the exception of a small number, would follow a superficial, one-dimensional religion. For this reason, the Ba'th party attempts to familiarize the people of Iraq more and more with Western civilization and an amoral life. In this way, he is trying to force the people to accept hibernation. Saddam knows well that if true Islam were to begin to blow like a storm in the streets of Baghdad what a disaster he would face. The reports from various Islamic movements inspired by true Islam show that not a day passes when some of them are not destroyed. And although Saddam has confined the environment for their growth, they continue their activities of planting bombs and handing out leaflets in order to inflame the true anger of the people, due to their religious awareness. Perhaps we can say that religious consciousness which will cause an ideological struggle is a warning still not quite apparent in Iraqi society. Unfortunately, this is a problem for other Moslem strugglers in the Middle East as well. Until the day when these Moslem strugglers make their fight an ideological one and provide their people with the necessary religious awareness, they will remain targets for the blows of the enemies of Islam.

The Cooperation Between Different Classes

Divisions and clashes of ideas between different groups of the people of Iraq is another factor which has overshadowed the necessary

finishing touch for the blossoming of a revolution--for example, the lack of a close cooperation of the Iraqi courts with other anti-Saddam strugglers who have not expressed enough compassion. Perhaps the only reason for this division is their nationalities, because, unfortunately, a sense of Arab nationalism has dug its roots into the people of Iraq. This has resulted in misunderstanding and separation between them and other people of Iraq.

The extensive propaganda of the Ba'thist Saddam, who has inherited the ambitions of the deposed shah, has made him spend large sums for propaganda [as published]. Recently, the extravagance of his regime has been witnessed in a new form through the distortions and praises of reactionary Western radio and television. The Western Zionist mass media has turned the news of the war upside down. They show the aggressive, monstous army of the Ba'th regime as heroes against the Iranian army and supporters of the Islamic people. Meanwhile, large masses of the people of Iraq, who, on the one hand, cannot consider the army and people of Iran as their enemy and, on the other hand, are under the influence of the mass media, pressure, and the suppression of Saddam, are awaiting a more opportune time to pay their debt to Islam. Given the aforementioned reasons concerning the absence of an uprising of the people of Iraq, a great responsibility rests on the shoulders of anti-Saddam groups who rise from the people. Everyone's eyes are hopefully watching the epoch-creating movement of these Moslem groups. Hopefully, under these war conditions, our struggling Moslem brothers in Iraq will take on the responsibility of coordinating the struggle of the people of Iraq and through the inspiration of the historical messages of Emam Khomeyni will make history move towards perfection--with the help of God.

9593
CSO: 4906

FORMATION OF SUPREME DEFENSE COUNCIL CRITICIZED

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 25 Oct 80 p 11

[Text] Retired Major General Mahmud Key, an expert in world military history, wrote in a letter:

" I have read in NAME-YERUZ that, in its war with Iraq, Iran has recently entrusted all executive decisions concerning military operations to a newly formed council, the Supreme Defense Council.

I am not aware of the make-up of that council, the competence and rank of its members, or the existence or lack of intellectual harmony among them. However, the fact that two of its members are Majles deputies (one of whom is a clergyman), leads me to conclude that, by doing that, Iran has compromised the effectiveness and efficiency of its high command and military operations which call for absolute decisiveness. This is an ominous development: during an armed conflict circumstances often arise when decisiveness and immediate decision-making are vital and paramount. Such circumstances are incompatible with vacillation, wavering, and the involvement of councils and committees. One must bear in mind the important fact that war is an 'art,' with very well-defined rules and principles. In short, with all its irregularities and seeming disorganizations, war, at the same time, has its own clearly-defined, almost 'mathematical' rules and principles which are never guided by chance, accident, or divine decree. And one of the most important and fundamental of these principles is that of high command and its oneness.

In his masterpiece,"On War," Karl von Clausewitz, the Prussian general and writer on military strategy, indicated: 'War is a continuation of diplomacy by other means.' Thus war breaks out when politicians' efforts, maneyverings, connivings, and deals fail. Consequently when a country reaches this stage of impasse and choses the war option, it is absolutely mandatory that from that moment on it entrusts its high command and the conduct of its military operations in the hands of only one commander-in-chief and stops mixing military affairs with politics and politicians. Indeed, politics' peculiarity is that when it is allowed to affecta judgment, it destroys justice and when it is allowed to be considered in military matters, it impairs their effectiveness and obstructs its decisiveness. And any vacillation in decision-making by submitting such matters to councils and committees, and consequent futile discussions, will lead to certain defeat in war.

That is why the formation of a supreme defense council empowered with executive decision-making and high command is just the opposite of what ought to be done. The formation of the new council will no doubt make Saddam Hosein swoon with joy! I pray that it will not prove too costly for Iran and I fervently hope that the council in question will be dissolved and Iran's high command entrusted in one competent individual so that any vacillation and indecisiveness may be averted before it is too late. Otherwise, Iran's defeat in the current conflict with Iraq is certain. Indeed, a commander-in-chief ought to be able to conclude decisively and carry out his ideas and military strategies promptly , without the need of obtaining time-consuming prior authorizations."

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CSO: 4906

'DISINTEGRATION DANGER' STRESSED BY FORMER TUDEH LEADER

Paris NAME-YE RUZ in Persian 25 Oct 80 p 12

[Text] In a communique Dr Fereidun Keshavarz, former secretary-general of Iran's Tudeh party, declared:

"Dear Iranian Brothers and Sisters, I am addressing myself to you, Iranians of every ideology, persuasion, religion, and social class. We all cherish Iran's soil and ancient culture because our parents and ancestors have lived there and are buried there. Because we were born there and grew up there. Iranians are attached to and proud of their homeland and their national honor. Despite their considerable suffering in the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution, Iranian soldiers and officers are nevertheless attached to Iran's soil and cherish its territorial integrity.

I also would like to address myself to my Baluchi, Kurdish, Azeri, Turkmen, and other Iranian brothers and sisters: you must bear in mind that despite the superpowers and today's world imperialism, it is in the interest of the world of tomorrow and the interests of all of us, Iranians, that, as in the past, we stick together, listen to, accept, and correct our mutual grievances. Otherwise, if we act like a divided flock, our enemies will easily destroy us by devouring us one by one.

Today Iran runs the risk of being broken up and disintegrated. The Iraqi government has invaded Iranian soil and blatantly threatens Iran's territorial integrity with its groundless claims. If Iraq is successful in carrying out its scheme, nothing will be left of our ancient land. Or, more exactly, today's aggressors will leave nothing intact.

Today, various individuals abroad are openly conniving and conspiring with various political groups in Iran and the remnant of the deposed Shah's agents in order to once again seize power and enjoy the enormous privileges of the past. Such individuals are playing politics over the corpses of scores of thousands youth who gave their lives for the Islamic Revolution. Today such individuals are showing their true characteristics, their real faces: they remain either silent or use any pretext to whitewash Iraq's invasion of Iranian soil. Furthermore, these individuals are becoming more blatant, vociferous, and shameless than in the past.

Dear Fellow Iranians, my 25 years of political experience convinces me that, in

today's world, no foreign country, irrespective of its ideology or regime, feels sorry for Iran and its oppressed people. Today, for us, Iranians, whether Kurds, Turkmens, Baluchis, Persians, and Azeris, there is no more urgent obligation than to drive away the Iraqi aggressors from the sacred soil of our homeland. To achieve this, an essential pre-condition is the union of all of Iran's progressive and freedom-loving forces.

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CSO: 4906

LEADER OF 'DEPRIVED' CALLS FOR PARTISAN WARFARE

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 15 Oct 80 p 10

[Interview with Hojjat ol-Eslam Amir Majd, in charge of the Organization for Mobilization of the 'Deprived'.]

[Text] Experience has proven that there is not a better way to face aggression by superpowers than by partisan warfare.

Question: What mission has the liberation army of the "deprived" and how is it organized?

Answer: A booklet has been prepared about the organization and the mission of the resistance of the liberation army that will be distributed among people. It can be briefly mentioned here that it has two main missions. Its first mission is internal, that of protection of the country's independence and guarding the Islamic Revolution. Its second mission concerns matters beyond the nation's frontiers. Internal mission concerns the following matters:

1. Facing the Enemy's Psychological Warfare

People's awareness and their mobilization for the purpose of facing propaganda plots by the enemy is a necessity. This is because the enemy is trying to defeat our revolution and dominate us once again by spreading rumors, weakening our national spirit and by creating divisions among us. Our actions will remove our vulnerability and gradually prepare the people for quick and effective reaction against plots by the East or the West.

2. Fighting Against Fifth Columns

Our struggle on a wide scale could put an end to activities by individuals who have sold themselves out, and those who, for reasons of their connection with the old regime, and foreign agents, are plotting against our Islamic revolution. The Fifth Column includes all agents of the East and the West who, from the very beginning of our revolution, have been plotting in various ways against us.

3. Fighting Against Sabotage by Enemy Agents

After the assignment of responsibilities in the resistance army is over and the entire country is put under the devoted militants, infiltrating enemy agents who

are trained outside the country to carry out sabotage against our vital installations, including oil pipelines, industries and communication networks, will be stopped. It is necessary that by training and by increased alertness of our resistance forces, especially those in the border areas, the mercenaries be apprehended before being able to do anything. I must emphasize here once again that in order to stop sabotage activities by infiltrating enemy agents we can rely only on people themselves. Without direct or indirect help of the people responsible forces will not be able to prevent sabotage by the enemy. This is because their numbers and the means at their disposal is so limited. If we are able to train people and familiarize them with the sabotage methods of the enemy agents, they can easily neutralize their actions. People are everywhere, and by recognizing and identifying suspected agents and reporting them to concerned officials, they can effectively help prevent sabotage. In every 22-man resistance group at least one person is in charge of information and of collecting news. In view of the fact that there are several such groups in every part of the country, the entire land will be covered by the intelligence collecting agents of the 22-million-man army [sic]. This is so because people consider the giving of information as a religious duty.

4. Reducing the Extent of Damages Caused by Enemy Bombing

By expanding training courses aimed at preparing the public to protect itself against air attacks, resistance groups will be able to make use of the previously chosen shelters such as basements of the strongly built structures and thus reduce the number of casualties to the minimum. By making proper preparations to meet air pollution created by chemical, microbiological and incinerable bombs, and by being prepared to give first aid, casualties could be noticeably reduced. Thus, the weakening of public spirit and the wasting of manpower capabilities of our fighting forces could be prevented.

5. Supporting Operations by the Regulars

When our regular forces are fighting the enemy at certain points in the country, the resistance army could support their operations in two ways:

One, by insuring security behind the lines of the regular army aimed at preventing operations by the fifth column and the saboteurs. Another way is to help and strengthen the regular army whenever a shortage of manpower is felt which could be done by dispatching handpicked men and volunteers from various resistance groups to join the regulars at the front.

I am happy to announce that at this point a number of our million-man army have already joined their brothers serving with the corps and the regular army, especially in the border zones, guarding the frontiers and keeping watch over the least enemy movements. And with their undestructible faith and strong spirit, they hold the initiative.

6. Taking Part in A War of Attrition

This stage is the most important mission of the resistance army during which resistance groups, employing partisan warfare tactics, will attack the enemy in towns, villages, hills, the desert and with a series of offensive activities will defeat

and destroy the enemy. This tactic will only be used when the country is suddenly occupied by an overwhelming enemy force. That is when a superpower aggressor has been able to make operation by our regulars impossible through a sudden attack from the air, sea and land.

Experience has proven that there is not a better and more effective way to fight against aggression by superpowers than by resorting to partisan warfare.

7. Holy War for Defeating Impasses

Whereas the resistance army is the last and the most permanent base of the revolution and its supporters and its position is anti-imperialist and has always been fighting against the real causes of our problems and miseries and has, on the other hand, prepared itself for its great devine mission of giving assistance to the deprived in the world, it should not allow itself to become involved in small and petty matters. But when responsible organizations and institutions are incapable of solving social problems, mobilization organizations must act to remove the obstacles and help appropriate authorities by suggesting basic solutions.

Question: How is the army organized?

Answer: Organization of the resistance army is based on self-sufficiency, simplicity and flexibility. In addition, as it was mentioned before, no restrictions have been put on the age and specialization of those who want to join. Under normal conditions, coordination and guidance are conducted through a centralized hierarchy, but during an emergency, groups will act freely and the hierarchal system will not prevent them from free and fast action.

Question: What are the operational methods of the 20-million-man army?

Answer: War of resistance is an allout war which has no fronts. In other words, it is a war that is fought on every front. It is fought wherever committed individuals exist. That is where the front is.

Therefore, operations by resistance groups are based on partisan warfare. Members of these groups do not have to leave their homes and places of work such as factories, universities, schools, refineries and dams except under exceptional circumstances. They will perform their duties in their own prescribed areas. Members of the resistance army continue their routine lives and it is only in times of danger that they are called upon to organize and take up arms. Resistance groups in cities and towns will engage in street and house to house fighting, making use of small firearms and homemade tools, no matter how elementary. They may be lightly armed yet they will be armed with ideological discipline and faith to be able to stop the enemy and destroy the aggressor in ditch to ditch fighting.

9561
CSO: 4906

BRIEFS

MEASURES AGAINST FOREIGN COMPANIES--Taha Yasin Ramadan, Revolution Command Council member and first deputy prime minister, asserted that specific ties and bases reagrding dealings with foreign companies which have confined their activities or failed to adhere to their contracts by taking advantage of the circumstances of war between Iraq and the racist Persian enemy, have been adopted. At a meeting with the minister of finance during a visit he made to the ministry today, Taha Yasin said that the circumstances of war demand the accomplishment of all works and projects quickly and accurately and in a manner that serves the course of victory against the enemy. [Text] [JN112304 Baghdad Voice of the Masses in Arabic 1600 GMT 11 Nov 80]

CSO: 4802

MOSLEM DIGNITARY SEES PLO RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Sep 80 p 3

[Article by Yehuda Ariel, HA'ARETZ correspondent: "Israeli Arab Extremism Directed at Occupation Not at State"]

[Text] "It is true that we oppose the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, but we wish to live in peace and brotherhood with the Jewish nation. An Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a Palestinian state, including good neighborliness with the Israelis will benefit both nations," the Qadi of Acre and Haifa Shaykh Haj Muhammad Hubayshi, stated in a special interview with HA'ARETZ.

According to the Qadi "the PLO is prepared to recognize Israel on condition that Israel recognize it, as well as withdraw from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank."

To the question how did the Qadi Shaykh Hubayshi arrive at the political and anti-Israel meeting in Shefar'am, he responded, "I was invited by my good friends Ramzi Khuri (a veteran RAKAH activist) and Ahmed Abu-Shan'ab. Never did I attend such meetings but this time I considered the wish of my good friend the mayor of Shefar'am, Ibrahim Nimayr al-Husayn, and that's why I went. At first I even refused to mount the podium of notables, but I could not continue my refusal when they repeated my name. Even so, I did not pronounce a blessing at the Shefar'am meeting, I spoke not a single word at this meeting."

The Land is Arab

In the Qadi's opinion the Arabs of Israel were 30 years too late in recognizing that the Mufti, Haj Amin al-Husayni, and the entire Arab leadership erred in their opposition to the establishment of the State. They should have recognized the tiny State of Israel that was proposed. Today we are against the conquest, but not against the State. Even the extremism of the Israeli Arabs, the young generation, including 22 and 24-year-olds is against the conquest the Israeli conquest and not against the State. Just as the Communists have been saying for many years."

Relative to the matter of the land being holy to Jews and Moslems, he said: "From a religious standpoint, the ground of this country was Arab just as it was in Spain. Jerusalem is holy and its borders were once again consecrated and all of East Jerusalem together with the other areas of Gaza and the West Bank in the years 1948 to 1967. Everything that the Arabs had before the Six-Day War is Arab ground."

The Qadi does not accept that these were incidental borders of the year 1948, but rather "borders consecrated to Arab land." The Qadi does not recognize the consecration of the land to Jews or a prior right of the Jewish people to the land. "We will remain Israeli Arabs for as long as the State exists, because this is our state and this is our birthplace. I, as one born in Acre and whose family has been here for many generations, am not prepared even to move to Haifa, because I was born in this city, and this is my place," he said.

At the start of the interview he reaffirmed something which had created an emotional storm 12 years ago: "Most of the Arabs of Acre still see it as an Arab city in accordance with the partition of 1947. Anyone saying otherwise is considered by many of the extremists as a traitor to his nation."

On this issue nothing has changed, he said.

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CSO: 4805

CONTOUR PLAN READIED BY INTERIOR MINISTRY

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 28 Sep 80 p 6

[Article by Yoel Dar: "In the Arab Section"]

[Text] The Interior Ministry has authorized the sum of 20 million pounds for the preparation of contour plans in all of the villages of the Northern Triangle within a year. The advisor to the Prime Minister on Arab Affairs, Binyamin Gur Aryeh, who reported on this noted that up to now the preparation of contour plans in 20 Arab villages has been completed, 20 other plans are on deposit, and another 15 are in the preparation and study phase.

According to the advisor, within a year of today there will be a contour plan for every one of the large Arab villages. Unlike in the past, the local Arab councils will not be burdened with half of the expenses, but rather all of the financial burden will fall on the Interior Ministry.

Contour plans are intended to support the accelerated development of the Arab village and to supply the needs of the rapidly increasing population within the next 20 years. It must be assumed that if the trend of increase of this population continues at the present rate (3.4 percent per year) the number of Arabs in the country will double by the year 2000, in other words--there will be need for doubling the areas allocated to Arabs for residences, for public buildings and for development.

The Interior Ministry hopes that contour plans will eliminate or significantly slow down the tempo of illegal construction, a phenomenon especially apparent in the villages of the Gaililee and the Triangle and along the road between Beersheba and Arad.

It is doubtful whether experts of the Interior Ministry know the scope of the illegal construction in the Arab section and how many houses have been built there on national territory or on areas which have been set aside for environmental development. The favorite excuse of the builders is, that they have taken this step because of red tape, because of a lack of contour plans and the failure to grant construction permits. Perhaps there is something in these reasons, but not always.

Thousands of homes have been built on national lands in areas surrounding villages. Will the new contour plans, and intensification of supervision over illegal construction, and cooperation between the Interior Ministry and police indeed bring about a limitation of this phenomenon? Time will tell.

In the near future, thousands of Moslem citizens of Israel will cross the Allenby Bridge on their way to Mecca. Unlike the last 2 years, this time there is no enthusiasm at all felt among those leaving. This journey, although its price is 100,000 pounds, is no longer an unattainable aspiration for Israeli Moslems, but that is not why their ardor has cooled. The reason lies in the attitude of the Saudi Arabian and Jordanian authorities toward their brethren who are residents of Haifa and Jaffa.

The Moslem pilgrims complained last year that their hosts did not concern themselves with providing sleeping places for them even though they paid all the money demanded of them and they did not always enjoy proper humanitarian or medical treatment.

Because of the many protests, the Jordanians decided to set up a special commission to deal with their matters. Jordanian buses belonging to the Jordanian Religious Ministry, will carry them from the Allenby Bridge to Amman and from there they will be transported by Iranian air-conditioned buses to Saudi Arabia. This is the way in which it was decided to compensate last year's pilgrims for the damages they sustained.

It appears that the Jordanian and Saudi Arabian authorities have understood that such conduct would mar their reputations in the eyes of the Zionist enemy and in particular would distort the fatherly image that the Arabs, and especially the Saudis, are attempting to create for themselves.

The public discussion about moving the graves from the Moslem cemetery on Gibborim Street in Haifa to another cemetery has recently been renewed.

A group calling itself the Moslem Initiative Commission released an announcement, in which it seeks to condemn the plan because it contains "elements of profanation and is damaging to the families whose dead are interred there." Another part of the Moslem community rejects these allegations and explains, that the intention is to utilize this space for the construction of 88 apartments for low income Moslem families.

Qadi Shar'i, the Shaykh Muhammad Hubayshi, ruled that transfer of the remains is in accordance with tradition (al-Shari'a) since according to Moslem tradition in which burials have been discontinued for 30 consecutive years is no longer a sacred site and its area may be utilized for another public purpose.

According to this plan, fraternal graves will be established elsewhere for all of the deceased, in order to prepare the area for public construction so that the entire community may benefit.

On the surface, the discussion is traditional-religious, but it is easy to discern two camps behind it: one camp which is in sympathy toward what is called the radical circles and a second camp in sympathy with what is called the moderates and cooperators. The plan has not yet been carried out, but the two camps are girding and casting threats into the air.

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CSO: 4805

FAR-REACHING ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS IN IDF CALLED FOR

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Sep 80 p 11

[Article by Matityahu Peled: "Weak Points of the IDF"]

[Text] From time immemorial, the public knew of the condition of the IDF mainly from those who were appointed over the security of the state--the minister of defense and the chief of staff. This information was never given out in full detail, but rather as a summary estimate only. The restrictions against giving detailed information to the public are understood and the need to rely upon the general good-faith of those appointed over our security has always been accepted with understanding.

This year, also, with the start of the new year, we have received from the defense minister and the chief of staff their estimates of the power of the IDF. But this time, perhaps more than ever, nothing in the words of encouragement that were expressed seemed to remove doubts. The defense minister, for example, making known to the personnel at the Defense Ministry on the eve of the New Year that he himself did much traveling around the world, but has yet to meet a military which was superior in quality to the IDF. This is a statement which is not comforting. For, where would Mr Begin have been able to come across other armies during his travels and have been able to test their quality? In his capacity as prime minister, it would appear that during his travels he did not come across anything but saluting parades and military bands. We never heard of his devoting time to undertake an actual visit to foreign armies, with the purpose of learning about their organization and their equipment.

Napoleon's Line of Thought

Had he decided, ever, on such a learning trip he would have discovered without a doubt that the matter requires a great deal of time and effort: it is necessary to meet with senior commanders and hear detailed briefings, to visit training and maintenance installations, to be present during the training of units and groups. Such a learning visit, even if highly speeded up, could not last less than several weeks in every one of the armies of the world. Mr Begin has neither the time nor the capability of devoting himself to this kind of learning and research and it is therefore difficult to accept his testimony, based upon his personal impression, that there are indeed no forces superior to the IDF.

Even the remarks of the chief of staff on the night after Yom Kippur were not such as would implant total confidence that the IDF is indeed prepared for its missions in maximal measure. He declined to answer the important question which he was asked on the matter of the organization of the IDF. That is, he did not say that the IDF is organized today as a totally modern army and that he does not believe that from this standpoint the IDF is not suffering from a lack. The chief of staff is to be commended on his forthrightness, but with that the question can be asked: Is it possible for an army to be prepared for its mission if it is defective in its organization?

The stress placed upon the quantitative strengthening of the IDF must arouse dissatisfaction in anyone familiar with such matters. One of the truths upon which the IDF was structured from its start was that it is not within the power of Israel to compete quantitatively with its enemies. As regards Ben Gurion and the chiefs of staff who served in his time, it was not the quantitative strength that was the main element, but rather the capability of drawing forth the little that the state was capable of putting at the disposal of the IDF and to elicit from that the maximum power. The line of thinking which guided the builders of the IDF, matched that of Napoleon as expressed in his summary of his victory over the Mamluk armies in Egypt: Even if the individual Mamluk is superior to the individual French soldier as a fighter, yet 10 French soldiers are not inferior to 10 Mamluks, and 100 French soldiers surpass 1000 Mamluks on the battlefield. In other words, the organization of an army, its level of command and the staff work in it--outweigh the quantitative value.

With regard to the IDF in its relationship to the Arab armies, the situation was several times more advantageous, because never did the individual Arab soldier surpass the Israeli fighter in battle capability. As the level of a unit rose, so did the superiority of the IDF increase, and its status, in direct proportion to the most forward organizational level that the IDF formed immediately upon its founding. Advanced organization is not characterized merely by the degree of savings and equipment and in manpower as is required of it, but rather mainly in its ability to provide advanced military response, to develop quality of command, technical skill, etc. When the IDF became a topic of admiration among connoisseurs ["mayvins"] in the world, it was not the quantities of equipment it owned, and not the type of the systems of battle gear which brought this about. The marvel stemmed from the originality which was evident in the IDF in the areas of organization, planning and theory.

Resting On Laurels

However, already during the decade of the sixties, points of weakness began to appear in the organization of the IDF. Visits paid to friendly armies revealed that the tendency to rest on its laurels had begun to strike root in the IDF also. Military history teaches that this tendency is stronger particularly among armies which have chalked up in their favor impressive accomplishments. The most notable examples are of the Prussian army, which was undefeated from the days of Friedrich the Great and was defeated handily by Napoleon at Jena (1806) and that of the French army, which was considered the best in the world until it was vanquished with shocking ease by the Germans during the Second World War.

If Mr Begin had really conducted a learning tour among the modern armies of the world, he would have discovered that one of the problems engaging them most during this period is how to avoid any evidence of resting on one's laurels from an organizational standpoint. It may be said that since the end of the Second World War the recognition of the need to maintain repeated and ongoing inspections of the entire organizational system has become one of the characteristics of modern military theory. However, when the former defense minister, Mr Ezer Weizman, put forth the need to reorganize the ground forces of the IDF, he noted as well that since the establishment of the IDF there had been practically no substantive changes made in it. This was also the determination of Maj Gen Tal, who had been requested by Mr Weizman to investigate whether there was a need for a reorganization of the IDF.

If these determinations are correct, then since the founding of the IDF in its present structure, during the early years of the fifties, there have been no far-reaching organizational changes in it; and if indeed that is the situation, then there is room for ample worry. The meaning of this is that the IDF today is a very antiquated army. We have heard from the deputy minister of defense, who himself is a veteran officer of the IDF, that on the way to organizational reform there are strumbling blocks of prestige and power struggles among the top ranks of the IDF. For the sake of truth, an antiquated structure and prestige and power struggles are intertwined always. This is a lesson which is not based upon the experience of the IDF, but rather on the experience of many armies in the course of history.

One of the factors which can calm the concerned, is the succession of victories in small and daring actions which the IDF performs against the forces of the enemy from time to time. Yet, it is important to remember that not by this is the strength of an army tested in battle. Even between the Six-Day War and the Yom Kippur War, the IDF carried out such spectacular missions and yet was found to be unprepared when the war erupted.

The same severe situation of the absence of conceptual preparedness prior to the Yom Kippur War is what struck the public with such a shocking blow--that very trauma that the chief of staff, according to his testimony, did not hear about until the night following the most recent Yom Kippur. Indeed, between the impressionability of the defense minister by the armies of the world and the lack of discernment of the chief of staff with regard to the influence of the Yom Kippur War on the public in this country, there is still an abundance of reasons for concern.

8090
CSO: 4305

EDUCATION MINISTRY SEES GAINS AMONG NON-EUROPEAN STUDENTS

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Sep 80 p 4

[Article by Amos Ben-Vered, HA'ARETZ correspondent: "Intellectual Gap Narrowing Between Students of European and Asian Extraction"]

[Text] New data recently developed in the Ministry of Education and Culture's planning department indicate a narrowing of the intellectual gap between immigrants from Europe and America and those from Asia and Africa in this country.

The data were reported the day before yesterday by the director of the department, Mr Moshe Egozi, on the second day of conferences of the Special Care Council affiliated with the Ministry of Education and Culture.

The Council, directed by Mr. Shlomo Ben-Eliahu, assembled for 3 days of conferences on the problem of special care, its accomplishments and methods of dealing with this population.

The Principal Data

Principal data reported by Mr Egozi are:

* The increase is continuing in representation of emigrants from Asia and Africa within the frameworks of education above the elementary level and the gap is narrowing between their part of the population and their part among students (14 percent in 1967 to about 6 percent in 1979).

* Among the students an increase has taken place in the percentage of those born in Israel (second generation) and the percentage of emigrants of Asia and Africa, at the expense of a decrease in the percentage who emigrated from Europe and America.

* Products of the educational system in the decade of the seventies--members of all communities--are of a higher intellectual level than those of the decade of the sixties, while those are of a higher intellectual level than those products of the educational system of the decade of the fifties.

* A significant and consistent increase has come about in the retention power of the educational system. Dropout rates in elementary and above elementary education are steadily narrowing. The percentage of those who reach grade 12 has increased from three-quarters within a 10 year period.

Pedadogical Personnel

Among pedagogical personnel, an increase has taken place in the percentage of academic teachers and senior teachers (graduates of 3-year seminaries). He also reported that the data indicate that there has been a continued increase in the percentage of the gross national output dedicated to education in Israel.

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BRIEFS

SETTLEMENTS TOP PRIORITY--The Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Rafael Eytan, has determined that the desired order of priorities for settlement should, in his opinion, be establishment of settlements along the borders of the country--and in first place: the international border in the Negev, the Arava, and the Jordan Valley. These statements were made by the Chief of Staff at a meeting yesterday in Tel Aviv between him and the activists of the Kibbutz Ha'Artzi [The National Federation of Communes]. Lt Gen Eytan discussed with them the place of the Kibbutz members in the IDF, as well as the matters of settlement and spatial defense and in the course of several hours answered questions by those present, many of whom are members of the security committees of the kibbutzim. With regard to the desired order of priorities for settlement, several of the participants noted that they accept his concept, however that they do not agree that the Jordan Valley should be in first place. The Chief of Staff said that he sees in the NAHAL [Pioneer Fighting Youth] an extremely vital reservoir of settlement, and he will continue to give priority to this force within the military framework, while creating appropriate conditions for its existence. He pointed out the important function which the kibbutzim fill in spatial defense and as a part of the entire array, which is intended to perform a decisive function in the first stages of war. Lt Gen Eytan put forth a request to the Kibbutz Ha'Artzi to permit many more young people of the kibbutzim to join the regular military forces. According to him, he is prepared to open a new track of service in the regular military for kibbutz members. This track would permit them to serve extended periods in the kibbutzim, so that the contact between the members who serve in the regular military and in the kibbutzim will not deteriorate. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Sep 80 p 10] 8090

CSO: 4805

RULER DESCRIBES LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN PARTY, NATION

Beirut AL SAFIR in Arabic 18 Oct 80 p 14

/Article by Bilal al Hasan: "'Ali Nasir Muhammad to AL SAFIR: The Removal of Some Political Bureau Members was the Result of Party Not Political Infractions"/

/Text/ 'Ali Nasir Muhammad is the top man in Democratic Yemen now and combines a hold over the three top positions: he is the secretary general of the Yemeni Socialist Party, the president, and the prime minister.

'Ali Nasir Muhammad seized all the reins of power after the dismissal of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il from the party secretariat and the presidency. However, the important distinction here is that 'Ali Nasir Muhammad was not the man who took charge of the dismissal process; rather, that was assumed by a group within the Political Bureau, and he found himself obliged to go along with this group lest the country be immersed in a sea of blood for which all the conditions had been prepared. In this course of events everyone believed that 'Ali Nasir Muhammad was not the top man and would not be the top man in Democratic Yemen: eyes focused on the members of the group which exerted pressure to have 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il removed. People drew pictures of each of them and placed them in the positions they thought appropriate for them. According to this picture, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad would go back to being just an ordinary man in power.

However, successive surprises occurred before and after the extraordinary conference of the Yemeni Socialist Party (12-14 October).

Before the extraordinary conference, Muhammad Salih Muti', member of the Political Bureau, former minister of foreign affairs and the most prominent member of the group which dismissed 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, disappeared from the limelight and fate brought him into solidary confinement after Ethiopia, like all Socialist countries, had refused to receive him and give him residence, as an expression of its annoyance with his stand against 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il.

After the conference, all its old members left the political bureau, except for the minister of defense, 'Ali 'Antar, and thus it happened that with the detention of Muti' and the dismissal of the other members of the Political Bureau from their positions, the existence of the group which strove to dismiss 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il ended and all members of the group were dismissed from political decision-making positions. Through this process 'Ali Nasir Muhammad became the top man in Democratic Yemen.

When you are in Democratic Yemen you can hear little bits of these facts here and there, then put them together yourself to form a logical consistent picture; however, absolutely no one will agree to talk to you explicitly about them--not to speak of officially endorseing them.

Even in the case of President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad we realized that it would be embarrassing and inappropriate to ask about these matters, so I abandoned three questions which were at the heart of this interview:

A first question: why didn't 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il attend the exceptional party conference, and did he belong to it or not?

A second question: on the reason why the issue of amending the party's bylaws was dropped from the agenda, preparatory to appointing 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il its chairman.

A third question: on the truth about the fate of Muhammad Salih Muti,'his presence in solitary confinement and the socialist countries' refusal to receive him.

Thus began the meeting with President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, proceeding from the fourth question, which was just a logical extension of the first three. This was: "The party's literature refers to the Corrective Movement of 1969 which removed Qahtan al-Sha'bi as a measure against right-wing deviation, and it refers to the events of 25 June 1978 which dismissed the two Salims as a measure against left-wing deviation. In the light of that, what is the theoretical basis of the dispute with some members of the Political Bureau, which led to their removal before the convening of the conference?"

/Answer/ It is not necessary that any organizational change in the leadership councils of our party be linked to the existence of deep political and intellectual disputes, as is the case with respect to progressive parties. There are organizational principles and revolutionary party principles which govern our internal party activity, and in the light of these principles and traditions, renovation measures take place in the party leadership. Organizational measures are usually taken concerning those comrades who commit party violations.

/Question/ In the report presented to the conference, you referred to the possibility of private sector participation in development, especially through the petty and middle bourgeoisie, but the report on the amended 5-year plan does not have any practical projects to offer to the private sector. How will you translate this issue into practical reality?

/Answer/ I would like to state that the report referred to in your question concerned the main outlines of the revised second 5-year plan; the projects you are talking about are generally not included in the outlines but lie in the plan itself. The revised second 5-year plan which the Higher People's Council will soon ratify contains appropriate fields for private sector participation in some development projects. The ratio of this sector's participation to total social production as expected is about 37 percent in 1980.

/Question/ In the report presented to the conference you referred more than once to the erroneous practices of the opportunistic left in the field of agriculture

and cooperatives and the position on the petty and middle bourgeoisie. Does your party intend to describe the nature of these practices and criticize them so that they may be a subject for broad discussion and everyone can benefit from the lessons of this experiment?

/Answer/ In numerous mass meetings and press conferences we previously described the nature of the practices of the opportunistic left which almost changed the course of the revolution in our country. Yemeni and progressive Arab media also participated in crystallizing and describing these practices and explaining their dangers. To give proof of that here we can give you an example of some of the childish practices of the opportunistic left. It resorted to an attempt to nationalize some small stores such as shops and to "keep individual peasants from benefiting from irrigation equipment, fertilizer and seeds and prevent them from buying plowing equipment, which made the peasants migrate from the land."

It resorted to auctioneering domestically over some measures such as appointing persons who understood nothing about economics but were appointed as officials in economic departments and organizations. This brought harm to the domestic economy as a result of failure and economic mismanagement. While it went to great lengths to adopt extremist economic measures, it engaged in suspicious conduct and positions outside the political line of our party on the level of foreign relations. In any event, a study is being prepared on the experience and practice of the opportunistic left in Democratic Yemen.

American Bases

/Question/ What are your practical recommendations to confront the United States of America's plan to establish military bases, especially in Oman and Somalia, where your country will be faced with a direct danger from these bases?

/Answer/ We have declared our position on the American military presence in the region most clearly and we have warned of the danger of American movements and schemes to the security and stability of the peoples of the region of the Arabian Peninsula and the Arab nation in general, especially since the American administration is concealing its open designs to occupy Arab oilfields. We still believe that the security and stability of the area lie on the shoulders of its countries and peoples alone, far removed from any form of imperialist hegemony and imperialist military presence.

/Question/ What are your practical recommendations to develop the organizations of the Perseverance and Steadfastness Front, especially the military ones, now that your report to the conference has stated that you consider it the first link in your Arab alliances?

/Answer/ There is no doubt that the Arab Perseverance and Steadfastness Front now constitutes the combative force in our Arab nation's struggle against imperialist and Zionist schemes and conspiracies. The front's summit conference held in Tripoli last April stressed the importance of strengthening the front's role in leading the Arab liberation struggle by starting to build the front's military, political, media and economic institutions and develop its relations with the forces of liberation, progress and socialism in the world--foremost among them the

friendly Soviet Union. We for our part will seek to carry out this conference's resolutions and will perpetuate the combative relations which link our party and revolution to the other elements in the front and the other elements in the front and the other Arab progressive forces.

/Question/ The Arab region recently witnessed two important occurrences: the Libyan-Syrian union and the friendship treaty concluded between Syria and the Soviet Union. What is your appraisal of these two events and what are the conditions for their success in the light of your experience?

/Answer/ The Libyan-Syrian Arab union is to be considered a practical contribution to strengthening the unity of Arab revolutionary forces along the road to comprehensive Arab unity. We are confident that this unity will result in strengthening the resistance of the two fraternal countries of Libya and Syria and deepening their combative solidarity along the path of the national liberation struggle for a union possessing socialist horizons.

As regards the treaty of friendship between Syria and the Soviet Union, we consider that that is a living embodiment of the combative relations which link the Soviet Union to perseverant Syria and draws its scope from the Soviet Union's support and backing for the Syrian Arab people's struggle to regain their usurped territories, achieve social progress and stand up to Zionist imperialist conspiracies. In addition, this treaty also responds to the interests and aspirations of the people of our Arab nation who have found in the friendly Soviet Union a firm defender of our just struggle for liberation, progress, socialism and unity.

/Question/ In the report, you assessed your new relations with Kuwait and the state of the emirates and referred to the need to develop these relations; how do you envisage the requisite approaches to such a development, politically and economically?

/Answer/ We believe that our relations with our brethren in Kuwait, the state of the emirates and the other countries of the region must help strengthen the chances for security and stability in the region in a manner which will guarantee the progress and prosperity of its peoples. On this basis, we have underlined the importance of establishing these relations on a foundation of peaceful coexistence and the coordination of efforts to confront the dangers of imperialist military bases and stand up to their aggressive moves.

/Question/ How do you envision the conditions of the requisite Arab movement to deal with the subject of the Iraqi-Iran war?

/Answer/ We have called out in a loud voice in demanding an end to this war, which is damaging the interests of the two peoples and the two countries of Iraq and Iran, exhausting their powers and benefiting only the forces of imperialism and Zionism. As we all know, the course of the war has resulted in grave developments and complications which must be dealt with far from emotions.

/Question/ Democratic Yemen's anxiety to make a success of the unity experiment with North Yemen is well known and obvious, but your media have started to emphasize the efforts of the enemies of union and the need to keep practice abreast of

agreements. Have obstacles arisen recently in this area? Is it true that some agreements between the governments of San'a' and the National Front have been cancelled as a result of foreign pressures?

/Answer/ We are proceeding with unlimited determination and resolve along the road to regain Yemeni unity, in terms of land and people, on sound democratic bases. We can say that the peaceful platform which we and our brothers in the north of the country are following has yielded our people important gains which may seem limited in size but, because of their significance, are of broad scope, enabling us to set forth some foundations for economic integration, trade and coordination in cultural and athletic activities and stimulate the movement of citizens between the two halves. Although there are some obstacles in the way of the peaceful struggle for unity, they will be dissolved by strengthening the true efforts toward unity.

As regards the latter part of your question, we support all efforts which have been made on behalf of the unity of national forces and elements and all noble people in Yemen toward the consummation of the Yemeni revolution.

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CSO: 4802

WOMEN'S LEADER EXTOLS ROLE OF REVOLUTION IN LIBERATING POWERS

Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 22 Oct 80 p 2

/Article by Huda Fadl: "Secretary General of Yemen Women's Federation in a Meeting with 14 OCTOBER"/

/Text/ The Yemen Women's Federation is one of the mass organizations which organize and provide the framework for the activity of working women in our country.

The federation plays a large, important role in consolidating the bonds of solidarity between the masses of women and the line of our political party, mobilizing women and raising their political and cultural consciousness.

In this meeting with Comrade Fathiyah Muhammad 'Abdallah, member of the Central Committee of our Yemeni Socialist Party and secretary general of the federation, we became acquainted with the contributions of the masses of women to the processes of revolutionary transformation underway in our country as well as the nature of the circumstances which women suffered from in the past and the gains and achievements they have made in the light of our progressive regime.

Question One: Comrade Fathiyah, at the very outset we would like you to talk to us a little about the situation women experienced in the past, in the context of the colonial feudal system, and the achievements they have made in the context of our new social system.

Answer One: The most conspicuous aspect of women's conditions in the colonial-feudalist system was the condition of inequality imposed between them and men. Feudal ideology sanctified attitudes of contempt and disdain toward women and the masses of women were deprived of many needs. Education was denied them.

A policy of enforced ignorance was practiced against them and they were deprived of their right to work and consequently their right to a noble healthy life.

However, in spite of the colonial system's repression of women, the masses of women participated in the struggle to acquire their rights and attain liberation and independence for the nation within the Yemeni national movement. Women led violent demonstrations in 1959 to protest against the brutal methods of the colonial authorities in repressing the masses of the people, trying to eliminate the national personality and imposing their colonial curricula on the schools of the region.

With the fall of the colonial-feudalist system and the country's acquisition of political independence, it became clear to women that national independence could only acquire progressive substance by ending exploitative production relations in the city and combatting feudalism and feudalist ideology in the rural areas. Women struggled to create a context through which they would be able to exercise their rights. That was realized in the desired manner only after the 22 June step, when women enjoyed great opportunities to end their economic subordination to men and were able to work in cooperative farms, state farms, and various factories, workshops and organizations. Many opportunities opened up for women in education, work in government organizations, study in faculties or study abroad. Among them were graduates in law, teachers in higher schools and doctors. That all gives us confidence that women have become conscious of their role in economically building the country.

The economic liberation of the society is measured by the extent to which the women in it are liberated.

Question Two: Could you talk to us about the role of the Yemen Women's Federation, from its first conference to today, in moving among the masses of women?

What are the various aspects of the activity the federation is performing toward this end?

Answer Two: Since the convening of its first conference, our federation has striven to prompt women to enroll in political, social and economic areas. The federation's bylaws and programs stipulate the need to enroll women, especially working women and housewives, in the context of the federation and make women conscious of the rights and obligations the constitution has given them.

In 1975, to guarantee the participation of women in the productive process--which is considered a basis of the economic liberation of women, the decisive factor in their total liberation--the federation opened a number of vocational complexes in all governorates of the republic to teach women who were not working new vocations which were socially useful, such as equipment maintenance, sewing, electrical work, and driving tractors and cars.

These complexes had brilliant success, large numbers of women enrolled in them and 1,085 trainees graduated from them. In addition, the federation opened special classes in its branches to give training in sewing, tailoring, printing and various handcrafts and to teach illiterate women the principles of reading and writing and political fundamentals. In the period 1975-77, 59,605 women were liberated from illiteracy through these courses. These liberated women were given greater power and more abundant opportunities to acquire work through and with the help of the federation.

Women's participation in political activity and increased political and social roles are among the basic matters which the federation is confronting. To this end, the federation has striven to defend women's rights and has played a prominent role in increasing their social and political contributions. Participation in local people's assembly elections has become a right of Yemeni women, either by running as candidates or by voting. A basic proportion of women has been attained

and guaranteed in the Higher People's Assembly, the highest legislative power in the country.

In addition, the local people's assemblies contain between three and seven female members each. In order to guarantee women's social rights, the federation is striving to strengthen the application of revolutionary laws and measures which will guarantee women's rights and obligations; most important of these is the Family Law, which helps care for families socially and in health terms by improving the activity of kindergartens, supervising them, participating in the selection of female guardians there and setting out curricula. The federation presses upon women the need to use sanitary methods in treatment, to go to hospitals and mother and child care centers, and to solve the social problems facing some families without prior prejudice against women.

Our federation attributes great importance to its activity on behalf of ideological and cultural activity among women and is anxious to use all media available to give honorable picture of the new Yemeni woman, raise her general political and cultural awareness, and eliminate all phenomena of belittlement and disdain for women's personality.

Our publicity activity is carried out as follows:

Participation in media committees, representation in women's departments, and emphasis on the positive picture of the new Yemeni woman.

Preparing and offering special programs through radio, television and the press (the magazine NISA'AL-YAMAN), which is directed toward the masses of women, and issuing local publications, wall posters and banners on national and international occasions.

Question Three: What is the role to which your mass organization aspires in eliminating women's regular and political illiteracy?

Answer Three: In the sphere of eradicating illiteracy among women, the federation has opened classes in all its branches in the governorates. Female federation members have gone into common sections and governorates to persuade housewives of the need to eradicate their illiteracy and reduce the problems which are inhibiting some women from enrolling in anti-illiteracy courses and set out appropriate solutions for them. An anti-illiteracy program was set out for women as part of the programs which the federation is trying to carry out as one of the goals before it. However, there are difficulties which the federation is still facing in this field, and these are:

1. Women's failure to be receptive to taking anti-illiteracy courses.

2. The absence of resources to attract women and appeal to them to enroll in these courses.

3. The absenteeism of a number of female students and female teachers' failure to appear sometimes result in the cancellation of classes.

This does not mean that the federation will abandon working in the field of eradicating illiteracy because of the difficulties it faces. The General Yemen Women's Federation has a massive project to open training centers and qualify women in all governorates, and courses will be opened to eradicate illiteracy and to follow up on emancipation from illiteracy. That will take place this year.

Question Four: How does the federation help carry out the plans and programs of the party and the revolutionary government?

Answer Four: The federation plays a prominent role in implementing the resolutions of the first party conference. This is represented by its encouragement of women to participate in economic construction and implementation of the second 5-year plan. That is taking place through promulgation of programs for productive campaigns and contests in residential districts to clean up sections and participate with popular Defense Committees in building and reconstructing housing.

The federation plays an important role in discussing party and government plans bearing on development, through its representatives in the higher and branch committees.

The federation also plays an important role in spreading scientific socialist thinking within women's circles by getting women to participate in studying in the School of Scientific Socialism and through the magazine NISA'AL-YAMAN and the daily programs offered in the context of either central broadcasting or local radio stations. The General Yemen Women's Federation considers that the party program approved at the first party conference is its program. Therefore the federation is performing all the tasks women are requested to perform at this stage.

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REVOLUTION'S ACHIEVEMENTS IN ROADBUILDING EXTOLLED

Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 23 Oct 80 p 2

/Article by Fatin Muhammad: "Undersecretary of Installations: Paved Roads Increased by 324 Percent in the Revolutionary Era over Pre-Revolutionary Period"/

/Text/ Land communications are a vital artery which is not to be disdained in the economic and social contexts. They link the various far-flung areas through a broad road system which brings remote areas close together.

Land routes are considered among the cheapest and best means of contact and transportation. Before independence they did not exist in our country and alienation among regions was great. For example, for someone to travel from the Governorate of Hadramawt to the Governorate of Aden was as if he was traveling from the south to the north of the peninsula. By land it would take 3 days, and serious attention was not given at that time to linking up the inhabited areas of the country--except for roads which basically served the interests of colonialism, since the roads were concentrated in the colony of Aden and some roads linking agricultural areas in Lahij, Abin and their outlying regions at that time. Colonialism deliberately neglected roads, in view of their effect from the following standpoints:

In breaking the isolation among regions.

In developing the most backward areas.

In reducing transport and operating costs.

In facilitating the course of activity of the central government.

However, the process of building roads in all areas of the republic increased after independence and massive capital investments were made with the objective of building a road system linking up the various governorates of the republic, out of the revolutionary government's awareness of the importance of roads, which are the arteries of economic life. The Road Department of the Ministry of Installations is considered the entity responsible for carrying out road studies and designing building, renovating and maintaining roads, as well as inspecting roadbuilding and maintenance materials. To talk about this important branch of the construction sector, we had a meeting with Muhammad 'Awad al-Daba, undersecretary of installations, who spoke at great length about the Road Branch, which deals with

building capability, the workforce, financing and projects.

Building Capability and the Volume of Accomplishments

On accomplishments in the field of roads, he says, "The department has managed to realize many accomplishments in the context of paved roads and in the context of the construction of dirt roads in all governorates.

"While in the 3-year plan productive capacity was 188 kilometers of paved roads, that is, 62 kilometers a year, and 1,308 kilometers of built and improved dirt roads, that totalled 522 kilometers of paved roads in the first 5-year plan--that is, it rose to 100 kilometers per year, 206 kilometers of paved road maintenance and renovation and 2,225 kilometers of constructed and improved dirt roads. The productive capacity of roads is expected to reach 135 kilometers per year this year, which means that the growth rate has increased 60 percent over what it was in the 3-year plan. Investments have surged; in the 3-year plan they totalled 8,076,000 dinars and in the first 5-year plan they reached 32,016,000 dinars. The following table shows the most important roads built in the 3-year plan and the first 5-year plan years:

Projects Carried out in the 3-Year Plan Years

Paved Roads		Dirt Roads	
Am'in-al-Mahfid	140 kilometers	Nuqayl al-Khala'-al-Hadd	40 kilometers
Aden-Abin	45 kilometers	The Central Road	250 kilometers
al-Mukalla-al-Dis	3 kilometers	Road construction in Suqutra	14 kilometers

Projects Carried out in the First 5-Year Plan Years

Paved Roads		Dirt Roads	
al-Mahfid-al-Mukalla	325 kilometers	al-Fatak-al-Hawf	5 kilometers
Nubat Dakim-Karash	44 kilometers	Sayhun-Nashtun	35 kilometers
al-Mukalla-Khalaf-Jul Mashah	14 kilometers	A road in Suqutra	327 kilometers

"The work carried out in the area of roads in the plan years has been very great when we compare that with what existed shortly before the plan: 94.4 percent of the stipulated amount has been built, improved and repaired.

"As regards amended second 5-year plan projects, it is expected that investment allocations will total 32.6 million dinars, including some funds to complete projects still under construction, most important of which is the al-Mukalla-Hadramawt road, 365 kilometers in length, the 116-kilometer Shugrah-Ahwar road and some new roads such as the 204-kilometer al-Dhahr-Sayhut road, in addition to the paving and repaving of 250 kilometers of old road, routine maintenance of 1,200 kilometers survey and design studies on 500 kilometers of new roads, and the development of the central Road Department workshop.

"The accomplishments the Road Department has realized in 13 years of independence in building new paved roads specifically total more than 1,361 kilometers. One should bear in mind that the paved roads built under colonial rule did not exceed

420 kilometers. Here one should observe that paved new roads increased by 324 percent in comparison with the pre-independence period."

Methods of Implementing Projects

What, however, are the methods of implementing projects--that is, how does financing take place? Our brother the undersecretary of installations, explaining this, states, "Financing was internal as regards roads. Then we began directing ourselves to taking loans from friendly and fraternal countries, and this was reflected in the construction method. These methods were reflected in the following systems"

"Cooperation with the lending companies. Is this method all the high-level technical experts who do not exist here come from these countries and we contribute our locally available experts. This is clear from the construction of the Am'in-al-Mahfid-al-Mukalla road in cooperation with the People's Republic of China. This pattern will continue in the al-Shahr-Sayhut projects and the project to extend and reinforce Aden International Airport, which is being carried out with the cooperation of the Soviet Union.

"The system of construction by seeking the aid of a supervisory team. We resorted to this method when we announced international bids to construct the al-Mukalla-Wadi Hadramawt and Aden-Ta'izz projects financed by the Kuwaiti Fund, the World Bank and the Arab Fund. International companies bid fantastic sums; after coordinating with the financing bodies, we considered that the best solution would be to seek the aid of supervisory teams. These consist of a group of between 20 and 25 experts for each project and local technicians, engineers and workers.

"One of the advantages of this technique is to reduce the hard currency which leaves the country through international companies. In addition, it gives our technicians and workers an opportunity to acquire expertise through actual practice and form a local technical base, as well as reducing costs.

"As regards the Aden-Ta'izz project, the largest bid companies presented was 32 million dinars and the lowest was 12 million. We are now trying to construct it for about 7 million, which was the 1976 price. In the al-Mukalla-Wadi Hadramawt project, the lowest bid offered was 17 million, and we are trying to carry it out for 10 million dinars in 1975 prices.

"Seeking the aid of foreign experts, as happened in the Shuqrah-Ahwar project which the Libyan Jamahiriyah contributed to financing. We are seeking the aid of Soviet experts."

The Workforce Drain

After that he moves on in his conversation to the condition of manpower in the area of roads. The total number of workers in the Road Department comes to 3,638 this year, 2,877 of whom are working on projects--most, 2,463 in number, at the worksite outside the Governorate of Aden. Local superintendents and engineers account for 3 percent of the total workforce, a very low proportion which is reflected in the level of planning, implementation and supervision.

/Question/ This means the refusal to agree to work in the area of roads. What is the reason?

/Answer/ There are a number of reasons, among them:

The strenuous nature of work in difficult climatic and environmental circumstances.

The poor living conditions at worksites in terms of food, housing and remoteness from built-up areas.

Although they receive a living allowance at the site, it is still not attractive to people working on road projects.

Our brother Muhammad 'Awad al-Daba considers that in fields like these it is necessary to give the workers special status so that wages and salaries will be revised in accordance with the nature of the work. Skilled labor, after being trained, moves on to better worksites as a result of these conditions. For example there 6,552 workers in 1973; this number dropped to 5,948 in the early part of the first 5-year plan, reaching 2,591 at the beginning of the second plan in 1979. This situation reflects the drain of the workforce in road projects.

Bringing Arab Countries Closer together through a System of Land Roads

/Question/ There is a domestic road system linking the various areas of the republic, in addition to another road system linking the two segments of Yemen. Is there a system linking countries in the Arab nation?

/Answer/ There is coordination with the Council on Arab Economic Unity in the Arab League to link existing roads in the republic up with other roads in the Arab nation. We have participated in a number of Economic Unity Council meetings in this area. There is a project to link up the two segments of the nation through the Aden-Ta'izz Road and in this route of ours a linkup will be made to the Arab nation's system and another road along the al-Naqabah-Bayjan-Harib-Ma'rib-San'a'-Nubat Dakim-al-Numayr-al-Dali'-Sannah-Qa'tabah-Ibb route. There is coordination to construct that road.

11887
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AMBITIOUS NEW AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DETAILED

Beirut AL-ANWAR in Arabic 22 Oct 80 p 8

/Article: "Agricultural Development Strategy in Saudi Arabia"/

/Text/ Officials in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia consider that agriculture, after God, is the pillar on which one must rely to meet the needs of all the Islamic countries, especially the developing countries which are in the most extreme need of ascertaining agricultural reserves and their importance. It is stressed that agriculture requires the arms and intense attention of the people of this nation and that there is a need to provide support and aid for farmers, so that they may perform their duties in meeting their country's needs for foodstuffs and other materials with which God has graced this country and which have been brought forth from the fertility of its land.

From this premise, the interest of Saudi officials in the agricultural sector stands forth on carefully studied scientific bases which conform to the most recent methods and mechanization science has created, in addition to the aid.

To establish this, we find that the agricultural sector has enjoyed great attention in the current third 5-year plan. Total costs for agriculture come to 7,974,500,000 riyals. The most important programs in this sector are:

1. The agricultural development program: this is aimed at preparing new lands for modern farming, reclaiming current irrigated areas and developing pasture and wooded areas. The most important projects are the two to develop Wadi Damad and Wadi al-Dawasir.

2. The production program: this is aimed at directly increasing agricultural production through improved seeds for farmers, aid to poultry and dairy producers by providing the necessary equipment for their output, and the production of inoculations and serums to prevent animal diseases.

The plan aims at achieving an output as follows:

Wheat: 198,872 tons, an increase of 28 percent over the second plan.

Vegetables: 719,598 tons, an increase of 28 percent over the second plan.

Fruit: 104,601 tons, an increase of 27 percent over the second plan.

Meat: 51,505 tons, an increase of 27 percent over the second plan.

Dairy products: 30,549 tons, an increase of 29 percent over the second plan.

Wooded areas: 10,500 donums, an increase of 250 percent over the second plan.

Pastures which have been protected: 500 kilometers, an increase of 1,823 percent over the second plan.

Training: an increase in the number of trainees /by/ 3,695, an increase of 48 percent over the second plan.

As regards the General Grain Silo and Flour Mill Organization, this plan aims at attainment of the following:

561,000 tons per year in flour mills--an increase of 47 percent over the volume achieved in the second plan, which was 381,000 tons.

175,000 tons per year in fodder mills--an increase of 133 percent over the volume achieved in the second development plan, which was 300,000 tons.

The total sums allotted to the organization's projects during the third plan will be 4,802,700,000 riyals, 6 percent of the total sums for the third plan.

In addition, the volume of grain delivered to officials in grain and flour silos up to early June, beginning at the start of the season, came up to 20 million kilograms of good grain, mostly from the production of al-Batin north of the town of al-Buraydah and all from the production of the al-Qusaymah area. There is no doubt that the quality and abundance of the crop is the result of the facilities and aid of the Agricultural Bank and and Ministry of Agriculture

Agricultural Development Plan Goals and Results

If we review the sector of agriculture and water, which is considered to be one of the most important sectors on which economic development in Saudi Arabia relies, we will find that the general goals of the plan are represented by the following:

Raising the level of competence and increasing crop and livestock production output.

Developing, preserving them, and making proper use of pastures and wooded areas.

Developing the kingdom's fish resources and the fish industry.

Developing and preserving water resources and using them properly on sound scientific bases.

Diversifying the country's crop production.

Proceeding from these general goals, it has been natural to concentrate on the basic requirements of growth in investment distribution and to give suitable priority to studies, experiments, and preliminary and detailed surveys, on grounds that that is a basis for determining the country's potential and agricultural and

water resources preparatory to developing them in a sound direction, as well as developing and improving resources which are actually known. Therefore the ministry has made expenditures to train experts and develop manpower in each sector so that it will be possible to put the development plan in execution.

Surveying and Evaluating Resources

In application of these goals, the Ministry of Agriculture and Water has surveyed, studied and evaluated the country's water and agricultural resources, including social and rural conditions. To carry out this type of comprehensive survey, the ministry has resorted to subdividing the kingdom into eight regions.

The results of the comprehensive survey of water and agricultural resources in the kingdom have established that the topography and soil of a large part of its territory are fit for agriculture and that potential groundwater reserves which can be replenished are to a large extent encouraging. So far the ministry has taken a number of steps in this direction, starting with survey activities, studies, experiments, the construction of dams and the construction and operation of irrigation, drainage and reclamation projects and ending with subsidizing the most important ingredients of agricultural production and guiding farmers in sound ways of using irrigation water, in addition to aiding farmers with seeds, chemical fertilizers and agricultural machinery, providing the necessary subsidies for domestic output, providing guidance and protection services through 90 branches spread out over the broad area of the kingdom, the drilling cased and hand-operated wells and expanding the determination of potable water systems in the various towns and villages of the kingdom.

In this context, the context of land reclamation, work is continuing seriously. Among the most prominent things to have been announced recently was the treatment by the Ministry of Agriculture's branch in the Eastern Province of 2,570 donums of agricultural land in al-Dammam and al-Khubar by chemical fertilizer.

1,177 head of poultry and livestock were treated for diseases and 257,888 head of poultry and livestock were inoculated. One hundred fifty shipments of various kinds of agricultural equipment, tools, pesticides and fertilizer were examined and inspected.

Agreement was made recently to drill 75 wells for industrial, agricultural and residential purposes. The branch's bacteriological laboratory is currently supervising cases of diseases among animals in the region and performing analyses of samples sent over to it to diagnose and treat sick animals.

Plant Production

The kingdom now produces more than 30 percent of the total local consumption of grain on an area of 4.3 million donums. Production of vegetables in the kingdom occupies second place, after grain, as a source of food, especially since some vegetables are exported to the gulf states at specific times, such as tomatoes, onions and watermelons. The farming of potatoes as a food product produced for starch has also been a success and it has been possible to apply it to 14 Directorates of Agriculture and Water in the kingdom, following adoption of the potato

potato farming project in 1976. It was possible to produce 2,000 tons locally in 1978. Storehouses were constructed to cool potato seeds in al-Kharj, al-Qusayn and al-Hufus and to provide vegetables in quantities meeting the needs of the main towns at all seasons. Farming has been introduced under controlled environmental circumstances (protected farming) through the use of greenhouses outfitted with equipment to control temperature and humidity.

New Farming and Animal Resource Projects

Among the most modern new animal resource and farming projects, the minister of agriculture and water recently approved a number of domestic agricultural projects as part of the ministry's policy of developing the agricultural sector and supporting the private sector with loans and determination of the economic feasibility of the projects which are approved and ratified involving the agriculture and livestock resources sector. Among these are a project to raise milk cows with a capacity of 600 head, whose costs exceed 30 million riyals, to be established on the al-Rass-'Anayzah road in the al-Qusaym region and a project to produce chickens for eating at a cost of 7,209,000 riyals. This project also entails the establishment of eight pens for raising poultry operating in accordance with the enclosed system. The capacity of this project will come to more than 800,000 meat chickens per year. Agreement has also been made to expand the egg production project belonging to a Saudi Company in the al-Kharj area, whose costs exceed 24 million riyals, in addition to agreement to a dairy and dairy product project for a cattle ranch comprising more than 500 head at a cost of more than 32 million riyals. The site of the project is in the Abha region and it will be operating at a productive capacity of 2 million liters per year. In addition a poultry project will be established in the Abha area to produce 15 million eggs per year through the enclosed system at costs estimated at 4,805,000 riyals. There is another project to raise and fatten al-Najd sheep and grow fodder on an area of 805 donums and establish facilities north of the al-Kharj springs at a cost of 5,274,000 riyals, in addition to a similar project to fatten sheep in the Hafr al-Batin area with an annual capacity of 36,000 head, at costs of 5,943,000 riyals. There is another project to grow vegetables inside protected structures in the area of Medina; the project consists of 30 donums of plastic houses and 10 donums of greenhouses with a productive capacity of 270 tons of tomatoes and 100 tons of cucumbers and costs estimated at 7.75 million riyals.

In addition it was announced in the early part of 1980 that the volume of animal resources in the kingdom is 5 million head and that the country produces 30 million chickens. There are 304 projects to produce eggs, meat and dairy products and 158 other projects which are under construction.

Alongside all that, agricultural roads have a large share of the ministry's budget this year; sums have been allocated to support existing teams and create new ones and include the credits necessary for stabilizing certain important agricultural roads with asphaltic and other materials in order to raise the service level and reduce maintenance costs, contributing to increasing the yield of these roads. The ministry will apply this system to the greatest possible number of agricultural roads in accordance with the priorities which have been set forth for that purpose, and the assistance of domestic contractors will be sought in implementing the stabilization operations.

The government attributes great importance to the subject of subsidies and loans it offers farmers through the ministry and the Agricultural Credit Bank to encourage them to increase production.

The government has ventured to grant subsidies to farmers to encourage them to increase production. Foremost among these grants are:

Subsidies equivalent to 45 percent of the purchase price of agricultural machinery for cooperative societies, individual farmers and tenants to strive to spread about the mechanization of agriculture.

Direct subsidies for pumps and irrigation machinery totalling 50 percent of the cost of fertilizer imported and produced locally.

Direct subsidies of 30 percent of the purchase price for poultry farm equipment including automated drinking and feeding troughs, incubators and electrical equipment related to various functions.

Grant of a direct subsidy of 50 percent of cost for concentrated fodder and Syrian corn in order to protect the poultry industry which has flourished in the kingdom and encourage local livestock production.

Subsidies for milk production by providing strains of cattle with international /levels of/ productivity.

The Agricultural Bank is making purchase transactions with private countries and organizations which produce these strains and the government will defray air shipping costs from the country of origin which are equivalent in amount to the base price of the cattle. The Agricultural Bank also pays the price of this cattle and the government pays out subsidies of 30 percent of the price of milking equipment.

This is in addition to the subsidies which are paid out to produce rice, wheat, and fine corn and to raise sheep and camels.

Last July it was announced that the Agricultural Bank branch in al-Ta'if offered 3,291 short-and medium-term loans to farmers in the al-Ta'if region and other areas included under the services of the al-Ta'if bank's branches which are six in number, during the past year.

The Agricultural Bank in Ta'if and its six other branches also offered about 245 cash loans in the same period as well.

Eng 'Abdallah al-Saykhan, manager of the bank branch in al Ta'if, also declared that the number of loan applications in the various activities in which the bank is engaged numbered about 1,200 in the period from the beginning of this fiscal year to now (July) and that the bank branches in Sabt al-'Alaya, Turabah and Rinah have been expanded. By being given powers to authorize them to approve the necessary credits in the form of loans, examine projects and loan applications and offer all types of service or services provided farmers in the regions belonging to these three branches.

The same month the manager of the Agricultural Bank in the Eastern Province announced that the bank's credits in this province came to more than 102 million riyals in loans and subsidies and that 55 million riyals were allocated to loans for 1980; of this, 18 million, or 33 percent of total bank allocations, were allotted to agricultural development projects.

It is expected that the share of agricultural projects this year will increase as a result of the presence of agricultural projects which are under study. Among the most important of these are projects for the production of milk and dairy products and projects for egg-laying and eating poultry, which are carried out inside enclosed units. The subsections for expenditures for well drilling and land reclamation projects in the Eastern Province have been bolstered and the credits allocated for subsidies came to 47,853,000 riyals this year, including subsidies for agricultural machinery, fodder, machinery equipment, poultry raising equipment, transport of imported cattle and subsidies for fishermen.

These great financial credits are the result of the government's interest in the agricultural sector and the concern of its officials and are consequently aimed at serving farming and farmers.

Land Distribution

Among the many other things which the government is offering citizens in this field, hundreds of plots of land are distributed to farmers every year to develop and benefit from and consequently to help increase national income and attain self-sufficiency in further agricultural matters.

Among the most recent matters announced in this field, last June 43 plots of unirrigated farmland were distributed in the al-Zulfi and Hafr al-Batin areas.

The North 'Alqah plan was subdivided preparatory to distribution. That contains 141 plots of farmland.

In the al-Qatif area it has been announced that the number of plots of farmland distributed to citizens in 1979-80 totalled 150, with a total area of 7,500 donums.

Construction of Dams

The Ministry of Agriculture and Water is trying constantly to construct dams and give them substantial priority in order to collect rainwater and other water in watercourses. There are numerous studies and designs in this regard; among them, for example, the design and construction of five dams was authorized in the al-Bahah area in the third 5-year plan, and these will have the greatest effect in preserving potable and irrigation water for the region on grounds that it is area with rainfall throughout the year.

It has been announced that it has been decided to build 14 large dams to store water and use it for agricultural purposes in a number of farming regions in the kingdom. These dams will have enough capacity to provide adequate water for irrigation and watering and raise and increase the capability of agricultural production in the future. One should also point here to the second development plan's interest in desalinated water to cover the requirements of towns; now, with the third plan, use is being made of well water and water from Wadi Fatimah and Wadi Khulays to increase the cultivated area in the two regions.

Among the most prominent modern dams there is the Wadi Najran Dam, with a storage

capacity of 85 million cubic meters, which in exceptional conditions can reach 100 million cubic meters. Preliminary costs total 370 million riyals; this can be increased in the event expansions and additions are carried out around the dam.

The people of the Najran area regard this dam as very auspicious because the water from rains and floods which generally occur in the rainy season was in the past lost in the sands of the al-Rub' al-Khali Desert. With the completion of the dam, the Najran area will be able to benefit from this water for irrigation and farming activities and other water uses throughout the year.

There is numerous extensive research to implement large water projects in a number of areas, including al-Qusaym, and 'Asir, in order to develop water resources and furnish them for farming and desert areas alike.

11887
CSO: 4802

UAE, BELGIUM PLAN PACT ON TRADE COOPERATION

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 12 Nov 80 p 1

[Text] Dubai, Nov. 11: Belgium and the UAE are to draw up an agreement on trade and technical cooperation.

Disclosing this in an interview this evening, Belgian Minister of Foreign Robert, Urbain, said work on preparing the draft could begin within a month or so. The draft would first be initialled but the full fledged agreement would be signed after detailed consideration of all its ramifications by both sides.

Urbain was speaking after attending a meeting by the visiting Belgian trade delegation, led by Prince Albert with the President and members of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry at the Chamber hall.

The minister said need for such an agreement arose out of a conviction that instruments of trade and technical cooperation between the two countries ought to be institutionalised. Prospects for stepped up Belgian exports to the UAE and Dubai in particular as well as collaboration in joint ventures, UAE investment in Belgian industry and transfer to this country of Belgian technology had brightened with the visit of the delegation and greater contacts between businessmen of the two countries. In view of this it was considered necessary to have an institutional framework through which the pace and level of trade and cooperation could be reviewed at all levels of contact from time to time.

Urbain said during their visit to Dubai members of the Belgian delegation had been enabled to discuss specific trade and industrial projects with entrepreneurs and traders here. Obviously, some of the contacts would take time to bear fruit but the Belgians had been struck by the immense potential for absorption of development initiatives in this country.

Four distinct areas of advancement in economic relations had been identified, Urbain said. There was a possibility of increased direct exports of Belgian products, both traditional and non-traditional. The country was also a producer of capital equipment which this country would find ideal for development schemes in industry and agriculture. Thirdly, Belgian firms with vast experience in project development in Arab countries were ideally suited for participation in joint ventures in oil exploration, refinery construction, petro-chemical plants and ports development. A fourth avenue would be in the field of technology transfer whose potential could be viewed in the light of Belgian advancements in science and technology.

In reference to prospects for collaboration in joint ventures, the minister said members of the delegation had held discussions today and yesterday with officials of Dubai municipality and the power company. They had also called on the Minister of Electricity and Water.

Earlier during the meeting between the visiting delegation, the largest ever from Belgium to the Gulf, Prince Albert expressed confidence that contacts made in the course of the visit and today would result in a much higher level of economic exchanges. He said while Belgian businessmen had been late in coming to the UAE, it was "better late than never." He expressed hope that follow-up measures for implementation of the trade and technical cooperation agreement between the two countries would be rapid.

Speaking on the occasion, Foreign Trade Minister Robert Urbain said Belgium was determined to catch up with other European countries exporting more already to this part of the world. He hoped that trade initiatives from his country would help better balance the lopsided trade figures which showed that Belgium exported to this country only one third of its imports from here.

The delegation was welcomed at the Chamber by CCI President Saif Ahmed al Ghurair who outlined the needs of the trading community here and the prospects for technical and agricultural collaboration.

CSO: 4820

UAE IMPORTS DIVERSIFIED DURING 1979

Abu Dhabi EMIRATES NEWS in English 15 Nov 80 p 3

[Text] The sources of UAE imports changed noticeably during 1979, according to a report issued by the Currency Board recently.

Western Europe's share in the total imports of the UAE fell by 7.3 per cent from 79.6 per cent in 1978 to 72.3 per cent in 1979. On the other hand, imports from Arab countries more than doubled from 4.6 per cent of UAE's total imports in 1978, to 9.4 per cent in 1979.

The report showed a slight rise in the percentage of imports from Asian countries from 11.2 per cent in 1978 to 13.7 per cent.

Imports from Eastern Europe and China fell marginally by 0.3 per cent from 2.7 per cent of the total in 1978 to 2.4 per cent in 1979.

The report pointed out that UAE's imports soared by Dh. 5,797 million from Dh. 20,845 million in 1978 to Dh. 26,642 million in 1979.

The Currency Board confirmed that changes in the pattern of origin of imports will continue in the future also. Imports from Arab countries will increase, as Arab Gulf countries are planning to widen and diversify their industrial base to meet the region's need of industrial commodities.

Some Asian countries are expected to play a prominent role in this development by providing cheap raw materials and labour.

The Currency Board stressed the fact that Gulf countries are concentrating on the manufacturing side. Some Arab Gulf States have ambitious plans to manufacture different kinds of industrial products to meet the needs of the region.

The Board's report stressed that such Gulf products must be of good quality to compete with imported items.

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END

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No. 2227

EGYPT: OPPOSITION PRESS COVERAGE
30 JUNE-AUGUST 1980

AL-AHRAR, Weekly Publication of Socialist Liberals Party

AL-SHA'B, Weekly Publication of Socialist Workers Party

AL-TAQADDUM, Organ of National Progressive Unionist Grouping Party

AL-DA'WAH, Monthly Publication of the Muslim Brotherhood

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LOW PAY CAUSING FLIGHT OF EMPLOYEES FROM PUBLIC SECTOR

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 30 Jun 80 p 1

[Article: "Flight From the Government and the Public Sector: Urgent Measures to Adjust Wages and Allowances to Stop Flight"]

[Text] The flight of government and public sector employees from their jobs to other jobs in the private sector or abroad, where they make reasonable wages, is on the rise. Official reports confirm that the rate of flight is as much as 40 percent in some types of jobs. The ministry of education has been deluged with resignation applications from loaned teachers [to other countries as to private schools], but the ministry has decided to reject the resignations.

The ministry of finance is studying a plan to increase periodic increments for employees as of the beginning of January. The General Workers Federation has submitted an urgent study in which it demands wage and salary increases to put an end to the phenomenon of the flight of employees. Meanwhile, the Bureau of Organization and Administration is discussing with the ministry of finance an urgent plan to adjust the wage scales.

Statistics provided by the Bureau of Organization and Administration and the Bureau of Statistics confirm that the rate of flight from government and public sector jobs, because of poor salaries and wages, has exceeded normal limits and has begun to affect the progress of work in the various government agencies. In some types of jobs, the rate of flight has reached 40 percent of the workers--a rate which is threatening a number of utilities with paralysis.

Competent authorities have presented urgent studies outlining the potential threat to work continuity, which would have an impact on production, unless the government moves quickly to remedy the situation.

The ministry of education has decided not to consider resignation letters received from loaned teachers [to other countries or to private schools], or from teachers who are on leave of any kind, regardless of whether the resignation was submitted during or after the period of the loan or leave of absence. Should anyone of these teachers fail to report to duty upon the expiration of the term of the loan or leave of absence, he will be given a warning in writing within a maximum period of 15 days after the date of his failure to report back to work. After that, he will be subject to investigation and will forfeit the right to be given employment certificates which he could use to apply for jobs outside the ministry of education's school system.

In an urgent memorandum, the General Workers federation has urged the formation of a higher council for wages and salaries, and has demanded that such a council be given absolute powers to revise wage scales in a manner that would keep up with the increase in prices, maintain production, and protect it from disruptions caused by the flight of workers.

The Bureau for Organization and Administration and the ministry of finance are studying a plan to increase salaries and revise wage scales by instituting an increase of 5 to 30 percent to all those working for the government and the public sector. The finance ministry is also considering increasing the periodic step increases for grades 6 through 3 to a flat 3 pounds, instead of 1 to 2 pounds, and for grade 2 from 4 to 5 pounds as of 1 January. This would benefit two million workers and employees in the government and the public sector who are in grades 6 through 2.

9254
CSO: 4802

CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF AGRICULTURAL POLICY

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 30 Jun 80 p 2

[Article by Mahmud Fawzi: "Two Former Ministers Say: The Agricultural Policy Is Wrong"]

[Text] The government's state on agricultural policy was completely devoid of any mention of the most important aspects of agricultural policy. The government failed to announce its policy on reforming the agricultural structure and its most important problems, namely, the small size of land ownerships. The government has also failed to spell out the manner in which it would coordinate relations between village banks and coops in the interest of agricultural production, the peasant and his income.

Where are the basics of a pricing policy on agricultural products in the light of changing costs and product alternatives? How will the government carry out the president's directives on agricultural intensification and on the need for the coops to enter the field of production instead of services? Has the government settled on a definite idea about the best possible product mix? And should that mix favor consumption and self-sufficiency, or the production of expensive, high return products for exportation? What is the government's practical policy with regard to promoting mechanized agriculture, which is almost totally ignored in the countryside? And what about meats, cattle feed, and the necessary radical solutions for their problems?

With regard to the mix of agricultural products, Dr Mustafa al-Jabali, the international agricultural expert and former minister, calls for producing items which we can export and importing products which we can obtain at lower than domestic costs. In other words, we should use our agricultural resources in a sound economic manner. He says that the call for increasing the yield of a feddan is not enough. The policy of the product mix should be based on sound foundations of optimum use of our climate, Nile waters and soil. We may want to use a feddan of land to grow a non-traditional crop for the purpose of exporting it and using the income from that crop to import the yield of several feddans of wheat.

At the same time, Dr Al-Sayyid, Jaballah, the agricultural expert and former minister of planning, says that we should pay attention to planting food products, because the world is heading for famine. He does not think that we should depend entirely on a policy of importing what we need, but that we should have ample food supplies on which food security and industrial development depend.

Dr Mustafa al-Jabali sounds the alarm when he says that, according to recent data, 18 percent of the Egyptian people get 1,200 calories a day, which is below the necessary minimum of 1,500 calories. This is to say that the food intake of 7.5 million Egyptians is less than the minimum standard. At the same time, a substantial percentage of Egyptians receive 7,000 calories a day, which is three times the necessary food intake.

Meanwhile, the following steps should be taken:

1--Well defined plans and programs should be immediately laid down to put an end to the smallness of agricultural land ownerships, which are the most significant obstacle to agricultural progress in Egypt. Many states have led the way along this line, including Switzerland, England, France. Even in India's Punjab province, there have been successful projects in this regard. In Egypt, we had begun to implement a project to pool independent agricultural effort, but that project soon became confined to cotton. Now, the project remains incomplete, even with regard to cotton.

2--There should be coordination between village banks and agricultural coops. This should be the first task of the ministry of agriculture. It is not a question of law, for each of the two has its own law. The ministry should coordinate the activities of village banks with those of the agricultural coops on the basis that the bank is an instrument for loans, savings and financial development, while the coop is responsible for agricultural production in all its aspects of supply, service, mechanization, fighting pests, marketing and so forth. Coordination between the two would be in the interest of agricultural production and the agricultural producer. The village bank is not an end in itself, nor is the coop. Both are means for increasing agricultural production, reducing its costs, improving it, intensifying it and increasing the income from it, in addition to implementing the state's agricultural policy.

3--The peasant's confidence in the ministry of agriculture should be restored, so that agricultural guidance may become real guidance. The ministry of agriculture should abandon the method of pressuring peasants, because such an approach is counterproductive. For example, the pressure applied by the ministry this year to distribute the "government's wheat" to the peasants, induced many peasants to use their own seeds and to receive the "government's wheat" without using it at all.

4--There should be a firm policy on pricing agricultural products. Prices should be announced well ahead of plantation time, so that they may have the desired practical effect. This policy should aim at providing the peasant with an adequate return on the best available alternative and secure the purposes of the state in terms of supply, exports or industrialization.

5--There should be an immediate revision of the allocations of fertilizers for all crops so that agricultural production may be increased by providing adequate and reasonable amounts of fertilizers. The government should allow the coops and individuals to import fertilizers so that they may be able to increase the quantity of fertilizers they wish to use without having to buy it in the black market.

6--Serious attention must be paid to mechanized farming, especially since this kind of farming is greatly ignored in the countryside. Even the general crop which sells tractors to individuals or local coops plays a limited role, namely that of a commercial middleman charging commission on the sale of tractors. The general coop does not get involved with the operation, maintenance or repair of the tractors, etc. The government said in its statement that it will establish service stations for agricultural equipment and machinery, but the statement did not make it clear whether such stations will be government-run, private or cooperative. It also did not clarify how such stations would be related to the peasant, the coop and the village bank. The peasants ought to have a clear picture of what the government has in mind.

7--With regard to the policy of livestock feed, [a distinction must be drawn between] feeds to secure more meat [fattening feeds], feeds for more milk, and general purpose feeds. It must be asked: Has the previous policy achieved the purpose of providing more meat and milk? Or is better to confine the distribution of feeds to cattle used in fattening and milk production operations? The present quantities of feed being distributed for the feeding of livestock in general are completely ineffective. Adding these quantities to those used to fatten livestock might help alleviate the meat crisis.

8--The government has announced an increase in the importation of breeds of livestock that yield high quantities of meat and milk, without paying attention to local breeds which were imported over 50 years ago. The most important of these is the (Farizian?). Has the government succeeded in improving local breeds? Rather, is it better to develop and select local breeds, as most countries of the world have done? By so doing, countries such as England, Holland and France were able to improve the Shorthorn, (Farizian?), (Charolet?) and others, thereby achieving optimum animal production.

9--Agricultural intensification. This means planting several crops in the same area each year. Agricultural intensification in Egypt can attain 180 percent. In many other countries it can attain up to 300 percent. The harvest areas of Egypt at present are about 10 million feddans. This can be increased through intensification to 18 million feddans in terms of production. Agricultural intensification depends primarily on early crops. What is the government's policy on this issue at a time when we are in dire need of increasing harvest areas.

10--Coops should be concerned with production rather than services. The government, in its agricultural policy statement, did not say anything about plans to switch and develop coops from services to production, which is what the president has advocated time and again. The president has said that the introduction of science and technology into farming, and the consequent increase in production, depend on developing and transforming the coops from service to production organizations. This transformation, advocated by the president, is the key to increased production and the success of major agricultural projects.

AL-AHAR is confident that President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat's assumption of the burden of domestic action and the responsibilities of the premiership, in addition to his other major functions, will be a shot in the arm for domestic policy on sound, well-studied, planned and programmed bases.

9254
CSO: 4082

MEMBERS OF OPPOSITION DISCUSS REASONS FOR ITS WEAKNESS

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 30 Jun 80 p 3

[Article by Jamal 'Abd al-Sami': "The Opposition in the People's Assembly: Why Has It Weakened and How Can It Regain Its Strength?"]

[Excerpts] The first session of the present People's Assembly will end in a few days. The question that has been imposing itself during this session is: Why has the influence of the opposition in the present Assembly failed to measure up to the level of the opposition in the previous Assembly?

The natural course of events is that with the emergence of parties, a budding opposition will emerge, and that such opposition will gradually build up strength and momentum from one Assembly to the next. But the opposite has become true, and the opposition today has diminished in strength, although the opposition has gained a new party which was not represented in the previous Assembly, namely, the Labor Party. What is the reason behind this? Why has the opposition within the People's Assembly weakened? AL-AHRAR posed this question to a number of party leaders and prominent politicians and members of the People's Assembly.

Engineer Ibrahim Shukri, leader of the Labor Party, said: "The opposition in the previous Assembly was more active and effective. The Assembly had 360 members. Of these, 70 members--independents or members of parties other than the ruling party--were in the opposition. This is to say that the opposition in that Assembly represented one fifth of the membership. In the present Assembly, members of the ruling party are more than 350 out of a total of 392, while members of the other parties and independents are only 40. This means that the opposition in the present Assembly is only one ninth of the total membership."

Engineer Shukri acknowledged a fact about which people have been talking, namely, the absence of influential personalities in terms of parliamentary practice and political orientation, such as Mustafa Kamil Murad, leader of the Liberal Party, Khaled Muhyi al-Din, leader of the NPUG, Dr Hilmi Murad, Dr Mahmud al-Qadi, engineer 'Abd al-'Azim Abu al-'Ata and Dr Layla Takla. Ibrahim Shukri went on to say that if he or another member of his party, which represents the biggest opposition bloc in the Assembly, spoke at any meeting, the chair may decide that the Labor Party has expressed its view. In the case of independents, however, each independent member expresses his own independent view.

Relative Balance and Free Elections

On how to establish a relative balance between the decisive [government] majority and the opposition in the People's Assembly, engineer Shukri said: "The basic solution to this problem is always free elections." He said that he will call on the Labor Party to discuss the present election system so that he may present an opinion defining what constitutes a majority party in such a way that no vote cast for any party would be lost, and so that a balance could be struck between the majority party and the opposition parties.

Asked about the best means to strengthening the performance of the opposition in the People's Assembly, the leader of the Labor Party emphasized the need for coordination between the opposition parties, other parties and independent members of the Assembly. He noted that the majority party must understand that it is not in its interest to fight the opposition, one way or another, directly or indirectly, because this would only breed lack of confidence in the Assembly by the people.

Questions Not Taken Up

Counselor Mumtaz Nassar, independent member of the Assembly, said that there is no doubt that the opposition has suffered greatly because of the absence of some excellent parliamentarians who regretably failed to win in the last elections, especially since those particular people have a broad experience in parliamentary work.

Mumtaz Nassar defended the present opposition represented by independent members, members of the Labor Party and members of the Liberal Party, saying that it is performing its role well and that its position against the Law on Immorality cannot be described as one of weakness. Members of the opposition in the Assembly had agreed that opposing the law in question was an act reinforcing democracy and rejecting the restrictions placed by that law on freedom and the exercise of constitutional rights. Nassar said that he disagrees with the view of the Liberal Party that the voice of the opposition is weak. The strength or weakness of the opposition, he said, cannot be measured by numbers but by the objectivity of the positions taken by the opposition. If the opposition is objective, it is strong regardless of the number of its members.

Mumtaz Nassar commented on the topics listed on the agenda of the People's Assembly. He particularly referred to queries and interpellations which have not been taken up for months now, thereby denying the opposition the opportunity of explaining its position on several major issues. He said that organizing the discussion of questions and interpellations is the responsibility of the Assembly's office (the Speaker and his two deputies). He noted that important questions are being delayed. I do not know whether this is due to the government's slowness in answering interpellations or to other reasons, he conceded. I have also noticed, he went on, that some important interpellations were ignored for months and were not placed on the agenda of the previous Assembly. I have repeated those interpellations in the present Assembly. Nearly a year has passed since I raised those interpellations again, he said, and yet they have not been placed on the agenda, nor have they seen the light of day.

Asked for examples of the interpellations which he brought up in the last session of the Assembly but were not placed on the agenda, Mumtaz Nassar said: "In one of those interpellations, I asked whether Shams Bandran, the former war minister, had left the country with a diplomatic passport, at a time when he was facing charges of crimes of torture, and whether that passport had been renewed by one of our embassies abroad."

Another interpellation which Mumtaz Nassar had submitted was addressed to the prime minister concerning a story published by an American newspaper in July 1978 about a report submitted by the Boeing Corporation to the Congress, listing payments made to some governments to facilitate the sale of the company's aircraft. The report had mentioned that two sources in Egypt had received $1.7 million. The interpellation addressed to the prime minister was whether the American newspaper's account was true or not. If the answer was yes, who were the two sources which received the abovementioned sum of money, and what measures did the government take in that regard?

Coordination Among Members of the Opposition

On how to increase the opposition's influence and effectiveness in the People's Assembly, counselor Nassar said: "Coordination has been recently instituted between the elements of the opposition in the Assembly. That coordination began between some independents, members of the Labor Party, and the two members of the Liberal Party. It involves all issues." He added that "the withdrawal of the opposition during the debate of the Law on Immorality was agreed upon by the members of the opposition. We opposed that bill in principle. Therefore, it would have been illogical for us to debate its details and specifics."

The Absence of Veterans and the Attitude of the Chair

Liberal Party member Muhammad Mahmud Isma'il said: "There are several major factors behind the weak impact of the opposition in the present People's Assembly in contrast to the previous Assembly. The most prominent factor--and here I agree with engineer Ibrahim Shukri--is the absence of a large number of veteran opposition deputies who had played a significant role in the previous Assembly. The opposition practiced by those former deputies was characterized by strength and objectivity. In that, they were aided by their diversified specializations, broad backgrounds and parliamentary experience."

Muhammad Mahmud Isma'il said that "the Speaker of the Assembly, Dr Sufi Abu Talib, as well as his deputies Muhammad Radwan and Muhammad Rashwan when they sit in for him, give the floor to a specific group of deputies. Discussion in all meetings of the Assembly is almost confined to this group who take the floor alternately, as if the Assembly is made up of no one else. A lot of people are not given the chance to speak, especially when major and important issues are debated. Finally, the Speaker invokes the bylaws to justify his decision not to permit many people to speak. However, the real reason is that the deputy who is denied permission to speak does not know the Speaker personally, or that the Speaker is quite aware of his orientation. A third possibility is that the Speaker wants to end the debate quickly for one reason or another.

"Moreover, the so-called national press plays a dangerous role in ignoring the activities of the opposition, and reports only those very few and marginal instances in which the opposition agrees with the government."

The Sphynx and Issues of the Hour

Nasr 'Abd al-Ghafur, National Party member of the Assembly, said: "We debate matters relating to the Sphynx, while the people do not have enough money to buy shoes. The issues of the hour that concern the man in the street are not those of the Sphynx, but such matters as: How does the citizen get to his place of work? What does he eat? Where does he get the money to buy clothes? The People's Assembly does not discuss these matters.

Nasr 'Abd al-Ghafur wondered: "Does it matter to the man in the street that something is wrong with the neck of the Sphynx or that Nefertiti's toe is hurting. The People's Assembly wasted four whole hours on this kind of talk, and the television service telecast the meeting in which Mansur Hasan, the minister of state for culture, discoursed on the Sphynx. Have the problems of the people thus been solved? It would have been more profitable for the Assembly to discuss how to deal with the meat problem, how to raise cattle, and what other countries are doing about similar problems."

Nasr 'Abd al-Ghafur wondered what the opposition could say on the question of the Sphynx. He emphasized that the agenda of the People's Assembly is not in tune with developments in the country. He noted that "some issues are imposed on the Assembly, such as the issue of national unity, for example. Those are issues on which all speakers say the same thing. Such issues and such discussions carry nothing new. The speakers virtually exchange poetic speeches, as we see happening in Syria where parliamentary meetings turn into oratorical contests and achieve nothing." 'Abd al-Ghafur added: "The people do not respect the members of the People's Assembly, because they feel that the Assembly does not pay attention to the people's problems. Citizens are always saying: What does a member of the People's Assembly do but go to pick up his salary?"

Putting Things in Order

Nasr 'Abd al-Ghafur said: "Things have to be put in order. This is to say that the problems of the masses must be the focus of attention during deliberations of the People's Assembly. This means that the agenda of the Assembly [illegible] reflect the events and developments which matter to the man in the street, in [illegible] f domestic events and policy or foreign events and policy."

Nasr 'Abd al-Ghafur cited, as an example, statements made by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, stressing the importance of commenting on such statements. He says: "Begin's statements on the settlements should be debated the day after they are made, not after a month." He goes on: "I recall that the day after the Egyptian People's Assembly debated the question of the settlements, Begin said in the Knesset that the Egyptian People's Assembly has overstepped its bounds, and that statements made in the Assembly threaten world peace. He stressed that it is the Egyptian People's Assembly which is obstructing peace in the Middle East. The People's Assembly should have answered Begin's statement the next day, or the Speaker should have made a statement in the name of the Assembly. But nothing of the sort has happened thus far, although a long time has passed since Begin's statements.

Media Siege of Opposition Efforts

Dr Hilmi Murad, one of the most prominent parliamentarians in the previous People's Assembly, said that there cannot be a thorough and full answer to the question of "why the opposition in the present Assembly is weak in comparison with the opposition in the previous Assembly." He said: "This is due to the siege imposed by the media around the opposition in the previous Assembly as well as the present one. The opposition takes positions on many issues in the People's Assembly, but the people do not learn anything about them. As an example, I wish to cite the interpellation made by Dr Ibrahim 'Awarah, an independent member of the Assembly, which I read into the minutes of one of the Assembly's meetings. The debate triggered by that interpellation showed that the (Thomson) Company of France made a gift of 900 refrigerators to the Society for the Care of Students. This was at a time when negotiations were going on over a bid by the French company to buy 51 percent of the shares of the Egyptian (Ideal) Company which makes refrigerators. This is tantamount to a takeover of the Egyptian company. The capital of the Egyptian company was assessed unfairly."

Dr Murad said that the press failed to publish anything about this incident, although it had a serious implication, namely, that the French company was trying to offer a bribe in the form of a gift to facilitate approval of the deal.

Dr Hilmi Murad said that perhaps one of the reasons for the comparison made between the opposition in the present Assembly and the opposition in the previous one is that the present opposition does not follow up on the issues that it raises. The former deputy pointed out that an incident as serious as the gift of 900 refrigerators should be a cause of fact-finding efforts and an occasion for questioning all those who agreed to accept that gift. It is an occasion for demanding the enactment of the law that has been promised the country time and again to establish a black list of companies that offer bribes.

Dr Hilmi Murad went on: "Perhaps the opposition in the new Assembly initially wanted to change the style of the opposition in the previous Assembly, which had led to the dissolution of the entire Assembly although the size of the opposition was small in comparison with the overwhelming majority of the ruling party." He said that "the present opposition is influenced by what is being written up to this moment, namely, that the task of the opposition is to stress positive rather than negative factors, and that the opposition has to offer alternative solutions for the government to adopt. This is to say that the opposition is meant to support the ruling party and the present government, which is contrary to the role of the opposition in a parliamentary multiparty system. The opposition party is supposed to offer an alternative program to that of the government. Its task is to underscore mistakes and draw attention to negative aspects as an incentive for the government to deal with problems."

The Ghost of the Single Party

Dr Hilmi Murad said that "the ghost of the single party and the political organization of the Socialist Union dominate the thinking of officials, of most members of the People's Assembly and of journalists who belong to the ruling party, to the extent that some people talk as if the state and the party are synonymous. This is grossly at variance with the multiparty system which was approved by the people in a public referendum as the basis of government. Even the national press plays the role

of the ruling party's press. In addition, the opposition's efforts to carry out its mission have been thwarted since the previous Assembly. All this discourages opposition members from carrying out their tasks in a positive manner. Bills offered by opposition members fail to reach the full Assembly, and end up in the files of committees. Questions raised by opposition members are couched in terms that make them sound as if they are meant to praise cabinet ministers. This is so much so that opposition members have become reluctant to present such questions, for fear of being accused of seeking to praise or thank a minister."

Persuasion Is Useless

Dr Hilmi Murad said that "the role of the opposition in the present Assembly is confined to speaking when a member is allowed to speak, and only to the extent tolerated by the majority. This majority has been known to interrupt opposition members when it sees fit, quite often preventing them from completing their statements.

"Judging from instances in the present session, it is difficult for the opposition to carry out its role, especially since the majority is committed in advance to carry out the party's wishes. Thus, any attempt to persuade the majority becomes useless. This is the reason why many members of the government's party are absent from meetings in which important and crucial issues are debated. Those members feel that they are committed to the government's positions, and want to spare their conscience any agony or confusion resulting from what the opposition members may say at these meetings."

Mustafa Kamil Murad, the leader of the Liberal Party, said that following any elections, deputies need parliamentary practice until they get used to the methods of debate and opposition. This is not an easy matter, he said, for it requires long practice. He said that the opposition needs to coordinate the activity of its members and distribute among them issues and topics related to legislation and oversight. This would enable the opposition to act in an organized and effective fashion. Reiterating what others have said, Mustafa Murad noted that a substantial number of experienced and veteran opposition members have not succeeded in their bids to win re-election for one reason or another, and that this has weakened the image of the opposition in the eyes of the public.

Mustafa Murad went on to say that completion of the Assembly's 5-year term would provide an opportunity for the stabilization of legislative life. It would enable the members of the People's Assembly to perform their functions and duties, and would reveal opposition talents which could develop to the point where they would become quite visible to the public. He emphasized that coordination among members of the opposition in the present Assembly--that is, members of the Labor and Liberal parties and independent opposition members--will strengthen the opposition, despite its small size.

Correction of an Error Barred

Shaykh Salah Abu Isma'il, independent member of the People's Assembly, stressed that "the weakness of the opposition in the present Assembly, is due to several factors. The most important of these is that a large number of interpellations and enquiries made by opposition members over a long period of time have not been

placed on the agenda thus far. This is in spite of the fact that the Assembly takes up questions and issues that are often of little importance in comparison to the interpellations and enquiries of the opposition. Also, the chair bars opposition members from expressing their full viewpoints on important issues. A good example is when the Speaker prevented me from correcting a certain error when the Law on Immortality was being debated. As a result, I walked out of that particular meeting."

Salah Abu Isma'il said that he is against joining any group, noting that he wants to be independent. I will not join a party, he added, because I do not want to be restricted in what I say.

9254
CSO: 4802

EGYPT SHOULD SEEK TO REGAIN ITS SCIENTISTS FROM ABROAD

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 1

[Editorial by Hamid Zaydan: "Shame On the Murderers"]

[Text] The murder of Dr Yahya al-Mashad, the Egyptian atomic scientist, was not the first casualty of the dirty secret war that is going on. Before him, Dr Samirah Musa was killed in the United States 28 years ago, and Dr Nabil al-Qallini disappeared in Czechoslovakia 5 years ago.

The dirty secret war does not conform to any law; nor does it respond to human considerations in relations among people. Murder in this war is the quickest and first impulse and decision. It is saddening that such a dirty secret war is the product of government agencies of the modern state--specialized agencies that either go on the attack to liquidate enemies and steal their secrets, or defend the state against a dirty war launched against it by another state with the same methods.

Egypt has lost a number of its scientists in this war. It had also lost a number of German scientists during a period of time when it used their services in its scientific research. Some Arab states have suffered heavy losses in this dirty war in terms of damage done to scientific research equipment, especially in the field of the atom and nuclear research.

Those who clearly bear the responsibility for this secret war are the murderers who so openly espouse the method of physical liquidation--as they have done during the occupation of Arab villages and towns in Palestine, when the Zionist gangs proceeded to kill women, children and old people. Their dirty war included the theft of missile boats from a French port and the sabotage of the Iraqi atomic reactor, which Dr al-Mashad was trying to repair, before he himself was killed.

The dirty secret war is still being waged by the secret agencies. Ezer Weizman, when he was Israel's defense minister, once declared that the hand of Israel will reach out to destroy atomic reactors in any Arab country whose future aim is to destroy Israel. This is to say that Israel still gives itself the right to kill and sabotage outside its own borders to prevent the Arab states from undertaking scientific and technological research, so that these states may remain far behind in the field of advanced research.

Israel itself is conducting joint nuclear experiments with the racist state of South Africa. And yet, it talks about friendly and neighborly relations with "her neighbors." Israel talks about peace in the region, while it continues to wage its secret war to destroy good neighborhood and threaten peace.

One aspect of this should concern us here in Egypt. Our scientists are leaving Egypt to work abroad. AL-AHRAM has reported that a huge number of Egyptian atomic scientists, some 250 scientists, are now working outside Egypt. This is an enormous number which can have a serious impact on scientific research, be it in the universities, the academy of scientific research or the atomic energy commission, in any country in the world, not just Egypt.

Can any state neglect its security, scientific resources and future to this extent? This is a most serious matter. It is not enough for us to weep over our victims, one after the other, and say: shame on the murderers. We in Egypt have a more important and serious responsibility. This is to regain our scientists, including those of our sons who went abroad to complete their higher education and did not return home. We have a responsibility to protect and provide them with the means of advanced scientific research, so that Egypt may enjoy modern prosperity and benefit from all means of modern technology.

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NEGLECT OF RURAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ALLEGED

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 5

[Article by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Jabiri: "The Strategy of Egyptian Development"]

[Text] The countryside of Egypt is the major problem facing the desired economic reform. The great majority of Egyptians live in the countryside, and the countryside is still the major source of food supply for the inhabitants of the cities. In addition, it is a major source of raw materials and labor needed by industry. It is also the main source of most of our important exports. Despite this obvious importance of the countryside, city lights have dazzled the eyes of our officials and made them unable to see the painful facts of life in the Egyptian countryside.

The countryside has been and continues to be the source of the bounties enjoyed by the lucky ones among city dwellers who are the object of attention and care. Their voice is heard and their satisfaction is a precondition for security and stability. I am talking here about the intellectuals and educated class who represent the pressure groups for change, when they deem it desirable. These groups have failed to see that the real Egypt is in the countryside--in the depths of Upper Egypt and the delta, in the villages and hamlets where millions of people struggle for subsistence in extremely poor economic, social and environmental conditions which hardly provide the bare biological necessities for survival.

Anyone who chances to visit a village in the countryside of Egypt will unavoidably be stunned and shocked by the inhuman way of life led by the majority of the inhabitants of Egypt's sad countryside. Feeders and canals are the common means of drinking and washing for man and beast alike. This is the reason for the failure of efforts that have been and are still being exerted to eradicate the endemic diseases which afflict the health of the Egyptian peasant and his children, generation after generation. This causes a real loss of millions of pounds annually for Egypt due to the deterioration of the productive power and mental faculties of the disease-ridden peasant.

Poor, sometimes nonexistent, roads and communications between the villages and the major cities, and between the villages themselves, are among the worst problems suffered by the Egyptian countryside, for they isolate it from close urban centers and cities which could play an important role in the development of the countryside.

The development strategy adopted thus far has resulted in the emergence of two distinctly separate sectors in the national economy, each of which almost constitutes

a separate economy. This explains why this phenomenon has been referred to as the two-tier economy. There is a modern sector which includes a host of commercial, banking and services activities, and is primarily concentrated in a limited number of urban centers (the capital and the ports). It attracts a large number of unemployed or semi-employed people who migrate to it from the countryside, but do not belong to it. Then there is the traditional sector, which incorporates the rest of the national economy, primarily the agricultural and rural sector. This sector is in a state of obvious and intense underdevelopment.

Because of the absence of a comprehensive and planned development policy, industry does not move to develop the countryside by providing it with the necessary industrial inputs, industrializing most of its products and increasing the profitability of agricultural production to the point where it becomes an incentive for higher production and greater productivity. Therefore, modern technology stops at a line drawn by profit-making decisions made within a specific political and social framework, and does not go beyond this line to improve the traditional sector. Agriculture needs customs protection, but the multinational companies reject import and export restrictions.

Sound and balanced economic development should start in the Egyptian countryside and the Egyptian agricultural sector for the reasons we have cited earlier. It should be kept in mind, however, that attention to the development of the rural and agricultural sector will not be at the expense of attention paid to industry.

Conscious and thorough economic planning is the only way to avoid pitfalls. Policies and economic chaos will only produce disarray, waste and the dissipation of national resources. Science and planning are the means with which the advanced nations seek to achieve greater progress and prosperity. We hope that Dr 'Abd al-Raziq 'Abd al-Majid [deputy prime minister for economic affairs] will take us back to the system of thorough five-year plans to achieve our economic and social goals and recoup the progress and prosperity we have missed. He should do that in a framework of comprehensive popular participation, sound democratic practice, self-dependence and liberation from any foreign control.

9254
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CONSTITUTIONAL FLAW SEEN IN CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL LAW

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 6

[Article by Mumtaz Nassar: "Consultative Council Law is Unconstitutional; Appeal to the President to Exercise His Constitutional Right to Return the Bill to the Assembly to Correct Clear Constitutional Violation in the Law"]

[Text] When the Consultative Council bill was submitted to the legislative committee, and then to the People's Assembly, we expressed the opinion that the bill, as drafted, was unconstitutional. In defense of our view, we said that the unconstitutionality of the bill could be detected through a mere reading of articles 62, 87 and 196 of the constitution. The provisions of these articles establish the unconstitutionality of this bill.

For example, article 62 of the constitution states that "a citizen has the right to elect, nominate himself for election and express his opinion in a referendum..." Therefore, when legislation is prepared to prevent citizens from nominating themselves for election to a constitutional institution, that legislation is in violation of a right that is specified in the constitution, namely, the right of a citizen to nominate himself for election. The Consultative Council law bars independent citizens from nominating themselves on the grounds that candidacy tickets are confined to parties, and that parties alone determine the tickets of candidates for the Consultative Council. The contention here is that such an arrangement is necessitated by the fact that the system in Egypt is a multiparty system in accordance with amended Article 5 of the constitution.

It is self-evident that this contention is untenable, because the multiparty system need not bar independent citizens from exercising their political rights as specified in the constitution, not to mention the fact that prohibition of independent citizens from nominating themselves should be specifically mentioned in the constitution. Amended Article 5 of the constitution contains no prohibition of the sort.

This is the first argument which bares the unconstitutionality of the Consultative Council law. The second argument derives from Article 87 of the constitution. That article says: "The law shall determine the electoral districts in the state and the number of elected members of the People's Assembly, provided that this number is not below 350 members, at least half of whom should be workers and peasants elected by direct and secret general ballot." When the constitution was issued on 11 September 1971, and become effective forthwith, the legislators decided to organize and regulate the manner in which the People's Assembly should be elected. Therefore,

they issued Law No 38 of 1972, which specified the direct ballot as the method of election. The legislators did not refer at all to election by ticket. This was in keeping with the constitution's reference to "election by direct and secret general ballot," which does not mean election by ticket. It is not possible to view election by ticket as direct and secret general ballot, since election by ticket means that the voters elect a party's ticket as a whole, not individual candidates. This is like electing the party itself first. Therefore, the election of a candidate cannot be regarded as direct.

Indeed, Article 196 of the constitution, added by constitutional amendment, says that the Consultative Council should be elected "by secret and direct general ballot." This is identical with the phrase used in Article 87 of the Constitution, which became the basis of Law No 38 for 1972 regarding the People's Assembly, and election by ticket. This means that the Consultative Council law should not have provided for election by ticket in the first place.

It seems to us that the idea of election by ticket did not occur to the officials until after the constitutional amendment was completed. Otherwise, they would not have transplanted the phrase contained in Article 87 of the constitution to the new article, which is Article 196. It thus appears from this comparison between Article 87, which led to Law No 38 for 1972, and Article 196, which included the same phrase cited in Article 87, that the constitutional legislators wanted the method of election of the members of the Consultative Council to be similar to that of the members of the People's Assembly as provided for in Law No 38 for 1972. Therefore, when the Consultative Council law provides that its members should be elected by ticket, it runs contrary to the provisions of the constitution, and is unconstitutional.

There are various methods of election. Each method has its pros and cons. Books on constitutional law are full of explanations of the good or bad aspects of each method. This should have induced those concerned to consider and study the methods that are best suited for our purposes, and to avoid the slips and pitfalls which are inherent in any method that departs from our original system, which took roots in our country ever since it adopted the democratic system in the era of the consultative representative council of 1972.

Election by ticket and on the basis of absolute majority is the worst form of election by ticket. Constitutional scholars who support the method of election by ticket say that it avoids the drawbacks of the direct ballot. They argue that a candidate might win by a difference of one vote in a direct election, and that this would be unfair to the voters who have cast their votes for the candidate who lost by one vote. In reply, we tell them that election by ticket would result in the election of all candidates on the ticket, who may be as many as 20 or more candidates, by a difference of one vote over another ticket. This means that the drawback they complain about with regard to direct election, is 20 times greater in the case of election by ticket.

Accordingly, I appeal to the government not to begin its work by violating the constitution which all have taken an oath to abide by. I appeal to the government to reconsider the Consultative Council law so as to remove the constitutional violations inherent in it. If the government should fail to respond to this appeal, I would request the president to exercise his right, stated in Article 113 of the constitution, to return the law to the People's Assembly so that the clear-cut constitutional violation in the law may be corrected.

9254
CSO: 4802

HIGH SKILLED LABOR WAGES BLAMED ON INADEQUATE TRAINING POLICY

Cairo AL-SHA'B in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 6

[Article: "Factors Affecting Labor Force in Egypt; Serious Phenomenon Calls for Solutions; Decrease in Professional Labor; Linkage Between Wages and Production Necessary"]

[Text] There are serious indications that the labor market in Egypt is in jeopardy as a result of the absence of permanent and steady training polices and the inadequacy of the present training centers. Experts of the National Council for Social Services and Development have conducted a scientific study in which they located the problem in the field of professional and vocational labor in Egypt, especially in the sector of building and construction. The most salient points made by the study are the following:

1) Emigration in search of employment abroad has grown enormously in the past few years. The ministry of planning has estimated the number of emigrant workers at 1.5 million, that is 3.7 percent of the total population. This has caused a majority deficiency in skilled professional and vocational labor, especially in the sector of building and construction.

2) Employment in the building and construction industry is unstable and inconstant, because of this industry's sensitivity to economic fluctuations.

3) There does not exist a firm training policy, and current training centers are inadequate in terms of number, quality and modern scientific development.

4) There is a natural attrition in vocational labor because of old age, disability or death. This is exacerbated by the discontinuance of the tradition of handing down skills from generation to generation.

Labor Estimates

Available statistics and estimates indicate that labor engaged in the economic activities of the services sectors is about 40 percent of the total labor force, while the wages of this segment amount to about 57.6 percent of total wages. Production sectors account for about 60 percent of the overall labor force, while their wages account for about 42.4 percent of the total wages.

A serious phenomenon in the vocational labor market, is the high level of wages in the sector of building and construction. In 1960, those wages were 15 percent, but they have now soared to 600 percent [sic]. The increase has also included ancillary labor. In 1960, construction workers made 80 piasters per day. Now they make 5 pounds and 70 piasters. A blacksmith who was earning 50 piasters a day, now earns 3 pounds. The wage of a smelter has risen from 70 piasters to 5 pounds, that of a tinner from 60 piasters to 3 pounds, a painter from 70 piasters to three pounds, and an electrician from 30 piasters to 3 pounds and 20 piasters a day.

These are the major features of the problems of skilled and trained professional labor in the field of building and construction. The difficulties which stand in the way of a solution of this problem, are the absence of a linkage between this kind of labor and related training and instruction, as well as the inadequacy of financial resources allocated to achieve the desired [training] objectives. Because of the enormity of the problem, scientists and experts at the National Council for Social Services and Development have come up with a number of solutions for it. These include the following:

1) Efforts should be made to provide all available human and material resources to overcome the problem deriving from the shortage and inadequacy of professional labor. This can be done by drawing up a policy to meet professional labor needs of development plans for the next 5 years, estimated at about 750,000 professional workers. Furthermore, efforts should be made to prepare and groom supervisory and executive elements and raising the productive capacity of the technical cadres.

2) A general and thorough survey should be made of the foreign labor market for the purpose of drawing up a national strategy, based on a scientific approach, to determine the volume of demand for Egyptian labor abroad. Egyptians working abroad are presently estimated at one million workers in all fields. This number is expected to increase in the future, in view of the material temptations, especially in the oil-rich countries which are undertaking ambitious [development] plans.

3) It is necessary to modify the structure of education so as to expand the scope of professional training through some kind of cooperation between the educational system and the training system on the national level, and by establishing a connection between technical and university education and the actual needs of the construction sector. The purpose of such linkage would be to provide technical skills. Scientific visits to other countries should be encouraged as a means of keeping abreast of modern developments in the various areas of construction. Attention should also be paid to pre-employment training and to continuous on-the-job training.

4) Wages should be linked to production by means of standards of performance. The present wages policy does not achieve the purpose of raising productive efficiency. The construction sector is almost the only sector with wage structure that differs from one company to another. The root of the problem is a glut in surplus unproductive labor.

9254
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GOVERNMENT'S METHOD OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING SCORED

Cairo AL-TAQADDUM in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 5

[Article: "The New Five-Year Plan--Has It Been Overlooked Inadvertently?"]

[Text] During the meetings of the NPUG committee set up to draft a reply to the government's policy statement, the members of the committee, who include a large number of experts, university professors and former ministers, noticed that the first point of interest about the new cabinet is that it is No 13 in the last 10 years. This is to say that Egypt has a new cabinet or a cabinet reshuffle approximately every 9 months. The committee noted that this is an unhealthy phenomenon that indicates a certain measure of instability.

Just before the committee met, the government presented its program and budget for a new fiscal year, as well as a new annual development plan and a five-year plan that begins in July. That, too, was plan No 4 within two years.

Two years ago, Dr 'Abd al-Razzaq 'Abd al-Majid, decided to change the system of the five-year plans by dropping each year as it expires, adding a new year to the plan on a continuous basis. Despite the inherent instability in planning involved in such a system, and the fact that it diminishes the importance of debating the plan, which becomes a process of deletions and additions, the government claims that this system provides for greater flexibility and insures the necessary effectiveness of the plan.

At any rate, and as a result of this system, the government has presented a number of successive plans:

1) In the middle of 1978 just before the Egyptian delegation's departure to attend the meetings of the Advisory Group [not further identified] a five-year plan, for the years 1978 to 1982 was prepared and quickly approved by the People's Assembly, so that the Egyptian delegation may have something to show in Paris. The delegation had to go to Paris with a full plan in hand. This was done despite the fact that details of the plan had not been submitted to the People's Assembly.

2) At the beginning of 1979, in accordance with the above-mentioned method, a new five-year plan, running from 1979 to 1983, was presented by the government. At the outset of 1980, the same thing happened again, and we were presented with a five-year plan ending in 1984.

3) Then the government changed the fiscal year by making it begin in July. Along with that, the government proposed, of course, to change the five-year plan whereby it would begin in the fiscal year 1980-81 and end in the fiscal year 1984-85.

Ambitious Plan, But....

In mid-June, the government presented the outline of a new five-year plan. Regardless of the details, the outline was extremely ambitious:

a) It called for investments of 25,000 million pounds.

b) It projected a rate of growth with Egypt has never before achieved--10 percent annually.

c) It promised a high employment rate of up to 1.5 million new workers over a period of 5 years.

It is true that the plan depended on two major sources of funding: borrowing from the outside world and revenues from oil and the services sector including tourism and the Suez Canal. It is also true that the plan did not deal with the problem of [the projected] deficit and the need to turn to additional foreign sources, promising to do so in the next plan. Despite all this, the plan's goals were extremely ambitious.

Apparently, however, this did not sit well with the People's Assembly. Either that, or the plan fell through inadvertently during the debate. For while the Plan and Budget Committee commented in its report on the budget and the 1980-81 development plan, it made no mention of the proposed new five-year plan. On the contrary, the committee specifically mentioned in its report that the 1980-81 plan was inspired by "the strategy of the five-year plan" which was approved at the beginning of the year.

What does this mean? Most probably, the government had not completed the drawing up of its new five-year plan which embodies the new policies initiated by the government. Most probably, too, the People's Assembly found it inappropriate to sign a blank check, because what was presented to it was merely 16 pages of a statement by the deputy prime minister under the title of "The General Framework of the Five-Year Plan, 1980-81 to 1984-85."

This is the most likely explanation, but it is not what matters most. What matters here is the significance of what is happening, namely, inconsistency and continuous shifts and changes even in the general framework of the economic policy enunciated by the ruling party. This is in an area which requires the greatest degree of stability.

In the light of the above, can we possibly debate the plans that are presented by the government and say, yes we agree, no we disagree. It is impossible to do so when the two branches of the government--the executive branch and the parliament--have not reached agreement. At any rate, we hope that the inadvertent omission of the plan will not last long, and that the government has not decided to shift from a five-year plan to a one-year plan.

We say this without going into more details. For it is certain that the question of development requires elaborate discussion and debate to come up with an answer to the following question: How are 3,000 million pounds being spent annually--properly or improperly?

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ACCOUNTABILITY OF PREMIER TO PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-TAQADDUM in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 6

[Article: "To Whom Should Interpellations Be Addressed: To the Prime Minister or His Deputy?"]

[Text] The prominent issue raised by the report of the special committee set up to study the statement of the president of the republic is the nature of the status of the president in the executive branch. After reviewing the provisions of the constitution, the committee concluded that while the constitution provides for the existence of a "government" and a "council of ministers," this does not preclude the president, in his capacity as the chief of the executive branch, from also acting as the prime minister if the conditions in the country require it, or if he decides to do so for various considerations.

In the light of this, the committee's report turned to the accountability of the prime minister, his deputies and the ministers, and cited constitutional provisions related to the accountability of the prime minister and so forth.

The People's Assembly, at the request of 10 members, can adopt a decision establishing the accountability of the prime minister. That decision has to be approved by a majority of the members of the People's Assembly. But the decision cannot be taken until after an interpellation has been addressed to the government and only after at least three days from the time the interpellation has been submitted. If, after this, the assembly adopts such a decision, it will submit a report to the president informing him of its opinion and the reasons on which it is based. The president can return the report to the assembly within 10 days. If the assembly again adopts the report, the president can submit the dispute between the assembly and the government to a popular referendum. If the result of the referendum is in favor of the government, the assembly will be dissolved. Otherwise, the government will have to resign, and the president will have to accept that resignation. This can be done if the president is not also the prime minister. But what happens when the president combines the two positions? To whom would parliamentary interpellations be addressed: the prime minister or his deputy? On this point, the committee was divided. More precisely, the whole committee stood on one side, and Mumtaz Nassar stood on the other.

The committee's position was as follows: "In the event the president also takes over the position of prime minister, he will not be subject to interpellations, but his deputy will. This is because his role as president supersedes his role as prime minister. This, however, does not prevent the People's Assembly from exercising its constitutional rights about establishing the accountability of the

cabinet, if it seems fit to do so, by addressing an interpellation to one of the deputy prime ministers. Designation of the deputy prime minister to answer interpellations does not deny the government's constitutional accountability to the People's Assembly. Accordingly, the assembly can exercise its right with regard to the cabinet's accountability for the general policies of the state by addressing interpellations and questions to Fu'ad Muhyi al-Din, the deputy prime minister."

Mumtaz Nassar took exception to the committee's position. He submitted a legal memo, to which the committee's report devoted no more than the following 2 lines: "However, committee member Mumtaz Nassar believes that Articles 124, 125 and 127 of the constitution apply to anyone who assumes the position of prime minister."

This is all that the committee had to say about Nassar's 7-page memo. In that memo, Mumtaz Nassar says: "The 1971 Egyptian constitution referred to the head of state as the president of the republic. It spoke about his criminal accountability but not about his political one. As for the prime minister, the constitution said that any member of the assembly has the right to address to the prime minister, any of his deputies, the ministers or their deputies, interpellations and questions that fall within their jurisdiction. Article 125 stipulated that each assembly member is entitled to question the prime minister, his deputies, the ministers or their deputies.

"It can be seen from such clear-cut provisions that the Egyptian constitution determines the political accountability of the chairman of the council of ministers. Can it be said that this accountability is nullified when the president of the republic assumes the premiership? In other words, would the president be politically unaccountable when he is also the prime minister, and would one of his deputies as prime minister assume his accountability? The clear answer to this question is in the constitution.

"The prime minister is politically accountable before the People's Assembly whether he combines the two positions of president and prime minister or is just a prime minister. To rule otherwise would empty constitutional provisions of their significance. Needless to say, the constitutional discussion conducted by the standing committee in the People's Assembly on 26 March 1973, and its conclusion that 'the position of the presidency supersedes that of the premiership, whereby the political accountability of the premier is assumed by his deputy,' is inconsistent with the clear provisions of the constitution. It is an axiom that when the provisions are clear, interpretations should not be attempted. In view of the above, the political accountability of the prime minister remains the same as it is specified in the constitution."

We wish to point out here that Nassar's memo was lodged with the office of the deputy speaker of the assembly. The assembly, meanwhile, approved the committee's report as is.

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NPUG ASSAILS GOVERNMENT'S ALIGNMENT WITH THE U.S.

Cairo AL-TAQADDUM in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 11

[Article: "No to Military Pacts and Bases"]

[Text] The NPUG has issued a statement condemning the policies being followed by Egypt. These aim at conspiring to drive the Arab nation, against its own will and determination, away from the road of true national liberation taken by the Arab nation in pursuit of its independence.

The statement said: "The [government's] political leadership misses no opportunity to affirm the American-Egyptian military alliance. It does not hide the fact that Egyptian bases were used in the abortive American aggression against the Iranian people. And it reaffirms daily its determination to place these bases at the service of American intervention in the Arab states of the Gulf or in Iran, on the grounds of defending the Gulf, or under the pretext of freeding the hostages in Iran.

"The least that can be said is that the government announces, applies, and admits that it has aligned the country politically and militarily with one of the two international camps, and has chosen the side of American imperialism and its Zionist agent as the basis of its foreign policy, in total disregard for the policy of nonalignment."

The NPUG statement goes on: "Our party has emphasized from the very beginning that the Camp David agreement is not a peace treaty, but an Egyptian-imperialist military pact which threatens the masses of the Arab nation and the African peoples. No one can deny that events are proving our party right day after day. The policies of the Egyptian government have isolated Egypt from the Arab and Islamic nation, and driven it away from the Arab and African national liberation movements and into the camp of the imperialist enemy. They are also dragging Egypt and the Arab region as a whole into grave dangers with incalculable consequences."

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BRIEFS

NPUG DISCUSSES POLITICAL SITUATION--The secretariat of the NPUG Central Committee held its 4th regular meeting on 30 June under the chairmanship of secretary general Khalid Muhyi al-Din. The secretariat discussed the current political situation, domestically and in the field of foreign affairs. The topics of discussion included the issues of abolition of administrative control and abolition of the reductions in house rentals. The secretariat also discussed developments related to the election of the Consultative Council and the press law. In the field of foreign affairs, discussion dealt with the military bases in Greece; the partial withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan; and the United States and Iran. Discussion also dealt with the Arab situation and the resumption of the Egyptian-Iraseli negotiations. The organizational plan submitted by Muhammad Khalil, secretary of the organization committee, was also discussed and approved after introducing some amendments into it. The plan will be presented to the general secretariat at its forthcoming meeting. [Text] [Cairo AL-TAQADDUM in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 10] 9254

RALLY COMMEMORATES 'ABD AN-NASIR--The Bureau of the Mass Action Committee met on 24 June under the chairmanship of Husayn 'Abd al-Razzaq to discuss the action program for the period from July to December 1980. It was agreed to require [NPUG branches in the] governorates to hold two rallies during this period. One of these rallies should be to observe the 28th of September. The bureau also discussed the NPUG approach to the masses with regard to the government's economic policy and its consequences. The members affirmed their stand against the participation of foreign capital in the ownership of public sector companies and their position on boycotting Israeli goods. A study was conducted on the subject of reformulating the party platform in simplified and occasionally colloquial language, printing it in a booklet, recording it on cassettes, and distributing it to NPUG members and friends. The bureau approved the formation of the branch offices of the Committee on Mass Action. The next meeting will be held on 2 July. [Text] [Cairo AL-TAQADDUM in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 10] 9254

NPUG VANGUARDS CAMP--The NPUG is holding a camp for its vanguards in Suez under the supervision of Layla al-Shal, 'Azimah al-Husayni and Zaynab Muwafi. Fifty members of the vanguards are taking part in the camp which opened on 26 June and will end on 4 July. An art exhibition featuring works by vanguards was held under the supervision of artist Bahij 'Uthman. The camp was visited by Dr Rif'at al-Sa'id, assistant secretary of the NPUG Central Committee, who gave a lecture on the national struggle in the modern history of Egypt. [Text] [Cairo AL-TAQADDUM in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 10] 9254

FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE MEETS--The Foreign Relations Committee met on 29 June under the chairmanship of its secretary Dr Milad Hanna. The committee set up subcommittees for African affairs, Asian affairs, Australia, Latin America, Western Europe, the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc, and the United States. The committee invited party members who are interested in any of those areas to attend its next meeting on 13 July. [Text] [Cairo AL-TAQADDUM in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 11] 9254

EDUCATION PLAN FOR 1980--The Education Bureau held its regular meeting on 23 June under the chairmanship of its secretary 'Abd al-Ghaffar Shukr. The final form of the 1980 education plan was reviewed and steps for future action were adopted. The bureau also approved the bureau's mode of operation and the division of its operation into three subdivisions: the subdivision in charge of preparing instruction leaders, the leadership instruction subdivision and the public instruction subdivision. A timetable for the meetings of each subdivision was drawn up, and it was decided that the full bureau will meet on a biweekly basis on the second and fourth mondays of each month. The subdivisions will be formed as follows: The subdivision in charge of preparing instruction leaders shall consist of Aminah Shafiq, chief, and Salah Zaki, Maher Bayyumi and 'Ali al-Dib, members. The leadership instruction subdivision will consist of Nabil Mansur, Zuhdi Zaki, Baha Bakhit and Muhammad al-Buhayri. The public instruction subdivision comprises Muhammad al-Jundi, chief, and Hilmi 'Ashur, Kamal Abu 'Aytah and Saber Basyuni, members. The Instruction Bureau will hold its next meeting on Monday, 7 July. [Text] [Cairo AL-TAQADDUM in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 11] 9254

YOUTH FEDERATION CONFERENCE--The Central Secretariat of the Youth Federation will meet on 10 July to discuss the organizational status of the Youth Federation in the governorates and preparations for a Youth Federation convention. [Text] [Cairo AL-TAQADDUM in Arabic 1 Jul 80 p 11] 9254

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HINT OF GOVERNMENT THREAT TO MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD MAGAZINE

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Aug 80 pp 4-6

[Editorial by 'Umar al-Talmasani: "We and Every Government"]

[Excerpts] No group or organization has been either praised or condemned in any part of the world as much as the Moslem Brotherhood. No other group has suffered as much as the Moslem Brotherhood. This is because the Moslem Brotherhood adopted its faith, as did the first generation of Moslems, both as a wordly and heavenly law. This was natural, because if our own prophet Muhammad, may God bless him, was not spared mistreatment by his own people, despite his superiority over all men, how can those who are following his footsteps fare better?

Men have disagreed and differed about divinity and about the prophets, and it is no wonder that they should also differ about the Moslem Brotherhood. We all know that acceptance by all people is an unattainable goal, and that it is good for this universe to have diversity and different shades of opinion. It used to be said in the old times that if all people were the same and had similar tastes, lots of goods would not sell. Those who were most vindictive against the Moslem Brotherhood in all countries were the rulers of the Moslem countries, because the sound and correct application of Islam would limit their power and authority. Likewise, the enemies of Islam recognized the threat which the Moslem Brotherhood posed to their strength, colonialism, and economies. This is because the enemies of Islam are fully aware of the vitality and effectiveness of Islam, and see in the Moslem Brotherhood a group that seeks to re-instill that vitality and effectiveness in the hearts of Moslems. This is where the danger lies, as the enemies of Islam see it.

Why Rulers Loathe Moslem Brotherhood

Moslem rulers carried a grudge against the Moslem Brotherhood, because they saw in its mission a danger to their power. Only God knows that the Moslem Brothers do not covet power or think of stirring up or concocting plots, but they say what they believe in clearly and openly, even though what they say may offend some rulers. When the Moslem Brothers testified that "There is no God but Allah," they gained the right to abide by and implement that testimony without hesitation and regardless of the consequences.

Everyone knows how the Moslem Brotherhood suffered at the hands of the all the cabinets of King Faruq--may God have mercy on him and on us--especially the cabinet of Ibrahim 'Abd al-Hadi, People also know how the Moslem Brotherhood suffered at the hands of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir, may God be merciful on him and on us. That suffering

was unequalled in all of human history. It is also no secret to anyone that the Moslem Brotherhood to this day does not have a legal status--not since 'Abd al-Nasir unjustly abolished that status because of his hatred for Islam and Moslems and his championship of Communism and Communists. This injustice has not been rectified.

Our View of Every President

We do not deify a ruler or attribute to him qualities that he does not have. We do not overlook his errors. We do not support him with our blood or offer to defend him with our souls, as those who are frightened by the slightest shout or who flee when they hear a shot pretend to do. We respect a ruler, but do not idolize him. We will defend him with our lives when he abides by and applies the law of God and leads the Islamic nation as it was led by Abu Bakr, 'Umar and those who emulated them, may God have mercy on them. As long as we obey God in word and deed, we are not thrilled if a ruler is pleased with us, nor are we scared if a ruler is angry with us. Our philosophy is that he who pleases man by angering God is a great loser, while he who seeks God's satisfaction by angering people, will be protected by God, because God alone protects his followers from his enemies, while no man, no matter who, can protect a fly from God's wrath.

Perhaps this is one of the secrets of the survival of the Moslem Brotherhood despite the ordeals they have suffered under all regimes.

The relationship between the ruler and the ruled should be based on trust. The ruler should trust the loyalty of his people while the people should trust the sincerity of their ruler. No nation whose ruler fears his people, or whose people lay in wait for their ruler will ever survive. In that kind of situation, each side is obsessed with the single idea of how to protect its interests from the other. Such an obsession dissipates a nation's energies. A nation that fears its ruler and acts hypocritically towards him is doomed, because in so doing it thinks only of its immediate mundane interests, not of its fate in the hereafter. When we fear a ruler to protect our livelihood or life, we equate him--a powerless being--with the all-powerful God, in defiance of God's words, "Do not make counterparts of God." A sincere citizen is one who gives advice to his ruler, who does not shield the truth from his ruler, who does not cajole his rulers to be safe from his wrath, and who does not praise his ruler publicly and curse him secretly. A ruler would do well to govern a people whose sons are manly and truthful, because such individuals would support the ruler in times of adversity and danger. A people whose assets are those of slogans, demonstrations and celebrations are useless and no good.

People are alike and equal like the teeth of a comb, as the Prophet, may God bless him, has said. A position does not bestow on a person any distinction, except to the degree to which he obeys God in discharging its functions. Authority does not grant a person any rights that are inherently his. In our faith, the more a Moslem becomes powerful, the more he must become modest in his relationship with God, and the more he must become respectful and merciful toward those creatures of God whose affairs were assigned to him by God. When a subject is so treated by his ruler, he will reciprocate his love and compassion and he will obey him and serve him loyally more than he is expected to do.

Importance of Ruler's Adherence to Koran and Sunna

We do not accept a ruler's reference to decisions and ideas as "my decisions, my ideas, my orders." We want him to say that the decisions, ideas and orders are drawn from the book and law of God, the teachings of His Prophet, God bless him, and the consensus of the nation. We fear that a ruler who does not ascribe everything to God and His Prophet is courting trouble. If he does fear God, he will be safe and will be always right. Even if such a ruler errs, his people will realize that he has tried his best, but failed. The ruler's failure would then be willingly accepted. If a Moslem ruler ascribes all power to God, he will be safe from blame and reproach, even if the people are in difficulty, because the nation will realize that the ruler did not act in willful malice, and that the difficulties is God's will, which every Moslem has to accept obediently. But if things are left to the ruler's decision alone, evil will prevail, because man--ruler or subject--is not the master of his own fate.

The way to guarantee the ruler's security and the people's safety is to accept God's omnipotence. If God's law is applied, how could the people disobey the ruler? In so doing, they would be disobeying God, who has admonished us with these words: "Allah is your God; worship Him, for this is the right course." It can thus be clearly seen that under no circumstances does a ruler have a right to allow or disallow anything that God has not allowed or disallowed. For if such a right is left to the ruler to exercise as he sees fit, chaos will prevail among the people, and the people will be punished for things that they thought were permissible and unpunishable.

A ruler is forbidden by the law of God from making a law retroactive. To do so, a ruler would show himself to be capricious. A ruler who rules the people by caprice is courting great danger. Making a law retroactive involves an infringement of justice and represents a blow to the people's trust and confidence. Such an action undermines security and bewilders and confuse the people and heightens their anxiety as to what they can or cannot do. Has anything hurt people more than such retroactive laws? The lesson of the tragedy of 5 June 1967 is still vivid in our minds. We are still suffering the aftereffects of that tragedy.

Permanence of Legislation Is Necessary

God almighty has not obligated men to abide by His book and the sunna of His Prophet, God bless him, for no reason. God has permitted whatever He has permitted and forbidden whatever He has forbidden as a permanent law that began with the revelation of the Koran and will end on the Day of Reckoning. This way mankind will always know that the Koran is the word of God that cannot be doubted. If God permitted a ruler to change things as he likes, the people would be subject to the whims and likes and dislikes of other men. They would not be subject to a permanent, perennial law in the light of which they can organize their lives and run their affairs. The permanence and clarity of legislation is the ruler's safety valve and the subject's guarantee of security. If a ruler lays down a law because he is angered by the people, it would be sheer injustice and a practice that would disgust the people, because what may hit someone today, may hit another one tomorrow. This would keep the people in a state of apprehension.

If we concede to a ruler the right to lay down laws as he likes, this would become a permament source of abuse. Even if we acknowledge that a particular ruler is a just one, how can we be sure that he will not be succeeded by an unjust ruler who

may make other laws to maintain his injustice? There have been constitutions that people have raved about as fair and just. But have these constitutions been permanent and immutable, anywhere in the world? The first thing a despotic ruler assaults is the constitution, no matter how good and thorough that constitution may be. A despotic ruler would abolish or suspend the constitution. And even in the most prominent, so-called democratic countries, new amendments are often added to constitutions or deletions made in them. They have never remained unchanged and permanent. It is only when the legislator is everlasting and eternal that security, safety, justice, prosperity and glory will be insured. In that situation, a ruler has to account for his actions before his creator, and the people will live in peace and satisfaction, because the Legislator will never change His will and justice. This is one aspect of our thinking about government and our view of the ruler.

God Created Men To Be Free

God has created men to be free, so that no personcan force another person to do anything, not even to worship Him ("There is no coercion in religion"). When He ordered His Prophet, God bless him, not to coerce people to do anything, even to convert into Islam, and when He willed that all people shall be fully free ("he who wishes to believe may do so, and he who wishes to blasphem, may do so too"), the all-knowledgeable and all-knowing God was aware that this was for the good of His creatures, so that no creature can possibly impose his own will on other people. This is something that Islam has irrevocably forbidden. Islam is the best means of reforming the universe. This is not our own view of our invention, but is the rule of God that applies to His worshippers if they are Moslems. It is the will of God that God's book shall be our arbiter in all matters, and that we shall finally and fully accept what God has justly and majestically willed.

This is what we believe in, and this is what we demand of any government, out of a sense of certainty and conviction, because it is the way to our salvation from punishment on the Day of Reckoning. To contravene what the Koran says, or even to acquisce in or condone a contravention of the Koran, is something that we cannot do, because it would cost us the loss of our hope to be admitted to God's paradise.

We accept God's will and rule and nothing else, even if our imperfect mind may tell us that this may be harmful to us. We are committed to this by virtue of our religion. History has tested us from 1928 until 1980 and found us to be loyal to our religion and faith, dedicated to our creed, firm in defending our views and patient in the face of the adversity that has befallen us. History has found us to be disdainful of all tyranny and wrath, except the wrath of the God of gods and king of kings.

We Do Not Plot

This is our attitude toward all governments in all Islamic countries. We do not plot against a regime, or join a front against a regime. We do not incite students or non-students against a regime, nor would we sully our hands with unlawful money to create disturbances against a regime. In this, we are not driven by fear--for we have not known fear since we pledged allegiance to God and vowed to work for His sake. Nor shall be accommodating and act as hypocrites. "Hypocrites will suffer in the lowest levels of the fires of hell," [says God]. We will remain what we are, and we will continue to spread the word of God in full awareness of what we are

doing. We will preach to the students, workers and peasants as well as to all members of this society in which the features of Islam have just about disappeared. If we do not have a newspaper, then each one of us will be a newspaper in his environment. If we do not have a house, then the house of each individual of us will be a public center for preaching the word of God. And if we do not have a brotherhood, then each one of us will act as a brotherhood.

The governments which fight the Moslem Brotherhood have to realize that they are fighting God, because he who antagonizes and fights a worker for God is actually antagonizing and fighting God. [Considerations of owning] the magazine, its publishing house and related property will not stand in the way between the preacher and his mission. Our prophet, God bless him, was asked to abandon his call or die. He refused the former choice and accepted the latter. He who believes that his fate is in heaven, and that his earthly death is irrelevant, will not be afraid of threats or lured by temptation.

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HISTORY OF U.S. CURRENT PEACE MOVES IN MIDEAST REVIEWED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Aug 80 pp 8. 9, 25

[Article by Sami Sayyid: "American Preparations for the Peaceful Solution Began Before 1952"]

[Text] The U.S. domination of the world, even though it may have become nominal after the Iranian revolution, did not spring from vacuum. Emerging from World War II, the U.S. quite intelligently realized that the nature of the new era would not brook blatant colonialism. It was necessary, therefore, to look for an alternative. The alternative to colonialism [Arabic: Isti'mar] was "Istihmar" [a play on words, literally meaning "to take people for jackasses"]--that is, making fools of the peoples of the Islamic nation and the Third World. The alternative, in other words, was to colonize peoples without the mechanism of colonialism.

To avoid speaking in riddles, we note that, after World War II, American policy was torn between two directions. The first direction was an idealistic and shining one derived from the role of the U.S. as the leader of the free world and the champion of democracy in the battle against the Nazi and Fascist regimes which were vanquished in the war. This made it necessary for the American government not to appear before the American public as a world power which interferes in the affairs of the various nations of the world, or supports the dictatorial regimes that were sprouting in the Islamic world. But then a second direction interjected itself into this picture. While the U.S. must project a shining image among the American people, it has interests in other countries, and these interests require the U.S. to interfere in the affairs of those countries. The U.S. realized, however, that its interference in the affairs of others should not be visible and conspicuous. This is when the U.S. devised the method of "istihmar"--making jackasses of others--and couched it in Machiavellian fashion. The "istihmar" methodology, simply put, operates on the premise that, with the demise of British and French colonialism and its relegation to the museums of history, the best course of action is to replace it with colonialism undertaken by sons of the Islamic nation and Thrid World themselves. If the peoples of the Islamic world want national governments and national leaders and rulers, the CIA would produce such governments and rulers. This is when the CIA began engineering revolutions which brought the military into power in various countries of the Islamic world.

The CIA's choice of the military to rule these countries was a very smart move. It was a move taken after a thorough psychological study of the military personality and the pros and cons which pull that personality one way or the other. The Americans, of course, are masters of behavioral control and social engineering. Perhaps

the most significant fact revealed by the studies made of the military personality is that the military is attracted to the concept of power and would do anything required of it, no matter how excessive, to attain power. The second most significant finding is that the military mentality makes judgments before analyzing a situation. These judgments tend, therefore, to be extemporaneous and unstudied.

Each time the military in the Islamic world became close associates of a ruler or a king, a revolution would occur. This would take place without there necessarily being a basis or purpose for such moves. Thus, we witnessed a succession of revolutionary coups in the Islamic world--in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya, and the Sudan.

The American aim behind these coups, and behind the installation of the military in the seats of power in the Islamic world, should be quite obvious to any novice in the science of politics. It is the control of the Islamic world, with all its crucial strategic routes, oil and raw materials.

The winds of fortune, however, do not always blow as one wishes, for there is in the region a serious problem which keeps it in turmoil and prevents the American interests from enjoying stability. This problem is the entity which was planted in the body of the area, namely, Israel. Britain performed the first act of the farce of the creation of Israel, and left the remaining acts for the U.S. to perform. These were the acts of support and consolidation. From the very beginning, the U.S. realized that it needed a permanent and fixed bridge to the heart of the Islamic world. It also realized that the bridge--Israel--would not be effective, unless peace is established between Israel and its neighbors. This is because even if Israel won in an overall war against the Arabs, or the Arabs won in a limited war against Israel, this would not enable American interests to enjoy stability in the region. It is true that everyone deals with the U.S.--some openly, some behind the scenes. But this would not guarantee a firm and solid base for American interests among the peoples of the Islamic world, who do not tolerate being anyone's lackey or give much weight to the power of the dollar, but are bound together by the power of faith.

In sum, the U.S. became aware since 1948 that the stability of the region, hence the stability of its interests, depended on peace between the Arabs and Israel. It set out to prepare for that. The U.S. awareness of the need for a peaceful settlement through direct negotiations became obvious when former Secretary of State William Rogers declared that a settlement dictated from outside cannot last. He said: "Negotiations have always been between long-time adversaries--so why should the Middle East be an exception to the rule? North Korea can talk to South Korea and the East Germans to the West Germans. The Indians meet with the Pakistanis immediately after a war and before the withdrawal of forces. Surely, then, the Middle East cannot be an exception to the rule that disputes should be resolved through active dialogue between the parties concerned. The only region of tension in which there are no negotiations is the Middle East." This kind of talk crystallizes the U.S. conviction that peaceful settlement is the only safeguard for the stability of American interests.

Preparations for such a peaceful settlement began shortly after 1948, and were consummated a long time after that. They went through many stages and phases which are not listed here in the chronological order in which they occurred. Each phase ushered in a successive one, and whenever a phase ended, the U.S. would move on to the next phase. These phases are:

1) The introduction of military rule into the Islamic world, after it became apparent that the military tend, as a matter of course, to settle accounts [quickly] with local political adversaries. We find, for example, that 'Abd al-Nasir spent a long time liquidating his political opponents while shelving the principal question of liberating Palestine. To make sure that the passions of the masses, which had been whipped up into a frenzy by fiery rhetoric, would not simmer down and subside, the inspired leader would come out with a speech or two whenever the Palestine question seemed to fade away. The people would soon kneel before him and repeat the songs of imminent victory. The CIA managed to make sure that his activity was not directed against the Jews, by virtue of the meetings which were held between 'Abd al-Nasir and the Jews in the 1948 armistice. When 'Abd al-Nasir met with the Jews, his questions to them dealt with their skillful organization in resisting the Nazis and with how they managed to set up defensive plans against that ferocious enemy.

2) The second phase was predicated on the first, and came as a result of it. The advent of military rule meant that the primary goal of the ruling leadership would be redirected towards purely domestic problems, which would polarize the masses, or would turn to regional problems and to the emerging conflicts between the ruling regimes of the various states. Examples: the dispute between Iraq and Syria; the Syrian-Egyptian Union, the breakdown of that union, and the emergence of conflicts between Egypt and Syria; Egyptian intervention in Yemen; an Egyptian-Saudi dispute; a Saudi-Yemeni dispute; a Kuwaiti-Iraqi dispute, and so forth.

3) After that, the U.S. realized that despite redirection of the interests and concerns of the ruling regimes in the Middle East and their passive attitude toward Palestine question, the U.S. had to make a direct move and hold direct Arab-Isareli negotiations. At that time--the mid-1960's--the U.S. was convinced that no Arab leader dared to negotiate with Israel, although most of the leaders of the region were convinced that such negotiations were necessary. However, the fact that the Arab peoples had been imbued with bombastic slogans and promises about the near end of Israel (when it would be pushed into the sea), acted as a barrier in the face of any Arab leader who considered the idea of negotiating with Israel. Therefore, the idea emerged of dealing the Arabs an incapacitating blow which would force them into capitulation, and compel them to accept the necessity of negotiating directly with the Israelis. 'Abd al-Nasir was thus drawn into the 1967 war. The leader had wanted to play a political game in which he would use the Arab armies and Arab dignity, but he had not prepared to protect his political ploy from a frightening collapse. The result was a crushing setback.

One of the most serious facts which confirm that 'Abd al-Nasir was not serious in preparing for battle is his conversation with his colleague 'Abd al-Latif al-Baghdadi 'Abd al-Nasir told al-Baghdadi that he found the Arabs asleep and thought of waking them up by closing the Gulf of 'Aqaba. 'Abd al-Nasir also made a statement immediately after the war which confirms his lack of seriousness. On 23 July 1967, he said: "When we began to mobilize and mass the armed forces, the chance of a war seemed to me to be 20 percent." Of course, we can never forget the dirty role played by the Soviet Union in drawing 'Abd al-Nasir to do what the Americans wanted him to do, namely, break the back of the Egyptian army and accept a peaceful settlement after the two superpowers had agreed that the Middle East should not be an area of direct struggle between them. The Soviet Union's role began when an Egyptian parliamentary delegation led by al-Sadat visited Moscow in May and returned with an emphatic word from the Soviets to 'Abd al-Nasir that Israel was massing its forces along the borders of Syria and preparing for a full-scale attack on it. Thus, the

war began with a lie. In fact, Levi Eshkol, then Iraseli prime minister, summoned the Soviet ambassador and affirmed to him that Israel was not massing troops along the Syrian borders and did not intend to do so. Eshkol even invited the ambassador to accompany him to the Syrian borders to see for himself that there is no such Israeli buildup, but the Soviet ambassador refused the invitation. Lt Gen Muhammad Fawzi went to Syria personally and flew over the Syrian borders, but found no indications of an Israeli military buildup. When he arrived in Damascus, Lt Gen Fawzi was startled when the Syrians asked him: "Where are the troop concentrations that you are talking about in Cairo?" Lt Gen Fawzi returned to Cairo and reported his findings to the authorities.

We can conclude from the above that 'Abd al-Nasir wanted to exploit what was called the Israeli threat to Syria to create one of the crises he was used to creating whenever he wanted to divert the attention of the Arab world and the Egyptian people to some sensational event. But did 'Abd al-Nasir know of the Soviet and American games, or where those games too subtle for his own thinking? The most serious thing we can say in conclusion about that phase is to quote Shams Badran's confessions during his trial because of the June setback. The confessions were published in the papers despite the strict censorship imposed at the time. Said Badran: "We warned 'Abd al-Nasir that an Israeli strike would occur after 48 hours." But he refused to disclose his source was American.

4) The next phase saw the Arabs in disarray, stunned by military defeat and deep divisions. The Arab states and officials were exchanging recriminations and accusations. The U.S. decided then to launch its move for a peaceful settlement. Thus began the Rogers initiative. It was more of a move for a separate Egyptian-Israeli settlement in which the Suez Canal would be reopened in return for ending the state of war between Egypt and Israel. 'Abd al-Nasir would have accepted the Rogers plan after he had been exhausted by the defeat. However, his revolutionary ebullience and his mobilization of the Egyptian and Arab masses still stood in the way of direct negotiations with Israel.

5) The U.S. later became convinced that Israel would not budget one inch, unless it was forced to do so by military force. I do not mean to say that the October war was planned by the CIA. No, it was planned and executed by the convictions and determination of our heroic soldiers and officers. But the outcome of that war, namely, the triumph of the Arabs in a limited war with Israel, was in the interest of the U.S. This is in line with what we said earlier, namely, that the previous phases were not entirely planned or arranged. Had we said that, we would have implied that the U.S. can divine events and has the power of prophecy, which it does not. Each phase was the result of the previous one, and the U.S. acted in each phase in the light of what happened in the previous one.

6) After the October war, there came the phase of secret meetings between certain Arab leaders and Israel. Perhaps the one who held most such meetings was King Hussein [of Jordan]. It has been said that not a month passed without King Hussein holding several meetings with Israeli leaders. It is therefore not strange that Dayan should say that Israel would not feel reassured about the presence of any Arab force in the West Bank in the future, except for the authority of King Hussein and Jordan. He said that Jordan's presence could safeguard the West Bank, and that he had discussed that matter with the Jordanian leadership. The Israeli public and political parties prefer a Jordanian presence in the West Bank as a guarantee of stability, and they consider this to be better than any other solution of the problem of the West Bank.

7) The subsequent phase required the liquidation of the Palestinian presence [in Lebanon], because it was considered to be an obstacle in the way of consummating direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israel. And so the game of a secretarian war between Moslems and Christians in Lebanon was put into action. The CIA used the Maronite Christians, who later became known as isolationists, to undertake the dirty role of liquidating the Palestinian presence. The conspiracy of these Maronites went as far as to deal with Israel.

8) With all this, conditions became ripe for the beginning of direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs. The Palestinian presence had been blunted. Israel was neither victorious nor defeated. Nor were the Arabs. In other words, there was an equilibrium. Therefore, secret meetings began between the Egyptian and Israeli sides. The Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Muhammad Hasan al-Tuhami himself told the Kuwaiti daily AL-SIYASAH that the first secret meeting took place on 15 July 1979, and the second on 29 August 1979.

The two meetings took place in Morocco, at the table of King Hasan, between Moshe Dayan and Muhammad Hasan al-Tuhami. At the first meeting, Dayan had to cut short a visit to Brussels where he was staying overnight enroute from Tel Aviv to Washington. He disappeared from the hotel in which he was staying and spread the word that he was meeting a girl friend at night. He flew to Paris and then to Morocco incognito in a special aircraft. European papers talked about Dayan's disappearance that night and reported all kinds of rumors which boiled down to the possibility that Dayan had conducted another secret mission. At the meeting, Dayan tried to have the secret meetings shifted to Cairo, but al-Tuhami rejected the idea. At the second meeting, Dayan suggested that the peace process could be stretched out from that time until the year 2000, until a permanent peace can be achieved. Al-Tuhami replied: "Moshe, be reasonable and talk about six months or a year."

At the third meeting, Dayan flew in a Boeing 707 with a team of guards. He made the distance from Ben Gurion airport to Morocco in 6 hours of nonstop flight at a distance of 1000 feet above sealevel to evade the radar stations along the coastline of southern Europe. He had left Israel in total secrecy aboard a plane which carried no markings that would indicate its nationality. He arrived in Morocco exhausted, as he said, from the terrible sound of the turbines at that low altitude. He removed the false long beard with which he disguised himself, and took off the dark glasses and European head dress which he was wearing before entering the palace of King Hasan. After the meeting, he used the same disguise, and returned to Israel in the same manner in which he had come to Morocco. At the meeting, Dayan tried to reaffirm Israel's allegations and claims about Jerusalem. Al-Tuhami countered by saying that if King David were alive today, he would not allow his star to fly over the minarets of the Moslems. After that, events occurred at a fast pace: the [Sadat] initiative, the Cairo preparatory conference, the Leeds meetings, Camp David, the peace treaty.

9) In completion of the phase which the U.S. had initiated before 1952, we expect to see the rest of the Arab states brought into the process. Syria, which alleges to be opposed to American imperialism, when it is in fact the biggest dealer with it, will be brought in. Then King Hussein and the other Arab leaderships will support the peace process, because the U.S. is not playing games.

Our own answer to these peaceful solutions which rob us of our rights to the recovery of Jerusalem and the establishment of a Palestinian state is drawn from the holy Koran: "You will find that the people most hostile to the faithful are the Jews and the idolaters." As for our peoples, we repeat for their benefit God's utterance: "Obey not he who has paid no heed to us, and who has followed his whim and gone astray."

YOUTH SUMMER ACTIVITIES CRITICIZED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Aug 80 p 27

[Article by Rabih Radi: "They Are Corrupting the Youth in the Summer"]

[Text] Some 10,000 young Egyptians are preparing to leave for Europe after standing in lines for hours, debasing themselves and doing all kinds of tricks to get an entry visa to a West European country. Most of them have borrowed the expenses of the trip in the hope of getting a simple job that would realize their dreams of buying some flashy consumer goods coupled with vague dreams of running free of the control and supervision of Middle East tradition--free to go out with any friends they like and live it up in night clubs.

The Greatest Danger

Travel and exploration of the unknown are nothing to be ashamed of in themselves. But there is great danger in very young people undertaking it. Most of these very young people are still living in Egypt under the authority and supervision of their fathers in poor economic conditions and in a society which still suffers from serious problems plaguing public utilities, such as badly paved streets, transportation that is not fit for human beings, and electric blackouts, water shortage. Their fathers are severely saddled by expenses that include private lessons for their children in addition to food and dress. On the other hand, cigarette ads in the movie theaters, and foreign liquor ads on television, arouse the dreams of young men and young women and transport them momentarily to worlds filled with yachts, gliders and blondes.

Those in charge of our media do not think of the conditions of deprivation in which our youth live, when they subject our youth to enticements which make our young people dream of traveling in the summer to the outside magic world. The media do not care if on these trips our young people have to sleep in parks or in crowded rooms, or if a young woman, whose family allowed her to travel alone in defiance of religious and moral codes, should go astray.

The tragedy is that this kind of youth was not brought up on a sound religious basis. Therefore, it is easily led astray. If anyone does not believe us, let him visit Aswan in November and December and watch college students dancing in night clubs until dawn in the presence of a group leader who is usually a professor. The students who are not lucky enough to go to Europe spend their time either in night clubs or in the streets.

Most or all of the youth clubs and centers, which are controlled by the ministry of youth and the Higher Council for Youth and Sports, have abandoned religious, educational and athletic standards. The youth center in Al-Jazirah, for example, has formed a folkloric dance group. It includes boys and girls who dance with scarves tied around their waists under the guidance of their tutor who is an effeminate and shameless man.

Other clubs devote all their attention to soccer and soccer stars, and have developed into something akin to casinos. The largest athletic club has used its playgrounds to hold two parties that lasted until the morning hours during July alone. There will be more because the officials in charge of that club have taken up the habit of holding dance parties for the two sexes around the swimming pool. One of the strangest things that those officials have done is running the following announcement just before the al-Adha Holiday: "In celebration of al-Adha Feast, the ceremonies committee will hold a dance party around the swimming pool." Yes, by God! A dance party to celebrate Al-Adha. The Moslems on Mount 'Arafat [holy pilgrimage sites in Saudi Arabia] chant prayers and slaughter sacrificial animals, while the officials in charge of the Moslem youth in Egypt's largest youth clubs hold a dance party around the swimming pool. Well, despite protests, petitions and telegrams, the party was held.

Where Is the Ministry of Youth?

I do not know what kind of a man is the father who sits happily watching his daughter dancing with a young man under the sponsorship of officials who all occupy very high and important positions in the government. This is, of course, in addition to big concerts by foreign singers in which the young go crazy, such as the concerts given last summer by the Spanish-French (Algerian-born) singer Enrico Masias. He turned out to be a Jew and he felt free to curse the Arabs and accuse them of stupidity for not joining the peace procession.

Now, where is the Ministry of Youth in all this? The ministry is busy holding spectacular festivals and spending enormous sums of money. It has not carried out the responsibility it was entrusted with, nor has it at least saved some of its expenses so as to buy tents, not to mention houses, for those who live in cemeteries and mosques.

The Higher Council for Youth and Sports is too busy organizing song competitions, solving soccer problems and eliminating the effects of blind fanaticism. These agencies will not solve anything anyway, because the beneficiaries and profiteers are in charge of youth affairs. They hold a meeting to arrange for money transfers, and organize activity in preparation for the Moscow Olympics, although we have withdrawn from those Olympics.

Do these youth agencies care if young Moslems go to Europe to become totally corrupted? Do they care if young Moslems dance in night clubs, or take to the streets with no other purpose than to play soccer, drink, congregate on street corners or walk aimlessly in the city?

The Bright Side

But there is a bright side. It is the shiny face of young men in the prime of their lives, who are virtuous, moral and God-fearing. These are the young men of the Islamic Groups. What we see here is a totally different picture. Camps of Islamic

Groups involve dawn prayers, Koran recitals, religious lectures and athletic exercises. This is in addition to their organizing pilgrimage trips to Mecca and printing booklets at cost price.

In spite of all this, obstacles are placed in the way of those groups and secret and open wars are launched against their activities. I would therefore like to ask those who fight the youth of the Islamic Groups. "Who is more useful for the country, and what kind of youth can we depend on: the youth who dance around swimming pools or the youth who recite the Koran and worship? Who is better: the effeminate young man who is a dancer in a folkloric dance group, or the real athletic and manly young man?"

The answer is obvious. All those in charge of youth, such as the ministry of youth and the sports authorities, have to do for a start is to establish youth camps which could cost no more than the cost of tents. Let them engage young Egyptians in afforestation, land reclamation, road building or canal digging projects. Let them organize each day in those camps on a religious basis, such as beginning the day with dawn prayers and Koranic recitals. The rest of the day would be devoted to work and prayer, as well as sports and religious lectures. This way, summers would produce a youth that is morally and physically developed. Otherwise, summers would produce young men who wear fancy chains and memorize the latest songs of Mr Travolta.

Peace be with you.

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CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL LAW SEEN AT VARIANCE WITH MOSLEM PRECEPTS

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Aug 80 pp 46-48

[Article by Muhammad 'Abd al-Quddus: "We Demand Revision of the Consultative Council Law; Formation and Jurisdictions of the New Council Are Inconsistent With Genuine Islamic Consultation"]

[Excerpts] The Consultative Council Law has been recently passed. We demand that this law be revised immediately, because it is inconsistent with genuine shura [consultation as practiced in early days of Islam and as advocated by Islamic religion]. To explain the reasons which make us reject the Consultative Council Law, we should first talk about shura in Islam, which, incidentally, is not observed by Moslem rulers. This disregard of shura has been the cause of all the tragedies and predicaments that have afflicted us, especially in modern times.

The great Islamic scholar Muhammad al-Ghazali says that shura is binding on the ruler. This is something which can be understood logically and rationally. It means that shura is not just a word that can be ignored by the ruler. To say that shura is not binding means that it is permissible for a ruler to be arbitrary in his views. To interpret the Koran in that manner would be a capitulation to the whims of the ruler, and would not be representative of true Islamic thought.

Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali raises the following question: If a community can err occasionally, how can a despotic ruler be infallible? Al-Ghazali goes on to answer his own question: If a community errs 10 percent of the time, the tyrant errs 100 percent of the time. Shura is a [collective] effort of the human mind to find the best answer to a given question. Although the Prophet Muhammad, God bless him, was infallible, he conceded his views on mundane affairs when he saw that the views of many of his followers were contrary to his. An example was when the majority of his aides wanted to fight outside the city during the Uhud invasion. This and other precedents affirm that shura is binding.

Shaykh Al-Ghazali denies the veracity of some claims that Abu Bakr [the chief aide and first successor of prophet Muhammad] followed his own opinion without consulting anyone else in the fight against the turncoats and that his opinion was contrary to that of the majority of the companions of the prophet, including 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab. Al-Ghazali says that such statements were false for two reasons:

1) Abu Bakr was executing a Koranic order. Implementation of the Koran does not involve shura.

2) To say that the majority of the companions of the prophet were against fighting the turncoats is a falsification of the truth. For example, the position of 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab was based on a misconception. He soon abandoned it when he found out the facts.

The well-known Islamic scholar, Shaykh Mahmud 'Id, imam of the al-Salam mosque in Alexandria, says that Islamic legists and theologians have determined that shura is a duty that cannot be shirked. They further determined that a ruler who disregards shura should be removed unquestionably. Giving opinion and counsel should not necessarily be at the request of the ruler. The consultative council itself can initiate the giving of counsel. Islam, as Shaykh Mahmud 'Id says, is a comprehensive system which is not confined to general political issues, but also involves the people's oversight of the acts and conduct of their ruler and his aides. Indeed, it involves the people's control of their own lives, so as to protect Moslems from corruption and abuse of influence, and prevent the government from being a source of wealth for the ruler or his relatives. Shura in Islam means observing and respecting the will of the nation, making use of qualifications and abilities in all fields, and enabling all free and honest people to express their views without persecution.

In the view of Shaykh Mahmud 'Id, the great majority of the modern Moslem states are quite dissociated from the shura system. He says that these states have four common features which are inconsistent with shura:

1) The lack of accountability of the ruler. The rulers of the Islamic states have absolute powers, and are unaccountable to their peoples. This is a clear attempt on the part of the rulers to equate themselves with God. God is not accountable for his actions, but his creatures are. The variance in the degree of lack of accountability of rulers in the Islamic states is a nominal one. Some rulers make their chief aides, such as their deputies or prime ministers, accountable to the parliament, although the rulers themselves are chiefly accountable. Other rulers do not even do that.

2) Decisions affecting the people's destiny are made exclusively by the ruler. This is a noticeable phenomenon in the Islamic countries. Strangely enough, such decisions made exclusively by the ruler often come as a surprise even to his closest aides. Every tyrant believes that he is serving his people's interests and general good. There is nothing strange in that, for Koran points this out when it refers to the characteristics of despotic Pharaohs in the chapter of Ghafir.

3) The will of the nation is falsified. The falsification can occur in several ways:

a) Rigging elections and plebiscites or even barring them altogether.

b) Political isolation of others by making the political system confined to one party or several nominal parties, and by imposing all kinds of restrictions on the formation of real parties which express the will of the masses.

c) Restricting the freedom of the press.

d) The institution of laws aimed at restricting the freedom of opinion, such as the laws recently introduced in Egypt, including the Law on Immorality.

4) War is waged against real Islam. Such a war can be conducted in various forms:

a) An open war, such as the one waged against Islam in Southern Yemen, Syria and Egypt in the 'Abd al-Nasir era.

b) Continuous harrassment of the Islamic groups and denying them the legal right to exist, such as at present in Egypt.

c) The application of Islamic laws and restrictions without the use of a system of shura. This represents a war on real Islam, as we see in Pakistan, Mauritania and Saudi Arabia.

Despotism, in the view of Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazali, is the first and basic reason for the defeats of the Moslems throughout this history, especially in the modern era. Absolute rule which has made a farce out of the shura system has brought one catastrophe after another upon the Islamic nation. Shaykh al-Ghazali says: "Political despotism is not a mere partial departure from the teachings of Islam, and not a denial of some secondary teachings of Islam. It is in fact that abandonment of Islam and a complete subversion of its creed." Al-Ghazali wonders about the situations and conditions created by despotism. The ruler in an Islamic country which lives under despotism is feared more than God and implored more than the Almighty. Shaykh al-Ghazali believes that the states of Western Europe are closer to shura, and are more respectful of the will of their peoples than the contemporary Islamic states are of their own peoples. As an example, he cites General de Gaulle and the referendum he conducted several years ago. When the French people told de Gaulle "no," he gathered his papers and went home quietly, although he was the one who liberated France from Nazi Germany and rescued it again from a civil war. Such a referendum cannot take place under present circumstances in the Islamic world. But even if a referendum is conducted, the ruler will do everything possible to make sure that the result is an overwhelming majority in his favor.

The Egyptian Consultative Council has three characteristics which are completely at odds with shura. These are:

a) Qualified persons who do not belong to parties are barred from membership in the council.

b) The head of state is in control of the council.

c) The new council lacks a clear-cut jurisdiction, its resolutions are not binding, and it does not perform an oversight function.

To explain those three characteristics which conflict with everything we said about shura, I would like to briefly tick off the defects of the new council:

1--Independents are barred from membership of the Consultative Council. The party system in Egypt is still a nascent system which has not yet taken roots in the conscience of the people. Therefore, the decision to confine membership of the council to the parties is a serious decision which doomed the council before it was even born.

a) Mumtaz Nassar, the prominent opposition member in the People's Council, says that the Consultative Council Law is unconstitutional because Article 62 of the constitution says: "A citizen has the right to elect and be a candidate for election

and to express his opinion in a referendum." This article makes the citizen's right to be a candidate for election a constitutional right. By barring independents from running for election, the law has infringed upon a cardinal constitutional right.

b) Lawyer 'Abd al-Fattah Hasan, former member of the People's Council, says that the greater majority of the people are not affiliated with any party. To make elections to the Consultative Council an exclusive domain of the parties means that the majority of the people are denied the right to participate. Citizens cannot freely form parties, because the government controls the process of party formation.

c) In a statement published in the press on 4 June 1980, Kamil Laylah, a secretary of the ruling party, said: "If the independents banded together in one movement, that would constitute an illegal party. There is no suspension of the right of independents to run for election, because an independent can run on the ticket of one of the parties." Replying to this, 'Abd al-Fattah Hasan says: "This is a peculiar statment, for who can swallow his pride and impose himself as a guest of a political party with which he is not affiliated? And what political party would offer itself as a vehicle for an independent to be elected to the Consultative Council?"

2--The individual value of the candidate is disregarded. Election by party ticket involves a serious shortcoming, namely, a disregard for the individual candidate, because the voter has to accept the party slate as a whole or reject it as a whole. This is against the free will of the voter, because the slate may contain candidates who are not qualified and others who are qualified. Not to give the voter the ability to distinguish between the good and the poor candidate in a slate of candidates is a distortion of parliamentary life and an act which would allow opportunists to infiltrate that life.

3--Adoption of the principle of absolute majority is an invalidation of the rights of the minority. 'Abd al-Fattah Hasan says that the few nations of the world which use the party slate system base that system on a proportionate distribution of seats, whereas the regime in Egypt adopts the principle of absolute victory for the majority, which is a denial of the rights of the minority. Here is an example: Let us assume that there is a district, with 7 seats in the Consultative Council, in which one party wins 51 percent of the votes, while another party wins 49 percent of the votes. Justice requires that the seats be distributed proportionately between the two parties. It was a complete surprise, therefore, when the authors of the new law determined that the party which wins the majority of votes in a district will win all seats in that district, regardless of the number of votes won by other parties. This is sheer injustice.

4--A new denial of minority rights. This is represented by the fact that if a party fails to receive 5 percent of the popular vote, it will not be able to enter the Consultative Council. That is to say that the votes it receives are worthless.

5--The head of state controls the Consultative Council. This domination by the head of state can be seen in three areas:

a) He appoints one third of the 120-man council.

b) Independents are barred from running and minority rights are flouted--all in the interest of the ruling party which is headed by the chief of state.

c) 'Abd al-Fattah Hasan says that the Consultative Council's law shows that the council has no authority to examine, discuss or express opinion on anything except those matters that are referred to it by the head of state or the speaker of the People's Assembly. If no matters are referred to the council, the council will have nothing to do and no right to discuss anything. And if certain matters are referred to it, and it fails to express its views on them within a certain period of time, this will be construed as approval!

6--The Consultative Council lacks jurisdiction. Herein lies a serious shortcoming of the Consultative Council. It is at variance with the real function of shura that the council be a nominal body. 'Abd al-Fattah Hasan says that the council does not have legislative jurisdiction, does not exercise oversight over the government, and its members do not have the right to address interpellations or other questions to the government. Its views on any issue are not binding.

7--Unnecessary rewards. Mumtaz Nassar says that despite the fact that the function of the Consultative Council is a nominal one, its members nevertheless receive monthly remunerations which are equivalent to those received by members of the People's Assembly. This is 75 pounds per month. This is to say that more than 100,000 pounds will be spent monthly on salaries of the 120 members of the Consultative Council, in addition to the salary of the head of the council which is equivalent to the salary of the vice president. This is in addition to attendance allowances. In the People's Assembly, attendance allowances run at 20 pounds per meeting. Naturally, members of the Consultative Council will demand equality in this regard.

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CAIRO UNIVERSITY MOSQUE UNFINISHED AFTER 16 YEARS

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Aug 80 p 60

[Article by Badr Muhammad: "The Story of the Al-Quds Mosque Which Remains Unfinished After 16 Years"]

[Text] The mosque of Al-Quds [Jerusalem] in University City in Al-Jizah is a mosque which was begun in 1964 but remains unfinished to this day. It is still a collection of pillars with a roof but without walls or water.

What is the story of that mosque?

The idea of building a mosque and an Islamic cultural center at Cairo University emerged in the 1960's. It soon became a project undertaken by the Arab Contractors Company. But the company was unable to get the necessary funds for implementing the project, so it stopped its work on it.

In March 1973, a society was formed under the name of "The Society to Build a Mosque and Islamic Cultural Center at Cairo University." The society's secretary was Dr Muhammad Safwat Husayn, a professor of medicine at Qasr al-'Ayni, and the treasurer was Dr Muhammad 'Abd al-Mun'im Abu al-Fadl, a professor of medicine at the same place. The society received 7,000 pounds from the ministry of social affairs plus contributions totalling 3,954 pounds. Potential donations were estimated at about 50,000 pounds. The president of Cairo University at the time was Dr Hasan Isma'il, the former minister of education.

What is the situation now? It can be said to be as follows:

1) The Arab Contractors Company, which was contracted to implement the project, received inadequate funds and ceased work on the project after putting up the pillars and the roof.

2) Shaykh Mitwalli al-Sha'rawi said that the ministry of religious trusts donated 23,000 pounds for the project, but no funds were received.

3) The university provided no support for the project and is not prepared to do so, because, as assistant university secretary Hasan Sha'rawi said, it has many outstanding debts. There are, however, several construction projects going on at the university, including, for example, a project to build premises for the Geography Department of the College of Letters.

4) The students lost hope for a quick completion of the mosque. They decided, therefore, to collect donations to complete components of the mosque, such as walls and water facilities. They called the mosque the Al-Quds mosque. The mosque has been actually opened for prayers.

5) It is being said in student circles that there are many reasons for the failure to complete the project. Perhaps there are instructions that the project not be completed. One such reason is the fear that the mosque and cultural center would act as gathering places for the students in times of crisis. But the assistant university secretary Hasan Sha'rawi has reassured the students that when the mosque is completed, it will be separated from the University City by a wall, although it is located within the city, because the mosque will be for the public in general and not for the students only.

9254
CSO: 4802

GOVERNMENT ACCUSED OF CRACKING DOWN ON ISLAMIC CAMPS

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Aug 80 p 61

[Article: "Regarding the Abolition of Islamic Camps and the Crackdown on Those Camps."]

[Text] I was fearful that the intervention of the central security forces in Asyut to disperse a peaceful procession by the Islamic Jama'at [Groups] would mark the beginning of a crackdown on the Islamic Movement. Since then many things have happened to confirm my fears. Let us tell the story from the beginning:

1) The Islamic Groups habitually hold cultural camps for students. But as a result of directives from the president of the republic, the authorities began to obstruct the holding of such camps. The universities of al-Minufiyah, al-Mansurah and others officially permitted the holding of such camps, but later withdrew their permissions.

2) In a camp for Agriculture and Education Colleges held in al-Fayyum, the ministry of the interior received orders to prevent the establishment of the camp by force. The students left the Shakshuk mosque, which was the site of the camp, and moved to the al-Hidayah mosque. But they were evicted from there by force. In addition, visiting students were prevented from getting to the camp in the mosque. That camp had 120 students.

3) In Suez, the central security forces arrested members of a camp of students of the University of al-Minufiyah and Cairo University's Agriculture College. There were more than 200 students. They were all taken to the al-Shuhada' mosque in Suez. Earlier, the camp of Cairo University's College of Commerce was subjected to harassments, although the site of the camp is owned by the Islamic Hidayah Society in Suez, which permitted the students to set up the camp.

4) The University of al-Azhar has cancelled the Islamic camp which was scheduled to be held this summer, after it had approved it earlier. The same thing happened at Cairo University, where Dr Ibrahim Badran, president of the university, refused to permit the holding of the camp in University City in Al-Jizah, as usual. He promised the students to permit them to hold the camp at the 'Amr Ibn Al-'As mosque, but he later withdrew his promise. Finally, the camp did take place at the Salah Al-Din mosque in al-Manyal.

5) All this confirms that direct and clear instructions have been issued to all university presidents not to allow the holding of such camps and to place all kinds of obstacles in their way. Everyone, including the central security forces and the Ministry of the Interior, knows that the Islamic Groups have a basic aim behind such camps: to enable the youth to return to their original culture and their true religion. In seeking to do that, the Islamic Groups are employing legitimate means. They feel no need to provoke the security forces or the ministry of the interior, because no matter what, this is not the right path to reform.

9254
CSO: 4802

POLICE ACCUSED OF FABRICATING ALLEGED MOSLEM-CHRISTIAN UNREST

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Aug 80 pp 62-63

[Article by Muhsin Radi: "Exposing the Facts About Al-Minya"]

[Text] The Egyptian mass media played a major role in exciting and confusing the Egyptian public about some separate incidents which took place in Al-Minya. The media portrayed these ordinary incidents, which occasionally take place among the citizens of Upper Egypt, as if they represented sectarian civil strife.

A large number of citizens were arrested, but the authorities released all of them, except for 17. Eleven were members of the Islamic Jama'at [Group], and 6 were Christians. The authorities decided to imprison them as of the date of their arrest, which was 9 April 1980, on the strength of the Emergency Law.

The detainees filed grievances against their continued incarceration and hearings were arranged for May. The hearings were postponed several times, until, finally, a historic hearing was held on 14 June. The courtroom in which the hearings took place on that day was filled with people. More than 50 percent of them were secret and not so secret detectives and policemen. The al-Mahattah Square in which the court is located was ringed by soldiers wearing helmets and carrying sticks. The square was thus turned into a military fortress. There were also armed and helmeted soldiers inside the courtroom.

Members of the Bar Association attended the hearing to defend all the defendants, refute the existence of sectarian civil strife, and show that national unity in Egypt is well and safe.

When the hearing began, Salah al-Sayyid stood up to speak on his own behalf and on behalf of the dean of lawyers. He said: "We say in all honesty and candor to all those who have fabricated this false case: keep your hands off Egypt, for there is no civil strife in Egypt. Egypt's Moslems and Christians drink the water of the same Nile and share the same life, the same hopes and the same plight, O tyrants of Egypt, keep your hands off those virtuous youngmen. Would you rather have them dance, frolic and loiter in the streets? Indeed, if there is civil strife, it is one between the Moslems and Christians, on the one hand, and the police, on the other. As for sectarian strife, it is dormant, and may God's curse be on anyone who arouses it."

He was followed by Fahmi Nashid, member of the Bar Association in Cairo and an Egyptian Christian. He said: "The Bar Association in Egypt as a whole stands united to defend the cause of national unity which is supported by the masses of the Egyptian people. National unity has existed in Egypt for generations. Its roots are deep in the hearts of the people. National unity is evidenced and proved by history. So, there is no need today to speak about national unity or anything else. We demand that all the defendants be released."

'Abdullah Salim then began to plead his case. He said: "I did not come here to defend those youngmen who believe in their God. They are confident that even if the whole world sought to harm them, no harm will befall them, as long as God does not allow it. There is a dispute between the police and some members of the Isalmic Groups in the city of Al-Minya. There are many witnesses who can testify to that fact, especially Christian witnesses. For example, witness Khayri 'Atiyyah Surian (Christian) has testified in the investigation that those who attacked him did not include a single member of the Islamic Group or the bearded ones." When the prosecutor told Surian that he had stated in the police record, in the presence of Lt Muhammad Nuh of the al-Minya division, that those who attacked him belonged to one of the Islamic Group. Surian publicly said that he had never made such a claim in his statement to the police, and that his assailants did not include any of the bearded ones. He said that his relations with the bearded ones were good.

Ishaq Tanyus and Ibrahim Tadrus also testified that their assailants were not members of the Sunni Group. 'Aida 'Azmi (Christian) also completely denied that members of the Islamic Groups had attacked her or anyone else. Furthermore, a Christian monk, Salim Ilyas Shin'un, publicly stated that there has been no attack on the Jesuit monastry or any other monastry. All these and other statements thus deny that the Islamic Group have committed any assaults. We also find that most of the policemen have stated that the whole thing was nothing more than a 'brawl' involving a crowd of Moslems and Christians. However, a few police officers tried to claim that they spotted a number of persons who were claimed to be leaders of the Islamic Group in al-Minya and who were known to them. Their testimonies, however, were conflicting and contradictory.

Sayyid Hasan then concluded his statement in court by saying: "Civil strife has become a convenient excuse to threaten the people. Now and then the police brandish this excuse to intimidate people. In this case, the fabrication attempt by the police authorities is obvious, and the judges are now called upon to say what 40 million Moslems and Christians expect them to say."

Addressing the police forces, Sayyid Hasan said: "Build up Egypt with love, tolerance and friendship among the people, not by fabricating charges or employing falsehood."

Before the session adjourned, the chief judge smilingly remarked to the lawyers: "You have forgotten the most important point in this case: the leader of the Islamic Group is called brother Muhyi al-Din Ahmad 'Isa [Ahmad and 'Isa are names of the Prophet Muhammad and Jesus respectively]. Is this not a demonstration of national unity?" Everyone smiled at this light remark and the session adjourned.

9254
CSO: 4802

ISLAMIC CONFERENCE IN AL-MINYA CALLS FOR RELEASE OF PRISONERS

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Aug 80 p 60

[Article by Ahmad Al-Siyufi: "A Large Conference in al-Minya Demands Release of Remaining Prisoners"]

[Text] An Islamic conference was held in al-Minya on Friday by members of the various Islamic organizations and societies in the governorate. The participants demanded the release of the remaining members of the Islamic Jama'ah [Group] in al-Minya who are still in prison. The conference adopted the following resolutions:

1) We demand the adoption of quick measures to release the remaining imprisoned members of the Islamic Jama'ah.

2) We the Moslems of al-Minya stand united and recognize no difference between an Islamic society or a Jama'ah. We will stand behind our brethren in the Islamic Jama'ah until they are released.

3) The conference affirms that the members of the Islamic Jama'ah are Moslem youths who follow the path of God and are committed to the teachings of God's Prophet, God bless him.

4) The conference considers itself in continuous session, and may convene at any time until all our demands are met.

5) The conference rejects all the lies that have been said about the Islamic Jama'ah and calls on everyone to keep their hands and tongues off the group.

6) The conference wishes to remind all of the basic demand, namely, to speed up the application of God's law [Islam] without delay or hesitation.

The day after the conference, the Higher State Security Court ordered the release of the remaining imprisoned members of the Islamic Jama'ah. However, brother Muhyi al-Din Ahmad 'Isa, the amir of the Islamic Jama'ah in al-Minya, and three of his colleagues, are still in jail. We demand to know: Why have not all the brethren been released following the decision of the court to set them free? And in whose interest is this failure to release them?

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BRIEFS

AL-AZHAR YOUTH PUBLICATION--Al-Azhar University has decided to publish a biweekly newspaper under the name of SHABAB AL-AZHAR [Al-Azhar Youth]. The new publication's board of directors will be headed by Dr Ahmad Fathi al-Zayyat, vice president of the university. The chief editor will be Dr Ahmad Hashim, dean of the college of Islamic studies. The artistic supervisor will be Dr Ibrahim Imam, dean of the Islamic information college. The deputy editor's position will go to Ahmad 'Atif, president of the al-Azhar University students association. AL-DA'WAH welcomes SHABAB AL-AZHAR as a voice of Islam and of al-Azhar and as a new colleague in the field of Islamic information. [Text] [Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Aug 80 p 61] 9254

CSO: 4802 END

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No. 2228

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4 December 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2228

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GULF WAR REFUGEES FLOOD JORDAN

Paris LE MONDE in French 9 Oct 80 p 4

[Text] A "desert bus" (a kind of trailer on wheels pulled by a truck-tractor motor), international transport trucks, special buses chartered to evacuate foreigners. Traffic between Iraq and Jordan seems to be moving despite its density, all along the 800 kilometers of desert that have to be crossed to get from one capital to the other. But at the border, there is an indescribable traffic jam.

The presence of Ba'ath militia on the Iraqi side does not make things any easier. Armed with machine guns, ominous-looking men are supposedly helping out customs officials check those crossing the border. Very young men in camouflage uniforms decorated with very odd looking epaulettes, are particularly worked up. There is a feeling that at any moment anything might happen. Too bad for those who do not know how to move by discretely. In a bar, a European woman who has apparently undergone a customs search even more picky and stupid than usual is crying, her nerves frayed.

On the Jordanian side there is a different kind of person, a different way of life. "Socialist" spying and red tape are over with. But King Hussein's Bedouins are not ready for such an influx of refugees and very few speak any language besides Arabic. At midnight Friday the presence of a Peugeot with a French flag draped across its hood at the entrance to the kingdom was a lifesaver for mothers, harried by the trip, not knowing what to do, without their husbands, who had stayed behind in Baghdad to continue work on the worksites set aside for foreign businesses.

Standing up next to the Peugeot there is an official from the cultural service of the French Embassy in Jordan and a Lebanese who works for the Spie-Batignolles Company who are expecting 310 women and children. The two of them are particularly helpful with border formalities since they speak Arabic. Cookies and hot drinks are served.

Even once the precious visa is procured, the travelers' troubles are not over. The hotels are full and there are long waiting lists at the airport. There are additional flights, but so many of them that sometimes there is not enough fuel to fill up the gas tanks, a situation which causes considerable turbulence on the flights.

The embassy is doing its best to find lodgings--for some in a school, for others in an officers' club that the Jordanian Army is letting them use. The official from the cultural service takes our names down and the names of the reporters with us, assuring us that he will inform the embassy of our unexpected arrival. Around 0300 hours the doors actually do open for us at the French mission. A hotel room shared by four people is better than spending the rest of the night out on the street after all. The message is transmitted and measures taken for us and for the refugees.

On each of his trips out of the country, the head of state emphasizes the "very important role" which French working outside the country are playing in the rise of the French economy. There are numerous examples which show the torpor of the administration if not the indifference or inability of its representatives to help when these French need their consulate or their embassy.

This time in Jordan, as in Kuwait, where the refugees fled by way of southern Iraq, the officials at the Quai d'Orsay met the challenge. A mere flag on a car in the cold desert night at the entrance to the Hashemite kingdom--lots of English, of Germans, of Italians wished it had been theirs.

8693
CSO: 4800

ALGERIAN AIMS IN WESTERN SAHARA CONFLICT ANALYZED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 8 Oct 80 pp 1, 2

[Article by Fatima Belarbi: "How Far Can Algiers Go?"]

[Text] Since the start of Operation Ouarkziz last March our southern provinces have undergone an extensive mopping-up operation designed first of all to destroy the pockets of refuge of the mercenaries from Algiers, and secondly, to seal off the Algerian-Moroccan borders in order to prevent any infiltration by the enemy forces based at Tindouf.

The most recent communiques of the mercenaries from Algiers--which (as usual) report countless Moroccan losses--actually reflect the defeats they are suffering at the hands of the Moroccan Army, which is determined to mop up the northern region of the Moroccan Sahara completely. The third mobile El Arak group has completed the operations it had already begun, that is to say, its operations at Ouhoud and Zellaka. Its mission is to mop up the region between Tan-Tan and Tarfaya as far as Smara, a strategic point leading to the Atlantic coast. The two aforementioned operations (to be specific, only a few elements of the groups involved) are mopping up the region situated beyond Bouizakarn and Tan-Tan and extending all the way to the Algerian border. It is there that the vast Ouarkziz range of hills extends (and the broad plateau of Hamada begins), and it is also there that the mercenaries from Algiers believed they could find shelter from which to carry out harassing actions against small localities such as Akka and Tata (which are situated not far from the Oued Draa), or Zag, which the mercenaries had announced they had encircled and captured last March (at the very time we were present there).

Even if it is true that for a while--that is to say, at the outset of the conflict--the enemy (for a number of reasons) did have the initiative, the situation in the field has changed since then. The Moroccan Army has been reinforced in materiel and men (something that is absolutely indispensable in view of the immensity of the recovered Moroccan lands), has been organized, and knows equally well both the enemy terrain and tactics: it cannot be taken by surprise henceforth. It will from now on have the initiative, and the engagements that are currently taking place in the South are the result of the large-scale mopping-up operation undertaken by the Moroccan Army, which has the mission of controlling and monitoring the thousands of square kilometers involved.

To be sure, writing and speaking of the Saharan provinces is one thing and observing at first hand while traveling through the provinces is another, and it is the latter course which will mirror at their true value the courage, self-sacrifice and

gallantry of the Moroccan troops, who shrink before nothing and are ready to make the supreme sacrifice for a sacred cause: the territorial integrity of Morocco.

Five years have already elapsed since the beginning of the conflict. Some speak of an imminent peace, while others speak of a change in attitude on the part of the Algerian leadership. One thing is certain, however: Libya's definite commitment in the conflict in northwest Africa, a commitment that is on an increasingly large scale. This menacing role being played by Tripoli is far from pleasing to Algiers, which appears not only disconcerted but anxious over the long-term objectives of the Libyan president, and it is undoubtedly the main reason for the questions currently being raised as to the Algerian position.

Is the recent Algerian-Mauritanian rapprochement therefore a means of counteracting Tripoli's increasing influence in Mauritania, or is it an effort to safeguard the alliance with Nouakchott in the event of a conflict with Morocco--and in such case is Algeria prepared to declare war on Morocco? Are there today two quite distinct factions of the so-called "Polisario"--one under the aegis of Algeria and the other under that of Libya?

In these circumstances, will Algiers attempt to regain control over its "creation," or will it seize the opportunity to withdraw from the conflict, leaving Tripoli alone to struggle with the problem and to "measure swords" with Morocco?

If it is true that the problem has until now remained the same--that is to say, if it is true that the conflict is between Algeria and Morocco (and in our view the infiltrations of the mercenaries from Tindouf into Moroccan territory are proof that Algiers has not changed its attitude)--it is no less legitimate to pose another question: "If the Algerian leadership has had the best of it to date (by making a rather heavy across-the-board investment in the financial, political and diplomatic areas), is it prepared to involve its army and its people in a war for a territory to which it professes to have no claim?" We shall have the answer when the Moroccan Army is at the gates of Tindouf.

10992
CSO: 4400

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY ARABIZATION BUREAU MEETING

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 17 Oct 80 p 6

[Text] The fifth meeting of the consultative committee of the Bureau for the Coordination of Arabization in the Arab World opened in Rabat on 10 October and closed last Wednesday morning.

The closing session was presided over by Dr Abdelkrim Khalifa, who read the following recommendations:

1. Increase the number of copies printed of the magazine AL-LISAN AL ARABI (publilished by the bureau) to 507,000; expand distribution of the magazine; and strive to publish the magazine in a satisfactory manner.

2. Give priority consideration--in distributing the magazine--to public libraries, universities, and scientific and linguistic institutions.

3. Consolidate relations between instructors who are specialists in different scientific sectors, on the one hand, and scientific and linguistic institutions both inside and outside the Arab world; and organize specialized seminars.

4. Invite the Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science to carry out a survey of Arab experts (and particularly those who are in foreign countries) so as to utilize their knowledge in the areas of science and Arabization.

5. Include other modern languages in the abridged dictionaries of the Bureau, which has to date been limited to the French and English languages.

6. Consolidate contacts between the bureau and the Arabization committees in Arab countries and universities.

7. Include linguistics, sociology, anthropology, economics, information, archaeology, astronomy and the arts (notably music and design) in the plans presented by the bureau for submission to the Fifth Arabization Congress.

8. Organize two seminars to be given by Arab experts in preparation for the Fifth Arabization Congress: one concerning the preparation of abridged dictionaries covering vocational and technical subjects, and the other concerning the preparation of abridged dictionaries for use in higher education.

9. The bureau should establish contacts with the linguistic centers in Cairo, Baghdad, Damascus, Amman and Rabat--and with universities and linguistic institutes in the Arab states--with a view to keeping abreast of their decisions concerning methods used to develop scientific terminology, in order that these decisions may be communicated to all concerned sectors in preparation for the seminar on the unification of Arabic terminology.

10. Establish continuing cooperation between the bureau for the Coordination of Arabization, the Linguistic Institute of Algeria, and the Institute for Study and Research in Arabization, located in Rabat.

The administrators of these institutions are requested to submit to the Arabization congress a memorandum indicating the aspects of cooperation and complementarity, and the means of [balance of sentence illegible].

11. Create an Arabic terminology bank at the Bureau for the Coordination of Arabization; respond to the need for the bureau to contact the international terminology banks with the aim of cooperating with them in respect to publicizing Arabic terminology and drawing on their experience in this field; and strengthen the bureau through the utilization of new techniques that will enable it to carry out its activities.

10992
CSO: 4400

MOROCCAN-TUNISIAN PHOSPHATE SECTOR COORDINATION

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 9 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] Tunis, 9 October (MAP)--Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali on Wednesday received, in Tunis, Mohamed Karim El Amrani, general manager of the Moroccan Phosphates Office, and the members of the Moroccan delegation who accompanied him on his visit to Tunisia.

The meeting took place in the presence--among others--of Tunisian Minister of National Economy Abdelaziz Lasram; Mohamed Tazi, ambassador of His Majesty the King in Tunis; and high officials of the Tunisian phosphates sector.

At the conclusion of the meeting El Amrani said it had afforded an opportunity for the two parties to analyze the various aspects of Tunisian-Moroccan cooperation in the areas of extraction, treatment and marketing of phosphates.

He added that "the talks held by the two parties during the visit by the Moroccan delegation to Tunisia are a continuation of the talks which Mohamed M'Zali had held with Moroccan officials during his most recent visit to Morocco. These talks," he said, "were held within the framework of the directives of President Bourguiba and His Majesty King Hassan II, with the aim of strengthening cooperation between the two countries in building the Great Arab Maghreb--a complementary front that is independent economically and technologically as well as politically."

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CSO: 4400

REGIONAL MARITIME ISSUES DISCUSSED

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 7 Aug 80 p 12

[Article: "Gulf Ports Will Face Difficult Situation and Vast Idle Capacities as of 1980 Because of Enormous Expansion"]

[Text] In the study he presented to the fourth session of the General Conference of the Arab Chambers of Commerce which was held in Bahrain last April, Natiq Rushdi al-Sukuti, the economic expert in the [Kuwaiti] Chamber of Commerce and Industry speaks about the unions and organizations concerned with maritime cooperation in the Arab Gulf. Al-Sukuti enumerates eight organizations concerned with this cooperation.

He says: There are several authorities and organizations concerned with strengthening or coordinating Gulf maritime cooperation. Some of them are Arab and their sphere of operation and activity extends to the Arab Gulf area, others are non-Arab and a third group comprises all the Gulf countries, including Iran.

Moreover, the Arab organizations and companies specialized in the sphere of oil cooperation have also contributed to strengthening some aspects of the Gulf cooperation.

Following is a review of the eight parties concerned with Arab Gulf maritime cooperation:

1. The United Arab Maritime Company

Gulf maritime cooperation among shippers is considered one of the most successful Arab cooperation experiences because it is a union [presumably referring to United Arab Maritime Company] that enjoys planning, coordination and implementation powers, contrary to many of the Arab organizations concerned with Arab economic cooperation whose powers do not go beyond the phase of planning, coordination, exchange of information, preparation of studies and participation in conferences and seminars.

The United Arab Maritime Company is considered one of the most successful unions of Arab shippers.

There is no doubt that the pioneer role in creating the United Company belongs to the Kuwaiti Maritime Company which was (abandoned) on logical bases in the interest of Arab Gulf maritime cooperation. Creation of the company is also due to the absence of any conflict in the interests of the constituent members. These are the two main reasons behind the success of this experience.

All the Gulf governments, with the exclusion of the Sultanate of Oman, are partners in this company. Moreover, Kuwait's stock in the company is owned by both the private and the public sectors. The company is considered the biggest Middle Eastern maritime company, considering that it owns at present 62 modern ships of good specifications with a capacity of 1.4 million tons of dead load and with an annual shipping capacity exceeding 4 million tons. The company is a member in many international maritime unions and operates on several international maritime routes to the world's important ports. The company is experiencing at present some difficulties embodied in the lack of Arab maritime cadres, in the current recession in the maritime shipping market, in the sharp competition among shippers, in the inadequacy of the advertizing on the part of the company and in its not being given preferential treatment by most of the Gulf states. All this has had an impact on the company's financial position and on its potentials for expansion in reliance on its own resources.

The company, by virtue of its representing the contributions of the Gulf governments, experiences some aspects of contradiction in the shipping policy generally and this compels it to adopt at times policies and positions favoring the interests of the Gulf importer over its interests as a shipper. This is done in response to the government line in some Gulf countries--a line that often favors the interest of the government importer. This position is reflected in the maritime conferences in which the company is represented and is a position that compels the company not to coordinate with these conferences' positions that serve the shippers.

2. Arab Union of Maritime Shippers

This is one of the unions emanating from the Arab Economic Unity Council. This union was founded in 1979 and its headquarters are in Baghdad. The union's goal is to defend the Arab maritime shippers, to express views on maritime policies and legislations, to help its members form a general policy and to unite their efforts in conducting technical, economic and legal research and studies, to express its views on issues pertaining to maritime safety, to conduct studies on the possibilities of setting up Arab organizations concerned with maritime inspection, registration, financing, middlemanship, mediation, insurance, maritime agencies and to encourage the creation of an industry to (provide and resupply) ships and an industry for maritime rescue and towing. The union accepts three kinds of members: Active, associated and observer members. The union's agencies are the general assembly, the board of directors and the general secretariat.

The number of the union members reached 17 by 2 February 1980 and the majority of them (53 percent) are Arab Gulf states. It is very difficult to assess the union's work at this early stage, especially since it was founded recently. However, whoever examines carefully the union's constitution and the memorandum

"justifying" its creation--a memorandum prepared by the General Secretariat of the Arab Economic Unity Council--can notice that the union's main role does not deal with executive matters concerning the Arab maritime shipper but rather deals with the issues of planning, the exchange of information, training and coordination, participation in Arab and international conferences and the preparation of research and studies, keeping in mind that this union will find difficulty in getting highly specialized cadres to implement its goals, especially since such cadres are scarce in the Arab world at present and since it is better to channel such specializations toward developing the Arab maritime shipping companies and organizations that do engage in executive activities.

3. Gulf Ports Union

This union was formed in 1976 and its headquarters are in al-Dammam, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Its members are comprised of all the seven Arab Gulf governments. The motive behind the creation of this union was the desire of these states to develop their ports, to attain a degree of coordination in their activities and to exchange experiences, information and specializations among the ports of the member states, including cooperation to reduce overcrowding in the Gulf ports and to prepare to set up a regional union including all the Gulf ports.

The union consists of a board of directors and a general secretariat. When reading the provisions of the agreement establishing this union, it seems to the objective analyst that the main motive for the creation of this union was to deal with a transient manifestation, namely the crisis of overcrowding or of "bottlenecks" in the Gulf ports during the 1974-78 period, and the subsequent need to establish minimum coordination and meetings among the Gulf port authorities. It seems that the union focuses on goals connected with coordination, planning, exchange of information, training, participation in conferences and the convocation of seminars without having the power to draw up a visualization or a plan to develop the Gulf ports and to set up specialized ports that reduce the multiplicity in the construction of fully equipped ports in all the area's states, with the enormous waste of investments that such a multiplicity means.

Moreover, the union does not have any executive power at the level of the Gulf ports. This underlines the absence of a Gulf agency capable of coordinating the activities and policies of the Arab Gulf ports. This absence may raise the issue of the development and maritime policies of the Arab Gulf states and the degree of the preparedness and of conviction among these states on the need to establish minimum coordination in this sphere, keeping in mind that the Gulf ports will face an extremely difficult reality in the 1980's as a result of the enormous expansion in the capacity of the ports, the multiplicity in the construction of piers and the transformation in the Gulf maritime shipping technology toward containerized shipping and (roll on-roll off) ships--all of which will create vast idle capacities on the piers of these ports as of 1980.

4. Union of Arab Ports

This union was established recently and its headquarters are in al-Basrah. It is one of the unions emanating from the Arab Economic Unity Council and its goals are to realize a degree of cooperation, coordination and exchange of information

among the Arab ports. This union was founded recently and we have not acquired detailed information on its structure or any evaluation of its activities.

5. The Regional Maritime Environment Protection Organization

This Gulf organization was formed in 1978 and its headquarters are in Kuwait. It includes the seven Arab Gulf countries and Iran. The organization seeks to safeguard and develop the maritime environment and to protect it from oil pollution and pollution with other harmful substances resulting from increased maritime activity. The organization is comprised of a council which includes the member countries, a permanent secretariat and a judiciary committee to settle disputes.

It can be said that this organization can provide the minimum coordination and cooperation among the Gulf states in this sensitive sphere, namely safeguarding the Gulf maritime environment and curtailing the destructive effects of the pollution that accompanies the increase in economic activity.

6. Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries [OAPEC]

This organization's main contribution to serving the Arab Gulf maritime cooperation lies in [its] adoption of the idea of setting up the Arab Shipbuilding and Repair Company in whose capital each of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have participated. The company has a giant drydock that can accommodate ships with a load capacity of 500,000 tons. The drydock is considered ideal for repairing giant tankers but cargo ships with giant capacity can also be repaired and given maintenance in this drydock.

The organization's second activity in the sphere of maritime cooperation is embodied in its complete proposals for setting up three maritime academies in Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Qatar to supply the Arab fleets with the manpower specialized and trained at the various levels with the aim of Arabizing the crews of the Gulf ships which rely to a large degree on non-Arab manpower.

The third activity is embodied in the studies conducted by the OAPEC legal agencies on the possibility of unifying the Arab maritime legislations.

This organization can study the possibility of setting up a Gulf company specialized in refuelling ships in a manner similar to the experiment of the United Arab Maritime Company, especially since some of the Gulf countries have already set up such companies which engage in extensive activities outside their regional borders.

7. Arab League and Its Specialized Agencies

The Arab League and its specialized agencies engage in tangible activity in the sphere of Arab maritime cooperation. There is not enough space here to mention all the proposed projects, projects under study or projects under implementation. However, we will focus on some of these projects which pertain to the Arab Gulf area in particular, namely:

A proposal to set up an Arab maritime academy in Sharjah to graduate Arab maritime cadres.

The project for the Arab organization for inspecting and registering ships. This project was proposed by the Arab League Permanent Communications Committee and is currently under implementation.

This organization seeks to register, classify and inspect Arab ships to provide them with the elements of safety. Initial approval for the establishment of this organization was given at the Riyadh conference held in February 1980. Kuwait will be the headquarters of this organization. There is no doubt that providing the organization with the cadres, the elements of operation, the powers and the support will enable the Arab countries, particularly the Arab Gulf countries, to enter this vital sphere of the maritime activity.

8. Arab Gulf Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Their Unions

In the Gulf, there are not any chambers of maritime shippers and shipping representatives or of (owners of shipped goods). The chambers of commerce defend the interests of many of the parties involved in the maritime activity, with focus on importers and on defending their interests vis-a-vis the shippers, port authorities, customs authorities, banks and insurance companies, considering that the consumer's interest is tied primarily to the importer's interest in this regard. These chambers have had some commendable positions in defending the interests of the Gulf importers against the illegal practices of some shippers. This is in addition to the position that these chambers took by confronting the Lloyds Insurance Group when this group unjustifiably raised its war risks fee in the Arab Gulf area in 1979.

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BRIEFS

IRAQ, JORDAN AGREEMENT--Amman, 16 Nov (INA)--An agreement was signed here today between Iraq and Jordan to transport passengers by road. Under this agreement, regular trips will be organized between Baghdad and Amman, according to schedules to be worked out later. The agreement was signed for Iraq by Nabhan 'Abd al-Majid, director general of the Organization for Passenger Transport, and for Jordan by 'Adnan al-Mufti, director general of the Tourist Transport Company. [Text] [JN161214 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1055 GMT 16 Nov 80]

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AFGHAN INVASION CONDEMNED BY EUROPEAN LEFT

Critical View of European Left

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 8 Oct 80 p 7

[Article by Massimo L. Salvadori: "The USSR Also Has Its Vietnam as the European Left Faces the Drama of Afghanistan"]

> [Text] To carry out an effective action in defense of the struggle which the Afghan people is putting up against the invader, one break away from theoretical prattle; when the PCI [Italian Communist Party] denies the imperialist nature of Soviet aggression, it is expressing an unacceptable judgment.

1. There are two essential questions here. The first is this: what can the European Left and, in particular, the Italian Left, do for Afghanistan? The second one is: what problems does Afghanistan pose for the Left?

Quite a few parties have noted that Afghanistan is now a kind of Vietnam for the USSR. This is an analogy which is undoubtedly well-founded and which immediately suggests a line of action for the Left: support for the principle of self-determination of peoples, for the sovereignty of smaller nations, and, hence, support for the partisan forces which are fighting, regardless of their ideologies, for national liberation.

Unless, of course, the acceptance, within the Italian Left, of the analogy between Vietnam and Afghanistan is anything but discounted. The major portion of the Italian Left has not had any difficulties in feeling the duty of mobilizing in support of Vietnam against United States policy because its categories of theoretical and historical judgment induced it, so to speak, quite naturally, to define that policy as imperialist and to refer to the struggle of the Vietnamese partisans and of North Vietnam as a struggle in defense of national liberty. The United States is the strongest capitalist country of the world and the Left, due to its entire theoretical tradition, was persuaded without any problems to establish a direct relationship between the United States, capitalism, and imperialism.

I am personally convinced that it is correct to refer to Afghanistan as a Soviet Vietnam not only in the more external significance, that is to say, because the USSR is in a position as a power plunged into an operation where it must face a partisan guerrilla force of major proportions, but also in the deeper sense because the USSR is playing the role of an imperialist power in Afghanistan. The difficulty facing a large portion of the Left springs from accepting this second meaning and this in turn is derived from the theoretical position which I would call a theoretical superstition, according to which imperialism can have only a capitalist connotation.

2. In one of his recent interviews in CORRIERE DELLA SERA, Enrico Berlinguer expressed himself in terms that follow the PCI's position, in general, on the international policy of the USSR and, in particular, on the legitimacy of establishing a link between the policy of the USSR and imperialism. He asserted that Soviet policy in the international field may well be inspired by criteria of big-power policy but that this policy cannot be called imperialist because imperialism is a historical and theoretical attribute of capitalist expansion. L'UNITA a few days ago confirmed the communist position by disclosing that aspects, such as current Soviet policy in the Indochinese Peninsula, in the Horn of Africa, in Afghanistan, etc., represent individual aspects of a policy which cannot be boiled down to a worldwide hegemonic design, where the term hegemonic stands for "imperialist."

All of this implies, on the communist side, the possible condemnation, in terms of "errors," of individual aspects of Soviet policy but it also hints at a refusal to boil that possibility down to its global nature. The motive is evident: behind globality stands the problem of imperialism. From such a position it follows, in particular, that Soviet aggression in Afghanistan is condemned as an error, not as an act of aggression within the context of a strategic design of worldwide significance and of an imperialist policy.

3. At this point it is necessary to go into a brief reflections on the nature of imperialism, precisely because every individual empirical historical judgment is based on the use of general theoretical categories.

Modern imperialism is undoubtedly tied to capitalism. The latter is based on some intimately interconnected elements: (1) the push of capitalism's economic centers toward first subjugating and toward then gobbling up areas outside the country in a kind of creation of colonies or direct assimilation of territories or the creation of countries that are merely formally independent but that in reality are puppets; (2) this push, which has economic roots, has never remained purely economical, but has always set in motion the government's intervention without which the economic drive cannot by itself accomplish the qualitative jump that is imperialism. Having said this we must also observe that imperialism can have and has had also noneconomical roots.

Imperialism as a matter of fact can also have roots which first of all are ties to the strategic and military requirements of the state, in the manner

of a big power. Now, regardless of whether the imperialist dimension is viewed in terms of primarily economic motivations or whether it is understood in terms of strategic and military motivations, imperialism shapes up as a policy whose ultimate essence is the submission of certain zones and the control of their economy, their policy, and their culture by a state which exercises dominance and thus deprives those zones of their autonomy and sovereignty. The fact that the deprivation of autonomy and sovereignty comes in a more rigid form (direct assimilation) or a less rigid form (creation and maintenance of dependence or puppet states) does not mean that the substance of domination would cease to be imperialist. In this sense we can speak of ancient, modern, and contemporary imperialism, although we must consider and understand the specific differences here. Capitalist imperialism therefore is a specific, historically determined form of imperialism in general; it is not imperialism, pure and simple. It is evident that, if the essence of imperialism is the expropriation of the sovereignty of certain zones by a dominant center, then the fact that this expropriation assumes precapitalist, capitalist, or post-capitalist forms, is secondary when compared to the general nature of imperialism.

4. When the PCI takes its time in protesting that the USSR, being a non-capitalist power, can indeed pursue a big-power policy but not an imperialist policy and that therefore its individual acts of oppression against minor centers are socialist "errors" but not the expression of an imperialist policy, it is using infantile theoretical judgment categories which however are not casual because, on this level likewise, they conceal its inability to grasp the nature of Soviet socialism such as it really is. In using this language, it recognizes the individual elements of the quantity without wishing to recognize the qualitative significance of such a quantity.

I am therefore convinced that the Italian Left and not only the Italian Left--in taking effective action in depense of the struggle of Afghanistan--should come up with its own categories of judgment which would do away with the inadequacy of a prattling theory.

One does not have to be a great theoretician on geopolitics to understand the nature of Soviet strategy toward Afghanistan; this is a strategy which appears obvious only if we examine the country's geographical location, bordering on the USSR, China, Pakistan, and Iran. The USSR certainly did invade Afghanistan because it is driven by a mistaken understanding of its tasks as an internationalist power and it has misinterpreted the duties of providing aid to a backward country which seeks its own way to modernization. Control over a region which gravitates toward the Middle East, Pakistan, and China, which therefore is a strategic key position in the context of current international tensions, sufficiently by itself explains the Soviet move in sufficiently eloquent terms. It is a move which ties in with the entire Soviet policy of penetration at critical points in Western Asia, in Africa, and in Indochina.

5. Having said all this I personally do not think that the debate can be terminated by simply saying that the USSR is also an imperialist power. This, in my opinion, is as necessary as it is insufficient. In the final analysis, the problem resides in the practical conclusions to be drawn. A condemnation in terms of only the "values" of Soviet policy in Afghanistan and elsewhere would wind up leading to an abstract end also if--I want to stress--this theoretical dimension has an essential value in the political debate within the Italian and European Left since it constitutes a necessary prerequisite for its concrete policy.

It seems to me that some crucial points must be identified here:

I. The partisan struggle in Afghanistan must be supported in the sense of the principle of national sovereignty; this is a point of decisive importance for all more or less secondary countries of the world in dealing with the policy of the superpowers;

II. But we cannot overlook the fact that the defense of national sovereignty of the smaller countries is a part of the reality of world politics. Now, this reality rests on the existence of international power centers which correspond to the characteristics of past and present history and which cannot foreseeably have any possibility of being modified;

III. The smaller countries have the possibility of having their sovereignty defended in a better fashion only in a new context of international balances so as to prevent the superpowers from operating undisturbed in the pursuit of their hegemonic objectives;

IV. We are witnessing a crisis of international bipolarism which is being modified as a result of the emergence of China as an atomic power, the re-emergence of Japan, for the time being only in terms of an economic power, the new role of Europe tied above all to the initiative of West Germany and France;

V. If it is true that the crisis of bipolarism is a fact of life, then the thing that is necessary--and this is the decisive point--is to find ways of resolving it, but in a way which would enhance rather than diminish international stability. The resolution in which the Left is interested consists of the constitution of new balances between several international power centers capable of assuring a macroequilibrium of a multipolar type which precisely as such is better able to guarantee also the existence of the smaller countries;

VI. The relationship existing between the possibility of autonomy of the smaller countries in the political field and the economic dimension is clear. Now, there seems to be no doubt that the constitution of a multipolarism of major power centers makes it easier for the smaller countries to have a larger number of options in their effort to get economic support toward their development;

VII. Europe can play a decisive role in the formation of a new pluripolar macroequilibrium side by side with China. But it can play this role all the more effectively, the more strongly and extensively it establishes political and institutional links within itself, links which will permit the transition from economic integration to political and institutional integration, the basis and prerequisite for military autonomy of its own, the latter certainly being an indispensable element. In this sense, the Italian Left must act as an aware and consistently European-oriented force also for reasons of political realism;

VIII. The crisis of bipolarism can be a positive but also a negative fact. If it should grow so as to increase instability throughout the world, rather than reducing it, then two threats would take shape: the explosion of the world or an attempt by the two superpowers to proceed to a new division of the world on the basis of a rigid imposition of force relationships much vaster than the division created after World War II. Such a new division would reduce the possibility of autonomy of the smaller countries to a minimum or to zero. This is why the crisis of the old-type bipolarism must lead to a multipolarism that will not be chaotic but that instead will be stabilizing. A united Europe would have a potentially fruitful role to play along these lines. The obvious danger is that it might lose its race against time--hence the urgency of the undertaking.

I intended to underscore the fact that solidarity with the smaller countries that are threatened by imperialist conflicts cannot be a sector thing and demands a broader strategy because every part of the world is now more than ever before a component of all of the worldwide problems. I therefore departed from the issue of Afghanistan alone and expanded the debate. I hope that this expansion will emerge clearly in terms of its motivations and connections with the specific topic of relations between the Left and Afghanistan.

Barbarous Repression Scored

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 8 Oct 80 p 8

[Article by Mike Barry: "Humiliation and Annihilation--Eyewitness Reports on Barbaric Repression"]

> [Text] For the Afghan people, the Middle Ages extended to the end of 1978. Afghanistan began to get to know the modern world only 2 years ago. But it came to see the most atrocious and barbaric face of that modern world. Thanks to a Pol-Pot-style racist regime, socialism, for the people of Afghanistan, became synonymous with concentration camps. The eyewitness accounts of the victims of repression and the most bestial tortures inflicted by the regime's police are varied and dramatic; the ultimate purpose seems to be the humilitation and the annihilation

of whatever human aspects there are left in any individual. But Afghanistan is anything but isolated. It is to be hoped that its friends and supporters will become ever more numerous and that the socialists all over the world will also be included among them.

'You Prisoners Have No Rights'

They took us to the toilets but they were not real toilets; they were more like "holes in the ground," like those we have in our rural areas. We were forced to stand in line and we were not allowed to delay in taking care of our physiological needs for more than just a couple of minutes. If you were too slow, you were insulted, you were dragged out before getting dressed again and you were then beaten. They told us: "You come back the same way you went." I saw people who refused to stand in line and they were beaten. Then they locked us up again in our cells and 24 hours and sometimes even 48 hours passed before we were allowed to go to the toilet again. There was a soldier outside, more powerful than the other, and his name was Gol Agha. He would often beat the prisoners, taking their money and telling them: "I am a Khalqi. That is the way things have to be in a people's regime! In a people's regime, nobody has the right to speak! No pens or books for political prisoners! A political prisoner cannot move about freely and cannot think or understand! All of you, who are locked up inside there, are traitors!" But it was not just the soldiers who talked like that. Very often, when they happened to be passing by, the commanders also made similar remarks. "You political prisoners have no rights. Keep quiet because you do not have the right to speak! The conditions under which we are keeping you here are entirely adequate! In the other countries, political prisoners are not being treated so nicely. This is a people's regime which has been established once and for all! A communist regime! Thanks to us, this country will become prosperous! We will kill and we will bomb all those who are against us, regardless of what group they belong to!" There camp commander was a certain Saied Abdolla. I heard him say with my own ears: "Only one million Afghans must remain alive! We need only one million communists (literally, 'Khalqi'); the others are no good to us and we will rub them out." This historical saying has already made the round in Afghanistan and deserves to be quoted in the original Persian language. And then he added: "You did not come here to learn something. This is not a hotel where we serve you gourmet foods. You are not here to take a bath, to read books, and to have fun! You are here because you are enemies of the regime. You are here to be interrogated, to be debased to the rank of scum, and to be eliminated."

I did not get permission to take a bath for 2 months. Then they gave me a bucket of ice-cold water to wash up outside, in the middle of the winter. Many prisoners caught pneumonia this way. Those who were stricken with serious diseases, such as appendicitis, were taken to the hospital after several days. But they were not getting much better treatment there; they were not operated upon but they only got aspirins and vitamins. In most

cases, obviously, the seriously ill patients did not recover and many died. It was very rare for a patient to be transferred to an outside hospital to be operated upon. I personally know sick people who died in that "hospital"; three persons who suffered internal bleeding were taken to the hospital only when they were already dying. The others did not have the right to any treatment leading to recovery. "Let them live--if they can--or let them die." The fate of the sick prisoner was a matter of no concern to them. They were afraid that the prisoners might fake being sick in order to be able to recover in the hospital.

Commandant Saied Abdolla was an inhuman tyrant. I have read things about the Nazi and fascist prisons but I believe that the communist prisons are perhaps even worse.

'They Burned Homes, Trees, and the Grain'

The young mother said: "Homes and villages--they destroyed everything. What was left to us we transported on our heads, from our homeland to this point here. My father, my mother, and my brothers died during the Holy War (Jihad). They remain buried there but we do not know exactly where. People fell on the hills, under the trees, and the trees burned. They vomited their fire [napalm] upon the trees and the trees burned. I escaped all the way here. I kept inquiring around but nobody knows anything about my folks. With the help of God we escaped together, dead-tired, exhausted, starved, with just the clothes on our backs--I and the Grey-Haired-Ones (safedmouy, a title of respect given to mature and old women, just as the Afghans give men the title of Greybeards). Our people are all 6 feet under but we escaped at night with the airplanes flying overhead and the tanks behind us."

[Question] From what village do you come, Madam?

[Answer] From Sorkh-Round. We arrived a week ago. We saw the bombing raids. We escaped from the Soviets. They took the young women away and they left only some old women behind. We tried to hide under a tree but they threw gasoline at the tree which caught fire. We ran along the irrigation canals, hiding, and the tank followed us and everything caught fire. We were able to get away at night.

[Question] What had you done against the government in your village?

[Answer] We are religious people. We did nothing! We did nothing againt this government but we were tyrannized!

[Question] What did the soldiers who came to your village destroy?

[Answer] The houses! The grain!

[Answer] (From the oldest woman) The grain! Everything that had been harvested was burned! And they killed our little babies! Then they

dropped gasoline tanks on our fruit trees and all our trees burned down! They dropped gasoline tanks on them and they caught fire. They did not even allow us to bury our dead. We ran and the planes flew overhead and the tanks advanced behind us. "Tat-tat-tat-tat!" The trees were splintered and the houses were wrecked. The children—my boy is dead, those women know it! And they made prisoners! They took the children away! They took the women away! But the men, when they caught them, they would kill them right away!

(The young mother) The Russians stomped them!

[Question] Were they Afghan or Soviet soldiers?

[Answer] Soviets! Soviets! Shuravi!

[Question] Did you see them?

(Both of them together) [Answer] Yeah! Yeah! Soviets!

(The young mother) There were airplanes in the sky and tanks on the ground. The Soviets brought them in. Two widows and two men they took away from my house. They killed the men. They took their wives away and they killed their husbands.

(The oldest woman, now making reference to the incidents that took place initially in the village of Sorkh-Round; (it seems that these were arrests of people presumed to be snipers; the participation of Soviet or Afghan repression personnel in this kind of operation is not clearly indicated) they threw them into their tanks. I said: "I will go and talk to them. I will talk to the mayor (the Afghan word is Oloswal)." I talked to a woman who was with them, a political prisoner; they had all kinds of prisoners but she was young. But they took the two boys away in their tank and then they made them get off and they machinegunned them. They threw them on the ground and they emptied their rifles and submachineguns into their backs.

[Question] Who did that?

[Answer] Soviets, Soviets! At Sorkh-Round. They did not return the dead to us and I spent many a night looking for them.

(The young mother) The Soviets would come every night to take us and kill us. They smashed everything and threw everything on the ground.

(The oldest woman) We are Muslims! We speak the Word; Mohammad is the Prophet of God, Mohammad Rasoul Allah! And those people are tyranizing us! I gave three sons to the Holy War! I came here with the only little girl left to me!

[Question] So you were absolutely unable to stay in your village?

(The mother) [Answer] Absolutely not!

(The oldest woman). They took the women away! They killed the men!

[Question] Are you sure that they took them away? Did you see that with your own eyes?

[Answer] (Both of them together) Yeah! Yeah! With our own eyes!

(The young mother) The Soviets took them away! We escape in order not to suffer the same fate, in order not to be taken prisoner by the Kafers (the infidels). And then there was hunger and thirst! Death! People were made prisoner! People were killed! That is why we escaped!

(The oldest woman) Young women, young men! Their husbands were killed by the airplanes and by the tanks! The women threw themselves into the river in order not to be captured by the Soviets! They all drowned!

(Both together) We saw them with our own eyes.

(The oldest women) Too much tyranny,too much, too much. They also burned the mosques with gasoline.

(The young mother) It is like petroleum. They dropped it and it catches fire.

[Quetion] Did they drop it from the airplanes?

(The young mother) [Answer] From both--from airplanes and tanks.

(The oldest woman) They dropped something and everything became dark; we rubbed our eyes with our fingers. They would have taken us away if we had stayed there. Who can remain? There is hunger. There is nothing to eat. The houses have been burned down.

(The young mother) The Hindus of Jialalabad got some bread to us. They dared help us! (Allusion to the Hindu stores in that city; now they praised the support given not only by the Hazara Shiites but also of the tiny Hindu minority of Afghanistan.) But the Russians did not allow a single piece of bread to reach our village from Jalalabad! No salt! No tea. We only had a little bit of corn. We ate it dry. Now it is all gone. And we kept looking at the sky all the time to see whether their airplanes might not be coming over!

(The oldest woman) The old people died. The young ones they took away, to the Soviet Union. The widow you see over there cannot even talk about this because she cries; all of her little children are dead!

(The young mother) They are like the Khalqi. They came to our village, they attacked our faith, and they said: "We need the land of Afghanistan. We do not need Muslims. We will kill them. We will kill them."

"Countryside Without a Sign of Life"

I must tell you a rough story. I am talking here about what happened in Kunar. I am talking about the poor people, about the mujaheddin. But first I want to talk about what happened earlier. The population of Kunar rebelled at first against the government of Taraki (that is almost correct; resistance actually broke out in the autumn of 1978 in Nuristan, in the northern part of Kunar, but numerous inhabitants of Kunar immediately sympathized with the resistance). The people of Kunar have been fighting against Taraki, against Amin, against Babrak, and against the Russians for a year and a half now. We ran into all kinds of obstacles and difficulties. In many places, the government conducted search operations and killed groups of people here and there.

But the Russian government these days--on 26 February in the valley of Kunar--well, they came with tanks, with aircraft, with helicopters, with Migs and all kinds of modern weapons. An entire division of the Russian army. Powerful. They began early in the morning at 0630; first they bombed the countryside, the villages, the hills and the valleys. At that time everybody was still in their homes. They were living their routine lives. They killed everybody, women and children. The bombings did not spare anybody; the young ones, who were able to fight, moving from concealed places, kept fighting. They fired at the tanks and the soldiers of the Red Army. Many were killed on the spot by the Russians but many Russians were also killed. The Russian soldiers entered the houses; they were deposited on the roofs from the helicopters. There were about 200. They entered the villages and they fought in the buildings. The village inhabitants resisted in their homes. Many were killed among the Russians and among us. Also women and children. A terrible scene; I do not know how to describe it. The wounded were all over the place; women and children in tears everywhere.

Our fighting men resisted so long as they had ammunition. Then they started throwing stones and sticks against the tanks. But when they were left with nothing but their bare hands, the entire population of the valley fled. Today, many are looking for their children, their wives, their parents. Everybody has been scattered into the mountains and valleys. All of the people around here were able to escape. Everything those poor people had in their homes has been destroyed. Today they have nothing, no means of support. The bombings which came before the start of the fighting were carried out with all kinds of bombs, bit bombs, rockets, and then there was a bomb which released tremendous heat and everything around it would catch fire. From another bomb would come a stinking smoke. It gave us headaches. A stench that made us choke. A terrible pain in the legs. All of the big towns in Kunar, such as Asmar, Sigal, the little valley of Fandan, they are all in the hands of the Russians.

All of the people who lived in those places went away. Now there is nobody there. It is a countryside of death, without any signs of life; only tanks and trucks with Russian soldiers. I do not know how things are going to end in Afghanistan. I do not know what the fate of the mujaheddin will be. The Russians have no concept of human life. We lost all of our friends, all of those who were dearest to us, we were fighting together, hiding among the rocks. And now--(he hesistated and fell silent).

The people of these valleys were very poor but they had happy lives with their families and their children. Now their lives have been turned upside down and wiped out by the Russian Army. For nothing. They lost everything and now they have no place to go. They have no goals. Their life no longer has any sense. I do not understand the Russians. I do not understand those people. I do not know what they want from Afghanistan. Why are they making life so tough for us? Why are they killing those people who are fighting for their own country, for their own faith, for their own liberty?

Soviet Strategy Outlined

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 8 Oct 80 pp 9-10

[Article by Jiri Pelikan: "Objectives of Soviet Aggression--Strategy Based on Extermination and Terror"]

[Text] I would like to concentrate on an analysis of Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan as a part of current Soviet strategy and draw conclusions regarding the Western Left. I have been asked to do this also on the basis of a comparison between this intervention and the intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, bringing out the common points and the differences. I would like to say first of all that historical situations are different and can never be reproduced in a mechanical fashion; I would like to make it clear that, in this sense, there is neither a fatalism, nor the possibility of revision in political life. This comparison however appears all the more useful to me because we are once again facing the case of Poland as it must cope with a very exclusive situation which, once again, confronts the Left and public opinion as well as all democratic forces all over the world with the danger of Soviet military intervention and the dilemma is how to avoid it or, if that should not be possible, how to confront it.

These are three completely different situations: Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. But there is one common question involved here: what is the Soviet strategy toward countries of "real socialism"--in other words, countries within its sphere of influence? The albeit limited study of these cases and above all the study of the first two military interventions in 1968 and 1979-1980 can help us better understand the behavior of the Soviet leadership group and the purposes of its strategy, also because these two cases involve widely differing situations. The USSR intervenes militarily in countries under its hegemongy in two cases: when the communist party in power becomes the spokesman for the need for

change and political, economic, and structural reforms, as in the case of the Prague Spring; when the communist party in power is divided or disappears or loses control of the situation as in Hungary in 1956 or in Afghanistan today. There is no doubt that direct military intervention for the Soviet leadership group represents the last instrument suitable in such cases after attempts at regaining control, by the political forces of the national regime loyal to Moscow, have failed. But there is also another important and common aspect: the last two military interventions in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan were carried out against two countries where Soviet troops had not been stationed although they were afterwards introduced "contemporaneously" in order to stay there. This shows that the USSR, or its current leadership group, believes the presence of troops to be the most important and indispensable guarantee for real socialism and, on the contrary, looks with suspicion towards countries which claim to subscribe to socialism but reject that presence, such as Romania and Yugoslavia. As we study the way in which these two interventions were stage-managed, we will find these common points and certain procedures which are repeated.

(1) Both interventions took the form of a surprise operation, a kind of raid, which did not permit any political and military responses. In both cases, the Soviet command used motorized infantry, tanks and transport as well as combat aircraft; in Afghanistan, in addition, they made much more use of military helicopters, a weapon which the Soviet Union developed during the sixties on the basis of the American experience in Vietnam.

(2) In both cases, the minute preparation of the military operation, undertaken in utmost secrecy, was accompanied by the total absence of political preparation for the intervention, both regarding the Soviet Army and the population of the countries to be invaded. In 1968, the Soviet soldiers did not have the slightest idea where they were and why they were there; only later was the threat of a German invasion and a local counter-revolution invented for them. In both cases, the political forces—including those positively oriented toward the USSR—were taken by surprise and were placed on the defensive and the overwhelming majority of the population adopted an attitude hostile toward intervention. At Prague and in Kabul, the USSR isolated itself even more so than during the earlier invasion. Both operations had wiped out almost any possibility of democratizing the country's political leadership and created a situation in which the regime could not exist without the presence of the Red Army.

(3) In both cases, military intervention eliminated the party leaders and brought to power the representatives of the so-called "sound forces" and "the real proletarian internationalists," that is to say, pro-Soviet groups; then they employed the same stage setup: the Soviet troops entered "upon invitation of the communist leaders and the people." But while in Czechoslovakia the names of the leaders, whose supposedly called upon the Soviet Army, were never disclosed and while even today, after 12 years, none of the present leaders, who could give those names, has the courage to admit them in public, Babrak Karmal in Afghanistan, brought to Kabul

with Soviet tanks, confessed to having asked for "brotherly aid," while Amin and Taraki, who had also asked for help, as Brezhnev had said several times, cannot talk--because they are dead, killed by those whom they had asked to help them. But the important thing here is the principle that in any country, where the Soviet Army intervened, they must ready a group that will take power and will assume responsibility for having "asked for brotherly Soviet aid," in other words, legalizing the intervention in international terms in this way.

(4) Another surprising thing is the propagandistic continuity in preparing and justifying the military intervention: there is always talk of concomitance between the existence of the domestic counterrevolution and external interference by imperialism. In the Czechoslovak case, they underscored the role of West Germany and, surprisingly, of Brandt, himself, and the SPD [Social Democratic Party of Germany]--obviously in addition to the Americans who always mentioned in this connection--and in the case of Afghanistan they mentioned China.

Domestically speaking, the most dangerous enemy in the case of Czechoslovakia was "the shadow of social-democracy," while in the Afghan case it is "religious fanaticism" and "feudalism."

(5) It is also very important to analyze the application of the so-called "Brezhnev Doctrine" in both cases. In 1968, many Western observers were ready to wait for [as published; accept] the justification for Soviet military intervention and thus the validity of the Brezhnev Doctrine because Czechoslovakia was a member of the Warsaw Pact and was located in a part of Europe considered as the Soviet sphere of influence established at Yalta. I do not now wish to challenge the concept of the division of the world but I want to underscore the error of those observers, an error which was also underscored by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. For the Soviet leaders, the Brezhnev Doctrine is applicable not only to the countries of the Warsaw Pact, that is to say, the countries of Eastern Europe, but to the entire socialist community, as Brezhnev himself defined it in his speech to the Congress of the PUWP in Warsaw in 1968 and further developed by Andrey Gromyko, in his June 1968 speech to the Supreme Soviet. For the USSR, the socialist community is a very vast phenomenon and includes all countries, both European and non-European, where either the local forces by themselves or with Soviet or Cuban support created a form of power of the Soviet type with a single political monopolist party, with the nationalization of the means of production, with censorship and control over public life, with a state ideology, with the repression of any opposition and a foreign alliance with the USSR, present in the country with military bases. That country thus automatically becomes a part of the worldwide socialist community and is subjected to the same rules with which relations between Moscow and the other countries--already included and consolidated in the block--are conceived. This is why the Brezhnev Doctrine is also valid in those countries and it therefore applies not only to Afghanistan but also to Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, Vietnam, etc. It is a good idea to

recall here that the Brezhnev Doctrine should be considered valid by the Soviet leaders also for those Western countries in which--also by democratic means, completely independent of the USSR--left-wing governments might someday come to power, governments which would then attempt structural reforms with a socialist content.

The case of Afghanistan certainly introduces many new aspects. It involved an independent country with a noncommunist regime but subjected to heavy Soviet influence and with very strong economic and military links with the Soviet regime. The case of Czechoslovakia involved ideological heresy, in other words, of revisionism which could contaminate the other countries in the bloc; but that danger did not exist in the Afghan case. Nor does this apply to the Islamic revolution which certain Western observers consider dangerous to the Muslims in the Soviet republics. Afghanistan did not even involve the defense of the zone established at Yalta or a danger of German revanchism. All of this leads us to the conclusion that the case of Afghanistan involves a new phase in USSR global strategy, an expression of its expansionism toward new spheres of influence for the purpose of arriving at a new partition of Asia and the Middle East which will be more favorable to it. The permanent stay of the Soviet forces and the construction of airports and bases indicates the Soviet desire to use the positions gained in Afghanistan as a point of departure toward other countries in that region, especially Iran and Pakistan, toward the warm water of the Indian Ocean and the richest petroleum wells. With this operation, the Soviet marshals intend to attain a triple goal: bases for the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean, closer access to, if not absolute control over the oil wells, which the USSR needs in order to hold together its future production which within 15 years will not be sufficient to meet its own energy needs and those of its allies, and at the same time to influence Western Europe in this fashion which to a great extent depends on petroleum supplies from that region.

Only the future will correctly answer these assumptions for us. Perhaps the next several days will tell us how Soviet strategy seeks to exploit the conflict between Iraq and Iran. I am personally convinced that the Soviet leadership will try to get the utmost advantage out of this for itself and will then prove to be inclined toward negotiations either with the United States or with Western Europe. They will try a new Yalta, this time for the Middle East and Asia. In this context, Afghanistan could be sacrificed by the Western powers to maintain access--even controlled and unlimited--to petroleum.

My idea as expressed here also would explain the passivity and indifference of the Western countries in the case of Afghanistan. After a big flood of words of condemnation, after a proposal to the European Community regarding the neutralization of Afghanistan, a proposal never cleared up and never seriously negotiated either with the Soviets or the Islamic countries, there has been nothing but profound silence. And this is only natural; why should those countries and governments defend the right of a people who is the victim of foreign invasion and Soviet hegemonism when they did

not do anything in many other cases, especially since those same governments in the past promoted the same policy of repression and hegemonism toward many other of the weakest nations? We can only be astonished that a portion of the Left with by no means little influence granted credibility to actions such as those of French President Giscard who went to Warsaw to meet Brezhnev to cover a maneuvers involving changes in Soviet divisions, saying that this was a correct step in the right direction, in other words, that one must believe Brezhnev's intention to withdraw troops from Afghanistan if foreign influence should cease and to expand the regime of Karmal toward nationalist and religious elements. How can one believe such an assumption when Soviet military intervention itself and the country's occupation destroyed almost any possibility of national reconcilliation and blocked the political situation, as is also confirmed by the example of Czechoslovakia 12 years after invasion?

And how can one expect a political solution of which there is so much talk, both in the government and among the left, through negotiations only with the Soviet Union? It is a shame that the Italian and Western press did not give more room to the statements made by Soviet Ambassador to Paris, Stepan Chervonenko who has a unique experience behind him; was he not the man who prepared Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia and who then also guided narmalization in 1969-1971? Mr Chervonenko said in Paris on 20 May 1980, addressing the French diplomatic press association that the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan would be a gift to the United States would mean a guarantee against foreign intervention in internal affairs! Since the USSR has no intention of giving the United States any gifts, it is therefore logical that the Soviet forces should remain in Afghanistan because they protect it and all those who oppose their presence threaten Afghanistan and therefore are aggressors. It is not a coincidence that the accord on Soviet presence in Afghanistan, signed in Moscow on 10 March, employs the same phrases as the Moscow dictate of 1968 through which a temporary presence of Soviet troops was imposed on Czechoslovakia, a presence which then was transformed into a permenent presence. Mr Chervonenko invites the West to recognize the existing realities, and realistic politics is now the biggest Soviet argument at a moment when ideological arguments have disappeared, arguments in which the Soviet leaders no longer believed, just like the political solution. This means the recognition of the Karmal regime, the closing of the frontiers, and permission for the Soviet forces to stifle resistance with blood and hunger. The Left, which has always defended the principle of self-determination of peoples and which had made common cause with national liberation wars, cannot accept such a "political solution" which also signifies the recognition of the USSR militarily to intervene in its sphere of influence against a commitment on the Soviet side to allow the United States and the West to have a free hand against any attempt at changing the political status quo in the other part of the world.

This is why we consider it necessary for the Left to adopt an initiative of its own and not to confine itself to pressuring only the governments or to criticize their behavior. We saw during the war in Algeria and later

in Vietnam that the Left was able to mobilize public opinion through big united demonstrations, meetings, strikes, sit-ins in schools, fund-raising, medications and food, dispatch of delegations, etc., and we saw how this helped step up pressure both upon the French government and then upon the American government to withdraw their troops from those countries. An essential component in this battle was the armed resistance of the Algerian and the Vietnamese peoples without which peace could not have been achieved. This is true also in the case of Afghanistan. This was confirmed by the newspaper LE MONDE on 15 May 1980 when it wrote that the only possibility of getting the Soviet leaders to change their decision to remain in Afghanistan and to withdraw resides "in the capacity of the Afghans to resist the Soviets" and "in the determination of the Westerners to supply them with the means." We know today that this desire on the part of the West does not exist, in spite of the fact that the West is furnishing large quantities of weapons to various dictatorial regimes throughout the world; but there is an Afghan resistance which in this situation can put solidarity and the alliance of all left-wing forces to the test. It must be the duty of the Left to promote political, moral, and also material solidarity with the Afghan resistance. This is quite apart from the influence which the Left can exert on certain Western governments and on the European Community. The Left has its own instruments of pressure upon the USSR through its channels and contacts with the CPSU. A special role falls to the PCI as the strongest communist party in the West and as a partner of the CPSU. We must here pay tribute to everything positive which the PCI and the Spanish Communist Party have already done to oppose Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. But we must also discuss together what more we can do. For example, an appeal or an open letter from the PCI to the CPSU to stop the intervention and to withdraw the troops from Afghanistan could have a much greater effect than any diplomatic move by any Western government. Instead, there is no reference to Afghanistan in the joint announcements released by the representatives of the PCI and the CPSU and in his latest speech, Enrico Berlinguer, as Bettino Craxi recalled recently, there was no such reference either, in spite of the fact that he came out with a long list of peoples who have been victims and protagonists this year.

In talking about Afghanistan, we are not turning away from the other dramatic situations at this time, such as those of the Cambodian, Eritrean, Kurd, Palestinian, Bolivian, Chilean, as well as the people of South Korea, the homicidal atomic arms race, the economic crisis, the struggle for civil rights in the countries of real socialism and in countries with military and fascist dictatorships, which still come up here and there. The struggle of the Afghan people against Soviet occupation is a part of that universal battle which the Western Left is also fighting. We have the very special great responsibility of not leaving the initiative of supporting the struggle of the Afghan people--as the struggle of the Polish workers--to the forces of the Right. Afghanistan today is a test of strength for the Left, as Spain was in 1936 and Vietnam during the sixties. If we do not stop the hand of the aggessor in Afghanistan and if we do not show that the Left is with the Afghan people, a victim of foreign invasion, then we may in the future, perhaps in the not too distant future, be confronted with even more

dramatic acts of aggression which then can no longer be stopped with demonstrations and political solidarity actions. We all know that the next intervention, for example, in Poland, would be a deadly blow not only to the socialist idea but also to peace in Europe and throughout the world. Our solidarity with the Afghan resistance becomes a commitment which must exorcise this terrible peril.

Liberation Movement Described

Rome AVANTI! in Italian 8 Oct 80 pp 9, 10

[Article by Mohammed Habib: "Afghan People's Resistance to Invader--Authentic National Liberation Movement"]

[Text] While, on the one hand, a large segment of Western public opinion condemns our country's invasion on 27 December by an expeditionary corps of 100,000 men, it seems on the other hand often to have difficulty in exactly grasping the characteristics of the forces that face each other in Afghanistan. Some people espousing the theory of the Soviet invaders, maintain that the events of April 1978 lined up one revolutionary party against another, the PDP, the promoter of democratic reforms, and obscurantist forces hostile to change. This thesis would have us believe that Afghan resistance to Soviet occupation springs above all from feudal forces, manipulated moreover by the American CIA.

But the facts of life are quite different and the nature of Afghan resistance, with its multiplicity and its mass character, cannot be understood independently of the circumstances under which it arose.

To be sure, on the eve of the April 1978 coup d'etat, popular discontent accumulating against the monarchic regime and against that of Prince Daud --both of whom by the way were supported and armed by the USSR--was very strong. The ruling classes exploited and oppressed the popular masses. The people were angry over the lack of care and over the corruption among the leaders and the people were therefore ready to receive a reform policy favorably. Nevertheless, the 1978 coup d'etat, fomented to put in power, with active Soviet participation, the Kalq Party--made up of a small group of intellectuals without any contact with the people--did not meet with popular support. Why? To answer that question, we must go back in time.

In 1953, the king's cousin, General Daud, took over as head of government. He asked the United States to supply him with weapons but the strengthening of bonds with American imperialism ran into an obstacle: there was a big territorial dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the latter being a member of CENTO under American sponsorship. Unable to come to an agreement with the United States, Daud turned to the Soviet Union for military aid. This is why Afghanistan since the middle of the fifties has constituted a gap in the American military deployment in Asia.

In return for infrastructure projects and particularly the construction of highways and airports as well as military aid, the USSR imposed a real

grab of resources upon Afghanistan (natural gas, minerals, agricultural production).

After the invasion of last December, the exploitation of Afghanistan's natural resources was stepped up very considerably. According to a report by the TASS [Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union], dated 2 April 1980, Afghanistan this year must export to the USSR 2.5 billion cubic meters of natural gas, that is, 16 percent more than in 1979. The purchasing price was not indicated.

Starting with the first 5-year plan of 1956, Soviet "aid" thus became more important than American aid ($150.3 million as against $82 million). As in many other countries of the Third World, Soviet "aid" in Afghanistan encouraged the creation of a state capitalism sector which serves as bridgehead for Soviet penetration.

At the beginning of the seventies, there appeared two contradictory but interconnected movements. On the one hand, the USSR, involved in growing rivalry with American imperialism entered an offensive phase in its international policy. After the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the events in East Pakistan in 1971 were highly revealing for the peoples of the region. With its traditional structure and its policy of nonalignment, Afghanistan--in spite of Soviet economic domination--was no longer in line with the ambitions of the new policy of the USSR in the region. On the other hand, we saw a strengthening of the pro-Western faction within the regime which tried to get closer to the Shah of Persia and to achieve a reconciliation with Pakistan. The result was the first pro-Soviet coup d'etat of 1973 which put Daud in power; he was the former prime minister and the architect of the rapprochement, with the USSR and the "Parcham" Party which was in the pay of the USSR and which is currently in power.

During the Daud regime, the USSR strengthened its rule over Afghanistan. Trade with the USSR accounted for 80 percent of the foreign trade volume and more than half of the industrial sector was controlled by the USSR. But although Daud further opened the country to the USSR in the economic and military sectors, he still refused to aline himself purely and simply with the expansionist views of the USSR in the region. Daud's reconciliation with Pakistan promoted the policy of the USSR in dealing with the separatist movements in Pakistan, in the Northwest Province, and above all in Baluchistan and for an outlet into the Indian Ocean. The renewed strengthening of the pro-Western faction of the regime starting in 1977 and the exclusion of the pro-Soviet "Parcham" Party from the government among other things persuaded the USSR to organize the sinister and bloody coup d'etat of 27 April 1978.

Following this coup d'etat, the USSR installed the dictatorial and antipopular puppet regime of Taraki-Karmal-Amin in order further to facilitate its control over Afghanistan. Under the cover of economic reforms, this regime launched a policy aimed at destroying the social and cultural structures of the Afghan people and smashing any attempts at national resistance against USSR rule.

I will not come back here to the brutal and ferocious repression to which the Afghan people has been subjected and the means of destruction used by the Soviets starting in April 1978. Afghan fellow citizens and foreign friends have testified to these crimes. I will only say that among the hundreds of thousands of martyrs, the best sons of our country, true revolutionaries who spent a large part of their lives in the prisons of King Zahir Shah, and then in those of Prince Daud, also included the patriots killed by Taraki after having been tortured by Soviet advisers.

These were the facts of life even before the open invasion by the USSR in December 1979 which made it even clearer in the eyes of our people that the regime's policy is also a policy of subservience to the foreigner, in this particular case, to the Soviet Union.

Thus, the local and often spontaneous resistance, which kept springing up in Afghanistan for the past 2 years in this part of the front in response to the arbitrary actions and fascist brutality of the regime, without any need for any orders coming from parties installed in Pakistan, went hand in hand with the development of the determination for national resistance against foreign rule, a determination which took hold among all population strata.

This desire for independence does not go back just to the entry of the Soviet troops into Afghanistan. Afghanistan--which was and remains one of the world's poorest countries--like all of the countries of the Third World--found itself facing the exploitation and domination maneuvers of imperialism and the big powers. In the past, the ruling classes had always served foreign interests and had often repressed and exploited the people. There is therefore nothing extraordinary if, within the current Afghan resistance, we find forces that already fought against the reactionary regimes of King Zahir Shah and Prince Daud. This is true for example of numerous revolutionary organizations that sprang from a grand movement of Marxist-Leninist inspiration, such as the "Eternal Flame," founded during the early sixties. This is also true of numerous democratic, nationalist, and progressive organizations, such as "Melat," "Afghan Melat," "Setami-Mili," etc., or Islamic political organizations such as "Hezbi-islami," "Jamati-islami," or the Movement of Shiite Militant Muslims.

One of these revolutionary organizations that sprang from the "Eternal Flame," the "Revolutionary Group of the Peoples of Afghanistan," is also a member of a united Islamic Front, "the Front of Mujahed Fighters" of Afghanistan founded in 1979 and made up of numerous progressive Islamic organizations. It is this front which is behind the revolt of the officers and soldiers of the garrison at Bala-Hesar in August in 1979 in Kabul, known for their progressive views. For the Front of Fighting Men, as indicated in Article 2 of their political platform, the fundamental objective of the resistance is to put an end to the rule of the Soviets and all forms of imperialism on the military, political, economic, and cultural level and to work toward the founding of an Islamic Afghanistan independent of the superpowers.

The Front's political program especially emphasizes equality among national and religious minorities, equal rights for men and women, and the struggle against feudalism and any other form of exploitation in the rural areas.

Among the fronts active internally, the two most important ones are: the Front of Nuristan and the Front of Hazaradjat.

The Front of Nuristan, in the country's northeast, is the first armed front of the Afghan resistance. In October 1978, the fighting men of Nuristan, under the leadership of their commander-in-chief Mohammed Anwar Amin, completely liberated Nuristan.

The Front of Hazaradjat is in a rather special situation. It consists of a large portion of members of the Hazarat minority, traditionally one of the most oppressed of Afghanistan. The region involved is in the center of the country and is quite far away from Pakistan and Iran. Hazaradjat is subjected to economic blockade and is surrounded by the Soviet troops who try to strangle it and reduce it by means of starvation. Some reports coming from Afghanistan indicate that the Hazarat fighting men managed to break out of the encirclement at several points, especially at Bamiyan and Gazni, but the threat still persists.

The armed and popular struggle began in the spring of 1979 in the country's south at Behssud and in the north at Yakalang. After 10 months of fighting, the Hazarats liberated 34 distrincts and two provincial capitals with a population of 3 million inhabitants and they have more than 70,000 fighting men. In the north of Hazaradjat they established contact with the Uzbek and Turkoman fighters; in the east they made contact with the Tagiki fighters and in the south, at Wardak and Gazni, with the Pacham fighters.

In September 1979, the various Hazarat groups got together and founded the "Revolutionary Council of Islamic Unity." The objective of the Hazarat Front, as explained by Nasseri, one of the Hazarat leaders, is "to overthrow the puppet government in the pay of the Soviet Union and to create a real Islamic government in which independence, liberty, and social justice will be guaranteed to all peoples of Afghanistan."

The fronts of Hazaradjat and Nuristan, like many other fronts at home, do not depend on any party or political organization and are military, political fronts with their administrations in the liberated zones.

We must also mention the "United National Front" which consists of revolutionary and nationalist organizations and which is particularly active in Kabul and north of Kabul. It is known that one of the leaders of that front, Majid Kalakany, a great revolutionary and popular man, was sentenced to death by the authorities in Kabul in June 1980.

The reference to Islam has a profound meaning for the Afghan national resistance. To get the proper idea of the role and importance of Islam, the religion of 99 percent of the Afghan population, one must take the following three elements into consideration.

1. Islam is profoundly rooted among the people. To a great extent, the culture and popular traditions of the Afghan people are many thousands of years old and are influenced by Islam. Islam has been and remains the factor of identity and unity of the Afghan people amid its diversity.

2. Ever since it came to Afghanistan, Islam always played a mobilizing role in resistance against foreign invaders. During the 19th century, during the three wars of independence against the English, religious personalities, such as the Mullah MoshR Alam, played a decisive role in mobilizing the people and leading them to victory. The British colonialists tried to use Islam to divide the people. But the religious leaders, who collaborated with the enemy of the people and the fatherland, were rejected by the people who called them "Mlahi Kazeb" (phony clergymen).

3. Islam played an important role in the fight against oppression and exploitation by the ruling classes. Today, once again, in a big national war for independence and liberty, progressive and militant Islam symbolizes and leads the struggle of the people.

It must be emphasized that, in their presentation of the facts, the Western media often fail to cover aspects of Afghan national resistance which are fundamental, such as the fact that it is rooted inside the country, as well as its largely popular and anti imperialist character.

The political program and the documents prepared by the various parties and organizations of the resistance indicate that the Afghan people rejects not only Soviet rule but any other imperialist rule, no matter from where it may come. This explains the hostility of the resistance to the "neutralization" of Afghanistan proposed by Western European countries. This plan as a matter of fact provides for giving Afghanistan the status of a neutral and nonalined country although Afghanistan was one of the countries that helped found the nonalined movement and in that capacity attended the Bandung Conference in 1955. The European "neutralization" plan would tend toward the creation of a regime which would maintain Soviet influence and domination in Afghanistan but, in return, the USSR would have to give assurance not to create any further threat to Western interests in the region.

As for the Karmal-Brezhnev plan, it calls for a "neutralization" of Afghanistan, guaranteed by the USSR and the United States. This plan has but one objective: to legalize the regime of Karmal, a regime which not only does not respond to the aspirations of the people but which does not even have any real existence. Any attempt in that direction will run counter to the rights of the Afghan people to fashion its own destiny and will encourage USSR intervention and aggression in our region and in the world.

Right now, the situation is still characterized by the intensity of fighting and by the broad range of means of destruction employed by the Soviet troops.

In the beginning of September, the Soviets launched a big offensive in the Panjchir Valley, about 100 kilometers north of Kabul, employing a big force. Their objective was to occupy this valley which is a bastion of the resistance and which is of vital importance to the resistance inside the country. The valley of Panjchir, several scores of kilometers long, rising to an altitude of more than 5,000 meters (the Hindukush massive) is close to the strategic road linking Kabul to the Soviet frontier and permits contact between the fighting men of Hazaradjat, in the center, and the fighters of Badakshan, in the north, close to the Soviet border, as well as those of free Nuristan, in the east of the country, close to the Pakistani border. The Soviet occupation of Panjchir would worsen the situation of the fighting men inside the country this winter.

Afghan resistance today more than ever before needs the political support of the free peoples. If the fighting men in the regions of the north and the south are not resupplied with food and medication before the winter, they will be facing an extremely difficult situation.

All democratic forces which are aware of the drama of the Afghan people and which support the right of the oppressed people to determine their destiny must understand that the only decisive force, which can drive the invaders from Afghanistan, is the Afghan resistance. The political and organizational unity of the resistance undoubtedly has not yet been achieved and the forces constituting it do not always have clear and well-defined programs. Some of them do not have a very firm position toward certain imperialist countries or regarding the former reactionary regime. But that should not make us forget that the active forces which resist Soviet invasion are real and proper anti-imperialist and progressive forces and that unity among the political forces and the military fronts as well as solidarity among the various nationalities and tribes throughout the country did develop authoritatively.

The Afghan resistance has the character of an authentic national liberation movement. With the courage and their sacrifice for the just and noble cause of the liberation of the country, the Afghan patriots are making a great contribution to the cause of justice and peace all over the world. This is why we are asking all anti-imperialist, democratic, and progressive forces that love peace and justice not to remain silent in the face of the genocide of the Afghan people.

We hope that the European democratic forces and especially the participants in this conference will actively contribute to the creation of solidarity committees capable of furnishing the Afghan resistance the political and material support which it needs.

At the cost of the blood of its 17 million inhabitants, our people will fight until victory and will not allow itself to be reduced to slavery.

I repeat the slogan of the Mudjahed fighting men's front:

"Neither American imperialism, nor Russian imperialism, nor any imperialism of any other foreign powers! For an independent, free, and modern Afghanistan."

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PAKISTAN ATTITUDE TO AFGHAN REBELS EXAMINED

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[Article by Ivan Denes: "The Afghan People Against the Soviets; On the Subject of Reports on Afghanistan"]

[Text] The events which have shaken up the very foundations of real socialism in Poland since July and which have triggered a process which could in no case be considered as completed threatened to divert the attention of the free world from the ever greater tragedy experienced by the Afghan people. Yet, shunting aside Afghanistan as a political problem would be a fatal error: That country remains the first geographic area outside the empire defined in Yalta in which the Soviet army is directly involved in a military confrontation which has already lasted over 10 months and which has not brought it a decisive victory!

On the other hand, the influx of refugees into Pakistan, fleeing the Soviet military machine in Afghanistan, has increased rather than abated. The rigors of the eminent winter in the high mountains would not make survival any easier than the horrible heat of last summer during which in the camps surrounding Peshawar alone hundreds of children died for lack of water...

It is for this reason that reports on Afghanistan aimed at the free world are of decisive importance, bearing in mind the notoriously misleading information policy of the Soviets and of the vassal Babrak Karmal regime in Kaboul. The Afghan mudjahidins--a term constantly mistranslated as "fighters for freedom" even though a mudjahidin is a fighter for "Jihad" or holy war for the prophet, can rely only on the spontaneity, the love of danger and the courage of a few Western journalists for their disinterested and far from adequately supported struggle to have the publicity so deserved.

Consequently, the purpose of the present article is not to report on the fights in Afghanistan but to present the exclusive tale of an eye witness on reporting possibilities, written by Ivan Denes for Voxmundi.

In its Urdu broadcasts, Radio Moscow frequently attacks the "center of international espionage" in Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan's "Northwest Frontier Province." Even the Khyber Intercontinental Hotel is frequently mentioned in Moscow's broadcasts.

Today the Khyber International, an old tourist hotel, has a rather neglected and dilapidated air: Ever since Prime Minister Daoud was overthrown and assassinated in Kaboul by the pro-Soviet Nur Taraki and that in Afghanistan only 80 kilometers away, the situation resembles a civil war, including the initial massive exodus toward Pakistan, the flow of tourists in the direction of Peshawar has virtually dried out. Conversely, the entry of the Red Army into Afghanistan, at Christmas in 1979, has filled the Khyber Intercontinental with a swarm of constantly rotating foreign journalists. There are at least three reasons for this:

- The other hotels in the city are unacceptable to travelers accustomed to Western comfort;

- All important Afghan resistance organizations have their headquarters--official or clandestine--in Peshawar. The leaders of the Islamic fanatics, the monarchists, the liberals and even the Maoists have settled there, protected by the ferocious-looking and heavily-armed troops. This is one of the reasons for the displeasure of the city's population, for the Pakistanis, who have an obsession for weapons, have been deprived of the right to own or bear arms inside the city, whereas the mudjahidins, with their Kalashnikovs and their Lee Enfields freely move around in their rack-equipped trucks;

- Over a distance of several hundred kilometers, from the Province of Chitral to the north--which, so far, has been largely spared by the fighting--to Katawaz to the south, the Afghan border could be crossed, clandestinely, naturally, only by starting from Peshawar, for it would be inconceivable to cross the border without the active help of one of the resistance organizations which have their headquarters precisely in Peshawar.

Resistance organizations or Afghan political parties frequently hold press conferences in the lobby or the conference rooms of the Khyber International, in the course of which relations among parties and organizations and the formation of cabals and the ever present machinations are far more frequently discussed than specific military actions.

Information which, in fact, originates in Peshawar is frequently datelined New Delhi, out of consideration for the touchiness and fears of the Pakistani authorities, and are purported to have been provided by "travelers" or "generally well-informed diplomats in the Indian capital;" news, however, is also spread through "leaks" and information deliberately disseminated by the Pakistani secret services and, partially, probably also thanks to "confidential behind-the-scene talks" betwee. journalists and the leaders or press officers of the resistance organizations who, in turn, receive their information by courriers arriving daily or, occasionally, even hourly from the theater of operations. However, considering the fact that within Afghanistan the couriers can reach the border only by foot, information on the various military activities frequently reaches Peshawar several weeks late.

It is obvious that such conversations could not be considered "confidential." The Afghan resistance organizations have been extensively penetrated by the Pakistani secret services. This could not have been difficult, considering the overlapping of families, lines of descendants and tribes typical of the border area. It is no great secret that the entire personnel of the Khyber Intercontinental is ruled by the secret services: returning from Afghanistan, covered in dust, wearing a wide turban, dressed in Pakistani clothes, unshaven and exhausted and, driven by the torrid heat one enters shakily the presently air-conditioned front hall of the hotel, the doorman asks most naturally, "What news do you bring, sir, from thereover?" Later on, in the elevator, the elevator operator would offer a hashish cigarette to the exhausted reporter with the same candor and spontaneity.

The rest is picked up by concealed microphones. In all likelihood, they are not disconnected even when a practicing Muslim pays a visit to a Western journalist in his room to have a drink of whiskey or a beer and freely criticize the Soviet invasion of a neighboring country, when he speaks out against the Afghan refugees compared to a swarm of locusts who have triggered a dizzying spiral in food prices and rentals, against smuggling and the drug traffic which no amount of fighting could hinder, against censorship or against the dictatorial measures adopted by Pakistan's President Zia-ul-Haq.

In Pakistan the population and the bureaucracy are opposing ever more openly any aid to Afghanistan except, naturally, for anything from which they could profit from Western aid. Zia-ul-Haq and the army cadres are the only one to realize that should Afghan resistance crumble it would be the turn of Pakistan with its fragile structure as a state, whatever the method used may be: open attack, intervention following a "request for help," or subversion.

In general, the Pakistani authorities maintain an ambiguous attitude on the Afghan question. As an Islamic country, naturally, Pakistan is on the side of the resistance. However, the fear of the Soviets, the Indians, and left wing subversion is deeply rooted in the minds of the authorities. It is above all the fear of leftist subversion that makes them give a hard time to the Afghans. They are well aware of the fact that a high percentage of goods unloaded for the Afghans at the port of Karachi or at an airport, whether aid to refugees or shipments of weapons for the resistance, consists of stolen merchandise which will be sold on the black market. In the marketplace of Jalalabad, the Afghan provincial capital, one may find powdered milk and soybean flour which Western governments and aid organizations had shipped to Pakistani refugees. There even is an organization which buys Moskovskaya vodka in Europe which it then resells to the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. The classical smuggling route through the Khyber Pass remains open and is used for absolutely incredible ventures. At the Peshawar Market one could, surreptitiously, naturally, look over Kalashnikovs with Arabic lettering, coming from Egypt.

Because of the fear of such dark and uncontrollable channels--they could, indeed, easily lead to left wing clandestine organizations--arms shipments are handled very cautiously as the Pakistanis try to restrict them.

As to reports, the Pakistani attitude is equally ambiguous. They obviously know that whenever a Western journalist requests a visa, listing his profession and his desire to visit Peshawar as well, it means that he would like to cross into Afghanistan.

To reach Afghanistan, he must begin by crossing what is known as the "tribal territories." This is a frontier area between 20 and 100 kilometers wide, where there is no law and where the Pakistani police no longer controls or handles. A written permit issued by the Pakistani authorities is necessary in order to be allowed to pass through the numerous police, militia or army control posts, before reaching the "tribal territories." In principle, in order to obtain such an authorization one must apply to the Ministry of Interior in Islamabad, the capital. Sometimes, however, it could also be acquired in Peshawar, providing, actually, to have shown one's "gratitude" in accordance with oriental customs.

Western journalists are very rarely issued such documents, after a great deal of effort, for it is assumed that they use the "tribal territories" only as a trampoline for entering Afghanistan, avoiding or deceiving the last frontier army posts. The scenario is always the same should one express the wish to visit Parachinar or Maram Schah, which are cities close to the border and where the various resistance organizations have their advanced basis: The journalist would ask to visit refugee camps and the authorities would suggest to him dozens of refugee camps outside the "tribal territories." Nevertheless, should the journalist succeed in obtaining a permit, he would be escorted by an official who would "accompany" him and whose traveling and living expenses he must pay. Before being able to cross the border with the mudjahidins, disguised as a mudjahidin himself, he must "shed" this official, either with fantastic adventures or at a price.

The purpose of such strict control is not only to safeguard the appearances of Pakistan's "noninterference" but also to see to it that nothing happens to the Western journalists. Otherwise, the attention of the entire international press would be drawn to the situation which prevails in that country, rather doubtful from the viewpoint of international law.

The guides assigned by the resistance organizations to accompany the journalists in their travels in the Afghan mountains also receive very strict instructions on how to look after the journalists and keep they away from fights. Thus, some colleagues follow their guide in the mountains for weeks without hearing a single shot. This was recently the case with a correspondent of the London SUNDAY TIMES who then had the gall to write in his newspaper that the fights were the pure invention of the journalists, that there was no more fighting in Afghanistan and that the resistance was limiced to a "minor rural guerrilla."

I personally saw in Pahtia Province, near Katzkai Village, the destruction of two tanks followed by a violent Soviet helicopter attack. To accomplish this, however, I first had to convince my guide, Engineer Mirwais Wardak, 26, to take me to a real fighting area.

Occasionally, some journalists would use doubtful methods. Thus, a colleague writing for the local newspaper KHYBER MAIL reports having witnessed the following

scene: In the summer, a crew of one of the three big American television networks had shown up in Peshawar with the intention of making a film in Afghanistan. The same day, for the first time, the Telex transmitted information on the new strategic road built by the Soviets from the northern frontier to the Iranian border, passing by Kaboul and Herat. Following this, the crew looked for a road under construction in the Pakistani mountains and staged the entire catchingly entitled, "Afghans Reduced to Slavery for Building a Strategic Road." Actually, between Peshawar and Herat there is at least 1,000 kilometers of hard and difficult to cross mountain paths, not to speak of the mortal danger....

Mirwais Wardak described to me his own experiences as well: A group of French journalists had combed the mountains with a fine-toothed comb without seeing any military action. They then managed to talk a malakh--in addition to verbal arguments one could easily imagine the type of other arguments used--to mount an attack against an armored Soviet patrol (the malakhs, the heads of families, are the true leaders of the Afghan resistance. They are the local commanders and the strength or weakness of a resistance organization or of a party depends on the number of malakhs which the head of the organization would succeed in winning over throughout the country). Some 200 mudjahidins took part in the attack and 14 were killed. The journalists were thus able to film, photograph and write. Yet, is this still journalism?

The most authentic and the most honest information center in Peshawar is at the bar of the Khyber Intercontinental: Muslims are not admitted; night after night, the journalists are among their own. Experiences and news are exchanged with unaccustomed frankness in contrast with the situation at other meeting places. When someone returns from "there," in general after days of walking and unbearable thirst, it is here that he will have his first bottle of beer and will start talking....

In that bar I saw one of the new Kalashnikov high-velocity bullets--the first to have been found, which Soviet paratroopers have begun to use in the Kunar Valley. A Japanese press photographer had brought it. It was there also that I saw for the first time fragments of a bomb shaped as a plastic toy which the Soviets cast on villages and roads. It was brought by the correspondent of a noted Swedish conservative newspaper.

The fact is that despite all the difficulties and the circuitous methods used by some colleagues, the feeling which prevails here is that of a common duty. An entire people has risen against foreign occupation and domination and it is our duty to make the world pay attention to the fate of these people and to see to it that this awareness is kept alive.

Solidarity and esprit de corps still remain among some Western journalists.

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CSO: 4900

BRITISH-ALGERIAN RELATIONS ANALYZED ON OCCASION OF QUEEN'S VISIT

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24-25 Oct 80 p 1

[Article: "British-Algerian Relations: A New and Fruitful Development"]

[Text] Algiers (APS) -- Queen Elizabeth II of England will be making an official visit to Algeria starting from today. Although she reigns without exercising any governmental power, her official visits take on a political character and bear witness to the importance Great Britain places on its relations with the countries which are visited.

The journey Elizabeth II is currently making in the Maghreb countries is following up her tour in the Mashraq (more particularly in the Gulf countries) in 1979. That shows the importance the Arab world is taking on for Great Britain. This revival of interest dates from the accession to power of the conservatives and Mrs Thatcher, an accession marked by the return of Great Britain to world affairs which had been somewhat neglected by the Labor government.

Mrs Thatcher has apparently set herself the task of stepping back into the international arena and reaffirming the traditionally important role played by Great Britain in the world.

In this regard, Algeria takes on particular importance: its role in the Third World and in the non-aligned movement, its independent policy, and its political and economic stability make it a sought-after and highly regarded partner and spokesman. The talks the Algerian minister of foreign affairs had at the time of his official visit to London last June are proof of this since very wide-ranging exchanges of views on the whole fabric of international problems took place on that occasion between the head of the Algerian diplomatic service and his British counterpart Lord Carrington.

The dialogue instituted at the political level can only give rise to a strengthening of bilateral relations at all levels, especially in the economic and cultural areas.

In the economic area, especially trade, Great Britain is Algeria's sixth-ranking partner with a overall trade volume of 115 billion centimes [as published] (after the United States, the FRG, France, Italy and Spain).

For nearly a year now these relations have been conditioned by the stay in Algiers of the British deputy minister for trade Mr Parkinson in February 1979, besides the visit of the Algerian foreign affairs minister to London, and as well by a mutual desire to improve these relations qualitatively as much as quantitatively.

In this regard the British economy harbors a certain interest in the sizeable Algerian market whose growth is affirmed by the projections of the Five-Year Plan. Some of the signs, among so many others, of this British interest are Mr Parkinson's visit and the establishment within the COMET (Committee for Middle East Trade: Organization for economic cooperation with the Middle East) of an Algerian subcommittee tasked with promoting commercial exchanges with Algeria.

Looking at it from another angle, Great Britain, by virtue of its status as an economic power of a high order, is responding to the desire of Algeria to keep diversifying its foreign trade further, particularly in purchases of durable goods and in the acquisition of technologies necessary to its development.

It should be noted that out of the concern to give concrete form to this mutual desire COMET is organizing for next November in London a seminar bringing together economic-commercial officials of both countries as well as representatives of the major British industrial concerns.

In the cultural area relations between the two countries, taking them at their current level, are felt to be insufficient compared to the existing potential. As an indication let us mention that in the year 1979-1980 some 1,312 students and trainees, for the most part post-graduate students, were being trained in Great Britain. Since a cultural agreement between the two countries is in the process of being negotiated, it is more than likely that the desire to see the volume and level of cultural exchange grow will take concrete form. With the visit of the queen of England, the relations between Algeria and England, which go back a long time as the treaties signed in the 17th and 18th centuries are evidence, will see a new and fruitful development. As a symbol of continuity in government-to-government relations, Her Majesty the Queen will in the course of her stay be presenting President Chadli Bendjedid facsimiles of treaties the first of which goes back to 1662.

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PRESIDENT MEETS WITH CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 3-4 Oct 80 p 1

[Article : "The President of the Republic addressing officers of the Committees and Departments of the Central Committee: /The Conduct of the Vanguard Militant must be Exemplary at Work and in Daily Life/--Keep the Grass-roots Militant Informed on All Questions that Concern the Country"]

[Text] Algiers (APS)--President Chadli Bendjedid, president of the Republic, secretary general of the Party of the National Liberation Front, presided Thursday morning at the office of the Presidency of the Republic over a meeting of the committee and department heads of the Central Committee, in accordance with Article 25 of the by-laws of the Central Committee.

In the course of this meeting, which lasted 3 hours, the officer of the permanent secretariat of the Central Committee presented a report on the Party's activities. Also an examination in the light of experience with Party structures was conducted of the implementation texts governing the attributions of the committees and departments, as well as their activities, in conformity with the basic statute of the Party and with the by-laws of the Party and the Central Committee.

Also examined was the organization of elections for the offices of the mouhafadhate [governorate] which will be held beginning the second week of October.

Following a debate on some questions dealing with party structure, harmony and complementarity in Party organizations and executive agencies, the President of the Republic, secretary general of the Party play its role rully in all its different domains.

"The National Liberation Front which guided the liberation struggle assumes today the mission of carrying forward our people's march toward building a socialist society. The slogan "The Leading Party" [Le Parti dirigeant"] must not be a slogan devoid of authentic and efficacious content," he stressed in substance.

The Chief of State, speaking at length of militancy within the Parti, said in this connection that "militancy is a commitment and not an obligation and it is not possible to be neutral vis-a-vis the Revolution. One is either for it or against it. There is no room for the spectator or the wair-and-see person. It behooves us to open the doors to the young, convinced elements so they may assume their responsibilities and be the guarantors of the Revolution's continuity," he underscored.

The President of the Republic insisted moreover on the need to keep the grass-roots militants informed on all questions that concern the country, particularly on the impact of decisions taken at government level.

The Chief of State then gave out organizational directives concerning the activity of Party structures, stressing the need to avoid an inflation of the structures. "The effectiveness of the Party," he said in this connection, "resides in the minutiae of the structures and in the accomplishment by each one of them of its responsibilities as much at the level of the center as of the base. It resides equally in the exercise of its role in all the domains of national activity, particularly in the awareness, drive and control as well as in the fight against the social scourges, by seeing to it that the conduct of the militant, who owes it to himself to be in the avant-garde, shall be exemplary at work and in daily life."

After bringing up some questions of national interest, the President of the Republic at the conlcusion of the meeting reviewed the international situation in a general way. In this connection the Chief of State gave out precise directives on certain problems in which he had to specify Algeria's position with respect to them, among which were international and regional political questions as well as ones of economic character, such as the North-South dialogue and energy.

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CHADLI ADDRESSES WORKERS' REPRESENTATIVES

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 1 Oct 80 p 1

[Article: "President Chadli to Worker's Representatives: "We Must Make Known to the People in All Frankness What Can be Achieved"; passages printed between slantlines appeared in boldface]

> [Text] /Algeria's option is based on a national experience which preserves its authenticity, bound to its own values and open to every universal experience./

Algiers (APS) [Algerian Press Service]--President Chadli Bendjedid, President of the Republic, secretary general of the Party of the National Liberation Front, yesterday morning received the members of the National Secretariat of the General Union of Algerian Workers at the office of the Presidency of the Republic.

Present at the meeting were the members of the Central Committee, Messrs Mohamed Cherif Messaadia, officer in charge of the permanent secretariat of the Central Committee, Mouloud Oumeziane, Minister of Labor and Vocational Professional Training, Mohamed Djeghaba, President of the General Organizing Committee, and Mohieddine Animour, adviser to the Presidency of the Republic.

At the start of the proceedings Mr Abdellah Demene Debbih, member of the Central Committee, Secretary General of the Union, gave an account of a certain number of questions that concern the world of labor, as well as problems being encountered in this sector. Workers' representatives were to have their opportunity to voice their views on the questions addressed.

The leadership of the UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers] expressed satisfaction with the successes achieved by the practice of dialogue, especially with regard to participation by representatives of mass organizations at meetings of executive authorities on occasions where questions of vital interest for the nation were being examined.

Following the presentations made to him, the president of the republic, secretary general of the party stressed the fact that the leadership draws strength from its faith in the principles of the Revolution, from the trust and support of the fundamental powers of the Revolution and the people.

Recalling the worker's Constitution, the President of the Republic made the following statement; /"The fundamental line is that wages must correspond with the effort delivered. Transitory measures must conform with the principles of the Statute, so there will be no more contradictions in the future."

The President of the Republic further insisted on the need to avoid making promises only to give satisfaction, without taking into account beforehand the means by which they can be redeemed. In connection with this the Chief of State emphasized the following: /"We must not make promises or commitments if we are not sure we can keep them or carry them out. Besides, we must make known to our people in all frankness what things are possible of achievement, and to specify the time needed to implement an action that has been decided."/

The President of the Republic insisted on the duty of keeping the grass-roots militant thoroughly informed on the principal problems and events. /"This is one of the objective conditions that make it possible for the FLN Party to fulfill its vanguard role."/

After reviewing the various stages of the Revolution, the President of the Republic stated that the strength of the Revolution lies in the fact that it is popular and that no one can pretend or arrogate to himself a right of guardianship over it.

/"Algerian ideology is the option of our people, based on a national experience, which preserves its authenticity, feels pride in its history, is bound to its Arab-Islamic values, as well as being open to all universal experiences," was the substance of what he said.

The President of the Republic was to accentuate the importance of trade union action in defending the gains of the Revolution, emphasizing that trade union activity in Socialist Algeria does not identify itself in its practices with unions in capitalist states where the workers are in one camp and the "bosses" are in the opposing one. The strength of the trade union lies in its faithful representation of the workers who constitute, side by side with the other forces of the Revolution, a portion of the government authority.

Following some remarks regarding certain rumors spreading about at one time or another, the Secretary General of the Party was to say: /"We are very well aware of the path we are to follow and of our obligations towards the Fatherland and the Revolution. No one will succeed in provoking us or fixing our attention on marginal problems. It is obvious that the chief source of these rumors is to be found among those who have been condemned by the people and the militants for their unsavory practices, and who are convinced that the hour has struck to settle accounts. That is why they try to sow confusion, hoping that in that way their appearance before the people's justice will be delayed."/

The President of the Republic affirmed the importance of the mission of all the social forces of the Revolution, while underscoring that the mass organizations are the seedbed of the Party of the vanguard and its popular extension.

After reviewing the outlook for the new society the country is building, the President of the Republic pointed out that the cultural Revolution must not become confined within a narrow concept. On the contrary, it must be extended in the widest

sense with an eye to fostering the feeling of pride for the national history, the consolidation of moral values and revolutionary principles, so that the new society will be built on healthy foundations of which the new man will be the cornerstone.

After addressing certain problems of an international and regional character, the President concluded his orientation address by accentuating the imperative of conjugation and coordination of efforts, the deepening of the dialogue and of the exercise of responsible democracy within an organizational framework.

He also noted with satisfaction the commitment and unrestrained support expressed to him by the officers of the UGTA, commitment and support that take the form of daily deeds for the consolidation and defense of the gains of the Revolution.

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MILITARY ENGINEERS ASSIST IN EL-ASNAM DISASTER

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 19 Oct 80 p 2

[Article: "The Military Engineers Move Into Action"]

> [Text] El Asnam (APS) -- Since Tuesday the units of Military Engineers have been carrying out the second phase of their operations in the El Asnam disaster area. Reestablishing lines of communication, building access roads and roads for traffic and detours and connecting roads, is being carried out at the same time living conditions are being improved in the countryside in general and in the camps of disaster victims in particular. These two tasks are being carried out by about a thousand men who took part Saturday, Sunday and Monday in emergency assistance efforts in El Asnam city.

The Military Engineers, who are combining the resources of the ANP [People's National Army] and national service, coordinate as well those of state enterprises which have hurried their equipment into the stricken areas, in particular those of SNS [National Steel Company], SONATRACH, SONAREM [National Mine Prospecting and Exploitation Company], SONACOME [National Mechnical Engineering Company], SN-METAL [National Metal Construction Company] and SONELEC [National Company for the Manufacture and Installation of Electrical and Electronic Equipment] whose equipment and organization in the field are remarkable.

If the watchword was speed during the first hours of the drama, since Tuesday it has been a time for rigorous planning, organization and assiduous work. Rush jobs are kept for units for whom that is their only mission, because that kind of work requires preliminary survey each time and, a certain amount of time and the necessary resources. The bulk of the units of the Military Engineers, made up of elements from the first, second and seventh Military Regions, is devoted in its entirety to carrying out the second phase of the Intervention Plan. The coordination of assistance activities, especially in the areas of civilian and military infrastructure, has been allowing activities to speed up in the last 5 days, because, as far as the engineer corps command is concerned, the impending rain, the cold settling in and the precarious living conditions are just so many things spurring them on to keep the stricken populations protected from any additional risks.

Camp after camp, without a break, the engineer corps' soldiers sent in turns into El-Asnam by civil defense services are setting up a complete system of resources and services (drinking water, access and sanitation) to provide for the needs of the affected populations in ordered fashion. Each day the military command of the engineer corps makes an up-date of the situation thanks to the activity reports supplied by all the officials of civilian and military units. These reports, in condensed form, permit the staff headquarters of the stricken area to adjust the pace of projects and to set the next objectives. At the present time, the military engineer corps is increasing its efforts to clear the rubble from the urban zone. The disorder and haste which have resulted from the need to act very quickly the first 2 days have been replaced by an iron discipline. No more truck drivers are dumping rubble just anywhere and no more vehicles are parking on access roads or in access areas. The complete demolition of buildings destroyed by the earthquake and the transportation of materials is being carried out methodically and with precision.

Two logistical bases set up outside El-Asnam are able to respond at any time and in very short order to any request for men or vehicles. Covered with dust and staggering with fatigue and lack of sleep, the civilian and military officials in charge of all the engineer corps activities are continuing to carry out this second phase before starting on the third working phase of the assistance plan.

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CSO: 4400

G -PETROLEUM PARITY GAINS GROUND

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 16 Oct 80 p 6

[Article: "The Principle of Gas-Petroleum Parity Gains Ground"]

[Text] Algiers (APS) -- The principle of parity of the price of natural gas with that of petroleum is becoming increasingly accepted by consumer countries some of which are also producers.

The acceptance of this principle is not solely a matter of rightful demands by producer countries but within consumer countries themselves there are increasing numbers of voices raised advocating the application of this principle which is starting to actually govern natural gas trade on the world market.

The alignment of the price of natural gas with that of petroleum is now becoming necessary, given the importance that natural gas has on the world energy market, along with its characteristics and availability.

Going over the arguments for the principle of parity of the price of natural gas with that of petroleum, the recently issued financial bulletin of the Tambert bank of Brussels makes the observation that "one thing emerges which is certain: future demand for natural gas can only be satisfied if there are considerable price increases; this is indispensable for the expansion of international trade in this source of energy."

The bulletin writes, "For the years ahead, on the one hand we must expect natural gas prices to be more closely aligned with those of petroleum and on the other hand we must expect supplies to come increasingly from faraway sources and to be subject to political vicissitudes," and it emphasizes that "the period of cheap abundant natural gas thus seems to be long past."

In addition, some countries are giving the alignment principle actual concrete form.

In deliveries of Indonesian natural gas to Japan, the Indonesian company Pertamina, which for several months has been demanding parity of natural gas pricing with that of petroleum, seems to be bringing Japan around to accepting the principle, which according to Indonesia ought to bring the natural gas price into line with f.o.b. cost of higher-quality petroleum. This is reported in the petroleum industry bulletin of 10 October.

According to this principle the price of natural gas would therefore exceed the $5 per million BTU currently paid and would make it more costly than a comparable fuel extracted from petroleum; the new formula would be implemented towards the end of the year or at the beginning of next year.

Indonesia this year is exporting 8.4 million tons of liquefied natural gas in return for 3 billion dollars.

In Europe the Netherlands at the beginning of this month concluded an important agreement on applying the principle of parity of the price of natural gas with that of petroleum, an agreement vis-a-vis all its European Community partners and to be applied in two stages. In the first stage the Netherlands are raising the price of the natural gas they deliver to four European countries (the FRG, Belgium, France and Italy) by bringing it in line with the price of heavy diesel applicable as of last 1 July.

In the second stage the Netherlands anticipates the revision of past contracts between the Dutch producing company and its European customers so as to tie the price of Dutch natural gas closer to that of petroleum products.

Holland supplies its European neighbors with 46 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually.

Finally, regarding Algeria, which for its part has for over half a year been demanding that the principle of aligning the price of natural gas to that of petroleum be applied in setting the price of its natural gas: while engaging in negotiations with its trading partners, particularly French and American ones, Algeria has put forward concrete and realistic proposals by defining its position clearly on many occasions.

According to a recent statement of the director of planning in the Ministry of Energy and Petrochemical Industries, the application of parity, which principle is generally accepted throughout the world, must be progressively implemented to take into account the interests of sellers as well as buyers. However, in spite of Algeria's being disposed to really stand firm in its intention to arrive at a final settlement of the matter of revising the price of natural gas founded on new, strong and durable basis there is much beating around the bush on the part of our partners which is difficult to explain and which also defers negotiations to a later date at every turn.

On this subject let us point out that SONATRACH and the French company EDF [French Electric Company] have agreed to meet again at the end of October in Paris for a second round.

The first round, which took place in Algiers, allowed the two parties to draw their points of view closer together to some extent.

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MEETING OF MASS ORGANIZATIONS' NATIONAL SECRETARIATS

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 23 Oct 80 p 1

[Article: "Preparation of a Work Program for 1981"]

[Text] Algiers (APS) -- Yesterday morning at the Zirout Youcef Palace, Mr Mohamed Cherif Messaadia, member of the Central Committee and an official of the Central Committee's permanent secretariat, presided over the meeting of the Mass Organizations' National Secretariats with the head of the department of Mass Organizations, the head of the organization department, the chairman of the committee on general organization, and the secretaries general of the mass organizations present.

The agenda of this meeting included infusing mass organizations with dynamism at the grass roots level, coordinating the activities of mass organizations in national and international frameworks, how the results of the actions and activities of mass organizations in 1980 have evolved, the preparation of a work program for 1981, and the creation of a coordination and liaison committee including members from the different mass organizations with a view to coordinating activity with the national committee set up following the El-Asnam earthquake.

On this occasion the permanent secretariat official asserted the need to strengthen the contacts of mass organization officials with the grass roots with a view to studying problems the latter is faced with, to try to resolve them, and to mobilize the grass roots to get the struggle for development and for building and construction underway.

The permanent secretariat official urged the mass organization members to strengthen and coordinate their actions and efforts to face up to the problems faced by the masses in their daily life and also to abandon meaningless slogans and give each catchphrase the sense it really has in practice.

9631
CSO: [illegible]00

EXILES PLEDGE SUPPORT FOR NEW SHAH

Nicosia THE CYPRUS WEEKLY in English 7-13 Nov 80 p 7

[Text]

Paris--In an unprecedented gathering, about 300 Iranian exiles met in a forest on the city's western edge last week to announce their recognition of Reza Pahlavi as the Shah of Iran.

Reza, the eldest son of the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, proclaimed himself Shah from his exile in Cairo last Friday on his 20th birthday.

The Paris gathering, which was held in a reception room in the Bois de Boulogne, marked the first time various monarchist exile group in the city officially staged a joint meeting.

The exiles and others at the reception preferred their identities not be published for fear that it could hurt relatives still living in Iran.

Beneath an Iranian flag and a large colour photograph of Reza, the exiles listened to speeches, sang the Iranian national anthem and composed a telegram to Reza announcing their support in his efforts to fulfill his father's death-bed wish that he restore the Pahlavi dynasty.

"We must fight together to save our country" one of the speakers told the group. "The new Shah is our symbol of unity".

Police guards were posted outside the reception room, but there were no disturbances.

Among the exiles attending the meeting was Princess Azadeh Shafik, a niece of the late Shah and Reza's cousin.

Azadeh, whose brother was assassinated by an unidentified gunman in Paris last December, publishes a newsletter in Paris called Iran Libre (Free Iran) and is considered one of the leading figures in the monarchist movement.

Insurrections

She recently told the Associated Press that support for Reza has been growing since his father's death and that he now receives about 300 letters a week from Iranians beseeching him to become their leader.

Monarchist sources among Paris' 5,000 Iranian exiles contend their supporters in Iran will stage an insurrection with military backing before the end of the year.

CSO: 4920

IRAQI SPOKESMAN ON CALL-UP OF AGED FOR SERVICE

LD181029 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 14 Nov 80 p 2

[Text] London--An official spokesman for the Iraqi Embassy in London has affirmed that the Iraqi forces are in an excellent position and that Iraq so far has not thrown all its manpower resources into the war with Iran.

Commenting on press reports misinterpreting the call-up of Iraqi citizens over the age of 65 as an indication of Iraq's need for fighters in its war with Iran, the spokesman explained that the call-up was in response to insistence by thousands of citizens in this age group who personally contacted President Saddam Husayn by letter and cable and who, because of their age, are neither subject to military service nor members of the People's Army. It is to be noted that the statement concerning their call-up was not issued by the Armed Forces General Command, but signed by the Iraqi president himself.

The spokesman asserted that so far Iraq has not declared a general alert and has not called up its armed forces reserves. Also, the number of fighters from the People's Army who have taken part in the battle so far does not exceed 20,000 men out of the Iraqi People's Army total of 300,000.

Referring to reports about the existence of some Arab forces fighting with the Iraqi Army, the spokesman denied the existence of such participation in the fighting in any form or extent. He said: "We are clarifying this for the sake of truth and history, although Iraq is proud of the Arab brothers' national stand and their readiness to participate in the national battle.

The spokesman described the report by London's NOW magazine about the existence of Egyptian forces in Iraq as a fabrication by a Zionist magazine, and part of the Zionist campaign by Zionist quarters to belittle and detract from the importance of the Iraqi victory, which is frightening the Zionist entity which is now mobilizing its media for a campaign of distortion against Iraq.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

DRAINAGE PIPE ORDER--A British company, Glynwed Factories, has won a contract to provide the Iraqi government with £6.3 million ($15.1 million) worth of cast iron drainage pipes and connections. A spokesman said that the firm beat off competition from producers in India, China and East European countries to secure the order, which follows another, worth about $6 million from Iraq in April. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Nov 80 p 9]

CSO: 4820

MINISTER COMMENTS ON REAGAN'S WISH TO SEE KING HUSAYN

LD190832 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0715 GMT 19 Nov 80

[Text] Kuwait, 19 Nov--Jordan's Foreign Minister Marwan al-Qasim today welcomed the wish of the American President-elect Ronald Reagan to meet with King Husayn, and described it as a positive initiative.

However, in an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper AL-SIYASAH, Minister Al-Qasim said that Jordan will not abandon its policy which made it boycott the Middle East peace talks taking place between Egypt and Israel under America's auspices.

Al-Qasim was replying to the wish expressed by the new American president to meet with the Jordanian monarch at the earliest possible opportunity.

Reagan believes, according to his election [campaign] statements and the views of foreign policy advisers, that Jordan has a special role in the peace moves for finding a solution to the Palestinian question.

The Jordanian minister said about Reagan's wish that "it is a positive initiative; however, we stress that Jordan has talked and continues to talk to the world from a firm and clear foundation based on the necessity to uphold right [words indistinct] with a state which is serious according to the principles it believes would be proper bases for a just and comprehensive solution to the conflict in the region."

The minister recounted the principles by saying that they are Israel's withdrawal from all territories it occupied in the war of 1967; the return of Arab Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty; and insuring the rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination under the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

Replying to other questions the minister reiterated Jordan's support for Kuwait in the wake of the incident in which one of its border posts along its northern border with Iraq was exposed to Iranian raids last week. He condemned Iran, accusing it of committing aggression against Kuwait and also against Iraq. He said: "Jordan quickly took up its natural and pan-Arab stand on the side of sister Kuwait in the same spirit which made it side with sister Iraq in its war with Iran, regardless of the consequences."

Minister Al-Qasim said that Jordan had hoped that Iran [words indistinct] its relations with the Arab world on the basis of mutual respect and the principles called for by the true Islamic spirit."

CSO: 4802

ANNUAL BUDGET PUBLISHED FOR FISCAL YEAR 1980-81

Kuwait AL-KUWAYT AL-YAWM [OFFICIAL GAZETTE] in Arabic 10 Aug 80 pp 1-3

[Article: "Decree on Law No 60 of 1980 Concerning Budget of Government Ministries and Departments for Fiscal Year 1980-81"]

[Text] After perusing the ruler's decree issued on 29 August 1976 amending the constitution,

Articles 142 and 144 of the constitution,

Law No 25 of 1974 on reorganizing the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development,

Law No 106 of 1976 concerning the reserve for the future generations,

Law No 31 of 1978 on the rules for preparing the general budgets and for supervising their implementation and the final accounts,

On the recommendation of the minister of finance,

And with the approval of the Council of Ministers,

We have issued the following law:

Article One

The revenues of the budget of the government ministries and departments is estimated at 4,640,227,000 dinars in accordance with chart A appended to this law.

Article Two

A sum of 928,045,400 dinars of the aforementioned revenues shall be appropriated for the reserve for the future generations in accordance with chart A appended to this law.

Article Three

The expenditures of the government ministries and departments budget are estimated at 2,925,000,000 dinars divided among the chapters listed in chart B appended to this law.

Article Four

A. A sum of 737,181,600 dinars of the aforementioned revenues shall be appropriated to be added to the state's general reserve funds.

B. A sum of 50 million dinars of the aforementioned revenues shall be allocated to meet the increase in the capital of the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development in accordance with the aforementioned law No 25 of 1974.

Article Five

The grade of a civil servant in the service shall be transferred from the category of non-Kuwaiti to the category of Kuwaiti immediately upon his acquisition of Kuwaiti citizenship.

The Civil Service Bureau shall be empowered to amend a number of jobs in each grade according to citizenship.

Article Six

The presence of an appropriation for a certain purpose in the assessment charts for the expenditures of each ministry or department does not absolve the ministries and the departments of observing with utmost care the laws, regulations, decrees and instructions in force insofar as the use of such an appropriation is concerned.

Article Seven

The ministers, each within his jurisdiction, shall implement this law which shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall go into effect as of 1 July 1980.

Amir of Kuwait Jabir al-Ahmad	Chairman of Council of Ministers Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Sabah	Minister of Finance 'Abd-al-Rahman Salim al-'Atiqi

Issued at al-Sayf Palace on 2 August 1980.

Estimates of Revenues of Government Ministries and Departments for Fiscal Year 1980-81

Chapter	Category		Fiscal Year 1980-81 Detailed	Fiscal Year 1980-81 Total	Estimates for Fiscal Year 1979-80	Revenues Collected in Fiscal Year 1978-79
1		Sale of crude oil, gas and refined derivatives		4,313,383,000		
	1	Crude oil	4,125,509,000		2,604,571,000	2,575,384,867
	2	Gas	187,874,000		68,994,000	55,435,148
	3	Refined derivatives			347,395,000	307,873,788
2		Taxes on net income and profits		137,650,000		
	1	Revenue tax from oil companies	136,900,000		74,243,000	78,677,581
	2	Income tax from other sources	750,000		500,000	707,931
3		Property taxes		4,000,000		
	1	Property transfer taxes	4,000,000		3,000,000	3,814,749
4.		Taxes and fees for goods and services		43,477,000		
	1	Concession fees from oil companies	43,173,000		25,334,000	18,707,270
	2	Registration and record fees	304,000		193,000	254,274
5		Taxes and fees on commerce and international transactions		47,370,000		
	1	Customs taxes and fees	47,370,000		41,200,000	46,310,660
6				81,021,050		
	1	Security and justice services	3,705,000		3,404,000	3,602,492
	2	Educational and cultural services	3,144,100		2,589,600	2,765,381
	3	Health services	300,000		230,000	205,462
	4	Housing and utility services	9,791,490		3,045,150	1,971,080
	5	Electricity and water services	23,550,000		19,598,000	18,346,076
	6	Transport and communication services	37,779,460		33,308,800	38,543,638
	7	Revenues from revenue stamps	2,000,000		3,000,000	2,765,607
	8	Other services	751,000		525,100	2,313,117
7		Miscellaneous revenues and fees		8,675,300		
	1	Revenues and fees	8,675,300		6,759,350	123,402,580
8		Capital revenues		4,650,650		
	1	Sale of land and real estate	46,500,650		3,433,000	4,384,155
		Grand Total	4,640,227,000	4,640,227,000	3,241,323,000	3,285,465,856

Distribution of Estimated Revenues

	Fiscal Year 1980-81 Sum	Fiscal Year 1980-81 Percentage	Fiscal Year 1979-80 Sum	Fiscal Year 1979-80 Percentage
Reserve for future generations				
A. Law No 106 of 1976	464,022,700	10.	324,133,000	10.
B. Additional sum	464,022,700	10.		
Increase in capital of Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development	50,000,000	1.08	50,000,000	1.54
General State Reserve Funds	737,181,600	15.89	617,190,000	19.04
Appropriations for Expenditures of Government Ministries and Departments	2,925,000,000	63.03	2,250,000,000	69.42
Grand Total	4,640,227,000	100.0	3,241,323,000	

Chart B. Appropriations for Expenditures of Government Ministries and Departments in Fiscal Year 1980-8

Section		Branch	Expenditure Chapters in Fiscal Year 1980-81: Wages	Public Expenditures	Construction Projects and Public Expenditures	Unclassified Expenditures and Remittance Payments	Total	Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1979-80	Expenditures in Fiscal Year 1979-80
1		Appropriations for Head of State				8,000,000	8,000,000	8,000,000	8,000,000
2		Amir's Office	1,933,000	515,000		450,000	2,898,000	1,694,000	996,246
3		Accounting Bureau	1,000,000	125,000			1,125,000	1,012,000	782,135
4	1	Council of Ministers	3,160,000	1,777,000		50,000	4,987,000	4,079,000	2,396,394
	2	Religious Interpretation and Legislation Department	946,000	310,000			1,256,000	851,000	510,400
5		Ministry of Planning	3,500,000	4,060,000		6,500,000	14,060,000	13,183,000	3,762,930
6	1	Civil Service Bureau	1,750,000	249,000		8,000,000	9,999,000	8,513,000	3,150,833
	2	Complementary Appropriations	10,980,000				10,980,000	8,580,000	6,021,965
	3	Second Complementary Appropriations	10,000,000				10,000,000		
7		Ministry of Foreign Affairs	6,200,000	7,881,000	11,111,450	2,837,000	28,029,450	13,533,000	8,357,467
8	1	Ministry of Finance-General Administration	6,100,000	24,632,000	200,000,000	1,620,000	232,352,000	22,700,000	16,120,117
	2	Ministry of Finance-General Accounts				1,059,226,400	1,059,226,400	1,482,444,100	1,192,074,488
	3	Customs Department	12,200,000	600,000			12,800,000	17,351,000	17,652,083
9		Ministry of Oil	2,280,000	825,000		11,520,000	14,625,000	13,910,000	1,963,054
10		Ministry of Commerce and Industry	2,940,000	849,000		31,680,000	35,469,000	19,825,000	2,161,453
11	1	Ministry of Defense	6,100,000	99,000		135,000,000	141,199,000	110,073,500	89,918,746
	2	National Guard	7,020,000	441,000		90,000	7,551,000	6,291,000	4,035,220

[Chart B--Continued]

12	Ministry of Interior	66,100,000	13,350,000		896,000	80,346,000	71,107,000	50,301,419
13	Ministry of Justice	6,400,000	1,536,000			7,936,000	7,243,000	4,678,978
14	Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs	5,350,000	2,320,000		269,000	7,939,000	7,050,000	4,871,228
15	Ministry of Education	150,800,000	31,000,000		2,250,000	184,050,000	165,420,000	122,622,581
16	Ministry of Information	15,470,000	9,000,000	2,000,000	989,000	27,459,000	22,209,000	16,616,596
17	Ministry of Health	74,100,000	42,000,000		11,570,000	127,570,000	97,500,000	62,302,823
18	Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor	11,500,000	3,300,000		16,600,000	31,400,000	27,562,000	20,316,860
19	Ministry of Housing	920,000	400,000			1,320,000	1,261,000	1,055,047
20 1	Ministry of Electricity and Water	25,300,000	10,100,000	190,000,000		225,400,000	32,400,000	24,582,679
2	Electricity and Water Distillation Plants	7,750,000	11,500,000		300,000,000	319,250,000	17,425,000	12,329,919
21 1	Ministry of Communication-Telegraph and Telephone	23,500,000	3,090,000	30,990,000		57,580,000	21,732,000	15,112,930
2	Post	4,270,000	1,270,000			5,540,000	5,001,000	3,454,395
3	Civil Aviation	4,650,000	2,800,000	2,438,500		9,888,500	6,376,000	4,599,274
22	Ministry of Public Works	28,250,000	13,250,000	183,941,000	300,000	225,741,000	38,700,000	27,591,429
	Complementary Appropriation*			25,000,000		25,000,000		
	Sums Expected Not To Be Spent	1,469,000	2,279,500	1,480,950	847,400	6,076,850	3,687,100	
	Grand Total	499,000,000	185,000,000	644,000,000	1,597,000,000	2,925,000,000	2,250,000,000	1,728,339,673

*To be distributed during the year with the knowledge of the Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Finance.

CSO: 4802
8494

PETROLEUM TRANSPORT COMPANY ISSUES ANNUAL REPORT

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 10 Aug 80 p 12

[Article: "Annual Report of Arab Maritime Oil Transport Company; Operation at Fleet's Full Capacity, Squeeze in Expenditures and Improvement in Maritime Transport Revenues Reduced Losses"]

[Text] A report by the board of directors of the Arab Maritime Oil Transport Company, included in the company's general annual report, has said that the company's fleet, comprised of eight units, continued to operate at full capacity throughout the year and that most of this fleet is on lease contracts for certain periods of time. Moreover, two liquefied gas ships (al-Barri and al-Bada') have joined this fleet. The first joined the fleet in the first half of the year and the second joined it at the end of the year.

The board of directors' report also says that there was relative improvement in the maritime shipping rates in the second half of the year and that this raised the company's revenues.

Despite the increased work load, the number of workers in the company has not risen beyond the number existing at the end of last year. Meanwhile, the company has continued to fill the vacancies with specialized Arab cadres and to develop the workers and provide them with effective training so that they may be familiar with the various aspects of development in the international maritime industry. This is in addition to the participation of some of the workers in specialized international maritime conferences and seminars to gain more knowledge with the aim of adopting the best methods for operating tankers.

The report also says that a system of control over the stores [al-makhzun] has been drawn up and implemented. Moreover, the system of storage followup and control has been implemented at the information center of the main office. The system of purchase followup has also been put into operation. Additionally, work is underway to formulate and implement a system for maintenance of the tankers and to design, formulate and examine the programs of the wages system tried in the last 5 months of last year. It is hoped that the manual system will be discarded finally at the beginning of next year.

The report adds that as in the past year, the company continues to exert pressure on some of the administrative expenditure. As a result of the improvement in maritime shipping revenues at the end of this year, of the reparations paid by a number of the shareholders in accordance with the OAPEC Ministerial Council decision taken at the end of last year and as a result of the company's participation with other Arab hydrocarbons shipping companies to form a group in the international insurance market, the company's losses have been reduced and its financial position has been somewhat improved.

8494
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

CONTAINERIZED SHIPPING PLANS--A specialized British publication reported yesterday that Kuwaiti and Malaysian commercial enterprises have agreed on setting up a joint containerized shipping company. The publication, (LLOYDS LIST), said that the company, owned by the Kuwaiti Balasim General Trade Company and the state-owned Malaysian International Shipping Company, will begin its operations with three ships later this month. The publication has also said that the company will operate its ships on a route from the Gulf to Japan and then to the United States and a return route to Kuwait via Australia. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 7 Aug 80 p 13] 8494

CONTROLS ON ARAB CORRESPONDENTS--Arab journalists will not be allowed to work in Kuwait before acquiring an advance permit from the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information. This measure will go into effect at the beginning of next year. The Kuwaiti Ministry of Information has asked the local papers to supply it with the names of all the journalists working in them. [Text] [Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 23 Aug 80 p 11] 8494

CSO: 4802

FRENCH VIEW OF TUNISIAN-FRENCH RELATIONS ON EVE OF BARRE VISIT TO TUNISIA

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 7 Oct 80 p 4

[Article: "AFP and Mr Barre's Forthcoming Visit to Tunisia--Fair Weather for Paris-Tunis Relations"]

[Text] Commenting on the forthcoming visit of Mr Raymond Barre to Tunisia. AFP writes the following:

French Prime Minister Raymond's visit to Tunisia at the end of October takes on a special importance, Tunis being the headquarters of the League of Arab States, an active member of the Islamic Conference, the Organization of African Unity and the nonaligned nations.

The secretaries General of the first two organizations are incidentally Tunisians. They are Messrs Chedi Klibi for the Arab League and Habib Chatty for the Islamic Conference.

The fact is that Tunisia plays an important role in the hottest pressure points of the world, namely the war between Iraq and Iran, the Soviet incursion in Afghanistan, and the Near East crisis, and a power such as France must out of necessity take this into account.

Moreover, relations between Paris and Tunis are cordial.

In fact a "convergence of policies" and a "similarity of positions" were noted in connection with the major problems addressed during the last visit to Tunisia, at the beginning of September, by the French Foreign Minister, Mr Jean-François-Poncet, which should facilitate political cooperation to grow closer year by year.

In regard to economic relations, the world economic situation is a difficult one, as both parties recognized. It does not permit ambitious commitments.

Tunisia, however, has sent out an appeal to France and its European supporters "for reexamination of the protectionist and safeguarding measures adopted by the EEC." measures which according to Tunis are in contravention with the 1976 Agreement between Tunisia and the European Economic Community.

Tunisia also desires to be henceforth "associated with negotiations with candidates for the enlargement" of the EEC.

Observers believe that these political and economic problems will be examined in their broad strokes by Mr Barre and his Tunisian opposite number, Mr Mohamed Mzali.

2750
CSO: 4400

BOURGUIBA ASSURES PALESTINIANS OF FRENCH BACKING

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 5 Oct 80 p 1

[Report on discussion between Mohamed Mzali and Farouk Kaddoumi; date not given]

[Text] New York--Prime minister, Mohamed Mzali, entertained Friday afternoon Mr Farouk Kaddoumi, chief of the Political Department of the PLO at his New York residence.

The Palestinian leader following the interview informed the TAP [Tunis-Africa Press Agency] that the conversations had been "fruitful" and "enabled us to discuss the most recent developments of the situation in the Middle East, and particularly to bring up the regrettable war between our Iraqi and Iranian brothers."

He went on to say "Mr Prime Minister gave us an account of the gains achieved by the Supreme Fighter, President Habib Bourguiba for the benefit of the Palestinian cause during his stay in Paris and the support he was promised on France's part."

The interview addressed among other things strengthening the aid for the just struggle of the Palestinian people as well as the repeated attacks by Iaraeli Zionist forces on South Lebanon and the need for the Arab countries to take steps in the very near future to put a stop to these aggressions, Mr Kaddoumi concluded.

Mr Hassan Belkhoja, foreign minister, was present at the interview.

2750
CSO: 4400

INCREASED FRENCH AID TO TUNISIA REPORTED

Moalla, Monory Head Session

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 26 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] An integrated study for the development of Southern Tunisia.
France plans to increase its public-sector aid to Tunisia.
Toward settlement of the issue of French accounts frozen in Tunisia.

Minister of Finance and Plan Mansour Moalla had a private talk with French Minister of Economy Rene Monory yesterday morning in the former's office before jointly presiding over a Franco-Tunisian working session devoted to the examination of ways and means of promoting economic and financial cooperation between the two countries.

As Mr Monory indicated at the end of this working session, in connection with it the two parties specified the ways and means of establishing a Franco-Tunisian financial institute which will be called on to participate in development projects and which could be extended to include Arab partners.

The French minister of economy indicated that both Tunisians and French have agreed to jointly engage in an integrated study for the purpose of developing Southwestern and Southern Tunisia.

Regarding the next Tunisian development plan, which he described as "ambitious," Mr Monory let it be known that in the course of their discussions the French representatives raised the question of financial support with their interlocutors, which France has extended in the form of public-sector aid for the sixth Tunisian plan.

He assured us that the French Government plans to again increase the volume of this public-sector aid to Tunisia and to develop exchanges for the purpose of establishing true technical cooperation designed to improve the training of administrative personnel.

Furthermore, the two parties have agreed to settle the issue of French accounts frozen in Tunisia.

Barre on French Participation

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 24 Oct 80 p 1

[Report of statement by French Prime Minister Raymond Barre: "The Time Has Come for Closer French Participation in Tunisian Industrial Development"]

[Text] From today until the 26 October, French Prime Minister Raymond Barre and his wife will be the guests of Tunisia, in response to an invitation from Mr and Mrs Mohamed Mzali.

This official visit comes under the double heading of work and pleasant memories. It is the affectionate and concrete expression of those privileged ties, "with neither hatred nor rancor," which Bourguiba succeeded in cementing between Tunisia and France.

In an exclusive statement made to LA PRESSE, Mr Raymond Barre made clearer the scope of his visit:

"In responding to the Tunisian Government's invitation, I hope to bear witness to the intimacy of the bonds that unite France and Tunisia.

"To be sure, no French prime minister has visited Tunisia since President Mendes-France did so in 1954. But the very frequent contacts between prime ministers of the two governments, such as President Habib Bourguiba's visit to France in 1972 and President Valery Giscard d'Estaing's to Tunisia in 1975, bear ample witness to the relations of friendship, trust and solidarity the two countries maintain with one another.

"My visit is therefore in response to my desire to discuss with Prime Minister Mzali and the Tunisian Government the major political issues that are of concern to Tunisia and France and to investigate ways of intensifying an already very close form of bilateral cooperation.

"From a personal standpoint, it is furthermore an opportunity to rediscover memories very dear to me, since it was in your country, at the Tunis Institute of Higher Learning, that I began my university career."

A Just and Lasting Solution to the Near East Conflict

"I will have extensive exchanges of views with the new Tunisian Government headed by Prime Minister Mzali. I am thinking particularly of the search for a just and lasting solution to the conflict that is tearing apart the Near East. Our two countries maintain views on this issue that are very close. We are also convinced that, from one end of the Mediterranean to the other, it is up to countries bordering on it to themselves resolve those problems that arise and that, consequently, we must grant priority to those essential trump cards which are trust, mutual respect and cooperation.

"We will also study with the Tunisian Government the question of how new enthusiasm can be injected into our bilateral relations.

"In the space of nearly 30 years, France and Tunisia have built up close, solid relations based on intensive exchanges of people, culture, techniques and ideas. All sectors of our countries' activities are affected by these relations, whether business, university, medical corps or research institute operations are involved. We have here, accumulated in the course of time, a common capital at all levels, which it is up to us to make productive."

Entering a New Phase

"In connection with this, the possibilities are numerous. We will fully investigate them, taking care to see to it that the exemplary cooperation that exists between our two countries enters a new phase. In the economic sector in particular, the time has come — as the Tunisian Government desires — for the closer participation of French firms in the industrial development of Tunisia. We will study the matter with the most open of minds, indeed that of the North-South dialogue to which France, like Tunisia, is most particularly attached.

"Lastly, there is one thing that heartens me in our relations. And that is the presence in France of a sizable community of Tunisian nationals and in Tunisia of a large number of my fellow Frenchmen. Both contribute very largely to the development of the two countries. Their activity, their dynamism are an essential gauge of the quality of our relations. The French Government attaches quite special value to it and hopes to maintain close cooperation with the Tunisian Government on the matter.

Mzali: More Cooperation With France

Paris LE FIGARO in French 24 Oct 80 p 2

[Interview with Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali by Jean-Marc Kalfleche; date and place not given]

[Text] Raymond Barre leaves Paris today for Tunis where he will spend 48 hours accompanied by Rene Monory and Michel Cointat. This visit by the prime minister, who will be received tomorrow at the Palais de Carthage [Government House] by President Habib Bourguiba, has been long in preparation. Jean-Francois Deniau, then minister of foreign trade, had preceded him in June and Jean-Francois Poncet went to Tunis on 3-4 September to announce a step-up in cooperation.

As Mohamed Mzali emphasized in the lengthy interview he granted us, the Tunisians in fact feel that the time has come to decide on the most ambitious objectives together. Because of their success in the field of industrial subcontracting (one might say that their country was "the paradise of small and medium-sized businesses"), they hope to get more involved in it and, for example, that Peugeot will no longer be satisfied with just assembling vehicles at Sousse but will also manufacture parts locally. Feeling that they are in a particularly good position at the moment in terms of inter-Arab affairs (they control the secretariats general of both the Islamic Conference and the Arab League, with headquarters in Tunis), the Tunisians would also like to impart a very specific content to the "trilogue" and the creation of an Arab-Franco-Tunisian bank will be the first item on the agenda between Raymond Barre and Mohamed Mzali.

Near East problems will also be discussed and among them, we may imagine, the problem posed by Libyan activism. A sort of "armed peace" has been established between Tunis and Tripoli as, moreover, has been between Tripoli and Paris. Could the Mzali government's decision to exploit the "Isis" deposit in the Gulf of Gabes jeopardize the peace? They do not think so in Tunis, and even less that there may be a new coup in Gafsa. Everything would be doomed to failure, first of all the open policy pursued by Hedi Nouira's successor with the support of the "supreme fighter."

26 January 1978: bloody riots in Tunis. 29 January 1979: Tunisians trained in Libya attempt to foment a revolt in Gafsa. Very recent events, but which here seem to be oddly remote. The second of these had created an atmosphere amenable to national reconciliation even before the withdrawal of Mr Hedi Nouira, felled by a cerebral hemorrhage. It is up to Mohamed Mzali, the new prime minister chosen by Habib Bourguiba and consequently "appointed heir" pending a new order, to set it [reconciliation] in motion. Eighteen months later (he was appointed on 23 April 1979), he seems to have won his bet.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, you are the "open-policy" man, but we are nevertheless surprised at statements attributed to you in a recent issue of JEUNE AFRIQUE: "I am in the process," you said, "of tossing out organizational structures inherited from some forgotten past. I am a subversive in my own way..." Now what is this "forgotten past"?

[Answer] I didn't put it exactly that way, but that makes little difference... "Organizational structures inherited from some forgotten past" are our administrative organizations and their abusive obsessions inherited from the Turks and from Napoleon through the expedient of the protectorate and finally from the experience of compulsory cooperation we went through some time after independence.

I am determined to challenge them, to combat these acquired habits, the administrative machine that divorces the people from their government. That is what I meant to say. We always get caught up in ideological debates, but we have to begin to reform this kind of thing

"Gradual" Change

[Question] This divorce between the administration and the people is today at the heart of the debate in all African capitals. But there are two schools of thought: those who believe that the time has come to go from a single party to a multiparty system and those who are convinced that it is enough to simply institute pluralism within the single party. You seem to be an advocate of the latter position.

[Answer] I don't think I have to choose between the two. The Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) will soon be 50 years old and I maintain that it will go on opening itself to new generations and new ideas, that it has not changed its character since its founding in 1934. When it was the Neo-Destourian Front, it was a liberation front that was neither sectarian nor monolithic and, since independence, it has first of all been a rallying point for our energies.

Naturally, there have been crises. But the miracle is that the president of the party, Habib Bourguiba, who is still at the tiller, is in the vanguard of those who advocate an open policy.

The PSD is not a party that has been decreed, as in some other Third World countries; it is a party legitimized by history, a "front" that normally conceals a bubbling cauldron if ideas and sometimes opposing factions. Having said this, I can only add that I am not a prophet. Perhaps Tunisia will evolve in the direction of a multiparty system. It has already had one. The socialist or communist "Archeos" [cf. arch 'land held collectively without right of alienation under customary law'] were not eliminated by us but democratically, by the people. I only hope that my party will always be "neo," that is, open to the nation's active forces.

[Question] This brings us right up to the two most important political events that have occurred in Tunisia since you became head of the government: on the one hand, the convocation of the next party congress in May 1981, which deviates from PSD custom (according to law, it should have been set for 1984), and, on the other, the creation of a "national labor-union commission" that brings together representatives of the former UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor], "condemned" after 26 January 1978, and those of the new one, composed of the same number of delegates. In justification of the first event, you invoked the need for bringing together "the psychological and human factors" required for the success of the next 5-year plan (1982-1987). This in itself resembled government self-criticism, but this feeling is reinforced when we see how you have opened the door wide to excluded and in some cases condemned union members...

[Answer] There is an Arab proverb that goes: "You can't lead people into paradise with chains." What would be the sense of the next plan if, in the context of a PSD congress, not all the leaders had an opportunity to discuss and participate in the shaping of their alternatives? Furthermore, what hope would we have of seeing the objectives we have set ourselves achieved if the country were to go on living in an atmosphere of social unrest?

I have met with former UGTT leaders. I know that the great majority of them are patriots. I told them: "As patriots, we ought to be able to reach agreement with one another," and I believe that we are achieving that goal. In 5 months time, not only have we emptied the prisons and released all union members, but some of them, still in prison only 2 months ago, are now participating in the management of the UGTT. We have to do this! And this took place without a hitch, gradually, as though it was a natural evolution.

Small and Medium-Sized Business Paradise

[Question] For several years now, one of the fundamental options of the Tunisian economic strategy has been subcontracting or, if you like, an alliance of foreign brands, manufacturing processes and investors with Tunisian manpower to export from Tunisia what would otherwise be manufactured at much greater cost in Europe.

This policy has produced excellent results in view of the fact that 300 small and medium-sized businesses, or almost that many, have established themselves in your country over the past 7 years. Now many of these are French and you are asking that this development be accelerated. Aren't you afraid that this kind of talk might offend those Frenchmen who are concerned over the increase in unemployment at home?

[Answer] Perhaps, but that is only because they don't understand the true factors involved in the problem.

Tunisia is not asking for a handout. It is anxious to skip the phase of aid and cooperation by replacing it. What is it trying to achieve? The conciliation of the interests of both parties.

When a French industry establishes itself here, for you that means exports of equipment, licenses and staff, therefore the creation of jobs.

When Tunisia asks France to help it exploit the gas deposits buried under the waters of the Gulf of Gabes, which represents an investment of some 500 million francs, it will grant a profit — six times that sum — that will be equitably distributed and it knows that this energy resource will certainly not be — on the contrary — an unemployment producing factor for you in France...

When we ask France, as we are now doing, to participate in a bank in which one-third of the capital is Tunisian, one-third Arab and one-third French, we are concerned with our own interests, but also with France's. Because this bank will produce profits, create transfers of French technology, sales of French capital goods, etc. Cooperation should be concrete in nature.

This is the only way to convince the people of Tunisia that between us and France there is really a solidarity of interests and not just a rate of speed reached in the days of the protectorate... We have to shift into high gear, into fourth, into fifth. When we go on about the "contract of civilization" that links us to one another, I'm all for it. That's all very well, but I wonder what exactly is there in it for us...

With our bank plan, we offer a very specific response to Valery Giscard d'Estaing's appeal for a "trilogue."

To Be an Arab and a Cartesian

[Question] We have yet to ask you about your oil resources. Will they be developed? Will Libya let you exploit certain known deposits in the Gulf of Gabes? Is it true that you are urging the French Oil Company to immediately exploit one of them, the "Isis" deposit, regardless of how Tripoli reacts?

[Answer] The "Isis" is outside the disputed area. As for the others, we place our trust in the International Court at the Hague and are counting on the deadline's being broken in a year's time.

[Question] However, there is still a bone of political contention between Tunis and Tripoli. Libya is still training 2,000 of your nationals in its camps and Qadhafi accuses you of serving as a foreign base of operations for one of his former ministers, Omar Meheichi...

[Answer] I fear that our Libyan friends — our neighbors, not friends — are misinformed on that point. Meheichi has not been here since April or May.

[Question] But let's get back to Tunisia. You seem to embody some of these apparent contradictions in yourself. You studied philosophy at the Sorbonne but are a resolute partisan of Arabization of education. Many observers think that you are better equipped than Mr Hedi Nouira to retain the respect of the "integrationist" France that is evolving, but you were the promoter of a family planning experiment that must have raised the hackles on lots of old fogeys. Are these contradictions or not?

[Answer] Only in the eyes of the Manicheans. I don't think I have to choose between East and West.

I am a Tunisian patriot and I take upon myself all the historical characteristics of my Tunisian heritage: Arabism, Islam, but also a Western contribution, the Cartesian approach and the French language. At this level, there is no contradiction in terms, and why would an Arabist, simply because he is an Arabist, be opposed to family planning and the banning of polygamy, which is what President Bourguiba has always wanted?

The Tunisians could not be real partners as far as France is concerned if they did not fully acknowledge their Arab and Islamic culture. The basis for our education is Arabic, but more and better French is being taught in Tunisia than before. There is no contradiction in this.

If I were some sort of second-rate Frenchman, what interest could I have for you? None. Zero. Tunisia can only play its role if it is peopled with Tunisians who respect one another, who acknowledge their Islamic culture and can assimilate their biculturalism on that basis. The more we defend Islam in terms of its modern aspects, the more we are regarded by the people as the defenders of the authentic values of Islam.

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TWENTY-FIRST GENERAL SESSION OF UNESCO IN BELGRADE

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 11 Oct 80 p 3

[Article by B. Ben Milad: "Some Thoughts" on the General Session of UNESCO in Belgrade, 23-29 September 1980]

[Text] The great international organizations are escaping less and less from the discords that increasingly each day set the industrialized and western countries in opposition to the Third World countries, among which the Arab countries are showing increasing activity.

Whether it be on questions of the new world economic order, the new world order of information, or on more general questions or ones of a political character, the gulf that separates them gives the impression of growing a little wider at every turn.

And there is no better demonstration of this than the aspect assumed often, nearly every time, by the meetings of these organizations, UNESCO for example, whose 21st General Session just held at Belgrade from 23 to 29 September 1980 was no exception to this rule.

Several important points were on the agenda: discussion of precise projects of a cultural, scientific and technical character, as well as discussion of the important McBride Report on information and communication.

All these questions, harmless on their face, not ones to create a problem, nonetheless underscored in varying degrees the near impossibility for the participants to arrive at any kind of meeting of minds.

This is how it was, for instance, with the problem of the equality of all countries over information and communication. This is an important demand of the Third World countries, which aspire to a new world order of information being established. This item provoked a unanimous uproar on the part of the western countries. Under the pretext of defending the "intangible" principle of freedom of the press--a principle that is very respectable and not often very respected--the latter group refused categorically to allow anyone to touch the monopoly the international press agencies exercise world-wide over information dissemination.

A demand such as this is however most thoroughly justified. And one needs to go no further than to take a look at the manner in which a certain western press

agency reported the work of this 21st session of the General UNESCO Conference to be convinced of this fact, and to see for oneself to what degree this so-called freedom of information is basically, and indeed in many cases, nothing more than the freedom to manipulate this information.

By the same token, giving ever dwindling support to the efforts of the Arab countries on behalf of the protection and integrity of the Islamic and Christian Holy Places against Zionist profanations, both in Jerusalem and in other occupied Arab territories, or Arab and African positions taken against apartheid and all forms of racial discrimination, the same media do a poor job of masking their irritation at what they call a " politicizing" of UNESCO. According to them, a development such as this risks the paralysis of this organization and its deferment from the technical, scientific and cultural goals that should remain proper to it.

In other words, defending human rights that have been kicked around by racists in Africa and elsewhere, or protecting the places sacred to the spirit, freighted with history and civilization, is nothing else but a political gesture quite alien to the mission of UNESCO and at odds with its spirit!!! [sic]

If this means anything at all it is surely that the people on the one side and the other in no way share the same conception of the role and nature of this organization. And this no doubt explains the unanimity on the part of the industrialized nations in refusing to increase the organization's budget. This request made by Director General Ahmadou Mahtar M'bow was judged "unrealistic" and was quite simply turned down. This grave dicision had no more definitive effect than to further clarify the very threat of paralysis which the industrialized countries denounced. And it can only provoke serious anxiety concerning the future of UNESCO, the same concern voiced by President Ahmed Sékou Touré when he invited "the industrialized countries and the developing countries to transcend their differences."

Will this appeal be heard? One may doubt as much. For though it may be easy for those on the one hand to temper their discussions it is more difficult for the others to moderate their appetites.

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EXTRAORDINARY INFLATION, COOPERATIVE SYSTEM SCRUTINIZED

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 26, 27, 28, 29 Oct 80

/Article by F'uad Ayyub, Fathi Rizq, Muhammad 'Abd-al-Karim and Ibrahim Ahmad: "High Prices--How Will We Cope with Them?/

/26 Oct 80 p 5/

/Text/ The mad increase in foodstuffs and consumer goods prices is no longer an ordinary matter subject to well known economic criteria. Rather, it is a matter of the individual judgments of those who control the market in the country. A single food commodity will be exposed to an increase of up to 80 percent then a corresponding drop in 60 days or less. This may be attributed to the fact that the market is not governed by laws or even commercial customs by virtue of which people can proceed. The victim of this inflation is the employee with a limited income, or even an average income, whether he is a native or expatriate, because he is not cared for by the subsidies that the government provides for flour, rice and sugar for citizens--they are just three out of hundreds of foodstuffs and consumer goods.

In the context of the inflation whose upsurge began in 1975 and has not stopped yet, prices have risen by different proportions, at a general rate of 50 percent for foodstuffs. Therefore the rise in salaries of government and donsequently domestic sector employees is a necessity in order to alleviate the sufferings of all the people. Assuring minimum prosperity for the citizen and improving his standard of living, as well as subsidizing more foodstuffs, whether for citizens--or for all people, which would be more beneficial--are becoming an urgent matter, since employees and workers cannot dispense with stable prices and limits on their amazing increases, along with raises in salaries.

In a study prepared by the Planning Ministry's Central Department of Statistics concerning prices and the evolution of prices in the country in 1979 on the basis of a month-by-month comparison as well as comparisons with the previous year, the evolution of price increases in various commodities is clear. If the increase in commodity, foodstuffs and other prices in 1979 is added to previous years, starting in 1977, the picture will be even clearer. It is natural that prices should rise by very low rates once a year, but for them to rise more than once a year is bewildering to people.

The year 1979 alone witnessed serious developments in prices, as was stated in the Central Department of Statistics study covering 12 months. The prices of most commodities increased by rates ranging from 5 to 14 percent, a serious phenomenon showing the extent that price fluctuations in the markets has reached. For example, but not exclusively:

Meat and eggs: Their prices in Abu Dhabi were stable in January and February, then started to rise until July and August, when they dropped 4 percent (because of the month of Ramadan). Then they resumed a tremendous rise, until they reached 15 percent in December. The same in Dubai; the increase in December even came to 20 percent. Likewise, in Sharjah, the rate reached 14 percent, and in Ra's al-Khaymah 13 percent.

Fish and shrimp: They rose by 8 percent in Abu Dhabi, then 9 percent, then dropped in July and September, then rose again by 4 percent in December. In Dubai the rate of increase in the price came to 9 percent in February, then 20 percent in March, finally reaching 14 percent in October and 28 percent in November and December! In Sharjah prices vacillated between rises and falls, ending with a 20 percent increase in December, while in Ra's al-Khaymah the rate of increase reached 17 percent.

The same with other commodities, especially vegetables, whose price increases, which were continuous, came to 53 percent in Abu Dhabi, 61 percent in Dubai, 45 percent in Sharjah and 77 percent in Ra's al-Khaymah.

The maximum increase in milk and dairy products in Abu Dhabi, 6% came in March, followed by August with 4 percent. In Dubai, the maximum increase came to 3 percent last November. In Sharjah the rate of increase rose to 8 percent in May then 7 percent in June; then the rate of increase dropped in August and September, then rose by 5 percent in December. In Ra's al-Khaymah the maximum increase in these goods, 5 percent, came in March; then the price decreased in December by 3 percent.

Beans Increased by 80 percent in September

In Abu Dhabi, the maximum increase for beans came to 8 percent in March, that increase continued in April, then dropped 5 percent and 9 percent in July and August (Ramadan), then began increasing again, reaching 8 percent in November, then dropped again, by 6 percent, in December. In Sharjah, the rise was 6 percent in April; it then dropped by 15 and 18 percent in July and August, then rose again in an insane manner, reaching 80 percent in September. The increase then dropped to 18 percent in October. In Ra's al-Khaymah the maximum increase was 5 percent, in February.

Shipments and transport also increased by 14 percent in Abu Dhabi and Dubai and by 15 percent in Sharjah.

Economists' Views

This is what the Ministry of Planning's statistics say. What is the opinion of persons working in the Economic Affairs Agency of the Ministry of Economy and Trade?

Mr Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Azim, deputy manager of the Economic Affairs Department in the Ministry of Economy and Trade, says: "The state of the emirates is following the system of a free economy. It leaves broad scope for competition and action of the law of supply and demand. The government intervenes in the market system only to the extent that that will help provide the consumers' requirements for essential commodities. The government rarely intervenes in the natural course of the market system except in order to protect the consumer and lessen the burdens of living on citizens and those resident in the territory of the state. In 1974 the government decided to give all persons working in ministries and government departments a minimum of 200 and maximum of 500 dirhams per month in a high cost of living allowance of 20 percent of base salary and to increase the social subsidies paid out to entitled persons by 50 percent."

He adds, "It was decided to subsidize the main foodstuffs (rice, sugar and flour) and distribute them to citizens at subsidized prices. The sum of 500 million dirhams was allotted for this purpose and the task of distributing these commodities at low prices was assigned. On 1 September 1972 his highness the president of the state issued a decree abrogating customs duties on all foodstuffs.

"On 14 January 1979, Law No 3 for the Year 1979 was issued establishing the Abu Dhabi Foodstuffs Company with a capital of 10 million dirhams. The government of Abu Dhabi contributed 20 percent of the capital, 30 percent belonged to founders who were citizens, and 50 percent was the contribution of citizens. The company was to import foodstuffs from international markets and distribute them at appropriate prices to citizens and local merchants in order to protect them from fluctuations in world prices."

The Emirates: The Highest Price Increases in the World

Mr Muhammad "Abd-al-'Azim underlines the fact of price increases in the state of the United Arab Emirates by saying, "As regards the prices of essential consumer goods, as I have said there are no government importing organizations to break the monopolies except for the Abu Dhabi Foodstuffs Company, which is still in its first stages and has not yet been able to expand the supply base. In addition there is no system for compulsory pricing and no kind of price surveillance in the state; also, local production of foodstuffs is slight and the country relies entirely on imports from abroad--importing inflation from foreign exporting countries.

"If we add the increase in the commercial profit margin of the country's merchants to what has been described above, the prices of essential commodities are increasing constantly, which is making the state of the United Arab Emirates one of the countries with the highest increases in prices in the world, not to speak of the differences in commodity prices among the emirates of the federation."

Food Prices Increased More than 50 Percent

Mr Muhammad 'Abd-al-'Azim adds, "In a study prepared by the Ministry of Economy and Trade on the general price level of main essential commodities in the country between 1977 and 1979, which dealt with consumer good categories, the following was evident:

"The increase in food prices from 1976 to 1979 came to 48 percent. If we take the constant increase in food prices in 1980 in general into consideration we will find that food prices have increased more than 50 percent.

"Fuel, water and electricity: it was established in the study prepared by the Ministry of Economy that their prices increased by 49 percent in 1979 over 1976 as well.

"The clothing and apparel category increased by 38 percent in 1979 over 1976, as is apparent from studies which the ministry has carried out.

"The category of household goods and services increased by 30 percent in 1979 over 1976.

"Housing: housing expenses increased by 100 percent from 1973 to 1976, then realized a relative drop from 1976 to 1979. Housing expenses then resumed increasing in 1980."

Burdens of Living Have Increased

Mr 'Ali Mahmud, economic researcher in the Ministry of Economy, says, "If the various studies place emphasis on a rise in the prices of goods and services, that means an increase in the burdens of living for families with average incomes."

The following appears in the study Mr 'Ali Mahmud is preparing on "the general price level in the state of the United Arab Emirates," which includes the effect of the increase in prices on average-income families in Abu Dhabi and the emirates:

Average expenses in the city of Abu Dhabi: this is a hypothetical study of a family whose monthly income was 5,080 dirhams per month in 1978. This income was adequate for a family in 1978 prices. If we assume that the total annual income of this family was 60,960 dirhams in 1978, the study shows that the family spent as follows: food, 18,000 dirhams a year; fuel, 3,060 dirhams; clothing, 6,800 dirhams; household goods and services, 4,100 dirhams; other goods, 4,000 dirhams; housing, 25,000 dirhams; and savings, zero. This means that that family spent all its income on the burdens of living in accordance with 1978 prices.

The overall expenses of the same family in 1980, with its annual income remaining stable, was as follows: food, 24,660 dirhams; fuel, electricity and water, 4,000 dirhams; clothing, 8,600 dirhams; household goods and services, 5,400 dirhams, other goods, 5,000 dirhams; housing, 29,000 dirhams. From the above example, we find that the total income of an average-income family was 60,960 dirhams during the year and that its expenses, according to the prices of goods and services in 1980, were 76,660 dirhams. This means that that family needed to borrow about 16,000 dirhams a year to cover its expenses.

Average expenses in the northern emirates: as is apparent from the hypothetical study Mr 'Ali Mahmud prepared on an average-income family in the northern emirates, the annual income of the family totalled 43,940 dirhams in 1978 which it spent, on the basis of 1978 prices, as follows: food, 16,220 dirhams; fuel, electricity and water, 3,470 dirhams; clothing, 6,540 dirhams; household goods and services, 3,900 dirhams; other commodities, 3,900 dirhams; housing, 10,000 dirhams; and savings, zero--that is, it spent its income in full.

The study stresses that this family's expenses increased in 1980 as follows: food, 21,880 dirhams; fuel, electricity and water, 4,600 dirhams; clothing, 8,100 dirhams, household goods and services, 5,100 dirhams; other commodities, 4,850 dirhams; housing, 10,000 dirhams. If we assume that this family's income is fixed, we will find that this family needs to borrow 11,000 dirhams a year to face the burdens of life.

40 Percent Additional Burdens on Abu Dhabi Inhabitants

The hypothetical study which Mr 'Ali Mahmud, economic researcher in the Ministry of Economy, is preparing, proves that the inhabitants of Abu Dhabi defray costs about 40 percent greater than those in the northern emirates, since the amount of the difference between the average expenses of the average-income family in the town of Abu Dhabi and those of corresponding families in the northern towns of the emirates came to 1,418 dirhams per month in 1978; this difference increased in 1980 to 1,844 dirhams because of an increase in prices.

The study stresses that the cost of living level in the capital, Abu Dhabi, is greater than that in the northern towns of the emirates, since the average-income family in Abu Dhabi spends about 25,000 dirhams a year on housing and the corresponding family in the northern towns of the emirates spends about 10,000 dirhams per year. If we add the rise in the prices and expenses the inhabitants of Abu Dhabi defray for food, fuel, clothing and other things in comparison with the prices prevailing in the northern emirates to that, we will find that middle-income families defray additional expenses of about 40 percent when they live in Abu Dhabi, the capital.

What about the Markets?

The closest example of the fluctuation in prices and speculation is what is happening in the refrigerated truck market near the port of Abu Dhabi and the fruit and vegetable market in the heart of the capital. The difference between what the owners of refrigerated trucks sell at and sales prices of the same goods in the fruit and vegetable market is great.

In touring the markets, the following became evident:

A box of yellow grapes sold by truck owners cost 20 dirhams and red grapes cost 25 dirhams.

The same box of grapes in the market was 50 dirhams; red grapes were 55 dirhams.

A box of tomatoes bought from truck owners was 20 dirhams; in the market it was 25 dirhams.

A carton of eggs from truck owners was 12 dirhams and from the market 15 dirhams.

A 15-kilogram bag of onions cost 20 dirhams bought from the truck owners and 25 dirhams in the market.

The price of a 10-kilogram sack of potatoes bought from truck owners was 30 dirhams and was 40 dirhams in the market.

The price of a sack of 33 oranges was 10 dirhams bought from the truck owners and the price of a kilogram of oranges was 7 dirhams in the market.

Opinions of Fruit and Vegetable Importers

At a meeting with some importers who own these trucks regarding the prices of the fruit and vegetables they sell to wholesale merchants, their costs, and the difficulties they may face when they come into Abu Dhabi, Mr Hamdan Suleyman said: "The sales process is related to supply and demand. There is no fixed price for any type of fruit or vegetable. For example, today they sell a box of tomatoes whose shipment cost 15 Lebanese pounds for 25 dirhams, and then they are going for 15 or 20 dirhams." This rise and fall in the price of the cargo, as Mr Hamdan Sulyman sees it, depends on the state of the market.

Mr Hamdan also pointed out that on some occasions some circumstances which might be outside their will and delay them on the road after they ship the goods sometimes force them to raise the price a little in compensation.

He said, "The lowest rental for a refrigerated truck is no less than 1,400 Jordanian dinars for every trip it makes, in addition to 1,000 dirhams in road expenses. They consider these sums large, especially if they occur at times which are not suitable for them, for example when they are in the midst of a large number of trucks, which forces them to lower price!"

Mr Fayiz Muhammad Dawud, a truck driver, said "We have no connection with the high prices of fruit and vegetables in the government markets in the recent period. We are not a party to the setting of the prices at which shop owners in the main market sell. All that concerns us is to sell the cargo and get rid of it before it is spoiled. The owner of the fruit and vegetable shop determines the price which he himself considers appropriate."

In his conversation, Mr Fayiz pointed out that the government's lack of oversight over prices in the local markets has caused the merchants to speculate in these prices and impose prices as they like.

In a tour of some shops in the vegetable market to ascertain vegetable prices, especially the prices paid by people who buy from the owners of refrigerated trucks, we found a great discrepancy in certain prices. For example, the owner of a refrigerated truck sells a 7-kilogram box of yellow grapes for 20 dirhams and red grapes for 25 dirhams, while the same box is sold for 50 and 55 dirhams in a number of vegetable shops in the market. When we ask the latter the price at which they buy this box from the truck owners, they answer that they bought it for 45 and 50 dirhams /respectively/..

'Abd-al-'Aziz Husayn, owner of a vegetable shop in the market, says that the rise in these prices has no relation to events going on in the region but may be ascribed to their high purchase price from the truck owners. He pointed out that these prices are not stable, either, since they may rise further today or tomorrow or even drop, and the rise in prices may be attributed to the shortage of some types of vegetables and large demand for them.

/27 Oct 80 pp 3, 7/

/Text/ The remedy for the gross inflation in living expenses begins before all else by raising the salaries of people working in the government by a percentage close to the inflation rates which have come to 50 percent in the case of most prices of foodstuffs and consumer goods in the past 3 years, while the rate has been no less than 90 percent in the case of fruit and vegetables. A rise in the level of wages has become an inevitable necessity in the light of the difficult living conditions which citizens and expatriates alike are experiencing. This is what the federal government considers and is striving to achieve, but this step must be followed by other concomitant if not simultaneous ones in the same direction lest we become compelled to appeal again for a rise in the wage level to keep abreast of the new inflation in prices in a few more years.

The first of these steps, which we consider necessary for stopping the wave of inflation invading the society of the emirates, is for the government to hasten to subsidize the main food commodities, thendetermine rates of profit for the importers (wholesale merchants) and the retail merchants who sell the commodity directly to the consumer. Most countries in the Arab Gulf have taken this step in the context of regularing domestic economic activities, alleviating the people's sufferings from inflation, whether they are citizens or expatriates. That is followed directly by horizontal expansion in the establishment of cooperative societies, support for these societies in a manner guaranteeing that they perform the duty of lowering the insane prices of some goods, and efforts to stabilize basic consumer goods. The experiment is still not progressing, in spite of the establishment of 7 societies in various areas of the country. The latter have turned into supermarkets engaging in their activities in cooperative contexts but unable to compete with merchants or to lower prices because of the low amount of support offered them. The third step is for the government to proceed to build dozens of large storehouses and coolers for societies and merchants in areas which receive imported commodities and in towns, close to public markets, renting them out at token rates to societies and merchants to help reduce the cost of the goods.

In the annual report set out by the Bureau of Complaints and Recommendations headed by Mr Sa'id ibn Nasir, undersecretary of state for council of minister affairs, the bureau's study of inflation makes the importance of this phenomenon clear. The undersecretary states that complaints over the fact that prices have become inflated in a manner threatening the income levels of individuals, whether they have limited, average or even high incomes, have been increasing in the past few years. Inflation is general and comprehensive. It does not discriminate among family budgets. Every employee, minor or senior, sets out percentages for spending in accordance with his income. However, these proportions are constantly being disrupted and all savings eliminated severely because of fluctuations in the prices of commodities and rises in consumer good prices, at rates in excess of all expectations. This poses a danger to citizens' savings, which constitute a living buttress for the overall economics of the nation.

Concerning that phenomenon the bureau's report says: "For 6 consecutive years, complaints about inflation and high prices have been continuous and increasing. Markets in the country are experiencing an escalating price race. Some people

attribute that to the economic problems the world is suffering from, which have affected the rate by which prices rise and consequently the level of local prices."

In spite of the decrees which have been issued raising the standard of living of individuals in the country, it is to be observed that inflation is progressing at rates in excess of these stipulated raises. There is no doubt that efforts now being made to develop local industries will have their effect in the future in realizing positive steps toward the attainment of self-sufficiency in some commodities, on grounds that the road toward prosperity is through equalizing production and consumption on the local level.

Some people consider that the rise in prices may be explained to a large extent by the control by a group of merchants of the local market, their exploitation of the consumers' need for these goods and their determination to increase profits in an exaggerated fashion in exploitation of the absence of a supervisory or oversight agency over prices.

The merchants base their justification for the rise in prices on the paralysis in the markets and the high rentals of shops and dwellings, in addition to the low international production of main foodstuffs and limited exports, which have resulted in scant supply, high demand and the reflection of world prices on local ones.

Bureau Recommendations for Treating the Problem

In this regard, bureau officials present recommendations to remedy this phenomenon. These may be summarized as follows:

A start in the implementation of the consumer cooperative project, which to a large degree will help stabilize prices and provide the necessary commodities for consumers.

Accelerated formation of an agency to take charge of price planning and surveillance which will have the right to reprice goods and fix the rate of profit on all goods.

Expansion of imports.

Intensification of surveillance campaigns over merchants, oversight of importers, and determination of appropriate profits for them.

Support for and increased supplies of basic commodities.

Attention to projects to exploit and develop fish resources by offering all possible facilities for them.

Support for and increased supplies of basic commodities.

Establishment for a company or body which will take charge of supervising a limited fleet of fishing vessels and construct a fish preserving and freezing plant.

A Commodity Subsidy System in Neighboring Countries

We now come to the principle of subsidizing foodstuffs. Support is supposed to be offered for every commodity whose price is set, and these commodities are supposed to include such basic necessary commodities of daily consumption as sugar, tea, fats, all dairy products, meat, rice, vegetables and fresh fruit. Many Arab Gulf states have adopted this principle, among them, for instance:

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where the government sets the prices of a number of main foodstuffs while subsidizing there commodities at various rates in accordance with their price in the world market. The price of the commodity is determined in accordance with its price at the source in addition to freight and transportation rates and an added 10 percent as profit for the merchant. This profit rate is calculated after adding on the subsidy which the government offers for each commodity in a manner which will stabilize it. This subsidy differs from commodity to commodity according to its price level at the source. Sometimes it is 3 riyals, for example per kilogram of sugar and rice, and sometimes it is 2 to 3 riyals per kilogram of meat. The commodity's price is set and application of the pricing is supervised by the Saudi Ministry of Commerce. The government subsidizes sugar, rice, flour and meat of all kinds.

Bahrain: there the government sets the prices of a number of foodstuffs such as sugar, fats, flour and rice,commodities which it subsidizes. There are other commodities whose price the government sets without subsidizing them, for instance cheese, toothpaste, meat, chicken, soap, some vegetables, and also cars.

Kuwait: the government subsidizes meat, milk, rice, sugar, flour, fats and other major commodities, setting a price for them which all merchants are committed to applying. In Kuwait there is a specialized agency for overseeing pricing application called the Consumer Protection Department which is subordinate to the Ministry of Trade. Kuwait practices the system of supply cards by virtue of which each citizen or expatriate and his family is given his stipulated monthly share of subsidized foodstuffs. It should be noted that Kuwait has the system of cooperative societies, which enter into strong competition with merchants, by virtue of which a drop of about 90 percent is achieved in the prices of foodstuffs and consumer commodities.

Qatar: This follows the same system as Kuwait. It has a Supply Department subsidiary to the Ministry of Finance, imports main foodstuffs, and distributes them to retain merchants for sale to consumers in accordance with the volume set out for each individual in the supply card. These commodities include sugar, rice, oil, fats and flour. The municipality also imports meat and sells it at low prices through butchers. When the prices of some commodities rise, which they did for example in mid-1977, the government issues a decree dropping their prices at rates ranging from 5 to 10 percent. These commodities are rice, sugar, oil, fats, dairy products, milk, beef, and mutton. One should realize that their prices have been set in advance.

We have the experiences of these neighboring Gulf states before us, and anyone who wants to learn more than we have mentioned about them may do so. The fact remains that it has become necessary for the Ministry of Economy and Trade to intervene so that it may put a limit to escalating inflation and profit rates. If the market

is thus abandoned to caprice and temperament, no one, no matter what he does, will be able to stop the current of rising prices or limit this crushing wave. It is not desired to line the consumer up against the merchant; that would harm economic activity and would be of no benefit. Rather, what is desired is for the government to subsidize all basic foodstuffs in all emirates of the country. That could occur in the manner which the government of Kuwait has followed, whereby the Ministry of Commerce holds merchants to account on the basis of the sales price at the source or point of origin of every commodity through purchase invoices and freight and transport costs. It sets out its subsidy for the commodity then determines its sales price to the consumer, after determining a reasonable profit for the retail merchant and wholesaler. This is what the price committee formed for this purpose previously in the municipality of Abu Dhabi proceeded to do at the end of 1977, but its activity was not destined to continue. What is important is that the government, as represented by the Ministry of Economy and Trade, which must be given this right and must also be supplied with subsidy funds and powers of oversight over the setting and application of prices, take charge of the matter.

The Cooperatives' Position on Price Reductions

The second step which must also be followed to reduce prices of foodstuffs and consumer goods is the growth of cooperative societies and their expanded establishment. The cooperative societies which now exist have not yet realized the greatest goal in their establishment, that of reducing prices--in fact some of them, especially those existing in such remote areas as Zayid City in al-Zafrah, for example--consist of a large shop or small supermarket the size of a village or growing town. One can apply the statement to the society of Umm al-Qaywayn which has not received the requisite subsidies; the 200,000 dirhams which the government gives each society is hardly enough even for the lease on the shops the societies rent out. Naturally it would have been better had the government built the societies' locations and presented a model so that the societies would become not grocery or vegetable shops but full comprehensive consumer societies.

The memorandum presented by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs to the Council of Ministers on the condition of these societies, which number seven so far, stated that these societies have not realized their goals in the manner stipulated in their charters and that they are facing or are threatened with loss. Cooperative consciousness does not exist in their management.

Among the most important recommendations stated in the memorandum are the following:

Coordinating the role of supervising the cooperatives among the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Works and Municipalities and the Abu Dhabi National Foodstuffs Importing Company. We can modify this recommendation by unifying the supervising body in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs or the Ministry of Economy and Trade, as the government sees fit, instead of coordinating the supervision. What is important is that we not fragment and duplicate the supervision; rather, it would be better if we unified it. This is then followed by the recommendation that the Ministry of Public Works and Housing set forth and establish a model consumer society and rent it out or give it to the societies, especially when they are in the process of being formed, provided that each cooperative complex contain

branches for various foodstuffs and consumer goods. The role of the municipalities must be auxiliary to the societies, they will exempt them from light and water bills, provide plots of land on which to construct their locations, or help them if possible with readymade buildings which can be delivered to cooperative complexes. The role of the Abu Dhabi National Company, as a pilot company, must be to provide commodities for these companies at non-competitive prices through simplified payment procedures.

Establishing a cooperative federation for the societies which will practice coordination among them and take charge of import activities for the various goods and commodities in order to reduce costs on the one hand and regulate sales and transactions in the local market on the other.

Constructing central storehouses for the societies and branch storehouses lest the societies be put at the mercy of merchants and importers.

Concentrating on cooperative service complexes in new societies in residential areas. The societies will contain sections for vegetables, fruit, gorceries, and meat, refrigeration warehouses, shops for sewing and barbers, a bakery, and a post office. This recommendation would adopt the system of cooperative societies in Kuwait.

Kuwait's Experience with Cooperative Complexes

Since we have broached Kuwait's experience in consumer cooperative complexes, it is necessary to discuss it with a view to emulating it, because it is still the best cooperative experience among the countries of the region. These complexes are spread about all sections of Kuwait, in the heart of the city, in its outskirts and in its outlying areas; indeed, some sections have a cooperative complex and branch complexes which run services and bring them close to all inhabitants of each section. Every cooperative complex contains a large shop for consumer goods resembling a large supermarket; this has everything the consumer wants, from cheese and dairy products to jam, candy, kitchen utensils, carbonated drinks, perfume, and everything a person wants in his home. All the implements are the most advanced ones manufactured in various countries of the world and are of good style and model. Alongside this great shop, which can accommodate 200 people making purchases at one time, there are the following services: a health unit with a unique design, an integrated postal unit, shops selling fruit and vegetables, meat and dairy products, others selling books, newspapers and magazines (small bookstores), then candy shops, other shops for shoes, a barber shop, and a shop selling photographic equipment and one for children's games.

10 Percent Profit on Consumer Goods

All this is in one complex which the government builds then gives to cooperative societies to turn into cooperative complexes where prices are below any others in the market. No matter what happens the rate of profit on consumer goods of all types does not exceed 10 percent, or 15 percent for perfumes and cosmetics in these complexes. The profit rate is determined by a general Cooperative Federation list for these complexes, and every cooperative society in Kuwait belongs to it. There is another system for subsidized commodities sold in the consumer cooperatives

which the government sets forth and in which the societies' profit rates are spelled out. All supply cards are connected to the societies and every citizen and expatriate has a supply card in accordance with his residence. Every citizen and expatriate also has a health card, also in accordance with his residence.

Kuwaiti Societies Reduce Prices by 40 Percent

The government provides the societies with cooperative complex sites at token rent and also exempts them from electricity and water bills. Although these societies help in reducing the prices of 90 percent of the consumer goods and foodstuffs in Kuwait, some of them realize an annual profit which reaches 3 to 4 million dinars. This may all be attributed to government subsidy of commodities and to its continuing support for these societies, followed by support from the citizens. You will find no citizen living in a residential area or district who does not share the greatest number of society shares.

The cooperative Federation of societies takes charge of importing many of the basic goods and has broad experience in this sphere. However, that does not mean that the societies cannot venture to make purchases themselves. Rather, every society has the right to import any commodity it wants directly from world markets--even ashtrays, hangers, canned spices, cups and copper trays. These societies also deal with the central fruit and vegetable market in a normal fashion, buying wholesale from it and selling retail at prices far below those in the shops and the supermarkets. In general the prices of all foodstuffs and consumer goods in Kuwaiti cooperative societies are 30 to 40 percent lower than in similar shops in the heart and various sections of Kuwait, except for commodities whose prices are set. The shops have no power to raise their prices because they are subject to strict surveillance on the part of the relevant government agencies.

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/Text/ One alternative which has been raised and is now available in coping with the instability in foodstuffs and consumer goods prices and blatant inflation in them, is that of cooperative societies. A substantial number of such societies has in fact been established, but, in spite of the passage of the more than 3 years during which some of them have been engaged in their activities in the country, the cooperatives have lost their meaning and have not achieved the basic objective for which they were established, which is to help lower prices. Indeed most of them have turned into large grocery stores.

The fault is not with the cooperative societies or with the concept behind them--rather, it is with the fact that they have not been empowered to perform their role and have been left alone to carry out the experiment without real, effective support from the government.

In this report, we are responding to a number of specific questions. These are: what have the cooperative societies offered since their establishment? Have they been able to compete with merchants in order to lower prices? If they have not been able to achieve this objective, what are the reasons? Have obstacles stood in the way of that? What solutions have been propounded to enable the societies

to perform their role in providing basic commodities to citizens, achieving equilibrium in the market and limiting inflation?

Mr Kamil al-'Adl, general manager of the Dubai Cooperative Society, considers that cooperative societies are to be considered one of the main means which the government can rely on in carrying out purposeful policies with a high degree of accuracy while guaranteeing that no excessive departures from policies which have been set out occur, as contrasted with other channels which exist in the non-cooperative sector.

He stresses that if the government wants to create a kind of balance in prices, it can rely on the cooperative societies spread about over various areas of the country.

He propounds the notion of establishing a price stabilization agency which will encompass the cooperative sector and part of the private sector. This agency would include experts from the government and cooperative boards as well as representatives of major merchants "who are supposed to possess commitment and honesty." This agency will specify the degree of price stability desired and the types of commodities in which price stability is to be preserved, while setting out a policy to provide these goods throughout the year and determine the role of the cooperatives and the commercial bodies cooperating with them during the requisite time period.

The tasks of this agency "also" include determining the needed financing while taking into consideration that this financing will not mean that the government will pay the differences in price but may sometimes mean loans from the government or banks, provided that they are repaid in a specific period of time.

The Sharjah Society Has Not Played Its Full Role

Mrs 'A'ishah Muhammad al-Numan, chairman of the board of the Cooperative Society in Sharjah, says "The basic goal in establishing the society is to combat inflation, limit price hikes, and provide all the citizens' requirements for supply commodities and materials in the first place. However, the fact is that the society has not been able to play its part, although it was established 3 years ago. The reason is that the society does not obtain the requisite financial support, the support which all corresponding societies obtain in Kuwait and Qatar for example, in spite of the fact that we obtained support of 200,000 dirhams in subsidies (on establishment). I can assert that this amount is not adequate for opening one society branch, and we have not received any further support since.

"The expenditures of the society and its branches are also large and we have an employee structure and other expenses such as water and electricity. The society's resources are limited and the number of members does not exceed 80, including founding members. This may be attributed to an absence of cooperative consciousness or great interest in the cooperative's role in serving citizens.

"The society has a main branch in the al-Fayha' section of Sharjah and a branch in the al-Khan area as well as three branches for distributing subsidized commodities.

We are now preparing to open branches in the al-Raqqah section and move the main branch to al-Zahra' Street so that the society will be able to perform its role in full in serving the citizens."

An Arbitrary Increase

Concerning the society's role in lowering the prices of and providing commodities, the chairman of the Sharjah society says "The problem is really difficult. The society no longer has a role, and the reason is price instability in the market. There are no fixed prices for any commodity, and consequently the society cannot perform its mission.

"Examples are many: the price of 'Nido' milk sold last March was 165 dirhams per box and it has now reached 205 dirhams. Sugar used to sell for 65 dirhams per 50-kilogram sack, and its price rose without justification to 165 dirhams, then rose again to 210 dirhams just 2 days ago.

"We have stable prices in flour and rice only. The reason is perfectly clear--the government provides subsidies for flour and rice, but, since the government removed its subsidies from sugar, the price of that continued rising until it increased by 145 dirhams per bag!

"At the same time, all vegetable prices rose in an arbitrary, unreasonable manner; prices are at the whim of merchants. Consequently the price instability in all these supply commodities and materials has caused the most extreme damage to the cooperatives and in most cases has turned them into mere ordinary shops selling at the same prices as the market!

We Ask To Be Treated the Same as Athletic Clubs

"I would like to state this point: if the society has bought goods at very high prices, is it possible, unless it receives a large financial subsidy, for the society to offer the goods at low prices? If we do that, the losses will be large and will cause the end of the society."

Mrs 'A'ishah Muhammad al-Numan, head of the Sharjah Society, offers a number of recommendations and solutions to enable the cooperative societies actually to perform their role in providing goods and presenting them at suitable prices. She says, "First, it is necessary to allocate large annual financial support to each society. We have heard that the Council of Ministers has agreed to an annual support amounting to 150,000 dirhams per society. This is a minor amount and will not be sufficient to pay the electricity bills. It is necessary to seek to have it increased so that it will cover the bulk of the society's expenses."

She adds, "We really are requesting that the cooperative societies be on a par with sporting clubs in terms of subsidies, because the societies' work in providing the citizens' requirements, combatting inflation and serving families is not less important than the role of the sporting clubs!" She also requests that a main center be established for cooperative societies encompassing the state of the emirates, performing the role of a cooperative federation supervising the societies, providing supply commodities and materials of all kinds at low prices and enabling the cooperative society to perform its mission.

'Adnan 'Attar, manager of the Sharjah Cooperative Society, says that there is another aspect to the problem of the increase in prices--and one of its most important causes--and that is the merchants' "recourse" to re-exporting supply goods and materials from the emirates. It is true that the goods and materials are available in large quantities, but the merchants re-export them and set prices as they like, and this speculation must stop!

With the Consumers

The citizen 'Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad, whom we met in the Sharjah Society, defined the problem by saying "The most important thing the cooperative societies do is to supply goods and materials at prices below those in ordinary shops, but the societies have turned into stores through the insane rise in prices. It is necessary that the government encourage cooperative societies to perform their role."

In the sales branch for subsidized supply commodities in Sharjah, the citizen Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Shaybah said: "We just get subsidized rice and flour. We are in direct need of having subsidized sugar brought back. Prices have risen to a very large extent, which no one can cope with, and citizens are also asking for support for fats, oils and soap along with renewed subsidization of sugar and resumption in sales of it in the subsidized commodity branches."

Mr 'Umar Hasan al-Sharif, manager of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs Cooperative Department, considers that since the issuance of the law establishing the consumer cooperatives in 1976 the government has made every effort to make citizens understand the economic and social importance of cooperative activity, with the goal of trying to improve the economic, social and cultural condition of people with limited incomes and resources. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, in accordance with the directives of His Excellency Sayf al-Jarwan, the labor minister and the "available resources," has striven to spread cooperative societies throughout the country in an attempt on the ministry's part to smash the monopoly over the citizens' requisite consumer goods and materials. These societies have managed to provide citizens with consumer goods at appropriate prices at their places of work and have "also" distributed state-subsidized commodities to the citizens.

Some of these societies have succeeded in realizing profits in the brief period of their activity. "The life of the most senior cooperative is 3 years."

Obstacles

In a report the Cooperative Department of the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has prepared on obstacles and problems that keep the cooperative societies from attaining their goals, many problems were "laid bare," including:

The scant financial support the government is providing for cooperative societies.

The absence of buildings and headquarters for cooperative societies, which causes them to resort to the use of unsuitable headquarters and imposes on them high rents which add to their material burdens.

The intense commercial competition to which the societies are exposed, in view of their scant resources, which do not help them import the goods they require,

compelling them to obtain their commodity requirements from local markets at high prices.

The societies' commitment to provide good commodities at cooperative prices and not to try to realize a material profit as a basic goal adds to their burdens and costs and involves them in material losses.

The cooperative societies' defraying of additional expenses from which they could be exempted, such as water and electricity bills.

The inadequacy of the societies' administrative and labor structure, because of their material inability to bear many burdens.

The decline in the societies' capital with each passing year, as an inevitable consequence of the foregoing, and the preservation of their existence and attainment of their goals.

The failure to pay out profits to members in the previous period of cooperative activity, which has prompted some participants in these societies to demand the withdrawal of the sums they had contributed to them, out of fear of losing their funds.

Recommended Solutions for Supporting the Societies

In a frank discussion of the problems the cooperative societies in the country are facing, Mr 'Umar al-Sharif, manager of the Cooperative Department, defined the solutions the department presented to "officials in the ministry," which will "if realized" help develop support for cooperative societies. These include:

Adoption by the government of the promulgation of a plan to build model cooperative societies and spread them about over the various areas of the country.

Offering loans at easy terms on easy conditions to cooperative societies.

Exempting cooperative societies in the country from payment of electricity and water bills.

Establishment of an institute for cooperative studies in the country to graduate domestic staffs who will understand the nature of cooperative work and will be able to bear responsibility for it.

Establishment of a general federation of cooperatives in the country which will contain all the cooperative societies now existing or to be built in the future, with the goal of increasing relations among them and helping them with regard to their activities, as well as overseeing cooperative activity.

He says that the government is expressing extensive interest in the cooperative movement as a means to propound solutions to the problems the masses are suffering from.

In the context of this interest, the Council of Ministers agreed last month to give each cooperative society a maximum annual support of 150,000 dirhams. The

'Abdallah Ahmad al-Khattal, a major vegetable dealer who specializes in trading in local vegetable production, says that a box of tomatoes whose price before the holidays came to 150 dirhams has, as a result of the delays in refrigerated trucks and the events in the region, now started to sell for 15 dirhams and its price will go down to 7 dirhams next January. The reason is the advent of local production in large quantities.

Every day more than 60 trucks come to the markets of Dubai and Sharjah bringing vegetables coming from Ra's al-Khaymah. The load in each truck is 400 boxes of various types. Large amounts of vegetables are sent to the markets in Abu Dhabi, Sharjah, 'Ajman and Umm al-Qaywayn.

Wholesale merchants compare their prices with those of the supermarkets, saying that at a time when a kilogram of tomatoes is being sold in the shops for 7 dirhams you will see it for 3 dirhams a box in the market, because the consumer defrays the supermarket's expenses in the form of rent, labor, electricity and a high rate of fruit and vegetable spoilage.

Seasons and Difficulties

The war has brought grave losses on many merchants. Some of them have paid prices five or six times those of Iranian and Lebanese imports, but events have prevented the latter from arriving because their own markets have required these items. Lebanese and Jordanian vegetables have started to be sent to Iraq to provide for the latter's consumption requirements. In addition difficulties have been afflicting trucks and refrigerated vehicles for a long period because of the security measures that the various countries have taken along the border areas.

To the events' influence on increased prices, Muhammad Yusuf Khammas adds the fact that fruit and vegetables have seasons in different export regions such as Pakistan, India and Lebanon: "Some imports which came by land or by launches have started to come by plane, multiplying prices and adding to the consumers' burdens. However, we have found alternatives to the Iranian onions and watermelons we had been importing in the markets of India and Pakistan." Muhammad Yusuf Khammas, a major imported fruit and vegetable dealer, says "It is true that the increase in the prices of some goods has reached 50 percent, but all kinds are now available and there is no shortage. What I would like to draw attention to is the fact that prices to the top merchants have increased too because of the increase in prices abroad and high freight rates: many of the goods which we used to import from India have doubled in price. The price of grapes we would import for 3 rupees has now gone to 6 rupees; the price of a sack of onions has gone from 1.5 to 4 dirhams.

Workers' Wages

"Prices of some commodities are rising in the markets because of a delay in ship arrivals. The wages of workers and porters have doubled in the recent period, multiplying our burdens."

He adds, "We in the Dubai market import many goods for export to the markets of Qatar, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia; every day we send from 10 to 15 refrigerated trucks to these markets, and six to 14 launches and 10 to 16 refrigerated trucks come to us. Sometimes we send these goods by sea to the markets in Bahrain."

Council of Ministers also determined to allocate the sum of 500,000 dirhams to hold training courses for society employees. A Council of Ministers decree was also issued, at its session on the eighth of last month, to have the Ministries of Public Works and Housing and Planning study plans to establish cooperative societies, with the proviso that the necessary credits for this be included in next year's budget and that the conclusions of this study be presented to the Council of Ministers.

Finally, the main signs on the road to the establishment of a strong cooperative movement in the state of the emirates have become clear. The cooperative movement's problems are known. Solutions are ready. Hope is being attached to the government agencies' interest in implementing these solutions. Finally, one awaits the signal to start a takeoff on the road "called" cooperation.

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/Text/ In a period which has witnessed import bottlenecks and the arrival of trucks across the borders, vegetable prices have multiplied. However, this problem has started to diminish with the advent of local vegetable production and the creation of alternative markets.

What are the views of major merchants and importers regarding the price increases which have been burdening the consumers?

What are the views of specialists, chambers of commerce and industry, and the Ministry of Economy and Trade?

What is the picture now in the markets of the northern emirates, especially in Dubai?

The farms in Ra's al-Khaymah, al-Fujayrah and al-'Ayn have succeeded in providing local consumer requirements for vegetables and eliminating the effects of the shortage which the war between Iraq and Iran has created.

Throughout the next 6 months, vegetables will be available in large quantities and at low prices and will come fresh to the consumer.

Merchants have started receiving large amounts of commodities they have imported to make up the shortage in imports which used to come from Iran such as onions and some types of fruit, seasoning and vegetables. Heavy refrigerated trucks which previously came from Iraq have also started arriving regularly across the Saudi border.

Fingers of accusation have been pointed at merchants, and the merchants have complained about world prices, the high rents for shops and workers' wages. It has been asserted that these factors have raised prices by 30 percent in the past year and that more than 20 percent of the increase has occurred in the past 2 months. Officials have another view.

What do the merchants say?

He says that wholesale prices per box now are as follows: grapes, 37 dirhams; pomegranates, 40; pears and guavas, 33; tomatoes (6 kilograms), 12; melons, 30; apples, 60; bananas, 28; eggs, 145; African oranges, 29; lemons, 65 dirhams. When sold retail, they increase by 2 dirhams, one for profit and one for transport and porters.

Reducing the Effects of the War

The prices, in the opinion of many merchants, have regained their equilibrium and the effects of the early stage of the war between Iraq and Iran have been reduced. Goods whose prices came to 50 dirhams per box before the holidays have now dropped to 20 and the alternative markets have provided much of what had been imported from Iran. This is what Ahmad Muhammad al-Habbal stresses: imports from alternative markets such as Jordan, Pakistan, India, Lebanon, Turkey and Oman are taking the place of imports from Iran, which used to reach a rate of 10 launches a day bringing about 5,000 tons of fruit and vegetables.

A vegetable dealer with 30 years' experience in the markets observes that fruit and vegetable prices are lower than in the Bahrain, Qatar and Saudi Arabia markets, especially as regards commodities coming from the markets of Pakistan and India. Imports from the markets of Lebanon and Jordan are cheaper there because the distance to these markets is shorter than to the markets in the emirates.

He adds that the number of trucks of average capacity which depart from the Dubai markets for the various emirates numeber 500 every day and that the price per box is 1 dirham higher in Sharjah and 3 dirhams higher in Abu Dhabi, al-'Ayn and Ra's al-Khaymah than in the Dubai market.

Going to Excess

Major merchants consider that small merchants go to excess in setting their profits. Nasir 'Abdallah, a major grocery store goods importer, gives an example, stating "the owner of a supermarket obtains a 24-can box of pineapples for 31 dirhams and sells it for 48 dirhams. He sets his profits at this level. As regards sugar, the increase came to 51 percent last month but small merchants made the consumer bear a two-fold increase."

'Abdallah Nasir Husayn says that the merchants are facing many losses in many commodities and that the wholesale merchant has preferred lower profits in exchange for selling greater amounts, while the small merchants prefer high markups.

Meat Is an International Problem

The doubling of meat prices was not caused by the war alone; rather, it was caused by an increase in meat prices in the producing countries and an increase in shipping costs.

'Umar Kan'an, a meat importer, says that Bulgarian and Rumanian meat is no longer arriving, because of the Iraqi-Iranian war, and that Australian meat prices have increased by 3 dirhams per kilogram. The wholesale price for mutton has come to 14 dirhams and for the consumer to 16 dirhams per kilogram. The price of frozen meat has gone to from 9.5 to 11 dirhams; some butchers sell it as if it were fresh,

exploiting the shortage, high demand and scant supply on the world market.

Muhammad Khammas says that the price of fresh meat imported from India rose from 10 to 20 dirhams there. For 9 months meat has no longer been coming from India because of measures the Indian government has taken but will probably be exported again at the start of next month.

This has raised the prices of meat, especially beef, whose price has risen to 25 dirhams for the consumer and 20 dirhams wholesale; the wholesale price of mutton has increased from 10 to 14 dirhams.

The Best Ways To Fight Inflation

What is the opinion of specialists in the Ministry of Economy and Trade and chambers of commerce and industry now?

Increased production and the availability of new income sources are the best means to combat inflation and cope with the increase in prices as officials from chambers of commerce and industry view it.

Economics experts consider that the solution lies in government intervention by establishing strong cooperative societies which are influential and can import commodities by themselves and set competitive prices for them which can bring down the general level of prices in the market. They consider that the main reason for the price problem is that some commodities are controlled by a limited number of merchants who set prices through their control of the supply and insist on obtaining a large profit margin which in the case of some commodities may come to 300 percent. In addition, importers and small dealers translate all increases in world prices to their advantage; if the increase is 5 percent, the consumer will suddenly be faced with an increase of 30 percent.

Sayf al-Gharir, chairman of the board of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Dubai, defends the merchants and assigns responsibility for the evolution of world prices by saying,

"There has been much talk about high prices and exploitation of these circumstances by some importers and merchants. The fact is that inflation has now become general in the whole world. Prices are constantly increasing and the value of currency is constantly decreasing. Most countries have been compelled to devalue their currency; we have found the consumer screaming and asking about the news in the papers, since his few dirhams are no longer enough to buy what he previously bought for the same price. Everyone has started groaning with complaints over inflation, because raises in personal salaries are no longer keeping up with the increase in prices.

"Advanced countries intervene to provide major goods and services at prices suitable for small consumers; the government must intervene by increasing production and income sources in an organized fashion solving people's problems, and providing the consumer with goods in appropriate ways at suitable prices."

The chairman of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry requests that the consumer be aware; if he does not like a merchant's prices, he should look for better,

lower prices because the free market has the advantage of competition which does not exist in other markets. He considers that dealing with increases in prices means increasing the number of shops, since this will increase competition, and high prices will cause investors and capital owners to build, establish and construct, which is the most important benefit of competition. Concerned figures and officials in the chambers of commerce and industry consider that the costs of large shops have their compensations and that obtaining goods from wholesalers and the market is better than looking for them in a supermarket, whose costs and profits are borne by the consumer and the small shop as well. Vendors in the market defray no expenses, and that influences the general price level.

The War Has Had No Effect

The chairman of the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry considers that our markets have not been influenced by the Iraqi-Iranian war, except in the case of certain minor goods which had been imported from these markets. He said "The effect falls on the two belligerent states, not on our markets."

Mr Sayf Ahmad al-Gharir says "It is the foreign companies which are benefiting all down the line; we, the officials, since we have surplus funds to invest in their countries and have interests which we are not developing, are leaving the price increases and the shipping and insurance costs to them, contenting ourselves with telling them 'You are exploiters.' The alternative, in my opinion, is for use to face their price increases by increasing output, to provide the ships that carry our cargoes, and to produce what we need. We should raise the prices of the oil we ourselves produce above the prices in the Rotterdam markets and bear the responsibility for that. A power plant annually consumes hundreds of millions in fuel and /illegible/ while the gas is released into the air. It is necessary that we benefit from it and also rely on fuel and oil to provide our drinking water, which is multiplying our burdens.

"I hope that the government will provide citizens with a productive project which will increase his income, double our production and create a base for the post-petroleum era, because increasing production will be an alternative and the only solution to the increases in prices."

An Alternative to Pricing

Experts in economics and planning in the Ministry of Economics and Trade consider that it is necessary for the state to intervene by establishing cooperative societies, since those are the most preferable alternative to the system of pricing or price setting, a system which has numerous problems and is based on the need to create an independent agency to conduct oversight over prices, engage in specific indoctrination of supervisors and promulgate a deterrent law. The lesson in their opinion is in the implementation, not penalties and laws.

Economists state that the prices prevalent in our markets are a direct translation of world prices and shipping and insurance costs, with a reasonable profit margin for the big merchant, some middlemen and retailers added in.

Experts estimate that the profit the retail merchant acquires from fruit and vegetables is no lower than 200 percent because of the nature of these goods and the

speed with which they are exposed to spoilage. This rate increases in the case of other foodstuffs and luxury goods because the merchant finds that any foreign increase is an opportunity to increase his prices and takes that as a justification.

Economists point to the massive profit margin which retailers obtain through the big discrepancy between the local price level and international prices, in addition to the phenomenon of sales, to which most stores resort in order to dispose of their surplus goods after they have realized sufficient profits. This is because the retailer insists on obtaining a greater profit and stands in solidarity with most merchants in confronting the consumer. This is apparent in the vegetable market. However, we find that prices do vary from shop to shop and town to town, and the reason is greed and lack of surveillance.

Officials in chambers of commerce and industry in the country have another opinion, which is that the small consumer goes to excess in his consumption and insists on obtaining certain goods which he can do without in the event they are in short supply or their prices are high. In this area, the consumer has lived off fish and meat a long time, and he can do without expensive goods for a while.

Between the recommendation of chambers of commerce and industry officials that production and opportunities for free competition be increased, and the view of economists regarding the provision of cooperative societies which are able to compete, lower prices and raise incomes, lie the means to confront the constant price increases.

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5 December 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2229

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RADIOELECTRONIC WARFARE IN ISRAELI-ARAB WARS

Moscow VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL in Russian No 7, 1980 signed to press 25 Jun 80 pp 65-71

[Article, published under the heading "In Foreign Armies," by Docent and Candidate of Military Sciences Engr-Lt Gen A. Paliy: "Radioelectronic Warfare in the Israeli-Arab Wars" (Based on foreign press materials); passages enclosed in slantlines printed in boldface]

[Text] Intensive electronic warfare was conducted in the Near East wars unleashed by Israeli aggressors in 1967 and 1973 against the Arab states. Radar, radio communications and radio navigation facilities set up active and passive electronic jamming. Attacks were delivered against radars by missiles homing in on the emissions, by tank subunits, artillery and sabotage groups. Radar and infrared decoys were employed to divert guided missiles from aircraft and ships. Radio deception was carried out. The RES [radio electronics] of the sides in turn were protected against electronic suppression and destruction by homing missiles.

/In June 1967/ Israel attached primary importance to the factor of surprise in attacking Egypt, Syria and Jordan. A large role was given to electronic warfare [EW] in this along with measures of operational cover and deception. Thorough reconnaissance was performed in EW interests during preparations for the aggression, at which time reconnaissance located the positions of radars, ZRK [surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems] and AAA batteries, control posts, communications centers, and the airfield network; and obtained data needed for conducting EW. As a result, even before the attack on the Arab states, Israel had vast information about their radio communications systems, primary and alternate frequencies of the RES, and state and military radio communications lines.

Israel's plan of aggression envisaged the disruption of interstate radio communications of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, disorganization of command and control and suppression of air defense radar operations. In carrying out their plan, the Israeli aggressors, in the first mass air attack on the morning of 5 June 1967, disrupted the operation of radars for detection and for control of aircraft and air defense weapons, and jammed radio communications between Cairo, Damascus and Amman. In order to achieve surprise

and bypass the Egyptian air defense system, attack forces of the aggressor aviation made a raid from the Mediterranean at altitudes of 150-300 m. On approaching the Egyptian shore, Israeli aircraft set up passive and active jamming of radars of the air defense troops. The radars and aircraft and air defense weapons control posts were destroyed in first order during strikes against airfields.[1]

On the first day of the aggression Israeli aircraft knocked out the Egyptian front communications center on the Sinai Peninsula. At this same time sabotage detachments landed there from helicopters destroyed the wire communications lines connecting the Egyptian General Staff with headquarters of the combined units. As a result the control of Egyptian troops on the peninsula was disrupted. The Israeli command performed radio deception by entering the radio communications of the Arabs' tank subunits and aircraft to transmit false orders and commands. As reported by the foreign press, the Israelis sometimes succeeded in assuming "control" of Arab tanks and aircraft and directing them to areas or to airfields occupied by Israeli troops.[2] For example, during the forward movement of the Egyptian 4th Tank Division on the Sinai Front to deliver a counterblow against the aggressor, Israeli deception personnel transmitted an order over this combined unit's radio net for a withdrawal of its regiment beyond the Suez Canal. The order was taken as genuine and the counterblow did not take place.[3]

In order to achieve surprise, the troop concentration areas and time were kept secret as radio facilities were used on a limited basis until the troops assumed the offensive. The regime of aircraft flights and operation of radio communications and radar facilities was kept unchanged.

These measures hindered the control of combat operations as well as the coordination of aircraft, air defense weapons and ground troops of the Arab states. As a result the Israeli command succeeded in achieving operational surprise in unleashing the war and inflicting serious damage on Egypt, Syria and Jordan in a seven-day period.[4]

During the Israeli-Arab war /in October 1973/ EW was conducted more intensively, with consideration of the experience gained in previous wars in the Near East and in Vietnam. A typical feature of this war was the fact that it reduced chiefly to a struggle by aircraft against air defense weapons and by tanks against antitank weapons. For this reason the EW also was conducted primarily for purposes of suppressing and protecting the RES of aircraft, air defense troops and tank units and subunits. The jamming of air defense electronics systems reduced air force losses and disruption of radio communications for control of tank units increased the number of tanks disabled by antitank guided missiles [ATGM's].[5]

Some 30 percent of attack aircraft in the Israeli Air Force were equipped with American electronic jammers and some of them were equipped with the Shrike antiradar missiles for reconnoitering and suppressing RES. Many F-4 aircraft had radar illumination warning gear and the ALQ-71 and ALQ-87

radar jammers, while the A-4 aircraft had warning gear, the ALQ-19 and ALQ-100 radar jammers and the ALQ-55 communications jammers.

By October 1973 the Israeli Air Force had 68 of the 400 warplanes equipped with communications jamming facilities. In addition, during the war Israel received in addition Shrike and Standard ARM missiles, automatic gear for jettisoning chaff packets and infrared decoys, as well as the ALQ-119 pod jammers for the F-4 aircraft. Several Phamtoms were refitted as EW aircraft by suspending on pylons four pods with two radio jammers and installing devices for launching Shrike missiles, as well as automatic equipment for dropping chaff and infrared decoys.[6]

At the beginning of combat operations chiefly passive radio jamming was performed for neutralizing radars by aircraft using the ALE-29 automatic equipment loaded with 32 pyrotechnic cartridges with chaff. In addition, aerial bombs with radio chaff were used, supplied to Israel by the Americans. In order to increase the capabilities for creating passive radio jamming during the war, 20 F-4 aircraft were fitted with the new ALE-38 automatic electromechanical equipment loaded with chaff packets made of fiberglas or aluminum foil. Israeli aircraft employed luminous decoy bombs to divert SAM's with an infrared [IR] homing head. But according to foreign military experts, the homing heads of Strela-type SAM's did not react to the emissions of these bombs, since their spectrum did not coincide with that of the gas jets of the aircraft engines, and they hit the targets. The strength of emissions of the IR decoys subsequently was increased. During the first week of combat operations, the foreign press reported that Arab air defense weapons shot down some 25 percent of Israel's A-4, F-4, Mirage and Super-Mystere warplanes.

After suffering telling losses from air defense weapons, the Israeli Air Force directed its main efforts to the fight against radars, control posts and air defense weapons and also shifted from mass strikes by groups of 24-30 aircraft to echeloned operations by small groups of 4-8 aircraft. Its operating tactics also underwent a change. The aircraft usually would fly at extremely low altitude (20-25 m). On approaching the zone of coverage of the Arab air defense weapons, they would deliver attacks with antiradar missiles from a distance of 20-25 km from the radars, then bomb radar and SAM positions, destroy fighter aviation on airfields and only after this shift to support of the ground forces. Strikes were delivered against SAM's with the simultaneous use of communications jamming, performance of an evasive maneuver and action by diversionary groups of aircraft. Communications jamming usually was accomplished from aircraft and helicopters flying over territory captured by the Israeli aggressors. The ALE-29 automatic equipment on Skyhawk aircraft would fire IR decoys with luminous tracers to divert SAM's with IR homing heads away from attacking aircraft. Instances were noted of the employment of American AQM-34H unmanned, controlled EW aircraft, which would approach the zone of SAM coverage 1.5-1 minute before the arrival of attack groups of aircraft, drop chaff packets and switch on active communications jammers. Their flight was controlled by radio command or by programs placed in their on-board program devices.

After mission accomplishment the aircraft would head to specific areas, where they would land by parachute or would be picked up in the air by helicopters.[7] Aircraft would conduct demonstrations simultaneously with the employment of EW facilities.

The Israeli Air Force prepared carefully for using EW facilities. Reconnaissance of strike objectives was accomplished by manned and unmanned aircraft approximately an hour before the take-off of the attack group. During preparations an analysis was made of air defense weapons and fighter and air defense weapons guidance systems in the vicinity of the strike objective. Then vulnerable elements were identified in the enemy air defense control systems and recommendations were developed for their electronic suppression and destruction. A planning table was drawn up based on these data. It defined the procedure for employing EW capabilities for the entire flight of the attack group and outlined the approach route to the target and operating procedures in delivering the attack.

Foreign military observers who analyzed the combat activities of the Israeli Air Force note that while it was able to deliver surprise strikes against airfields, air defense weapons, control posts, communications centers and radar stations in the 1967 aggression and thus ensure supremacy in the air and on the ground, it no longer succeeded in doing this in 1973. The SAM and artillery systems guided with the help of modern RES demonstrated particularly high results in the battle against Israeli aircraft. According to estimates of foreign military experts, 90 percent of the 110 enemy aircraft shot down by the Arabs' air defense weapons in the first days of the war were destroyed by SAM's and AAA and only 10 percent were shot down in aerial combat.[8]

In the opinion of foreign military specialists, the reasons for the poor effectiveness in suppressing RES were the small amount of EW facilities used at the beginning of combat operations and the narrow frequency band in which the jammers operated.[9] In addition, Israel allegedly did not have jamming capabilities against new RES for controlling SAM's, which inflicted particularly telling losses on its aircraft. The effectiveness of communications jamming performed by the Israeli Air Force was reduced by the fact that several types of RES were employed simultaneously in the mixed groupings of air defense troops of Egypt and Syria. This hindered their suppression using the communications jamming gear of aircraft, which had a limited range of frequencies.[10]

Taking account of the heightened combat capabilities of air defense weapons, foreign military specialists believe that there must be continued use, along with EW facilities of attack aircraft, of special manned and unmanned EW aircraft capable of destroying and suppressing electronic facilities by jamming in order for tactical aviation to overcome air defenses.

At the beginning of combat operations Israel's intelligence was not able to identify the new operating frequencies of Arab radars, which previously had not been noted in operation. The American APR-25, APR-26, APR-27 and

other radio receivers were not able to detect the operation of individual Arab radars and warn aircraft crews of radar illumination and the guidance of SAM's against the aircraft.

According to an admission of the foreign military press, the insufficient operating range of Shrike missiles forced Israeli pilots to enter the coverage zone of SAM's in order to launch them. The Arab crews of the SAM guidance radars took steps to combat the antiradar missiles. In addition, the low effectiveness of communications jamming facilities of the Israeli aircraft is explained by improper planning, insufficient coordination, clumsy operating tactics of the aircraft, the personnel's poor knowledge of the EW gear and also by the fact that some pilots were not switching on jammers at the beginning of the war, fearing to attract missiles and fighters by their emissions.

EW was conducted in the Israeli Navy using passive communications jamming facilities and by launching decoys, which supported strikes by Gabriel missiles from guided missile boats against surface ships and shore installations of the Arab countries. They operated primarily at night in coordination with helicopters which simulated guided missile boats and with aircraft which delivered strikes against shore radars and artillery positions.[11] For example, that is how several Israeli guided missile boats delivered strikes against Syrian naval ships in the vicinity of Latakia under cover of passive jamming in a sea battle on the night of 6/7 October 1973, destroying three guided missile boats and one minesweeper. On the night of 8/9 October six Israeli guided missile boats employed passive jamming in combination with maneuver in a battle against four Egyptian guided missile boats in the vicinity of Damietta (the Nile delta) and destroyed three Egyptian boats, losing but one.[12]

Ground-based EW subunits equipped basically with American communications intelligence and communications jamming gear also functioned in the Israeli Army. They were deployed on the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights within the tactical zone. The facilities of these subunits detected the operation of ground-based and aircraft RES in the frequency range from 2,000 to 16,000 MHz, determined the location of radar stations, control posts and SAM positions and performed communications jamming. They used the jamming in an attempt to disrupt control of aircraft and ground units of the Arab countries just as was done in June 1967.

In addition to the aircraft, shipboard and ground-based EW facilities, the Israelis employed expendable communications jammers. In addition, when the Israeli aggressors moved to the west bank of the Suez Canal their tank subunits and reconnaissance-sabotage groups destroyed SAM systems and radars of the Egyptian air defense troops.

As asserted by the foreign press,[13] after the mass use of EW facilities the Israeli Air Force's losses were reduced threefold at the end of the October war of 1973.

During the wars the Israeli military command organized intensive reconnaissance of RES by manned and unmanned aircraft, helicopters and boats as well as by reconnaissance-sabotage detachments. The United States helped Israel collect intelligence, using the SR-71 aircraft and the "Big Bird" ISZ [artificial earth satellite] for this purpose. Results of aerospace reconnaissance were made known to the general staff in Tel Aviv. For example, on 8 June 1967 Israeli aircraft erroneously attacked the American intelligence ship "Liberty" of the American Sixth Fleet near the shores of Egypt. She was outfitted with gear for communications intercept and for recording and analyzing radio signals.[14] On an assignment from the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), the ship was engaged in communications intercept and the recording and analysis of RES signals and clear-text and encoded radio conversations being conducted on the battlefield by troops of the Arab states and the Israeli aggressors. The intercepted signals and radio messages were being decoded and transmitted to American embassies in Near East countries, to the U.S. NSA and to the Israeli side. In addition, coded false orders in Arabic often would be transmitted from the "Liberty" to disrupt command and control of Arab troops for military unit commanders. For example, that was the case in the vicinity of El Arish, where the Egyptians were attempting to organize defenses. Obeying false orders for a withdrawal, which were later found to have come from the "Liberty," Egyptian troops abandoned the city without resistance.[15]

U.S. aerospace espionage has continued even after cessation of military operations in the Near East.

Employing new high-quality equipment sent by the Soviet Union, the Egyptian and Syrian armed forces conducted EW in order to disorganize the enemy's control and protect their own RES against suppression by communications jamming and destruction by homing missiles. To disrupt enemy control they would deliver strikes against control posts and RES and would set up active and passive communications jamming. For example, on 6 October the Egyptian Air Force delivered strikes against control posts and EW centers on the Sinai Peninsula and against the RES for control of aircraft located at airfields of Bir Gifgaf, El Arish, Ras Nasrani and Bir Tamada.[16] As a result, the Israeli command post in the Sinai, an EW center and several Hawk SAM systems were disabled. The fact that control of Israeli troops was transferred to the command post at El Arish and the jamming of Egyptian communications and radar facilities ceased can serve as proof of the effectiveness of these strikes.

To destroy air defense radars on the Sinai Peninsula, the Egyptian Air Force employed antiradar missiles, which disabled several radars. Arab troops employed reconnaissance-sabotage detachments to destroy control posts and RES. For example, on 6 October Syrian commando detachments seized and destroyed three communications intelligence, communications jamming and control centers in the vicinity of Hermon, Tell Obunada and Tell Faras. As a result the Israelis were deprived of the capability of conducting surveillance of Syrian troops and jamming the communications of Syrian Armed Forces.

Communications jamming subunits of Egypt and Syria disrupted radio communications controlling aircraft and ground forces and suppressed the operation of radio navigation systems and RES for guiding the Hawk SAM's. For example, on 6 October 1973 79 Syrian aircraft delivered a mass strike against Israeli troops in the vicinity of the Golan Heights under cover of active and passive communications jamming performed by aircraft and ground-based stations, losing only one aircraft. According to the foreign press, the communications jamming was so effective that the Israeli SAM systems and fighter aircraft were not able to operate against the Syrian aircraft.[17] Meanwhile, coordination between communications jamming subunits and communications intelligence was not organized in the Egyptian Army because of the negligence and mismanagement of the military leaders. Their work was not coordinated with troop combat operations. Therefore the communications jamming did not always disrupt control of the enemy's aircraft and ground forces units and combined units.

To conceal their electronic facilities, the Syrians and Egyptians would maneuver frequencies and carry out other measures. They would defend against communications jamming by using several types of RES in the air defense systems which operated in different modes and on different frequencies. They would conduct organizational measures and would employ protective gear. All these measures hindered the Israeli Air Force in detecting and suppressing air defense RES and required the more intensive use of EW facilities.

Visual observation and communications intelligence, which detected enemy aircraft according to the RES operating aboard them, also provided valuable information on the air enemy in suppressing air defense radars by jamming.

Thus, EW in the Arab-Israeli wars was distinguished by a high intensity and conducted with the use of a large amount of EW facilities, means of destruction by fire, and diverse electronic equipment in the air force, air defense, navy and ground forces. It has been said abroad that the basic lesson of the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967-1973 was the fact that the role and capabilities of EW both in offensive and defensive operations has increased considerably and continues to rise in modern warfare.[18] After conclusion of the wars the conduct of EW was analyzed in many capitalist states. Special attention is given to an analysis of the operating frequencies, duration, recurrence frequency, structure and other parameters of radio signals, knowledge of which is needed in perfecting the equipment, methods and tactics of EW. Its results have shown that some of the EW capabilities being employed were of insufficient effectiveness under combat conditions.

For this reason the directions of research and development of EW technology have changed somewhat abroad. Instead of individual capabilities they have begun to develop systems, which include communications intelligence gear, gear for active and passive jamming of RES, antiradar missiles and radar and IR decoys. Aircraft and helicopters of tactical, army and deck-based aviation are being fitted with EW facilities. As the experience of local wars indicated, this considerably increases their effectiveness in

performing combat missions. As a result of the fact that there were high losses of manned aircraft in local wars, the development of unmanned EW aircraft has stepped up. Expendable communications jammers, which demonstrated sufficiently high effectiveness, are being improved intensively. Countries participating in the aggressive NATO bloc have begun work of improving gear for the detection and warning of illumination of combat equipment by electro-optical means, for improving methods of reducing the military equipment's own emissions, and improving means of electro-optical suppression. There is an improvement taking place in the quality of homing weapons in which homing warheads can be targeted not only on radio emissions of RES, but also on infrared (thermal) emissions of military equipment.

EW tactics are being improved in numerous exercises of member states of the aggressive North Atlantic Alliance in Western Europe with consideration of the experience of the Arab-Israeli wars and use of the latest EW facilities and electronic technology intended for European theaters of military operations.[13]

FOOTNOTES

1. ARMY, No 8, 1967, p 28.

2. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 29 October 1973, Vol. 181, p 16.

3. AFRIQUE NOUVELLE [sic], Paris, No 7, 1967.

4. MILITARY REVIEW, No 9, 1967, p 59.

5. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 5 November 1973, Vol. 99, No 19, p 18.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid., 22 October 1973, Vol. 99, No 17, p 20.

8. NEWSWEEK, 5 November 1973, p 20.

9. Ibid., 29 October 1973, p 23.

10. NEW SCIENTIST, 25 November 1973, Vol. 60, No 869, p 267.

11. DEFENSE NATIONALE, January 1974, pp 182-185.

12. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, December 1973.

13. UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Vol. 102, No 10, October 1976, pp 42-49.

14. "Sekrety sekretnykh sluzhb SShA," [Secrets of the U.S. Secret Services], Moscow, Politizdat, 1973, p 149.

15. M. Heikal, "The Cairo [sic] Documents," New York, 1973, p 13.

16. AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY, Vol. 103, No 1, 7 July 1975, pp 16-20.

17. NEWSWEEK, 22 October 1973, pp 10-18.

18. IDR, Vol. 6, No 6, December 1973, pp 699-702.

19. INFANTRY, March-April 1974, p 380.

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EUROPEAN ISLAMIC COUNCIL WARNING

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 8 Nov 80 p 3

[Text]

LONDON, Nov. 7 (SPA) — The European Islamic Council has announced that about 50 millions Muslims in the Soviet Union are threatened by systematic cultural annihilation.

The council described how Soviet Muslims are prohibited from Islamic education, and their mosques are being transformed into museums opposed to Islam and places totally contradictory to the religion. The council circulated a memorandum to the delegates participating in the European Security and Cooperation Conference that opens in Medrid Tuesday.

The Islamic council said in the memo, of which a summary has been given to journalists, that there are only 450 mosques in which the Islamic ritual is practiced now in the Soviet Union. There were 25,000 mosques in the country before the revolution of October, 1917.

The council called on countries that signed the Helsinki agreement for European security and cooperation to raise the issue of continuous and dangerous violations of the basic rights of Muslims in the Soviet Union. It also urged the participants to call for the freedom of Muslims in practicing their religious rites, performing the pilgrimage, developing cultural, social and commercial relations with the Muslim world and the return of the Qaram guerrillas to their country.

CSO: 4820

FUNCTION OF TEHRAN SECURITY STAFF DISCUSSED

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 12 Oct 80 p 5

[Interview with Brother Zavareh'i, deputy minister of interior in charge of Tehran Security Staff]

[Text] Security, economic and social chaos are the natural byproducts of all wars and struggles. They are inevitable but could be brought under control to a great extent. Factors that usually add to the chaos could be isolated and dealt with properly. This is possible in two ways, by concentrated or scattered efforts. In other words, it would be impossible to achieve anything without a center or a point for coordination of all efforts and evaluation of possibilities. At the same time, the role that could be played by people throughout the country should not be forgotten. Past experience has proven that whenever society was faced with a mortal danger, people came together and were united. This tremendous power should not be overlooked. This is exactly what happened following the war imposed on us by Iraq which caused the formation of Tehran Security Staff. It is the duty and responsibility of the staff, which is the subject of this report, to become a focal point aimed at harnessing the scattered power and forces of devoted individuals in greater Tehran so that social, economic and mental security in the city could be assured. We have carried reports about devoted revolutionary forces in the past. Even if we had not reported that it would have been enough just to open our windows and watch our revolutionary people all over the place. It looks as if the spirit of the Almighty has been among our people everywhere in this land. In this report, we are visiting a center charged with coordinating these forces. Brother Zavareh'i, deputy minister of interior and the head of Tehran Security Staff answers our questions.

Responsibilities of Tehran Security Staff

Question: When and for what specific purposes did the Tehran Security Staff begin to operate?

Answer: After a sudden attack by Iraq against our bases and centers during the last days of the month of Shahrivar [23 Aug-22 Sep 80], the need for the formation of a staff capable of coordinating our wartime efforts was immediately felt. Soon after, at a meeting attended by representatives from the general police department, gendarmerie, revolutionary corps, the committee for mobilization of the poor, held at the ministry of interior, the Tehran Security Staff was born. Later, in

a directive sent to the Governors General, the formation for similar staffs were requested in the provinces. These were formed also by governors of various cities and towns.

Question: What is the difference between the Army General Staff and that of a city security staff?

Answer: The joint staff is concerned with matters of border incidents and conflicts and its communiques deal with news about armed conflicts. The Security Staff deals with internal affairs in the cities.

Question: What has been accomplished by the Tehran Security Staff since its formation?

Answer: The Staff is charged with two major responsibilities. One is security in the strict sense of the word. In time of war it is only natural for a series of problems and difficulties to develop in various areas of the country's economic and social life. Another responsibility of the Staff is that of planning designed to solve existing problems. With respect to security, coordination among the responsible organizations such as the police, the army, and the mobilization corps has been established and an operations headquarters for Tehran already has been formed. On the basis of divisions for the committees, Tehran has been divided into 14 districts. As a result, patrolling of the streets that was previously done by a single policeman from the police department, is now the responsibility of patrols made up of three people from the police department, the committees and the mobilization corps. Police and committee patrols also guard the city jointly. Regarding efforts to solve difficulties and problems created by war, committees have been formed to coordinate the related efforts. One such committee is that of firefighting. All organizations possessing firefighting equipment have been requested to coordinate their operation in order to be more effective during an emergency. Concerning medical care, a staff was established at the ministry of health following discussions about the matter. As to the fuel supply, committees are now studying the matter to assure an equitable distribution. There also exist an economic mobilization staff which is directly under the office of the prime minister. I am a member of that staff, representing the ministry of interior. As far as the foodstuff is concerned, thank God, we have no worries. There is also no need for rationing. But for distribution purposes, a foodstuff committee has been formed at the ministry of interior and hope to find out soon how it will work. For distribution of foodstuff we rely especially on mosques as our bases.

Propaganda Duties

Question: What are the future plans of Tehran Security Staff?

Answer: An important future task for us is that of propaganda and guidance. This war that has been imposed on us instead of doing us harm has become a factor to help rid us of the bad effects of the past. If we want to take advantage of this and make the most of it we must guide people and give them direction. One of the main goals of the imperialists during their years of domination of nations was to turn them into consumers and keep them away from spirituality. Now, an opportunity has arisen to inform those who are not yet quite familiar with our revolution, and try to return to our human selves.

We must try to make use of things to the extent that is necessary in our daily lives, discarding luxuries. In Tehran and other large cities, almost one third of the bread people buy is thrown away in the garbage cans. This is religiously wrong and economically harmful. Efforts must be made to prevent waste at public eating places (such as government self-services). As far as gasoline and kerosene are concerned, it is quite natural that our production will not be on the level as previous years, because the Abadan refinery has been bombed by the Iraqi mercenaries and is no longer operating. It is therefore necessary for people to conserve oil and refrain from entertaining or travelling. A family of four or five people should not live in separate heated rooms. They should conserve energy by keeping just one room warm.

What the enemy thinks will cause us discomfort, if we face them wisely, could help make new people out of us and enable us to rid our society from lethargy and the influence of western culture.

How to Resist

Question: As a responsible official, what message do you have for the people?

Answer: First, cut down consumption and conserve. Do not cause lines to be formed which is something our enemies and antirevolutionaries would like you to do. Observe the blackout. This does not mean that no one could turn on the light in his own house. It means that light should not be seen from outside. Cover your windows facing the streets. The ministry of energy does not cut off electricity to avoid public hardship.

Drivers are advised to cover their headlights with blue and drive with low headlights. At the same time, we would like to ask our loyal and concerned citizens to refrain from bothering those who observe these regulations. I have unfortunately noticed, some evenings on my way home, that people are harassed even though they drive with their headlights covered and on low beams. Yet, they are hollered at and ordered to turn off their lights. It is impossible to drive in absolute darkness. Therefore people driving with their headlights covered and on low beam should not be stopped. Out in the country, drivers must not proceed with country beams. The last thing I like to point out is that people must stop spreading rumors. This could be done in two ways. First, we can do this by advising simple and innocent rumormongers against it whenever we come across one and stop the rumor right there and then. Second, to get in touch with security authorities whenever we meet rumormongers with malicious intents.

Information Chamber

After my conversation with Brother Zavareh'i, I visited the information and newsroom. There were several telephones and a number of brothers were busy answering questions asked by people. I talked with Brother Ebrahimi who was in charge. He said:

"The vast information we receive from the people is extremely helpful. For example, after we are informed by neighbors of a light burning somewhere, we act through one of our 14 committees to turn it off. I recall a short time after Iraq had launched its military attack against us a Tehran University professor suggested that our

air force planes drop copies of Imam's communiques in Arabic over various towns in Iraq. The proposal was immediately passed on to the joint staff and was approved.

"People can get in touch with us by calling one of the following numbers: 5608021 [sic], 568023 and 568017. These are operating 24 hours a day to receive suggestions people have to offer."

Before my leaving the information center, someone called to say that flames were leaping from an old city trash area near his house. He then suddenly said "Iraqi migs are dropping bombs" and then hung up. At 4:50 pm the sound of airplanes and explosions made everyone rush to the balcony on the sixth floor. Two migs could be seen flying at low level, one of them leaving a thick smoke behind. A few minutes later, after the start of the red alarm, smoke columns could be seen in the distance.

People's Suggestions

At the end, I took notes of suggestions offered by people and telephoned to Tehran Security Staff for the purpose of printing them in the newspaper for the benefit of our readers.

A Brother by the name of Morovat Moradi telephoned to say that he and his friends with a private vehicle stand ready for anything they are asked to do.

Another caller suggested that in order to do away with kerosene lines mosques should be used as distribution centers.

A brother from the Voice of the Islamic Republic Radio called to suggest that the red "FF" lights [electric door openers] of homes should be covered by tape to make them invisible.

Another Brother telephoned to suggest that the Islamic Association of taxi drivers should be called upon to help transport passengers at nights.

A Brother by the name of Mehdi Khalkhali called to propose that all people should be given military training.

Another caller warned that air force pilots and military personnel should be instructed to be careful during their interviews not to give away military secrets.

Another caller's proposal was that of giving first aid instructions through mass media.

A Brother Mar'ashi called to say that it would be better if the date of the gasoline purchase by taxi drivers was written in their gasoline booklets.

Another caller suggested that emergency telephone numbers be repeatedly broadcast by radio.

One person asked that addresses and telephone numbers of recent army and revolutionary corps martyrs (killed in war with Iraq) be announced so that people could visit their families. He also suggested that memorial services for such people be announced so that people could attend.

Another suggestion was that a radio program in Arabic for the benefit of the Arabic speaking believe in our Islamic revolution be broadcast on wave lengths next to that of Iraq radio. It was also suggested that messages by Imam Khomeyni be broadcast in Arabic by our own radio.

A compatriot suggested that American spies should be transferred to oil refineries so that they could get a taste of Russian bombs Iraqi pilots are dropping at the instruction of the United States.

A Brother called to suggest that a revolutionary council for Iraq be formed to function the same way it did during the revolution in Iran.

A woman who had lived in Berlin during the bombing of that city, recommended that people collect their chinaware and other loose objects from shelves to reduce danger in case of a bombing. She also suggested that during explosions people should stand close to columns and keep their mouths half open [sic].

A Brother caller had two proposals to offer. He said that taxi drivers who spread rumors should be severely punished. He also suggested that repairmen (mechanics) should learn how to fix and repair agricultural machines and equipment.

A number of people living along the Karaj highway called to say that driving on the highway during the blackout hours should be banned because drivers were now driving at night with their country beams on.

Someone called to say that big motorcycle owners were filling their gasoline tanks with about 15 liters of gasoline at gas stations and then sell it at double the price. He recommended that the sale of gasoline to motorcyclists be limited to 5 liters each.

Another caller protested that a number of people were harassing drivers at nights even though they drove with their headlights covered.

One person suggested special uniform and insignias for Brothers now engaged in mobilization affairs and operations.

Finally, another Brother caller proposed that for the red sirens (during air raids) the existing loudspeakers in the mosques be used.

9561
CSO: 4906

MAYOR ANNOUNCES MOBILIZATION COUNCILS FOR TEHRAN

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 8 Oct 80 pp 2, 12

[Article: "341 Local Councils To Be Formed"]

[Text] With the establishment of the headquarters for general services mobilization in Tehran, training programs in first aid, military rescue operation, firefighting and that of organizing various boroughs of the capital have already gotten underway. In making the announcement, Tehran Mayor Engineer Tavassoli called on people to help set up local councils as quickly as possible in order to be prepared to face conditions created by war.

The mayor also added that as of 5 Mehr [27 Sep 80], local municipality branches in various sections of the city had been informed through a circular to prepare themselves to offer necessary training to people in first aid, firefighting and military operation, first for their employees, and next to the public, following formation of mobilization councils.

The mayor said that central mobilization headquarters had already been informed and with the help of the Red Crescent Organization had completed mobilization training plans for the deprived people and the municipality, on a city-wide basis. Concerning the objectives of the councils, he described these as that of mobilizing all city workers in order to help people during the war, giving first aid instructions, fighting fires and giving basic military instructions and organizing people in different districts by local mobilization councils. The mayor further added that as of 15 Aban [6 Nov 80], plans to divide the city of Tehran into 20 new districts and 341 subdistricts will soon be put into operation.

Regarding formation of local councils, the mayor said: "Under the existing war conditions, residents in each district should choose five trusted and honest individuals interested in civic duties, and introduce them to the headquarters of their local municipality. After their approval by the leader of the local mosque, they should be sent, along with two regional representatives, to take over the job of training people and organizing their area. This is to assure that all work is done voluntarily supervised by the local councils and that vital affairs of every area are managed by residents of concerned areas themselves. Engineer Tavassoli explained that formation of local councils had been under study for the past 18 months. He said that with the establishment of 20 districts and 341 subdistricts exact areas are now designated the lists of which have been distributed to local municipality branch offices. He further announced

that in the divisions, each district is divided into several smaller sections with the average population of each section reaching 10,000, based on 1355 (21 Mar 76-20 Mar 77) census. Some of these districts are designated by their local titles and some are designated by numbers.

Tavassoli also said that in recent weeks some 20 water tankers, equipped with repair gears, spare parts and accompanied by several mechanics had been dispatched to the war zone areas of Dezful and Ahvaz. Five ambulances from the Behesht-e Zahra cemetery had been dispatched to the war zone in the south along with six experts (firefighters) and one fire engine to Abadan refinery. A number of experts carrying firefighting equipment were also sent to the refinery in Tabriz. Cash contributions by municipal employees had been deposited to the special account number 77777 of the Red Crescent Organization.

In concluding his remarks, the mayor of Tehran expressed hope that people in every district in the country will soon take charge of the affairs in their own areas and that under the present war conditions form their local councils and prepare themselves to perform their duties. Telephone numbers of the central headquarters of the municipality, which is open 24 hours a day to extend whatever assistance it could are as follows: 658064 and 659323. The numbers for the 12 areas responsible for planning and coordinating military training, first aid, firefighting and rescue programs are as follows:

Telephone Numbers for the 12 Municipal Districts:

First district: 926195, 926060 and 924806; second district: 899669, 896342; third district: 363232, 363484 and 362777; fourth district: 542412; fifth district: 305433 and 305432; sixth district: 349051, 349052 and 34953; seventh district: 550771 and 550772; eighth district: 793242, 797907 and 791930; ninth district: 683085 and 683230; tenth district: 272176, 272644 and 270569; eleventh district: 9777700 [sic] and 979900; twelfth district: 593041 and 593042--extension 30.

9561
CSO: 4906

POLL SHOWS 50 PERCENT UNDECIDED ON KNESSET ELECTION

TA181203 Jerusalem POST in English 18 Nov 80 p 2

[Report by POST political correspondent Mark Segal: "Jerusalem POST Poll: Record 50 Percent of Voters Undecided"]

[Text] Nearly half of the electorate is undecided about what party to vote for in the next elections, according to the latest Jerusalem POST poll, taken at the end of October by the Modi'in Ezrahi Applied Research Center among a representative selection of 1,302 voters.

This largest yet undecided voting bloc has been swollen by erstwhile national religious party voters, apparently because of the police probe involving Religious Affairs Minister Aharon Abu-Hatzera. The NRP dropped to nine seats in this poll, compared with 12 in the previous August-September poll.

The Likud and the Labour Alignment remain more or less stable at 22 and 58 Knesset seats respectively. In the general election in May, 1977, the Likud returned 45 seats and Labour 32.

It appears that the NRP losses may have slightly helped the Likud but not, as might have been expected, the ultra right-wing Tehiya, which has declined from the previous poll's projected three seats to one in the latest survey.

The lost 3 percent in the NRP support surfaced in the undecided bloc of voters, which rise from the last survey's 42.6 percent of the electorate (undecided, 26.5 percent; won't vote, 9 percent; won't say, 7.1 percent) to the current record level of floating voters of 45.4 percent (undecided, 32.5 percent; won't vote, 7.8 percent; won't say, 5.1 percent).

According to centre director 'Amiram Yarqoni, only 25.1 percent of those who voted for the Likud in 1977 would today choose that party. Yarqoni noted that only 18.7 percent of ex-Likud voters had switched to Labour and 43.1 percent had slipped into the floating voters bloc. He noted a high 73.6 percent fidelity among former Labour voters, with only 0.4 percent of former Labourites switching to Likud and 22.3 percent of former Labour voters undecided.

According to the poll, there is a high level of undecided voters among old supporters of the Democratic Movement for Change, now amounting to 48.6 percent, with 39.1 of old DMC voters having switched to Labour and only 3.6 percent going to the Likud.

The older the voter the higher the level of indecision, and 43.4 percent of the floating vote belong to the lower educational brackets (part of the traditional Likud constituency), according to the poll.

Further confirmation of this prognosis was the inclination of higher status voters towards Labour, with the residual support of the Likud still apparent towards the lower end of the education and income scale. The Likud also enjoys more backing among the oriental communities (18.3 percent) than among those of western origin (7.9).

Labour, on the other hand, enjoys almost equal support from all the communities (27.6 percent of oriental communities and 34.4 percent of westerners).

Likud is stronger among those defining themselves as traditional (17.4 percent) compared to 8.2 percent among the secular-minded.

The poll results:

Parties	October-November percentage	MKS	August-September percentage	MKS
Likud	18.2	22	17.8	21
Labour	48.4	58	48.5	58
NRP	7.7	9	10.1	12
Aguda and Poalei Aguda	5.8	7	5.1	6
Democrats	0.1	--	0.2	--
Shinui	0.6	1	0.3	1
Tehiya	1.1	1	2.0	3
Others	18.1	22	16.0	19

CSO: 4820

PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON MINISTER ABU-HATZERA

TA211107 Jerusalem POST in English 21 Nov 80 p 2

[Report by political correspondent Mark Segal: "Jerusalem POST Poll: Suspending a Probed Minister"]

[Text] An overwhelming majority of the public believes that a minister involved in a police investigation should suspend his cabinet duties, according to a poll conducted for the Jerusalem POST.

The poll was conducted by Modi'in Ezrahi Applied Research Centre against the background of police inquiries into allegations of corruption against Religious Affairs Minister Aharon Abu-Hatzera.

The response to the question "Should a minister against whom a police inquiry is being conducted take leave from his duties?" was 74.3 percent positive, 24.4 percent negative and 4.3 percent undecided.

According to centre director 'Amiram Yarqoni, the heaviest demand for a minister under investigation to take leave was among the better educated--82.6 percent, western communities--81, white collar workers--78, the secular--81.6, the better-off--84.1, Jerusalem residents--86.2, inhabitants of the urban areas and rural districts--79.4 each, and labour voters--81.4 percent.

A more forgiving attitude was found among those at the bottom of the educational scale--65.5, and among lower income levels--66.9, and blue collor workers--68.5

A similar attitude was found among oriental communities--64.1, the religious section of the population--57.5, residents of Tel Aviv--64.9, and of the new immigrant towns--59.9. The level of tolerance was particularly high among voters of government parties--of the Likud--68.1, the NRP--66.9 and the Aguda block--44.4 percent.

The poll was conducted among a representative sample of 1,302 adults.

CSO: 4820

NAVON INTERVIEWED ON PEACE PROCESS, RELATIONS WITH EGYPT

TA141102 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Nov 80 p 15

[Interview with Israeli President Yitzhaq Navon by political correspondent 'Uzi Benziman: "Al-Sadat Has a Genuine Interest in Continuing With Peace"; date and place not given]

[Text] Question: Is the peace Egypt established with Israel a genuine peace or a trick to recover the Sinai Peninsula?

Answer: The circumstances that led Al-Sadat to establish peace with Israel have not changed. The return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt has not been the Egyptian President's only consideration, although it is an important one. First indications of the Egyptian intentions to settle its conflict with Israel were already detected in the interim agreements: their readiness to allow free passage of Israeli goods through the Suez Canal and the declaration included in the interim agreement that the next stage would be a peace treaty.

Egypt's interest in reaching a settlement with Israel are fundamental: Their determination to assure free passage of vessels through the Suez Canal, the desire to solve the complicated Egyptian demographic problem, their aspiration to develop the Suez Canal and not to endanger the renovated Suez Canal towns with a war. After the 6-Day War Egypt accepted the Soviet proposal and integrated a wealthy and educated sector of the population into the army ranks. For the first time in the Yom Kippur War these families suffered the agony of bereavement. This phenomenon also had an impact on the views of Egyptian policy-makers regarding the need to reach an agreement with Israel. The Arab masses regarded the Yom Kippur War as an important diplomatic, political and psychological victory. However, militarily speaking, following the initial accomplishments of the Arab armies in the first days of the war, the IDF advanced close to the Egyptian and Syrian capitals and threatened their armies and regimes.

The Egyptian leadership remembers this. It would be recalled that it was Egypt that asked for a cease-fire. In a message to President Al-Asad on the occasion of the declaration of a cease-fire during the Yom Kippur War, Al-Sadat wrote more or less: following lengthy days of war I have concluded that we are not only fighting against Israel but also against the United States. I

am not ready to again witness the destruction of the Egyptian Army. My heart bleeds while I am writing these words to you but I am prepared to be tried by history.

Al-Sadat wanted to get rid of Soviet tutorship and get the support and assistance of the United States. In order to achieve this he had to settle his conflict with Israel. Therefore, the main reasons that led Al-Sadat to end the conflict with Israel are still valid. Under no circumstances is there a certain and absolute guarantee that the situation might change suddenly. However, the Egyptian situation and Al-Sadat's attitude indicate that his desire to have peace with Israel is fundamental. Moreover, it is worthwhile to judge leaders based on the way they speak to their people. This is a very good criterion by which to evaluate a policy. In Arabic, Al-Sadat talks to his people about peace. Time and again he talks to the Egyptians about this issue and reiterates the importance of peace and the key role peace plays in Egyptian policy. He argues about it with the academic staff at Alexandria University, he speaks about it in the parliament, he emphasized Egypt's determination to honor its commitments toward Israel. Al-Sadat believes in his just way and promises the Egyptian people that the other Arab nations will follow in his steps. Following the talks I had with Al-Sadat and other Egyptian personalities I gained the impression that they are very determined to establish peace with Israel.

Question: At what price?

Answer: Obviously, they pose several conditions for an agreement. Egyptian writers want to experience peace and, as far as they are concerned, this depends on the solution of the Palestinian problem and Israel's adjusting to their positions on various topics; an agreement should be reached on this point. They distinguish between full peace and a formal peace.

Question: What do you think about the peace conditions posed by Egypt?

Answer: The basic premise in my contacts with the Egyptians was: there is a written agreement which should be entirely exhausted. We should persuade the Egyptians to enhance the normalization in the relations between the two countries. I do not interfere into the question of whether, where and on which issues a compromise can be attained.

Question: Among the people who accompanied you to Egypt there were those who returned to Israel full of anxiety about Al-Sadat's intentions.

Answer: When President Carter arrived in Israel in March 1979 to complete the negotiations on the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty I told him that we were contributing tangible and irretrievable assets to peace, such as the air bases, military installations and oil resources and that there was an incompatibility between our investment in the peace process and the Egyptian contribution which was, essentially, their recognition of Israel. The Egyptian investment in the peace treaty is abstract and can be withdrawn easily. This is the reason for anxiety regarding peace and its price. I said

this to Carter. In my last visit I told Al-Sadat that it was important to deepen and expand the foundations of normalization in the relations between Israel and Egypt in order to dispel anxieties and suspicions and to increase confidence. I explained to the Egyptians that the tangible assets we conceded should be reciprocated by putting into practice the words of the peace treaty. There is a peace treaty stipulating conditions and this treaty should be exhausted.

Question: There are those who describe Al-Sadat as a sly artist who regards peace as a trick to lure Israel into a trap.

Answer: My impression is that Al-Sadat has a genuine interest in continuing with peace. He sees the nature and strength of peace differently than us because he has other considerations, such as the attitude of the Arab world toward Egypt. However, he fundamentally adheres to the peace process. The Egyptians tell us: We have given you what you have always wanted--recognition of your existence. What you are giving us in return are assets that belong to us. One should bear in mind the Egyptian view which differs from our feelings.

Question: The impression was gained that the cabinet handled the reports about your talks in Egypt in a bizarre way.

Answer: I have no complaints about the way the prime minister behaved upon reading and listening to my impressions about Egypt.

Question: Did you discuss with Al-Sadat the possibility that a Republican administration may be in charge in the United States?

Answer: I presume that there will be a temporary pause in the negotiations on the autonomy because of the results of the U.S. presidential election.

Question: Is Egypt at all interested in reaching an agreement on the autonomy before the return of the rest of the Sinai Peninsula?

Answer: They want to reach an agreement which will be the closest possible to their views about the nature of the autonomy. It is not convenient for them to reach April 1982 (the date for completing the IDF's withdrawal from the Sinai) without reaching an agreement on the autonomy. They are afraid that in that case the Arab world will accuse them of abandoning the Palestinians and giving absolute priority to Egyptian matters only.

Question: Were you surprised at Al-Sadat's attitude toward the Labor Party's ideas regarding an arrangement for Judaea and Samaria?

Answer: No. It has been published that Al-Sadat is opposed to imposing autonomy on Gaza first before an agreement has been reached on the nature of the autonomy and that, at this stage, he objects to a "Jordanian solution" for Judaea and Samaria.

Question: Would peace be threatened if Israel and Egypt did not reach an agreement on the autonomy?

Answer: The Israeli-Egyptian agreement on the establishment of the autonomy will determine the nature and quality of peace and relations between the two nations. The absence of an agreement on the autonomy would not necessarily threaten the very existence of peace. However, without an agreement on the autonomy this would be a cold and formal peace, a sort of an end to the state of belligerency.

CSO: 4805

YADIN DISCUSSES RELATIONS WITH REAGAN ADMINISTRATION, EGYPT

TA092030 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 9 Nov 80

[Evening Newsreel interview with acting Prime Minister Prof Yiga'el Yadin by political correspondent Shim'on Schiffer in Jerusalem on 9 November--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Professor Yadin, what do you think Israel should do now to explain its positions to the new administration in the United States?

[Answer] We first have to know who will be in that administration. As for the president--we know who he is. However, unlike other systems, in the United States at least 3,000--if not 4,000--people called officials, and cabinet members there are also officials, are replaced. It is only natural that our information efforts, both by the Israeli Embassy or by the government, are always directed at those who are in power at the time because then you know who you are addressing yourself to and you know whom you must talk to regarding each decision. Well, then, in my humble opinion the first thing is to know who constitutes the new administration, not only who is the president, but who are the cabinet members, the advisers, the undersecretaries and the like. I think this will be our first mission: to know who they are, to establish contacts with them and, in many cases, perhaps explain again our basic positions.

[Question] Do you share the assessment that the positions of the new administration, or the newly-elected president, are closer to the national consensus in Israel on various issues?

[Answer] Assuming that what was said prior to the elections is fulfilled--and I hope it is, because more than at any time before, the president will here be faced with the problem of credibility--no doubt Reagan's declarations, promises and remarks are often more similar and convenient to Israel in terms of the national consensus, such as the attitude toward the PLO, the matter of a Palestinian state and the Jerusalem issue--it is not exactly what we want, but it is at least positive--and to a certain extent even what he said about the settlements, and anyone who so wishes can interpret his remarks as constituting an approval of the present government's maximal settlement plan. However I, who do not agree with this plan, regard this as a certain kind of endorsement of all the settlements [hityashvuyot vehitnahaluyot] in the Jordan Rift Valley, in Syria [as heard, presumably meaning the Golan Heights, previously Syrian territory] and other places regarding which former

U.S. administrations have never made a distinction between what was done according to one party's platform, or another, viewing any settlement established since 1967 as being illegal. I would say that, judging by the opinions he expressed, he is undoubtedly a lot more positive toward the national consensus.

[Question] Reagan talked about Israel's role in a strategic alliance in the region. Do you think there is now room for suggesting a strategic pact or offering to Reagan to establish U.S. bases here or in the Sinai?

[Answer] I must say that people sent several months ago on behalf of Reagan--he, of course, was not here, although Anderson did come--to explain Reagan's position had one main message to deliver, which they emphasized to us time and again, namely that Reagan regards Israel as a strategic asset. This was not said as a result of the voters' influence or merely because of emotional problems. [as heard] Even with the current administration we hold talks in the style of a strategic dialoque from time to time. There is no doubt in my mind that now it will be with much greater ease and clarity that we will be able to ask them what a strategic asset means; how do you regard it, how do we regard it.

The two specific questions you raised have already been raised by the prime minister several times when he said that he would be able to make recommendations to the cabinet on some issues you had previously mentioned, provided of course that a request for that comes from the American side. Then we will see. Yes, I see this as an important subject which I think soon, when the new administration starts operating, we will be able to ask: What does a strategic asset mean to you and then explain what we regard it to be.

[Question] One assessment says that the Reagan administration will move away from the Camp David accords and not act according to them. Do you share this assessment?

[Answer] Let me tell you, this has to do with futurology and not with archeology [Yadin's profession]. It is very difficult to predict and I doubt that anyone knows. It is true that some advisers to Reagan, such as Jackson or Kissinger, even though they are not administration advisers but are advisers in setting up the administration, we are acquainted with each one's views. I have a feeling that at least until they realize--if they realize this at all--that it is impossible to exhaust or implement the accords, they are hardly likely, in my opinion, to come up with new suggestions. Do not forget that the administration, again as per Reagan's declarations, is not looking forward to plans demanding cooperation with the Soviets. At this juncture, any deviation from the Camp David accords will again lead to Geneva, or to the United Nations where the Soviets, too, have a say. This is my evaluation. Of course, should it transpire that it is impossible to implement the accords for whatever reason, they may look for alternative solutions. The media mentioned all sorts of things--such as solution by stages and the like. I think the Camp David framework will be sustained both in terms of one administration's commitment to pursue those made by preceding administrations and also because I cannot foresee another solution that they could at this point suggest.

[Question] Finally, Sir, a question that has nothing to do with the Reagan administration but with another regime, that of President Al-Sadat: It became known today that President Al-Sadat said during various conversations with President Navon that he would not allow any Egyptian personality to come to partake in an event that takes place in Jerusalem. In your opinion how should Israel react to this move?

[Answer] I do not know what he told President Navon and, therefore, I cannot comment on what you said, if indeed he had said so.

The problem is Butrus Ghali's statement, and it is very important. We would like talks to be held in Jerusalem, of course. In fact, apart from President Al-Sadat's visit, only once did a committee which was ultimately disbanded, sit at the Jerusalem Hilton. All the meetings pertaining to autonomy in fact took place in Beersheba, Netanya, Herzliyya--at least in two of those places--and it was not by sheer coincidence. The fact of the matter is that we would like meetings to take place in Jerusalem, but we must also remember, even though I come not to justify them, that there are countries with which we have if not a peace treaty, then at least full normalization, which also have a reserved position toward Jerusalem, to use an understatement. We can only plead, but it would be very difficult to argue against the Egyptians and say: Why do you not come to Jerusalem, because they in turn could say: Why did this country or that country remove its embassy from Jerusalem? At the same time, I believe that President Al-Sadat, in addition to other things, also very pragmatic and does not insist too much on these matters. I think that when the negotiations are resumed in effect and no great commotion in principle is raised on them and no pressure is applied on him on that point--and I saw that on a certain television program by, of all networks, our own television, it was precisely Israelis who pressed him five times: what about Jerusalem, what about Jerusalem--one must understand that we, at least, should not make things more difficult for them. I hope that ultimately deliberations will also take place here. With respect to peace, what I would like to see is progress and that negotiations take place. Whether this occurs in al-'Arish or Beersheba or Netanya--at this stage they, too, will be fine. We will one day also reach the next solution, but this will take time.

[Schiffer] Mr Acting Prime Minister, thank you very much.

[Yadin] Thank you.

CSO: 4805

'MA'ARIV' OPINION ON WHAT NATION CAN EXPECT FROM REAGAN

TA141640 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 14 Nov 80 p 16

[Commentary by Yosef Harif: "Reagan's Aides Soothe Begin: President Reagan Will Keep 'Most of His Promises' to Israel"]

[Excerpts] What has happened since Reagan won the victory about a week ago that has suddenly sowed a lack of confidence about the future? Suddenly the Israeli Government has been assailed by a "links madness." We must develop links with the Republicans--this was said almost in a panic during the cabinet session. Two ministers asked: Why did Ambassador 'Evron not make ties with the Republicans in time? There was more than a trace of blame in their questions for the ambassador's "blunders."

It seems there is no point in panic which, as far as can be seen, is the result of an Israeli complex of looking for faults in ourselves. Do "ties" per se embody some sort of special magic with the power to work new miracles in Israeli-U.S. relations? When Israel had "ties" with the outgoing Carter-Brzezinski administration, was its life always sweet? Did not that administration try, in its own obscure way, to bring about Begin's downfall? In all the policy following Camp David, was not the fact that the United States was almost entirely identified with the Egyptian side in the autonomy talks outstanding? What about the outgoing administration's untiring courting of the PLO? How did the so-called existing ties with the Democratic administration help in foiling the U.S. anti-Israeli votes in the Security Council on Jerusalem and the settlements in Judaea and Samaria?

Israel would do well to show patience and not panic and, most importantly, to stop debasing itself in the view of everyone by this dishonorable perpetuation of who is guilty of not having made ties with the Republicans.

The ties will come, but they are not the main point.

It is U.S. interests that will guide Reagan's administration, just as they did for the policy of all its predecessors, Democrat and Republican, and not necessarily the "tie" of this or that Jewish businessman or one of the president's confidants. By the way, as proof that it is still too early to concentrate on looking for ties, we can use the fact that Ambassador 'Evron appealed to Ted (Cummings), one of Reagan's Jewish confidants (apparently on the matter of holding a meeting between Reagan and Begin) and the result was that the same (Cummings) whose familiarity with Jewish affairs is not, for the moment, especially great, turned for advice on this matter to... Max Fisher....

Perhaps there is a point in drawing encouragement from the mission Reagan gave to Richard Allen. Allen was sent to welcome Begin and to promise close cooperation. It may be no coincidence that the man chosen to represent Reagan in this case is Richard Allen, who is the same man Reagan sent to meet Begin in [word indistinct] in June—the start of [words indistinct].

Israel can certainly console itself with one thing: the Reagan administration cannot be worse than the Carter administration. But perhaps it will be better if its policy is affected by Reagan's recognition that a guaranteed oil flow is not necessarily dependent on a solution--ala PLO--to the Palestinian problem and that Israel must not be pressured and weakened since this--as he phrased it--would weaken the U.S. position. If only he adheres to these two principles, then Israel will be left with a maneuvering space board enough for the continuation of the peace process.

It is a fact that since 1967 no U.S. administration has been able to impose a solution on Israel although attempts of this sort have been made (the "Rogers Plan" was the basis of one such solution). Israel's position today, despite the West's dependence on oil, is much stronger. In the current Middle East reality characterized by the fall of the Iranian shah, the Iraq-Iran war, Syria, torn apart from outside and from within and bogged down in Lebanon and, mainly, the existence of a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel (whatever the creaks of the "normalization") Israel is not so dangerous. When Reagan speaks about Israel--as he has done--and his close aide, Richard Allen, tells Begin over and over again: "It must be clear to you that our policy is not determined by a Jewish vote and proof of this is what Reagan wrote 1 year before he was a presidential candidate." Why should Israelis be so panicky and almost hysterically search for "ties?"

Will Reagan keep all his promises to Israel?

No, frankly, he will not. But it will be sufficient if he keeps an appreciable part of them for the political and military situation to be immeasurably better than it has been up to now. While Begin is visiting the United States people are trying to bring him information about what is currently going on in Reagan's close circle. The latest information--beyond what Begin heard from Richard Allen--is that "according to the evaluation of his close advisers, Reagan's attitude toward Israel has always been warm and friendly and he will keep most of his promises."

Nobody has ever expected a presidential candidate to keep all of his promises. If Reagan really keeps most of his promises--and, after all, from Israel's viewpoint he said and promised so much--then this will be Israel's greatest achievement.

CSO: 4805

NABULUS COURT SENTENCES TWO 'TERRORISTS'

TA141500 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 14 Nov 80 p 6

[Report by 'Amos Levav: "Two Terrorists Sentenced in Nabulus to 15 and 17 Years in Prison"]

[Text] Yesterday the Nabulus Military Court sentenced two terrorists, described as holding senior positions in their terrorist organizations, to 15 and 17 years in prison.

Khalid Ahmad ('Atamanah), 33, from Janin, was sentenced to 17 years in prison. Military prosecutor Lt Yosef Hiqri described him as the "region's main weapons supplier." The prosecutor determined that ('Atamanah) had supplied sabotage and explosive materials to terrorist squads--that had, among other things, tried to lay an explosive charge on the Bat Galim coast--and was captured by swimmers. Fifty detonators and 2 kg of explosive material were found in his house.

Lieutenant Hiqri accused ('Atamanah) of being a meber of Fatah since 1967, when he went to Syria on his own initiative and joined the organization. "He holds the most senior status in the organization," the prosecutor commented. He added that ('Atamanah) was connected with two Israeli-Arab terrorists from Galilee who had laid sabotage materials in Karmi'el, 'Akko and Nahariyya.

The judges, presided over by Maj Mordekhay Peled, decided: "It is only seldom that one can find a man of the type of the accused, who is so adherent to evil objectives of sowing ruin and destruction."

Hisam Yusuf (Khattatbah), 22, from Bayt Furik village near Nabulus, was sentenced to 15 years in prison. Lieutenant Hiqri accused him of being a member of the People's Front for the Liberation of Palestine and of having tried last March to bring sabotage materials over the Jordan River, together with two of his friends. However, the river had risen and the trio were unable to make the crossing. They waited for a month and in April they succeeed in bringing in an "enormous quantity" of ammunition and sabotage materials.

The court decided that this was one of the gravest cases ever brought before it and accepted the prosecutor's remarks that the supply of explosive material to terrorists was the "breath of life to the terrorist organizations; without it they cannot function."

CSO: 4805

SOVIET PEACE COMMITTEE DELEGATION ARRIVES

TA041923 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1815 GMT 4 Nov 80

[Text] Ben-Gurion Airport, 4 Nov--The Soviet peace committee delegation arrived in Israel this evening for a week-long visit as the guest of a public committee of Knesset members from different parties who visited the Soviet Union 2 years ago on behalf of the peace movement.

At Ben-Gurion Airport the head of the delegation, Prof (Oleg Aleksandrovich Ratov), said the delegation hopes that the talks conducted in Israel will lead to improved mutual understanding between Israelis and Russians and will aid in solving the Middle East conflict.

Asked whether it is not desirable to improve relations between the two peoples by a resumption of the diplomatic relations between Israel and the Soviet Union the head of the Soviet delegation said the Soviet Union does not entertain prejudices against Israel. "We only represent a Soviet organization but it is known that the Soviet Union severed relations with Israel following Israeli acts of aggression and it is not only the Soviet Union that cut off relations with you," he said.

Asked what the Soviet peace committee is doing in view of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan Prof (Andrey Mikhaylovich Zakharov), a representative of the Soviet peace committee, said that the committee supports Soviet policy in Afghanistan against any foreign intervention in this country.

The other delegation members are Mr (Kobert Varshenovich Markarian), a senior official of the peace committee, and Mr (Yuriy Leibovich Chernov), a secretary of the Soviet Painters' Union.

The delegation was received by Knesset members Avraham Melamed (NRP), Naftali Feder (MAPAM), Charlie Biton and Tawfiq Tubi (from RAKAH).

Congratulating the guests MK Feder said he hopes the visit will enable the guests to acquaint themselves with the peace-seeking Israel and help them "get rid of the stereotype of the Israeli as present in the Soviet Union."

No details have been released yet on the visit's schedule since the guests first wanted to coordinate the plan with the Russians. According to the plan they will tour the country, meet with various groups of people on kibbutzim, in plants and in the Knesset and will hold talks. No meetings have been scheduled for the visitors with government representatives.

CSO: 4805

POSSIBLE AGREEMENT WITH EGYPT ON BORDERS IN WEST BANK

TA141649 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 14 Nov 80 pp 3, 15

[Commentary by Dalya Shehori: "Possible Agreement on the Border in the West Bank"]

[Text] Unlike Israel which in the U.S. presidential election gambled on Carter and abandoned Reagan, Al-Sadat is playing it both ways regarding Israel. He conducts talks on normalization and the autonomy with Begin and, at the same time, invites the Labor Party leaders to visit him. Al-Sadat has probably found it easier to be wiser because public opinion polls in Israel are so unambiguous and because there is no doubt about him being at a dead end as far as Begin is concerned. In any case, the visit of the Labor Party delegation composed of Shim'on Peres, Abba Eban and Hayim Bar-lev conducted in Egypt last week provided the opportunity for a political dialoque and for comparing positions and set the way for continuing the peace process after the Israeli leadership has changed.

At the end of the talks with the Labor Party delegation a rather lengthy joint communique was issued. Among other things, it stated that "the two delegations expressed the hope that the peace process would keep its constant momentum and would eventually be joined by Jordanian and Palestinian representatives in order to assure its full success." It was also noted in the joint communique that "the National Democratic Party has accepted the invitation of the Israeli Labor Party to attend its convention" and that additional consultations and contacts would be held between the two parties.

It is not clear from the communique whether the Labor Party and the Egyptian ruling party reached an agreement regarding Jordan. One gets the impression that if there were any differences of opinion they were blurred out of the desire not to stress differences about an as yet unconceived issue. After all, Jordan is not anxiously knocking on the door to join the negotiations and in case it does so in the future (why not in the framework of the autonomy plan?) Al-Sadat would not object to it.

It seems that the differences between Al-Sadat and the Labor Party regarding Jordan stem from differences in temperament and emotional feelings rather [than] from political evaluations. Al-Sadat does not harbor any feelings toward King Husayn whereas the Labor Party regards him as a partner and

wants him to be part of any agreement reached in the region, perhaps because of the good experience the Labor Party has had with him over the years. Once I heard a senior Israeli politician from the Labor Party refer to Husayn with deep appreciation and recount the various occasions on which there was full and reliable cooperation with him.

Yet, at Camp David Al-Sadat explicitly acted not to include Jordan in the talks. Did he act so because he believed that Jordan might block the solution of the Palestinian problem? Or, maybe he feared that acting jointly with Jordan already in the initial phases would increase reservations in the Arab world about him? In any case, it is rather clear that various considerations lead both Al-Sadat and the Labor Party in their attitude toward Jordan. Apparently, the right reaction to these possible differences has so far been not to stress them since there is no need for it.

One of the confidential accomplishments reached in the dialogue between the Labor Party and President Al-Sadat's party was the remark made by Dr Butrus Ghali from which it emerges that Egypt does not necessarily advocate a full Israeli withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 boundaries in the West Bank. During a symposium conducted by the OCTOBER magazine, MK Abba Eban explained that under no circumstances would Israel return to the 4 June 1967 boundaries in the West Bank. Party Deputy Chairman Dr Mustafa Khalil--the former Egyptian prime minister and minister of foreign affairs--replied that in the era of missiles territories were not important. There were effective substitutes such as demilitarization and arrangements in the field which would avail Israel with effective supervision and defense without controlling the West Bank.

Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Dr Butrus Ghali added: "The question is what is the Labor Party's map as far as the West Bank is concerned. There is a difference if you think about 10 percent (where you will remain) [last four words are author's notation] or if you think about more." This was the first time that an Egyptian personality raised the possibility--although merely in a preliminary question--that Israel will not fully withdraw from the West Bank. He spoke about 10 percent and the Israeli participants regarded this as a reason for double rejoicing in that the very principle on total withdrawal was being cancelled and that the 10 percent issue could be regarded as a starting position.

Labor Party Chairman Shim'on Peres did not answer Dr Ghali's question, since he had not come to Cairo to draw maps. Nevertheless, it was decided to leave the Egyptian remarks in the minutes of the meeting. Later, Peres replied to Dr Ghali and he noted that the Alon plan--which is based on an Israeli presence in unpopulated strategic areas--signified a withdrawal to an area which constitutes 30 percent of the West Bank. Peres added that there was a difference between the international border in the Sinai and the border in the West Bank because the latter had never been determined and could be for the first time drawn through negotiations.

The Labor Party delegation emphasized that its position concerning a territorial compromise was not only founded on the realization that the Palestinians were a political problem but also on the opinion that it was immoral to rule 1.25 million Arabs. The Egyptians were impressed by this

explanation, or, at least, this is what the Israelis thought. The Egyptians asked about settlements in the West Bank. The Labor Party leaders explained that they supported the existence of several settlements and had yet to make up their minds regarding others. Evidently, the Egyptians wanted to hear that when the Labor Party assumed power and participated in the negotiations it would agree to remove settlements in the West Bank. However, all they were told was that the Labor Party's approach on the settlements was a selective one, based on security considerations and totally different from the Likud attitude. The Egyptians were also told that talk about the future of the settlements in the West Bank was, in fact, hypothetical. Also, there had been no talk about the settlements in the Sinai before the practical negotiations on the peace treaty began.

One of the harshest complaints voiced by the Egyptians referred to the situation of the Arabs in the West Bank. We thought, the Egyptians said, that the establishment of peace with Israel, our agreement to implement full autonomy in the West Bank and Israel's recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians would have an immediate effect on the situation of the inhabitants of the West Bank. However, not only has their situation not improved but it has worsened. There are restrictions, there is no freedom to organize politically, mayors have been deported, the Jerusalem Law was enacted and now there are intentions to annex the Golan Heights.

President Al-Sadat noted that he had not received Begin's reply to his proposal regarding the implementation of the autonomy in Gaza first. Had Israel agreed to this proposal, Al-Sadat said, this would have had an affect on the discussions on the autonomy. In that case we would have made do with a framework agreement on the autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza and would have proceeded with implementing the autonomy in Gaza first.

The members of the delegation gained the impression that Al-Sadat had made an agreement with President Carter that they would energetically act to complete the negotiations on the autonomy after the U.S. election. The results of the U.S. election placed Al-Sadat in front of a vacuum. He does not know Reagan and does not know what strategy the new administration will adopt. Nevertheless, he is encouraged by the strengthening of his position in the Arab world, and flourishes a list of the Arab countries followed by a short analysis of their situation. In Libya there is a lunatic leader, Iran and Iraq are fighting each other, Iraq's Husayn is breaking his head, King Husayn does not know what he wants, in Syria there is a weak government and Iran is on the brink of a nervous breakdown. Indeed, the Arab countries are at odds and thus Egypt emerges as a balanced and stable element. Egypt has been and remains a leading element in the Arab world. It cannot be ignored so there is no reason to be nervous. [sentence as published]

The recognition of the key role Egypt plays in the Arab world enables Al-Sadat to show more patience in the face of the postponements in the autonomy negotiations. His Israeli interlocutors gained the impression that Al-Sadat is not in a hurry. There is no urgency regarding the momentum and it is possible to wait. Perhaps until the government has changed in Israel? This remains an unanswered question.

For no apparent reason and, maybe, because of the mystic side of his personality, Al-Sadat believes and is convinced that the autonomy talks will end successfully sometime in 1981. At the end of the talks attended by Israel, Egypt and the United States, Al-Sadat sees the following development: Jordan and the Palestinians will join the negotiations on the final status of the West Bank. Al-Sadat envisions this scenario so clearly that his interlocutors could not but wonder about his utter confidence in the success of the as yet futile autonomy talks and the as yet impending participation of Jordan and the Palestinians. Al-Sadat apparently relies on the Americans; otherwise, there is no other explanation.

Al-Sadat wanted to hear--and did hear--from the Labor Party leaders that they support the peace treaty and identify with the Camp David accords although at the time they had criticized these accords. Al-Sadat referred to the importance of solving the problems in the region--namely, establishing the autonomy--so that Israel, Egypt and other countries no longer have to occupy themselves with the Israeli-Arab conflict and can prepare to face the Soviet threat. Simultaneously, Al-Sadat unambiguously stated that he was opposed to the establishment of a Palestinian state. In fact, he used the Camp David accords to which Al-Sadat works--there is no mention of a Palestinian state or the PLO. As far as Jordan is concerned, Al-Sadat said that its presence was not necessary at this stage but it could definitely join the next phase since no solution is possible without Jordan. Al-Sadat's agreement to continue and hold constant contacts with the Labor Party and even send a delegation to the party convention in December indicated that he found certain people among the members of the visiting delegation with whom he thought it worth his while to foster relations not only because they may rise to power but also because once they are in power they will be relevant people.

I asked member of the delegation MK Abba Eban about his impression from this current visit to Egypt, besides the political aspects. Eban had visited Egypt during Begin's first visit to that country and noted that peace has deepened since then. You could only hear positive statements from Al-Sadat, Eban said, whereas now the entire Egyptian establishment praises peace. Everybody says that we have passed the point of no-return, that peace was good for Egypt, Israel and the entire world. Al-Sadat is depicted in posters as the deliverer of peace. People want to know us, both in practice and academically, and not only through caricatures and other cliches.

The impression one gains is that the Labor Party's visit to Egypt was very pleasant and calm and that its very existence attests to the way we have already traveled since the peace treaty was signed. The not-so-academic question of how would normalization look if we had an ambassador who could speak and read Arabic in Cairo, a man with a flexible political conception and fully knowledgeable of diplomatic protocol, still remains. There is no doubt that a considerable part of the difficulties our first ambassador to Cairo, Dr Eliyahu Ben-Elisar, has encountered in adjusting to his new residence stems from his opinion, personality, nature and ineptitude rather than from Egyptian intentions to stop the wheels of peace. Today there is normalization between Israel and Egypt in spite of the discordant notes emerging from our embassy; normalization has overcome them.

CSO: 4805

FUTURE IDF CAMP CONSTRUCTION IN AUTONOMY AREAS CONFIRMED

TA131726 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 13 Nov 80

[Text] The IDF has been establishing military bases in areas to be included within the boundaries of the autonomy. This was confirmed today by Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori. Nevertheless [as heard], the defense establishment is currently completing the paving of a security road system in Judaea and Samaria. The deputy defense minister today toured Jewish settlements in Judaea and Samaria. He was also accompanied by our correspondent Sha'ul Stav.

[Begin recording] [Stav] The paving of a security road system in Judaea and Samaria is currently being completed. These roads cross the area lengthwise and widthwise. The work is carried out on a huge scale and heavy equipment is being used under difficult conditions. The roads are being paved on a mountainous area after having overcome many topographical obstacles. Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori elaborates:

[Tzipori] There are three roads in which we have recently been investing a great deal: the trans-Samaria road [kvish hotze shomron], the trans-Judaea road [kvish hotze Yehuda] and the Eretz Hamirdafim road. These are three basic roads in addition to already existing roads, such as the Jerusalem-Jericho road and so on.

[Stav] What is the financial investment in these roads?

[Tzipori] The investment is very large and burdensome. Anything related to security involves burdensome investment. I will not cite any figures in order to avoid any assistance to critics.

[Stav] Replying to our question, the deputy defense minister confirmed that the IDF has recently been establishing military bases in areas designed to be included within the autonomy territory.

[Tzipori] The Israeli autonomy plan as presented to the world refers to a so-called coexistence, where we are totally responsible for the security and the army is deployed in its camps in the best possible way for the defense of the State of Israel. [end recording]

CSO: 4805

SETTLEMENT POTENTIAL IN WEST BANK FORESEEN

TA131656 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1105 GMT 13 Nov 80

[Excerpts] Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhay Tzipori is visiting the Jewish settlements in Judaea and Samaria today. During the visit he said that the Jewish settlements in Judaea may grow, develop and build new neighborhoods, and this does not contradict the cabinet statements concerning the completion of the West Bank settlement project. Defense Minister Tzipori expressed his views to our correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh:

[Begin recording] With regard to the Israel [settlement] activity in the territories Mordekhay Tzipori believes that it will continue to increase.

[Tzipori] In my opinion, the possibilities are unlimited without harming any of the local inhabitants. We have vast areas, even in the several places where I visited today. I visited the Qarne Shomron bloc and, in my opinion an urban settlement could be established there with a small industry, and perhaps even beyond that. A settlement of 100,000 or more people could be set up there.

[Ben-Melekh] Deputy Defense Minister Tzipori explained that the government statement about the 10 last settlements being constructed is not imposing limitations on the settlement. It may limit the number of new names [of settlements] but not the number of settlers.

[Tzipori] When they [the cabinet] spoke about beginnings of settlements--round these blocs that already exist we must now consolidate and expand settlements. For example, we said that we will begin 10 new settlements this year or early next year. This does not mean, however, that Ari'el, which now has 5,000 to 6,000 dunams will not grow and become an immense settlement. Let us take Giva'tayyim, for example, the entire city is spread over 2,500 to 3,000 dunams. Ari'el has 6,000 dunams. The Rehan region has 8,000 dunams. Then we will set up neighborhood sectors, how shall I say it, thousands of families may come to live here. The same is true of Shilo which is a splendid place. If I am not mistaken we have some 2,000 dunams here. In the meantime the settlement has been built on several dozens of dunams. There is no question of any limitation on settlement. Let Shilo turn eastward and start progressing and building houses.

[Ben-Melekh] Tzipori said that 'Ezer Weizman also shared this view. He advocated the establishment of large blocs of settlement. Weizman's dispute with Gush Emunim, Tzipori explained, was because Gush Emunim occasionally created an uproar with four new trailers. [end recording]

CSO: 4805

ARABS IN TERRITORIES CAN APPLY FOR ISRAELI CITIZENSHIP

TA170705 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 17 Nov 80

[Text] Tomorrow several new amendments to the citizenship law take effect. One of these amendments allows citizenship to be conferred upon residents in the administered territories. Our correspondent, Hayim Zissovitz heard details about the new amendments from the director of the Interior Ministry's immigration services and population register department, Yehudit Hibner.

[Begin recording] [Hibner] There were persons resident in these territories who, for reasons of their own, were very interested in acquiring Israeli citizenship. Until now the legal situation precluded them from doing so. This law enables them to acquire citizenship if they fulfill certain conditions, first and foremost that they are loyal to the State of Israel and have contributed to the country out of this loyalty.

[Question] That is, a resident of the West Bank or on the Golan Heights or in Gaza who expresses loyalty to the state and a desire to help it will now be able to acquire citizenship?

[Answer] He will be able to submit a request, and if he fulfills the conditions I have noted, which are stated in the law, he will be able to acquire citizenship.

[Zissovitz] Another amendment to the law, which takes effect tomorrow, relates to Arab citizens who cannot prove whether they were in the country prior to the 1952 cutoff date. Until now they could not acquire citizenship even if, for example, they had been here before then but had left during the [948] [words indistinct]

[Hibner] The new amendment asserts that they, too, will be considered citizens if they were lawfully registered in the population register in 1952 and since then have not left the country. [end recording]

CSO: 4805

PLO-JORDAN COMMITTEE FUNNELING MONEY INTO TERRITORIES

TA131036 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0505 GMT 13 Nov 80

[Text] The Gaza mayor will ask the coordinator of activities in the administered territories, Maj Gen Dani Mat, for permission to accept $5 million from the Arab countries and the joint Jordan-PLO Committee. Al-Shawwa will present this request to Major General Mat in a meeting scheduled for today.

About the joint committee for the territories, and about the funds that it is injecting into the territories, we hear from Bassam Ja'bar:

[Begin recording] The more funds the joint Jordan-PLO Committee grants to institutions and organizations in the Gaza Strip, the larger the number of people coming to the military government for approval to accept the financial aid. The request by the Gaza mayor to be allowed to accept $5 million from Arab states and from the joint committee was not the only request recently submitted to the military government. The government has recently approved $2 million from Saudi Arabia for a Gaza college, on condition that the money not be used for expanding the college but for the payment of wages to teachers and other workers.

The joint committee is attempting to funnel money into the area in every way available. Recently it funneled $600,000 to Gaza, through the UNRWA organization. Attorney Ibrahim Abu-Sittah, a Gaza Strip notable, who has close family ties with the PLO representative on the committee, Hamid Abu-Sittah, is now staying in Amman where he will raise funds for the Gaza Strip. Hamid Abu-Sittah is also staying in Jordan at present.

It is noteworthy that whenever the joint committee meets it discusses increasing the financial aid for the territories. There have been several protests in the Gaza Strip that the committee gives preference to the West Bank. Gaza notables told us that they thought that the subject of financial aid to the territories would be extensively discussed at the Arab summit conference scheduled for 25 November in Jordan. As is known, Jordan is striving to increase its influence over the Palestinian issue, and it is trying to ensure that all funds allocated by the Arab countries for the territories pass through Jordan. [end recording]

CSO: 4805

CONSUMER PRICE INDEX RELEASED; HISTADRUT REACTS

TA141409 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 14 Nov 80

[Text] The consumer's price index rose by 11 percent in October. Since the beginning of the year the index has risen by 100.9 percent. The spokesman of the Central Bureau of Statistics reported in October items particularly increasing in price were clothing and footwear by 29.2 percent, fruits and vegetables by 20.7 percent and health services by 12.4 percent. The wholesale prices index also rose by a large 10.2 percent in October. The index of housing costs rose by 11.2 percent.

An updated survey on apartment prices was also released today. Last month the sale price of apartments increased by 10.3 percent. The survey indicated that from April to September there was an upswing in the apartment market and their selling prices rose by an average of 18 percent. The apartment prices that increased the most are in the northern cities and the central area. The average price of an apartment in Jerusalem is 350,000 shekels; in Tel Aviv, 460,000 shekels and in Haifa and the central area, 270,000 shekels.

The Histadrut secretary general reacted by saying that the October index rise of 11 percent was the highest since the economic revolution [announced by the Likud government upon taking office]. Talking to our correspondents Asher Schwartz and Moshe Nestelbaum, Yeruham Meshel emphasized that since Yiga'el Hurvitz' appointment as finance minister exactly a year ago, the rise has totaled 138.4 percent--almost 40 percent more than in the time of Hurvitz' predecessor, Ehrlich.

Meshel notes that the price rises occurring in the first half of November were not included in the October index. These include the price of fuel, transportation, milk and milk products, oil and margarine. In his opinion the government must fulfill the Histadrut's basic demands, both to help large families and to update various allowances. Meshel announced that the Histadrut will not accept any erosion in wage earners' real wages and it is doubtful that in the 1981 wage agreement the Histadrut will demand wage increases for the workers as well as full cost of living increases. Meshel called on the government to curb the inflation for fear that it will be impossible to stem the flood that may ensue.

CSO: 4805

OIL INVESTMENT HAS GROWN SINCE CAMP DAVID

TA230946 Jerusalem POST in English 23 Nov 80 p 3

[Report by Arye Wolman: "Sinai Oil Investment Grew After Camp David"]

[Text] Seven of the 12 drills at the 'Alma oilfield in the Gulf of Suez were completed and almost the entire extraction and distribution network for drawing gas from northern Sinai was built after Israel had agreed to return the two areas to Egypt under the Camp David peace accords.

Information about the timing of the investments in the two sites was disclosed to the Jerusalem POST by an Energy Ministry source.

The investment of "large sums of money" in engineering and geological work in the 'Alma oilfield after the Camp David agreement was signed in September 1978 paid off according to the source. Oil production increased from 15,000 barrels a day in September 1978 to 40,000 by August 1979. When the field was returned to Egypt in November 1979, it was supplying about 20 percent of Israel's daily oil needs.

The increased output served as a bargaining counter, and helped secure Egypt's agreement to support Israel with oil after the return of the area, the source said. Egypt also compensated the Israeli National Oil Company for the equipment and installations it left at 'Alma, and paid for the seismic and geological information the company had gathered in the Gulf of Suez.

In the northern Sinai gas field, near Moshav Sadot, the testing bores were completed in September 1977. Over the next 10 months, further drillings defined the full extent of the field and its reserves of gas. It was realized that extracting gas from the field would be a lucrative proposition. But the Camp David accords of September confronted the Energy Ministry with a dilemma: whether it would be worthwhile developing and using the field for only two-and-a-half years, according to the source.

The Sadot gas field is due to be returned to Egypt in April 1982. No agreement has yet been reached as to whether Israel will continue to be able to extract gas from the site.

In the end, the ministry decided to lay gas pipes from Sadot to a site near 'Arad, 80 kilometers away, where the gas is processed. The pace of construction was stepped up and on August 17, 1979 the extraction of gas began.

Today, the field yields 30 million cubic feet of gas--the equivalent in energy terms of about 5,000 barrels of oil. The output, which provides three percent of the state's needs, is four times greater than that of Israel's only other major gas field, which was opened at Zohar in 1958. Several major industries in the 'Arad region, such as the Dead Sea Works and the Negev Phosphates plant in Oron have converted their installations from oil to gas consumption.

CSO: 4820

EDITORIALS CRITICIZE RAFAH SETTLERS COMPENSATION

TA180638 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 18 Nov 80

[Review of morning press editorials]

[Excerpts] Most editorials this morning have harsh words of criticism for the cabinet's decision in principle to pay a huge compensation to the settlers of the Rafah area who will be evacuated during the final stage of the Sinai withdrawal.

The independent HA'ARETZ dismissed the negative vote on this issue by Finance Minister Hurvitz as a mere gesture and an alibi for future reference. HA'ARETZ questioned whether the cabinet has considered the effect of the payments on doctors, teachers and other salaried workers. The Israeli public must rise up against this waste of its money. The paper calls on the labor opposition to take the unusual step of announcing it will not honor such compensation agreements and that it will negotiate more reasonable terms if it comes to power.

The English-language Jerusalem POST compares the vast sums being offered to the Rafah settlers to the far more modest amounts being suggested for another group of victims of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty--the Negev Bedouin who are being evacuated to make way for the air bases. It is true, argues the POST, that the Rafah farms are far more valuable than the desert land of the Bedouin, but the value of the land developed by the Rafah farmers is largely a result of generous government assistance and cheap local Arab labor in working the farms. If Rafah is accepted as a precedent, writes the POST, no presently occupied area could ever be returned by any Arab rule for strictly economic reasons because it would spell bankruptcy for Israel.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

ELECTION POLL--Ari'el Sharon and 'Ezer Weizman are the preferred candidates for defense minister with Sharon leading by 3.6 percent. These are the findings of a nationwide Pori Institute poll commissioned by HA'ARETZ. In reply to the question: "Who, in your opinion, should be the defense minister?" Sharon received 28 percent whereas Weizman got 24.4 percent. In an identical poll conducted a month ago the gap between Sharon and Weizman was far larger. Sharon then received 30.2 percent compared with Weizman, who only got 19.4 percent (a gap of 10.8 percent). The third preference is for Moshe Dayan with 4.9 percent; fourth came Yitzhaq Rabin with 3.6 percent followed by Shim'on Peres with 2.3 percent. Prime Minister Menahem Begin, who holds the defense portfolio, seemed to only 2.3 percent as the most suitable for the post of defense minister. [sentence as printed] Other figures chosen by those polled but who received less than 1 percent were Moshe Arens, Mordekhay Gur, chief of staff Refa'el Eytan, Hayim Herzog, Me'ir 'Amit and Binyamin Peled. Nearly 30 percent (29.1 percent) had no preferred candidate whatsoever. The poll comprised a representative cross section of 1,200 men and women. [Text] [TA231006 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 23 Nov 80 p 3]

SPARE PARTS TO ARABS--Israeli factories are indirectly exporting large quantities of vehicles spare parts to Arab countries, primarily to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. This has been disclosed by spare parts manufacturers who participated in the "automechanics" exhibition of vehicle spare parts and accessories held in Frankfurt, Germany. Manufacturers who participated in the exhibition pointed out that the Arab countries' market was large, rich and had a high annual growth rate in the number of vehicles. Arab businessmen with large amounts of capital were looking for vehicle spare parts in Europe, without being overscrupulous about adhering to European standards and prices. Israeli manufacturers who sell their products in Europe--through European registered export companies without any connection with Israel--have succeeded in setting up links with Arab businessmen and getting export orders from them which total hundreds of thousands of dollars. The Israeli products are transported to Arab countries via a third European country, where all identification signs proving Israeli origin of the spare parts are removed. Nineteen Israeli manufacturers displayed their products at the Frankfurt "automechanics" exhibition, including 14 manufacturers who exhibited their products at the Israeli National Pavilion. "Automechanics" is the largest exhibition in the world for garage equipment, spare parts and vehicle accessories. [Text] [TA240942 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 24 Nov 80 p 1]

WEST BANK COLLEGES--Upon the resumption of studies at the Bi'r Zayt College today military sources have noted that the policy to be adopted toward the universities in the territories in case of disruptions will be firmer than in the past. People caught carrying out acts of sabotage or rioting will be severely punished. These military sources reported that the firm policy in the territories had failed to include the universities but had been implemented in other spheres. The sources noted that the firm policy became stronger after 'Ezer Weizman left his post as defense minister. This policy was approved by both the prime minister and defense minister as well as the cabinet. During Begin's absence, Deputy Prime Minister Yiga'el Yadin has participated in the decisionmaking on this issue. A reliable source stated that the policy will be not to give in to inciters even if this involves a front clash with demonstrators and university officials. [Text] [TA211347 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Nov 80 p 2]

YAMIT COMPENSATION PAYMENTS--The Agriculture Ministry has decided to set up a special directorate, headed by the ministry's director general, in order to implement the document of principles concerning the payment of compensation for the Yamit district evacuees. This was stated by Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon at a meeting in Moshav Diqla with about 100 settlers from the district. He told them that in the coming days each family would receive about another 100,000 shekels as a down payment for the compensation, in addition to the 180,000 shekels they have already received. The agriculture minister said that the directorate under director general Ben-Me'ir would meet with each settlement committee, and then with each of the settlers in order to examine in the field the condition of the household and the investments which, by the government's decision, will be included in the compensation payments. The ITIM correspondent adds that for the first time since the peace agreements a meeting between the ministers and the settlers took place in a good atmosphere. Minister Sharon said that when demonstrations against him were held in the Yamit district, he understood the settlers and he had no intention of settling accounts with them, as he understands the difficult crisis they are going through. Even if the compensation covers the monetary damage, Sharon said, it will not be able to compensate for the suffering and the difficulties that the settlers will yet encounter. Regarding the public criticism of the size of the compensation, Minister Sharon said he would reply to all the critics next week from the Knesset rostrum. The ITIM correspondent reports that Yamit settlers who are not farmers have drawn encouragement from the document of principles drawn up by the cabinet, and they are organizing in order to demand compensation equal to that being offered the farmers. [Text] [TA211554 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 21 Nov 80]

RABIN SUPPORTS UN RESOLUTION--Tel Aviv, 20 Nov--Speaking last night to the council of the Tel Aviv branch of the Labor Party, MK Yitzhaq Rabin said the next government of Israel will have to adopt UN Resolution 242. Rabin said that previous Israeli governments had not accepted that resolution up to now because of the opposition of the National Religious Party and the former Rafi faction, and later because of the Likud positions. [Excerpt] [TA201958 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1620 GMT 20 Nov 80]

GOODS TO ARAB COUNTRIES--The terrorists in southern Lebanon have released a merchant from the (Kharfa) village who they had kidnapped over the weekend, on his way to Beirut. In the past 24 hours the terrorists have been preventing the passage of merchants from southern Lebanon northward toward Beirut which causes serious harm to the inhabitants. The efforts made by southern Lebanon inhabitants to transfer goods from Israel to Beirut proves that a new outlet has recently been developing for Israeli exports: to Lebanon and then to other Arab countries. This is done through smart merchants living in the enclave. These merchants have been taking advantage of the open border between Israel and Lebanon. They purchase high quality goods in Israel and then transfer them to the Arab countries. No taxes are paid in southern Lebanon thus the profits are very high. One of the merchants recently purchased 2 million cans of high quality beer in Israel and paid in cash. He shipped the entire load to southern Lebanon, with Beirut as its destination, where he sold the beer for a very high price. The goods, which often bear the Israeli trade mark, frequently pass from Lebanon to Syria and to other Arab countries. Many other goods, such as color television sets and other electric appliances make their way to the Arab countries by the same route. One of the merchants recently sold 50 used Israeli tractors to traders in southern Lebanon. Most of the tractors were subsequently sold outside Beirut. [Menahem Horowitz] [Text] [TA201442 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 20 Nov 80 p 2]

ARABS RECEIVE CITIZENSHIP--More than 30,000 Arabs will receive Israeli citizenship according to the new citizenship law. Visiting the villages of Abu Sinan, Judaydah and Al-Makr in western Galilee Interior Minister Burg said the inhabitants in question have not remained in Israel continuously since 1948 and thus have not received citizenship. Minister Burg participated in the dedication of the new mosque in Abu Sinan. [Text] [TA201403 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 20 Nov 80]

RECTOR REPLACED BY MUSLIM--Bethlehem, 19 Nov--The Bethlehem University Board of Trustees met today in order to adopt a resolution to replace the university rector, who is a Christian, by a Muslim rector, in accordance with the demand of Union of Arab Countries Universities. The board of directors argued that they were compelled to adopt a resolution of this kind because the union stipulated that the university would not be recognized by the union, unless the Christian rector was replaced. The board of trustees expressed its appreciation to rector Joseph (Walstein) but informed him that the university cannot reject the terms of the Union of Arab Countries Universities because, so far, bachelor degrees from Bethlehem University have not been recognized in the Arab world. The union only appoints Muslims for positions in universities in Arab countries. ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria notes that this Issue, which is arousing resentment among the Christian intelligentsia in the region, has even reached the Vatican, but it seems that not even the Vatican can change the situation. [Text] [TA192031 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1850 GMT 19 Nov 80]

EAST JERUSALEM SCHOOL--Jordan is seeking to make the (Al-Brahamiyah) High School, in East Jerusalem, the chief Judaea and Samaria University. This is within the framework of its goal to try to concentrate the main institutions of the territories in Jerusalem. This has been learned by our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari. The Royal Commission for Jerusalem Affairs has allocated a large sum

for a structure for the university in the eastern part of the city, and its construction has already begun. At first it will serve as a high-school, and gradually it will become an institution for higher education. Israel previously had not allowed a university to be opened in the village of Abu-dis. That university, too, was to have been opened under Jordanian aegis. [Text] [TA171755 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 17 Nov 80]

POPULARITY POLL--Prime Minister Menahem Begin's popularity remains stable; Finance Minister Yiga'el Hurvitz' popularity is on the downswing and Interior and Police Minister Dr Yosef Burg's popularity has registered an appreciable drop. These are the conclusions of a nationwide public opinion poll conducted by the Pori Institute at the request of HA'ARETZ. The number of those satisfied with Menahem Begin's performance as prime minister reached 27.6 percent, the same rate as in the previous poll. Those satisfied with Yiga'el Hurvitz' performance as finance minister dropped to 26.4 percent, as opposed to 28.4 percent last month. The number of those people satisfied with Dr Yosef Burg's performance as interior and police minister is currently 29.7 percent as compared with 50.2 percent who were satisfied with his performance in the last Pori public poll on this issue conducted in October 1978. The poll was conducted on a sample of 1,200 men and women who were interviewed throughout Israel. [Excerpts] [TA141230 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Nov 80 p 3]

VENEZUELAN COMMERCIAL COOPERATION--A framework agreement is now being signed in Jerusalem for commerce and economic cooperation between the Israeli and Venezuelan ministers of commerce and industry. Israel already has several broad agreements of this nature, but this is the latest one since 1977. Israel attaches great importance to this evening's signing of the agreement, since the Venezuelan Embassy was one of the first to leave Jerusalem and now a widescale economic agreement is being signed in the Israeli capital. Minister Gid'on Pat told Gadi Sukenik that the agreement was a pleasant surprise for Israel and, in addition to the expected economic benefits, a permanent source of fuel supplies may open up to us in time. [Begin Pat recording] Today we are trying to create a new target for Israeli exports in Latin America, especially in Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Chile. These are countries that together import an annual total of about $60 billion worth of various products. We can certainly penetrate such a market, both with produce and with the construction of factories they very much want in all sectors of the economy. Venezuela itself imports an annual $14 billion worth of a variety of products. It is a great fuel exporter and perhaps we may also find another permanent source of fuel in Venezuela as a result of closer economic relations between the two countries. [end recording] Our correspondent reports that Israel has already submitted a list of 13 projects for economic cooperation with Venezuela. Among other things, there are projects for the production of edible oils and other oil products; a system for the transport of agricultural produce and joint projects in the field of solar energy. [Text] [TA191900 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 19 Nov 80]

LESS OPPOSITION TO SETTLEMENTS--There has been a considerable decline in the view that the establishment of additional settlements in Judaea and Samaria is liable to prove an obstacle to autonomy, according to a Pori public opinion poll which was commissioned by HA'ARETZ. The number of those opposed to the establishment of new settlements has decreased from 45.3 percent in May 1980 to 37.5 percent. When asked, "Do you think that the establishment of additional settlements in Judaea and Samaria could--or could not--be a major obstacle in the establishment of autonomy in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?" 37.5 percent gave a positive reply, as opposed to a nearly identical number--34.0 percent--who said that the establishment of additional settlements would not be an obstacle to autonomy. A further 14.4 percent said that the establishment of additional settlements "might" be an obstacle to autonomy, while the remaining 14.1 percent had no opinion either way. The public also sees no special urgency in reaching an agreement on autonomy, "in light of the recent events in the Middle East." When asked, "How urgent is it to reach an agreement on autonomy as quickly as possible in light of the recent events in the Middle East?" 35.4 percent replied that there is no urgency, as opposed to 23.7 percent who said that the need for an agreement on autonomy is "very urgent" and 21.7 percent who said an agreement is "a bit urgent." The remaining 19.2 percent had no opinion on the subject. The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women who were interviewed personally in their homes, throughout the country. [Text] [TA191420 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Nov 80 p 3]

ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURAL PROJECT--An Egyptian agriculture delegation is winding up its visit to Israel. Their visit here followed a similar one by an Israeli delegation earlier this year. Reporting on the visit is reporter Harley Braidman: [Begin recording] [Braidman] The main project agreed on in principle is the establishment of four agricultural farms of an area of 10,000 acres in the Nubariyah zone west of Alexandria. The pilot plant would include farms for rearing cattle and sheep. Israel's share would be in providing the developments, supplying the inputs, the irrigation equipment, the seed, pesticides and fertilizers. Eventually the whole project could cover 250,000 acres. There is also a project of vaccinating all livestock against Rift Valley malaria, as well as development of joint fishing projects in the Dead Sea and the Bardawil Lagoon. Prof Shmu'el Pohoryles, who is in charge of planning agricultural cooperation with the Egyptians, told me about other developments. [Pohoryles] Other important items of development of cooperation and the future development is cooperation in exports, especially in organization, of infrastructure for export and import of Israeli inputs, especially seeds [words indistinct]. It seems to me that this is the first step of creating an infrastructure for future cooperation. The main field of our cooperation should be transfer of technology, I mean the transfer of technology including know-how and all technological components of agricultural development. [end recording] [Excerpts] [TA152007 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1800 GMT 15 Nov 80]

WATER PROJECT ALTERNATIVES--Digging a channel from the Mediterranean to the Dead Sea along the southern route from Tel Qatif to Masada, is less profitable and less economically advantageous than digging the channel in the north, through the Yizra'el Valley, or in the central section, below the Jerusalem Mountains. This emerges from a survey conducted to study the project's investment alternatives, prepared by Dr Ya'aqov Zehavi and Dr Amnon Gross of the business administration faculty at Tel Aviv University. At the conclusion of lectures and discussions on this topic, discussion moderator Prof Ze'ev Hirsch said that although the government decision on the southern route for the sea-to-sea channel is not official it actually gives that route precedence and is responsible for abandoning the examination of other routes. "This is despite the fact that it is now clear, especially after the findings of this survey were published, that it is still too early to propose a solution and to decide on any given route." Professor Zehavi, who presented the alternatives study explained that the project was profitable with any alternative, and would still be profitable even if it would involve maintaining the Dead Sea waters at a level of 400 meters below sea level, as contrasted to the original planning of 393 meters below sea level. (A lower level may be necessitated by the desire not to flood the Jordanian potash plants in the southern part of the Dead Sea.) [Mikha'el Garti] [Excerpt] [TA161457 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Nov 80 p 1]

GAS CONSUMPTION DOWN--The recent frequent price rises of gas and electricity have led consumers to cut down on these items, according to data the electricity corporation and the fuel authority. Since the beginning of the year there has been a 3.7 percent drop in the consumption of gas for private vehicles. This is the first such drop for some years; recent years have seen annual increases of 5 to 6 percent in gas consumption. Electricity consumption for home use has also dropped in the past 2 months, and overall electricity consumption in the country did not increase during the first 7 months of the year. Recent years had seen an annual rise of about 6 percent in this sphere. [TA161835 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 13 Nov 80 p 17 TA]

EXPORTS TO EGYPT--The "Agrexco" Company has signed an agreement on principle with Egypt for the supply of 1,500 tons of bananas to the Egyptian market. The banana export will start in December and will continue until the end of February 1981. [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Nov 80 p 4 TA]

IMMIGRATION DOWN--In the first 10 months of 1980, 18,869 new immigrants arrived in Israel, as opposed to 31,666 in the parallel period last year. Immigration from the Soviet Union during this period stood at 7,160 persons, as opposed to 14,654 in the parallel period in 1979. Of the 1,424 Jews who left the Soviet Union in October, 1,103 did not go to Israel, comprising a dropout rate of 77 percent. The dropout rate among Soviet Jews in the first 10 months of 1980 was 64 percent. In October 1980, 1,697 new immigrants arrived--267 of them from the United States--as opposed to 1,525 in September. [TA191428 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 19 Nov 80 p 3 TA]

AGRICULTURAL AID AGREEMENT--Israel has recently signed several agreements for agricultural cooperation with foreign countries. These include agreements with Thailand, Italy, Venezuela and Jamaica. The Israeli Ministry of Agriculture also hopes to expand cooperation with the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Brazil and Peru. [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17 Nov 80 p 3 TA]

GAZA VENDOR MURDERED--A fruit vendor from the (Al-Shati) refugee camp was murdered in Gaza this morning. The vendor was selling his fruits on the Gaza beach when an unidentified person appeared, drew a pistol and fired it at the vendor. He died instantly. The ITIM correspondent in the Gaza Strip notes this is the fourth murder in the Gaza Strip during the past 6 weeks. This reinforces the assumption that a liquidation squad is active in the Gaza Strip to frighten and deter persons who are termed accomplices of the Israeli regime. [Text] [TA190829 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 18 Nov 80]

FOREIGN DEBT--Israel's debts in foreign currency totaled $16.3 billion at the end of June 1980. This data was included in a report published yesterday by the director of the Bank of Israel Foreign Exchange Department. Israel's debt increased by $1.9 billion in the last 10 months. [TA221558 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 21 Nov 80 p 10 TA]

HIGH-TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS--Exports of sophisticated products developed by Israeli science-based industries will amount to $1 billion in 1980. The scope of exports will increase four times by the end of this decade. This was stated yesterday by the chief scientist at the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism, Prof Arye Levi, during a tour with science correspondents. He added that exports of sophisticated products will constitute 50 percent of all industrial exports, excluding diamonds. Among the products mentioned: artificial kidneys, an instrument for detecting breast cancer, pacemakers, instruments for measuring blood pressure and pulse, sophisticated detonators for mortar shells, altimeters for light planes, processing of a new anti-viral protein. [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Nov 80 p 3 TA]

ACTION AGAINST TERRORISTS--The overwhelming majority of the Israeli public justifies the IDF's operations in Lebanon. This has emerged from a countrywide Pori public opinion poll, commissioned by HA'ARETZ. Of those asked, 76.8 percent justify the carrying out of military operations against the PLO in Lebanon, "at any time and as far as is needed, whether or not they attack us." A further 17.5 [percent] justify the carrying out of military operations in Lebanon "only if attacks have been carried out in Israel." Only a minority, 2.9 percent, oppose any military action whatsoever within Lebanon. Prominent among those opposed are persons with a high level of education, persons in the academic and administrative professions and persons of European or American origin. The remaining 2.8 percent had no opinion either way on this subject. The poll covered a representative sample of 1,200 men and women who were interviewed in their homes throughout the country. [Text] [TA111257 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Nov 80 p 3]

AGRICULTURAL AID TO EGYPT--The Egyptian Agriculture Ministry is asking Israel for aid in growing short-staple (akala) cotton; a superior strain that does not grow in Egypt. Cotton growing is the primary sector of Egyptian agriculture, almost all of Egyptian cotton is long-fibered, of the pima strain which is world-famous for its high quality and special characteristics. It seems that it is possible and profitable to grow short-staple cotton in a short period of time. Thus, in the framework of one "agriculture year," the same land could be used for growing two kinds of crops: wheat and cotton. In Israel, short-staple and medium-staple varieties comprise the majority of cotton cultivation. The Israeli agricultural crops are of the highest yield per acre in the world. Last week, at a meeting between representatives of the Israeli and Egyptian Agriculture Ministry during President Navon's visit to Egypt the Egyptians requested the beginning of a joint project for the development of a short-staple cotton strain. At the first stage the Egyptians will buy saplings and experimental land plots from Israel for the next season. [sentence as printed] The chief of the Agricultural Planning and Development Center, Prof Shmu'el Pohoryles, reported that the Egyptians hope to obtain Israeli aid in developing the peanut industry and in developing diverse crops in the arid regions. [Aharon Pri'el] [Text] [TA031412 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Nov 80 p 4]

INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS INCREASE--Israel's industrial exports (excluding diamonds) totaled $2,598 million in the first 10 months of 1980, as against $1,961 million in the parallel period last year--an increase of 32 percent. Net exports of polished diamonds totaled $1.2 billion in the first 10 months of 1980, as against $1,027 million during the parallel period in 1979--an increase of 17 percent. [TA121753 Tel Aviv HATZOFE in Hebrew 11 Nov 80 p 4]

RECORD UNEMPLOYMENT RATE--The unemployment rate for the third quarter of the year stood at 5 percent of the civilian labor force, according to a survey conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics. With 65,000 now unemployed, this is the highest level since 1968-1969, the final year of the recession of the 1960's. The number of unemployed was 62,000 in the first quarter of the year and 56,000 in the second. The rise in unemployment during the last few months reflects the treasury's attempts to reduce the level of activity in the economy and to improve the country's trade balance. The worsening of unemployment has also increased the length of time people have been receiving unemployment compensation. The number of unemployed receiving benefits is now 11,700. [Jerusalem POST in English 10 Nov 80 p 1 TA]

TRADE GAP DOWN--Israel's trade gap this year has gone down by 9 percent to $2.36 billion. This is due to exports rising by 24 percent and imports going down by 10 percent. Total exports in the first 10 months of the year were [figure indistinct] billion. [Text] [Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 17 Nov 80 TA]

MOUNT HEBRON SETTLEMENT--The Jewish Agency Settlement Department has decided to establish a moshav in the Guvrin area, on the slopes of Mount Hebron, beyond the pre-6-Day War borders. The moshav will belong to Hapo'el Hamizrahi, the settlement movement of the National Religious Party. [Text] [TA190733 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 0500 GMT 19 Nov 80]

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

WEST BANK AFFAIRS--Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan is now in charge of the ministry dealing with West Bank affairs and he is aiming at turning Jerusalem into the focus of Jordanian influence in the West Bank. This was reported by East Jerusalem sources to our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari. Among other things, Prince Hassan recommended that the trade unions in the territories move their centers from Nabulus to Jerusalem. He also proposed financing a luxury building for them in the center of East Jerusalem. Our correspondent recalls that Jordan established a committee on its behalf not long ago, composed of outstanding personalities from East Jerusalem and intended to replace the national guidance committee which is inspired by the PLO. [Text] [TA091248 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 9 Nov 80]

CSO: 4805

DIRECTOR DISCUSSES MAURITANIZATION, GUELBS PROJECT FINANCING

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 8, 9 Oct 80 p 3

[Interview with Baba Ould Abdallahi, administrative director of the SNIM-SEM [National Industrial and Mining Company]: "We Are Hoping That the Financing of the Guelbs Project Could Be Started This Month"]

[8 Oct 80, p 3]

> [Excerpts] Recently Baba Ould Abdallahi, administrative director general of the SNIM-SEM recently gave an interview to the national press in the course of which he reviewed the financial situation of the company for the first half of 1980 and discussed the problem of hiring Mauritanian cadres.
>
> In that part of the interview, answering a question on the cost of employing foreigners, the speaker stipulated that "If a foreigner is not needed he would not be kept by the SNIM. If needed, he would be kept whatever the cost."
>
> This cost is very high, he pointed out, for comparing what a foreigner is paid compared with a Mauritanian hired in a similar position, the foreigner's salary is higher by a factor of 8. Furthermore, the administrative director general of the SNIM commented on the new directions in the management of the company which earned the SNIM management the contragulations of the administrative council.

Question: Could you give us an idea of the cost to the SNIM of employing a foreigner and how could the hiring of Mauritanians affect such costs?

Answer: As you realize, hiring foreigners is very expensive. Obviously, the problem of foreigners is not one of cost. It is whether or not a foreigner is needed or is not. I believe that the current option is that we should hire foreigners only to the extent to which they are indispensable to the operation of our enterprise. In my view, this is the fundamental option, for if we must have foreigners because we need them, because they cannot be replaced, or because we do not have the Mauritanian personnel we need, at such a time we must have the type of personnel we need, whatever the cost, to the extent to which such personnel is indispensable. The basic option, however, is that in the future, when the foreigner will not be necessary, he will not be kept by the

SNIM. If he is needed, he will stay, whatever his cost. I would say that the cost is quite high compared with the wage of a Mauritanian on the same level, the difference varying by a factor of 4-5, not counting other benefits which are not given the Mauritanians, such as insurance, social security, or travel to the country of origin.

Therefore, if we were to compare such wages and benefits with the wages of a Mauritanian, they would be higher by a factor of 8. This is extremely expensive. That is why, actually, the hiring of Mauritanian personnel is not merely a nationalistic action. I believe that it is an economic action as well, for it enables the company to achieve substantial savings.

However, this must be considered with a great deal of objectivity. The Mauritanians must realize that a number of positions they have been given in the enterprise are extremely important. Quite frequently the young Mauritanians we are currently employing are young people with great intellectual capacity. Their training is excellent. However, in order to properly implement the tasks which had been entrusted to foreigners, the Mauritanians who lack the same experience and years of practice should exercise their willpower. The Mauritanians must realize that the enterprise, being their own, its existence, its operations and the efforts it is making to hire Mauritanians depend, above all, on them. This means that they must apply a great deal of goodwill to carry out their jobs. Only thus could the conversion to Mauritanian personnel be good. Essentially, it is not a question of a decision to be made by the general management according to which Mr X will replace Mr Y. Mr X will have to realize that he is replacing Mr Y first of all because he is a Mauritanian. Furthermore, he must have the proper knowledge and an interest in the enterprise and the personnel of the enterprise, the environment and the country at large, because he is tied to this country. **He must be a Mauritanian with national feelings as each one of us has. Such national feelings must play a role, for they are as important as knowledge.**

[9 Oct 80, p 3]

> [Excerpts] The Guelbs project which will determine the future of the SNIM has been launched. The company's officials believe that the starting point for the implementation of the financing plan will be this month. This was stated by Baba Ould Abdallahi in this final part of the interview he recently gave to the national press following the meeting of the company's administrative council.

Question: The future of the SNIM-SEM depends on the Guelbs project. What point has it reached?

Answer: On the subject of the Guelbs project may I simply repeat here that its purpose will enable us to undertake the first stage of the exploitation of two rocky mountain peaks known as the Guelb El Ghain and the Guelb Oum Arwaguen located east of Zouerate.

This exploitation has become necessary because the exploitation of the Kedia of Idjill, which enabled us to market a rich mineral, is becoming exhausted.

The situation of the Kedia of Idjill today enables us to say that by 1982 we shall be forced to find a compensation for the Kedia output for, as you know, the current installations enable us to extract and haul 12 million tons per year. Even at the 10 million tons per year level, the output of the Kedia of Idjill would drop to an average of 6 million tons by 1984. Therefore, in order for the company to retain its output capacity and keep open the jobs they are providing today and maintain the level of earnings which it has reached, and if it is to remain viable, it should find the means to compensate for this shortage in the extraction of minerals. It is precisely the development of the Guelb El Ghain, the first to be developed, which will provide such a compensation. The minerals extracted from the Guelb are far poorer (35 percent iron content). However, they are magnetic and, consequently, can be enriched. The installations which will be built, this time, will no longer be exclusively geared for extraction but will include a concentration plant. This is the reason for their substantially higher cost compared with the extraction of the rich Kedia deposits.

Let us specify in the case of the mineral we shall extract in the Guelbs that it would not be sold as it would be but, therefore, would have to be concentrated. This will be achieved with a concentration plant which will require the building of a major electric power plant and other related installations. This will require an initial investment of $450-460 million.

About $360 of the $460 will be financed by external sources following the enactment of loan agreements currently being completed. The financing has already been concretized by the loan agreements, guarantees and collaterals and is currently being organized. We hope that it will be started in October, for the conditions which are demanded of us. Consequently, we are in the process of meeting the overall conditions demanded by the financing sources and we hope that they will agree to open the financing in October, for currently we have already signed a number of contracts related to the implementation of the Guelb project. Equipment has already been ordered and work on the site has been undertaken, particularly the rail linkage between Guelb El Ghain with the old tracks in the Kedia of Idjill area.

The building of a power plant, (aerofols) magnetic separators, primary and secondary crushing mills, installations for the erection of the metal structures for the building of the El Ghain plant and the power plant, and other engineering projects common to the entire installation have already been undertaken. To this effect the SNIM has already made payments either in advance or when due based on contracts concluded with the various enterprises. Such payments have already reached such major sums that should the sources of financing refuse to implement the loan agreements in October, the company's treasury would find itself in a rather delicate situation, for so far we have already paid out over $22 million as an advance out of our own funds. This is an advance which should normally be reimbursed to us by the financing institutions from the loans. Consequently, the Guelb project has been initiated and we believe that on the financial level the starting point will be in October.

Question: Mr Director General, in the course of this same session the results of the 1979 fiscal year were examined. What were its results and what will its repercussions be on the year 1980 which is coming to a close?

Answer: The fiscal 1979 ended in a deficit, unfortunately. In some aspects the situation was quite touchy, for in some cases the company made a certain number of overpayments compared with the budget as stipulated by the council. In some cases such overpayments were substantial. Nevertheless, the current general management and the administrative council were able to take a certain number of measures, for it was the study of the 1979 financial situation which led us to consider the conditions under which a certain number of sectors within the enterprise were functioning, leading to such expenditures. This enabled us to realize that in some areas there were no follow-ups and that a number of out-of-step actions had been taken which prevented the company from economizing. That is why we were forced to take a certain number of measures whose effects are already partially being felt. It is obvious that these effects are the results of the very great efforts made particularly by those in charge and the workers. We must state that without such efforts no results would have been achieved, for we have been forced to put an end to some situations. We were forced to change some habits. For example, we realized that vehicle operations were very costly. In Zouerate we ordered that all service vehicles no longer be used after the normal working hours.

Furthermore, after work such vehicles are kept in an area guarded by company agents and those who use them must retrieve them in the morning when work begins. Our personnel accepted this decision as they accepted decisions involving some reorganizations in the use, for example, of spare parts. We have eliminated a certain number of intermediary storage areas in the workshops. We have taken measures to enable the central warehouse to deliver parts when needed, for such deliveries, which take place two or three days following the request, made it possible for those in charge of the workshops to acquire intermediary stockpiles. This was a rather risky method for taking parts out of the warehouse, making possible, in some cases, the disappearance of such parts.

Finally, all these measures are based on the fact that the 1979 operational year resulted in a loss to be avoided. We became aware of the fact that unless measures were taken, such actions which harmed the company in 1979 would not make it possible to repair the situation.

Question: The administrative council has given you the power to sign the agreement relinquishing the DCPP [Petroleum Products Marketing Department] which became a state company. When will this separation become effective?

Answer: The transfer of the DCPP to the state is a decision which had been made at the request of the government. The administrative council had given its agreement for the petroleum products marketing department and the Nouakchott SNIM workshop to be transferred to the state. The state, therefore, set up a company to this effect known as the Mauritanian Petroleum Products Marketing Company [SMPP]. This company is being organized. In order to prevent this separation from resulting in shortages for the country and disagreements among the transferred personnel, this separation will be practically implemented the moment the SMPP will be able to take over from the SNIM. We are hoping now that all this will be achieved by 1 November.

5157
CSO: 4400

PRC-CONSTRUCTED PORT TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN 4 YEARS

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 17 Oct 80 p 3

[Article by Mohamed O. Jelledi: "Port de l'Amitié: Construction Work Is Proceeding Normally"]

[Text] Nouakchott's deep water port, built by the People's Republic of China pursuant to a bilateral cooperation program, will cost the tidy sum of 6 billion ouguiya when ready to operate; it will be one of the foremost achievements of the country.

In fact, the Port de l'Amitié, financed by a Chinese loan, is a living example of cooperation and of shared concerns among Third World Countries. It will undoubtedly have a clear and direct impact on the life of the average Mauritanian. That is why one need have no hesitation in confidently asserting that the Port de l'Amitié is the natural, normal accompaniment to another gigantic achievement--the Nouakchott-Nema highway--the highway of hope. Construction of a deep-water port will no doubt resolve the difficulties encountered by various companies--Nouakchott Wharf in particular--in bringing supplied into the country.

Also, we will no longer depend on foreign ports where until now our imports of heavy equipment and other merchandise are unloaded.

Meanwhile, it must be said that the construction work is proceeding satisfactorily and, according to M Yu Lanyu, engineer in charge of the construction works, it should be completed in a little less than 4 years if all problems are resolved on time.

The crucial current problem for the Chinese technicians is the lack of adequate data on Atlantic Coast weather conditions.

Such meterological data is a key concern.

In fact, as M Yu Lanyu emphasized, it is difficult if not impossible to proceed further without having at hand all the technical data, for example, wind and wave velocity, rainfall potential, and also to be able to carry out a certain number of trials at sea. In this area, he said, one must avoid blunders and improvisations.

To this problem, which the technicians seem to take very seriously, must be added the difficulties caused by the frequent electric power stoppages, which even if temporary nevertheless are easily avoidable delays. Is it not quite upsetting to see such a large and important construction site as the port paralyzed for a whole day because there is no electricity?

At all events and despite these little problems one cannot but express real satisfaction over the degree of progress already achieved.

More than 210 meters of bridge are now completed and the whole land infrastructure--enclosure, road-bed, warehouses, workshops, and administrative buildings--are well on the way toward completion. The high seas platform is in place and trial runs have started. This platform, ordered from the Netherlands, cost the sum of approximately $4,700,000, or 211,500,000 ouguiya, without counting the tug.

It arrived last 15 August and was installed in the sea where it is being tried out by Chinese, Dutch, and Mauritanian engineers who must gather the technical data needed for continuing operations.

The dock itself will have the form of an obtuse angle approximately 1450 meters long and 13.5 meters wide.

It will have 3 mooring-berths, which means it can accommodate 3 ships at the same time.

9772
CSO: 4400

EEC FINANCING DAM PROJECT

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 8 Oct 80 p 1

[Report: "$13 Million for the Foum Gleita Dam"]

[Text] In Brussels the EEC has given the green light for the financing of a major development project requested by our country.

This applies to the building and operation of a dam and reservoir at Foum Gleita, in the center of the Gorgol Noir Basin, which is an affluent of the Senegal River.

The dam, which will make possible the irrigation and cultivation of 3,600 hectares of land in the southern part of the country, will help to reduce our dependence of external food supplies. Actually, once completed, i.e., in slightly over two years, according to expert computations, the farmers in the Kaedi area will be raising over 25,000 tons of cereal crops, rice and corn, eventually, and 2,400 tons of vegetables.

This would be sufficient to feed the area and, eventually, ship surpluses to other parts of the country.

The total cost of the project is very high, $97 million. It will be financed, therefore, from several sources.

The EEC has approved its share of $13 million.

Other financing sources which have pledged to contribute to the financing of the project are the Saudi Development Fund, the Abou Dhabi Fund, the Islamic Development Bank, the FAC (French Aid and Cooperation Fund), Bilateral German Aid, the World Bank Group and the FIDA (International Agricultural Development Fund).

The project will be implemented by the Gorgol Project Authority and an institution which has been recently organized by SONADER (National Rural Development Company).

This is considered the biggest agricultural project so far financed in our country.

5157
CSO: 4400

RAINFALL THIS YEAR CLOSE TO NORMAL

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 8 Oct 80 p 1

[Report: "This Year Precipitation Will Be Close to Normal"]

[Text] Even though precipitation this year is still below normal, the shortage is less drastic compared with previous years in the area of the rivers of Gorgol. Such is the conclusion of technicians working on the Agryment Project which, at the end of each September, determines the balance of precipitation recorded in the country.

At the beginning of the 1980 winter season, their balance shows a precipitation comparable to a normal year even though there was a shortage of rain virtually throughout the country and, particularly, in the north: The Aleg Monguel area alone had above-normal precipitation.

Comparisons with recent years indicate that precipitation in the river area had reached 84 percent of the normal in Rosso, 89 percent in Boghe and 75 percent in Kaedi.

This year the Tamchekett area has been particularly deprived of rain and in the north and the northwest the ratio between the precipitation and the normal ranges between 10 and 20 percent. Compared to previous years the precipitation in 1980 equaled that of 1978 and 1979.

However, the Agryment technicians add, the timing was better in 1980 in the sense that after a month of July relatively deprived of precipitation over the entire country, in August and September rains fell regularly within the stipulated period. This was not the case in 1978 and 1979.

This gives our farmers a reason to be satisfied. They will not fail to draw greater benefits from this winter season with a view to reaching food self-sufficiency.

5157
CSO: 4400

MOROCCAN-SPANISH RELATIONS DISCUSSED

Overtures To Renewed Relations

Rabat L'OPINION in French 17 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] The signing of a new agreement for cultural cooperation between Morocco and Spain, to replace the one established in 1957, is a concrete example of the progress that has been made by the diplomatic corps of these two nations towards better understanding and a joint desire to overcome bilateral disputes.

Contrary to preliminary speculation, the documents resulting from the recent visit of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Morocco indicate the beginning of a solution to this problem.

It is obvious that only general guidelines could be established at these high levels. The details and determination of the drafts of agreements depend on the competence of experts.

Consequently, towards the end of this month, Morocco and Spain will sign a treaty creating a study commission to deal with the project for constructing a fixed link across the Straits of Gibraltar. Renewal of the present agreement concerning fishing rights will be discussed by experts beginning 28 October. Last of all, Spain has made a firm commitment to facilitate the transit of Moroccan citrus fruits over Spanish territory.

It is evident that the discussions held by the two chiefs of the Moroccan and Spanish diplomatic corps renewed cooperation between our two countries and even raised it to the level at which it should have been all the time.

Beyond this aspect of the matter, we shall witness the beginning of a new climate in our bilateral relations. It may be predicted that this psychological barrier, which is responsible for many misunderstandings between our two countries, will tend to disappear. Henceforth, Morocco and Spain can aspire to objective cooperation, to cooperation of partners.

His Majesty, Hassan II, recently said that neither Morocco nor Spain can be budged, that we run the same risks and that we have complementary interests with regard to geopolitics. Consequently, it is natural that consultations between the officials of both countries will yield the expected results and will correct the errors committed by one side or the other.

Discussions Between Ministers

Rabat L'OPINION in French 15 Oct 80 pp 1, 3

[Text] Upon invitation from the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Me M'Hamed Boucetta, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jose-Pedro Perez-Llorca, arrived Monday evening at the Rabat-Sale airport for an official 24-hour visit to Morocco.

In a statement to the press, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed his delight and satisfaction to be in Morocco in his capacity of head of the Spanish diplomatic corps.

"This is my first official trip outside of my country with regard to bilateral matters," he said, emphasizing the great importance attached by the Spanish Government to its ties with Morocco and to the contacts and friendly relations which exist between the two countries.

"It is a normal phase of Spanish policy to entertain friendly relations with our great neighbor to the South, Morocco," stated the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs who added that this visit will furnish the opportunity for an exchange of views with his Moroccan counterpart and with other Moroccan officials.

Jose-Pedro Perez-Llorca concluded by expressing the desire that the visits by the two diplomatic chiefs to each other's country would increase in frequency for the benefit of both nations.

Upon descending from the aircraft, the chief of the Spanish diplomatic corps was greeted by his counterpart Me M'hamed Boucetta as well as Abdelhaq Tazi, Secretary of State for Cooperation, Alfonso de la Serna, Spanish ambassador to Morocco, Maati Jorio, ambassador from the court of His Majesty, King Hassan II, of Morocco to Spain, Mohamed Kabbaj, in charge of the mission to the Royal Cabinet and of the fixed (transit) link between Europe and Africa across the Straits of Gibraltar, Omar Benchemsi, governor of His Majesty, the King, in the Rabat-Sale prefecture, as well as several other personalities.

The two ministers were then scheduled to have a conversation followed by a lengthy work session which included the delegations of both nations.

Preparation of an early visit to Spain by His Majesty, King Hassan II, renewal of a fishing agreement, which will expire on 31 January 1981, the problem of transit of Moroccan citrus fruits across Spain, construction of a fixed link (bridge or tunnel) across the Straits of Gibraltar as well as the question of tension in northwestern Africa constituted the principal subjects which were scheduled to be discussed when the session was continued yesterday morning.

Then, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs was received by the Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, Me Maati Bousbid.

The conversation dealt with bilateral relations and the methods that would be suitable for strengthening cooperation between the two nations in the areas of economics, culture, science and technology.

It should be mentioned that Me Boucetta gave a dinner in honor of his Spanish counterpart. On this occasion, Me Boucetta presented a speech, the complete text of which appears below.

"Minister Boucetta: This new Moroccan-Spanish meeting is a source of great satisfaction to us. It testifies to the continuity of the ties of friendship and good neighborliness that exist between our two countries, ties that we intend to consolidate even further. Consequently, we are particularly happy to receive you as the distinguished representative of an old friendly nation whose destiny has been intimately linked with ours.

Minister Coucetta, we realize that your first official visit to a friendly country has been made to Morocco. While fully appreciating this gesture, we believe that it fits in with the policy of cooperation that has become habitual between our two countries each time that changes in the international situation require it.

Finally, your visit takes place at a particularly critical time as regards the international situation and will permit us to work together closely on matters that concern us.

In the Middle East, Israel persists in its policy of illegal occupation of Arab territories, the legitimate rights of the Palestine people continue to be flouted and the achievement of peace requires that the international community redouble its efforts. In view of all this, the Arab world appreciates the policy followed by Spain which has always upheld the cause of law and justice.

Similarly, we cannot remain indifferent to the armed conflict between Iraq and Iran. Our nation can only deplore this war between two neighboring countries which are united by ties of religion and history.

In view of the obligations which are incumbent on it as an active member of the Islamic family and its attachment to the principle of peaceful solution of differences, Morocco is ready to support any action which is capable of putting an end to this conflict and of permitting Iraq to recover its historical rights.

These conflicts, Minister Boucetta, which have been contained up to now, run the risk of degenerating to a point where world peace would become endangered.

Spain and Morocco, which are countries that occupy a privileged position in the Mediterranean area and are centrally located between Europe, Africa and the Arab world, should make their contribution to the solution of these conflicts.

Minister Boucetta, Morocco believes in the virtue of dialogue for solving differences which may arise between nations. It has continued to demonstrate this belief in spite of acts of aggression which have been taken against it and in spite of a violent ideological war which has been conducted against it ever since it recovered its Saharan territories.

This desire for peace is a result of our concern for not closing the door to the future and for contributing to stability and peace in a vital region of the world. We are convinced that Spain shares the concern for preserving our region from a conflict that would be detrimental to everyone. Morocco is open to any dialogue with regard to its territorial integrity and its unity.

The meeting between His Majesty King Hassan II and his Majesty King Juan Carlos the First has furnished a decisive impetus to our cooperation, for which we can only congratulate ourselves. Important accomplishments have resulted, but a great deal remains to be done in order to realize the ambitions of our two rulers and of our two nations.

The fixed transit link across the Straits of Gibraltar, which has furnished the occasion for many conferences between Moroccan and Spanish experts, is surely one of the projects that is in keeping with the historic responsibilities of Morocco and Spain with regard to Africa, Europe and the Arab world.

Once again, I repeat to you my wishes of welcome and hope that you will have a pleasant stay with us."

The Spanish minister then recalled that there exists a permanent dialogue between Morocco and Spain. "This dialogue," he stated, "will contribute to the search for peaceful solutions to all the problems which now exist throughout the world."

With regard to the Middle East problem, the Spanish minister indicated that his government has always supported the Palestinian cause.

Jose-Pedro Perez-Llorca concluded his address by stating that "Between Spain and Morocco, there exists a common heritage in every area generally and in the field of culture particularly."

In this respect, the head of the Spanish diplomatic corps recalled the richness of the Moroccan historic patrimony as well as the project on which the two countries are collaborating, namely, the fixed link project across the Straits of Gibraltar.

In addition to the members of the Spanish delegation, those taking part in this dinner included several ministers and ambassadors accredited to Rabat as well as other personalities.

7619
CSO: 4400

SECURITY REPORT RELEASED

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 8 Nov 80 pp 1, 3

[Text]

RIYADH, Nov. 7 (SPA) — Interior Minister Prince Naif submitted copies of the fifth edition of the Interior Ministry's statistical book Friday to King Khaled, Crown Prince Fahd and Second Deputy Premier and Commander of the National Guard, Prince Abdullah.

The book comprises statistical statements of the activities of the ministry and its various departments during the year 1979.

The book, based on official figures and statistics, is issued to inform the public and researchers of the ministry's efforts to preserve security and fight crimes that resulted in the drop of the rate of crime generally, and emphasize the Kingdom's role as one of the leading countries in achieving security, stability and lowest crime rates.

The book revealed that the figure of criminal accidents in 1979 represent a reasonable rate in comparison to other countries and taking into consideration the comprehensive development of the country that requires recruiting manpower from various nationalities and catagories. Sixty-eight per cent of the crimes were committed by Saudi Arabians, and about 32 per cent by foreigners.

The statistics disclosed that dangerous crimes, like murders, did not exceed 4.6 per cent of the total. The book highlighted in analysing the figures in the Kingdom's firmness in combating drugs because they contradict with the principles of the Islamic Sharia, and bear harmful complications on the health and mental ability of the public.

The number of vehicles registered in the Kingdom amounted to 2,723,116. The book showed that 290,207 new license plates were issues in that year, of which 159,272 were for private cars, 12,779 for taxis, 115,679 for trucks and 477 for buses. The total figure of new vehicles has declined by 29,729 than the previous year. Driving licenses issued in that year reached 241,153.

Meanwhile, the total number of traffic accidents reached 17,743 in which 16,703 were injured and 2,843 killed. Non-Saudi drivers involved in the accidents make-up 37 per cent of the total, the book disclosed.

Fire accidents on the country's level numbered 3,870 in 1979, down from 4,365 in 1978 or 11.4 per cent. The fires resulted in SR176,945,699 of losses and caused the death of 81 people, of which 15 were women. Sixty-seven men and 28 women were seriously injured, while 189 men and 38 women suffered slight injuries. The death toll decreased by 45 per cent than that of 1978.

Rescue operations by the Civil Defense departments and stations across the Kingdom reached 559 cases in comparison with 445 in the previous year. Material losses on these cases amounted to SR5,086,020 and resulted in the death of 553 men and 54 women. Those slightly injured included 230 men and 44 women.

The book attributed the decrease in the number of fire accidents and the increase of rescue operations to the more sophisticated communication means and equipping fire engines with heavy and light technical devices. The continuous training of civil defense men on advanced equipment and mastering them added to the growing public awareness on repelling the causes of fires contributed to the drop of accidents.

In the field of passports, 1,024 people with Arab ancestry of which 574 were men and 450 women were given Saudi Arabian nationalities in 1979. Those of non-Arab background given nationality numbered 590, of which 348 were men and 242 women. Last year, 881,358 Saudi Arabians left the Kingdom and 913,807 returned. Of those who departed, 258,711 left via airports, 15,900 via seaports, and 606,747 land exists. Airports received 230,002 people of those coming in, 16,430 returned through ports, and 667,375 via land entrances.

Foreigners who entered the country in 1979 numbered 2,484,749. Of those, 1.6 per cent came in though airports, 88,927 through ports and 781,722 by land. While expatriates who left the country reached 2,423,547, of whom 1.57 per cent left via airpot, 86,294 sea ports and 758,604 via land exits.

The Internal Security Force College students numbered 897 during the 1979-80 academic year. Those in the primary year numbered 329, students of intermdediate year reached 303 and those of the last year, 265. Graduates in the same year reached 2,201, of which 63 graduated with the rank of officers and 1138 reservists.

In medical services, the statistical book disclosed that 126,204 male, female and children patients called on the Public Security medical units. The number of doctors and administrative officers at the Public Security Medical Services Directorate General reached 303, of which 182 are Saudi Arabians and 121 foreigners. Another 298 people worked on the medical units distriguted over the work sites, the review said.

Regarding institutes and divisions assigned to the Public Security Department's general training administration, the Officers Institute was founded in 1968, and already has offered 19 courses for 507 officers. The personnel Institute began in 1966 and has held 78 sessions from which 4,760 cadets have graduated.

Other institutes include the Civil Defense Institute established in 1974. The center has offered five training courses to date and has trained 526 persons. The Traffic Institute, set up in 1967, has completed ten sessions for 1,527 trainees. It also sent 163 students to the United States to attend three preparatory courses. There are also driving Institutes in which 103,309 persons registered and from which 62,547 persons obtained their driving licenses in 1979.

The Frontiers Guard Institute was set up in 1962. It so far organized 90 courses from which 3,821 persons graduated. The Passports Insitute founded in 1972 held four taining courses and 510 persons passed their tests. The Music Division was established in 1973. To date, it held six courses, from which 278 persons graduated. The Physical Training Institute created in 1972 organized six training courses to date.

A total of 330 persons are registered in the latter, including seven non Saudis.

The firearms Training Division was set up in 1968. To date, it organized 51 courses for 1,071 persons. The Machinery Division created in 1968 organized 32 courses which were joined by 1,705 persons. The Language Division established in 1968 organized 11 courses so far that were joined by 122 persons. The Horse Riding Division was set up in 1970. It organized six courses so far for 162 trainees.

Regarding scholarships abroad, 407 persons — including 15 officers, 66 reservists, nine officials and 317 students were sent abroad to read their degrees and attend courses. In its plan, the Interior Ministry catered for the diversification of scientific specializations to cover its various requirements.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

SOVIET MILITARY DELEGATION--A Soviet delegation headed by Lieutenant General (Solinov) arrived in Syria a few days ago, and is scheduled to remain there for 1 week. The delegation's purpose: to advise Syrians on the subject of forming a popular army. The delegation members will meet with representatives of the Syrian army and party. It is reported from Damascus that, in the wake of a calming of the situation in Aleppo, the Syrians have begun evacuating their 3d Armored Division from that town. [Text] [TA111251 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Nov 80 p 1]

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END

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SUMMIT PARTICIPATION SIGNALS STRENGTH OF MODERATE STATES

LD261151 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 22 Nov 80 pp 1, 15

[Unattributed report: "'AL-SIYASAH' Reveals What no Arab Official Wants To Be Quoted on: The Summit War...; The War To Answer a Simple Question: Who Leads the Arabs now in Egypt's Absence; the Inside Story as 'AL-SIYASAH' Sees It From Its Correspondents in Five Major Capitals"]

[Text] In Egypt's absence, who has the first say in the Middle East now and in the next 5 years?

This is the question that is not being put publicly, and nobody wants to go on record as having asked it. Nevertheless, what is now being termed the "Arab summit war" in the foreign press is in fact a "conflict under the table," in which various weapons and slogans are being used in order to reach the categorical answer. It is as if one party has to say to the other: It is we and not you who have a say in the area.

In the past few days AL-SIYASAH has critically analyzed reports by its correspondents in four [as published] capitals and from sources that are usually described as highly placed. The conclusion drawn from the analysis is that the "summit war" is primarily a battle over whether or not it should be held in Amman on 25 November. [Summit was held on schedule] The mere fact that the summit will be held in Amman on Tuesday means that it is a victory for a particular Arab axis and its mere postponement in order to be held in a venue other than Amman--even if 24 hours later--means, on the other hand, a victory for another Arab axis.

Just as no Arab official wishes to be blamed for publicly posing the central question "Who now has the say in the Middle East?" no official wants to be blamed for publicly talking about an Arab axis. This is a sensitive question, particularly since everybody is raising the slogan of unity of ranks and unity of stands in the face of regional and international dangers.

Therefore, this diagnosis by AL-SIYASAH will be rejected by Arab officials but these officials know, just as many other people know, that the issues they are debating are side issues that are being discussed above the table while the real conflict is taking place under the table in order to reach an answer to the question: Who now has the say in the Middle East? Is it Syria and the rejectionist countries or is it the three other countries that insist on holding the summit at its scheduled time and place? With the existence of such an axis the PLO, because of its close ties with Syria and in view of its links with the rest of the Arab countries, now finds

itself in a more sensitive, critical and awkward situation like them it has never experienced before. The situation up to last Thursday boiled down to the simple point: who is not with us is against us. In his recent prolonged tour Yasir 'Arafat, using all his diplomatic skill and long political experience, tried to avoid this point.

The countries that are in favor of the summit have offered all possible facilities and compromises in order to ensure that the summit will be held as scheduled and to uphold the slogan that calls for preserving the sanctity of meetings at such high level. It is also in order to ensure the maximum possible national agreement at a time when challenges from every quarter are intensifying and, consequently, there is a growing need for a common view--even if an acceptable minimum--on the basis of which dialog can be conducted with the new U.S. Administration and Europe as well as among the Arab countries themselves.

Syria, for example, asked that the summit (in case it is held) should not give King Husayn a national authoritization when he holds talks with President-elect Ronald Reagan when they meet shortly. Syria was given this promise. It was also reported that Syria asked that the question of financial aid that was agreed at the Baghdad summit should not be discussed. Again Syria obtained a promise to this effect. It was also reported that the question of Jordanian-Syrian relations, with all the questions involved in security issues, was also discussed. But Syria finally said: If the differences between us have reached such an extent, then let us postpone the summit to a later date and hold it, say, around 20 January in Mecca under King Khalid 'Abd al-'Aziz's chairmanship, shortly before the Islamic summit.

CSO: 4802

AL-SA'IQAH ATTACKS JORDANIAN REGIME POLICIES

LD261357 Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 14 Nov 80 pp 1, 9

[SANA report: "Al-Sa'iqah Calls for Halting the Dialog With the Jordanian Regime; The Regime Exploits the Dialog To Carry Through the Liquidationist Solutions"]

[Text] Damascus--The organization of the vanguards of the popular liberation war--al-Sa'iqah forces, issued a statement here yesterday on the Palestinian relationship with the Jordanian regime. In its statement, the organization declares its withdrawal from the membership of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian committee for supporting steadfastness in the occupied territories and calls for the suspension of the Jordanian-Palestinian dialog and for the halting of material aid to Jordan.

The statement points out that about 2 years after the establishment of the Palestinian dialog with the Jordanian regime and the formation of the steadfastness committee and in view of the Jordanian regime's political posture and daily practices, this regime's real intentions and policies which are inconsistent with the Arab stand which rejects the Camp David agreement, have been exposed.

The statement emphasizes that the Jordanian regime has not let any occasion pass without manifesting its nonadherence to the Rabat summit resolution which recognizes the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people. The statement points out that this regime has denied the rights of the Palestinian Arab people and has appointed itself as their trustee whether by reviving its plan for the establishment of the [Jordanian] United Kingdom or by seeking a so-called European initiative for finding a solution to the Palestinian problem through a suspect plan with Jordan.

The statement says that the Jordanian prisons are still crowded with Palestinian detainees and their doors are still open to receive more of our people's strugglers on the charge of affiliation with the Palestinian national action.

The statement also points out that the obvious harmony and identity of views between the new American administration and the Egyptian regime and the Zionist Labor Party leadership are completely identical to the convictions and practices of the Jordanian regime.

In Beirut, the Palestine Liberation Front has denounced the Jordanian regime's stand and its suspect role with regard to the fateful Arab issues.

In a statement made by the front's Secretary General Tal'at Ya'qub yesterday, the front said that the Jordanian regime has adopted oppressive, intimidatory and persecutory methods against the progressive Palestinian and Jordanian strugglers and it is responsible for the liquidationist campaigns and attacks that are launched against many Arab liberation movements in the area and for exporting the machinery of police repression to some areas in the Gulf.

The Palestine Liberation Front secretary general said that the Jordanian regime has directly supported and aided reactionary religious [the Muslim Brotherhood] forces and urged them to carry out subversive activities against the Syrian Arab region, which is a member of the steadfastness and confrontation front, as a necessary prelude to the successful implementation of the aggressive imperialist plans in our country, particularly the Camp David plot.

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'AL-QABAS': ARABS MUST AGREE TO WIN OVER REAGAN

GF301408 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 29 Nov 80 p 1

[Editorial: "It is Preferable To Be in Two Trenches and Agree Than Be in the Same Trench and Disagree"]

[Text] The fact which the Arabs have to face sooner or later is the stand the new U.S. President, Ronald Reagan, will adopt on the Middle East issue.

The new U.S. President has deliberately kept his stand low keyed and vague. During the election campaign he did not depart from the usual rules of the game: outbidding in favor of Israel. After his victory, however, he bided his time and refrained from premature statements more harmful than useful. He is definitely in a different position from that of his predecessors: He does not wish to renew his term of office, and he does not owe his victory to the Jewish vote. He does not have special relations with the Arabs. His plank was to enhance U.S. prestige in the world.

This means that when he does tackle the Middle East problem he will be putting forward a primarily U.S. solution that may not necessarily be biased toward Israel, or complimentary to the Arabs, or seeking to curry favor with the Soviet Union.

This is the fact the Arabs have to keep in mind--be they those who attended the Amman summit or those who boycotted it. Perhaps this fact is of interest above all to Syria because of its concern for the Golan Heights. This fact is equally of interest to the PLO because the fate of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the establishment of a Palestinian state on any part of Palestinian soil concern it.

What we wish to stress here is that the new U.S. President is not, apparently, compelled to adopt a very pro-Israel stand--unless the Arabs themselves compel him to do so. The Arab split that appeared as a result of absentees from the Amman summit may be the direct and principal reason for Reagan's ultimately taking Israel's side, if only because he cannot support the Arabs if they themselves do not support one another.

Therefore, we hope that a summit of the steadfastness and confrontation front states will be held and that its resolutions will "complement" the Amman summit resolutions rather than oppose them. In this way all the Arabs will appear to be confrontation states against Israel and not states confronting one another.

We have no doubt that all the Arab states do not differ on the crux of their pan-Arab cause, and in this there is no difference between those that attended the Amman summit and those that absented themselves--it is much better to agree on the same cause and be in two trenches than to disagree and be in the same trench.

CSO: 4802

PALESTINIANS TRAIN IN SYRIAN, LIBYAN CAMPS

Lebanese Government Concerned

Nicosia AL-'ASR in Arabic 24 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Yusuf Hasan: "Palestinian Training Camps on Syrian Territory"]

[Text] The PLO has promptly reassured the Lebanese Government with regard to the proclamation of general conscription for Palestinians.

Reliable Palestinian sources in Beirut stated that the Lebanese Government as well as President Sarkis had expressed concern over the fact that the PLO had provided young Palestinian men and women with free and open access to the training camps so they can receive weapons training.

The liberation organization made a point of notifying a few Lebanese figures who had recently visited Mr 'Arafat that Palestinian training camps were not located on Lebanese territory and that most of them were on Syrian territory.

The liberation organization also explained that the purpose behind proclaiming general conscription for Palestinians, as Mr 'Arafat explained to his visitors, was the fear of a broad-base Israeli operation in South Lebanon aimed against the resistance and the Palestinian camps.

Thousands of Palestinian students and workers have arrived at the Palestinian training camps in Syria and Libya to receive preliminary weapons training. This training will be followed by specialized courses [which will be available] in countries considered friendly to the liberation organization.

During the last 2 days 1,000 male and female fighters graduated from one of the training camps. They participated in maneuvers with live ammunition alongside combat units that have several years of combat experience.

[The new graduates] participated alongside the infantry formations in field artillery maneuvers, in anti-aircraft artillery [maneuvers] and in [maneuvers] with tanks and armored vehicles which Palestinian forces obtained from several Arab and eastern European countries. For the first time the tanks also took part [in the maneuvers].

The ability to coordinate various kinds of support weapons emerged in these intense maneuvers, and the need to use telecommunications devices in the course of directing battle also emerged.

It is known that Palestinian forces have advanced telecommunications devices. These constitute an advanced combat system [for communications] between the various high commands and the field commands on land and during combat.

The most notable training included in the maneuvers, which lasted for 48 continuous hours, consisted of training in anti-landing operations, in raids that are carried out by propellor airplanes and in strikes against the rear commands of hostile forces.

The course of these maneuvers was supervised by a number of military commanders in the PLO. Most notable of them was Staff Brig Gen Sa'd Sayil [or] Abu al-Walid, director of military operations in the PLO's Supreme Military Command. The maneuvers were also witnessed by some Arab and foreign military attaches in Beirut.

A prominent leader in the PLO stated that the recent maneuvers that were carried out by Palestinian units in South Lebanon are considered the first of their kind with regard to the number [of Palestinians] who participated and the weapons that were part of the combat formations in the maneuvers.

One day after the conclusion of these maneuvers, Khalil Wazir [or] Abu Jahid, one of Yasir 'Arafat's most prominent assistants, supervised other maneuvers that were carried out by the militias of Fatah. These militias were provided with individual and heavy weapons, whose importance is no less than that of those weapons which professional military men have, and some motorized units which consist basically of the Palestinian Liberation army.

Syrian Military Leader Surfaces

Nicosia AL-'ASR in Arabic 24 Oct 80 p 5

[Article: "Naji Jamil Undertakes the Charge of Palestinian Action"]

[Text] Maj Gen Naji Jamil, commander of the Syrian air force, who played an important role in the Lebanese crisis when he was a member of the permanent Syrian delegation that was contacting Lebanese officials and various groups during the administration of President Franjiyyah, has come to the forefront again after he was charged with the mission of carrying out Palestinian action in Syria and supervising party organizations whose basic objective is to liberate the occupied land.

Informed sources state that from now on every relationship with the Palestinians inside Lebanon and mainly in Syria will pass by Maj Gen Naji Jamil.

Although some sources have spoken about a new organization for Palestinian action and for the relationship with Palestinians as well as for the armed party organizations in Syria, the real reasons for the return of Maj Gen Jamil are still unknown. Maj Gen Jamil had always objected to the chaos on the Lebanese scene which resulted from the failure to put into effect the agreements that were made between the Lebanese government and the Palestinian Resistance, and specifically, the Cairo Agreement.

When Maj Gen Jamil was involved in the task of mediating with Minister Khaddam and Gen Hikmat al-Shihabi, his positions were well known and inflexible.

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BRIEFS

GULF DEFENSE DISCUSSED--Kuwait, 25 Nov (KUNA)--Visiting Saudi Interior Minister Nayif Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz has had a meeting with his Kuwaiti counterpart, Shaykh Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah. Kuwaiti officials say that the 2-hour talks covered security of the Arab Gulf region and relations between the two neighboring Arab countries, and particularly the field of police and public security. Prince Nayif's visit, which began yesterday, coincides with reports carried by a Saudi paper that contacts are being made between the oil-producing Gulf countries over the formulation of a security pact among them. There has been no official comment on these reports carried by the paper AL-MADINAH AL-MUMAWWAH yesterday, which say that the proposed pact calls for the Gulf countries to be considered a comprehensive security entity, and that any aggression against any of them would be regarded as aggression against all of them. [Text] [LD251420 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 1224 GMT 25 Nov 80]

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REBEL OPERATIONS ASSESSED, LACK OF COORDINATION NOTED

Paris LE MONDE in French 11-12 Nov 80

[Article by Ian Hamel--passages between slantlines originally published in italics]

[11 Nov 80 pp 1, 4]

[Text] A large segment of the Pachtoun populace, the Mohmand tribes, expressed on 8 November their "total support for the Afghan revolution," according to Radio Kabul. The radio asserts that "starting now, the Mohmand warriors will no longer authorize the enemies of Afghanistan to utilize their territory--situated on either side of the northern Afghan-Pakistani frontier--for sabotage of the armed struggle against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan." This adhesion to the pro-Soviet regime would be the largest effectuated by one tribe. On the other hand, the exodus of the upper ranks of the civil service has accelerated in recent weeks, according to the UNHCR bureau in Islamabad.

The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan is also leading Pakistan to intensify its armament effort. China recently began to deliver it the first of 65 Fantan fighter-bombers (derived from the MiG-19) and SAM-2 ground-to-air missiles, the United Press of India agency indicated on 9 November.

However, within Afghanistan itself, the resistance to the Soviet occupation is marking time, as Ian Hamel reports, after traveling in several parts of the country with a team from the reporters' association.

I. The Despair of the "Combatants of the Faith"

The crest of a turban and the barrel of a Kalachnikov emerge from the low wall. The Pachtou sentinel gravely scrutinizes the environs, then the grill is opened.

About 50 people are milling around in the garden of the stylish villa of Sib-ghatullah Al-Mojaddedi, chief of the Afghanistan National Liberation Front. Moudjahidin (combatants of the faith [Islam]) are finishing up loading cases of arms and munitions on board a varicolored antique wagon. In the absense of Mojaddedi, a severe but liberal theologian, his son Azim is directing operations. The rough Afghan

"querilleras" with grizzled hair listen with deference to this delicate young man with the carefully barbered short beard. The somewhat theatrical appearance of the Pachtous, big dark-tinted warriors, contrasts with that of the Hazara peasants, of Mongol extraction, almost graceless in their humility.

These latter, members of a traditionally despised ethnic group, Shiites to make things worse, are scarcely at ease amongst the Sunnite Muslims. /"We are the only ones not to limit our struggle against the Russians to the Pachtou regions,"/ observes Azim, adding: /"Against atheistic communism, we have buried our old racial rivalries."/ Ali, the Hazara "commandant," nods in agreement. Small and thick-set, this Kabul innkeeper, aged 35, went into the bush early in 1979. Arriving with his men at Peshawar, in Pakistan, to look for arms, he returns to fight in the high central plateau of Afghanistan. It is with him that I must cross secretly into Afghanistan.

/"Mohamed Daoud, communist! Ali Bhutto, communist! Indira Gandhi, communist! Ayatollah Khomeyni, communist!" None of the personages mentioned get the time of day from Afhajan, "commandant" of the moudjahidin of Parachinar, the principal market-town of this little stubby finger of Pakistani territory [jutting into Afghanistan], the last stage before going undercover.

I timidly venture the name of King Zaher Shah, overthrown in 1973. The visage of my interlocutor, a deserter from the Afghan army, brightens immediately: /"He is a good Muslim, he never killed any Afghans. Everyone knows it, only he could bring about the union of all the moudjahidin. We are all waiting for him."/ This opinion is shared by the moderates in the Islamic Alliance, an informal organization that includes 5 of the 6 main exile groups, including the National Liberation Front. By contrast, the very theocratic and intransigent Hezb-e Islami (Islamic party) of the "engineer" Hekmatyar Gulbuddin does not hesitate to describe the former sovereign as an /"assassin"...Not surprising: Gulbuddin is a communist,"/ replies the commandant of Parachinar at once.

The resistance certainly seems to be split in two: there are supposed to have been localized confrontations between the /"madmen of Allah"/ of the Hezb-e Islami and the moudjahidin of other groups.

/"Thanks to Zaher Shah we are receiving some arms and a bit of money,"/ continues the deserter officer. /"Brezhnev asked him to take the throne back. The king posed 4 conditions: that Soviet troops withdraw, that the USSR close its embassy in Kabul and pay indemnities to Afghanistan, and finally that the communist party be banned."/ None of the moudjahidin seems to want to question these somewhat incredible remarks. Could it be that the resistance feels itself so painfully in need of a leader worthy of respect that the parties are obliged to regild the cost of arms of the fallen sovereign, who has remained silent in his Italian retreat for the last 7 years?

Spreading right out on the ground an aerial map, Aghajan puts his finger on the town of Ghazni, headquarters of a province that bears his name: /"Tomorrow you will go down there."/ 15,000 moudjahidin are preparing for a /great war against the "chouravis"/ (Russians). /We are not like the Russians, we are not afraid to die./

Islamabad exerts rather relative, if not altogether theoretical, control over this region whose tribal populations ignore the Pakistani-Afghan border drawn artificially by the English in 1893. Nevertheless, General Zia-Ul-Haq, the Pakistani chief of state, does not want to lay himself too open to Soviet charges that he is aiding the resistance. So we will wait for the border police to ostensibly turn their backs to go to Trimangal. /"Bakshish! Bakshish!" his neighbor murmurs to me with a knowing air when our bus comes to the deceptively vacant-looking soldiers. I had put on the long shirt falling to the knees, ample pantaloons the color of sand, and a bonnet like those of the Hazaras rather than the /"rooster-head"/ turban of the Pachtous. Ali, the commandant, recommended that I pretend to be sleeping in case we were stopped: /"If you are asked any questions, simply answer that you are Nouristani/ (another Afghan ethnic group).

"Beware: Kalqis"

At the foot of the wild-looking mountains, while unloading our vehicle, I notice that the mortar, the rockets, and most of the cases of arms and munitions remained at Parachinar. The entire gear for the 50 Hazara moudjahidin will be carried on four small donkeys, whose owner fixes the price of hire at 50 afghanis (1 afghani = 10 centimes) for each 7 kg of cargo. After having wound our way for several hours in the valley, the narrow rocky path begins the assault on hills that become increasingly precipitous. The caravan lengthens out, the men pant with exhaustion. The older ones try to stay in step with the slow but regular pace of the donkeys. At regular intervals, we cross small groups of men usually armed with old rifles, their chests crossed with cartridge-pouches. Moudjahidin? Smugglers? Both at the same time, probably. Despite the fatigue, no one forgets to perform the salutation, "salam-o alekom." The chief of a village called Wardak, recently bombarded, stops for a moment. /"The Russians are using poison gas. After the bombings, the skin falls off in shreds," they say. Nevertheless, none of the survivors show any injuries. Throughout the conversation, the women and girls turn their backs on us, occasionally glancing at us furtively, a shawl held tightly between their teeth.

/"Afghanistan! Afghanistan."/ (pronounced "Afrranistan," my closest traveling companion never ceases to repeat). His face brightens as he points out to me a line of hill crests. Is this the border? Unlike the rest of the country, the province of Paktia is wooded, but the systematic and unregulated cutting of the resinous trees cannot fail to produce catastrophic erosion in the years ahead. Protected from the burning sun by the shade of the pines, we progress more easily. For Gulpacha Mohabat, former pilot for the king and Daoud, today the head of the military section of the Afghanistan National Liberation Front, this region assumes a strategic and psychological importance of the first magnitude. So it is appropriate to wage sustained actions against the communists and the Soviets here. Nevertheless, for Hanan Djadji, a royalist giant imprisoned in 1974 after failing in a coup attempt, /"the Djadjis are making war on behalf of the Djadji. Every tribe must rally behind its chief, without taking parties into account."/ His entire and numerous family, which has taken refuge in Pakistan, agrees. For them, the notion of clan is more important than that of political grouping.

Night falls rapidly, the Hazaras throw their patou (cloaks) over their backs and continue imperturbably their march without giving themselves the least repose. Feet stumble among the fallen rocks. Harassed, frozen, I walk like a sleep-walker with my eyes fastened on the silhouette of the moudjahidin in front of me. Feebly illumined by the moon. With a gesture, Ali halts the column. First stop? /"Beware:

Kalqis!" someone whispers to me. Fires are blinking down there, at the bottom of the valley. All the men have grabbed their rifles, Kalachnikovs or Lee Enfields, and are waiting, immobile and silent. The guerrilas prefer to avoid a confrontation, and [instead] take a long detour. During this first night in Afghanistan, we will only sleep 4 hours, bellies empty, in the bed of a dry stream. Chahir, my interpreter, a degree-holder from the French school in Kabul, shares with me a cake of unleavened bread.

/"Do you know why we did not fight? The moudjahidin economize on their ammunition to fight in Hazarajat. We are not going to Ghazni."/ Then, noticing my astonishment, he adds: /"Since the parties in Peshawar are not interested in them, the Hazaras are obliged to lie to obtain a few weapons."/ In Pakistan, in fact, the fighting waged by this Mongol-origin ethnic group is greeted by nothing but silence.

During the entire trek through Paktia and then Logar, not a single shot will be fired. Silent, bellies empty, heedless of fatigue, and of the cold as well as the sometimes torrid heat, these peasant warriors will go at a furious pace. The group stretches out over several kilometers, and the furthest behind sometimes do not rejoin the group until quite late in the night. During a stop at a tea-house, a small mud-wall fortress planted in a rocky desert, Odam Khon, a toothless old man with a thin white goatee, shows me his feet looking as though slashed by knives. Despite his daily Calvary, no complaint escapes his lips. Has he not signed a moral compact with God? For, what can he hope for with his antique rifle and his six pitiful cartridges?

The forests of firs are followed by a desolate world of grayish or ochre mountains, arid, dried-out, burnt-out by the sun. Here and there, several thorny bushes offer meager hiding places in case Soviet helicopters fly over. In Logar, which was said to be the site of bloody battles, we hardly find anything but little shepherds leading along their sheep with fat pouches of fat under their tails with the help of a frond. Ferocious watch-dogs bark at our approach. Koutchis (nomads), faithful to their tradition of hospitality, offer us tea and bread. The women, frequently unveiled, are sometimes carrying a weapon. It is said they are fighting right beside the men. At nightfall, we find shelter in the bazaars, fortresses of dried mud, sometimes with no doors, where the Islamic "chouans" provision themselves with tea, sugar--powder or multicolored bonbons--and with white rice. I am offered Bulgarian "Phoenix" cigarets taken, I am told, from a Soviet helicopter downed by the moudjahidin. The travelers crowd together in the dust, even rolling the ground into their covers [sic], liters of tea continually bouent [translation unknown].

With one hand the moudjahidin tirelessly tell their beads and with the other they preen their goatees attentively. Though he may speak the same language--"Dari" or Persian--as the Hazaras, my interpreter, a young Tadjik aged 19, imprisoned for 2 months and tortured under the Taraki regime, seems as deracinated as I am in this desolate region. The meager westernization of the country undertaken by King Zaher Shah hardly penetrated past the gates of Kabul. Since then, the split between the capital and the rest of Afghanistan has been continually growing.

We proceed into a narrow defile that winds around between two high walls so close together that the sun shines through only at the zenith. Through this jagged pass, encumbered with masses of rocks, comes a flood of refugees every day fleeing toward Pakistan. The Soviets cannot be unaware of this "desperate path," nor of the stores

of arms in the fissures of the mountain. Every morning, a small white reconnaissance aircraft overflies the defile at low altitude. /"We should not deceive ourselves, the communists know this region perfectly well, the precision of their fire on our grotto is ample testimony,"/ asserts the engineer Dastaguir, showing with his finger the impact of a rocket barely 1.5 meters from the entrance.

For this militant of the Jamiat-e Islami (Islamic Rally), the most theocratic movement in the Islamic Alliance, the situation could get much worse this winter: /"The Americans and the Europeans are not supplying us with arms. Pakistan diverts the humanitarian assistance to its own profit. What is to become of us? After I empty the charger of my Kalachnikov, I will have no more ammunition. The children and the women have no shoes, or covers, or warm clothes. Nothing grows in these mountains. All this time the Russians are using capitalist methods to win the war. In order to gain the complicity or at least the acquiescence of certain tribes, they pour in thousands of afghanis. In Paktia, three families accepted it. In the face of that, what can the moudjahidin do? Aircraft intervene in the smallest engagement, and we have no missiles, and if, with our meager resources, we come to destroy a tank, the Russians eradicate the nearest village."/

To this quasi-impotence must be added a growing hostility to the mullahs who exert undivided authority over the moudjahidin. /"It is wrong to think that the Afghans are fanatics. A Khomeyni has no chance with us, and not simply because we are Sunnites: the Hazaras are of like mind,"/ says a Pachtou officer, who adds: /"One of our proverbs says: "Never trust barbers, journalists, or mullahs, for these three types meet everyone and tell others what has been confided to them..." In this war we have no leader, and the stupid mullahs are given all the authority. Oh! If the king were to return."/

The anarchy that reigned in the nearby valley of Sor-Khab, a green oasis set amongst the austere and gray mountains of Logar, confirms remarks made by Milza Mohamed, an officer who deserted from the Afghan Army. How else can one explain the absense of the most elementary safety rules other than by the neomedieval obscurantism of certain religious leaders who have become, with the jihad (holy war) warrior chieftains? In the eyes of the mullahs, the only alternative for a moudjahidin is to become either a "shaaeed," that is a saint, if he falls in combat, or a "rosie" or hero, if he kills an infidel.

[12 Nov 80 p 5]

[Text] II. A Part-Time War

/"Above all, don't waste your words on romanticism. I don't know whether you westerners should really be thanked for representing all Afghans as barefoot heros who would turn back the greatest army in the world with stones,"/ said a former official of the Afghan ministry of foreign affairs to me before my departure for the bush. /"Let us not be hypocrites: it is not by repeating "Allah o akbar" (Allah is above all) that we can turn back Russian tanks. Even the most ignorant peasant knows it, and will not kill himself in vain. Do you know what some refugees in Peshawar are thinking? To die for my country, certainly, but not before it's necessary, and [only] after the others."/

In "A Barbarian in Asia" Henri Michaux speaks of /"the beneficiary's blindness to the advantages of a nation and a situation that for the time being are especially privileged,"/ and in the bush we often have to put aside our western dictionary of preconceived ideas. The /"bellicose," "sanguinary," "undisciplined" and "brave"/ Afghan tribes who defeated English and Russian weapons in the last century would be hard put to repeat their exploits today. One no longer fells a hundred tanks by attacking from ambush (except, it would seem, in the Panshir valley, northeast of Kabul), and the occasional heavy machine-gun can do little against the MI-24. The universe of the moudjahidin is open to misgivings. The officers who deserted from the Afghan Army] no longer try to hide it: without massive external assistance, they will not be able to take Kabul.

The village of Sor-Khab, huddled in a narrow valley, has just undergone its second bombardment in 2 weeks. Despite the particularly vigorous fire of the helicopters, each time there was only one victim to mourn. And each time the battle lasted only one long hour, peace returning as suddenly as it had been shattered. Each time, finally, the civilian population, warned ahead of time by emissaries coming from the capital close by had sheltered themselves in time in the mountains.

/"There is the republic of the moudjahidin," triumphantly claims a young rebel, pointing out the valley to me. His Kalachnikov will never be taken by the enemy. A half-thousand combatants of the faith are camping here nearly at the gates of Kabul. The larger part of Afghan territory does in fact seem to escape the control of the communist government of Mr Babrak Karmal. Nevertheless, without missiles or anti-tank weapons, they cannot launch operations of any great scope. /"With the pitiful means at our disposal, we have nevertheless managed to paralyze the administration put in place by the "donkeys of Lenin." Not one Kalqi dares to venture into the region, and the schools are empty,"/ says one of the local leaders of the Jamiate Islami. If in Peshawar the Islamic Alliance is more a marriage of convenience than of love, it is not the same with the internal resistance. The men of the Burhanuddin Rabbani cohabit, with no apparent problems, with those of the Afghanistan National Liberation Front and several "unaffiliated" [types].

Only the Hezb-e Islami groups, highly mobile, composed of young combatants, well armed and well-shod, form a band apart. /"Gulbuddin Hkematyar, who calls himself an engineer, is nothing but a tool. When he was a student at Kabul, he threw vitriol in the faces of unveiled women! When he was opposing Daoud, he immediately got substantial aid from Ali Bhutto, both arms and money. It's just a question of who is manipulating him. Personally, I am persuaded that he is playing a double game,"/ says a former member of the king's bodyguard. His men, all royalists, think that the leader of the Hezb-e Islami, whom they regard as a fanatic, may soon enter into a coalition government with the communists and thus lay a certain popular foundation for the Babrak Karmal regime.

Profound Divisions

Though deemed responsible for the arrival of the Soviets in Afghanistan, the members of the Parcham (flag) nevertheless enjoy a less execrable reputation than their fellow enemies of the Kalq (people)--the two factions constituting the Democratic and People's Party of Afghanistan, or the communist party. In the current vocabulary of the guerrillas, a communist is always called a Kalqi. It is simultaneously a symbol of tyranny, of brutal imbecility, and of abjection: /"They sleep with their sisters and their mothers,"/ they often tell me very seriously. In any case, at a

meeting bringing together the various religious and military leaders of the village of Sor-Khab, it will be decided not to go ahead with the extermination of the families of the Kalqis...Another decision made at the same time attests to the almost total absense of discipline that previously reigned: the chiefs (or their aides-de-camp) will now have to attend the meetings; competent [sic] leaders will be dismissed, especially those who only distribute arms to members of their own family; the moudjahidin must not in future absent themselves for more than 5 days, especially when they are taking their weapons with them; the moudjahidin who may have extorted money from Afghans will have their weapons confiscated, be excluded from the party, and denounced to other resistance organizations.

Such orders can only be explained by the extreme uniqueness of this war. In rebellion against the central government since, in some cases, the communist sources--who became moudjahidin periodically return to their families to cultivate their fields.

So I will have to wait for about a week for the return of the region's Mojaddedi representative, who left to visit his three wives, before being able to participate in a control operation on the Kabul road; hostilities being suspended during the absense of the chief. If this "part-time" war seems to lend itself to smiles--seen from the West--it is nevertheless the kind of war best adapted to the Afghan context. Deprived of all international aid, the internal resistance can only count on its own resources. Moreover, because of lack of ammunition, it would be useless for the combatants to remain continually on a war footing. This precarious /modus vivendi/ is somewhat disorienting.

Is it a sign of strength or of weakness on the part of the Soviet Army to tolerate [the existence of] a camp of "desperados" at the gates of Kabul? /"The very existence of this village of moudjahidin proves our impotence," says the former member of the king's bodyguard without illusions. /"How could we withstand a tank attack joined with a parachute drop of commandos on the mountains? If we did not suffer more losses during the two bombardments, it is only because of the cowardice of the Russian pilots. They fire from very high altitude out of fear of being brought down by one of our dachakas [translation unknown] while diving in the valley."/ Reduced to semi-inactivity, this high-ranking officer invites me to a picnic in a little wood several kilometers, from Sor-Khab with his men. He insists on talking to me out of the presence of the mullahs.

/"I have been a soldier for 30 years, and despite that I have never been given any real authority. We are tired of the "bearded ones" (religious chiefs), their incompetence is leading the resistance into disaster. Unfortunately, the Afghans only have confidence in their mullahs. Only the mullahs have not betrayed them. By contrast, they mistrust the soldiers, for many of them are communists. The parties in Peshawar are not worth much, but we are obliged to go through them to get arms."/

During the entire conversation, his men, all old soldiers, never quit assembling and dismantling their Kalachnikovs. They improvise a shooting match but, due to the scarcity of ammunition, each contestant will only get one shot! /"When you go back to Europe, go see Zaher Shah, he is an open man, and tell him that we are waiting for him. Only those who have personal ambitions don't want him to return,"/ the officer told me gravely. /"Don't think that we are reactionaries: we don't just want the re-establishment of the kingship. Times have changed, but we think that Zaher Shah is the only man capable of bringing about Afghan unity."/ To the minds

of the great majority of combatants in the interior, the ever-deepening divisions in the outside resistance constitute the greatest handicap. /"We have lost everything: our houses, our land, our brothers, our children, but we have brought our divisions with us,"/ was the fatalistic commentary of the brother of one of Daoud's ministers, in exile in Qetta, in Pakistani Baluchistan.

"I'll Bring You Back Vodka From Kabul"

In quick-march the column crosses the verdant plain, checkered with small fields bordered by small low walls of stone. A once-prosperous region. I see for the first time windows with glass in them. The habitations, small forts, at some remove from each other, carry traces of recent fighting: the farmers have come back and are still finishing up the clearing of the debris. Apparently, the Soviet-Afghan army is trying to intimidate the population, which fraternizes openly with the moudjahidin, rather to exterminate it. Several times we are invited to take tea and refill our bags with fruit. The chief of the village offers to come with us to the road. This old man, of almost skeletal thinness, with white hair and beard, is only 52 years old!

Wheels wobbling, the car from Kabul arrives, for once, on time. The moudjahidin put in their orders with the driver (tea, sugar, cigarets) and give him a roll of film taken in Sor-Khab so it can be developed in the city. The car will come back tomorrow with the provisions. /"I am going back to my family tomorrow, for they have had no news of me for a year. When I come back, I'll bring some vodka with me for you,"/ jokes a young man to me, a youth from Kabul who deserted the Afghan army. Twenty-one years old, he was conscripted, transported by air to the Bamiam province. After successfully escaping with 6 of his comrades, it took him a week on foot to get back to the Kabul region.

It's a typical scene, these young conscripts with shaven necks, fleeing toward Pakistan. Their uniforms come off, little by little, in the course of their march, until they have only the shoes. They all say the same thing: /"I do not want to shoot at the moudjahidin, I do not want to kill Muslims."/ One day about 30 adolescents will come seeking refuge in the mountains, as the Kalqis are requisitioning all youth of fighting age. The youngest refugee was only 14.

For how long can the Afghan resistance hold out? The purchase of a sheep represents a luxury for most the moudjahidin. Will they, in the near future, be obliged to flee to Afghanistan to survive, and therefore abandon their struggle? The flow of refugees is unceasing, and among them are many young people. The students from Kabul feel ill at ease amidst the rude peasants, hardened to adversity and obedient to the mullahs. /"If a clergyman questions me about the Koran, I'm lost, for I know nothing. He will quite naturally accuse me of being a Kalqi,"/ my interpreter confides to me. Chahir will also be severely called to task for having "forgotten" to say his prayer.

"The Parties Control Us"

In the KHYBER MAIL in Peshawar on 12 August, the Afghan resistance estimated at half a million the losses in human life since the intervention of the USSR. In reality, it is impossible to get a precise total. In this country broken into a thousand families, there are a thousand wars and a thousand different resistance movements. This is both the strength and the weakness of the moudjahidin.

In each region, in each valley, the Soviet-Afghan Army must take a different strategy, sometimes directly opposite to the one before: the carrot or the stick, money or fragmentation bombs. But, concerned about protecting his own village, his horizon extending only as far as his minaret, the Afghan peasant scarcely sees--even if he speaks of it--the real necessity of uniting the resistance. If the latter does indeed penetrate deeply into the interior of the country, nevertheless the influence of the parties diminishes in proportion to the distance from the border zones. If by their talent the Pachtou story-tellers are able to transform the least small skirmish into a Hundred Years' War, it is nonetheless true that this conflict, with its train of exactions, strikes out blindly at the civilian populations.

Sharp bursts of light interrupt the silence irregularly. Bombardment? Artillery fire? It is barely daybreak in the province of Paktia. We have marched the whole night on the return road at the slow pace of the dromedaries. Unable to see in the moonless night, we were constantly stumbling on the narrow rocky trail.

On a crest at the border, moudjahidin are throwing rocks at small green-colored anti-personnel mines to make them explode. Every nook is crammed with explosive devices disguised as paper figures or watches. Tonight, along all the access roads to Pakistan, helicopters from the Soviet-Afghan Army have scattered deadly devices that will randomly mutilate men, women, children. At the hotel Shalozan, a wretched hovel in Parachinar, a young man has been waiting for almost 10 days for an amputation. He stepped on a mine and his foot was shattered, and the leg became infected.

/"We have not gotten a visit from a single resistance leader in 2 years,"/ says an exofficer imprisoned under Taraki and freed after the arrival of the Soviets: /"The parties represent nothing at all, but unfortunately they control us. Without them, no weapons for fighting, no money for our families. They amuse themselves with the moudjahidin like a little child with a bird. They would like to see an ignorant people so they can dominate it. They systematically throw out of their positions of responsibility the officers and the intellectuals, in short all the competent people;"/ the sound of a clock ticking can be heard everywhere, in every quarter. Less than a year after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the resistance is quite out of breath, and it is not only from lack of antiaircraft weapons.

9516
CSO: 4900

MOMAND TRIBES FIGHTING FOR REVOLUTION

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 11 Nov 80 p 2

[Text] With the passage of time the Saur Revolution wins greater and stronger support from the vast working people of Afghanistan and the working peoples living in the region and all over the world.

Last week the people of Nangarhar witnessed that a large gathering of elders, ulama and dignatories of the Momand tribes living in the free border areas was held in the compound of the Tribal Affairs Department in Jalalabad, Nangarhar Province, to express their strong and firm backing and support for the Saur Revolution and especially its new revolutionary phase and the government of the Democartic Republic of Afghanistan.

The Momand tribes which have displayed every bravery and heroism in the course of history and made every sacrifice to fight against colonalism and imperialism strongly condemned the subversive and terrorist activities of the enemies of Saur Revolution and the internal and external counter—revolutionaries and reactionaries who are trained, armed and sent to Afghanistan by the military and reactionary circles of Pakistan and the imperialists headed by the United States and its allies, Chinese Hegemonists reaction of the region and the Arab to kill the innocent toiling people of Afghanistan and set on fire the private and public properties and buildings.

They declared that these counter—revolutionaries are not only the enemy of Saur Revolution and the working people but also the Momand Tribes. They voiced strong resolution that they would not allow the terrorists and armed bands, mobilized and supported by the enemies of the people of Afghanistan, to use the Momand district against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The Momand tribes shared the views and the opinion of the working people and the government of Afghanistan that the presence of the limited military contingent of the Soviet Union has not been for any aggressive purposes. The only reason behind it is to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity and national sovereignty of Afghanistan against foreign aggression. It will be withdrawn when the foreign aggression stops and the enemies of Saur Revolution, supported by the imperialists and international reaction, cease to continue their provacations and subversive activities.

The solidarity with and support for the working people of Afghanistan and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are increasingly growing and expanding as the people see that the progressive regime under the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the vanguard of the working people in this country, is doing every thing in its power for

the happiness, prosperity and comfort of the toilers and oppressed people.

Now the system is well established and stabilized, meeting the demands and aspirations of the people according to the objectives of Saur Revolution. The moves made by the party and government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan are in response to the public demand for a prosperous life void of oppression, tyranny and exploitation of man by man.

In the light of the fundamental principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan the different nationalities living in Afghanistan enjoy democratic rights and freedoms and have the right to develop their own culture on an equal basis with other brother nationalities.

The Saur Revolution enjoys the full support of the people as it is in line with the will of the people. The people no longer wanted to live under the oppression of a corrupt and despotic ruling class of the past which sought its own interest. As long as the revolution in Afghanistan enjoys the vast support of the people there would be no power to stop its on-ward march. The people forge ahead and the DRA government puts into effect the aspirations and the objective of Saur Revolution by implementing gigantic socio-economic plans serving the interest of the large masses of workers, peasants and other toilers.

Now the people of Afghanistan have fully recognised their friends and foes. They know that imperialists headed by US in collusion with the Chinese hegemonists are the enemies of the working people of Afghanistan and the revolution which they have staged in their own benefit.

CSO: 4920

MOSLEM BROTHERHOOD STUDENTS ARRESTED IN CRACKDOWN

Athens ATHENS NEWS in English 11 Nov 80 p 2

[Text] New Delhi, (Reuter)--A large number of Kabul University students have been arrested over the past four months in a government crackdown on members of outlawed Islamic groups, an Afghan teacher said here Monday.

The teacher, who arrived from Kabul recently, told reporters that most of the arrested students were charged with being members of the banned Moslem Brotherhood Organisation.

He said there were organised group sactive on the campus distributing anti-government pamphlets at night. [as published]

Students Flee

The 28-year-old Kabul University economist, who did not want to be named, said attendance in most faculties was low as many students had fled the country or had been drafted into the army.

The teacher, who is on his way to the United States, said that security forces had also picked up students on the streets or from their homes for conscription.

He said the government recently announced that students joining the forces would be exempted from writing examinations and promoted to higher classes.

Kabul Radio said last month young men aged 21 and above who had failed to report for service in the Afghan armed forces would not be punished if they turned up for duty by Nov. 7.

Sent to Russia

The teacher said about 2,000 student sympathisers of President Babrak Karmal's Parcham faction of the ruling People's Democratic Party had been sent to the Soviet Union.

"I do not know whether they have been sent for military training or what," he added.

The teacher said Soviet advisers were members of a high-powered committee set up to review the university's curricula, teaching methods and administration, but no curriculum changes had been made so far.

Political indoctrination classes were held in some faculties, he added.

Diplomatic sources here said the situation in the troubled city of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan had improved in the past few weeks but the influence of anti-government rebels continued to be prevasive.

Teachers Shot

They said rebels had told schools to close and three teachers had been shot for ignoring the order.

The sources added that rebels had forced butchers hoarding meat to reopen their shops and had fixed the prices.

Quoting a first-hand report, the sources said the city was less tense and markets were no longer shut for days on end.

But the report said most people were indoors by 7 p.m. two to three hours before curfew time. The sources said there were two curfews, one enforced by rebels from 9 p.m., the other by the authorities one hour later.

CSO: 4920

MEASURES BEING TAKEN TO BOOST ECONOMY

Loans to Agriculture

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 11 Nov 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] The Board of Directors of Agriculture Development Bank met yesterday. Abdul Wakil, minister of finance and chairman of the Board presided over the meeting. After reviewing the reports of Executive and local Advisory boards and international auditors the balance sheet and financial statement of the Bank during 1358 was approved at the meeting.

Other proposals of the Executive Board was also discussed at the meeting and necessary decisions were made. [as published]

A source of the Agriculture Development Bank said that during 1358 the Bank extended a total of Afs. 998 million worth of loans including credits for financing purchase of chemical fertiliser, improved seeds, insecticides and pesticides, agriclture machinery, irrigation schemes, orcharding, animal husbandry, marketing etc. to toiling peasants, cooperatives and agricultural organisations through central office and the Bank's provincial chapters all-over the country. [as published]

The loan extended for financing the purchase of agriculture machinery during the past year shows an increase of 223 per cent. Similarly, the extending of credit to settlers was also added to the Bank's credit programme and under this programme a loan amounting to three million afghanis was paid.

Finance Minister and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank expressed appreciation for the hard work of employees of the Bank during 1358 in implementing the developmental programmes of the DRA revolutionary government in agriculture sector. He wished that the officials and employees of the Bank will make more efforts towards realisation of the objectives of the Saur Revolution, especially its new evolutionary phase, so that better and more effective services are rendered to peasants and cooperatives. He also hoped for further expansion of Bank's scope of activities to render better services to people and to agriculture sector in the country.

The meeting was attended by Director-General of Agriculture Extension and Productions, Governor of Da Afghanistan Bank, President of Foreign Liaison of Planning Affairs Ministry, President of Treasury Department, Ministry of Finance,

members of Bank's executive and advisory boards and representative of International Auditing.

Role of Bank Profits

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 9 Nov 80 p 3

[Text] President of Afghan National Bank, Pohanmal Mohammad Akram Khalil in an interview with the reporter of Kabul New Times concerning the activities of the Bank in 1358 and its net profit explained that in the light of the lofty objectives of the Saur Revolution, particularly in its new stage, Afghan National Bank strives to make further contacts with the national tradesmen and institutes in order to improve the conditions of banking under the guidance of the Ministry of Finance. It is hoped that the bank will soon proceed from its traditional stand toward progress and development to better accomplish its role in the growth of your national economy. To attain further recognition in the national and international level, beside other activities, the bank has undertaken a series of measures including publications and publicities so that on the one hand its legal entity is maintained and on the other hand more customers and clients are attracted in order to perform what is worthy of a national and commercial bank toward progress and development in the country.

Pohanmal Khalil said, in fact the bank has profitted Afs. 151,799,332.89 in the year 1358. But from this amount sum of Afs. 5,470,000.00 was counted for the loss of the IBM according to the decision of the board of directors of the bank, thus leaving Afs. 146,329,332.98 as net profit for the bank which shows a much greater gain than the year 1357. Similarly the bank's income in the year 1358 amounts to Afs. 298,928,651.45 while its expenditure was Afs. 152,599,318.56 giving a profit of Afs. 146,329,332.98 for the bank.

He added that the percentage of increase in the net profit of Afghan National Bank in the year 1358 compared to 1357 was satisfactory and this in itself indicated that the Afghan National Bank has achieved further successes in the expansion of commercial and business transactions and banking. Of course the encouragement of the confidence of clients and customers as well as the honest services of the working staff of this establishment had an important role in this regard.

He said further that a glance at the passive transactions of the Afghan National Bank would reveal that in the year 1358 an increase of 9.59 percent has occurred in number of the savings accounts while the increase in the amount of this account was 7.30 per cent. Similarly savings accounts with interest has increased 20.12 percent in 1358 compared to the year 1357 while non-interest saving accounts have increased 45.43 percent.

As it is seen, the currency accounts too have considerably increased in 1358 compared to the year 1357. This increase is 4.67 percent in the number of current accounts and 11.67 per cent in the amount, which shows a great change in this regard. It is noteworthy that in the active transactions such as loans 87.35 percent increase has occurred.

Pohanmal Khalil said about the number of Letter of Credits, collections, exchange of foreign currencies, in 1358 that first of all credits given through the Afghan National Bank should be in accord with the following conditions: The merchant should have obtained the permit to import and export of goods from the official authorities in advance; the client or the merchant who obtains the required proforma from the company concerned in the transaction, should first register it in the Ministry of Commerce and then call to the bank to open a letter of Credit. After the completion of the above mentioned conditions the client can either pay the total amount of the letter of credit or can borrow part of it from the bank. Of course the percentage of the credit fund

varies according to the commodities in conditions of FOB and CIF and the amount of foreign currency in the letter of credit will be converted to its equivalent of Afghanis according to the rate of the day.

The number of letters of credit in the year 1358 had reached to 1939 sheets while the purchase and selling of foreign currencies through the Afghan National Bank are as follows:

Dollar purchased $20,-069,488.33.

Dollar sold: $16,657,386.-52.

Pounds purchased: £843,409.37.

Pounds sold: £511,874.52.

Mark purchased: M11,823,255.74.

Mark sold: M10,007,184.58.

The President of Afghan National Bank said, guarantees will be issued according to the request of internal establishments and individuals through one of the concerned banks in favour of the foreign company. Thus before the merchant or the establishment contacts the bank, he makes a contract with the offering company concerning the purchase of goods or machine tools etc. and submits to the bank an application requesting the issuance of a guarantee by the bank covering the price of the concerned commodity. Considering the purchase contract the bank takes a guarantee of portable and unportable properties proportional to the price under a legal document and after being assured of it the bank issues a guarantee covering the price of the goods in the contract in favour of the exporting company to one of the banks in the country where the exporting company resides. The buyer on the basis of a separate contract pays the instalments in due times. In the year 1358, 205,289 loads of goods weighing 9,990,953 kilogrammes were transfered to Kabul from the Soviet ports while from Pakistan 469640 loads weighing 4,155,141 kilogrammes were transported to Kabul. Similarly 234,-363 cartons weighing 113,-707 kg. from the Soviet territory and 27,818 cartons weighing 3,156,570 kilogrammes through Pakistan have been exported to foreign countries.

He added that the import letters of credit are not only a considerable source of income for the commercial banks, but also maintains the development of trade from the point of view of importing of capital and consumer goods in the sphere of national economy, and since the imported goods are charged legally with taxes and custom duties, therefore, they play an important role in financing the state budget.

Taking into consideration the fact that a considerable increase has occurred in the volume of the bank credit, facilities such as renouncing the charges on loans of letters of credit before the payment of the money, and also increase in the percentage of debts have been provided which of course are encouraging in the growth of national economy and banking transactions.

He added that the Afghan National Bank with its 45 years of experience in banking enjoyed full confidence of its clients and customers by adopting better approaches in 1358 and further strived to attract more clients and provide the means of their satisfaction. That is why the Afghan National Bank has been able to accumulate the total capital by absorbing small amounts of money. Of course the accumulation of small capitals plays a very important role in the new investments in the national economy of the country and are extremely useful and effective from the point of view of banking.

The President of the Bank said, after the victory of the Great Saur Revolution, as in all social and economic spheres in the country, banking too has seen great positive changes. The positive activities of the bank can be traced in the passive and active transactions which were explained above.

Pohanmal Khalil said in conclusion that right now the Afghan National Bank has sixteen branches and representatives inside and outside the country. Its representatives abroad are namely the Afghan-American Trading Company, New York, Afghan National Bank in London, Afghan National Bank in Hamburg, Afghan National Bank, Karachi, Afghan National Bank, Peshawar and Afghan National Bank in Chaman.

Export Promotion

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 10 Nov 80 p 3

[Text] Afghanistan is one of the least developed countries, with traditional economic and social structures. The constraints imposed on its trade with outside world by its land-locked geographical situation, required a new, global approach in trade promotion: an approach that would stretch well beyond the boundaries traced for such activities in other developing countries. Trade promotion in countries such as Afghanistan requires coherent vision, at short, medium, and long-term stages of their economic development and implies slow, patient action in putting together all components which will successfully result in enhancing the performance of the foreign trade sector.

Imaginative initiative in the area of trade policies and promotion strategies, building up of a responsive and adequate institutional structure, but first and foremost continuing improvements in such basics as product adaptation and development, quality control and improvement, costing and pricing, packaging and transport, constitute the essential parts of such a drive.

The Export Promotion Project, backed by the International Trade Centre (ITC) and financed by the United Nations Development Programme and earlier by the Swedish International Development Agency has been carried out, eversince 1974, with these realities in mind. [as published]

Under the project comprehensive assistance in the field of promoting Afghan export products, both traditional and new, has been given to the Ministry of Commerce.

Major directions of the project activities include the following:

--Assistance in establishing and strengthening of export organizations. Afghan Handicraft Emporium was created which is now a major exporter of handmade articles.

--Assistance in establishing a proper market research system. Potential studies on all major export products were prepared to help exporters and importers better know each other.

--Assistance in direct marketing. A number of missions were carried out to try Afghan products in major markets such as Western Europe, US, Japan, Australia. The missions brought sizable contracts, useful contacts and much needed ideas on product adaptation.

--Assistance in planning and implementation of Afghan participation at international fairs and exhibitions. Since mid-1975 participation of Afghanistan at 27 outside fairs was made possible. New markets discovered, new buyers identified and millions of dollars worth of orders obtained, are the results of this activity, and a large number of Afghan officers were trained in preparation and handling participation, and in technique of commercial negotiations.

--Preparation of publicity materials. Colour catalogues on Afghan handicrafts, including one on handmade carpets, and an Afghan Foreign Trade Directory were printed.

--Establishment of a proper trade information system thus securing non-stop flow of commercial information on all major export-import products. The availability of the most up-to-date information on the international supply, demand and price situation helps Afghanistan take better advantage of existing commercial possibilities.

--Training of personnel. Training programmes, seminars, workshops and study tours were organised and carried out for most of the counterpart officers with the purpose of improving their professional qualifications.

UN assistance in the export promotion sector is very well received and strongly support by the Ministry of Commerce and various agencies involved in the export trade. [as published] The assistance has helped create more jobs, increase foreign exchange earnings so much needed for implementation of national development programmes. (FOCUS)

CSO: 4920

IRAN-IRAQI WAR DEFINED AS 'IMBROGLIO, RESTLESSNESS'

Brussels SPECIAL L'EVENTAIL in French 24-30 Oct 80 pp 14, 19

[Article: "Imbroglios and Restlessness..."]

[Text] The conflict between Iraq and Iran, which started 22 September last, is entering its fifth week.

The end is not in sight despite the conciliation efforts of the Islamic Conference and the meeting of the Security Council. One could even wonder as to the way it could degenerate. However, before considering this aspect of the problem it might be useful to review the causes of the conflict and see the viewpoints expressed toward the belligerents.

When the Iraqi forces mounted the attack against Iran, on 22 September, their armed forces command stated that the invasion of Iranian territory was, "...an answer to the Iranian decision to paralyze maritime traffic in the Straits of Ormuz." Yet, after his 25 September interview in Paris with Giscard d'Estaing, Tarek Aziz, Iraqi vice prime minister, listed in the course of a press conference Bagdad's conditions for a cessation of hostilities. The conditions cast a somewhat better light on the reasons for the Iraqi intervention and could be reduced to four points. They are the following: 1) demand of Iran to respect Iraq's sovereignty and right over its own territories and waters; 2) the establishment of good neighborly relations agreements with Iraq and the other Arab countries in the Gulf; 3) cessation of Iranian interferences in the domestic affairs of Iraq and the other Arab countries; 4) cessation of all aggressive activities on the part of Iran against these countries."

Actually, in addition to the matter of Iranian interference, the main problem is the territorial problem existing between the two countries. Actually, Iraq had been forced to yield to Iran under the shah a portion of 80 square kilometers in the area of Qasr-e-Chirin and part of the Shatt-el-Arab. Yet, according to the 1975 Algiers agreement, Iraq is reclaiming these territories. Furthermore, it contests Iranian sovereignty on three small islands in the Ormuz Straits: Abu Musa, Big Tunb and Little Tunb. It does not want them for itself. It merely asks of Iran to pull its forces out of them and "...prove that it has neither ambition nor hostility toward the Arabs by restituting them to the United Arab Emirates." Thus, profiting from the fact that Khomeyni had dismantled the Iranian Army, Bagdad recovered the territories on which it had laid claim while securing for itself several territorial positions with a view to its future negotiations with Tehran.

Had these few aspects constituted the totality of the problem, it would have been very simple and of no particular interest. Yet, a number of factors have totally changed the picture. The first is the nature of the belligerents as petroleum producers. They have not only stopped their petroleum exports but, through reciprocal destructions of their petroleum installations, are seriously compromising their futures. Furthermore, Iran is threatening to block the Straits of Ormuz. The implementation of this threat would entail, on the one hand, Western military intervention to reestablish free navigation in the Gulf. On the other hand, the conflict would then risk going beyond its current local limits and spreading over the entire Arab Peninsula. The West would thus become totally deprived of its petroleum supplies.

Another factor is the complexity of the positions held by the various countries toward the belligerents. Jordan, Kuwait and Saudia Arabia support Iraq. Syria, Lybia and the PLO have taken Iran's side. Thus, united within the "intransigent front" against the Camp David accords, Iraq and Jordan, on the one hand, and Syria, on the other, have been split by the current conflict. The game played by the USSR and the United States is no less complex. The USSR has armed Iraq and has a certain number of military advisors in the country. Furthermore, it has just concluded a security treaty with Syria. According to the treaty the USSR will supply military aid and, if necessary, troops to Syria. Finally, making everything clear, through Vinogradov, its ambassador in Tehran, Moscow has offered arms to Iran!... The U.S. position is just as clear. Officially, starting with the outbreak of the conflict, as forced by the hostages and the presidential elections, the United States has taken Iran's side. Washington made clear advances to Tehran. Nevertheless, it is continuing to supply arms to Saudia Arabia which is Iraq's ally and is being accused by the Iranians of supplying Bagdad with military intelligence!

Finally, the last but not least factor we shall mention is that these events are taking place, on the one hand, in an area vital to the survival of the West and, on the other, an area which the USSR considers or would like to consider its preserve.

Other than these various positions, somewhat contradictory and rather confused, let us try to shed a little bit more light by analyzing to the extent of the possible the game played by the two superpowers. The day following the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran conflict, on 25 September, Muskie and Gromyko met for over 3 hours. Two points stand out from this conversation. The first is that "profound differences of view" had pitted one man against the other and, secondly, that Soviets and Americans intended to remain neutral in this matter. This was one month ago. Yet, as the conflict between Iraq and Iran is assuming the nature of a war of attrition, we have witnessed a change in the positions of each of the superpowers.

The United States is guided by three main objectives. The first is the November presidential elections. The release of the American hostages would be a substantial contribution to Carter's eventual reelection. From this viewpoint the Iraq-Iran conflict is an interesting feature. Since it uses American military ordnance, the Iranian Army is experiencing a particularly urgent need for spare parts. Currently one out of eight combat aircraft is airworthy. Simple logic,

therefore, is that, henceforth, the hostages are of no interest to you, give them back to us. We shall respond by lifting the sanctions against Iran and give you the military materiel you need. In order to emphasize the point and, above all, exert a little bit of pressure, the U.S. Air Force AWACS, airplanes crowded with electronic equipment and based in Saudia Arabia, are hindering, to a certain extent, the activities of the Iranian Phantom Jets. This is a simple warning which could be made far more effective. The Iranians have read the signs properly. That is why, in his press conference prior to his departure from New York, on 18 October, Ali Rajai, the Iranian prime minister, formulated as a condition for the release of the hostages the withdrawal of the AWACS from Saudia Arabia, on the one hand, and the elimination of American support to countries favoring Iraq, on the other, such as Saudia Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt. These Iranians have clearly acquired the art of putting America's poor diplomacy in an impossible position. The dilemma which faces Carter is to choose between a trump card for his own reelection and withholding U.S. support from its allies! This is happening particularly at a time when the United States is trying to regain the influence they have either lost or substantially changed in this part of the world after they dropped the shah! To wind it up, the final objective of the United States is not only to insure unhindered sailing in the straits but the possibility for petroleum extraction in an area whose continuing deliveries are indispensable to Western survival.

In turn, the Soviets are being particularly discreet in this entire matter. This is not to say that they are keenly following developments or that, true to their expansionistic policy, are not continuing to position their pawns in this area.

Currently the European countries have petroleum reserves for about four months. However, a continuing Iran-Iraq conflict would not fail to trigger major worries. On the one hand, interruptions of petroleum supplies would be felt even more painfully than increases in crude oil prices; on the other hand, the danger of the conflict spreading to the neighboring Arab countries should not be ignored. To the Westerners, the problem would no longer be that of insuring free navigation in the Gulf but of protecting the oil wells from eventual destruction.

At this stage, any hypothesis, even, and above all, the most pessimistic, should be considered....

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CSO: 4900

PRESIDENTIAL AIDE DISCUSSED WAR, HOSTAGE SITUATION

Paris AN-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 13-19 Oct 80 pp 9-10

[Interview With Mohammad Hasan Pir Hoseyni, President Bani-Sadr's Adviser for Internal Affairs, by Fadiyah al-Sharqawi; "Interview With Pir-Hoseyni: There Is U.S.-Soviet Agreement; Islands Are Iranian Historically"]

[Text] Mohammad Hasan Pir-Hoseyni, President Bani-Sadr's adviser for internal affairs, has asserted during his visit to France that the Iraq-Iran war will extend to the entire area and that the "United States and the Soviet Union are in agreement on changing the Gulf map for their private interests," that Bakhtiar's government is a meaningless dream, that "the three islands are Iranian historically, and that peaceful discussions could have been held regarding the borders.

In the following interview with AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, Pir-Hoseyni said that Iran is not in need of military supplies [imdadat] at present, that it is ready for an endless war with Iraq and that this war is not a war between two nationalities.

[Question] Are you in Paris on an official mission and can France play the role of a mediator in the Iraq-Iran war in view of the good relations it has with Iraq?

[Answer] I am not here on an official mission. This visit comes within the framework of other visits in Europe. I believe that before speaking of a Franch mediation in the ongoing war, it is better to talk about putting an end to the war. Iraq, through the government of Saddam Husayn, has committed an aggression against Iran. We are only defending ourselves and Saddam's army must return to its previous borders before any mediation. We have never wanted this war and we don't want it to go on. I believe France is capable of playing an important role in this regard.

[Question] What are the limits of the Iraq-Iran war, and do you think Iran is capable of continuing the war despite its numerous domestic problems?

[Answer] I cannot define the limits of this war in advance, However, I assert on the Iranian side that Iran will carry on with this war until it regains all its territories and until it pushes Saddan's army beyond the borders agreed upon in the 1975 Algiers treaty. Continuation of the war depends on Iraq and on the extent of Iraq's readiness to persist in its aggressions against us. We will continue to defend ourselves to the last able-bodied person in Iran. This issue is an issue of

life or death to Iran and to the revolution. We are not defending our land alone but defending all of humanity in this revolution which believes that it is the model for the revolutions that can liberate the persecuted peoples in the world.

[Question] Do you believe that the borders agreed upon in the Algiers treaty are fair to Iraq?

[Answer] The talk about fairness or unfairness is something that should have been discussed around the negotiation table and not through war. Therefore, I cannot comment on this issue under this particular circumstance. The agreement exists, regardless of whether it is fair or not. To discuss its fairness, the war and the fighting whould be stopped and this matter should then be discussed.

[Question] Let us assume that Iraq did not launch this war and invited you to hold discussions on the agreement, would it have been possible to respond to this call?

[Answer] We are always ready for discussions and we would have lauded such a thing if it had been done. This is what we blame Saddam's government for. Why didn't it transform this matter into a real discussion?

Fate of Islands

[Question] But don't you believe that Iraq has legitimate demands, at least insofar as the borders are concerned?

[Answer] I repeat that Iraq, in case it has certain demands, should have resorted to dialogue and to peaceful means to realize them. However, this doesn't mean that all they [Iraqis] are demanding is legitimate and that they would have gotten everything they demanded. No. I would like to separate two things: The three islands and the borders.

Concerning the three islands, I believe that they have never been the property of anybody other than Iran. If we review history, we will find that these islands had belonged to Iran and were then controlled by the British for a time. When Britain departed from the area, the islands' inhabitants occupied them. But this doesn't mean that the islands belong to the inhabitants. I also can see no justification for Iraq and for Saddam to demand these islands, especially since Saddam will have no geographic control over them. Iraq asserts that it wants these islands to return them to the Arab fold. We ask Saddan Husayn: Who are you to act as the godfather of the Arab states?

Moreover, if we assume that these islands are Arab islands, then we ask this question: Under whose control will these islands be placed? Under the control of Sharjah or of any other small Arab country? They will end up under the control of the United States. Allow me to explain to you the situation in the area. The United States has military bases and a regular U.S. army in Muscat and Oman. This means that in case these islands are returned to the Arab countries, they will end up under the control of the United States. Moreover, one of our revolution's goals in the Gulf area is to oust the United States from the area. Therefore, the demand for these islands is illegitimate. I believe that Saddam Husayn knows this perfectly well and this is why he no longer demands them.

As for the borders, if Iraq has any demands then it must stop the war first and move out of the Iranian territory second. It must also declare a cease-fire and promise not to interfere in the Iranian domestic affairs. However, I again repeat that this doesn't mean that they will get everything they are demanding. I believe that a legitimate discussion can lead to legitimate results.

Iraq's Reasons

[Question] Why, in your opinion, has Iraq launched this war and do you think that there are goals behind it?

[Answer] Saddam wanted to launch this war a long time ago. He committed numerous agressions against Iran through his interference in our domestic affairs after the revolution's triumph in February 1979. Saddam has given asylum and aid to Savak members and men of the shah's regime fleeing Iran. In fact, Iraq started its war against Iran in Qasr-e-Shirin 8 months ago. They started by encroaching upon towns and killing innocent people. I believe that Saddam has chosen this particular time because he believes that Iran is in a weak position at present. But his calculations are wrong and the biggest proof of this is, as you can see, that when the Iraqi agression started, Iran put aside the internal problems it was facing and has transformed all its efforts to defend its independence, territories and resources.

[Question] The Iranians have asserted repeatedly that there will be no cease-fire before Iraq returns to the previous borders. Do you think that in case the war continues, Iran will be able to reach a military phase through which it can negotiate?

[Answer] First, from a military standpoint, we can say that the Iraqi army is not strong enough to confront the Iranian forces. We possess a strong fighting army and there is a difference between a strong fighting army and an army of mercenaries. I believe that Saddam's army is an army of mercenaries. Saddam pays them [troops] to fight and they possess no national feeling and no ideological motive for fighting. The destruction of a regular army is impossible, unless Iraq can destroy the entire army and all its weapons. However, Iraq cannot destroy 20 million people because the Iranian army is not fighting alone. The people are the ones fighting. Moreover, with its organization and training, the Iraqi army is not very efficient whereas the Iranian army has broad field experience and all its naval, land and air forces are well trained. I also believe that in its present condition, the Iranian army is capable of carrying on with the war. Through a simple mathematical process, we can assert that the Iranian army is capable of carrying on with an endless battle if Iraq is prepared for such a battle. But I do not believe that Iraq is capable of an endless battle and that it will be the major loser.

Moscow's and Washington's Role

[Question] What, in your opinion, is the role played by the two superpowers in this war?

[Answer] I believe that the two superpowers, especially the United States, are playing a major role in this war. Despite its declaration of neutrality, the

United States has participated in this war by sending its radar aircraft [AWAC'S] to Saudi Arabia, through King Husayn's support for Saddam Husayne, by convincing friendly countries, such as France, Britain and Australia, of the need to interfere in the problem and through the threats to interfere in Iran in case the Strait of Hormuz is hit [closed]. This is insofar as the United States is concerned. As for the Siviet Union, this country has given Iraq supplies and spareparts. This means a direct intervention in the war. What we want of the world peoples, especially of the peoples living under the wing of the major powers, to urge their governments to stop their aggressions against us.

[Question] Iran has asserted that it has acquired military spareparts from Turkey. How can you make your allegations of direct U.S. intervention in the war compatible with your getting aid from Turkey which is known for its ties with the United States at all levels?

[Answer] I cannot answer this question. I have not received any information or affirmation on what you call Turkish military aid to Iran. Therefore, I cannot give an answer on this contradiction in our policy [sic].

[Question] Political observers believe that you will throw yourselves into the bosom of the Soviet Union sooner or later, especially since no country in this world can afford not to be associated with one of the two superpowers. What is your opinion.

[Answer] I believe that this question is difficult. However, I would like to answer it. Iran has paid, as you know, an exorbitant price for its independence--this is why we are not prepared to lose this independence. However, acquiring weapons from another country does not mean that you have lost your independence. We are prepared to accept any aid, provided that the price is not our independence.

[Question] But you have not answered my question?

[Answer] I don't believe that it is necessary for us to establish new relations with the Soviet Union. I don't at all believe in such a thing.

[Question] Do you think that the Iraq-Iran war will extend to new areas?

[Answer] Yes, because Saddam Husayn has been disappointed in this war and he will try to persuade other countries, especially Arab countries which we consider friends and allies, to enter the war for one goal, namely to prove that he is the Arab world leader. However, this depends on the other countries and on the possibility of their sliding into the war or of being transformed into an Iraqi military base. In such a case, we will fight these countries in defense of our countries.

[Question] Do you think that one of the Arab states will turn into a military base for Iraq?

[Answer] So far, with the exception of one Arab state which has done so, I have no information on other Arab states. I hope that they will not slip and fall into the trap because it is not in the interest of their countries, of Iran or of the world to do so.

Saudi Arabia and United States

[Question] You have hinted in your statements at one Arab state which has done this so far. Is it Saudi Arabia and what is its role, in your opinion in this war?

[Answer] Saudi Arabia has played an important role in this war. There are reports asserting that ammunition and weapons have been transported from it to Iraq. However, these reports have not been confirmed so far. Therefore, I cannot assert that Saudi Arabia has gotten directly involved in the war. I believe that the United States is using Saudi Arabia as a screen to advance military aid to Iraq.

[Question] This means that you are accusing the United States of being behind the war?

[Answer] Of course. I will go even further to say that the United States is the party that has called for this war. The dispatch of 4 AWACs to Saudi Arabia is of great significance and is something that confirms that the war will enter a new phase, meaning that it will expand to new fronts. I will go still further to say that through the presence of these aircraft, the United States is beginning a war for a big change in the area's map. The presence of the aircraft is not intended solely to protect the Saudi oil wells. It also means that Saudi Arabia has agreed to play the role of a command and control center for a quick war in the area.

[Question] Do you believe that the other Arab states will enter this war?

[Answer] I believe that the governments in the Arab Gulf, and even in the Arab desert [sic], do not have enough power to defend their independence in case the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia declare war on them. Let me give you an example. Saddam Husayn did not need more than 6 hours to reach the center of Kuwait a few years ago. In Oman, there are U.S. bases in which Egyptian troops are present and these forces need no more than a few hours to invade all the Gulf states. An aggression of this sort is something easy for Saudi Arabia, the United States and Iraq to commit. I do not believe that they need more than one day to expand the war to the entire area. They possess sufficient military hardware for this purpose. However, the area will turn into a real hell. The aircraft [AWACs] present in Saudi Arabia currently can watch and control 250 miles. This means that Saudi Arabia, which is covering Iraq and Saddam Husayn, is well-prepared and equipped to interfere in these small countries of the area, and even in Iran, at any moment.

Arab-Iranian War?

[Question] This means that the Iraq-Iran war will turn into an Iranian-Arab war?

[Answer] We cannot call it an Arab-Iranian war. It is a mixed war for changing the area's map.

[Question] Now, in your opinion, will the area's map change?

[Answer] Let us imagine the scenario of this war through the area's map. The fighting will extend to the other fronts, including the Persian Gulf, and the major

powers suddenly decide to bring peace to the area. How? Through military intervention. Military intervention requires that their forces be present around the Persian Gulf. Thus, this gulf will be divided militarily among the major powers. Then negotiations based on political and military pressures will follow for the purpose of stripping away territories and for bringing into existance new governments supporting the major powers--governments on which these powers can rely to keep the oil in loyal and friendly hands. This will be the goal of the war in case it extends to new areas, else what is the meaning of launching the war from the southern Persian Gulf when they can launch it from sea? What is happening at present is a major war for changing the area's map and for creating new countries, as happened in the past. This means that all the oil will be monopolized by the imperialists.

[Question] Do you think that the Soviet Union will watch such a situation as a spectator?

[Answer] I believe that there must be an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States and I believe that such an agreement does exist in the long run [sic]. I don't understand how the Soviet Union can watch this military occupation in this strategic area as a spectator after the arrival of the U.S. aircraft, at a time when the United States has combat-ready troops in Oman, and at a time when the United States is preparing domestically an army with a nucleus of 100,000 troops to be sent to the area in the near future? Let us put ourselves in the place of the Soviet Union. Can it stand silent and relaxed in the face of all these transformations whereas in the past, it used to protest any simple move by the United States? The military balance in the area has been upset and yet we have seen no serious movement on the part of the Soviet Union. This means that there is prior agreement between the two superpowers to control a secure area in order to guarantee their private interests.

Military Supplies

[Question] You have asserted that Iran does not need military supplies in the Iraq-Iran war. But in case this war is prolonged, how will you acquire military supplies as long as you are isolated politically?

[Answer] I do not like the word 'isolation.' But I do understand your meaning. I believe that it is difficult for a large number of states to understand the principles of the Iranian Islamic revolution because most of the positions that we adopt are derived from the revolution's positions. Most states, governments and politicians determine their political positions that are based on force through the political, ideological and strategic balances whereas our revolution relies on a different philosophy. This is something which requires time for the states to comprehend and to harmonize their policies with our policy. I agree that we have made a mistake in not explaining this policy, perhaps because we have not had enough time or because we have not exerted sufficient efforts in this regard. This is why we have not been able so far to convince these countries and these governments of our foreign policy. This is also why we rely for support on the peoples and not the governments. We know that the countries of the world have realized that this war has been a war of agression by Saddam Husayn against Iran. But very regrettably, the peoples do not possess the information media to express this realization.

As for the political isolation, we acknowledge that we are in a poor position politically insofar as the positions of the governments of some countries are concerned. But insofar as the citizens of these countries are concerned, we are strong.

[Question] But you cannot continue the war without any political and, consequently, military aid?

[Answer] This is the truth. But if the war is prolonged, it will not be between Iran and the Arab countries but between these countries and the superpowers. We need aid from the friendly countries and I believe that if we reach such a position, there are numerous countries that will not leave us without assistance.

[Question] What do you expect Bakhtiar's role to be in the present phase, especially in the wake of the reports of his proceeding to Iraq to form a government in exile?

[Answer] I believe that a government in exile is a mere dream. A man must be simple-minded to accept a government in exile from Bakhtiar or any other person. The proof of this, and a man can make conclusions from this proof, is that during the attack of Saddam Husayn's troops on Khorramshahr the Iranian army could not intervene to repel this attack at the right time but the citizens were there and used their home-made molotovs to repel this attack. The citizens were able to destroy 18 Iraqi tanks. This means that the people are ready to repel any attack against our country's independence. The formation of a government in exile means nothing to us or to anybody else. We believe that this government is Bakhtiar's toy. Bakhtiar loves playing and is happy with this toy.

[Question] Some accuse you of continuing to keep the hostages as a pressuring lever against the United States to prevent it from interfering in the war directly?

[Answer] I would like to separate the issue of the hostages from the war issue. We are not persecutors and we do not want to exploit this situation and these persons to exert pressure on the United States to reach an agreement. The Majlis [parliament] is the authority concerned with the hostage issue and is working to end the problem. They [parliament members] work independently of the influences of the war. However, these hostages are a part of the international community. In case the United States interferes in the war, such intervention would constitute an agression against all the international communities, especially the Iranian community. The intervention of the United States or of any other country will change the international situation which will, in turn, effect the hostages.

[Question] But their [the hostages'] trial has taken a long time?

[Answer] I admit that this is true. However, the politicians and the journalists who have visited the hostages numerous times have expressed their satisfaction with hostages' situation. The hostages swim, play, go out in the fresh air, read books and magazines and receive mail from their families. Solving their problem depends on a resolution from the Majlis. It is difficult to adopt such a resolution because the hostage problem is not the problem of the 52 individuals but that of the U.S. administration and of the acts it has committed against Iran.

[Question] What is your view of the international position vis-a-vis the Iraq-Iran war?

[Answer] Immediately after launching the war, Iraq launched an international propaganda campaign. Iraq has secured travel tickets for numerous journalists and has been content with giving them reports. But there are many faulty reports and I believe Iraq cannot continue to mislead the world public opinion because the truth will come out. So far, I believe that world public opinion supports Iran because we have been able to stand fast and to fight, despite the economic and military boycott imposed on us, a country that receives aid and supplies from the major powers. I believe that the peace-loving peoples will be compelled to view our steadfastness with admiration.

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THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT TO BE COORDINATED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 9 Nov 80 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN — Responsibility for coordinating the judiciary of the nation with the legislative and executive, rests with the Minister of Justice, Minister of Justice Ebrahim Abadi said yesterday in an interview with Fars.

He was commenting on questions which were put to him on the nature of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Justice which is subject to supervision by the Higher Supreme Judicial Council, by terms of the Islamic Constitution.

The minister explained that Revolutionary Leader Imam Khomeini had often underlined the need for a strict separation of powers between the judiciary, the legislature and the executive arms of state.

A primary reason for the Imam's concern was the bitter experience of the past during the former shah's regime, when there was constant interference by the powers that were in the work of the judiciary he said. Abadi said that he was going to make certain of this by discussion with the Supreme Judicial Council.

Abadi speaking of Majlis deputies' reactions to the questions involved as regards judicial authority and its need to be related to the other branches of the executive and the legislature, felt that there was much scope for future definition of judicial powers according to bahests of the Imam.

CSO: 4920

MUJAHEDIN DISTURB SA'ADATI'S TRIAL

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 9 Nov 80 p 1

[Text]

TEHRAN — Mujahedin Khalq members were said to have created unruly disturbances before the gates of the Evin prison where the trial of Mujahedin member Muhammad Reza Sa'adati continued into its third session in the Islamic Court.

Pars reporting a communique issued by the Revolutionary Prosecutor General's office said that a group of agitators said to belong to the Mujahedin Khalq Organization had milled around the Evin prison gates demanding entry and hurling abuse at the Revolutionary Guards whom they attempted to provoke.

The communique said that the Revolutionary Guards held their patience despite being called SAVAKIS, lackeys of power mongers and expansionists and other such names.

When the agitation intensified the hecklers were warned by loudspeaker to disperse but the order was ignored. When the Revolutionary Guards opened the gates in order to get the protesters to move off a scuffle ensued in which a Revolutionary Guard was stabbed, the communique said.

A number of Mujahedin-Khalq followers were arrested following the incidents the communique said.

In conclusion it said that the Prosecutor General's office will endeavor to carry out its humanitarian duties and functions and will not be concerned with political plots and maneuverings in the execution of its functions.

CSO: 4920

TEHRAN SECURITY STAFF PLANS TO SOLVE FUEL CRISIS

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 11 Oct 80 p 5

[Text] Turn off your water heaters, unplug your samovars. Do not drive for a while. Preparing variety of dishes at the same time no longer is considered a sign of luxury. It is a waste of food and fuel which will hurt our war efforts.

Remember the mild winter of the revolution and prepare yourselves for a low consumption in the fall and winter seasons. We were once put to test and emerged proudly showing the world that shortage of consumer goods was not able to make us bow to the oppressor, be it the shah or anyone else. The closeness of the main oil centers, refineries and export facilities of both Iran and Iraq has made it possible for the two countries to bomb each other's oil centers and temporarily put a stop to their operations. In the first days of the war Iraqi Migs attacked our oil storage tanks in Abadan, putting them on fire. But precautionary measures by responsible officials made it possible to avoid irrepairable damages. Oil Minister Tondguyan announced in a press conference that despite repeated Iraqi air attacks Iran was continuing to export oil. While announcing that there were no shortage of fuel, Iranian officials have declared that as a precautionary measure since the war could last for some time, fuel including kerosene, gasoline and gasoil will be rationed and private cars will not be allowed to continue operating.

At the same time, in answer to the Iraqi aggression, Iran has retaliated by bombing that country's oil centers at Kirkuk, Musol and Basrah, the port from which most of Iraq's oil is exported from, disrupting their entire operations. The strict censorship in Iraq has made it impossible for the outside world to learn about the fuel situation and its distribution in that country. But there is no doubt that as a result of the destruction of the oil facilities in Iraq, kerosene and gasoline are not going to be in abundance there as it had been before.

But the shortage (of fuel) will do more harm to Iraq than to Iran. This is because the revolutionary spirit of unity and solidarity which exist among Iranians is lacking in Iraq, and, unlike in Iran, there is a wide gap between the ruled and the rulers in Iraq. Political observers are of the opinion that the majority in Iraq, especially among the Shi'ites, are against the war and do not look upon it, as the Iranians do, as a jihad (holy war) against infidels and the defense of the country.

Anyway, the shortage of foodstuff and some vital consumer goods could hurt the country from within and it is only through public alertness that the negative effects of such a situation, brought about by war, could be neutralized. Iranians have experienced fuel shortage once before, but the people were determined to overthrow the old regime and were able to put up with it during the winter and did not let cold weather affect their iron will. Now that the people are facing an external enemy, they are even more determined and united.

Most people have turned off their water heaters and do not turn them on except in an emergency. Many people have parked their cars and have not driven them for quite some time. A number of them are now busy preparing their korsis [coal foot warmers] for the winter.

Malektabar, who has been unemployed for some time now, in talking about fuel conservation since the war started, says: "The only thing we could do about saving fuel was to turn off our water heater. Before fuel shortage, our water heater was on all the time. Now we turn it on only on Fridays in order to take a bath. As far as gasoline is concerned, consumption was stopped with the start of the mobilization week."

'A Hassani, a self-employed man, talking about reducing their fuel consumption at home, says: "Even though I have 30 liters of gasoline in my car tank right at this moment, I prefer to go on foot or take the bus rather than use my car. During the revolution, following the fuel shortage, I purchased an oil heater, and now if the war continues throughout the winter season and the oil shortage persist, I will turn to the korsi, using charcoal. The advantage will be that it will also keep our tea and food warm." Akbar Salamati, a high school student, says: "In order to avoid standing in line for kerosene, we have turned our water heater off and warm the water on our [charcoal] stove for dishwashing. My mother suffers from pain in her hands if she uses cold water for washing dishes. For cooking, we use gas or kerosene, depending on which one is available. Now that kerosene is not available the gas stove is being used. If no gas could be found, we shall go back to our "valors" [stoves].

Maliheh Danesh Monfared says: "I have two small children and must keep the water warm all day because I wash their feet several times every day. They will catch cold if I turn the heater off. I do not know how to conserve fuel. All I can do is not to hoard it. Fortunately, a number of local boys bring us some kerosene once every few days."

Formation of Supervisory Councils

'Ali Asghar 'A, who has worked in one of the rural development organizations for a short while, says: "Radio, television and the press must be used to make people fuel-conscious and teach them how to conserve fuel. People will certainly listen and act willingly. Another way of conserving fuel and preventing its hoarding is through the formation of councils to supervise its distribution.

"Providing people with gas and timely distribution of bottled gas can effectively help conserve our oil supplies. A knowledgeable friend of mine is of the opinion that gas pipelines in a wide area of the capital city have been laid and the only thing that remains to be done is to be connected to the main gas storage tanks. By doing this, the problem of gas distribution could be solved.

"I have spent good many years in rural areas and I know that the majority of people in the villages have preserved their traditional heating system of wood burning. Reactivation of the system can be of great help to these people during the oil shortage."

Gasoline and Gasoil

When fuel shortage develops, gasoline and gasoil are among the first to become short. Officials urge people to use public transportation and leave their cars home. One week after private car owners were denied gasoline, officials declare that in order to send enough supplies to the war front, gasoline will be rationed on the basis of 30 liters a month for every vehicle. Banning the use of private cars has created lots of problems for many people. Yet, it has made many people realize that it is possible to live without a car. All that is required is a little footwork and getting up a little earlier in the morning. Another benefit of the ban on the use of private vehicles is that people in big cities, especially in Tehran, will have the opportunity to breath clean air.

Regarding the decrease in the level of air pollution in Tehran, since after the start of war and gasoline rationing, the head of the Organization for the Protection of the Environment, Dr Taqi Ebtekar, says:

"Implementation of the mobilization plan provided us with the chance to measure the level of air pollution in connection with the use of private vehicles. In normal times, more than 1,000,000 vehicles are in use in Tehran. Recent restrictions have reduced this number to 100,000 vehicles being used every day. The amount of carbon monoxide produced in normal times is about 4,000 tons a day. This is now reduced to 400 tons a day. Also some 5 tons of lead was being produced [released in the air] every day by cars burning super gasoline. This is now reduced to 500 kilos daily."

The head of the Organization for the Protection of Environment also asked people to avoid using their water heaters. In this connection, he said: "Because of incomplete and faulty combustion, water heaters release a lot of carbon monoxide gas in the air and, therefore, people should not turn them on to help reduce the level of this dangerous gas in the air..." It is worth mentioning that according to experts, if the level of carbonmonoxide in the air reaches between 30 to 50 grams per square meter it will effect the hemoglobin in the blood which will be harmful for the nervous system. Another polluting agent in cities is hydrocarbon gas which is released in the air by faulty engines and is considered a cancer producing agent. The existence of these types of gases in the air produces a layer in the atmosphere that can prevent the sun rays from reaching the earth with damaging effect on kidneys and nerves.

As was mentioned before, technical defects in cars and malfunctioning engines cause higher consumption of gasoline and gasoil in addition to polluting the air.

Iraj, who works in a repairshop on Revolution Avenue, talking about the technical defects in automobiles causing a higher consumption of gasoline, says: "If the carburator fails to function properly and the engine, as we say, chokes, the result is a higher consumption of gas. Another factor, resulting in a higher consumption, is the malfunctioning of the clutch. Another factor is leakage. All these defects are easily repairable."

Mehdi Zamani Moqaddam, a mechanic in Sattar Khan workshop, talking about the same subject, says: "There are many technical defects that could result in fuel waste. These include a dirty airfilter, a defective regulator, or bad carburator, faulty spark plugs and points. If one of those mentioned fail to function properly the engine will be out of tune and the fuel consumption will be greatly higher. Drivers must tune up their engines after every 7 to 10,000 kilometers. If this is done regularly, in addition to saving fuel, the life of the engine will be prolonged."

Imani, who is in charge of the repairshop of Iran Kaveh, producer and builder of heavy trucks, talking about fuel consumption of heavy trucks using gasoil, says: "In order to increase engine power, some truck drivers adjust the engines of their trucks to increase the inflow of fuel into carburator. A truck driver who thinks his truck does not move as fast as he desires when going uphill, adjusts his engine in order to feed more fuel into it, thinking this will help increase the engine power, which will result in higher speed. In fact, this will only increase fuel consumption as well as shorten the life of the engine. Truck engines are built with certain specifications, with the amount of fuel needed to operate properly determined accordingly. Increasing the fuel inflow by manipulation will not affect efficiency while it will do harm to the engine and its parts.

Gasoline and Gasoil

Gasoline and gasoil are the most important fuel used by various plants and production units inside the country. A shortage of these fuel and their rationing will certainly create hardship and problems for these plants. Even though some plants have large supplies of fuel in their storage tanks, this will only suffice them for a short period of time. In order to prevent any fuel shortage that could result in a total stoppage of the nation's industries, officials have set up a staff to help solve the fuel crisis. Describing the situation in this connection, Dr Seyyed Esfahani, a member of the staff, says: "The staff is set up to help secure fuel needed by both government and nongovernment-owned industries. Following a thorough study of the existing fuel supplies in the country, various industrial plants have been asked that by preparing a report about their fuel consumption in the past three months, or the amount of fuel they had burned during last fall, to contact the centers that were announced in (the staff's) first communique, and make arrangement for the delivery of their needed fuel. The staff has asked various industries to switch to fuel oil (mazut) because sufficient supply is on hand, with no restrictions. At the same time, the staff urges drivers not to drive over 80 kilometers per hour. Driving at higher speed will result in higher consumption."

Drivers should also take note that frequent change of oil is not necessary. The quality of the oil now in use is good enough and an oil change between 3,000 to 4,000 kilometers will be all right.

Gas

Gas is a fuel with high home consumption (for cooking purposes). We face no gas shortage at this time, but distributing companies [distributing bottled gas] are having trouble in their operations. Hari, a member of Tehran Security Staff, with some experience in distribution of gas, in explaining the conditions, says: "As for natural gas that is now being distributed through the existing pipelines, we are not facing any shortages. As for liquid gas that is being distributed in cylinders,

no shortage exists at this moment, but it may develop if this fuel source is overused. A part of Tehran's gas pipeline network has been left unfinished. The gas company hopes to be receiving the needed regulator soon to finish the job. In the meantime, people are urged to conserve their gas supply as much as possible by limiting their cooking to the minimum."

Tehran Security Staff has repeatedly asked for public cooperation and urged people to save fuel so that we will be able to support our fighting men in our border areas. The Staff, despite gasoline rationing, urges people not to use their cars and asks drivers to give rides to people, helping them get to their destinations. With regard to kerosene, people are urged to turn off their water heaters and use small heaters for warming their rooms. They are also asked to use small electric heaters without creating power shortage.

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CSO: 4906

GAS RATIONING RULES EXPLAINED

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 8 Nov 80 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN - The Ministry of Oil, the Traffic Department and the Fuel and Energy subcommittee of the Bank Saderat announced further details concerning the gasoline rationing plan to Pars news agency which we are reporting as follows:

Ration coupons for gasoline will be sold to private owners of automobiles through the branches of Bank Saderat.

The owners of private autos should report to the Bank between noon and 4:00 p.m. to purchase their coupons, except on holidays when the coupons will be sold at the Bank during the morning.

To avoid crowding at the Bank's branches, the coupons will be sold on specific days according to the last digit of the customer's license plate number.

Owners holding license plate numbers with the following digit should report on the following days:

Nos. 1 & 2 - Fri., Nov. 7
Nos. 3 & 4 - Sat., Nov. 8
Nos. 5 & 6 - Sun., Nov. 9
Nos. 7 & 8 - Mon., Nov. 10
No. 9 - Tues., Nov. 11.

Auto owners should present their personal identification card, their car identification card, their ownership documents, and their car registration papers to the Bank when purchasing coupons.

Bank Saderat emphasized that no other documents will be accepted by the Bank.

Anyone lacking the necessary documentation on their autos should first report to the Traffic Department to obtain duplicate documents before going to the Bank for coupons.

To obtain duplicates of lost documents, the owner of the vehicle should report to the Car Registration Center of the Traffic Department and then present all his documents at the Bank Saderat between November 22 and December 1st to purchase ration coupons.

The Traffic Department announced that there is no problem in obtaining duplicates of lost ownership documents, car registration papers, or car identification cards.

All taxi and vanette owners who have not yet obtained their gasoline coupons should report to the branches of Bank Saderat before Tuesday, Nov. 11, and ensure that they are holding the necessary documents at the time of purchase.

The distribution of gasoline will begin at petrol stations on Nov. 12 to all vehicles, whether private or official, upon presentation of ration coupons.

The coupons are printed in four colors: orange, red, green and brown - each denoting a specific amount of gasoline to be issued.

The bearers of orange and red coupons will be entitled to receive 30 liters of gasoline in exchange for one coupon.

The bearers of green coupons will be entitled to receive 15 liters of gasoline in exchange for one coupon.

The bearers of brown coupons will be entitled to receive 5 liters of gasoline in exchange for one coupon.

Members of the medical profession who own automobiles should follow the same regulations applying to private owners as outlined above to obtain their ration coupons.

The Medical Association has announced that a proposal for supplying members of the medical profession with surplus gasoline rations is currently under discussion.

The result of the discussions concerning this proposal will be announced by the Medical Association when a decision has been reached.

CSO: 4920

STEPS TAKEN FOR REVIVAL OF RUG INDUSTRY

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 2 Nov 80 p 12

[Text] Iran Rug Company has announced that 300 million tumans has been appropriated to help rug manufacturers become self-sufficient.

In a press conference, the company announced that in order to help rug makers, the company will offer technical assistance while the Office of Reconstruction Crusade will provide the funds. The plan will include the giving of loans to rug manufacturers, mostly in low income rural areas.

Iran Rug Company has given details of the plan and the efforts aimed at reviving the rug industry.

People familiar with Iran's rug industry know well that the problem faced by the fading industry are more than one or two. The source of the problems lie in the old regime's dependence on external powers which made it arrive at the sorrowful condition we are witnessing now.

There was a time when Iran was known only for its rugs. Iran's reputation in this respect had once reached a point, and was so worldwide, that even after the discovery of oil, so vital for the economic life of the West, the Persian rug remained as the symbol of the country. Many nations that had tried in the past to compete with Iran in this field had failed and Persian rugs remained unrivalled, in design, patterns and color. Yet, such a magnificient and famous product, which its rivals in the East had failed to imitate, fell victim to the misguided economic policies of the old regime and its total dependence on the West. The end result was the sad condition of the rug industry, so much so that few domestic consumers could afford to purchase a handmade rug any more.

The decline of traditional agriculture, animal husbandry and the quality of life in rural areas, along with migration of rural population to cities and towns, in search of higher income and easier jobs, coupled with other factors, including the increased popularity of machine-made rugs, made production of Persian rugs very expensive to the extent that it became a luxury item, both in Iran and abroad.

I may sound unbelievable, but it is a fact that in recent years, some rug merchants imported Persian rugs they had purchased from shops outside the country. They said that the price of rugs in Iran was so high that, inspite of all the expenses

incurred, such as customs duties and transportation, imported rugs that had been exported years ago, were still far less expensive than those being made at the present time.

A thorough and careful study is needed in order to trace the roots of the problems and difficulties the rug industry is now facing. These cannot be described here in this short article. This is a subject about which books and lengthy reports should be written.

The announcement by the representative of Iran Rug Company indicates that the decision to revive the rug industry had been originally made by the Revolutionary Council with institutions such as the Organization for Reconstruction Crusade and some government agencies are also involved. There is no doubt that every aspect of the problem must have been taken into consideration. Yet, there is an important fact that we hope will not be overlooked by the organizations involved in the revival plan. This is the "tradition" of rug making. Making rugs, like most other traditional occupations in the country, had, for centuries past, been a desirable and praiseworthy tradition. This tradition, along with that of farming, animal husbandry and many other traditions had formed the fabric of social life in the land. But, unfortunately, this fabric of life was disrupted and destroyed, and along with it came the disruption in population and job distribution, and the tradition of rug-making was gradually abandoned.

Our patient, hard-working and God-fearing farmers were attracted to cities and towns and were put to work at construction projects that were mushrooming all over the country by a false economic prosperity. Agriculture and animal husbandry were destroyed, and with that, our rural cottage industry, with the rug industry as its most important one, began to decline.

The revival of such an industry (cottage) is not easy if it is not done with the revival of the rug-making tradition. Rug manufacturers could be provided with patterns, designs and other necessary tools. But, first of all, it will be necessary to look around and search for rug weavers who have migrated to cities and turned into, peddlers on the streets of Tehran, Mashhad and Esfahan, and try to persuade them to give up their peddling. The secret of reviving the rug industry lies only in this. It is true that rug weaving could be taught in classrooms, but it requires more than 5 or 10 years to master the art and learn the intricacies of the art. This art is something that had been passed on from generation to generation, from fathers to sons and from mothers to daughters for many generations. This is, as mentioned before, a treasure that has changed places and was transferred from the rural areas into the cities and was lost in the many lures of the big cities. This valuable treasure must be recovered. The declining tradition of rug manufacturing must be revived. The secret of the revival of the rug industry lies in the revival of the tradition of rug-making, and nothing else.

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BRIEFS

NEW VVIR HEADS ANNOUNCED--The Prosecutor General, Ayatollah Seyyed Abdulkarim Moosavi Ardebili, has yesterday issued orders for appointments of three temporary heads of the Voice and Vision of Iran (Radio and TV) to manage the administrative affairs until the authoritative judiciary, executive and legislative bodies of the countries selected a VVIR management. Ali Akbar Mohtashemi and Abdullah Noori were introduced to supervise the VVIR and Dr Nadeemi to head the 2nd TV channel. Ayatollah Ardebili advised that the appointments were to fulfill the gap created in absence of the supervisory authorities in VVIR. The Prosecutor General made the fresh recruitees responsible to supervise all activities of VVIR "to guide it towards aims of the revolution and to block the relay of deviationary interviews and occurences that are against the interests of the country and benefits the enemy." The Islamic Majlis (Parliament) had last week approved a law to form a body to govern the VVIR affairs. That governing body, however, has not yet been formed. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 8 Nov 80 p 2]

STANDARDS FOR STUDY ABROAD--Application forms for students wishing to study abroad will be printed in the newspapers as soon as possible," announced Dr Gholamreza Jahanshahi, Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Culture and Higher Education to Pars yesterday. Dr Jahanshahi, who is also the Head of the Educational Assessment Department of the Ministry, further announced that there is no age limitation for students wishing to study abroad. He provided further details of the necessary qualifications for such students, saying that a foreign language exam must be passed by the student in either English, French, German or Italian. He also stated that a minimum grade average must have been achieved in order to quality, which he listed as follows: for the B.A. degree the written average must at least be 15; for Masters degree the B.A. degree grade average must have been at least 3 (B); and for doctorate degree the M.A. degree grade average must have been at least 3.5 (B+). For further information in this regard, applicants are requested to telephone 838021-27 (extension 81). [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 9 Nov 80 p 2]

WAR-TIME BUDGET PREPARATION--The Plan and Budget Organization has plans underway to cover situations arising from the present wartime state of emergency in the nation as well as for the coming year 1981, announced by Deputy Minister of the Organization, Abbas Qaemolsabchi. In an interview with the persian daily, Kayhan, yesterday, the deputy said that the Plan and Budget Organization is presently identifying the tax sources for the funding of the emergency budget. The gathering of direct taxes for expenditure on social welfare programs as well as the elimination of unnecessary expenditures by official administrative offices are important

activities in the Organization at present, he said, adding that waste by government offices is one of the lingering vestiges of the previous regime. Development expenditures included in the emergency budget would be allotted for productive projects, Qaemolsabahi said. "Any projects involving investment in nonproductive fields will be cut from the budget as these so far have only contributed towards inflation in the country." When asked for details of the proposed budget for the year 1360 (1981), Qaemolsabahi said that this plan is under discussion but would depend entirely on conditions created by the ongoing war. "Under these circumstances, top priority is given to providing the nation with necessities and funds for reconstruction as well as plans to reduce unemployment," he said. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 9 Nov 80 p 2]

CSO: 4920

COMMUNIST DEPUTY MEETS 'ARAFAT, CONDEMNS GOVERNMENT POLICY

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 19 Oct 80 p 24

/Article by Raymunda Tawil: "'Israel's' Representative Meets 'Arafat: We Reject Camp David and Autonomy Jointly"/

/Text/ On 24 September Mr Tawfiq Tubi, deputy secretary general of the Israeli Communist Party, Knesset member and member of the Israeli delegation to the World Peace Conference held in Sofia (Bulgaria), met with Mr Yasir 'Arafat, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization. This meeting stirred up a hostile storm in official Israeli circles and at the same time stirred up broad hopes among the forces working for peace in Israel.

AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WAL-DUWALI held a conversation on this meeting with Mr Tubi.

/Question/ What were the motives for this meeting with Mr 'Arafat and how did it take place?

/Answer/ It was the common desire to have a just peace reign in the Middle East and put a limit to the tragedy of the Palestinian people. As you know, the World Parliament of Peoples for Peace was held in Sofia from 23 to 27 September at the initiative of the World Peace Council. During the inaugural session, after Mr 'Arafat had concluded the statement from the Palestinian people, a ceremonial meeting took place between him and the members of the forces for peace in Israel--Tawfiq Tubi, Charlie Piton, Hasan Bisharah, Felicia Langer and Liton Zahafi, all of whom belong to the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality.

Rejection of Camp David

This meeting reflected common hopes for a just peace and the aspiration to end the occupation and have the Palestinian people attain their legitimate rights to determine their own destiny, including establishing their independent state. Without these rights, one cannot establish a just permanent peace in the region. Also reflected at the meeting, and in previous meetings, was the appreciation which our brothers in the Palestine Liberation Organization harbor toward the position the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality represents, striving to mobilize the most extensive forces inside Israel to put a limit to the policy of occupation in the occupied Arab areas and the policy of capricious violence against the Arab masses in Israel. This position was also represented by common resistance to the Camp

David autonomy conspiracy and our aspirations to end the occupation and settlement, enable the Palestinian people to obtain their rights to establish an independent state in accordance with the United Nations resolutions, and have the bloodshed cease.

The statements by the lawyer Langer and the statement by Charlie Biton met with a welcome from the Palestine Liberation Organization delegation in Sofia.

/Question/ What positions did you reach agreement on with the Palestine Liberation Organization delegation?

/Answer/ We reached agreement first and in principle as common members of the Sofia conference itself. In another area we reached agreement on the need for common resistance to American imperialism and its aggression against the freedom and independence of peoples, especially the Palestinian people. We also reached agreement in the context of the resolutions adopted, which were to support the Palestinian people, condemn the presence of the occupation, condemn the law incorporating Jerusalem, and demand the application of the United Nations resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Israel.

/Question/ What are the issues of the discussion you held with the Palestine Liberation Organization delegation?

/Answer/ In every meeting with the Palestine Liberation Organization, we conduct a dialogue and exchange views in order to serve peace in the area. Official meetings took place between the Israeli Communist Party and the Liberation Organization, and we for our part will strive to continue these meetings.

Begin and Perez Are the Same

/Question/ What is the official Israeli reaction to this meeting? Does this position include all Israelis?

/Answer/ The wave of provocation and hysteria which ruling reaction has stirred up and the stupid threat to withdraw immunity from Knesset members who participated in the meeting represent the extremist racist voices which adhere to the sword in dealing with the Palestinian arab people. Whether the voices belong to the Beginist Likud or the Perezist Ma'rakh, they rise up in expression of aggression, expansion, the usurpation of rights and continuation of the policy of contempt for the rights of the Palestinian Arab people, and they rise up to continue the platform of contempt for the Palestinian people themselves, indeed to strive to eliminate this people.

They are the same voices which resist recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization as a sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and resist any meeting with the Liberation Organization. The entire world recognizes the Liberation Organization, and is thus isolating the racist Israeli government's positions in the United Nations and in the international context.

What the Israeli government fears the most is defeat within Israeli itself, since increasing voices within Israel are stating that peace will occur only through a just solution based on the United Nations resolutions, which Israel rejects.

These resolutions call for a guarantee that the Palestinian people will obtain their rights to establish an independent state alongside Israel. This is a matter which requires sitting down and negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization, which is in fact what we intend to stress to the public in Israel, and this is the same position which represents the stand of the broad Arab masses within Israel, who have in their turn welcomed our meeting with 'Arafat. It also represents the peace-loving Jews.

Hysteria and Popular Support

Our well known program represents a living, active bridge to a just peace and just settlement, while the rulers of Israel are making provocations and threats because they do not want to create any common language between the Palestinian Arab people and the Israeli people. They insanely resist any common foundation on whose basis just peace and peaceful coexistence can be built in the place of incorporation, contempt and aggression.

There has been a popular reaction. I say that I anticipated the wave of hysteria, threats and stupid provocation on the part of the official reactionary forces in Israel, but the popular support for our activity surpassed my expectations, because, through wise voices representing broad masses arose amid the smoke of hysterical provocation. For example Yitzhak Shur wrote in AL HAMISHMAR "Those who met Yasir 'Arafat in Sofia were not elected by Geula Cohen but rather were elected by a large public, and they have the right to conduct a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization in the context they consider suitable." Also, Aharon Bikhar wrote in the newspaper YEDIOT AHARONOT, "Embracing Yasir 'Arafat was not an easy matter, it was the only option, and anyone who says the contrary must remember that he is condemning the present generation and coming ones to revolve in a vicious bloody circle."

Bikhar and Shur represent different broad circles in Israel. Uri Avneri also condemned the provocation against our delegation and stressed the need for dialogue with the Liberation Organization to attain a just peace.

/Question/ What are the historic dimensions of this meeting?

/Answer/ We have been happy to meet with 'Arafat and we consider that every meeting with the Liberation Organization is a support for a just peace. These necessary meetings underline to the Israeli people that a base for peace exists and that the peace will come only through the pursuit of the path and policy which we have referred: Israeli recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization, Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, and approval of the establishment of the Palestinian state. What the meeting, and different ones, show is that the basis for peace exists if Israel withdraws from the platform of aggression and recognizes the United Nations resolutions, foremost among them the right of the Palestinian people to establish Palestinian states in the occupied territories.

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GOVERNMENT ACCUSED OF CENSORING EAST JERUSALEM PRESS

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 21, 22 Oct 80

[Article by Robert Faris: "Events and Issues: Israeli Censorship of Arabic Press in East Jerusalem; Tel Aviv Prohibits Arabic Press from Publishing Radio Israel Broadcasts; Publication of Anything that Reveal Crimes of Israeli Occupation Prohibited; AL-FAJR, AL-SHIHAB, Two Patriotic Newspapers Harrassed by Censorship while AL-QUDS Enjoys Sponsorship of King Husayn and Approval of Begin"]

[21 Oct 80 p 13]

[Text] The old Arab bus lurched and came to a stop in front of an Israeli Army roadblock outside Jerusalem on a cool morning last summer. Two Israeli border patrol soldiers began coarsely prodding the passengers to disembark from the bus so that the routine inspection of identity cards can be carried out. One of the soldiers noticed that a West Bank Arab was eying him haughtily.

As he looked carefully at the Arab's identity card, the soldier said with disdain, "If you are 24 years old, why are you not yet married?" The Arab responded immediately, "Why don't you introduce me to your sister?"

The Israeli [soldier] dragged the Arab from the bus, and he [eventually] left him on the side of the road with a broken nose and a cut in his lip. The young Arab man staggered under the burning rays of the sun until he reached Jerusalem. He was almost unconscious; he was exhausted and frightened. However, when the fear turned into anger, Hamzah al-Tawil filed a complaint against the two soldiers who beat him up.

On the following day the incident appeared on the third page of THE JERUSALEM POST. Other Hebrew newspapers carried the story. Afterwards, newspapers reported that a military court had fined the two soldiers for using violence and had fined Hamzah al-Tawil for his "insolence." However, none of these incidents was published in the three Arabic newspapers, AL-QUDS, AL-FAJR and AL-SHIHAB.

The editor-in-chief of AL-FAJR Ma'mun al-Sayyad said, "Of course, we did receive news of the incident, but the Israeli authorities prevented us from printing it."

According to Arab editors-in-chief, publication of such incidents is always prohibited.

"Anything that would show Israel in a poor light is absolutely prohibited." This is what "Ali Ya'ish, editor-in-chief of AL-SHIHAB declared.

According to an order issued by the Israeli Military Administration after the 1967 war, no Arabic newspaper may be circulated in the occupied territories without prior permission from the military administration, and the publication of any article, picture of advertisement that poses a threat to security is prohibited.

[Any attempt] by Arabic newspapers to reveal to anyone that they are being consored and prohibited from publishing would be considered illegal conduct. The editors-in-chief of AL-FAJR and AL-SHIHAB showed me copies of the articles and materials whose publication was prohibited by the Israeli authorities. [They did so] despite the fact that they knew of the dangers to which they were subjecting themselves, dangers that may go as far as closing down the two newspapers.

Documents that are smuggled outside Israel support the claim made by the editors-in-chief that the censorship which is imposed on the Arab press is political more than military, and that this political censorship is practiced secretly to maintain the image, which the Israeli authorities are promoting, of allowing free political expression on the occupied Arab land.

The two editors-in-chief are hoping that this incident will reveal the real position of the Arab press in Israel.

Political not Military Censorship

The documents show, for example, that on the 15th of November 1979 the Israeli Military Administration confiscated 15 news items in AL-FAJR that dealt with the arrest of the mayor of Nablus, Bassam al-Shak'ah on the 11th of the same month. Israeli authorities had tried to deport al-Shak'ah after claiming that he had informed an Israeli general that he sympathized with the guerilla actions that were carried out by the PLO. Thirteen of the 15 news items that were confiscated dealt with local reactions to the arrest of al-Shak'ah. The other two confiscated news items dealt with international reactions to the same incident.

One of these news items was merely a translation of information announced by Israeli television about the mayor of Hebron who had called for a general strike in his municipality to protest the deportation of al-Shak'ah.

The other 14 news items were simple news items. Two days before that, that is, on the 11th of November, the censor prohibited the publication in AL-FAJR of information about a demonstration that was carried out by the group, Peace Now, in West Jerusalem to protest the deportation of al-Shak'ah. One of those who spoke during the demonstration, a professor of political science at Hebrew University called Daniel Emit, charged the Israeli government with trying to deprive the Palestinians of one of their most articulate spokesmen. These incidents were published in the Hebrew newspapers, but the Arab press was prohibited from publishing them.

Ma'mun al-Sayyad, editor-in-chief of AL-SHIHAB explains the effect of this censorship by saying, "The purpose of such censorship is to break up our political solidarity and our sense of national awareness." He adds angrily, "We do not

have clear instructions. We know that press material which is provocative, libelous or disruptive of the peace is absolutely forbidden. But what constitutes provocation? To the Israelis it means anything that shows our resentment towards their rule. What do I do then when I translate press material directly from the Hebrew press or from Israeli radio and television? I am not even allowed to publish the official Arab radio news which is broadcast from radio Israel! I have come to the conclusion that there is no way to deal with censorship."

Lt Col (Ami Jioleska), the Israeli military spokesman in Jeruslaem, whose influence extends to the West Bank, acknowledges that sometimes there is a very fine line between military censorship and political censorship. He says, "We must understand that the situation in these areas is extremely sensitive. Sometimes a mere match will set off a tremendous explosion. Censorship is essential to prevent such explosions."

According to (Jioleska's) point of view, even press materials quoted from Israeli newspapers can be inflammatory. Nevertheless, he does acknowledge that censorship is sometimes carried out arbitrarily. But he sayd, "Censorship bears no relationship to mathematical precision. People with different inclinations who are responsible for consorship have different points of view. One censor may permit something which another would prohibit. This depends on the mood of the censor: whether or not he had had a good night's sleep the night before or whether he had had an argument with his wife."

The Liberal Nature of Military Rule

(Jioleska) says that despite these circumstances Israeli censorship is not as harsh as it is reported to be. He adds, "Unfortunately, we are a country that is in a state of war with the PLO whose basic ideology is the destruction of Israel. It is no secret when I say that the Palestinians in general and the Arab press are receiving support from the PLO."

He declares, "We are making an effort to be liberal, but we will not allow our enemy to receive support."

The Israelis insist on their claim that they are ruling occupied Arab territory in a liberal fashion that is unprecedented in the history of occupation. They point out with pride to the three Arabic newspapers which are printed in East Jerusalem.

Among the three Arabic newspapers that are printed in East Jerusalem we find that AL-FAJR and AL-SHIHAB are characterized by a clear tone that expresses [support for] the Palestinian people's right to determine their own destiny. They are, therefore, subjected to more censorship than AL-QUDS whose tone is weaker than that of the former two newspapers. This affirms the fact that the thin line between political censorship and military censorship becomes very clear whenever Arabic newspapers exceed the proper bounds in articulating the national line.

AL-FAJR and AL-SHIHAB began appearing in 1972, and they were closed down for various periods. This did not happen to AL-QUDS. In 1974 the former editor-in-chief of AL-FAJR, Yusuf Nasir disappeared on his way home, and he has not been found since. During the same year the former editor-in-chief of AL-SHIHAB, 'Ali al-Khatib was deported.

Those two newspapers support the PLO, but they are prohibited from expressing their support.

Al-Sayyad says, "We are allowed to write in our newspapers that we want an independent Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. But when we write that the PLO is the legitimate and the sole representative of the Palestinian people, the censor deletes that part."

AL-FAJR has a circulation of about 8,000 copies, whereas AL-SHIHAB has a circulation of about 3,000 copies.

AL-SHIHAB tried to increase its circulation through press investigations. Most of these investigations, however, were deleted by the censor. Publication in AL-SHIHAB of a detailed report about the settlements on the West Bank during Begin's adminstration was prohibited on 3 January. In addition to interviews with official Israeli figures the report included Israeli government documents.

The readers of AL-SHIHAB and AL-FAJR are patriotic, Palestinian students and intellectuals. Students at the University of Bir Zayt on the West Bank have a special regard for journalists.

AL-QUDS Is Husayn's Newspaper

A chemistry student at the university said, "Those two newspapers are the only ones that voice the Palestinian question." His colleagues supported his statement.

Bassam al-Shak'ah supports the students' opinion. He says, "AL-SHIHAB and AL-FAJR speak for the Palestinian people. AL-QUDS, however, speaks for the Israelis."

Recently, the Palestinian National Consultative Assembly which is made up of West Bank mayors, prominent figures and academicians, issued a directive to Arab businessman to stop publishing their advertisements in AL-QUDS.

Circulation of AL-QUDS amounts to approximately 15,000 [copies]. It was established in 1966, and it was closed after the Six-Days war. It reappeared again in 1968. For 4 years it was the only Arabic newspaper in East Jerusalem.

According to Palestinian political understanding AL-QUDS is considered "the most moderate newspaper." It is read by workers, merchants and the former ruling class. This is due to the fact that it focuses its attention on publishing social news that is especially important in a traditional society. Although AL-QUDS opposed the Camp David accords at the outset, it began endorsing them with caution a few months ago. It is the only Arab newspaper that King Husayn prefers.

AL-QUDS is characterized by the excellent relations it has with the Israeli military administration. It is the only Arab newspaper which Arab prisoners are allowed to read. It is the only newspaper that prints Israeli advertisements. Teddy Kolech, mayor of Jerusalem, launched his elections campaign on its pages.

AL-QUDS did not come up to me with any examples of materials that had been consored. Bassam al-Shak'ah, the editors-in-chief of AL-FAJR and AL-SHIHAB as well as some Israeli leftists explain this situation by saying that AL-QUDS does not have much to show in that regard.

[22 Oct 80 p 13]

[Text] Begin's Government Is Preparing AL-QUDS To Speak for Autonomy; Israel Fears Two Words: Returning and Defiance; Some Love Poetry and News about Settlements Prohibited.

In the first part of this report, which AL-SAFIR published yesterday, the writer described the position of the Israeli censor with regard to the two new Arabic newspapers, AL-FAJR and AL-SHIHAB in East Jerusalem. He concluded that the censorship to which these two newspapers were being subjected was political and not military censorship as Israel alleges. The writer began comparing the conditions of the three Arabic newspapers and the magnitude of the hardships they endured because of the censorship. [He showed] how AL-QUDS had no problems with the Israeli military administration. Here, the writer explains the reasons for this special situation.

Those who are criticizing AL-QUDS are saying that Begin's government is preparing it for a post-autonomy role. It is thus that the newspaper has more freedom in the hope that it would maintain its credibility with the Arab masses while it supports, in ambiguous terms, the Israeli policy.

Mahmud Abu al-Zalaf, publisher of AL-QUDS denies that his newspaper is receiving better treatment than AL-FAJR and AL-SHIHAB. In fact, he affirms that "The two other newspapers explain what we do. We can cover the West Bank in its entirety as long as we go after the facts." He gave me a copy of his newspaper. There was a three-column news article on the first page describing a demonstration that started from al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem to protest Israel's attempt to nationalize the East Jerusalem Power Company.

Quite the opposite from that, we find that AL-FAJR had mentioned this matter in three lines only.

Abu al-Zalaf explained this situation by saying, "It was not a difficult situation [to report] from a journalistic standpoint. We reported the story in a truthful manner, and its publication was not prohibited. The staff at AL-FAJR are mere amateurs."

Abu al-Zalaf affirmed that publication of that subject was prohibited in AL-FAJR because it was receiving financial support from the PLO and it was also receiving U.S.-Jewish funds."

Abu al-Zalaf has a theory according to which American communists [and] Jews coordinate their activities with the PLO for the purpose of foiling the peace process.

However, Ma'mun al-Sayyad, editor-in-chief of AL-FAJR said, "This is not true. We are an independent newspaper. Furthermore, any person can go to the mosque, get and story and conduct interviews. This is exactly what we did, but the censor censored our article and did not censor the article in AL-QUDS."

Although AL-QUDS is not having censorship problems, some Israelis are having problems with it.

One finds that [one such Israeli], for example is (Amnun Kapiliyuk). He works for the daily Hebrew newspaper, ('AL HAMISHMAR) and is the correspondent for LE MONDE in Jerusalem. He believes that Israeli censorship of Arab newspapers is set off by political motives. Evidence for this lies in the fact that AL-QUDS has been unscathed by the censor's scissors.

(Kapiliyuk) wrote two articles last December in ('AL HAMISHMAR) about censorship of the Arab press. He stated that AL-QUDS was opposed to the PLO and was supportive of Jordan. AL-SHIHAB and AL-FAJR, however, were being subjected to political castration because of their position on the PLO.

Abu al-Zalaf threatened to sue (Kapiliyuk), but he has recently withdrawn his suit.

Forbidden Words

(Kapiliyuk) says, "When I began looking into this matter, I was truly surprised when I saw the materials whose publication had been prohibited." He discovered that there were specific words whose publication was prohibited. The word "return" for example, which means the return of the Palestinian refugees to their "homeland" terrifies many Israelis. General (Y. Harkabi), former chief of Israeli intelligence and current professor in the Political Science Department at Hebrew University, writes in his lengthy study, "The Arabs' Position on Israel," that the Arabic word for "returning" is synonymous with the destruction of the Israeli state and the mass extermination of the Jews.

(Kapiliyuk) does not believe that this word threatens the existence of Israel. He believes that this word makes Israel feel guilty.

There is another Arabic word: defiance. This word is used to mean standing firmly against the Israeli occupation and against the proposed autonomy project.

(Kapiliyuk) also discovered numerous other words that were deleted by order of the censor in poetry texts and in prose selections. He restates what Moshe Dayan had said about one poet being equal [in effect] to 10,000 guerillas, and he affirms, "This is true. The Arabic language is a rich language and is full of figurative expressions. I found simple lines of verse that did not refer to the national question, but the poetry was prohibited. Perhaps our censors hate love! More likely the censor could not understand the poems and therefore prohibited them."

(Kapiliyuk's) discoveries provide examples of the Israeli censorship's highhandedness. The editor-in-chief of AL-FAJR, Ma'mun al-Sayyad affirms that there is method to this madness. He says that the Israelis practice five kinds of censorship.

Local news is subject to the most severe methods of censorship. Materials that are prohibited include Palestinian reactions to the autonomy project in addition to news pertaining to new Jewish settlements on occupied Arab land. [News about] the occupation of Arab land and legal Palestinian measures to stop this expansion is also prohibited.

Ma'mun al-Sayyad says, "We are not allowed to breathe a word about the (Allon Moren) settlement." This is the settlement that was established on the West Bank and aroused considerable controversy when the Israeli Supreme Court declared it illegal last October.

PLO statements come in second among the censor's interdictions: [these include] news about guerilla raids, news about the arrest of people who are under political suspicion, and the blowing up of the homes of guerillas.

Afterwards comes the news about the violent Palestinian resistance to the autonomy project or to Israeli rule. News about the closing of schools, the violent demonstrations, the deportation of Palestinian intellectuals and political leaders is all prohibited.

Ma'man al-Sayyad says that he has established for himself a general idea of the press materials that he will be able to publish about the Arab world. Although it is certain that the censor would prevent him from publishing Arab criticism of the Israeli government, AL-FAJR can print almost everything pertaining to the West. He added, "They do not care what we say about Carter as long as he is not here. However, our criticism of al-Sadat is severely censored."

Why should we allow them to have an Arab press?

There is increasing debate in military circles about the subject of censoring the Arabic press. We have this, of course, from higher reliable sources. Some argue that as long as the press material does not clearly affect security, it is political material. They call attention to the fact that the Palestinians on the occupied Arab lands cannot be isolated from the outside world. West Bank residents can receive television programs from Amman, and they can also listen to radio broadcasts from the entire Arab world. As long as Arabs make up part of the population, nonmilitary censorship is meaningless. In fact it would arouse the resentment of the Arabs. They say, "Resentment leads to violence."

(Kapiliyuk) affirms that the Arabs in the occupied territories "do not lack information." He emphasizes the theory that forbidden news travels faster than news printed in newspapers despite the fact that such news may be sometimes tainted by a lack of credibility. "They are rejecting censorship. On the other hand, we find that the Israelis are making an effort to prove that they are the most liberal occupation force in history. They are constantly shattering this image, however, by continuously censoring sharp criticism against the autonomy project and by their attempts to destroy the national consciousness of the Palestinians."

(Kapiliyuk) once asked the late Palestinian historian 'Arif al-'Arif about what he thought was the most positive phenomenon of the Israeli military rule on the occupied lands. 'Arif al-'Arif replied that the Israelis had somewhat boosted freedom of speech, whereas this freedom had been suppressed under the rule of King Husayn. He added that he thought that the former labor government had realized that allowing people to express their anger in a relatively free press may prevent them from throwing bombs.

The hurling of bombs as well as other aspects of political unrest are increasing as a result of the fact that opposition to the autonomy talks is becoming widespread.

At the same time censorship of the Arabic press has increased ever since Begin came to power.

The resentment of some Israeli military men to the escalation of Palestinian resistance to Israeli rule has been increasing. They feel that the Arabic press has been inciting the masses to violence.

After six Jewish settlers were killed by residents in Hebron last May, the military government suspended circulation of both AL-FAJR and AL-SHIHAB on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip for 10 days. The military government was compelled to revoke its decision when the two newspapers filed a complaint in the Supreme Court.

On 2 August, and specifically 3 months after the attempt to assassinate the 3 mayors, the offices of AL-FAJR were bombed. AL-FAJR and AL-SHIHAB received threatening letters in Hebrew from an unknown terrorist group, the Youth of Israel, asking them both to shut down. A few days after the bombing, the military government placed the editors-in-chief of AL-FAJR and AL-SHIHAB under forced house arrest "to preserve the peace, public order and the safety of the area." Since both of them live in Ramallah, that meant keeping them away from their work.

Lt (Ami Jioleska) fully supported the measures of his government. The lieutenant, who is the Israeli military spokesman, declared that "after the massacre of al-Sahil in March 1978, the Arab press cheered. I sometimes wonder, why should the Arabs have their own press?"

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MILITARY STRATEGY ANALYZED, U.S. NAVY BASE TO BE ESTABLISHED

Nicosia AL-'ASR in Arabic 5 Oct 80 p 2

[Article: "Report about Israeli Military Strategy: Port of Haifa To Be Turned into Permanent U.S. Navy Base; Navy Forces To Be Organized into Terrorist Units"]

[Text] Prime Minister of Israel Menahem Begin has turned the port of Haifa into a permanent base for the U.S. Sixth Fleet. He has also reorganized the Israeli navy so it can carry out terrorist missions. The navy will carry out its operations inside Lebanon with the cooperation of Israeli airplanes and infantry divisions.

After Begin took over the Israeli Ministry of Defense, becoming the acting minister of defense following the resignation of Ezer Weizman, the prime minister of Israel set out to reconsider [Israel's] defense policy so as to make it consistent with his views and congruent with his aspirations as well as with the aggressive steps he expected to make. After the Camp David Accords were signed and Egypt was isolated from the battlefield, Begin's government had to set [illegible] a new strategy that would realize its expansionist and aggressive ambitions.

The most prominent feature of this strategy is the fact that Israel is turning into a U.S. military base with the expansion of the port of Haifa. This expansion would turn the port into a permanent location for the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea.

AL-'ASR has obtained a copy of a secret report that includes details about the military strategy of the navy, the role it is supposed to play and the tasks with which it is charged in the area, and especially on the Lebanese coast. In addition, the report includes details about the missions the navy is to undertake in the Red Sea and around the oil wells. The most important points made in the report along with the names of section and unit leaders follow:

"Among the tasks with which the Israeli navy is charged are [the following]:

1. Exterminating the attacking forces and paralyzing their means of communications.

2. Carrying out landing and sabotage operations.

3. Backing up the land forces.

4. Setting up blockades.

5. Carrying out reconnaissance operations.

6. Defending the Israeli means of communications.

7. Defending Israeli shores against landing activities.

"The naval forces have staff for operations, reconnaissance, cadres, finances and tactics.

"The naval forces are also divided into two sections: the first section is in the Mediterranean Sea, and the second section is in the Red Sea.

"The Egyptain-Israeli treaty allows Israel to sail its ships in the Suez Canal where the traffic of the Israeli fleet increases.

"The number of individuals in the Israeli navy is 5,000 persons; the navy has the same number of reserves. Whereas enlistment in the navy is based on the Draft Law which is enforced in a voluntary and a compulsory manner, commando units, diving units and submarine crews are formed by volunteers only. Most of the navy officers are Jews who were born in Palestine or who emigrated from Europe to Israel. They are graduates of the Naval Military Academy in 'Akka and the Political Institute in Haifa. During the course of their study, they acquire experience with offensive operations derived from the U.S. experience in Vietnam.

"The following subjects are part of their training programs:

"Landing, reconnaissance, sabotage, anti-submarine activity and attacks from missile boats on coastal targets.

"During the attacks on Lebanon much attention was given to the cooperation between the forces of the navy, the airplanes and the Israeli infantry.

"In 1979 the number of vessels in the Israeli fleet amounted to 180. [The following were among them:

"Three submarines, 21 missile-carrying vessels, 35 coast guard vessels, 21 landing vessels, 3 Gaul submarines. In addition, there were weapons, British electronic devices, helicopters, missile boats and other pieces.

"The Israeli navy has an infantry division that has 1,000 persons divided into two groups: one group guards the coast, and the second [carries out] reconnaissance and sabotage [activities].

"The reconnaissance and sabotage group is made up of groups of commandos and divers who carry out various terrorist actions against Lebanon. Sometimes, they coordinate these terrorist actions with the air force commandos.

"Small groups are organized for carrying out the sabotage operations; they are transported to the target by helicopters or by boats.

"The principal bases of the Israeli navy are located in Haifa and Ashdud on the Mediterranean Sea and in Ilat in the Gulf of 'Aqaba. The plants where the principal ships are built are also located in Haifa."

The report concludes by saying that the U.S. Sixth Fleet was using these bases and that the United States of America was making plans to turn the port of Haifa into a permanent base for the U.S. air force.

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PRESS REVIEWS ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR, ATTACK ON BORDER STATION

LD181150 Kuwait KUNA in English 0950 GMT 18 Nov 80

[Press review]

[Text] Kuwait, 18 Nov (KUNA)--Extracts from Kuwaiti editorials Tuesday:

'AR-RA'Y AL-'AMM on Monday's Kuwaiti protest against Iran: "We do not know exactly what was the response of the Iranian ambassador here when he was summoned by the Foreign Ministry to receive a Kuwaiti protest against Iran's sending its military aircraft twice within a few days to attack al-Abdal region.

"The only justification, we believe, is that Iran is aiming at dragging the whole region into the Iraqi-Iranian conflict. Amidst its political and military instability, Tehran seems not to be able to find an outlet better than trying to kindle the fires of war in the region with its naive belief that the Gulf countries will put pressure (?on Iraq) to freeze its war with Iran.

"Aggression against Kuwait is not that easy. Therefore, Tehran has to find another means to cover up its failure on the Arabistan front. It must resort to the style of logic in dealing with its neighbors instead of trying to imitate the imperial method of acting as the policeman of the region under the cover of Islam. Iran will suffer from more international isolation. Iran knows well that it is not a source of terror to the Arabs who had asked right from the beginning for peaceful neighborhood under the banner of Islam. But, unfortunately, Tehran chose war and hegemony and faced failure in Arabistan."

KUWAIT TIMES on the same subject: "It is significant to note that there has been no word about Tehran's response to Kuwait's formal protest against the rocketting of Abdali area by Iranian Phantoms last Wednesday. Replying promptly to a formal diplomatic note, specially when it concerns such an an emergent [as received] matter as the violation of territorial sovereignty, is considered an international obligation. But Iran has, instead of replying to the protest note, repeated the violation of Kuwaiti air space and unleashed another rocket attack. This exposes the premediated plans of Tehran leaders, arising mainly from preconceived notions which admit no rational approach.

"Kuwait has (?already) lodged its second protest following yesterday's attack which caused some damage also. Whether Tehran leaders will care to reply to it, remains to be seen. However, irrespective of it, the prompt reaction of Saudi Arabia and other brotherly countries, reassuring Kuwait of firm support in case of emergency, is heartening.

"While as a peace-loving country, Kuwait would very much like to see an end to the Iran-Iraq war and settlement of their disputes through negotiations, it would certainly stand firm (?whenever) it comes to any infringement of its own sovereignty."

AL-ANBA' on Iranian Iraqi war and the attack on Kuwait: "When the war between Iran and Iraq erupted some Arab capitals were paralysed. They did not know what to say.

"Arab wars, whether long or short, always result in a loss and at best in retraction and deterioration, but the Iraqi war is a long one with signs of victory.

"As such, an assessment of stances and unveiling of allegations related to saving money, blood and Arab solidarity is necessary, because those allegations and stances are a cover for one reality and that is the support of those adopting them being given to Iran against Iraq.

"The support given to Iran is the reason for this wild struggle among some Arabs. The astonishing thing is this silence adopted by some regarding the repeated Iranian aerial attacks on Kuwaiti airspace and territory. All we wish is not to find ourselves, accordingly, forced to limit our Arab relationships and designing formulating [as received] them according to what we see and know of those who were silent as regards the threat posed to us."

ARAB TIMES on the same subject:

"The Iran-Iraq war may continue for some time longer especially as there is no power in Iran capable of deciding matters of war or peace. War has become part of the daily life of Lebanon, and war is likely to become part of the daily life of Iran and Iraq also.

"This situation may persist until there emerges in Iran somebody who can decide its destiny properly.

"Iran thought a land link between Kuwait and Iraq was the cause of Iraq's strength, though other overland international lines with Baghdad never suffered any cut. That is because in this case the world is dealing with a well-established state and a firm political administration of a state that understands what it really needs.

"So Iran, despite its domestic chaos, realised that there are certain balances and limits that should never be trespassed even when in a state of despair or suicide.

"Kuwait is a country of important international relations. The world has accurately weighed Kuwait due to its strategic situation among the international group of nations, whether at the level of oil production or within the norms of the international market."

CSO: 4820

TRADE AGREEMENT SIGNED WITH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 10 Oct 80 p 15

[Article: "Trade Agreement Between China and Kuwait Signed; Chinese Minister of Trade Talks About Laws To Protect Foreign Investments"]

[Text] A trade agreement between Kuwait and the People's Republic of China was signed yesterday morning in the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The agreement stipulated increasing and strengthening trade exchange between the two countries and providing the necessary terms for the goods that are exchanged between both parties based on the laws and regulations that are in effect in both countries.

The agreement was signed for Kuwait by Minister of Trade and Industry Mr 'Abd-al-Wahab Yusuf al-Nafisi. Minister of Foreign Trade Mr Li Qiang signed for China. Mr Qiang is currently visiting the country at the head of an official delegation.

After the agreement was signed the Chinese minister stated that his country welcomed Kuwaiti investments and Kuwaiti investors to cooperate in the establishment of joint projects in various areas. He said that the authorities in his country had enacted numerous laws pertaining to foreign investments. Some of these laws have already been issued, whereas others are still under consideration.

The minister said that the purpose of issuing these laws was to encourage foreign investors, to provide them with the necessary protection and to preserve their interests. The Chinese minister added that his country was striving to strengthen trade and economic relations with the countries of the Gulf in general and with Kuwait in particular.

Our Activities in the Gulf

The Chinese minister said that China was currently preparing itself for setting up commercial agencies and centers in the Gulf states. He indicated that his country was currently pursuing well-known and clear methods to attract capital [to China]. He said that China honored recognized international laws and regulations.

He responded to a question about whether his visit had produced an agreement over specific projects by saying, "We are not talking about details now, but we are rather laying the groundwork for the future of our cooperation. Details will be left to the specialists." He said that the agreement stipulates the formation of a joint committee between the two countries.

About those areas in which China can offer cooperation he said, "We would like to cooperate in various fields such as construction, hotels, oil and mineral exploration and sea and air transport."

The signing of the agreement was attended by the undersecretary of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Mr 'Abdallah al-Hamad; the assistant deputy for trade affairs, Mr Badr 'Abd-al-Rahim. Members of the delegation accompanying the visiting minister attended the signing [ceremony] for the Chinese side.

China Is One of Kuwait's Clients

A responsible official in the Ministry of Trade and Industry stated that the signing of this agreement was necessary because China was one of Kuwait's most important clients of the materials urea and ammonia. In addition, trade relations between the two countries had advanced steadily during the past few years. Most foods are now imported from China; stationery and school supplies for school students are also imported from China.

The source stated that China had enacted a number of laws to encourage investments. The most important of them was the income tax law, a law to ensure the transfer of profits and a law to protect foreign capital from nationalization. Such laws would encourage investors to strengthen trade and economic ties with China.

He said that [investors] have confidence in China because China adheres completely to the agreements that are made with it.

The responsible official indicated that the Chinese minister of foreign trade had extended an official invitation to the minister of trade and industry and to a number of specialists to visit China and to explore the areas of cooperation from which both parties can benefit.

The joint committee between the two countries will hold its first meeting in the Chinese capital Beijing next spring.

On the other hand Minister of Oil al-Shaykh 'Ali al-Khalifah al-Sabah received in his office yesterday the Chinese minister of foreign trade, Li Qiang.

Al-Shaykh Khalifah informed the Kuwaiti News Agency that he reviewed with the Chinese minister the oil relations between the two countries and the methods of strengthening those relations.

The minister commended the good and friendly relations that tie the two friendly countries.

Upon his arrival to Kuwait last Saturday the Chinese minister had stated that he would talk with Kuwaiti officials about supplying his country with one million tons of oil.

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NATURALIZATION LAWS TO BE LIBERALIZED

Nicosia AL-'ASR in Arabic 26 Sep 80 p 8

[Article: "To Strengthen Domestic "Open-door" [infitah] Policy Kuwait Liberalizes Naturalization Measures 5 Years after Keeping Tight Hold on Them"]

[Text] A brief news report leaked by the Kuwaiti Ministry of Justice has created an uproar everywhere that continues to rage even as these lines are being written. The news states that the Kuwaiti government intends to reopen naturalization proceedings 5 years after such proceedings were tightly closed.

The crown prince of Kuwait al-Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah held a meeting for this purpose which lasted about 4 hours. The crown prince met with the members of the Legislative and Legal Committee and the Supreme Naturalization Committee.

One of those who participated in this meeting was al-Shaykh Salman al-Da'ij. He announced after the meeting ended that "a discussion of the Naturalization Bill had taken place since the joint ministerial committee had completed the final reading of the bill in preparation for presenting it to the Council of Ministers as soon as possible."

To indicate that "as soon as possible" did not signify tabling the bill, al-Shaykh Salman emphasized that "changes had been introduced into the bill." However, he apologized for not giving any additional details about these changes at the present time.

Despite official assertions that the government was dealing with the subject of naturalization with "intensive care" and that, accordingly, it would not rush into doling out citizenships in a haphazard fashion," there was considerable turmoil in some Kuwaiti agencies which viewed this liberalization and, accordingly, the naturalization of several thousand persons as "disruptive of the social balance and the population makeup of Kuwait." These agencies went even further by stating that "naturalization threatens Kuwait's domestic security and exposes it to the winds of problems and resentments."

AL-QABAS, a Kuwaiti newspaper published an article by a female Kuwaiti writer named Iqbal al-Gharaballi. The title of the article was, "Oh, Citizenship of my Country." The article stated, "I am not at all ignorant of the shudder I would feel whenever I imagined that if only scores of those several thousands who meet the necessary

requirements for acquiring the citizenship of my country were to become citizens, Kuwaitis would be harmed."

Official sources, however, have affirmed that the reactions aroused in some conservative Kuwaiti circles by the decision to liberalize naturalization measures will not dissuade the government from going ahead and carrying out its decision which comes in the age of the domestic "open-door" [infatah] policy. The government decided to adopt this policy so it can assimilate some of the changes and upheavals that were created by the tense and perturbing conditions that loom over the Arabian Gulf area.

These sources added that the Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs Mr 'Abd-al-'Aziz Husayn did not respond to a question that was put before him at a private meeting about whether the government would approve the naturalization of all those who are eligible for Kuwaiti citizenship. The Naturalization and Passports Administration does not have specific statistics about their numbers which are now estimated to be over 10,000 persons, most of them nomads.

But the same sources indicated that the prevailing trend in concerned official circles favors granting citizenship to those who had made formal, registered applications for citizenship during certain years (between 1976 and 1978 for example). Decisions on applications submitted in other years or decisions on applications that will be resubmitted subsequently are to be postponed.

This will not be the only problem facing the implementation of the aforementioned decision. In fact there is another problem created by the nomads who are still living in the desert in old Arabian houses which the Kuwaitis call al-'Ashish. Those people have no nationality. Consequently, they live without receiving any handouts from the government. They rather depend on the sources of livelihood that are well-known in the desert--raising cattle for example. They cannot travel [abroad] because they cannot obtain passports.

The subject of citizenship has now been raised again in the United Arab Emirates. An announcement was made there that the Naturalization and Passports Law would be amended for the purpose of "ensuring justice and equality for everybody in the seven emirates; well-known principles and rules regarding the state's right to grant citizenship would be followed."

The purpose of these changes is "to restrain the power local authorities in the emirates have in issuing passports and giving citizenship to people who may or may not deserve them, especially after it became evident that a number of branch committees throughout the state had committed numerous violations and excesses in applying the law. This has resulted in many people becoming citizens without sufficient proof."

These changes will include granting first class citizenship to those who have been residing in the country since 1925 or before, provided that they are of Arab origin. Anyone who has been living in the country legally and continuously since 1940, 1941 and 1942 is to be granted second class citizenship.

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BRIEFS

BRAZIL LOAN--Banking sources in London stated yesterday that the Kuwaiti National Bank was the only Arab bank that had contributed to a 156 million dollar loan to the Telecommunications Agency in Brazil. No other details were immediately available about the terms of the loan that was made to the (Telepress) Agency. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 4 Oct 80 p 17] 8592

CSO: 4802

PROBLEMS OF SMUGGLING ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED

Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 25 Sep to 5 Oct 80 p 67

[Article by Mishal Marqas: "Smuggling Threatens Even the Treasury; Smuggling Wreaks Havoc in Lebanon, Sparing Neither the State Treasury nor Industrial Sectors"]

[Text] The general directorate for customs in Lebanon is complaining about smuggling, not through illegal ports this time, but through legal ports and customs posts. This agency has come to acknowledge that this is leading to the treasury's bankruptcy. The Lebanese state was relying on customs duties to cover about 80 percent of its employees' salaries. However, recently, it has begun to lower its expectations, in view of an increase in employees' wages. Complaints about smuggling are not restricted to the responsible agency in government, but extend to the production sector in Lebanon, especially the industrial sector. Manufacturers' complaints are coupled with a warning about shutting down, if the situation continues as it is.

The Complaints can be set forth as follows:
The first is at the level of the general directorate for customs. The director general for customs, Dr Shuqi Sha'ban, described the situation as "a disaster. The shortfall in the treasury's revenue from customs duties will lead to its bankruptcy." Sha'ban does not hide his uneasiness over the customs administration's lack of discipline. "Were it not for an hororable few who loyally serve the public interest, everything would have collapsed."

How is smuggling through legal ports or customs posts done? This is not a new matter, although its scope has expanded recently. In the past, any citizen or non-citizen was always able to bring in goods subject to customs duties without paying the duty, by means of friends working in the customs administration, or customs officials themselves, who would disregard claiming such duties, in view of the goods being limited and for personal use. At times, such goods as these were passed with the payment of "a favor."

Before the "incidents," smuggling expanded through these ports of entry, especially Beirut airport, since quantities of readymade clothes, perfume and other items began to flood the Lebanese market.

After the incidents, the phenomenon spread, based on the principle: "Why smuggle through the port of Beirut and not the airport?" Or the reverse, "Why smuggle through Beirut airport and not the port?" The scope of selling goods for amounts

which officials from customs dictated has spread. Each party claims in front of his bosses that "it is impossible to stop smuggling and bringing in goods here, unless smuggling is stopped by the other party." With respect to this, Dr Sha'ban says: "The two are in agreement. If one of the two parties has goods at the other's place, he asks him to arrange things, and that is done for him."

Second, (and this "boggles the mind," as one merchandise official put it), smuggling is accomplished by means of trickery. A merchant persuades a ship captain that the imported goods are intended for re-export, and the captain gives him a manifest to that effect. On the basis of the manifest, the goods are exempt from customs duties. Then they are shipped from the port to a nearby coastal area and smuggled in.

The third aspect is the return of illegal ports to operation. The reasons announced were that some merchants were committed to importing their goods through them, when the decision to close them down was made last July, and that those merchants had opened letters of credit with the banks. In addition to that, the closure of these ports led to a rise in the prices of certain commodities, including foodstuffs, which caused those supervising them to reopen these ports. However, activity in these ports is not what it was before the decision to close them was made.

Three Results

What are the results of this smuggling on the national economy?

Undoubtedly, smuggling has a negative effect on the state's economy and on the production sectors. This can be shown as follows:

1. The state budget:

If it were not for the customs duties paid through the port of Beirut, there would be no duties worth mentioning. During the first 8 months of this year, the state received 313.5 million Lebanese pounds, compared to 175 million last year. The increase amounted to 79 percent. Customs duties paid through the port represent 65 percent of the total customs duties paid.

As for the other ports of entry, the airport, Juniyah, Tripoli, al-Masna' and Sidon, customs duties paid through them registered a decline of 33.4 percent, or 166.8 million Lebanese pounds, compared to 250.5 million paid last year for the same period.

The decline in receipts was most severe at the port of Juniyah, amounting to 86 percent, followed by Tripoli and the northern region, 58 percent; Sidon, 50 percent; al-Masna', 2.4 percent; and the airport, 1.2 percent

If the port of Beirut, in resuming its natural role, has raised customs receipts, while they have declined at the port of Juniyah, in view of its being a wartime port used as a result of Beirut's closure, then the other ports of entry, especially the airport, should have had increased customs revenue. The disparity in customs duties paid demonstrates to some degree the amount of smuggling within them, considering the fact that the illegal ports were active in 1979, and their effect on receipts for this year should not be of any consequence.

The fact remains that the amount expected was 480.5 million Lebanese pounds, i.e., a shortfall of 52.8 million. The director general for customs, Dr Shuqi Sha'ban, estimates that this shortfall will increase.

2. Production sectors:

The sectors most damaged [by smuggling] are some of the industrial sectors, most importantly household furniture and furnishings, textiles, tanning and leather goods, especially shoes. These sectors cannot compete with goods imported from stocks in industrial countries, which people want to buy in view of their lower prices. These industries, mostly located in the eastern zone of Beirut, where ordinary labor is not plentiful, threaten to close down within 2 years at most. Some are considering dismissing their labor force and converting to merchandizing. Some of these factories' production has fallen to about 20 percent of capacity, because of their inability to compete with smuggled goods. Consequently, they cannot resort to using smuggled raw materials either, because no company or institution with any self-respect could inform its customers that its prices have been lowered, because it is relying on smuggled raw material.

3. Consumers:

Smuggling remains the means which, relatively speaking, spares the consumer, but the possibilities of getting rich quick have not left much room between the prices of smuggled and non-smuggled goods. Everyone in Lebanon agrees on one thing, the attainment of profits, even at the expense of Lebanese production, the Lebanese consumer, and the Lebanese state.

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DEVELOPMENT IN THE PDRY; A HISTORICAL REVIEW

East Berlin HORIZONT in German Vol 13, 5 Nov 80 pp 14-15

/Report by Ingo Herfurth/

/Text/ From 12-14 October last 437 delegates assembled in the College for Scientific Socialism in Aden, capital of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, for an extraordinary congress of the Yemen Socialist Party. They analyzed the revolutionary progress in the PDRY since the founding congress 2 years ago and discussed further steps for advancing the successful construction of a new society. Rapturous applause and cheers for the party leadership erupted when, on the final day, delegates were notified of the reelection as general secretary of the YSP Central Committee of 'Ali Nasir Muhammad who is both chairman, presidium, Supreme People's Council, and chairman, Council of Ministers.

Thus renewed confidence was expressed in a politician who, for many years and frequently in difficult conditions, labored in responsible party and state jobs, and who is renowned far beyond the Arab region as an outstanding statesman and bold patriot.

Leading Functions in the National Liberation Struggle

'Ali Nasir Muhammad was born on 31 December 1939 to a family of peasants in Abiyan district. After graduating from secondary school he studied at the Aden teacher training college. From 1959 he was employed as teacher and later principal of an elementary school. At that time he joined the "Movement of Arab Nationalists." In 1963 the National Liberation Front (NLF--later UNFPO) was established as the united movement of various political groups and orientations, who together pursued anticolonialist goals. 'Ali Nasi Muhammad was one of the founders. He acquired great merit in the course of the achievement of the front's united leadership--the general command. In the same year, on 14 October (now celebrated as the PDRY's national day), began the organized armed struggle of liberation against the nearly 130 year old yoke of the British colonial power and the native feudal lords allied with it. 'Ali Nasir Muhammad was one of the leaders in the armed struggle for his native region.

When national independence was achieved and the People's Republic of South Yemen established on 30 November 1967, he was appointed governor of the second district (Tuban). At the time the leaders of the young people's republic (admitted in December 1967 to the United Nations Organization as its 123rd member) was composed

almost exclusively of NLF members. It was confronted with the task task of strengthening national independence, repulsing violent attacks by internal and external counterrevolutionaries, and guiding the country toward the path of social progress.

On 20 March 1968 rightist forces carried out a coup to prevent the steps decided upon at the Fourth NLF Congress. 'Ali Nasir Muhammad resigned his job. By a corrective move on 22 June 1969 the left forces within the NLF succeeded in subduing the counterrevolution and creating important prerequisites for the subsequent transition to the path of socialist development. During that stage 'Ali Nasir Muhammad held the job of Minister for Local Administration and, a few months later, assumed the office of Defense Minister, which he kept until October 1977. All this time he was a prime initiator of fundamental measures for the revolutionary transformation of the country.

Consistently for the Establishment of an Advance Guard Party

The democratic constitution in effect as of 30 November 1970 gave the republic the name it now carries--People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). The new regime in the PDRY was mainly engaged in holding its own against the still strong counterrevolution and strengthening its grip on power in the country. Every advance on the new path was wrung from internal and external enemies in an unrelenting class war. At the same time, though, this speeded up the NLF's internal maturation and had the effect that its most advanced representatives approached the attitudes of scientific socialism and championed the further expansion of relations with the USSR, the GDR and the other countries of the socialist community.

In 1970, as a logical consequence of this development, the NLF changed its name to "National Front Political Organization." 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's active role at this stage--of the utmost importance for the advance of the PDRY--is demonstrated in the fact that he was elected to the executive committee (Politburo) of the NFPO Central Committee and, a year later, appointed prime minister. Subsequently he also (temporarily) assumed the responsibility for the departments for education and finance.

In March 1972 the Fifth NFPO Congress met in Aden. It mapped the future actions and goals of the revolution and adopted the NFPO program and charter. The program stated that a national democratic revolution is proceeding in the PDRY, in the course of which the conditions for transition to socialist construction are being created. The program continues that the NFPO is working to set up an advance guard party equipped with the theory of scientific socialism and designed to be the leading force in the implementation of the tasks of the national democratic revolution.

En route to such an advance guard party the so-called unification congress met in October 1975. The NFPO, the People's Democratic Union (PDU) and the Advance Guard People's Party united in the United Front of Political Organizations (UNFPO). 'Ali Nasir Muhammad was confirmed in his high party and government functions and continued to be among those forces who consistently labored for the establishment of an advance guard party. In June 1978 President Salim Rubaya 'Ali and his petty bourgeois-nationalist followers attempted a coup directed mainly against the establishment of such a party; 'Ali Nasir Muhammad thereupon--temporarily--assumed the office of head of state also.

Founded on 11 October 1978 was the Yemen Socialist Party--an advance guard party with a program and charter based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism. At the founding congress 'Ali Nasir Muhammad was elected to the party Politburo and, in December 1978, deputy chairman, presidium, Supreme People's Council. He was also confirmed in his office as prime minister.

The establishment of the YSP lifted the development of the PDRY to a qualitatively higher level. The delegates to the extraordinary party congress were able proudly to indicate the successes achieved by the party and the country's working people in the past 4 years. General Secretary 'Ali Nasir Muhammad delivered the Central Committee's political report to the party congress. He noted: "Life has confirmed the correctness of the YSP line, backed by the ideology of the working class."

In fact the speeches at the Plenum again emphasized that the revolutionary democratic forces had, in the teeth of difficult internal and external conditions, succeeded in achieving remarkable progress in the development of the country. At the same time the two major documents of the party congress, the political report and the new directives for the Second Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) clearly showed that the YSP itself gained a good deal of strength and maturity since its foundation, and that it is increasingly well equipped to cope with the key issues of development.

Appointment as Supreme Representative of the Party and Government Leadership

When, at the Eighth Central Committee Plenum in April last 'Abd al-Fatah Isma'il asked to be relieved of his office as YSP Central Committee general secretary and chairman, presidium, Supreme People's Council, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad was unanimously elected to succeed him. Shortly after accepting these supreme offices 'Ali Nasir Muhammad said at a celebration: "When I assumed the high office of party general secretary and chairman of the presidium, Supreme People's Council, I was quite aware that this imposes an enormous responsibility and, at the same time, a supreme duty to the party. My success in these party and government offices will be the success of the party and the revolution, the success of the Yemeni working class and the noble goals for which our Yemeni people are fighting. The basis of our party's victory is its political, ideological and organizational unity. I am sure that the leading role of our party will grow stronger and our people continue to rally around the revolutionary advance guard, the Yemen Socialist Party."

At the latest party congress this prediction was confirmed. It reaffirmed that the continuing consolidation of the party's leading role in state and society, the more efficient utilization and planned expansion of the country's economic potential and the improvement in the people's living conditions represent decisive prerequisites for the successful pursuit of the Yemeni revolution.

In the course of his comments on international and foreign political issues 'Ali Nasir Muhammad emphasized the main feature of the current international situation: The expansion and deepening of the influence exerted by the socialist world system, its decisive effects on the advance of the revolutionary world process. The expansion of cooperation with the socialist community of nations--headed by the Soviet Union--was stressed as the guarantor of further internal and external PDRY success.

For Firm Friendship With the Socialist Countries

Leading official delegations of his country 'Ali Nasir Muhammad visited the countries of the socialist community on several occasions and thereby made a personal contribution to the development of this firm alliance.

In May last, on the occasion of an official visit of friendship to the USSR, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad was distinguished by Leonid Brezhnev who bestowed on him the "Order of International Friendship." Since his visit to the GDR in Januarh 1978 'Ali Nasir Muhammad has also maintained close personal relations with the members of our country's party and government leadership.

The cordial meetings with Erich Honecker and Willi Stoph have given new impetus to the long-standing friendship, comradely cooperation and anti-imperialist solidarity between the two countries. That was reflected in the statement issued by 'Ali Nasir Muhammad before his departure from the GDR. He said: "We leave the GDR with sentiments of cordial friendship, the firm will to advance on the path of socialist construction for the welfare of the people and to further develop friendship and cooperation between our two parties, countries and peoples.

Relations between the GDR and the PDRY are varied and comprehensive. From the earliest days the German Democratic Republic has stood firmly and with full solidarity at the side of the people of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in their struggle for the consolidation of national independence and the construction of a new society. This close cooperation is based on the common views of our two countries and their leading parties with regard to all fundamental issues of international development.

Many symbols of successful bilateral cooperation bear witness that the relationship of the GDR and the PDRY demonstrates a truly novel type of international relations. The construction of industrial plants, the equipment of agricultural workshops, the work of a FDJ brigade in helping train Yemeni cadres, aid in the construction of an internal communications network, the successful labors of GDR advisers and specialists in farming, education, industry and health care as well as the training of PDRY cadres in our country have helped the GDR to an excellent reputation in the PDRY. Last year the high standard of general relations was underlined most emphatically on the occasion of the visit to the PDRY by a party and government delegation led by Erich Honecker. At that time a treaty on friendship and cooperation was signed, and so was an agreement on cooperation between the SED and the YSP as well as a program on economic and scientific-technological cooperation through 1985. This initiated another and more advanced stage in our bilateral relations.

Speaking to the delegates at the extraordinary party congress 'Ali Nasir Muhammad described as outstanding examples of the high standard of relations with the socialist countries the treaties of friendship and cooperation concluded in 1979 with the Soviet Union and the GDR, the exchange of high level delegations and last year's admission of the PDRY to CEMA as an observer.

PDRY--Important Peace Factor in the Region

'Ali Nasir Muhammad's comments on international problems emphasized the importance of the PDRY's relations with the countries of the region. He reaffirmed his

country's good will for purposefully expanding the existing extensive relations with socialist Ethiopia on the basis of the treaty of friendship signed in December last. It is quite in character for the principled line of the PDRY and its active role as member of the rejection front that, at the extraordinary party congress, its party and state government leaders once again--and emphatically--advocated even closer cooperation between the progressive Arab countries and forces.

The YSP general secretary once again underlined the PDRY's interest in normal and mutually beneficial relations with its neighbors on the basis of peaceful coexistence. In view of the growing attempts by imperialism, especially the United States, further to stoke tensions on the Arabian Peninsula, in the Gulf and at the Horn of Africa, the PDRY's policy once again shows itself an important factor in the defense of the peaceful lives of the region's peoples.

In the course of his concluding address, frequently interrupted by rapturous applause, he appraised the results of the 3-day conference as a new starting point and significant qualitative advance toward the realization of the YSP's aims and tasks. The devotion of the PDRY's revolutionary party to the struggle for social progress in its own country and the world, to peaceful coexistence, detente and the consolidation of cooperation with the liberation forces in all Continents was, he said, proof of the party's resolution to continue on the road to national democratic revolution.

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OPEC AND THE WAR BETWEEN IRAQ, IRAN

Beirut AL-SAFIR in Arabic 18 Oct 80 p 13

[Interview with Former Saudi Minister of Oil by Mustafa Karkuti: "'Abdallah al-Tariqi Tells AL-SAFIR That Iraqi-Iranian War Is Destructive, Tragic, Meaningless; OPEC Would Continue Even if Saudi Arabia Were To Leave It; Reducing Production, Not Increasing It Is in the Interests of Saudi Arabia"]

[Text 'Abdallah al-Tariqi, former Saudi minister of oil and one of the founders of the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries, OPEC, says that the Iranian-Iraqi war will create deep wounds in the OPEC organization. But he believes that there is no fear for OPEC even if the largest oil producing country, like Saudi Arabia, were to leave it. Saudi Arabia alone, no matter how much it raises its levels of production, cannot satisfy consumers. It has no choice but to stay in OPEC.

In an interview with AL-SAFIR, al-Tariqi also said that raising the levels of oil production in Saudi Arabia damaged some oil fields because water leaked underground as a result of continuous and increasing pumping. The decision to increase production "was a stupid decision."

Al-Tariqi believes that because of the war between Iraq and Iran the OPEC summit which was to have been held early in November in Baghdad will not take place before at least a year. The problem is not confined to the fact that Iran would not be participating in the summit, but it is rather because Baghdad itself was being subjected to bombardment and air raids.

He also mentioned that an oil boycott is now "unlikely" unless political changes ar made in the producing countries. Al-Tariqi is proposing a gradual plan for imposing the boycott. This plan is to begin by having the Arab countries that produce oil make a decision to reduce production of this raw material by 40 percent.

The text of the interview follows:

The Effect of the War on OPEC

[Question] Do you believe that OPEC will continue to be OPEC after the Iraqi-Iranian war comes to an end? That is, do you believe that the organization can remain untouched by the effects of a war between two of its principal members?

[Answer] Of course not. OPEC will undoubtedly be greatly affected despite what is known about the fact that it undergoes vital changes regularly. With regard to the effects of the Iraqi-Iranian war on the oil organization, the war will leave deep wounds in the nature of OPEC's membership and in relations between Iran and Iraq. As Mouslims we cannot support a war that takes place between these two countries. The Holy Koran stipulates that when a dispute occurs between two parties, a third party must decide between them to achieve peace. So far, however, no one has come forward to arbitrate between the two. This is what is causing the destruction that is happening in the two countries.

[Question] Can you, for example, imagine OPEC without Iran?

[Answer] Yes, there can be an OPEC without Iran and there can even be an OPEC without Saudi Arabia or any one of the other senior member. The fact that one country or another leaves OPEC is not what is important. What is important is that most of the oil exporting countries remain in one cartel. In December 1977, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates tried to do business alone outside OPEC. That experience led Saudi Arabia to lose some of its oil wells. We know, according to a U.S. Congressional report dealing with the Saudi oil situation, that by trying to leave the general conference, the Saudis were trying to prove that they can exert pressure on the other oil exporting countries to make them accept the Saudi oil policy and increase their oil production. We also know that increasing Saudi oil production was not enough to satisfy buyers in the oil market. In technical and practical terms what did happen was that the increase which the Saudis decided to put into effect created high pressure in the Saudi oil fields that, in turn, caused water to penetrate these fields. This means that large quantities of oil were lost while (they were) still in the ground.

[Question] The decision to increase production, then, was a political decision. No sane person could have made such a decision without taking technological and and technical considerations into account.

[Answer] I believe that the decision was made in a political context. It was a stupid decision. In this regard we must add the following: even before 1976 Saudi Arabia had begun negotiations with ARAMCO to purchase the oil resources in the country. Because of the agreement that was reached with the owners of ARAMCO, the corporation refused to carry out the necessary repairs to the fields where the water had been leaking for the last 4 years.

[Question] Can we go back to what you have already mentioned about the possibility of OPEC continuing even without Saudi Arabia? Don't you think that OPEC without Saudi Arabia, which is the largest oil exporting member of OPEC, would diminish the the organization's prestige as a whole?

[Answer] Of course not, as long as Saudi production, regardless of its volume, and as long as the production of the Emirates, for example, fail to satisfy the consumer's [demand] all over the world. As long as the majority of the oil producing countries insist on implementing the decisions they make with regard to prices or production, the result will be that Saudi Arabia will be like a person who is trying to destroy himself. Saudis cannot accept such a situation because they will realize that the 13 oil fields will [eventually] be depleted. This will undoubtedly teach them an unforgettable lesson. But if this happens, the only thing they can do is replace the oil minister after holding him fully responsible for what happened.

The OPEC Summit Conference

[Question] What in your opinion will happen to the OPEC summit conference which is to be held in Baghdad early next November?

[Answer] I don't believe there will be a summit conference at all, at least for a year. The problem is that this war between Iraq and Iran is not clear. It is a destructive and tragic war. To a certain extent I find myself uncertain about what I am saying. However, it is a destructive, evil and a stupid war because it is destroying the economic institutions that were built during the last 10 or 15 years. The future of the Iraqi and the Iranian peoples depends on these institutions. If these economic institutions are in fact destroyed, if the oil and petrochemical companies and the refineries in both countries are destroyed, such destruction means that both countries will have to rebuild, and this would take 5 to 10 years. Besides, construction costs now are many times more than what construction costs were 10 years ago.

At any rate before the war broke out, it was not thought likely that Iran would take part in an OPEC summit in Baghdad. Now that Baghdad has been subjected to bombardment and raids, I do not believe that the Iraqis will want to hold the conference in the Iraqi capital.

[Question] In view of the fact that OPEC summit, which was to set down a strategy of action for the oil exporting countries, will not be held, do you expect consideration of the Saudi plan to schedule prices to be suspended or postponed? [This is the plan that involves] agreement over an increase in the price of oil for several years. Such an increase would be consistent with the increase in the rates of inflation in the consuming countries. Saudi Arabia is asking OPEC members to approve this idea.

[Answer] It is not necessary for this matter to be postponed. This plan, by the way, is a good one. However, this does not mean that it is the best one. It is at least the first step towards reaching an agreement between oil producers and importers.

Saudi Production

[Question] Saudi oil production now amounts to 8.5 million barrels per day. After Iraqis and Iranians stopped pumping their oil because of the war, Saudi Arabia decided to increase its production by 700,000 barrels per day despite the damage that this would do to some fields. What do you think about this?

[Answer] It is not in the interests of Saudi Arabia, nor is it in the interests of its oil resources for Saudi oil production to exceed 5 million barrels per day. If Saudi Arabia decides to reduce its production to that level, there would be no energy crisis because the other oil producing countries like the Emirates (Abu Dhabi), Iran and Iraq can increase their rates of production without having that increase affect the fields of those two countries.

[Question] If Iraq were to decide to increase its daily oil production to 5 million barrels--its current production is about 3 million barrels--would not this affect the quantity of the reserves it has?

[Answer] No. Iraq has large quantities of oil. Besides, Iraq needs its oil revenues more than Saudi Arabia does. We must mention that Saudi Arabia's oil reserves will not last more than 20 years if it maintains its current levels of production.

[Question] If one were to allow oneself to suppose that the Arab oil exporting countries were to decide to use oil as a weapon and to impose an oil boycott so as to exert pressure on the west, and especially on the United States, for the purpose of reaching a solution to the Palestinian question, what can these countries do?

[Answer] What these Arab oil countries can do is to threaten the west that they would reduce oil production by 40 percent, for example, unless Israel is forced to withdraw from all the land it occupied in 1967. The fact that the Arab countries would carry this out would be justified because the west and the United States did promise and did say a great deal on this regard, but they did not carry out any of these promises. We know that Israel will cease to exist even without a war if it is abandoned. All that we are asking from the west is to force Israel to implement UN resolutions. I believe that the Arab oil companies could achieve spectacular success if they were to carry out this step.

[Question] Is it possible to see these countries undertaking such a measure 1 year from now?

[Answer] No, not within a year. I do not believe this step will be taken unless it is preceded by political changes in these countries. There is, for example, a new generation of Saudis that has begun to take shape ever since the members of this generation started to emerge and to return to the country after completing their studies and their special training abroad. It is inevitable that those people will realize that they have no future unless they were to work in the interests of the people to save the country's resources. After that happens, it would be possible to impose an oil boycott to achieve political objectives. When Saudi Arabia decides to increase its production at a time when oil markets have a glut of oil, such a decision is extremely short-sighted. Continuing to increase production will have adverse consequences and will do serious damage to the fields themselves.

[Question] This means that an oil boycott may not take place before 5 or 6 years!

[Answer] Yes, this is correct.

[Question] This may be so, provided that the situation in the area remain unchanged during this period. But what if there were political or military changes in the next few years that would change the reality [of the situation]?

[Answer] If this were to happen, the equation would naturally be different. The war between Iraq and Iran is not expected to go on. When the war does end, it is expected that certain changes will take place in both countries. This will lead to the creation of understanding and relations of good neighborliness between the two countries, and they would regain their activity in OPEC. We believe that the new situation will generate a position that is more understanding and more positive towards the Palestinian problem. With Algeria, Libya and Kuwait beside these two countries, Saudi Arabia will become incapable of opposing a decision to impose an oil boycott that these countries may make. If this does happen, a decision to impose a boycott may be made in less than 5 years.

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JOINT MILITARY FORCE PROPOSED

Nicosia AL-'ASR in Arabic 30 Oct 80 p 8

[Article: "Joint Gulf Army Established for Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain; Sultanate of Oman Left Out"]

[Text] After the Iraqi-Iranian war broke out, people on the highest levels in the Gulf began studying a military project which calls for the establishment of a joint army between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain.

In this regard some Arab diplomatic sources who revealed [information] about this project stated that the steps for this project which have been determined in principle in the last 2 weeks are as follows:

1. Convening a conference of the ministers of defense and foreign affairs of the countries in question so they can draw up a detailed and scheduled plan for the implementation of the project. This plan would then be submitted to the leaders of these countries who would study it in a summit conference they would convene.

2. Establishing a supreme command for the joint army; it would be made up of the ministers of defense of the participating countries. One of the ministers would preside over this joint command on a rotating basis.

3. The forces of this army are to be divided among three basic units: land, sea and air.

4. These units are to be distributed as follows: the land unit in Saudi Arabia; the naval unit in Bahrain; and the air unit would be between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

These are the general steps that are anticipated in the context of putting this military project into practice.

On the practical scene these diplomatic sources stated that the date for convening a conference for the ministers of defense had not yet been set--at least not until the writing of these lines. But it is likely that it will be held after a decisive and a practical end to the war between Iraq and Iran.

On another scene we offer the following piece of information about the size of the military troops in each one of the afore-mentioned countries.

1. Saudi Arabia has 47,000 soldiers; 380 tanks; 136 fighter airplanes and patrol boats; 72 coast guard vessels; 4 mine sweepers; and 6 landing ships. Four of these ships are for equipment.

2. The number of persons in Kuwait's army is 12,400. They are equipped with 280 tanks; 50 fighter airplanes; 43 coast guard vessels; and 3 landing ships.

3. Bahrain has 2,500 soldiers. It does not have tanks; nor does it have an air force. It has two high speed missile boats; two high speed gun boats; and 14 coast guard vessels. It has a small hovercraft navy unit in addition to two landing ships.

4. The United Arab Emirates has an army of 25,150 soldiers armed with 45 British light Scorpion tanks; 52 fighter airplanes, 26 of which are Mirage airplanes; 6 high speed boats; 6 large patrol boats; and 3 coast guard vessels.

5. Qatar has an army of 4,700 soldiers equipped with 24 AMX tanks; 4 fighter airplanes, 3 of which are old British Hunter FGE-6 chasers; 6 large patrol boats; and 29 coast guard vessels.

One notes that, collectively, these countries which are expected to participate in the joint army have large land, sea and air forces. In addition, most of them, especially Saudi Arabia, expect to receive a collection of the most modern fighter airplanes and tanks.

Two marginal observations are to be made on all this:

The first is that the project left out the Sultanate of Oman which has an army of 14,200 soldiers. It seems that underlying this exclusion is a desire not to arouse any sensitivities that may develop following the establishment of the proposed joint army. This is because some of the Arab countries reject the political and military relationship that exists between the sultanate and the United States. One of the more recent aspects of this relationship manifested itself in permitting the establishment of U.S. military bases in Oman.

The second observation is that the joint army constitutes a translation into practical terms of the slogan that was proclaimed recently by Gulf officials. This slogan states, "Only the people of the Gulf can defend the Gulf and protect its natural resources."

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SYRIAN TREATY WITH SOVIETS EXAMINED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 18 Oct 80 pp 26, 27

/Article by Fu'ad Matar: "A Reading of a Treaty Which Has Been Abrogated and a Treaty Which Has Been Concluded"/

/Text/ On Thursday 9 October 1980 a treaty of friendship and cooperation was signed in Moscow by President Hafiz al-Asad and Leonid Brezhnev, secretary general of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Since this treaty, which was arrived at by an undeclared Soviet request, seems, in some of its aspects, and perhaps in the essential one, to be a vindictive response on the Soviet Union's part to President Anwar al-Sadat and the United States, it might be appropriate to make a comparison between the treaty with the Soviet Union which President al-Sadat previously abrogated in July 1972 and the treaty which President Hafiz al-Asad has recently signed.

Through the following observations, it is possible for us to ascertain the circumstances of the two treaties, and we can perceive many things:

First, the traditional Soviet nomenclature for the treaty is "treaty of friendship and cooperation." The formula of this treaty is always ready in the desk drawers of the Soviet leaders, although what happens is that a sort of revision is made to certain phrases, according to circumstances and the type of party with which the contract is made.

It has become customary for the Soviets to insist on signing the treaty with those of its allies who are not well off, are going through delicate financial and security circumstances and most of all need arms.

If the party with which the treaty is being signed has a strategic status, this party can exert some power, adding what it wants, or some of what it wants, to the treaty.

For example, President Hafiz al-Asad was able, because of extremely important strategic situation, to add expressions and words which did not appear in the Egyptian-Soviet treaty to the treaty he signed with Brezhnev such as "continuing the struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism and racism in all its forms and manifestations, including Zionism," a clause inserted in the preamble to and

Article Three of the Syrian—Soviet treaty. This sort of clause did not appear at all in the Egyptian-Soviet treaty, nor did the word "Israel"--just the phrase "elimination of the effects of the aggression."

Had the clause referred to in the Syrian-Soviet treaty talked about continuing the struggle "against Israel," and not just "against Zionism," that would have been considered a wish come true.

Second, because of the proliferation of talk the past 2 years that a treaty would be signed between Syria and the Soviet Union, the signing was not accompanied by the tumult which accompanied the signing of the Egyptian-Soviet treaty.

A few weeks before President al-Asad's trip to Moscow and the signing, the gossips and story-tellers had started asserting that the treaty would be signed, while the Egyptian-Soviet treaty was signed without psycholegical preparation, when no one was paying attention.

In addition to that, when Nikolai Podgorny came to Cairo on 25 May 1971, no one knew that there was a copy of the treaty in his pocket which he would request President al-Sadat to sign, while, when President al-Asad traveled to Moscow, it was completely clear that the goal of his trip was to sign then go back to Damascus.

It is true that the leadership in the Soviet Union is collective, but there are priorities and important matters. When Leonid Brezhnev signs a treaty with Syria for the Soviet party, that does not have the same impact as the Egyptian-Soviet treaty, which was signed for the Soviet party by the least important man in the Soviet "Troika," Nikolai Podgorny.

The Soviet Union showed a certain diffidence toward its friends or allies in Egypt, because it was content to sign the treaty with President al-Sadat at a time when 'Ali Sabri (a Soviet protege) and the other members of the Nasirite group had been put in prison on the charge of conspiring against President al-Sadat and at a time when it was fully clear to the Soviets that al-Sadat did not have faith in relations with them. That became apparent later when President al-Sadat terminated the treaty without cause and expelled the Soviet experts, who numbered 15,000, in the midst of a campaign of calumny which had not occurred between the Soviet Union and any country linked to it by privileged relations.

The Soviets might have believed the joy which President al-Sadat conveyed over the treaty and ignored what had happened to 'Ali Sabri and the others. While talking about this joy, one might recall the expression which President al-Sadat used on 2 June 1971 and a cartoon by Salah Jahin (who after that came to confine his cartoons to everything defaming the Arabs and strengthening the trend toward the Egyptian-Israeli peace) which was published 2 days after the signing of the treaty. President al-Sadat's expression was "The press and the propaganda of the West have tried to portray our internal affairs as a change in our political line; this treaty has been a decisive response to the attempt to cast doubts about our course and through the treaty we have stressed that our frienship with the Soviet Union is not a temporary friendship and is not tactical but is a lasting friendship and is strategic."

The cartoon printed in AL-AHRAM on 30 May 1971 (one day after Podgorny left Cairo with al-Sadat's signature to the treaty) showed al-Sadat and Podgorny standing in

front of a plaque of the treaty with the following comment "This too is a high dam." AL-AHRAM published another cartoon by Salah Jahin which Podgorny did not receive graciously when the Soviet ambassador in Cairo showed it to him; that cartoon portrayed Podgorny carrying a sign on which was written "We are on your side, al-Sadat" and al-Sadat appeared smiling with joy at his embrace.

The point in all that was to state that the Egyptian-Soviet treaty was not signed as a result of each side's faith in the other but was signed in an atmosphere of haste. The air of joy which President al-Sadat spread about did not change its real circumstances.

The Syrian-Soviet treaty was signed under different circumstances. The two contracting parties are in agreement over the pressing need of each for the other.

Third, in comparison with the Egyptian-Soviet treaty, the article bearing on military aspects in the Syrian Soviet treaty appears to be non-traditional in substance, stipulating that "the two lofty contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military sphere in accordance with the agreements concluded between them in this regard, in accordance with the interests of strengthening their defensive capability." Meanwhile the article on this subject in the Egyptian-Soviet treaty stipulated the following: "in order to strengthen the defensive capability of the United Arab Republic, the two lofty contracting parties will continue to develop cooperation in the military sphere in accordance with the United Arab Republic to master the arms and materiel which have been brought into the United Arab Republic in order to strengthen their ability to eliminate the effects of the aggression and also to strengthen their ability to confront aggression in general."

The difference between the two texts is great. The text included in the Egyptian-Soviet treaty means that the Soviet Union is training the Egyptian army in arms imported into Egypt for the goal of eliminating the effects of the Israeli aggression (though the text does not specify the aggression and the fact that it is Israeli). The text included in the Syrian-Soviet treaty inspires one to believe that the Soviet Union considers that it has strategic boundaries in Syria which Syria must defend in accordance with the treaty. The grounds for making that statement are the fact that the clause contains mention of two defenses, not one: "in accordance with the interests of strengthening their defense capabilities." Since Syria has not supplied the Soviet Union with arms, strengthening its defensive ability here entails the notion of strategic borders.

Fourth, it may be fair to say that the Soviet Union has benefited from the negative effects left by President al-Sadat's steps of abrogating the treaty and the method he used to expell the experts, a method insulting to the Soviet Union. Article 13 of the Syrian-Soviet treaty contains a reference to this and stipulates that "any dispute which might arise concerning the interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this treaty will be resolved in bilateral fashion in accordance with the spirit of friendship, mutual understanding and respect." This article did not appear at all in the Egyptian-Soviet treaty. It seems clear, from the formulation of the words in it, that if Syria does have some objections or interpretations on the articles of the treaty in the future, they will be dealt with in a manner which will leave no room for conduct such as that which President al-Sadat displayed. In that regard it should be observed that Article 14

stipulates that the duration of the treaty is 20 years, that is, that it will end in 2000, while the duration of the Egyptian-Soviet treaty, which was not destined to last more than 14 months, was 15 years.

Fifth, President Hafiz al-Asad signed the treaty after an agreement between him and Col Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi to establish a Syrian-Libyan merger union. Consummation of the treaty before declaration of the union might have been carefully studied by the Syrian and Libyan presidents; declaring the union would mean that the Soviet Union had signed a treaty with two parties, Syria and Libya, not just Syria alone. If we add the Soviet-South Yemeni treaty to that we will find that Algeria is the only perseverance and steadfastness state which is not linked to the Soviet Union by treaty. In this sort of situation Breshnev can, as he lives out his final days, tell the people of the Soviet Union that after 8 years their leaders had compensated for Egypt, which is irreplaceable, and that their treaty with Syria, to which Libya will be a party in the event the unity is achieved, will amount to more than compensation.

Sixth, President al-Asad will not be compelled to let Communists participate in the government, as happened with President al-Sadat when he appointed Dr Isma'il Sabri 'Abdallah (a Marxist) planning minister after the signing of the agreement. The Syrian Communists were represented in power before the treaty, but after the treaty they will find that they are in a better position.

In addition to that, the signing of the treaty constitutes a challenge to the religious tendencies which tried to stir up difficulties in recent months in the face of some Soviet symbols in Syria.

This is a fleeting comparison of the two most important treaties the Soviet Union has signed with Arab countries.

The lesson is in the intentions of those signing the agreement and the mode of implementation of the treaty stipulations by the stronger party, which is the Soviet Union.

11887
CSO: 4802

FOREIGN MINISTER ISSUES LATEST SUMMIT DEMANDS, EXPLAINS TREATY

Paris AL-MAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 19 Oct 80 pp 23, 24

/Article by R. D. K: "Khaddam: The Isolated Party Is Not Syria, but American Policy"/

/Text/ "A Syrian treaty with the Soviet Union?" replies the Syrian foreign minister 'Abd-al-Halim Khaddam. "No." He adds, "There is a consolidation of cooperation, and when we sign a (military) treaty we will announce that to the world. There is no comparing our cooperating with Moscow with Somalia's and Oman's permitting the establishment of American bases."

This is the most conspicuous portion of Minister Khaddam's conversation with AL-MAHAR AL-'ARABI WAL-DUWALI, in which he dealt with the development of relations with the Soviet Union and Arab conditions in general. Here is the text of it:

/Question/ The treaty which Syria will sign with the Soviet Union includes military cooperation. Why did Syria decide to sign a treaty of this type?

/Answer/ Posed that way, the question is wrong. It should be as follows: What is Syria doing to consolidate its relations with the Soviet Union? We consider that the balance in the region, following the signing of the two Camp David agreements, has been greatly disturbed from both the military and the political viewpoints: from the military viewpoint, as a result of Egypt's departure from the Arab ranks and increased American military aid to Israel, so that the military balance lies with Israel; from the political viewpoint, a disruption has occurred in the political balance as a result of the Americans' involvement in the area and the string of military bases the United States is constructing in and around the Arab nation, which is consequently aimed at encircling and totally dominating the region. If we consider that one cannot distinguish between American policy and Israeli policy and that the American leaders are declaring on every occasion that the issue of Israel is a special one as far as the United States goes and that the security of Israel is part of America's security--in the face of this situation, when there is American dominance, that means that there is Israeli dominance.

Naturally that makes it mandatory that we seek every means to enable us to preserve our independence and strive to stand up before aggression, in order to restore balance to the area, especially when we consider that this disruption of the balance will lead to the continued implementation of the Camp David policy, especially

since Camp David has three goals, first, to bring Egypt out of the Arab ranks, which has happened; second, American political and military dominance over the region, for which action is taking place; and three, to liquidate the Palestinian cause. There is no doubt that this objective has faltered, because of two factors:

The first factor is Syria's perseverance and Syria's political line, which categorically and practically rejects the policy of Camp David and has taken measures to confront this policy. The second factor is the perseverance of the Palestinian Arab people in the face of the political line which Egypt has set forth regarding the Palestinian cause and through our brethren's heroic stands in occupied Palestine. However, this does not mean that the Camp David policy has come to a stop. Rather, the parties to Camp David are striving to create circumstances to continue with this policy and consequently to complete all the steps in the series.

Therefore there is a disruption in the balance. There is an attempt at American dominance and consequently Israeli dominance. To that we can add the state of fragmentation the Arab nation is going through and the state of conflict and contradiction which has in practice removed most Arab countries from the stage of the Arab-Israeli struggle. We consider that Syria now is almost alone on the front line.

The question we face is whether we will remain in this condition or will strive to create new circumstances which will have the effect of supporting the Arab position and increasing its rigidity and Arab resources. Naturally, in order to achieve that it is necessary to work in two directions. The first one, the main, practical one, is to work to rectify the Arab context and restore Arab solidarity, which must be built on clear, explicit bases founded on the premise of commitment to confronting the enemy and placing all resources to confront the Zionist entity in Palestine. The second line is to work to develop relations with the Soviet Union in order to provide the ingredients of defense and achieve balance between American involvement in the region and the need to have other forces present which have stood and are standing on our side and supporting us in confronting the American involvement. Therefore Syria has investigated ways, means and formats which will have the effect of strengthening relations with the Soviet Union and placing them in a framework. These relations will be founded on bases of friendship and cooperation between the two countries. This friendship is not new in Syrian-Soviet relations but rather is firm and traditional. We believe that upgrading these relations to a new step and context will result in increasing the firmness of the Arab situation and position.

/Question/ Is this step an affirmation of relations on the military level?

/Answer/ The new step is a strengthening of relations in all directions which will strengthen our military ability and our political perseverance.

/Question/ Will Syria allow the Soviet Union to build any military bases on Syrian territory?

/Answer/ To talk about the treaty is to talk about friendship and cooperation. When we arrive at a format for placing relations between us and the Soviet Union in a framework, the format will be announced to the whole world.

/Question/ Syria is criticizing Oman and Somalia for their cooperation with the United States in the military field, while it is now allowing itself to establish relations of the same type with the Soviet Union.

/Answer/ First, there is no room for comparison. Somalia has given military bases to a country which is committing aggression against the Arabs, to a country which helps Israel, to a country which is striving to implant the Zionist entity, to a country which is giving Israel arms to bomb our villages and homes every day and kill our children, women and old men. Cooperating with this country is one thing and cooperating with the Soviet Union, which is standing alongside us and helping us in the face of aggression, is something else.

The Isolated Party Is Not Syria

/Question/ Opinions in political groups have it that Syria has felt isolation in the Arab world and has come to feel despair over this isolation. Therefore it decided that it was necessary to make an alliance with the Soviet Union. What is your opinion?

/Answer/ Syria is not isolated in the Arab nation; rather, it is imperialist policy which is isolated. All the Arab masses are standing alongside Syria. Syria has stood against Camp David and the majority of the Arab countries are standing against Camp David. Our masses are struggling against Camp David. What is isolated is imperialist policy in the region, not the policy of opposition to Zionism and Israel.

/Question/ Will the Syrian-Soviet treaty have an effect on the Syrian-Libyan union on the one hand and the Lebanese situation on the other?

/Answer/ You keep using the word "treaty." I would prefer it to be called strengthening and developing our relations with the Soviet Union.

/Question/ So I wish you would explain the situation to me. Will a treaty be signed between the Soviet Union and Syria, or not?

/Answer/ When a treaty is signed, that will be announced. Any relations with the Soviet Union will be reflected positively on the overall Arab situation, the movement toward union between Syria and Libya and the situation in Lebanon.

/Question/ Sometimes the Arab League adopts positions over which the Arab countries are not unanimous in their opinions. For example, the Arab League position on the Iraqi-Iranian war; do you believe that the Arab League should have taken such a position, or observed silence?

/Answer/ I would like that question to be directed to our brother the secretary general of the Arab League.

/Question/ Is Syria in agreement with the league's position?

/Answer/ That matter should be discussed with our brother the Arab League secretary.

The Need To Make the Summit a Success

/Question/ With regard to the coming Arab summit in Amman, some Arab parties have said that ideas will be presented which are aimed at strengthening Arab-European cooperation in all fields, political, economic and military. Does Syria agree to this approach?

/Answer/ Arab-European relations are one thing and European initiative to resolve the Middle East crisis is something else. As regards Arab-European relations, we are in favor of strengthening them and developing them to the farthest possible extent, in a manner serving our national interests. As regards the European initiative, our position toward that is well known.

/Question/ Will you be presenting any ideas at the coming summit conference?

/Answer/ The summit conference must be held at its stipulated time. It is necessary to ensure the conditions for holding it and making it a success. While we consider that some Arab countries, through their policies and practices, are constantly striving to create circumstances which will not result in the success of this conference, we hope for constructive positive participation from all Arab countries which will help in convening the conference and making it a success.

/Question/ It has been said that the United States has begun indirect military intervention in the gulf. Are you afraid of American military intervention?

/Answer/ It is part of the strategy of the United States to increase its military presence in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and the Arab Gulf. This is nothing new. The development of American military activity is now assuming new forms which will result in developments in the region which might not be in the interests of the region or in the interests of international peace and security.

We Hope and Are Exerting Efforts

/Question/ In the context of Lebanon, will a Lebanese cabinet be formed soon? What are the bases which will have the effect of hastening this?

/Answer/ Every Arab and every sincere person hopes that Lebanon will succeed in forming a political cabinet encompassing all parties whose basic task will be the attainment of national reconciliation in accordance with the principles declared by His Excellency President Ilyas Sarkis. We in Syria have exerted and still are exerting efforts in this direction.

/Question/ When will Syria determine that the time has come to withdraw its troops from Lebanon?

/Answer/ The presence of the Arab "deterrent force" in Lebanon is connected to the tasks of this force and the decision of the Lebanese government. When the Lebanese government requests the withdrawal of the "deterrent force" from Lebanon, no "deterrent force" will be left in Lebanon.

/Question/ Do you believe that the withdrawal of the "deterrent force" at this time is not in Lebanon's interests? Are you worried about the consequences if withdrawal takes place now?

/Answer/ Every Arab has the right to be worried about Lebanon. Lebanon is part of the Arab nation, and the Lebanese people are part of the Arab nation. The pains afflicting Lebanon are reflected in one form or another on the Arab nation. Of course the continued situation in Lebanon is not just disturbing to the Arab people in Lebanon--it is also disturbing to all of us. This situation calls for anxiety. Therefore every sincere person in Lebanon, and those who love their country, must do all they can, relinquish a certain degree of selfishness and realize some selfish or factional concessions for the sake of the whole country. The unity and survival of Lebanon are much more important than any gains realized by one group or another.

/Question/ Do you mean that the continued presence of the "deterrent force" in Lebanon is still necessary?

/Answer/ This is something for the Lebanese to decide and is the province of the Lebanese government.

11887
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BRIEFS

SECURITY RAIDS MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD--Damascus, 25 Nov (SANA)--The newspaper TISHRIN reports today that security men in Homs--central Syria--with the cooperation and effective participation of the citizens yesterday morning stormed a Muslim Brotherhood den and killed three of its criminal members. [Excerpt] [JN250844 Damascus Domestic Service in Arabic 0815 GMT 25 Nov 80]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

GDR-CZECH AID TO YAR--Dr 'Abd al-Karim al-'Iryani, chairman of the Council of Ministers, this afternoon received in his office Brother Muhammad Hizan al-Shuhati, minister of economy, who presented to the brother prime minister a report on his visits to the GDR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The brother minister of economy returned to Sana this morning after leading an economic delegation to the GDR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. The brother minister told the SABA NEWS AGENCY soon after his return that he had been instructed to make the two visits by the brother leader, President Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih. The brother minister said he was very pleased with the talks held with officials at all levels in the two friendly countries. The brother minister stressed that his visits had been highly successful and had resulted in the YAR securing economic assistance and various vital projects. Delegations from the GDR and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic would soon be arriving to follow up what had been agreed upon in Berlin and Prague. The brother minister concluded his statement saying that the projects agreed upon included a tannery, a footwear factory, rural electrification, quarrying for marble, and the supply of spare parts for the textile and other factories. The YAR would also receive some agricultural equipment and workshops for industrial complexes. The projects would be implemented soon. [Text] [LD161650 San'a' Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 15 Nov 80]

END

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No. 2231

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10 December 1980

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ARAB ECONOMIC COOPERATION DISCUSSED

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 2-3 Oct 80 p 19

[Article by Khalid 'Aqil: "Arab Union of Chambers of Commerce Discusses Arab Economic Strategy"]

[Text] Shaykh Isma'il Abu Daud, head of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Jiddah, has returned from Tunis after heading the Saudi delegation to the meeting of the 51st session of the council of the General Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture for the Arab Countries, which was held recently in Tunis.

Shaykh Isma'il Abu Daud told AL-MADINAH that this session had discussed various aspects of Arab economic cooperation and its requirements in the coming stage, in the hope that the next Arab Economic Summit Conference will be basically sympathetic to supporting and guiding joint economic activity resting on the bases of serving pan-Arab economic development. Emphasis was also placed on giving joint economic activity special priority by describing it as a basic complement to development.

Shaykh Abu Daud added that the general secretariat of the council will submit a memorandum to the next economic summit conference including the union's point of view concerning the strategy of joint Arab economic activity. The Arab chambers of commerce will also ask that profit-making projects be submitted which the Arab Company for Arab Investments (SHA'A) could consider establishing and developing to spread the goals and activities of this company to Arab investors. The council also urged support for tourism cooperation among Arab countries so that this sector may participate in strengthening the bonds of relations among Arab citizens. This sector would participate within the framework of Arab economic development plans by setting up the basic structure necessary for tourism and facilitating travel arrangements. During this meeting the membership of the Committee on Affairs of Joint Arab-Foreign Chambers of Commerce was extended. This committee is composed of Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Syria, Iraq and Morocco.

The role of the Union of Arab Chambers in the joint chambers was also discussed. The council approved the memorandum prepared by the secretary-general of the Union of Arab Chambers concerning joint Arab chambers and the role of the Union of Chambers of Commerce in them: reaffirming the importance of the chambers in protecting Arab economic interests abroad, and also the necessity of incorporating the fields approved by the union into the basic statutes of the joint chambers in Western Europe to put them on the correct path.

Shaykh Isma'il Abu Daud went on to say that this meeting approved the cooperation agreement between the Union of Arab Chambers and the Korean Chamber of Commerce and Industry. A meeting will be set up in the near future between the Arabs and the Koreans. The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the PDRY was nominated for membership on the board of directors of the French-Arab Chamber of Commerce. The Council received information about the French-Arab Chamber of Commerce's Council on Alternate Energy Sources, which will be held in Tunis in October, and also the celebration which will mark the 10th anniversary of the founding of the joint French-Arab Chamber of Commerce. The council authorized the secretary-general of the union to contact the appropriate authorities in Kenya to set a date for a visit by a delegation from the Arab Chamber of Commerce, provided that during this visit contacts would also be made to organize an economic conference for representatives of the Arab and African private sector in Kenya during 1981. Unified steps to create an Arab-Canadian Chamber of Commerce were also discussed.

Shaykh Isma'il Abu Daud concluded by saying that the council had agreed to hold its 52nd session in a state of the region during March 1981. The main topic will be protecting Arab wealth abroad and preserving Arab resources. The next meeting also will deal with the role of the oil sector in economic integration.

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CSO: 4802

PLO OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON UNIFIED INFORMATION

Luanda JORNAL DE ANGOLA in Portuguese 3 Oct 80 p 10

[Interview with Magid Sharar, director of the Unified Information Department of the PLO, by Carlos Cardoso, of AIM, who is currently covering events in the Middle East; date and place of interview not specified]

[Text] Question: What is the role of the Department of Unified Information in the PLO?

Answer: The department was established in 1972, following the opening of the Al Fatah news bureau in Jordan. It was an attempt to bring together all the official news organs of the other Palestinian organizations in one information center, which was given the name "Unified Information."

We discovered, however, that it was not easy to unify information without first unifying the military forces and other sectors of the different organizations. Therefore, the major effort is still exerted by Al Fatah. The other organizations still maintain their information offices, their magazines and other activities, but we insist on preserving a unified information service, looking to unify Palestinian information activities in the future.

Question: How has the service progressed over the years?

Answer: When we began, there were 38 of us, and now there are over 300 in Beirut, Damascus and other capitals.

We have the PALESTINE REVOLUTION, as a daily and a weekly. Another section is WAFA, the Palestine news agency, which regularly broadcasts three times a day, in Arab and in English. It also has correspondents in various capitals of the Arab world and the socialist countries.

The third section is that of radiophonic services, which broadcast to the occupied territories. Our main station is in Lebanon, but we have other stations in Democratic Yemen and Algeria. Before the Camp David accord we also had a station in Cairo.

The fourth section is foreign news, which specializes in relations with foreign journalists and publishes a monthly magazine, PALESTINE REVOLUTION, in English and French.

The fifth section, one of the earliest, is that of film and photography. It has produced 32 films, documentaries and newsreels. The section portrays the revolutionary activities since 1968, and at present we have over 400,000 photographs.

Another section is that of Mass Information, specializing in communication between populations inside and outside the camps. This section makes local broadcasts to the camps, and so it is in daily contact with the masses.

As I said earlier, there are now over 300 of us. Most of our staff has learned by doing. We are soldiers and we have followed the life of the guerrillas for the last 10 years.

We have lost many cadres. For example, we lost Hani Jawhalia, Omar and Muha, who were three of our best cameramen, and also Talal Rameh, who was an editor of the magazine PALESTINE REVOLUTION.

During this period, we have sent over 140 cadres to other countries, especially socialist countries, for training in journalistic work, and we receive real support from our friends, particularly in the Film Section. Most of our film staff was trained in the GDR.

Question: Does the fact that every PLO organization has its own information office prejudice the existence of a common program?

Answer: All the member organizations of the PLO are represented in our National Council, and most of them are represented on the Executive Committee, the directing body of the PLO. There are many ideologies among the Palestinians, however. Some groups are considered Marxist-Leninist. The Al Fatah is a nationalist movement. So it is logical that each organization would want its own news agency reflecting its politics and ideology.

Still, this does not mean that each Palestinian group has its own constitution and respective political program. No. There is only one constitution and one political program determined by the National Council. I think we will continue to have several magazines, but this is not to say that the Palestinians do not have a unified policy. On the other hand, every organization has the right to speak to its members. This reflects the internal democracy within the PLO. We have always taken care to resolve our problems democratically. On any issue, each organization has the right to express its own position, to uphold its point of view, but in the end we have to come to an agreement. We stress the need to maintain democratic relations in all the meetings of the National Council because we consider them a basis for unity.

In recent years, we have faced difficult and complex problems. We have not forgotten that in 1978 we ignored democratic dialog, and many confrontations erupted between Palestinian organizations. About 40 individuals died in these incidents. After 3 months, all the people were convinced of the need to return to democratic dialog. It was an important lesson for us, and the masses brought great pressure on all the organizations to return to democratic dialog during that period.

Question: How do you view the Israeli propaganda machine?

Answer: The Zionist propaganda has been very effective, particularly at the international level. When we began the armed struggle, the Zionist propaganda succeeded for many years in having it believed that the Palestinians were terrorists. Through our political and diplomatic efforts, however, we are beginning to change public opinion. We are working on communication at three levels.

First, we are working to respond to the issues facing the masses in the occupied territories, so they can confront the scheming imperialist propaganda and engage in the resistance. This way we can convince them that the enemy is not so strong, that they can break away. At this time, we can say that all the Palestinians support the PLO and consider it the directing force of the Palestinian people.

Second is our work at the Arab level. The Palestinian cause is very strong, and the struggle over the past 70 years have been supported by the Arab masses. We have always had soldiers from various Arab countries in our ranks. But we know we must maintain a strong propaganda machine to counter the propaganda of the reactionary Arab regimes and the imperialists, who try to spread the idea that the problems in the Middle East are caused by the Palestinians. Hence, we explain the facts to the Arab masses. The major enemies are the United States of America and Israel, its base in the Middle East. We have been very successful, especially after the victory of the Iranian revolution. We have enabled our masses to absorb this truth. The principal target is American imperialism.

In the last Fatah congress, we considered the United States to be the leader of all the forces against freedom, and we convinced the Arab masses that Israel is not only a threat to the Palestinians but to the Arab people, because its primary task is to protect American interests and enable the imperialists to continue to rob the Arab world of its wealth. Moreover, we teach our people to distinguish between friend and foe. Our people are well convinced that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as the democratic and progressive forces throughout the world, are our real friends in the struggle.

The third aspect of our activity pertains to our friends. We make a daily effort to inform friendly countries regarding our struggle. This means more support for and greater understanding of our cause. Finally, we are countering strong imperialist and Zionist propaganda in West Europe, the United States and countries governed by fascist regimes. We are making a real effort to be effective on this front.

Question: You said that in the last Fatah congress the United States we classified as the principal enemy...

Answer: We are convinced that the United States will not change its policy with respect to the Arabs and Palestinians, and even feels that its interests in the area are in real danger. The Americans will feel that Israel ultimately cannot protect their interests. In other words, our struggle must be against the United States. We have been very successful in convincing most of the Arab masses that those who talk about fighting Israel and maintain good relations with the United States are also on Israel's side. Israel is a U.S. base. This is the answer to all the reactionary Arab regimes that would distinguish between the two.

Question: There is currently a good deal of talk about relations between the PLO and Iraq...

Answer: We have had difficult and complicated relations with Iraq. When the Arabs held the Baghdad summit meeting, we stayed put and so did Iraq. We have our policy and they have theirs. We do not agree with all the details of their policy, for instance, with respect to relations between Iran and Iraq. We are trying to help eliminate the problems between Iraq and Iran. Again, regarding relations with the Soviet Union, we have strategic relations with the Soviet Union and so does Iraq. We are careful to resolve our problems on the basis of our political program and not the programs of others. In the end, our struggle against the enemy is always hard, but we are well supported by our friends. There is the case of Mozambique. The Mozambican party, government and people support our struggle. President Samora Machel is a great friend of the Palestinian people. We know that he always discusses the Palestinian cause wherever he goes. We also know that Mozambique is very influential in Africa. This means more support for the Palestinian struggle. Although the struggle is hard, we will fight to the final victory.

(Magid Sharar, chief of information of Al Fatah, is also a member of the Al Fatah Central Committee, the National Council of the PLO and the Palestine Congress. While he was living in occupied territory he was known as one of the most famous writers of tales.)

6362
CSO: 4401

SAUDI PRINCE DELIVERS 'SCATHING ATTACK' ON COMMUNISM

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 16 Nov 80 p 2

[Text]

TAIPEI, Nov. 15 (SPA) — Deputy Minister of Interior Prince Ahmad Friday launched a scathing attack against world communism.

At a dinner banquet given in his honor by the Saudi Arabian charge d'affaires in Taipei, Prince Ahmad thanked the Chinese for their warm welcome and hospitality and again lashed out at communism. He said it was a blessing for China to enjoy such a stable state of security despite the great threat it is facing from world communism, particularly from Communist China.

Nationalist China is a vivid example of progress, unlike Communist China which is crushed under the yoke of the Communist regime, he added.

Prince Ahmad said that communism is a destructive force and is spreading its venom and corruption around the world. He added that the Middle East and several other countries in various places have suffered a great deal and continue to suffer from Communist interference in their destiny and affairs. This also provides the reason why these countries are exposed to backwardness and weakness, while their principles and values are threatened. But he said, "Our Islamic faith is an impregnable fortress against the destructive Marxist ideology in our Arab and Muslim society, and this is why this society will always remain away from Communist influence."

The minister urged the countries of "the free and developed world" to combine their efforts to repel "world Communist aggression" and save "those who fell in to its net."

Prince Ahmad said Saudi Arabians believe that man's mission in this world is to do good for his fellow human being, and foremost among duties toward human rights should be to ward off the Red threat whose characteristics are bloodshed and persecution.

He again thanked the Chinese president for having decorated him with China's highest honor. He hailed the strong friendship binding the two countries, which still is developing and flourishing.

Later in the evening, a meeting was held between the Saudi Arabian and Chinese delegations led respectively by Prince Ahmad and China's National Security Chief, Gen. Aziz Wang. Discussions dealt with various aspects of security cooperation.

In addition, Prince Ahmad visited Taiwan's General Garrison and was briefed on its role by its commander Gen. Wang. He then prayed at Taipei's mosque. He also had talks at the mosque with Sheikh Dawood Chio, president of the Islamic Society of Nationalist China.

Sheikh Dawood briefed Prince Ahmad about the activities of his society in spreading Islam in China and providing education for Muslim children. He thanked the people and government of Saudi Arabia for assisting the society. Sheikh Dawood asked Prince Ahmad to convey his greetings and best wishes to King Khaled and Crown Prince Fahd for their continuous assistance to Muslims everywhere.

Islam was introduced to China one thousand years ago, but after the Communist uprising mosques and Islamic societies were closed, Dawood explained. This turn of events caused Muslims to flee the continent and seek refuge with their society in Taiwan. According to the People's China, there were over 50 million Muslims in the past. However, new statistics by the same government show that the number of Muslims now does not exceed ten million, he added.

Thousands of mosques have been closed in Communist China, but Muslims will triumph

at the end. They now shoulder the great responsibility of propagating Islam, Dawood said.

In his reply speech, Prince Ahmad said that by extending help to Muslims in China and everywhere else, the King of Saudi Arabia, who is the servant of the two Harams, is only fulfilling his duty. He told the members of the society, "I convey to you the greetings of your Muslim brothers in Saudi Arabia. Your brothers in the Kingdom pray so that God may deliver those who are suffering from persecution under the tyrant Communist rule, grant them victory and restore their dignity by defeating their enemies."

He reaffirmed that no matter how despotic "the enemies of God" become and no matter how great they think they are, only those who fear God will emerge victorious. "But God has ordered us to be patient and perseverant and remembr Him with awe in whatever we do.

Therefore, your (the Muslims of Taiwan) steadfastness in defending what is right will ultimately yield their fruits to Islam and the Muslims of China," Ahmad said.

He thanked the government of The Republic of China for enabling Muslims to practice Islam in full liberty. This is a gesture appreciated by Muslims in all parts of the Islamic world, and in Saudi Arabia, in particular, he said. And he repeated that "King Khaled and your Muslim brothers in Saudi Arabia are keen on assisting and supporting you, so that you may continue to fulfill your mission which consists in raising high the banner of God and propagating the eternal message of Islam." Prince Ahmad then gave $30,000 to the society to help it in its mission.

Later in the day, Prince Ahmad visited the Criminal Investigation Bureau in Taipei and was briefed by officials on the bureau's functions and the part it plays in combating crime. He inspected the Police Academy where he was received by its commander and senior staff officers. The prince also attended a display of police investigation techniques.

CSP" 4820

KARMAL WARNS DISSIDENTS WITHIN PDP

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 21 Nov 80 pp 1, 10

[Text] New Delhi, Nov. 20--Afghan President Babrak Karmal has issued a strong warning to dissidents within Afghanistan's ruling People's Democratic party (PDP) and threatened them with expulsion from the party, diplomatic sources said here yesterday.

In a speech to party activists in Kabul after he returned from his first official visit to the Soviet Union, the Afghan leader said those not working for the good of the party would be expelled "even if they had been heroes in the past."

The sources said observers in Kabul saw this as a possible forerunner to the expulsion of past and present military commanders belonging to the party's Khalq (Masses) factions hostile to President Karmal and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

The Afghan leader, who returned to Kabul on Nov. 5, heads the rival Parcham (Flag) faction.

In his Nov. 13 speech which was later broadcast by Kabul Radio, President Karmal called for party discipline and "unity in thought, conscience, honour, words and deeds."

Main Target

The sources said Interior Minister Mohammad Gulabzoi, a leader of the Khalq faction, was regarded as the main target of the attack against party dissidents.

According to earlier diplomatic reports, members of the Khalq faction were said in Kabul to have obtained arms from the Interior Ministers and police stores and set up underground units.

In the broadcast monitored here this week, President Karmal spoke of eternal friendship and solidarity with the Soviet Communist Party.

He said some party officials were abusing their position and warned dissidents that factionalism would never be tolerated.

"Compromise with this kind of situation is impossible," he said.

Military Front

On the military front, the sources said air activity over Kabul was high in the past week and military convoys continued to rumble through the streets at night.

They said a convoy was seen returning from the Ghazni area south of Kabul last week with damaged tanks on 15 transporters. The sources said five Afghan and two Russians were killed on the night of November 14-15 when Soviet soldiers forcibly entered a house in the Kharte Parwan district of Kabul. Some reports said the soldiers were looking for girls but other reports said they only tried to take away valuable objects.

Police instructed Afghan eyewitnesses to say that anti-Government rebels were responsible, according to the sources.--Reuter.

Visits Wakhan District

Reuter adds:

Kabul Radio said yesterday that Afghan President Babrak Karmal had visited the Wakhan district of Afghanistan's northeastern province of Badakhashan which borders the Soviet Union.

There have been Press reports that the Soviet Union is in the process of annexing the largely-uninhabited 300 square km (115 sq mile) Wakhan corridor, which points towards China in the east between Pakistan and the Soviet Union.

It did not give a date for the visit by the Afghan leader who returned to Kabul on Nov. 5 after a 20-day visit to the Soviet Union.

CSO: 4920

SOVIET DELEGATION ARRIVES IN KABUL

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Nov 80 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Nov. 13--A high-powered Soviet delegation arrived in the Afghan capital yesterday to take part in the 21st frontier sessions of the two countries, Radio Kabul said. The delegation includes Soviet cartographers.

Meanwhile, well-informed Afghan dissident sources here said that the delegation might be refixing the boundaries between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. There were reports that the Soviet Union was keen to bring certain areas, bordering China within its boundary for the strategic importance of the area.

The delegation was met at the airport by Bahpole Bahrose, President-General of the Afghan Cartographic Department, the radio said in its Pushtu news bulletin monitored here.

A number of high ranking Afghan military officials were also present.

Fighting

According to a report from Kandhar Mujahideen destroyed one tank near Sdahk waa gas station on November 10.

Russian planes bombed the new and old sections of the Kandhar city which caused civilian casualties.

A report from Takhar province said that Mujahideen destroyed one tank and 28 trucks in a day-long fighting with Russian troops.

They also captured some food supplies in another incident in which six Russian soldiers were killed.

According to another report Mujahideen destroyed two tanks by mines in Yendara of Takhar province.--AFP/PPI

CSO: 4920

POSSIBILITY OF NEW SOVIET OFFENSIVE VIEWED

Karachi DAWN in English 21 Nov 80 p 4

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Nov 20: Soviet helicopter activity has been stepped up around Kabul in what could amount to a new offensive against the guerillas in Afghanistan, Western diplomatic sources said here today.

They said that on Nov 15 the Kabul Defence Ministry announced joint ground and air manoeuvres in Kabul, Parwan, Ghazni and Nangarhar provinces.

Dozen's of Soviet helicopter gunships took to the air from Kabul and the activity was still continuing yesterday alongwith high-flying Soviet jet fighters and bombers; the sources said.

Joint Soviet-Afghan military contingents were reported conducting searches of villages for guerillas, and in Wardak province, west of Kabul, Soviet forces shelled a suspected guerilla encampment, the sources said.

Soviet forces had also tried for the fourth time to invade the Panjshir Valley north-east of Kabul and were met with the usual stiff resistance by guerillas in four days of fighting, the sources said.

Villages near Kandahar in southern Afghanistan were reported to have been bombed by Soviet helicopters and jets, they said.

Kabul residents were woken during the night of Nov 10-11 by loud explosions from a battle that lasted seven hours in Hudkhel village on the outskirts of the capital.

Office workers travelling into Kabul the next day said they saw about a dozen bodies lying near a wall in the village which was surrounded by troops, the sources said.

The guerillas were reported to have attacked a police station at Kart-i-Nau near the village the same night and to have lost five men in the encounter though claiming the same number of dead among Afghan soldiers who fought them.

Another group of guerillas tried to blow up a nearby thermal power station but were discovered and chased away the sources said.

The sources confirmed earlier diplomatic reports that a family of Afghans and two Soviet soldiers were killed last week when Russian troops forcibly entered a house in Kabul.

They said the home was that of a judicial official of the Afghan Government Interior Ministry who had just returned from leading a group of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca.

A group of Soviet soldiers entered the house and killed the official, his wife, mother and three daughters. The official's son was reported to have evaded the soldiers by hiding under a quilt in the bathroom the sources said.

Some reports said the Russians were looking for girls, but other reports said the tried to take away valuable objects.

The sources said Soviet officers who were called to the scene by a police patrol shot and killed two of the marauding Soviet soldiers on the spot.

Police had been told by the authorities to blame the incident on the guerillas, the sources said.

Kabul bus drivers refused to drive to the north on Nov 19 until guaranteed safe passage after a Soviet patrol was reported to have killed a bus driver and three passengers, the sources said.

At Jubal Serak on the same highway on Nov 14, a traveller reported seeing a burnt-out truck and the bodies of more than a dozen Afghan youths wearing the scarf of the Afghan Young Pioneers, a youth wing of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

The sources quoted the traveller as saying the youths had been attacked by guerillas who escaped with a number of sub-machine-guns.

One Million Killed

According to eminent Afghan intellectual and recent defector from the Kabul regime of Mr Karmal, about one million Afghans have been killed in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion last December and an equal number of them have fled their country.

"The Russians are brutally killing the Afghan people," he said in interview with the "Voice of America" in New York.

Before fleeing from Afghanistan Mr Paktiawal was a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Education. He was the deputy leader of the Afghan delegation to the UNESCO conference held in Belgrade, where he denounced the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and defected to West Germany.

Mr Paktiawal told "VOA" that the Soviet Union wanted to dominate on every walk of life in Afghanistan. He added: "The Soviet Union has full control over all the Afghan mass media and for the achievement of its objectives and interests, it has completely changed the syllabus of the schools."

As he put it, the Soviet Union was violating "our human rights, taking advantage of our natural resources and is thrusting its system of government on our people."

He said that in his opinion the UNESCO conference was the best place where the world could be informed of these facts.

Mr Paktiawal said the Soviet soldiers were killing the people without any discrimination. "The Soviet Union doesn't care for anything. It is destroying the whole valleys and villages, don't care for even small children, ladies and for elder people."

He added that the Soviet Union was destroying everything. In spite of all this, the people of Afghanistan were fighting with the old type of guns and even with spades, and they would resist and fight until the last Soviet soldier remained in Afghanistan. They would continue to resist to bring an end to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Mr Paktiawal said that some of the Afghan cities were under the control of the Russians while the rest of the country was controlled by the resistance forces. The Afghan officials could not travel from one city to the other by road, and in any case they had to travel by air.

He confirmed the reports that the Soviet soldiers belonging to Central Asian areas had fled and joined the Afghan Muslim rebels. He added: "When the Soviet Union realised that the Soviet Muslim soldiers had sympathy with resisting Afghans, they called them back from Afghanistan."--Reuter/APP

CSO: 4920

MANY SOVIET OFFICIALS KILLED BY MUJAHIDEEN

Karachi DAWN in English 23 Nov 80 pp 1, 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Nov 22: Freedom fighters and opponents of the Moscow-installed Afghan regime have murdered several Soviet and Afghan officials in Kabul in recent weeks, Afghan and diplomatic sources said in Delhi today.

Unknown assailants killed the Principal of a junior high school, and assassinated an Afghan official outside the Ministry of Education this week, diplomats said.

Officials in Kabul did not know whether the assassins of the two men, both members of President Babrak Karmal's Parcham or flag faction of the ruling Marxist People's Party, were members of the opposing Khalq, or people's faction or urban guerillas. There were no further details of the killings.

Reports of cooperation between Khalqis, who oppose Karmal on several issues, including the continuing presence of 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and insurgents engaged in a two-year-old anti-Soviet guerilla war have increased, diplomats said.

Unidentified guerillas burned down Wazir Akbar Khan high school in Karte Parwan about three weeks ago, Afghan sources who travelled recently from Kabul, said.

Student activists circulated secret night letters to other students at the high school urging them to go on strike around the same time, they said.

Guerillas also set fire to the 20,000 square-foot Kabul Customs House in the north-eastern industrial area of the capital last week, they reported. Officials rushed firefighting equipment to the Government building and roped off the area. The extent of damage was not known.

Guerillas shot down an official of Kabul province identified as Mohammad Humza and burned his jeep in Qalai Murad Baig, about 25 miles from the capital this week, the Afghan sources reported.

Guerillas also attacked armed parchamite civil patrolemen the night of Nov 15 in Dasht-i-Bachi, just west of Kabul, killing six men, and escaped with their Kalishnakov rifles, diplomats said.

Mujahideen killed 6 officers, 17 non-commissioned officers and 20 defence personnel and destroyed 2 tanks near Lashkargah in Helmand province.

According to latest reports in Parwan province, Mujahideen offered stiff resistance to the Soviet-Afghan joint operation in Yurchi area near Bagram and killed 3 officers and wounded 14 officers and sepoys on Wednesday night.

Mujahideen who attacked the provincial headquarters of charikar last week, killed and wounded 11 sepoys and released all the prisoners from the provincial jail.

Mujahideen also ambushed a convoy on the main highway and destroyed 6 vehicles.

In Farah province, Mujahideen fired upon Soviet advisers in Dilaram killing 4 advisers on the spot.

PRESIDIUM

The Presidium of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan today approved a report by Afghan President Babrak Karmal on his "historic" 21-day visit to the Soviet Union, Kabul radio reported.

The report was endorsed "wholeheartedly", and was called a "historic step" which would have "international and internal repercussions beneficial to the Afghan people", the state-owned radio said in its Pushto language news bulletin monitored here.

The seven-member Presidium also approved a speech delivered by Mr Karmal at the party meeting after his return from the Soviet Union on November 5, the radio said.—PPI/UPI/AFP

CSO: 4920

KARMAL REGIME POSTPONES OFFENSIVE AGAINST FREEDOM-FIGHTERS

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 17 Nov 80 p 3

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Nov. 16: The Soviet-backed Afghan government has postponed any major offensive against Afghan freedom-fighters until next March and instead will use the time for a domestic reorganisation programme on three fronts—party, military and administration, area experts close to the Indian Foreign Ministry said.

The decision climaxed a series of developments that followed the return of Afghan President Babrak Karmal to Kabul on Nov 5 after a 21-day 'friendship visit' to the Soviet Union, the experts said quoting diplomatic reports from the Afghan capital.

The decisions were endorsed at the fourth plenum of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) which met in the Afghan capital last Tuesday.

The domestic reorganisation programme would be aimed at eliminating counter-revolutionary infiltrators and to further strengthen the bonds of friendship and military cooperation between Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, the experts said.

Afghan military officers would be sent to the Soviet Union in greater number for advanced training in combat tactics.

Meanwhile, Afghan army units would undertake manoeuvres in some of the Afghan provinces to test and check the interactions of different Afghan army units, the experts said quoting reports.

The emphasis at the fourth plenary session, which was attended by cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, members of the revolutionary council and the central committee of the party, was laid on reorganisation of the party, political indoctrination and induction of young Afghans into the party and the army, cleaning up the administration by replacing officials of suspect loyalty by dedicated partymen and further centralising power in the Prime Minister and the President, both posts now being held by Karmal.

During the session, some members called for party unity, but interestingly, Karmal abstained from making any reference to the unity issue, the sources said.

The session reiterated its earlier stand that the limited contingent of Soviet troops would continue to stay in Afghanistan, until al leo-called foreign aggressions against the country ceased.

Detailed references were made by Karmal and other participants to the outside interference in Afghan affairs.

On the issue of a political solution the session unanimously resolved that the May 14 peace proposal should be the basis for any negotiations.

The sources here could not give further details on military strategy against the freedom-fighters discussed at the plenum.

However, well informed Afghan dissident sources in the Indian capital insist that during the fourth plenary session some important Soviet-Afghan agreements have been formalised. However, there was no confirmation either from diplomatic sources or the Indian Foreign Ministry.

The third plenum which was held in the Afghan capital on July 23 had taken a series of important military decisions.

The 652,000 square kms (252,000 square miles) Afghanistan was divided into seven military zones for operations against the freedom-fighters decision to strengthen security forces, raising of volunteer force and defence committees were also taken.—AFP.

CSO: 4920

MUJAHIDEEN FREE 58 WOMEN PRISONERS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 18 Nov 80 p 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Nov. 17: Afghan insurgents raided a women's prison north of Kabul last week, released all 58 inmates and killed several guards accused of supplying the convicts to entertain Soviet troops, a report from Afghanistan said yesterday.

Other guards helped in the release of the women last Monday from the prison at Charikar, the capital of Parwan Province, 65 kilometres north of the capital, said a source in Kabul who in the past has been accurate.

A protest strike against the slaying of five bus drivers by Russian soldiers has halted all bus service on the main north-south highway from Kabul through the Salang Pass Tunnel to the Soviet border, the report from Afghanistan continued.

It said the drivers were killed last Nov. 8 in a dispute over Russian demands to supply them hashish at a bus stop at Kenjan, 150 kilometres north of Kabul near the north portal of the tunnel.

Guerillas in Paktia Province continued to block a long caravan of trucks loaded with firewood for Kabul, now feeling the first blasts of winter, the report said. Not a single firewood truck has moved to the capital from Paktia since Nov.8 despite efforts by Afghan and Soviet troops to clear the road, it added.

The latest Kabul report said firewood was selling there for as much as 150 Afghanis (3.75 dollars) for seven kilograms (15.4 pounds), nearly 10 times normal price.

Hizbi-Islami Afghanistan reports from Kandooz Province that the Mujahideen attacked the project of water supply in Khanabad District, as a result two Parchamis watchmen at the project, were killed, one tank installed in front of the project for safety was destroyed.

The Press release of the Hizbi Islami further said the same day one highranking official of Karmel Regimewas captured alive. He was executed by the Mujahideen's summary Islamic court.

Reports from Logar province say the Mujahideen captured and executed 15 spies and pro-Russian elements. -APA/PPI

CSO: 4920

MUJAHIDEEN AMBUSH SOVIET CONVOYS

In Logar Province

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 13 Nov 80 p 8

[Text] New Delhi, Nov. 12--Guerillas fought three battles with combined Soviet and Afghan forces in Logar province, south of Kabul last week, diplomatic sources said here today.

They said that on Nov. 5 a unit of Afghan provincial militia moved into Logar to attack a suspected guerilla camp, but was repulsed by superior guerilla forces.

Soviet helicopter-gunships were called in and these scattered the guerillas, the sources said.

But the following day the guerillas ambushed a Soviet reinforcement convoy and using anti-tank weapons and Molotov cocktails claimed to have destroyed 95 vehicles, the sources said. They added that the guerilla claim was probably exaggerated.

Other reports said the guerillas were successful largely because 600 Afghan militia men defected to them with their weapons during the first battle.

Soviet Copter Downed

The sources said that in a separate encounter near Zeididad in Logar province on Nov. 6, the guerillas, according to an unconfirmed report, managed to shoot down a Soviet helicopter with a ground-to-air rocket.

The weapon was probably a Soviet surface-to-air rocket brought to the guerillas by defecting Afghan troops, the sources said.

Heightened level of Soviet helicopter activity in and out of Kabul continued and on most nights long convoys, including tracked vehicles, could be heard passing through the capital, the sources said.

Ambushes

Apart from the battles in Logar, there were also consistent reports of successful guerilla ambushes in Paktia province over the past two weeks, the sources said.

Soviet and Afghan forces were said to have sustained losses in the ambushes and the guerillas to have captured arms, ammunition and food supplies.--Reuter

Afghan Troops Killed

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 15 Nov 80 p 3

[Text] Quetta, Nov. 14--The freedom fighters claimed to have killed three soldiers, captured four army officers of Afghan army and destroyed an armoured car during a fight in the area of Spin Baldu (Kandahar province).

According to a Press release issued here today by the Hizb-i-Islam, Afghanistan (Yunis Khali's group), the Mujahideen ambushed a convoy and gunned down two officers besides destroying a tank and a weapon carrier in the area of Arkhandad (Kandahar province).

Moreover the Mujahideen raided a hospital in Talkan city, the headquarters of Takhar province and injured surgeon in charge.

A tank was blown out on the Jalalabad-Talkan road in the area of Nangurhar province during an attack on a convoy. This attack was conducted by Mujahideen commander Awal Khan.

According to another Press release issued by the Harkat-e-Inqilab Islami-i-Afghanistan, the freedom fighters during a grim fighting in the area of Qila Musa, killed 80 troops of the Russian backed Afghan army.

A Mujahid lost his life there. Besides, the freedom fighters destroyed three tanks in the area of Roshaink where the Afghan army had attacked the Mujahideen with its full vigour.--PPI

CSO: 4920

REBEL RESISTANCE TO GOVERNMENT SEEN WANING

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Nov 80 p 9

[Article by Fred Halliday]

[Text]

NOOR Ahmad Noor, the second secretary of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, and other government officials describe the period since last December as "the new phase" of the Afghan revolution, one in which they are trying to reverse the "disastrous" policies of the previous President, Hafizullah Amin. This means among other things, playing down the more outspokenly revolutionary claims.

Land reform has been put in abeyance, the programme of forced education for rural women has been stopped, and the red flag introduced by Amin has been replaced by a version of the pre-revolutionary banner. Three non-party ministers have been appointed and, according to some sources, there has been an end to policies of torture and arbitrary education pursued under Amin.

The greatest problem the Afghan Government faces is the continuing disagreement between the Khalq and Parcham factions of the ruling party. Officially, the try and to execute 17 former Amin associates implicated in his reign of terror.

But the Khalqis remain a powerful force in the party. While disclaiming Amin, they remain loyal to the memory of the late President Taraki and criticise the Parchamis for excessive reliance on the Russians. They support the Soviet role in removing Amin last December, but believe that it would have been better if the Russians had then quickly withdrawn again.

Signs of continued Khalqi influence can be seen throughout government-controlled areas; a Khalqi slogan even adorns the walls of Alexander the Great's former

two factions have reunited, but the now-dominant Parchamis blame the Khalqis for many of Afghanistan's problems and insist that it was "popular anger" which led them to fortress in Herat.

Several prominent Khalqis remain in government posts and they probably remain dominant in the armed forces. The Parchamis insist that it was the brutally enforced reforms of the Khalqis that turned the population against the revolution, and one official told me that, in his subprovince of 4,500 people in central Afghanistan, 36 peasants who owned a bit more land than the others had been taken away and summarily shot on Amin's orders. Undoubtedly, Amin was partly responsible for dissipating the goodwill which Afghan revolutionaries enjoyed in the first months after they came to power.

According to Noor Ahmad Noor, the key to solving the crisis in Afghanistan and to preparing the ground for a withdrawal of Soviet troops is to be found in direct talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Noor insists that the Soviet forces will remain in Afghanistan for as long as the rebels receive external aid.

His remarks support those of many other officials who met during a week's visit to Afghanistan. Yet the official view is also that rebel activity has fallen off considerably since June and July, and that the rebel forces have now broken up into groups of one or two dozen men who are avoiding direct clashes with Afghan or Soviet forces. Recent visitors to the lower Kunduz Valley, once a centre of rebel activity, report that life there has returned to normal. In such regions as Khost and Paktia local tribal militias loyal to the Central Government are in control.

The town, too, seemed to be calm, judging from the cities of Kabul and Herat, which I visited. The streets were busy and peaceful by day, and the curfew was in force at night. There seemed to be no foundation for reports that Afghan troops at the Kabul base of Pul-i-Sharqi had recently mutinied.

Meanwhile, President Karmel has won pledges of continued support from the Kremlin, in his recent visit to Moscow.—*The Muslim-Guardian Service.*

CSO: 4920

KABUL CRACKDOWN ON UNIVERSITY STUDENTS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Nov 80 p 8

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Nov. 10: A large number of Kabul university students have been arrested during the past four months in a government crackdown on members of outlawed Islamic groups, an Afghan teacher said here today.

The teacher, who arrived from Kabul recently, told Reporters that most of the arrested students were charged with being members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood Organisation.

He said there were organised groups active on the campus, distributing anti-government pamphlets at night.

The 28-year-old Kabul university economist, who did not want to be named, said attendance in most faculties was low as many students had fled the country or had been drafted into the army.

The teacher, who is on his way to the United States, said that security forces had also picked up students on the streets or from their homes for conscription.

EGYPTIAN AID: Egypt has been giving military aid to Afghan resistance fighters in Afghanistan to counter the Soviet intervention, President Anwar Sadat disclosed here today.

Addressing the first meeting of the constituent assembly of the League of Muslim and Arab Peoples, President Sadat said Egypt's aid was "military as well as material and political". And he added: "The heroic Afghan resistance fighters are inflicting heavy losses on the Soviet invaders".

STEPPED UP: Hizbe-i-Islami Afghanistan has stepped up its guerilla war activities in Kandhar province causing great panic and harassment in Babrak Government circles in Afghanistan.

The organisation claimed that Kandhar was now under control of Mujahideen

A Press release said in Peshawar that on Nov. 3, two Mujahideen attacked the two government officers in Kabul gate in Kandhar city. As a result one officer was killed and one Mujahideen wounded while another martyred.

On Nov. 4, the Mujahideen exploded Rang Bridge located 15 Km to the north of Kandhar. On the following day Mujahideen attacked the government convoy in Zarang district, located near Kandahar.

On Nov. 6, the Mujahideen also attacked the Russian invading forces in Logran and Sarpoza district to the west of Kandhar city.

In this five tanks and three trucks of the Babrak' regime were destroyed, and a lot of automatic weapons have been captured as a booty by Mujahideen.--PPI/AFP Reuter

CSO: 4920

MOVEMENT OF AFGHAN ARMY EXAMINED

Karachi DAWN in English 21 Nov 80 p 7

[Article by Brig. A.R. Siddiqi (Retd)]

[Text]

ACCORDING to a front-page story datelined New Delhi, Nov. 15, Kabul Radio announced major military exercises from November 16 in four Afghan provinces where anti-government guerillas have been active.

The radio, monitored in New Delhi, said: "All forces would be moved" to the provinces of Parwan, Ghazni, Nangarhar and Kabul. "Exercises and manoeuvres" will be held by air and land forces.

There are two main types of military exercises — with and without troop or TEWT (tactical exercise without troops — pronounced Tuoot). A TEWT is a sand-model or map-room exercise like a game of chess involving hypothetical situations, moves and counter-moves — mental arithematic in short. A collective exercise with troops involves moving bodies and things physically and deploying them on the ground, in the air and on water. Such an exercise could be either one-sided, with an imaginary enemy, or two-sided with a real enemy to counter the moves of own forces and thus to train them in various phases of war, e.g., advance-to-contact, attack, defence, withdrawal, etc.

Collective exercises or manoeuvres, in abnormal conditions such as are obtaining in Afghanistan today, are also held to move and pre-position men and war materials in selected areas in anticipation of a military operation against a likely internal or external threat. Assembly (dumping) and concentration (deployment) areas, close to the border, are selected for moving men and material up front when required.

Coming almost in a chain sequence and at the heels of the three Afghan air raids into Pakistan, the reported garrisoning of the Wakhan corridor by the Soviet troops; the extended stay of Babrak Karmal in Moscow and his tirade against Pakistan on his return from there, the on-going Afghan military manoeuvres so close to the Pakistan borders, are significant if not sinister.

While one should firmly resist the temptation of jumping to conclusions, one can ignore a plausible hypothesis in an unpredictably difficult situation only at one's own cost.

Leonid Brezhnev's projected visit to New Delhi early in December together with Mrs Indira Gandhi's recent acerbic utterances about Pakistan (reminding it the 1971 debacle and of India's magnanimity in vacating captured territories and releasing over 90,000 POWs) leave enough to one's imagination which should best be restrained without being curbed.

Accidents

Now a mere look at the map would show that the areas selected by the Afghan armed forces for their winter manoeuvres, make a rough arc in a south-easterly direction. Ghazni forms the southern-most part of the arc and is also relatively deep inside to serve as the rear area to support operation further east close to the Pak-Afghan borders.

Furthermore, the activated arc lies right below the northern tier topped by Badakhshan (at the mouth of Wahan now being garrisoned by Soviet troops), which together with Kundua, Baghlan, Kunar, Nangarhar, etc., have been the scene of some of the fiercest battles with the government forces.

The question is why the Afghan armed forces should have selected only this part of the country for their manoeuvres. Are there no training areas available in the rest of the country? On the face of it, at any rate, it would not look particularly well advised to hold manoeuvres along the hottest part of the border.

Suppose an accident occurs? In view of the fact that the air force is also taking part in the manoeuvres, it would be surprising if accidents do not occur — what with simple navigational errors, a plane crashing and falling down or an old artillery shell landing on the wrong side of the border.

One hopes that the Afghan mobilisation along the eastern border is not a prelude to the hot pursuit of the insurgents but the possibility cannot be overlooked.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

SOVIET BOMBING NEAR HERAT--London, Nov. 16--Soviet bombing on villages near Herat city in Afghanistan has claimed a heavy toll, according to BBC report tonight. The radio quoted eye-witnesses as saying that over 50 villages have been destroyed and many dead bodies were still lying beneath debris causing stinking odour. The eye-witnesses also said that the attacks were carried out by the Soviets themselves. Since August last, Herat was under control of Mujahideen but now the Soviets have succeeded in restoring their hold on the city. BBC report said a third attack by Russians to drive out Mujahideen from Panjsher valley has proved fruitless. The Soviet armoured units have also launched fresh attacks on Mujahideen of Paktia Province, who have been consistently carrying out ambushes. Recently there have been reports of acute shortage of firewood in Kabul. Its prices have shot up beyond purchasing power of most of the population. BBC reported three clashes during the night between Mujahideen and the Soviet troops in Kabul during the preceding week and on Wednesday a car of secret police service was set on fire in broad daylight.--PPI [Text] [Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 17 Nov 80 p 1]

MUJAHIDEEN CONTROL KANDHAR--Islamabad, Nov. 9--One of the three major Afghan cities, Kandhar, has gone out of the control of the Soviet troops and the Afghan Government forces, Radio Teheran reported. A diplomat who recently visited Kandhar city situated in the south of Afghanistan, has compared its situation with Herat city, where the Soviet intervention is being resisted and which is still under the control of Mujahideen. According to the diplomat, the Soviet and Afghan troops have abandoned their intention to seize the city because in such an attempt they will have to sustain a lot of loss of life. Meanwhile, Hezbi-i-Islami Afghanistan has reported that Mujahideen attacked a Russian convoy which was on its way from Ghazni to Urgun district located east of Ghazni at a distance of 50 km near the Sarawza area. The fighting started on 3rd of Nov. and continued for five days. The Russian forces were reinforced thrice in order to break down the encirclement by the Mujahideen in which 12 tanks were destroyed and five trucks burnt. In another clash in the area of Kachoor Salar of Alinagar district, six tanks were destroyed and a large number of Russian troops were killed by the Mujahideen.--APP/PPI [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 10 Nov 80 p 1]

AFGHAN SECRET POLICE IN DELHI--New Delhi, Nov. 17--Members of the Afghan secret police have arrived in New Delhi, apparently to foil any attempt by Afghan exiles to stage protests when Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev visits India next month, Afghan opposition sources said. President Brezhnev is expected here on December 8 for a five-day official visit and Afghanistan is likely to be a major topic in talks with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The sources said Afghans living in Delhi who include former government officials, had identified at least five members of the secret police who had, they said, arrived recently from Kabul to infiltrate the estimated 6,000-strong Afghan community here.--Reuter. [Text] [Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 18 Nov 80 p 2]

CSO: 4920

REAGAN VIEWED AS NEW FALSE PROPHET

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 12 Nov 80 p 2

[Editorial: "Harmful Insects and Reagan's Election"]

[Text]

TEHRAN – The evening daily Ettela'at in its 'political analysis of the day' carried the following article written by Hessameddin Emami who is a famous commentator:

Four years have not still passed since the appearance of the first 'supporter' of Human Rights when the puppet show of the U.S. presidential elections presented to 'humanity' its second protector of 'Human Rights'.

Four years ago in the course of the U.S. presidential elections, Jimmy Carter, in order to defeat his opponents and to bamboozle the public, resorted to the same means that the Spanish colonialists did five centuries ago to deceive the American Indians and to penetrate that large continent. Carter, with the consultation of his advisor, Brezezinsky while carrying the Bible in one hand and what was called 'Human Rights' in the other, made his attempts to win the elections.

Those who still remember the former U.S. presidential elections four years ago know how Carter took the lead in the elections following the 'Watergate' scandal. Carter clothed himself in the holy garments the revival of 'ethics and spirituality' and the ancient criteria of American Christianity and so created a 'mission' for himself. He claimed that the materialist society of the United States could be rescued from the complicated worldy problems only through such remedies. Carter believed that the 'Watergate' scandal created by Nixon could be covered up just only by taking such measures. With the achievements he gained in the first stage he changed his 'mission' to an international one and exposed himself to the world in the guise of a new supporter of 'Human Rights'.

Nonetheless, only a few months after beginning his administration Carter's charm of 'Human Rights' stopped short of bewitching the masses and all his policies, either in Europe or the Latin America or the Middle and Far East revealed that he was indeed a real successor to Nixon.

Carter's policies vis-a-vis Iran and Palestine as well as Nicaragua exposed the diabolic face of Washington and revealed the real intentions of the White House pontiff of spiritualities and 'Human Rights.'

Now that four years have passed revealing the hollowness of any alleged concern by America for 'Human Rights', Ronald Reagan, the former cowboy actor of the United States and the new successor of Carter, in his most recent interview speaks of 'Human Rights' and gives the world the good tidings of the appearance of a new false prophet.

He has labelled as 'terrorists' the oppressed nation of Palestine which has been fighting for 35 years with the hope of returning to their rightful homeland. He considers 30 million U.S. Blacks and other minorities as being 'second class' citizens of this land. He is against an independent Palestine and against any negotiations with Palestinians.

Since notorious supporters of Zionism like Kissinger, General Alexander Haig and Senator Henry Jackson are close advisors and aides of Reagan, therefore, one of the main foundations of his 'Human Rights' policy includes the support for Zionism.

Consultation with the European allies and NATO members, and supporting owners of the American industries, to whom Reagan owes his victory in the elections, is another sign that the second pillar of his government would be based on strengthening militarism and Western military domination.

The decrease of welfare and development expenditures in the budget of the United States, the strengthening of racial discrimination of ignoring the rights of the oppressed in the interests of the oppressors is once again leading this country back to the policies of 30 years ago. In this way the revival of reaction is the third pillar of Reagan's government.

For these reasons, although he has not entered the White House, the agents of force and the statesmen of subservient reactionary regimes are tripping over each other in their haste to congratulate him. Israel expects further support from the Reagan side. Sadat has hoped that the 'active and positive' role of the United States in establishing peace in the Middle East would continue as before! King Khalid of Saudi Arabia has welcomed Reagan's election most warmly and expressed worry over the present state of 'peace' throughtout the world.

More interesting are the statements of 'Habib Chatti' the Secretary General of the Islamic Countries Conference. Chatti while expressing his 'sincere congratulations' had commented that Reagan could be 'better' fellow for the Arab and the Islamic World!!

Thus, Reagan's election despite its overall disadvantage to himanity has had certain side benefits, that is, it has revealed the hypocrisy of the so-called 'neutral' statemen.

'Harmful insects' either in Iran or other parts of the world which the United States considers the 'regions of its interests' have been inspired with new life and have started an offensive and mysterious movement, which is a warning to all revolutionaries particularly to those of Iran to be more alert.

Now that we are in war with the infidel Ba'athist regime of Iraq and under circumstances that, due to the extraordinary situation there are deficiencies and shortcomings, the hope of Washington's client has increased. They considered Carter an ineffective vehicle of their interests and have considered their hopes in Ronald Reagan.

But fortunately, the Revolution's eyes are open and while it spends its energy in thwarting the latest conspiracy of the United States on the Iraq-Iran border, is also aware of what transpires 'behind of the front' and of the frenetic activity of certain noxious insects.

CSO: 4920

MOJAHEDIN ASSIGNED SA'ADATI TO EXPOSE CIA AGENTS

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 15 Nov 80 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN — Mohammad Reza Sa'adati was reported having revealed Tuesday that he was assigned by the left-wing Mujahedeen-e-Khalq organization to head operations intended to hunt and track down local networks of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and had been in contacts with an official in the Soviet Embassy in Iran that led to discovery of an assassination attempt underway on Imam Khomeini's life.

Sa'adati repeated his complaint in many sessions of his trial on charges of spying for the Soviet Union that inspite of his desperate appeals to the court for a lawyer to defend the file, he was being denied his lawyer's presence.

He said that atleast 10 persons were killed on the prolongation of the case and he did not want any more political pressures exerted on the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq organization, of which he is a member, by halting the court proceedings any longer.

Sa'adati, pleading to extend the allowed time-limit of only 7 1/2 hours to defend himself said that he could not properly defend himself without the presence of a defending lawyer and was bound to make a mess of his defenses, but preferred to carry on with the proceedings in order not to prolong the trial.

The Pars news agency, reporting another of his trial session late evening Wednesday, reported Sa'adati as having confessed that the first meeting with the contact, a Soviet journalist, took place in the house of the other Mujaheds "Rezais" regarded as "family of martyrs" by the organization.

Pars said the Revolutionary Prosecutor, Lajvardi, then read few documents procured from the Tehran's U.S. Embassy which identified Sa'adati's Russian contact as "Finseeko" who was reported being conversant in both Farsi and English and a member of the Soviet secret service agency-the KGB and "did not have any interest in political questions." Sa'adati's trial is still continued.

The agency reported two "recessions" were called forth by the court during the 6th and 7th sessions of Sa'adati's trial that continued Thursday.

The Mujahed was reported having told the court that the meetings resulted on the proposition of the left-wing group and as a consequence of the first move initiated by "the Journalist and Cultural member of Russia."

The prosecutor told that Sa'adati conducted "an illegal study" of his own file, took microfilms of all its pages and sent it to "Russia."

Sa'adati retorted with counter objections to the "method of investigations" carried out by the court and announced that he declared those pages "devoid of value" since "these were prepared under pressure and torture" applied on Sa'adati during his imprisonment for about 1½ year period.

The head of the court asked the Mujahed to provide clarifications on "the Soviet spy's questions on the Tudeh Party, Fedayeen-e-Khalq, Kordestan's episodes, and Shariatmadari."

Sa'adati referred to "pro-Shariatmadari" demonstrations and said the Mujahedeen-e-Khalq organization kept itself aloof on these matters... and Pars said that at this point the court called for a "recession" since there was "not enough time for further clarifications on the remaining issues."

CSO: 4920

ESHRAGHI REVIEWS ASPECTS OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 12 Nov 80 pp 1, 4

[Text]

TEHRAN -- Three groups are responsible for sullying the Islamic Revolution and showing it up as what it really is not, said Ayatollah Eshraghi, the son-in-law of Revolutionary Leader Imam Khomeini, in a recent interview with the Persian daily 'Kayhan.'

Of the first group, Eshraghi said, were those who had no sympathy for Islamic Revolutionary aims whatever but were intent on exploiting the Islamic Revolution to fulfill their personal material gains. Such individuals, he described as opportunists.

A second group described by Eshraghi were those who made actual contributions to the Islamic Revolution and in the overthrow of the deposed shah. While this contribution is recognized, he said, it has to be asked whether their opposition was from motives of a sincere struggle against oppression and in the cause of God and Islam, or whether it was a hope that the struggle would bring them ulterior benefits.

It is possible that these strugglers only wished to gain high rank and diplomatic position, or simply a monopoly of power after the success of the revolution, Eshraghi said, and these persons in the second group were monopolists who were bringing discredit on the real revolutionaries.

Of the third group of really dedicated revolutionaries Eshraghi said their interests in perpetuating the Islamic Revolution was fired with fervor and zeal for Islam, but unfortunately tended to excesses which distorted the image of the Islamic Revolution.

Their actions tended to show up the Islamic Revolution as hard, inflexible and uncompromising in the extreme, he said, pointing in particular to certain judges who had issued judgments that appeared to be unreasonable.

Eshraghi of course held closely to the line of Islamic deterrent punishments, saying that for example the cutting of a hand as a punishment for theft tended to inculcate a salutary fear and has proved a successful form of deterrent punishment according to Islamic Law. He said that such stern laws were necessary in order to maintain a healthy society.

However, he was critical of those who had enforced punishments that were not in conformity with the canons of Islamic Law and had been meted out indiscriminately at the whims of those judges.

Ayatollah Eshraghi took up at the interview a discussion on the topic of faith and expertise. He confirmed that expertise, when required as an essential advantage, combined with faith as a form of progressive knowledge brought increased benefits to society necessary for its development.

He further said that he was in complete agreement with the need for expertise among government members who already had faith.

When Ayatollah Eshraghi was asked about exporting of the Islamic Revolution, he said it was important for Iran to have the best of relations with the rest of the world from all points of view and this would be one of the best means for impressing on them the benefits and richness of the Islamic Revolution.

Besides, it was important for Iran to have economic and industrial relations with other countries in the world so that Iran could individually develop its own industrial strength, contributing to self-sufficiency and self-reliance. But he had the strongest reservations on compromises with the superpowers or any other country if having relations with them meant giving up the prime Iranian goal of preserving its self-reliance and independence.

In concluding his interview Eshraghi said all his comments had been made with the purpose of harmonizing and bringing about solidarity within society. Constructive criticism even among Moslems is not to be spurned but is a thing of necessity, so that it will lead to self-examination and improvement of conditions, he said, adding that it was more necessary now than ever in these sensitive times.

Ayatollah Eshraghi said he hoped that after the war was over the nation would be able to settle down to a period in which it can address itself to internal problems and have no fear of constructive criticism for improvement of conditions in an effort to better society.

CSO: 4920

FOUNDATION DISTRIBUTES PLOTS OF LAND

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 12 Nov 80 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN -- The Housing Foundation has distributed 125,000 plots of land among the residents of the provinces and 15,000 plots of land among residents of Tehran since October 14, declared the Minister of Housing and Urban Development, Engineer Gonabadi, in his report to the Majlis yesterday.

One item on the agenda of yesterday's open session of the Majlis was a review of the activities of the Housing Foundation since October 14, the day it passed under the direction of the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development.

Gonabadi continuing with his report, also declared that from October 14 onwards, the Foundation has completed 10,000 buildings for the poor which were partially constructed and repaired 10,000 other buildings.

The Housing Foundation has granted 240 million rials in interest free loans; loaned 700 million rials at one per cent interest; and lent 300 million rials at four per cent interest.

In addition to these sums, the Foundation has given 200 million rials in outright grants to the poor for use in purchasing construction materials, he said.

As his concluding point, Gonabadi referred to Article 85 of the Constitution and proposed that the Majlis appoint delegates to deal with the housing problem in the country.

The Majlis then directed its attention to another issue of immediate concern: the war refugees.

Majlis Speaker Hojjatoleslam Hashemi Rafsanjani reported that various deputies have referred to him and declared that their provinces are capable of accepting refugees. Rafsanjani advised that these deputies should meet with the governor generals and supervisors of their respective provinces and with the cooperation of the Ministry of the Interior, this problem would be resolved.

Speaker Rafsanjani then proposed the appointment of Engineer Ezzatollah Sahabi as the fully-authorized Majlis representative in the Commission for the Law of Protection and Development of the Industries of Iran, which the Majlis approved.

Ali Asghar Baghani, a deputy from Sabzevar, addressed the Majlis concerning his ongoing war with Iraq.

"Our nation has proved that if the war is prolonged they will endure it, relying on their complete faith in God and Islam", he said.

"Our enemy, the Ba'athist regime of Iraq, should realize that our nation is now fully prepared to face any conceivable hardship. These two years following the Revolution have developed a true revolutionary spirit in the people, which combined with their experience, enables them to confront any enemy."

CSO: 4920

U.S. REACTION TO IRAQI WAR WITH IRAN ATTACKED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 13 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by 'Abd al-Nur 'Abbud: "American Militarism Potential Threat to Gulf"]

[Text] American militarism, battered in lengthy encounters in Vietnam, Korea, Latin America and the Middle East, is making another show of strength in the current conflict between Iraq and Iran. In provoking the war, the Persian regime gave the United States a much-awaited opportunity to meddle in the affairs of the Gulf region and flex military muscles in a way threatening world security.

The U.S. hastened to dispatch 32 warships to the region "to protect vital interests" and encouraged other powers to assert similar military presence miles away from their countries, U.S. President Jimmy Carter, who has been for one long year begging the Khomeini regime to release the hostages, now resorted to assert irrational strength and heighten tension in the region. He failed to raise a voice of opposition when the zionist invaders got away with Arab territory which is three times as large as the 1947 partition area allotted for the zionist entity. But in the Iraq-Iran conflict, he volunteered to make explicit accusations and expressed hypocritical concern over Iran's territorial integrity as being threatened by Iraq.

Although Iraq made it clear that the war was imposed upon it and that it had no territorial ambitions in Iran, U.S. opportunism continued to brag about concern over Iranian territory with an aim not difficult to interpret. The U.S. imperialists are pinning much hope to Persian fanatics now in power to play somehow a role similar to that played by the deposed Shah in serving American aggressive stragegies.

Under apparent encouragement from zionist lobby in the U.S., Mr Carter and his Secretary of State Edmund Muskie labelled Iraq's self-defence as aggression and U.S. representative at the U.N. Security Council claimed Iraq had invaded Iran and that the invasion threatened its dismemberment. With the zionist aggression on territories of four Arab countries still abetted and encouraged by the U.S. administration and financed by U.S. tax-payers, the United States cannot claim impartiality of judgement.

Mr. Carter has now been failed by his zionist voters in spite of humiliating pledges and promises to the zionist entity. He had assured Jewish electorate he would continue his service to the zionists if he were to be elected. His campaign coincided with a new round of zionist aggressions on south Lebanon and occupation of new territories in total defiance of international law and U.N. conventions.

President-elect Reagan will reach the White House in January against a background of promises of increased assistance to the zionist entity and belligerant declarations about renewal of the arms race. This means further complications area ahead in the U.S. policy which can only increase tension in the world. As far as this region is concerned, U.S. politicians must have a second thought about their military and strategic postures or risk turning the region into a virtual hotbed for super-power rivalry and escalate world tension. This will not serve U.S. long-term interests. The hostages game and the fuss stirred about it cannot deceive the world. U.S. politicians must understand that American interests can only be served through human approach to the interests and sovereignty of other nations. If they were to presume that the reactionary regime in Iran could undertake the notorious role of a policeman serving American strategic interests in the Arab Gulf, they better recall the fate of their former policeman! Only a change of American heart can alter the image of ugly American in the Middle East. The big stick diplomacy and hooliganism on the international scene are doomed to failure, sooner or later.

CSO: 4820

IRAQ ECONOMY SAID TO BE STRONG DESPITE WAR

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 18 Nov 80 p 6

[Article by Dr Bashir A. al-Alak: "A Solid and Prosperous Economy"]

[Text]

"A good and concrete economy can never be built overnight. It requires good planning, hard work, dedication and full utilisation of resources. Besides, a healthy economy is that which remains so for generations to come." This statement is the result of a painstaking research work in the economic field conducted by the famous economist Peter Drucker.

This vitally important statement leads me to shed some light on the Iraqi economy, specially at a time when the country is engaged in a war against Iran. It should be emphasised that it is a well-known fact that the mere indication or rumour of a distant conflict between two or more countries is sufficient by itself to bring out catastrophic effects on the economies and the well being of the parties involved. Furthermore, it is inevitable that a war between the two oil producing countries can be described as an "economically damaging" one, bearing in mind that Iraq and Iran depend to a larger extent on revenues from oil for present and future development plans.

Yet, the Iraqi economy is stronger than ever before. This fact need not puzzle economic analysts and planners. One may wonder, therefore, what is the "secret" behind Iraq's healthy economy at a time when Iran's economy is suffering from disintegration, chaos and absolute bankruptcy. This article is intended to bring the facts to the open.

1. Besides its large oil reserves, Iraq has a strong agricultural base and is not nearly as dependent on foreign expertise to run its economy as in the case of Iran, whose

agricultural sector is underdeveloped and ailing. Iraq has enormous agricultural potential due to the rivers Tigris and Euphrates which give Iraq its ancient name, Mesopotamia — the land between the rivers.

2. Iraq enjoys tremendous amount of foreign reserves. Iraq could pay for all its needs for a full year without earning a cent from oil or any other source. According to International Monetary Fund statistics, Iraq's reserves were four times larger than its import bill. However, Iran's reserves have been dwindling even before the start of the war and has since been living on charities.

3. Iraq's credit rating is excellent. In his recent press conference, President Saddam Hussein told world journalists that, "We have had contacts from numerous countries and financial institutions offering their readiness and desire to loan us, but we have declined their offers." From an economic point of view, this clearly shows that Iraq enjoys an international reputation and has the trust and respect of the majority of countries of the world.

4. Unlike Iran, Iraq has a leadership capable of achieving the aspired objectives. As Peter Drucker pointed out, a good economy is not built overnight. If an economy is to remain solid and prosperous, it will certainly require good planners and thinkers behind it. It definitely needs dedication and a leadership capable of achieving long range planning objectives. As President Saddam Hussein pointed at the press conference, "We are in a strong economic situation. Our plans for this year will be carried out as scheduled, and will be fulfilled on time, and our Five-Year Plan will see the light on time too, in 1981 precisely. It will be weighed in several billions of dinars and not dollars. We will continue with our plans even if we had to do without oil revenues for the next five years. Our thirteen years of hard work, patience and perseverance are bound to reap good results."

5. Iraq's economy is unique in the sense that it has withheld periods of severe hardship, whereas the Iranian economy has been suffering from periods of ups and downs even at the best of times. In 1973, Iraq's nationalisation initiative met with great success contrary to widespread believes and convictions that the Iraqi economy could not possibly survive. The same expectations and predictions were made during the 1974 renegade pockets in Nor-

thern Iraq. Although the war against these pockets lasted for twelve months. Iraq successfully managed to win the war and achieve political & economic stability. If the economy was not solid enough, it would have collapsed in few hours, let alone months.

6. Iraq's economy enjoys what economists call a state of "Full Employment". Full employment indicates a situation where all people who wish to work are employed. In other words, the Iraqi economy can absorb increasing number of workers in an effort to enhance its structure and utilise its under capacity. While full employment indicates a high standard of living for those engaged in it, unemployment indicates a state of economic chaos and mismanagement. This characterises the Iranian economy, as hundreds of Iranians every day find themselves without jobs and securities. Persistent unemployment is the biggest threat to any country's economy and can have damaging repercussions on the well-being of its people.

7. While Iran has completely devoted itself to the war, leaving behind its other activities and completely ignoring the state of the economy, Iraq's everyday life is normal and stable. As it is stated above, the Five-Year Plan will be approved shortly and executed on time. "We do not wish to be bogged down with war, because if we do, our progress, which we value so highly, would suffer. and this, would help achieve the basic aims of those who forced the war on us, whether in Iran or outside it", President Hussein said at the press conference. This philosophy stems from the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party's deep-rooted conviction that the country must develop itself and build a solid economy capable of achieving happiness and prosperity not only. for the Iraqi people but for all Arabs everywhere. Iraq. unlike Iran, is not interested in short-term gains, but rather, in a healthy economy that our generations would be proud of.

CSO: 4820

ENEMY CAMPAIGN OF RUMORS AGAINST IRAQ ALLEGED

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 13 Nov 80 p 6

[Article by Dr Ihsan M al-Hasan: "Fruitless Effort"]

[Text] Since the beginning of the Persian racist aggression in Iraq, Persian mass media, backed by imperialist and Zionist social psychologists together with the fifth column which constitutes Persian agents and spies, reactionary elements and the enemies of Iraq's Revolution, have spread all kinds of rumours among the ordinary people. Such rumours aim at twisting facts and forging evidence to confuse people, destroy their morale and weaken their will to fight and challenge the aggression.

When the designers of rumours achieve such objectives, the enemies might have a hope of winning the psuchological war and this, consequently, enables them to realize certain victories in the military conflict. That is why our mass media during the war have to be over active in revealing the rumours, ascertaining their sources, perceiving their purposes and repulsing them publicly by providing material proofs which counteract their allegations and lies.

Rumour is an inconsistent and distorted story which constitutes hazy and contradictory information. The circulated story embodies some confused and dubious facts particularly when its details are complicated and ramified. Rumours usually appear during tragedies and general crises such as the outbreak of wars and epidemics and the occurrences of political and social conflicts and dissensions. The Persian racists and their agents have circulated many rumours among the Iraqi people during the war knowing that the war circumstances serve the purpose of misleading the people by diffusing among them fabricated stories, unconfirmed news and inconclusive details about events which concern them and evoke their emotion.

Baseless Rumours

Persian imperialist agents intended to break up Iraq's internal national solidarity and cohesion, and to weaken the cemented ties between the political leadership and the people. In so doing, they spread absurd and ridiculous rumours which claim that Iraq is suffering from sectarian conflicts and political divisions and dissentions, and that there is a keen rivalry and struggle between the leadership and certain religious sects and political groups.

False allegations like these are far from the truth. Nobody denies the coherent solidarity of the Iraqi masses and the high degree of cooperation and unification which exists among them. Nor does anyone fail to see the popularity of the Iraqi political leadership headed by President Saddam Hussein and his overwhelming backing by the masses. Such facts concerning the reality of the Iraqi internal front and the stout ties which bind the Iraqi leadership with the masses falsify the Persian imperialist rumours circulated in the country.

Moreover, the Persian imperialist agents tried to transmit some fabricated stories about the strength and superiority of the Persian racist armed forces, their alleged victories in the battle, and the damage and losses they inflicted on Iraqi military and economic institutions. All material and documentary evidence show quite categorically the tremendous triumph of the Iraqi army in the battle, its capability and efficiency in achieving its military targets in a short period of time, Its crushing success in destroying Persian military and economic installations, capturing hundreds of Persian troops, heavy military equipments including aircrafts, tanks and ships, and huge quantities of ammunition.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

LIBERATED AREAS POSTAL SERVICE--The Ministry of Transport and communications has opened four post offices in four territories liberated by Iraqi forces during its battle against the Persian aggressors. Mr. Sadoun Ghaidan, Revolution Command Council member and Minister of Transport and Communications told Iraqi News Agency yesterday that these post offices have already started offering services in their areas as well as to Iraqi fighters. The Minister pointed out that the Iraqi mail services are offered regularly and normally and that the International Post Federation has been informed of the continuity of Iraq's foreign mail services as they used to be before the Iraq-Iran conflict. The Minister also confirmed that the mail service staff that had accompanied the Iraqi forces in its march inside Iranian territories have completed installing mailing and saving boxes in Iraqi positions. It is worth mentioning that the said post offices were opened in Muhammara, Mahran, Dezful and Qasr Sheeren. [Text] [Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 18 Nov 80 p 1]

CSO: 4820

IMMIGRANT PRESSURE GROUPS DEPLORED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Dr Ram Yashi: "Community Mobilization"]

[Text] The ferment rising in the absorbtion centers mainly in the north of the country and in particular among the immigrants from the Soviet Union points up the prevalence of a difficult perception among them. There exists a feeling of great discrimination and anger over the careless and unconcerned handling in what they perceive to be their central problems. We all agree that the variety of red tape and tribulations damage the immigrants and it is the duty of those responsible to effect improvement. However, we must distinguish between this situation and two other manifestations:

1. Those immigrants who were interviewed and indicated mainly violation of economic privileges, for example: inappropriate housing conditions or wage conditions, temporary work, and the like. They should not be blamed, as it may be that those who did not know how to give them the proper response gorged them with promises that are not redeemable under the conditions of the country. Upon their arrival in this country they reveal that not only are the promises made to them not being redeemed, but in addition they are not able to receive correct notions of what the government is capable and not capable of granting them. It is also difficult for them to understand what the norms prevalent in the country are. No doubt these immigrants would be appalled if they completely understood the situation of a large number of native born persons and of those who immigrated 30 years ago who are still living under conditions worse than theirs, and this is a very serious matter. Today's period is different from that of the past when a generation of the founders preached to the new immigrants and explained that they must go through a difficult period in order to attain what they had attained.

Statistics tell us who are in the bottom two-tenths in the country. There is the danger of deep ferment among the mideast communities which despite their seniority in the country still find themselves in the status of deprived in contrast to those who have newly arrived.

The manifestation of "tent" settlements on the land and the expansion of the Ambi movement has come against the background of people suffering economic discrimination who are rebelling against the sense of failure--the inability to attain over the course of 30 years better economic and social conditions. The Ambi movement

expresses the perception that if the State invested in families blessed with children what it invests today in an immigrant, it would also eliminate the feeling of discrimination and in particular would strengthen the sense that from a democratic standpoint there is no less importance attached to internal immigration than to immigration from beyond our borders--especially when the latter is so meager.

2. Insult has been added to injury by those labeling themselves immigrant organizations. At least according to the present handling it can be established that these organizations harm but do not help. Instead of assuring better absorption of the immigrants they foster among them a feeling of isolation.

People who had done everything in their homeland to become Israelis are here doing everything to belong to those abandoning that homeland.

Many among the immigrants from the Soviet Union rebel against this manifestation and their desire is only to transform as quickly as possible into Israelis in every sense.

There is also the fear of a confrontation between groups of immigrants--as we have recently brought to light--in immigrant centers. There is no doubt that this is antithetical to the goal of the integration of exiles and the creation of a unified nation.

The fervor of the organizational spokesman has brought on unrestrained expressions against the State as a whole. It is difficult to understand how people in the public eye who are sensitive to the image of Israel abroad, closed an eye to a situation which was exploited for evil by the anti-Israel propa anda in the Soviet Union.

* * *

And as we still stand stupefied by the manifestation in the absorption centers, the affair of the Ministry of Religions overtakes us. No one knows, of course, what the police investigation is eliciting and what the conclusions will be, but even here we are witnesses to distortion and to exploitation for ill of the community sense of discrimination.

The sense of discrimination is explicable among immigrants from North Africa who, on the way to their absorption, had passed through all the "Departments of Hell" both from a spiritual as well as from a material standpoint. The disgrace is that offspring of the immigrants from the mideast communities have all but been convinced of their inferiority--it will still take a long time to correct the injustice and to restore their self-respect to the children of these communities; there is no doubt that they are entitled to a different economic and social status.

But what relevance does this have to the community mobilization to defend a public figure?

Many of the members of the mideast communities achieved high office, bettered themselves at the expense of the discrimination of members of their own community.

The very fact of their finding themselves in their station did not contribute significantly to the improvement of the situation of that particular community. The greatest blame hovers over the parties, both left and right, which seized upon the person most comfortable to them—not in order to advance the interests of the community but rather to assure support and votes and at times on the basis of empty promises.

The watchword about the impossibility of misleading most of the people most of the time is known. There is no substitute for sage policy to correct errors which have been committed in the past. The social gap must be narrowed, the economic discrimination must be corrected and self-respect must be restored. This cannot be accomplished by organizations of immigrants.

We were recently informed that the Sephardic Federation is soliciting public support for the Ministry of Religions under the guise of community discrimination.

What is the Sephardic Federation, what does it represent, what are its goals, who chose its leaders, whom does it serve? In the few cases known to me, when someone turned to this Federation to solve an education or a health problem of a member of the Sephardic community, a negative answer was forthcoming--that the Federation lacks resources. In a country which absorbs immigration from the Diaspora there is room for organizations that will guard the heritage of the community, that will nurture the seminal values, in order to emphasize the variegated nature of the Israel nation and thereby to enrich our culture. There is no place for the organization of those who departed from various exiles into pressure groups.

8090
CSO: 4805

PREMIER SCORED FOR POLITICAL PROMISE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Oct 80 p 11

[Article by Yehuda Litani: "Settlement Obstructions"]

[Text] On Sunday of this week when members of the former kibbutz Beyt Ha'arava arrived at the remnants of the kibbutz which had been destroyed during the War of Liberation, many were overcome with emotion. This was on the day of the takeover of the land held by NAHAL [Pioneer Fighting Youth] in the name of Beyt Ha'arava at a distance of several kilometers from the original site which is near the 'Abdallah Bridge over the Jordan River. Members of the kibbutz who had to retreat on 20 May 1948 to Sodom--a kibbutz which had transformed salt earth to a place of fertility--showed their children and grandchildren where the dining room, the nursery and the water line had been located. Afterwards, during the installation ceremony, the former members of Beyt Ha'arava saw the young pioneers decked in tricot shirts bearing the special logograph--a representation of the Dead Sea beside the legend "Return to Beyt Ha'arava 1948-1980"--their hearts swelled with pride.

Most of the former Beyt Ha'arava members had already formed a new kibbutz named Kavari, which belongs to the Kibbutz Ham'e'uchad [Federation of Collectives]. This is the kibbutz [collective farm] movement of the late Yigal Allon, originator of the very famous Allon Plan, in which a strip of some 12 kilometers free of Israeli settlements had been set up. Up to the time of the upset in June of 1977, Alignment governments had been careful not to settle the corridor in order to retain it as a negotiation card in the foreseen negotians with Jordan and in order to provide Jordan with direct passage, clear of Israeli settlement, to connect with the other areas intended to be transferred to Jordan in Samaria and in Judea.

On the Line--and Beyond

The NAHAL takeover of Beyt Ha'arava, whose establishment stirred memories and sentiments associated with the old and good Eretz Yisrael, is one of 6 settlements which had been set up in the Jericho sector by the Likud government with the goal of "blocking" the Jericho corridor and of preventing the Alignment government--if the Alignment in fact crushes the Likud in the elections more than a year hence--from exercising the "Jordanian Option" or, as it is expressed by the members of the Herut "prevention of the establishment of a PLO state."

Three of the six settlements in the Jericho Corridor sector have already been established. Three others are contemplated for the near future. When a number of

former Beyt Ha'arava members, people of the Kibbutz Federation, were questioned about the contradiction between their deceased leader and the establishment of the renewed Beyt Ha'arava, some of them answered in confusion: "The important thing is to establish another settlement."

Every settlement policy of the government is designed primarily to obstruct the policy plans of the next government, and secondarily to establish a base to be reckoned with of settlements on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. In a brochure recently published by the first ranking expert for settlement affairs in Israel and the head of the settlement department of the Jewish Agency, Prof Ra'anan Weitz, he wrote among other things: "The current form of dealing with settlement can be considered 'running amok' which is content merely with pegging stakes into the area... In the West Bank, which is the region densely populated by Arabs, only 21 settlements have been established, all of them as a temporary measure only. Yet, because of their difficult situation and the enormous base cost, nearly 10 billion Israel pounds have been poured into these settlements ... (1 billion shekels [the new Israeli coin]). The improper method of dealing and the failing strategy have brought the existing settlements to a severe situation from an economic standpoint."

One bent on a plan of obstructionism rather than a plan of serious settlement, will not be satisfied with what exists and will seek to add more and more settlements--roadblocks for the next government, in order to prevent the establishment of a PLO state or return of a part of the Territories to the Kingdom of Jordan. That is why we need not take seriously the proclamation attributed to Prime Minister Menahem Begin according to which they mean to establish "only 4 more settlements."

One of the methods of circumventing the proclamation about the 4 settlements is to establish new settlements on the green line, the majority of which at the time of establishment will be within the confines of "lesser Israel," but within the confines of the West Bank. When one examines the Master Plan for Development of Settlement in Judea and Samaria of Mati Drobles, the associate chief of the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, one detects several proposed blocks of settlements within these (adjacent to the green line): 5 or 6 of this type of settlement are proposed for establishment in the sector of the slopes of Mount Hebron, another 4 settlements are proposed for establishment in the Yatir block south of Mount Hebron, 4 additional settlements are proposed for establishment in the "West Block" northwest of the Bank. Likewise with Halmish Block and with Modi'im Block, both in the central section of the Bank, and in another block called the North Samaria Section. In all of the blocks mentioned, it is possible to establish (and everything in accordance with known and revealed plans) at least 15 more settlements. There is little doubt that this option will be exercised by the settlement leaders of the Likud government--Arik Sharon, Mati Drobles and their colleagues in the Gush Emunim [a political group].

Another method for setting up new settlements while circumventing Begin's proclamation is the "amoeba method" or division of existing settlements into 2 or even into 3 settlements. The Military Authority and the Israel Lands Administration are siting tracts of land (governmental, rocky ground, and--since necessity knows no law--at times even private lands) adjacent to the existing settlement, for transfers of some of the settlers as a new "suburb" of the settlement. With the passage of time the suburb becomes a settlement for all intents and purposes. That was so in the case of the settlement Mitzpeh Jericho, which at the start of its establishment was considered a "suburb" of Ma'aleh Adumim despite a distance of 8 kilometers between the two points.

Cancelling Debts

By this method it is possible to establish a minimum of some 10 new settlements without the thing being considered (by the Government of Israel, at least) as establishment of new settlements. Not to mention that many of the new settlements on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip are at present in this kind or another stage of construction, planning or approval. Only a certified public accountant is able to ascertain at this time, at the beginning of the month of October 1980, which 4 new settlements exactly did the Prime Minister allude to. Who knows precisely which settlements have been approved? When? By whom?

Until not too long ago, Likud spokesmen were able to say that Settlement X being constructed at such and such a location had already been approved during the days of the Alignment government. Now this is more difficult, but we must admit that this government is more open on the matter of settlements than the Alignment governments, and plans of future settlement are spread out for all interested parties to see, local or foreign, resident of the West Bank or a person from the US Embassy in Tel Aviv.

The settlement "obstruction" is meant, as stated, for an Alignment government which is about to be formed following the coming elections (if indeed the current differences between Peres and Rabin do not return the Alignment to its condition prior to the June 1977 elections). Presently, abundant capital is flowing to the settlements, especially to those on the West Bank which are the "spoiled brats" of the Likud government. A small example, and not even the most prominent one, may be that of the Ministry of Religions. From 1967 to the present 143 settlements were constructed in the Territories--most of them, until now, defined as non-religious. Despite this the Ministry of Religions maintains in the Territories 107 rabbis in full position, 140 ritual slaughterers in part-time position, and 177 bath attendants (who work in the ritual baths) in part-time positions.

As are the rabbis in full or part-time position, the slaughterers and the bath attendants, so also are many other settlers occupied in the settlements in government positions. Thus, for example, Benny Katzover, one of the leaders of the Gush Emunim and a settler of Elon Moreh, serves also as head of the religious council in the district. The settlers fear that should the Alignment come to power it will attempt to prune these plantings. According to their calculations the Alignment will shy away from an open physical confrontation, from evacuation attempts which did not succeed during the previous session either--and therefore (and even the Alignment leaders are talking about this more or less openly) will employ the method of "draining budgets."

The current government relates with munificence, with excessive munificence, to the settlements on the West Bank and in the [Gaza] Strip, in which it recognizes an obstacle to a PLO-Palestinian state.

A subtle indication of this was given last week during a tour of the Bank by the chairman of the Jewish Agency Aryeh Dulcin, a member of the Liberal Party, who related that while he was treasurer he cancelled for "these marvelous people" (the Gush Emunim people) various debts. How much did he cancel? Tens of thousands" Hundreds of thousands? Millions? Mr Dulcin remained mute and did not explain.

And if it is thus with the Liberals, who are not among the leading advocates of settlements among the Likud, how are the people of Herut and Rafi, whose list of concerns is topped by settlements, proceeding?

Coming back to Beyt Ha'arav, in which the veterans of the kibbutz were almost reduced to tears this week at the sight of the land takeover of the new NAHAL holding which carries the same name. There was a military parade and bugles, raising of the flag, and even the Deputy Defense Minister Mordekhai Tzipori found time to arrive at the ceremony in a helicopter. Those very veterans who made salt lands fertile and transformed them into a blooming garden believe that this is also the goal of the settlers in the present. And that is not so. The new Beyt Ha'arava is an obstruction in the series of more or less regular obstructions designed not to make fertile but rather to break up. That is why they make do with a line of huts anywhere in the dunes near the 'Abdallah Bridge. This is the settlement policy of the Likud and it has not yet even reached its peak of acceleration.

If in fact the Alignment regains power, and girds itself and seeks to dismantle these obstacles, it will have to do this by the application of rationality and with utmost patience. Haste emanates from Satan, goes a familiar Arab adage. Add indeed, anyone seeking to change a new reality, which has taken place over an extended period, in too great haste will break up the obstacle rather than dismantle it and of course damage will result.

8090
CSO: 4805

COMMUNISTS CITED ON POTENTIAL ROLE OF NATIONAL MOVEMENT

LD181531 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 13 Nov 80 pp 6-7

[Report by special correspondent Dominique Bari on return from southern Lebanon: "Bombs Over Nabatiyah"]

[Excerpt] "As an integral part of the Near East crisis, the Lebanese crisis will only be finally resolved when there is an all-embracing, just and lasting settlement in the region," we were told by Zuhayr Tawilah, member of the Lebanese Communist Party Politburo and chief of the Communist daily AL-NIDA. "But the national movement believes there is a possibility of a step forward toward a solution nationally. This possibility accords with the deep aspirations of the whole Lebanese people. This is the significance of the proposals made to President Sarkis last spring. These proposals were based on the principles of the country's integrity, the [word indistinct] nature of Lebanon and the condemnation of Isreali aggression in the south and the Phalangists' artition plan. The question of Lebanon's democratic development and the question of the army, its reorganization and its deployment in all sectors were also raised."

The extreme right, which was opposed to the plan, was isolated, but Sarkis' equivocations helped it. The prime minister, Al-Huss, balked at the question of the army and resigned. His designated successor, Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh, failed in his attempt to form a government. Shafiq al-Wazzan has just been appointed in his turn. What will he do? Since the spring the Lebanese crisis has deteriorated: Israeli pressures have been stepped up in the south, as we have seen, and the Phalangists, by means of machineguns, have strengthened their military authority at their allies' expense in the so-called "Christian" sector. In July 1980 Bashir al-Jumayyil, chief of the Phalangist militia, got rid of the military apparatus of Sham'un's party, the National Liberal Party, the last ally within the "Lebanese front." Bashir's aim is to ensure he has all the power in the reactionary region, to establish his own order there and play a strong card with respect to the central power in order to bring about the failure of any political compromise in Lebanon.

"There is in effect a partition supported by Israel, which now wishes to link the reactionary stronghold of Mount Lebanon to the southern enclave where Haddad is." "Who can stop this threat?" the communists ask. The state and the army cannot and will not. The Syrians no longer have the means, and that only leaves the national movement and other Lebanese antifascist forces.

A plan now under discussion by the national movement leadership aims, in particular, to ensure the movement's preponderance over all the other forces present in Lebanon and to put an end to the process of attrition in the progressive regions, as Georges Hawi, general secretary of the Lebanese Communist Party, said at a meeting in Saida on the party's 56th anniversary. "The national movement must be the essential driving force in the struggle against the isolationist plan." One aspect--not the least important--of this struggle, the communists stress, concerns the security of the population in the regions controlled by the national movement. "On this basis," Georges Hawi specified, "we can mobilize the patriotic Lebanese masses with greater force and therefore do more to support the Palestinian revolution and the Arab steadfastness front."

In this struggle the Lebanese progressives are appealing for international solidarity.

CSO: 4800

FRANCO-MOROCCAN COMMISSION MEETING TO WORK OUT COOPERATION PROBLEMS

Current Situation Reviewed

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 28 Oct 80 p 2

[Article: "The Franco-Moroccan High Commission Will Meet in Paris This Week--Mr Boucetta Will Lead the Moroccan Delegation"]

[Text] Rabat, 28 October (AFP [French News Agency])--M'Hamed Boucetta, Moroccan minister of state in charge of foreign affairs & cooperation, will leave Rabat for Paris on Wednesday to take part in the meeting of the Franco-Moroccan high commission.

Mr Boucetta will be accompanied by some 15 high officials in finance and the technical ministries.

This high commission, created in 1970, has met only twice: the first time in 1971, in Paris, and the second time in April 1979, in Rabat. The third meeting had been planned for last spring in Paris, but His Majesty Hassan II's visit to France at that time led the two governments to postpone it to the autumn.

Mr Boucetta will be received on Wednesday by President Valery Giscard d'Estaing, to whom he will deliver a message from the Sovereign. He will also have talks with the prime minister, Raymond Barre, and will have a private conversation with Mr Francois-Poncet.

Finally, the two delegations will work in committees.

The talks and sessions as a whole can be categorized under four headings: political matters, economy and finance, cultural and cooperation matters, consular and social problems.

In the political area, Boucetta and Francois-Poncet will continue the talks they began in New York in September on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly. They will concentrate on the problems connected with the Maghreb region, after Barre's visit to Tunis and the signing of the Frano-Algerian agreement, with the Western Sahara affair in the background.

The Israeli-Arab conflict will also be discussed, and particularly the problem of Jerusalem, which is of special interest to His Majesty Hassan II, who is chairman of the "AL QUDS" committee of the Islamic Conference. The subject of the war between Iraq and Iran will surely be raised also.

In the economic domain, a comprehensive review will be done, toward a reorientation of relations in function of the needs of the two countries. Morocco, which is preparing to launch a 5-year development plan, desires considerable French particpation. It could favor it by private-investment reform and by incentive measures for small and medium-size enterprises.

In 1978 and 1979, France had strengthened its No 1 position among Morocco's trading partners by taking 27.4 percent of Moroccan exports (26.5 percent in 1978) and by providing 27.7 percent of its imports (26.1 percent in 1978).

But this share fell to 23.8 percent for the first half of 1980, because of the reduction in Moroccan imports of equipment goods, which are reported to constitute 40 percent of French sales, and the dizzying increase for petroleum products.

At the same time, the rate of coverage, which was 53.4 percent for the first half of 1979, rose to 75.9 percent for the corresponding period of 1980.

The Moroccan authorities would like to interest French industry in the country's big development projects: steel at Nador, on the Mediterranean coast; mining of phosphate uranium, oil shale; extraction of uranium from phosphates; fishing and canning; agricultural development; development of infrastructures, etc. For this purpose, they are seeking a "new generation" of industrial investments.

In the area of cultural cooperation, the conclusions will be drawn from the visit by the French minister for universities, Mrs Alice Saunier, last September. The number of French cooperation personnel is presently 4,600. The number of teachers, however, is to be reduced by 300 at the end of a 5-year stabilization plan.

The situation of the 388,000 Moroccan workers in France will be at the center of the fourth category of the Franco-Moroccan talks. The problem of the Moroccan "hewers" of Lorrainewill probably cause our delegation to ask for assurances and commitments along the lines of the recent Franco-Algerian agreement on immigrant workers.

As for the French community in Morocco, it still numbers about 46,5000, despite the progress in Moroccanization and the obstacles placed in the way of regular renewal of work contracts.

Strengthening of Bilateral Cooperation

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 31 Oct 80 p 1

[Article by Mohamed Idrissi Kaitouni: "Morocco-France--Strengthening Bilateral Cooperation"]

[Text] The Moroccan-French permanent intergovernmental commission opened its proceedings in Paris yesterday under the presidency of M'Hamed Boucetta and Jean Francois-Poncet. Several Subjects are on the agenda, and negotiations are to be undertaken to solve the problems in suspense and especially to revive cooperation between the two countries in the various areas on solid foundations, in mutual respect and in a climate of complete understanding.

But it can be asserted at this time that the two parties will be animated by a firm desire to give a new impulse to bilateral relations and to develop further the bonds

between the two peoples. Thanks to this desire and this spirit of cooperation, the two parties will succeed in solving all the problems encountered at the level of trade relations, financial relations, technical assistance and cooperation in general.

The trade balance between the two countries in 1979 was more than 2 billion dirhams in deficit to the detriment of Morocco, and it is up to the joint commission to find the means to eliminate this deficit, mainly by means of more sustained activities by France on the economic and financial level (increasing public and private investments, opening up a line of credit to finance Morocco's purchases from France, etc).

Furthermore, and in view of the privileged and historic bonds that unite Morocco and France, the latter should increase the government's share in the lending granted to our balance of payments, notably in the form of "project aid," because of the fact that the 1981-85 5-year plan will be a development plan comprising the carrying-out of important production and infrastructure projects and consequently necessitating greater support by France for financing them.

Likewise, France's aid should be valuable in the areas of phosphates (extraction of uranium from phosphates, phosphoric acid), oil exploration, exploitation of oil shale, new energies, etc.

As regards cultural and technical cooperation, France should take administrative and financial measures to encourage applicants for cooperation positions in Morocco and avoid the problem of the withdrawals and defections that occur every year, especially in the education sector.

For this purpose, it is necessary to go from the stage of substitution cooperation to that of training cooperation.

On the other hand, as regards consular and judicial relations, an urgent solution should be found to the problems deriving from application to Moroccan nationals of the July 1975 law on divorce and of the provisions relative to the competency of French jurisdictions in the matter of divorce by foreigners. Application of this law to our nationals would be prejudicial to them because it provides that only the French legislation is applicable in the matter of divorce even if both spouses are foreigners.

Finally, among all the subjects that will doubtlessly be examined by the intergovernmental commission is that of our emigrant workers in France, who should not only retain the advantages already acquired but also obtain others, such as voluntary return and automatic renewal of residence permits.

These are a few aspects of Moroccan-French cooperation and several of the problems that deserve to be solved. But in reality, the field of action of this cooperation is very vast, and the areas that it should touch are very varied. Because of this, and in view of the special relations that have always existed between Morocco and France, a particular effort should be made to tighten the bilateral bonds within the framework of mutually advantageous cooperation.

11267
CSO: 4400

DETAILS OF MOROCCAN-BULGARIAN COOPERATION GIVEN

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 9 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] Rabat, 9 Oct (MAP)--The Moroccan-Bulgarian negotiation which began in Rabat on 2 October were ratified on Tuesday 7 October by the signing--at the Ministry of State in Charge of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation--of the record of the proceedings. The record will be submitted to the permanent intergovernmental committee that is scheduled to meet next November in Sofia.

These negotiations--which took place in a climate of friendship--dealt with relations in the areas of trade, industry, technology, mining and agriculture.

The two delegations reached a number of decisions designed to strengthen relations between the two countries in various sectors.

Several economic projects have been the object of talks between the experts of the two countries.

Other, more detailed, talks will be held in the coming months among experts of the two countries, especially in the industrial domain.

Various opportunities for cooperation in respect to mining have been studied.

The contacts between BULGARGEOMIN and the BRPM [Mineral Exploration and Investment Office] will be intensified. Bulgaria will grant technical assistance to Morocco in this specific sector.

In the agricultural sector Bulgarian participation could be carried out in many sectors, particularly in the areas of water resources and forests, agricultural research, stock raising, and hydroagricultural equipment.

During its visit the Bulgarian delegation was received by the secretary of state for cooperation at the Ministry of State in Charge of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, by the secretary general of the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform, and by the secretary general of the Ministry of Equipment and National Development.

10992
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POLICE ROUGH UP OPPOSITION PARTY MEMBERS

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 28 Oct 80 p 2

[Article: "Police 'Elements' in Plain Clothes Rough Up Certain Members of the Central Council of the JMPS (Moroccan Youth for Progress and Socialism)"]

[Text] The day before yesterday, Sunday 26 October 1980, at the end of the meeting held by the Central Council (CC) of the JMPS, comrades Mohamed Ansari, member of the CC and of the Casablance Section Bureau, and Choukrat Mohamed, member of the CC and of the Azrou Section Bureau of the JMPS, as they were heading toward their respective destinations, were stopped by plain-clothes police elements who showed their identity cards! They took the two comrades by force to a small alley where they conducted an interrogation on the proceedings of the Central Council, on the names and responsibilities of certain members! Next they took by force certain documents and notes that were in the comrades' possession.

We can only raise the most energetic protest against these doings, which are anti-democratic and unfortunately recall the Oufkir era.

The JMPS is a legal organization, one that acts in broad daylight, a responsible and serious organization. We express our complete indignation at these doings and forcefully condemn them, and we ask the authorities concerned to put an end to them. These irresponsible actions, which violate the law and are an outrage against public freedoms, harm the democratic process and the image that our country is beginning to acquire in the concert of nations that enjoy a democratic system.

The JMPS will continue in its militant march in the service of the homeland, defending the supreme interests of our nation and the legitimate rights of all of our youth, confident of the support of this youth and of its solidarity.

Furthermore, comrade Ahmed Salem Latafi, first secretary of the JMPS, has sent the National Bureau's protests to the authorities concerned.

11267
CSO: 4400

JMPS CLOSES MEETING WITH GENERAL RESOLUTION

Casablanca AL BAYANE in French 31 Oct 80 p 6

[Article: "The General Resolution Adopted at the Conclusion of the Proceedings of the Central Council Reaffirms the Essential Political Positions of the JMPS (Moroccan Youth for Progress and Socialism) and the Specification of the Organizational Tasks"]

[Text] The Central Council of the Moroccan Youth for Progress and Socialism met in its seventh regular session on Sunday 26 October 1980 in Casablanca.

After listening to the report presented in the name of the National Bureau by comrade Ahmed Salem Latafi, first secretary, and discussing and approving it unanimously;

After the statements by the members of the Central Council had placed emphasis on analysis of the general situation of youth in the light of the country's political, economic and social climate, as well as the particular situation of the JMPS, in its actions, positions and struggles;

And after the Central Council had evaluated and discussed in depth the organizational situation of the JMPS in its positive aspects and its weaknesses, and after the indispensable decisions had been taken with a view to consolidation of the present achievements and with a view to generalization of the positive and creative experiences, the Central Council of the JMPS reaffirms:

I. On the Political Level:

1. International

The socialist world continues to grow stronger at all levels, economic, political and social, with youth playing a decisive role in it alongside the working class.

The international scene is also witnessing glorious victories achieved by the forces of progress and anti-imperialist struggle, supported by the victories of the peoples of Nicaragua in Latin America and of Zimbabwe in southern Africa and of other peoples in Asia.

On this occasion, the Central Council hails these victories and expresses solidarity with the peoples concerned.

Nevertheless, imperialism is trying to recover the bastions it has lost in recent years, by working toward domination of the peoples and their resources, especially in the Near East.

The Central Council, condemning the Camp David agreements once again and rejecting any defeatist solution, reaffirms its unconditional support for the fighting Palestinian people, under the leadership of the PLO, and it also makes common cause with the Lebanese people under the leadership of its national movement.

It also expresses its solidarity with the Bahraini students in the painful ordeal that they are presently induring and calls for cessation of the repressive and arbitrary measures to which they are being subjected.

It also expresses its sadness and profoundly deplores the murderous war that has broken out between Iraq and Iran, two neighboring countries known for their anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist positions and their support for the Palestinian cause. It considers that this war gives imperialism prestexts for transforming the region into an arsenal, for threatening world peace, just as it enables the Zionists to accentuate their traitorous attacks against southern Lebanon in order to strike at the Palestinian resistance and the Lebanese progressive forces. Continuance of this war can only help to split the Arab, anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and antireactionary ranks further, which only profits the adversaries of the cause of liberation and progress of the peoples. Thus it calls on the two sides to stop the war immediately and to solve the problems between them by negotiation, by nonagression and with mutual respect for national sovereignty.

2. National

The Central Council salutes our valiant [as published] for the victories it is winning on the battlefield against the enemies of our territorial integrity, and it also notes and congratulates it for the relative improvement noted at the level of international understanding of the cause of our territorial integrity.

Nevertheless, the economic and social crisis remains and grows worse. The timid measures adopted by the government in favor of the tenants were quickly emptied of their content when it raised the prices of basic items and of school supplies, which correspondingly downgrades the buying power of the broadest popular masses, which has profound repercussions on youth and children.

The policy of prices rises and wage freeze, of lockout and layoff of workers, of expulsion of lycee students, the refusal to grant lycee students the right to form benefit societies, as well as the attempts to undermine the resolutions of the Ifrane conference, in which the JMPS took part--such a policy leads only to aggravation of the crisis and to its corollaries: unemployment, waste of youth, and other well-known social evils.

Thus the Central Council calls for abandonment of this failed policy and the establishment of a new policy that meets the aspirations of our youth and of our people.

The CC, also condemning the racist practices of which our workers are the victims abroad, the most recent being the murder of a young Moroccan in Marseille, in France, reaffirms its total solidarity with the Moroccan emigres and calls for putting an end to this intolerable situation.

The Central Council, evaluating the political reality of the country, cannot help but express satisfaction at the return of a number of exiles to their native country.

With regard to the immediate problems of youth, the Central Council calls for giving every attention to the children and youth by greatly increasing the number of nurseries within the reach of all, by increasing considerably the budgets of the ministries of Youth & Sports and of National Education, and by immediate and total application of the recommendations of the Ifrance conference, without dissipating the work of its committees.

It is also indispensable to put into effect the law on the establishment of lycee students' benefit societies, to offer jobs to young people of working age, and to confirm irreversibly the achievements of widespread availability of scholarships and free education.

II. On the Organizational Level

The Central Council urges efforts to carry out the following tasks in the coming year.

1. In the Area of Organization

--seeing to better structuring of the sections;

--holding section conferences;

--seeing to the carrying-out of tasks on time, in conformity with the program established, combining boldness with realism;

--celebrating the fifth anniversary of the founding of the JMPS;

--organizing special days for the youth of Sebta and Melillia.

2. In the Area of Propaganda

--improving the work of information and propaganda;

--spreading information widely about all the actions of the Central Council and the sections;

--attending to the weekly "AL BAYANE for Young People" page in the two editions, Arabic and French;

--publishing an information bulletin;

--organizing conferences on various themes;

--publishing an information brochure on organization, publication of various materials.

3. In the Area of Training

--organizing two national seminars for cadres;

--organizing study days at the section level;

--examining the problem of extremist ideological tendencies among youth;

--making the international democratic youth movement known.

4. In the Area of the Pioneers

--institution of a National Council of Pioneers;

--conferences in the sections on the situation of children;

--unifying the styles of contact and relations with children and unifying the hymns and songs;

--organizing a seminar devoted to the Pioneers.

5. In the Area of External Relations

--ensuring better organization of external relations, correspondence, and the exchange of documents and information;

--ensuring better knowledge of the JMPS on the international level;

--receiving friendly and sister international delegations and exchanging visits.

6. In the Area of Young People's Travel and Tourism

--raising the level of the present experiences and improving them;

--consolidating the experience and traditions acquired, diversifying and multiplying them.

7. In the Area of Vacation Camps

After the organization expressed its satisfaction at having gone into the field of vacation camps for the first time, and with success, it considers necessary:

--the development of new and positive experience and the taking of measures to raise their level;

--taking the view that the problem requires constant attention, not only on account of the present situation but aimed at even higher effectiveness.

8. In the Financial Area

Paying even greater attention to this area than heretofore, the problem being of an organizational nature and responsibility for it being incumbent on all members.

11267
CSO: 4400

MOROCCAN CONCEPT OF JUDAISM VERSUS ZIONISM EXPLAINED

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 10 Oct 80 pp 1, 2

[Editorial by Ahmed Alaoui: "Judaism and Zionism"]

[Text] Some of our Jewish fellow countrymen believed--following the various conferences of the Islamic ministers of foreign affairs at Fes and Casablanca, the meetings of the Al Quds committee, and the adoption at these Muslim assemblies of resolutions concerning Palestinian problems in general and the problem of Al Quds in particular--that they detected a change in Morocco's attitude toward Judaism.

Nothing of the sort has occurred.

Moroccan policy with regard to Judaism is constant. One part of Jewish culture is of Moroccan origin, and the Jews of Morocco are intermingled with the very history of our country. There has been a Jewish population in Morocco since ancient times, speaking Berber or Arabic, completely integrated, and differing from their fellow countrymen in one respect only: religion. Morocco has in fact always practiced tolerance and regarded Judaism as a revealed religion in the same category as Christianity.

It is a source of pride for Islam that it is the only one of the revealed religions to accept the other two, even though they for their part do not accept Islam. At the political level the Jews have always been regarded as full-fledged Moroccans. We would like to recall to mind the noble and courageous attitude of His Majesty Mohammed V, who during World War II refused to put into effect the anti-Jewish laws of the Vichy government. In independent Morocco the Jews enjoy the same rights and the same freedoms as their Muslim fellow countrymen. Morocco is one of the few Arab countries where the Jews have the right to vote and to be elected to public office. Need we point out that at the time Morocco attained its independence one of the ministers of the government was a Jew, Dr Benzaquen--and that a number of Jews were elected at the recent municipal councils?

Judaism and the Hebraic culture are a part of our national heritage and Morocco intends to preserve them, because it reverses tolerance and those values which are universal.

Judaism and Zionism are, however, two completely different things. We have always made the distinction between the two, ever since 1919. Moulay Youssef was, in fact, the first Arab and Muslim chief of state to protest against Balfour, and

Morocco steadfastly maintained that position up to the day Palestine was partitioned and maintains it to this very day. Morocco has steadfastly supported the Palestinian people. Following the 1947 partition His Majesty Mohammed V (may God have mercy on his soul) officially protested that decision, and while denouncing Zionism assured the Moroccan Jews of his solicitude and his protection for them in their capacity as Moroccan citizens: he denounced Zionism but condemned anti-Semitism.

This is likewise the policy of His Majesty Hassan II.

Zionism is in effect nothing more than a form of imperialism, colonialism and even racism and has nothing in common with Judaism, which is a religion worthy of respect.

Zionism was created for the purpose of conquering Palestine and dispossessing the Arabs of the lands they had held for thousands of years, in order to settle emigres there. It was therefore nothing other than a colonial enterprise. We have, moreover, seen the Zionists practice a policy of totalitarian racism and repression in the occupied Arab territories.

Morocco has rejected the amalgamation of Zionism with Judaism--something which the Zionists themselves desire so as to create a feeling of insecurity and uneasiness among the Jews in the Muslim countries (such as Morocco) and thereby induce them to emigrate, for Israel wants to "import" all the Jews throughout the world. It is this amalgamation that must be exposed, in order to avoid falling into the trap that lurks behind it.

Our policy in this regard is clear cut. Some eminent Jews are anti-Zionist, for they regard this movement as a fascist undertaking.

We may also point out that 44 percent of the Jews in Israel have declared themselves opposed to the annexation of Al Qods.

Be that as it may, religion must not be confused with political ideology; and many leading figures throughout the world who regard the Jews as full-fledged citizens in their respective countries are equally strong in their condemnation of Zionism.

Morocco has made a substantial contribution to this evolution and to this differentiation. It also conceived the Rabat Charter (adopted by the Arab summit conference in 1974), which set forth the conditions for peace and in fact accepted the existence of Israel within the latter's pre-1967 borders.

This major development is attributable to the realism of His Majesty Hassan II and to his personal action. We have already emphasized that in the view of Morocco and His Majesty Hassan II the Palestine problem was a sacred problem, not a diversionary device. This was apparent again when during his press conference at Ifrane His Majesty the King made a fresh contribution to settlement of the Israeli-Arab war by calling for dual recognition, with Israel recognizing the PLO and the right of the Palestinian people to have a fatherland and form a state, and the PLO for its part recognizing Israel.

All this proves that Morocco's policy is a constant one. Morocco is giving its total support to the cause of the Palestinian people and to their just struggle. While it denounces Zionism it also denounces anti-Semitism just as vigorously, and following the attack on Copernic Street His Majesty the King instructed his ambassador to convey to the representatives of the Moroccan Jewish associations in France Morocco's indignation at this attack--which it condemns--and its commiseration for the victims. Here are the words of our ambassador:

"I ask that you be so kind as to express for me, and for all Moroccans, our deep feelings and our indignation at this atrocity committed against our fellow countrymen of the Jewish faith and against the entire Jewish community of France."

For--and we repeat emphatically--although Morocco regards Zionism as a reprehensible ideology it feels the greatest respect for Judaism as a revealed religion.

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CSO: 4400

SAUDI ECONOMIC PLANNING REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic 3 Oct 80 pp 10-12

[Article: "New Saudi Strategy Benefits Gulf and Friendly States"]

[Text] Announcement of the third Five-Year Plan in Saudi Arabia (totaling 782 billion riyals, or 221 billion dollars) was expected last May. However, it was postponed because of reconsideration of its cost. One of the reasons for the delay was the current tension in some areas of the world, which led to reconsideration of the defense budget after the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

Evaluation of this plan indicates important points which will control the domestic economy over the next 5 years:

Economic Cooperation

The basic goal of the second Five-Year Plan (1975-1980) was the creation of a modern national economy. Eighty percent of available capital was allocated for basic development and the creation of water, electrical and effective communications systems. This plan achieved most of its aim. The clear difference in the new plan is more comprehensive development in the political, military and economic fields.

Also, development aid to the states of the Third World is no longer given as it was 10 years ago, and offering aid to the African and Asian states has now become part of a strategy. Aid is now given in an orderly way to build up these states economically so that they can supply Saudi Arabia with cheap consumer commodities and labor, and also to strengthen these states militarily to prevent aggression in the region, since all of these elements have been taken into consideration in the new plan.

Most of the projects are ambitious for the Arabian Peninsula. This appeared in programs of economic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the states of the Gulf.

The roots of this cooperation go back to the Riyadh Conference of 1979, which brought together the ministers of planning from seven Gulf states to establish the basis of complete economic unity.

The first goals of this plan were to organize industrial projects, help to export non-petroleum products, and keep domestic markets from being flooded with goods.

There was also a project to organize sources of labor. All of these goals were coordinated with the new Five-Year Plan. For example:

A credit of 2.3 billion riyals (696 million dollars) was set aside to encourage joint projects and to train labor.

Both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia have drawn up plans for 20 joint projects costing about 2.5 billion dollars.

Saudi Arabia has abandoned its project to build an aluminum plant in "Jubayl" in the interest of the existing aluminum plant in Bahrain, of which it owns 20 percent of the shares.

The joint petrochemical industry of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain will be modernized to produce methanol and ammonia with an investment of 40 million dollars.

The private sector will be encouraged to establish joint projects and invest in other Arab Gulf states.

A plant for lubricating oils in North Yemen (which is connected with the Mobil Company and the Petromin Company in Saudi Arabia) will be linked with a similar plant in Jiddah.

It is likely that the Arab Organization for Industrialization (the joint Arab attempt to establish military industry in Egypt which has been "shelved" since Camp David) will be re-established in Saudi Arabia with Gulf partners and labor from Pakistan.

Industrialization

In the previous plan, the sum of 25 billion dollars was spent to build 900 factories, most of them for manufacture and assembly. In the future Saudi Arabia will concentrate on establishing energy-based industries to make the most effective use of its petroleum resources.

Saudi economic aid also is aimed at neighboring states to create industries requiring large numbers of workers in these states.

As to estimates of expenditures and industrial production in the future, one can consider the development which occurred in the two new industrial cities of "Jubayl" and "Yanbu'" as similar to the exploration of Siberia or the clearing of the Amazon jungle.

The industries relying on natural hydrocarbons will form the basis for these two cities, but they will produce other nonpetrochemical items. As for the planned light industrial zones, they will produce everything from construction material to umbrellas and soap.

A large part of the new plan has been set aside for these two cities.

The new industries will be technologically advanced, to the extent that in 20 years "Yanbu'" will have a population of no more than 150,000 and "Jubayl" no more than 380,000.

At present there are between 10,000 and 12,000 workers in each of the two cities.

However, when the basic industries go into production the small industries will begin to grow, relying on cheap energy and readily available chemical raw materials.

In view of the great number of export operations which will occur, both "Yanbu'" and "Jubayl" have begun to build modern port facilities.

Agriculture

Much attention has been given to agriculture, earmarking credits for projects in electricity, municipalities, housing and education to develop remote rural areas to prevent emigration to the cities and consequently to increase production of food.

Between 1970 and 1980 the sum of 1 billion riyals (303 million dollars) was spent on price supports for imported food supplies. What concerns Saudi Arabia is the shortage of food produced locally, not the cost of importing, since self-sufficiency in grain is the first and foremost goal.

However, this requires more than ample capital, because the agricultural structure is still in its infancy.

Education

Credits allocated for social services will be increased with the intent of expanding educational and health services to include remote areas of the desert. The sum of 23.9 billion riyals (7.2 billion dollars) has been set aside for women's education with the goal of ensuring adequate education through the university level so that women are not forced to go abroad for higher education.

Labor

The oppressive problem which controls every article of the third plan is the issue of labor. The strategy of the plan announces confidently a policy to develop labor in a positive manner, taking into consideration that the strategy of the third plan is aimed at reducing the number of foreign workers.

Unofficial estimates say that the economy relies on about 2 million yemenis and a similar number of other foreigners.

The new plan is intended to reduce the number of foreigners to 55 percent of the total number of workers. Also, huge and costly steps have been taken to educate and train national cadres to participate in making use of modern technology, but the number of withdrawals has been very high.

The joint Saudi-American economic committee set up 18 centers to train managers and skilled workers.

The second plan was aimed at increasing the number of native technicians.

Summary of Principles of the Third Five-Year Plan (1980-85):

Preserving Islamic values and applying and spreading Islamic law.

Supporting religious and national devotion and internal security.

Following up development by increasing economic resources and oil income and preserving natural resources.

Reducing dependence on oil exports as a basic source of national wealth.

Developing labor by education, training and higher public health levels.

Establishing the necessary bases for reaching the general goals.

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CSO: 4802

WORK ON EAST-WEST PIPELINE TO BE COMPLETED BY 1 JULY 1981

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 16 Nov 80 p 3

[Text]

JEDDAH, Nov. 15 (SPA) — Work on the east-west crude oil pipeline, Petroline, will be completed by July 1, 1981, officials said Saturday.

Petroline will link the Red Sea port of Yanbu with the oil fields in the Eastern Province. The pipeline will cost SR1.64 billion and extends to a length of 1,200 kilometers.

The 48-inch diameter pipeline will pump 1.6 million barrels daily. The pipeline will link the oil field at Al-Gaswar in the Eastern Province with the export plant at the Red Sea coast and will have 11 pumping stations strung throughout its length. In addition, three maintenance centers will be constructed in strategic locations.

The coastal complex at Yanbu and the shipping facilities at the western end of Petroline represent a vital factor in developing the Red Sea port city of Yanbu, which has been chosen to be the industrial center of the Kingdom's western coast.

Petroline has been about five years in the making. Construction started in 1978. In addition, Petroline can be termed a success even before the oil starts flowing. Regarding management, training, government relations and contract administration, Petroline is living proof of Saudi Arabia's ability to handle the tough jobs that once were the exclusive province of the multinational oil companies.

Unlike other petroleum engineering works in Saudi Arabia, Petroline represents a uniquely national effort. The pipeline will be owned solely by the government. It involves high-level responsibilities ranging from the Kingdom's industrialization program to national security.

As with other large projects in the Kingdom, Petroline has major foreign firms working for it in the management and design of the east-west crude oil pipeline. Brown and Root of Houston and Mobil Overseas Pipeline of Dallas have been involved in Petroline from the beginning. But each company's contract specified both the involvement and training of Saudi specialists from the blueprint stage through completion, and all of the work is coordinated through Petroline's offices in Houston and Jeddah.

Petroline will be joined by a cross-country natural gas liquids (NGL) pipeline that will feed an NGL fractionation plant at Yanbu. Though Aramco will manage construction and operation of the NGL line and plant, other projects will be owned totally by the government and will be coordinated by Petroline.

The crude oil terminal at the Yanbu industrial complex will feed tankers bound for Europe and the United States with an average of 1.6 million bpd of high quality crudes. It will trim 3,000 to 5,000 kilometers off tanker routes that would otherwise have to round the Arabian Peninsula.

Eleven one-million-barrel storage tanks are now under construction at the Yanbu industrial complex.

CSO: 4820

THIRD WORLD PRESS SAID TO BE FAILING IN ITS DUTY

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 21 Oct 80 p 5

[Column by Dr Bourjini Salah: "Information and the new International Economic Order"]

[Text] The extraordinary session of the UN on international economic cooperation has just finished its labors with the adoption of a few resolutions on the forthcoming world-wide negotiations and a project for international strategy for the third decade of development. Since the Third-World press, still unaware of its role, has related the event only in a marginal way, the western mass media almost ignored the holding of that session, paying all their attention to the OPDC meeting and the eventual increase in energy prices. Once again international public opinion was scoffed at by a press which was either unconscious of its duties or unscrupulous in unveiling certain truths regarding the precarious situation of the world economy, the coming apart of the Bretton Woods system and its unfortunate repercussions on the development of the Third-World countries.

A. The need to recognize the seriousness of the present crisis.

For more than one alerted observer, the years of 1980 and 1981 are considered as pivotal years in international relations before debouching on the institution of new forms of cooperation between North and South.

The rate of deceleration of the average growth rate of a large number of developing countries and the movement of impoverishing several regions in the world are running the risk of producing a tragedy and in the long run a general confrontation if no serious action is taken by the great economic powers.

Humanity has never faced such a grave crisis, characterized by galloping inflation and chronic unemployment, complicated by the specter of an energy shortage and by uncertainty both on the monetary level and on the trade level.

Faced with this alarming situation the western mass media continue to show no interest except in a few particular aspects of the crisis, such as the problem of unemployment in the industrial countries and its unfortunate repercussions on the well-being of the wealthy countries, as they pretend to ignore the impact of that crisis on the development of the Third World. The silence of those mass media and their indifference with regard to the problems of the Third World confirm the idea that they are still the greatest defenders of an economic system based on exploitation and domination.

It is for that reason that the developing countries would gain a great deal if they speeded up the putting into place of the structures of the new information order that has been advocated, among others, to serve and to help in the beginning of a new economic order, equitable and fair.

In fact, no one must have any illusions about immediate results to be expected from the North-South dialogue as long as public opinion in the industrialized countries remains on the margin of events or even worse, remains hostile to any change.

Is it not time to realize that information is an important power which the developing countries should use to support their claims? The countries of the Third World, following the example of the developed countries, should learn to use that formidable weapon in order to apply a constant pressure on their partners whose intransigent positions often rest on a public opinion that is unaware of the realities, on parliaments or on institutions uninformed with regard to the truth which additionally is often deformed for the needs of the cause.

B. The state of current information and the New International Economic Order [NOEI]

Everyone agrees that information could play a capital role in the promotion of the concept of an NOEI in the world in general and in the industrialized countries in particular.

However, if we examine the reasons why the beginning of an NOEI has not found the necessary support in the industrialized countries but rather an indifference and even rejection, we find that those reasons are varied.

There are in the first place some partisans of the current order who want to maintain it and perpetuate it no matter what it may cost because its reform would mean the disappearance of the privileges and interests that they get from it. In other words, a majority of those within the industrialized countries do not share the economic interest of those who are asking for a change. However, if that majority has not always taken a favorable position, it is also possible that it may have not had objective information, which would permit it to observe the bonds of interdependence which today exist among all economies.[1]

In fact, a well-informed public opinion could help to develop the necessary political will permitting governments to participate in the establishment of a new and more viable economic system. However, it cannot be forgotten either that the great international press agencies are first of all multinational enterprises with headquarters in the great centers of economic power.

They are consequently engaged in a policy of defending the status quo, based on the perpetuation of the dependence of the Third-World peoples.

Furthermore, the editors and owners of the Western press organs have always behaved like merchants and industrialists by opposing any idea which goes contrary to the interests of their group, and that is what explains their attempts to frighten public opinion and to make it apathetic toward the claims of the developing countries.

Also, the current economic crisis has not been perceived except through the increase in petroleum prices and the reaction of the public facing the demands for

reforming the international economic system in that case could only be negative.

That is the reason why the developing countries must devote all their interest to the role of information and to the responsibility of the mass media in the establishment and popularization of the New International Economic Order.

That rule is incumbent in the first place on the information media of the countries of the Third World which should among other things:

Inform themselves directly and very seriously about the negotiations going on between developing countries and industrialized countries and the achieved results.

To inform the public on the bases of those negotiations, about their content and their development, while supplying the most accurate information possible at the same time that they inform the public on the problems which have really been presented.

--To anticipate the nature of public reactions and their influence on political power.

Being given the situation of interdependence, news is still a collective right of society as a whole, in the sense that the countries of the Third World should define their demands with regard to the international information agencies represented in their countries since the same disorder which exists in the systems of international economic relations exists in the information system.[2]

It is a question of making the aspirations, the ideas and programs of the Third World accessible to the public opinion of the industrialized countries, while avoiding the problems of semantics.[3]

The popularization of that concept should be made beginning with a clear understanding of the content of the new economic order and an awareness of the notion of interdependence of the problems while serving the common interests of all humanity.

For that, it is necessary to emphasize the great responsibility of those who are in charge of transmitting the truths to public opinion.

It is necessary to recognize that the countries of the Third World have today also succeeded in translating into very concrete terms the nature of their claims and the reforms that they propose to apply to the present system. The documents drawn up by the countries of the Third World contain all the elements of information which are necessary on this subject.

Communication is a problem of a structural nature which cannot be considered as a separate and independent phenomenon from its economic, cultural and social content. It is one of the principal instruments of public political and economic power which those who enjoy that institution use.

The present verbal structure of the press and of information in the world where everything is organized around one center which has relations with the periphery

in no way reflect the reality of our days.[4]

There is a direct relation between information, the public knowledge, political behavior and the transformation of the structures.

The international press agencies are national agencies which have formed combined international structures or a vertical system of information in the interest of perpetuating the ideas and interests of the directing classes and the preservation of the existing order.

That is why it is necessary to undertake some radical reforms in the social communication systems and create a constant and multi-directional flux as a long term goal.

Only the creation of regional and international agencies by the Third World and the establishment of a system of exchange and information from South to South could ensure an adequate news service to be supplied to public opinion in the industrialized countries. This opinion should be persuaded that the NOEI takes its interests into consideration.

None of that can see the light of day unless we begin with a reorganization of the information system in the countries of the Third World. Whatever its nature, it is of very great importance for the press to understand that the objective of the great debates going on now about cooperation between North and South will have a decisive influence both on the peace and on the world which we shall bequeath to our children.[5]

FOOTNOTES

1. International Center for Development--Mass media and North-South economic relations. Nice, France. October, 1975.

2. See the report on the United Nations Conference "Western Public Opinion and the New International Economic Order," Tunis, October 1977.

3. S. Amin: After Nairobi, Preparing the non-alined summit in Colombo--an Appraisal of UNCTAD IV, IDEP/DIR 2747 June 1976.

4. S. Amin, A. Farhi, N. Hussein, the Crisis of Imperialism. Ed. de Minuit, Paris, 1976.

5. See the speech by Mr W. Brandt, given at the Castle of Gymnich (FRG) on 9 December 1977, on the occasion of the first meeting of the independent commission for international development.

12116
CSO: 4400/215

PRIME MINISTER MZALI INTERVIEWED BY 'ESSAYED'

Tunis LA PRESSE DE TUNISIE in French 19 Oct 80 p 4

[Interview granted by Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali by Salama Abderrahmane of the newspaper ESSAYED. Time and place of interview not given]

[Text] The newspaper ESSAYED published an interview in its last number which Mr Mohamed Mzali, the prime minister, had given to its special reporter Salama Abderrahmane. We read there especially:

[Question] Since you have been named prime minister and secretary general of the party, eyes have been focused on Tunisia in the framework of questions about the possibilities of changing the domestic and foreign policies of Tunisia. What is your reply to those questions?

[Answer] Tunisia's policy is based on the coherent whole of a number of constant values and principles whose essential goal is to permit man to assume his destiny as a responsible citizen conscious of his duties and rights, all of this within the framework of a policy whose objective is to bring together all conditions which may be able to assure the general promotion of the Tunisian man and his access to progress and prosperity. Those values and principles on which Tunisian policy rests are all inspired by the thought of President Bourguriba and his general conception of the state, of society, and of public affairs. As for the questions on possibilities of changing the domestic and foreign policies of Tunisia, I would say in reply that our action will depend on deepening and consolidating the essence of the route that we have followed for a number of years by working for the correction of the weak points which might show themselves and in looking for adequate solutions, within the framework of a dialogue and respect for the other parties, to the problems which present themselves.

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, can you define for us with more precision the broad lines of Tunisia's current policies on the domestic and foreign levels and your view of its political future and on what might characterize that policy with relation to the preceding period?

[Answer] As I have said in my reply to the first question, our activity during the present period will be principally devoted to the consolidation of the gains made by Tunisia since independence and to enriching our political experience and our development. I could declare that the great lines of Tunisian policy on the domestic level consist of healing the political and social climate by setting up

rules for a responsible dialogue and an association of all social forces in the discussion of whatever may be of interest to the affairs of the country, all the more so since we are beginning a new decade of development and we are in the process of preparing the sixth development plan. Our policy in this domain tends toward an evaluation of what has been carried out in order to identify the weak points and the strong points and to define our development of objectives as a consequence. At the same time we wish to take into account the demands of the present stage and of the new needs created above all among the young people by the social and cultural progress which the country has accomplished. The goal of all those activities is to achieve a dynamic equilibrium among the different factors making up Tunisian society on all the economic, social, political and cultural levels.

On the foreign level, our policy aims at the development of relations of brotherhood and solidarity with the brother countries and an improvement of the climate among those countries. It also tends to establish more balanced and more equitable relations between the industrial countries and the developing countries. In brief, those are the principal axes on which Tunisia's policy rests on both the domestic and foreign levels.

Party Assuming Its Role

[Question] What is the mission of the party and that of the government during the present stage and to what degree does the party guide the general policy of the country?

[Answer] In order to understand the real role that the Destourian Socialist Party is assuming in the life of the Tunisian people, it must not be conceived by means of the classic definitions of political parties. The Destourian Socialist Party is neither a class party nor a group of interests. It is a party which has acquired its legitimacy as a result of a long and bitter struggle in which it has been the principal mover of the popular forces for the conquest of liberty and progress. It is also a movement open to good will and to everyone who, animated by sincere intentions, wishes to work on behalf of the general interest and for the protection of their nation. The PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] includes workers, farmers, tradespeople, intellectuals, united around a coherent core of values and common principles of action. Strengthened by that broad base, the PSD plays an essential role in the life of the country. It is still, in fact, as it has been during the national struggle for liberation, the mover and the impulsive force of the developmental effort of the nation. It is furthermore a group for reflection and action where different concepts of the country's future meet each other and from that meeting at the end there comes forth an overall concept of the diverse dimensions of the life lived by Tunisian citizens. Alongside that primary role, which is a role of reflection, of conceiving and of creating, the party animates political life, mobilizes energies in the service of objectives of development. Thus it assumes an active role in the development of the country since it arouses enthusiasm, encourages a spirit of work and of self-sacrifice among the citizens and especially among the young people, and it is obvious that the party is assuming that role in a climate of dialogue, of bringing together, and of respect for the decision of the responsible majority.

[Question] Taking into account all of the data, how do you act with respect to

what is called the opposition, the Movement of Democratic Socialists and Popular Unity, for example?

[Answer] What you call opposition and chiefly the tendencies that you have just cited are in reality made up of elements which struggled within the party and there they assumed political responsibilities--at a certain moment they found themselves in conflict with the majority. Their attitude was then to constitute themselves in political currents advocating different ideas. The overwhelming majority of the Tunisian people is attached to President Bourguriba. However, the party remains open to all of those who respect the fundamental rules of political action within any organization, and above all the pledge to respect the majority decision. The party is open. It also works with the aim of being the unifier of all categories of the Tunisian people within the framework of solidarity and common action for the good of the general interest.

Reforming Thoughts, Actions

[Question] The transfer of the headquarters of the League of Arab States to Tunis has given Tunisia a new role and a heavy responsibility on the Arab level. Mr Prime Minister, what is the effective strategy of Tunisia for reinforcing the League of Arab States and for assuring its effective engagement on the Arab and international levels?

[Answer] The choice of our country to host the headquarters of the League of Arab States is an honor which reflects on all Tunisians. We are sparing no effort as the host country to assure to the League all the conditions for permitting to fulfill its determining and effective role for the profit of the causes of the Arab nation. Tunisia, as a member of the League of Arab States, has always acted for the improvement of the political climate among the Arab brothers and has insisted on the need of transcending marginal considerations and problems in such a way as to put us into a position to resolve our problems and to assume our presence on the international scene as a group which has its ambitions with regard to civilization and its desire to contribute to the progress of humanity.

All those considerations place heavy responsibilities on us, not only on the political level since it has been asked of us to turn back the challenge of Zionism and colonialism, but also on the civilizing level since we must reform our ways of talking and of acting with the goal of assuring a take-off and progress to our peoples.

Tunisia sees its role in the framework of the Arab family under that overall point of view and it is working to give to its role a character of efficiency and of effectiveness.

Reinforcing Palestinian Resistance

[Question] Mr Prime Minister, the question of the Middle East is still at an impasse and the situation within the occupied Arab territories is getting worse day by day. What is your attitude, first in regard to this question, and second with regard to the present situation inside the occupied territories and what is your concept of the appropriate solutions for that question?

[Answer] The situation in the Middle East which is getting more serious and worsening is essentially due to the intransigence of Israel and to its ignorance of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, in spite of the general reprobation of world public opinion for the policies of the Zionist State.

That attitude takes a number of forms, among which we observe attempts to eliminate the Palestinian resistance, aggression against Arab countries and the occupation of their territories and attempts to liquidate the Lebanese state by means of characteristic military attacks and by dividing it into pieces.

The Arab attitude toward that bare-faced Zionist challenge should be an attitude of solidarity in the sense that the Arab states should reinforce Palestinian resistance by using all their means to guarantee to it effective conditions for action. The Arab states must also follow a common strategy on the international political level. The Arab World, thanks to the action undertaken with regard to world public opinion, has been able to win a growing support for the Palestinian cause in the media and in the countries which were not so long ago the strongest allies of Israel and the defenders of Zionist positions.

European-Arab Dialogue

[Question] One last question if you will permit it, Mr. Prime Minister. What is the role of Tunisia in the Arab-African dialogue and the European-Arab dialogue?

[Answer] The relationships of Europe with the countries of the African continent and with the Arab World were characterized in the past by imbalance and injustice. That was caused essentially by the nature of those relationships in the times of colonialism.

Today, however, facts have changed completely. It is that on the day following the accession of the African and Arab states to independence, there was a certain awareness and a new conception of what relations between nations should be in a sense of a greater equity and a better balance. From that point of view, the necessity was evoked of beginning a dialogue between Europe, Africa and the Arab World and in fact certain gains were able to be made in that domain. As far as we Tunisians are concerned, we face the problem on a double level.

First, as far as the work of development is concerned, we think that such a dialogue and the cooperation which will result from it will have the most fortunate effects on the acceleration of the process of economic development of the Arab and African countries, thanks to the exchanges of experience and to the training of African and Arab cadres through the utilization of modern scientific and technological methods and procedures.

Second, and on the level of "civilization" we are not putting any brakes on that dialogue on the economic or scientific side since we hope to go beyond that aspect of the problem and come out with an overall "civilizational" approach embracing all the aspects of the lives of the peoples with their cultural, social and political dimension. It is thus that in a dialectic zeal that dialogue will be able to go beyond the state of simple relationships of the producer-consumer type to become constructive and creative. It is at that price that the Arab and African

peoples will lift themselves to the place which is returning to them in the concert of nations.

Such is the role which Tunisia is in the process of playing in the European-Arab and European-African dialogue. Moreover, we are struggling for the setting up of a triangular dialogue among those political and cultural communities which can very well be completed.

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FUTURE OF TRADE UNIONISM DISCUSSED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 20 Oct 1980 pp 21-22

[Editorial by Hammadi Ben Hammed: Future Trade Unionism]

[Text] Trade unionism strictly for demands. Should it exist?

There is no doubt about it, if the worker has been abandoned to his fate, submitted to an oppressive socio-economic system. Unionism strictly for demands, in that kind of situation, also crosses the Rubicon to turn the flank of revolutionism of anarcho-syndicalism and of all kinds of excesses and adventures.

History is edifying on that subject.

Toward the middle of the 19th century, in Europe, the lamentable conditions in which the workers lived--conditions of maximum exploitation of human labor by capitalism--forced unionism to erect the demand, the aggressive demand, into a system, although at its origin that unionism had as its ambition only to claim for the laboring world the right of using the principle of negotiation with the management with an intention of putting a brake, for example, on the lowering of wages and to insure the right to work.

Hence, the proliferation of the maximalist theories which in the wake of a Marx, of an Engels or of a Bakunin advocated substituting the dictatorship of the proletariat for the tryanny of capitalists.

The proposition that an exploited man is very naturally attracted by "the magic of extremes," the dictatorship of the proletariat in his eyes constituting the perfect way of disalienating the worker and of insuring social equality. The trade union, a cell of professional negotiation, becoming in that way a necessarily political machine whose objective is the overthrow by any means of a regime which is "unjust by nature and by destination."

Bourguiba analyzed that phenomenon in a masterly way in the speech that he gave on 31 July 1965 at the Labor Exchange, on the occasion of the 10th Congress of the UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor], of which we published a few extracts last week.

He was to specify that the role of trade unionism under an unjust regime is to "overthrow the regime by opposing force with force and by bringing about the collapse of the entire edifice by sabotaging its interior," all the more so since the doctrine of the class struggle "is based on the existence of opposing interests and on the tendency of every social group to ensure for itself the greatest amount of profit." It is not true, however, Bourguiba declared, that "as the theorists of revolutionary trade unionism, Bakunin, Pelloutier and their disciples believed, that only the worker creates wealth, while the head of the enterprise is just a parasite who lives on the sweat of the worker. That is a concept which does not lend itself to analysis. Without the engineer, the director, the administrator and the machine (capital), the worker, reduced to no more than the strength of his arms, cannot do a great deal. Production results from a collective effort in which multiple elements participate: one brings the strength of his arms, the other his science and his technology, the third contributes to it with his research effort and his invention. The real social problem is a problem of dividing the products resulting from that collective labor among all the social categories which have contributed to its production...."

"It is therefore essential that all of those who participate in production act together harmoniously for the purpose of fomenting an increase in production and stimulating the activity of all the parties involved. Progress and prosperity are achieved at that price. Only that way permits us to create new wealth which can bring us out of under-development and open the door for us to dignity and freedom.

"If Tunisia has succeeded in defining an original method by basing itself on a community of spirit and of actions between the working class and the other social categories which contribute to the economic and social advancement of the country, it is necessary to see in that a product of history, the result of a cooperation based on a reciprocal confidence of almost half a century...."

That is to say that it is manifestly possible for a trade unionism other than revolutionary trade unionism or even the trade unionism strictly devoted to demands, can exist.

It is exactly that which Bourguiba chose to explain with all clarity in his 1965 speech. Trade unionism leads unavoidably to excess and to intolerance if society reduces the worker to a thing, if it does not offer him in his work anything more than a closed and anonymous universe. A universe of exploitation. And that has never been the case in Tunisia. Bourguiba has always had present in his mind the trials endured all over the world by the laboring masses. His struggle, since the 30's, has been to liberate them, to give them back their status as persons, to confer upon them a dignity, to reserve for them the interest that comes back to them from national wealth, an outcome which was perfectly conciliated--once that national independence was achieved--with the existence of a trade unionism whose objective was to be directly interested and consulted with regard to the macro-economic and micro-economic progress of the country. It was therefore that Bourguiba, strengthened by that certainty, was able to call on the UGTT, as of his return from exile in June 1955, for an active participation for the purpose of realizing that magnificent aspiration which is a promotion of Tunisian man.

Active participation.

In a socio-economic system which believes in association, in the complementarity of interests of all the citizens in any social category to which they may belong and which rejects the ideology of the class struggle, trade unionism cannot be conceived otherwise than as part of this participation. Participation is the exclusion of all resort to force between capital and labor, it is the introduction of understanding, of dialogue, of confidence and of a spirit of solidarity in the machinery of active life.

Tunisia is not the Europe of the middle of the 19th century.

There is no need for boycotting or sabotage, of general strikes or of savage strikes so that the workers may obtain satisfaction. A blind social agitation is untimely in a situation where the primacy of man is a sacrosanct dogma, it puts in danger the common interest and deserts the objectives which a rational and responsible trade unionism wishes to achieve. That is all the more true since participation, exactly, permits formulating demands by the one side and by the other side, making them prevail by means of procedures of consultation, of discussion, of negotiation and of finally becoming agreements which are compromises between the demands and the possibilities. In other terms participation is the best means of reducing social tensions--in short there should exist in any rapidly changing country--in what it offers to the employees and to the employers and to their respective unions, the possibility of resolving by dialogue and compromise a number of problems involving the organization and the management of labor, concerning problems of personnel, like those that relate to the job environment, to training, to information, etc.

In any event, there is a debate which the National Trade Unions Commission, newly set up, as a preliminary to preparing the next UGTT congress, has certainly been led to study in order to permit Tunisian trade unionism to continue going forward, considering itself, as Mohamed Mzali noted in his interview with the newspaper LE MONDE last 10 July, both the workers' defender and the party responsible for the realization of a new society, in other words, one which will consolidate the immediate imperatives and the conditions for bringing about a better future."

And besides, isn't that the path for a future trade unionism? Trade unionism of participation and of social peace.

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END

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No. 2232

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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SCHOOL GIRLS SHOUTING ANTI-RUSSIAN SLOGANS SHOT IN KABUL

Lahore MASHRIQ in Urdu 18 Sep 80 pp 3, 8

[Article: "Girl Students Shouting Anti-Russian Slogans Shot at in Kabul; Full Control of Mujahidin Over Large Areas in Afghanistan"]

[Text] Kabul, 17 September (APP/BBC/Radio Report)--Kabul Radio has admitted that heavy fighting was going on between the Russian Army and the Mujahidin at Durra Panjsher. The radio also claimed that a large ammunition store has been captured near Herat. Chinese and American weapons were also found in that storage. Several people in Kabul have been arrested as foreign agents. An international agency specializing in military activities reported that the Russian strategy against the Mujahidin has failed and the Mujahidin have captured large areas in Afghanistan.

According to Radio Kabul, Russian Army attacked a village in Herat area and captured a large quantity of ammunition after killing several Mujahidin. According to the radio report, captured weapons included some of Chinese and American make. Radio Kabul announced that heavy fighting was still going on in Panjsher area. The radio reported that the governor and the commander of this area assured safety of life and property to people. According to a news report hundreds of men on both sides have been killed in the 2-week long battle at Panjsher. The Mujahidin have stopped the movement of Russian tanks with large rocks thrown from the hills. Reports of heavy fighting in Vardak and Lohgarh have been received. Many Afghans have been arrested in Kabul for being foreign agents.

Meanwhile, a senior airman of the Afghan airlines reported that several Afghan girls were shot dead at Kabul. They were demonstrating against the Russian occupation of Afghanistan. Sayyed Abdi, a senior captain of the Afghan airlines, Aryana, told BBC that when the Afghan soldiers refused to fire at the girls in Kabul, armed communists in civilian dress came forward and shot the girls with machine guns. Sayyed Abdi witnessed this incident. He fled Afghanistan immediately after. He said that all these girls did was to shout: "Russians, leave Afghanistan." The Russian officer could not stand it. Another ex-pilot, Zia, said that Russian pilots were flying planes of the Afghan airline. The Afghan pilots who escaped death or arrest have fled the country. Russian pilots have taken over the airline after Afghan pilots stopped working.

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MUJAHIDIN TO EXECUTE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

Lahore MASHRIQ in Urdu 17 Sep 80 p 3

[Article: "56 Armored Vehicles and Tanks Blasted by Mines; 60 Members of Khalq and Parcham Factions Killed, 15 Arrested; Turmoil Among High Officials Fearing Execution"]

[Text] Peshawar, 16 September (PPI)--Hizb-e-Islami group of Mujahidin under the leadership of Engineer Hikmatyar have planned to shoot high ranking officers in the Afghan government. This decision has disrupted the lives of high officials as several officers had already been shot following this announcement. Prominent among these is the death of Mr Bakhtiar, an officer in the Home Ministry.

It was learned that Lughman Province has been besieged for a long time and that the Afghan soldiers decided to join the Mujahidin. However, these soldiers were killed by the Russians who got wind of their plans. The Russian Army attacked the outskirts of Lughman to break the siege but were badly beaten by the Mujahidin after a fierce battle. The Mujahidin captured a large amount of Russian ammunition. The Russian launched this attack from Jalalabad airport. According to another report, Mujahidin of Hizb-e-Islami had planted mines from Malalabad to Lughman thus destroying 56 tanks and armored vehicles. According to reports from Nangarhar, the Mujahidin raided many places and killed several members of Khalq and Parcham factions, captured 15 alive as well as ammunition.

According to AFP, the freedom fighters surrounded the governor's palace and headquarters of the army there at Aibak, capital of Samangan Province. Even Radio Kabul admitted that the Mujahidin are very active in Baghlan and surrounding areas. According to another report, several homes were destroyed at Dorshika by a Russian air raid. API reports that police in Kabul have been alerted for possible attack by the freedom fighters.

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BRIEFS

MINISTERS' DEATH REPORTED--Peshawar, 14 September (PPI)--Last Tuesday at Sayyed Khel in Paktia Province, Mujahidin of Hizb-e-Islami group shot two ministers and two high ranking officers after summary trials. Mullah Mohammed Yunus Khalis, leader of Hizb-e-Islami announced this at Peshawar today. Mullah Yunus' Hizb-e-Islami is an associated group of the Islamic coalition established for Afghanistan's independence. The deceased ministers and officers were: Minister for Frontier Affairs Asif Mohammed; Welfare Minister Nazar Mohammed; Habib Alwasal; and Ihan Mir Prekoti. According to the announcement these people had gone to negotiate with the tribal members of Sayyed Khel. The Mujahidin surrounded them under the leadership of Mullah Jalalal Din Haqani. They were captured, tried summarily, and shot later. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 15 Sep 80 pp 3, 10] 7997

RUSSIANS USE ILLEGAL WEAPON--New Delhi, 16 September (N.R.)--According to diplomatic sources, the Soviets are using AKS rifles, banned by international agreement, against the Mujahidin. These rifles are advanced models of AK-47 rifles. The bullets used in these rifles explode after entering the body; and the victim dies from internal bleeding. It should be remembered that such bullets were used on this subcontinent by the English army during the 19th century and were manufactured at Dum Dum near Calcutta. According to diplomatic sources, the Russian Army is using "needle bombs" in Afghanistan. This bomb shoots needles over a wide radius when exploded, badly wounding people in the area. According to these sources the number of Karmal soldiers has decreased dramatically forcing more and more Russian soldiers to fight against the Mujahidin. According to these sources the U.S.S.R. has taken over administration of communications and English and Soviet newspapers published from Kabul. [Text] [Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 17 Sep 80 p 8] 7997

CSO: 4203

DEBATE ON FIVE-YEAR PLAN REPORTED

National Assembly Opens Debate

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 24-25 Oct 80 p 1

[Text] The autumn session of the National People's Assembly, which began last Wednesday, continued on Thursday. Two points were on the agenda for Wednesday's meeting: the adoption of ordinances 80-02 and 80-03 of 13 October 1980 concerning the measures decided on by the government following the earthquake at El Asnam and the suppression of violations of the law committeed in connection with the calamity.

The second point taken up Thursday was the presentation by Mr Abdelhamid Brahimi, member of the central committee, minister of planning and territorial administration, on the 1980-1984 five-year plan. Mr Brahimi organized his presentation before the deputies of the National People's Assembly around the "principal elements" of the five-year plan, "the specific contents of the plan, their appropriateness to the solution of current problems, their contribution to the strengthening of medium-term development, as well as conditions for achieving a new stage in development." Speaking of the Algerian conception of planning which takes into account the economic and social realities of the state of development reached by the country, Mr Brahimi stressed that "our planning should be scientific in its preparation, democratic in its elaboration, and mandatory in its implementation."

In his communication, the minister remarked that [begin boldface] "the stakes are high, since we can less and less count on mineral resources to supplement the nation's only permanent resource, labor." [end boldface] The five-year plan aims at the twin objectives whose realization should permit a rehabilitation of the economic situation, which is "deeply stricken by at least two types of imbalances: the first involves our relations abroad and the second our sphere of production and trade." "External balance constitutes a strategic objective of the five-year plan."

The reestablishment of balance at the macro-level of the national economy envisioned by the next plan--also found in the decennial perspective--should guarantee the rehabilitation of the situation characterized by imbalances with damaging consequences, "such as increasing exposure externally, the decline in profits and the apparatus of production, the erosion of purchasing power of the workers, and the exacerbation of social and regional inequalities."

The finality of the "equilibrium of production and trade aimed at signifies that the volume of goods and services produced, their quality, the locale and timing

of their availability, correspond to the social needs, both in quantity and quality, where and when those needs are expressed."

The efforts that will be deployed to reestablish external balance should go hand in hand with the in-depth actions to reestablish internal balance, an objective that is equally strategic. This should be accomplished through measures of "reorganization undertaken at the level of enterprises, of sectoral branches, of the juridico-administrative environment, and of management methods."

With improvement of the efficiency of the apparatus of production, gross domestic product should experience a growth at least equal to 8 percent. In his communication to the National People's Assembly, the minister of planning and territorial administration indicated that per capita income "will go up 4 percent."

"The plan," according to the minister, "puts priority on putting into operation programs and projects that can be put into operation rapidly...." "The strategic objective of investment planning relates to the general structure of the five-year investment program and the substance of the inter-sectoral policies." "It will be necessary," Mr Brahimi was to say, "to ban the precipitous launching of new programs, the anarchic conditions of their entry into operation, and uncontrolled costs and delays."

The question of the private sector and especially its place and role in the national economy was also broached by the minister, who said that "the present situation is far from its [The private sector's] deep and effective insertion into the country's development efforts." "It is fitting," he said, "to specify the juridical framework regulating its activity, its obligations, and its rights in accordance with the "spirit and the letter" of the national Charter."

Decentralization, "understood as the restructuring of the level of decision-making between the central and local authorities," as well as the pivotal role played by the annual plan, were other subjects of the communication presented by Mr Abdelhamid Brahimi.

Minister Answers Questions on Plan

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 26 Oct 80 p 2

[Text] The deliberations of the National People's Assembly resumed yesterday afternoon as part of the autumn 1980 session, which began last Wednesday under the chairmanship of Mr Rabah Bitat, member of the Political Bureau, and in the presence of Mr Abdelhamid Brahimi, member of the central committee and minister of planning and territorial administration.

The working session yesterday consisted in the reading of a part of the introduction of the report on the bill containing the five-year plan drawn up by the planning and finances committee of the National People's Assembly, in the intervention of four deputies and in the response to remarks and questions by the minister of planning and territorial administration.

In the introduction to its report on the bill containing the 1980-1984 Five-Year Plan, the committee briefly analyzed the past decade in terms of development in

general, in the course of which several insufficiencies were identified "...nevertheless, at the same time this strategy produced remarkable results in several economic and social areas, it engendered distortions whose negative effects are manifesting themselves more and more sharply in tandem with the profound changes that have been affecting our economy."

"Moreover, the investment effort, as it become more and more massive, increasingly lost ground in coherence and effectiveness. Instead of contributing to meeting objectives of integrated and independent development, it aggravated the intersectoral, inter-regional, and intra-regional distortions."

In its conclusion, on the subject of the past decade, the committee states "that beyond the problems born of the rapid and ambitious development of our country, imbalances and serious distortions are affecting our economy. Their resorption is an imperative if we are to reinforce the gains of the revolution and establish our development on durable foundations that will ensure our independence."

In a second part of this introduction, the 10-year prospects set down by the political directorate are reviewed.

The 1980-1984 Five-Year Plan was elaborated on the basis of the results of progress in the 1967-1978 decade and is also set down in a long-term course of which it constitutes the first stage.

The four interventions made after the reading of this part of the report concerned several related points, especially in regard to the human resources demanded by a five-year plan of this scope for its realization. It is believed that mediocrity must be fought and eliminated, for the cadres and the capable men exist. And therefore to translate into reality the expression "the right man in the right job" this must be done. They also all consider that control at all levels is imperative.

It also stressed that realization of the plan is essentially based on the [foreign exchange] reserves procured by hydrocarbons. Which is not a permanent safety net, because this wealth is exhaustible.

In his response to the interventions, the minister of planning and territorial administration emphasized, in fact, the necessity of a clear national policy for hydrocarbons. He also said that the only durable source of wealth in a nation is labor. He also recalled that the five-year plan was drawn up in accordance with the results of the second session of the central committee. Responding to a question concerning agriculture, the minister says that the problems of this sector cannot be resolved in five years. Especially as the finances accorded to the agricultural sector in previous plans had a weak rate of utilization.

The problem of technical assistance was also described, and it was predicted that it will continue to exist in the context of the services linked to production, so long as we do not have access to all the cadres of which our economy is in need.

Elsewhere, concerning emigration, the reintegration of 25,00 emigrants annually is scheduled, said the representative of the government at the end of his remarks, insisting on the improvement of the intensity of labor.

The deliberations of the National Popular Assembly will resume tomorrow morning.

Planning Minister's Statement

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 26 Oct 80 p 6

[Text] The second day of deliberations of the autumn 1980 session of the National People's Assembly was marked by a communication from the minister of planning and territorial administration. The importance of this communication to the debate in a session basically dedicated to the Five-Year Plan is self-evident.

We publish below, in its entirety, the remarks of Mr Abdelhamid Brahimi, made before the deputies.

I. Planning and Five-Year Plan

Our economic and social realities, the state of development at which we have arrived, concretely determines the Algerian concept of planning.

In order to avoid misunderstandings and mistakes it is necessary to spell it out afresh by recalling the principal elements.

Then I will proceed, in this presentation intended to constitute a prefatory contribution to your debates, to the specific substance of the five-year plan, its appropriateness to the solving of current problems, its contribution to the strengthening of medium-term investment, as well as conditions for realizing this new stage.

We begin with what our planning is not.

--It is not a grab-bag of projects here and there with precisely calculated costs and with scarcely noticeable effects on the development of the national economy.

--It is not a speech justifying the status quo by reflecting the spontaneous workings of real forces on the economic and social terrain.

Preparation of the Plan: A Political Task

As a unitary system for guidance of economic and social development, our planning, as prescribed in the National Charter, must be "scientific" in its preparation, DEMOCRATIC in its elaboration, and "mandatory" in its implementation.

The five-year plan, submitted today for your discussion and approval, has followed, I should say for the first time in our history, the threefold criteria laid down in the National Charter. A faithful expression, in the economic and social domains, of the political determination to advance Algerian society, by removing obstacles and facilitating the deployment of the constructive energies of all the social forces of the revolution, this plan is based on analysis of the complexity that characterizes our economic and social realities today.

The balance-sheet for the decade past constituted an objective starting point from which the strong points of our development were identified and weaknesses brought to light.

Its lessons are integrated into the five-year plan.

This balance-sheet and the rough draft of the five-year plan were at the center of numerous exchanges of views in various fora, culminating in the holding of sessions of the Special Congress of the FLN [National Liberation Force party].

In theory, even more participation and democratization could have been implemented. In practice, it suffices to recall, in order to put the process into context, that the preparation of the review and the five-year plan, over which were superimposed the current activities, took less than a year.

It is also important to take due notice of the new fact that the preparation of the plan has ceased to be an administrative labor conducted by a small coterie. it has become fundamentally a political labor, in accordance with the directions of Brother Chadli Bendjedid, President of the Republic, Secretary General of the FLN.

This last fact all by itself should guarantee the implementation of the plan and thus promote its "mandatoryness." One must not, however, put too much reliance on mechanical effects and, by consequence, it is important to move ahead altogether energetically to mobilize all available elements to contribute to the complete success of this plan.

The stakes are high, as we can less and less count on mineral resources to supplement the nation's only permanent resource (one cannot state this too often): labor.

The overarching idea of growth, in large proportions, of production and productivity in the years to come pervades the substance of the five-year plan through and through; here now are the main elements.

Think Through the "Logic" of Extroversion

II. The Substance of the Five-Year Plan

As I have already suggested, this plan is continous with the past, when it aims at consolidating and broadening the economic and social gains made to date. At the same time it looks ahead to the future by moving to rehabilitate the situation and reestablish the overall balance of the economy.

It is also found in a 10-year perspective which envisions, starting in 1985, putting into operation programs and activities, in line with the increasingly numerous and complex needs, on sound foundations and by virtue of the harmonious functioning of our economic apparatus.

The overall [lines of the] economic policy are followed, and the values assigned to the indicators of growth and development constitute the first category of the contents of the plan. The second category specifies the tools required to attain these objectives. For purposes of clarity of exposition, I will lay before you these measures only in the third place [sic], keeping in mind however that the success of their operation will depend in a decisive way on the success of this plan and the pursuit under satisfactory conditions of economic and social development.

Our present economic situation is stricken profoundly by two types of imbalance at least: the first is our relationship with the exterior, the second our [domestic] sphere of production and trade.

These imbalances are not only the subject of academic interest: they entail the unleashing of especially harmful effects [illegible] as the increasing exposure to the outside, the decline of profits, of the apparatus of production, of the purchasing power of the workers, and the exacerbation of social and regional inequalities.

To be convinced of this it is enough to think of the effects on people's behavior of an inflationary spiral if it was maintained for too long...or again let us try to think through the "logic" of extroversion.

Without the shadow of a doubt the fundamental imbalances from which our economy suffers must be vigorously fought as soon as possible.

The Five-Year Plan retains this objective clearly and precisely, and moreover in a way which specifies that the reestablishment of balance will be effectuated on a larger scale, or in other words at levels that far from reducing the growth rate will amplify it.

Excessive recourse to outside sources, and one of its corollaries, excessive endebtedness, constitutes one of the most important [illegible] of the plan. The relative weight of both the first and second ought to be reduced.

As you may recall, at the end of 1979 contracted debt rose to more than 111 billion Algerian dinars, the mobilized debt to more than 67 billion dinars, and debt service to more than 14 billion dinars, just for 1979 alone. One must also keep in mind the fact that the present debt will necessitate, for [debt] service alone, almost 80 billion dinars during the five-year period.

External Balance, A Strategic Objective

What will one have to do to remedy this situation?

Obviously, it is important for the mobilization of new external credit to be strictly contained and orchestrated, as to speculators, as to money markets we consider, and above all as to economic operations eligible for external financing.

In this latter area, our margin for maneuver is certainly not insignificant. In fact, systematic preferential recourse to the internal market should become eventually the rule. It will be supplemented by recourse to the external markets only in case of strictest necessity.

More precisely, the Five-Year Plan anticipates a growth rate in real terms of imports of goods and services on the order of 6 percent per year, or approximately one-third of the growth logged during the last plan. If the rate of 6 percent deducted accurately reflects the effort at reducing excessive recourse to the outside, it does not in any way fetter the steady progress of the economic and social apparatus.

In fact, the category of semi-finished goods will grow at a rate of more than 9 percent, food sector consumer goods at more than 5 percent, and industrial consumer goods at more than 8 percent.

Special mention should be made of the rate of importation of equipment goods, expected to be kept to 4 percent per year. This level is explained, technically, by the volume of social investments in the plan, and therefore of investment which have small import contents, and of course it presupposes substantial resort to our own capacities, of conception, realization, and production. That is to say [it presupposes] the economic value attaching to mobilization of national capacities and the flourishing of their creativity.

External balance is a strategic objective, taken fully into account in the five-year plan.

However, the activities described in this domain remain inadequate if not supported by actions to be taken in the field of internal balance, that is, in our production and trade.

As everyone knows, under-utilization of production capacities, inadequate productivity, insufficient suppleness of economic supplies, constitute characteristic aspects of our present situation. The five-year plan intends to alleviate this through two series of moves: schematically, actions of habitual type, including investments and reorganization moves, undertaken at the level of the enterprise, the branch, the sectors, the juridico-administrative environment, and management methods.

I will have occasion to return to these questions in a moment. I would now, however, like to stress the fact that even investment moves to "revitalize" production capacities should be totally linked to concrete objectives and thus be fully prepared before being launched.

The balance of production and trade that this plan aims to reestablish means at bottom that the volume of goods and services produced, their quality, the locale and the time of their availability should correspond to social needs, both in quantity and quality, where and when these needs are expressed.

Protecting the Purchasing Power of the Poor Masses

This question by itself should reveal that the dynamism of the internal balance is far from being remediable just by additional doses of more and more massive investment.

New and large dynamics are to be impressed on production of goods and services; while insuring the increase of income, they will also permit the attentuation of inflationary tendencies and their train of exacerbated social inequalities; they will contribute to moderating the phenomena of penury, which are profound factors for social instability.

These two evils, inflation and penury, hit and discourage the whole laboring class, how well we know it, and this is why we are devoting our best efforts to struggling against them.

We should also know that the struggle against inflation and its other form, want, is a long-term struggle which requires the contributions of all of us. Ubiquitous phenomena, they require in reality uniquitous action.

Under these conditions, the five-year plan has kept as necessary and possible an annual growth in gross domestic production of more than 8 percent in real terms.

These [begin boldface] minimum target [end boldface] growth rates are explained, in the first place, by an enlargement of the work force by more than a million persons in the period: it is also explained, and above all, by growth in productivity that is both substantial and realistic, because premised on reduction in idle capacity, better qualified labor, moves to reorganize the economy, improvement of the quality of supervision, etc...

Because of the expansion of jobs and better-qualified labor, income will grow at a rate of 7.5 percent, just slightly inferior to the growth rate of the gross domestic product.

The growth of per capita income will exceed 4 percent and create the objective conditions for the formation of real savings, useable for the formation of household capital, especially for at least the partial financing of their habitations.

Household consumption will undergo structural transformations relative to development (relative reduction in food spending, relative growth in the percentage spent on durable consumer goods, leisure, culture, etc...)

More specifically, the purchasing power of disadvantaged groups will continue to be protected, whether by the present policy of stabilization of the price of basic necessities, or through a more selective policy addressing more directly the concerned groups in the population. Our irreversible socialist option still impels us to tie improvements in living conditions, especially those of the groups in the population who are still disadvantaged, to improvements in production.

For in order to achieve the objectives described, especially the reestablishment of the fundamental balance of the economy, action must be grounded as much on progress in rehabilitating the reorganization [sic] as on the nature and content of the investment programs to be undertaken.

The Investment Program: A Double Necessity

The expansion of national capacities and the improvement of their social and economic effectiveness, is the most important condition required for success in meeting the objectives, and for the realization of the ambitious investment programs called for.

In reality, the proposed volume of 400 million Algerian dinars of investments as well as the structure of this program reflects a double necessity.

In the first place, it is a question of response to the most important social exigencies, in order at length to arrive at high-quality training for the new generations, at satisfactory housing and health conditions, and continous improvement in the standard of living of broad classes of the populace.

In the second place, it is appropriate to meet the preparatory conditions for long-term growth, continous and durable, in national resources, the only real guarantee that the increasingly greater economic and social needs of increasingly varied kinds

will be satisfied, and the only guarantee of the [continued] strengthening of the economic independence of the country.

Therefore, the programming of anticipated investment activity has fully integrated this double aim.

Top priority in these new activities goes to strengthening the apparatus of existing production, to making it yield its full value, and to the creation of all levels of new capacities of achievement, making possible the attainment of levels of costs and time-factors the national economy can sustain.

Similarly, the plan puts special emphasis on putting into operation programs and projects which are rapidly realizable, and which will promote the attenuation of the most lively social tensions and the gradual correction of imbalances in the functioning of the economy.

Beyond these urgent measures, a large place is given in the same way to the completion of projects now in the works, to the launching of big investment projects destined to lay the groundwork for the future in strategic fields.

However, freedom of maneuver--with respect to the amelioration of the intersectoral structure of investments--is significantly reduced by the scale of programs already committed.

They reach at the start of the plan nearly 200 billion Algerian dinars; nevertheless, a significant part of actions already pledged, notably those concerning social programs and collectives, is suitably inscribed in the objectives of the Five-Year Plan and requires only minor adaptations to new conditions of maturation and realization of the programs.

Under these conditions, the organization of arbitrations and decisions on the new activities will be decided, throughout the duration of the plan, by the coherence of objectives with resources, the quality of the programming and the maturation of projects, and their extent of participation in the most important objectives.

The structure of the investment program which accords 32 percent to social equipment and collectives, 23 percent to the industrial sector, 15 percent to hydrocarbons, 12 percent to agriculture and hydraulics, 9 percent to economic infrastructure, and 8 percent to means of realization and transport equipment, thus reflects the constraints foreseen and the objectives set.

Develop Concrete and Operational Mechanisms for Managing the National Economy

One must guard against hasty interpretation of these figures which do not [fully] express, in certain sectors such as agriculture, hydraulics, and economic infrastructures, the scope of efforts to be made and the ambitious goals set for them. For example, the development problems in hydraulics lie not so much in the massive injection of investments over a short period, but more in the identification and putting into operation of programs better adapted to its consolidation and development.

In fact, the big hydraulic programs can only be justified if one realizes their true importance in terms of the profitability of existing dams (siltation, the recovery of potentially irrigable lands), reduction of losses in the system, which amount to about 50 percent, development of small and medium [-size] hydraulics, and the putting into place of capacity to give permanent support to the hydraulic effort over a long period.

In this context, respect for the general structure of the five-year investment program and the substance of the sectoral policies constitutes the strategic objectives of the investment planning. Also the estimates on expenditure authorization in financial terms should not be taken as being in themselves goals of the plan's operation: they depend, in reality, as well on the relative progress of the different sectors in mobilizing human and material resources, and on increases in costs and prices throughout the economy.

It will also be necessary to ban the precipitous launching of new programs, the anarchic conditions under which they are set up, and uncontrolled costs and delays.

And, finally, in order to increase the economic and social effectiveness of the investments to be initiated, it is becoming imperative to develop intersectoral and regional coordination of programs and projects.

The distribution of tasks and prerogatives in matters of deciding on the maturation and guidance of projects will guarantee the diffusion of responsibilities at all levels.

In a general way, the proposed plan which is submitted to you lays special stress on a smaller number of strategic parameters the maintenance and control of which largely conditions the success of the economic policy pursued.

Such an approach is all the more opportune as the profound changes expected in the functioning of the economy added to uncertainties on the international economic scene, make detailed normative [numerical] targets--which pretend to regulate economic and social activity in all its categories, over a five-year period--arbitrary and rapidly obsolete.

Under these conditions, the task of developing concrete and operational mechanisms of managing the national economy, and organizing the putting into operation of detailed sectoral activities, devolves upon the Annual Plans, on the basis of the real results in execution of the National Plan.

Poorly Adapted "Organizational Patterns"

III. Guarantees of Success of the Five-Year Plan

The five-year plan proposed for your approval has been described in certain places as ambitious.

Does it not, in fact, pursue tasks difficult to accomplish, indeed impossible for some?

Does it not try, in fact, simultaneously, to reestablish external balance, permanent sources of acceleration of material growth, and resolutely to undertake the

action of reducing deficits in the satisfaction of collective needs, whose role in the flowering of humanity, called for in the National Charter, is well recognized?

On balance one must recognize that this plan, the expression of a clear and determined political will, has chosen to resolve the real problems facing the country not only today but in the longer term, and it has chosen, in order to do this, to have recourse not only to easily manipulatable tools but also to those difficult to mobilize and put into operation.

I want first of all to speak of activities or reorganization of our economic apparatus of production of goods and services.

I want to speak of the necessity of reduction of costs throughout the national economy, and more particuarly in the domains of high "social sensitivity" such as housing, construction of schools and health units, municipal water supplies, to cite only these fields.

I would like in the third place to speak, in the context of the intensive utilization of our production potential, of the role and place of the private sector, and how it should be defined and organized.

Decentralization of the process of decision-making toward enterprises and regions will lead me to put emphasis on the growing confidence being placed in t initiatives, coordinated at the base [sic]. It is true that much is expected of this decentralization, an authentic foundation of the effective democratization of economic and social life.

The majority of our enterprises in production of goods and services function under far from satisfactory conditions. One of the most striking lessons learned from the review of the decade dealt in fact with their inadequacies with respect to financial profitability, and even with respect to economic and social profitability.

From this situation flows the impossibility of "generating" resources sufficient for the replacement and modernization of the instruments of production. Among the objective causes of this state of affairs, organizational inefficiency stands in the first rank. In truth, "organizational patterns" invented about 1967-1968 continue today to control our enterprises. But it has become obvious that these "organizational patterns" are no longer well adapted to the new and intense developments of our enterprises. In a more concrete way, it is recognized that the initial polyvalence of our enterprises tends to become dispersion, that their large size becomes stolidity, and that the centralization which enabled them once to control the parameters of their development has become today bureaucratization and an inhibiting factor.

We will have the opportunity, within the five-year plan, to present to you in detail steps bearing on the differentiated reorganization of enterprises intended to make them more flexible entities, of more manageable size, and responsive to the pull of demand under conditions of cost, quality, and timeliness in all respects better adapted than those which exist today.

Decentralization: Authentic Restructuring of Levels of Decision-Making

It is in this context that questions relative to the financial structure of enterprises can be and should be examined. The financial restructuring, to be brought about in the larger context of the restructuring of enterprises, characterized mainly by clarification of missions and levels of decision-making, will also result in the definition of controllable cost centers.

Thus, our units will be better armed and motivated to act in a meaningful way on their real costs and thus on their productivity.

Present cost conditions, as well as today's level of productivity, are certainly untenable on average and over time. Indisputably they threaten the realization of programs of very large social impact whose importance to the overall efficiency of the economy is primordial.

The overall efficiency of the economy is the fundamental axis of this Five-Year Plan, beyond any considerations inspired by abstract schemes or schemas from basic empiricism, because accepting the reality of the environment such as it is.

It assumes full utilization of the national potential for production of goods and services.

The mobilization of all capacities of production called for by this plan, public and private production capacities, constitutes an indispensable condition for realization of the totality of objectives of this plan.

It is, in fact, to define, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the National Charter, the role and the place of the private sector.

This latter should no longer continue to develop itself practically in the absence of any juridical framework that would regulate its activity. It is vital to define precisely what are the obligations of the private sector with respect to national development, economic and social, just as it is necessary to define what are its rights.

It is clear that the present situation of the private sector is far from supporting its deep and effective insertion into the country's development efforts. To say the least, the non-mobilization of private savings, especially small private savings, for the exclusive benefit of production, has engendered among other negative effects, the unhealthy growth of parasitic activities and investments are either sterile (hoarding) or speculative.

On another level, the mobilization of regional potentialities in service both of diffusion of sources and of the fruits of development gives to decentralization a special dimension.

Though the policy of territorial administration must be understood in terms of long-range perspectives, the totality of activities already anticipated in this plan favors, collectively, reductions in regional imbalances.

Decentralization can be understood as the authentic restructuring of levels of decision-making between central and representative local authorities; it should also

lead to the effective cooperation of local collectivities and enterprises by virtue of the availability of resources in the decision-making process: in all cases, decentralization aims in this plan at the eminently political objective of widening participation in the work of development and, beyond that, at the promotion of man, to which the National Charter gives central importance, as all of us know.

The Pivotal Role of the Annual Plan

It must be clear that an objective of such scope, because it constitutes the climax of all successful development progress, cannot countenance in any way demagogic positions.

We have taken note of the ephemeral character of mineral resources in the dynamization of development; this awareness leads us back to the only permanent resource the country has, its labor capacity.

On its quantitative and qualitative development, which is improving through the training dispensed, depends basically the pace of growth capable of being achieved and maintained in the middle and long term by the Algerian economy.

The five-year plan is closely in line with this ambition.

It goes perfectly into our concept of planning which rejects rigid schemas and laxistes [translation unknown] forms of action with respect to economic and social realities.

The reduced number of strategic parameters retained includes investments in the most efficient structure possible, taking into account the available freedom of maneuver: it integrates the far-reaching steps of reorganize the functioning of our economic apparatus, in order to improve its technical performance and to increase its social benefits.

The necessity for authentic and continual control over the evolution of our economy, the scale of changes expected, the uncertainties in the external environment, determine the pivotal role given to the Annual Plan. Indeed the nature of the latter is profoundly changed from a simple arithmetical slice of a national development plan into a powerful tool of organization and hierarchialization of the actions contained in the five-year plan, on the basis of the results recorded and the obstacles encountered.

The totality of objectives and resources, their connections, would remain no more than an idea if our capacity to work were not mobilized to the greatest possible extent.

These work capacities constitute the ultimate motive force for economic and social development. Nothing durable can be undertaken when they are faltering or kept down to mediocre levels.

In conjunction with the numerous and varied measures which this plan will put in place to stimulate and reward productive efforts, it will be fitting, beyond the sphere of economics per se, to create all the [necessary] conditions so that labor will appear as the exlusive source of the wealth of the nation and the foundation of the improvement of the living conditions of the citizens of this country.

(Sub-Titles By The Editors)

9516
CSO: 4400

PARTY DETRACTORS CRITICIZED BY TRADE UNION CADRE

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 7 Oct 80 p 1

[Article by K.B: "Reckonings"]

[Text] Trade union cadre have denounced destructive elements that are trying to disseminate doubt among workers.

The problem is therefore to find out who these elements are, who is manipulating them and insidiously spreading rumors intended to undermine the morale of the working classes and their trust in the political administration, and to turn worker opinion against the comprehensive program of correction and reorganization resulting from the special FLN congress: we recall that this congress, on the initiative of President Chadli, was a real forum of responsible democracy, during which an uncompromising evaluation was made. Antinationalistic practices were also denounced, along with deviations likely to threaten the achievements of the socialist revolution.

The notable events in Algeria in 1980 certainly gave cause for reflexion on the part of those who "have betrayed the trust and squandered the property of the people." The first files to be opened by the Accounting Office, the responsible debates over the supervision that the People's National Assembly will have in future, the social measures taken in favor of the workers and the most disadvantaged levels [of society], the process of strengthening party structures and the mobilization of mass organizations on the basis of true representativity of the militant grassroots, in short, the leading role that the National Liberation Front expects to assume, basing its ideas faithfully on the orientations of the National Charter and the resolutions of the Extraordinary Congress of the party -- all this gives rise to uneasiness and anxiety. . .

Bearing in mind prospects such as these, in which responsibilities are clearly defined -- for individuals as well as for institutions -- one can understand why people are becoming nervous and why anxiety is appearing in some circles. A reckoning will have to be given sooner or later. That is the whole strength of the mass-mobilizing FLN that has led us to victory.

But the rub is that it is within the very system of elements to which the revolution entrusted responsibilities, and which are becoming the most ferocious inquisitors of the social progress policy concretized in the country.

Stupidity is not a characteristic exclusive to the ignorant. It gets serious when it is exercised through the deeds and words of these professionals who are no longer even grateful for their living, nor conscious of belonging to a state which has raised them to such a status level that they confuse "freedom of speech" and antinational denigration that could conceal many flaws [as published]....

These people do as much harm in their circles as all the harmful elements incapable of conforming to the model of society that the people have decided to build.

12149
CSO: 4400

PRESIDENT CHADLI'S COMMENTS TO YOUTH LEADERS

Algiers EL MOUNDJAHID in French 7 Oct 80 p 1

[Report on President Chadli's remarks to members of the national secretariat of the National Union of Algerian Youth, at the presidential palace on 6 October 1980: "Grassroots Representativity in Every Organization Guarantees the Success of Democratic Dialogue and the Broadest Mobilization"]

[Text] Algiers (APS)--Chadli Bendjedid, president of the republic, party secretary general, received the members of the national secretariat of the National Union of Algerian Youth at the presidential headquarters on Monday afternoon.

The meeting took place in the presence of the members of the Central Committee, Mohamed Cherif Messaadia, official of the permanent secretariat of the Central Committee, Mohieddine Amimour, counselor at the presidential palace, and Ahmed Sbaa, head of the department of mass organizations.

After welcoming the youth representatives, the president of the republic invited the secretary general of the union to speak, and he made a brief presentation on the organization's activities.

The majority of the members of the secretariat reaffirmed, in their comments, the commitment of youth to the socialist choices defined in the national charter and their cooperation with the administration of the country to make sure of further achievements.

The youth representatives also denounced the speculation engaged in by certain foreign press correspondents concerning their activities and the positions they have adopted.

The president of the republic spoke at length on his conception of the role of youth in a country where the percentage of young people exceeds the average of 60 percent of the population as a whole. In particular, he stated: "The post-independence generation is the link between the November generation and those to come. So it must assume great historical responsibility.

As for its leadership, it owes it to itself to acquire unity of ideas, coherence of work, and coordination of effort.

If the independence generation assumes responsibility for the continuity of the revolution, I must say in all candor, you will reap tomorrow whatever you sow today. I am sure that you are measuring the full range of your role in building the new society, firmly attached to the authenticity of its past and open to the experiences of the world."

After stressing the characteristics of the society that the Algerian people hopes to see developed, and the importance of patriotism as a factor in building a socialist society, in conformity with the national charter and Arab-Islamic values, the president of the republic stated: "Our concept of cultural revolution includes all historical, civilizing, and social facts. It cannot be a narrow concept limited to education or the arts. We are firmly convinced that the overwhelming majority of our youth is fully aware of its role in history."

The president of the republic particularly emphasized the hopes placed by the revolution on sincere Algerian university youth proud of its history. And he also expressed his deep respect for youth in national service and the efforts they constantly make in building the country.

The party secretary general then stressed the importance placed by the National Liberation Front on mass organizations, emphasizing particularly the sincere representativity of the grassroots throughout each organization, "for," he said,"that is the guarantee of the democratic dialog that leads to shared conviction in decision-making and will consequently assure broader mobilization for applying this decision. Now, that cannot occur if the organization's leadership is not the sincere expression of its constituency."

On the subject of certain issues of national concern, the president of the republic indicated that the administration's main concern is to work,as a priority, to solve the day-to-day problems of citizens. "This is the area," he added, "to which belong certain decisions recently made concerning housing, water and bread supplies. Other decisions are being made about spare parts that interest citizens and affect economic enterprises in a general way. They also concern the development of professional training with a view to training the maximum number of technicians needed by the country."

After stressing the importance of the role to be played by harmonious, united youth, and the efforts that party organizations must make to consolidate its activity, the president of the republic again expressed the confidence of the political administration in aware and committed youth to work according to the will of its people and the objectives of the revolution.

At the end of the meeting, the president of the republic wished the youth representatives all success in their task.

12149
CSO: 4400

GDR DELEGATION ARRIVES FOR OFFICIAL VISIT

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 9 Oct 80 pp 1, 3

[Excerpts] Algiers (APS)--Horst Sindermann, ember of the Poltticial Bureau of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party, president of the People's Chamber of the GDR and vice president of the Council of State, arrived at Houari Boumediene International Airport for a 7-day official visit to Algeria at the invitation of Rabah Bitat, political bureau member and president of the National People's Assembly

On leaving the aircraft, Mr Sindermann was greeted by Raoah Bitat Djelloul Melaika, central committee member and vice president of the People's National Assembly, and by assembly deputies.

In a statement to the national press, the president of the People's Assembly of the German Democratic Republic expressed pleasure at the friendly and cooperative relations linking Algeria and the GDR.

After expressing his great pleasure in responding to the invitation extended by the president of the National People's Assembly for him to make an official visit to Algeria, Mr Sindermann said that he was particularly pleased to continue with his Algerian counterpart the talks already begun in Berlin and Algiers. "That first meeting," he stressed, "is proof of the very close relations that exist between the two peoples."

"I particularly want to take this opportunity," he continued, "of transmitting the warmest greetings of the people of the GDR to their friends the Algerian people."

The vice president of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic then paid homage to the liberation struggle waged by the Algerian people for its national independence, before mentioning that his talks will concern the strengthening of bilateral relations and topics of mutual interest.

Touching on the international situation, Mr Sindermann alluded to the pockets of tension that threaten world peace and the arms race started by the

imperialist powers. "That is why we shall discuss these problems to be able to finalize our positions and our activities," he said.

After pointing out the increasing growth in the development of bilateral relations in all areas, Mr Sindermann expressed the hope that relations would become even deeper and farther reaching in the interests of both peoples, a task that both parliaments will help to bring to a successful conclusion.

In conclusion, Horst Sindermann stressed that this visit will certainly make it possible for him to become better acquainted with Algerian development and to draw the bonds of friendship uniting the two countries even closer.

Last evening at the governmental palace, prime minister Mohammed Abdelghani, member of the Central Committee of the FLN Party, received the parliamentary delegation of the German Democratic Republic, led by Horst Sindermann, member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Unified Socialist Party, president of the People's Assembly, and vice president of the Council of State of the GDR.

The interview was an opportunity to examine the bilateral relations of the two countries and international problems of mutual interest.

Djelloul Melaika and Mohammed Yala, central committee members and vice president of the people's assembly and minister of finance respectively, were present at these talks.

Mr Sindermann leading a large delegation, was accompanied by Djelloul Melaika, vice president of the APN [People's National Assembly] and by members of the reception committee accompanying the president of the People's Assembly of the GDR during his official visit to Algeria [as published].

Algiers (APS)--The GDR parliamentary delegation on official visit to Algeria includes in particular Manfred Clauss, deputy of the parliamentary group of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] and vice president of the permanenet commission on national education; Otto Fiedler, deputy of the Democratic Peasant Party of Germany (DBD) and member of the permanent commission on agriculture, forestry and the agro-alimentary sector; Ulrich Fahl, deputy and vice president of the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic Union and member of the permanent commission on defense; Joachim-Ernst Gierspecq, deputy of the parliamentary group of the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD) and vice president of the permanent commission on citizens' requests; Erhard Conscher, deputy of the parliamentary group of the Liberal Democratic Party and vice president of the permanent commission on industry, construction, and transport; Mrs Margot Pschebizin, deputy of the parliamentary group of the Federation of Free German Trades Unions (FDGB), and member of the peramenent commission on parliamentary regulations.

12149
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

MILITARY TRIBUNAL--Ouargla (APS)--Lt Col Hocine Ben Maalem, member of the Central Committee, commandant of the 4th Military Region, inaugurated a military tribunal at Ouargla on Sunday morning. The inauguration, which took place in the presence of the civil and military authorities of Ouargla governorate and the region's superior officers, was to be followed by the ceremony of installation of the magistrates. [Text] [Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 7 Oct 80 p 3] 12149

GRADUAL INCREASE OF ENERGY PRICES ADVISED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 8 Sep 80 pp 24-25

[Article by Fu'ad Sultan: "Open-Door Policy Production Is in Danger and Reason Is Energy Prices"]

[Text] Regarding the energy problem and its effects on the open-door economic policy projects, AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI has addressed the question to Fu'ad Sultan, chairman of the Board of Directors of the Egypt-Iran Bank, considering that the bank owns a big project for the production of clay bricks and that this project has almost come to a halt because of the rise in oil prices. Sultan has said:

There is no doubt that it is the duty of every official and every economist to work to eliminate the flaw in the national economy at present, especially in the price and cost structure which contains a direct or concealed subsidy in the form of energy prices lower than the international prices. These low prices affect consumption, saving and the proper use of the relatively limited resources. However, this cannot be done on the basis of discrimination against a certain production sector in society but through applying the increase [in fuel prices] to all the production sectors in society, or at least to a complete production sector without discrimination between the various production units, so as to prevent the creation of a black market for oil derivatives--a black market which will lead to further imbalance in society. This is in addition to the fact that discrimination in this regard against the investment sector will weaken, if not completely destroy, this sector's competitive ability in the local markets, not because of technical inadequacy but because of a decision made by the political authority. It cannot be said that the rise in costs is countered by the tax exemption enjoyed by the investment companies because this exemption applies to profits only and, in this case, there is big doubt as to the ability to realize profits.

Fu'ad Sultan adds that correcting the flaw resulting from numerous accumulations during the period of the closed-door economic policy under which we lived cannot be realized all at once. The correction must be made in phases so that the rise in costs may be compatible with the rise in incomes and so that such a sudden rise in the price levels without a parallel rise in wages and incomes may not lead to damaging social consequences.

An actual followup on the effect of the rise in fuel and energy prices on the already existing projects, especially the projects in which fuel is one of the main production components--as is the case in all industries producing construction components--shows that all these companies are suffering from an enormous rise in production costs that

puts them out of competition and, consequently, exposes them to vast losses that will inevitably lead to liquidating them, especially since the economic feasibility studies for the already existing projects were prepared on the basis of the conditions prevailing in the market at the time of their foundation, meaning conditions concerning the structure of costs and of the prices of the final product in light of the general income level and, consequently, in light of society's absorption capacity. For example, the increase in fuel prices has led to raising the production cost of 1,000 bricks of desert clay--considering that this industry is the ideal alternative to the red brick industry whose production relies at present on scraping off top soil from arable lands with all the grave consequences of such a practice, a practice which has not stopped despite the law incriminating it because there is no substitute to the Nile silt--from 20 to 40 Egyptian pounds. This undermines the project's competitive ability, considering that red bricks are sold for 30 pounds only [per 1,000 bricks]. Thus, the increase in fuel prices has killed this vital industry while still in the cradle.

Fu'ad Sultan further adds that the matter requires that the government reconsider its oil policy vis-a-vis the open-door policy companies in a manner that realizes the public interest. In his view, what is required--and what has been unanimously demanded by the investors conference--is to unify the energy (fuel and electricity) prices applied to the production sector, regardless of its ownership (public sector, private sector or investors). We have no objection to moving the energy prices upward gradually for all (public and private sectors and investors) to reflect the cost of the alternative opportunity [sic] in a manner that does not affect the state economy and that leads to the proper use of the resources within a reasonable period, let us say 5 years.

If this is impossible to do for one reason or another despite the grave harm it means to investment and to the ability of the new projects to compete, then we recommend that the international energy prices be applied to the companies that were notified in the permits given them by the Public Investment Authority that they would be treated according to the international energy prices. We also recommend that the decision not be retroactive.

However, because such discrimination will curtail, if not stop altogether, any new investments, especially in the sectors of construction materials, constuction, ceramics and food security, it may be necessary to exclude the companies producing construction materials from this decision and to extend equal treatment in energy prices to new investments in these sectors, especially in the clay brick industry, so as to put an end to scraping off arable top soil and in order that the implementation of this law may not lead to raising housing costs.

If it is possible to apply the international energy prices to the companies whose permits call for the application of these prices, then fluctuation in the international energy prices applied to these companies must be narrowed so that the price prevailing throughout the year may at least, be set at the beginning of the year to enable the companies to determine their price policy throughout the year in light of the costs. Changing energy prices every 3 months to reflect the change in the international energy prices is extremely damaging to the production and marketing programs.

Fu'ad Sultan concludes by saying that unless the decision discriminating against the investment companies is reconsidered, this decision will cause the local and foreign

private sector to refrain from investing in production projects at a time when the open-door economic policy has begun to bear fruit in terms of the turn by investors toward the production sector, in addition to the services sector, as a result of the stability of the political and economic factors--a stability which realizes for Egypt an open-door production which is the only path toward real development.

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INCREASED ENERGY PRICES SEEN DETRIMENTAL TO CERTAIN INVESTMENT COMPANIES

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 8 Sep 80 pp 20-22

[Article by Ibrahim Sarhan: "Problem of Energy Prices in Egypt; Energy Pressures on Open-Door Policy Companies"]

[Text] Some say that sale by the government or by the production units whose pricing is subject to government control of their products at prices lower then the international prices constitutes an indirect subsidy for the consumers of these products and that equating local prices with the international prices is the right policy. This is said on the basis of what has been implanted in the minds as a result of the continued deficit in the general budget, namely that the subsidy constitutes a burden to the national economy.

To start with, we must point out that the generalization that it is necessary to equate local prices with the international prices of the goods exchanged at the local markets is something that is not acceptable economically. We must also point out that the generalization that subsidies always constitute a burden to the national economy is also something that is unacceptable economically.

To put it in detail, determining the price policy of the goods exchanged in the local markets must start with a differentiation between the local commodity and the imported commodity. Regarding the first kind, i.e. the local commodity, it is acknowledged economically that the rules for setting the prices of a locally produced commodity are different from the rules for setting the prices of imported commodities or the commodities in which imported products constitute a large part. The costs of the production of local goods and, consequently, their prices are determined according to the nature of the distinctive production circumstances of a country. Considering that the characteristics and nature of these circumstances are different in different countries of the world, it is natural that each country is distinguished by the production of a number of commodities whose prices are lower than those of similar commodities in other countries. This is how international trade started. Here is where the danger of the statement on the need to adopt the international prices as a basis for setting up the prices of all the locally produced goods becomes evident. Setting the prices of the locally produced goods should be done in accordance with the costs of their production and of the local and foreign demand for them. It is expected that the interaction between the changing economic factors will lead the national economy to produce a number of commodities whose prices are lower than those of similar commodities in foreign countries. This realizes a double-edged advantage to the national economy. On the one hand, if the low price of the commodity is due to low labor wages, then the success of the national economy in producing this commodity and in selling it at low prices compensates the workers completely or

partially for their low wages. On the other hand, the low prices of such a commodity enable the national economy to penetrate foreign markets.

Two Energy Sale Prices

Essentially, the preceding analysis is not different if the local commodity consists partially of imported components. It is natural for the imports to leave their impact on the prices of local products. This impact consists of two parts, namely the prices of imports assessed in foreign currency and the value of the foreign currency. It is natural that the price of a local product will rise with the rise of the international prices of imports or with the rise of the value of the foreign currency, or with the rise of both. However, the economic authorities cannot let the prices of these commodities be set by the free interaction of the market forces if this interaction harms the economic or social goals of the national economy. It is no secret that a rise in the prices of certain products leads to a rise in the price level of the national economy generally or may harm exports. We will point out two things in this regard:

The economic authorities are eager to safeguard the freedom of the production activity, especially of the local industries, against a sudden or a considerable rise in the prices of imported semi-processed materials, particularly if this rise or part of it is due to a drop in the value of the national currency. This is because the drop in the value of the currency should be viewed basically as a means for squeezing non-essential imports.

If it is inevitable for the economic authorities but to let the international prices reflect their effect on the local prices, then this must be done gradually so as to avoid a chaotic rise in prices and the subsequent undermining of the stability required for the local production level, both in terms of production for the local market and production for foreign markets. This is similar to what has happened in the United States in the second half of the 1970's. It is well-known that the sudden rise in fuel prices motivated the U.S. economic authorities to adopt the two-price system, namely the old price and the new price. Though the situation does not call for our embarking on the details of the pricing policy, it is still necessary to point out that the basic goal of this policy is to keep the national production clear off the dangers of sudden big leaps in fuel prices and to enable the national economy to absorb such leaps gradually.

Ghost of Increased Energy Price

A decision has been issued by the deputy prime minister and the minister of petroleum raising the prices of the oil derivatives of diesel oil [sular] and heavy oil considerably. At the same time, a decision has been issued by the Ministry of Electricity raising electricity prices also. In both cases, the large increase in prices has been confined to the industrial and production companies set up under the canopy of the law on the investment of Arab and foreign capital. In both cases, implementation of the decisions has been on a retroactive basis.

The industrial companies have hastened to demand abolition of the decision on the basis of its clear and sudden impact in raising production costs and prices. This impact is reflected clearly, for example, in the case of the Arab Porcelain Company. According to numerous studies on cost accounting, fuel represents 25 percent of the company's total costs. If we admit that the government decisions on fuel prices have

caused the diesel oil price to rise by nearly sevenfold, that of heavy oil by nearly twentyfold and the price of electricity by nearly fivefold, then this simply means that the decision will inevitably lead to raising the total costs and the sale price of the company's products by more than twofold. This is if we disregard the retroactive aspect of the decision.

The question raised now is: Is the new situation compatible with the requirements of the survival of this and similar companies subject to the provisions of law No 43? If the answer is negative, does the situation require a fundamental change in the government policies to safeguard the survival of these companies, whether the change comes in the form of abolition of the said decisions or in the form of amending the other economic policies?

The required answer appears in several points:

The rise in the price of the products of the open-door policy companies as a consequence of the rise in fuel prices exceeds by far the customs (exemptions) set to protect [local] products against foreign competition.

The fuel decisions burden the companies subject to their effect not only with the difference between the local prices and the international prices but, as a result of the crop in the value of the Egyptian pound (i.e. the rise in the value of foreign currencies), with nearly double this difference. This is explained by the fact that the Public Petroleum Authority begins with the price of fuel assessed in foreign currency and then transforms this price into Egyptian currency, regardless of whether the fuel in question is an importable or an exportable commodity.

It is well-known that if the commodity is exportable, then its price in the local market must be lower than its price in the international market by a sum equal to the transportation, insurance, commission, marketing and storage costs. This is the least to expect. Add to this the fact that if the commodity is exportable, then assessment of its price in the local market must take into consideration the drop in the average price of the unit exported if the local consumption of such a commodity is offered to the international market.

The statement that the fivefold increase in electricity prices is based on the fact that the previously prevalent prices contained a concealed subsidy is a statement that is not based on sound economic calculation. If the cost of a unit of electricity has to be tied to the cost of its production, then we must take into consideration the elements of this cost. It is well-known that a part of the electricity production in Egypt relies on local elements, namely the part generated by way of the waterfalls, and that another part is generated through the use of fuel. It is also well-known that the cost of a unit produced in the second way exceeds the cost of a unit produced in the first way. It is also known that the use of fuel in the production of electricity is an inevitable result of the inadequacy of the electricity produced by way of the waterfalls to meet the local electricity consumption needs. This explains the increase in the cost of electricity production in Egypt. The meaning of the recent decision is to burden the companies subject to law No 43, to the exclusion of all others, with the price compatible with the highest cost for electricity production in Egypt. This consequently means that the increased electricity production costs in Egypt have been the result of the increase in consumption caused by the companies subject to law No 43 and not others. This logic cannot

withstand sound economic analysis. It may be acceptable that the companies set up in accordance with law No 43 pay an electricity price compatible with the average cost of producing an electricity unit in Egypt, provided that such a burden not result in harming considerations of competition or other economic or social goals.

A selective price policy is a must as long as the ultimate goal is not to harm the living standard of certain classes. It is essential to note in this regard that the production of sanitary appliances and glossy ceramics that are necessary for low-economy and middle-income housing represents no less than 80 percent of the total production of the Arab Porcelain Company.

Burdens and Advantages

The advantages offered by law No 43 on the investment of Arab and foreign capital have formed one of the fundamental justifications on which the government decision to apply international prices to the energy used by these companies is based. Such a justification raises a number of facts or, to put it more precisely, a number of principles:

The advantages offered by law No 43 have not been granted in a haphazard manner. They have been found on the logical basis that new projects are usually in a poorer position in terms of (organization) than already existing projects, regardless of whether the latter are part of the national economy or of a foreign economy. This means that the government has ended up abolishing indirectly the advantages of investment in accordance with law No 43. This is an unacceptable consequence. Moreover, the advantages given have been given to industries essential to the national economy. Furthermore, the total exemptions from the commercial profits tax and from the customs fees given a company [set up in accordance with law No 43] in the next 5 years amount to nothing in comparison to the burdens that the company will shoulder during the exemption years as a result of the increase in fuel prices. The total value of the advantages is less than the value of the fuel price difference in a single year.

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SELECTIVE APPLICATION OF INCREASED ENERGY PRICES RECOMMENDED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 8 Sep 80 pp 22-23

[Article by Mustafa al-Arwadi: "Energy Price Should Be According to Production Cost"]

[Text] The set prices for the oil derivatives used for production purposes are special prices that are much lower than the international prices. Due to logical justifications, these prices have remained unchanged whereas the international prices have taken several successive leaps that have created a gap between the local and the international prices.

Despite this, the local prices cover both costs and profits and are compatible with an acceptable rule because they contain no concealed subsidy. These prices cover production and distribution costs and yield a rewarding profit for the capital invested in them. The subsidy is represented fundamentally in the subsidy for the butane gas [butagaz] which is expensive to consume by nature.

We are not calling for "uprooting" the international prices and implanting them in our local prices indiscriminately and without any distinction, especially in the broadly used intermediate [semi-processed] commodities that pervade all activities of the national economy, led by certain subsidized goods (such as bread and vegetable oils) in which the raising the prices of the intermediate commodities is tantamount to a conversion measure that leads ultimately to an increase in the oil sector revenues, along with a parallel increase in subsidy.

Therefore, we do not support the opinion that the difference in the international and local prices of oil derivatives constitutes a concealed subsidy for the sectors consuming such derivatives. We believe in the opinion that calls for calculating the cost of the lost opportunity [sic] on the basis of what is actually expected to happen. Therefore, the quantities allocated for local consumption intended to meet the basic necessities should not be calculated as international trade commodities with international prices. The value of these quantities should be calculated on the basis of cost (including profits). Thus, the export price of the international trade commodities should not be considered as reflecting the cost of the lost opportunity [for the export] of these commodities (or part of them) that are allocated by necessity for local consumption by virtue of the fact that their exportation (or exportation of the part of these commodities linked to essential [local] use) is an impossibility. Therefore, the price set on the basis of cost and profit constitutes a sound basis for the price of the oil derivatives used in the basic economic activities, both the existing and the expected activities, as long as this price is subject to the limits just defined and pertaining to essential use in the basic activities.

Free Zones...Special Status

But there is a definite specification emanating from the general rule and compatible with it at the same time. This specification pertains to the free zone projects whose entire production is allocated for exportation and to similar joint internal projects which set aside part of their production for exportation. The application of the international prices of oil derivatives which the government has viewed as a basis for dealing with these companies in return for the investment incentives given to these companies in the form of customs and tax exemptions (effective for a period of 5-8 years), facilities for the remittance of profits and of part of the wages of foreign workers and so forth--the application of these prices is fair as long as the companies are informed of the conditions of dealing and of the prices in accordance with which the dealing will take place in terms of the basic production requirements [mudkhalat] generally and in terms of oil derivatives and energy in particular.

There has recently been complaint by some investors in the joint projects to the effect that these projects are suffering losses (either absolute or relative, in the sense of a drop in profits) as a result of dealing on the basis of the international prices of oil derivatives. These companies demand that the local prices be applied to them in return for their relinquishing the incentive advantages given to them in the form of customs and tax exemptions, i.e. these companies are demanding that they be treated on an equal basis with the local companies.

But the more important issue is to attempt to find out the sound aspects and the flawed aspects in the measures and studies concerning the new projects generally.

Perhaps what comes immediately to mind in this regard is the inadequacy of the basic studies and their failure to take into consideration the potentials concerning the prices of the production requirements [mudkhalat] and of the final products [mukhrajat]. Such consideration constitutes one of the fundamentals of project feasibility and evaluation studies. Disregard for this possibility (the possibility of application of the international prices of oil derivatives) is perhaps not justified by the absence of a statement on the part of the state (in case of the remote possibility that the state policy in this regard is not declared). This is due to the already mentioned fact that one of the fundamentals of analyzing projects is to visualize the potentials concerning both benefits and costs and to measure the sensitivity of both aspects to price changes. What this discussion may lead to is the conclusion that a project may be initially successful (despite) the haste which leads to inadequate economic studies and profitability calculations--calculations which must be made.

Selective [tamyiziyah] Incentives

The other issue which this situation raises is the degree of the efficiency of the incentives offered to incoming capital to participate in the development operations and to realize profits capable of attracting it to the desired spheres and activities that achieve the targeted goals (both economic and in-kind). The incentives in their various forms amount to no more than customs exemptions and similar exemptions or price incentives concerning both the (production requirements and the final products). A pause is necessary here to ponder the situation and to raise some questions as a result of the current problem. It is right for incentives to be uniform without distinction between the various incoming projects, both the projects whose production

is channelled toward exportation or toward meeting recreational needs and the projects whose production is channelled toward meeting basic needs? Or does the situation require that preferential treatment be given according to the nature of the projects and of their production and according to the degree of their consumption of the resources (and the position of these resources), thus giving preferential treatment to the investments channelled toward the desired spheres when the benefits of these projects to and their impact on the national goals are compatible? This direction is strengthened by the urgent need created by the present situation summed up in the fact that some existing joint investments are faltering whereas other projects are in a totally different position.

Perhaps the last question--and it is an extremely important question--raised by this situation is connected with the procedural aspects embodied in the studies that must be carried out for projects and in the content and extent of such studies. Establishing compatibility between the investor's goals and the national goals requires that the studies be conducted in accordance with what the international programs for preparing and evaluating projects prescribe. It may not be permissible for us to disregard or go below the minimum required by such programs because such studies on the profitability of the projects at the various levels makes it possible to conclude the policies (dealings) that guarantee compatibility between the individual and national interests and that set the incentives (both price and tax incentives) quantitatively. This quantitative limit may vary from project to project, may call for reconsidering the non-preferential treatment approach and may ultimately lead to the common goal (in addition to eliminating existing obstacles). This goal requires application of the preferential treatment, as I have already pointed out.

In any case, conducting such analyses represents, in our view, the primary sphere of the activity of the technical agencies of the Investment Authority whose basic task is, in our estimate, to establish compatibility between the investor's interest and the national interests and, consequently, to conduct negotiations that lead to a position representing a meeting point between the interests of the two sides--an interest guaranteed by the aforementioned profitability calculations which should be used as a basis for this interest and should determine its extent.

If we return to that with which we started, namely the prices of oil derivatives in particular and of the other (production requirements) in general on whose basis the dealing is conducted, it becomes possible to underline briefly what we believe in this regard, namely that the main factor determining the prices on whose basis the companies are dealt with is not essentially the ownership of a project and whether it is a joint project or a national project controlled by the private or the public sector. The main consideration is the commodity produced and its type, whether essential or luxury commodity and regardless of the producer, be it a joint project or a project with a purely national capital owned by the public or the private sector.

The rule that may be proposed as a start is that the prices of the (production requirements) of a commodity (or parts of a commodity) designated for export should be calculated at the international prices, regardless of whether the producer is a joint project or a national project, so as to preserve the local resources, especially the oil resources, to streamline their use and to avoid speeding up the onset of the energy crisis. As for the essential goods(such as bread, cement and construction materials) it is permissible to conduct the transactions on the basis of the subsidized prices for the oil derivatives and for the other (production requirements),

provided that the necessary calculations be made to realize profits for the projects producing them. Thus, the situation requires that negotiations be conducted with the foreign investors in these spheres to determine the incentives that guarantee attracting foreign investments. The well-known scientific programs should be adopted in this regard. If the preceding period has been the period of a preliminary testing, then it is certain that the adoption of scientific programs is an inevitability dictated by the evident need for streamlining the decisions.

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EXPANSION OF EGYPTIAN TELEVISION

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 4 Aug 80 p 6

[Article by Mustafa al-Damrani: "New Stage in History of Egyptian Television Begins August 15; Alexandria Station to Cover Northern Coast by Year's End; Al-'Arish Station Starts Operations Next Year"]

[Text] Egyptian television is scheduled to undergo total modernization next August 15. Channels 5 and 9 will be separated according to Safwat al-Sharif, president of the board of trustees. This separation has two important aspects. The first implements President Sadat's directive calling for Egyptian TV to reach all parts of the republic, so that citizens everywhere can see Egyptian achievements.

The second recognizes the necessity of creating a technical and administrative entity for each channel, so that there will be maximum competition, innovation, and advancement. These developments will serve a viewing audience that has steadily increased in numbers during the past 20 years.

Al-Sharif spoke of the developments commencing August 15 saying that channel 5 would be an official channel and would be adequately funded. The channel's philosophy would appeal to the citizenry's interests and would cover political, intellectual, literary, and technical events. Political programming would occupy a large time bloc and would reflect what is going on in the country. Events would be covered in a modern method with world news telecast via satellite as it occurs. Newscasts would contain voices and pictures of events. Internal affairs would be covered in an attractive modern fashion, social and local issues featured in a new format, and artistic evening programs presented. Channel 5 would continue to telecast twice per day, once in the morning and once in the evening.

Channel 9 To Telecast Once Per Day

A comprehensive plan for channel 9 has also been drawn up, permitting telecasting only once per day. The plan calls for monetary revenues from the channel, something that will benefit the entire television system. Channel 9 will offer modern advertising and services to the commercial sector. Television will thereby become less dependent upon government appropriations. Advertising revenues will be used to modernize machinery, equipment, and programming as well as to increase salaries. Channel 9 will be a commercial channel, moving along at a fast pace and featuring modern advertising techniques.

Cultural programming will increase on channel 9; cultural, educational, and high quality artistic shows will be featured. Advertising will decrease greatly on channel 5, but will increase considerably on channel 9.

Alexandria Television

Sharif says that concurrent with these developments he is required to study problems relating to poor reception on the west coast, at Matruh and al-Sallum. Hence he visited the Alexandria station and studied problems first hand with the engineers and technicians. He found that certain fixtures necessary for the station's operation have been out of order for a year and that a particular type of pulley is missing. He issued an order to the television engineers to provide the money necessary to repair things. Contracts with appropriate companies have been let, so the problem will be fixed in at least 6 months. Starting next January clear reception will be available on the west coast, in Sallum, and Matruh.

October Celebrations to Reach al-'Arish

The decision to separate channels 5 and 9 took into account events in al-'Arish. Mrs Himat Mustafa, president of the television system, Ahmed Sa'id Amin, vice-president, and Sharif met numerous times and extensively studied methods whereby Sinai and al-'Arish could be provided television reception. It was decided to import the necessary equipment and build an al-'Arish TV station. Contracts were let so that Egyptian TV will arrive in these areas by October 1981.

Higher Planning Committee

The new organizational structure and the separation-modernization decisions, which will be demonstrated to the citizenry starting next August 15, has caused al-Sharif to issue several directives. The most important calls for formation of a higher planning committee in order to lay out a new policy for programming on the two channels, so as to achieve informational, cultural, educational, and entertainment objectives. Services are to compliment one another and offer competition in both form and content. This committee will include Himat Mustafa, Ahmed Sa'id Amin, Hamada 'Abd al-Wahab, Shirwit Shaf'i, and a commercial sector representative.

Channel Five's Board of Directors

A board of directors for channel 5 will be formed. This board will help the channel's manager with his daily work and decision-making. It will suggest policies to be followed, particularly regarding the channel's proposed annual budget. Everything will be undertaken according to television policy and the decisions and recommendations of the board of trustees, visiting members, and a committee of administrators. The channel's manager and board of directors will meet every morning to discuss matters brought before them, study these matters, and to form a programming committee. This committee will relay appropriate decisions to the channel's manager. The channel's board of directors will be guided by the channel's administrative and technical auspices. Hamada 'Abd al-Wahab, president of channel 5, will head that channel's board of directors.

Channel Nine's Board of Directors

A board of directors for channel 9 will be formed to help the channel's manager administer daily affairs and to suggest policy, particularly regarding the channel's proposed annual budget. Decisions of the board will take into account recommendations of visiting members and the program directors' committee Mrs Shirwit Shaf'i, president of channel 9, will head the board.

The new organizational structure includes creation of a special committee for each channel, so as to allow creative talents freedom to work in the organization, starting from August 15, in a spirit of modernization and excellence.

The channel 5 committee includes 18 persons working in television with the following specialties:

Hamada 'Abd al-Wahab, president
Amal Mikawi, educational programming
Ibrahim al-Shakankiri, drama
Farida 'Araman, documentaries
Hind Abu al-Sa'ud, variety shows
Ahmad 'Izat, live programming
Mohamad Raga'i, children's programming
In'am Mohamad 'Ali, women's programming
Fu'ad Shakir, religious programming
Fayza Wasif, foreign/export programming
Hassan al-Saghir, social programming
'Abd al-Karim Abu Sayf, sports
Ibrahim al-Ghorab, preparation and production
Samiha Gibril, revision
Firyal Salih, announcing
'Abd al-Salam al-Nadi, news

Channel nine's committee includes:

Shirwit Shaf'i, president
Zaynab Yassin, revision
'Aida 'Abd al-'Aziz, imported programming
Nadiha Kamal, women's and youth programming
Kawthar Heikal, cultural programming
Mohamad 'Awis, religious programming and preparation
Hamida Hamdi, announcing
Fahi'Abd al-Sattar, variety programming
Moustafa al-'Anani, population and family planning programming
Isma'il 'Abd al-Fattah, sports
Salah Samhan, children's programming
Hamdi Yusif, production
Mahmud Sami Khalil, social programming
Nawal Siri, news

The new structure provides for the appointment of Ibrahim al-Shakankiri as producer and director of studio 11. He will be responsible for meeting the requirement of 125 hours' production annually. Yehia al-'Almi has been appointed director and producer for studio 5, which will specialize in productions for both channels plus shows, plays, and musicals.

Yusif Marzuk has been appointed director and producer for studio 2. He will be responsible for 125 hours of annually required production.

The new structure calls for formation of a committee to specialize in policy, planning, and implementation for drama and film production. This committee will be comprised of:

Mrs Himat Mustafa, president
Ahmad Sa'id Amin, deputy
Mohamad 'Abd al-Fattah
Hamada 'Abd al-Wahab
Shirwit Shaf'i
Fahmi Hasan
Mamduh al-Lithi
Ibrahim al-Shakankiri
Yusif Marzuk
Yehia al-'Almi

This committee will also set separate budgets for each unit, e.g., videotape, information, and will approve cinematic and video production planning at least 6 months in advance.

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JOINT ACTION ON NILE BASIN DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 25 Jul 80 p 18

[Article by Ahmad Nafi': "Egypt: What Is Extent of Its Need for Fresh Water or What Is Truly Called 20th Century Oil? Truth of Ethiopia's Position and Extent of Its Cooperation With Nile Basin Countries; What Is Position of Nile Basin Countries in Face of First Practical Test for Setting Nile Basin Authority and Toward Transfer of Technology in Sphere of Water Resources; Preparation of Joint Plans To Regain Lost Resources and To Extend Study on Equatorial Lakes for 2 More Years?"]

[Text] The Nile basin countries have agreed on a new phase of cooperation which has its goal and its means. The goal is to agree on plans for the nine countries over whose lands the river spreads its power--plans which these countries will implement for the good of their peoples. The means in the present phase is to complete the hydrometeorological studies on the equatorial lakes basin. These are the studies which the Nile basin countries started in August 1967 in two phases, the second of which will end with the end of this year.

This agreement embodies a new step in a pioneer work adopted by all the countries overlooking the same river. This work has come as a result of the increased awareness of the importance of cooperation among the Nile countries to realize the maximum advantage possible from the resources of the river for the benefit of all the countries concerned. The agreement has also come as a natural result of the years that have witnessed for the first time cooperation among technicians from various countries in united studies to control the river water and to prepare for regaining the resources lost in the upper equatorial areas.

This agreement was reached in an extraordinary meeting held by the Technical Committee in charge of the project for the studies on the equatorial lakes basin. This extraordinary meeting was held in Cairo on 9 and 10 July because the second phase of the project ends next December. This has made it necessary to determine the future of the project and to decide on the idea prevalent among the parties concerned, namely the idea of setting up a Nile basin authority similar to the Joint Egyptian-Sudanese Committee for the Nile Water.

At this meeting, which was attended by representatives of all the Nile basin countries, including Ethiopia, several issues were decided, the most important being:

First, extend work in the project for 2 more years, beginning in January 1981. One of the goals of this phase is to improve verification of the measurements made by the "mathematical model" set up to measure drainage in any part of the equatorial lakes by gathering more data, by training the engineers of the countries involved in the project on the model and by continuing the studies on the [water] storage systems and potentials.

'Abd-al-Badi' Abu-al-Huda, an Egyptian engineer, has been chosen director for the first year of the extended period of the project. (Boshijia), a Tanzanian engineer, will be in charge of managing the project in the second year.

Second, urge the Nile basin countries to define their position in principle vis-a-vis the idea of setting up a technical authority for the Nile basin countries. It was deemed fit to decide on the idea in principle before embarking on the details and on drawing up the agreement concerning this idea.

Third, the Technical Committee has proposed that the project's goals after the 2-year extension be the following:

A. Continue gathering and analyzing data, storage studies and national plans for exploitation of the water resources.

B. Transfer technology in the sphere of water resources, including underground water resources, to all of the basin's countries.

By analyzing these decisions, it becomes evident that there is full conviction on the need to extend the duration of the project which was motivated by the interest of the Nile basin countries in agricultural expansion as a means to raise the living standard of their peoples. It also becomes evident that there is more than just a feeling of satisfaction with the results realized so far and with the goals set for the coming phase, namely exploiting all of the Nile's resources--foremost of which is regaining the resources lost to the swamps spread throughout the equatorial areas. The specific loss estimated so far (a loss occurring in Sudan's territories) has been calculated at 36 billion cubic meters [annually], not to mention other losses that have not been calculated so far due to factors beyond the control of the technicians. Despite this, the outcome of the Cairo meeting is considered a practical test for the intentions of all the Nile basin countries, especially those of Ethiopia because Ethiopia has to decide right away the extent of its readiness to march forward with the other countries toward setting up a Nile basin authority to utilize and use to advantage all of the river's resources. The other countries called upon to take part in the joint action in this sphere are: Egypt, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire.

When we single out Ethiopia in particular to this regard, we do not do so out of bias or out of unfairness but because Ethiopia is the only country that has come up with feeble excuses to disavow the international agreements on the Nile River and to deny the gained rights of one of the river basin's countries. Ethiopia's latest attempts in this regard have been its statements that Egypt has conveyed the river water to the Sinai without consulting its partners in the river. Moreover, Ethiopia has procrastinated for years in joining the Technical Committee for the present studies on the upper equatorial lakes. It was finally compelled

to join the other countries on the basin as an observer just to keep abreast, it seems, with the ongoing negotiations. For these reasons, the parties concerned familiarized the Ethiopian delegation during its presence in Cairo with Egypt's current and future projects. During its stay, the Ethiopian delegation also visited the canal area and saw the old and new culverts carrying Egypt's share of the Nile water to the Sinai lands. The delegation was even familiarized with Egypt's real share which is hardly enough for Egypt and saw how Egypt re-uses drainage water after mixing it with fresh water.

National Plans for Exploitation of Nile

Therefore, it is true that the decisions represent a practical test for the intentions of each state because the Nile countries are now required to prepare a national plan for exploiting their water resources. These plans are closely linked with the projects for the full exploitation of the Nile waters and they all represent inseparable links in one chain. The water resources include, naturally, the natural rivers, rainwater and underground water. All of these are elements which ultimately determine the need for major irrigation projects, the site of such projects and the extent of the projects' effects on the countries' relations with one another, the extent of the advantage taken of such projects and the method of operating the projects.

For example, the needs of the countries of East Africa are different from those of Egypt and Sudan. The East African countries are in dire need of energy which can be generated through the construction of a dam on Lake Mobutu (Lake Albert formerly). The construction of such a dam seems necessary to realize the desired benefit from several water control projects on the Nile River, including the pioneer project being currently implemented by Egypt and Sudan in al-Sudud [Dams] area in southern Sudan through opening the canal known as the Jongli Canal.

In its first phase, which will end in 1984, this project will save 4-5 billion cubic meters of water wasted in the area of plant obstructions. In the second phase this water volume will be doubled, provided that the Albert [Mobutu] dam be built to regulate the flow of water in quantities compatible with the canal's capacity. This means that Egypt and Sudan want water to be stored in Lake Mobutu to secure a steady water flow from Uganda's lakes (the upper sources) to Bahr al-Jabal and then to the White Nile in Sudan.

Thus, the river countries meet on the need for drawing up joint plans to exploit the river resources in a manner that yields varied benefits to each of these countries. It must be acknowledged that all the Nile River countries are in need of its hidden resources. But the kind differs from one location to another. For example, the countries flooded by tropical rains for more than 6 months a year do not need to store water for lean years, keeping in mind that the cost of water storage projects is enormous. However, these countries may be in need of electricity. Consequently, it becomes vital that agreement be reached on the types of projects that realize the goals of the Nile basin countries, despite the difference in these goals. The way to achieve this is multisided joint action using various means.

Preserving Natural Resources

This leads us to the issue of explaining the increased need for fresh water in every part of the world, considering that fresh water is the cornerstone in any agricultural or industrial progress. Fresh water, in the words of Engineer Muhammad 'Abd-al-Hadi Samahah, the minister of irrigation, will pose the most serious crisis in natural resources in the last decade of the 20th century. As of this time, fresh water is the oil of the 20th century.

This is why the minister of irrigation believes that Egypt is facing at present and will face in the future a heavy burden to preserve its natural resources, the most important of which is fresh water. Egypt must confront with all its capabilities in the various spheres any attempts to reduce any part of this resource, regardless of how meager. Egypt is a desert country in which there is almost no rainwater. Moreover, the underground water which Egypt contains and which is economically usable for various purposes is limited in volume. Therefore, any expansion in agriculture, drinking or industry depends fundamentally on the Nile River waters which God has given Egypt and its people as a blessing. Throughout our long history, the Nile has continued to carry a vastly abundant wealth between its banks and Egypt owes its existence and its entity to this great river. There isn't in the entire world a country whose life depends on a river as Egypt's life depends on the Nile River waters.

This fact has been firmly established in the minds of Egyptians since the beginning of time, says Engineer Samahah, one of the men of the fourth generation of Egyptians who have been working to control the river and who have turned it into something like an ascetic who glides quietly and who desires nothing more than a sustenance from life. After being uncontrollable and inclined toward flooding here and there and destroying land, crop and life, major engineering works have been carried out to harness this river. Mina built the river's northern bridge to secure the country's safety and to preserve the civilization of the deep-rooted Egyptian people. Then Mina's successors came and built dams, barrages and storage works to preserve billions of cubic meters of the river's golden waters which used to flow into the sea. Thus, the Egyptians have continued to live in a long and hard struggle to tame the river and to exploit it properly and the Nile has continued to be a vast sphere in which Egyptian engineering art has roamed, innovated and created to save the river's civilization from drowning and destruction and to build on the river's gates [ma'abir] the most ancient civilization known to the world generation after generation.

Egypt's Rights to Nile Waters

Within the framework of the serious and purposeful efforts to preserve every drop of the river's water and to develop its resources, the Egyptians started to contact the fraternal countries on the Nile basin to agree on the ideal method for exploiting and developing the waters of this great river in the interest of all the Nile basin countries. On 15 May 1902, an agreement was concluded between Britain and Ethiopia on the demarcation of the Ethiopian-Sudanese borders. Even though the treaty was intended fundamentally for stabilizing the borders between the two countries, it did, however, include a pledge on the part of the Ethiopian

king not to issue any orders or permit the issuance of any orders regarding any works on the Blue Nile, Tana Lake or (al-Subat) River that could obstruct the flow of their waters into the Nile River unless the Sudanese government approves such works in advance. In 1929, a Nile water agreement was concluded to control the use of the river water in Sudan so that such use may not affect Egypt's gained right and natural right to the Nile waters. The agreement contained mutual assurances, to which Britain was a party, that no irrigation or power-generating projects would be set up without prior agreement with the Egyptian government.

In 1949, the Egyptian government began to think of implementing the projects connected with its water policy which had been formulated in 1933, including the country's agricultural expansion program until 1953, within the limits of the additional storage water produced by elevating the Aswan Dam for the second time, construction of Jabal al-Awliya' Dam and continuous storage in the equatorial lakes. As a result of the Ugandan government's consideration of exploiting the Victoria waterfalls on the Nile River to generate power by building a dam for this purpose, the Egyptian government thought of turning toward water storage in Lake Victoria and coordinating the two countries' interests in this regard. Negotiations were held for Egypt's participation in this important project from the start in terms of design, construction and operation of the dam after its completion, with participation in the dam's costs and its annual operation costs in view of the common benefit accruing to both countries. Agreement was actually reached to build this dam near Owen waterfalls so as to benefit from the constant water storage in Lake Victoria and to form a reserve in the lake for Egypt's benefit. Agreement was also reached to send Egyptian engineers to the dam site to take part with the Ugandan officials in supervising operation of the dam to realize the interests of both Egypt and Uganda. This vital accomplishment is still serving the purpose for which it was constructed through cooperation between the Egyptian and Ugandan technicians.

Within the framework of these various agreements, major works have been built on the Nile River outside Egypt's borders. Sannar Dam was built on the Blue Nile in 1935 to serve Sudan. Jabal al-Awliya' Dam was built in 1937 in the interest of summer cultivation in Egypt, considering that annual storage in this dam amounts to nearly 3.5 billion cubic meters. However, all these agreements do not meet Egypt's needs to exploit its historical and natural right to the Nile River waters. This is why Egypt concluded with the fraternal Sudan on 18 May 1959 an agreement for the full utilization of the river waters. Under the canopy of this agreement, projects were built to control the river and to divide its benefits between the two countries. In accordance with this agreement, Egypt built the High Dam near Aswan and Sudan built Al-Rusayris Dam on the Blue Nile. The agreement also provided for Sudan to construct any other works which it deems necessary for it to exploit its share of the waters, including the Jongli Canal which is being built at present.

This agreement, in accordance with which the Joint Egyptian-Sudanese Technical Authority for the Nile River Waters was formed, constituted the beginning for agreement with the countries overlooking the equatorial lakes plateau to cooperate with the UN Development Program by setting up the Technical Committee for conducting hydrometeorological studies on the equatorial lakes basin. The work of this committee has developed in a manner that heralds formation of a technical authority for the Nile basin countries.

The only thing lacking for the creation of this authority is the political decision that will enable it to start its studies for implementing the major projects in light of the existing and future studies.

Initial Projects of Common Interest

There is a semi-agreement in principle on the projects whose implementation is urgent, including:

Use of the equatorial lakes as large storage sites that regulate the volume of water flowing from them so as to make the water inflow into Sudan, including runover, constant and as close to the average as possible.

Raise the capacity of Bahr al-Jabal in Southern Sudan.

Establish partial storage in Bahr al-Ghazal basin in Southern Sudan.

Build storage facilities in al-Subat River basin and look for storage [sites] in the upper Blue Nile River in Ethiopia.

Generally, the initial estimates of the waters that can be supplied--estimated near Aswan--after the construction of some of these projects amounts to nearly 18 billion cubic meters of water which will be divided equally between Egypt and Sudan. These projects, whose initial construction costs are estimated at 700 million pounds, will save nearly 7 billion cubic meters of water lost in the obstructions area between Jongli and Malakal, a similar quantity of water lost in Bahr al-Ghazal basin and 4 billion cubic meters lost in Mashar swamps. This concerns the water projects that can be exploited in the area of the equatorial plateau and down to Sudan only. The costs do not include those of the other projects connected with these storage projects, such as the projects to exploit the waterfalls in the interest of all nine countries.

Inevitability of Cooperation for Common Goal

In this regard, Engineer Samahah says that it is evident that reaching the goal of controlling the Nile, of making full use of its resources and of building the projects that increase its yield and reduce the loss throughout the river's course cannot be easy unless firm technical cooperation is established among all the countries located on its basin. Each of these countries must understand the rights that the other countries have to this common river. The countries located near the source or near the upper Nile should not imagine that the water flowing in their territories belongs to them solely or is their exclusive property to dispose of in any manner they wish. They must feel the opposite and must think that any project to utilize the river must be agreed upon in advance with the other countries that may be affected by such a project. This principle cannot diminish the sovereignty of a state over the part of the joint river's course that passes through its territories but indicates respect and concern for the common partnership and is compatible with the rules and spirit of the international law.

The minister of irrigation adds that he hopes that Ethiopia has been convinced through its participation in the Technical Committee's meetings in Cairo of the advantage of sincere cooperation among the river's countries. Egypt still welcomes, as I have made clear in my statement to the People's Assembly, anyone who wants to work to develop the Nile River waters for the benefit of all of the river's sons and within the framework of the international law and convention and of the bilateral or multilateral agreements concerning the Nile, as well as within the framework of respect for the rights of utilization of the various countries.

In contrast to Ethiopia's position, Egypt believes in the necessity of starting immediate contacts with Ethiopia to study the hydraulics of the Ethiopian [river] sources because of their major significance insofar as the Nile waters are concerned. This doesn't mean that Egypt doesn't approve of the projects being built in the Ethiopian plateau. However, the technical studies necessary for the phase of exploiting all the river sources and tributaries in an ideal manner is a totally different story. Ethiopia has before it the example of the spirit which motivated the East African countries to take voluntarily the initiative of cooperation in discovering all the wasted resources in the equatorial lakes, in the tributaries and in the streams that flow into them with the aim of embarking on joint action to regain these wasted resources.

Energetic Policy on Nile

The minister of irrigation points out that Egypt has received this initiative with the interest it deserves. Egypt has been and will always be active insofar as the Nile waters are concerned. Egypt has also always been eager to strengthen cooperation with the Nile countries and has been a pioneer in the sphere of creative cooperation among the nine countries. Egypt's relationship to the Nile has never been confined to the mere use of the river waters. This relationship has gone beyond to broader and more comprehensive spheres so that the Nile may truly become "the blessing of the Egyptians." Egypt does not conceal its projects and its need for the river water. The increasing mouths year after year, according to Engineer Samahah, require new land to be added to our arable area in order to meet the needs of these enormous numbers. In the year 2000, Egypt's population will amount to 80 million persons. To maintain the individual's current share of land (0.17 feddans per capita), we need to increase the cultivable area by at least 7 million feddans. This turns the need to secure the water necessary for these lands into an enormous national undertaking.

It is also for this reason that Egypt seeks creative cooperation in implementing projects in the interest of the Nile peoples. Egypt has given the example for this cooperation in all the major projects in which it has been involved as a party.

Egypt acted with full abidance by the international principles when it constructed the High Dam in cooperation with the fraternal Sudan and, previously, in constructing the Owen Dam in Uganda. Egypt has paid full reparations for the lands submerged as a result of construction of the two dams. Egypt expects Ethiopia to observe these principles which commit all the countries along the sources of the Nile River to consult with the countries at the mouth of the river before

constructing any works on the river that could pollute its waters, obstruct their flow or undermine any part of the natural or gained right of the countries at the mouth of the river. This is what Ethiopia is not observing at present by taking measures to implement some projects that may change the long-established legal system [status] of the Nile. This is something that neither Egypt nor the other Nile countries can accept.

Required Understanding and Sound Commitment

It is obvious that Ethiopia has resorted to diverting attention from its attempt to violate the international law by claiming that Egypt is violating the principles of the legal system [status] of the Nile River by diverting a part of the river waters to Egyptian territories in the Sinai without consultation with the other Nile countries. Ethiopia has disregarded several fundamental facts in its claim, the first being the fact that the Sinai, as Egyptian territory, is a part of the Nile basin and that every inch of its lands is entitled to be irrigated by the Nile waters within the framework of the use of Egypt's gained right and natural right to the Nile waters. One of the seven branches of the Nile, known as (al-Bayluzi) branch, in reference to the town of (Bayluz) or al-Tinah, used to flow into the Sinai and pour into al-Bardawil Lake which has gained its suitability for breeding certain types of fish from the silt settling in it. This is something proven by the atlases. The second fact is that there is no law or convention that commits the countries on the mouth of a river to consult with the countries along the sources of a river before using their rightful share of the water in any part of the country. Such commitment exists in one case only, namely when the country at the mouth thinks of building a dam that may submerge any lands in the country at the source of the river. This is something by which Egypt abides.

The importance of the Nile river projects thus becomes obvious. The problems of these projects are big and many-sided. The countries of the Nile basin are numerous and their goals are different. Yet, there is no alternative before these countries to the cooperation that takes into consideration only the common interests in total freedom from the political whims and even in freedom from the differences in the social systems--a cooperation that asks to regain the wasted resources. There is no alternative before these countries other than setting up the proposed authority for the Nile basin--an authority that comprises all the parties concerned, including Ethiopia. This is not difficult to achieve by the Nile countries if the concept of fraternity, sincerity and peace for the interest of all the peoples is firmly established in these countries.

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THIRD FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN ANALYZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic Oct 80 p 35

[Article: "The Third Five-Year Development Plan: Saudi Labor Force...For Saudi Arabia"]

[Text] It was a big surprise when the broad headlines revealed the Third Five-Year Development Plan for Saudi Arabia. Contrary to the expectations of the majority of the observers, it did not vary much from the Second Five-Year Development Plan. In fact, and to some extent, it complemented it on the economic and social levels. It also reflects the weight of a class called the "nonruling technocrats." This plan was also considered as "liberal radicalism" among the circles of businessmen.

Plan Objectives

The plan concentrates on the development of Saudi labor, modernization, development and evolution of cities and of rural areas as well as the evolution of the social sectors. In order to accomplish all of this, $300 billion have been allocated to the plan, $50 billion of which have been added as reparations for inflation which is expected to reach an annual average of 7 percent throughout the 5-year period (1980-85). Comparing the third plan with the second plan, allocations for expenditures have been increased at a rate of 36 percent or an increase from $44 billion to $59 billion.

This increase, for a country like Saudi Arabia, is causing considerable speculation. How could the Saudi community bear the weight of the economic changes which the plan will fund? According to Sheikh Hisham Nazir, the Saudi minister of planning, the case is not how these monies will be expended, but what should be done to increase the returns on the investments and make the plan a success. Clearly, the events at Mecca did not give enough warning to the Saudi leadership as if to say: "Decisions are irreversible." How could this be possible and Saudi Arabia produces 9.5 million barrels of oil per day and the country itself is in need of no more than 5 million barrels per day? Juhman Ibn Said al-'Attiba, the leader of the Mecca operation, has repeatedly responded by saying that Saudi Arabia will not decrease its oil production, as the plan has adopted, but that expending such huge amounts would require changes to be made in the social structure. The opponents of this idea have decreased in number and the reason is obvious: the industrial and agricultural investments will absorb 36.3 percent

of the amounts alloted for the 5-year period, and this equals the size of the expenditures provided for in the general projects category which was 50 percent, then dropped to 35.5 percent in the new development plan. The Saudi government also wishes to construct 1,150 new factories.

The social effects are apparent: immigration from the rural areas into the new and old cities to form the new labor class, or the increase of foreign immigration into the labor market of Saudi Arabia. The seriousness of both effects are obvious. For this reason, several ministries have joined in to limit the social dangers. The Ministry of the Interior will have the task of stopping the foreign labor influx, and, indeed, it has already begun doing so. The Ministry of Labor will have the task of starting a campaign to increase the Saudi's interest in work. Despite the concentration of cash on the former development plan (because it increased the immigration of the labor force from rural areas), the new development plan stressed the priority of the formation of a qualified labor class. The Ministry of Labor revealed the statistics that out of 2 million workers in Saudi Arabia, 1.5 million are not Saudi citizens, and it is expected that their number will increase in 1985 by 500,000 workers. Thus, sharp criticism of the curriculum has been pouring at the Ministry of Education. What is needed is not constructing university buildings as much as opening training institutions. On this basis, and according to these terms, 19 percent of the expenditure category, allocated for the whole plan, has been set aside for education and training purposes, instead of the 15 percent previously allotted in the second development plan.

The problem is that the Saudi citizen refuses to "dirty his hands" at work. He refuses to work in construction projects, which may earn him 50 dinars per day. He refuses to work in factories and refuses to work as a taxi driver, which may earn him 300 dinars per day. The Saudi, instead, prefers to work in offices leaving the field open to foreign laborers in the industrial and construction sectors. If the government wanted to reduce the rate of foreign labor by 55 percent, as adopted by the new development plan, it is then necessary to decrease the employment opportunities in the field of services, and this is what the minister of planning had promised when he said: "We must clean the departments."

The problem does not only lie in the fact that the Saudi does not like to do "dirty work" but it is also his refusal to change the nature of the social relationships which are the direct outcome of the revenues of oil and investments. Also, the problem lies in particular with the role played by women on the economy. She is no longer restricted to staying within "four walls." The minister of planning favors the policy of openness, as it relates to women. In his opinion, the problem cannot be summed up in a "yes" or "no" answer. But what kind of role can a woman play and how. First, education for women shall become legally binding. Second, it is necessary to reduce the difficulties which stand in her way while seeking employment in the area of services. It seems, however, that women who are graduates of higher institutions perform better quality work than do their male counterparts, according to the view of one businessman. He also added that the Saudi woman refuses to be treated any differently from the way the Lebanese and the Syrian women working in Saudi Arabia are treated.

Speeding Up the Process of Industrialization

Labor, the role of women, the formation of the Saudi labor class, all of these are problems that indeed delayed making public the details of the development plan, according to a report published in the "Middle East Business" magazine. Sooner or later, these issues will become the axis for the development of Saudi Arabia. The government wants to speed up the industrialization process regardless of the cost, and, of course, the cost is very high. The Saudi government has adopted a plan to encourage foreign industrial investments within the framework of the new development plan guaranteeing every investor 500 barrels of oil per day for every $1 million invested in the heavy industrialization area. Also, the development plan makes a provision for the second year (1981) by allocating $73.6 billion, which is an increase of 27 percent over this year's budget for the plan. It also shows budgetary provisions for the vitalization of local governments and municipalities.

With the start of this new development plan, foreign ministries have begun making trips to Saudi Arabia to help implement the projects of the plan. In this race, the United States will get a big share especially since it holds the position of being the biggest exporter to Saudi Arabia. Last year alone, the United States exports totaled $5 billion and this year's exports may reach $6 billion. Since the new development plan raises the total imports to about $30 billion (U.S. Department of Commerce projects this figure would be $36 billion), as noted, the expectations of the United States are more optimistic, as opposed to the pessimism shown by the observers of the events at Mecca.

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JORDANIAN MINISTER RESPONDS TO JOURNALISTS ON ARAB SUMMIT

JN260920 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 27 Nov 80 pp 1, 19

[Excerpts] Amman--Information Minister 'Adnan Abu 'Awdah met yesterday evening with journalists and correspondents of local, Arab and international news agencies, television and radio stations and discussed with them the third meeting of the 11th Arab Summit Conference, which was held under the chairmanship of His Majesty King Husayn at the Royal Cultural Center yesterday evening.

The information minister then answered questions posed by the journalists. In reply to a question, he said that the conference yesterday unanimously approved the pan-Arab Economic Charter, after this charter was endorsed by a four-member committee comprising Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Iraq. Abu 'Awdah added that this charter will be signed by the Arab leaders during today's final session.

In response to a question about whether there was an intention of forming an Arab committee to visit the Arab states which did not attend the summit, he said that no specific decision has been reached to this effect.

Asked about the African Development Fund, Abu 'Awdah said that this fund was established for the purpose of achieving Arab participation in the development and economic backing of the African states.

The minister expressed his sorrow over the boycotting by some Arab states of the 11th Arab Summit Conference, adding that previous Arab summit conferences were not attended by all.

The minister pointed out that since the conference was attended by the Arab majority, it represents the Arab nation's desire and will, which would thus guarantee the effectiveness of the decisions reached by the conference.

In reply to a question on the stand of the states participating in the Amman summit in regard to the Iraqi-Iranian war, the minister said that it was affirmed that the Arabs would confront any aggression against any Arab territory.

The minister stated that the political resolutions of the conference stressed the importance of the Baghdad and Tunis summit resolutions. Abu 'Awdah pointed out that the necessity was also stressed for continuing dialogue with the world states and all their groups, including the European group.

In reply to another question on whether the conference discussed the issue of southern Lebanon, the minister said that the place accorded this matter was similar to that devoted to it at the Tunis summit.

Replying to a question on the procedures adopted with regard to preserving the achievements of the Amman summit, Abu 'Awdah said: I do not believe that the stands of the states which boycotted the conference will affect the results of the summit, particularly since these states participated in laying down the program joint political action and the economic papers--with the exception of the paper on the decade of development--during the foreign ministers conference.

Replying to a question on the purpose behind massing the Syrian forces along the border near Jordan, Abu 'Awdah said: We do not know if these concentrations of troops are against Jordan. We believe that the purpose behind massing these troops is to bolster the Syrian forces, in order to confront Israel in the Golan.

The minister affirmed that the Arab states which implemented their commitment to bolster the standfastness of our people in the occupied territory will continue to bolster this steadfastness. The minister pointed out that the states which abandoned the bolstering of steadfastness from the first moment were Libya and Algeria.

Replying to a question on the PLO's boycott of the Amman summit and the effect such a boycott would have on its cooperation with Jordan, Abu 'Awdah said: I do not believe that the non-attendance of the PLO will be a reason for non-cooperation with Jordan, since such cooperation has gone beyond the stage of dialogue. I hope that the non-attendance of the PLO will not affect cooperation in such a way that it deters the bolstering of our people's steadfastness in the occupied territory.

Concerning the reason the PLO did not participate in the conference, the information minister said that there are two aspects to the issue: the first represents the stand declared by the PLO and the memorandum it addressed to the general secretariat, in which it attempted to give the reasons for not attending the conference. The second is what we all know about the PLO position, which is set forth by the PLO leaders during the convocation of the meetings of the seven-member committee and of the foreign ministers conference. This clearly shows that they did not attend due to pressure.

On Arab moves in the international arena, the minister affirmed that such moves will continue and include all international groups, particularly those groups which influence the course of events in the Middle East region.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

SYRIAN-JORDANIAN TALKS--Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad has invited Jordan's King Husayn for an official visit to Damascus to discuss all the contentious issues. The invitation was transmitted to Husayn through Saudi Deputy Prime Minister Prince 'Abdallah who ended a mediation mission yesterday. Among the problems the Syrians wish to raise during the talks with Husayn is also the development of Jordanian-Iraqi relations. The Syrians have revealed increased queasiness in view of the fact that Jordan is currently the chief means of supply for the Iraqi Army and economy following the blockade of the Iraqi sea outlet on the Persian Gulf. The Syrians will also want to discuss what is termed "the future of the Jordanian-Syrian cooperation." The evaluation is that Damascus will try to harm Husayn's maneuvering space in the Arab world and limit his independence. [Excerpt] [TA040852 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Dec 80 pp 1, 2]

CSO: 4805

GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN KABUL, HERAT REPORTED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 23 Nov 80 p 1

[Text] NEW DELHI, Nov. 22: Islamic freedom fighters have so far killed several Soviet and Afghan officials in Kabul in recent weeks, Afghan and diplomatic sources said today.

Unknown assailants are reported to have killed the principal of a junior high school, and assassinated an Afghan official outside the Ministry of Education this week, diplomats said.

Officials in Kabul, however, did not know whether the assassins of the two men, belonged to President Karmal's Parcham party or were members of the opposing Khalq party or urban guerillas no further details of the killings were available.

Reports of co-operation between Khalqis, who oppose Karmal on several issues, including the continuing presence of 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and insurgents engaged in a two-year-old anti-Soviet guerilla war have increased, diplomats said.

Unidentified terrorists also burned down Wazir Ali Khan High school in Karta Parwan about three weeks ago, Afghan sources who travelled recently from Kabul said.

Guerillas also set fire to the 20,000 square-foot Kabul Custom's House in the North-eastern industrial area of the capital last week, they reported. Officials rushed fire fighting equipment to the government building, the extent of damage was, however, not known.

Rebels are also reported to have shot down an official of Kabul province identified as Mohammad Hamm and burned his jeep in Qalai Murad Baig, about 25 miles from the capital this week.

Earlier in the week, diplomats reported two incidents of attacks by Soviet soldiers on private houses in Kabul.

In a nearby suburb Soviet soldiers also broke into a house and attempted to kidnap the daughters of the owner. A gunfight broke out, leaving five Afghans and two Russian military men dead, they said.

The diplomats were unable to confirm the Afghan reports but they said violence in Kabul continued 'at least on a sustained level'.

REGIMENT DESTROYED: According to a report from Herat province Mujahideen of the Islamic Alliance destroyed completely a regiment of Afghan troops in Badghis province in mid October. Regiment 70 came under heavy attack by Mujahideen in Kotal area among the Pistachio forests of Badghis.

In this attack Mujahideen, under the command of Karam Khan and Naik Mohammad, had these troops under siege for three days continuously.

In the fightings Mujahideen killed four Russian advisors 15 soldiers. 120 soldiers, however, joined Mujahideen.

In the fighting 5 Mujahideen were martyred and seven wounded.

According to a report for Kandhar, Arghandab came under heavy Russian bomberdment recently which killed many concerned innocent villagers.

300 soldiers joined Mujahideen after they came under attack in Shawaki.

APPROVED: The Presidium of the Ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan today approved a report by Afghan President Babrak Karmal on his "historic" 21-day visit to the Soviet Union, Kabul Radio reported.

The report was endorsed "wholeheartedly", and was called a "historic step" which would have "international and internal repercussions beneficial to the Afghan people", the state-owned radio said in its Pushtu-language news bulletin monitored in New Delhi.

The seven-member presidium also approved a speech delivered by Mr. Karmal at the party meeting after his return from the Soviet Union on Nov. 5, the radio said. –UPI/PPI/AFP

CSO: 4920

SOVIETS LOSE CONTROL OF SOUTHERN AFGHAN BORDER

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 19 Nov 80 p 5

[Text]

LONDON:

Soviet hopes of stabilising the Government of Babrak Karmal in Afghanistan have suffered severe setbacks, with Soviet and Afghan forces unable to control movements of refugees across the long border with Pakistan.

The Russians have tried bribery to split opposing tribes, but this strategy misfired disastrously in September with the killing of the Afghan Frontier Affairs Minister while engaged on a peace mission.

Loss of Soviet control of the Southern borders has resulted from the deployment of all available troops in Afghan cities, where they face increasing difficulties in holding down a hostile population. Reports from the border areas tell of bold attacks by Mujahidin bands, daylight raids, and kidnappings of officials in Jalalabad and even in the heavily guarded heart of Kabul.

Afghan guerillas are aiming to disrupt all commercial traffic to the Pakistan frontier—fresh fruit exports are one of the few remaining sources of revenue left to the Kabul Government. Some 40 trucks laden with fruit for export were burned on the Kabul-Jalalabad highway in 10 days at the end of September, resulting in serious losses to the Afghan and Pakistani truck-owners and a likely ending to trade.

The southern borders are now more open than before and many thousands of Afghans are taking advantage of this to flee into Pakistan before the winter snows set in.

Many of the refugees are young high school and college students, teenagers fleeing from forced conscription into the Afghan army. But there are also men and women with professional skills—doctors, engineers and others—of the type the Karmal Government is attempting to keep inside the country by promises of better conditions and a refusal of passports on any pretext. Some of the refugees do not reach exile in safety, though, as booby-trap devices and mines have been laid along the trails and mountain passes to deter movements of all kinds across the border.

The bitter feelings aroused in this civil war are highlighted by the story of the death of Faiz Mohammad, the Frontier Affairs Minister, who made contact with the influential Zadran tribe of Waziristan, close to the border-land where he himself was born. The move was intended as part of a wider peace initiative.

The Minister swept into Pakhtia by helicopter with four other civil and military officers after careful negotiations and assurances of safe conduct. Inside the helicopters were a large sum of money and a ceremonial gift of three fat sheep—the traditional tribal accompaniment to peace-making.

An eye-witness account says that at first everything went well and according to custom, with the shooting of rifles into the air to mark the arrival of distinguished guests, the slaughter of the sheep, and preparations for the feast. Only after the meal was finished were the five men killed—as tools of the hated Russians.

After the murder, tribal leaders burned the bundles of banknotes—to the value of $20,000 to $60,000 by varying accounts—in front of the assembly, a move interpreted as a demonstration by the Zadran tribe that the killing took place not from greed but from patriotism.—P.T.-Observer Service.

CSO: 4920

PRESIDENT KARMAL'S ACTIVITIES REPORTED

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 21 Nov 80 pp 1, 7

[Text] NEW DELHI, Nov. 20: Kabul Radio said yesterday Afghan President Babrak Karmal had visited the Wakhan district of Afghanistan's north-eastern Province of Badakhshan which borders the Soviet Union.

There have been Press reports that the Soviet Union is in the process of annexing the largely-uninhabited 300 square KM (115 sq. mile) Wakhan corridor, which points towards China in the East between Pakistan and the Soviet Union.

It did not give a date for the visit by the Afghan leader who returned to Kabul on November 5 after a 21-day visit to the Soviet Union.

AFP adds: Mr. Babrak Karmal has said his country wants to open' political dialogue with Iran and Pakistan to resolve differences with them, Radio Kabul reported on Tuesday.

In an interview with French Radio and the Czechoslovak news agency Ceteka, the Afghan President reiterated his offer of Nov. 5 for seeking ways to finding a peaceful solution in the region, the Radio said.

The Afghan ruler, who on return from his 21-day tour of the Soviet Union criticised Pakistan in a tough-worded statement on alleged interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, now offered Kabul's friendship and co-operation to Islamabad.

Afghanistan, wanted friendly relations with all, particularly its neighbours and 'with Iran and Pakistan it wants to have the closest relations', the Radio quoted Mr. Karmal as saying.

Reuter adds: Babrak Karmal has issued a strong warning to dissidents within Afghanistan's Ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) and threatened them with expulsion from the party, diplomatic sources said here yesterday.

In a speech to party activists in Kabul after he returned from his first official visit to the Soviet Union, the Afghan leader said those not working for the good of the party would be expelled "even if they had been heroes in the past."

The sources said observers in Kabul saw this as a possible forerunner to the expulsion of past and present military commanders belonging to the party's Khalq (masses) faction hostile to President Karmal and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan — the Afghan leader heads the rival Parcham (flag) faction.

In his November 13 speech, which was later broadcast by Kabul Radio, President Karmal called for party discipline and 'unity in thought.. conscience, honour, words and deeds.'

The sources said Interior Minister Mohammad Gulabzoi, a leader of the Khalq faction, was regarded as the main target of the attack against party dissidents.

According to earlier diplomatic reports, members of the Khalq faction were said in Kabul to have obtained arms from the Interior Minister and police stores and set up underground units.

In the broadcast monitored here this week, President Karmal spoke of eternal friendship and solidarity with the Soviet Communist Party.

He said some party officials were abusing their position and warned dissidents that factionalism would never be tolerated.

"Compromise with this kind of situation is impossible," he said.

On the military front, the sources said air activity over Kabul was high in the past week and military convoys continued to rumble through the streets at night.

They said a convoy was seen returning from the Ghazni area south of Kabul last week with damaged tanks on 15 transporters. The sources said five Afghans and two Russians were killed on the night of November 14-15 when Soviet soldiers forcibly entered a house in the Kharte Parwan district of Kabul. Some reports said the soldiers were looking for girls but other reports said they only tried to take away valuable objects.

Police instructed Afghan witnesses to say that anti-Government rebels were responsible, according to the sources.—Reuter/AFP.

CSO: 4920

WRAPUP ON MUJAHIDEEN ACTIVITIES

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 18 Nov 80 pp 1, 5

[Text] NEW DELHI, Nov. 17 Afghan freedom-fighters raided a women's prison north of Kabul last week, released all 58 inmates and killed several guards accused of supplying the convicts to entertain Soviet troops, a report from Afghanistan said yesterday.

Other guards helped in the release of the women last Monday from the prison at Charikar, the capital of Parwan province, 65 kilometres north of the capital, said a source in Kabul who in the past has been accurate.

A protest strike against the slaying of five bus drivers by Russian soldiers has halted all bus service on the main north-south highway from Kabul through the Salang Pass tunnel to the Soviet border, the report from Afghanistan continued.

It said the drivers were killed last Nov. 8 in a dispute over Russian demands to supply them hashish at a bus stop at Kenjan, 150 kilometres north of Kabul near the north portal of the tunnel.

Mujahideen in Paktia province continued to block a long caravan of trucks loaded with firewood for Kabul, now feeling the first blasts of winter, the report said. Not a single firewood truck has moved to the capital from Paktia since Nov. 8 despite efforts by Afghan and Soviet troops to clear the road, it added.

The latest Kabul report said firewood was selling there for as much as 150 Afghanis ($3.75) for seven kilograms (£15.4) nearly 10 times normal price.

Peshawar report adds:

Hizb-i-Islami, Afghanistan reports from Kandooz province that Mujahideen attacked the water supply project in Khanabad district of Kandooz province. As a result, two Parchamite watchmen of the project were killed. One tank installed in front of the project was also destroyed.

A Press release of the Hizb-i-Islami said one tank was destroyed by a rocket launcher while it was standing in front of the oil station of Kandooz province. The same day, one high official of the Karmal regime was captured alive. He was executed by the Mujahideen summary Islamic Court.

Reports from Logar province say the Mujahideen executed 15 spies and pro-Russian elements captured in Logar province.

The report adds these persons have been involved in the murder and torture of innocent people and sending reports to the Government about the Mujahideen activities. The report also adds that Mujahideen in Logar province attacked a Russian convoy in Tangi area.

A tank and an armoured car and a carrier of food supplies were destroyed. No casualties were reported on the Mujahideen side.—APA/PPI

CSO: 4920

AIR ACTIVITY AROUND KABUL STEPPED UP

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 21 Nov 80 pp 1, 7

[Text] New Delhi, Nov. 20: Soviet helicopter activity has been stepped up around Kabul in what could amount to a new offensive against the guerillas in Afghanistan, western diplomatic sources said here today.

On November 15 the Afghan Defence Ministry announced joint ground and air manoeuvres in Kabul, Parwan, Ghazni and Nagahar Provinces.

Dozens of Soviet helicopter gunships took to the air from Kabul and the activity was still continuing yesterday alongwith high-flying Soviet jet fighters and bombers, the sources said.

Joint Soviet-Afghan military contingents were reported conducting searches of villages for guerillas, and in Wardak province, west of Kabul, Soviet forces shelled a suspected guerilla encampment, the sources said.

Soviet forces had also tried for the fourth time to invade the Panshjir valley north-east of Kabul and were met with the usual stiff resistance by guerillas in four days of fighting, the sources said.

Villages near Kandhar in southern Afghanistan were reported to have been bombed by Soviet helicopters and jets, they said.

Kabul residents were woken during the night of November 10-11 by loud explosions from a battle that lasted seven hours in Hudkhel village on the outskirts of the capital.

Office workers travelling into Kabul the next day said they saw about a dozen bodies lying near a wall in the village which was surrounded by troops, the sources said.

The guerillas were reported to have attacked a police station at Kart-Nau near the village the same night and to have lost five men in the encounter though claiming the same number of dead among Afghan soldiers who fought them.

Another group of guerillas tried to blow up a nearby thermal power station but were discovered and chased away, the sources said.

The sources confirmed earlier diplomatic reports that a family of Afghans and two Soviet soldiers were killed last week when Russian troops forcibly entered a house in Kabul.

They said the home was that of a judicial official of the Afghan Government Interior Ministry who had just returned from leading a group of Muslim pilgrims to Mecca.

A group of Soviet soldiers entered the house and killed the official, his wife, mother and three daughters. The official's son was reported to have evaded the soldiers by hiding under a quilt in the bathroom, the sources said.

Some reports said the Russians were looking for girls, but other reports said they tried to take away valuable objects.

The sources said Soviet officers, who were called to the scene by a police patrol, shot and killed two of the maurauding Soviet soldiers on the spot.

Police had been told by the authorities to blame the incident on the guerillas, the sources said.

Kabul bus drivers refused to drive to the north on November 13 until guaranteed safe passage after a Soviet patrol was reported to have killed a bus driver and three passengers, the sources said.

At Jubal Serak on the same highway on November 14, a traveller reported seeing a burnt-out truck and the bodies of more than a dozen Afghan youths wearing the scarf of the Afghan Young Pioneers, a youth wing of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).

The sources quoted the traveller as saying the youth had been attacked by guerillas who escaped with a number of sub-machineguns.

Meanwhile, Hezbe Islami, Afghanistan, reports from Laghman province that the Mujahideen attacked heavily the military base of Russians in Surkh-Kanoo area and destroyed a great number of tanks.

All those Russians who were in four-tracks were killed. The same day a convoy of Russians on its way from Jalalabad to Kabul was attacked by the Mujahideen and as a result 450 Russians were reported to have been killed.

According to another report received recently, Mujahideen attacked the houses of Russians in Samar-Khil area and killed seven Russians.

The representative of Hezbe-Islami, Afghanistan, reports from Salungar district that heavy conflicts happened between Mujahideen and the Russian troops.

During the conflicts which lasted for six hours 20 Russians were killed, a tank was destroyed and one rocket-launcher captured as booty from Russian troops.--Reuter/PPI.

CSO: 4920

KASHENDI FALLS TO MUJAHIDEEN

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 22 Nov 80 pp 1, 5

[Text] PESHAWAR, Nov. 21: According to a report from Balkh Province Mujahideen of Sarab under the command of Haji Abdul Mohammad brought Kashendi country of Sholgara Sub Province under their control in the fighting in the area.

Mujahideen destroyed two tanks and killed 21 agent troops, says a Press release of Islamic Alliance for Liberation of Afghanistan.

A report from Kunar Province said that Mujahideen launched a guerilla attack on Sarkani Sub Province and burned down one jeep, and also killed the commander and two of his associates.

They also burned down one house belonging to a Parchami.

According to another report from Kunar Province Mujahideen of Daywagal under the command of Said Khan made an attack on a military convoy on the way between Norgal and Patan. In the fighting, Russian troops suffered heavy casualties and one armoured car was destroyed.

According to a report from Badakhashan, Russian troops launched a savage attack on Shahri Boourg, but the Mujahideen repulsed the attack.

The fighting lasted for four days and hundreds of Russians including several officers were killed.

Mujahideen and villagers casualties were 38 dead and 50 wounded.

Shakshaikhan Baguvan, Angarian, Malwan, Koal, Gardani Rayg, Barlas and Safaid Shar Villages were heavily damaged and many schools, mosques and houses completely destroyed.

According to a Karachi report:

Armed clashes have taken place between Government forces and the Afghan freedom fighters in Parwan and Badakshan provinces of Afghanistan, Radio Pakistan quoting Kabul Radio reported today.

Radio Pakistan quoted Voice of Germany as saying that Afghan freedom fighters are putting up fierce fighting against Government forces in Panjsher Valley about 150 kilometers north of Kabul.

A fourth attempt is now being made to dislodge the freedom fighters from this strategic valley and gain control over the area.

Another report said the Soviet troops have received a set back in the Panjsher Valley.—PPI.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

SOVIET, AFGHAN OFFICIALS KILLED—New Delhi, Nov. 22: Islamic freedom fighters and opponents of the Moscow-installed Afghan regime have murdered several Soviet and Afghan officials in Kabul in recent weeks, Afghan and diplomatic sources said today. Unknown assailants killed the principal of a Junior High School, and assassinated an Afghan official outside the Ministry of Education this week, diplomats said. Officials in Kabul did not know whether the assassins of the two men, both members of President Babrak Karmal's Parcham or Flag faction of the ruling Marxist People's Party, were members of the opposing Khalq, or People's, faction or urban guerillas. There were no further details of the killings. Reports of cooperation between Khaliqis, who oppose Karmal on several issues, including the continuing presence of 85,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and insurgents engaged in a two-year-old anti-Soviet guerilla war have increased, diplomats said. Earlier in the week, diplomats reported incidents of attacks by Soviet soldiers on private houses in Kabul. Russian soldiers killed an Interior Ministry official, his wife, mother and three daughters before being gunned down by Soviet Military Police on the night of November 14, the diplomats said. More kidnap cases have been reported by Soviet soldiers.—APP. [Text] [Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 23 Nov 80 pp 1, 5]

SOVIET FORCES FIGHTING MUJAHIDS—New Delhi, Nov 21: Major Soviet forces are in action against Afghan freedom fighters in four provinces around Kabul, diplomatic sources in New Delhi said today. They said Soviet helicopter gunship activity over Kabul had been heavy for many days and large military convoys continued to pass through the city daily. But the sources said there was not enough information to say whether a large-scale planned offensive was being waged against the nationalists before winter sets in or a series of sweeps were being carried out against various pockets of resistance. Soviet ground and air forces were in action against the freedom fighters in Wardak, Logar, Nagahar and Parwan provinces, the sources said. More killings occurred in Kabul, including two this week when a school principal was shot and another man was gunned down outside the Ministry of Education, the sources said. The sources said both these victims were believed to be members of President Babrak Karmal's Parcham (flag) faction of the ruling People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). Vehicle searches for arms were frequent and thorough in Kabul and on all approach roads. Motorists are stopped several times on every road going out of Kabul, the sources said.--Reuter. [Text] [Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 22 Nov 80 p 6]

BIG SOVIET OFFENSIVE--London, Nov. 23: Soviet troops in Afghanistan have launched a major offensive against resistance fighters in Logar province, south of Kabul, BBC reported today. In a report from New Delhi the BBC said the move was the Soviets' most determined effort yet to smash the resistance in Logar province. The BBC spoke of a "large-scale invasion" of the province. Soviet warplanes had "brutally" bombed villages. Heavy losses were reported. Afghan troops were not involved in the fighting, apparently because too many of them had deserted, the radio said.--DPA [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 24 Nov 80 p 1]

CSO: 4920

LONG-TERM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DISCUSSED

Algiers AL-SHA'B in Arabic 26 Oct 80 pp 1, 5

[Article by Jamal Salihi: "National People's Assembly: Discussion of Long-Term Economic Development Directions"]

[Text] The National People's Assembly works yesterday were distinguished by the convocation of a special morning session under the chairmanship of brother Rabih Bitat, Political Bureau member and the National People's Assembly speaker, to receive Queen Elizabeth II of the United Kingdom.

The evening session, which conducted its works in the presence of brother 'Abd al-Hamid Brahimi, Central Committee member and the minister of planning and of national development, was devoted to hearing a part of the Planning and Finance Committee report on the long-term economic and social development directions within the framework of the [assembly's] discussions on the bill concerning the Five-Year Plan.

This part of the report was discussed by the deputies. The minister of planning provided explanations on their observations and queries.

The Planning and Finance Committee report, read by brother 'Abd al-Aziz Belkhadem, the committee rapporteur, dealt with the economic, social and cultural development strategy followed in the preceding 10-year plan which required in particular realizing the goals embodied in:

Eliminating the causes of unemployment.

Providing education to all children.

Building an apparatus capable of guaranteeing our growth and of bolstering our independence.

Eliminating the factional [al jihawiyah] differences, in addition to recovering [sic] the national resources and to dealing with the changes that have taken place at the industrial, agricultural, social and political levels.

The report noted that as it has produced significant results in all spheres, this strategy has also created flaws producing negative aspects that have intensified as a result of the profound changes that have occurred in our economy.

Thus, 55 percent of the investments have gone for industry, 9.2 percent for agriculture, irrigation and fishing and more than 36 percent for the other sectors (construction, public works, the social sector, the infrastructures and so forth).

Considerable differences have also been recorded between the estimated and the realized gross national production. Whereas the estimates amounted to 9 percent for the first 4-year plan and 11.2 percent for the second 4-year plan, the actual accomplishments amounted to no more than 5.9 percent and 5.5 percent successively. As for the individual citizen, the gross national production has only realized a poor growth of 2-3 percent annually.

Generally, the production and productivity goals have not been realized insofar as the investment goals are concerned. Thus, the conditions of economic integration have not been realized and this has caused resorting to the outside world [to meet the demand].

The tendency toward importation has risen from 23 percent in 1967 to 48 percent in 1980 and this has damaged our balance of payments severely.

As for incomes, they have developed by a large degree as a result of the investments which rose at a rapid rate of 8 percent in the first 3-year plan, 11 percent in the first 4-year plan and 17 percent in the second 4-year plan.

Because the incomes have not developed by the same degree for the various social groups, the rise in prices has hurt the classes with limited or fixed incomes more strongly than others.

As for the social results, we must note the tangible development in the level of employment, considering that 1.1 million non-agricultural jobs have been created during the 10-year plan and that the democracy of education has been actually realized in view of the fact that 73 percent [of those eligible for schooling] were enrolled in schools in 1978. In the sphere of health, this period has been characterized by the realization of an extremely significant accomplishment, namely the establishment of free medical care. Insofar as housing is concerned, this period has shown that this sector has not been given priority despite the significant efforts exerted in the countryside.

The Planning and Finance Committee report then dealt with the broad lines of the coming 10-year plan which includes the 1980-84 plan.

If the goals drawn up for our 1980-90 10-year economic plan seek to meet the social needs primarily, then the broad lines of this 10-year plan should seek to:

Bolster and develop our energy potentials.

Mobilize the water resources to a maximum.

Focus on and expand agriculture.

Follow up development of the essential and basic traditional industries to cut off the ties of dependence on the outside world.

The dimensions of these tasks and awareness of the demographic growth and of its impact on work and production make it possible to measure the (resources harnessed) to accomplish the tasks. If the population reaches 27 million by 1990 and if we take into consideration complete elimination of the deficient use of manpower and the return of emigrants, then the total number of working people will amount to 6.3 million people in 1990 whereas it was 3.7 million people in 1979.

Creation of the manpower constitutes the main and permanent task of the economic policy of the long-term plans.

Quantitatively, the policy to create the manpower requires:

Improving the elementary and intermediate education.

Developing the formation of such manpower within the economic units in a concerned manner.

Exerting effective and wide-scale efforts to develop the components.

The incomes produced by the activity of the real funds and services during this period will grow by more than 150 percent over the preceding period. This total growth in the non-agricultural economy includes the growth in incomes resulting from a growth of 180 percent in wages and of nearly 70 percent in incomes from other than wages. The total consumption will rise by nearly 120 percent between 1979 and 1990.

As for social needs, employing the national language at all levels of education and using this language in all branches require all the sections of the educational, cultural and developmental apparatus to exert big efforts.

The number of students in elementary education in the year 1990 will exceed their number in 1979 by one million students. The number of students in intermediate education will amount to 1.7 millions, the number of high school students will rise by 400,000 and the number of students in higher education will reach 200,000.

In the sphere of housing, the matter concerns the construction of 1.2 million housing units. The committee has proposed that this figure be raised to 2 million units if we want to attain the housing conditions prevailing in 1966.

Meeting all these social and other needs requires an annual production growth rate of 8 percent.

The results expected in the various production sectors will be reflected in a gradual bolstering of our economic and financial independence. Revenues from monies and services should be reduced to the lowest level possible and should drop from 50 percent to 25 percent by 1990.

Generally, revenues from services and monies will increase at a lower rate than the increase rate in the national production (5 percent compared to 8 percent).

As for exports, the major part will continue to consist of fuels. Assuming that fuel prices will develop appropriately and considering the volume of investments in this 10-year plan--a volume amounting to 900 billion dinars--the balance of monies and services will be in equilibrium generally.

During the coming plan, it is necessary to secure nearly 50 billion dinars in new foreign loans to meet the deficit in foreign debt repayment and to guarantee equilibrium in the balance of payments.

After the 1984-90 period, the surplus produced by the exchange of monies and services should guarantee the full repayment of the inherited debt, including the currently planned debt. It should also guarantee completion of the 10-year plan without new financial obligations that are liable to affect the foreign balances in the long run.

After a review of the broad lines of the long-term economic and social development by the Planning and Finance Committee rapporteur, a number of deputies spoke to underline the human element as an essential and indispensable condition for the success of the development plan, in addition to the material and financial conditions. The deputies also inquired about the theoretical and methodological concepts on which the plan relies, especially since this is the first time that the national development plan is discussed at the various levels and since it is the first time that the National People's Assembly takes part in discussing it. Stree was also put on the need to devote more attention to the agricultural section and not to rely on the fuel section, considering that it is a depletable resource. Stress was also put on the importance of control in its various forms and on the sound management of the establishments by reorganizing them so as to ease the pressures and tensions and to eliminate the drawbacks.

In his reply, the minister of planning shared the view of the deputies who see the need for devoting greater attention to the human element. In this regard, the minister stressed that there must be a clear policy in the field of fuels so that we may not rely on them, considering that they are a depletable resource. The minister also stressed the need to rely on work as the only and permanent means of wealth. However, this goal requires time, as the minister has said.

In the sphere of agriculture for which the investments allocated are, in the view of a number of deputies, small, the minister noted that not all the investments allocated for this sector have been used and that the problem in agriculture is not so much a financial problem as it is a problem of work, organization and productivity.

Concerning the return of the emigrants, the minister stressed that measures can be taken for the return of a larger number than agreed upon with the French authorities, should the occasion arise, without the need to reconsider the plan.

8494
CSO: 4402

AUTHORITIES ALLOW EXEMPT COMPANY TO PROCEED WITH SHARE ISSUE

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Nov 80 pp 14-15

[Text]

Bahrain's Ministry of Commerce has allowed an Exempt Company to proceed with a share issue which was originally cancelled when it became apparent that it had been oversubscribed about 680 times.

The Arab International Insurance Company EC (AIIC) was among the first Exempt Company to make a share issue after the lifting of a ban on the registration of such companies. The ban, lifted two months ago, was imposed after an issue by the Gulf Investment Co was oversubscribed more than 1,000 times last October; at the same time, Gulf Medical Projects Co, a joint venture involving the government of Sharjah, set something of a record by attracting $8 billion worth of bids for a share issue with a face value of only $4 million (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, October 1, 1979).

Exempt Companies – so-called because they are not required to have any local participation, let alone a controlling Bahraini interest – enjoy the same tax advantage as other companies. They are not, however, permitted to compete on the local market and Bahraini citizens and companies may not apply for shares on public offer, although they may participate as founders.

The AIIC offered 2.5 million shares at their face value of $1 million for public subscription out of an issued capital of $6 million; the company's authorised capital is $10 million. It has been decided to allot shares on the basis of 1.47 for every 1,000 applied for, which indicates that the issue was over-subscribed 680 times ; this would put the total application at about $1.7 billion.

The Commerce Ministry at first refused to accept the result, suspecting that there must have been some duplication during the two-week subscription period; however, reports from Bahrain said last week, they rescinded their decision after consultations with AIIC's founders, who are principally from Kuwait.

Under Bahraini law, an applicant for a share issue on public offer may submit an offer for a maximum of 10,000 shares; however, reports from Bahrain said, it used to be a well-known practice for copies of nationality certificates to be bought and sold to enable potential subscribers to submit more than one bid under different names.

The reports quoted the Director of Commercial and Company Affairs at the Commerce Ministry, Ahmed Hubail, as saying that AIIC applied for offshore public company status before the laws were tightened up, and therefore copies of nationality certificates were accepted under the old regulations.

Mr Hubail said that in September, when an issue by the Arab Iron and Steel Company was oversubscribed 42 times, applicants were required to register in advance and to produce original identification documents in support of their application. This procedure would be adopted in all future offshore public company share issues, he said.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

STOCKPILING HITS SHIPYARD BOOKINGS--Bookings at ASRY are 20 to 30 per cent below capability but industry sources blame the oil supply situation rather than high insurance rates resulting from hostilities in the Gulf. Western Oil stocks are at record levels, and many crude carriers are in use as floating storage tanks. A spokesman for the Bahrain-based shipyard, which is owned by member states of Oapec, said the dry dock utilisation rate for October was 75%. Bookings for November are down 70% of capacity, with a slight improvement towards the end of the year. Last year vessels were so tightly scheduled for entering the dry-dock that the occupancy rate rose to more than 94 per cent but in March there was a temporary setback in response to increased war risk premiums with a 15 per cent fall in booking. April and May were fully booked but there was the usual quiet period during the summer and demand has not yet picked up. Industry sources believe that as much depends on the level of oil consumption in the West--which to some extent could be boosted by a severe winter--as on future development at the head of the Gulf. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 8 Nov 80 p 12]

WAR HOLDS UP SHIPMENTS--Midal Cables of Bahrain is holding $500,000 worth of aluminum conductor for Iran and is delaying manufacture of another $1.5 million worth or orders. General Manager Straut Mansfield told the GULF MIRROR last week: "We were loading up trucks to take the cables to the port the day war broke out." The order cannot be shipped at present but I am reasonably confident of arranging shipping in the not too distant future." The Iranian Port of Bandar Abbas is open, Mr Mansfield said but Midal will have to bear higher freight and insurance costs to get its goods through since this was a package deal including carriage insurance and forwarding. The major customer in Iran is the state electricity undertaking and Mr Mansfield expects further big orders once hostilities cease. "Commercial contact with Tehran is still good," he added. Another aluminum exporter hit by the war is Balco, the marketing organisation which handles the Bahrain and Saudi government offtakes from ALBA. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 8 Nov 80 p 12]

IRON PELLET PLANT--The Arab Iron and Steel Company of Bahrain expects to begin producing iron pellets by the spring of 1983, the company's General Manager Omar Grine announced recently. The company, Mr Grine said, plans to build a plant with an annual capacity of 4 million tonnes at a cost of $300 million, with output going mainly to the Gulf market. When the pellet plant is operational, the company plans to move towards producing steel, Mr Grine said. The Arab Iron and Steel

Company was formed recently and has an authorised capital of $150 million; 110 million shares with a par value of $1, of which 50 per cent has been paid up. The company's founders hold 62 million shares and they include investors from Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE, Jordan and Iraq. The public was invited to subscribe for the remaining 48 million shares and the issue was oversubscribed by 42 times. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Nov 80 p 16]

CSO: 4820

MILITARY TOWNS BUILT TO HOUSE ARMY PERSONNEL

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 1 Aug 80 p 4

[Article by Faruq al-Shadhili: "Inauguration of First Military Town Near Nasr City; 341 Apartments Delivered to Members of Armed Forces; Three Towns in Dahshur, Suez and Isma'ilia"]

[Text] Lt Gen Ahmad Badawi, the minister of defense and of war production, has opened the first military town for housing officers of the armed forces.

The land was prepared, the housing built and the utilities supplied in 18 months. A total of 341 personnel housing units were turned over yesterday and 500 more units will be delivered by the end of this year. The town has been named al-Tawfiq town and it is one of four towns being built by the armed forces in Dahshur, Inshas and on the Cairo-Isma'ilia highway and Cairo-Suez highway. Al-Tawfiq town is located near Nasr City. Lieutenant General Badawi has laid down the cornerstone in al-Tawfiq town for the construction of 2,400 more units. Lt Gen Ahmad Badawi declared at the inauguration of the town: "It has become familiar to us to see new projects in which the armed forces have undertaken the full responsibility of implementation." Badawi also said that the inauguration of the first phase of the personnel housing units in al-Tawfiq town confirms this fact and that this project deserves to be given attention and to be studied so that we may proceed toward similar projects which will ultimately realize self-sufficiency for our armed forces in the sphere of personnel housing in the military towns that are scheduled to be built.

Badawi added: These projects represent an effective contribution on the part of the armed forces in solving the housing crisis. At the same time, the projects realize psychological and moral stability for the members of our armed forces. This is something in which we eagerly participate because of its positive impact on the performance of the armed forces.

Maj Gen Engineer Husayn Anwar, the head of the Armed Forces Major Projects Agency, declared that 341 personnel housing units have been distributed in the first phase of the town, that 500 more units will be delivered by the end of this month [sic] and that construction works will continue until the number of units in the town amounts to 1,840 units by the beginning of 1982.

Anwar added that some improvements and changes will be made in the coming phase, that the parts for these buildings have been manufactured at the prefabricated building plants of the armed forces, that they have been constructed by the troops and the officers themselves and that modern materials have been used in the finishing works for the buildings.

8494
CSO: 4802

DEVELOPMENT WITHIN ARMED FORCES SIGNAL CORPS REVIEWED

Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic 22 Aug 80 pp 18-19

[Article by Hamdi Lutfi: "Hot Line Incorporated Into Our Armed Forces; How Did Signal Corps Fight Among Vanguard Formations; What Has President al-Sadat Secretly Given the Egyptian Army Corps in Which He Served as Officer"]

[Text] The signal corps of our armed forces are undergoing a new scientific and technological revolution. They have recently used the "hot line."

This line and its wide-range electronic network represent the highest advanced level of combining wire and radio service.

It is the open path for applying command and control over the forces in their military fronts without the use of the human factor!

Come let us cast a look on this new area of the scientific revolution among the formation of our armed forces.

The signal corps of our armed forces is eager to carry out its annual plans in a manner that makes it possible for it to keep up pace with the international developments in the major armies--the signals developments that have practically created a technological revolution in radio and electronic communications for military purposes--and to realize the highest standards of military command and control over the field armies and the combat formations spread throughout the frontlines and the deep theaters of military operations.

The Egyptian Signal Corps has made positive strides in developing signals communication through their brilliant action in the glorious October war.

Throughout recent years, the signals corps has urged the latest "western-made" communications equipment, has applied the most advanced accomplishments realized by technology and has recorded successive accomplishments, of which the latest is that "hot line" which the corps has added to our armed forces--a line which reflects a very advanced level of combined wire and radio service. The corps has actually put into operation this line or this electronic network of centrals [telephone exchanges] which has a range of more than 7,000 kilometers.

Maj Gen Ahmad Fu'ad, signal corps commander and one of the heroes of the glorious October, has told me that "the system of automatic electronic centrals represents a modern method in bolstering military signals communications and in enhancing the standard of their performance to help realize automatic command and control at the most advanced command levels adopted by the major armies in the 1980's."

The "hot line" of our armed forces is characterized by increasing the number of linkage channels without using the human factor, and by the automatic manipulation of the free channels to raise the capacity for rapid communication among the network of automatic military centrals that are connected to the transit [sic] centrals.

What are the transit centrals?

The centrals of the automatic telephone network in the military commands, formations and cantonments operates through dividing the command centers into sectors whereby every sector has a portable [intiqali] transit central and each unit and formation has a subsidiary central linked to the transit centrals. Each transit central in every military sector operates on a special code number and is used to establish automatic communications among the various sectors. This constitutes an advanced level of signals service.

The hot line guarantees confidentiality, security and speed through automatic linkage.

This system includes a number of modern electronic centrals produced by the French (Thomson) Company. This company had earlier received a group of Egyptian signals officers who underwent a 4 month training course and acquired practical and scientific experience in operating the electronic centrals that function on computerized programs, using electronic components and circuits. The officers then returned home and took part in the measurement and installation works that are of a technical level as high as that of the European microwave system, the (triospheric) system, pivotal communications system, the cipher system and the telex system.

These expert Egyptian signal corps officers and the groups they trained after their return to the homeland used their scientific and field experience in planning and constructing the new telephone networks, and the pivotal cable projects for the Telecommunications Authority when the signals corps was entrusted with an important role in solving the telephone problems facing the Egyptian masses. This was done as part of the armed forces' participation in building various projects within the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport, Communication and Maritime Transport.

The Egyptian signal corps has always been in the vanguard, and the bravest signal corps men sacrificed their lives while marching forth to liberate the Sinai in the October 1973 war. This is a story that has not yet been accorded sufficient recognition--the story of the heroic glory of the signal corps. From the time of the preparations for the glorious war, during the war itself and then in the stage of deployment and control over liberated Sinai, not a single military position was cut off from the signal corps. This in itself represents a superior field performance. Signals are the nerves, ears and eyes of the commander, the aorta and artery of the heart and the brain in the head. Victory and supremacy by the armed forces on land, at sea and in the air depend on the efficiency of this corps, its scientific standard, and the training and steadfastness of its men.

I will cite here some details of the concerted efforts made by the signal corps men when I accompanied them on the western bank of the canal and then in the Sinai when we crossed to it on that glroious day in history.

One of the major problems that our forces had to overcome in order to begin crossing the canal was the communications problem and the need to secure signals at high efficiency so that all the armed forces command and elements could be linked with each other as of the first minutes of the movement [crossing], rather a long time before the movement--which is no longer a secret now--in order to make it possible to have command control over the vast numbers of our fighters. We also had to transport voluminous equipment and minute equipment to the eastern bank. We performed our tasks with magnificent success, thanks to the comprehensive training that had taken place during the years of patience and silence.

In simulating the canal, our training was not far from the canal itself. In fact, the training took place in the canal itself, across al-Ballah Island. During the operations, nobody in Sinai west of the canal, even during the so-called loss of contact with the heroic Third Army, felt that he was cut off in terms of communication from the rest of the forces.

Before the war, we took into consideration the fact that the Israeli enemy would utilize radio jamming of our communications. This is a lesson that we had learned from the 1967 war. The enemy actually did exploit all scientific resources to jam our communications but we countered all attempts with 100 percent success. After a while, the enemy completely abandoned these endeavors, having realized that they had been a failure.

The signal corps now includes all kinds of electronic equipment. In the major powers, they do not call this corps the signals corps but the electronic equipment [sic] corps because this branch includes signals communication, electronic war equipment, the means of remote control over intercontinental missiles and anti-ballistic missiles. Thus, the Egyptian signal corps was able to excel over the enemy with the mettle, training and education of the Egyptian fighter, and with its own electronic capabilities.

This is why a number of foreign journalists said that the Egyptian signal corps surpassed Israel's by several years.

During the war of attrition, the troops who crossed over to the eastern bank to fight the enemy there used to set up radio communication between the eastern and western banks and communicated with some cities in the republic.

I remember a soldier from Aswan who crossed over to the eastern bank, fought and destroyed one of the strong positions on the Bar-lev line during the 1970 operations and who asked a colleague in the signal corps to help him contact his father at the High Dam. In minutes, this soldier was talking to his father and the father could not believe his son when the latter told him: I am talking to you from the Sinai.

Many of our soldiers kept on writing letters to their families in 1969-70 while fighting their battles in the Sinai and before returning to their bases on the west bank. The signal corps was always careful to convey the letters to the people concerned. During the combat, storming and development of the offensive in the immortal October war, the signal corps continued to be careful to give military mail from the frontlines and from deep inside theaters of operation top-level service.

There were mobile post offices which crossed the canal with the first waves. This was done on the instructions of President al-Sadat--instructions which we carried out. Those post offices had special sections for money orders. After combat, some of our troops remembered to send their wages to their families through the military post offices which moved to the liberated territories even before they were liberated.

When history records that the fate of the 10th of Ramadan operations was determined in the first hours of the successful crossing operations and of storming Israel's defenses tactically. When we learn that the main means of communication in this phase was the means of radio communication and that in some special operations this means was actually the only means, then we can determine fully the role played by radio communications, especially at the lower tactical levels, at the level of combat units and even the level of brigades and divisions when a part of those forces was on the eastern bank while the other part was still on the western bank.

The use of sophisticated radio equipment by some of the forces which carried out special-type operations, such as the forces opening gaps in the earth barrier and the shock troops behind the enemy lines, had a great impact on keeping the initiative and control in the hands of these forces throughout the operations. This is in addition to the operations of the air and naval forces which maintained constant and unflawed radio communication among their units through various means and not just one means, by way of the links in control of the formations [units].

Before, during and after the war, the members of the radio communication stations continued to operate as a single team, in the sense that each member knew the others in every sense of the word. Every group knew the members of the group of the station on the other side and were aware of their method of work and their characteristics. Each member reached the point where he could tell that a colleague was absent from the other station by discerning an unusual change in the station's operational characteristics. There is no doubt that this standard of training facilitated uninterrupted communication and even protected our communications from the jamming and deception elements to which the enemy had previously resorted but which he could not use against us in the 1973 war.

A signal corps commander has told me:

We had been ready before President al-Sadat celebrated the signal corps day with us before the end of 1972. We had been ready half a year earlier. We continued specialized training and careful and timed coordination compatible with the various forms of the enemy defenses and compatible primarily with the unconventional offensives that had to be carried out by our armed forces, requiring special arrangements on the part of the signal corps.

For example, the signal communication cables across the canal were built in the first minutes, and not hours, of our forces' crossing of the Suez Canal. The main units, the subsidiary units and the minor units continued to be in complete contact while the operations were being carried out. We achieved speed records in establishing communication with the command center and, consequently, with the signals centers at the tactical and mobilizational combat levels. We also used multi-channel radio communication equipment for tactical, mobilizational and strategic purposes, all of which strengthened our forces' signals communications.

Multi-channel radio communication combines the characteristics of single-channel communication through stationary positions with the system of communication with various corps. This helped to convey command orders to the combatants easily and to receive communiques and information with the same ease and speed.

The signal units working in the frontline field installations were able in the few years preceding the war to construct thousands of kilometers of heavy cable lines—a signals system that is most strongly exposed to being severed or destroyed by artillery shelling or air force bombing or by the movement of our tank and armored forces. Thanks to the vigilance, energy, daring and training of our men, these lines continued to be intact and available to all the elements of our forces throughout the operations. The signal corps men sacrificed their lives to keep the communication between the commanders and the fighters at all combat levels open and safe.

The sacrifice with which the martyred heroes have decorated the signal corps, its long history of struggle and its constant strife since the 1930's to maintain the elements of superiority was thus crowned. Many are the Egyptian minds capable of innovating and of bringing about developments year after year. President al-Sadat was one of those youth when he tried to develop the signal systems in 1939 and clashed with the British commands that rejected all forms of improvement and development when they concerned the Egyptians. This constituted the start of his confrontation with the occupying British commands and his defiance of the colonialists. However, President al-Sadat has never forgotten the importance of the signal corps. The first of his successful practical steps in diversifying the sources of weaponry was that step which he made secretly and through which he acquired modern equipment for the signal corps in November 1971. This secret did not become known until the 6 October 1975 celebrations.

President al-Sadat visited the comrades-in-arms of the signal corps in 1972 and wrote these words in the visitors' book: "I want the signal corps to be in the vanguard when we fight our battle—a corps always capable with the brains and faith of its members before their equipment."

The battle did take place and the standing of the Egyptian signal men, the greatest and bravest of men, escalated.

8494
CSO: 4802

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR AGENCY REORGANIZED

Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 4 Aug 80 p 1

[Article: "Five Offices Under Control of Socialist Prosecutor for Notifications, Investigation, Custodianship and Research"]

[Text] Counselor 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad 'Ali, the socialist public prosecutor, has issued a decision to reorganize and redistribute the powers and the responsibilities in accordance with the new law for the protection of values from shame. The decision provides for the creation of five offices for notifications, litigation, investigation, prosecution, complaints, appeals, management of funds placed under custodianship, research and classification of sentences.

The decision provides for the notifications and litigation office to have the power to review all the notifications and cases presented to the agency and the cases received from the general prosecution for criminal prosecution, to examine the issues affecting a public interest concerning the citizens on the instructions of the president of the republic or of the People's Assembly or at the request of the prime minister, prepare the annual report and answer the People's Assembly's observations, propose amnesty or mitigation of penalties and propose and study requests for reconsideration.

The investigation and prosecution office will have the power to investigate and to prosecute before the Values Court the actions resulting in political liability in accordance with the law for the protection of values; the acts capable of harming the country's security or the socialist society's economic interests; the incidents of aggrandization in accordance with law No 34 of 1971 which regulates custodianship and safeguards the people's safety; investigate candidates for elections to whose nomination objections are raised in accordance with the laws to protect values and the law to protect the domestic front and social peace.

This office will also represent the agency when appeals against the objection decisions are made before the Values Court, will investigate issues touching on a public interest concerning the citizens, will supervise implementation of the sentences, instructions and decisions issued in the cases of political liability and will report on the appeals made against the sentences issued by the Values Court.

The complaints and appeals office: This office will receive, examine and act on the complaints submitted to the agency by the citizens (and will make the nominations for the higher positions).

Management of funds placed under custodianship: This office will implement the socialist prosecutor's decisions banning a person from disposing of his property and will manage such property, will initiate the lawsuits concerning such property, be they made by the agency or by others, and will follow up implementation of the sentences issued on such cases.

Office of research and classification of sentences: This office will be in charge of preparing legal studies, will propose the legislative amendments to deal with gaps developing from application of the law to protect values from shame and the others laws linked to it, will classify the sentences issued by both levels of the Values Court, will conclude the legal principles and will file the sentences issued by the Custodianship Court.

Counselor 'Abd al-Qadir Ahmad has also issued a decision organizing the powers and responsibilities of the public prosecutor's assistants.

The decision provides for appointing Yusuf Darraz as head of the notifications and litigation office and 'Abd al-Hamid al-Buhayri and Ahmad Dahshan as members.

The decision also provides for appointing Lawyer Naji Ishaq as head of the investigation and prosecution office and Hanafi Rizq, 'Adil 'Abd al-Hamid, 'Izzat al-Sayyid, Muhammad 'Abd al-Hakim, Anwar Rashad al-'Asi, Najib Yunis, Mahrus 'Abd-al-Halim and Mahmud Zaki al-Sharbini as members.

The decision also appoints Lawyer Ahmad Jamal 'Abd al-Hakim as head of the complaints and appeals office and Nabil Muhammad 'Abd al-Nabi and Jamal Safwat as members. The decision also appoints Lawyer Hilmi Khalifah as head of the office of management of the properties placed under custodianship and 'Abd-al-Qahhar Zahaqi, Husayn Muhammad, Husni 'Abd al-Hamid and 'Abd al-Mun'im Ahmad as members.

Dr Sulayman 'Abd al-Majid will head the office of research and classification of sentences.

8494
CSO: 4802

COMMITTEE APPROVES JERUSALEM CONSTRUCTION PLAN

TA031648 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 3 Dec 80

[Excerpts] The Ministerial Committee on Jerusalem Affairs today endorsed a 5-year plan for the development of north Jerusalem, on the completion of which the number of Jewish reisdents in the area will rise to 100,000. This project is intended for the territory that was expropriated south of the Neve Ya'aqov neighborhood some 1 year ago, in order to create a continuum among the Jewish neighborhoods in Jerusalem.

A portion of the territory will be allocated for the construction of 5,000 housing units for Arab inhabitants. Our correspondent Moshe Hakohen reports:

[Begin recording] The area of 4,600 dunams that was last year expropriated south of the Neve Ya'aqov neighborhood, will constitute the main reserve of land for construction until the mid 80's. This was reported by Minister of Housing and Construction David Levi today at the meeting of the Ministerial Committee that approved the 5-year plan for the development of the area. The minister reported that the potential of construction for public purposes in Jerusalem in the other new Jerusalem neighborhoods is only 2,000 housing units.

According to Minister Levi, since the unification of Jerusalem in June 1967 there has been an unprecedented housing upswing in Jerusalem. In this period of time 35,000 housing units were set up in just public construction.

According to the data reported by the minister of housing, the percentage of Jewish population in Jerusalem, in comparison to the Arab population, has declined 1.6 percent since 1967. In the wake of the construction momentum expected in Jerusalem on the approval of the 5-year plan, the proportions of Arab and Jewish population may be restored to that which previously existed.

In the framework of the 5-year plan, the committee has also approved the paving of a road that will connect Bayt Horon, via the Ramot neighborhood with Ma'ale Adummim.

The chairman of the Ministerial Committee, Minister Yosef Burg said after the meeting that intense negotiations are now being conducted over the transfer of the ministries of agriculture and construction to Jerusalem, and the transfer of the prime minister's office to east Jerusalem:

[Burg] The prime minister is not only a prime minister. He is also in charge of his own office. Some day he will make his decision.

[Hakohen] At the moment there is no decision, so I understand.

[Burg] The decision exists, as is well known. But I do not have the technical and chronological details. [End recording]

CSO: 4805

SHARON ON SETTLEMENT ISSUE, RIOTS, WEIZMAN

TA291325 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0805 GMT 29 Nov 80

[Interview with Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon by Shim'on Schiffer, date and place not given--recorded]

[Excerpt] [Schiffer] The disturbances by students in Judaea and Samaria over the last several weeks, the attack on the children of Qedumin settlers, the revived debate on the size of the defense budget and 'Ezer Weizman's expulsion from the Herut movement were some of the issues I asked the agriculture minister about. This is Shim'on Schiffer.

Ari'el Sharon does not shoot from the hip in his answers. He maneuvers very carefully between what he thinks and what he is willing to say in public. According to Sharon the quiet that prevailed until recently in the territories was the result of a tactical move and not a planned policy. Sharon does not wholeheartedly accept the methods now used in Judaea and Samaria in suppressing student riots.

[Sharon] I believe that we must deal with the situation with fairness and firmness. I do not think that the only answer to the problem is shooting. We faced a similar problem of student demonstrations in the Gaza Strip in the past and our answer to the problem then was different. This does not in any way mean that sometimes situations are not created in which there is no other alternative but to fire. If soldier's lives are endangered, there is no alternative but to shoot. However, there is a variety of other courses of action. In my opinion it is also desirable to refrain as much as possible from collective punishment. There is no simple answer to the problem. This issue must be tackled daily. The military authorities should have time to deal with this problem on a daily basis, and to daily look for solutions that would be suitable to any situation that may rise, not only for a situation that has already arisen.

[Schiffer] A dialogue with the inhabitants of the territories should be conducted on the autonomy plan. As a result of Sharon's initiative, the ministerial team for the autonomy talks has recently endorsed the proposal according to which the inhabitants of the territories would participate along with the Israeli settlers in the division of water and land resources. Of course, the land in question is public land that will be placed at the public disposal once the land required for security and settlement is alloted.

Ari'el Sharon firmly rejects the argument that it is the establishment of settlements in regions densely populated by Arabs that causes the situation in the territories to deteriorate.

[Sharon] We heard this perverse argument after the murder of the young people who returned from prayer in Hebron. I can only ask this question: Following the murder of the children and husband of Smadar Haran [in a terrorist attack that occurred some 2 years ago] should Jews not live in Nahariyya? Following the murder of the Ma'Alot children [a terrorist attack in which school children were killed and wounded] should we not live in Ma'Alot? After the atrocious murder on the coastal road, on the very outskirts of Tel Aviv, in which, among others, not a few children were murdered, should we conclude that we must not live in Tel Aviv?

[Schiffer] The agriculture minister also rejects the ideas raised by Alignment figures who said that they will work for the degeneration [nivun] of the settlements that were set up in areas that are not compatible with the Alignment's territorial compromise plan.

[Sharon] I hope that many of the excellent people in Israel who are Labor Party members--and there are many good people here who are aware of this problem and feel strongly about it--will be present in Judaea and Samaria at that time, [presumably when settlements are threatened by a future Alignment policy] in order to aid the settlements there to face the danger of those who want to ruin them.

[Schiffer] I will be there too, if things happen in that area, Sharon adds. His statements about the need to cut the defense budget in the past caused an uproar among the defense establishment leaders, but he had not retracted his demand to revise Israel's conception of defense and to cut the defense budget as a result. At the present moment too, not only is it possible to make cuts, but it is imperative, and over 20 billion Israeli pounds can be slashed from the defense budget. The security establishment exists, it is strong and firm notwithstanding the fact that almost 10 billion pounds have been slasned from it. Ari'el Sharon says that there is a limit to what the state of Israel can afford.

[Sharon] We will have to reduce the size of the army. I mean the standing army. We should return to the conceptions accepted in the past, namely of more reserve army and less of a standing army than we have today. We need an army that is small, effective and disciplined. It is true that the chief of staff has made great efforts to improve army discipline, and the situation at the present moment is not as it was a few years ago, but we are still facing a situation that should cause concern. We have to streamline the army, increase discipline, increase alertness and preparedness, and we must reduce its size. The need to reduce the army cannot be avoided.

[Schiffer] The former commander of the southern command pledges that the cuts can be introduced without damaging the army's capability.

[Sharon] This decision on defense budget cuts can only be done in a cabinet session, in this or some other cabinet form, since this involves a very serious consideration. One must be familiar with the defense system and be conscious of the different possiblities and alternatives.

[Schiffer] Minister Sharon, could you carry out this plan that you have presented to us?

[Sharon] Absolutely. Yes. I regret that I was not placed in a position to do so.

[Schiffer] And from here we pass on to another mine field, on which many people find themselves killed by their own mouth, concerning the relations between leading figures of the Likud and removing 'Ezer Weizman from the Herut Party.

Ari'el Sharon suggests a verbal armistice, stopping the disputes and the mutual slandering. Everyone had better keep the copies of his check book in his own pocket, he says, hinting at the fiery dispute between the two candidates of the Alignment for the premiership. [Words indistinct] Sharon believes that 'Ezer Weizman acted wrongly in voting for the nonconficence motion against the government, and that his must not be treated with great seriousness.

[Sharon] One must keep an eye on the goals. Those who think Herut should return to its natural size, actually says let us return to opposition for 30 years. Yet Herut, in its capacity as the leading party in the Likud, has assumed responsibility for basic and important national objectives, which perhaps were not undertaken by any former government. These are the peace process and the settlement issue. These tasks should be completed.

We are witnessing developments in the rival party. We see the two main contenders who have already resorted to the most primitive weapons at their disposal. But I am positive that after the contest is over, they will eventually unite and will work together in the elections.

We are facing many tasks. This is why [words indistinct] along with expressing dissatisfaction, and dissatisfaction was justified, the Herut movement should have found a way to enable 'Ezer Weizman to continue his activity. After all, 'Ezer Weizman belongs to our camp. He does not belong to the camp of Bar-Lev, of Abba Eban and of Peres.

[Schiffer] And do you believe that Menahem Begin will succeed in leading the Likud to victory in the next elections?

[Sharon] Yes. Certainly. I believe that if we adequately organize for the elections, if Begin places emphasis on the central issues--and the central issues in Israel are its security and existence--if the movement prepares and acts as it should, I absolutely believe that under Prime Minister Menahem Begin's leadership the Likud certainly has reasonable chances of winning the elections.

[Schiffer] Neither Moshe Dayan nor 'Ezer Weizman insisted on safeguarding Israel's internal interests in the course of the negotiations with Egypt as did Begin, and occasionally Begin was alone in his struggle, says Ari'el Sharon. This must be the advent of the messaiah!!! [End recording]

CSO: 4805

CHIEF OF STAFF ON BUDGET CUTS, EASTERN BORDER

TA271212 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 27 Nov 80 pp 1, 2

[Report by Yo'el Marcus: "'The Defense Budget Cut Did Not Curb Inflation But It Did Damage Security'"]

[Text] Chief of Staff Lt Gen Raefa'el Eytan is vigorously opposed to new cuts in the defense budget and thinks that the previous budget cut of 8 billion Israeli pounds contributed nothing to the economy, did not curb wastage and inflation, and on the contrary caused real damage to the country's security. "We have less ammunition and the scope of training has been decreased."

Lieutenant General Eytan thinks that at a time when there is no economic policy that defines the aim and ways of action and sets a timetable, it is not helpful but harmful to attack the defense budget.

"No calculation can verify what was done with the money taken from us," the chief of staff told his confidants. "Prices have gone up, the cost of living index has jumped and the 1.5 billion Israeli pounds cut from the budget from the defense establishment was given to teachers--because it was impossible to resist them."

It is the chief of staff's opinion that, with the difficult situation, the government should declare an economic state of emergency: impose controls on foreign currency, freeze salaries and prices, do not unnecessarily increase the price of fuel, bring back subsidies, do not give benefits at the state's expense to anyone who is not doing national service and implement a drastic policy of control, utilize worker mobility, guarantee that salaries and benefits given to public employees should serve as an example, ban strikes in essential sectors and firmly insist on this. With regard to budgets, the chief of staff thinks that there is an alternative involved for each ministry: if the police budget is cut, there will be more thieves. If the Ministry of Education budget is cut, there will be more illiterates. But if they cut the Defense Ministry's budget, the country's existence will be in danger. Because of the reduction in reserve service activities, we must strengthen an efficient standing army. "The country's fate should not hang by a thread."

The chief of staff thinks that the Eastern Front could suddenly heat up. "They will begin firing at Israel in order to put an end to the dispute between themselves." We must be ready for any eventuality. The chief of staff, in an internal debate, said that the public did not know the financial cost of every terrorist who

did not succeed in infiltrating into Israel, how much money was being invested in sealing off a 700 km border as well as the sea and the fact that not a single terrorist infiltrates. But if a terrorist were to infiltrate into any settlement, millions of Israeli pounds would afterward be invested, without accounts, in establishing security fences and all the rest. Lieutenant General Eytan stated that an aerial photograph for intelligence requirements costs the IDF 10 million Israeli pounds. In such a costly war of existence the country must give up many things; it is impossible to maintain a standard of living like that of Europe.

In an internal debate the chief of staff stated that the salary component in government ministries represented 80 percent of the budget, while in the Defense Ministry the salary component was less than 50 percent. "But the country's salaries are not being harmed. When the defense budget is cut," the chief of staff said, "the amount of damage to the budget is fateful: in ammunition, fuel and fortifications. It is easy to harm this, but nobody is touching salaries." The chief of staff thinks that the defense budget is an impetus to the economy, not an inflationary factor. The defense budget also spurs on a giant industry whose exports total a billion dollars and which has developed items ranging from advanced radar systems to cast steel.

From the chief of staff's remarks it emerges that the defense establishment is starting an extensive campaign against further cuts to its budget, both in the budgetary year now ending and in the next one. Finance Minister Yiga'el Hurvitz said that this time he did not intend to visit "BOR" (the operational command room of the general staff), this being after he admitted that on his last visit to "BOR" he compromised concerning the cuts in the defense budget.

CSO: 4805

SMALL ISRAELI POLITICAL FACTIONS AGAINST EARLY ELECTIONS

TA241139 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 24 Nov 80 p 2

[Yehoshu'a Bitzur report: "The Small Factions Are Not Interested in Early Elections"]

[Excerpt] The alignment is now entitled to submit its private draft motions to the Knesset about dissolving the Knesset and holding new elections as soon as possible, because this draft motion was already placed on the agenda 1 year ago by the late Yiga'el Allon and Moshe Shahal--long may he live. However, it is very doubtful that the alignment will be able to recruit a Knesset majority in favor of its immediate dissolution.

It is true that the coalition has now dropped to only 60 Knesset members, but most of the small factions who generally vote against the government--as they also did last week during the no confidence vote--are not interested in early elections at this stage, because they are not yet prepared for the election campaign. This applies particularly to Knesset members from the Oriental community who left the Likud, the Democrats and Sheli, such as Yitzhaq Yitzhaqi, Mordekhay Elgrably and Se'Adya Marciano. These members are now busy organizing their movements and are still looking for running mates before running for the Knesset elections.

At the same time, not one of the partners in the coalition camp is interested in holding the elections this spring. Under these circumstances it cannot be assumed that the alignment will succeed in getting together the 61 votes needed in the Knesset to gain a majority for a draft motion for the dissolution of the Knesset and the holding of new elections.

CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS MAJORITY AGAINST EARLY ELECTIONS

TA011317 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Dec 80 p 4

[Smith Institute Public Opinion Poll: "55 Percent Support Continued Tenure of Government--Until the Elections"]

[Text] While the Alignment continues its trend of increasing its advantage over the Likud, the eagerness and desire for the government's resignation faded a little during the 2 months that included the Knesset recess and the U.S. presidential elections. These findings appear in a poll commissioned by MA'ARIV.

In the poll, which was conducted in October-November, a small majority supported the continued tenure of the present coalition government, although many of these supporters made their support contingent upon the replacement of ministers. (See table 1.) These results were obtained before Moshe Dayan and 'Ezer Weizman voted with the opposition in a vote of confidence in the government.

In view of the relatively quite internal and external political situation that prevailed in the period when the poll was conducted, it is no wonder that a slight drop occurred in the public's wish to see the government resign. At the same time, the public is in fact hinting that it is not satisfied with many things in the current government. Despite this, however, it is in no hurry to replace it with a different government.

Naturally, one can argue that in a stable democracy such as Israel, in which everyone expects that every government will serve out its full term, one does not expect the people to favor the shortening of the government's term only because it is unsuccessful. In other democracies, governments that are unpopular for a lengthy period manage to recover and to regain the public's support until the elections. Could this not happen in Israel as well? The answer is, of course, yes. True, it may be argued that the 43 percent of the public that wants the government to resign is a high percentage, but more important is the fact that a considerable part of the support now enjoyed by the opposition--particularly the Alignment--in public opinion polls is soft, and these backers do not want early elections. It is also possible that this is a hint that many critics of the government still hope that it will improve.

The results indicate an improvement in the government's standing. It scored well in its activities relating to defense and foreign affairs, and there was a rise in the popularity of key ministers such as Shamir, Sharon, Levi and Burg. There

were less intense fears among the public concerning its economic future. Support grew for the government's positions on the settlements, and sharper opposition was expressed to territorial concessions for peace. To all these was added the stand favoring the government's continued tenure.

Despite all this, there is also another aspect: the popularity of Prime Minister Menahem Begin stood at 41 percent, but did not increase--and he, after all, is the key figure in the Likud. Moreover, the government did not gain any additional significant support through economic policy. Yiga'el Hurvitz was the focus of criticism, and his personal popularity fell, while criticism of his policy increased by leaps and bounds. In the latest poll, nearly half of those polled thought he would not succeed in curbing inflation and ameliorating the economy. Shim'on Peres scored well for the manner in which he is fulfilling his duties.

The fact that domestic problems occupy first place on the public's scale of priorities is shown in the answers given to a new series of questions that were included in a poll commissioned by MA'ARIV and conducted by Hanokh Smith's Research Center. Interviewees were asked to give their views on four domestic issues upsetting them, and on four international issues they regard as important. (See table 2.)

It emerges that all eight issues worry the Israeli public. But three of the internal issues are in the first three places: inflation in Israel upsets 94 percent of those asked, with more than two-thirds replying that it is "very worrying." In second place comes the socioeconomic situation, with 87 percent "worried" or "very worried." This is followed by the issue of emigration.

The tiny majority the government won in the confidence vote on 19 November would seem to point to a resumption of tension on the domestic front. As the October-November poll indicates, the government embarked on this stage of Israeli politics with meager public support. Only the religious parties continue to enjoy the full support of their constituents, although it is not clear what the ramifications will be of the Abu-Hatzera affair.

As already noted, not everything points to a gloomy future for the coalition government: the standing of Prime Minister Begin has levelled off; the popularity of Yiga'el Hurvitz, even if it has been slightly eroded, is still higher than that of any finance minister since Pinhas Sapir; the settlement policy has wider support; and the public, even though it prefers the Alignment to the Likud, is not eager for a change.

Table 1--"Do you think that in the light of recent developments the government should carry on or resign?" (in percentages)

Date	Govt Should Continue as is Until Elections	Continue but Replace Some	Should Resign	No Opinion
Feb-March 1980	28	31	34	7
Aug-Sep 1980	30	17	48	5
Oct-Nov 1980	34	21	43	2

Table 2--"Which of the following issues worries you and which do not worry you?" (in percentages)

Issue	Very Worrying	Worrying	Not Too Worrying	Not Worrying	No Opinion
1. The inflation in Israel	69	25	3	2	1
2. The socioeconomic situation in Israel	56	31	7	3	3
3. Increased emigration	58	24	6	8	4
4. Israel's world standing	42	37	10	8	3
5. Increased antisemitism in France and elsewhere	45	32	8	11	4
6. Decreased immigration to Israel	40	29	15	12	4
7. State of the peace negotiations and the autonomy talks	21	37	23	14	5
8. The Gulf War between Iran and Iraq	17	37	18	25	3

CSO: 4805

PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON LEADING POLITICAL TEAMS

TA281121 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 28 Nov 80 p 1

[Public Opinion Poll: "The Leading Team Is the Determining Factor"]

[Text] The party's leading team is the most important factor in the public's decision on whom to vote for, but it is only slightly more important than the factor of the party's platform.

The Alignment leaders' team is considered to be more suitable than that of the Likud.

These findings emerge from the joint poll conducted by the Israel Institute of Applied Social Research and the Communications Institute of the Jerusalem Hebrew University. The above issue was researched in November at the request of YEDI'OT AHARONOT.

The majority thinks that the platforms of the Alignment and the Likud differ on the question of foreign policy (65 percent) and primarily in economics (77 percent).

Question: When you decide for which party to vote, what is the most important factor in making your decision: the party's platform, the team leading the party, or your personal loyalty to it? (Answers in percentages.)

The Leading Team	The Platform	Loyalty
43	40	17

Question: When you consider the team of leaders from the Alignment and the Likud, which team, in your opinion, is more suitable to deal with the country's problems? (Answers in percentages.)

Date	Alignment Team	Likud Team	No Opinion
	Foreign Policy		
March 1980	39	19	42
November 1980	42	17	41
	Economics		
March 1980	43	20	37
November 1980	43	13	44

CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS SUPPORT FOR LIKUD DOWN TO 14 PERCENT

TA211302 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 21 Nov 80 p 22

[Hanokh Smith Election Forecast, "Support for the Likud Has Declined to 14 Percent--Just Like Herut's Strength in the 1960's--Although Satisfaction With the Government Has Increased"]

[Text] Despite the relative drop in political tension in Israel in the past 2 months (up to the end of this week), and the easing in the international arena following the U.S. presidential election, the growing support for the Alignment and the declining support for the Likud are continuing, as is shown by a MA'ARIV public opinion poll conducted by Smith's Research Center among a representative population sample during the final week of October and the first week of November. This poll covered over 1,200 Jews through the country, residing in all the various types of settlement: cities, development towns, kibbutzim and moshavin (see table 1).

If elections were held today, 42 percent of those polled would vote for the Alignment--2 percent more than in the poll conducted 2 months ago. Only 16 percent said they would vote for the Likud--2 percent less than in the previous poll. This is the first time the Alignment has led by 26 percent. The proportion of undecided voters stands at 24 percent.

Few changes turned up among those supporting other parties. Despite the "Abu-Hatzera Affair," support for the religious parties remains stable, and the same is true for the small parties: Sheli, the Civil Rights Movement, Shay and Tehiya, each of which obtained over 1 percent in the poll--the minimum quota figure for entering the Knesset. The Independent Liberals and Yiga'el Yadin's Democratic Movement have fallen considerably below the minimum quota. The proportion of undecideds is still high, totalling about one voter in every four.

The present poll represents the views of Jewish voters only. An adjustment of the results to cover the vote of the minorities, and a comparison of these corrected results with the voting patterns for the previous Knesset, turn up an interesting picture (see table 2).

The last poll showed that support for the Alignment had reached the level it stood at in 1973, even without taking into account the 23 percent who still had not decided who to vote for. Both the Likud and the other Jewish parties have lost considerable support since the 1977 elections. Of those who said they voted

Likud in 1977, only slightly more than 35 percent said they would vote Likud if elections were being held today. A further 25 percent said they would vote Alignment, while 23 percent are still undecided. About 9 percent of those who voted Likud in the past admitted that they are so disappointed that they would not vote at all if elections were held today.

The situation is even worse among those who supported the DMC. Only a marginal percentage of those sampled who had voted for the DMC in 1977 said they would vote for Yadin's Democrats if elections were held today, while just 5 percent said they would vote for Shay. The majority of these voters--over 58 percent--said they would vote for the Alignment, while a further 23 percent said they were still undecided.

Those who voted for the Alignment in 1977 are persisting in their support for that party. Nearly 90 percent of those who said they voted Alignment in 1977 would back it again if elections were held at this time, while the rest are still trying to make up their minds. Thus, despite the internal dispute over the leadership in the Labor Party, it continues to maintain its strength and is getting a growing number of voters from among those who voted for the Likud or for the DMC in the elections of 3 years ago. This just reinforces my evaluation--which was published in a previous series of articles in MA'ARIV--that in periods preceding an election campaign, support for the opposition parties is a function of the public's reaction to the ruling party or coalition, and is affected only slightly by the internal problems in the opposition parties.

At the same time, the continuing groundswell in the tendency of voters to shift from the Likud to the Alignment in the past 2 months--which were relatively quiet--is surprising not only in view of the acute squabbles within the Alignment itself, but also in the light of the public mood, as this was reflected in answers I received to other questions I put to those taking part in the survey.

Since the 1973 election, the Smith polls have presented a series of standard questions on the voters' estimation of the government's success. The percentage of those who believe the government has succeeded in its actions, or has largely succeeded in its various spheres of activity, is cited for each of the four last polls in reply to the question: "In your view, is the government succeeding or not succeeding in the following activities?" (See table 3)

It would appear that the answers we received in the latest poll indicate a growing view that the government is functioning better in certain spheres.

In the sphere of handling of defense matters the latest poll showed a considerable increase in those who believe that the government is succeeding, or succeeding in the main. Over two-thirds of those asked today believe that the government is succeeding in the main or is succeeding in this sphere. However, this change has not had a concrete effect on the public's general view of the government's success overall. In the period under discussion the main events in the defense sphere were successful IDF raids on terrorist bases in Lebanon. In its replies to this question, the public apparently expressed its support for and its satisfaction with these actions. This support would seem to be directed more toward the IDF than toward the government.

Similarly, there has been an increase in the percentage of those who believe the government has largely succeeded in the foreign policy sphere, though the actual proportion (27 percent) of those who think the government is succeeding was particularly low. This increase, too, had no effect on the public's overall view of the government.

It is possible that the improved evaluation of the government's operation is a function of the absence of any pressures as a result of the U.S. election campaign, and not necessarily because of any specific actions by the Israeli Government. This may, perhaps, explain the lack of the effect these enhanced viewpoints have had with respect to the voters' general opinion about the government's activity.

No change is discernible in the social or economic spheres. In both these areas only a small fraction of the population believes that the government is succeeding or succeeding in the main. The public's appraisal was heavily influenced by the August and September consumer price indices--which showed more moderate price rises than the recently published October index.

The ongoing low public appraisal of the government's dealing with the social and economic spheres is consistent with the generally low estimation of the government's success, as is reflected in the latest poll. The slight increase in the public's evaluation of the government's success--which stood at 18 percent--even if it is statistically insignificant, is interesting in itself, because this increase did not prevent the continued drop in the general support for the Likud within the coalition.

This poll must find an explanation for the ongoing decline in support for the Likud within the general atmosphere, which should have balanced it or perhaps even caused something of a recovery. We shall try to furnish these explanations in the coming articles.

The fact still remains that aside from the defense sphere, in which all Israeli governments have enjoyed public support, the present government continues to draw sharp public criticism in most spheres of its activity. The minor shifts from one poll to the next cannot blur this fact. The ongoing decrease in support for the Likud and the virtual disappearance of support for the DMC are living proof of the public's displeasure.

Table 1--How They Said They Would Vote (in percentages)

Date	Likud	Alignment	Religious Parties	Other Parties	Undecided
May 1979	26	33	13	8	20
Sept 1979	23	36	11	6	24
Feb-Mar 1980	20	37	11	6	26
Aug-Sept 1980	18	40	12	7	23
Oct-Nov 1980	16	42	12	6	24

Table 2--Comparison of Poll Results With 1973 and 1977 Elections (in percentages)

Date	Likud	Alignment	Religious Parties	Other Parties	Arab Parties	Undecided
Oct-Nov 1980 Poll	14	39	12	6	6	23
1973 Knesset Elections	30	40	12	12	6	-
1977 Knesset Elections	35	25	14	20	6	-

Table 3--Those Replying That the Government Is Succeeding or Largely Succeeding in its Actions (in percentages)

Sphere	Sept 79	Feb-Mar 80	Aug-Sept 80	Oct-Nov 80
Economic	11	18	14	14
Social	18	15	18	19
Defense	69	61	56	68
Foreign Affairs	44	31	20	27
General View of Govt	25	20	17	18

CSO: 4805

PUBLIC OPINION POLL ON ISRAELI ARABS IMAGE

TA241208 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 24 Nov 80 p 4

[Mina Tzemah Public Opinion Poll: "The Israeli Arab's Image Is Very Varied"]

[Text] From an interim report on a public opinion poll conducted by Dr Mina Tzemah on "The Positions of the Jewish Majority in Israel toward the Arab Minority," published yesterday by the Jerusalem Ven Leer Institute, it emerges that the inhabitants of Haifa and the north and the inhabitants of Beersheba and the south reveal a more positive attitude toward Arabs than do inhabitants of other towns and regions.

The findings also show that the image of the Israeli Arab is quite varied and there is no tendency to place him in the category of "black" or "white."

The poll covered 1,223 interviewees who were a representative section of the adult Jewish population of Israel. The data were collected in January 1980. About 50 percent of those interviewed tend to think that a large proportion of the Arabs (or even all of them) have a negative attitude toward the state of Israel and Jews. The view of the Arab attitude toward the state generally has no connection with the image of their personal traits--this was found by the poll--that is, the attitude toward their personal traits may be positive, while the view of their attitude toward the state of Israel is negative. (This finding reinforces the conclusion that their image is quite varied.)

Most of the people interviewed showed great willingness for personal contact with Arabs and 40 percent of those interviewed were prepared for close personal contact with Arabs (residence in the same building). More than 50 percent of those interviewed were prepared for contact with Arabs in the form of residence in the same town and various social events.

Among the following classes the number of people interviewed who were prepared for contact with Israeli Arabs reached 50 percent or more in at least 8 of the 10 possibilities for contact that were presented to them: people aged 10-41; people with the higher education; people born in Europe and America; second-generation Israelis of Western extraction; inhabitants of Jerusalem; inhabitants of Beersheba and the south; inhabitants of Haifa; and people who intend to vote for the Alignment.

About 50 percent of those interviewed support the general position favoring equal rights for Arabs, but when specific rights were mentioned, the percentage of people interviewed who supported equality dropped to about 40 percent. It was also found that concern for the country's security was the main factor motivating the Israeli public to support restrictions on the implementation of equal rights for Arabs. About 50 percent of those interviewed stressed an emotional distance from the Israeli Arabs and felt relief when they learned that people injured in accidents in Israel were Arabs, not Jews. It was also found that there is a direct link between the view of the Arabs' attitude toward the state of Israel and willingness for contact with them. The more positive the attitude was considered to be, the higher was the willingness for contact.

CSO: 4805

POLL ON HURVITZ POPULARITY, ECONOMIC SITUATION

TA301452 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 30 Nov 80 pp 1, 2

[Smith Institute Public Opinion Poll: "Only 18 Percent Think the Actions of the Government Are Successful"]

[Text] Approximately 18 percent of Israeli voters believe the government is successful--or mostly successful--in its actions. An exclusive public opinion poll conducted for MA'ARIV by the Smith Polling Institute does not indicate a change in the public's opinion about the government's general success or its performance on socioeconomic issues during the period of October-November 1980.

It emerges that 14 percent of the public believe the government is successful--or mostly successful--in its actions in the economic sphere whereas 19 percent believe the government is successful in the social sphere.

Undoubtedly, the key figure in the economic sphere is Finance Minister Yiga'el Hurvitz. The appreciation for Prime Minister Menahem Begin's actions remains unchanged. It should also be noted that the prestige of several public figures, such as Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir and Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon, has risen. Among the ministers included in the poll, only Yiga'el Hurvitz has lost some of his popularity.

Table 1: "In your opinion, how does Yiga'el Hurvitz perform his duties as finance minister?" (Figures in percents)

Date	Very Good	Good	Medium	Very Bad	No Opinion
February-March 1980	18	26	21	22	13
August-September 1980	14	22	26	32	6
October-November 1980	12	20	29	35	4

In a poll conducted during February-March 1980, 44 percent expressed the opinion that Yiga'el Hurvitz performed his duties well or very well. This percentage declined to 36 percent in the poll conducted during August-September 1980 and to 32 percent in the latest poll, that is, an additional decrease of 4 percent. The number of those who thought Hurvitz performed his duties badly gradually increased to 35 percent during the October-November poll, that is, they exceeded the number of those who thought he performed his duties well.

Even among Hurvitz' critics, the majority thinks that he performs his duties better than his predecessors--Simha Ehrlich and the late Yehoshu'a Rabinowitz (only 10 to 15 percent thought they performed their duties well during their terms as finance ministers). Nevertheless, the decline in Hurvitz's popularity may be related to the decline in support for the Likud.

Appreciation for the minister is certainly connected to the success of his policy.

Table 2: "Do you think that Finance Minister Hurvitz will succeed in curbing inflation and healing the economy?" (Figures in percents)

Date	Will Succeed	Will Partially Succeed	Will Not Be That Successful	Will Fail	No Opinion
February-March 1980	18	32	18	19	13
August-September 1980	10	25	21	36	8
October-November 1980	10	22	19	46	3

A dramatic change has occurred in the situation since February-March 1980. At that time, about half of those interviewed thought Hurvitz would succeed--at least partially--while only 9 percent thought he would fail. In the last poll, only 32 percent expressed the opinion that he would succeed--at least partially--in performing his duties, whereas 42 percent thought that he would fail. The difference between the current poll and the one conducted 2 months ago does not necessarily lie in the fact that there has been a 3 percent decline in the number of those who think Hurvitz will be partially successful but in the 10 percent increase in the number of those who think he will fail. It should also be noted that this was also the prevalent opinion before the 11 percent rise in the October index was published.

Another element reflecting the public's opinion about the economic situation is the feeling regarding its present and future economic prosperity. In the last poll, only 15 percent expressed the opinion that their living conditions had improved compared to last year; 38 percent said their living conditions were identical to those of last year and 30 percent said there had been a slight decline in living conditions. These conclusions are compatible with current statistical data generally indicating a slight decline in family living conditions.

As for the future: Only 14 percent think their living conditions will rise next year; 39 percent think they will remain unchanged; 28 percent believe they will decline slightly and 19 percent are convinced there will be a significant decline in living conditions.

These percentages are very similar to the conclusions of the previous poll on the same issue. In other words, the public generally believes next year will be similar to last year and there will be a slight decline in living conditions.

Amazingly enough, evaluations about the economic situation during October-November 1980 were more optimistic than those during February-March 1980. This means that the public's concern for the economic sphere as expressed in the October-November 1980 poll is more dependent on the success or failure of Hurvitz' policy than on a feeling of real or possible deprivation of the economic sphere.

Another Likud minister and key figure in the socioeconomic sphere is Construction and Absorption Minister David Levi. In the poll conducted during October-November 1980, 42 percent said Levi performs well. This is a 5 percent increase compared to the August-September 1980 poll. Levi's prestige has relatively risen while Hirvitz's popularity has declined. However, no significant importance should be attached to this fact because the rise in the public's appreciation for Levi is absolutely incompatible with the decline in the public's support for the Likud whereas the decline in Hurvitz's popularity is largely connected to the deterioration of the Likud's stand.

Whereas the Likud's image has been apparently tarnished by the failing economic policy the religious parties were affected by other difficulties, particularly in the wake of the Abu-Hatzera investigation affair. Minister Abu-Hatzera has, at least temporarily, been dealt a heavy blow. In the October-November 1980 poll, only 11 percent said he performed his duties well as minister for religious affairs whereas 45 percent said he performed badly, and 35 percent refrained from voicing their opinion. Never has any minister, except for the finance minister, been given such a low rating.

Has the Abu-Hatzera affair had any affect on the support for the religious parties or other religious ministers? The answer is that apparently there has been no real or general effect. The rate of the potential vote for the religious parties has not at all diminished, according to the October-November 1980 poll.

The public was also asked to evaluate the performance of interior minister and chairman of the ministerial committee for the autonomy affairs Dr Yosef Burg. In the October-November 1980 poll 40 percent of those polled said Minister Burg performed his duties well compared with 39 percent who had expressed the same opinion in a poll conducted in September 1979, at a time when the government was more popular than today.

An outraged public could have directed its accumulated anger because of the Abu-Hatzera affair at the leader of his party but it did not do so: instead, Burg joined Shamir, Sharon and Levi in the line of ministers whose activities have gained more appreciation compared to previous polls.

Surprising conclusions were also registered in the opposition camp. In the lapse between the last two public opinion polls, Yitzhaq Rabin also became a candidate for the Labor Party's leadership and the rival of the current leader, Shim'on Peres. The open confrontation has had direct and positive implications on Peres' popularity. In the poll conducted during August-September 1980 33 percent thought that Peres was a good or very good opposition leader. This rate increased by 8 percent in the October-November 1980 poll and reached 41 percent who said he was a good or very good leader. Nevertheless, the improvement in Peres' image should be interpreted cautiously. People will probably be tempted to compare the Peres-Rabin confrontation to the race between Kennedy and Carter before and after Kennedy decided to run for the Democratic Party's nomination. However, circumstances are totally different and the Israeli system for electing the candidates is altogether different from the American system.

One may conclude from the poll that there has indeed been a change but it still remains unclear. The improvement in Peres' image indicates that the public thinks

Peres is doing as good a job as leader of the opposition as Begin does as prime minister. This is actually the only similar point, since Begin and his cabinet are the ones in power whereas Peres is the leader of the opposition and has to make do with the satisfaction emerging from the rise in the public's appreciation for his party--as reflected in public opinion polls--1 year before the Knesset election.

It will emerge from the next article in this series that a slight majority of the public does not yet favor the resignation of the current government.

CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS SUPPORT FOR SETTLEMENT HAS DOUBLED

TA281625 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Nov 80 p 19

[Eighth article in an "Election Forecast" series by pollster Hanokh Smith: "The Rate of Supporters of Settlements and of Ari'el Sharon Has Doubled; At the Same Time the Rate of Those Prepared for a Compromise in Judaea and Samaria Has Diminished"]

[Text] While the support for the Likud continued to drop, according to our latest poll conducted in the last week of October and the first week of November, the support for the Likud leader, Prime Minister Menahem Begin, remained steady (see table No 1). Actually, the percentage of those who thought Begin was fulfilling his function as prime minister well tended to remain stable in all three polls conducted this year, while the support for his party continued to decline.

It is noteworthy, however, that there was a steep decline in the percentage of voters who believed that the prime minister was functioning well between May 1979 and February-March 1980 (a drop from 59 to 40 percent; a 19 percent decline). At the same time the support for the Likud dropped by 6 percent (from 26 to 20 percent among Jewish voters). It should be noted that before 1979 over 59 percent believed Begin was fulfilling his duties well.

Table No 1--Is Menahem Begin functioning well or very well as prime minister? (Figures in percentages)

Date	Begin Functions Well As a Prime Minister	Vill Vote For Coalition Party	Will Vote For Likud
May 1979	59	40	26
Sep 1979	53	35	23
Feb-Mar 1980	40	31	20
Aug-Sep 1980	41	30	18
Oct-Nov 1980	41	28	16

In spite of the fact that Begin's popularity with the public declined, the percentage of those who still think that he fulfills his duties as prime minister well is much higher than the percentage of those who intend to vote for the Likud or for another coalition party. Begin is, therefore, seen as the central political power in the coalition government, and he is doubtlessly its main asset in the elections.

This is particularly striking after Moshe Dayan and 'Ezer Weizman, both of whom were very popular in their offices as foreign minister and defense minister, have left the government.

It is interesting, nevertheless, that several ministers received higher ratings than in previous polls. First among them is Foreign Minister Yitzhaq Shamir, who won the support of 33 percent of the respondents, who thought that he was functioning well in his job. This is a steep rise from the 20 percent rating given him in a previous poll 2 months ago. It constitutes significant progress for him, which was achieved with the help of a considerable portion of those who had previously been undecided (a decline from 40 to 25 percent of the voters). The support for Shamir is not as extensive as that of former Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, who enjoyed the support of two thirds of all the Jewish voters. They believed he was carrying out his duties as foreign minister very well, even in May 1979.

Another man for whom public support has increased is Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon. In the poll conducted in October-November 37 percent thought he was functioning well. The broadest support for him previously was 26 percent in February-March 1980. Ari'el Sharon remains a controversial figure on the Israeli political scene: the number of those who are critical of him is as large as the number of those who support him. In the latest poll 31 percent of the respondents replied that he was not doing a good job as agriculture minister (as opposed to 40 percent who thought so in the February-March poll).

Along with his office as the agriculture minister Ari'el Sharon is the moving force behind the settlements in the administered territories. It is hard to know with certainty on which of Sharon's functions the voter is basing his opinion. Yet, because of Sharon's central role in the settlement issue, one may assume that the majority of the public judge him on the basis of this issue. We may assume, then, that the growing support for Sharon is related to an increasing support for the settlement policy, which is connected with him.

In the August-September poll I wrote that there had been a process of growing extremism in the attitude of the Israeli voter on the issue of settlement in the occupied territories and the territorial concessions that should be granted to Jordan in exchange for the peace treaty. The poll conducted in October-November indicated that there has been further extremization in public opinion, as can be observed in table No 2.

Table No 2--Settlement in Judaea and Samaria; which of the following stances is closest to yours? (Figures in percentages)

Stance	Oct-Nov 1980	Aug-Sep 1980	Feb-Mar 1980
Gush Emunim, Sharon: Extensive settlement	28	22	14
'Ezer Weizman: Controlled settlement in large blocks	15	19	20

	Oct-Nov 1980	Aug-Sep 1980	Feb-Mar 1980
Stance of part of opposition: Settlement only in strategic, non-settled regions	23	20	21
Opposing new settlements: Favoring strengthening of the existing settlement in territories	9	11	9
Opposing new settlements while the peace talks continue	12	14	21
Other opinions	1	1	4
No opinion	12	13	11

From this data one may infer that the percentage of voters who support the Gush-Emunim Sharon stance on settlement in the territories has doubled since February-March 1980 (from 14 to 28 percent).

The most significant decline was in the number of those who supported the position that no new settlments should be set up during peace talks. This position has lost an increasing number of votes, from 21 to 12 percent at present.

A close examination of the table shows a clear and continued change from the stance advocating the restriction of settlement in one way or another to the stances held by Gush Emunim and Sharon. This data should be treated with caution. However, Gush Emunim-Sharon supporters are still a minority of Jewish voters, although this is a considerable minority.

It is also difficult to analyze the support for Weizman. While Weizman was very active when previous polls were conducted, it is hard to know now whether the support for Weizman now is part of the support for the government, or comes from those opposed to it. In other words, the choices of alternative policy lines expressed in the February-March poll do not mean the same thing now, particularly as far as Weizman is concerned.

Moreover, the various opposition stances still enjoy significant support, although the total support for these three alternative stances has declined from 51 to 44 percent.

Further evidence of the extremization of Israeli stances on vital policy issues is connected to territorial concessions to Jordan, if Jordan agrees to peace with Israel. The question was: Are you willing to cede territories in exchange for peace with King Husayn and Jordan, as with al-Sadat and Egypt? If yes, which territories? The results were: some 91 percent of the Jewish voters in this poll answered that they objected to any territorial compromise in East Jerusalem,

which is identical with the percentage of those who held this opinion in the previous August-September poll. The decision on this issue remained as it was: unanimous. But regarding other administered areas a number of changes have been observed (see table No 3).

Table No 3--"In exchange for peace with King Husayn and with Jordan, as has been made with al-Sadat and Egypt, are you willing to restore settlements? Which?" (Figures in percentages)

	Date	No	Only Part	Everything	No Opinion
Judaea, Samaria	Aug-Sep	50	37	10	3
	Oct-Nov	57	33	9	1
Gaza	Aug-Sep	38	21	37	4
	Oct-Nov	44	19	35	2

There is a marked increase in the number of people who are unwilling to cede territory in Judaea and Samaria and in Gaza in exchange for peace with Jordan. This rate roughly corresponds to the increase in the support for Sharon and Gush Emunim on the settlement question. A clear but not decisive majority prefers not to make territorial concessions to Jordan in exchange for peace; while a clear, but small majority is willing to cede at least part of the Gaza Strip in return for peace. The difference in the stances on Judaea and Samaria on the one hand, and Gaza on the other, is related to the more confident attitude toward Gaza, which is geographically close to Egypt, a country that enjoys greater credibility in Israel, in everything related to the peace process, than does Jordan.

To sum up, although there is an extremization in the attitude of Israelis on these two issues, the nation is still divided, and it is difficult to reach a concensus.

It is perhaps surprising that despite the clear extremization on the settlement issue and the issue of territorial concessions in exchange for peace with Jordan, support for Mr Begin as prime minister did not increase, and support for the Likud continued to go down. As a matter of fact, those who enjoy the most public support are Sharon and Shamir.

The solution to this riddle lies perhaps in the order of priorities: as already pointed out, despite the large support for the government on foreign affairs and security issues, no such support was seen in economic and social areas. This low support is closely related to the low degree of government popularity. These aspects will be examined in the next series of articles.

CSO: 4805

BANNED ARAB NAZARETH CONFERENCE DISCUSSED

TA031333 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 3 Dec 80 p 7

[Commentary by Yo'el Dar: "The Order--In the Face of Political Erosion"]

[Text] Prime Minister Menahem Begin, in his capacity as defense minister, has put an end to the guessing about whether the "Congress of Israel's Arabs," which was scheduled to be held on 6 December in Nazareth, would in fact take place. The question now being asked is how the 80 members of the organizing committee--among them 25 council heads, four Knesset members and other Muslim, Christian and Druze public figures--will react. Will they accept the decision or will they launch a legal and public struggle which will perforce lead to an exacerbation in the relations between the country's Arab population and the government (and indirectly with the Jewish population)?

Ever since the outlawing of the Al-Arad group's attempt to organize in the early 60's, no attempt has been made to prevent Arab assemblies, to restrict their political moves, or to take legal measures against the organizers of the various protest meetings that take place every few months. Both the "Progressive National Movement" and the "Sons of the Village," which are considered the most extremist elements among the Israeli Arabs, enjoy complete freedom of action. The ban on the Nazareth meeting is more significant than the outlawing of Al-Arad, because the latter represented a fairly small group of Arab intellectuals, whereas behind the organizers of the Nazareth conference are the half of the Arab population that voted for Rakah, along with hundreds of Arabs who had never before identified with Rakah.

There are those who maintain that the entire initiative for the congress came solely to augment Rakah's strength for the forthcoming Knesset elections. Proof of this, they say, is that most members of the organizing committee are connected with Rakah in one way or another, and the so-called 6th of June Charter was drawn up by Rakah theoreticians and printed by a communist printing firm.

Others, however, point out that even if the initiative did come from Rakah, the fact is that Arab public figures who have never belonged to Rakah took part in the preparatory meetings or expressed solidarity with the congress' objectives. The participants in the preparatory meeting at Shefar'am, less than 3 months ago, included: Mk Hamad Abu-Rabi'a, who is affiliated with the Alignment; the Kadi of 'Addo and Haifa Shaykh Muhammad (Hubayshi); and the head of the Mi'ilya village local council, Elias (Liyus). Shefar'am Mayor Ibrahim Nimr Husayn was also a

signatory to the invitation to the preparatory meeting; however, he did not show up, and it is still not clear whether this was because of differences of outlook he had with the organizers or because his name was erroneously included on the list of sponsors.

The prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs, Binyamin Gur-arye, spent the past few weeks feeling the pulse of the moderate--or what is termed the "positive"--Arab population. He and his aides held many public meetings in the Arab villages and spoke with various persons, who seem not to have been convinced of the meeting's grave nature. Many Arab notables, under increasing pressure from the radical circles, evaded any clear reply about whether they intended to take part in the meeting.

The initiative had its birth a few months ago under the influence of the communist intellectual Emil Touma and Rakah members. Some 100 Arab public figures drew up a document, which they called the 6th of June Charter. Divided into several chapters, this document deals with the relations between the Arabs of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. It states, among other points, that the Arabs of Israel are an integral part of the Palestinian Arab people. The document also asserts that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinian Arabs in Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait, Judaea and Amaria and the Gaza Strip but does not represent the Arabs living in Israel. (In my view, this contention is pretty insubstantial, for who will believe that the PLO and not King Husayn represents the Palestinians, who make up over 50 percent of Jordan's population? Who do a quarter-million Palestinian need Yasir 'Arafat and George Habash and not their own rulers? If this be the case, is it logical that precisely the Arabs of Israel should be represented by their own elected representatives? After all, both the Palestinians in Jordan and in the other Arab countries have their elected representatives. Why can Tawfiq Zayyad represent Palestinians in Nazareth, while the heads of the governments in Jordan, most of whom are Palestinians, cannot represent their own people who live in the Hashemite Kingdom?)

In another section of the document its authors demand equal rights; they demand that the Interior Ministry increase the grants to the Arab local authorities and recognize their standing as a national minority. At the Nazareth conference the organizers had intended to elect a body that would represent all the Israeli Arabs, a kind of supreme committee to serve as their elected and recognized representatives. This body would speak in the name of all the Arabs living in Israel, whether they are Rakah members or potential Alignment or Likud voters.

The political erosion among the Arabs of Israel began in the final year of Shmu'el Toledano's tenure as the prime minister's adviser on Arab affairs. It was in these years that the ideological framework was created for the first Arab congress. This was when the body called the Committee of Heads of Arab Local Councils was formed and when the Democratic Front was created among the Arabs. Then came "Land Day" and other events that strengthened radical elements such as the "Sons of the Village" and the Democratic Front.

In that period any Arab organizing was written off, the argument being that it posed no threat. In the past 3 years more attention has been paid to events in the Arab sector, and things are called by their name. At the same time, however, those who banned the Nazareth congress must seriously weigh the problems confronting the country's Arab citizens and consider how to help those who wish to be a part of the country, as well as how to prevent any worsening of relations between Jews and Arabs. If no serious action is taken, the result will be the erasure of the green line and the growing identification of Israel's Arabs with the national aspirations of their brethren in Nabulus, Janin and Ramallah.

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

BORDER POLICE STATIONED AT NEGEV--A border police patrol company was stationed at the third Negev airfield site in Tel Malhata--between Beersheba, Dimona and 'Arad--a few weeks ago. Border police forces conduct regular patrols 24 hours a day over the 62,000 dunams of the airfield. The company is accommodated in houses constructed specifically for that purpose near the building site. Its forces are to prevent the expected Bedouin objection to the infrastructure work at the site and to remove them from the area. During the night border policemen patrol around the site's heavy equipment to prevent sabotage acts. The border police company was transferred to Tel Malhata following an incident during which three agriculture ministry surveyors were attacked by dozens of Bedouin while they were marking the area. It has been reported that the possibility of transferring the border police staff to the Dimona absorption center is being looked into. The center is currently vacant and has 60 buildings, some occupied by "black Hebrews." The rest of the buildings will be renovated by the police and the Dimona municipality for the border policemen. [Text] [Report by Buqi Na'e: "Border Police Forces Have Been Stationed at a Negev Airfield"] [TA041158 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 4 Dec 80 p 6]

NAZARETH RALLY INTENTIONS--Mk Tawfiq Tubi has said that the PLO does not represent the Israeli Arabs. The representatives of the Israeli Arabs are their Knesset members, he said. He emphasized that the Israeli Arabs are living in conditions different from those in which Palestinians in other countries live. Tubi confirmed that it was the goal of the Nazareth Conference to urge the government to recognize the PLO. He claimed that this is a position acceptable to many Jews in Israel as well as on some Knesset parties and most of the countries of the world. Our Knesset correspondent Tzvi Yisre'eli noted that Tubi's remarks came in reaction to charges made against the organizers of the Nazareth Conference, alleging that they regard the PLO as their representative. [Text] [TA031425 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 3 Dec 80]

SAUDIS BEHIND TURKISH DECISION--It was Saudi pressure that motivated the Turkish Government to reduce the level of its representation in Israel, thus compelling Israel to reduce the level of its own representation in Ankara. This is the prevailing view in Jerusalem following an official announcement on this matter published yesterday in Turkey. Ever since Turkey decided, some months ago, to move its consulate from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv (in the wake of passage of the Jerusalem Law), political circles in Israel have followed the intentions of the Ankara government with respect to its relations with Israel. The change of regime in Turkey aroused the hope that there would be no further exacerbation in the

relations between the two countries, but the past few days showed that this was a vain hope. Following a visit by the Turkish foreign minister to Saudi Arabia last week, the Ankara government informed Israel of its intention to cut back its representation in Tel Aviv to the level of second secretary only. The Turkish Government suggested that this decision be played down, and Israel agreed. Jerusalem was surprised yesterday when Turkey issued an official communique on this decision. [Excerpt] [TA031157 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Dec 80 p 2]

SPRAY USED AGAINST DEMONSTRATORS--The security forces will use a new spray in Judaea and Samaria to disperse demonstrations. A decision on this was made after it became clear that the use of tear gas was not sufficiently effective. Security sources said last night that the new spray does not affect the lungs, but is more effective than tear gas in the sense that it causes the crowd to flee the area and makes them incapable of further rioting or demonstrating. The need for this spray arose after it became evident that the pupils in Judaea and Samaria had developed methods of defense against tear gas. After a few minutes, as the gas dispersed, they would assemble again and continue their disturbances. Besides the use of this spray, which is designed to stun the pupils but not to injure them, the security forces have decided to hold teachers partially responsible for disturbances. It emerges thatthose educators who receive their wages from the military government are the very ones who encourage the pupils to demonstrate and riot against the military government. [Text] [TA011144 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Dec 80 p 16]

ARAB EMIGRATION DECREASING--The number of young Arabs from East Jerusalem, Judaea and Samaria who left the area for good over the last 13 years is much less than the number of people who entered the area during the same period in the framework of unification of families. Arab sources reported yesterday that there was emigration movement by young people from East Jerusalem and the West Bank during the Jordanian rule, but since the end of the 6-day war, it has decreased because of Israel's presence in the area and with the sharpening of the Palestinian problem. Governmental and security sources last night confirmed that from year to year the "emigration consciousness" among the Arabs of East Jerusalem and the West Bank is decreasing. [Text] [TA281127 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 28 Nov 80 p 3]

FRANCE COMPETING FOR AIRCRAFT PURCHASE--Paris--Bolivia is now examining possibilities of purchasing a 24-craft "KFIR" squadron and is about to send a delegation of army personalities to Israel and some European countries to pursue this matter. The alternatives Bolivia has are to purchase the "Jaguar," a French-British coproduction, or the French "Mirage-3." Accounts reaching Paris claim that this has been reported by the Bolivian commander of the air force. French sources have claimed that Israel has an advantage in the competition because it is offering spare parts for the French "Mirages" as part of the "package deal." (Many Latin American countries employ Mirage aircraft in their air forces.) The DAVAR correspondent added that the Carter administration embargoed military sales to Bolivia last summer after the army had taken brutal control of the country. This happened a few days prior to the scheduled swearing in ceremony of the president, who was elected in a democratic manner. In the first few weeks after the coup hundreds of people were murdered, including trade union activists and leaders of the democratic parties. [Text] [TA041136 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 4 Dec 80 p 1]

SOUTHERN SINAI DEVELOPMENT CONTINUES--Even though all of Sinai is to be evacuated, the government is spending 1 million Israeli shekels on settlement and infrastructure in the region. The treasury has asked approval [from the Knesset's finance committee] to transfer over 1 million shekels from the 1979 budget surplus to cover expenditures made this year within the framework of previous commitments. Of this sum, 441,000 shekels were from the regular budget and 612,000 shekels were from the development budget. The money is earmarked for the development of the southern Sinai district, the development of highways and road, and infrastructure work in Ofira and Na'Ama. [Excerpt] [TA031215 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Dec 80 p 3]

13 SEATS FOR DAYAN-LED FACTION--If the Rafi faction were to leave the Likud and contest the general elections on its own, headed by Moshe Dayan, Yiga'el Hurvitz and Zalman Shoval, it could win--as of mid-November--about 10 percent of the vote, or 13 Knesset seats. This emerged from the monthly public opinion poll conducted by Dr Mina Tzemah, director of the Dahaf Agency's Research Institute, for the weekly QESAFIM. Ultimately, this list would gain most of its seats--seven--at the Alignment's expense; along with two from the Likud, one each from the NRP and Tehiya, and the rest at the expense of the other parties. As will be recalled, the October poll showed that without Moshe Dayan an independent Rafi list would be able to win just three seats--the same number it has in the current Knesset. The ongoing election forecast for November--according to data collected before Weizman's expulsion from Herut and before the L'Express affair--shows a slight rise for the Alignment and a drop for the Likud, as compared with October: Alignment--63 seats (61 in October); Likud--26 (29); NRP--8 (8); Orthodox--6 (5); Tehiya--3 (2); others--13 (14). However, as the earlier polls showed, if the Alignment were headed by Yitzhaq Rabin it would get more seats than it would under the present leadership--66 seats in the November forecast, identical to the number in the previous poll. [Text] [TA011135 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 1 Dec 80 p 1]

POPULATION FIGURES--The government statistician, Dr Moshe Siqron, today reported the latest statistics for the population of Israel. These included the fact that Israel's population is approaching 4 million. About 3.9 million are citizens of whom about 3.25 million are Jews. The population of Israel is expected to rise above 4 million next year and by the year 2000 there will be about 5.5 million people in Israel. The official annual of statistics is to be published tomorrow. [Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1900 GMT 1 Dec 80]

SOVIET DROPOUTS--The increase in dropouts from the Soviet Union continued in November. The HA'ARETZ correspondent has learned that during that month the dropout rate among those leaving the Soviet Union reached 74 percent; 789 Jews received exit permits, but 581 of them dropped out in Vienna. Additional data showed that in November the Soviet authorities granted the lowest number of exit permits in 2 years, apart from Last August. This data is arousing concern among immigration authorities because it proves that the Soviet authorities are cutting down considerably on the number of immigrants. [Text] [TA030632 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 2 Dec 80 p 1--report by Yosi Melman, London, 1 Dec]

UNEMPLOYMENT IN NOVEMBER--The number of people who sought employment in November totaled 38,500, about 2,000 people less than in October. The demand for workers by employers increased by 500 compared with October. The number of people unemployed for 6 days or more remained stable at 14,000. Our correspondent Jon Feder notes that for the first time in 4 months there has been a decrease in the number of people seeking employment because of the demand for seasonal workers in agriculture. [TA041352 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 4 Dec 80]

JUDAEA, SAMARIA CLINICS--The Israeli sick fund established eight new clinics in the Samaria settlements beyond the Green Line in the last 2 weeks. Four more are in the planning stages. The clinics were opened in Qedumim, Elon More, Sal'it, Ari'el, Elqana, Qarne Shomron, Ma'ale Shomron and Neve Zuf, with the one in Qedumim serving as a regional clinic for the Samaria settlements. More Kupat Holim clinics are expected to be established throughout Samaria soon. In October and November, Kupat Holim established 17 clinics in Samaria, the Galilee and the new outposts in the Galilee. [TA041352 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1440 GMT 3 Dec 80]

COAL DEPOSITS--Large lignite deposits have been found in the Hula Valley. The coal can be used as raw material for the production of electricity. There are about half a billion tons of lignite in the Hula Valley and this is sufficient to operate a power station to supply about 600 megawatt in 30 to 40 years. However, it will take 10 to 12 years to get the project moving. [TA040713 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 3 Dec 80]

DATA ON EXPORTS--The net export of goods in November 1980 totalled $404 million in current prices; $363 million in industrial exports and $41 million in agricultural exports. This was a 2 percent increase over November 1979. The net value of the exports in November 1980--seasonally deducted and without diamonds, ships and planes--was down 23 percent from October. In the first 11 months of 1980 net exports totalled $4,689 million, an increase of 22 percent over the parallel period last year, when exports totalled $3,853 million. Industrial exports (without diamonds) were up by 29 percent, diamond exports by 17 percent and agricultural exports by 6 percent. [TA040713 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 3 Dec 80 p 8]

NEW KFIR MODEL--The Israel aircraft industries has developed a 2-seat KFIR aircraft for training. The craft has room for the trainer and the student and is already used by the Israel Air Force. This model differs from previous KFIR models primarily in the nose, which has been significantly lengthened. The longer nose together with the additional space for another pilot necessitated changes in the aircraft's center of gravity and its shape. [Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 27 Nov 80]

ADDITIONAL LAND FOR SETTLEMENTS--The council of the Jewish settlements in Judaea and Samaria demands that the government start an operation to double the number of Jews living beyond the Green Line. The council has prepared a project to build 3,000 housing units in the area and it requests that the government implement this low cost housing project, as has recently been done in Ma'ale Adummim. Our correspondent on settlement affairs has learned that an additional tens of thousand dunams was recently approved for these settlements. This addition was done from lands that are not privately owned and are to be found near these settlements, although they are not always contiguous with the settlements. The settlements whose territory will increase as a result of this decision are mainly Elqana, Ari'el, Qarne Shomron and Giv'on. [Text] [TA300643 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0600 GMT 30 Nov 80]

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

CABINET RESHUFFLE PREDICTED--Well-informed Jordanian sources have told AL-WATAN that a cabinet reshuffle will take place in Jordan that may involve six portfolios, including the Foreign Ministry to which Hasan Ibrahim, minister of occupied territories affairs, is expected to return as successor to Marwan al-Qasim, who may be appointed ambassador to an important capital. The sources said that among the portfolios possibly involved in the shakeup is that of Jordanian Minister of Transport 'Ali Suhaymat who expressed the desire to leave the cabinet because of his private business, particularly construction and engineering work in Saudi Arabia, which brings him a high income. The reshuffle also includes Minister of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs Kamil al-Sharif. The reshuffle is expected to be announced shortly, after Prime Minister Mudar Badran completes the reshuffle arrangements. [Text] [LD021705 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 30 Nov 80 pp 1, 11]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

NEW LONDON PURCHASE--London (KUNA)--Financial sources said here Friday that the Kuwait Investment Office in London has raised its share in the commercial insurance union, which is one of the biggest British insurance companies. The KIO has purchased 200,000 shares to raise the value of its shares in the Union to about five per cent. [Text] [Kuwait ARAB TIMES in English 1 Nov 80 p 1]

NEW POWER PLANT--Kuwait will have a new power and desalination plant by 1985, official sources told KUWAIT TIMES yesterday. They said work on the plant to be set up in the Glei'a area, south of Kuwait city, would begin soon. Several batches of Pakistani workers had already been recruited to begin the project which would help meet the country's needs of power and water. The sources said that only three of the country's six power generating plants were now operational. The South Shueibah power station which was damaged earlier this year was now being overhauled. The sources said the coming months would be ideal for the work on the damaged units as the plant's load would come down considerably as power consumption declines in winter. The sources said Kuwait's current power output stood at 2,550 megawatts. Doha accounted for 1,050, South Shuaiba 800, North Shuaiba 400 and Shuweikh 300. They said the country's need during this month would not exceed 2,200 megawatts. The work on damaged units were expected to be completed before the advent of summer, they added. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 4 Nov 80 p 1]

VISIT BAN--The ban imposed with effect from Oct. 1 on entry visas and visit cards to Kuwait has not affected recruitments by the government and public sector, Assistant Undersecretary for Nationality, Passports and Residence, Suleiman al-Mesh'an, said yesterday. "Procedures concerning residence permits are carried out normally as long as it serves the interest of the national economy," he said. He stressed that the ban affected only private visits to the country by relatives of the working expatriates, but pointed out that it was only temporary. "The ban holds pending a reassessment of the situation," he said. [Text]

DESALINATION PLANS--Manufacturers of water desalination units may soon find themselves bidding for a large, and final, contract in Kuwait. The Finance Ministry and four semi-public financial institutions last week incorporated the Kuwait Company for Manufacturing Seawater Desalination Units, which will produce the technology locally, rather than importing it. The firm plans to sign the contract before the end of next month to acquire the necessary basic technology from a foreign firm. Among those under consideration are IHI of Japan and Weir Westergarth of Britain, reports from Kuwait said. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Nov 80 p 15]

REFINERY BIDS--The Government of Kuwait has set a December 15 deadline for prequalifying bids for a contract to modernise and more than double the capacity of its Old Topping refinery at Mena Abdullah, it was announced last week. The Kuwait National Petroleum Company is still working on the final details of the modernisation programme, but it is known that it plans to increase capacity from 110,000 a day to 250,000 b/d. The project, which is expected to be tendered this year, is also likely to include several processing units; these should include crude distillation, vacuum distillation, residue conversion, process-cooking, hydrocracking, fluid catalytic cracking, hydrotreating and H2 manufacturing. The contract will also cover construction of ancillary buildings and facilities for the refinery, which was owned by the US oil company Aminoil until its nationalisation in 1977. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Nov 80 pp 15, 16]

CSO: 4820

POLITICAL, MILITARY CONFLICT SAID TO BE IMMINENT

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 11-17 Aug 80 pp 12-13

[Article by Nahad al-Mashnuq: "Sarkis Has Crossed the Red Line, and Talk of Rounds of Fighting Has Resumed; The War of Explosion!"]

[Text] "The country is approaching a political and military conflict."

So say many observers. Some people almost go so far as to specify the time and place of the eruption, and some feel that President Sarkis is responsible.

As the different rounds of the Lebanese war unfolded and intersected during the turbulence of the past 2 years, the crowds of journalists became more cohesive and less widely distributed among the politicians. The journalists became largely restricted to specific centers in the two areas of Beirut: in east Beirut, where former president Kamil Sham'un and Shaykh Pierre Jumayyil--along with former president Sulayman Franjiyyah--focused political activity in the presidential palace in B'abda; and in west Beirut, which was the headquarters for the late Kamal Junblat, former prime minister Sa'ib Salam and Dean Raymond Iddih. The latter converted his home into a permanent headquarters for journalists and a broadcasting center for news concerning political meetings and contacts.

At the beginning of the war, the journalists were interested in knowing what the future held. Would the war stop after the second or third round or would it continue? The opinions, speculations and prophecies multiplied, and the smallest public matter was interpreted as either a negative or a positive sign until the picture became confused and no one was able to hold on to the thread of the truth any longer.

Meanwhile, then prime minister Rashid Karami had issued an official statement denying the speculations of a new round of fighting which were circulating at the time and had reached the pages of the newspaper. He said that [illegible] speculations were the "foolish talk of agents and traitors." Dean Raymon[illegible] h uttered his famous witticism: "Ask discernment from Fatimah."

The Lebanese situation had entered a state of instability in which neither war nor peace was certain. The only thing which could be reported with certainty was the spectacle of refugees under fire, or people fleeing capture, or businessmen wrestling with the problem of moving their firms and goods.

Five years after the start of the war, Lebanon is once again wrestling with the question: Is the situation approaching a new outbreak which will impel the country out of the no-war-no-peace situation in the political and military spheres, or will it continue to mark time?

The Two Wars

The fighting in the eastern part of the capital which caused matters to be decided in the Phalangist Party's favor and assured its control awakened fears of partition in the minds of many. Some politicians came close to deciding that the events witnessed in this area were just an indication of what the western area would undergo, although in a different manner because of the difference in the political and military balance of forces.

President Sarkis' acceptance of the resignation of the government, the appointment of Prime Minister Taqi al-Din al-Sulh, and the talk about a government of activists imposed the question: Will the entry of the militias and the armed organizations into the government cause it to be strengthened at their expense, or will it allow them to confiscate the legitimacy attached to the government? And thus won't this lead to the formation of a compensatory governmental structure for the side which wins out in its area of authority, thus encouraging sides in other areas to take a similar step, allowing for the differences in the balance of forces to become more widespread.

Then came the series of assassinations which culminated in the murder of press chief Riyadh Taha and Ba'ath Party national command member Musa Sha'iyb. These assassinations were both preceded and followed by a series of disruptions, some of which failed and some of which were successful. Thus, speculations of a conflict regained currency, and some whisperers were so certain that they went so far as to specify the time and place of such a conflict.

It would be a military conflict different from the rounds of fighting experienced in Lebanon in 1975. It would be reflected in assassinations, the hurling of explosives, and a political conflict brought about by the continued faltering of the process of forming a new government. Two formulas are proposed for this new government: a government of effective individuals, or a government of effective substitutes.

The responsibility for this dual conflict lies with the politicians associated with President Sarkis, who is armed with an army whose weapons have been the more effective thus far and which the various sides agree may be deployed in any area of Lebanon.

These observers feel that President Sarkis is responsible because he attempted in a secret adventure--"the first of its kind in his era"—to bypass the international law which dictates that conditions in Lebanon should be frozen in their present state until the American administration can find enough time to bring a thaw in the Middle East crisis and involve its primary sides in the settlement, thus allowing it to devote some time—however little—to the Lebanese crisis.

The more that President Sarkis—who seems alone these days—attempted to cross the red line of the international decision to freeze the situation by means of a

political government, the more isolated and under attack he became. When he brought in Taqi al-Din al-Sulh to form an active government and keep him company in his political isolation, he found that the Lebanese sides more than any others wish to hold on to their status, their roles, and their resentments, and they have worked and continue to work so that others will have these positions.

Of course, this description does not extend to all those involved in the formation of the politically active government. However, the position of some prevented the formation of a government of activists, and this had the effect of negating the positive attitude of the others in effect if not in word.

The Old Efforts

Up until last week, President Sarkis continued his efforts along with the appointed prime minister to form a political government of activists. He pursued these efforts despite difficulties which, though they seemed obvious, did not fall into the realm of impossibility in the view of those close to the president. This determination was not just a result of the fact that President Sarkis does not believe in confronting the anticipated developments in the Arab and Lebanese spheres negatively except through a government of this type. Rather, there were several other reasons, including the following:

1. President Sarkis has been working to form such a government for 3 months and with such extreme secrecy that even cabinet nominees did not want to speak openly of the government. Based on these efforts, Walid Junblat and Shaykh Amin Jumayyil reached agreement through a mutual friend that the Lebanese Army should enter the area of northern al-Matan--which is Shaykh Amin's area--several days after the formation of the government. This would simplify Mr Junblat's role in introducing the army into certain areas of al-Tammas in the western area. Shaykh Amin committed himself to this despite his knowledge that the entry of the Lebanese Army into his area confronts his brother, Shaykh Bashir, the commander of the 7 July movement, with a military map that complicates the movements of his forces.

2. President Sarkis characterizes the purge of the military forces of the Liberals which took place on 7 July under the leadership of Shaykh Bashir Jamayyil as nothing less than an attempt at partition which demands a political government to counter it, recognizing that the efforts to form such a government began prior to 7 July and became an urgent necessity following this date.

3. With regard to these efforts, Lt Col Juni 'Abduh, the director of intelligence of the Lebanese Army, was sent by President Sarkis as an envoy to Damascus on Tuesday, 4 July. He met with officials there and sought their opinion on a government comprised primarily of Walid Junblat, Samir Sabbagh, Amin Jumayyil, Dani Sham'un, Michel Sasin, and Eli Karamah. In a discussion of the prime ministership, Lieutenant Colonel 'Abduh reported on behalf of the president that this position had been narrowed down to Taqi al-Din al-Sulh and Shafiq al-Wazin. This was because former prime minister Rashid Karami had not agreed to form a government because of northern factors relating to former President Franjiyyah. His brother-in-law, Malik Salam, was in solidarity with him, according to Karami. As for Mr Shafiq al-Wazin, he also did not agree to form a government because he believed that the Islamic climate was not appropriate for cooperation with President Sarkis. He also

expressed apprehension about former prime minister Sa'ib Salam. In a meeting between him and an envoy from President Sarkis, he discussed the government of Dr Amin al-Hafiz which was rejected by both the Islamic and nationalist sides during the term of President Franjiyyah. The Syrian official laughed and said: "You like Taqi al-Din, don't you?" The Lebanese official replied that no other options were available, and he requested that President al-Asad be apprised of President Sarkis' message.

President al-Asad requested that deliberations be conducted concerning this government. The Lebanese envoy replied that the traditional parliamentary deliberations which the president had conducted were not indicative of the extent of the acceptance of such a government, and that there is no tradition of consulting the activist political and military parties on the matter of the government. He answered that the activist parties should be consulted, and so this actually occurred for the first time in the formation of a Lebanese government. The president met with the activist parliamentary, political and military leaders. The dialog took place during President Asad's reception of Mr Nabih Bara, the secretary general of the Amal movement. On 7 July, the Lebanese forces conducted an operation to eliminate the military positions of the Liberals. On the following day, President Sarkis' envoy returned to Damascus to review the situation and reiterate the make-up of the new government following the acceptance of the resignation of Dr Salim al-Huss' government. Names were added on both sides. These included Dr 'Abdallah Sa'adah, former president of the Syrian National Party, as an orthodox minister, in the event that Dr Albert Mansur, representative and Nationalist Movement member, were not advanced for the Catholics.

The envoy did not seek an answer on the make-up of the government, but he said that President Sarkis saw it as an urgent national necessity, even though it appeared to be an accomplished fact to the ministers as well as to Damascus itself. The Syrian reply speculated that this government would not work, and that if President Sarkis were able to form it, then it would be in God's hands. President Franjiyyah had always been represented in the government through his son, Robert, but if it were not accepted, there was a standing offer to Mr Rene Mu'awwad to represent the north.

The envoy returned to Beirut with the Syrian reply and the make-up of the government was presented to Prime Minister Taqi al-Din al-Sulh prior to his appointment on Sunday. His response was that he wanted to have a hand in forming the government. He requested that Nasri al-Ma'luf and Fu'ad Naffa' be appointed as ministers and requested that Dr Nazih al-Bizri be ruled out.

The answer was that it was up to Prime Minister al-Sulh to convince Shaykh Pierre about Nasri al-Ma'luf, but that the rest was easily done.

Prime Minister al-Sulh was appointed on Sunday morning, and he resolved on his own part to hold parliamentary deliberations despite the fact that he had been asked to announce the government on Monday.

The Answer With Al-Amin

Things remained straightforward up to Monday afternoon, since all the envoys who had gone to Damascus up until that time had brought back ambiguous answers. However, the one exception to this was 'Abdallah al-Amin, member of the Ba'ath Party's

regional command in Lebanon, who returned demanding that Mr 'Asim Qansuh be excluded from the government. The session ended, and everyone who was inside left. On the following day, which was Tuesday, Walid Junblat went to Damascus to seek clarification of the Syrian position. This injected clear difficulty into the formation of a government of political activists.

Since that time, the search has continued outside this formula. It became clear that the appointment of Taqi al-Din al-Sulh to lead the government and the appointment of the Phalangists to the cabinet created a spate of difficulties which became hard to circumvent, despite the rapid efforts made by Mr Manh al-Sulh in Damascus.

It also appeared to be hard for President Sarkis to abandon Prime Minister Taqi al-Din, and equally hard for Damascus to bypass President Franjiyyah for a number of reasons, some of which are well known.

Now a dialog has begun concerning an ordinary mixed government drawn from members of parliament and individuals who represent--relatively speaking--the government of activists. This is a government which would supposedly set the climate for a political government.

But can this phase stand a caretaker government? The answer does not lie with President Sarkis or Prime Minister al-Sulh, but rather with the developments which are rocking the area. The manifestations of these developments in south Lebanon are clear.

8591
CSO: 4802

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH ON ARMY DAY ANALYZED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI in Arabic 11-17 Aug 80 p 13

[Article by Rafiq Shallala: "The Government of the '1 August' Program"]

[Text] Lebanon's celebration of Army Day this year (1 August) was not like celebrations of the past, for it included something more far-reaching than parades and symbols.

President Ilyas Sarkis found Army Day and his customary speech at the officers graduation ceremony an occasion to emphasize several facts which he has voiced numerous times in his private councils without moving into the public arena.

One of these facts was that he plans to continue exercising the responsibility of government until the end of his term. This statement was a reply to reports that have circulated in recent days in some of the information media and political clubs to the effect that the president wanted to resign. In his speech, however, he asserted that he will continue to follow the "rescue course" amid manifold difficulties which have affected every sphere of activity and in spite of the accumulation of obstacles and the series of clashes. He stated that this course is the "course of rebuilding the army, the course of rebuilding the nation, and the course of belief in our existence and in what is dearer than existence, namely, our freedom, our right and our honor."

The second fact which the president wishes to disclose was his commitment to placing security issues generally and army-related issues in particular before all other matters. In this context, the president emphasized the continued rebuilding of the army with all that it requires, "because the army is the wall of the state and the armor of the country." In this message, the president--who is the supreme commander of the army--was again responding to those who have damaged the reputation of this national institution, cast doubt on the effectiveness of rebuilding it and reequipping it, and called for a halt to this process.

The third thing which the president emphasized in his speech was his continuing effort to achieve national unification, reflecting his belief that security and unification form the cornerstone for the rebuilding of the nation. He stressed that the army took steps toward unification before the political authorities were in a position to achieve unification and bring about a meeting of the sides concerned in the Lebanese peace.

What the president failed to say in his speech in al-Fiyadhiyah he said to a delegation from the army command in the presidential palace. He added one main fact to those that he wished to disclose, namely, that the nation will not stand unless its people succeed in building a national army which is popularly supported by all Lebanese. He said that if this is not achieved, the nation's situation will be very dangerous.

Sarkis stressed the effect of a new belief in Lebanon, pointing to the responsibility of the army command in the current period and asserting that the unification of the nation and the reconciliation of the Lebanese people will make it possible for the army to assume its duties in a climate which contains much fewer difficulties and obstacles than exist at present. The entire people, added the president, call for the army in every place, but the lack of unification among the effective sides in this nation keep the ardent national desire generally unattainable. He urged that unification be accomplished while the army command is working to rebuild the institution, for when unification is accomplished, the use of the army with the aim of strengthening this unification and safeguarding it from rebellious groups will become possible.

Irrevocable Positions

Observers in Beirut felt that President Sarkis' speech to the army expressed the true position of the government on this sensitive question which preoccupies the minds of many these days. The facts that the president announced with regard to the army form the framework which the president has drawn up for present or future interaction with any Lebanese or non-Lebanese group in matters pertaining to the army. The presidential positions in this framework are irrevocable; there can be bargaining on any political matter except the military issue concerning the institution which Lebanese look toward as their means of salvation.

Observers feel that Sarkis, who has chosen to mobilze the political and security issues together, has composed a mental picture of the duties which the forthcoming government will undertake. He has apparently decided that this question will ultimately be settled after the country has edged to the very brink of the precipice.

One can also understand from this what concerned the president in his speech on the occasion of Army Day--and the message he wanted to convey was not directed solely at the members of the Lebanese army and the graduating officers, but rather at all those affected by what is occurring in Lebanon and those who are working on political and military lines at the same time. For the government has become faced with one choice for which there is no alternative, and this is to assign new duties to the army. Otherwise, it will find itself weak and the commander of the armies of the other petty states which are growing day by day and developing for themselves everything that a state needs in the fields of security, politics, information and economics. This was what President Sarkis meant when he said that the nation will be in danger unless the army assumes responsibility for maintaining its security so that it can restore its unity and bring prosperity back to its institutions.

The new government will be "the government of decision" with respect to the army, whether it is a government of activists--or individuals close to the activists--technocratic or extra-parliamentary. For the decision is not determined by the positions or characteristics of the ministers so much as it is the outcome of a consensus to safeguard the security of the country before which all other considerations yield. The people have begun to press their rulers to make the decision, and if they hesitate, the people will make another decision.

The fact is, however, that the Lebanese Army with its roughly 23,000 troops is incapable of imposing security by force at the present stage. While it is true that the Lebanese Army is the strongest of the armed groups in the Lebanese arena in terms of readiness, troop strength and leadership, it is not stronger than them collectively. The armed groups which began to work their will in the country from 1975 will not surrender their arms easily, for the owner of something cannot give it up even when threatened with force. For this reason, any new role for the army must be agreed to beforehand by the Lebanese people, because force cannot bear fruit, but will only increase the destruction and inflict more casualties. This position has always been the line which the administration has followed during the present phase. It has not deployed the army in any area without the approval of the affected sides so that the legal power returning after an absence will not be for one group and not another. It is the unionist line that the army command has formulated since the appointment of General Victor Khuri as commander which has helped make the army the hope of all those who long for security. And now, the course of rebuilding the army is continuing according to a basic program whose general features were delineated by the incontrovertible facts of unification.

In this context, one thing pointed out by President Sarkis among the facts reflected in his Army Day speech is clear. This is that national unification will simplify the role of the army and ease the burdens it will face on the ground.

The new government which will be formed sooner or later is called upon--if it is not a government of activists, and it won't be, in any case--to prepare another time for the achievement of unification. If this proves impossible, then a suitable climate in which to expand the role of the army must be prepared.

Will the new government be the "government of decision"?

Those who read between the lines of President Sarkis' speech on Army Day found that it contained a positive answer to this question. And 1 August 1980 could be the starting point.

Still, efforts must be combined, obstacles must be surmounted, reservations must disappear, interventions must come to a halt, agitation must cease to exist, and threats must evaporate so that the government--which is about to bid farewell to its fourth year in power--can make a new departure on the course of security and peace. Will the dream be achieved in the two remaining years, or will these two years be a period of weakening, so that its replacement will be weak and easily dominated?

8591
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IAEA ASSISTANCE NEEDED FOR COUNTRY'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 1 Oct 80 p 2

[Article: "IAEA Assistance Needed To Realize Our Nuclear Program"]

[Text] The 24th session of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) regular general conference was held recently in Vienna, the Austrian capital, with the participation of the delegates from 110 countries and numerous observers.

The Moroccan delegation to the session was headed by Ali Skali, governor with the agency's council of governors.

During this session Ali Skali made a speech in which he indicated that it is being held a short time after the meeting of the second conference which had been directed to examine the strategic arms nonproliferation treaty and whose efforts had met with failure.

The head of the Moroccan delegation added that "the international climate is experiencing a serious deterioration and many tense hotspots have appeared which may generate grave consequences for the peace and security of the world."

After drawing attention to the dwindling of natural sources of energy, Ali Skali indicated that the use of nuclear energy is becoming unavoidable in insuring economic and social development, and therefore the well-being of all humanity. "For this reason my delegation has not ceased to underline the importance of the mission of the agency, and its great responsibility in the field of utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes," the head of the Moroccan delegation noted.

Ali Skali then drew the attention of the participants to the work of the 24th IAEA session to the fact that the Moroccan delegation considers that in order to achieve concrete results in the field of nonproliferation of nuclear arms, it is absolutely necessary for the nuclear powers to respect the NTP [Nonproliferation Treaty] and fully implement the obligations stemming from it. "Now," says the head of the Moroccan delegation, "nuclear tests are constantly increasing."

Continuing his speech, Ali Skali recalled the need for the nuclear powers to offer security guarantees to the countries not equipped with nuclear arms. "My delegation welcomes the creation of a special work group of the disarmament committee for international agreements, able to effectively insure the states not

equipped with nuclear arms against the use or threat of usage of nuclear arms" added Skali, who remarked that the creation of denuclearized zones constitutes an important disarmament measure."

Moroccan Energy Resources

Mentioning the energy resources at Morocco's disposal, the head of the Moroccan delegation pointed out that "the primary energy sources used to meet our needs are water resources, coal and hydrocarbons."

"The results registered in the 1978-1979 period demonstrate that the average rate of annual growth for primary energy was 7.5 percent.

Our primary energy consumption needs were filled in 1979 in the following percentages: 82.1-hydrocarbons, 8.8-hydroelectricity, 7.8-coal, and 1.3-local natural gas.

Underlining the importance attached to the search for oil in our country, Ali Skali said:

"Many operations are being carried out in that connection, either with the state's own resources or in association with foreign partners. At the present time many promising sedimentary basins are the object of intense prospecting on land and at sea, as Morocco has at its disposal 2 maritime fronts which extend over almost 3,500 km.

"Moreover, one of the most promising approaches in Morocco is represented by the development of oil shale resources whose thick strata form the substructure of the layers of phosphates. Therefore, this confirms the fact that our country which has three-fourths of the world's phosphate reserves, is also well provided with oil shale. Two important beds (Timahdit and Tarfaya) have already been the object of significant geological, mining and technological operations. Programmed studies, work and realizations aim at developing this natural resource, for the production of electricity by direct burning as well as for the production of oil and gas through pyrolysis."

As regards hydroelectricity, the head of the Moroccan delegation indicated that it represents at the present time about 9 percent of the national energy consumption and could be developed further, considering the number of favorable sites in the waterways system which present an energy potential of 6 billion KWH, of which 2 billion are now being used. It is planned to equip the entire remaining potential by the year 2000 not only as regards large projects, but also for small water resources.

"As for coal, which represents 7.4 percent in the energy balance of our country, it is produced in Jerada at the rate of 750,000 tons per year. Fitting out a new center is continuing in order to increase this production. At the present time research is being carried out with the view of determining the extent of the bed under the Hauts Plateau.

"As regards uranium, during the last few years, geological and radiometric explorations have been carried out by seismological survey, drilling and mining operations, principally in the high Moulaya where 22 borings were made and in the High Western Atlas where 54 borings were made, yielding high uranium content with possibly as much as 1.13 uranium oxide."

As regards the uranium contained in the phosphates, we are following very closely the development of technology for its extraction, starting with phosphoric acid and we are especially following the results obtained in some industrial units already being exploited.

In connection with nuclear energy, Ali Skali indicated that the "first 600 MW nuclear unit will probably not be operation-' before 1993-1994, and it would be interesting--for reasons of ease of use and furnishing of spare parts--to construct some identical units before going on to a higher energy stage.

"Studies in the choice of sites and training of highly technical cadres which have already been accomplished in collaboration with IAEA experts, will be intensified during the course of the next few years.

"The nuclear program outlined beyond 1993 therefore includes the staggered establishment, up to the year 2000, of four 600 MW units."

Skali announced that "Morocco, which has proceeded with the purchase of a research reactor of the Triga type from General Atomic has already received the reactor vessel and plans to complete its installation in a few months," and he added "that the development of the scientific and technical program expected from its operation cannot succeed without the continuing assistance of IAEA experts." And Skali concluded "in these different fields the agency's assistance is at the same time necessary and valuable. Consequently, we would like to express the hope that the agency's assistance program will be continued and developed."

7993
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REPORT ON SHALE OIL OUTLOOK

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 17 Oct 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] At the conclusion of the Moroccan-American symposium on oil shale, Mr Moussa Saadi provided information on the development of these deposits, which, in ten years, in 1990, will furnish the equivalent of 3,100,000 barrels of oil annually. To be sure, this amount is not a limit: production could be increased as much as will be feasible.

Here are the plans to be carried out:

1. Immediate realization of the extraction facility T3 (national process) which will be operational in 1983 at a cost of 1300 million dirhams.

Beginning in 1985, it will produce 100,000 barrels of oil annually.

2. Realization of the continuous surface process to be placed in service in 1988, which will, in 1990, have an annual production of 1,750,000 barrels.

3. Establishment of the first on-site treatment facility which will go into service in 1988 and which will produce, in 1990, 250,000 barrels of oil annually.

This on-site process must be further tested, but if positive results are achieved, it is possible that the capacity of this facility will be increased.

4. Immediate realization of the thermal power plant at Timahdit. A contract has been signed with the USSR to put the first section, from 200 to 250 megawatts, into service in 1984. When the four or five sections will be operational, the plant will produce 3 billion KWH annually, the equivalent of a million tons of oil.

These are very reasonable goals, with regard to the immense possibilities offered by the Moroccan oil shales.

However, we must take these various factors into account:

1. The high rate of investments which have kept the project (in the least) costly (preliminary) stage (of all) the T3 process.

2. The rapid development of extraction techniques which is an incentive for Morocco to avoid any excessive haste.

3. The high cost of oil produced and the favorable prospects offered by oil research.

Following are the essential aspects of the outstanding talk Mr Moussa Saadi gave before the symposium on Moroccan oil shale. Here are the main points of the talk that Mr Moussa Saadi gave on oil shale in Rabat during the Moroccan-American symposium:

"The deposits of oil shale known today, which include considerable oil resources, are primarily located in the United States, the USSR, Brazil, China, Australia, and of course, in Morocco. Other reserves are now being evaluated in several countries, including Jordan and Thailand.

The technologies for development of these bituminous rocks are improving daily and should allow oil shales to play an increasingly important role, especially in countries such as Morocco, where consumption, still relatively modest, can be satisfied, at least in part, by this resource.

"Moreover, interest in oil shales is not a recent phenomenon. The first patent to extract oil from shale was granted to a group of English entrepreneurs in 1964 [sic]. Following this, other processes have been put into use, especially in France, Scotland, Sweden, Brazil and China. However, even though the production of oil from bituminous shale preceded the discovery of oil, it has remained very weak in comparison with the production of the oil industry, since the advent of this latter in 1959 and above all, after the discovery of large deposits in the Middle East.

"It is above all after World War II and in a world context, where the economy was based on abundant and cheap energy, that the oil shale industry yielded to the unprecendented growth of oil, by vanishing in the majority of countries, with the exception of the USSR, where development continues even today.

The Timahdit deposit

"With regards to Morocco, the first attempt at development was begun, near Tangiers, in 1943. This however, was discontinued. It was in 1964 that interest in the oil shales of Timahdit was renewed. Morocco's participation in the international symposium on oil shales, organized in 1968 in Tallin, in Estonia (USSR), provided it with information on various uses of oil shales, such as the production of oil and gas, direct combustion for the production of electricity and the development of by-products such as ash.

"This prompted a preliminary geological study of the Timahdit deposit with the collaboration of Soviet experts. At the time of the energy crisis at the end of 1973, Morocco already had available a good geological study on this large deposit.

The discovery of Tarfaya

"In March 1974, His Majesty the King, in his historical speech in Erfoud, attracted attention to the necessity of promoting research on mining and on energy-producing substances, while developing to the maximum the resources of the national subsoil. Beginning with these directives and profiting from the geological information furnished by various geologists who had worked in Morocco, exploration was undertaken in several regions, which led to the discovery of another large deposit of oil shale in the region of Tarfaya.

Under the phosphates

Numerous outcrops of bituminous rocks were discovered throughout the country. The majority of them were in the same geological strata situated in the upper cretaceous layers. From this, it can be observed that the layers of oil shales of this age formed the bedrock for layers of phosphates. It is not therefore surprising that Morocco, which possesses three-quarters of the world's phosphate reserves, also has considerable oil shale reserves. These same layers are found in other countries of Africa, the Near East and America, sometimes along with liquid hydrocarbons.

The characteristics of Moroccan oil shale

"Soil and laboratory studies, conducted in connection with numerous foreign organizations, have shown that the characteristics of Moroccan shales, especially those of Timahdit, are favorable in comparison with other deposits throughout the world.

--"Great thicknesses of layers containing kerosene of sometimes more than 100 to 150 meters.

--"Regularity of grades along the same level and progressive development of these grades in depth with a maximum in the middle of the formation.

--"Inexistence of completely sterile layers within this formation.

--"Good quality of extracted oil which is considered excellent by the experts.

--"Sulfur content amounting to eight percent of the oil are sufficiently high to permit profitable recovery of this product, so valuable to the phosphate industry.

--"The mechanical properties of the bituminous rocks show enough compaction to allow underground and open-pit mining to begin, without however, showing extreme resistance to fracturing and crushing.

As with phosphates, the main deposits of oil shale are never too far from the sea. The Tarfaya deposit is even situated on the shores of the Atlantic, which represents a great advantage for the water supply of future industrial facilities.

As demonstrated in Timahdit, these shales are self-combustible, which makes them particularly useful for the production of electricity.

The deposits are often situated in thinly populated regions and do not pose many environmental problems.

Moreover, the Timahdit deposit has the advantage of being located in the center of the country, not far from the main areas of consumption.

All these advantages combine to give Moroccan oil shale excellent conditions for development.

Conclusive tests

"For this reason, this deposit was the subject of exhaustive geological and mining work, which allowed the clarification of the reserves and the various procedures

actually known, both in America and in Europe. It was in this way that almost all of the most well-known treatment procedures were tested. Tests of direct combustion were also performed, as were studies of on-site procedures.

"All these studies and tests yielded positive results. The ashes produced from pyrolysis and combustion were also the subject of a laboratory study which showed that it is possible to use them in making cement and construction materials.

"These were the principal results recorded and trends pursued. As you can observe, all the results obtained were positive. With the successive oil price rises on the international market, the exploitation of shales is showing itself to be increasingly competitive compared to the price of foreign oil. What is more, such a project will permit the country to gradually ensure its energy independence and to free itself from the unknown factors characteristic of the oil market, while enjoying other economic and social advantages.

9671
CSO: 4400

TRADE BALANCE FOR FIRST HALF OF 1980

Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE in French 3 Oct 80 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Trade Balance for First Half of 1980: Imports: 8,569.9 M DH (+24.5 percent) Exports: 5,027.5 M DH (+39.7 percent)"]

[Text] According to the statistical tables of the foreign exchange office, the trade balance for the first half of 1980 appears as follows:

Imports:	8569.9 MDH
Exports:	5027.5 MDH
Deficit:	3542.4 MDH

As compared with last year these figures show significant increases:

Imports:	+24.5 percent
Exports:	+39.7 percent

We recently published the trade balance figures for the first 5 months of 1980. Remarkable results were noted as regards exports which showed an increase of 59.7 percent. A set back was evinced in June. As a matter of fact exports progressed only slightly (+5.1 percent).

The following are the overall results for the month of June (in MDH):

	1979	1980
Imports	1220.3	1252.6
Exports	626.5	658.2
Deficits	593.8	594.4

It should be noted that the import-export coverage which amounted to 52.3 percent for the first half of 1979 rose to 58.7 percent in 1980. At the end of May it was 59.7 percent. It was influenced by the June results where the coverage was only 52.54 percent.

We recently published the broad lines of the overall Moroccan trade balance for the first half of 1980. Hereunder you will find new particulars on the results arrived at by entering in the books CAF [expansion unknown] imports, and FOB exports for each of the first 6 months.

The increase in exports is explained essentially, on the one hand, by important shipments of raw material and on the other by semi-manufactured products.

JANUARY	CAF IMPORTS	FOB EXPORTS	BALANCE
1979	1043.6	579.3	-464.3
1980	1257.8	657.3	-600.5
FEBRUARY			
1979	1014.7	487.6	-527.1
1980	1463.8	840.4	-623.4
MARCH			
1979	1162.1	638.4	-523.7
1980	1457.6	990.1	-467.5
APRIL			
1979	1268	624.1	-643.9
1980	1751.4	911.7	-839.7
MAY			
1979	1176.6	642.5	-534.1
1980	1386.8	969.8	-417
JUNE			
1979	1220.3	626.5	-593.8
1980	1252.6	658.2	-594.4
TOTAL			
1979	6885.3	3598.4	-3286.9
1980	8569.9	5027.5	-3542.4

In fact, the sale of phosphates accrued in value up to 40.1 percent reaching 262.2 MDH as against 187.2 MDH. It must be remembered that this concerns finance statistics which do not account for exported tonnage but for foreign exchange collections. These statistics are lower than the actual figures since they go back to the end of 1979. Since then exported tonnage has increased and phosphate's market price has resurged in a most spectacular manner.

As regards shipments of phosphoric acid our receipts have grown and have reached 41.1 MDH, as against only 14.7 MDH. The same trend also applies to our citrus fruit exportation: 33.6 MDH as against 0.6 MDH and for canned fish: 45.1 MDH as against 16.3 MDH.

On the other hand, the sale of mining products, other than phosphates, registers a decrease (45.6 MDH against 95.6 MDH) due to the falling off of our lead exports: 6 MDH against 56.1 MDH.

As regards the growth in our imports (1,252.6 MDH against 1220.3 MDH) this is due especially to the advance in the prices of energy products and the increase in our sulphur purchases.

7993
CSO: 4400

MOROCCO TO CREATE POSTS FOR COMMERCIAL ATTACHES

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 15 Oct 80 pp 1-2

[Text] The Council of Government, which met last Thursday 9 September, under the chairmanship of Mr Maati Bouabid, prime minister and minister of justice, adopted an important measure creating an overseas commercial attache position.

It must be kept in mind that the appointment of overseas commercial attaches is part of measures taken to stimulate exports, as provided for in the economic and social development programs of 1973-1977 and 1978-1980.

These measures also concern the creation of the CMPE (Moroccan Center for Export Promotion), the establishment of export guarantees and provisions for export financing, to name a few. The establishment of these export incentives is a necessity which must be tied to the need to reduce the deficit in our commercial exchanges by means of stronger export promotions and a reinforcement of the country's economic and financial independence.

Besides its positive effect on the balance of trade, export development is an essential stimulus of economic growth through its effects on employment, industrialization and the development of national resources.

Because of this, His Majesty's government has always considered the export sector a fundamental priority of its program of action.

The various measures which have been taken on behalf of this sector, such as the publication of an export code, the establishment of an economic customs system and export guarantees, show the desire of the government to significantly promote exports. These export incentives would have a limited effect if there were no steady assurances of outlets for our products, especially our manufactured goods, in the principal markets.

Moreover, the experience of several countries who are leaders in exports has shown that the presence in the market of a team made up of commercial promoters or "vendors" is an irreplaceable means to:

--explore commercial opportunities and gain knowledge of the market in question,

--orient national exporters on identified gaps and provide them with all requested assistance to fill them,

--act as an advisor for the choice of products, distribution network,advertising strategies, etc.

With the creation of this overseas commercial attache post, an important gap has now been filled.

The advisors attached to the ministry in charge of foreign commerce will be assigned to Moroccan diplomatic missions and placed under the authority of the diplomatic mission head. These economic advisors are responsible for many different tasks.

They will be in charge of:

--apprising and informing the various administrations and companies on everything that bears on exchange between their assigned country and Morocco,

--participating in the preparation and negotiation of commercial agreements that Morocco must conclude with third countries,

--coordinating Morocco's economic and commercial action in the countries concerned,

--assisting farmers, merchants and national manufacturers in their foreign economic activities, etc.

The importance of the functions that will be assigned to these economic advisors justifies the rigorous conditions for selection provided by the decree just adopted.

An original aspect of this decree is that it opens access to these functions to people with experience in the private sector. This praiseworthy initiative shows that the greatest priority is placed on the experience of the candidates and their competence in the area of international commerce.

A training period of several months has also been provided to familiarize the future economic advisors with the techniques of international marketing and facts about the countries in which they will exercise their functions.

With this new measure, Morocco will be equipped with structures well-adpated to this main priority of export promotion. Moreover, this action will round out the activities of the Moroccan Center for Export Promotion.

This center, which will be set up in Casablanca, will be primarily oriented towards export promotion of manufactured goods.

9671
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

NEW SUGAR REFINERY--In conjunction with the government policy of His Majesty the King of providing for the country's sugar needs as rapidly as possible, a ceremony was held last Wednesday afternoon at the headquarters of the ministry of finance, during which Mr Abdelkamel Reghay, minister of finance, Mr Azzeddine Guessous, minister of commerce, industry, the merchant marine and maritime fishing and His Highness Moulay Ali, in his capacity of president of the sugar company of Zmamra, signed an investment agreement for the establishment of a new sugar refinery at Khemis Zmamra, in the province of El Jadida. The production of the new sugar refinery will provide for 8 to 10 percent of Morocco's present consumption. It will employ 500 salaried workers, of which about 180 will be permanent positions. It should be noted that several Moroccan sugar refineries will provide the authorized capital for this new company, including COSUMAR (Moroccan Sugar Company) and the sugar refineries of Doukkala and Sidi Bennour. A Moroccan-Kuwaiti investment group will also participate. [Text] [Rabat L'OPINION in French 17 Oct 80 p 2] 9671

CSO: 4400

OFFICIAL IS OPTIMISTIC OF RICH OIL RESERVES

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 5 Nov 80 p 11

[Text]

New, commercially viable oilfields in southern Oman mean that the country is heading for self sufficiency, as it also has vast untapped reserves of natural gas. The problem is manpower.

'THE OIL picture is fairly bright right now. We don't want to be too optimistic, with inflation coming this way, but ...' There is a definite note of excitement in his voice as the usually cautious spokesman of Petroleum Development (Oman), a company closely associated with Shell, discusses the new fields in southern Oman.

At the moment Oman is pumping just under 300,000 barrels per day. This does not put the country in the big league, but it does belie the view put forward five years ago by some pessimists that Oman's resources would shortly be close to depletion.

NOT FEASIBLE

The new 445-kilometre pipeline which brings oil from the southern fields and links up with the pipe from Fahud is in full use. Its construction is regarded as a technical feat because of Oman's geography.

To connect Burba and Marmul with the oil terminal at Mina al Fahal near Muscat, it was necessary to lay the pipeline over mountainous ranges.

The existence of oil in southern Oman has been known for thirty years, since Wendell Philipps received an exclusive oil concession from Sultan Said bin Taimur, the former ruler and the father of Sultan Qaboos.

But the fields were never exploited, partly because of the old sultan's refusal to allow economic development in his country. Also, the fields were not considered economically feasible at the time because they only yielded heavy crude. Recent discoveries of light crude have overcome this objection.

OBSTACLE

The Omani government is now anxious to produce as much oil as possible. A refinery is being built near Muscat with the collaboration of the Japanese giant Mitsubishi. When it comes on stream in 1982 it will have a refining capacity of 50,000 b/d. Oman's own consumption currently stands at 25,000 b/d, so the country is heading for self sufficiency.

Oman also has considerable reserves of natural gas which it has barely touched. By the 1990s it is expected that many rural power stations which now operate on refined oil will have converted to gas.

Oman's development of resources does face a serious obstacle — a lack of technical expertise and manpower. It has virtually no petroleum engineers and few junior technicians.

Sultan bin Taimur's aversion to development extended to education, and ten years ago, when he was deposed, the country still had no school system.

CSO: 4820

RURAL BIAS IN NEW FIVE-YEAR PLAN REPORTED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 22 Nov 80 pp 18-19

[Text] The Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Qais Al Zawawi, who is also Vice President of the Financial Affairs Council last Sunday outlined the main features of Oman's new Five-Year Development Plan beginning in January 1981.

The plan was approved by Sultan Qaboos last Saturday. The Minister told reporters that the plan took two years of concerted efforts by the Ministries for its preparation.

The plan he said estimated the net revenue of the state during the next five years to be around 6,947 million Omani Rials after deducting the stipulated amount of the general reserve fund of the state.

The general expenditure for the next five years would be OR 7,364 million including OR 2,152 million for developmental purposes. The developmental outlay would thus be more than double that in the first plan period.

The Minister said the plan includes an extensive programme to provide facilities to various parts of the Sultanate with priority to areas like the Musandam area, the southern region; the interior region and other remote areas.

The facilities, he explained, would include schools, health clinics, roads electricity, water and cultural, religious and social centers. The aim was to bring these areas to the level of other developed parts of the country.

The minister said the plan gave special priority to irrigation, agriculture and fisheries. It also gave a boost to the private sector in agriculture, fisheries, industry, mining and traditional professions.

The plan also provided for an outlay of one million rials for construction of low cost houses. The outlays on roads, ports telecommunications, health and education, were much more than in the first plan.

The Minister said that a bank will be set up to promote agriculture and fisheries projects in the private sector. The development bank already existing would offer loans for industrial, mining and other development projects.

A manual giving details of the plan would be published soon, he said.

CSO: 4820

JOINT YSP-DFLP COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED

Aden AL-THAWRI in Arabic 25 Oct 80 pp 5, 13

[Article: "Joint Communique on Outcome of Talks Between Yemeni Socialist Party and Democratic Front for Liberation of Palestine"]

[Text] At the invitation of the YSP [Yemeni Socialist Party] Central Committee, a delegation of the DFLP [Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine] led by Nayif Hawatimah, the secretary general, visited the PDRY from 3-9 October 1980. The delegation included comrade Taysir Khalid, DFLP Political Bureau member, and comrade Abu-Firas, the DFLP representative in Aden.

During its visit, the delegation met with comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, the YSP Central Committee secretary general, chairman of the presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly and the prime minister, and with numerous party and state leaders. The Yemeni and Palestinian sides reviewed the Yemeni and Palestinian conditions and the serious political developments in the Arab area and the Middle East in particular and the international situation generally.

The talks between the YSP and the DFLP were characterized by comradely frankness and reflected the struggle relations between the two sides. During its visit, the delegation familiarized itself with the development of the revolutionary experience in the Democratic Yemen and with the extensive preparations for the special YSP general congress. The delegation asserted that this congress, which will be held this October, constitutes a prominent event in the country's political life--an event that is liable to bolster the party's leadership role among the toilers and popular masses of the Democratic Yemen, to enhance the progressive regime's status, to safeguard, develop and defend its accomplishments, to improve the various branches of the national economy and to enhance the people's standard of living in the economic, social, educational and cultural spheres. The Yemeni and Palestinian sides also underlined the fundamental role of the special congress in bolstering the struggle to realize Yemeni unity on national and progressive bases and with the free democratic will of the people in both parts of Yemen. They also underlined the role of this congress in bolstering the relations of struggle alliance between the Democratic Yemen on the one side and the Arab liberation and progress forces and the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front on the other, as well as the relations of struggle alliance with the socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union, so as to march forward in a united front against imperialism, Zionism, racism and reaction and to build the world of peace, social progress and socialism.

The DFLP delegation has expressed its deep appreciation for the accomplishments realized by the Democratic Yemen under the YSP leadership in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres throughout the years of independence. The delegation has also expressed its appreciation for the success achieved by the PDRY in the sphere of foreign policy at both the Arab and international levels by bolstering its relations with the Arab Steadfastness and Confrontation Front and with the Socialist countries, especially in the wake of concluding the friendship treaties with the Soviet Union, the GDR and Ethiopia and in view of the role that these treaties play in realizing the interests of the liberation and progress forces in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa, particularly under the shadow of the renewed U.S. strategy of aggression in this area. The DFLP has also expressed its high appreciation for the YDP policy and for the Yemeni people's struggle to unite the two parts of Yemen on democratic bases opposed to imperialism and reaction.

The Palestinian delegation, led by DFLP Secretary General Nayif Hawatimah, also reviewed with the YSP leaders the latest developments in the Arab area and the connection of these developments with the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples' struggle to foil the U.S. imperialist settlement, to confine it to the Egyptian-Israeli front and to obstruct its spreading to the Palestinian front and the other Arab fronts. They also reviewed the efforts of the Arab confrontation and steadfastness forces to continue the struggle against the West European and reactionary Arab schemes complementing the Camp David accords and to foil and defeat these plans in preparation for repelling the Israeli occupation from all the occupied Arab and Palestinian territories and for realizing the Palestinina people's right to repatriation, self-determination and an independent national state. The delegation also reviewed the struggle and steadfastness of the Palestinian masses, their valiant opposition to self-rule, and the expanding role performed by the DFLP within the framework of the PLO to bolster the Palestinian national unity inside and outside the occupied territories and under the canopy of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The YSP leadership, led by comrade 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, has expressed the principled and firm position of the Democratic Yemen vis-a-vis the Palestinian people's struggle for their right to repatriation, self-determination and an independent national state without any shackles or conditions. This leadership has also expressed its condemnation of the Camp David agreement and its firm position against the West European and reactionary Arab schemes complementing this agreement and this U.S. imperialist settlement. The leadership has also expressed its readiness to continue its support for the Palestinian revolution's and Lebanese National Movement's struggle against the imperialist, Israeli, Lebanese and isolationist plots aimed at the Palestinian and Lebanese peoples' resistance and at arranging the conditions on the Lebanese arena and in the occupied territories. In particular, to accept these schemes that complement the U.S. imperialist settlement for the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

The YSP leadership has also expressed its deep appreciation for the fundamental, outstanding and escalating role undertaken by the DFLP to build the Palestinian National Front in the occupied territories and to strengthen the national unity within the framework of the PLO and for the role performed by the DFP in defining and popularizing the Palestinian people's national and pan-Arab struggle tasks within the framework of the Arab national liberation movement.

The two sides have also expressed the unified position that the struggle to foil the U.S. imperialist settlement and the schemes complementing it that are being prepared by Western Europe and the International Socialism, in coordination with the Arab reactionaries in the area and in agreement with the United States, forms the central link in the entire struggle of the Arab national liberation movement which is opposed to imperialism, Zionism, and reaction. They have also expressed the unified position that this struggle requires that strong assistance be advanced to the Palestinian resistance and to the Lebanese National Movement on the advance confrontation lines so as to foil the schemes seeking to weaken and contain the revolution forces and to subjugate the PLO and to turn it into a disarmed political front. They require support for resistance to the schemes also seeking to weaken and contain the Lebanese revolutionary and National Movement forces and to impose the U.S.-Israeli-isolationist Lebanese solution on the Lebanese arena at the expense of Lebanon's unity, Arabism and independent democratic development. The two sides have also lauded the steadfastness and sacrifices of the fraternal Lebanese people and of their national and progressive forces and their honorable positions in defending the revolution and the PLO. The two sides have also underlined their united position in support of Lebanon's unity, Arabism and independent democratic development.

The two sides have also lauded the steadfastness of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories and condemned the Israeli enemy's decision to annex Jerusalem as a flagrant challenge against the Palestinian people's right to their homeland and a flagrant challenge in the face of the Arab and Muslim peoples in particular and of the world community generally. They have also urged the Arab states to adopt tangible and effective measures against the Israeli enemy and against the U.S. imperialism by putting their capabilities on the advance fronts to support the Palestinian revolution, the Lebanese National Movement and Syria. The two sides have also urged the Arab states to cut off oil and gas supplies to the United States, to withdraw Arab assets from the U.S. banks and to boycott the U.S. economically because of the U.S. position that supports the Israeli enemy and that defies openly the will of the Palestinian people, the Arab and Muslim peoples and of the international community.

The two sides have also reviewed the Arab situation and have underlined the importance of the Syrian-Libyan unity and its role in bolstering Syria's steadfastness in the face of the Israeli enemy, and of the imperialist and reactionary acts of sabotage and plotting that support the Syrian reactionaries and the Muslim Brotherhood gangs at home with the aim of weakening Syria's opposition to Camp David and to the schemes complementing it and with the aim of employing the conditions on the Syrian front to prepare for Syria's subscription to the U.S. imperialist settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The two sides have also underlined this unity's role in bolstering the Libyan Jamahiriyah's steadfastness in the face of al-Sadat's reactionary concentrations on the Jamahiriyah's borders and in the face of the U.S.-al-Sadat-Israeli alliance and the U.S. military bases in Egypt that pose a threat to the security and peace of the Libyan Jamahiriyah and of the Arab area. The two sides have also lauded the formation of the Egyptian National Front under the leadership of Lt Gen Sa'd al Din al-Shadhili and the struggle of the Egyptian masses at home under the leadership of their national progressive forces, led by the Progressive National Grouping. They have also underlined their firm solidarity with the Egyptian people's struggle to overthrow the regime of the traitor al-Sadat

who is sacrificing the Egyptian people's supreme interests and is plotting with the U.S. imperialism and with Zionism against the liberation and progress froces in the Arab area and in Africa.

The two sides have reviewed the conditions in the Arab Peninisula, the Gulf, the Red Sea area and the Horn of Africa and have underlined the importance of establishing the relations among the states of this vital area on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence as a main condition for sparing the area's peoples the dangers emanating from the strong tension nurtured by the imperialism of the United States of America--tension that escalates the chances of threatening the peoples' security and stability. In this regard, the two sides have underlined their full condemnation of the United States and of its policy which is based on building military bases of aggression in Eqypt, Oman, Somalia and Kenya in preparation for concluding suspect military security alliances tied to the Pentagon circles and to the renewed U.S. strategy of aggression which is masked by the slogans of defending the Arab and Islamic countries against imaginary dangers and which actually seeks to plot and commit aggression against the Democratic Yemen, the socialist Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, the Middle East national liberation movement and against all the forces of progress and liberation that are opposed to imperialism, Zionism and reaction in the Arab area and in the Middle East. The two sides have urged the area's peoples and their national and progressive forces to struggle jointly for the liquidation of these aggressive U.S. bases, for defeating the imperialism of the United States and for liquidating its oil and economic interests. The two sides have also stressed their full condemnation of the course of hostility to communism and to the Soviet Union--a course masked falsely with Islam and seeking fundamentally to cover up the ambitions of the U.S. imperialism and its policy which is against the security and stability of the Arab area and of the Middle East and the National interests of their peoples--a policy seeking fundamentally to weaken the national and pan-Arab liberation struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.

The two sides have stressed that the struggle against the renewed U.S. strategy of aggression in the Arab area in particular and in the Red Sea, Horn of Africa and the Middle East generally requires unity of struggle by the forces of the Arab national liberation movement and requires the alliance of these forces with the Iranian, Afghan and Ethiopian revolution in a broad regional front and with the socialist countries, led by the Soviet Union, for joint struggle to confront and defeat the U.S.-Israeli-Arab reactionary onslaught and to liquidate the U.S. military bases that pose a threat to the security and peace of the peoples.

The two sides have expressed their support for the struggle of the fraternal Omani people under the leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman to liquidate the U.S. bases and foreign forces and to evict them for good from Omani territories and their struggle to build an independent, free and democratic Oman.

The two sides have also expressed their support for the struggle of the Sahara people and for their right to determine their future under the leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of (al-Saqiyah al-Hamra' and Wadi al-Dhahab) and have lauded the military victories scored by the Sahara people and the expanding international recognition of the Sahara Republic.

The two sides have reaffirmed their solidarity with the Ethiopian revolution and have expressed appreciation for the revolutionary Ethiopian leadership's efforts to preserve Ethiopia's unity and to improve Ethiopia's economic and social conditions. They have also expressed support for the big basic steps taken by the revolution leadership to build the Working People's Party, the vanguard of the workers, farmers and other Ethiopian toilers.

The two sides have reviewed with extreme interest the ongoing war between Iraq and Iran, the big service that this war renders the U.S. imperialism and the Israeli enemy and the grave harm it causes the joint struggle of the Arab and Iranian peoples in the interest of the common enemy, especially of the U.S.-Israeli-al-Sadat Camp David alliance.

The two sides have also reviewed the international conditions and expressed their satisfaction with the victories scored by the peoples of Indochina, southwest Asia, Africa and Nicaragua and the alignment of the peoples of these countries with the camp of the liberation, progress and socialism forces whose strength is growing steadily as a result of the struggle of these peoples—a struggle that relies on the support and backing of the Soviet Union and of the socialist countries.

The two sides underline their support for the efforts of the Soviet Union and of the socialist countries to back up the anti-imperialist front and their efforts to strengthen detente and peaceful coexistence, in order to preserve the gains of peoples and to safeguard world peace and security. While supporting the SALT II agreement and denouncing the U.S. administration's maneuvers to block its approval and while supporting the sincere efforts to bring success to the European security conference scheduled to be held in Madrid at the end of this year, the two sides condemn the policy of the U.S. imperialism to set up and develop new medium-range nuclear missile bases in West Europe by virtue of its escalating the arms race and of threatening the safety and security of the European and world peoples.

In reviewing the development of the bilateral struggle relations between them, the two sides have expressed full satisfaction with the broad and deep cooperation between the YSP and DFLP in the various spheres. To strengthen this cooperation, a bilateral cooperation agreement has been concluded by the two sides.

At the conclusion of the visit, comrade Nayif Hawatimah and the delegation accompanying him expressed their deep appreciation for the warm welcome accorded them and for the outcome of the talks with the YSP leadership.

8494
CSO: 4802

GULF STATES, TURKEY SIGN OIL ACCORD

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 10 Nov 80 p 2

[Text] BAHRAIN, Sun. — Gulf countries agreed in principle today to help Turkey make up a shortfall in oil supplies from warring Iran and Iraq, a Turkish Embassy spokesman in Saudi Arabia said.

The agreement was reached at talks in Riyadh among Turkish Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen, Saudi Crown Prince Fahd Ibn Abdulaziz and the Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al-Faisal.

Turkey depends on Iran and Iraq for nine million tonnes a year (180,000 barrels a day) of oil.

IN PRINCIPLE

Saudi Arabia also agreed in principle to sign a long-term oil supply contract with Turkey, the spokesman added. He said no timetable prices or amounts had been decided for either the short-term aid or long-term contract.

Saudi Arabia and Turkey agreed during the talks that they have similar views about regional problems and King Khalid would visit Turkey at a date to be fixed, the spokesman said. — Reuter.

CSO: 4820

FIRST CONTRACTS AWARDED FOR PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Nov 80 pp 13, 14

[Text]

Gulf Petrochemical Industries has awarded the first contracts for the construction of its $400 million ammonia and methanol complex in Bahrain.

King Wilkinson (International) of Houston, which prepared the initial feasibility study for the project and which is working on a similar plant in Saudi Arabia, has been awarded a consultancy contract worth up to $9 million, it was announced last week.

Uhde of West Germany has won an order for an undisclosed sum for process technology and for technical expertise; the methanol process itself is sub-licensed from ICI of Britain.

The complex is designed to produce 1,000 tonnes of methanol and 1,000 tonnes of ammonia daily. Gulf Petrochemical's Chairman, Tewfik al-Moayed, said last week that the company expected to put out for tender early next year for the main contract. He explained that the agreement with Uhde was for the preparation of basic engineering for the entire petrochemical complex.

Wimpey Laboratories has won a site survey and soil analysis contract prior to the clearing of the 1,000 metre by 600 metre site, which is being reclaimed from the sea. Cowinconsult of Denmark has been appointed civil consultants for the site project.

Gulf Petrochemical, which is capitalised at $160 million, is owned as a joint venture by the governments of Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

NEW REFINERY--Oil officials are studying bids by international oil companies to build a new 50,000 barrels a day adjacent to the national oil distributing company refinery at Umm Said. The refinery, 5 times bigger than the existing unit is expected to meet the increasing local demand for refined oil up to 1995. In the initial years its surplus products will be exported. The existing 10,000 barrels a day refinery currently produces 885,231 barrels regular grade petrol, 36,000 barrels of high octane petrol, 32,000 barrels of kerosene, 482,000 barrels of jet fuel and 965,000 barrels of diesel oil. But Qatar's consumption exceeds 878,000 barrels of regular grade petrol, 362,000 barrels of high octane petrol, 34,000 barrels of kerosene, 549,000 barrels of jet fuel and 1,350,000 barrels of diesel oil. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 8 Nov 80 p 9]

NEW BANKING MEASURES--The Qatar Monetary Agency is considering the introduction of a legal reserve requirement on local and foreign currency deposits for local banks. It is likely that the percentage would be along "Gulf lines" and no interest would be paid on the reserves. Local currency deposits would be tackled first, to be followed later by foreign currency deposits held by local banks. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 8 Nov 80 p 15]

CSO: 4820

SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION WITH FRANCE NOTED

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 13 Nov 80 p 13

[Article by Ahmad Shaaban]

[Text] RIYADH — Plans for a solar energy powered thermodynamic plant on a site near Riyadh two years ago mushroomed into a full-fledged cooperation programme.

Between the Kingdom and France. Now the plant — scheduled to begin operating soon — will also serve as a magnet for research especially in the uses of solar energy for agriculture, according to Didier Ganichot, an adviser to the French abbassador in Jeddah.

Elements to "experiment and test the different services which solar energy could render to an agricultural installation at a remote site" will make up part of the cooperative programme, Ganichot said. Included will be operations on pumping, air-conditioning, refrigeration, winter-gardens, and water desalination.

RESEARCH

The original 40-kilowatt plant near Riyadh, requested two years ago by the Saudi national company Electricity, was supplied by Sofretes, a semi-governmental firm which specializes in advanced technology, Ganichot, said.

The Saudi Arabian National Centre for Science and Technology (SANCST) received the plant. That body is responsible for all solar energy research programmes in the kingdom.

When the agreement with Sofretes came through, one giant step followed — the cooperative venture. A protocol between SANCST and the French Commissariat de l'Energie Atomique (CEA) was signed, and two Saudi Arabian engineers designated for the programme were sent to France for a course at the CEA laboratories.

A final accord for the venture, financed jointly by the kingdom and France, will be signed within a couple of months, Ganichot said.

One aspect of the programme deals with "reverse osmosis" for desalination, the same process used by Jeddah's mini-water purification plants. Based on the principle of ultra-filtration, the process involves a pressure system.

Chemical experiments have shown that when a container of water separated by a porous panel contains water of different salinity, and pressure is applied to one side of the panel, that side will gradually be filled with water of a higher salt density.

Meanwhile, desalted water will move through the pores of the panel to the opposite, non-pressurized side of the container.

Solar energy is effective with reverse osmosis since a minimal amount of energy is necessary. The process can be used in the kingdom effectively, moreover, because Saudi Arabia has abundant sunshine as well as the money to finance research for alternative energy sources.

Ganichot points out that France "is a leader in this field," too, thus leading to the cooperative venture.

But this cooperation, as in any field, can be limited by a language barrier. Consequently, France has begun a cultural plan involving two basic parts : language centres and academic cooperation. Three centres — in Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam — will have 12 full-time and 12 part-time instructors.

CSO: 4820

INSURANCE TRADE HIT BY WAR

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 6 Nov 80 p 3

[Text] LONDON, Wed. — The United Arab Emirates insurance market has lost valuable business through the Gulf conflict, which has cut the once booming re-export trading from Dubai, according to Lloyd's List, the specialist insurance and shipping newspaper here today.

In a report from Abu Dhabi, the newspaper said that no accurate figures for the downturn are available. But the UAE Insurance Association, which represents most of the 6 UAE insurance companies, says the loss was one per cent of the re-export trade.

For the first six months of this year, exports from Dubai were running at around 400 million dirhams.

The newspaper commented, "this is only one of a number of difficulties facing the insurance market in the UAE most stem from sheer weight of numbers — there are too many companies chasing insufficient business. —Kuna.

CSO: 4820

MOROCCO PERCEIVES ALGERIAN CHANGE OF ATTITUDE ON SAHARA

Dakar LE SOLEIL in French 6 Nov 80 p 8

[Text] Rabat--There is a general feeling in the Moroccan capital, 5 years after the "Green March" of 350,000 Moroccans into former Spanish Sahara, that the conflict which bloodies the region has entered its "final quarter hour."

King Hassan II, who has stated many times in the past year that "1980 will be the year of peace" in the Sahara, can see his efforts coming to fruition. He has declared that Moroccan troops have acquired "total control on the battlefield," while a marked evolution can be noticed in diplomatic activities.

During the 5 war years, the Algerian and Libyan supported POLISARIO has never succeeded in establishing control over any major town or village, nor to secure a strong position in the Western Sahara; even if its vehicles can move unhampered through its rugged and desertic spaces.

This failure of the POLISARIO, particularly in its attempts at securing Smara, has forced it to concentrate the major part of its efforts, for the last year, on the undisputed territories of the Moroccan south, more densely populated and closer to its bases in Tinduf.

This northward shift of the war has incited King Hassan II to draw the Algerian leaders attention to the fact that Moroccan defenders would now have no more reasons not to counterattack into Algerian territory.

Alluding to the catastrophic consequences which could result from an eventual conflict between the two countries, last 10 October as he addressed the Moroccan national assembly, the king stated his "conviction" that POLISARIO's action was "an element of a vast intrigue directed against Morocco and Algeria." These admonishments have been read in Rabat as a public appeal toward Algiers following numerous secret contacts to seek a solution to the conflict.

They have been followed almost immediately, in connection with the earthquake in El Asnam, by concrete signs of improved relations between Rabat and Algiers: condolences message from King Hassan II to President Chadli Benjedid, dispatch of military planes loaded with blankets, food and medical supplies, collection of sheepskins in the Aid Al Adha, to be sold for the benefit of the earthquake victims, and a return message of thanks from the Algerian president. Only a few months ago, such gestures would have been unthinkable; even while King Hassan II had carefully prevented, through the 5 war years, reaching an irremediable break between the two countries.

On the international scene, the Moroccan position has first obtained a victory early in September, at the Wise Men Committee of the OAU meeting in Freeport. Impressed by 10 delegations from Saharouite groups supporting Morocco, the committee has adopted a resolution which ignores the POLISARIO's existence, and which does not require anymore that Moroccan troops should be removed before a referendum is held to decide of self-determination.

In Rabat, there is a perception that the Algerian position has shifted and, in certain political circles, hope is expressed that Algiers could extricate itself completely from the Saharian imbroglio where, as it has always proclaimed, "it has no particular interest to defend."

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END

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2234

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GULF STATE SECURITY AGREEMENTS

Jiddah ARAB NEWS in English 27-28 Nov 80 p 1

[Text]

KUWAIT, Nov. 26 (SPA) — The Kingdom is awaiting ratification of several bilateral agreements that will link Arab Gulf states in a network of common security Saudi Arabian Interior Minister Prince Naif, in Kuwait Wednesday, said draft agreements with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman are in the hands of these countries' ministers. Saudi Arabia last year and early this year signed security pacts with Tunisia, Jordan and Iraq.

Also linked to the Kingdom by security agreements signed during the past year are the Republic of China and South Korea.

"Once these (new) agreements have been signed, they will help bring about the security coordination and unification that we have always wanted," Prince Naif said.

"The security of every state in the Arabian Gulf affects the security of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom," he said. "We will not permit any threat to this security."

The prince said his government now treats Kuwaiti citizens as Saudi Arabians in terms of entry, exit and residence. Only an entry visa is needed for as lengthy a stay as they want. The current visit to Kuwait included talks with Sheikh Nawaf Al Hamd, minister of interior, on matters of mutual security interest.

"We were both satisfied by the security situation in our countries and certainly did not ignore the effects, direct or indirect, of the war between Iraq and Iran," Prince Naif said.

The government has respected resolutions by Arab ministers to allow the movement and residence of Palestinians in Arab countries, the prince said. But the government, he pointed out, does not encourage foreigners living in the Kingdom on short visas or brief contracts to bring in their families since this would tax available services. Decisions on keeping families out "were not security measures," the prince said.

Those who expect to be in the Kingdom for a long time and who can afford to maintain their families, of course would be allowed to bring them in, he added. And people in the country prior to the new regulations are naturally exempt.

CSO: 4820

SUDAN, MOROCCO AGREE ON JOINT TRADE PLAN

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 15 Nov 80 p 16

[Text] Sudan and Morocco agreed on Wednesday to establish joint Chambers of Commerce and Trade centers in the capitals of both countries.

The agreement signed here by Sudanese Trade Minister Farouk Al-Maghboul and Moroccan education and scientific research minister Saeed Billashier, also called for exchange of visits by businessmen from both countries.

The two countries also agreed to revive a navigation agreement they signed in 1977 but failed to implement. Meanwhile, in another development five international banks have agreed in principle to reschedule Sudanese debts totalling 600 million dollars, Finance Minister Bader-Edin Suliman has said.

Suliman, quoted by the Sudanese news agency, said the agreement would be formalised in the near future. Citibank, Chemical Bank, Deutsche Bank, Union Banques Arabes et Francaises and the Arab-African International Bank would give Sudan three years grace period and seven years maturity in the reported rescheduling agreement, Suliman said.

Sudan is also seeking the possibility of getting 50 million dollars to 100 million dollars from European lending markets to support its balance of payment, Suliman said without elaboration. No other details were given.

Another AP report has said that a week-long symposium on how to achieve African industrialisation through modern technology began in Khartoum, on Wednesday. The symposium sponsored by the United Nations Industrial Development Organisation and the Organisation of African Unity, aims at putting technical know-how, acquired by industrial countries of developed [as published] at home to best use in the Black continent.

A UNIDO Press release said the symposium would also seek means of boosting industrialisation in Africa and national technology planning.

CSO: 4820

REPORTS OF FIGHTING IN AFGHAN PROVINCES

Karachi DAWN in English 28 Nov 80 p 22

[Text] Peshawar, Nov. 27--According to reports from inside Afghanistan, heavy fighting continues all over Afghanistan between the Russian forces and Mujahideen.

In Rustaq sub-province of Pakhar province Russian troops launched the attack with more than one thousand tanks and armoured cars and 62 helicopters and jet bombers after Mujahideen eliminated Karmal's troops and captured their weapons.

In the fighting that took place Mujahideen killed 22 Russian soldiers, five Mujahideen were martyred. But casualties among the villages were very high.

More than a hundred women and children were killed and 60 houses, mosques and schools were destroyed.

Russian invaders launched an attack on Bolaghain and Sanjan of Kohistan sub-province (Parwan province).

Fighting continued for one and half day. Details of casualties is not known, but two helicopters were shot down.

Another Russian attack was launched on Andarab of Boghlan province. Mujahideen of the Islamic alliance resisted strongly. Numerous Russians were killed and five tanks destroyed.

According to a report from Baghlan, Mujahideen of Nahreen launched an attack on the Russian troops. In the heavy fighting 82 Russian soldiers were killed and seven tanks were destroyed.

The report adds that all Parchami agents escaped from the sub-provincial capital of Nahreen after this incident.

According to a report from Panjshair, Mujahideen of the alliance defeated another attack by the enemy for bringing the valley under its control. In one of the incidents, Mujahideen under the command of Abdul Wasae destroyed four tanks and six trucks and killed a large number of the invading troops.

In another incident Mujahideen destroyed three tanks and killed more than one hundred Russians and Karmal's troops. Three officers and twenty soldiers of the Babrak Army and some weapons were captured by the Mujahideen.

The Afghan Government has warned Cabinet Ministers, party members, the Armed Forces, Secret Police and militia against harassing people in the name of quashing guerilla activities and said that anyone found guilty would be severely punished, Kabul radio announced.

A commission has been set up to investigate the growing number of accusations of murder and harassment, the state-owned radio said last night.

"Concerned Ministers and all Government officials at the centre and in the provinces will be held responsible for following the basic principle of the Government's laws, regulations and decrees in dealing with the counter-revolutionaries," the radio said.--PPI-AFP.

CSO: 4920

HEAVING FIGHTING CONTINUES IN PAKTIA

Karachi DAWN in English 26 Nov 80 pp 1, 12

[Text] Peshawar, Nov. 25--The Hezb-i-Islami, Afghanistan, has claimed that fighting was going on all over Afghanistan against the invading Russian forces with most of the territory now under full control of Mujahideen.

According to a report, Mujahideen of Hezb-i-Islami, Afghanistan, attacked the capital of Paktia province (Sharana). The fighting lasted from 10 p.m. till early morning. As a result a military jeep along with the wireless set and two military trucks were completely burnt up.

The Governor's communication house was destroyed. Three towers of the Governor's building were destroyed, and a commander, two captains and twenty soldiers were killed.

Reports from Laghman province say that heavy fighting took place between Mujahideen of Shinwar, and the Russians in which several hundred Russians and militia troops were killed.

According to a report from Kunar province, Russian troops launched an attack on Dera Paich.

In the fighting Mujahideen destroyed three tanks, killed four Russians and wounded several of them. Heavy bombardment by helicopters and jets severely damaged Shah Saleem, Chenar Banda, Malumanda, Shengal, Wamt and several other villages.

Another report from Kunar said a strong Russian attack was also launched on Dara Mazar. In this attack in which hundreds of tanks and thirty planes took part, hundreds of Russians were killed and 55 Mujahideen.

According to a report from Laghman province, Russians suffered heavy casualties. They withdrew from Laghman but in some places tried to instal their agents.--PPI.

CSO: 4920

JOINT USSR-AFGHAN 'MANEUVERS'

Karachi DAWN in English 27 Nov 80 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Nov. 26--Joint Soviet-Afghan military exercises have been underway in Afghanistan for the past two weeks which are officially described as "manoeuvres," but which western diplomats are inclined to classify as search and destroy operations.

Reports from the provinces reaching Kabul contain gruesome details.

Many reports said the Afghan troops involved in the manoeuvres were disgruntled and outraged by the civilian population's cold rejection of them.

In the townlet of Hussein-Kot, only 15 kilometres north of the capital a general agreement has been reached between the soldiers and the local inhabitants.

Searches are carried out in form only.

According to Kabul Radio and Afghan newspapers, almost all the important ministers visited the manoeuvre areas to evaluate deployment of the troops "and to suggest improvements."

In Kabul itself security measures have again been tightened since the manoeuvres began.--DPA.

CSO: 4920

REPORT ON FIGHTING IN KANDAHAR AREA

Karachi DAWN in English 1 Dec 80 pp 1, 10

[Text] Quetta, Nov 30--As a result of grim fighting in district Khakhiawa (Kandahar province), the Mujahideen of Hizb-i-Islami Afghanistan (Yunis Khalis group) captured 50 guns, four rifles and four soldiers of the Afghan Army.

The Mujahideen also attacked a godown and seized 15,000 kilograms of wheat. They also hoisted the white flag of the Hizb-i-Islami in the area.

The freedom fighters also attacked the Education Department office at Sarikar, the provincial headquarters of Parwaan province, as a result of which they killed three members of the Parcham Party and captured 30 Afghan Armymen.

They also seized seven rifles and three machine-guns.

The Afghan Army encircled a camp of the Mujahideen in the Khogiani area of Nangarhar Division and killed 17 Mujahideen and three other persons.

The Mujahideen, however, succeeded in breaking the siege and gunned down 23 troops of the Afghan Army including 18 Russian officers. The Mujahideen sniped at a police station in Kabuli Darwaza area in Kandahar City at night and killed two Russian captains and many guards posted there.

Three Mujahideen also lost their lives in this attack.

In another attack in the Herat Darwaza area in Kandahar City, the Mujahideen killed twelve Afghan Armymen besides destroying three weapon carriers and two tanks. They also seized a wireless set.

The attack was conducted by Commander Haji Khair.

The freedom fighters also attacked an Afghan forces camp in Energia area (Kandahar province) and as a result of four hours of tense fighting the Mujahideen killed eight troops of the Afghan Army and destroyed three tanks. Six Mujahideen lost their lives while three were grievously injured.

New Russian Rifle

According to reliable reports received from across the border, the Soviets are testing their new AK-74 assault rifle--a 5.45 mm weapon likely to replace the existing AK-47 rifle--in their combat against the Mujahideen in Afghanistan.

An analysis of its rounds shows that the projectile is not made of lead but consists of a steel insert surrounded by a copper jacket with an empty space in the extreme nose which 'blows an enormous hole in a man.'

This feature of the new rifle raises the possibility of violation of the Geneva Convention against the use of explosive bullets which banned the notorious 'dum-dum' hollowpoint bullet.

The new rifle has two variants--the solid stock AK-74 and the folding AKS-74 which are apparently similar to the old AK-47 but are thought to make better use of plastics in their construction.

It is further learnt that the Soviets have inducted P-19 surveillance radars in Afghanistan which are used in conjunction with SAMs surface-to-air missiles. These radars have the ability to guide the missiles towards low flying targets through heavy clutter and have a maximum range of 85 kms.

Meanwhile, acts of sabotage and assassination against Soviet personnel have recently increased amidst growingly strained relations between Soviet forces and Afghan Army. One recent example was the assassination of four Russians while sleeping at a military camp near Mazar-i-Sharif.

Fighting also erupted between the Soviet troops stationed at Jalalabad and Afghan soldiers in which a number of Russians were killed during an exchange of fire.

The names of those involved in this infighting have been sent to the Army headquarters at Kabul for necessary action.

Cuban Denial

Cuba's Foreign Ministry yesterday strongly denied news reports its troops have been sent to Afghanistan.

In an official dispatch transmitted by Cuba's official 'Prensa Latina' news agency the Ministry said reports published earlier last week accused Cuba of sending soldiers to Afghanistan.

"There are no Cuban soldiers, there are no Cuban combat units in Afghanistan. Those who say or imply otherwise are lying," the Ministry said.

According to a BBC report tonight, Cuban Foreign Ministry statement said such reports were meant to undermine Cuba's mediatory efforts to bring about a settlement of the Afghan problem.

CSO: 4920

SOVIET TROOPS' MORALE EXPECTED TO FALL

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 30 Nov 80 p 8

[Text] Peking, Nov. 29--Afghan guerillas fighting Soviet troops are suffering from a shortage of warm clothing and lack of shelter as the bitter winter sets in, the official New China News Agency (NCNA) said today.

But the extreme cold will also guerillas, it added. [as published]

Quoting guerillas, the NCNA said that the morale of Soviet impede the movement of Soviet tanks and aircraft, especially the helicopter gunships which posed the main threat to the troops was expected to sink further this winter.

The guerillas had the advantage that they obtained their supplies locally unlike the Soviet troops who were supplied from thousands of miles away, it added.

It said: "Although the guerillas "can live under the open sky in the mountains in summer, they, however, must find a place to live in today." "Their winter clothes and quilts are not adequate."

"As the freedom fighters are lightly-equipped and waging a guerilla warfare, it is unlikely that their operations will be seriously affected by the winter," it said.

The NCNA quoted guerilla leaders as saying Soviet troops were likely to concentrate their forces to defend major cities, airfields and bases this winter.

"They are expected to safeguard the security of main lines of communication and attack selected areas under guerilla control to cut off contact between different groups," it added.--Reuter

CSO: 4920

PETROLEUM TRADING FLUCTUATES

Exports Resumed

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 17 Nov 80 p 4

[Text]

An East German tanker loaded 80,000 tonnes (about 560,000 barrels) of Iranian crude from the terminal at Kharg Island last week despite the continuation of the Gulf war, it was reported. Oil industry sources in London quoted by *Agence France-Presse* said that loading was disturbed by an Iraqi air raid, but later resumed and the tanker left with a full cargo.

Kharg Island is about 220 kilometres south-east of Abadan, the heart of the battleground.

The report said that vessels from North and South Korea, Turkey and Rumania loaded Iranian crude from the terminal at Lavan-e-sirri, 750 kms down the Gulf from the war zone, last week.

Imports of Petroleum Products

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 24 Nov 80 p 5

[Text]

Iran recently imported $600 million worth of refined petroleum products, *Agence France-Presse* reported from Munich last week. Quoting an unnamed director of the Tehran branch of an unidentified German bank, *AFP* said these imports consisted mainly of petrol, kerosene and diesel.

The source also warned that Iran's Central Bank reserves were lower than its own director, Alireza Nowbari, has been claiming. According to the unidentified bank manager Iran only has only enough reserves to last it another three or four months. In recent weeks, Mr Nowbari has on several occasions stated that his country had enough currency reserves to maintain its economy without oil exports for another 8 months, and even 11 months if everybody tightened their belts (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, October 20).

CSO: 4920

JAPAN HALTS WORK AGAIN ON PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 17 Nov 80 pp 4, 5

[Text]

Work has again been suspended on the $3.6 billion Japanese-Iranian petrochemical complex at Bandar Khomeini on the Gulf, the venture's main Japanese partner announced in Tokyo last week. Mitsui and Company, the leader of a consortium of Japanese firms, said a decision to halt work was taken in Tehran, where Emei Yamashita, President of the project's Japanese investment firm Iran Chemical Development Company, was conferring with the Iranian authorities. The bandar Khomeini complex was 85 per cent complete when the Gulf war began but has been bombed several times by Iraqi aircraft. According to Japanese press reports, the cost of repairing damage to the plant could exceed $700 million.

Work on the project was halted by the Iranian revolution and was resumed shortly before the war after the Japanese government provided fresh funds and several Japanese firms joined the consortium. Mitsui denied last week a report in the Tokyo daily *Asahi Shimbum* that a plan was being devised to cover losses if Mitsui withdrew from the project. " Mitsui will have to consult the Japanese government, financial institutions and other partners here before it makes such a decision," the company declared in a statement issued in Tokyo.

There is, however, the possibility that the Japanese government may end its participation in the Bandar Khomeini complex. A government spokesman said last week that a decision on whether to continue official support would be taken after the bomb damage had been assessed. *Reuters* quoted industrial sources as saying that the government's withdrawal would lead Mitsui and other Japanese firms to pull out as well. The government spokesman said official policy was still to complete the Bandar Khomeini project.

Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki told the Diet (parliament) last week than an envoy would be sent to Iran once the fighting ended to assess the damage to the complex. He indicated that the envoy would probably

be accompanied by a team of experts and the Ministry for International Trade and Industry said it was putting together a group of officials, industrialists and bankers who would go to Tehran after the war. Mr Suzuki said he was aware of the fact that the Iranian government was determined to complete the Bandar Khomeini complex, Iran's biggest industrial venture. But the Japanese Premier added that it was necessary to determine the extent of the damage caused by Iraqi aircraft.

Meanwhile, Japanese manufacturers and exporters of machinery last week sought aid from the government to overcome financial difficulties arising from contracts with Iran and Iraq. The Japanese Industrial Machinery Exporters Association said contracts this year with the two countries totalled $5.9 billion. Machinery worth $1 billion had been shipped but no payments had been received and another $1.9 billion worth of exports could not be shipped to Iraq or Iran because of the war, the Association said. It asked the government to apply export insurance for exports stranded by the war and to permit exporters to invoke *force majeure* for machinery that cannot be shipped to the Gulf.

CSO: 4920

NEW MEAT AGREEMENT CONCLUDED WITH NEW ZEALAND

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 17 Nov 80 pp 4, 5

[Text]

Iran has concluded a new agreement with New Zealand for the supply of 70,000 tonnes of lamb during the current season, which started on October 1. The $128 million deal far exceeds the 47,000 tonne shipment originally provided for by an agreement between the two countries just over a year ago (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, October 22, 1979).

New Zealand was to supply Iran with 200,000 tonnes of meat between 1979 and 1983 at a total cost of $450 million; this represents an average of around 50,000 tonnes every season, which ends in September. Iranian purchases of New Zealand meat had already reached 64,400 tonnes last September, nearly 20,000 tonnes more than the 47,000 tonnes scheduled.

According to reports from Wellington, the Iranian Meat Organisation has agreed to grant New Zealand an option to ship meat orders with a margin of 10 per cent above or below contract specifications.

At the present rate of supply, New Zealand is providing Iran with more than one-fifth of its meat imports, which constitute around 30 per cent of the country's meat consumption. Along with Australia, which supplies Iran with vast quantities of wheat as well as 60 per cent of its meat imports, New Zealand meets aoubt 30 per cent of total Iranian food needs (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, May 12 and October 8, 1979).

Last week, Iran's Minister of State for Executive Affairs, Behzad Nabavi, announced the tripling of petrol prices and new plans to ration basic goods. So far, the only consumer necessity to be rationed was sugar, Mr Nebavi said. But the continuation of the war in the Gulf and the 20-25 per cent food price increases may mean that meat may also become rationed soon.

CSO: 4920

DISPOSITION OF SHAH'S WEALTH POSES SERIOUS PROBLEMS

Karachi DAWN in English 26 Nov 80 pp 7, 9

[Article by Yehia M. Syed]

[Text]

JUST how much did the late Shah take out of Iran? What devious and dubious mechanisms were used to milk the country? Where has the money gone? What role did the international bankers play in the tragedy of Iran?

The answer to the first, the more important, question is between 56 billion and one billion dollar.

Tom Shack of Abourezk, Shack and Mandehall, the Washington law firm, hired by the Islamic Revolutionary government of Iran, in early Dec, 1979, had started legal proceedings against the Shah (who was alive then and living in America) for the return of some 56 billion dollars in allegedly misappropriated funds and 'compensation damages'.

Tom Shack had then said the legal proceedings against the Shah call for the Shah to refund 20 billion dollars allegedly twisted from Iranian Government funds through the Pahlavi Foundation.

Western analysts' view

A separate paper demanded the return of 8 billion dollars from Empress Farah and another 30.5 billion dollars from the Pahlavi couple for 'punitive damages'.

On the other side of the scale the extent of the late Shah's own fortune has been the subject of constant speculation since the Shah fled Teheran on 16 Jan. 1979.

The collective overseas assets of the Pahlavi family, according to Western analysts quoted by the British newsweekly, "8 Days", last 1979) December, are probably close to the Islamic Revolutionary Government of Iran's calculations of 17 billion and 21 billion dollars, which the Iranian Government says the Pahlavi family had put away abroad in property and in Swiss and American banks.

The fact of the matter is that so far the most intentive probing by top investigators, even the CIA, have failed to prove a conclusive link between the Pahlavi Foundation and the personal fortunes and the amount involved.

The Pahlavi Foundation, no doubt, was one of the richest and most useful front organisation in modern financial history.

Mohammed Reza Shah till his departure on Jan 16, 1979, ran Iran as a personal fiefdom, like his father before him, for 38 years that he ruled.

Even without the vast properties and holdings amassed throughout Iran and abroad during the 54-year-rule of the Pahlavi dynasty, the family is still reckoned one of the richest in the world.

As recently as early 1977, the Chase Manhatten, the American bank which had been closest to the Imperial Pahlavi family, took the lead in raising a record loan.

cycle companies — Pichiteman and Tiffo!"

Most earnings from holdings within the Pahlavi net were shifted from Teheran banks, through Bank Omran and three other banks partly controlled by the Pahlavis, viz. Bank Iranshahr, Bank Dariush and Bank Etebarat, into accounts of properties overseas.

Twelve private Iranian banks also made 800 million dollars in loans to the Shah's three sisters—Ashraf, Shams and Fatima — according to Mr Ali Reza Nobari, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran.

Mr Nobari explained that three million dollars were transferred into secret numbered accounts in Geneva, Paris and one of Citibank's Middle East branches.

During the last month of the Shah's reign (Jan. 1979), according to a February communique issued by the Central Bank Employees, the Pahlavi Foundation also received, in various foreign bank accounts, 12 million dollars from the National Iranian Oil Company ten million dollars from the Plan and Development Organisations, 25 million dollars from the Finance Minstry, 6 million dollars from the Defence Ministry, and 12 million dollars from Bank Markazi. These sums were regular payments, a kind of royal levy, paid three times a year by ministries and state-run agencies!

For obvious reasons the foreign accounts were never placed under the personal Pahlavi name. An Iranian investigation into the Shah's Swiss assets said recently: "There are hundreds of front companies, trustees, and people acting as nominees on behalf of the Shah or his family. Concealed that way, there could be two, four, even eight billion dollars stashed in Switzerland alone."

A bank statement for a Pahlavi Foundation account in the 'Union des Banques Suisses' shows that 12 million dollars was paid into the Pahlavi Foundation account by PIOC (the National Iran Oil Company) on 1st Feb. 1962, and another 8 million dollars was added by the Iranian Seven Year Plan Organisation on Feb. 27.

This latter money was once earmarked for the Shah's much vaunted agricultural reform of 56,800,421.59 dollars. In the Pahlavi Foundation account 45 million dollars were paid out in round sums: the Shah's family took 26 million dollars, including 15 million dollars payment made to his wife, Farah.

It provided no less than 500 million dollars for the Imperial Government to balance its budget, which was suffering (even after the 1973 oil-price increase) acutely from arms buying and other projects.

This sum was raised by 11 bankers, including the British Natwest, which enjoyed close links with the Chase.

The international bankers were all competing to lend to the Shah and his family and the frontiers between the Government and the monarchy were often blurred. The Shah had his own personal bank, the Bank Omran (which means "development"), but it was engaged in developing the Shah's personal fortune. It was wholly owned by the Pahlavi Foundation which, though presented as a charity, was the chief vehicle for the imperial family's finances and fortune.

Some time ago a Paris-based Iranian exile newspaper Namah Rouz, claimed that the late Shah and his relatives owned a share in over 6,000 enterprises (in some like Bank Omran 100 per cent; Bank Iranshahr, 20 per cent; Development and Investment Bank of Iran, major share; Bank Etebarat, owned by Ashraf Foundation and Ashraf's son now killed; Kourosh Credit and Loans, the Shah and twin sister Farah major shareholders; Middle East Insurance Services Ashraf Foundation, 100 per cent shareholder, etc both inside and overseas.

Through the Pahlavi, Ashraf Pahlavi and Farah Pahlavi Foundations—shadowy multinational financial entities that operated on the basis of charity for tax purposes—the royal family reportedly controlled 80 per cent of Iran's cement industry; 52 per cent of all banks and insurance companies; 40 per cent of all textile productions; 42 per cent of the construction industries; 70 per cent of the tourist and hotel industries and 56 per cent of the steel and aluminium industries (these figures are taken from the British newsweekly, "8 Days").

Not only Mohammad Reza Shah ran Iran as his own property, and as "Shah Inc", but his brother, Mahmoud, also ruled over the mining industry by holding shares in at least eight of the major companies that mined cobalt, turquoise and bauxite.

"Instead of the bicycle that most daughters receive from their fathers", wrote a British weekly, "Princess Shahnaz was given a controlling interest in two motor-

Records destroyed

As the Pahlavi records and most of the important documents and files about the royal family's finances were either destroyed or shredded by the bank officials involved to save their necks, no correct or real assessment can be justly made of the Shah's and his family's assets and cash deposit abroad.

Perhaps it was because of this that as late as November 4, 1980, on the first anniversary of the taking of 52 American hostages Mr Ali Reza Nobari, Governor of the Central Bank of Iran was quoted as saying that while the assets frozen in the US were worth 20,000 million dollars (£8,176 million), the late Shah's assets could be worth a further 7,000 million dollars (£2,862 million).

On the first anniversary of taking of American hostages (Nov. 4) the Iranian Majlis (Parliament) had set out four conditions for freeing them which, in reverse order, were:

(a) The return to Iran of the assets of the late Shah.
(b) The dropping of all financial claims against Iran.
(c) The unfreezing by President Carter of blocked Iranian assets held in American banks.
(d) The pledge by the US not to interfere in Iranian affairs.

While (a) was estimated by Mr Nobari at 7,000 million dollars (£2,862 million), he estimated that frozen assets in America (c), which were frozen on Nov. 14, 1979, ten days after the American Embassy in Teheran was occupied by a group of militant students — in gold and cash — were worth 14,000 million dollars (£5,725 million. There was a further 6,000 million dollars (£2,454 million), he had said, in terms of 258 suit claims brought by American corporations, companies and banks and citizens (b), as a result of the cancellation of contracts for projects in Iran started during the Shah's regime and abruptly stopped after the Revolution.

The American view, as I write, is that two of the above four terms put forward by the Iranian Government for releasing the hostages could pose a serious obstacle, requiring lengthy negotiations, even court actions — the cancellation of all American legal claims (b) and the return of the assets of the late Shah (a).

At the time when President Carter froze the Iranian assets in the US, a year ago (on Nov. 14, 1979), they totalled about 8,000 million dollars (£3,270 million). Since then writs for 3,000 million dollars (£1,227 million) have been filed, while major American banks used their Iranian deposits to offset loans to Teheran given during the Shah's reign.

Experts say it could take years for the courts to settle the 268 suits filed by American individuals and corporations against Iran.

Moreover, they say, it has not been possible to locate and assess all the late Shah's holdings in the US.

Mr Nobari and a group of American lawyers, who were consulted before the Iranian Majlis drafted (on Sunday, Nov. 2, 1980) the above four conditions for the release of the American hostages, worked out what they believed to be an "escape formula". This was designed to assist the American President around the legal difficulties that would be involved in trying simply to transfer the Shah's wealth back to Iran.

The American lawyers convinced Mr Nobari and the Iranian Government that the way out of this dilemma and legal impasse was for Iran to announce the nationalisation of the assets of the late Shah and his immediate family.

While the release of the American hostages in Iran, as I write, now appears to depend critically on Washington's willingness to unfreeze the Iranian assets in banks, it is ironic that many of them are held in London.

The answer to my second self-posed question in the beginning "what devious and dubious mechanisms were used to milk the country" lies in just four persons who played a role in the Shah's billion-dollar machine — Hushang Ansari his brother, Cyrus Ansari, former Iranian Prime Minister Jaafar Sharief Emami and Mohammad Jaafar Behbehanian, the Shah's private Financial Adviser.

Hushang Ansari, a lowly government newsman employed by the Iranian Government news agency bureau in Tokyo (where he married a Japanese wife, whom he divorced as he rose up in status), caught the Shah's eye during his 1958 official visit to Japan. He joined the Tokyo Embassy's commercial section.

From there Hushang's career really took off and he became Ambassador at Tokyo and within 6 years he rose from a lowly diplomat to head the all powerful post of Financial and Economic Affairs Minister (1974-77). He was sent to Washington to serve the Pahlavi fortune abroad in the event of the impending rebellion in Iran.

Hushang's brother, Cyrus, who obtained a US citizenship by marrying an American, acted as one of the Shah's nominee on the board of the West German group, Krupp, in which the Shah's interets were huge. He bought Huttenwerke, a subsidiary of Krupps, for 150 million dollars, and for yet another 125 million dollars he bought Krupp's two Brazilian subsidiaries. In Oct. 1976, the Shah purchased a 25.01 per cent share in Krupp's holding company for reportedly 225 million dollars.

Mohammad Jaafar Behbehanian for the better part of his 33 years in the Imperial Court, served as the Shah's private financial adviser and handled all the Shah's assets outside the Pahlavi Foundation and received a handsome sum for major transactions.

Before the Shah fled Teheran, he reportedly made him to sign a 70 million dollar cheque made payable to bearer, which was to be deposited in an undisclosed account outside Iran. With the money he fled to Switzerland when he owned a townhouse in Basle. Behbehanian, who was on the board of the Bank of Oman, 100 per cent owned by the Pahlavis, also ran the Shah's financial affairs in Europe and perhaps in America.

Former Iranian Prime Minister, Fata Sharief Emami, the fourth of the Shah's "money men," was also called "Mr Five Per Cent" in the inner Government circles as that was the percentage he got as commission on every deal concluded between private enterprises and the shady Pahlavi Foundation, the organisation which acted as the royal family's conduit to carefully concealed bank accounts abroad.

Emami, who for 16 years ran the Foundation, escaped Teheran before the February revolution.

None of these, including the late Shah, perhaps, was or is aware that there is no pocket in the shroud.

CSO: 4920

BRIEFS

U.S. DATA COMPANY SUES--The American company Control Data Corporation has filed lawsuits totalling $28 million against the government and firms in Iran for non-payment of its computer services. The claims are based on the failure of the company's Iranian customers to pay their bills, and Control Data Corporation's inability to recover the use of its assets, mainly computer equipment under lease. Control Data's Vice-president Lawrence Perlman said the purpose of the suits was to protect the company's legal rights in Iran as no other legal remedy was available. This did not mean, he added, that the company was unwilling to arrive at an amicable resolution of its differences with the Iranian clients. On the contrary, such a solution was desirable to Control Data in order to resume normal business with Iran as soon as possible, Mr Pelman pointed out. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 24 Nov 80 p 5]

CSO: 4920

'DAVAR'CRITICAL OF POLICY IN TERRITORIES

TA081635 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 8 Dec 80 p 7

[Commentary by Dani Rubinstein: "When the Military Considerations Are the Sole Decisive Ones"]

[Text] For many months, ever since Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizman resigned, no political echelon has devoted any attention to the administered territories. When Moshe Dayan and Shim'on Peres were defense ministers and after that, during 'Ezer Weizman's period in office, every action in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip was also considered from the political or socio-economic viewpoint. Matters have now gone through a complete metamorphosis. It is the military-security consideration that now guides almost everything done in the territories.

In the past a cabinet minister was the person to go to with complaints, requests and problems from Nabulus, Hebron and Gaza. Today, such a person no longer exists. Prime Minister Begin has, in fact, left the handling of the territories to the IDF, the chief of staff, the police, the security services and his deputy, Mordekhay Tzipori. The main interest Begin and Tzipori have shown in Judaea and Samaria has been in the Gush Emunim settlements. Without examining their timetable of meetings and sessions over the past year, it is clear that the Elon More affair, for example, was far more important for them than dealing with any matter involving the Arab population in the territories.

It has been a long time since any Israeli from the political level visited an Arab town in the territories. Begin has never made such a visit and neither has Tzipori. It seems, in fact, that not one of the current cabinet members has ever set foot in an Arab town hall or house in the territories. This is an enormous change from the practice in previous years. Apart from previous defense ministers, some of whom were more (Dayan) and some less (Weizman) involved on a daily basis with matters of policy in the territories, a very considerable list of previous cabinet ministers dealt with this: Yig'al Allon, Yosef Almogi, Mikha'el Hazani, Yosef Sapir, Victor Shem-tov, Avraham 'Ofer, Abba Eban, Shlomo Hillel, Hayim Givati, Aliyahu Sasson and others. Each of them devoted some part of their time and work to the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, held meetings, got to know people, made tours of public institutions and Arab municipalities in the West Bank and Gaza. Today there is nothing. Begin's current government is putting into practice the Israeli saying that has angered so many people: The Arab problem must be examined through the sights of a gun. Perhaps this is what Moshe Dayan meant when he said, as he was quoted by a television correspondent on Saturday night: "Sometimes the military government treats the Arabs of the territories the way a dictator treats the natives."

It was against this background that the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs decided to deport Fahd al-Qawasimi and Muhammad Milhim. "From the security aspect, there was no alternative," Justice Minister Moshe Nisim said, and security elements insisted on this firmly (I do not know whether all the security elements claimed this, at least one of them was not pleased with the [passage indistinct]

cause much more security damage, there are army and security personnel who believe in a violent policy of deportations, firing at demonstrators and massive punishment, and they are the people who now control Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. Only the Visnews Television Film (and not that of Israeli television), which was screened throughout the world and showed Israeli soldiers firing from a roof-top, caused a change in policy, and over the last few days more tear gas and rubber bullets have been used and less live ammunition.

The security elements, who are the only decisionmakers on the scene, are now fighting an all-out war against Palestinian flags, theater performances, folklore shows, books and art exhibitions and even the Gaza Bank, which wants to be called the Bank of Palestine, and, of course, male and female students who throw stones. Compared to the situation in previous years, today this is the most prominent and almost the only Israeli presence in the streets of the Arab towns.

Obviously, terrorist activity in the West Bank and Gaza, or anywhere, must be blocked, but when what is involved is Israeli policy in the territories, the security consideration is only one of many. For example, from the security point of view the open bridges are real trouble. Why are they not closed? There were some IDF commanders, such as Rehav'am Ze'evi, who once held a regional command, who demanded that they be closed, but they were not heeded.

From the security standpoint, the employment of Arab workers in the Israeli economic structure is a disaster. Many Jews have been killed because workers from the territories planted bombs or served as a cover for terrorists who infiltrated their ranks. But no security element has suggested that the employment of the Arab workers--who are also building fortifications and settlements (and acquiring information about them in the process)--be halted. It turns out that there are many other considerations, political and economic, that are often far more important than the security considerations. To put the matter bluntly: the security elements are ready to have a few Jews killed by bombs, but for the bridges to remain open and the workers from Gaza and Hebron to continue coming to Tel Aviv.

An examination of the expulsion of al-Qawasimi and Milhim and of the security considerations that weighed in favor of the expulsion shows that these were pointless. In every corner of the territories there are hundreds and thousands of persons who speak and behave just like the two deported mayors of Hebron and Halhul, or even worse. If their deportation were defined as a means of deterrence, what they experienced since their original deportation 7 months ago would be sufficient (if deportation is in fact a deterrent, for leaders have been deported from the territories ever since 1967).

From the military-security point of view, the Arab population in the territories is a very small problem. After all, they have neither tanks nor planes, and they can perpetrate only a few acts of terrorism and sabotage, and even these are usually

blocked by the security services. The problems in the territories are hardly of a security nature; they are political. The social and economic ties with Israel are far more important. Therefore, what should have been asked was: was the expulsion of al-Qawasimi and Milhim politically necessary? This is a whole new question. This kind of expulsion--and the same holds for all the acute penal actions in the territories--solves virtually nothing from the security point of view. On the contrary, these actions deepen the hatred and the bitterness, and, what is more important, they make the possibility of dialogue between us and the residents of the territories more remote.

When al-Qawasimi and Milhim are no longer in Hebron and Halhul, we will not be rid of them. They will be in Amman, Beirut, Paris, London, on UN rostrums, in the United States. They will cause us far greater damage there, or when they meet with 'Arafat and George Habash, and they will be more embittered and more enraged. Then, too, we shall, ultimately, have to talk with them and live with them and with others like them in East Jerusalem, Nabulus and Ramallah.

CSO: 4805

LABOR PARTY COMMITTEE ENDORSES PROPOSAL ON TERRITORIES

TA071428 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1300 GMT 7 Dec 80

[Text] A labor party committee has approved a draft political proposal which will be submitted to the party's convention. Our correspondent Asher Schwartz notes that the draft proposal opposes the annexation of all the territories and advocates recognized and defensible borders that will be permanent. The labor party states that there should be no return to the 4 June 1967 borders and that Jerusalem will remain united and under Israeli sovereignty. The municipal layout of Jerusalem should provide for more involvement of all the inhabitants in administering the city's affairs. The draft proposal further calls for negotiations with Jordan and Syria and for a territorial compromise with them (?and for a settlement on) the establishment of a Jordanian-Palestinian state whose territory west of the Jordan River would be demilitarized.

The labor party would be ready to talk to Palestinian personalities and elements in the framework of the negotiations on peace with Jordan. The draft proposal regards the autonomy as one of the possibilities for an interim arrangement. The proposal further emphasizes that the defense and settlement alignment in the Golan Heights will remain under Israeli sovereignty as well as the Jordan Rift Valley, the northwestern part of the Dead Sea, Gush 'Ezyon, the area surrounding Jerusalem and the southern part of the Gaza Strip.

[Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew on 7 December says in a report by Moshe Meisels that according to Knesset members Gad Ya'aqobi's and Hayim Tzadoq's suggestion it was decided to add to a passage stating that "the territory of the Palestinian-Jordanian state west of the Jordan River will be demilitarized and no foreign army will be allowed to cross the Jordan in a westward direction" the following sentence: "The demilitarization will not preclude reaching agreed security arrangements which would involve an Israeli presence."]

CSO: 4805

'HA'ARETZ' CRITICIZES DECISION TO DEPORT W. BANK MAYORS

TA081324 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 8 Dec 80 p 7

[Commentary by Yehuda Litani: "A Boomerang Called Expulsion"]

[Text] While at a party, an Israeli who was visiting South Africa not long ago became involved in a conversation with a South African of British origin who was considered to be a supporter of the more liberal stream. "You in Israel are treating the Palestinians exactly as we treat the blacks here," he told him. The Israeli became angry and tried to prove the many differences between South Africa and Israel, but, as he related afterward, he knew in his heart that the South African's claim was well-founded.

This week I was reminded of this when I heard what Justice Minister Moshe Nisim said when he was informing the press of the decision by the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs to deport Hebron and Halhul mayors Fahd al-Qawasimi and Muhammad Milhim. In his remarks he admitted that it was not political considerations that had guided the ministerial committee when they made their decision, but purely security ones. It seems that if the avowedly racist South African Government had been confronted with a similar decision under Israel's circumstances and pressures--it would have decided not to deport the two mayors. Despite the discriminatory policy of the South African Government, its members have not lost their wisdom--they take world public opinion and the political pressures confronting their country into consideration.

Fahd al-Qawasimi and Muhammad Milhim are no angels of peace. An attempt to represent them as devoted lovers of peace, as people for whom only a tightening of the relations between Arabs and Jews is important, as moderates not easily angered--would definitely be refuted. It is unnecessary to hold secret meetings of "security elements" or to leaf through the most classified files to know that both of them were members of the National Guidance Committee--the supreme body of PLO supporters in the territories. They expressed themselves openly and frequently even sharply, against Israel's policy in the territories. They participated in National Guidance Committee meetings both in a full forum and in that of the Hebron hills region only. It may be assumed that in these forums they discussed and decided on ways of reacting to this or that move by the military government.

Although both of them, and particularly Muhammad Milhim from Halhul, presented a moderate, peace-loving image to the outside world during times of pressure they

expressed themselves otherwise. An Israeli who is actually not a hawk, who heard a lecture by Fahd al-Qawasimi in Boston a few months ago, did not believe his ears. According to him, he had never in all his life heard such a venomous attack on Israel. At the famous meeting held in Hebron shortly before the murder incident at the Hadassah Building, al-Qawasimi and Milhim also expressed themselves with great bitterness against Israel's policy in the territories and the Israeli settlers.

The only point is that they were not unusual in their extremism in both words and actions. Most of the personalities and leaders in the administered territories speak and act in the same way. This is a protest against the fact that Israel's policy in the territories since the October War has been, in principle, static: maintaining the status quo, conquest, as simple as that, without any attempt at offering alternatives. The only attempt proposed--autonomy--has been rejected out of hand by the decisive majority of inhabitants of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

Fahd al-Qawasimi inherited an honorable legacy--Shaykh Muhammad Ali al-Ja'bari's seat. When he started, he behaved like a complete beginner in politics. When he was elected to office in the spring of 1976 he expressed himself--and not only in public--with great moderation in comparison with such other mayors, supporters of the PLO, as Karim Khalaf, for example. Until the municipal elections, al-Qawasimi was an agronomist by profession, working for the military government in Ramallah and was used to regular work with Israelis. I spoke with him on occasion and gradually it was possible to understand that his friendly attitude toward Israel was slowly becoming bitter and hostile. The Qiryat Arba' settlers who planned to make Hebron the test for the government's attitude toward the settlement problem and who went from "conquest" to "conquest"--from the Avraham Avinu Synagogue to the Hadassah Building--helped in this to no small degree.

If Fahd al-Qawasimi had wanted to commit political suicide, he would have kept quiet in the face of the attempts by the Qiryat Arba settlers and their successes. But because he wanted to stay in office, he did not hold his peace and the military government began to label him as an extremist, although his colleagues in the National Guidance Committee jeered at him for his hesitancy and fence sitting. For the most part they spoke of him as the most moderate among them, the one who tried to run between the raindrops, someone who wanted to maintain good relations with both the PLO and Jordan. I saw Fahd al-Qawasimi in all kinds of situations, but at the peak of his depression I saw him in his home after a meeting the settlers held at the Avraham Avinu Synagogue after the murder of Yehoshu'a Saloma. "Now they will take all of Hebron away from us," he said in despair.

Muhammad Milhim is a more experienced "political fox." Until he was elected mayor of Halhul, he was an english teacher at a local high school, and because of his command of English, he was a magnet for every journalist who went there and wanted to review the settlements issue. And it was not only his command of English--also his smiles, his European appearance, his somewhat vague formulations; all of these turned him into one of the most popular West Bank personalities in Europe and the United States. He presented a soft image to the outside world, but Muhammad Milhim was undoubtedly one of the main PLO standard bearers in the territories.

It is important to stress that despite the fact that they belonged to the pro-PLO camp, both of them constantly repeated their opinion that there was room for two states--Israel and Palestine--in the country and that they were in favor of recognition of the state of Israel within the 1967 borders and of the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, whose capital would be East Jerusalem.

Fahd al-Qawasimi and Muhammad Milhim were deported, along with the Shari'a Qadi of Hebron, Shaykh at-Tamimi, by former Defense Minister 'Ezer Weizman (with the approval of Prime Minister Menahem Begin and the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs) as a rapid reaction to the murders at the Hadassah Building. Israeli security elements who recommended the deportation think, for some reason, that the deportation of leaders causes a relaxation in the situation. The security elements and military government personnel who recommended the deportation succeeded in their desire to kill two birds with one stone--the Israeli public got the impression that those who had inspired the murderous attack had been punished, while the world of the mayors who supported the PLO collapsed around them--and, from their viewpoint, these were also definitely troublemakers.

After the capture of the murder squad it emerged that there had been no connection between the murderers and the mayors. Now began a long legal campaign, an appeal to the high court of justice by those close to the three deportees; getting the mayors to sign declarations as demanded by the high court; an appearance before an appeals committee; and again an appeal to the high court of justice, whose results are known. After the high court judges passed the honor on to the government, asking it to hold another discussion on the matter, many people in the territories hoped that this would be a "propitious time" for the Government of Israel. I was surprised to hear someone from the pro-Jordanian camp, known for his hostility to Milhim and al-Qawasimi (who used to call Muhammad Milhim, scornfully, the "Kennedy of Halhul") speak with great regret about the decision by the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs to deport the pair. Don't you understand, he said, it is not a question of pro-Jordan or pro-PLO in this case. The Government of Israel had the opportunity of demonstrating generosity and perhaps of turning over a new leaf in its relations with the inhabitants of the territories. What a pity that you did not give them a chance--3 months, 6 months in their homes. If they had not behaved in accordance with instructions, their expulsion would then have been accepted differently.

Security elements think that during the period between their deportation and their return to Israel for the legal discussion of their affairs, Milhim and al-Qawasimi set up widespread, close links with various PLO personages. They say the mayors took every opportunity to incite against Israel and that on one occasion they even incited refugee camps in Southern Lebanon to use violence against Israel.

This is what they did, according to those security elements, when they were abroad. But if they are really such a great security risk, just as the movements of other people and mayors are kept under surveillance by the military government, almost every step and move they make, every phone call, every trip when they are in their towns of Hebron and Halhul can be watched.

It is difficult to imagine that Muhammad Milhim and Fahd al-Qawasimi represent a greater security risk than other members of the National Guidance Committee who have not been deported. The security elements regarded their expulsion not only as a security matter, but also a matter of prestige. They followed the high court debate with concern, fearing the mayors would be left here. It is also difficult to understand the logic of the expulsion. Will no new Muhammad Milhim and Fahd al-Qawasimi arise soon from among the people of Hebron and Halhul? Not only will this happen, but they will certainly be more extremist and hostile.

Most of the leaders and others expelled from the territories since 1967 have joined the PLO leadership as "representatives of the territories" and thus have given more legitimization to the PLO. There is almost no doubt whatsoever that at least one of the two mayors who were deported last Friday will assume an important place in the forefront of the fight the PLO is waging aginst Israel. It is reasonable to assume that if the two of them knew that a sharp sword was being held to their necks, they would cut down their public activity to a minimum, while now they will continue with the propaganda campaigns in the name of the inhabitants of the territories on every possible stage in the West and East.

The high court judges supplied the political echilons with a way to cautiously get out of the trap they were in over the matter of the deportation, except that, like a beast of burden wearing blinders, the members of the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs saw only the patch of ground closest to them. Anyone who spoke with Palestinians living in the territories, young and old, supporters of Jordan, the PLO, the "Muslim Brotherhood" and the communists, realized, after the deportation, that this action left a deep mark on the relations between the two nations; the conquered and the conquerors. This will not only be expressed in demonstrations and breaches of the peace, which began right after the decision by the Ministerial Committee for Security Affairs, but in something more basic. For many people from the territories the chance that the pair would not be expelled was the last ray of hope, which has now been extinguished. It seems, especially to the moderates, that this has ended any chance of coexistence and understanding between Israelis and Palestinians, at least for the foreseeable future.

CSO: 4805

LEGAL EXPERTS EXPLAIN W. BANK MAYORS' DEPORTATION

TA071044 Jerusalem POST in English 7 Dec 80 pp 1,8

[Report by David Landau, diplomatic correspondent: "Legal Experts Dismiss 'Probation' for Mayors"]

[Excerpts] The government could not have allowed former mayors Muhammad Milhim and Fahd al-Qawasimi to remain on the West Bank for a period of probation, to test the sincerity of their peaceable protestations. Had it decided to do so, the expulsion orders against them would automatically have lost their validity, and, were the government to decide later to expel them after all, it would have had to issue new orders.

This significant legal-political point was made clear to the Ministerial Defence Committee on Friday by Attorney-General Yitzhaq Zamir and State Attorney Gavri'el Bach after Health Minister Eli'ezer Shostak suggested that the ex-mayors be given a last-chance trial period at home.

In light of the legal aides' explanations, Shostak joined with Premier Menahem Begin and five other committee members in voting to implement the expulsion orders forthwith. Only Deputy Premier Yiga'el Yadin voted against.

The five minister who joined Begin were: Deputy Premier Simha Ehrlich and ministers Ari'el Sharon, Yiga'el Hurvitz, Moshe Nisim and Shostak. Three other members of the Ministerial Defence Committee--Shamir, Burg and Hammer--were abroad.

Zamir and Bach explained that the expulsion orders would remain valid only for a "reasonable time" after the high court's ruling. If the government did not act upon them within that reasonable time, the orders would automatically lapse.

The legal men stressed, too, that the high court in its obiter dictum (an extraneous part of the ruling) recommending that the government reconsider the expulsion, had meant just that--i.e., reconsider in the sense of consider once-again. By holding the discussion in the Ministerial Defence Committee, and reviewing all the facts and assessments of the various legal and security authorities, the government was certainly complying with the court's recommendation, Zamir and Bach said.

CSO: 4820

PERES-RABIN CONTEST SEEN DAMAGING LABOR PARTY

TA251311 Jerusalem POST in English 25 Nov 80 p 2

[Report by Mark Segal: "Jerusalem POST poll: Peres-Rabin Clash Will Hurt Labor"]

[Text] Tel Aviv--A large majority of the public believes that the contest for the leadership of the Labour Party between chairman Shim'on Peres and former premier Yitzhaq Rabin will damage the party.

The latest Jerusalem POST poll, conducted among 1,302 adults by the Modi'in Ezrahi Applied Research Centre asked the following question: "In your opinion, will the leadership contest between Rabin and Peres cause harm to the Labour Party?" A total of 65.2 percent said "yes," 27 percent said "no," and 7.8 percent were undecided.

In the October-November poll, Rabin continued to be the favourite for the premiership, ahead of Prime Minister Menahem Begin, while 'Ezer Weizman was the popular choice for his former post as defence minister. Abba Eban was the favourite for foreign minister. However, large segments of the public were unable to make up their minds about all four positions.

Who is most suited to be prime minister?

Name	Oct-Nov	Aug-Sep
Rabin	24.4	24.7
Begin	22.7	16.6
Peres	12.1	11.4
Navon	5.0	1.2
Weizman	2.7	3.5
Dayan	2.6	1.5
Sharon	--	0.9
Others	3.9	—
Undecided	26.6	40.2

Who is best suited to be foreign minister?

Name	Oct-Nov	Aug-Sep
Eban	25.3	20.2
Dayan	17.2	16.2
Shamir	12.0	6.8
Weizman	2.2	3.9
Peres	1.5	1.5
Rabin	1.5	2.2
Herzog	1.5	1.4
Tamir	--	1.4
Moda'i	--	0.8
Others	4.5	3.6
Undecided	34.3	42.0

Who is best suited to be defence minister?

Name	Oct-Nov	Aug-Sep
Weizman	28.4	22.8
Sharon	19.3	17.3
Dayan	7.1	5.4
Rabin	3.5	3.9
Bar-lev	3.0	3.0
Peres	2.6	3.4
Begin	1.5	--
Gur	1.3	1.5
Shamir	--	0.5
Others	2.5	3.6
Undecided	30.8	38.6

Who is best suited to be finance minister?

Name	Oct-Nov	Aug-Sep
Hurvitz	29.4	27.4
Levinson	8.2	8.4
Ya'acobi	2.2	2.3
Ehrlich	1.5	--
Shavit	1.5	--
Others	5.0	4.4
Undecided	52.6	57.5

CSO: 4820

RABIN SEES ISRAEL AS STABILIZER OF MID-EAST

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Oct 80 p 11

[Article by Yitzhak Rabin: "The New 'Eastern Front'"]

[Text] In seeking to assess the implications and the perspectives of the Iran-Iraq war one must limit the assessments by the assumption that it is still in full force and that its results are yet to be determined.

The war is the most encompassing and the sharpest within this century between Moslem nations. By comparison, the war between Morocco and Algeria on the future of the Spanish Sahara is nothing more than a limited conflict. So was the war in Yemen at the beginning of the sixties. The sharp character of the Iran-Iraq war is not only the application of the military power of both, but rather the mutual efforts to sow destruction in the petroleum economies which are the primary source of revenue of both, and the massive strikes at the civilians of both nations.

With respect to Iran, the war could bring about its disintegration, by the ripping of territories away from it or to its coalescence by the strength of the common danger. The fate of Iran will also be determined by the degree of political intervention, both separate and reciprocal, of the two powers--the Soviet Union and the United States. For the question: what proportions will this intervention reach and what will be the change in the character of this intervention by each of the two powers--there is yet no answer.

It is worthwhile to examine the progress of the war from two standpoints and perspectives: the Israeli perspective and the possible implications of the war upon the struggle between the two great powers which is intensifying in the reach for influence in the Middle East--primarily over the Persian Gulf and its petroleum treasures.

For a long time now I have stressed repeatedly that the struggle between the two great powers will intensify during this decade with respect to the fate of the Middle East and that it is even possible that the future of the western democracies, and of Europe in particular, will be decided by this struggle.

A test of the significance of this war from the Israeli viewpoint points up the following items:

The war will exert a negative effect upon Israel and its economy, which as a part of the free world will have its fuel supply affected and the price of its fuel increased (even if only for a limited time). Even the political nervousness which has seized various parts of the free world has a negative effect, from Israel's standpoint.

Anyone still possessed of blind faith in the power of agreements between countries, without those agreements enjoying strategic-political support through military and diplomatic power--has another good reason to rid himself of his delusions in the face of bitter reality.

In 1975, an agreement was reached between Iran, under the rule of the shah, and Iraq, whose president at that time was still Hassan al-Bakr but whose strongman was in fact already Saddam Husayn, its current president. This agreement was torn to shreds by Saddam Husayn 5 years after it had been achieved because a significant lowering of the status of Iran and of its military strength took place following the fall of the regime of the shah. The Khomeyni regime significantly weakened the Iranian military power. Its diplomatic status, after its cutoff from the United States deteriorated. The military supply connections ceased between the United States and Iran, whose main arms are of U.S. manufacture. Iran ceased to enjoy great-power support. All of these converted the Iraq-Iran agreement to the value of a scrap of paper upon which it was written.

It would appear that the lesson to Israel is abundantly clear: any diplomatic agreement, and especially in the very perverse reality of the Middle East, has neither meaning nor prospects for existence if behind it there do not stand diplomatic and military counterweights which render its violation by one of the parties as hazardous to that party. These facts of life should provide guidance when we are dealing with agreements between ourselves and Arab nations and with the conditions within such agreements.

Every local dispute in the Middle East--and certainly the Arab-Israeli dispute--is bi-level. Mixed in it and intertwined with it are local parties to the dispute (this is its first level) and the superpowers. It is vital to Israel to assure the existence and the development of the system of relations with the U.S., which was nurtured over a period of more than 30 years and especially since the Six-Day War.

Loss of American support by Israel, or even its curtailment, has hidden within it great hazards for Israel, as the Iranina lesson demonstrates. This is not to imply that Israel must accept American dictates and yield its will before the will of the U.S., but by the same token disregarding the wide American interests in our region beyond the Arab-Isreali dispute, may lead us to very severe outcomes.

Contrary to other assessments prevalent in Israel, it is my opinion that the Iran-Iraq war lessens the hazards lurking for Israel from the east, at least for the forseeable future. This is based on the assumption that Iran will not disintegrate as a nation.

Even if a cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war is achieved and following it some solution will be found for the disputes which ignited the fire, a heavy deposit of

hate will remain in the relations between the two countries. Should the war end with specific advantages for Iraq (today it is difficult to define such advantages), Iran will not consider that the close of the issue.

In effect a new eastern front has opened for Iraq, which will certainly occupy its attention over a few years. It is highly doubtful that at this stage Iraq will be overjoyed to open an additional front toward Israel, or to participate actively in the initiative of our eastern front, in a war against Israel.

When Syria began its intervention in Lebanon in 1976, many disagreed with my view that Syria, because of its intervention, would find itself in a diplomatic and military bind, which would limit its freedom of maneuvering with respect to Israel. Others were of the opinion that this was the closing of a ring of an eastern front against Israel. Reality has proved that they were in error. Now, too, those who interpret the progress of this war as a direct threat against Israel are in error. The Iraq-Iran war in effect limits the Iraqi interest in an opening of a western front against Israel, in addition to its new eastern front against Iran. If we take into account Syria's entanglement in Lebanon and the fact that, at least at this stage, Egypt finds itself removed from the war circut--the danger of an eastern front for Israel has now been reduced as an actual danger.

The power of the Arab military is of permanent interest to Israeli assessments. From the first impression, which is, of course, possibly a superficial impression, Iraq has not demonstrated military planning and battle capability on a superior level, despite its quantitative military advantage. Although the initiative at the opening of the air and land attack was in Iraq's hands—the Iranian air force was not damaged significantly and the Iraqi land forces did not arouse surprise in their fighting nor did they chalk up impressive gains. The fact that against the Iraqi force there was a most debilitated Iranian force in comparison to its power during the period of the Shah, not to mention at all the power and the quality of the IDF--does not tie laurels onto the head of the Iraqi military.

Now for some perspectives on the international theater and on the struggle of the two superpowers for strategic influence, I have written and expressed myself on previous occasions that the fall of the regime of the shah in Iran was the severest blow to the interests of the free world, and above all of the U.S. since the end of W.W.II. The rise of Khomeyni to power eliminated the U.S. from Iran and although the Soviet Union has not entered Iran in its place (so far) the matter caused an undermining of the inter-great-power balance in the Persian Gulf which is of top strategic import to the free world.

The error of President Carter was that he was apparently misled into believing that the alternative was between a totalitarian regime and a progressive regime in Iran, and in not understanding that the true alternative was between a pro-Soviet totalitarian regime and a pro-American totalitarian regime. This error brought about the weakening of the shah and an acceleration of the process of his downfall. Today the U.S. stands devoid of any actual and serious power to influence the course of the war and the region has been exposed to additional intervention, political and perhaps not political only, by the Soviet Union.

I am not dismissing the possibility that the Soviet Union will attempt to fill the role of mediator between the two sides now at war even as the U.S. wisely did in

the Israeli-Egyptian connection following the Yom Kippur War. If matters indeed so develop, it will be a Soviet victory of first rate international significance. If the U.S. does not rethink its steps, does not change its policy, does not demonstrate an abundance of foresight and capability for intervention—its situation will become worse and the fate of the Persian Gulf will lie under a question mark instead of bing a gulf which was clearly under western influence.

I have more than a reasonable basis to assume that the shah correctly perceived the strategic situation in the region when he tied his fate to the United States and foresaw the danger threatening from the Soviet Union and its ally Iraq with respect to the Persian Gulf. It is a pity that the Americans did not stand at his side properly, beginning in 1977. In November 1977, the shah visited the President of the U.S., Jimmy Carter. In this meeting the President pressed the shah on the issue of the promise of civil rights in Iran or at least demanded from him to implement a part of human rights. As an outcome of that, censorship was lifted partially in Iran and partial freedom was restored for political activism. In Iran's circumstances, this development accelerated the process of the downfall of the Shah the price of which shortsightedness is now being paid by the U.S. and there is no assurance whatever that the account is thereby being wiped clean. It is possible that the price will still rise.

It is proper for the U.S. and particularly for Europe to note intelligently now what the real threat is to their vital interests—that an assured flow of oil from the Middle East to their economic systems not be disrupted and not be subject to the whims of the Soviets.

The delusion that sacrificing the vital interests of Israel and that the ignominious courting of the petroleum producers and extremist Arab elements will assure a flow of petroleum, has now been eliminated with the advent of the Iraq-Iran war.

Countries of the West and Europe in particular must reexamine their approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. They must support the Camp David Agreements and the peace treaty with Egypt as a fundamental base for the continuation of the peace process. Appeasement of the Soviet Union and its Arab allies has never led to a solution and this method will not lead to stability in the Middle East.

In Conclusion, the Middle East is a theater subject to strange concatenations of circumstances: in its western part a peace has been devised between the largest Arab nation and Israel. Whereas in its eastern part a comprehensive war has erupted between two Moslem countries. The peace was devised as a result of diplomatic wisdom--American, Israeli and Egyptian. The war rages as a result of American failure and Soviet inspired aggressiveness.

If there is no change in the U.S. policy and if this power does not find authentic allies in the Middle East--the West will lose its positions in this region most vital to it, the Middle East.

Israel is such an ally and is capable of contributing by counsel as well as by action to the stability of the region. Better that we do this by contacts with the U.S. and with various elements in the region--not over the airwaves and on the pages of the press. This is a period which calls for imaginative thought and quiet dialogue with the U.S.—while carefully maintaining a closed mouth.

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NEW POLITICAL ACTIVISM SEEN IN NON-ASHKENAZI COMMUNITY

Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 2 Nov 80 p 8

[Article by Shevah Weiss, professor of political science at Haifa University and member of Labor Party's leadership bureau: "Israel's Ethnic Protesters"]

[Text] Shevah Weiss sees Israel's non-Ashkenazi elites making some extreme demands before settling for what they consider to be their political due.

WE HAVE recently been witnessing increasing signs of an "ethnic revolution" in Israel. The Ohalim demonstrations, in which residents of poor neighbourhoods set up tent cities to demand better housing, is one blatant example. And some people are willing to translate such phenomena into the language of practical politics.

There is much talk of the electoral potential of what the political jargon labels "ethnic communities." The reference is always to Jews of Asian or African origin, and their families — even if they were born in Palestine or Israel. A new myth is being constructed around this potential.

Yet what in fact is the electoral strength of the Sephardi community? The answer is complex, for their strength does not show itself in sectarian voting alone. Much of it, less visible, is in the existing "mixed" parties.

That strength has already expressed itself, most effectively, in the "overthrow" of the Alignment. It was the ethnic vote that stirred up the electoral storm of May 1977.

But this fact was obscured by the meteoric rise of the Democratic Movement for Change. It should be made clear, for once and for all, that in May 1977, it was the voters of Kiryat Shmona, Yokneam, Afula, Beit Shean, Shlomi, Dimona and similar towns with a predominantly Sephardi population, as well as the voters of Jerusalem's Katamonim and Tel Aviv's Hatikva Quarter, who unseated the Alignment.

This can be proved simply enough: the DMC got about 200,000 votes, which gave them 15 Knesset seats. Only about a third of these — perhaps a little more — represented shifts of support from the Alignment. The rest came from the Likud, the Independent Liberals, the Citizen's Rights List and from new voters.

So if it was only a matter of damage inflicted by the DMC, the Alignment would have remained on top, and the Likud, which also lost votes to the Democrats, would have made do with second place, as in 1973.

In that case, the Alignment would have won about 45 seats (instead of the 51 it had in the Eighth Knesset), and the Likud, about 34 seats (compared to 39). The president would have invited the Alignment leader, Shimon Peres, to form a cabinet. He would almost certainly have managed to do so with a sizeable coalition including the National Religious Party and perhaps the DMC. And that would have been that.

The "overthrow" would not have been — and neither would we be witnessing the current confrontation in the Alignment leadership.

But in fact, the Alignment lost 21 seats, and more than 40 per cent of its strength (this figure takes into account the small factions hanging on to the Alignment's coattails). It turns out, then, that aside from the five to six seats the Alignment lost to the DMC, it was another 15-16 seats poorer.

At the same time, the Likud, which lost four or five seats to the Democrats, still had a net gain. Taken together with Ariel Sharon's Shlomzion Party, it ended up with 45 seats. All for one simple reason: masses of Sephardi voters shifted directly from the Alignment to the Likud. They didn't express their protest through the Ashkenazi old boy network, the somewhat supercilious academics of the Democratic Movement. They found their outlet in the Begin ethos. Through their shift, the Alignment ceded about 10 seats to the Likud — perhaps more. The rest it gave to the NRP (two to three seats) and to the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality (Communists). Representation of minority factions associated with the Alignment dropped from three seats to one.

WHEN the smoke cleared away, the DMC, Likud and NRP had all advanced, but principally the latter two. And behind it all was the vote of what is stereotypically called "the Other Israel."

It was the Other Israel that took the reins of government from the "worker's Israel" and gave it to supporters of the Greater Israel.

Add to all this the strange case of Samuel Flatto-Sharon. We have not necessarily seen the last of him, or his phenomenon.

Paradoxically, some members of the Sephardi community — Mordechai Elgrably (formerly DMC), Sa'adia Marciano (formerly Shell) and Charlie Biton (Democratic Front) won their seats through the Ashkenazi or Arab vote. For many voters recoil from supporting "ethnic" parties or party functionaries who bear the ethnic label. The very people who fit that category of "ethnic" favour the nation over their community. Their instinct is to refrain from legitimising sectarian parties.

Some observers say they had no choice — that they were forced by the Ashkenazi old-timers to support the original political establishment of the Yishuv. But in fact, they came to Palestine or to Israel as Jews, as Zionists, and not to perpetuate their Diaspora identification by supporting narrow communal interests. Remaining in religious frameworks symbolized for them, no less than for the dominant Ashkenazi culture, inferiority, or even failure.

In the past they had given most of their support to Mapai and Ben-Gurion, or to Herut and Begin; in May 1977 it went to the Likud and Begin. They, like most of the Ashkenazim, were attracted by personalities: Dayan, Ezer Weizman and Ariel Sharon, in addition to Ben-Gurion and Begin. Few of them were influenced by "their" communal representatives in the large parties. And in fact, those representatives did more to advance their own political careers than to get out the vote for their parties.

If those same representatives were to form an ethnic list of their own, they would undoubtedly be in for a big disappointment, much like David Ben-Haroush, leader of the Wadi Salib revolt in the 50s, or the Black Panthers, who failed to win support in the elections to the Eighth Knesset. Like their Ashkenazi counterparts, Sephardi political functionaries benefitted from the umbrella of a large party and the big names at the top.

But now the big names have left the political arena, and the aura of those remaining has dimmed. Yet there are flickers of a new national leadership emerging — with a position of honour for President Yitzhak Navon. And Navon's reputation is not necessarily linked to his ethnic background. So even if he rises and makes his way in the jungle of practical politics, he will have massive support from Ashkenazim, just as Ben-Gurion and Begin had the support of the Asian and African communities.

It is not the ethnic voters at large who polarize the society, if that is what's happening, but the petty functionaries, and the less petty functionaries.

Still, there has been a change. In the last generation, a new crop of effective non-sectarian political leaders has sprung up. Though their non-Ashkenazi roots may be a reason for their appearance on the scene, at least in the first stage, their success is a matter of personal qualities. These have included ministers Shlomo Hillel, Aharon Usan, David Levy and Aharon Abuhatseira; MKs Shoshana Arbelli-Almoslino and Mosha Shahal; mayors, local council heads, and university professors. But at the same time, the Likud has failed to respond to the desires of the very people who gave it the reins of government on a "platter of protest."

The development of ethnic elites on the one hand, and the persistence of the protest on the other, are bound to change the voting patterns of the population that justly refuses to be called "the Other Israel."

The future may well hold something like an anti-Ashkenazi revolt, however quiet.

The campaign for the Tenth Knesset elections is likely to be characterized by a courting of the disenchanted by the establishment parties, as well as an attempt to consolidate more sectarian power.

The non-Ashkenazi elites will no longer be satisfied with crumbs from the high table. They may make some extreme demands before they settle for a comfortable seat at dinner.

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PANEL REVIEWS CURRENT SECURITY ISSUES

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Sep 80 pp 15-16

[Interview with Yigal Yadin, Yitshaq Rabin, Moshe Arons, Shlomo Gazit, and Zvi Zamir by Dov Goldstein: "Holiday Interview"]

[Text] Five people were invited to the discussion: Prof Yigal Yadin, deputy prime minister; Yitshaq Rabin, past prime minister; prof Moshe Arons, chairman of the Security and Foreign Affairs Committee; Gen (Res) Zvi Zamir, past chief of Mosad; Gen (Res) Shlomo Gazit, past chief of the IDF Intelligence Branch.

We presented them with the opening question: optimists among us believe that what Israel decides to do or not to do will determine our fate, or at least affect it to a substantial degree.

The pessimists evade responsibility and attempt to place it on the shoulders of others. They argue that external factors force us to make moves, and our influence over them is so minor and marginal as to make Israel's decisions as to what to do or not to do meaningless.

The truth, as it often is the case, lies somewhere in between: the fate of Israel is not only in its hands, but it is in no way completely in the hands of others.

In order to do something or not to do it, at the appropriate time and with the resources at our disposal, there must be a national appraisal. Without such an appraisal, there is little prospect that the choice will be correct. To actualize the issues, we will ask you the following: the fact that this year, according to the secular calendar, the eve of the Yom Kippur War falls on the day on which the Camp David Agreements were signed (18 September), of course has no significance. But because of the significances of these two events--war and peace--which so dramatically contradict one another, which of the two events today appears more dominant to you? Which is to say: is Israel closer to peace or to war today? How would you make such a national assessment? Does the Israeli government possess the tools and means appropriate for making such an assessment?

Each of you shall answer according to your past experience and present world view. In any case, we have not included in this discussion only the questions of how to conduct a national assessment, but also actual political positions, in the critical issues of war and peace.

Shlomo Gazit: I speak from the reality of the General Staff and the security system. This is the only level which for years has had as a task the assessment of the national situation. This role has been imposed on the Intelligence Branch. In clarification, let me say the following. A national assessment is a concept which differs from an intelligence assessment. An intelligence assessment supplies only the requested data. A national assessment is based on such data, and adds to it the general dimension, from all possible views: Israeli and foreign; the strength of the IDF and the resources available to it in manpower, equipment, weapons, and budget; the international situation and the positions of the superpowers, the position of Diaspora Jewry (a factor which only Israel has to consider), and the like.

In the civilian system there is no body parallel or similar to the General Staff or the Intelligence Branch to examine the data and formulate an assessment of the national situation. There never has been such a body, not only in the present government, but ever since 1948-1949. The military body may be subject to criticism, depending upon whether its assessment was correct or in error, whether it met the test or failed--but this is the functionary body which has been assigned the task. This does not mean that the civilian system in the past and present has not made correct decisions. But a body specifically assigned the task of making a national assessment simply does not exist in the civilian system.

Yitshaq Rabin: Without entering into a historical debate, the General Staff/Intelligence Branch performs the evaluation of the national situation, which deals with the possibility of war. But this is only one component in the national assessment. For purposes of assessment in the event of war, there is a definition which was set by prior governments, and I have no knowledge that it was changed...

Moshe Arons: True, it has not been changed.

Yitshaq Rabin: And so, it exists still: the General Staff/Intelligence Branch bears the responsibility for making the national assessment in the event of war. It has the responsibility for giving the warning in time, and for indicating the possibility of war.

In a democratic regime, which suits the character and constitution of a democratic country, in a parliamentary government and certainly in a coalition regime--the responsibility for national assessment, beyond the event of war, is imposed on the government itself. It can be helped by an aiding body, which exists now, within the framework of the Defense Ministry, the IDF, the Foreign Ministry, and other intelligence factors, such as the Mosad, which stands at the disposal of the government; it can of course be aided by experts from the Finance Ministry in all matters affected by economic and financial data, which are an inseparable part of any national assessment. But the ultimate responsibility rests on the shoulders of the government. Of course, when we speak of a coalition government, in which each of the party components has a different world view, there can be differences on national goals. It is natural that various ministers have differing approaches to defining goals, and any national assessment will be influenced by these differences. This is the strength of a democratic regime, and it is also one of its weaknesses. It does not seem to me that within the framework of a parliamentary-cabinet regime there is room or need for a national

security council, on the American model. No European parliamentary government has such a body. In our system, the Ministerial Committee for Security (or the whole government) is, in fact, the national security council, by its functions and responsibilities. This is the body which deals with all of the security issues as well as economic issues. and it decides what Israel must do under various circumstances.

So, even if it is possible to differ with the decisions of governments at various times, and to criticize them--I do not accept the claim that in Israel there is no body within the civilian system which performs the task of national assessment.

I will give you an example. When I was prime minister, when we conducted negotiations with Egypt over the interim agreements, we established a negotiating team which included the prime minister, the deputy prime minister, the foreign minister, the defense minister, and the chief of staff. Alongside this team was a regular supporting team, which was the responsibility of the director general of the Prime Minister's Office, with the participation of the director general of the Foreign Ministry, the legal counsel for the government, representatives of the IDF, and representatives of the various government ministries, depending on the issue being discussed. The support team prepared position and working papers. It received stenographic reports of the discussions with Dr Kissinger. The support team would convene to work out positions and transmit its recommendations to the negotiating team. For the purpose of formulating positions, the support team was aided by the opinion and assessments of experts on oil, economy, security, etc. It is the government which makes decisions, and on certain issues it can call upon a team of experts of a committee of ministers to study, examine, and clarify--and file recommendations. The government can also assign a certain issue to a committee of ministers and authorize it to act on its behalf, with its full authority.

The decision making level of the Israeli Government also has a good and reasonable possibility of receiving complete data dealing with the decision before the decision. There can be debate, and such debates are an essential characteristic of the democratic way of life, as to whether the government has taken the correct decision or not, or whether in the decision making process all essential considerations have been made, or that perhaps important considerations have been ignored. But it would be incorrect to say that in Israel there is no civilian body which deals with national assessment, and which makes decisions based on its weighing of the issues, and data.

I will say a few more words, not about the actual method of making a national assessment, but about the substantive part of the opening question: basically, we are now closer to peace than we were on the eve of the Yom Kippur War. If I compare the situation on Yom Kippur 1973 to that of Yom Kippur this year, I would not say that peace is certain, a sure thing, and in our pocket, but the Camp David Agreements, with all of the debate and division, created a fact: there is an Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, and within the agreements is a potential, which enables the beginning of a peace process on the eastern sector. Will this potential be exploited? That is not a methodical question, but rather a question of what are the goals and positions by which the government will operate.

Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Yadin: I will first deal with the coincidence of dates mentioned in the opening question. Although the fact that 18 September of this year is also the eve of Yom Kippur and also the date on which the Camp David Agreements were signed is only a matter of coincidence--there is a direct link between the two events. I have no doubt that the seed of peace was sown in the Yom Kippur War. Only after that war could Sadat, from his point of view (rightly or wrongly, which is another question) say to the Egyptian people: "We have broken the roadblock of fear, and we have shaken off the sense of inferiority, and we have proven that we are no less better than the IDF." This process was contained in something else: Sadat and his military people realized beyond any doubt (although it was never expressed publicly) that in fact they had no real prospect of solving the problem of Egypt's relations with Israel through yet another war. I see a link running from the Yom Kippur War through the interim agreements which were signed by the Rabin government, to the Camp David Agreements.

Now, as for the method regarding a national assessment: I agree with Rabin that the government is the body which decides and is the supreme commander of the army. It is neither the defense minister nor any other person who is the supreme commander, but the whole government. A second point: when I speak of a national assessment, I am not speaking only of questions of defense. Look--the issue of the water canal. This involves questions of security, politics, economics, ecology, and more--all within the framework of the one decision. In my view the question is: is the Israeli Government equipped with a permanent body which can give the government a national assessment on this issue? The answer is that there has never been such a body and there is no such body now, but the importance and essential nature of such a body cannot be exaggerated.

In the absence of such a body, aided for the purpose of preparing a complex national assessment by various experts and offices, the Israeli Government works in different ways: if the issue relates to one ministry, or the responsibility of one ministry is cleared than that of others, then the government imposes the responsibility of preparing an assessment on that ministry. In the matter of the canal, for example, when the problem extends beyond the area of the one ministry, the government appoints a committee of experts, and orders it to investigate and formulate a proposal. In other matters, the government imposes this responsibility on a ministerial cabinet. All of this proves that the Israeli Government has still not yet found a regular permanent way of establishing a body which would prepare national assessments in any significant area which extends beyond the sphere of any one ministry.

It seems to me that a small body should be set up alongside the cabinet and the prime minister, equipped with the appropriate tools, to prepare for the government position papers in every significant matter. Such a body would base the "paper" on an investigation and study involving experts and professionals.

Question: Is this such a body referred to by the Agranat Committee in its recommendations?

Yadin: Here we can correct an error. There is prevalent in the press and among the public the assumption that the Agranat Committee recommended the creation of a national security council, on the U.S. model. The committee did not deal with such a possibility, and it made no such recommendation. The committee said that

since in the Israeli reality there is a ministerial committee for national security, it is the body responsible for making national assessments, for making decisions, and for conducting a war on behalf of the government, in the event of war--it is imperative that it be a small body, no more than eight to ten people. The present government made this recommendation, and created a ministerial committee for defense, at first with eight members and later expanded to ten ministers. The smaller the body, the greater its ability to function.

There is a second matter rebarding which the Agranat Committee made recommendations (and I view it today as still being essential) which neither the Rabin government nor the present government accepted and realized: there must be a special advisor appointed for the prime minister to deal with intelligence, who will be completely independent of other intelligence systems, who will have access to all collected intelligence material, and who will be able to independently consider the question of what is a national assessment. In the absence of such an advisor, the monopoly over national assessment is almost exclusively in the hands of the military--and it proved its failure in the Yom Kippur War prelude. I regret that our recommendation was not accepted. I have also raised this issue in the present government, but the recommendation has not been implemented.

Rabin is correct. Our body which parallels the American National Security Council is the ministerial security committee. Although the committee is aided as necessary by experts and professionals, it lacks an independent staff to prepare for it assessments of various areas--on the basis of intelligence assessments by the Mosad and the General Staff. I consider this lack a significant deficiency, both in prior governments as well as the present one. Moreover, the Knesset Committee on Foreign and Defense Affairs is not completely free of responsibility for not being on guard in the matter of the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. The committee must have independent tools of its own to test and examine the intelligence data. Lacking these tools, the committee receives estimates prepared for it but lacks the ability to test alternatives.

Our approach must be one of multiplying tools for dealing with the assessment of intelligence material and its significance, rather than having a single monopolistic body, with all of its ability and reliability. I do not hold this view in other areas, but here, duplication is a blessing. It is better for the government to receive several assessments of one situation--the government faces a severe dilemma: it does not have alternatives from which to choose. The government needs alternatives, and this would be very positive, if it had before it two, three, or four assessments of issues of supreme national importance.

As for the issue of peace and war, I do not believe that we have data sufficient to answer the question as to whether we are closer to peace or to war. There is no way of assessing this today. I have recommended to both the government and the army to continue as though the situation were reversed, i.e. not towards peace, but rather towards war, so that we shall not be surprised.

Of course, the peace with Egypt is of decisive importance. If we--the Egyptians, Americans, and ourselves--agree to exploit this process and continue it, then there is an opening to advance the peace process, and in that respect there has occurred a great change since the Yom Kippur War of 1973.

Yitshaq Rabin: I want to raise a point with the deputy prime minister: in both the military and the governmental spheres, a sharp distinction must be drawn between intelligence assessments, and the conclusions and decisions of the commanding level and of the political level. These are two totally different areas. On the eve of the Yom Kippur War, the Intelligence Branch came to the government and said what it said. It supplied two bodies of information: data on the possibility of the outbreak of war, and data on the intentions of the Arabs. The Intelligence Branch based its assessment that there would be no war not on the basis of possibilities, but on the basis of intentions.

When the political level and the commanding level receive the two bodies of data--possibilities and intentions--and in addition the summary by the Intelligence Branch regarding what is expected or not expected, it must ask itself: this is the assessment of the Intelligence Branch; what must I do in the wake of this assessment and summary? I do not believe that the political level can, or is entitled to make the conclusion that the only consideration is the assessment of the Intelligence Branch. The command level and the political level must add to the assessment of the Intelligence Branch their own considerations, their own responsibility, and their own ability to make assessments. When I served as Chief of Staff, people from the Intelligence Branch came to me and reported that the enemy had moved two divisions on a certain border, but they--the Intelligence Branch people--had formulated an assessment that the enemy did not have warlike intentions. I said: "Good, that is you assessment, and I am sure it is based on tested reports and reasonable evaluations. But what if you are wrong?" Of course, this question cannot have an unambiguous answer. I gave the order to deploy two additional units on those front lines.

This means that at the command and political level which make decisions, there is added to the intelligence estimate a consideration by these levels which is obligatory. When the intelligence estimate, certainly based on reasonable considerations, minimizes the danger and interprets phenomena as not threatening war, the senior command and political levels must ask the question: what degree of danger do I undertake if I adopt the intelligence estimate? Sometimes, when the answer is that the degree of danger, if the Intelligence Branch has erred, is very great--then the senior command and political levels cannot accept that danger and they must proceed contrary to the estimate and assessment of the Intelligence Branch.

Yigal Yadin: We have no dispute, because ultimately the decision of the command and political levels will determine fate. There is a difference between the General Staff and the government. The Chief of Staff is a professional. I would like for the government to receive several assessments indicating several possible directions, and not just one.

Moshe Arons: In an intelligence estimate, a very sharp distinction should be made between two areas: intelligence information and assessments. These are two important areas for making decisions. Now, estimates have never been unambiguous, and they have always involved a substantial degree of uncertainty. If there were no ambiguity, and intelligence estimates could be made in the style of an algebraic problem, then everyone would know how to solve them, and everyone's results would be identical. Since there is such a degree of uncertainty and cloudiness, the question is what degree of danger do you take upon yourself when you adopt a certain assessment.

On the eve of the Yom Kippur War, no one could say with certainty what were the intentions of the Egyptians and the Syrians, and no one could say whether or not they would attack. Even if things had been stated by the Intelligence Branch with certainty, or almost complete certainty--they still could not have been accepted with certainty.

This is also the rule in the peace process with Egypt. No one can say whether this step will lead to peace or to war. There is cloudiness and uncertainty.

Yigal Yadin: In the Yom Kippur War, the command level and the senior political level could have reached another assessment with respect to the dangers and the likelihood of war, on the basis of the same intelligence facts. If the assessment had been different, I am not ready to swear that war would not have broken out, but I am not ready to swear that war would have broken out. And if it had broken out after we had called up the reserves and properly deployed them, then the results would have been totally different. And I say this again and again to strengthen my demand that the decision makers have on the table before them more than one assessment. This should always be the practice.

Yitshaq Rabin: I will give you one example. Once, on the eve of the semi-annual renewal of the mandate of the UN observers in the Golan Heights, a report was received that the Syrians were about to go to war. The Chief of Staff, the Intelligence Branch Chief, and the Air Force Commander came to me (I was then prime minister) demanding that we call up so many tens of thousands of reservists for war. It should be remembered that the IDF, and all of us, were still in the shadow of the Agranat Commission and its report. I had the clear feeling that since the Yom Kippur War and the Agranat Commission report, there would be a distinct tendency among military people to exaggerate the significance of reports, so as to be as sure as possible that they would not be caught again unprepared. I said to the military people: "We will not mobilize as many as you want. I am ready to mobilize far fewer, perhaps a tenth of what you ask for, and I take upon myself the state and government responsibility for the danger which stems from a small mobilization. Maybe, because of a small mobilization, we will not make the proper response, in the event that your assessment is correct and war breaks out, but the responsibility rests on the government and me."

I allowed the Chief of Staff to present his full position to the cabinet, and his demand to mobilize the large number which he proposed. Only after I had presented my position to the cabinet, it supported my position. We made the small mobilization. War did not break out.

Yigal Yadin: But if you had failed...if war had broken out and Israel had not been able to make a full response, and as a result certain problems developed, and certain severe difficulties... We all know that nothing succeeds like success... You opposed professional advice, and succeeded. On the eve of the Yom Kippur War, the cabinet followed professional advice--and the results were otherwise.

Zvi Zamir: The intelligence assessment is an ongoing and dynamic process. Very often we are predicting the future with only part of the facts, and the facts that we have may be subject to dispute.

I myself have doubts about the substance of the Egyptian-Israeli peace. In the process of developing relations between Egypt and Israel, I see signs which cause me concern. If I were holding a post today in the official-political sphere, I would point to the lack of necessary changes in Egypt needed to assure that this peace is a true one. I do not see that public opinion shaping circles in Egypt are supporting peace. I do not see that Sadat has made an effort to bring together our respective influential circles. There are no exchange visits of professors, teachers, scientists, media people. The whole process is superficial, slow, and thin.

In speaking of an assessment of the national condition, it should be said (and every intelligence person knows this) that the most important characteristic is skepticism as to whether what was true yesterday is true today, and if what was true this morning is true at noon. To what kind of peace are we moving? There have been basic changes in the arena. The U.S. today is not the same U.S. at the signing of the Camp David accords. Iran is not the same Iran of that time. Our relations with the U.S. are ultimately different than they were then, and relations between the U.S. and Egypt have moved from one extreme to the other. In such a situation, it is imperative to re-examine everything anew, and we must weigh the possibility of having to adopt a new national assessment requiring moves in different and new directions.

Yigal Yadin: One must always consider and study the different and varied views of a process. One should not be limited to considering the big question as to whether Egypt has really broken out of the circle of war, or whether it has just adopted a temporary tactic. Less critical questions are appropriate for consideration, such as: because of the peace, Sadat has become more dependent upon American arms. We must consider and answer the question: what does it mean for us? Is it desireable, as a means of pushing out threatening Soviet influence, and should it be encouraged? Is it negative, in terms of the balance of power, and should it be opposed by various means?

Zvi Zamir: The questions raised by Yigal raise other questions which I want to be sure are being considered properly, so as to reach a balanced national assessment. I, for example, am very concerned about Iraq. I am not referring in particular to the danger of nuclear weapons (although the decisive importance of this question goes without saying), but rather to the fact that never before has there been a serious competitor to Egyptian leadership of the Arab world. For several months, Iraq has posed a serious threat to the traditional leadership of Egypt. This changes the situation fundamentally. We must examine the peace process in light of these changes.

In this situation, I have a real basis for concern. By the method according to which a national assessment is prepared in Israel, all of the intelligence data will end up on the table of one factor--the Intelligence Branch. There is no change; this is how it has been done for years, all the time. This is what happened on Yom Kippur. The Israeli political system, according to its structure, does not enable professionals to decide. The political system bows to political necessities.

Yitshaq Rabin: In the U.S., the body responsible for making national assessments is the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency).

Zvi Zamir: And in Israel, the body which assesses whether we are moving to peace or war has never included the Mosad. The chief of the Mosad has never participated in a body making a national assessment, and at the decision making level, the Mosad has never been represented.

Shlomo Gazit: You never had the tools for making assessments...

Zvi Zamir: True. We never had them.

Yigal Yadin: That's the end of it. Now the Mosad has an assessment body.

Zvi Zamir: I do not accept Yitshaq Rabin's opinion. Of course, it is ultimately the cabinet which decides in a democratic-parliamentary regime. But there is a need for pluralism in intelligence assessments. It is imperative that there be a body which receives the various assessments, with all of the intelligence material, not to synthesize it but to present the cabinet with a full picture, in all of its variety.

There is definitely a need for the prime minister to have an intelligence advisor, with three to five aides, who will oversee the collection and assessment process. This must be an established form of work, and not hand to mouth. On the subject of Iraq, I would expect that the advisor would have his staff investigate and study everything related to the issue, and present him with all of the material. This material would be presented to the prime minister, and that would be the assessment of the situation by the assessing factor, on the question of Iraq. On the basis of it and other considerations, a decision would be made.

But even if we proceeded in this way--there would be no sure way of avoiding errors. There has never been such a guarantee. But in this way, the danger of error is reduced, and the prospects of preparing a realistic and correct assessment are improved.

Moshe Arons: There is a very strong and clear link between the issue which we are discussing here (how to prepare a national assessment) and the question as to whether we are closer today to what issued from the Yom Kippur War or to what is included in the concept of the Camp David accords: Was the Camp David agreement another Israeli mistake, after the error of the Yom Kippur War, or has the Camp David agreement corrected the error of the Yom Kippur War? Is it a positive process, advancing peace and good for Israeli interests, or, God forbid, was it the first withdrawal of Israel and Zionism, after a hundred years of magnificent achievement?

Today, we urgently need an assessment of the highest importance: will another Israeli concession strengthen and assure peace, or is there no value at all to concessions, and no importance to their size of scope, and that peace with Egypt is an unattainable goal?

This is the question. Its answer must determine Israeli policy. For this reason an assessment is so important.

It is possible to make a correct decision on the basis of an incorrect assessment. This can happen, but the prospects are slim. The correct assessment raises the likelihood that the decision will be correct.

A true assessment of the national situation must be full and comprehensive. Its components include the economic, social, demographic, political, and security situation. All of the components are inter-related, linked to each other. A national assessment must be interdisciplinary and integrated. It must take into account all of the factors, and be updated. It must constantly examine changing phenomena and events.

These are things in which there has never been an unambiguous determination. The solution lies in pluralism. There must be a spectrum of possibilities for choice, including opposing views and assessments: the assessment by the Intelligence Branch, by the Mosad, by academics and experts, by the Foreign Ministry, and by the Knesset Committee on Foreign and Defense Affairs. All of these together, with the contradictions and oppositions. There should be no fear of duplication.

Before the signing of the peace treaty with Egypt, it was obligatory that a concentrated and focussed staff operate alongside the Ministerial Committee on Defense. It was obligatory that a staff of experts operate, and present its assessment to the prime minister and the cabinet.

Both before the peace treaty and before the signing of the Camp David accords, experts in economics analyzed the ramifications of the agreements and placed them before the cabinet--perhaps there were those who would have conducted the negotiations differently. But there was never such a staff. There were no such experts. And the result is that Israel signed agreements the economic ramifications of which have been very severe for Israel, and it is doubtful if it will be able to exist with them. I do not want to use stronger words, and say that the effects are impossible for Israel to live with. If a comprehensive and general assessment had been made before the signing, it would have been clear that the economic issue was so serious that Israel could not sign such an agreement.

The criterion for making a decision should not have been: "We will sign in any event." Rather, it should have been: "under possible conditions we will sign, but under impossible conditions, we will not sign." I am very suspicious that the criterion under which the government signed was: "We will try as much as possible to achieve the best possible conditions, but we will sign under any conditions." This is an invalid criterion. You will not today find one cabinet minister who will not confess that the severe economic consequences of the agreements came to him as a surprise. You will not find one cabinet minister who will not admit that there was insufficient information regarding these consequences.

Zvi Zamir: Is there constant evaluation of relations with Egypt today?

Moshe Arons: No. There is no ongoing oversight. And this is precisely what I was referring to: if there had been a team of experts alongside the cabinet, that would have been its role. To conduct such oversight. To learn of changes occurring. To present the cabinet with updated assessments.

Yitshaq Radin: There were no surprises for me. I saw the process, and I understood what was happening and what would happen.

Shlomo Gazit: Did you expect that the peace treaty with Egypt could be a separate agreement?

Yitshaq Rabin: No. There was no such possibility.

Moshe Arons: Where does all this lead to: to peace or war? It is worth answering another question: where is the world going? It is not proceeding to realize the vision of the end of days. It is becoming more and more contentious, fragmented, hostile. Natural resources are being used up. The population is growing...

Yitshaq Rabin: Another solution will be found...

Moshe Arons: In the meantime, resources are being consumed. Every country, every people is coming apart from possessions, power, and economic strategy, and is making a critical mistake and is posing a question mark with respect to their ability to survive the harsh war of existence.

Another question: where is the Arab world going? The answer, it seems, is unambiguous: it is becoming richer and stronger in astonishing measure, unprecedented in the world. And along with the wealth and the power is the inducement to destroy Israel by economic, political, and military means. We can face up to this reality. We can overcome it, in spite of the fact that we are a small country, poor in natural resources and small in population. We have the most talented and excellent manpower in the world. In that area we are very rich. But we must know where the world and the Arab world is going, and act accordingly, and not in accord with our naive expectations.

Shlomo Gazit: I agree with Yitshaq Rabin, and I did not mean to propose that a body or institution replace the cabinet, the cabinet committees, or the Committee on Foreign and Defense Affairs. I mean that there is a need for the government to receive formulated and updated proposals, without having appear before it interests to present programmatic positions. The Israeli government makes decisions with insufficient information. It is important that is receive two or three working papers expressing different approaches, differing assessments, different alternatives. We need a well established body, aided when necessary by experts in various fields, and the government should make decisions in the essential national sphere only after this body has given it all information possible, all views, and all of the possible ramifications.

In every intelligence estimate, a distinction must be drawn between two areas and there has to be an unbreachable zone between them. There are technical issues in the area of facts. On the issue as to whether Egypt has 10 or 14 divisions there can be no dispute. This must be a known fact beyond doubt. What the Egyptians intend to do with this force--that can be an issue subject to debate. Israel--and there is no country which does not act thuslt--must have an intelligence body which bears national responsibility for the intelligence assessment. I am not opposed to pluralism which was discussed here. But the Intelligence Branch is the body which bears the responsibility. It is incumbant that there be a distinction between facts, which are not disputed, and assessments, which are speculative. If they are mixed, there will be a negative effect.

In intelligence work there are several types of situations. There was the situation on the eve of the Yom Kippur War. The decision in Egypt was to go to war. Dates were set, units were assigned missions. The decision in Egypt was made in February-March 1973, and we did not know about it until very late. That was the absolute responsibility of intelligence. It should have been able to interpret the riddle correctly. And we did not know.

If today Sadat decides--and I emphasize if--that the whole peace process is nothing but a scheme, and he decides with Husayn and the Saudi Arabians and the Syrian president to remove Israel from the Sinai and to weaken it, and then to attack it with combined forces to put an end to it--the role of intelligence is to know about such a decision. The primary task in a situation in which such a decision has been made is for intelligence to know about it.

There can be a second situation, different from the first, in which intelligence seeks an answer to another question: what would be the response of a country, a eader, or a block of countries to a certain event. Here there is no decision which has to be discovered. Here there is only the possibility of predicting a development, not on the basis of a decision already made. For example: when there was an Israeli-Syrian air clash before the Six-Day War, it caused in its time a war tremor, to some extent due to misinformation supplied by the Soviets to Nasser. Nasser did not intend to start a war in May-June 1967. No intelligence estimate could have indicated that he intended to do so then. But an intelligence estimate also had to appreciate how Nasser would react if war had developed, or if there had been a collision between Israel and Syria. There is no unambiguous answer to a question of this sort. It is definitely possible that Sadat does not know at this time how the Egyptians will respond if there will be a serious military clash between Israel and Syria.

When we speak of assessments for a term of years, there are unlimited possibilities. The questions of energy, the increasing power of the Arabs thanks to their enormous resources, the possible social revolutions, the phenomenon of religious revival--in all of these one can perceive trends, but to assess such processes is speculation. Here no intelligence body has any advantage over any smart Jew--a writer, a journalist, or an academic.

We have an intelligence community which is quite complicated in its structure. It has no written constitution. But precisely because of the lack of a constitution it operates excellently--on the basis of mutual links and reporting, in a voluntary manner.

I agree with the proposition that the process which brought Sadat to Jerusalem and the Camp David accords had its origin in the Yom Kippur War. But I cannot ignore the fact that we did not know at the right time about the Yom Kippur War or about Sadat's decision to visit Jerusalem.

About 2 months before Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, we had an intelligence assessment whose conclusion was that there had been no change in Sadat's position regarding peace with Israel. When we learned of Sadat's decision to make the visit to Jerusalem, there was a kind of sense that reality had slapped us in the face and tripped up our assessment. But I have not since changed my mind that in spite of the visit and the talk about peace, there is always a parallel danger of war, and the Egyptian people could be pulled enthusiastically into a war.

I recently had the opportunity to meet with a senior Egyptian person in the U.S. Together we analyzed Sadat's moves, intentions, and motives, and I was surprised to learn that the opinions and assessments of this Egyptian were completely based on our intelligence assessment.

The Middle Eastern dispute has shifted from a state of freeze to a fluid and super-dynamic condition. It has opened the possibility of peace in the Middle East and the integration of Israel among the peoples there. But it also contains awesome dangers for Israel that did not exist in the static condition which prevailed before. In the defense area, the short term issue is of less concern. Our military might is such that we do not have to be concerned.

Question: To summarize, do you believe that since the Yom Kippur War intelligence efforts and tools have been perfected, and that the danger of a surprise war has been reduced?

Zvi Zamir: Yes. I am sure that every intelligence generation moves ahead of the last one. But there is a need to carefully track the peace process.

Shlomo Gazit: Many steps have been taken to reduce the danger of a repetition of the mistake which occurred before the Yom Kippur War. But there is no quarantee against errors and mistakes. In the narrow area of warning of a war, we are better prepared. But there is another danger: because of our sensitivity in the wake of the Yom Kippur War, we could be misled negatively, to excessive caution, to over-reaction, out of fear of the possibility of another war. Such misleading creates an escalation, and increases the danger of war. Another concern is that intelligence has the task of serving those who make the decisions. If the decision makers do not listen to what the intelligence people say, the best data in the world will not serve any good purpose.

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BRIEFS

NEW GALILEE OBSERVATION POSTS--The Jewish Agency's Settlement Department has begun establishing two new observation posts in the Galilee near Kibbutz Hasolelim and not far from the Bedouin settlement Basmat Tab'un. The observation post near Hasolelim (which bears the temporary name of Solelim B) will become a kibbutz, whereas the other post, near Basmat Tab'un, is intended to serve as a communal settlement with 300 families. Upon the completion of these two posts, the deployment of 32 such posts in vulnerable locations throughout the Galilee will have been completed. The members of the Segev bloc nucleus have now been informed that work will begin toward establishing Moshav Qoranic. This promise comes after a 2-year delay and will involve building 30 housing units. [Text] [TA050900 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Dec 80 p 4]

DRUZES REQUEST IDENTITY CARDS--Only 500 Druzes who live in the Golan Heights have taken advantage of the law recently passed by the Knesset that permits Druze to receive Israeli identity cards. Other Druzes are not requesting Israeli identity cards because several of the sect's notables in the Golan Heights are pressuring them not to make such a move. Our correspondent in the north, Menahem Horowitz, discussed this issue with a member of the Majdal Shams Village council, Abu Jabal (Sada). [Begin recording] [(Sada)] The law did not force everyone to submit; everyone can do what he wants and there are many who do want the identity cards. People are looking ahead: will their future be with the Syrians? Will Israel annex the Golan Heights? Will the people be real Israelis and an inseparable part of Israel? The situation frightens people. The Druzes do not want to abandon their land and homes. [Horowitz] Recently Druze notables in the Golan Heights increased their pressure in an attempt to persuade the inhabitants not to accept Israeli identity papers. We will not be responsible for you if it is decided to return the Golan Heights, the notables tell the inhabitants who want to receive identity papers. [End recording] [Text] [TA071658 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 7 Dec 80]

WEST BANK DISTURBANCES--Today there were minor infringements on the peace in Judaea and Samaria. Each case was dealt with rapidly by the security forces. Our correspondent Sha'ul Stav reports: Today there were minor infringements of the peace in Judaea and Samaria against the background of the deportation of the mayors of Hebron and Halhul. In Nabulus, students from the (Qadri Tukam) school threw stones at Israeli cars. The school's director intervened in the incident and took the students into the classrooms without involving the security forces. In Ramallah, stones were also thrown at Israeli vehicles. One of the throwers was captured by the driver of a stoned car. The thrower was handed over to military government personnel. In

Hebron there were student riots along the main highway. Stones were thrown at security forces personnel. The rioters were dispersed by tear gas. In several towns in Judaea and Samaria, including Jericho, students went on strike and gathered in the school yard. However, these short strikes did not develop into demonstrations. In Halhul, the military government ordered the town's high school closed until further notice. This followed the serious rioting by the school's students yesterday. [Text] [TA071633 Tel Aviv IDF Radio in Hebrew 1510 GMT 7 Dec 80]

BAN ON NAZARETH RALLY--A Jewish-Arab convention was held in the Tel Aviv Bat Dor Hall yesterday instead of the Nazareth Conference that was banned by the defense minister. A Jewish-Arab committee was elected at the end of the convention to conduct a public campaign for the cancellation of the ban on the Nazareth Conference. The moderator, 'Uzi Burstein, stated that the committee will conduct the campaign through demonstrations near various places including the Knesset and the prime minister's office as well as rallies and other actions both written and verbal. The HA'ARETZ correspondent in the Galilee reported that yesterday Rakah failed to turn its protest against the banned Nazareth Conference into a noted event in Nazareth. An attempt was made to hold a 1-hour strike in the town's high schools, but most of the schools ignored the call for a strike. The call for a 1-hour strike in the municipality addressed to the municipal workers' committee headed by Rakah Mk Tawfiq Zayyad was not attended either, and it was necessary to set up a special action committee for this. Yehuda Ari'el, HA'ARETZ correspondent in Western Galilee, reported that rallies were held in Rakah clubs in Arab villages of the Western Galilee early in the evening yesterday. Manifestoes in Arabic, prepared by various political elements including Jews, were also distributed yesterday. All of the manifestoes were worded in such a way that there would be no cause for suits against their authors. [Excerpts] [TA071159 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 7 Dec 80 p 3]

COUNTERING ARAB ECONOMIC EXPANSION--Prime Minister Menahem Begin will consult with Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir in order to formulate policy to counter the hazard of Arabs controlling economic institutions in the West. It is possible that Israeli emissaries in various capitals will participate in order to alert the governments and public opinion to the danger facing free nations, the prime minister reported in a letter which he sent to the chairman of the economic Committee of the Knesset, Knesset Member Gad Ya'acovi. MK Ya'acovi recently sent a message to the prime minister in which he warned about the gradual control by Arab governments and companies on well-known institutions in Western countries. Among other things, Arabs have acquired 10 percent of the shares of the subsidiary of Volkswagen in Brazil; the Government of Kuwait acquired from a Swiss metals company in Zurich 10 percent of the stock of the well-known German Metalschafft company; Kuwait is completing the acquisition of the fifth largest bank in Arizona in the U.S. for $40 million. MK Ya'acovi noted that by means of this control the influence of Arab nations will increase on the foreign policies of the West and on its system of economic considerations. Therein lie dire security implications since a portion of these companies and enterprises manufacture for the defense and military establishments of western nations. He suggested that Israel expose this process on the international level and increase the awareness of the West to the implications and the dangers therein. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 5 Oct 80 p 1] 8090

ARABIC INSTRUCTION--Cash grants beyond the norm approved for them will be awarded by the Ministry of Education to schools above the elementary level to encourage and expand Arabic studies. Today, approximately 30,000 students are studying Arabic. Award of the incentives is intended to increase the numbers of those learning Arabic. The Director General of the Education Ministry, Eliezer Shmuely, has decreed that students who did not study Arabic in elementary schools must begin study of the language in upper schools (grades 9-10). Students who did study Arabic in elementary schools or in intermediate groups, are also to be given the opportunity to continue their studies in schools above the elementary level. Arab teachers will also be employed for instruction of Arabic. About 450 students in colleges of education and in teachers' institutes will be prepared this year for teaching this language. The office supervision Arabic instruction will this year conduct weekly qualifying courses in four large urban centers. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 5 Oct 80 p 19] 8090

PUBLIC FAVORS RABIN--Former Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin is preferred by a larger percentage of the public to lead the Labour Party than party chairman Shim'on Peres, according to the Jerusalem POST poll conducted by the Modi'in Ezrahi Applied Research Centre among 1,302 adults last month. According to the poll, Rabin also has the advantage over Peres within the Labour Party. Over 45 percent of the party members questioned picked Rabin, compared to 37.5 percent for Peres. In response to the question of who should lead the Labour Party, Rabin got a total of 46.7 percent, Peres got 24.9 percent and President Yitzhaq Navon got 1.6 percent. Another 1.6 percent mentioned various other candidates, while 25.3 percent could not make a decision. Rabin is particularly popular with voters of right-wing parties, according to the breakdown of his support conducted by centre director 'Amiram Yarqoni. Over 59 percent of Likud voters preferred the former premier, compared to 9.1 percent for Peres. And 58.8 percent of National Religious Party supporters would like Rabin to lead Labour with about 10 percent preferring Peres. Rabin was more preferred among men than women, among the Orthodox and among Haifa residents, while Peres did better among the oriental communities and among residents of the greater Tel Aviv region. [Mark Segal] [Text] [TA021346 Jerusalem POST in English 2 Dec 80 p 3]

ARAB UNEMPLOYMENT--Speaking in Jerusalem on 27 November, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Yisra'el Katz announced that the rate of unemployment in the administered territories was 3 percent compared with 5 percent in Israel. He added that his ministry was working to equalize the wages of workers from the territories employed in Israel with those of Israelis. Between 1970-78 wages of inhabitants of the territories rose by 5 percent a year, he said. [TA281455 Jerusalem POST in English 28 Nov 80 p 1 TA]

FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES--Foreign currency reserves dropped by $61 million in November, bringing the total decline in the past 4 months to $222 million. The steep decline followed a relatively long period of increases in the total reserves. Total foreign currency reserves stood at $2,725 million at the end of November 1980, showing a gain of $155 million since December 1979 despite the drop in recent months. Israel will receive DM80 million from West Germany next month, as the first installment of an aid agreement of DM140 million between the two countries. The remainder will be paid out over the next 3 years. [Jerusalem POST in English 3 Dec 80 p 2 TA]

ARAB LIVING STANDARDS--Statistics just released by the military government indicate a sharp rise in the living standards of West Bank and Gaza Arabs over the past 5 years. The statistics rely on a survey of 3,900 families in villages, towns and refugee camps in the territories. The survey found a higher rate of prosperity in the West Bank than in Gaza. It also discovered that the percentage of people owning household equipment and private vehicles has doubled since 1974. The categories with sharp rises were gas cookers, electric stoves and refrigerators, televisions, taperecorders, bicycles and private cars. There was a vast difference between the towns and villages because many of the villages do not have electricity all hours of the day and night. The survey also attempted to compare West Bankers to the Israeli Arabs noting that the comparison is not really valid because the last survey of Israeli household equipment was taken in 1974. However, in nearly all categories of equipment West Bankers were ahead of the Israeli Arabs in 1977 and the amount of consumer goods in the territories increased significantly since then. [TA030618 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1800 GMT 30 Nov 80 TA]

OCTOBER PRICE RISES--Prices went up by 8 per cent in October and are likely to go up by 9-10 per cent in November, according to government economists. The predicted November price hike includes the pending rise in oil prices. The monthly inflation rate will not fall below 6-7 per cent, according to the same sources. They estimate that the inflation rate for 1980 will be 125-130 per cent, compared with 111.4 per cent in 1979. The shekel was devalued by 7.9 per cent against the dollar in October, by 10.1 per cent to the pound sterling and by 8.4 per cent to the Japanese yen. But it was devalued by far less to other European currencies. Only 2.4 per cent to the German mark, 3.1 per cent to the Franch franc [as published], 2.9 per cent to the Dutch guilder and by 3.7 per cent to the Swiss franc. [by Shlomo Maoz] [Text] [Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 2 Nov 80 p 1]

CSO: 4820

LEBANESE LEADER DISCUSSES DANGERS FOR LEBANON

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 15 Oct 80 pp 22-23

[Interview with Walid Junblat by Salih Qallab: "Dispatch from Beirut: Walid Junblat in Longest Interview with AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM: 'Gulf War Will have Negative Effects on Lebanon; Let Arabs Give Me Guns, and I Will Be Prepared To Fight Bashir al-Jumayyil' I Advocate Dialogue with the Phalangists;' the Resistance Is Responsible for the Chaos in the Nationalist Areas; the Resistance Must Deal with the Lebanese Government; No Solution Unless Eastern Front Is Established"]

[Text] When I told Mr Walid Junblat that AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM wanted to ask him some questions about the Lebanese situation and the Arab situation, he stopped toying with the fringes of the tapestry that was hanging over the chair on which he was sitting, and he said in a low voice that reminded one of the whispers of the late Kamal Junblat, "What public opinion? There is no public opinion. Public opinion in the Arab homeland is a prisoner."

This is Walid Junblat, chairman of the Socialist Progressive Party and chairman of the Political Council of the Lebanese National Movement. He is the young man upon whom responsibilities were hurled at once after his father, national leader Kamal Junblat, lost his life.

As soon as one enters it, the atmosphere of his home reflects the magnitude of the responsibility that was placed on the shoulders of this young man. Pictures of his late father abound in entrance ways and halls [all over the house], relating a long history of political struggle on the Lebanese, Arab and international scenes.

These pictures, whose number exceeds 100, speak of Kamal Junblat's Lebanese, Arab and international relations. They chronicle his meetings with various Lebanese officials in all the administrations, and they chronicle his meetings with Arab kings, heads of state and leaders of liberation movements. In addition, they also chronicle his meetings with the most prominent leadership figures and with leaders of liberation movements in the world.

It is in the atmosphere of this house, whose walls and furniture attest to the legal reasons for the developments of the situation that took place in the area more than 40 years ago, that one asks oneself an urgent question: Can this enthusiastic young man whose appearance, demeanor and conduct appear unaffected bear the burden that was left to him by the man who went beyond the boundaries of Lebanon to become an international figure?

I recall that when Walid ascended the speaker's platform at UNESCO House in Beirut 3 years ago on the day commemorating the 40th day after Junblat's death, he was choked up. Tears welled in the eyes of those who were present: some of them were moved by the scene, and others were moved because they remembered Kamal Junblat. Still others [were moved] because they appreciated the position of this young man who suddenly found himself with a heavy burden on his shoulders.

During the last few years, ever since the death of Junblat, Walid has been assuming the responsibility efficiently. He maintained the course that was outlined by the great [leader] who is no longer with us, beginning with strengthening the structure of the Socialist Progressive Party and including the leadership of the Lebanese National Movement as well as international and Arab relations.

Furthemore, anyone who has been keeping up with Walid Junblat for the last 3 years will discover that this young man who is brimming over with enthusiasm was able to tread the political minefields in Lebanon with extreme caution without having a single mine explode under his feet and without allowing any provocation--from a small person, a big person, Lebanese or Arab--to make him forego the poise which he inherited from the great departed one.

The death of Kamal Junblat, which occurred while the Lebanese ship was sailing in turbulent seas, has left 1,001 cracks [in the vessel]. But Walid has proven that he is indeed the son of this experienced, brave navigator. He sat at the helm with steadfastness and courage, and he is now trying and trying [to steer this ship] despite the strength and severity of the storm.

Walid Junblat spoke to AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM about all the issues. He spoke his mind candidly and openly without forgetting for a single moment the turbulence and the complexities that besiege Lebanon.

The Gulf War

[Question] The war that is raging now between Iraq and Iran will affect the Arab scene. What effect will this war have on Lebanon?

[Answer] Lebanon will most certainly be affected by the results of this war. Since this war will eventually dissipate the Arab effort, making it lose its focus on the basic Arab question, which is the question of Palestine, it will be the rightist Phalangist forces that will benefit from this war over a long period of time.

Any intra-Arab struggle or any struggle between an Arab country and another country that supports the Palestinian question is out of place. Its beneficiaries will be the rightist forces in Lebanon or elsewhere. Besides, there are lateral complications and well-known biases.

[Question] Some people are saying that after the outbreak of the war the Lebanese question will become a secondary question.

[Answer] Eventually the Lebanese question may become a secondary one. But it will re-emerge as soon as the fighting ceases.

The war in the Gulf will end in a week or two after both sides become exhausted. Interest in the Lebanese question will then return, and that question will assume serious proportions as a result of increasing western pressure in the Gulf.

If western pressure in the Gulf increases, it will then become essential to do away with the revolutionary seat in Lebanon which is represented by the National Movement and the Palestinian Resistance.

[Question] Does this mean that you in the National Movement as well as the Palestinian Resistance will come under new attack immediately after fighting in the Gulf ceases?

[Answer] No, not immediately. But it is certain that the results of this war will be reflected in the form of a counter attack against the National Movement and the Palestinian Resistance.

[Question] When?

[Answer] I don't know exactly when because this would be subject to local events, to Arab and international reactions and to a decision by Bashir al-Jumayyil and Israel.

[Question] In following your political activities one notices that you try to combine the forces into blocs on the side of the National [Movement]. Is this bloc formation against the Lebanese Front or against the Lebanese government?

[Answer] I am affirming that we must first consolidate the Lebanese government over all Lebanese territory to avoid renewal of the civil war. This includes mobilizing the army and expanding the legitimate government in those areas. We must then have a dialogue with the Phalangists on well-known, self-evident principles.

But continuing in this deadlock, in the current stage of deterioration, signifies further deterioration.

Not a Period for Dialogue

[Question] But there are those who say that dialogue after the 7 July has become impossible as long as Bashir al-Jumayyil....

[Answer] No. There is no such thing as impossible. Nothing is impossible.

[Question] What are the justifications for such a dialogue under current circumstances?

[Answer] Bashir al-Jumayyil is a force on the Lebanese scene. In view of this situation, there are only two solutions: there can either be dialogue with him or war with him. There is no solution other than these two.

[Question] In your opinion is the present period one for dialogue?

[Answer] No. The present period is not suitable for dialogue. Furthermore, sometimes dialogue is not permitted.

[Question] Who is it who is not permitting dialogue?

[Answer] I don't know.

A Pessimistic View

[Question] After the accord program floundered, after the current cabinet crisis and after the blow of 7 July which Bashir al-Jumayyil directed against his former ally Camille Sham'un, we bagan hearing statements saying that Sarkis would be Lebanon's last president and that al-Huss would be its last prime minister.

[Answer] This is a very pessimistic view. I believe that the legitimate Lebanese government still has considerable Arab and international support. Current conditions, however, do not allow it to extend its authority.

The legitimate government in Lebanon had a specific symbol even under the worst conditions at the height of the civil war in 1975 and 1976.

This symbol was represented by President Franjiyyah, despite his hostility to the national course at the time.

In my opinion the international equation continues to favor the legitimate Lebanese government even if that government became a mere symbol.

[Question] Unfortunately, what you are saying appears to be mere hopes in the light of attempts to re-apportion the political map in the area!

[Answer] There is no doubt that the division created by the Iraqi-Iranian war, where two trends have emerged in the Arab region, will compel the National Movement [to adopt] one of these two courses. National action must be developed, and an alternative program must be proposed.

We in the Lebanese National Movement are in the process of preparing such a program.

[Question] Will you restrict this program to the National Movement or will the program include also the forces that can join the movement in the context of a national rescue front?

[Answer] When I speak about the National Movement, I mean the front of existing parties and also the national figures and agencies.

[Question] But we do notice that you are focusing on the North. Do you intend to promote the Ihdin Communique?

[Answer] Which Ihdin Communique are you referring to?

[Question] The first one.

[Answer] The North is one of the principal mainstays of Lebanon, particularly since there is a Christian group there that is rejecting the Phalangist program.

[Question] Is action being taken in this area?

[Answer] Yes, I will visit the North. There is a program to promote coordination and action between us and President Franjiyyah.

No Justifications for a Comprehensive Attack

[Question] The south is experiencing a serious situation daily, and there are possibilities for wider and broader explosions in this area.

[Answer] The south and, accordingly, Lebanon represent the first and the last battlefield between the Arabs and Israel.

I believe that there are no justifications at the present time for a comprehensive Israeli attack on the south because the international situation is not conducive to such an attack. Such an attack, however, may occur in the near future.

Israel would launch an all-out offensive when it feels that danger on the northern borders is increasing, when Syria's defense capability increases and when there is a nuclear threat to Israel if Iraq acquires a nuclear reactor.

But now I believe that Israel is comfortable with the situation in Lebanon. It is trying to further Lebanese-Palestinian disaccord, and it is trying to take maximum advantage of the struggle on the Lebanese scene.

[Question] But one notices that Israel is continuing its preparations and its movements in the south.

[Answer] What Israel wants at the present time is to raise the level of tension. As you know it is carrying out limited operations. For Lebanon, however, these limited operations are considered broad.

The continuous artillery shelling of Sidon, which may subsequently reach al-Shuf, has a major effect on security, economic and political conditions in Lebanon.

[Question] The National Movement, the resistance and the Arabs [in general] have responsibilities towards the south. What preparations have you made to defend the south and to bolster the resistance of its people?

[Answer] The resistance and the National Movement are doing their duty with the modest capabilities they have.

The major responsibility falls on the shoulders of the Arabs, but it seems that the Arabs have abandoned the Arab-Israeli struggle and have restricted it to Lebanon.

The Eastern Front

[Question] What specifically are you asking of the Arabs?

[Answer] An eastern front! An eastern front! There can be no political or military solution unless the eastern front is established. A military balance

that generates a political balance must be created since there can be no political balance without a military balance.

[Question] Let us be more specific. What is required of the Gulf states? Are they required to join the eastern front?

[Answer] No. What is required first is the establishment of the eastern front of Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Support from the Gulf would come later.

[Question] What about present support for the south under present conditions, that is, before the establishment of an eastern front, in view of the fact that present conditions are not conducive to its establishment?

A Program for the South

[Answer] I am opposed to financial support for the south at the present time because it will be pocketed by feudalists and ministers and because the poor resident of south Lebanon who has suffered damages will not benefit from this support at all.

[Question] What if the [financial] support were to come to the National Movement?

[Answer] This would be possible. We did carry out a program for south Lebanon, and we received a 10 million dollar subsidy from Libya.

We formed a committee for this matter, and the fund is open.

We intend to carry out special projects that are not merely confined to building a house that was torn down [here] or compensating a person [there] for damages he had suffered. We will carry out projects such as digging artesian wells and building orphanages and hospitals. The purpose of these projects is to stabilize the residents of south Lebanon in their cities and in their villages.

What is required, for example, is the transformation of some south Lebanon villages into something that resembles the Israeli kibbutzes so they can defend themselves. The construction of orphanages is also particularly required.

The Palestinian Resistance did build orphanages, but what it did build is still far short of what is needed.

We Want Guns

[Question] You are proposing a dialogue with the Phalangists while Bashir makes military preparations and proposes the liberation of all Lebanon. He is making statements to that effect daily.

[Answer] Let the Arabs, instead of giving us statements and talks about moral support, give us guns so we can confront Bashir al-Jumayyil.

I am prepared to confront al-Jumayyil, but let the Arabs give me the guns.

[Question] Before the guns, is the National Movement organized and is it prepared for this?

[Answer] Yes, everything within our capabilities is available. Everything is ready. There is deterioration, decay, fragmentation and partisanship in national action. All this is true because we are living in a post Kamal Janblat period, but we are capable of confrontation and we are prepared for it if we have real support.

[Such conditions may weaken] Palestinians who are being tempted io build their state and to consolidate the privileges they gained on the land. This constitutes a mortal danger to the Palestinian question.

[Question] But before the guns, I believe that you also need Arab political positions.

[Answer] We do in fact find it difficult to explain our point of view to the Arab countries. Furthermore, I am stating that the program of the Lebanese Front and, accordingly, the Lebanese right, is still meeting with approval in the Arab region on the basis of mutual interests against what is called the communist threat.

[Question] Let us go back to the government's position in view of the fact that Prime Minister Taqiy al-Din al-Sulh turned down the invitation to form a government of activists. Is it possible that a new government will be formed in the near future, or will the government of al-Huss be in fact the last government?

[Answer] No. A new government like that of al-Huss will be formed. Circumstances are not conducive to the formation of a government of activists unless some of the given factors are changed.

[Question] Is there coordination with Syria in this direction?

[Answer] Coordination on basic and sensitive matters between us and Syria is essential and normal. We have geographic, political and historic ties with Syria.

The Security Situation in the Nationalist Areas

[Question] There are daily complaints about security conditions in the nationalist areas. Some officials in the resistance have indicated that, going along with what is happening in the eastern region, the movement refuses to take control of security conditions in those areas in the absence of the Lebanese government.

[Answer] With all due respect and affection to those officials in the resistance, I am asking them to stop their aid to some Lebanese organizations that in reality have no value and no effectiveness. The practices of such improvised organizations hurt the Palestinian question as well as the Lebanese question.

Unfortunately, it seems that some officials in the resistance do not yet have confidence in some of the principal nationalist parties in Lebanon.

In this area I believe that the Socialist Progressive party and other principal Lebanese nationalist parties did offer a great deal to the Palestinian question. Therefore, we expect the resistance to reciprocate with more than what it is doing at present.

[Question] Let us go back 4 years. At the end of 1976 the National Movement turned down the principle of self policing on the pretext that it was considered one form of partitioning. Today, you are reaping the consequences of that position.

[Answer] I am saying that the responsibility for maintaining safety falls primarily on the shoulders of the Lebanese police. We must help the Lebanese police in this area. A Palestinian and a Syrian decision must be made on this subject, especially in the large cities, so that the police can put an end to attacks and deal with matters of traffic and theft.

With regard to south Lebanon, I believe that a joint police [force] affiliated with the National Movement and the resistance can take care of this matter according to an urban formula other than the current one.

The European Initiative

[Question] There is talk about a European initiative that would solve the Middle East question. Since any movement on the situation in the Middle East will affect Lebanon, we want to hear your opinion on this matter.

[Answer] Numerous points of view with regard to the European initiative have emerged. Some people welcomed it; some criticized it; and others had reservations about it.

As far as we are concerned, we must look carefully into this initiative, and we must find out what are its considerations. If it leads to anything positive for the Palestinian question, we would welcome it.

If we were to go back to the history of the Palestinian question, we would find that there has been continuous rejection and deterioration. Let us accept [an initiative] once and see what happens!

You will also notice that the present year has been characterized by inactivity on the Palestinian question although last year was characterized by the Palestinian penetration of Europe when Abu 'Ammar visited Austria, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. This visit constituted the climax of this penetration.

Errors

[Question] What in your opinion is the reason for this inactivity?

[Answer] The reason lies in the errors that were made on the Palestinian scene. Abu 'Ammar's visit to Paris should have been successful. But what made matters worse was the attempt to assassinate former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpur Bakhtiar.

Despite our points of view with regard to supporting the Iranian Revolution, we. as Palestinians or as Lebanese, are not responsible for the liquidation of Bakhtiar.

Let the Iranians settle their questions themselves. This incident has affected the Palestinian question as well as the Lebanese question because the West is still racist and prejudiced against the Arabs. Some parties used this incident against the Plaestinian question and against the Arabs.

[Question] It seems that the [European] initiative is related to the U.S. elections.

[Answer] No. I believe that the initiative is not directly related to the U.S. elections because these elections occur periodically. U.S. policy in the area, however, is unchanged; it is set by agencies, organizations and administrations.

The United States is concerned about its interests in the Middle East. As long as these interests are not threatened, as long as they are secure, Washington does not find itself compelled to change its positions vis-a-vis conditions in the Middle East.

And here we must refer to the fact that statements about Israel being an agent of stability in the Middle East have been heard in the West after [the outbreak] of the Iraqi-Iranian war. This is important because Israel will remain for the West an essential base in the east.

Settlement

[Question] It seems then that there are no possibilities for any acceptable solution to the Palestinian question in the foreseeable future.

[Answer] Yes, [there seem to be no possibilities], and this constitutes a major danger to the Palestinian question in Lebanon because the inactivity and the waiting under the auspices of Bashir al-Jumayyil building his state may weaken some of the Palestinians and may tempt them to build their own state and consolidate the privileges they gained on the land. This would constitute a mortal danger to the Palestinian question.

Turning Palestinian privileges in Lebanon into industrial and commercial organizations and agencies will bring an end to the Palestinian question.

[Question] Do you mean the settlement of Palestinians?

[Answer] Yes. There is spontaneous settlement, but there are those who are contributing to the entrenchment of this settlement. They are trying to legitimize it, and herein lies the danger.

The settlement of Palestinians exists. Even if the Palestinian question is settled, the settlement of Palestinians will continue. We do not reject that, but we will then demand that the Palestinian be given a political identity which is different from the refugee identity he has at present.

The Government and the Organization

[Question] But the settlement of Palestinians which involves no weapons is one thing and the establishment of armed settlement, which is a state entity, is another.

If Israel is turning down the settlement of Palestinians in the second sense on the West Bank, how can it possibly accept it in south Lebanon on the borders of Hebron where most of the population is Arab?

[Answer] A de facto settlement does exist from Tyre in the south to the al-Barid river in Tripoli.

In this regard I am affirming that to fight the settlement of Palestinians the PLO must make concessions to the legitimate government of Lebanon in some regions. Otherwise, the settlement of Palestinians will assume its actual proportions.

There is no escape from dealing with the Lebanese government. The resistance's refusal to deal with the government is unacceptable.

[Question] But the resistance is saying that it is the government that is refusing to deal with it!

[Answer] No. Is it reasonable or acceptable that there be no dealings between the Lebanese government and the Palestinian resistance for 5 years? This is neither reasonable nor acceptable.

Abu 'Ammar visited Sarkis only once. It is in the interests of both parties that a constant formula be set so that the two parties can deal with each other and cooperate.

[Question] But the National Movement is saying that the Lebanese government has adopted the separatist program in its entirety!

[Answer] Who said that?

[Question] We heard that in press statements.

[Answer] Unfortunately, different, contradictory and varied press statements from the National Movement abound. This is because some officials in the National Movement are fond of the press and of making statements [to the press].

[Question] In your judgment what is the position of the Lebanese government on the struggle that is ongoing on the Lebanese scene?

[Answer] Let us suppose that the Lebanese government is partial to the other side by 80 percent. We have to deal with it so we can take advantage of the 20 percent.

[Question] Twenty percent and more [for] al-Huss. The resistance is dealing with him now with the utmost respect.

[Answer] This is not certain.

Finally, we can only say that Junblat's conversation with AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM was not merely talk to while away the time, but it was rather from beginning to end [an expression] of a position of commitment. He was thinking out loud about the question of Palestine and the question of Lebanon.

This national leader who pursues an unswerving course granted this exclusive interview to AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM because he wanted to convey what was on his mind to the Arab citizen wherever he may be. He wanted his conversation to be an invitation to the Arab nation to stand up against the dangers that threaten it.

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CRISIS IN FISHING INDUSTRY ANALYZED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 24, 25 Oct 80

/Article by Abdallah Bensmain: "Fishing: The Alarm Signal"/

/24 Oct 80 p 2/

/Text/ Fishing, a strategic sector, is a resource the importance of which to Morocco can be seen by the position it occupies in the national economy. A principal resource, fishing is in third place after mining and agriculture. Some 50,000 people are directly employed in this industry; in addition, the fishing industry allows for the establishment of jobs in an indirect way in sectors that participate from a distance in the development of the fishing industry.

The fishing sector, although it is still of real social and economic importance, also shares, in a no less real way, in balancing the trade balance. With an average export value of 290 million dirhams for the 1978-79 season, fishing plays a determining role in the trade balance, at the same level as phosphates and the production of prunes.

Its approximately 3,900 kilometers of coastline make of Morocco a country of immense potential fishing resources. If they were exploited in an adequate fashion, these resources could profoundly alter the fishing sector.

It is, indeed, public knowledge that in spite of definite efforts, fishing in Morocco is still short of the real needs of the country. Far from responding to the needs of the national economy, the fishing sector, in spite of the enormous possibilities offered by the halieutic resources, is in a state of crisis that is scarcely favorable for an integrated exploitation of these resources.

This opinion, widely shared by fishing experts, is based on specific data. The canning industry can be an indicator, a major barometer for determining the main characteristics of this crisis.

The recent "awareness" tour organized by FICOMA /Federation of Canning Industries in Morocco/ in Safi, Essaouria, and Agadir attempted specifically to present the record of the fishing industry through its daily experience, the problems it encounters both in supplying its factories and in marketing the industrial product.

The canning industry, which includes 84 seafood processing plants along the Moroccan coast, produces the following fact in order to show the scope of the crisis: the

production potential of the fish-canning industry is currently being used to produce 65,000 tons of fish, whereas the production capacity is approximately 250,000 tons of fish. In terms of percentages, the factories are operating at only 22.5 percent of their capacity.

We Have a Coastal Fishing Fleet: But the Fish Have Gone Out to Sea

Far from being an isolated fact in the fishing industry, this situation, according to the president of FICOMA, is of several years' duration. The reason, according to the same source, is due to difficulties in being able to guarantee regular supplies to the industry. In "worrying" terms, since this has justified, on the part of FICOMA, action to make the press aware, the situation can be summed up as follows: 22 factories are at a total standstill, while 26 are operating at less than 20 percent of their capacity, and 36 at 35 percent of their production capacity.

The canning industry places the problems, at first, on two levels to explain the slump in which it is floundering. On the one hand, the question of supply, and on the other, the lack of competition of the finished products.

In the first case, the argument put forth may be paradoxical, but it is summed up by the industrial sector as follows: Morocco, which possesses the largest fish reserves, does not catch sufficient to keep the factories running at a profitable level. This comes from the fact that the current fishing fleet is not responding in an adequate fashion to the demands of the canning industries.

This fleet, which has traditionally been in the coastal fishing sector, finds itself suddenly obsolete: the coastal fishing zones have been deserted by the fish. To the point where there is no choice left either of fish or of being able to assure supplies to the canning industry.

To Have Global Vision

In order to be able to meet this demand, it is useless to rely on the traditional fishing fleet. FICOMA believes that the solution lies in an overall policy. The fishing industry, in order to respond adequately to its economic mission, should be changed in accordance with the new demand. Since the fishing zones have moved, an global policy that is capable of satisfying the canning needs must adapt to the new demands: the fishing fleet, in order to fulfill its mission, needs to be renewed. According to the canners, proof of this can be given by the fact that in the new fishing zones, "all the fishing fleets, except the Moroccan," can be found there.

This results in a systematic pilfering of the halieutic resources by foreign fishermen, a pilfering which, according to the statistics of the FAO amounts to 900,000 to 1 million tons of fish per year. The lack of Moroccan fisherman in these zones is possible either because a fishing fleet is not equipped for deep-sea fishing or because it needs means of preserving the fish on board the trawlers themselves.

On the other hand, the point that gets attention, according to the canners, is the lack of competitiveness of the nation's canning in foreign markets. This is even more important since 92 percent of the production is destined for export.

The reasons for the lack of competitiveness is explained by the increases in production costs.

According to the fishing industry's industrial sector, it is not possible to have the sale prices support the successive increases that have taken place in this industry. These increases are distributed at various production levels. The price of materials has increased (metal cans, cardboard, oil, and so on) as well as that of labor, energy, and tools.

The situation thus presented results in an imbalance between the export receipts and the production costs. The consequences, the basic cause of which, according to the canning manufacturers, is this imbalance, can be summed up as follows:

"Loss of markets to the benefit of a more dynamic and better equipped competition, which is utilizing fish taken freely and in great quantity from our own coasts;

"The threat of factories closing and reduction of work hours, causing depression among the fishermen;

"Cessation of all investment projects."

Trial of Strength: "We Are Preparing a Plan . . . of Technical Unemployment"

According to the same source, this has reached the point where "some companies, no longer having the means to support the social costs of fixed labor, are in the process of preparing a plan of technical unemployment which they will submit to the local authorities.

In order to alleviate the disadvantages of this situation, measures can be taken. The canning industry thinks that, first and foremost, the solution lies to a large extent in backing the canning industry.

This solution, which in some regards is very severe, was set forth in the following terms by the by the Moroccan General Economic Federation:

"The first measure that would be desirable to take quickly and which would surely have an immediate positive effect on our exports, is the liberating of foreign trade for canned fish, while still maintaining the control mechanisms that the state deems necessary," and it added:

"The marketing system in operation since 1965 has proved to be ineffective and costly. The administrative unwieldiness has reduced our exporters to powerlessness."

In other words, the questioning of the OCE /Marketing and Export Office/ becomes evident in that it has a deeply committed responsibility.

The OCE, with a quasi-monopoly in the area of foreign trade, constitutes, according to the canning industry, a restraint on the development of the canning industry in that this office relies on texts that were written mostly in the 30's by the French Protectorate. This time lag has repercussions on market research, on exporting itself, and in particular on the product to be exported.

Freeing Marketing Procedures?

According to the Federation of Canning Industries in Morocco, the solution to the marketing problem lies in making the fish canning trade freer. In support of its claim, it gives two examples: the textile industry and handicrafts, which, according to the federation, operate better now that they no longer come under the OCE.

In the specific case of fish canning, FICOMA would like the manufacturers to take their destiny in their own hands even on the international markets. In order to do this, the federation advocates a sort of return to an agency such as the UCIC /Trade and Industrial Canning Union/ which has had no justification for existence since 1965, the year of its replacement by the OCE.

The UCIC operated in the form of a cooperative, administered by a collegiate board of directors comprising the whole of the canning industry.

The union, which started sometime around 1945, was concerned specifically with the marketing of canned fish. In concrete terms, this agency was charged with finding prospective markets and with distributing orders among the canners according to the capacities of each.

Finally, the UCIC also organized the delivery of the product to those who had ordered it. According to FICOMA, the advantages of such an agency as the UCIC would be measurable merely by endorsing it: for one thing, there were no losses, whereas for several years there have been losses at loading of between 8 and 10 percent of the goods each year; in addition--which is even better--the UCIC had an up-to-date progress report which was available to the canners, whereas the OCE refuses to divulge its statistics; this refusal, according to FICOMA, creates an atmosphere of suspicion by making people believe that the OCE favors some canners over others in its quotas.

According to the canners, the OCE, far from serving the sector, is contributing in a definitive way to smothering it. The canning industry supports its views with the argument that this industry is subject to a policy that does not respond to the demands of contemporary trade. In addition, there are the administrative delays inherent in any administration, which, it seems, and the Federation of Canning Industries believes, are cultivated in particular by the OCE.

This is why, according to FICOMA, the question of approval and control is a real handicap for the canning trade and a real means of pressure in the hands of the OCE. Aside from the delays for which the OCE has been blamed, the canning industry has been heard to grumble about the cost of the OCE to the industry.

The OCE, on the other hand, which keeps 4.5 percent of the canning industry's turnover, thinks that this figure is consistent and in keeping with the operations it takes care of. This 4.5 percent, which includes market research costs (3 percent), quality control (1 percent), and transit costs (0.5 percent), are deemed excessive by the canners, who charge the OCE with inertia, in a word, with lack of effectiveness.

In short, to listen to FICOMA, the OCE is a sort of official parasite which, far from promoting foreign trade and the export of national products, lives at the expense of the very people who are to a large extent guaranteeing its existence.

A paradoxical situation? Assuredly, if one adheres to this point of view. But the situation is far more complex. It goes beyond the simple relationship between the OCE and the canning industry and includes partners of which the OCE/canners speak very little and about which they remain somewhat reticent.

On a practical level, the canning industry is not only going to war (and this is practically the case!) against the OCE, but also against the Fishing Office.

Comparison of Canned and Frozen Fish Exports in 1977/78 and 1978/79

Products	1977/78 Campaign			1978/79 Campaign		
	Quantity	Price*	Value	Quantity	Price*	Value
Sardines in cases	1,851,000	93.3	172,800	1,881,000	100.8	189,600
Other Fish	7,700	7.8	60,500	7,900	7.3	57,900
Frozen Fish	4,500	3.4	15,500	3,400	2.3	7,800
Total Preserved	44,500	5.6	248,800	44,300	5.7	255,300
Fish Meal	19,800	1.5	30,500	18,500	1.3	24,500
Oil	6,600	1.5	9,900	8,700	1.4	12,100
Total By-Products	26,400	1.5	40,400	27,200	1.3	36,600
Grand Total	70,900	4.07	289,200	71,500	4.08	291,900

*Price in dirhams per kilogram
Quantity: in gross ½-tons. For sardines, quantity: in cases of 100 boxes, ¼ club 30.

/25 Oct 80 p 2/

/Text/ The role of the offices has been questioned and the claims take turnings with various consequences. Thus, even though the OCE is not directly concerned with the problem of supplies, it is still no less involved in it. If the Fishing Office is blamed for not supplying the necessary effort to renovate and adapt the fishing fleet, the OCE, for its part, is accused of starving the small fishermen.

In fact, according to the logic of the Federation of Canning Industries, even though the OCE's control has permitted the quality of the national production and its adaptation to the demands of foreign markets (European in particular) to be upheld, if not improved, this does not mean that this control has not found to be negative by its restrictive nature.

In truth, this amounts to saying that the under-equipment in the area of fishing causes problems for the quality of the catch subject to the control the OCE exercises

over the canning industry, and it should be restated here that 92 percent of its total production is destined for export. Since the fishing fleet is doomed--at least until further notice--to operate along the coastline and in the vicinity of seafood processing centers, the canning industry gives this as a reason for refusing the cargoes of fish which are at times, it appears, sold off at prices even below cost.

The argument put forth by the canneries, as though it were obvious, concerns the OCE's control and the institutional requirement of this control over products destined for the canning industry.

Protect the Moroccan Label While Easing Standards

In the light of this, the Federation of Canning Industries has said it is ready to explore new markets, in the Third World in particular, that are likely to respond favorably to other criteria than those required by the European market. Having said this, the same federation thinks it possible--on condition that the standards are redefined, that a new easing of these standards occurs--that greater quantities will be purchased, and at better prices, of the catches from the still under-equipped fishing sector.

This "good" feeling of the canners is justified to a certain extent. The under-equipment of the infrastructure, which dates back to the time of the Protectorate, is, indeed, no longer responsive to the best utilization of the seafood processing industry. This state of affairs, in fact, makes it hazardous to attempt any preserving of a product that has a very low resistance to the normal room temperature of the factories. The solution would thus lie in setting up freezer plants.

Faced with this situation, the fishermen are really grumbling. If it is true that a feeling of hostility is developing toward the OCE because the canners are pointing an accusing finger at it, it is also true that these canners, with the Fishing Office, are channeling and directing the anger and frustration of the fishermen, boat owners or merely sailors.

From the point of view of figures, during the last season only 30,000 tons of the 108,000 tons of fish caught were purchased by the canning industry. The boat owners and small fishermen found themselves, when all was said and done, with a sizeable quantity of fish in their holds, with which they did not know what to do.

This is the precise point to question the role of the Asmak Company, which is supposed to concern itself exclusively with marketing seafood products on a national scale. One might rightly ask why this company does not fulfill the regulating role it has been given? The Asmak Company, which was conceived with the aim of promoting the consumption of fresh fish by the people, seems, after some remarkable beginnings, to have responded increasingly slowly.

Established in 1973, the Asmak Company, which had 50 points of sale throughout the country, now has points of sale only in the major urban centers.

According to the Asmak Company's management, the failure, which is not a failure in marketing the fish, can be explained by several failures. The lack of adequate structures, which caused irregularities at supply level, the drop in activity,

which was caused by this situation and by the dispersement of the points of sale, problems with controlling prices, with the quality of the fish, retail marketing without a real infrastructure of a product as perishable as fish: these are all factors which affected the activities of Asmak.

In the light of the foregoing, according to the Asmak management, one can better understand why this company has not fulfilled the ambitions set for it.

The Asmak Company has showed itself to be an unprofitable operation as a solution to a specific problem (making the public aware of fish as a food), since the very complex problems of administration and control finally ended by weakening, in a tangible way, the efforts of the Asmak Company.

Asmak's Fresh Fish Is Dead: Long Live Frozen Fish

However, far from being discouraged by the special conditions of marketing fresh fish, the management of Asmak is proposing an overall strategy for the future under the same management. A verification that everyone agrees in recognizing: national consumption is weak compared to the available resources. Although the need to have fish consumed is real and is a solution at the level of the local market, there is a problem in seeing the answer only in terms of fresh fish. On the contrary, the problem must be posed in terms of an industrial solution.

If fish is an industrial activity, it becomes urgent to study the question of distributing seafood in a new way. The solution of fresh fish being long dead, Asmak nevertheless does not despair and considers that the solution lies in freezing. The frozen product, although it is not part of the consumption habits of the country, nevertheless represents a choice for the future, with advantages that cannot be disputed.

With the nutritive quality of the fish remaining intact with freezing methods, the fish stays in a condition of irreproachable quality while needing no special structure. In addition, the price element should be noted (frozen fish is 25 to 30 percent cheaper than fresh fish), as should the regularity of supplies. As the management of Asmak is fond of repeating, "Fresh fish is a fish for a chance meeting; with frozen fish, there is the advantage of being able to make a date."

Asmak takes the view that any solution aimed at developing fish consumption is erroneous unless it recognizes the importance and viability of freezing, which, according to Asmak, is the miracle solution to prepare for the year 2000.

Fishermen: "Everyone Is Blackmailing Us"

Thus, at the end of this survey on the fishing sector, it can be seen that the problems are many, linked, and complex. The canning industry, by pulling the alarm bell to draw attention to the problems with which it says it is faced, has revealed a sector in crisis in which it forms but one aspect, of importance, to be sure.

By placing itself in the center of the discussions, the Federation of Canning Industries has, for all that, not masked the real dimension of the problems, of which it forms an important part. At the end of this overview of the fishing

sector, the stakes have to do with many elements and it would be difficult to say which one has more importance than any of the others.

The fishermen, the boat owners, the offices (OCE, ONP) are as important as the canning industry in the fishing sector. The accusations made by the canning industry against the OCE have not brought any significant reaction from this office. Unofficially, the leaders say they are ready to face a public debate, to reveal everything, which can show that the accusations against this office are without basis.

The major party to be accused is, of course, the OCE, but if the canning industry is accusing this office of strangling the industry, the industry is under attack from boat owners and small fishermen who blame it for smothering them shamelessly. Since the infrastructure for preserving the catches of fish are lacking, one can easily understand the complaints of the boat owners and fishermen-sailors, for whom the canning industry is their only client.

The canning industry's refusal to take the fishing cargoes is explained, according to the industry, by the OCE standards with which they must comply. Situated at the crossroads of the various components of the fishing sector, the canning industry possesses a real power of pressure: especially over the fishermen. This means of pressure, which seems like a blackmail instrument in the hands of the canning industry, can be implemented at any given moment. Especially during the height of the season.

The action recently taken by the Federation of Canning Industries has shown this. While refusing to acknowledge its responsibilities with regard to the current "crisis" that the fishing sector is going through, the canning industry has said it is ready to take adequate measures for it to be reabsorbed. To which the good sense of the fishermen replies: no unilateral decision from the very people who are strangling us. Or, further, from Asmak, which is calling for a development of freezer systems to increase and make local consumption tangible.

(Investigation carried out in Safi, Essaouria, Agadir, and Casablanca.)

11550
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

DIESEL ENGINES FOR PUMPS--Goteborg (Tidningarnas Telegrambyra) Volvo Penta has received a new large order for diesel motors from Saudia Arabia. The order includes 3,500 six-cylinder engines valued at 140 million Swedish kronor. The deliveries are to take place during all of 1981. Together with the 2,000 motors ordered in 1979, and the motors earlier delivered, there are now 10,000 Volvo engines operating in Saudia Arabia. The motors in the new order are primarily planned to be used as power plants for irrigation installations in the desert. [Text] [Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 26 Dec 80 p 27]

CSO: 3109

ETHIOPIAN NEWS AGENCY INTERVIEWS PRESIDENT NUMAYRI

LD171240 Khartoum SUNA in English 1010 GMT 17 Nov 80

['Text' of Ethiopian news agency interview with Gen Ja'far Muhammad Numayri, president of Sudan--date and place not given]

[Text] [Question] The process of normal relation between the two neighbouring fraternal peoples and countries initiated early tnis year by the top leaders of the Sudan and Ethiopia constitutes a major event of far-reaching importance in this area of the world. How could your excellency assess the aftermath of visit and talks with Comrade Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam in Khartoum.

[Answer] The tarm (normalizing) is short of expressing the trust links that bind the people of the two countries. Sudan and Ethiopia are not only linked by geographical neighbourhood but by human intermingle and joint historical and mutual interests. Thus by considering differences whatever their magnitude where they remain a passing phenomenon bilateral relations will flourish determining in the end the ensurance of good neighbourliness and mutual cooperation. As regards good neighbourliness, Sudan has in recognition of the its [as received] volume potentials and impact on the Arab world and the African continent, represented an indisputable international weight. Moreover, Sudan is a stabilizing factor in this port of the world in view of its ties with neighbouring countries.

The visit of brother chairman Mengistu, which took place at a convenient time, had provided an opportunity for constructive dialogue which made clear the fact that the interests of Sudan and Ethiopia are contrary to any sort of difference between them.

[Question] There had been a series of exchange of visits between Sudanese and Ethiopian experts in various fields since last May, in an effort to promote joint venture. What are the prospects for mutual collaboration in road transport and communication between Ethiopia and Sudan?

[Answer] The possibilities of mutual cooperation are unlimited particularly in economy, culox [as received] transport, communications and road construction including the completion of the African road network which could link Africa's eastern and western parts. Sudan has tailored a policy towards such cooperation with most neighbouring African states. The attitude was not confined to the signing of agreements but reached the stage of forming joint ministerial committees assigned to facilitate border trade and settling of arising problems. Such policy

has proved beneficial and we hope by adopting the same procedure with sister Ethiopia we could strengthen the interests of the Ethiopian and Sudanese peoples.

[Question] The good neighbourhood policy being pursued by the Democratic Republic of Sudan and socialist Ethiopia is contributing to the peace and stability in this region of Africa and the Red Sea. How could this be strengthened and become permanent?

[Answer] We believe that the stability and promotion of bilateral relations is the most significant guarantee for the stability of our region and the Red Sea as well. We have even called for keeping the Red Sea free from any sort of foreign presence, aiming at keeping it [words indistinct] international conflicts, since it has been proved that these conflicts attain their often [as received] at the expense of local identities and their vital interests as well. Sudan had initiated the call for the red [word indistinct] state conference in a bid to attain the objective in question. The conference held only a session in Taaz, Northern Yemen, and was attended by the heads of states of Somalia, Sudan, Northern Yemen and Southern Yemen. Regional and international changes had ruled out attempts to include all the littoral states in Taaz conference. Still, Sudan has not ceased endeavour in hold an expeded [as received] summit to work out means for ensuring that the Red Sea will be kept as a water way safeguarding the interests of its littoral states and the world at large without any sort of prejudice. I consider the promotion of Ethiopia-Sudanese ties a significant step towards that objective.

[Question] The conclusion of military [word indistinct] between the United States and Somalia has added a new element of instability to an already turbulent situation in the horn of Africa. How does your excellency conceive Sudan's role in bringing about lasting peace in this area of the world?

[Answer] As I said before Sudan's established conviction emanates from its recognition of the danger of foreign presence in our region whatever its nature is, any foreign presence in the region of [words indistinct]. The region will then be turned into a center of international conflict carrying dangers to peace and stability and to the aspirations of the peoples of the region in development and prosperity. We in Sudan still believe that the states of the region are capable of defending themselves against any external threat. Thus, good neighbourliness, cooperation, non-interference in others internal affairs, resorting to dialogues in solving arising problems and complete understanding of mutual interest, constitutes a guarantee not only against all sorts of dangers but against foreign presence in any part of the region.

[Question] The setting up of six autonomous regions in the Sudan got off the ground last May--what is the driving force behind this structure in terms of streamlining and extending social, educational and health amenities and facilitating administrative programmes?

[Answer] The regional government resolution, according to the permanent constitution, is binding to the government. The resolution has explicitly stated governing of Sudan should be decentralized in view of Sudan's vastness that exceeds a million square miles in area. The application of regional government through the formation of regions which was approved by the National Congress of the Sudanese Socialist

Union, is in tune to the constitution's demand and an implementation of its articles. As regards the significance of the new administrative situation towards development, health and culture, I think nothing new could emerge. The peoples local government formula, which was in extensive practice ten years ago, was based on decentralizing of services which were undertaken by the councils of the peoples local government at provincial levels.

Still, I consider the role to be shouldered by the regional government in devising comprehensive development plan in every region a significant one which in turn could lead to integration of Sudan resources.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

MILITARY SUPPLY AGREEMENTS--Khartoum, 24 Nov (SUNA)--Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Majid Hamid Khalil, first vice president and defense minister, has announced that agreements have been signed with the PRC, United States and France to supply the armed forces with their requirements. He added that this year will witness another move to complete what we aspire for. He stressed the fact that supplying the armed forces and raising their fighting capability are proceeding according to a precise study. [Text] [LD241408 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1000 GMT 24 Nov 80]

GOVERNOR RELIEVED OF POST--The president of the republic, Jafar Muhammad Numayri, today issued a republican decree relieving Mr Abdullah 'Umar, governor of Northern Kordofan Province, of his post as provincial governor. The deputy governor will discharge the duties of the provincial governor. [Text] [Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 25 Nov 80]

THIRD AMF LOAN--The Arab Monetary Fund has agreed to provide a loan of 5 million Arab Dinars (approximately $19 million) to Sudan to help meet the country's balance of payments deficit. The three-year loan carries interest at 5.8 per cent, an average of 1.5 per cent higher than the AMF's second loan to Sudan, $7.3 million, extended in October of last year. Total lending by the AMF to Sudan now stands at around $24 million. Chronic balance of payments problems and severe economic difficulties because of falls in commodity exports this year have already led to a rescheduling of $1.1 billion Sudan has borrowed on international markets. As this newsletter reported in its November 10 issue, $600 million lent to private Sudanese banks has just been rescheduled by a group of five major Western banks; one year ago Sudan and its creditors reached an agreement enabling the Khartoum government to stagger the payment of some $500 million in arrears over the following seven years. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 17 Nov 80 p 6]

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END

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No. 2235

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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CRITICISM OF MOROCCAN RAID ON MAURITANIA

Algiers EL DJEICH in French Sep 80 p 24

[Article by Aissa Siouda: "Moroccan Raid on Mauritania: Diversionary 'Phantoms' "]

[Text] Failures, whether diplomatic or military, are hard to accept. So hard in fact that they sometimes make people do foolish or even ridiculous things. Hassan II knows something about that. He is considered a master in such matters. His successive failures in the western Sahara haunt him and give him nightmares, but ones he still persists in trying to turn into dreams. The dream of a great Morocco, so dear to Allal el-Fassi, stretching from Tangiers to the Senegal river, by way of Tindouf in Algeria and as far as certain parts of Mali. Some dream!

The very latest failure to afflict sharifian diplomacy, at the 17th OAU summit in Freetown, at which the SDAR [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic] was recognized by 26 countries, or the majority of the organization's members, has stuck in his throat like a bone. But the king does not seem to be giving up his dream as a result, and is trying to make others pay the price, a very high one, for his failures. Royal stubbornness and cynicism! Who is the victim this time? Mauritania, a country that Hassan II has never forgiven for having abandoned him and left him all alone in his military venture in the Sahara, and for having become aware of his greedy expansionist plans.

The curtain has fallen. The truth is out. The bombing of the area around Boulanouar, a few kilometers northwest of Nouhadibou, the economic capital of Mauritania, exposes Hassan II's plans for hegemony. To that end, any means are right according to the monarch's way of thinking.

Diplomatically isolated, threatened at home by ever-growing popular dissatisfaction, the sharifian monarch is now trying to save his shaky throne through acts of pure barbarity. The raid on Boulanouar is a very significant example.

Up to the present, two countries were known to be capable of this sort of barbarity toward their neighbors: Israel and South Africa. Now, Morocco makes the third one. Rabat's expansionist logic impels it to commit the

inadmissible, to defy the law and international entreaties, with a frenzy akin to desperation. The desperation of a cornered regime sparing neither politics nor military means to stay in power.

The actual bombing of Boulanouar cannot be considered as merely an incident of no great importance, because it sheds light on two disturbing aspects.

First, it has just reminded us that the dream of a "great empire" is still alive and that Hassan II is not giving up his hegemonic policy. The danger still exists. It is getting more and more serious. And then, it includes a diversionary aspect. The failure of Moroccan diplomacy at Freetown, the diplomatic and military victories of the SDAR, are impelling the would-be politicians in Rabat to play the card of dissension, with the obvious intention of confusing the issues in the Saharan problem. A no-trump game, because the truth cannot be hidden indefinitely from international opinion. The Saharan cause itself carries victory after victory, and the ALPS [Saharan People's Liberation Army] battle after battle. The ultimate victory of the Saharans is only a matter of time.

The attack on Boulanouar is part of a larger plan, aimed at the destabilization of Mauritania. Unable to justify, in the eyes of international opinion, a military annexation of the country, Rabat is trying to accomplish its aims through recourse to economic pressure. The objective of the raid, in fact, was destruction of the railroad linking the mining area of Zouerate to the port of Nouhadibou. By means of these tricks, Rabat is trying to reinstate in Nouakchott the businessmen favorable to it who have been excluded from the Mauritanian scene since the establishment of the Military Committee for National Salvation. But the maneuver failed. Mauritania again asserted that nothing will make it renege on its promises. Morocco is merely accentuating its isolation.

12149
CSO: 4400

CRITICISM OF SADAT FOR DEALING WITH U.S., ISRAEL

Algiers EL DJEICH in French Sep 80 pp 25-26

/Article by Aissa Siouda: "The Pious Leader, American Strategy, and the Latest Concessions"/

/Text/ Despite the slaps in the face received daily from his "dear friends" in America and Israel, Anwar Al-Sadat, the "pious Rais /leader/" makes no complaints, does not flinch. What is more, he is content to wait about in his ostrich-like policy and persists in his course. Neither the neglect nor the indifference that he meets with every day have succeeded in making him turn back. Could he do so, anyway? He would still not desist from increasingly cherishing his "beloved duo" (Israel and the U.S.): the "holy faith" has its obligations! Love, when you enthrall us!

In love it is not the same as in war. One must especially not offend one's dear partner, not upset his feelings in any way. He must be surrounded with every consideration. To blazes with the Arab common cause, Palestine, and the struggles of so many generations! After all, they are not worth much compared to an affectionate glance from the "two darlings."

Love is believed to be blind, but in politics, it is cynical, it sees farther and aims higher. Limitless, spellbinding, it wants everything and expects everything.

First Egypt, then the rest of the gulf Arab countries as far as the ocean, and all as a result of the complicity of other courtiers, other "Sadats" of whom there are so many in this vast homeland.

To show his devotion to his friends, Sadat gives them presents, and not negligible ones. The most recent are his naval and land military bases, to the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force. How pleased the Americans must be! Here is Egypt, the whole of Egypt, once a bastion of Anti-imperialism in their hands. What unhoped-for luck, when one has just lost Iran, and for ever! Merely a pawn move: the shah, a gendarme lost; Sadat, a gendarme found. A major piece in the area, complementing the role of Israel which for a variety of reasons cannot assume this role on its own.

For Israel cannot hide behind the curtain of Arabness and Islam to intervene in the region; henceforth the rais will take care of that. And so several warships from the sixth fleet have dropped anchor in Alexandria, several units of the U.S. Air Force have been stationed in a military airport situated northwest of Cairo since 10 July. These air units have come to strengthen those already stationed in Qena since implementation of the secret clauses of the disgraceful "Camp David" accords. These air and sea units are to undertake with the Egyptian Army joint training maneuvers that will last until next October. Thus the corrupt class now ruling Egypt has succeeded with the complicity of the United States in diverting the Egyptian army from its real mission, namely, confrontation with the Zionist enemy, by entrusting it with missions not its own. The concentration of several divisions on the Libyan border illustrates the truth of this. Soldiers and private officers are not to be blamed when the supreme command of this army is composed of a corrupt class that is willing to sell the whole of Egypt for "another handful of dollars." But the ultimate task of saving the country devolves upon those soldiers and those sincere officers who through their alliance with patriotic popular forces may wash away the shame and pick up the imperialist challenge.

The latest news is that two "F4 E" type aircrafts have crashed 12 kilometers from the above-mentioned airport in a desert area. The two pilots were killed. A commission has been ordered to look into the circumstances of this accident. The "Arab Egypt Liberation Front" has claimed responsibility for blowing up one of the U.S. "Phantoms" and attributes the operation to officers and soldiers who are still faithful to Nasserian principles and are doing all they can to prevent Egypt's becoming a Zionist base.

And so, despite the Knesset's recent decision to make Al Quds the definitive capital of Israel, Anwar Al-Sadat is throwing himself with even more force into the arms of imperialism and Zionism.

Those who long ago ceased to wager on the "return of the prodigal son" to the "Arab ranks" have received a big slap right in the face. If only the people would wake up! But it is not in their nature to do so. Need it be recalled therefore that whatever is taken by force is retrieved by the same means, and that nothing is to be expected from the bourgeois "catering" class that rules Egypt, with the "devout rais" at its head.

Any change in this country can only be the work of opposition by popular Egyptian forces. For only these forces interpret the will of the people.

The lessons of history have taught us that the will of the people is invincible whatever the strength of the imperialist powers. There is no lack of examples. The fate of despots is surely in the "dungeons of history"; the most outstanding example occurred recently in the home of the "Devout Rais." His friend the shah died in his arms, amid general indifference.

The progressive and popular forces will rise one day, it is certain, to put

an end to the story of this tragic "rotten love" that has gone on too long between the "Devout Rais" and his "friends and relations," for the wheel of history can never be prevented from turning in the direction of the aspirations of the people.

12149
CSO: 4400

APW TO EXERCISE GREATER POPULAR CONTROL

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French 24-30 Oct 80 pp 39-40

[Article: "A New Function: Inspection"]

[Text] Submitted by the government to the office of the National Popular Assembly 26 March 1980, that is during the recent spring session, the bill, amending and completing Order No 69-38 of 23 May 1969 setting forth the provincial code, is now being studied by an Assembly committee.

Study of this bill, planned for the last session and no doubt postponed due to the rather brief length of the session (the Party's special congress was a factor), will take place this fall along with other matters. Thus this time the deputies will have had enough time to study the documents and make an informed judgment.

But aside from certain provisions which specify somewhat better the responsibilities devolving on the governorate and the APW [Governorate Popular Assemblies], this bill will surely inspire a broad discussion.

Since what else could the deputies talk about in such a context if not about decentralization and deconcentration and above all debureaucratization of the administrative apparatus? Thus beyond the discussion of the juridical content of the document the Assembly will no doubt take up certain aspects connected with the functioning of administrative institutions. Above all, when it is known that the 5-year plan will this time be totally decentralized, involving a greater responsibility for the governorate and the APC. Since decentralization at the governorate level permits improvement of economic and social planning methods, inasmuch as they constitute a new approach to development problems.

Today then the governorate structures should be strengthened, giving them all the juridical, material, human and political resources necessary for the accomplishment of its important task.

Since the elaboration 11 years ago of the governorate code many things have changed the political, economic and social aspects of the country. But the code guiding the operation of a decentralized collectivity has not notably evolved and in some places there are gaps which create difficulties in operation.

Thus the bill to be submitted to the deputies beginning 22 October, opening date of the fall session, presents a fundamental principle, namely the updating of the

code by "strengthening the powers exercised by the governorate" and by perfecting its functioning with a view toward a better decentralization. This concerns the APW as well as the governorate executive.

Fill in the Gaps

If it is simply a matter of adapting the language to a new situation, one cannot help asking why the governorate assemblies' activities declined during a good period. Is it due to a bad coordination between the executive structure and the APW? This reason does not explain everything. There must be another reason--either in the systematic nonapplication (in the spirit and in the letter) of the legislation or else in the weakness of the latter.

The new draft bill, seeking to fill the gaps, confers other functions on the APW, widening its scope of activity, giving decentralization a content that is closer to what is expected of it. It should be said that decentralization does not mean, as it is often alleged, a decentralization of problems and an inflation of laws; on the contrary, it makes every effort to democratize State action, simplify governing procedures, and indeed break down the barrier separating government from citizen. Eleven years' experience provide inescapable conclusions. In that connection the balance sheet that could be drawn up on the function of the governorate and the APW as a decentralized structure is surely positive. Taking into consideration the experience gained up to now the draft bill seeks to extend the powers of the one, which strengthen the authority of the other. Thus decentralization and deconcentration bring about necessarily an increase in the burdens of the governorates which now have their economic, social and cultural authority considerably widened.

A Permanent Coordination

Conforming to the National Charter and the laws adopted by the National Popular Assembly at its preceding sessions, popular inspection will be exercised by the APW, as the new code specifies in 15 articles. Thereby the inspection function completes at the governorate level the political, technical and administrative inspections carried out by other institutions entrusted with that function. In this framework and according to the draft bill the APW carries out investigation in the public services of an administrative, industrial or commercial nature managed by the governorate or which operate within its territory; of enterprises or local organizations of any nature charged with operating programs of governorate economic, social and cultural development; cooperative organizations under State control and economic groups, socialized enterprises operating on the overall governorate level. Only organizations, enterprises and services whose inspection is carried out by APW and the APC and the juridical services, party organs, ANP services and those of public security, are excluded from the field of APW intervention and inspection.

APW exercises its inspection function by means of a permanent committee seeking to insure quality of services by public administrations, to judge the efficiency of enterprises and local organizations, to oversee at the governorate level the proper application of laws and regulations in force, to propose any urgent measure needed to safeguard the patrimony of local collectivities and enterprises, self-managed enterprises, or cooperative organizations in the socialist sector. Thus

the draft code, while widening the scope of action of the executive council, endows the Assembly with new functions; it will have a new office which will include a chairman and four vice chairmen who will become permanent. Also the APW can present a recommendation to the government which will consider making it a bill.

These institutions lacked a few responsibilities and practical functions needed for them to become more operational and hence more efficient. One might consider that inspection, which is not an easy task--far from it--will democratize the life of the popular assembly and allow it to play its role fully--this remains a current necessity. Provided of course that there is between it and the executive council an on-going coordination and harmonious relationship able to withstand every trial. In this connection the party will oversee, without replacing administrative bodies, the proper functions of the decentralized institutions which are directed by men in whom it has reposed its confidence.

Thus it is in the proper framework of the governorate that the party "impresses an ever-renewing élan on its role of creating and orienting and brings about the harmonizing and unity of aspirations between the base and the summit. Within the local governorate aspirations and popular participation find their full development, and there one has, for the party as for the state, the confrontation of ideas and of experience needed for the concretization of our political options and governmental action."

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CODIFICATION OF TWINNING OF AGRICULTURAL, NONAGRICULTURAL UNITS TO BE DISCUSSED

Algiers REVOLUTION ET TRAVAIL in French 1 Nov 80 pp 12, 13

[Article--passages between slantlines originally published in boldface]

> [Text] The department of mass organizations and voluntariate has just considered a document on the twinning of agricultural and nonagricultural units. This document, submitted for discussion, has the virtue of putting the voluntariate back into its natural place, which after all is one which the workers and their labor organization have always demanded. This framework departs from the sporadic character of the voluntariate and proposes a more highly elaborated form, in which the headquarters, in particular, is the driving force.
>
> On the occasion of the commemoration of the anniversary of the agrarian revolution, the labor movement is invited to reflect on this text, to formulate suggestions, and even to enrich the proposals in the interests of even closer solidarity between workers and peasants.

Among the means of enlarging and deepening, both qualitatively and quantitatively, the voluntariate, the twinning of agricultural and nonagricultural units will constitute the /Highest Form/ of organization of the voluntariate in support of the agrarian revolution.

In effect, the twinning is intended to establish /permanent and regular linkage/ between agricultural operations and the nonagricultural economic and sociocultural units; thus the twinning signifies the organization of support activities supporting the agricultural units which are not limited to material or circumstantial needs, but which are part of a general program of activity established at the start of the twinning, conjointly by the workers and peasants in the twinned units, while also taking into account material needs at the time as well as concerns looking toward the amelioration of living and working conditions of the peasants.

So twinning is /an integrated form of the voluntariate/ and it is superior because of the integration, in a given period (the agricultural year or several agricultural years), of diversified activities in economic matters and techniques of health, education, and leisure.

The elaboration of any program of twinning organization necessitates determination of its objectives, its field of action as well as definition of the criteria which should rule the choices and decisions of twinning.

Objectives of Twinning

A higher, integrated, and permanent form of the voluntariate, twinning is the organization of political, economic, and sociocultural relations between agricultural and nonagricultural units with a view toward the consolidation of the alliance of the basic forces of the revolution, namely the workers and the peasants.

The consolidation of the alliance between the earth and the factory, between fellahs and manual laborers and intellectuals of the factories, the schools, and institutions is aimed ultimately at mobilization focused on the objectives laid out in the National Charter for agrarian revolution, cultural revolution, and industrial revolution, and industrial revolution.

Twinning is thus the concrete manifestation of the unity of the three revolutions--agrarian, cultural, and industrial--through which the revolution marches ahead toward socialism.

The achievement of this unity in the framework of the overall progress of our revolution assumes a strategic importance for the success of this undertaking, so true is it that the split between the agrarian and the industrial revolutions, between the industrial and cultural revolutions, carries within itself the risk of thwarting this progress, because this split (or these splits) represent a discoordination between the objectives aiming for the same goal, expressed in space and time.

At the moment, when concerns are effectively focused on evaluation and review of the previous achievements of the revolution and on the refinement of development plans for the decade to come, it has become imperative to better coordinate programs and activities and to synchronize them in order to progress in a more balanced way.

Twinning thus appears in all the depth and scope and significance of its objectives which are therefore political, economic, and sociocultural.

/Political objectives:/ On the political side, twinning represents the concrete solidarity between the towns and the peasants, between UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers], UNFA [National Union of Algerian Women], UNJA [National Union of Algerian Youth], and ONM [National Veterans Organization] with UNPA [National Union of Algerian Peasants] right in the field.

The political objective is realized through:

--joint mobilization at the level of the agricultural unit, on objectives of the agrarian revolution;

--join mobilization around the watchwords of the policy decreed by the FLN [National Liberation Force] Party in the implementation of the National Charter in matters of economic, social, and cultural development;

--the exchange of ideas and experiences with regard to the struggle for national independence and the struggle for development, in the countryside and in the towns.

In regard to this political objective, it is appropriate to stress the preeminent leadership role of the party cells in the economic units that will have to impel, orient, and activate the twinning units.

/Economic Objectives:/ In the overall picture, the economic objectives are defined in terms of the effort to integrate agriculture and other economic sectors, and they are manifested by the functions and obligations which the nonagricultural sectors must fulfill vis-a-vis agriculture.

This effort at integration is, however, the special charge of the economic and administrative structures and institutions responsible for agriculture and the sectors concerned. It necessitates activities that are both of larger scope and better sustained.

The twinning is defined with economic objectives much more modest which should not be confused with those proper to the economic institutions concerned and still less with palliative policies designed to substitute for them.

In the current interpretation, the objectives of twinning are by nature noneconomic while nevertheless having an impact at the level of the twinned agricultural units.

Thus, the economic impact of twinning is going to consist in diverse activities programmed in accordance with operational needs or the needs of the agricultural unit, which could be:

/technical work:/ topographical surveys, land management plans, agricultural exploitation plans, plans for construction of sheds and buildings.

/repair and maintenance work/ on the equipment and agricultural machinery depot, mechanical and electrical maintenance.

--/improvement projects:/ desherbage [translation unknown], clearing the stones from land, reforestation, building of sheds, access roads, etc...

It is timely to mention and ephasize at the same time that the twinning operation is not aimed at what might be called accountable economic objectives.

Basically it is a question of organizing and bringing to bear the technical and material support needed for agricultural units to have the proper logistics, not to make up for them or replace them.

/Sociocultural Objectives:/ The sociocultural objectives are at the meeting-point of the imperatives of the agrarian and cultural revolutions.

This point of intersection reveals, first of all, that there is still more underdevelopment in the country than in the cities;

"It is true too that while the peasants continue to live in the historic cultural heritage which is proper to our identity and our personality, in the towns, by contrast, it is obvious that a certain rather vulgarized ambivalent "Culture", linked to a whole set of actions, gestures, and mental reflexes arising from the insidious ambiance of the styles of life and thought characteristic of French domination, secular and lower middle-class, continues to impregnate social behavior in the urban environment." (CF National Charter, Page 64).

Thus appears, in terms of twinning, the possibility of mobilization around the basic objectives of the cultural revolution intended to lead to the formation of a new man in a new society, with the development of the national personality and the collective identity, as well as the creation of a "balanced society in which each citizen is neither cut off from his roots nor kept on the margins of progress" (CF National Charter page 64).

The concrete activities in terms of a twinning program will involve:

--alphabetization and Arabization of adults and unschooled youth;

--the organization of conferences on cultural and political subjects;

--the organization of artistic activities.

The cultural activities envisaged as part of a twinning program will necessarily be associated with other social objectives in matters of hygiene and health which could consist in the organization:

--of conferences or proposed films on the health of mother and child and based on watchwords of preventive medicine.

--of involvement from time to time in vaccinations, preparations for going into maternity labor, etc.

Criteria of Twinning

To define the criteria of twinning is to identify the elements that should be considered decisive in terms of opting for it, but also at the same time to specify the limits of its field of action and to forestall improper operations of twinning.

If we say that it is the highest, most integrated and permanent form of the voluntariate, that implies that it should be /selective/ and not universal.

/Selectivity/ implies that twinning should not be occasioned by activities of a sporadic character, limited in time, isolated activities, confined to only one economic or cultural pigeonhole linked to a limited-objective political campaign.

/Freedom of membership and democracy,/ should reign in the decisions of the economic cultural and social units concerned.

/Units proposed/ for twinning should be organically structured and of sufficiently high quality in terms of the FLN Party (workplace cell) and of the mass organizations concerned.

/The geographic position/ of units proposed for twinning should be situated in a single commune, a single daira [translation unknown] and a single governorate in accordance with the size of the units and the numbers of peasants and workers.

/The choice of units/ to be twinned should take into account the /nature of the units;/ CAPRA [Agricultural Production Cooperative of the Agrarian Revolution], CAPCS [Communal Multi-Service Agricultural Cooperative], joint operational cooperative, self-administered domain in agricultural affairs, industrial units, commercial units, and service units.

/The advisory opinion of the tutelary administrations/ is necessary for any twinning operation.

Organization Programming

Four steps can be envisaged in terms of organization and programming

/a) Campaign of explanation and sensitization of militants/

This campaign is to be undertaken under the aegis of the councils of coordination of the governorate and communes, by the party cells, UGTA and UNPA and other mass organizations to sensitize and mobilize the militants around the objectives and criteria of twinning.

/b) Preparation:/

The militants proceed through the party cells, UNPA and UGTA to the study as well as evaluation of the human and material resources and to identification of twinning projects.

/c) Discussion and Adoption of Twinning Projects:/

First at the cell level and then at the level of the councils of coordination of the commune and the governorate.

/d) Programming and Mobilization:/

The adopted plans contain the twinning projects. Mobilization is effectuated through the establishment of brigades at the level of the units concerned.

The brigades will be created as specialized teams. The unit of time for the full execution of the twinning program is the agricultural year. The twinning program takes into account the characteristics of the academic and university year and the time of year in industry and the services that is best suited and meshed to the imperatives of the agricultural year.

Follow-up and Evaluation

--In terms of twinned units, coordination and coherence, activities are sanctioned monthly by the meetings of the chiefs of teams and brigades with the responsible officials of the FLN cells, UNPA, and UGTA.

--Every trimester the councils of coordination of the commune and the governorate review the activities in the framework of the twinning.

The objective of follow-up and evaluation is to watch over the implementation of the programs authorized as well as over proposed measures of improvement.

A continual evaluation, every trimester and for every governorate should be the responsibility of the commission of the voluntariate in the central committee.

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PUBLIC INDUSTRIAL SECTOR DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 6 Oct 80 pp 26-32

[Article by Engineer Muhammad Taha Zaki Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources: "How Can the Public Industrial Sector Be Liberated?"]

[Text] For about a quarter of a century the public industrial sector has played a prominent role in the implementation of development projects in Egypt and has become the backbone of Egypt's economic structure. But there have been many obstacles and restrictions on the path which it has followed, and they have prevented it from achieving more progress.

For some time now discussions have been going on concerning how to liberate the public sector from these restrictions. These discussions, in the Ministry of Industry, have crystallized in the form of a draft law, for the development of the public industrial sector, which aims at encouraging Egyptian capital to participate in supplying capital for industrial companies.

The man responsible for this basic idea is Engineer Taha Zaki, the minister of industry. Here is what he has to say about it:

The Ministry of Industry and Mineral Wealth was established in July 1956 in order to assume the job of constructing a national industrial base which would support the economic and political independence of the Arab Republic of Egypt and be able to achieve a doubling of the national income so that economic prosperity would be achieved for all Egyptians.

The Need for Central Planning and Recording Its Implementation:

In order that the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Wealth be able to achieve these two national goals, from the time that it was established the ministry has undertaken the responsibility of preparing industrial development plans and programs on the national level. In doing so, the ministry has followed a strategy of comprehensive central industrial planning. In this regard, there have been a number of basic considerations which the ministry has had to take into account. Here are some of them:

1. The necessity to concentrate on setting up basic industries as a firm base for Egypt's industry. Among the most important of these industries are the iron and

steel industry; the fertilizer industry; industries which produce construction materials, materials baked in kilns and furnaces, pipes, and rolled metal; industries which deal with non-ferrous metals such as copper and aluminum; and the various engineering industries.

2. The aim of this national industrialization planning is to change the framework of Egypt's commodity production from being that of an agriculture-oriented framework to being that of an integral economic framework. This is to be done while taking into account parallel growth between both the sector of industry and the sector of agriculture, and taking into account coordination between industry and the other economic sectors. In addition to this, one must bear in mind coordination between the various industrial sectors in the framework of the national industrialization plan.

3. Utilization of energy, the sources of which are distributed throughout the various areas of the country. This is something which cannot be achieved except by means of industrial planning on the national level. It involves the establishment of the fertilizer industry by means of utilizing electricity from the Aswan Reservoir, the aluminum industry by means of utilizing electricity from the High Dam, and the fertilizer industry by utilizing natural gas from the gas fields at Abu Qir.

4. Developing and supporting processing industries which rely upon local raw materials. At the head of the list here are the food industries, such as the sugar industry which depends on sugar cane and sugar beets; the textile industries, which depend on cotton and flax; the building materials industries producing cement and sand bricks, which depend on limestone, clay, gypsum, and sand; and the chemical industries such as those which produce nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers.

5. Industrial products cannot be distributed nation-wide unless industrial planning and implementation take place on the national level. This is the only way to meet the needs, in terms of various industrial products, of all of the masses of people in the various parts of the country. This is particularly true with regard to food supply, as in the case of sugar and edible oils; industrial cleaning agents and soap; and clothing supply, as in the case of fabric materials used for clothes worn by the Egyptian masses.

6. The setting up of industrial areas which embrace a number of industrial enterprises which constitute an integral industrial center providing a complete infrastructure of facilities such as means of transportation, housing, water, supply, electricity, and sewage cannot be achieved unless industrial planning and implementation take place on the national level.

7. Regional distribution of the industrial enterprises--to all of the provinces on sound economic bases such that each enterprise, in the region in which it is established, will have potential for success--cannot occur except by pursuing the method of comprehensive national industrial planning which is able to determine the most appropriate locations, from all economic and social points of view, in which to set up the industrial enterprises.

Today, a quarter of a century later, the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Wealth is responsible for the planning and supervision of the public industrial sector which currently consists of 116 companies. They represent 5 different types of principal industrial sectors, and are distributed as follows:

There are 30 companies in the textile and clothing manufacturing sector, 21 companies in the food industry sector, 26 companies in the chemical industry sector, 31 companies in the sector including basic metal industries and their products, and 9 companies in the sector which includes the mining industry and the industry which produces materials baked in kilns and furnaces. Thus the above-mentioned shows that the state, since the establishment of the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Wealth, has been oriented toward national industrial planning and this has been one of the principal factors which have helped to implement its industrial development plans and the establishment of large-scale enterprises engaging in large-scale production.

The Need For Centralized Industrial Planning In a Prosperous Egypt

National industrial planning, in years past, has been the foundation of industrial development in Egypt. Economic and social progress in the Egypt of the future will depend on the quantitative, qualitative, and technical development of Egyptian industry so that Egyptian industry, in addition to meeting the needs of the Egyptian masses, will also become an industry geared toward export, able to compete on the world market. The only way this can be achieved is to follow this method of national industrial planning.

We must bear in mind that the population of the Arab Republic of Egypt is expected to reach a figure of 66 million persons by the year 2000. What this means is that Egypt itself will be a large market which will require the establishment of industries which produce on a large scale in order to meet the needs of the country's growing population. The reason for this is that large-scale enterprises have numerous advantages over smaller ones--the most important advantages being reduction in costs and improved quality of production. This requires us to engage in industrial planning on the national level, not on the local, provincial level, because this will make it possible to set up enterprises which produce on a large scale. It is an indisputable fact that a national industrialization plan is the result of coordinating integral regional development plans which aim at extending development within the regions. As for the new cities which will be established in the desert and on the seacoasts, the industrial sector will constitute the basic core of their economy and social and technological growth and development.

Today, if we look at the framework of Egypt's national industrial structure, we see that there is still an eighth reason which stresses, now more than ever the need to adhere to and be committed to the strategy of central national industrial planning which the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Wealth has been engaging in since it was established. This reason is the fact that industry has spread and the fact that industries are linked with each other. The best way for us to show the reality of this fact is to point it out in the following examples which we cite:

The Textile and Clothing Manufacturing Sector

We have already pointed out that this sector consists of 30 companies which are located in different provinces of the country. The sector's production is as follows:

Yarn of various categories--uncut cotton fabrics, processed cotton fabrics, woolen yarn, synthetic fibers, woolen fabrics, synthetic fiber fabrics, knitting yarn, and ready-made clothes as a final product.

All of these activities could be located in integrated central enterprises as is the case with the Egyptian Textile Co. in al-Mahallah al-Kubra which produces all of the types of materials mentioned above.

Or the activity engaged in in one company could require mutual cooperation with another company which engages in an activity which supplements the former. This is the case with the Egyptian Fine Textile Manufacturing Co. in Kafr al-Dawwar which produces and weaves cotton yarn, after which the yarn is processed in the Al-Bayda Egyptian Dyeing Co. This is also true of the Daqahliyah Textile Co. which only produces yarn and then supplies it to other associated companies in Zifta, Mit Ghamr, and other cities in other provinces.

There is also another example of a company which produces textiles and then has the textiles processed in another company which is located in another province. This is true of the Damietta Textile Co. which has its product processed in the Nasr Dyeing and processing Co. in al-Mahallah al-Kubra. In fact there are special enterprises which serve the public sector or private sector companies which are in their area. An example is the case of the Nasr Dyeing and Processing Co. in al-Mahallah al-Kubra and the Cairo Dyeing and Processing Co. in Shubra al-Khaymah.

Also, the Central Egypt Co. in al-Minya and al-Fayyum produces cotton yarn which is then transformed into fabric materials in the Bani Suwayf Co., and then the materials are processed in one of the associated companies such as the Nasr Dyeing and Processing Co. in al-Mahallah al-Kubra, the Al-Bayda Egyptian Dyeing Co. in Kafr al-Dawwar, or the Cairo Dyeing and Processing Co. in Shubra al-Khaymah.

What this means is that there is a very clear interrelationship between these companies. There is also an interrelationship between this sector and the sector of chemical industries which supply the dyes, chemical materials, industrial goods, and assistance which enter into the processes of weaving, processing, and dyeing the fabrics. The Chemical and Dye Materials Co. in Kafr al-Dawwar meets the needs of the textile and clothing sector by providing the various dyes.

The Metal-Producing Industries Sector

This sector consists of 10 companies which are located in various provinces. Eight of these companies have to do with the iron and steel industry. The Egyptian Iron and Steel Co. in Hulwan supplies the other companies of the sector with semi-finished steel products such as:

Steel beams to the Egyptian Copper Co. in Alexandria, the Delta Steel Co. in Musturud, the National Co. in Abu Za'bal, the various private sector companies located in provinces throughout the country which produce rolled reinforcement iron, and enterprises engaging in construction work.

Cast iron for the foundries of public and private sector companies, and which is utilized in the production of cast parts which are used in engineering products and in sewage pipes.

Providing the Nasr Pipe Co. in Hulwan with the sheets of steel needed for making pipes, providing the Nasr Co., which manufacturers cars and light means of transportation, with sheets of steel, providing the (Idyal) Delta Industry Co. with sheet metal for the production of refrigerators and washing machines, and providing the food industry companies with steel strips which are necessary for packaging their products.

Likewise, the companies in Cairo and Alexandria which produce metal products supply the construction sector with its needs in terms of the cast-iron pipes, coated basins, and bathtubs, the expansion in production of which goes along with the needs of the housing and urban development sector.

The Chemical Industries Sector

The chemical industries are considered to be one of the main foundations of industrial production in view of the fact that they are so closely involved with all industrial sectors. The chemical industries sector includes many industries, the products of which serve as raw materials for a great number of industries in other sectors. For example, the Egyptian Chemicals Co. in Alexandria produces caustic soda which is supplied to the artificial silk industry in the Artificial Silk Co. in Kafr al-Dawwar and the Industrial Firms Co. (Asku) in Shubra al-Khaymah. It is also considered to be the basic raw material for the manufacture of edible oils and soap in the companies of the food manufacturing sector which are located throughout the provinces of al-Gharbiyah, al-Daqahliyah, al-Minya, Sawhaj, and so on.

In the same company, chlorine derivatives also go into the processes of water purification in all of the water purification plants in the various provinces of the country. In addition to this, bleaching substances play a major role in the paper manufacturing industry, which is located in the provinces of Alexandria and Cairo, and they also play a major role in the textile sector. Also, sodium carbonates are produced as a raw material for the manufacture of glass in the province of al-Qalyubiyah and in the glass-manufacturing plants of the private sector.

The fertilizer companies, which are located in the provinces of Suez, Alexandria, Aswan, Hulwan, al-Qalyubiyah, and al-Gharbiyah, meet the needs of the agricultural sector, throughout the country, in terms of different types of nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers.

The iron and steel sector depends on the coke which is produced by the Nasr Coke and Basic Chemicals Co. in Hulwan. This company also produces other products such as concentrated acids necessary for the manufacture of explosives which are utilized by the war industries sector.

The chemical industries sector is very closely linked to the transportation sector because it provides the latter with truck trailers, [frames] for motorcycles and bicycles, and tractor frames for use in agriculture. This industry is concentrated in the city of Alexandria. This sector also provides various rubber products. The most important of these are hoses for the sectors of irrigation, petroleum, and synthetic gases, as well as conveyor belts and driving belts for the sectors of iron and steel and the sector of mining.

Plastic products are mainly produced in the two plastic plants in Shubra al-Khaymah and Alexandria. They produce water pipes for the housing and irrigation sectors, and they supply the engineering industries sector with products which go into the manufacture of refrigerators, washing machines, radios, and television sets.

The plastics sector also meets our needs in terms of good supply. It provides plastic containers for packaging various food substances such as edible oils, sugar, and so forth. It also produces artificial leather which serves as an alternative to the natural leather which is used in the manufacture of shoes and other leather products. Likewise, the chemical industries sector is of service to various other sectors through its production of synthetic gases in the Synthetic Gas Co. In Musturud. Its enterprises are located in Cairo, Alexandria, Hulwan, and Aswan, and they supply their products to the sector of metal construction industries and the sector of the ship-building industry. Likewise, synthetic gases such as nitrous oxide are used for medical purposes in the various hospitals throughout the country. The carbonated water industry, whose plants are located in various provinces of the country, utilizes carbon dioxide which is produced by the company.

The chemical industries sector also includes the production of writing and printing paper. This paper is produced by the (Rakta) Co. in Alexandria, which thereby serves the sector of culture and education. Industrial paper is produced by the National Paper Co. in Alexandria and the (Simu) Co. in al-Qualyubiyah. This product is supplied to the food industries sector in order to cover its need for packaging and wrapping paper and the like.

In addition to this, papaer and cardboard processing is done by the Muharram Industrial Press Co. and the (Frta) Paper Manufacturing Co. in Alexandria and al-Gharbiyah. These companies meet the needs of many industrial sectors such as the food industry sector, textile sector, engineering industries sector, and other sectors which require packaging and wrapping materials for the manufacture of cigarettes and packaging of food products. The most important products involved here are the various kinds of soap and the corrugated cardboard boxes which are necessary for the export of agricultural products such as oranges, fruits, and flowers.

As we can see from the above-mentioned, the chemical industries sector has companies and plants in various provinces which engage in different operations. We have seen that their products serve the needs of various other industrial sectors in addition to serving still other sectors of the national economy. Likewise, we have clearly seen the extent of the importance of the sector's products for the various areas of economic activity in the fields of production and services. In fact, this sector has had a great degree of influence on the growth of the other sectors.

If we look at the degree of involvement of chemical industries products in the other sectors, we clearly see how important it is to have a central body which coordinates the needs of the various sectors such as those of agriculture, transportation, irrigation, food supply, as well as the sectors of education and war production. This coordination cannot be achieved except by means of having a comprehensive view of the needs of these sectors, bearing in mind the growth of the country's population and economy.

Participating In the Stimulation of the Private Industrial Sector and In Supervising and Controlling It

The ministry also oversees the organized private industrial sector which is represented by enterprises, the capital of which exceeds 5,000 Egyptian pounds or the number of workers of which exceeds 10,000.

Together with the Ministry of Economy, Foreign Trade, and Economic Cooperation, the ministry is participating in making a study of the industrial enterprises being carried out, under the conomic open-door policy, jointly with Arab and foreign capital.

Also the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Wealth has the responsibility for overseeing the Federation of Industries, the Cotton Yarn and Fabrics Assistance Fund, and the Artificial Silk Assistance Fund.

The ministry's apparatus and public agencies which belong to it are carrying out these tasks as follows:

A. The following public agencies are participating in the planning and implementation of industrial enterprises:

1. The Public Industrialization Agency.

2. The Public Executive Agency for Industrial and Mining Complexes.

3. The Agency for Geological Survey and Mining Enterprises.

B. Two other public agencies are also participating:

4. The Criteria Standardization Agency.

5. The Nuclear Materials Agency.

The ministry also has government departments which undertake supervision and training:

1. The Industrial Supervision Department.

2. The Department of Productivity and Vocational Training.

3. The Chemical Department.

As has been mentioned, the apparatus of the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Wealth, and the public agencies which are subordinate to it, carry out the work of planning, control, coordination, and supervision of implementation with regard to all of the industrial and mineral wealth sectors in all provinces of the country, regardless of whether or not they belong to the public sector, private sector, or operate jointly in both sectors.

There is no doubt that the preoccupation with the problems of economic growth which aim at national prosperity has acquired special priority as far as the policy of President Anwar al-Sadat's government is concerned. This requires bringing out the elements of an attitude which challenges these problems in the industrial sector in an effort to derive the points of equilibrium and the crossing points of intrusion within the framework of a system which is in harmony with the concept and content of Egypt's constitutional, political, and economic system.

First of all, public sector companies must be freed of government restrictions and direct supervision, whether centralized or non-centralized, as long as this does not violate the principle of national planning and control, and separating ownership from administration in public sector companies.

There is no dispute that the public sector is the one which contributes the most toward the gross national product. There is also no doubt that the difference between the public sector's actual productivity today, in comparison with the productivity which it is possible for the elements of production to achieve, is always attributable to government restrictions and government interference in the technical, financial, economic, and commercial administration of this sector's enterprises. The result of this is a decrease in production efficiency and a deterioration of the firmness of the economy which finds itself buried in the guidelines of the government. These government guidelines are very far removed from the reality of these economic enterprises, and this, in turn, has led to many of the well-known negative phenomena which have cropped up.

In this regard, the government restriction or interference is equally felt, whether it is central government interference on the part of the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Wealth or local government interference on the part of the provincial government of the regions in which the industrial enterprise, or at least part of it, is located.

For this reason the public sector should be liberated so that ownership is separated from administration, and this will enable the administrative bodies to be guided by executive, technical, and economic principles of administration, as well as scientific and established administrative principles which are followed in the case of economic enterprises.

Freeing the administration of the public sector in this manner does not mean that it will escape guidelines of control, whether this involves commitment by this administration to achieve the goals assigned to it by the national industrialization plan, or with regard to its commitment to the principles of production efficiency, criteria standardization, industrial control, or the principles of protecting the environment from pollution, and other such principles observed by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Wealth. This liberation from government restrictions also does not mean not being committed to the principles of local regulations which have to do, for example, with security and public order. Likewise, this liberation from government restrictions does not mean that the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Wealth will not adhere to its commitment to assume the burdens of national industrial planning. It does not mean, for example, that the province in which the enterprise is located will cease to be committed to undertaking, in all possible ways, to cooperate with, facilitate, and enable the administration of the industrial enterprises to achieve an increase in industrial productibity--including

the provision of the necessary utility services for the enterprise as well as solving local problems which the enterprise confronts.

Likewise, freeing the public sector and its administration from government restrictions in the manner described above shall not result in infringements or violations of the protection of public capital in an enterprise. On the contrary, the Public Accounting Office, Ministry of Finance, and Central Bank of Egypt--each in its area of competence and in accordance with established legislative principles--will continue to monitor the public sector administration. The public sector administration will be held to account for its errors in accordance with established economic principles or in accordance with legal principles, from both the civil and criminal codes, depending on the nature of these offenses.

The adoption and formation of holding companies, in the modern economic sense of the word, is something which can bring about an important change in the manner of formation of the national structure of economic activity as well as its administration, control, orientation, and development.

Secondly, Egyptian capital should participate in the development and renovation of public sector company enterprises and in helping them to expand.

The state should encourage Egyptian capital to contribute toward the economic development plan and to promote the national economy. In particular, Egyptian capital should be encouraged to share in the development and renovation of public sector company enterprises and in promoting their expansion. This could be done by establishing tax and customs exemptions and economic guarantees which could be in the form of guaranteeing a minimum capital investment yield which, for example, would be 1 percent higher than the current interest rate for time deposits. This guarantee should be limited to a time period which corresponds to the circumstances of each enterprise, and these exemptions and guarantees should be enjoyed by both the old and new shareholders.

This encouragement should be extended to all existing enterprises, the purpose being to develop, renovate, and expand them. It should be in the form of discounting the company's capital increase to the degree that will enable it to retain 51 percent of its public capital for establishing subsidiary companies which derive from the holding company or for establishing completely new enterprises. This, of course, must always occur within the framework of being in compliance with the national industrialization plan which is laid down by the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Wealth, in cooperation with the various economic sectors. Needless to say, regional planning also has a role to play in the establishment of national planning.

Concerning the policy of setting prices for industrial products, Engineer Taha Zaki had the following to say:

In terms of setting prices, industrial products are divided into two groups. They are:

1. Products sold at prices set by the government. Specifications and prices of these products are published in ministerial decisions and the companies are committed

to implementing them. These products are mostly products subsidized in the interests of the consumers. Examples of them are: fabric materials used for clothes worn by the Egyptian masses, sugar, edible oils, soap, artificial butter, fodder, and nitrogen and phosphate fertilizers (a whole list is enclosed).

2. The remaining products are not sold at prices set by the government. The basic policy with regard to them is that the board of directors of each company issues a decision to set their prices in accordance with the authority entrusted to them by Law No 111 of 1975, this being considered one of the elements of marketing policy. Determination of the prices takes place on the basis of the cost and profit which is in line with market demand and the extent to which the market can absorb the product.

The setting of the prices also has to be in line with the government's policy of controlling prices and achieving justice and a balance in the interests of the producers, those working in the distribution channels, and the consumers. The Ministry of Industry feels that the planning of the policy for determining the prices of industrial products should proceed as follows:

First of all, with regard to goods whose prices are set by government:

One must bear in mind that government intervention in the form of compulsory price-setting for some products emanates from the government's soverign authority. The objective of this intervention is basically to protect consumers and to guarantee the availability of basic goods related to food supply, clothing supply, and housing. Usually the prices set by the government are lower than the cost of the products, and the state budget, for this reason, provides subsidies in the interests of the consumers.

One must also bear in mind that current price lists include some goods which do not fall under this concept since they correspond to non-basic needs on the part of the consumers, such as cigarette paper, drinking glasses, tanned leather goods, pencils, woolen yarn, and pressed wood.

If these products continue to be in the lists of goods whose prices are set by the government, this could lead to the state having to impose extra burdens on the public budget in terms of subsidies paid in the interests of consumers. For this reason, we feel that the following should be done:

1. Lists of goods whose prices are set by the government should be streamlined so that they do not include goods which do not correspond to basic needs.

2. It should not be allowed to manipulate the price of any item whose price has been set by the government, not should the specifications of this item be modified without obtaining permission from the Ministry of Industry and without petitioning the Ministerial Production Committee and the Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs.

3. The state should undertake to pay the total difference between the cost of producing the goods--adding to it a reasonable margin of profit--and the price set by the government at which the goods are to be sold. This can be accomplished in one of two ways:

A. These goods can be delivered from the factories to distribution outlets selected by the state which are appropriate for the marketing of each item. Such outlets would be, for example, the Agricultural Credit Bank, for fertilizers; and the agencies of the Ministry of Supply and Internal Trade, for food and clothing items. And the prices should be economical. The subsidies should be put at the disposal of the marketing agencies, taking into consideration that the subsidies are established in the interests of the consumers and not in the interests of the manufacturing companies. This approach is the one preferred by the Ministry of Industry because it clearly defines the subsidies and fully directs them to those who are entitled to them.

3. The sale of goods at prices set by the government should be done by the industrial firms in accordance with what is decided by the state. The companies would recover the subsidy balances monthly in accordance with the procedure currently followed. We feel that if this approach is used, it should be used on a temporary basis and only during the fiscal year 1980-81.

Secondly, other products produced by industrial firms should not be sold at prices set by the government:

The authority for setting the prices of these products should rest with the administrative boards of the companies in accordance with law and coordination should be undertaken with the apparatus of the Ministry of Industry within the framework of the following guidelines:

1. First of all, there should be rationalization of costs, putting to work idle resources, improvement in productivity, and dealing with the problem of loss and ruin of raw materials--all of this in order to increase production and decrease production costs.

2. Standard specifications should be completely observed.

3. Prices should be determined on the basis of the rationalized costs of local and imported raw materials as well as the cost of services such as electricity, transportation, water, and wages.

4. The price set for a product should not be more than the cost of its imported counterpart, provided that the specifications are the same.

5. Industrial firms should commit themselves to publicly announcing the prices at which their goods are sold--in order to protect the consumers. This includes printing, on the containers, the sale price at which the item is sold to the consumers--together with the item's specifications, weight or size, the date it was produced, and the date until which the product can be used. All of this is in order to protect the consumer.

6. The company should give the ministry a complete report concerning the prices of its products in accordance with the decision made by its administrative board. The company should also inform the ministry of any modifications in the products after they have been submitted to the ministry for review, in accordance with the above-mentioned guidelines. Then the necessary rectifications can be undertaken in time.

In this manner a balance will be achieved for the producer (the industrial firms) since the producer will recover his production costs and will earn a reasonable profit, and since the producer will commit himself to rationalization, increased production, raising the workers' productivity, putting idle resources to work, maintenance of equipment, and combatting loss and ruin of raw materials.

Also, the consumers will be protected since they will obtain manufactured products at the lowest of two prices because the prices of any manufactured item will not be more than that of its imported counterpart. They will also be protected because the prices, specifications, weight, and other data concerning the items will be printed on their containers. In addition to this, those working in the distribution channels will earn their fair share of profit from the price which covers their costs and profit margin, and thus there will be no more possibility for exploitation.

As for the policy of providing subsidies, this policy guarantees that the subsidies will be used in the cases of basic goods and goods used by the masses--goods which the state wants to provide at lower prices in order to alleviate the suffering of the masses.

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INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION DATA

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic 6 Oct 80 pp 38-42

[Economic data compiled from the Statistical Yearbook of the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (October 1974, October 1977, July 1980): "Ten Years of Industrial Production"]

Development in Total Value of Industrial Production

(in millions of Eg. pounds at current prices)

Industrial activity	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Petroleum products and crude oil	133.2	152.2	155.2	178.4	263.9	385.7	574.9	696	848	2465
Mining products	---	12.1	11.0	12.6	21.2	22.4	23	27	30	35
Chemical and medicinal products	150.5	155.9	117.4	116.3[1]	169.4	269	282	345	372	446
Food products	482.8	485.6	602.6	562.6	614.8	694	778	871	989	1140
Engineering and electrical products	232.3	235.6	245.4	245.0	201.0	394	447	554	666	824
Building materials and pottery and crockery products	88.0	59.7	61.6	65.0	73	94.0	76.3	82	81	84
Textile products	470.3	510.9	512.7	543.4	594.9	689.0	757	837	1099	1161

[1] Does not include the total value of the public sector's production of medicines and insecticides.

The compilation does not include production from government workshops or military production plants for the war effort, nor does it include the industries of cotton ginning, cotton pressing, milling grain, packaging tea, and printing and publishing.

Mineral Products

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Crude oil	1,000's of meters^3	16388	17010	12230	9706	8533	12999	19020	20.8[2]	24.3[2]	26.3[2]
Phosphates	1,000's of tons	716	713	564	553	612	518	500	568	639	587
Manganese	1,000's of tons	4	4	2	3	5	4	4	3	6	-
Iron ore	1,000's of tons	451	473	478	656	1302	1087	1243	1308	1468	1435
Table salt	1,000's of tons	454	421	383	437	514	664	606	741	755	728
Sulphur[1]	1,000's of tons	-	-	-	-	28	-	-	-	-	-
Kaolin	1,000's of tons	22	45	25	33	28	35	30	47	46	42
Oxides (all types)	tons	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Asbestos and vermiculite	tons	449	70	441	351	37	-	3165	784	882	536
Zinc ore and lead	tons	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

[1]Amounts shown are the total production from mines and petroleum products.

[2]In millions of metric tons.

Chemical Products

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Soap	1,000's of tons	136	150	154	143	183	219	227	218	230	245
Glycerin	tons	3019	3303	2941	2715	3122	1051	3757	4300	4018	12591
Industrial cleansers	tons	15155	400	17869	20406	16510	20606	21008	21854	22862	27552
Sulphuric acid	1,000's of tons	30	30	28	20	31	40	27	30	33	32
Caustic soda	1,000's of tons	20	18	16	14	30	37	27	28	31	37
Regular paper and cardboard	1,000's of tons	162	155	151	147	130	144	-	153	165	169
Superphosphate fertilizer	1,000's of tons	411	487	518	419	464	518	463	513	494	483
Ammonium lime nitrate fertilizer(15.5%)	1,000's of tons	-	-	-	-	639	793	1085	1244	1386	1689
Ammonium lime nitrate fertilizer(26%)	1,000's of tons	-	30	-	-	-	61	95	5	-	-
Ammonium nitrate lime fertilizer (31%)	1,000's of tons	382	350	288	209	253	293	282	509	301	-

Chemical Products (contd)

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Ammonium sulphate fertilizer	1,000's of tons	4	5	4	4	7	9	7	11	11	13
Thomas phosphate fertilizer	1,000's of tons	22	34	44	38	35	33	27	28	27	9
Outer tires (cars, bicycles, motorcycles)	1,000's	807	622	927	860	814	922	760	921	858	933
Inner pipes (cars, bicycles, motorcycles)	1,000's	757	817	897	876	761	988	965	1075	901	1011
Rubber products	1,000's Eg. pds	3574	3787	3837	4493	4708	5716	5597	6034	6232	6043
Pencils	1,000's Eg. pds	307	250	-	-	110	377	484	413	215	153
Oxygen	1,000's Eg. pds	570	660	665	616	617	629	674	701	721	670
(astlin)	1,000's meters^3	744	907	1105	898	860	916	995	1174	1216	1121
Chlorine	1,000's of tons	5	5	5	3	4	5	5	5	4	6
Carbon dioxide	1,000's of tons	3	3	4	3	3	3	4	5	6	5

Chemical Products (contd)

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Insecticides	1,000's of tons	4	8	9	8	12[1]	19[1]	8	7	7	9
Tanned leather goods	1,000's of tons	10	11	15[1]	17[1]	20	23	22	21	18	40
Glue	1,000's of tons	1	1	-	2	1	2	2	2	3	3
Medicines	millions of Eg. pounds	33	40	46	54	58	60	76	108	113	125
Cosmetics	millions of Eg. pounds	5	6	8	9	10	20	21	22	28	35
Matches	billions of match-sticks	34	40	42	35	36	42	46	64	54	54

[1] [Translator's note: There is no footnote in the original corresponding to the footnote numerals in the table]

Quarry Products

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Granite	1,000's of meters^3	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	3	2	2	2	2
Basalt	1,000's of meters^3	367	332	401	329	-	48	47	90	99	85
Marble	1,000's of meters^3	4	6	7	7	8	8	12	12	23	26
Limestone	millions of meters^3	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6
Regular sand	millions of meters^3	3	3	3	3	3	3	4	6	7	6
Gravel	millions of meters^3	2	2	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	2
White sand	1,000's of meters^3	67	138	113	120	120	120	120	120	115	147
Clay	1,000's of tons	975[2]	923	896	900	950	950	1000	986	1085	950
Raw gypsum	1,000's of tons	259[2]	212	239	219	216	213	200	250	593	796
Pumice stone	1,000's of tons	-	-	-	-	-	120	125	113	124	85
Sandstone	1,000's of tons	81	86	93	102	110	110	120	101	111	787[3]
Dolomite	1,000's of tons	91	88	90	100	100	110	110	118	130	504

[1]Less than 500 cubic meters.

[2]In thousands of tons.

[3]In thousands of cubic meters.

Most Important Products Necessary for Building and Construction

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Sheet and crystal glass	1,000's of tons	15	21	21	24	16	20	23	21	19	27
Safety glass	tons	892	738	682	879	903	877	1026	1006	953	978
Porcelain	tons	2654	3976	2770	2612	1863	1917	1413	3625	3525	3873
Sanitary utensils	tons	7314	8539	9975	10320	6892	6809	3946	3991	4475	4874
Ceramic bricks	1,000's of tons	-	60	67	81	85	87	79	82	84	97
Earthenware pipes	1,000's of tons	13	19	27	27	20	18	18	13	15	14
Concrete pipes and products	1,000's of tons	38	22	50	43	39	38	37	41	38	32
Asbestos pipes and sheets	1,000's of tons	62	64	68	57	56	66	69	79	77	80
Baked bricks	millions	770	762	773	743	500	600	500	173[1]	300	190
Sand bricks	millions	17	20	42	58	70	43	32	38	63	65
Cement slabs	millions of meters[3]	2	2	3	4	-	2	3	4	4	5
Gypsum and plaster	1,000's of tons	346	412	238	369	363	425	251	264	325	-

[1] In thousands of tons.

Most Important Products Necessary for Building and Construction (contd)

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Regular portland cement	1,000's of tons	2193									
White portland cement	1,000's of tons	42	3921	3822	3617	3264	3579	3362	3232	2722	2987
Iron cement and (krnk)	1,000's of tons	1024									

Food Products

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Glucose	1,000's of tons	38	38	40	43	41	39	43	47	37	35
Treacle	1,000's of tons	48	50	52	54	63	60	60	62	74	74
Chocolate	tons	1885	2579	2481	1214	992	1752	2231	3893	4169	4577
Dough	1,000's of tons	56	60	61	62	71	74	79	89	97	100
Dried vegetables	tons	4039	4852	2826	4106	6614	4907	5250	7260	5203	5272
Fruits	tons	-	-	-	-	71	14	29	20	26	26
Sweets	1,000's of tons	55	66	70	69	59	66	63	65	64	60
Alcohol	millions of liters	32	32	32	31	29	32	30	32	30	24
Cottonseed oil	1,000's of tons	126	118	145	131	149	157	151	167	171	177
Flaxseed oil	1,000's of tons	3	4	4	3	3	4	4	5	5	5
Cottonseed oil cakes	1,000's of tons	599	567	581	609	536	472	356	438	430	442
Molasses	1,000's of tons	262	259	27	260	237	253	293	302	274	309
Cigarettes	millions of cigarettes	-	16500	16159	20582	18442	20863	23248	25032	27558	29931
Tobacco products	tons	-	-	-	-	2997	2974	3022	2892	3219	3552

Food Products (contd)

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Full-cream white cheese	1,000's of tons	125	125	126	127	127	121	134	138	147	155
Cooked, dried cheese	tons	7679	7925	9120	7632	7635	9960	12696	12886	15147	14223
Pasteurized milk	1,000's of tons	29	33	31	38	42	41	54	69	73	70
Artificial butter	1,000's of tons	64	69	72	88	100	132	128	133	151	160
Canned sardines	tons	1271	1372	2091	2577	2273	2769	3969	3376	3927	4683
Canned tomato sauce	tons	1235	1648	1084	1853	1748	2872	2950	2709	5838	3911
Canned vegetables	tons	3272	5748	4882	7732	4111	5606	9602	9739	7999	4412
Yeast	tons	7017	6971	7607	8196	7933	9167	9498	10083	10932	11863
Carbonated water	millions of bottles	592	618	660	586	660	782	958	1182	1390	1424
Cornstarch	1,000's of tons	15	16	16	19	18	18	18	19	18	18
(mult)	1,000's of tons	2	1	1	1	2	2	3	2	-	-

Food Products (contd)

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Vinegar	millions of liters	4	5	6	7	6	8	9	10	10	11
Beer	millions of liters	24	28	30	32	29	29	30	38	42	34
Wine	1,000's of liters	5899	5424*	5592*	3413*	1427*	1955	1089	1283	1662	-
Spirits	1,000's of liters	7282	11832	15516**	12680**	9572**	680	645	640	621	636

*In thousands of liters.

**In tons.

Most Important Metal Products

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Semi-formed iron blocks	1,000's of tons	22	20	13	9	2	3	113	143	145	151
Steel sections	1,000's of tons	114	105	92	88	78	101				
Sheet metal and plates	1,000's of tons	41	40	43	43	39	42	46	34	41	50
Cast iron	1,000's of tons				50	210	99	92	70	66	119
Reinforcement iron	1,000's of tons	135	210	239	234	262	212	228	248	261	302
Nails	1,000's of tons	7*	9*	-	-	8	9	9	9	9	-
Wire	1,000's of tons	14	20	14	15	16	21	17	15	18	21
Automobiles	number	3590	5750	5380	5591	9639	11514	9877	13997	13833	15670
Trucks	number	1164	1484	1709	1518	815	935	1370	1690	1173	2304
Busses and chassis	number	369	349	362	314	301	305	373	475	468	592
Tractors	number	1192	937	1237	1143	1259	1241	1664	2761	2925	2783
Air conditioners	number	1455	1548	1323	2229	2606	3617	6779	8436	11445	14056
Refrigerators	1,000's	54	62	55	39	59	115	115	135	146	207

*Includes only wire nails.

Most Important Metal Products (contd)

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Washing machines	1,000's	16	16	29	26	31	44	71	126	228	273
Bicycles	1,000's	60	52	57	31	46	72	72	91	85	91
Diesel engines	1,000's Eg. pds	-	-	-	-	1346	2922	4711	4488	4014	-
LPG heaters	1,000's	12	11	-	-	8	16	16	19	18	18
RR cars	1,000's Eg. pds	2586	2819	3851	3660	3700	6726	10522	11140	13511	16344
LPG stoves	1,000's	53	85	-	115	4845	5381	5973	6903	7560	9421
High-pressure pipes	tons	4366	4520	6305	7198	5775	2248	5413	4764	5805	4950
LPG cylinders	1,000's	155	126	-	-	134	202	241	294	305	366
Sewing machines	1,000's Eg. pds	184	354	-	293	440	283	487	477	314	375
Metal construction	1,000's Eg. pds	3547	1536	3461	5809	6804	7425	9411	9538	12260	12825
Metal furniture	1,000's Eg. pds	3965	4691	5397	5580	5752	7971	9970	9692	11053	13120
Expanded metal	1,000's Eg. pds	64	121	113	126	151	172	143	166	209	329
River navigation, construction, and ship repair units	1,000's Eg. pds	-	4574	5082	5432	5336	6936	7893	7193	10612	17505

Most Important Metal Products (contd)

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Circular water pumps	1,000's Eg. pds	112	104	107	105	113	135	140	294	360	357
Steel foundry products	tons	2613	-	3554	4036	2780	5542	1781	1775	1583	2091
Explosives	1,000's Eg. pds	85	80	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Copper products	1,000's of tons	7	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Lead products**	1,000's of tons	7	-	-	-	-	-	5	4	4	4
Aluminum products	1,000's of tons	7	-	7	6	-	-	-	-	-	-
Zinc containers	1,000's Eg. pds	69	60	-	-	751	579	405	336	-	-

**Products included here are rolled and drawn lead for molds and lead sealing materials for workshops.

***In thousands of tons. [Translator's note: There is no triple asterisk in the table in the original.]

Textile Products

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Cotton yarn	1,000's of tons	164	171	179	183	179	181	193	210	212	216
Cotton fabrics	1,000's of tons	-	779[1]	708[1]	722[1]	733	782	563	595	604	610
Woolen yarn	1,000's of tons	10	11	12	11	11	12	11	12	10	11
Woolen textiles	1,000's of tons	8[1]	9[1]	9[1]	9[1]	7	9	12	10	10	10
Artificial silk yarn	1,000's of tons	7	7	7	6	5	6	6	6	5	5
Artificial silk fabrics	1,000's of tons	-	5	54[1]	55	52	34	35	36	48	52
Jute yarn	1,000's of tons	27	28	26	28	32	36	37	38	34	39
Jute textiles	1,000's of tons	28	29	24	25	31	32	33	34	29	31
Blankets, rugs, and kilim carpets	1,000's of meters[2]	6595	8236	7968	8220	8322	8[2]	11[2]	12[2]	14[2]	16[2]
Crochet work (cotton)	millions of dozens	2	3	-	-	1233	898	975	784	417	602

[1]The fabrics were made from the various types of yarn shown in the table.

[2]In millions of meters.

Most Important Electrical Products

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Electricity production	billions of kW	-	8	8	8.1	9	10.4	11.5	13.5	15.0	16.3
Reinforced cables	tons	-	5218	6644	3637	4254	6466	6514	7867	7174	-
Uncovered electrical wires and cables	tons	-	-	22895	16787	17948	23010	22586	25458	28604	30875
Electric meters	1,000's	140	139	-	116	144	153	153	154	154	185
Liquid-cell batteries	1,000's	309	417	466	462	458	578	673	687	696	734
Radio batteries	1,000's	151	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
[1]Millions of kW Dry-cell illumination batteries	millions	67	89	82	90	5816[1]	6226[1]	128	126	76	90
(Bergmann) insulator pipes	tons	-	4200[1]	5737[1]	3260[1]	1536	54	1518	1497	1847	3920
Electric light-bulbs	1,000's	14856	19622	17400	16500	20[3]	23[3]	23[3]	23[3]	33[3]	40[3]

[1]In thousands of meters.

[2]In thousands of Egyptian pounds. [Translator's note: The original contains no footnote numeral in the table for this footnote.]

[3]In millions.

Most Important Electrical Products (contd)

Product	Unit	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Electric heaters	1,000's	5	4	25	39	40	45	62	41	62	63
Electric switchboards	number	986	1087	1667	1686	1719	1267	1825	2131	3650	-
Electric phonographs	1,000's	-	-	-	-	2	1	1	(3)	(3)	-
Regular radios and transistor radios	1,000's	148	122	164	148	158	221	117	265	368	223
Telephones	1,000's	64	67	76	49	71	85	88	151	174	249
Phonograph records	1,000's	-	839	-	663	721	530	169	143	87	-

Most Important Petroleum Products

(in thousands of tons)

Product	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979
Gasoline	360	695	859	961	1225	1335	1476	1524	1711	1763
Kerosine	490	740	976	1158	1335	1294	1439	1502	1652	1640
Torbanite	456	749	962	1034	1149	1469	1717	1961	2190	2280
Diesel oil	98		157	165	178	138				
Mazut	1612	2572	3213	3050	2831	4165	5056	5254	5437	5536
LPG	9	7	18	43	62	49	59	64	72	99
Asphalt	58	73	113	143	67	118	135	148	193	211

JUMAYYIL HOPES FOR 'UNDERSTANDING' FROM U.S. ADMINISTRATION

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 10-16 Nov 80 pp 34-41

[Interview with Bashir Jamayyil, commander of Phalangist Party militia, by Lydia Georgi, date and place not given]

[Excerpts] The following is a translation of the full interview, which was conducted in French:

The general impression is that the Ain Remmaneh incidents, coming after the July 7 operation, have dealt a heavy blow to the Phalangist-NLP alliance — an impression which has tended to be confirmed by the contradictory statements issued by Sheikh Pierre and President Chamoun on Army presence in Lebanese Front areas. Do you think this alliance can survive, despite the Phalangist Party's proven military superiority?

The action undertaken by the Lebanese Forces on July 7 and the recent Ain Remmaneh clashes were not a test of one party's power against another; they were an operation intended to remedy the situation in the liberated areas, restore order and unify the Lebanese Forces. The NLP-Phalangist alliance emerges from this operation stronger than ever, the proof being the visit I paid President Chamoun yesterday (Tuesday), which will be followed by important measures to consolidate the Lebanese Forces.

How do you explain the contradictory statements issued by Sheikh Pierre and President Chamoun on Army presence in Ain Remmaneh?

I think the nuances that may have appeared in the few hours that followed the Ain Remmaneh incidents have now been totally cleared up. We have already held several meetings with President Chamoun on this issue and even on the question of the reinforcement of the Lebanese Forces. I think those nuances have definitely been eliminated.

Are you in agreement on Army presence in Ain Remmaneh? You don't accept Army presence there. Has President Chamoun changed his mind?

I think President Chamoun goes even further than us on this matter.

Would you elaborate? In what way does he go further?

We are in total agreement that the Army has a specific role to play in Ain Remmaneh. The Army was in no way able to stop the wave of banditry and vandalism which was sweeping Ain Remmaneh, and we were compelled to do that ourselves. Now we all say that if the Army wants to be present, let it be present on the demarcation line. If it wants to deploy inside Ain Remmaneh, let it first take over the airport, Damour

and West Beirut. It has all that to take over first.

We would like to know the opinion of Mr. Wazzan on what is happening in West Beirut now. Why doesn't the Army have the right to intervene there? Why doesn't he ask himself what is going on in West Beirut?

Do you object to the deployment of the Army *inside* Ain Remmaneh if the Army troops that were present there are changed? If so, why? In other words, why do you want to keep the Army on the "front lines" of Ain Remmaneh?

What does the Army have to do inside Ain Remmaneh? What would it have to do inside Ashrafiyeh? or Jounieh? or Jbail? What it should do is take it upon itself to liberate the country from the alien forces occupying it: it should deploy in Damour, Aishiyeh and every other place where alien armed forces are present on the ground, defying State authority.

It is therefore a normal thing for the Army to handle the front lines and areas of Ain Remmaneh.

What do you mean by "the front lines and areas"?

I mean the front lines of the Ain Remmaneh area. That is where the Army should be present, if it wants. If it is too cowardly to handle them, we can handle them ourselves. We handled them for six years.

Would you accept an Army take-over of the Ain Remmaneh centers previously controlled by the NLP, as President Chamoun has demanded?

I have already answered this question.

Do I understand you to mean that you would not accept an Army take-over of the centers previously controlled by the NLP?

It is not the Army's role to be inside Ain Remmaneh. As long as Damour and Aishiyeh are occupied, the Army has no bloody business inside Ain Remmaneh.

How do you explain the fact that the Army did not intervene to stop the Ain Remmaneh clashes, especially since they must have known that this would lead to more attacks on the Army Command and would further undermine the credibility of the military establishment in the eyes of leftist and Moslem forces, and even President Chamoun himself?

Put that question to Victor Khoury. He is in a better position to answer you.

May I have your own explanation?

Yes. While maintaining my first answer, I think that an army without motivation and without a cause is an army which cannot fight. The Army cannot intervene in Ain Remmaneh for the same reasons that have prevented it from fighting the Palestinian and Syrian occupation. This is an army of salaried men and military parades. The command, starting with Victor Khoury, has done everything it can to neutralize the Army and make it an army of military parades. This is not a fighting army, because there is no faith whatever at the command level in what is being done. There is no conviction, no spirit of responsibility whatsoever at the level of the high command.

So you are saying that it is the Army which refused to intervene?

It cannot intervene, because of the vicissitudes and contradictions existing in it.

You say that your meeting with President Chamoun will be followed by "important measures to consolidate the Lebanese Forces." Could you give us an idea of those measures?

Certainly. They could involve the dissolution of the Kataeb (Phalangist) Military Council and the militias of the other organizations which are members of the Lebanese Forces. We would then be able to move from the stage of synchronization to the stage of merger. I think that is the stage we are now studying.

Does that mean that the other militias will be disbanded and that only the Phalangist militia will remain?

We will dissolve the Kataeb Military Council and the militias belonging to the other organizations, so that all the Lebanese military potential can merge into one military organization, which will be the Lebanese Forces. We have so far contented ourselves with synchronization among the various military institutions, but now we will have a total merger. All militias will be dissolved and there will be only one Lebanese force.

Is that what you discussed with President Chamoun?

President Chamoun will declare this himself.

Is there any possibility of a meeting between you and Dany Chamoun?

For my part, that presents no problem whatsoever. Dany is a young man alongside whom we have fought for several years, and his place is among us. I myself have no problem with him.

Don't you think the fact that the Phalangists have demonstrated a clear military superiority can have repercussions on your allies?

I have two remarks to make about this:

The first is that the July 7 and Ain Remmaneh operations were not undertaken by Phalangist troops as such, but by the Lebanese Forces — under the command and cover of the Lebanese Forces. It was by no means a settling of accounts between parties. Therefore, what was done must be credited to the Lebanese Forces, not to one party at the expense of another. The proof of this is that the Kataeb Military Council is on the point of being dissolved so that the Kataeb forces can merge with the other Lebanese forces.

The second remark is that our allies have understood this point. It is undeniable that the July 7 and Ain Remmaneh affairs, in the final analysis, were rather unfortunate episodes. We must all get together to extract only the good aspects of what has happened, and I think that is what we are doing now.

You say the Kataeb Military Council is "on the point of being

The new Lebanon should be a democratic, liberal country which is not shared with the Palestinians and in which equality, security and freedom of belief is guaranteed for everyone

dissolved." Does that mean it will be dissolved in the very near future?

Perhaps before this issue of *Monday Morning* is published.

Who will be the commander of the Lebanese Forces then?

The commander will be appointed by Sheikh Pierre and President Chamoun.

Will it be you?

They can choose me or someone else. They can choose whoever they want. There's no problem at all as far as I'm concerned.

Then there will be no Phalangist militia, no NLP militia, no Guardians of the Cedar militia...

The Lebanese Army will be automatically allowed into the rightist areas if it deploys in the leftist areas, but not until then

That will all be finished. Militarily, there will be only the Lebanese Forces. We don't want any more July sevens. To avoid that, and to avoid a situation similar to the one currently prevailing in West Beirut (where every four or five armed hoodlums make their own law in their own quarter), we will all merge under one command.

After the meeting of the Higher Defense Council on Monday, there have been reports that the Defense Law's pending decrees will be issued soon — a development which would presumably make the deployment of the Army in both parts of Beirut possible. What would your position be in that event? Would you accept Army control over *all* your areas if Army control is accepted in the leftist-dominated parts of Beirut?

We have always affirmed that the Army must be deployed in all Lebanese regions to extend State authority and sovereignty over them. It remains for the people responsible in the Army to *want* to take charge of maintaining order and security in all Lebanese regions and to firmly exercise their authority in those regions — which, unfortunately, was not the case in Ain Remmaneh.

If the Defense Law decrees are issued, and if as a result the leftist alliance withdraws its objection to Army presence in its areas, will you automatically accept Army presence in your areas?

From now on, we will accept the Army only to the extent that it intervenes in other areas.

So if Army deployment becomes possible in the leftist-controlled areas, you will automatically accept the Army in your areas?

Yes, automatically. And if it also wants to come into our homes, why not? Let it come to every hole where it is not present.

Many charges have been made against you personally and the Phalangist Party in general after the July 7 and Ain Remmaneh operations, and we would like your answer to each of these charges. There is, for instance, the charge that the Phalangist Party is consolidating its hold on its areas in preparation for the declaration of an independent Christian state under its leadership (as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat said last week).

You are free to believe the lucubrations of Mr. Sadat. As for us, we have affirmed a thousand times that the establishment of a Christian state is out of the question. The idea of a

Christian state is self-contradictory. Furthermore, we really don't feel like cutting ourselves off from the entire Arab hinterland.

It has also been charged that the Phalangist Party intends to cooperate with Israel to trap the Palestinians in a military "pincer" operation, with the Israelis attacking from the south and you attacking from the north.

Perhaps the Palestinians have an interest in spreading these rumors to justify their armed presence in Lebanese regions where they should not be present.

There is also the charge that your next step will be a military operation to take over Hazmieh and Baabda.

I have the impression that everybody knows more about our military secrets than we do. They attribute to us military intentions that we are very far from imagining. *Il est vrai qu'on ne prête qu'aux riches* (it is true that only the rich are envied).

How would you explain the fact that the Ain Remmaneh incidents coincided with the formation of the new government? Is there any link between the two?

If there is a link, it was established not by us but by the usual trouble-makers, whom everybody knows.

Do you think there is a link...

This is all a figment of Wazzan's imagination — the timing and the relation between the two.

Don't you think those developments contributed to the embarrassment of the new government?

That is the government's problem. Whether it is embarrassed or not is the least of our worries. We have stated that we are in no way concerned with what this government can do.

What is your exact position on the new government? What government would you support in the present circumstances?

I have already stated that we care nothing about the governments that are formed or unformed in the framework of a political system which has proven to everyone's satisfaction that it is unadapted to the real needs of the country.

Do I understand you to mean that you will not support any government as long as the present political system is maintained?

You understand me very well.

You have repeatedly stated that "the old Lebanon" will never return, which has led many to the conclusion that you have an idea of what "the new Lebanon" should be like. Assuming that partition is out of the question, what kind of Lebanon are you fighting for? A federation? A confederation? ...

I am fighting first against the alien forces which are occupying a significant part of the country. I am fighting for a sound conception of the state based on concrete givens, instead of the current awkward application of constitutional rules imported from abroad. Federation or not, the formula would be of little importance if there were real entente among the different Lebanese families — entente sealed by joint action agreed upon by the residents. I have already said, on more than one occasion, that entente is not a text or a piece of paper but a spirit and an action.

What is this "sound conception of the state based on concrete givens"?

We will not announce it now. We will not talk about it as long as the country is under double occupation. Let us first liberate, and then we can state what we want in terms of a constitutional system or anything else.

But the major principles, certainly, are these: a democratic, liberal country where everyone is equal; a country where everyone has security; a country in which each of us is free in his convictions and beliefs; a country which we do not share with the Palestinians. We will fight to block the partition that the Americans and Palestinians are trying to impose on us.

These are the major principles. We'll see about the details later.

Your emphasis on military strength gives the impression that you are expecting a military solution of the Lebanese problem. Is the impression justified? Are those who are fearing another military trauma in Lebanon right to do so? Or can you visualize a peaceful solution through negotiations with the anti-Phalangist Christians, the Lebanese Moslem community and the Palestinians?

We are open to any form of negotiations with any side — even the Palestinians, if this can lead to persuading them to leave the country.

Does this mean that you are not ready to negotiate with the Palestinians unless you have prior assurances that the goal will be their departure from Lebanon?

Certainly, because it is out of the question to negotiate with them with a view to giving them a part of Lebanon so they can turn it into an alternative homeland, as the Americans want.

Do you have any idea where you want the Palestinians to go?

Let them go wherever they want. That is their problem, not ours.

Doesn't the fact that you will not negotiate unless you receive prior assurances rule out negotiations?

That is why we have been unable to conduct any serious negotiations over the past six years.

You seem to be at odds with President Chamoun on this point. He says he is ready to accept the Palestinians in Lebanon for a certain period...

For a certain period. That means he too wants them to leave, so we are in agreement.

I am under the impression that you want them to leave now.

Don't you? At any rate, I don't think I have any differences with President Chamoun on this issue.

You made a statement in a speech last week which was regarded as critical of the Pope — something to the effect that His Holiness must not imagine that Lebanon is a testing ground for Moslem-Christian coexistence. Is the quote accurate? If so, do we take it to mean that (1) you disapprove of the Vatican's attitude toward the Lebanese crisis, and (2) you are against experiments in Moslem-Christian coexistence in Lebanon?

I would not address the least criticism to His Holiness, whom I hold in great respect and veneration. Where Moslem-Christian experiments are concerned, we have applied various forms of Moslem-Christian coexist-

We are ready to serve once more as a testing ground for Moslem-Christian coexistence, on condition that this be done free of any foreign interference

ence and we are ready to serve once more as a testing ground for this coexistence — on condition that this be done *in vitro*, free of any foreign interference. In fact, what is preventing the success of this experiment is the pressure of Arab irredentism which neighboring states are exerting on Lebanon. It is our hope that the Vatican and other friendly states will stop or reduce this pressure by taking action with the third states concerned, rather than contenting themselves with giving us advice from a distance.

So the quote attributed to you is accurate?

It is accurate. It is not, however, directed against the person of the Pope but against the Vatican's policy on the problem of the Christians of Lebanon. When we take into consideration the fact that Paul VI once allowed himself to weep in St. Peter's Square over the fate of "the poor Palestinians" as Damour was being massacred, we have the right to make this remark.

What exactly do you want the Vatican and other friendly states to do?

I want them to understand us. We are only asking for their understanding.

You have demanded that they take action with third states to stop pressures...

We want them to understand us and explain our point of view. We are hoping that now, after the election of the new American President, the point of view of the Lebanese Resistance will be better understood (in the U.S.) — because we have so far been coming up against a blank wall, both at the American embassy in Beirut and with the American Administration in Washington. We hope that this wall will now be brought down and that the U.S. will from now on show much more understanding toward us and toward all its friends.

Do you have any indications that U.S. policy will change, or are you just hoping for a change?

There may be some indications. There are indications that the new American Administration will understand what is happening here better.

And do what?

The United States is a major power. It knows better than us what should be done to save this country from the nightmare into which it has been plunged.

Do you think the Syrian-Soviet treaty will have any effect on Syrian presence in Lebanon, and do you think the Syrian-Phalangist dialogue that was started a few months ago will be resumed?

I personally don't see how the Syrian-Soviet treaty can concern Lebanon. For the rest, we remain open to any dialogue.

Under what circumstances do you envisage a resumption of the Phalangist-Syrian dialogue? What steps should precede a resumption of the dialogue?

If it's steps you're talking about, these are now being explored. The ground is being explored. Don't forget that we waged a war of resistance against Syrian occupation in 1978, and there are many disputes between us and the Syrian authorities.

If you're talking about preconditions, we don't have any and we will accept none from anyone. The ground is being explored, and we reject pre-conditions from either side.

We want the Vatican to understand us and explain our point of view

The resolutions of the Second World Maronite Conference stress the "distinct identity" of the Maronites and demand that the Maronites be given "the right to be distinct." How does that translate into practical terms.

In these times when everyone is seeking roots for himself, it is only natural that the Maronites should want to underscore their special character in order to preserve their identity.

Does "the right to be distinct" carry political implications?

Not the implications you're thinking of, at any rate. We are against the partition of this country; we are against the establishment of a Christian or Maronite entity in Lebanon. We are fully aware that would be a fatal mistake. We will fight any partitionist idea or any idea which could lead to the creation of a sectarian mini-state on part of Lebanon's territory.

This, however, does not preclude a new political system – within the legal constitutional framework, and within the internationally recognized Lebanese borders – which would constitutionally guarantee freedom and security for each Lebanese entity living in Lebanon.

The Maronite Conference, therefore, is by no means aimed at the creation of a Maronite nation or the partition of the country. On the contrary, it unconditionally supports the Lebanese Resistance in its struggle against the partition which the Palestinians and Americans are trying to impose. But within the internationally recognized borders, we have the right to live in total freedom and security. That is what the resolution of the Maronite Conference means.

Mr. Raymond Edde has charged that the lobby with which the Lebanese Forces are associated in Washington is a "Lebanese-Israeli lobby which has nothing Lebanese about it other than its name." Would you tell us if there are links between you and the Israeli lobby in the U.S.?

The take-over of Hazmieh and Baabda is 'a military intention that we are far from imagining'

Who can take Raymond Edde seriously anymore?

There are other people who have made the same charge.

Other than Raymond Edde? Who else, for instance? No one.

So you deny the charge?

You know, these are Byzantine discussions which have absolutely no effect on us and are of no importance whatsoever as far as we're concerned. These accusations mean nothing to us, and it would really be a waste of time to discuss them. ●

CSO: 4820

NEW SECURITY MEASURES FOR WEST BEIRUT

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 15 Nov 80 pp 5-6

[Text] Lebanese official sources commenting on the new security measures that were adopted this week by the Lebanese leftist National Movement (an alliance of Lebanese leftist and progressive parties) said that the main conclusion to be drawn is that from now on security in the western quarters of Beirut will be the responsibility and privilege of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF).

The measures that were adopted in the wake of violent clashes between the Independent Nasserite Mouvement (Mourabitoun) and the National Syrian Social Party (NSSP, formerly known as Parti Populaire Syrien, PPS) had been obstructed by several members of the National Movement for a long time on the grounds that security matters should not be entrusted to non-Lebanese sides.

New Measures. The Executive Committee of the National Movement's Central Council announced on November 10 that it had decided to close down all offices and centers belonging to the various member-parties, and to maintain open only the headquarters of these parties.

The committee also decided to eliminate all military manifestations by preventing armed elements and para-military cars from moving about in Beirut's western quarters. It also decided to close down all Palestinian offices located outside Palestinian camps.

Assessment. The fact that the new measures give the PLO and the ADF, but especially the PLO, the upper hand in security matters in west Beirut is expected to increase the strain between Palestinian resistance organization and Lebanese leftist organizations that have recently grown more resentful of the PLO, observers said.

National Movement leader Walid Jumblot, the president of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) had repeatedly denounced the laxity existing in West Beirut and the abuses suffered by the population due to the fact that too many organizations and armed elements were allowed to carry out whatever activities they wanted. His statements, at the time, were accompanied by calls for the unification of the National Movement and for the entry of the Lebanese Army in West Beirut.

The Mourabitoun, on the other hand, had recently clashed with Palestinian organizations over which side should be in charge of security matters in various parts of West Beirut. However, there was no accord between the PSP and the Mourabitoun.

These and other N.M. member-organizations were delaying acceptance of Syrian and Palestinian-sponsored security measures on two grounds: 1) that a new government was to be formed and could come up with a security plan involving security measures for all parts of the country; 2) that a solution could be found to the controversy over the organizational decree of the new Army law and allow for the deployment of the Lebanese Army in West Beirut.

The deployment of the Army was also called for by the Shiite political and religious leaderships of the country and in particular by the Amal movement.

The Ain Remmaneh one-day clash between the Lebanese Army and the "Lebanese Forces" commanded by Phalangist leader Bechir Gemayel put an end to all these calls. The fact that the Army emerged from this clash battered and with a lower prestige served Syrian and Palestinian interests in the sense that it put an end to two main questions: 1) Lebanese calls for a security plan involving the deployment of the Army; 2) Moslem leaders' calls for the deployment of the Army in West Beirut.

The main question now is what will happen in the future. The rightwing Lebanese Front is escalating its campaign against the PLO and urging Lebanese Moslems to unite around one command and move against Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon.

On the other hand, speculations have it that the (Syrian) ADF may one day decide to pull out from Beirut and the question would then be whether it will leave the PLO in control or whether the PLO would be left alone to confront opposition and attacks coming not only from the rightwing Lebanese Front but from other sides as well.

Informed observers believe that it will all depend on the turn inter-Arab problems take in the coming days and weeks. These divisions among Arab states have already played havoc with plans to hold the 10th Arab summit in Amman, later this month and many are enclined to link the recent troubles witnessed in Lebanon (from Ain Remmaneh, to West Beirut to the cabinet crisis) to these inter-Arab divisions.

CSO: 4802

UAE DIPLOMAT ARRESTED FOR ARMS SMUGGLING

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 12 Nov 80 p 1

[Text]

BEIRUT, Tues. — Lebanese security officers at Beirut International Airport have arrested an Arab diplomat and two others as they tried to smuggle 56 pistols and 75,000 rounds of ammunition to the United Arab Emirates, according to police.

The three were identified as: Khalifa Said Al Meri, an attache at the embassy of the United Arab Emirates in Beirut, Abdel Aziz Abdel Karim, a minor employee at the embassy and Hassan Ali Atweh, an embassy driver, police said.

HAVEN

Although both Al Mer and Karim claimed diplomatic immunity, Foreign Ministry officials in Beirut said only Al Meri's credentials entitled him to diplomatic immunity but that he would be held for questioning his diplomatic status.

Beirut International Airport as a haven for drugs and arms smugglers, but recently security forces have tightened security measures to halt the flow of arms to Lebanon's private militias.

Lebanon has the most flourishing black market for light arms in the Middle East. There were plenty of unofficial reports of arms smuggling from Lebanon to Arab states in the Gulf. Today's announcement, however, was the first official report of a seizure of a Gulf-bound arms shipment.

Meanwhile, military experts defused a bomb containing an estimated 20 kg of explosives in the northern port of Lebanon's Tripoli at dawn today.

State-run Beirut Radio reported that only 12 hours earlier two car bombs went off in a busy shopping centre in Christian east Beirut, killing 10 people and wounding more than 60.

The radio said the explosives were spotted by a security patrol touring the city, 90 km north of here.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

BOND MARKET PROGRESS--Beirut bankers, acting with the aid of the World Bank, have taken a significant step towards the goal of creating a bond market in Lebanon by the end of this year (AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, March 3). The sum of LL 9 million ($2.57 million) has been subscribed by 22 banks to set up the Finance Corporation of Lebanon, acting in conjunction with the International Finance Corporation, the World Bank's private sector affiliate. The new Lebanese financial institution is to serve as the basis for the proposed bond market. Three of the subscribers are foreign banks operating in Lebanon and George Achie, a member of the new corporation's founding committee, said the subscription list was being kept open for other foreign banks even though the deadline of October 15 for subscribers had not been extended officially. Mr Achie said he expected other local and foreign banks to take up shares with a minimum holding of LL 250,000. Mr Achie said the full capital of LL 10 million ($2.86 million) of the new Finance Corporation of Lebanon had already been paid up. When the scheme was first put forward in March, the IFC was expected to take a stake of between 20 and 25 per cent of the shares. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 10 Nov 80 p 15]

CSO: 4802

RELATED ITEMS ON MOROCCAN-SOVIET COOPERATION

Phosphates, Shale and Fish

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 4 Nov 80 p 1

[Text] Moscow, 4 November (Maghreb-Arab Press Agency)--The Moroccan-Soviet commission followed up its deliberations Monday afternoon in Moscow with an exchange of views between the two parties.

In the course of this meeting, the minister of state for foreign affairs and cooperation, Me M'Hamed Boucetta, laid stress on the necessity of strengthening economic, technical and cultural cooperation between Morocco and the Soviet Union.

It should be noted that the Moroccan-Soviet commission, which had not met in 4 years, will from now on hold regular meetings. In this sense, Me M'Hamed Boucetta declared that the commission will be meeting again next year in the kingdom of Morocco in order to review accomplishments and elaborate a program for the next step in such a way that the accords between the two countries be continued and in the interest of both parties in the different domains.

Also, the minister of commerce, industry and the merchant marine and maritime fishing, Mr Azzeddine Guessous, met Monday afternoon with the head of the Soviet part of the commission and the vice-president of the state commission for economic relations, as well as other leaders in the economic sector.

Similarly, the subcommittees created out of the joint commission began their labors.

Thus, with regard to the Meskala project, for the operation of which a cooperation agreement was signed,the discussions began between the Soviet part and a big delegation from the Shereefian Office of Phosphates led by the director general of the office, Mr Mohamed Karim Lamrani. These discussions resulted in the conclusion of a protocol in this important domain to last from 1981 to 1984, as well as the implementation of the accord concluded between the two parties for prospecting and exploitation of bituminous shale at Tarfaya, in addition to geological research.

As for maritime fishing, the discussions continue on elaboration of a proposed agreement covering 1980-1981 and which assumes a scientific and technical character.

Four Cooperation Protocols Signed

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 8 Nov 80 p 3

[Text] Moscow, 8 November (Maghreb-Arab Press Agency)--Morocco and the Soviet Union Monday signed in Moscow two protocol agreements on scientific and technological cooperation.

The two documents were signed by Mr M'Hamed Boucetta, minister of state for foreign affairs and cooperation, and the president of the state commission and Soviet minister of foreign economic affairs.

Two other protocols were signed by Mr Azzeddine Guessous, minister of commerce, industry, merchant marine and maritime fishing, and the Soviet minister of external trade.

Following the talks between the Moroccan and Soviet officials, the president of the state commission expressed his satisfaction in the cooperation of the two countries, alluding to the extremely important agreement on the Meskala phosphates, adding that the present visit being made by the Moroccan delegation to the Soviet Union will contribute further to the improvement of existing relations between the two countries in regard to scientific and technological cooperation.

The minister of state for foreign affairs and cooperation, Me Boucetta, said for his part that the signature of the 4 protocols between Morocco and the Soviet Union will contribute to the strengthening of bilateral relations over the next 5 years.

Touching on international questions, Me Boucetta said that the problem of Al Qods must occupy a large place in Moroccan-Soviet relations.

The discussions, said the minister of state, also bore on the situation that prevails in northwest Africa, in the Near East and on questions of mutual interest.

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MOROCCAN-BULGARIAN BILATERAL COOPERATION

Rabat L'OPINION in French 13 Nov 80 pp 1, 3

[Text] The official visit of Me M'Hamed Boucetta, minister of state for foreign affairs and cooperation, to Bulgaria ended Tuesday with the signing of a proces-verbal of the deliberations of the second session of the intergovernmental commission of economic, technical and cultural cooperation and with a joint Moroccan-Bulgarian communique.

The two documents were signed by Me Boucetta and Mr Samen Samenov, vice-prime minister and Bulgarian minister of metallurgy and mineral resources.

During an exchange of remarks, Me Boucetta said that Morocco wants to extend bilateral cooperation beyond the field of roads--confined to the exchange of products--in order to arrive at structural cooperation.

The minister of state said that the Moroccan proposal to set up joint machine construction units is an interesting example. The field of Moroccan-Bulgarian [potential] cooperation, he said, is vast and regards trade, exchanges of scientific information, agriculture and stock-raising, geology and mines, fishing and vocational training, as well as other branches of socioeconomic activity.

"We are happy to say that cooperation between Bulgaria and Morocco could be both deep and useful," he said, adding that, thanks to the exchanges which have already taken place and to the accords which exist between the two countries, "We are advancing and refining the domains in which cooperation should take place."

Me Boucetta, on the same occasion, congratulated the Bulgarian advisers in Morocco for the "dedication with which they are fulfilling their mission," and mentioned that the Moroccan students in Bulgaria are happy with their stay in that country.

"There are so many reasons for having confidence in the future," concluded Me Boucetta.

For his part, the vice-prime minister of Bulgaria pointed out that the decisions made in the course of the first session of the commission, in April 1980 in Rabat, are being executed successfully.

The Bulgarian side is persuaded that the decisions made during the session in Sofia will contribute to the expansion of our commercial and economic exchanges, he said.

The joint Moroccan-Bulgarian communique indicates that during his visit to Sofia, from 9 to 11 November 1980, Me Boucetta had talks with the president of the Bulgarian council of ministers, Mr Stanko Todorov, and Mr Petar Meladinov, minister of foreign affairs. He was also received by the secretary general of the Bulgarian Popular Agrarian Union and vice-president of the council of state.

During their meeting, Me Boucetta and his Bulgarian counterpart, according to the communique, examined bilateral relations and proceeded to an exchange of views on current international problems.

"They noted with satisfaction the positive improvement in Moroccan-Bulgarian relations, based on the principles of peaceful coexistence," the document says.

With regard to international problems, the communique indicates, the two sides "emphasize the necessity of strengthening detente, mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit."

They also reaffirmed the determination of the two governments to pursue efforts aimed at strengthening cooperation, arresting the arms race and leading to the adoption of effective disarmament measures.

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GOVERNMENT BUDGET REPORTEDLY TO CALL FOR EVEN MORE INCOME DISTRIBUTION

Rabat L'OPINION in French 23 Oct 80 p 1

[Article by M.T.]

[Text] A recent Council of Government meeting studied the 1981 draft budget which will be the first fiscal year of the next 5-year plan.

Although we do not yet know the options decided upon which will determine the principal orientations of this plan, certain indications nevertheless permit us to suggest that, in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty Hassan II, it will probably work to reduce social inequalities and limit operating expenses to devote most investments to the equipment effort.

One of the principal tasks entrusted to the present government since its formation consists in attenuating social and regional disparities. That is what the King recalled in a speech he gave when opening the current parliamentary year.

Therefore, we expect this budget for fiscal 1981 to serve as the point of departure for this policy.

If the definition of any budget and any plan is based upon political consideration first and foremost, it is obvious that the commitments made by the government are sufficiently clear that we have the right to demand their fulfillment. These commitments, moreover, were sufficiently developed on the occasion of the working days, seminars or even parliamentary debates so that they cannot lend themselves to any sidestepping during this period of our country's development.

There is no need to recall that our people have always responded positively to every demand for mobilization or sacrifice. However, it would be inappropriate to ask the popular classes to exclusively pay the costs required for our development and the defense of our country and our institutions.

The decision to reduce by one-third the rent of tenants whose income does not exceed 1,500 dirhams is a first step which should serve as an example for other reforms which should bring about redistribution of national revenues in an equitable manner.

The bulk of our population consists of workers, poor farmers and low-level government employees. It is the standard of living of the working classes that we should

now think about. For several years, their purchasing power has continued to deteriorate; and if solutions are not found to remedy this situation, there will be practically no national market, for lack of consumers. This is tantamount to the limiting of every productive investment effort, to the generalizing, therefore, of unemployment, to the causing of bankruptcy...

Obviously, the decision is political. It supposes new options and new choices, beginning with the application of a veritable policy of austerity.

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DOUIRI CALLS FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH, INDEPENDENCE

Rabat L'OPINION in French 13 Nov 80 pp 1, 3

[Text] "I thank God the All-Powerful, for having brought us together again, on this glorious day, to celebrate the advent of the new year.

"It is customary on such a day to take stock of our various achievements and contemplate what we intend to undertake in the future.

"In listening to the speech of the secretary general, our dear brother Abderrahman Al Boury, we were able to truly appreciate the importance of the achievements made and of the efforts expended in order to enable our country's development to keep growing. And it is all the more important when one realizes that our country must deal with a difficult situation which was imposed on us. Also, it is with great pride that I can say that few nations confronted with the situation we are experiencing could achieve what we have undertaken. And this is especially due to our will and determination, as well as that of all the citizens of Morocco, united behind His Majesty the King Hassan II, may God glorify him; so that our country may join the ranks of the developed nations and regain the place which has always been its own throughout history.

"It is a great honor for me to hear His Majesty the King Hassan II, the Unifier of the Nation and Guide of the Green March [sic], speak so highly of the work done by your services.

"Your will and determination are such that I can look at the future of our ministry and our country with complete serenity.

"In working with you, I have been able to appreciate you at your true worth, and my admiration for you is confirmed everyday. And, if thanks to your efforts we have been able to complete the first stage of our work, I wish to be able to achieve, with the same determination and the same patience as in the past the next steps which will enable us to attain our goals, which as you know are numerous and ambitious and require the qualities that you already possess.

A Plan for Needs and Aspirations

"As you all know, this year is the first year of the new five-year plan. Also, in implementation of the wise injunctions of His Majesty the King Hassan II, may God glorify him, this plan should be a plan of recovery which will contain important projects which should enable our country to continue its economic development in the next 20 years, so that it can regain the place that has always been its own among the developed nations.

"This plan, unlike previous ones, will not be based on our own financially resources, but will have as its essential foundation the achievement of our objectives and the satisfaction of the national needs.

"With respect to the ministry of infrastructure and national promotion, the following steps will enable us to attain our objectives:

"1) Increased development of vocational training and the training of cadres;

"2) Improvement and implementation of new methods of management;

"3) Taking adequate social and administrative measures;

"4) Development and definitive Moroccanization of the public works sector;

"5) Perseverance in the effort of national development.

"In the rest of my speech, I am going to go more deeply into each of these points so as to bring out the role which our ministry should play in achieving these objectives.

Vocational Training

"No one is unaware of the importance assumed by the training of cadres in the development of a country. Also, our country which has played an important cultural role throughout its history, must regain its place. Therefore we must work to endow our country with a national technology.

"As I told you last year at this same time: our ministry, which gives a fundamental importance to the training of cadres, has created the "Directorate of Training." This directorate will in particular be responsible for the development of scientific research. Similarly, during the year to come, the ministry is going to establish a scientific research body, as well as research laboratories in the fields of roads, hydraulics, and harbors. These laboratories will be equipped with the most modern materials and will be headed by national engineers.

Improvement of Management Methods

"The ministry is presently undertaking, in collaboration with national research bureaus, studies which should permit the establishment of new methods of public administration. These new methods must make it possible to determine policies to be followed with regard to infrastructure; and clarify the distribution of responsibilities when a decision is taken. They should also contribute to the optimization of the profitability of investments. Taking into account the encouraging results obtained by the application of the Basic Roads Scheme; a study was begun to produce a Basic Harbors Scheme. Similarly an identical study dealing with water problems will be produced during the next 5 years.

"During the year ahead, the ministry will publish a flow chart which will permit better control and follow-up on projects as well as better determination of needs.

Social Reforms

"Concerning the social domain, the ministry of infrastructure and national promotion has proposed a revision of the statutes regulating the public function. Also, while awaiting the approval of these statutes, research will be begun in the ministry on facilitating internal promotion. Also, a proposal has been made to lower from 7 years to 5 years the number of years necessary for the certification of laborer agents. Thus, this year 1,000 laborer agents will be certified.

"Regarding the allocation of housing to functionaries, the measures taken have borne fruit. By agreement with the ministry of habitat and territorial administration, plots of land and housing will be reserved for minor functionaries in future activities of this ministry. The proposal made by our ministry, namely the reservation of 2 percent of the infrastructure budget for the construction of housing to benefit the functionaries has been well received by the government.

"The experience gained by the directorate for hydraulics with the vacation resorts will be applied to all directorates.

"In order to assure all functionaries of transport, the ministry is going to develop the acquisition of public transport vehicles and reduce the purchase of individual vehicles.

"The social role of our ministry is not limited just to functionaries of the ministry of infrastructure, but extends to all the functionaries of the state; particularly in the religious field. Our country should not continue to perpetuate the practices inherited from the era of colonialism, but must return to its Muslim authenticity. Whereas at the time of colonialism our pupils did not work on Friday, now they do; whereas they should make use of this day to go to the mosque and perfect their religious education.

"Also, in accordance with the directives of His Majesty the King Hassan II, the prime minister has drawn up a proposal to make Friday a holiday. Also, as to the proliferation of alcoholic beverages which is happening more and more in our country, and which is contrary to our religion; the prime minister--following the wise injunctions of His Majesty the King Hassan II, may God glorify him--has given his instructions to put an end to this scourage.

Help the Public Works Sector

"In the context of its oversight mission with regard to the building and public works sector, the ministry is undertaking several steps at the governmental level to reactivate this economic sector. Thus, the ministry has ceased collaboration with foreign research bureaus in order not to approve contracts except for those with national research bureaus and enterprises, except in the case where a foreign enterprise subsidizes the project; on condition that the work be effectuated by national companies.

"Also, in order to permit national enterprises to have sufficient Moroccan cadres, the ministry has decided to supply these firms with engineers and action cadres; and to perm t cadres in the ministry with much experience to rejoin the private sector. Measures will be taken in order to require the private firms to recruit Moroccan cadres instead of calling on foreign cadres.

"As we are fully conscious of the role of Arabization in the development of our country, we have, within our ministry, Arabized all correspondence and converted the typewriters from the French to the Arabic. Similarly, we are going to Arabize procedures for contract ratification.

"In order to facilitate this work, the ministry has prepared a technical dictionary that will soon be distributed to the various services.

The Objectives of the Ministry in...

"Following the wise injunctions of His Majesty the King Hassan II, may God glorify him, the infrastructure created by our ministry will be built up in a new perspective and with the help of modern methods.

Also we will make a distinction between two types of infrastructure:

--Economic infrastructure.

--Social infrastructure.

...the Field of Large Infrastructure Projects and...

"The first type of infrastructure should enable our country to assure its economic independence and the development of international trade. I will cite as an example:

--The fixed connection between Europe and Africa through the Straits of Gibraltar, which is going to transform the region both economically and socially.

--In this connection, following the instructions of His Majesty the King, our ministry is going to undertake studies on the establishment of a new port near the Straits of Gibraltar which should facilitate North-South trade.

--Infrastructure on the Gharb plain through the construction of several dams, including the Mjra; Madez; Ait Aoyub, and the diversion of the Matmata. This should permit the meeting of Morocco's sugar needs, and strengthen its energy independence.

--Harbor infrastructure for fishing, in order to contribute to the development of this sector. Also starting next year work will be done toward this end on the Nador, Jorf Lasfar, and Agadir ports.

...in the Socioeconomic Field

"As to the second type of infrastructure, the ministry is going to make it in the years to come a major part of its activities. This will be done in order to be able to improve living conditions for the citizens, to reduce regional disparities, and to integrate isolated regions.

"Thus, with respect to roads, the ministry is going to become involved in all the regions of the kingdom in the upkeep and maintenance of the national network. In order to expand regional trade, the ministry in collaboration with the local collectivities is going to build new regional roads. For this, the ministry is going to supply the necessary supervisory personnel, build the construction works, and supply the workyard equipment; as for the local collectivities, they are going to supply the manpower and the materials.

"In the field of harbors, the effort to build regional ports will be continued. One can cite the construction of the port of Ras Kebdana, the renovation of the ports of M'diqfi Jebba, Al-Hoceima, and the equipping of the ports of Nader, Safi, Agadir, Tan-Tan, and Tarfaya. The contracts for building the port of Laayoune has been let, and those for the ports of Sidi Ifni, Boujdour, and Dakhla are in preparation. As one can see, these ports are going to contribute to the economic take-off of several regions of the kingdom.

"With regard to water research, a major program has been launched: and major human and material resources will be mobilized for its realization. Moreover, the ministry is going to undertake the construction of two large dams which should supply potable water to the towns of Nador and Safi. A large dam with two purposes--provision of potable water and energy production--will be built in the Al Hoceima region. Studies for the dam at Ait Couarit on Oued Lakhdar have been completed and the work should soon begin.

"The ministry is going to indemnify the proprietors of the flooded lands, re-establish communications on all the roads cut by the building of the dams. Major projects are going to be undertaken for the supply of potable water to the biggest towns of the kingdom. For the towns of lesser size, a large sum will be reserved in the next 2 years to assure water supplies for them. In the rural areas, the ministry is going to undertake the drilling of wells at the request of the local collectivities, in the framework of the "World Decade for Potable Water' (1401-1410). These various steps should make it possible to assure each citizen his provisioning in potable water by the end of these 10 years.

The Role of National Promotion

"Particular attention will be given to the national promotion services, to permit them to continue the important work done during recent years. This reinforcement will give all the resources necessary to national promotion in order to play an important role in economic development, especially by the resorbtion of unemployment and aid to the other services of the ministry.

"This undertaking will be especially characterized at the regional and local level by the construction of roads, well-drilling, reforestation, the protection of water reserves, and constructions of a social nature such as mosques and foyers [translation unknown]. And too, His Majesty the King Hassan II has given his high injunctions for national promotion to contribute to the organizing and the flourishing of youth.

"All these projects that I have just cited our ministry is planning to achieve during this first year of the 15th century of the Hegira.

"Before concluding, I ask God the All-Powerful to give us the strength and will to undertake, under the wise leadership of His Majesty the King Hassan II, may God glorify him, all these labors which will make our nation rich and prosperous."

We note that before this the secretary general, Abderrahim Al Boury had sketched out the achievements of the ministry and the projects under way in the fields of dam construction, potable water supplies for towns, road infrastructure, and improvement of the road network.

He also made mention of the efforts expended by the ministry in terms of public infrastructure, and building in Rabat, in collaboration with the Chinese Government, of a sports complex.

After having underlined the role of the ministry in the development of the Sahara provinces, Mr Al Boury indicated several programs have been elaborated in the fields of national promotion, construction of water-towers, and vocational training.

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DATA BANK PROPOSAL UNDER CONSIDERATION

Morocco MAROC SOIR in French 17 Oct 80 p 7

[Text] MAP--Under the high patronage of the minister of information, Abdelouahed Belekziz, and the French ambassador to Rabat, Jacques Morizet, Pierre Pelou, curator of the National French Libarary and administrator of the Political and News Data Bank (BIPA), held a conference Wednesday evening in Rabat on the subject of "a plan for a political information and news bank."

During his conference, Pierre Pelou particularly covered specialized information in the world in general and in France specifically and information handling.

After having stated that his visit fell within the framework of cooperation between France and Morocco, Pierre Pelou said that this mission "is of great importance for the problems of information, organization and development in Morocco."

On the subject of information problems in the world, the conference speaker recalled American influence in this sector. "In fact," he emphasized, "the information sector has been practically monopolized by the United States; however, this monopoly has given rise to the establishment of a multitude of data bases and banks, of data processing centers and transmission networks.

As regards the significance of a data base, Pierre Pelou said that this is an automated bibliographical file which feeds back documents, in particular books or newspaper articles. As for the data bank, he said that it gives access to the data itself. And, finally, as regards the processing center, Pierre Pelou said, "This is a center for calculations, a technical and information processing center which has a very powerful computer in which an entire series of data bases and banks are stored." After having given a briefing on American influence in the information field, the conference leader described the influence of the Japanese who, according to him, "over the last few years have greatly increased their data bases and banks, particularly in two essential sectors, namely data bases which are of an economic nature and data bases of a technological kind." In this regard, he recalled that the big Japanese companies are spending 1.6 percent of their turnover on information problems (70 billion francs are spent every year in Japan on information problems by the private sector).

As concerns Europe, the conference speaker said that within the framework of the European Economic Community (EEC), an entire infrastructure on information problems has been developed particularly in Luxembourg.

The conference leader recalled the establishment in Luxembourg of the CDIST (Scientific and Technical Information Commission) which is responsible chiefly for developing a policy concerning the establishment and organization of data bases and banks through the different countries of the EEC, establishment of processing centers (20 centers in Europe) and also the establishment of a European data transmission network, EURONET, which will link the different national networks.

On the question of specialized information in France, the conference leader said that this subject has created a certain number of problems and questions concerning the restructuring of specialized information in France.

He also mentioned some of the organizations to which a report on this subject had been entrusted, including the MIDIST (Interministerial Mission for Scientific and Technical Documentation and Information). This organization's objective, he said, is to provide guidance and to organize everything concerning the development of data bases and banks in France.

The second mission was entrusted to the Ministry of Industry. This ministry was made responsible for the establishment of an information industry oriented toward data processing equipment as well as toward the establishment of data bases and banks for the public and private sectors.

The third organization of this information infrastructure in France is the Ministry of Universities which above all establish data bases and banks.

The last organization which is part of this infrastructure is that of the Ministry of Culture and Communications which is doing important work, in particular on the establishment of an information system within the framework of the National Audiovisual Institute, which is called the IMAGO system and which is working in particular on the establishment of a data base as well as on televised newscasts.

As concerns the BIPA, the conference speaker said that this bank is reliant on French documentation and is a central directorate of the government dependent upon the services of the prime minister and more particularly of the secretariat general of the government. French documentation, the conference speaker went on to say, is first and foremost an official publishing house but without a monopoly and also a documentation organization. The latter published a certain number of works relating to political, economic and social life, as well as several periodicals.

As for the role of the BIPA, Pierre Pelou said that it handles and disseminates information. "Everything that relates to published works and documentation falls within the purview of the BIPA which sets up data bases and banks and places them at the disposal of consumers such as parliament, the services of the prime minister or the Elysee, which are privileged consumers, but also makes them available to anyone in the world who wants to have access to this kind of information," Pierre Pelou said. "The BIPA," he added, "collects or selects different kinds of categories of documents."

The conference leader also recalled the sectors covered by the BIPA through its four divisions (information, government, politics and press photography).

After having discussed the technilogical aspects of the BIPA, Pierre Pelou said that as regards the dissemination of its products, the BIPA uses three methods: the conversational method via a terminal, printed products and microfiches.

In conclusion, the conference speaker said that in spite of the efforts which have been made and the results obtained by France in this sector, there is a great deal still to be done in the specialized information field.

At the end of this conference, a general discussion took place during which Pierre Pelou answered the various questions asked by the audience.

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MOROCCO'S TEXTILE SITUATION SUMMARIZED

Morocco MAROC SOIR in French 22 Oct 80 p 9

[Article by Brahim Amjahdi]

[Text] Last Friday, the Moroccan Association of Textile Industries [AMIT] held its regular general meeting in the presence of Abdelali Benlemlih, head of the Textile Industries Division, Ministry of Commerce and Industry; Mohamed Guedira, director of the Moroccan Center for the Promotion of Exports (CMPE); and a representative of the Directorate General of Customs and Indirect Taxes.

The agenda of this important meeting covered the following points:

--Reading of the secretary's report and the financial report;

--Electing of the bureau and members of the Council of Administration;

--Examining of various questions.

The work of this meeting began with the reading of the secretary's report by Mohamed Drissi Queytouni, deputy and outgoing president of this association.

This report brought out the many and important activities of the AMIT with a succinct analysis of the present situation of the textile industry in our country and a balance sheet of accomplishments during the past fiscal year.

"First, it is useful to recall the broad picture of the situation prevailing in 1979, the second year of the 3-year plan of reflection and stabilization.

"On the whole, the Moroccan economy continued to be characterized by the persistence of the international crisis which was translated into another sharp rise in the prices of energy, raw materials and capital goods and, in the domestic sector, continuation of a policy of austerity and the strengthening of our territorial integrity.

"The policy of austerity was based on the decrease in public expenditures, limitation on imports and restrictions on credit. This policy prevented aggravation of the foreign deficit without, however, attainment of the desired objectives at the level of the fundamental balances."

As for the deficit in the balance of trade, there was a deterioration compared to 1978 because of the increased impact of the oil bill. An appreciable increase in exports and a rise in the number of our workers transferring to foreign countries and tourist revenues did, however, permit reduction of the overall balance of payments deficit.

Development in the Textile Industry

Drissi continued, "In spite of a difficult economic situation, the textile sector in 1979 experienced rather favorable development with sustained activity in most of the areas. This is particularly noticeable at the level of investments which developed favorably, with total commitments of 173 million dirhams. This is equal to last year's total.

The value added produced by the textile industry in 1979 totaled 1.107 billion dirhams, with the sectors production amounting to 3.108 billion dirhams compared to 2,820 billion dirhams in 1978.

Restrictions on imports and the campaign against smuggling have had beneficial effects, resulting in an improvement of the domestic market.

The textile industry in 1979, moreover, benefited from rather sizable government orders, particularly in the cloth, cotton fabrics and ready-to-wear apparel sectors. However, most of the enterprises experienced financial difficulties deriving from the following factors:

1. The insufficiency of bank support and even the withdrawal of certain banks.

2. The deposit prior to import which reached figures at times by far exceeding the possibilities of the working capital.

3. The excessive increase in the costs of all factors of production.

4. The demand for cash payment by suppliers.

Supplies of raw materials were often made very difficult because of:

1. Instability on the international raw materials market which was accentuated by the rise in the price of oil.

2. The decision to halt or decrease the production of certain European spinning mills.

The prices of raw materials increased 15 to 30 percent forcing the enterprises to raise their sales prices but less than the rising costs of the production factors.

Exports totaled 830 million dirhams in 1979; i.e., a 10 percent increase compared to 1978.

Analysis of Each Branch

Spun and Woven Wool

This sector as a whole experienced positive development except for mercerized threads. The woven cloth experienced an important increase because of the level of government orders. Knitting thread also registered appreciable growth.

Several projects in the woven wool sector are now being studied or implemented. It is estimated that over 40,000 new spindles will be installed in 1980-81.

Spun and Woven Cotton

On the whole, market trends have been good with more sustained domestic demand. Paralleling product improvement, the prospects for this sector are optimistic, account taken of the investments made and the demand of the hoisery thread branches.

It should be noted that the ready-to-wear apparel industry continues to be very dependent upon imports which are being admitted on a temporary basis and that increasing demand for finished articles (light fabrics) requires an adaptation of production to export demands.

Woven Upholstery

This sector continues its advance with a very dynamic commercial policy both on the domestic and foreign markets; thus, its exports represented about 60 percent of the turnover experienced.

Efforts also made to improve quality and diversification of manufactured articles justify the ban on all imports.

Woven Silk and Synthetic Fibers

This sector experienced a slight drop in production and supply problems in the thread area. Investments now being made in the manufacture of more diversified articles make it possible to anticipate better prospects.

A restructuring of this sector would permit national production to replace imports being temporarily admitted to the country and to meet domestic needs in finished articles.

Woven Terry Cloth

This sector experienced several problems because of weak domestic demand. Exports are continuing to increase and are being called upon to develop even more; however, on the whole, activity is being maintained at a rather stable level. It should be stated that after a period of investment and organization, this branch is now entering a phase of full production which should result in an improvement in the rate of utilization.

Embroidery

Embroidery activity has developed little compared to the previous year; however, there was an observable movement in the direction of producing more finished luxury articles.

The drop in foreign demand forced the enterprises to fall back upon the domestic market where demand has been rather satisfactory. The export turnover which represented 33 percent of 1978 production reached only 21 percent in 1979.

Texturization

Three plants now have 8,904 reeling spindles and 2,704 throwing spindles; other plants are under study. Some plants are already exporting, which is a good sign.

Knits

Warp knit which supplies the domestic market with a gamut of very diversified articles experienced a drop in production of about 25 percent. This branch exports very little.

On the other hand, woof knit has experienced a clear advance thanks to sustained demand particularly on foreign markets and this in spite of supply problems and treasury tensions.

In spite of the international situation, prospects are quite promising. Important investments are now being made for the renovation of equipment, with a view particularly to the manufacture of articles with fine sizes.

Ready-To-Wear Apparel

Ready-to-wear apparel experienced the most remarkable advance which is reflected in production earmarked for export. Of production evaluated at 500 million dirhams, 64 percent were exported; i.e., 321 million dirhams, representing 38 percent of total exports of textile products.

Increased activity in this branch necessitated important investments for renovation or expansion.

Forecasts are optimistic thanks to good prospects on foreign markets.

Finishing and Printing

This sector experienced a sharp setback due to a drop in demand attributable particularly to strong emphasis on the export of unfinished fabrics.

The production capacity of this activity is sufficient to meet processing needs. Effort should be exerted toward improvement of the quality of processing at all levels to better meet the demands of both the domestic and export markets.

Hard Fibers

The hard fibers sector (jute sacks, twine and cord which manages to meet the needs of the country maintained its activity in spite of increases in the costs of production and competition from systhetic substitute products.

Continuing his presentation, Drissi gave a brief summary of the situation in the textile industry during the first 6 months of 1980.

The general trend in this sector is characterized by a certain amount of sluggishness which is explained by uncertainties on the international market, by the situation being experienced by certain traditional European partners and by problems of all kinds encountered in keeping our enterprises active by assuring them of as normal financial management as possible.

In spite of this rather unfavorable climate, investments totaled 139 million dirhams compared to 103 million dirhams during the same period of the previous year; i.e., an increase of 35 percent.

The making of these investments should result in the creation of 2,200 new jobs.

As for 1980 exports, forecasts are quite favorable. As of the end of June, exports totaled 492 million dirhams.

In spite of all the difficulties encountered, the textile sector should attain the objective which we have set for ourselves at the SATEC [expansion unknown]: to exceed the turnover figure of 100 billion dirhams in exports as of the end of 1980.

Establishment of a CMPE

In a related connection, in the future business sector, the establishment of a Moroccan Center for the Promotion of Exports is a happy initiative which merits every encouragement. To this end, Drissi invited the men of the profession to facilitate the task of the director of this center and to provide him with all the information he will need to accomplish his mission.

At present, he emphasized, a study on revision of the Investments and Exports Code is being conducted in the CGEM [Moroccan General Economic Federation], and we have not failed to stress certain points which seem vital to us.

"The situation our country is experiencing demands additional and prudent effort from us in the management of our affairs.

"But at the same time we must show greater dynamism to continue down the road to expansion, while accepting all the sacrifices to effectively contribute to the defense of our territorial integrity.

"Let us also note that a CMPE will be opened very shortly in Casablanca which we remind you is a new tool for the promotion of textile exports."

The reading of the financial report, the second point on the agends, was approved.

As for the election of the new bureau for a period of 2 years, Drissi Queytoni [as published] was once again reelected to the presidency of this association.

The members of the new bureau are as follows:

President: Mohamed Drissi Queytoni

Vice Presidents: Alami Tazi, Tahar Bouchaara, Driss Sebti, Mohamed Lahlou, Mohamed Tazi, Mohamed Kabbaj, Abdou El Manjra, Yves Sanchez, J. Toledano and Mustapha Doghmi.

Secretary General: Abdelhamid Mikou

Treasurer General: Abdelali Alami

Group Presidents

Tahar Bouchaara: Cotton Spinning-Weaving

Abdelilah Kabbaj: Wool Spinning-Weaving

Mohamed Kabbaj: Silk, embroidery and mesh

Mohamed Lahlou: Furnishings

Aziz Idrissi: Knits

Mohamed Tazi: Ready-To-Wear Apparel

Mohamed Polkhayat: Reeling; Weaving

Telegram to His Majesty the King

At the end of this meeting, a telegram of loyalty and devotion to the Alouite Throne was sent to the royal cabinet.

8143
CSO: 4400

PARDON OF TRADE UNIONISTS HELPS CREATE CLIMATE OF CALM

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 17 Nov 80 pp 24-25

[Editorial by Hammadi Ben Hammed: "The Page Has Been Turned"]

[Text] "In taking these humanitarian measures on behalf of the first group of trade unionists convicted by the State Court of Justice, the Supreme Commander has tried to ensure that the painful page of events of 26 January 1978 has been turned once and for all and that all nationalist trade unionists will unite to serve the nation's higher interests. The chief of state also hopes that these measures will encourage the creation of a psychological climate in which the next UGTT [Tunisian General Federation of Labor] congress will be held under normal conditions, permitting the free and democratic election of new union leaders. In this way, the Tunisian people's fight for progress, dignity and invulnerability will be strengthened and the workers and all the country's human forces will be able to contribute to the drafting of the Sixth Five-Year Plan under better conditions."

It was in these terms, on Monday, 10 November 1980, that Mohamed Mzali commented upon President Bourguiba's decision to pardon ten trade unionists convicted by the State Court of Justice and other trade unionists sentenced as a result of several criminal and police cases by the proper courts in Tunis, Sousse, Kasserine, Sfax, Gafsa and Sidi-Bouzid. The effects of the rulings were therefore nullified.

Three days later, on Thursday, 13 November, the chief of state met for the first time with the members of the National Trade Union Commission, headed by their chairman, Noureddine Hached. The meeting provided the chief of state with the opportunity to affirm "the trade union confederation's need to have within its ranks loyal nationalists who demonstrate a sincere spirit of responsibility and working, by dint of a sustained and fruitful effort, to engage the country on the path of prosperity, progress and invulnerability."

The Supreme Commander emphasized the need to "pursue the action of educating workers so as to inculcate in them our high patriotic values and make them realize their rights in order to avoid any action that might hinder our development effort." The chief of state emphasized that the UGTT must help strengthen efforts being made by the government to ensure the success of the Sixth Plan, which can guarantee that Tunisia will triumph over underdevelopment and achieve progress and prosperity. In this way, the UGTT will have helped to consolidate Tunisia's prestige at home and abroad.

The social atmosphere in Tunisia today is therefore one of detente, serenity.

At the root of this detente and serenity is Bourguiba's willingness to trust others.

Measures of clemency, pardons and releases have come one after the other throughout recent months, bearing witness, as noted by Mohamed Mzali on 19 May, the eve of the 24th anniversary of independence, "to the great heart of Bourguiba, who nourishes hatred against no one." They also demonstrate the political will of the founder of the new Tunisia to make every individual, even if a dissident for a time, aware of his national responsibility, provided that he demonstrates a determination to recognize errors of approach, evaluation and judgment and that he expresses a desire to rejoin the national community and once again become an active, sincere and loyal militant, moved by the ambition to serve.

Among the presidential decisions are the following: the reopening of the School of Law and Economics and the National Engineering School in Tunis on 1 March 1980; the lifting of measures to exclude a certain number of persons from the party on 8 March 1980; the conditional release, on 9 March 1980, of a number of imprisoned trade unionists; the chief of state's statement on 3 August 1980 that "there no longer exist any political prisoners in Tunisia, either among the workers or the students"; and the recommendation of the Political Bureau of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] on 4 August 1980 to create a "national trade union commission on which all Tunisian workers will be represented so as to prepare for the next congress of the UGTT, ensuring the presence of delegates to the congress from all trade union members and seeing that the work takes place in a free, democratic and responsible climate."

Other important decisions include those relating to the suppression of the vigils corps at the university, the rehiring of workers laid off following the events of 26 January 1978 and the exclusion from the party ranks of those who departed from its principles and used their leadership posts for inadmissible purposes.

Along with these actions, one should note the intense action aimed at making Tunisians aware, action tirelessly waged by Mohamed Mzali since 23 April 1980 and inspired by President Bourguiba. This awareness is necessary in the new era so that:

1) at the political level, government at all levels will be by consensus and so that all the country's human resources, no matter what their political affiliation, will be attracted to centers of decision making and action, considering that this country belongs to all Tunisians, that it is the patrimony of everyone and that all the people want to guarantee its stability, justice and prosperity;

2) at the social level, we may prevent tension and all forms of confrontation and that there may be a dialog with workers, all workers, in order to guarantee them better living conditions and greater dignity; and

3) at the economic level, the development policy will have a deep social significance, encouraging the fairest possible distribution of wealth and using imagination and creative innovation to further the spirit of enterprise, intelligence and will.

All these steps were taken in recent months so that Tunisia might embark once and for all on the path chosen by Bourguiba: the path of union and invulnerability,

turning the page of the "wanderings" that Tunisia had to endure and that are an affront to its real vocation, made of tolerance, openness and moderation.

It is a vocation that Bourguiba, throughout his long struggle, has affirmed, emphasizing a humanism of freedom, dignity and responsibility in his administration of man and in affairs of state, demonstrating a constant concern for the achievement of a progressive democracy in keeping with the political maturation of Tunisia and the evolution of the economic and social conditions of its environment.

While the "wanderings" may at one time have threatened that vocation, while the intransigencies and excesses they engender may have risked bringing down the nation's structure, Bourguiba has been there to rectify the situation, prevent the reign of disproportion and blindness, reconcile the country with itself and revive in the Tunisian people the sense of solidarity, brotherhood and love for one's neighbor.

Nothing can illustrate this better than the outcome of the painful events of 26 January 1978, when abuse after abuse took the place of dialog, concertation, the essential foundations of Bourguibian political practices, when stubbornness, obstinacy, refusal and one-upmanship led the country down the path of adventure and chaos, ruled by uncontrolled passions.

The page has now been turned and most Tunisians now say "Never again!"

But a great deal remains to be done and Bourguiba clearly defined it in receiving the National Trade Union Commission.

It is a question of working for truly national trade unionism, responsible trade unionism that can freely participate in the acceleration of economic and social development and the consolidation of national unity, following the guideline that the interests of the workers cannot be dissociated from the interests of the Tunisian people as a whole.

Moreover, this objective is more within our reach than ever, as the paths of the future have been cleansed of maximalisms and their magic.

The tasks of the future, those which consist of triumphing over underdevelopment, of preserving invulnerability and dignity, of consolidating the democratic structure, are so essential and so absorbing that loyal, sincere and honest nationalists, imbued with their responsibility, could never abandon them, even for a time, for the nasty cock fights that led to that unfortunate 26 January.

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TUNISIA DETERMINED TO REMAIN INVULNERABLE

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 17 Nov 80 p 35

[Article by Raja El Almi: "Our Invulnerability"]

[Text] Various important elements have now combined to lead the debate back to the standards -- or terms -- of invulnerability, as intended and conceived by modern Tunisia. Actually, the chief of state has on several occasions and only recently -- on Monday, when receiving Mohamed Mzali, prime minister and secretary general of the PSD [Destourian Socialist Party] -- strongly recommended that the sum allocated by the budget to national defense should be increased, without thereby harming in any way the areas of development that have traditionally received priority. In addition, Minister of Interior Driss Guiga made a statement on Friday (published in a local daily on Saturday) revealing that intensified security measures have been taken throughout the Tunisian territory, particularly in the south, in order to prevent any unfortunate developments as the result of certain troop movements and certain particularly unstable situations that prevail in regions next to our territory.

Finally and above all, the fundamental basis of the preservation of national sovereignty, independence and the achievement of true invulnerability has always constituted a major concern of the Bourguibian regime. The concept of invulnerability as articulated in Tunisia is not simply to have the means of military defense that are essential to a response and the safeguarding of freedom, but also to have the moral strength, complete conviction, the total determination of every individual leading to the unity of all, fierce, freely given, absolute, against any attempt on the fruit of the labor of a nation and the aspirations of a people that wants to build and not destroy, that wants to defend justice and freedoms.

In Tunisia, it is not by counting tanks and missiles that one gauges defense in terms of invulnerability. While arms are necessary, while the so-called "strike" force is also, the union of all the people around common ideals, concerted actions, marked by constant vigilance, undeniably represents the essentially new and modern trump card which the Bourguibian regime has shown it held over and over.

Consequently, at a time when the arms race, the race to improve means of defense in developing countries, often results in fewer credits granted to development and economic and social construction, Tunisia is adopting quite another position which, while granting to means of defense and their modernization all the attention they deserve in a world that is prey to hegemonic appetites, resolutely refuses to allow them to be acquired at the expense of the areas whose planned improvement is vital

to the fight to overcome underdevelopment. Tunisia likewise refuses to slow down its constant efforts for the advancement of man through education, health, social services, jobs, culture (and so on), in order to acquire defense means. Moreover, it is clear that one could not easily try or succeed in such an undertaking in the face of a nation convinced of its rights and determined to defend itself with strength and serenity. In this, the National Union takes on its full significance, as do support for and loyalty to the regime that has given the Tunisian people so much since it came to power.

The purpose of Bourguiba's Tunisia has never been and will never be warlike, which is what truly makes the difference, for far from trying to attack or take from others, Tunisia wants nothing more than to defend and protect itself, whether by dissuasion or action, against any appetites that might make an attempt on its sovereignty.

Among the developing countries, Tunisia offers an almost unique example of moderation, tolerance and a concern for justice and fairness, and on the domestic front, in these modern times, it is involved in a constant quest for the best possible consolidation of social peace and human advancement. There is concertation, debate is free and responsible and different views and opinions are expressed. Work is relentless so as to build the future in keeping with the aspirations of the majority of the people to prosperity and progress.

In other words, in this sense, Tunisia and the Tunisian people have many things to defend and protect. Have they not clearly demonstrated this?

But in the light of experience, albeit bitter, it has now become essential for Bourguiba's Tunisia to be able to defend itself by acquiring the most appropriate equipment and by granting the necessary credits, particularly within the framework of the next budget for 1981. It is also essential that real and total invulnerability be consolidated further by the involvement of everyone in the development process, through the unity of all around what has made the success of modern Tunisia: the will to have what is better, not worse, the will to build and construct, the will to unite and not divide.

It is essential so that Tunisia may remain this wall of wills against which destructive appetites would fling themselves, but without being able to conquer it.

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ARAB-AFRICAN-EUROPEAN 'TRILOGUE' DISCUSSED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 3 Nov 80 p 55

[Commentary by Souad Hassan: "Let us Turn to Practice"]

[Text] The visit which Raymond Barre, the French prime minister, paid to Tunisia, was the occasion of an enhancement and reassertion of the importance of the "trilogue" which should develop among Arab, African and European partners.

Asserting the determination of their respective governments to promote this "trilogue," the French and Tunisian prime ministers went beyond a simple reminder of the principle in order to lay as of now the foundations for specific action in this respect. Barre and Mzali emphasized the need for introducing changes in international economic relations. Yet, such changes call for the formulation of plans and implementations in the technical, economic and financial areas. Actually, it is now a question of going beyond theory and undertaking specific action.

Thus, by deciding to create an "investment bank with the participation of Tunisia, French financial institutions, and Arab partners," the two governments laid the initial foundations for new cooperation with a view to eventually reducing the current imbalance of trade through practical action. The fact that a bank would constitute one of the initial effective stages of this "trilogue" is not accidental. It is within the structural framework of a financial institution that various plans will be most closely studied from the viewpoint of their profitability and will thus be subjected to a test.

Everyone is aware of the importance of the implementation of such a joint project both domestically, for the host country, involving the creation of jobs and integration within the national economy, and on the international level, affecting all partners through the development of commercial relations among them, and respective new openings of international markets for some and the opportunity for new investments, for others.

Such being the consequences affecting their economies, the promoters of the "trilogue" decided to base their activities, first of all, on a financial level. This will mean that each plan will be subjected to a critical study of all its factors on the implacable basis of profitability. This requirement will protect the partners from undertaking any kind of thoughtless or courtesy project.

The structural basis of the "trilogue" has been established. Following the resolve of the French and Tunisian governments, let us emphasize the need to promote such dynamism in the rest of Africa. By virtue of its double affiliation with the Arab world and the African continent, Tunisia could play a basic role in the success of the "trilogue." By virtue of this double affiliation and the privileged nature of its relations with Europe, Tunisia could become the most listened to maker, promoter and partner in the "trilogue." Considering that such an intercontinental undertaking may not be restricted merely to economic and financial exchanges, the French and Tunisian prime ministers equally emphasized the fundamental nature of the cultural "trilogue." This implies meetings, cooperation, dialogs and confrontations among different civilizations which have been frequently reciprocally ignored. In order to be successful, the "trilogue" may not ignore the human, social and historical dimensions of the exchange among peoples and civilizations.

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TUNISIAN MINING OUTPUT SURVEYED

Tunis DIALOGUE in French 10 Nov 80 p 57

[Article by Mustapha Souai: "Sustained Activity Thanks to Strengthening of Domestic Demand"]

[Text] The strengthening of the mining industry sector, noted in 1979, continued in 1980 as confirmed by the latest statistics of the Office of Mines and Geology. This recovery is due, first of all, to increased domestic demand (after the SAEPA reached full capacity) and, secondly, the increased amount of investments in this sector and the measures taken to improve the situation in the non-ferrous metals sector. Thus, investments in the sector exceeded by 34.3 million dinars the figures planned for the first three years of the Fifth Plan, totaling 118.3 million dinars. This year's appropriations for the sector totaled 20.3 million dinars, reaching, therefore, a grand total of 138.6 million dinars for the 1977-1980 period.

The extraction of calcium phosphate, which is the main Tunisian mining product, showed a tremendous development in the new mines, whereas the output of the old mines declined by the substantial amount of 26.4 percent. All in all, the production of phosphates by the various Tunisian mines reached 2,760,473 tons in the first seven months of 1980 as against 2,218,761 tons over the same period in 1979, or a 24.4 percent increase. On the commercial level, domestic sales over the same period totaled about 1.8 million tons or a 56.2 percent increase compared with the first seven months of 1979. Mineral exports remained the same, totaling 864,000 tons. Therefore, local sales which currently account for two-thirds of overall sales, greatly increased as a result of the development of the domestic processing of this mineral converted into phosphoric acid and fertilizers (simple and triple superphosphate, etc.). Let us point out that between January and July 1980 the SAEPA purchased 627,482 tons of phosphate as against no more than 30,491 tons over the same period in 1979.

In the first 7 months of 1980 231,774 tons of iron ore were sold mostly to Al-Fouladh in Menzel Bourguiba as hematite and carbonate, as compared with 238,217 tons in the first seven months of 1979, showing a slight 2.7 percent drop.

This was a natural drop directly related to the relatively high level of iron ore stockpiled in recent years totaling 226,242 tons by 3 July 1980. Sales on the local market are continuing to rise particularly following the increased

activities of the Menzel Bourguiba metallurgical plant. In the first seven months of 1980 iron ore sales totaled 214,610 tons as against 183,639 tons over the same period in 1979, or a 17 percent increase. Let us point out that 18 percent of the ore sold came from the Djebel-Djerissa mine, Tamera-Douaria accounting for the balance.

The production of lead ore is continuing to stagnate as a result of the diminution of reserves and even the exhaustion of some deposits. In the first 7 months of 1980 a total of 8,870 tons of lead ore had been marketed compared with 9,414 tons in the first 7 months of 1979, or a 5.8 percent decline. However, this level of output does not meet the increased requirements of the Tunisian Mining and Metallurgical Company (SMMT) which, therefore, has been forced to increase its imports. In the first 7 months of 1980 the company imported 14,054 tons as compared with 10,079 tons in 1979, or a 39.4 percent increase. As to zinc ore, all of which is exported, since Tunisia does not have a zinc processing refinery, in the first 7 months of 1980 output reached 10,989 tons or a 21 percent increase compared with the corresponding period in 1979. Let us point out that such increase in zinc ore production is the result, above all, of the start up of the Fedj Hassene mine and, secondly, the consolidation of the output of the Sidi Bou-Aouane and Djebel-Hallouf mines. Fluorite production is continuing to improve. It totaled 24,228 tons as against 21,289 tons over the first 7 months of 1979, or a 13.8 percent increase. A total of 18,595 tons were sold on the local market and 2,303 tons were exported (to Italy) in the first 7 months of 1980. The comparison between these sales and the same period in 1979 shows a respective increase of 2.4 and 35.4 percent. Within the same period of time barite and silver production increased.

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END

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22 December 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2236

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NEW, RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES IN ARAB WORLD DISCUSSED

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 17, 24 Nov 80

[Article by Dr Nouhad Baroudi, officer-in-charge of the Natural Resources, Science and Technology Division of the UN Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA)]

[17 Nov 80, pp 11-15]

[Excerpt]

The predominance of oil and gas as sources of energy in the Arab world obscures widespread use of other forms of energy in the region and their future potential. The following Special Survey on alternatives to oil and gas is in two parts and is by Dr Nouhad Baroudi, Officer-in Charge on the Natural Resources, Science and Technology Division of the UN Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA) and is published with his kind permission. It is derived from a paper which Dr Baroudi delivered at a seminar on new energy forms held at Sousse in Tunisia at the end of last month under the auspices of the Chambre de Commerce Franco-Arabe and the Union of Arab Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture. Part 1 of the survey covers hydro-electric power, nuclear energy and nuclear fuels.

New and renewable sources of energy are being utilised at present in almost all Arab countries, in one form or another. The most important to-date is of course hydro-power, which has so far been harnessed in eight countries where it was responsible in 1978 for the generation of 15 Terawatt-hours (billion kilowatt-hours) of electricity. Nuclear energy can be found in four Arab countries, but in the form of training reactors for research and experimentation. Solar energy applications are going on in 17 countries, but principally for water heating and pumping. Energy from biomass is produced and widely utilised in the Arab world, but only in its primary forms in the sense that fuel wood, charcoal, agricultural wastes and animal dung are mainly used for domestic heating and cooking. Geothermal sources exist in nine Arab countries, but their use has been confined to non-energy purposes. Wind energy can be harnessed in at least 12 countries where wind is available at sufficient levels of velocity, but its applications have so far been limited to windmills.

New and renewable energy sources, however, do not account today for more than 6 per cent of total Arab primary energy requirements. This percentage is furthermore likely to decline in the future, despite a spectacular growth expected to take place in absolute terms.

This paper reviews the programmes and/or perspectives of the 21 Arab countries in the fields of hydro-electricity, nuclear power, solar energy, biomass, geothermal and wind energy, before assessing the role that these new and renewable sources of energy are likely to play in the energy balance of the Arab world in the coming 20 years.

Hydro-electricity

Eight of the 21 Arab countries utilise at present hydro-energy for power generation, and in four of them (Egypt, Lebanon, Sudan and Syria) this source is the major supplier of electricity. Hydro-generation in the Arab world approached 15 TWh in 1978, as compared to less than 2 TWh in 1960. In relative terms, its contribution to total power supply peaked at 34 per cent in 1969, before gradually declining to 22 per cent in 1978. This

downward trend is likely to continue in the future, and hydro-power output in the year 2000 is projected to account only for 6 per cent of the Arab world's total electricity supply, although it would exceed by 180 per cent its level of 1978 in absolute . ms. By the turn of the century, 13 Arab countries would be using hydro-energy to generate power in one way or another, with Egypt, Iraq and Sudan (in that order) producing more than 80 per cent of the Arab total.

Country programmes and perspectives in this field are summarised below:

In Algeria, the share of hydro-electricity in total power generation reached a peak of about 35 per cent in 1968, before declining more or less regularly so as to reach 5 per cent in 1978. Hydro-generation has also been reduced in absolute terms since 1973, because of the country's increasing needs for priority uses of water such as irrigation, municipal and industrial demand. Total installed capacity of about 287 Megawatts comes mainly from plants at Mansouring (100 MW), Algioum (90 MW) and other small stations in the Kabylia. It has been at around this level since the late 1960's and is not expected to undergo much change in the future. The authorities believe that the production level of 1977-1978 (250 GWh or million kilowatt-hours) could be maintained for another 25 years.

Djibouti has no hydro-power installations at present, but prospects do exist in two areas. First, a depression could be created in the Goubed Bay (155 sqrare kilometres) at the end of the Gulf of Tajurah by building dams across the narrow passage between the Bay and the Gulf. Solar evaporation would then reduce the water level by 5 to 6 metres annually, so that generating capacity would reach 5 to 6 MW after the fifth year and 12 to 13 MW in the 17th year. Second, the Assal Lake has a surface area of about 300 square kilometres which is 174 metres below sea level. The project would involve building a 10-kilometre water canal from the Gulf of Tajurah to the depresssion; this would generate power during a first stage when the depression is filling, and a second stage by solar evaporation.

In Egypt, hydro-power has been the most important source of electricity generation. In 1970-1977, it was responsible for more than two-thirds of total power production. As of 1978, however, hydro-electricity's share has started a downward trend with no foreseen reversal. In fact, it is expected to decline to reach 28 per cent in 1985, 22 per cent in 1990 and only 15 per cent in the year 2000. This is because the river Nile accounts for virtually all the conventional hydro-power potential of the country, and about 80 per cent of this potential has already been harnessed at the Aswan dam (345 MW installed capacity) and the Aswan High dam (2,100 MW).

The operational capabilities of both the Aswan dams are severely constrained by conflicting irrigation needs and transmission system reliability. As such, the dependable generating capacity of both these plants is currently being assessed at less than two-thirds its nominal level, capable of generating about 9 TWh annually.

The untapped power potential of the river Nile consists of a 60-metre drop from Aswan to Cairo from which at least 350 MW are anticipated to be realised before 1990 with the extension of the Aswan High dam and the installation of generating facilities in three ex. . ing barrages at Nag Hamadi, Esna and Assiut.

The Qattara depression project

The Qattara depression in the western desert is the other main hydro-power possibility. The project would involve canalising water from the Mediterranean to the depression, using a 60-metre descent to generate power. The depression has a surface area at zero level of 19,500 square kilometres, with the deepest point at 134 metres below sea level. Estimated capacity would be about 640 MW for the first 12 years while the depression is filling, and about 340 MW by solar evaporation thereafter. The Egyptian Electricity Authority, however, has indicated that capacity would reach a peak of 8,000 MW upon the completion of the four stages of the project. Due to the massive excavation work required, the first stage of the Qattara project is not expected to be completed before the late 1990's.

It is expected that the average load factor of Egypt's hydro-power stations would remain through the rest of the century equal to the current effective load factor of the Aswan dams, ie 66 per cent.

Hydro-power production started in Iraq in September 1972, when a 84 MW plant at Sam arra was commissioned. With about 550 GWh, this station contributed in 1978 a little more than 8 per cent of the country's total electricity output. The authorities have planned for at least seven other hydro-electric projects to be completed by the turn of the century. Installations at Dokan and Hemrin are expected to be completed in the early 1980's, with a combined capacity of 450 MW, yielding an output of 1.58 TWh. Power stations at Derbendkhan and Haditha would add another 740 MW to the country's hydro-power capacity by 1990, with a corresponding addtion of 2.48 TWh in production. Dams to be built during the course of the 1990's at Mosul, Bakhama and El-Fataha are expected to bring total hydro-electric capacity in Iraq to more than 3 GW. This would generate a total output of 12.52 TWh in the year 2000, implying an overall load factor around 47 per cent.

No hydro-electric production in Jordan

There is no hydro-electric production in Jordan at present, despite the existence of three dams (Khaled Ibn El-Walid dam, Al-Maqarin dam and King Talal dam) which have so far been used solely for irrigation purposes, due to the country's primary need for water. Technically, the dams have a combined generating capacity of 91 MW and are capable of producing some 400 GWh with a 50 per cent load. The authorities, however, seem determined to develop hydro-power in Jordan, in view of its attractiveness as a clean, renewable source of energy which would also contribute to some extent to alleviate the fuel import bill. In this connection, the possibility of canalising water from the Gulf of Aqaba to the Dead Sea for power generation is under consideration. The surface area of the Dead Sea approaches 1,000 square kilometres at 400 metres below sea level, and the electricity that would be generated while the depression is filling and later through solar evaporation, is considerable. The project, however, would require massive excavation work to build the 180-kilometre water canal, thus involving heavy investment funds.

In the light of the above, it is assumed here that hydro-generation capacity in Jordan would be in the neighbourhood of 40 MW in 1990 and 70 MW by the turn of the century.

In Lebanon, hydro-power has been produced since the early 1930's (Al-Safa station) and has gradually developed into a major source of electrical energy for the country. Generating capacity reached 246 MW in 1968 and has remained at that level since then. The national electricity company EDL operates nearly 90 per cent of capacity (of which the Litani river installations represent 70 per cent), while the rest (27 MW) is owned by private stations selling their production to the public network.

The 1975-1976 civil war and the events of 1978 caused considerable damage to Lebanon's electric production, transmission and distribution installations. As a result, hydro-power generation had to be increased to compensate for the reduction in production of the most-affected thermal stations, with the consequence of raising the overall load factor of hydro-electric plants from an average of 35 per cent during 1970-1974 to 49 per cent in 1978.

EDL plans do not provide for any significant expansion in the Lebanese hydro-power capacity. However, the addition of 36 MW to the Litani installations at Al-Awali station, which had been planned before the civil war, may well have taken place by 1985. In that year, the load factor is expected to average around 40 per cent, before increasing to 45 per cent in 1990 and 50 per cent in the year 2000.

In Morocco, the contribution of hydro-power to total electricity generation, which averaged as much as 90 per cent during 1960-1965, has been declining since then but still represented more than 35 per cent in 1978 (1,416 GWh). In mid-1979 there were 18 hydro-electric stations having an average production potential of 1,584 GWh, two-thirds of this coming from four large plants (Afourer Ait-Ouarda, Bine El-Ouidane, Im'Fout and Idriss the First).

The authorities are determined to develop fully the country's untapped potential. During the first half of the 1980's, some 540 GWh will have been added to hydro-power output through the extension of the Lalla Takerkoust station and the commissioning of four new plants (Oued El-Makhazine, Al-Massira, Merija and Dechra El-Oued). As for the rest of the century, a number of hydro-electric schemes are envisaged, which include the utilisation of some 13 new waterfalls and the use of the Tah depression in the south (a small replica of Egypt's Qattara depression) and two smaller depressions located nearby (Hamirah and Tisfurin) to generate power. It is expected, in the light of these planned projects, that hydro-power production would have reached 2.4 TWh by 1990 and 3 TWh by the year 2000.

Saudi Arabia's plans

Saudi Arabia is studying the feasibility of transforming the Gulf of Dawhat Salwa into a depression for helio-hydro-electric generation. The total area involved is 6,460 square kilometres, and the depression would be created by building a dam between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and another dam between Bahrain and Qatar, of a total length of 58 kilometres in shallow waters. The project is estimated to produce 70 MW of electrical energy at an optimum head of 12.4 metres, and the power would be shared with Bahrain and Qatar.

Somalia has limited possibilities for hydro-power generation on the Juba river, where a plant is expected to be commissioned in the near future.

Hydropower generation started in Sudan back in 1962, when it accounted for 2 per cent of the country's electricity output. This percentage has been steadily increasing since then and reached about 54 per cent during 1976-1978. Production approached 500 GWh in 1978, generated by three plants at dams on the upper reaches of the Blue Nile and its tributary the river Atbara, with a combined capacity of 116 MW. The largest of these plants, at the Roseires dam, is being expanded by another 80 MW to reach a total capacity of 170 MW.

The various cataracts and rapids on the Nile have considerable hydro-power potential, which has been estimated by the authorities at about 3,770 MW from eight

possible stations. Of this potential capacity, only 160 MW are presently being developed, and there are plans for an additional capacity of 800 MW to be installed by the year 2000.

The present load factor stands in the region of 49 per cent, but future projects are planned to produce power at about 70 per cent load, since they would be mainly intended for electricity generation, while existing schemes have other functions such as irrigation and flood control. Accordingly, the average load factor of hydro-power installations is projected to increase gradually to reach 65 per cent by the turn of the century.

The importance of the Euphrates

Syria's most important hydro-power and irrigation source is the Euphrates river, which accounts for 88 per cent of the country's water resources. A large basin development scheme on the Euphrates has already been completed, comprising a reservoir, a dam and a power station consisting of eight units of 100 MW each. Generation from this plant exceeded 2 TWh in 1978 (more than 80 per cent of the country's total electricity supply) and was expected to reach a peak of 2.4 TWh in 1979, before starting to decline by about 40 GWh annually due to increased diversion of water and pumping requirements for irrigation purposes. In addition to this 800 MW Thawra plant, there are a few small hydro-electric stations with a combined capacity of 23 MW, namely, at Souk Wadi Barada near Damascus (7 MW), at Rastan between Hama and Homs (8 MW), and at Shezar near Hama (8 MW). These small plants add some 50 GWh to the country's annual hydro-power output.

There are some possibilities for further hydro-power development in Syria, notably two dams on the Euphrates and another dam on the Khabour river, a tributary of the Euphrates, with an estimated combined capacity of 300 to 400 MW. The authorities have planned to commission these stations between the late 1980's and the early 1990's. It is projected here that 300 MW would have been installed by 1990, with an additional 100 MW during the 1990's. As for the average load factor of hydro-power generating installations in the country, it is estimated to gradually decline from 34 per cent in 1979 to 27 per cent in 1990 and stabilise at about that level for the rest of the century.

In Tunisia, hydro-power contributes a small part to total electricity generation. Four plants at El-Aroussia, Nabeur, Fernana and Kasseb, with a combined capacity approaching 29 MW, have been producing between 20 and 70 GWh annually, the output fluctuating with the scarcity of water. Apart from a new plant of about 25 MW at Sidi Salem which is scheduled to be commissioned in the early 1980's, prospects for further development of the country's hydro-power capacity are not considered too bright. It is, therefore, projected that hydro-generation would average some 80 GWh annually through the 1985-2000 period.

Nuclear power

Whether the introduction of nuclear energy in the Arab world for large-scale electricity generation is a sound option on economic, social, political and environment grounds, is an important subject which deserves careful investigations that go beyond the scope of the present study. It will only be stated here that the major arguments put forward by nuclear proponents – namely, that it is a cheap and clean form of energy best able to fill the energy gap – call for serious scrutiny, particularly in a developing area endowed with tremendous hydrocarbon resources and sunlight.

1. Reactor technology and research

Plans have been reported in 10 of the 21 Arab countries, eight on a commercial level and two on a research and experimentation level.

Algeria's National Declaration (Decree No 76 of July, 1976) has explicitly opted for the establishment of an effective nuclear technological development as a means to ensure a long-term energy source and at the same time to give impetus to national development in science and technology. The Centre de Sciences et de la Technologie Nucléaires (CSTN), established in the late 1960s, initiated an ambitious programme for the development of nuclear technology and research. About one-half of Algeria's expenditures on science and technology (45 million Algerian Dinars – $12 million) is assigned to CSTN activities, which cover uranium processing, enrichment, reactor technology, nuclear materials, electronic simulation, theoretical and applied nuclear physics, health physics, and the nuclear fuel cycle. The authorities expect that Algeria will soon be able to manufacture and operate its own reactors.

According to the IAEA, three units of 150 MW each would be in operation by 1990, and it is expected that this capacity would have been doubled by the year 2000.

In Egypt, it would be necessary to install a number of nuclear power stations with a total generating capacity of 6,000 MW by the year 2000 in order to meet electricity demand, according to the Electricity Authority. In the meantime, the commissioning of four stations with a combined capacity of 1,800 MW is optimistically scheduled for commissioning between 1978 and 1990.

The necessary arrangements are currently being made for the installation of the first plant at Sidi Krir on the western coast near Alexandria, with a capacity of 600 MW. Other sites under study are in the Lake Bourollos area on the coast between Alexandria and Port Said, and also on the Red Sea coast.

It is projected here that nuclear power generation would be responsible for about 13 per cent of total Egyptian electricity output in 1990 and for about 32 per cent in the year 2000. These shares are lower than the 20 and 40 per cent, respectively, predicted by the Electricity Authority.

Iraq's Atomic Energy Commission was established back in 1956. Research is going on at the Nuclear Research Institute (Tuwaitha) and at the Nuclear Research Centre (Baghdad) with experimental reactors. Co-operation agreements have been concluded with France, Italy and the USSR. A 2 MW Russian research reactor has been operating since 1968 at the Tuwaitha Institute. France is reported to be providing shortly a 70 MW training reactor and installing a 600 MW nuclear plant which would be commissioned by 1985. A French fast breeder reactor is also under negotiation for later.

By 1990, according to the IAEA six units of 150-200 MW capacity each would be in operation in the country. It is expected that by the year 2000 Iraqi nuclear capacity would have reached 2000 MW.

Kuwait's plans up to the year 2000 envisaged the installation early in the second half of the 1980s of a station of about 600 MW, which would be followed in the early 1990s by a plant of the same size. The acquisition of two more stations of 1,200 MW each would subsequently be considered, thus allowing for a total installed capacity of 3,600 MW by the turn of the century. A cooperation agreement has been signed with Britain. The acquisition of a 50 MW training reactor has been under consideration, as well as the establishment of a nuclear energy commission.

Kuwait reconsiders its nuclear programme

More recently, however, the Kuwaiti authorities have been reconsidering the country's nuclear energy programme, in view of the ever-increasing costs of reactor installation and operation. As a result, it seems likely that the implementation of the programme would be deferred for a few years at least. It is projected here that nuclear electricity would not be produced in Kuwait before the early 1990s, and that nuclear capacity would have built up to some 1,800 MW by the year 2000.

In Lebanon, Electricité du Liban seems to have plans for nuclear power in the future, but no indication is available concerning the possible size of the projected plant nor the date of operation.

In Libya, an Atomic Energy Commission was founded in 1975. Research is expected to start soon at Al-Fateh University, in cooperation with the USSR, which may provide a 10 MW training reactor. Reports have mentioned that a 440 MW plant would be constructed by the Russians and another 600 MW station by the French. Plans for a heavy-water reactor might also be considered. Other cooperation agreements have been concluded with Argentina and India.

In its draft long-term plan for the electricity sector prepared recently, the Libyan Secretariat of State for Electricity (SSE) expects that a 400 MW nuclear plant would be in operation in the country by 1990. The SSE does not foresee any increase in capacity during the 1990s.

Morocco is negotiating with France over the possibility of installing a 200 MW reactor which could be commissioned in the mid-1980s. R & D activities have been initiated at Rabat University. According to IAEA forecasts, two units of 200 MW each would be in operation in the country by 1990. As for the year 2000, installed nuclear capacity could reach 600 MW.

Saudi Arabia has no intention at present to introduce nuclear energy on a commercial scale, but considerable emphasis is being put on R & D activities, which have started in three universities. A training reactor of 6 MW was to be installed at Dhahran University under a cooperation agreement recently concluded with France. A nuclear medicine centre has been established in Riyadh. A large multi-purpose national nuclear research centre is planned by the Ministry of Petroleum and Minerals, which is at present in control of nuclear energy pending the establishment in the near future of an atomic energy commission.

The IAEA, however, has predicted that a 150 MW unit would be operating in the Kingdom by 1990. This capacity is expected to be double by the year 2000.

Syria established an Atomic Energy Commission in 1976, and the authorities recently declared their intention to introduce nuclear energy on a commercial scale in the 1980s. There are plans for the installation of two units of 600 MW each, which would be in operation in 1989-1990. Two similar units are projected to be added before the turn of the century.

In Tunisia, R & D in nuclear energy is underway at the Institut de Recherche Scientifique et Technique. There are plans to introduce nuclear electricity in the country in the late 1980s, with the installation of a 250 MW reactor. This capacity is expected to have trippled by the year 2000.

An average load factor of about 60 per cent is considered a likely estimate for the Arab world as a whole up to the year 2000.

Nuclear fuel availability

The effective exploration and extraction of uranium deposits in a number of Arab countries is by now an accepted national objective, which is seen to be justified by the need for a long-term regular supply of nuclear fuel as a prerequisite to establishing any independent national nuclear capacity, let alone certain alarming forecasts of a world shortage of uranium in the not-too-distant future. It should be noted, however, that uranium, after extraction, needs to be enriched before entering the nuclear reactor, and enrichment technology is at present the monopoly of a few countries, primarily the USA and the USSR.

Primary deposits

In Algeria, geological and ground surveys started in 1970 and exploration drilling is underway in the southern part of the country. Primary uranium ore deposition is estimated at between 28,000 and 78,000 tonnes. In Democratic Yemen, certain uranium-and thorium-bearing concentrations of heavy sands have been reported, but recent investigations tend to indicate that they are uneconomic or marginal. Radiometric surveys have also revealed a number of interesting anomalies of uranium and thorium in granite massifs. In Egypt, geological mapping has been undertaken in various parts of the country, and extensive areas have been covered by airborne surveys for radioactivity since the late 1950s and more than 7,000 anamalies have been identified. Recently, significant finds have been reported in the eastern part of the Egyptian desert, near Mount Jilala El-Bahria. A uranium production plant is under construction, with an expected output of 100 tonnes in 1981. On the other hand, some monazite (a mineral containing uranium and thorium) exists with black sands sedimented on the northern shores of the Nile Delta. Exploration is underway in Iraq, with promising prospects.

In Jordan, carborne and band scintillometre surveys have shown that the Zarqa-Ma'an rift valley is the strongest radioactive area in the country. Some exploration is going on in Libya in cooperation with Argentinian, French and Japanese firms.

In Mauritania, intensive exploration programmes have been underway since 1957, including geological mapping, radiometric airborne and ground surveys, performed by France, Japan and the Total company. By 1974, numerous rich anomalies had been found.

In Morocco, widespread uranium mineralisation was reported in the 1940s and 1950s by unsystematic surveys undertaken by France and the US. A national plan of action was set up in 1968, and significant progress was made in exploration whereby two highly radioactive areas were located. Present estimates of uranium reserves range from 47,000 to 1.54 million short tonnes of U_3O_8.

Intensive exploration in Arabian peninsula

In Saudi Arabia, intensive exploration for radioactive mineral deposits has been carried out since the early 1960s, using airborne scintillometre and spectrometre surveys followed by some ground checking. No discrete uranium minerals were found, but certain areas were considered to warrant further investigation. Recently, however, some reports indicated that uranium and thorium occurrences may well have been detected in these areas by a French firm.

In Somalia, airborne and ground surveys as well as exploration drilling have been carried out since the 1960s. In the Bur area, 400 anomalies were located, of which 49 were of interest. In Mudug province, 14 anomalies were found which showed that uranium mineralisation was represented exclusively by carnotite. Primary uranium ore deposition is estimated at between 6,000 and 10,000 tonnes of U_3O_8, mainly at Wabo, Dusa-Markeb and Mirig in the Mudug province and at Alio-Ghelle in the Bur area.

In Sudan, geological mapping followed by radiometric airborne and gound surveys revealed four areas of radioactive occurrence. Uranite has been reported in association with copper and iron ores, and thorium-bearing black sands were identified. Further surveys are being carried out in the Hofrat-En-Nahas areas in the western part of the country.

In Syria, a team of Russian geologists undertook a geological mapping programme in the early 1960s followed by airborne surveys which indicated some distinct radioactive zones. Exploration is at present carried out by British firms in the southern desert, through field and aero-radiometric surveys.

In the UAE, radioactive anomalies located by airborne and ground spectrometre surveys have been recently confirmed to be due to potassium-rich rocks and not to uranium or thorium deposits as was originally believed. Large areas of Yemen abound in the same kind of rock from which uranium is being extracted elsewhere. Exploration projects, however, will require time and heavy expenditures.

[24 Nov 80, pp 11-15]

[Text]

Solar energy

This section presents a brief review of current and planned activities in solar energy R & D and applications in the Arab world. A detailed study on the subject is underway in cooperation between ECWA and OAPEC.

The sun is a source of energy of unlimited quantity. It is free, clean safe and widely and generously distributed in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia alone receives the equivalent of one hundred trillion (10^{14}) kWh of solar energy every day, theoretically enough to supply the electricity needs of the whole OECD area for 20 years. Moreover, solar power technology is much simpler than nuclear technology and could be easily transferred to and assimilated by developing countries. Investments require a much smaller foreign exchange component than nuclear energy. Solar costs are likely to follow a downward trend due to rapid technological advances, whereas nuclear costs are constantly on the rise. Finally, solar energy may be safely used in a number of applications other than electricity generation, such as for space and water heating and cooling, water desalination, water pumping, crop drying, cold storage, for greenhouses, sewage treatment, industrial process heat, etc.

Interest in solar energy in Arab countries started in the late 1950s and early 1960s (Sudan, Tunisia), but it was not until R & D efforts were seriously stepped up in the Western world during the past few years that official attention was devoted to the question in the Arab world. Solar energy conferences and/or exhibitions were held in Saudi Arabia (1975, 1978), Libya (1976), Tunisia (1977), Bahrain (1977, 1978), Egypt (1978) and Morocco (1978). Government bodies or commissions for solar energy were established in six Arab countries, and nine solar research laboratories are already operating or planned. Annual R & D budgets add up to about $27 million in the Arab world (of which Saudi Arabia alone accounts for $15 million), compared to a federal US budget approaching $1 billion Solar energy R & D in the Arab world is carried out in insolation (11 countries), photovoltaic conversion (seven countries), solar thermal conversion (five countries), solar storage (four countries) and concentration (two countries). Chemical conversion studies are practically non-existent.

Solar energy ongoing and planned applications in each of the 21 Arab countries are summarised below.

In Algeria, a comprehensive feasibility study on the application of solar energy and its role in the overall energy picture by the year 2000 has recently been undertaken. A "solar village" is to be set up which will use solar energy in water heating and pumping, space heating and cooling, refrigeration, thermal and photovoltaic conversion. A solar furnace built by the French in the 1950s is expected to produce steam for a thermal electricity turbine of about 30 kW. A solar thermal conversion unit of 10 kW is also planned. There is an Algerian section of COMPLES (Coopération Méditerranéenne pour l'Energie Solaire) which serves as a link with the international solar energy community. Cooperation is mainly with France and West Germany.

The solar energy programme in Bahrain was initiated in 1977 by the Bahrain National Oil Company (BANACO) in cooperation with the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR). A feasibility study was commissioned in April 1978 to study the potential of solar energy in the country, including the identification of applications and a commercialisation strategy. Cooperation is also underway with West Germany and Britain.

No known solar energy activity is being considered in South Yemen at present. Climatic conditions, however, appear quite favourable, and average solar intensity is theoretically equivalent to a power generation of around 200 kWh per square metre per year, assuming 10 per cent radiation efficiency.

French developing solar irrigation in Djibouti

In Djibouti, a solar pump is being installed with French bilateral aid for irrigation purposes. Possible areas for future solar energy applications include the Assual Lake and the Goubed Bay, which could both become precious sources of hydroelectric generation by use of solar evaporation.

In Egypt, studies have indicated that direct daily solar intensity averages about 3,500 kilocalories per square metre in winter and double that amount in summer, theoretically equivalent to a power generation of about 150 and 300 kWh per square metre per year, respectively, assuming 10 per cent radiation efficiency.

Solar energy use started at the turn of the century when the British built a 37 kW solar water pump. Another start took place in the early 1960s when solar water heaters were produced domestically and sold for EL 100 ($142) each, before production was discontinued for lack of interest. Solar energy activity is now diversified and undertaken in cooperation with many countries, mainly Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Saudi

Arabia, Sweden and the US. Although the Egyptian solar programme is at present one of the most active and diversified in the Arab world, it seems to rely too much on outside funding for support.

The Egyptian Solar Energy Laboratory (SEL) of the National Research Centre is at present handling five projects: two thermal power plants totalling 7 kW, solar cooling, solar drying and solar desalination. The SEL has also plans for the domestic manufacture and marketing of solar flat-plate collectors. The Solar Energy Commission, established in 1976 under the auspices of the Ministry of Electricity and Energy, is dealing with numerous projects, including the Qattara depression hydroelectric generation plant, solar reverse osmosis, water heating and space heating cooling for a 100-room hotel on the north coast, a 5 kW solar pump with a cooling and freezing unit, three pilot solar water heaters of different types equipped with flat-plate collectors, 1,000 solar water heaters for domestic and community usage, various meteorological and testing stations, a complete "solar village," cooling and freezing stores for fish at the High Dam Lake, solar desalination, one 10 kW and one 100 kW solar thermal conversion units, two mobile 5 kW units for desert research, and many other projects. Six universities are carrying out applied research in various aspects of solar energy use, including rural applications which seem to hold promising prospects after the success of some demonstrations to villagers.

The private sector has also been active in promoting solar energy applications in Egypt. A 620-room hotel to be built near the Pyramids will make use of the sun for electricity generation, water and space heating, cooling and ice-making. A project for a solar water heater factory, with a production capacity of 100,000 heaters during the first year and 300,000 heaters thereafter, has been submitted to the National Industrialisation and Investment Committee for approval.

Iraq seems determined to encourage solar energy utilisation, although no solar applications are yet in view in the public sector. Al-Mustansiriyah University is cooperating with the Foundation for Scientific Research to develop a solar energy programme for the country. Immediate plans are to design solar collectors with local materials for space and water heating, water desalination in remote areas, yellow corn drying in winter, greenhouse night-heating in winter, solar energy use in desert zones, and the establishment of a solar energy research centre.

Third World participation in Jordan

Average insolation in Jordan is theoretically equivalent to a power generation of about 200 KWh per square metre annually, with 10 per cent radiation efficiency. The country's solar energy programme started in 1971 at the Royal Scientific Society (RSS), and a Department of Solar Energy was established at the RSS in 1975. Cooperation partners include Australia, France, West Germany, India and Kuwait (KISR), as well as ALECSO and the CEC. The main activities have been water desalination (such as the Aqaba desalination plant commissioned in October 1977), "plastic agriculture," greenhouses, crop drying, ground sterilisation, photovoltaic telephones in rural areas and along highways (100 units installed as of August 1978), a 200 kW solar powered thermal electricity station for use in an integrated "solar village," and solar water heaters. A project for the development of a domestic solar water heater industry was started in 1972 by the RSS. There are at present two companies in Amman producing 30 heaters per day, and about 20 other such firms in the West Bank. Jordanian universities are not contributing much to the country's solar energy development.

Another major possibility for solar energy application in Jordan is to link the Gulf of Aqaba with the Dead Sea by a water canal to generate power by use of solar evaporation.

Kuwait experiences a daily insolation of about 45,000 kilocalories per square metre, which is theoretically equivalent to a power generation of around 2,000 kWh per square metre per year, assuming 10 per cent radiation efficiency. A major solar energy programme was initiated in September 1976 under the responsibility of the Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research (KISR). In Kuwait and the Gulf region, solar heating and cooling of buildings are areas of great potential which are developing into a viable domestic industry, in cooperation with US institutions. A 100 kW solar thermal conversion unit will be commissioned in February 1981, in cooperation with a West German firm. It is expected to generate an average of 800 kWh per day. It would be used as part of an integrated food (greenhouse) /water (desalination) /power (electricity generation) complex particularly suitable for isolated communities. Cooperative programmes have also been concluded with Bahrain and Jordan.

Lebanese Solar Energy Society set up in April

Lebanon was emerging as an active centre for solar energy activities when the war started in 1975. Institutions concerned with solar enrgy are the National Council for Scientific Research (CNRS), the American University of Beirut and Saint-Joseph University. Close cooperation has been established between these three institutions, and emphasis is being put on solar heating and cooling of buildings, water desalination, photovoltaic conversion, insolation and integrated solar

architecture. A pilot project is being implemented on solar heating of an apartment in Beirut. The CNRS, whose representative has recently been elected Vice-President of COMPLES (Coopération Méditerranéenne pour l'Energie Solaire), aims to establish a solar energy centre in Lebanon. Recently, the private sector has been showing considerable interest in the introduction of small-scale solar energy applications, particularly solar heating and cooling of buildings. Finally, a Lebanese Solar Energy Society was created in April 1980.

In Libya, solar energy activities are getting underway. There are indications that an autonomous solar research institute may be set up. A centre for Solar Energy Studies was established at the Arab Development Institute at Tripoli in June 1978. Solar work is also being undertaken at the Atomic Energy Commission and at two universities (Al-Fateh and Qar Yunis). Emphasis is on solar thermal conversion, heating and cooling of buildings, water desalination, solar drying, water pumping, and refrigeration. The first solar energy device, a water pump for irrigation purposes, was installed in the Sidi Rhuma area in May 1978. Cooperation is underway with Canadian and US firms.

Solar energy activities in Mauritania are at present limited to the installation of French-made water pumps for municipal and irrigation purposes. After a first rather unsuccessful attempt in 1973, a 5 kW photocell pump has recently been installed, and there are plans for six other pumps. A "solar village" at N'Takat, to be built with French assistance, has been under consideration. Three different ministries are concerned with solar energy applications, and emphasis will be put in the future on water desalination, fish drying, cold storage, water heating and solar electricity for rural settlements. Apart from France, cooperation is underway with Senegal.

In Morocco, solar water heaters have been known since the early 1940s. Demand has been increasing rapidly but has so far been met by imports, due to the lack of a domestic solar water heater industry. A study on the possibilities of solar energy utilisation in the country has been prepared recently by the Ministry of Energy and Mines, which is at present studying a helio-hydroelectric power plant project at the Tah depression (and perhaps two other smaller depressions) using solar evaporation, similar to the scheme for the Qattara depression in Egypt. Other plans of the Ministry include solar thermal electricity in remote areas, a solar energy research centre, and solar demonstration stations. Interest in solar energy has also been shown in three universities/schools, where projects include the establishment of a photovoltaic laboratory and solar energy applications in the mining industry. It was recently decided to establish a Moroccan section of COMPLES.

In Oman, a few experimental solar water heaters were installed at Salalah by the British in 1971. The US also assisted in preparing in 1977 a study on possible solar energy applications in the country, which recommended the use of photovoltaic cells for electricity generation and water desalination and the utilisation of solar water heating in remote villages. Two villages in Dhofar were chosen for this. The installation of a 15kW solar electricity plant has also been under consideration.

In Qatar, a British experimental photovoltaic generator started operating in 1977. No firm solar plans have been formulated yet, but areas of interest include solar thermal conversion, solar heating and cooling of buildings, and an integrated food/water/power complex.

Saudis have Arab world's biggest programme

Saudi Arabia has the largest solar energy programme in the Arab world. From the first photovoltaic beacon installed by the French at Madinah Airport in the early 1960s, use of solar energy has been growing on an ever-larger scale. Serious efforts were initiated in 1969 at Dhahran, and by now four universities (Dhahran, Riyadh, Jeddah and Dammam) are active in almost all fields of solar energy, as are a number of ministers and institutions. The Saudi Arabian Centre of Science and Technology (SANCST), established in 1977, tries to co-ordinate these efforts. In early 1978 the decision was taken to set up a Solar Energy Society in the Kingdom. Cooperation agreements have been concluded with Austria, France, West Germany and the US. The Saudi-US programme is the largest, extending over five years at a total cost of $100 million to be contributed equally by each party.

Amongst the most significant solar applications underway or planned in Saudi Arabia are (a) a "solar village" 50 kilometres outside Riyadh to be completed by 1981; (b) a solar-powered heating complex for the Airborne School at Tabu , which is the largest project of its type in the world; (c) a huge heliostat-electricity generation project in the Eastern Province; (d) an industrial plant in Jeddah to manufacture solar components for heating and cooling buildings; (e) a "solar building" in Jeddah; and (f) an integrated solar energy complex at Jubail on the Gulf.

Special mention should be made of a helio-hydroelectric generation project which is still under study, whereby a depression would be created in the Gulf of Dawhat Salwa by building dams between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and between Bahrain and Qatar. The project would be similar to that of the Qattara depression in

Egypt and would have a capacity of 70 MW to produce electricity using solar evaporation.

Saudi Arabia has also been active in providing financial assistance to universities in Australia, Niger and the US in solar energy R & D.

In Somalia, direct solar radiation has been estimated to be theoretically equivalent to an annual power generation of around 200 kWh per square metre, assuming 10 per cent radiation efficiency. Solar energy activities have been carried out in cooperation with UNICEF since 1976 and with ECA, India, Italy, UNESCO and UNIDO since 1978. A modest pilot solar desalination plant to supply drinking water for a fishing community at Khuda on the Indian Ocean was scheduled for completion in 1979. Another solar distillation plant of a larger size is also underway. Plans include integrated solar/wind/biogas energy utilisation in rural areas.

Interest in Sudan since the early 1970s

In Sudan, solar energy has been since the early 1970s a field of interest at the Energy Research Institute and at Khartoum University. Work has been underway in insolation, heating, refrigeration, water desalination, food drying, photovoltaic conversion and low/high temperature thermal conversion, including power plants in remote areas for electricity and irrigation purposes. Cooperation comes from Denmark, France and The Netherlands. Two solar pumps have been installed, one at the Institute's premises in Soba for demonstration, and the other at the Hillat Hamed village to supply households with water. A project for a "solar village" at Umm Safari (North Kordofan) is under study.

Solar energy activity in Syria started in the mid-1970s at Aleppo and Damascus Universities, with emphasis on heating and cooling systems, solar storage and concentration, and solar cells. After the Ministry of Electricity had established a Solar Energy Committee in 1977, solar applications started moving ahead, mainly in the direction of locally manufactured solar water heaters. A housing project at Dummar is to be supplied with 500 of these heaters, and a number of summer youth camps will have solar-heated water. A solar water and space heating system may also be installed at the Al-Tall Institute of Political Studies.

Tunisia's Institut de Recherche Scientifique et Technique has been active since 1963 in space cooling, water heating and water desalination. Three solar desalination stills were built, providing 8,200 litres of fresh water per day, but were unfortunatley abandonned six years later. A National Energy Commission was established in 1977 and has been considering legislation to promote solar energy applications and usage, including subsidies and tax deductions for solar users and investors, the establishment of a solar energy commission and a photovoltaic laboratory. Interest in solar energy is also evident in universities and other institutions throughout Tunisia, with emphasis on insolation, photovoltaics, solar cooling and heating, solar electricity generation, solar water pumping and solar cookers. Cooperation is underway with Australia, the CEC, France, West Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, UNEP and the US. A Tunisian has recently been elected President of COMPLES.

Solar energy applications already existing or underway in Tunisia include 11 photovoltaic water pumps, a small solar desalination still, a number of water heaters installed in private homes and public schools, a solar-heated swimming pool on Djerba Island, and an assembly plant for flat-plate collectors. Plans include the installation of a solar thermal power plant in the 50 to 100 kW range, the local manufacture of collectors and their use for water and space heating.

In the UAE, the integrated food/water/power complex installed on Saadiyat Island (Abu Dhabi) in the 1960s with US assistance is one of the major solar energy applications in the Arab world. A 90 kW diesel turbine generates electricity, while the waste heat is recycled to desalinate water for drinking and to grow vegetables in greenhouses. A French-made solar water pump of 1 kW is also operating at Al-Ayn at an experimental farm. Contacts with foreign groups in France, West Germany, Italy, Sweden and Switzerland have been made for such solar applications as water pumping, cooling and heating of buildings, solar thermal conversion and photovoltaic conversion. A feasibility study for the development of solar energy technology in the UAE is under preparation.

Americans involved in Sanaa University scheme

In Yemen, direct solar intensity measured in Sanaa, Hodeidr and Taiz averages about 5,000 kilocalories per square metre per day, which is theoretically equivalent to a power generation of more than 200 kWh per square metre per year, assuming 10 per cent radiation efficiency. The country has been seeking US assistance in developing a solar energy programme at Sanaa University, but no solar applications have been introduced so far.

After this brief review of ongoing and planned solar energy activities in the Arab world, the virtues of this safe, non-polluting, widespread and renewable source of energy cannot, in conclusion, be overemphasised. Of special importance is the concept of an integrated food/water/power complex which is particularly suited for isolated communities far removed from the electricity grid and have access only to sea or brackish water. There are many such areas in the Arab world. Technology is accessible and adaptable, costs are reasonable, operation and maintenance are simple, and such a complex can meet the electrical energy, fresh water, vegetable and poultry requirements of a community.

Biomass conversion, geothermal and wind energy

This section gives a sketchy and incomplete presentation of the potential for biomass, geothermal and wind energy in the Arab world. Detailed studies on the availability, utilisation and prospects of these three energy sources in Arab countries are underway at ECWA.

Biomass conversion

Energy from biomass is produced and widely utilised in the Arab world, in the sense that fire wood, charcoal, agricultural wastes and animal dung are used principally for domestic heating and cooking. Such traditional energy souces still represent a major part of total energy requirements in some countries. However, the interesting form of biomass energy, namely conversion by hydro-generation, pyrolysis or fermentation (biogas), is practically non-existent. The raw materials for biomass conversion are widely available; what is essentially needed is government action to harness this important energy source.

Certain Arab countries are contemplating more seriously than others the exploitation of biomass for energy production. For instance, Egypt is undertaking studies in cooperation with Sweden on the possibilities of converting agricultural and animal remains into biogas for energy purposes and fertiliser production in rural areas. Lebanon is investigating the possible use of municipal wastes for biogas production. Studies on the possible use of biomass energy in rural areas are being carried out in Saudi Arabia. In Somalia, plans for integrated solar/wind/biogas energy systems for rural areas are being formulated. Sudan produces annually about 13 million tonnes of agricultural wastes, mainly cotton stalks and bagasse, which are partly used for energy purposes by direct combustion. The authorities are now contemplating the conversion of such wastes by pyrolysis into fuel for use in boilers of sugar factories, and the relevant studies are being undertaken by the Energy Research Institute under the sponsorship of the Sudanese National Research Council. In Syria, there are plans for utilising municipal wastes (about 300,000 tonnes in Damascus alone) and agricultural wastes to produce energy and fertilisers. In Yemen, a number of public baths (hammams) in Sanaa are reported to use municipal wastes for heat production, and there are plans for a more expanded and rational use of energy from biomass in the future.

Geothermal energy

The Arab world lies within various geodynamic zones which allow for different types of geothermal fields. Five distinct favourable environments have been identified: (a) the Orogenic Mediterranean zone, including Morocco and the northern parts of Algeria, Tunisia and Libya. (b) the Red Sea – Gulf of Aden – East Africa triple tectonical rift system, including the eastern parts of Egypt and Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia, to the west; and the western part of Saudi Arabia, North Yemen and South Yemen, to the east; (c) the Jordan valley fault system, including Lebanon, the southern part of Syria, Jordan and Iraq; (d) a number of intracratonic volcanic centres, such as in the southern part of Algeria, Libya, the southwestern part of Sudan and the central part of Saudi Arabia, and (e) large sedimentary basins, including north-central Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. Within the first four environments, medium (80 to 150°C) to high (150 to 350°C) temperature geothermal sources could be expected at relatively shallow depths, thus allowing for the operation of small-scale electricity generators (1 kW to 1 MW) and, in some cases, larger plants (10 to 100 MW). As for the fifth environment, hot water reservoirs could be found in medium depths, which might be used for electricity generation through binary fluid systems or for direct heat production.

Geothermal sources have been identified in a number of regions in the Arab world, and investigations are underway to assess their potential contribution to the energy balance of the countries concerned. For instance, in South Yemen, there is a hot spring at Sidara which gives birth to Wadi Hajar, the only perennial river in the country.

In Djibouti, exploration has been going on since 1969 in Daguiron-Gelafi, Goubed and the Abbe Lake. In 1974-1975, drilling in the Asab field revealed considerable amounts of hot wet steam that could yield a power generating capacity of 1.5 to 2 MW. The country's geothermal energy potential is considerable, but development financing seems to be a major constraint.

In Egypt, a number of wells and natural springs yielding water at 40 to 60°C have been found around the Gulf of Suez and down the western coast on the Red Sea, in the Halwan area and in various parts of the western desert. Such low temperature waters are expected to be harnessed in the future for domestic and commercial uses. Prospects for discovering geothermal sources up to 150°C are considered good, and these sources would be utilised for electricity generation through binary systems. Finally, the possibility exists that high temperature sources (above 150°C) lie within the Earth's crust under the Red Sea; these would be used directly for electricity production.

Good geothermal prospects in Jordan

In Jordan, there are good prospects for the exploi-

tation of geothermal energy, particularly in the Jordan river valley, which is the site of a number of hot springs, and also in the Zarqa-Ma'an rift valley. Upon the recommendation of a team of French and Italian experts who visited the country in 1975, the Jordanian authorities have been investigating the question with the assistance of the United Nations.

In Saudi Arabia, there are plans for the exploitation of the Kingdom's geothermal energy potential.

In Somalia, exploration is underway, and the authorities are placing high hopes on the contribution of geothermal sources to the country's future energy balance. In Syria, geothermal sources have been discovered in the Orontes valley and the Palmyra mountains. The Higher Council for Science believes that there are good prospects for more finds in the future. Studies to harness this energy source are underway.

In Tunisia, the possibilities of exploiting domestic geothermal resources are being investigated.

In North Yemen, geothermal potentials do exist, particularly in the area of recent volcanic activity 25 km east of Dhamar (a town about 100 kilometres southeast of Sanaa) with temperatures reaching 180°C of dry heat on the surface. There are also hot springs in various parts of the country, such as in the Damth area (about 150 kilometres southeast of Sanaa) where a number of localities carry a toponymic denomination starting with "hammam." Some assistance in studying the possibilities of exploiting these sources in Yemen came from Italy in 1975 and in 1976.

Geothermal energy is not so well known in most Arab countries, and interest in that energy source has so far been less keen than in other new and renewable sources such as solar energy. This is probably due to the fact that the technology and economics of geothermal energy are variable according to geological situations, not to mention the importance of the initital investments in some cases.

3. Wind energy

The wind, like the sun, is a free, clean source of energy, widely distributed in the Arab world. It is well adapted to the needs of rural communities. Its technology is simple and it can generally be harnessed wherever wind is available at certain levels of velocity. Interest in wind energy has recently been growing in the Arab world, where a number of countries are carrying out studies and experiments to assess the potential of this renewable energy source.

For instance, in South Yemen, there are wind recording stations in Aden and Mukalla, but the best potential exists in the slopes and valley of the hinterland.

In Egypt, two areas, around Marsa Matrouh on the Mediterranean and around Horghada on the Red Sea have so far recorded average wind speed high enough (about 20 km/h) to warrant further investigations for the development of wind power generation. There were as of April 1978, 11 wind recording stations in various locations on the Egyptian coasts. Cooperation is underway with the US Agency for International Development and the University of Oklahoma to install a complete experimental wind power station in one of the two locations mentioned above.

In Jordan, the Royal Scientific Society is studying the possibility of producing electricity from wind-powered generators. In Lebanon, windmills have been in existence for many years, and there are plans for a more important utilisation of wind energy in the future, particularly for electricity generation.

In Mauritania, a comprehensive study of the potential for wind energy utilisation in the country is being undertaken with the assistance of France. Morocco's Ministry of Energy and Mines has been studying the possibility of using wind energy along with solar systems. In Oman, consideration is being given to install a pilot plant at a village in Dhofar to generate electricity using wind energy.

Somalia's potential for wind energy use is considered good, and the authorities are seriously contemplating the development of this alternative energy source. Wind velocity at Berbera, Chisimaio and Magadishu ports is approximately 20 km/h but varies greatly from one place to another in the hinterland. The gradual introduction of windmills and wind-powered generators in the country is given high priority by the Government.

CSO: 4820

REGIONAL COOPERATION SEEN AS KEY TO FOOD SECURITY

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 11 Nov 80 p 4

[Text]

FOOD security in the Arab world can be realised through the utilisation of Sudan lands, Kuwait's fertilisers and oil revenues, a specialised report said yesterday.

In spite of the increasing rate of agricultural production in the Arab world, none of those countries have reached the stage of self-sufficiency in food, the Arab Organisation for the Promotion of Agriculture said.

Due to an improvement in living standards and increasing population, the Arab world is more and more relying on imported food, the report added.

Over 16 per cent of the Arab population are facing problems of malnutrition and one third of the inhabitants are lacking in proteins and calories, the Organisation warned.

Geographical conditions, scarcity of water, manpower shortage and increasing costs of fertilisers were cited as main problems which confront agricultural development in the Arab world.

Lack of adequate investment in agriculture sectors coupled with poor planning are also hindering efforts for progress, the report added.

RECALLED

The report called for the improvement of the agricultural infrastructure through proper planning and new legislation.

It called for the encouragement of collective efforts and the provision of administrative and financial facilities.

The organisation stressed the important role of the agricultural cooperatives and demanded up-grading of marketing systems.

Sudan's vast lands can cope with the agricultural requirements of the entire Middle East and a large part of Africa's need for meat, the report said.

While Syria and Iraq can cope with the needs of the Arab world for wheat Lebanon and Jordan can provide its fruit and vegetable requirements, it added.

SUITED

The north African Arab states can grow adequate supplies of citrus, bananas and olives while Sudan and Egypt will produce larger quantities of cotton.

Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are well suited to secure the need for fertilisers while the oil industry can well invest surplus funds in agriculture, the report added.

It has been proved beyond doubt that no single Arab state can implement its own food security programmes and the need for collective participation is obvious, the Organisation's report said.

Iraq and Syria are presently engaged in ambitious plans to promote the agricultural sectors through the introduction of mechanised farming systems.

A 72 per cent increase in appropriations for agricultural promotion is planned by Iraq and Syria adding $100 million to their agricultural fields, the report said.

In spite of prevailing difficulties, the creation of an agricultural common market seems the one and only channel for solving this problem, the Arab Organisation said — Kuna.

THE SUDAN
200 mls
Sudan borders
Southern provinces
Towns
Capital
Rivers
Railways
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA
Red Sea
LIBYA
CHAD
Darfur
Kordofan
Bahr El Ghazal
Upper Nile
Equatoria
ETHIOPIA
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CONGO (Kinshasa)
UGANDA
KENYA
Lake Albert
Lake Rudolf

CSO: 4820

SCHOLAR SUGGESTS VATICAN TYPE HEADQUARTERS FOR ISLAM

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 13 Nov 80 p 4

[Article by A. Haque Choudhury]

[Text]

SYED Yousef Hashem Al Refai, an eminent Kuwaiti scholar, has called for a Vatican type Muslim headquarters in Mecca or Rabat which could ensure a uniform policy to resolve crises in the Islamic world.

He noted that there were a number of Muslim organisations with policies varying a great deal. A centralised system could avert a number of problems arising from such a situation, he added.

Al Refai was talking to Kuwait Times on the eve of his departure to Bangladesh on a seven-day visit at the invitation of Islamic organisations and ulemas of Bangladesh. Accompanying him is Abdul Razzak Mutawa, a Kuwaiti philanthropist.

Asked about the financial support for the 'Muslim Vatican' proposal, Al Refai pointed out that there were a large number of Awkaf organisations which could contribute towards the goal.

Al Refai said their visit to Bangladesh was a goodwill mission aimed at fostering the Islamic brotherhood and cooperation among the Muslim peoples. During their stay they will visit the seats of Islamic culture, religious institutes and study life in Bangladesh.

CONFLICTS

The Ambassador of Bangladesh to Kuwait, M.A. Barek, who was also present during the interview, pointed out that this non-official visit to Bangladesh coincided with the advent of 15th Hijra century.

In reply to a question, he disclosed that their initial survey would help in determining the form of assistance that Islamic institutes of Bangladesh need for their development.

Turning to the conflicts among the Muslims, he expressed concern over the current Iraq-Iran war, saying that such a show-down would only benefit the enemies of Muslim world.

He said the big powers have already succeeded in diverting world attention from Jerusalem and Afghanistan where the people are fighting for the restoration of their legitimate rights.

Al Refai regretted that after the death of former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Islamic bloc had fallen victim to disunity and narrow nationalisms. He said disunity among Muslims and Arabs had led to strengthening the Jews occupying the Arabs lands.

WELCOME

Asked what steps could be taken to ease the tension among Muslim states, he said, 'there is no magical remedy to cure this disease which has plagued us for a long time.'

Al Refai, strongly supported the views expressed by H.H. the Amir, and the Crown Prince Premier Sheikh Saad on the advent of the 15th Hijra century.

He particularly supported the proposal about an Islamic court of justice for resolving all the disputes and conflicts faced by the Islamic world. The Bangladesh Ambassador also expressed his opinion that the Amir's proposal should be brought to the next Islamic Conference Organisation (ICO) for reviewing and subsequent implementation.

CSO: 4820

GROWTH OF MAGHREBIAN FUNDAMENTALISM DISCUSSED

Casablanca LAMALIF in French Oct 80 pp 9-10

[Article by Mohamed Chaoui]

[Text] In recent months new indications of activity by "fundamentalist" Islamic groups have emerged in various countries. Though we cannot go into all the detail about every country, we can nevertheless at least point to some of the signs.

Without a doubt in Tunisia the "Muslim Brothers" (a rather vague name that covers both organized groups and a movement, a faction) are the most deeply rooted and constitute an actual political force. Their activity and influence have been on the increase ever since 1977, and the sermons given by their imams attract very large crowds and audiences in the mosques. In student circles (where 30 percent are their followers) and, in general, among youth (where unemployment and underemployment are out of control), they recruit new militants continuously. The period of Ramadan has become traditionally a time for a revival of activity for the Tunisian Muslim Brothers, who made themselves known for the first time in Sousse by sacking a cafe that remained open during Ramadan. This movement puts out newspapers (one of which was suspended for 3 months, and the manager of the other was arrested after the publication of an article against the Saudi Arabia regime), distributes a large quantity of brochures and cassetes. Relations with the regime are often quite tense (but nonetheless the Muslim Brothers [FM] condemned the commando attack on Gafsa) and though the fundamentalists apparently lack a precise alternative political program, they unceasingly attack the westernization preached by the regime and in particular the "lifting" of the obligation to fast during Ramadan (decided by Bourguiba in 1960) and the personal statute of 1956 abolishing polygamy as well as the policy of the institution of religious endowment and of the integration of elementary education with the Department of National Education. In short, it is the policy of secularization of public life and mores that is the favorite target of the "fundamentalists." But it is obvious that this only became possible in connection with the growing aggravation of the disparities between rich and poor and the decline in opportunities available to hundreds of thousands of young people doomed to joblessness. To characterize this climate, one must remember that on the morrow of independence, in the halcyon days of "Bourguibaism," the disparities between social classes were not very severe. The middle class has become considerably richer, and its system has resulted in a deterioration in the standard of living and a decline of opportunity for the majority. Now secularization, and modernization, appear to this

dispossessed majority as the apanage of wealth, as the justification and even the symbol of the ostentatious welath of the well heeled. Also, the rejection being total, privilege and secularization are equated. Then, too, one must consider a still deeper factor: that having to do with the societal crisis (or identity crisis) being experienced by all the Arab-Muslim societies. Which only makes more complex the resort to fundamentalism, and perhaps explains both the impact of the movement and its political and organizational limits. The present situation in Tunisia is characterized by a certain liberalization, but tensions remain: strikers have been arrested, opposition political organizations are not always recognized, and with the high cost of living and commercial speculation, the social climate could deteriorate at any moment. Will the system be able to neutralize the growing influence of the Muslim Brothers, while the latter can more or less serve as an alternative to all those it [the system] consigns to the fringes? The persistent tensions and the constant activity of the fundamentalists are not, in any case, headed this way at the moment.

Identity Crisis and Social Disparities

In Algeria, the month of Ramadan was also the occasion for a revival of "fundamentalist" proselytism. This was also the occasion for the official National Union of Algerian Youth [UNJA] to open a campaign against the "Muslim Brothers" (FM) accused of being "the henchmen of imperialism and reaction" and "imposters" who are attempting to "undermine" the revolution (L'UNITE, a UNJA organ, August 1980). Thus in Algeria the authorities denounce above all the political character of the activity of the FM opposed to the "socialist option" which is a notion that fits in with "progressive Islam" (we note in passing that the UNJA organ praises the "Islamic revolution" of Iran and attacks Saudi Arabia and Sadat). We recall that it was in connection with education problems--which are still quite serious--that fundamentalism's most violent demonstrations occurred (riots at the university, especially). Thus the thorny questions of Arabization, and career selection carry a malaise which the FM want to channel for their benefit (in particular among the "Arabizing" who consider themselves wronged by the present system. Also the social problems linked to frantic urbanization, the rural exodus and unemployment are factors which deflate the official national and populist slogans and ideology and give to the sermons of the fundamentalists in more and more mosques a special resonance. But the regime seems to be more prepared than Tunisia's to deal with this process: on the one hand, it has never threatened the status quo in mores and tradition; on the other hand, it still relies on ad hoc solutions to resorb the social and cultural tensions.

Therefore, in order to catch up, the regime decided on the development of Islamic education and the creation of a department of Islamic Sharia [Islamic law] (at independence Koranic and elementary education had been integrated into [the Department of] Education, and the Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies had been eliminated). As an Algerian official said, "The people are facing an identity crisis" and nationalism expanded to a "total ideology" cannot respond to it. Thus the evolution of the "fundamentalist" movement in Algeria will be tied very closely to that of the activity of the state in the domains of teaching, jobs and urbanization, in particular. In Morocco the situation seems, at first glance, more complex. One finds the same basic characteristics of the "fundamentalist" push, namely the societal crisis and the aggravation of social disparities and problems. But the activity of the FM occurs in a context which, contrary to Tunisia and

even more contrary to Algeria, is based on traditionalism; on the other hand, the existence of the religious centers whose influence has continued to be lively, represents a kind of "receptive structure" which could moderate the radical intentions of the FM; the relative recognition of the multiplicity of political and cultural currents constitutes perhaps also a "safety valve" in this sense, and finally the impact of the left opposition furnishes another alternative which has not yet undergone a profound deflation (such as is the case for Algerian "socialism"). All these are factors which make more complex the appearance of the phenomena of the FM in Morocco. Though it be certain that their influence cannot be ignored (in particular in the suburbs of the big cities), one can still not predict with certainty the reality of this impact nor the political nature of this movement. (In fact, the assassination of Omar Benjelloun indicates that manipulation cannot be excluded and, moreover, the trial of his assassins was recently the occasion for a demonstration organized by members of their association.) It is obvious, however, that the aggravation of the social problems constitutes promising terrain for the growth of fundamentalism, and the factors that up to now have limited its impact could be overwhelmed. It suffices to recall on this subject, the excesses of one Zitouni and his religious center at Fes, or again this quite special phenomenon--albeit rather isolated--of the peasants having resorted to the temples of the saints to vent their grievances against the abuses and injustices of which they were victims: in this way the fellah of the Kalaa Sraghna took refuge in the temple of Moulay Ali Charif in Marrakech in order to protest against their caid [Arab chief or judge] accused of wanting to disposses them of communal land (AL MOUHARRIR of 19 August 1980); still in the Haouz region, another similar case supposedly occurred at the temple of Moulay Brahim. Of course, one cannot attribute all these quite different situations to the impact of FM, but it is possible to see in them signs of a certain general change which the latter could be tempted to channel wherever they can.

One sees therefore that to varying degrees--reflecting the different political contexts, the same deep social malaise, and relatively similar social problems, the "fundamentalist" current is being felt throughout the countries of the Maghreb. Though in Tunisia it is unquestionably most visibly present, everywhere else it has also made inroads. Even in Libya, where Mouammar Qadhdhafi made himself the herald of a "revolutionary" Islam, it is not inconceivable that a more traditionalist "religious" opposition should evolve, given the limitations put on the role of the Ulamas by the regime and, on the other hand, the barely orthodox interpretation Qadhdhafi makes of Islam, since he contests the [validity of the] Sunna (stories of the Prophet and his companions) as the religious foundation. Doubtless Qadhdhafi's populist Islamism, strongly activist and proselytizing, does not fail to inspire some mistrust and anxiety in the Maghreb. Thus, both for Tunisia and Algeria (not to speak of Morocco where this motif is obsolete because of Libya's interference in the Sahara), there is apprehension over the impact this so-called "popular" and "egalitarian" Islam could have in their own countries, if circumstances were right.

9516
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

BAN ON NEW WELLS--Bahrain is to impose a two year restriction on the country's artisian wells in a bid to conserve water. Preliminary details of the measure, which bans the use of the country's main underground water supplies for two years, were released this week to the Gulf Mirror by Agriculture and Commerce Minister Habib Kassem. Said Mr Kassem: "We are particularly concerned about the amount of water which is wasted in Agriculture and Industry. The ban will apply to two geological zones A and B, which lie closest to the earth's surface. Water in these zones which is purer than water deep down, is being used up too quickly. We need a breathing space to protect supplies." Artesian needed in agriculture and industry [as printed] will still be available, but only for zone C, which is less pure than A and B and less accessible. "The move will force those involved to be more careful in distributing and conserving supplies," he said. Mr Kassem said the measure was in line with a new law passed this year aimed at tightening up legislation on water usage. Bahrain has one of the highest rate of water consumption in the world which is 75 gallons per head daily. Internationally the figure is between 45 and 50 gallons. He said further details would be made public following Cabinet approval of the final report on Bahrain's water resources. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 15 Nov 80 pp 17-18]

FOOD FIRM--The government of Bahrain now has a 51 per cent stake in the Bahraini-New Zealand Company for Trade and Storage (BANTS) after buying out the firm's three Bahraini shareholders, all local companies. Bahrain's Minister of Trade and Agriculture Habib Ahmad Qassem said the move was in line with his government's objective of attaining self-sufficiency for food. The government of New Zealand holds the remaining 49 percent stake in BANTS. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR REPORT & MEMO in English 24 Nov 80 p 10]

CSO: 4820

PUBLIC CLAMORS FOR MILITARY TRAINING IN SCHOOLS

Millions March

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 26 Oct 80 p 13

[Text] Millions of Iranian students, alongside their teachers and parents, participated in a march and 'unity' prayer at the summons of Ayatollah Montazeri in order to neutralize the plot of brazen counterrevolutionaries, and commenced the Islamic republic's second 'Mehr' [23 Sep-22 Oct] month.

The march, which was also held in cities across the country, took place with even more complete splendor and greatness in Tehran.

Tehran's students began moving in the early morning hours from eight directions towards Tehran University, the meeting-place of those in the revolution's forefront. They carried posters of Imam Khomeyni, Ayatollah Montazeri, and the infatigueable warrior Taleqani, and shouted slogans about reopening the schools, and condemning the filthy plot of the agressor Ba'thist Iraqi government and its master, the United States.

Reports of KEYHAN's correspondents on the march ceremony indicate that the marchers were full of enthusiasm. Many of them carried books or notebooks, and placing them under their arms as if they were powerful weapons for the destruction of the enemy of religion and country, raised their fists in the air, and chanted while stamping their feet.

Our correspondents add: The participants in the First of Mehr [23 September] march, after transversing the designated routes, gathered at Tehran University. There the ceremony from 1100 hours of followed the prepared program. After recitation of a passage from the glorious word of God, a message from the imam concerning recent events was broadcast. Then a member of the District and University Unity Council read the text of a message from the council which, while congratulating the students upon the commencement of the school year, requested the total vigilance of brother and sister students against counterrevolutionary plots.

Then a presidential message was read by one of the students, as follows:

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Students, dear children of the Islamic nation. Your school year begins on a day when the children of Islamic

Iran have stood up manfully and firmly against the aggressor forces; the resistance that Muslim youth has shown is one of the most valuable achievements of the Iranian Islamic revolution. Our enemies fancied that our armed forces have no morale, that it had been lost, and... They did not know that when faith and belief were involved, the reconstruction of the armed forces was completed very rapidly. Our enemies fancied that our army would not resist, and nourished half-baked thoughts. But they came up against steel walls of resistance. Dear brothers and sisters, our enemies fancied that weapons make a war. Lo, they see that belief and faith make firm a war - the faith of the Islamic nation's children has been shown in action, and future days will make this concrete faith even more evident.

Dear students, the enemy had no expectation of such capability, experience, and scientific training in our armed forces - and lo, airplanes and armored forces are shot down and destroyed one after the other. It even becomes clearer to us to what degree scientific knowledge and experience is valuable, and it becomes clear to them that our armed forces have not spent their lives falsely. The construction of Islamic society requires firmness of belief along with rapid scientific and experimental progress - scientific knowledge is not separate from belief; to whatever degree your level of true knowledge increases, to whatever degree you transform the study environment to an environment for the fruition of talent, to whatever degree your preparedness for monotheistic society increases, to whatever degree the school environment becomes one of science and Islamic understanding, to that degree the steps we make towards our goal will be faster, and we can build the Islamic republic more firmly.

My dears - it is in your faces that the lines of tomorrow's society take shape, it is in your pure faces that the lines of belief, knowledge and decision for the protection of an unswerving life and the stability of a free Islamic society must reach total clarity. Your responsibility today is very great because of your role in preserving the safety of the country today for the building of tomorrow's society. From God on high I ask for your success in carrying out this responsibility, and I hope that the victories of the Islamic revolution run one after the other like waves across your joyful and successful faces.

After this Mohammed 'Ali Raja'i, prime minister of the Iranian Islamic Republic, delivered a speech concerning recent occurences and the First of Mehr [22 September]. In a portion of his speech he said:

The largest bases of our revolution are the schools, the revolution's best capital our children. We have come forward in all our strength to guard this capital with the greatest possible vigilance. This is because these innocent children condemned the commanders of oppression, despotism and arrogance with their pure, warm blood and their chants of 'God is great'.

The prime minister then said: These beloved children are all striving together so that through the deepest possible understanding of the revolution's ideals, they can prepare themselves for the future of their beloved revolution and Islam.

Mr Raja'i said: It is not only we who are aware of this great and beloved force. The enemy also had his eyes fastened upon it, and throughout the entire summer he plotted so that he would be able to make an onslaught when the schools reopened, and exploit the re-opening for his own purposes. But God granted us success in forcefully identifying and smashing these plotting idolators.

Mr Raja'i's speech continued: Today all the nation's organs and all those who feel a responsibility for the revolution are watching over the great student force because the counterrevolutionary, by resorting to various strategems, is plotting to weaken the relations between the responsible organs and the students. At the same time all of our students have come to learn Islamic ideology from pledged teachers, and in the future take part as prepared officers in the perpetual struggle of truth with evil.

In another portion of his speech the prime minister said: Saddam Hoseyn and Carter and all the Idol's forces of East and West must know that we struggled for God, the Koran and Khomeyni, and we have them in our hands. Because we had God, the Koran and Khomeyni, we overthrew the biggest idolatrous powers. And today Saddam and Carter, with all their facilities and savagery cannot take these dear things from us which we gained by our own blood.

After the prime minister's speech, a united prayer took place, led by Hojjatoleslam Seyyed 'Ali Khamene'i, Tehran Friday prayer leader. Between the two prayers, 'Ali Akbar Parvaresh, representative from Esfahan in the Islamic Consultative Assembly, delivered a speech concerning recent events and pressure from foreigners through counterrevolutionary radio broadcasts from abroad.

After prayer, the march declaration was read.

Students Declaration

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 26 Oct 80 p 13

[Text] At the end of yesterday's student march, a twelve-point declaration was framed and read as follows:

1 - We condemn the desperate efforts of the Iraqi regime and the plots of the domestic associates of the superpowers in the western region, and announce our total readiness for sacrifice in the path of Iran's Islamic revolution. We ask officials for the greatest possible decisiveness in shattering foreign agents.

2 - We ask officials to expand military training in the schools as much as possible, so that an army 20-million strong will be established as quickly as possible.

3 - The Islamic revolution must be exported to all the oppressed, tyrranized nations of the world so that their century-old hopes can be realized. Therefore we ask the Islamic revolutionary government to expand their efforts in this regard as much as possible.

4 - While renewing our unbroken pact with the great leader of the revolution, the great imam of the oppressed world, Khomeyni, we emphasize that we deem the incontestable authority of the imam's line over the Majles, the government and other organs to be an obligatory and indispensable matter, and we condemn any effort to assert a line other than the imam's.

5 - We ask the respected Cultural Revolutionary Council to take the fastest possible steps in the path of the educational revolution; to transform that

system, to purge it completely, to purify books and rewrite them, and to prepare lessons for students compatible with the Islamic revolution.

6 - We ask officials to purge all teachers associated with the counterrevolution or a line other than the imam's from the Ministry of Education; to appoint suitable cadres and ideological groups which conform to the Islamic revolutionary line; and not to surrender to the superficially intellectual and ideologically unsound recommendations by which, under the pretense of examining beliefs, so-called revolutionary teachers are being expelled.

7 - Alongside the rest of the people, we announce our support for all the efforts of pledged teachers and students to neutralize the plots of the superpowers and their domestic stooges.

8 - Unfortunately, the administrative revolution has lost its upward and effective path. Officials must carry out this task to its Islamic limit with the participation of Islamic societies and all the Muslim masses, and completely cleanse all forms of corruption and Idolatry from Iranian bureaus and offices.

9 - We request the Islamic Consultative Assembly to investigate the hostage problem as decisively as possible, and not to surrender to impressions calculated to make the hostages look oppressed.

10 - We ask the arming of the Muslim people and the devoted followers of the imam through dependable and proven channels, such as the Komiteh and Mobilization guards, in order to prepare them for confrontation with every kind of plot and intrigue.

11 - A culture which seems martyrdom and a spirit which fosters martyrs is a great and unbreakable weapon of Islam. Our Islamic society must refrain from every sort of consumer culture, individualism, corruption, welfarism and western tendencies so that we can move forward to heroic reconstruction.

12 - We announce to the dictatorial and mercenary regime of Saddam Hoseyn that our hearts beat in anticipation of the wondrous command of the imam, so that with a shout from the great masses we can rush to the help of our Muslim brothers in Iraq, and sever the Ba'thist regime, meaning Saddam's U.S. puppet regime, from the region.

Support in Provinces

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 26 Oct 80 p 13

[Text] Yesterday, the first day of the school year, teachers and students from primary, junior and senior high schools across the country attended class, following the advice of the nation's imam and responding to the summons of His Holiness Ayatollah Montazeri. After class teachers and students took to the streets for a wonderful march, condemning the plots of foreign agents.

In Kermanshah, student revolutionary groups and organizations marched and proclaimed their readiness, accompanied by the clergy and all classes of people. After the march they went to the Friday Mosque to pray, and held a 'unity' prayer.

Despite Iraq's air attacks the night before last and yesterday over Kermanshah's air space, and the bombing of its airport, the heroic people of Kermanshah and surrounding cities took part in the students' march with no anxiety whatsoever.

In the border region of Javanrud, near Kermanshah, tribes and border-dwellers, students and teachers participated in a march and shouted slogans against the United States and Iraq. At that time a propaganda official for the Reconstruction Crusade gave a speech concerning the preservation of unity among all the people. A six-part declaration announced support for the Islamic republic and readiness to do battle with the mercenaries, and was ratified by the students' cries of "God is great."

A splendid march was also held in Esfahan. In order to put on this march the Cultural Section of Esfahan's Martyr Foundation organized a staff, and the people were asked to express their views towards having the most splendid students' march possible. Similar ceremonies in other cities of the province were also held.

In Bushehr as well students took part in marches after the governor had published an announcement. Students in surrounding cities of the province also took part in marches, and through their unity turned the last hope of the counterrevolutionaries into despair. These counterrevolutionaries had foolishly thought that they could prevent the holding of classes by means of delusive and seditious slogans.

According to reports of KEYHAN correspondents from Rudsar, Rasht, Khorramabad, Aligudarz, Qom, Dorud, Ezna, Kuhdasht, and other districts of Lorestan, Galugah, cities in the provinces of Mazandaran and Gilan, Fars, Khorasan, Sistan va Baluchistan, Yazd, Kerman, East and West Azerbaijan, Hormozegan, Kohkiluyeh va Boyer Ahmad, and cities and villages in other provinces of our country, students answered the summons of High Faqih Ayatollah Montazeri, and by participating in marches and unity prayers, once again showed their unity in the face of imperialism's plot.

9597
CSO: 4906

COMMENTS ON RCC DECISION TO EXECUTE THIEVES

Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic 2 Nov 80 p 4

[Article: "Execution for Anyone Who Perpetrates the Crime of Theft"]

[Text] The Revolutionary Command Council [RCC] decided to execute perpetrators of the crime of theft as specified in Article 440 and Paragraphs D and E of Article 433 from Penal Code No 111 of 1969.

Text of the decision follows:

No: 1631.

Date: 30 October 1980.

Based on the provisions of Paragraph (A), Article 42, of the Interim Constitution, in its session held on 30 October 1980, the RCC decided the following:

First: Any person who perpetrates any of the following crimes shall be sentenced to death:

1. The crime of theft as specified in Article 440 from revised Penal Code No 111 of 1969.

2. The crime of theft as specified in Paragraph (D), Article 443, from Penal Code [remainder of line illegible].

3. The crime of theft as specified in Paragraph (E), Article 443, from the Penal Code.

Second: This decision shall be enforceable from the date of its publication in the official newspaper and until further notice.

Saddam Hussein
President, RCC

Official Source Comments:

In a statement to the INA [Iraqi News Agency] yesterday an official source commented on the importance and scope of the decision, stating that certain unscrupulous persons have taken advantage of the current situation and the preoccupation

of our armed forces and the platoons of the People's Army with combat missions against the Persian enemy. They are burglarizing houses, taking advantage of blackout conditions at night in the streets, alleys and squares, and the fact that many of the houses are missing their men, who are participating in honorable combat on the battlefields or elsewhere.

He added that, since the punishment imposed for such crimes as these when they are perpetrated under normal conditions is not suitable to a state of war, which requires that the punishment be made harsher in order to deter others. These actions are incompatible with the simplest prerequisites of citizenship and are considered treason against the nation which requires very determined and strong opposition: For these reasons the decision made punishment harsher for theft which occurs during a state of war on a populated patrol at night and at all other places of residence.

9605
CSO: 4802

ECONOMIC PROGRESS IN WEST BANK REVIEWED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 10 Sep 80 p 23

[Article by Yovel Elitzur: The 'Open Bridges' After 13 Years" (A)]

[Text] In Bayt Sahur which is near Bethlehem everyone knows the Abu-Ayta family. More precisely, it is not a family, but an entire tribe--whose branches dominate many of the manufacturing enterprises which this mostly Christian municipality excels in.

One branch of the family controls an enterprise for knitted products and another branch manufactures mother-of-pearl trinkets, plastic sponges, accessories for electrical appliances, as well as several of types of plastics utensils.

Work is plentiful, and workers are brought in even from Gaza. But the members of Abu-Ayta are not content. They see no future for their enterprises. Most of the entrepreneurs of Judea and Samaria share these feelings of insecurity and frustration.

After 13 years of Israeli domination, more than a half a million residents of Judea and Samaria perceive themselves as fluttering between the east and the west. Their living standard is increasing on an average of more than 11 percent annually, a rate double that prevalent in Israel. There is no unemployment. The economy enjoys the best of both worlds, as it were: It is connected by its umbilical cord to the Israeli economy but profits as well from an uninterrupted flow of funds from the petroleum countries in the Persian Gulf.

But everyone knows that this abundance is supported by nothing. Production is at a standstill and the expansion of agriculture is in danger.

Nicola Abu-Eyta, smiling, courteous businessman who in the past served as mayor of Bayt Sahur, tells that he established the Jordanian Plastic Company in 1958, and after the Six-Day War established a similar enterprise in Amman. Many other manufacturers did likewise in Judea and Samaria. The Government of Jordan does not permit export of manufactured goods form the West Bank unless they have been manufactured from raw materials that have been transported over the bridges. Except that it is unprofitable for manufacturers in Judea and Samaria to bring raw materials this way and that is not only because importing through the port of 'Aqaba is expensive and time consuming, but also because the rigid security inspections on

Allenby and Adam Bridges effectively prevent the transport of goods--particularly with respect to sacks of PVC and polyethylene.

1948-1967 Policy: Prevent Industrialization of Judea and Samaria.

Eysa, the son of Nicola who helps his father manage the enterprise in Bayt Sahur, says that the output is marketed principally in Judea and Samaria. "We can't compete with the Israeli enterprises neither with samples nor by the credit arrangements which are customary in the Israeli market. We're not as successful in confronting inflation as are our competitors." However, another worker in the enterprise reveals: "The enterprise in Amman is larger, has newer equipment, but production at Bayt Sahur is greater."

While refusing to be quoted, the manufacturers in Judea and Samaria admit that the Jordanian prohibition on transporting manufactured goods which were made from raw materials that did not come through Jordan--it is merely a continuation of the policy adopted by the Hashemite Government between the years 1948 and 1967, when the rule of the West Bank was in its hands: to prevent industrialization in Judea and Samaria, and to establish the manufacturing base of the kingdom on the East Bank. The official explanation for the import restrictions involves the regulations of the Arab Boycott, that is: the need to prevent any Israeli components from being part of goods marketed in Arab countries.

Manufacturers in Judea and Samaria are also prepared to admit that these restrictions, while being bothersome and hindering the development of their enterprises, integrate very well with the goal which in any case exists among the entrepreneurs in Bethlehem, in Ramallah and in Nablus: to spread investments so as to assure a base also in a more secure location, and not to risk accumulation of capital on the West Bank alone--where (in their view) the war may break out anew at any hour.

A short trip through Bayt Sahur will immediately reveal the odd contradiction with which the residents of Judea and Samaria live between the prosperity of the individual and the shattered base of the economy. New white and reddish stone homes are springing up on every one of the sides of the sloping hills on which the municipality is built, and blend well with the dusty, rocky landscape of these last days of summer. There is a great deal of activity in the many workshops scattered through the narrow back streets. The owner of an enterprise which fashions images of Christian saints from olive tree-trunks, reveals: "I don't even consider export to Jordan. I sell everything in Bethlehem, and I can't even fill all the orders." The luxurious green Volvo of Nicola Abu-Ayta parked at the enterprise, stands out against the background of the obsolete and all-too-pathetic equipment of the plastics enterprise, and illustrates a picture of simultaneous expansion and retardation.

How the Sixth Fleet Was Discovered

During the first week of July 1967, when trucks loaded with vegetables of the Jenin merchants crossed the Jordan River eastbound at the shallow water pass of Tel-abu-Tzutz--with the tacit agreement of a number of Israeli local officers, but without a specific decision by the Israeli authority--an economic-social planning

group was sitting in Jerusalem, which at the conclusion of its work (two weeks subsequent to that) recommended to the government certain steps to assure open economic borders for the passage of goods between the two banks of the Jordan River. The group did not know that its recommendations had been implemented even before they had been reduced to writing.

The decision regarding the "open bridges" was doubtless one of the most daring and revolutionary not only in the history of region, but also in the procedures of holding an area after conquest. Few remember today that the decision to close an eye to the initiative of the vegetable merchants in Jenin was intended not only to solve the problems of the residents of the area, in whose hands after the Six-Day War there remained a bumper crop of tomatoes, cucumbers and eggplants, as well as an abundance of cantaloupe and watermelon--but also the problems of the Israeli farmers, who were concerned about unanticipated competition coming from the region which had suddenly been included within the area of jurisdiction of Israel.

It will be recalled that those responsible for Israeli agriculture searched at that time for other markets for the output of Judea and Samaria, and discovered among other things, the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, whose sailors were hungry for fresh fruits and vegetables. "We shall bombard the American warships with melons," --Ariel Amiyad, who was then the general manager of the Agriculture Ministry, proposed.

The effects of the deed were far-reaching, and not a single one of its initiators may argue that he foresaw them. In effect, to this very day, the full theoretical implications as to what has happened to the economy of Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip over the past 13 years have not yet been assessed. Immediately following the Six-Day War, Israeli planners brought for the proposals regarding the settlement of Arab refugees from Gaza into agricultural villages in the region of Al 'Arish and even into the West Bank. Plans were laid for manufacturing centers which would be exempt from tax liability to any jurisdiction, and in which multinational companies would be permitted to establish enterprises and benefit from cheap manpower and from "freedom from taxes."

High Birthrate, A Significant Percentage of Children

Even in the Galilee Paper which was prepared in 1973, there was still a discussion of the need to invest 1.2 billion Israel Pounds within 5 years for the development of the Occupied Territories. Even this plan was not implemented, as is known, and today we know that every Israeli plan "for the settlement of refugees" and for "development" was not only superfluous--inasmuch as the standard of living of the regions's residents increased at a dizzying pace even without the Israeli "development"--but would have impeded a process that was desirable for Israel, whose genesis was in the "open bridges" policy.

The various development plans overlooked a number of simple facts: the Judea and Samaria area is in effect a much too restricted area, lacking water for irrigation or wide, level expanses suitable for agricultural development. Even the number of employed whose problem had to be allegedly solved is limited: a total of 135,000 persons, including those working in their agricultural economies. In the year 1967, the number of those prepared to go out into the labor market was even smaller.

The bridges that were opened in July 1967 and the Israeli market that was discovered during that period, solved the immediate problem of the surplus of agricultural output. The open bridges also helped the residents of Judea and Samaria, who since 1948 turned eastward to the rich petroleum countries to find more remunerative employment, to continue to emigrate in that direction. The Israeli economy, which began to gain strength following the Six-Day War from the slow pace of the year preceding the war, even began to absorb workers from Judea and Samaria and Gaza. Approximately 40,000 registered workers from Judea and Samaria--one-third of all the manpower of the West Bank--today is employed in Israel.

The very aggressive modernization of the agricultural economy in Judea and Samaria incessantly freed workers from the family economies in the village, and those immediately joined the work force which today earns its livelihood outside of its places of residence. If, despite this, the portion of those participating in the work force from among the region's population is relatively small, it can be explained by the high birthrate--a very significant percentage of the inhabitants of Judea and Samaria are children--in the high net number of women who are not working (inasmuch as their husbands and brothers work elsewhere and send home a goodly part of their wages) as well as by the fact that the educational system is more developed: compulsory education also includes the 15-year-olds.

The "open bridges" policy did not bring about, however, an "integration" of the economy of the West Bank with that of Jordan--any more than the large numbers of workers in Israel, marketing a part of the agricultural goods in Israel did not bring about the "integration" of this economy into the Israeli market. In recent years, the increasing bias toward Jordan and other Arab countries is discernible but this is not at the expense of the connection with Israel. Jordan and the Persian Gulf countries absorb mainly skilled manpower and funds that businessmen on the West Bank in the past customarily deposited the capitals.

Problem of the Grapes from Mount Hebron

While the import and export of goods between the Occupied Territories and Israel have increased in recent years at a sufficiently energetic pace, which kept up with inflation, a very apparent reduction in the imports of goods from Jordan has taken place (imports over the bridges last year made up only about 1.5 percent of the total imports into this region). Nor is the export by way of the bridges developing, and in real prices is even decreasing. In contrast to exports of 343 million Israel pounds by way of the bridges in the year 1976, this export of last year totaled 1.1 billion Israel pounds--a sum similar to the export (at current prices) by this means in the previous year. Export by way of the bridges today makes up about one-third of the total export of the Occupied Territories.

Even the makeup of the goods moving by truck over the Jordan River bridges has changed decidedly since the summer of 1967. They are no longer carrying mainly cucumbers and tomatoes, cantaloupes and watermelon. More than half of the agricultural export are citrus fruits from the Gaza Strip. Similarly, there is a demand for fresh grapes from the hills of Hebron. There are no longer agricultural surpluses in Judea and Samaria. The residents, whose standard of living has risen, are absorbing increasing quantities--and even Israeli agriculture has adapted itself to the marketing of the produce of the Territories. Only the late-ripening grapes of Mount Hebron cause specific problems, since they arrive at the Israel

market when there is a glut of grapes there. A recent study at the Vulcany Institute raised the possibility of sending certain quantities of these grapes to England and Germany for the Christmas holiday period.

Another solution to the matter of surpluses which occupied the advocates of the concept of the "open bridges" in 1967, is the development crops intended for export to Europe. Jordan Valley farmers learned from their Israeli neighbors there to grow winter vegetables--particulatly eggplant, which fetch high prices in the European market. The growing of several strains of onion intended for the European market was also very successful.

Upon completion of development of the O'or Valley, which is irrigated by the waters of the Yarmokh River, demand in Jordan for fruits and vegetables from the East Bank will drop even more. Except that the farmers who learned from their Israeli trainers how to grow vegetables under plastic sheets, how to utilize modern equipment, systems of sowing cycles and past control--are the very ones who in the future will be called upon to traverse the Jordan River and to integrate with the intensive agriculture which is going to develop in the eastern Jordan Valley.

In the industrial export over the bridges, the main product is perfume made from palm-tree oil which is brought in through Aqaba, olive-oil, soap and stones from the Hebron region (which are sold in part cut and in part even polished). The stone manufacture resulted in the founding in recent years of a chain of enterprises replete with improved equipment which stand abreast along the length of the Jerusalem-Hebron road. However, in general the development of industry of Judea and Samaria is not on a par with that of agriculture in the region: here new technologies were not acquired. The progress is slow, and in several areas even nonexistent.

What, then, is the source of the unprecedented expansion that is felt these days in Judea and Samaria? Undoubtedly, it stems in part from the incomes of the workers of the West Bank in Israel, and in part--almost certainly the larger part--from the transfer of funds from the residents of the Territories who work in the Arab countries. It is difficult to measure these transfers inasmuch as the transfer is done by means of the Jordanian banks, where many of the residents of Judea and Samaria maintain their active accounts.

Thirteen years after their opening to traffic following the Six-Day War, the Jordan bridges serve mainly for the movement of persons. About 1 million people, half a million in each direction, will pass over them this year. While, during the years immediately subsequent to the Six-Day War, the number of incoming was greater than the number of outgoing, since the year 1974 the balance is negative and points to a 15,000-17,000 person exodus annually over the number of entrants (in which figure is included also the traffic through the Ben-Gurion Airport). The consensus is that the tempo of the "brain drain"--exodus of professionals, entrepreneurs and skilled workers--will be on the increase in the years to come.

How does this trend dovetail with the construction movement which is also felt in Judea and Samaria? Does the "mind migration" signal a waiving on the part of Arabs of their efforts to set up a Palestinian state? What will be the economic base of this state, if it is established? On this, in the next article of the series.

8090
CSO: 4805

AFFORDABLE HOUSING FOR HAIFA ARABS

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 16 Sep 80 p 6

[Article by Yosef Mikhaelsky: "An Arab Ghetto in Haifa?"]

[Text] "Problems of urban and national dimension are anticipated regarding the issue of housing for the Arabs of Haifa. If there are no changes for the better in the present situation, the Arabs of Haifa will find themselves facing an inability to arrive at dwelling solutions and strong pressure will be created on the existing area." This conclusion is the outcome of the study by Yosef ben-Artzi of the University of Haifa on the topic "Creation of the Housing Model and Characteristics of the Dwelling Transition of the Haifa Arabs."

The investigator, who examined the dwelling condition and the behavior of the Arab population of the city within the dwellings, attempted to determine, among other things, whether the processes affecting the Arab population of the city indicate the existence of an Arab ghetto similar to the black ghettos in the United States or of other population groups in other countries.

He established that it is not yet possible to define the Arab dwelling sample in Haifa as an ordinary and typical ghetto. On the other hand, it is also impossible to disregard the existence and the intensification of qualitative characteristics of a ghetto in Haifa, which are apt to alter the situation in the future. Many points unify the Arabs of Haifa, yet it appears that despite their existence, the processes through which the people are passing are indicative of processes of segregation in the western world. It is therefore proper to define the model (the character of dwellings and the processes affecting the Haifa Arabs) as an emerging ghetto, although there is complete uncertainty with regard to the direction of its development. External institutional intervention may prevent this and impede the present processes.

Ben-Artzi assumes that the Arabs of Haifa have already spread to all of the neighborhoods of the city where they wish to live. They are not penetrating any new neighborhoods. They aspire to strengthen their consolidation and to preserve the internal connections at their high level. This is one of the reasons for their lack of desire to move to another residential area, far from dense Arab population. Land limitations in Haifa will prevent the spreading and joining of Arab residence, and hostility and suspicion between Jews and Arabs which will prevent joint residence on a large scale will continue.

In the existing situation in the city the pressure will increase for housing solutions and will arouse resentment among citizens who are supposed to enjoy equal rights but who in effect do not receive proper treatment. The resentment will rise from the lower classes to the middle classes and will even affect the leadership. Thus, there will be created a very difficult social ferment. Such ferment may develop into unpleasant situations for the State of Israel and for Israeli society inasmuch as a country which professes to solve the housing problems of its residents cannot justify turning away from problems of housing for a portion of its residents, the portion which will associate its ferment with political consequences.

"While we view the social outbreaks in the black ghettos in the U.S., in the ghettos of British cities, and are reminded of the outbreaks of Wadi Salim, there is developing among us a component of inhabitants whose housing alternatives are becoming ever fewer. There is no attention given to these problems, and the resentment of the component will increase," Ben-Artzi writes and stresses, that in order to prevent the possible development of social and political ferment against the background of a housing crisis, the Government of Israel should give its attention to the creation of housing alternatives for the Arabs of Haifa. In his view the possibilities are: rehabilitation and renovation of the existing Arab concentrations in Wadi Nisnass, in the lower city and the Karmel Station, as well as new construction in open zones on the edges of the "existing geographical concentrations."

In the summary, the author of the study writes: "We are not able to propose, for example, the transfer of Arab population to a 'development city' in the Galilee or to other neighborhoods within the city [of Haifa] in view of the findings of the study that revealed ties, strong ones, among the minority, between it and the neighborhood in which it is living, and the strong desire of the residents to remain together. It was therefore recommended to build and develop within the concentrations and adjacent to them, in order to attract an Arab population there and prevent problems which are likely to develop if the present processes and trends continue. There are in Haifa possibilities for creating alternative solutions and these should be planned against a background of findings of the kind that this study has brought to light, and it is in that manner that its implementation section also addresses itself."

8090
CSO: 4805

STUDY REVEALS EXISTENCE OF TRAINED MANPOWER BASE

Paris L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE MODERNES in French Third Quarter 1980 pp 40-49

[Text] Wedged in the midst of a region which for 30 years has experienced uninterrupted agitation, Jordan has been subjected to the consequences of all the political and economic upheavals which could occur in the Middle East. In fact, ever since its inception, it has been faced with the Palestinian problem and has been obliged, for reasons of solidarity with the Arab community, to line itself up on the side of the nations participating directly in the struggle against Israel. This attitude has brought it many disappointments, namely, loss of the West Bank in 1967, violent confrontation with the Palestinians in 1970 and 1971 and partition of its territory as a result of the war of October 1973. In fact, the Israeli-Arab conflict has doubly penalized Jordan at the very moment that it was making every effort to achieve an economic boom:

(1) By losing the West Bank, Jordan was deprived of the richest portion of its territory. (Forty-five percent of its gross national product came from this region).

(2) The successive wars brought onto its territory a considerable influx of Palestinian refugees (nearly 300,000) who thus added themselves to a population that was already quite underprivileged.

Such a tax paid to the Arab cause could have appeared insurmountable to a little country with limited natural resources. Nevertheless, due to its political stability and a very capable diplomacy, Jordan succeeded in recovering and bringing together all the elements of a new economic policy.

Taking advantage of the aid furnished by the petroleum producing nations, Jordan gradually built up economic organizations that were suited to its actual means, while succeeding in attracting to its capital city the business men and companies that, since 1976, had been fleeing the territory of Lebanon which has been plagued by civil war.

Prince Hassan, brother of the King of Jordan, heir to its throne, and responsible for the economy of his country, addressing the United Nations Conference on Scientific and Technical Development in August 1979, made the following remarks with regard to Jordanian manpower: "Like many other developing countries, Jordan is a nation which exports skilled labor to work for the third world countries but also

for other nations of the world. This movement of manpower has been beneficial to both donating and receiving parties. However, it is now producing negative results for Jordan, namely, the brain drain. The latter imposes considerable economic loss for the countries that export manpower. It decreases their scientific and technical potential. It is important to find remedies; however, these should be stretched out over a more or less lengthy period, since an abrupt cessation of migration to the Middle East would produce fatal consequences both to the countries exporting manpower and to those importing it."

This short quotation constitutes a good summary of the exceptional situation of Jordan in the extraordinary current of human migration which traditionally characterizes the Middle East.

Deprived of raw materials, but abounding in an active population whose skills continue to improve, Jordan occupies a privileged position, particularly with regard to the petroleum producing nations. In fact, the latter, which are immensely rich, are generally underpopulated and consequently incapable of implementing their developmental policies without resorting to imported manpower.

Jordanians, who are present in nearly every country of the Middle East, occupy many specialized posts and thus participate actively in the formidable economic boom now being experienced by the Arab world.

It is true that, in order to carry on this difficult struggle, Jordan disposes of an important trump card--its skilled manpower. In a region dominated by nations which are immensely rich but also underpopulated, such a weapon possesses an inestimable value. The Jordanians have understood this very well. This is why they have made every effort to benefit as much as possible from this situation.

Resourcefulness of the National Labor Force

The population of Jordan is now estimated to be nearly 3 million inhabitants. Its growth rate is 3.4 percent annually, 56 percent of the total population being under 20 years of age.

The nomads and seminomads constitute no more than 5.6 percent of this population since urbanization continues its upward trend. In fact, population centers of more than 5,000 inhabitants account for nearly 50 percent of Jordanian citizens. (Amman has about 700,000 inhabitants, Zarqa 220,000, Irbid 80,000 and Aqaba 20,000).

To be sure, as is the case with most Arab countries, it is difficult to obtain complete official statistics. Nevertheless, the tables displayed below furnish a good idea of the general structure of the Jordanian population.

(2 million workers in 1950. Source of data in tables: "Asia," second edition, 1977, volume 1, published by International Labor Organization, Geneva.

N.B.: These tables do not include those Palestinians who are not Jordanian citizens.

Table 1. Estimate of the Population and Labor Force From 1950 to 1970 by Sex (in thousands)

	Number of inhabitants	Percent of inhabitants working	Number of workers	Men	Percent	Number of workers	Women	Percent	Number of workers
1950	1237	25.46	315	642	46.12	300	595	2.53	15
1955	1447	25.34	367	751	46.41	348	696	2.63	18
1960	1695	25.52	433	879	46.70	410	816	2.71	22
1965	1955	25.19	492	1008	46.21	466	947	2.80	26
1970	2280	24.80	565	1171	45.56	534	1109	2.87	32

Table 2. Estimate of the Labor Force in Agriculture, Business and Services From 1950 to 1970 (in thousands)

	Total Population			Men			Women		
	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Agriculture	Industry	Services
1950	165	68	82	157	65	78	8	3	4
1960	190	114	129	182	109	120	8	5	9
1970	191	186	189	183	177	173	8	8	16
				(in percent)					
1950	52.3	21.5	26.1	52.3	21.7	26.0	52.5	17.8	29.6
1960	43.8	26.3	29.8	44.3	26.4	29.2	35.9	24.0	40.1
1970	33.7	32.8	33.4	34.2	33.2	32.4	25.0	26.0	48.9

Table 3. Projections of the Population and Labor Force by Sex From 1975 to 2000 (in thousands)

	Total Population			Men			Women		
		Number of inhabitants working	Number of workers		Number of inhabitants working	Number of workers		Number of inhabitants working	Number of workers
1975	2688	24.24	652	1377	44.4	612	1311	3.1	39
1980	3177	23.80	756	1624	43.5	707	1553	3.1	49
1990	4397	23.79	1046	1915	43.1	826	1837	3.4	63
1985	3752	23.68	888	2241	43.2	967	2156	3.6	79
2000	5889	24.74	1457	2998	44.5	1336	2891	4.2	121

[Table 3 as published]

As in many other areas, 1973 was an important date with regard to the employment situation in Jordan. Between 1960 and 1973, due to an uncertain economic policy, Jordan had an excess of workers. There was an overabundance of skilled labor and the unemployment rate was high. Furthermore, as we have pointed out, the sudden arrival of several hundred thousands of Palestinian refugees in 1967 had totally destabilized the national economy. Following the October 1973 crisis, due to the quadrupling of the price of petroleum, the Gulf nations were able to embark on vast development programs. Since they now lacked sufficient labor, they were forced to solicit foreign workers.

Jordan, a fellow Arab nation, and being located close to the countries needing its services, has been able to seize upon this occasion to export its surplus skilled workers. The latter, attracted by salaries three or four times those prevailing in their home country, were not long in migrating in a body. It is estimated that, between 1974 and 1977, more than 20,000 Jordanians emigrated each year to the Gulf countries. It appears that this exodus has slowed down somewhat during the last 2 years and has stabilized at a rate of 10,000 departures per year. By 1979, out of a working population of nearly 600,000 persons, it was generally admitted that more than half had left Jordan to go and work abroad. The distribution of migrants at that time was as follows:

125,000	Saudi Arabia
75,000	Gulf Emirates
50,000	Kuwait
20,000	Libya
30,000	Europe
36,000	North and South America

Such an exodus could not be tolerated by the Jordanian economy since it is true that no nation can assure its own development with less than 50 percent of its skilled human resources. Courageously, the Jordanian authorities studied the problem, considering both the causes and consequences of such a situation.

Jordanian Reaction on the Emigration of the Labor Force

In 1976, the Jordanian government began to seek solutions for the problem of decreasing the number of departures of workers to foreign lands. Paradoxically, Jordan, up to then a traditional reservoir of manpower, found itself obliged to issue an appeal for foreign workers. In fact, by that time, there were already more than 50,000 immigrants filling jobs in the Jordanian economy. These included nearly 30,000 Egyptians, 5,000 Koreans, 8,000 Pakistanis, etc.

Many long, detailed investigations were then conducted throughout the country. They were aimed at answering a number of key questions: What were the reasons that motivated the Jordanian workers to leave the country? Exactly how many of them were there abroad? What were the consequences of such an exodus of manpower on the national economy? How many foreign workers would have to be imported? What were the measures to be taken to keep Jordanian workers from leaving their homeland?

Not all of the answers have as yet appeared clearly, but the Jordanian authorities have not waited for this to implement a series of measures which have begun to

bear fruit. The differences between the prevailing wages in the petroleum exporting nations or in the Western countries from those in Jordan constituted the only essential reason for the exodus of the Jordan workers, whether skilled or not. Therefore, the Jordanian government began to appreciably increase the salaries of its workers beginning in 1977. However, this increase immediately produced a rise in production costs, thus placing a heavy burden on domestic businesses which thus lost their competitiveness.

Realizing that they could not catch up with the salaries prevailing abroad, the Jordanian authorities then concentrated on improving the social conditions of their workers, creating a better school system for children than was offered by the countries to which Jordanians had emigrated, generally improving national insurance benefits (health, family, etc) as well as increasing the number and powers of trade unions.

Other measures were also studied for the purpose of helping to keep Jordanian workers in their country such as early initiation of a system whereby the workers owned a share of the company, a balanced salary policy and especially the development of a professional training program that was adaptable to the needs of the nation. The last item deserves particular attention. In fact, very early in the game, the Jordanians sought to adapt their worker training programs to the needs of the domestic economy. With the aid of the World Bank, they had created as far back as 1972 a Polytechnic Institute and a professional training center called the "Trade Training Center." The former furnished specialized education in the fields of mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, civil engineering, architecture and chemical engineering while the latter was slanted towards preparing for the construction industry.

Since these two schools rapidly proved to be inadequate due to the low number of students admitted as well as the small number of professions dealt with, they were expanded. Moreover, three other training centers were opened, two of them under the sponsorship of UNWRA and one bearing the name of Vocational Training Center.

Jordanian officials had two things to be concerned with. On the one hand, they had to train the number of experts necessary to satisfy the requirements of Jordan's economy as well as those of the nation which requested skilled manpower. On the other hand, they had to quickly reverse the ratio of four engineers to one technician which then existed in Jordan and which prevented normal operation of their businesses.

Their reasoning led them to the following conclusion. For one high level supervisor who had received his education at a university, the composition of the work force that he required was as follows: 3 or 4 technicians who had received their training at the Polytechnic Institute; 10 to 12 craftsmen, trained at the Vocational Training Center; 32 to 36 skilled workers who were graduates of the Trade Training Center and 48 to 50 unskilled workers.

By imposing such an organizational structure, the officials responsible for reorganizing the job market created a true labor hierarchy with highly specialized categories. Instruction at the level of the Vocational Training Center and the

Polytechnic Institute lasts 2 years. It is free of charge but the students are required to remain at the service of the national economy for a period of 4 years. However, they may buy their way out of their contract by paying the sum of 1600 dinars, which is the equivalent of approximately 24,000 French francs. As for the skilled workers, once they are graduated from the Trade Training Center and have had 2 years of certified experience in their trades, they are given the title of "craftsman."

Actually, all of these measures, which are intended to be more effective in confining the worker to his country, have resulted in being only partially successful since the newly trained technicians sometimes leave the country and "forget" to pay their debts and since some of the less skilled workers do not hesitate to abandon their trade for a better paying one. The Jordanian government as well as the International Labor Office estimate that, in spite of these measures, 40 percent of Jordanian workers leave for the Gulf nations after completing their training.

Defeat or Not?

Jordanian officials do not agree with this view. In fact, they maintain that the free flow of manpower is essential to the observance of human rights and to the national economy. It is true that such a situation is not completely disadvantageous for the following reasons:

It is estimated that 170 million dinars (2.6 million French francs) are returned each year by migrant workers. This results in considerably improving the condition of the nation's finances. Furthermore, the Jordanian economy would be quite incapable of suddenly absorbing the 250,000 to 300,000 workers who are now living abroad. In fact, there essentially exists a shortage of "unskilled" labor in Jordan. Finally and most of all, the migrant workers serve as ambassadors of Jordanian know-how and contribute to the influence of their country while simultaneously acquiring experience and diplomas abroad which will be useful upon their return to their home country.

Moreover, rather than suddenly cutting off these transfers of skilled labor, the Jordanian Government has considered it preferable to try to control them, in order to benefit from them as much as possible. Among the measures taken for keeping better track of the emigrating or immigrating workers, the signing of bilateral agreements with the nations that import or export labor appears to be the most effective. Libya and Pakistan have been the first countries which have been asked by Jordan to do this. The agreements with the Libyan Government provide that the latter will only authorize the admission of workers who have been duly sent by the Jordanian Minister of Labor. This measure was presented by the Jordanian government, not as an attempt to constrain freedom of movement, but as an aid to keeping count of Jordanians working abroad. By the same token, this arrangement permits the Jordanian authorities to prevent the departure of experts as soon as the threat of a shortage within a certain category of employment arises. The agreement concluded with the Pakistani Government essentially permits improving the lot of Pakistani workers who are generally victims of the approximately 900 more or less shady employment agencies that recruit workers in Pakistan for service in Middle Eastern countries.

Encouraged by these preliminary results, the Jordanian authorities are now trying to conclude identical agreements with Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrein, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. They would even like to organize a conference for assembling the representatives of Arab nations that export manpower, this conference to be sponsored by the Arab Labor Office or the International Labor Office. They believe that such a meeting would permit better organization of the labor market at a regional level, establishment of a labor code for migrant labor (guarantees concerning salaries, social rights, etc.) and development of a system of compensation for the labor exporting nations so that they may recover the expenses incurred in training experts who will then be working abroad.

Moreover, a new breed of official is now appearing in certain Jordanian embassies, namely, the labor attache. These attaches, who are already on the job at Kuwait and Abu Dhabi and are being planned for at Riyad, Tripoli and Bonn (West Germany), are charged with the mission of keeping a watchful eye on the interests of their migrant countrymen.

The Women's Place

As in other Arab countries, Jordanian women constitute nearly 50 percent of the nation's active force. To be sure, the proportion of women obtaining jobs is still very low. Without seriously attacking time-honored traditions, but determined to promote social progress, Jordan had progressively opened up the job market to females. In 1976, only 4 percent of women were employed. By 1979, this figure had increased to 12 percent. Jordanian authorities now admit that, without the advent of the female sex to the job market, the country would now be suffering from a severe crisis. To be sure, women have not yet received admission to all types of employment. However, in certain specific areas, their numbers have been steadily increasing. By 1979, the percentage of women employed in certain professions had already reached the following levels: 34 percent in bookstores, museums or libraries; 17 percent as dentists; 11 percent as pharmacists and 5 percent as physicians. In the area of skilled labor, 55 percent of secretaries and 60 percent of clothing workers were women.

The Jordanian women have therefore indeed found their place in the national economy. Fifty percent of the youth below the age of 24 consists of girls. This group constitutes a labor force that is less likely to be tempted to go abroad and is therefore more stable. The problem lies in the lack of willingness displayed by the government to absorb women into their organization. Only the private sector is opening up, although it is still doing this slowly. This is insufficient to change the present employment situation significantly.

Conscious that it must control the changes in the skilled manpower situation, Jordan appears to be the driving force in the regional dialogue that brings together all the nations that are concerned with employment problems. By the lucidity of its analyses and the candor of its conclusions, it presents itself as the responsible leader whose principal concern is the search for reasonable and consequently effective solutions. The rank that it holds in the skilled labor market, the care imparted to the training of its technicians, even if these are destined to expatriation, and the reasonable opening up of the job market to women make Jordan a pilot nation. More and more people, Arabs and non-Arabs, are entering into discussions with representatives of the Jordanian Government. Together,

they are trying to lay the foundations of a close cooperative effort which should make it possible to overcome a crisis whose seriousness is obvious to everyone.

If the political events which are shaking up the Middle East so dramatically do not once again manage to sweep away all the efforts of the Jordanian government, the latter, with its skilled manpower, will hold the key to true wealth in this region.

7619
CSO: 4800

ELECTIONS PUT OFF UNTIL GULF WAR ENDS

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 17 Nov 80 p 5

[Text]

The Gulf war has brought sleepless nights for Kuwaiti leaders and their nervousness was increased sharply last week when an unidentified aircraft fired two rockets at the Kuwaiti border post at Abdali. The attack caused no damage or casualties on the gound, but it sent tremors through world foreign exchange markets, boosting an already strengthening dollar as Gulf money sought a haven.

Another casualty in the war is likely to be the parliamentary elections planned for the beginning of next year in Kuwait. A correspondent reports that these elections have been postponed until the end of the war and a return to normal conditions in the Gulf.

Our correspondent writes:

The Kuwaiti government has said nothing so far about putting off the elections, but officials have suspended preparatory work for the poll. The move did not really come as a surprise: even without the war between Iraq and Iran, there were plenty of reasons why there is likely to be continuing tension in the Gulf. They include the likelihood that US foreign policy during Ronald Reagan's Presidency will be characterised by deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union; coupled with the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, South Yemen and Ethiopia and the revolution in Iran, this worsening of relations seems bound to add up to continuing tension for Gulf states.

As a substitute for the elections and in order to placate opposition to their postponement, Kuwait's Deputy Prime Minister Sheikh Jaber al-Ali al-Salem al-Sabbah has proposed the creation of an appointed Council of Sages, bringing together political and cultural leaders as well as tribal and trades union leaders. The council would have consultative and legislative powers, although its precise jurisdiction has not been spelled out.

A final decision on postponing the elections and the appointment of a council is expected within the next few weeks. If the war is ended quickly, elections will be held. Otherwise, uncertainty hangs over a return to parliamentary rule in Kuwait.

CSO: 4820

VERDICT GIVEN IN NEWSPAPER BOMBING

Two Convicted

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 16 Nov 80 p 1

[Article by Zakaria Al Qaq]

[Text]

THE State Security Court, delivering its verdict in the Al Rai Al Aam explosion case yesterday, sentenced one of the accused to death and another to life imprisonment with hard labour.

A third accused was pronounced not guilty. The three were charged with murder and possessing explosives.

The man condemned to death, Rouhi Ibrahim Abdul Latif, 23, worked as a guard at the office of Al Fatah commando group here.

He was found guilty of planting, explosives in the printing press of Al Rai Al Aam newspaper, which killed two people, injured 18 others and destroyed the press on July 12.

The third accused, Jihad Mezyid Amin, 36, a major in Al Fatah commando group, was found innocent by the court.

CONSCIENCE

After reviewing the statements of the prosecution, the text of the investigations and the medical reports about alleged use of force against Rouhi the court, said it was guided by conscience in giving more weight to a particular set of evidence than to another.

SISTER

The defence plea that confessions made by during the investigations were invalid because these were extracted under duress were not accepted by the court on the ground that all evidence indicated that Rouhi knew what he was doing when he made the confessions.

Besides, he had given minute details of the operation.

At one time Rouhi said he was intimated by the police, and at another he said he was afraid of the general prosecutor.

He then reversed his statements and said he had confessed as a result of threats made against his sister.

In its judgment, the court held that the second accused Wayil Abdul Latif, played a limited role and his confession of the crime help the CID in its investigations.

The court therefore took a lenient view according to the Kuwaiti law, and sentenced him to life imprisonment.

All three men are Jordanian nationals.

One Acquitted

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 16 Nov 80 p 1

[Text]

JIHAD Mesyid Amin (right) the third accused, was released as the court found the evidence against him to be dubious. Amin, 36, has the rank of a major in Al Fatah commando group.

The court took note of the CID Inspector's statement that he had no information if the third accused had instigated others to commit the crime and that he had no further investigations to conduct in this matter.

The court, therefore, gave the accused benefit of doubt and released him.

Publisher's Testimony

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 16 Nov 80 p 5

[Text]

THE Rai Al Aam blast which caused the death of two press workers on July 12, was instigated by Iran, according to the newspaper's publisher Abdul Aziz Al Masaeed.

In his testimony before the court, which was disclosed yesterday, he said that he had realiable information in March and May that "an organisation which had strong ties with Iran" was being instigated to blow up the press or to kill him.

He told the court Iran was enraged by his newspaper's stand in denouncing demonstrations by Kuwaiti Iranians. He recalled that the paper had called upon the Kuwait government to strip unpatriotic people of their Kuwaiti nationality.

Al Masa'eed's testimony was recorded in camera shortly before the trial of three men accused in the case was completed last month.

One of the accused was given the death sentence when judgment was passed yesterday. Another was given life term and hard labour while the third walked out of court a free man. (See story on page one).

Al Masaeed said the source that gave him the plot against the press did not name the organisation but he could make his own conclusions.

EDITION

Al Masa'eed said believed that it could be the Palestinian Al Fatah organisation as it had strong links with the revolutionary regime in Iran and was engaged in battles in Southern Lebanon predominanty populated by Shi'ites.

"Only Khomeini and his government could protect the organisation from these Lebanese Shi'ites," Aziz Al Masa'eed said.

He also held that the Iranian government had grudges against Kuwait for its decision to withdraw the nationality from Al Muhri family which had been deported from Kuwait on charges of sowing seeds of sedition through speeches in mosques against the government.

"In my opinion, there are common interests between the Iranian government and Al Fatah organisation," Al Masa'eed asserted. He ruled out the possibility that the incident could have been prompted by the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria or by the Phalangists of Lebanon. He also said he could not accept the plea given by the second accused to the effect that they had blown up the paper merely to kill one of the workers. "He who wants to kill a man does not blow up the whole place for that," he said.

He affirmed that the paper followed a purely Kuwaiti

policy. "We are not tilted towards Egypt, Syria or any other regime for that matter," he said. "Egypt in particular cannot be involved as it has no record of violent political activity in Beirut and has never been engaged in blast incidents or circulating leaflets," he added.

Aziz Al Masa'eed also categorically denied that the Beirut-based Al Amal Organisation, could be involved, contrary to what was mentioned in the cable received from the Kuwaiti Embassy in Beirut. He said that from what he knew about that organisation he felt quite sure that it was incapable of planning or carrying out the blast. "I am also on good terms with a government that deals with that organisation," he said. "I could have been tipped off if the organisation was planning anything against me or my paper," he said.

He also denied that the Libyan Cultural Attache in Kuwait was providing him with material against Imam Al Musa Sadr with a view to maligning the Imam. He said that the publication of an alleged message from Imam Al Sadr could not have supplied enough motive for a crime like this.

It may be mentioned that during investigation, the CID had revealed that the incident had a political motive and that there was a link between the accused and the Palestinian Fatah organisation. The CID were inclined to believe that a certain political organisation had used the defendants to carry out the blast crime offering them money.

Earlier, a cable received by Kuwait's Foreign Ministry from the Kuwait Ambassador in Beirut had warned that an organisation affiliated to "Al-Amal" was planning to blow up the Al Rai Al Aam newspaper because of articles abusing the Shi'ite Imam Al Sadr. The cable also mentioned that the Libyan Cultural Attache in Kuwait was the source of the Al Rai Al Aam publisher in his writings against Imam Al Sadr.

Al Masa'eed supported the affirmation of his father, Aziz Al Masa'eed that Fatah organisation planned and carried out the explosion.

The Press Manager testified that the paper had carried an article attacking Muslim Brothers.

The General Manager said in his statement that the paper was following a nationalist policy and took a firm stand against Camp David and the Phalangists of Lebanon.

CSO: 4820

KIC SEEN AS MOST ACTIVE ARAB BOND COMPANY

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 15 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by John Evans]

[Text]

LONDON, Fri. — The big financial group, Kuwait Investment Company (KIC), has established itself as the most active Arab institution in the $15 billion-a-year international bond market.

In the first nine months of 1980, KIC arranged a total of three international bonds or notes, totalling $104.5 million, for its customers.

This placed it 32nd in world rankings, with a 0.9 per cent share of the international bond markets, a survey of the markets by the influential British financial magazine, Euromoney disclosed today.

By contrast, the top ranking bank in the international bond markets is West Germany's powerful Deutsche Bank, which gained a 12.8 per cent share of the market. It led 22 bond issues totalling $1.3 billion in the period.

The Euromoney survey is based on all currencies used in inter-national bond investment, and restricted to banks which act as sole lead managers or joint lead managers of issues.

SIXTH RANK

KIC in fact performed even more notably in one currency sector, that for French francs. It was the sixth most active institution in French bond issues, managing one bond of 133.3 million francs.

Western bankers consider the heightened activity of Arab banks in the international investment and capital markets to be one of the most significant trends of the last couple of years, considering it a key Mid-East contribution to world financial stability through the re-distribution of surplus oil export earnings back into the international economy.

Last year, the most active Arab banks in the bond markets were Kuwait Foreign Trading, Contracting and Investment Co, with three issues, and the Kuwait International Investment Company, with six issues.

Those institutions remain extremely active in the bond markets, but do not show highly on the Euromoney "League tables" because of the way in which the statistics are compiled.

For example, Kuwait International Investment Co has managed issues so far this year in the Eurocurrency investment markets totalling about $1.5 billion, including floatations for Swedish, Hungarian, British, Japanese, Canadian and Arab borrowers.

RANGE

The range of the currencies it managed included US dollars Kuwaiti dinars, Canadian dollars and special drawing rights — the international currency "basket."

In dividing up the bond markets into sectors, KIC recorded 18th place in the flat-rate note division, managing one issue totalling $50 million. The leader of this section was France's Societe Generale, with two issues totalling $400 million.

Meanwhile, the Kuwaiti dinar sector of the international bond markets has declined this year, partly because of the economic upheavals around the world.

According to Euromoney, only one KD issue was floated in the January-September period, bringing down the Kuwaiti currency's share of the bond markets to 0.2 per cent compared with 2.6 per cent last year.

In the first nine months of the year, a total of new issues amounting to $13.6 billion was floated around the world, in all currencies.

Euromoney also publishes tables showing the most active banks arranging international syndicated loans.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

MALDIVE LOAN--A loan agreement was signed yesterday between the Republic of Maldives and Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) whereby the Fund will make a loan of KD 2.9 million to help finance the fish-wealth exploitation project. The loan agreement was signed on behalf of the Republic of Maldives by Abdul Sattar Amir, minister of fisheries. Abdul Rahman Salem Al Ateeqi, chairman of Kuwait Fund board of directors and the minister of finance, signed on behalf of the Fund. The project aims at increasing the production of fish for the purpose of export, a matter which will increase the foreign currency earnings of Maldives. Total cost of the project is estimated at KD 4 million of which 73 per cent is covered by the Fund. The loan will be for a period of 20 years including 5 years period of grace, and will be amortised in 30 semi annual instalments the first of which will fall due on 15.12. 1985 and the last on 15.6.2000. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 6 Nov 80 p 2]

JAPAN AIR LINE LOAN--Kuwait International Investment Company (KIIC) will lead in a US $40 million international issue for Japan Air Lines (JAL), a company statement said yesterday. The loan will be at 8.8 per cent interest payable half yearly, and the issue will be guaranteed by Japan Industrial Bank, it will fall due in 1990. A number of Arab and international banks will colead in the issue which will be registered at Luxembourg stock exchange. This is the first time that an Arab financial institution leads in a public issue in favour of a Japanese borrower, the statement added. KUNA [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 6 Nov 80 p 2]

LABOR STATISTICS--Over 7000 establishments in Kuwait were inspected by representatives of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour during 1977, a report said last Sunday. During the periodical checks over 5000 contraventions of labour legislations were spotted by inspectors who were assigned for the purpose. The establishments employed over 19,000 labourers and contraventions were estimated at 75%. In another drive which covered 6,000 establishments employing over 10,000 workers, the per centage dropped to 73%, the report said. Contraventions included excessive working hours, wages and wrongly imposed penalties on workers. Only 1,657 establishments comprising 27% of industrial employers were found to be adhering strictly to labour laws, the report said. A total of 3,495 contraventions were sent to courts and some 4,000 warnings were made to industrial establishments, the report said. The inspection is part of a plan for the protection of the labour force and to ensure the application of Labour legislations and proper employment of women and children. The programme is to ensure

labour safety and that wages are paid in accordance with current legislations. The plan which came into force in 1977 is gradually expanded to cover all industrial establishments and was recently expanded to include schools, banks, airline firms and cooperative societies. The service is also applied in non-government hospitals, kindergartens and pharmacies. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 15 Nov 80 pp 18-19]

BOMB DEFUSED--Bomb experts went to the premises of the Social Reform Society and safely defused a bomb which had been found on the premises yesterday evening, the Chief of Security in Hawalli governorate said. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 18 Nov 80 p 1]

SEA FRONT PROJECT--Kuwait Municipality concluded a contract for the implementation of a KD 120-million project for the improvement of the sea front. The project extending from Shuwaikh to Salmiyah will be executed in six phases under the supervision of an international consultancy firm. The project will include the construction of recreational sites and social centres in addition to an open theatre and a yachting harbour. The final stage of the project will involve the preparation of sand beaches, cafaterias, restaurants and a series of gardens. KUNA [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 8 Nov 80 p 3]

EMERGENCY SHELTERS--The Ministry of Public Health will soon put up signs indicating the location of emergency shelters. The shelters, mainly in government buildings, schools and police stations, are aimed at the safety of people in case of emergencies. Official sources said the plan had been contemplated since quite some time and the current tense situation in the region had prompted the authorities to speed up the process. The move is the first one in a series of plans aimed at civil defence. [Text] [Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 8 Nov 80 p 3]

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

COUNCIL APPROVES 1980 BUDGET--The Ministerial Council met yesterday under the chairmanship of Lt Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haydala, president of the Military Committee of National Salvation and head of state and government. During this meeting, the council examined and approved the budget for the 1980 [as heard] fiscal year. The budget, which is balanced and totals 10.4 billion ouguiya is characterized by austerity and discipline in revenue collection and expenditure estimates in conformity with the military committee of national salvation's directives. Thus, the budget deficit, which was 5.49 billion ouguiya in 1978 has been reduced to 2.21 billion ouguiya. Special emphasis was placed on rural development fishing and the marine economy by extending large credits to the regional development fund and to the fishing development and territorial water surveillance fund. Finally, tax relief was granted to the low income group and a salary increase was granted to civil servants who earn less than 15,000 ouguiya. [Text] [AB091558 Nouakchott Domestic Service in French 1400 GMT 9 Dec 80]

CSO: 4400

KUWAIT TO BECOME 'FAVORED PORT' IN AREA

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 14 Nov 80 p 2

[Article by John Evans: "Kuwait Poised To Be Key Gulf Shipping Centre"]

[Text]

LONDON, Thurs. — Kuwait is poised for a potentially massive expansion as a shipping and transporting centre, and is increasingly becoming the favoured Gulf port of many big international shipping lines.

This is the conclusion of a Kuna survey among western shipping, freighting and transporting organisations, as they re-evaluate the Gulf area's trading prospects in the wake of the Iraqi-Iranian war

The wide-ranging reconstruction requirements in Iraq and Iran as a result of war damage, requiring huge amounts of concrete, structural steel and many other imported items, points to a central role for Kuwait as developing its role as a key Gulf transshipment centre, the survey of western expectations shows.

Iran alone is estimated to need to spend some $20 billion in re-constructing its oil installations, particularly the big Abadan complex.

Kuwait has already felt the impact of the conflict, as foreign shippers diverted their Iran or Iraq-bound cargoes to Kuwaiti ports. Goods have piled up on the Kuwaiti docksides.

UPTURN

In the event that hostilities cease, Kuwait with its key land links with Iraq and Iran — will be in the centre of an international scramble to ship re-construction materials and goods in, particularly to Iraq, western shipping and business analysts say.

In fact, the whole of Kuwait and its economy will undoubtedly be affected by the reconstruction "boom" and the oil state will itself undergo a brisk business upturn, according to western analysts. Additionally, plans for railway links with Iraq and Kuwait's other neighbours may well have to be advanced for the huge volume of transshipment forecast.

"We can see Kuwait for an indefinite period becoming the key Arab port in the Gulf," says one European shipping line.

The view in Europe is that Iraq's own big ports complex, Basrah, will not be able to handle the huge influx of materials necessitated by re-construction. In recent years, Basrah has been stretched to handle Iraq's own normal imports, and lengthy delays and congestion have often been experienced.

The Iranian port of Khorramshahr is now felt in the west to be very vulnerable, with Iran turning to its Gulf ports as alternatives.

The eventual sovereignty issue of the Shatt-Al-Arab, which Iraq is now claiming, raises grave question marks over the future of Khorramshahr, western analysts say.

INFRASTRUCTURE

The port of Bandar Abbas, right on the mouth of the Gulf and Bandar Khomeini, are seen as the two main Iranian shipping centres in coming years. But Chabahar, right on Iran's border with Pakistan, may also be built up, analysts say.

But such expansion, requiring back-up infrastructure, such as good road and rail links, could be hampered in the initial phase.

Other Gulf ports, as well as Kuwait, may share in the Iraqi-Iran reconstruction upturn.

But Dubai could face setbacks once the war ceases and if Iran releases the US hostages and reaches an agreement with America.

Says one Western analyst, "It is an open secret that Dubai is used as a transshipment centre for embargoed goods into Iran, in order to overcome the Western trade boycotts against Iran."

He added, "when and if the embargo is dropped, lower Gulf ports could stand to lose a lot of useful trade.".

But Western shippers do confess to some worries over whether Kuwait can easily accommodate a two, three or even four-fold increase in traffic through its ports complex, as business builds up.

One of the most pressing needs, they consider, is to build up Kuwait's facilities for container traffic, centred on the requirement of large container cranes.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

GROWTH OF FERTILIZER INDUSTRY--The Gulf Arab states will be able to export one million tons of ammonia and two million tons of urea fertilisers by the end of the decade, according to a special bulletin of the Arab Federation of Chemical Fertiliser Products. The availability of the natural gas as the basic raw material in the fertiliser industry will allow the Gulf states to be competitive in the world market, said the bulletin. The industry was first started during the mid-1960s in Kuwait with two plants for ammonia and urea. At present, $3.4 bn have already been invested in fertiliser industries in the region and indications are that the figure will rise by the end of the decade to $5.5 billion. New fertiliser industries still under construction in the Gulf, will increase the present annual capacity of 2.4 mn tons of ammonia and 3.4 mn of urea to almost double by the mid-1980s. A surplus, intended for exports, is expected before the end of the decade. To secure and develop the industry, the Gulf states are now heading towards joint projects. Examples are the Saudi venture with Bahrain and Kuwait for the production of Ammonia, while others are between Tunisia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. [Text] [Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 15 Nov 80 p 17]

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

STATE BUDGET UP--Allocations for major public projects in the new Qatari budget are about 20 per cent higher than last year and total about QR 6 billion ($1.65 billion), it was announced last week. Although this sector continues to receive the lion's share of public spending, it is relatively less important than in earlier years, since the budget total has jumped by 34 per cent, from QR 6.7 billion ($1.8 billion) in 1979-80 to about QR 9 billion ($2.5 billion) in the fiscal year beginning on November 8. Announcing the new budget last week, Finance and Petroleum Minister Sheikh Abdulaziz bin Khalifa al-Thani said that about half the money allocated for major projects would be spent on industrial, agricultural and petrochemical ventures. Industrial development alone accounted for 36 per cent of the sums earmarked last year. No details of spending under the new budget are yet available. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 24 Nov 80 p 6]

REFINERY CONTRACT--Qatar's General Petroleum Company, which runs the state's oil and gas industry, has awarded a $140 million contract to the French firm Technip for a turnkey oil refinery with a capacity of 50,000 barrels a day, it was announced last week. The plant will be located at Umm Said, south of Doha, where Qatar's existing refineries are situated. Refining capacity at present is about 55,000 b/d for crude. Technip, which is believed to have beaten off fierce competition to win the order, won a similar contract three years ago to participate in the Umm Said petrochemicals complex. THe firm was responsible for an ethylene plant producing 280,000 tonnes a year, which is due to become fully operational about now. Qatar's crude production is about 500,000 b/d, much of which is exported to France. The new refinery will process oil produced onshore and will include storage facilities for intermediate and refined products. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 24 Nov 80 p 6]

CSO: 4820

RESEARCH DEEMED ESSENTIAL FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 17 Nov 80 p 5

[Article by Muhammad al-Sulayman: "Research Is Means to Agricultural Development; Riyadh University's Agricultural Experimentation Station Tests Irrigation and Crop Development Methods That Are Most Suitable to Climate Conditions; Experiments Conducted for the First Time To Compute Actual Water Needs of Plants; Sprinkler Irrigation System Proves To Be Least Wasteful Despite High Cost"]

[Text] The development of the agricultural sector is a matter of considerable interest in Saudi development plans since agriculture will become the second prop next to industry for the Saudi economy in the post-oil period. Agricultural production will also become a principal source for ensuring food to citizens of the homeland. Since the mutation of agricultural products cannot be imported in the manner in which technology and industrial machinery are imported, due to special environmental conditions, which are unlike those of any other environment, it was inevitable that agricultural products be developed in accordance with the conditions of the environment itself and with what is suitable to it. Hence comes the importance of establishing agricultural experimentation stations. These are set up by the Ministry of Agriculture and Water in various areas of the kingdom, and they are also set up by scientific organizations and universities.

Riyadh University's agricultural experimentation station, which is highlighted in this report, is carrying out this function in addition to the other scientific functions which it is providing to researchers and students at the university's College of Agriculture. The area of the station, which is located in the district of Dirab, south of Riyadh, is estimated to be 6,000 dunums. About 400 dunums in that station are being cultivated at present for educational purposes, for research and for guidance.

We met with station director, Dr 'Atallah Abu Hasan who told us about the purpose of establishing the station and about the cooperation [that was taking place] between it and other agencies to achieve the interests of the public.

Dr Abu Hasan said, "The purpose [behind such a station] is that any student in the colleges of agriculture or in other colleges needs to have botanical gardens for cultivating different kinds of plants. He also needs model fields so he can practice the agricultural operations of agricultural production. The student can thus be introduced to the different kinds of plants during their life cycle. The student learns how to treat the plants and maintain them under normal field conditions. The student also learns about all the operations that take place to immunize the plants. He also learns about harvest operations and crop preparation.

"At these experimental stations the student sees all these operations at the times when they are carried out. The student himself is also trained in the latter stages of his education in carrying out the various agricultural activities. For him, agriculture thus becomes not [just] a subject to be studied in books, but rather a concrete fact which he can see. He can obtain agricultural training in accordance with the most modern technological methods that are in use. By the time he graduates, a student would have practiced the science and the art of agriculture."

Developing Agricultural Technology To Suit the Environment

"A station for research and studies has also been set up because agriculture is an art and an industry that is very closely tied to the environment. Despite the dire need and the urgent necessity for using modern technology in agriculture and for importing new and advanced ideas from the countries that are advanced in agriculture, we must develop these methods and try them under the conditions of the local environment. No matter how similar the local environment is to other environments, it will not be identical to them. Hence emerges the importance of the research and the experiments that take place in the local environment so that the best means can be selected and those which are most suitable to the agricultural environment and the rural society that prevails in our country can be identified. Every imported agricultural innovation is worthless in this field until its success can be established under the conditions of our agricultural environment. There are also numerous problems which farmers and producers encounter. These problems may pertain to plants, water or pests that attack the plants and cause production to be weak. Finding solutions to these problems and difficulties which face farmers and producers becomes a necessity. The only way such problems and difficulties can be solved is by research and study. Experiments provide the only means through which solutions and suggestions can be made for overcoming difficulties. This station was established to conduct these experiments and to provide the results to farmers as well as producers."

Courses for Farmers

"Through the College of Agriculture the station offers specialized training courses to those working in the agricultural field for the purpose of upgrading their professional standards. The station also sets up the programs for these courses.

"The station also hosts the trainees in some of the training programs so as to acquaint them with the areas of production and with the agricultural activities that take place at the station."

The station has its own administrative organization which is suitable to the nature of the goals with which it has been charged. This organization produces a close tie between the station and the various scientific divisions.

A station director has been appointed. He has many administrative and executive powers; he manages and supervises personnel, and he also supervises all the activities on the farm in general. He makes administrative and financial decisions in the context of the farm to ensure the proper course of work on the farm. A special committee named the farm committee has also been formed. Its function is to discuss the farm's general policy, the implementation priorities of that policy and other scientific activities that take place on the farm since it is a station for agricultural experiments and research. Every member of the committee deals with his area of specialization. There is also an assistant who oversees the farm's technical units. Committee members are responsible for meeting the needs of these units, each in his area of specialization.

Carrying Out the Experiments

Mr Khadr Abu 'Isa, the station's immediate supervisor spoke about the technical units and said, "The farm is divided into a number of technical units. An agricultural engineer is responsible for each unit; and a number of workers is assigned to each unit. Every unit conducts experiments and oversees the agricultural operations that take place within that unit. Each unit has full responsibility for all the activities related to these experiments that take place in it. These units are:

"The maintenance and equipment unit. These units [sic] concern themselves with the maintenance of agricultural machinery since a large number of machines have been available to the farm which has become self-sufficient with regard to equipment. Farms now prepare [the soil], cultivate it and harvest [the crop] without delay. There are plowing machines, tractors, harvesting machines and seeding devices. A special workshop has been set up with a number of specialized technicians who repair and maintain all the machines on the farm.

"There is a field crops unit which oversees and conducts experiments on existing crops like clover and wheat. A number of agricultural engineers conduct these experiments. About 200 dunums are designated for field crops. These are irrigated by spraying. This area may be expanded in the future.

"There is a horticulture and fruits unit which oversees the orchards and the fruit trees. There is a plan to cultivate 170 dunums with fruit trees. These will be irrigated by modern irrigation: sprinkler

irrigation. There are also 50 dunums cultivated with palms, and there are farms for grapes, apples, oranges and plums. Some of these fruits are not suitable to the environment, but the experimental cultivation of these fruits has nevertheless been successful. These experiments try to select varieties that are suitable to the environment so they can be cultivated. This unit is divided into several orchards, and each orchard is cultivated with a specific variety [of fruit].

"There is a prevention unit which oversees the farm by checking the plants for pests such as insects and bacteria. This unit sprays the cultivated plants periodically with pesticides to protect them from diseases to which they may be subjected.

"There is a forestry unit which was set up recently and is confined to 40 dunums. These donums are planted with forest trees and irrigated by sprinklers. There is also a vegetables unit which concerns itself with experiments on vegetables and activities to follow-up on these experiments."

Solutions to Irrigation Problems

Irrigation is considered an important factor for the success of any project for farmers because of the importance of water to plants and because water is not available in large quantities in our land. Therefore, we must find solutions to reduce water loss and to give the plants no more and no less than the water they need. Dr Mahmud Hassan 'Abd-al-'Aziz, who supervises irrigation experiments, spoke about [the progress] achieved by science in discovering and improving methods of irrigation.

He says, "I conducted several experiments at the station to reduce water loss and to control irrigation averages so that irrigation would meet the actual needs of the plants with no water loss. This is being done through systematic distribution that guarantees the most suitable conditions for growth. There is no doubt that one of the methods, which is the sprinkler irrigation method, not only achieves the goal, but is also superior to the other high-efficiency irrigation systems such as irrigation by spraying and sub-surface irrigation.

"There is also a fully automatic device on the farm for regulating irrigation procedures. A special system that is suitable to each crop has been set up."

The Pros and Cons of a Sprinkler Irrigation System

A sprinkler irrigation system is considered under many of the conditions that are critical for other irrigation systems to provide the best and the ideal solution. It is known that surface and sub-surface irrigation methods fail completely in the case of sandy soil or water with a high salt content. Irrigation by spraying also damages the plants: the leaves burn because of the high salt content of the water. The case is also the same for sandy soils in areas that are characterized by high winds.

The basic idea behind sprinkler irrigation rests on the notion of supplying the plants with the water and nutrients they need through small openings or outlets located near the roots of these plants. The water and the nutrients flow to the plants repeatedly or continuously at very small rates so as to give the roots of the plant the humidity that is suitable and adequate to the plant's needs at all times. The humidity of the soil may be allowed to fluctuate between 80 and 100 percent, and this would benefit the plant. The plant would thus not suffer the strain of trying to get the water it needs.

Sprinkler irrigation devices vary in shape, design and operating [method], but they all have a main device which includes the various control mechanisms and connects the water source or the principal water line to the distribution pipes that are laid out near the rows of plants. It is on these pipes that the openings or the outlets which provide the soil and the plants with nutrients are located. Water is distributed [through these openings] simply, slowly and under very low pressure. A sprinkler irrigation method makes the area where the roots are located always humid through the repeated flow of water, and this reduces the salinity that affects the plant.

There is no doubt that a sprinkler irrigation system is costly. This is due to the fact that capital is necessary for purchasing the pipes, the filters, the sprinklers and the various control devices. But before going ahead and adopting such a system, one must study all the analytical considerations such as cost per unit area for the crop; the alternative cost in case another system is utilized; and also the anticipated return under the conditions of the various methods. A comprehensive study of all the factors that affect the design [of the system] is also necessary, such as the area of the land; the source, quantity and quality of the water; and selection of the proper place for the control devices.

Before the system is put into operation, filters are to be washed, agricultural fertilizers prepared, and the device with all its parts is to be selected, attended to and maintained periodically. In addition to the various irrigation systems in the station, there is an experiment that is being carried out to compute the plants' actual water needs. This is considered the first such experiment in the Middle East.

Modern Equipment

There are numerous buildings on the farm that serve the purposes of scientific research, training, guidance and managing and maintaining the various facilities of the farm. There is a farm administration building; there are homes for the agricultural engineers which consist of 12 units with their facilities; there is also a building for housing workers; and there is a building for managing the seedlings for the campus in al-Dara'iyah.

Three warehouses have also been built; each warehouse has an area of 300 square meters.

These warehouses were built in different locations on the farm so that the highest degrees of flexibility in operations and use can be achieved. A maintenance workshop has also been built; it has been equipped with the most modern devices, and its other requirements are being completed.

Four greenhouses have been built; two of them are for experiments and research, and the others are for growing seedlings.

Each one of the greenhouses is air-conditioned and fully equipped with devices which can be controlled according to the steps and conditions of an experiment. All the equipment in the greenhouses works automatically and can be activated by the control keys of the cooling or heating devices. [These control keys also] control the irrigation system or the direction of the sun's rays. This equipment is considered the most modern in the world. Included among the preparations that were made for the station was the construction of a 300 kilowatt power station. It has two generators, each with a 150 kilowatt capacity. The power station was designed to accommodate a third generator in the future. There is also a meteorological station on the farm furnished with the most modern equipment. It was built for the purpose of establishing full records of the climatic conditions that pertain to agricultural activities so that researchers can benefit from them in the research and experiments they conduct on the farm. The farm has also been furnished with numerous modern machines that are required by the variety of activities and operating requirements of the most modern scientific methods in accordance with special standards that are consistent with climatic and environmental conditions in the kingdom.

Conducting Scientific Research

The station director spoke about the cooperation between the station and other agencies.

He said, "The research station participates in many of the activities of the other government institutions. The college has consistently contributed its technical capabilities to [the activities of] Tree Week during the last few years. During that week the station provides assistance in guidance, and the college cooperates with the National Center for Science and Technology in the area of research where four research projects that pertain to agricultural production are underway.

"All the agricultural activities that pertain to planting and preparing seedlings, decorative plants and gardens take place at the research station. These activities are needed by the college buildings and administrations on the campus of Riyadh University on al-Dara'iyah Road.

"The college offers training courses in the agricultural field to workers and engineers.

"The station cooperated with the Ministry of Trade which had asked that experiments be conducted to find out how much oil there was in a certain kind of decorative plant. These experiments were carried out; the percentage of oil was estimated; and [the results] were submitted to the Ministry of Trade."

Future Plan for the Station

The station is trying to offer services and to achieve the goals to which the kingdom is aspiring: progress and advancement in agricultural production. Officials in the College of Agriculture try to make the station's work easier, and they try to ensure all its needs. When water becomes available, the station hopes that the cultivated terrain will be expanded in all the areas of the station and that those areas which need reclamation will be incorporated into programs whose objective will be to reclaim those areas on an experimental basis. The station also hopes that the area which is cultivated with fruit trees--about 250 dunums--will be doubled and that fruit trees will be grown and studied.

A building for students will be built where they can live during the training period, while experiments are being conducted.

The station will also seek to expand [its activities] in the field of agricultural research so that solutions to problems that face farmers in all areas of the kingdom can be found. The station will become a center for disseminating the most modern methods and results [in agriculture] that are based on scientific research. The farmer and producer can be guided by these methods and results in their field of production. The station will take part in training the professional staff who work in the agricultural sector because it has modern and technologically advanced methods in the field of agriculture.

8592
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

CRUDE OIL EXPORTS DOWN--Oman's crude oil exports fell from a total of 9.2 million barrels in September to 8.5 million bbl last month, an average of about 275,000 b/d, Petroleum Department Oman announced. No explanation was given for the drop. Oman's terminal outlets, which all lie east of the Straits of Hormuz, have not been affected by the fighting between Iraq and Iran, while the halt in supplies from those two countries has meant that there is a market for as much oil as Oman wishes to export. The official price of Oman's crude is $33.40 per bbl, while the government was recently asking an additional $3.10 per bbl for contract sales. This is well below prevailing spot prices. The September export level was higher than the monthly average of about 9 million bbl achieved in 1979. It remained substantially lower than the 360,000 b/d average which the Omani Minister of Trade and Industry, Muhamad Zubair, recently told this newsletter was the official short-term export target. [Text] [Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 24 Nov 80 p 8]

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24 December 1980

NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2237

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PLO LEADER VIEWS SENATOR PERCY STATEMENT ON PALESTINIAN STATE

DW091015 Frankfurt Hessischer Rundfunk Network in German 1210 GMT 8 Dec 80

[Excerpts from interview with 'Abdallah al-Ifranji, PLO representative in the Bonn Bureau of the Arab league by reporter Buschlueter--recorded]

[Text] [Question] Did you learn from the papers about Percy's suggestion, or were you informed beforehand about such a move by the senator [U.S. press report on Senator Percy's support for a Palestinian state headed by PLO chief 'Arafat]?

[Answer] I learned about it through the press. But I was not surprised. I was not surprised because the Americans must realize some time that there will be no peace in the Middle East without the Palestinians, the PLO and the establishment of a Palestinian state. If Reagan really wants to strengthen or achieve peace in the Middle East, he must embark on the right way, and the right way goes via the PLO.

[Question] Do you have concrete clues indicating that new American President Ronald Reagan could get along with state chief 'Arafat, mark my words--state chief?

[Answer] He has to live with that because 'Arafat has been accepted and recognized by most countries as a statesman and not as a terrorist. I believe that 'Arafat is considered by all statesmen of the world not merely as a statesman, but as a respected politician.

[Question] But if the new American president wanted to implement that, he would naturally have to reckon with Israel's resistance. Don't you think that the Israelis would protest vehemently?

[Answer] Naturally, they would protest strongly. But you know, the whole world does not follow the wishes of the Israelis. The world must take into consideration that other factors exist in addition to Israel. Israel must accept that. The times are gone when the Israelis could do as they pleased. We will accept nothing but a Palestinian state on our territory. And we will get that state, whether the Americans like it or not.

CSO: 4403

JORDAN PAPER REPORTS PLO OFFICIAL'S MONTE CARLO INTERVIEW

JN060847 Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 6 Dec 80 pp 1, 16

[Text] In its program "What Took Place Tomorrow," Monte Carlo Radio last night hosted Khalid al-Hasan, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Palestine National Council and member of the Fatah Central Committee. AL-RA'Y publishes hereunder what came in this interview exactly as it was broadcast:

Mr Al-Hasan spoke about the consultations which took place in Damascus prior to the Amman summit, about the reasons which drove the resistance movement not to attend this summit and about whether the PLO was pressured not to attend the summit. He said: The truth is that in politics and political relations, there are two kinds of pressure: the first kind of pressure is imposed by the general state of affairs and its political elements that exist when a decision is made. This is justified and legitimate pressure because it is the political decision which takes current circumstances into consideration. In such cases, the choice may be between the lesser of two evils--not that this is what happened regarding the PLO's stand on the summit conference in Amman.

The decision was made by a majority of opinions. It is well-known that there are organizations which adhere to the Syrian position. However, it is also well-known that the situation in Lebanon is volatile or is about to explode. Thus, the interest of the resistance movement lay in not attending, particularly since the other side clearly understood this situation and expressed it in the resolution which was adopted at the summit confirming the PLO's sovereignty as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Jordan's Stand on the PLO

On the Syrian request to Jordan that it reconfirm that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and on why the PLO itself has not requested such a confirmation, Al-Hasan said: We do not demand such a confirmation because in every statement and at every meeting between us and Jordan, the phrase "The PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people" appears in the joint statement issued. This has been the case since the formation of the first committee which drew up the framework for action and cooperation with Jordan after the Baghdad summit. Therefore, we do not need such a confirmation.

The Syrian-Jordanian Crisis

On the PLO's silence over the Syrian-Jordanian crisis, Jordan's constant confirmation of the PLO's role and the accusations leveled by Damascus against Amman which say that Jordan wants to strip the PLO of its role as the Palestinian people's representative, Al-Hasan said: We do not want to pour oil on the fire. The Palestinian issue in the international arena is very earnestly concerned that the Arabs do not differ about it. The unity of the Arab stand gives strength to the Palestinian stand in the international arena. Furthermore, we do not want to interfere in Jordan's or Syria's domestic affairs. Whenever we can, we have constantly tried to extinguish fires in the Arab world because this is in the interest of our cause. This explains our silence. We do not need confirmation or denial because, as I have said, I can say 100 percent clearly that since the Baghdad summit to date, there has been nothing to indicate that there has been a change in the Jordanian stand pertaining to the subject of Palestinian representation.

The Amman Summit

Asked about the PLO's absence from the Amman summit and its attendance of the Tripoli summit, Al-Hasan said: One of the basic principles which enables us to continue in this "mosaic" Arab world--which is stumbling and has become unable to maintain its agreement for a sufficiently long time--behooves us to cling to the accomplishments contained in the Palestinian national charter regarding nonintervention in Arab disputes and the consideration of our cause as being above these disputes.

Our attendance of the steadfastness summit or the Tripoli meetings has absolutely no connection with our absence from the Amman summit since the time, circumstances and the occasion are different. What took place in Tripoli was an urgent call by Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi for internal reasons and other reasons which I need not discuss at this point. It was a heated meeting, and it ended up with a new stand by brother Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi which we in Fatah do not understand. We do not want to open a battle with Libya due to this new stand. Ultimately, Libya is free to take any decision it wants about who to back and who not to back. The important thing, however, is that the occasion, topic and circumstances are different. Thus, there can be no relationship between the two stands. That was one decision and this was another.

I would like to stress that our brothers who attended the summit appreciate our situation, as they have appreciated the situation in Lebanon. They are aware that through our stand, we prevented a lot of harm not only to the PLO and Lebanon, but to several Arab states as well.

Answering a question on his opinion regarding the existence of an intention by those who participated in the Amman summit to impose any form of sanctions against those who boycotted the conference, including the PLO, Khalid al-Hasan said: I cannot answer for the stand of these states regarding the other Arab states. At any rate, Algeria's stand was the result of its earlier declaration of adherence to the PLO's stand and was not against the Amman

summit. I do not want to enter into the subject of what the relations will be between the Arab states which attended and those which did not. However, as far as we are concerned, I do not believe that there is even the mere notion of sanctions because, if this does take place, it will lead to several catastrophes. However, there was censure and there was a wish for the PLO to be present, but there was also appreciation for the PLO's stand.

Al-Hasan said: The United States in particular and Western Europe in general want to see Jordan at the table of negotiations regarding self-rule. However, Jordan strongly rejects this role, particularly since the Arab summit conference in Rabat, which decided that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. He added: Jordan has reiterated its rejection of the Camp David accords and the self-rule conspiracy, and it has adhered to this and to the Baghdad summit resolutions. On the basis of this commitment, necessary funds were earmarked for steadfastness, to be dispensed in coordination between Jordan and the PLO. The possibility of cooperation between the two sides began on the groundwork of Jordan's rejection of the Camp David process and the self-rule plot. He added: Attempts continue to be made to drag Jordan into the Camp David accords. However, Jordan rejects this. It is on this basis that we cooperate.

On the differences regarding the dialogue between Jordan and the PLO, Al-Hasan said: The differences regarding the dialogue with Jordan are not in the Fatah movement. The basic difference is with some of our brothers in the other organizations who believe that this dialogue is "useless" while we tell them that in political action, a negative stand is impermissible. He added: I confirm that cooperation with Jordan in the bolstering of steadfastness is proceeding well.

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

KLIBI RETURNS TO TUNIS--Damascus, 9 Dec (AFP)--Arab League Secretary-General Chadli Klibi cut short a tour of Arab capitals last night after an apparently fruitless first leg here. Instead of going on to Jordan, Saudi Arabia and South Yemen, Mr Klibi flew straight back to Arab League headquarters in Tunis. There were unconfirmed reports here that Syrian leaders refused for the time being to sign a charter for Arab economic action approved at the recent Arab summit conference, which was boycotted by Syria and other countries of the hardline steadfastness front. Mr Klibi also did not seem to have succeeded in soothing the Syrian-Jordanian dispute. Observers noted that Amman and Damascus continue to exchange accusations. Syria had approved of the economic charter at the foreign ministers' meeting preliminary to the summit. The reported refusal to ratify the charter now might be intended to deny the legitimacy of any measure adopted at the summit, observers here believed. [Text] [NC091410 Paris AFP in English 1351 GMT 9 Dec 80]

CSO: 4820

HABIB CHATTI ON EEC, U.S. ATTITUDE ON PALESTINE

LD0808411 London ASH-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 5 Dec 80 p 1

[Report by Ynis Muhammad Ishaq: "Important Meeting in Paris To Discuss the Fate of Jerusalem; Giscard d'Estaing To Meet With Hassan and Chatti on Monday in the Presence of the Presidents of Bangladesh and Guinea"]

[Excerpt] Paris--Islamic conference secretary general Habib Chatti has greatly welcomed the success of the Saudi mediation to end the Jordanian-Syrian crisis and the Saudi Arabian kingdom's role in the consolidation of Arab and Islamic solidarity. He said he hopes that this Saudi initiative will have positive results in the near future.

Chatti affirmed that on Monday he will meet with French President Giscard d'Estaing in the presence of King Hassan II of Morocco, Bangladesh President Zia Rahman and Guinean President Ahmed Sekou Toure, to discuss the Palestine issue, the problem of Jerusalem and the action Europe should take in the future.

Chatti pointed out that the Jerusalem committee will carry out extensive contacts by visiting these [European] states and explaining the Islamic states' viewpoint. It will also ask Europe to work for a peaceful solution to the Middle East problem and to contribute to this end by recognizing the Palestinian people's legitimate rights and the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people--improving on the European stand during the Venice and Brussels summits.

He emphasized that Europe's declaration of its intention to continue its efforts for a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East is a step that is both constructive and positive.

The Islamic conference secretary general then spoke about the situation in Afghanistan. He said that the [Islamic conference] organization has done everything in its power to hold a dialogue with Moscow but, very regrettably, it could not achieve such a dialogue. The only thing we can do now is to reemphasize our nonrecognition of the present government in Afghanistan and the need for the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from its territory and for the Afghan people to be given the opportunity to choose the system of government that suits them.

Chatti pointed out that the Camp David agreement is now completely dead and that the new American administration will inevitably find itself faced with

a problem which needs to be solved. If this administration is to come up with something new, it must be in the form of a new initiative concerning the situation in the Middle East, especially because the situation in this area is liable to explode at any moment.

He expressed his hope that the new American administration will see facts other than the facts that existed during the election period, especially now that the Soviet Union is seeking to expand its influence and despite all Reagan's statements which do not generate optimism. Facts, however, will compel Reagan to amend his stand and to adopt a policy that will take America's real interests into consideration. We are determined to resort to any means to force America to take a clear stand. The Islamic organization will contact the new American administration in order to explain the magnitude of the situation in the Middle East.

CSO: 4802

ISLAM'S ADVOCACY OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDERLINED

Kuwait AL-'ARABI in Arabic Nov 80 pp 6-10

[Article by Ahmad Baha' al-Din: "Muslims Are Lagging Behind Islam; Rights of Muslim Man Are Starting Point"]

[Text] Islam is entering its 15th century of the Hegira and the Muslims are lagging behind it by almost 10 centuries.

Backwardness: by what criterion and when did this cycle of backwardness start?

Some may perhaps choose a purely geographic criterion, namely the halt in the geographic growth of the Islamic sphere.

Some may perhaps choose a political date--such as the fall of the Umayyad State, the fall of Andalusia, the invasion of the Arab East by the Tatars and the destruction of Baghdad and then of Damascus or the transfer of the caliphate from the Qurayshis to the Ottomans on the hands of Salim I--as the criterion for the start of the backwardness.

Others may choose as a criterion for the start of the backwardness either the onset of the sectarian split in the Islamic movement, thus returning to the war between 'Ali and Mu'awiyah and the emergence of the split between the Sunna and the Shi'ites or the onset of the intellectual persecution, embodied in the tribulation of Ahmad ibn Hanbal in the days of al-Ma'mun and in forcing scholars and jurisprudents--through imprisonment, torture and execution--to adopt the interpretation of the head of the state on religious, intellectual and philosophical issues.

Actually, I do not want to be arbitrary. Moreover, in interpreting major historical changes, one cannot stop at a single event, regardless of how significant. We consider the significant event a "turning point" which is actually the consequence of long preludes which we perhaps failed to understand before the occurrence of this event.

Consequently, when I say that Islam is entering the 15th century while the Muslims are lagging behind by nearly 10 centuries, I am only trying in fact to take a middle-of-the-road and reasonable position without fanaticism and without underlining a certain event or a certain century in particular.

What I mean--and this is the criterion that I nominate here--by backwardness is not to denote the geographic sense and the area of the state territories, the military sense and the might of the state or the economic sense and the prosperity of the state. What I mean is a general cultural sense that includes all these things and includes fundamentally what is more important, namely: The degree of the proximity or remoteness of the Muslims from the essence of the values and ideals which their religion came to preach, advocate and establish on earth.

Consequently, and this is the second criterion, determining the start of the backwardness entails an endeavor to look for the vast time span in which the phenomena of backwardness--in this comprehensive sense--started to accumulate in succession. Islam was--and this is something on which historians of all races unanimously agree--the fastest religion to proliferate at such a wide scale, even though it was not a religion that spread in vacuum nor in a remote part of the earth. It was a religion that proliferated rapidly, sweeping in its way lofty and strong civilizations and empires.

In less than 1.5 centuries, Islam covered such a vast area of the then known world.

What is more important, this proliferation was not the result of military invasion alone but also the result of the speed with which people of all civilizations and races embraced this new religion which, I have already asserted, is a message and not an empire.

Everything happened rapidly.

Almost everything happened in the first 4 centuries, despite the strong tolerance [in that period].

The important eras came in rapid succession, beginning with the era of al-Rashidun caliphs, then the state of the Umayyads, the state of the Abbasids in Baghdad, the strong states in Andalusia, the Samanid state (in Samarqand), the Ghaznawi state (in Afghanistan), the Hamadani state from Mosul to Aleppo and then the Tulunid and Fatimid state in Egypt.

In those same centuries, we came to know all the prominent and immortal military leaders, beginning with Khalid ibn al-Walid, Tariq ibn Ziyad and ending with Jawhar al-Siqilli [the Sicilian]. Even Saladin came only a little after the 15th century. This, naturally, is not an exact recount but mere examples from widely-spaced places and ages.

In jurisprudence, we knew all the imams and jurisprudents, beginning with Ja'far al-Sadiq and ending with the founders of the four schools: Abu Hanifah, al-Shafi'i, Malik and ibn Hanbal.

In literature, sciences, arts and philosophy, there were al-Jahiz, al-Mutanabbi, al-Kindi, Abu al-'Ala' al-Ma'arri, Ibn al-Haytham, Avicenna, al-Razi, Jabir ibn Hayyan, Ibn Hazm and many others.

The list is enormously long and does not need to be defined.

However, with the sunset of those first centuries, the black thread was beginning to mix with the white thread and darkness was crawling gradually, perhaps with a slowness that was not noticeable to the people of those eras. But when we view the age in its entirety, we can see the darkness clearly.

From Degeneration to Awakening

As usual, the Islamic history knew tyrants at an early stage, beginning with Yazid ibn Mu'awiyah. The good and the bad alternated, rising and falling with the change of states and the transfer of the centers of events. 'Umar ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz reminded people of the justice of al-Rashidun caliphs while striking and destroying the Ka'bah with catapults reminded people of the pre-Islamic era. But the general atmosphere of civilization, both in its rise and its fall, continued to be the main characteristic of those early centuries.

Meanwhile, the elements of degeneration were infiltrating the onrush, or the remnants of the onrush, of the renaissance and were gaining new ground daily. Those elements made gains at times from the inside, with the restriction of the freedom of thought, with the end of the era of the jurisprudents and of the imams and the onset of the era of the interpreters who were not jurisprudents, with the termination of jurisprudence and with inflicting the severest punishment on jurisprudents, with the increased distance between the ruler and the ruled--and, consequently, the increased suspicion between them--and with the ruler's resorting to the employment of foreign elements purchased as servants and then elevated to the rank of rulers. This is how the Mamelukes [al-mamalik which means owned slaves] infiltrated, gained strength and then seized power.

Those elements also made gains with the predominance of regional and family control over the spirit of fraternity and equality. Consequently, endless war erupted between countless mini-states and matters reached the point of seeking the help of foreign rulers against (each other), as happened in the Andalusian kingdoms for example.

The gains by the elements of degeneration were also made as a result of the abandonment of the tradition of the age of the Arab renaissance--an age which was confident of itself and which opened up to the world's civilizations and cultures to absorb, select and learn from them--and of the turn toward gradual isolation from the world. Let us take as an example the west in particular. The West was advancing, developing its sciences and enhancing its knowledge while we refused to learn what was happening around us until the West came to invade us one day with weapons which we didn't know, with sciences which we did not understand and with inventions about which we had not heard.

At other times, the elements of degeneration came from abroad. The Tatars were invading our world from the East, the Europeans were expelling us from Andalusia and from all the Mediterranean islands and the Ottoman onrush was reaching the gates of Vienna only to be defeated by corruption, opulence and tyranny.

The Mamelukes, the mercenaries, the slaves and the eunuchs ruled us before modern colonialism came with all its might to find everything torn into shreds.

Of course there did emerge after those early centuries great rulers, such as al-Zahir Baybars who repelled and defeated the Tatars in 'Ayn Jalut, great philosophers, such as Ibn Khaldun, or great voyagers, such as Ibn Batutah. But the marching darkness generally was stronger than those few flashing meteors.

Thus, it is not surprising to say that Islam is entering its 15th century while the Muslims are lagging nearly 10 centuries behind. Perhaps there are many who say: Even more.

At the time when Islam is entering the 15th century, one of the most important features of the international events is an "Islamic awakening" that has taken various--at times conflicting, at times confused and at times optimistic--forms so far.

This is because it is not easy to make up for centuries of backwardness and because there is no quick way for such compensation.

It is not the right of any ruler or leader to monopolize for himself the discovering of this way.

Necessary Foresight

However, there are acknowledged necessities if we really want to surmount this phase through the safest way:

We must look ahead and must reject any inclination that takes the Muslims back to waging battles that occurred almost 1,400 years ago.

What is surprising is that Islam is the only religion which has one undisputed basic text, namely the venerable Qur'an. Regardless of how far the interpretations and the opinions differ, it is unacceptable that the difference turn into a conflict when we have this firm and indisputable base.

The Islamic history must be rewritten with a critical scientific view that does not extend the sanctity of Islam itself to the behavior of thousands of Muslims who have alternately erred and been right.

We must realize that the starting point in development is man, that man is both heart and mind, that development is not skyscrapers, not the purchase of the latest weapons and not the possession of any kind of material things.

We must acknowledge that the human mind can only move in freedom and with persuasion, and that the human heart can only be won with love, dignity and respect.

To start with, we must restore to the Muslim the rights given him by the Qur'an. Islam proliferated through preaching and not through weapons. In Islam's age of prosperity, Islam's enemies were always stronger in weapons and weaker in argument.

The rights of the Muslim man are the starting point.

This is what erudition later defined under the name of human rights, such as the freedom of thinking, opinion and belief, liberty, fraternity and equality or democracy (consultation) and social justice.

Restoration of the sublime human values preached by Islam to the Muslim man without any pretexts or any apologies and the transformation of these values into detailed, applied and respected laws constitutes the start of the path.

Anything else is void and is nothing but emptiness.

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CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

ROMANIAN RELIGIOUS LEADERS ARRIVE--Amman--(Ya'qub Muhammad), mufti of the Muslims in Romania, and Shaykh (Rajab Sali), the imam of Bucharest, arrived in Amman yesterday on a visit to Jordan at the invitation of the Ministry of Awqaf, Islamic Affairs and Holy Places. [Text] [JN041040 Amman AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 4 Dec 80 p 1]

ISLAMIC NEWS AGENCY FUTURE--Riyadh--Dr 'Abd al-'Aziz Khujah, Information Ministry undersecretary for information affairs and chairman of the Executive Council of the Islamic News Agency, yesterday had talks with agency director General Safdar 'Ali al-Qurayshi on future expansion plans for the agency. Dr Khujah stressed the need to continue to expand the activities of the Islamic News Agency in all spheres of news dissemination and coverage in order to cover the largest possible area of the world, according to a well organized stage-by-stage plan. It is worth noting that periodic high-level meetings are held regularly in order to supervise the progress of the agency offices established in Islamic capitals. It has been decided to increase the number of offices so as to cover all Islamic capitals and all major world media centers. The Islamic News Agency transmits for more than 9 hours daily and its daily output of approximately 10,000 words is currently received by 20 Islamic states. The agency also transmits a special daily bulletin in Spanish to 13 American states. [Text] [LD011541 Riyadh AL-JAZIRAH in Arabic 24 Nov 80 p 5]

CSO: 4802

POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS OF GUERRILLAS ANALYZED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Nov 80 p 12

[Article by Thomas Ross: "Politicians and Fighters--Aspects of the War Against the Soviet Occupation Force in Afghanistan"]

[Text] Peshawar, Nov--"We fight under one single command; our command is called Islam," says the Afghan guerrilla fighter. His name is Mohammad Ibrahim and he is a member of the Yusufzai tribe. He has come to Pakistan for treatment of a bullet wound near the heart. Three days from now he will once again cross the mountains to resume the war against the Russians with his band. Ibrahim is a member of one of the smallest of those six political-religious organizations which, headquartered in Peshawar, have formed a quasi-official "Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan."

"Our common headquarters is called Islam"--this is the Mujahedin's favorite answer to the question of whether their fight would not show greater success if they had an integrated organization and a common command center. Since the start of the armed resistance against the communist regime in Kabul in July and August of 1978 the number of organizations has been on a constant increase. All attempts to combine them into a single entity have thus far been unsuccessful. A high Pakistani official is probably correct in stating: "Unity is contrary to the Afghan's character and their history."

Afghan resistance against the USSR is primarily plagued by two factors: The lack of weapons and ammunition and rivalry within its own ranks. While during the past 6 months various fighting units have attempted to coordinate their operations and to keep each other informed, mainly through messengers, about plans, offensive and defensive actions in several border provinces, particularly Kunar, Nangarhar and Paktia, politically effective cooperation is as remote as ever.

Today there are an estimated 30 different groupings, which we might as well call parties: The most active and well-known, and those best supplied with money and weapons, are the religious ones. The largest ones among them individually claim to represent the majority of the Afghan people. These claims can neither be substantiated nor investigated. Only one political representative in Peshawar, Shamsul of the "Afghan Millat," openly admits: "We do not represent the entire nation. But then no single party does."

Afghan Millat, who consider themselves social democrats, have in effect few adherents; but in Western and Indian eyes they have the advantage of being secularly oriented.

Three religious "parties" probably have the most members: the Hizb-e Islami, headed by young Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; the Gailani group and the Mujahid group. Both attract their members because they are entitled to call themselves a Pir, a sort of hereditary holy man; political figures are neither Gailani nor Mujahidi. On the other hand, Hekmatyar, a former student of engineering at Kabul University, is a passionate politician and while he is not a mullah, he is a devout Muslim, ideologically close to the Iranian fundamentalists who, until the outbreak of Iraqi-Iranian hostilities, had been supporting the Hizb-e Islami with money, weapons and also in a political sense.

The extent of control and leadership exercised by the political parties in Peshawar over the guerrilla bands in Afghanistan is more or less loose, depending on the individual organization. It is probably most effective in the Hizb-e Islami which undoubtedly is the most disciplined, best organized and ideologically the best motivated. However, armed resistance is still concentrated mostly among the Pashtun (Pathan) tribes and subsidiary tribes and among other ethnic communities: Hazara in the center, Uzbeks, Tajiks and Turkomans in the north.

The Hizb-e Islami is further distinguished from the rest by numbering among its adherents also some non-Pashtuns, especially in the north. One of the reasons for this is the fact that Hekmatyar's grandfather, a member of the Kharot tribe, had emigrated to Qonduz, a town a few miles from the Soviet border.

In refugee camps the "parties" are engaged in strong competitive efforts to attract adherents. Their rivalry is more pronounced in Pakistan where it often goes so far that members of one do not dare enter the territory of another. Occasionally there has been an exchange of rifle fire between two groups. Political rivalries are often superimposed upon traditional tribal or communal enmities in those cases.

The parties of course deny such altercations; they claim that ordinary bandits had misappropriated the honorary title of Mujahedin. But demands and claims of religious groups were partly responsible for the tragic outcome of several attempts at rebellion by regular Afghan troop units. During August 1979 the mutiny of Asmar garrison resulted in a bloodbath because of the Hizb-e Islami's attitude. Last January, a plan for the defection of units in Sukhrod (near Jalalabad) came to nothing because of the mullahs' attitude. Last October, units garrisoned at Pol-E-Charkhi, outside the Kabul city limits, had planned a mutiny and the assassination of Russian puppet President Babrak Karmal prior to his departure for Moscow. The plan shortly leaked out or was divulged by treachery and was aborted in a bloodbath by Soviet troops. Information about this, gathered from various sources, appears to be reliable.

Representatives of the political "parties" like to badmouth one another; mostly they speak badly, rarely well about the other. For instance, the so-called worldly groups accuse the mullahs of being stupid, naive and narrowminded. The mullahs as well as the Hizb-e Islami are accused of stubborn intolerance and of cruelty against dissenters based on ideological and religious fervor. On the other hand, there are among the mullahs fighting in Afghanistan men of great courage and effectiveness, like Mauvi Khalis, who leads a dissident Hizb faction in the Jalalabad region.

In Peshawar, religious groups of exiles are dominant. They receive most of the money and most of the support, primarily from the Arab states, from Iran (until

the start of the war) and from the small but influential Pakistani Muslim parties. From which side the support of Afghan "exile parties" comes depends upon their ideological orientation. Additional importance is given by the Pakistanis to those parties willing to recognize the Durand Line, drawn during British colonial times, as the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Only a tiny minority is of course willing to do so.

Since the beginnings of the resistance against the communist regime in Kabul, the USSR and its allies as well as nonaligned India accuse the Pakistani Government of furnishing weapons and training to the guerrilla fighters. Not the smallest evidence exists for this to date. True, the Mujahedin are today often better equipped with rifles than units of the Pakistani Army. Their unintentional supplier is the Soviet Union. Thousands, perhaps tens of thousands of Afghan soldiers have defected to the Mujahedin in the past year with their weapons, mostly Kalashnikov AK 78s. The Mujahedin have looted arsenals and they have attacked military convoys--Afghan ones and apparently also small Soviet ones.

However, the guerilla fighters may have gotten their hands on light weapons, but hardly any heavy or defensive ones, probably because the Russians have distributed such weapons with great care and only to reliable Afghan units. In a few cases the Mujahedin were successful in capturing a few antitank and antiaircraft weapons. Out of fear of provoking the USSR Government, neither the Pakistani Government, nor the Arab states, nor China are furnishing weapons to the Mujahedin. That at least is the impression one gains from observation and conversations within the crisis area.

One of the main worries of the Mujahedin is the chronic lack of ammunition. True, there are shops or rather huts, in the village bazaars of the Pakistani tribal area where old-fashioned guns and ammunition of various calibers can be bought. Large caliber bullets cost the equivalent of DM 40 per dozen; a fortune for an Afghan. Besides, there is a need for tons of ammunition, not just a few boxes.

Despite the contempt in which many guerrilla fighters hold the representatives of the "political parties" in Peshawar (they like to call them "political merchants"), the parties play an important role. They serve to establish contact with foreign countries, to procure money and food, and to establish coordination. Afghan resistance shares with the freedom movements of the former colonies, from the 1950's up to the time of Zimbabwe, not only the division of effort between politicians in exile and guerrilla fighters in the occupied homeland, but also the frequently tense relationship between the two parties. But never before has dissension been so great.

This fragmentation is a reflection of the variety inherent in Afghan, especially Pashtuni, society. Every ruler in Kabul and, in other times the British from Delhi, have used this fragmentation for their own purposes, bought tribes and incited them against one another. Karmal's predecessor, Amin, attempted to do this also, but with little success. Karmal sent the minister for border and tribal matters, Lt Col Faiz Mohammad, formerly minister of the interior in the government of President Daud who was assassinated in 1978, along with some high-ranking officers to Paktia, to the Jadran tribe. Apart from money, the minister also brought sheep, turbans and clothing. A banquet was prepared. However, the minister was unable to enjoy it,

because the Jadran considered this attempt to buy them as an insult to their honor and killed him.

Nothing is known about additional attempts to buy tribes on the part of the communist government. It appears that hate of the Russians and of their puppet regime headed by Babrak Karmal is so passionate and so unanimous that while it may be possible to by certain individuals, no tribes will let themselves be wooed by the communists.

9273
CSO: 4403

PREPARATIONS FOR WINTER BEHIND FRONTLINE

Baghdad BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 23 Nov 80 p 2

[Article: "Iraqi Engineers and Workers Build Anti-flood Embankments Behind the Frontline"]

[Text] There is brisk civilian activity going on behind the battle front in the southern sector. Bulldozers, shovels and other earth-moving and road-building machinery and equipment are busy building flood-control embankments and bunds to protect communications links for Iraqi troops.

These massive building operations have made considerable progress and are reaching as far as Ahwaz area where the rattle of earth-moving machines and vehicles are mingling with the bursts of explosions and the thud of artillery. The will and determination of Iraqi building workers are as powerful as that of their warriors.

We met Mr Alaa Hameed al-Barrak, Chairman of the State Organization for the Operation and Maintenance of Irrigation Projects, during a tour of the work sites. He said the building of these embankments and bunds were decided in the light of careful calculations to preclude the danger of floods or heavy rainfall in the winter season.

"They are precautionary measures against the opening of Dez reservoir and flooding of Karun and Karkha rivers which may lead to inundating the roads," Mr Barrak added. "The length of the principal embankment now nearing completion is 95 kilometres. Work is divided into four sections under supervision of four technical directors from the Ministry of Irrigation."

Mr Barrak said that the Ministry of Irrigation already mobilized all its resources to get the project implemented on schedule. An engineer in one of the advanced sites said he felt much honored to take part in the battle by means of the construction of embankments to protect communication links for the Iraqi Army.

The high enthusiasm of workers and engineers on the projects provides confidence that the project should be completed in a record period. A trade union committee chief said all workers felt deeply honored and fortunate to undertake implementation of the project. A worker on the site said everybody is prepared for any sacrifice and undertaking any task.

A Kurdish worker said he came from the Kirkuk Irrigation Department to volunteer with his colleagues for taking part in Qadissiyat Saddam Battle. He hoped to be able to take part in any combat action on the battle field as well.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

OIL PUMPING RESUMED--The pumping of Iraqi oil from northern Iraq across Syria to Tripoli refinry has resumed. The pumping operations had been halted since the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war.[Text] [NC071536 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1515 GMT 7 Dec 80]

FREE HOUSING FOR SURVIVORS--The Revolution Command Council [RCC] has decided to grant a house or an apartment to the wife and children of armed forces martyrs as well as to the parents of an unmarried martyr in whatever province they choose and without rent. The RCC has also decided to settle the loans on the mortgaged house or apartment of a martyr and to grant the residence to the martyr's wife and children. [Text] [JN110800 Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 10 Dec 80]

LEBANESE KURDISH PARTY--Baghdad, 10 Dec (INA)--The Kurdish Democratic Party in Lebanon has hailed the victories being achieved by the Iraqi army in the battle of honor and dignity against the Persian aggressors. This was contained in a cable received by President Saddam Husayn from Jamil Mahu, the party's secretary general. In his cable, he stressed that the homicide and massacres committed against the Iranian Kurds were no less atrocious than those perpetrated against the other Iranian peoples by the hands of the ignorant Persian clique in Iran. He added that the Persian racists have unjustly tortured the Iranian peoples, particularly our brother Kurds in Iran's Kordestan. He stressed the party's support for Iraq in defending its legitimate national and patriotic rights against the hateful Persian regime, as represented in the ignorant clique and the new agents of U.S. imperialism, Zionism and reaction in the region. Mahu is currently on a visit to Iraq. [Text] [JN101913 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1750 GMT 10 Dec 80]

STUDENTS UNION WITHDRAWS--Baghdad, 9 Dec (INA)--The National Union of Iraqi Students [NUIS] has decided to suspend its membership in the International Students Federation [ISF] and to withdraw from the organizations which belong to the federation. This came in a statement by Muhammad Dubdub, chairman of the NUIS Executive Bureau, who added that the NUIS attended the ISF conference held in Berlin on 18-24 November and noticed that there was a current within the ISF which sought to wipe out the democratic formulas and to impose an extremist political line on a number of world students organizations that are members of the ISF. Muhammad Dubdub said that this current

penetrating the ISF organizations revealed its hostility to those students organizations which have an independent national policy and which represent broad student masses in their own countries. Dubdub said that the ISF has accepted as members organizations which represent only themselves because of their absence from the national struggles in their own countries. Muhammad Dubdub also said that the withdrawal of the Iraqi union had a positive effect on the nonalined and progressive student forces and organizations in the world. The Yugoslav students organization, the Moroccan students union and a number of student bodies in Asia, Africa and Latin America also withdrew from the ISF and affirmed their independent line and their struggle by the various legitimate formulas and channels to express their independent opinions. Mr Muhammad Dubdub headed the NUIS delegation to the ISF conference. [Text] [JN091904 Baghdad INA in Arabic 1700 GMT 9 Dec 80]

CSO: 4802

DAYAN DEFINES VITAL INTERESTS TO BE PRESERVED IN AUTONOMY PLAN

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 3 Oct 80 pp 9-10, 24

[Interview with MK Moshe Dayan]

[Text] MK Moshe Dayan does not conceal the fact that he is accustomed to changing his opinions. He does not even regard this as a reason for embarrassment. To cling to old views whose time has past during a period of rapidly changing circumstances -- this is not one of the qualities of a diplomat of stature.

The nucleus remains solid, and perhaps this is the essence: no Palestinian state. The IDF retains the right to be anywhere in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza. Israel must settle anywhere it considers to be proper, but the settlements must be true ones, deeply-rooted, and not fictitious. We must not impose Israeli sovereignty on the Arabs of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza against their will, and we must not annex these territories with their inhabitants to Israel.

On these principles there is no compromise. As for the methods of implementation, realization, and application, there are changing solutions in changing circumstances of time, and they have as many shades, delicatenesses, and sensitivities as the fertile imagination can produce.

We hosted MK Moshe Dayan in the editorial office of MA'ARIV. He was in good spirits. Except for some strong tea and milk, he avoided all the food and drink delicacies. The MA'ARIV participants in the conversation were: Shmuel Shnitzer, Moshe Zak, Shalom Rosenfeld, Yuval Elitzur, Dov Goldstein, Ido Dissentchik, Levi Yitzhaq Hayerushalmi, Avraham Tirosh, and Menahem Talmi.

Shmuel Shnitzer: I want to formally welcome Moshe Dayan -- a controversial personality, against whom all kinds of things can be said, but for whom one must always say that he is an interesting personality, an original thinker. Even when this thought is not unanimously accepted, it is impossible to say that it is not stimulating, that it is not innovative. We will use this opportunity to hear reactions and positions on various controversial questions.

[Question] Let's begin with the recent development -- the war between Iran and Iraq. Does this war prove that there is no Islamic unity, that there is no pan-Islamism? Can the conclusion be drawn from this war that actually we are not exactly the main cause for all the conflicts in the Middle East but rather that

there are other no less important and perhaps more dangerous factors than the Arab-Israeli conflict? What is your estimate of the prospects of the war if it will not be terminated by outside intervention? Which of the two sides can be hurt, and where does this lead the Middle East?

[Answer] In my opinion, Iraq is much stronger today than Iran. It was also stronger than Iran in the past in spite of Iran's past quantitative advantages both in people and in weapons. I had the impression from talks which I had in Iran and with other parties, and also from Israeli estimates by those who are qualified to make them, that Iraq was stronger.

This is certainly true today. The Iranian army is crumbling. Many generals have been removed and even executed. Many of the radar installations which were of a first-rate quality as long as they were under the responsibility and care of the Americans have gone down the drain in one form or another.

Iraq, on the other hand, has many Soviet advisors, and it is dependent on the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union, Iraq is a first-rate asset. It is a land bridge from the Soviet Union to the Persian Gulf. The Soviets have always attached much importance to this, and in this respect they do not have another ally. In Iraq the army is not in a state of disintegration and chaos, and it is backed by a big power for the supply of weapons, guidance, and a threat as if it has said: I, the Soviet Union, as an official or unofficial ally of Iraq, am likely to intervene if you attack her. The Russians have formulations, which are known to all of us, that this front threatens the security of the Soviet Union, the events are taking place along its southern border, and so forth. All of this is happening at a time when Iran is involved in a conflict with the United States, the only power which can create a counterbalance to the Soviet Union.

I have no doubt that without Iraq's manifest superiority, it would not have taken the initiative which it did. It considered this time to be appropriate and convenient. As long as Iran will not find a way to communicate with the United States so that it will create a balance of power against the Soviet Union, Iran will not be able to defeat Iraq. Instead, Iraq, in one way or another, will give it a beating.

[Question] Is it perhaps possible that there will be some kind of reversal, as occured in the Ethiopian-Somali war, in which Iran would turn precisely to the Soviet Union?

[Answer] At the moment I do not think that this is possible. The Soviet Union is tied to Iraq. It is difficult to assume that it would change sides. It has commitments to Iraq, and for Iraq, this question is very important. I assume that before Iraq launched the war, it consulted with the Soviet Union.

[Question] Do you think that it acted with the approval of the Soviet Union?

[Answer] Yes. There was also an official announcement by the Soviet Union that it supports the Iraqis in this conflict.

[Question] If the dispute between the United States and Iran were to be resolved, does the United States have the logistic capability to balance the forces, or is its capability limited to a verbal threat?

[Answer] I believe that it has such a capability. It has been for a long time now that the United States has drawn for itself a red line for the protection of the American interests in the Middle East, which include oil. In my opinion, beyond this red line, the United States will be ready to use military force. This encompasses its interests in energy and other main security matters such as strategic lines on the border with the Soviet Union.

[Question] And this includes geographically the Arabian Peninsula, the southern Persian Gulf, and not its northern part?

[Answer] I believe so. The United States is unable to and does not want to impose itself on any country which does not request it to do so -- in contrast to what the Soviet Union did in Afghanistan. The United States would not do this even if its inaction in a certain country would cause it actual or strategic damage such as the loss of warning facilities on the Soviet border in Turkey or Iran or in the matter of oil.

It will not impose itself, however if that country appeals to it, and it is not a member of the Warsaw Pact (such as Poland or East Germany) but a country which still does not have any formal identification with one of the big powers, then even if it will be very disturbing to the Soviet Union, the United States, in my opinion, would use force to protect vital interests. In regard to means, first of all, I believe that the United States has the logistic means. Secondly, the question will be between the Soviet Union and the United States: to where is the one and from where is the other. In Iran, which at the moment is a kind of neutral territory, the United States would be prepared to endanger itself, in my opinion, if Iran appealed to it. It would say: "It belongs to me. The Iranians have appealed to me, and I have responded." It would then demand that the Soviet Union remove itself and its "clients" from this territory, and they would find a solution to the questions by the creation of neutral sectors in such a piece of land or another. However, essentially, it would intervene if Iran asks it, and it would be able to bring a balance between the two forces by the very threat of its intervention. That is to say: it would say to the Russians, "if you enter the conflict, we will also enter. Please stay out of this problem."

Another thing regarding the question of the military capability of the United States: the fact that the United States does not have an appropriate level of conventional forces stems, in my opinion, more from the United States' unwillingness to intervene in various insignificant disputes, and therefore it does not have such forces. The contrary version, which holds that because it does not have such forces, it is unable to intervene in all kinds of disputes and it was unable to act in Iran and other places, is incorrect.

This means that if the United States wants to adopt a policy of intervention in a local conflict, which requires conventional forces, the technical question of establishing this force is no problem for it. It would establish such forces.

[Question] Can a country in a region of conflict exist without the backing of a big power?

[Answer] Are you referring to a specific country?

[Answer] Can we be neutral, or are we dependent upon a big power and forced to rely on it to guarantee our existence?

[Answer] I do not know what you mean by "rely on." I will define this more precisely. In my opinion, we can exist here even when the conflict is at its height, when the Arab and Islamic countries are against us, without military intervention by the United States on our behalf, and even whenever the United States does not use its full political importance, such as its not casting a veto at the last session of the Security Council. However, we would be unable to do this successfully if the United States would also stop selling us weapons. As long as the United States is ready (and as of now it is ready) to sell us weapons, and the question is only one of operating them, -- then, in my opinion, Israel can hold its own and repel attacks against it even when we are faced with an unfavorable balance of forces and a multifaceted Arab build-up. All of this depends, of course, on the Russians not taking an active part in the war.

[Question] Isn't the need to depend on a big power the result of the intervention of another big power on behalf of the other side?

[Answer] In a certain time this was the case. That is to say, the main motivation of the United States in helping us was not only the fear that without it we would collapse, and the United States is committed to our existence. Instead, it was more than this. She was confronted with the question of the Phantom versus the Mig and the lessons involved in that in terms of its interest.

This was evident in the last two wars in the Middle East, in 1967 and 1973, when the Soviet Union threatened to come to the aid of Syria in 1967 and to the aid of Egypt in 1973 (when the Third Army was surrounded and we were close to Cairo, the Soviet Union said then that it would send Russian airborne divisions). The American response to the Soviets was: "If you go in, we will also go in." Johnson said this more sharply, even though the Soviets had not threatened then to use nuclear weapons: "I am sending the Sixth Fleet, and it is armed with nuclear weapons."

In 1973 when the Soviets said that they would send forces to defend Cairo and to help supply the encircled Third Army, the Americans said, "If you go in, we will also go in."

I mentioned two examples in the area of American intervention in both of which the essential interest was American both in terms of the test of the Phantom against the Mig and the direct American intervention against the Soviet threat.

[Question] Was this actually a test of the Phantom against the Mig or a test of the Phantom against the missile?

[Answer] If you are referring to the anti-aircraft missile, the SAM, in my opinion, the Phantom cannot win such battles. Not the Phantom and not our aircraft. The Americans were unsuccessful in combat involving the aircraft against the surface-to-air missiles in the Viet Nam War. Therefore, aircraft should not be permitted to be destroyed in their attempts to overcome the missiles. Ground elements must be introduced into the battle. Frequently, the air arm must be removed for certain and

even lengthy periods of time from the area of armor or infantry combat in the knowledge that the aircraft cannot participate significantly in this area because the missiles would shoot them down.

[Question] Let's return to the political side. Do you see some threshold beyond which we would endanger American support in weapons supply, or is it possible to move calmly here to the end?

[Answer] I see such a threshold, and it changes from time to time. There were times when the Americans stopped supplying weapons to Israel. There were times when they threatened us, such as in 1957 when Eisenhower and Bulganin warned us as well as the British and the French that if we did not evacuate the Sinai, they would use force against us. In such a case, of course, one cannot talk about aid to Israel. Even during Truman's time, during the War of Independence, we did not receive weapons from the United States because they said that their policy was not to intervene in regions where there were conflicts. Ford and Kissinger also suspended the supply of weapons to Israel in 1975 during the time of the policy of "reassessment."

What happened in the past can happen again. At the moment, in my opinion, the Camp David Agreement is a framework which also commits the Americans. As long as we essentially do not violate the Camp David Agreement in substantive matters and do not deviate from it, we are, in my opinion, on solid ground in our relations with the Americans, and just to convince you, it must be remembered that Resolution 242 was adopted in 1967. Thirteen years have passed and it is still a sacred cow.

The ink on the Camp David Agreement and its annexes which the United States signed as a witness has still not dried. One of the annexes is a memorandum of understanding between the United States and us in which there are American commitments. The entire agreement and this memorandum was approved by the American congress, and at least for the foreseeable future, I do not believe that the Americans will violate it or that we would damage our relations with the United States -- unless we do not fulfill our part of this agreement and work against American interests.

Moreover, even if the American interests change in respect to them and are not in accord with that which is stated in the Camp David Agreement -- in the framework agreement -- the Americans would consider themselves committed to us and would sell us weapons as long as we fulfill our part of this agreement.

For example, the settlements issue: we have disagreements with the United States, not as deep as they appear on the outside, but they exist, or regarding East Jerusalem. However, since in the Camp David Agreement, there are no specific definitions of these issues and it cannot be claimed that we are violating commitments stemming from the agreement -- in my opinion, the current Israeli policy on these issues will not bring the United States to a situation in which it would say that it will not sell us weapons.

On the other hand, if we act in a way which is substantially contrary to the Agreement and violates it, we can cross the threshold, and they can say: if you want to work against us, do not expect us to supply you with weapons.

[Question] Is it true that at the basis of our agreement with Egypt there was a conception that we would give up the Sinai and get Judea and Samaria, that this was the basic assumption of our entire deal with Egypt, and that all of this took place in your first talk with Hassan Tuhami in Morocco?

[Answer] Never! This is absurd! In the talk with Tuhami, the possibility of arranging a meeting between Begin and al-Sadat was discussed. The Palestinian issue was not discussed at all. At certain times, the Egyptians, and primarily and perhaps only al-Sadat, expressed and used such formulations from which it was possible to conclude that in the Palestinian issue, al-Sadat only needed a "fig leaf" and no more.

I never heard such an expression from him. On the contrary, I heard him say that the emphasis is on not making a separate agreement, and on this there were disputes and stubbornness. There was a suspension of the talks, and there was the big argument over the famous Section 6.

I will say parenthetically that now when I hear or read about what is happening, I hear about some Israeli "conception" which says: "The Egyptians do not want to continue to discuss the autonomy issue, so we will not withdraw from the Sinai." Don't we remember our argument against "linkage?" What has happened here? Just a short while ago we were afraid that the Egyptians would tie the agreement of Israel and Egypt to that which was happening in the Palestinian issue. Can we say now that if the Egyptians separate the two issues, we do not want to implement the Israeli-Egyptian agreement? Of course, official institutions are not saying this, but such talk is being heard.

Another matter requires clarification:

When the Egyptians say that they do not want a separate peace with us, who are actually the others referred to? At this time, one cannot speak about Syria because of the relations between Egypt and Syria, which are not good; therefore, the reference is to Jordan and the Palestinians. Actually, we have no conflict with the Kingdom of Jordan. Its boundaries are clear -- the Jordan River and other agreed upon lines, and in no place are we east of this border.

The dispute with Jordan is on the issue of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and it is identified with the Palestinian issue. When Egypt says that it does not want or is unable to make a separate agreement with us, it means a territorial agreement or settlement on the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip. The issue, therefore, is one, but it involves two entities: Jordan and the Palestinians.

[Question] Al-Sadat initially insisted that the autonomy talks must be concluded by May 1980. Now he has suspended the autonomy talks for the fifth time. It seems that he is in no hurry. Is this just a matter of tactics, that is to say he wants to defer the resumption of the talks until after the elections in the United States this November, or has there been a change in his position? If you were in the cabinet today, would you recommend pressure for the continuation of the autonomy talks?

[Answer] I can tell tales out of school. When Yitzhaq Rabin returned from his talks with al-Sadat, he telephoned me -- and he doesn't do this often -- and said: "I want to tell you that al-Sadat repeated word for word what you had been saying

regarding the Palestinians. It was tape recorded and will be publicized." Al-Sadat has degraded the importance of the Israeli-Egyptian-American talks on this issue. He has said why is it important if we decide to resume the talks?

In my opinion, his conduct now is one of tactics. He, as I, does not believe that the solution lies is the Israeli-Egyptian-American talks but rather in the talks with the Palestinians. However, to the extent that there must be an American-Israeli-Egyptian understanding, he is in no hurry. He has two dates: one, the elections in America and two, the completion of the evacuation of the Sinai by our forces. He can therefore say: Good, these talks which are not leading to anything, can continue or not continue provided that their disruption by the Egyptians will not damage Egypt's relations with the United States and will not give the Israelis an excuse for not completing the withdrawal.

[Question] Permit me to remind you that on 12 June 1977, before you joined the Likud government, you were interviewed by BBC and at that time, you brought up the idea of "Arab autonomy in the West Bank under Israeli supervision, the Arabs having their own parliament and conducting their own affairs, and Israel concerning itself only with security matters."

[Answer] Today I would not define it as a parliament. The definition that I use today is to permit the Arabs to administer their own affairs. We must say to them administer your own affairs provided that our vital interests are protected. What are our vital interests? First of all, that there be no independent Palestinian Arab state. Our autonomy proposal refers to an administrative council -- "self-rule" and in parentheses, administrative council. I would say that they should administer their own affairs. For example, this forum should consist of 12 to 18 people, however if they decide that they want to meet in a broader forum, can we prevent them from doing so?

Today I would not use the term parliament because it is like an expression of political independence, and I did not propose this even then because I was talking about Israeli control in matters of security and foreign affairs in the West Bank, that is to say under no circumstances an independent state.

In my opinion, we are today in a situation in which we must, for our own good and as soon as possible, remove our imposed rule over the Arabs. I emphasize "imposed" because it is possible that when we come to a certain city such as Gaza or Bethlehem and offer to remove and eliminate our rule, they will say to us: "Do not impose chaos on us." Then we will say: "If you request us to continue to administer your affairs, we are prepared to do this." However, vis-a-vis the world, ourselves and the Palestinian Arabs, it is in our interests not to impose ourselves on them but not to give them the right to administer our affairs or to adversely affect our vital interests which today are: the settlements in the territories, exclusive security (that is to say, the IDF will be anywhere it considers appropriate and only the IDF, and no other army, will be there), the right to purchase land, and the nonestablishment of a Palestinian state. We must not permit them to plant the seeds from which later the plant of a Palestinian state would sprout on its own.

[Question] You are proposing that unilateral action be taken and that the Arabs in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip be permitted to administer their independent lives as long as the vital interests of the State of Israel are not adversely affected. How do you define the vital interests of Israel?

[Answer] I have said that the IDF, and only the IDF, be anywhere it considers appropriate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Secondly, there be no Palestinian state. Thirdly, the right of Israelis to purchase and acquire land there be guaranteed. Fourthly, the right to settle, maintain, and expand the existing settlements and to establish others or additional ones. These are the things. If there is land and the government of Israel considers it proper to establish a settlement, the settlement should be established. For this, one needs the government which has a majority in the Knesset, and it will decide the policy on this issue.

[Question] Are you saying only with the authorization of the government?

[Answer] Yes, absolutely.

When I said that the gap between the Americans and us, for example in the issue of settlements, is not as deep or as sharp as it appears. I was referring to Carter's conception which he has repeated from time to time and which says: every Israeli has the right to purchase land and to establish his home anywhere he wants to in the West Bank. This is one issue. Another thing is a policy of colonization where on the basis of this policy the government wants to extend its control or increase its influence in the West Bank, and there are those who say actually to bring about an Israelization of the West Bank.

When Carter emphasizes that every Israeli has the right to live anywhere in the West Bank and in Gaza, to purchase land, and build a home, I would not propose that the Government of Israel be less Zionist than him and say: "Every Jew does not have the automatic right to purchase land and build a home." However, I am speaking about policy, that is to say the establishment of an entire settlement (and not individual action of one kind or another) which subsequently requires protection of that settlement and the provision of services and which creates a political reality. In this matter, everyone must be bound by government policy and settlements must not be established without its consent. However, if a Jew came and said: "I have purchased a house in Shekhem, and I want to live there," I would say: "In my opinion, Jews do not have to live in Shekhem. If you want to live in Shekhem, live there, but don't come to me in the morning and say: what about the children, what about the stone throwing, and what about the fact that they burned my car?"

[Question] Why do you nevertheless describe the right to purchase land as a vital interest?

[Answer] I am not speaking about individuals. I am speaking about the fact that the State wants to establish a settlement. I want to make a distinction between an individual right and government policy. We must have the right to buy land in the West Bank because otherwise the leadership in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza can make a decision which prevents or prohibits Arabs from selling land. I believe there is a possibility of purchasing land. Therefore, if the government wants to establish a settlement in a certain region and wants to buy land for this purpose, it is necessary that the agreement between the Palestinian Arabs and us be such that they will not be authorized or permitted to cast a veto. They can persuade an Arab not to sell his land, but their rights to administer their lives as they choose must not include the right to pass a law or institute an administrative regulation which prohibits Arabs from selling land.

[Question] But for what purpose do we need land there?

[Answer] In order to establish settlements.

[Question] We are now touching upon a subject which is at the very heart of the dispute and which is causing all the severe arguments among us. There is a consensus among all the broad groups of the people regarding the IDF's right to be located and function freely in these territories. There is no dispute on this. In contrast, there is a dispute if the establishment of settlements is really such a vital interest. Why is it a vital interest of the State of Israel to establish settlements in Judea and Samaria?

[Answer] In my opinion, it is necessary, desirable, and vital that we have settlements -- solidly based and deeply rooted, true and not fictitious settlements -- in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza Strip. When I speak about fictitious settlements, I mean that a settlement next to Shekhem, even if it is established sincerely, with its sources of employment in Jerusalem, is a settlement which can stand on its own feet only if industry is established there.

During the next period of time, settlements must be established selectively in blocs: the Jordan Valley, the greater Jerusalem region, and Gush Etzion. Ma'ale Adumim can belong to the Jerusalem region, however I am not speaking now about the Jericho-Jerusalem line but rather about Jerusalem outside the Israeli sovereign sector. In addition, the Jerusalem region must extend across the plateau to certain areas which have security importance because anti-aircraft warning stations are located there -- Ba'al Hatzor and its vicinity. And in the Gaza Strip -- the fruit-picking [areas]. These are the things which I consider vital today, and in my opinion, necessary to us.

[Question] You did not include Samaria?

[Answer] The partition for me is not Judea and Samaria, but rather wherever yes and wherever no. I do not think it is necessary to establish a settlement, and certainly not an isolated one, on Jabal Kabir next to Shekhem. I am not contradicting my view that settlements must be established selectively. There are places where they must not be. In the places where they must established, this must be done in blocs. Additional Israeli settlements must be established in the Jordan Valley. I proposed in the cabinet, and the proposal was adopted, that a water pipeline be extended from the Kinneret and southward through Bet She'an and Tirat Zevi.

The settlements are required for two reasons. The first is security and the second is our connection to the Land of Israel. The security reason has two aspects: in order that an Arab state not be established, it is necessary that there not be a homogeneous Arab settlement there. If there is a general Arab homogeneous settlement, it will be difficult to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. In terms of security, I believe that it will be very difficult to justify the presence of the IDF in these areas over a long period of time if it is also not based on the fact that there is an Israeli population there, not numerically equivalent to the Arab one but that there is an Israeli population there. This is Israel's interest.

[Question] Doesn't this constitute annexation?

[Answer] No. The same thing, but in a reverse way, applies also to the Arab settlements in Judea and Samaria. They can, if they want to, be tied to Jordan and the Jordanian parliament in the autonomy period. In this matter, I have a different opinion than that of the government. If the Arab settlements say: "We do not want to establish a ministry of education for ourselves; we want to be bound by the Jordanian ministry of education" -- this is acceptable to me. In my opinion, this is a mutual right: Qirat Arba is connected to the government of Israel, elects to the Knesset, and receives funds like Afula and Kafr Saba whereas Shekhem and Gaza (if they so desire) are connected to the Government of Jordan and receive funds from it -- provided that this does not mean Jordanian sovereignty over these settlements. Therefore, this is not annexation but rather mutual integration. This is to say that the various settlements can, if they so desire, be connected to the relevant governments.

Why are the settlements required? Because I do not want to see the actual borders of Israel along the green line. And the significance of borders not along the green line is the possibility of maintaining an army and establishing settlements in their areas up to Jordan and the international border with Egypt. This must be Israel's future map (we are not discussing the Golan Heights now), and therefore, I do not think that Israel can maintain such a map without settlement in blocs and one which really stands on its own feet. To the one who believes that Israel can be satisfied (or must be satisfied) with a map of the green line, which is also the result of war, the settlements are not necessary and there is no requirement for the IDF to be on secure borders.

[Question] Your map is actually the Allon Plan...

[Answer] Would that Allon, of blessed memory, had accepted this plan. He spoke about sovereign partition and a border with Jordan which would split the West Bank in some place. I am speaking about the fact that we have a right, which no one can block, to settle up to the Jordan, that the IDF can be in any place it wants to be, and that there be no sovereignty -- of an independent Palestinian state or the Government of Jordan -- in these territories. These are two different concepts. One says: Divide it: The second says: No, we will live side by side without a sovereign partition.

I said earlier that in my opinion, the disagreements on settlements are not so sharp. When one examines practically the locations which must be settled and where to dismantle and where not to dismantle existing settlements, the differences between the Alignment and the Likud are marginal. All of these blocs were generally established by the Alignment as blocs. I do not know what its platform will be for the elections to the next Knesset. For this Knesset it again endorsed this urban and rural settlement.

At the recent convention of Hakibbutz Hame'uhad [National Kibbutz Movement], they repeated this concept while mentioning these areas which are permanent settlements (and I am not speaking now about the Golan Heights). There are differences of opinion regarding certain places, including a distinction between densely populated and thinly populated regions. However, when you try to identify these places, then the dispute narrows to Shilo, Shekhem 'Illit, and several other such places.

[Question] In a book which was recently published in the United States, the author claims that Israel sank the American ship Liberty during the Six-Day War even though it knew that it was an American spy ship. A Senate committee will investigate the matter. You were the minister of defense then. What happened?

[Answer] I welcome the Senate investigation. I prefer the Senate to investigate and reach authoritative conclusions rather than all kinds of reporters and their collaborators making guesses.

In regard to the incident itself, as far as I remember, our forces made a mistake in the identification of the ship, and they bombed it until the error was revealed. Our forces did not bomb it because it was engaged in intelligence but rather because they did not identify it as an American ship, and after the mistake became known, they received instructions to stop the bombing.

Basically, in our relations with the Americans -- and I can say this for all the periods of time when I served in governments of Israel -- there was virtually no question which they asked to which we did not respond with the truth. We said to ourselves: We must see to it that everything is clean and open between the Americans and us. This does not only apply to what we did to the American ship but also if they were to ask tomorrow in regard to Lebanon as to which weapons were used, we would say: such and such weapons -- so that we would not come to a situation in which we would say: "We do not want to tell you," and they would say: "If so, then it is possible that they were American weapons." It is not worth it to get into such a situation, and it is preferable for us to say, if it was the reality, "American weapons" -- and afterwards to discuss the essence of the matter as to whether or not we had violated in this way some commitment.

Had we known that the Liberty was an American Intelligence ship, not only would we not have bombed it under any circumstances but also we would not have concealed from the Americans that which was taking place on the battlefield. If the American military attache had come and asked us what was happening on the Port Said front, we would have said we have such and such forces, the Egyptians have such and such forces, and that is the combat picture.

[Question] If the Arabs, and especially Iraq where the danger appears to be concrete, were to have nuclear weapons, would we be able to exist then on the basis of a balance of fear, as exists in the global sense?

[Answer] I will not go into definitions of a balance of fear.

To Israel's publicized formal statement that we will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, I want to add that we also must not come late.

[Question] With your permission, we will move to another area. What was so improper in this government that you saw fit to resign from it, and what are your future plans?

[Answer] I did not leave the government because it was not functioning properly.

I will answer part of the question, and I will not respond to the other part. It is not my custom to criticize others. It is my custom to state what must be done.

There were differences of opinion between the government, or the majority in the government, and me on the issue of the negotiations with the Palestinians and a solution to the Palestinian problem. I will tell you what the differences were and what the technical part was.

The differences of opinion were on the issue which we have just discussed. I believe that Israeli policy must be such that we do not impose Israeli sovereignty against the will of the Arabs who reside in the region between the Jordan River and the green line, except for Jerusalem.

When the discussions of the agreement with Egypt were completed and they began to discuss the application of the autonomy plans, differences of opinion on this issue became evident already from the first step. Even if there is to be no manifestation in the first 5 years of autonomy, we must know where the road which we are taking is leading us. The road in the first 5 years of the transition period -- in chich I believe Begin's statement that he would not deviate from that which is stated in the Camp David Agreements -- is so broad that from Israel's point of view, we must know what we are aspiring to. When you take the first step, you want to know where you will be with the future steps.

I believe that we must aspire to a situation in which Israeli sovereignty will be imposed on this territory only with the agreement of the Arabs. This means that we must say to them: "We are preventing you from realizing your aspiration for the establishment of the Palestinian state. Even if you want this, it will not come about. We will not sign such an agreement. This is not included in the Camp David Agreement. If you do this in contravention to the agreement, we will use force and prevent it. However, at the same time, we assure you we will not make you become part of Israel without your consent." Therefore, the reality must be such that we will not force them to become Israelis, and we will not permit them to convert this territory into a Palestinian state.

This point must be expressed in all the actions which we take during the negotiations on the basis of legislation and also in the decisions of the government on the question of the settlements -- where to settle and where not to settle.

There were differences of opinion on this issue, and no one will deny it. The Likud went to the elections with a platform which stated that Israeli sovereignty must be imposed from the Mediterranean Sea to the Jordan. It is no wonder, therefore, that the ears of the members of the government -- headed by the prime minister -- were receptive to this demand, to see this as a final objective. I never agreed to this, and I was assured before I joined the government that it would not be done. In truth, this was not scheduled in the framework of the government's timetable just as I was assured that the new government would continue to prevent Jews from praying on the Temple Mount, beyond the Gate of the Mughrebins. I read in a newspaper that the police prevented a group of Jews from praying there despite the fact that during the period of Golda's government, it was the Herut people who demanded this and who also attempted to enter there and pray.

However, in the autonomy issue, there was a need to look beyond the 5-year transition period, and on this point there were differences of opinion between the government and me.

This matter also had a practical-technical implication. In regard to the conduct of the autonomy negotiations, it was clear to me that the government and the prime minister did not want to let me conduct these negotiations authoritatively and substantively, not only formally. That is to say that they did not want that I, together with other ministers, should work up proposals on the basis of the government decisions and bring them for government approval, as was the case in the peace negotiations with the Egyptians in which there were two or three ministers. At that time we would bring proposals, which at times were adopted and which at times were rejected by the government (Ezer and I or Ezer, Begin, and I -- but no more than that).

When it came to the autonomy issue, my situation was as follows: either I had to agree to the proposal that I be chairman of a committee, the opinions and aims of whose members were different than mine, or that I not participate in the negotiations and continue to be a member of the government and be involved with the ministry of foreign affairs without being involved in the main issue of our policy, which is tied to our relations with the Americans, the Arabs, and Europe.

I saw no reason to continue as a member of the government.

[Question] Were you in agreement with the government policy on domestic affairs?

[Answer] What are domestic affairs? The economy? I actually was not involved in it. That is to say I was not satisfied with the results, with the inflation, and so forth. However, as to whether or not it was necessary to permit the acquisition of foreign currency, I really did not have an opinion on this matter.

[Question] What are your plans?

[Answer] If the elections to the Knesset were being held today or if the lists for the Knesset had to be submitted today, and I had to decide, there is no shadow of a doubt that I would not go to the next Knesset in any combination.

[Question] What if a new combination were created today?

[Answer] It depends on the combination.

[Question] If a force between the Alignment and the Likud were to emerge, would you go with it?

[Answer] If you are talking about membership in the Knesset, I have no interest in going to the Knesset. I am not a new immigrant in the Knesset, and what is the use of my sitting in the cafeteria another 4 years? All the years that I was in the Knesset and involved in political executive activity, I played key roles. I was not only a member of Knesset or only one who expressed opinions, but I was instead in the hierarchy of the governments in which I participated and in which decisions were taken.

Therefore, when you ask me what I would do if a new combination were created, I will give you the following example.

Let's assume that there would be a list, with those views I was in complete agreement, and it had 5 to 7 representatives in the Knesset. That list would have neither the authority nor the importance in the determination of government policy. Perhaps it would have a minister or one and one-half ministers and they would give him a marginal role -- but the entities who determine the policy would be the other partners in the government.

For this I would not go. The interest which I had in active participation in political life was that I had a role which had authority or the capability to influence. It is not as if someone were saying: You dragged along the government and you brought it to this, and you did not fight for this, and so forth -- as if the governments really did what I wanted... However, I also do not degrade the extent of influence which I had. A list with a few representatives will not have such a degree of influence among the large entities. I am not interested in anything less that this. The question for me is not to gain a seat in the Knesset.

[Question] Just a few days ago, a survey was published which states that a list headed by you and with Weizman and Tamir would win 19 seats. This is already a significant number of seats. Do you believe in surveys and how does this combination appear to you personally?

[Answer] I do not know about surveys. There is a poem by Alterman called "Signs", and the refrain there consists of two parts. The first part says: "Because signs, my daughter, speak falsely." Later in the poem, he says: "Signs, my daughter, speak truthfully." This is my opinion of surveys.

In order for me to join a list, it must have two essential ingredients. First, there must be an identity of views on policy and on the main issue of the Palestinian problem. Second, it must have prospects for becoming an important factor which would influence and determine government policy. I do not want to mention names, but I do not see a possibility of a combination like that which existed with the establishment of the DMC because the combination was on the basis of a unanimous desire to change the situation and to enter the political life of the Knesset. These two ingredients are not sufficient as a basis for a party which would not disintegrate shortly thereafter. When it comes to the implementation of the policy, it becomes evident that the common denominator is the running for the Knesset or also the desire for change but not the other positive things.

I do not see such a list, and a list cannot be one of only three people or only headed by three people. Such a list must be homogeneous in its political viewpoint, and it must have the prospect of obtaining such a number of seats that it would be able to be an influential factor in the government.

[Question] If you were asked to be a member of the government in a position of influence and action -- and let's leave for the moment the question as to which government this would be -- is there a possibility that your response would be affirmative?

[Answer] The importance of the members of the government is determined by two factors; first, by their specific position, to be the minister of social betterment or another minister; second, by the body which asks them with its number of members of Knesset. Without mentioning names, there were members in this government whose

intellectual quality was undoubtedly on a high level, and their actual influence on matters of general policy was very slight because the prime minister did not want to honor them. They were unable to threaten resignation because their departure would not have shattered the coalition. The question is not only membership in the government but also the position, the body in back of you, and first and foremost, the basic policy of that government.

I can say now that I cannot participate in a government which would implement the policy of the Likud. I left it because I was not a partner in it, and therefore, I would not return to it. I do not expect that the policy of the Likud will change in such a way that it would bridge the gap between us. And what about the policy of the Alignment? I do not know. Today I turned on the news at 0100, and the news was skimpy. They only spoke about two subjects, about two wars: between Iran and Iraq and between Rabin and Peres.

[Question] Why aren't you prepared to respond to questions which concern the competition in the Labor Party?

[Answer] I do not want to get involved in matters in which I am not a partner. I am not a member of the Labor Party. If I were a member of the Labor Party, I would be obligated or compelled to support one of the sides. Therefore, I do not want to get involved with this matter or express an opinion.

[Question] Is your "Sede Boqer" in Tsahala a basic or conjectural matter? That is to say in the current constellation, as you explained, you are sitting in Tsahala, but...

[Answer] When Ben Gurion went to Sede Boqer, he said that he wanted to leave for 2 and only 2 years in order to take a rest from these matters -- and then to return.

As I evaluate the development of things in the country, my departure from the executive positions is final. I do not see any possibility, not for myself and not for the Alignment, that I will join or return to the Alignment. I do not see any possibility that I will join the Likud, and I do not see any possibility of another list, in addition to the religious ones, which would have the importance that would give me the possibility of playing a key role and significantly influencing government policy.

[Question] One of the reasons for your departure was that Begin did not give you a key role in the conduct of the negotiations. If Begin were to call you today and say: I have tried this way of negotiations with Burg and with a ministerial committee, and I have failed. You take it. Is this possible?

[Answer] Begin would say such a thing? Apparently you do not know him... but nevertheless, the days of this government are numbered. There is no reason now, even if the situation were like your hypothetical description, to join the government. We are moving towards the elections, 2 months earlier or 2 months later.

If Begin were to propose to me that I come and get involved in the autonomy negotiations, and it would be in accord with my policy, I would suggest to him that I serve as an assistant to the prime minister, not as a member of the government, and

I would get involved in this matter. Of course, all these proposals would have to be approved by the government, and I would be involved in the technical part, without being a member of the government.

However, in my opinion, the entire picture is hypothetical. From my point of view, I consider this subject, the negotiations for a settlement with the Palestinians, to be an important one, so I would devote all my time to it. I believe that this issue requires progress, and if they believe that the way which I propose is correct, I am ready to be an official involved in it. However, this is not a practical question.

[Question] Are you still a member of the Labor Party?

[Answer] No. When I announced that I was accepting Begin's offer to be the minister of foreign affairs, I received a letter from the secretary of the Labor Party which stated that this was unacceptable to the party and that he thought that I should leave the party. He did not write to me that I was being expelled from the party, and he also did not have the authority to expel me from the party without a trial. I responded to this letter that I was announcing my departure from the Labor Party.

I recently received a letter from the Tsahala branch of the Labor Party which stated that they were calling for new members to join the party. The letter was completely in stencil, and only the name Moshe Dayan was handwritten. I thought about the matter for awhile. What was the purpose of this proposal? I responded to the letter: "I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter." And that was it. I tell this as a matter of curiosity. Of course, this was not the way if the Labor Party wanted me to return or if I had wanted to return to the Labor Party.

[Question] Is there such an opening?

[Answer] There have been no attempts, and in my opinion, there is no such opening.

[Question] Because of the political program?

[Answer] Because I burnt the bridge. The party was opposed to my joining the government. I joined, and I left the party. Although, in my opinion, I have continued to be "Labor" and even a MAPAI'nik and maintain good relations with some of the members and find that there is an identity of views, in the organizational sense of belonging to the party, I do not believe there is such an opening.

I do not know the political viewpoint of the Labor Party. As of now, I do not know if they are basically for a partition of the West Bank between Israel and Jordan. Nevertheless, according to their program today, we have no common basis.

[Question] Even on the price of peace?

[Answer] Even on the price of peace. I believe that the partition of the West Bank means the establishment of a Palestinian state. The PLO has announced that if it is given only Shekhem or 100 square meters, it is ready to accept it, not as a substitute for its political program, but rather as a stage toward the implementation of its well-known political program.

Husayn has said that everything the Palestinians want will be given to them in the West Bank. This means that even if we divide the territory with Jordan, Jordan would subsequently turn over the territory under its control to the Palestinians, and the Palestinians would be administered by the PLO. This is what would happen. The smaller the territory which we turn over, the greater will be the prospect that a war against us will be launched from there because it will not constitute a solution of the Palestinian problem.

[Question] You consider yourself a "Labor" person, a MAPAI'nik. How is this expressed in practice?

[Answer] I can say something between humor and piquancy. When they complain that I helped Begin, I say to those members of the Alignment: listen, was there one proposal of mine which was not adopted by your majority in spite of the opposition of some of the Herut members? Did you vote against any of the proposals which I brought to the Knesset? With whose strength were they actually adopted? With the strength of the Alignment. And who were those who voted against? One time there were four abstentions from the Alignment: Shlomo Hillel, Shoshana Almoslino, Yigal Allon, and Amos Hadar. All the others voted for. Most of those who voted against or abstained were from the NRP or the Herut.

I never had a proposal on foreign policy which the Alignment did not support. The proposals which I brought to the Knesset were supported more by the Alignment than by the Likud.

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SCHOLARS ASSESS JORDAN'S PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESS

Tel Aviv AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 19 Sep 80 pp 5,10

[Article: Israel's Policy in the Territories—from Failure to Settlement]

[Text] Israel's policy in the territories omitted the Jordanian option and gave the PLO international stature; the PLO would have needed 50 more years to achieve its present status, had it not been for Israel's mistakes; even now the Jordanian option holds the only realistic chance of insuring Israel's security and solving the Palestinian problem both as a human and a political problem—each day a territorial compromise becomes more imperative. Such compromise must be clearly defined, encompassing most of the territories, including a flexible, agreed solution to the problem of East Jerusalem.

These conclusions were the running theme of the symposium conducted by AL HAMISHMAR. Participants were: Professor Yehoshua Porat, head of the History of Islamic Countries study group at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem; Professor Menahem Milson, head of the Asian and African Studies, Hebrew University, who accompanied President Sadat in Jerusalem in November, 1977; and Tzvi Alpeleg, a retired colonel who studies the Palestinian subject at the Shiloah Institute at Tel Aviv University.

Hayim Shor (moderator): The purpose of this symposium is to examine Israel's policy in the territories. But first I would like to ask a question. What is your assessment of the chances of a Palestinian state, a Jordanian-Palestinian state, either linked or separate from Hussein?

Yehoshua Porat: I consider the Jordanian solution to be the best one. It is the lesser of the evils for the Arabs and the best for Israel. It can be achieved in terms of the political and historical circumstances under which the Arabs in question now live. It should be done quickly, since there is no other way to extricate outselves from the maze of the Israeli conquest of the West Bank.

Menahem Milson: I agree with Professor Porat. A political agreement with Jordan is the preferred solution for Israel. It is feasible in territorial terms, since the geographical aspect is clear. Jordan, the east bank, is the link of the West Bank to the Arab world. In regard to population, half of Jordan's residents east of the river are Palestinians who originated in the west side of the Jordan. A Palestinian state exclusively in the West Bank is a risk for both Israel and

Jordan. It would be a problem, since east of the Jordan Amman has become the political center, while a state west of the Jordan would look to establish Jerusalem as its political administrative capital, which would make a settlement in Jerusalem extremely difficult.

A Missed Opportunity of Settlement

Tzvi Alpeleg: I agree in principle. I believe that after 67 we had the opportunity to reach a settlement with the representatives of the local population. We could have created some sort of an autonomy, based on an agreement between Israel and Palestinian representatives in the territories, without any link to Jordan or the PLO, and in time a broader base would have been found, namely, a Jordanian-Palestinian-Israeli base. But this opportunity was missed in the years following the Six-Day War.

The new situation which has now come about leads us to a political settlement based upon Husayn's federation plan, which was proposed by him in 1972. This plan, with certain changes, was in effect the basis for negotiations. If Israel had reacted differently--in 1972 Israel rejected it categorically--then we could have had negotiations which would have led to a modus vivendi which would have satisfied all three parties. Israel might have achieved its security objectives. Husayn might have achieved his sovereignty objectives, and the Palestinians would have achieved a certain measure of political expression for their national aspirations.

Husayn's aspirations to recover the West Bank still exist. It is a vital interest for the Jordanian regime not to bring about a total separation between the two banks which would undermine the regime and cause serious upheaval. The Palestinians cannot expect much more than such a settlement. I think they know it, at least the FATAH knows it, that for now it is in their interest to come to an agreement with Jordan. If Israel continues to reject categorically the Jordanian wish to discuss its sovereign status in the West Bank, Israel will go against its own interests and will precipitate the establishment of a Palestinian state in an extreme form.

National Consolidation in Its Infancy

Yehoshua Porat: National consolidation, the consolidation of a national identity in the Middle East, is still in its infancy. The Arabs have only begun to struggle with their own identity: Are they one national group which should establish one state? If not, what is the legitimate national structure of their future state? The concepts of Jordanian and Palestinian are fluid. All Arabs express loyalty to a unified ideology, which sees the Arabs as the only legitimate group for the existence of the state. On the other hand, there is a territorial division into states, none of which, except for some fringe groups, has developed an ideology which sees the state as the main basis for national identity.

Nevertheless these states exist, and like any other political institution they create pressure groups, interests, and identity. This maze has brought about the present situation. Hence when we talk about Jordanians versus Palestinians, we are not talking about something analogous to Frenchmen and Germans. Take Jordan,

annex it to Syria, and in a few decades Jordanian identity will disappear. The same is true about Palestine. The same is true in other parts of the Arab world, except perhaps for the Maronite community in Lebanon. The Egyptians too were once in this state and today they have a different ideology. In Iraq today there is a surprising adoption of Iraqiness which searches for Babylonian roots.

We sometimes get the impression that the Israeli public conceives Palestinianism the way Germanism was conceived by German nationalists in the 19th century, as self-understood, different from the Slavs in the east or the French in the west. The reality in Jordan has proved how the emphasis there has changed: from Syrian to Arabic; from Arabic to Jordanian; and how the Palestinians became part of it, and how readily they became part of the Jordanian system; and how there was no struggle in Jordan or any propaganda to break away and form a Palestinian entity, rather there was opposition to the Hashemite regime because of its foreign policy, its objection to militant Arab nationalism, and its moderation toward Israel; because of its objection to Nasser. But not in the name of Palestinianism.

The Political Border Is the Determining Factor

In Europe, excluding clear ethnic foci which created nations, what has determined national affiliation has been the political border which was drawn by the various powers in their various capitals. The border between Holland and Germany was not determined by Dutch or German ethnicity, but by the political power of the group which established the Merchants' republic in Amsterdam and set its own border. This border determined Dutchness, rather than Dutchness determining the border.

The Middle East's situation is similar to Medieval Europe. The commonly used written language and culture is completely different from the spoken language, which is yet to be written, which does not represent a particular region, and which is made up of many dialects. This indicates how much free play still exists among the political powers when it comes to decide on established borders or shaping regimes in the Middle East, and to what extent the forces in the area can influence the shaping of the area. Some argue that the Palestinians feel like strangers, that Amman is foreign to them, the way a German would feel like a stranger in Warsaw. They add that the Palestinians have their own dialect, different from the Jordanian. This is unfounded. Not a word of truth in it. Even if there were a linguistic difference between the Jordanians and the Palestinians, Amman is the largest Palestinian city in the world. Amman had 30,000 inhabitants in 1948. Today it has one-half million. Where did they all come from? Not from natural growth. Those were the hundreds of thousands of Palestinians who left.

Some people assume that anyone who supports the Jordanian solution wants to deliver the Palestinians to a totally foreign rule. This is not true!

One Nation, One State

Menahem Milson: Let ma make a point which supports Professor Porat. I recall a talk with a prominent Palestinian leader who supports Jordan. He said he rejects Husayn's federation plan. I thought he rejected it because it did not give enough expression to the Palestinian component. I asked him to explain the

rejection of the plan, and he said that the plan was not good, because it spoke about a united kingdom, as if we were two separate parts. After all, it is one kingdom and it should become again one state. Why a federated kingdom all of a sudden? What's bad about a single kingdom? We are one people, one public, there is no need to make distinctions. I believe this shows that they consider themselves one people.

Take the example of Libya, which was created after WWII. The creation of a Libyan state and a Libyan people was the decision of the world powers, the colonial powers. If they had decided on dividing Libya into three regions, Tripoli, Fezzan, and Cyrenaica, would have had three political groups, not one. Even today this one group exists as part of the Arab people living in one political state. I therefore agree with Professor Porat's observation, that the chance of creating a political structure which will last and which will encompass Palestinian political aspirations is realistic, with Amman as its capital. It is also a better option for Israel than an Arab state in the West Bank.

Palestinian Identity Is A Fact

Alpeleg: We should now ask ourselves what is the concrete meaning of what has been said so far. The Arabs accept the Pan-Arab ideology. They consider themsleves one nation which was divided by strangers, broken down into separate states etc. The question is how does this apply to what we are talking about. Is or isn't a Palestinian considered a stranger in an Arab country he happens to go to?

Shor: Husayn himself says that he doesn't represent the Palestinians. He must have his reasons.

Alpeleg: The borders were drawn by the powers which won WWI, thus creating separate political identity for each of these states. I am sure that this is not forever. It will change. If there is a tendency in Europe to erase the national and political borders, it can also happen in the Middle East. What separates the states here is much less than what separates them in Europe, and what unites them is much more also. If this were true not only ideologically but also concretely, the Palestinian problem would disappear in 30 years. The Palestinians have kept a separate identity not only because of the ill will of the Arab regimes. And there is ill will. They were given citizen rights, but they were kept as strangers.

We are dealing with a concrete subject: the resolution of the problems between us and the Palestinians. Does the ideology or the fact that the Arabs are one nation and the Palestinians do not have a separate national identity have any significance?

In my opinion, since our problems are short-range ones and the changes are long-range, it would only have academic meaning if we dealt with the question, who are the Palestinians? Part of the Arab nation or not? In our present reality they are a separate group, with problems which regrettably we should consider as ours, and which call for a solution.

Freedom of Movement and Employment in Jordan

Milson: I believe that the Jordanian example, that is, the way the Palestinians were absorbed in Jordan, whether or not they were refugees, shows the possibilities. Jordan gave them citizenship, freedom of movement, and employment. They do not feel like strangers. Most of the Jordanian administration is in Palestinian hands. They are active in the security system. The head of the security services for many years was a Palestinian from Nablus. The same is true in the armed forces, where there are many Palestinian commanders of combat units. They have attained high ranks in the army and are in key diplomatic positions. The way they have been absorbed in Jordan shows the potential of a political structure which is willing to accept them and give them an identity.

Alpeleg: This sounds as though Israel's best bet is to wait around until the Palestinian problem is resolved by the assimilation of the Palestinians.

Milson: No! What it means is that if a political entity is established after negotiations with Jordan, which will include east Jordan and the territories which Israel is willing to give back, this entity will be able to accomodate the Palestinians.

The determining factor is the denial of citizenship, freedom of movement, and employment, which happened to Palestinian refugees in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. A villager from the Ramle area, who became a refugee and went to Nablus, is seen as a stranger by the local people. He cannot readily get married there. He cannot easily buy land. This is typical of Arab society, in which a member of another tribe or another village is long considered a stranger. Yet in the mercantile urban society, and in the urban elite, people moved from Jerusalem to Amman and from Nablus to Salt and have not been regarded as strangers. Religious functionaries from Hebron serve in all Jordanian towns and are not seen as strangers. Thus, we should be able to see the difference between stranger status which is the result of political circumstances and decisions, and the one which is not political and does not delay political processes.

Failures and Missed Opportunities

Shor: All three of you spoke about mistakes Israel has made in regard to the residents of the territories. What should be Israel's polity in regard to the territories until the end of the negotiations?

Porat: I think it's a pity that we took over the territories. We could have refrained from doing it on June 5, 1967. The main war was with Egypt. We won quickly. Jordan did not try to conquer Israel. The occupation stopped the Jordanization of the Palestinians. We now must find a way to make King Husayn understand that he can get back the territories. The residents of the territories should be made to understand that this is Israel's intention.

In the summer of 1967 the Central Jordanian Bank and the Israel Bank came to an agreement on a joint control of the banking system in the West Bank in order to renew its activity by professionals. This could have given Jordan a certain legitimacy in the territories. The military government aborted it. There are many more examples. Recently I have heard people who headed the military government say that for the first 3 years they saw Jordan as the enemy and undermined its position.

Today, achieving this goal is much harder. Today we must pay a much higher price, especially in Jerusalem. I think that in 1967-68 we could have insured our security needs in the territories and reached a much better solution in regard to Jerusalem. Now we must strive toward a Jordanian solution and make it clear to the inhabitants. This would strengthen the pro-Jordanian elements in the territories.

Israel's Policy Undermined the Chances of Settlement

Milson: An Israeli political decision for a settlement with Jordan does not go against history but rather seeks to create or to renew a political structure which does not contradict the natural internal forces in the Arab Palestinian society. In other words, it is not an artificial manipulation. On the contrary, it is the result of what I have said before about the successful integration of urban elite of west Jordan within the east Jordan system, under rather difficult circumstances, under both the previous and the present cabinet, including leaders from west Jordan, not to mention the economic establishment, etc.

Shor: You may want to touch on the resistance to Jordanian forces.

Milson: I have learned that the Israeli policy damaged the Jordanian option, yet it did not destroy it. This option is linked to the geographic and demographic reality. The possibilities exist, but the damage was caused by the effort to separate the political establishment in the West Bank from the Jordanian center of power.

In asnwer to my arguments, the supporters of the policy at the time, the Dayan policy, said two things. First, they agreed, and said that it was unavoidable in light of Jordan's support of the terrorists. Second, they said that Jordan undermined our efforts to create normal conditons because of its claim to this area.

Finally, Major General Rafael Vardi, who was at the time the military commander of the West Bank and later the coordinator of the territories, said at a public forum that Jordan was considered the enemy. This of course raises two questions. First, did those who did those things understand the political implications, namely, if you weaken Jordan's political influence you strengthen rival forces which compete with Jordan in the area, namely, the PLO. Was it a calculated risk, or was the risk taken without understanding the danger? Moreover, this explanation is valid until Black September, until the liquidation of the PLO's military power in Jordan. After Balck September, when it was clear to all that Jordan is not a host country for the terrorists and thus we are not at war with it, on the contrary, after Jordan destroyed their military power and limited their activities, why did we continue to encourage the anti-Jordanian elements?

This attitude was expressed by holding elections in 1972. Israel brought about municipal elections in the West Bank in 1972 in contravention of international conventions. Israel found a loophole for doing it, but it was no so self-understood, and it went against Jordan's wishes. The only rational excuse for this move was the desire to create an urban political establishment independent of Jordan.

We now know the results of that move. During the 1972 elections, the defense minister made an effort to see to it that Hamdi Knean, who was pro-PLO got elected. The fact that he didn't run and was not elected, and instead Haj Mazuz al Misri, who was pro-Jordanian, ran and was elected, was not the result of the official policy but happened inspite of it, and was reluctantly accepted.

Supporting Anti-Jordanian Palestinian Elements

Porat: During the first 5 years, and it was clear that Jordan had the main claim from the international standpoint, and also had the greatest support in the territories, our policy in the territories was anti-Jordanian, designed to weaken the main claimant. After Rabat, when our main claimant is the PLO, we are anti-PLO. The basic intention of all our governments has been to keep the status quo in the territories. The status quo in the territories is the goal of governments, the goal of the decision makers in all the governments of Israel. Not an annexation status quo, but one of military rule, which gives us military control while sparing us the difficult problem of what to do with the population politically.

Milson: I disagree with Provessor Porat. You describe things rationally, but I don't think the reality in the area is rational. It that were the case, there would at least have been consistent policy. In my opinion, there is something more serious here: a tradition was started of supporting anti-Jordanian Palestinian elements which has continued even after Rabat. It is a strange thing. I prefer therefore to talk about deeds and results, not about reason. There is a great deal of disparity between our actions and our statements in the past, and we do not know the thoughts of those who spoke and those who acted. There was a tendency to regard pragmatic leaders--and generally the pro-Jordanian were pragmatic--as those who did not follow estreme nationalistic examples and symbols, which demand immediate fulfilment.

The Israeli trend during the entire period of our rule in the West Bank has been to treat with greater respect extremist leaders. At times it was necessary, because of circumstances, to treat them harshly. But they were still considered the natural leaders. The pragmatic leader was belittled as not being a natural leader. He was a personage out of the past, a servant of the rulers, who was treated with disrespect. This was a mistake, from the standpoint of Israel's interest, since it is in Israel's interest to be able to deal with pragmatic leaders who are willing to negotiate.

This is also a mistake in misunderstanding political reality. For you cannot say that those extremist leaders who want immediate fulfilment of the messianic vision of Arab nationalism are the natural and authentic leaders. Israel's partiality toward the more extreme may be subconscious and unrelated to political reason. This partiality has continued for a long time. It found its expression in belittling and undercutting leaders like Aziz Shahada and even Jabri. Contrary to popular belief, Israel's attitude toward Jabri has not been one of support. In the 1972 elections Israeli leaders encouraged anti-Jordanian Palestinians to run against Jabri. This was due to the Israeli view which regards radicalism as the authentic expression of the Arab public. The pragmatic leader was not seen as a spokesman of the people.

We Expelled the Right Representatives

Alpeleg: No doubt the results of the war, namely, the severing of the West Bank from the east, the halting of the Jordanization process of the Palestinians, or their integration in the Jordanian kingdom, worked against Israel. But it seems to me that even after the occupation, or particularly after the occupation, we could have taken advantage of the situation and benefit from it. We could have said to Jordan, we give you back the West Bank with conditions which the king might not have agreed to before the occupation. We could have reached a modus vivendi with him which would have been in Israel's interest, more so than before 1967. We could have gotten rid of the burden of the West Bank's population and reached a settlement with Jordan.

If the actual occupation of the West Bank was a mistake, the second mistake was made immediately afterwards when we did not look for a way out of the new reality. Not only we did not look for a bilateral settlement between Israel and the residents of the territories, we prevented it. We expelled the leaders, thinking that this was our chance to extricate ourselves from the Jordanian embrace. These will always be supporters of an independent Palestine, as exemplified by Aziz Shahada and others. They said that they never agreed to the annexation of the West Bank by Jordan. They said that this was their chance finally to speak for themselves. What did we do to them? We said, we don't talk to you. They went home and waited to see what would follow. Instead of reaching a settlement with the local residents, we missed in the first stage the broader settlement of the two options. Instead we followed a policy which pushed Jordan out.

Even that part which is considered planned policy--the open bridges and the salaries and the link to Jordan etc.--is only circumstantial, it came about, and the policy makers in the territories accepted it after the fact and allowed their commentators and public relations officials to tell the public that this was Israeli wisdom, which was planned accordingly.

There Was No Political Conception

Shor: In other words, this whole aspect of the policy was not planned?

Alpeleg: I have an explanation for the bridges affair which is anchored in the political reality.

Milson: What caused the acceptance a posteriori by Dayan of this situation was economic necessity and not political conception. The one who tried to come up with a political conception and decided on the bridges was Baruh Yekutieli. There is clear evidence about it in Shabtai Tevet's book. Even the term open bridges was coined by Yekutieli, who was one of the key people at the time in dealing with the economic and fiscal problems of the West Bank on behalf of the military government. But as for the policy makers--like Dayan--this was the result of economic necessity. An effort was made to find markets in Europe. An agreement was sought with the suppliers of the American army in Germany, but it didn't work out. Since nothing worked this solution was reluctantly accepted.

Porat: I would like to add, it is not so much economic as internal politics, namely, the power of the farm industry in Israel. The farm lobby in Israel exerted great pressure because of the competition of the surplus in the West Bank which is produced by cheap labor, hence at a lower price. Afterwards people said, this is proof of openness toward Jordan. It was not openness toward Jordan, but acceptance of a situation which came about.

We Have Helped the PLO to Dominate the Territories!

Alpeleg: We had a liberal intention, but in the end we achieved the opposite results. We sinned through ignorance in dealing with the Arab population.

Shor: But we cannot say that this was the result of the Israeli administration closing the two options, the Jordanian and the Palestinian, which only left the option of keeping the territories.

Alpeleg: I have no doubt that the political positions of the residents of the territories contradicted the Israeli occupation and the Israeli presence. They contradicted the Israeli occupation not only because Israel had certain intentions including or excluding Jordan. As long as Israel was in the territories, their position was contradictory. Let us assume that Israel did not make all the mistakes it has made and continues to make, in the area of settlements, of expropriation of land--would the political position of the residents have been in favor of Israeli presence? The political position of the residents, for young to old, has been--negation of the Israeli occupation. The fact that this political position was translated into political action and became a confrontation which cannot be dealt with, was not foreseen. It was contrary to expectations, not my expectations, but Moshe Dayan's expectations. Those expectations did not come true. In terms of the political solution, we actually have helped to PLO to take charge. If arafat could be honest with himself, he would hand up pictures of Israeli leaders in his office. Because of their mistakes the PLO gained momentum and became prominent.

Porat: This, by the way, reminds me of the argument that the enemies of Israel made an important contribution to the birth of Israel, because of their rejection of solutions which would have taken the wind out of the sails of the Zionist movement.

Milson: This is a very generalized analogy. It does not fit your concept of Arab nationalism, which points to certain solutions, namely, either a Palestinian state or total rejection of a solution to the problem of Palestinian Arabs.

Alpeleg: I tend to accept this analogy. We have adopted their lack of wisdom. I am convinced that without stopping the integration process, without separating the West Bank from Jordan, and then without that policy or lack of policy in the territories after 1967, the PLO would have needed another 50 years to achieve what it has already gotten. Its growing international stature is the result of the situation which was created in the territories after 1967.

Porat: I don't think Dayan is the only one who should be chastised. Let us remember how the Israeli government reacted to the Jordanian federation plan, not only negatively, but insultingly, despite the fact that it was one of the wisest ideas at the time.

Alpeleg: Golda said Husayn was trying to furnish someone else's apartment.

Porat: In the territories the plan enjoyed wide support. All of this was hidden from the Israeli public. The plan was looked upon with disdain. In this respect the Alignment was no better than the Likud. I agree, the oil does not explain everything, our mistakes do. Not only the mistakes in the territories, but also our political mistake of not offering a clear alternative for the PLO, which makes the PLO the only alternative to occupation. Our policy is seen, correctly, as a desire to perpetuate the status quo. The PLO thus gains support.

Nowhere in the western world did I find more public sympathy for Israel and the Jewish people than in Norway, more so than in Holland. Norway provides its own oil. Its change of attitude toward Israel is incredible. Does oil explain it? Great Britain has also changed its tune toward Israel without being dependent on oil, and having close economic ties with us, since we buy a great deal there.

Oil is not the only deciding factor. What is deciding is the fact that we present a policy which no one can buy. Europe, having issued the Venice document, does not demand that the PLO recognize Israel. After all that heppened, they have not given up their basic stand which says that the Jewish people has a right to its own state and to self-determination. If we continue with our insanity, we will destroy the last vestige of friendship left.

The Position of the Arabs in the Territories as a Political Factor

Milson: There have been many discussions which still continue about our policy in the territories. The Israeli public is engaged in a very lively discussion between those who would like to make concessions and those who won't give up land under any circumstances. Those who are willing to give up some land and those who are willing to give up everything. In the meantime it has not been made clear to the public that that our policy in the territories makes it impossible for us to deal with the territories. Most of those who are willing to make concessions do not see them as an end in itself, but as a price we have to pay to achieve the end. What is the end? The end is Israel's existence as a democratic Jewish state. It is also peace. To achieve these ends we have to pay the price. In order for Israel to pay the price, the territories have to be managed in such a way that they do not become a burden. If they are a burden, and if there is unrest, and if the voice of the PLO is the only one heard in them, then we may not even be able to use the territories as a bargaining card. The Arabs read the papers and analyse the situation and they may reach the conclusion that Israel may have to return the territories for nothing. Let us remember that for the Arabs to sign a peace treaty is a not an easy thing to do.

We today, after we have signed a peace treaty with Egypt, are still not award of the fact that the signing of a public peace treaty is a high price to pay for the Arab political standpoint. In order for the Arabs to pay such a price we have to give them something in return. Hence the situation in the territories affects our ability to conduct negotiations regarding the territories and implement policies. A common Israeli conception among policy makers has been that the political positions of the residents are not important. Israel would reach a solution without outside parties, since the residents and their leaders are not independent. It is true that they are not independent, but this does not mean that their political positions are not important.

Moreover, anyone who studies the PLO knows that the PLO believes that without establishing a monolithic rejection front against the Camp David accords in the territories, the accords cannot be defeated. Therefore the PLO is working on establishing such a front. It does it by giving money to its supporters and by intimidation and ostracizing and physical terror against its opposition. Hence the voice of the residents is important in any political settlement.

The slogan which has prevailed in Israel, according to which we are conducting a dialog of deeds with the residents is very dangerous. Besides the fact that this is a rhetoric ploy, since a "dialog of deeds" is a contradiction in terms, since deeds are not a dialog, this slogan is also a coverup for the lack of a political dialog, which is needed and which should be pursued. Or the slogan "coexistence," is also a coverup for the absence of an agreement, when we talk about "coexistence" instead of agreement. The slogan "coexistence" went up in smoke of burned tires.

Porat: The only thing which made an impression on the Arab public was our ability to rule the territories with a minimum of resistance, as we captured the PLO units and prevented riots.

Milson: It is important to distinguish between those leaders who are moderate and those who are not. If the only voice heard in the West Bank is the PLO's, we cannot conduct meaningful negotiations with Jordan, since Jordan needs certain conditions under which to conduct negotiations. First of course we must have Isreali readiness to make territorial concessions, but this is not enough. The Rabat resolution took Jordan out of the negotiation process, and now it needs conditions which will enable it to come back. For this purpose it cannot have a united front in the West Bank, which supports the PLO, but needs to hear from those who do not support the PLO and believe that Jordan is a good basis for a solution. In other words, we have to reach a state of affairs in which they can speak up.

In a practical sense the difference between a moderate and a radical leader, besides supporting the PLO, is the willingness to have normal relations with Jews rather than use every incident to create friction with the Israeli government or public.

Porat: But why do you accept without criticism the provocative behavior of the settlers? It is not unrelated, and it can be changed.

Milson: I believe that law enforcement and prevention of provacations should apply to both sides. As long as the government is there it has to take care of both Jews and Arabs. I am talking about a moderate Arab leader and a radical one, both of whom are lumped together by a large segment of the Israeli public which says that all Arabs are the same! We are aware of different kinds of Jews and different kinds of Jewish conducts. Most of us are. But there is a mistaken notion which says that all Arabs are the same. Haj Mazuz al Misri did not love Israel, but when he served as mayor of Nablus he did not support the PLO but Jordan. He was in favor of an agreement, while Hamdi Kenean was not. Israel has an interest--and I am not talking now about ability--to let those who support Jordan make their voice heard so that Jordan can come back. Jordan needs this in order to come back as a representative of the Palestinians in the negotiations, although it needs more. Such people enable us to rule in the territories with less difficulties and less force, which is important in and of itself.

In brief, we have created a situation whereby the pragmatic elements, the law abiding, non-violent ones, have been neutralized in the political arena, their tie to Jordan has been damaged by our moves, while those who look for political underground activities have found fertile ground for their activities.

Shor: If I understand you correctly, whether a Jordanian-Palestinian or a Palestinian state comes about, if we do not initiate a dialog with the Arabs the situation will not imporve.

Milson: A political dialog with pragmatic elements in the territories is as important for Israel as any political settlement. If the political character of Jordan changes and the monarchy disappears and is replaced by another regime, the population will remain and we will have to keep in touch with pragmatic leaders who are not close to the radicals in the Arab political spectrum.

We Will Be Able to Insure Israel's Security Needs

Porat: Milson has mentioned the term "interim compromise," negotiating territorial compromise with Jordan. This needs to be clarified. I don't believe that after what happened the Jordanian government will be willing to give up territory, except for minor adjustments. Anyone who speaks about a solution through the Jordanian option needs to realize that it means returning almost everything back to Jordan. There is no chance Jordan or anyone else will agree to the status quo which we have created in Jerusalem--all of Jerusalem in Israeli hands in terms of national sovereignty. The system of boroughs is not a solution either. The boroughs system deals with sewage. Anyone who deludes himself that letting the old city take care of its water and sewage will solve the problem, is quite wrong. What we can achieve is insuring the security interests of Israel in the West Bank. If Sadat understood it, Husayn will also.

The Israeli security interest in the West Bank is to prevent it from becoming a base for a massive attack on Israel. This we have to insure. The more we prepare ourselves for such a future, the better. Swallowing the pill will then be easier. The Alignment's territorial compromise slogan needs to be clarified. Otherwise one may think that the Alignment is not sincere. Things can be carried to the absurd. The fact is that the residents of the territories did not take up arms and would not take up arms to chase the IDF out of Nablus. I believe the Arabs are a wise people. Palestinians who live in Egypt do not like Sadat's initiative. Palestinian students protested his initiative. But when they found out that it meant losing their monthly allowance of 10 pounds on which they live, they said, let us wait and see.

I also have the opposite examples. The Egyptian people rose against the British in 1919. The Syrians had a general strike for almost 3 months in 1936 which forced the French to chance their policy and negotiate.

We Have to Switch to Qualitative Terms

Alpeleg: There is an example of Palestinian Arabs, who in 1936 held a general strike and continued to riot for a long time. But the question still remains: why during 70 years of British rule in Egypt only in 1919 there was civil disobedience and why did the Palestinian Arabs let the Jews take the main part of

fighting the British. Husayn had his reasons for worrying about a dialog between Israel and the residents of the territories. His cooperation with the PLO was the result of his fear that Israel will get together with those leaders in the territories who never accepted the Jordanian rule. The problem was indeed what would we do in the territories. I think that what we did in the territories should have brought about the creation of a radical Palestinian state. For how can you keep the status quo and argue there is no one to talk to, we won't talk to the PLO, and that's that.

Of course we did not intend to bring about a PLO state or an absurd situation. I say that there was no well thought out plan. Things were done without thought, unprofessionally, intuitively, and then we tried to dress them up with all kinds of theories. We held elections. Did we really want to get rid of Jabri? The fact is the military government expelled Dr Hamzi Natasha in order to pave the way for Jabri as mayor of Hebron. But Jabri was smarter than us and said, you spoiled it, under such conditions I cannot run when there is terrorism. I have no chance. So the deadline for voter registration was extended twice, to persuade Jabri. But this wise man refused.

It seems to me that in order to do something now toward a solution we have to earn again the right to living space which we lost because of our sins. We need space for maneuvering. We have to reduce the influence of the PLO and create for ourselves or for Jordan the necessary conditions for political activity.

There is one problem which we ignore: the time must come when we will start to talk about ourselves and about the Arabs in different terms. During all the years of the conflict we have measured our relations with the Arabs in quantitative terms, and where such terms are concerned we cannot expect to have the upperhand for long, not in what pertains to size of population, strategy, economic resources, or power in the international arena.

We have to switch from quantitative to qualitative terms: the nature of our relations with this part of the world. We talk about peace? We'll have to talk about peace in unquantitative terms. For what is the goal of Zionism? We came here to build a state which will live in peace with its environment, and not by the sword.

Where Did the Tension Grow

Milson: If we take the 1972 elections, we will see that the political public in Nablus did not want to vote. The town and its leaders were forced to have elections. Moreover, one of the seemingly liberal principles was the separation of words and deeds. For deeds, such as laying bombs, we resorted to punishment. Words of public figures were not punished. This is a destructive principle, because in political life words is part of political action. In the case of an occupied population and its leaders who publicly identify with terrorist organizations, this is a political act. The fact that leaders were not punished and there was no restriction put on them in this matter created a tension, aggravated the conflict, and caused the outbursts which later had to be severely punished. This has changed the territories from an asset which could be used in negotiations to a burden.

What did Anton Atallah do when he was appointed senator in Jordan at the end of 1967? He pledged his allegiance to the king. No doubt this was an act of protest against Israeli rule in the West Bank. He was punished for his words. He was not involved in incitement or terrorist activity, but was rather an old, law abiding man. He was not allowed to return to his home in the West Bank in Jerusalem. Hamdi Kenean, on the other hand, who since 1967 identified with the terrorist organizations and kept praising them during his entire term of office as mayor, was supported by the Ministry of Defense. This was a message to the political crowd in the West Bank.

Alpeleg: If in any of the Arab countries the political act was separated from the political word, as we have tried to do in the territories, I wonder how long the Jordanian regime would have lasted. The question is, why are we trying to do things which have not cucceeded anywhere else?

Cultivating Moderate Leadership Rather Than Radical

Milson: The distinction between moderate and radical leadership is often presented in a distorted way, as if this were an artificial distinction. This is not so. Arab leaders (who are political like anywhere else, with their own particular Arab political and cultural characteristics), move along an uninterrupted line which runs between two polarities: one polarity is an eschatological national vision--making Arab unity a reality. The other are the pragmatic needs, the pragmatic interests, and there are people who according to their temper and ideological background are closer to one polarity or the other. Most of them act according to necessity and interests. Israel's objective in the territories is to create an atmosphere which will enable the pragmatic elements to act. They don't have to be created or invented. One only has to create conditions which will enable them to exist without fear of being murdered or liquidated, and, of course, create interest in pragmatism.

If you show willingness to negotiate with Jordan you have to create interests which will help a pragmatic leader justify his position. If you say, there is no negotiation, you play into the hands of the radical. The policy in the territories should be one of encouraging the pro-Jordanian elements to express themselves. I believe Jordan needs it. There are several indications from Jordan that it needs it. People who come back from Jordan say that Jordan and King Husayn never gave up the prospect of returning to the territories. Under the present circumstances, after Rabat and after the rise of the PLO's prestige he needs a justification. The justification can come in two ways: from the Arabs of the territories who would invite him as a legitimate representative, whereby the king will be able to tell the Palestinians and the Arab world that he is the one who can get the biggest prize from Israel. Israel therefore must say, we are willing to negotiate with Jordan, and with Jordan only.

Shor: What about a territorial compromise?

Milson: After the peace treaty with Egypt, in which Israel gave back everything, it will be very hard to achieve a territorial compromise in which Jordan won't demand that Israel return to the 1967 borders, including partnership or part in the sovereignty of Jerusalem.

Two other components have to be looked at: political and diplomatic freedom of action in the area of security. The Camp David accords created an uncomfortable precedent. In the agreement with Jordan the time element should be more substantial. We have to keep in mind that we have many scattered settlements, and also the strategic importance, namely, the security risk. The fact that the West Bank borders on Israel's vulnerability justifies various Israeli demands. The 1967 borders will be Jordan's demand, but this does not mean that an Israeli statesman who suggests a territorial compromise with Jordan must define the initial price according to the Jordanian initial demand, especially when the details of the agreement are not known, and the security problem on our eastern border is particularly difficult.

In addition, we must remember that the point of departure are the Camp David accords, which bind every Israeli government. This framework, which has many drawbacks, also has an advantage, in that the autonomy is an interim arrangement which enables the to reach an agreement without predetermined borders.

In the ignoring of policy in the territories on the part of the Israeli public there has actually been a partnership between the left and the right. There seems to be here a partial partnership between those who want to give up territories for nothing and those who won't give up territories for any price.

Porat: Uri Avneri and Moshe Dayan are natural allies in opposing the Jordanian option.

Milson: Also in looking down on the moderate Palestinian leadership.

Porat: We should mention one example: when the military government helped bring out the newspaper AL QUDS, it was brought out as an anti-Jordanian paper. After a few years it changed its tune. But in the early years, when it first came out with Israeli encouragement, it was anti-Jordanian.

Shor: Gentlemen, we have to stop. I thank you on behalf of our readers for your instructive comments.

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WOMEN'S ADVANCEMENT FACES OBSTACLES

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Oct 80 p 13

[Article by Y'hudit Knoller: "They Do Not Reach the Top; Politics and Homemaking Do Not Go Hand in Hand--According to Study Examining Reasons Stopping Israeli Women from Reaching Leadership"]

[Text] It is no secret that women who attain key positions in politics suffer from unstable family life. It is no accident, says Professor Shevah Weiss, who coauthored an article in Jewish Sociological Quarterly on the status of women in the Israeli political map.

Women are conspicuous by their absence in political life, as they have been for the past 30 years. There are several reasons for this, according to the authors. Israeli politics is conducted by professionals who make their living in that way. Women who turn to politics also work and take care of a home, and find it hard to compete in their triple role with the professionals. Thus, the most successful women in politics are those who are not bound by the home or do not find their fulfilment in family life.

Yet Israeli politics has some additional characteristics: the Arab-Israeli conflict and the constant state of war have created a male culture. Women have accepted this supremacy unquestioningly, even in the kibbutzim, where men do patently feminine jobs. Despite the elections system which encourages women to present their candidacy, they are stopped by the appointment system which is based on dealing with various pressure groups, including ethnic ones. While women are securing certain positions in this system, only a few make it. According to the study, although 40-50 percent of the party members are women, only 7.5 percent attains party leadership. In the Knesset their number is even smaller, 1-1.7 percent.

The religious parties have contributed their share in pushing women aside by relegating them to the kitchen. There is an additional factor: Israeli women who are involved in politics are less willing to compromise than their male colleagues. They do not tend to accept party discipline and are prone to leave the parent organization and establish their own independent faction in keeping with their opinions and beliefs. This detracts from their chance to get a good place in the list of appointments. Perhaps the fact that they do not have much to lose encourages their lack of conformity.

The status of women who have entered the Knesset is not brilliant.

Since the Sixth Knesset not one woman has served in the foreign relations and security committee. Except for the Fourth Knesset not one woman has served on the financial committee. Women can be found in the education and labor committees, but not as chairpersons.

The only post in which they have served in disproportion to their numbers is the vice chairperson of the Knesset, which is basically a technical post. In the past it was considered prestigious though without authority, but since the number of vice chairpersons has been increased the prestige has declined.

It would have been logical for women to excel in municipal activities—because of the proximity to the home and the flexible hours, as well as the affinity of the female stereotype to municipal work--education, health, welfare, environment, and culture. Also political struggles are considered less intense at that level. But reality is different from theory. Women are even less represented there than in the Knesset. Only one woman in Jewish municipal life, according to the study (and to the best of my knowledge only one Arab woman, Y.K.) has thus far served as mayor, namely Hanah Levin in Rishon Leziyyon.

The authors end with a somber prognosis: "If there is no real change in this matter, the equality of the sexes as proclaimed by the Declaration of Independence will remain hypocritical lip-service."

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AGRICULTURE HURT BY ENERGY CRISIS, INFLATION

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 30 Oct 80 p 19

[Article by Aharon Priel: "Energy Crisis and Inflation Badly Hurt Agriculture; Director General of Agriculture Ministry: Farmers Received Financing Covering Only 50 Percent of Investment"]

[Text] No one has yet found the way to settle Israel by establishing new industries. Agriculture is still the way to create new settlements which could be much larger were it not for the cost of water and inflation.

This according to Meir Ben Meir, director general of the Minsitry of Agriculture. Mr Ben Meir explains that what limits the growth of settlements is the cost of water and the inflation.

The agricultural planning system debates whether to establish large diversified farms which can withstand changes and fluctuations, or many small ones which have greater social and security value.

Large diversified farms are extremely expensive, as is the cost of water, in which the energy component reaches 60 percent. Yet a large farm can resist social upheaval which results from economic crisis, Ben Meir explains.

He points out that economically the thousands of small farms in Israel today are a great burden which might be overcome if they only grew crops for export.

Ben Meir argues that the government (as well as previous governments) is not patient enough to build an agriculture which can be immune to social upheavals or economic crises. After new farmers who lacked knowledge and experience were able to become established as exporters of fresh agricultural product, "came the big shock of the energy crisis and the inflation in the Israeli economy and turned everything upside down," Ben Meir says.

He maintains that under the present inflation exports could be channeled in two directions: a small number of export farmers with sufficient financing, and a large number of export farmers without sufficient financing. The farmers have received financing which covered only 50 percent of their investment, and the rest was self-financed in ways which caused complications. The devaluation of the pound did not keep up with the loan rates, and the agricultural product which was expected to be the answer of the small farm as part of as many farms as possible entered a greater crisis than any other product, Ben Meir explains.

In order to contend with the cost of water it is necessary to find agricultural products for which the use of water is marginal. In other words, income and "knowhow" oriented products.

The director general of the Ministry of Agriculture is not satisfied with the scope of demands made upon the farmer, who is told to constantly increase his exports on the basis of sophisticated agriculture, and the means which the government and the society put at his disposal. "The result is, we always arrive too late," Ben Meir argues.

The director general maintains that we do not do enough in the area of agricultural research and guidance in the field.

Because of bad times the budget for training new farmers is cut, expecially in areas which are economically and socially depressed. The cuts perpetuates the depression. "If we cannot train the new farmers systematically all those big investments we have made in the new settlements will go to waste, including many settlements in the Jordan Valley."

The cuts may cause serious crises, more than we can imagine, agricultural experts believe, as they react to the firing of 60 agricultural trainers.

Despite the difficulties in the present and the grim prophecies, which predicted a black future for the farmers, the ministries of finance and agriculture worked during the past 9 months on extricating the agriculture from its plight. The director general explained that the measures taken by the two ministries helped save the farms from a serious crisis.

Meir Ben Meir puts his trust in two key areas of Israeli agriculture—research and training. He is prepared to fight any attempts to effect mindless cuts in these areas or to dismiss trainers.

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BRIEFS

DECLINE IN HOUSING--During the first three quarters of 1980 construction started on only 12,700 new apartments, a 31 percent decline compared to last year at this time. It is now clear that 1980 shows an unprecedented low in new apartment construction. The previous low year, 1977, shows construction of 21,000 new apartments, while 1980 is going to be lower. The main reason for the decline is the reduction in private construction. Construction statistics in 21 large towns in which 55-60 percent of private construction is concentrated, show that through September construction started on 6,960 apartments, compared to 9,900 last year at the same time. These figures are based on official data of the Central Bureau of Statistics, combined with estimates of the Contractors Center, released this week by the center's economist, Mr Binyamin Kendler. It was further reported that a sharp decline in industrial, commercial, and public construction took place this year compared to last. Through September 640,000 square meter of non-residential construction was started, a 28 percent decline compared to last year. Here too construction is the lowest in years. This sharp decline in construction is also the result of delays in signing contracts between the ministry of housing and the construction companies. It will cause a growing shortage in apartments and a rise in apartment cost in the months ahead. [Text] [Tel Avia HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Oct 80 p 14] 9565

BRAIN DRAIN--The problem of "brain drain" in Israel and the need to stimulate research and development activities to prevent this phenomenon was discussed yesterday at the first session of the ministers' committee on science and technology, chaired by Energy and Infrastructure Minister Yitzhak Mod'ai. Professor Gad Hetzrony, director of the Council for Research and Development, reviewed the interdepartmental system related to research and development subjects and pointed out that the tasks are scattered in government departments and there is a need to organize the research and development system in the overall national planning. The question of activating the National Council for Research and Development which will convene in a few weeks was also discussed. Mr Mod'ai stated he had contacted Knesset Chairman Yitzhak Berman with a request to establish a Knesset committee for research and development. [Text] [Tel Avia HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Oct 80 p 3] 9565

DEVELOPMENT TOWN EXPORTS--During the first half of the year the export originated in development towns reached 400 million dollars. By the end of the year it will reach 800 million dollars, a more than 50 percent growth compared to last year. These figures were reported by Minister of Industry, Commerce and Tourism Gidion Pat, to the economic committee of the Knesset. The minister added that 44 percent of all those employed in development areas work in production, as compared to a national average of 25 percent. The minister told the committee that during the first 9 months of the year 155 enterprises were started or enlarged in development areas, costing 800 million shekel, employing more than 3000 workers. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 22 Oct 80 p 7] 9565

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

SOVIET CULTURAL DELEGATION--Amman, 8 Dec (PETRA)--A Soviet delegation representing the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, led by (Shikola), deputy minister of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education in the Soviet Union, arrived here from Beirut last night. The delegation includes (Malatshanov), deputy chairman of the Near East and Middle East department in the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. The 9-day visit comes in implementation of the cultural agreement concluded by the Jordanian-Soviet friendship societies in Jordan and the Soviet Union. This agreement is ratified every 2 years. [Excerpt] [JN080954 Amman PETRA-JNA in Arabic 0930 GMT 8 Dec 80]

CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

NEW PORT STORAGE MEASURES--The General Port Authority announced yesterday that it will store transit goods in the open as of tomorrow, Wednesday, without taking any responsibility for any resulting damages. The authority said that it has resorted to this measure due to the pileup of goods in the port warehouses and due to the unavailability of sufficient roofed storage space. The authority urged the maritime companies and agents, shipowners, merchants and importers to pick up these goods immediately and without any delay. The authority will also store goods (belonging to Kuwait) packed in sacks--regardless of whether their contents are for human or animal consumption--in the open as of tomorrow without taking any responsibility for any resulting damage. The Ports Authority has also announced that as of the beginning of January 1981, goods that are not packed well enough to withstand all the handling of all phases until delivery will not be accepted so that the authority may secure the safety of imported goods and may render its services available to all importers. The authority has also asked all importers to stress in the credit letters that they open the need for quality and uniform packaging, and for the use of sacks and of other means of protection that guarantee the delivery of these goods in good condition. The General Port Authority has pointed out that there are certain kinds of goods that arrive packaged poorly. These goods are: All the commercial goods arriving from Taiwan, cast iron sewer and manhole covers from India, commercial goods from Korea, gravel and powder arriving from Italy, canned food cartons arriving from Egypt, redwood arriving from Malaysia and white wood arriving from Romania, Sweden, Finland and Yugoslavia. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 14 Oct 80 p 17] 8494

ASIAN OIL SUPPLY--Oil sources in Jakarta said yesterday that Indonesia will ask OPEC to increase its oil supply to five countries in Southeast Asia. In its capacity as an OPEC member, Indonesia has said that this request is in agreement with the international organization's policy of aiding the developing countries that face difficulty in acquiring their energy needs. Maj Gen Piet Haryono, the director of Pertamina, has noted Kuwait's and Saudi Arabia's ability to raise their oil production to supply these countries, namely: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines and Indonesia. Indonesia imports oil derivatives because of its limited refining capacity. It is expected that Indonesia will submit this proposal to the OPEC ministers meeting scheduled to be held in Bali Island next December. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 26 Oct 80 p 15] 8494

LOAN TO BOTSWANA--A loan agreement was concluded yesterday between the Republic of Botswana and the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic Development. In accordance

with the agreement, the fund is to advance a 2 million dollar loan to participate in financing the new international (Gaboron) airport in the Republic of Botswana. The agreement was signed on behalf of the Republic of Botswana by Balidzi Jaolit, the permanent undersecretary of finance and development planning, and on behalf of the fund by 'Abd al-Rahman al-'Atiqi, the minister of finance and the appointed chairman of the fund's Board of Directors. The project seeks to build an international airport that links Botswana with the outside world directly. It is expected that the project will have positive effects on the national economy, represented in increased direct trade with the outside world, in addition to bolstering the country's political independence and invigorating the tourist movement. The total costs of the project, whose implementation will start at the end of this year, are estimated at 13.9 million Kuwaiti dinars. The fund will cover 14.4 percent of these costs. It is expected that the project will be completed by the middle of 1984. The loan duration is 20 years, including a 4 year period of grace and it will be repaid in 32 semi-annual installments, the first of which will be due on 15 December 1984 and the last on 15 June 2000. The interest on the loan is 2.5 percent annually, in addition to 0.5 percent annually to meet the costs of managing and implementing the loan agreement. [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Oct 80 p 15] 8494

CSO: 4802

CHIEF OF STATE INTERVIEWED FOLLOWING CEAO MEETING

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 29 Oct 80 p 5

[Interview with Mohamed Khouna Ould CMSN President, chief of state and government date and place not given]

[Text] During the Sixth CEAO Conference session CMSN [Military Committee for National Salvation] President, Chief of State and Government gave an important interview to the Nigerian Press in which he outlined the political and economic situation of our country after its withdrawal from the Sahara conflict, his role in the subregional organs in West Africa, the Arab-African cooperation and many other important questions.

Here is the complete text of that interview:

[Question] Mr President, what is Mauritania's political and economic situation after its withdrawal from the Sahara conflict?

[Answer] As you know, we are now watching a world crisis, concerning economic and political situations. The relapses of this crisis are felt in our country.

As you also know, Mauritania belongs to that Sahelian group, which was particularly hard hit by 12 years of prolonged drought.

Otherwise, Mauritania has not escaped the misdeeds of bad administration, which the majority of African nations have known after independence.

Add to that the heritage of 3 years of East Sahara wars.

But, I think that, despite of this particularly difficult context, we are not the most unfortunate ones in Africa. Our situation rather, urges optimism in the future, judging by the conclusions of international organs specialized in the field of economy and finances.

[Question] Mr President, your country belongs to a certain number of subregional organs in West Africa. What is the motivation for that and what do you expect?

[Answer] Mauritania's affiliation to numerous subregional organs comes from its will to fully play its role in the political and economic fight which drives our continent. You know that, as Nigeria, our country occupies a double-barrelled position, between the Arab Maghreb and Black Africa.

This position gives us particular responsibilities towards our people, but also towards the Arab and African people. It is to say that we cannot but be present where these people's interests demand it.

Now, for us, these organs perfectly answer our concern on favoring cooperation between member-countries and in contributing to the acceleration of the continent's economic integration.

[Question] Mr President, what do you make of the Arab-African cooperation?

[Answer] Mauritania fights for an Arab-African cooperation based on the loyalty to the fraternal solidarity principles and support to just causes. But this cooperation, unfortunately, collides with the interest of certain powers which know Africa well, as mutual difficulties between African and Arab countries. Meanwhile, in our bilateral domain we notice encouraging examples of cooperation among certain Arab and African countries.

[Question] Mr President, what do you think about the North-South dialogue and what should be done, according to you, for a profitable organization of a very just new world economic order?

[Answer] We think that, despite the failure of meetings, the North-South dialogue should continue. But the obstinate selfishness of rich nations should urge us, our underdeveloped countries, to organize more, to have better administrations and better control of our resources.

[Question] What opinion do you have of the East Sahara situation and what do you predict would end the conflict?

[Answer] You know that we have withdrawn from the Sahara war and that since then we have maintained a neutral position in this conflict.

But we have noticed that the Maghreb peace doesn't seem to progress at the pace we would have desired. Above all, we notice that after the last meeting of the OAU "ad-hoc" committee in Freetown, our Moroccan brothers opted for a blockade policy to all negotiable solutions.

We have great hope that his situation will end, because an armed solution does not profit anyone.

Only narrow minds are attracted by it. But His Majesty, King Hassen II is one of this century's great men and I am sure that he will find a negotiable solution.

9626
CSO: 4400

BRIEFS

QATARI DONATION TO MINISTER--Yedali Ould Cheikh, Minister of Justice and Islamic Affairs talked, yesterday, with the Charge d'Affaires of Qatari, on behalf of our country. On this occasion the Qatari diplomat gave the Minister a check in the amount of $328,000 dollars, his country's aid to outfit the Ministry of Justice and Islamic Affairs. [Text] [Nouakchott CHAAB in French 30 Oct 80 p 1] 9262

COPPER MINING COMPANY APPROVED--The council of Ministers met, yesterday morning, 24 October 1980. It was presided by Lt Col Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla, president of the Military Committee of National Health, Chief of State and Chief of Government. The council approved an ordnance project to create a joint-venture company called Societe Miniere d'Inchiri [Inchiri Mining Co]. The creation of this company has, as objective, the restarting of the exploitation of the Akjoujt Copper Mine. This operation will have essentially, as consequence, the increase of economic and social activities in this region, sorely tried these past years by the closing down of Ex-Somina and the damaging effects of the drought. [Excerpt] [Nouakchott CHAAB in French 25-26 Oct 80 pp 1, 8] 9626

CSO: 4400

KING SOLOMON'S GOLD MINE TO BE REWORKED

Kuwait KUWAIT TIMES in English 24 Nov 80 p 3

[Text]

LONDON, Sun. — The Arab world should soon know whether it is to get its first new gold mine in nearly 30 years. And all the signs look encouraging for a $70 million a year gold rush.

While the mine, in Saudi Arabia, will be one of the most modern, it will also be on the site of one of the most ancient gold-workings known to mankind.

For the new mine, for which feasibility studies are expected to be completed before the year-end, will be based on the antique Mahd Adh Dhahab — cradle of gold — workings north-east of the Saudi seaport city of Jeddah.

Mining is known to have taken place on this site 3,000 years ago, and some experts believe it could have been the Biblical "King Solomon's mine", the bullion treasure house of ancient Arabia.

JOINT

The mining project is a joint development by the big London based metals group, Consolidated Gold Fields and Petromin, the Saudi state agency concern.

If the Mahd Adh Dhahab mine is brought into production, it is anticipated the operation will treat "about 120,000 tonnes of ore per year," a Consolidated Gold Fields spokesman says here.

Gold production could amount to two to three tonnes a year, with associated silver, copper and zinc production, he adds.

At a current gold price of near $650 an ounce, the mine's gold output could be worth up to $70 million annually, not including the income from other metals, experts say.

PLANS

Current feasibility plans call for underground development at the mine — situated on an ancient caravan route between the Yemen in the south and Jordan in the north — next year, with full production being achieved in 1983.

The development cost for the project is being put by some experts at some $30 million making it profitable within months of full production.

This will be the fourth time that Mahd Adh Dhahab has been exploited. Mining probably originally took place 3,000 years ago, and was resumed 1,000 years later when as much as 40 tonnes of gold and silver bullion may have been produced, according to Consolidated Gold Fields.

Mining was carried out for a third time between 1939 and 1954 by the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate, which produced 23 tonnes of gold and 31 tonnes of silver.

The bulk of this was obtained by treatment of ancient mining "tailings" or waste, the balance being from fresh mining on the surface and underground. The new project could also treat ancient tailings, as well as exploiting new mining.

COSTS

The Saudi Syndicate's development ceased as a result of increasing production costs and depletion of ore reserves.

It is clear that the upward spiral in the world gold price — which this year touched a record $850 an ounce — is the key in the moves to re-open the "cradle of gold."

Consolidated Gold Fields says that the rising gold price during the 1970s aroused the interest of the Saudi Directorate General of Mineral Resources, which commissioned the US Geological Survey to carry out exploration of the mine.

CSO: 4820

U.S.-EGYPTIAN JOINT MANEUVERS DISCUSSED

Damascus AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 19 Nov 80 p 5

[Article by 'Abd al-Rahman al-Dahhak: "The Egyptian Regime Is Paving the Way for U.S. Aggression"]

[Text] The joint American-Egyptian maneuvers are part of the preparation for imperialist aggression against the Arab world. Since the beginning of this year the American secretary of defense, Harold Brown, has been making announcements about the readiness of the Rapid Deployment units which have been formed from among the United States' seven armies. Training of these units already began last February in the states of California and Florida. These units include 80,000 regular troops, 40,000 reserve troops, 170 Phantom F-16 fighter planes, 23 B-52 bombers, in addition to 4 squadrons of huge transport planes. Gen Kelley, the commander of the Rapid Deployment units, has announced that this new unit's mission will be that of guarding America's interests in the Middle East. It is no accident that these Rapid Deployment units have been established. They are part of the new American strategy which was planned by Henry Kissinger when he was the American government's national security advisor and when he became secretary of state he made the Rapid Deployment units part of America's actual military strategy.

Political commentators are of the opinion that the basic motive for forming this unit is the United States' fear that another war, such as the October War, will occur between the Arabs and the Zionists and that this will affect the world's oil supply. This fear was expressed by Kissinger after the October War when he threatened to occupy the Arab oil fields unless they were left untouched by the war and outside the scope of the Arab-Zionist conflict.

In March of 1974, the Pentagon gave assurances of its readiness to occupy the oil fields and establish control over these sources of oil in order to keep the oil pumping so that it could continue to be supplied to the United States.

At the time, these statements provoked strong reactions on the part of the Arab nations and the international community. In the face of these reactions, the United States said that it had given up any idea of occupying the oil fields, but in fact the United States continued to lay down a complete American strategy concerning this matter. Nixon, Ford, and Carter, more than once, have stated that the United States will use military force to guard what it has called its vital interests in the Persian Gulf area.

But then there was a succession of events in the Middle East after the signing of the two Camp David treaties. There was the fall of the shah of Iran, who had been playing the role of policemen for the Pentagon in the area, there were the plots to partition Lebanon, there was the failure on the part of the imperialists to expand the civil war in Lebanon, and there was the general expansion of liberation movements in the Arab countries and throughout the world. All of this made the United States give up its policy of being silent on the matter, and it proceeded to reveal its new strategy concerning the Middle East.

In the second conference in Venice, which was held during the latter part of last April, Carter and his secretary of state, Muskie, made announcements concerning America's new plans and concerning Europe's role in carrying out these plans in order to confront what they called the advance of communism and in order to guard their joint imperialist interests.

Part of this plan is that the European nations would provide sufficient military facilities, in terms of logistics and supplies, to the American Rapid Deployment units, and they would participate to the extent that they could in such military efforts. Most of the European nations declared their full readiness to offer facilities, but did not want to become involved in military actions. An exception was Britain, which also announced that it had formed rapid deployment units consisting of airborne troops and squadrons of planes. In connection with this, Britain said that it was going to demand to regain the position that it once had in its base on Cyprus and to the east of Aden. This would be within the framework of cooperation between Britain and the United States.

In October of last year, President Sadat of Egypt signed a treaty with the United States which arranged for providing the U.S. with military facilities, in accordance with the two Camp David agreements. In May of this year the first fruits of this agreement began to appear--in the form of joint maneuvers conducted by the American army and the army of Sadat's regime. These maneuvers went on for 3 months.

A few days ago a second series of maneuvers began. The saw the participation of 1,400 American troops from America's Rapid Deployment forces, in addition to squadrons of transport planes. The maneuvers were being held in order to teach American troops to conduct war in desert terrain, according to a statement made by the Egyptian regime's chief of staff. A few days ago, an S-141 military transport plane crashed near the American air base west of Cairo. All of those on board, including 6 pilots and navigators and 7 passengers, were killed. This was one of the planes participating in the joint American-Egyptian maneuvers which have been called "Rising Star." The objective of the maneuvers is to train a rapid deployment force to deal with emergency situations, in particular those which might occur in the Middle East. They are also being held in order to acclimate American troops to desert terrain and to climatic conditions which predominate in the Arab world. After this crash occurred, Muhsin Hamdi, one of Sadat's major generals, said in a press conference that these maneuvers were being held in order to train Americans in case they would be called upon to intervene in the Arab world.

The training includes land and air maneuvers, with live ammunition, and involves airborne operations. The maneuvers also involve training to defend against tank attacks. These maneuvers are expected to begin before the end of this week.

These American efforts to step up military preparations, which are taking place in Egypt, an Arab country--in addition to American bases which already exist in Somalia, Kenya, Muscat, and Masirah, in addition to expanding the base at Diego Garcia--emphasize the hostile intentions on the part of the United States toward the Arab world. These hostile intentions are being aided and abetted by Sadat, who began this policy by committing his act of treachery and is now paving the way for American aggression not only against the Arab world, but also against liberation movements throughout the world, especially the liberation movements in Africa.

9468
CSO: 4802

BRIEFS

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ACTIVITIES--The Muslim Brotherhood in the Syrian city of Hamat killed four members of the Tishrin corrective movement after abducting them. Military planes [subsequently] bombed some of the quarters in which the Muslim Brotherhood members sought refuge. Those who were killed, were identified as Shaykh (Muhammad 'Ulwan) and Shaykh (Ibrahim Muhammad Arfan). In Aleppo, Muslim Brotherhood members robbed the Central Bank and planted a bomb in a building belonging to the communications administration. In Aleppo too, the Muslim Brotherhood abducted the owner of the Nile Hotel in the (Bab al-Faraj) quarter. The owner (Faruq al-Kusa) was later found murdered in the town of 'Afrin. Reports say that the Syrian authorities have apprehended about 100 Egyptians on charges of dealing with the Muslim Brotherhood. [Text] [NC101600 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1515 GMT 10 Dec 80]

JAPANESE DIET MISSION--Damascus Dec 10--A suprapartisan Japanese Dietmen mission arrived in Damascus Wednesday evening for talks with leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The group, made up of members of the Dietmen's League for Japan-Palestine Friendship, is headed by former foreign minister Toshio Kimura. It was invited by Khalid Fahum, president of the PLO parliament. The mission members plan to meet with Fahum during their stay here until Friday. They will later go to Lebanon for a meeting with Yasir 'Arafat, leader of the PLO. In their meeting with the PLO leaders, the mission members plan to reveal their stand that the organization is the sole representative of the Palestinians, according to sources close to the mission. The Japanese Government has been showing a posture up to now that the PLO is the representative of the Palestinians. But the view to be indicated to the PLO leaders by the mission is a more positive one than that of the government, the sources said. [Text] [OW110104 Tokyo KYODO in English 0028 GMT 11 Dec 80]

OFFICERS DEFECT--Kuwait, Dec 11 (AFP)--Five Syrian officers have flown a helicopter into Jordan and requested political asylum, the Kuwaiti daily AL-QABAS reported today citing Jordanian sources. The newspaper did not specify which branch of the forces the officers belonged to but said that they ranged in rank from "commander to lieutenant." The five reportedly defected from Khalkhalah Airport on the border between the two countries. [Text] [NC111104 Paris AFP in English 1048 GMT 11 Dec 80]

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END

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RUSSIAN POLICY TOWARD AFGHAN MUSLIMS REVIEWED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 23 Oct 80 p 5

[Article by Kuldip Nayyer: "Russian Policy and Muslims; Khalq Faction of Afghan Communists Also Against Russia"]

[Text] Kuldip Nayyer, editor of the prominent Indian daily, the Indian Express, recently visited Russian-occupied Afghanistan. Some of the observations he made were printed in Pakistani newspapers also. A translation of one of the articles in the series is being printed below. It reveals the observations of a prominent Indian journalist on the Russian aggression about which the Indian government is so supportive--the Editor.

If a referendum was held today in Afghanistan, 99 percent of its people would vote against the Russian occupation. If, for some reason, the Russian troops were to leave Afghanistan, the Karmal government would fall and its members be punished in the streets of Kabul.

The hatred against the Russians and the present government has increased enormously. I was present in Kabul 1 month after the Russian occupation began and it was not possible to find even one person who was in favor of the Russians. Everyone considered Russia as an aggressor.

The Russian troops marched into Afghanistan on 26 December 1979. The hate against the Russians and the Afghan government started from that very day and has been rising. The people were already expressing dissatisfaction with the governments of Taraki (from April 1978 to September 1979) and Amin (from September to December 1979). The mullahs had created an atmosphere which caused people to be ready to fight against communists to save Islam. However, there were still some people who were loyal to the government. The Russian aggression changed the whole picture. The people fighting against communism were provided the weapon of nationalism which is more effective than the weapon of religion. The army dwindled from 100,000 to less than half its size. Most of the intellectuals have either left the country or joined the rebels. The rebels, living in camps in Peshawar, Rawalpindi, and other cities, have leaders in the form of these intellectuals. At present most of the roads are closed and it is dangerous even to go 10 miles out of Kabul. The students, who once supported the communist movement, are enraged against it.

The most unfortunate event for the Russians was the cooling of the communist movement. The People's Democratic Party, the ruling party of Afghanistan, is divided now. It should be mentioned here that during the fifth decade of this century, the Communist Party of India with the help of Moscow had managed to reconcile the two factions of Afghan communists--Khalq and Parcham. Later, the Khalq faction openly joined the rebels against the Russian presence in Afghanistan. Some leaders of the Khalq faction told me that communism did not mean Russian occupation and that they were determined to push the intruding army out of their country. The Khalq people do not mind the Russian influence in their country; it is the presence of Russians that they are against.

It should be remembered that at the time when Russian troops entered Afghanistan, 5,000 Russian advisors were working in Afghanistan with the government's approval. This fact has been accepted by everyone, including the Western powers, that Afghanistan is in the Russian sphere of influence. Everyone accepts that any government that rules Kabul has to be approved by Russia. The Islamic countries which are fighting for Afghanistan's freedom accept this position and believe that the Russian troops should leave Afghanistan only after Moscow is satisfied with any future government of Kabul.

The question arises: If Russia had full control over Afghanistan then why did Russian troops enter Afghanistan? This question is still discussed as hotly as it was during my first visit to Kabul. It is felt that Russia is interested in more than Afghanistan itself. For example, an important position from military point of view, is its strategic location from where they can capture the oil-rich Gulf area in no time. Also, as need arises, Iran can be protected or captured very easily from here. Keeping this in mind, it is hard to believe that Russian as offended world opinion just for the 250 miles of area outlying its borders.

It is not expected that Russia is moving directly south toward Pakistan. American President Jimmy Carter has assured the Pakistani president, General Zia, that America will stand by its 1959 pact according to which America is to help Pakistan in case it is attacked by Russia. Thus, Russia cannot afford to risk a world war.

The truth is that Russia has erred. First, it got itself involved in the mutiny against President Daud in 1978 at a time when Afghanistan was not ready for a communist revolution. At that time, only 50,000 out of its 13 million people supported Khalq and Parcham factions. Later, Russia gave preference to Babrak over Taraki. The biggest mistake was that the Russians failed to take strong nationalist feelings of Afghans into account. These are the same Afghans who fought three wars with the British in 100 years. Their struggle with the Russians is only one year old!

7997
CSO: 4203

MUJAHIDIN PLAN TO ATTACK KABUL IN THREE MONTHS

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 20 Oct 80 pp 3, 10

[Article: "Several Russian Planes Destroyed in Mujahidin's Attack on Kabul Airport; New Troops and Helicopters Arrive in Afghanistan; Attempt to Overthrow Karmal"]

[Text] Peking, 19 October (APP)--The official news agency of People's Republic of China commenting on the recent visit of Karmal to Moscow said that the warm welcome extended to him shows that he is very important to Russia. The Russians are forced to recognize Karmal inspite of the strong opposition by Afghans to the Russian troops. According to this agency, the Mujahidin are defeating the Russian and Karmal army badly. The latest proof of this is the attack on Qandahar airport where several Russian planes were destroyed. According to the agency, Russian troops have strengthened their control over communication centers of important cities. To limit the movement of Mujahidin, shelling of important roads outside Kabul has been increased. Fresh Russian troops and helicopters also have arrived in Kabul from Russia. These will be used against the Mujahidin hiding in the mountains.

An attempt to overthrow Babrak Karmal government before his visit to Moscow failed because some Afghan officers informed the Russians who in turn besieged two cantonments of Afghan troops with tanks. Many Russians were killed in these skirmishes. The Russian troops have closed all the roads leading to Kabul and bombed the surrounding areas.

7997
CSO: 4203

EXPATRIATES REPORTEDLY RETURNING TO HOMELAND

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 26 Nov 80 p 2

[Text]

A large number of our deceived compatriots are reported to have been returning to their homes in Afghanitsan. They are the people who left their homes either as a result of the oppression and tyranny of Hafizullah Amin, the spy of imperialism and agent of CIA, and his band of criminals, or because they were deceived by the feudal lords and big land owners who had lost their interests and privileges in this country. ...

The Saur Revolution which was staged by large masses of workers, peasants and oppressed elements under the leadership of the vanguard of the working class, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, was in effect a striking and crushing blow to the feudal lords and landlords and the exploitative ruling circles.

These elements left the country and took refuge to the arm of imperialism, led by US in collusion with Chinese Chauvinism, Pakistan Militarism and reaction of the region. While leaving their home country they deceived a large number of the compatriots by telling them that not only their lives but also their sacred religion were in dangers.

The second banch was forced as a result of the cruelty and oppression execrised by Amin and his band while ruling the county irresponsibily and unlawfully.

Upon leaving their homes they fell prey to the enemies of Saur Revolution and the working people of Afghanistan. There they were drawn into training camps and were taught the techniques of killing and looting, and terroristic activities and were exported to their homeland to kill their brothers, sisters, mothers and even the innocent children and women. No doubt, while carrying out their subversive activities a great number of these subversive elements and terrorists who had created terror and fear in the country were either crushed down or arrested by the revolution defence groups, and units of armed and security forces with the support of the inhabitants.

Of course, when away from their homeland they faced many difficulties and problems they could not have thought of it at all.

It was here they realised that they were deceived to abandon their homes. Away from their fatherland, relatives and fellow countrymen they were suffering much specially when they saw they were living in a

foreign land and ruled by aliens and the imperialists who wanted to use them against their compatriots in an attempt to serve their own militaristic and political designs in Afghanistan and the region.

While living away from their homeland experiencing untold hardship and difficulties they received now and then the news of the development efforts made by the party, government and the people of Afghanistan for the happiness and prosperity of the people without any distinction of race, sex, nationality, family and other considerations.

They found out that Islam was not in danger as the enemies of Saur Revolution were claiming. They were told that the DRA Fundamental Principles provided for freedom of worship and inviobility of Islam in Afghanistan and that the people were freely performing their religious rites and obligations under the protection provided by the state.

They were told that the leadership of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan was making every effort to provide every facility possible to help people work, not only for themselves but also for their own country, the country which has been held backward by the past feudal order and exploitative and oppressive ruling classes for years.

All these provided a strong incentive and a fierce driving force to our deceived compatriots to return to their homes and join the development activities being carried out in the interest of a new life in the country.

The point which deserves mentioning here is that the Pakistan reactionary and military circles are trying to create obstacles to those who intend to return to their homes. Under the imperialist designs the Pakistani rulers want to continue fanning up subversive acts and keeping the so called Afghan refugees in reserve for their imperialistic schemes.

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, the Government and the people of this country welcome heartily these returnees and hope they would join their fellow countrymen in taking active part in the implementation of huge social, economic and cultural transformation plans undertaken. We are sure they will make a good contribution, in their turn one way or another, towards the building of the new society, maintaining of peace, and ensuring of progress, democracy and social justice.

CSO: 4920

COAL PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION INCREASED

Kabul KABUL NEW TIMES in English 26 Nov 80 p 2

[Text] "Approximately eighty percent of coal extracted from mines in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is being consumed by the state industrial enterprises and organisations and the remaining twenty percent is consumed by the individual compatriots."

Engineer Mohammad Hassan Osman, head of liaison of the Coal Enterprise Department of the Ministry of Mines and Industries in an interview with the reporter of the KABUL NEW TIMES in connection with the performance of the enterprise during the first six months of 1359 said:

During the first six months of 1359 an amount of 43,000 tons of coal have been mined from the Karkar and Doudkash mines out of which 35,700 tons have been transported to Kabul and other provinces for distribution to the consumers. This figure show an increase of 71.5 percent as anticipated in the coal extraction plan during the current year.

Since the consumption of coal during the 1359 has been extremely increased, Engineer Hassan Osman added, the bricket factory in Kabul, from the beginning of the current year, have exerted great efforts so that the factory could cope with the ever-increasing coal requirements of the state organisations and the public and as a result of untiring efforts of the factory's personnel during the first six months of this year 15,000 tons coal have been procured and put at the disposal of the consumers in the capital. Meanwhile, distribution of coal among the public is presently continuing with full swing.

Engineer Hassan Osman further said that at present sufficient amount of coal is available in the Karkar-Doudkash mines and Balkh province bricket plant and its distribution currently continue in the Pulihomri and Balkh provinces, beside Kabul, sales of coal also take place at the extraction sites, from which Afs 38,665,000 has been earned during the first half of the current year.

Opining further he said, eighty percent of coal produced in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is being consumed by the state industrial enterprises, factories and organisations who form our permanent customers and twenty percent is being consumed by individuals in Kabul and provinces for heating purpose usually during the winter season.

Because of shortage and scarcity of fuel material during the current year, Eng. Hassan Osman added, an extremely increasing number of the people apply for coal supplies which is unprecedentedly high in comparison to 1358. Taking into account the shortage of fuel materials in the country in general and the ever-increasing demand of the state organisations and the public, the Coal Enterprise Department with the help and collaboration of the Ministry of Mines and Industries the Coal Enterprise have taken necessary steps for provision and procurement of sufficient amount of coal and put at the disposal of the organizations and the citizens in the capital as well as in the provinces.

The Coal Enterprise Department. Eng. Hassan Osman went on, not only tries to provide ample amount of coal for the consumers, and tries to remove the difficulties of the organisations and the public, but this institution also seeks ways and means to better serve the people through timely transportation of coal to the capital and provinces. In the beginning of the current year this department, through maintaining contact with the Kabul Municipality, the Kabul Traffic Department, General Transport Department, private transport companies and other related institutions have sought practical ways and means for smooth and continuous transportation of coal from the extraction sites. As a result of these contacts, the department of coal enterprise was able, with assistance of the above-mentioned organisations to regulate transportation of coal from the extraction sites and within the cities considerably and prepare a regulation fixing the rate of transportation of coal which have been confirmed by the related companies and organisations. The coal bricket factory has time and again requested the customers that in case the transport owners violate the set regulations devised for transportation of coal, they should contact the Traffic Department, Kabul Municipality or the factory management itself, so that the difficulties of the public is removed, Eng. Osman concluded.

CSO: 4920

EGYPTIAN AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS REVIEWED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 18 Sep 80 p 3

[Interview with Dr Khaled al-Shazli, Dean of the Alexandria School of Agriculture, by Albert Tewfik to AL-AKHBAR: "A Dialogue With a Scientific Specialist Concerning Our Agricultural Problems; Subsidies as Well as Government Consumption Societies Should Be Gradually Eliminated. Buildings on Cultivable Land Should Be Removed Using Force If Necessary; The Crisis Centers Around the Crucial Issue of Proper Economic Planning; At One Time, Egypt Had 4000 Agricultural Societies But Only 800 of Them Have Succeeded"]

[Text] This is a dialogue with one of the most highly qualified scientists specializing in agricultural problems--Dr Khaled al-Shazli, Dean of the Alexandria School of Agriculture. Dr Shazli has many ideas and suggestions regarding the agricultural dilemmas facing Egypt. He calls for the gradual elimination of the subsidies system and the abolishment of the Government Cooperatives (gamiyaat). He also advocates the removal of all buildings built on cultivable land even if force must be used to do so. Dr Shazli states that the crisis of proper economic planning is the source of all of our problems. Dr Shazli is one of the men who spoke during President Sadat's meeting with the faculty staff of Alexandria University. Dr Shazli offered some of his ideas and suggestions during this meeting with the president but he was not able to present all of his ideas due to the time factor. Therefore, this interview was conducted to enable Dr Shazli to expand upon his recommendations. The eternal river, the Nile has been flowing in the valley since ancient times. It nourishes the growth of plant-life of both banks, sustains the life of the cattle, and feeds the Egyptian people.

Along both banks, the farmer stands as a giant from sunrise to sunset. His chest is exposed to the sun, his hands till the land and he eats sparingly in order to provide food through his labor and sacrifice for the Egyptian people.

Egypt, which exported food surplus at one time, is importing it today, even though the land has remained unchanged and the farmers are still tilling the soil. What has changed is that 1 million mouths are added to the population every year. It was assumed that the cultivable land would be increased by a degree equal to the population growth but what has actually occurred poses a very serious problem. During the last 10 years, Egypt reclaimed 9000 acres which are currently being used for the production of food. At the same time, buildings were constructed on 850,000 acres of cultivable land in direct violation of the law.

In past years, Egypt was self-sufficient in terms of food production. Today, we import food at the current high prices of the world market. Is it possible for Egypt to resume the former agricultural position it once held?

I submitted that question to Dr Shazli, Dean of School of Agriculture, Alexandria University during the course of a long interview.

[Answer] Why not? This could be accomplished by increasing the cultivable land through scientific technology and by re-educating the farmers. This is a viable solution possible for a country which has 13 schools of agriculture. Before 1967, the production percentage was in keeping with the population growth. The production rate of increase was 3.2 percent while the rate of population increase was 2.7 percent. Therefore, the production was abundant. After the 1967 set back, the rate of production decreased by 9 percent while the rate of population increase remained at 2.3 percent. Now, you can imagine the effect that had on the food crisis.

Mistakes

The dean says, "Let us put the facts together clearly. These facts include mistakes which adversely affect agricultural development. These facts are:

--Increase of the population.

--Increase of the standard of living in the cities. This motivated the farmers to migrate increasing the problems in the cities.

--The rising up of the banner of industrial development and the allocation of all resources for this purpose for many years at the expense of agricultural development.

--Increase in the construction of buildings at the expense of cultivable land.

--The failure to implement the proposed projects to develop agricultural resources. It is important that we realize the seriousness of this situation.

In 1961 a supreme committee was organized to develop animal resources. I was a member of that committee. The committee has not met since 1961. Every minister appointed new members to the committee but it never convened. If we are really concerned with the development of animal resources, a supreme committee should be created by a presidential decree in order to insure that the committee will not become a toy in the hands of the ministers."

Animals Are Weak

[Question] Since we are talking about animal resources, what is your conception of the meat crisis?

[Answer] First of all, animals need proper nourishment. In our country, the cow is weak and slim, and yields one-quarter of the meat which is obtained from European cattle. Here, the cow gives 400 kg of milk a year. The cow in the USA gives 6000 kg of milk and in Scandanavian countries it gives 45,000 kg. Diet is the reason for the large gap. Lack of fresh and dried food because of nonavailability or due to the corruption of the officials in the agricultural societies. In Egypt there are

4000 agricultural societies of which only 20 percent have succeeded. The farmer sells his share on the black market to realize a greater profit and gives his animals inferior feed. If we examine the price for the kilogram of meat under the current conditions, and we assume that the breeder makes 20 percent profit and the butcher 20 percent profit, then the price to the consumer would be only 260 piasters. We are facing a shortage of animal feed. We need 5 million tons of concentrated forage and 3 million tons of starchy food. However, our production is only 1 million tons and we import the rest and subsidize its sale. In the winter time, we grow green forage, and in its place in summer we grow corn, rice and cotton where we could be planting 200,000 acres with green forage all year round. The decision not to kill the heifers is correct, and we should add to it the ban on slaughtering the calves. The calf is being slaughtered when its weight reaches 70 kg in order to reserve the forage for the cow even though the calf could be raised until its weight reaches 400 kg. In other words, we could increase the production of meat by 60,000 tons every year.

Increasing Production

[Question] Is it possible to increase the production until a surplus is accrued and both competition and prices decrease?

[Answer] First I would like to say that when the price of merchandise goes up, it never comes down again unless a stagnation occurs or the laws which help raise the prices are amended or repealed. It is possible to increase production as follows:

--The law should be applied firmly to ban construction of any cultivable land and to remove any buildings erected on these lands.

--Special and wide-reaching attention should be given to the expansion of cultivable land regardless of cost. It is the future.

--At this point, I should like to refer to the program which grants the graduate of the agricultural school 20 acres to be reclaimed and become his personal property. The failure of 80 percent of this program has been proven. The program could be altered by establishing a large settlement of 1000 acres. This farm is to be divided into various divisions. Corn is to be planted in one, vegetables in another, and fruits in a third section and so on. The graduates would receive this farm as a whole and they should be forced to live on it. Whoever leaves the farm would have his portion taken away from him. When there are 50 graduates on the settlement who are joined together by friendship, school days, and competition, the farm yield will be more:

A Fifth Year in the School of Agriculture

Agricultural guidance should exist. In other words, agricultural science should be transferred from the university to the land by obligating the farmers to benefit from the agriculture engineers. For example, the head of the agriculture society should be an agricultural engineer, and not necessarily one who has clout in the village. The agricultural society should expand its activities and should not be guided by the staff of the Agricultural Guidance Department of the Ministry of Agriculture. Therefore, I request that a fifth year should be added to the education program in the school of agriculture. This additional year would be similar to a residence

year in medical school. The graduate of the school of agriculture would spend the fifth year on the school farm in order to apply his knowledge and benefit from the experience which he would later transfer to the land. Therefore, each agricultural school should be granted 10,000 acres to conduct its experiments and research. A law should be passed to prevent the graduate from joining the professional association until he has completed his training period.

Farmers Society

The schools of agriculture should play an important role in rural development and agricultural guidance. We have 14 agricultural schools whose research projects do not reach the farmer. Furthermore, the agricultural guidance which is affiliated with the government has no relationship with the farmer except through TV commercials. I formed "The Farmers Society For Rural Development" similar to the Society of the University of Iowa Society which supervises 33 million of acres within the state. I was exhausted attempting to register the society although most of the agriculture ministers were from Alexandria University.

I have been informed recently that the form of this society will be studied by the ministerial committee for production.

Among the objectives of this society is to get the professor out of his ivory tower to participate in practical applications. The society will have all specializations such as animal resources and agricultural crops. The society will provide the farmers in Egypt with modern science and experiments to increase the production. For instance, why does the acre of cotton in one governorate yield 10 qantars while the acre in another governorate yield only 7 qantars? This is due to a lack of proper guidance which is our responsibility. The world lives in a technological revolution and we should re-examine and evaluate our objectives in order to catch up with the technological revolution.

Protein

I asked the nutrition professor of Alexandria University the question: Is it necessary to eat meat?

[Answer] The body needs a minimum of protein which ranges between 40 and 70 grams a day in order to stay healthy, according to the UN report. Meat gives 21 grams, fish 28 grams poultry 9 grams, milk 9 grams, and cheese 5 grams. This means that we can substitute fish, poultry, and other protein sources for meat. In Egypt we consume 1,096,000 tons of protein a year of which 150,000 tons are animal protein. The figure for animal protein should be at least 450,000 tons. We must pay attention to farming poultry and fish.

Poultry

There are only five merchants who control the marketing of poultry. The breeder should sell the chicken when it reaches a maximum of 54 days old, otherwise the value of the feed it eats will be wasted. Therefore, he must yield to the pressures of the merchant who has the facilities for slaughter, refrigerators for storage, and trucks for transporting the chicken. The breeder sells the chicken for 76 piasters--and of course--he makes a profit. The merchant sells it for a price that

ranges between 150 and 200 piasters. It is possible to establish thousands of societies for farming poultry. The facility for poultry farming which houses 5000 chicken, costs 9000 Egyptian pounds. Since the chicken growth cycle is very fast which is (54 days), then in the second cycle it is possible to have 50,000 eggs. You sell whatever you can and the rest will hatch. Any organization large or small can establish this and put shares on the market for 10 Egyptian pounds a share. This society can provide its workers, whose number is estimated at 10 thousand professors, workers, and students, with self-sufficiency of poultry. This way there would be enough poultry and the price would not exceed 1 Egyptian pound per chicken.

We in Alexandria University are undertaking a huge project. We have a British loan of 1.5 million Egyptian pounds. The Ministry of Planning is paying the installments and we will repay the ministry out of the project's return. An agreement had been made with an agricultural British firm to establish an automatic slaughter house, a canning factory, and methods to utilize the by-products as well. This project would use the most current agro-mechanical equipment.

Fish

I always call for a halt in filling up any lake in Egypt with earth. The Mediterranean Sea has become polluted and its fish have decreased. There are a few kinds of good eating fish to be obtained from the Red Sea. Therefore, we should pay special attention to fish breeding in the lakes. There are 550,000 acres of lakes in Egypt of which each acre produces a ton of fish. In comparison the acre in China produces 8 tons of fish per acre.

If an organization for fish resources is established and utilizes the modern scientific methods for breeding fish in the lakes, it will be possible to produce 4 million tons a year.

The Public Sector Shares

[Question] If your ideas and projects are carried out, will the meat and poultry crisis end?

[Answer] The crisis is not just a meat crisis, it is an economic planning crisis. Any type of economic, agricultural, or industrial development requires stability and a clear policy. A study of the economic plan which includes wages and prices should be carefully conducted. Specialists from the University should take part in such a study. The public sector should be independent from the government. President Sadat was right when he said that the government should not interfere in production. This is the principle designated by the "Infitah (open economic) Policy." The share of the public sector companies should be put on the market for both the workers and the public. An assembly of share holders should elect a chairman of the board for the company while the government could appoint a co-chairman to maintain an interest in its share. This concept could be activated in the meat and milk companies and if it succeeds it should be applied to other sectors.

Elimination of Subsidies

The state pays 1 million Egyptian pounds a year to subsidize the frozen meat. This meat seeps out on the black market to butchers and hotels who pay very high prices for it. Add to this the subsidy of imported forage. The victims are the state and the citizens. I see that subsidy should be gradually eliminated over a 10 year period at a rate of 10 percent every year in addition to a clear economic policy by which every citizen would know his rights and obligations. Furthermore, I demand the abolishment of the Government Cooperatives where the staff riots and the subsidy does not reach those who deserve it. Those societies should be converted into civic societies and their boards of directors formed from the citizens or the workers who have a greater interest in their societies than outside managers. Frankly speaking, we attempted a planned economy but it did not succeed. Therefore, we should try the free economic system encouraging competition and other factors which would lead to increased food production. The state's role should be one of helping, offering facilities, and controlling in order to prevent deviation and enforce the law.

Before closing, I asked Dr Shazli about the college research budget last year. He said, "13,000 Egyptian pounds."

9607
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STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF IRAQ-IRAN WAR EXPLORED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Nov 80 pp 119-124

[Article dated 2 October 1980 by Jacques Vernant, Director of Studies at the EHESS: "The Iraqi-Iranian Conflict"]

[Text] Mr Saddam Husayn must have known that by denouncing on 17 September the Algiers agreement of 6 March 1975, and by proclaiming that Iraq would henceforth enforce its sovereignty over both banks of the Shatt Al Arab, ordering the following day that all ships sailing on the Shatt Al Arab would have to run up the Iraqi flag and pay a tax the amount of which would be set by Baghdad, that he was triggering a conflict with Iran in the very short term. Iran, whether we are talking about the Islamic Republic or about a different government, could only refuse to comply. So on 22 September the Iraqi Air Force bombed the Iranian airfields, undoubtedly attempting to imitate the tactics which by having allowed the Israelis in 1967 to secure total mastery of the air gave them victory in 6 days. The following day Baghdad was announcing that the Iraqi armed forces had invaded Iranian territory.

By taking the initiative of opening hostilities with Iran, the Baghdad regime could not have been unaware that it was running a risk. Any war entails one, even for those who can pride themselves on having an overwhelming military superiority. The Soviet Union is experiencing this in Afghanistan to its cost.

Saddam Husayn's decision can have two explanations. Either he underestimated the Iranian armed forces' capacity for resistance and the strength of Persian patriotism and let himself be convinced that the Islamic regime would collapse with the first shock, or else he considered the Ayatollah and his ideology to be a serious enough danger to justify taking major risks.

If you accept the first hypothesis, Saddam Husayn committed the error which brought J. F. Kennedy the Bay of Pigs fiasco. The Iranian emigres located in Baghdad and elsewhere have been able to persuade the Iraqi leaders that strong forces of opposition would band together against the Islamic regime as soon as "liberators" appeared. This lost sight of the fact that Iran is one of the three countries of the region--with Egypt and Turkey--to which the term nation can justifiably be applied. By that I mean that we are talking about "old" countries which are still going strong not only thanks to the framework provided by a government, an army and a police force, but because of the influence of a history and long life in common.

The Iranian resistance to the invasion, which appears to have surprised the attackers and an amazingly poorly informed international public opinion, was foreseeable.

The second hypothesis would imply that the anti-establishment fundamentalism of the Iranian mullahs is setting off more reverberations in the Arab world than is apparent--and that the Iraqi Baas [Ba'athist party?] in particular is worried. The support provided to Iraq by Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Morocco could also be explained by the fear that the Iranian revolutionary virus might be contagious. Paradoxically it is the conservative Gulf and Maghreb states which have taken the side of a secular and progressive if not socialist government. This is a real "Holy Alliance"--but for how long?--against a spoilsport who does not abide by the rules of the game. And, for varied reasons, Syria, Libya and Algeria favor Iran.

If it were a matter of a weak adversary, ready to give in, or of an intolerable threat, the invasion of Iran by Iraq would be strategically justified, if one were assured that the war would be short and would "pay off." At the time I am writing this that hope does not seem to be well-founded: the war will probably neither be short nor pay off for Iraq.

But did not Saddam Husayn's strategy consist of taking territorial pawns in Iran in order to wait in a position of strength for his initial objectives to be accomplished: recognition by Iran of Iraqi sovereignty over the Shatt Al Arab, Iran's giving up the three little islands controlling the Strait of Hormuz which Teheran has been occupying since 1971, and a change of government in Iran? This scenario, which anticipates the intervention of Iranian forces against the Islamic regime, is even more implausible in the context of a hypothesis of a war of position than in a "blitzkrieg" hypothesis. A war of attrition works in favor of mobilizing a population sensitive to the wounded homeland's call for help--and which moreover is able to think that since it has triumphed over the Shah's army it does not need to be afraid of confronting an Arab army. Aside from the not very probable case in which the Iranian population might be in a state of "shock" as a result of a crushing military defeat, it is seemingly out of the question that it would passively stand by during a military coup ending the government stemming from the Khomeyni revolution.

In these circumstances, contrary to appearances and to the hasty interpretations of the first days of the conflict, Iran is not in the position of being the weak one up against the strong one; far from it. And it was to be expected that Teheran would refuse to give in to Baghdad's commands. To recognize Iraqi sovereignty over the Shatt Al Arab would have been to accept the idea that all ships going to or coming from Abadan and Khorramshahr were crossing Iraqi territorial waters. To agree to this demand and the one concerning the three little islands in the Strait of Hormuz would have been to recognize the gulf as Arab--and under Iraqi control.

Quite apart from the use of force through which it intends to validate its rights, Baghdad invokes legal reasons. In 1913 the Treaty of Constantinople had granted the Ottoman Empire sovereignty over the whole of the Shatt Al Arab with the exception of some islands and mooring grounds. The agreement was signed by the British and Russian plenipotentiaries just as by both parties concerned. This treaty

was confirmed in July 1937 between Iraq--which had become independent in 1930--and Iran. During the Second World War, Great Britain--the mandatary power from 1920 to 1930--retook military control of Iraq and was occupying the south of Iran, its activity starting in 1941 by a naval bombardment of the Iranian fleet at Khorramshahr. The agreement signed in 1975 by the Shah and Saddam Husayn settled the border problem--basically the Shatt Al Arab border, which was fixed in the middle of the river in accordance with Iranian demands. In return Iraq got Iran to break off its military aid to the Kurds who had been rebelling for more than 20 years. And so it was done. The Iraqi government today refers to the pressure it had to give in to in 1975 and to the "unconscionable" nature of the bargain imposed on it.

However, it should be mentioned that nearly all formal international agreements could be questioned under the pretext that they were concluded "out of necessity." It is quite rare that a state agrees to concessions if it does not feel forced to. Forced to, given the circumstances; if these change, the state goes back on its commitments. There you have the precise meaning of the "rebus sic stantibus" clause, explicit or implicit in classical treaties. Now then, the international community seems to accept--for want of a better way--that an international agreement labelled unconscionable by one of the parties can be questioned by the force of arms. Thus regarding international relations other than those of the Great Powers, we are still in the era of Clausewitz. In the areas of the world where new states have sprung up, wars are a natural product in a way. Contrary to what certain people used to think, independence and development do not give peace to those countries which enjoy them. Independence releases ambitions: national, partisan, and personal; development guarantees the possession of modern military means, which can be used for tests of strength.

In this international environment, conflicts often break out without the Great Powers having anything to do with them and they are equally incapable of putting an end of them. One cannot seriously maintain that the United States provoked or indeed agreed with the Iraqi military action. At a time when the hostage affair was seemingly getting unjammed, and when negotiation could be considered, with Teheran not setting unacceptable conditions any more, Washington had no interest, in the current election context, in making Iran bleed, or in stirring up tensions, even if it reserves the right to bet on a simple eviction of the "religious types" who are running the country. But Washington strategists are not that naive. As for the USSR, it is placed in an awkward position by the initiative, a hazardous one at the very least, of one of its Arab clients. The only indirect advantage that Moscow finds in the new international situation is that there is no more interest in Afghanistan and that the Islamic Conference will, after the Iraqi attack, find it difficult to call down the wrath of God and men on someone like Russia who has attacked a Moslem country.

Control of the conflict by the two Great Powers turns out to be difficult. All that is in their power to do is to remain outside it. In order for them to be able to end it, the two Great Powers would in effect have to be decided to act in a concerted fashion, or the United Nations would have to have real muscle--which comes back to the same thing, since the Charter anticipated the United Nations having its own forces which have not been able to become reality for lack of agreement between Americans and Soviets. It is not certain that today this agreement is a sufficient condition for peace to be kept or reestablished. But it is a necessary condition.

Be that as it may, in this new crisis--which will leave its mark on the region, let us not doubt that--the United States and the Soviet Union are forced to maneuver with extreme caution. The United States must be concerned with the fate of the hostages held in Iran and protect the chance to warm up its relations with Teheran in the future; it has to at the same time take into account the signs by which Baghdad has recently indicated its desire to strengthen its ties with the West. Moscow, linked by a treaty with Iraq, cannot betray its ally; but the USSR does not for all that espouse Baghdad's cause. It does not intend to sacrifice the advantages which it has in Iran in order to satisfy Iraq's national ambitions--supposing that these could be achieved.

The Iraq-Iranian conflict invites other observations.

1.--We must observe how difficult it is to find an appropriate framework for negotiation or mediation. As far as the United Nations is concerned, neither Iraq (the aggressor) nor Iran (the country attacked) has shown itself to be in a hurry to submit to the Security Council which is normally the competent body in matters jeopardizing peace. It is only on 26 September, 4 days after the launching of hostilities, that on Iran's request the Islamic Conference met, the President of Pakistan General Zia Ul Haq presiding, who was entrusted with a mission of mediation. It is only on 28 September that the Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution enjoining the two parties to stop shooting and enter into negotiations. On 23 September, the Vice President of the United States Muskie [as published] and USSR Foreign Affairs Minister Gromyko had had long talks in New York. Iraq agreed to a ceasefire. Iran observed that the Security Council was not requiring the withdrawal of Iraq's forces and made plain that it would not negotiate as long as one Iraqi soldier remained on national territory.

2.--Within the Moslem community this conflict can only weaken the Arab countries and the "Arab cause." Even more than the conflict itself, the fallout which it cannot fail to have will reduce the international influence of Arabs to the advantage of Moslem non-Arab countries.

3.--The Iraqi undertaking was more risky even than it appeared at first sight. Assuming that Baghdad were to succeed in pulling it off--which, I repeat, was extremely unlikely--Israel would undoubtedly not have permitted Iraq to consolidate its advantages. The destabilizing effect of the Iraqi action was therefore making itself felt well beyond the gulf region and occasioned much more serious risks than those which result from our oil dependence.

4.--The Iraqi undertaking had the effect of uniting varied components of the Iranian nation around the government. It is to be feared that it might have fallout in Iraq itself and that the effect of destabilization might not be felt only outside the country.

5.--Finally, it would be interesting to analyze what the reasons are for the press and mass media in France and of course in Europe to have been so clearly sympathetic to Iraq and optimistic about the success of its military intervention, when an analysis of the facts and a minimum of reasoning lead to opposite conclusions.

9631
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SUPPLYING OF WEAPONS TO IRAN, IRAQ DETAILED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 24 Nov 80 pp 142-146

[Article: "Iran/Iraq--Who Supplies the Weapons"]

[Text] Soviet arms go to Iraqis and Iranians, U.S. planes provide supplies for the ayatollah from Libya, Soviet planes fly war materiel from Saudi Arabia to Iraq, Israelis with Syrian approval supply Iran via Beirut--the helpers in the war being waged in the oilfields apparently are not governed by their old antagonisms.

The attackers were taken by surprise. For weeks the Iraqis had been content to keep the port of the Iranian city of Khorramshahr occupied; the center of the city, they figured, would soften up on its own.

But when they finally made their first attempt also to occupy the town proper, they were in for a surprise.

The defenders did not surrender by any means. Even after having used up their ammunition, the men of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard fought on, this time with clubs and knives. "They were simply mad," an Iraqi major said later in amazement.

Meanwhile the Iranians as a rule no longer have to fall back on such cut-and-thrust weapons. Nor will they have to do so in the foreseeable future.

On adventurous routes, enough war materiel is reaching Iran to enable its people to hold their own in the battle in the oilfields which has been rocking back and forth undecided for more than 9 weeks. The supplies, however, do not suffice to give Khomeyni's fighters the upper hand.

The harassed realm of the ayatollah is getting help from the most varied countries, which in quite a number of cases definitely are enemies of one another. As if sometimes bloody differences all of a sudden did not matter any longer, Israel and also Israel's archenemy Libya, communist North Korea and anticommunist South Korea are supporting Iran.

Ahead of all the rest, however, the Soviet Union is rendering daily aid. NATO intelligence experts are sure that, while untiringly protesting strict neutrality in the conflict, the rulers in the Kremlin are supporting both sides.

Iraq is being given direct support by the Russians, who are supplying munitions as well as spare parts for planes and armored vehicles on the basis of agreements concluded before the war.

Iran, on the other hand, is being supplied by Moscow more or less discreetly through satellites and friendly countries. Western experts claim that transport for the most part is handled by the seven jumbos of Iran Air. The huge planes, each of which can carry 90 tons of freight, take on spare parts and probably also munitions in the GDR and transport them to Tehran via Poland.

According to the same experts, Bulgaria is an important turntable in the supply of the two warring sides. They say that Sofia's official airline, the Bulgarian Airlines-Balkan, transports supplies both to the Syrian capital, Damascus, to be passed on to Iran, and to the Jordanian capital, Amman, to be passed on to Baghdad.

Iranian jumbos take off from the runways of Libyan Chief of State Qadhdhafi, who--involved in every crisis--has opened his well-filled arsenals and ammunition depots for the harassed mullahs. Via Bulgaria and through Soviet air space, the war materiel reaches Khomeyni's country unimpeded--small arms, armored planes and Soviet ZSU 23-4 Vierlings antiaircraft tanks.

Even U.S. planes are flying on the ayatollah's side. According to NATO intelligence, the Flying Tiger Line, thoroughly experienced in delicate missions for decades, is transporting Libyan arms donations on official air routes of the Mediterranean and via Turkey to Iran. Does Washington really not know anything about that?

Like Libya, Iran supporter Syria too is in a position to supply Western arms, such as Hot and Milan antitank rockets jointly produced by the Germans and French.

The Israelis as well, who at one time were often cursed publicly by the ayatollah, are helping him with important spare parts, because Iran, enemy of its enemy Iraq, after all is less close and less dangerous.

According to Western military experts, the Israeli supplies, with Syrian concurrence, are transshipped in the Christian part of Beirut and transported to their destination by the Lebanese freight forwarders Trans-Mediterranean Airways.

Even the distant North Koreans have their hand in it, loading Iranian jumbos in Pyongyang with supplies from Soviet arsenals. These are needed to a certain extent because Reza Pahlevi for his shiny armor had also procured minor quantities of Soviet antiaircraft guns, infantry tanks and trucks.

According to Western situation estimates, U.S. arms captured in Vietnam also are being shipped from the Far East to Iran.

Whatever their new friends cannot come up with, the mullahs are purchasing with foreign currency from international arms dealers. For maintenance and repair they have hired Japanese and South Korean specialists who know how to handle the equipment, mostly of U.S. origin.

The Far Eastern helpers are not having an easy time, for the one-time strongest and most modern war machine of the region is now but a shadow of what it once was.

Of the total of 450 Iranian fighter planes--U.S. F-4 Phantoms, F-5 Tigers and F-14 Tomcats--only 120 are regarded as combat ready, and none of the 78 Tomcats is among those 120. The latter are so sophisticated technologically that they cannot be kept in flying condition without U.S. support.

The situation is different as far as the Phantoms and Tigers are concerned. Whenever there was a lack of spares, they were without ado taken from other aircraft, which, to use aviation jargon, were "cannibalized."

But the Iranians not only lack equipment; they also lack experienced pilots. All pilots trained in the United States originally were considered suspect by the mullahs, part of them being dismissed and part even imprisoned. In the meantime, however, the proper ideology has become secondary. More than 100 pilots trained in the United States have been taken from their prison cells and put in the cockpits of combat-ready aircraft.

It was the Iranian Phantom pilots above all who confused the Iraqis with their stunts. At minaret height, for example, they would thunder over Baghdad or, as they had learned in the United States, outmaneuver the Iraqi antiaircraft rockets supplied by the Soviets.

Many of the flying Iranians, however, never reached enemy territory. Since, owing to the lack of spares, the electronic friend-foe identification system did not work, a number of Iranian planes were brought down by their own air force, while others crashed because of technical difficulties--more than 40 in all.

At the beginning of the fighting, Western scouts noted 1 1/2 actions per plane per day--in other words, a total of 180--but in the meantime the rate of action has dropped dramatically. Now there are only about 60 sorties a day, and the rate is dropping further. The NATO standard is three sorties per day per plane, with a greater number supposed to be possible, if need be.

No wonder, then, that the crippled air force of the ayatollah was unable to do much when 9 of the total of 12 Iraqi divisions (not just 3, as Baghdad President Saddam Hussein had announced) crossed the borders of the eastern neighbor on a 600-Kilometer-wide front on 22 September.

In the northern sector the 7th and 8th Motorized Infantry Divisions together with the 2d Mountain Division advanced to the foot of the Kabir Mountains, which reach up to 2,000 meters, occupying a territory of a total of 400 square kilometers claimed by Baghdad.

In the center sector, topographically favorable for the use of armored units, the Iraqis made the greatest territorial gains. Their 9th and 10th Armored Divisions approached the town of Desful about 70 kilometers from the Iranian border, while the 6th Armored Division and the 1st Motorized Infantry Division advanced toward Ahwaz.

The objective of the operation: To cut the routes between northern and southern Iran along the Karkheh river and thus to make replenishment more difficult for the Iranians.

In the south the 3d Armored Division and the 5th Motorized Infantry Division as well as special and militia forces crossed the Shatt-al-Arab, the river through which the Euphrates and Tigris flow into the Persian Gulf, encircling the cities of Khorramshahr and Abadan.

By controlling the Shatt-al-Arab, according to NATO experts, Saddam Hussein had attained his military objectives. They believe that rather than taking Khorramshahr and Abadan through costly house-to-house fighting, he is setting them up for seizure by bombarding them with artillery and tank cannon—supposedly the correct military procedure.

The soft marshland along the river does not permit massive employment of armored vehicles, and the Iraqi president does not want his none too numerous infantry formations to bleed to death in street fighting against a militant population amply equipped with small arms.

Moreover Sunnite Hussein is afraid of unfavorable effects on the Shiite part of his people if he has their Iranian coreligionists slaughtered by the thousands.

Besides, the Iraqis were faced with unexpected problems particularly in the south, for the Iranians managed to make combat ready 50 to 70 of their total of about 205 U.S. Huey Cobra helicopters.

The agile helicopters, equipped with air-to-ground rockets and other arms, operate from a distance outside the range of Iraqi air defense forces.

First the Iraqis employed helicopters of their own, then even MIG 21 and MIG 23 Soviet fighter planes, against the Huey Cobras--without avail. Now they are trying to spot the helicopters from the ground and destroy them, which too is causing them difficulties in light of their poor reconnaissance.

How long the two sides will be able to continue their fight--occasionally disparaged by the Americans as "Mickey Mouse war"--is difficult to predict in light of the many unexpected and often incalculable helpers, for despite all the reports of military successes, Iraq so far has not managed to attain its actually political objective—to shake the Khomeyni regime in Tehran and compel it formally to recognize new borders farther east.

Western experts believe that Baghdad will perhaps be able to maintain its military superiority on the battlefield for half a year, but then the higher population figure--Iran has 37 million inhabitants while Iraq has only 13 million--will make itself felt.

Until then Tehran, however, would also have to find new financial resources. Its reserves, estimated at 6 billion dollars at present, can only last until spring.

The Iraqi dollar cushion, on the other hand--about 18 billion at the start of the war--will last longer, particularly because the allied Saudis have assumed Baghdad's oil delivery responsibilities, supplying Iraq's customers with Saudi oil. The payments are transmitted by Riyadh to Baghdad as war credits.

The Saudis are also sending arms. Western scouts claim to have observed that of all things big Soviet Il 76 transports (NATO code: "Candid") have taken large quantities of war materiel from the desert kingdom, which continues to have no relations with Moscow, to Iraq.

The war situation might, however, change abruptly if the mullahs finally release the U.S. hostages detained for more than a year, because then Washington has promised not only to release the Iranian assets frozen in the United States but also to deliver the arms that were still ordered and paid for by the shah.

The other Western countries too would no longer be tied to the trade embargo against Iran. A NATO expert comments: "Because of the hostages, President Saddam Hussein feels he is really being pressed for time."

8790
CSO: 4403

LIBYAN ENVOY TO TEHRAN CALLS SADDAM 'FASCIST DICTATOR'

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 8 Nov 80 p 10

[Text] The notion that Saddam, according to him, gave part of Iraq's territory to the shah and now he wants to retrieve it from Khomeyni is absolutely ridiculous.

Saddam is not only fighting the people of Iran, but also the people of Iraq.

When Imam Khomeyni said that blood will be victorious over the sword, science did not accept it. But, the power of the Islamic revolution has proven the imam's words right.

Libya feels a responsibility concerning the destruction caused by the war in Iran.

Qadhdhafi is neither a legislator nor the president of Libya. He does what the Libyan people want. Saddam asked Libya and several other countries for assistance in fighting the shah. However, surprisingly, three months after this request, we witnessed him on television embracing the shah like a brother. Even though he has constantly issued anti-Israeli slogans, Saddam has not even sent one airplane to fight the regime in occupied Palestine.

Sa'd Mojabbar, the Libyan ambassador to Iran, made these statements in an exclusive interview with our correspondents.

What you will read below is the complete text of the questions and answers of the Libyan ambassador to them.

Question: What kind of relationship do you see between the revolutions of Iran and Libya?

Answer: I have always pointed out that the relationship between the Islamic revolutions of Iran and Libya is a strategic one. In my opinion, both countries must work very hard to be able to universalize the Islamic revolution and to help it progress to such a state of development that all the downtrodden of the world, regardless of color or creed, can live freely under its godly power. I have also mentioned many

times that the relationship between the Islamic revolutions of Iran and Libya is one the likes of which have not been witnessed anywhere else in the world.

Question: What do you think about those who want to cloud the relationship between Iran and Libya, such as Egypt and Israel?

Answer: In my opinion, there exists no country in the world which is able to create friction between us. The reason is simple: because these two countries are completely independent and make their own decisions. These two countries do not follow anyone's orders, they determine their own destinies.

We are not talking about Egypt, we are talking about an individual who, as a president forced on the people, has usurped power. Not only is he incapable of being an enemy of Libya and Iran, but he is even incapable of being an enemy of Egypt. He has merely set the flag of the Qods occupiers flying higher than that of Islam over Cairo mosques and his true face is clearly seen by all. Since about 11 years ago, we have been supporting the Islamic revolution of Iran, because we need the power of God, the power of the two Islamic revolutions of Iran and Libya, to universalize the Islamic revolution. This is something which would have been impossible single-handedly. Now--God willing--with the help of God and the support of our Iranian brothers, we will establish the government of God and will bring the gifts of freedom, independence, and peace to the oppressed people of the world. Thus, you can readily see that given this great, sacred goal, people such as Sadat and the occupying Qods regime are too insignificant to create friction in the Islamic revolutionary movement of these two countries. As it has been proven to the world, Islam is a religion whose superiority has been proven to all the people of the world.

Reasons for the Postponement of Qadhdhafi's Trip

Question: What is the reason for the postponement of Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi's trip to Damascus?

Answer: Whether Colonel Qadhdhafi will go or not is an issue inflated by the press who wish to draw conclusions from it. No problem exists and--God willing--when the proper opportunity comes, Colonel Qadhdhafi will go to Damascus. But, what I think is worth mentioning is that Colonel Qadhdhafi's trips to any place are decided by the General People's Committee of Libya and he, himself, makes no decisions in these matters. In fact, Qadhdhafi is not a legislator or president of Libya to make decisions and he is well aware of this. When he proposed the unification of Libya and Syria, the decision was made in the Committee. If he were to make decisions like a king, a president, or any other power, he could simply express his opinion and decide personally. But, in Libya, we do not have a king or a president. Decisions are made by the General People's Committee. At the proper time, and following the command of the people, Qadhdhafi will go to Syria. Of course, I must mention that the proposal for this unity was first presented by Colonel Qadhdhafi himself and was warmly received by Hafiz al-Assad.

Revolution and Scientific Balance

Question: Geographically, the two enemies, Egypt and Israel, are located exactly between you and Syria. Do you not think that the unification will cause border problems in the future?

Answer: Geography, physics, and mathematics will not influence the revolution. The power of revolution overshadows science. I am referring to the Islamic revolution of Iran, which was not logical according to physics or mathematical calculations. A person sitting on a blanket in Paris was saying: blood will triumph over the sword. Although neither physics nor any other science accepts this statement, basically it is scientifically implausible for blood to triumph over the sword, or for the Iranian people in the streets wearing shrouds to fight tanks and machine guns, although this is not acceptable as far as physics or any other science is concerned, as you witnessed yourselves in the Islamic revolution of Iran, the shah's army, which was perhaps the fifth most powerful in the world, could not stand up against the people. Blood was, in fact, victorious over the sword.

The same is true of the Libyan revolution. In the Libyan revolution, we were confronted with five American and three British military bases. Colonel Qadhdhafi and a few of his fellow officers stood up against them. Could anyone believe that Qadhdhafi and his companions would be victorious? As far as physics, mathematics, or any other science was concerned, this was impossible. But, with the help of "Allah," it became possible. Now that 11 years have passed since that victory, not only must Syria and Libya unite, but Jordan, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and others must also participate in this union, so that we can take the 1st step towards an Islamic movement. Every day that we can take the 1st step towards an Islamic movement. Every day a number of our brothers are martyred in Lebanon and Palestine. But, we cannot wait for others to join us, we must act quickly. We cannot hold up physics or any other science as our foundation and wait. Our foundation is God, and we move with Him. Unity between Libya and Syria is our first movement to preserve the Quran and Islam. We know that problems exist along this path; but, since we trust in God, we do not fear Israel, Egypt, or any other power.

The World and the Unification of Libya and Syria

Question: There is no doubt that this is a sacred and human relationship. But, has the reaction of other Arab countries been positive?

Answer: Many people and governments welcome this unity and have sent us congratulatory messages. But, I must mention that positions are clear. Those who oppose the enemies of Islam and oppression are with us. And those who believe the opposite, obviously dislike this unification.

Question: What is your position concerning Iraq's forced war on Iran and its reactions in your country and other Arab countries?

Answer: Allow me to speak frankly. In this war, both parties are guilty to a certain extent. But, throughout the world, every Moslem must be happy to witness the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran. Because this revolution has strengthened the Moslem front against the enemies of Islam, imperialism, and the enemies of freedom and independence. But, with the victory of this revolution and the strengthening of the Moslem front, it would have been better if the forces would have united to fight against the real enemy, Israel, the usurper, because the country which truly needs freedom is Palestine. The result of this futile war has been the waste of millions of dollars which should have been spent to fight Israel. Another result has been the destruction of economic resources, including oil, large amounts of war machinery, and, most important of all, thousands of Iranian and Iraqi brothers.

I remember four months ago, Colonel Qadhdhafi sent a telegram to Mr Bani-Sadr and Saddam Hussein asking them not to escalate the skirmishes. But, unfortunately, the war did spread. We have continually tried to stop it, for example, by bringing the minister of the Islamic conference in Libya. Unfortunately, however, Saddam refused to listen to us. Since we are trying to move in step with Islam, we did not fight him in this respect, because our Iranian brothers needed no help from us. But we still believe that the Iranian forces oppose Israel and imperialism; therefore, Saddam's statement that Iranians are infidels is unacceptable to us.

At a time when many of the weapons of Israel in its war with Arabs were supplied by Iran, and at a time when Iran was giving millions of barrels of oil to Israel and other imperialists daily, Saddam was not calling Iranians infidels. I remember exactly three months before the fall of the Pahlavi regime, Farah was invited to Baghdad for a friendly visit. Did Saddam not think of Iranians as infidels then? Furthermore, right after the revolution, when the Iranians recognized the true rights of the Palestinians, closed the Israeli embassy and turned it into a Palestinian embassy, he concluded that Iranians are anti-Islam and anti-Arab.

How could anyone make such accusations against a country whose leader, Imam Khomeyni, condemned Israel in 1961 and recognized the rights of the Palestinians? Even if border differences do exist between Iran and Iraq, and even if the Iranians have taken over some of Iraq's territory, under circumstances such that Iran is totally opposed to Israel and seeks to spread Islam, is this the time to speak of problems such as a few kms of territory or the annulment of the 1975 treaty?

The notion that, according to Saddam, he gave part of Iraq's territory to the shah and now he wants to retrieve it from Khomeyni is absolutely ridiculous.

Saddam himself signed the 1975 treaty, and it was he who asked Libya, Algeria, Syria, Palestine, and several other countries to aid him against the shah. Colonel Qadhdhafi gave a very significant speech concerning this and we sent a representative to Baghdad to find out what we could do for him. Three months later, however, we saw him on television embracing the shah like his own brother. It was then that he signed the 1975 treaty, too. But (Jalud) answered: never; we cannot join with an enemy of Islam and freedom. From then on our relationship began to cool.

I have previously told the president and the prime minister of Iran that if Iran had occupied even one piece of rock belonging to Iraq, we would have fought Iran, because we would have known that Iran sought to occupy Iraq. But, everyone knows that Saddam started it. Imam Khomeyni said a long time ago that you don't want a cm of Iraqi territory. He also said: the true people of Iraq will govern that country after Saddam's regime. Therefore, the position of Libya is quite clear. We support the people of Iran and Iraq. Saddam is not only at war with the people of Iran but also with the people of Iraq. He is a dictator. He is a fascist. At a time when Iraq and Syria were supposed to unite, he put Hasan al-Bekr aside with trickery and hypocrisy, took the power into his own hands, and destroyed all those who were interested and involved in this unification. Thus, he cleared the field and took over. In 1977, when Sadat visited the regions of occupied Palestine and his betrayal became known, Colonel Qadhdhafi asked for an Arab conference to investigate Sadat's actions along with the crimes of the Israeli regime and to make appropriate decisions, because Sadat had created a great fissure in the unity of the Arabs. Iraq was the only country which spoke of Arab unity, anti-imperialism, and against oppression and tyranny. But, this same country cut off its relations with the Arabs and played no role in the Arab movement against Israel. Now, it is

fighting our Moslem brothers, whether in Iran or Iraq. Saddam constantly issued slogans, but he did not even send one airplane for occupied Palestine. Why?

Because Saddam cannot understand who is an enemy and who is a friend and Moslem brother. Many things can be said about Saddam's tyrannical deeds in Iraq. How could Saddam speak of democracy and freedom when he has created this war? We questioned him, made suggestions to him, and told him that it was wrong to start this war. But, he paid no attention. Now, he considers us an enemy of the Arab nations. We are not an enemy of the Arabs. It is he who has taken an anti-Arab stance. We will fight any power that seeks to disrupt the independence and freedom of Arabs, even if it were Iran. But the problem is that Saddam, not Iran, works against Arabs.

Under such conditions, when the enemy is crouched waiting to attack, how could two brother Moslems allow themselves to fight each other? If there are problems with the treaty, they must be resolved behind closed doors, because Islam has shown the way to solve a problem between two brothers. But, this is not the problem. We concluded that this dictator is trying to make his mark on history. He wants to become famous to assure his place in history. He is a person who has usurped power in Iraq and now seeks to use Qadessiyeh as the dividing line between heathenism and Islam, against Islam. But, for us it is clear what this dictator wants to do. This dangerous undertaking will endanger Islam, the Arabs, and everybody, and we cannot condone it. The interesting thing which has surprised us is the people that Saddam is killing. Are many of the people of Khuzestan not the same Arab-speaking people whom Saddam wants to liberate, or so he says? It is really interesting that he is killing the Arabs who live in Iran under the flag of Islam and has forgotten about those Arabs who live under the flag of Zionism. One should ask Saddam which group needs to be liberated. Obviously, the second group, and not those who live comfortably and in freedom in Iran.

Responsibility for the Destruction

Question: God willing, the war will end some day. What do you think about the cooperation between our two countries?

Answer: When we speak of cooperation, we should note that because of our sacred beliefs, we, Iran, Syria, Algeria, and other true Moslem nations must move forward united on a path which is that of Islamic government throughout the world. What exists in Iran and Libya belongs to us and to Iranians, because we are not separate from each other. We feel responsible for the reconstruction of the damages that the Iraqi and Iranian people have suffered. God willing, we will play an active role in this area. God willing, we will work together to end this war. However, as Imam Khomeyni has said, this war was a blessing in that it opened our eyes. In any case, in the future, we will all unite and an Iraq liberated from dictatorship will join us. Then, Iran, Libya, Syria, Algeria, Iraq, Yemen, and others will unite and will not allow anyone to dare threaten Moslems.

9593
CSO: 4906

SITUATION OF EVIN PRISON INMATES REPORTED

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 17 Nov 80 pp 190, 192

[Text] They carried him on their shoulders while singing a song. The song praised the liberation from the yoke of the shah regime, the liberation from oppression. The tune and text of the song had originated in Tehran's Evin Prison, where Iranian antishah militants were imprisoned.

The songs from the time of the shah regime are again sung today, in the same prison: always, when one of the prisoners is discharged.

Arrest as well as discharge are today just as unpredictable for Iranians as they were at the time of the shah. Arbitrariness, chaos, humiliation and different kinds of torture belong to the daily routine of the Iranian prisons.

This lesson was learned also by Sadegh Ghotbsadeh, the former foreign minister of Iran. Week before last he was taken to Tehran's Evin Prison because he had dared to criticize openly the management of the Iranian broadcasting system by the mullahs. Ghotbsadeh was set free after a few days, but only after a personal intervention by the ayatollah, whose close friend he has been for years.

It is normal, however, for a prisoner to remain in prison for many months without knowing why and without even being given a hearing. This happens to most political prisoners at Evin Prison, and also to most prisoners at Kasr and the other prisons in the country, even though the law prescribes that court procedures have to be started within 24 hours after the arrest.

"Uncertainty about one's fate is terrible," says a former prisoner. Another one reports: "The inmates are waiting to be called over the intercom, and finally have their cases processed. But to most it does not even make any difference whether they are set free or not, since they have become so lethargic."

There are enough reasons why they should be resigned. It happens frequently that a person who has been discharged is after a while again taken to prison, where he must wait for a long time until his case is heard because new evidence has allegedly been discovered.

This happened to the physician Shaykh al-Islamsade, a former minister under the shah's prime minister, Hoveyda. Originally sentenced to death, and subsequently having his sentence commuted to life imprisonment, he was later discharged with the explanation that a mistake had been made in his case. Hardly had he been set free when he was arrested again. Now he is awaiting a new trial, and meanwhile works as prison doctor.

A worse fate befell a young member of the "Mujahedin-i-chalk," a leftwing Islamic militant group. The mujahid was first set free, but then arrested again after 3 days, and 2 days later he was dead, shot by an execution commando in the "execution chamber," a room located next to the solitary confinement section number 4.

The prisoners housed in this section heard the rattling of submachine gun fire almost every night in July and August when death candidates were killed. According to reports by Evin inmates, those who are executed are not killed by single shots but are punctured with bursts from submachine guns.

"When they have thus punctured the condemned persons with their bullets," relates a prisoner who had listened to these executions for weeks, "they then give each one a final shot in the head to make sure that the person is dead. This way we always knew how many had been killed each night."

There are about 2,000 prisoners at Evin Prison in Tehran today. Up to 20 men are herded together into so-called open sections, cells of approximately 12 square meters. The so-called solitary confinement cells are only 5 square meters, and up to 5 prisoners live in them.

Those in solitary confinement at Evin Prison are primarily left-oriented opposition members and Kurds, but also Amir Abbas Intesam, vice premier in the Basargan government. He at least has a chance to prepare himself mentally for his trial, but he is not permitted any other kind of preparation. He is not allowed to study documents or talk with a defense lawyer.

Even fewer rights has Zia Nasiri, a leading Afghan resistance fighter against the Soviets. He came to Iran to ask for support for Afghan rebels, and he was received by Khomeyni and Bani-sadr. But for 7 months now he has been in solitary confinement, his eyes covered with a bandage and his hands tied. Nobody knows why.

Among the women awaiting trial at Evin is the U.S. journalist Cynthia Dwyer, who was arrested at the beginning of May on the charge of "espionage."

Only for some especially qualified Evin inmates has the uncertainty come to an end. Some 60 pilots, suspected of rebellion against the government, were hurriedly released so that they can make amends for their crimes through brave actions in the war against Iraq.

8889
CSO: 4403

'TEHRAN TIMES' EDITOR APPEALS TO PUBLIC FOR AID

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 24 Nov 80 p 3

[Editorial: "An Appeal to Readers"]

[Text]

IT IS with a great feeling of reluctance that we launch out on this appeal to our generous minded readers who have kept us afloat by buying our newspaper regularly and thus proving to us the need to keep going despite immense difficulties that we have been faced with in the newspaper as a business concern.

Grateful as we are for this generosity, we have come to a point where we shall have to cease publishing unless we are helped with larger contributions to tide us over in present circumstances of economic hardships within the country, which is affecting us in no small way.

As you are perhaps aware, a newspaper is subsidised mainly on its advertisements, which due to a slowdown of economic activity has become severely depleted. Being a fledgling newspaper with no reaches to vested interests, we have been severely handicapped and our efforts at inviting assistance from several organisations for partnership, or assistance in other forms, have been unsuccessful.

For almost six months now we have continued on the voluntary efforts of our staff hoping for a happier turn in business fortunes. Now we find we will not be able to do this much longer.

Almost the last thing we have now to lean on is the beneficence of readers who can help us with their ideas and suggestions, or their direct contributions in funds big or small. And we choose this blessed month of Muharram in which to do it and also remembering the Holy Prophet Muhammad's (may peace be upon him) saying that: "A greater blessing is on the giver than on the receiver."

If any of you are inclined to help us your contribution, large or small may be sent into our Account No. 441 with the Bank Saderat Branch No. 3193, Ostad Nejjatollahi Street (Villa Avenue), Tehran.

CSO: 4920

SUGAR RATIONING BY COUPONS BEGUN

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 24 Nov 80 p 2

[Text]

TEHRAN — Distribution of sugar will begin today and each ration share will be 1 kilo 200 grams, announced the spokesman of the Economic Mobilization Council, Engineer Samiei.

Pars news agency reported yesterday that consumers may purchase their sugar ration by presenting the coupon marked "A" (alef) to the sugar distributors.

Sugar will be sold at the government-set prices of 24 rials per kilo for granulated sugar and 29 rials per kilo for cube sugar.

The number of ration shares the consumer will be entitled to buy is based on the color of coupon in their possession.

Each brown coupon entitles the purchaser to one ration share, blue coupons to two shares, red coupons to three shares, green coupons to four shares, and black coupons to five shares.

The spokesman also announced that ration coupons for sugar have now been distributed to everyone. These coupons are valid until March [illegible] (end of the year 1359) and consumers may purchase their sugar when needed from the distributors.

He added that the sugar distributors must sort the coupons they receive by color and deliver them to a branch of Bank Saderat in order to receive their next allotment of sugar for distribution.

Any irregular activity observed concerning sugar distribution may be reported by telephoning 552217, 552218 or 302028 in Tehran or to the Sugar Organization offices in the provinces.

The Economic Mobilization Command spokesman thanked all the responsible and Moslem officials of the Sugar Organization of Iran for their trouble and their honesty in distributing and selling the granulated and cube sugar.

The spokesman then further announced that from December 6th, vegetable shortening will be sold throughout the nation at government controlled prices.

The factory representatives will start their work as soon as possible for the transportation and distribution of vegetable shortening, which will be conducted under the observance of the Vegetable Shortening Council and a representative of the Economic Mobilization Base.

The spokesman concluded the announcement by making a plea to all Moslems and responsible people to decrease their rate of consumption in a bid to step up the nation's ability to counter the Iraqi Ba'athist regime.

CSO: 4920

STRATEGIC VALUE OF GOLAN QUESTIONED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 30 Oct 80 p 7

[Article by Matityahu Peled: "Burden, Not Asset"]

[Text] According to a wide-spread misconception, the numerous border incidents along our border with Syria in the years prior to the Six-Day War were due to the fact that the Syrian army was occupying high positions overlooking our settlements at close range. Another misconception is that by capturing a 15-20 km deep strip on the Golan Heights we have removed the threat of Syrian gun fire from our settlements north of the Sea of Galilee.

The first misconception is based on the simplistic premise that the border incidents on our Syrian border were result of the Syrian advantage in altitude. Those who espouse this view overlook the fact that while our settlements were harassed by the Syrians, the settlements in the Jordan Valley, dominated by the Irbid Heights south of the Golan Heights, were living in peace. Why didn't the difference in altitude in Irbid cause the same problems as the Golan Heights?

We can easily answer this question if we remember that after the Six-Day War, when things quieted down in the Hulah Valley, trouble started in the southern settlements. For several years they experienced the same harassment which the settlements to the north suffered from prior to 1967. Indeed, at that time the residents of the Beisan and Jordan Valleys questioned the wisdom of occupying a narrow strip in the Golan which deprived them of their traditional peace. Some of them even argued that part of the Irbid Heights should be taken to stop the Jordanians from harassing the settlements in the valleys.

This, as we know, is not how their problem was solved, as indeed it has been in recent years. While they were having trouble they were told that peace would return to their region when the Jordanians realized that there was no point in their harassing the Israeli settlements in the valleys west of their border. And so it was. Today all the settlements, north and south, enjoy peace, despite the fact that the Jordanians are sole masters of the heights, which clearly shows that Israeli occupation of the heights is not what makes their settlements in the valley secure.

As for the quiet on the Syrian side of the border, it is certainly not the result of Israel's presence in a narrow strip on the edge of the Golan Heights. Syrian

guns are back in almost the same positions as before the Six-Day War. All Hulah Valley settlements are within effective range of Syrian artillery, exactly as they were before overtaking the Golan. Yet there are no border incidents between us and the Syrians.

The reason is quite simple: despite the state of war between Israel and Syria, the cease fire arrangements are clear and do not give cause for misunderstanding or undue tension. This was not the case before the Six-Day War. At that time the cease fire conditions were extremely vague and caused no end of misunderstandings. Shortly after the cease fire agreement went into effect its conditions began to raise questions: what was the meaning of the demilitarization of the territories held by the Syrians during the war and turned over to Israel as a result of the agreement? Was Israel entitled to build settlements or not? What water rights did Israel and Syria have? Did the Syrians have fishing privileges in the Sea of Galilee?

Enlarged Demilitarization

Not only were these questions left without a clear answer in the agreement itself, Israel, arguing that the Syrians were seeking to curtail its sovereignty in its own territory, was determined to act according to its own interpretation and pay no attention to the Syrian objections. Clearly it was possible to act differently, and look for a way to legally mediate these problems. Israel, however, preferred to use force, even though it was clear that the Syrians would not take kindly to it and the Israeli settlements in the area were going to suffer. It was a calculated risk which no party and no other public body objected to.

Whether indeed this was the best way to deal with those difficult problems which were caused by the cease fire agreement which was signed in a haste and left many unresolved problems, is today a matter of historical discussion. But to argue that all the problems of the settlements in the valley were due to the fact that the Syrians were positioned a few meters higher is sheer nonsense. The suffering of the settlements was the direct result of a deliberate Israeli policy which sought to use force in its interpretation of the cease fire agreement. This policy was not always consistent. For instance, the decision to populate the demilitarized areas along the Syrian border, despite Syrian objection, was made as late as 1958, after a relative calm for several years. But even the incidents which were caused by the digging of the Jordan canal a few years earlier would not have occurred if the Israeli government would have resorted to international arbitration instead of seeking to impose its will.

As mentioned, there are no unclear clauses inthe present cease fire agreements, and therefore we have calm in the Hulah Valley. The contribution of the Golan Heights settlements to this situation is purely marginal, since the Syrian guns are still there and can be fired at any minute. Hence the illusion about the strategic value of this small area Israel occupies in the Golan Heights. A strip of land which does not even force the enemy to remove its guns cannot be considered strategic. The removal of light weapons positions does represent a certain tactical improvement, but this can be secured through demilitarization. Furthermore, only an expanded demilitarization can give Israel a strategic advantage in that it would remove the Syrian guns.

This is an approach which can offer the Hulah Valley settlements real security instead of the imaginary security which is offered by the settlements on the Golan Heights, which are a strategic burden rather than a strategic asset. If Israel had accepted the principle of the Security Council resolution 242 and would have declared its willingness to return the Golan Heights to Syrian sovereignty, on condition that the Heights would not be used for launching an attack on Israel, it would have been possible to propose the demilitarization of an area larger than the one held today by Israel. A reasonable area would have been the entire territory from the international border to a line parallel to the Damascus-Dar'a road, shortly west of it. This arrangement would have pushed the Syrian guns some 50 km from the border and would have given real depth to the secured area east of the Hulah Valley.

On the basis that Egypt has already agreed to the demilitarization of the Sinai peninsula, and that the Camp David accords state that the Israeli-Egyptian treaty is a model for future agreements between Israel and its neighbors, we could propose the expanded demilitarization of the Golan Heights in the hope that it will not be rejected. Such approach should replace the one which sees territorial expansion as a sacred goal even when it means great security risk.

9565
CSO: 4805

GOLAN SETTLERS DIVIDED ON ANNEXATION

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 31 Oct 80 pp 15, 20

[Article by Mati Golan: "People on Heights: 'We Will Not Be Bargaining Card;' 'We Will Not Return Heights, Even for Greatest Peace in the World--Returning Sinai Was Enough; G'ulah Kohen Pushed Us Aside; Why Sacrifice Children's Lives for Territory which Israel May Not Want?'"]

[Text] You pass the sign ushering you into the Golan Heights and you are immediately surrounded by the calm of the peaceful hills, the soft autumn sun, and the distance which almost cuts you off from everything. You want to stop the car, get out, stretch on the ground, and let this calm cleanse you of everything the city has filled you up with.

Everything here is so uncomplicated. Even the army vehicles which pass by fail to scare you. You prefer to think that they are not here for security reasons, but only as a show for tourists who might be disappointed if they did not see at least one tank for good measure.

The workers in the fields blend in the landscape. Their motions fit the background. Slow, somewhat clumsy, almost indifferent. Their calm, it seems, cannot be disturbed. All this changes when you meet them. Underneath the calm there are violent emotions and, above all, many doubts and misgivings.

They work, build, are happy, sad, they hate and love in this place. Same as people everywhere. But they do not know whether the home in which they have invested their best years is for good. They fulfill the goals of Zionism more than those who live in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, but their homes and land are not part of the State of Israel. Not officially.

This is a matter of applying Israeli law to the Golan Heights. Annexation. Do they support it? Do they wish to be annexed?

In the yard of the military governor's building near the Druse village Mas'adah, an idyllic picture: two soldiers sit at a long wooden table and play backgammon. One is short, thin, wearing a skullcap. The other tall and heavy set. They reluctantly agree to take a break.

The skullcapped one has no problems with annexation. The Golan is ours. "We won't give it back even if we have the greatest peace in the world." His friend agrees. "The Golan is an inseparable part of Israel." Why? He hesitates. Difficult question. At last he finds an answer. "Because it belongs to us."

The skullcapped one has an arithmetical argument. Returning the Sinai was enough. There is no need to shrink at both ends. If it were up to him, he would not have returned the Sinai either. He would have cancelled the peace, since "I do not trust Sadat." He trusts no one, not even Begin. He did not vote for him. He knew that if he won "he would turn over the whole world. With him it is either war or peace." Whom would he vote for? MAFDAL (religious party)? No. No one. On a second thought, MAFDAL. And the Abuhatzirah affair does not bother him? Not at all. He will vote for him even if he is found guilty. Because they looked to start up with him. "They are all thieves," the heavy set one declares. The skullcapped one nods in consent and rolls the dice.

Ten minutes from Mas'adah is kibbutz El Rom of the Kibbutz M'uhad movement. Near the entrance stands a modern structure of cubes, which turns out to be the dining hall. On the path leading from the parking lot to the dining hall I am greeted by Ron Saltzman, who notices the tape recorder I am wearing. He is a dark youth who is sure of his views. The proposed law? This is not the right time for it. When this government goes it will be the right time for it. This is no government. They make fun of labor. When I am about to leave he shakes his head in regret. "Too bad this is not for television."

Architectural Vision

On the ground floor of the dining hall there are scores of mail boxes. One member opens his box, takes out a letter, and closes the box. He reads fast and throws the letter into a trash can. "Another party fundraiser," he tells his girlfriend. "I'm fed up."

The dining hall is divided by canvas partitions. One part, the larger one, is empty. Members eat only in the smaller part. Whoever built this dining hall must have been a person of vision.

Avi Marx, of medium height, balding, thin, welcomes me with a shy smile and invites me to the table. We are joined by Shalom Bleir. Corpulent and sporting a mustache. Avi is the secretary of the kibbutz. A native of London, he came here at age 18. Shalom is the coordinator, native of Poland, came here at age 10.

After I ask Avi about the annexation he wants to know if I am soliciting his opinion as secretary or personally. He finally agrees that it does not make any difference, but he stresses that he speaks as a member of the kibbutz, not as secretary.

When Avi and Shalom begin to talk I find out that the briefing I received from experts before I left was unfounded. I was told to go to the kibbutzim of both MAPAI and MAPAM (mainline and leftwing labor parties respectively), since the

former support the bill and oppose territorial compromise in the Golan, while the latter take the exact opposite view. This may be true about the politicians but not the local residents. In fact, it may not even be true about the politicians.

Avi, in a quiet voice, says that he supports the bill, "but not now. It may hurt our foreign relations." Shalom agrees and adds an interesting argument. Under certain conditions annexation can be a bargaining card. We shouldn't waste it. For peace he is willing to return the West Bank, but not the Golan. "Since here there are no million Arabs."

Avi does not take my questions seriously. "They won't ask us anyway. They didn't ask us when they returned Kuneitra. They didn't ask us when they gave the Syrians 1000 dunams of El Rom's lands. A week after they promise it they won't do it." And what now? I ask. "If they promise me real peace I am willing to leave quietly."

How should their party, the Labor party, vote for the bill? Shalom, who says he is a party member, says that "G'ulah Kohen pushed us into a corner. Our representatives, who had sent us here, find it difficult to vote against it. But I wouldn't hesitate to vote against it." Avi adds: I am concerned about the Syrian reaction. We have been living recently as good neighbors. I believe we can reach a settlement with them if we do it quietly.

What does Mori Sh'rira, who I met on the path on my way back, think? He is a member of kibbutz Kabri who came to El Rom as part of a family program to help new farms. He would like to stay here for good. Not so his wife. There are problems. He looks back on the original intent. What was the intent of the settlement? It was to prepare the ground for peace with Syria. Despite his love for the place, he would not mind returning it for peace. Needless to say, he does not support the annexation, certainly not now.

I am curious about the connection, if any, between the Golan and the rest of Israel. Would Mori Sh'rira give up East Jerusalem for peace? "It's hard to say." But its not hard to say it about the Golan. There is a traditional, historical difference. He supports the peace treaty with Egypt, but he is certain that it could have been obtained under better conditions. This would certainly have been the case if Yigal Allon had been heading the government. Also Rabin, since his views are close to Allon's. Not Peres, since he agrees with Dayan. It seems easier for these young men to forgive Asad than make peace with the RAFI people.

The court outside the dining hall fills with young people who look out of place in their looks, their clothes, their behavior, and their--language. They speak American, Dutch, and Scandinavian English. Among them are June Ina Sande of Norway, Almira of Holland, and Dina Walkira of California. They have come here as volunteers, a Gentile gathering of the exiles. What are young Christians looking for in Kibbutz Al Rom on the Golan Heights? They were bored in their country. They wanted to see the world. They heard about the kibbutz. Almira explains: the kibbutz is a place you can go back to from your travels in Israel. You get food and a place to sleep. It's like a hotel, only cheaper. They heard about the annexation proposal, and they have no doubts that the Golan must be an integral part of Israel. "Because of security." The U.S. objection does not

bother them or arouse them, not even the American girl. "The U.S. has global interests and the small countries suffer. It's like telling Americans to give back land to the Indians. In general, they do not believe peace is possible. "We were in Egypt and we saw another side," Dina says.

A few hundred meters before the entrance to kibbutz Ramat Magshimim of the Poel Hamizrahi there is a large sign: The Golan Heights is an inseparable part of the state of Israel. Someone erased the prefix "in."

On the patio in front of the kibbutz office a few young people are sitting on the floor. Two are wearing IDF uniform, cleaning their rifles. Little tots are playing nearby. Are you willing to talk? What is there to talk about? Everything is perfectly clear. The time has come to annex. Not to create a new reality, but to legalize the existing one. A law is hard to revoke. And what if Assad came to Jerusalem, like Sadat, and would say he is willing to sign peace in return for the Golan? "He wouldn't be serious." We should try to persuade him that the Golan belongs to Israel.

Are you from HA'ARETZ?

It is almost sacrilegious to mention the U.S. in this place. They do not like to hear about Israel's dependency on this superpower. The U.S. should not mix in." "They are not going us any favors." Or: "If we tell the U.S. tomorrow we are going to talk to Russia, the U.S. will run after us." There is no answer when I mention that there is no need to run, since Russia is not interested."

The MAFDAL is also unmentionable. Before I utter the name of the religious party they call out in a chorus: Don't mention the MAFDAL. All the parties are a bunch of hypocrites. Will they vote for the MAFDAL? They don't know. They are not sure. They may not vote altogether. It's a big mess. Burg was offered the position of foreign minister and he refused. Why? Because the money is in the Ministry of the Interior.

Someone chimes in. You are from HA'ARETZ? He tells the others, I wouldn't talk to him. I get up to leave. The sun is beating down on me. The air is dry. My tongue is dry. Can I have a glass of water? They look at one another listlessly. Perhaps at the shop, someone says. No one bothers to show me where the shop is. I dare not mention the dining hall. Good boys with skullcaps. They were taught how to show hospitality. In El Rom I was invited to lunch, coffee, tea. I declined. But they did offer.

All the same, I managed to get to Katzrin which, on the Golan, is considered a city. The entrance is a barbed wired iron gate like all settlements on the Golan. The main road behind the gate is a wide, paved city road. Never mind it is only 2-300 yards long and only serves some 15 cars a day. Some day even this road may have to be widened.

In the middle is a miniature shopping center. A grocery, clothing store, three restuarants next to one another. I pick the steak house. After I order the owner, Amram Zaguri, joins me. He came here from Migdal Haemek. He tells me there are

400 families now. Can a restaurant exist on such a number of people? No. He makes his money on tourists and soldiers. He is for the bill. "So we can be like all the citizens of the state." Uri D'vir, stocky, a plumber by trade, came to Katzrin from Hulon. Because of housing problems. Here rent is subsidized. He has enough work to do. He only has a problem with monopoly. If he wants to work for M'korot they tell him, sorry, you are one person, we only deal with Herut and Solel Boneh. Okay, I say, I live here and I would like to work here. They tell me, go to Herut, you may get a subcontract. Crumbs, Uri says. I am not looking.

Does he like Katzrin? We should call this place towbutz, he says, because it is like a kibbutz inside a town. Quiet, clean air. Isn't he concerned the town may be given back some day? No, he trusts the Syrians. They are not up to having peace. If there is going to be peace after all, he is willing to relocate nearby. He gives the bill his blessings. "To be the stepchild of a state is not the best thing." He believes the new law will encourage government support and open the pockets of private investors who may be followed by settlers who some day will turn Katzrin into a real city.

Also a Formal Announcement

Shimon Sheves is the chairman of the Golan Heights settlements. He is the typical Golan settler. In his late twenties, burning blue eyes, black beard, curly hair, a cow hand by trade, he has been spending a great deal of time in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem to raise consciousness regarding the Golan and the annexation. Is he not disturbed by the fact that the bill was proposed by Geula Kohen? He is disturbed, but there were 22 other members of Knesset who supported it. What if his party, the Labor, will vote against it? It is a problem. If the principles change, perhaps a new party will have to be formed.

What will the law give him? What does he need it for? Some people, he says, were against proclaiming the state. The history of practical Zionism has shown that deeds are important, not words. Where there is a settlement that is where the border will be set. I trust this principle, this education which I received. Until the Camp David accords. Now I don't trust it. Now I need a formal proclamation. I will like us to be like the Galilee and the Negev.

So far so good. Who doesn't want the Golan? The difficult question for all is the price. What if peace with Syria means returning the Golan? The fate of the settlements is not what should determine the outcome, Sheves says. It should be a security matter. In this respect he is not willing to give up the Golan. Even if it means not having peace.

On the other hand he would readily give up the West Bank. He would oppose a law which would annex that region to Israel. What is the difference? Why should the fate of the West Bank settlers be different? The difference, he says, is 1.2 million Arabs whom he does not want to have in Israel.

As for the timing, Sheves believes there never was better timing. The elections, as long as there is no change in the balance of powers. The retreat from the Sinai. After the Sinai retreat is completed it will be a lot harder to deal with Egypt. Finally, the elections in the U.S.

Is he concerned about the Syrian reaction? Not too much. Two shells which fall on the farm are not a pleasant thing. But it is harder when my wife and friends say that if we are not sure this is our land why are we here. Why sacrifice my children if I am not sure the state wants this land?

And this, in a nutshell, is the whole problem. They want peace, very much so. But they also want the Golan. They build ex nihilo. But they are not sure tomorrow they may have to return everything they have built. How does Sheves put it? It is very hard to live as a bargaining card.

9565
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IMPLICATIONS OF SYRIAN TREATY FOR MILITARY POLICY CONSIDERED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Oct 80 p 9

[Article by Matityahu Peled]

[Text] From the nervousness and confusion shown by the Israeli government concerning the recent events in the Middle East, it could be deduced that it is very uncomfortable for Israel to be located in this region of the world. It is behaving like a stranger who has chanced upon a place that he does not know, where every whisper arouses uncontrollable fears. Most of all, it appears that Israel is quite uninformed concerning the extent of its responsibility for an appreciable part of what is happening in the region where (we hope) it will exist for a long time. When the war between Iraq and Iran broke out, no one foresaw its timing or intensity. But the Russo-Syrian treaty has slowly taken shape, and it has been plain to everyone that it began with President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem. The great strategic change that occurred with the stablishment of peace between Israel and Egypt is Syria's discovery of Israeli aggression. There is no need for this aggression to materialize, in order for grave fears for the present situation to be aroused in Syria; it faces Israeli power without being able to depend on Egyptian power, which even if not used was liable to tie up considerable Israeli forces during periods of tension.

Syria has learned from experience that even during its most difficult times, as in 1965-1967, before the crisis of May 1967, she could not depend on active intervention by Egypt on her side. But the state of war between Israel and Egypt was of itself a guarantee against Israel's turning its full power against Syria. This guarantee has been canceled, and Syria has been seized by deep anxiety. It is enough to see how the Syrian regime has run to and fro seeking allies; first it proposed union with Jordan, then union with Iraq, and disappointed by them, finally union even with Libya. All this was hopeless, but to a country that feels besieged, any straw on the water looks like a life raft.

Israel could have prevented this nervousness, but it preferred to encourage it. The voices that have been heard in Israel ever since the peace process began, the invasion of Lebanon, and lately the political declarations in Jerusalem warning of Israel's reaction against Syria on one matter and another—all have been interpreted in Damascus as preparations for an Israeli offensive against Syria. For the last few months every observer arriving in the Middle East has asked himself, when and how will Israel implement its threat against Syria? In Beirut, Europe, and the journalistic circles, this seems to be a very practical question.

The explanations of the probability of such an outcome sound quite authentic. The Syrian government is beset by difficulties; Syria is isolated in the Arab world; and Israel, despite the peace agreement with Egypt, continues to enlarge its army as it charges that it sees danger on the "eastern front"--a creature of the imagination that is invisible except as an answer from a well-known circle that is generally intended to justify aggression.

In its tardy way the USSR finally got used to the idea of a treaty with Syria, but it may be assumed that it was not happy about it. Its experience with Egypt, Somalia, and Yemen does not encourage a policy of such agreements, which require a substantial Soviet investment on which the return is most uncertain. But it is no wonder that after Moscow examined Israel's reactions to the events in the Persian Gulf, it decided to answer the Syrian pleas.

Ever since the war between Iraq and Iran broke out, the "official spokesmen" in Israel have not stopped describing the dangers that they foresee for us. Without any critical examination of the data, Israel has taken for granted, as an assumption not requiring proof, that the war would strengthen Iraq and deliver to it the leadership of the same "eastern front" that expired after the Yom Kippur war of 1973. Now it is clear that Iraq's pretensions of waging a "Six-Day War" type of blitzkrieg against Iran have gone up in smoke. Iraq will almost certainly come out of this war enfeebled, with an army in need of organization and supplies (and it is not yet clear where these would come from), and really not fit for military activity for a considerable time. Moreover, her position in the Arab world is shakier today than ever before; and the Rejection Front itself, which was only a remnant of the situation that ceased to exist after the 1978 Baghdad conference, was completely destroyed when Libya and Syria, the important members of the Front, supported Iran, Iraq's deadly enemy.

That Baghdad conference, the decisions of which they are energetically refusing to acknowledge in Israel, called for peace with Israel on the basis of Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 boundaries and recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to a sovereign state. It is known that these conditions are not acceptable to the Israeli government, but the presentation of this resolution as an expression of uncompromising hostility toward Israel recalls Israel's refusal to admit the existence of Sadat's peace offer of February 1971--an offer that he recalled to us all in his Kneset speech, to the great embarrassment of those who had been the national leaders at that time. Only a disregard of the Baghdad conference decisions can enable all kinds of spokesmen to charge that Iraq has never revealed any readiness to recognize Israel, or alternatively, that Iraq opposes the establishment of a Palestinian state. Thus also, disregard of everything happening in the Middle East makes it possible to describe a normal and natural development as though it were destined to bring calamity to Israel.

Lately we have heard that a new growing danger is coming upon us: The narrow roads and camel tracks that have been used for so long for land traffic between Iraq and Jordan are being replaced by express highways (God save us!) The bearer of these grave tidings, the deputy minister of Defense, would certainly think it natural if Jordan and Iraq both remained backward countries in no need of fast roads. But the fact is that these two Arab states are developing very rapidly, and from an economic standpoint their situation is excellent. The scope of the trade

between them and their financial means are enabling them to improve not only their standard of living, but also the means of transportation between them. Of course these improved roads can be used by tank carriers, but let us not assume that Israel has the military means to restrain the economic and cultural development of the Middle East. To our great joy, the prospect has not yet disappeared that Israel will be integrated into the development of the region where it desires to dwell, and that it will stop seeing every step of progress as a security risk. Under the present circumstances it would be more reasonable if Israel understood that in spite of the present serious deterioration at the Persian Gulf, for a country like Iraq that depends on one port that can be closed to navigation in an instant, there is a real problem in importing vital supplies for a population of millions that has suffered a great deal in any case from wartime destruction. If this population could get relief through the opening of another supply line from the port of Ashdod, for example, it would certainly do Israel no harm. To our great regret, this is now impossible; but it may become possible in the future.

9045
CSO: 4805

UNIVERSITY ENROLLMENT STATISTICS REPORTED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ 15 Oct 80 p 4

[Article by Amos Ben Vered]

[Text] The number of students expected in universities in the 1980-1981 academic year now beginning is liable to reach 59,000, as compared to 57,500 in 1979-1980.

These and other details of the new academic year were reported the day before yesterday by Mr Gedalya Ya'acovi, director-general of the Planning and Budgeting Committee of the Council for Higher Education, in a memorandum prepared for the opening of the academic year.

Distribution, by Institutions

The memorandum explains that the approximate distribution of students by institutions for 1980-1981 will be: Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 25.7 percent; Tel Aviv University, 26.3 percent; Bar Ilan University, 15.1 percent; Israel Institute of Technology (Technion), 13.8 percent; University of Haifa, 10.7 percent; Beersheba University 7.5 percent; Weizmann Institute, 0.9 percent.

About 70 percent of the students are studying for a bachelor's degree, 17 percent for a master's, and 5 percent for a Phd. The rest are enrolled in courses of study that award a post-graduate certificate (particularly teachers' certificates of all classes), and in special study programs.

Thousands in Special Courses

To the number of students who will study in the seven university-level institutions in 1980-1981 must be added thousands more who will study in dozens of academic courses in the Open University (in 1979-1980 about 5,000 students enrolled in 46 courses), and thousands more in pre-academic preparatory classes (there were about 2,500 in 1979-1980). Of the 36,000 enrolled in universities for the first semester, about one-fourth are enrolled in more than one university. Hence the actual number of persons studying in universities is about 25,000.

Cutback in Teaching Staff

The explanation for "enrollment in more than one university" is that students thereby hope to make sure that they will be accepted by at least one institution.

According to the director general of the planning and budgeting committee of the Council for Higher Education, the size of the teaching and administrative staffs has decreased in recent years in the universities. The cutback in manpower, which occurred in spite of the expansion of teaching and research in the nation's academic system, resulted from savings and improved efficiency that were achieved because of budget cuts.

Since 1973, the number of students has increased by 10,000, whereas the teaching and administrative staffs have been cut back by 1000 positions.

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BRIEFS

NOTERA GAS FIND--A good quality gas-water mixture was obtained the last 2 days in tests at gas well Notera-2 in the Huleh. The mixture was treated to separate the gas, but the presence of the water prevents estimation of the size of the gas reservoir. It can not yet be said whether commercial extraction will be worthwhile. Tests began at the end of last week, but because the material obtained is a gas-water mixture, tests to evaluate the reservoir volume will continue a few more days. Dry gas was found at Notera-1, but the reservoir was too small to justify commercial operation by itself. At the time of reporting last night, the extraction was going well, and there was no pressure drop that might indicate that the reservoir was too small. In contrast to dry gas wells, where the pressure drops quickly when the reservoir is small (as at Notera-1), the pressure drops slowly in liquid wells, and so the test will continue for a few more days. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Oct 80 p 2] [9045]

RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INCREASE--Research and development programs of IL 3.5 billion were presented for the last half of the year by industry to the office of the chief scientist of the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Tourism; they constitute a significant increase over the previous year. So reports Arye Lavi, the chief scientist. He indicated that according to the 1979-80 summary, the budget for the new industrial programs, aside from those of the research institutions, has had a real increase of 15 percent and totals more than IL 2.8 billion. However in contrast to the increase in the regular projects, there was an actual decrease in the budget. The national projects have an increase of the order of 4.5 percent. The chief scientist also reported that support of research institutions had increased through a "basic research" fund and joint funds of the office of chief scientist and the institutes of higher education. In 1979-80, 123 basic research projects were authorized, as compared to 82 in 1978-79. [Text] [Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 15 Oct 80 p 4] [9045]

CSO: 4805

SONIMEX ANNOUNCES INCREASES IN PRICES OF ITS PRODUCTS

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 4 Nov 80 pp 1, 8

[Article: "Increase in SONIMEX Product Prices Announced Yesterday by Minister of Commerce, Industry and Mines"]

[Text] Yesterday monring, Mr Cissoko Mamadou, minister of Commerce, Industry and Mines, commented for representatives of the national press on the latest measures taken by the Council of Ministers to adjust the prices of the products sold by SONIMEX [National Import and Export Company].

We are giving below the full text of this important statement.

After taking a close look at the situation of SONIMEX, the Council of Ministers, in its meeting of 31 October 1980, had to make decisions concerning the adjustment of the prices of the products sold by SONIMEX.

The purpose of this statement is to explain why we had to make these adjustments; as you will see, however, they were made so as to take into account the social impact they will have, considering the low income of our people, rather than the difficulties resulting from international economic conditions which, as we all know, are characterized by a more than galopping inflation.

After 16 years of existence, SONIMEX's objectives have not changed much: on the contrary, the steady development of its activities has only confirmed that the economic and social mission which was assigned to it at the time of its creation was justified; this mission was:

- to ensure the normal and regular supply of our territory as a whole with the three staple products and goods for which it has an import monopoly;

- to make sure that these products were distributed equitably so as to satisfy the actual needs of all of our people; to make sure at all times that they were sold at the lowest possible prices consistent with the low income of many consumers; and to guarantee the stabilization of these prices.

It is with respect to prices that the social character of SONIMEX's mission is continuously reflected, and the government is watching it with particular attention.

Thus, since almost one year now, SONIMEX has had to sell at prices much lower than the cost prices of the products sold. As a matter of fact:

- rice has been costing SONIMEX 18 UM per kilo since January, but it is still sold for 12 UM per kilo;

- sugar loaves sold for 45 UM per kilo cost 74.60 UM per kilo, and sugar tablets costing 64.70 UM per kilo were selling for only 35 UM per kilo.

Until now, only tea sales have shown a small profit margin which, however, is far from sufficient to cover the deficit of several hundreds of millions of ouguyia generated by SONIMEX's selling the other products at a loss.

In view of this situation which, if it were allowed to continue, might greatly endanger its activities, even its survival, SONIMEX has not failed in the past to ask for an adjustment of these prices. However, until today, the government has postponed its agreement on any price increase in order not to place a burden on the people.

Here, I should denounce the regrettable exploitation made by some unscrupulous merchants of the fact that these prices were frozen. Following only their selfish interests and with the complicity of agents who cared little for national interest, they strove to resell fraudulently abroad a large part of these products which, through SONIMEX, are heavily subsidized by the state.

After this one-year period of voluntary and costly stabilization of the prices of these essential food products, reason orders us not to allow the already large gap between our consumers' prices and the prices actually charged on international markets to grow larger; all the more so that SONIMEX, the main agent and implement of this social policy, already finds itself in a critical financial situation.

Let our fellow citizens be reassured: the price increases which will become effective on 1 November have been set at very reasonable levels in all cases, and the new prices are still below the actual cost price of the products involved:

- the price of sugar loaves will increase from 45 to 50 UM per kilo;
- the price of sugar tablets from 35 to 40 UM per kilo;
- the price of broken rice from 12 to 15 UM per kilo;
- the price of whole rice will increase to 30 UM per kilo;
- all varieties of tea will increase by 100 UM per kilo.

Another fact which deserves consideration is that, because of the low increase in these prices, our sales prices are still lower than those of

neighboring countries. Now, we know that such considerable price differences between these countries and ours are just what encourages some of our merchants to get involved in the speculation and fraud denounced above. Therefore, if it were not that the government wishes to prevent a deterioration of the purchasing power of the people, it would be logical and desirable for us to gear SONIMEX's price policy toward a constant harmonization of its prices with those of our neighboring countires.

Harmonization, of course, would not necessarily mean selling at the same prices, but rather making sure that the price differences are low enough to discourage any attempt at fraud and diversion.

The price differences have not yet reached this level. However, we do hope that, in addition to a strict application of all of our anti-fraud legislation by the newly created Direction of Economic Control, we can also rely on the civic spirit and responsible behavior of our merchants and on the cooperation of CGEAM [expansion unknown], especially the Federation of merchants and we would appreciate the latter's assistance in stopping the flight of these products--for which we are paying such high prices--outside our borders, and in preventing the illegal price increases at consumers' level which place such a heavy burden on those of our people who have a low purchasing power.

Finally, at the risk of repeating myself, I wish to stress that, in the difficult economic situation in which we now find ourselves and which does not spare any third-world country, only the union of our people around the CMSN [expansion unknown] and its government to carry through our economic and social development program, only this union, I say, will enable us to gather--in a not too distant future we hope--the fruits of the long [sacrifice] which we shall thus have accepted.

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CSO:4400

MOSCOW MEETING OF MOROCCAN-SOVIET COMMISSION

Rabat L'OPINION in French 4 Nov 80 p 1

[Text] Meskala Project, Fishing and Bituminous Shale Dominate Discussions

The Grand Moroccan-Soviet Cooperation Commission met yesterday (Monday) in Moscow for the first time since its creation 4 years ago.

The Moroccan delegation to the deliberations of this commission was led by the minister of state for foreign affairs and cooperation, Me M'Hamed Boucetta, and included Azzeddine Guessous, minister of commerce, industry and merchant marine, and maritime fishing; Mohamed Karim Lamrani, director general of the Shereefian Office of Phosphates and several high officials from Moroccan economic establishments.

The deliberations of the commission are going to concern questions having to do with economic and technical cooperation between the two countries as well as with means for moving ahead toward further consolidation, especially in the fields of maritime fishing, commercial interaction, tourism, agriculture and the training of cadres and artisans. The commission should also examine the modes of implementation of the various economic accords signed between the two countries.

It was with these purposes that Mr Azzeddine Guessous left Sunday evening, as we mentioned, from the Rabat-Sale Airport for Moscow.

In a press statement, the minister indicated that the meeting of this commission is an opportunity to assess present political, economic and cultural relations between the two countries. "Commercial transactions between the two countries, the Meskala project, the energy question, will be examined," Mr Azzeddine Guessous also said, adding that "There will be an examination of measures to take aimed at an eventual transfer of Soviet technology for processing of bituminous shale. The maritime fishing question will also be before the two parties, as it is the case that the two countries have signed a fishing agreement that has been ratified by Parliament."

The two countries, it will be remembered, in March 1978 in Moscow concluded a long-term commercial agreement and a cooperative agreement on maritime fishing. Another convention, under the terms of which Morocco should supply its Soviet partner 10 million [unit not stated] of phosphates per year for at least 30 years, was also signed between the two countries at Moscow.

On the trade scene, volume of trade between the two countries reached 700 million dirhams (1 DH = 1.06 French fr) in 1979, thus growing by 2.5 percent by comparison with the previous year.

9516
CSO: 4400

MEETING ON NEXT FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Rabat L'OPINION in French 3 Nov 80 pp 1, 3

[Text] Rabat--(Maghreb-Arab Press Agency). The prime minister and minister of justice, Me Maati Bouabid, presided Saturday at the Directorate of Statistics in Rabat over a meeting which is part of the process of preparation of the next 5-year plan and of the general census on population and habitat. This meeting was held in the presence of Mr Taib Bencheikh, secretary of state in the office of the prime minister responsible for planning and regional development.

The prime minister and minister of justice made a speech on this occasion in which he first praised the efforts being made by the various cadres of the secretariat of state for planning and regional development in the context of preparations for the 5-year plan. He indicated that preparation of this plan has already entered into its second phase of elaboration and that the commissions which are meeting as part of this process at the national and regional levels have been inspired in their labors by the wise counsel of His Majesty the King bearing on several points, including:

--The necessity of safeguarding territorial integrity and the strengthening of national defense capabilities.

--The training of cadres in accordance with a harmonious policy taking into account the economic and social needs of the country and the system it is pursuing in the field of training and education.

--Promotion of the agriculture sector, with due regard for its driving role in the process of development.

--Promotion of the maritime fishing sector in order to achieve food self-sufficiency.

--Judicious exploitation of energy resources.

The prime minister and minister of justice indicated also that industrial development will be based on the completion of major projects in heavy industry (steelworks complex, production units for phosphoric acid) in addition to the promotion of small and middle-size industrial projects. He stressed that the national and regional commissions have also worked hard on the study of the tourist sector and means for export development, as well as on the situation of Moroccan workers abroad.

The prime minister said that the goal of His Majesty the King is to reduce the disparities both between social classes and between the various provinces of the kingdom. He added that the royal guidelines made jobs a fundamental criterion in the choice of economic projects that will be executed in the course of the next 5-year plan.

In other matters, after having recalled the wise directives of His Majesty the King concerning the overall financial package for the 5-year plan, Me Bouabid asked for redoubled efforts so that the proposed plan can be presented as soon as possible to the government, then to the Superior Council of National Promotion and Planning before its submission to the House of Representatives. He also indicated that the government of His Majesty has decided to undertake a general census of population and habitat, emphasizing that the aim of this national project can be summarized in the following points:

--Determination of the number of people in the kingdom.

--Understanding of the social and economic particularities of the population.

--Collection of the scientific data necessary for research and studies.

Speaking on this occasion, Mr Taib Bencheikh underlined the extent of participation in this activity of the various services under the secretariat of state for planning and regional development, including the National Documentation Center, considered internationally to have been successful as a pilot project, the Office of Cooperation Development, the National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics and the College of Information Sciences.

The remarks of the secretary of state were followed by a discussion of several subjects involved with regionalization of allocations and projects, the problem of the cadres and their training, the question of equilibrium between the operating and capital budgets, questions relative to organic structures, the population census and the programming of labor in this field.

The prime minister and minister of justice clarified aspects of all these questions.

9516
CSO: 4400

ISTIQLAL PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING

Rabat L'OPINION in French 3 Nov 80 pp 1, 3

[Text] The central committee of the Istiqlal Party met Saturday afternoon at party headquarters in Rabat under the chairmanship of combatant Abou Bakr Kadiri and in the presence of members of the executive committee.

After an introductory speech, Mr Abou Bakr Kadiri yielded the floor to Abbes Al Fassi who gave an extensive presentation on the party's participation in the government and on the role played by Istiqlalian ministers in responding to the aspirations of the popular classes, and in achieving social justice through the elimination of the disparities between regions and the various social classes in the nation.

Abbes Al Fassi next provided a glimpse of the broad lines of the new finance bill and the 1981-1985 five-year plan.

Afterward, he sketched out the activities undertaken by the different departments headed by Istiqlalian ministers, putting the emphasis on the many positive achievements made since October 1977 (infrastructure and national promotion, education, habitat, youth and sports, and training of cadres).

Concerning our recovered Sahara [sic], Abbes Al Fassi paid vivid homage to the action taken by our valiant Royal Armed Forces and to their supreme commander, His Majesty Hassan II, for the defense of our territorial integrity and for their total control of the terrain and the military situation.

Abbes Al Fassi recalled the commitment of Moroccan people to remain vigilant and mobilized to defeat any attempt to attack our territorial unity. Faithful to the solemn declaration of the Green March [sic], the Moroccan people will not shrink from any sacrifice to preserve what they have acquired and to foil the plots spun by their enemies.

On the diplomatic front, Abbes Al Fassi highlighted the move undertaken by Me M'Hamed Boucetta, Mr Abder-rahman Baddou, and Mr Abdelhaq to lay the foundation for frank and sincere cooperation with all countries that respect our national sovereignty and our territorial integrity.

After having analyzed the latest results in Africa and worldwide, Abbes Al Fassi insisted on the strengthening of our diplomatic activity to be a militant, dynamic and omnipresent diplomacy.

In conclusion, Abbes Al Fassi announced the preparation of a vast program for the celebration of the 15th century of the Hegira and the 25th anniversary of independence.

Afterward, the floor was given to Mr Abdelkrim Ghallab, who reviewed activities of the Istiqlalian parliamentary group and its contribution to the strengthening of the democratic process. Mr Ghallab next gave a glimpse of the various legislative proposals made by Istiqlalian deputies, and which are all inspired by the party program and by the constant concern to serve the popular masses and to translate their needs into legislative action.

In their different contributions in discussion of the government's program, the finance bill and proposed bills, the members of the group of Unity and Egalitarianism--animated by the determination to faithfully discharge their mandate and to fully merit the confidence of the voters--spared no effort to enrich the democratic experience and to create a cadre adequate to the expression of the popular will.

After Mr Ghallab's presentation, Mr Hassan Haloui presented a document on prices and the economic situation.

At the end of these presentations, discussions were held and several members of the central committee intervened to discuss different subjects brought up by the speakers.

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IMPLICATIONS OF OIL, POWER GAME ON GULF AREA EXPLORED

Abu Dhabi AL-WAHDAH in Arabic 12 Nov 80 p 9

[Article by Dr Khaza'al al-Jasim: "The Oil Game and Control of Arabian Gulf: Oil Has Political, Economic, Military, Industrial Implications; West Wants To Use Middle East as Means for Achieving Alternative Energy Sources"]

[Text] Why has the interest of the superpowers shifted to the Middle East, and specifically to the Arabian Gulf area? This area has had oil for a long time, but there has never been so much interest in the area. Such interest had been focused on other parts of the world such as Southeast Asia. During the Vietnam War, THE NEW YORK TIMES, which is the largest newspaper in the United States, wrote that "U.S. interests in Southeast Asia amount to nothing when compared to U.S. interests in the Middle East." Did interest shift to the area after the energy crisis? Was the shift in interest caused by the growing nationalist and patriotic movements in the Middle East? Was it because [the countries] in the area established their national sovereignty over the oil? An increase in oil revenues would ensue from the establishment of such sovereignty. These revenues can be used to develop the area, and such development may constitute a threat to western interests in the area.

Always Look for the Oil

One can ask oneself an unlimited number of such questions, and one can also expect different answers to them. The answer to these questions, [however], lurks in the oil. In order for us to understand the successive threats [that are made against us] as well as the mobilization of U.S. and western military forces and fleets in the area surrounding the Arabian Peninsula, we must [first] understand the role of oil and its relationship to Israel so that we can explain these maneuvers and [these efforts] to create consecutive crises in the area.

Above all else, we must know that 90 percent of the oil business is political and that the importance of oil cannot be compared or related to the importance of any other primary material. This is because oil serves several economic, military, industrial and political dimensions and

because the principal problems in the world--wars, development, energy and environmental pollution--cannot be separated from crude oil.

The strategic importance of oil in military operations has become so great that it is now impossible to imagine fighting wars with today's weapons without oil. From a social and political standpoint, oil consumption has become a standard for measuring economic prosperity and a society's quality of life. A country that consumes more oil is one that is more civilized and more advanced, whereas the one which consumes little oil is one that is more backward and more sluggish.

The Superpowers Have No Oil

There is an extraordinary fact about oil which has complicated the oil question even further. While most of the superpowers have no oil, the rich oil fields that were discovered this century are located in areas of the world that are backward--in distant countries whose governments were not amenable to the sudden industrial changes that had taken place. It was surprising that foreign policy and domestic policy, turning their attention to such countries, became part of the oil game. The governments and the peoples of these countries were no more than hostages. The governments of most of these countries expected to receive some returns from the oil, but they never dreamed of achieving full control over this resource. Such control was realized to a certain extent in the seventies.

The division of the Arab world, the emergence of Zionism as an important factor in western policy and the emergence of Arab nationalism as a latent force have made control of the oil resources the principal goal of the western struggle in the area as well as the principal motive behind the western powers' [desire] to consolidate and to maintain political and economic control over the area. This is what is making the population in the area permanently anxious about oil. Although oil is a local [substance] and can be found in all of these countries, it does foster a profound relationship between the multi-national corporations, backed up by their governments, and the oil producing countries. These countries and their western governments try to use every weapon possible to maintain their control over the area by all possible ways and means: political, economic and military. The threats that are proclaimed and designed by these countries--and the United States is at their forefront--constitute the best evidence that military action is used to control the oil fields.

The importance of the Arab world emerges in the fact that it produces about 20 million barrels of oil per day of OPEC's total production of 30 million barrels per day. World oil production, including the oil produced in the Middle East, is only 60 million barrels per day. OPEC's oil exports come to 28 million barrels per day, whereas total world oil exports amount to 29 million barrels per day. This means that OPEC exports 95 percent of the world's oil exports. In addition, the Arab world's oil reserves amount to approximately 54 percent of total world oil reserves.

The emergence of consumer patterns in industrial societies, in addition to the current low price of oil compared with the prices of [its] alternatives, makes oil the principal source of energy among other energy sources. And yet, how long will oil continue to control the world and especially the Arab world? At present, confirmed oil reserves are about 650 billion barrels. Compared with the current rate of growth in consumption, which amounts to 22 billion barrels per year, oil will be depleted in the next 30 years. This means that the age of oil will come to an end.

The Western World and the Energy Crisis

The world energy crisis may thus destroy the industrial strength and the economic prosperity of the western countries. Although the technological capacity of the more advanced countries did face obstacles that impeded the development of alternatives to oil, the industrial countries may lack the means to continue to find a way out of extinction and [to avoid] destroying what is making them at present, during the period of transition to non-oil sources of energy, depend completely on Middle East oil. At current rates of production this oil may continue to flow for about the next 50 years. In other words, the industrial countries are trying to turn the Middle East into a mere bridge over which they can cross over to alternative sources of energy. By the time Middle East oil is depleted, the industrial countries would have developed alternative sources of energy, and the Middle East would have nothing to depend on for income unless these countries were to adopt a collective development policy other than the policy they have now. That is, they are to produce sources of income other than oil to make up for the oil in case it is depleted. This cannot be done on a state level because the distribution of resources in the Arab world is not equal. These countries, however, can complement each other in case they integrate [their plans] and adopt a collective development policy. Thus, the political implication of oil, which has existed for a long time and has been closely tied to the history of colonialism is now at the forefront. This has made the Arab countries suffer from various kinds of occupation, wars and examples of extortion and theft because of the oil. This area has been exploited for a long period of time, and its oil resources have been taken at nominal prices. Competing for Arab oil and safeguarding the roads that lead to the oil are still the basic reasons for the cold and the real war between the superpowers. Meanwhile, the Soviets, China and Eastern Europe are considered fortunate because the oil they produce satisfies their needs. The United States, which consumes more than 25 percent of the world's total energy and whose reserves have declined to the level of the United Arab Emirates' reserves, cannot at present meet more than 55 percent of its needs from local production. However, 88 percent of the oil western Europe relies on is imported. Japan relies completely on imported oil. Western Europe imports about 84 percent of its oil from OPEC countries and 67 percent from the Arab world. Despite this major importance of oil and of these world import rates, the oil imports of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Countries (the industrial countries) compared to the national income of these countries came to 3.1 percent only in

1978. Furthermore, 85 percent of the oil revenues are funneled back into the industrial countries in the form of investments and bank deposits that represent nothing more than ledger entries or import purchase orders in the banks of New York, London and Zurich.

8592
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USE OF FORCE TO SETTLE DISPUTES REJECTED

Abu Dhabi AL-WAHDAH in Arabic Nov 12, 80 p 3

[Report on Interview with 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali: "There Are No Disputes Between the Two Parts of Yemen; We Oppose Use of Weapons To Reach Agreement;" date and place not given]

[Text] AL-WAHDAH conducted an interview with His Excellency 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali, member of the Central Committee of the Socialist party in Democratic Yemen and minister of state for cabinet affairs. The interview dealt with a number of hot questions.

Mr 'Abd al-Wali denied the existence of disputes between the leaders of both parts of Yemen. [He said] that the rumors which were being circulated by some agencies of the media about a week-long struggle between the armed forces in the two countries were biased and unfounded. The objective of these rumors was to diminish the gains that have been achieved by the people of Yemen towards restoring unity to both parts of Yemen.

His excellency affirmed that relations between Aden and San'a' were quite good and that communications between President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih were proceeding on course for the purpose of carrying out all the agreements that had been approved. These agreements were reached during the visits that the two presidents exchanged.

He also affirmed that the unity committees were active in carrying out their tasks so they can complete them soon. Some of these committees have actually completed their tasks.

Mr 'Abd al-Wali said that some of the agencies in question in both parts of Yemen have actually begun doing what they have to do to restore the unity of both parts of Yemen, and especially in the economic area. Joint companies have been established in the area of maritime shipping and tourism, and the coordination of the two economic five-year plans for both parts of Yemen is ongoing for the purpose of providing the basic conditions for the economic integration of both parts of Yemen. These are essential preliminaries for firmly establishing the foundation of Yemeni unity.

With regard to the Democratic National Front which represents the opposition in North Yemen, his excellency said that the dialogue with the National Front was proceeding in a normal and a regular fashion. "President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih is monitoring and sponsoring this dialogue to ensure that all the national forces in North Yemen stand together and unite. These forces are fighting for democracy, for development and for protecting the republic from any foreign interventions whose bitter fruits would only be reaped by the Yemeni people who are yearning for liberation, national sovereignty and complete Yemeni unity."

His excellency affirmed that all that was being said about the alleged clashes that were mentioned recently was no more than conjecture devised by the forces that oppose the hopes and the objectives of the Yemeni people.

The Yemeni minister of state expressed his regret regarding the ongoing war between Iraq and Iran. He said that Democratic Yemen had already declared its official position on the war. "We are opposed to the use of arms to reach agreements. Border problems between two countries cannot be solved by force because there are powers that would take advantage of all this. It is basically these powers that force the outbreak of unjust wars among the peoples of the Gulf area, an area which is considered one of the most important in the world. The evidence for this lies in the fact of U.S. presence in the area and in the fact that the United States is hoping to use numerous slogans to bring the area under its influence. Among these slogans are the protection of interests and the preservation of stability."

The Yemeni minister affirmed that the natural place for Arab capabilities and resources, which are being consumed in the ongoing war between Iran and Iraq, was to put them to work for the liberation of Jerusalem, for the establishment of a Palestinian state and for the restoration of the legal rights of the Palestinian people.

He also affirmed that unless human and other capabilities and energies are invested, "everything that we do will prove futile, and the Arab citizen who yearns for stability and peace will reap the bitter fruits of our actions."

With regard to the facilities that are being made available in the area to the United States and the danger of these facilities to the security of the area in general, the minister said, "The United States is the primary enemy that is threatening the peace, safety and stability of the Gulf area and the Arabian Peninsula. It is the United States which is providing generous support to Zionism and its spearhead, Israel. The United States has found for itself a number of associates and supporters in the Arab rank. They followed al-Sadat in piercing the unity and the alignment of Arab solidarity after joining the front that opposes the hopes and aspirations of the Arab nation.

"Those who found themselves captives of sycophancy and imperialism, such as the two regimes in Somalia and in the Sultanate of Oman, formed the bridges that threatened the oil wells and the Arab nations in this area. Those regimes provided a climate for U.S. intervention and haughtiness. With their policies they strayed away from Arab solidarity and consensus." The Yemeni minister emphasized his country's position against the bases and the facilities that were being granted to the United States of America. He affirmed that his country supported Arab solidarity as well as the use of Arab force to turn back all the conspiracies, to liberate the occupied land and to restore to the people the right that was usurped from them.

With regard to the General Emergency Conference of the Yemeni Socialist Party that was held last October 12 in Aden His Excellency 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Wali said, "The conference crowned the successful actions that were undertaken by the party in the period between the convening of the first and the second conferences. These actions sought to correct the course of the revolution in Democratic Yemen following the economic and social destruction that was practised by the opportunist left led by Salim Rabi' 'Ali who assumed the leadership of the country by himself and disregarded everything that was related in any way to collective leadership.

He said, "His one-man leadership suspended the constitution, disregarded collective leadership and turned its back on all the values and traditions of struggle that were established by the political organization--the National Front. The politics and the parasitic nature of the opportunist left were characterized by the total disruption of the national alliance. The interests of toiling social groups were hurt at a time when Salim Rabi' 'Ali was proclaiming slogans and carrying out a campaign of punishment against nationalist elements and forces. The foreign policy of the opportunist left was characterized by evasion, deception, making promises and commitments and shifting easily from one position to another. The insane policy of the opportunist left has had its effects on the importance of establishing normal relations with our neighbors based on Arab coexistence and solidarity against imperialist and Zionist plots which have targeted the area in general. The emergency conference stood in front of the sum total of the struggle of previous years and adopted well-considered resolutions which will establish an economic foundation under the guidance of the conference regarding the modified 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan. All sectors of the national economy are contributing to that plan as well as Arab funds and fraternal countries--chief among which is the United Arab Emirates for which we harbor much appreciation--Kuwait and the socialist countries. These countries will participate in vital projects such as electricity, roads and educational and health establishments." He said, "The conference emphasized the importance of developing the proper, scientific economic management of production and service facilities; improving project performance, especially in construction projects and in the proper distribution of manpower; and expanding the scope of training and qualifying [people] and delivering social services."

Regarding the Conference of Yemeni Expatriates which will be held in Aden at the end of this month, the Yemeni minister said:

"A steering committee for the conference has been formed: it is chaired by Salim Salih, minister of foreign affairs. The committee has prepared the documents for the conference at which the basic laws will be discussed in the presence of delegates from all parts of the world where Yemeni expatriates live. Among these laws is a special investment law and a citizenship law. The steering committee has completed all the special measures for convening the conference on the 25th of this month. We can say that we are giving Yemeni expatriates increasing attention because they constitute an important sector of our Yemeni nation."

The minister affirmed that the conference will reflect the interest which the Yemeni Socialist Party and the state are bestowing upon the expatriates because they represent an important part of Yemen. "Their participation in [the process of] building up their homeland is essential. We are confident that through the results that will be achieved by the conference, a firm policy towards expatriates will be established and better relations to serve our citizens who are living abroad will be created."

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END

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CLOSING GAP BETWEEN HOPES, POSSIBILITIES ADVOCATED

Kuwait AL-'ARABI in Arabic Nov 80 pp 11-15

[Article by Dr 'Abd al-'Aziz Kamil: "Islamic Action: Between Hopes and Possibilities"]

[Text] I visited the late Mr 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam the first secretary general of the Arab League in 1974.

We met in his home in Hulwan, south of Cairo. We talked about Arab and Islamic action and the need to proceed in such action gradually within an integrated, flexible framework. I remember him saying, "When work began in the Arab League, projects were limited in scope. I was very careful not to overburden the league so that it would succeed in the efforts it undertook and have a taste of success that would encourage it to take more steps and expand the circle of action and cooperation."

Mr 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam went on to say, "There is a big difference between what we hope for and what is possible. We place great hopes on Arab action, but our efforts are limited and our steps short. We must work together and cooperate with each other."

This conversation was a prelude to the dialogue on Islamic action that took place after the Islamic Conference Organization was formed and the decision to establish it was made at the first Islamic Conference that was held in Rabat in December 1969 after the fire in al-Aqsa Mosque.

The hopes that were placed on the organization increased because it was the first practical manifestation of the Islamic nations' will after the fall of the caliphate in 1924. One of the hopes that the late 'Azzam had was to see the organization proceed slowly and not take on more than it could handle so it can savor the taste of success and continue on its course.

Between Hopes and Possibilities

Hopes multiply in our minds as we hail the arrival of the 15th century of the Hegira calendar. Hopes have wings with which they hover in the horizons of the future, but actions that are possible tie us down. Steps can be taken on the firm ground of the present to realize possible actions and to proceed therefrom towards the future. There is a big difference between the flutter of wings and the step of a

foot. We have to confront this gap in Islamic action between what we hope for and what is possible, and we must bridge that gap so that we can turn our hopes into possibilities from which we can move forward to new hopes.

Let us first understand that there is no contradiction between hopes and possibilities. Possibilities pave the way to hopes, and the present is the gateway to the future.

The road to Islamic action is impeded most significantly by the fact that we turn away from our agreements, that we violate them, that we refrain from shouldering the responsibilities of those agreements or that we become preoccupied with marginal or local objectives. Genuine leadership action requires the application of what God Almighty said in the Koran: "And when they grew steadfast and firmly believed in Our revelations, We appointed leaders from among them who gave guidance at our bidding" [The Adoration]. Leadership is achieved with patience, with certitude, with clear intellectual vision, with heartfelt faith and with steadiness on the course.

In order for us to see the scope of action clearly, we have to tour its principal positions, and we have to acquaint ourselves with its features. A general overview here is more important than a painstaking view of details which would be required for executive action.

Once again let me say what I said about the relationship between possibilities and hopes: there is no contradiction between a partial view and a general view. The whole is a sum of the parts, and a general view helps us place the parts in their proper places. The two views complement and affect each other. This comprehensiveness has its historical depth, its range in space and its objective implications.

Historical Depth

We do not want to go back beyond the early 14th century Hegira; 100 years suffice. The Islamic world was divided among the major countries of the world at the time, or it was on its way to being divided and subjected to the control of colonialism. The scientific and technological gap between the advanced world and the traditional world was vast. The Industrial Revolution pervaded Europe and the United States. The wealth of the world was transported by ships across the oceans to the capitals of colonialism. Even people were carried by ships across the Atlantic Ocean to fuel the agricultural and the industrial effort in the New World, which was swept by a white human tempest that destroyed the Red Indian and his home and wrecked his civilization. Nothing was left of his glory and his history but human ruins and petrified relics [which may now be found] in the museum of modern American civilization: mere examples of something that was.

Some civilizations in the Far East were able to put up a greater resistance, and despite bloody wars, destruction and the drain of resources, Islam was able to survive.

The Koran continued to be the loadstone in Islamic life and the center around which that life turned. It was the religion, the language and the bond between all Moslems. Prayer continued to be a daily encounter uniting the bodies and the

spirits of Moslems. Alms-giving continued to be an economic and a social bond among Moslems. Fasting continued to be a seasonal rite of worship, remembrance and affection. Pilgrimage continued to be a convocation of all Moslems even though some countries prevented Moslems from going on the pilgrimage.

Sometimes the harassment of Islam and Moslems reached the point of full extermination or extreme oppression. Moslems were sometimes tempted by the glitter of the West where good is mixed with evil, scientific progress with waves of corruption, and technology with a detachment from one's roots.

Moslems were divided among civilizations and cultures; they spoke in numerous languages and dialects; and sectarian local interests and prejudices emerged. Some voices continued to proclaim the truth. They wrote; they spoke; and they advocated setting a good example in the spoken and the written word.

Regarding Population and Objectivity

With regard to the population, waves of external or hidden colonialism swept most of the Islamic world [like a flood], leaving no more than a few limited parts immune from the waves of water. These became islands of freedom in the cradle of Islam [the Arabian Peninsula] and in Afghanistan. The colors of the colonialist countries spread over the map of the Islamic world with Britain, France and the Netherlands having the largest share.

In this regard, colonialism tried to obliterate the Islamic identity. The most violent battles were directed against the Holy Koran, the Arabic language and the Arabic letter. The battle of the Arabic letter itself had to be studied, observed and met with a counter plan. The removal or insertion of a letter was either a cultural rupture or bond, and it was an intellectual orientation.

Weakening the relationship between the Koran, the Arabic language and Islamic civilization will in turn lead to cultural decline. The emergence of narrow tendencies is just like the emergence of water: if it flows in abundance, it covers up small holes and crannies, and the surface of the water appears level.

If the flow of water diminishes, a flowing river turns into a brackish swamp, and the running water turns into scattered small pockets and puddles that stay as they are until a flood occurs, connects them together and generates fertility and growth on the banks.

Predestination and Human Effort

The decades of the 14th century Hegira went by, and the Islamic world underwent great changes. I am saying changes and not development.

The Islamic world occupies a bloc in the middle between the continents of the old world. Let us say it is a central continent whose outermost parts stretch between the Atlantic Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Its front line ports are in the heart of Africa, in Southeast Asia and now they are in Europe. New ports emerged in the New World with the advent of the age of aviation and the ease of transportation. The Islamic world used to be a continuous body, but it now has a satellite system:

satellites and stars rotating around the sun. The light of God is radiating from the cradle of Islam: the stars are the capitals of the Islamic world, and the satellites are new Islamic delegations in Europe, in the New World and in Australia.

Oil gushed out from the land of Islam. It is new wealth coming from the bowels of the earth; it is a new test for humanity.

Moslems, you have a centrally located position. Here is the energy. Here is the wealth. In your countries there is land which is suitable for agriculture; there is land for pasture; and there is land covered with forests. You have a variety of minerals; you have fertilizers; you have manpower. You have to forge all this into a new life.

Your political independence lies in your hands. Your economic destinies lie in your hands, but you must "know" that the journey to knowledge [requires] effort. With money one can buy whatever one wants except intelligence and a creative intellect. This is the region of creativity. Before that it was the region of creation. Between being the region of creation and becoming that of creativity it is now the region of cultural challenge.

I am almost saying that in the post-prophecy age God has not gathered for Moslems more causes of material power than those He has gathered together for them now.

The dawn of this 15th century of the Hegira calendar is the date of the great challenge to the Islamic will. All Moslems are preparing for it.

This [notion of] having "oil for the time being," of plentiful production with a short life for the oil is unlike agriculture where production is limited but long-lived. The fate of oil in the ground is known; but the rainfall is pre-ordained by God, and it is one of God's cosmic ways, [inevitable] like the night and the day.

The permanent forces of being in the Islamic world are coming face to face with energy and money at this historical stage. The permanent will come face to face with the ephemeral. The challenge lies in the area of planning and knowledge at a historical turning point where the Islamic forces converge and the strength to survive [meets] a peak in concentration.

But who will do this?

The young people. Let us look into some of their affairs.

Those Young People

The last third of the 14th century Hegira saw many of the movements of Islamic youth. The problem of young people in Islam is almost confined to deviation from Islam, distorting Islam or being strongly driven towards it.

Without going into the details of young people's activities, which occasionally ended in what we can call "periodic collective suicide," I will state that we need a new formula or new formulas for the activities of young Moslems.

In general, the Middle East area is characterized by its violent struggles, compared to some of the countries of Southeast Asia which has the largest Islamic bloc.

I was visiting these countries recently in September 1980, and I saw in them examples of Islamic action whose experiences we need to share. In their temperament some of these countries reminded me of the gentleness of the people of al-Madinah al-Munawwarah. There, religion is morals, dealings, a social structure, cooperation with the ruler in doing good, the dissemination of Islam by good example, the improvement of the scientific and technological standard of Moslems and the affectionate coexistence of religions.

It is human nature that there be some struggles, but the dominant characteristic is constructive action and participation in constructive activities.

Let us look into the movements of young people. Let us examine how they appeared and how there was mutual caution and hostility followed by conflict between them and the agencies of government. Let us then examine how most--if not all of them--ended up [broken] as sharp pieces and fragments that soon regrouped and started all over again to encounter the same destiny.

We do actually need new formulas [for action]. These will come about as a result of studying previous formulas and [initiating] an open dialogue between the ruling agencies and young people. Religious and cultural organizations would participate in this dialogue, and the energies of young people would be turned towards positive constructive efforts on good courses with which they would be pleased. They would sense the results of their actions; they would achieve self-actualization; and they would stay away from the tension and the rejection which advocates hostility and conflict at a distance.

There is no doubt that reviewing the educational formation in the schools, colleges and universities and coordinating the relationship between the home, the school, the mosque and the media will help direct [efforts] towards constructive action, a positive attitude and an ability to stay in step with the progress of life.

Islamic Immunity

Let me go back to the comprehensive development plan in the Islamic world.

Let me begin in a humble fashion.

Let us first agree to keep these projects away from disputes and political struggles when we make them.

Let us say that the questions of preparing young people for the future and for questions of development have an "Islamic immunity" that is unhampered by political struggle. It is sufficient at first to prepare young people and development projects as fortified areas whose sphere we would try to expand later.

This development is to turn Moslem funds towards the land of Islam. It would be strange to find foreign investments in the land of Islam and Islamic investments in foreign capitals. It would be strange to find that Islamic investments in foreign capitals exceed Islamic investments in the land of Islam.

I do not want to blame colonialism or the dearth of trust that exists between Moslems; nor do I want to blame the fact that projects have been subject to political movements. With a new beginning, there must be a new [way of] thinking. I believe that the notion of Islamic immunity for projects that are agreed to on a bilateral, regional or general Islamic level may solve many problems for us. It may help us achieve more progress to move on to further projects.

Efforts are being made now to join the advanced Islamic centers in the western world with the body of the Islamic world. But this matter must be organized by a general plan that would bring together all the parts of the partial plan that is in effect now. I had an opportunity to look into some of these plans which [first and] basically seek to coordinate the relationship between specialists in new countries and, second, to establish more cooperation between them and the seat of Islam.

If development plans can broaden the areas of cooperation between the seat of Islam and the advanced centers through the international Islamic organizations; if the circulatory and life-giving system can be strengthened between the Islamic capitals, where the original centers of culture are located, and the new Islamic ports, where scientific progress can be found; if this were possible; and if we were patient in supporting it, we would actually be able to give the new century a distinctive, scientific and cultural nature that would differ from that of the 14th century.

The Economy of Effort

This cooperation requires that we set up an Islamic data bank, an international, Islamic documentation center to organize information about us for the scientists and the research they are carrying out and for the exchange of information between researchers and across the fields of research. This in turn would reduce the time [required for research]. No effort would be lost to redundancy or proceed on conflicting lines. Branches of this bank may be established in the capitals of Islam, and they may be tied with an organized communications network. Let us try to bring such a bank into the circle of Islamic immunity. The researchers are building the future. Let us give them their right to work and to establish themselves so they can give us the production that is our right.

It goes without saying that these suggestions do not conflict with the broader steps that Arabs and Moslems are taking to regain [the usurped] land and the sacrosanct objects and to cooperate with each other in scientific or military fields.

Let me return to the starting point.

Let me go back to the hopes and the possibilities.

Let the hopes be big hopes. Let the steps on the road be possible and steadfast. Life goes on. Let us give the hopes their due to reach maturity on the road of possibility. Let us consider at length what God Almighty said: "The sun is not allowed to overtake the moon, nor does the night outpace the day. Each in its own orbit runs" [Yasin: 40].

These are general lines each of which needs some detailed explanation. Let the first planning attempts be those of an agency like the Islamic Conference Organization. It would compile the proposals and the research articles that are being published now to meet the new Hegira century. Let the Islamic Conference Organization try to formulate from these proposals and research articles a comprehensive plan and then determine the stages and the priorities for progress. Newspapers, magazines, and scientific organizations that contribute to this subject may help the Islamic Conference by sending copies of the studies they published in preparation for the translation of these proposals into a comprehensive plan and into partial plans as well as stages and programs of action.

We ask God to make us steadfast in our purpose and resolute in our pursuit of sensible conduct.

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CHALLENGES FACING ARABS, MOSLEMS LISTED, ANALYZED

Kuwait AL-'ARABI in Arabic Nov 80 pp 26-30

[Article by Dr Shakir Mustafa: "We Are in a State of Siege, Not Facing Challenges"]

[Excerpts] Not long ago a musical was playing in New York and in London. Its success and popularity were such that it played for years. The title of the play reveals what it is about: "Stop the World! I Want To Get Off!"

The hero of the play is weary of the world. He is fed up, hopeless and worn out by the challenges of the age, and he wants to leave the ship on whose board he was placed in spite of himself.

> "If given the choice, he would readily abandon her;
> "Was he not led to her against his will?"

Can the passengers on this globe, floating amidst the infinity of the stars, make such a statement? Can they stop the terrestial vehicle and get off? Can they submit their resignation and escape? One thousand years ago, [the Arab poet] al-Ma'arri said:

> "And would man escape from the dominion of his lord
> "And flee from His earth and His skies?"

If the world cannot be stopped and if no one can get off and escape, then everyone on this globe, whether he wants to or not, is facing the challenges of life and of the age. Everyone [on the globe] is playing a part in the great game of humanity--the tragic game that is crushing this age.

Never in any one of the ages of history has the struggle between the powers of the world with its challenges and its magnitude been more vicious in its brutality, more potent in its devices or broader in its scope than it is today. This is the age of terror for individuals and nations alike. It is the age in which the weakest is crushed to the bone. In the final analysis all of life may be a battle between the strongest and the weakest. The history of human societies in its entirety may be no more than the story of challenges and counter challenges—no more than a tooth and nail story. Even those who summarized the story of humanity in a few words did so in those terms. Darwin wrote of "the struggle for survival"; Marx wrote about "the class struggle"; and Toynbee [developed] the theory of "challenges." But this age in particular is different; I can almost say that it is a tragic age.

The difference between it and previous ages lies not in the quality of the process of struggle and not in the eternal process of challenge, but rather in the fearful degree to which this challenge has been pushed, in the satanic powers and devices that are being used in that challenge and in the extent with which the challenge has spread into space.

Am I falling into [a state of] gloomy pessimism?

I have always hated darkness and gloom. I have never allowed the darkness of night to overwhelm or have the better of me. This gloomy family of despair, pessimism, nightmares and nihilism with its recently hatched chicks and their nesting places, stays forever outside my frame of reference. Faced with the question of challenges, however, I was not able to flee from this devilish family. I was not able to prevent it from ambling in my view or hovering around me.

Will I be forgiven if I make, here and there, scathing statements? Will some intellectual leader imbued with a Mohammedan spirit light a fire and turn on the light?

Our Backs to the Wall

I do not just see us in a state of challenge. Challenge lets one have weapons with which one can maneuver and space in which one can take action. We are in a state of siege. Not only has the glove been thrown in our faces, but we are also fighting with our backs to the wall. The cosmic powers that are standing on the other side are not only challenging us, but they are also setting up fires and bases on the borders. They are mining the gates, setting up catapults and entering into the mountains like demons in fairy tales. Against our wishes they are forcing us to make a crucial choice [by making us] ponder Shakespeare's fatalistic question: "To be or not to be, that is the question."

Indeed I know that the reader, seated comfortably in his chair will describe me as a manic depressive or will accuse me of hallucinating. If he is merciful, he will accuse me of extreme exaggeration. But is there no room for warning in the course of celebrating the arrival of the new century? Should a scout lie to his people and leave them in their dazed stupor while [approaching] Tatarian boats eclipse the dawn?

Let us first look into the factors of the situation and define our terms and our boundaries. First of all, the Islam that we are referring to in the challenge is not the Islamic religion. It is this enormous cultural institution which one-fifth of the world's population professes that is presenting the challenge. It is challenging its own people as well as others. As a doctrine and a way of life Islamic ideology has established for itself a permanent corner which is one of the most prominent in humanity's religious thought. It has affirmed itself historically, and is one of its most important positive attributes.

Second, the Islam that we are referring to is not the cultural, social and spiritual heritage of the Islamic countries. Fourteen centuries of continuous cultural effort (with their ups and downs) established the roots of this heritage, solidified its rich body and made it a principal part of the greater heritage of humanity.

It is the Moslems [themselves] who are the subject of the challenge: it is the Moslem human community in whose midst, at whose forefront and in whose most prominent center the Arab nation is located. In this sense Islam has three interrelated cultural centers: the Arab center, the African center and the Asian or Indochinese center. All these centers are located in what has been called the Third World. It is the world of the orphans of the age—a world characterized by [the following]:

A. Densely populated ethnic communities, leading a uniquely structured life. These communities have ancient structures, relations and classes. Their traditions are ancient, and their populations are multiplying exponentially.

B. Conventional productivity with limited returns. Their material and human energies are dissipated, and they have a poor standard of living among whose features are depression and poverty.

C. They have conventional cultural structures whose slow pace is hardly able to help them develop, open horizons for revolutionizing socio-economic relations or contribute to the powers of the age and its alarming ideas. Let us [then] move into the 15th century.

Our Eyes on the Ground

The new century has actually emerged, and its new moon is shining in the sky. But I doubt that very many Moslems gazed at the sky and realized that along with this new moon a new century had dawned on Islam. If Moslems had looked up, I doubt once again that they would have thought about the meaning of the dawn of this new century in the context of the age, and I doubt that they would have run after the magnitude of its challenges. Hundreds of millions of the Moslem masses--and the Arab masses are in the same boat--are preoccupied with trivia. Their outlook is lowly. No one looks at the sky or at the horizon. "Your hearts are taken up with worldly gain from the cradle to the grave. But you shall know. You shall before long come to know. Indeed, if you knew the truth with certainty, you would see the fire of Hell: you would see it with your very eyes. Then, on that day, you shall be questioned about your joys" [Worldly Gain].

I cite this warning from the Koran to give not only spiritual advice, but also material advice on life. Many people are distracted from, unconcerned with or indifferent to the future and destiny, living absentmindedly outside time. To many, this occasion is presented as a religious, ceremonial occasion. The Hegira [emigration] attribution which is bestowed upon on the century, clothes it in religious garb and ascribes to it a transcendental and religious nature. This entails echoes of prayers, images of minarets, rounds of recitations from the Koran and the aggrandizement of the pilgrimage. It were as though the Hegira calendar were running a lonely course in time, as though the coming century would proceed on the same pace and with the same tempo as the previous centuries had; or as though it were another page, like its predecessors, to be added to the eternally recurring annuals.

If we were to do away with this split in the image and if we were to remind ourselves that we are in the last two decades of the 20th century and that most of the 15th century [Hegira] will be in the 21st century, those challenges will reveal themselves as though they were a procession of demons.

The First Challenges

The first one of these challenges is that of the growing tyranny of eastern civilization. This "white evil," as some of its own people call it, is sweeping all boundaries like Noah's flood. Both the socialist East and the imperialist, capitalist West are joining together in pushing this tyranny to its utmost. Never in the entire history of humanity has there been a civilization with such satanic powers and with such universal tyranny. This is not a traditional cultural imperialism that we are facing, but rather a cosmic cultural dragon that moves about with giant-like steps, trampling under its feet the little creatures and the reedy borders that are set up by other cultural groups.

This civilization which was founded four centuries ago by plundering and enslaving the three continents is still plundering and enslaving others and is practicing more tyranny than tyranny itself. If the gold discovered in the United States and the wealth of Asia and Africa, which were colonized for 300 years, made the United States what it is today, it is the cultural surplus accumulated in the West that is imposing backwardness, slavery and abject subjugation on others. Among the expressions that recur at meetings between the North and the South or between the advanced countries and the developing countries is that "the rich are getting richer and the poor are getting poorer."

[It is also said] that one of two alternatives loom in the horizon before the year 2000: an explosion or a famine.

The source of this civilization's might lies in the fact that it entered the second post-industrial revolution during the sixties—the age of a revolutionary technology in production power. In the seventies, with the lunar landing, it entered the second age of discoveries: the age of cosmic man and satellite civilization. In [all] this we have been spectators and not participants; [we watched] in a daze, lacking the positive [attitude] that would keep us in touch with the age. This civilization is putting advanced technology, applied cybernetics and computers to work, and it is using brainwashing techniques more frequently and with increasing complexity so it can penetrate the macrocosm and the microcosm and impose its logic, its interests, its beliefs and its intellectual and material invasion. Willingly or unwillingly, we endure, as a result of all this, subjugation, bloodshed, ideological defeat and blatant aggression—blatant to the point of being contemptuously degrading.

The 21st century will be qualitatively different from the entire past and also from the present which we are experiencing. Revolutionary methods initiated in industry in the fields of information and communication, and the use of cybernetics in management, business and in advanced electronic computers, are destroying all the primary cultural bases in favor of a new cultural structure. This will not only lead to a cybernetic-electronic-space age, but it will also lead to the age of one civilization that will ravage all others. Will western civilization destroy us? Yes indeed it will. The only place we will have in it is that which slaves had in ancient civilizations.

Woe to the Inert

The second one of these challenges is that of the rhythm of the age with its alarmingly swift revolution and its profusion of knowledge, production and consumption. Today, the world is experiencing a revolution that is like an earthquake; it is shaking the very foundation of life, thought, communications and change. It is a revolution in relations between thought, time and production and between time and change; it is a revolution in time. Woe to the inert!

If we want figures, the amount of knowledge which man has discovered in the last 15 years has been computed to be twice that of what he has known and discovered since the birth of civilization until that time. The alarming acceleration is growing. In the advanced countries, it is the scientists who will become the proletaria of the future in a matter of two or three decades.

Citing figures again, man spent 5,000 years after his creation before he discovered writing. It was only 500 years ago that the printing press was discovered. Man then began printing about 1,000 books a year. In 1960 the rate was 700 books a day. In 1965 that rate rose to 1,000 books a day. Today, the daily rate is 2,100 books.

By the year 2000 electronic [devices] will have replaced paper. This is not science fiction; it is the future reality. Books will be programmed into computers, and a reader will be able to peruse them in his home from the data banks which [he contacts] by means of telecommunications devices.

Citing figures again and again, the fastest means of transportation before Christ was the bicycle, which traveled at 35 kilometers an hour. Around 1890 the steam engine achieved the speed of 120 kilometers an hour. In the sixties of this century man traveled in rockets and reached the speed of 6,000 or 7,000 kilometers per hour. Then man revolved around the earth in space ships at 30,000 kilometers an hour. In 1968 man traveled to the moon at a speed of 142,000 kilometers an hour. This means that he traveled all around the earth and more in 1 hour! Today man can travel to the stars at many times more that speed. Where will he go [after that]?

What about production? Production in the West from the dawn of the century until World War II increased at an annual rate of 5 percent. From World War II to 1965 it increased at a rate of 7 percent. In the next 10 years it increased at a rate of 18 percent. This means that a child who was born in 1910 found himself in 1975 surrounded by a society that was producing 40 times what it was producing on the day of his birth.

What about consumption? Let us assume that the energy generated from burning 33 million tons of coal is [equal to] K. Man consumed only half a K from the birth of Christ till about 130 years ago. Today, man is consuming energy at a rate of 1 K every 10 years, and more is yet to come!

The world is floating on a ship piloted by 1,001 devils. Our ancestors used to say that time was like a sword; if you don't cut it, it will cut you. This piercing statement has never been more meaningful as it is today. The world is no longer a

two-dimensional flat surface now that its spherical nature has been discovered. The world has become three-dimensional. Ever since relativity [became known] and ever since the introduction of the computer, the world has entered the age of the fourth dimension: the time dimension. Does not time present a broad challenge?

The World That Woke Up

The third challenge is that of the tempestuous awakening that is taking place everywhere in the world. The world no longer belongs to the West alone as it did in the past. Nor does it belong to us alone as it did centuries ago. The world now belongs to the growing hordes of humanity whose voices are being heard from every corner of the world asking for their place in the sun. The United Nations, which after World War II had no more than 45 members, now has 151 members who are affiliated with no less than 9 or 12 cultural centers. Numerous religions have joined the international forum. Conflicting ideologies stepped into the arena [along with] strange aesthetics [and] brainwashing. The bustling crowd proposed negro cultural programs along with Chinese programs and Indian programs along with Latin American programs. The bets will be placed on those who will keep their heads above the western flood and on those who will be delivered from drowning and from being trampled under the feet of those who will be rushing towards the future. These young international forces which have been storing much energy, resentment, heritage and aspirations are in turn approaching the procession and leaving their negative as well as their positive marks on the lines [of battle].

The fourth challenge is the greatest one: it is the internal challenge. If the other challenges are challenges of "the other," this self-acting challenge is more difficult and more severe. These traditional intellectual socio-economic structures, which have so far been protecting us and giving us a sense of negative security, have begun to crumble and to disintegrate under the blows of the age. All the structures are being shaken: the natural, the supernatural and the cultural structures are all being shaken.

> "He was so shaken and disturbed,
> "It seemed as though the earth shook under his feet."

The given factors of the age leave nothing but sand under our feet. Even the "shells" into which the "dignified" withdraw no longer provide a shield for resistance. They too crumble into bits and pieces. Just as isolation is no longer possible, capitulation is no longer acceptable. The [trappings of the] age penetrate one's home and kidnap one's children. They pull the comfortable rug from under one's feet and from under the feet of one's neighbor. The age is giving the following generations assumptions and ideas other than ours. Just as the West and the East rob us of our monies, our wealth, our lands and our minds, this age is taking our cultural shield away; it is either trying to take it away or it is trying to empty its content.

The greatest challenge is that of the need to reconcile with the age from our cultural peculiarities. It is that of sensing the accelerating rhythm of time and introducing it into the system of values and the method of production. It is that of mandatory coordination with the movement of humanity and of a spontaneous radical revolution from within.

If the sense of inevitable change, revolution or development is something about which everyone is in agreement--see the books, the propaganda, the conferences and the pleas of reformers and revolutionaries in this regard--and if this sense is an indication of health and vigilance, its shortcoming lies in the fact that it does not take time into account. Time is not on our side. It is fleeting at a frantic pace. The triple speed which is required of us--the speed of catching up, the speed of the age itself and the speed of the race--is still beyond our sensory perception.

Dont's speak to me about the Islamic Revolution for which the bells are tolling today. It still lies within the realm of reactions, and it is still political in nature. The military class that is leading it is an institution whose structure is western to the core. The most that it can do is decline into sectarianism or into a reactionary axis. Fear of the Islamic Revolution which has been spread all over the world by the western and the eastern media was merely an attempt on the part of the East and the West to reassure [themselves] that the Islamic Revolution will not become a radical, cultural and socio-economic revolution. The Islamic Revolution will not become a revolution that is congruent with the age; it is the revolution of a civilization that is opening up another path for humanity.

If one were sympathetic with the embattled position we, the Arabs, hold, one would find that we are the only tragic nation in the 20th century. There is not a nation on earth in this age that is suffering as much as we are from the fierce struggle of the powers and the magnitude of the challenges.

What is the reason for this? The reason is that the curse of the Third World is for us a threefold curse. We are exploited because we belong to this orphan world. We are also attacked because we are Moslems whose historic positivism poses many dangers to the West. Finally, we are subjected to a fatal siege because we are Arabs who occupy a critical international strategic location, posses energy resources, substantial funds and growing human experience. All these are dangerous "sins" that may not be forgiven.

In the next century it is our destiny that will be the subject of bets because bets are being placed now for the next age: the second age of slavery. We will have one of two roads:

We can either get out of the siege or die under the [Tatarian] boats. No one can escape, and no one can say, "Stop the world; I want to get off!"

Didn't I say that we were in a state of siege?

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WAYS OF INCREASING EGYPT'S AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION DISCUSSED

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-ITQISADI in Arabic 18, 25 Aug 80

[Series of articles by Mahmud Murad: "Egypt's Food Supply in the Future"]

[18 Aug 80, pp 16-20]

[Text] The World Will Be Facing a Great Famine After the Year 2000

In order to provide food for ourselves till the year 2000, we will need 10 billion Egyptian pounds plus 70 billion cubic meters of water plus 5 million feddans of land.

Why was Egypt not complaining 30 years ago? Now Egypt is importing millions of tons of basic commodities.

Is it reasonable for us to import more than 80 percent of the wheat and 90 percent of the lentils that we consume?

Who is not concerned with the subject of Egypt's food supply in the future? Who does not deal with it in his conversations and comments every day, whether with members of his family or with other people--and talks to himself about it if there is no one else to talk to about it?

How many people among us do not have problems concerning food? Think how many of us there are who make jokes about the prices of vegetables, fruit, and a kilogram of meat. Look at all those among us who wish to go back to the good old days, even if it is back to a time which is just a few years ago. We are also hoping that the future will be better, and that it will provide us and our future generations with an abundance of food which will be both of good quality and reasonably priced!

This is an issue which preoccupies everyone because it is part of the essence of life. In fact it is life itself. Although some people are content to merely talk about the problem, there are others who have given free rein to their tongues and to their minds. They are moving and thinking in every direction in an attempt to arrive at a solution to this problem!

The question is, is it actually possible to arrive at a solution? This question is especially apropos because the whole world, as we are told by Dr Sayyid Jaballah, the former minister of planning, will be stricken with a great famine which is lying in wait to ambush us sometime after the year 2000!

In order to figure what our future food supply will be, it is necessary to introduce additional figures into our calculations. For example, we have to calculate the water from the Nile, and how it will be utilized. In other words, we have to calculate what is called the water distribution balance. Also we have to calculate the nature and fertility of Egypt's land, the crops that we will be planting, and how to develop these crops so that they become of better quality and more abundant.

Egypt's population grows by about 1 million persons each year, that is, we have an additional 1 million stomachs that want to eat food 3 times a day or more. So we have to figure the volume of consumption of food of all types that Egyptians will be eating every day and every year, regardless of who has enough to eat and who does not have enough to eat! The important thing is that Egyptian stomachs devour a quantity of food which must be taken into account when we are figuring how much to produce and how to do it.

This type of calculation is difficult, but it is at the fingertips of scientists who are able to solve such riddles with ease. It is true that these scientists are of different opinions, but this difference in opinions is a blessing because it is a clash of opinions which can give birth to a spark of light which can illuminate the facts for us.

One of these facts is that agriculture in Egypt until the latter 40's was a traditional type of agriculture which was carried on by primitive means and depended on physical effort expended by men and animals. The land ownership situation was as follows: The overwhelming majority of Egyptians--94.5 percent--owned less than 5 feddans of land, and altogether they owned about 35 percent of Egypt's total agricultural land area. On the other hand, 5.5 percent of the landowners owned about 65 percent of all of the land, and among this group a mere 0.1 percent of the landowners owned 20 percent of all of the land. This is what the situation was before the 23 July 1952 Revolution. (See Table 1) As a result of this, the relationship between the landowners and tenant farmers was predominantly one of despotism and arbitrariness. There was no minimum wage for agricultural laborers. The prevailing system was one of detailing laborers to jobs, and this system threatened to take away their means of livelihood unless they worked for just a few piasters.

But regardless of the social and class situation which was created by this type of economic structure and system of ownership, the question remains--did agriculture then meet the food supply demands of the people?

This question has been answered by the Egyptian scientist Dr Mustafa al-Jabali, formerly the minister of agriculture and the recipient of this year's award from the state in appreciation for his services in the field of science: "In spite of all of these bad conditions, Egyptians at that time did not feel that there was any danger threatening them as far as their food supply was concerned, nor

Table 1. Distribution of Ownership of Agricultural Lands Before the 1952 Revolution

Amount of land owned	Property owners (1,000's of persons)	Percentage	Total area (1,000's of feddans)	Percentage
Less than 5 feddans	2,642	94.3	2,122	35.4
5-10 feddans	79	2.8	526	8.8
10-20 feddans	47	1.7	638	10.7
20-50 feddans	22	0.8	654	10.9
50-100 feddans	6	0.2	430	7.2
100-200 feddans	3	0.1	437	7.3
More than 500 feddans	2	0.1	1,177	19.7
Totals	2,801	100.0	5,984	100.0

did they clearly feel that there was a shortage in basic food commodities. Perhaps this is due to the fact that the amount of agricultural land which an individual owned then was enough to supply him with his basic needs in terms of food. This is in addition to the crops such as cotton, rice, and onions which were being exported."

I differ with Dr al-Jabali's opinion that the amount of land allotted to each individual was sufficient for him. Or perhaps I should say that his criterion is wrong, that is, one cannot divide the total agricultural production by the number of inhabitants in order to obtain the average share of each individual. This is because the social conditions which created class divisions, as is indicated by the data showing distribution of ownership, were the dominant factor in the distribution of food production and, whatever criterion is used, they caused the distribution to be unjust. One must also remember that the illiteracy rate, as well as the level and type of jobs performed by individuals then, were factors which limited their lifestyle, aspirations, and consumption in general. This means, for example, that all individuals were not equal in the quantities of meat that they ate, nor in the number of times that they ate it. In this regard, there was a wide and dreadful disparity between individuals. Even after the revolution the principal meal for most Egyptians consisted of an onion and a bowl of whey. We should also be using this criterion when dealing with dozens of other goods and commodities. If we say that agricultural production was sufficient for peasants living in the countryside and even for the poor people living in the cities, then where was it that they lived, and what was it that they ate and drank? We have to remember that there was a limit which had been set for the desires and aspirations of the common people, and that this limit represented a firm barrier which was overcome only by very few people. And in the eyes of most people, crossing this barrier was considered to be a type of undesirable integration [between classes]. The minority of people who represented the privileged class maintained this system and they exploited the

religious feelings of the common people by giving a biased interpretation to the Koranic verse "We have made some people higher than others in degree."

In any case, I thought it would be good to present this brief glimpse of the past, which gave birth to the present, before discussing our contemporary situation and its problems.

New Changes in Agriculture

During the period from 1952 to 1980, many radical changes occurred which affected Egypt's agricultural, social, and population structure. The most important of these changes was the emergence of the 1962 agricultural reform law, along with its amendments in 1961, 1965, and 1969. In the opinion of Dr al-Jabali, this led to an "improvement in the agricultural land ownership structure," regulated the relationship between landowners and tenant farmers, prohibited the expulsion of peasants from their land for legal reasons, set a minimum wage for agricultural laborers, and regulated credit and marketing within a cooperative structure. In his opinion, this law and others led to the elimination of some forms of exploitation, the great disparity in land ownership, and to the improvement of social relationships in the rural areas.

Dr al-Jabali also is of the opinion that the construction of the High Dam, and its resulting regulation and control of the waters of the Nile, made it possible to establish an ambitious program for the reclamation of an estimated 900,000 feddans of new land. But then the 1967 War came and this prevented the completion of this program, which still had 500,000 feddans to deal with. Also, the High Dam led to the doubling of the area being planted with rice--a crop which needs lots of water. The area under rice cultivation came to total 1.2 million feddans per year, and the degree of intensiveness in the planting of rice rose from about 15 percent to about 19 percent.

However, this period also saw the happening of some things in the field of agriculture--our source of food supply--which could be considered negative, even though they are considered to be "positive" from the point of view of other sectors in the economy. For example, industrial development is a positive factor when it comes to those who are interested in industrialization, development, and modernization of society. But working with machines is different from working with hoes and plows. Industrialization involves new factors which have an impact on people's behavior, cause them to follow a settled way of life, and bring about urbanization. However, agriculturalists say that industrial development has occurred at the expense of agriculture, since agriculture has borne the burden of providing the necessary investment for industrial growth. Furthermore, the migration of people from the rural areas to work in the factories has led to a shortage in the agricultural labor force. In addition to this, urban expansion and the establishment of new cities and housing developments, with all of their utilities, have led to the devouring up of agricultural land. About 60,000 feddans of agricultural land is lost every year! These areas which have been suitable for agriculture and are disappearing represented a barrier and a source of conflict for the new agricultural lands which are being established based on the utilization of water provided by the High Dam. The amount of land which has been lost due to urban expansion totals more than the amount of land which has been

There is another factor which has been prominent during this period, and that is the tremendous increase in population. In 1952 Egypt's population was about 25 million, but by 1980 it had become 42 million. Likewise, prices have increased to such a degree that incomes have not been able to keep pace with them. According to Dr al-Jabali, it was after 1973 that there occurred a widening of the gulf between incomes in Egyptian society. All of this has had a negative impact on the food supply problem. And this has resulted in a widening of the gap between food production and food consumption!

My basis for stating the size of this gap is an official document, prepared by Dr Mahmud Dawud, minister of state for agriculture and food supply, concerning the volume of food production and consumption. He considers this document to be his basis of dealing with the problem of food supply in Egypt.

Table 2. Document From the Office of the Minister of State for Agriculture and Food Supply Concerning the Development in Production, Consumption, Importing, and Exporting of Egypt's Principal Commodities From 1960 to 1979 (in thousands of tons)

		1960	1970	1977	1978	1979
Wheat	Production	1443	1269	1697	1933	1856
	Consumption	2185	2361	5999	7053	6707
	Imports	624	1036	4302	5120	4851
Rice	Production	1056	1736	1477	1528	1630
	Consumption	846	1131	1284	1375	1505
	Imports	-	-	-	-	-
	Exports	207	605	193	153	125
Beans	Production	208	297	270	231	236
	Consumption	230	297	293	263	255
	Imports	22	-	32	32	19
Lentils	Production	48	24	24	16	9
	Consumption	52	50	69	66	69
	Imports	4	26	45	50	60
Edible oils	Production	109	130	91	112	123
	Consumption	104	178	327	355	414
	Imports	-	57	236	243	291
	Exports	5	-	-	-	-
Sugar	Production	338	324	603	629	620
	Consumption	278	230	808	922	971
	Imports	-	-	205	293	351
	Exports	43	89	-	-	-

This document (see Table 2) shows that we produce about one-fourth of the wheat--our basic food commodity--that we consume. This is according to 1979 statistics. The rest of the wheat is imported, and this amounts to 4.851 million tons! Also--and this is something which is really strange--we import 60,000 tons of lentils. This is approximately 7 times what we produce, which is 9,000 tons, and represents more than 90 percent of what we consume [sic]! And as we all know, lentils are one of the foods eaten by the Egyptian masses!

Let us now put aside this document, which really needs to be read two or three times, and ask the following:

What then is the solution?

First of all, 10 billion Egyptian pounds must be set aside for land reclamation. It is true that Egypt's land is fruitful and fertile. But it has become exhausted because it has been used for so long and has produced so much. This is why it constantly needs to be fertilized, particularly after the construction of the High Dam which blocks the silt, keeping it as far away as the Sudanese border. This makes it twice as necessary for our land to be treated with good varieties of fertilizer. Since this is true, and if we add to this the fact that we are losing land due to urban expansion, as has been pointed out, then what we need to do is to have new land to reclaim and to cultivate.

What is the total area of land that we need, and on what basis do we estimate this total?

Dr al-Jabali says that what we need depends on what our population is. If we assume that the annual rate of population increase is about 1.25 million persons, then this means that by the year 2000 Egypt's population will total about 67 million. And if we assume that each individual will need half a feddan of new land in order that his basic needs be satisfied, then it will be necessary to reclaim about 600,000 feddans of land every year (in order to meet the needs of the increasing population). We must also bear in mind that every year 60,000 feddans are lost as a result of urban expansion. This means that we have to reclaim 660,000 feddans every year, that is, about 13 million feddans of new land must be made arable by the year 2000. This is a goal which is difficult to achieve and requires enormous amounts of money and huge resources and potential.

Therefore we must modify our calculations and have them conducted on the basis that each additional individual due to the population increase would have only one-seventh of a feddan. In fact, this is the amount of agricultural land per individual that Egypt has right now.

In such a case we would need to reclaim only 180,000 feddans (instead of 600,000), in addition to the 60,000 lost due to urban expansion. This means that we would need to reclaim about 250,000 feddans per year, that is, 5 million feddans by the year 2000. This will cost 10 billion pounds if we figure on the basis that the cost of reclaiming 1 feddan, according to 1980 prices, is about 2,000 pounds. This means that we would need about 500 million pounds per year.

Is it possible to achieve this?

In the past, the most that we have been able to reclaim during a single year has been 150,000 feddans. But it is possible for us to increase this figure and to reclaim 250,000 feddans every year. We can do this if we utilize nontraditional methods, eliminate present-day obstacles, and succeed in attracting investment both from inside Egypt and from abroad. Also, we would have to untie the hands of the private sector so that individuals could benefit from the fruits of their efforts and not be exploited. Above all, we would have to set up a good water distribution balance and system which would utilize the waters of the Nile in a way which would be both better and more just, and without losing a single drop of it!

Billions Are Being Lost From the River

As far as Egypt is concerned, its main water resource is the Nile River. The following was said in a study made by the National Council for Production and Economic Affairs, which is one of our specialized national councils: "Due to the construction of the High Dam, and due to the fact that its large capacity is used as a permanent water reservoir, Egypt has come to the point where it can guarantee itself a fixed annual yield of water which is calculated on the basis of the average water yield of previous years. This average yield is 55.5 billion cubic meters of water per year."

If we add to this principal source of water the other sources of water that are now available, such as ground water which provides us with about half a billion cubic meters, and the constant drainage water which gives us 9 billion cubic meters, then the total water yield per year becomes 65 billion cubic meters. In addition to this, there are also other quantities of water which we expect to have. This includes the water which is lost from the Nile River bed in its upper reaches. Research has shown that the average total of water which is lost in the swamps of southern Sudan is 36 billion cubic meters per year. If we disregard water that is lost through natural causes such as evaporation, leakage, etc, the amount of water that it would be possible to save, if projects are implemented in the area of the Upper Nile, is 18 billion cubic meters per year. If this water were divided equally with Sudan, then Egypt's share of it would be 9 billion cubic meters per year!

There are also projects designed to transform sea water into fresh water which can be used for irrigation. This could provide us with several million cubic meters of water. What all of this means is that the sources of water which are currently available to us are sufficient, especially after the construction of the High Dam. But the question is do we have enough ambitious plans for expansion and land reclamation?

Dr al-Jabali says that if it were possible to have about 11 million feddans of land under cultivation by the year 2000, then this would require about 66 billion cubic meters of water per year. To this you would have to add about 13 billion cubic meters which are needed for purposes other than agriculture, and this would mean that we would need 79 billion cubic meters. Using the previous method of calculation, we would end up with the following: 65 billion cubic

meters (available) + 9 billion cubic meters (expected) = 74 billion cubic meters. This means that the water shortage (compared to the amount needed, which is 79 billion cubic meters) would be 5 billion cubic meters, and this we would have to provide somehow.

But this calculation is at variance with the calculations of Dr al-Jabali--who is a professor whose field is that of water distribution balance and who is the head of a school of land reclamation. He says that Egypt's annual share of 55.5 billion cubic meters of water would go up to 57.5 billion cubic meters after the completion of the Jonglei Canal project in 1984. If we had 11 million feddans of agricultural land by the year 2000, and if we reduced the amount of water rationed from Aswan from about 800 cubic meters of water per feddan per year--which is the present allotment of water--to 600 cubic meters, then we would need about 66 billion cubic meters. Add to this the 13 billion cubic meters for purposes other than agriculture. This means that we would then need 79 billion cubic meters, that is, there would be a shortage (compared to the figure of 57.5 billion) of about 21 billion cubic meters. What can be done about this? He says that if we could recover the water which is lost in the Upper Nile Basin (the swamps previously referred to), the Sobat Basin, the Zeraf River Basin, etc, then this would give us an additional 9 billion cubic meters. This means that the shortage would be 12 billion cubic meters. If we could come up with 6 billion cubic meters of drainage water (and not 9 billion, as the National Council has calculated), then the shortage would go down to 6 billion cubic meters. At this point, he emphasizes, it would be necessary to reduce the amount of water rationed at Aswan to about 5,000 cubic meters per feddan, and this would mean that agriculture would need 55 billion cubic meters instead of 66 billion cubic meters.

But the big question is: Is it possible to reduce the amount of water rationed from 8,000 cubic meters--the amount currently used--to 5,000 cubic meters per feddan? Remember that 20 percent of the water is lost on the way due to evaporation and leakage, and this means that only 4,000 cubic meters would actually reach each feddan. If we double the frequency of our crop planting--that is, if we plant each feddan twice a year--this would mean that each feddan would be irrigated with only 2,000 cubic meters of water for each planting. Scientists believe that this amount of water is not enough for consumption and cleaning purposes. It is the opinion of this great scientist that the rationalization of irrigation is linked to the development of agriculture, and that it is not possible to achieve this within the present framework of fragmentation of land ownership and scattering of our crops! He feels that it is necessary to bring the crop areas together, concentrate on production, and revise the methods of water transportation and distribution so that they are done by methods which guarantee that less water will be lost. This would require a radical change in the viewpoint of those who utilize the water and work with it, because at present they do so on the basis that it is a resource which is freely available and one need not worry about budgeting it or watching how much he uses!

This discussion now brings us to two matters which are highly important. They are "fragmentation of land ownership" and "the manner in which the water is viewed by those who use it!" What is meant by fragmentation of land ownership,

and what is the objection to it? Does this mean that what is desired is a return to the ownership of large plots of land, with all of the feudalism and unequal relationships in the rural areas which this system would threaten to restore? And how can we get the peasants to treat the water on the basis that each drop of it should be used carefully, that it should be used for what is beneficial, and that the water is not something merely to be wasted?

[25 Aug 80, pp 18-21]

[Text] How Can We Overcome the Problem of Fragmentation of Land Ownership and Respect the Waters of the Nile?

There is a difference between solving the problem locally and solving it on a regional basis.

We only produce 8,000 ardebs of seed per year.

There is a "prescription" for increasing crop production and productivity of the land.

A very small "slice of bread," a "piece of ta'miyyah" in the narrowest Egyptian alley, and a "bowl of lentils" in the smallest village in Upper Egypt--all of these things are foodstuffs just as much as the most sumptuous meal in a large palace is. They are closely linked to the food supply problem. In fact, food such as this is really the basis of our food supply, and it constitutes both the object and the focus of concern on the part of Egypt as well as of the whole world which is affected by the food supply problem. Fear of famine has been a threat to the whole world ever since the ancient and famous theory formulated by Malthus. This fear is still alive today after the latest study made by the U.S. Department of Agriculture which says that a great famine is lying in wait to ambush the world sometime after the year 2000. This is because the countries of the world are not producing enough food for their steadily increasing population--a population which by that time will total more than 7 billion! So the problem is not a local problem restricted to Egypt. It is a worldwide problem. But in Egypt we are doubly concerned about it, because it is a life-or-death problem. It is true that we do not live to eat, but it is also very important for us to eat in order to be able to live! In the last issue of AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI we reviewed some of the factors concerning the production and provision of our food supply in Egypt, the most important of which are the land and our water supply. We ended the article by raising the question: How can we overcome the problem of fragmentation of land ownership, and how can we come to respect the water from the Nile River rather than simply grabbing and squandering it as if it were something merely to be wasted?

The truth is that it is indeed necessary to overcome the problem of "fragmentation" and "squandering" in order to even be able to start out on a sound path toward providing for ourselves in terms of a food supply. I repeat that our food supply problem is linked to the "slice of bread" because we import about 5 million tons of wheat every year. It is even linked to the "piece of ta'miyyah" because we import 20,000 tons of the beans used in making ta'miyyah. The problem is also linked to the "bowl of lentils" because we import 60,000 tons per year of this

also. I need not dwell any longer on this (see the article in the last issue of AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI), but I do simply want to point out that this discussion is not something which is a luxury. It is a necessity which demands the concern and expression of opinion on the part of all individuals interested in the future of this country!

Let us turn to the problem of "fragmentation of land ownership." First of all, let us dispense with the solution which promotes the authorization to own large plots of land. This solution, with all that it would entail, would bring feudalism back to Egypt. In connection with this, we are afraid of feudalism not only because of large landowners owning the land. We are also afraid of its other dimensions, the main one being the fact that it involves owning the human beings who work on the land and eliminating their freedom. In other words, it means returning to the society of "the master and the slave!" So let us put this aside as a solution, and let us seek a more ideal solution which is the method of "crop area concentration and combining of agricultural ownership." Let us listen to the opinion of Dr Mustafa al-Jabali, who is an Egyptian agricultural scientist, the head of a land reclamation school, and who is the recipient of this year's award from the state in appreciation for his services in the field of science:

"The predominant system of ownership is characterized by the scattering and fragmentation of property into small plots of land which do not permit the utilization of highly-effective scientific methods of agriculture. Also, the scattering of crop areas represents the predominant pattern of crop distribution on the level of Egypt's agricultural enterprises. This makes it difficult to accomplish the processes of providing agricultural guidance and instruction, and it makes it difficult to control the factors of production and to produce homogeneous commodities for local and foreign markets and for industry. Also, this lack of homogeneity in production, particularly in the case of fruits, vegetables, and some other commodities, has deprived Egypt of an important advantage which it could have when competing with the other countries of the world in the field of international trade. This advantage is that of high-quality large-scale production of goods which are exported!

"There have been numerous attempts to overcome this 'fragmentation.' These attempts have met with limited success in the case of lands which have gone through agricultural reform and which have adhered to the necessity of using a particular type of crop rotation, based on the concentration of a single crop in a given area. Furthermore, the method of crop area concentration has been applied on a nationwide level in Egypt in the case of cotton. But in the case of the other crops, the farmers have been left free to do as they please, and there are no guidelines which control the distribution of these crops. The result has been that crop production has been scattered among Lilliputian agricultural enterprises. The only solution is for us to deal with this matter if we want to modernize Egyptian agriculture so that it can utilize scientific methods and means of large-scale production. This could take place gradually by means of utilizing collectively-used irrigation and drainage ditches as a basis for distribution of intensively-planted crops. But the combined service operations have to take place on the basis of scientific and cooperative methods, and accounting and participation must be on the basis of actual land ownership. If all of this takes

place gradually, then by the year 2000 we will be able to arrive at having a type of organization of our agriculture which will permit the elimination of the defects of the phenomena of fragmentation and scattering of crops which predominate at the present time. By then we could also modernize our agriculture and rationalize the utilization of our available water resources, without our water being something which is free for everyone to plunder!"

Respect For the Waters of the Nile?

How can we respect the water that we get from the Nile, conserve every drop of it, and view it as being something which is valuable, is to be invested in what is beneficial, and should not be squandered?

Our view and our belief is that this can only be accomplished by using two methods simultaneously, each of which complements the other:

The authorities and government agencies concerned must undertake action to carefully rationalize the use of this water. This must be done by means or methods which are successful and which have a direct impact on the individual peasants in their fields. At the same time, the peasants must be aware that every drop of the water is being used for the objective he had in mind and that whatever water is lost will have an impact on his crop and his neighbor's crop. This will make the peasants more concerned about the water, and thus they will be more interested in conserving it.

All of this has to be accompanied by a campaign of agricultural guidance, instruction, and enlightenment in order that these concepts be well-understood by all of those who work with the water and make use of it.

This way we would be respecting, conserving, and benefiting from the water of the Nile. If we did this and if we successfully introduced the method of crop area concentration, then it would be possible to modernize Egyptian agriculture through the introduction of new technology. The first feature in this regard would be "mechanization," which simply means the utilization of machines in the process of tilling the land, planting seeds in it, and then harvesting and gathering together the crops. There are small pieces of machinery which can work on smaller plots of land. But it is not possible for a peasant, by himself, to buy a piece of machinery to plow only his small plot of land, and then to buy another item of machinery to plant the seeds, and still a third piece of machinery to harvest the crop. But if the crop areas were concentrated, that is, if large areas of land were planted with one particular crop, then this situation, plus the use of cooperative methods, would enable the purchase of an item of machinery which could be utilized throughout this total area. This would lead toward saving time, increasing productivity, and better use of the land instead of leaving the land fallow between one planting and the next.

Dr al-Jabali says: "Egyptian agriculture still relies on the efforts expended by men and animals. The result of this is a decrease in production efficiency and consequently an increase in the cost of production. Furthermore, the animals that are used in agriculture have to eat, and therefore they consume part

of the yield obtained from the farmland. This being true, the animals are competing with human beings in Egypt to gain the fruits of a limited plot of farmland!" Dr al-Jabali goes on to say: "The utilization of animals and human beings in the process of agricultural labor is not sufficiently conducive to the success of the method of 'intensification of agriculture,' that is, the planting of more than one crop in the same area, one crop after another. What happens is that the land is left fallow between successive crops. Losses after the harvest are much greater than when mechanization is employed, in addition to the fact that control of the agricultural work operations becomes something which is quite possible with the spread of mechanization."

Actually there is no disputing this argument. But we have our reservations about the point which concerns the matter of the animals and the fact that they consume part of what the farmland produces. This point was that machines should be utilized and animals should be dispensed with so that they do not consume, as food, the clover which is now being planted over large areas of land. We refute this point!

For the peasants, raising animals is something which is at the very heart of the make-up of life in the rural areas. We are not talking here about the necessity of using animals in agriculture. What we are in favor of is bringing in mechanization, but continuing to have the peasants raise animals in order to provide them with some food items such as milk, cheese, and butter. We feel that this custom should be promoted and that the peasants should develop their expertise in raising animals, benefiting from the necessary guidance given to them so that they can contribute toward furnishing meat and meat products.

So we have our reservations about this point. However, we agree with Dr al-Jabali's other opinions, especially with the opinion which says that in view of the steadily-increasing migration of peasants from the rural areas either to the cities or to other countries, the agricultural work force in Egypt is now suffering from an apparent shortage which has led to an increase in the wages of agricultural workers and to a noticeable decrease in their production efficiency. Consequently the costs of production have gone up. The only way out of this situation for us is to make use of appropriate mechanization for small plots of land, and this will lead to an increase in the production efficiency of the agricultural workers and to a decrease in production costs. Even more important than this, mechanization will free Egyptians from having to expend so much physical effort in agricultural work and will enable them to utilize means of modern technology.

It will also provide work opportunities which are acceptable to the young people of the rural areas who have started to shun manual labor but who would no doubt welcome working with machines. This would have an impact on the tendency to migrate from the rural areas and would make villages areas which attract people rather than areas which drive them away. The villages would then constitute a modern, changing production base and the social relationships there would become more modern and progressive. This would also permit the introduction of agricultural industries in the rural areas which would open up broad opportunities for productive jobs for young people in these areas, in addition to increasing the value of agricultural products and reducing crop losses. Above all, this would result in an increase in crop productivity.

How Do We Raise Production?

Increasing crop productivity means that each feddan starts producing more than what the average feddan produces, and this is the goal of vertical expansion in agriculture. This comes about not only by means of mechanization, but also by means of other factors. In order to properly discuss this, we should know from the outset that "productivity in the case of the principal crops in Egypt" is very high in comparison with average productivity worldwide. But the other side of the coin of this high productivity is the fact that production costs in Egyptian agriculture are very high if we take into consideration the number of agricultural workers who work in the production of a given farm enterprise. "In fact," as I was once told by Engineer Sa'd (Hijris), the deputy minister of agriculture, "in Egypt we have 4.5 million agricultural workers cultivating about 6 million feddans of land, whereas in Sweden only 200,000 agricultural workers are cultivating 8 million feddans! And in Holland 400,000 people are cultivating 16 million feddans!"

"What this situation means," according to Dr al-Jabali, "is that it is likely that our increase in crop productivity will be limited, slow, and costly. However, we do have the opportunity to double our productivity of sorghum, to raise our productivity of wheat by at least 70 percent, and to increase our productivity of rice by about 30 percent. As for raising the productivity of fruits and vegetables, it is likely that this will occur in the range of 50 percent by the year 2000. This will require the generalized practice of planting highly-productive types of crops as well as the utilization of a whole set of agricultural practices, such as using select seed, which are considered necessary for increasing production!"

"Seed" is a problem!

The basis of the problem is that we do not produce it. Instead, we depend on importing it for our agriculture. In spite of this economic open-door policy of ours, under which everybody has started to rush to get consumer goods, no one has established a single company in Egypt to produce seed and not a single Egyptian investor, either individually or together with a foreign partner, has ventured in this direction. This has not happened even though such a company would be very important to Egypt, and would be very profitable!

Dr Sa'id Mustafa, head of the Agricultural Research Center, says: "We are engaging in research which is beyond our capabilities. For this reason, we need to have Egyptian companies engage in activities in this field just as foreign companies do. Our capacity is limited to only 7,000 or 8,000 ardebs of seed. This is of no use to us because it means that our potential is lacking or even nonexistent.

Dr Mahmud Dawud, the minister of state for agriculture, agrees with this, and adds: "Last year an American company brought us some new seed for sorghum and set a price for selling it to the peasants, the price being 1 Egyptian pound per kilogram of seed. Since the ministry is interested in development, it provided a price subsidy of 75 piasters, that is, the peasants had to pay only one-fourth of the price. But this year the company representative came back and

brought only 200 tons of seed, and requested that the ministry eliminate its subsidy and let the seed freely circulate in the market. The company representative pulled out of his pocket contracts for buying all 200 tons of the seed, and this came about because the peasants were demanding to buy the seed even without the subsidy because the seed was of good quality. The peasants do not mind paying 12 pounds for 12 kilograms of seed which they can then plant in a feddan of land and harvest about 17 or 18 ardebs of a crop whereas the seed that they used to use produced only half this total crop!"

One of the most important factors in increasing production is "agricultural intensification," that is, planting more than one crop on the same area of land. Concerning this, Dr al-Jabali says: "If the present rate of intensification has already been about 200 percent, in comparison with 300 percent for the first one and 350 percent for vegetables, then it is probably possible to reach this before the year 2000. However, in order to do this we would have to generalize the planting of crops which mature early and would have to spread the use of seedlings wherever possible, and this would involve setting up plant nurseries, using modern methods in a very limited part of the agricultural land area. One thing in this regard which helps us is that Egypt has a very suitable climate which permits us to utilize every day of the year in crop production. Thus we should not waste this potential by having the land lie fallow, for any period of time, between crop harvesting and planting." An integral part of this whole operation is the process of "fertilizing the land" so that it will continue to be fertile for agriculture and stock farming. This fertilization has become even more important after the construction of the High Dam which blocks the alluvial mud--the fertile silt of the Nile--and keeps it from advancing north. As a result, Egyptian land has come to require the use of chemicals and fertilizers. Furthermore, the land requires the use of insecticides, agents for killing plant diseases, for killing weeds, and for stimulating plant growth!

So, after this brief review of the matter it is clear that the "food supply problem in Egypt" is a matter involving many factors and problems and that the future status of our food supply depends on the extent of our available potential and on the vertical and horizontal expansion which we must achieve, by means of intensifying our efforts and by utilizing advanced scientific methods. That is to say, our chronic traditional problems in this area do not mean that the end of the world has come. It is quite possible for us to solve this problem if we make use of non-traditional solutions and if we start along revolutionary and scientific paths.

Perhaps those who have read the first article in this series, in the last issue of AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, and then have read this article up to these lines, would be wanting to ask, and rightly so: Is it possible for us Egyptians, by ourselves, to solve the food supply problem in isolation from the other countries of the world--a world which will be facing a great famine at the beginning of the next century, that is, only 20 years from now?

This question hits right on the mark. The age which we are currently living in--and also the age which is coming--is not an age in which small entities can survive. They are becoming fragments of no value--like small fish which are being eaten up by larger ones! This fact applies in the field of politics as

well as in other realms. It also applies to the realm of food supply, which is the basis of our world economy. And, as we know, economics is the basis of what motivates the nations of the world either to keep peace with each other or to clash with each other in the form of wars! It is true that the whole world is facing a problem concerning food and famine within the framework of what is called the worldwide "food crisis." Egypt is a part of the world, and consequently both affects the world and is affected by it. Instead of getting lost in a maze, what Egypt must basically do is to look around itself, not from the political point of view, but rather from the purely economic point of view. The world right now is dividing itself up into regional areas in which the nations in these areas are complementing each other in production. This is already being done by Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Now our area needs to organize, especially since our area is the domain of the "Arab nation," which has a common history and destiny and whose foundations rest on an authentic national basis.

Arab Integration...And Going It Alone!

This is what must take place. And if we consult the opinion of science, here is what Dr al-Jubali says:

"The solutions which have been suggested for solving the food supply problem cannot be implemented within the framework of Egypt alone. It is necessary for us to have integration and coordination between the agricultural policies of the Arab countries. It will require a great deal of joint Arab action to implement any plan which has the objective of providing for an abundant food supply and of setting up food reserves for the Arab countries as a provision for the near future and not-so-near future. Such a plan would also involve the mobilization of all of our resources in order to develop our food production on a long-term basis."

In general, if this is what the solution is, then Egypt alone is capable of achieving the solution to its problems. But this can only be done through greatly increased and exhausting efforts on our part, and it would require that our minds be receptive and that our intentions be good!

9468
CSO: 4802

MAJLES MEMBERS GIVE VIEWS ON REAGAN

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 6 Nov 80 p 3

/Article: "Views of Islamic Consultative Council on Reagan's Victory"/

/Text/ Following Reagan's victory and Carter's defeat in the American presidential elections, the chairman and the members of the Islamic Consultative Council of Iran expressed their views regarding Reagan's victory and its effect on the future of the war between Iran and Iraq, the Middle East and other international affairs in a conversation with PARS NEWS AGENCY. In combining these views, one may conclude that the election of different persons to the presidency will have no effect on the American nation's relations with deprived, downtrodden countries, in view of that country's imperialist policy, or, in the words of Hojjatoleslam Khalkhali "American policy is subordinate to the capitalist world, not a person."

We present a summary of the views of the chairman and representatives of the Islamic Consultative Council in this regard:

Hashemi Rafsenjani: Reagan's election to the American presidency has no connection with us; it is the business of America and their electoral system. We have chosen this and will continue it. We will fight anyone who wants to fight with us, and we can have an understanding with anyone who wants to follow the right path."

Ali Akbar Parvaresh: "As the emam has said, neither Carter nor Reagan can have an effect on an Islamic movement, since their way of thinking is based on dealing with the political affairs of the day political custom and international custom. We are the ones who will decide whether to crush dominant values or not and, if we regress from that decision, it is natural that they will be able to play a part in either the Democratic or Republican dimension."

Musavi Kho'eyniha: "We have an argument with America; now it can have any president it wants. Carter is not relevant. We are fighting against the archcriminal imperialist policy of America. Now, whether the president is Carter or Reagan, the yellow dog is the brother of the jackal."

Fakhroddin Hejazi: "It is true that Eisenhower was a Republican and created the 19 August coup d'etat, but Kennedy and Carter were both Democrats and caused the 5 June calamity and the martyrdom of 60,000 revolutionary martyrs. So we never think whether the enemy's enmity is pale or dark, and our overall policy will not change at all with the election of Reagan."

Ahmad Tavakkoli: "The American presidents, whether Democrats or Republicans, are the product of the overall policy of America, which is to preserve the worldly interests of America and nothing else. Therefore the election of Democrats or Republicans depends on the mode of mildness or harshness to which imperialism needs to resort in order to continue its archeriminality."

Fo'ad Karimi: "From the standpoint of the nature of exploitation and imperialism of both parties, the Democrats and Republicans, both persons, Carter and Reagan, have one characteristic; their difference is just in their method of operating. Therefore the change and transformation in the superpowers' government is just a change in surface appearances."

Mohammad Javad Hojjati-Kermani: "To us, there is no difference between Reagan and Carter. Imperialism is imperialism and colonialism is colonialism. If there is a difference between the Republicans and Democrats, it is that the Democrats always hide their iron claws in silk gloves. Therefore, the fact that imperialism will show its true fact with the election of Reagan this term is a source of joy for us because the people will be able to understand them better and fight them better."

Abdolhamid Dialmeh: "We admit of no differences in the pawns of international Zionism, because they implement their overall policies by various means. Whenever harshness is necessary, they bring in the Republicans; whenever a surface mildness is necessary, they bring in the Democrats."

Sadeq Khalkhali: "America's policy is subordinate to the capitalist world, not to a person. It is international Zionism, imperialism and the multinational monopolies which play a big part in orienting the thinking of the American presidency. To the extent that that is connected to us, we will not change our policy with the advent of Reagan to power, and will go our own way."

11887
CSO: 4906

'MIZAN' WRITERS PROTEST RAID TO PROSECUTOR GENERAL

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 22 Nov 80 p 2

/Article: "Letter of Board of Editors of MIZAN to the General National Public Prosecutor"/

/Text/ In the name of God:

Date: 20 November 1980; Number: 381

His Excellency Mr Musavi Ardabili, general national public prosecutor:

The scandal of the occupation of the newspaper MIZAN's office on the morning of Tasu'a has assuredly been conveyed to you. A group of about 15 persons, some no more than 16 years old, attacked the newspaper's office, stole documents and financial assets, broke doors, windows and drawers, wrote anti-Islamic slogans, disrupted files and archives, and brought about considerable damages.

Also four cars, with these license numbers--a yellow Benz, Tehran 22-49984, a cream-colored Benz 55523 Tehran, a musk-colored Benz 1113 and a musk-colored Benz 6546--were parked in front of the newspaper and the passengers, who introduced themselves as committee patrol officials, sat in the Benzes and oversaw the pillage of the freedom and property of the newspaper. These gentlemen, in the face of repeated requests from newspaper officials, refrained from showing identity papers and, not only did they not deter the interlopers, they even displayed affection to them before the terror-struck eyes of the people. When the newspaper officials tried to take photographs of the assailants, the people in the Benzes, on the excuse of averting a fight, prevented this action and allowed the interlopers freely to leave the newspaper office after putting masks on their faces and using vile language after 5 hours of destruction.

It is not clear to the MIZAN officials what the cooperation between the assailants and the committee patrols means; whether this was the implementation of justice and the defense of freedom which the committee patrols were watching over and carrying out.

Here one must state that after contact was made with Mr Baqeri-Kani in the Central Committee, Mr Abrari went to the newspaper office and he was the only one to take an assailant with him to the Central Committee.

In thanking him, we wish for success from God for such a brother.

Mr Musavi Ardabili:

Is there hope for others in a country which does this to a well-known newspaper whose officials have an Islamic combative past?

The people responsible for MIZAN have proceeded to publish only for the sake of performing their Islamic duty and they depend on no power but divine grace and the protection of the Moslem people of Iran. They stood and did not surrender for many years in the face of the regime of satan at a time when many people were silent. Now, again, under no circumstances will they suffender to this kind of counterrevolutionary action. In this action they well know the treasonous hand of the hireling agents of the superpowers and the parties dependent on them and consider such a non-Islamic act on the part of a group of Moslems, even a small group, to be impossible.

Mr public prosecutor:

The day before yesterday they invaded MIZAN. Tomorrow they will invade the other manifestations of freedom and defenders of the constitution. For the sake of God and the blood of the martyrs, in order to avoid the destruction of the revolution, please prevent such hostile acts. Give the order that the people who perpetrated this crime, some of whom fortunately have been recognized by us, be arrested and tried. Stipulate that their motives and sometimes their provocators be made known to society. Declare that no one has the right to trespass against the rights of others. Make it clear that the committees are assigned to defend the rights of the people. Finally, by condemning the actions of this group, show the Islamic Republic of Iran that freedom of the press, which is a necessary condition for the performance of the duty of ordering what is proper and denying what is prohibited, cannot be suspended.

/Signed/ The editorial board of MIZAN.

Copies to: the office of Emam Khomeyni, the leader of the revolution; the office of the president; His Excellency Mr Qoddusi, the general revolutionary public prosecutor; Mr Raja'i, the prime minister; His Excellency Mr Mahdavi-Kani, the minister of the interior and president of the revolutionary committees; His excellency Mr Baqeri-Kani, chairman of the Central Committee; the newspapers KEYHAN, ENQELAB-E ESLAMI: ETTELA'AT and JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI.

11887
CSO: 4902

BRIEFS

GARMSAR GUARDS DISBANDED--Tehran--The Revolutionary Guards Corps of Garmsar has been disbanded due to disorderliness, announced the Central Command Council yesterday. Pars News Agency reported that the Corps was charged with interference in government organizations, continuous violations and disobedience to the Central Command. The Central Command has ordered all Revolutionary Guards of the Garmsar Corps to report to the Coordination Base of the Central Command within 24 hours or else they will be in violation of the law. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 30 Nov 80 p 2]

WAR-STRICKEN CITIES RENAMED--Tehran--The names of war-embattled cities have been suggested to be renamed after the war heroes, announced the Ministry of the Interior yesterday. Pars News Agency reported that the cities which have been bravely fighting Iraq, in particular Abadan, have been requested to receive a name honoring extraordinary militants. The Ministry of the Interior has asked all inhabitants of the western and southern regions of the country to offer suggestions for city names. These suggestions may be mailed to the Geographical Division of the Ministry of the Interior or telephoned to 533815 or 526608 during office hours. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 1 Dec 80 p 2]

HIGHWAY LINK OPENED--Tehran--The second phase of the Tehran-Qom expressway will be opened on Thursday, December 11, announced the Ministry of Roads and Transportation. Pars news agency reported that the road opening ceremony will be attended by Ayatollah Husseinali Montazeri, Minister of Roads and Transportation Musa Kalantari, and Majlis deputies of Qom. It was further announced that travellers may enter the expressway at the Highway Patrol station at the 79 kilometer mark (Nalebadan of 79 kilometer). The road will be open to all automobiles, buses and minibuses from Thursday. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 7 Dec 80 p 2]

REFUGEES GET ID CARDS--Ilam--Iranian identification cards were issued to 1,350 expelled Iraqis, announced the Governor General of Ilam yesterday. Pars News Agency reported that the Iraqis had been thrown out of their country by the Ba'athist mercenary government. The Governor of Ilam further advised that 200 others expelled from Iraq had been sent to Isfahan and Jahrom. He added that the Ilam Governorate had undertaken many activities for the welfare of the expelled in face of the coming winter season. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 1 Dec 80 p 2]

PROFESSOR SHOT--Tehran--The head of the Science and Technology University, Dr Esrafilian, was wounded by gunfire near his home on Saturday evening, announced a spokesman of the University. Pars News Agency reported that Dr Esrafilian was returning home when he suffered minor injuries from shots fired at long range. The culprit escaped under cover of darkness. Dr Esrafilian granted an interview a few days ago in which he stated that an arms cache had been discovered in the girls' dormitory of the University after several girls belonging to the Mujahedin Khalq Organization were forcibly evicted. Uncovered was ammunition for a G-3 machine gun, a colt pistol and other miscellaneous. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 1 Dec 80 p 2]

KEROSENE DISTRIBUTION--Tehran--Unfair distribution of kerosene in the capital will shortly be eliminated, announced the Governor General of Tehran, Mohammad Sepehri-Rad. In an interview, he explained that an earlier plan of the Economic Mobilization Headquarters whereby each family was to receive 20 liters of kerosene each week was incorrectly implemented. For reasons unknown some areas of Tehran were left with no effective system of kerosene distribution. The Governor General advised that the Fuel and Power Committee has assigned the kerosene problem to a sub-committee for investigation. He then allowed that butane, like other oil products, is facing a shortage. The Governor called on everyone to conserve butane and advised that the National Gas Company has been contacted regarding a fair butane distribution program. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 1 Dec 80 p 2]

GHEE RATIONED--Tehran--Distribution of vegetable shortening (ghee) by coupon will begin December 6, announced an official of the Shortening Distribution Council to Kayhan. The daily reported that upon presentation of coupon "B" of the Economic Mobilization Base coupons, 450 grams of shortening per person will be sold at the government set price. The Council stated that the price of shortening has not gone up, and is uniform throughout the country. The price for 900 grams of shortening is 63 rials; 1800 grams is 124 rials; and 4500 grams is 294 rials. Open locally-produced shortening is distributed at the price of 65 rials per kilo. The Council will also distribute shortening to industrial and guild consumers such as restaurants and chelo-kebabis at 125 rials per kilo. [Text] [Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 1 Dec 80 p 2]

CSO: 4920

CORRESPONDENT REPORTS ON HAIG'S APPOINTMENT

TA170705 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0500 GMT 17 Dec 80

[Text] About 1 year ago, General Alexander Haig--who has been chosen as secretary of state by president-elect Reagan--asked Israel to aid him among U.S. Jewish voters if he decided to run for the presidency. This has been learned by our Washington correspondent Shalom Qital. Our correspondent reported that at the beginning of the presidential election campaign Haig turned up--of his own initiative and dressed in his army uniform--at the Israeli Embassy in Washington and conferred with Ambassador 'Evron. Haig asked 'Evron whether he would support him in his run for office since his pro-Israeli position was well known. Ambassador 'Evron replied that although Israeli personalities could not interfere in the U.S. Presidential campaign the fact was borne in mind that Haig had supported and accelerated the military airlift to Israel during the Yom Kippur war when he was President Nixon's chief of staff.

Israel was asked to intervene on Alexander Haig's behalf on another occasion when Haig was mentioned as the candidate to the post of NATO commander. The secretary of state at the time, Henry Kissinger, asked the late Israeli Foreign Minister Yig'al Allon to influence his colleagues at the European International Socialist to support Haig's senior appointment with NATO. Such support was needed in the wake of suspicions about Haig's involvement in the Watergate affair.

Our U.S. correspondent noted that the secretary of state-designate is indeed known for his support for Israel. He has more than once declared the need for a strong Israel and said that he regarded Israel as a strategic asset for the United States.

Regarding the changes expected in the State Department when Haig arrives there, our correspondent has learned that U.S. Ambassador to Israel Samuel Lewis will apparently be appointed as head of the Middle East desk at the State Department. This post is currently filled by Harold Saunders. Our correspondent added that as far as is known Haig intends to deal with Middle East affairs--as part of a series of issues to which he attaches priority--as soon as he assumes his post as secretary of state. Samuel Lewis is regarded as a noted expert on Middle East issues and as an ambassador who succeeded in his post in Israel. Therefore, he will be appointed to the senior post of head of the Middle East desk at the State Department. It has not yet been determined who will replace Lewis in Israel.

Meanwhile, West European countries last night welcomed Alexander Haig's appointment as secretary of state. Officials at the Foreign Office in London last night said that they shared Haig's approach concerning a firm stand in contacts with the Soviet Union. Correspondents note that Haig's opinions are known to West European countries from the time he served as NATO commander. According to them, Haig succeeded in establishing close relations with European leaders.

However, on Capitol Hill in Washington, there were expressions of bitterness at Haig's appointment. Correspondents foresee a difficult struggle in the Senate over the endorsement of Haig's appointment. Several senators and representatives have said that they would demand an in-depth investigation of the role played by Haig in the Watergate affair when he was President Nixon's close aid.

CSO: 4805

IRAQI PERFORMANCE IN WAR SEEN DICTATING CHANGE IN ISRAELI MILITARY ESTIMATES

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 17, 19 Oct 80

[Article by Ze'ev Shiff: "Surprise in the Persian Gulf"]

[17 Oct 80, p 13]

[Text] After 14 weeks of war in the Persian Gulf, it seems that we have already gained a rather good perspective not only on the Iraqi Army but also for introspection and self-examination of several basic Israeli assumptions regarding the eastern front, from which it would perhaps be possible to draw conclusions for the future. The immediate conclusion is that our knowledge of Iraq, and primarily the Iraqi Army, is insufficient, and this does not mean numbers and arms deals. This is a negative appraisal of the Israeli intelligence community because it seems that not only do we not know but we have not known that we do not know. The seriousness of this lack of knowledge will have to be determined by experts; nevertheless, it is good that this has come to light in a war involving others and not a war in which Israel is directly involved.

Although Iraq is a considerable distance from Israel's border, it has for some time been defined by the IDF heads as a confrontation state, whose army is likely to appear on a front against Israel as occurred in the Yom Kippur War and the Six-Day War. We must know what is happening there no less than in Syria and Jordan. If the latter two would have concentrated the main part of their armies for an attack on a third state, we would undoubtedly have had much more information then that which we had on Iraq. We would also have known the minutest details about the progress of the war itself.

The question is what we knew beyond the general estimate that a war would break out. Did we know about the large scale military concentrations of the Iraqi Army before the attack and the time for the launching of the attack? Did we estimate accurately the caliber of the Iraqi command, the status of the air force, and the anti-aircraft defense system? Were we correct in our estimates of its logistical capability and the movement of troops over long distances? It is the knowledge of these details that distinguishes an intelligence estimate from a press estimate. Incidentally on 19 and 22 April, two Saudi newspapers (AL-MAJALLA and AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT) published articles which stated that a military confrontation between Iraq and Iran was inevitable. The articles analyzed the military estimate of the Iraqi command and how each of the Arab countries was likely to react to such a confrontation.

Expected Surprise

These details are important also because the Iraqi Army surprised us in the Yom Kippur War. It was a surprise within a surprise. Our forces on the Golan Heights were surprised by the appearance of the Iraqi armored division on the front. This caused the IDF to partially withdraw one of the divisions at night. It was only thanks to the inferior caliber of the Iraqi command that we were later successful in attacking them. It became clear after the war that it was not a real surprise: we surprised ourselves more than the Iraqis surprised us. At the top, and also at the command level, they knew about the approach of the Iraqi force to the front, however for some reason the information was not transmitted to the forces at the front.

It must be estimated that even the Americans did not know accurately what was about to happen and when between Iraq and Iran until the war broke out. It was possible to get the impression that they lacked information on what was happening during the first days of the war. Whoever considers this a small consolation should note that in a few days the American intelligence services began to fill in the gaps. It is possible to sense this in their communications media who generally receive briefings in Washington. The United States has an important technological advantage over us. The ability to operate spy satellites over the battlefield provides them enormous information. These satellites provide clear pictures of every tank and cannon and details on every firing of a surface-to-surface missile, on the movement of forces, and so forth. They do not provide information on decisions and plans, however this is already a different matter. Israel does not have such satellites and this is a shame, however it is precisely because of this that we must fill in the gaps with all the other information collection methods.

In regard to the information which we had, the conclusion is clear, and this is not the case regarding the lessons which we must learn from the war about the Iraqi Army. It provides us with new and enlightening facts, however it is better to wait with the final lessons until the end of the war and until we have most of the details. History is replete with mistakes which were made on the basis of what appeared to be a failure of the enemy army. For example: Hitler's estimate of the Russian Army from the winter war against Finland. The Russian Army displayed an extremely low capability in this war, and Hitler went so far as to draw the conclusion from it that he would be able to defeat it completely.

The picture of the situation, as it appears to date in the Persian Gulf War, is that the Iraqi Army is large and is equipped with the best modern equipment which is operated poorly and primitively. It has managed to register defeats in virtually all the areas. First, the Iraqi intelligence as has been revealed in this war, has suffered a sharp defeat. It was mistaken in its estimates regarding the Iranians' military capability and the opposition of the local population. It was mistaken regarding the length of the war and apparently also on the matter of the aid which Iraq would receive from the Soviet Union during the war. What is no less serious is that the Iraqi field intelligence also failed in its estimate of the area in which the fighting would be conducted.

The logistical failure was no less great. This fact, like the operational effectiveness of the Iraqi Army, should interest us since the movement of troops and defending them are an important factor in the participation of an Iraqi force in a war

against us. It was possible to observe, for example, how the Iraqi bridging elements were delayed for several days as if they did not know in the beginning that they were involved in a region of swamps and streams. It seems that the breaks in the fighting also were the result of logistical problems and less because of Iranian opposition.

Regarding the operational caliber, the question marks are no less great. It seems that to date, Iraq has thrown about 9 or 10 of its 12 divisions into the battle (against the dispersed and relatively small forces of the Iranians). The Iraqi command apparently has difficulty in commanding formations larger than a brigade, and perhaps even a regiment. The advance, despite the first surprise which was to their credit, is conspicuously small in relation to the number of days of fighting. Despite the fact that the Iraqi Army has commando units and a substantial number of new helicopters which they acquired from the Soviet Union and France, these forces were not used for the seizure of bridgeheads and for a rapid advance. The result was that the relatively small Iranian forces were able to stop the Iraqi advance. The most notable success of the Iraqi Army has been the bridgehead on the Karun River, however even it was a small one at the time of the writing of this article. Had a more serious army confronted them, they would have certainly been pushed back.

Paralyzed Airforce

A strange case in itself is that of the Iraqi Air Force. This air force has many modern MIG-23 aircraft, long-range bombers and so forth. It has almost 500 aircraft. Such a quality and quantity of aircraft should have dealt Iran an unendurable blow. However, the force was not operated properly, and not because the Iraqis had compassion for the Iranians (many of whom are now being driven out of Khuzistan) but rather because of leadership and the level of the inefficiency. However, what is far more surprising is that these hundreds of aircraft with the many surface-to-air missile batteries have been unable to prevent the few Iranian aircraft from attacking strategic targets in Iraq. All of this is at a time when the Iranian Air Force is a shadow of what it was during the period of the Shah. Of the hundreds of aircraft, they activate a quartet here and there (after they have apparently disassembled many Phantom aircraft for the purpose of using their spare parts). It was recently also reported that the Iranians have begun to activate parts of their giant fleet of helicopters, the Cobra attack helicopters (armed with anti-tank missiles) against the Iraqi Army in the Abadan region.

Had the Iraqis been confronted by Iran's old army, from the period of the Shah, they undoubtedly would have been defeated. The Iraqi Army now holds the upper hand, primarily thanks to its enormous firepower, however it is taking many casualties and heavy damages. If the Iraqi Army in its present form were to appear on the eastern front against us, it would be soundly defeated if it were to encounter a fresh and mobilized IDF. Although the Iraqis are accruing much operational experience in this war, it also indicates that Israel's eastern front no longer appears as it did yesterday. More on this in the next article.

[Article by Ze'ev Shiff: "Change on the Eastern Front"]

[19 Oct 80, p 9]

[Text] The Iraqi-Iranian War and the operations of the Iranian Army raise questions regarding the current thinking in the IDF regarding the eastern front and its

projected threat to Israel in the coming years. Until the war, this thinking was that the eastern front has been strengthened to the extent that it consititues a serious threat to Israel despite the peace agreement with Egypt. It is a front which can be organized rapidly even without a joint command. It can move against Israel even without Egypt's aid, and perhaps with the intention to drag Egypt into the war against us in the second stage. The conclusion of this thinking is that despite the peace with Egypt, under no circumstances should the IDF regular army be reduced. The Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Rafael Eitan, even believes that the regular army should be increased if the economic situation permits.

This thinking was not accepted without question even before the Persian Gulf war. HA'ARETZ commented on this question by emphasizing that the eastern front is not consolidated, and the expected threat will develop only in the future, after the withdrawal from the Sinai and when Iraq acquires a military nuclear option. The Persian Gulf war has caused an additional change in this estimate. This change stems from the fact that one of the main factors on the eastern front, Iraq, has become involved in a war which will keep it occupied away from our borders for a considerable length of time. On this front Iraq has always been regarded as the primary strategic power, without whom Syria or Jordan would not dare to become involved in a war against Israel. It has now also become evident that the Iraqi Army has displayed a surprisingly low caliber of effectiveness in the war against Iran. Although it is accruing operational experience, a substantial amount of time will pass before it will derive the lessons and improve itself.

Today actors are standing on the stage of the eastern front without any real coordination among them. Each of them has improved and strengthened itself in recent years with many modern weapons. The Syrian Army has undergone a major reorganization worthy of a test, however its commanders still do not feel themselves to be capable of standing alone against the IDF. The treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union, which they did not want in the past, must be considered more as an attempt to find an answer to the possibility of an Israeli preemptive war and the internal situation in Syria. Its involvement in Lebanon is not helping this partner of the eastern front. There are opinions today (Dr Tzvi Lanir, "The Israeli Intervention in Lebanon") that the Syrian military intervention in Lebanon has even improved Israel's strategic situation.

Lebanon does not represent a partner on the eastern front. Saudi Arabia is strengthening itself and is even using extremist language against Israel to the extent of a call for a jihad. At the same time, however, it is permitting the United States to envelop it with defense belts because of the Soviet threat.

Jordan is a case by itself. Its army has also undergone a reorganization, and it is absorbing the most modern equipment which will bring its army to a level of equipment which is not inferior and perhaps even superior to that of the IDF. Those responsible for this are Britain, France and the United States, the last one of which is no longer concerned, as it was in the past, about withdrawing an old tank for every tank which Jordan receives. Jordan has wavered between Syria and Iraq and has finally chosen Iraq. Had Iraq achieved a rapid and clear victory over Iran things would have been different. Iraq could have turned westward toward the front with Israel. The danger of the Iraqi-Jordanian inclination would have been substantive and immediate.

A Period of Time

However, the results of the Persian Gulf war are different. It is now evident that even if Iraq finally achieves a limited victory on the ground, it will have to leave large forces on the Persian Gulf to protect its military gains. Baghdad will be concerned about Iranian revenge and sudden seizures. It is not impossible that the trouble with the Kurds will start again and that there will even be plans for a revolution in Iraq in the wake of the war. Baghdad's attention will be focused in the future on the Gulf front and not on the Israeli front, not to mention the need which will be aroused to correct the deficiencies exposed in its army.

This leads to the conclusion that Israel's eastern front has changed form as a result of the war in the Persian Gulf. Despite the enormous quantities of new weapons on this front its threat has lessened. If we add the fact that there is a peace agreement between Israel and Egypt, it is clear that the strategic threat projected today to Israel, simultaneously from the south and east, has been decreased. This is not a permanent situation, and it is not known how long it will continue. However, it is now certain that Israel has a period of time on the eastern front. It will apparently continue to the middle of 1982, when the IDF withdrawals from the Sinai will be completed, and perhaps longer. Much depends on the recovery of the Iraqi Army and the future of the negotiations between Israel and Egypt.

This change requires a few conclusions. One of these relates to the defense budget and the order of priorities of the defense system in the future. The shaky economic situation of the State of Israel has caused a cut of about IL9 billion in 1980. The debate over the cuts was a strange one, and it did not result in the government, in collaboration with the IDF, discussing the structure and size of the army and its strategic concepts. The debate, in the meantime, was swept under the rug, however not for long. The coming deliberations on the defense budget for 1981 and the economic situation of the state will not permit many postponements.

Sooner or later the economic condition of the state will raise the question as to the necessity for Israel to cut its regular army. There will certainly be those who will claim that this must not be done because an intelligence error is always possible and large regular army is the only guarantee against a military surprise. This will certainly be the argument of those who are responsible for overseeing the military situation, the chief of the General Staff and his deputy. If this approach is accepted, however, there will be no alternative to a drastic cut in many research and development programs of the defense system, beginning from the Lavi aircraft and smaller but extremely important development programs being implemented in the Armament Development Authority and other places. Only giant export deals of weapons systems from Israel which will bring in large sums of money are likely to save these development plans without a cut in the regular army. It is very doubtful if the answer to these questions will come from the IDF. The answers must be found by the political level, that is the minister of defense and the Ministerial Committee for Defense Affairs. They have the overall responsibility for defense and the broader view.

5830
CSO: 4805

RABIN, PERES SEEK ARAB VOTE

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 20 Oct 80 p 19

[Article by Moshe Meisels: "Peres and Rabin Start Bid for Arab Vote"]

[Text] Peres and Rabin start their bid this week for the Arab vote in the Labor party convention.

In the previous convention which took place in February 1977, some 100 Arab delegates participated. It is believed that they had tipped the scale by a few votes in favor of Rabin.

This time the number of Arab delegates is put at 130, and past experience prompts the candidates to go after the Arab vote. Rabin will visit Arab communities in the Galilee this week as part of his campaign, and Peres is expected to follow closely behind.

Two trends appear among the Arabs: some prefer to stay with the establishment, while others are loyal to the memory of the late Yigal Allon.

Labor party Chairman Shim'on Peres changed his tune this week as he picked up the gauntlet which Yitzhak Rabin threw at him.

At first, in a meeting with Labor's old-timers, Peres announced he would consider refraining from taking on Rabin's challenge under certain conditions. Later on he said that the party's conference should take cognizance of his unanimous election as candidate for prime minister, as was decided 10 months ago, and either uphold it or cancel it before a new contest.

While Rabin was talking about a contest for the candidacy, Peres was talking about a vote of confidence at the convention for his candidacy.

Peres' supporters have said that after Rabin has officially announced the contest, Peres' reaction could be taken to mean that he was afraid of losing and was hiding behind formal excuses. Peres was persuaded and announced publicly for the first time that he was going to accept the challenge at the convention for the candidacy for prime minister in the next government. He pointed out that although he was elected by the party center as the party leader, if challenged he would take on any candidate at the convention. He would not hide behind legalistic arguments and would look for a decisive majority.

9565
CSO: 4805

ARABS URGED TO FORM INDEPENDENT LIST

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 3 Oct 80 p 4

[Article by Qasim Zayid: "Arabs of Israel Seeking Political Place"]

[Text] The leaders of the Arab community do not conceal their concern about the mystery which envelops their political future. The view for them is not clear, and they are seeking their proper place on the Israeli political map looking ahead to the elections to the 10th Knesset. They reject the English expression "take it or leave it" which guides the actions of most of the parties among the Arabs. The leaders of the Arab community are seeking a way out of the vicious circle. They want to break the political stalemate at any cost, and prevent the surprises and confusion which the parties cause for the Arabs of Israel.

MK Zaydan 'Atasha who for a number of months now has been trying to find his place on the political map describes the Arabs of Israel as a vine which has been cut 90 times in 30 years. He believes that there is chaos in the political party activity of the Arab sector: "The parties drop their decisions down from above without considering the aspirations of the Arab citizens". "The place of the Arabs of Israel is missing from the political map while in most of the parliaments of the world the national minorities have appropriate representation, a situation which does not exist in Israel". "All of this is a result of a misunderstanding or a denigration of the capabilities and loyalty of the Arabs of Israel."

"Israel Is Not Our State"

The result, according to MK 'Atasha, is that "the parties have rolled the ball of the Arabs of Israel against their will into the field of the RAKAH, and this distorts the true face of the Arabs of Israel." In order to avoid an improvised policy which entails surprises and confusion for the Arabs of Israel in the near future, MK 'Atasha invited a group of Arab personalities to a meeting in order to formulate advice on the direction in which the Arabs of Israel must move.

An ironclad principle which guides MK 'Atasha in his action is that "Israel is our state, and this country is our homeland. We are prepared to work with the constructive parties for the application and strengthening of this principle." 'Atasha does not conceal his concern about the methods employed by most of the parties among the Arabs--"they do not respect the opinion of the Arab citizens. They do

not build their platforms with due consideration for the positions of the Arabs of Israel who have shown that they are the best ally of the State of Israel and its governments."

MK 'Atasha wonders: "If the Labor Party is built from various sectors, why can't the Arab sector constitute a pressure group like the other groups represented in the Labor Party?"

Electoral Force

According to 'Atasha, "The Arab citizens constitute a large electoral force. In the coming elections there will be 235,000 Arab voters who can win 15 seats. Why is this force fragmented? Why are there now only four Arab members of Knesset, most of whom were elected by Jewish votes?"

What does he suggest then in order for them to escape from this entanglement? "The responsible forces among the Arabs of Israel must unite and adopt a political line for their own good and the good of the State. They must not remain split and fragmented."

Like Zaydan 'Atasha, Ibrahim Nimar, mayor of Shefaram and one of the prominent personalities in political and social work in the Arab sector, compares the current situation to an abandoned pot. He is convinced that RAKAH is unable to serve the interests of the Arabs of Israel and resolve their complex problems.

On the other hand, Abu Hatem, Ibrahim Nimar's nickname, believes that with the other parties, "we have not yet obtained what we need. If a constructive independent Arab list is not established, it will be difficult for us to compete with RAKAH, and we will be unable to demonstrate our existence. If there is a clear-thinking Arab list with a clear-cut platform, which will be ready to join a progressive government coalition, then we will be capable of significant achievements and contributing our share in the advancement of the anticipated peace campaign in the entire region."

A similar position was expressed by Shahaf Da'san, principal of the high school in Kefar Taiyiba in the Triangle: "For 32 years the parties have managed to split us into various factions and communities." Nevertheless, he also points out the danger in the establishment of an Arab list "in that in the past there were similar attempts, and they also failed." Nevertheless, despite the considerable danger, Da'san is in favor of the establishment of an independent political body--"and if not, we must look for an allied party, however under no circumstances should we continue to be satellites for the Arabists of the parties."

Labor's Test

At a meeting in Kefar Tamrah, which was convened on the initiative of MK Zaydan 'Atasha and in which about 100 Arab personalities participated, many of the speakers placed their hopes in the Alignment as the only ally of the Arabs of Israel. Others, however, maintained that an Arab pressure group must be established which

would seek appropriate representation for Arab citizens in the Alignment's list for the Knesset. They also protested against the arrogance and degradation which the representatives of the Arab community encounter in Labour's institutions.

The leaders of the Arab community are concerned that Labor will not draw the requisite lessons from their defeat, including that in the Arab sector. There have been many complaints that "while we are about 1 year away from the elections, we still do not see any clear-cut plan of action of Labor among the Arabs."

Many of those with whom we talked warn that "we are giving the Labor Party a chance, however under no circumstances will we permit the Arabs of Israel to remain a flock without a shepherd to lead them."

They Have Learned the Tricks of the Trade

Anyone who knows the situation among the Arabs is aware that the Arabs of Israel have learned the tricks of the trade. In what respect? Most of the Arab leaders have not sentenced themselves to isolation. They are grouping in every corner. Many see nothing wrong in being members in more than one structure. They come to every meeting to which they are invited, and they do not hesitate to speak their mind without difference, restraint, or fear. They do this with self-confidence and in the belief that they "are not obligated to anyone or any party."

They are ready to go with any party which will respond to their aspirations and offer appropriate solutions for their problems. I am convinced that the time when this leader or another would seek personal benefits has passed.

The Arab leaders want to be successful and at the same time find solutions for the problems which are burdening the members of their community. Nevertheless, the Arab representatives are not "looking for a groom regardless of how ugly he is." They are sympathetic to the Labor movement provided that it shows some sympathy, a warm attitude, and understanding of their problems.

Not Like a Flock Which is Led

One would perhaps not believe that even the leaders and council heads who are with the RAKAH are not like a flock which is led. One of the prominent personalities who is with RAKAH told me: It is true that the Arab Congress is the first shot in RAKAH's election campaign. It is trying to unite the Arab masses around it, but it has not achieved much success." He commented that "the storm in the press about the Congress and the uproar it is causing in the press are out of true proportion to the Congress itself.

"RAKAH has not succeeded in mobilizing new dominant forces for the projected Congress. I know that many of those who gave their consent and came to the Shefaram meeting will not come to the Arab Congress which is to be held in Nazareth and the RAKAH leadership is aware of this. This is the reason for their attempt to appease those who are endeavoring to withdraw their support for the establishment of the Congress."

He is aware of the fact that "the RAKAH intends to set the tone in the Congress and afterwards, however we on the periphery of the Democratic Front are also aware of this situation, and we will not permit the RAKAH to lead us by the nose."

Moreover, "the strength of the front stems from the non-party personalities who move in alliance with the RAKAH." The facts in the area reinforce and even confirm his comments.

We know from knowledgeable sources that a not insignificant number of those who participated in the Shefaram meeting will not come to the Arab Congress. They even express regret over their participation in the Shefaram meeting, and they even acknowledge that they were misled. The Shefaram meeting, therefore, does not really express the true strength of the RAKAH among the Arabs.

A renowned personality from the Galilee told me: "Whoever thinks that the Arab masses are blindly following RAKAH and that its ideology is blinding them is really mistaken. The Arabs of Israel are not fascinated by the RAKAH's political line, and they follow it for no other reason than the lack of an alternative."

In my humble opinion, the Arabs of Israel this time are going to be easily compromised. Any party interested in having its policy acceptable to the Arabs of Israel will have to adopt a sufficiently clear policy. The parties should not delude themselves that the Arabs of Israel can be easily misled for benefits as in years past.

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GOLAN HEIGHTS DRUZES REPORTEDLY UNDER PRESSURE

TA161129 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 16 Dec 80 p 2

[Report by Yo'el Dar: "Pressure on Golan Druzes Not To Accept Citizenship"]

[Text] Many Druze citizens of the Golan Heights have recently been under heavy pressure aimed at preventing them from accepting Israeli citizenship. This campaign is being run by three main elements: Druze inhabitants of Israel who are linked with Rakah, members of the Safadi and Abu Salah clans of Majdal Shams (the largest of the Druze Golan clans) and local priests (except for one of them).

The DAVAR correspondent reports that because of this pressure, by Friday 12 December only 360 Druze citizens submitted requests to receive Israeli citizenship.

Those requesting citizenship, together with their relatives, amount to about 1,000 people, that is, less than 10 percent of the total Druze population of the Golan Heights.

An authoritative Ministry of the Interior source told the DAVAR correspondent that pro-Israeli elements have recently lowered their voices and refrained from reexpressing views supporting Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights. The same source was able to relate that even the head of the Mas'adah Local Council, Muhsin abu Salah, who had led the pro-Israeli camp for years, only submitted a request for Israeli citizenship after persuasive discussions with influential Israeli friends. Many of his relatives and people from his village have not yet followed in his footsteps.

It may be assumed that the heavy pressure being brought to bear by local priests and members of the Abu Salah and Safadi clans has had its effect. For example, 10 days ago a religious rally was held in Madjal Shams, the largest of the Druze villages on the Golan Heights, and at its end it was decided to boycott and socially ostracize any Druze who wants to be an Israeli citizen. The rally was held in the Druze place of worship and many of those present had, directly or indirectly, benefited from Israeli rule (as did many of the Abu Salah family). Quite a few of the Safadi clan members who had shown their sympathy for the Israeli rule a short time after the 6-day war also attended the rally.

The Syrian threats to punish the relatives of those Golan Heights Druzes who submit requests for Israeli citizenship have also apparently influenced many people. The threats have been made in various ways, including by Radio Damascus.

An Israeli source told the DAVAR correspondent that the unexpected development could weaken those elements who support the annexation of the Golan Heights to Israel. "If the majority supported the annexation of the Golan Heights to Israel, as we predicted in the past, we could have claimed that this political move sprang from the wishes of the local inhabitants, but now it will be very much more difficult to take an initiative of this sort, when 90 percent of the local population have not yet submitted requests to receive Israeli citizenship" that source confirmed.

CSO: 4805

STUDY SHOWS UNWRITTEN AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA ON LEBANON

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 14 Oct 80 p 4

[Article by Oded Granot: "Study: Unwritten Agreement Prevails Between Israel and Syria on Lebanon"]

[Text] A system of an unwritten agreement has been created between Israel and Syria on Lebanon and has laid the foundation for an Israeli-Syrian compromise on the future of this country. This is the estimate of a new study recently published by Tel Aviv University's Center for Strategic Studies.

The author of the study, Dr Tzvi Lanir, maintained that Israel has not yet displayed a profound understanding regarding the new possibilities which have been opened in Lebanon to reach a rapprochement with the Syrians. Such a rapprochement, according to Dr Lanir, would likely benefit Israel without necessarily leading to a political agreement on the Golan Heights.

The basis for this new and original thesis which Dr Lanir presents in his analysis of the achievements and compulsions operating on all the parties involved in the Lebanese crisis. This analysis indicated the creation of new game rules between Syria and Israel in this area which are completely different from the system of relations between the two countries on other issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict like, for example, the Golan Heights and the peace agreement which Israel signed with Egypt.

The creation of a system of "signals," "understandings," and "red lines" between Syria and Israel in Lebanon, in which each side (Israel and Syria) maneuvers cautiously, has produced a "pattern of conduct" by the two countries, which Dr Lanir describes as an "open pattern" of relations. This system has stabilized the relations between Syria and Israel and Lebanon and reduced the danger of their being dragged into a war.

As such, for example, Syria refrained from taking action to eliminate the Christian enclaves in Lebanon in 1977 and 1978 as a result of Israeli "signals" by reconnaissance flights over the Syrian forces in Lebanon. Israel, on the other hand, refrained from an excessive and uncontrolled reaction to the entry of a Syrian company into Nabatiyah in January 1977. In another situation, Israel gave the

Syrians to understand that it would not exploit the removal of a division from the Golan Heights in order to transfer it to the Syrian-Iraqi border during the tension between the two countries in July 1976.

Dr Lanir describes the Israeli intervention in Lebanon as a "success story" and emphasizes, in contrast, the Syrian failure to exploit the numerous resources which it has invested in Lebanon for the attainment of political objectives.

He believes that Syria has now come to understand that it cannot achieve a settlement in Lebanon without regard for Israel's military interests in this area, and therefore, the current cease-fire, in certain circumstances, is likely to develop into a kind of "passive settlement" in Lebanon.

Dr Lanir's study actually accuses Israeli policy of failing to as yet make an attempt to reach a rapprochement with the Syrians and especially in terms of the prospects entailed in such attempts at rapprochement in relation to the attainment of a compromise settlement in Lebanon. Such a compromise is likely to give the Syrians the possibility of an "honorable departure" from Lebanon without losing prestige, the Christians--a basis for a cantonal solution, and Israel--the strengthening of its interests in the security strip in southern Lebanon.

The researcher estimates that such a settlement on Lebanon, if it is achieved, is likely to have implications also for a solution of other aspects of the conflict, among other things, since the Syrians, unlike the Egyptians, hold in their hands significant pressure cards vis-a-vis the Palestinians.

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CSO: 4805

ISRAEL MOVES TO STOP FLOW OF PLO FUNDS INTO WEST BANK

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Oct 80 p 19

[Article by Yosef Tzuriel: "Military Government Struggles Against Flow of PLO Funds"]

[Text] The local authorities and public institutions in the West Bank continue to receive large sums of money from outside the country. Security forces are investigating to determine the source of the funds in order to ascertain if the "cornucopia" is from the PLO.

The military government is required to provide the vital services for the Arab population within the framework of the encumbering budgetary constraints. However, personalities in the Arab population have long understood that the Israeli [military] government would not be able to bear the financial burden for a long period of time. Therefore, the mayors have initiated development plans which have been submitted to the government both for authorization and for funding.

The military government has been mired in difficulties. From its entire budget, only crumbs have been left for purposes of development. Most of the money has been designated for current expenses. A reexamination has revealed a shocking distortion in the budget structure. On the one hand, the military government funds the entire educational system, and it allocates more than one-half of its funds for this purpose. On the other hand, it has no allocation even for the repair of the water system in one of the neighborhoods in Jericho, and it does not have 50,000 shekels for the procurement of a medical device for the hospital in Shekhem.

This distortion of reality which was disclosed already during the first year of Israel's presence in the West Bank exists today in the military government.

The expression "impoverished government" is commonly used by mayors and dignitaries. This gap between the requirements and the budgetary limitations has been discussed many times in various forums and especially in the Directors-General Committee for the Administered Territories. The demands for development funds have continued to increase with the passage of time, however the means available to the military government have remained limited.

The pressures from one side and the limitations from the other have created a situation, the severity of which cannot be estimated. Two mayors made the following argument to a senior official in the military government: "If you are unable to fund the vital development plans for our cities, give us permission to collect money from Arab sources."

The immediate reaction of the military government was: absolutely not. The explanation given was that conducting private campaigns would damage Israel's image in the world and would create a situation in which there would be affluent cities and poor ones, local authorities aided by outside sources and ones aided only by the military government.

However, this negative response did not last long. It disolved against the background of disagreements on the political and security levels in this issue. This dispute has involved various considerations. For some time now there has been talk about moderates and extremists among the West Bank leaders, and the question was raised: Why shouldn't we do something good for the moderates among them and permit them to collect funds from outside the country, and in this way they would be able to strengthen their status in their cities?

Confusion in the Government and the Towns

This approach has permitted "unidentified" mayors to benefit from a windfall. It has also encouraged syphocancy and the mushrooming of all kinds of methods of transferring money from Arab countries to the West Bank.

The confusion in the military government on this issue has increased with the passing of the years, and it has been dominant in the towns. One person claimed that he was able to collect money for his city among "Ram Allah expatriots" circles in the oil principalities. Another person claimed that he received a "grant" from the ruler of Kuwait. Later it became known that during the course of his visit in this principality, he was joined by a PLO man. The Jordanian government, which has acted wisely and quietly, drew out the "aid whip" for all to see and dictated conditions to those who wanted assistance.

When Ezer Weizman was serving as the minister of defense, guidance was given to the effect that the money coming from Arab countries was designated for the building of a school and the paving of roads, and not for the manufacture of explosives, there was no reason to prevent the mayors from collecting money for their cities.

The mayors were thus given a "free hand," and they began to tour Arab countries for fund-raising purposes. The campaigns were so successful that Jordan became concerned about its status in the West Bank. It therefore initiated a counter move: the establishment of a joint committee with the PLO to provide financial aid to the local authorities and public institutions in the administered territories.

This committee, which as of today is working under conditions of mutual suspicion and divisiveness among Arab mayors and dignitaries in the West Bank, is guided by several principles acceptable to both the PLO leadership and the Jordanian authorities:

*Guarantee of the status of East Jerusalem as the capital of the West Bank.

*Limitation of the number of Arab workers employed in Israel.

*Halting of the emigration of Arabs from the administered territories.

*Guarantee of the independence of the local authorities and the religious institutions in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Besides these principles, there are attempts by both the PLO and Jordan to leave their mark by means of the money, most of which comes from the oil principalities. However, money is pouring into the West Bank from various Arab sources who do not want to be associated with the joint Jordan-PLO committee. The contributors are interested in giving the money to a certain mayor or specific project.

With the institution of the "strong arm" policy in the West Bank, a new instruction has been issued: the introduction of money from the PLO is not permissible. Security elements note that they are able to determine the source of every significant sum of money transferred to the region.

The mayors, who have become accustomed to generous development allocations as a result of the foreign fund-raising campaigns, have not reconciled themselves to this. The mayors claim that the PLO is now involved in every matter related to the Arabs of the administered territories, and there is no Arab entity interested in functioning as its substitute. The military government is disturbed by this issue because it has become accustomed to not being concerned about development plans.

The security elements recognize the difficulties. However, they believe that the situation which had prevailed until a few months ago bordered on anarchy, and they want to put a stop to it.

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SOLDIERS ADMIT MISDEEDS IN WEST BANK VILLAGE

TA170752 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 17 Dec 80 p 1

[Report by David Richardson: "Soldiers Admit to Charges of Curfew Wrongdoings"]

[Text] A number of soldiers have confessed to abusing residents and stealing valuables in the West Bank village of Silwad during the curfew 10 days ago, a military spokesman confirmed last night. Earlier it was announced that investigators had verified some of the villagers' complaints.

Officers from units active in Silwad during the curfew were debriefed yesterday at Ramallah military government headquarters by West Bank military Commander Brig Gen Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer, the commander of the central command Maj Gen Moshe Levi and other top IDF officers. After the session, it was apparently decided to issue more stringent orders governing the behaviour of soldiers during curfews and searches in the administered territories.

Residents of the village complained to the JERUSALEM POST and other newspapers last week that soldiers had destroyed food and furniture, assaulted some of the younger villagers and stolen money during the course of house-to-house searches in the village between December 4 and 6.

The village was under curfew following the murder of a local resident, who was named on Amman Radio as a collaborator with the military authorities. It was the third such political assassination this year.

One resident filed a complaint last week with Ramallah police alleging that money had been stolen from her in the course of a search of her house. One soldier was detained last weekend in connection with this complaint.

Earlier in the week, another six complaints were filed with the military government about alleged irregularities by the soldiers, said to have been a unit of paratroopers.

Military sources at first tended to dismiss queries about the allegations as "exaggerated and probably unfounded."

CSO: 4820

COURT TO BE ESTABLISHED FOR WEST BANK SETTLERS

TA161818 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1700 GMT 16 Dec 80

[From evening newsreel]

[Text] An urban court for the Jewish residents of Judaea and Samaria will begin operating in another 2 months. A magistrate will preside over the court. Avraham Ben-Melekh has learned that the Judaea and Samaria command, in coordination with the ministries concerned, has drawn up a special order under which the court will operate.

[Begin Ben-Melekh recording] The first Jewish urban court in the territories will likely be situated in Qiryat Arba'. This court will have the power, for instance, to send people to jail for up to 3 months. Since Israeli law is not in effect in the territories, the court will operate by a special order, which the regional command has drawn up, according to special operating regulations.

In the first stage the court will deal mainly with matters relating to taxation, sanitation, planning, construction and supervision of the settlements' master plans. The court will give the Jewish regional councils the legal ability to impose their bylaws, to cope with criminals and to consolidate public life in the settlements. At present, they are unable to do this, and in fact there is now nothing to prevent any Jewish resident in the territories to do whatever he pleases in a settlement.

All the Jewish local authorities will defray the costs of the court; they will also finance the salary of the magistrate. At first, the Jews in Samaria will have to go to Qiryat Arba'. Later, a special court for the Samaria settlements will also be established. In a subsequent stage, a district appeals court will be set up. As far as is known, such a court will also be established in the Gaza District.

The preparations for the activation of the first Jewish court were made secretly and have almost been completed. The only thing being awaited is the regional commander's signature. [end recording]

CSO: 4805

PRESS ANALYZES BAN OF FOREIGN PRESS COVERAGE IN WEST BANK

TA161141 Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 16 Dec 80 p 9

[Commentary by Eliyahu Salpeter: "Closed Area—Open to Argument"]

[Text] The military government's decision not to permit journalists to enter the West Bank towns where student rioting is occurring gained Israel a great deal of criticism by the Western press. The NEW YORK TIMES explained to its readers that the military government wanted to prevent the press from reporting the wave of anti-Israeli demonstrations. The CBS Broadcasting Network reported the arrest of two members of the coverage team and the confiscation of filmed footage. LE MONDE reported moves against a UPI corresponding and commented that the military government's opposition contradicts the announcement by the civil authorities, who claim that there has been no change in the status of journalists in the territories.

The Foreign Press Association protested these moves and published an announcement saying that "promises made by defense ministers about freedom of approach by the foreign press to new events in the West Bank are being broken wholesale by the military government."

The great publicity given to the affair did not, of course, contribute to Israel's positive image in the world. We must ask what, in this case, caused greater damage: what the military government did or how it did it?

The military government claims that the appearance of television crews provokes the demonstrators into increasing the breaches of the peace in order to supply the cameramen with propaganda material serving the PLO abroad. In their reports, foreign journalists treat this claim with scorn. Neither side, it appears, has clean hands in this affair. There have been graver riots in the territories in the past, but when the military government had a genuine ruler, it was not the custom to expel foreign journalists, and certainly not wholesale. Therefore we may believe the complaints of the foreign journalists, that the military government is now less tolerant toward criticism and wants to prevent coverage of inconvenient, unpleasant events.

However, there is no doubt that there are serious foundations for the military government's claims that the appearance of television cameras encourages the demonstrators. Furthermore, it is doubtful if there is a single foreign correspondent in Jerusalem who does not know Kaymonda at-Tawil and her Jewish friend

[presumably Felician Langer] who in fact maintain a sort of Palestinian Arab liaison office. The foreign journalists have more than once received advance notice that "something is going to happen" in one of the West Bank towns and when the television cameras arrive--they are guaranteed something to shoot. And so, a single closeup of a burning tire fills the screen like a large incendiary bomb....

This is not something fabricated in the old city of Jerusalm: Most of the "liberation movements" have learned from the communists and leftists of all varieties and how to use, not only the freedom of the press, but the free press in democratic countries, to disseminate their propaganda. And if the U.S. and Western European television cameramen are now complaining about being forbidden to shoot the dispersal of a demonstration in Hebron or Bi'r Zayt, it would be worth reminding them of the great services they and their colleagues supplied, for example, to Khomeyni and the "revolutionary students" by showing the taking-over of the U.S. Embassy and the imprisonment of the hostages. The problem was discussed at length at the time, both in the general press and in communications media professional papers and not much doubt remained that the television camera--particularly on such occasions--is not just a passive spectator in what occurs, but becomes an active factor in the political-propaganda exercise.

From this it follows that if the military government has good, sincere intentions in banning the entry of cameras to rioting areas, it could achieve this objective by restricting the ban only to the entry of television cameras. The correspondents, including television correspondents, would be allowed to be present, to see, hear and report--even in a broadcast in front of the camera. In this way, the claim that the purpose of the ban is to prevent coverage of the event would be undermined. It may be assumed that there will be some journalists who will, because of anger, exaggerate what they tell the television viewers. But if we wish to eliminate the spurring-on factor of television cameras, this is a price it may be worth paying.

Except that a decision on this issue--like most of the issues of principal involving the military government--cannot be made by military government officers. Even in more ordered times, the IDF and the military government had a different--and more restricted--set of considerations than those of the political echelons. The IDF and the military government want, first of all, to guarantee calm in the territories and preserve their own positive image among the Israeli public. Concern for Israel's positive image abroad is, at best, secondary, today. When the government's control is collapsing in every sphere, the journalists play an increasingly large role in civilian control over the military establishment and, in this context--supervision over what occurs and does not occur in the territories.

It would not be practical, nor would it be desirable from the aspect of publicity, to make a distinction between the Israeli journalists and the foreigners in what concerns the coverage of military government actions. Therefore, there is no choice but to permit foreign journalists to move freely in the territories, even when demonstrations or rioting are occurring there. However, if the television camera encourages the riots--and, as stated, there is a great deal of truth in this claim --then an "Israeli" camera does this no less than does a foreign one. It would, therefore, be worthwhile making a distinction between television cameramen and journalists, whether foreign or local.

The consideration of what serves the national interest better--more rapid calming of a demonstration or concern for publicity--must, in each and every case, be placed in the hands of the political echelons and the decision should be implemented by members of liaison units and spokesmen who are specialists in relations with the press. Maintaining the level of these forces is one of the defense minister's tasks and must be no less under his control than what occurs in tank-repair shops or in the command of the military police.

The ideology that says that "we must stop playing at being beautiful people" is no substitute for maintaining the level of maintenance and supervision over the behavior of commanders and troops--or for a knowledge of how to conduct Israel's publicity on IDF issues.

CSO: 4805

GUSH ETZYON SETTLEMENTS ENCROACH ON ARAB LAND

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 21 Oct 80 pp 11, 14

[Article by Yehudah Litani: "In Beit Askariya Arabs Feel Like Island Among Settlements; The Thorn in Gush Etzyon's Side"]

[Text] Beit Askariya, a cluster of Arab houses "stuck" in the heart of Gush Etzyon, between kibbutz Rosh Tzurim in the north and regional center Alon Sh'vut in the south. Beit Askariya is not a village, and can barely pass for a hamlet, but it is an exception in the West Bank. Generally the settlements find themselves to be an island surrounded by Arab villages, but in Beit Askariya the Arabs feel like an island surrounded by settlements. Moreover, they see themselves as a salami sliced at both ends: they are eaten in the north by Rosh Tzurim and in the south by Alon Sh'vut. The members of the village, also known as Hirbat Zakharia, belong to one family--the family of Ibrahim Atallah, his three sons and their families. The family once belonged to the village of Artas near Bethlehem, which borders on Beit Askariya.

One of Gush Etzyon's old-timers recalls how prior to 1948 the local settlers enjoyed good relations with the village, while Ibrahim Atallah points to a scar on his left leg which, he says, is the result of a wound he received by being shot at by a Jordanian soldier when he tried to defend his Jewish neighbors during the Jordanian takeover. That same old-timer doubts Ibrahim's story. Ibrahim also mentions how three defenders of the Gush found shelter in his home on their way back to Jewish Jerusalem. I spoke to one of the three, who did not corroborate Ibrahim's story. "No one in the neighboring villages offered to help us," the 1948 fighter, today a senior officer in the IDF, stated.

In either case, the rebuilding of Gush Etzyon shortly after the Six-Day war put an end to Ibrahim Atallah's isolation. The members of kibbutz Rosh Tzurim say that the land which Ibrahim cultivates near their kibbutz used to belong to Jews, and as proof they show old maps and air photos dating back to the pre-1948 era. I visited the place most recently 6 years ago, and I was astounded when I saw how Ibrahim's lands receded almost to his doorstep. Parcel by parcel was taken over by the kibbutz, which is known as one of the least militant settlements in the West Bank.

The Relations Were Good

Ibrahim Atallah--a character out of a British film of Lawrence of Arabia--has a pointed grey beard, an oversize grey 'abayah, Kufiyah and 'iqal, and the look of a

wise man who knows how to stay out of trouble. He has documents which show that his lands belonged to his family as far back as the British Mandate and the Turkish rule. He says that he used to have good relations with the kibbutz, but he is no longer on speaking terms with his Jewish neighbors because they had caused him to spend 10 days in jail on a suspicion that he had uprooted the trees of a nearby settlement.

"I wouldn't do such things," says Ibrahim Atallah, "and indeed they were not able to prove anything. We can only rely on Allah," continues the Arab scholar who got stuck between the two settlements. "They don't let me cultivate my land on the other side of the road." The land on which the center named after the late Moshe Hayim Shapiro was built also belongs to him, says Ibrahim. He admits that his life was changed by the settlements. Until 1967 water had to be brought in by tankers. Now his home has been connected to the settlements' water line.

"They even tried to subvert my water line," Ibrahim continues. "One day I found out my water meter was dismantled and the settlers told me I could no longer use the water." But Ibrahim Atallah does not rely only on God and so he went to see the mayor or Bethlehem, Elias Farij, who arranged for reconnecting his water line. He also asked his lawyer, Elias Huri, to contact the military governor on this matter.

At the moment there is an injunction of the court which forbids the cultivation of a certain parcel of land to which Ibrahim claims ownership while the settlers argue that they bought it legally from another party who was the legal owner. Ibrahim maintains that they bought it from a man who has no legal claim to it. The settlers insist the deal is legitimate and wish to continue cultivating the land. Ibrahim's son relates he was removed from another parcel by the military administration while being threatened with a weapon.

"You journalists are neglecting us," a farmer who joined the conversation said. "Did you know a few months ago a fight broke out between farmers from Nahlin and settlers who wanted to build a road through their fields over there in the wadi (he points at the wadi below Ibrahim Atallah's home)? The Nahlin farmers," he goes on, "said that the settlers will build the road on their dead bodies, and they started attacking each other. In general," the farmer says, "we have many fights here, which the military government and the police never find out about. Not to mention the press and the rest of the media."

He describes the situation in Gush Etzyon as a "settlers' peace." "In other words," he says, "they do what they feel like doing. They refer to private land as public land or stony land, and they take over. They build roads to their land through our land. They walk around armed and think might is right. When they are ready for an operation like plowing or building a new road, they bring over the military administration who threatens us and forces us to leave our land."

A short investigation with the security people shows that this farmer tends to exaggerate, but there is still a grain of truth in his words. A few months ago a fight which bordered on violence did break out between the settlers and the farmers of Nahlin. Land disputes have taken place for the past 12 years. The security people say that the Arab farmers blow up these incidents beyond all proportion.

Reparations? Absolutely not!

But Ibrahim Atallah's case is quite tangible. I recall how his land looked 6 years ago and I see it now. The reduction is obvious. He scratches the ground with his black rubber shoes and tells me with a shy smile he now has less than 10 dunams. "Once I had a great deal more. I am now practically destitute, and I have to support my family and my three sons' families."

Ibrahim Atallah says he has no political motives or views. Through his facade of indifference one begins to detect a sympathy for Jordan. He mentions well-known pro-Jordanian political activists who would help him, and hopes things will revert back to 1967, namely, to Jordanian rule. What about a Palestinian state? "I am not a political expert," Ibrahim Atallah plays innocent. "A Palestinian state? A Palestinian-Jordanian state? What do I know? I am a farmer, and all I want is to have my lands back." He looks at his yard, at the two grazing cows, the dog barking nervously at every stranger, the grapevines, the fig trees, and he tells me he hopes some day peace will arrive and one nation will not rule the other.

"You see up there?" he says and points at a group of houses built at Alon Sh'vut in recent years. "This is land which was taken from the mukhtar of the village of Artas. Down there is my land, which 9 years ago they invaded with tractors and overran the harvest. Sit down, what's your rush?" he asks and forces me to sit on his porch, facing the wadi between the two settlements, revealing a pastoral view, and offers me coffee and grapes. "These are the last grapes left on the vines," he apologizes. "That's why they are so small."

In late 1972 Ibrahim Atallah published an open letter in the local Arab press which was intended for the then minister of defense, Moshe Dayan. He wrote that early in the morning the bulldozers invaded his land and destroyed the crops. He wrote that 21 people, including babies, depended on those crops for their substenance, and did not know what they were going to do. His letter prompted the well-known poetess Fadwa Tuqan to write a poem, which stated:

> ...In the name of the babies I ask you
> Give me back my land
> Which is my sustenance.
> Oh general,
> The sustenance of the babies
> I request.
> Give me back my land
> I absolutely refuse
> To receive reparations for it...

"Why do you refuse to receive reparations?" I ask Ibrahim Atallah. His face becomes hardened and impenetrable. His answer sounded like a quotation from Tuqan's poem: "Under no circumstances, absolutely not. They can take it by force. But to sell? To receive reparations? I never agreed to it and I never will. This is my land. My fathers' land. You can't sell it or receive money for it. If they take everything I still have Allah who will provide."

I forgot to mention that the Arabs call the place Beit Askariya because they believe the prophet Zecharia is buried there. One of the houses in the village marks his grave. The Jews disagree. They maintain that Zecharia is buried a good few miles north of there. The two sides disagree not only in what concerns the present, but also the distant past.

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ISRAELI COMMENTATOR WANTS GOLAN INITIATIVE FROZEN

TA161305 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 16 Dec 80 p 9

[Commentary by Daniyel Block: "The Initiative for the Imposition of Israeli Law on the Golan Heights Must Be Frozen"]

[Text] The resolution by the Council of the United Kibbutz Movement expressing support for the imposition of Israeli law on the Golan Heights says that the date for the parliamentary initiative will be decided by the Labor Party institutions. It is to be hoped that political wisdom will guide the party to freeze the initiative for a very long period and that the Knesset faction and Knesset members from the kibbutz movement will not be dragged behind Ge'ula Kohen, [initiator of the Jerusalem bill] nor will they fall into the trap the Likud, in its weakness, is setting for them, as happened with the Jerusalem law.

There is no doubt that the kibbutz movement has a genuine desire to strengthen, consolidate and fortify the pioneering, security settlement on the Golan Heights. This desire is based on broad support from the public in Israel, which gives the Golan Heights supreme preference in a national consensus, to which only Jerusalem comes second. Our security claim to the Golan Heights is one of the strongest. It is accepted with understanding by anyone who sees both the situation in the field and the vital need to control the Golan Heights for the defense of the north of Israel and the country's water sources.

However, a Knesset law on this issue would not serve any vital objective, it would only awaken bears from their sleep and harm any Israeli publicity or political effort aimed at gaining security borders. Any timing would be terrible for legislation for the annexation of the Golan Heights, but at the moment the timing is particularly terrible: today there are processes of splitting in the rejectionist front and the eastern front against us. There is a certain devaluation in the status of the PLO. At such a time, Israel has no interest in providing an excuse to mend the rifts, reinforce the status of the ruler of Syria and of the PLO and perhaps improve relations between Amman and Damascus. By doing so, we might also provide al-Asad with an excuse to evacuate his forces from other fronts and move them to the Golan Heights, on the pretext that Israel is taking a unilateral step violating the agreement about the separation of the Golan Heights.

If legislation were to contribute anything significant to strengthening our position in the Golan Heights, perhaps it would be worth passing the law, despite the

political and publicity damage and the risk of war. But, like the Jerusalem law, a Golan Heights law per se would not provide us with a single extra brick, furrow or even a settler. Its damage is certain, its benefit is doubtful.

Let us for a moment assume that the Knesset had legislated a law several years ago annexing the Rafah approaches, Yamit and Ofira. Would this law have prevented the peace agreement being signed with Egypt, including the evacuation of those settlements? That same massive majority that supported the peace agreement would also have supported the cancellation of the law. Perhaps the process of making the decision would have lasted for another few days, but the final result would have been the same, whether the law had existed or not. Neither the Jerusalem law nor a Golan Heights law can prevent negotiations over their future, if the other party demands this. At most, it would make the formal process of Knesset approval for the agreements somewhat more complicated, if the government reached the conclusion that, for the sake of peace, there was a point to making symbolic concessions in Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

It should be recalled that Israel has not the slightest iota or a legal claim, from the aspect of international law, over the Golan Heights and this is in contrast to the existing claim agreed upon by at least some of the experts, with regard to east Jerusalem, Judaea, Samaria and Gaza. The Golan Heights is on the Syrian side of the international border. In 1967 the Government of Israel was willing to make peace with Syria on the basis of the international border and it was after the Arab refusal that the settlement campaign began in the Golan Heights.

In peace negotiations, Israel should fight for the Golan Heights to remain in its possession, partially or in its entirety, and see to suitable security arrangements also based on settlement, to prevent the Golan Heights from again becoming a Syrian military base. A unilateral legal move for the annexation of the Golan Heights would only force the Arab side, in advance, to insist upon its return as a condition for any peace agreement, just as the Rafah approaches farmers forced al-Sadat to oppose any compromise over the settlements or airfields.

Our ability to hold on to areas essential for our security and existence in the Golan Heights and the Jordan rift valley depends on many factors: our economic independence, our domestic social strength, our power to stand firm against external pressure, our ability to recruit Jewish and other public opinion in the United States and Europe and the degree of internal conviction by the decisive majority of the public of the rightness of our position. Passing a Golan Heights law similar to the Jerusalem law would contribute nothing to even one of the above. On the contrary, it would even undermine the support for our justified position among Jewish and non-Jewish friends.

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EBAN PROPOSES NEW TERRITORIAL AGREEMENT

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 19 Oct 80 p 2

[Article by Moshe Meisels: "At Labor Party's Platform Committee, Abba Eban Proposes New Term: 'Territorial Agreement;' Instead of 'Territorial Compromise;' Permanent Border with Syria to Cross Golan Heights according to Negotiated Agreement; 'Strive for Peace with Jordanian-Palestinian State'"]

[Text] At session of Labor party's platform committee headed by Israel Galili, the doves supported a general principles platform while the hawks demanded a detailed platform.

Knesset Member Abba Eban presented principles for the platform. He demanded to change the term "territorial compromise" and substitute instead "territorial agreement," a recognized term in international law. He proposed that in negotiations with Syria and Jordan, Israel be prepared to discuss agreements which will bring peace in stages, starting with the ending of the state of war. The permanent border between Israel and Syria will run through the Golan Heights according to a negotiated agreement. Israel should strive for peace with a Jordanian-Palestinian state, based on territorial agreement which will provide Israel with defensible borders, the rule of a Jordanian-Palestinian state over dense centers of Arab population, and the preservation of the Jewish character of the State of Israel. Such peace requires the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and the Palestinians must participate in defining their future through negotiations attended by their elected representatives, Eban stated.

Moshe Karmel argued that the main basis for the platform should be the platform for the previous elections. He does not see any substantive changes in the platform. The nuclear threat in the region should be taken into consideration, Karmel added.

Knesset Member Z'ev Katz demanded a detailed platform. He argued that if the platform is limited to general principles it will not solve the territorial, strategic, and settlement problems.

Israel Gat stated he opposed a Palestinian state, but supports self-determination for the Palestinians, which should not be confused with the term self-rule, which is worthless.

Hayim Rimon also supported the term self-determination for the Palestinians. Asher Meniv demanded general principles in the platform, which can be used in future negotiations, while Yosef N'vo insisted on spelling out the principles.

At the end of the session a heated argument started between Professor Z'ev Sternhal who claimed that there was no difference between a territory held by the IDF and one in which both the IDF and settlements are present, from a security standpoint, and Ariq Nehemqin, who maintained that there is a great difference in motivation between the two when it comes to security considerations.

The Yahdav circle (which support Shim'on Peres), which convened at the end of the week under the chairmanship of the Tel Aviv district of the Labor party's secretary, Member of Knesset Eliyahu Speiser, decided that Peres has to clearly announce his readiness to accept the challenge to his candidacy at the convention; that the party decide on the terms of the contest; and that the ratio of representation not be tampered with after the contest.

The meeting, which included Knesset members Yehezqel Zakay, Tamar Eshel, and Yehudah Hashay, Secretary of Tel Aviv Workers' council Dov ben Meir, Aharon Harel, Masha Lubleski, Rina Dotan, Hayim Rimon, Dov Tabori and others, resulted in a decision not to rule out any candidate who has a right to a position because of personality, personal activities, or geographical location.

The party's Jerusalem district's secretary, Member of Knesset Uzi Bar'am, a supporter of Peres, said at the end of the week that he did not rule out the possibility of including Yitzhak Rabin in the Labor's senior team and as member of the next government. Rabin's public popularity should be used in the interest of the party, he added.

The Alignment chairman, Member of Knesset Moshe Shahal (also a Rabin supporter), said that Rabin has put in question the choice of Shim'on Peres as the elected candidate, and as long as this is the case, Peres' candidacy should be determined by a large majority and in a definitive and unequivocal way.

Hertzlia Mayor Yosef N'vo, a Rabin supporter, said that the contest was a democratic way of reaching a decision, provided that everyone accepted the decision of the convention.

MAPAM's general secretary, Victor Shemtov, said that the contest has become a fact. He sees hints of a split in some of the statements, which can spell disaster for the labor movement.

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LAND PURCHASED TO EXPAND JUDAEA, SAMARIA SETTLEMENTS

TA151636 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 15 Dec 80 p 2

[Report by Jerusalem correspondent Mordekhay Basok: "Thousands of Dunams of Expropriated Land Have Been Added to Settlements in Judaea and Samaria"]

[Excerpt] The Israel Land Administration and the Jewish National Fund have purchased thousands of dunams of landin the past few months for six Jewish settlements in Judaea and Samaria. Some of the land acquired has been registered in the land registry books. The murder of the two Arabs in Silwad near Jerusalem recently is also connected to sale of land.

The purchase of land is being conducted under a cloak of secrecy, out of fear for the lives of the Arab brokers. The land purchased is scrub, of no agricultural value. It is being sold at exorbitant prices, much beyond its real value. The Arab brokers justified the high price, saying that the sellers feared for their lives.

In the meantime, the Qiriyat Arba' land problem has been solved. The settlement will shortly receive thousands of dunams, not all of it as one continuous piece of land. The land in question is Miri land [term from period of Ottoman rule meaning state-owned land]. The Israeli Government, through the military government, has recently declared its ownership of the land. Yesterday it was learned that Arab villagers west of (Shalalda), in the neighborhood of al-Sharah, north of Qiriyat Arba' complained that 1,000 dunams of Miri land in their area were declared as belonging to the Qiriyat Arba' planning region. As is the custom, they were given three weeks to submit their appeal to the High Court of Justice. If they do so, their appeal will be transferred to the military government board of appeals, as was the case with Giv'at Haharsina. In that particular case the petition was rejected, and scores of apartments for Qiriyat Arba' settlers are now being constructed there. Qiriyat Arba' settlers told our correspondent that "the dog does not bark when it has no complaints."

The land problem has been similarly resolved in Ari'el, although the quantity of land added there was much more modest.

A senior source in the Jewish settlements council said, that, nevertheless, in numerous settlements such as 'Ofra, Baty Horon, Shave Shomron and Tapu'ah the land problems have not bee solved yet. In Qedumim the problems were only partially solved. The Elon Moreh settlement on Mount Kabir also faces land problems.

Uri Ari'el one of the "Amana" leaders [a Gush Emunim settlement movement], said yesterday that there has been considerable land buying activity in the territories. He said that this refers to both official bodies such as the Jewish National Fund and the Israel Land Authority, and to private individuals. According to him, the "Amana" movement does not purchase any land itself, although it encourages others to do so. He added that his movement did not accept the prime minister's statement that only another 10 settlements would go up in the territories before the autonomy was established. "We have told the prime minister and the agriculture minister that this position is completely unacceptable to us." According to Uri Ari'el, "Amana" will put up settlements according to its ability and according to what it considers to be state needs.

He did not rule out the possibility that a new settlement would be established on the Rujays land, where Elon Moreh used to be located. It should be recalled that the state purchased dozens of dunams there. According to Ari'el, "Amana" will put settlers there "if there are enough lands and other possibilities there." He declined to explain the meaning of the term "other possibilities."

It was also learned yesterday that the Israel Land Administration would like to establish a neighborhood of villas and high-rises in an-Nabi Samu'il, 2 km away from the Jerusalem Ramot neighborhood. On this site there are some 500 dunams of private land that belong to Jews and that were purchased some 50 years ago. The Israel Land Administration will submit the settlement plan for approval by the Judaea and Samaria military government headquarters. The plan also emcompasses public institutions such as schools, an infirmary, etc.

The minister in charge of the Israel Land Administration is Agriculture Minister Ari'el Sharon.

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VALIDITY OF JORDANIAN OPTION QUESTIONED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Oct 80 p 5

[Editorial: "The Jordanian Option"]

[Text] Of all the Arab countries, Jordan is the only one which has not been satisfied with the expression of verbal support in the Iraqi war against Iran but instead has made available to Baghdad air bases, port facilities, and roads in order to permit the Iraqi air force to find a haven for its expensive aircraft and the Soviets to expedite supplies to the Iraqi forces.

For Rabat 'Amman this has involved a substantive political turnabout because in recent years it has been tied to Syria, Iraq's old enemy, without severing completely its traditional ties to the western powers. Now Jordan has turned its back both on Damascus and Washington and has been backing a country which is one of the most extreme in the Arab rejectionist front.

The question confronting Israel is whether or not, in light of the position which King Husayn has taken in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict, the "Jordanian option" is still open? Is it possible to continue to base a political doctrine on the assumption that if the government of Israel is changed and the Alignment comes to power it would be appropriate to invite King Husayn to join the peace negotiations in the firm hope that he would not only respond affirmatively but would be prepared to agree to a territorial compromise?

The Alignment is preparing for the elections with a program based on this expectation. It circumvents with various explanations the repeated statements of the king of Jordan that he is opposed both to the Camp David Agreements and the territorial compromise formula. The Alignment believes that Jordan is playing a double game, and while it declares it has no interest in negotiating with Israel, it continues nevertheless to show an open and active interest in what is happening in Judea and Samaria. This means that it continues to be a possible partner in the talks with Israel.

Is this assumption still valid? After Jordan's joining the most extreme camp in the Arab world, is it possible to determine that this in sum is a tactic and that Huseyn is still prepared to abandon his new allies in order to join al-Sadat in an effort to achieve a comprehensive peace with Israel?

The hope at this time appears to be completely unrealistic, and the ideologues of the Labor Party who reject the autonomy plan because of the prospect of reaching an agreement on a territorial compromise with Husayn must reassess their political platform in light of the new orientation which Jordan has chosen.

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NEGEV BEDOUINS COMPLAIN OF 'BLACK GOAT' LAW

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Oct 80 p 10

[Article by Dr Yitzhaq Baili: "The Black Goat Law"]

[Text] The economic and cultural existence of the approximate 100 Bedouin sheep-herding families in the Negev mountains is in immediate danger. On 9 October, the green patrol of the Ministry of Agriculture began to seize the flocks of black goats of these Bedouins and sell them for slaughter.

The legal basis for this operation is the plant protection law (goat damages), called the "Black Goat Law" adopted in 1950 but never enforced. According to this law, a person can raise goats "only in the land areas belonging to him," however, the Bedouins of the Negev mountains have only small land areas, which they use in the winter for growing wheat for their bread. Nevertheless, the Bedouins of the Negev mountains, like their forebears are accustomed to finding a natural pasture for their flocks in the desert spaces outside their plots of land.

Senior Israeli ecologists concerned with the wilderness describe the Black Goat Law and the concept of the "destructive goat" on which it is based as antiquated. In a letter to the JERUSALEM POST (15 Aug 1978) Professors Mikhael Even-Ari and Emanuel Noi-Meir of Jerusalem and Ze'ev Naveh of the Technion made the following points for the protection of the black goat:

*A goat which consumes shrubbery does not kill it but prunes it. The shrubs can still grow, blossom, and multiply even with the constant presence of goats in the area.

*The grazing of the goats prevents the shrubs and trees from taking over the entire area and pushing out and destroying the herbaceous plants, including useful grazing grasses and beautiful wild flowers, and also the various kinds of wildlife and birds which need open areas and grassy vegetation. As such, the black goat plays a role in the preservation of the balance and variety in nature.

*The black goat is well able to exist in hot mountainous regions with shrubbery vegetation. It produces milk and meat primarily with wooden and thorny plants which have no other economic use. The meat and milk produced by the black goats in the pasture cost the national economy less imported fodder and less foreign currency than any other kind of protein from a living thing which we can produce or import.

Although the ecologists warned of the danger of overgrazing (a situation in which the number of goats in a certain area is too large and causes too much consumption of the vegetation in that area), they concluded that "the problem is not how to get rid of the black goat but rather how to protect it in a controlled framework in order to prevent overgrazing."

In accordance with these points, Dr Moshe Sharon, the then prime minister's advisor on Arab affairs, made "proposals for the controlled raising of sheep of Bedouins in the Negev" (Document 66.0-4, Office of the Prime Minister, 4 September 1978). According to these suggestions, 1000 families throughout the Negev would be permitted to raise 80 goats each. It was also decided that the state would make pasturelands available to these Bedouins and provide them water at a fee. Supervision of the implementation was assigned, according to the proposals, to the inspectors of the green patrol.

These proposals of Dr Sharon were not implemented because of the opposition of the Ministry of Agriculture. Nevertheless, they recognized the fact that "maintenance of the traditional way of life which is based on sheep raising is still important to many Bedouins."

It is especially important to Bedouins who are serving as scouts in the IDF--Bedouins whose life experience in "the territory" prepares them for scouting. In the entire Negev mountains there is virtually no family whose sons have not served the IDF. Among them are also IDF disabled. The only request of these Bedouins to the state for 30 years has been to permit them to live in accordance with their traditions.

In the last 3 years, this sole request was not satisfied and has led to frustration. First, a large part of the Negev mountains (about 1,500 square kilometers) was declared a nature preserve. The Bedouins who were living in this area were removed by the green patrol. As a result of the peace agreement with Egypt, broad firing ranges of the IDF, most of which have not been used since 1967, are again required for training within the framework of the withdrawal from Sinai. From what remains in the Negev mountains, the best of the pasturelands of the Bedouins (about 20,000 dunams) were given to the Sede Boqer kibbutz which decided to raise a flock of 200 sheep--and the flocks of the Bedouins were prevented from entering these areas by kilometers of barbed wire fences which were provided by the Jewish Agency.

Finally, after the 100 Bedouin families in the Negev mountains found corners in the desert which were not declared nature preserves, training areas, or new lands for Sede Boqer, the green patrol came, and this time on behalf of the Israel Lands Administration, to inform them that they were on state lands and that they had to leave the area.

The Bedouins appealed therefore to the courts which issued an injunction prohibiting the green patrol from removing them until their demands were heard in court. However, the Bedouins' rest was short-lived because now the green patrol had begun to seize their flocks of goats under the authority of the Black Goat Law.

The Bedouins in the Negev mountains are not claiming ownership over broad areas. Their demands for the most part are for small sections, those which their fathers worked in remote wadis. Nevertheless, they regard the Negev mountains as their home in the broader sense, just as a Tel Avivian considers himself a resident of the entire city.

In the past the Negev mountains were the tribal area of the Bedouins and they enjoyed free access to all the pasturelands and water sources there. European researchers who visited the Negev mountains in the 19th century left behind incisive evidence of the presence of Bedouins of those tribes there.

For example, in 1835, Edward Robinson from the United States visited them in the Negev mountains "between Wadi 'Arava and Hatiya of the Sinai." In 1869, the British orientalist Professor Palmer found them in En'Aqev and in Nahal Zin, and the Czech researcher Alois Mosil met with them in 1897 on Ramat Mitrad and next to 'Avedat.

Today the 100 shepherd families in the Negev mountains are not seeking ownership over the entire tribal area which was available to their fathers and even not an approach to this entire area. Also, as citizens who have always supported the defense of the state, they are not disputing its current defense requirements. All they are asking is to remain in the region, which they know and which is holy to them because it is the burial ground of their fathers to whom they offer sacrifices and seek blessing.

In 1977, I proposed to the Nature Preservation Authority to integrate 40 families (only!) as nomads in the Negev mountains preserve (about 1,500 square kilometers) where their flocks would be limited in number and under effective supervision. However, this proposal was rejected incidentally through the decision that "nomads and nature preserves do not go together." The fact that Bedouins who still maintain an almost biblical way of life represent an educational asset sought after by students, researchers, soldiers, and visitors from abroad, did not dissolve the opposition of the Nature Preservation Authority.

An additional solution is being discussed now in contacts between the Civil Rights Association in Israel and members of the Ben-Meir Committee responsible for the settlement of Bedouins in the Negev. According to the plan submitted by the Association, a village for about 100 families who tend their flocks in the Negev mountains themselves will be established, and they will raise sheep there for meat and milk. For 6 months, the Bedouins will feed their flocks with provided food, and in the winter season they will be allocated natural pasturelands. Both the Bedouins and the national economy will benefit from discontinuation of their specialization in sheep raising.

However, if the Ministry of Agriculture does not stop seizing and destroying the flocks of the Bedouins, there will be no basis for discussion of the agreed upon solution. These Bedouins who have cast their lot with the State of Israel regard the enforcement of the Black Goat Law against them as an act of discrimination intended primarily to remove them from the Negev mountains into towns prepared for them next to Be'er Sheva. In such an atmosphere, every solution found for them in the future will only constitute a political loss for the State of Israel because the anger and bitterness of the Bedouins will continue.

Moreover, a new idea is growing among these Bedouins that perhaps it would be better for them to leave the State of Israel before their staff of life is broken completely. If this tendency actually materializes, we will have to ask ourselves the question: Is it true that even minorities that go along with us cannot expect consideration and security in the Jewish state?

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BRIEFS

ARAB LAND EXPROPRIATED IN GALILEE--The government has expropriated 117 dunams of land belonging to four persons in Sakhnin, an Arab village in Bet Netofa valley, in order to extend the holdings of Lotan, a lookout post near the village. The announcement of the expropriation, published in RESHUMOT, the government gazette, said the land was needed for public purposes. Government officials said the four land-owners had refused any compensation in money or land. They quoted one of them as saying he would have rejected any offer, "even if I was offered a plot in the garden of Eden." The committee of Arab local councils said Arabs in the Galilee have no objection to land being expropriated for public use--Jewish or Arab. But it does object to land being taken from Arabs and given to Jewish settlements and land-owners, it said. This is the first time in two years that land has been expropriated from Arab villages and given to a lookout post. Most of the 17,000 dunams expropriated four years ago from Arab villages in the Galilee were used for public projects, such as roads, or are being held in reserve. Fifty dunams of the land expropriated four years ago has recently been allocated to the Arab village of al-Makr in Western Galilee. The government also gave al-Makr and the neighboring (Saydah) 200,000 shekels for cultural and social projects. [Text] [TA160943 Jerusalem JERUSALEM POST in English 16 Dec 80 p 3]

PLO-UNIFIL PACT--A secret pact was signed about 1 month ago by the commander of the UNIFIL force in southern Lebanon, General Emanuel Erskine, and the PLO leadership, according to which armed Palestinians will be given freedom of action and movement in the UNIFIL region in disregard of Security Council resolutions prohibiting the armed presence of terrorists in this region. This was disclosed by the Christian-Phalangist publication, AL-AMAL. According to the newspaper, which based its report on reliable sources, General Erskine kept the pact secret and did not report it to the UN headquarters in New York. This headquarters sent him a sharply worded letter and placed the responsibility on him for the effects of this pact, reports AL-AMAL. UNIFIL at the time permitted the entry and stay or armed PLO signal officers in its area of control besides the extra territorial status which has been given to terrorist positions in the area. At the end of May 1978 as a result of the United Nations-PLO pact, arrangements were made for the presence of terrorists who infiltrated into the area under UNIFIL supervision. UN authorities estimated the number of terrorists who stayed in the area under UNIFIL control to be 190, and today they acknowledge the presence of about 300. However, the true figure is about 600-700 terrorists. [Text] [Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 1 Oct 80 p 1] 5830

EGYPTIAN MARKETING AGREEMENT--The Israeli Agricultural Exporting Company, AGREXCO, and an Egyptian company signed an agreement for economic and commercial cooperation in five fields, AGREXCO's marketing of Egyptian agricultural produce in Europe. AGREXCO's director general and the chairman of the Egyptian exporters and producers union, who has recently visited Israel, signed this agreement. The AGREXCO Company also opened a liaison office in Cairo and exported large quantities of butter and bananas to Egypt over the last 2 weeks. The two companies have also decided to cooperate on production of seeds and to exchange know-how in this field. [TA151755 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 15 Dec 80 p 8]

NEW SETTLEMENT NEAR JERUSALEM--The Israel Lands Authority is to establish a new settlement near (Nabi Samwel), north of Jerusalem. To this end, the authority will allot about 500 dunams of state domain land, or land owned by the Jewish National Fund. Our correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh notes that the land lies outside Jerusalem's boundaries, and now an approval is being awaited from the planning committee of the Judaea and Samaria command. [Text] [TA141217 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1200 GMT 14 Dec 80]

EXPANSION OF W. BANK SETTLEMENTS REPORTED--The area of several settlements in Judaea and Samaria is being expanded. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari has learned that, for instance, about 1,000 dunams near the village of Si'ir will be added to Qiryat Arba' and apparently an industrial center will be established there. Our correspondent has been told that the land was untitled [bilti-musdarot] and that proceedings were underway to declare it state-owned land. The mukhtars of the ('Arab Sha'lalde) bedouin tribe on the site have been informed of their right to appeal the decision to the military appeals committee or the high court of justice. The area in question consists of rocky, uncultivated and scattered plots of land. The area of Ari'el is also going to be expanded. It has also been learned that there are intentions to annex additional land to the Tel-Hadasha settlement in the Giv'on area. The villagers in the area have already appealed the issue to the high court of justice. [Text] [TA141121 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 14 Dec 80]

BOOKS, TRADE FAIRS PARTICIPATION WITH CAIRO--Israel will participate in the International Books Fair scheduled to be held at the end of January in Cairo and in the International Trade Fair to take place in May 1981 in Cairo. This was decided last week in Cairo at the end of the meetings of the Israeli-Egyptian normalization committee. It was also decided that the land terminal for the passage of goods between Egypt and Israel--which was agreed upon a few months ago--would open tomorrow. The terminal will be located at Ne'ot Sinai. Goods will be allowed to pass between the two countries from 0800 to 1200. In order to assure the speedy transfer of the goods, a 3-day notice prior to the arrival of the Israeli cargo to the Ne'ot Sinai terminal will be required. In the meantime, reports persist about the difficulties faced by Egyptian citizens wishing to visit Israel. About 20,000 Israelis have thus far visited Egypt whereas only 1,000 Egyptians have arrived in Israel, most of them to visit relatives in the Gaza Strip and northern Sinai. [Excerpt] [TA141054 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 14 Dec 80 p 3]

NOVEMBER CONSUMER PRICE INDEX--The consumer price index rose by 9.4 percent last month, with price increases in all categories of consumer goods, particularly in food and transportation costs. The index has risen by nearly 120 percent since the

beginning of the year. The treasury said that the rise in the index again proved the dire and urgent need to cut government spending and prevent the funneling of additional money into the economy. [Excerpt] [TA141412 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 15 Dec 80]

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD AT BI'R ZAYT--A political organization--the Muslim Brotherhood--has for the first time begun to operate at Bi'r Zayt University. This has been learned by our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari. A Muslim Brotherhood list ran for election to the association of university teachers and workers in the territories. However, it was defeated by a leftist list. A group of Muslim Brotherhood activists has also begun to operate among the Bi'r Zayt students and they have been arguing with the leftists on how to conduct Falastin week. The leftists favored a moderate tactic whereas the Muslim Brotherhood members demanded a firm struggle. [Text] [TA151147 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1100 GMT 15 Dec 80]

KIBBUTZ MOVEMENT FAVORS GOLAN ANNEXATION--A large majority of the United Kibbutz Movement Council has decided to take action toward applying Israeli law and administration on the Golan. Our correspondent Avraham Ben-Melekh said that another resolution adopted unanimously was that the Golan is an inseparable part of the State of Israel and Israeli sovereignty over the Golan would constitute a guarantee for security and peace. The movement also pledged itself to work for continued development of the Golan together with the bodies dealing with settlement and [the Histadrut-affiliated] Hevrat 'Ovdim. These resolutions were endorsed at the end of the council meeting held at Kibbutz Nezer Sereni. [Text] [TA120609 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 11 Dec 80]

GRANT MADE TO WEST BANK VILLAGES--Ramallah, 15 Dec--Today the Hebron hills villages received a grant of 10 million Israeli shekels from the military government, for the development of water sources and projects in the region. The large grant was handed over by the commander of Judaea and Samaria, Brig Gen Binyamin Ben-Eli'ezer, during a tour of the area. The chairman of the Agricultural Association of the Hebron Hills Villages, Mustafa Dudin, who has served as minister of agriculture in several Jordanian governments, acknowledged the grant, saying that this sum would solve a considerable part of the problems caused by the grave shortage of water from which the area has been suffering for several years. He is convinced that the inhabitants will flourish from now on. The ITIM correspondent in Judaea and Samaria reported that the inhabitants of the Hebron hills have been complaining for a long time that the funds from the Jordanian-PLO "Stand Fast" ['Amidah Ha-Eytanah] Fund have bypassed the Hebron hills villages, which are suffering from drought, and this has caused a drop in incomes and poverty. [Text] [TA152053 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1840 GMT 15 Dec 80]

JORDAN-SAUDI AID CONFLICT TO TERRITORIES--Jordan and Saudi Arabia are at odds over aid to the territories. Jordan is upset that a Saudi bank in Jiddah wants to extend aid to the West Bank, directly rather than through Amman. The reference is to the Islamic Bank of Saudi Arabia which has established a special fund--called the Jerusalem Fund--for the purpose of assisting Islamic projects and municipal councils that encourage religious tendencies. Jordan acceded to the establishment of the fund on the condition that the money is channeled through it. A Samaria mayor who directly appealed to the Saudi Fund was reprimanded by Jordan. The mayor said in his defense that the joint Jordanian-PLO committee was not paying him. [Text] [TA160950 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 16 Dec 80]

MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD ACTIVITY--Another Muslim Brotherhood group has organized in the territories, this time in a religious university in east Jerusalem. This group is operating under the aegis of the Supreme Muslim Council. Our correspondent Pinhas 'Inbari has learned that female students have also joined this group. The women wear special traditional attires and the men grow beards. [Text] [TA160947 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 16 Dec 80]

IMMIGRATION DATA--For the first time in 10 years the number of immigants arriving in Israel in a 1-month period dropped below 1,000 in November. A reduction in exit permits granted to Soviet Jews and extensive reportage about the high inflation and unemployment rates in Israel were believed to be the cause. [TA151755 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 15 Dec 80 p 1]

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

SUPPORT FOR KURDISH STATE--Beirut, 6 Dec (AFP)--Three Kurdish organizations today expressed satisfaction with Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi's announcement of support for the creation of an independent Kurdish state. The three groups were the Syrian division of the National Union of Kurdistan, the Kurdish Workers Party of Turkey and the Lebanese section of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan. In a communique, the groups also reiterated Kurdish support for "the legitimate rights of Arab peoples" and to "the progressive forces represented by the steadfastness front." It was reported yesterday that Col al-Qadhdhafi said the establishment of an independent Kurdish state was the only solution to the Kurdish problem. [Text] [NC061641 Paris AFP in English 1625 GMT 6 Dec 80]

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

SHEET GLASS FACTORY--Dr 'Ali Khalaf, secretary general of the Gulf Industrial Investment Organization, said yesterday that the Gulf countries have decided to establish a sheet glass factory costing 200 million dollars. The Qatar newspaper GULF TIMES reported that 45 percent of the output of the factory, whose productive capacity is 100,000 tons annually, will be used by Saudi Arabia and that 30 percent will be used by Iraq. He said that studies are currently under way to determine the factory's location. He added that an agreement for establishing a factory to produce aluminum will be signed next month in Bahrain. It will cost 34 million Bahraini dinars (90 million dollars). [Text] [Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 17 Nov 80 p 15]

CSO: 4802

INTERIOR MINISTRY CONCLUDES SECURITY AGREEMENTS WITH TAIWAN

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 15 Nov 80 p 19

/Article: "Saudi-Chinese Meeting Discusses Cooperation Between Both Parties in Security Areas"/

/Text/ Yesterday evening a meeting was held in Taipeh between the Saudi and Chinese parties, headed by His Royal Highness Prince Ahmad ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, undersecretary of the interior, and Gen 'Aziz /sic/ Wang, Chinese director of national security.

During the meeting, which was attended by members of the delegation accompanying his highness and a number of Chinese security agency officials, a discussion was made on issues related to cooperation between the two countries in various security fields.

His Royal Highness Prince Ahmad ibn 'Abd-al-Aziz, the undersecretary of the interior, who is visiting Nationalist China, attended a dinner party held in his honor by Shaykh Ahmad Abu 'Ashi, charge d'affaires in the kingdom's embassy in Taipeh, yesterday evening.

Attending the party were His Excellency Sun Yun-hsuan, premier of nationalist China and president of the Chinese Executive Council, a number of Chinese ministers, the commanders of the armed forces, the dean of the foreign diplomatic corps in Taipeh, and a number of Chinese officials, in addition to the delegation accompanying his highness.

Prince Ahmad gave a talk at the party in which he expressed his thanks and appreciation for the great hospitality his highness and the delegation accompanying him had received from all Chinese officials during their visit to Nationalist China. His highness said, "In this visit we have learned about much concerning security which China can offer the kingdom in this area."

In his statement, the prince praised the stability and security which Nationalist China enjoys, in spite of the great threat facing it from international Communism, from Communist China in particular. He said that Nationalist China represents a true living example of progress before mankind in comparison with Communist China, which is staggering under Communist rule.

His highness talked about destructive Communism and the attempts it makes to spread its corrupt poisons among various areas of the world. He said that the Middle East region and other countries in various regions have suffered and are suffering from Communist interference in their destiny and their affairs, exposing these countries to backwardness, weakness and damage to their principles and values.

In this regard, his highness stressed "Our tolerant Islamic belief is a deterrent barrier in the face of destructive Marxist ideas in our Arab Islamic society, and this will cause these societies to be remote from Communist influence."

His highness called upon the peoples of the free and advanced world to consolidate efforts to repel international Communist aggression and save those who fall under its influence from this dominance.

His highness said, "We believe that man's mission is the good of his brother man, and one of the prime obligations of human rights is to banish the red danger whose various ways and means are characterized by bloodshed and repression."

In concluding his talk, his highness spelled out his thanks to his excellence the Chinese premier for presenting the great medal to his highness and praised the strong friendship and affection joining the two countries, which are growing and flourishing with the passage of time.

His excellency the Chinese premier also made a statement in which he praised the firm historic relations joining the two friendly countries and expressed his country's thanks to the kingdom for the great aid it has offered Nationalist China in various fields. He expressed his country's readiness to offer every service to the kingdom.

His excellence also asserted that His Highness Prince Ahmad's current visit to China would help develop and consolidate relations between the two countries in all areas.

In addition His Royal Highness Prince Ahmad ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz stressed yesterday that the actions of the government of His Majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, servant of the two holy shrines, on behalf of brother Moslems in every area of the world are a commitment on the part of his majesty the king, and his predecessors, always to perform this duty.

In another area, His Royal Highness Prince Ahmad ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the undersecretary of interior, made a visit to the Protectorate General of the Taiwan Region and heard a statement by Gen Wang Jinesh, head of the protectorate, on his tasks.

After that his highness went on a visit to the Taipeh Mosque, where he performed two prayers of salutation to the mosque and met with Shaykh Da'ud Chu, the head of the Islamic Society in Nationalist China, the members of the society and the imam of the mosque.

Shaykh Da'ud welcomed His Highness Prince Ahmad ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz and explained to him the society's activity of spreading Islam in China and educating the Moslem people there.

He also expressed the society's appreciation to the government and people of the kingdom for the aid they have provided the society.

He sent greetings to His Majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz and His Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz the crown prince and deputy prime minister for the constant support they have provided for Moslems everywhere.

The head of the Chinese Islamic Society talked about the history of Islam's advent to China and said "Islam came to China 1,000 years ago but after the Communists made the revolution they closed down all the mosques and Islamic societies, which caused Moslems to flee under the oppression of Communist tyranny and move the society to Taiwan.

He said that according to Chinese Communist government statistics the number of Moslems in China in the past was greater than 50 million but, in the latest Communist government statistics, it appeared that the number of Moslems in China does not exceed 10 million. Shaykh Da'ud added that thousands of mosques were closed down there but that the Moslems would triumph in the end and they bore great responsibility for spreading Islam.

Then His Highness Prince Ahmad ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz talked to the Islamic Society of Nationalist China, emphasizing the great responsibility laid upon them to make the eternal mission of Islam known.

He stressed that the action the government of His Majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, servant of the two holy shrines, for the Moslem brothers in China and everywhere else in the world are a commitment on the part of his majesty the king and his predecessor's to perform this duty always and eternally.

Addressing the members of the society, his highness said "I send you the greetings of your Moslem brethren in the kingdom, from the holy house and mosque of his prophet Muhammad, may God's peace and blessings be upon him, who send their greetings to you in Taiwan or in the motherland." His highness added, "Your brothers in the kingdom beseech almighty God to give you success in your mission and call on almighty God to cast light upon the oppressed under tyrannical Communist rule, and may God help his servants, love his army and abandon his enemies."

His Highness Prince Ahmad ibn 'Abd-al-Aziz stressed that no matter how unjust and vain the enemies of God may be, the end will belong to the pious, with God's permission, and he said "Almighty God, to whom be praise, has ordered us to be patient and perseverant and put our trust in him in all our acts. The devout always suffer but God's reward for this tribulation in the world and the hereafter is great."

He said, "Your insistence on the right and your perseverance will have a good effect on the glory of Islam and the Moslems in China."

11887
CSO: 4802

INTERIOR MINISTRY ISSUES 1978-79 STATISTICAL DIGEST

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 8 Nov 80 p 3

/Article: "Ministry of the Interior Issues Its Register for the Year 1978-79"/

/Text/ His Royal Highness Prince Nayif ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the minister of the interior, presented a copy of the fifth edition of the Ministry of the Interior's Statistical Register to His Majesty King Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, His Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the crown prince and prime minister; and His Royal Highness Prince 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, the second deputy prime minister and head of the National Guard.

The register contains statistical data on the activities of the ministry and its various agencies during 1978-79.

The book, which relies on official figures and statistics, is aimed at informing citizens and researchers of the efforts the ministry is making in various fields of establishing order, fighting crime (in a manner which has led to a drop in the crime rate), and highlighting the role the kingdom is fulfilling as a pioneering country in the fields of achieving security and stability and bringing the crime rate to its lowest levels.

The Statistical Register stresses that crimes which occurred in the kingdom in 1978-79 in their totality represent a reasonable percentage when compared with similar rates in all other countries, once consideration is given to the comprehensive renaissance the kingdom is going through in all spheres and the resultant entry of manpower of different groups and nationalities to deal with this renaissance.

The proportion of Saudi perpetrators of crimes was 68 percent and that of foreigners was roughly 32 percent.

The statistics also show that crimes of a serious character, such as murder and the like, do not in their totality exceed 4.6 percent of total crimes. In the area of analysis of the statistics, the book referred to the government of the kingdom's anxiety and insistence on fighting and eliminating drugs, as they are in violation of Islamic law and have a dangerous effect on the health and minds of citizens.

The book stated that in the field of traffic, the number of cars registered in the provinces of the kingdom totalled 1,723,116 and the number of license plates given

out in 1979-80 came to 290,207, 159,272 of which were private, 12,779 were for taxis, 115,679 were for transportation and 2,477 were for buses--a drop of 29,729 from last year.

The automobile driving licenses given out last year came to 241,153 and the number of automobile accidents totalled 17,743; 16,703 persons were injured and 2,843 persons died in these. The proportion of non-Saudi drivers involved in the accidents came to 37 percent of the total.

In the realm of civil defense, the number of firefighting operations throughout the kingdom totalled 3,870 as compared with 4,365 cases last year, or a drop of 495 cases, or 11.4 percent.

The fires resulted in material damages of 176,945,699 riyals, the death of 66 men and 15 women, serious injury to 67 men and 28 women and minor injuries to 189 men and 38 women.. The number of deaths due to fire dropped by 45 percent from 1977-78.

Lifesaving activities of civil defense agencies in departments and centers throughout the kingdom totalled 559 as compared with 445 cases last year; these cases resulted in material damages totalling 5,086,020 riyals. They also resulted in the death of 553 men and 43 women and minor injuries to 230 men and 44 women.

The drop in fire cases and the rise in lifesaving activities may be attributed to the development of telecommunications systems, provision of these systems in civil defense behicles, the availability of light and heavy technical equipment in civil defense agencies, the continued training of employees in modern equipment so they may be used in the most thorough manner, and the constant awareness of citizens thanks to the indoctrination programs and the activities pursued by other agencies to eliminate garbage and debris.

In the realm of passports, the number of people of Arab origin acquiring Saudi citizenship in 1978-79 came to 1,024, including 574 males and 450 women, and of persons of non-Arab origin 590,of whom 349 were men and 242 were women.

The number of Saudis who left the kingdom totalled 881,358 and those who returned to it 913,807. Of these, 258,711 citizens left by airports, 15,900 by seaports and 606,000 and 747,735 /sic/ through /land points/; 230, /missing/ citizens returned to it through airports, 16,430 citizens through seaports and 667 /sic/ citizens through land points.

The number of foreigners coming from various countries to the kingdom totalled 2,484,749 and those leaving it totalled 2,423,547. The number of people coming in by airports totalled 1,614,100, through seaports 88,927 and through land points 371,722. The number of persons leaving by airports totalled 1,578,649, by seaports 86,294, and by land points 758,604.

The number of students in the Domestic Security Forces College in the academic year 1979-80 came to 897, of whom 329 were in the preparatory year, 203 in the middle year and 265 in the final year. The number of graduates totalled 2,201, of whom 2,063 were of officer rank and 138 were of noncommissioned officer rank.

In the field of medical services, the number of men, women and children visiting Public Security health units came to 126,204. The number of doctors and administrators working in the General Department of Medical Services in Public Security came to 303, of whom 182 were Saudi and 121 were non-Saudi. There were 398 people working in the health units, distributed among the various working units.

In the field of institutes and wings belonging to the Public Security General Training Department, there is the Officers' Institute which was established in 1968, which has so far organized 19 training courses in which 507 officers enrolled; the Soldiers' Institute, which was established in 1966, which has so far organized 78 courses and graduated 4,760 persons; the Civil Defense Institute, founded in 1974, which has so far organized five courses, in which 526 students have studied; and the Traffic Institute, which was founded in 1967, and has so far organized 10 courses, in which 1,527 students have enrolled, sending 163 students to the United States for training courses. There are automobile driver training schools, the number of people admitted to which came to 103,309 students in 1979-80 and from which 62,547 graduated, as well as the Border Guard Institute founded in 1962, which has so far organized 90 courses from which a total of 3,821 people have graduated; the Passport Institute, established in 1972, which has so far organized four courses from which 510 people have graduated; the Music Wing, established in 1973, which has so far organized six courses graduating 278 people; the physical training Wing, established in 1972, which has organized six courses so far, with 330 people enrolling in them, of whom seven were non-Saudis; the Marksmanship Wing; the Machinery Wing, which was established in 1968 and has so far organized 32 courses which 1705 students have joined; the Languages Wing, which was established in 1969 and has held 11 courses so far which 122 students have enrolled in; and the Equestrian Wing which was established in 1970 and which has so far organized six courses in which 162 students have enrolled.

In the area of foreign fellowships, the number of people sent abroad to acquire scholarly degrees and take various courses totalled 407, of whom 15 were officers, 66 were noncommissioned officers, nine were employees and 317 were students. The Ministry of Interior in its plan has specified the diversification of specialized fields, to cover all various requirements.

Dr Ibrahim al-'Awaji, the undersecretary of Interior, stated that the ministry has followed the system of developing and improving all aspects of its activities in all sectors subsidiary to it. He said that attention to the manpower field has been clear and noticeable, through the inclusion of competent officers who have graduated from the Domestic Security Forces Faculty in operating security agencies, the inclusion of many university graduated and accredited persons, and the granting of foreign fellowships to large numbers of civilians and military persons to obtain higher scholarly credentials and train in various fields in order to be a good ministry nucleus of expertise and competence on which its expansions will be based in the future.

Dr al-'Awaji pointed out that to the same extent that attention has been given to the human element in developing the agencies in the ministry and raising the caliber of its activity, attention has been given to the technical aspects, since all agencies have been supplied with the most modern scientific equipment used

in the most advanced countries of the world in the service of security and in the fight against crime.

He praised the efforts of the government of his majesty the king and his crown prince in the realm of supporting the ministry's agencies and providing all necessary resources to assist them in realizing their mission, through the directives of his highness the minister of the interior and his highness the undersecretary, which have had the greatest effect in achieving these results.

11887
CSO: 4802

WRITER UNDERSCORES BENEFITS OF SOVIET TREATY TO SYRIA, ARABS

Aden 14 OCTOBER in Arabic 31 Oct 80 p 30

[Article by Ibrahim 'Abd al-Tawwab: "The Strategic Importance of the Soviet-Syrian Treaty"]

[Text] The Soviet-Syrian relationship has recently entered a new stage of development. The Friendship and Cooperation Treaty signed between the two countries early last month has endowed this relationship with a strategic and legalistic character.

It can be said that the elevation of the relationship between the two countries to this high and far-reaching level of development entails many advantages and benefits for Syria and the Arab struggle of liberation in its present phase. Perhaps the most important benefit is that the treaty constitutes a decisive practical response to al-Sadat's betrayal and capitulation and places the Camp David accords again in a new predicament, in addition to the predicament of reaching a dead-end.

On the pan-Arab level, the treaty is important in that it will tangibly put an end to the political turnabouts which seem to be developing. The early signs of such turnabouts can be seen in the implicit or open readiness of some Arab states and regimes to accept the American capitulationist formula for settling the Middle East crisis and the Arab-Zionist conflict, provided that such a formula be presented to those Arab parties in a form that is outwardly different from that of the Camp David accords. It is believed that the anticipated initiative of the Western European nations will provide just that kind of a modified formula. For some time now, this formula has been trumpeted and advertized by certain media and political circles known for their rightist orientations and Western connections which are interested in this type of modified, cosmetic settlement of the conflict in the region.

Furthermore, the Soviet-Syrian Friendship and Cooperation Treaty will spare the Arab forces of steadfastness, principally Syria and the Palestinian resistance movement, the need to depend on Arab solidarity as defined by the Baghdad and Tunis summits. That kind of solidarity has offered a supine response to the Camp David trio and the capitulationist plans it has advocated. It has also failed to respond to the exigencies of confrontation--especially the exigencies and requirements of military confrontation with the Zionist enemy which seemed determined to impede and encircle the process of political sifting which began

to take place in the Arab arena following the Egyptian ruler's visit to occupied Jerusalem and which resulted in the emergence of the Arab steadfastness front and the general Arab people's congress.

In addition to the above, the Soviet-Syrian treaty entails a great--even strategic--benefit for Syria in the following areas;

The Political Sphere

The treaty can play a major strategic role in overcoming the strategic imbalance in the Middle East, which occurred as a result of the removal of Egypt from the line of military confrontation with the Zionist enemy, as well as in striking a military balance between Syria and the Zionist entity. Such a balance is important and needed in the present juncture for fear of a war between the two sides. The outbreak of such a war is a distinct possibility, as we know. It is clear that the target of such a war would be Syria and the Palestinian resistance.

In this context, Syria has to take into consideration the possibility that the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary forces in the region may try to distract the steadfastness states by means of contrived side wars designed to prevent those states from providing actual military and material aid to Syria in the event of a war between Syria and the Zionist entity. Lest Syria, in a critical moment, be caught unawares by such a situation, it should seek to strike that kind of military balance with the enemy.

In fact, situations in which states of the steadfastness front are being distracted are not only possible but have actually existed for a while. Libya, for example, has been living for some time in a situation in which al-Sadat's regime has declared a state of war against it. The same can be said of Algeria. King Hassan II has said that he will chase down Polisario fighters even into Algerian territory. In that case, it is not unlikely that the regime of King Hassan II would provoke Algeria militarily. Likewise, it is not unlikely to expect Democratic Yemen to be distracted by similar stratagems, especially since it is located in a sensitive area which is of strategic and economic importance to the imperialist powers. It is noticed that the present situation in the region is complex and increasingly ridden by crises, particularly after the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war. On the whole, the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf region is living today in a state of oper war, prominently represented by the increase in the American and Western military presence, the Iraqi-Iranian war and unstable internal conditions which might distract the attention of the member states of the steadfastness front.

The Economic Sphere

Undoubtedly, the Syrian-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaty will guarantee Syria the opportunity to achieve speedy and coordinated economic development. Although such development will primarily depend on the internal conditions in Syria, the treaty will effectively lessen Syria's dependence on aid and loans, Arab or Western. Syria was the first to realize that such aid loans were used as a means of pressure to derrail Syria from its progressive, anti-imperialist

and anti-Zionist orientations. Syria has also found out that from experience that when the aid and loans failed to achieve the political goals behind them, the donors sought two alternative courses of action: one, to threaten to cut off the aid and loans, and, two, to look for other means that may be more effective in inhibiting Syria's political line of action and its opposition to the Camp David accords. Those means were found in the Moslem Brotherhood and other bourgeois, parasitic and feudal groups that are opposed to the progressive course of Syria and fearful that this course may one day destroy their class interests. Nevertheless, the group which were incited and guided by the imperialist-Zionist-reactionary forces to kill, terrorize and sabotage the economic institutions in the country have also failed, their attempts foiled from the outset.

In our view, Syria's victory against the terrorist groups, as was pointed out by the political report submitted to the latest congress of the Syrian Communist Party, is due to the fact that these groups were clearly perceived by the Syrian people to be carrying out an imperialist-Zionist-reactionary master-plan designed to bring Syria to its knees in favor of the implementation of the Camp David accords. As a result, the masses of the Syrian people, especially the workers, peasants and other toiling and educated groups of the Syrian people, failed to support and respond to the activities of the dissident groups and their claims which are robed in a religious mantel.

At the outset of this year, Syria conducted a comprehensive and important review of all aspects of the internal situation. It coupled that with a series of political, economic and legal laws and measures aimed at enhancing the efficiency of the state's administrative apparatus and improving the people's living conditions. Labor wages were raised. The agricultural ownership ceiling was lowered by a special law--a measure which earned the satisfaction of peasants in the countryside, since it would improve their living conditions.

In the realm of domestic and foreign trade, Syria has recently adopted a number of measures which will effectively minimize the role of parasitic bourgeoisie in that realm and lower its profits. In that connection, Syria has regulated the process of the importation, distribution and sale of vital goods connected with the daily needs of the people, taking that process away from the hands and control of the parasitic bourgeoisie. The industrial economic institutions in the country have been re-evaluated and reorganized in such areas as production, daily and annual returns, production improvement and the material and health conditions of the workers in these institutions. In addition to all that, and as part of these comprehensive measures, the government earmarked financial allocations for each province in the country. The less-developed provinces received larger allocations. The aim of that move was to promote the standard of services in the country as a whole.

Since late last year and early this year, Syria witnessed an unusual political resurgence on the mass level. This was represented by the following:

1) The prolonged meetings held by the national progressive front under the leadership of President Hafiz al-Asad toward the end of last year. In those meetings, the overall internal situation in the country, Syria's foreign policy and the national role it must play to counter the Camp David accords were discussed at length. The 10-day meetings resulted in a political statement which was described at the time as a program of political action for the next progressive phase in Syria. The statement triggered a series of wide-scale political

discussions and panels to debate the contents of the statement. A high-level political committee headed by the former prime minister was formed to organize and follow up those debates and symposia which were marked by candor and a positive approach. The general outcome of all those debates and discussions was an affirmation of the need to strengthen the internal situation in the country in a manner that would decisively guarantee the eradication of the roots of the counterrevolutionary forces and the liquidation of their material mainstays.

2) The affirmation of the need to intensify the fight against the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary forces while at the same time strengthening Syria's alliance with the national Arab liberation movement and the joint Palestinian-Lebanese forces and consolidating Syria's relationship with the world revolutionary forces and their vanguard--the countries of the Socialist system led by the Soviet Union.

3) The holding of the 7th regional congress of the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party early this year. The debates and results of the congress were positive and received the support of all the national and progressive forces in the country. The report submitted by the central committee of the Syrian Communist Party to the recent party congress more than 2 months ago emphasizes that, on many issues, the results of the Ba'th party congress went beyond the aforementioned statement of the national front and reaffirmed the need to solve all the issues and carry out all the goals set forth in the internal and foreign policy spheres.

4) There were conferences by a number of mass-based organizations, such as worker, peasant, women and student organizations, etc. The conferences led to positive results which were much in accord with the positive and progressive political atmosphere that has emerged in the country.

Finally, the most important decision taken by the Syrian leadership in the context of the aforementioned measures was the decision to arm the popular sectors. Such a decision will go a long way toward involving the popular masses in Syria in the task of preserving the country's progressive orientations by means of actually participating in liquidating the enclaves and positions of the counterrevolutionary forces, including the Moslem Brotherhood and all the class groups which have been harmed by the latest measures taken by the government and the prospect that those measures will spread out to the point where they would destroy the class interests of those groups.

With this in mind, we can reiterate our previous premise that the Friendship and Cooperation Treaty signed between Syria and the Soviet Union will seriously guarantee Syria the opportunity to achieve a rapid and well-orchestrated progress in the field of economic development.

The Political Sphere

We have talked at length about the role and importance of the Syrian-Soviet treaty in the economic and military spheres in Syria as well as the treaty's impact as a means of bolstering the steadfastness of the forces of Arab struggle. But we have not talked yet about the role and importance of the treaty in strengthening Syria's position in the Arab homeland and in the international field and the nonaligned movement, and so forth. No doubt, the treaty will guarantee Syria a distinctive and effective position in the Arab and international arenas.

To rehash the statement issued by the national and regional commands of the Ba'th Party after the joint meeting they held to endorse the treaty, Syria will find in the treaty the important backing which it needs and which would help it play a major role within the nonalignment movement and the Third World's struggle for its freedom, independence and the safety of its interests. The treaty would also provide Syria with an important support in the Arab sphere. In the eyes of all the honorable men in our Arab world as well as the friends and enemies of the Arab struggle of liberation, Syria today is the first and principal line of the Arab peoples' military confrontation of the Zionist military aggression and arrogance in the region. It is therefore important that Syria should play a distinctive role and assume a strong political position in the Arab world and, to a lesser degree, in the inernational arena. Accordingly, all the forces of the national Arab liberation movement, primarily the steadfastness front, should diligently and intensively work to make Syria the axis of the political and military pan-Arab thrust toward liberation and victory against the alliance of the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary forces.

Finally, to sum up our observations about the Syrian-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaty, we can say that it is of extreme strategic importance for Syria, in particular, and the Arab forces of steadfastness, in general, at this particular juncture. It is this strategic importance of the treaty for Syria and the Arab progressive forces which has evoked the spate of hostile reaction currently emanating from the political and informational circles of the imperialist, Zionist and reactionary forces.

9254
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CROWN PRINCE DELIVERS PARLIAMENT ADDRESS, DESCRIBES POLICIES

Sharjah AL-KHALIJ in Arabic 4 Nov 80 p 5

/Article by Muhammad Abu 'Abduh: "Khalifah Inaugurates the Consultative Council: Emphasis on Supporting the Federation"/

/Text/ Acting in the place of His Highness Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Aal Nuhayyan, the president and ruler of Abu Dhabi, Lt Gen Shaykh Khalifah ibn Zayid, the crown prince and deputy supreme commander of the armed forces, inaugurated the second session of the fifth legislative season of the National Consultative Council yesterday morning.

Lt Gen Shaykh Khalifah stressed the need to support the federal body, firmly implant its foundations, achieve its objectives, look after it, and strengthen its progress and stability in order to provide further progress and stability for the people of the emirates.

Shaykh Khalifah emphasized that the government is continuing to implement a policy aimed at preserving and exploiting oil resources in accordance with a carefully studied plan taking into consideration the country's actual social and economic development needs. His highness stated that a massive industrial base is now being established in the al-Ruways area containing an oil industry complex which includes the al-Ruways refinery project and a series of other big projects, among them on shore gas, the fertilizer project, and the natural gas transmission treatment. These projects enjoy special attention to the development of domestic staffs which will be able to perform their responsibilities in this vital public sector.

Lt Gen Shaykh Khalifah expressed his hope that the gracious efforts being made for a cease fire between Iran and Iraq will be crowned by success and that these efforts at a peaceful settlement will prevent the shedding of blood and the waste of resources of the two Moslem countries.

Lt Gen Shaykh Khalifah stressed the emirates' firm position that the realization of peace in the Middle East will depend on Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, the liberation of Arab Jerusalem and the attainment of a comprehensive solution to the Palestinian people's cause of regaining their legitimate rights, returning to their country, determining their destiny and regaining their sovereignty over their soil.

Here is the text of the speech:

Brother members of the National Consultative Council:

In the name of God, with God's help, acting for his highness and /my/ father Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Aal Nuhayyan, the ruler of the country, we are inaugurating the second ordinary session of the fifth legislative season of your venerable council, beseeching great God almighty to make us succeed and be triumphant, for he is truly the protector.

On the occasion of the convening of this new session, we declare our pride at and appreciation for the constructive role your venerable council has played in its previous session and your sincere cooperation with the government on behalf of the good and the glory of the nation.

Brother members:

Perhaps it is good fortune that the convening of this session is occurring concurrently with the advent of the 15th Islamic century, a date which entails the greatest human mission, when great almighty God made man aware of his mercy and sent down his glorious prophet muhammad, on whom be peace and blessings. We will take this lofty occasion to present to his highness, my parent and the ruler of the country, and our honorable people the most sincere greetings, calling upon the great lord almighty to make the new Islamic century a prelude for bounty and blessings for us and the Arab and Islamic nation.

Achievements

Brother members:

During this year, through the success granted by God, the government has managed to carry out many projects and vital services for the sake of the country's development and the citizens' welfare. In the field of oil and industry, the government is continuing to carry out its policy aimed at preserving and exploiting oil resources in accordance with a carefully studied plan taking the country's actual economic and social growth needs into consideration.

In the al-Ruways area the signs of a massive developed industrial base have begun to appear, since the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company has been constructing an oil industry complex comprising the al-Ruways refinery project and another series of projects which are essentially based on the use of natural gas, headed by the onshore gas project, the fertilizer project and the natural gas treatment and transmission project.

This enjoys special attention to the development of domestic staffs capable of performing their responsibility in this vital sector in the context of a comprehensive plan which the Oil Department is carrying out in order to Arabize positions in the oil companies.

Diversification of Revenue Sources

In order to carry out the policy of diversifying national income sources and guaranteeing the resources and welfare of coming generations, the General Industrial Organization has managed to perform numerous industrial projects this year and is intending to carry out other projects, most prominently the iron and steel complex, the steel pipe project and the electric wire and cable plant.

In the area of public works, municipal service and water and electricity, the competent bureaus have carried out dozens of vital projects in order to keep abreast of rapid construction development in various areas of the emirate.

The government is directing special attention to the sector of agriculture, forests and forestation: our pilot experiment in this field has become an example which is emulated throughout the whole area.

Keeping up with great development in land and sea transport in the local and international contexts, completion of the final stage of the new Abu Dhabi international airport project is now underway, in preparation for its inauguration next year, in addition to development of the existing airport, and preparations for designs for the new al-'Ayn international airport have started. Efforts to develop Zayid Port to receive bigger ships are also underway.

Supporting the Federation

Brother members:

We stress before your venerable council our absolute faith in the need to support the federal body, implant its foundations, achieve its goals and objectives, and consolidate its progress and development in order to provide further progress and welfare for the people of the state of the United Arab Emirates.

We underline our zeal to consolidate relations with the states of the Gulf and the Arab and Islamic world and hope that the gracious efforts being made for a cease fire between Iraq and Iran will be crowned with success and that these efforts will lead to a sound settlement preventing the shedding of blood and wastage of the powers and resources of the two Moslem states.

We also believe in the need to keep the Gulf area removed from international struggles and keep it an area of peace.

We assert our firm position that the attainment of peace in the Middle East will depend on Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories, the liberation of Arab Jerusalem and Islamic shrines and the attainment of a comprehensive settlement to the Palestinian people's cause, so that they may regain their legitimate rights, return to their country, determine their destiny and regain their national sovereignty over their soil and so that the permanent just peace to which the peoples of the region aspire may be established.

We ask all-powerful almighty God to grant us all success in what will be beneficial for this people and Arab and Islamic nation, to plant our feet firmly, to grant us his aid and assistance, and to cause our days to be days of progress, prosperity and welfare.

Lt Gen Shaykh Khalifah arrived at the site of the Consultative Council yesterday morning at 1000 hours and was met by Shaykh Sultan ibn Surur al-Zahiri, chairman of the council, and the members of the council. Lt Gen Khalifah reviewed the honor guard and the band played the national anthem.

Attending the inauguration session were Shaykh Hamdan ibn Muhammad, the deputy prime minister; Shaykh Tahun ibn Muhammad, the ruler's representative in the Eastern Province; the chairman of the board of directors of Abu Dhabi National Oil Company; and Shaykh Ahmad ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Mubarak, chief of the Islamic Judiciary. At the beginning of the session, the agenda was read out and then Lt Gen Khalifah read out his statement.

'Abdallah ibn Ahmad al-'Utaybah, vice chairman of the Consultative Council, made the following statement:

His Highness Shaykh Khalifah ibn Zayid Aal Nuhayyan:

Honored highnesses and gentlemen:

Brother members:

In the name of the National Consultative Council, I give you warm blessed greetings from God and take this auspicious occasion to present to His Highness Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Aal Numayyan, the chief of the state and ruler of the country, and to your highness the greatest appreciation and hopes for the precious trust you have given to this council and noble attention which has been constantly given it since its establishment.

I also direct deep thanks to you and to his highness for being so gracious as to inaugurate this new session, which is a review which supervises the policy of the emirate in all areas.

We hope that this session will be replete with achievements for the good and the welfare of all citizens in our beloved nation.

We make a promise before God and before you that we will be loyal to the era and the trust, and God will grant success. Peace and God's mercy and blessings be upon you.

At the end of the statement by Mr al-'Utaybah, the session was recessed to bid farewell to His Highness Shaykh Khalifah ibn Zayid; then the council returned to the meeting to form a committee to respond to the inauguration speech and form the council's permanent committees.

The Committee To Respond to the Inauguration Speech

A committee was formed to respond to the inauguration speech, chaired by 'Abdallah Ahmad al-'Utaybah, the vice chairman of the Council, with Muhammad ibn Baruk, Hamil al-Ghayth, Jabbarah ibn Hasan, Ahmad ibn Khalfan al-Murri, 'Abdallah al-Mas'ud, Muhammad al-Fandi al-Mazru'i, Yusuf ibn 'Abdallah Husayn, Hamad ibn 'Abdallah al-Qamazi, 'Abdallah ibn Sultan al-Rumaythi and Ahmad ibn Hadir al-Murbihi as members.

It was decided that the committee would hold its first meeting on Tuesday evening 11 November, and the branch committees of the council were formed; these retained their composition of last year, with no change.

The session was then recessed, on the proviso that the council return to convene on 17 November.

Report on the Projects Carried out

The government of Abu Dhabi set forth a statement by the Secretariat General of the National Consultative Council listing projects which had been carried out and projects which it had been decided were to be carried out in the coming period. Herewith are the most important contents of the statement:

In the Sphere of Oil and Industry

With respect to Abu Dhabi National Oil Company:

The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company, directly or through wholly- or partly-owned companies or companies subsidiary to it, continued to implement the government's oil policy in all forms and aspects in terms of exploration, drilling, development, exports, refining and distribution inside the country, and in terms of assuming the tasks of the land and sea transport of crude oil and products and natural gas to consumers in local and international markets, as follows:

The exploration and drilling operations carried out by the four operating companies ADMA, SHEDCO, ZADCO AND YUDECO, on the land and territorial waters of the emirate of Abu Dhabi, witnessed substantial, increasing activity.

On the basis of the statements by his highness the ruler of the country on the need to develop the Sath, Qarnayn and Dalma offshore fields, developing storage and export facilities on Dalma Island in order to participate in hastening their development, an agreement was concluded this year between the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company and the Japanese firm JEDECO whereby the two companies will take charge of developing these fields, and the JODECO company will take charge of development operations by proxy for ADNOC and JODECO.

The Abu Dhabi National Oil Company is committed to the government's policy, which is aimed at preserving and exploiting the country's petroleum resources in accordance with a thoroughly studied plan which takes into consideration the actual needs of economic and social growth in the light of the country's present comprehensive economic plan and the needs of coming generations in the future.

Greater attention will be given to the diversification of national income sources and the gradual effort to avoid relying on one source, the exportation of oil. On that basis, the government has begun planning to make use of such available raw materials as oil and natural gas, which is wasted by being burnt off. To achieve this objective, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company has been assigned to perform the task of carrying out this policy. Previously, the company had made the necessary studies to establish a petrochemical complex in the al-Ruways area near Jabal

Dhanna, which is considered the natural port for exporting oil from the onshore fields in the emirate of Abu Dhabi.

The fruits of that effort, as represented by the numerous installations and facilities which Abu Dhabi National Oil Company has set up in the area, considering that they are essential and necessary for carrying out any project, recently started to appear.

In order to carry out the government's policy of using associated natural gas which had previously been burnt off, the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company is now carrying out some industrial projects which will essentially use natural gas; in addition to the gas liquefaction plant constructed on Das Island, which began production in 1977, these are:

The Abu Dhabi onshore gas project, eight fertilizer projects in al-Ruways, and natural gas treatment and transmission (end-1977); it is anticipated that operation of the second line will start in 1981).

Among the projects which will use natural gas that still are under study, there is a new natural gas liquefaction project.

There are the al-Ruways refinery project, other industrial projects, the caustic soda and hydrochloric acid project and the drilling chemicals production project.

A group of industrial projects is now under planning and study; most important of these are:

The al-Ruways refinery expansion project;

The basic lubricating oil production project;

The basic (azumatic) products project;

The ether separating project.

In addition to the above, Abu Dhabi National Oil Company is developing its workforce and raising its technical level and requisite practical capability in all oil industry fields.

The Oil Department

This year the Oil Department has continued carrying out its responsibilities by supervising the exploration, drilling, development, production and export activities of all oil companies operating in the country, in order to confirm that these activities are taking place in accordance with the most modern practical and scientific methods followed in the oil industry and guarantee the production of the greatest possible amounts of oil present in the formations without damaging them. The department has given complete attention to the subject of safety and security for people and oil installations.

The department has also continued its responsibilities of supervising operations of developing and maintaining producing fields.

The department has carried out its responsibilities of supervising production operations in onshore and offshore oilfields, replacing the allowable production volume in every field, zone and well, in a manner realizing the requisite levels of production from these fields, with the objective of obtaining the greatest quantity of oil reserves and extending the fields' lives.

The department also continued its supervision of oil production and export operations in oil storage areas and through export terminals to check on the quantities produced and exported, preparatory to calculating government revenues on them.

The department continued to supervise the arabization of positions in the oil companies in accordance with the plan set out for that.

The department followed up on the general contracting firms in the oil installation area for which land had been allocated in the al-Musaffah industrial area to build the bases they require in the form of mechanical shops, machinery and equipment warehouses, and piers.

With respect to the General Industrial Organization:

The General Industrial Organization carried out the following projects in 1980:

Expansion of the al-'Arayn cement plant.

The limestone plant in al-'Ayn.

The livestock fodder plant in Abu Dhabi.

Work is still underway on construction of the following two projects:

Expansion of the Abu Dhabi National Silo and Flour Mill Organization.

The Abu Dhabi ship repair basin.

The projects the organization is determined to carry out in the future are:

The iron and steel complex.

The steel pipe project.

The electric wire project.

The vocational training center.

The 1980-85 five-year industrial projects.

Electricity Projects

The statement enumerated the projects the Water and Electricity Department carried out this year in the West Umm al-Nar plant, the al-'Ayn and outer areas project, and the electricity distribution systems.

The statement also enumerated the projects being carried out, most important of which were:

The West Umm al-Nar plant, operating tests on the remaining units; it is expected that the remaining steam turbines and desalination units will be put in operation before the end of this year.

The al-'Ayn plant, operation of an outer wall for the plant equipped with safety and security equipment and construction of a station for unloading fuel outside the plant wall.

Distribution of electricity, the Abu Dhabi airport transformer station, equipment for transmitting communications conveyed on ultra high voltage line wires, a number of overhead and underground lines, construction of 10 main series stations, construction of 80 kilometers of overhead line and underground cable, connections to 3,640 new consumers in Abu Dhabi and outlying areas and illumination of 5 kilometers of roads.

Distribution of water, expansion of the East Abu Dhabi lines, expansion of the West Abu Dhabi lines, provision of pipes, valves and other accessories, provision of water distribution equipment, expansion of section lines, expansion of main serial stations, a concrete reservoir, a pump station, water distribution in al-Musaffah, water distribution in Bani Yas, facilities, tanks, a pump station and the project to pump water to the tank.

Among the most important activities, projects and services the department intends to complete or carry out in the future are the Umm al-Nar plant, the Abu Dhabi plant, the al-'Ayn plant, the Tawilah and Musaffah plants outlying areas, electricity distribution and water distribution.

Public Works

The Works Department is carrying out a number of important construction projects in various parts of the emirate, including towns, villages and desert areas, within the framework of the comprehensive development plan the government is anxious to carry out, detailed as follows:

Roads and bridges:

In the field of land communications, the department carried out a number of road and bridge projects this year, most important of which were:

Renovation of the al-Maqta' body, protection of curves on the Umm al-Nar bridges, additional roads for the villages of al-Wajn and Mudaysis, village roads and services in other areas. The department is now building, paving and reinforcing a number of internal and outer roads, among the most important of which are:

The road to the new international airport.

Additional roads to the villages of al-Hir and Suwayhan.

The second pair of lanes for the al-Mafraq-Turayf road; the second pair of lanes for the Jabal Dhanna-Turayf road.

Expansion and consolidation with a surface layer of roads in the 'Ayn al-Fayidah area.

Expansion of the al-'Ayn-al-Mafraq road.

Traffic signs for the outer roads.

Railings for the corniche.

The department is also currently studying a number of new road projects or expansion of existing roads, in order to begin carrying them out next year. Among the most important of these are:

Construction and paving of the truck road from the al-'Ayn fertilizer plant to al-'Ayn.

The Umm al-Nar-Bu Muraykhah road.

Reconstruction, improvement and expansion of the road from the al-Maqta' bridge to the al-Mafraq intersection.

Government building projects:

This season work was completed on 39 various projects, distributed among the various parts of the emirate; most important of these were 274 ordinary dwellings in various areas of the emirate, 1,345 prefabricated popular dwellings in Abu Dhabi and al-'Ayn, 30 villas in al-Mafraq, the al-Jazirah and Abu Dhabi clubs, a 50-bed clinic in Ghiyathi, and a guard unit in Abu Dhabi.

The department is now carrying out 37 various projects distributed among various areas of the emirate, among the most important of which are:

3,832 prefabricated ordinary dwellings in Abu Dhabi and al-'Ayn, 560 ordinary dwellings in the western area, Dalma Island and the al-'Ayn road, 290 villas in al-Dafa' and al-Mafraq, and the second stage of 50-bed clinics in Suwayhan, Bad' Zayid and Rimah.

First and second phases of the police academy, the police officers' club, the headquarters of the directorate general of police, the Abu Dhabi and al-'Ayn public library, the royal court building, a new guest palace in Abu Dhabi, the Emirates Club and the al-'Ayn Club, the Islamic judiciary building, and 18 mosques in various areas.

The department is intending in the future to carry out 13 different projects; these are in the process of being handed over, declared, designed or studied. The most important of them are:

380 ordinary dwellings in Jarn Yafur, the western area and Dalma Island; 180 villas in al-Mafraq; a Works Department building in Abu Dhabi; works offices in al-'Ayn;

the Abu Dhabi tourist tower; the headquarters of the Abu Dhabi Chamber of Commerce and Industry; the Planning Department building in Abu Dhabi; the customs building; two centers for memorizing the glorious Koran in the western area; and two mosques in Abu Dhabi.

Land and Air Communications

This year the department carried out many projects belonging to the Departments of Seaports and Airports, above and beyond the projects being carried out and those the department intends to carry out in the future. The statement enumerated these projects, most important of which were development of the existing Abu Dhabi international airport and preparations to move to the new Abu Dhabi airport. The statement reviewed the projects which have been carried out in Port Zayid and those which are expected to be completed by the end of this year. The most important of these are the construction of four container terminal piers, a pier for roll-on roll-off ships, an oil tanker pier, construction of cranes in the container terminal, construction of a harbor to receive small craft and deepening and construction activities.

A Free Zone in Abu Dhabi Port

The Works Department is intending to construct a free zone in Abu Dhabi port to store transit goods, deepen the ship channel before al-Sa'diyat Island, construct the observation tower and anti-pollution equipment, and study the possibility of covering the ship channels and the port piers with television equipment to control supervision of shipping activity in the passageways.

Accomplishments of Abu Dhabi Municipality

The statement reviewed the projects of the Municipality and Town Planning Department; the department carried out the following:

Construction of 90 villas on the airport road, construction of 24 shops in Jarn Yafur, construction of 36 shops in Bad'Zayid, construction of 10 shops in Musaffah, construction of a park in the al-Mishrif Palace in Abu Dhabi, construction of a capital park restaurant and construction of a wall around the municipal slaughterhouse.

The following road projects:

A number of inner roads in the town of Abu Dhabi, roads and parking areas for the al-Mafraq Hospital, the transmission station road in Mahawi, and palace roads and parking areas.

The following sewer projects:

Connecting the commercial buildings and residential villas in areas of the capital to the general sewer system; provision and installation of mechanical and electrical equipment for the three main discharge stations; extending the main general line and branch lines in the eastern area in the middle of Abu Dhabi Island; the general sewer system, opening stations and branch linkups to the northern section of the town of Abu Dhabi and the Tourist Club area; extension of the new lines to the new

plant in al-Mafraq; construction of three main plants to discharge sewer water to al-Mafraq; construction of major sewers and plants and construction of branch sewers in the eastern sections of Abu Dhabi; construction of main and branch sewers and opening stations in the central and northwestern area; construction of three underground water tanks in the east, at Ra's al-Akhdar and Qasr al-Bahr; construction of four underground reinforced concrete sewage water tanks with connecting sewer line system; four underground sewage water tanks along with a system of connecting pipelines;construction of main and branch sewers containing sanitary drainage channels in the central and western sections of Abu Dhabi Island; construction of 20 urgent contracting works including branch connection and expansion work in the purification plant; and general improvements in the performance of the current project and the general irrigation system. The statement reviewed the agricultural projects the Municipality of Abu Dhabi carried out and projects under construction and reviewed the planning projects for the coming period and road projects.

The statement also reviewed the projects in al-'Ayn Municipality and the department representing the ruler in the eastern area. This will be published at a later time.

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MASSIVE AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS IN RA'S AL-KHAYMAH REVIEWED

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 6 Nov 80 p 5

/Article by Ibrahim Ahmad: "Ra's al-Khaymah Is Turning Into a Great Vegetable Farm"/

/Text/ The land of Ra's al-Khaymah has begun to turn into the vegetable farm of the state of the United Arab Emirates. The acreage of the vegetable farms and fruit orchards in the coming season will come to 100,000 donums, which will lie in more than 1,980 farms in the northern area.

The Ra's al-Khaymah area is distinguished by the fact that there are citizens farming whose main vocation and sole source of income is farming and whose goal is to attain self-sufficiency for the country.

In the area there are now 550 farmers specialized in farming fruit and vegetables and using the most modern farming methods. Each of them owns a farm ranging in area from 150 to 300 donums; in addition, there are 2,500 citizens who own tremendous numbers of date palms.

From the farms of Ra's al-Khaymah more than 60 trucks emanate every day bearing more than 6,000 boxes of cabbage, cauliflower, tomatoes, cucumbers, squash, zucchini, okra, (shilqum), radishes, onions, coriander, parsley, chard, gargir, pepper, beans, carrots and so on; the farmers' trucks head every day for the markets of Dubai and Sharjah with their produce.

What is the picture in the farms in Ra's al-Khaymah now?

What do farmers expect from the Ministry of Agriculture?

What are their most important problems and how can they be overcome?

Why are the farmers waiting for agricultural marketing?

How do they defray the processing of their output?

AL-ITTIHAD lived with the farmers in al-Hamraniyah, Khatt, Shiml, al-Diqdaqah, Sha'm and Idhin. It listened to their recommendations and opinions and ascertained their hopes and problems.

At the outset, the farmers and people responsible for farming in the northern area stress that the output of their farms will achieve self-sufficiency in vegetables for the whole state over a period of 6 months, and they hope that canneries and freezing and drying plants will be established for their surplus production so that optimum economic use will be made of output and a large proportion of it will not be placed in garbage cans, wasting tremendous precious resources.

The Ra's al-Khaymah area is considered the oldest farming area in the country and the one with the greatest vegetable output, as 'Abdallah Muhammad Khalfan, deputy director of agriculture in the northern section, asserts. He says, "The planting season starts on 15 July, when seedling operations begin in the nurseries, so we can start farming at the beginning of September each year, in the case of vegetables. As for fruit, the seedling and planting operations begin in April and end in November.

"Each of the area's 1,950 farms contains two or three wells, although the water in some of them has started to drop off because of the extensive pumping and paucity of rains. A start has been made in coping with this problem by constructing a dirt dam in Idhin and there are studies to construct another one in Wadi al-Bih, where rainwater will be retained behind these barriers for periods of up to 4 months, supplying the wells with water."

36 Tractors

Concerning the services which the farmers obtain, the deputy director of agriculture says "We now have 36 tractors, now that the region received 19 this week with all their equipment and 19 drivers. We are drilling wells and plowing for farmers free of charge. The construction of fences, pump repair, provision of seeds, pesticides and fertilizer are obtained by the farmers at half price. Engineers and technicians are taking charge of the operations of agricultural guidance and orienting farmers in methods of spraying insecticides and treating plant diseases in successive regular periods, under the supervision of 'Abdallah Darwish, official in the Treatment Section of the region, who asserted that the region is performing its duty insofar as resources are available to it."

What do the farmers say?

What are their complaints?

How do they aspire toward the future?

Priorities for Farmers

'Ali Hamad al-Batra, one of the farmers who have realized the best vegetable and fruit production, says that the department of agriculture drilled two wells for him and provided him with loans, /saying/ "But that does not mean that everything is as it should be. We are lacking many services now and the farmer must accustom himself to waiting until his turn comes. The matter is now subject to priorities and it is our duty to observe them."

'Ali Hamad adds, "The boxes the farmers use are unsanitary and we hope that the government will provide a box factory. Priorities are also delaying the farmers'

acquisition of necessary services. The problem of problems is the fact that the seeds, whose arrival is expected in the month of May, do not reach us until November, which is something that cannot stand delay or postponement. I recommend that the Ministry of Agriculture plan for the arrival of summer seeds on time, in the month of January, and the winter seeds at the beginning of their season in May.

"The subject which draws the attention of all the farmers, and is tantamount to a dream for them all, is agricultural marketing, and the protection of local fruit and vegetable production to guarantee that the farmers obtain the fruits of their efforts and labors. I believe that our production this season and in the coming seasons will be adequate for our requirements and will realize self-sufficiency for us."

Output is Excellent

'Ubayd 'Ali Shumayl, a farmer in al-Hamraniyah, says "Our agricultural output has attained an excellent level and in terms of quality competes with the best vegetables coming in from abroad. However, the problem is that we cannot market them in a manner which brings us a worthwhile return.

"The best crops are watermelons, cabbage and tomatoes, but without organized marketing to compensate our efforts, the farmers may turn away from farming. At first the market was on their side, but now we have begun to suffer from stagnation, spoilage of products and the loss of many of them.

"It is the government's duty to buy our production at specific prices and offer it on the markets. The excess will be directed to plants either for freezing or for drying. This is because each farmer employes 10 to 15 workers and they cost us considerable wages.

"We have been waiting for agricultural marketing for 3 years. What has been done in al-'Ayn and Abu Dhabi is a splendid example in the field of marketing." It is the farmer 'Ubayd ibn Shumayl who is talking. He adds, "There is no difference between the farmers in al-'Ayn and Ra's al-Khaymah. We pay our workers high wages and buy small boxes for 3 dirhams and large ones for 5."

The Problem of Seeds

'Ubayd raises a serious problem and that is that the (al-jahh), watermelon, seeds he obtained this year were rotten and yielded a bad crop. The farmers wasted money and effort and realized no output. In fact, the watermelons were not fit to eat.

Ahmad 'Abdallah 'Abd-al-Ghani, a farmer in the Khatt area, who has been working in agriculture for 15 years and owns four farms in al-Diqdaqah, al-Hamraniyah and Khatt, /says/ that his best production this year was in tomatoes, flowers, cabbage, (shilqum), carrots, coriander, chard, okra, onions and parsley.

Ahmad 'Abdallah says, "Marketing is our problem. Processing our surplus output is a necessity lest our vegetables which we take to the market be lost, and we sometimes are compelled to sell them at unprofitable prices or throw them in the garbage because we are at the mercy of agents and middlemen and cannot sell by the box, so consequently all our hopes are dissipated at the end of the day."

Ahmad 'Abdallah refers to the two problems of seed and loans and delays in them, and demands that credits be increased so that each farmer may obtain his due. He recommends that the government expand fertilizer manufacture, since three plants are not adequate for the growing needs; the price of a sack from the plant is 300 dirhams and reaches the farmer at 300 dirhams. He also considers that it is necessary to provide fodder to increase the quantity of livestock which can become a good revenue source for all farmers.

Insecticide Spraying Is Delayed

Misbah Majid al-Safiri, a farmer in al-Diqdaqah, says: "The water problem has started to cause us anxiety. We had been relying on wells which we had dug by hand, and after expanding the deep wells the volumes of water increased; however, the problem is that the vehicles which spray the insecticides came 2 months behind schedule, because they came in turns in accordance with the farmers' registration of their needs. The solution lies in increasing the number of vehicles and preparing technicians so that spraying can take place on time and we can obtain the best production."

Misbah says that the income of the farmers in al-'Ayn doubled after the application of agricultural marketing, which has come to represent the hope of all farmers in Ra's al-Khaymah, which could be transformed into a great state vegetable farm, attaining self-sufficiency and saving the local consumer a great deal. It is also the duty of the state to encourage farmers and increase their receptivity toward and desire to pursue agriculture, when he finds that the income is greater than expenses and that the revenues satisfy him and reward his efforts.

Palm Tree Worms

In the midst of magnificent vegetable farms stands out a real tragedy which is now facing the owners of palm trees. Worms have afflicted many of their palms, eating into them and destroying them. Spraying operations do not work and an urgent remedy is needed.

Ibrahim Muhammad al-Jabri, a farmer in al-Rams, says "The worms eat the palms, fill them with holes, kill the seedlings and make the palms die." He complained to specialists, offered samples and is still waiting, because none of the treatment operations have yet had an effect. A date palm seedling is worth 200 dirhams, farmers take care of the palms for 7 years--then the worms come and eat them in 2 months and destroy them totally.

1,980 Farms

There are many positive features in the large farms, foremost among them the services the farmers obtain. However, that does not prevent us from pointing out negative aspects.

It remains for us to say that 60 new farms will be added to those which exist now in the next 2 months. These farms are distributed among the agricultural areas which now have 1,980 farms--120 in al-Hamraniyah, 500 in Khatt, 600 in Shiml, 450 in al-Diqdaqah, 60 in Sha'm, and 250 in Idhin. We are still expecting more.

This is a rapid picture of the fruit and vegetable farms in Ra's al-Khaymah, which are now providing the markets in the emirates with all their vegetable requirements, so that they will realize self sufficiency for 6 consecutive months of the year. We can do more if agricultural processing resources are available.

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CONSULTATIVE COUNCIL MEMBER DISCUSSES EVOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 17 Nov 80 p 19

/Article by Yahya 'Abd-al-Raqib: "A New Consultative Council Will Soon Appear in Yemen and the Founding People's Assembly Will Be Eliminated"/

/Text/ Shaykh 'Abdallah ibn Husayn al-Ahmar is considered a prominent figure in Yemen--an extraordinary personality who has played a great role in the contemporary history of Yemen. He is a leading personality who has played, and still is playing, a major role in this Islamic Arab country. He has granted his life to it--in fact has sacrificed much of his thinking, effort and struggle on its behalf, in order to preserve Yemen's consciousness.

There is no Yemeni, indeed Arab, who does not know his national contributions, including his chairmanship of the former consultative council and the tireless work which he pursued in getting Yemen to avoid further fragmentation and dissension. Shaykh 'Abdallah, who is now an active member of the Consultative Council, was and still is a man whose word is heeded and who has penetrating vision and great capability, and a personality whose values and genuine nature receive great honor.

AL-MADINAH took the opportunity of Shaykh 'Abdallah's visit to the kingdom to hold with him this meeting which was characterized by objectivity and bluntness, and illuminated many aspects related to his country which are of concern to every Yemeni inside and outside his country.

Here is the text of the conversation:

/Question/ Your visit to the kingdom is occurring at a time which demands an exchange of visits among the countries in the region, in order to arrive at a united goal. Could we learn something about the nature of this visit?

What is your conception of the nature of Saudi-Yemeni relations in the past, present and future?

/Answer/ In fact, I came here on a personal visit with the purpose of greeting his majesty the king, his highness the crown prince and His Highness Prince Sultan. I am not performing any official or political mission on this visit.

As for Saudi-Yemeni relations, they are strong and firm and there is a great deal of talk about them.

/Question/ Many Yemenis are anxious to learn about the current conditions of Yemen as you see them. Is that possible?

/Answer/ The conditions of Yemen at the present time are all right. People who live outside Yemen imagine that there is a greater danger than those who live inside it do. The problems and disturbances we hear about in the world make us view what is happening at home as something very simple; in the current stage the Arab and Islamic world and many third world peoples are going through in the form of disturbances, especially, I can say that we are better now.

The New Cabinet Change for Normal Factors

/Question/ The new cabinet change has preoccupied many Yemeni people in view of the confidence and the period the previous cabinet had enjoyed. What does this change mean?

/Answer/ Change is a natural thing which occurs in Yemen. The previous cabinet spent more than 6 years under the premiership of our brother Mr 'Abd-al-Ghani and played its full role in every field.

The fact is that in the period he spent in the premiership was the best premier of Yemen, and left the cabinet beloved by all.

As for the change, or the factors of change, these arose from Mr 'Abd-al-'Aziz 'Abd-al-Ghani's conviction that he should relinquish the premiership. I believe that the political factors were no greater than the natural or technical ones. The change brought in people who do not differ from the previous ones, since there has been no change in policy or even in government in my opinion.

/Question/ So that means that the new cabinet change was by request of Mr 'Abd-al-'Aziz himself?

/Answer/ Yes, as far as he personally went, he insisted on that.

/Question/ What things has the Founding People's Assembly realized? What about its present and future and the extent to which the Consultative Council is linked to it? Will a change of some kind be made in it?

/Answer/ The Founding People's Assembly is a temporary one. Its formation occurred by appointment, not election. At the same time it took the place of the Consultative Council, which was an elected parliament, and also was the popular institution which was found in Yemen at one period. There is a stipulation on this in the six principles of the 26 September Revolution. This council played its part in one of Yemen's periods, until its time ended. There then came the 13 June Movement, and this council was dissolved under the command of Lt Col Ibrahim al-Hamdi. After the murder of Ibrahim al-Hamdi and the assumption of power by Lt Col Ahmad al-Ghashmi, this council was formed under the name of the Founding People's Assembly. Its members were selected by the government and it was given some of the powers which were given to the Consultative Council in the realm of codifying laws.

In some other areas it was not given the powers the previous Consultative Council had. This is as far as the People's Assembly goes. There will soon be a free popular election to the new Consultative Council.

/Question/ Does that mean that the Founding People's Assembly will be dissolved?

/Answer/ Yes, and a new Consultative Assembly will take its place, because the election law has been issued, forming committees to supervise the elections, which god willing will be soon.

/Question/ Yemeni unity is a dream which attracts every Yemeni. The two leaders of the Yemenis have talked about it abundantly. Where is it today? Is it expected that it will be realized soon? Has agreement been made on the necessary foundations for union? Will South Yemen, along with the north, renounce its principles?

/Answer/ Unity between the two segments of Yemen, the northern and the southern, is natural; they are one people and are joined together by all the links of brotherhood, tradition and religion. There is no difference between the two people of Yemen. They are one people, and union between them on this basis is natural.

If there is a split, it is in the regimes, because in the south there exists a left-wing system embracing Marxist thinking, which is considered a serious matter alien to the region, and it is this which is perpetuating the split. When the English, who were the colonizers of Aden and the protectorates, left, the union ought to have declared then, automatically.

This is because in the past the factor for the split was the imperialist presence. Otherwise the south would have been part of the north, because the north is the mother and the south is an inseparable part of it.

The presence of British colonialism in the south is what caused the separation of this part from its great body. The Yemenis in the north and the south were fighting together to have the British leave Aden, so that the south, along with the north, could come under the writ of one flag. However, unfortunately, no sooner did British colonialism leave Aden than a government was created which declared the Marxist system, which is alien to the region, and this state perpetuated the rift, which,with the existence of this system, is greater than in the past. Now, a dialogue is underway on the basis of restoring brotherhood between Yemenis and the existence of a constitution based on Yemen's true state, heritage, beliefs, morals and concerns, so that it will be the constitution of the unity committee. The people involved have made big strides in preparing for this.

So far the rulers of the south have not relinquished anything and, in my opinion and what I and others perceive, these rulers are still perpetuating the system which the regime in the south is based on.

/Question/ This means that the union will not be established soon?

/Answer/ God creates what he wishes. If God, on whom be praise, changes hearts and the brothers in the south become convinced of Yemen's belief in conduct and Islamic law, then hopes will be great. By conviction I mean the brother rulers in

the south--the people are Moslem by their innate disposition and conviction and do not need a witness.

/Question/ So does that indicate that the two parties have not agreed to the necessary bases for union so far?

/Answer/ The sections which have been placed in the constitution are considered nearly agreed upon, and they are also derived from Islamic law.

Erroneous Conception and Biased Rumors

/Question/ Shaykh 'Abdallah: some Arab papers recently published news of the occurrence of skirmishes between the Yemeni army and the opposition National Front. To what extent is this statement true?

/Answer/ I told you already that people outside Yemen consider Yemen to be a disaster, and that the problems are greater than they really are. There actually are things, but they are less important than someone remote from Yemen would imagine and also less important than what the newspapers remote from Yemen indicate. This is also being spread about by the brothers in the south, as has been seen in newspapers, which have conveyed this news.

/Question/ Thus, through your discussion, we can say that what the papers have conveyed is true but not to the extent they have stated.

/Answer/ We cannot actually hide the fact that there is activity on the part of elements connected with the leftwing regime in Aden, with directions, reinforcement and support from them.

/Question/ So what does this action from the south mean, at a time when the two countries are discussing union?

/Answer/ We are all wondering as you are, and perhaps many Yemeni people in these quarters specifically are wondering.

/Question/ We can deduce from this wondering that only the people in the two segments of Yemen, but not the others, are united. Don't you agree with me on that?

/Answer/ Yes, the Yemeni people are the ones who have the say on union. They are a Moslem people devoted to Islamic belief and not content with an alternative. This is a fixed truth which will not admit of debate. Unity will occur only on this basis.

/Question/ It is said that there is an Islamic front in Yemen which came into being after the birth of the National Front. What is the truth of the matter? What is the government's position on these fronts?

/Answer/ That is true, there are elements and groups which believe in the Islamic creed who are prompted by duty and prompted by belief to confront the sabotage coming from the left and from Communist agents. People spontaneously call those

who are confronting the Communists the Islamic group because these people possess devout Islamic thinking and the others possess apostate Marxist thinking.

The Yemeni People Are Moslem by Nature and Proud of Their Belief

/Question/ Some people say that giving this front that name has given birth to a new question about the Yemenis, since I hear some people making statements to the effect that the Yemeni people are Moslem by their innate nature and proud of their belief and do not need this kind of front.

/Answer/ Those who are committing this action have not given themselves this designation. Rather, it is the people themselves who have given it to them, since it is the people's notion that those who are confronting the Marxists and the Communist tide are an Islamic group.

/Question/ So what can we call this movement, for example? Is there a specific name for it?

/Answer/ In my opinion they are actually defending religion, honor, dignity and the nation.

Thus we can call them "holy warriors in God's path." The greatest pillar of Islam is holy war, which is a duty of every Moslem. If any Islamic country is invaded, holy war is the obligation of all.

As for the government's position on "fronts," it does not recognize them or any other party organization, because our constitution prohibits that.

/Question/ Why therefore doesn't the government act against these things which actually exist, as long as parties and fronts are outlawed in Yemen, as you have informed us?

/Answer/ They are not officially declared. They are the ones who call themselves the non-national front. They claim that and have organizations abroad which stand alongside them.

/Question/ Non-national--what do you mean?

/Answer/ I mean non-national, not national. They pretend to nationalism, as Communist countries pretend to democracy, and adopt names which are directly opposed to reality. There are Communist countries which claim to be democratic but that is the opposite of the truth.

/Question/ In fact we have discussed with you some Yemeni issues which concern and engross Yemeni expatriates in the kingdom. I thank you for this responsiveness.

/Answer/ I exchange thanks with all and would like to tell the Yemenis in the kingdom that they are actually living in Yemen, because there is no barrier separating Yemen from the kingdom.

Our customs, traditions and genuineness are common and arise from one source. The distance between us is growing small. When a Yemeni moves into Saudi Arabia or goes back to Yemen, it is as if he is moving from one place to another within his nation.

The Iraqi-Iranian War Is a Loss for All

/Question/ The Iraqi-Iranian war has gone on almost 2 months. What is Yemen's position on it? Could you give the reader your conceptions of its implications for the region?

/Answer/ Yemen's position on this war is one of compassion for all.

This war is truly grave. Its implications for the region, the Arab cause and the Islamic world are also grave. Those who are benefiting from this war are the Eastern and Western camps. The greatest beneficiary is Israel, the enemy of all, because this war is wasting the strength of two Islamic powers. It would have been more worthy had the powers directed it to liberating holy Jerusalem, liberating the usurped Arab territories, and working to strengthen the Islamic nation against the obscurity which envelops it. The war between Iraq and Iran is a war that neither of these two countries benefit from; they are both the losers.

/Question/ So Yemen's position on it is one of neutrality?

/Answer/ Yemen's position on it is that of a third brother distressed for all and compassionate for all.

/Question/ Perhaps you have read that Kuwait is exposed to rocket bombardment. What is your concept of the implications of this action? How can the region avoid further crises?

/Answer/ I read that the area where the two rockets fell is near the Iraqi-Iranian borders and near areas exposed to attack by both sides. We can say that what happened was perhaps a mistake and not deliberate.

Almighty God, to whom be grace, says "Be pious, lest dissension afflict those of you who have been treated unjustly." In particular, war must be avoided.

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RAPID GROWTH OF ECONOMY, MILITARY UNDERLINED

London AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 18 Oct 80 pp 34, 35

/Article by As'ad Haydar: "Arabia Felix on the Threshhold--of the Age"/

/Text/ North Yemen's celebrations of the 18th anniversary of the 26 September revolution did not deter its leaders from following up on the war on the Iraqi-Iranian borders. At the apex of the celebrations, after representatives of President Sadam Husayn had arrived to participate in the celebrations in San'a', a telephone conversation took place between Presidents Saddam Husayn and 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih in which the Yemeni president stressed to the Iraqi president his country's readiness to offer the Iraqi forces, especially the air force, all necessary facilities.

However, the preoccupations of the Iraqi-Iranian war did not prevent large numbers of delegations from being invited from Arab and friendly countries to participate in the celebrations the likes of which San'a' had not witnessed since the beginning of the revolution. These invitations were just a North Yemeni attempt to show the degree of stability Yemen enjoys on the one hand and the volume of arms the Yemeni army enjoys in the era of Col Salih on the other.

In the latter context, that is, arms, it was clear, from the weapons which appeared on display, how recently they had reached San'a', whether they were tanks' artillery pieces or even certain types of planes which circled in the air over the display. In addition, the diversity of their sources was also clear--by Yemeni official desire, as a senior officer told AL-MUSTAQBAL. Alongside the Soviet arms, which were most conspicuous in the armored forces, there were American arms and French arms--light armored vehicles of the Panhard type. In the context of the air force, Soviet MiG aircraft made a display, followed by American airplanes of the F-5 type. It was strange, during the review, to observe American Soviet and French military delegations sitting side by side while following the display. The American military delegation became interested when the airplanes appeared, and its head went down from the guests' podium and sat on the ground to observe the fighters flying, recording at the same time his observations on the types of maneuver of the planes and the pilots' skill in carrying them out. The surprise of the military review was its conclusion, when over the show podium flew a Sukhoi-22 aircraft; that was the newest Soviet weapon the Yemeni army had received. In responding on the reason for the diversification of arms sources, and whether Soviet arms in this quantity would not provoke their neighbors in the Gulf states, the Yemenis

insist, "Whatever their source and type, the arms in the hands of the Yemenis become Yemeni, serving Yemeni interests and goals, so there is no reason to fear."

In the course of answering that very question, Dr Hasan Makki, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, said "Prince Sultan has underlined his agreement to diversify arms sources for his country, so why can't we ourselves exercise this freedom?"

Some military experts who observed the military display in the capital, San'a', or in the other Yemeni towns estimate that the numbers in the Yemeni army have become several times greater than in the past, when it had about 12,000 troops, and that there is no room for comparing the modern current Yemeni army, especially in recent years, with the old Hemeni army, from the standpoint of size of equipment and diversity of equipment.

In the domestic context, there is no doubt that Yemen is experiencing considerable economic growth. This growth has clear features in all vital installations, especially in the construction field. Through the projects which have been inaugurated or whose cornerstone was laid in the country during the revolutionary celebrations, the size of the leap which the Yemeni government is trying to make to get out of the shackles of backwardness in which it was fettered throughout the decades of imamate rule is apparent. An American report which has lately been distributed asserts that the growth rate in Yemen exceeded 8 percent in 1979. It is important to point to the concentration on the educational sector in the country; the budget allotted for school construction comes to more than 1 billion Yemeni riyals, that is, more than $200 million. This expansion is also the result of the inhabitants' receptivity to education, and one of the most prominent manifestations of this is the fact that people urge their daughters to go to schools and universities. However, this leap has not been without a price. Inflation is obvious and can be noted even in the smallest daily requirements of Yemenis. As evidence of that, a Yemeni merchant told me, when I stated that the price of the object I wanted to buy had doubled in the last year, "If you come tomorrow you may find that the price has doubled again. There are no stable prices nowadays." With respect to the construction and public services sector, the high prices there are paralleled in only a few countries of the world. In the city of Jiddah, which has become a suburb of San'a', the rent for a single apartment in the modern buildings currently being constructed comes to about 35,000 riyals a month, or about $8,000. Although there is repeated talk about the "qat" problem, the fact that it has become an economic issue draining the national economy has become a local issue. The report points out that the Yemenis spend $16.5 million a day, or the equivalent of $6 billion a year, on it.

In a political attempt to develop the climate of stability in Yemen, the Yemeni leaders, as Yahya al-'Arshi, the minister of information asserted to AL-MUSTAQBAL, are trying to effect a domestic reconciliation by preparing for legislative council elections early next year, as well as effecting approval of the national charter, which is still "in draft," currently being studied in a competent committee made up of 100 members representing the various political currents in the country. If this committee is able to complete the draft of the national charter by the stipulated time, transcending its internal disputes and the differences in its political currents, Yemen will have taken a great step toward stability. A well informed Yemeni official says "The unity agreements with the southern segment of the country

and mutual cooperation between the Yemeni leaders in San'a' and Aden will facilitate this success. The national front is compelled to cooperate, even if we assume it does not want to do so, now that those who have returned from Aden to San'a' have returned."

Regarding unity between the two segments, President 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's participation in the revolutionary celebrations in the northern segment the morning of the military display possesses considerable significance. The steps toward unification are brisk these days, but are quiet and carefully thought out. As the minister of information, Yahya al-'Arashi, asserts along this line, the North Yemeni effort to achieve a kind of economic integration in vital areas, such as the establishment of joint organizations in the context of tourism, land transport and fishing is continuing. Telephone communications between San'a' and Aden have become domestic in kind and although officials in San'a' insist on negating the importance of "the will of individuals in the unity process," and state that no change in the political leadership in Aden will be made at the expense of unity, these officials are closely following the silent struggle going on in Aden between the two currents in the Socialist Party, in addition to the leadership struggle represented by 'Ali Nasir Muhammad and 'Ali 'Antar, the minister of defense. These officials are afraid that the activity of 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il's current, which puts heavy emphasis on the issue of unity, will become prominent again in Aden, especially now that Salih Muti', foreign minister of foreign affairs, who is known for his opposition to 'Abd-al-Fattah Isma'il, has been stripped of all his party positions. The Yemenis in San'a' say that 'Ali Nasur Muhammad's tenure in the presidency constitutes a kind of guarantee, especially since he does not seem to put heavy emphasis on the rapid attainment of unity at any price, and that the outlines of the political struggle going on in Aden will become apparent in the next 3 months and the first fruits of that will be in the exceptional party conference in the first half of this month. If 'Ali Nasur Muhammad preserves his three positions in the course of the conference, that will mean that he has succeeded in "braking" 'Ali 'Antar.

The struggle in Aden is not the only one over union. In San'a' there are currents which are opposed to, or at least suspicious about, union. One officer who occupies a high position, though not in the leadership (director of military protocol in the army), told me "Unity is a difficult thing. It is adequate for us to coordinate. No official can make concessions to the other party." Here is the gravity of the matter: if the current in San'a' which is suspicious about unity, out of its regional interests, prevailed, that would lead to a total change in the situation in Aden in favor of persons insisting on unity at any price and by any means, even military ones.

The perils that the union might falter are not the only ones in San'a'. For some time North Yemen has been observing a powerful struggle between the National Front and what is called the Islamic Front. This struggle has recently turned into an armed struggle, especially in the Province of Sa'dah. The minister of education, Muhammad Khadim al-Wajih, is considered the most prominent personality in the Islamic Front. The leadership is afraid that the scope of this struggle will broaden and that foreign threads will become interwoven into it, especially following the front's latest statement, which spoke about the role of the Moslem Brothers in the course of the struggle now going on in various parts of the Arab nation.

North Yemen, as in all stages of the past, is now suffering from reciprocal Arab pressures. Every Arab body or axis is trying to attract it, by enticement or terror. The most recent type of pressure San'a' witnessed was the demand by Arab bodies that the two ministers Hasan Makki and Yahya al-'Arnashi be dismissed from the cabinet, on the excuse of carrying out a general modification in the cabinet by virtue of which Muhammad al-Junayd, minister of finance, would be expelled; one should bear in mind that there is no common denominator between the two parties. The two ministers Makki and al-'Arashi were slated for expulsion from the ministry for political reasons, among them their political "extremism" in positions on all foreign levels, especially as regards their relations with their Gulf neighbors. However, Maj 'Ali al-Shatir, director of moral guidance in the army, who is close to President Salih, asserted to me: "No political change can be made in Yemen as a result of foreign will. If a change occurs it will not be within the next 2 months, as some people anticipate, and if it occurs it will be for domestic reasons only." In San'a' it is bruited about that 'Abd-al-Ghani, the prime minister, is slated to leave his position in the event any change occurs and that Muhsin al-'Ayni is slated to succeed him.

In the natural setting in San'a' one can observe the extent of the pressures exerted from abroad, or the way the Yemeni officials pay attention to their neighbors on all sensitive matters, every day.

From time to time, these pressures are translated into sudden occurrences which turn calm and stability into chaos and anxiety, as happened last Ramadan, when that month turned into long days of extreme tension and constant anxiety. However, the wisdom of the political leadership made it possible to pass peacefully through the days of Ramadan, including the night of the "holiday pause," one of the most prominent repercussions of which was Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Ahmar's failure to sit down in the front row with President 'Ali 'Abdallah al-Salih during the military parade and later at such other revolutionary celebrations as the inaugurations of projects and so forth.

An Arab diplomat who has kept abreast of events in North Yemen and is informed about its domestic and foreign tribulations told AL-MUSTAQBAL "We cannot deal with North Yemen the way we would deal with any other Arab state. It has seen the light only a few years ago and still, perhaps for decades to come, is the prisoner of the complexes of its tribal human structure. Therefore it would be best for us to concentrate on the bright points in Yemen without neglecting the negative ones which are present throughout the length and breadth of the country. Yemen is trying to transcend its condition and establish some democratic elements within itself. It may succeed in this course or it may fail, as a result of well known foreign circumstances and pressures. But its experience deserves more attention from the Arabs."

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